Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02293/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02293-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christine Biros
Appellee
Shanni Snyder
Pro Se Appellee
U Lock Inc
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

______________ 

No. 23-2293 

 ______________ 

In re: U LOCK INC., 

 Debtor 

U LOCK, INC., 

 Appellant 

v. 

CHRISTINE BIROS 

______________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Pennsylvania 

(Nos. 2:22-cv-01284; 2:22-cv-01222; 22-ap-02048) 

U.S. District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer 

______________ 

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

December 6, 2024 

______________ 

Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges. 

(Filed: January 13, 2025) 

______________ 

OPINION∗

______________ 

∗

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent. 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
2 

SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 

U Lock, Inc. appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s 

order dismissing U Lock’s adversary action against Appellee Christine Biros. Because U 

Lock’s failure to timely appeal the Bankruptcy Court’s order deprived the District Court 

of jurisdiction, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand with instructions to

dismiss U Lock’s appeal.1

 

I2

A 

In 2015, U Lock borrowed $325,000 from Biros to purchase property. A dispute 

about payment and terms arose and Biros sued U Lock in state court. Biros prevailed, 

and in January 2022, recorded deeds to the property in her name. In April 2022, Biros 

requested a writ of possession from the state court. Days later, a purported U Lock 

creditor, Shanni Snyder, placed U Lock in involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy. In re U 

Lock, Inc., No. 22-20823 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2022), ECF 1. 

1

 Judge Matey would affirm the District Court’s order based on U Lock’s waiver 

of its standing claim. In response to the Bankruptcy Court’s inquiry as to why it would 

permit the adversary complaint “to proceed at this point given that the Trustee is not the 

one bringing that action,” U Lock’s counsel responded that “if the Trustee is not going 

along with it, then I guess we’re kind of stuck with it.” App. 382. And when the 

Bankruptcy Court asked if there was “any reason why [it] should keep that adversary 

[complaint] on [its] calendar at this point,” U Lock’s counsel answered no. App. 388. 

On this record, Judge Matey agrees with the District Court that U Lock “intentional[ly] 

relinquish[ed] or abandon[ed]” its standing claim. See In re RFE Indus., Inc., 283 F.3d 

159, 164 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 

2

 In reviewing the order dismissing U Lock’s adversary complaint, we accept as 

true the facts stated therein and also consider “public records, including judicial 

proceedings.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp., 990 F.3d 728, 736-37 (3d Cir. 2021). 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
3

On May 13, 2022, after the bankruptcy petition was filed, the state court granted

Biros the writ of possession. Thereafter, Biros notified the state court of the bankruptcy

and, at a hearing two days later, sought an order from the state court stating that the 

automatic stay associated with U Lock’s bankruptcy did not impact her ability to execute 

the writ. The state court took the request under advisement but, before it ruled, the 

Bankruptcy Court declared the May 13, 2022 order granting the writ of possession void

because it violated the automatic stay.

 U Lock, without consulting the Bankruptcy Trustee,

3 filed an adversary 

proceeding against Biros alleging that her actions in the state court violated the automatic 

stay and seeking (1) damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) for costs incurred in defending 

against the state court activity, and (2) a contempt finding under 11 U.S.C. § 105. 

Snyder, the creditor who had placed U Lock in involuntary bankruptcy, moved for leave 

to intervene or join the adversary proceeding, asserting that that “automatic stay 

violations [] affect the value of the estate,” and therefore impact her interests as a 

creditor.

4 A244.

On August 10, 2022, the Bankruptcy Court (1) dismissed the adversary complaint 

because it found that only U Lock’s Trustee could pursue the § 362(k) claim on behalf of 

U Lock and (2) denied Snyder’s motion to intervene as moot, given the dismissal. On 

3 The Bankruptcy Court appointed an interim trustee for U Lock in June 2022. 4 Based on Biro’s counsel’s negative comments before the state court, Snyder also 

sought emotional distress damages. 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
4 

August 23, 2022, Snyder appealed both orders, and on September 6, 2022, U Lock—not 

its Trustee—appealed the dismissal order. 

The District Court affirmed because, although U Lock raised arguments asserting 

its standing to sue before the District Court, it waived these arguments by (1) failing to 

make them before the Bankruptcy Court, and (2) “conced[ing] at the hearing that the 

adversary action should have been brought by the Trustee.” Order at 2-3, U Lock, Inc. v. 

Biros, No. 2-22-cv-01284 (W.D. Pa. June 21, 2023), ECF 24. The District Court also 

upheld the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that the case’s dismissal mooted Snyder’s 

motion to intervene.5

 Id. 

U Lock appeals.6 

II7

A 

Because “the prescribed timeline within which an appeal from a bankruptcy court 

must be filed is mandatory and jurisdictional,” In re Caterbone, 640 F.3d 108, 110 (3d 

5

 In its brief to the District Court, U Lock asserted that its appeal was timely under 

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(3), but neither Snyder, Biros, nor the District Court addressed

the timeliness of the appeal. 

6

 Snyder did not file a notice of appeal but did file a brief labeled “Informal Brief 

or Informal Brief Friend of the Court,” Dkt. No. 30, without being granted leave to do so. 

7

 The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 1334. 

Whether the District Court had appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158 and 1334 

depends on whether U Lock timely filed its appeal. “[T]his court can raise the question 

of its and the district court’s jurisdiction at any time . . . . When the lower federal court 

lacks jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits but merely for the 

purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit.” Bacon v. 

Sullivan, 969 F.2d 1517, 1519 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Smith v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 471 (2019). 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
5 

Cir. 2011), we must first address whether U Lock timely appealed the dismissal order to 

the District Court. A notice of appeal must be filed within fourteen days of a bankruptcy 

court’s order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1). However, “[i]f one party timely files a 

notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 

when the first notice was filed.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(3). Because U Lock appealed

more than fourteen days after entry of the Bankruptcy Court’s order, its appeal is 

untimely when considered on its own, but may be rendered timely if Snyder’s appeal 

from the case’s dismissal constitutes the appeal of a “party” under Bankruptcy Rule 

8002(a)(3).8

Whether Snyder is a “party” whose appeal renders U Lock’s appeal timely turns 

on whether she had standing to appeal. See Maiz v. Virani, 311 F.3d 334, 339 (5th Cir. 

2002) (explaining that if a party has standing to appeal, it qualifies as a party for purposes 

of the “multiple appeal” rule in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(3), on which 

Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(3) is based); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002 advisory 

committee’s note to 2014 amendment (explaining that Rule 8002 is an adaptation of 

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)); 10 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 8002.06 (Alan N. 

8

 Rule 8002(a) applies to appeals from adversary proceedings. In re Vazquez 

Laboy, 647 F.3d 367, 371, 373 (1st Cir. 2011). 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
6 

Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,16th ed. 2024) (suggesting that “party” in Rule 8002(a) 

refers to one who has standing to file an appeal). 

Here, Snyder lacks statutory standing under 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) to seek damages 

for Biros’s purported automatic stay violations.9

 The estate owns any § 362(k) claim for 

damages associated with U Lock’s injury in defending against Biros’s purported stay 

violations. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (providing that property of the estate includes 

interests acquired by the estate post-filing of a bankruptcy petition); cf. 2 Collier on 

Bankruptcy ¶ 303.25 (explaining that claims against the debtor which arise during the 

“gap period,” which is the time between the filing of an involuntary petition and an order 

of relief, give rise to claims against the estate). “[O]nce a cause of action becomes the 

estate’s property, the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee, and only the trustee, the 

statutory authority to pursue it” unless abandoned. In re Wilton Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d 

273, 280 (3d Cir. 2020); In re Atl. Bus. & Cmty. Corp., 901 F.2d 325, 327, 329 (3d Cir. 

1990) (holding trustee could recover damages for automatic stay violations).10 Because 

9

 Whether a litigant, such as Snyder, has “‘standing’ to pursue causes of action that 

become the estate’s property” refers to the litigant’s “statutory authority under the 

Bankruptcy Code, not its constitutional standing to invoke the federal judicial power.” In 

re Wilton Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d 273, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2020). 

10 U Lock’s suggestion that the Trustee abandoned the automatic stay violation 

claim is belied by (1) its admission before the Bankruptcy Court that it did not 

communicate with the Trustee before bringing the action, and (2) the lack of any other 

indicia that the Trustee abandoned the cause of action. See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)-(b) 

(requiring “notice and a hearing” before trustee may abandon property); In re Wilton 

Armetale, Inc., 968 F.3d at 284 (stating that if a trustee wants to abandon property, he 

must do so overtly and intentionally). U Lock’s argument that it has standing because the 

alleged stay violations and injuries occurred during the “gap period” before a trustee was 

appointed is also unavailing as the adversary action was filed after a trustee had been 

appointed. 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
7 

the Trustee did not abandon or assign the claim, only the Trustee could bring it, and 

Snyder lacked the authority to do so.11 Given that she could not bring the action, she 

lacks standing to appeal the Bankruptcy Court order dismissing it.12 As a result, her 

appeal was not one by a “party” under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a)(3) whose appeal could 

extend the time for U Lock to appeal. Therefore, the fourteen-day clock for U Lock to 

file a notice of appeal began to run with entry of the Bankruptcy Court’s order on August 

10, 2022, not with the filing of Snyder’s notice of appeal. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 

8002(a)(1). Because U Lock filed its notice of appeal twenty-seven days after the 

11 Courts outside of our circuit have recognized circumstances in which creditors 

may have statutory standing to bring suit under § 362(k). See, e.g., In re Ampal-Am. Isr. 

Corp., 502 B.R. 361, 371 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (recognizing that “[t]he typical 

example of a [creditor § 362(k)] claim that satisfies [] prudential limitations involves a 

violation of the stay that impairs a pre-petition secured creditor’s interest in specific 

property of the estate”). However, in such cases, the creditor seeks to vindicate a direct 

interest, not a “generalized injury to the estate and an indirect injury to all creditors . . . 

[which reduces] the pool of assets available for distribution.” Id. at 372. 

12 Snyder’s alleged emotional damages do not give her standing to appeal because 

they lack a causal connection to the purported stay violation. See In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 

657, 669-70 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that a successful claim for emotional damages 

will depend on plaintiff’s ability to link their distress to the stay violation itself). 

Snyder also does not have standing to appeal under the “person aggrieved” 

standard, which generally governs non-party appeals, because Snyder has only a 

derivative, and not a direct, interest in the adversary action’s dismissal. See In re Boy 

Scouts of Am., 35 F.4th 149, 157 (3d Cir. 2022) (explaining that “[p]otential appellants 

are ‘persons aggrieved’ [if their] . . . ‘rights or interests are directly and adversely 

affected pecuniarily by an order of the bankruptcy court’” (citation omitted)); see, e.g., In 

re Buccaneer Res., L.L.C., 912 F.3d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “[w]hether 

the bankruptcy estate or a creditor can pursue a claim against third parties” turns on 

“whether the creditor has suffered a direct injury or one that is derivative of an injury to 

the debtor” and stating that “[i]f the harm to the creditor comes about only because of 

harm to the debtor, then its injury is derivative, and the claim is property of the estate . . . 

[and] only the bankruptcy trustee has standing to pursue the claim for the estate” 

(collecting cases)). 

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/13/2025
8

Bankruptcy Court entered its order, U Lock’s notice of appeal was untimely, and the 

District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider it.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the order of the District Court and 

remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal.

13

13 Because no timely appeals can be pursued, the Bankruptcy Court’s order 

dismissing U Lock’s complaint is the final disposition of this adversary action.

Case: 23-2293 Document: 45 Page: 8 Date Filed: 01/13/2025