Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03400/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03400-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Family Mutual Insurance Company
Appellant
Anthony Van De Venter
Appellee
Jeanette Van De Venter
Appellee
David Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3400

AMERICAN FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAVID WILLIAMS, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:14-cv-00248-SEB-DKL — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 23, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and SYKES and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. They say every dog has its day. This 

case is about a dog—specifically, Emma, a black Labrador. 

Emma lived in Indiana with Anthony and Jeanette Van de 

Venter, friends of David Williams. When Williams, then visiting the Van de Venters, took Emma outside so that she could 

relieve herself, she raced off toward an enticing sound and 

Williams was injured. Before us is the question whether 

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American Family Mutual Insurance (AmFam), the Van de 

Venter’s home insurer, must cover Williams’s medical expenses. AmFam said no and brought this suit for a declaratory judgment to confirm its reading of the policy. The district 

court, however, found in favor of the Van de Venters and Williams. We affirm. 

I

The relevant facts are undisputed. In October 2012, Williams, a college friend of Anthony Van de Venter, visited the 

Van de Venters at their home in Monroe County, Indiana. On 

Tuesday, October 23, 2012, the Van de Venters went to work, 

leaving Williams at home for the day. Williams was sharing 

the house with Emma. Before they left, the Van de Venters 

told Williams that Emma would be fine inside while they 

were away. If she wanted to go outside, they instructed him, 

she would ring a bell by the front door, and he should let her 

out. They said nothing about walking her.

At approximately 10:40 a.m., Williams was watching television when Emma scratched on his bedroom door. He followed her downstairs, clipped a leash to her collar, and accompanied her outside. They returned without incident. 

Roughly an hour later, Williams heard the bell at the front 

door ring. He went downstairs again to find Emma by the 

door, whining. He again affixed the leash to her collar and 

walked with her into the backyard, away from the road. 

As Williams held Emma’s leash, a “woof” rang out, shattering the early-afternoon air. That neighborhood dog’s bark 

proved to be, quite literally, worse than its bite: Emma lurched

toward the sound, pulling Williams to the ground and seriously injuring his shoulder. Williams sued the Van de Venters, 

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No. 15-3400 3

alleging that they were negligent in, among other things, failing to exercise reasonable care for his safety while he was a 

guest in their home. 

At the time of Williams’s injury, the Van de Venters’ home 

was insured by a home-insurance policy with AmFam. The 

policy included personal liability coverage indemnifying the 

Van de Venters for compensatory damages for bodily injury

and guaranteeing a defense against suits for such damages. 

The policy also contained a provision stating: “Intra-Insured 

Suits. We will not cover bodily injury to any insured.” In relevant part, the policy defined an “insured” as “any person ... 

legally responsible for a[n] ... animal owned by [a named insured or resident relative of a named insured] to which [the 

policy’s personal-liability coverages] apply.” 

AmFam took the position that these provisions relieved it 

of the duty to defend or indemnify the Van de Venters. As we 

noted, the district court rejected its position, and AmFam now 

appeals. 

II

We review the district court’s decision to grant summary 

judgment de novo. Steimel v. Wernert, 832 F.3d 902, 910 (7th Cir. 

2016). When reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, we take the motions one at a time and for each one we

construe all facts and draw all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the non-moving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).

AmFam argues that Williams was legally responsible for 

Emma at the time he was hurt, and for that reason he was an 

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insured under the policy. As an insured, it concludes, he cannot turn to the policy for coverage of his claim. 

In diversity cases where neither party raises a conflict of 

law issue, federal courts apply the law of the state in which 

they sit. Ball v. Kotter, 723 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir. 2013). This is 

such a case. Indiana uses the law of the principal location of 

the insured risk. Dunn v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 836 N.E.2d 

249, 251 (Ind. 2005) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 

CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 (1971)). The Van de Venters’ house is 

located in Indiana, and so we rely on Indiana law. 

If not specifically defined in the policy, clear and unambiguous language is given its ordinary meaning. See Holiday 

Hosp. Franchising, Inc. v. AMCO Ins. Co., 983 N.E.2d 574, 577 

(Ind. 2013). The policy does not define the term “legally responsible,” nor does it otherwise indicate that the term has a 

specific meaning. We therefore turn, as Indiana courts would,

to the dictionary. Id. at 579. Black’s Law Dictionary defines 

“responsibility” as the “quality, state, or condition of being 

answerable or accountable; LIABILITY.” BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY 1506 (10th ed. 2014). “Liability,” in turn, means

“legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by 

civil remedy or criminal punishment.” Id. at 1053. To the same 

effect, Merriam-Webster defines “responsible” as “liable or 

subject to legal review or in case of fault to penalties.” 

MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1935 

(1986). When used in the legal sense, “responsible” means 

roughly “subject to some kind of liability.”

Indiana law makes two kinds of people legally responsible 

for animals: owners and keepers. Ross v. Lowe, 619 N.E.2d 911, 

914 (Ind. 1993) (“An owner or keeper who fails to exercise ...

reasonable care may be liable in negligence for the manner of 

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No. 15-3400 5

keeping and controlling the dog.”). Indiana Code § 15-20-1-2 

defines an “owner” as “a person who possesses, keeps, or harbors a dog.” A “keeper, for purposes of imposition of liability, 

is one who exercises control over an animal on his premises 

with knowledge of its presence, whether he be an owner, or 

bailee.” Williams v. Pohlman, 257 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1970). In Vetor by Weesner v. Vetor, 634 N.E.2d 513, 515 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 1994), the court held that a jury could find that the victim’s grandparents were a dog’s keeper where they had “not 

simply acquiesced but were intentionally causing the dog to 

come to their home.” Id. (noting that they permitted the dog 

to “roam their farm,” fed and watered it, and gave it affection). In order to qualify as a keeper, a person must “undertake[] to manage, control, or care for the animal as [an] owner, 

in general, is accustomed to do.” 3B C.J.S. ANIMALS § 75. The 

definition therefore “implies ... a substantial number of incidents” and that the person “suppl[ies the dog] with the necessities of life.” Id. A person “harbors” a dog when she “affords 

[it] lodging, shelters, or gives refuge ... for a limited purpose 

or time.” Id. § 374.

Whatever the limits of these definitions, they are not met 

here. Because Emma was not on Williams’s property, he did 

not harbor her. Neither did he undertake any control of her 

that would approximate that of an owner. He did not intentionally cause her to come to any area of the house. Indeed, 

she rang the bell at the front door, signaling that she wished 

to go outside. He merely attached her leash and accompanied 

her there. Williams was not responsible for giving Emma any 

food, water, affection, or other care—and he gave her none. 

Except for the brief moments when he walked outside with 

her, he did not interact with Emma at all. Even then, it seems 

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that his physical control was very limited: their first contest of 

wills resulted in his injury.

Finally, Williams did not have “possession” of Emma under any traditional definition of the word. He did not “exercise dominion over” Emma; neither did he assert a “right under which” he “exercise[d] control over” her “to the exclusion 

of all others.” Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 1351.

Williams was just a houseguest who twice accompanied his 

host’s dog outside as it did its business: he did not possess, 

keep, or harbor Emma. 

AmFam pushes back with the argument that Williams was 

“legally responsible” for Emma because the Van de Venters 

granted him a bailment over her. There are several problems 

with this theory. First, Indiana law seems to consider bailees 

of animals to be a subset of keepers. See Williams, 257 N.E.2d 

at 331. If Williams was not a keeper, he could not have been a 

bailee. More fundamentally, Williams does not meet Indiana’s 

requirements for a bailee. “A bailment arises when: (1) personal property belonging to a bailor is delivered into the exclusive possession of the bailee and (2) the property is accepted by the bailee.” Kottlowski v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 

670 N.E.2d 78, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). Delivery requires “full 

transfer ... of the property to the bailee as to exclude the owner 

and all other persons.” Id. “Acceptance requires either an express contract to take the article and later redeliver it, or circumstances from which such a contract can be implied.” Id. 

None of these things happened in this case. Emma was not 

transferred to Williams at all, let alone to the exclusion of the 

Van de Venters. Under the undisputed terms of Williams’s

and the Van de Venters’ understanding, Williams and Emma 

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No. 15-3400 7

simply coexisted in the house during the Van de Venters’ absence. Neither did Williams expressly or impliedly agree to 

“take” Emma. Quite literally, Williams let a sleeping dog lie—

or do whatever else it was doing. The Van de Venters could 

have come back at any time and, on a whim, taken her away. 

They could have sent someone else to walk, feed, or take her 

out. AmFam wants us to evaluate in isolation the periods during which Williams accompanied Emma outside, disregarding the rest of their day together. But doing so does not accurately reflect their relationship (or lack thereof). Despite 

spending all day in the same house, Williams’s only interactions with Emma took place when he twice affixed a leash to 

her collar, and for a few minutes, accompanied her outside, 

exercising at most limited control over her movements. 

Even if it were not clear that Williams was not legally responsible for Emma, there would be strong reasons to reject 

AmFam’s owner, keeper, and bailment theories. First, AmFam’s theory would lead to absurd results: it would render an 

unsuspecting bystander legally responsible for the dog whose 

leash he holds while the dog owner ties her shoe. In fact, 

nearly anyone who tried to control a dog, even for moments, 

at the behest of the owner would be legally responsible. 

Moreover, fitting Williams’s conduct within the term “legally responsible” would take all the bite out of its meaning 

in the policy. If any person exercising any control over an animal were legally responsible for it under the policy, then 

nearly all interactions with animals would be excluded from 

policy coverage. The intra-insured provision was not meant 

to preclude coverage of every guest or business invitee who

drops by the house and even momentarily controls the dog. 

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Exclusions of coverage must be “clearly expressed to be 

enforceable.” State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Flexdar, Inc., 964 

N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind. 2012). Where they are not, “the policy 

will be construed most favorably to the insured.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). If AmFam had intended “legally responsible” to reach so broadly, it should have used more specific 

language. Indiana follows the rule that “[p]olicy terms are interpreted from the perspective of an ordinary policyholder of 

average intelligence.” Allgood v. Meridian Sec. Ins. Co., 836 

N.E.2d 243, 246 (Ind. 2005). An average policyholder would 

not consider a houseguest legally responsible for a dog 

merely because she agreed to take it out to relieve itself, and 

while doing so, held it by a leash. To the extent reasonable 

people could differ on the matter, the term must be construed

against AmFam. Id. 

AmFam’s citations to non-Indiana authorities fail to support its contention that Indiana would regard Williams as 

Emma’s keeper. See, e.g., Malik v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 625 

N.W.2d 640, 642 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (plaintiff legally responsible for dog where he took it to his house and cared for it 

during owner’s week-long vacation); Van Kleek v. Farmers Ins. 

Exch., 857 N.W.2d 297, 303–04 (Neb. 2014) (dogsitter legally 

responsible for dog where he was completely responsible for 

dog’s care during owners’ four-day vacation). The Utah case 

the district court found persuasive, Neztosie v. Meyer, is closer 

to this one. See 883 P.2d 920, 921 (Utah 1994). Neztosie held 

that a grandfather who checked on a dog’s food and water 

while its owners were out of town was not a keeper, noting 

that the term “implies the exercise of a substantial number of 

the incidents of ownership.” Id. (citing McEvoy v. Brown, 150 

N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958) (“The casual act of feeding 

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No. 15-3400 9

or watering the dog is not such an act that would constitute 

keeping or harboring.”)).

Finally, AmFam cites a dog’s breakfast of Indiana common 

and municipal law theories, none of which indicates that a 

person’s fleeting physical control over an animal can make her 

liable for the animal’s actions. Williams’s use of a leash does 

not in itself give rise to a legal duty under Indiana law. Even 

if Williams had what AmFam terms “care, custody, and control” over Emma at the time of his injury, this status is not connected to any theory of liability under Indiana law. AmFam’s 

res ipsa loquitur argument is waived. See D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. 

Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 800 (7th Cir. 2015) (arguments not 

raised below are waived). And its assorted citations to state, 

county, and municipal law are inapposite. See, e.g., Burgin By 

& Through Akers v. Tolle, 500 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1986) (common-law duty of owner or keeper); Ross, 619 

N.E.2d at 914 (same); Monroe Cnty. Code §§ 440-12–17 (subjecting owners to potential liability); Bloomington Code § 

7.24.040 (penalty paid by owner/guardian).

III

Williams was not Emma’s owner, keeper, or bailee. He was 

therefore not “legally responsible” for her under Indiana law, 

not an insured under the policy, and not precluded from coverage by the policy’s provision barring intra-insured suits. 

AmFam owes duties to defend and indemnify the Van de 

Venters against Williams’s suit arising from his injuries. The 

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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10 No. 15-3400

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur with the 

court’s opinion and judgment holding that American Family 

must both defend and indemnify the Van de Venters in Williams’ claim against them for his injury. The undisputed facts 

show that when he visited the Van de Venters’ home and 

took their dog for a walk, he was not the dog’s owner or 

keeper under Indiana law. He therefore was not “legally responsible” for the dog and so was not an “insured” whose 

own injury claim would be excluded from coverage.

There is another, more fundamental reason for rejecting 

American Family’s attempt to deny coverage. Chief Judge 

Wood’s opinion for the court hints at it, noting that the “intra-insured provision was not meant to preclude coverage of 

every guest or business invitee who drops by the house and 

even momentarily controls the dog.” Supra, at 7. It might be 

useful for future cases to explain this more fundamental 

problem in American Family’s theory. It has less to do with 

the tort law of pets and more to do with the law of liability 

insurance and the scope of the duty to defend.

The Van de Venters’ “Gold Star Special Deluxe” homeowners’ policy with American Family treats as insureds the 

Van de Venter family and any other residents of the household who are relatives or minors in their care, if any. The 

policy also provides that for personal liability coverage:

insured also means: (1) Any person or organization legally responsible for a watercraft or 

animal owned by any person included in paragraph a. [the household] to which Section II [liability] Coverages apply. This does not include 

a person or organization using or having custody of the watercraft or animal in the course 

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No. 15-3400 11

of business or without your specific permission.

Pl. App. 53 (¶5-b-1). A similar provision treats domestic employees as insureds, so that they and the Van de Venters 

would be covered if a visitor is hurt by the alleged negligence of an employee. Id. (¶5-b-2). Both the employee and 

the watercraft and pets provisions in this homeowners’ policy are related to the familiar provisions in auto policies that 

extend liability coverage, for example, to a friend who drives 

an insured vehicle with the owner’s permission. From the 

point of view of the insureds, the objective is to buy peace of 

mind for the threat of liability for injuries to visitors to the 

home or caused by operating family vehicles.

Ten pages later in the fine print, the eleventh of twenty liability exclusions says: “We will not cover bodily injury to 

any insured.” Pl. App. 63. Such “intra-insured” exclusions 

prevent fraudulent and collusive claims, for example, by one 

family member against another, expecting the deep pocket of 

the insurance company to come up with cash. See Frost v. 

Whitbeck, 654 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Wis. 2002). Applying the “intra-insured” exclusion to Williams’ claim in this case, however, has virtually no precedent and would be contrary to 

basic principles of liability insurance.

To begin with, it is hard to imagine how Williams could 

be considered “legally responsible” for his own injuries from 

the dog’s bolt toward the neighbor’s dog. It’s tempting to 

stop there. But American Family has built its entire case by 

cooking up an alternative hypothesis. Suppose, it says, that 

when Williams took the Van de Venters’ dog for a walk, the 

dog had injured somebody else, a neighbor. We know that 

did not happen, but it might have happened, says American 

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12 No. 15-3400

Family, so let’s think it through. We see that American Family’s theory for this case collapses from internal contradictions.

First, the injured neighbor sues both the Van de Venters, 

who own the dog, and visitor Williams, who was actually 

walking the dog and who they say should have had control 

of it. The Van de Venters and visitor Williams then tender 

the neighbor’s claim to American Family for a defense. The 

Van de Venters are covered, of course, and are owed duties 

of both defense and indemnification. What about a duty to 

defend visitor Williams? If the insurer or the courts were to 

get caught up in the details of Williams’ relationship with 

the dog — how long he was staying, his exact duties toward 

feeding and walking the dog, and even whether he initiated 

the particular walk or the dog did (see supra at 5) — it 

would be difficult to decide whether he would be owed a 

defense and ultimately whether he would be owed a duty of 

indemnification, which would seem to depend on whether 

he qualified as a “keeper” under Indiana law. Those questions have occupied most of this litigation.

There is a simpler way to address the problem under 

American Family’s hypothetical: start with the duty of defense, which must be decided first. Under well-established 

principles of liability insurance, the visitor (Williams) is 

owed a defense as an insured if someone asserting a claim 

based on the household dog’s actions is merely trying to hold 

him “legally responsible” for the dog’s actions. If the neighbor ultimately wins a suit against the visitor, then by definition the visitor is held “legally responsible” and is therefore 

an insured and should be covered.

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No. 15-3400 13

But the duty of defense must be decided long before ultimate liability can be decided, and before many factual details can be known. Under the terms of the American Family 

policy, the visitor is entitled to a defense simply because he 

might be held legally responsible. The hypothetical visitor is 

entitled to a defense even if the neighbor’s claim against the 

visitor were a sure loser, such as if it were clear the visitor 

was not the dog’s keeper. “It is the nature of the claim, not its 

merit, which establishes the insurer's duty to defend.” Terre 

Haute First Nat'l Bank, 634 N.E.2d at 1339, quoting Trisler v. 

Indiana Ins. Co., 575 N.E.2d 1021, 1023 (Ind. App. 1991). An 

“insurance company has a contractual duty to defend unfounded, false and fraudulent suits based upon risks it has 

insured.” Davidson v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 572 N.E.2d 502, 505 

(Ind. App. 1991), citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mallon, 409 

N.E.2d 1100, 1105 (Ind. App. 1980) (duty to defend applies to 

“unfounded, false or fraudulent suits” based upon insured 

risks); Home Fed. Sav. Bank v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 695 F.3d 725, 

731 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying Indiana law and reversing 

summary judgment denying duty to defend).

On the other hand, if the neighbor succeeded on the 

claim against the visitor, the visitor would have been found 

“legally responsible” and would fit nicely within the definition of an insured, at least for that incident. That interpretation 

of the policy fits with Indiana law and gives the homeowner

and the visitor the peace of mind the homeowner paid for by 

buying liability insurance.

So far, so good. But how far do we go with this visitor’s 

status as an insured under the “intra-insured” exclusion? It 

should be limited to a specific incident involving the dog. To 

explain, let’s use a different hypothetical. Suppose the 

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14 No. 15-3400

homeowner asks a neighborhood teenager to care for and 

walk the dog while the owners are away for a few weeks. 

And suppose the teenager is so involved in the dog’s care 

that she qualifies as a “keeper” under Indiana law. That 

makes her “legally responsible” for the dog, at least when 

she takes it for a walk. If the dog hurts another neighbor 

while she is walking the dog, she is clearly an insured and 

will be defended and indemnified.

But now suppose the dog-walking teenager, while visiting the house for other purposes, trips and falls on a loose 

carpet on the stairs. American Family’s theory seems to be 

that the teenager qualifies as an “insured” for all purposes. If 

that were correct, the “intra-insured” exclusion would apply

and the homeowners would have no coverage for her claim 

against them for their negligence. That result would be unjust and completely contrary to the reasonable expectations 

of all parties, and especially the insured homeowners. Yet 

that result follows from American Family’s logic.

When asked about this hypothetical in oral argument, 

American Family’s counsel said the visiting teenager would 

not be an “insured” for those purposes. Counsel insisted, 

though, that if the visiting teenager slipped on the stairs 

while visiting the house to walk the dog, she would still be 

an insured so that her own injury claim against the owners 

would not be covered. (Oral argument at 6:00—9:40.) Counsel did not provide a basis for American Family’s proposed 

line, nor is one evident.

The problem lies in the assumption, implicit in American 

Family’s argument, that an outsider like the dog-walker is an 

insured either for all purposes or for no purposes. It makes 

more sense, and fits better with the parties’ reasonable exCase: 15-3400 Document: 41 Filed: 08/08/2016 Pages: 16
No. 15-3400 15

pectations, to say that a person who is an insured based on 

this notion of legal responsibility for the pet is an insured 

only with respect to claims against her arising from her arguable legal responsibility for the pet. Surely that would be 

the insurer’s position if the visiting dog-walker tendered to 

the insurer a claim not related to the dog-walking, such as an 

allegedly negligent injury to another guest on the premises.

This need to focus on the incident giving rise to the claim 

becomes obvious in another important context—liability 

coverage both for injuries to domestic employees and for injuries caused by domestic employees. The American Family 

policy here makes clear that it protects the Van de Venters 

for claims by injured domestic employees. See Pl. App. 62–64 

(¶E-2-c; ¶II-D-7; ¶E-1). But as noted, the American Family 

policy treats domestic employees as insureds where they are 

alleged to have caused injury to someone else, such as a visitor to the home. Pl. App. 53 (¶5-b-2).

How does the “intra-insured” exception apply to domestic employees? Under American Family’s argument here, a 

domestic employee might be treated as an insured in some 

instances, so that employee is also an insured. If that’s true, 

there would be no coverage for the Van de Venters if a domestic employee were injured and brought a claim against 

them. American Family asserted this position at oral argument, but it cannot be the law. It would make the policy’s 

provisions covering claims by domestic employees illusory if 

not downright fraudulent. 

The solution lies in limiting the effect of the provisions 

treating outsiders (such as visiting dog-walkers and domestic employees) as insureds. They should apply only for

claims arising directly from incidents that make them inCase: 15-3400 Document: 41 Filed: 08/08/2016 Pages: 16
16 No. 15-3400

sureds for these very limited purposes. The intra-insured exception should not apply to deny coverage to the homeowners on claims by people who might be deemed insureds for 

such limited purposes and in such limited circumstances. 

The purpose of the intra-insured exception simply does not 

apply to such people. The broader interpretation advocated 

by American Family would contradict other purposes and 

provisions in the policy, such as the liability coverage for injuries caused by domestic employees and the broad coverage 

that homeowners expect for accidents that injure visitors like 

Williams.

Returning from the hypotheticals to this case, we could 

also affirm on the simple basis that it makes no sense to treat 

Williams as if he were “legally responsible” for his own injuries resulting from the dog’s actions. Accordingly, he was not 

an insured for purposes of this incident. The intra-insured 

exception does not bar coverage of his claim against the Van

de Venters.

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