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Parties Involved:
John Francis Rourke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

FILED 

United Scaaa Coun of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH ' CIRCUIT 

DEC -- 31990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN FRANCIS ROURKE, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) Nos. 90-5092, 

) 90-5129, 

) & 

) 90-5130 

) (D.C. No. 85-CR-57-C) 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, MCWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

_34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cases are therefore ordered 

Appellant entered a plea of guilty to charges of importing 

controlled substances, in violation of 21 u.s.c. SS 843(b), 

952(a), and 960(a)(l), and assisting in filing a false income tax 

document, in violation of 26 u.s.c. S 7206(2). The district court 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 1 
sentenced appellant to eighteen years' imprisonment. Appellant 

subsequently challenged these convictions, his sentence, and the 

denial of parole in three separate proceedings. The district 

court denied relief in all three actions and appellant appeals. 

In appeal No. 90-5092, appellant challenges the denial of his 

motion to recall all copies of his presentence report, claiming 

the Bureau of Prisons and the United States Parole Commission 

violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Because this court 

lacks jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. See State Bank 

of Spring Hill v. Anderson (In re Bucyrus Grain Co.), 905 F.2d 

1362, 1365 (10th Cir. 1990)(appellate court may raise 

jurisdictional issue sua sponte). 

The district court entered its order denying appellant's 

motion June 16, 1989. Appellant, who was incarcerated throughout 

these proceedings, filed his notice of appeal April 13, 1990, 

asserting he did not receive notice of the district court's 

dispositive order until April 10, 1990. 

In a civil action involving the United States as a party, a 

litigant must file his notice of appeal within sixty days of the 

entry of a final order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(l). The district 

court, in its discretion, may extend the time for filing the 

notice of appeal an additional thirty days if the motion to extend 

the time is filed within thirty days of the expiration of the 

filing period. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Appellant filed his 

notice of appeal well beyond the time for filing either a notice 

of appeal or a motion to extend the filing period. "Lack of 

notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the time to 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 2 
• 

appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a party for 

failure to appeal within the time allowed, except as permitted in 

Rule 4 (a) • • • • " Fed. R. Ci v. P. 7 7 ( d) • 

A timely notice of appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional. 

=B:rc;::o'""w:..:::d:.:e=-=r=------=-v-=·--=D:..:1.=-=· r=-e=c-=tc:oc:r:...,'--""'D=-e;;.p..._' ..a:ta...--=oa..:f=---C=o=r=r""'e;..;:c'""'t=i=o=n==s , 4 3 4 U • S • 2 5 7 , 2 6 4 

(1978); see also 28 u.s.c. S 2107. Absent a timely notice of 

appeal, this court has no discretion to review the merits, but 

rather must dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 

See Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988). 

In appeal No. 90-5129, appellant appeals from the district 

court's denial of his motion, made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32, to vacate his sentence and for resentencing based upon a 

corrected presentence report. In this motion, appellant 

challenged both his conviction and his sentence.. To the extent 

appellant asserted claims challenging the validity of the 

convictions underlying his sentence, we will liberally construe 

those allegations as claims seeking collateral relief from his 

convictions, asserted pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 2255. See Haines v. 

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 

Appellant asserted that the sentencing court improperly 

sentenced appellant based upon a presentence report containing 

false and inaccurate information. Appellant acknowledged that the 

court, at the sentencing hearing, questioned both appellant and 

his attorney concerning the accuracy of the information contained 

in the presentence report and both appellant and his attorney 

stated the report was accurate. 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 3 
Ordinarily, if a criminal defendant fails to challenge 

information contained in a presentence report at the time of 

sentencing, as provided pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 32, the 

defendant may not subsequently challenge the accuracy of the 

presentence report. See United States v. Edmondson, 818 F.2d 768, 

769 (11th Cir. 1987); cf. United States v. Pogue, 865 F.2d 226, 

230 (10th Cir. 1989)(where, at sentencing, defendant stipulated to 

amount of restitution and expressly waived hearing to determine 

restitution, court would not address merits of subsequent 

challenge to amount of restitution impos,ed by sentencing court). 

In the instant case, however, appellant further asserted that 

he failed to challenge the accuracy of the presentence report at 

the time of sentencing because appellant was under the influence 

of strong psychotropic medication, administered by medical 

personnel at the jail, which rendered appellant unable to 

understand and meaningfully participate in the sentencing process. 

Appellant further asserted that he was similarly incapacitated at 

the time he entered his guilty plea to the charges underlying his 

sentence. 

A defendant's incompetency at the time of pleading or 

sentencing constitutes sufficient grounds for relief under section 

2255. See Schutz v. United States, 432 F.2d 25, 29 (10th Cir. 

1970)(plea proceedings), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1002 (1971); 

Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir.) 

(sentencing), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 972 (1977). Where the 

defendant's allegations of incompetence at the time of pleading or 

sentencing amount to more than conclusory statements, an 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 4 
• 

evidentiary hearing is required.. See, ~, United States v. 

Gutierrez, 839 F.2d 648, 649, 652 (10th Cir. 1988)(citing Sanders 

v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963)); Nolan v. United States, 466 

F.2d 522, 524 (10th Cir. 1972). 

In support of his claims, appellant submitted medical records 

from the jail, documenting the administration of this medication 

to appellant during the time in question, a pharmaceutical 

publication addressing the possible side effects of this 

medication, the affidavit of a medical doctor and personal friend 

of appellant's, who, after reviewing appellant's medical records, 

expressed his belief that this medication could have affected 

appellant's competency during the time period in question, and an 

affidavit of one of appellant's family members attesting to the 

significant changes in appellant's personality and behavior during 

the time of the plea and sentencing hearings. Further, appellant 

alleged that the government attorney suggested to the court prior 

to sentencing that appellant be transferred to a federal prison 

hospital for treatment before the court sentenced appellant. 

Because appellant has asserted more than a conclusory claim 

that he was incompetent at the time he entered his guilty plea and 

at the time the district court sentenced him, an evidentiary 

hearing was required. We, therefore, vacate the district court's 

order denying relief on these claims and remand this action to the 

district court for proceedings consistent with this order and 

judgment. 

The remainder of the district court's order denying appellant 

relief on the other claims asserted in this motion is affirmed. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 5 
Among those other claims included in his Rule 32 motion, appellant 

challenged the validity of his plea agreement with the government, 

under which appellant agreed to abandon an appeal of an earlier 

federal conviction entered in the Eastern District of Virginia and 

an interlocutory appeal to this court challenging the charges 

underlying this appeal as violating double jeopardy, to forego 

any appeal from a prior federal conviction appellant suffered in 

Illinois, and to waive any double jeopardy defense appellant might 

have to the convictions at issue in the instant appeal. Appellant 

further asserted that, even if he could have validly waived his 

double jeopardy defense, he did not do so, in light of the 

district court's failure to make a specific inquiry concerning the 

waiver of this defense at the plea proceeding. 

A voluntary guilty plea precludes a criminal defendant from 

subsequently asserting a double jeopardy defense that was not 

apparent on the face of the record before the court accepting the 

plea. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); ~ 

also, ~, Dermota v. United States, 895 F.2d 1324, 1326 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 107 (1990). Review of the federal 

indictments filed against appellant in Illinois, Virginia, and 

Oklahoma does not establish a facially-apparent double jeopardy 

defense. 1 

Appellant's guilty plea to the Oklahoma charges thus waived 

the double jeopardy defense he now asserts. See Broce, 488 U.S. 

1 This court takes judicial notice of pleadings filed with this 

court in United States v. Rourke, No. 85-1987 (dismissed Oct. 7, 

1985), which included copies of these three indictments. 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 6 
1 at 569. Such a waiver is not made invalid because "' double 

jeopardy' was not specifically waived by name," Ricketts v. 

Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 9 (1987), or because the court failed, at the 

plea proceeding, to inquire specifically concerning appellant's 

waiver of a double jeopardy defense. See Broce, 488 U.S. at 572-

73. 

Further, a criminal defendant may validly waive, pursuant to 

a plea agreement, his right to appeal. See,~, United States 

v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Johnson 

v. United States, 838 F.2d 201, 202-04 (7th Cir. 1988)(voluntary 

waiver of right to appeal forecloses collateral review), petition 

for cert. filed (April 21, 1988). The district court's order 

denying appellant relief on these and his remaining claims is, 

therefore, affirmed. 

In appeal No. 90-5130, appellant challenges the district 

court's denial of his petition for a writ of mandamus, asserted 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. S 1361, to compel the United States Attorney 

General to remove false information from appellant's presentence 

report and to compel the Parole Commission to preclude this 

information 

eligibility. 

from its consideration of appellant's parole 

Mandamus relief is appropriate only if 1) the 

a clear right to the relief sought; 2) the 

a plainly defined and preemptory duty to do the 

petitioner has 

respondent has 

action petitioner seeks; 

available. See Wilder 

1988). 

and 3) no other adequate remedy is 

v. Prokop, 846 F.2d 613, 620 (10th Cir. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 7 
The district court gave appellant an opportunity to challenge 

any information included in the presentence report at the time of 

sentencing. 2 Because appellant failed to challenge the accuracy 

of the presentence report at the time of sentencing, he was 

precluded from subsequently challenging the accuracy of the report 

in this proceeding. 

865 F.2d at 230. 

See Edmondson, 818 F.2d at 769; cf. Pogue, 

Appellant also asserted that the inclusion of information in 

his presentence report concerning the activities underlying his 

prior federal convictions entered in Virginia and Illinois, as 

well as activities underlying charges in Illinois which were 

dismissed as part of a plea agreement, violated appellant's plea 

agreement with the government in this case. The plea agreement in 

this case provided that "the government will not subject 

[appellant] to additional federal criminal prosecution for any 

criminal acts he committed in connection with his narcotics 

organization." Contrary to appellant's assertions, the inclusion 

in the presentence report of information concerning appellant's 

prior drug-related activities and consideration of this 

information by the sentencing court, the Bureau of Prisons, and 

the Parole Commission did not amount to "additional federal 

criminal prosecutions" and, therefore, did not violate the plea 

agreement. 

2 Although appellant challenged the accuracy of the presentence 

report in his petition for mandamus relief, appellant failed to 

assert in this petition, as he had in his Rule 32 motion, that he 

was incompetent at the time of sentencing. 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-5092 Document: 010110093934 Date Filed: 12/03/1990 Page: 8 
Finally, appellant again challenged the validity of his plea 

agreement. As discussed above, this claim lacked merit. Because 

appellant failed to establish that he was entitled to the relief 

sought in his petition for mandamus relief, the district court's 

order denying mandamus relief is also affirmed. 

To summarize, appeal No. 90-5092 is DISMISSED for lack of 

appellate jurisdiction. Appeal No. 90-5129 is REVERSED and 

REMANDED only to the extent the district court denied appellant 

relief, without conducting an evidentiary hearing, on his claims 

that he was incompetent at the time of the plea and sentencing 

proceedings. The remainder of appeal No. 90-5129, as well as 

appeal No. 90-5130, is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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