Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03705/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03705-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Norris
Appellee
Melvin Shoemate
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3705

___________

Melvin Shoemate, *

*

Petitioner-Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director, Arkansas *

Department of Correction, *

*

Respondent-Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: November 15, 2004

___________

Before RILEY, LAY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

An entry of judgment convicting Melvin Shoemate of rape was filed in

Arkansas state court on May 8, 1997. After the entry of judgment, Shoemate had

thirty days in which to file a notice of direct appeal under Arkansas law. Ark. R.

App. P. Crim. 2(a). Shoemate’s wife filed a notice of appeal on his behalf within

thirty days of the judgment. However, the Arkansas Supreme Court returned the

notice of appeal on July 8, 1997, because it was not filed by Shoemate or a licensed

attorney. Thereafter, Shoemate could file a motion for belated appeal within eighteen

months of the entry of judgment. Ark. R. App. Crim. P. 2(e). He could also file a

petition for post-conviction relief within ninety days of the entry of judgment.

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Rule 37.2(c) provides in relevant part:

If . . . the petitioner was found guilty at trial and did not appeal the

judgment of conviction, a petition claiming relief under this rule must

be filed in the appropriate circuit court within ninety (90) days of entry

of judgment . . . .

If an appeal was taken of the judgment of conviction, a petition

claiming relief under this rule must be filed in the circuit court within

sixty (60) days of the date the mandate was issued by the appellate court.

In the event an appeal was dismissed, the petition must be filed in the

appropriate circuit court within sixty (60) days of the date the appeal

was dismissed . . . .

2

The Honorable William R. Wilson, Jr., United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, adopting the Proposed Findings and Recommended

Disposition of the Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrate Judge for

the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

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Ark. R. Crim. P. 37. Shoemate filed a motion for belated appeal alleging ineffective

assistance of counsel. After finding that Shoemate never requested that his attorney

file a notice of appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied his motion for belated

appeal on March 26, 1998. Shoemate v. State, 965 S.W.2d 779 (Ark. 1998).

Shoemate then attempted to file a Rule 37 petition for post-conviction relief under the

Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.1

 The Arkansas courts found that Shoemate’s

petition for post-conviction relief was not timely since the motion for belated appeal

did not constitute a direct appeal within the meaning of Rule 37. Shoemate v. State,

5 S.W.3d 446 (Ark. 1999). Shoemate was thus required to file his petition for postconviction relief within ninety days of the entry of judgment. Id. at 447-48. 

On November 28, 2000, Shoemate filed his federal habeas petition in district

court. The district court2

 found that Shoemate’s Rule 37 petition was not timely filed

in the Arkansas courts under § 2244(d)(2) of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and counted the time in which

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The one-year limitations period of the AEDPA begins to run at “the date on

which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration

of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). The magistrate judge and the

district court assumed without deciding that the five-month period from the entry of

judgment on May 8, 1997, to the time when Shoemate filed his motion for belated

appeal on October 9, 1997, would be tolled for purposes of the AEDPA. Because it

is unnecessary to pass on this issue in this case, we will assume the same without

deciding the matter. See Wright v. Norris, 299 F.3d 926, 929 & n.3 (8th Cir. 2002)

(assuming without deciding that Arkansas post-conviction proceedings remain

pending during the time that the Arkansas Supreme Court will hear a motion for

belated appeal).

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his Rule 37 petition was pending toward the one-year limitations period under the

AEDPA. The untimeliness of Shoemate’s Rule 37 petition in the Arkansas courts

thus led to the denial of his habeas petition in federal court. Shoemate argued that the

district court should equitably toll the period in which his Rule 37 petition was

pending. The district court denied his petition and issued a certificate of appealability

on the issue of equitable tolling.

Although the AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations on habeas

petitions, it is a true statute of limitations rather than a jurisdictional bar.3

 The statute

is thus subject to equitable tolling in appropriate circumstances. Kreutzer v.

Bowersox, 231 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 863 (2001).

Equitable tolling is appropriate when (1) extraordinary circumstances beyond a

prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a petition on time, or (2) when conduct

of the defendant has lulled the prisoner into inaction. Id. The doctrine applies “only

when some fault on the part of the defendant has caused a plaintiff to be late in filing,

or when other circumstances, external to the plaintiff and not attributable to his

actions, are responsible for the delay.” Flanders v. Graves, 299 F.3d 974, 977 (8th

Cir. 2002). Because the doctrine is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, it gives

the plaintiff an “exceedingly narrow window of relief.” Jihad v. Hvass, 267 F.3d 803,

805 (8th Cir. 2001). 

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Shoemate argues that the time between March 26, 1998, when he filed his Rule

37 petition, and December 2, 1999, when his Rule 37 petition was denied as untimely,

should be equitably tolled to bring his habeas petition within the one-year limitations

period. He argues that he was “lulled into inaction” by Arkansas Supreme Court

decisions which prohibited the filing of a Rule 37 petition and a motion for belated

appeal at the same time. Shoemate contends that under Arkansas law, if a defendant

wishes to assert that his attorney is ineffective for failure to file a notice of appeal, the

proper method to seek relief is through a motion for belated appeal within eighteen

months. Robbins v. State, 705 S.W.2d 6, 7 (Ark. 1986); Lomax v. State, 688 S.W.2d

283, 285 (Ark. 1985). A Rule 37 petition cannot be a substitute for a timely motion

for belated appeal. Robbins, 705 S.W.2d at 8. Shoemate argues that the Arkansas

Supreme Court’s decisions require that the remedies be pursued separately, and has

“repeatedly held that [Rule 37] post-conviction relief . . . is not available while an

appeal is pending.” Brewer v. State, 621 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Ark. 1981); L.T. Tapp v.

State, 920 S.W.2d 482, 483 (Ark. 1996). According to Shoemate, the Arkansas

Supreme Court required that he first pursue a claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel via a motion for belated appeal. Only after his motion for belated appeal was

concluded could he seek Rule 37 post-conviction relief. Because he followed the

path charted by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Shoemate argues that he was “lulled

into inaction” by its decisions. The time in which his Rule 37 petition was pending

should thus be equitably tolled to fall within the one-year statute of limitations of the

AEDPA. 

We find that equitable tolling is not warranted and we deny Petitioner’s

argument for the same reasons as set forth by the district court. Shoemate’s failure

to file his habeas petition within the one-year limitations period was due to his

misunderstanding of the proper procedures for filing a Rule 37 petition under

Arkansas law. The delay was not an extraordinary circumstance, nor was it due to

affirmative conduct on the part of the state. In making his recommendations to the

district court supporting the dismissal of the habeas petition, the magistrate judge

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found that “pro se status, lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, confusion about

or miscalculations of the limitations period, or the failure to recognize the legal

ramifications of actions taken in prior post-conviction proceedings are inadequate to

warrant equitable tolling.” See e.g., Kreutzer, 231 F.3d at 463 (holding that “[e]ven

in the case of an unrepresented prisoner alleging a lack of legal knowledge or legal

resources, equitable tolling has not been warranted”); Jihad, 267 F.3d at 805-07

(finding that an unsuccessful search for counsel could not warrant equitable tolling);

Graves, 299 F.3d at 976-77 (finding that a claim of actual innocence could not justify

equitable tolling). We hold that Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the Arkansas rules,

statutes, and the time period set forth therein do not justify equitable tolling.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

______________________________

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