Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00187/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00187-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
Defendant
R. Ivanne Vazquez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R. IVANNE VAZQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, 

INC.,

Defendant.

No. 2:15-cv-0187 GEB DAD PS

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

This matter came before the court on March 20, 2015, for hearing of defendant’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Attorney Bryan Hawkins appeared on behalf of the defendant. There was no appearance by, or 

on behalf of, plaintiff R. Ivanne Vazquez.1 After hearing oral argument, defendant’s motion was

taken under submission. 

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1 On April 13, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to “re-schedule hearing” of defendant’s motion to 

dismiss. (Dkt. No. 18.) Therein, plaintiff explained that the reason he did not appear at the 

March 20, 2015 hearing on the motion is because he “was totally sick” and “was caring for [his] 

grandfather who was very sick.” (Id. at 1.) However, having reviewed all the documents 

submitted in connection with defendant’s motion, the undersigned finds it unnecessary to set this 

matter for another hearing of defendant’s motion. Accordingly, plaintiff’s April 13, 2015 motion 

to re-schedule will be denied. 

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 For the reasons stated below, the undersigned will recommend that defendant’s motion to 

dismiss be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff commenced this action on January 12, 2015, by paying the required filing fee and 

filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.

2

 (Dkt. No. 1.)

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges causes of action pursuant to the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

(“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. ' 1692, et seq., and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

(“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civil Code ' 1788, et seq., as well as a claim for the “INVASION OF 

PRIVACY BY INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION.” (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) at 2-4.3) The matter 

was transferred to this court on January 20, 2015. (Dkt. No. 3.) On February 17, 2015, defendant

noticed the pending motion to dismiss for hearing before the undersigned. (Dkt. No. 12.) 

Plaintiff filed an opposition on March 12, 2015. (Dkt. No. 15.) Defendant filed a reply on March 

19, 2015. (Dkt. No. 16.) Plaintiff filed a filed an unauthorized sur-reply on April 17, 2015.

4

 

(Dkt. No. 19.)

STANDARDS

I. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to raise the defense, by 

motion, that the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of an entire action or of specific 

claims alleged in the action. “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may 

either attack the allegations of the complaint or may be made as a ‘speaking motion’ attacking the 

existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact.” Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 

594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).

 

2

 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action. Therefore, the matter was referred to the 

undersigned in accordance with Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

3

Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

4

The filing of a sur-reply is not authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local 

Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12; Local Rule 230. Nonetheless, in light of plaintiff’s pro se status, 

the undersigned has reviewed the sur-reply and considered it in evaluating defendant’s motion.

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When a party brings a facial attack to subject matter jurisdiction, that party contends that 

the allegations of jurisdiction contained in the complaint are insufficient on their face to 

demonstrate the existence of jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 

(9th Cir. 2004). In a Rule 12(b)(1) motion of this type, the plaintiff is entitled to safeguards 

similar to those applicable when a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is made. See Sea Vessel Inc. v. Reyes, 

23 F.3d 345, 347 (11th Cir. 1994); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n. 6 (8th Cir. 

1990). The factual allegations of the complaint are presumed to be true, and the motion is granted 

only if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Savage v. 

Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2003); Miranda v. 

Reno, 238 F.3d 1156, 1157 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2001). Nonetheless, district courts “may review 

evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for 

summary judgment” when resolving a facial attack. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039.

When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, no 

presumption of truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff’s allegations. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d 

at 733. “[T]he district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any 

evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of 

jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). When a Rule 

12(b)(1) motion attacks the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, plaintiff has the burden 

of establishing that such jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ’g Co., 594 F.2d at 733.

II. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 

1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of 

sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 

F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the 

court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light 

most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). In general, pro se complaints are held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 

520-21 (1972). However, the court need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the 

form of factual allegations. United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th 

Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than 

an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 

elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. See also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements, do not suffice.”). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove 

facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have 

not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 

459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court is permitted 

to consider material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint, documents that are not 

physically attached to the complaint if their authenticity is not contested and the plaintiff’s 

complaint necessarily relies on them, and matters of public record. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 

250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001).

III. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions Pursuant to Rule 12(e)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) provides:

A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to 

which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or 

ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response. 

The motion must be made before filing a responsive pleading and 

must point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If 

the court orders a more definite statement and the order is not 

obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the time 

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the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other 

appropriate order.

FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e). See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002) (“If a 

pleading fails to specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant 

can move for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.”); C.B. v. Sonora 

Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1190–91 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (“A Rule 12(e) motion is proper only 

if the complaint is so indefinite that the defendant cannot ascertain the nature of the claim being 

asserted, i.e., so vague that the defendant cannot begin to frame a response.”).

A court should deny a motion for a more definite statement “if the complaint is specific 

enough to notify [a] defendant of the substance of the claim being asserted” or “if the detail 

sought by a motion for more definite statement is obtainable through discovery.” C.B., 691 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1191. A Rule 12(e) motion “is likely to be denied where the substance of the claim 

has been alleged, even though some of the details are omitted.” Neveu v. City of Fresno, 392 F. 

Supp. 2d 1159, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2005). This liberal pleading standard is consistent with Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) which allows pleadings that simply contain a “short and plain 

statement of the claim.” Id.

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s “entire complaint fails to allege any facts as to what” the 

defendant did wrong. (Def.’s MTD (Dkt. No. 12) at 14.) A reading of plaintiff’s complaint 

reveals that the complaint sets forth the basis for the court’s jurisdiction, identifies the parties, 

asserts causes of action and requests relief. The complaint does not, however, allege a single fact 

addressing defendant’s alleged wrongful conduct. 

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt a flexible pleading policy, a 

complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims and must allege facts that 

state the elements of each claim plainly and succinctly. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); Jones v. 

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). “A pleading that offers ‘labels 

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of cause of action will not do.’ Nor 

does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual 

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enhancements.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

555, 557). A plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which the 

defendants engaged in that support the plaintiff’s claims. Jones, 733 F.2d at 649.

Although plaintiff’s complaint does not contain any factual allegations, attached to that

complaint as Exhibit 2 is a September 30, 2013 letter from Select Portfolio Servicing seeking 

payment of plaintiff’s mortgage payments for the period from November 1, 2012 through 

September 1, 2013. (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) at 15.) Nonetheless, all of the complaint’s causes of 

action have a one-year statute of limitations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d); CAL. CIV. CODE § 

1788.30(f); Guillen v. Bank of America Corp., No. 5:10-cv-5825 EJD (PSG), 2011 WL 4071996, 

at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2011) (“the applicable limitations period for of invasion of privacy is 

one year in California”); Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App.3d 868, 880 (1980) (“The 

statute of limitations in which to commence an action for invasion of privacy is one year.”). In 

this regard, even assuming the September 30, 2013 letter attached to the complaint constitutes in 

some way an allegation by plaintiff of defendant’s wrongful conduct, plaintiff’s complaint would 

barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. 

Defendant also argues that this action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In this 

regard defendant has requested that the court take judicial notice of the fact that plaintiff has 

previously litigated a similar action against the defendant. (Def.s’ MTD (Dkt. No. 12) at 11; RJN 

(Dkt. No. 12-1) at 1-4.) On August 15, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court 

for the Northern District of California, naming as a defendant Select Portfolio Servicing and 

alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act and 

the Uniform Commercial Code.

5

 See R. Ivanne Vazquez v. Select Portfolio Servicing, et al., 

Case No. 13-cv-3789-JST (N.D. Cal. 2013); (Def.’s RJN (Dkt. No. 12-2) at 2-7, 30).

On January 13, 2014, the District Judge assigned to that earlier action granted the 

defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint. (Def.’s 

 

5

This court may take judicial notice of its own records and the records of other courts. See

United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n. 1 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 631 

F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980); see also FED. R. EVID. 201.

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RJN (Dkt. No. 12-2) at 29-34). On March 5, 2014, plaintiff filed an amended complaint in that 

earlier filed action alleging causes of action for “lack of standing to foreclose,” fraud in the 

concealment, fraud in the inducement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, illegal 

securitization, “violations of RESPA, TILA,” and “petition to quiet title.” (Def.’s RJN (Dkt. No 

12-3) at 2.) Defendant again moved to dismiss and, on May 20, 2014, the District Judge assigned 

in that action granted the motion to dismiss without leave to amend. (Def.’s RJN (Dkt. No. 12-4) 

at 15-17.)

The doctrine of res judicata governs “[t]he preclusive effects of former litigation.” Hiser 

v. Franklin, 94 F.3d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. Of 

Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 77 n. 1 (1984). Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the 

merits bars further claims by parties or their privies based on the same cause of action.” Montana 

v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The doctrine also “bars all grounds for recovery 

which could have been asserted, whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties 

. . . on the same cause of action.” C.D. Anderson & Co. v. Lemos, 832 F.2d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.

1987) (internal quotations omitted).

“Res judicata applies when ‘the earlier suit . . . (1) involved the same “claim” or cause of 

action as the later suit, (2) reached a final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved identical 

parties or privies.’” Mpoyo v. Litton ElectroOptical Systems, 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Sidhu v. Flecto Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002)). The court looks at four criteria 

to determine whether two suits involve the same claim or cause of action, “(1) whether rights or 

interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the 

second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) 

whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise 

out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.” Turtle Island Restoration Network v. U.S. Dept. 

of State, 673 F.3d 914, 917-18 (9th Cir. 2012).

“Reliance on the transactional nucleus element is especially appropriate because the 

element is ‘outcome determinative.’” ProShipLine Inc. v. Aspen Infrastructures Ltd., 609 F.3d 

960, 968 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 988). “[T]he inquiry into the ‘same 

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transactional nucleus of facts’ is essentially the same as whether the claim could have been 

brought in the first action.” U.S. v. Liquidators of European Federal Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 

1151 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Here, plaintiff’s earlier action involved the same parties and a final judgment on the merits

of that action was entered. See Colodney v. Orr, No. EDCV 14-1973-VAP (SPx), 2015 WL 

1636818, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2015) (dismissal without leave to amend is a final judgment on 

the merits); Nnachi v. City of San Francisco, No. C 10-0714 MEJ, 2010 WL 3398545, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2010) (“Dismissal of an action with prejudice, or without leave to amend, is 

considered a final judgment on the merits. Dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) is also considered a final judgment on the merits.”).

In his opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, plaintiff argues that the two actions 

involved different claims. He argues that in this action his claims concern “the allegedly 

unlawful misrepresentations, alleged unfair and illegal practices in defendant’s effort to collect on 

an alleged debt . . . . as opposed to any legitimacy of their alleged debt.”6 (Pl.’s Opp.’n (Dkt. No. 

15) at 6.) However, as noted above, attached to plaintiff’s January 12, 2015 complaint filed in 

this court is a September 30, 2013 letter from Select Portfolio Servicing to plaintiff, thanking 

plaintiff for his “August 29, 2013 and September 17, 2013,” correspondence “regarding 

validation of the debt” and explaining that Select Portfolio Servicing acquired plaintiff’s 

mortgage loan on June 1, 2013, and that “at that time [his] loan was due for the November 1, 

2012 monthly mortgage.” (Compl. (Dkt. No. 1) at 15.) Plaintiff has also attached to his 

complaint in this action a July 22, 2013 letter from plaintiff to Select Portfolio Services 

demanding that Select Portfolio Services “CEASE AND DESIST COLLECTIONS ACTIVITIES 

PRIOR TO VALIDATION OF PURPORTED DEBT” and citing to “the Fair Debt Collection 

Practices Act laws of the United States Code ' 1692 et. seq.” (Id. at 27.)

/////

 

6

 In his March 5, 2014 amended complaint filed in the earlier Northern District action, however,

plaintiff argued that it was “very clear” that “Select Portfolio Servicing Inc.,” did not “have any 

authority to collect . . . .” (Def.’s RJN (Dkt. No. 12-3) at 5.) 

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It is apparent from plaintiff’s July 22, 2013 letter and Select Portfolio Servicing’s 

September 30, 2013 letter, plaintiff could have raised the claims he now asserts in this action in 

his earlier action filed in the Northern District. Specifically, plaintiff could have presented these 

same allegations in the March 5, 2014 amended complaint filed in the earlier filed Northern 

District action. See Turtle Island, 673 F.3d at 918 (“If the harm arose at the same time, then there 

was no reason why the plaintiff could not have brought the claim in the first action. The plaintiff 

simply could have added a claim to the complaint.”); United States v. Liquidators of European 

Federal Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (“where claims arise from the same 

factual circumstances, a plaintiff must bring all related claims together or forfeit the opportunity 

to bring any omitted claim in a subsequent proceeding”). Therefore, this action is also barred by 

res judicata doctrine.

For all of the reasons stated above, the undersigned concludes that defendant’s motion to

dismiss should be granted.

LEAVE TO AMEND

The undersigned has carefully considered whether plaintiff could amend his complaint to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted that would not be barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. “Valid reasons for denying leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, prejudice, 

and futility.” California Architectural Bldg. Prod. v. Franciscan Ceramics, 818 F.2d 1466, 1472 

(9th Cir. 1988). See also Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 

1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the court 

does not have to allow futile amendments). Here, in light of the deficiencies noted above the 

undersigned finds that it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to amend in this case.7

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7

 If plaintiff believes that he can amend his complaint to state a claim that is not barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata, and that cures the deficiencies noted above, he should clearly explain 

specifically how he would do so in any objections he elects to file to these findings and 

recommendations.

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff’s April 13, 2015 motion to reschedule (Dkt. 

No. 18) is denied.

IT IS ALSO HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s February 17, 2015 amended motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 12) be 

granted; 

2. Plaintiff’s January 12, 2015 complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be dismissed without leave 

to amend; and

3. This action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised 

that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District 

Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Dated: July 22, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1\orders.pro se\vazquez0187.mtd.f&rs.docx

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