Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03077/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Respondent
Horace Lee Wilson
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HORACE LEE WILSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3077

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-0752-13-0551-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 11, 2015

______________________ 

HORACE LEE WILSON, Madison, AL, pro se.

CHRISTOPHER KEITH WIMBUSH, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY. 

______________________ 

Before CHEN, LINN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 WILSON v. ARMY

PER CURIAM. 

Petitioner Horace Lee Wilson (Mr. Wilson) appeals 

from a final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board 

(Board) that sustained Mr. Wilson’s removal from his 

position as an administrative assistant with Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command (AMC), Office of Equal 

Employment Opportunity (EEO), Redstone Arsenal, 

Alabama. [JA 8] Wilson v. Dep’t of the Army, No. AT0752-13-055-I-1 (MSPB Dec. 4, 2014) (Final Order). 

Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In his position at the EEO, Mr. Wilson was the EEO 

Office’s timekeeper and helped manage the Workforce 

Recruitment Program (WRP), a program designed to 

provide job opportunities for students with disabilities. In 

2012, the AMC Chief of Staff appointed an investigating 

officer to investigate alleged time card fraud and abuse 

among certain EEO employees. After examining entrance 

turnstile records, sent emails, requests for leave, time 

submitted to the timekeeping system, and a Governmentprovided laptop, the investigating officer submitted a 

report detailing her findings. The report concluded that 

Mr. Wilson had committed time card fraud or abuse, 

improperly used Government resources for personal 

benefit, engaged in unprofessional misconduct, misused a 

Government common access card, and was derelict in his 

duties. As a result of this investigation and one additional investigation, the Chief of Staff proposed to remove Mr. 

Wilson on the charge of conduct unbecoming of a Federal 

employee, alleging eight separate grounds. After considering the evidence, the Chief of Staff found that seven of 

the grounds were supported by a preponderance of the 

evidence and concluded that removal was appropriate. At 

the same time, the Chief of Staff offered Mr. Wilson the 

option of remaining employed at a reduced grade in a 

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WILSON v. ARMY 3

position outside of the EEO office. Mr. Wilson rejected 

this offer. He was thereafter removed from his position 

and he filed a complaint with the MSPB.

In its initial decision, the administrative judge (AJ) 

concluded that the agency had carried its burden of proof 

on six of the seven grounds. In the Final Order, the full 

Board expressed concern about the AJ’s credibility determinations on the first three allegations. The Board 

determined, however, that the AJ correctly found that the 

remaining three allegations were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, i.e., that Mr. Wilson: (1) committed time card abuse or fraud; (2) used Government 

resources to perform duties associated with his private 

business; and (3) failed to follow instructions or cooperate 

with the acting director of the EEO office. The Board 

further found these three bases sufficient to sustain Mr. 

Wilson’s removal. Accordingly, the Board explained that 

it was unnecessary to decide whether to overturn the AJ’s 

findings on the first three allegations.

Mr. Wilson timely appealed the Board’s Final Order. 

On appeal, Mr. Wilson appears to assert three general 

categories of objections to the Board’s Final Order. First, 

he argues that the Board failed to consider the entirety of 

the evidence in the record. Second, he argues that the 

Board erred in accepting the AJ’s credibility determinations on the three sustained allegations. Finally, he 

asserts that he was treated unfairly during the initial 

investigation and that the Board should have considered 

this treatment in reaching its final decision. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Our review of Board decisions is defined narrowly and 

limited by statute. We must affirm a Board decision 

unless it is (1) arbitrary or capricious or not in accordance 

with law, (2) obtained without procedures required by 

law, rule, or regulation having been followed, or (3) unCase: 15-3077 Document: 17-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/11/2015
4 WILSON v. ARMY

supported by substantial evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c)(1)–

(3); Hayes v. Dep’t of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed. 

Cir. 1984). Under the substantial evidence standard, we 

must affirm the Board’s decision if the record contains 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Consol. 

Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). However, 

“[t]he evaluation of witness credibility is a matter within 

the discretion of the AJ and is virtually unreviewable.” 

Frey v. Dep’t of Labor, 359 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

2004).

Before the Board will sustain an agency’s decision to 

discharge an employee, the agency must establish by 

preponderant evidence that (1) the charged conduct 

occurred; (2) there is a “relationship between the misconduct and the objective of promoting the efficiency of the 

service”; and (3) that the penalty imposed is reasonable. 

James v. Dale, 355 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Mr. 

Wilson does not appear to challenge the Board’s conclusion that a nexus existed between his misconduct and the 

objective of promoting the efficiency of the service.

I 

The Board’s decision sustaining the removal rested on 

its finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported

three grounds for the “conduct unbecoming” charge. On 

appeal, Mr. Wilson asserts that evidence in the record 

supports reversal of the Board’s conclusion. Because 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion, 

however, we must affirm the Board’s finding.

Mr. Wilson first asserts that the Board failed to consider evidence demonstrating that he did not commit time 

card abuse. He points to his statements that he often 

performed his duties off-site and that his immediate 

supervisor authorized his off-site work. He also argues 

that on many occasions, the security turnstiles that 

monitored whether he entered the building were not 

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WILSON v. ARMY 5

working. Mr. Wilson presented these arguments to the 

AJ and the Board. The Board also considered Army’s 

evidence that Mr. Wilson “did not enter the building at all 

on 10 days and arrived late on 67 days without adequate 

leave coverage.” Final Order at 6. In addition, the Board 

credited the testimony of “several coworkers” who “attested that the appellant often arrived late, left early, took 

extended lunches, or was otherwise unaccounted for 

during the day.” Id. The AJ found Mr. Wilson’s statements less persuasive than the testimony of his coworkers, noting that Mr. Wilson was unable to account for any 

of his movements during these absences, and in favor of 

testimony that at least one turnstile was operational at 

all times and that security personnel would not routinely 

allow employees to circumvent security protocols. 

Mr. Wilson also argues that his personal use of his 

Government computer was de minimis. Both the AJ and 

the Board considered the Army’s evidence that over half 

of the emails that Mr. Wilson sent between April 21, 

2012, and August 31, 2012, were unrelated to official 

work duties. In August alone, seventy of the eighty-nine 

emails were unrelated to work duties. The Board further 

considered Mr. Wilson’s decision to engage in an interview 

with a local newspaper during his duty hours to promote 

his private business. Because of the vast quantity of nonwork related use, the AJ and the Board therefore rejected 

Mr. Wilson’s de minimis argument. 

Finally, Mr. Wilson contends that the Board should 

not have credited the testimony of the acting EEO officer 

to find that Mr. Wilson failed to follow instructions and 

cooperate with a supervisor. But such credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable.” Moreover, the 

Board’s conclusion was also supported by documentary 

evidence, including emails that Mr. Wilson sent to the 

acting EEO officer that reveal disrespectful and hostile 

behavior towards his superior.

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6 WILSON v. ARMY

Based on the Board’s findings and our limited ability 

to review credibility determinations, we find Mr. Wilson’s 

arguments unpersuasive. The Board’s decision that the 

charged conduct occurred is supported by substantial 

evidence. 

II

The determination of an appropriate employment 

penalty is a matter committed primarily to the discretion 

of the employer and can be reversed only for an abuse of 

discretion. See Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 1246, 1251 

(Fed. Cir. 1999). The penalty must be reasonable in light 

of the sustained charges, and we have “effectively defined 

reasonable in this context to mean merely that the agency’s choice of penalty not be grossly disproportionate to 

the offense.” Webster v. Dep’t of Army, 911 F.2d 679, 685 

(Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted).

The Board found that Mr. Wilson’s removal was reasonable given the serious nature of the charged conduct 

and its direct relation to his primary work duties. His 

disregard for his obligation to staff his duty position was 

even more concerning because he was the EEO Office’s 

timekeeper. The Board therefore reasonably found that 

this misconduct “went to the very core of his responsibilities of a federal employee” and called into question “his 

reliability, veracity, trustworthiness, and willingness to 

ethically perform his duties.” Final Order at 11. With

respect to his use of Government resources for personal 

business, the Board found that Mr. Wilson “violat[ed] the 

trust the agency has placed in him and destroy[ed] the 

confidence established in the employer-employee relationship.” Id. The Board further determined that his behavior towards his superior “undermin[ed] management’s 

capacity to maintain employee efficiency and discipline.” 

Id. at 11–12. At bottom, because Mr. Wilson’s use of 

government time and resources was known to his coworkers and was reported in a local newspaper, the Board 

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WILSON v. ARMY 7

reasonably concluded that his behavior could undermine 

other employees’ confidence in the EEO Office and damage the public’s confidence in the Government as a whole. 

Finally, the Board considered Mr. Wilson’s seventeen 

years of service as a mitigating factor, but found that it 

could not cure the damage caused by his misconduct.

For these reasons, the Board concluded that the penalty was reasonable. Thus, to the extent that Mr. Wilson’s arguments can be construed as urging us to find 

that his penalty is too severe, we disagree. The Army’s 

chosen penalty is not “grossly disproportionate to the 

offense” and therefore the Army did not abuse its discretion when it decided to discharge Mr. Wilson.

COSTS

No Costs.

AFFIRMED

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