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Parties Involved:
Gerald Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed March 29, 1996

No. 95-3116

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GERALD SMITH,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00154-08)

Alan C. Drew for the appellant.

Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Bernice A. Harleston, Assistant

United States Attorneys, for the appellee.

Before: BUCKLEY, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM: Gerald Smith appeals an order of the district court directing, pursuant to the

Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3141, et seq., that for the safety of the community he be

detained in jail until histrial. We review the district court's finding of fact regarding the safety of the

community for clear error. See United States v. Simpkins, 826 F.2d 94, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The Bail Reform Act requires that a defendant be detained prior to trial if there is clear and

convincing evidence that no conditions placed upon his release would reasonably assure the safety

of the community. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) & (f). In determining whether the release of a defendant

would endanger the community, the court must consider any available information concerning "the

nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence

or involves a narcotic drug"; "the weight of the evidence against the person"; various personal

information including character, employment, past conduct, and so on; and "the nature and

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seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's

release." 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). This determination must be made following a detention hearing, at

which the defendant may call witnesses or present information by proffer. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). If

the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant committed a drug offense for which a

maximum penalty of ten years imprisonment or more is prescribed, the court must presume, subject

to rebuttal by the defendant, that no combination of conditions upon the defendant's release would

reasonably assure the safety of the community and the appearance of the defendant as required. 18

U.S.C. § 3142(e).

Smith was charged by indictment with first degree murder, armed robbery, and various

narcotics and weapons violations. After a magistrate judge found that Smith should be detained

pending trial, Smith sought a de novo detention hearing before the district court. At that hearing the

Government presented the indictment in order to show that there was probable cause to believe that

Smith had committed a drug crime punishable by a maximum sentence of ten years or more. The

Government also proffered that at trial the evidence would show that Smith was engaged in a

conspiracy to sell wholesale quantities of cocaine and that he was an "enforcer" in that drug

conspiracy. Moreover, several witnesses would testify that Smith murdered a rival drug dealer by

shooting him in the head at point-blank range.

Smith testified at the hearing. He denied that he committed the acts charged in the indictment

but made no proffer of evidenceof good character, family situation, or employment, for

exampleto support his claim that his release would not be a danger to the community. Although

he did agree to accept whatever conditions the court might see fit to impose upon his release, Smith

also acknowledged that he had a criminal record, that he had in the past possessed firearms, and that

he had not been employed for four or five years.

Applying the factors set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 3142(g), the district court found that "there are

no conditions of release that would reasonably assure the safety of the community" should the

defendant be released. Accordingly, the court ordered Smith detained without bond pending trial.

I. The Bail Reform Act

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Smith argues first that the Bail Reform Act does not permit the Government to proceed by

way of proffer in lieu of presenting live witnesses at a pretrial detention hearing. The Act specifically

permits a defendant to proceed by way of proffer, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), but it is silent upon the

question whether the Government may do so. Smith urges that we draw a negative inference from

that silence. Every circuit to have considered the matter, however, has rejected that inference and

permitted the Government to proceed byway of proffer. See United States v. Gaviria, 828 F.2d 667,

669 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Martir, 782 F.2d 1141, 1145 (2d Cir. 1986); United States

v. Winsor, 785 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Acevedo-Ramos, 755 F.2d 203, 206-

07 (1st Cir. 1985).

We join our sister circuits in holding that the Act allows this practice. As the Second Circuit

noted in Martir, the Government regularly proceeded by way of proffer under the District of

Columbia bail statute that served as the model for the Act. 782 F.2d at 1145; see United States v.

Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1338 (D.C. 1981) (in banc). That it could continue to do so under the

nationwide Act literally goes without saying. Cf. Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. ICC, 955 F.2d

722, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (under doctrine of ratification, congressionalreenactment ofstatutory

terms that have been given consistent judicial interpretation expresses intent to adopt that

interpretation).

II. The Constitution

Smith also argues that the district court's decision to permit the Government to proceed by

proffer denied him procedural due process and his right under the Sixth Amendment to confront his

accusers. A pretrial detention hearing, however, is neither a discovery device for the defense nor a

trial on the merits. The process that is due is only that which is required by and proportionate to the

purpose of the proceeding. That purpose includes neither a reprise of all the evidence presented

before the grand jury, United States v. Suppa, 799 F.2d 115, 119 (3d Cir. 1986), nor the right to

confront non-testifying government witnesses, see, e.g., United States v. Accetturo, 783 F.2d 382,

388-89 (3d Cir. 1986); Winsor, 785 F.2d at 756-57; United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 1397-

98 (3d Cir. 1985). See also United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985)

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(purpose of pretrial detention hearing is not to "rehash ... probable cause" but to provide opportunity

for detainee to show no risk of flight or danger to community); United States v. Williams, 798 F.

Supp. 34, 36 (D.D.C. 1992) (same).

We conclude that Smith was provided sufficient procedural safeguards to satisfy the

constitutional requirements applicable to a proceeding directed at the question whether one whom

the Government has probable cause to believe committed crimes of violence and a serious drug crime

poses a danger to the community if allowed to remain at large until histrial. Smith had representation

by appointed counsel, the ability to testify (which he did), and the right to proffer the testimony of

others in his own behalf (which he did not). A right to require the Government to produce its

witnesses against him would complicate the hearing to a degree out of proportion to the liberty

interest at stakeviz. the interest in remaining free until trial, for what is by statute a period oflimited

duration. See Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq.

III. The Facts

The Government in this case presented the indictment to show that there was probable cause

to believe that Smith had committed a drug offense punishable by a maximum sentence of ten years

or more; the indictment alone would have been enough to raise the rebuttable presumption that no

condition would reasonably assure the safety of the community. See United States v. Dillon, 938

F.2d 1412 (1st Cir. 1991); Suppa, 799 F.2d at 119; United States v. Dominguez, 783 F.2d 702, 706

n.7 (7th Cir. 1986); Hurtado, 779 F.2d at 1477-79; United States v. Contreras, 776 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.

1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mosuro, 648 F.

Supp. 316, 318 (D.D.C. 1986). The Government also proffered that several witnesses would testify

that Smith was involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs, that his role in the conspiracy was that of an

"enforcer," and that he murdered a rival drug dealer in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Smith himself testified that he had possessed firearms, that he had two prior convictions for

cocaine possession, and that he had been unemployed for several years. The only factors militating

against pretrial detention were Smith's testimony that he did not commit the crimes charged in the

indictment, his willingnessto accept whatever conditionsthe court imposed upon hisrelease, and his

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argument through counsel that the crimes charged in the indictment were "somewhat stale" and

should not be the basis for a presumption that Smith would be dangerous if released.

Based upon this record, we have no reason to think that the district court erred, much less

clearly erred, in finding that Smith presents a danger to the community. The pretrial detention order

of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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