Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02210/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-02210-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Latavia Hurts
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LATAVIA HURTS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:13-cv-2210 CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) determining plaintiff was no longer eligible for Supplemental Security Income 

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”) because she did not meet the adult 

rules for disability. For the reasons discussed below, the court will grant plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, deny the Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and remand 

this matter under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was awarded SSI when she was eight years old. Once plaintiff attained the age of 

eighteen, plaintiff’s disability was redetermined under the rules for disability used for adults. 

Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 13-14. The medical improvement review standard is 

inapplicable to the disability redetermination. AT 14. Plaintiff alleged she was unable to work 

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due to problems with learning, understanding and remembering. AT 140. In a decision dated 

September 27, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s disability ended on February 1, 2007.1 

AT 13-23. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. omitted):

1. The claimant attained age 18 on December 10, 2004, and was 

eligible for supplemental security income benefits as a child for the 

month preceding the month in which she attained age 18. The 

claimant was notified that she was found no longer disabled as of 

February 1, 2007, based on a redetermination of disability under the 

rules for adults who file new applications. 

2. Since February 1, 2007, the claimant has had the following 

severe impairments: depression, post traumatic stress disorder 

(PTSD), learning disorder and borderline intellectual functioning.

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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3. Since February 1, 2007, the claimant did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one 

of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 

1.

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that since February 1, 2007, the claimant has had the residual 

functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the 

claimant can perform simple repetitive tasks; understand simple 

instructions; and can occasionally interact with supervisors, peers 

and the public.

5. The claimant has no past relevant work.

6. The claimant was born on December 11, 1986 and is a younger 

individual age 18-49.

7. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate 

in English.

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue because the claimant 

does not have past relevant work. 

9. Since February 1, 2007, considering the claimant’s age, 

education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there 

are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy 

that the claimant can perform.

10. The claimant’s disability ended on February 1, 2007 and the 

claimant has not become disabled again since that date. 

AT 15-23. 

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed error at step three of the sequential evaluation by 

not finding she met or equaled Listing 12.05C. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

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responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in 

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends she meets or equals Listing 12.05C and is therefore presumptively 

disabled. The Social Security Regulations “Listing of Impairments” is comprised of impairments 

to certain categories of body systems that are severe enough to preclude a person from performing 

gainful activity. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(d). Conditions described in the listings are considered so severe that they are 

irrebuttably presumed disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In meeting or equaling a listing, all 

the requirements of that listing must be met. Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 

1985). It is the disability claimant’s burden of proving that his or her impairments meet or equal 

the required elements of a Listing. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F. 3d 1094, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).

To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he meets each characteristic of 

a listed impairment relevant to his claim. To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must establish 

symptoms, signs and laboratory findings “at least equal in severity and duration” to the 

characteristics of a relevant listed impairment, or, if a claimant’s impairment is not listed, then to 

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the listed impairment “most like” the claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. A finding of 

equivalence must be based on medical evidence only. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d)(3). 

The Listings under 12.05 describe intellectual disabilities consisting of a “significant 

subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially 

manifested during the developmental period,” i.e. the onset of the impairment occurred before the 

individual was age 22. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.05. The manifested deficit in 

adaptive functioning is a prerequisite that must be met by Listings 12.05A-D, along with the 

individual requirements for each subdivision. Listing 12.05C requires a valid verbal, 

performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment 

imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function. 

The ALJ discussed in some detail whether plaintiff met Listing 12.02, 12.04 or 12.06 and 

concluded she did not. AT 16-17. However, with respect to Listing 12.05, the ALJ summarily 

determined, without analysis, that plaintiff did not meet this Listing. After review of the entire 

record, the court finds the ALJ’s failure to fully analyze whether plaintiff met Listing 12.05 

constitutes reversible error.2

The record contains two IQ scores that appear to meet the regulatory definition.3 In 2000, 

when plaintiff was almost fourteen years old, she underwent a psychological disability evaluation

conducted by Dr. Stearns. AT 274-278. Her verbal IQ was assessed as 69. AT 275. At the age 

of 25, plaintiff was again evaluated in a comprehensive psychological exam by Dr. Ewing. AT 

366-371. Dr. Ewing assessed plaintiff’s verbal IQ as 70. AT 369. Assuming arguendo that these 

IQ scores are valid,4plaintiff meets the first of the individual requirements under Listing 12.05C. 

/////

 

2

 Defendant contends this theory was not presented to the ALJ. Plaintiff’s counsel explicitly 

raised the issue of whether plaintiff met Listing 12.05C in the brief submitted to the ALJ prior to 

the hearing on August 22, 2012. AT 220-222, 385.

3

 The record contains a third reference to a verbal IQ of 66 assessed after testing in October, 

1994, when plaintiff was eight years old. AT 283.

4

 Because the ALJ’s analysis did not address in detail Listing 12.05C, the ALJ did not discuss the 

validity of plaintiff’s IQ scores.

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At step two of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ also found that in addition to borderline 

intellectual functioning, plaintiff has the additional impairments of depression, post traumatic 

stress disorder (PTSD) and learning disorder. AT 15. This finding meets the second of the 

individual requirements under Listing 12.05C. See Fanning v. Bowen, 827 F.2d 631, 633 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (impairment imposing additional and significant work-related limitation of function 

met if additional impairment’s effect on plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work activities is more 

than slight or minimal); see also Pedro v. Astrue, 849 F.Supp.2d 1006, 1015 (D. Or. 2011)(step 

two determination of additional impairment satisfies third prong of 12.05C). It thus appears 

plaintiff meets both the individual requirements of Listing 12.05C. 

To meet this Listing, however, plaintiff must also demonstrate that she fulfills the 

diagnostic description, i.e. significant subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in 

adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period. There is some 

evidence in the record that plaintiff may have manifested deficits in adaptive functioning during 

the developmental period. See, e.g. AT 249 (at age 12, plaintiff’s reading, written language and 

knowledge skills those of age equivalency of seven), 251 (poor hygiene, problems with stealing), 

AT 265 (fine motor coordination in 50th percentile), AT 276 (plaintiff socially awkward; 

difficulty in initiating and sustaining friendships). See generally Pedro v. Astrue, 849 F.Supp.2d 

1006, 1011-12 (D.Or. 2011) (plaintiff may use circumstantial evidence to demonstrate adaptive 

functioning deficits, including attendance in special education classes, dropping out of high 

school, difficulties in reading, writing or math, and low skilled work history); see also Reyna v. 

Astrue, 2011 WL 2441906 (E.D. Cal June 8, 2011) (plaintiff attended special education classes, 

failed all classes except wood shop, dropped out in the ninth grade, and held a series of menial 

positions in which he had difficulty following directions); Gomez v. Astrue, 695 F.Supp.2d 1049 

(C.D. Cal. 2010) (plaintiff attended special education classes, dropped out in the ninth grade, 

never obtained any other education or job training, and evidence in the record of a long history of 

teachers’ comments noting that plaintiff’s performance in school warranted special class 

placement). 

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The ALJ failed to properly consider whether plaintiff met Listing 12.05C and thus remand 

is appropriate. The remaining question is whether to remand this case to the ALJ for further 

proceedings or to order the payment of benefits. “The decision whether to remand the case for 

additional evidence or simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court.” Stone v. 

Heckler, 761 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1985). Generally, the Court will direct the award of benefits 

“in cases where no useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings or 

where the record has been thoroughly developed.” Varney v. Secretary of Health and Human 

Services, 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987). Remand for payment of benefits is appropriate 

where the ALJ erred in discrediting evidence and, absent any outstanding issues to be resolved, it 

is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the plaintiff disabled were such 

evidence credited. Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004). 

The record suggests that upon proper review of the entire record, the Commissioner could 

find plaintiff is presumptively disabled under this Listing. However, because the validity of the 

record IQ scores and whether plaintiff sufficiently manifested deficits in adaptive functioning 

during the developmental period have not been addressed by the ALJ, the matter will be 

remanded for further consideration of Listing 12.05C.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is granted;

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 19) is denied; and 

3. This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order. 

Dated: November 26, 2014

4 hurts.ss.rem

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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