Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cr-01113/USCOURTS-azd-3_02-cr-01113-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Chief
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Gary Chief, 

Defendant. 

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CR-02-1113-PHX-DGC

ORDER

On June 24, 2004, Defendant Gary Chief was found guilty of abusive sexual contact

and placed on probation for five years. On April 20, 2006, Defendant’s probation was

revoked and he was sentenced to prison for six months, followed by 36 months of supervised

release. On February 12, 2008, the Government filed a petition to revoke supervised release.

The petition alleges that Defendant violated a special condition of his supervised release that

required him to submit to periodic polygraph testing as a means to determine compliance

with the requirements of his therapeutic program. The petition alleges that on January 23,

2008, on advice of counsel, Defendant stated that he would not participate in an upcoming

polygraph examination.

At a hearing on September 25, 2008, the parties agreed that Defendant had appeared

for a polygraph examination on January 11, 2008. Only two questions were asked during the

examination: (1) Since your release from prison, have you had sexual contact with a minor?

(2) Since your release from prison, have you touched a minor for sexual reasons? Defendant

responded “no” to both questions. The polygraph examiner found Defendant’s answers to

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be inconclusive as to deception or non-deception, and another polygraph examination was

scheduled for February 1, 2008. On advice of counsel, Defendant refused to participate in

this examination.

The parties agree that Defendant retains his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination while on supervised release and may assert it in response to questions asked

during a polygraph examination. See United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir.

2005). The parties disagree, however, on how the privilege must be asserted. The

Government contends that Defendant must assert the privilege on a question-by-question

basis, and that his blanket refusal to appear for the February 1 polygraph examination

violated his supervised release. Defendant contends that his refusal to appear was warranted

in light of the clearly incriminating nature of the subjects that would be addressed at the

examination and a long history of polygraph exams where Defendant has incriminated

himself. 

The Ninth Circuit generally requires that “the Fifth Amendment claim be raised in

response to the specific questions propounded by the investigating body . . . [A] blanket

refusal to answer any question is unacceptable.” United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 741

(9th Cir. 1977). The Ninth Circuit has recognized an exception to this rule when the trial

court, “based on its knowledge of the case and of the testimony expected from the witness,

can conclude that the witness could ‘legitimately refuse to answer essentially all relevant

questions.’” United States v. Tsui, 646 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States

v. Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 701 (5th Cir. 1980)). This exception is narrow and applies only

“where the trial judge has some special or extensive knowledge of the case that allows

evaluation of the claimed [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege, even in the absence of specific

questions to the witness.” United States v. Moore, 682 F.2d 853, 856 (9th Cir. 1982). 

This petition falls within the narrow exception recognized in Tsui and Moore. The

Court is familiar with Defendant’s history of polygraph examinations in this case and several

instances where he has provided incriminating information. At the exam on January 11,

2008, Defendant was asked only two questions: whether he had engaged in physical sexual

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contact with a minor since his release from prison and whether he had touched a minor for

sexual reasons since his release. Responses to both questions could be incriminating. The

purpose of the February 1 polygraph exam, according to Probation Officer Mark Geiger (who

testified at the hearing on September 25), was specifically to resolve issues raised by the

January 11 examination. No other purpose was identified. The Court thus can conclude that

Defendant would have been asked about possible crimes since his release from prison and,

based on his history, likely would have incriminated himself in response. On the basis of

these unique facts, the Court concludes that Defendant properly exercised his Fifth

Amendment right when he declined to participate in the February 1, 2008 examination. 

The Court wishes to emphasize what it is not deciding. The Court is not holding that

Defendant may make blanket objections to polygraph exams under other circumstances. The

general rule remains. Fifth Amendment rights generally must be asserted on a question-byquestion basis. Nor is the Court rendering any opinion on the probation office policies

discussed at the hearing on September 25, 2008, or on the question of whether Defendant has

a right to counsel during polygraph examinations. These issues need not be decided to

resolve the present petition.

Because the Court concludes that Defendant made a valid assertion of his Fifth

Amendment rights in refusing to participate in the February 1, 2008 polygraph exam, the

Court will deny the petition to revoke his supervised release.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Petition to Revoke Supervised Release (Dkt. #80) is denied.

2. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition (Dkt. #97) is denied. The petition

is not facially defective and did not fail to give Defendant adequate notice of

the charges against him.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

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