Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-36000/USCOURTS-ca9-14-36000-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sally Jewell
Appellee
Leslie A. Kerr
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LESLIE A. KERR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SALLY JEWELL, Secretary of

Department of the Interior,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-36000

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-00230-RRB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Alaska

Ralph R. Beistline, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 2, 2016

Anchorage, Alaska

Filed September 6, 2016

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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2 KERR V. JEWELL

SUMMARY*

Whistleblower Protection Act

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack

of jurisdiction of plaintiff’s claim under the Whistleblower

Protection Act (“WPA”) brought against her former

employer, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, based

on plaintiff’s failure to present the WPA claim to the Merit

Systems Protection Board.

The panel held that the statutory scheme governing the

Civil Service Reform Act and the WPA did not authorize

plaintiff to file her WPA claim in district court without first

presenting it to the Merit Systems Protection Board. The

panel further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction

over plaintiff’s WPA claim because the Merit Systems

Protection Board provides the exclusive avenue for obtaining

judicial review of a WPA claim. Finally, the panel held that

the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to

remand her WPA claim to the Merit Systems Protection

Board.

COUNSEL

Stephani Ayers (argued) and Thad M. Guyer, T.M. Guyer &

Friends, P.C., Medford, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KERR V. JEWELL 3

Charles W. Scarborough (argued), Stephanie R. Marcus, and

Marleigh D. Dover; Karen L. Loeffler, United States

Attorney; Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant

Attorney General; Civil Division, Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.; for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Leslie Kerr, a former employee of the United States Fish

and Wildlife Service (FWS), contended she was

discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII

and retaliated against in violation of the Whistleblower

Protection Act (WPA). Kerr presented her claims to FWS’s

Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office, which denied

her Title VII claims on the merits and dismissed her WPA

claim for lack of jurisdiction. Rather than appealing the EEO

office’s decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board

(MSPB), which had jurisdiction to review the WPA claim on

the merits, Kerr filed a civil action in federal district court,

asserting both her Title VII claims and her WPA claim. The

district court dismissed the WPA claim for lack of

jurisdiction based on Kerr’s failure to present the claim to the

MSPB. Kerr appeals, and we affirm.

We hold, first, that the statutory scheme governing the

Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) and the WPA did not

authorize Kerr to file her WPA claim in district court without

first presenting it to the MSPB. Kerr has what is known as a

“mixed case,” because she challenges a serious personnel

action – her removal – on account of discrimination. In a

mixed case, a decision of an agency’s EEO office is subject

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4 KERR V. JEWELL

to review in the district court, without an intervening stop at

the MSPB. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2). Kerr was free to take

her Title VII claims directly from FWS’s EEO office to

district court, bypassing the MSPB. Nothing in § 7702(a)(2),

however, authorizes an employee to present an entirely

unreviewed WPA claim in district court without first

presenting it to the MSPB.

Second, although a federal district court can exercise

federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, that

general grant of jurisdiction does not apply where it is fairly

discernible that Congress intended a statutory review scheme

to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review. See Elgin

v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132–33 (2012). In

Elgin, the Supreme Court applied this principle to the CSRA,

holding that, “[g]iven the painstaking detail with which the

CSRA sets out the method for covered employees to obtain

review of adverse employment actions, it is fairly discernible

that Congress intended to deny such employees an additional

avenue of review in district court.” Id. at 2134. The WPA is

part of the CSRA, and nothing in the WPA alters the

conclusion the Court reached in Elgin. The statutory scheme

places exclusive original jurisdiction in the MSPB. 

Accordingly, the scheme precluded the district court from

exercising original jurisdiction over Kerr’s WPA claim.

BACKGROUND

We described the facts underlying this case in an

unpublished decision resolving a previous appeal. See Kerr

v. Jewell, 549 F. App’x 635, 636–38 (9th Cir. 2013). As we

explained there, Kerr was employed by FWS as director of

the Kodiak National Wildlife Refuge. Over a period of

months, Kerr was subjected to a series of adverse personnel

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KERR V. JEWELL 5

actions. These included a negative performance evaluation

rating her “minimally successful,” a warning letter stemming

from an allegedly inappropriate contact with another

employee and a 60-day temporary assignment (or “detail”) to

a position in Anchorage. Later, her superiors made the

assignment to the Anchorage position permanent. When Kerr

refused the reassignment, the agency approved her removal

from employment, and Kerr involuntarily retired on the day

her removal would have taken effect.

While these events were unfolding, Kerr was also

subjected to alleged sex discrimination. During a

performance review, a supervisor asked Kerr whether she

could “learn to be more feminine.” Id. at 636. She also

reported finding Playboy magazines in a cabin at the refuge. 

During the same period, Kerr filed a series of complaints with

her superiors, the human resources office and the Department

of the Interior’s Office of Inspector General, challenging her

adverse treatment, complaining about the magazines and her

supervisor’s comment and reporting what she described as

gross mismanagement by her supervisors, including

widespread alcohol abuse among FWS employees.

Kerr eventually asserted claims of discrimination and

retaliation against FWS. The process began in March 2006,

when Kerr filed an informal complaint with the FWS EEO

counselor. In May 2006, after the counselor failed to resolve

the case, Kerr filed a formal complaint with FWS’s EEO

office, alleging claims of sex discrimination, religious

discrimination and retaliation. As amended, the complaint

challenged, among other things, the negative performance

review, the warning letter, the 60-daydetail in Anchorage, the

decision to remove her from employment and her resulting

involuntary retirement.

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6 KERR V. JEWELL

In June 2006, while the EEO complaint was pending, Kerr

filed an “appeal” with the MSPB, challenging her removal.1

The MSPB appeal alleged not only discrimination and

retaliation on account of sex and religion, in violation of Title

VII, but also retaliation for engaging in protected

whistleblower activities, in violation of the WPA and arising

from her complaints of mismanagement. The WPA prohibits

retaliation against an employee for disclosing “any violation

of any law, rule, or regulation, or . . . gross mismanagement,

a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial

and specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8).

In July 2006, FWS’s EEO office accepted Kerr’s claims

for investigation, other than those relating to her removal. 

The EEO office dismissed those claims because she had

decided to challenge her removal before the MSPB: “By

filing with the MSPB first, you elected to pursue this matter

with them.”

In October 2006, the MSPB informed Kerr it lacked

original jurisdiction over her claims pertaining to the less

serious adverse personnel actions – the warning letter, the

negative performance evaluation and the 60-day detail. See

5 U.S.C. § 7512 (listing five serious personnel actions,

including “a removal,” over which the MSPB has

jurisdiction); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1) (same); see also

Reddick v. FDIC, 809 F.3d 1253, 1256 & n.1 (Fed. Cir.

2016). The MSPB advised Kerr it had jurisdiction solely

over claims related to her removal.

1 Although the statute refers to this type of filing as an “appeal,” in fact

these are original MSPB proceedings.

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KERR V. JEWELL 7

The MSPB also informed Kerr she had a “mixed case,”

“in which an employee . . . alleges that a personnel action

appealable to the Board was based, in whole or in part, on

prohibited discrimination.” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.151(a)(1); see

also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a). The Board gave Kerr two

options with respect to her claims relating to her removal. 

She could either present the claims to FWS’s EEO office,

later appealing them to the MSPB, or she could bypass the

EEO office and present them in the first instance to the

MSPB, by filing an original “appeal” with the Board. See

5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(a) (“Where the appellant has been

subject to an action appealable to the Board, he or she may

either file a timely complaint of discrimination with the

agency or file an appeal with the Board . . . .”). But she could

not challenge her removal in both forums simultaneously. 

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(b) (“An aggrieved person may

initially file a mixed case complaint with an agency pursuant

to this part or an appeal on the same matter with the MSPB

pursuant to 5 CFR 1201.151, but not both.”). The Board thus

advised Kerr she could either “move to withdraw this appeal

without prejudice to the underlying claims, exhaust the

agency’s EEO procedure, then file a new appeal to the Board

concerning her removal within the time limits set forth at

5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b),” or “she may abandon the EEO

procedure with respect to her removal only, and continue to

pursue this appeal.” Kerr chose the first option, informing the

Board “she elects to exhaust EEO procedures before filing a

new appeal with the Board concerning her removal.”

Accordingly, in November 2006, the MSPB dismissed

Kerr’s appeal “as premature, without prejudice to the

underlying claims.” The Board noted Kerr could “file a new

appeal to the Board” after conclusion of the EEO

proceedings. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.154(b) (“If the appellant

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8 KERR V. JEWELL

has filed a timely formal complaint of discrimination with the

agency . . . [a]n appeal must be filed [with the MSPB] within

30 days after the appellant receives the agency resolution or

final decision on the discrimination issue . . . .”). In light of

the MSPB dismissal, FWS’s EEO office accepted Kerr’s

claims arising from her removal for investigation.

In September 2008, the Department of the Interior’s

Office of Civil Rights issued a final decision on Kerr’s formal

EEO complaint. The decision rejected Kerr’s Title VII

claims on the merits. To the extent Kerr claimed she was

removed in violation of the WPA, however, the Civil Rights

Office dismissed the claims, stating “such actions [are]

outside the purview of the EEO process and, therefore, not

protected activities under Title VII.” This ruling was

consistent with longstandingEqual OpportunityEmployment

Commission (EEOC) precedent declining jurisdiction over

claims of retaliation not based on discrimination. See, e.g.,

Petitioner v. Shinseki, 2014 WL 899672, at *1 n.1 (EEOC

Feb. 27, 2014) (“[T]he Whistleblower Protection Act is a

statute that is not under the Commission’s purview.”);

Remsburg v. Daley, 1998 WL 72077, at *2 (EEOC Feb. 9,

1998) (“[T]he agency properly dismissed that portion of

appellant’s complaint based on retaliation for unprotected

activities . . . [because] whistleblower activities are generally

outside the purview of the EEO process.”).2

When the EEO process was resolved, Kerr did not file an

appeal with the MSPB, as she had previously indicated she

would do. Instead, she filed this civil action in federal district

court, alleging violations of Title VII and the WPA. The

2 Kerr does not challenge the agency’s decision that it lacked jurisdiction

over her WPA claim. We therefore have no occasion to address that issue.

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KERR V. JEWELL 9

district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 

Kerr appealed, and we vacated and remanded. See Kerr,

549 F. App’x 635.

On remand, the government moved to dismiss the WPA

claim, arguing for the first time that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over the claim because Kerr had failed to present

it to the MSPB. The district court granted the motion, noting

it was

undisputed that Kerr failed to fully present her

whistleblower retaliation claim to the MSPB

before she brought her “mixed claim” action

in the district court. Rather, she proceeded

with her mixed case before the EEO, which

has no jurisdiction to review a WPA claim,

and informed her of such. Thus, she has not

preserved that claim for judicial review. 

Indeed, when an employee bypasses the

MSPB, federal courts cannot possibly apply

the proper deferential standard of review to

the agency’s action, because there is no record

to review, and therefore no decision to defer

to. Kerr cites no authority that would allow

this Court to decide the WPA claims in the

first instance.

See 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (providing for deferential judicial

review of decisions of the MSPB). Following trial, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of the government on the Title VII

claim, and the district court entered final judgment dismissing

Kerr’s case.

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10 KERR V. JEWELL

Kerr filed a motion for relief under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 59(e), urging the district court to reconsider its

jurisdictional ruling on the WPA claim or, alternatively, to

remand the WPA claim to the MSPB. The district court

denied the motion and declined to remand the claim, noting

it could not “‘remand’ a matter to an agency that did not issue

a decision.” This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction.” Rattlesnake Coal. v. U.S.

EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2007). The district

court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. See id.

“We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 59(e) motion

for abuse of discretion.” McQuillion v. Duncan, 342 F.3d

1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 2003).

DISCUSSION

Kerr’s appeal requires us to address two questions:

(1) whether the statutory scheme authorized her to assert her

entirely unreviewed WPA claim in the district court without

first presenting it to the MSPB and (2) if not, whether her

failure to follow the statutory scheme deprived the district

court of jurisdiction over the claim. We consider these

questions in turn.

A. The Statutory Scheme Did Not Authorize Kerr to

Present Her Unreviewed WPA Claim in District Court

We first address whether the statutory scheme authorized

Kerr to present her unreviewed WPA claim in district court

– i.e., whether the CSRA and the WPA affirmatively granted

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KERR V. JEWELL 11

the district court jurisdiction over the claim. We begin by

briefly describing the respective statutory and regulatory

schemes through which a federal employee can obtain

administrative and judicial review of claims under the WPA

and Title VII.

1. Administrative and Judicial Review of WPA Claims

The WPA makes it unlawful to “take . . . a personnel

action with respect to any employee or applicant for

employment because of . . . any disclosure of information by

an employee or applicant which the employee or applicant

reasonably believes evidences . . . any violation of any law,

rule, or regulation, or . . . gross mismanagement, a gross

waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and

specific danger to public health or safety.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 2302(b)(8).3

The applicable statutes and regulations establish a

comprehensive scheme whereby federal employees can

obtain administrative and judicial review of their WPA

claims. As a general matter, WPA claims must be presented

initially to either the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) or the

MSPB. See id. §§ 1214, 1221(a); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2. If the

employee follows the first path, she files initially with the

OSC. She may appeal an adverse decision by the OSC to the

MSPB. See 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5(a). An adverse decision by the

3 Section 2302(b)(8) was first enacted as part of the Civil Service

Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978). 

The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA), Pub. L. No. 101-12,

103 Stat. 16 (1989), amended and strengthened the provision. Although

the provision derives from both laws, a claim under § 2302(b)(8) is

commonly referred to as a WPA claim, and we follow that convention

here, as do the parties.

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12 KERR V. JEWELL

MSPB, in turn, is subject to judicial review. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 1214(c). If the employee follows the second path, she files

initially with the MSPB. See id. § 1221(a). The MSPB’s

decision is then subject to judicial review. See id.

§§ 1221(h); 7703(b).4

2. Administrative and Judicial Review ofDiscrimination

Claims Generally

For federal employees who claim they have been

discriminated against by their respective agency in violation

of Title VII (or other federal antidiscrimination laws), the

process for obtaining administrative and judicial review

begins with an informal complaint. Employees “who believe

they have been discriminated against on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability, or genetic

information must consult a Counselor prior to filing a

complaint in order to try to informally resolve the matter.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a). If the matter is not resolved by the

counselor, the employee may file a formal discrimination

complaint with the agency’s EEO office. See id.

§§ 1614.105(d), 1614.106(a). When the EEO office issues a

final decision, the employee has the right to appeal the

decision to the EEOC, see id. § 1614.401, or file a civil action

in federal district court, see id. § 1614.407. When an

4

Judicial review ordinarily occurs in the Federal Circuit, subject to two

exceptions. First, cases of discrimination subject to 5 U.S.C. § 7702,

known as mixed cases, are filed in district court. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(b)(2). Second, under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement

Act of 2012, non-mixed cases involving solelywhistleblower claims under

the WPA can be filed in any federal circuit court, not just the Federal

Circuit, for a five-year period. See id. § 7703(b)(1)(B); Daniels v. Merit

Sys. Prot. Bd., No. 13-73913, 2016 WL 4191522 at *5 & n.8 (9th Cir.

Aug. 9, 2016).

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KERR V. JEWELL 13

employee elects to appeal first to the EEOC, the EEOC’s

decision is subject to review in district court. See id.

§ 1614.405(c).

3. Administrative and Judicial Review of Discrimination

Claims Involving Serious Personnel Actions (“Mixed

Cases”)

A different scheme applies to mixed cases. “When an

employee complains of a personnel action serious enough to

appeal to the MSPB and alleges that the action was based on

discrimination, she is said (by pertinent regulation) to have

brought a ‘mixed case.’” Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596,

601 (2012); see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.302(a)(1) (defining a

“mixed case” as a complaint of “employment discrimination

. . . based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age,

disability, or genetic information related to or stemming from

an action that can be appealed to the Merit Systems

Protection Board (MSPB)”); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.151(a)(1)

(establishing rules for “any case in which an employee or

applicant for employment alleges that a personnel action

appealable to the Board was based, in whole or in part, on

prohibited discrimination”); accord Washington v. Garrett,

10 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A ‘mixed case’ brought

under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2) is one which involves both a

personnel action normally appealable to the MSPB and a

claim of discrimination.”). “The complaint may contain only

an allegation of employment discrimination or it may contain

additional allegations that the MSPB has jurisdiction to

address,” such as a claim under the WPA. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.302(a)(1).

A federal employee bringing a mixed case

may proceed in a variety of ways. She may

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14 KERR V. JEWELL

first file a discrimination complaint with the

agency itself, much as an employee

challenging a personnel practice not

appealable to the MSPB could do. See 5 CFR

§ 1201.154(a); 29 CFR § 1614.302(b). If the

agency decides against her, the employee may

then either take the matter to the MSPB or

bypass further administrative review by suing

the agency in district court. See 5 CFR

§ 1201.154(b); 29 CFR § 1614.302(d)(1)(i). 

Alternatively, the employee may initiate the

process by bringing her case directly to the

MSPB, forgoing the agency’s own system for

evaluating discrimination charges. See 5 CFR

§ 1201.154(a); 29 CFR § 1614.302(b). If the

MSPB upholds the personnel action (whether

in the first instance or after the agency has

done so), the employee again has a choice: 

She may request additional administrative

process, this time with the EEOC, or else she

may seek judicial review. See 5 U.S.C.

§§ 7702(a)(3), (b); 5 CFR § 1201.161;

29 CFR § 1614.303.

Kloeckner, 133 S. Ct. at 601.

4. Application of These Principles to Kerr’s Action

Under these principles, Kerr was free to present her WPA

claim challenging her removal in a direct appeal to the

MSPB. Her Title VII claims challenging the less serious

personnel actions (the negative performance evaluation, the

warning letter and the 60-day detail) had to be presented to

FWS’s EEO office. Her Title VII claims challenging her

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KERR V. JEWELL 15

removal (her mixed case) could have been presented initially

to either FWS’s EEO office or the MSPB.

Kerr instead presented all of her claims to FWS’s EEO

office. When that office ruled against her on her Title VII

claims and declined to exercise jurisdiction over her WPA

claim, Kerr proceeded directly to district court, bypassing the

MSPB. There is no dispute that Kerr was permitted to raise

her Title VII claims in district court. The parties dispute,

however, whether Kerr was also permitted to assert her WPA

claim there, having failed to present it to the MSPB.

Kerr maintains her actions were authorized by the CSRA

and WPA statutory scheme, relying on Wells v. Shalala,

228 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 2000), and 5 U.S.C. § 7702. Section

7702(a)(2) authorizes a direct route from the EEO office to

district court in mixed cases. It states:

In any matter before an agency which

involves – (A) any action [which the

employee or applicant may appeal to the

Merit Systems Protection Board]; and (B) any

issue of discrimination prohibited under

[section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

section 6(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act

of 1938, section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act

of 1973 or sections 12 and 15 of the Age

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967];

the . . . decision of the agency in any such

matter shall be a judicially reviewable action

unless the employee appeals the matter to the

Board . . . .

5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2).

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In Wells, a federal employee alleged two claims –

constructive discharge on the basis of discrimination, in

violation of the Rehabilitation Act (a mixed case claim), and

retaliation, in violation of the WPA. See Wells, 228 F.3d at

1140. The employee filed a formal complaint with her

agency’s EEO office, which investigated and denied the

claims. See id. at 1142.

5 The employee then filed a civil

action in district court, raising both claims and relying on

§ 7702(a)(2)(B). See id. Although the government argued

the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the employee’s

WPA claim because he failed to exhaust the claim before the

MSPB, the Tenth Circuit disagreed:

As it applies in this case, § 7702(a)(2)(B)

provides that in “any matter” before an

executive agency which involves “any issue

of discrimination” prohibited under the

Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically

29 U.S.C. § 791, the agency shall resolve such

matter. (emphasis added). The section then

provides: “The decision of the agency in any

such matter shall be a judicially reviewable

action unless the employee appeals the matter

to the [MSPB].” 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2)(B). 

Thus, the plain language of § 7702(a)(2)(B)

provides that if an employee alleges disability

discrimination under § 791 as a basis for

agency action, he may either file suit in the

district court or pursue an administrative

procedure after an adverse agency decision. 

5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(2)(B); see also 29 C.F.R.

5 Wells does not discuss whether the agency’s EEO office declined to

exercise jurisdiction over the employee’s WPA claim, as occurred here.

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KERR V. JEWELL 17

§ 1614.310(a). In addition to his [WPA]

retaliation claim, Plaintiff plainly alleges

disability discrimination under 29 U.S.C.

§ 791 as a basis for his constructive discharge.

Id. The court thus concluded § 7702(a)(2) authorizes an

employee with a mixed case to bring a WPA claim directly

from an agency’s EEO office to district court, without first

presenting it to the MSPB. See id. at 1142–43.6

Kerr relies on Wells, arguing § 7702(a)(2) authorized her

to bring her claims, including her WPA claim, directly from

the EEO office to district court. We disagree. Although

Wells offers one plausible reading of § 7702(a)(2), there are

several drawbacks to the Tenth Circuit’s analysis.

First, the Tenth Circuit did not discuss the practical

import of its interpretation of § 7702 where, as here, the EEO

declines jurisdiction over the WPA claim. When an

employee presents a WPA claim only to the EEO office, the

EEO office declines to exercise jurisdiction over the claim,

and the employee elects to bypass the MSPB, the employee

6 The Fourth Circuit also has permitted a direct path from the EEO to

district court when an employee has a mixed case that also includes a

WPA claim, albeit in different circumstances. See Bonds v. Leavitt,

629 F.3d 369, 377, 379 (4th Cir. 2011) (applying 5 U.S.C.

§ 7702(e)(1)(A), the provision that governs when an agency’s EEO office

fails to resolve a formal complaint within a reasonable period of time,

rather than § 7702(a)(2), the provision authorizing judicial review of an

unfavorable decision by the EEO office). Under § 7702(e)(1)(B), Kerr

would have been entitled to present her entire case, including her WPA

claim, in district court had she presented the claims to the MSPB and the

MSPB did not resolve them in a timely manner. See Ikossi v. Dep’t of

Navy, 516 F.3d 1037, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2008). That did not occur here,

however.

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18 KERR V. JEWELL

winds up presenting an entirely unreviewed WPA claim to the

district court. It is highly unlikely Congress intended that

result. As the Supreme Court has explained, the CSRA

“‘comprehensively overhauled the civil service system,’

creating an elaborate ‘new framework for evaluating adverse

personnel actions against federal employees.’” United States

v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 443 (1988) (alterations omitted)

(quoting Lindahl v. OPM, 470 U.S. 768, 773–74 (1985)). “It

prescribes in great detail the protections and remedies

applicable to such action, including the availability of

administrative and judicial review.” Id. The WPA

strengthened the CSRA’s protections for whistleblowers,

expanding the role of the Office of Special Counsel, see

5 U.S.C. §§ 1211–15, authorizing employees to seek

corrective action directly from the MSPB, see id. § 1221(a),

and adopting a set of robust procedural rules to protect

employees in MSPB proceedings, see, e.g., id. § 1221(c)(1)

(authorizing the MSPB to stay the allegedly retaliatory

personnel action); id. § 1221(d)(1) (granting the MSPB

subpoena power); id. § 1221(e)(1) (requiring an employee to

establish only that the protected activity was a “contributing

factor” in the challenged personnel action); id. § 1221(e)(2)

(requiring the government, to avoid corrective action, to

prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that it would have

taken the same personnel action in the absence of the

employee’s protected activity); id. § 1221(g) (authorizing

broad remedies and an award of “reasonable attorney’s fees

and other reasonable costs”); id. § 1221(h)(1) (providing for

judicial review of the MSPB’s decision). Nothing in the

WPA suggests Congress intended to permit employees to

bypass this comprehensive system of administrative review. 

As the D.C. Circuit has observed, “[u]nder no circumstances

does the WPA grant the District Court jurisdiction to

entertain a whistleblower cause of action brought directly

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KERR V. JEWELL 19

before it in the first instance.” Stella v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 135,

142 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

Second, judicial review of agency decisions on WPA

claims is deferential. See Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1260

(9th Cir. 1998); Washington, 10 F.3d at 1428. “[T]he court

shall review the record and hold unlawful and set aside any

agency action, findings, or conclusions found to be . . .

(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or

(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 7703(c). When an employee bypasses the MSPB, there is

no administrative record to review, and no decision to which

a court may defer, but rather only a decision that the EEO

lacked jurisdiction.

Third, the Tenth Circuit’s reliance on the “plain

language” of § 7702(a)(2) lacks persuasive force where, as

here, an agency’s EEO office refuses to consider the WPA

claim on the merits. The statutory language authorizes

judicial review of the “decision of the agency.” Id.

§ 7702(a)(2) (emphasis added). When the employee’s agency

declines to exercise jurisdiction over the WPA claim, there is

no decision on the merits of the WPA claim for the court to

review.

Finally, the Tenth Circuit’s decision is at odds with our

decision in Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1998). 

Sloan did not address a WPA claim, but it did prescribe the

proper procedure to be followed when an employee asserts

both a mixed case discrimination claim (i.e., a discrimination

claim challenging a serious personnel action) and a nondiscrimination claim subject to the MSPB’s original

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20 KERR V. JEWELL

jurisdiction. We held that, “[i]f a complainant wishes to

preserve both claims, he or she must not pursue an appeal of

the EEO decision with the EEOC [or the district court]. 

Rather, he or she must file the appeal with the MSPB, or be

deemed to have waived the non-discrimination claim.” Id. at

1260. “Once the MSPB issues a decision, . . . the employee

may . . . appeal the entire case (including all claims) to the

appropriate United States District Court.” Id. (citing

29 C.F.R. § 1614.310(b)). Thus, Sloan suggests the MSPB

furnishes the exclusive path for obtaining judicial review of

a WPA claim.

In light of these authorities, we are not persuaded by

Kerr’s argument that the statutory scheme in general, or

§ 7702(a)(2) in particular, granted the district court

jurisdiction over her WPA claim.

B. Because the MSPB Provides the Exclusive Avenue for

Obtaining Judicial Review of a WPA Claim, the

District Court Lacked Jurisdiction Over Kerr’s WPA

Claim

Even without an affirmative grant of jurisdiction by the

CSRA or the WPA, district courts have general federal

question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See Elgin v.

Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2132 (2012). This grant

of jurisdiction, however, is not absolute. As the Supreme

Court explained in Elgin, a statutory scheme precludes

district court jurisdiction when “it is ‘fairly discernible’ from

the [statute] that Congress intended covered employees

appealing covered agency actions to proceed exclusively

through the statutory review scheme.” Id. at 2132–33

(quoting Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 207

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KERR V. JEWELL 21

(1994)). In applying this standard, “we examine the

[statute’s] text, structure, and purpose.” Id. at 2133.

In Elgin, the Court concluded it was fairly discernible

from the CSRA’s text, structure and purpose that Congress

precluded district court jurisdiction over claims not

proceeding through the MSPB. “Given the painstaking detail

with which the CSRA sets out the method for covered

employees to obtain review of adverse employment actions,

it is fairly discernible that Congress intended to deny such

employees an additional avenue of review in district court.” 

Id. at 2134. Thus, “extrastatutory review is not available to

those employees to whom the CSRA grants administrative

and judicial review.” Id. at 2133 (emphasis omitted).

Similarly, we have long held that the remedies set forth in

the CSRA are exclusive. In Veit v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 508,

511 (9th Cir. 1984), we held “the federal courts have no

power to review federal personnel decisions and procedures

unless such review is expressly authorized byCongress in the

CSRA or elsewhere,” agreeing with other circuits that “the

comprehensive nature of the procedures and remedies

provided by the CSRA indicates a clear congressional intent

to permit federal court review as provided in the CSRA or not

at all.” In Rivera v. United States, 924 F.2d 948, 951 (9th

Cir. 1991), we likewise explained that “Congress’s purpose

in enacting the CSRA was to channel grievances and disputes

arising out of government employment into a single system

of administrative procedures and remedies, subject to judicial

review.”

That Kerr’s whistleblowing claim arises under a provision

– 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) – associated with the WPA does not

alter this conclusion. The CSRA and the WPA are integrated

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22 KERR V. JEWELL

into a single statutory scheme. “The Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1989 increases protections for

whistleblowers, but it does so within the context of the

CSRA.” Rivera, 924 F.2d at 954; see also Richards v.

Kiernan, 461 F.3d 880, 885–86 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing cases)

(“[T]he CSRA provides the exclusive remedy for claims

brought pursuant to the WPA.”); Ugarte v. Johnson, 40 F.

Supp. 2d 178, 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (Rakoff, J.) (“That

plaintiff claims here to have been a whistleblower does not

create any greater right for her in a district court than under

the general CSRA scheme because enactment of the WPA

left the role of the federal courts unchanged in the review of

employment decisions affecting federal employees. . . . The

WPA . . . expanded the MSPB’s jurisdiction to enable it to

hear claims of retaliation for whistleblowing which had been

previously outside its jurisdiction, but conferred no

jurisdiction in th[e district] court.” (citations omitted)).

In light of these authorities, the statutory scheme under

the CSRA and the WPA provided the exclusive means for

Kerr to obtain judicial review of her WPA claim. That

scheme “allocate[s] initial review to an administrative body”

– the MSPB – rather than the district court. See Thunder

Basin, 510 U.S. at 207. Because Congress intended the

MSPB to have exclusive original jurisdiction over her WPA

claim, the district court properly dismissed the claim for lack

of jurisdiction.7

7 Kerr correctly points out that “[m]ost exhaustion requirements

established by Congress do not result in a loss of subject matter

jurisdiction.” Maronyan v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 658 F.3d

1038, 1040 (9thCir. 2011). Elgin, however, addresses a different question

– whether a statutory scheme precludes district court jurisdiction because

it is fairly discernible that Congress intended the statute’s review scheme

to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review.

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KERR V. JEWELL 23

C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By

Declining to Remand to the MSPB

Kerr argues in the alternative that the district court should

have remanded her WPA claim to the MSPB rather than

dismissing it without prejudice. The district court, however,

acted reasonably by declining to remand a matter to an

agency that had not issued a decision. See McQuillion,

342 F.3d at 1014.

D. Further Proceedings

If Kerr wishes to pursue her WPA claim, her proper

course is to file an appeal before the MSPB. At oral

argument, the government acknowledged the deadlines for

presenting claims to the MSPB are subject to equitable

tolling. Tolling may be warranted here in light of Kerr’s

reasonable reliance on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Wells. 

Cf. Harris v. Carter, 515 F.3d 1051, 1055–56 (9th Cir. 2008)

(applying equitable tolling when a habeas petitioner relied in

good faith on Ninth Circuit precedent later overruled by the

Supreme Court); York v. Galetka, 314 F.3d 522, 528 (10th

Cir. 2003) (applying equitable tolling when Tenth Circuit law

was unsettled and the relevant statute was ambiguous). The

question of tolling should be addressed in the first instance by

the MSPB.

CONCLUSION

The district court properly dismissed Kerr’s WPA claim

for lack of jurisdiction. The judgment of the district court,

therefore, is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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