Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01002/USCOURTS-caDC-23-01002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
T-Mobile USA, Inc.
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 7, 2023 Decided January 12, 2024

No. 22-1310

T-MOBILE USA, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

INTERVENOR

Consolidated with 23-1002

On Petition for Review and Cross-Application 

for Enforcement of an Order 

of the National Labor Relations Board

Mark D. Harris argued the cause for petitioner. With him 

on the briefs were Mark Theodore and Shiloh Rainwater.

Greg P. Lauro, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were 

Ruth E. Burdick, Deputy Associate General Counsel, David 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 1 of 27
2 

Habenstreit, Assistant General Counsel, and Kira Dellinger 

Vol, Supervisory Attorney. 

Glenda L. Pittman and John Alexander van Schiack were 

on the brief for intervenor Communications Workers of 

America, AFL-CIO in support of respondent. 

Before: SRINIVASAN, Chief Judge, GARCIA, Circuit Judge, 

and RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARCIA. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge 

RANDOLPH. 

GARCIA, Circuit Judge: The National Labor Relations Act 

protects employees’ rights to self-organize and choose 

representatives to bargain with their employer. To that end, the

Act prohibits employers from dominating a “labor 

organization,” which the Act defines as an employee group that 

exists at least “in part” to deal with employers over working 

conditions. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2). 

In 2015, T-Mobile established an organization it called 

T-Voice. The company picked employees—which it labeled

“representatives”—to comprise the group and told other

employees to use those T-Voice representatives to raise issues

with management. When the National Labor Relations

Board’s General Counsel charged T-Mobile with unlawfully

dominating T-Voice, T-Mobile argued that T-Voice was not a

labor organization because T-Voice representatives made

proposals to management individually, not as a group, and that

in any event most T-Voice proposals did not concern employee

working conditions. Because the Board reasonably rejected

those arguments as inconsistent with the Act and Board

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 2 of 27
3

precedent, we deny T-Mobile’s petition for review and grant 

the Board’s cross-application for enforcement of its order.

I.

A.

T-Mobile is a national wireless telecommunications 

carrier that operates 17 call centers across the country. At each 

center, T-Mobile employs customer service representatives—

referred to as “CSRs” or “frontline” employees—to handle 

customer calls.

T-Mobile established T-Voice in January 2015. The 

organization’s charter stated that its mission was to “[e]nhance 

Customers[’] and Frontline experience by identifying, 

discussing, and communicating solutions for roadblocks for 

internal and external customers” and to “[p]rovide a vehicle for 

Frontline feedback and create a closed loop communication 

with [the] T-Mobile [Senior] Leadership Team.” A761.

In June 2015, when T-Mobile expanded T-Voice to cover 

all call centers nationally, an Executive Vice President at the 

company emailed the following to all CSRs:

T-Voice is your voice—it’s made up of 

Frontline Representatives from each call 

center . . . . Their job is to raise Frontline and 

customer pain points to ensure they are resolved 

and then results are communicated back to the 

Frontline . . . . You can raise issues by reaching 

out to your T-Voice representatives. Be vocal, 

let us know what you think.

A676. “Pain points” are perceived problems and complaints. 

Customer pain points indirectly affect CSRs because they 

result in service calls and customer irritation that CSRs are 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 3 of 27
4

tasked with handling. Frontline pain points more directly 

concern terms and conditions of employment such as bonus 

compensation and work schedules.

T-Mobile filled T-Voice with CSRs selected from 

different shifts, call functions, and call centers and paid them 

to serve as T-Voice representatives. As indicated in the email 

above, T-Voice representatives primarily collected customer 

and frontline pain points from fellow CSRs and presented them

to management.

T-Voice representatives collected pain points in several 

ways. During “table days,” they set up a table and talked to 

CSRs face-to-face. Representatives also arranged meetings 

with small teams of CSRs at which they solicited pain points.

And CSRs could submit pain points via physical suggestion 

boxes or to designated email addresses.

After they received pain points, T-Voice representatives 

entered them into a database as conveyed by the submitter, 

subject to minor grammatical or clarifying edits. T-Voice 

representatives also submitted their own pain points. Once the 

pain points were in the database, customer experience 

managers evaluated them and entered a response, which the 

T-Voice representatives then relayed back to the affected 

CSRs.

T-Voice representatives also discussed pain points with 

management in a variety of other ways. Sometimes, T-Voice 

representatives emailed pain points directly to management. 

Managers in charge of the T-Voice program also met with 

T-Voice representatives during weekly, monthly, and annual 

meetings. Weekly local meetings involved discussions with 

site senior managers regarding the most significant or recurring 

pain points. Monthly regional meetings involved sharing best 

practices for gathering pain points.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 4 of 27
5

During monthly national telephonic meetings, T-Voice 

representatives learned the resolution of the previous month’s 

top three pain points and could ask questions or make 

suggestions. For example, during the September 2015 

meeting, a T-Voice representative suggested that the company

provide CSRs with a script explaining how phone exchanges 

work. T-Mobile responded that it “will be” considering the 

proposal and added it “to the list of things to relook at to ensure 

[the company has] it properly covered.” A746. During the 

January 2016 meeting, after receiving an update on T-Mobile’s 

new device insurance plans, T-Voice representatives suggested 

edits to the corresponding CSR training materials. T-Mobile 

edited the materials accordingly. And during the March 2016 

meeting, T-Voice representatives suggested that device 

emulators be provided to CSRs to help them troubleshoot 

problems with customers’ devices. The company promised to 

provide an update on the proposal by the next month’s call.

These national meetings often included focus groups run 

by a T-Mobile manager. During a January 2016 focus group 

on coverage and network issues, T-Voice representatives 

recommended on-site trainings for CSRs on coverage and 

device compatibility, and “network-specific talking points to 

help address customer questions/concerns.” A736. The 

manager emailed notes from that meeting to the broader 

T-Voice team and the company’s Customer Service Leadership 

Team. 

T-Mobile also held two national, in-person T-Voice 

summits. All T-Voice representatives and many senior 

managers attended these two-day events. The 2015 summit 

included break-out sessions where focus groups of T-Voice 

representatives addressed topics including “Employee 

Engagement/T-Mobile Culture,” “Metrics,” “Systems/Tools,” 

and “Frontline Readiness.” Notes from the “Metrics” focus

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 5 of 27
6

group indicate that T-Voice representatives made proposals for 

changes to calculations of CSR performance metrics—for 

instance, dropping the high and low scores on customersatisfaction surveys and excluding calls lasting less than 45 

seconds from the calculation of another metric. The T-Mobile 

Vice President who hosted the focus group and another senior 

manager circulated the minutes to other managers 

“[f]or our discussion.” A697.

Notably, T-Mobile sometimes announced to employees 

that it had implemented proposals solicited through T-Voice 

and credited T-Voice with those changes. In one illustrative 

episode, a T-Voice representative emailed a Senior Vice 

President to request 45 dual monitors for CSRs in a particular 

department. T-Mobile considered and granted the request. The 

company then credited the change to T-Voice, announcing in 

its newsletter that the “T-Voice team was instrumental in 

raising the need for dual monitors” and that “[s]olving this pain 

point should lead to a happier, more productive workplace.” 

A116, A683. T-Mobile also credited T-Voice with changes 

involving, for example, an employee loyalty program that gave 

CSRs milestone anniversary gifts, a charging station in the 

employee break room, and free Wi-Fi access.

B.

The Communications Workers of America (“CWA”) has 

attempted to organize CSRs at T-Mobile since 2009. In 

February 2016, CWA filed an unfair labor practice charge 

against the company. The Board’s General Counsel then filed 

a complaint alleging, in relevant part, that T-Voice was a labor 

organization under Section 2(5) of the Act and that T-Mobile 

dominated T-Voice in violation of Section 8(a)(2) of the Act. 

T-Mobile has never disputed that it dominated T-Voice. The 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 6 of 27
7

only relevant dispute before the Board was whether T-Voice 

qualified as a statutory labor organization.

An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a four-day 

trial and ruled that T-Voice was a labor organization. On 

September 30, 2019, the Board reversed the ALJ. T-Mobile 

USA, Inc. & CWA, AFL-CIO (“T-Mobile I”), 368 N.L.R.B. No.

81 (Sept. 30, 2019). The Board read its precedent to require 

that a labor organization deal with management through “group 

proposals,” and held that T-Voice did not satisfy that 

requirement because T-Voice representatives submitted their 

proposals individually rather than through a collective 

mechanism. Id. at 8–9. CWA then petitioned our court for 

review of the Board’s decision.

On April 16, 2021, we granted CWA’s petition for review 

and remanded the case to the Board for further consideration. 

CWA v. NLRB, 994 F.3d 653, 664 (D.C. Cir. 2021). Our 

decision focused on “dueling lines of Board precedent” about

the “definitional requirement that a ‘labor organization’ must 

exist for the purpose, at least in part, of ‘dealing with’ the 

employer concerning conditions of work.” Id. at 659. We 

noted that the Board’s decision was premised on the “view that 

an organization does not engage in ‘dealing with’ an employer 

unless it makes ‘group proposals’ to the employer” and that 

“proposals from individual members of the group would not be 

sufficient.” Id. at 660.

We agreed that the precedents the Board cited are 

consistent with an interpretation of the “group proposals”

requirement that would “require some process for adopting or 

advancing [proposals] as proposals of the organization.” See 

id. at 662–63 (discussing Polaroid Corp., 329 N.L.R.B. 424, 

429 (1999); EFCO Corp., 327 N.L.R.B. 372 (1998), enforced, 

215 F.3d 1318 (4th Cir. 2000); E.I. du Pont & Co., 311 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 7 of 27
8

N.L.R.B. 893 (1993); Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 

994 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994)). But we 

also identified two other decisions the Board failed to consider: 

Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. 1245 (1995) and Reno Hilton 

Resorts Corp., 319 N.L.R.B. 1154 (1995). CWA, 994 F.3d at 

662. In both cases, we explained, the Board found employee 

groups were labor organizations without examining whether 

proposals from members of the group had been “embraced by 

the group through any formal process.” Id. at 663. In Dillon 

Stores, the “dealing with” requirement was met even though

proposals were “‘advanced collectively’” only in the sense 

“that the proposals were made ‘on a representational basis’” by 

members of the employee group at issue. Id. at 662 (quoting 

Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1250, 1252). Similarly, we

observed that in Reno Hilton the Board found labororganization status where the employee groups “or their 

members made proposals.” Id. (quoting Reno Hilton, 319 

N.L.R.B. at 1156).

We further noted that, even in cases fitting the Board’s 

new “group proposals” requirement, the Board had never “held 

that an organization in which employee representatives make 

proposals to management does not constitute a labor 

organization unless those proposals are adopted by the group.” 

Id. at 663. Such a requirement, we explained, would seem “in 

tension” not only with Dillon Stores and Reno Hilton, but also 

with precedent holding that a group “‘may meet the statutory 

definition of “labor organization” even if it lacks a formal 

structure.’” Id. (quoting Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994). 

Separately, we noted that such a requirement “might be easily 

circumvented and undermine the function of Section 8(a)(2),”

which aims to broadly preclude employer domination of 

employee groups purporting to represent other employees. Id.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 8 of 27
9

We therefore concluded that the Board’s formal “group

proposals” requirement “broke new ground” and left 

uncertainty “about what the record must show for the Board to 

find that an organization made group proposals” and qualifies

as a statutory labor organization. Id. We remanded the case to 

the Board to “reconcile” its precedent, id. at 655, directing it to 

“identify what standard [it] has adopted for separating ‘group 

proposals’ from proposals of employee representatives, like 

T-Voice representatives.” Id. at 664. In doing so, we noted 

that the Board’s precedent suggested two potential rules. First, 

consistent with Dillon Stores, it might suffice that “an 

employee representative makes a proposal while acting in a 

representative capacity.” Id. at 663; see id. at 661–62. Second, 

despite the possible difficulties we identified with such an 

approach, we noted that perhaps the Board meant to require 

something more, “such as a formal vote adopting the proposal.” 

Id. at 663.

On remand, the Board effectively endorsed the first option, 

finding that the “group proposals” requirement for dealing is 

satisfied if individual group members acting in a representative 

capacity make proposals to management. T-Mobile USA, Inc. 

& CWA, AFL-CIO (“T-Mobile II”), 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, 4–5

(Nov. 18, 2022). Applying that rule, the Board determined that 

T-Voice was indeed a labor organization and that T-Mobile 

violated Section 8(a)(2) by dominating T-Voice. Id. at 8–9. As 

part of its remedy, the Board ordered T-Mobile to immediately 

disestablish T-Voice and post a remedial notice at facilities 

where T-Voice is or has been maintained. Id. at 9–10.

T-Mobile timely petitioned for review and the Board filed 

a cross-application for enforcement of its decision.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 9 of 27
10

II.

Section 8(a)(2) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice 

for an employer “to dominate or interfere with the formation or 

administration of any labor organization or contribute financial 

or other support to it.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). Section 2(5) of 

the Act defines a “labor organization” as “any organization of 

any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee 

or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for 

the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 

concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, 

hours of employment, or conditions of work.” Id. § 152(5). A

group therefore qualifies as a labor organization if employees 

participate; the group exists, at least in part, for the purpose of 

“dealing with” the employer; and those dealings concern the 

subjects listed in Section 2(5). See Electromation, 309 

N.L.R.B. at 995–96. If an “employee representation committee 

or plan” is involved, there must also be evidence that the 

committee “is in some way representing the employees.” Id. at 

996.

The Board has held that the statutory phrase “dealing with”

contemplates “a pattern or practice,” E.I. du Pont, 311 

N.L.R.B. at 894, of bilateral conduct involving “proposals from 

the employee [group] concerning the subjects listed in 

Sec[tion] 2(5), coupled with real or apparent consideration of 

those proposals by management,” Electromation, 309 

N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21.

III.

T-Mobile contests four aspects of the Board’s decision in 

T-Mobile II. The company argues that the Board’s revised 

approach to the “group proposals” requirement is unreasonable 

and inconsistent with Board precedent; that, even under that 

revised approach, substantial evidence does not support the 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 10 of 27
11

Board’s determination that T-Voice is a labor organization; that 

the Board deviated from its findings in T-Mobile I without 

explanation; and that the Board failed to consider key facts 

before ordering the disestablishment remedy. None of these 

arguments warrants relief.

A.

We first address T-Mobile’s challenge to the Board’s 

clarification of its “group proposals” requirement. We will 

“abide [the Board’s] interpretation of the Act if it is reasonable 

and consistent with controlling precedent.” Enter. Leasing Co. 

v. NLRB, 831 F.3d 534, 543 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brockton 

Hosp. v. NLRB, 294 F.3d 100, 103 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).

T-Mobile’s argument concerns the Board’s interpretation 

of what it means for a group of representative employees to 

“deal with” an employer. The Board initially held that 

proposals from individual members of such a group to 

management are not sufficient to constitute “dealing” by the 

group. After we raised questions about that approach and 

remanded to the Board for clarification, the Board changed 

course. In the decision on review, the Board held that an 

employee group can “deal with” an employer where the 

group’s individual members make proposals to management 

while acting in a representative capacity, even if there is no 

additional indication that the full group endorses the individual 

member’s proposal. That conclusion fits comfortably with the 

Act’s text and purpose, and with relevant Board precedent.

As the Board explained, “nothing in the text of Section 

2(5) or its legislative history supports the notion that the 

employee group must adopt proposals in any particular way 

before those proposals may be found to be group proposals.” 

T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 6. Rather, the Act’s text 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 11 of 27
12

places no limit on how a group may “deal with” an employer. 

In assessing the related question of what types of groups may 

constitute labor organizations, the Board has similarly noted 

Section 2(5)’s “broad” text and concluded that a group may 

qualify “even if it lacks a formal structure, has no elected 

officers, constitution or bylaws, does not meet regularly, and 

does not require the payment of initiation fees or dues.” 

Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993; see also NLRB v. Ampex 

Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1971) (“The statute has been 

broadly construed, both with respect to absence of formal 

organization and the type of interchange between the parties 

which may be deemed ‘dealing.’”).

The Board’s approach also tracks the Act’s statement of 

purpose, which includes the goal of protecting workers’ “full 

freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of 

representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of 

negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment.” 29 

U.S.C. § 151. As the Board has explained, Congress defined 

the term “labor organization” “broadly” to achieve that goal, 

aiming to “rid[] collective bargaining of employer-dominated 

organizations” so that employees would retain “the freedom to 

choose their own representatives.” Electromation, 309 

N.L.R.B. at 993.

By contrast, as we noted in CWA, T-Mobile’s proposed 

requirement that a group of representative employees must 

adopt proposals in some particular fashion before conveying 

them to management would seem an odd fit with the Act’s 

broad text and purpose. See CWA, 994 F.3d at 663. 

Accordingly, the Board was justified in choosing the contrary 

course we ourselves identified in that opinion. If a group of 

employee representatives otherwise satisfies Section 2(5)’s

requirements, the fact that the group operates by allowing its 

individual members to make proposals to management rather 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 12 of 27
13

than through a more formal collective mechanism does not 

make employer dominance of that group any less offensive to 

the Act’s objective of ensuring that employees retain “the 

freedom to choose their own representatives.” Electromation, 

309 N.L.R.B. at 993. If the individuals are members of a group

that represents other employees and make proposals in their 

capacity as members of that group, those proposals can 

reasonably be regarded as proposals of the group for purposes 

of the “dealing with” requirement.

As for precedent, the Board recognized that it had 

previously found statutory dealing regardless of whether the 

employee group formally adopted the proposals group 

members submitted to management. In particular, the Board 

explained—consistent with our analysis in CWA—that its 

decision in Dillon Stores directly supports its revised approach. 

T-Mobile II, 374 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 6. There, members of an 

employee group acted in a representative capacity when 

presenting proposals to management during quarterly 

meetings. Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1250. But the group 

did not collectively adopt the proposals beforehand. Id. at 

1250–51. Still, the Board found statutory dealing because the

“proposals and grievances had been advanced collectively, on 

a representational basis.” Id. at 1252 (emphasis added). As 

we explained in CWA, the phrase “advanced collectively” in 

Dillon Stores necessarily “means only that the proposals were 

made ‘on a representational basis,’” because there was no 

evidence that the group adopted individual representatives’ 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 13 of 27
14

proposals. 994 F.3d at 662.1

 As the Board also emphasized, 

there is no contrary precedent. That is, neither the Board nor 

T-Mobile has identified any case in which the Board “found 

that an employee group that acted in a representative capacity 

and made proposals to management was not ‘dealing with’ the 

employer” and therefore was not a labor organization. 

T-Mobile II, 374 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 6; see also CWA, 994 F.3d 

at 663.

T-Mobile’s counterarguments lack merit. The company

notably does not contend that the Act’s text or purpose supports

its preferred requirement that the employee group take some 

formal action to endorse individual group members’ proposals 

before group dealing can be found.

Instead, T-Mobile submits that the Board’s approach 

conflicts with its precedent. T-Mobile describes several Board 

precedents as involving groups that not only conveyed

proposals to management as representatives of other 

employees but also took some additional action to adopt the 

proposals as their own. T-Mobile Br. at 23–24 (discussing 

Grouse Mt. Assocs. II, 333 N.L.R.B. 1322 (2001), enforced, 56 

F. App’x 811 (9th Cir. 2003); Aero Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B.

1101 (1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 144 F.3d 995 (6th 

Cir. 1998); and Ryder Dist. Res., Inc., 311 N.L.R.B. 818 

(1993)). T-Mobile’s description of those cases is accurate. But 

that fact is no stand-in for what T-Mobile really needs: a Board 

decision stating that such action is required for a group of 

1 The Board explained that Reno Hilton, the other case we 

identified in CWA, had found groups to be labor organizations when 

the groups “or their members” made proposals to management. 

T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 7 n.15. But the Board also 

observed that there was no explicit finding in Reno Hilton that the 

group acted in a representative capacity, and so it relied primarily on 

Dillon Stores. Id.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 14 of 27
15

representative employees to qualify as a statutory labor 

organization. As we have explained, there is no such case.

T-Mobile also argues that if an individual group member’s

proposal made in a representative capacity can constitute a 

“group proposal,” then the Board’s approach improperly 

conflates two distinct Section 2(5) prerequisites: the “dealing 

with” requirement and the requirement that, “if an ‘employee 

representation committee or plan’ is involved,” there must be 

evidence that the committee or plan is in some way 

representing the employees, Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 

996. T-Mobile is incorrect. Although a group’s representative 

nature might matter for multiple Section 2(5) requirements, 

that does not somehow render the “dealing with” requirement 

a nullity. As T-Mobile acknowledges, statutory dealing 

requires more than a group or its members making proposals in 

a representative capacity—the group must also engage in a 

“pattern or practice” of bilateral conduct involving proposals 

on “the subjects listed in Sec[tion] 2(5) coupled with real or 

apparent consideration of those proposals by management.” Id.

at 995 n.21.

Moreover, T-Mobile has no persuasive answer to Dillon 

Stores, which we already identified in CWA as affirmatively in 

conflict with any formal group-adoption requirement. 

T-Mobile instead submits that later Board precedents citing 

Dillon Stores have failed to follow its reasoning. The only case 

the company cites in support of that assertion is Simmons 

Industries, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 228 (1996). There, after finding 

that the employee committees at issue functioned in a 

representative capacity, the Board proceeded to conduct a 

separate inquiry into dealing and found the requirement 

satisfied because the committees made proposals to 

management by a “consensus process” or otherwise “discussed 

and made proposals.” Id. at 254; see id. at 253. According to 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 15 of 27
16

T-Mobile, the Board’s approach in Simmons indicates that,

even post-Dillon Stores, an individual member’s proposal is 

not “imputed to the group simply because of its representative 

structure.” T-Mobile Br. at 26. But like the other Board 

precedents on which T-Mobile relies, Simmons merely 

demonstrates that collective group action is one way of 

satisfying the “group proposals” requirement for statutory 

dealing. The decision does not state that such collective action 

is necessary, much less overturn Dillon Stores. Nor does it

foreclose the view—which the Board has now explicitly 

adopted—that group members making proposals in a 

representative capacity is an alternative means to the same end.

B.

Next, we address T-Mobile’s challenge to the Board’s 

finding that T-Voice is a labor organization under the Board’s 

clarified approach to the “group proposals” requirement.

“We must uphold the judgment of the Board unless, upon 

reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the Board’s 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence, or that the 

Board acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying 

established law to the facts of the case.” Int’l Union of 

Electronic, Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers v. 

NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). Substantial evidence is

enough “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Micro Pac. Dev. Inc. v. 

NLRB, 178 F.3d 1325, 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (internal 

quotation mark omitted) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 

305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Thus, we reverse the Board “only 

when the record is so compelling that no reasonable factfinder” 

could agree with the Board. Bally’s Park Place, Inc. v. NLRB, 

646 F.3d 929, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation mark 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 16 of 27
17

omitted) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. NLRB, 983 

F.2d 240, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).

Recall that, to find labor-organization status, the Board 

needed to find that (1) T-Voice submitted group proposals (2) 

on statutory subjects, (3) those proposals received real or 

apparent management consideration, and (4) there was a 

pattern or practice of such bilateral dealing. See E.I. du Pont, 

311 N.L.R.B. at 894; Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21. 

Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding on each 

requirement.

The Board cited six characteristic examples of statutory 

dealing in support of its conclusion that T-Voice is a labor 

organization. T-Mobile II, 374 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 7–8. They 

are: a September 2015 proposal regarding 45 dual monitors for 

CSRs in the Dedicated Care Department; October 2015 

proposals concerning the metrics used to measure CSR 

performance; a March 2016 proposal for device emulators to 

help CSRs troubleshoot problems with customers’ devices; a 

September 2015 proposal that T-Mobile provide CSRs with a 

script to aid in explaining phone exchanges to customers; 

January 2016 proposals for trainings on coverage and device 

compatibility, and network-specific talking points to help 

CSRs address customer questions; and a January 2016 proposal 

on updating the language in materials for training CSRs on the 

company’s new device insurance plans. Id.

First, because the foregoing proposals “originated with [a]

T-Voice representative acting as a representative of fellow 

employees,” the Board found that they all qualify as “group 

proposals” under its clarified approach. Id. at 7. T-Mobile 

does not dispute the Board’s finding that T-Voice members 

acted in a representative capacity. Nor could it. As the Board 

highlighted, the company calls employees serving in the 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 17 of 27
18

T-Voice program “T-Voice representatives,” an apt title given 

that they are selected “from different shifts, call functions, and 

call centers.” Id. at 5. Moreover, T-Voice “expressly solicited 

‘employee’ or ‘Frontline’ pain points” from CSRs outside the 

group. Id. at 8. In T-Mobile’s own words, T-Voice was “a 

direct line of Frontline feedback for senior leadership.” Id. at 

5. Taken together, this evidence establishes that T-Voice and 

its representatives functioned in a representative capacity. And 

because T-Voice representatives acted in that capacity when 

making the six proposals the Board identified, those six 

proposals were group proposals.

Second, the Board reasonably found that the proposals 

addressed statutory subjects. As the Board explained, because

the proposals “concerned metrics, training, and equipment for 

CSRs, they constituted proposals regarding conditions of 

work.” Id. at 8; see Reno Hilton, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1156–57 

(describing “equipment needed by employees” and “training of 

new employees” as “employment conditions”); T-Mobile I, 

368 N.L.R.B. No. 81, at 2 (acknowledging that “metrics” for 

measuring CSR performance “related to employees’ terms and

conditions of employment”).

T-Mobile offers no contrary authority. Instead, it contends 

that several of the proposals were intended to address customer 

issues as opposed to conditions of work. But in this specific

context—where T-Mobile employs CSRs for the purpose of 

addressing customer issues—the distinction is hardly a clean 

one. As we explained in CWA, “[c]ustomer pain points 

indirectly affect CSRs because they generate service calls and 

customer irritation that the CSRs are responsible for handling.” 

994 F.3d at 656. It makes sense, then, that proposals about 

CSRs’ ability to address customer pain points also relate to 

their conditions of work, particularly when CSRs’ performance 

in resolving those pain points directly impacts other terms of 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 18 of 27
19

their employment, such as compensation and work schedules.

See T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 2; A711. Take, for 

example, the March 2016 device-emulator proposal. T-Mobile 

insists that the proposal concerned customers’ experience, not 

CSR working conditions. But requesting a device that would 

aid CSRs in performing their jobs—and, in turn, potentially 

improve their performance metrics—plainly concerns working 

conditions in addition to improving the customer experience.

Third, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

determination that T-Mobile management gave real or apparent 

consideration to each of the six proposals. See T-Mobile II, 372 

N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 7–8. In response to the dual-monitors 

proposal, T-Mobile “reviewed the costs of the monitors and 

then accepted [the] proposal by supplying dual monitors to 

CSRs in the Dedicated Care Department.” Id. at 7. The 

proposals regarding CSR metrics, trainings on coverage and 

device compatibility, and network-specific talking points were

forwarded from senior management to other managers for 

discussion. Id. Indeed, T-Mobile eventually rejected one of 

the metrics proposals (dropping the high and low scores on 

customer-satisfaction surveys) via its response to a subsequent

pain-point submission. As for the device-emulator proposal, 

T-Mobile “promised to provide an update” during the next 

T-Voice monthly meeting. Id. at 7–8. And after receiving the 

proposal for a script on phone exchanges, management added 

the suggestion to “the list of things to relook at to ensure [the 

company] ha[s] it properly covered.” A746; see T-Mobile II, 

372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 8. Finally, in response to the proposal 

to update the training material language on device insurance 

plans, T-Mobile “edited the language accordingly.” T-Mobile 

II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 8.

T-Mobile’s objections to these findings lack merit. As a 

threshold matter, the company takes issue with the Board’s 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 19 of 27
20

view that management consideration of proposals is enough to 

satisfy the bilateral mechanism for dealing. Citing E.I. du Pont, 

T-Mobile argues that dealing requires an employer’s 

acceptance or rejection of a proposal by word or deed. But as 

the Board notes in its decision, see T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. 

No. 4, at 5, E.I. du Pont states only that a bilateral mechanism 

“ordinarily entails . . . acceptance or rejection by word or 

deed,” 311 N.L.R.B. at 894 (emphasis added). Such a response 

is not a prerequisite for dealing under Board precedent, and 

none of the authorities T-Mobile cites declares otherwise. See 

EFCO Corp. v. NLRB, 2000 WL 632468, at *5 (4th Cir. May 

17, 2000) (per curiam); Simmons, 321 N.L.R.B. at 254; Grouse 

Mt. Assocs. II, 333 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1336 (2001); Reno Hilton, 

319 N.L.R.B. at 1156; Dillon Stores, 319 N.L.R.B. at 1250. 

Real or apparent consideration of proposals by management is 

a reasonable bar for bilateralism and has support in Board 

precedent. See, e.g., Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21; 

Polaroid, 329 N.L.R.B. at 424–25.

T-Mobile next contends that, in any event, as to some of 

the six proposals, management exhibited “mere awareness”

rather than real or apparent consideration. T-Mobile Reply at 

17. We disagree. As the Board found, the record reflects that 

T-Mobile “either forwarded the[] proposals to other managers 

for their consideration, indicated that they would be 

considered, or simply accepted them.” T-Mobile II, 372 

N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 8. All of that conduct goes beyond 

exhibiting awareness.

T-Mobile is correct that forwarding proposals for 

management follow-up or promising future review is not the 

same as direct evidence that management actually considered 

the proposals. But circumstantial evidence of consideration—

real or apparent—is enough for the Board to reasonably draw 

the required inference. See, e.g., Inova Health Sys. v. NLRB, 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 20 of 27
21

795 F.3d 68, 82 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Thus, circumstantial, but 

substantial, evidence supports the Board’s finding . . . .”). The 

record here contains at least such evidence for each of the six 

proposals.

Fourth, substantial evidence supports the Board’s 

conclusion that the six proposals satisfy the pattern-or-practice 

requirement for dealing. An employee group is a labor 

organization under Section 2(5) if it exists even “in part” for 

the purpose of dealing with employers on statutory subjects. 

29 U.S.C. § 152(5). So “if the evidence establishes . . . a 

pattern or practice [of statutory dealing] or that the group exists 

for a purpose of following such a pattern or practice, the 

element of dealing is present.” E.I. du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 

894. This requirement is assessed by looking to both “what the 

organization is set up to do and . . . what it actually does.” 

Polaroid, 329 N.L.R.B. at 424–25 (citing Keeler Brass Co., 

317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1113 (1995)).

Here, as the Board emphasized, T-Mobile’s own 

statements and actions go a long way towards satisfying that 

test. The T-Voice charter—written by T-Mobile—stated that 

the organization’s mission was to “[e]nhance Customer[] and 

Frontline . . . experience by identifying, discussing, and 

communicating solutions for roadblocks for internal and 

external customers,” and that its purpose was to “[p]rovide a 

vehicle for Frontline feedback and create a closed loop 

communication with [the] T-Mobile Sr. Leadership Team.” 

T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 1 (alterations in original). 

To be clear: The terms “Frontline” and “internal customers” 

refer to the T-Mobile employees that T-Voice members were 

charged with representing. It would be difficult to imagine a 

more direct statement—in the organization’s founding 

document no less—that the group exists at least in part to deal 

with the employer on behalf of other employees.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 21 of 27
22

The Board identified subsequent communications between 

T-Mobile and its employees that were consistent with 

T-Voice’s charter. When T-Mobile announced the national 

roll-out of T-Voice to CSRs, T-Mobile stated that T-Voice 

comprises “Frontline Representatives”; that their “job is to 

raise Frontline and customer pain points to ensure they are 

resolved and then results are communicated back to the 

Frontline”; and that CSRs should “raise issues by reaching out 

to [their] T-Voice representatives.” T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. 

No. 4, at 1–2 (alteration in original). As the Board put it, 

T-Mobile “encouraged employees to raise any and all pain 

points to their T-Voice representatives.” Id. at 2. 

And after the company-selected T-Voice representatives 

began their work, the company was sure to “announce[] to 

employees that it had implemented suggestions solicited 

through T-Voice and credit[] those changes to the T-Voice 

‘team.’” Id. The starkest example stemmed from the dualmonitor proposal. After accepting that proposal, T-Mobile 

announced in its newsletter that the “T-Voice team was 

instrumental in raising the need for dual monitors” and that 

“[s]olving this pain point should lead to a happier, more 

productive workplace.” A116. The Board also found that 

T-Mobile credited T-Voice with, “for example, an employee 

loyalty program that gave CSRs milestone anniversary gifts, a 

charging station in the employee break room, and free Wi-Fi 

access.” T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 2.

In short, T-Mobile explicitly described T-Voice to its 

employees as a representative organization for raising issues 

about work conditions and then repeatedly acknowledged 

T-Voice’s success in that intended role. Against that backdrop, 

the Board reasonably concluded that the six examples of 

dealing established a pattern or practice.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 22 of 27
23

T-Mobile’s arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. 

The company stresses that the six examples constitute a very 

small overall percentage of the pain points submitted through 

T-Voice. But it cites no Board precedent engaging in this type 

of ratio analysis. E.I. du Pont, on which T-Mobile primarily 

relies, acknowledges the distinction between a “pattern or 

practice” and “isolated instances” of dealing—it does not 

specify a test for differentiating between the two, let alone 

endorse T-Mobile’s approach. 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. The same 

is true for the other Board decisions T-Mobile cites. See Aero 

Detroit, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 1101, 1113–14 (1996); Ryder 

Distrib. Res., 311 N.L.R.B. 814, 818 (1993).

The Act’s text further justifies the Board’s refusal to 

indulge T-Mobile’s approach: It covers any organization that 

exists “in whole or in part” to deal with employers on statutory 

subjects. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (emphasis added). If T-Mobile’s 

argument prevailed, an employer could avoid the consequences 

of dominating a labor organization by simply adding a nondealing element to the organization large enough to distort the 

ratio in its favor.

Comparing this case to the facts of Stoody Co., 320 

N.L.R.B. 18 (1995), T-Mobile also argues that six examples of 

dealing should be insufficient as an absolute matter. In that 

case, the Board concluded that a single instance of statutory 

dealing that did not coincide with the employee group’s 

announced purpose was an “isolated error,” not a pattern or 

practice of dealing. Id. at 20–21. That situation bears no 

resemblance to this one. As the Board explained, far from oneoff dealing that could be regarded as an “error,” “the T-Voice 

program expressly solicited ‘employee’ or ‘Frontline’ pain 

points over a period of roughly 6 months,” and T-Mobile 

repeatedly and explicitly announced that the purpose of 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 23 of 27
24

T-Voice was in part to improve CSR working conditions. 

T-Mobile II, 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, at 1–2, 8.

We do not foreclose the possibility that in another case, 

with a different record, six instances of dealing might be 

insufficient to support a finding that an organization engaged 

in a pattern or practice of dealing within the meaning of the 

Board’s precedents. But the full record here—including 

T-Mobile’s own repeated statements—sufficiently supportsthe 

finding that T-Voice existed at least “in part” to engage in a 

pattern or practice of statutory dealing.

C.

T-Mobile separately asserts that the Board acted arbitrarily 

and capriciously because it reversed without explanation its 

conclusion in T-Mobile I that none of the six examples 

amounted to dealing, “either because they concerned purely 

customer issues (troubleshooting devices, a script about phone 

exchanges, setting up coverage, and talking points) or they 

prompted no response from management (changes to employee 

metrics).” T-Mobile Reply at 13. This argument 

mischaracterizes what the Board found in T-Mobile I. There, 

the Board stated that it was “unnecessary to pass on whether 

the pain points transmitted by T-Voice concerned Sec. 2(5) 

statutory subjects.” T-Mobile I, 368 N.L.R.B. No. 81, at 6 n.21. 

We recognized as much in our prior opinion: “Because the 

Board found T-Voice did not ‘deal with’ T-Mobile as required 

for it to be a ‘labor organization,’ the Board did not address 

whether any pain points submitted by T-Voice concerned 

conditions of work or other statutory subjects.” CWA, 994 F.3d 

at 657–58. And as for the proposal on changes to metrics, the 

Board simply noted in the facts section of the decision that one 

manager testified that no follow-up action took place—the 

Board did not make a finding as to that fact. T-Mobile I, 368 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 24 of 27
25

N.L.R.B. No. 81, at 5. Because T-Mobile I does not contain 

the findings the company claims were reversed in T-Mobile II,

there is no inconsistency between the decisions, and 

T-Mobile’s argument that the Board neglected to explain the 

claimed inconsistency necessarily fails.

D.

Finally, T-Mobile contests the Board’s order requiring the 

disestablishment of T-Voice. T-Mobile offers two reasons 

why the disestablishment remedy is improper. First, it 

contends that the Board failed to consider that, in February 

2016, the company “expressly limited” T-Voice to addressing 

customer issues and “has not engaged in any alleged dealing 

with management since.” T-Mobile Br. at 44. After that date, 

the argument goes, T-Voice ceased to function as a labor 

organization, so disestablishing T-Voice as currently 

constituted would not effectuate the purposes of the Act. 

Second, T-Mobile claims that the Board failed to account for 

the harm disestablishment would cause its business. 

We lack jurisdiction to consider these arguments. Section 

10(e) of the Act states that “[n]o objection that has not been 

urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, 

unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be 

excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 160(e). This provision furthers “the salutary policy . . . of 

affording the Board opportunity to consider on the merits 

questions to be urged on review of its order.” Marshall Field 

& Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253, 256 (1943). The “critical 

question” in applying Section 10(e) is therefore “whether the 

Board received adequate notice of the basis for the objection.” 

Camelot Terrace, Inc. v. NLRB, 824 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 

2016) (quoting Alwin Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 192 F.3d 133, 143 

(D.C. Cir. 1999)). Although we have not required that the 

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 25 of 27
26

ground for an objection be stated explicitly in a party’s written 

objections filed with the Board, we have required, at a 

minimum, that the ground be “evident by the context in which 

[the objection] is raised.” Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 669 

F.2d 790, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

T-Mobile did not put the Board on notice of the specific, 

fact-intensive arguments it now advances on appeal. Before 

the Board, T-Mobile took exception to the ALJ’s 

disestablishment remedy in only the broadest of terms, 

claiming the remedy had “no support in the record, statute or 

case law.” SA90–91. Similarly vague objections have been 

held to satisfy Section 10(e) only when additional context 

provided the Board adequate notice, such as where the party’s 

briefing to the Board or the nature of the disputed issues

clarified the nature of its objection. See, e.g., NLRB v. Blake 

Constr., Co., 663 F.2d 272, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Camelot 

Terrace, Inc., 824 F.3d at 1090; see also May Dep’t Stores Co. 

v. NLRB, 326 U.S. 376, 386 n.5 (1945). No such illuminating 

context is present here.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny T-Mobile’s petition for 

review and grant the Board’s cross-application for 

enforcement.

So ordered.

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 26 of 27
RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting: I respectfully

dissent for the reasons stated by Board Member Ring in his

dissent. See T-Mobile USA, Inc., 372 N.L.R.B. No. 4, slip op.

at 10–13 (Nov. 18, 2022).

USCA Case #23-1002 Document #2035492 Filed: 01/12/2024 Page 27 of 27