Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01116/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01116-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott Dahlem
Appellant
The Board of Education of Denver Public Schools
Appellee
The Colorado High School Activities Association
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

I f

1 ILED 

U<1ucd States (' f , .ourt o Ap,n.:.~J Tenth c· · r .. a s · · ""1r~:utt 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS A p R 2 3 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT RO.BERTI 

· · · ., .. FiOECKER 

SCOTT DAHLEM, an underage male, 

by his mother and next friend 

NANCY DAHLEM, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF DENVER 

PUBLIC SCHOOLS; and THE COLORADO 

HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES 

ASSOCIATION, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 89-1116 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(.D.C. NO. 87-Z-1300) 

Clerk 

David H. Miller, Esq., American Civil Liberties Union Foundation 

of Colorado, Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Michael H. Jackson (Dwight L. Pringle with him on the brief), 

Semple & Jackson, P.C., Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for DefendantAppellee, Board of Education of Denver Public Schools. 

Alexander Halpern (Susan S. Schermerhorn with him on the brief), 

Caplan and Earnest, Boulder, Colorado, Attorneys for DefendantAppellee, The Colorado High School Activities Association. 

Before ANDERSON, EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN,* District 

Judge. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior Judge, U.S. District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1116 Document: 01019623130 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 1 
"In any action or proceeding" brought under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

"the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part 

of the costs." 42 u.s.c. § 1988. "[T]ne prevailing party 'should 

ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances 

would render·such.anpaward unjust.'" Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 

S. Ct. 939, 942 n.l (1989) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park 

Enterps., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)). The issue in this appeal is 

under what circumstances a plaintiff who obtains preliminary 

relief, but whose suit is dismissed as moot while the order is on 

appeal, is entitled to an award of attorney's fees. 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff-appellant Scott Dahlem, then a senior at George 

Washington High School in Denver, Colorado, wished to participate 

in interscholastic gymnastics, but the school only had a girls' 

gymnastics team and the Colorado High School Activities 

Association ("CHSAA") prohibited boys from joining girls' teams. 

Dahlem filed suit against defendants-appellants CHSAA and the 

Board of Education of Denver Public Schools ("the Board") under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that barring him from his chosen sport 

because of his gender violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The 

district court consolidated the case with Rowley v. Members of the 

Board of Education, a similar suit in which a freshman at another 

school sought to play on his school's girls' volleyball team. 1 

1 Both Dahlem and Rowley were represented by the American Civil 

Liberties Union. 

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The court held a hearing and, relying upon the same reasoning and 

analysis in both cases, granted each plaintiff a preliminary 

injunction. R. Vol. III at 4-7, 15-20; R. Vol. II at Tabs 6, 22. 

Both orders were appealed. While the appeals were pending, 

the gymnastics season ended. Because Dahlem was a senior, this 

rendered his claim moot ... -... Accordingly, his appeal was .dismissed, 

and the district court was directed to vacate the injunction and 

dismiss the case. See Mandate, R. Vol. I at Tab 13. He then 

filed a motion in the district court for attorney's fees under 42 

U.S.C. § 1988. Meanwhile, the Rowley appeal proceeded to a decision on the merits. This court held that the district court had 

applied an incorrect legal standard, and reversed the district 

court's order. See Rowley v. Members of the Bd. of Educ., 863 

F.2d 39, 40-41 (10th Cir. 1988). After the opinion was released, 

but before the mandate issued, Rowley decided that he did not ~ant 

to play volleyball. This mooted his action as well, so we vacated 

the judgment and withdrew our opinion. See id. at 41. 

Following the conclusion of the Rowley case, the district 

court denied Dahlem's motion for attorney's fees. The court held 

that Dahlem was a prevailing party, but that it would be unjust to 

award Dahlem attorney's fees when Rowley showed that, had the case 

not been dismissed as moot, the relief Dahlem received would have 

been reversed. Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys 

Fees, R. Vol. I, Tab 15 at 3-5. This appeal followed. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1116 Document: 01019623130 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 3 
DISCUSSION 

As a threshold matter, the Board contends that this court's 

instruction to the district court to dismiss Dahlem's action as 

moot stripped that courf of jurisdiction to grant attorney's fees. 

We disagree. While a claim of entitlement to attorney's fees does 

-· .not-p~eserve a.moot cause .of action, __ Lewis v. Continental Bank 

Corp., 58 U.S.L.W. 4330, 4332 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1990) (citing Diamond 

v. Charles, 476 u .. s. 54, 70-71 (1986)), the expiration of the 

underlying cause of action does not moot a controversy over 

attorney's fees already incurred. Nash v. Chandler, 859 F~2d 

1210, 1211 (5th Cir. 1988); Grano v. Barry, 733 F.2d 164, 168 n.2 

(D.C. Cir. 1984); United States v. Ford, 650 F.2d 1141, 1144 (9th 

Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 942 (1982); Ramey v. Cincinnati 

Enquirer, Inc., 508 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 

422 U.S. 1048 (1975); Comment, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 

in Moot Cases, 48 u. Chi. L. Rev. 819, 824 (1982); see also 

Operating Eng' rs Local Union No. 3 v. Bohn, 737 F.2d 860, 863 

(10th Cir. 1984). 

I. PREVAILING PARTY 

"[N]o fee award is permissible until the plaintiff has 

crossed the 'statutory threshold' of prevailing party status." 

Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. 

Ct. 1486, 1491 (1989) (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 

433 (1983)). We must first decide, therefore, "a question of some 

difficulty": whether a plaintiff who obtains a preliminary 

injunction which is "mooted after being rendered but before the 

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losing party could challenge its validity on appeal" is a prevailing party in the district court. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 

58 U.S.L.W. at 4333. 

The parties are at odds over whether Dahlem's preliminary 

injunction satisfied the two-part test first enunciated in Nadeau 

.v~. Helgemoe~ 581 R.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978), -~or= determining whether 

a plaintiff who obtains relief without a final judgment on the 

merits is a prevailing party. 2 One of the requirements for a 

preliminary injunction is a '"substantial likelihood that the 

movant will eventually prevail on the merits. 111 United States ex 

rel. Potawatomi Indian Tribe v. Enterprise Management Consultants, 

Inc., 883 F.2d 886, 889 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Lundgrin v. 

Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th Cir. 1980)) (emphasis added). For 

the purpose of deciding whether a plaintiff is a prevailing party, 

a preliminary injunction is considered a decision on the merits so 

long as it "represent[s] an unambiguous indication of probable 

success on the merits, and not merely a maintenance of the status 

quo • • II Webster v. Sowders, 846 F.2d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 

1988); see also,~, Taylor v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 810 F.2d 

1551, 1558 (11th Cir.), reh'g en bane denied, 816 F.2d 688 (11th 

Cir. 1987); Chu Drua Cha v. Levine, 701 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 

1983). This is such a case. See R. Vol. III at 7 ("the Court 

finds that .•• there is a substantial likelihood that the 

2 First, the "attorney's efforts [must have been] a necessary 

and important factor in achieving the improvements." Second, 

"defendants' conduct [must have been] required by law." Nadeau v. 

Helgemoe, 581 F.2d at 281. This test has been adopted in the 

Tenth Circuit. See, ~, O'Connor v. City & County of Denver, 

894 F.2d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 1990); Foremaster v. City of St. 

George, 882 F.2d 1485, 1488 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1116 Document: 01019623130 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 5 
plaintiffs will prevail at the ultimate hearing"). Because the 

Nadeau test only applies to a plaintiff "who does not receive a 

judgment on the merits," J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 

F.2d 1469, 1473 (10th Cir. 1985); Operating Eng'rs Local Union No. 

3 v. Bohn, 737 F.2d at 863; accord Leuthje v. Peavine School 

Dist., .. .872 F.2d 352, 354 (10th.Cir. 1989), Dahlem's prayer for 

attorney's fees will not be judged by the Nadeau test. 3 

Our inquiry is more straightforward. The Supreme Court has 

on several occasions discussed what is required to be a prevailing 

party. 

"'[R]espect for ordinary language requires that a plaintiff receive at least some relief on the merits of his 

claim before hci can be said to prevail. 1 Thus, at a 

minimum, to be considered a prevailing party within the 

meaning of § 1988 the plaintiff must be able to point to 

a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal 

relationship between itself and the defendant." 

3 Another reason why the Nadeau test is inapplicable to the 

present case is that a distinction should be drawn betwe~n a case 

where "the defendant 'voluntarily' complies under the threat of 

the lawsuit, for such compliance, although mooting the lawsuit, 

shows acquiescence in the plaintiff's position," and one where ''a 

defendant's 'involuntary' compliance with a seemingly valid court 

order •.. , under fear of contempt, moots a lawsuit such as this 

one but does not demonstrate acquiescence in plaintiff's 

position." Kay v. David Douglas School Dist. No. 40, 108 S. Ct. 

740, 740 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 

All of the cases cited above (and many others applying the Nadeau 

test), are of the former type. In J & J Anderson, for example, 

the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order against the 

enforcement of a town ordinance, but before further proceedings 

could be held the ordinance was repealed, mooting the controversy. 

J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d at 1471-72. 

The purpose of the Nadeau test is to ensure, in cases where a 

concession of defeat might be inferred from defendant's conduct, 

that the conduct was actually brought about by the lawsuit. 

Attorney's fees should be awarded only when the suit brought about 

such conduct, and not when the defendant acted supererogatorily. 

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Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 109 S. 

Ct. at 1493 (quoting. Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)). 

Such "relief on the merits" may fall short of "a formal judgment," 

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760-61 (1987), so long as it works 

a "material alteration," Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland 

I.ndep. School Dist..,. 109 S. Ct. at 1493, of "the .'substantial 

rights of the parties,'" Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 

(1980) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 

(1976)). In short, a prevailing party is one which "win[s] the 

relief it seeks." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 58 U.S.L.W. at 

4332. We make this inquiry "without regard to whether we think 

the district court's decision on the underlying merits [was] 

correct." Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct, 

686 F.2d 1278, 1290 (6th Cir. 1982); accord,~, Curtis v. 

Taylor, 625 F.2d 645, 649 (5th .Cir.), modified on other grou'nds 

and reh'g denied, 648 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980); Bagby v. Beal, 606 

F.2d 411, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1979); Libby by Libby v. South InterConference Ass'n, 728 F. Supp. 504, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1990); see 

Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202, 205 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the fact that a party should not have 'prevailed' 

ordinarily would not deprive him of attorney's fees"). 

We are in accord with the courts which have held that a party 

which achieves the objective of its suit by means of an injunction4 issued by the district court is a prevailing party in that 

4 This case does not present, and we do not decide, the question of whether a plaintiff who obtains only a temporary restraining order which does not implicate the merits of the claim, and 

whose suit is mooted before further proceedings can be held, is a 

[footnote continued] 

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court, notwithstanding the fact that the case becomes moot, 

through no acquiescence by the defendant, while the order is on 

appeal. See, ~, Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 

1986); Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct, 686 

F.2d at 1290-91; Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 847-48 (9th 

Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); 5 Doe v. Marshall, 

[footnote continued] 

prevailing party. Compare Fitzharris v. Wolff, 702 F.2d 836, 838-

39 (9th Cir. 1983) with, ~' Paragould Music Co. v. City of 

Paragould, Ark., 738 F.2d 973, 975 (8th Cir. 1984); Bly v. McLeod, 

605 F.2d 134, 137 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 

(1980); Libby by Libby v. South Inter-Conference Ass'n, 728 F. 

Supp. at 510-12. The absence of a judicial determination relating 

to the merits has been considered a fatal defect by some courts. 

See, ~' Laurenza by Laurenza v. Mississippi High School 

Activities Ass'n, Inc., 708 F.2d 1038, 1042-43 (5th Cir. 1983); 

Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 601 (1st 

Cir. 1982). 

5 Then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, joined by Associate Justice 

Whit~, dissented from the denial of certiorari, stating: 

"To treat respondents as 'prevailing parties' under 

§ 1988 because they secured a preliminary injunction is 

to ignore the fact that petitioners exercised their 

right to appeal the entry of that order and the fact 

that the propriety of the injunction was being 

challenged on appeal at the time the case became moot 

and the appeal dismissed. No permanent injunction ever 

issued and there has been no settlement or consent 

decree. • . • Exposure of any party to [liability for 

his opponent's attorney's fees] when mootness deprives 

him of the appeal authorized by law which he had already 

initiated should result only from a clear authorization 

by Congress or settled precedent of this Court." 

Alioto v. Williams, 450 U.S. 1012, 1013-14 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 

dissenting from denial of certiorari). 

The clear weight of the authority cited in the text is to the 

contrary, however, and induces us to go along in this case, albeit 

reluctantly. In other situations, such as a decision clearly 

contrary to controlling law or one rendered by a district court 

which was improperly influenced, the Chief Justice's position 

might prove persuasive. This is not such a case, so we do not 

reach that question. 

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622 F.2d 118, 119-120 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 

(1981); Bagby v. Beal, 606 F.2d_at 415; Kimbrough v. Arkansas 

Activities Ass'n, 574 F.2d 423, 426 (8th Cir. 1978); see also 

Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 691 F.2d 597, 600 (1st 

Cir. 1982). 6 But see Ward v. Arkansas State Police, 493 F. Supp. 

l315, 1328 (.E.D. Ark •. -1980.), rev!.d on o.ther grounds, 653 F.2d 346 

(8th Cir. 1981); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 486 F. 

Supp. 187, 192 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1980); Kay v. David Douglas School 

Dist. No. 40, 738 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Or. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. 

Ct. 740 (1988). 

Doe v. Marshall is most similar to the case at hand. A high 

school senior obtained a preliminary injunction requiring his 

school to allow him to play on the football team, and he played 

6 Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375 (11th Cir •. 1982), is not to the 

contrary. In that case, the district court enjoined the State of 

Georgia to provide Medicaid reimbursement for medically necessary 

abortions. While the order was on appeal, the Supreme Court 

decided two cases which severely undercut the district court's 

rationale. The court of appeals remanded the case for reconsideration, and the district court dismissed the complaint on the 

merits. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not a 

prevailing party, even though the injunction allowed over 1800 

women to obtain abortions which would not otherwise have been 

available. 

This case does not stand for the proposition that transient 

injunctive relief, regardless of its practical effects, is not 

sufficient to confer prevailing party status. It is simply an 

example of the unremarkable rule that an adverse decision on the 

merits precludes such status on that issue. See Palmer v·. City of 

Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316, 1320-22 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 

U.S. 1049 (1987); Ward v. County of San Diego, 791 F.2d 1329, 1334 

(9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987); Harris v. 

Pirch, 677 F.2d 681, 689 (8th Cir. 1982); Smith v. University of 

N. C., 632 F.2d 316, 352 (4th Cir. 1980); Harrington v. VandaliaButler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192, 197 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied, 441 U.S. 932 (1979). The distinction between a dismissal 

for mootness and one on the merits is significant. See Palmer v. 

City of Chicago, 806 F.2d at 1322. 

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the entire season. The order was appealed, but the appeal was 

mooted by the plaintiff's graduation while the appeal was pending. 

The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff was a "prevailing 

party": 

"Even preliminary relief may serve to make a plaintiff a 

'prevailing party' under [§ 1988]; the lawsuit need not 

proceed to completion. All that is required is that the 

plaintiff obtain the primary relief sought. That 

requirement has been satisfied in this case." 

Doe v. Marshall, 622 F.2d at 120 (citations omitted); see also 

Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d at 1108 {plaintiffs were a prevailing 

party bec~use they ''show[ed] that the '"final result represents in 

a real sense, a disposition that furthers their interest'''" (quoting Miller v. Staats, 706 F.2d 336, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting 

Commissioners Court v. United States, 683 F.2d 435, 441 (D.C. Cir. 

1982)))); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d at 847 (plaintiffs were a 

prevailing party because they "succeeded on a 'significant issue 

in litigation which achieve[d] ... the benefit the parties 

sought in bringing suit"' (quoting Sethy v. Alameda County Water 

Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 

U.S. 1046 (1980))). 

Did Dahlem win the relief he sought? We hold that he did. 

He brought suit so that he could participate in interscholastic 

gymnastics during his senior year. Because of the district 

court's preliminary injunction, he did so participate. No subsequent judicial proceedings could have given him any more relief on 

his claim. It cannot be suggested that Dahlem's foray into the 

legal system was anything but completely successful. 

"'"[V]ictory'' in a civil rights suit is typically a practical, 

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rather than a strictly legal matter,'" Exeter-West Greenwich 

Regional School Dist. v. Pontarelli, 788 F.2d 47, 51 {1st Cir. 

1986) (quoting Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d 287, 291 (1st Cir. 

1986)), and "[t]he mootness of the subsequent appeal . 

emphasizes, rather than detracts from, the practical 

qsignific.ance,"-.Grano v._ Barry,.783 F.2d.at 1109, of the relief 

Dahlem received. 

II. SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 

The district court's discretion to deny fees to a prevailing 

plaintiff "is quite narrow." Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. 

Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 129 (10th Cir. 1980). "' [T]here are few 

cases denying attorney fees to a prevailing party as unjust under 

§ 1988,' and '[a] strong showing of special circumstances is 

. necessary to support [such]~ denial.'" Wilson v. Stocker, 819 

F.2d 943, 951 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting J & J Anderson, Inc. v. 

Town of Erie, 767 F.2d at 1474). The present case is quite unusual, and it comes within the "special circumstances" exception. 

The district court declined to award Dahlem attorney's fees 

because 

"(i]f Rowley were to petition this Court for attorneys 

fees under § 1988, said motion would be denied due to 

the Tenth Circuit's reversal of this Court's order. It 

would be manifestly unfair to award plaintiff Dahlem 

attorneys fees simply because he chose to seek dismissal 

of his appeal prior to the ruling by the Tenth Circuit. 

This Court concludes that the subsequent history of the 

almost identical companion case of Rowley constitutes a 

'special circumstance' that would render the award of 

attorneys fees to plaintiff Dahlem unjust." 

Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Attorneys Fees, R. Vol. I, 

Tab 15 at 5 (citation omitted). 

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This is not simply a case where a plaintiff obtained relief 

which was .. legally disputable. This is a case where plaintiff's 

lack of entitlement to the relief he obtained was promptly 

revealed by the reversal of a companion case concerning identical 

legal issues and overlapping defendants, and only a fortuity over 

which none .of the parties.had any control prevented. plaintiff's 

judgment from being reversed at the same time. The court may 

consider related claims when deciding whether a fee award is 

appropriate. See Izard v. Arndt, 483 F. Supp. 261, 266 (E.D. Wis. 

1980). Moreover, because Dahlem and Rowley were both represented 

by the American Civil Liberties Union, Dahlem cannot complain that 

we are making the propriety of a fee award to him hinge upon the 

appellate performance of someone else's attorney. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that it would be 

unjust to tax the defendants for Dahlem's attorney's fees when the 

defendants were deprived by Dahlem's graduation of the opportunity 

they successfully pursued in an identical companion case to 

vindicate their position. 

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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