Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01685/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01685-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Octavio Torres-Rivas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1685

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Octavio Torres-Rivas

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Fayetteville

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 Submitted: March 14, 2016

 Filed: June 9, 2016

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Before WOLLMAN, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

BENTON, Circuit Judge. 

Octavio Torres-Rivas pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine

in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. He appeals, claiming that the

government violated the plea agreement by arguing against an acceptance-ofAppellate Case: 15-1685 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/09/2016 Entry ID: 4409837 
responsibility reduction, and that the district court erred in denying his request for

1

acceptance of responsibility. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court

affirms. 

On July 1, 2014, the government and Torres-Rivas made a plea agreement,

which says:

The United States agrees not to object to a recommendation by the

Probation Office or a ruling of the Court which awards the defendant an

appropriate-level decrease in the base offense level for acceptance of

responsibility. If the offense level in the Presentence Report is 16 or

greater and the Court accepts a recommendation in the Presentence

Report that the defendant receive two points for acceptance of

responsibility, the United States agrees to move for an additional onepoint reduction for acceptance of responsibility for a total of three

points. However, the United States will not be obligated to move for an

additional one-point reduction or recommend any adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility if the defendant engages in conduct

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility including, but not limited

to, the following a) falsely denies, or makes a statement materially

inconsistent with, the factual basis set forth in this agreement, b) falsely

denies additional relevant conduct in the offense, c) is untruthful with

the United States, the Court or probation officer, or d) materially

breaches this plea agreement in any way. 

The agreement also says:

At the sentencing hearing, the United States will be permitted to bring

to the Court’s attention, and the Court will be permitted to consider, all

relevant information with respect to the defendant’s background,

character and conduct, including the conduct that is the subject of this

investigation for which he/she has not been charged up to the date of

this Agreement, and/or which is the basis for any of the counts which

The Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the 1

Western District of Arkansas. 

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will be dismissed pursuant to this agreement, as provided by § 1B1.3 of

the Sentencing Guidelines.

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), months later, addressed a threat

investigation about two letters to cooperating co-defendants in February 2014 and

August 2014. The PSR says, “Based on threats believed to be made by the defendant

to cooperating defendants and witnesses, it isrecommended the defendant receive an

enhancement for obstruction of justice. . . . [C]onduct resulting in an enhancement

under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct.” 

At sentencing, the court heard testimony about the two letters. The government

argued they show obstruction of justice. The government also claimed that TorresRivas should be denied acceptance of responsibility because of the obstruction of

justice and because he denied relevant conduct about his interaction with coconspirators (as a leader or organizer). The district court rejected the obstruction-ofjustice enhancement, based on “enough gaps” in the evidence. The district court also

denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, saying “I think he’s a leader,

number one. I think what happened after July 1, 2014 is relevant, as well as some of

what happened prior to July 1. So I’m not going to give . . . acceptance of

responsibility.”

According to Torres-Rivas, the government—aware of the first letter at the

time of the plea agreement (and plea)—broke the terms of the agreement by arguing

against acceptance of responsibility. Regardless, he believes that the district court

should have granted acceptance of responsibility. 

I.

This court reviews de novo “issues pertaining to the interpretation and

enforcement of a plea agreement.” United States v. Stobaugh, 420 F.3d 796, 800

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(8th Cir. 2005). “Plea agreements are contractual in nature and should be interpreted

according to general contractual principles.” United States v. E.V., 500 F.3d 747,

751 (8th Cir. 2007). “[W]here a plea agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguities are

construed against the government.” United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 890 (8th

Cir. 2003) (en banc). “Any promise made by the Government that constitutes a

significant part of the defendant’s inducement or consideration for making the plea

agreement must be fulfilled to satisfy due process.” Stobaugh, 420 F.3d at 800. 

Torres-Rivas claims the government had an affirmative duty to recommend a 

decrease for acceptance of responsibility and violated that duty by first not arguing

for it, and then by arguing against it. However, any duty is conditional. The

agreement provides that the government would “ move for an additional one-point

reduction for acceptance of responsibility” if “Court accepts a recommendation in the

Presentence Report that the defendant receive two points for acceptance of

responsibility.” Because the PSR had no recommendation for acceptance of

responsibility, the government had no duty to argue for acceptance of responsibility. 

See United States v. Borer, 412 F.3d 987, 994-95 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding no breach

of plea agreement where government did not recommend sentence at low end of

guideline range, and plea agreement made such recommendation contingent on the

range “anticipated by the Presentence Report”). Cf. United States v. Gomez, 271

F.3d 779, 781-82 (8th Cir. 2001) (disapproving government’s decision not to

recommend acceptance-of-responsibility reduction where agreement clearly required

it, even if defendant breached plea agreement after signing it). 

This case is not like United States v. Mosley, 505 F.3d 804 (8th Cir. 2007),

where the agreement said:

as of the date of this agreement, defendant appears to qualify . . . for

acceptance of responsibility. However, the government shall be free to

contest the adjustment under USSG § 3E1.1(a) should the defendant

subsequently fail to continue to accept responsibility . . . . 

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The government there violated the plea agreement by arguing against acceptance of

responsibility. The government became aware of new information that Mosley lied

in some pre-plea statements to police—which predated the plea agreement. Unlike

Mosley, the agreement here does not say that, if the defendant subsequently fails to

accept responsibility, the government may then argue against acceptance of

responsibility. The only condition here to the government’s obligation is that the

government agrees “not to object to a recommendation by the Probation Office or a

ruling of the Court which awards the defendant an appropriate-level decrease in the

base offense level for acceptance ofresponsibility.” (emphasis added). The probation

office did not recommend acceptance of responsibility, and the court did not award

it. “[T]he language of the plea agreement in the instant case permitted the

Government’s actions at the sentencing hearing.” Stobaugh, 420 F.3d at 801. 

II.

“[A] defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to credit for acceptance

of responsibility as a matter of right.” United States v. Shade, 661 F.3d 1159, 1167

(8th Cir. 2011). “Under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), the burden is on a defendant to show

that he clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility.” United States v. Vega,

676 F.3d 708, 723 (8th Cir. 2012). “Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the

commencement of trial combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising

the offense of conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any

additional relevant conduct for which he is accountable under § 1B1.3 . . . , will

constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

cmt. n. 3. “Whether the defendant accepted responsibility is a factual question that

depends largely on credibility assessments made by the sentencing court. This Court

gives great deference to the district court’s denial of a request for a reduction for

acceptance ofresponsibility and reviews the decision for clear error.” Vega, 676 F.3d

at 723.

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Although the district court did not grant the obstruction-of-justice

enhancement, the court had ample evidence to deny acceptance of responsibility. As

Torres-Rivas notes, “[m]ost ofthe acceptance-of-responsibility inquiry focuses on the

defendant’s conduct through the time he pleads guilty.” United States v. Stapleton,

316 F.3d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 2003). Nonetheless, the district court may look to

defendant’s conduct after the guilty plea. See United States v. Jones, 539 F.3d 895,

898 (8th Cir. 20108) (finding district court did not clearly err when it found Jones’s

denial of association with a witness through his “objections to the presentence

investigation report” inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility). In addition to

the threatening letters, Torres-Rivas denied relevant conduct by multiple objections

to the PSR—including 16 of 23 paragraphslabeled “Offense Conduct,” almost every

paragraph with information from cooperating witnesses (including where he stored

his meth and how much currency a cooperating defendant held for him). The district

court found that “what happened after July 1, 2014 is also relevant,” and “his conduct

was not such that would entitle him to acceptance of responsibility.” This court does

“not substitute our judgment for that of the district court because the district court is

in a better position to assess whether a defendant has accepted responsibility and to

assess the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 897.

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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