Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10571/USCOURTS-ca9-12-10571-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Myron Tsosie
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CORBERT GOLDTOOTH,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10570

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-08190-

JAT-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MYRON TSOSIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-10571

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-08190-

JAT-3

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 10, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed June 12, 2014

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2 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

Before: John T. Noonan, Sidney R. Thomas,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Noonan

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel reversed two defendants’ convictions on two

counts of aiding and abetting robbery on the Navajo Nation,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 1153, and 2, and remanded

for entry of judgment of acquittal.

The panel held that the defendants’ convictions’ on

Count 1 cannot survive under the government’s aiding and

abetting theory because no rational juror could have found

that the defendants had the requisite advance knowledge that

the robbery was to occur, where the government presented no

evidence that the taking of Kallen Crawford’s tobacco was

anything but a spontaneous act by the snatcher.

Regarding Count 2, the panel held that attempted robbery

under § 2111 requires specific intent – i.e., that the

defendants intended to take the things of value alleged in the

indictment. The panel held that a rational juror could not

have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendants had intended to rob Sheldon Davis of a wallet they

never asked for, never looked for, and never knew existed;

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 3

and that a rational juror could not have found that the

defendants intended to rob Davis’s nonexistent money. As

the government failed to prove that the defendants possessed

the mental state required for the underlying crime of

attempted robbery, the panel concluded that the government

necessarily failed to prove that either man had aided and

abetted any such attempt.

COUNSEL

Tyrone Mitchell, Tyrone Mitchell, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona,

for Defendant-Appellant Corbert Goldtooth.

James S. Park, Park Law Office, PLC, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Defendant-Appellant Myron Tsosie.

Rachel C. Hernandez (argued) and Tracy Van Buskirk,

Assistant United States Attorneys, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

NOONAN, Circuit Judge:

Corbert Goldtooth and Myron Tsosie (together,

“Appellants”) appeal their convictions on two counts of

aiding and abetting robbery on the Navajo Nation. Because

no rational juror could have convicted either man of either

count, we reverse.

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4 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

I

A

The facts are not in dispute. In the early morning hours

of July 31, 2011, Kallen Crawford and Sheldon Davis, both

in their late teens, were rolling tobacco and smoking

cigarettes outside a gas station in Fort Defiance, Arizona, a

small community within the Navajo Nation. At

approximately two a.m., a four-door sedan driven by a

woman arrived at the gas station. Three men, two of whom

the police later identified as Appellants, exited the vehicle

and walked over to Crawford and Davis, who were seated

next to each other on the curb. As the strangers approached,

Crawford and Davis noticed that each man was trying to

conceal a weapon—one carried a baseball bat, another held

a 12-inch knife, and the third had a pocket knife. The men

surrounded Crawford and Davis: the two men with knives

stood in front of them while the man with the bat stood

behind.

Crawford, trying to defuse the situation, offered to roll the

men some Tops brand tobacco, which he had purchased at the

gas station for about three dollars. One of the men then asked

Crawford and Davis if they claimed membership in any gang. 

They said no. After identifying themselves as members of a

local gang, Appellants asked whether the teens had anything

on them or in their pockets. Again, they said no. They were

never asked whether they had money or a wallet.

The man with the pocket knife then quickly patted down

Davis’s front side, while the man with the baseball bat patted

down Crawford’s. Nothing was found or taken. Davis

testified later that, in reality, he had been carrying a wallet in

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 5

a pocket of his “skinny jeans.” He also testified that he

typically kept personal property in his back pockets. Davis,

however, had no money in his wallet or anywhere else on

him. As for Crawford, he testified that he had had a wallet in

his back pocket and a $175 smartphone in his front pocket. 

Crawford and Davis remained seated during the pat downs;

they were never asked to stand.

As Crawford continued to roll the tobacco into cigarettes,

the man to his rear “nudged” him in the head with the

baseball bat to hurry him up. The man with the pocket knife

took Crawford’s hat and, before returning it, smacked Davis

on the back of the head and urged his compatriots to get

going. Crawford eventually handed the three cigarettes he

had rolled to the man with the bat, who, suddenly and without

permission, snatched the remaining tobacco from Crawford’s

lap.

The three men then walked back to the car they had

arrived in and were driven away. The encounter lasted five

or ten minutes. No verbal threats were ever made; Crawford

and Davis were not physically harmed.

Some twenty to thirty minutes later, a police officer

stopped the vehicle carrying the three men. The officer had

received a call indicating that the sedan had been involved in

a gas station robbery. Before the car came to rest, the officer

noticed something shiny being ejected from the passenger’s

side of the vehicle. A backup officer arrived soon thereafter,

and he discovered a long silver knife lying in the dirt by the

car’s rear. Appellants were arrested on the scene and

transported by a third officer to a nearby jail. During

booking, the police found a black pocket knife on Tsosie’s

person. The third man in the vehicle, Goldtooth’s teenage

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6 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

son, was taken to the hospital to treat a badly bleeding hand. 

Before he left, the police removed a sheath from the young

man’s belt matching the long knife found in the dirt. The

female driver consented to a vehicle search, which turned up

a weighted, black baseball bat. No tobacco was ever found.

On August 13, 2011, Special Agent Matthew Shelley, a

federal investigator, interviewed Goldtooth about the events

of July 31. During the interview, Goldtooth admitted to

asking Crawford and Davis for cigarettes, and that he may

have done so “in a threatening way.” Goldtooth also

admitted to “flying” his gang colors that night and to

throwing the knife out of the vehicle. He never mentioned

money or a wallet.

On September 27, 2011, Appellants were each charged

with two counts of aiding and abetting robbery on an Indian

reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 1153, and 2. 

Count 1 alleged that Appellants had robbed or attempted to

rob Crawford of “a package of Tops brand tobacco.” Count

2 alleged that Appellants had robbed or attempted to rob

Davis of his “money and wallet.” Appellants pleaded not

guilty to both counts.

B

Beginning April 11, 2012, Appellants were tried jointly

by a jury of their peers. In its case in chief, the government

called as witnesses Davis, Crawford, the female driver, and

various law enforcement personnel involved with the case.

At the close of evidence, Appellants orally moved for

judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of

Criminal Procedure. In denying the motion, the district court

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 7

stated that it did not want to “minimize the appeal” of

Appellants’ arguments with respect to count 2 of the

indictment—the alleged robbery or attempted robbery of

Davis’s money and wallet—so it invited “further briefing” on

the matter should they be convicted on that count.

On April 20, 2012, after roughly five hours of

deliberation, the jury found Appellants guilty on both counts.

Four months later, on August 31, 2012, Goldtooth filed a

written motion again requesting that the district court issue a

judgment of acquittal, or, in the alternative, grant a new trial. 

Tsosie joined the motion. The district court denied the Rule

29 motion with respect to count 1 on October 1, 2012, but

withheld its ruling as to count 2. Concerned that count 2

alleged that Appellants had robbed or attempted to rob Davis

of his “money and wallet” even though “there was no money”

on him, the lower court asked for “more briefing.”

On October 31, 2012, the district court denied Appellants’

Rule 29 motion in its entirety, noting only that it was

“satisfied” with the government’s supplemental briefing. 

That same day, the district court sentenced Goldtooth to 115

months in prison—the high end of his Sentencing Guidelines

range—followed by three years of supervised release. Tsosie

was sentenced to 78 months in prison—the low end of his

Guidelines range—and three years of supervised release.

This appeal followed.

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8 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

II

Appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

against them.

1 Our review is de novo. See United States v.

LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 2011). We reverse.2

A

Our inquiry proceeds in two parts. See United States v.

Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 

First, we “consider the evidence presented at trial in the light

most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 1164. In so doing,

we presume that the jury resolved any evidentiary conflicts in

the government’s favor. See id. Second, we determine

whether the evidence, so viewed, is sufficient “to allow any

rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Step two, we have

explained, protects against those “rare occasions” when a jury

convicts someone even though “no rational trier of fact”

could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. That

1 Before the district court, both men challenged the sufficiency of the

evidence against them as to both counts. Tsosie’s decision not to

challenge count 1 on appeal does not foreclose our reversing his

conviction on that count. See United States v. Baker, 999 F.2d 412,

416–17 (9th Cir. 1993) (reversing codefendant’s conviction even though

he “did not raise the issue on appeal”); United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d

509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is ‘manifestly unjust’ to reverse the

conviction of one co-defendant but to uphold the conviction of another

co-defendant when the same error affected both defendants.”). Nor does

our doing so prejudice the government. See United States v. Brooks,

610 F.3d 1186, 1202 (9th Cir. 2010).

2 Because we reverse for insufficient evidence, we do not reach

Appellants’ other claims of error.

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 9

said, we have an “obligation” to identify such rare occasions,

including where “the evidence construed in favor of the

government may be insufficient to establish every element of

the crime” or “where mere speculation, rather than reasonable

inference, supports the government’s case.” Id. at 1167; see

also United States v. Bennett, 621 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.

2010).

The jury here convicted Appellants on two counts of

aiding and abetting robbery on an Indian reservation, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 1153, and 2. To convict

either man on count 1, the government had to prove four

elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant

took or attempted to take a package of Tops brand tobacco

from Crawford; (2) that the defendant used force, violence, or

intimidation in doing so; (3) that the alleged robbery took

place on the Navajo Nation in the District of Arizona; and

(4) that the defendant is an Indian. To convict either man on

count 2, the government had to prove the same four elements

beyond a reasonable doubt, except that the first element

instead required proof that the defendant took or attempted to

take money or a wallet from Davis.

The government could also satisfy its burden by proving

that Appellants had aided and abetted a robbery. See United

States v. Garcia, 400 F.3d 816, 820 (9th Cir. 2005)

(“[A]iding and abetting is embedded in every federal

indictment for a substantive crime.”). To convict either man

under such a theory, the government had to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) that a robbery was committed by

someone; (2) that the defendant knowingly and intentionally

aided, counseled, commanded, induced, or procured that

person to commit each element of robbery; and (3) that the

defendant acted before the crime was completed. See Manual

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10 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of

the Ninth Circuit § 5.1 (2010). The government was not

required to prove which person had actually carried out the

robbery and which person or persons had aided and abetted. 

See United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir.

1995).

B

As to count 1, the government emphasized an aiding and

abetting theory because it could not prove which of the men

had actually grabbed the tobacco from Crawford’s lap.

To aid and abet a robbery, however, Appellants must have

had foreknowledge that the robbery was to occur. In

Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014), the

Supreme Court examined 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal aiding

and abetting statute under which Appellants were convicted. 

There, the Court explained that “an aiding and abetting

conviction requires . . . a state of mind extending to the entire

crime.” Id. at 1248. With respect to an armed drug sale

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Court held that an aiding and

abetting conviction requires the government to prove the

defendant had “advance knowledge” that a coconspirator

would use or carry a gun as part of the crime’s commission. 

Id. at 1243. “[A]dvance knowledge,” continued the Court,

“means knowledge at a time the accomplice can do

something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.” Id. at

1249–50.

No rational juror could have found that Appellants had

such advance knowledge. The evidence, viewed in the light

most favorable to the government, showed only that

Appellants exited the car and, weapons drawn, approached

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 11

Crawford and Davis; that Crawford, feeling intimidated,

offered to roll Appellants cigarettes; that Goldtooth was

interested in getting cigarettes and may have asked for them

in a threatening way; and that immediately after Crawford

handed the cigarettes to the man with the baseball bat, that

man reached down and grabbed the remaining tobacco from

Crawford’s lap.

None of this evidence indicates foreknowledge. There

was no evidence Appellants had drawn up plans or had

discussions prior to the taking; no evidence Crawford or

Davis thought the tobacco would be snatched; and no

evidence the two non-snatchers had any idea the taking would

occur, let alone that they had aided or encouraged it.

Nor could a rational juror have inferred foreknowledge or

intent from the circumstances. True, a jury may infer

advance knowledge “if a defendant continues to participate in

a crime after” it has been committed. Rosemond, 134 S. Ct.

at 1250 n.9. But there was no evidence here that the two nonsnatchers in any way participated in the snatch. Mere

presence at the scene does not an aider and abettor make. See

United States v. Andrews, 75 F.3d 552, 555 (9th Cir. 1996). 

Even if Appellants had become aware of the taking once it

happened, that alone cannot satisfy the government’s burden. 

See United States v. Bancalari, 110 F.3d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir.

1997) (explaining that “mere presence at the scene of the

crime and knowledge that the crime is being committed is not

enough” to sustain an aiding and abetting conviction).

What’s more, neither Appellant would have had time to

participate after learning of the taking. Crawford and Davis,

the government’s own witnesses, each testified that the

culprits left the scene immediately after the snatch. Crawford

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12 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

stated, for example: “It was like a matter of seconds after I

gave the cigarettes back to them was when they left, and the

guy behind me took my package and they left.” In other

words, Appellants could not have participated because there

was no time to do so.

At bottom, the government presented no evidence that the

taking of Crawford’s tobacco was anything but a spontaneous

act by the snatcher. The culprit, says the government, just

“grabbed” or “snatched” the tobacco from behind Crawford. 

Such an act of spontaneity could not have been known in

advance or intended by another. See 16 The Oxford English

Dictionary 307 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “spontaneous”

actions). Put simply, one cannot know in advance what

cannot be known in advance.

Appellants’ count 1 convictions cannot survive under the

government’s aiding and abetting theory.

3

C

As to count 2, the government acknowledges, as it must,

that Appellants could only have been convicted of attempting

to rob Davis’s money or wallet because nothing was actually

taken from him.

3 To the extent the jury may have found either man guilty as the

principal robber, rather than as an aider and abettor, that verdict would

have been equally irrational. Based on the wildly inconsistent

identification evidence produced at trial, no rational juror could have

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that either Goldtooth or Tsosie was

the snatcher.

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 13

It does not appear that our court has expressly decided

whether attempted robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2111 requires

proof of specific intent. See United States v. Burdeau, 168

F.3d 352, 356 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that completed

robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2111 “is a crime of general intent”

without addressing attempted robbery). We now hold that it

does.

In Burdeau, we looked to our more developed case law

interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), the federal bank robbery

statute, because “the wording of § 2111 is nearly identical to

the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).” Id. We do the same

here. “[E]ven though bank robbery itself is a general intent

crime,” we have explained, “attempted bank robbery requires

the specific intent to rob a bank within the meaning of

18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).” United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry,

231 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (citing United

States v. Darby, 857 F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1988)). Our

reasoning in Darby applies with equal force to the generic

federal robbery statute:

[I]n order to convict for bank robbery, the

government must prove that the defendant

took the property. This act of taking by force,

violence, or intimidation is sufficient to

constitute the crime of bank robbery. It is not

necessary to prove an intent to steal. When

the charge is one of attempted bank robbery,

however, the transaction in question is at an

earlier stage. There has not been a taking of

the property. We are thus concerned with

whether attempted bank robbery requires an

intent to take the property. . . . In order to

prove an attempt to commit a crime, the

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14 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

government must prove an intent to commit

the acts that constitute the crime. Thus, in

order to prove attempted bank robbery, it is

necessaryto prove that the defendant intended

to take the property by force, violence or

intimidation.

Darby, 857 F.2d at 626.

So too here. Accordingly, we hold that attempted robbery

under 18 U.S.C. § 2111, like most other attempt crimes,

requires proof of specific intent. See id. (“Attempted bank

robbery requires the specific intent to rob a bank.”); see also

21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 155 (2014) (“Attempt is a

specific-intent crime.”).

The government, then, was required to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellants intended to take the things

of value alleged in the indictment—viz., Davis’s money or

wallet. If no rational juror could have so found, Appellants’

convictions must fall.

The government’s case on count 2 rested solely on three

pieces of evidence. First, Davis testified that, as best he could

remember, he was carrying a wallet but no money on the

night of the alleged robbery.

4 Second, Davis testified that one

4 That Davis had no money on him does not preclude an attempted

robbery conviction, so long as the government could prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellants had intended to take money they thought

Davis had. See United States v. Fleming, 215 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir.

2000) (“Factual impossibility is not a defense to an inchoate offense.”);

see also Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law 633 (5th ed. 2010) (“All courts

are in agreement that what is usually referred to as ‘factual impossibility’

is no defense to a charge of attempt.”).

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 15

of the men had asked him and Crawford whether he had

anything on him or in his pockets. And third, Crawford and

Davis testified that two of the men had briefly patted down

their front pockets but found nothing.

A closer look at this evidence reveals that no rational

juror could have found Appellants guilty of attempted

robbery of money or a wallet beyond a reasonable doubt. It

is true that one of the men asked Davis whether he had

anything in his pockets. But it is just as true that Appellants

never asked Davis if he had money or a wallet on him. There

was also no evidence that Davis gave Appellants any reason

to believe that he was carrying money or a wallet. In fact,

Davis told Appellants (untruthfully) that he had nothing in his

pockets.

As for the pat downs, Davis testified that he was patted

down by the man with the pocket knife, who stood facing

him. Davis, who was seated, also testified that his pat down

was “quick” and that it went from his “ribs . . . all the way

down to [his] thighs,” including his “front pockets.” Viewed

in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence

was that Davis’s wallet was in a back pocket of his “skinny

jeans,” where he typically carried his personal property, and

that Appellants failed to find anything during the pat down

because the man with the pocket knife did not frisk Davis’s

back pockets.

Appellants’ actions during the pat downs do not evince an

intent to rob Davis of money or a wallet. Quite the opposite. 

Had Appellants wanted to rob Davis, they would have asked

him to stand up so they could search him, including his back

pockets, more easily. Had Appellants wanted to rob Davis,

they would not have conducted “just a quick pat down”; they

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16 UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH

would have searched his person thoroughly. Had Appellants

wanted to rob Davis, they would not have patted down his

“ribs,” where men typically do not keep money or a wallet. 

Appellants were in total control of the situation. Had they

wanted to find Davis’s wallet, they would have.

In addition, Crawford, who was seated right next to

Davis, testified that he was patted down from behind by the

man with the baseball bat. Any rational juror would conclude

that the man who patted down Crawford would have had

ready access to the back pockets of either teen, had he so

wanted.

Perhaps most significantly, Crawford testified that he had

been carrying a wallet in his back pocket and a smartphone,

worth $175, in his front pocket. The evidence in no way

explains how Appellants, had they been looking for

something to rob, could have overlooked this expensive

smartphone in the very pocket they patted down. Indeed,

Appellants seemingly went out of their way not to rob Davis

of any valuables. The only fair inference is that they were

looking for weapons. Finding none, Appellants left the teens’

pockets alone.

In light of the foregoing, a rational juror could not have

concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellants had

intended to rob Davis of a wallet they never asked for, never

looked for, never found, and never knew existed. Neither

could a rational juror have found that Appellants had intended

to rob Davis’s nonexistent money. For a juror to have

inferred otherwise “would be impermissible speculation.” 

Bennett, 621 F.3d at 1139; see also United States v. Dinkane,

17 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing defendant’s

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UNITED STATES V. GOLDTOOTH 17

armed robbery conviction where the evidence was

insufficient to establish his intent to aid and abet).

As the government failed to prove that Goldtooth or

Tsosie possessed the mental state required for the underlying

crime of attempted robbery, it necessarily failed to prove that

either man had aided and abetted any such attempt. See

United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 959 (9th Cir. 2007)

(“There is no question that a conviction for aiding and

abetting a crime requires proof that the underlying crime was

committed . . . .”). Without proof of the requisite mens rea,

Appellants’ convictions on count 2 cannot stand.

* * *

We reverse Appellants’ convictions and remand to the

district court for entry of judgment of acquittal on both

counts. Appellants may not be retried. See McDaniel v.

Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (per curiam) (“Because

reversal for insufficiency of the evidence is equivalent to a

judgment of acquittal, such a reversal bars a retrial.”).

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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