Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06004/USCOURTS-ca10-96-06004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tyrone Maurice Clark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

. FILED 

lJaatect States Court ot Appeals 

Tentb Circuit 

MAY 21 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

TYRONE MAURICE CLARK, No. 96-6004 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-116-L) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Tyrone Maurice Clark, prose, El Reno, Oklahoma. 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, Mary M. Smith, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 1 
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34 (a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. This case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Tyrone Maurice Clark appeals pro se from the Order of the district court denying 

his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 (e) for the return of property. Clark claims 

that the method of service employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("the FBI") in 

the administrative forfeiture proceeding was constitutionally deficient. We affirm. 

On June 21, 1994, Appellant Clark was arrested after negotiating the quantity, 

price, and delivery of six kilograms of cocaine with an undercover FBI agent. After his 

arrest, the FBI seized $101,760.00 in U.S. currency from Clark and his associate. A sixcount indictment was returned against Clark in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma on August 3, 1994. On November 9, 1994, Clark pleaded 

guilty to count one, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 

21 U.S. C. § 846, and the government subsequently dismissed the remaining five counts. 

Clark was sentenced on January 17, 1995, to 180 months of imprisonment and five years 

of supervised release. 

In connection with the seizure of the currency, the FBI commenced an 

administrative forfeiture proceeding. Notice apprising Clark of the forfeiture proceeding 

and his right to contest it was accomplished by several means. On July 19, 1994, the FBI 

sent notice by certified mail to Clark at the Oklahoma County Jail where he was being 

held prior to his indictment. It also sent notice the next day to a Wichita, Kansas, address 

recorded for Clark at the time of his arrest. The return receipt for the County Jail notice 

2 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 2 
was signed on July 25, 1994. The second return receipt, sent to the Wichita address, was 

signed by Dorothy Barnes, who appears to be Clark's mother-in-law, on July 25, 1994. 

The FBI also served notice by publication in The New York Times on August 7, 14, and 

21, 1994. As no claim was made to contest the administrative forfeiture, a Declaration of 

Forfeiture was issued as to the seized currency on October 12, 1994. 

Almost two months after he was sentenced~ Clark filed his Rule 41 (e) motion for 

the return of the $101,760.00 in currency seized from him at the time of his arrest. The 

district court entered its Order denying Clark's motion on December 12, 1994. It held 

that the currency had been administratively forfeited by the FBI and that the evidence 

showed Clark had been served with notice in a constitutionally adequate manner. This 

appeal followed. 

On appeal, Clark asserts that the methods of service employed by the FBI were 

constitutionally defective so as to constitute a denial of due process. He concedes that he 

was incarcerated at the Oklahoma County Jail from the time of his arrest until his 

sentencing. But he contends that he did not receive the certified mailing of notice sent by 

the FBI to that facility. Clark claims that he should have been served in person at the jail. 

Furthermore, Clark maintains that the two additional forms of service were otherwise 

defective. In the alternative, Clark argues that the seizure and forfeiture constituted 

jeopardy in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 

In order to properly effect a forfeiture, the government is required to give notice to 

all persons who have or claim an interest in real property being administratively forfeited 

3 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 3 
See 19 U.S. C.§ 1607~ 21 C.F.R. § 1316.75. If no claim and bond are received by the 

forfeiting agency within the prescribed time limits, a declaration of forfeiture must be 

issued. See 19 U.S.C. § 1609~ 21 C.F.R. § 1316.77 (b). 

Notice is designed "to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate 

preparation for, an impending 'hearing.'" Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 

436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978). Due process thus requires "notice reasonably calculated, under all 

the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford 

them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 

Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 

When the government can reasonably ascertain the name and address of an 

interested party, due process requires the government to send "[n]otice by mail or other 

means as certain to ensure actual notice." Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 

791, 800 (1983). But due process does not require that the interested party actually 

receive the notice. United States v. 51 Pieces of Real Property, 11 F.3d 1306, 1316 

(1Oth Cir. 1994 ). "So long as the government 'acted reasonably in selecting means likely 

to inform [the] persons affected, ... then it has discharged its burden."' !d. (quoting 

Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d 646, 649 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 

1005 (1989)). 

Due process issues, which call for legal conclusions, are subject to de novo review. 

See Facet Enters. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 970 (lOth Cir. 1990). But the question of 

whether the FBI employed means that were reasonably calculated to provide Clark actual 

4 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 4 
notice is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. See 51 Pieces of Real 

Property, 17 F.3d at 1316. 

Federal district courts have jurisdiction to review whether an administrative 

forfeiture satisfied due process and statutory requirements. United States v. Woodall, 12 

F.3d 791, 793 (8th Cir. 1993). Due process attacks on forfeiture proceedings may be 

pursued in a civil action under 28 U.S. C. § 1331. United States v. Giraldo, 45 F.3d 509, 

511 (1st Cir. 1995). But the fact that Clark brought his motion in the district court under 

Rule 41 (e) does not defeat the district court's jurisdiction to hear a due process 

challenge. Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511. "Where criminal proceedings against the movant 

have already been completed, a district court should treat a rule 41 (e) motion as a civil 

complaint." Onwubiko v. United States, 969 F.2d 1392, 1397 (2d Cir. 1992); United 

States v. Martinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1366-67 (9th Cir. 1987). As a result, we construe 

Clark's Rule 41 (e) motion liberally, as seeking to invoke the proper remedy. 

Although the district court did not make a specific finding that the means 

employed by the FBI to give Clark notice were reasonable, we can infer such a finding 

from the district court's ultimate holding that the notice to Clark was constitutionally 

adequate. See 51 Pieces of Real Property, 17 F.3d at 1316. When the government is 

aware that an interested party is incarcerated, due process requires the government to 

make an attempt to serve him with notice in prison. United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. 

Currency, 12 F. 3d 1160, 1163-64 (3d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U. S.L. W. 

3669 (U.S. Mar. 28, 1996) (No. 95-1575); Giraldo, 45 F.3d at 511; Woodall, 12 F.3d at 

5 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 5 
794. The FBI mailed notice to Clark at the facility where he was incarcerated at the time. 

Clark admits that he was incarcerated at the Oklahoma County Jail when the FBI sent 

notice to him there. This means of service, by return-receipt, certified mail, was 

reasonably calculated to apprise Clark of the forfeiture action. We cannot say that the 

district court's finding to this effect was clearly erroneous. 

As the Supreme Court has indicated, service by mail is a constitutionally 

acceptable means to provide actual notice. See Mennonite Bd. of Missions, 462 U.S. at 

800. Sending the certified mail notice to Clark at the Oklahoma County Jail thus satisfied 

due process requirements and, for that reason, we do not consider the adequacy of the 

FBI's additional methods of service. That Clark may not have received the certified mail 

notice does not negate the constitutional adequacy of the FBI's attempt to accomplish 

actual notice. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the FBI was not required to effect 

notice through every means calculated to provide actual notice. See 51 Pieces of Real 

Property, 17 F. 3d at 1318. Clark's assertions that "[e]veryone is served in person in jail" 

and that the FBI should know that "most of the time [a certified letter is] never received 

by the person [who] is incarcerated," notwithstanding, Clark has not shown the sort of 

exceptional circumstances that would have required the FBI to employ a means other than 

certified mail. We have found no case suggesting that service by mail is inadequate or 

requiring the government to personally serve an interested party at the place of 

incarceration. We decline to create such a requirement here. 

6 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 6 
Because he failed to file a claim and cost bond that would have halted the process, 

Clark did not contest the administrative forfeiture proceeding. See 19 U.S. C. § 1608; 21 

C.F.R. § 1316.76. As a result, he has lost his opportunity to litigate the forfeiture. See 

United States v. Castro, 78 F.3d 453, 456 (9th Cir. 1996); Mayfield v. City of Virginia 

Beach, 780 F. Supp. 1082, 1085 (E.D. Va. 1992). 

Clark has similarly lost his opportunity to litigate his jeopardy claim. Clark asks 

this court to consider whether the "seizure constituted jeopardy." But the administrative 

forfeiture became complete prior to Clark's guilty plea and sentencing. Because of his 

failure to appear in response to the FBI's constitutionally adequate notice and his 

resulting failure to contest the administrative forfeiture proceeding, Clark was not even 

placed in jeopardy until his sentencing. He thereby was necessarily not twice placed in 

jeopardy by the forfeiture. 

Because Clark appeals prose, we are obliged to read his pleading liberally. See 

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Therefore, we construe his claim 

alternatively as an effort to raise the issue of double jeopardy concerning his subsequent 

guilty plea. Even with this construction of Clark's argument, however, his double 

jeopardy argument also fails. 

This court has recently held that where an interested party fails to contest the · 

original, civil forfeiture proceeding, that party cannot raise a double jeopardy argument 

subsequent to sentencing for a related criminal offense. See United States v. German, 16 

F. 3d 315, 319-20 (lOth Cir. 1996). The reasoning behind German is that because of the 

7 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 7 
failure to contest the administrative forfeiture, the would-be claimant was not a party to 

the forfeiture proceeding, not at risk of a determination of guilt, and thus was never in 

jeopardy. !d. at 319. A party who was never in jeopardy can never be in double 

jeopardy. !d. 

By failing to file a claim in the forfeiture proceeding, Clark has missed his 

opportunity to litigate the question of his interest in the seized currency. His later Rule 

41 (e) motion does not suffice as a contest to the forfeiture and does not place him back 

in a position of jeopardy. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Order of the district court denying Clark's Rule 41 

(e) motion for the return of property is AFFIRMED. 

8 

Appellate Case: 96-6004 Document: 01019277479 Date Filed: 05/21/1996 Page: 8