Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01385/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01385-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Norma E. Caquelin
Appellee
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

NORMA E. CAQUELIN,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________

2019-1385

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims 

in No. 1:14-cv-00037-CFL, Senior Judge Charles F. Lettow.

______________________

Decided: May 29, 2020

______________________

THOMAS SCOTT STEWART, Stewart Wald & McCulley, 

LLC, Kansas City, MO, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also 

represented by ELIZABETH MCCULLEY; STEVEN WALD, St. 

Louis, MO. 

 ERIKA KRANZ, Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by 

JEFFREY B. CLARK, ERIC GRANT. 

 ANDREA CAROL FERSTER, Rails-To-Trails Conservancy, 

Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Rails-To-Trails Conservancy. 

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2 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

 MEGHAN SUE LARGENT, LewisRice LLC, St. Louis, MO, 

for amici curiae Iowa Farm Bureau Federation, Illinois Agricultural Association, Kansas Farm Bureau, Missouri 

Farm Bureau Federation. Also represented by LINDSAY 

BRINTON. 

 MARK F. HEARNE, II, True North Law Group, LLC, St. 

Louis, MO, for amici curiae National Association for Reversionary Property Owners, Cato Institute, Southeastern Legal Foundation, Reason Foundation, 

Inversecondemnation.com, James W. Ely, Jr. Also represented by STEPHEN S. DAVIS. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, LINN and TARANTO, Circuit 

Judges.

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

Norma Caquelin owns land that was subject to a railroad-held easement limited to railroad use. The railroad 

applied to the federal Surface Transportation Board for

permission to abandon its rail line, noting that it had run 

no traffic over the line for two years. Shortly thereafter, 

the Board granted the permission to abandon, to take effect 

a month later, unless, as relevant here, the federal-law process for considering use of the easement land for a public 

recreational trail was duly invoked. That process was invoked, and two days before the abandonment permission 

was otherwise to take effect, the Board issued a Notice of 

Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU). The NITU prevented effectuation of the abandonment-authority approval and thus blocked abandonment—and, as a result,

blocked the ending of the railroad’s easement, for which 

abandonment was a necessary condition—for 180 days, 

during which the railroad could negotiate to try to reach an 

agreement with two entities that expressed interest in a 

transfer of the easement for trail use. The NITU expired 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 3

on the 180th day when no such agreement was reached. 

The railroad completed its abandonment three months 

later.

Ms. Caquelin sued the United States in the Court of 

Federal Claims, alleging that a taking in violation of the 

Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause occurred when the government, by issuing the NITU that blocked abandonment,

prevented termination of the easement during the 180-day 

period of the NITU. The trial court granted Ms. Caquelin’s 

motion for summary judgment of liability. Caquelin v. 

United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 658 (2015) (Caquelin I). The 

court relied on our decisions in Ladd v. United States, 

630 F.3d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Ladd I), Caldwell v. United 

States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and Barclay v. 

United States, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The parties 

stipulated to compensation of $900. Deferring the issue of 

attorneys’ fees, the court entered judgment under Court of 

Federal Claims Rule 54(b).

The government appealed. It argued that this court 

should overrule at least Ladd I, and perhaps also Caldwell 

and Barclay. And it argued that a NITU, when not followed by a trail agreement, should not be treated as a categorical taking; instead, either it should be subject to a 

general regulatory-taking analysis under Penn Central 

Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 

(1978), and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321–24

(2002), or it should be analyzed using the multi-factor approach adopted for government-created flooding in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, 568 U.S. 

23, 38–40 (2012). 

Without ruling on the merits of the government’s arguments, we remanded for the trial court to receive additional 

evidence, as needed, and to make findings under an Arkansas Game approach, so that consideration of the legal challenges could proceed on a fuller record. Caquelin v. United 

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4 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

States, 697 F. App’x 1016, 1019–20 (Fed. Cir. 2017) 

(Caquelin II). On remand, the trial court again held that a 

taking had occurred. Caquelin v. United States, 140 Fed. 

Cl. 564 (2018) (Caquelin III).

The government appeals. We affirm. We reject the 

contention that Arkansas Game calls for displacing the categorical-taking analysis adopted in our precedents for a 

NITU that blocks termination of an easement, an analysis 

applicable even when that NITU expires without a trailuse agreement that would indefinitely extend the federallaw blocking of the easement’s termination. We clarify, 

however, that a NITU does not effect a taking if, even in 

the absence of a NITU, the railroad would not have abandoned its line (a necessary prerequisite for termination of 

the easement under state law) during the period of the 

NITU: in such a case, the NITU takes nothing from the 

landowner that the landowner would have had in the absence of the NITU. We leave to future cases further questions about that issue. Here, the government has not 

sought a remand for findings on when the railroad would 

have abandoned the line in the absence of a NITU, and the

evidence permits a finding that abandonment would have 

occurred during the NITU period if the NITU had not issued.

I

A

The Transportation Act of 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 

456, 476–78, requires a rail carrier that intends to abandon 

or discontinue a railroad line to file an application with the 

Surface Transportation Board. See 49 U.S.C. § 10903(a); 

49 C.F.R. §§ 1152.20–1152.22. A rail carrier qualifies for 

an exemption from certain requirements if it certifies that 

no local traffic has moved over the line for at least two 

years and that any overhead traffic can be rerouted over 

other lines. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(b). The National Trails 

System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, § 208, 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 5

97 Stat. 42, 48 (Trails Act), provides for blocking of “abandonment,” however, despite the absence of any rail use, 

present or in prospect, if a proper entity agrees with the 

railroad to take over the rail right-of-way for trail use. 16 

U.S.C. § 1247(d). Such trail use is deemed “interim,” id., 

and the term “rail banking” is applied, 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1152.29(a), because rail use might someday be restored.

When a rail carrier applies for permission to abandon, 

as relevant here, the Board’s regulations provide that any

prospective trail sponsor may file a comment indicating an 

interest “in acquiring or using a right-of-way of a rail line 

. . . for interim trail use and rail banking.” 49 C.F.R. 

§ 1152.29(a). If the rail carrier agrees to negotiate an 

agreement with such a potential trail sponsor, the Board 

will issue to the rail carrier and potential trail sponsor a 

NITU providing for a 180-day negotiation period. Id.

§ 1152.29(d)(1); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce 

Commission, 494 U.S. 1, 7 n.5 (1990) (Preseault I). Consistent with the limitation of potential outcomes recognized 

in the full name—“a Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment”—the NITU generally provides that the rail carrier may, during the NITU period, continue the process of 

physical abandonment, i.e., may “discontinue service, cancel any applicable tariffs, and salvage track and materials.” 

49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1); see also Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 7 

n.5. If the parties reach an agreement, and duly notify the 

Board, the right-of-way remains under Board jurisdiction 

indefinitely while used as a recreational trail, and state law 

may not treat that “interim use . . . as an abandonment of 

the use of such rights-of-way for railroad purposes.” 16 

U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Government Opening Br. 8 (notification to Board of trail-use agreement “prevents a railroad easement from being abandoned as it might otherwise 

under applicable law”). If the parties fail to reach an agreement, and the NITU expires, the rail carrier gains authority to abandon; that authority does not mandate 

abandonment, but if the rail carrier does not exercise the 

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6 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

authority within a one-year period defined by regulation, it 

cannot abandon without filing a new request for abandonment authority. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1), (e)(2).

In Preseault I, the Supreme Court held that, to the extent that the application of the Trails Act results in a Fifth 

Amendment taking by preventing a property owner from 

regaining an unencumbered interest in the land subject to 

a right-of-way, the Tucker Act authorizes suit in the Court 

of Federal Claims. 494 U.S. at 11–17. We subsequently 

held that establishment of a trail under the Trails Act results in a Fifth Amendment taking when the original easement granted to the rail carrier under state property law is 

not sufficiently broad in scope to encompass recreational 

trail use. Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525

(Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc) (Preseault II).

In Caldwell, we addressed a statute-of-limitations 

question, and we “h[e]ld that the Fifth Amendment taking, 

if any, under the Trails Act is accomplished when an NITU 

is issued and state law reversionary interests that would 

otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment 

proceedings are forestalled.” 391 F.3d at 1236; id. at 1233 

(“The taking, if any, when a railroad right-of-way is converted to interim trail use under the Trails Act occurs when 

state law reversionary property interests that would otherwise vest in the adjacent landowners are blocked from so 

vesting.”). We followed that rule in Barclay, 443 F.3d 

at 1373–74. Later, in Ladd I, we applied Caldwell and 

Barclay, along with the principle that “physical takings are 

compensable, even when temporary,” 630 F.3d at 1025 (citing Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 

1991)), and held that the Board’s issuance of a NITU effects 

a taking—“when state law reversionary property interests 

are blocked,” id. at 1023—even if the rail carrier and potential trail sponsor never reached an agreement, so that 

no conversion to trail use occurred. Id. at 1022–25.

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 7

B

This appeal is the second in this rails-to-trails case, see 

Caquelin II, 697 F. App’x 1016, which involves land now

owned by Norma Caquelin in Franklin County, Iowa. The 

North Central Railway Association, Inc. and its predecessors had held an easement over the land since acquiring 

the easement by condemnation in 1870. J.A. 201–04; 

Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. at 569. It is undisputed that the 

railroad’s interest was an easement. United States’ Pretrial Memorandum of Contentions of Fact and Law at 21, 

Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. 564 (2018) (No. 1:14-cv-00037), 

ECF No. 50 (“Under Iowa law, the interest acquired in this 

segment was an easement.”); United States’ Cross-Motion 

for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support at 1, 

Caquelin I, 121 Fed. Cl. 658 (2015) (No. 1:14-cv-00037), 

ECF No. 18. It is also undisputed that the easement was 

limited to rail use and that Norma Caquelin has owned the 

fee interest in the land subject to the easement since before 

the Board proceedings began in 2013.

In May 2013, the railroad applied to the Board for authority to abandon the line. J.A. 1332–35. Invoking a provision that exempts qualifying applicants from some 

requirements for such authority, 49 C.F.R. § 1152.50(b), 

the railroad certified that it had not run trains over the rail 

line for at least two years, J.A. 1334. The railroad also certified that the abandonment would be “consummated on or

after the effective date of a Board decision.” J.A. 1333. 

On June 5, 2013, the Board sent a notice to the railroad 

indicating that, if the Board did not receive a trail-use/railbanking request under 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29, the exemption 

would become effective on July 5, 2013, and that the railroad could then abandon the rail line on that date. 

J.A. 1400; Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. at 569–70. In late 

June, however, the Board received such a request—which 

the railroad supported—jointly submitted by a city and an 

organization. J.A. 1391–98; Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. 

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8 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

at 570. On July 3, 2013, two days before the abandonment 

authority was set to take effect, the Board issued a NITU, 

which prevented the abandonment-authority approval 

from taking effect and instead gave the railroad 180 days 

(until December 30, 2013) to negotiate with the city and 

organization that had expressed interest in sponsoring a 

recreational trail on the land. J.A. 1403–06; Caquelin III, 

140 Fed. Cl. at 570. The NITU authorized the railroad, 

while the NITU was in effect, to “discontinue service and 

salvage track and related materials,” J.A. 1405, and, relatedly, provided that “[i]f no agreement is reached [by December 30, 2013], [the railroad] may fully abandon the 

line,” J.A. 1406. See Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. at 570.

The negotiating parties did not reach agreement during the 180-day negotiation period, and when the organization interested in operating a trail sought an extension of 

the NITU, the railroad declined to consent. Id. at 570. The

NITU expired on December 30, 2013, and the railroad was 

authorized to abandon the line. See id. The railroad later 

notified the Board that, as of March 31, 2014, it had “exercised the authority granted [to it by the Board] . . . and fully 

abandoned the . . . rail line.” J.A. 1409; see Caquelin III, 

140 Fed. Cl. at 570–71.

C

In January 2014, Ms. Caquelin sued the United States 

in the Court of Federal Claims. We have already described 

the trial court’s initial ruling, our remand for further development, and the trial court’s ruling on remand, namely, 

Caquelin III. See supra, pp. 3–4. In that remand ruling, 

rendered after a trial and now before us, the court summarized how takings doctrine should be applied in various circumstances, Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. at 573–78, and,

based on that analysis, concluded that the Arkansas Game 

approach is “inapplicable,” id. at 578. It reiterated its earlier conclusion, which reflected this court’s holding in 

Ladd I, that the Board in this case effected a categorical 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 9

taking, for the period of the NITU, because the NITU prevented the end of the easement by denying abandonment 

authority during that time—under governing state law, 

abandonment is a precondition to extinguishment of railroad easement rights and reversion of easement-free rights 

to the relevant fee owner. See Iowa Code § 327G.76 (2020);

Caquelin III, 140 Fed. Cl. at 578.

The court went on to apply the Arkansas Game approach on the assumption that it legally governed, an assumption we had directed the court to indulge for the sake 

of completeness of record development and analysis. The 

court determined that the NITU “blocked [Ms.] Caquelin’s 

reversionary interest in the property . . . for a total period 

of 180 days,” during which time “the NITU deprived [Ms.]

Caquelin of all use of the land at issue.” Caquelin III, 

140 Fed. Cl. at 579. The court also determined that the

Board “issued the NITU with intent to block Ms. Caquelin 

from any use of the corridor segment while a potential trail 

use was being negotiated,” and that “[t]he very purpose of 

the [Trails] Act is to effectuate a taking to preserve the option for interim trail use and railbanking.” Id. at 580. Relatedly, “the result of the NITU was foreseeable, as the very 

point of a NITU is to prevent a landowner’s reversionary 

interest from taking effect so the trail negotiating process 

can take place.” Id. As to the character of the land, and 

reasonable investment-backed expectations, the court 

found, “reclamation of the corridor plus tiling could put the 

land into productive use,” id. at 581, and such reclamation 

could have begun in July 2013 without the NITU, id.

at 582–84. Finally, although the dollar value of use of the 

land was low, “the NITU act[ed] as a complete interference 

to the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of their land,” which 

“would have reverted to [Ms.] Caquelin but for the issuance 

of the NITU.” Id. at 584.

The government appeals. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). 

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10 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

II

We review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. Love 

Terminal Partners, L.P. v. United States, 889 F.3d 1331, 

1340 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Whether a taking has occurred is a 

question of law based on factual underpinnings. Wyatt v. 

United States, 271 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The 

property rights of the parties in a rails-to-trails case are 

analyzed under the relevant state’s law, which in this case 

is Iowa law. Rogers v. United States, 814 F.3d 1299, 1305

(Fed. Cir. 2015).

A

The government accepts that the trial court’s judgment 

is supported by Ladd I, but it renews its two arguments 

that this court should no longer adhere to Ladd I. First, it 

contends, the Supreme Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra requires that the general regulatory-takings analysis of Penn 

Central be applied to assess whether a NITU is a taking

when no trail-use agreement has been reached before it expires, and that such a NITU should not be treated as a categorical taking. Second, it contends, at a minimum we 

should replace the categorical approach with the multi-factor approach of Arkansas Game—which shares certain features of the Penn Central analysis.

Ladd I governs this panel’s decision unless we conclude 

that it has been superseded by an intervening Supreme 

Court decision. See, e.g., Lone Star Silicon Innovations 

LLC v. Nanya Technology Corp., 925 F.3d 1225, 1235 

(Fed. Cir. 2019); Troy v. Samson Mfg. Corp., 758 F.3d 1322, 

1326 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Doe v. United States, 372 F.3d 1347, 

1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The only post-Ladd I decision of the 

Supreme Court invoked by the government is Arkansas 

Game. We do not think, however, that Ladd I is inconsistent with the decisions on which the government relies, 

including Arkansas Game. In this section, we explain this 

conclusion. (In the next section of this opinion, we clarify 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 11

a point not previously litigated or decided in our cases

about when a taking occurs as a result of a NITU.)

1

It is important to identify the nature of the government 

action at issue. The NITU in this case, as in similar cases, 

was a government action that compelled continuation of an 

easement for a time; it did so intentionally and with specific identification of the land at issue; and it did so solely 

for the purpose of seeking to arrange, without the landowner’s consent, to continue the easement for still longer, 

indeed indefinitely, by an actual trail conversion. The government seems to accept, and in any event has not meaningfully contradicted, the foregoing characterization of the 

NITU as allowing occupation by someone other than the 

landowner.1 

It is likewise not meaningfully disputed before us that, 

if the negotiations for a trail conversion had succeeded, the 

resulting indefinite federal-law continuation of the 

1 See Marvin M. Brandt Revocable Trust v. United 

States, 572 U.S. 93, 104–05 (2014) (“The essential features 

of easements—including, most important here, what happens when they cease to be used—are well settled as a matter of property law. An easement is a ‘nonpossessory right 

to enter and use land in the possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.’ Restatement (Third) of Property: 

Servitudes § 1.2(1) (1998). ‘Unlike most possessory estates, 

easements . . . may be unilaterally terminated by abandonment, leaving the servient owner with a possessory estate 

unencumbered by the servitude.’ Id., § 1.2, Comment d; 

id., § 7.4, Comments a, f. In other words, if the beneficiary 

of the easement abandons it, the easement disappears, and 

the landowner resumes his full and unencumbered interest 

in the land.”).

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12 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

easement would have been a categorical taking, not an action whose evaluation under the Takings Clause requires 

a multi-factor analysis. See Ladd I, 630 F.3d at 1019 (“It 

is settled law that a Fifth Amendment taking occurs in 

Rails-to-Trails cases when government action destroys 

state-defined property rights by converting a railway easement to a recreational trail, if trail use is outside the scope 

of the original railway easement.”). The NITU, which expired without a trail agreement in this case, mandated continuation of the easement for a shorter period, providing a 

right of occupation by someone other than the landowner

and, the trial court found, barring the landowner from using the ground burdened by the easement. Caquelin III, 

140 Fed. Cl. at 580. Ladd I, following Caldwell and Barclay, along with Hendler concerning temporary takings, 

held that this federal-law maintenance of an easement is a 

categorical, though temporary, taking, because, for takings-law purposes, it is relevantly the same in character as 

the longer-duration coerced continuation of an easement 

that a NITU effects when a trail conversion takes place.

2

This categorical treatment of a coerced easement that 

impairs the landowner’s right to exclude by allowing others’ occupation finds support in Supreme Court precedent. 

See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 24 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 

(“We recently concluded . . . that a taking would occur if the 

Government appropriated a public easement.” (citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987))); 

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 832 (a “permanent physical occupation” 

occurs “where individuals are given a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro, so that the real property 

may continuously be traversed, even though no particular 

individual is permitted to station himself permanently 

upon the premises”); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 

522, 523 (1992) (explaining that “[w]here the government 

authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually 

takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 13

compensation” and that “[this] category of cases requires 

courts to apply a clear rule”); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 

444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (“[T]he ‘right to exclude,’ so 

universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the 

Government cannot take without compensation”; “even if 

the Government physically invades only an easement in 

property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation.”); see 

also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) 

(“Without question, had the city simply required petitioner 

to dedicate a strip of land along Fanno Creek for public use, 

rather than conditioning the grant of her permit to redevelop her property on such a dedication, a taking would 

have occurred. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at 831. Such public 

access would deprive petitioner of the right to exclude others, ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 

that are commonly characterized as property.’” (quoting 

Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176)).

3

Tahoe-Sierra did not depart from that treatment of a 

coerced easement allowing physical occupation. The Court 

in Tahoe-Sierra held that the ordinary regulatory process 

subject to the Penn Central standard includes, as a necessary tool, a temporary moratorium on landowners’ development on their own land while the consideration of useregulation possibilities is underway, and such a moratorium should therefore be subject to a Penn Central analysis. 535 U.S. at 321–44. Tahoe-Sierra involved neither a 

government creation or continuation of an easement nor 

any taking of a comparable recognized land interest to force 

the landowner to allow others on the land. Indeed, the 

court introduced its analysis by stressing the “distinction 

between physical takings and regulatory takings,” id.

at 321, and made clear that its ruling was addressing the 

latter only—namely, government “regulations that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property,” id. at 321–22. The Court reiterated that 

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14 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

“[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an 

interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner,” including 

when the government takes a leasehold and occupies it 

even temporarily. Id. at 322. The question in Tahoe-Sierra, the Court stressed, was not about that, but about government regulations of landowners’ own uses of their 

property. Id. at 322–24.

As we ruled in Casitas Municipal Water District v. 

United States, the Tahoe-Sierra analysis applies only in a 

regulatory-taking case. 543 F.3d 1276, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 

2008). And as Ladd I holds, a NITU like this one does not 

present a regulatory-takings case. 630 F.3d at 1022–25. 

Indeed, in the present context, “unless the [Board] attaches 

postabandonment conditions to a certificate of abandonment, the [Board’s] authorization of an abandonment 

brings its regulatory mission to an end.” Hayfield N. R.R.

Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622, 633 

(1984); see Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 21–22 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In the Board’s June 5, 2013 notice authorizing 

abandonment as of July 5, 2013, and in the NITU itself (the 

Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment), the Board 

confirmed the absence of any federal regulatory interest except, as relevant here, the Trails Act interest in seeking to 

arrange an indefinite continuation of the easement, i.e., an 

indefinite taking. As the government acknowledged in the 

trial court, “[t]he only purpose of the NITU [was] to allow 

the railroad time to negotiate with a third party regarding 

railbanking and interim trail use under the Trails Act.” 

United States’ Reply in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Caquelin I, 121 Fed. Cl. 658 (2015) 

(No. 1:14-cv-00037), ECF No. 20. Neither in Tahoe-Sierra 

nor any other case cited by the government did the Court 

treat as a “regulationf” subject to the Penn Central standard a government action aimed only at securing a coerced 

easement for others to use the landowner’s land.

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 15

In short, the purpose of the compelled maintenance of 

an easement in this NITU situation was simply to try to 

arrange for a longer-term taking. Tahoe-Sierra does not 

address such a situation. And such a situation does not fall 

within Tahoe-Sierra’s rationale that a moratorium on certain uses of land by the landowner can be a necessary part 

of the process of making decisions about regulations of 

landowners’ own uses. For those reasons, Tahoe-Sierra 

does not show that Ladd I is incorrect.

4

Nor does Arkansas Game show that Tahoe-Sierra now 

must be held to provide the governing standard or otherwise show that Ladd I is incorrect. In Arkansas Game, the 

Court reversed a ruling of this court that temporary government-induced flooding could not be a taking. 568 U.S. 

at 31–40. Reiterating its rejection of “the argument that 

government action must be permanent to qualify as a taking,” id. at 33, the Court concluded that government-induced flooding was not immune from that principle. The 

Court explained that a number of facts could bear on 

whether particular government-induced flooding activities 

would constitute a taking, id. at 36–39, but the Court

stated its holding in terms of rejecting a categorical exemption from Takings Clause liability: “We rule today, simply 

and only, that government-induced flooding temporary in 

duration gains no automatic exemption from Takings 

Clause inspection.” Id. at 38. 

We do not think that Arkansas Game implies that a 

non-categorical approach to finding a taking applies to the 

NITU situation at issue here—a mandated continuation of 

an easement, not to regulate the landowner’s conduct on 

her land, but only to buy time to arrange a permanent taking by indefinite coerced maintenance of an easement. No 

such situation was involved in Arkansas Game and the 

Court did not call for a non-categorical approach to such a 

narrowly defined situation. Indeed, the Court reaffirmed 

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16 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

the recognition of Tahoe-Sierra that “‘[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an interest in property

for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner.’” Arkansas Game, 568 U.S. 

at 31 (quoting Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322) (emphasis 

added). In addition, the Court, pointing to several categorical-takings cases, stated that “the takings claims approved in these cases were not confined to instances in 

which the Government took outright physical possession of 

the property involved.” Id. at 33.

Arkansas Game did not involve government action to 

maintain a recognized formal legal interest in land (an 

easement) that limited the landowner’s interests, much 

less an action taken only to buy time to try to arrange a 

categorical taking. Nor did it involve government authorization of intrusions by persons other than a landowner. 

Rather, it involved intrusions by water, which the Court 

made clear form a broad class of situations having quite 

different characteristics, not neatly classified into subcategories, with many of the possible government-induced 

flooding actions comfortably characterized as the exercise 

of regulatory power of a public resource, where the burdens 

and benefits affect a broad segment of the public. See id.

at 36–39; see also Br. for Respondent at 40–41, 44–45, Arkansas Game, 568 U.S. 23 (2012) (No. 11-597), 2012 WL 

3680423, at *40–41, *44–45. Government-induced flooding 

therefore comes within the rationale for more flexible takings standards—recognition of “the nearly infinite variety 

of ways in which government actions or regulations can affect property interests.” Arkansas Game, 568 U.S. at 31. 

The NITU situation involved here does not readily come 

within that rationale.

Finally, as the government has observed in this case, 

the trial court, in applying the Arkansas Game factors pursuant to our remand, relied in large part on the aspects of 

the NITU that are built into the Ladd I treatment of the 

NITU as a categorical taking. The additional findings 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 17

focus on whether the particular portion of land burdened 

by the easement was capable of being productively used by 

Ms. Caquelin and when such use would have begun. See 

Caquelin, 140 Fed. Cl. at 581–84. As far as we have been 

shown, the only identified difference between applying Arkansas Game and the categorical-takings analysis is that

the former might permit the government to mandate an 

easement, without giving rise to takings liability, as long 

as, during the time of the easement, the landowner could 

or would not have made productive use of the land on which 

the easement ran. We see nothing in Arkansas Game, or 

in other takings law to which we have been pointed, to support such a result.

We conclude that Ladd I remains governing precedent 

and has not been undermined by Arkansas Game in favor 

of a non-categorical approach.

B

In the course of arguing for a multi-factor approach to 

the takings question here—an argument we reject for the 

reasons we have set forth—the government makes one 

much more limited contention. It suggests that a taking 

should not be found to have occurred during the period a 

NITU is in effect if, even in the absence of the NITU, the 

railroad would not have abandoned its rail line during that 

period. This causation-based suggestion amounts to a request for a clarification of our case law on the timing of a 

NITU-based taking, to address a situation not presented or 

therefore ruled on in the Caldwell–Barclay–Ladd I line of 

cases.

Our discussion of this contention here is appropriately 

limited. The government does not seek a remand for findings on when the railroad would have abandoned its line 

had there been no NITU from July 3, 2013 to December 30, 

2013. Instead, it makes the legal suggestion just noted and 

simply asserts that there was no evidence that the railroad 

would have abandoned its line during that 180-day period 

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18 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

had there been no NITU. At most, then, the government 

has presented only a request for a clarification of the legal 

standard—to incorporate an inquiry into when abandonment would have occurred in the absence of the challenged 

government action—together with an assertion of evidentiary insufficiency as to whether the railroad would have 

abandoned its line during the 180-day period. The precise 

timing is immaterial to liability if abandonment would 

have occurred during the NITU period, and there is no issue of damages here.2 We agree with the government’s legal point but not its assertion of evidentiary insufficiency.

1

It is a fundamental principle of takings law that a government action is not a taking of property if, even in the 

absence of the challenged government action, the plaintiff 

would not have possessed the allegedly taken property interest. St. Bernard Parish Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 

1354, 1359–60, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2018); see United States v. 

Archer, 241 U.S. 119, 132 (1916). That causation principle 

focuses on comparing the plaintiff’s property interest in the 

presence of the challenged government action and the property interest the plaintiff would have had in its absence. 

See Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 24 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 

(endorsing the proposition, acknowledged by the government, that “the existence of a taking will rest upon the nature of the state-created property interest that [the 

landowners] would have enjoyed absent the federal action 

and upon the extent that the federal action burdened that 

interest”). It reflects a causation principle hardly unique 

to takings law. See, e.g., Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 

2 For example, it is immaterial here that there was 

a short gap between the date of issuance of the NITU 

(July 3, 2013) and the date on which the Board’s grant of 

abandonment authority would have taken effect (July 5, 

2013) had no NITU issued.

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 19

1178 (2020) (explaining general but-for rule governing 

damages and certain other result-altering relief). 

The application of that causation principle to the NITU 

situation at issue is straightforward. The challenged government action is the legally mandated maintenance of the 

easement through denying abandonment authority to the 

railroad. It is undisputed that, without abandonment by 

the railroad, the easement would remain. It follows that 

the NITU would not have altered the continuation of the 

easement during the NITU period—i.e., would not have 

caused the only alleged taking of property—if the railroad 

would not have abandoned the rail line during that period 

even in the absence of the NITU.

The government stated at oral argument that our line 

of cases on NITUs and takings, growing out of Caldwell,

does not foreclose applying the general causation principle 

in just this way. We agree. To begin with, this line of cases 

grows out of and seeks to follow Caldwell, and the concluding statement of the holding in Caldwell by its terms incorporates this causation inquiry: “We hold that the Fifth 

Amendment taking, if any, under the Trails Act is accomplished when an NITU is issued and state law reversionary 

interests that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal abandonment proceedings are forestalled.” Caldwell, 

391 F.3d at 1236 (emphasis added). The court used similar 

language at the outset of its analysis, stating that “when a 

railroad right-of-way is converted to interim trail use,” the 

taking, if any, occurs “when state law reversionary property interests that would otherwise vest in the adjacent 

landowners are blocked from so vesting.” Id. at 1233 (emphases added). This language incorporates the causation 

inquiry we have described. In Barclay, this court repeated 

the “would otherwise vest” language from Caldwell, see 

Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373, and it subsequently explained 

that one of the plaintiffs admitted that, “after issuance of 

the NITU, ‘the easement continued in existence beyond the 

time when it otherwise would have been abandoned,’” 

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20 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

concluding: “Thus, the NITU triggers accrual,” id. at 1374 

(emphasis added). And in Ladd I, this court quoted the

“otherwise would have been abandoned” language from 

Barclay in describing the legal rule being followed. 630

F.3d at 1021. 

It is true that other language in Caldwell, Barclay, and

Ladd I uses a shorter formulation referring simply to the 

NITU date as the date of taking. See, e.g., Caldwell, 

391 F.3d at 1235 (“We therefore hold that the appropriate 

triggering event for any takings claim under the Trails Act 

occurs when the NITU is issued.”); Barclay, 443 F.3d 

at 1378; Ladd I, 630 F.3d at 1020. But that language is 

better read so as not to run counter both to the fuller formulation and to basic causation principles. It can be read 

as a shorthand that applies where no party has pointed to 

any legally material difference between the NITU date of 

issuance (or expiration) and a date of abandonment in the 

but-for world in which there was no NITU. That was true 

in Caldwell, and it was also true in the follow-on cases of 

Barclay and Ladd I: nothing in those opinions suggests 

that a party in those cases argued to this court that, even 

in the absence of the NITU, the railroad would not have 

abandoned the rail line until some date that would make a 

difference to the outcome of the issue on appeal—whether 

timeliness, in Caldwell and Barclay, or liability for a taking, in Ladd I. In that situation, the shorthand formulation simply reflects the lack of any difference in the case 

between the shorter formulation and the fuller formulation. Its presence in the cases should not erase the fuller 

formulation where the difference matters. 

These are circumstances calling for application of the 

principle that prior decisions do not establish controlling 

precedent on an issue “never squarely addressed.” Brecht 

v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993); see, e.g., Arthrex, 

Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 880 F.3d 1345, 1349 

(Fed. Cir. 2018). We recognized and applied that principle 

in Ladd v. United States (Ladd II), where we held that the 

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CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES 21

statement of the accrual rule in Caldwell and Barclay does 

not control where the facts give rise to an issue of suspending the accrual, because “[n]either case addressed whether 

and under what circumstances the claim accrual suspension doctrine should apply in Trails Act cases” and “there 

is no indication that the landowners in those cases” met the 

conditions for suspension. 713 F.3d 648, 654 (Fed. Cir. 

2013). The principle is especially applicable where the 

foundational case prominently states its holding in terms 

that already do account for the causation inquiry that is 

part of takings law. We conclude, therefore, that there is 

no taking until the time as of which, had there been no 

NITU, the railroad would have abandoned the rail line,

causing termination of the easement that the NITU continued by law.

We decide no more on the doctrinal issue. Other questions could well arise in the future, such as questions about 

whether the plaintiff or the government has the burden of 

production or persuasion on what the railroad would have 

done if there had been no NITU. With no request from the 

government for a remand for further proceedings on the 

but-for-NITU issue in this case, we do not address such 

questions here.

2

The government suggests that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the railroad would not have 

abandoned the line at issue between July 3, 2013 and December 30, 2013, even if no NITU had issued. We reject 

the suggestion. The government does not point to any evidence at all affirmatively indicating that the railroad 

would have delayed abandonment past December 30, 2013, 

had there been no NITU to interfere with the grant of authority of abandonment that was set to take effect on 

July 5, 2013. In the absence of any such evidence, there is 

no clear error in a contrary finding on the evidence of record in this case.

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22 CAQUELIN v. UNITED STATES

The railroad filed an application to abandon, indicating 

an affirmative intent to abandon. When it was asked for 

consent to an extension of the December 30 expiration date, 

it refused, confirming an interest in abandoning sooner rather than later (in the absence of a promising negotiation 

for a trail agreement). It completed the abandonment just 

three months after December 31, 2013, the date on which 

it became legally authorized to abandon the line, suggesting a comparable time period had authority been granted 

as of July 5, 2013. The statute itself provides generally for 

authorization to remove track during the NITU, an authorization that was included in the NITU here, suggesting an 

expectation of comparatively prompt completion of abandonment. And there was evidence that the railroad in this 

case did remove track in 2012 or 2013, see J.A. 282, a precondition to abandonment-based easement termination 

under Iowa law, Iowa Code § 327G.76. In the absence of 

contrary evidence, this evidence suffices to support an inference that, had there been no NITU, the railroad would 

have completed abandonment during the period in which 

the NITU was in effect.

III

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 

the Court of Federal Claims.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED

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