Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01987/USCOURTS-cand-4_07-cv-01987-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darryl A. Baca
Plaintiff
Robert A. Horel
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DARRYL A. BACA,

Plaintiff,

 v.

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden; S. L.

KAYS; D. O’DONNELL; and J.

BURLESON,

Defendants. /

No. C 07-1987 PJH (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiff, an inmate at Pelican Bay State Prison, has filed a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He has paid the filing fee. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners

seek redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review the court must identify any cognizable claims, and

dismiss any claims which are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. at

1915A(b)(1),(2). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." "Specific facts are not necessary;

the statement need only '"give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests."'" Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 Bell Atlantic Corp. disapproved the "no set of facts" language in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957). Conley had stated "the accepted rule that a complaint should not be

dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 45-46. Bell

Atlantic Corp. decided that "this famous observation has earned its retirement. The phrase is

best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard." Bell

Atlantic Corp, 127 S. Ct. at 1969. 

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omitted). Although in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual

allegations, . . . a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds of his 'entitle[ment] to relief'

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief

above the speculative level." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65

(2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer "enough facts to state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face." Id. at 1986-87.1

 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was

violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

B. Legal Claims 

Plaintiff complains that defendant Kays, an associate warden, cut off his wife’s

visiting rights for two years on grounds she was involved in gang activity and had assisted

him in directing gang activity from the prison. He asserts that this violated his due process

and equal protection rights under the federal and state constitutions.

Interests protected by the Due Process Clause may arise from two sources--the Due

Process Clause itself and laws of the states. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 223-27

(1976). Changes in conditions so severe as to affect the sentence imposed in an

unexpected manner implicate the Due Process Clause itself, whether or not they are

authorized by state law. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Deprivations

authorized by state law that are less severe or more closely related to the expected terms

of confinement may also amount to deprivations of a procedurally protected liberty interest,

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provided that (1) state statutes or regulations narrowly restrict the power of prison officials

to impose the deprivation, i.e. give the inmate a kind of right to avoid it, and (2) the liberty in

question is one of "real substance." Id. at 477-87. In the latter, and more common state

law scenario, "real substance" will generally be limited to freedom from (1) restraint that

imposes "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents

of prison life," id. at 484, or (2) state action that "will inevitably affect the duration of [a]

sentence," id. at 487.

A prisoner's interest in unfettered visitation is not guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause itself, Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989), but

because California has created regulations from which a protected interest in visitation

could arise, a court must also whether the regulations creating the right to participation in

the program narrowly restrict the power of prison officials to deny inmates visitation, and

whether the deprivation suffered due to a denial of visitation is one of "real substance." 

See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 477-87. 

Looking at the regulatory language, California Code of Regulations title 15, section

3170.1 sets forth general substantive criteria which must be followed and circumstances

under which visitation must be approved. However, section 3172.1(b) specifically provides

that visitation may be discretionarily denied for reasons other than those set forth in the

regulations and section 3170.1(c) states that visits are subject to denial or restriction as

necessary to provide fair allocation of prison resources. This reservation of the right to

allow and disallow visits "is not such that an inmate can reasonably form an objective

expectation that a visit would necessarily be allowed absent the occurrence of one of the

listed conditions." See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 464-65 (finding no protected liberty interest

in Kentucky regulations). Because a visit may be denied regardless of compliance with

substantive criteria, this language is not sufficiently mandatory to meet the first prong of the

Sandin test, and therefore no protected liberty interest requiring constitutional protection is

created.

In addition, the right to freedom of association is among the rights least compatible

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with incarceration. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U. S. 126, 131 (2003). Thus the denial of

visitation does not constitute an "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation

to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487. For these reasons, there

is no due process right in visitation in California prisons. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,

1092 (9th Cir. 1996), amended, 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998) (prisoner has no

constitutional right to access to a particular visitor).

Plaintiff also has failed to state a plausible equal protection claim. He compares

himself with inmates who have received rule violation reports, and who therefore receive a

hearing and due process, when he has not been issued a rule violation report – that is, he

is not similarly situated to inmates who have been given such reports. 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for federal relief that is plausible on its face. The

federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice. Because the court declines to retain

jurisdiction over the state-law claims, those claims will be dismissed without prejudice. See

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). 

CONCLUSION

The federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice. The supplemental state law

claims are DISMISSED without prejudice. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2007. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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