Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04636/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04636-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fred Foulk
Respondent
Clenard Cebron Wade
Petitioner

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CLENARD CEBRON WADE,

Petitioner, 

v. 

FRED FOULK, 

Respondent. 

Case No. 13-cv-4636-TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; DENYING 

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner Clenard Cebron Wade, a state prisoner, proceeds 

with a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent was ordered to show cause why the 

petition should not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer 

and Petitioner filed a reply. For the reasons set forth below, 

the petition is DENIED. 

I 

Petitioner was found guilty after a jury trial of grand 

theft, battery causing serious bodily injury, criminal threats, 

assault, and false imprisonment by violence. People v. Wade, 204 

Cal. App. 4th 1142, 1146 (2012). He was found not guilty of 

fifteen other counts. Id. at 1145-46. He was sentenced to 33 

years and 8 months to life in state prison. Id. at 1146. In a 

partially published opinion the California Court of Appeal 

affirmed the conviction, but reduced one of the convictions from 

grand theft to petty theft. Id.; Answer, Ex. G. Petitioner was 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 1 of 21
2 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

not retried on the theft count and the California Supreme Court 

denied review. He was resentenced to 33 years to life. 

II 

The following factual background is taken from the order of 

the California Court of Appeal.1

Because the facts underlying the counts 

involving Jane Doe I are not relevant to the 

issues on appeal, we need not summarize them, 

other than to point out that they involve 

several alleged episodes of threats and 

physical and sexual violence against Jane Doe 

I, a woman with whom defendant had resided in 

a romantic relationship. Because the facts 

underlying the counts involving Jane Doe II 

are relevant to the issues on appeal, we do 

summarize them. 

Jane Doe II testified she had a brief 

relationship with defendant in August 2006. 

He arrived at her house in the early morning 

hours of August 26th. He was slurring his 

words and being very loud, and she told him 

to leave. He got on top of her on her bed 

and refused to leave. They argued and he 

began to choke her with his arm. She managed 

to get his arm off her neck and they 

struggled. Defendant threatened to kill her 

and began to choke her again, this time with 

his two hands. Defendant put so much 

pressure on her throat that she could not 

breathe, and she blacked out. She did not 

know for how long she was unconscious. 

Jane Doe II's daughter came to Jane Doe II's 

room and they yelled at defendant until he 

exited through the front door. Jane Doe II 

saw that defendant was holding her purse. 

Jane Doe II's daughter tried to retrieve the 

purse, but defendant hit her with the purse 

and pushed her. The purse fell on the ground 

during the struggle; Jane Doe II tried to 

pick it up, but defendant managed to get it. 

Defendant left with the purse, which 

contained about $700. 

 

1

 This summary is presumed correct. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 

1132, 1135 n.1 (9th Cir. 2002); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 2 of 21
3 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Jane Doe II testified she had bruises on her 

neck from the choking; the bruises remained 

for about a week. The mobility of her neck 

was not impaired by the choking. She did not 

seek medical treatment. 

About two weeks after the incident, defendant 

left Jane Doe II a voice mail message 

stating, “I see you are not home and this is 

O'fear. I wouldn't come home tonight because 

you are gonna die.” 

Wade, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 1146-47(footnote omitted). 

III 

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”) amended § 2254 to impose new restrictions on federal 

habeas review. A petition may not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless 

the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a 

decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by 

the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Additionally, habeas relief 

is warranted only if the constitutional error at issue had a 

“substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion 

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of 

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] 

Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 3 of 21
4 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under 

the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may 

grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct 

governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 

prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court 

making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether 

the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. Moreover, in 

conducting its analysis, the federal court must presume the 

correctness of the state court’s factual findings, and the 

petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by 

clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). As the 

Court explained: “[o]n federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a 

highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’ 

and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of 

the doubt.’” Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011). 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly 

established law to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. “[C]learly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the 

dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions as of the time of the 

relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 4 of 21
5 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

federal court may not overrule a state court for simply holding a 

view different from its own, when the precedent from [the Supreme 

Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 

12, 17 (2003). 

When applying these standards, the federal court should 

review the “last reasoned decision” by the state courts. See 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 

423 F.3d 1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no 

reasoned opinion from the state’s highest court, the court “looks 

through” to the last reasoned opinion. See Ylst, 501 U.S. at 

804. When the state courts have adjudicated a claim on the 

merits but no state court has supplied a reasoned decision, the 

federal court must undertake an independent review of the record 

to determine whether the state courts' denial was objectively 

reasonable. See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 

2000). 

With these principles in mind regarding the standard and 

scope of review on federal habeas, the Court addresses 

Petitioner’s claims. He alleges that: (1) the trial court denied 

him his right to represent himself; (2) the trial court gave 

erroneous jury instructions with respect to battery with serious 

bodily injury; and (3) juror misconduct and bias.2

 

2

 Several other claims were dismissed, but the Court found that 

liberally construed these claims were sufficient to require a 

response. Docket Nos. 25, 27. 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 5 of 21
6 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

IV 

A 

 Petitioner first contends that the trial court improperly 

denied his motion to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 

 The California Court of Appeal set forth the background for 

this claim: 

In the present case, on April 7, 2008, 

defendant filled out a form in which he asked 

to be permitted to represent himself. On the 

form, he acknowledged specified hazards in 

self-representation. He also indicated that 

he did not know the possible defenses to the 

charged offenses and that he wished to talk 

to a lawyer regarding the elements of the 

charged offenses and possible defenses. 

On April 8, 2008, the trial court held a 

hearing on defendant’s Faretta motion. The 

court asked defendant if he knew the defenses 

to the charges, and defendant said that he 

knew some of the charges or defenses. The 

court explained that the charges were “very 

serious,” expressed doubt that defendant 

could represent himself without being aware 

of the defenses, and noted that defendant had 

indicated on the form that he wanted to talk 

to a lawyer about the elements to the charged 

offenses and possible defenses. After the 

court noted that defendant had a lawyer, the 

following exchange occurred: 

“DEFENDANT: This happened yesterday. ‘Cause 

I filled out yesterday the Faretta 

attachment. I haven’t considered it until 

yesterday, so I haven’t had much time to just 

go over it with him. 

“THE COURT: Well I’m not satisfied, Mr. Wade, 

that you understand exactly what’s involved 

with this representation here — 

“DEFENDANT: Okay. 

“THE COURT: — given the nature of the 

charges. [¶] So what I’m thinking is if you 

want to familiarize yourself with the 

possible defenses to the charges, and there 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 6 of 21
7 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

are many charges here, and you want to refile 

a request for a Faretta, I’ll reconsider it. 

[¶] At this time, based on the fact that you 

do not know the possible defenses to the 

charges, I’m going to deny your request 

without prejudice — 

“DEFENDANT: Okay. 

“THE COURT: — to you refiling this — 

“DEFENDANT: All right. 

“THE COURT: — if you choose to do so. [¶] But 

as I said, looking at these charges here, 

they’re very, very serious. And your risk of 

exposure if you’re convicted is huge, so I 

think that if you want to take some time and 

maybe speak to an attorney, your attorney, 

about the possible defenses to the charges 

and then come back to the court, you may do 

that. 

“DEFENDANT: Okay. 

“THE COURT: But at this point I’m going to 

deny your request. 

“DEFENDANT: All right.” 

Ex. G at 5-7. Petitioner also indicated in the written Faretta 

motion prior to the hearing described above, that he wished to 

speak to his lawyer to have the defenses and elements of the 

charges explained and he was unaware of possible defenses in the 

case. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 424. 

On July 15, 2008, Petitioner filed another Faretta motion. 

CT at 429-31. The trial court held another hearing and the 

following exchange occurred: 

THE COURT: Sir, there are 23 charges, plus 

all of the enhancements. That is enormous. I 

really want you to go through it with 

someone. And if you go through it with 

[trial counsel], you go through each of the 

counts with him, and you figure out what your 

defenses are going to be for each of them. 

And if you still want to represent yourself, 

then you’ll be well on your way. But you 

might as well have the benefit of [trial 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 7 of 21
8 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

counsel’s] advice before you go through that. 

Can I set up a time right now for you to do 

that and we can put this on hold? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

THE COURT: Okay. [trial counsel], when are 

you going to be able to go through all 23 

counts with him? 

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Well, Mr. Wade knows that 

I’m going on vacation in a couple of days. 

It would have to be when I return. But we’ve 

also spoken about the issue of the trial 

date. I am making a motion to continue. Mr. 

Wade concurs in that, and [the prosecutor] 

has no objection. So we should have 

sufficient time to do that. 

THE COURT: Okay. So─

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: What I would propose is, if 

Mr. Wade wishes, because I know he’s 

represented several times that he wishes to 

represent himself, we can do one of two 

things today: We could pick another trial 

date or we could come back in mid-August when 

I return after I’ve had a chance to talk to 

Mr. Wade, and he can alert the Court at that 

time if in fact he wishes to represent 

himself or not. 

THE COURT: What would you like to do, sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: That one. 

THE COURT: Okay. 

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Why don’t we return─why 

don’t we come back August 21st─

THE COURT: Okay. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 91-92. 

 On September 11, 2008, Petitioner withdrew the Faretta 

motion. CT at 433; Traverse at 43. The California Court of 

Appeal denied this claim, though only discussed the first hearing 

held on April 7, 2008. 

From that exchange, it is clear the trial 

court denied defendant’s request to represent 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 8 of 21
9 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

himself in order to provide defendant an 

opportunity to acquaint himself with the 

defenses to the charges before deciding 

whether to represent himself. Defendant 

himself had requested an opportunity to 

discuss possible defenses with an attorney. 

It was not improper for the trial court to 

conclude that, in a case of this nature, it 

was appropriate that defendant have that 

discussion with counsel before the court 

found that defendant made a “knowing” 

decision to represent himself. Such a 

discussion would provide defendant a better 

idea of what the task of representing himself 

would entail and, thus, help defendant to 

“‘“understand the significance and 

consequences”’” of the decision to represent 

himself. (Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 545; see Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 

77, 92 [“the information a defendant must 

have to waive counsel intelligently will 

‘depend, in each case, upon the particular 

facts and circumstances surrounding that 

case’ ”].) 

Defendant contends the trial court erred 

because, after he stated he was only aware of 

“some” of the charges or defenses, the court 

stated, “That’s a problem because for you to 

be able to represent yourself you have to 

know the possible defenses.” He contends the 

court effectively denied his motion because 

he had not demonstrated the ability to defend 

himself competently, which would be contrary 

to Faretta. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 

835-836.) However, the trial court expressly 

denied the motion because the court was not 

satisfied that defendant understood “exactly 

what’s involved with this representation 

here.” Thus, the denial was based on 

defendant’s lack of understanding of the 

consequences of the decision to represent 

himself, not his inability to represent 

himself. The trial court did not err in 

denying defendant’s Faretta motion. 

Ex. G at 7. 

A criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 832. But a defendant's 

decision to represent himself and waive the right to counsel must 

be unequivocal, knowing and intelligent, timely, and not for 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 9 of 21
10 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

purposes of securing delay. Id. at 835; United States v. Arlt, 

41 F.3d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A request for self-representation must be unequivocal. 

Meeks v. Craven, 482 F.2d 465, 466-68 (9th Cir. 1973); accord 

Armant v. Marquez, 772 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1985). The requirement 

of unequivocality serves two purposes: it ensures that the 

defendant does not inadvertently waive his right to counsel, 

Meeks, 482 F.2d at 467, and also prevents the defendant from 

taking advantage of the mutual exclusivity of the rights to 

counsel and self-representation, Adams v. Carroll, 875 F.2d 1441, 

1444 (9th Cir. 1989). If a defendant equivocates, he is presumed 

to have requested the assistance of counsel. Id. 

Before a trial court may allow an accused to exercise the 

right of self-representation, it must conclude that the accused 

has "knowingly and intelligently" waived his underlying right to 

counsel. Faretta at 835. Consequently, the Sixth Amendment 

requires that a state trial court, before letting an accused 

proceed pro se, be assured that he "is made aware of the dangers 

and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 

establish that 'he knows what he is doing and his choice is made 

with eyes open.'" Snook v. Wood, 89 F.3d 605, 613 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(quoting Faretta at 835). 

Petitioner has failed to show that the state court opinion 

was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court authority. When 

Petitioner first requested to represent himself, the trial court 

denied the motion without prejudice so Petitioner could discuss 

it with counsel and make an informed decision. It was Petitioner 

who stated that he had not had time to discuss the request with 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 10 of 21
11 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

his attorney. Petitioner also indicated in the written Faretta 

motion that he wished to speak with his attorney about the case 

and did not know about possible defenses. The trial court denied 

the request without prejudice so that Petitioner could consult 

his attorney to more fully understand the significance and 

consequences. Allowing Petitioner this extra time to make a 

knowing and intelligent waiver was not an error, and Petitioner 

has not shown that his request was unequivocal. 

At the second hearing on July 15, 2008, the trial court 

continued the hearing so that Petitioner could discuss all 23 

counts against him with his attorney before deciding to exercise 

his Faretta rights. Two months later Petitioner withdrew his 

Faretta motion. For all the reasons discussed above, Petitioner 

is not entitled to relief. The state court denied Petitioner’s 

request without prejudice so that Petitioner could first consult 

with his attorney and then make a ‘knowing’ decision. After 

Petitioner discussed the issue with his attorney on multiple 

occasions, Petitioner ultimately withdrew the motion. The state 

court’s decision finding no error was not objectively 

unreasonably and this claim is denied. 

B 

Petitioner next argues that the trial court gave an 

erroneous jury instruction with respect to battery with serious 

bodily injury. He argues that the evidence did not support the 

finding that the battery committed against Jane Doe II resulted 

in serious bodily injury, because there was no evidence that the 

injury required medical attention. Petitioner choked Jane Doe 

II, and she blacked out and did not know how long she was 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 11 of 21
12 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

unconscious. 

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim: 

A battery is “any willful and unlawful use of 

force or violence upon the person of 

another.” (§ 242.) “If, however, the 

batterer not only uses unlawful force upon 

the victim but causes injury of sufficient 

seriousness, then a felony battery is 

committed. For this second category of 

battery, ‘serious bodily injury’ is required. 

(§ 243, subd. (d).)” (People v. Longoria 

(1995) 34 Cal. App. 4th 12, 16, 40 

Cal.Rptr.2d 213 (Longoria).) The statute 

provides that “‘Serious bodily injury’ means 

a serious impairment of physical condition, 

including, but not limited to, the following: 

loss of consciousness; concussion; bone 

fracture; protracted loss or impairment of 

function of any bodily member or organ; a 

wound requiring extensive suturing; and 

serious disfigurement.” (§243, subd. 

(f)(4).) Section 243 also prescribes 

enhanced punishment for batteries against 

peace officers and other specified persons. 

“If what would otherwise be a simple battery 

(any unlawful touching, even without causing 

pain or injury) is committed against, e.g., a 

peace officer engaged in the performance of 

his/her duties, then the offense is 

punishable by one year in county jail and a 

$2,000 fine.” (Longoria, at p. 16, 40 

Cal.Rptr.2d 213; see § 243, subd. (b).) 

“Similarly, a distinction is made when it is 

a peace officer” or another specified person 

“who is injured by a batterer. Unlike the 

ordinary victim, for enhanced punishment to 

be imposed ‘serious bodily injury’ is not 

required. Section 243, subdivision (c) 

provides that a battery against a peace 

officer engaged in the performance of his/her 

duties is punishable by a $2,000 fine and 

three years in state prison when ‘an injury 

is inflicted on that victim.’” (Longoria, at 

pp. 16–17, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, first 

italics added; see also People v. Wilkinson 

(2004) 33 Cal. 4th 821, 831, 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 

420, 94 P.3d 551.) The statute provides that 

“‘Injury’ means any physical injury which 

requires professional medical treatment.” (§ 

243, subd. (f)(5).) 

In the present case, defendant argues that 

both the section 243, subdivision (f)(4) and 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 12 of 21
13 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

(f)(5) definitions must be satisfied in order 

to show the “serious bodily injury” required 

to sustain a conviction for felony battery 

under section 243, subdivision (d). That is, 

he argues that, because the word “injury” is 

part of the phrase “serious bodily injury,” 

the injury suffered by the victim must both 

require medical treatment (§ 243, subd. 

(f)(5)) and also constitute serious 

impairment of a physical condition (§ 243, 

subd. (f)(4)). The instruction given by the 

trial court, CALCRIM No. 925, did not require 

a finding of necessity of medical treatment: 

“Whether a particular injury qualifies as a 

‘serious bodily injury’ is a matter for the 

jury to determine. You must evaluate the 

nature, extent, and seriousness of any injury 

when considering this question. To find an 

injury to be a ‘serious bodily injury,’ you 

must find that the injury caused a serious 

impairment of physical condition. Such an 

injury may include, but is not limited to, 

loss of consciousness. While a loss of 

consciousness may qualify as serious bodily 

injury, whether it so qualifies in this case 

is a matter for the jury to determine.” If 

defendant's interpretation of the statute is 

correct, the trial court's instruction was 

erroneous, because “The trial court must 

instruct even without request on the general 

principles of law relevant to and governing 

the case. [Citation.] That obligation 

includes instructions on all of the elements 

of a charged offense. [Citation.]” (People 

v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal. 4th 1233, 1311, 18 

Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Under 

defendant's interpretation of the statute, an 

injury requiring medical treatment is an 

element of the offense of battery with 

serious bodily injury. 

To resolve whether defendant's interpretation 

of section 243 is correct, we are guided by 

familiar canons of statutory construction. 

“‘[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] 

ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as 

to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ 

[Citation.] In determining that intent, we 

first examine the words of the respective 

statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the 

language of the statute, “then the 

Legislature is presumed to have meant what it 

said, and the plain meaning of the language 

governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is 

clear, courts will not ‘interpret away clear 

language in favor of an ambiguity that does 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 13 of 21
14 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

not exist.’ [Citation.]”' [Citation.] If, 

however, the terms of a statute provide no 

definitive answer, then courts may resort to 

extrinsic sources, including the ostensible 

objects to be achieved and the legislative 

history. [Citation.] ‘We must select the 

construction that comports most closely with 

the apparent intent of the Legislature, with 

a view to promoting rather than defeating the 

general purpose of the statute, and avoid an 

interpretation that would lead to absurd 

consequences.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Coronado (1995) 12 Cal. 4th 145, 151, 48 Cal. 

Rptr. 2d 77, 906 P.2d 1232.) 

We conclude that the plain language of 

section 243, subdivision (f)(4) controls. 

That is, a loss of consciousness that 

constitutes a “serious impairment of physical 

condition” is a “serious bodily injury” 

without any showing that the injury required 

medical treatment. If the Legislature had 

intended that “serious bodily injury” means a 

“serious impairment of physical condition” 

that also required medical treatment, it 

could have so provided. The separate 

definition of “injury” in subdivision (f)(5) 

does not render ambiguous the clear language 

of subdivision (f)(4), because subdivision 

(f)(5) clearly applies to section 243, 

subdivision (c), for batteries against peace 

officers or other specified persons causing 

“injury.” Accordingly, applying the plain 

language of subdivision (f)(4) does not, 

contrary to defendant's assertion, make the 

definition of “injury” in subdivision (f)(5) 

surplusage. (See In re Jerry R. (1994) 29 

Cal. App. 4th 1432, 1437, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

155 [“Whenever possible, we must give effect 

to every word in a statute and avoid a 

construction making a statutory term 

surplusage or meaningless. [Citations.]”].) 

Moreover, “serious bodily injury,” as used in 

section 243, is “ ‘essentially equivalent’ ” 

to “‘great bodily injury,’” as used, for 

example, in the section 12022.7 enhancement 

for the infliction of such injury on a person 

during the commission of a felony. (People 

v. Burroughs (1984) 35 Cal. 3d 824, 831, 201 

Cal. Rptr. 319, 678 P.2d 894, overruled on 

another ground in People v. Blakeley (2000) 

23 Cal. 4th 82, 89, 96 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 999 

P.2d 675; accord, People v. Moore (1992) 10 

Cal. App. 4th 1868, 1871, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

713; People v. Villarreal (1985) 173 Cal. 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 14 of 21
15 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

App. 3d 1136, 1141, 219 Cal. Rptr. 371; see 

also People v. Hawkins (1993) 15 Cal. App. 

4th 1373, 1375, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 434 

[“substantially the same meaning”]; but see 

People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal. App. 4th 11, 

26, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 693 [although the “usual 

assumption” is that the phrases have the 

“same meaning,” the statutory definitions 

differ].) “‘[G]reat bodily injury’ means a 

significant or substantial physical injury.” 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (f).) Although any medical 

treatment obtained by the victim is relevant 

to determining the existence of “great bodily 

injury” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal .4th 

58, 66, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 373, 190 P.3d 706), 

the statutory definition and relevant CALCRIM 

instruction (No. 3160) do not require a 

showing of necessity of medical treatment. 

Nor are we aware of any case authority 

imposing such a requirement. Accordingly, our 

construction of “serious bodily injury” is 

consistent with the definition of “great 

bodily injury.” 

Because the prosecution was not required to 

show that Jane Doe II's injury required 

medical treatment in order to prove defendant 

committed a battery causing serious bodily 

injury, the trial court's instruction 

properly omitted that element. We will 

affirm the conviction for felony battery 

against Jane Doe II. 

Wade, 204 Cal. App. 4th at 1147-50(footnotes omitted). 

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under 

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas 

corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 

(1991). 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury 

charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process. See Estelle at 72; Cupp v. Naughten, 414 

U.S. 141, 147 (1973). The instruction may not be judged in 

artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context of 

the instructions as a whole and the trial record. See Estelle at 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 15 of 21
16 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

72. In other words, the court must evaluate jury instructions in 

the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of 

the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

169 (1982) (citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

To the extent Petitioner argues that the state courts 

misinterpreted state law, he is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief. Nor has Petitioner shown that the jury instruction was 

so deficient that it infected the entire trial and violated due 

process. There was sufficient evidence to find that the victim 

suffered serious bodily injury when she was choked into 

unconsciousness, and the state court’s decision that there was no 

error in the jury instruction was not unreasonable. 

To the extent Petitioner contends the battery statute is 

void for vagueness because he did not have adequate notice that 

his conduct was forbidden, he is not entitled to relief.3 

Petitioner had notice that committing a battery was prohibited. 

And as noted above, the statute states that loss of consciousness 

can be a serious bodily injury. Nor has Petitioner cited to any 

authority clearly establishing that because a jury has discretion 

to determine whether loss of consciousness is a serious bodily 

injury, then this discretion violates the Constitution. See 

Panther v. Hames, 991 F.2d 576, 578-79 (9th Cir. 1993). 

 

3

 In the motion to dismiss, the Court noted that, liberally 

construed, Petitioner’s claim presented a federal claim regarding 

jury instruction error that violated his federal due process 

rights. It is not clear if Petitioner also intended to present a 

vagueness claim, and he did not discuss it in his traverse. 

Regardless, the Court will still look to the merits of a 

vagueness claim. 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 16 of 21
17 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

It has also been found that the term “serious bodily injury” 

is not unconstitutionally vague. See Butler v. O’Brien, 663 F.3d 

514, 521 (1st Cir. 2011). The state court’s denial was not 

unreasonable and Petitioner has failed to show that he did not 

have notice that strangling someone to the point of 

unconsciousness could result in battery with serious bodily 

injury. 

C 

Petitioner next alleges that jurors were biased and 

committed misconduct.4 He argues that two jurors worked for a 

business under criminal investigation (including one who worked 

for the county vehicle pool) and another juror was friends with a 

testifying police officer. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees to the criminally accused a 

fair trial by a panel of impartial jurors. U.S. Const. amend. 

VI; see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). "Even if only 

one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced, the defendant is denied 

his constitutional right to an impartial jury." Tinsley v. Borg, 

895 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

The Constitution "does not require a new trial every time a 

juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation." 

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982). The safeguards of 

juror impartiality, such as voir dire and protective instructions 

from the trial judge, are not infallible; it is virtually 

 

4

 The Court has conducted and independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state court denial was objectively 

reasonable because there was no reasoned decision for this claim. 

See Delgado, 223 F.3d at 982. 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 17 of 21
18 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

impossible to shield jurors from every contact or influence that 

might theoretically affect their vote. Id. Due process only 

means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the 

evidence before it and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent 

prejudicial occurrences and to determine the effect of such 

occurrences when they happen. Id. Such determinations may 

properly be made at a hearing. Id. Rather than ordering a new 

trial any time the issue of juror bias arises, holding a hearing 

to determine actual bias is the appropriate course of action. 

Id. 

The Ninth Circuit has stated that: 

A court confronted with a colorable claim of 

juror bias must undertake an investigation of 

the relevant facts and circumstances. An 

informal in camera hearing may be adequate 

for this purpose; due process requires only 

that all parties be represented, and that the 

investigation be reasonably calculated to 

resolve the doubts raised about the juror's 

impartiality. So long as the fact-finding 

process is objective and reasonably explores 

the issues presented, the state trial judge's 

findings based on that investigation are 

entitled to a presumption of correctness. 

Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 974–75 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) 

(internal citations omitted). 

Petitioner has failed to show he is entitled to relief for 

his general claim that two jurors worked for a business under 

criminal investigation, including one of whom worked for the 

county vehicle pool. He presents no specific arguments, just 

conclusory allegations with little support. See James v. Borg, 

24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are 

not supported by a statement of specific facts do not warrant 

habeas relief.”). Petitioner does not describe how these jurors 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 18 of 21
19 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

were biased due to their employment. Similarly, his general 

allegations that jurors should not have been empaneled due to the 

questionnaires they submitted are insufficient to warrant habeas 

relief. Moreover, the jury found Petitioner not guilty of 

fifteen of the twenty counts. 

 Petitioner also argues that a juror was biased because he 

informed the judge midtrial that he recognized a testifying 

police officer when he entered the court as someone he had gone 

to high school with. The trial court and the attorneys 

questioned the juror. RT at 849-57. The juror stated that he 

had gone to high school with the police officer but had not seen 

or talked to him in at least four years. RT at 850. He stated 

that they were friends in high school, but only hung out once in 

a while at that time and then went their separate ways after 

graduation. RT at 851. The juror stated at the beginning of 

trial that he did not recognize the name and it was only upon 

seeing the officer that he recognized him. RT at 856. 

Petitioner’s trial counsel stated that it was an honest mistake. 

Id. The juror stated he would be fair and impartial regarding 

the police officer’s testimony. RT at 852-57. The trial court 

also re-read a jury instruction to the juror regarding the 

credibility of witnesses. RT at 854. After hearing arguments 

from the attorneys and reviewing the transcripts, the trial court 

found that the juror could be fair and impartial and should not 

be released. RT at 862-64 

After the trial court ruled that the juror would stay, the 

police officer at issue testified. The police officer testified 

that he responded to a radio call for a possible rape, observed 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 19 of 21
20 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

Petitioner, radioed for more officers and was one of the officers 

who apprehended Petitioner. RT at 865-74. The officer also 

logged clothing and other items from Petitioner into evidence at 

the police station. RT at 875-78. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate an unreasonable 

application of Supreme Court authority or an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. The trial court conducted a proper 

investigation of the relevant facts and circumstances. See 

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1985) (a state trial 

judge is in a far superior position to assess juror bias than 

federal habeas judges); see also Austad v. Risley, 761 F.2d 1348, 

1350 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The Supreme Court has clearly established 

that the determination of a juror's partiality or bias is a 

factual determination to which section 2254(d)'s presumption of 

correctness applies.”), citing Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 

1036 (1984). 

 Petitioner has not shown that the juror was biased or that 

he failed to decide the case solely on the evidence. The juror 

had not spoken to the police officer in more than four years and 

they were not close friends in high school. The police officer’s 

involvement only concerned the arrest of the Petitioner with 

other police officers and the logging of evidence at the police 

station. In closing argument by trial counsel the only reference 

to the police officer was that he observed Petitioner and did not 

see or recover any weapons and that Petitioner was acting 

normally. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief. 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 20 of 21
21 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

a

V 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus is DENIED. 

Further, a Certificate of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 

11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Petitioner has 

not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Nor has Petitioner demonstrated 

that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Petitioner may not 

appeal the denial of a Certificate of Appealability in this Court 

but may seek a certificate from the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit under Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 

Procedure. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases. 

The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of 

Respondent and against Petitioner, terminate any pending motions 

as moot and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 01/14/2016 

________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

G:\PRO-SE\TEH\HC.13\Wade4636.hc.docx 

Case 3:13-cv-04636-TEH Document 32 Filed 01/15/16 Page 21 of 21