Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03146/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03146-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Allen Shaffer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3146

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Richard Allen Shaffer

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Sioux City

____________

 Submitted: September 24, 2015

 Filed: December 7, 2015

____________

Before LOKEN, BEAM, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

____________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

This appeal concerns whether a conviction by court-martial may qualify as a

serious violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c), the federal three strikes law. The

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
District Court sentenced Richard Shaffer to life in prison under § 3559(c) based on 1

a prior court-martial conviction. Shaffer now appeals. We affirm.

I.

On February 10, 2014, Shaffer pled guilty to one count of bank robbery in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Shaffer had approached a bank teller and handed

her a note stating, “Be Quiet (GUN) Gimmie the money in the drawer and the

replenishment drawer 100, 50, 20 10, 5, Now Be Quiet!” The teller gave Shaffer

$3,710. Shaffer was arrested the following day. The robbery carried a statutory

maximum sentence of 20 years. 

The government sought enhancement to a sentence of life in prison under 

18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Section 3559(c) provides:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted

in a court of the United States of a serious violent felony shall be

sentenced to life imprisonment if . . . the person has been convicted (and

those convictions have become final) on separate prior occasions in a

court of the United States or of a State of . . . 2 or more serious violent

felonies.

In 1979, Shaffer was convicted in a United States Army General court-martial

for the unpremeditated murder of a fellow soldier. He was sentenced to 25 years

confinement at hard labor and served 18 years. In 2004, Shaffer was convicted in the

United States District Court for the District of Nebraska for six consolidated bank

robberies. Neither party disputes that both crimes qualify as “serious violent

felonies.” § 3559(c)(2)(F). The district court found that a general court-martial

The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, United States District Judge for the

1

Northern District of Iowa. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
qualifies as a court of the United States, thus Shaffer was sentenced to a mandatory

life sentence under § 3559(c). Shaffer’s only argument on appeal is that his 1979

conviction by court-martial is not a conviction “in a court of the United States or of

a State” under § 3559(c) and cannot serve as a predicate offense. 

II.

“[A] court of the United States” is not defined within § 3559. If the courtmartial qualifies as a “court of the United States,” Shaffer must receive a life

sentence. If it does not, he does not have two qualifying predicate offenses, and

Shaffer will be subject to a 20-year statutory maximum sentence instead. This court

reviews the district court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. United States v.

Williams, 136 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 1998).

A.

Shaffer argues that “a court of the United States” is a term of art meaning an

Article III court. As such, Shaffer states that this court should not resort to the

familiar rules of statutory interpretation, and instead should hold that a court-martial

does not constitute “a court of the United States” as a matter of law.

A term of art is a phrase with an established common law meaning. United

States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957). Where a term of art is used in a statute

without being defined, the court will generally presume that Congress intended to

invoke that established common law meaning. See id.; Morisette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246, 262 (1952). However, “we do not assume that a statutory word is used

as a term of art where that meaning does not fit.” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.

133, 139 (2010) (finding that “physical force,” within the statutory definition of

“crime of violence” meant “violent force” and thus differed from the meaning of

“physical force” within the definition of battery) (citing Turley, 352 U.S. at 411). 

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
“Ultimately, context determines meaning.” Id. (citing Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co.,

367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)).

Shaffer pointsto Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Southland Corp. v. Keating for

support, wherein Justice O’Connor refers to “courts of the United States” as a term

of art and states that it unmistakably excludes state courts. 465 U.S. 1, 29 n. 18

(1984) (O’Connor, J. dissenting). But Southland addresses a statutory framework in

which only civil cases could be implicated, so it does not discuss courts-martial. Id.

at 14-16 (discussing the Federal Arbitration Act). Instead, “a court of the United

States” has been defined in varying ways, even within Title 18. Shaffer has failed

2

to establish that the phrase “a court of the United States” has an established common

law meaning or is a term of art within the context of § 3559, and available authority

does not support such a conclusion. 

Absent the application of a term of art, this court looks to “plain language, and

give[s] words their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” Hennepin Cnty. v.

Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 742 F.3d 818, 821 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks

18 U.S.C. § 23 (“As used in this title, except where otherwise expressly

2

provided the term ‘court of the United States’ includes the District Court of Guam,

the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District Court of the

Virgin Islands”); 18 U.S.C. § 6001(4) (“‘Court of the United States,’ means any of

the following courts: the Supreme Court of the United States, a United States court

of appeals, a United States district court established under chapter 5, title 28, United

States Code, a United States bankruptcy court established under chapter 6, title 28,

United States Code, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the

Virgin Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court of the

United States, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces”); 18 U.S.C. § 3662 (distinguishing between “a court of the United

States” and a court of the District of Columbia or United Statesterritory by including

convictions in “a court of the United States, the District of Columbia, the

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a territory or possession of the United States . . . .”).

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
and citations omitted). “[T]he words of a statute must be read in their context and

with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Davis v. Michigan Dept.

of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989). Thus, definitions of “a court of the United

States” in other contexts are of limited value. See id. 

Elsewhere in Title 18, “a court of the United States” is defined expansively. 

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 23, 6001(4). Section 6001(4)’s expansive definition discredits

Appellant’s argument that “a court of the United States” must be limited to only

Article III courts. In section 6001(4), “a court of the United States” is defined to

include “a United States bankruptcy court established under chapter 6, title 28, United

States Code, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, the Superior Court of the

District of Columbia, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin

Islands, the United States Court of Federal Claims, the Tax Court of the United

States, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces,” among others. 

Further, courts-martial fit within the plain meaning of “a court of the United

States.” A court-martial is a court. Anderson v. Crawford, 265 F. 504, 506 (8th Cir.

1920) (quoting Deming v. McClaughry, 113 F. 639, 650 (8th Cir. 1902)). Courtsmartial are established by and connected to the United States Government. First,

courts-martial were created by Congress and authorized by Article I, Section 9 of the

United States Constitution. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261-62 (1969)

(overruled on other grounds). Second, courts-martial are governed by federalstatute. 

See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946. Third, the United States Supreme Court can review many

decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the court to which those

convicted by court-martial ultimately appeal. 10 U.S.C. §§ 866, 877; 28 U.S.C. §

1259. Fourth, court-martial conviction is a bar to successive federal prosecution. 

Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 355 (1907) (finding that a federal civilian

court and court-martial trying one person for the same offense constituted double

jeopardy because “the two tribunalsthat tried the accused exert all their powers under

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
and by the authority of the same government”). Shaffer argues that to include courtsmartial in “a court of the United States” would create conflicts in the military chain

of command, but within the context of § 3559, none are apparent. Ordinary rules of 3

statutory interpretation lead to the conclusion that courts-martial fall within the

meaning of “a court of the United States.”4

B.

Moreover, inclusion of courts-martial within “a court of the United States” is

consistent with the purpose of § 3559(c), which is to enhance the sentences of

individuals who have committed three “serious violent felonies.” The statute

5

illustratesits comprehensive intent by including convictions in state courts as well as

“court[s] of the United States.” Were the court to find that courts-martial were not

included, Shaffer would be put in a unique position where because he committed

unpremeditated murder while in the military, he is subject to a shorter sentence for

a subsequent offence than a similar individual who instead had been prosecuted in a

10 U.S.C. § 1558 states that “[a] court of the United States may review a

3

determination by the Secretary of a military department . . . .” However, this court’s

determination that “a court of the United States,” includes courts-martial is limited

to within the context of § 3559(c).

28 U.S.C. § 451 statesthat “[t]he term‘court of the United States’ includesthe

4

Supreme Court of the United States, courts of appeal, district courts constituted by

chapter 5 ofthistitle, including the Court of International Trade and any court created

by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled to hold office during good

behavior.” No such limitation exists § 3559(c). This would suggest that § 3559(c)

does not similarly exclude courts where judges do not serve during good behavior. 

Without such a limitation, a “a court of the United States” would most naturally be

read to include courts-martial.

The purpose of § 3559(c) is evidenced by its text. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility 5

LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (noting that the Federal Arbitration

Act’s purpose “is readily apparent from [its] text”).

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
state or federal court. Thus, unlessthere isreason that Congress would have intended

to exclude those convicted by courts-martial from § 3559, including convictions by

courts-martial best serves the purpose of § 3559.

6

Courts’ analyses of courts-martial’s inclusion in the Armed Career Criminal

Act (ACCA) are instructive. Three federal appeals courts have addressed the

question of whether “any court” in 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1) and 922 of the ACCA

includes courts-martial; all have concluded “yes.” United States v. Grant, 753 F.3d

480, 485 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that differences between courts-martial and civilian

courts did not compare to the severe differences between civilian courts and certain

foreign courts discussed in Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), and that

courts-martial fit within the term “any court”); United States v. Martinez, 122 F.3d

421, 424 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plain meaning of “any court” includes

courts-martial); United States v. MacDonald, 992 F.2d 967, 969-970 (9th Cir. 1993)

(finding that differences between civilian courts and courts-martial do not justify the

exclusion of courts-martial from“any court”). These courts have similarly considered

the purpose of the applicable statute and found inclusion of convictions by courtmartial consistent with its purpose. See MacDonald, 992 F.2d at 970 (finding that

treating court-martial convictions as convictions in “any court” “consistent with the

statutory purpose, ‘to keep guns out of the hands of risky people.’” (quoting

Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 112 n. 6 (1983))); Grant, 753 F.3d

at 485 (“Including court-martial convictions for violent felonies in the armed career

No sufficient reason exists to exclude courts-martial from “a court of the

6

United States.” Shaffer relies heavily on the differences between military and civilian

courts, pointing out that courts-martial are not Article III courts. While this is true,

it does not establish how inclusion of courts-martial would be adverse to § 3559’s

purpose orsupport the notion that “a court of the United States” only includes Article

III courts. Shaffer fails, too, to identify differences in procedure or rights afforded

that adequately support exclusion.

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356 
criminal tabulation furthers Congress’s objective of identifying and deterring career

offenders.”). 

Much like the ACCA’s phrase, “any court,” the purpose of § 3559, plain

language of § 3559, and broad definitions of “a court of the United States”

throughout Title 18 indicate that Congress intended “a court of the United States” to

have an expansive definition which includes courts-martial.7

III.

Accordingly, we hold that Shaffer’s conviction by general court-martial is a

conviction in “a court of the United States” within 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Shaffer is

subject to a mandatory life sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c).

______________________________

United States v. Stuckey, which Shaffer cites, isinapposite. 220 F.3d 976 (8th 7

Cir. 2000). In Stuckey, the court determined that the felony in question did not

qualify as a “serious drug offense.” Id. at 984. This court stated, “the mere fact that

we are dealing with military drug convictions in this case only gets the government

half-way home; we must still determine whether or not the convictions are ‘serious

drug offenses.’” Id. Thus, this court held that the military court-martial conviction

was a conviction in “any court.”

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-3146 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/07/2015 Entry ID: 4343356