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Parties Involved:
Marlissa Alexis Joseph
Petitioner
U.S. Attorney General
Respondent

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

Nos. 22-14252 & 23-11632

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

MARLISSA ALEXIS JOSEPH, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petitions for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A216-358-618

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14252

Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Marlisa Joseph seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order dismissing her appeal of the Immigration 

Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of her applications for statutory withholding of 

removal and relief under the United Nations Convention Against 

Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 

Punishment (“CAT”). She also seeks review of the BIA’s final order 

denying her motion to reopen her immigration proceedings. 

She argues that the BIA’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence because she established past persecution on the 

basis of her Haitian descent and her sexuality, and she established 

that it was more likely than not that she would be persecuted in the 

future. She argues that the BIA failed to consider her race-based 

claim, and her inclusion in the particular social groups of Bahamian 

women or Bahamian girls and individuals with a disability of severe 

mental illness. She argues that she established that it is more likely 

than not that she would be tortured if she is deported to the Bahamas. She argues that she was denied full and fair proceedings, and 

the IJ and BIA violated her statutory and constitutional due process 

rights. She argues that her ability to obtain and present evidence 

was affected by her mental health conditions, including major depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic attacks, and 

anxiety. She argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying 

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22-14252 Opinion of the Court 3

her motion to reopen and failed to consider the evidence she presented. 

I.

We review the decision of the BIA, and the decision of the IJ 

to the extent the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision or expressly agrees 

with the IJ’s reasoning. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 

1341, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009). In deciding whether to uphold the 

BIA’s decision, we are limited to the grounds upon which the BIA 

relied. Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir. 2016). 

Section 1252(d)(1) provides, in relevant part, that a court can 

review a final order of removal only if the non-citizen has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the non-citizen as 

of right. INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). We have held that 

“[a] petitioner has not exhausted a claim unless he has both raised 

the core issue before the BIA and also set out any discrete arguments he relies on in support of that claim.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

810 F.3d 792, 800 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks and citation 

omitted). We have also held that exhaustion is “not a stringent 

requirement.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 

(11th Cir. 2015). Though exhaustion does not require a petitioner 

to use precise legal terminology or provide a well-developed argument to support her claim, it does require that she provide information sufficient to enable the BIA to review and correct any errors 

below. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has 

held that the obligation to exhaust administrative remedies in INA 

§ 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), is a claim-processing rule, is not 

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14252

jurisdictional, and is subject to waiver and forfeiture. Santos-Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 419-23 (2023). We have since clarified 

that INA § 242(d)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), as a claim-processing 

rule, is generally applied where it has been asserted by a party. Kemokai v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 83 F.4th 886, 891 (11th Cir. 2023). 

We review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for 

substantial evidence. Perez Zenteno v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 

1306 (11th Cir. 2019). We review de novo claims that the BIA failed 

to provide reasoned consideration for its decision. Ali v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 931 F.3d 1327, 1333 (11th Cir. 2019). Under the substantial 

evidence standard, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision, draw all reasonable inferences in favor 

of that decision, and affirm the BIA’s decision unless the evidence 

compels a contrary finding. Perez-Zenteno, 913 F.3d at 1306. While 

the agency is required to consider all evidence that a petitioner has 

submitted, it need not address specifically each claim the petitioner 

made or each piece of evidence the petitioner submitted. Jeune, 810 

F.3d at 803. 

An alien is entitled to withholding of removal under the INA 

if she can show that her life or freedom would be threatened on 

account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a PSG, or 

political opinion. INA § 101(a)(1)(42)(A); 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(a)(1)(42)(A); Delgado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 487 F.3d 855, 860-61 

(11th Cir. 2007). An alien bears the burden of demonstrating that 

she more likely than not would be persecuted upon her return to 

the country in question. Delgado, 487 F.3d at 861. The alien can 

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22-14252 Opinion of the Court 5

meet her burden by showing either: (1) past persecution in her 

country based on a protected ground, in which case a rebuttable 

presumption is created that her life or freedom would be threatened if she returned to her country; or (2) a future threat to her life 

or freedom on a protected ground in her country. Id.

Persecution is an extreme concept, requiring more than a 

few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation. Id. In 

determining whether an alien has suffered past persecution, the 

BIA must consider the cumulative effects of the incidents. Id. Because an applicant’s protected trait need not be the only motivation 

for the persecution, where multiple motivations are at play, the 

BIA must determine whether a protected ground was or will be at 

least one central reason for persecuting the applicant. INA 

§ 208(b)(1)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); Lingeswaran v. U.S. 

Att’y Gen., 969 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2020). 

An applicant who has not suffered past persecution may 

demonstrate that her life or freedom would be threatened in the 

future in a country if she can establish that it is more likely than not 

that she would be persecuted on account of a protected ground. 8 

C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2). The BIA shall not require the applicant to 

provide evidence that she would be singled out individually for 

such persecution if: (1) the applicant establishes that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to her on account of a protected ground; and (2) the applicant 

establishes her inclusion in and identification with such group of 

persons. Id. 

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-14252

An applicant seeking CAT relief must establish “that it is 

more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed 

to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). All 

relevant evidence must be considered, including her ability to relocate and human rights violations within the country. Id. 

§ 1208.16(c)(3). In this context, “torture” means:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 

or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a confession, punishing him or her for an act her 

or she or a third person has committed or is suspected of 

having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her 

or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 

of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by, or at 

the instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a 

public official acting in an official capacity or other person 

acting in an official capacity. 

Id. § 1208.18(a)(1). To generate grounds for reviewability, we 

must be left with the conviction that the BIA “has heard and 

thought [about the case] and not merely reacted.” Ali, 931 F.3d at 

1333. 

Here, because the BIA adopted the IJ’s opinion, our review 

will include both the BIA’s opinion and the IJ’s decision. See 

Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1350. The BIA’s decision to deny Joseph’s 

application for withholding of removal and CAT relief was supported by substantial evidence. Although the IJ concluded that she 

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22-14252 Opinion of the Court 7

established past persecution, she failed to show that a protected 

ground was one central reason for the persecution. See Lingeswaran, 969 F.3d at 1287. Further, the IJ’s conclusion that she failed to 

establish that it is more likely than not that she would be persecuted on account of a protected ground was supported by substantial evidence. See Delgado, 487 F.3d at 861. To the extent that she 

argues that the BIA ignored her race-based claim, she failed to raise 

the core issue of whether she was entitled to withholding of removal on the basis of her race before the BIA, and she did not set 

out any discrete argument she relied on in support of that claim. 

Jeune, 810 F.3d at 800. The government asserted that Joseph failed 

to raise the issue of whether she was persecuted because of her 

race, and, because Joseph failed to provide information sufficient 

to enable the BIA to review and correct any errors below regarding 

her race-based claim, any argument that she was entitled to withholding of removal based on her race is unexhausted. See Indrawati, 

779 F.3d at 1297; Kemokai, 83 F.4th at 891. To the extent that she 

argues that the BIA erred by failing to consider her inclusion in certain particular social groups, that argument is unsupported by the 

record. 

Additionally, the BIA’s conclusion that she failed to establish 

eligibility for CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, and the BIA did not err in its evaluation of her CAT claim. 

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2); 1208.18(a)(1); Ali, 931 F.3d at 1333. The 

BIA’s opinion indicates that it heard and thought about the case, 

not merely reacted. Ali, 931 F.3d at 1333. 

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-14252

II.

We review de novo the claim that the agency violated the petitioner’s due process rights. Lapaix v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 605 F.3d 

1138, 1143 (11th Cir. 2010). The Fifth Amendment entitles petitioners in removal proceedings to due process of the law. Id. Due 

process requires that aliens be given notice and an opportunity to 

be heard in their removal proceedings. Id. To establish a due process violation, the petitioner must show that she was deprived of 

liberty without due process of law and that the purported errors 

caused her substantial prejudice. Id. To show substantial prejudice, an alien must demonstrate that, in the absence of the alleged 

violations, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Id. 

Generally, the BIA presumes that aliens are competent to 

participate in removal proceedings. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. 

Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011). In Matter of M-A-M-, the BIA determined 

that, when indicia of incompetency are present, the IJ must make a 

competency determination. Id. at 480-81. An alien is competent 

for the purposes of immigration proceedings if “[she] has a rational 

and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, 

and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence 

and cross-examine witnesses.” Id. at 479. Removal proceedings 

can continue despite an alien’s lack of competency, so long as safeguards are in place to ensure that the alien’s rights and privileges 

under the INA are protected. Id. 

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However, “[m]ental competency is not a static condition. ‘It 

varies in degree. It can vary over time. It interferes with an individual’s functioning at different times in different ways.’” Id. at 480 

(citation omitted). “As a result, Immigration Judges need to consider indicia of incompetency throughout the course of proceedings to determine whether an alien’s condition has deteriorated or, 

on the other hand, whether competency has been restored.” Id. 

Here, we conclude that Joseph was not deprived of a fair and 

full opportunity to present her case. She was given a reasonable 

opportunity to present evidence on her behalf, the IJ ordered a 

competency evaluation which noted that her mental health issues 

did not affect her understanding and comprehension, and she indicated that she understood the nature of her proceedings on two 

separate occasions. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. at 479. The IJ 

also accounted for any change in how her mental health issues affected her over time. Id. at 480. Thus, we can discern no due process violation. 

III.

We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen under the 

abuse of discretion standard but employ de novo review to the BIA’s 

underlying legal conclusions. Dacostagomez Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 40 F.4th 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Our

review is limited to determining whether the BIA exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Zhang v. U.S. Att’y 

Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2009). A motion to reopen will 

not be granted unless the agency is satisfied that evidence sought 

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-14252

to be offered is material and was not available and could not have 

been discovered or presented at the former hearing. 8 C.F.R. 

§ 1003.23(b)(3). The BIA has discretion to deny reopening even 

where the movant has made a prima facie case that reopening 

would otherwise be appropriate. Id.

We conclude that the BIA’s denial of Joseph’s motion to reopen was not an abuse of discretion. To the extent that the evidence she submitted with her motion pre-dated the date of her removal order, that evidence was properly rejected as previously 

available. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3). To the extent that the evidence she submitted post-dated her removal order, that evidence 

was insufficient to establish that she was prima facie eligible for 

withholding of removal or CAT relief. Id. 

IV.

For these reasons, we deny Joseph’s petition.

PETITION DENIED 

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