Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01137/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Respondent
Robert M. Miller
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROBERT M. MILLER,

Petitioner

v.

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1137

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. SF-4324-14-0598-I-3.

______________________ 

Decided: August 11, 2016

______________________ 

ROBERT M. MILLER, Fairfax, VA, pro se.

CORINNE ANNE NIOSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA 

BURKE; KATHRYN R. NORCROSS, MICHELLE OGNIBENE, 

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Arlington, VA.

______________________ 

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2 MILLER v. FDIC

Before PROST, Chief Judge, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit 

Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Robert Miller appeals from a decision of the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (“Board”) denying his request 

for corrective action under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). 

Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. SF-4324-14-0598-I-3 

(M.S.P.B. July 24, 2015). For the reasons below, we 

affirm.1

BACKGROUND

 Dr. Miller is a preference-eligible disabled veteran 

and was employed as a Financial Analyst with the Division of Insurance and Research of the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation (“agency”) at the time of his nonselection for a Financial Economist position with the 

agency. When Dr. Miller expressed interest in applying 

for the Financial Economist position, he was informed 

that the vacancy announcement for the position had 

closed. Dr. Miller informed the agency that his preference-eligible status entitled him to apply to the closed 

position. The agency then forwarded him an application 

packet and requested he return the completed application 

by the end of the next business day. The application 

included a questionnaire regarding the applicant’s qualifications; the vacancy announcement explained that the

applicant’s resume must substantiate responses to the 

questionnaire. 

 

1 Dr. Miller filed a motion seeking to supplement 

the record and seeking sanctions against the agency. 

Miller v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., No. 16-1137, Dkt. No. 43. 

We grant-in-part and deny-in-part. We grant Dr. Miller’s 

request to supplement the record but deny his request for 

sanctions.

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MILLER v. FDIC 3

The agency reviewed applications for the position and 

placed applicants into categories A–C. Within each 

category, preference-eligible veterans would receive 

selection priority. Dr. Lee, a subject matter expert for the 

agency, reviewed Dr. Miller’s application. Per Dr. Lee’s 

assessment, several of Dr. Miller’s questionnaire responses were not substantiated by his resume. As such, 

Dr. Miller’s responses were downgraded, and the agency’s 

scoring algorithm placed Dr. Miller in category B. Only 

applicants in category A were referred to the selecting

official. 

Dr. Miller sought information from the agency regarding the basis for his category B placement. Dissatisfied 

with the agency’s response, Dr. Miller filed a USERRA 

appeal with the Board. 

The administrative judge (“AJ”) found that Dr. Miller 

failed to meet his burden to show, by a preponderance of 

evidence, that the agency discriminated against him on 

the basis of his military service in connection with his 

non-selection. Dr. Miller did not seek review by the full 

Board, and the AJ’s decision became final. 

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision 

of the Board is limited. We must affirm the Board’s 

decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). USERRA 

prohibits employers from discriminating against employees or prospective employees on the basis of their military 

service. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). In relevant part, it provides:

A person who is a member of, applies to be a 

member of, performs, has performed, applies to 

perform, or has an obligation to perform service in 

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4 MILLER v. FDIC

a uniformed service shall not be denied initial 

employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that 

membership, application for membership, performance of service, application for service, or obligation.

Id. 

USERRA discrimination claims are analyzed under a 

burden-shifting framework. Sheehan v. Dep’t of the Navy, 

240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Under this framework, an individual who makes a USERRA discrimination 

claim bears the initial burden to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that his military service was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment 

action. Id. This burden can be met by either direct or 

circumstantial evidence:

Discriminatory motivation under the USERRA 

may be reasonably inferred from a variety of factors, including proximity in time between the employee’s military activity and the adverse 

employment action, inconsistencies between the 

proffered reason and other actions of the employer, an employer’s expressed hostility towards 

members protected by the statute together with 

knowledge of the employee’s military activity, and 

disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses.

Id. at 1014. “In determining whether the employee has 

proven that his protected status was part of the motivation for the agency’s conduct, all record evidence may be 

considered, including the agency’s explanation for the 

actions taken.” Id. If this initial burden is satisfied by 

the appellant, the burden shifts to the employer to show, 

by a preponderance of evidence, that the employer would 

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MILLER v. FDIC 5

have taken the same action for a valid reason. Id. at 

1013.

Dr. Miller challenges the Board’s procedural rulings 

and the merits of its conclusions, and he alleges bias of 

the AJ. Dr. Miller also supplemented the record with 

newly-discovered documents. We address each of these 

issues in turn.

A.

Dr. Miller alleges several procedural errors by the AJ, 

including refusing to allow expert testimony, refusing to 

compel production of applications from veterans who were 

also placed in category B, and admitting into evidence 

applications of non-veterans Dr. Lee deemed ineligible. 

We find that the AJ did not abuse his discretion in making these determinations. 

First, regarding the AJ’s refusal to allow testimony 

from Dr. Miller’s proffered expert, the AJ explained that 

Dr. Miller’s proffered expert did not have sufficient expertise with respect to the qualifications of candidates for the 

position at issue. Dr. Miller does not demonstrate that 

the expert possessed expertise in governmental hiring 

processes or the particular Financial Economist position 

at issue. As such, the AJ did not abuse his discretion by 

precluding testimony from the expert.

With respect to the AJ’s denial of Dr. Miller’s motion 

to compel production of applications from other veterans 

in category B, the AJ found these applications were not 

relevant. Specifically, the AJ determined that because 

Dr. Lee reviewed Dr. Miller’s application, only applications reviewed by Dr. Lee were relevant to Dr. Miller’s 

discrimination claim. As Dr. Lee did not review the 

applications that were the subject of the motion to compel,

the AJ refused to compel their production. Despite 

Dr. Miller’s arguments to the contrary, the AJ did not 

abuse his discretion by finding only applications reviewed 

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6 MILLER v. FDIC

by Dr. Lee relevant to Dr. Miller’s appeal, which was 

based on alleged discrimination by Dr. Lee. 

Dr. Miller also challenges the AJ’s decision allowing 

the agency to admit evidence that Dr. Lee deemed several 

non-veterans ineligible for the position. Dr. Miller asserts 

that this evidence was irrelevant because, unlike him, 

these non-veterans lacked basic qualifications for the 

position, rendering them ineligible. While Dr. Miller’s 

arguments may go to the weight this evidence should be 

given, the AJ’s decision to admit the evidence was not an 

abuse of discretion. 

B.

We next consider Dr. Miller’s argument that he met 

his burden of showing that his non-selection was motivated by discrimination. Although Dr. Miller raises numerous disputes with the merits of the AJ’s findings, we find 

that substantial evidence supports the ultimate conclusion that Dr. Miller failed to meet his burden of proof. 

According to Dr. Miller, the agency discriminated 

against him for exercising his right as a disabled veteran 

to apply late for the Financial Economist position. As 

support, he points to the closeness in time between exercising his right to apply late and Dr. Lee’s discounting of 

some of his questionnaire responses, asserting a connection between those two actions. But the AJ explained 

that there was no evidence that Dr. Lee was aware that 

Dr. Miller had applied late based on his disabled veteran 

status. While Dr. Miller posits reasons why Dr. Lee could 

have known the reason for his late application, he concedes the lack of evidence in the record. Petitioner’s 

Br. 18–19. Dr. Miller also points to the agency’s request 

that he submit his completed application within one 

business day of receiving the application packet, impeding 

his ability to submit a more thorough application. But 

Dr. Miller does not dispute that he had a month’s notice of 

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MILLER v. FDIC 7

the vacancy, asserting only that he initially lacked interest in the position.

Dr. Miller also argues that the AJ erred in weighing 

the evidence. He asserts the AJ weighed the following

evidence too heavily: (1) the fact that the agency ultimately selected a veteran for the position; (2) testimony from

certain individuals involved in the review of his application that they had ties to and positive views of the military; and (3) the fact that Dr. Lee deemed ineligible 

several non-veterans lacking basic qualifications for the 

position. We agree with the AJ that these are all relevant 

considerations in a USERRA appeal, and weigh in favor of 

the AJ’s determination that Dr. Miller’s non-selection was 

not motivated by discrimination prohibited by USERRA.

Dr. Miller next challenges Dr. Lee’s rationale for discrediting some of his responses to the questionnaire while 

crediting those of certain non-veterans. He argues that 

Dr. Lee failed to credit certain experience she found 

unsupported by his resume, yet credited other applicants 

with experience not well supported by their resumes. In 

Dr. Miller’s view, Dr. Lee’s evaluation of his and other 

applications was so inconsistent and illogical that the only 

reasonable conclusion is that Dr. Lee discriminated 

against him because he is a veteran. The AJ considered 

this argument and determined, however, that Dr. Lee 

provided a reasoned basis for her evaluations. Specifically, the AJ concluded that to the extent Dr. Lee treated 

applicants differently, it was due to her own professional 

background and expertise. When applicants had professional and educational experience similar to Dr. Lee’s, she 

was more willing to infer relevant experience from their 

resumes. For example, applicants who completed their 

doctoral studies in the field of Labor Economics, the same 

field studied by Dr. Lee, were at times credited with 

experience not explicitly detailed in their resumes. While 

Dr. Miller clearly disagrees with the accuracy and consistency of Dr. Lee’s assessments, this evidence does not 

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8 MILLER v. FDIC

demonstrate that Dr. Lee discriminated based on 

Dr. Miller’s military service.

Finally, Dr. Miller disputes the AJ’s credibility determinations regarding agency witnesses. But “an evaluation of witness credibility is within the discretion of the 

Board” and in general such credibility determinations 

“are ‘virtually unreviewable’ on appeal.” Kahn v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting

King v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 133 F.3d 1450, 

1453 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). We do not find the AJ’s credibility 

determinations arbitrary or capricious.

C.

Dr. Miller next claims the AJ who presided over his 

appeal exhibited bias against him. Dr. Miller asserts bias 

because the same AJ presided over all six of his appeals to

the Board and ruled against him in each one. The AJ’s 

bias, according to Dr. Miller, is further demonstrated by 

the AJ’s numerous rulings against Dr. Miller on procedural motions. To show bias, an appellant must meet a 

high standard: 

[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of 

facts introduced or events occurring in the course 

of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, 

do not constitute a basis for bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism 

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course 

of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or 

even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, 

ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. 

Beiber v. Dep’t of Army, 287 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 

2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Liteky v. United 

States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)). While we appreciate 

Dr. Miller’s frustration resulting from his lack of success 

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MILLER v. FDIC 9

in appeals to the Board, we detect no reasonable basis for 

finding the AJ’s decisions in this case reflect bias against 

Dr. Miller.

D.

Finally, Dr. Miller has supplemented the record with 

recently acquired documents. While we have considered 

these documents, we find they do not establish any error 

in the Board’s decision. First, an email exchange and 

agency scoring rubric confirm that Dr. Miller would have 

been placed in category A if his questionnaire responses 

had not been downgraded by Dr. Lee. Because the AJ 

assumed as much, the confirmation provided in these 

documents has no impact on the AJ’s analysis and conclusions. Dr. Miller also supplements the record with the 

application files of other veterans that were placed in 

category B. But because there is no evidence these applications were reviewed by Dr. Lee, the basis for their 

placement in category B is not probative of the reasons 

Dr. Lee downgraded Dr. Miller’s application.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Dr. Miller’s remaining arguments 

and find them unconvincing. The AJ did not abuse his 

discretion in his procedural rulings. The AJ’s determination that Dr. Miller did not meet his burden of showing 

discrimination toward his military service or status as a 

disabled veteran was a motivating factor in his nonselection is supported by substantial evidence and is not 

arbitrary or capricious. Because Dr. Miller failed to meet 

his burden, we need not consider whether the agency 

would have taken the same action for a valid reason. The 

decision of the Board is therefore affirmed.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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