Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04788/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-04788-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arlene Ackerman
Defendant
Jerry J.
Plaintiff
Matthew Kumin
Interested Party
San Francisco Unified School District
Defendant
Spearmon
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEJA MARIE J, a minor, by and

through her guardian ad litem,

JERRY J,

Plaintiff,

v

SAN FRANCISCO UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, et al,

Defendants. /

No C-05-4788 VRW

ORDER

Deja Marie J was a student at the Treasure Island

Elementary School (“the school”), which is part of the San

Francisco Unified School District (“the district”). Doc #1

(Complaint) ¶¶ 13-15. On February 2 and 3, 2005, Deja was

allegedly sexually and physically assaulted by a fellow student. 

Id ¶¶ 15-19. On November 22, 2005, Deja filed suit via her father

Jerry J against the district, the district’s superintendent Arlene

Ackerman and the school’s vice-principal Spearmon. The complaint

included, inter alia, a 42 USC § 1983 claim alleging that Spearmon

deprived Deja of equal protection and of her right under Title IX

to be free from sexual and physical assault and harassment. Id ¶¶

39-42.

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United States District Court

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On November 30, 2005, the court approved Jerry J’s

petition to be appointed guardian ad litem of Deja. Doc #5. On

February 8, 2006, plaintiff’s counsel, Matthew Kumin, informed the

court that the parties had reached a tentative settlement pursuant

to a mediation held on December 15, 2005. Doc #7. Because Deja is

a minor and her attorney seeks fees and costs from the recovery,

Jerry J now moves for a court order approving the minor’s

compromise. Doc #8.

“It has long been established that the court in which a

minor’s claims are being litigated has a duty to protect the

minor’s interests.” Salmeron v United States, 724 F2d 1357, 1363

(9th Cir 1983). Hence, “a court must independently investigate and

evaluate any compromise or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure

itself that the minor’s interests are protected, even if the

settlement has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent

or guardian ad litem.” Id (citation omitted).

No federal statute appears to govern how a court should

review a petition to compromise a minor’s § 1983 claim. Other

courts have turned to state law to determine whether a minor’s

compromise is fair and whether attorney’s fees awarded from the

settlement are reasonable. See Nice v Centennial Area School, 98 F

Supp 2d 665, 668-69 (ED Pa 2000). Cf Wilson v Garcia, 471 US 261,

267 (1985) (for § 1983 claims, borrowing the state statute of

limitations for personal injury actions); 42 USC § 1988 (noting

that when no suitable federal law exists, “the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the [forum

state], so far as the same is not inconsistent with the

Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the

cause * * *.”). Relying on state law seems especially appropriate

here, given that “matters of concern to the family unit, including

the well-being of minors, traditionally have been of utmost

interest to the individual states.” Nice, 98 F Supp 2d at 669. 

Accordingly, the court applies California law when evaluating the

compromise of Deja’s claim.

California law requires the court to make an “order

authorizing and directing that such reasonable expenses * * *,

costs, and attorney fees, as the court shall approve and allow

therein” be paid out of the settlement proceeds. Cal Prob Code §

3601(a); Curtis v Fagan, 82 Cal App 4th 270, 98 Cal Rptr 2d 84, 90-

91 (2000). The statute “bestows broad power on the court to

authorize payment from the settlement — to say who and what will be

paid from the minor’s money * * *.” Goldberg v Superior Court, 23

Cal App 4th 1378, 28 Cal Rptr 2d 613, 614-15 (1994) (relying on the

“plain language of the statute permit[ting] the court to make an

order authorizing ‘such reasonable expenses’ as it ‘shall approve

and allow’”). The court’s role in approving a minor’s compromise

is to “assure that whatever is done is in the minor’s best

interest” and that “the compromise is sufficient to provide for the

minor’s injuries, care and treatment.” Id at 615.

The present petition for compromise fails to demonstrate

that Deja’s interests have been adequately protected. Kumin has

not submitted any evidence concerning the extent of Deja’s

injuries, her current medical needs or the cost of such needs in

the future. In fact, Kumin’s declaration noted that he had “some

misgivings about the amount of the settlement” but that he “did not

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believe it would have been in the best interests of the minor child

psychologically and emotionally, to go through depositions and a

trial * * *.” Doc #9 at 2. Without any basis to compare the

measure of proposed recovery against Deja’s damages and anticipated

need, the court cannot determine whether the proposed settlement

“is sufficient to provide for the minor’s injuries, care and

treatment.” Goldberg, 28 Cal Rptr at 615.

With respect to attorney’s fees, the fee arrangement

governing this case provides for a one-third contingency fee after

first deducting costs if the case settles prior to a case

management conference, as in the present case. Ex #9, ¶ 3; id, Ex

2, ¶¶ 7, 9. The settlement amount here is $10,000; Kumin contends

that he has costs of $250 and requests a contingency fee of

$3,333.33. Doc #8, ¶ 10; Doc #9, ¶¶ 3, 6.

As a preliminary matter, the court notes that the

requested fee does not correlate with the fee arrangement’s terms. 

The arrangement states, “Attorney will deduct their [sic] costs

then take a percentage of the remaining amount as compensation for

their Attorney’ [sic] fees.” Doc #9, Ex 2, ¶ 9. Applying the 1/3

contingency fee rate to $9750, which is the settlement value after

deducting costs, the contingency fee should be $3,250, not

$3,333.33.

More importantly, California law provides that “[a]

contract for attorney’s fees for services in litigation, made by or

on behalf of a minor, is void unless the contract is approved, on

petition by an interested person, by the court in which the

litigation is pending or by the court having jurisdiction of the

guardianship estate of the minor.” Cal Fam Code § 6602. Although

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the court appointed Jerry J as guardian ad litem (Doc #5) and Jerry

J appears to have entered into the contingent fee contract for

counsel’s services, the court is unaware of having approved any

such agreement or that any other court with jurisdiction approved

the contingency fee contract. “[A] minor, who must appear through

a guardian, is not bound by admissions [or other material

decisions] of the guardian ad litem that have not been approved by

the court.” Torres v Friedman, 169 Cal App 3d 880, 215 Cal Rptr

604, 608 (1985) (holding that an attorney’s withdrawal from a

minor’s representation must be accomplished by court order). 

Accordingly, the contingency fee arrangement here appears to be

without legal effect or consequence. See also All-West Design, Inc

v Boozer, 183 Cal App 3d 1212, 228 Cal Rptr 736, 744 (1986)

(explaining that a contingency fee agreement was not controlling

because “[t]he court’s decision must be based upon

reasonableness”).

California law also provides that “[i]f the contract is

not approved and a judgment is recovered by or on behalf of the

minor, the attorney’s fees chargeable against the minor shall be

fixed by the court rendering the judgment.” Cal Fam Code § 6602. 

Along with section 3600 of the Probate Code, these provisions

require the court to assess independently how much can be paid from

the minor’s proposed settlement for attorney’s fees and costs.

“The determination of reasonable attorney fees is

committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which is in

the best position to judge the value of professional services

rendered in its court.” Olson v Cohen, 106 Cal App 1209, 131 Cal

Rptr 2d 620, 627 (2003) (construing agreement between parties for

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recovery of reasonable attorney fees). Among the factors the court

may consider are “the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the

amount involved in the litigation, the skill employed in handling

the litigation, the attention given, the success of the attorney’s

efforts, the attorney’s learning and experience, the intricacies

and importance of the litigation, the labor necessary, and the time

consumed.” Id.

As the California Supreme Court has observed, this

inquiry “ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i e, the number of

hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly

rate.” PLCM Grp v Drexler, 22 Cal 4th 1084, 95 Cal Rptr 2d 198,

206 (2000). “The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the

community for similar work. The lodestar figure may then be

adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case,

in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal

services provided.” Id (internal citations omitted). The Ninth

Circuit also permits the lodestar test for determining a reasonable

attorney’s fee award in common fund cases. See, e g, In re

Washington Public Power Supply Systems Sec Lit, 19 F3d 1291, 1296

(9th Cir 1994).

Hence, to determine what attorney’s fees are reasonable

here, the court must consider both the number of hours that can be

reasonably attributed to prosecuting this case on the minor’s

behalf and the reasonable rate such services entail. But neither

plaintiff’s petition (Doc #8) nor Kumin’s declaration (Doc #9)

address these issues.

//

//

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Now, to be sure, in light of the modest recovery here, a

one-third fee does not seem at first glance to be out-of-bounds,

assuming the amount of the recovery is reasonable under the

circumstances. That has yet to be demonstrated. To allow

plaintiff and her counsel to obtain approval to the fee contract

and show that the settlement is reasonable, the court VACATES the

June 22, 2006, hearing and allows plaintiff until July 7, 2006, to

serve and file an application for approval of the fee contract and

further memorandum in support of the reasonableness of the

settlement. Upon the service and filing of the foregoing, the

matter will stand submitted unless the court otherwise orders.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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