Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50610/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50610-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Javier Anaya-Acosta
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-50610 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  CR 09-00456-FMC

JAVIER ANAYA-ACOSTA,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Florence-Marie Cooper, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 4, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed January 3, 2011

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Richard C. Tallman,

Circuit Judges, and John A. Jarvey, District Judge.*

Per Curiam Opinion

*The Honorable John A. Jarvey, District Judge for the Southern District

of Iowa, sitting by designation. 

109

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 1 of 7
COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, and Jonathan D.

Libby (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant.

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Christine C. Ewell,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division,

and Jennifer M. Resnik (argued), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Los

Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Javier Anaya-Acosta (“Anaya-Acosta”) appeals his December 3, 2009 conviction for being an illegal alien in possession

of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(5)(A). Anaya-Acosta argues that, because he was

subject to a departure control order issued pursuant to 8

C.F.R. § 215.2, he was not illegally in the United States, as

required for a conviction under § 922(g)(5)(A), when he possessed the firearm and ammunition. He contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of

acquittal and that it improperly instructed the jury as to

whether he was legally within the United States.

Because we find that the issuance of a departure control

order does not modify an alien’s immigration status and is not

equivalent to being paroled into the United States, we affirm

Anaya-Acosta’s conviction.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anaya-Acosta is a native and citizen of Mexico, and he

admitted to entering the United States without inspection on

112 UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 2 of 7
or about December 17, 1997. On July 27, 2007, an immigration judge issued an order granting Anaya-Acosta the opportunity to voluntarily depart before August 2, 2007, with an

alternative order of removal. However, on October 17, 2007,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) served

Anaya-Acosta with a departure control order that required

him to remain in the country until its revocation. The order

was issued at the request of the Los Angeles Police Department because Anaya-Acosta was a material witness in a state

murder case. Anaya-Acosta was not held in custody while he

awaited that trial.

While under the departure control order, Anaya-Acosta was

arrested in California on May 8, 2009 for being an illegal

alien in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Anaya-Acosta admitted to possessing the loaded firearm and to being a native and citizen

of Mexico. At trial, he challenged only the illegality of his

presence in the United States. He argued that the departure

control order, which temporarily prohibited him from leaving

the United States, rendered him legally within the country

when he possessed the firearm. The district court denied

Anaya-Acosta’s motion for judgment of acquittal on this

issue, and a jury convicted him.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal and its interpretation of the elements of a

criminal statute de novo. United States v. McNeil, 320 F.3d

1034, 1035 ( 9th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Hardy,

289 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2002). To the extent

Anaya-Acosta challenges the jury instructions given by the

district court on the elements of the offense charged, the standard of review is also de novo. United States v. PerdomoEspana, 522 F.3d 983, 986 (9th Cir. 2008).

UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA 113

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 3 of 7
DISCUSSION

To sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(5)(A), the government must prove that Anaya-Acosta was “illegally or unlawfully in the United States” when he possessed the firearm.

Accordingly, we must determine what effect, if any, a departure control order has on the legality of an alien’s presence in

the country for purposes of § 922(g)(5)(A). Anaya-Acosta

contends that the departure control order cured his illegal status by modifying the immigration judge’s order for voluntary

departure or removal. We disagree and hold that a departure

control order does not affect the legal status of an alien’s presence in the United States under § 922(g)(5)(A). 

[1] The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) is charged with promulgating regulations under

§ 922. Because the statute itself is silent as to the meaning of

“illegally or unlawfully in the United States,” we defer to the

ATF’s interpretation. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984); United States v.

Lopez-Perera, 438 F.3d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 2006). The regulation interpreting § 922(g)(5)(A) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Alien illegally or unlawfully in the United States.

Aliens who are unlawfully in the United States are

not in valid immigrant, nonimmigrant or parole status. The term includes any alien — 

(a) Who unlawfully entered the United States without inspection and authorization by an immigration

office and who has not been paroled into the United

States under section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act (INA);

. . . 

(d) Under an order of deportation, exclusion, or

removal, or under an order to depart the United

114 UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 4 of 7
States voluntarily, whether or not he or she has left

the United States.

27 C.F.R. § 478.11. We find that Anaya-Acosta was illegally

in the country and remained so as a matter of law under both

of the foregoing subsections of the regulation. 

[2] We reached a similar result in United States v. Latu,

479 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2007), in which the defendant was

convicted under § 922(g)(5)(A) despite being allowed to

remain in the country while his non-frivolous application for

adjustment of status was pending. Latu’s conviction was

affirmed as the Court stated, “absent a statute preventing

Latu’s removability upon the filing of his application for

adjustment of status,” his presence remained illegal or unlawful under § 922(g)(5)(A) as interpreted by 27 C.F.R. § 478.11.

Id. at 1159. See also United States v. Bravo-Muzquiz, 412

F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that defendant was unlawfully in the United States under § 922(g)(5)(A) despite having

been released on an immigration bond pending conclusion of

his removal proceedings). Similarly, there is no legal authority indicating that Anaya-Acosta’s immigration status is

affected by the departure control order, which ICE can revoke

at any time. We find that Anaya-Acosta’s status is legally

indistinguishable from Latu’s. 

[3] Alternatively, Anaya-Acosta argues that his presence in

the United States at the time of his arrest was the equivalent

of being “paroled” into the country pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(d)(5), thus excluding him from the operation of

§ 478.11(a). Again, we disagree. 

[4] The Attorney General has discretionary authority to

grant parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant

public benefit” to any alien applying for admission to the

United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Anaya-Acosta cites

no authority to support his claim that a departure control order

is equivalent to parole. Indeed, parole is granted only to aliens

UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA 115

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 5 of 7
who have not yet entered the United States and who must be

inspected by immigration officers before entering. 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1182(d)(5), 1225(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(q). 

Anaya-Acosta, in contrast, had already illegally entered the

country without inspection or authorization, and he was

ordered to leave. His reliance upon the ATF’s exclusion for

paroled aliens is therefore misplaced due to his pre-existing

unlawful entry and illegal status. If the ATF wished to create

an exclusion for aliens under departure control orders in addition to aliens paroled into the country, it could have done so,

but it did not. 

[5] Moreover, Anaya-Acosta ignores the disjunctive nature

of § 478.11. Section § 478.11(d) includes any alien “under an

order to depart the United States voluntarily, whether or not

he or she has left the United States.” This section clearly

reaches Anaya-Acosta’s presence in the United States under

the departure control order. Thus, even assuming § 478.11(a)

is somehow inapplicable to Anaya-Acosta, he would still be

illegally here under § 478.11(d).

[6] Finally, Anaya-Acosta contends that “he had, in

essence, already departed the United States” upon ICE’s grant

of voluntary departure, and that he never thereafter illegally

entered the United States to bring him within § 478.11(a),

despite his admission of having entered without inspection or

authorization in 1997. He cites cases holding that an alien has

not entered the country unless the alien is free from official

restraint, see, e.g., Lopez-Perera, 438 F.3d at 935; United

States v. Lombrera-Valdovinos, 429 F.3d 927, 929 (9th Cir.

2005), and argues that after his voluntary “departure,” he was

not free from official restraint inside the United States

because he was under the informal supervision of the Los

Angeles Police Department. Anaya-Acosta does not cite, and

we have not found, a single case to support his contention that

an alien, having entered the country illegally and having been

ordered to leave, should be treated as having departed without

116 UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 6 of 7
actually doing so. Anaya-Acosta’s contention that his presence was not illegal because “he had, in essence, already

departed the United States” ignores both reality and the plain

language of § 478.11(d), which provides that an alien is

unlawfully present if “under an order to depart the United

States voluntarily, whether or not he or she has left the United

States.”

CONCLUSION

[7] The district court properly denied Anaya-Acosta’s

motion for acquittal and correctly instructed the jury on the

elements of the offense charged against him. His conviction

is AFFIRMED.

UNITED STATES v. ANAYA-ACOSTA 117

Case: 09-50610 01/03/2011 ID: 7597188 DktEntry: 23-1 Page: 7 of 7