Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01366/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01366-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dino Lomeli
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1366

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Dino Lomeli, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2009

Filed: February 25, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

In 2004, Dino Lomeli, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in Mexico and

extradited to the United States to stand trial for murder in Texas state court and

conspiracy in the Northern District of Iowa. After pleading guilty to the Texas murder

charge, Lomeli pled guilty to conspiracy to launder money and conspiracy to

distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana and 500 grams or more of cocaine. The

district court1

 sentenced Lomeli to 235 months imprisonment, to run consecutively to

his Texas sentence. We affirm.

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-2-

I.

Lomeli was charged with the 1997 murder of Amy McKeever in Texas state

court. Additionally, Lomeli was charged in federal court with conspiring to transport

marijuana and cocaine from Corpus Christi, Texas, to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, from 1994

to 1996. Lomeli used his auto repair shop in Corpus Christi, Texas, to load

automobiles with marijuana, which would then be driven to Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for

distribution. Drug proceeds would then be sent back to Lomeli via Western Union,

couriers, and U.S. Postal Service money orders. 

Before he could be arrested for the murder of McKeever or for the instant

conspiracy charges, Lomeli fled to Mexico. He remained in Mexico until 2004, when

he was arrested and extradited to the United States pursuant to the extradition treaty

between the United States and Mexico. See Extradition Treaty between the United

States of America and the United Mexican States, May 4, 1978, 31 U.S.T. 5059 (“the

U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty” or “the treaty”). 

Lomeli pled guilty to the Texas murder charge and was sentenced to 30 years

imprisonment. While serving this sentence, Lomeli was arrested and transported to

the Northern District of Iowa for trial on the instant conspiracy offenses. In April

2008, Lomeli pled guilty to conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i), and (h), and conspiracy to distribute more

than 100 kilograms of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vii),

and 846. 

Lomeli’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) found him to have a base

offense level of 30, coupled with a four-level increase for role in the offense and a

three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. This left Lomeli with an

adjusted offense level of 31. Lomeli had a Category VI criminal history due to his

Texas murder conviction as well as previous convictions for possession with intent

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-3-

to distribute marijuana, possession of drug proceeds, driving while intoxicated,

criminal mischief, causing bodily injury, and reckless driving. 

Lomeli’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range was 188-235 months

imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Lomeli to 235

months imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently with each other but

consecutively to the undischarged portion of his 30-year Texas murder sentence. In

sentencing Lomeli, the district court rejected the argument that it was violating the

U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty by considering Lomeli’s criminal history in

determining his sentence. The district court also provided an alternative sentence: 

If the computation of the criminal history under the advisory guidelines

is found to violate the Treaty of Extradition with Mexico, the Court

would still impose the very same sentence after considering the statutory

factors at 18 USC 3553(a), and for the same reasons that I have

previously stated: Drug quantity, criminal history, his leadership role, the

fact that this is his second conviction involving drug distribution, and the

fact that I find that he is a dangerous and threatening person. So that’s

my alternate sentence. Both sentences, the one I’m going to impose

today and the alternate sentence, are going to be at the top of the range.

(Sent. Hr’g Tr. 21:24-22:12.)

II.

Lomeli appeals his sentence, arguing (1) that the doctrine of specialty contained

in the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty prohibits the court from taking into account his

prior criminal history when sentencing him for the instant offenses, and (2) that the

court erred in sentencing him to 235 months imprisonment on each count, and in

ordering that these sentences be served consecutively to the undischarged portion of

his 30-year Texas murder sentence. We address these issues in turn.

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 3 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-4-

A. 

We review questions of treaty interpretation and application de novo. See

Smythe v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 312 F.3d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see

also Silverman v. Silverman, 338 F.3d 886, 904 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Heaney,

J., dissenting) (“[T]he interpretation and application of treaty language is reviewed de

novo . . . .”). When interpreting a treaty, “[t]he clear import of treaty language

controls unless ‘application of the words of the treaty according to their obvious

meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its

signatories.’” Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)

(quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)). This circuit has held

that extradited individuals such as Lomeli have standing to raise any objection that the

surrendering country might have raised to their prosecution. See Leighnor v. Turner,

884 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 151

(8th Cir. 1987). 

Article 17 of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty states, in relevant part: 

1.- A person extradited under the present Treaty shall not be detained,

tried or punished in the territory of the requesting Party for an offense

other than that for which extradition has been granted nor be extradited

by that Party to a third State unless:

a) He has left the territory of the requesting Party after his

extradition and has voluntarily returned to it;

b) He has not left the territory of the requesting Party within 60

days after being free to do so; or

c) The requested Party has given its consent to his detention, trial,

punishment or extradition to a third State for an offense other than

that for which the extradition was granted.

U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra, 31 U.S.T. at 5071 (emphasis added). Article

17 is an explicit recitation of a general rule of extradition known as the doctrine of

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 4 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
2

The phrases “doctrine of specialty” and “doctrine of speciality” are used

interchangeably, see Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of Specialty in the Federal

Courts: Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 Va. J. Int’l L. 71, 71 n.1

(1993), although “doctrine of specialty” is much more common. See, e.g.,

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 477 (1987).

Although Article 17 of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty is entitled the “Rule of

Speciality,” for consistency we shall refer to the “doctrine of specialty.”

-5-

specialty.2

 In general, the doctrine of specialty provides that “a defendant may be

tried only for the offense for which he was delivered up by the asylum country.”

Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151. The doctrine dates back to the mid-1800s, but was first

adopted by the Supreme Court in 1886. See Jacques Semmelman, The Doctrine of

Specialty in the Federal Courts: Making Sense of United States v. Rauscher, 34 Va.

J. Int’l L. 71, 75, 80-85 (1993). In United States v. Rauscher, the Court held:

the weight of authority and of sound principle are in favor of the

proposition that a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction

of the court, by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, can

only be tried for one of the offenses described in that treaty, and for the

offense with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition,

until a reasonable time and opportunity have been given him, after his

release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose

asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings.

119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886). The doctrine is now commonly included in many U.S.

extradition treaties. See Semmelman, supra, at 76 (“All extradition treaties entered

into by the United States since Rauscher have contained a specialty clause.”); see also

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 477 (1987)

(stating that the doctrine is included “[u]nder most international agreements, state

laws, and state practice”). It “is based on principles of international comity and is

designed to guarantee the surrendering nation that the extradited individual will not

be subject to indiscriminate prosecution by the receiving government.” Turner, 884

F.2d at 389 (citing Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151, 153); see also United States v.

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 5 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-6-

Lazarevich, 147 F.3d 1061, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The doctrine of specialty embodies

the principle of international comity: to protect its own citizens in prosecutions

abroad, the United States guarantees that it will honor limitations placed on

prosecutions in the United States.” (quotation omitted)). 

Lomeli argues that the district court’s use of his past criminal history in

determining his sentence constitutes a “punish[ment] . . . for an offense other than that

for which extradition has been granted,” U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra, 31

U.S.T. at 5071, and is thus a violation of the doctrine of specialty. Lomeli also cites

portions of his extradition paperwork filed by the Mexican government, which

provide:

Section 10, Subparagraph II of the International Extradition Law

demands the requesting country’s commitments that crimes committed

prior to the extradition, omitted in the complaint as well as crimes not

connected with the one specified in such complaint, shall not be subject

to the process, not even as aggravating circumstances, unless the

Defendant consents freely to be judged for such . . . . This commitment

is set forth in Section 17 of the Extradition Treaty between the United

States of Mexico and the United States of America . . . .

(Appellant’s Br. Add. 31 (emphasis added).) According to Lomeli, “[t]here could be

no clearer example of the use of a prior criminal record as an aggravating

circumstance then computing a sentence on the United States Sentencing Guidelines.”

(Appellant’s Br. 9.) 

However, Lomeli’s arguments run contrary to clearly established law in this

circuit and others. We have previously held that the doctrine of specialty was not

violated when a sentencing court took into account uncharged conduct when

increasing a defendant’s parole guideline. See Turner, 884 F.2d at 388, 390. There,

we rejected the argument “that the rule of specialty . . . was intended to preclude the

receiving government from taking any pre-extradition conduct into account when

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 6 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-7-

making parole decisions.” Id. Instead, we held that “the doctrine is generally

understood to prohibit indiscriminate prosecution of extradited individuals rather than

to prohibit the receiving state’s consideration of pre-extradition offenses while

prosecuting the individual for crimes for which extradition was granted.” Id.

We faced an analogous situation in Thirion, 813 F.2d 146. There, a defendant

was extradited from Monaco to face various criminal charges, not including

conspiracy. Id. at 150 & n.4. The jury was instructed that it could find the defendant

guilty of the substantive offenses based on a theory of coconspirator vicarious

liability. Id. at 151. We upheld the conviction and rejected the defendant’s argument

that the rule of specialty barred the instruction regarding coconspirator vicarious

liability, noting that because the defendant was not charged with conspiracy he “was

tried only for those crimes for which he was extradited.” Id. at 153. We also agreed

with the Second Circuit that:

It is clear . . . that even as the speciality doctrine has been defined and

broadened in this century, it has never been construed to permit foreign

intrusion into the evidentiary or procedural rules of the requisitioning

state, as distinguished from limiting the jurisdiction of domestic courts

to try or punish the fugitive for any crimes committed before the

extradition, except the crimes for which he was extradited.

Id. (quoting United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 944 (2d Cir. 1976)) (additional

quotation omitted); see also United States v. Garcia, 208 F.3d 1258, 1261 (11th Cir.

2000), vacated on other grounds, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001) (“In the same vein, the

doctrine of speciality does not control the evidentiary procedural rules of American

Courts.”).

As Turner and Thirion make clear, the doctrine of specialty does not operate to

bar consideration of all pre-extradition conduct when determining a defendant’s

punishment for the extradited offense. These holdings are in line with those of our

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 7 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-8-

sister circuits that have allowed nonextradited conduct to affect a defendant’s

sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Garrido-Santana, 360 F.3d 565, 578 (6th Cir.

2004) (doctrine of specialty not violated where sentencing court used defendant’s

failure to appear to enhance his sentence under USSG §3C1.1); Garcia, 208 F.3d at

1261 (“[D]efendant was not punished for crimes other than those for which he was

extradited because under our law, the consideration of other conduct in the sentencing

process is legally and conceptually a part of the punishment for the inducted [sic]

crimes and within the limits set for those crimes.”); Lazarevich, 147 F.3d at 1063-65

(doctrine of specialty not violated where the sentencing court used a foreign

conviction as basis for upward departure due to understated criminal history under

USSG §4A1.3(a)); United States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1575-76 (11th Cir. 1995)

(doctrine of specialty not violated where defendant was extradited for conspiracy and

government “extended the conspiratorial period for three years”).

Decisions by the Supreme Court also undermine Lomeli’s argument. The Court

has held that the “use of evidence of related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant’s

sentence for a separate crime within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute

punishment.” Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399 (1995); see also Nichols v.

United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (“Enhancement statutes, whether in the nature

of criminal history provisions such as those contained in the Sentencing Guidelines,

or recidivist statutes that are commonplace in state criminal laws, do not change the

penalty imposed for the earlier conviction.”). Lomeli’s argument—that he was

punished for his prior, unextradited crimes when the district court took them into

account in determining his criminal history—directly conflicts with Witte and is,

therefore, unavailing.

Additionally, we doubt whether Mexico intended that the district court not

consider Lomeli’s criminal history when it extradited him. Lomeli’s standing to assert

his doctrine of specialty argument is based on Mexico’s ability to object to his

prosecution. Turner, 884 F.2d at 389. “In determining whether the [doctrine of

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-9-

specialty] has been abrogated in a given instance, the circuit courts have inquired

whether the surrendering state would regard the prosecution at issue as a breach.”

United States v. Jetter, 722 F.2d 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (quotation

omitted); see also United States v. Najohn, 785 F.2d 1420, 1422 (9th Cir. 1986) (per

curiam) (“[T]he protection [of the doctrine] exists only to the extent that the

surrendering country wishes.”). Given “the long-standing practice of United States

courts of considering relevant, uncharged evidence at sentencing,” Lazarevich, 147

F.3d at 1064, we have some doubt whether Mexico intended the doctrine of specialty

to shield Lomeli in the manner he asserts. Although Lomeli’s extradition resolution

purports to prohibit the United States from using Lomeli’s pre-extradition conduct

“even as aggravating circumstances,” the resolution grounds this “commitment” in

Article 17 of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. As explained above, Article 17

does not prohibit the district court’s consideration of Lomeli’s criminal history when

sentencing him for the extradited offenses, and we fail to see how Lomeli’s extradition

resolution changes that analysis. 

In sum, we reject Lomeli’s argument that the doctrine of specialty prohibited

the district court from correctly calculating Lomeli’s criminal history under the

Guidelines and from using that calculation to determine his advisory Guidelines

sentencing range. To hold otherwise would “permit foreign intrusion into the

evidentiary or procedural rules of the requisitioning state.” Thirion, 813 F.2d at 153

(quoting Flores, 538 F.2d at 944). The plain language of the treaty prohibits the

United States from punishing Lomeli for nonextradited conduct. We hold that the

district court’s consideration of Lomeli’s criminal history did not constitute

punishment for nonextradited conduct, therefore the treaty was not violated. Thus, we

affirm Lomeli’s 235-month sentence. 

B.

Lomeli also appeals the 235-month sentence imposed by the district court.

First, Lomeli argues that the district court abused its discretion by considering his

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-10-

criminal history at sentencing, which Lomeli argues was an improper or irrelevant

factor. Second, Lomeli argues that the district court abused its discretion in ordering

that his 235-month sentence run consecutively to the undischarged portion of his 30-

year Texas murder sentence. 

“On appeal, we will review a sentence for an abuse of discretion, giving due

deference to the district court’s decision.” United States v. Braggs, 511 F.3d 808, 812

(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Rita v. United

States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)). First, we must “ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly

calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to

consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S.

at 51. If the sentence is procedurally sound, we “then consider the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion standard,” and

we “may . . . apply a presumption of reasonableness” to a sentence within the advisory

Guidelines range. Id. A district court’s decision to impose a consecutive sentence is

similarly reviewed for reasonableness. See United States v. Shafer, 438 F.3d 1225,

1227 (8th Cir. 2006).

After reviewing the record, we can discern no procedural error in the court’s

imposition of a 235-month sentence. The district court properly calculated Lomeli’s

offense level and criminal history and correctly determined Lomeli’s advisory

Guidelines sentencing range. The court then considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors in arriving at the sentence it deemed appropriate, and adequately explained its

reasons for sentencing Lomeli at the top of the advisory Guidelines range, citing the

seriousness of Lomeli’s past criminal conduct, the fact that this was his second drugrelated conviction, and the fact that he is a violent and threatening person. As we

explained above, it was not error for the court to consider Lomeli’s criminal history

as this did not violate the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. 

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 10 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
3

The parties agreed that the 1995 edition of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines Manual would apply to Lomeli’s sentencing—unless using the current

version of the Guidelines Manual would result in a reduced sentence—and Lomeli’s

PSR used the 1995 Guidelines Manual to calculate Lomeli’s Guidelines sentencing

range. Thus, we will also use the 1995 Guidelines Manual in determining the

reasonableness of Lomeli’s sentence.

-11-

We next turn to the question of whether the district court committed procedural

error in ordering Lomeli’s sentence to run consecutively to the undischarged portion

of his Texas murder sentence. In his brief, Lomeli makes passing reference to an

abuse of discretion by the district court. We interpret this statement as an argument

that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors and to be cognizant of

the elements listed in section 5G1.3 of the Guidelines. Because this argument was

raised for the first time on appeal, we review for plain error. See, e.g., United States

v. Starfield, 563 F.3d 673, 674 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862,

865 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1390 (2009). “Under plain error review,

the defendant must show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial

rights.” Phelps, 536 F.3d at 865. If a defendant makes that showing, “an appellate

court may exercise its discretion to correct a forfeited error only if it seriously affects

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)).

Consecutive sentences are specifically contemplated by the Sentencing

Guidelines, which provide that, in cases where the defendant is subject to an

undischarged term of imprisonment, “the sentence for the instant offense may be

imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior

undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the instant

offense.” United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §5G1.3(c)

(Nov. 1995)3

; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (authorizing a court to impose concurrent

or consecutive sentences absent exceptions that do not apply here and stating that

“[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run consecutively unless

the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently”). In determining whether to

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 11 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-12-

impose a concurrent or consecutive sentence, the Guidelines direct the sentencing

court to:

consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a)) and be cognizant of:

(a) the type (e.g., determinate, indeterminate/parolable) and length of

the prior undischarged sentence;

(b) the time served on the undischarged sentence and the time likely

to be served before release;

(c) the fact that the prior undischarged sentence may have been

imposed in state court rather than federal court, or at a different

time before the same or different federal court; and 

(d) any other circumstance relevant to the determination of an

appropriate sentence for the instant offense.

USSG §5G1.3, comment. (n.3). 

Here, we are satisfied that the district court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors

was sufficient to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and USSG §5G1.3. Additionally, it

is clear that the district court was cognizant of the details of Lomeli’s Texas murder

sentence, which is all that the Guidelines require. Thus, we find no plain error in the

district court’s decision to order a consecutive sentence and, therefore, no procedural

error in Lomeli’s sentence. Absent any procedural error, we “consider the substantive

reasonableness of [Lomeli’s] sentence . . . under an abuse-of-discretion standard,”

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, and we hold that Lomeli’s sentence, which was within the

advisory Guidelines range, was reasonable. See United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d

716, 717 (8th Cir. 2008) (“A sentence within the Guidelines range is accorded a

presumption of substantive reasonableness on appeal.”).

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 12 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231
-13-

III.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 09-1366 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/25/2010 Entry ID: 3638231