Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72326/USCOURTS-ca9-12-72326-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AUGUSTIN VALENZUELA GALLARDO,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-72326

Agency No.

A056-010-094

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued November 21, 2014

Submitted January 5, 2015

San Francisco, California

Filed March 31, 2016

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Morgan Christen,

Circuit Judge, and J. Michael Seabright,* District Judge

Opinion by Judge Christen;

Dissent by Judge Seabright

* The Honorable J. Michael Seabright, District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

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2 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo’s

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

precedential published opinion in Matter of Valenzuela

Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838 (BIA 2012), holding that a

conviction for accessory to a felony under California Penal

Code § 32 is an aggravated felony “offense relating to

obstruction of justice” under Immigration and NationalityAct

§ 101(a)(43)(S). 

The panel wrote that the BIA’s revised interpretation of

obstruction of justice to require only “the affirmative and

intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with the

process of justice,” departed from its prior construction of the

statute by requiring no nexus to an ongoing investigation or

proceeding. The panel held that the new construction raises

grave doubts about whether § 101(a)(43)(S), so construed, is

unconstitutionally vague. The panel remanded for the BIA to

apply its previous interpretation in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez,

22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (en banc), or to offer a new

construction.

Dissenting, Judge Seabright wrote that the majority

mistakenly found that the BIA in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez

had previously required a nexus to an ongoing investigation

or proceeding, and that the BIA’s opinion in Matter of

Valenzuela Gallardo did not announce a new interpretation

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 3

removing the requirement. Judge Seabright wrote that rather

Matter of Valenzuela Gallardo explicitly clarified language

in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez in light of what the BIA

considered to be this court’s misreading of BIA precedent in

Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). Judge

Seabright would also find that the absence of a requirement

for an ongoing investigation or proceeding does not render

the BIA’s definition vague, much less create grave

constitutional doubts.

COUNSEL

Frank P. Sprouls (argued) and John E. Ricci, Law Office of

Ricci & Sprouls, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner.

Rebecca Hoffberg Phillips (argued) and Imran Raza Zaidi,

Trial Attorneys, and Ada Elsie Bosque, Senior Litigation

Counsel, United States Department of Justice, Office of

Immigration Litigation, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

CHRISTEN, Circuit Judge:

Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo, a citizen of Mexico,

pleaded guilty to violating California Penal Code § 32,

accessory to a felony. An immigration judge (IJ) ordered him

removed to Mexico, concluding that his conviction

constituted an “offense relating to obstruction of justice” and

therefore an aggravated felony under the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(43)(S). The Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Valenzuela Gallardo’s

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appeal. In its decision, it announced a new interpretation of

“obstruction of justice” that requires only “the affirmative

and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to interfere with

the process of justice.” Contrary to the prior construction,

this interpretation of INA § 101(a)(43)(S) requires no nexus

to an ongoing investigation or proceeding. Valenzuela

Gallardo petitions for review, arguing that the agency’s

revised interpretation of the statute raises serious

constitutional concerns about whether the statute is

unconstitutionally vague. We agree and remand to the Board

for application of the previous interpretation or formulation

of a construction that does not raise grave constitutional

doubts.

BACKGROUND

I. Facts

Augustin Valenzuela Gallardo was admitted to the United

States as a lawful permanent resident in 2002. In November

2007, police discovered him in a stolen vehicle with

possession of methamphetamine, ecstacy, and a loaded

firearm. Valenzuela Gallardo was arrested and charged with

two counts of possession of a controlled substance

(methamphetamine) in violation of California Health and

Safety Code § 11378, one count of possessing

methamphetamine while armed in violation of California

Health and Safety Code § 11370.1, and one count of failing

to comply with the terms of his probation in violation of

California Penal Code § 1203. He agreed to plead guilty to

an amended count of accessory to a felony in violation of

California Penal Code § 32. All remaining charges were

dismissed. Initially, Valenzuela Gallardo was placed on

probation, but he subsequently violated the terms of his

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 5

probation and was sentenced to sixteen months’

imprisonment.

II. Proceedings

In June 2010, the Government placed Valenzuela

Gallardo in removal proceedings. The Government argued

that a conviction under California Penal Code § 32 constitutes

an “offense relating to obstruction of justice,” and therefore

an aggravated felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(S).

Valenzuela Gallardo filed a motion to terminate removal

proceedings in July 2010. He appeared before an

immigration judge and contested removability on the grounds

that his conviction was not an offense “relating to obstruction

of justice” because “the federal ‘Obstruction of Justice’

grounds must relate to an extant judicial proceeding.”

The IJ denied Valenzuela Gallardo’s motion to terminate

removal proceedings. The IJ reasoned that the BIA had

previously held that the federal crime of accessory after the

fact, 18 U.S.C. § 3, is an aggravated felony, that there was

“no material difference” between § 3 and California Penal

Code § 32, and that the BIA has not “limit[ed] the scope of

the obstruction of justice aggravated felony to cases in which

there is a pending judicial proceeding.” The IJ thus

concluded that a conviction under California Penal Code § 32

is an “offense relating to obstruction of justice,” and ordered

Valenzuela Gallardo removed to Mexico.

Valenzuela Gallardo filed an appeal but the BIA

dismissed it. After the BIA denied Valenzuela Gallardo’s

motion to reconsider, he petitioned for review and requested

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a stay of removal. Our court dismissed that petition for lack

of jurisdiction.

In May 2011, we issued an opinion in Trung Thanh

Hoang v. Holder, a case that looked to two prior BIA

decisions and held, under the agency’s interpretation, that a

crime constitutes an obstruction of justice crime “when it

interferes with an ongoing proceeding or investigation.” 

641 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2011) (some emphasis added).

In light of our opinion in Hoang, the BIA sua sponte

reopened Valenzuela Gallardo’s proceedings for further

consideration of his removability. In the opinion that

followed, In re Valenzuela Gallardo, a three-judge panel of

the BIA sought “to clarify [the BIA’s] prior precedents on the

scope of the phrase ‘relating to obstruction of justice,’” and

rejected Hoang’s holding. 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 840, 842

(B.I.A. 2012). The three-judge panel announced that

“obstruction of justice” requires only:

the affirmative and intentional attempt, with

specific intent, to interfere with the process of

justice—[this] demarcates the category of

crimes constituting obstruction of justice. 

While many crimes fitting this definition will

involve interference with an ongoing criminal

investigation or trial, we now clarify that the

existence of such proceedings is not an

essential element of “an offense relating to

obstruction of justice.”

Id. at 841 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). In light of this

interpretation, the BIA concluded that Valenzuela Gallardo’s

conviction was an offense “relating to obstruction of justice.” 

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 7

Id. at 844. Because Valenzuela Gallardo was ultimately

sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment for his

offense, the BIA concluded that his conviction was for an

aggravated felony. Id. It therefore dismissed Valenzuela

Gallardo’s reopened appeal. Id.

Valenzuela Gallardo petitions for review, challenging the

BIA’s most recent interpretation of INA § 101(a)(43)(S). We

have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), and we

hold that the BIA’s new construction of “obstruction of

justice” raises grave doubts about whether the statute, so

construed, is unconstitutionally vague. Because we see no

clear indication that Congress intended to delegate authority

to the agency to push the constitutional boundary, we remand

to the agency, as the agency requested, for consideration of a

new construction or application of the interpretation it

previously announced in In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N.

Dec. 889 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc), and to which we deferred

in Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review legal questions de novo. Perez-Enriquez v.

Gonzales, 463 F.3d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). Where, as

here, the BIA reviews an IJ’s decision de novo, our review is

limited to the BIA’s decision. Shah v. INS, 220 F.3d 1062,

1067 (9th Cir. 2000).

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DISCUSSION

I. The BIA’s most recent interpretation departs from its

prior interpretations.

“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at

any time after admission is deportable.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The INA does not separately define

“aggravated felony.” Instead, it refers to a list of qualifying

criminal offenses, which includes offenses “relating to

obstruction of justice, perjury or subornation of perjury, or

bribery of a witness, for which the term of imprisonment is at

least one year.” INA § 101(a)(43)(S).

In 1997, a twelve-member en banc panel of the BIA ruled

in In re Batista-Hernandezthat the federal crime of accessory

after the fact, 18 U.S.C. § 3, “clearly relates to obstruction of

justice” and constitutes an aggravated felony under INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S). 21 I. & N. Dec. 955, 961 (B.I.A. 1997). The

Board explained:

[T]he wording of 18 U.S.C. § 3 itself indicates

its relation to obstruction of justice, for the

statute criminalizes actions knowingly taken

to “hinder or prevent (another’s)

apprehension, trial or punishment.” . . . [T]he

nature of being an accessory after the fact lies

essentially in obstructing justice and

preventing the arrest of the offender.

Id.

Two years later, a sixteen-member en banc panel of the

BIA issued Espinoza-Gonzalez and concluded that misprision

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 9

of felony, 18 U.S.C. § 4, does not constitute obstruction of

justice and is not an aggravated felony under INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S). 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 897 (B.I.A. 1999). The

BIA reasoned:

We do not believe that every offense that, by

its nature, would tend to “obstruct justice” is

an offense that should properly be classified

as “obstruction of justice.” The United States

Code delineates a circumscribed set of

offenses that constitute “obstruction of

justice,” and although misprision of felony

bears some resemblance to these offenses, it

lacks the critical element of an affirmative and

intentional attempt, motivated by a specific

intent, to interfere with the process of

justice. . . . [W]here the obstruction of justice

offenses are broadly stated, courts have

interpreted them narrowly. To include all

offenses that have a tendency to, or by their

nature do, obstruct justice would cast the net

too widely.

Id. at 893–94 (citation omitted). Espinoza-Gonzalez

distinguished misprision of felony from accessory after the

fact, which had been at issue in Batista-Hernandez:

The definition of the federal crime of

accessory after the fact in 18 U.S.C. § 3

requires an affirmative action knowingly

undertaken “in order to hinder or prevent

(another’s) apprehension, trial or

punishment.” Although misprision of a

felony has as an element the affirmative

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concealment of the felony, there is, unlike § 3,

nothing in § 4 that references the specific

purpose for which the concealment must be

undertaken. The specific purpose of

hindering the process of justice brings the

federal “accessory after the fact” crime within

the general ambit of offenses that fall under

the “obstruction of justice” designation.

Furthermore, concealment of a crime is

qualitatively different from an affirmative

action to hinder or prevent another’s

apprehension, trial, or punishment. It is a

lesser offense to conceal a crime where there

is no investigation or proceeding, or even an

intent to hinder the process of justice, and

where the defendant need not be involved in

the commission of the crime. Further,

accessory after the fact has been defined as

obstructing justice. United States v. Barlow,

[470 F.2d 1245,] 1252–53 [(D.C. Cir. 1972)].

Id. at 894–95 (emphasis added).

Although the phrase “obstruction of justice” is not

statutorily defined, the BIA observed that Title 18, Chapter

73 of the United States Code lists a number of offenses under

the heading “Obstruction of Justice” and provides

“substantial guidance, consistent with judicial

pronouncements on the subject, as to the contours of the

‘obstruction of justice’ category of offenses.” Id. at 893, 894

n.4; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521. The Board noted:

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The intent of the two broadest provisions,

§ 1503 (prohibiting persons from influencing

or injuring an officer or juror generally) and

§ 1510 (prohibiting obstruction of criminal

investigations), is to protect individuals

assisting in a federal investigation or judicial

proceeding and to prevent a miscarriage of

justice in any case pending in a federal court.

Id. at 892 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The BIA also

found guidance in the Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Aguilar, which narrowly construed § 1503’s

“catchall phrase”1

to require action taken with an intent to

influence judicial or grand jury proceedings. 515 U.S. 593,

598–99 (1995) (holding that “[t]he action taken by the

accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand

jury proceedings”).

Our court has deferred to the agency interpretation

announced in Espinoza-Gonzalez on three occasions. See

Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir.

2011); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 (9th

Cir. 2008); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076,

1086–87 (9th Cir. 2008). In the proceedings below, a threejudge panel of the BIA revisited its en banc court’s

interpretation of obstruction of justice and clarified that a

nexus to an “ongoing criminal investigation or trial . . . is not

an essential element of ‘an offense related to obstruction of

1 The catchall phrase in § 1503 provides that obstruction of justice

includes a person who “corruptly, or by threats of force, or by any

threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or

endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of

justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a).

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justice.’” In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838,

841 (B.I.A. 2012). Applying this broader definition, the BIA

dismissed Valenzuela Gallardo’s appeal.2 Id. at 844.

II. The constitutional avoidance doctrine applies in the

Chevron context.

We apply the Chevron framework where, as here, there is

“binding agency precedent on-point” in the form of a

published BIA opinion. See Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at

1081 (quoting Kharana v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 1280, 1283 n.4

(9th Cir. 2007)). Under the familiar Chevron framework, we

first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise

question at issue.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If the statute

“unambiguously bars” the agency’s interpretation, that is the

end of the analysis, see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,

531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001), “for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

2

In its briefing and at oral argument, the government made clear that the

operative definition of “obstruction of justice” is the one the BIA

announced in Valenzuela Gallardo, so that is the one we review. The

dissent would have us review a construction that is narrower and more

concrete than the one the BIA advocates. Dissent at 44. The dissent also

quarrels with our characterization of the BIA’s interpretation of INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S) as “new,” see Dissent, Section I, but the government did

not dispute that this is a new interpretation. More to the point, whether the

BIA’s definition is new, newly clarified, or merely “a change from this

Circuit’s interpretation of BIA precedent,” Dissent at 33, the BIA in

Valenzuela Gallardo “invoke[d] . . . Brand X” and set out the operative

construction of “obstruction of justice.” Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N.

Dec. at 840. “Under Brand X,” it is our duty to review “the BIA’s most

recent interpretation.” Anaya-Ortiz v. Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 678 (9thCir.

2010); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 13

intent of Congress,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. To

determine whether the statute unambiguously bars an agency

interpretation we “apply[] the normal ‘tools of statutory

construction.’” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001)

(quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9). If, after application

of these tools, an immigration statute remains “silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue before the

agency,” we proceed to Chevron Step Two and determine

whether “the BIA’s interpretation is ‘based on a permissible

construction of the statute.’” Renteria-Morales, 551 F.3d at

1081 (quoting Parrilla v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th

Cir. 2005)). If it is, the court must defer to the BIA’s

reasonable statutory interpretation.

We have deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of

“obstruction of justice” in at least three cases because the

INA did not unambiguously bar the interpretation and the

interpretation was reasonable.3 Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1160–61;

Salazar-Luviano, 551 F.3d at 860; Renteria-Morales,

3 Valenzuela Gallardo argues that the BIA cannot depart from our

court’s decision in Hoang or its own prior interpretation in EspinozaGonzalez. We disagree. In National Cable &Telecommunications Ass’n

v. Brand X Internet Services, the Supreme Court expressly instructed that

“[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency

construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior

court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous

terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.” 

545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005). Because our prior interpretations of

§ 101(a)(43)(S) did not follow unambiguously from the statute, see

Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1161, the BIA was free to interpret the phrase

“obstruction of justice” in a manner inconsistent with those precedents. 

Therefore, “[u]nder Brand X, we must apply Chevron deference to the

BIA’s most recent interpretation” if Congress has not directly spoken to

the issue and the BIA’s interpretation is reasonable. Anaya-Ortiz v.

Holder, 594 F.3d 673, 678 (9th Cir. 2010).

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551 F.3d at 1086–87; see also INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,

526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999) (“It is clear that principles of

Chevron deference are applicable to [the INA’s] statutory

scheme.”). However, our prior deference to the BIA’s

interpretation of “obstruction of justice” does not end the

Chevron Step One inquiry. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,

480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987) (concluding that the BIA’s

interpretation of “well-founded fear,” an otherwise

ambiguous term, was inconsistent with the INA at Chevron

Step One). Rather, before turning to Chevron’s Step Two, we

must ask whether Congress intended to permit the agency

interpretation. Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000). To answer this

question we are aided by traditional tools of statutory

construction. See id. at 132–33; MCI Telecomms. Corp. v.

Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–26 (1994). If a court,

employing these tools, “ascertains that Congress had an

intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the

law and must be given effect.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.

Particularly relevant here are the doctrines of

constitutional avoidance and constitutional narrowing. 

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fl. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades

Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). The dissent objects to our

use of constitutional narrowing to interpret the INA, arguing

that we should stick with “the familiar Chevron standard.” 

Dissent at 34. But Chevron itself instructs that “employing

traditional tools of statutoryconstruction” is a straightforward

application of Chevron. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. 

Indeed, the canon of constitutional avoidance “is highly

relevant at Chevron step one.” Morales-Izquierdo v.

Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 504 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc)

(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 492–93 (majority opinion)

(holding that constitutional narrowing is inapplicable at

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 15

Chevron Step Two).4 Because we “assum[e] that Congress

does not casually authorize administrative agencies to

interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional

authority,” if an agency’s statutoryinterpretation “invokes the

outer limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication

that Congress intended that result.” Solid Waste Agency of N.

Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531 U.S.

159, 172–73 (2001). Absent clear indication, we invoke

constitutional narrowing at Step One to avoid the

constitutional question and foreclose the constitutionally

4 The dissent criticizes our mode of Chevron analysis and the use of the

doctrine of constitutional avoidance at Chevron Step One. See Dissent at

47–48 (quoting Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1320–21 (10th Cir.

2015)). The dissent is incorrect, however, that we only ask whether

Congress intended an implicit delegation in “extraordinary cases.” See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44 (directing courts to determine whether

Congress explicitly or implicitly delegated authority to an agency);

Dissent at 49–50. Rather, when read in context, the cases invoked by the

dissent stand for the proposition that we should hesitate to find an implicit

delegation in “extraordinary cases” of “economic and political

significance.” King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (emphasis

added) (concluding that the potential implicit delegation at issue was of

such “deep economic and political significance” that “had Congress

wished to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have done so

expressly”); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60 (concluding that

“Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such

economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion”). 

Here, where the potential implicit delegation is not one of deep “economic

and political significance,” we must turn to other tools to assess

Congressional intent, such as the constitutional avoidance doctrine.

Furthermore, even the dissent acknowledges that the Supreme Court

applies the constitutional avoidance doctrine in the Chevron context,

Dissent at 63–65; DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575–76, and our en banc

authority says that the doctrine is inapplicable at Step Two, MoralesIzquierdo, 486 F.3d at 492–93. That leaves Step One, lest we abdicate our

role.

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questionable interpretation. Williams v. Babbit, 115 F.3d

657, 662–63 (9th Cir. 1997); see also DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at

588 (construing the NLRA to preclude an interpretation

raising grave constitutional concerns rather than deferring to

the agency interpretation).

The use of constitutional narrowing in the Chevron

context is not a novel concept. The Supreme Court and our

court have refused to accord deference to agency

interpretations that raise grave constitutional doubts where

other permissible and less troubling interpretations exist. In

DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building &

Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988), the

Supreme Court announced the applicability of the

constitutional avoidance doctrine in the Chevron context. 

DeBartolo concerned the National Labor Relations Board’s

(NLRB) interpretation of “coercion” as used in the National

Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The NLRB decided that a

labor union’s peaceful handbilling of consumers was

prohibited if it encouraged consumers to boycott stores that

failed to pay fair wages. Id. at 573. The Court held that

though the interpretation would otherwise be entitled to

Chevron deference, the NLRB’s interpretation posed serious

questions of validity under the First Amendment. Id. at

574–76. The Court invoked the constitutional avoidance

doctrine: “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a

statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court

will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such

construction is plainly contrary to the intent ofCongress.” Id.

at 575 (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490,

499–501 (1979)). The DeBartolo Court observed:

“[T]he elementary rule is that every

reasonable construction must be resorted to,

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in order to save a statute from

unconstitutionality.” This approach not only

reflects the prudential concern that

constitutional issues not be needlessly

confronted, but also recognizes that Congress,

like this Court, is bound by and swears an

oath to uphold the Constitution. The courts

will therefore not lightly assume that

Congress intended to infringe constitutionally

protected liberties or usurp power

constitutionally forbidden it.

Id. (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).

The Court ultimately determined that a less

constitutionally suspect interpretation was not foreclosed by

the statutory language or legislative history. It therefore

declined to defer to the NLRB’s interpretation because a less

problematic construction “makes unnecessary passing on the

serious constitutional questions that would be raised by the

Board’s understanding of the statute.” Id. at 588.

In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme

Court further refined its application of the constitutional

avoidance doctrine to agency interpretation of ambiguous

statutes. The Rust Court reviewed facial challenges to

regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and

Human Services under Title X of the Public Health Service

Act. Id. at 181. Because the regulations provided that funds

under the Act could not be used to pay for abortions, directly

or indirectly, the challengers claimed the regulation violated

the First and Fifth Amendments. Id. The Court observed that

the principle espoused in DeBartolo “is based at least in part

on the fact that a decision to declare an Act of Congress

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unconstitutional ‘is the gravest and most delicate duty that

this Court is called on to perform,’” id. at 190–91 (quoting

Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927)), and concluded

that a “statute must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to

avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but

also grave doubts upon that score.” Id. (quoting United States

v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916)). Applying this

rule, the Court held that the public health regulations at issue

in Rust did not “raise the sort of ‘grave and doubtful

constitutional questions’ that would lead [it] to assume

Congress did not intend to authorize their issuance,” and

declined to invalidate the regulations. Id. (citation omitted).

Our court considered DeBartolo and Rust in Williams v.

Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). There, we synthesized

and applied the DeBartolo-Rust constitutional avoidance

standard for the first time. Id. at 661–63. The Babbitt court

reviewed an interpretation by the Interior Board of Indian

Appeals (IBIA) of the Reindeer Industry Act as it pertained

to reindeer sales in Alaska. Id. at 659. The IBIA interpreted

the Act to prohibit non-Natives from joining the Alaska

reindeer industry. Id. On appeal, non-Native appellants

claimed that the IBIA interpretation violated the

constitutional guarantee of equal protection. Id. at 660.

Our analysis in Babbitt began by observing that the IBIA

interpretation was entitled to Chevron deference “absent other

considerations.” Id. at 660 n.3. We then went on to analyze

one of those “other considerations,” namely, whether the

interpretation raised equal protection concerns. Id. at 661. 

We concluded: “Rust and DeBartolo, read together, require

courts to scrutinize constitutional objections to a particular

agency interpretation skeptically. Only if the agency’s

proffered interpretation raises serious constitutional concerns

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may a court refuse to defer under Chevron.” Id. at 662. 

Because we concluded that the IBIA’s interpretation of the

Reindeer Act raised serious constitutional concerns, and

because “a less constitutionally troubling construction [was]

readily available,” we interpreted the Act as not precluding

non-Natives from owning and importing reindeer in Alaska. 

Id. at 666.

When a court practices what Babbitt termed

“constitutional narrowing,” it leaves agencies “free to adopt

any interpretation that doesn’t come perilously close to the

constitutional boundary.” Id. at 662–63. Constitutional

narrowing recognizes that the decision to foreclose a

constitutionally troubling interpretation is a legal decision,

not a policy decision, and should be addressed by the courts,

not the agency. Id. at 662. Agencies specialize in making the

policy decisions necessary to apply generalized statutory

provisions to the complexities of everyday life. FDA v.

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132–33 (2000). Judges

specialize in “say[ing] what the law is.” Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). “[W]hen a

court construes a statute so as to avoid a difficult

constitutional question, it is not making a policy choice,” it is

making a legal choice. Babbit, 115 F.3d at 662. The policy

choice remains with the agency, which is “free to adopt any

interpretation that doesn’t come perilously close to the

constitutional boundary.” Id. at 663.

These authorities establish that where an agency’s

interpretation of a statute raises grave constitutional concerns,

and where Congress has not clearly indicated it intends a

constitutionally suspect interpretation, we can assume

Congress did not delegate authority for the interpretation and

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deem it foreclosed by the statute. With this framework in

mind, we turn to the agency interpretation before us.

III. The BIA’s new interpretation raises grave

constitutional doubts.

The BIA has been express in stating that it does “not

believe that every offense that, by its nature, would tend to

‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be

classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’” In re EspinozaGonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893–94 (B.I.A. 1999). And

the BIA has given some indication of where it draws that line:

18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact) is an obstruction of

justice crime, whereas 18 U.S.C. § 4 (misprision of felony) is

not. Id. at 892. According to the BIA, the distinction

between these crimes—and the “critical element” of

obstruction of justice crimes—is the “affirmative and

intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere

with the process of justice,” regardless of the existence of an

ongoing investigation or proceeding. In re Valenzuela

Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 842 (B.I.A. 2012). In other

words, though the BIA has said that not every crime that

tends to obstruct justice qualifies as an obstruction of justice

crime, and the critical factor is the interference with the

process of justice—which does not require an ongoing

investigation or proceeding—the BIA has not given an

indication of what it does include in “the process of justice,”

or where that process begins and ends. Valenzuela Gallardo

argues that this new interpretation raises grave doubts about

whether INA § 101(a)(43)(S) is unconstitutionally vague. 

We agree.

“The Fifth Amendment provides that ‘[n]o person shall

. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

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process of law.’” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551,

2556 (2015) (alterations in original) (quoting U.S. Const.

amend. V). The “[v]agueness doctrine is an outgrowth . . . of

[that clause]. A conviction fails to comport with due process

if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a

person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is

prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or

encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.” United

States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008). The Supreme

Court has advised:

What renders a statute vague is not the

possibility that it will sometimes be difficult

to determine whether the incriminating fact it

establishes has been proved; but rather the

indeterminancy of precisely what that fact is.

Thus, we have struck down statutes that tied

criminal culpability to . . . wholly subjective

judgments without statutory definitions,

narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.

Id. at 306 (emphasis added). “The prohibition of vagueness

in criminal statutes ‘is a well-recognized requirement,

consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the

settled rules of law,’ and a statute that flouts it ‘violates the

first essential of due process.’” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at

2556–57 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S.

385, 391 (1926)).

Recently, the Supreme Court held that the residual clause

of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 is

unconstitutionally vague because it “denies fair notice to

defendants and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges.” Id.

at 2257. The residual clause states that a “violent felony” is

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“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year . . . that . . . involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B). The Court held that two features of the clause

render it unconstitutionally vague. First, the clause “leaves

grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a

crime. It ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially

imagined ordinary case of a crime, not to real-world facts or

statutory elements.” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Second, the clause creates

“uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to

qualify as a violent felony. It is one thing to apply an

imprecise ‘serious potential risk’ standard to real-world facts;

it is quite another to apply it to a judge-imagined abstraction.” 

Id. at 2558. The Supreme Court concluded: “By combining

indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a

crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for

the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause

produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due

Process Clause tolerates.” Id.

The residual clause left grave uncertainty about the

amount of risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent

felony. The BIA’s new construction leaves grave uncertainty

about the plethora of steps before and after an “ongoing

criminal investigation or trial” that comprise “the process of

justice,” and, hence, uncertainty about which crimes

constitute “obstruction of justice.” See In re Valenzuela

Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838, 841 (B.I.A. 2012). We can

glean no definition of “the process of justice” from the BIA’s

case law. See, e.g., id. at 840–41 (distinguishing 18 U.S.C.

§ 4 (misprision of felony) from 18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after

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the fact) based on § 3’s specific intent requirement).5 The

phrase “obstruction of justice” has no statutory definition or

settled legal meaning. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (INA definitions

section with no definition of “process of justice”); Black’s

Law Dictionary 1329 (9th ed. 2009) (providing no definition

of “process of justice”). When the BIA clarified that the

“process of justice” does not necessarily involve an ongoing

investigation or proceeding, it eliminated the narrowing

principal Hoang had gleaned from earlier BIA case law. See

Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1160–61,

1164 (9th Cir. 2011). We do not hold, as the dissent suggests,

that “ongoing proceedings” is the only permissible anchor for

the “process of justice.” But after Valenzuela Gallardo,

arguably everything that happens after someone commits a

crime could be considered to be part of the “process of

justice.” We cannot reconcile this expansive interpretation

with the BIA en banc court’s declaration that it does “not

believe that every offense that, by its nature, would tend to

‘obstruct justice’ is an offense that should properly be

classified as ‘obstruction of justice.’” In re EspinozaGonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889, 893–94 (B.I.A. 1999). As the

Supreme Court noted in Williams, amorphous terms “without

statutory definitions, narrowing context, or settled legal

5 At oral argument, the government would only go so far as to say that

interference with the “process ofjustice” includes interfering with another

person’s arrest or apprehension. This only confirms that a conviction

under California’s accessory after the fact statute is a crime “relating to

the obstruction of justice.” See Cal. Penal Code § 32 (“Every person who,

after a felony has been committed . . . aids a principal in such felony, with

the intent that such principal may avoid escape from arrest, trial,

conviction or punishment . . . is an accessory to such felony.”). The

government’s response does not provide a limiting principal or tell us

what crimes—other than § 32—fall within and outside the nebulous

“process of justice.”

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meanings” raise vagueness concerns. See United States v.

Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008).

Absent some indication of the contours of “process of

justice,” an unpredictable variety of specific intent crimes

could fall within it, leaving us unable to determine what

crimes make a criminal defendant deportable under INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S) and what crimes do not. See City of Chicago

v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999) (plurality opinion)

(invalidating as unconstitutionally vague Chicago’s antiloitering statute in part because it did not give potential

violators notice of “what loitering is covered by the ordinance

and what is not”). More importantly, because the BIA’s new

interpretation invites arbitrary enforcement, defense lawyers

will be unable to accurately advise their clients about the

immigration-related consequences of a conviction or plea

agreement. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360

(2010) (holding that defense “counsel had an obligation to

advise [defendant] that the offense to which he was pleading

guilty would result in his removal from this country”).

What we do know is that, in the INA, Congress identified

three types of obstruction-related offenses that qualify as

“aggravated felonies” and trigger deportation: “[1] an offense

relating to obstruction of justice, [2] perjury or subordination

of perjury, [3] or bribery of a witness.” INA § 101(a)(43)(S). 

Perjury and bribery of a witness are clearly tied to

proceedings, and this informs our understanding of

Congress’s intended interpretation of “obstruction of justice.” 

See Microsoft Corp. v. C.I.R., 311 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir.

2002) (“The doctrine of noscitur a sociis counsels that words

should be understood by the company they keep.”). Shedding

more light on what Congress intended is the list of

obstruction of justice crimes Congress included in Title 18,

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Chapter 73, on which the BIA based its interpretation of INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S). See Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at

892. The difficulty presented by the BIA’s new interpretation

of “obstruction of justice” can be seen by comparing it to the

Chapter 73 obstruction of justice crimes. As the BIA has

recognized, almost all of these “obstruction of justice

offenses . . . have as an element interference with the

proceedings of a tribunal.” Id. at 892. The few that do not

require interference with a tribunal or investigation have as an

element the intent to interfere with a specific act associated

with a tribunal or investigation. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(b)(3) (prohibition on tampering with a witness with

the intent to hinder or prevent “communication to a law

enforcement officer” regarding a federal offense); 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(d)(2) (prohibition on harassing someone with the

intent to prevent that person from “reporting [a federal crime]

to a law enforcement officer or judge”); 18 U.S.C. § 1519

(prohibition on falsifying or destroying a record “with the

intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or

proper administration of any matter” within the jurisdiction

of the United States).6

The Government and dissent assure us that the BIA’s new

interpretation is sufficiently limited because it still requires

6 The dissent discusses examples of crimes that clearly fall within the

BIA’s newinterpretation, but we are concerned with the outer edges ofthe

definition, not its core. The fact that the BIA’s interpretation encompasses

conduct Congress undoubtedly intended to include in “obstruction of

justice,” see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521, does not resolve the due process

concern presented by the phrase “the process of justice.” In Johnson, the

Supreme Court reaffirmed that its case law “squarely contradict[s] the

theory that a vague provision is constitutional merely because there is

some conduct that clearly falls within the provision’s grasp.” 135 S. Ct.

at 2561.

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specific intent. But this does little to answer the question

central to our constitutional concerns—specific intent to do

what? See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306

(2008) (“What renders a statute vague, however, is not the

possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine

whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved;

but rather the indeterminancy of precisely what that fact is.”

(emphasis added)). Though it ostensibly defines the required

mens rea—intent to interfere with the “process of justice”—it

provides little instruction on the equally important actus reus. 

Cf. Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2014)

(“[B]oth the actus reus and the mens rea must be considered

in concert to determine whether the behavior they describe is

sufficiently culpable.” (citation omitted)); Trung Thanh

Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)

(“Espinoza-Gonzalez ‘articulated both an actus reus and mens

rea element of the generic definition of [obstruction of

justice] crimes for purposes of §1101(a)(43)(S).’” (alteration

in original) (citation omitted)). Specific intent does little to

accord fair notice when there is no indication of what it is that

must be interfered with in order to “obstruct justice.”

The Government also argues that the one-year sentence

requirement offers a limitation on its interpretation. See INA

§ 101(a)(43)(S). But as with the specific intent element, the

one-year sentence requirement does not reduce the

indeterminacy of the type of conduct that qualifies as an

aggravated felony. Indeed, in the context of accessory after

the fact, the one-year sentence actually reflects the severity of

an underlying crime committed by another person. The

residual clause the Supreme Court examined in Johnson also

required a one-year sentence. 135 S. Ct. at 2555. There, the

sentence at least reflected the crime actually committed by

the defendant at issue, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (“[T]he

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term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”), but even so,

the length-of-sentence limitation was insufficient to salvage

the clause from its vagueness. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at

2563. We see no reason for concluding that the same oneyear sentence requirement is sufficient to dispel the serious

constitutional doubts presented here.

The dissent reads our opinion as imposing a “temporal

nexus requirement” on the BIA’s definition of “crimes

relating to obstruction of justice.” Dissent at 36. It doesn’t. 

We do not hold that the BIA’s definition of “obstruction of

justice” must be tied to an ongoing proceeding; rather, we

hold that the BIA’s new interpretation of obstruction of

justice raises grave constitutional concerns because it uses an

amorphous phrase—“process of justice”—without telling us

what that phrase means. It is difficult to imagine a specific

intent crime that could not be swept into the BIA’s expanded

definition. The problem is the absence of any narrowing

context—not necessarily the specific narrowing context of a

tie to “ongoing proceedings.”7 The BIA is free to define

7 The dissent argues that “the BIA’s definition is not missing the

required nexus” to “a foreseeable or contemplated proceeding,” Dissent

at 52–53, and suggests that the BIA’s interpretation of “obstruction of

justice” requires a nexus to an ongoing or contemplated proceeding or

investigation. But this is not what the BIA said in Valenzuela Gallardo

or in oral argument before our court. In Valenzuela Gallardo, the BIA

articulated that “the existence of such proceedings is not an essential

element of ‘an offense relating to obstruction of justice.’” 25 I. & N. Dec.

at 841. If, as the dissent suggests, the BIA intends interference with the

“process of justice” to mean interference with an ongoing or foreseeable

or contemplated investigation or proceeding, it can clarify this on remand.

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obstruction of justice as it sees fit on remand, as long as the

definition is not unworkably vague.8

IV. Under the constitutional avoidance doctrine, we do

not defer to the BIA’s new construction.

Having determined that the BIA’s new interpretation

creates serious constitutional doubts, we must determine

whether Congress “[made] it clear that it chooses the

constitutionally doubtful interpretation.” Williams v. Babbitt,

8 The dissent argues that we create or exacerbate a circuit split with the

Second, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. See Dissent at 44–45 & n.6. 

We don’t. Our sister circuits do not address whether the BIA’s

interpretation of “obstruction ofjustice” is unconstitutionally vague in any

of the cases cited by the dissent. See Armenta-Lagunas v. Holder, 724

F.3d 1019, 1020–21 (8th Cir. 2013); Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97,

98–99 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Denis v. Attorney General, 633 F.3d

201, 207–09 (3d Cir. 2011). “Nexus to an ongoing proceeding” was not

at issue in Armenta-Lagunas or Higgins because the state statutes in those

cases plainly required such a nexus. See Armenta-Lagunas, 724 F.3d at

1023; Higgins, 677 F.3d at 105 (noting that the Connecticut statute

“require[s] a nexus to an official proceeding”). In United States v.

Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2010)—a case decided before

Valenzuela Gallardo and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276

(2013)—the Fifth Circuit relied on the alien’s conduct, not the elements

of her crime of conviction, to decide that the crime “relat[ed] to

obstruction of justice.” Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d at 549–50. The

conduct was extreme: Gamboa-Garcia witnessed a murder, drove and

cleaned up the getaway car, financed the murderer’s escape, and lied to

police. Id. at 547. The dissent also overlooks that our circuit has long

disagreed with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of INA § 101(a)(43)(S). 

In fact, our circuits’ views depart from the get-go because the Third

Circuit does not even consider the undefined term “obstruction of justice”

to be ambiguous. See Denis, 633 F.3d at 207–09, 211 & n.12 (“[W]e

again depart from the view adopted by the Ninth and Fifth Circuit Courts

of Appeals . . . .”). Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, our decision does

not create or exacerbate a circuit split.

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115 F.3d 657, 663 (9th Cir. 1997). We see no such

indication. All of Congress’s express examples of

obstruction of justice contemplate ongoing proceedings or

investigations or are otherwise sufficiently specific to provide

notice of what conduct is prohibited. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1501–1502, 1504–1521; supra Section III. And although

the catchall provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 pertains to anyone

who “influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to

influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of

justice,” courts have universally construed this broad

language to require an ongoing proceeding:

Recent decisions of Courts of Appeals have

likewise tended to place metes and bounds on

the very broad language of the catchall

provision. The action taken by the accused

must be with an intent to influence judicial or

grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that

there be an intent to influence some ancillary

proceeding, such as an investigation

independent of the court’s or grand jury’s

authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d

596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing cases). Some

courts have phrased this showing as a 

“nexus” requirement—that the act must have

a relationship in time, causation, or logic with

the judicial proceedings. United States v.

Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 1993);

United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679

& n.12 (3d Cir. 1975). In other words, the

endeavor must have the “‘natural and

probable effect’” of interfering with the due 

administration of justice. Wood, 6 F.3d at

695; United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647,

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651 (11th Cir. 1990); Walasek, 527 F.2d at

679. . . . But . . . if the defendant lacks

knowledge that his actions are likely to affect

the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite

intent to obstruct.

United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (emphasis

added); see also In re Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec.

889, 892 (B.I.A. 1999) (noting that the Supreme Court has

“narrowly” construed the catchall provision).9 As the BIA

itself observed in Espinoza-Gonzalez, even the broadest

obstruction of justice provisions intend “to protect individuals

assisting in a federal investigation or judicial proceeding and

to prevent a miscarriage of justice in any case pending in a

federal court.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at 892. We see no indication

Congress intended that “obstruction of justice” be interpreted

as broadly as the BIA has done here.

9

Judicial interpretations of § 1503 are particularly relevant here because

the BIA’s construction pertains to a criminal statute, where federal

courts—not administrative agencies—have expertise. See Leocal v.

Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Although here we deal with

[18 U.S.C.] § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and

it has both criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must

interpret the statute consistently, whether we encounter its application in

a criminal or noncriminal context, the rule of lenity applies.”); Mugalli v.

Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (“But the BIA’s conclusion that

a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) necessarily constituted an ‘attempt’

as the BIA had defined it depended on an analysis of a federal criminal

statute and was thus beyond the BIA’s administrative responsibility and

expertise. That conclusion was therefore entitled to no deference from

us.” (emphasis added)). Because the BIA has expertise in interpreting the

INA, but not the federal criminal code, there is less reason to defer. See,

e.g., Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (striking down

BIA interpretation of aggravated felony provision without mentioning

Chevron deference).

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Further, and contrary to the dissent’s argument, the fact

that Congress defined “aggravated felony” to include not just

obstruction of justice offenses but offenses “relating to

obstruction of justice” does not indicate its intent that the BIA

“push the constitutional envelope.” Williams v. Babbit,

115 F.3d 657, 662 (9th Cir. 1997). The use of the modifier

“relating to” broadens the INA’s intended reach, but it is not

an explicit indication that Congress intended that the BIA

approach the constitutional boundary, nor is it an excuse for

abdicating our role. See Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,

1990 (2015) (striking down the BIA’s interpretation of an

aggravated felony “relating to a controlled substance,” INA

§ 237(a)(2)(B)(I), as inconsistent with congressional intent). 

If Congress wishes to authorize such a result, “it must do so

explicitly.” Babbitt, 115 F.3d at 662.

For over a decade, we upheld the interpretation that the

BIA announced in Espinoza-Gonzalez—requiring a nexus to

an ongoing proceeding—as a plausible construction. See

Trung Thanh Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157, 1161, 1164

(9th Cir. 2011); Salazar-Luviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857,

860 (9th Cir. 2008); Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d

1076, 1086–87 (9th Cir. 2008). This demonstrates that “a

less constitutionally troubling construction is readily

available.” See Babbitt, 115 F.3d at 666. We do not

independently inquire into another interpretation, see

DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades

Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577 (1988); we leave it to the BIA to

“adopt any interpretation that doesn’t come perilously close

to the constitutional boundary.” See Babbitt, 115 F.3d at 663. 

“And, of course, Congress may . . . remov[e] the statutory

ambiguity and mak[e] it clear that it chooses the

constitutionally doubtful interpretation—in which event, the

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32 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH

courts will have to confront the constitutional question

squarely.” Id.

Our decision to remand to the BIA, rather than attempt to

reconcile the questions that arise from the interpretation its

three-judge panel announced in Valenzuela Gallardo, is

consistent with the charge from Congress that the BIA

administer the INA. See Gonzalez v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183,

186 (2006) (per curiam). It is also consistent with the

government’s request in its supplemental briefing that the

court remand for the Board to provide an alternative

definition of the ambiguous statute if we agree with the

petitioner’s view of this one.

We remand to the agency so that it can either offer a new

construction of INA § 101(a)(43)(S) or, in the alternative,

apply Espinoza-Gonzalez’s interpretation to the instant case.

CONCLUSION

We grant Valenzuela Gallardo’s petition for review and

remand to the BIA for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

PETITION GRANTED AND REMANDED.

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 33

SEABRIGHT, District Judge, dissenting:

For several reasons, I respectfully disagree with the

majority Opinion, and dissent.

I. Overview

First, In re Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. 838

(B.I.A. 2012), did not announce a new Board of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) interpretation that removed a required nexus

between an obstructive act and an existing proceeding,

thereby rendering its interpretation vague. The majority

Opinion concludes that Valenzuela Gallardo raises grave

constitutional vagueness concerns by changing a well-settled

BIA construction, and gives the BIA an option of applying its

“previous interpretation” on remand. But the majority

Opinion relies on a mistaken premise that In re EspinozaGonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (B.I.A. 1999) (en banc),

previously required a nexus to an ongoing investigation or

proceeding for a crime of conviction to be “an offense

relating to obstruction of justice” for purposes of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(S).1In fact, Espinoza-Gonzalez did not (and

Valenzuela Gallardo explains why). Valenzuela Gallardo is

not a change from BIA precedent – it is a change from this

Circuit’s interpretation of BIA precedent.

As explained to follow, Valenzuela Gallardo explicitly

clarified language in Espinoza-Gonzalez, in light of what the

BIA considers to be the Ninth Circuit’s misreading of BIA

1

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S) provides that “[t]he term‘aggravated felony’

means . . . an offense relating to obstruction of justice, perjury or

subornation of perjury, or bribery of a witness, for which the term of

imprisonment is at least one year[.]”

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precedent in Hoang v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Further, Valenzuela Gallardo specifically reaffirmed In re

Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (B.I.A. 1997) (en

banc), which held that 18 U.S.C. § 3 – a crime that is

indistinguishable from California Penal Code § 32 which is

at issue here – is indeed a crime “relating to obstruction of

justice.”2 Valenzuela Gallardo did not purport to overrule or

change the BIA’s prior (and still valid) en banc precedent,

although it surely meant to trump Hoang. And as the

majorityOpinion acknowledges, this is the BIA’s prerogative

under principles of deference set forth in National Cable &

Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services,

545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial

construction of a statute trumps an agency construction

otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court

decision holds that its construction follows from the

unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for

agency discretion.”) (applying Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

Thus, viewed in proper context, the matter should be

analyzed under the familiar Chevron standard where, given

a statutory ambiguity, courts defer to an agency’s

construction of a statute it administers if its construction

“reflects a plausible reading of the statutory text.” MoralesIzquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 493 (9th Cir. 2007) (en

banc) (discussing and applying Chevron).

2 California Penal Code § 32 provides that “[e]very person who, after a

felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such

felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest,

trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has

committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted

thereof, is an accessory to such felony.”

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 35

Second, although the majorityOpinion acknowledges that

the term “relating to obstruction of justice” in

§ 1101(a)(43)(S) is ambiguous, it refuses to give deference to

the BIA’s reasonable, permissible, and plausible formulation

at Chevron step two. But this type of refusal should be

reserved for “major” or “extraordinary cases.” See King v.

Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015) (explaining that

deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a

statute that it administers “is premised on the theory that a

statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from

Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps. . . . In

extraordinary cases, however, there maybe reason to hesitate

before concluding that Congress hasintended such an implicit

delegation”) (quoting Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000))

(emphasis added). And unlike King’s challenge to the Patient

Protection and Affordable Care Act, this is not an

extraordinary case.

Instead of deferring, the majority applies the canon of

constitutional avoidance because it views the BIA’s

construction as approaching a constitutional boundary –

vagueness – a type of interpretation that it believes Congress

could not have intended. But applying the constitutional

avoidance doctrine in this instance, where the context calls

for an ordinary Chevron analysis, allows the exception to

swallow the rule. See, e.g., Nat’l Mining Ass’n v.

Kempthorne, 512 F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e do

not abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a

possible constitutional problem; the argument must be

serious.”). The BIA’s formulation (whether a crime “includes

the critical element of an affirmative and intentional attempt,

motivated by a specific intent, to interfere with the process of

justice, irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal

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investigation or proceeding”) does not raise “grave”

constitutional vagueness concerns.

The majority Opinion reasons that without a nexus to an

existing proceeding or investigation, the BIA’s definition

fails to indicate the contours of “the process of justice,”

thereby presenting grave or serious constitutional concerns. 

But many obstruction crimes do not require an ongoing or

pending proceeding – crimes which are undoubtedly“relating

to obstruction of justice” (a term indicating that Congress

specifically intended to broaden – not narrow – the scope of

qualifying obstruction crimes). Such crimes require a nexus

only to a foreseeable or contemplated investigation (e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1)), or to a specific type of proceeding

(e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1519), or otherwise to “the process of

justice” such as by hindering or preventing an offender’s

apprehension or arrest (e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3) and thereby

materially interfering with the ability to investigate or

prosecute. That is, there is no temporal nexus requirement. 

The absence of a specific requirement for an ongoing

investigation or pending proceeding does not render the

BIA’s definition vague, much less create grave constitutional

doubts on that score.

Finally, to the extent the constitutional avoidance doctrine

can apply to the BIA’s formulation in the current Chevron

context, we should apply it differently than the majority

Opinion does. If the BIA’s formulation raises serious

questions as to vagueness, then – as has been done previously

– we should construe the agency’s precedent in a readilyapparent way that is constitutional, not remand with an option

for the BIA to apply its previous interpretation. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The

constitutional questions raised by the [Interior Board of

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 37

Indian Appeals’] interpretation are grave . . . . We therefore

interpret the Reindeer Act as not precluding non-natives in

Alaska from owning and importing reindeer.”); United States

v. Stansell, 847 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Because a

reasonable limiting construction can be placed on the

challenged regulation, we hold that [it] is not substantially

overbroad.”).

And the BIA’s formulation can certainly be viewed to

include a required nexus – short of a pending or ongoing

investigation. The formulation requires an affirmative

attempt (i.e., an act), with specific intent, to interfere with the

process of justice – sufficiently encapsulating the type of

nexus or connection required in crimes such as 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1512(b)(1), 1519, and 3 (and thus to California Penal Code

§ 32 at issue here). Valenzuela Gallardo also specifically

refers to acts that clearly constitute obstruction – without a

pending proceeding or investigation – in giving obvious

meaning to the phrase “the process of justice.” See 25 I. & N.

Dec. at 841–42 (referring to acts with intent “to hinder or

prevent [the principal’s] apprehension, trial or punishment”

and “that [the] principal may avoid or escape from arrest,

trial, conviction or punishment”) (emphasis added). And it

reaffirms its en banc precedent further explaining “the

process of justice.” See id. at 840 (explaining that obstruction

occurs with an act meant to “prevent[] the arrest of the

offender”) (quoting Batista-Hernandez, 21 I & N. Dec. at

961). We need not remand for further explanation.

To follow, I explain these points in more detail.

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38 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH

II. ApplyingBrand-X,Valenzuela Gallardo clarified prior

BIA decisions in light of Hoang

It is undisputed that the Immigration and Nationality Act

(“INA”) does not provide specific guidance as to the meaning

of “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” in

§ 1101(a)(43)(S) – that is, the term is ambiguous. See, e.g.,

Renteria-Morales v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.

2008) (“[Section] 1101(a)(43)(S) does not clearlyset forth the

elements of the generic federal crime. Because the INA does

not define the phrase ‘offense relating to obstruction of

justice,’ we must determine whether there is any binding

agency precedent on-point which does define that phrase.”)

(citations and some quotation marks omitted); SalazarLuviano v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 857, 860 (9th Cir. 2008)

(“Because Congress itself did not define the phrase ‘offense

relating to obstruction of justice’ in the INA, we defer to the

BIA’s ‘interpretation of the elements of a generic obstruction

of justice offense under § 1101(a)(43)(S)[.]”) (citation and

editorial marks omitted); Hoang, 641 F.3d at 1160 (“Though

the United States criminal code includes a chapter entitled

‘Obstruction of Justice,’ 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521, it does not

clearly set forth the elements of a generic federal obstruction

of justice crime; nor does § 1101(a)(43)(S) provide a generic

definition. Consequently, we must determine whether the

agency charged with implementing the INA has defined the

term.”) (citation and footnote omitted).

Under Chevron, given an ambiguity in a statute that an

agency administers, a court “does not impose its own

construction of the statute, but rather it decides ‘whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.’” Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d

1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 39

843). And Brand X “instructed federal courts to defer to

reasonable agencyinterpretations of ambiguous statutes, even

when those interpretations conflict with the prior holding of

a federal circuit court.” Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder,

702 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citing Brand X,

545 U.S. at 982–83). In other words, “[a] circuit court must

apply Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of a

statute regardless of the circuit court’s contrary precedent,

provided that the court’s earlier precedent was an

interpretation of a statutory ambiguity.” Gonzales, 508 F.3d

at 1235–36 (citing Brand X, 545 U.S. at 980–82).

In 2011, a majority in Hoang (over a dissent from Judge

Bybee) interpreted BIA precedent regarding § 1101(a)(43)(S)

to require a pending proceeding or investigation such that a

Washington crime of rendering criminal assistance is not an

offense “relating to obstruction of justice.” 641 F.3d at

1162–64. Hoang thus concluded that the Washington statute

was categorically not an aggravated felony because it

potentially criminalized the rendering of criminal assistance

“before any investigation or judicial proceeding has begun.” 

641 F.3d at 1162. It did so, however, despite an en banc BIA

decision, Batista-Hernandez, which held that a conviction of

18 U.S.C. § 3 (accessory after the fact) “clearly relates to

obstruction of justice.” 21 I. & N. Dec. at 961.3 BatistaHernandez cited “the wording of 18 U.S.C. § 3” and caselaw

reasoning that “the nature of being an accessory after the fact

 

3

 18 U.S.C. § 3 (“Accessory after the fact”) provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United

States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts

or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his

apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after

the fact.

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lies essentially in obstructing justice and preventing the arrest

of the offender.” Id. (citing United States v. Barlow, 470 F.2d

1245, 1252–53 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). The BIA reasoned that

18 U.S.C. § 3 “criminalizes actions knowingly taken to

‘hinder or prevent (another’s) apprehension, trial or

punishment.’” Id.

Hoang relied in part on another BIA en banc decision,

Espinoza-Gonzales, issued two years after BatistaHernandez. The BIA in Espinoza-Gonzales (in a decision

written by Board Member Grant) held that the federal crime

of misprision of a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 4 is not “an

offense relating to obstruction of justice.” 22 I. & N. Dec. at

892–95.4 The Hoang majority analyzed the BIA’s approach

to the differences between 18 U.S.C. § 3 and 18 U.S.C. § 4 as

follows:

Espinoza-Gonzalez distinguished misprision

of a felony from accessory after the fact on

the grounds that the latter both “references the

specific purpose for which” the act is done,

22 I. & N. Dec. at 894, and requires “as an

element either active interference with

proceedings of a tribunal or investigation, or

action or threat of action against those who

 

4

 18 U.S.C. § 4 (“Misprision of felony”) provides:

Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission

of a felony cognizable by a court of the United States,

conceals and does not as soon as possible make known

the same to some judge or other person in civil or

military authority under the United States, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three

years, or both.

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 41

would cooperate in the process of justice.” Id.

at 895. The BIA stated that “concealment of

a crime [as in 18 U.S.C. § 4] is qualitatively

different from an affirmative action to hinder

or prevent another’s apprehension, trial, or

punishment [as in 18 U.S.C. § 3]. It is a

lesser offense to conceal a crime where there

is no investigation or proceeding, or even an

intent to hinder the process of justice. . . .” Id.

at 895 (emphasis added). Taken as a whole,

Espinoza-Gonzalez does not suggest that the

BIA considered accessory after the fact to be

an offense relating to obstruction of justice

even though it does not require the defendant

to interfere with an ongoing proceeding or

investigation. The language used indicates

that the BIA now concludes [in EspinozaGonzalez] that accessory after the fact is an

obstruction of justice crime when it interferes

with an ongoing proceeding or investigation.

641 F.3d at 1164.

A year later, the BIA in Valenzuela Gallardo specifically

responded to Hoang (in a decision also written by Board

Member Grant, the author of Espinoza-Gonzalez) by

explicitly reaffirming Batista-Hernandez and clarifying

Espinoza-Gonzales. See Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N.

Dec. at 844. The BIA “respectfully invoke[d] the authority

in Brand X to clarify [its] prior precedents on the scope of the

phrase ‘relating to obstruction of justice.’” Id. at 840. In

explaining Espinoza-Gonzales, Valenzuela Gallardo

reiterated that the key distinction between 18 U.S.C. § 3 and

18 U.S.C. § 4 is that § 3 “references the specific purposes for

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the concealment, which are hindering or preventing the

‘apprehension, trial or punishment’ of the principal offender.” 

Id. at 841 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3). In contrast, “nothing in

§ 4 . . . references the specific purpose[.]” Id. (quoting

Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 894). Valenzuela

Gallardo reasoned:

[W]e supported this distinction by pointing

out that “concealment of a crime is

qualitatively different from an affirmative

action to hinder or prevent another’s

apprehension, trial or punishment.” 

[Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec.] at 895. 

We concluded that misprision does not

constitute “obstruction of justice” because “it

lacks the critical element of an affirmative and

intentional attempt, motivated by a specific

intent, to interfere with the process of justice.”

Id. at 896. This element – the affirmative and

intentional attempt, with specific intent, to

interfere with the process of justice –

demarcates the categoryof crimes constituting

obstruction of justice. While many crimes

fitting this definition will involve interference

with an ongoing criminal investigation or

trial, id. at 892–93, we now clarify that the

existence of such proceedings is not an

essential element of “an offense relating to

obstruction of justice.”

25 I. & N. Dec. at 841.

In other words, the BIA disagrees with the Hoang

majority’s conclusion that “[t]aken as a whole, Espinoza-

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 43

Gonzalez does not suggest that the BIA considered accessory

after the fact to be an offense relating to obstruction of justice

even though it does not require the defendant to interfere with

an ongoing proceeding or investigation.” Hoang, 641 F.3d at

1164. It disagrees with the Hoang majority’s interpretation

that “the BIA now concludes [in Espinoza-Gonzalez] that

accessory after the fact is an obstruction of justice crime

when it interferes with an ongoing proceeding or

investigation.” Id. Espinoza-Gonzales never required a

crime of conviction to have as an element only “active

interference with proceedings of a tribunal;” it always

required “either active interference with proceedings of a

tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against

those who would cooperate in the process of justice.” 22 I. &

N. Dec. at 893 (emphasis added).

The purpose of Valenzuela Gallardo was not to announce

a new comprehensive BIA interpretation; it was simply to

reaffirm and clarify its precedent that – despite Hoang – a

pending or ongoing investigation or proceeding is not a

necessary element of a crime “relating to obstruction of

justice.” 25 I. & N. Dec. at 844. It must be read together

with both Batista-Hernandez and Espinoza-Gonzalez as

establishing the BIA’s construction of “relating to obstruction

of justice.”

Applying the categorical approach to California Penal

Code § 32, Valenzuela Gallardo then reasoned that:

The provisions of this statute are closely

analogous, if not functionally identical, to

those in 18 U.S.C. § 3. Critically, both

statutes include the element of an affirmative

and intentional attempt, motivated by a

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44 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH

specific intent, to interfere with the process of

justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 (requiring that the

offender act “in order to hinder or prevent

[the principal’s] apprehension, trial or

punishment”) (emphasis added); Cal. Penal

Code § 32 (West 2012) (requiring that the

offender act “with the intent that [the]

principal may avoid or escape from arrest,

trial, conviction or punishment”) (emphasis

added)[.]

25 I. & N. Dec. at 841–42. The BIA thus gives meaning to

the term “process of justice” by referring to statutes and

obstructive acts even without a pending proceeding or

ongoing investigation.5 And it based its decision on the same

key factor that it has applied since at least 1999 in EspinozaGonzalez – whether a crime has “the critical element of an

affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by specific

intent, to interfere with the process of justice.” In this

fundamental aspect, the decision was hardly a new

interpretation.

Valenzuela Gallardo also considered that

§ 1101(a)(43)(S) requires only an offense to be “relating to”

obstruction of justice, indicating that a broader reading is

proper. 25 I. & N. Dec. at 843. And it recognized that the

Third Circuit in Denis v. Attorney General, 633 F.3d 201, 209

(3d Cir. 2011), considered the phrase “relating to obstruction

5 Furthermore, “hindering or preventing” a principal’s “apprehension,

trial, or punishment” satisfies a “materiality” requirement that may be

necessary to satisfy vagueness concerns with some obstruction crimes. 

See, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582, 585 (9th Cir. 2015) (en

banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).

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VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH 45

of justice” to be unambiguous such that a conviction for

accessory after the fact in the Third Circuit would necessarily

qualify as an obstruction offense under § 1101(a)(43)(S). 

Reasoning (properly) that “[a]n important purpose of [BIA]

precedent is the establishment of a uniform interpretation of

law in cases before the Immigration Judges and the [BIA],”

id. at 844 (quoting Matter of U. Singh, 25 I. & N. Dec. 670,

672 (B.I.A. 2012)), it concluded that “accessory after the fact

offenses necessarily relate to obstruction of justice”

irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal

investigation or proceeding. Id.6

6 After Valenzuela Gallardo was issued in 2012, the Eighth Circuit

similarly interpreted Espinoza-Gonzalesto mean that a Nebraska witnesstampering statute (Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919(1)) is a crime “relating to

obstruction of justice” for purposes of § 1101(a)(43)(S). See ArmentaLagunas v. Holder, 724 F.3d 1019, 1022–24 (8th Cir. 2013). Although

Armenta-Lagunas did not specifically address vagueness or whether a

pending proceeding is required, it found nothing uncertain about the BIA’s

formulation:

[T]he offenses entitled “Obstruction of Justice” all

required “the critical element of an affirmative and

intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to

interfere with the process of justice.” [EspinozaGonzales, 22 I. & N. Dec.] at 894. “In other words . . .

it must include as elements both (1) the actus reus of an

‘active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or

investigation, or action or threat of action against those

who would cooperate in the process of justice,’ and

(2) the mens rea of a ‘specific intent to interfere with

the process ofjustice.’” Higgins v. Holder, 677 F.3d 97,

102 (2dCir. 2012) (quotingEspinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. &

N. Dec. at 893).

724 F.3d at 1022.

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In short, this case involves a straightforward application

of Chevron. The court should defer to the BIA’s reasonable,

permissible, and plausible interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(S).

III. The use of the constitutional avoidance doctrine in

this case undermines Congressional intent

Moreover, in the context now before us – where it is

undisputed that the statutory language is ambiguous – the

constitutional avoidance doctrine is an inappropriate

framework to disregard the BIA’s interpretation. Certainly,

if the BIA’s definition is unconstitutional, then we have the

power to strike it or make such a declaration. But MoralesIzquierdo, an en banc opinion of this court, in no uncertain

terms reasons that “the constitutional avoidance doctrine . . .

plays no role in the second Chevron inquiry.” 486 F.3d at

493. That is,

Similarly, the Second Circuit inHiggins concluded that a Connecticut

witness-tampering statute (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-151) is a crime “relating

to obstruction of justice.” See 677 F.3d at 105–06 (citing EspinozaGonzales). And in United States v. Gamboa-Garcia, 620 F.3d 546 (5th

Cir. 2010), the Fifth Circuit held the same for an Idaho accessory statute

(Idaho Code § 18-205). See id. at 550.

Notably, the witness-tampering statutes analyzed inArmenta-Lagunas

and Higgins both require a perpetrator to “believ[e] that an official

proceeding” “is pending or about to be instituted.” Armenta-Lagunas,

724 F.3d at 1023 (emphasis added); Higgins, 677 F.3d at 104 (same). 

Likewise, Idaho Code § 18-205, analyzed in Gamboa-Garcia, does not

refer to a pending proceeding. The majority Opinion’s approach is thus

inconsistent with the Second (Higgins), Fifth (Gamboa-Garcia) and

Eighth Circuits (Armenta-Lagunas) – creating or perpetuating a circuit

split.

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we are not deciding between two plausible

statutory constructions; we are evaluating an

agency’s interpretation of a statute under

Chevron. At step two of this inquiry, our

function is “not simply [to] impose [our] own

construction on the statute, as would be

necessary in the absence of an administrative

interpretation. Rather, . . . the question for the

court is whether the agency’s answer is based

on a permissible construction of the statute.” 

When Congress has explicitly or implicitly

left a gap for an agency to fill, and the agency

has filled it, we have no authority to reconstrue the statute, even to avoid potential

constitutional problems; we can only decide

whether the agency’s interpretation reflects a

plausible reading of the statutory text.

Id. at 492–93 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (emphasis

added) (brackets and ellipses in original).7

Rather than giving deference to the BIA’s permissible

formulation, the majority Opinion (avoiding MoralesIzquierdo’s logic) relies on authority indicating that

constitutional avoidance can apply at Chevron step one. See,

e.g., Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 504 (“The avoidance

canon . . . is properly applied at step one of the Chevron

7

See also Garcia-Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008)

(“[T]he doctrine is unavailing to petitioner, because, as the Ninth Circuit

held, once an ambiguous statute has been interpreted by the agency in

charge of its implementation, we lack the ‘authority to re-construe the

statute, even to avoid potential constitutional problems.’”) (quoting

Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493).

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analysis. While . . . the avoidance canon cannot be used to

render an agency’s interpretation ‘unreasonable’ at Chevron

step two, the canon is unquestionably a ‘traditional tool of

statutory interpretation’ that may and should be used to

determine whether Congress intended to preclude the

agency’s chosen interpretation.”) (citations omitted)

(Thomas, C.J., dissenting); but cf. Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d

1313, 1321 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he canon on constitutional

avoidance does not bear on our inquiry at step one.”).

That is, although the majority Opinion acknowledges that

the term “relating to obstruction of justice” is ambiguous, it

applies the canon of constitutional avoidance because

Congress could not have intended an agency construction that

approaches a constitutional boundarywithout some indication

allowing such a construction. But this reasoning utterly

disregards the term “relating to,” which indicates a broad

interpretation – meaning Congress intended to include not

only crimes that actually constitute “obstruction of justice,”

but also crimes that are “relating to” such crimes. See, e.g.,

Rodriguez-Valencia v. Holder, 652 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.

2011) (“When interpreting the INA, we construe the ‘relating

to’ language broadly.”) (quoting Luu-Le v. I.N.S., 224 F.3d

911, 915 (9th Cir. 2000) (some quotation marks omitted)).

For example, in analyzing an aggravated felony statute,

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (including as an aggravated felony

an “offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting,

forgery, or trafficking in vehicles . . . for which the term of

imprisonment is at least one year”), Albillo-Figuero v. I.N.S.,

221 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2000), held that the clause “relating

to” “necessarily covers a range of activities beyond those of

counterfeiting or forgery itself.” Id. at 1073. As Kamagate

v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2004), reasoned, “the

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phrase ‘relating to’ . . . is [often] used [in the INA] . . . to

define aggravated felonies by reference to the general subject

of the offense of conviction, suggesting Congress’s intent to

reach more broadly than any single statute.” Id. at 154 (citing

8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(K)(i), (Q), (S), & (T)).8

Thus, by using the term “relating to” in § 1101(a)(43)(S),

Congress intended to reach a wide spectrum of obstruction

crimes, even those that may reach near to the limits of

congressional authority. It surelymeant to include more than

crimes constituting obstruction of justice, not just some of

them.

The exception “to hesitate before concluding that

Congress has intended such an implicit delegation,” should be

reserved for major or “extraordinary cases.” See Brown &

Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159 (“In extraordinary cases,

however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding

that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.”)

(emphasis added) (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of

Questions of Law and Policy, 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370

(1986)). And, although the issues we face regarding the

meaning of “relating to obstruction of justice” have proven to

be challenging, this is not an extraordinary case. Compare

8 Contrary to the majority’s view, Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980,

1990 (2015) (cautioning that courts may not extend “relating to” “to the

furthest stretch of [its] indeterminacy” where language and historical

context “tug in favor of a narrower reading”) does not change this

reasoning. See United States v. Sullivan, 797 F.3d 623, 639 (9th Cir.

2015) (“[W]e interpret the phrase ‘relating to’ broadly . . . unless the text

and history of the statute require a narrower construction.”) (some

editorial marks and citation omitted) (discussing Mellouli), petition for

cert. filed (U.S. Jan. 28, 2016) (No. 15-7875). Nothing here “tugs in favor

of a narrower reading” as was analyzed in Mellouli.

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King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (upholding the Patient Protection

and Affordable Care Act despite statutory ambiguity because

“[t]his is one of those [extraordinary] cases”) (referring to

Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). Because this is not

such a case, the BIA is owed deference. And applying the

constitutional avoidance doctrine in this instance – where the

constitutional questions are not “serious” (as explained to

follow) – invites courts to apply an exception whenever there

is statutory ambiguity. Cf. Liu v. Waters, 55 F.3d 421, 426

(9th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e must not allow [an] exception for

constitutional questions to swallow the rule.”).

The majority Opinion correctly states that we must ask

whether Congress intended to permit the agency

interpretation, and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance

can sometimes aid in this task. But by reading the term

“relating to” out of the statute, the majority Opinion ignores

true Congressional intent. That is, because Congress’ use of

the term “relating to” demonstrates intent to broaden the

scope of covered obstruction-related crimes, the doctrine

should not be employed to narrow the scope of covered

crimes. In short, the majority Opinion’s use of the doctrine

as applied here does not further Congressional intent but

instead undermines it.

IV. The BIA’s construction does not present “serious”

or “grave” constitutional concerns

More to the point, even examining the BIA’s construction

at Chevron step one, the constitutional avoidance doctrine

only applies to truly “serious” constitutional questions. See

Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and

Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 577 (1988); Williams,

115 F.3d at 662 (“Only if the agency’s proffered

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interpretation raises serious constitutional concerns may a

court refuse to defer under Chevron.”). They must be

“grave.” Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991);

Williams, 115 F.3d at 663 (“[C]onstitutional narrowing

should displace Chevron only when the constitutional

problems are truly ‘grave’ . . . because all possible

interpretations raise constitutional problems.”). “[T]he

‘constitutional doubt’ doctrine does not apply mechanically

whenever there arises a significant constitutional question the

answer to which is not obvious.” Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239 (1998). That is, “we do not

abandon Chevron deference at the mere mention of a possible

constitutional problem[.]” Kempthorne, 512 F.3d at 711. 

“An agency’s interpretation may be permissible even if it

would create constitutional issues.” Olmos, 780 F.3d at

1322–23 (citing Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 493).

Here, the BIA’s interpretation in Valenzuela Gallardo

does not approach the void-for-vagueness line. It is true that

obstruction of justice crimes punishing acts intended to

impede “the due administration of justice,” such as the

omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), have a potentially

“vast” coverage. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 583 (Kozinski, J.,

concurring). But federal obstruction statutes are not

unconstitutionally vague where they include a mens rea of

“corruptly persuade” or “corruptly endeavor.” See, e.g.,

United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985)

(rejecting that 18 U.S.C. § 1503 is unconstitutionally

overbroad or vague given “its explicit mens rea requirement

that a person must ‘corruptly’ endeavor to interfere with the

due administration of justice. Thus, one must impede the due

administration of justice with the general intent of knowledge

as well as the specific intent of purpose to obstruct.”)

(citations omitted); United States v. Shotts, 145 F.3d 1289,

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1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (rejecting vagueness challenge to

18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), reasoning in part that ‘“corrupt’ is a

scienter requirement which provides adequate notice of what

conduct is proscribed”) (citing United States v. Thompson,

76 F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996)).

Under Ninth Circuit law, “corruptly” in this context

means that the obstructive conduct “must be done with the

purpose of obstructing justice.” United States v. Rasheed,

663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Laurins,

857 F.2d 529, 536–37 (9th Cir. 1988).9 And this definition of

“corruptly” is the functional equivalent to the BIA’s language

at issue here (“the affirmative and intentional attempt, with

specific intent, to interfere with the process of justice,

irrespective of the existence of an ongoing criminal

investigation or proceeding”). That is, the BIA requires a

“corrupt” mens rea in its construction.

The majority Opinion reasons that without a nexus to

pending or ongoing proceedings – as the Ninth Circuit in

Hoang had interpreted Espinoza-Gonzales – the meaning of

“the process of justice” is vague (or approaches that line). 

And it is true that many, if not all, obstruction crimes require

some connection between the obstructive act and a

“proceeding.” See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,

544 U.S. 696, 707–08 (2005) (indicating that a nexus to a

foreseeable or contemplated proceeding might suffice under

18 U.S.C. § 1512). But in my view, because a pending

9 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b) (“As used in section 1505, the term

“corruptly” means acting with an improper purpose, personally or by

influencing another, including making a false or misleading statement, or

withholding, concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other

information.”).

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proceeding does not create the necessary connection, the

BIA’s definition is not missing the required nexus. If a

person specifically interferes with an ongoing investigation,

then the requisite specific purpose of an obstructive act is

obvious. But obstruction does not require the investigation

or proceeding to be pending. “Pending” is sufficient, but not

necessary. And its absence does not render the definition

unconstitutionally vague.

Rather, what is necessary is a connection to some

contemplated “process of justice” that encompasses an “evil

intent to obstruct.” United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,

599 (1995) (“[A] person lacking knowledge of a pending

proceeding necessarily lacked the evil intent to obstruct.”)

(citing Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893)). 

This “evil intent” is adequately articulated by the BIA as “an

affirmative and intentional attempt, with specific intent, to

interfere with the process of justice.” Moreover, Valenzuela

Gallardo (as well as Batista-Hernandez and EspinozaGonzalez) describes or refers to “the process of justice” as

including arrest, apprehension, conviction, or punishment. 

See 25 I. & N. Dec. at 841–42. Valenzuela Gallardo also

refers to specific federal obstruction crimes, as detailed to

follow, that do not require proceedings to be pending, and

that also give further meaning to “the process of justice.”

A. Crimes Under 18 U.S.C. § 1512

Prime examples of federal obstruction crimes that do not

require “pending proceedings” are witness-tampering crimes

set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1512 such as:

• 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (“Whoever knowingly

uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly

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persuades another person, or attempts to do

so, or engages in misleading conduct toward

another person, with intent to – (1) influence,

delay, or prevent the testimony of any person

in an official proceeding”); and

• 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) (“Whoever corruptly –

(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a

record, document, or other object, or attempts

to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s

integrity or availability for use in an official

proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs,

influences, or impedes any official

proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than 20 years, or both.”).

Although these crimes require some connection to an

“official proceeding,” they do not require it to be pending. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (“For the purposes of this section

. . . an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be

instituted at the time of the offense.”). Congress adopted this

language to encompass a perpetrator’s actions even before an

investigation has begun. Legislative history explains:

[Section 1512(f)(1)] obviates the requirement

that there be an official proceeding in progress

or pending. The Committee felt that this

increases the scope of the section by

expanding the galaxyof witnesses and victims

the protections of its language is meant to

embrace. Intimidation offenses are

particularly insidious and do violence to

traditional notions of justice because no one

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can be convicted of a crime which is not

reported. Subsection [(f)(1)], among other

things, specifically reaches intimidation

offenses before a crime is reported to the

appropriate authorities.

JudiciaryComm., 97th Cong., Victim and Witness Protection

Act of 1982, S. Rep. No. 97-532, at 19 (1982), reprinted in

1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3 (emphasis added).

That is, although the government must still connect the

obstructive act to an official proceeding under § 1512(b)(1),

see Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 707–08, the nexus does not

have to be to an ongoing proceeding. Rather, it requires

proof under § 1512(b)(1) of a foreseeable or contemplated

proceeding. See id. (“It is, however, one thing to say that a

proceeding ‘need not be pending or about to be instituted at

the time of the offense,’ and quite another to say a proceeding

need not even be foreseen. A ‘knowingly . . . corrup[t]

persuade[r]’ cannot be someone who persuades others to

shred documents under a document retention policy when he

does not have in contemplation any particular official

proceeding in which those documents might be material.”);

see also United States v. Friske, 640 F.3d 1288, 1292 n.5

(11th Cir. 2011) (“Consistent with Aguilar’s nexus

requirement, the government must prove [under § 1512(c)(2)]

that the defendant knew of or foresaw an official proceeding,

and knew that his actions were likely to affect it.”).

Other obstruction of justice crimes in § 1512 do not even

require an “official proceeding:”

• 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d)(2) (“Whoever

intentionally harasses another person and

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therebyhinders, delays, prevents, or dissuades

any person from . . . reporting to a law

enforcement officer or judge of the United

States the commission or possible commission

of a Federal offense . . . . or attempts to do so,

shall be fined under this title or imprisoned

not more than 3 years, or both.”); and

• 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) (“Whoever

knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or

corruptly persuades another person, or

attempts to do so, or engages in misleading

conduct toward another person, with intent to

. . . hinder, delay, or prevent the

communication to a law enforcement officer

or judge of the United States of information

relating to the commission or possible

commission of a Federal offense . . . shall be

fined under this title or imprisoned not more

than 20 years, or both.”).

These sections “make[] no mention of ‘an official

proceeding’ and do[] not require that a defendant’s

misleading conduct relate in any way either to an ‘official

proceeding’ or even to a particular ongoing investigation.” 

United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1288 (11th Cir.

2006). “[Section] 1512(b)(3) requires only that a defendant

intended to hinder, delay, or prevent communication to any

‘law enforcement officer or judge of the United States’ [and

thus] requires only ‘the possible existence of a federal crime

and a defendant’s intention to thwart an inquiry into that

crime.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Veal, 153 F.3d 1233,

1250 (11th Cir. 1998)). See also, e.g., United States v.

Guadalupe, 402 F.3d 409, 411 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[P]roving a

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violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3) does not depend on the

existence or imminency of a federal investigation but rather

on the possible existence of a federal crime and a defendant’s

intention to thwart an inquiry into that crime by officials who

happen to be federal.”) (emphases added); United States v.

Baldyga, 233 F.3d 674, 680 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that

defendant’s conduct violated § 1512(b)(3) where he hindered

government cooperator’s “communication with authorities”

and where “the possibility existed that such communication

would eventually occur with federal officials”) (emphasis

added).

These types of obstruction crimes, while not requiring a

nexus to a pending proceeding, can fairly and reasonably be

said to require a specific intent to interfere with “the process

of justice.” See, e.g., United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 24

(1st Cir. 2006) (“[S]ubsection (b)(3) ‘does not connect the

federal interest with an ongoing or imminent judicial

proceeding,’ but rather ‘speaks more broadly’ to ‘the

character of the affected activity, the transmission of

information to federal law enforcement agents[.]’”) (quoting

Veal, 153 F.3d at 1250–51). See also United States v.

Phillips, 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[I]n terms of

the Aguilar nexus requirement, a conviction is proper [under

§ 1512(c)] if interference with the official proceeding is the

‘natural and probable effect’ of the defendant’s conduct.”);

Friske, 640 F.3d at 1292 (“Aguilarrelied on the principle that

‘a person lacking knowledge of a pending proceeding

necessarily lack[s] the evil intent to obstruct.’”) (quoting

Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599).

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B. Another example – 18 U.S.C. § 1519

Another example is destroying documents intending to

obstruct a federal investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1519. 

This obstruction crime has a very specific mens rea. It

criminalizes the knowing alteration, destruction, mutilation,

etc., of records, documents, or “tangible objects,” intending

to obstruct the investigation or proper administration of

matters within federal jurisdiction.10 Section 1519 “covers

conduct intended to impede any federal investigation or

proceeding including one not even on the verge of

commencement.” Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074,

1087 (2015) (emphasis added). See also United States v.

Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 379 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 1519 does

not require the existence or likelihood of a federal

investigation.”); United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 210

(3d Cir. 2012) (“[The government] was not required to prove

that [Defendant] intended to obstruct or impede a specific

federal investigation.”). “To ensure that the statute is applied

‘broadly,’ criminal liability ‘also extends to acts done in

contemplation of such federal matters, so that the timing of

the act in relation to the beginning of the matter or

10 Section § 1519, entitled “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of

records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy,” provides:

Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates,

conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in

any record, document, or tangible object with the intent

to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or

proper administration of any matter within the

jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United

States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to

or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be

fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20

years, or both.

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investigation is also not a bar to prosecution.’” Moyer,

674 F.3d at 210 (quoting S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 13 (2002));

see also United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 711 (8th Cir.

2011) (similar reasoning).11

Section 1519 is not vague. “Section 1519’s scienter

requirement . . . eliminates any concerns regarding statutory

vagueness.” Moyer, 674 F.3d at 211. Specifically,

“[b]ecause a defendant will be convicted for violating § 1519

‘only for an act knowingly done with the purpose of doing

that which the statute prohibits, the accused cannot be said to

suffer from lack of warning or knowledge that the act which

he does is a violation of law.’” Id. at 212 (quoting Screws v.

United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945)). “Here, by the

express language of [§ 1519], no liability will be imposed for

knowingly falsifying documents without an ‘intent to impede,

obstruct, or influence a matter.’” Id.

11 Indeed, several Circuits have held that no “nexus” (as that term is used

in Aguilar and Arthur Andersen) is required at all under § 1519. See

Yielding, 657 F.3d at 712 (“We conclude that the ‘nexus’ requirement

urged by Yielding – that the government must show the accused knew his

actions were likely to affect a federal matter – does not apply to a

prosecution for the knowing falsification of documents under § 1519. The

text of § 1519 requires only proof that the accused knowingly committed

one ofseveral acts, including falsification of a document, and did so ‘with

the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper

administration’ of a federal matter.”); Gray, 642 F.3d at 378 (“In view of

the statute’s plain language, which is fully consistent with the legislative

history, we decline to read any such nexus requirement into the text of

§ 1519.”); Moyer, 674 F.3d at 209 (“We conclude that proof of such a

nexus is not required.”). Nevertheless, cases speak in terms of

“foreseeable” or “contemplated” proceedings. See Yielding, 657 F.3d at

811; Moyer, 674 F.3d at 210.

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In rejecting a vagueness challenge to § 1519, Yielding

reasoned that “the statute does not impose liability for

‘knowingly . . . destroy[ing] . . . any . . . document . . . in . . .

contemplation of any [federal] matter,’ without an intent to

impede, obstruct, or influence a matter. If it did, then the

statute would forbid innocent conduct such as routine

destruction of documents that a person consciously and in

good faith determines are irrelevant to a foreseeable federal

matter.” 657 F.3d at 711 (editorial marks in original). 

Yielding concluded: “[t]he plain language of the statute

forbids the knowing falsification of a document with the

intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or

proper administration of a federal matter, even if that matter

is not pending at the time of the obstructive act.” Id. at 715. 

See also United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 753–56 (6th

Cir. 2012) (rejecting vagueness challenge to § 1519); United

States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2008) (same).

Similarly, Valenzuela Gallardo’s formulation –

affirmative and intentional attempt, motivated by a specific

intent, to interfere with the process of justice, irrespective of

the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation or

proceeding – encompasses acts done with the purpose of

impeding or obstructing justice. See, e.g., Rasheed, 663 F.2d

at 852. That is, like § 1519’s requirement to intend to

influence “the investigation or proper administration of any

[federal] matter,” the BIA’s formulation requires a specific

intent to interfere with the process of justice “irrespective of

the existence of an ongoing criminal investigation or

proceeding.”

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C. The majority Opinion’s other criticisms do not

help its vagueness analysis

In discussing vagueness, the majority Opinion also faults

the BIA for providing little instruction as to the requisite

actus reus, with no indication of what conduct must be

interfered with. But the BIA requires “affirmative action

knowingly undertaken,” 25 I. & N. Dec. at 840 (quoting

Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 894) (emphasis added)

– that is, an act – and Espinoza-Gonzales further defines the

actus reus as “either active interference with proceedings of

a tribunal or investigation, or action or threat of action against

those who would cooperate in the process of justice.” 22 I. &

N. at 893 (emphasis added). As the Eighth Circuit reasons,

the BIA has not eliminated an actus reus. See ArmentaLagunas, 724 F.3d at 1024 (“To satisfy the actus reus

element, the statute of conviction simply must require an

active interference with proceedings of a tribunal or

investigation, or action or threat of action against those who

would cooperate in the process of justice.”).

Applying the categorical approach, California Penal Code

§ 32 includes as elements specific instances of conduct that

interfere with the process of justice (“harbors, conceals or

aids a principal . . . with the intent that said principal may

avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction, or

punishment[.]”). Petitioner’s California conviction was for

a crime that necessarily requires “an affirmative and

intentional attempt, motivated by a specific intent, to interfere

with the process of justice, irrespective of the existence of an

ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding.”

And the majority Opinion’s citation to Johnson v. United

States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), does not support its

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conclusion that the BIA’s construction raises grave doubts as

to vagueness. Johnson concluded that the Armed Career

Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) “residual clause,” which defines a

“violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . ‘otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical

injury to another,’” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is

unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Unlike

Johnson, for the reasons just stated, the BIA’s formulation

provides objective standards (it does not eliminate a required

nexus, and adequately explains a connection to “the process

of justice), and requires analyzing statutory definitions – not

“judge-imagined abstraction[s].” Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at

2558. Moreover, Johnson declared the residual clause vague

not only because of its indeterminancy, but because of a long

history by the Supreme Court and other courts of “repeated

attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and

objective standard out of” its language. Id. There was a

“pervasive disagreement about the nature of the inquiry one

is supposed to conduct and the kinds of factors one is

supposed to consider” among lower courts. Id. at 2560. 

Nothing like that is involved with the BIA’s formulation. 

Johnson addressed vagueness as to the specific language of

the residual clause by applying settled principles12– it

provides no support for questioning, on vagueness grounds,

the BIA’s construction of § 1101(a)(43)(S).

12 Johnson concluded that the ACCA’s residual clause is

unconstitutional because of two flaws – uncertainty as to: 1) how to

estimate the risk posed by a crime in an “ordinary case,” and 2) how much

risk is required for a crime to qualify. 135 S. Ct. at 2557–58. And the

residual clause contains a list of exemplar crimes, causing further

confusion. Id. at 2558. But the residual clause’s flaws simply don’t exist

with the BIA’s definition requiring a specific intent to interfere with the

process of justice.

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V. If applicable, we should apply constitutional

avoidance differently

Finally, even if the constitutional avoidance doctrine

should be applied to the situation before us, we should apply

it differently than how the majority Opinion does. When

presented with grave doubts as to the constitutionality of a

regulatoryinterpretation, courts should read the interpretation

narrowly in a readily-apparent way to avoid the constitutional

issue. See, e.g., Williams, 115 F.3d at 666; Stansell, 847 F.2d

at 615 (“Because a reasonable limiting construction can be

placed on the challenged regulation, we hold that [it] is not

substantially overbroad.”) (emphasis added); Meinhold v.

United States Dep’t of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469, 1479 (9th Cir.

1994) (“[T]he regulation under which Meinhold was

processed need not be construed so broadly as to raise

constitutional concerns. It can reasonably be construed to

reach only [constitutional grounds].”); United States v.

Bulacan, 156 F.3d 963, 974 (9th Cir. 1998) (similar); cf. Ma

v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In the

immigration context, courts have often read limitations into

statutes that appeared to confer broad power on immigration

officials in order to avoid constitutional problems.”). Put

differently, “our task is not to destroy the Act . . . but to

construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to

comport with constitutional limitations.” U.S. Civil Serv.

Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, AFL-CIO, 413 U.S.

548, 571 (1973).

In Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., when faced with a

National Labor Relations Board’s (“NLRB”) interpretation

that presented serious First Amendment questions, neither the

Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court remanded the action

to the NLRB to promulgate a different interpretation – the

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64 VALENZUELA GALLARDO V. LYNCH

Eleventh Circuit construed it “as not prohibiting consumer

publicity.” 485 U.S. at 574. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp.

concluded, “as did the [Eleventh Circuit], that the section is

open to a construction that obviates deciding whether a

congressional prohibition of handbilling . . . would violate the

First Amendment.” Id. at 578.

Likewise, in Williams, the Ninth Circuit did not instruct

the district court to remand the interpretation to the agency to

allow it to reconsider its interpretation in a manner that did

not violate equal protection, or come close to that line. 

Rather, given an agency interpretation that presented grave

constitutional questions, Williams then “interpret[ed] the

Reindeer Act as not precluding non-natives in Alaska from

owning and importing reindeer.” 115 F.3d at 666.

And so, even if Valenzuela Gallardo raises serious

constitutional questions about vagueness, rather than

remanding to the BIA, we can give the definition a limiting

construction and construe it to include the necessary nexus

where such a construction is readily apparent. And

Valenzuela Gallardo can certainly be properly construed to

fully encompass crimes “relating to obstruction of justice.” 

The BIA meant to include crimes with an element of

interfering with “the process of justice,” such as preventing

or impeding a principal’s apprehension, trial, or punishment. 

Valenzuela Gallardo, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 841. Such a meaning

is obvious from Valenzuela Gallardo, especially when read

in conjunction with the BIA’s en banc decisions in Batista

Hernandez and Espinoza-Gonzalez, both of which Valenzuela

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Gallardo explicitly referred to when “reaffirming” and

“clarifying” them. Id. at 844. There is no reason to remand.13

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

13 The majority Opinion states that the government’s supplemental

briefing requested a remand so that the BIA could consider an alternative

definition. But the government’s request was a fallback, apparently

contingent on the panel deciding at Chevron step two that the BIA’s

definition is “unreasonable.” See Resp’t’s Suppl. Mem. at 10 (“If the

panel decides, however, the Board’s definition is unreasonable this Court

should remand for the Board to provide an alternative definition of the

ambiguous phrase.”). Although we certainly have the power to do so, it

is inappropriate to remand to the BIA in this instance.

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