Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50029/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50029-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Stephen Forrester
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-50029 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  3:01-cr-03177-W-2

MARK STEPHEN FORRESTER,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 3, 2009—Pasadena, California

Filed January 5, 2010

Before: Cynthia Holcomb Hall, Thomas G. Nelson and

Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

303

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COUNSEL

Benjamin L. Coleman and Ethan A. Baloch, Coleman &

Baloch, LLP, Attorneys for defendant-appellant Mark Stephen Forrester. 

Karen P. Hewitt, Bruce R. Castetter, Todd W. Robinson, and

Stewart M. Young, Attorneys for plaintiff-appellee United

States of America. 

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OPINION

MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Mark Stephen Forrester (Forrester)

appeals his conviction and sentence for conspiracy to manufacture and distribute ecstasy in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846

and 841(a)(1). Forrester and his codefendants operated a large

ecstasy laboratory that was under surveillance for over a year

before being closed by law enforcement authorities. Forrester

represented himself at trial, and was convicted and sentenced

to 30 years in prison. We previously remanded Forrester’s

case based on our finding that Forrester unintelligently

waived his right to counsel. On remand, Forrester pleaded

guilty, and was again sentenced to 30 years. He raises five

issues on appeal. First, he claims that the district court erred

by failing to allow him to argue that ecstasy should be categorized as a Schedule III, rather than a Schedule I, controlled

substance, and that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) is unconstitutional.

Second, he asserts that he has a present right to accept the

government’s original plea offer—which he originally

rejected—because he had been misadvised by the district

court concerning his maximum sentence exposure. Third, Forrester alleges that his conspiracy indictment was unconstitutionally vague. Fourth, he argues that the district court erred

in denying his motion to suppress all fruits of the wiretap.

Finally, he claims that the district court erred in sentencing

him to 30 years in prison. 

We affirm Forrester’s conviction, but vacate his sentence,

and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTS, PRIOR PROCEEDINGS, AND

JURISDICTION

Law enforcement authorities conducted a lengthy investigation into an elaborate conspiracy to manufacture ecstasy.

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Investigators tracked the conspiracy for over a year using an

array of surveillance techniques. They traced chemical purchases, used confidential informants to infiltrate the operation, followed Forrester to Stockholm where he met with

chemists, and discovered a clandestine laboratory in Escondido, California. Agents raided the lab and seized large volumes of ecstasy and precursor chemicals. 

In October 2001, Forrester and his codefendants were

charged with conspiracy to manufacture and distribute

ecstasy. On October 23, 2002, the district court held a Faretta

hearing to determine whether Forrester was competent to represent himself. The judge found that he was but, during the

hearing, the district judge misinformed Forrester that he was

facing a sentence of 10-years-to-life, when he was actually

facing a sentence of 0-to-20 years. Forrester represented himself from that point in the proceedings until his initial appeal.

On July 3, 2003, the government approached Forrester and

his codefendant Dennis Alba (Alba) with a deal. They

informed Forrester and Alba that if they did not both plead

guilty that same day, the government would file an enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 requesting that Forrester’s

maximum sentence be increased from 20 to 30 years. Forrester and Alba both declined the offer and, on July 18, 2003,

a jury found Forrester guilty. He was sentenced to 30 years on

May 26, 2003. Forrester appealed on May 31, 2003. We

found that Forrester had unknowingly and unintelligently

waived his right to counsel because the district judge misinformed him regarding his maximum sentence, United States

v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 506-09 (9th Cir. 2008) (Forrester

I), and remanded the case to the district court. On remand,

Forrester entered a conditional guilty plea, and was sentenced

again to 30 years. He now appeals for the second time. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742.

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STANDARDS OF REVIEW

In addressing Forrester’s first claim regarding the classification of ecstasy as a Schedule I substance, we review de

novo the district court’s construction or interpretation of a

statute. See Beeman v. TDI Managed Care Servs., Inc., 449

F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006). The district court’s decision

to preclude a defendant’s proffered defense is also reviewed

de novo. See United States v. Batterjee, 361 F.3d 1210, 1216

(9th Cir. 2004). 

Forrester next argues that his failure to accept the plea was

involuntary. The voluntariness of a guilty plea is subject to de

novo review. See United States v. Gaither, 245 F.3d 1064,

1068 (9th Cir. 2001).

Forrester also contests the sufficiency of the conspiracy

indictment, which we review de novo. United States v. Berger, 473 F.3d 1080, 1097 (9th Cir. 2007). 

We next address a number of issues with regard to the

wiretap application. We review de novo the district court’s

interpretation of the wiretap statute. United States v. Luong,

471 F.3d 1107, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). A bifurcated standard of

review applies to wiretap necessity findings. First, we review

de novo whether a wiretap application is supported by a full

and complete statement of the facts in compliance with 18

U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). United States v. Rivera, 527 F.3d 891,

898 (9th Cir. 2008). If a wiretap is adequately supported, then

we review the district court’s necessity finding for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Lynch, 437 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir.

2006).

Finally, Forrester raises three sentencing issues. We review

ex post facto challenges to sentencing decisions de novo.

United States v. Ortland, 109 F.3d 539, 543 (9th Cir. 1997).

Similarly, we review de novo whether the district court failed

to make sufficient findings. United States v. Carter, 219 F.3d

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863, 866 (9th Cir. 2000). Whether the method used by the district court to approximate the quantity of drugs was proper

under the Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and factual findings related to the capability of a drug operation are reviewed

for clear error. United States v. Chase, 499 F.3d 1061, 1068

(9th Cir. 2007).

DISCUSSION

Forrester appeals his conviction and sentence. First, he

argues that ecstasy should be classified as a Schedule III substance, and that his maximum sentence must be determined by

a jury. Second, he asserts that misinformation regarding his

maximum sentence rendered his rejection of a plea deal unintelligent. Third, he claims that his conspiracy indictment was

unconstitutionally vague. Fourth, he alleges that the district

court erred in denying his motion to suppress all fruits of the

wiretap. Finally, he claims that his sentence was improper. 

I. Controlled Substance Scheduling

[1] The Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 21 U.S.C. § 801

et seq., establishes five categories or “schedules” of controlled

substances. Ecstasy has been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance since March 23, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg.

5156 (Final Rule dated Feb. 22, 1988—Schedules of Controlled Substances; Scheduling of 3,4 Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) into Schedule I of the Controlled

Substances Act; Remand). Violations involving Schedule I

substances carry more severe penalties than those in Schedule

III because the drugs have a high potential for abuse and no

generally accepted medical benefits.1 21 U.S.C. § 812(b)(1).

Forrester claims that the district court erred by failing to allow

him to present a defense that ecstasy should be categorized as

1The maximum Schedule I and III sentences for offenses committed by

a defendant with a prior drug conviction are 30 years and 10 years, respectively. See §§ 841(b)(1)(C), (D). 

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Schedule III rather than as Schedule I, which defense, had it

been allowed, would have subjected him to a lower maximum

penalty, as set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). Alternatively, he argues that § 841(b) violates the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments because it allows a maximum sentence to be

determined by a fact not found by the jury. 

A. Collateral Attack on a Scheduling Order

[2] The Attorney General (AG) has designated ecstasy as

a Schedule I controlled substance under the CSA.2 The CSA

allows the AG to schedule a substance on a temporary basis

when doing so is “necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to

the public safety.” 21 U.S.C. § 811(h).3

[3] Forrester argues that the Schedule III definition more

accurately describes ecstasy than does the one in Schedule I,

and that “the scheduling of ecstasy has been questioned by the

medical community.” Forrester further argues that denying

him the opportunity to argue that ecstasy should be designated

a Schedule III controlled substance violates Touby v. United

States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991). Specifically, Forrester believes

that he has a right to collaterally attack the substance of the

scheduling order because Congress has not explicitly foreclosed such review. This is an issue of first impression in this

circuit. 

2Congress delegated the authority to schedule drugs to the AG, 21

U.S.C. § 811(h) and the AG, in turn, has delegated the authority to update

the CSA schedules to the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). 28 C.F.R.

§ 0.100. However, the legitimacy of this delegation is not at issue here;

accordingly, for purposes of this opinion, we attribute scheduling decisions to the AG. 

3This allows the AG to bypass, for a limited time, the lengthy procedure

required for permanent scheduling and thus enables the government to

respond more quickly to dangerous new drugs. Temporary scheduling

orders remain valid for one year. Section 811(h)(6) provides that a temporary order is not subject to “judicial review.” Id. 

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In Touby, the petitioners were convicted of conspiring to

manufacture “Euphoria,” a designer drug that was temporarily

placed under Schedule I. 500 U.S. at 162. The primary question in Touby was whether the AG’s power to temporarily

schedule a substance violated the non-delegation doctrine. Id.

at 164-67. The Court also considered whether the temporary

scheduling statute was unconstitutional because it bars judicial review. Id. at 168-69. The Court held that (1) direct, preenforcement review of a permanent scheduling order is

plainly authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 877 and that petitioners

wishing to challenge the order can do so when the temporary

order becomes permanent, (2) the AG’s compliance with his

delegated duties may always be challenged by individuals facing criminal charges, whether they are temporary or permanent, and (3) substantive, collateral attacks on temporary

scheduling orders may be brought by criminal defendants

whose sentences will be affected by the order. Id. at 160. 

The concurring opinion in Touby emphasized that “the

opportunity of a defendant to challenge the substance of a

temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution is essential to the result in this case” and that Congress

“did not intend to foreclose review in the enforcement context.” Id. at 169-70. The concurring minority was concerned

that temporary scheduling orders, which have not been fully

vetted by the AG or passed all of the necessary procedural

requirements, were going to have a severe impact on criminal

defendants who were sentenced pursuant to the orders. In

effect, the opinion permitted a concurrent vetting by the

courts to ensure that such temporary orders were not

improper. We construe Touby’s holding to be limited to temporary orders because permanent orders are thoroughly vetted

and allow for direct attacks through 21 U.S.C. § 877. 

The Eleventh Circuit, the only circuit to have previously

addressed this issue to date, came to the same conclusion.

United States v. Carlson, 87 F.3d 440 (11th Cir. 1996). Carlson, like Forrester, attempted to substantively challenge the

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AG’s ruling that ecstasy is a Schedule I controlled substance.

Id. at 446. The Eleventh Circuit held that a defendant cannot

“make a collateral attack on a final regulatory decision in a

criminal case.” Id. It gave two reasons: “[f]irst, the decision

to schedule a substance like [ecstasy] is a complex matter, . . .

[and] [s]econd, and more importantly, the agency itself is not

a party in the case; hence it has no opportunity to defend its

scheduling order.” Id. Additionally, to allow all criminal

defendants to collaterally attack a permanent scheduling order

based on their view that a particular drug has been misscheduled would potentially place a continuing, onerous burden on district courts to constantly re-litigate the same issue.

[4] Forrester argues that, in other situations, Congress has

been explicit about not permitting collateral attacks at trial.

For example, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) states:

If a designation under this subsection has become

effective under paragraph (2)(B) a defendant in a

criminal action or an alien in a removal proceeding

shall not be permitted to raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance of such designation

as a defense or an objection at any trial or hearing.

Section 1326(d) contains a similar provision in the deportation context. However, the evidence that Congress has, at

times, taken a more proactive stance toward controlling collateral challenges is not sufficient to overcome our reading of

Touby, and the persuasive reasoning of our sister circuit, to

the effect that collateral attacks are not permitted in criminal

cases involving permanent scheduling orders. 

[5] We hold that substantive collateral attacks on permanent scheduling orders are impermissible in criminal cases

where defendants’ sentences will be determined by those

scheduling orders. Accordingly, we conclude that the district

court did not err in denying Forrester’s motion for an evidentiary hearing on the issue.

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B. Constitutionality of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) 

Forrester also argues that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) violates

the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, as construed in Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v. Buckland, 289 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2002), because it allows his maximum sentence to be determined by a fact not found by the

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[6] The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that “[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Buckland, the government conceded that the district court had violated Apprendi when it,

rather than the jury, determined the quantity of drugs attributable to the defendant. Buckland, 289 F.3d at 568. Forrester

contends that the question of whether ecstasy meets the definition of a Schedule I substance is a factual determination that

must be left to the jury. 

[7] In both Apprendi and Buckland, the judges made

improper findings of conduct (sale of a particular drug and

engaging in hate speech, respectively) by a preponderance of

the evidence. The respective courts held that those findings

should have been made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Buckland, 289 F.3d at 563; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.

However, both cases explicitly confirm Congress’s ability to

“ramp up the punishment for controlled substance offenders

based on the type and amount of illegal substance involved in

the crime.” Buckland, 289 F.3d at 568; see also Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 495 (recognizing Congress’s ability to choose “[t]he

degree of culpability . . . associate[d] with particular, factually

distinct conduct”). Therefore, under Buckland and Apprendi,

the relevant fact questions for the jury in this case would have

been what conduct Forrester engaged in (conspiracy to manufacture and distribute drugs) and what type of drug was

involved in the conspiracy (ecstasy). Here, those are issues of

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fact that would have been found by a jury had Forrester gone

to trial, instead of pleading guilty.4 In contrast, the question of

whether ecstasy is a drug that warrants greater restrictions and

punishment because of its highly undesirable qualities is one

that has been properly delegated to the legislative branch. In

other words, it is within the realm of Congress’s power to

“ramp up the punishment” for ecstasy. Buckland, 289 F.3d at

568. The AG, with the power delegated by Congress,5 chose

to do so by categorizing it as Schedule I rather than as Schedule III. In the same way that elements of a crime are determined by Congress, so are the classifications of certain illegal

drugs. Determining which offenses are worthy of greater punishments is a legislative prerogative. This policy judgment

cannot properly be construed as a “fact that increases the penalty for a crime” within the meaning of Apprendi. 530 U.S. at

490. 

II. Rejected Plea Offer

On October 23, 2002, Forrester waived his right to counsel

under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (the Faretta

hearing). However, during the Faretta hearing colloquy, the

district court incorrectly advised Forrester that he faced 10

years-to-life in prison, whereas he actually faced zero-to-20

years in prison. Forrester I, 512 F.3d at 507. The government

did not correct the court’s erroneous advice. 

On July 3, 2003 (five days before trial), the government

extended a plea offer to Forrester and Alba. The government

told Forrester that if both he and Alba accepted the “package

deal,” Forrester could limit his exposure to 20 years. The gov4Forrester pleaded guilty and thus waived his right to a jury trial. His

guilty plea thus stands in the place of a jury’s findings. See United States

v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 709 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (Tallman, J., dissenting

in part) (citing United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1272 n.2 (11th

Cir. 2001)). 

5

See supra note 2. 

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ernment stated that if the plea offer was not accepted by 2:00

pm that same day, it would file a sentence enhancement pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. The offer was not accepted by either

Forrester or Alba, and the government filed the § 851

enhancement, thereby enhancing Forrester’s maximum penalty from 20 to 30 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). 

The case proceeded to trial and Forrester was convicted,

and sentenced to the maximum of 30 years. We reversed,

finding a defective waiver of counsel due to the district

court’s erroneous sentencing advisement during the Faretta

hearing. Forrester I, 512 F.3d at 505-09. Following remand,

Forrester filed a motion requesting that the district court strike

the § 851 enhancement and allow him to plead guilty without

the enhancement because he had been misadvised of the

potential penalties at the Faretta hearing. The district court

denied the motion, stating: 

Well, the government has the right to file anything

they think, any conduct or convictions they think

they can prove. With regard to misadvising him of

the maximum penalty, you are absolutely correct I

did misadvise him. No question about that.

. . . 

In any event, I don’t think there is anything inappropriate for the government having filed that 851 allegation. I understand your honor [sic] position, but

your request that I have it stricken or dismissed is

denied.

Forrester then pleaded guilty and was sentenced (again) to the

30-year maximum. Forrester alleges that the district court

erred by failing to dismiss the § 851 sentence enhancement

due to its prior sentencing miscalculation, thereby depriving

him of the opportunity to make a knowing and intelligent

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decision to accept an earlier plea offer that did not include the

enhancement. 

[8] Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) states that the

court must hold a hearing and inform a defendant of, and

determine that he understands, “any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine, and term of supervised

release” and “any mandatory minimum penalty,” before it

accepts his guilty plea (the plea hearing). FED. R. CRIM. P.

11(b)(1)(H) & (I). A failure to ensure that a defendant understands his range of exposure may violate the requirement that

a guilty plea be “knowing and voluntary.” See, e.g., Tanner

v. McDaniel, 493 F.3d 1135, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding

that guilty plea is voluntary and knowing only if defendant

understands the range of allowable punishment that will result

from his plea). Forrester’s case differs from the standard situation where pleas are found involuntary due to misinformation about the potential sentence in two ways: (1) Forrester

rejected the plea offered to him, and (2) the court misinformed him of his exposure during a Faretta hearing rather

than during a plea hearing. 

[9] “[T]here is no constitutional right to plea bargain.”

Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977). Nonetheless, defendants who plead guilty are given the protection of

the “voluntary and intelligent” requirement because, in pleading guilty, they are relinquishing fundamental constitutional

rights. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b) (detailing defendant’s right

to plead not guilty, to a jury trial, to have counsel, to confront

witnesses, and to present evidence). However, the voluntary

and intelligent requirement has never been extended to rejections of plea offers. When a defendant turns down a guilty

plea, he is giving up only the opportunity to limit his exposure

to the terms of that plea. 

Forrester argues that, once a plea offer has been made, a

defendant has a right to be accurately informed about his

potential exposure before deciding to reject it. He relies on

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Nunes v. Mueller, a habeas case in which an attorney misinformed the defendant that he had received a plea offer for 22

years as opposed to 11 years. 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003).

In Nunes, we suggested that the right to make an informed

decision about a plea is a corollary to the right to voluntarily

and intelligently plead guilty. Id. at 1053 (“The right that

Nunes claims he lost was not the right to a fair trial or the

right to a plea bargain, but the right to participate in the decision as to, and to decide, his own fate—a right also clearly

found in Supreme Court law.”). In that case, we ordered the

reinstatement of Nunes’ original plea offer, rather than the

more common remedy of a new trial, in order to “put the

defendant back in the position he would have been in if the

Sixth Amendment violation never occurred.” Id. at 1057

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

[10] Nunes was based on the well-founded constitutional

right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 1051-1054. For

Nunes to apply here, we would have to find that Forrester suffered a similar unconstitutional deprivation of rights that

tainted his rejection of the plea offer. We decline to do so on

these facts. Though a defendant may have a right to voluntarily and intelligently reject a plea offer, we need not reach that

question in this case because any error was harmless. See

Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964, 971 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000) (reciting Chapman “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard

for constitutional trial type errors). 

First, Forrester was offered a “package deal” with Alba.

Because Alba rejected the deal, Forrester could not unilaterally have accepted it even if he had been aware of his actual

potential sentence. Indeed, Alba had no incentive to accept

the plea, as the threatened enhancement did not affect his

exposure because he already faced life in prison on a continuing criminal enterprise count. 

[11] Second, Forrester’s maximum and minimum possible

sentences were overstated. Forrester was offered a 20-year

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cap on his sentence when he thought he faced 10-to-life if he

went to trial. In rejecting the offer to cap his exposure at 20

years, he risked receiving what he thought was a life sentence

for the potential benefit of being acquitted. He now claims

that, had he known that he actually faced a potential sentence

of 0-to-30 years (with the enhancement), he would have foregone risking the 30-year maximum and accepted the deal to

cap his exposure at 20 years. In other words, he says he was

willing to risk receiving 10-to-life for the possibility of

acquittal, but would not have been willing to take his chances

at 0-to-30. We find this argument counterintuitive. Though it

is certainly possible that a misinformed defendant may reject

a plea that he otherwise would have taken, that was undoubtedly not the case here. Cf. United States v. Stubbs, 279 F.3d

402, 411 (6th Cir. 2002) (“When the maximum possible sentence is overstated, the defendant might well be influenced to

accept a plea agreement he would otherwise reject.” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)).6

 Therefore, the

district court’s denial of the motion to strike the enhancement

was proper.

III. Sufficiency of the conspiracy indictment

Forrester alleges that his indictment for conspiracy was

insufficient. The second superseding indictment at issue

reads: 

Beginning at a date unknown to the grand jury and

continuing up to and including October 18, 2001,

within the Southern District of California, and elsewhere, [Forrester and 18 other named defendants],

6

In Forrester I, we rejected a similar argument that the district court’s

overstatement made Forrester less likely to waive counsel. 512 F.3d at

507-08. We emphasized in that context, however, that harmless error

review does not apply to Faretta waivers. Id. at 508. By contrast, errors

relating to plea hearings are subject to harmless error review. See United

States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 1146 (2003). 

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all charged elsewhere, did knowingly and intentionally conspire together and with each other and with

other persons known and unknown to the grand jury

to manufacture and distribute a controlled substance,

to wit, 3,4 Methylenedioxyamphetamine (“MDA”),

commonly known as “ecstasy”, a Schedule I Controlled Substance, in violation of Title 21, United

States Code, Sections 846 and 841(a)(1). 

Forrester filed a motion to dismiss for deficiency, and the district court denied the motion without explanation. 

[12] An indictment “must be a plain, concise and definite

written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense

charged.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1). “An indictment is sufficient if it (1) contains the elements of the offense charged and

fairly informs a defendant of the charge against him which he

must defend and (2) enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.”

United States v. Lazarenko, 564 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir.

2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Generally, an

indictment is sufficient if it sets forth the elements of the

charged offense so as to ensure the right of the defendant not

to be placed in double jeopardy and to be informed of the

offense charged.” United States v. Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 949,

958 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). With

respect to conspiracies, “[a]n indictment under 21 U.S.C.

§ 846 . . . is sufficient if it alleges: a conspiracy to distribute

drugs, the time during which the conspiracy was operative

and the statute allegedly violated, even if it fails to allege or

prove any specific overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.”

United States v. Tavelman, 650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir.

1981) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

[13] Forrester contends that the indictment is insufficient

because it fails to specify a beginning date for the conspiracy,

thereby possibly subjecting him to double jeopardy. However,

although an indictment cannot be completely open-ended, see

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United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir.

1979), an indictment that specifies an end date is sufficient to

apprise defendants of the charges and enable them to prepare

a defense, see United States v. Rohrer, 708 F.2d 429, 435 n.7

(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that an indictment alleging that the

conspiracy extended until “at least” 1980 was sufficient). 

[14] In addition, uncertainty regarding a conspiracy’s

beginning and ending dates does not render an indictment

fatally defective so long as overt acts alleged in the indictment

adequately limit the time frame of the conspiracy. United

States. v. Laykin, 886 F.2d 1534, 1542 (9th Cir. 1989) (18

specific facts alleged in the indictment were sufficient to limit

the time frame). Here, the second superceding indictment

tracks the language of the conspiracy statute, identifies a location and co-conspirators, and alleges the purpose of the conspiracy. It also alleged a semi-discrete time period (it gave an

end date but no beginning date) and certain overt acts. Taken

together, the indictment was sufficient to apprise Forrester of

the charges against him, enable him to prepare a defense, and

to avoid double jeopardy on the same charge. We thus conclude that the district court did not err in denying Forrester’s

motion to dismiss the indictment.

IV. The Wiretap

On February 5, 2001, the government submitted an initial

application for a 30-day wiretap order. The application contained a 53-page affidavit by Special Agent Robert Aguirre,

and a separate 3-page affidavit (Exhibit C) that was filed

under seal. The district judge approved the wiretap on the

same day. Forrester challenges the wiretap on several

grounds. First, he claims that he was entitled to access the

redacted contents of Exhibit C. Second, he claims that the

wiretap application failed to comply with the “necessity”

requirement of the statute. Third, he claims that the wiretap

violated the Fourth Amendment.

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A. Right to View the Redacted Affidavit 

Exhibit C provided information about a confidential informant referred to as “CS.” Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

16 governs government disclosure of information, stating: 

Upon a defendant’s request, the government must

permit the defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph books, papers, documents, data, photographs,

tangible objects, buildings or places, or copies or

portions of any of these items, if the item is within

the government’s possession, custody, or control

and: 

(i) the item is material to preparing the

defense; 

(ii) the government intends to use the item

in its case-in-chief at trial; or

(iii) the item was obtained from or belongs

to the defendant. 

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 2518

states that the fruits of a wiretap may not be used in court

unless a copy of the court order and the wiretap application

are furnished to each party: 

The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in

evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing,

or other proceeding . . . unless each party . . . has

been furnished with a copy of the court order, and

accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. 

Id. § 2518(9). 

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[15] The district court denied Forrester’s motion for specific discovery of Exhibit C. It found that the items sought

were not discoverable under Rule 16 because they were not

material to the presentation of the defense. The question is

whether 18 U.S.C. § 2518, which mandates disclosure of the

wiretap application, allows the government to redact some

information in the application. This is a question of first

impression in our circuit, though one that has been addressed

by other courts. 

Forrester asks us to adopt the reasoning of the district court

in United States v. Arreguin, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (E.D. Cal.

2003). That court held that, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9),

a defendant has a right to all wiretap application materials,

including unredacted copies of affidavits in support of the

application. It reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 2518 “was enacted

to provide greater [privacy] protection than that mandated by

the Constitution under then-existing precedent,” id. at 1060

(citing Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 48 n.7 (1972)),

and noted that “[t]he statutory requirements for wiretap authorization are far more burdensome than those mandated by the

Constitution,” id. at 1060-61. Similarly, the court noted that

18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(b) provides that wiretap applications can

not be unsealed absent a showing of good cause and gives

judges discretion in determining what to disclose. Id. at 1061.

Section 2518(9), on the other hand, requires that each party

receive a copy of the wiretap application before evidence may

be received—it does not include any of the discretionary language found in § 2518(8)(b). Id. The district court considered

this to be “a judgment by Congress that the good cause

requirement is satisfied where the government plans to use

evidence derived from a wiretap.” Id. at 1061-62. Under that

reasoning, the court required the government to disclose wiretap applications in their entirety before using the evidence

derived from the wiretaps. Id. at 1062-63; see also United

States v. Manuszak, 438 F. Supp. 613, 619, 625 (E.D. Pa.

1977) (“Unlike Section 2518(8)(d) . . . which gives the court

discretion to deny access to the order and application, Section

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2518(9) mandates that these items be made available to a

party facing any proceeding[.]” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

[16] We find the reasoning in United States v. Danovaro

more persuasive. 877 F.2d 583 (7th Cir. 1989). In that case,

the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant does not have a right

to redacted portions of a wiretap application if the government is able (and willing) to defend the warrant without relying on the redacted information. Id. at 588. The court

determined that such a rule was consistent with 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(9) because “[s]tatutes requiring disclosure, but silent

on the question of privilege, do not override customary privileges.” Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,

397-98 (1981)). Furthermore, the privilege to withhold information in order to protect informants is well-established. See

Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957).7 The Danovaro court held that the information excised in that case,

which had been examined in camera, was not essential to support the warrant or to show that a wiretap was necessary. 877

F.2d at 588. Because the redacted portions were not necessary, the Seventh Circuit declined to determine whether the

government can redact information (with in camera review)

when the information is essential to the validity of the warrant. Id. We adopt as the rule of this Circuit the Seventh Circuit’s narrow rule from Danovaro,8

 but we also decline to

7The Arreguin court, in contrast, held that the statutory disclosure

requirement of § 2518(9) always trumps the informant privilege set forth

in Roviaro. See Arreguin, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 1061. 

8At least two other district courts have also found Danovaro more persuasive than Arreguin. See United States v. Coles, No. 05-440, 2007 WL

2916510, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2007) (“The Arreguin court’s analysis has

the appeal of simplicity, as it confines its assessment to the statutory text

and draws its conclusions based on what it regards as clear Congressional

intent. We do not agree with the Eastern District of California, however,

that Congressional intent on this question is so self-evident. Moreover, we

are concerned that the Arreguin court and the Defendant, to the extent he

urges the adoption of its analysis, embraces a sort of formalistic approach

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determine whether the government can redact information

when that information is essential to the validity of the warrant.

The preamble to Exhibit C states: “As noted in Exhibit B,

none of the information set forth in this supplemental pleading is being submitted to establish either probable cause or

necessity for the requested wiretap.” The rest of the two-anda-half page document is redacted. Exhibit B explains that

[d]ue to the nature of the CS’s cooperation with law

enforcement officers and the risk to the safety of the

CS if his/her identity is disclosed, I am submitting

details regarding the CS’s background and knowledge in [Exhibit C]. For the purpose of establishing

probable cause for the requested wire intercept, I am

not submitting the facts and circumstances in Exhibit

C; rather, I am providing the Court with the information in Exhibit C to substantiate my belief that the

CS is a reliable source of information and, as

addressed below, to show the limitations of the CS

with respect to law enforcement’s ability to achieve

the goals of this investigation without the requested

wiretap authorization.

Because, as discussed below, the unredacted parts of the wiretap application were more than sufficient to establish necessity, we find that the district court did not err in denying

Forrester’s motion for specific discovery. 

to Title III that has been rejected by the Third Circuit.”); United States v.

Freeman, No. 06-205-03, 2008 WL 879966, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,

2008) (“Like the court in Coles, I find it unwise to rely solely on the textual peculiarities of Title III to conclude that Congress’s intent was that the

informer’s privilege not apply to disclosures pursuant to § 2518(9). Consequently, I disagree with the reasoning and conclusion of Arreguin. Moreover, I find persuasive the reasoning of the . . . Seventh Circuit in

Danovaro . . . .”). 

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B. § 2518’s Necessity Requirement

Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c), a judge may authorize a

wiretap if the application demonstrates that “normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too

dangerous.” This “necessity requirement” is intended to

ensure that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where

traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose

the crime. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12

(1974).

The district court authorized the wiretap after finding that

it was necessary. The 72-page wiretap application extensively

detailed target subjects, the basis of information, the MDA

manufacturing process, the facts establishing probable cause,

and the inadequacy of traditional investigative techniques.

The latter section, spanning 20 pages, explained how the use

of confidential informants and undercover officers, physical

surveillance, pen registers, telephone rolls, search warrants,

interviews, grand jury subpoenas, and trash searches had

proven inadequate. 

[17] Forrester argues that the application did not provide a

full and complete statement regarding the government’s

investigatory techniques, and therefore failed to meet the

necessity requirement. In fact, the wiretap application contained a full and complete statement of the facts. It described

in great detail the entire course of the investigation. It

described the target subjects and their backgrounds, the

numerous sources of information (DEA & Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement agents, federal, state, and local drug task

force officers, and the Swedish National Criminal Investigative Department, among others), the MDA manufacturing

process, Forrester’s trips to Sweden to visit known ecstasy

manufacturers, specific chemical orders and shipments,

efforts to follow Forrester to Sweden and details of his activities there, and an extensive analysis of the pen register and

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toll information for the target telephone. To demonstrate that

traditional investigative techniques were insufficient, the affidavit described the use (and lack of success) of confidential

informants, undercover officers, physical surveillance (including stationary cameras), pen registers, search warrants, interviews, and trash searches.

Based on this full and complete statement, the district

court’s necessity finding was not an abuse of discretion. The

application carefully explains why traditional investigative

techniques would not have enabled officers to achieve the

goals of the investigation. For instance, it noted that one of

the confidential informants knew of a clandestine lab but

could not get the defendants to disclose its location. There

was also some evidence that the confidential informant (CI)

was receiving incorrect information, and as a drug buyer, the

CI was not privy to key information about the defendants’

operation. As another example, the application noted that the

use of physical (camera and video) surveillance had enabled

the government to identify some target subjects, confirm that

Forrester traveled to Sweden, and confirm a meeting between

Forrester and Alba. However, it could not establish the identities of all coconspirators or provide evidence of the purpose

and content of conspiratorial meetings. The application also

listed specific investigative goals not yet achieved through the

use of conventional techniques, including the identification of

all coconspirators of the target subjects, the manner in which

they were laundering the proceeds, and the locations where

they were manufacturing and distributing the ecstasy. 

Forrester’s reliance on United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412

F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2005), is misplaced. There, we found a

lack of necessity because the government’s investigation of a

particular office building in question was too limited. Id. at

1108. “This brief investigation included: five days of pen registers . . .; an equally brief use of trap-and-trace analysis of the

telephones; limited physical surveillance; and a preliminary

inquiry attempt to place an undercover agent . . . .” Id. The

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investigation into Forrester and his codefendants, in comparison, went on for many months and was thorough and targeted.

[18] The necessity requirement was intended to ensure that

wiretaps are not used as the initial step in a criminal investigation. United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515 (1974).

However, officials need not exhaust every conceivable investigative technique before obtaining a wiretap. United States v.

Commito, 918 F.2d 95, 98-99 (9th Cir. 1990); United States

v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1988). Based on

these principles and the information contained in the wiretap

application, we find that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that the wiretap was necessary, and denying the motion to suppress.

C. The Fourth Amendment Wiretap Claim

Forrester argues that, even if the necessity requirement was

met, the application violated the Fourth Amendment standard

set forth in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) because

of a lack of exigent circumstances. In Berger, the Court held

that: 

[The wiretap statute] permits uncontested entry without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a

showing of exigency, in order to avoid notice would

appear more important in eavesdropping, with its

inherent dangers, than that required when conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized.

Id. at 60. Berger did not create a bright-line exigency requirement. Rather, the Court was troubled that eavesdropping had

been authorized without requiring probable cause, without a

description of the conversations it sought to record, and without a termination date. Id. at 59-60. Here, probable cause was

established, the wiretap was limited to one month, and the

application described the conversations and information that

it sought to “seize.” 

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[19] Furthermore, the Supreme Court has routinely

acknowledged that § 2518 “prescribes the procedure for

securing judicial authority to intercept wire communications,”

Giordano, 416 U.S. at 507, and was enacted specifically to

“meet the constitutional requirements for electronic surveillance enunciated by [the Supreme Court] in [Berger] and Katz

v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967),” Mitchell v. Forsyth,

472 U.S. 511, 532 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).

Therefore, we conclude that because the wiretap application

met the standards set forth in § 2518, which do not require a

showing of exigent circumstances, the application did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 

V. Sentencing 

A. Temporary Amendment to the Ecstasy Act

[20] The November 2000 sentencing manual provided that

one gram of MDA was the equivalent of 50 grams of marijuana. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (2000). The Ecstasy AntiProliferation Act of 2000 (Ecstacy Act), contained in Pub. L.

106-310, directed the Sentencing Commission to increase

penalties for ecstasy. Pub. L. 106-310 §§ 3663(a), 3664.

Accordingly, the Sentencing Commission promulgated a temporary amendment to § 2D1.1 that increased this ratio to

500:1, effective retroactively as of May 1, 2001. The district

court relied on this temporary amendment in setting the base

offense level. Forrester argues that subjecting him to a heightened sentence pursuant to the temporary amendment violated

the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. 

1. The end date listed in the indictment

The indictment alleged that the conspiracy continued until

October 18, 2001. The indictment was reproduced in full in

the plea agreement. The plea’s “Factual Basis” section mentioned only a beginning date, stating that “[i]n or about

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November, 2000, . . . Forrester entered into an agreement with

Alba, and others, to manufacture and distribute” ecstacy. 

[21] We have declined to treat “guilty pleas as admitting

factual allegations in the indictment not essential to the government’s proof of the offense.” United States v. Cazares, 121

F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1997). Forrester asserts that,

because “the date alleged in a section 846 indictment is not

an element of the offense,” the date in the indictment, even

though it was replicated in his signed guilty plea, was not part

of the admission. In Cazares, we held that the “appropriate

course is not, as the government argues, for the defendant to

delete this [end date] from the guilty plea, but rather, for the

government at the plea colloquy to seek an explicit admission

of any unlawful conduct which it seeks to attribute to the

defendant. Having failed to do so, the government must follow the normal procedure of proving relevant conduct at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. at 1248

(internal quotation marks omitted). There is no mention of an

end date in the plea agreement, nor did Forrester admit to one

at the plea colloquy. Therefore the temporary amendment,

which took effect after Forrester’s admitted start date of

November 2000, cannot apply to him under the current posture of the case. We therefore remand for resentencing.

Unless the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy continued until after the temporary

amendment became effective, Forrester should be sentenced

under the November 2000 50:1 ratio. 

2. Effective Date of the 500:1 Ratio

Forrester also argues that even if the October 18, 2001 end

date can be used for sentencing, the increased ratio of 500:1

did not become effective until November 1, 2001, at the earliest, because the temporary amendment was invalid. We agree

that the temporary amendment’s retroactivity was invalid, but

hold that the amendment became effective on June 6, 2001

when it was initially published. 

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In United States v. DeLeon, the Eighth Circuit considered

whether the referenced temporary amendment violated the

Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 330 F.3d 1033, 1034

(8th Cir. 2003). The court analyzed the APA’s three-step rulemaking provisions, which require notice of the proposed rule,

a hearing or receipt and consideration of public comments,

and the publication of the new rule. Id. at 1036-38 (citing 5

U.S.C. § 553). The crux of the inquiry was the precise date on

which the amendment became effective. The DeLeon court

determined it became effective on June 6 (the publication

date) even though the publication listed a retroactive effective

date of May 1. 330 F.3d at 1036. 

[22] The court’s reasoning was two-fold. First, § 553(d) of

the APA ordinarily requires that a rule be published at least

30 days prior to its effective date and, upon a showing of

good cause, permits a rule to take effect immediately upon

publication. Id. Therefore, even if the good cause exception

applies, the earliest effective date would be the June 6 publication date. Second, the court considered whether the amendments could be retroactive to May 1. Agencies cannot adopt

retroactive regulations “unless that power is conveyed by

Congress in express terms.” Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.

Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). The government argued in

DeLeon that the emergency nature of the Ecstasy Act, read

together with the Sentencing Act of 1987, empowered the

Commission to make the amendment retroactive. DeLeon,

330 F.3d at 1036-37. The court disagreed, holding that the

“true effect of the 1987 Act is merely to imbue the Commission with the power to enact temporary rules that take effect

immediately without prior Congressional approval.” Id.

(emphasis added). The court reversed and remanded for

resentencing of DeLeon under the former, pre-Ecstasy Act

scheme. Id. at 1038. For the same reasons, we hold that the

amendment to § 2D1.1 became effective on June 6, 2001 (the

initial publication date). We also reject Forrester’s argument

that the effective date should be the November 1 final publication date rather than the June 6 initial publication date.

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Therefore, if on remand the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the conspiracy continued until at

least October 2001, then the enhanced 500:1 ratio was appropriately applied to Forrester’s sentence because it ended after

June 6 2001, when the enhanced ratio became effective. 

B. Estimating Ecstasy Quantities 

[23] Under the Sentencing Guidelines, “[w]here there is no

drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of

the offense,” a district court may estimate the quantity of the

drug and may consider “the size or capability of any laboratory involved.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.12; see also United

States v. Putney, 906 F.2d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 1990). The government recommended a base offense level of 38 premised on

(1) a “theoretical maximum yield” (TMY) of 183.6 kilograms

(kilos) of ecstasy, as calculated by DEA chemist Skinner, (2)

an “actual yield” of 63.1 kilos of ecstasy, also calculated by

Skinner, and (3) a detailed “business plan” discovered at the

ecstasy laboratory suggesting that the conspiracy intended to

produce 440 kilos of ecstasy. Forrester argues that the conspiracy involved less than 60 kilos of ecstasy and that the

appropriate base level (using the 50:1 ratio) was 32. The district court applied the 500:1 ratio and, without making specific findings as to the precise quantity of ecstasy involved,

concluded that the base offense level was 38.

1. Insufficient Findings as to the Amount of Ecstasy

Involved

Forrester claims that the district court failed to make specific findings regarding the parties’ factual disputes about the

amount of ecstasy involved, in violation of Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 32. In United States v. Carter, we held

that “[f]or each disputed fact upon which the district court

intends to rely in imposing the sentence, the district court

must make an explicit factual finding that resolves the dispute

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[or] must clearly state that the disputed fact was not taken into

account . . . .” 219 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2000).

Here, the district court held a lengthy hearing in which the

government presented evidence about the estimated yield,

which led to an extensive exchange between the parties

regarding the chemist’s theoretical yield estimate, the PSR,

the reliability of Alba’s statement corroborating that estimate,

and Alba’s business plan indicating that the goal of the conspiracy was to manufacture 440 kilos of ecstasy per month.

The district court must rule on each of these disputed facts

individually. See id. at 866-67. In doing so, the court ensures

meaningful appellate review and avoids “the unfairness that

would result to a defendant if prison or parole officials were

to rely on false allegations or uncorrected reports.” Id. at 866.

[24] The district judge calculated a base level offense of 38

based on the “testimony of the chemist at trial, the grafts that

were seized from the lab up there, and just tangentially the

fact that the Ninth Circuit actually upheld the same base

offense level in Mr. Alba’s case.”

9

 Although the sentencing

hearing was very thorough, a specific finding was not made

as to the amount of ecstasy involved in the conspiracy.10

While a base offense level of 38 may well have been reasonable, that particular level applies to a range of quantities

beginning at 60 kilos, so it cannot be used as a proxy for an

exact finding as to the amount of ecstasy involved in this case.

[25] Since this case is being remanded for additional findings as to the end date of the conspiracy, we also direct that

9The finding that “the Ninth Circuit actually upheld the same base

offense level” for Alba was erroneous. That issue was not raised on appeal

in Forrester I. This error demonstrates the importance of having each finding explained so that its merits can be assessed later. 

10The lack of a specific finding as to the amount of ecstasy has, in turn,

hampered us in determining whether the appropriate drug estimation

method was used. 

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the district court make explicit findings on all contested issues

raised at sentencing, the most important of which is the

amount of ecstasy involved in the conspiracy. 

2. The Amount of Ecstasy Involved

Although the district court did not make explicit findings as

to the amount of ecstasy involved, it necessarily relied on

some implicit finding of quantity in determining the base

offense level. There are three criteria for approximations of

drug quantity. United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1141

(9th Cir. 2006).

First, the government is required to prove the

approximate quantity by a preponderance of the evidence . . . which means that the district court must

conclude that the defendant is more likely than not

actually responsible for a quantity greater than or

equal to the quantity for which the defendant is

being held responsible. Second, the information

which supports an approximation must possess sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable

accuracy. Third, since the sentence depends in large

part upon the amount of drugs . . . and approximation is by definition imprecise, the district court must

err on the side of caution in approximating the drug

quantity.

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We have repeatedly held that a court must “err on the side

of caution” when estimating drug quantity, Chase, 499 F.3d

at 1069, and when there are two “equally good measures” for

making a calculation under the guidelines, a court must select

the one “bringing the less punishment,” United States v.

Hardy, 289 F.3d 608, 614 (9th Cir. 2002). We have also discouraged the use of a TMY analysis, and in individual cases

have deemed it an inappropriate methodology to calculate

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drug quantity. Chase, 499 F.3d at 1069 (“the relevant inquiry

[is] not what a theoretical maximum yield would be”).11 In

theory, the TMY would be permissible in the absence of more

conservative, equally reliable estimates. Where a lower

approximation is an “equally good measure,” however, a rule

calling for a conservative estimate is likely to be incongruous

with a method that calculates maximum yield.12

Here, the government’s expert, DEA chemist Skinner, testified that one of his calculations was a maximum theoretical

yield of 183.6 kilos of ecstasy. In Chase, the government’s

expert had “quite candidly admitted that his calculation was

a maximum theoretical yield,” an approach that this court

found “unreliable as a method of estimating how much

methamphetamine [the defendant] produced.” Id. However,

Skinner also testified that “there is a wide range in the yield

. . . from lab to lab,” and that he had also calculated a substantially lower “actual yield” of 63.1 kilos of ecstasy based upon

the quantities of seized materials. The actual yield assumed

that Forrester’s lab could achieve a “conservative” 50% yield

at each reaction state from the seized precursor chemicals,

instead of the 100% yield assumed in the TMY calculation.

The chemist based his estimates to some extent on his conversation with Forrester’s co-conspirator Alba. The district judge

indicated that he had calculated the base offense level of 38

relying on, among other things, the testimony of the govern11Forrester observes that the TMY result is particularly suspect in this

case because, “according to the government, the conspiracy was only able

to manufacture 24.6 kilos during the preceding year, but it would then suddenly produce 159 kilos with the seized chemicals.” 

12Theoretical yield calculations are clearly permissible; it is the use of

a maximum theoretical estimate that is problematic. See, e.g., United

States v. Williams, 989 F.2d 1061, 1073 n.5 (using the lower estimate of

a theoretical range); United States v. August, 86 F.3d 151, 153 (9th Cir.

1996) (same); United States v. Basinger, 60 F.3d 1400, 1410 n.5 (9th Cir.

1995) (explicitly “minimiz[ing] the potential for overestimating drug

quantity by adopting the expert’s most conservative figure”). 

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ment’s chemist, but did not specify on which of the two estimates he was relying. 

[26] Since the district court did not make any explicit findings about the amount of ecstasy involved when it imposed a

base offense level of 38, we need not reach the question of

whether the court relied on an improper method of calculating

the amount of ecstasy. However, we note that when there are

two reasonable methods of calculation, the district court

should select the measure that brings the lesser punishment,

Hardy, 289 F.3d at 614. Therefore unless, on remand, the district court’s findings show that the TMY was the most reliable

method available to calculate the amount of ecstasy, the 183.6

estimate is likely too high. 

Forrester also claims that his sentence was substantively

unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), but we decline to

reach this issue because we are remanding for additional findings and resentencing. 

CONCLUSION

[27] For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Forrester’s

conviction, VACATE his sentence, and REMAND for additional findings and resentencing in conformity with this opinion.

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