Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00113/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-00113-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Moore
Respondent
Darryl A. Schlappi
Petitioner

Document Text:

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION - 1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

DARRYL A. SCHLAPPI, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

STEVEN MOORE, Warden, 

Respondent. 

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CASE NO. 2:10-cv-00113-RSL-JLW 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Petitioner Darryl Schlappi is currently incarcerated at the Deuel Vocational Institution 

in Tracy, California. In 1990, he was convicted by a jury in the San Diego County Superior 

Court of one count of attempted first degree murder with a firearm enhancement, and 

sentenced to a term of life with the possibility of parole, plus two years. (See Docket 1 at 1.) 

Having exhausted his remedies in the courts of California, petitioner seeks federal habeas 

corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Specifically, he challenges his 2007 denial of parole by 

the Board of Parole Hearings of the State of California (the “Board”).1 (See id., Ex. A at 1.)

 1 The Board of Parole Hearings replaced the Board of Prison Terms, which was abolished on July 1, 

2005. See California Penal Code § 5075(a). 

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Respondent has filed an answer to the petition in which he admits petitioner has 

exhausted the claims set forth in his federal habeas petition, but contends petitioner’s claims 

are without merit. (See Dkt. 12 at 4-12.) Petitioner has filed a traverse in response to 

respondent’s answer. (See Dkt. 13.) The briefing is now complete, and this matter is ripe for 

review. 

Having thoroughly reviewed the record and briefing of the parties, I recommend that 

the Court find as follows: 

(1) The U.S. Supreme Court has clearly held that where a state statutory scheme 

includes mandatory language that creates a presumption of parole release 

based on certain designated findings, that statute gives rise to a federal 

constitutional liberty interest in parole; 

(2) California statutes and regulations contain such mandatory language; 

(3) That language provides that a prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence 

has an expectation of parole release unless the Board or the Governor finds that 

he will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole; 

(4) The California Supreme Court has interpreted this statutory language to 

provide that an adverse parole decision must be supported by “some evidence” 

of current dangerousness; 

(5) Whether “some evidence” of current dangerousness exists is determined in 

accordance with California law; 

(6) Applying these standards, the record before the Board in 2007 contained 

“some evidence” of petitioner’s dangerousness; 

(7) The denial of parole therefore did not violate petitioner’s federal due process 

rights, and the decision of the California Court of Appeal upholding the denial 

was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law; 

(8) Petitioner’s claim that his due process rights were violated because he did not 

receive a “fair and impartial” parole hearing should be denied; and 

 

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(9) The Court should deny the petition for a writ of habeas corpus and dismiss 

 this action with prejudice. 

 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

During the 2007 parole hearing, the Board referred to the following summary of the 

commitment offense, as set forth by petitioner’s life prisoner evaluation reports:2 

On September 8, 1988, Police were called in to investigate a 

possible gunshot victim in a remote area adjacent to the San 

Luis Rey River. Upon Police arrival, the victim was still alive. 

Life Flight transported him to the hospital where the victim 

(William Odom, Jr.) expired due to multiple gunshot wounds. 

Because of the severity of his wounds, he was unable to tell 

police anything about his assailants. 

During the Police investigation, information was received 

implicating three men in the killing. The three men were known 

on the streets as “German, Psycho, and Cowboy.” The 

investigation continued without any concrete evidence or 

arrests. On January 6, 1990, Glen Sinaiko, a.k.a. “Psycho,” 

voluntarily came to Oceanside Police Department and confessed 

to having been involved in the shooting. He told the police that 

defendant, Darryl Schlappi, a.k.a. “German,” shot the victim in 

the head. Sinaiko stated the motive for the murder was a $60 

drug debt. Sinaiko testified that he, Schlappi, and Randy Gray, 

a.k.a. “Cowboy,” met the victim in a restaurant in Oceanside. 

They were able to lure him into the vehicle and drive him to the 

riverbed, where the victim and Sinaiko got out of the car and 

walked into an adjacent bush area. Sinaiko gave the victim a 

line of cocaine to waste time, while he waited for Schlappi to 

show up with the shotgun. Sinaiko took the weapon and shot 

the victim in the lower abdomen, handed the shotgun to 

Schlappi and ran toward the car. He returned to the location 

and witnessed Schlappi shoot the victim in the region of the 

head. After this event, both men returned to the car and Gray 

drove them back to Oceanside. 

On February 2, 1990, Schlappi was arrested in Utah by the 

Oceanside Police Department. During Police interviews, 

 2 Although the Board asserted that it was utilizing petitioner’s November 2006 evaluation as the 

relevant “Statement of Facts,” the summary the Board actually read into the record appears to come from 

petitioner’s July 2005 evaluation. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 8-9; id., Exs. C and I.) 

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Schlappi denied any involvement. He later recanted and 

admitted that he was there, but denied shooting the victim. 

 

(Dkt. 1, Ex. I at 1.) 

The Board also read petitioner’s version of the crime into the record: 

In the past Schlappi had denied shooting the victim. However, 

at the time of his Initial Parole Consideration Hearing in April 

of 1997, he stated that he was at the scene, and that he did in 

fact shoot the victim in the leg, but not the neck. Schlappi 

stated that Sinaiko shot the victim in his neck and stomach, and 

that the victim died as a result of the stomach wound. Schlappi 

further stated that he knew what he did was wrong, that he takes 

full responsibility for his part in the crime, and that he would 

have to live with that guilt for the rest of his life. Schlappi 

stated that he has admitted at his last two BPT hearings that he 

took the victim’s wallet, wiped the shotgun clean, and agrees 

with the police report that the shotgun was returned to the 

owner. Schlappi stated there was a dispute between Sinaiko and 

the victim over a $60.00 drug debt and that they were only 

going to scare and intimidate him in order to make him pay 

Sinaiko. Schlappi stated he had no idea Sinaiko intended on 

killing the victim. 

(Id. at 1-2; id., Ex. A at 23-24.) 

In addition, during petitioner’s 2007 parole hearing, petitioner told the Board that the 

victim was lying in a curled up fetal position on the ground when petitioner shot him. (See 

id., Ex. A at 23 and 28.) Specifically, petitioner asserted that “[t]he shot that I had fired was 

from behind, which grazed his neck and hit his legs, my one shot. That’s how you get the two 

wounds . . . but it seems like there’s been some confusion on that.” (Id. at 24.) 

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of attempted first degree murder with 

use of a firearm in 1990, and sentenced in the San Diego County Superior Court to a term of 

life with the possibility of parole, plus two years. (See id. at 1.) Petitioner was received into 

the California Department of Corrections on February 26, 1991, and his minimum eligible 

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parole date was set for June 21, 1998. (See id.) Thus, petitioner had been in custody for 

approximately sixteen years at the time of his 2007 parole hearing, and approximately 

nineteen years as of this writing. He has been incarcerated for more than twelve years past his 

minimum eligible parole date. 

The parole denial, which is the subject of this petition, followed a parole hearing held 

on November 8, 2007. (See id.) This was petitioner’s eighth parole application, including his 

initial parole consideration hearing. His previous applications were also denied.3

 After his 

2007 denial, petitioner filed habeas corpus petitions in the San Diego County Superior Court, 

California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court. (See Dkt. 12, Exs. 2, 5, and 7.) 

Those petitions were unsuccessful. This federal habeas petition followed. Petitioner contends 

his 2007 parole denial violated his federal rights under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 

Constitution. (See Dkt. 1 at 6.) Thus, the habeas petition before this Court does not attack the 

propriety of his conviction or sentence, but solely challenges the Board’s 2007 decision 

finding him unsuitable for parole. 

 III. PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS 

 Petitioner contends that the Board violated his state and federal due process rights by 

finding him unsuitable for parole based primarily upon the immutable facts of the 

commitment offense and his prior criminal history.4

 (See Dkt. 1 at 4.) He also argues that the 

 3 Since his 2007 parole denial by the Board, petitioner has had one subsequent parole hearing in 2008. 

His federal habeas petition challenging that decision is currently pending before the Honorable Kimberly J. 

Mueller. (See Case No. 2:10-cv-000486-GEB-KJM.) A prior habeas petition, challenging the Board’s 2006 

denial, is also currently pending before the Honorable Craig M. Kellison. (See Case No. 2:08-cv-01707-MCECMK.) 4

 Petitioner’s state law claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (asserting that “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court 

determinations on state-law questions.”). 

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panel’s criticism of his parole plans was “unreasonable” because petitioner “has no family in 

California,” and therefore “[i]t is unreasonable to expect [petitioner] to know all of these 

people or organizations personally.” (Id. at 5.) As a result, he asserts that there is no evidence 

to support the Board’s conclusion that petitioner currently poses an unreasonable risk of 

danger to society. (See id.) Finally, petitioner argues that the Board denied him a fair and 

impartial hearing under the Due Process Clause by asking him during his hearing about a 

witness’ statement to police regarding petitioner’s role in the commitment offense. (See id. at 

6-8.) 

Respondent contends that petitioner does not have a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest in being released on parole, that the “some evidence” standard is inapplicable in this 

context, and that even if he does have a protected liberty interest, the Board adequately 

predicated its denial of parole on “some evidence.” (See Dkt. 12 at 8-11.) Respondent also 

contends that petitioner’s claim regarding the witness’ statement introduced during his parole 

hearing is based upon state rather than federal law, and is therefore not cognizable on federal 

habeas review. (See id. at 5.) In sum, respondent argues that petitioner’s federal 

constitutional rights were not violated by the Board’s 2007 decision, and that the California 

Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the Board’s 2007 parole denial was not an unreasonable 

application of clearly established federal law. (See id. at 11-12.) 

 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REQUIRED SHOWINGS 

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) governs this 

petition because it was filed after the enactment of AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 326-27 (1997). Because petitioner is in custody of the California Department of 

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Corrections pursuant to a state court judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides the exclusive 

vehicle for his habeas petition. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2004) 

(providing that § 2254 is “the exclusive vehicle for a habeas petition by a state prisoner in 

custody pursuant to a state court judgment, even when the petitioner is not challenging his 

underlying state court conviction.”). Under AEDPA, a habeas petition may not be granted 

with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless petitioner 

demonstrates that the highest state court decision rejecting his petition was either “contrary to, 

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). 

As a threshold matter, this Court must ascertain whether relevant federal law was 

“clearly established” at the time of the state court’s decision. To make this determination, the 

Court may only consider the holdings, as opposed to dicta, of the U.S. Supreme Court. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). In this context, Ninth Circuit precedent 

remains persuasive but not binding authority. See id. at 412-13; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 

1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Court must then determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law.” Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the 

Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

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“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. At all 

times, a federal habeas court must keep in mind that it “may not issue the writ simply because 

[it] concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather that application must also be 

[objectively] unreasonable.” Id. at 411. It is the petitioner’s burden to establish that the state 

court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

AEDPA also requires federal courts to give considerable deference to state court 

decisions, and state courts’ factual findings are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 

Federal courts are bound by a state’s interpretation of its own laws. See Murtishaw v. 

Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Powell v. Ducharme, 998 F.2d 710, 713 

(9th Cir. 1993)). This deference, however, is accorded only to “reasoned decisions” by the 

state courts. To determine whether the petitioner has met this burden, a federal habeas court 

looks to the last reasoned state court decision because subsequent unexplained orders 

upholding that judgment are presumed to rest upon the same ground. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2007). 

In this case, after the San Diego County Superior Court denied petitioner’s habeas 

petition on the merits, petitioner filed petitions in the California Court of Appeal and Supreme 

Court. (See Dkt. 12, Exs. 2, 5, and 7.) The California Court of Appeal denied the habeas 

petition in an unpublished opinion filed on July 20, 2009. (See id., Ex. 5.) Petitioner’s habeas 

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petition in the California Supreme Court was summarily denied. (See id., Ex. 7.) This Court 

should therefore regard the California Court of Appeal’s opinion as the last reasoned decision 

of the state courts and should accord that decision the deference required by AEDPA. 

V. FEDERAL HABEAS CHALLENGES TO STATE PAROLE DENIALS 

 A. Due Process Right Under California’s Parole Scheme 

Under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the federal and 

state governments are prohibited from depriving an inmate of life, liberty or property without 

the due process of law. U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV. A prisoner’s due process claim 

must be analyzed in two steps: the first asks whether the state has interfered with a 

constitutionally protected liberty or property interest of the prisoner, and the second asks 

whether the procedures accompanying that interference were constitutionally sufficient. Ky. 

Dep’t of Corrections. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). 

 Accordingly, our first inquiry is whether petitioner has a constitutionally protected 

liberty interest in parole. The U.S. Supreme Court articulated the governing rule in this area 

in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), and Board of Pardons v. Allen, 

482 U.S. 369 (1987). See McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying 

“the ‘clearly established’ framework of Greenholtz and Allen” to California’s parole scheme). 

The Court in Greenholtz determined that although there is no constitutional right to be 

conditionally released on parole, if a state’s statutory scheme employs mandatory language 

that creates a presumption that parole release will be granted if certain designated findings are 

made, the statute gives rise to a constitutional liberty interest. See Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 

12; Allen, 482 U.S. at 377-78. See also Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (“We have 

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repeatedly held that state statutes may create liberty interests that are entitled to the procedural 

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 

 As discussed infra, the California statutes and regulations at issue in this case contain 

mandatory language providing that a prisoner serving an indeterminate life sentence has an 

expectation of parole unless, in the judgment of the parole authority, he “will pose an 

unreasonable risk of danger to society if released from prison.” 15 CCR § 2402(a). 

Specifically, California Penal Code § 3041(b) provides that the Board “shall set a release date 

unless it determines . . . that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period 

of incarceration for this individual. . . .” Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b) (emphasis added). The 

California Supreme Court has interpreted this language to provide that an adverse parole 

decision must be supported by “some evidence” demonstrating current dangerousness. See In 

re Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1204 (2008); In re Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1254 (2008). 

Thus, the California Supreme Court has held that as a matter of state constitutional law, this 

mandatory language in California’s parole scheme creates a liberty interest in parole. See 

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1204; Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th at 1254, 1258; In re Rozenkrantz, 29 

Cal.4th 616, 654 (2002). 

In addition, the Ninth Circuit recently considered this statutory language in Hayward 

v. Marshall, and concluded that the appropriate inquiry for a federal habeas court is whether 

“some evidence” of current dangerousness supported the Board or Governor’s denial of 

parole. 603 F.3d 546, 562 (9th Cir. 2010). In other words, the federal Due Process Clause 

requires that California comply with its own quantum of evidence requirement. See id. at 569 

(Berzon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that “the majority is correct to 

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review the state court decision here for compliance with the California Constitution’s 

requirement of ‘some evidence’ of future dangerousness. The federal Due Process Clause 

requires at least that much.”). Accordingly, the majority in Hayward observed that it did not 

need to decide “whether a right arises in California under the United States Constitution to 

parole in the absence of some evidence of future dangerousness.” Id. The Hayward court 

could finesse this ultimate legal issue because it found, as I recommend this Court find in this 

case, as a matter of fact, that the record contained “some evidence” of petitioner’s 

dangerousness. 

Critical to our analysis and what the majority failed to articulate, however, is the fact 

that a state prisoner’s right to federal habeas review of an adverse parole decision emanates 

from clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 561. See also Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 68 (“In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a 

conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(c) (“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . [h]e is in 

custody in violation of the [United States] Constitution or laws. . . .”). The governing law in 

this context remains Greenholtz and Allen. This Court assumes that the Ninth Circuit in 

Hayward did not intend to overrule decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent holding that a 

federal liberty interest arises from a state statute that employs mandatory language creating a 

presumption that parole release will be granted if certain designated findings are made. As a 

result, the undersigned follows the same reasoning as the concurrence, and finds that while 

petitioner’s liberty interest in parole originates from California law, its ultimate protection on 

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federal habeas review arises from the federal due process clause. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 

569. 

To provide a framework for analyzing whether “some evidence” supported the 

Board’s decision with respect to petitioner, this Court must consider the California statutes, 

regulations and case law which govern decision-making by the Board. See Biggs v. Terhune, 

334 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2003). Under California law, the Board is authorized to set 

release dates and grant parole for inmates with indeterminate sentences. See Cal. Penal Code 

§ 3040 and 5075, et seq. At the time of the 2007 hearing, § 3041(a) required the Board to 

meet with each inmate one year before the expiration of his minimum sentence and normally 

set a release date in a manner that will provide uniform terms for offenses of similar gravity 

and magnitude with respect to their threat to the public, as well as comply with applicable 

sentencing rules. Subsection (b) of this section also requires that the Board set a release date 

“unless it determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the 

timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration 

of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual, and 

that a parole date, therefore, cannot be fixed at this meeting.” Id., § 3041(b). Pursuant to the 

mandate of § 3041(a), the Board must “establish criteria for the setting of parole release 

dates” which take into account the number of victims of the offense as well as other factors in 

mitigation or aggravation of the crime. The Board has therefore promulgated regulations 

setting forth the guidelines it must follow when determining parole suitability. See 15 CCR 

§ 2402, et seq. 

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Accordingly, the Board is guided by the following regulations in making a 

determination whether a prisoner is suitable for parole: 

(a) General. The panel shall first determine whether the life 

prisoner is suitable for release on parole. Regardless of the 

length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable 

for and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the 

prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society if 

released from prison. 

(b) Information Considered. All relevant, reliable information 

available to the panel shall be considered in determining 

suitability for parole. Such information shall include the 

circumstances of the prisoner’s social history; past and present 

mental state; past criminal history, including involvement in 

other criminal misconduct which is reliably documented; the 

base and other commitment offenses, including behavior before, 

during and after the crime; past and present attitude toward the 

crime; any conditions of treatment or control, including the use 

of special conditions under which the prisoner may safely be 

released to the community; and any other information which 

bears on the prisoner’s suitability for release. Circumstances 

which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for 

parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of 

unsuitability. 

15 CCR § 2402(a) and (b). Subsections (c) and (d) also set forth suitability and unsuitability 

factors to further assist the Board in analyzing whether an inmate should be granted parole, 

although “the importance attached to any circumstance or combination of circumstances in a 

particular case is left to the judgment of the panel.” 15 CCR § 2402(c). 

In examining its own statutory and regulatory framework, the California Supreme 

Court in Lawrence held that the proper inquiry for a court reviewing a parole decision by the 

Board is “whether some evidence supports the decision of the Board or the Governor that the 

inmate constitutes a current threat to public safety, and not merely whether some evidence 

confirms the existence of certain factual findings.” Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1212. The court 

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also asserted that a parole decision must demonstrate “an individualized consideration” of the 

specified criteria, but “[i]t is not the existence or nonexistence of suitability or unsuitability 

factors that forms the crux of the parole decision; the significant circumstance is how those 

factors interrelate to support a conclusion of current dangerousness to the public.” Id. at 

1204-05, 1212 (emphasis added). Although the discretion of the Board in parole matters is 

very broad, it must offer “more than rote recitation of the relevant factors with no reasoning 

establishing a rational nexus between those factors and the necessary basis for the ultimate 

decision – the determination of current dangerousness.” Id. Thus, the California penal code, 

corresponding regulations, and decisional law clearly establish that the fundamental 

consideration in parole decisions is public safety and an assessment of a prisoner’s current 

dangerousness. See id. at 1205-06. 

 B. Summary of Governing Principles 

 By virtue of California law, petitioner has a constitutional liberty interest in release on 

parole. The Board may decline to set a parole date only upon a finding that petitioner’s 

release would present an unreasonable current risk of danger to society if he is released from 

prison. Where the parole authorities deny release, based upon an adverse finding on that 

issue, the role of a federal habeas court is narrowly limited. See Hayward, 603 F.3d at 562-

63. It must deny relief if there is “some evidence” in the record to support the parole 

authority’s finding of current dangerousness. See id. That is the determinative issue in this 

case. 

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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE RECORD IN THIS CASE 

A. Due Process Clause Claim 

The Board based its decision that petitioner was unsuitable for parole primarily upon 

his commitment offense, as well as petitioner’s previous record of violence, unstable social 

history, and inadequate parole plans. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 83-86.) The Board’s findings 

track the applicable unsuitability and suitability factors listed in § 2402(b), (c) and (d) of title 

15 of the California Code of Regulations. After considering all relevant and reliable evidence 

in the record, the Board concluded that evidence of petitioner’s positive behavior in prison did 

not outweigh evidence of his unsuitability for parole. (See id. at 83.) 

With regard to the circumstances of the commitment offense, the Board concluded that 

the offense was carried out in “an especially cruel and callous manner,” “a dispassionate 

and/or calculated manner,” and “in a manner which demonstrates an exceptionally callous 

disregard for human suffering.” (Id. at 83-84.) See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)(B) and (C). The 

Board found that “[t]he prisoner helped plan . . . an execution.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 83.) The 

victim’s bowels and guts were hanging out and [petitioner] aimed at the head but missed and 

shot the victim [in the leg].” (Id.) See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)(B). The Board observed that 

“[t]his demonstrates a mindset that has no regard for human life at all.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 84.) 

The Board also concluded that “the motive for the crime was inexplicable or very 

trivial. It was for a debt of sixty dollars . . . There was some inkling that maybe it had more to 

do with dope. . . .” (Id.) See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)(E). In addition, during the hearing 

petitioner admitted to the Board that he shot the victim because “I didn’t want him to identify 

us. That was part of the reason.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 30.) When the panel asked petitioner, who 

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has a background in the Marine Corps, if he meant to kill the victim when he shot him, 

petitioner responded, “Yes. You know, to finish the job.” (Id.) Based upon the record before 

this Court, the circumstances surrounding the commitment offense and the trivial motive for 

the crime provide “some evidence” to support the Board’s finding that petitioner carried out 

his offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1). 

The second factor relied upon by the Board was petitioner’s previous record of 

violence. See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(2) (providing that if a “prisoner on previous occasions 

inflicted or attempted to inflict serious injury on a victim, particularly if the prisoner 

demonstrated serious assaultive behavior at an early age,” this circumstance tends to indicate 

unsuitability for parole). Specifically, the Board found that “[petitioner] has a record of 

assaultive behavior starting with his juvenile history at age seventeen. [He] had sold the car 

to an individual . . . and the person that allegedly was going to buy the car had someone else 

in the room and a violent fight occurred.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 85.) During the hearing, 

petitioner explained that “this incident happened right after my family had abandoned me . . . 

And rather than leave and get people involved and handle it maturely, you know, and 

responsibly, I let the situation escalate into a fight.” (Id. at 35.) As a result of this incident, 

petitioner served six months at a juvenile ranch facility in Utah. (See id. at 84; see id. at 37.) 

The Board observed that “[t]his type of behavior at age seventeen escalated, as you can see, 

which is related to the prisoner’s crime and his record . . . the violence escalated to a murder.” 

(Id.) The Board’s finding regarding petitioner’s history of violence was supported by “some 

evidence” in the record. 

 

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In addition, the Board found that “[t]he prisoner has an unstable social history” which 

began at a very young age and contributed to his commission of the commitment offense. 

(Id. at 85.) See 15 CCR § 2402(c)(3) (providing that if a “prisoner has a history of unstable or 

tumultuous relationships with others,” this circumstance tends to indicate unsuitability for 

release on parole). Specifically, when the Board asked petitioner during the hearing “what 

was going through [his] mind at the time” of the offense, petitioner responded that he had 

agreed to help his co-defendant Sinaiko collect the $60 debt from the victim “in order to be 

accepted and to be approved of” by Sinaiko. (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 20.) By way of explanation, he 

went on to describe his social history, which he claims “destroyed me emotionally.” (Id. at 

18.) Petitioner said, “there was (sic) several events in my life that led up to this crime . . . I 

grew up in a family with a very abusive father, for one.” (Id. at 16-17.) “When I was 

seventeen my family abandoned me on the street.” (Id. at 17.) When the Board asked 

petitioner why he didn’t turn himself in during the approximately five months between the 

commitment offense and his arrest, petitioner responded, “Well, like, let me finish. I was 

leading up to the crime here . . . A year before the crime I had a divorce from my wife. She 

had left me for someone else, and that’s when the [methamphetamine] use started, was about 

a year before.” (Id. at 18.) At the time of the murder, “I hadn’t dealt with any of this, you 

know, pain from my past . . . I was engaging in all these defense mechanisms and all the 

repression. . . .” (Id. at 19-20.) 

Thus, petitioner asserted that he committed this offense in part to obtain social 

acceptance from his co-defendants, which he desperately wanted as a result of his difficult 

childhood, two failed marriages as an adult, and methamphetamine use. (Id. at 20; see id. at 

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39.) As a result of this discussion, the Board decided that petitioner’s unstable social history 

constituted a factor tending to indicate that he was unsuitable for parole. (See id. at 85.) This 

Court finds that the Board’s conclusion as to this factor was clearly supported by “some 

evidence” in the record, such as petitioner’s testimony regarding his “emotionally destructive” 

social history at the hearing. 

Finally, the Board considered petitioner’s parole plans, and concluded that it “would 

like to see [petitioner] perhaps get some more areas that you can live in as far as your living 

situation. . . .” (Id. at 86.) Petitioner told the Board that if he was released on parole, his 

“primary choice” was to live in a residence facility set up by the Calvary Chapel in Monterey, 

California. (Id. at 51.) During the hearing, however, the Board elicited the fact that petitioner 

had not actually been in direct contact with the pastor or any other person at the Calvary 

Chapel. (Id. at 53.) Although petitioner asserted that he has “a job offer there in Monterey 

through the pastor there . . . [at] a maintenance business,” when the Board asked what 

petitioner would be doing, he responded, “I think it’s a – I think it’s – I think he – I think it’s a 

tile-laying business.” (Id. at 54.) Petitioner also admitted that he did not have any tile-laying 

experience, “didn’t know all of the details of the job,” or possess much information about the 

residence facility where he would be living. (Id. at 53-54.) For example, petitioner did not 

know how much he would be paid for his work, or how long he could live at the residence 

facility. (Id. at 57.) The Board observed that “it doesn’t seem like there’s a lot of information 

that [petitioner has] explored with that.”5 (Id. at 58.) 

 5 Although petitioner also briefly mentioned a Veterans Affairs facility in Menlo Park or a ministry in 

San Diego as possible residences, the discussion during the hearing focused on petitioner’s “primary” parole 

plans in Monterey. (Id. at 52-53.) 

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As discussed above, the viability of a prisoner’s parole plans is a statutory factor that 

is relevant to a Board’s suitability determination. See 15 CCR § 2402(d)(8) (providing that if 

a prisoner has an “understanding and plans for the future,” including “realistic plans for 

release or . . . marketable skills that can be put to use upon release,” this circumstance tends to 

indicate suitability for release on parole). In addition, California courts have held that 

inadequate parole plans may, in certain situations, provide “some evidence” that a prisoner 

remains currently dangerous. See Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1228-29 (citing approvingly In re 

Honesto, 130 Cal.App.4th 81, 97 (2005) (finding “some evidence” to support denial of parole 

based upon prisoner’s inadequate parole plans, unstable social history, and inadequate 

participation in prison programs)). In this case, it was unclear to the Board whether petitioner 

would have the necessary skills for employment as a tile-layer, given his lack of experience in 

this field. Moreover, it was unclear whether petitioner’s residential and employment plans at 

the Calvary Chapel were indeed viable and realistic, in light of the fact that petitioner had 

never made direct contact with anyone associated with the facility. Based upon the record 

before this Court, petitioner’s parole plans appear uncertain, and therefore “some evidence” 

supports the Board’s finding regarding this factor. 

During the hearing, the Board also considered and weighed the statutory factors which 

favored petitioner. For example, the panel acknowledged petitioner’s positive psychological 

reports, completion of welding and plumbing vocations, and noted that petitioner “stayed 

busy during this last period with self-help [programming].” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 42-50.) See

also 15 CCR § 2402(d)(9) (providing that a prisoner’s “institutional behavior indicat[ing] an 

enhanced ability to function within the law upon release” constitutes a factor tending to 

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indicate suitability for parole). The Board commended petitioner for never receiving a CDC 

115 rules violation report, which documents a prisoner’s misconduct “believed to be a 

violation of law or . . . [otherwise] not minor in nature. 15 CCR § 3312(a)(3). It also 

commended petitioner for not receiving any CDC Form 128-A custodial counseling chronos 

for over a decade. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 47.) CDC 128-As are issued “[w]hen . . . minor 

misconduct recurs after verbal counseling or if documentation of minor misconduct is 

needed. . . .” 15 CCR § 3312(a)(2). The Board advised petitioner to continue with his anger 

management and education, because based upon his progress and good behavior in prison to 

date, “the Panel feels that you certainly have a lot of potential.” (Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 86.) 

Despite petitioner’s positive gains, however, the Board found that petitioner would 

present an unreasonable risk of danger to society if released on parole. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 

83.) The Board has broad discretion to determine how suitability and unsuitability factors 

interrelate to support its conclusion of current dangerousness to the public. See also 

Lawrence, 44 Cal.4th at 1232. The Board’s findings with respect to petitioner’s commitment 

offense, previous record of violence, unstable social history, and inadequate parole plans were 

amply supported by the record before this Court. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 83-86.) As a result, 

this Court agrees with the California state courts’ finding, discussed below, that “some 

evidence” supports the Board’s conclusion that petitioner remains a current danger to public 

safety. 

B. California Court of Appeal’s Decision Upholding the Board’s Parole Denial

The California Court of Appeal considered all of the above factors and evidence in the 

record and “conclude[d] that ‘some evidence’ supports the board’s decision to deny Schlappi 

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release on parole.” (Dkt. 12, Ex. 5 at 5.) Specifically, the California Court of Appeal asserted 

that “the Board’s ruling highlighted three general areas of concern . . . (i) the nature of 

Schlappi’s commitment offense; (ii) Schlappi’s pre-incarceration criminal history; and (iii) 

Schlappi’s post-release plans.”6 (Id. at 6.) The state court also found no merit in petitioner’s 

contention that the Board failed to allege any nexus between his offense and current 

dangerousness. The state court found, “it is clear from the record that the Board did not act in 

the manner forbidden by Lawrence – relying reflexively on the aggravated nature of 

Schlappi’s commitment offense to deny parole. Rather, the Board concluded that the nature 

of Schlappi’s commitment offense, along with other factors, indicated an unacceptable risk of 

current dangerousness.” (Id. at 6.) For example, the court asserted that petitioner’s juvenile 

offense, “like the commitment offense, indicated that Schlappi reacted to trivial, commonly 

occurring events (this time a dispute over money owed for a used car) with unlawful 

violence.” (Id. at 8.) Similarly, the court noted that “the uncertainty of Schlappi’s postrelease plans further supported a conclusion that Schlappi could easily fall into old patterns of 

criminality and violence,” because “there is a high likelihood that Schlappi, upon release, will 

encounter circumstances analogous to those that led up to the commitment offense and thus, 

that he could reoffend in a similar manner.” (Id. at 7-8.) 

Finally, the California Court of Appeal observed that the Board’s decision relied, at 

least in part, upon immutable factors such as petitioner’s commitment offense and preincarceration history of violence. The state court acknowledged that the Board cannot rely 

upon immutable factors to deny petitioner a parole date in perpetuity, as over time “the 

 6

 As discussed supra, this Court finds that the Board’s decision actually highlighted four general areas 

of concern: the three factors identified by the California Court of Appeal, as well as petitioner’s unstable social 

history. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 85.) See also 15 CCR § 2402(c)(1)-(3); id. § 2402(d)(8). 

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suitability factors undoubtedly will eclipse the immutable characteristics that formed the 

primary (although not exclusive) basis for the Board’s decision.” (Id. at 10.) When the 

unsuitability factors identified by the Board in this case are “[t]aken together,” however, the 

state court nevertheless concluded that the “low threshold” of “some evidence” to support the 

Board’s decision was satisfied because the evidence of petitioner’s suitability is not yet “so 

‘overwhelming’ that we must reverse the Board’s consideration as a violation of due process.” 

(Id. at 11.) 

The record before this Court amply supports the California Court of Appeal’s finding 

that the “some evidence” standard was satisfied in this case. For example, the Board accorded 

petitioner individualized consideration with regard to all relevant statutory factors, including 

petitioner’s most current parole plans, and concluded that he remained a current danger to the 

public. Even though the Board found that petitioner’s positive behavior in prison was 

ultimately outweighed by other unsuitability factors, it duly considered his good behavior. 

See Shaputis, 44 Cal.4th 1241, 1260 (holding that the Governor does not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously in reversing a grant of parole when evidence in the record supports the 

conclusion that the circumstances of the crime continue to be predictive of current 

dangerousness despite a prisoner’s discipline-free record during incarceration); Lawrence, 44 

Cal.4th at 1228 (asserting that despite a prisoner’s discipline-free record during incarceration, 

where the record contains other evidence of unsuitability for parole, “the aggravated 

circumstances of the crime reliably may continue to predict current dangerousness even after 

many years of incarceration.”). Accordingly, I recommend the Court find that the California 

Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the Board’s parole denial was a reasonable application 

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of clearly established federal law. 

C. Petitioner’s Claim That He Was Denied A “Fair and Impartial” Hearing

During the 2007 parole hearing, the Board asked petitioner about a witness statement 

from an Oceanside Police Report which the Board asserted was part of the non-confidential 

section of petitioner’s central file at the prison. (See Dkt. 1, Ex. A at 68-75.) Specifically, the 

witness’ statement suggested that petitioner had more of a leadership role in planning and 

carrying out the commitment offense than petitioner had admitted to the panel during the 

hearing. (See id. at 70.) When the panel asked petitioner whether he was acquainted with the 

witness, who “seems to know a lot about [petitioner],” petitioner told the panel he had “never 

heard of her.” (Id. at 73.) Petitioner contends that the witness’ statement regarding his role in 

the offense should not have been considered at his hearing because it was unreliable, and “[i]t 

is clear from the conduct of the hearing panel that their decision was predetermined . . . a clear 

and deliberate violation of his Due Process rights guaranteed under the state and federal 

Constitutions.”7 (Dkt. 1 at 6-8.) 

In a footnote on the last page of its reasoned decision, the California Court of Appeal 

rejected petitioner’s argument that the Board erred by introducing this witness’ statement 

during the 2007 hearing. Specifically, the California Court of Appeal observed that “[t]he 

hearing transcript reflects that the commissioners asked Schlappi about this statement, but 

there is no suggestion in the Board’s ruling that it relied on it in denying him release.” (Dkt. 

12, Ex. 5 at 11 n.8.) Furthermore, the state court concluded that “[w]e can see nothing 

improper in asking Schlappi about the statement,” because the regulations provide that the 

 7 As discussed supra, petitioner’s state law claims are not cognizable in a federal habeas petition. See 

Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68.

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panel shall consider all relevant, reliable information in determining suitability for parole. 

(Id.) 

It is undisputed that under the Due Process Clause, prisoners are entitled to neutral 

decision-makers in parole suitability hearings that are free from bias or prejudice. See 

O’Bremski v. Maas, 915 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1990). Specifically, parole board officials 

must “render impartial decisions in cases and controversies . . . because the litigant’s liberty is 

at stake.” Id. (citing Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1303 (9th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, 

the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he parole determination . . . must include 

consideration of what the entire record shows up to the time of the sentence, including the 

gravity of the offense in the particular case.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 15. 

Based upon the record before this Court, there is no evidence to suggest, let alone 

support a finding, that the panel during petitioner’s 2007 parole hearing was biased, or the 

outcome of the hearing was predetermined. Given the fact that this inculpatory statement was 

in the record, the Board acted fairly to petitioner by bringing it to his attention and offering 

him a chance to comment upon it. As noted, there is nothing in the decision to indicate that 

the Board relied upon the witness’ statement in any way. In addition, petitioner has failed to 

cite any authority to support his contention that by asking petitioner a question regarding a 

witness’ statement contained in his central file, the panel committed an error of state law that 

violated petitioner’s federal due process rights. On the contrary, the record reveals that 

petitioner received an individualized assessment of his suitability for parole during his 2007 

parole hearing. 

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Without more, petitioner has failed to show that the Board’s introduction of the 

witness’ statement regarding petitioner’s role in the commitment offense resulted in a federal 

constitutional violation. Accordingly, I recommend the Court find that the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision denying petitioner’s contention was a reasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. 

VII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners were recently 

amended to require a district court that denies a habeas petition to grant or deny a certificate 

of appealability in the ruling. See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 (effective December 1, 2009). Previously, the Ninth Circuit held that a prisoner was 

not required to obtain a certificate of appealability from administrative decisions, such as a 

denial of parole. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004); Rosas v. 

Nielsen, 428 F.3d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 2005). 

In Hayward the Ninth Circuit overruled “those portions of White and Rosas which 

relieve a prisoner from obtaining a certificate of appealability.” Hayward, 603 F.3d at 554. A 

certificate of appealability is now required to “confer jurisdiction on [the Ninth Circuit] in an 

appeal from a district court’s denial of habeas relief in a § 2254 case, regardless of whether 

the state decision to deny release from confinement is administrative or judicial.” Id.

 In order to obtain a certificate of appealability, a petitioner must make “a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Specifically, if a 

court denies a petition, a certificate of appealability may only be issued “if jurists of reason 

could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists 

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could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed 

further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). See also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 

U.S. 473, 484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he 

must demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere 

good faith on his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338. 

 For the reasons set forth in the discussion of the merits in my Report and 

Recommendation, jurists of reason could not find the result recommended in this case 

debatable. Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny petitioner a certificate of 

appealability on the issue of whether the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claims was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision that was 

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that as of the 2007 Board hearing there 

was “some evidence” that petitioner would have posed an unreasonable risk of danger to 

society or threat to public safety if released from prison. In addition, petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that the Board denied petitioner a fair and impartial hearing under the Due 

Process Clause by asking petitioner about a witness’ statement to police regarding petitioner’s 

role in the commitment offense. Accordingly, the California Court of Appeal’s opinion 

upholding the Board’s decision was a reasonable application of clearly established federal 

law. I therefore recommend the Court: 1) find that petitioner’s federal constitutional rights 

were not violated; 2) deny the petition; 3) dismiss this action with prejudice; and 4) deny a 

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JOHN L. WEINBERG 

United States Magistrate Judge 

certificate of appealability. 

This Report and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with this Report and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with this Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.” Any response to 

the objections shall be filed and served within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

might waive the right to appeal this Court’s Order. See Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th 

Cir. 1991). A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation. 

DATED this 12th day of July, 2010. 

A 

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