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Parties Involved:
Martin Alcala-Avalos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 08-50031

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MARTIN ALCALA-AVALOS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

No. 3:07-CR-1375-ALL

Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Martin Alcala-Avalos appeals his sentence. Finding no reversible error,

we affirm.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

April 6, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 08-50031 Document: 00511072139 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/06/2010
No. 08-50031

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-105 (1989). That statute stated, in relevant part: 1

It is unlawful for any person knowingly to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute, with or without remuneration, to possess, or to possess with intent to

manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute, with or without remuneration, a controlled substance; or to induce, attempt to induce, or conspire with one or more

other persons to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute, with or without remuneration, or to possess with intent to manufacture, dispense, sell, or distribute, with or without remuneration, a controlled substance.

By contrast, Alcala-Avalos’s charging document stated, in relevant part, that he “did unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell a Schedule III controlled substance, to-wit: Lysergic Acid.”

 The applicable version of section 2L1.2 defined “drug-trafficking offense” as “an of- 2

fense under federal, state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance

. . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt.

n.1 (B)(iv) (2006).

2

Alcala-Avalos pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a). He had previously pleaded guilty of the unlawful sale of a controlled

substance in Colorado. Because of that conviction, the presentence report for 1

the illegal-reentry charge recommended applying the 16-level drug-trafficking

enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). At the sentencing hearing, the 2

court raised sua sponte the issue of whether the charging documents were sufficient to support the enhancement. Finding that they were, the court applied

the enhancement and sentenced Alcala-Avalos to 46 months’ imprisonment, a

term at the bottom of the advisory sentencing range.

Alcala-Avalos frames his statement of the issue in plain-error terms, but

his brief argues that de novo review applies because the purported error involves

the application of the federal sentencing guidelines. The government notes that

plain error “arguably applies,” because Alcala-Avalos did not object, but the government contends that our review is de novo under United States v. IzaguirreFlores, 405 F.3d 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), because the court raised

the general issue of the enhancement.

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No. 08-50031

United States v. Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408, 414 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States 3

v. Bullard, 13 F.3d 154, 156 (5th Cir. 1994)).

See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 526 F.3d 804, 806 (5th Cir), cert. denied,

4

129 S. Ct. 625 (2008) (“When a defendant fails to raise a procedural objection below, appellate

review is for plain error only.”).

3

Alcala-Avalos’s sentencing hearing, however, did not consist of “exhaustive

briefing by the parties and consideration of the issue [as to whether or not the

enhancement applies].” Id. Instead, the court asked to see the charging documents to determine whether the enhancement applied. At no time before or after that did Alcala-Avalos give any indication that he believed the drug-trafficking enhancement was inapplicable. Indeed, in stark contrast, he stood mute during the sentencing hearing. If he disagreed with the enhancement, he should

have said so. Cf. United States v. Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d 352, 355 (5th Cir.

2005). 

“A party must raise a claim of error with the district court in such a manner so that the district court may correct itself and thus[] obviate the need for

our review.” The error complained of was not obviated by the court’s sua sponte 3

decision to look at the charging documents. Alcala-Avalos does not assert on appeal a failure to examine the documents; instead he complains of the court’s legal conclusion that the enhancement appliedSSa conclusion to which he did not

object. Accordingly, we review for plain error.4

Plain error arises where “(1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and

obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Even then,

this court does not exercise its discretion to correct the error unless it seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and

results in a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Henao-Melo, 591 F.3d 798,

801-02 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Alcala-Avalos asserts that the court erred in applying the enhancement

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No. 08-50031

See COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18-403(1). 5

 That is, “the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, tran- 6

script of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).

See, e.g., United States v. Olea-Rivera, 318 F. App’x 292, 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (per cur- 7

iam) (“An error is clear or obvious only if it is clear under existing law, and an alleged error

is not clear or obvious if the relevant law is unsettled.”); United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d

750, 756 (5th Cir. 2007).

4

for his conviction of unlawful sale of a controlled substance, because the statutory definition of “sale” includes an offer to sell, which is not conduct that sup- 5

ports a drug-trafficking enhancement, see, e.g., United States v. Garza-Lopez,

410 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2005), and the relevant documents do not sufficient- 6

ly narrow the definition, see, e.g., Gutierrez-Ramirez, 405 F.3d at 355-56. That

argument, however, fails to take into account the difference among jurisdictions

with regard to the effect of a guilty plea. In some jurisdictions, a guilty plea constitutes an admission of all the facts in the charging document. United States

v. Morales-Martinez, 496 F.3d 356, 359 (5th Cir. 2007). In others, a guilty plea

admits “only those material facts needed to support the conviction.” Id. “Because different jurisdictions have different rules, we must determine the effects

of a guilty plea in the jurisdiction in which [the defendant] entered his guilty

plea.” Id.

There are no published opinions of this court stating how Colorado law

treats guilty pleas. That alone would suffice to render any error in applying the

enhancement not obvious. But one of our sister circuitsSSone that is doubtless 7

more familiar with Colorado law than are weSShas held that a guilty plea in Colorado courts admits everything in the charging document, even if the language

is used in the alternative. See United States v. Torres-Romero, 537 F.3d 1155,

1159-60 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2174 (2008). If that were the case,

then the fact that “sell” is statutorily defined to include alternative definitions,

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No. 08-50031

 Indeed, the spirited dissent in Torres-RomeroSSurging that Colorado law takes the

8

narrower approach that a guilty plea only admits as much as necessary to support a conviction, see generally Torres-Romero, 537 F.3d at 1160-65 (Hartz, J., dissenting)SSonly confirms

our conclusion that any error was not obvious.

5

some of which might not constitute drug-trafficking offenses, would be irrelevant. Cf. Morales-Martinez, 496 F.3d at 358. We do not reach that difficult

question of Colorado law on this sparse record, however, because the court’s error, if any, was far from “clear or obvious.”8

AFFIRMED.

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