Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07055/USCOURTS-caDC-95-07055-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Schindler Elevator Corporation
Amicus Curiae
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority
Appellant
Marie Beatrice Weston
Appellee
Victoria Marie Weston
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 1996 Decided March 15, 1996

No. 95-7055

VICTORIA MARIE WESTON AND MARIE BEATRICE WESTON,

APPELLEES

v.

WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

95-7098

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cv01750)

David R. Keyser argued the cause for appellant, with whom Robert L. Polk and Robert J. Kniaz were

on the brief.

Jay B. Dorsey, III argued the cause for appellees.

Edward J. Longosz, II and Adam W. Smith were on the brief for amicus curiae Schindler Elevator

Corporation.

Before: SILBERMAN, BUCKLEY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA")

appeals from a judgment following a jury verdict finding that WMATA was negligent per se in the

inspection and maintenance of its escalators, which proximately caused a hand injury to the two-year

old plaintiff. WMATA makes seven claims of error on appeal, but we need only address its

contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the meaning of § 902.5 of the D.C.

Elevator Code. Although framed in terms of an error of interpretation, WMATA's contention

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1After both sides rested but before the jury instructions, Marie Weston withdrew as a plaintiff

and assigned her right to recover medical expenses to Victoria. For purposes of clarity, our

opinion will continue to refer to the "plaintiffs." 

2WMATA filed a third-party complaint against Schindler Elevator Corporation, the escalator's

manufacturer and maintenance contractor, which the district court severed from the underlying

action on October 3, 1994. 

necessarily presents the court with the question whether the jury was instructed on the correct law.

Because the District of Columbia regulation, violation of which the district court instructed the jury

was negligence per se, had been repealed at the time of the accident, the instruction was erroneous.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the district court with instructionsto enter judgment

for WMATA, in accordance with the special verdict form finding that WMATA was not negligent.

I. 

The accident took place on July 11, 1990, at the Minnesota Avenue Metro station. Marie

Weston was riding up an escalator, with her seven-year-old son Alphonso on one side and her

two-year-old daughter Victoria on the other. When Alphonso broke away from his mother and

distracted her attention, Victoria somehow caught her right hand in the gap between the escalator

steps and the "skirt" (the part below the balustrade) on the side. Victoria's hand injury required

extensive surgery, and she retains some permanent disability. Marie Weston incurred medical

expenses of $17,922.61 on behalf of her daughter.

Marie and Victoria Weston1filed suit against WMATA in federal district court on July 27,

1992.2 At trial, the plaintiffs' theory was that WMATA had failed properly to inspect and maintain

the escalator in question. They called the mechanic from Schindler Elevator Corporation, the

manufacturer and maintenance contractor, who conducted the routine bi-monthlymaintenance on the

escalator, Guilford J. Bobo. Bobo testified that he inspected according to, and ensured compliance

with, the manufacturer's guidelines of a three-sixteenths inch gap on either side, using a gauge

calibrated at three-sixteenths of an inch. Similarly, the District government inspector who inspected

the escalator after Victoria's accident, Leonard Harris, testified that he conducted visual inspections

according to his understanding of D.C. law, which required a three-sixteenthsinch gap on eitherside,

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3The inspection report that Harris filled out indicated that Harris may have mistakenly

inspected a different escalator at the same Metro station. 

4The district court overruled WMATA's objection that Gravette was impermissibly delivering

an opinion on matters of law. An expert witness may not deliver legal conclusions on domestic

law, for legal principles are outside the witness' area of expertise under Federal Rule of Evidence

702. Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509-12 (2d Cir. 1977). In light of our

disposition, we need not decide whether Gravette was stating an opinion on the law. 

and that on July 12, 1990, the escalator was in compliance with D.C. law.3 The WMATA inspector

who inspected the escalator after the accident, Theodore Perper, testified that he conducted a visual

inspection to check compliance with the Safety Code of the American National Standards Institute

("ANSI"), and found that the gap was "in compliance" without specifying the applicable standard.

Another WMATA escalator inspector, Girard P. McGrail, testified that he made a visual examination

to see whether the gap complied with the ANSI Code, which he understood to require no more than

three-eighths of an inch on eitherside. In an inspection that McGrail conducted on the same escalator

on October 16, 1990, after a five-year-old girlsuffered a hand entrapment injury similar to Victoria's,

he found that the gap on the right side was greater than three-eighths of an inch.

The plaintiffs also called an expert witness in escalator engineering, Leroy T. Gravette III,

who testified that under the law that he believed wasin force at the time of the accident in the District

of Columbia, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 13A, § 902.5 (1984), the gap clearance was required to be no

more than three-sixteenths of an inch on either side, and the sum of the two gap clearances was

required to be no more than one-quarter of an inch.4 Section 902.5 of the D.C. Elevator Code

provided:

The clearance on either side of the steps between the steps and the adjacent skirt

guard shall not be more than three-sixteenths inch (3/16"), and the sum of the

clearances on both sidesshall be not more than one-quarter inch (1/4"); except where

means are provided to cause the opening of the power circuit to the motor and brake

if an object becomes caught between the step and the skirt panel as the step

approaches the lower combplate.

Because WMATA's maintenance of the escalator so that the gap on either side was less than

three-sixteenths of an inch was not inconsistent with the possibility that the sumofthe gaps was more

than one-quarter of an inch, the plaintiffs submitted that WMATA was negligent per se.

The plaintiffs also presented evidence that WMATA'sinspectionandmaintenance procedures

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5WMATA introduced evidence only on the extent of Victoria's injury. 

were negligent. They sought to show that WMATA's escalator inspectors were assigned to too many

escalators to do their job properly, were inadequately trained, conducted visual inspections rather

than using tools for more precise measurements, and that WMATA lacked follow-up procedures to

ensure that its contractor, Schindler, performed repair work as instructed. In addition, the plaintiffs

introduced evidence of a prior accident on the same escalator to show that WMATA had notice of

the dangerous condition of the escalator but had failed to warn the plaintiffs.5

After instructing the jury, but before the jury began its deliberations, the district court

suggested the use of a special verdict form that separated "negligence per se" from "ordinary

negligence." The plaintiffs agreed to this verdict form. The jury thereafter found that WMATA was

not liable under the theory of "ordinary negligence" but was liable under the theory of "negligence

per se" and awarded damages of $218,000. The judge denied WMATA's motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, and WMATA appeals.

II.

The jury verdict against WMATA, which was based on a theory of negligence per se, was

predicated on § 902.5 of the D.C. Elevator Code, which was enacted in 1984. In the district court,

and again on appeal, WMATA maintains that its inspection procedures were in compliance with §

902.5. WMATA urges a construction of § 902.5 that the requirement that the sum of the gaps not

exceed one-quarter of an inch excluded escalators equipped with "means ... to cause the opening of

the power circuit to the motor and brake if an object becomes caught between the step and the skirt

panel as the step approaches the lower combplate" (known as a skirt switch). WMATA thus

interprets § 902.5 to require a three-sixteenths of an inch gap on either side only for escalators

equipped with a skirt switcha safety device that will stop the escalator before an object caught in

the gap strikes the edge of the combplate. However, plaintiffs' expert, Gravette, testified that this

exception applied only to descending escalators because it is determined by the "step approach[ing]

the lower combplate." The district court interpreted the exception to apply only to "the area where

the safety switched is located" and not to the middle of the escalator. We need not resolve this

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6Effective November 27, 1992, pursuant to D.C. Code § 5-1309, the Mayor promulgated,

subject to Council review, the 1990 BOCA code and the 1992 D.C. Supplement to replace the

1984 BOCA code and the 1986 D.C. Supplement. 39 D.C. Reg. 8665 (1992). These provisions

dispute over the proper interpretation of § 902.5 because § 902.5 had been repealed at the time of

the accident.

In the district court, the parties stipulated that § 902.5 was the governing regulation. Even

though WMATA operates over five hundred escalators throughout the Metro system, WMATA's

counsel never clearly informed the district court that § 902.5 had been repealed and, as on appeal,

attempted to harmonize that section and the ANSI Code. Thus, counsel misinformed the district

court (contrary to WMATA's legal interest) that the D.C. Elevator Code was in effect at the time of

the accident. As amicus Schindler points out, § 902.5 was repealed by the District of Columbia

before Victoria's accident occurred. While parties may enter into stipulations of fact that are binding

upon them unless they can show manifest injustice, " "[p]arties may not stipulate to the legal

conclusions to be reached by the court.' " TI Fed. Credit Union v. Delbonis, 72 F.3d 921, 928 (1st

Cir. 1995) (quoting Saviano v. Commissioner, 765 F.2d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 1985)). The court is

authorized to determine what law was in effect at the time of Victoria's accident, and thereby avoid

deciding a hypothetical case framed by the plaintiffs and WMATA. United States Nat'l Bank v.

Indepedent Ins. Agents, 113 S. Ct. 2173, 2179 (1993). Accordingly, we address whether § 902.5

remained in force at the time of the accident.

In 1987, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the Construction Codes Approval

and Amendments Act of 1986. D.C. Law 6-216, 34 D.C. Reg. 1072 (1987) (codified at D.C. CODE

ANN. §§ 5-1301 to 5-1309 (1994)). The Act repealed "[t]he District of Columbia Elevator Act of

1977, effective November 3, 1977 (D.C. Law 2-36; 13A DCMR Chapters 1-16)." D.C. Law 6-216,

§ 12(a)(4), 34 D.C. Reg. at 1102. Thus, the 1984 D.C. Elevator Code, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 13A,

was no longer in force at the time of the accident.

In place of the Elevator Code, the District of Columbia substituted the 1984 Basic/National

Building Code promulgated by the Building Officials and Code Administrators International

("BOCA"), its 1985 supplement, and the 1986 D.C. Supplement.6 D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1301(3),

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were not yet in effect at the time of the accident. 

7The 1986 D.C. Supplement provides that:

All buildings and structures and all parts thereof, both existing and new,

shall be maintained in a safe and sanitary condition. All service equipment, means

of egress, devices and safeguards which are required by the Construction Codes in

a building or structure, or which were required by a previous statute in a building

or structure, when erected, altered or repaired, shall be maintained in good

working order.

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 12A, § 104.2 (1987). 

(6)(A), (12)(A), (H). The BOCA code in turn refers to the 1981 Safety Code for Elevators and

Escalators jointly promulgated by ANSI and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers

("ASME") and its 1982 supplement. BOCA Basic/National Building Code § 2100.2, at 361 (9th ed.

1984); id. § 2117.1, at 378. To the same effect, the 1986 D.C. Supplement to the Construction

Code, issued in June 1987, provides that "[a]ll escalators ... and their enclosures shall comply with

the provisions of this section and ANSI A17.1." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 12A, § 2117.1 (1987). The

ANSI code provided that: "The clearance on each side of the steps between the step tread and the

adjacent skirt panelshall be not more than 3/16 in. (4.8 mm)." ASME/ANSI Code A17.1a § 802.3e,

at 110 (Supp. 1982). Consequently, § 902.5 had been repealed, and a simple three-sixteenths of an

inch requirement was in effect at the time of the accident.

Confronted with the repeal of the D.C. Elevator Code, the plaintiffs maintain that the ANSI

code, as adopted by the 1984 BOCA code and the 1986 D.C. Supplement, does not apply

retroactively to existing structures. They refer to § 103.1 of the 1986 D.C. Supplement, which

providesthat "[t]he legal use and occupancy of any building orstructure existing on the effective date

of the Construction Codes or for which it has been approved previously, may be continued without

change." D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 12A, § 103.1 (1987). But that provision deals only with construction,

and the 1986 D.C. Supplement has separate provisions governing the scope of the Construction

Codes for maintenance.7 Moreover, the 1986 Act provides that the Construction Codes, as defined

in § 5-1301(4), "shall control ... [m]atters concerning the ... maintenance of all buildings [and]

structures... in the District ofColumbia and appliesto existing or proposed buildings and structures."

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8At oral argument, plaintiffs' counsel invoked a provision in the 1986 Act that the 1977

Elevator Act would remain in effect after the date of repeal to govern the construction of

buildings that had already received or filed for a construction permit or were under contract at the

time of repeal. D.C. Law 6-216, § 12(b), 34 D.C. Reg. at 1102-03. That section applies only to

construction standards, however, and not to maintenance standards. 

D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-1303(a)(1).8 Thus, we conclude that the ANSI code provided the

three-sixteenths of an inch requirement that applied to the maintenance of escalators in the District

at the time of the accident.

The plaintiffs' negligence per se theory rested on evidence that WMATA was not in

compliance with the requirement in § 902.5 of the D.C. Elevator Code that the sum of the two gaps

be not more than one-quarter of an inch. The plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction, which the district

court adopted, concerned only § 902.5. Most of the plaintiffs' witnesses testified that WMATA was

in compliance with the ANSI code. Although plaintiffs' expert Gravette testified that WMATA's

visual inspections were not in compliance with applicable requirements in the ANSI code, the

plaintiffs did not request a negligence perse instruction based on those code sections. Furthermore,

the isolated testimony from WMATA inspector McGrail that he had inspected to a three-eighths of

an inch standard, rather than to a three-sixteenths of an inch standard, cannot support a finding of

negligence per se because the plaintiffs did not request, and the district court did not submit to the

jury, the three-sixteenths of an inch standard from the ANSI code as the legal standard of care.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment insofar asit found WMATA negligent perse based on

an error of law as to the governing standard of care.

III.

The district court, in order to avoid the necessity for a new trial if this court reversed the

judgment on negligence per se grounds, cf. Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603, 607-08 (D.C.

1991), submitted a special verdict form to the jury that separated what the district court labeled

"ordinary negligence" from "negligence perse." Under D.C. law, violation of a statute or regulation

that is designed to protect the class of persons of whom the plaintiff is a member against the type of

accident that occurred is negligence per se. Otis Elevator Co. v. Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254, 1259 (D.C.

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9The district court properly rejected WMATA's request for an instruction that a violation of §

902.5 was mere evidence of negligence, rather than negligence per se, since WMATA produced

no justification for an inability to comply with § 902.5. See Perkinson v. Gilbert/Robinson, Inc.,

821 F.2d 686, 692 & n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A

(1965)). 

10In some instances, defenses such as contributory negligence may also be questions for the

jury. Although contributory negligence is unavailable in a negligence per se case if the defense

would defeat the purpose of the statute or regulation, Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395

A.2d 63, 68-69 (D.C. 1978), the D.C. Court of Appeals has decided that the D.C. Elevator Code

does not have the purpose "to protect members of the public from their own negligence." District

of Columbia v. Brown, 589 A.2d 384, 386 (D.C. 1991). In any event, in the instant case, the

district court correctly ruled that the defense of contributory negligence could not go to the jury. 

If Marie Weston had been contributorily negligent, her negligence could not have been imputed to

her daughter Victoria to bar Victoria's claim for damages, but it could have barred Marie's claim

for medical expenses, even though Marie had assigned that claim to Victoria. See Gould v.

DeBeve, 330 F.2d 826, 827, 830-31 (D.C. Cir. 1964). However, WMATA presented no

evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that Marie Weston was not

exercising ordinary care. 

11The district court also instructed the jury on the plaintiffs' theory of res ipsa loquitur.

Although not all accidents on escalators are of the type that would not ordinarily occur in the

absence of someone's negligence, "it may be common knowledge that escalator mechanisms do

not catch the feet or hands of riders unless someone is negligent." Hailey v. Otis Elevator Co.,

636 A.2d 426, 429 (D.C. 1994); see also Bell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 483 A.2d 324, 329

(D.C. 1984). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the plaintiff to get to the jury based only on

circumstantial evidence of the defendant's negligence. See 4 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, THE LAW

OF TORTS § 19.11, at 69-73 (2d ed. 1986). When the jury entered a verdict for WMATA on the

theory of "ordinary negligence," it rejected the plaintiffs' res ipsa loquitur theory. 

1992). Although the element of negligence is established as a matter of law,9the jurymust still decide

whether the statute or regulation was violated and whether that violation was a proximate cause of

the injury.10 Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314, 323 (D.C. 1995). By contrast, for liability in the

absence of the violation of an applicable statute or regulation, the jury must find that the defendant

breached a duty of ordinary care and that the breach was a proximate cause of the injury.11

Consequently, by finding for WMATA under the alternative theory of liability that did not depend on

an applicable statute or regulation to establishWMATA'sstandard of care (the theory that the district

court called "ordinary negligence"), the jury necessarily found that WMATA did not breach a duty

of ordinary care. Although the verdict form might have been clearer if the elements of the two

theories of negligence had been spelled out, particularly in light of the jury instructions on three

theories of negligence ("ordinary negligence," negligence per se and res ipsa loquitur), the plaintiffs

did not make such a request or otherwise object to the form, and the district court correctly instructed

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the jury on the law of non-per se negligence, such that the verdict form was not error. See FED. R.

CIV. P. 49(a); cf. District of Columbia v. Banks, 646 A.2d 972, 981-82 (D.C. 1994). Nor do the

plaintiffs argue on appeal that they are entitled to have the case remanded for a new trial in the event

that the negligence per se verdict is overturned.

Accordingly, because the jury found that WMATA was not negligent under a standard of

ordinary care and there are no grounds for which the plaintiffs could receive a new trial, we remand

the case to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for WMATA.

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