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Parties Involved:
Ryan D. Krueger
Appellant
Aaron Krzewinski
Appellee
Carrie Stage
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 19, 2020*

Decided March 19, 2020 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-3103 

RYAN D. KRUEGER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JOSH KAUL, et al., 

 Defendants-Appellees.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 19-C-1470 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

*

 The district court dismissed the complaints in these cases at screening, 

see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), before any defendant appeared. The appellees are not 

participating in the appeals. We have agreed to decide the cases without oral argument 

because the briefs and records adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and 

oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 19-3379 Document: 7 Filed: 03/19/2020 Pages: 4
Nos. 19-3103 and 19-3379 Page 2 

No. 19-3379 

RYAN D. KRUEGER, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

CARRIE STAGE and AARON 

KRZEWINSKI, 

 Defendants-Appellees. 

 

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. 

No. 19-C-1670 

William C. Griesbach, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

In these appeals, which we have consolidated for decision, Ryan Krueger 

challenges the district court’s dismissals of his complaints alleging violations of his right 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act to have a veteran’s “advocate” accompany 

and communicate for him in a state-court proceeding. The district court dismissed the 

complaints at screening, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for failing to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted. We affirm the judgments. 

Recently, we decided an appeal in the first of Krueger’s three federal cases 

challenging the same ongoing paternity suit in state court. Krueger alleged in his first 

suit that the family-court commissioner violated his right under the Act to have an 

advocate during the proceeding to facilitate his participation (Krueger has PTSD). The 

district court dismissed the complaint, and the case became moot on appeal because the 

commissioner told Krueger that he was entitled to have a lay advocate present. See 

Krueger v. Wisconsin, 790 F. App’x 828 (7th Cir. 2020). 

But events in the state-court proceeding led Krueger to file suit in federal court 

twice more. First, Krueger sued the commissioner for limiting what the advocate could 

do for him in court. Krueger alleged, without much detail, that she interfered with his 

ability to have an effective advocate, violating the Act. In the same complaint, he sued a 

county veterans-service officer and a sheriff’s deputy, alleging that, with the 

commissioner’s permission, they attended a hearing only to intimidate him. He 

appeared to seek declaratory or injunctive relief, stating that these violations “must 

stop.” In the second new case, Krueger sued the mother of his children (the petitioner in 

Case: 19-3379 Document: 7 Filed: 03/19/2020 Pages: 4
Nos. 19-3103 and 19-3379 Page 3 

the paternity suit) and her lawyer, alleging that they violated his rights under the Act 

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well) by seeking to reduce the role of his advocate, apparently 

by arguing that the lay advocate was practicing law without a license. 

The district court dismissed both complaints at screening for failure to state a 

claim. The commissioner was immune from a suit for damages, the court reasoned, and 

injunctive relief was untenable because Krueger did not allege that he would be subject 

to similar conduct in the future. Further, the court “lacked jurisdiction” to review the 

decision to allow the officer and deputy to observe the hearing, and Krueger’s 

allegations of intimidation were too conclusory. As to the second complaint, the court 

dismissed the claims against the petitioner and her attorney because Title II of the Act 

does not create liability for discrimination by private individuals, and it dismissed the 

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the defendants were not state actors. The court 

warned Krueger that should he file any more frivolous suits, he could be sanctioned.1

On appeal, Krueger argues that the district court erred by dismissing his first 

complaint without determining “what an ADA Advocate can and cannot do” in his 

state-court proceeding. Unlike the district court, we view Krueger as fairly alleging that 

the commissioner will continue to deny him the ability to have an effective advocate; he 

asserted, in describing his requested relief, that this behavior “must stop.” And nothing 

suggests that the proceeding has ended. 

But the relief Krueger seeks—an order directing the state court how to conduct 

its ongoing proceeding—runs contrary to the principles of equity, comity, and 

federalism underlying our abstention doctrines, so the district court could not have 

properly exercised jurisdiction over this claim. See Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown, 

908 F.3d 1063, 1065–66 (7th Cir. 2018); see also SKS & Assocs., Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 

677–82 (7th Cir. 2010). This matter does not fit neatly into the scenarios under which it is 

appropriate to abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971): the paternity case is 

not a criminal proceeding; it is not a civil enforcement proceeding akin to a criminal 

prosecution (the state is not a party, and Krueger is not a target); and it does not touch 

on a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts. See Sprint 

Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77–79 (2013) (describing Younger’s scope); see also 

1 Krueger then unsuccessfully tried to remove the underlying paternity action to 

federal court. Finding his conduct to be part of a “pattern of abusive and duplicative 

litigation,” the district court fined Krueger $400 and imposed a filing restriction. Stage 

v. Krueger, No. 20-C-65, 2020 WL 241553, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 16, 2020). 

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Nos. 19-3103 and 19-3379 Page 4 

Mulholland v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 815–16 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that 

Younger applies in “exactly three classes of cases”). But as in Courthouse News, Krueger 

seeks a level of intrusion by a federal court into the state court’s operations that is 

“simply too high,” at least before the state courts have had a chance to consider the 

issue. 908 F.3d at 1074. In effect, Krueger asked for a writ of mandamus to a state-court 

commissioner directing the scope of the advocate’s participation in the pending case, 

and that is not within the province of the federal courts. 

Krueger’s remaining arguments lack merit. He asserts that he has evidence to 

support his allegations of “intimidation” by the service officer and sheriff’s deputy. But, 

assuming that Krueger was intimidated, nothing in his complaint plausibly suggests 

that because of these defendants (who appear to be public employees) he was 

“excluded from participation in” or “denied the benefits of” public services, programs, 

or activities. 42 U.S.C. § 12132; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). The 

district court was also correct to dismiss Krueger’s claims against the petitioner and her 

attorney under Title II of the Act because that section covers discrimination only by 

public entities. See Ashby v. Warrick Cty. Sch. Corp., 908 F.3d 225, 230, 234 (7th Cir. 2018)

(describing elements of claim and affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of 

public school where event was organized and maintained by a private museum). 

Krueger also contends that he stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the attorney 

because he is an “officer of the court,” but—even assuming Krueger alleged a violation 

of a constitutional right—this is insufficient, standing alone, to suggest any action taken 

“under color of state law.” See Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318–19 (1981). 

AFFIRMED 

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