Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01963/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01963-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald Wesley Fields
Petitioner
Neotti
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD WESLEY FIELDS,

Petitioner,

v.

NEOTTI, Warden

Respondent.

 /

1:09-cv-01963-AWI-DLB (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 9]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation (CDCR) following his no contest plea to one count of sexual penetration of a

minor and two counts of lewd acts upon a child under the age of 14. Petitioner also admitted

having suffered three prior serious felony convictions. On February 9, 2006, Petitioner was

sentenced to a determinate state prison term of twenty seven years. (Lodged Doc. No. 1.) 

Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On November 27, 2006, the California Court of

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, struck the parole revocation fine, but affirmed the judgment in

all other respects. (Lodged Doc. No. 2.) Petitioner did not seek review in the California

Supreme Court.

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Petitioner subsequently filed four pro se state post-conviction collateral petitions. The 1

first petition was filed on December 12, 2006, in the Fresno County Superior Court. (Lodged

Doc. No. 3.) The petition was denied on December 22, 2006. (Lodged Doc. No. 4.)

The second petition was filed in the Fresno County Superior Court on May 7, 2007. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 5.) That petition was denied on June 4, 2007. (Lodged Doc. No. 6.)

The third petition was filed in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District on

June 19, 2007. (Lodged Doc. No. 7.) The petition was denied on February 21, 2008. (Lodged

Doc. No. 8.)

The fourth and final petition was filed in the California Supreme Court on May 15, 2008. 

(Lodged Doc. No. 9.) The petition was denied on December 10, 2008. (Lodged Doc. No. 10.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on November 4,

2009. (Court Doc. 1.) Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on February 1, 2010. 

(Court Doc. 9.) Petitioner did not file an opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review th

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

All filing dates reflect application of the mailbox rule. See Rule 3(d) of the Federal Rules Governing

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Section 2254 Cases.

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response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Therefore, the Court will review Respondent’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on November 4, 2009, and thus, it is subject to

the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

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In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, on November 27, 2006, the California Court of Appeal, affirmed the

convictions but struck the parole revocation fine. Petitioner did not file a petition for review in

the California Supreme Court. Thus, direct review became final on January 6, 2007, when the

forty-day period for seeking review expired. Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 28(b) (renumbered to

8.500(e)(1); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 813 (9 Cir. 2002). Therefore, the one year th

limitations period began on the following day, January 7, 2007, and absent tolling, was set to

expire on January 7, 2008. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) th

(holding that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of

statutory tolling applicable to the one year limitations period.) 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is

tolled where a petitioner is properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled

during the intervals between one state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a

habeas petition at the next level of the state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also

Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). th

Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if

the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction petition was timely or was filed within a

reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis,

546 U.S. 189 (2006). Claims denied as untimely or determined by the federal courts to have been

untimely in state court will not satisfy the requirements for statutory tolling. Id.

1. No Tolling While First Petition Was Pending in State Court

Petitioner’s first state habeas petition was filed and concluded prior to the start date of the

statute of limitations. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 3-4.) The petition was denied on December 22, 2006-

sixteen days before the limitations period commenced. (Lodged Doc. No. 4.) A collateral action

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filed prior to the effective date of the statute of limitations has no tolling consequence. Waldrip

v. Hall, 548 F.3d 729, 735 (9 Cir. 2008). th

2. Period of Time That Lapsed After Commencement of Limitations Period

As just stated, the one-year limitations period commenced on January 7, 2007, and at the

time the second petition was filed on May 2, 2007, 120 days of the limitations had expired. 

3. Tolling During Period of Time the Second and Third State Petitions Were Pending in

State Court

Respondent does not argue that the second and third state petitions were improperly filed;

therefore, Petitioner is entitled to tolling for the pendency of his second and third state petitions. 

Thus, the limitations period was tolled from May 7, 2007 (date second petition signed) through

February 21, 2008 (date third petition denied). (Lodged Docs 5-8.) See Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. at 410 (stating that the limitations period is tolled while “a properly filed application for

state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending”). 

 4. No Tolling for Period Between Denial of Third Petition and Filing of Fourth Petition

Respondent argues that Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling because he

delayed 85 days after the denial of the third petition on February 21, 2008, before he brought the

fourth petition. (Lodged Doc. Nos. 8-9.) While it is arguable that the 85 days of delay may be

unreasonable under California law, the Court need not resolve the issue because the petition is

untimely even if this period is tolled. 

5. Tolling During Period Fourth Petition Was Pending in State Court

Respondent does not argue that the fourth state petition was improperly filed. Therefore,

Petitioner is entitled to tolling from May 15, 2008 (date fourth petition signed) through

December 10, 2008 (date fourth petition denied). (Lodged Doc. Nos. 9-10.) 

D. End of Limitations Period

After the fourth state petition was denied on December 10, 2008, Petitioner delayed an

additional 329 days of the limitations, and the instant petition is untimely by 84 days. Mayle v.

Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 644 (2005); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 271 (2005); Nino v. Galaza,

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183 F.3d at 1007. 

E. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance

stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department

of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. th

Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993). 

Petitioner has not presented, nor does this Court find, any basis to warrant equitable

tolling. Accordingly, the instant petition is untimely. 

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition be GRANTED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to dismiss the petition with prejudice.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The Court will then review the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: March 13, 2010 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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