Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03463/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03463-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Shirley J. Cooper
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SHIRLEY J. COOPER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security 

Administration,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-3463 JSW 

ORDER GRANTING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND

REMANDING CASE

Plaintiff Shirley J. Cooper brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the

“Commissioner”). This matter is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment

and the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16-5,

the motions have been submitted on the papers without oral argument. Having carefully reviewed

the administrative record and considered the parties’ papers and the relevant legal authority, the

Court hereby GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, DENIES the Commissioner’s

cross-motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS the matter to the Commission for additional

proceedings pursuant to the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

BACKGROUND

Cooper brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3) to obtain judicial

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review of a final decision of the Commissioner denying her request for Social Security benefits from

August 28, 2001, Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, until January 16, 2004, the date from which the

Commissioner approved benefits. Cooper was fifty-five years old on August 28, 2001, her alleged

disability onset date. (Administrative Record “AR” at 43-44.) Cooper graduated from high school

and has worked as a transit operator, an interviewer/survey worker, a shoe store shelf straightener,

and a rental car driver. (Id. at 44, 99.) Cooper has not engaged in gainful employment since August

28, 2001. (Id. at 98.) Cooper’s alleged disabling medical conditions are arthritis in her back and

knees, groin pain, bilateral inguinal hernias, high blood pressure, pain in her right shoulder, and

depression. (Id. at 30, 44, 98, 409-13.)

Cooper applied for Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income on March

7, 2002, when she was fifty-five years old. (Id. at 29.) Cooper’s initial and reconsideration

applications were denied. (Id. at 43.) A hearing was first conducted before an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) on September 29, 2003. (Id.) Cooper and vocational expert John Velton testified. 

(Id.) In his decision dated November 21, 2003, the ALJ found that Cooper was not disabled. (Id. at

48.) Also, the ALJ found that Cooper’s allegations regarding pain and other symptoms lacked

credibility. (Id.) The ALJ found that Cooper had “medically determinable impairments

significantly limit[ing] her ability to perform basic work activities,” but found that Cooper retained

the residual functional capacity to perform light work, and that none of her impairments or

combinations of impairments precluded her from her past relevant work as a survey worker or a

driver. (Id.) Cooper requested a review of the ALJ’s decision on January 22, 2004. (Id. at 65-69.) 

The Appeals Council’s order dated June 22, 2004, vacated the decision and remanded the case to the

ALJ for further proceedings with instructions. (Id. at 84-86.) 

On December 7, 2004, a second hearing took place before the same ALJ. (Id. at 30.) Cooper

and John Becchetti, M.D., a medical advisor, testified during the hearing. (Id.) The ALJ issued a

partially favorable decision on February 24, 2005. (Id. at 29-37.) In his decision, the ALJ found

that Cooper was disabled since January 16, 2004, but not before that date. (Id.) The Appeals

Council denied Cooper’s requests to review and reopen the ALJ’s second decision. (Id. at 4-16.) 

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Having exhausted her administrative remedies, Cooper commenced this action for judicial

review of the ALJ’s second decision. Cooper argues that the ALJ’s conclusions were not made by

application of proper legal standards or supported by substantial evidence. On June 14, 2006,

Cooper brought the instant motion for summary judgment. On July 12, 2006, the Commissioner

filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s

determinations are supported by substantial evidence and free of legal error.

ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review of Commissioner’s Decision to Deny Social Security Benefits.

A federal district court may not disturb the final decision of the Commissioner unless it is

based on legal error or the factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Considering the administrative

record as a whole, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but less than a

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). To determine whether

substantial evidence exists, courts must look at the record as a whole, considering both evidence that

supports and undermines the ALJ’s findings. Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846

F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). An ALJ’s decision must be upheld, however, if the evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir. 1984). 

B. Legal Standard for Establishing a Prima Facie Case for Disability.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disability. Id. at 1452. The

disability assessment by the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation to determine

whether a person is disabled. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. 

First, the claimant must not be working. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). Second, the claimant’s

impairment must be “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Third, when the claimant has an impairment

that meets the duration required and is listed in Appendix 1 (a list of impairments presumed severe

enough to preclude work located in subpart P of part 404 of 20 C.F.R. § 416.920), or is equal to a

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listed impairment, benefits are awarded without considering the claimant’s age, education, and work

experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). Fourth, if the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal a

listed impairment, the Commissioner assesses the claimant’s residual functional capacity to

determine if the claimant can perform past work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). If the claimant can

perform prior work, then benefits are denied. Id. Fifth, if the claimant cannot perform prior work

because of the impairment then the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual

functional capacity are considered to see if the claimant is capable of performing other work that

exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g). The claimant is not entitled to benefits if

the claimant can adjust to other work. Id.

In step one here, the ALJ found that Cooper was not working. (AR at 30.) In the second

step, the ALJ found that Cooper’s degenerative joint disease in her hips, back and knees, and a right

inguinal hernia and right supraspinatus tendon tear constituted “severe” impairments; however, the

ALJ found her impairments did not meet or medically equal the listed disabling conditions. (Id. at

30-31.) In the fourth step, the ALJ found that prior to January 16, 2004, Cooper had the residual

functional capacity to perform light work and was capable of performing her past work, specifically,

as an interviewer/survey worker or a driver. (Id. at 31, 34.) And finally, the ALJ found that Cooper

was disabled since January 16, 2004. (Id. at 35.)

Cooper argues that the ALJ’s finding that Cooper was not disabled before January 16, 2004

should be reversed because the ALJ applied incorrect legal standards and the decision was not

supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Cooper contends that the ALJ: (1) improperly

discredited the opinions of a treating physicians; (2) failed to make proper findings to discredit

Cooper’s pain testimony; (3) improperly determined Cooper’s residual functional capacity; and (4)

failed properly to determine the onset date of Cooper’s disability. The Court will address each

argument in turn. 

C. The ALJ Improperly Discredited the Treating Physician’s Opinions.

Cooper contends that the ALJ committed error by improperly discrediting the opinions of her

treating physicians and improperly evaluating the medical evidence. The Commissioner argues that

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the ALJ properly rejected the opinions of Cooper’s treating physicians.

In general, the opinion of a treating physician is afforded greater weight than one from a nontreating physician. Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). However, the ALJ

may disregard the treating physician’s opinion if the ALJ “‘make[s] findings setting forth specific,

legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the record.’” Id. (quoting

Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987)). The ALJ can meet this burden “by setting out

a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Here, the ALJ explained that he typically gives the opinions of treating physicians “great

weight.” (AR at 33.) However, he rejected a September 2003 opinion by Dr. Lai, one of Cooper’s

treating physicians, in which Dr. Lai found that Cooper could:

stand no more than 15 minutes at a time up to two hours per day, could sit less than

[3] minutes at a time, could lift less than [5] pounds frequently and less than 10

pounds occasionally, she could do no bending, stooping or crouching due to her groin

pain and degenerative joint disease of the left knee and cervical and lumbar

spines. (Id.) 

To support this determination the ALJ stated:

I . . . find that opinion not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory diagnostic techniques and also inconsistent with other substantial evidence

in the record. See, Social Security Ruling 96-2p. Notably, Dr. Lai’s own report lacks

any significant objective findings. In addition, Dr. Lai himself noted that there was

no evidence of significant degenerative joint disease and that the claimant’s groin

pain was of unknown etiology. (Id.)

An ALJ may reject a treating physician’s conclusions when they are not supported by

objective findings. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). An ALJ may also

reject a treating physician’s opinion that is “brief and conclusory in form with little in the way of

clinical findings to support its conclusion.” Young v. Heckler, 803 F.2d 963, 968 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, the ALJ “must do more than offer his conclusions. He must set forth his own

interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors’, are correct.” Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 725 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988)). The

ALJ failed to do so in this case.

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Here, the ALJ’s opinion reviewed some of the medical evidence, but did not link the

evidence to his conclusion that Dr. Lai’s findings were not supported by “significant objective

findings” or “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 

(AR at 33.) Thus, the ALJ did not give sufficiently specific reasons for rejecting Dr. Lai’s

conclusions. See, e.g., Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421-22 (“To say that medical opinions are not supported

by sufficient objective findings or are contrary to the preponderant conclusions mandated by the

objective findings does not achieve the level of specificity [the Ninth Circuit requires], even when

the objective factors are listed seriatim.”). Furthermore, the ALJ did not explain why he disagreed

with Dr. Lai’s opinions about Cooper’s abilities to stand, sit, lift, bend, stoop, and crouch. He did

not set forth his interpretation of the objective evidence or explain why his interpretation, rather than

the doctor’s, was correct. Rather, the ALJ merely determined that the medical evidence of record is

consistent with his finding that Cooper was able to perform light work through January 15, 2004. 

(AR at 33.) “This approach is inadequate.” See Embrey, 849 F.2d at 422 (finding that an ALJ

commits error where he fails to give specific reasons for rejecting a treating physician’s conclusions

and “merely states that objective factors point toward an adverse conclusion and makes no effort to

relate any of [the] objective factors to any of the specific medical opinions and findings he rejects.”).

Thus, the ALJ committed legal error when he discredited the opinion of Cooper’s treating

physician but failed to set forth “a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting

clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1408.

D. The ALJ’s Assessment of Plaintiff’s Credibility Was Improper. 

Cooper argues that the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard when he discredited Cooper’s

pain testimony but failed to “state supportable reasons, grounded in evidence, for discrediting Ms.

Cooper’s statements.” (Motion at 12.) The Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s assessment of

Cooper’s credibility was proper because he “advanced several clear and convincing reasons,

supported by substantial evidence, supporting his credibility assessment.” (Cross-Motion at 7.)

“In deciding whether to accept a claimant’s subjective symptom testimony, an ALJ must

perform two stages of analysis.” Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ

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must first determine whether the claimant has properly produced objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment that could reasonably produce the alleged pain or symptoms. Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (reaffirming Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407). Once

the claimant meets this requirement, and unless the ALJ makes a finding of malingering based on

affirmative evidence thereof, “the ALJ may reject the claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of

her symptoms only if he makes specific findings stating clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918

(9th Cir. 1994)). In addition, the ALJ “must state specifically which symptom testimony is not

credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. This serves

to provide the reviewing court with assurance that the ALJ did not arbitrarily dismiss the claimant’s

testimony regarding pain. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. ALJs are permitted to consider numerous

factors in determining whether a claimant’s subjective statements are credible. See id. at 346-47; see

also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.

Here, the ALJ first found that Cooper had some impairments prior to January 16, 2004, but

went on to discredit her statements regarding pain and other symptoms with respect to that time

period. (AR at 33.) The ALJ offered several reasons in support of this finding. First, the ALJ noted

that a reported after medical examination undertaken due to her complaints failed to produce

significant findings to corroborate Cooper’s complaints. (Id.) Second, the ALJ stated that Cooper’s

behavior regarding treatment and assessment undermined her credibility. (Id. at 33-34.) Finally, the

ALJ asserted that his own observations of Cooper during the two hearings before him diminished

her credibility. (Id. at 34.) 

However, the ALJ’s rationale is insufficient because it fails to specify which specific parts of

Cooper’s testimony he discredited. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[g]eneral findings are

insufficient; rather the ALJ must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence

undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (quoting Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995)). Therefore, the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standard to discredit

Cooper’s pain testimony and the Court is unable to find that the opinion by the ALJ did not

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arbitrarily disregard Cooper’s testimony regarding her pain. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-46. 

E. The ALJ Improperly Determined Plaintiff’s Residual Functional Capacity.

Cooper asserts that the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) determination was legally

flawed and led to an erroneous determination that Cooper had the capacity to perform light work

prior to January 16, 2004. Specifically, Cooper contends that the ALJ failed to: (1) perform a

function-by-function analysis of her functional limitations and restrictions before expressing her

RFC in terms of an exertion level; (2) consider that Cooper used a medically-prescribed cane to

ambulate; (3) consider the vocational expert’s testimony during the first hearing; and (4) consider

the combined effects of Cooper’s impairments. (Motion at 14-16.)

An ALJ must first determine whether the claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed

impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d) (step three of the disability analysis). If the claimant’s

impairments do not meet or equal a listed impairment, then the ALJ must assess the claimant’s RFC. 

See id. § 416.920(e) (step four of the disability analysis). The RFC is “the most [the claimant] can

still do despite [her] limitations.” Id. § 416.945(a)(1). To make an RFC assessment, the ALJ must

first perform a “function-by-function” analysis of the claimant’s impairments compared with the

functions required for work-related activities. SSR 96-8p. The ALJ must consider the claimant’s

impairments including the impact of any related symptoms. Id. And, the ALJ must engage in the

function-by-function analysis before categorizing the claimant’s abilities in terms of exertional

levels (e.g., light or heavy work). Id. The RFC is then used to determine if the claimant is able to

perform past relevant work. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The burden of proof is on the claimant at

this step, but the ALJ must make the requisite factual findings to support his conclusion. Pinto v.

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001); see also SSR 82-62.

Here, the ALJ found that Cooper’s impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment but

that her impairments significantly limited her ability to perform basic work activities. (AR at 36.) 

The ALJ’s opinion cites extensive evidence of Cooper’s conditions and their severity prior to

January 16, 2004, but then concludes that Cooper was able to perform light work such as “her past

work as an interviewer/survey worker . . . and as a driver . . . .” (Id. at 34.) The ALJ’s analysis is

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insufficient. First, the opinion does not address Cooper’s functional limitations resulting from her

impairments prior to January 16, 2004. Second, it does not engage in a function-by-function

analysis to determine exactly what functions Cooper is able to perform in light of her impairments. 

And finally, the opinion expresses Cooper’s RFC in terms of the exertional work level (“light

work”) without first engaging in a function-by-function analysis. (AR at 34.) 

The Commissioner argues that the ALJ was not required to perform a function-by-function

analysis in light of Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). (Cross-Motion at 8-9.) 

However, Bayliss held that an ALJ is not required to prepare “a function-by-function analysis for

medical conditions or impairments that the ALJ found neither credible nor supported by the record.” 

Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1217 (citing SSR 96-8p). Here, the ALJ found that Cooper had severe and nonsevere impairments that were credible and supported by the record, but he failed to perform any

function-by-function analysis. Therefore, the ALJ applied an incorrect legal standard when he

determined Cooper’s RFC without performing the required function-by-function analysis. 

In addition, the ALJ’s determination that Cooper had the capacity to perform past work was

further flawed because it did not contain factual findings to support the conclusions. To conclude

that Cooper had the capacity to perform a past relevant job, the ALJ was required to make specific

factual findings addressing the physical and mental demands of the past job and whether Cooper was

able to fulfill those demands in light of her RFC. See Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th

Cir. 2001); see also SSR 82-62. The ALJ must consider both severe and non-severe impairments

because even those impairments that are not severe may be outcome determinative when considered

together with limitations resulting from other impairments. Pinto, 249 F.3d at 844; SSR 82-62; SSR

96-8p. Here, the ALJ failed to address the physical and mental demands of Cooper’s past work or

whether Cooper’s RFC prior to January 16, 2004 would allow her to perform those functions. In

particular, the opinion does not address whether Cooper was able to sit for extended periods of time

or alternate sitting and standing frequently, functions relevant to her ability to perform her past

work. Moreover, the ALJ did not consider Cooper’s non-severe impairments in his analysis,

Cooper’s reliance on a cane to ambulate, or the occupational expert’s testimony from the 2003

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hearing. Therefore, the ALJ also failed to apply the correct legal standard to determine whether

Cooper was able to perform her past work prior to January 16, 2004.

In sum, the ALJ applied the incorrect legal standard to determine Cooper’s RFC and also to

determine whether Cooper was able to perform her past work in light of her RFC.

F. The ALJ Failed to Determine Properly the Onset Date of Plaintiff’s Disability.

Cooper next argues that the ALJ’s determination that she was able to perform a full range of

light work until January 16, 2004 was erroneous. Specifically, Cooper contends that her disability

onset date should not have been inferred by the ALJ, but rather that the ALJ should have developed

a record to determine the onset of her disability. (Motion at 17.) In response, the Commissioner

argues that, due to the progressive nature of Cooper’s conditions, the exact date she became disabled

had to be inferred from the evidence, and there were reasonable grounds to support the ALJ’s

determination. (Cross-Motion at 9-10.)

Factors that a court should consider when determining a claimant’s disability onset date

include: (1) the claimant’s statements as to when the disability began, (2) the day the individual

stopped working, and (3) the medical evidence. SSR 83-20. The Court may infer that the onset date

“of a disabling impairment[] occurred some time prior to the date of the first recorded medical

examination” if the evidence supports such a conclusion. Id.; see also Armstrong v. Comm’r, 160

F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998) (a claimant’s diagnosis date may not be conclusive evidence that the

impairment was not disabling long before that date). However, where a claimant has “slowly

progressive impairments, it is sometimes impossible to obtain medical evidence establishing the

precise date an impairment became disabling.” SSR 83-20. When there is no precise evidence

available as to when an impairment became disabling, the ALJ must call on the services of a medical

advisor. Delhomme v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 1991); see SSR 83-20.

Here, Cooper alleges that she has been disabled since August 28, 2001 and has not worked

since that date. (AR at 29, 98.) However, the medical evidence is not precise as to when Cooper

became disabled. First, Cooper has sought treatment for pain in her right groin area since at least

April 2001. (Id. at 182-83.) In September of 2001 Cooper was prescribed a cane for ambulation due

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to her painful limping gait. (Id. at 173.) In 2002, an x-ray of Cooper’s cervical spine indicated that

she suffered from degenerative disc disease. (Id. at 240.) A subsequent x-ray of Cooper’s knees

also indicated “degenerative joint disease of the medical compartment on the left and also of

bilateral patellofemoral compartments.” (Id. at 226.) Cooper continued to see Dr. Lai in 2003,

whose records indicate that Cooper continued to suffer from multiple areas of pain and continued to

ambulate with a cane. (Id. at 294, 309.) A 2003 bilateral hip MRI indicated degenerative changes

of Cooper’s right hip joint; however, the MRI did not provide definite evidence of avascular

necrosis. (Id. at 310.) In December of 2003, Cooper reported increasing hip pain to Dr. Lai and was

not able to get on the examination table during the examination. (Id. at 225.) It was then that

Cooper was referred to an orthopedist. The orthopedist reported that as of January 16, 2004 (the

date of the appointment) Cooper reported hip and groin pain for several years that had gotten

progressively worse. (Id. at 317.) In February 2004, an ultrasound of Cooper’s groin area indicated

that she had a small right indirect hernia. (Id. at 316.) An MRI of Cooper’s shoulder in March 2004

indicated an “incomplete articular side supraspinatus tendon tear” and “joint effusion.” (Id. at 314.) 

In March 2004, the orthopedist ordered a bilateral hip x-ray study of Cooper in the “frog lateral

position.” (Id. at 313.) This study concluded that Cooper suffered from “[p]rogressive degenerative

joint disease bilaterally, now advanced on the right and moderately advanced on the left.” (Id.) The

doctor then suggested that Cooper may need a total hip arthroplasty, if physical therapy failed. (Id.

at 312.) However, there is also medical evidence that indicates that Cooper may not have been

disabled prior to January 16, 2004, including x-rays and ultrasounds rendering inconclusive results

and physician opinions during that time that indicate contrary results. (See id. at 31-32.) Indeed,

even the ALJ indicated that the record was ambiguous. (AR at 31) ( “According to the claimant’s

medical records, on complaints of groin and/or hip pain, the medical evidence, at least prior to 2004,

was somewhat equivocal.”).

In sum, the evidence is not conclusive with regard to when Cooper became disabled. 

Although some of Cooper’s impairments were not diagnosed until 2004, Cooper’s impairments may

have become disabling prior to January 16, 2004. In light of the equivocal evidence, the ALJ was

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required to call a medical expert to aid in determining the onset date. See Delhomme, 924 F.2d at

848; SSR 83-20. Instead, the ALJ inferred Cooper’s disability onset date in light of the progressive

nature of Cooper’s impairments and the inconclusive evidence. (AR at 35.)

In response, the Commissioner argues that Dr. Becchitti’s testimony assisted the ALJ in

making the reasonable inference that Cooper’s impairments became disabling on January 16, 2004

even though Dr. Becchetti did not specifically discuss Cooper’s onset date. (Cross-Motion at 9-10.) 

However, Dr. Becchetti was called by the ALJ to assist in determining the status of Cooper’s hernia

and not the onset date of her disability. (AR at 415.) As such, the ALJ committed legal error

because he failed to call a medical expert to assist him in a determination of Cooper’s disability

onset date. 

G. Remand Standard.

The decision to remand is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. Apfel, 211

F.3d 1172, 1175-77 (9th Cir. 2000). If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original

administrative proceedings or will allow the Commissioner properly to complete the administrative

proceedings, then the case should be remanded. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir.

1980). Here, remand is appropriate because additional proceedings can remedy the ALJ’s legal

errors. Moreover, in light of Cooper’s age and the delays in this case, additional proceedings should

be held within 90 days. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 504 (9th Cir. 1989).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Cooper’s motion for summary judgment and

DENIES the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Court REMANDS the

matter to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 1, 2007 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:05-cv-03463-JSW Document 23 Filed 03/01/07 Page 12 of 12