Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01436/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01436-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeanne Kitchen
Plaintiff
Lodi Unified School District
Defendant
Catherine Nichols-Washer
Defendant
Neil Young
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

JEANNE KITCHEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LODI UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:14-01436 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION 

TO DISMISS AND MOTION FOR LEAVE 

TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Jeanne Kitchen brought this action against 

defendant Lodi Unified School District alleging disability-based 

discrimination, retaliation, and interference in violation of the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation 

Act. Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, reimbursement for 

health care premiums she paid as a result of her allegedly 

wrongful exclusion from the school district’s Early Retirement 

Health Benefits program. Defendant moves to dismiss several of 

these claims.

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I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff worked as a school teacher for the defendant, 

Lodi Unified School District, from 1991 to 2012. (Compl. ¶¶ 13-

15.) In September 2009, plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar 

disorder, and around the same time, she required surgery for a 

back disability. (Id. ¶ 14.) Between September 2009 and the 

summer of 2012, plaintiff missed work due to her disabilities. 

(Id.) She allegedly worked most of the 2010-2011 school year, 

and worked in the fall semester for the 2011-2012 school year. 

She did not work during the spring semester of 2011-2012 due to 

disability. (Id.) 

By that time, plaintiff qualified for early retirement

from the school district. (Id. ¶ 15.) During the summer of 

2012, plaintiff decided to exercise her option to retire, and she 

submitted a letter of retirement on August 22, 2012. (Id.) Her 

effective date of retirement was September 30, 2012. (Id.) 

Through its Early Retirement Health Benefits program, 

defendant ordinarily pays for retirees’ health coverage premiums. 

(Id. ¶ 16.) Plaintiff alleges that defendant excluded her from 

the program based on the fact that she took unpaid days off prior 

to retirement. (Id.) She alleges that, but for that time off, 

she would have qualified for the Early Retirement Health Benefits 

program. (Id.) 

Plaintiff brought this action under the ADA and 

Rehabilitation Act seeking reimbursement of premiums paid as a 

result of her exclusion from the Early Retirement Health Benefits 

program, interest on that amount, and injunctive relief ordering 

defendant to pay future premiums. (Compl. at 8.) She asserts 

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five causes of action: (1) disability-based discrimination in 

violation of Title I of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112, et seq.; (2)

disability-based discrimination in violation of Title II of the 

ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq.; (3) disability-based 

discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 

§§ 794, et seq.; (4) retaliation and interference in violation of 

Title V of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203; and (5) retaliation in 

violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 704, et seq. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 25-45.) 

II. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s first and fourth 

claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) on 

the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity and plaintiff’s second 

and fifth claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim on which relief can be granted.

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim 

under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept the allegations in the 

complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 

the plaintiff. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), 

overruled on other grounds by Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 

(1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). To survive a 

motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead “only enough facts to 

state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This 

“plausibility standard,” however, “asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” and where a 

complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with a 

defendant’s liability,” it “stops short of the line between 

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possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

A. The Eleventh Amendment Precludes Plaintiff’s First and 

Fourth Claims

The Eleventh Amendment bars any suit against a state or 

state agency absent a valid waiver or abrogation of its sovereign 

immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54

(1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890) (holding that 

the Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of that same 

state as well as suits brought by citizens of another state). 

This immunity applies regardless of whether a state or state 

agency is sued for damages or injunctive relief, Alabama v. Pugh, 

438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978), and regardless of whether the 

plaintiff’s claim arises under federal or state law, Pennhurst 

State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121, (1984). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “Eleventh Amendment 

immunity does not implicate a federal court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction in an ordinary sense,” and thus, should be treated

as an affirmative defense for which “the public entity . . . 

bear[s] the burden of proving the facts that establish its 

immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.” ITSI T.V. Prods., Inc. 

v. Agric. Ass’ns, 3 F.3d 1289, 1291-92 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Eleventh 

Amendment immunity, whatever its jurisdictional attributes, 

should be treated as an affirmative defense.”); see also Hill v. 

Blind Indus. and Serv. of Md., 179 F.3d 754, 760 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(concluding that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a true 

jurisdictional bar because it can be waived or forfeited by the 

state). 

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In Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. 

Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the

Eleventh Amendment shields states from employment claims under 

Title I of the ADA. Id. at 360 (striking down Congress’s 

purported abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity as exceeding 

its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The 

Ninth Circuit has extended Garrett’s holding to Title V claims 

that are premised on alleged violations of Title I. See Demshki 

v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he Court’s 

holding necessarily applies to claims brought under Title V of 

the ADA, at least where . . . the claims are predicated on 

alleged violations of Title I.”). 

California school districts, including the defendant,

are considered agents of the state and may assert Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 

F.2d 248, 253-55 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that California’s 

scheme of centralized state control of and funding for public

school districts makes them immune from suit under the Eleventh 

Amendment because the school district “is an agent of the state 

that performs state governmental functions and . . . a judgment 

would be satisfied out of state funds”). Plaintiff makes no 

argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment

squarely precludes plaintiff’s first claim for relief under Title 

I of the ADA and fourth claim for relief under Title V of the 

ADA. 

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Cognizable Claim for Relief 

under Title II of the ADA

Individuals may not bring claims related to their 

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employment under Title II of the ADA. Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t 

of Justice, 170 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen viewed 

as a whole, the text, context and structure of the ADA show 

unambiguously that Congress did not intend for Title II to apply 

to employment.”). Title II pertains to “Public Services,” id. at 

1175, whereas employment claims are reserved for Title I, id. at 

1172 (“Title I applies specifically to employment.”). 

This holding would appear to bar plaintiff’s attempt to 

sue her former employer under Title II. But plaintiff argues 

that her Title II claim is proper because it arises, not out of 

her employment with defendant, but out of her exclusion from 

defendant’s Early Retirement Health Benefits Program, which 

should be considered one of the “services, programs, or 

activities” covered by Title II. (Pl.’s Opp’n at 8 (Docket No. 

10).) 

Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified 

individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, 

be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of 

the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be 

subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132. In Zimmerman, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the phrase

“services, programs, or activities” as applying “only to 

‘outputs’ of a public agency, not to ‘inputs’ such as 

employment.” Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174 (citing Decker v. Univ. 

of Houston, 970 F. Supp. 575, 580 (S.D. Tex. 1997)). In defining 

the scope of a public agency’s “outputs,” the court drew a line 

between services that an agency makes “generally available” to 

the public and the “inputs” required to provide those services:

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Consider, for example, how a Parks Department would answer 

the question, “What are the services, programs, and 

activities of the Parks Department?” It might answer, “We 

operate a swimming pool; we lead nature walks; we maintain 

playgrounds.” It would not answer, “We buy lawnmowers and 

hire people to operate them.” The latter is a means to 

deliver the services, programs, and activities of the 

hypothetical Parks Department, but it is not itself a 

service, program, or activity of the Parks Department.

Id. at 1174. 

The Ninth Circuit did not directly consider whether a 

retirement health benefits program falls on the input or output 

side of this line. However, it is clear that such a program is

not generally available to the public. An individual becomes 

eligible for retirement health benefits as a direct result of his 

or her employment relationship with the school district. (See

Compl. ¶ 30 (“As a former school teacher with more than 20 years 

of service, Plaintiff was qualified to participate in the 

Defendant’s Early Retirement Health Benefits program . . . .”).) 

Presumably, a school district’s primary service is education, and 

it engages in the provision of retirement benefits only “as a 

means to deliver [] services, programs, and activities” relating 

to education. See Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1174. 

Moreover, at least one other circuit has concluded that 

retirement benefits relate to an individual’s employment with a

public agency, not the “services, programs, or activities” of 

that agency. See Mary Jo C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 

Civ. No. 09-5635 SJF ARL, 2011 WL 1748572, at *10-12 (E.D.N.Y. 

May 5, 2011) (holding that Title II does not apply to a 

plaintiff’s claim for denial of disability retirement benefits 

because such a claim “clearly relate[s] to her employment with 

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that entity, as opposed to the programs and services the Library 

offers to the public at large”) aff’d in relevant part in Mary Jo 

C. v. N.Y. State & Local Ret. Sys., 707 F.3d 144, 168-72 (2d Cir. 

2013). 

Because plaintiff’s claim arises from her employment 

with defendant, she cannot bring it under Title II of the ADA. 

Zimmerman, 170 F.3d at 1178. Accordingly, the court must grant 

defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second claim. 

C. Plaintiff Fails to State a Claim for Retaliation in 

Violation of the Rehabilitation Act1

The Ninth Circuit has held that a retaliation claim 

brought under the Rehabilitation Act “requires a plaintiff to 

show: ‘(1) involvement in a protected activity, (2) an adverse 

employment action and (3) a causal link between the two.’” Coons 

v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 887 (9th Cir. 

2004) (quoting Brown v. City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th 

Cir. 2003)). Defendant argues that plaintiff fails to allege

facts establishing involvement in a protected activity or a 

causal link. (Def.’s Mem. at 7-8 (Docket No. 7-1).) 

With regard to the first required showing, a request 

 

1 The Rehabilitation Act contains no anti-retaliation 

provision of its own. Instead, it expressly incorporates the 

ADA’s anti-retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. McCoy v. 

Dep’t of Army, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2011) 

(Karlton, J.). Accordingly, the court draws in part from the 

case law and requirements of that section, which provides that 

“[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because 

such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by 

this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, 

proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12203(a). 

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for accommodation of a disability can constitute involvement in a

protected activity. See Coons, 383 F.3d at 887 (“Coons was 

engaged in a protected activity when he requested that the IRS 

make reasonable accommodations for his alleged disability.”). 

However, to state a retaliation claim premised on a request for 

accommodation, a plaintiff must “allege[] facts which demonstrate 

that the defendants were aware of plaintiff’s attempts to seek 

such accommodation.” Weixel v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 

287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002); see also Alex G. ex rel. Dr. 

Steven G. v. Bd. of Trs. of Davis Joint Unified Sch. Dist., 387 

F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (Levi, J.) (requiring 

plaintiffs to show “the defendants knew [plaintiffs] were 

involved in the protected activity”). 

Plaintiff alleges she was denied eligibility based on 

“the time off she required as a reasonable accommodation for her 

disability.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) However, the complaint is silent as 

to whether plaintiff actually made a request for time off as an 

accommodation for her disability or otherwise alerted the 

defendant of the need to accommodate her. Because she fails to 

allege such a request, plaintiff falls short of showing that she 

engaged in an activity protected by the Rehabilitation Act.

Plaintiff’s Complaint also fails to allege “a causal 

link” between her involvement in a protected activity and the 

defendant’s adverse employment action against her. See Coons,

383 F.3d at 887. Plaintiff alleges “there is evidence that 

Defendant LUSD took affirmative and intentional steps to ensure 

that Plaintiff Kitchen would be excluded from the program,” 

(Compl. ¶ 17), and she points to this statement in support of a 

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causal link, (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 10, 13). But a fair reading of 

this statement does not contain an allegation that defendant’s

“affirmative and intentional steps” were taken because of

plaintiff’s request for an accommodation or any other alleged 

protected activity. Nor does it point to any circumstantial 

evidence of causation, such as her employer’s knowledge of her 

disability. See Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1376 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (“Causation sufficient to establish the third element 

of the prima facie case may be inferred from circumstantial 

evidence, such as the employer’s knowledge that the plaintiff 

engaged in protected activities and the proximity in time between 

the protected action and the allegedly retaliatory employment 

decision” (citing Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 

731 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

Accordingly, because plaintiff fails to allege the 

first and third elements of a prima facie retaliation claim, the 

court must grant defendant’s motion to dismiss. 

III. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a First Amended Complaint 

(“FAC”) pursuant Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) to address

the issues discussed above and add two additional defendants--

Superintendent Catherine Nichols-Washer and Director of Personnel 

Neil Young--as state officials sued in their official capacity. 

(See Pl’s Mem. in Support of Mot. for Leave to File FAC at 1-2.) 

A party may amend its complaint under Rule 15(a) “once 

as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is 

served . . . or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 

12(b) . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Thereafter, a party may 

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amend only “with the opposing party’s written consent or the 

court’s leave.” Id. “[T]he court should freely give leave [to 

amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see 

also Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 

(9th Cir. 1989) (“We have stressed Rule 15’s policy of favoring 

amendments, and we have applied this policy with liberality.”). 

But “leave need not be granted where the amendment of the 

complaint would cause the opposing party undue prejudice, is 

sought in bad faith, constitutes an exercise in futility, or 

creates undue delay.” Ascon Properties, 866 F.2d at 1160. 

Defendant opposes plaintiff’s request on the basis of 

futility. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Leave to File FAC at 

3-7.) “[A] proposed amendment is futile only if no set of facts 

can be proved under the amendment to the pleadings that would 

constitute a valid and sufficient claim or defense.” Miller v. 

Rykoff–Sexton, Inc., 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988). 

As explained above, plaintiff’s first, second, and 

fourth claims against defendant are barred as a matter of law, 

and the court can envision no set of facts that will allow 

plaintiff to allege that defendant violated those respective

statutes. Accordingly, any proposed amendment to those claims as 

against defendant would be futile.

However, the court cannot conclude that no set of facts 

would entitle plaintiff to relief under her fifth claim, 

retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. (Compl. 

¶ 42-45.) Defendant appears to argue that this claim would be 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. 

for Leave to File FAC at 3-7.) However, “Congress may exercise 

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its spending power to condition the grant of federal funds upon 

the states’ agreement to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity.” 

Douglas v. Cal. Dep’t of Youth Auth., 271 F.3d 812, 820, amended, 

271 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida 

Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 

(1999)). The Ninth Circuit has held that “the clear waiver 

language of the Rehabilitation Act conditions the receipt of 

federal funds under the Rehabilitation Act upon a state’s 

agreement to forgo the Eleventh Amendment defense” and “by 

accepting federal Rehabilitation Act funds, California has waived 

its sovereign immunity under the Rehabilitation Act.” Id. at 

820. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment does not necessarily bar 

plaintiff from amending her fifth claim to correct its current 

deficiencies and state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Similarly, the court cannot conclude that no set of 

facts would allow plaintiff to state a valid claim against the

additional defendants she proposes. Plaintiff may sue state

officials for prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young, 

209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9 (“Those 

standards [of Title I of the ADA] can be enforced by . . . 

private individuals in actions for injunctive relief under Ex 

parte Young.”). She should have a chance to bring those claims. 

The court cautions, however, that to the extent that 

plaintiff may seek to sue state officials in their official 

capacity for relief properly characterized as retrospective, her

claims may be barred again by the Eleventh Amendment. See

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (“Relief that in 

essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an 

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action of a state official in his official capacity that was 

illegal under federal law is barred even when the state official 

is the named defendant.”); see also Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. 

Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002) (“In determining 

whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young avoids an Eleventh 

Amendment bar to suit, a court need only conduct a 

straightforward inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an 

ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly 

characterized as prospective.” (quotation marks and citation 

omitted)); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666 (1974) (“We do 

not read Ex parte Young or subsequent holdings of this Court to 

indicate that any form of relief may be awarded against a state 

officer . . . so long as the relief may be labeled ‘equitable’ in 

nature.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Lodi Unified 

School District’s motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, 

GRANTED;

Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is 

signed to file an amended complaint, if she can do so consistent 

with this Order.

Dated: November 4, 2014

 

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