Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02739/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02739-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Independent Party
Plaintiff
John Arntz
Defendant
Suzanne Bushnell
Plaintiff
Clara Daims
Plaintiff
Tim Dupuis
Defendant
Alex Padilla
Defendant
Voting Rights Defense Project
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VOTING RIGHTS DEFENSE PROJECT,

AMERICAN INDEPENDENT PARTY OF

CALIFORNIA, CLARA DAIMS, and

SUZANNE BUSHNELL,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

ALEX PADILLA, in his official capacity

as Secretary of State, JOHN ARNTZ, in his

official capacity as chief of the San

Francisco Department of Elections, TIM

DUPUIS, in his official capacity as chief of

the Alameda County Registrar of Voters,

Defendants. /

No. C 16-02739 WHA

MEMORANDUM OPINION RE

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY

INJUNCTION

INTRODUCTION

In this action claiming statutory and constitutional violations relating to the

dissemination of information regarding procedures for the presidential primary, plaintiffs sought

a preliminary injunction. The motion was denied on the record at a hearing. This memorandum

opinion sets forth the reasoning for denial of that motion.

STATEMENT

This action concerns the dissemination of information regarding voting procedures for

the California presidential primary, which is scheduled to occur in six days on June 7, although

the vote-by-mail procedure began on May 9. Under California law, an individual who declines

to disclose a preference for a political party when registering to vote (a “no-party-preference

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voter”), may nevertheless vote in a political party’s primary if that party has adopted a rule

permitting so-called “crossover ballots.” A crossover ballot is the only means by which a noparty-preference voter can vote for a presidential nominee in the upcoming primary. The

Democratic Party, the American Independent Party, and the Libertarian Party have elected to

permit such crossover ballots. (The Republican Party has not.) Individuals affiliated with a

party participating in a given primary cannot obtain a crossover ballot to vote in another party’s

primary, although they could change their affiliation (including by changing to no party

preference) by May 23. Put in practical terms, Republicans could have re-registered as noparty-preference voters and then obtained a crossover ballot to vote in the Democratic primary,

provided they changed their affiliation on or before May 23, now more than a week ago. 

Plaintiffs are supporters of Senator Bernie Sanders and expect their relief will support his

campaign. Senator Sanders, however, has no part in this lawsuit.

Defendants Alex Padilla, Secretary of State of California, John Arntz, chief of the San

Francisco Department of Elections, and Tim Dupuis, chief of the Alameda County Registrar of

Voters, through their respective agencies, engaged in extensive efforts, including distributing

information by mail and via the internet, hosting outreach and education events, and buying

advertisements in print media and on public transportation, regarding the rights of no-partypreference voters to obtain crossover ballots in order to vote in the three presidential primaries

identified above. Defendants also plan to display information about no-party-preference voters’

rights prominently at poll stations (Dupuis Decl., Exhs. A, D–F; Arntz Decl., Exhs. A–B, D,

F–I, K–T; Reyes Decl., Exhs. A–R). Defendants have made similar efforts to inform voters that

they could re-register to vote for a different party or to remove any party affiliation by May 23

(e.g., Arntz Decl., Exh. B).

Plaintiffs’ theory in this case is that certain information disseminated as part of the

foregoing efforts has been inadequate or misleading. They primarily take issue with the

contention that the poll workers in Alameda County have been trained not to affirmatively

inform no-party-preference voters of their rights to obtain a crossover ballot, while poll workers

in San Francisco (and other counties) have been instructed to affirmatively inform no-partyCase 3:16-cv-02739-WHA Document 46 Filed 06/02/16 Page 2 of 7
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preference voters of that option. They also note that no-party-preference voters received

applications to vote by mail that set a deadline of April 18 for any request for a crossover ballot,

and they received subsequent applications for replacement ballots (in case they later realized

they wanted a crossover ballot) with a deadline to make that request by June 1. Finally, they

note that individuals that had indicated a party preference did not receive any information about

what their rights regarding crossover ballots would be should they choose to change their

registration. 

The Court’s ruling on the record followed briefing and oral argument heard on an

expedited schedule in order to allow more time for an emergency appeal before the primary. 

This memorandum opinion amplifies on that ruling.

ANALYSIS

A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy a four-part test established by

the Supreme Court in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 

Specifically he must establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to

suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips

in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20. Our plaintiffs fail at

every step.

1. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT LIKELY TO SUCCEED ON THE MERITS.

A. Constitutional Claims.

Plaintiffs contend that defendants’ conduct constituted arbitrary discrimination in

violation of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment, but they cite no authority suggesting this conduct is anything close to a

constitutional violation. In Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992), the Supreme Court

held that in the context of election regulations, we must apply a “flexible standard” that weighs

the burdens of the regulation against the government’s interest in enacting them. If the burden

is severe, the regulation is subject to strict scrutiny, if not, it may be justified by important state

interests. 

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Here, the burden on no-party-preference voters, is slight, if it exists at all. Voters must

read the materials provided to them to understand their rights; only some counties will spoonfeed the information. The government’s interests in arranging for an orderly and fair primary,

avoiding voter confusion by providing too much information, and ensuring that voters can

receive their ballots in a timely manner all plainly justify defendants’ conduct.

B. Voting Rights Act Claims.

Plaintiffs also contend that defendants violated Sections 10101(a)(2)(A) and (B) of Title

52 of the United States Code. Section 10101(a)(2)(A) concerns voter registration, which is not

at issue here. Section 10101(a)(2)(B), on the other hand, prohibits a state from denying the

right to vote “because of an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any application,

registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such error or omission is not material in

determining whether such individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election.” 

Plaintiffs’ theory is that defendants have violated Section 10101(a)(2)(B) by omitting the

statements regarding no-party-preference voters from materials distributed to voters that had

indicated a party preference, but there is no evidence of the possibility that anyone may be

denied the right to vote as a result of that omission. Defendants have, in fact, extensively

campaigned to inform voters about their rights, so in the unlikely circumstance that a voter

timely removed her party affiliation but still sought to vote in a presidential primary via

crossover ballot, ample information has been disseminated to inform her of that right. 

Thus, plaintiffs have failed to show any likelihood of success on their Voting Rights Act

claims.

C. Claim for Mandamus.

Plaintiffs do not assert independent claims based on violations of state law but rather

seek a writ of mandamus under federal law compelling defendants to carry out certain alleged

duties under state law. Plaintiffs cite Section 1361 of Title 28 of the United States Code as the

authority for that relief, but that provision only grants a district court authority to compel “an

officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty . . . .” 

Defendants are all state and local officials, so Section 1361 does not apply. Moreover, it is an

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abuse of discretion for a district court to issue an injunction that requires state officials to do

anything more than what is required by federal constitutional or statutory law. See Trueblood v.

Washington State Dept. of Soc. and Health Services, No. 15-35462, 2016 WL 2610233, at *7

(9th Cir. May 6, 2016) (citing Katie A., ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles Cnty., 481 F.3d 1150, 1155

(9th Cir. 2007)). 

Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing this motion has left too little time for any relief anyway,

save and except for possibly relief at polling places. Contrary to plaintiffs, however, state law

does not require defendants to affirmatively inform no-party-preference voters of their rights to

obtain a crossover ballot at the polling place. Section 13102(b) of the California Elections Code

provides, “[a]t partisan primary elections, each voter not registered disclosing a preference with

any one of the political parties participating in an election shall be furnished only a nonpartisan

ballot, unless he or she requests a ballot of a political party” that has authorized crossover

ballots. Thus, the plain language of the statute contemplates that the voter would affirmatively

request the crossover ballot.

As stated, the Court is without jurisdiction to issue an injunction against our defendants

based on a state law duty, but plaintiffs have not shown that they could succeed on the merits in

any case.

2. NO IRREPARABLE HARM.

Plaintiffs’ theory of harm rests entirely on speculation. They contend no-partypreference voters might be denied crossover ballots or might be unaware of their rights, and

they are concerned that defendants will act contrary to the law although there is no factual basis

for that concern. Defendants have already undertaken significant efforts to inform voters,

particularly no-party-preference voters, of their rights, and voters will have additional

information in front of them at their respective polling places. Far from establishing irreparable

harm might occur, plaintiffs have failed to show that they would suffer any harm as a result of a

denial of their motion. 

3. BALANCE OF THE EQUITIES AND PUBLIC INTEREST.

In Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964), the Supreme Court cautioned:

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[U]nder certain circumstances, such as where an impending

election is imminent and a State’s election machinery is already in

progress, equitable considerations might justify a court in

withholding the granting of immediately effective relief in a

legislative apportionment case, even though the existing

apportionment scheme was found invalid. In awarding or

withholding immediate relief, a court is entitled to and should

consider the proximity of a forthcoming election and the

mechanics and complexities of state election laws, and should act

and rely upon general equitable principles. With respect to the

timing of relief, a court can reasonably endeavor to avoid a

disruption of the election process which might result from

requiring precipitate changes that could make unreasonable or

embarrassing demands on a State in adjusting to the requirements

of the court’s decree.

In S.W. Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914, 919 (9th Cir. 2003), our

court of appeals applied the same principle in the context of an injunction in a Voting Rights

Act case (as here):

In this case, hardship falls not only upon the putative defendant,

the California Secretary of State, but on all the citizens of

California, because this case concerns a statewide election. The

public interest is significantly affected. For this reason our law

recognizes that election cases are different from ordinary

injunction cases. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 585, 84

S.Ct. 1362. Interference with impending elections is

extraordinary, id., and interference with an election after voting

has begun is unprecedented.

Although plaintiffs became aware of many of the alleged irregularities and inaccuracies

herein at least as early as May 13, they did not file this motion until 7:00 p.m. on Friday, May

27, just eleven days before the election. Moreover, although the Court set a briefing and

hearing schedule just three minutes after the motion was filed, plaintiffs’ delays ensured that the

motion could not be heard and decided until June 1, less than a week before the primary. 

Plaintiffs’ proposed relief, to the extent it is feasible at all, would no doubt cause voter

confusion by changing the rules in the middle of the primary and changing the messaging about

voters’ rights. Voters have already received clear enough instructions, submitted their vote-bymail applications, and some votes have already been cast. The extraordinary remedy that

plaintiffs seek is not warranted.

Plaintiffs’ contention that they could not file the complaint or this motion because they

were developing their theory based on poll-worker training rings hollow. Plaintiffs should have

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been investigating that issue from the outset, and they should have sought relief as to the claims

they already knew about immediately. Moreover, plaintiffs delayed more than twenty-four

hours between informing the deputy courtroom clerk that they would seek to be heard on a

request to shorten time to hear this motion and actually filing this motion. 

CONCLUSION

The reasons stated above required denial of plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary

injunction.

Dated: June 2, 2016. 

WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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