Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-99005/USCOURTS-ca9-12-99005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terry D. Bemore
Appellant
Kevin Chappell
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TERRY D. BEMORE,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

KEVIN CHAPPELL, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 12-99005

D.C. No.

3:08-cv-00311-

LAB-WVG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 10, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed June 9, 2015

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Ronald M. Gould,

and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

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2 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

SUMMARY*

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas

corpus relief on California state prisoner Terry Bemore’s

claim that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective at the

guilt phase, reversed the district court’s denial of habeas

relief with respect to Bemore’s penalty phase

ineffective-assistance claim, and remanded.

Regarding Bemore’s argument that counsel fraudulently

misappropriated and diverted court-issued funds supplied to

the defense thereby creating a conflict of interest, the panel

held that without a showing that counsel’s misuse of funds

caused him to investigate less thoroughly than he otherwise

would have, Bemore has not established any constitutional

deprivation under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980).

The panel held that counsel provided constitutionally

deficient representation at the guilt phase by presenting a

weak alibi defense after failing to investigate either that

defense or a mental health alternative. The panel concluded,

however, that Bemore did not suffer the requisite prejudice to

the guilt verdict as a result, and that the California Supreme

Court’s rejection of this guilt-phase claim was not an

objectively unreasonable application of Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 674 (1984).

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 3

The panel held that counsel provided constitutionally

deficient representation at the penalty phase in that counsel’s

early decision to pursue a risk-fraught “good guy” mitigation

strategy did not satisfy her duty first to unearth potentially

mitigating mental health evidence. The panel held that in

deferring to counsel’s decision not to pursue a mental health

mitigation case despite counsel’s unreasonable investigation,

the California Supreme Court unreasonably applied

Strickland. The panel concluded that Bemore was so

substantially prejudiced by the constitutionally deficient

deprivation of adequate representation at both stages that it

was unreasonable for the state court to have left the death

penalty in place. The panel wrote that mitigation mental

health evidence, combined with a different guilt phase

strategy, might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal of

Bemore’s moral culpability, and that the state court’s contrary

conclusion constituted an unreasonable application of

Strickland.

With regard to the guilt phase ineffective-assistance

claim, the panel held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Bemore’s motion for an evidentiary

hearing and discovery. With regard to the penalty-phase

ineffective-assistance claim, the panel wrote that its

conclusion that declarations and other evidence already in the

record support Bemore’s claim obviates any need to remand

for discovery.

The panel remanded to the district court with instructions

to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect

to the penalty phase and to return the case to the state court to

reduce Bemore’s sentence to life without parole, unless the

state elects to pursue a new capital sentencing proceeding

within a reasonable amount of time as determined by the

district court.

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4 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

The panel addressed Bemore’s other asserted grounds for

relief in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

COUNSEL

Robert R. Bryan (argued) and Cheryl J. Cotterill (argued),

Law Offices of Robert R. Bryan, San Francisco, California,

for Petitioner-Appellant.

Holly D. Wilkens (argued), Supervising Deputy Attorney

General; Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General; Julie L.

Garland, Senior Assistant AttorneyGeneral; Robin Urbanski,

Deputy Attorney General, San Diego, California, for

Respondent-Appellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Terry Bemore was sentenced to death for the murder of

Kenneth Muck, a employee at Aztec Liquor in San Diego. 

His co-defendant, Keith Cosby, was tried by a separate jury

and sentenced to twenty-five years to life for the same crime. 

Bemore seeks habeas relief on the grounds that his trial

lawyers were constitutionally ineffective for: presenting a

flawed alibi defense; failing to challenge the torture special

circumstance; presenting no evidence of mental impairments

at the guilt phase or penalty phase; and creating a conflict of

interest by diverting state-paid defense funds for personal

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 5

use.1See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 674 (1984). We

hold that counsel provided constitutionally deficient

representation at the guilt phase, but Bemore did not suffer

the requisite prejudice to the guilt verdict as a result. With

regard to the penalty phase, however, Bemore was both

deprived of the representation guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment and so substantially prejudiced by the

constitutionally deficient deprivation of adequate

representation at both stages that it was unreasonable for the

state court to have left the death penalty in place.

We therefore affirm in part, as to the district court’s

denial of the habeas corpus petition challenge to Bemore’s

conviction for murder. We reverse in part, as to the district

court’s denial of the habeas petition with regard to the penalty

phase claim.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Crime

Around 10:00 pm on August 26th, 1985, Kenneth Muck

was ending his shift as a clerk at Aztec Liquor. Before

locking up for the night, Muck was supposed to set a burglar

alarm and transfer cash from the store register to a safe in a

back-room storage area. At some point after 10:15 pm, the

security company that monitored the alarm system called

Aztec’s owner to notify him that the alarm had not yet been

set. The owner sent an employee to check on the store. The

1

In addition to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Bemore

raises several other grounds for habeas relief. We address them in a

memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion.

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6 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

employee walked in, saw blood near the storage room, fled,

and immediately called the police.2

The police found Muck dead on the floor of the storage

room, stabbed thirty-seven times. The safe was gone. 

Smeared blood and striation marks on the floor indicated that

the safe had been tipped onto a mop and pushed or dragged

out the door. Officers noted two sets of bloody footprints,

one of which, an expert determined, was made by men’s size

thirteen tennis shoes.

Two months after the robbery and murder, a local TV

show, Crime Stoppers, ran a segment seeking information

about the Aztec crimes. Patti Hill, girlfriend of Bemore’s

friend Jackie Robertson, contacted Crime Stoppers and

conveyed her suspicion that Bemore and his friend Keith

Cosby were involved. She provided to the police several

money bags and a knife Bemore had left in Hill and

Robertson’s apartment, as well as a mop Bemore had thrown

into a dumpster. The owner of Aztec Liquors identified the

mop and money bags as identical to those stolen from the

store.

Not long afterwards, Cosbywas drivingBemore’s car and

crashed it into someone’s yard. Cosby was taken into

custody, and a detective obtained a warrant to search the car. 

2

Interviews with area residents confirmed that Muck was killed

sometime around 10:00 pm. A neighbor had visited the store between

9:30 and 9:45 pm to return a plunger he had borrowed and had a casual

conversation with Muck. He found nothing amiss. That neighbor also

reported seeing a car outside the store matching the description of

Bemore’s car, a maroon Buick Electra 225 with several visible missing

parts, including hubcaps and the front license plate. Another neighbor

testified that she and her boyfriend looked out their bedroom window

between 9:45 and 10:00 pm and saw two strangers standing outside a

“medium to large-sized sedan-type” car behind the liquor store.

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 7

Found in the trunk during the search were two knives and two

pairs of shoes, size twelve or thirteen. Cosby eventually

admitted he was at Aztec Liquors the night of the robbery, but

told police Bemore had committed the murder while he

waited outside.

Cosby and Bemore were both charged with first degree

murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187), robbery (Cal. Pen. Code §

211), and burglary (Cal. Pen. Code § 459), along with two

special circumstances: murder in the commission of a

robbery and intentional murder involving torture. The trials

were severed; Cosby went to trial first. He was convicted of

both Aztec crimes and also of another murder-robbery, tried

concurrently. With respect to the Aztec murder, the jury did

not unanimously find true the special circumstances of torture

and murder in the commission of a robbery. Cosby was

sentenced to twenty-five years to life for Muck’s murder. 

B. Trial - Guilt Phase

Bemore was then tried separately. The prosecution

centered its case on the testimony of residents of the Bates

Street neighborhood who knew Bemore. Bates Street was

known to be “a marginal neighborhood whose inhabitants

generally knew one another and were involved in the sale and

use of crack cocaine.” People v. Bemore, 22 Cal 4th. 809,

821 (2000). Taken together, the Bates Street residents

testifying at trial placed Bemore on Bates Street the night of

the murder, wearing shoes similar to the size thirteen

sneakers whose footprints were left at the crime scene, and

with fresh scratches on his back.3 Bemore’s friends Troy

3 Bemore alleges that the prosecution withheld or allowed to go

uncorrected evidence pertaining to impeachment of many of these

witnesses in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and

Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). We conclude, however, in the

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Patterson and Jackie Robertson admitted to helping Bemore

and Cosby drill a hole in the stolen safe. Several witnesses

testified that Bemore had made statements to them

implicating himself in Muck’s murder.

In support of the torture special circumstance allegation,

the prosecution’s expert witnesses testified about the

circumstances and details of the murder. The forensic

pathologist who performed the autopsy, for example,

concluded that Muck was likely restrained for some period of

time during the attack. He opined that at least two knives

were used to cause the thirty-seven wounds and that both

knives recovered from Bemore’s trunk were consistent with

at least some of the wounds. A crime scene reconstructionist

concluded using blood spatter patterns that fifteen to thirty

minutes passed from the initial assault to the last blow.4 At

closing argument, the prosecution suggested that the evidence

indicated that Bemore and Cosby had restrained and tortured

Muck for the purpose of “forc[ing] [him] to open up the

safe.”

The defense, led by appointed counsel Robert

McKechnie, presented few witnesses, relying primarily on

Bemore’s own testimony. Bemore’s primary defense was a

novel alibi.

memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion that,

applying AEDPA’s stringent standards, it would not have been

unreasonable for the state court to deny those claims because Bemore was

not prejudiced.

 

4 The defense made little effort to challenge the prosecution’s forensic

experts. We find it unnecessary to reach Bemore’s IAC claim on that

matter. See infra note 18.

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 9

Accordingto Bemore, he was committing another robbery

at the time of the Aztec crimes. Bemore told the jury that at

approximately 9:00 pm on the evening of Muck’s death, he,

Patterson, and Cosby drove to a K-Mart to case it for a

robbery. While he was inside, Patterson and Cosby took off

in his car. Left with no car and no cash, Bemore walked to a

nearby Wherehouse Records store and robbed one of the

clerks. He then got into a cab and went to buy cocaine,

eventually returning to Bates Street to smoke the cocaine and

to buy more.

Some (unspecified) time later, Bemore went on, he saw

Cosby and Patterson drive past in his car with a bloodcovered safe in the backseat. He helped his friends carry the

safe to his garage, assisted them in opening it, and convinced

them to give him a share of the money inside. Despite the

earlier testimony of several Bates Street residents that

Bemore had implicated himself in the murder, Bemore firmly

denied knowing anything about it.

On cross-examination, the alibi broke down. Twice

Bemore referred to Wherehouse Records—the store he

claimed to have robbed—as “Wherehouse Liquor.” He

couldn’t remember which direction he had walked to get from

K-Mart to Wherehouse Records; why he had chosen to rob

Wherehouse Records over all the other stores he had passed

along the way; or whether he had intended to rob the

Wherehouse Records store when he walked into it. He

couldn’t remember whether there had been people in the store

when he pointed the gun at the cashier or whether any of the

employees had said anything to him during or after the

robbery. Nor could he remember several other aspects of the

robbery, including what he said, how he handled the gun, and

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10 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

how much money he took. He seemed to have forgotten

factual details he had given in his direct testimony.

5

Two witnesses to the Wherehouse Records robbery had

identified Bemore as the robber at a preliminary hearing.

6 To

corroborate Bemore’s alibi at trial, counsel called the two as

witnesses. One—the cashier, Yolanda Salvatierra—this time

was not sure whether Bemore was the robber, and said she

had in fact been unsure when she identified Bemore at the

preliminary hearing. Both at trial and at the preliminary

hearing,she described the robber as “muscular” and six-foottwo or six-foot-three. Bemore was six-foot-six, and he was

thin both at the time the crimes occurred and at trial.

Carrie Jacobs, the second Wherehouse Records robbery

witness who had identified Bemore at the preliminary

hearing, was unavailable at trial. Her testimony from the

preliminary hearing was read to the jury. Although she had

identified Bemore out of a lineup after the crime, Jacobs

wasn’t sure at the preliminary hearing that Bemore was the

person she had earlier identified; she “couldn’t . . . definitely

say” that he was. Like Salvatierra, she remembered the

robber as muscular and about six-foot-one, and she thought

he was “possibly . . . darker” than Bemore. She reported that

she had gotten only a fleeting glance at the Wherehouse

5

In his direct testimony, for example, Bemore said that he had

approached a Wherehouse Records clerk and told her he was going to

retrieve his checkbook from his car; he then left the store briefly, returned,

and robbed the clerk at gunpoint. On cross-examination, the prosecutor

asked him, “You said something about a checkbook earlier?” Bemore

responded “I said something about a checkbook?”

 

6

 Bemore was initially charged with fourteen other robberies and three

counts of assault in addition to the Aztec robbery. After a preliminary

hearing, the magistrate held Bemore to answer for only the Aztec crimes

and a few others; the others were later dismissed.

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 11

Records robber, who otherwise had his back to her the entire

time.

On rebuttal, the prosecution called a third eyewitness,

Kim Rainer, an employee who was with Salvatierra when the

store was robbed. Immediately following the robbery,Rainer

described the perpetrator as a muscular black man of about

Bemore’s height. At both the preliminary hearing and at trial

Rainer said her initial descriptions were incorrect—perhaps

due to her distress at the time—and that the robber was

actually shorter than Bemore and had lighter skin. She stated

that she could not positively identifyBemore as the robber of

the Wherehouse Records store.

Also on rebuttal, investigator Richard Cooksey testified,

further calling into question Bemore’s description of the

Wherehouse Records robbery. According to Cooksey, a

parking structure mentioned in Bemore’s testimony did not

exist at the time of the crime, and the distance from K-Mart

to Wherehouse Records was longer than Bemore said it was. 

Crucially, Cooksey also testified that when he had driven

from Wherehouse Records to Aztec Liquors, obeying all

traffic laws, the travel time was just over sixteen

minutes—meaning that even if Bemore had committed the

Wherehouse Records robbery at 9:00 pm, he could easily

have arrived at Aztec before Muck’s murder, which occurred

around 10 pm.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. The

jury also found true the special circumstances of murder

during the commission of a robbery and murder involving the

infliction of torture.

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C. Trial-Penalty Phase

The trial then proceeded to a penalty phase before the

same jury. The prosecution’s penalty phase case centered on

testimony that Bemore had committed two prior,

unadjudicated offenses.

Zelda C., who formerly lived on Bates Street, testified

that one night, after she hosted a group of people in her

apartment to smoke cocaine, Bemore raped her. Zelda did

not tell the police about the rape at the time, but two of her

sisters testified that she called them the morning after the

incident and told them about the rape. (The judge admitted

Zelda’s statements to her sisters, over the defense’s objection,

as excited utterances.) Lloyd Howard, who sold drugs to

Bemore and many other Bates Street residents, and who had

invited Bemore to Zelda’s house the night of the rape,

testified that Zelda also told him about the rape the following

morning.

As to the second prior unadjudicated offense, Kevin

Oliver (“Oliver”) and his wife, Jacqueline Oliver, testified

about an altercation with Bemore in which Bemore pointed

a gun at Oliver and hit him over the head with a wine bottle.

Bemore and Oliver were both taken to the hospital. Oliver

testified that he overheard Bemore, who was being treated

next to him, say aloud that he planned to kill Oliver’s

children.

McKechnie’s co-counsel, Elizabeth Barranco, led the

penalty phase presentation for the defense. In preparation,

Barranco had hired forensic psychologist Dr. Kenneth

Fineman to evaluate Bemore. Barranco had recently read an

article of Dr. Fineman’s describing his theory regarding “sun

children”—minority children from poor homes who, because

of their talents, become immersed in affluent white society,

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 13

but then subsequently act out and, due to the psychological

stress of having to live in two different worlds, begin using

drugs. Barranco hoped that Bemore, an African-American

and former star basketball player recruited to play at several

colleges, might fit this diagnosis. Her mitigation strategywas

to present Bemore as “a good guy with a drug problem.”

Barranco sent Bemore for four days of psychological

testing with Dr. Fineman. When Dr. Fineman’s report came

back, Barranco was surprised and “angry” that the report

made no mention at all of the “sun children” theory. Instead,

Dr. Fineman reported that Bemore suffered from a number of

psychological conditions, including “mild, diffuse organic

brain impairment”; attention-deficit disorder; and poor

impulse control resulting in “a fundamental inability to

control his behavior” when his “needs press upon him.” He

also stated that Bemore “can be quite hostile, explosive and

aggressive[,] . . . [and] seldom takes into account the impact

his actions are likely to have on others.” Based on his

findings, Dr. Fineman named several “diagnostic

considerations,” including “bi-polar affective disorder,”

“intermittent explosive disorder,” and “anti-social personality

disorder.”

Dr. Fineman approached Barranco and recommended

further testing to complete a mental health diagnosis. 

Barranco did not have Dr. Fineman or any other mental

health professional follow up. Instead, convinced that Dr.

Fineman’s report conflicted with her “good guy” defense

strategy, she placed the report “in the back of a file drawer.” 

She did not show it to or discuss it with Bemore, and there is

no evidence in the record before us that she showed it to her

co-counsel.

Rather than further investigating a mental health

mitigation strategy, Barranco went forward with her

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14 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

previously chosen “good guy” mitigation plan. She called

over 40 witnesses to testify to Bemore’s personal history and

good character. Many of the witnesses knew him through

high-school and college basketball and described him as a

good player and kind person. Some did not believe Bemore

used drugs; others said he became addicted to drugs and

alcohol after his mother died. Several witnesses described

him as a deeply religious person and related that he had at one

time attended ministry school. Bemore’s wife testified that

Bemore had expressed remorse for putting his family through

the ordeal of the trial. And a number of inmates, correctional

officials, and other jail personnel described Bemore as

obedient, religious, and a role model for other inmates.

On a different topic, Bemore’s childhood family life,

Bemore’s half-brother Kenneth Daugherty testified that he

and Bemore, along with two other half-brothers, were raised

by a drug-abusing caretaker while their mother was ill with

severe rheumatoid arthritis. The caretaker physically abused

the children by hitting them with a cane and with an

extension cord. One of Bemore’s other brothers testified that

as a child, Bemore, the youngest of the four brothers, was

sometimes recruited to act as lookout while his brothers

committed burglaries. Dr. Bucky, a clinical psychologist,

testified that children like Bemore who grow up with

substance-abuse problems in the home are likely to develop

their own chemical dependancies in the future.

On rebuttal, the prosecution concentrated on Bemore’s

behavior in jail. Several witnesses, painting a different

picture than Barranco had presented, testified that Bemore

used threats and intimidation to obtain drugs, cigarettes, and

other scarce commodities while incarcerated. Some of these

witnesses, and others, maintained that his religiosity was a

pretense, contrived to obtain favorable testimony at trial. A

few said Bemore was physically violent. On surrebuttal, a

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 15

group of inmates testified that the inmates who had testified

against Bemore regarding his behavior in jail did so to

retaliate against him because he did not tolerate their

disciplinary infractions, but, instead, disposed of their drugs

and intervened in their fights.

Inmates and officials also described a “food-tampering”

incident they said Bemore had masterminded. Bemore, they

said, intentionally contaminated one evening’s dinners,

expecting that a large group of inmates would be taken to the

hospital and some might be able to escape. The plan

succeeded in sending many inmates to the hospital. None

escaped.

After considering all the penalty phase evidence, the jury

sentenced Bemore to death.

D. Procedural History

Judge Gill (who had previously presided at Cosby’s trial)

denied Bemore’s motions for a new trial and a modification

of his sentence. The California Supreme Court affirmed the

conviction and sentence. On June 19, 2000, Bemore filed a

habeas petition directly with the California Supreme Court.7

Seven years later, the court summarily denied all claims on

the merits without an evidentiary hearing.

Bemore then filed a timely writ of habeas corpus in the

district court for the Southern District of California. The

court refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on any of

Bemore’s claims and denied relief on all claims. A final

7 Bemore’s current counsel has represented him throughout hisstate and

federal habeas proceedings.

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order and Certificate of Appeal were issued on September 25,

2012.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review a district court’s denial of a petition for writ of

habeas corpus de novo. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943,

964 (9th Cir. 2004). Because Bemore’s petition was filed in

the district court after the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) became effective, we may

grant relief only if the last state court merits decision was

“‘(1) was contraryto, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court . . . ; or (2) resulted in a decision that was

based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” 

Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). For relief to be granted, a

state court merits ruling must be “so lacking in justification

that there was an error . . . beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.

86, 103 (2011).

Here, on direct appeal, the California Supreme Court

issued a reasoned ruling on the narrow claim that counsel was

ineffective for presenting “good inmate” evidence at the

penalty phase. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th 809, 847–853 (2000). On

habeas, the California Supreme Court summarily denied

Bemore’s broader ineffective assistance of counsel (“IAC”)

claims without analysis or citation to authority. In

determiningwhether the California Supreme Court’s decision

to deny habeas relief concerning the “good inmate” evidence

IAC claim was reasonable, we applyAEDPA deference to the

state court’s analysis. See Cannedy v. Adams, 706 F.3d 1148,

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 17

1156–59 (9th Cir. 2013). For claims that the state court did

not expressly address, including penalty-phase IAC claims

not limited to the “good inmate” evidence, we conduct an

independent review of the record to “determine what

arguments or theories . . . could have supported[] the state

court’s decision.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. We then “ask

whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that

those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding

in a . . . decision of th[e] [Supreme] Court.” Id.

B. Conflict of Interest: Misuse of Defense Funds

Bemore argues, first, that lead counsel McKechnie

fraudulentlymisappropriated and diverted court-issued funds

supplied to the defense, thereby creating a conflict of interest. 

See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).8 Relying

on a declaration by Barranco,9 Bemore claims that despite

the $145,851.81 paid to lead investigator Charles Small—a

sum totaling nearly half the defense budget—“little [to] no

work was . . . done” by Small. Assertedly, McKechnie knew

8 Bemore’s briefing categorizes this contention as an IAC claim but

analyzes the issue as a conflict of interest claim governed by Cuyler, not

Strickland. If otherwise made out, a Cuyler claim can succeed without

proving that there is a reasonable probability that the alleged conflict

affected the outcome of the trial, as required under Strickland. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348. Bemore has,

accordingly, not argued that the alleged conflict-of-interest IAC would

satisfy the Strickland standard for prejudice.

9 We refer throughout to Barranco’s declaration dated June 12, 2000. 

Barranco has since submitted three other declarations. Those three

declarations were not before the California Supreme Court, so we may not

consider them here. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398

(2011). We deny Bemore’s motion for a stay and abeyance to present the

late-submitted declarations to state court, as he has not made the requisite

showing of good cause for not having presented them earlier. See

Gonzales v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 980 (9th Cir. 2011).

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of Small’s fraudulent billing but continued to pay him for

work not performed because Small knew that McKechnie had

cheated on his wife during a business trip, and McKechnie

was afraid Small would reveal that information if he refused

to pay him. Bemore also suggests that McKechnie

encouraged defense specialists to bill for more hours than

they actually spent on the case, and that he billed for hours

worked by a law clerk who later insisted that he had “never

spent so much as one minute on the case.” That money,

Bemore alleges, paid for McKechnie’s gambling habit and his

“lavish lifestyle; e.g., his new law office and his expensive

home.”

Troubling as these allegations are, Bemore has not shown

that the asserted financial improprieties support a Cuyler

claim. To make out such a claim, “a defendant who raised no

objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of

interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” 

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.

Here, it is questionable whether the allegedly padded

bills, without more, could demonstrate an actual conflict of

interest. Although Bemore repeatedly refers to McKechnie’s

conduct as fraudulent, a violation of an ethical duty or

standard of professional conduct does not create a conflict of

interest absent a showing that the violation “actual[ly] . . .

impaired [counsel’s] ability to effectively represent” his

client. United States v. Nickerson, 556 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th

Cir. 2009). And while a conflict of interest claim “may in

theory lie where an attorney’s financial interests are in

conflict with his client’s interests,” Williams v. Calderon,

52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added), without

evidence that the available defense funds were run dry,

overcharging the court—even fraudulent overcharging—has

no inherent tendency to dissuade counsel from loyalty to his

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client where it counts: in the investigation and presentation of

the case.

Further, even if we were to conclude that McKechnie’s

use of funds did create an actual conflict of interest, Bemore

has not shown that any such conflict affected McKechnie’s

performance. Bemore acknowledges that there was no “lack

of funding” or “insufficient funds” for his defense. Court

disbursement lists show that eight individuals listed as

experts were employed and received defense funds, and that,

in addition to Small, seven investigative firms were paid

small sums to conduct forensic investigation. The

accusations of fraud may bolster Bemore’s other IAC claims

by negating, for example, any inference that the amount of

time and money spent indicates that McKechnie’s decisions

were carefully considered and researched. But without a

showing that McKechnie’s misuse of funds caused him to

investigate less thoroughly than he otherwise would have, 

Bemore has not established any constitutional deprivation. 

See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348.

C. IAC: Guilt Phase

We turn now to Bemore’s claim that McKechnie offered

ineffective assistance at the guilt phase by (1) presenting an

“unprepared, uncorroborated, and uninvestigated” alibi

defense, and (2) failing to investigate and present evidence of

mental impairment that could have negated Bemore’s

culpability. As we shall develop, the two subissues are

closely related.

To prevail on a Strickland ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, a defendant must establish that counsel’s

performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. Counsel is deficient where

he makes errors so serious as to deny the defendant the

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“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment—where he

fails to offer “reasonably competent” assistance as measured

by “prevailing professional norms.” Id. Reversal is

warranted only if the defendant can show that “there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Id. at 694.

A federal court applying AEDPA on habeas review must

ask whether the state court was unreasonable in its

application of Strickland, a question “different from asking

whether defense counsel’s performance fell below

Strickland’s standard.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 101. “The

question is whether there is any reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id. at

105.

1. Investigation and preparation of the alibi and

alternative defenses

“[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations

or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular

investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. 

The duty to investigate is flexible, and not “limitless.” 

Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)

(quoting United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 584 (9th cir.

1983)). Also, a tactical decision may constitute

constitutionally adequate representation even if, in hindsight,

a different defense might have fared better. See id.; Reynoso

v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1113 (9th Cir. 2006).

McKechnie’s investigation of defenses, we conclude, was

so deficient as to fail these forgiving standards. Whether

performance was deficient is a fact-specific inquiry; “[n]o

particular set of detailed rules for counsel’s conduct can

satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances

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faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions

regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–89. Prevailing professional

norms do, however, provide insight into what it means to

provide reasonably competent assistance. See Bobby v. Van

Hook, 558 U.S. 4,7 (2009).

Bemore was charged in 1985 and tried in 1989. During

that period, “the prevailing professional norms, as outlined by

the ABA Standards, required that a lawyer ‘conduct a prompt

investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all

avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case

. . . .’” Doe v. Ayers, 782 F.3d 425, 434 (9th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Van Hook, 588 U.S. at 7, 11) (internal alterations

omitted).

McKechnie’s investigation and preparation of the alibi

defense did not meet this standard. The extent of

McKechnie’s investigation was, apparently, reviewing police

reports of the Wherehouse Records robbery and crossexamining at the preliminary hearing three eyewitnesses to

that crime.10 McKechnie did not take steps to investigate the

plausibility of the alibi by researching the timeline and

geography to which Bemore planned to testify. He did not

interview the eyewitnesses at all after the preliminary

hearing, even though the trial was three years later. And the

first and only time McKechnie met with Bemore to prepare

the alibi testimony was the night before Bemore was to take

the stand. Yet, Bemore’s alibi was the entire defense. 

10 As indicated earlier, financial records show checks for “investigation”

services made out to several payees, but the record does not indicate, and

the state has not attempted to explain, what, if any, work was done. Any

inference that productive work must have been completed is diminished

by the allegations of fraudulent billing.

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Because he expended such minimal effort, McKechnie did

not learn of several critical flaws in the alibi presented.

First, especially given the alibi’s central importance,

McKechnie’s decision minimally to prepare Bemore, the

primary alibi witness, was professionally unacceptable. See

Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 890 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding that failure to prepare a witness to testify “could

[not] possibly ‘be considered sound trial strategy’” (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)). Bemore was so unprepared that

he could not supply basic facts about the crime, forgot his

own direct testimony on cross, and testified to details easily

disproved by investigator Cooksey’s rebuttal testimony.

11

The discrepancies in Bemore’s testimony were so obvious

that, in his closing argument, the prosecutor presented a chart

comparing Bemore’s testimony on direct and crossexamination, telling the jury, “two people testified for the

defense in this case. They were both named Terry Bemore.”

Second, investigation into the geographical layout of

Wherehouse Records and its surroundings would have

revealed that the account Bemore provided on the stand

rested in part on geographical features that were not there

when the crime was committed.

Third, and critically, a rudimentary investigation also

would have demonstrated that it was possible for the same

perpetrator to have committed both the Wherehouse robbery

at 9:00 pm and the Aztec robbery and murder at 10:00 pm.

Indeed, as McKechnie was aware from the preliminary

hearing, the state initially charged, and the preliminary

11 McKechnie not only failed to prepare Bemore to testify, according to

Barranco, but also rattled Bemore just before he took the stand by leaning

over and whispering, “‘Just don’t act like a nigger’ or words to that

effect.”

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hearing magistrate judge found probable cause for, both

crimes. In other words, the inherently risky “I was

committing a different robbery” alibi was not really an alibi,

as Bemore could have both committed that robbery and

committed the murder. Bemore did testify to his whereabouts

after the Wherehouse robbery, but that account was entirely

uncorroborated, lacking in detail, and self-contradictory.

Finally, McKechnie’s decision not to interview before

trial the key eyewitnesses likewise contributed to the large

gap in defense counsel’s pretrial information regarding the

viability of the alibi. Such interviews could have revealed

that one witness McKechnie planned to present to corroborate

the alibi would recant. In light of Jacobs’s unavailability at

trial, Salvatierra’s changed testimony meant that there was

not a single witness testifying live before the jury who placed

Bemore at Wherehouse Records. And Jacobs’s testimony,

read to the jury by Barranco, was wavering, as she stated that

she did not remember whether Bemore was the person she

identified in a lineup after the Wherehouse Records crime;

Jacobs thought the robber “might have been darker” than

Bemore; and she indicated that, although Bemore’s face

looked like what she remembered of the robber’s, she saw the

robber’s face only “for an instant.”

Counsel’s duty to investigate and to prepare his client’s

defense becomes “especially pressing where . . . the witnesses

and their credibility . . . are crucial.” Reynoso, 462 F.3d at

1113. That is the case with regard to a lawyer’s decision

whether to discourage his client from presenting an

uncorroborated, implausible alibi theory, see Johnson v.

Baldwin, 114 F.3d 835, 840 (9th Cir. 1997), particularly in a

capital case, where a penalty phase will follow. In that

circumstance, it may well be preferable for the defendant not

to take the stand where his alibi is weak, “thereby depriving

the jury of [an] adverse credibility determination” that could

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greatly undermine the jury’s sympathy for him at the penalty

phase. Id.; see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 181 (2004).

The state maintains that these precepts are not pertinent

here, as it was Bemore’s idea to present the alibi.12 But even

if the alibi was suggested by Bemore, counsel cannot neglect

to investigate both the possible alibi and alternative defenses. 

“Although a defendant’s proclamation of innocence . . . may

affect the advice counsel gives,” it “does not relieve counsel

of his normal responsibilities under Strickland.” Burt v.

Tallow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 17 (2013).

We are not suggesting that, had McKechnie made an

informed decision to present an imperfect, but well-prepared

alibi, rather than a weak alternative defense (or no defense),

that would necessarily have been deficient performance. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But, as we develop later, in a

capital case, the choice of guilt phase defense involves

strategic decisions as to both the guilt and penalty phases. 

“[C]ounsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice

when s/he has not yet obtained the facts on which such a

decision could be made.” Reynoso, 462 F.3d at 1113

(quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir.

1994)) (alteration omitted). “This is not a case where counsel

‘could not have predicted just how damaging placing [the

defendant] on the stand would be.’” Hernandez v. Martel,

824 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1091 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Allen

v. Woodford, 395 F.3d 979, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005)) (alterations

in original). With adequate investigation, McKechnie could

have made an appropriate strategic choice and then

competently advised Bemore as to whether to take the stand,

12 Bemore, by contrast, contends that McKechnie contrived that plan. 

We need not address that disagreement. As we explain, regardless of

whose idea the alibi was, McKechnie was obliged to investigate it.

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given the available alternatives. McKechnie, however, failed

to conduct a reasonable investigation, nor did he make a

reasonable decision rendering investigation unnecessary. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Instead, McKechnie essentially

abdicated his role as a lawyer in developing the principal

defense. His failure adequately to investigate before putting

on an alibi that was not really an alibi was constitutionally

inadequate even under our “doubly deferential” review. 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 104.

Moreover, and notably, a potentially “viable alternative

defense”—a mental health defense—was quite possibly

available, yet McKechnie did not investigate that defense,

either. Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 976 (9th Cir.

2001). The “deference owed [to] strategic judgments” to

pursue one trial strategy and not an alternative is “defined . . .

in terms of the adequacy of the investigations supporting

those judgments.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521

(2003). Medical expert reports and statements by Bemore’s

family and friends, all known or readily available to

McKechnie at the time, evinced a possibility that Bemore was

so mentally impaired as to be unable to form the requisite

intent to commit the crimes. Dr. Fineman, hired by cocounsel Barranco to conduct an investigation for the penalty

phase, issued an eighteen-page report a year before the trial

began indicating that Bemore suffered from, among other

mental defects, organic brain impairment and a “fundamental

inability to control his behavior.” There was a possibility that

Bemore had some form of mental illness, including bipolar

disorder.13 According to Dr. Fred Rosenthal, a psychiatrist

13 There is no indication in the record before us that McKechnie was

aware of the report. McKechnie led the guilt phase of the trial, and

Barranco the penalty phase, with minimal overlap in their duties. 

Barranco stated that she placed the report “in the back of a file drawer”

upon reading it.

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hired by habeas counsel, bipolar disorder causes manic

phases in which the individual “will become . . . impulsive,

have lapses in judgment, and can even become psychotic.” 

Intermittent explosive disorder, another of the possibilities

Dr. Fineman mentioned, causes episodes that “often resemble

epileptic seizures” in which “the individual [may] engage in

sudden violence and then have no memory of his actions

when the episode ends.”

Dr. Fineman’s declaration states that he “informed trial

counsel of the test results and advised that a guilt-phase

defense of diminished capacity was possible in this case, but

recommended that further development was necessary.”14 No

follow-up was ever conducted.

McKechnie’s unawareness ofthe report—ifhewasso unaware—does

not absolve him of his investigative duties or undermine the IAC claim

with regard to the defense team as a whole. In Wiggins, the Court held

that an investigation into a defendant’s background was deficient where

counsel failed to uncover details about the defendant’s social history that

were easily obtainable in “state social services, medical, and school

records.” 539 U.S. at 516. Here, with minimal coordination between

counsel, McKechnie should have been aware that Dr. Fineman had been

engaged and that a report was in existence, and he should have read the

report.

 

14 California’s diminished capacity defense had been abolished several

years before Muck’s murder. See Cal Penal Code § 25 (1982). Dr.

Fineman’s suggestion of a diminished capacity defense was therefore in

error. But, although a criminal defendant on trial in California in 1989

could not use evidence of his mental health issues to demonstrate that he

“could not” entertain the requisite mental state to commit the crime, and

could not present evidence of insanity at the guilt phase, he nevertheless

could introduce mental health evidence not rising to the level of insanity

to demonstrate that “he did or did not” in fact possess the requisite mens

rea. People v. Elmore, 59 Cal. 4th 121, 142–44 (2014) (quoting People

v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 350 (1949), superseded by statute as stated in

People v. Saille, 54 Cal. 3d 1103 (1991)); see also Saille, 54 Cal. 3d at

1116–17.

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McKechnie was also on notice that a number of Bemore’s

family, friends, and acquaintances had described Bemore as

having an erratic and “crazy” temperament. Transcripts of

pre-trial interviews with several government witnesses

reported that Cosby had described Bemore’s behavior during

and after the killing as “crazy,” “frenz[ied]” and “berserk.” 

Another witness warned that Bemore was generally a calm,

quiet person, but that he occasionally went into violent fits,

“like a raging bull.”

Finally, there were strong indications that Bemore’s daily

functioning may have been impaired. Bemore’s brother

testified at the penalty phase that Bemore was beaten with an

extension cord and a cane in his childhood. McKechnie may

also have been aware that Bemore suffered from periodic

seizure-like episodes.15 Moreover, Bemore “freelyadmitt[ed]

to at least a 10 year history of drug usage including PCP,

heroin, marijuana and cocaine.” Dr. Isabel Wright, a social

anthropologist hired for the penalty phase, explained in a

letter to the judge that Bemore’s cocaine addiction left him

“no longer able to control his behavior.” Taken together,

these facts—or their availability on a proper investigation—

would have alerted McKechnie to the possibility of serious

mental-state issues that, properly investigated, might have

given rise to an alternative to the alibi defense.

15 Bemore alleged in his state habeas petition that Cosby knew, and was

willing to testify, that the drugs Bemore consumed made him “crazy,” and

that Bemore “[s]ome times [sic] for no apparent reason . . . would start

drooling like he had cerebral palsy.” Cosby’s declaration so stating,

submitted in federal habeas proceedings, was not presented to the state

court. However, Dr. Fineman’s declaration, which was before the state

court, quotes from an “affidavit[]” of Cosby’s including the same

language about “cerebral palsy” as quoted in Bemore’s state habeas

petition and as appears in Cosby’s the later-submitted declaration. The

record is not clear whether Cosby made these statements before the trial,

and, if so, whether McKechnie was aware of them.

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The state contends that, once McKechnie settled on the

alibi defense, he had no duty to pursue a “directly

conflicting” mental health defense. See Bean v. Calderon,

163 F.3d 1073, 1082 (1998); Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264,

1266–68 (9th Cir. 1997). That contention puts the cart before

the horse. Even if presenting mental health evidence would

have conflicted with or diluted an alibi defense in this

instance, that fact does not absolve counsel of a duty to

investigate a mental health—or alibi—defense. That way, he

could decide in an informed manner which defense was

preferable, an especially critical decision where the

weaknesses of an alibi should have been known.

The cases the state relies on do not undermine our

determination. In Turk, for example, counsel adequately

investigated the self-defense strategy he ultimately chose,

discovered significant evidence supporting that theory, and

then made an informed decision not to pursue an insanity

defense that would have conflicted with the requirement that

a person who acts in self-defense act “as a reasonable

person.” 116 F.3d at 1266. In Bean, counsel’s decision to

reject a diminished capacity defense in favor of a properly

investigated alibi defense was reasonable in large part

because the defendant “refus[ed] to adopt the diminished

capacity defense.” 163 F.3d at 1082. See also Phillips,

267 F.3d at 979–80 (explaining that Turk and Bean were not

determinative of the IAC issue that case). These cases do not

disturb the principle that counsel may not “settle[] early on an

alibi defense,” without investigating potential mental health

defenses: “strategic decisions . . . [must] be reasonable and

informed.” Jennings, 290 F.3d at 1014 (citing Strickland,

466 U.S. at 691).

Nor are we convinced by the state’s arguments that

counsel was absolved from his duty to investigate Bemore’s

mental health because other evidence was inconsistent with

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a guilt phase mental health defense. The state notes, first,

that Dr. Fineman’s report mentioned possible unfavorable

diagnoses, including anti-social personality disorder, in

addition to bipolar disorder and other impairments. Relying

on Hendricks v. Calderon, which held that “even where there

is a strong basis for a mental defense, an attorney may forego

that defense where the attorney’s experts would be subject to

cross-examination based on equally persuasive psychiatric

opinions that reach a different conclusion,” 70 F.3d at 1038,

the state argues that where counsel has obtained an

unfavorable expert report, he has no duty to “shop” for

differing opinions. See Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d

926, 947 (9th Cir. 2001).

The state also emphasizes that evidence was adduced at

trial suggesting that Muck’s murder was premeditated,

deliberate and intentional, and maintains that defense counsel

therefore reasonably declined to investigate a mental health

defense. For example, forensic experts testified that he

suffered a number of non-lethal stab wounds—a result, the

state argued, of Bemore’s “unsuccessful effort to torture him

into opening the safe.” And a number of witnesses testified

that Bemore told them he would not have stabbed the clerk so

many times had he opened the safe rather than fighting back. 

Because such evidence was inconsistent with a defense that

Bemore did not possess the requisite mens rea for the crime,

the state argues, abandoning any investigation of a mental

health defense for the guilt phase was reasonable.

The state’s arguments are misguided. First, Dr. Fineman

indicated that “further development was necessary” before

firm conclusions could be reached. McKechnie could not

have determined whether the potentially favorable expert

testimony would be undermined by the partially adverse

preliminary findings without the benefit of an actual

diagnosis. The principle that counsel need not doggedly seek

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out a favorable expert report in the face of a conclusively

unfavorable one does not negate counsel’s duty to follow up

on a concededly preliminary report that both contained some

potentially promising information and recommended further

inquiry.

Further, that there was likely to be evidence introduced at

trial consistent with premeditation, deliberation, and intent,

while critical to the prejudice inquiry—as we later

explain—did not absolve McKechnie of the duty to conduct

an adequate mental health investigation. Notably, the alibi

defense necessarily depended on convincing the jury to

discredit witness reports of Bemore’s incriminating

statements. So a mental health defense would have been no

worse in that regard than an alibi defense. And a follow-up

mental health evaluation might have resulted in a diagnosis

consistent with what happened during the murder.16 Without

uncovering the weaknesses of the alibi defense or

investigating the contours of a potential mental health

defense, McKechnie was not in a position to determine which

defense was the more promising strategy.

Finally, many of the potential diagnoses the state cites as

inconsistent with a mental health guilt phase defense would

likely have been of benefit at the penalty phase. Porter v.

McCollum, for example, held that an neuropsychologist’s

16 That Muck was stabbed repeatedly and over an extended period does

not, as the prosecution argued, mean that the crime must have been carried

out in a planned, deliberate manner. Moreover, had McKechnie made an

informed decision and then pursued a mental defense, the forensic

evidence that the stabbing occurred in this manner could have been

disputed. Although we find it unnecessary to reach Bemore’s IAC claim

regarding the failure to challenge the torture special circumstance, see

infra note 19, we note that McKechnie made no effort to dispute the

forensic evidence regarding the manner of the stabbing.

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report that the petitioner “suffered from brain damage that

could manifest in impulsive, violent behavior” established

mitigating evidence that the petitioner was “impaired in his

ability to conform his conduct to the law and suffered from an

extreme mental or emotional disturbance.” 558 U.S. 30, 36

(2009).

Had he conducted an appropriate investigation,

McKechnie might have determined that a mental health

defense, even if a longshot at the guilt phase, was the superior

choice in view of the impending penalty phase. In capital

cases, “counsel must consider in conjunction both the guilt

and penalty phases in determining how best to proceed.” 

Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192. Where the evidence of guilt is

substantial, “avoiding execution may be the best and only

realistic result possible.” Id. at 191 (quotation marks and

alterations omitted) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the

Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death

PenaltyCases § 10.9.1, Commentary(rev.ed. 2003), reprinted

in 31 Hofstra L.Rev. 913, 1040 (2003)). In such

circumstances, counsel “may reasonably decide to focus on

the trial’s penalty phase, . . . [and] must strive at the guilt

phase to avoid a counterproductive course.” Id.

Presenting a weak alibi defense at the guilt phase, and

thereby risking losing credibility in advocating for a client’s

life at the penalty phase, is often a questionable strategy, as

the Supreme Court has acknowledged. See id. at 192; United

States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 n.19 (1984).17 As noted

17 Empirical data shows that “complete innocence” guilt phase defenses

are often risky, sometimes contributing to the imposition of the death

penalty, and also that, even if a defendant does not express remorse for his

crime, jurors react favorably to strategies that reflect an acknowledgment

of responsibility. Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The

Intersection of Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the DeathPenalty, 83Cornell

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in Yarborough v. Gentry, if defense lawyers “make certain

concessions showing that [they] are earnestly in search of the

truth, then [their] comments on matters that are in dispute will

be received without the usual apprehension surrounding the

remarks of an advocate.” 540 U.S.1, 9–10, (quoting Jacob A.

Stein, Closing Argument § 204, at 10 (1992)). Given the

hazards of a weak innocence defense, counsel’s failure even

to investigate Bemore’s potential mental health issues is a

strong indication of deficient performance.

Any single omission in McKechnie’s investigation and

preparation may not, on its own, have rendered his

performance “below an objective standard of

reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. But taken

together, and in light of the consideration that Bemore’s

defense was entirely dependent on the weak, uninvestigated

alibi, we conclude that “there is [no]reasonable argument that

counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard,” Richter,

562 U.S. at 105, by presenting that defense after failing to

investigate either it or a mental health alternative.

2. Prejudice at the guilt phase

We nevertheless affirm the district court’s denial of

Bemore’s guilt-phase IAC claim. Reasonable jurists, we

conclude, could disagree whether, as the trial actually went,

Bemore has illustrated “a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see

Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

In a case in which counsel’s error was a failure adequately

to investigate, demonstrating Strickland prejudice requires

L. Rev. 1557, 1589 (1998) (cited in Nixon, 543 U.S. at 192).

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showing both a reasonable probability that counsel would

have made a different decision had he investigated, and a

reasonable probability that the different decision would have

altered the outcome. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. On

the record before us, fairminded jurists could conclude either

that (1) had McKechnie conducted an adequate investigation

into the alibi and available alternative defenses, he would

likely have presented the alibi defense anyway, or that (2)

although a reasonably competent attorneywould have chosen

to pursue a mental health defense instead of the alibi, the

mental health defense was not reasonably likely to succeed.

To prevail on a mental health defense, Bemore would

have had to prove either that “because of his mental illness or

voluntary intoxication, he did not in fact form the intent

unlawfully to kill,” Saille, 54 Cal. 3d. at 1117 (emphasis

omitted), or that he was not guilty by reason of insanity—i.e.,

that he “was incapable of knowing or understanding the

nature and quality of his or her act and of distinguishing right

from wrong at the commission of the offense,” Cal. Pen.

Code § 25. See Elmore, 59 Cal. 4th at 142–44. Bemore did

present some evidence to the state habeas court tending to

show that these standards might have been met. But given

the evidence suggesting Muck’s murder was deliberate and

premeditated, the record does not provide sufficient evidence

to demonstrate that any reasonable jurist would have

concluded that a guilt-phase mental health defense was

reasonably likely to have been successful in avoiding a guilty

verdict.

Perhaps most notably, no expert testimony was presented

on habeas indicating that, had follow-up mental health

investigation occurred, counsel could have presented

evidence sufficient to establish a mental health defense to

first-degree murder. Dr. Fineman did not conduct a followup evaluation of Bemore for the habeas petition, despite his

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34 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

insistence that a follow-up evaluation was necessary to make

any firm diagnosis of Bemore’s mental state. And he did not

attest on habeas that Bemore’s mental state at the time of the

offense was consistent with any guilt phase defense to the

crime. Rather, Dr. Fineman averred only that the facts “gave

rise to the guilt-phase defense of whether he was able to form

the requisite intent,” and that “it is questionable as to whether

he was capable of knowing or understanding the nature and

quality of his act and of distinguishing right from wrong.”

(Emphases added).

Dr. Rosenthal’s state habeas declaration is more definite. 

Dr. Rosenthal met with Bemore after trial, and, having

reviewed Dr. Fineman’s preliminary report and other

materials, declared that Bemore “was not able at the time of

the homicide to form the requisite specific intent,

premeditate, deliberate, or harbor malice . . . because of his

extreme mental disorders and intoxication.” But any

testimony negating Bemore’s sanity or intent to kill or to

premeditate at the time of the crime would have been

countered by the substantial evidence that the crime involved

deliberate, premeditated decisions. Witnesses testified that

Bemore told them he stabbed Muck because he did not open

the safe upon demand.

Thus, even had the defense presented a mental health

defense, the jury could well have concluded from the

evidence that the killing was done in a calculated manner by

a perpetrator able to understand and intend the consequences

of his actions. Bemore may well have garnered more

sympathy with the jury had he presented a mental health

defense—or no defense—in lieu of an incongruous alibi

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 35

defense.

18 But the prejudice resulting from Bemore’s

appearance on the stand is not a basis on which we may grant

relief at the guilt phase (although, we later conclude, it is

quite pertinent to our penalty phase analysis). See Cargle v.

Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1208 (10th Cir. 2003); Sanders v.

Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003).

In sum, Bemore has not shown a reasonable likelihood

that the result at the guilt phase would have been different but

for counsel’s errors. The California Supreme Court’s

rejection of this claim was therefore not an objectively

unreasonable application of Strickland.

19

18 Even a better investigated and prepared alibi would not have likely

have been successful. Numerous state witnesses testified to conversations

with Bemore in which he had admitted involvement in the Aztec murder

and robbery. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 820–25. Bemore did not contest that

his car was at the scene of the crime and that he was involved in opening

and disposing of the stolen safe. And knives linked to Bemore were

consistent with those used to kill Muck. Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 819–20.

 

19 We need not address Bemore’s additional argument that McKechnie

rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance at the special

circumstances phase by neglecting to challenge the prosecution’s theory

that Muck was tortured. Even if McKechnie had persuaded the jury not

to vote for the torture special circumstance, Bemore would still have been

death-eligible based on the robbery special circumstance. True, any

ineffectiveness at the special circumstances phase may have prejudiced

Bemore at the penalty phase—facts established regarding the length of

time and degree of pain Muck suffered may have made it more likely that

the jury would vote for the death penalty rather than life in prison. But

because we ultimately reverse as to the penalty phase, based both on

counsel’s ineffective representation in investigating mitigating

circumstances and also on prejudicial spillover from the guilt phase IAC,

it does not matter to our ultimate judgment whether Bemore was

additionally prejudiced by counsel’s performance at the special

circumstances phase. See United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008, 1029

n.29 (9th Cir. 2014).

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D. IAC - Penalty Phase

The representation Bemore received at the penalty phase

by counsel Barranco, like the representation by McKechnie

at the guilt phase, was “outside the wide range of

professionallycompetent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

690. Further, assuming, as we must, that the California

Supreme Court concluded otherwise, its conclusion was an

“objectively unreasonable” application of the Supreme

Court’s holding in Strickland. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520–21

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 409). Finally, as to the penalty

phase, we are persuaded that “counsel’s errors were so

serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and that “there

is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree.” Richter,

562 U.S. at 786. We therefore reverse the denial of habeas

relief with regard to imposition of the death penalty.

1. Investigation of mitigating evidence

At the penalty phase, counsel’s duty to follow up on

indicia of mental impairment is quite different from—and

much broader and less contingent than—the more confined

guilt-phase responsibility. See Doe, 782 F.3d at 435;

Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 2006). At

the guilt phase, a defendant’s mental state is directly relevant

for limited purposes—principally, as we have discussed, legal

insanity or actual failure to form the requisite intent at the

time of the offense. See supra note 14. By contrast,

“[b]ecause a sentencing jury is given ‘broad latitude to

consider amorphous human factors, in effect, to weigh the

worth of one’s life against his culpability,’ the presentation of

relevant mitigation evidence is of vital importance to the

jury’s penalty determination.” Frierson, 463 F.3d at 993

(quoting Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1044).

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Consequently, “‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant

mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the

capital sentencing phase.’” Wharton v. Chappell, 765 F.3d

953, 970 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d

1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1999)). “To that end, trial counsel must

inquire into a defendant’s social background, family abuse,

mental impairment, physical health history, and substance

abuse history; obtain and examine mental and physical health

records, school records, and criminal records; consult with

appropriate medical experts; and pursue relevant leads.” Id.

(quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir.

2009)). Where counsel is aware of potentially mitigating

evidence, he or she must investigate that evidence, absent a

reasonable strategic reason not to do so. Hendricks, 70 F.3d

at 1039.

Barranco’s penalty-phase investigation failed to meet

these standards. Like McKechnie, Barranco was on notice,

through preliminary hearing testimony, transcripts of the

state’s interviews with Bates Street residents, and her own

conversations with Bemore’s friends and family, that Bemore

had periodic manic-like episodes; was a heavy drug user; and

was severely beaten as a child in a manner and to a degree

that brain damage could have resulted. Barranco was also

aware, through Dr. Fineman’s preliminary diagnoses, that

Bemore may have been bipolar or suffered other mental

disorders. And, notably, while many of Dr. Fineman’s

diagnoses were preliminary, he conclusively found that

Bemore suffered “mild, diffuse organic impairment,” and

exhibited impaired reasoning skills, judgment, and ability “to

control his impulsivity.”

Despite these indications, Barranco purposely truncated

the inquiry into Bemore’s mental health. She hired Dr.

Fineman specifically for the purpose of developing the “sun

child” theory that would have explained Bemore’s drug use

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as the product of cultural pressures, not to develop evidence

of mental impairment. When Dr. Fineman reported that

Bemore did suffer a number of mental impairments and

possible disorders, and recommended further inquiry, she

terminated his involvement and put his report in the back of

a drawer. And Dr. Bucky, who testified only about the

impact on Bemore of growing up in a family with chemical

dependency, was “neither asked . . . to conduct any

psychological testing of Mr. Bemore nor requested . . . [to]

give an opinion as to his mental state at the time of the

homicide.” The net result was that there was, except for Dr.

Fineman’s fairly vague “organic impairment” assessment,

and despite Dr. Fineman’s indications of possible, serious

mental health issues, no definitive conclusion concerning

either Bemore’s mental state at the time of the crime or his

overall mental health diagnosis.

None of the state’s arguments in defense of Barranco’s

ill-considered decision to brush aside any mental health

mitigation inquiry are convincing. The state points to the

“over forty witnesses” who did testify for the defense at the

penalty phase. Many of these witnesses knew Bemore only

slightly, as one-time basketball teammates or co-workers. 

One witness was an orthopedic surgeon who testified about

a foot injury Bemore had suffered. The vast majority spoke

only about their perception that Bemore had good character. 

But “the ABA Standards prevailing at the time called for

[Bemore]’s counsel to cover several broad categories of

mitigating evidence,” not just one. Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 11. 

And a good character defense was unlikely to be persuasive

to a jury that had just decided that Bemore had carried out a

grizzlymurder, including torturing the victim, and had lied on

the stand to boot.

Some of the defense penalty phase witnesses did mention

Bemore’s drug problems and tumultuous upbringing. Even

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so, it is not enough just to present “extensive mitigating

evidence” where particularlypersuasive evidence—especially

evidence in the form of expert testimony—was omitted. 

Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227.

Caro held, for instance, that a petitioner was entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on an IAC claim because his lawyer had

not engaged toxicologists or neurologists to evaluate the

impact of the petitioner’s extensive chemical exposure, nor

provided “those experts who did examine [him] with the

information necessary to make an accurate evaluation.” Id.

at 1227; see also id. at 1226–27. We so held even though the

jury was presented with evidence that the petitioner was

beaten as a child and exposed to chemicals. Id. at 1230

(Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). As Caro made clear, it is not

enough that some of the defense witnesses informed the jury

of the facts that might underlie a mental health mitigation

defense; “expert testimony to explain the ramifications of

those experiences on [petitioner’s] behavior . . . is necessary.”

Id. at 1227 (maj. op.).

The state also maintains that it would have been apparent

from the outset that a mental health defense would have

conflicted with Barranco’s strategy of presenting Bemore as

“a good guy with a drug problem, garnering whatever benefit

[she] could from the notion of lingering doubt.” Had Dr.

Fineman testified, the state argues, the state would have

cross-examined him about some of the adverse elements of

his initial report—namely, that Bemore, in addition to

possibly suffering from bipolar disorder and organic

impairment, was “subtly controlling,” “self-indulgent,”

unable to “empathize with others,” and possibly a sociopath. 

These findings would have cast doubt on Bemore’s character,

the state suggests, and so Barranco could have made a

strategic decision not to pursue a theory that would allow

those findings to come out.

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This reasoning is unpersuasive, for several reasons. First,

Barranco’s investigation into her chosen “good guy”

mitigation strategy itself contained a serious omission,

making her decision to pursue that approach in lieu of

presenting mental health evidence uninformed in that

respect.20 As part of her “good guy” strategy, Barranco

attempted to present Bemore as a good inmate, which opened

the door to damaging rebuttal testimony about Bemore’s bad

behavior in jail, including several instances of assault and,

most particularly, his role in the alleged food-tampering

incident that sent a number of prisoners to the hospital in the

hope of fostering escape. Barranco expected that evidence of

the food tampering incident would not be admitted, as she

thought—erroneously—thatBemore had been found factually

innocent of the offense. See Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 849. In

fact, Barranco admitted to the trial court that she had relied

on “rumor and hearsay,” id. (alteration omitted), rather than

looking into the food tampering case herself, and told the

court that “she would not have introduced good inmate

evidence ‘at all’ had she known the food tampering evidence

20 On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court addressed the narrow

question whether Barranco provided ineffective assistance by presenting

evidence of Bemore’s good behavior in jail, as that evidence opened the

door to damaging rebuttal testimony about the uninvestigated foodtampering incident. See Bemore, 22 Cal. 4th at 850–51. The court held

that the food-tampering testimony was not so damaging that it would have

altered a reasonably competent attorney’s defense strategy. On the whole,

the court reasoned, Barranco made an informed decision to present the

“good inmate” evidence and “risk unfavorable revelations on rebuttal.” 

Id. at 851. We assume, for present purposes, that the California Supreme

Court reasonably applied Strickland in concluding that Barranco’s

presentation of “good inmate” testimony and her investigation ofthe foodtampering incident did not themselves fall below Strickland’s standard for

effective assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). But that

assumption does not address the reasonableness ofthe California Supreme

Court’s denial of relief on the much broader penalty phase IAC claim,

discussed above, on habeas review.

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‘had happened’ and ‘could come in . . . as the last evidence

the jury hear[d] before they deliberate penalty.’” Id. Given

that Barranco should have been aware the state would attempt

to rebut evidence of Bemore’s good behavior in jail, her

failure to examine the details of the incident is, at least, strong

evidence of deficient performance. See Rompilla v. Beard,

545 U.S. 374, 383–85 (2005) (holding that the state court

unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that counsel’s

performance was adequate, where counsel failed to examine

a publically available file on the defendant’s prior

conviction).

Second, while it “may well have been strategically

defensible upon a reasonably thorough investigation” to rely

on good character evidence in addition to mental health

evidence, “the two sentencing strategies are not necessarily

mutually exclusive.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535. One can

have a serious mental illness and still be a good friend and

kind person. A defense that Bemore was “a good guy with a

drug problem,” was fully consistent with a defense that he

was a good guy who was plagued by a drug problem and

mental illness. And even if the mental health evidence

showed Bemore to be impaired in a manner that made him

self-serving, explosive, and violent, as the state contends,

“brain damage that could manifest in impulsive, violent

behavior” is nonetheless mitigating, as it indicates that

Bemore was “substantially impaired in his ability to conform

his conduct to the law and suffered from an extreme mental

or emotional disturbance.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 36.

Third, a decision is not a “strategic” one if not informed. 

The question under Strickland is not only “whether counsel

should have presented a [different] mitigation case,” but also

“whetherthe investigation supporting [counsel’s] decision not

to introduce mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable.”

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523.

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We recently held, in Elmore v. Sinclair, for example, that

it was a reasonable strategic decision for counsel to pursue a

remorse mitigation defense in lieu of a mental health defense

that would “detract from, or destroy, the remorse strategy.”

781 F.3d 1160, 1172 (9th Cir. 2015). In Elmore, counsel

hired two mental health experts to evaluate the defendant,

and, armed with their conclusions, conducted two mock trials. 

The mock trials showed that jurors responded more favorably

to a defense based on remorse and acceptance of

responsibility than to one based on the defendant’s mental

health or brain damage. Id. Here, by contrast, Barranco

decided to present her “good guy” mitigation defense without

first investigating appropriately the mental health alternative. 

When an alternative in the form of a mental health mitigation

strategy became apparent by way of Dr. Fineman’s report and

anecdotes from Bemore’s friends and family, she

precipitously pushed that possibility aside as inconsistent

with the “sun child” aspect of her planned “good guy”

mitigation presentation.

In short, Barranco’s early decision to pursue a riskfraught “good guy” mitigation strategy did not satisfy her

duty first to unearth potentially mitigating mental health

evidence. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36. “In deferring to

counsel’s decision not to pursue a [mental health] mitigation

case despite [counsel’s] unreasonable investigation, the

[CaliforniaSupremeCourt] unreasonablyapplied Strickland.”

 Id. at 534.

2. Prejudice at the penalty phase

To determine whether Barranco’s failure to investigate

and uncover mitigating evidence prejudiced Bemore, we

must consider both whether there is “a reasonable probability

that a competent attorney, aware of this [evidence], would

have introduced it at sentencing,” and that “had the jury been

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 43

confronted with this considerable mitigating evidence, there

is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a

different sentence.” Id. at 535, 536. If no reasonable jurist

could disagree that the mitigating evidence a proper

investigation would have uncovered “may have meant the

difference between a life or death sentence,” Daniels v.

Woodford, 428 F.3d at 1210, we must grant relief. See

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1403.

The available mitigating mental health evidence was

compelling. Even without the benefit of a final diagnosis, 

Dr. Fineman had determined, before trial, that Bemore had

organic brain damage and “a fundamental inability to control

his behavior” when his “needs press upon him.” Reviewing

Dr. Fineman’s report in light of information about Bemore’s

drug use just before the crime and his history of erratic,

explosive behavior, Dr. Rosenthal stated that whatever

Bemore’s specific condition might be, it was clear at the time

of trial that his ability “to appreciate the criminality of his

conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the

law was impaired.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3(h). Dr.

Fineman’s and Dr. Rosenthal’s conclusions would have been

bolstered by Dr. Wright’s statement that “[o]nce Bemore

stated using Crack he was no longer able to control his

behavior,” and by available testimony from Bemore’s friends

that he was prone to uncontrollable manic-like episodes. 

TroyPatterson, for example, stated in his declaration that, had

he been asked, he would have testified that, at the time of the

Aztec incident, Bemore was “constantly using mind-altering

drugs” that “made him crazy . . . flip out, go out of his mind

and lose control of himself.”

At the penalty phase, the jury was explicitly instructed to

take mental health evidence into account, by considering

whether Bemore was “under the influence of mental or

emotional disturbance” and whether his “capacity . . . to

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44 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his

conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a

result of mental disease or defect or effects of intoxication.” 

The prosecution affirmatively addressed each of these issues

during closing argument, emphatically stating that Bemore

“wasn’t under the influence of any extreme mental or

emotional disturbance,” and that his capacity to conform his

conduct with the law was not diminished by intoxication or

mental defect. Had the mental health evidence been

presented, this reductive argument could not have been made. 

At the capital penalty phase, where the jury is given broad

latitude to consider all factors that bear on whether a

defendant ought to live or die, see Frierson, 463 F.3d at 993,

a reasonably competent attorney would have presented that

evidence, see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535–36.

That Cosby received twenty-five years to life for Muck’s

murder is also of some relevance to our conclusion regarding

Strickland prejudice.21 Cosby, whose attorneys presented

evidence of impaired judgment due to drug use and organic

brain damage, received this lesser sentence despite his having

been concurrently convicted, by a single jury, of a second

robbery and murder. In ruling on a motion to reconsider

Bemore’s death sentence, Judge Gill stated that the

significantly different sentence in the Cosby trial was “in

[his] mind.” He was satisfied that the discrepancy was

justified, however, because in “the case of Mr. Cosby there

was some fairly convincing evidence [of] head trauma he

sustained as an infant . . . [and] demonstrable physiological

damages and deficits.” He noted that “[t]here’s no such

evidence in the case of Mr. Bemore.” Had mental health

21 The result in Cosby’s trial is, of course, not itself a sufficient basis for

determining the likely impact of mental health evidence in Bemore’s

penalty phase. C.f. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43–46 (1984).

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 45

evidence been presented, “there is clearly a reasonable

probability that the . . . jury—and the . . . judge—‘would have

struck a different balance,’ and it [was] unreasonable to

conclude otherwise.” Porter, 558 U.S. at 42 (quoting

Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537).

Our conclusions with regard to IAC at the guilt phase

further support our conclusion that it would have been

objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that

the Strickland prejudice standard was not met at the penalty

phase. First, as a general matter, “[e]vidence that might not

rise to the level of defense of a crime may nonetheless be

important mitigating evidence.” Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d

612, 624 (9th Cir. 2010). And second, in this instance,

counsel’s guilt phase IAC in choosing, between two

inadequately investigated defenses, each unlikely to succeed,

a weak alibi defense likely to undermine Bemore’s credibility

and thus the likelihood of jury sympathy for him, could well

have contributed to the outcome of the penalty phase. The

two ineffective representation decisions—not putting on a

mental health mitigation defense at the penalty phase, and

putting on a guilt phase defense both unlikely to succeed and

likely adversely to affect the jury’s view of Bemore for the

penalty phase—must be viewed cumulatively in determining

whether the Strickland prejudice standard was met with

regard to the jury’s decision to sentence Bemore to death. 

See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 290 n.3 (1973);

Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003).

As the state indicates, the prosecution did present

significant aggravating evidence, including allegations of

assault and rape. But mitigating mental health evidence

would have proven a heavy counterweight. In addition to

lessening Bemore’s culpability for the Aztec crimes, such

testimony would likely have affected the jury’s opinion with

regard to the unadjudicated offenses.

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Prejudice under Strickland does not require a showing

that counsel’s actions “more likely than not altered the

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. For Bemore to have

avoided the death penalty, only one juror need have been

persuaded by mitigating evidence to show mercy and vote

against a capital sentence. So Bemore need only show that

counsel’s errors were “sufficient to undermine confidence in

the outcome” reached by a single juror. Id. at 694.22

In denying Bemore’s penalty-phase IAC claim, the state

court “either did not consider or unreasonably discounted the

mitigation evidence” that could have been presented. Porter,

558 U.S. at 42. We conclude that mitigating mental health

evidence, combined with a different guilt phase strategy,

“‘might well have influenced the jury’s appraisal’ of

[Bemore’s] moral culpability,” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538

(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 398), and that the state court’s

contrary conclusion constituted an unreasonable application

of Strickland.

E. Discovery Motions

In addition to denying Bemore’s claims on the merits, the

district court denied Bemore’s motion for an evidentiary

hearing and motion for leave to take depositions of three

defense witness. Bemore appeals denial of both motions. 

The district court’s ruling on the discovery motions is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Mabe v. San Bernadino

Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1112 (9th

Cir. 2001).

22 Richter noted that “the difference between Strickland’s prejudice

standard and a more-probable-than-not standard” may be “slight.” 

562 U.S. at 112. Even so, there is a difference, which could matter in

some instances. So precision as to the applicable standard is essential.

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BEMORE V. CHAPPELL 47

As to Bemore’s claim of IAC at the penalty phase, our

conclusion that declarations and other evidence already in the

record presented to the state court support Bemore’s claim

obviates any need to remand for discovery.

With regard to discovery on Bemore’s guilt phase IAC

claim, we may not consider new evidence unless the state

court’s legal conclusions were contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law as determined

by the Supreme Court, or its determination of facts was

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented to the state

court, 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at

1398–99; Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1166–67 (9th Cir.

2005). We reject Bemore’s argument that the state court’s

denial of an evidentiary hearing rendered its determination of

facts unreasonable, see §2254(d)(2); Hurles v. Ryan, 752 F.3d

768, 791–92 (2014). “Under California law, the California

Supreme Court’s summary denial of a habeas petition on the

merits reflects that state court’s determination that ‘the claims

made in th[e] petition do not state a prima facie case entitling

the petitioner to relief.’” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 n.2

(quoting In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770 (Cal. 1993))

(alterations in original). As Bemore has not shown that it was

unreasonable or contrary to clearly established federal law for

the state court to conclude that, taking the factual allegations

in his habeas petition to be true, he was not entitled to relief

on his guilt phase claim, see People v. Duvall, 9 Cal. 4th 464,

474–75 (1995), further discovery is not warranted, and the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion.23

 

23 We further reject Bemore’s contention that an evidentiary hearing is

warranted based on new evidence that presents a new, unexhausted claim,

as Bemore has not shown “good cause for not presenting the new evidence

to the state court.” Gonzalez, 667 F.3d at 972, 980; see supra note 9.

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48 BEMORE V. CHAPPELL

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief

on Bemore’s claim that his counsel was constitutionally

ineffective at the guilt phase. We REVERSE the district

court’s denial of habeas relief with respect to Bemore’s

penalty phase IAC claim and REMAND with instructions to

grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to

the penalty phase and return the case to the state court to

reduce Bemore’s sentence to life without parole, unless the

State of California elects to pursue a new capital sentencing

proceeding within a reasonable amount of time as determined

by the district court.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part and

REMANDED.

 Case: 12-99005, 06/09/2015, ID: 9566405, DktEntry: 65-1, Page 48 of 48