Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56762/USCOURTS-ca9-13-56762-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bath Iron Works Corporation
Appellee
Huntington Ingalls Incorporated

Carol McIndoe
Appellant
Lorraine McIndoe
Appellant
Pauline McIndoe
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CAROL MCINDOE, as Wrongful

Death Heir, and as Successor-inInterest to James McIndoe,

Deceased; LORRAINE MCINDOE;

PAULINE MCINDOE, as Legal Heirs

of James McIndoe, Deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS

INCORPORATED, FKA Northrop

Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc.,

Defendant,

and

BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-56762

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-09639-

RGK-SS

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2 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

CAROL MCINDOE, as Wrongful

Death Heir, and as Successor-inInterest to James McIndoe,

Deceased; LORRAINE MCINDOE;

PAULINE MCINDOE, as Legal Heirs

of James McIndoe, Deceased,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

HUNTINGTON INGALLS

INCORPORATED, FKA Northrop

Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc.,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION,

Defendant.

No. 13-56764

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-09639-

RGK-SS

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 31, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed March 31, 2016

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 3

Before: Alex Kozinski, Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain,

and Jay S. Bybee, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

SUMMARY*

Maritime Law / Asbestos Claims

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of shipbuilders on strict products liability and

negligence claims brought under federal maritime law

against companies that built naval ships aboard which James

McIndoe allegedly was exposed to asbestos.

The panel held that the two naval warships were not

“products” for the purposes of strict products liability. 

On the general negligence claims, the panel held that

there was a genuine issue of fact as to whether McIndoe was

exposed to asbestos-containing materials originally installed

upon such ships, but not as to whether any such exposure was

a substantial contributing factor to his injuries.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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4 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

COUNSEL

Richard M. Grant, Brayton Purcell LLP, Novato, California,

argued the cause and filed the briefs for the plaintiffsappellants. With him on the briefs was Lloyd F. LeRoy,

Brayton Purcell LLP, Novato, California.

Daniel J. Kelly, Tucker Ellis LLP, San Francisco, California,

argued the cause and filed the brief for defendant-appellee

Huntington Ingalls Incorporated.

Edward R. Hugo, Brydon Hugo & Parker, San Francisco,

California, argued the cause and filed the brief for defendantappellee Bath Iron Works Corporation. With him on the brief

were James C. Parker and Charles S. Park, Brydon Hugo &

Parker, San Francisco, California.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide whether two naval warships are

“products” for the purposes of strict products liability and

whether a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether asbestoscontaining materials originally installed upon such ships

caused a decedent’s injuries.

I

In the 1960s, James McIndoe served aboard two U.S.

Naval ships which contained pipe insulation made from

asbestos. From 1961–1963, he served aboard the USS Coral

Sea, an aircraft carrier built by a predecessor in interest to

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 5

Huntington Ingalls Inc. (Huntington) and commissioned in

1947. From 1966–1967, he served aboard the USS Worden,

a guided missile cruiser built byBath Iron Works Corporation

(Bath) and commissioned in 1963. Aboard each ship,

McIndoe was allegedly present during maintenance work

involving the removal of pipe insulation that caused asbestos

fibers to float in the air he breathed.

On September 27, 2011, McIndoe died from

complications related to mesothelioma, a form of cancer

closely associated with asbestos exposure. PlaintiffsAppellants are McIndoe’s legal heirs, who filed suit in

California state court against Bath and Huntington,1

arguing

that McIndoe’s exposure to asbestos-containing materials

aboard their ships contributed to his death. McIndoe’s heirs

raised design, manufacture, and failure-to-warn claims based

on theories of both strict products liability and general

negligence. The case was removed to federal district court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), where Bath and Huntington

each moved for summary judgment. The district court

granted both motions on the grounds that the ships were not

products for purposes of strict liability and that the heirs

could not establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding

whether the shipbuilders were responsible for installing any

asbestos-containing insulation that caused McIndoe’s

injuries. McIndoe’s heirs timely appealed, and these cases

have been consolidated before our court.

1 The lawsuit also named a number of other defendants who are not

parties to this appeal.

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6 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

II

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment, and, “viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party, [determine] whether there

are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the

district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law.” 

Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2014)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]here is no issue for

trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the

nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. 

If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly

probative, summary judgment may be granted.” R.W. Beck

&Assocs. v. City & Borough of Sitka, 27 F.3d 1475, 1480 n.4

(9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Arguments based on conjecture or speculation are

insufficient . . . . ” Id.

Federal maritime law—“an amalgam of traditional

common-law rules, modifications of those rules, and newly

created rules”—governs this case. E. River S.S. Corp. v. 

Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986); see

Wallis v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 306 F.3d 827, 840 (9th Cir.

2002) (federal maritime law applies to torts that occur on

navigable water and bear a substantial relationship to

traditional maritime activity).

III

McIndoe’s heirs first argue that Bath and Huntington

should be held strictly liable for defects in materials

originally installed on the ships they built. The Supreme

Court has recognized that federal maritime law incorporates

actions for products liability, including those that sound in

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 7

strict liability. E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 865. The

question whether a naval warship is to be considered a

“product” in this context, however, appears to be one of first

impression for the federal courts of appeals.

When analyzing products-liability claims under maritime

law, we look to the Restatement of Torts (the

“Restatement”)—particularly the most recent Third

Restatement—for guidance. Oswalt v. Resolute Indus., Inc.,

642 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Saratoga Fishing

Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 879 (1997) (citing

both Second and Third Restatements in evaluating maritime

products-liability action). The Third Restatement defines a

“product” subject to strict liability as “tangible personal

property distributed commercially for use or consumption.” 

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 19(a) (Am. Law

Inst. 1998) (emphasis added). “[O]nly when the complainedof injury was allegedly caused by a defect in something

within this . . . definition of ‘product’ should the defendant

manufacturer or seller be strictly liable for the harm caused.” 

Id. § 19 reporter’s note, cmt. a. Injuries caused by other items

are actionable only “under negligence, misrepresentation, or

some other liability theory.” Id.

By these terms, the Restatement would exclude warships

that were never “distributed commercially” from the realm of

strict products liability. This makes sense. The general aim

of strict liability is to “plac[e] responsibility on the . . . party

most able to prevent harm” caused by dangerous products and

thus to incentivize proper “design and quality control” of

such products. All Alaskan Seafoods, Inc. v. Raychem Corp.,

197 F.3d 992, 995 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Third Restatement). 

Therefore, “strict liability should be imposed on the party

best able to protect persons from hazardous equipment.” E.

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8 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 866. These goals would be

advanced little by imposing liability on the builder of a

custom-ordered naval ship. As evidence submitted in this

case suggests, a ship built under government contract2 may

not even be designed by the builder but instead by the

government itself or another outside professional. Further,

the shipbuilder does not manufacture—and has little ability

to control the quality of—the many thousands of component

parts installed on each ship, let alone to account in its pricing

for the virtually unlimited liability that would flow from a

rule holding it strictly liable for their dangers. We do not

believe that federal maritime law—the primary goal of which

is to protect and to promote the “smooth flow of maritime

commerce,” Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668,

674–76 (1982)—would countenance such a sweeping grant

of liability. See generally Mack v. Gen. Elec. Co., 896 F.

Supp. 2d 333, 344–46 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (discussing principles

of strict liability and maritime law).

We therefore agree with the district court that McIndoe’s

heirs cannot sustain an action for strict products liability

premised upon the notion that the warships in question are

2 McIndoe’s heirs do not dispute that Bath and Huntington built the

relevant ships pursuant to government contract.

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 9

themselves “products” under maritime law.

3 Accordingly, the

heirs may prevail only under a theory of negligence.

IV

We turn to the heirs’ general negligence claims. To

prevail on such claims, they must demonstrate, among other

things, that McIndoe’s injuries were caused by exposure to

asbestos that was attributable to the shipbuilders’ conduct. 

To do so, McIndoe’s heirs must be able to show both that he

was actually exposed to asbestos-containing materials that

were installed by the shipbuilders and that such exposure was

a substantial contributing factor in causing his injuries. 

Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Tr., 424 F.3d 488, 492 (6th Cir.

2005). We examine each requirement in turn.

A

First, McIndoe’s heirs must show that he was exposed to

asbestos from materials that Bath or Huntington installed

aboard the Coral Sea and Worden. The heirs do not claim

3 We express no opinion on the circumstances under which a

commercially distributed or mass-produced vessel would qualify as a

“product” under maritime law. McIndoe’s heirs cite cases in which the

manufacturers ofsuch vessels have been held strictly liable for their flaws. 

But such vessels enter the general stream of commerce in a way custombuilt vessels do not, and thus the cases cited say little for the standards that

should govern liability for the naval shipbuilders at issue here. See

generally Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 19 cmt. e. (Am.

Law Inst. 1998) (distinguishing pre-fabricated or mass-produced homes

from those which are built and sold “one house at a time”); see also Stark

v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 21 F. App’x 371, 378 n.6 (6th Cir. Oct.

3, 2001) (“[Custom-built] vessels resemble custom-designed houses,

which are also not likely to be considered ‘products’ under the

Restatement.”).

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10 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

that the shipbuilders were responsible for replacing or

maintaining such insulation after the ships were

commissioned. Therefore, they must show exposure to

asbestos from materials that were originally installed aboard

the ships. The heirs seek to demonstrate McIndoe’s asbestos

exposure through the first-hand observations of two lay

witnesses and, based on these observations, the opinion of

one purported expert.

Regarding the USS Coral Sea (built by Huntington and

commissioned in 1947), McIndoe’s heirs offered a

declaration of Brian Tench, who boarded the ship as an

ensign in 1961 and spent significant time with McIndoe in

engineering spaces of the ship. Tench testified that there

were insulated steam pipes throughout the engineering spaces

in which he worked with McIndoe; that “[b]ased on his

training and experience,” he knew such insulation contained

asbestos;4that, he saw McIndoe in the area of others

removing asbestos-containing insulation on 20–30 different

occasions; and that the removal of the insulation created

“large amounts of visible dust” in the air McIndoe breathed. 

Tench states that he knows some of the removed pipe

insulation was original to the ship because he could tell from

the thickness of the paint on the insulation that it had been

painted 6–8 times, indicating to him that it must have been

aboard the ship for some time.

4

It is not clear from Tench’s declaration how he obtained this

knowledge, other than his conclusory statements that he came to learn it. 

And there is some reason to doubt that Tench’s knowledge could be

established at trial, given his statement that he relied at least partly on

statements of others who said that the insulation contained asbestos.

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 11

Regarding the USS Worden (built by Bath and

commissioned in 1963), McIndoe’s heirs offered a

declaration of Thomas Sappington, who boarded the ship in

1964 and worked for two years in one of the ship’s fire

rooms. Sappington declared that there were thousands of feet

of insulated pipe in the fire rooms; that McIndoe was “often”

present when maintenance was performed, which involved

the removal of pipe insulation; and that the process of

removing the insulation created visible dust in the air

McIndoe breathed. Much like Tench, Sappington declared

that he could distinguish the ship’s original pipe insulation

from later-installed replacement insulation based on visible

seams between new and old insulation and on variances in the

thickness of their paint,5and that he believes much of the

insulation removed in McIndoe’s presence was original to the

ship.

McIndoe’s heirs built upon these accounts through the

declaration of Charles Ay, a professional asbestos consultant

who worked aboard hundreds of naval ships as a pipe

insulator in the 1960s–1980s. Ay stated that, based on his

experience, he knew that insulation used on high-pressure

pipelines in Naval ships built in the 1940s–1960s always

contained asbestos; that nearly half of all originally installed

insulation aboard such vessels was not removed during the

life of the ship; that during McIndoe’s time aboard the Coral

Sea, at least 70 percent of the original asbestos-containing

insulation would have remained; that during McIndoe’s time

aboard the Worden, “virtually all” of the original insulation

would have remained; and that he personally saw thousands

5 Like Tench, Sappington also refers to statements of others who told

him which sections of insulation had been replaced and which were

original.

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12 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

of lineal feet of asbestos-containing pipe insulation while

working as an insulator aboard each ship (in the mid-1960s

on the Worden and the 1970s on the Coral Sea). Based on his

experience and the statements of Tench and Sappington, Ay

concluded that it is “virtually impossible” that McIndoe

would have avoided being exposed to asbestos dust from

original insulation during his time aboard each ship.

We agree with the district court that the evidence that

McIndoe was exposed to asbestos originally installed by the

shipbuilders is not especially strong. The only direct

evidence presented to support the claim that such insulation

was removed in McIndoe’s presence is the rather implausible

testimony of Tench and Sappington that, nearly 50 years

later, they recall the thickness of the paint on the removed

insulation to such a degree that they can surmise the age of

the insulation. To these direct accounts, Ay can add only his

speculation as to what materials a person in McIndoe’s

position would have encountered, with no actual knowledge

of McIndoe’s activities aboard the ships. Nevertheless,

viewing these statements in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs, Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1065, we conclude that a jury

could determine that McIndoe was exposed to originally

installed asbestos, even if it seems unlikely that a jury would

do so. Such evidence therefore creates a genuine issue of fact

regarding whether McIndoe was at least exposed to asbestos

from the shipbuilders’ materials.

B

But even if the evidence may establish that McIndoe was

actually exposed to asbestos installed by the shipbuilders, his

heirs still must show that any such exposure was a substantial

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 13

contributing factor to his injuries.6 Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at

492.

1

Absent direct evidence of causation, a party may satisfy

the substantial-factor test by demonstrating that the injured

person had substantial exposure to the relevant asbestos for

a substantial period of time. See id.; see also Menne v.

Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1462 (10th Cir. 1988) (“More

significant under traditional causation tests than the question

of mere exposure to [asbestos-containing] productsiswhether

the exposure was sufficiently sustained (or frequent) and

intense to constitute a proximate cause of [the plaintiff’s]

mesothelioma.”). Evidence of only minimal exposure to

asbestos is insufficient; there must be “a high enough level of

exposure that an inference that the asbestos was a substantial

factor in the injury is more than conjectural.” Lindstrom,

424 F.3d at 492 (internal quotation marks omitted).

McIndoe’s heirs failed to put forward such evidence here. 

Even crediting the assertions of their two first-hand

6 Lindstrom, from the Sixth Circuit, appears to be the only federal Court

of Appeals decision to consider squarely the causation standard

applicable to asbestos claims under maritime law. But the Sixth Circuit’s

analysis comports with the general approach taken by other federal courts

in asbestos cases, and we agree with the district court and the parties that

such standard governs our analysis. See also Benefiel v. Exxon Corp.,

959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying “substantial factor”

requirement to maritime tort); Curtis v. ABB Inc., 622 F. App’x 661 (9th

Cir. Nov. 13, 2015) (mem.) (applying Lindstrom to asbestos claim);

Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 36,

reporter’s note, cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2010) (citing numerous

jurisdictions that employ the substantial-factor standard to limit scope of

liability in asbestos cases).

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14 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

witnesses, at most the heirs have provided evidence that

McIndoe was “frequently” present during the removal of

insulation aboard the Worden and was present 20–30 times

during such removal aboard the Coral Sea. But, as the

district court found, even if McIndoe was around asbestos

dust several times, his heirs presented no evidence regarding

the amount of exposure to dust from originally installed

asbestos, or critically, the duration of such exposure during

any of these incidents. Without such facts, McIndoe’s heirs

can only speculate as to the actual extent of his exposure to

asbestos from the shipbuilder’s materials. At this stage, more

is needed. See Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc.,

637 F.3d 1047, 1061 (9th Cir. 2011); R.W. Beck & Assocs.,

27 F.3d at 1480 n.4.

2

The heirs do not seriously contend that they provided

evidence demonstrating that McIndoe suffered substantial

exposure to originally installed asbestos for a substantial

period of time. Instead, they argue that evidence of

prolonged exposure is not needed, because they presented the

opinion of Dr. Allen Raybin—a medical expert who asserted

that every exposure to asbestos above a threshold level is

necessarily a substantial factor in the contraction of asbestosrelated diseases.

The district court properly rejected this argument. 

McIndoe’s heirs appear to have introduced Dr. Raybin’s

testimony and his “every exposure” theory of asbestos

causation to reject the substantial-factor test as a whole. Dr.

Raybin did not speak to the severity of McIndoe’s own

asbestos exposure beyond the basic assertion that such

exposure was significantly above ambient asbestos levels. 

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 15

More critically, Dr. Raybin did not speak to the severity of

McIndoe’s exposure to originally installed asbestos—and

generally did not make distinctions between the overall dose

of asbestos McIndoe breathed aboard the ships and that

portion of such exposure which could be attributed to the

shipbuilders’ materials.7 Likewise, Dr. Raybin did not opine

on the effect of McIndoe’s actual exposure to the

shipbuilders’ asbestos-containing materials, except in the

broadest sense. Namely, while Dr. Raybin concluded that the

exposures described by Sappington and Tench would have

substantially contributed to McIndoe’s injuries, he explicitly

and directly based such conclusion on his “each and every

exposure” theory of causation. Taken together, Dr. Raybin’s

testimony aims more to establish a legal conclusion—what

general level of asbestos exposure is required to show disease

causation—than to establish the facts of McIndoe’s own

injuries.

McIndoe’s heirs cite no case approving the use of such a

sweeping opinion to satisfy causation under maritime law. 

Indeed, in Lindstrom, the Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected an

argument similar to the heirs’, concluding that such a theory

of liability would render the substantial-factor test essentially

meaningless. See 424 F.3d at 493. Allowing causation to be

established through testimony like Dr. Raybin’s would

“permit imposition of liability on the manufacturer of any

7 To the extent that Dr. Raybin attempted to assert that the encounters

described by Tench and Sappington “are high level exposures that

occurred for a prolonged period of time,” he had no basis on which to do

so. As described above, Tench and Sappington failed to provide

information regarding the intensity or duration of McIndoe’s alleged

exposures to originally installed asbestos aboard the Worden and Coral

Sea; McIndoe’s heirs cannot rely on a third-party expert to fill in those

percipient gaps for them.

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16 MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS

[asbestos-containing] product with which a worker had the

briefest of encounters on a single occasion.” Id. This is

precisely the sort of unbounded liability that the substantial

factor test was developed to limit. See Restatement (Third)

of Torts: Liab. for Physical & Emotional Harm § 36

reporter’s note, cmt. b (Am. Law Inst. 2010). Because the

heirs’ argument would undermine the substantial factor

standard and, in turn, significantly broaden asbestos liability

based on fleeting or insignificant encounters with a

defendant’s product, we, too, reject it.8

Notwithstanding the declaration of Dr. Raybin,

McIndoe’s heirs failed to put forward evidence demonstrating

that McIndoe was substantially exposed to asbestos from the

shipbuilders’ materials for a substantial period of time. The

heirs have established no genuine issue of fact regarding

whether any such exposure was a substantial factor in

McIndoe’s injuries, and thus they cannot prevail on their

general negligence claims.9See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at

492–93.

8 As the Sixth Circuit acknowledged, rejection of this argument still

allows a plaintiff to satisfy causation through expert testimony that the

plaintiff’s actual exposure to certain materials substantially contributed to

the development of his injuries. It simply prevents the type of sweeping

testimony offered here—that all exposures to asbestos above background

levels necessarily and substantially contribute to development of diseases

like mesothelioma. See Lindstrom, 424 F.3d at 493.

9 Because we conclude that McIndoe’s heirs cannot establish a prima

facie case for their claims, we do not consider the shipbuilders’ asserted

affirmative defenses.

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MCINDOE V. BATH IRON WORKS 17

V

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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