Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03087/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Spencer L. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2002 Decided June 17, 2003

No. 01-3087

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SPENCER L. JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00062–01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. A. J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Valinda Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III, and

Thomas C. Black, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and WILLIAMS,

Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: In this appeal we consider Spencer Johnson’s challenges to his conviction and sentence for

possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base. Johnson levels one challenge premised on the

Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), and three attacking the district court’s refusal to depart downward from the sentence prescribed by the

United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). Although

the appeal poses procedural complexities as a consequence of

the loss and later recovery of the court reporter’s notes of

Johnson’s sentencing hearing, the substantive analysis of

Johnson’s claims is relatively straightforward. For the reasons stated below, we reject the defendant’s arguments and

affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

On June 22, 1998, a jury found Johnson guilty of possessing

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii), and of

simple possession of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 844(a). Johnson was sentenced to 121 months’ incarceration and 5 years’ supervised release for the first count, and 12

months’ incarceration and one year of supervised release for

the second, to be served concurrently. Johnson appealed his

conviction, arguing that the prosecutor had made improper

statements in his closing argument to the jury. This court

found that, although the prosecutor’s remarks were improper,

the error was harmless. See United States v. Johnson, 231

F.3d 43, 49 (D.C. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Johnson I].

Johnson also advised the court that he wanted to raise

several challenges to his sentence, particularly a claim that

the district court should have granted a two-level adjustment

to his offense level under the so-called ‘‘safety valve’’ provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(6) &

5C1.2. Johnson contended that he was hampered in making

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these challenges, however, because the court reporter’s notes

and any transcript of the sentencing hearing had been lost by

the Miller Reporting Company, and because the sentencing

judge—who under such circumstances would normally have

approved a reconstruction of the proceedings pursuant to

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c)—had fallen ill and

was unable to reconstruct the record. Agreeing that Johnson

had been disadvantaged, the court remanded the case for

resentencing ‘‘[i]n light of these unusual circumstances.’’ 231

F.3d at 45.

On remand, the circumstances became even more unusual.

Shortly after the decision in Johnson I, Miller Reporting

found the court reporter’s notes and reproduced the missing

transcript. The government then moved to recall this court’s

mandate and to reopen the appeal to permit Johnson to raise

any issues that appeared in the newly-available transcript,

arguing that the existence of the transcript rendered resentencing unnecessary. In response, the court issued an order

denying the government’s motion, ‘‘without prejudice to the

matters set forth by [the government] TTT being presented to

the district court for its consideration.’’ United States v.

Johnson, No. 98–3111, Order at 1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 1, 2001).

At the resentencing, Johnson abandoned the safety valve

argument and instead raised several claims that he had not

asserted at his original sentencing. Chief among these was

an attack on his conviction and sentence based upon the

Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), a decision that had not been issued until after

Johnson submitted his briefs in Johnson I. Johnson also

contended that he was entitled, on a number of grounds, to a

departure from the sentence otherwise dictated by the Sentencing Guidelines. Finally, Johnson argued that the resentencing court should consider all of these claims de novo,

despite his failure to raise them at his original sentencing.

The district court rejected Johnson’s request for a de novo

sentencing. Finding that the limited purpose of the remand

had evaporated once the reporter’s notes were discovered and

transcribed, and that the transcript showed that there was

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‘‘nothing wrong with what [the original sentencing judge] did,

why he did it, or how he did it,’’ the court held that ‘‘the

purpose for the remand [would best be] served by reissuing

or newly issuing’’ the same judgment and commitment. Resentencing Tr. at 48–49 (July 5, 2001). In the alternative, the

court held that there was no Apprendi error in Johnson’s

trial or sentencing, see id. at 50–51, and that the defendant

was entitled to ‘‘no downward adjustment of any kind,’’

Resentencing Tr. at 9 (July 16, 2001); see id. at 13. Accordingly, the court reimposed the original sentence.

Johnson now appeals from his resentencing. Of the many

arguments raised during the remand, he presses only four

here. The first is the claim of Apprendi error, which we

consider in Part II below. The remaining three are claims

for departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, which we

consider in Part III.

II

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, ‘‘[o]ther than

the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.’’ 530 U.S. at 490. Johnson contends that

both his conviction and his sentence under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii),

for a drug offense involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base,

violate this rule. We begin by addressing the appropriate

standard of review, and then consider the merits of Johnson’s

Apprendi argument in Parts II.B and II.C below.

A

Ordinarily, we would review an Apprendi claim not raised

at trial or sentencing only for plain error under Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 52(b)—even when Apprendi itself was

not issued until after the sentencing took place. See United

States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002); see also United

States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286–87 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Johnson

asks us to eschew this usual course in light of the remand for

resentencing that was ordered in Johnson I. Although he did

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not raise any of his current objections at his trial or initial

sentencing, Johnson maintains that the district court should

have treated the resentencing as a ‘‘replacement’’ sentencing

and reviewed his claims de novo. He further contends that

this court should now review the district court’s rejection of

those claims as if they had been properly raised below.

While he does not quite close the loop, the implication of

Johnson’s argument is that we should review the district

court’s decision under the harmless error standard of Rule

52(a). See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1999).

At the time this appeal was argued, the standard governing

remands for resentencing was that stated in United States v.

Whren: ‘‘[U]pon a resentencing occasioned by a remand,

unless the court of appeals expressly directs otherwise, the

district court may consider only such new arguments or new

facts as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals’

decision—whether by the reasoning or by the result.’’ 111

F.3d 956, 960 (D.C. Cir. 1997). After oral argument in this

case, the en banc court decided United States v. McCoy, 313

F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In McCoy, we held that, when a

defendant seeks to raise for the first time on remand an

argument that was only ‘‘contingently relevant in the initial

sentencing (but the contingency did not then materialize),’’

and when ‘‘the district court’s action on remand renders the

contention determinative,’’ a defendant may raise the previously contingent issue if ‘‘she [can] establish ‘good cause’ TTT

for not having raised it sooner.’’ Id. at 561–62.

In neither McCoy nor Whren did the defendant seek to

raise on remand an argument that had become newly available because of an intervening change in law, like the Apprendi decision in Johnson’s case. Nor need we decide today

the standard that would ordinarily apply in such cases. As

we have noted, this is an unusual case that became even more

unusual as events unfolded. Although we might not have

employed the same adjective, we are sympathetic to the

district judge’s statement that it ‘‘seem[ed] surrealistic’’ to

pretend that the transcript of the original sentencing did not

exist when it did. Resentencing Tr. at 25 (July 5, 2001). As

the judge put it: ‘‘Why should I act as though there is no

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transcript and search for error and problems when we now

have the transcript and there was no error and there are no

problems?’’ Id. at 37.

We have no good answer to the judge’s query. Indeed, we

have no good answer as to why this case should be treated

any differently than if the missing transcript had been discovered before our decision in Johnson I, rather than shortly

thereafter. That is particularly so since defendant’s Apprendi claim has nothing to do with anything he discovered in the

lost transcript. We therefore conclude, in retrospect, that we

should have granted the government’s motion to recall the

mandate and simply reinstated Johnson’s initial appeal. If

we had done that, we would have reviewed Johnson’s Apprendi argument under the plain error standard, notwithstanding

the intervening change in law. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631;

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 464, 466–67 (1997);

United States v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2001).1

And we see no reason to do otherwise today simply because

the Miller Reporting Company first lost, and then found, the

court reporter’s notes.2

Johnson contends that there is a good reason to modify our

standard of review: considering his claims under a more

liberal standard, he argues, would deter Miller Reporting

1 See also United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (noting that, although the Supreme Court applies plain rather

than harmless error review to claims premised on intervening

changes in law notwithstanding that an objection would have been

futile at the time of trial, it evaluates the plainness of the error

based on the state of the law at the time of appellate consideration).

2 At the resentencing, the government argued for application of

an even more restrictive ‘‘cause and prejudice’’ standard of review

because the defendant failed to raise his Apprendi claim the first

time he came before this court. See generally Perkins, 161 F.3d at

71. Johnson had the opportunity to do so since Apprendi was

issued four months prior to the decision in Johnson I, albeit after

the briefs were filed. The government has abandoned this argument on appeal, Appellee’s Br. at 16 n.4, and we need not consider

it because it makes no difference to our disposition of the case, see

Perkins, 161 F.3d at 71.

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from neglecting its obligations in the future. We are doubtful

that we have the authority to alter the standard of review of a

defendant’s appeal in order to deter or punish a court reporting company. Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487

U.S. 250, 254–56 (1988) (holding that ‘‘a federal court may not

invoke supervisory power to circumvent the harmless-error

inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

52(a)’’ in order to deter prosecutorial misconduct); United

States v. Tucker, 8 F.3d 673, 675 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc)

(‘‘[A] court of appeals ‘may not disregard the doctrine of

harmless error’ in order to punish what it views as the

misconduct of a court reporter.’’ (quoting Bank of Nova

Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256)). Moreover, whatever may be the

deterrent value of remanding a case for resentencing when a

transcript has been lost, see Johnson I, 231 F.3d at 49, we

find it difficult to fathom how a decision by this court to

review a defendant’s case under a harmless rather than plain

error standard would have any effect at all on a reporting

company’s behavior. There are, in any event, far more direct

ways of penalizing a court reporting company that fails to live

up to its contractual and statutory responsibilities.3

 Accordingly, we will employ the usual plain error standard in

reviewing Johnson’s Apprendi claim.

B

Having finished wrestling with the standard of review, we

find the balance of the analysis relatively straightforward.

Johnson asserts that the district court committed Apprendi

error by entering a judgment of conviction under

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), which is prescribed for drug offenses involving 50 grams or more of cocaine base, rather than under

§ 841(b)(1)(C), which applies where the violation involves

3 See Tucker, 8 F.3d at 677 (recognizing that federal courts

‘‘undoubtedly have the authority to sanction dilatory court reporters’’ through, for example, the imposition of fines); United States v.

Johnson, 732 F.2d 379, 383 (4th Cir. 1984) (‘‘Both [the court of

appeals] and the district court have supervisory powers over court

reporters including the power to punish for civil contempt in

appropriate cases.’’).

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‘‘ ‘any detectable amount’ ’’ of a controlled substance, Webb,

255 F.3d at 897 (quoting United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d

1055, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). The judgment of conviction was

error, Johnson contends, because the trial court did not

instruct the jury that to convict it must find beyond a

reasonable doubt: (1) that the quantity of drugs at issue was

at least 50 grams; and (2) that the drug in question was a

form of cocaine base known as ‘‘crack.’’ In the absence of

such instructions, Johnson argues, he could not lawfully have

been convicted of violating anything other than

§ 841(b)(1)(C), which has no requirements regarding drug

quantity or type.

Johnson further contends that this error led to several

errors in sentencing. Although the term of imprisonment

that Johnson received (121 months) is below the statutory

maximum (20 years) applicable to the § 841(b)(1)(C) charge,

Johnson asserts that the term of supervised release that the

court imposed (5 years) is greater than the maximum permitted under § 841(b)(1)(C)—which he maintains is 3 years—and

is appropriate only for a conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).4

4 Johnson’s argument is based on 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2), which

states that ‘‘[e]xcept as otherwise provided,’’ the term of supervised

release for a Class C felony shall be ‘‘not more than three years.’’

Section 841(b)(1)(C), which carries a 20–year maximum term of

imprisonment, is a Class C offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(3).

Section 841(b)(1)(C), however, expressly provides for a term of

supervised release of ‘‘at least 3 years.’’ 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)

(emphasis added). At the time of Johnson’s trial, there was a split

in the circuits regarding the maximum term of supervised release

under § 841(b)(1)(C). Compare, e.g., United States v. Kelly, 974

F.2d 22, 24 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that 3 years was the maximum

term), with United States v. Garcia, 112 F.3d 395, 397–98 (9th Cir.

1997) (holding that a term of supervised release greater than 3

years could be imposed). After the oral argument of this appeal,

Congress resolved the circuit conflict by adding the words ‘‘Notwithstanding section 3583 of title 18’’ to the supervisory release

provision of § 841(b)(1)(C), see Pub. L. No. 107–273, § 3005(a), 116

Stat. 1758, 1805 (Nov. 2, 2002), thus making it clear that the term of

supervised release for a conviction under that section can exceed 3

years, see H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 107–685, at 188–89 (2002).

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Johnson also argues that, while there is no mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1)(C), his conviction under

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) subjected him to the latter’s mandatory

minimum sentence of 120 months. Finally, in an argument

we reserve for consideration until Part II.C below, Johnson

contends that if he had been treated as possessing non-crack

cocaine base rather than crack cocaine, his sentencing guideline range would have been 21 to 27 months, rather than the

121- to 151-month range that was applied in his case, see

Presentence Invest. Rep. at 7 (June 1, 2001). Compare

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(12), with id. § 2D1.1(c)(4).

Under the plain error standard, we can correct these

alleged errors only if there was ‘‘(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is ‘plain,’

and (3) that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’ ’’ Johnson, 520 U.S.

at 467 (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732

(1993)). ‘‘If all three conditions are met, an appellate court

may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,

but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’’ Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). Although the government argues that Johnson’s claims fail all four prongs of the

plain error test, its argument regarding the fourth prong is

directly supported by the Supreme Court’s decision in United

States v. Cotton and our own opinion in United States v.

Webb, and is more than sufficient to dispose of this appeal.

Accordingly, we proceed directly to a discussion of that

prong, and in particular do not pause to consider the validity

of any of Johnson’s claims of error.

The defendants in Cotton were sentenced in accordance

with § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), notwithstanding that the indictment

did not allege that their offense involved 50 grams or more of

cocaine base5

 and that the trial court did not instruct the jury

that to convict it had to find that the offense involved that

threshold amount. 535 U.S. at 627–28. Like Johnson, the

Cotton defendants did not object either at trial or sentencing;

as in the instant case, Apprendi was not decided until Cotton

was pending on appeal. Id. at 628. In the Supreme Court,

5 Johnson’s indictment did so allege. See Indictment at 1.

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the defendants’ challenge focused on the omission of the 50–

gram allegation from the indictment. (In federal prosecutions, such a fact must be charged in the indictment, as well

as submitted to the petit jury. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476,

490.) The Court held that plain error was the appropriate

standard of review in light of the defendants’ failure to object

in the district court, and proceeded directly to the fourth

prong of that standard. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631–33.

Citing an earlier case in which a district court’s error had

been the failure to submit an element of an offense to a petit

jury, the Supreme Court declared that where the evidence

that an offense involves at least 50 grams of cocaine base is

‘‘ ‘overwhelming’ ’’ and ‘‘ ‘essentially uncontroverted,’ ’’ there

is ‘‘ ‘no basis for concluding that [an] error seriously affect[s]

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’ ’’ as required by the fourth prong. Id. at 632–33

(quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470). The Court then went on

to conclude that there had been no plain error in Cotton,

noting the overwhelming evidence of the quantity of drugs

involved in the defendants’ conspiracy, and concluding that

‘‘[s]urely the grand jury, having found that the conspiracy

existed, would have also found that the conspiracy involved at

least 50 grams of cocaine base.’’ Id. at 633.

Presaging the analysis applied by the Supreme Court in

Cotton, this court employed a similar approach in Webb. 255

F.3d at 900–02. Webb was charged with (inter alia) three

counts of narcotics violations involving cocaine base, one for

each of three drug distributions. The count involving the

third transaction was the only one in which the quantity

exceeded 50 grams, and was therefore the only one to charge

a violation of § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Id. at 892. Following preApprendi precedent, the district court told the jury (without

objection) that it could convict on each count without finding

that the defendant distributed any particular amount of cocaine. See id. at 893, 897. After the jury returned convictions on all counts, the court (again without objection) calculated the total quantity of cocaine base involved in all of the

counts and imposed a guideline sentence appropriate for a

violation of § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). See id. at 893.

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On appeal, Webb asserted, among other things, that his

sentence violated Apprendi, which had been decided in the

interim. 255 F.3d at 897. Employing the plain error test

and proceeding directly to the fourth prong, we concluded

that the evidence of drug quantity was both ‘‘ ‘overwhelming’ ’’ and ‘‘ ‘essentially uncontroverted.’ ’’ Id. at 900–01

(quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 470). We reasoned as follows:

[The] counts involved three separate transactions: the

government alleged that on each occasion, Webb sold a

quantity of crack to the government’s cooperating witness. For the jury to have convicted Webb of each of

these three incidents, the jurors must have believed that

Webb engaged in each of the three transactions and was

responsible for the amounts he provided. The specific

amount involved in each transaction was established by

the testimony and report of a government chemist, and

was confirmed by tape recordings of conversations between Webb and [a cooperating witness], in which the

two discussed the quantities of crack involved in the

transactions. Webb did nothing to challenge the evidence of drug quantity at either trial or sentencing, and

even on appeal offers no scenario under which the jury

could have convicted him of the transactions, yet rationally found that they involved different quantities than

those testified to by the government chemist.

Id. at 901.

The analysis applied in Cotton and Webb is equally applicable here. Three officers testified that they saw Johnson

throw objects onto a roof as he was being pursued by police.

See Trial Tr. at 57 (June 18, 1998); id. at 95–96; Trial Tr. at

12 (June 19, 1998). The police recovered two bags of drugs

from the rooftop where Johnson had tossed the objects, see

Trial Tr. at 51 (June 17, 1998), and a government chemist

testified that one of the bags contained 30.8 grams of cocaine

base while the other contained 30.5 grams, see Trial Tr. at 45

(June 19, 1998). Johnson, testifying in his own defense, told

the jury that the drugs did not belong to him. Id. at 111–12.

He did not differentiate between the two bags, and did not

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dispute the drug quantities specified by the chemist. He thus

offered the jurors no scenario under which they could have

convicted him of unlawful possession with intent to distribute

cocaine base, yet found that the quantity involved was less

than 50 grams.6

Johnson contends that he had no reason to contest drug

quantity at trial because the trial took place before the

Supreme Court issued the Apprendi decision. Webb made

the same argument, and we responded in this way:

[E]ven accepting Webb’s contention that he had no reason to contest quantity at trial, he had every incentive to

contest it at sentencing. The presentence report’s recommendations concerning the quantity of drugs involved

in Webb’s transactions, and the district court’s adoption

of those recommendations, dramatically affected Webb’s

sentencing range. Yet, TTT he did not dispute the accuracy of the drug quantities there reported. Moreover,

whatever his incentives below, Webb surely has an incentive on appeal to suggest a scenario under which he could

plausibly have disputed the drug quantities specified by

the chemist. Even now, however, he suggests none.

255 F.3d. at 901–02 (citations omitted). In virtually every

respect, Johnson’s situation is the same as Webb’s, except

that Johnson had an additional opportunity at his resentencing to object to the quantity calculation and to pose a

plausible scenario under which the jury could have found him

guilty yet responsible for less than the entire quantity of

drugs. He did not do so.7

6 We further note that the verdict form given to the jury required

it to state its verdict on a ‘‘charge of unlawful possession with intent

to distribute 50 or more grams of cocaine base, also known as

crack.’’ Appellee’s Supp. App. at A1 (emphasis added). The jury

marked the box designated ‘‘guilty.’’ Id.

7 When confronted with this deficiency at oral argument, defense

counsel suggested that the jury might have found that only one of

the two bags of cocaine base found on the roof belonged to

Johnson—who, under this scenario, would have had the bad luck of

throwing his bag of crack onto a roof that already happened to

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Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson’s conviction for

possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii), survives plain error review of Johnson’s claim of

Apprendi error based on drug quantity.

C

We reach the same conclusion regarding Johnson’s claim

that the trial judge violated Apprendi by failing to instruct

the jury regarding the ‘‘type’’ of drug that he was charged

with possessing. Johnson contends that the ‘‘cocaine base’’

specified in § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) refers only to the ‘‘crack’’ form

of cocaine base;8

 that he was therefore entitled to an instruction that the jury could not convict unless it found, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the drug contained in the bags was

crack; and that, because the court gave no such instruction, it

could only convict and sentence him under § 841(b)(1)(C).

Without addressing the validity of any of these claims, upon

none of which this circuit has ever ruled, we again conclude

that there was no plain error in this case.

At Johnson’s trial, the government’s chemist equated cocaine base with crack. Trial Tr. at 44 (June 19, 1998). A

narcotics expert testified that the weight of the drugs in each

of the bags (approximately 31 grams) is a weight at which

‘‘crack cocaine’’ is commonly sold on the street. Id. at 71–72.

In addition, he gave a description of what ‘‘crack’’ looks like,

contain another, virtually identical bag of crack. We find this

scenario implausible. In any event, because Webb made clear that a

defendant must present a plausible scenario to satisfy his burden of

showing plain error, the proffer of such a scenario at oral argument

comes too late in the proceedings to affect our disposition. See

United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671, 677 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

8 For support, Johnson relies on a provision of the Sentencing

Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), note D (‘‘ ‘Cocaine base,’ for

the purposes of this guideline, means ‘crack.’ ‘Crack’ is the street

name for a form of cocaine base, usually prepared by processing

cocaine hydrochloride and sodium bicarbonate, and usually appearing in a lumpy, rocklike form.’’).

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id. at 59–61, which matched the arresting officer’s description

of the drugs he recovered from the roof, Trial Tr. at 61–62

(June 17, 1998); Trial Tr. at 40 (June 18, 1998). That officer

also testified that both bags of drugs contained ‘‘crack cocaine.’’ Trial Tr. at 51 (June 17, 1998). Johnson neither

objected to this testimony nor contended that the substance

was other than crack cocaine. And again, despite the fact

that, if his argument were correct, the difference would have

been important for sentencing purposes even prior to Apprendi, see supra note 8, Johnson never claimed at either

sentencing or resentencing that the drugs were a form of

cocaine base other than crack. Nor did he do so on this

appeal.

Accordingly, we again find no plain error, and therefore

affirm Johnson’s conviction for violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

and (b)(1)(A)(iii) by possessing with intent to distribute 50 or

more grams of cocaine base. Moreover, as we held in Webb,

because the conviction survives, so, too, does the sentence

that is concededly appropriate for that offense. 255 F.3d at

900, 902.

III

In addition to his Apprendi challenge, Johnson argues that

the district court erred in failing to depart downward from

the otherwise applicable guideline sentence on three

grounds.9

 At oral argument, Johnson’s counsel conceded that

two of those departure claims depend upon the success of

Johnson’s Apprendi challenge. Having rejected that challenge, we agree that those two departure claims are now

moot.

The first of those is Johnson’s claim that he is entitled to

what he calls a ‘‘tail-wagging-dog’’ departure. Johnson ar9 Although the Statement of Facts section of Johnson’s opening

brief mentioned many other departure claims that Johnson had

raised at his resentencing, the defendant’s briefs contain arguments

concerning only the three departures discussed in this Part. At

oral argument, Johnson’s counsel clarified that only those three are

at issue on appeal.

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gues that, because post-Apprendi it is the jury rather than

the court that determines whether an offense involves at least

50 grams or more of crack, it is now atypical for a court’s

determination of drug quantity (the ‘‘tail’’) to increase a

defendant’s sentence significantly above that required by the

jury’s verdict (the ‘‘dog’’). Whatever the validity of defendant’s argument, it has no application here. Because we have

affirmed Johnson’s conviction under § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), he is

subject by statute to a 120–month mandatory minimum sentence. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). The one additional

month imposed by the sentencing court puts very little tail on

that particular dog.

Johnson’s second now-mooted claim is based on U.S.S.G.

§ 5K2.20, which permits a departure below the applicable

guideline range when the defendant’s criminal conduct constitutes ‘‘aberrant behavior.’’ Johnson argues that his involvement in the drug crime for which he was convicted was

‘‘aberrant’’ in light of his relatively clean record and good

behavior while in prison. But § 5K2.20 is inapplicable on its

face to a defendant like Johnson, who has been convicted of

an offense that carries a mandatory minimum sentence. See

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 (providing that a ‘‘court may not depart

below the guideline range on this basis if TTT the instant

offense of conviction is a serious drug trafficking offense’’);

id. § 5K2.20, cmt. n.1 (defining ‘‘serious drug trafficking

offense’’ as any controlled substance offense that ‘‘results in

the imposition of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment’’).

Johnson’s sole remaining claim is for a departure based on

a theory he calls ‘‘residual doubt.’’ Such a departure should

be granted, Johnson contends, because there remains residual

doubt as to whether the prosecutor’s closing argument, which

this court found improper in Johnson I, affected the verdict.

Johnson concedes that no court has ever granted a departure

on this theory, and further concedes that he failed to raise it

at his original sentencing. He maintains, however, that Johnson I made the claim ‘‘newly relevant,’’ and therefore subject

to de novo review upon resentencing under the Whren stanUSCA Case #01-3087 Document #754745 Filed: 06/17/2003 Page 15 of 16
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dard, by holding that the prosecutor’s remarks constituted

error.

We need expend no time discussing either Johnson’s theory

or the appropriate standard of review, as it is plain that he

has simply misunderstood the panel’s decision in Johnson I.

In holding that the prosecutor’s improper comments were

harmless error, the court necessarily concluded that they did

not have ‘‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict.’’ Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). Indeed, the court went further,

stating that it did not think it ‘‘plausible, in light of the

formidable evidence arrayed against Johnson, that the prosecutor’s remarks are what account[ed] for Johnson’s relatively

speedy conviction.’’ 231 F.3d at 48. There is nothing in

these statements to suggest that the Johnson I panel had any

‘‘residual doubt,’’ either about the impact of the prosecutor’s

remarks on the jury verdict or about Johnson’s guilt. And

our references in Part II to the overwhelming nature of the

evidence against the defendant should make clear where this

panel stands as well.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s conviction and

sentence are

Affirmed.

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