Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01012/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rochester City School District
Appellee
Richard Smith
Appellee
Rickey L. Tolbert
Appellant

Document Text:

14-1012 

Tolbert v. Smith 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

____________________________________ 

August Term, 2014 

Argued: January 7, 2015 Decided: June 24, 2015 

Docket No. 14-1012-cv 

____________________________________ 

RICKEY L. TOLBERT, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

—v.— 

RICHARD SMITH AND ROCHESTER CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

___________________________________ 

Before: LYNCH AND CARNEY, Circuit Judges, and KOELTL, District 

Judge.*

1 The plaintiff, Rickey Tolbert, appeals from the judgment of 

2 the United States District Court for the Western District of New 

3 York (Siragusa, J.) dismissing his complaint. The district 

4 court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims 

5 for defamation, discrimination, and hostile work environment, in 

6 violation of federal and state anti-discrimination laws and New 

7 York State common law. 

 

* The Honorable John G. Koeltl, of the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by 

designation. 

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1 We affirm the judgment of the district court in all 

2 respects, except that we vacate the judgment dismissing the 

3 discrimination claims and remand as to those claims for further 

4 proceedings. 

5 ______________ 

6 DAVID ROTHENBERG, Greiger and Rothenberg, LLP, for Plaintiff7 Appellant Rickey Tolbert. 

8 

9 MICHAEL E. DAVIS (Edwin Lopez-Soto, General Counsel, on the 

10 brief), Rochester City School District, Law Department, for 

11 Defendants-Appellees Richard Smith and Rochester City School 

12 District. 

13 

14 ______________ 

15 John G. Koeltl, District Judge: 

16 

17 The plaintiff, Rickey Tolbert, is an African-American 

18 former teacher at John Marshall High School (“John Marshall”) in 

19 the Rochester City School District (the “School District”). He 

20 appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for 

21 the Western District of New York (Siragusa, J.). The district 

22 court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims 

23 of discrimination and hostile work environment under Title VII 

24 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 

25 (“Title VII”); the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), 

26 N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The 

27 district court also dismissed the plaintiff’s defamation claim. 

28 On appeal, Mr. Tolbert contends that he identified 

29 sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of racial 

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1 discrimination, to show a hostile work environment, and to 

2 support a claim for defamation. For the reasons explained 

3 below, we affirm the judgment of the district court except with 

4 respect to the discrimination claims, as to which there are 

5 genuine disputes as to material facts that preclude summary 

6 judgment based on Mr. Tolbert’s prima facie case of 

7 discrimination. 

8 I. 

9 A. 

10 Mr. Tolbert was a culinary arts teacher at John Marshall 

11 from 2006 to 2009. He was a non-tenured, probationary teacher, 

12 who taught three culinary arts classes a day. 

13 Because he was a probationary teacher, Mr. Tolbert’s 

14 classes were observed by John Marshall administrators. The 

15 reviewing administrator would then write a “Formal Teacher 

16 Observation.” The Formal Teacher Observation Form includes a 

17 space for written comments and also a “Summary of Performance” 

18 section that asks the evaluator to check one of five boxes. The 

19 available boxes are “Distinguished,” “Proficient,” “Meets 

20 Professional Standards,” “Below Professional Standards,” and 

21 “Unsatisfactory.” 

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1 At the end of each school year, Mr. Tolbert also received 

an annual evaluation by a John Marshall administrator.1 2 The 

3 Annual Evaluation Form includes eighteen categories. The 

4 evaluator is asked to check one of five boxes for each category—

5 which are the same as those on the Formal Teacher Observation 

6 Form—and provide written comments. The evaluator must also 

7 provide an “Overall Summary Rating,” again by checking one of 

8 five boxes. 

9 During his second year teaching, Mr. Tolbert consistently 

10 received marks of “Proficient” or “Meets Professional Standards” 

11 on his evaluations. Laurel Avery-DeToy, an administrator at 

12 John Marshall, conducted Mr. Tolbert’s Formal Teacher 

13 Observations and his annual evaluation for the 2007–2008 school 

14 year. Mr. Tolbert has no complaints about these reviews. 

15 B. 

16 Before the start of the 2008–2009 school year, defendant 

17 Richard Smith was hired to replace Joseph Munno as the principal 

18 of John Marshall. According to Mr. Tolbert, this is when his 

19 employment situation started to sour. 

20 Mr. Tolbert alleges that he did not receive a budget to 

21 purchase supplies for his classes. The size of his classes also 

22 grew. In the two previous years, he had around sixteen to 

 

1

 The evaluations from the 2006-2007 school year were not 

included in the record. 

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1 eighteen students per class. In the fall of 2008, each of his 

2 classes had at least twenty-eight students—despite a collective 

3 bargaining agreement provision limiting at least one of his 

4 classes to twenty-four students. After Mr. Tolbert complained, 

5 the John Marshall administrators eventually reduced the number 

6 of students in his classes. 

7 Mr. Tolbert also claims that many Individualized Education 

8 Plan students were placed in his classes, and he was not given 

9 the assistance of a paraprofessional. The defendants insist 

10 that due to budget cuts, a number of paraprofessional positions 

11 were eliminated. As a result, the Special Education 

12 Administrator determined that Mr. Tolbert would not be assigned 

13 a paraprofessional for the 2008–2009 school year. The 

14 defendants also note that twenty-three percent of the John 

15 Marshall students had Individualized Education Plans. 

16 Mr. Tolbert also experienced some problems with the 

17 cleanliness and the maintenance of the kitchen in his classroom 

18 (known as the “Jurist Room”). In the fall of 2008, the Monroe 

19 County Department of Health and the New York State Department of 

20 Health identified various health code violations. As a result, 

21 Principal Smith closed the kitchen. The parties dispute the 

22 cause of these violations. Mr. Tolbert insists that the 

23 janitorial staff did not clean the kitchen regularly, and the 

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1 defendants contend that Mr. Tolbert and his students were—in 

2 part—at fault. 

3 But these problems were not new. In December 2007, Mr. 

4 Tolbert complained to school officials that the custodial staff 

5 was not cleaning the kitchen properly. And in March 2008, the 

6 New York State Department of Health identified a number of 

7 health code violations in the kitchen. 

8 C. 

9 Mr. Tolbert also alleges that Principal Smith made racist 

10 remarks. In the fall of 2008, Mr. Tolbert volunteered to cook 

11 for a homecoming breakfast. When discussing what food would be 

12 served, Mr. Tolbert alleges that Principal Smith asked him: “Do 

13 you only know how to cook black, or can you cook American too?” 

14 JA 332. 

15 In October 2008, a student in Mr. Tolbert’s class alleges 

16 that Principal Smith asked her if she was learning anything from 

17 Mr. Tolbert. In January 2009, during a conversation about 

18 reopening the kitchen, Principal Smith asked the same student 

19 “how [she] expected to learn if all [she] was learning to cook 

20 was black food.” JA 450. When asked to define “black food,” 

21 Principal Smith allegedly said “that what he meant was American 

22 food.” Id. And another one of Mr. Tolbert’s students alleges 

23 that in January or February of 2009, Principal Smith told her 

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1 that “black kids can’t learn in a cooking class because all they 

2 want to do is eat.” JA 453. 

3 At some point, Principal Smith and Mr. Tolbert both 

4 inspected Mr. Tolbert’s classroom. Mr. Tolbert claims that he 

5 showed Principal Smith areas in the classroom that had not been 

6 cleaned by the janitorial staff, and Principal Smith remarked 

7 that “the kids we get to this school are not from much better 

8 than this.” JA 335. Because of the demographics of the John 

9 Marshall student body, Mr. Tolbert interpreted this comment as a 

10 reference to the students’ race. And in the beginning of the 

11 2008–2009 school year, Barbara Postell, then a counselor at John 

12 Marshall, asserts that Principal Smith—when referring to John 

13 Marshall students—stated that “my friends, they are not like 

14 us.” JA 457. Ms. Postell interpreted this as a comment about 

15 the students’ race. Principal Smith denies making any of these 

16 statements. 

17 Mr. Tolbert also claims that Principal Smith told him and 

18 his students that the Monroe County Department of Health had 

19 closed the kitchen in Mr. Tolbert’s classroom. That statement, 

20 according to Mr. Tolbert, was incorrect; Principal Smith had 

21 closed the kitchen. 

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1 D. 

2 Mr. Tolbert received three Formal Teacher Evaluations 

3 during the 2008–2009 school year. In November 2008, Ms. Avery4 DeToy observed one of Mr. Tolbert’s classes and submitted a 

5 lengthy and negative evaluation. She rated his performance as 

6 “Unsatisfactory,” the lowest of the five options. 

7 In December 2008, Anthony Bianchi observed one of Mr. 

8 Tolbert’s classes and concluded that Mr. Tolbert had met 

9 professional standards. In March 2009, Mr. Tolbert requested 

10 that someone other than Ms. Avery-DeToy conduct his next 

11 evaluation, and Principal Smith assigned the review to Jason 

12 Muhammad. After observing an April 6, 2009, class, Mr. Muhammad 

13 concluded that Mr. Tolbert had met professional standards. 

14 In March 2009, the “Administrative Team” at John Marshall 

15 sent a memorandum to the teaching staff. The memo discussed 

16 year-end evaluations and identified which administrator would 

17 review each teacher. According to the memo, Mr. Muhammad would 

18 conduct Mr. Tolbert’s annual evaluation. But Principal Smith 

19 later reassigned the evaluation to Ms. Avery-DeToy, the only 

20 administrator who had previously rated Mr. Tolbert’s performance 

21 as “Unsatisfactory.” Mr. Tolbert claims that he received no 

22 notice of the reassignment. 

23 Mr. Tolbert’s annual evaluation was not positive. For 

24 twelve of the eighteen categories, Ms. Avery-DeToy described Mr. 

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1 Tolbert’s teaching as “Below Professional Standards.” For the 

2 remaining six categories, Mr. Tolbert received marks of “Meets 

3 Professional Standards.” The Overall Summary Rating was “Below 

4 Professional Standards.” The comment sections noted that Mr. 

5 Tolbert had shown some growth, but expressed concern about his 

6 teaching strategy, professional development, and lack of 

7 involvement with his students’ parents. In the end, Ms. Avery8 DeToy recommended denying Mr. Tolbert tenure. 

9 Principal Smith agreed, but he recommended that Mr. Tolbert 

10 receive a fourth year of probation. Principal Smith declared 

11 that he made this decision “[b]ased on Tolbert’s observations 

12 throughout 2008–2009, his final evaluation and my own 

13 observations of his performance.” JA 45. Principal Smith and 

14 Ms. Avery-DeToy informed Mr. Tolbert of the decision in April 

15 2009. 

16 Mr. Tolbert refused the fourth-year-probation offer. 

17 Accordingly, a recommendation against granting Mr. Tolbert 

18 tenure was forwarded to the Rochester City School Board. 

19 Although the School Board did not approve the denial of tenure, 

20 Superintendent Jean-Claude Brizard made a “final decision” to 

21 deny tenure. Superintendent Brizard testified that his decision 

22 was based on Principal Smith’s recommendation and the reviews of 

23 Mr. Tolbert from “the last year and part before that.” JA 260. 

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1 By a letter dated August 31, 2009, the School District 

2 informed Mr. Tolbert that he would not receive tenure. The 

3 School District again offered Mr. Tolbert a fourth year of 

4 probation, which he refused. 

5 E. 

6 Mr. Tolbert filed his original complaint in November 2009. 

7 After an amendment, the complaint alleged a claim for racial 

8 discrimination arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and a claim for 

9 defamation against Principal Smith. Against the School 

10 District, the plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to 

11 discrimination and a hostile work environment because of his 

race, in violation of Title VII and the NYSHRL.2 12 

13 The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all 

14 claims, which the district court granted. The district court 

15 dismissed the discrimination claims because it found that Mr. 

16 Tolbert had failed to establish a prima facie case of 

17 discrimination because he had not suffered an adverse employment 

18 action and had failed to raise an inference of discrimination. 

 

2

 The defendants suggest, without elaboration, that the 

plaintiff did not timely exhaust his administrative remedies 

before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission with respect 

to his Title VII claims. The defendants do not explain this 

argument in their brief. The district court noted that an 

argument of non-exhaustion had been raised but never decided it. 

Therefore, we do not reach the issue of non-exhaustion and any 

appropriate argument of non-exhaustion can be addressed on 

remand. 

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1 It dismissed the hostile work environment claims because it 

2 concluded that the alleged hostility was not a result of Mr. 

3 Tolbert’s race and was not sufficiently severe. And the 

4 district court dismissed the defamation claim because the 

5 complaint failed to allege when or to whom the defamatory 

6 statements were made. 

7 Mr. Tolbert timely appealed. 

8 II. 

9 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and the 

10 district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 

11 and 1367. 

12 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Velazco v. 

13 Columbus Citizens Found., 778 F.3d 409, 410 (2d Cir. 2015) (per 

14 curiam), and may affirm on any basis that finds support in the 

15 record. Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 

16 387 n.2 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). Summary judgment is 

17 appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

18 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

20 317, 322 (1986). In determining whether summary judgment is 

21 appropriate, we must resolve all ambiguities and draw all 

22 reasonable inferences against the moving party. See Matsushita 

23 Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 

24 (1986). 

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1 This Court has “repeatedly expressed the need for caution 

2 about granting summary judgment to an employer in a 

3 discrimination case where, as here, the merits turn on a dispute 

4 as to the employer’s intent.” Holcomb v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 

5 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2008). At the same time, we have also made it 

6 clear that “the salutary purposes of summary judgment—avoiding 

7 protracted and harassing trials—apply no less to discrimination 

8 cases than to . . . other areas of litigation.” Weinstock v. 

9 Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal 

10 quotation marks omitted). 

11 III. 

12 Mr. Tolbert alleged a racial discrimination claim against 

13 Principal Smith under § 1981, and a racial discrimination claim 

14 against the School District under Title VII and the NYSHRL. The 

15 Title VII, § 1981, and NYSHRL discrimination claims are governed 

16 at the summary judgment stage by the burden-shifting analysis 

17 first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

18 792, 802–04 (1973). See Brown v. City of Syracuse, 673 F.3d 

19 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2012). Although the § 1981 claim is against 

20 Principal Smith and the Title VII and NYSHRL claims are against 

the School District, the analysis is the same.3 21 The claims 

against both defendants turn on Principal Smith’s conduct.4 22 

 

3

 Section 1981 provides for individual liability. Whidbee v. 

Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc., 223 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 

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1 Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Mr. Tolbert bears 

2 the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 

3 by showing “(1) he belonged to a protected class; (2) he was 

4 qualified for the position he held; (3) he suffered an adverse 

5 employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action 

6 occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of 

7 discriminatory intent.” Brown, 673 F.3d at 150 (internal 

8 quotation marks omitted). “The requirement is neither onerous 

9 nor intended to be rigid, mechanized or ritualistic.” Abdu10 Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 467 (2d Cir. 

11 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

12 There is no disagreement that as an African American, Mr. 

13 Tolbert is a member of a protected class. Nor do the defendants 

14 question Mr. Tolbert’s qualifications. The defendants, however, 

15 argue that Mr. Tolbert did not suffer an adverse employment 

 

2000). Title VII does not. Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 

79 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The NYSHRL provides for 

individual liability under an aiding-and-abetting theory, see 

Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2004), but 

the plaintiff made no such claim against Principal Smith. 

4

 Although Superintendent Brizard made the ultimate tenure 

decision, he relied on Principal Smith’s recommendation. And 

“the impermissible bias of a single individual at any stage of 

the promoting process may taint the ultimate employment decision 

in violation of Title VII. This is true even absent evidence of 

illegitimate bias on the part of the ultimate decision maker, so 

long as the individual shown to have the impermissible bias 

played a meaningful role in the promotion process.” Bickerstaff 

v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal 

citation omitted). 

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1 action and that there is no evidence giving rise to an inference 

2 of discrimination. We disagree. 

3 A. 

4 An employee suffers an “adverse employment action” if he 

5 “endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions 

6 of employment. An adverse employment action is one which is 

7 more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of 

8 job responsibilities.” Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 90 (2d 

9 Cir. 2006) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

10 Denying Mr. Tolbert tenure and extending his probation was an 

11 adverse employment action. 

12 In New York, teachers serve a three-year probationary 

13 period. Then it is usually up or out: the teacher either 

14 receives tenure or is terminated. But, as here, school 

15 districts may extend the probationary term for one year and 

16 postpone the tenure decision. See Borkowski v. Valley Cent. 

17 Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 1995). 

18 This Court has held or assumed that the denial of tenure is 

19 an adverse employment action under Title VII and other 

20 employment statutes. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Greenburgh Cent. 

21 Sch. Dist. No. 7, 691 F.3d 134, 147 (2d Cir. 2012) (Family 

22 Medical Leave Act retaliation); Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 445 

23 F.3d 586, 591–92 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (Title VII and the 

24 Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Back v. Hastings On 

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1 Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113, 123–26 (2d Cir. 

2 2004) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 

3 93 (2d Cir. 1984) (Title VII); see also Okruhlik v. Univ. of 

4 Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 2005) (Title VII and § 1983). 

5 This makes sense. Tenure is a material condition of employment 

6 because it provides long-term job security. See Mt. Healthy 

7 City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1977) 

8 (“The long-term consequences of an award of tenure are of great 

moment both to the employee and to the employer.”).5 9 

10 But the defendants insist that this case is different 

11 because Mr. Tolbert was offered a fourth year of probationary 

12 employment. According to the defendants, Mr. Tolbert’s 

13 employment situation would have been no worse had he accepted 

14 the offer. 

15 The defendants ignore the fact that the offer of a fourth 

16 year of probation was intertwined with the denial of tenure. 

17 Had the plaintiff received tenure, he could have been terminated 

18 only for cause. But had he remained a probationary teacher, he 

19 could have been terminated for any lawful reason. N.Y. Educ. 

 

5

 In the context of university tenure decisions, “a prima 

facie case that a member of a protected class is qualified for 

tenure is made out by a showing that some significant portion of 

the departmental faculty, referrants or other scholars in the 

particular field hold a favorable view on the question.” 

Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93–94. That requirement does not apply to 

a prima facie case for an elementary or high school teacher. 

Donnelly, 691 F.3d at 151. 

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1 Law §§ 2573(1)(a), 2573(5)(a), 3020-a. The denial of tenure 

2 therefore was the denial of a material improvement in the 

3 conditions of the plaintiff’s employment. 

4 Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any 

5 individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, 

6 or privileges of employment,” § 2000e-2(a)(1), the NYSHRL 

7 similarly prohibits employers from “discriminat[ing] against 

8 such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or 

9 privileges of employment,” N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(a), and 

10 § 1981 provides that all “persons . . . shall have the same 

11 right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by 

12 white citizens,” § 1981(a). Refusing to award a contract or a 

13 material employment benefit for a discriminatory reason violates 

14 those statutes. See, e.g., Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93 (“Tenure 

15 decisions are not exempt under Title VII, . . . and plaintiffs 

16 seeking to show that forbidden purposes lurk in a tenure 

17 decision have available methods of challenging such decisions.”) 

18 Indeed, were we to accept the defendants’ interpretation, 

19 then failure to promote claims—or any claims alleging the denial 

20 of an employment benefit—would be non-actionable. And that 

21 cannot be the case. “A benefit that is part and parcel of the 

22 employment relationship may not be doled out in a discriminatory 

23 fashion, even if the employer would be free under the employment 

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1 contract simply not to provide the benefit at all.” Hishon v. 

King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 75 (1984).6 2 

3 Extending an employment relationship by one year by itself 

4 may not qualify as an adverse employment action. But when 

5 coupled with the denial of tenure, it is assuredly an adverse 

6 employment action. During the fourth year of probationary 

7 employment, a teacher can be fired at any time for any lawful 

8 reason. N.Y. Educ. Law § 2573(1)(a). But if granted tenure, 

9 the teacher may be fired only for cause. Id. §§ 2573(5)(a), 

10 3020-a. The denial of tenure after three years, when a teacher 

11 was otherwise eligible for tenure, does not become any less an 

12 adverse action because the teacher is provided with another year 

13 of probationary employment. 

14 Of course, a school district may defer a decision on tenure 

15 and obtain another year’s experience with a teacher, provided 

16 that the decision is not made for an unlawful reason such as 

17 racial discrimination. But the denial of tenure after three 

18 years cannot lawfully be based on a discriminatory reason, even 

19 if the teacher remains employed as a probationary teacher. The 

 

6

 Douglass v. Rochester City School District, 522 F. App’x 5 

(2d Cir. 2013), an unpublished disposition upon which the 

defendants rely, is not to the contrary. In that case, the 

Court held that a fourth-year extension of probation did not 

place the plaintiff “in any worse employment position than she 

would have been in absent the offer.” Id. at 9. However, this 

Court was careful to explain that the plaintiff did not “assert 

a claim for discriminatory denial of tenure.” Id. at 9 n.1. 

Mr. Tolbert asserts that claim here.

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1 plaintiff alleges that is precisely what occurred here, and that 

2 is a sufficient allegation of an adverse action. 

3 B. 

4 The defendants next contend that Mr. Tolbert did not 

5 identify facts giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 

6 Mr. Tolbert identified racially offensive comments 

7 allegedly made by Principal Smith, two of which concerned Mr. 

8 Tolbert’s qualifications as a teacher. According to Mr. 

9 Tolbert, in the fall of 2008, Principal Smith asked him: “Do you 

10 only know how to cook black, or can you cook American too?” One 

11 of Mr. Tolbert’s students declared that in January 2009, 

12 Principal Smith asked her “how [she] expected to learn if all 

13 [she] was learning to cook was black food.” JA 450. Another 

14 student declared that in January or February of 2009, Principal 

15 Smith told her that “black kids can’t learn in a cooking class 

because all they want to do is eat.”7 16 JA 453. 

 

7

 As the district court found, the other evidence cited by 

the plaintiff does not raise an inference of discrimination. 

Reverend Willie Harvey and Barbara Postell declared that Malik 

Evans told them that Principal Smith was racist, but Reverend 

Harvey’s and Ms. Postell’s testimony would be inadmissible 

hearsay if offered at trial. Finnegan v. Bd. of Educ., 30 F.3d 

273, 274 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (explaining that “double 

hearsay” cannot “create a genuine issue to be tried”); see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). Cynthia Elliott’s testimony that she 

“believe[d]” Principal Smith’s decision to deny tenure “was 

based on race” is mere speculation. JA 264; see Bickerstaff v. 

Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that 

courts must “carefully distinguish between evidence that allows 

for a reasonable inference of discrimination and evidence that 

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1 When responding to Mr. Tolbert’s discrimination claims, the 

2 defendants did not discuss any of these remarks in their briefs 

3 to this Court or in their briefs before the district court. The 

4 district court nonetheless found that Principal Smith’s “stray 

5 remarks” were “too attenuated” from the tenure decision and not 

6 probative of Principal Smith’s intent. Tolbert v. Smith, No. 

7 09cv6579, 2014 WL 906158, at *15–16 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014). 

8 “[T]he more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation 

9 to the employer’s adverse action, the less they prove that the 

10 action was motivated by discrimination.” Tomassi v. Insignia 

11 Fin. Grp., Inc., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007), abrogated on 

12 other grounds by Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 

13 177–78 (2009). But there is no bright-line rule for when 

14 remarks become “too attenuated” to be significant to a 

15 determination of discriminatory intent. 

16 In April 2009, Principal Smith and Ms. Avery-DeToy told Mr. 

17 Tolbert that he would not receive tenure, and the two “black 

18 food” remarks concerning Mr. Tolbert were made in the fall of 

 

gives rise to mere speculation and conjecture”). And Allen 

Williams’s testimony that Superintendent Brizard said that there 

was a problem with Principal Smith is inadmissible hearsay and 

does not raise an inference of discrimination. Ms. Postell 

thought that she was also the victim of discrimination and filed 

a complaint with the Employment Equal Opportunity Commission. 

But the complaint was found to be without merit, and the 

district court here fairly concluded that it had “little 

probative value.” Tolbert v. Smith, No. 09cv6579, 2014 WL 

906158, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2014). 

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1 2008 and in January 2009. The remarks all occurred during a 

2 single school year, and one occurred within three months of 

3 Principal Smith’s decision to recommend that Mr. Tolbert be 

4 denied tenure. A third alleged remark in January or February 

5 2009 attributed to Principal Smith also reflected racial bias. 

6 None of the remarks was so attenuated that it should be ignored. 

7 Moreover, the remarks were made by the de facto 

8 decisionmaker, the remarks clearly suggest racial bias, and two 

9 of the comments were about Tolbert’s qualifications as a 

10 teacher. And Principal Smith’s comment to a student that “black 

11 kids can’t learn in a cooking class because all they want to do 

12 is eat,” JA 453, could be viewed as evidence of a discriminatory 

13 intent on Principal Smith’s part in dismantling John Marshall’s 

14 culinary arts program. The fate of that program, for which Mr. 

15 Tolbert was the only teacher at John Marshall, was directly 

16 relevant to the decision whether to grant him tenure. See Henry 

17 v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2010) 

18 (noting factors that district courts consider when determining 

if a remark is probative of discriminatory intent).8 19 But the 

20 district court appeared to find that because the formal 

21 evaluations did not refer to Mr. Tolbert’s race, there was no 

 

8

 The two other allegedly racist remarks by Principal Smith—

that the students “are not from much better than this” and that 

“they are not like us”—are less probative. 

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21

1 “nexus” between the decision to deny tenure and Principal 

2 Smith’s remarks. Tolbert, 2014 WL 906158, at *16. 

3 Employers are unlikely to leave a “smoking gun” admitting a 

4 discriminatory motive. See, e.g., Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. 

5 Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994). And such evidence is not 

6 required to make a prima facie case of discrimination. Luciano 

7 v. Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210, 215 (2d Cir. 1997). The 

8 plaintiff need not show that Principal Smith declared that the 

9 tenure decision was tied to the plaintiff’s race. Statements 

10 showing an employer’s racial bias, which Mr. Tolbert identified, 

11 are sufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. 

12 See id. 

13 Moreover, there is a factual dispute as to whether 

14 Principal Smith followed regular procedures when he evaluated 

15 Mr. Tolbert for tenure. “Departures from procedural regularity, 

16 such as a failure to collect all available evidence, can raise a 

17 question as to the good faith of the process where the departure 

18 may reasonably affect the decision.” Zahorik, 729 F.2d at 93. 

19 The plaintiff submitted evidence that Principal Smith 

20 changed the person who conducted Mr. Tolbert’s year-end 

evaluation without providing notice to Mr. Tolbert,9 21 that 

 

9

 While the defendants assert that Mr. Tolbert’s evaluation 

was reassigned because Mr. Muhammad was having difficulty 

completing his evaluations on time, it is for a jury to decide 

whether that explanation is credible and rebuts any inference of 

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22

1 Principal Smith relied on the 2008–2009 evaluations in 

2 isolation, and that the unsatisfactory performance reviews by 

3 Ms. Avery-DeToy were aberrational. These irregularities, when 

4 combined with Principal Smith’s alleged remarks, are sufficient 

5 to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Back, 

6 365 F.3d at 124–25 (finding sexist remarks and procedural 

7 irregularities sufficient to rebut a nondiscriminatory reason 

8 for denying tenure). 

9 There was no argument in the district court or before us 

10 that summary judgment should be granted at the second or third 

11 stages of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. Therefore, because we 

12 conclude that Mr. Tolbert met his initial burden of establishing 

13 a prima facie case of discrimination, we vacate and remand with 

14 respect to the § 1981, Title VII, and NYSHRL discrimination 

15 claims. 

 

discrimination that could be drawn from the alleged procedural 

irregularity. 

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23

1 IV. 

2 We next consider whether the district court erred by 

3 granting summary judgment dismissing the hostile work 

4 environment and defamation claims. We conclude that it did not. 

5 A. 

6 Mr. Tolbert asserted hostile work environment claims 

against the School District under Title VII and the NYSHRL.10 7 

8 Hostile work environment claims under Title VII and the NYSHRL 

9 are governed by the same standard. Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 

10 F.3d 115, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2013). To establish a prima facie 

11 case of hostile work environment, the plaintiff must show that 

12 the discriminatory harassment was “sufficiently severe or 

13 pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and 

14 create an abusive working environment,” and “that a specific 

15 basis exists for imputing” the objectionable conduct to the 

16 employer. Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d 

17 Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is axiomatic 

18 that the plaintiff also must show that the hostile conduct 

19 occurred because of a protected characteristic. Alfano v. 

20 Costello, 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002). 

 

10 A hostile work environment claim may be brought against an 

individual pursuant to § 1981. Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 

774 F.3d 140, 151 n.6 (2d Cir. 2014). But the complaint asserts 

no such claim. 

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1 Mr. Tolbert failed to identify sufficient material facts 

2 showing that his work environment was objectively hostile and 

3 abusive. “As a general rule, incidents must be more than 

4 ‘episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in 

5 order to be deemed pervasive.’ Isolated acts, unless very 

6 serious, do not meet the threshold of severity or 

7 pervasiveness.” Id. at 374 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 

8 Perry, 115 F.3d at 149). 

9 Mr. Tolbert alleges that Principal Smith made two offensive 

10 statements in his presence. Only one—the remark regarding 

11 “black food”—necessarily concerns race. The other remark—that 

12 the students were “not from much better than this”—is ambiguous. 

13 And whatever the meaning of the remarks, they do not qualify as 

14 “a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments” that altered 

15 the conditions of Mr. Tolbert’s employment. Schwapp v. Town of 

16 Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 

17 omitted). 

18 Nor do the other alleged instances of hostility support a 

19 hostile work environment claim. Mr. Tolbert complains that he 

20 did not receive a budget. But Principal Smith did not give a 

21 lump-sum budget to any teacher; he instead requested that each 

22 teacher submit a request for supplies. 

23 Mr. Tolbert contends that he lost the assistance of a 

24 paraprofessional. But the Special Education Administrator made 

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1 that decision because of budget cuts. And there is no evidence 

2 that the Special Education Administrator’s decision was a 

3 product of racial animus. 

4 More students were placed in Mr. Tolbert’s classes for the 

5 2008–2009 school year than in the previous two years. But after 

6 Mr. Tolbert protested, the class sizes were reduced. And there 

7 is no evidence that Principal Smith—or anyone with a 

8 discriminatory motive—initially assigned an excessive number of 

9 students to Mr. Tolbert’s classes. 

10 Finally, Mr. Tolbert alleges that the janitorial staff did 

11 not properly clean his classroom. But Mr. Tolbert’s problems 

12 with the janitorial staff predated Principal Smith’s arrival, 

13 and there is no evidence that the janitorial staff acted out of 

14 animus or at the direction of Principal Smith. 

15 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the hostile work 

16 environment claims. 

17 B. 

18 Mr. Tolbert next contends that the district court erred in 

19 dismissing the defamation claim against Principal Smith. The 

20 amended complaint identifies four defamatory statements, but Mr. 

21 Tolbert discusses one on appeal. He alleges that Principal 

22 Smith told Mr. Tolbert’s students that the Monroe County 

23 Department of Health had closed the kitchen in Mr. Tolbert’s 

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1 classroom. That statement, according to Mr. Tolbert, was 

2 incorrect; Principal Smith closed the kitchen. 

3 A slanderous statement, by definition, must be false. “But 

4 in defamation law, as in life, determinations of fact and 

5 fiction are not zero-sum. In New York, a statement need not be 

6 completely true, but can be substantially true, as when the 

7 overall ‘gist or substance of the challenged statement’ is 

8 true.” Chau v. Lewis, 771 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 

9 Printers II, Inc. v. Prof’ls Publ’g, Inc., 784 F.2d 141, 146–47 

10 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Kraus v. Brandstetter, 562 N.Y.S.2d 

11 127, 130 (App. Div. 1990). 

12 Principal Smith’s statement was substantially true. In the 

13 fall of 2008, Principal Smith closed the kitchen after the 

14 Monroe County Department of Health had identified a number of 

15 sanitation problems. A Monroe County Department of Health 

16 Inspection Report Observation stated that in order for the 

17 kitchen to reopen, it needed to be reinspected. Although 

18 Principal Smith had “closed” the kitchen, the Monroe County 

19 Department of Health prohibited its reopening without an 

20 inspection. “Prevented reopening” is substantially similar to 

21 “closed.” 

22 Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of Mr. Tolbert’s 

23 defamation claim. 

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1 CONCLUSION

2 We have considered all of the arguments of the parties. To 

3 the extent not specifically addressed above, they are either 

4 moot or without merit. For the reasons explained above, we 

5 AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing all claims, 

6 except that we VACATE the judgment of the district court 

7 dismissing the discrimination claims. The case is REMANDED for 

8 further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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