Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03725/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03725-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dale Gaver
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3725

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska. 

Dale Gaver, *

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: March 14, 2006

Filed: June 27, 2006

___________

Before COLLOTON, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Dale Gaver conditionally pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 29

months’ imprisonment. Gaver appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence

and his sentence. We affirm.

On July 29, 2004, a judge in Nebraska issued a warrant to search Gaver’s

residence for controlled substances. Pursuant to the request of investigating officers,

who cited information giving reason to believe that there were rifles and handguns in

the residence, the issuing judge specified that the officers were authorized to enter the

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1

The Honorable F. A. Gossett, United States Magistrate Judge for the District

of Nebraska.

2

The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of Nebraska.

-2-

residence without knocking and announcing their presence. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-

411. Upon executing the warrant, the officers seized methamphetamine and five

firearms.

After he was indicted, Gaver filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized

from his home, arguing that the no-knock entry was inconsistent with the Fourth

Amendment. A magistrate judge1

 recommended denial of the motion, finding that the

officers had reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence would

threaten their safety, inhibit their investigation, or be futile, and that, in any event, the

officers had acted in good-faith reliance on the warrant. The district court2

 disagreed

that a no-knock entry was reasonable, but concluded that the officers reasonably relied

on the warrant, and denied the motion to suppress.

Gaver then entered a conditional plea of guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion

to suppress. Gaver stipulated to applicable sentencing guideline provisions that

resulted in an advisory guideline range of 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. At

sentencing, the court chose a sentence at the low end of the advisory range, and then

subtracted eight months as credit for time already served in state custody in

connection with a prosecution of state offenses arising from the same operative facts

that led to the federal conviction. Gaver’s ultimate sentence, therefore, was 29

months’ imprisonment.

On appeal, Gaver argues that the evidence gained from the search of his home

should have been suppressed. According to Gaver, the search was not reasonable

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under the Fourth Amendment, because the officers entered the residence without

knocking and announcing their presence. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931-

36 (1995). He further disputes the district court’s conclusion that the evidence should

be admitted because the officers acted in a good-faith reliance on a “no-knock” search

warrant issued by a neutral magistrate.

Since the district court’s ruling, the Supreme Court has held that the

exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of the knock-and-announce requirement

of the Fourth Amendment. Hudson v. Michigan, No. 04-1360, 2006 WL 1640577, at

*6 (U.S. June 15, 2006). Gaver’s motion to suppress was premised entirely on his

contention that officers violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to knock and

announce their presence, and Hudson disposes of his claim. We need not consider

whether the officers acted reasonably by entering without knocking and announcing,

because even if there were a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule

would be inapplicable.

Gaver also argues that his sentence was unreasonable. He asserts that the

district court gave the sentencing guidelines controlling weight and did not consider

the other factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). It is evident, however, that the

court did consider Gaver’s request for a “downward departure or a deviation” based

on his post-offense rehabilitation and other circumstances, (S. Tr. at 12), and that the

court understood its authority to vary from the advisory guidelines, but simply

declined to do so. Gaver also contends that the seriousness of his offense and his

personal problems with controlled substances and alcohol compelled a more lenient

sentence. But Gaver stipulated to the advisory guideline range in his plea agreement,

and a properly calculated guideline sentence is presumptively reasonable. United

States v. Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2005). That Gaver has struggled

with substance abuse does not necessarily require a non-guidelines sentence, cf.

United States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006), and the district court

found nothing “extraordinary” about his acceptance of responsibility or his

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participation in substance abuse treatment while on pre-trial release. (S. Tr. at 17-18).

Gaver benefitted, moreover, from the district court’s decision to reduce his sentence

by eight months as a credit for his time already served in state custody, and we

conclude that the sentence of 29 months’ imprisonment was not unreasonable.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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