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Parties Involved:
Alonso Eriza-Gomez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12323

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:15-cr-00032-WSD-ECS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

ALONSO ERIZA-GOMEZ, 

a.k.a. Alonso Pineda-Celis, 

a.k.a. Berlin Eriza-Gomez, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(February 29, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Alonso Eriza-Gomez appeals his 57-month sentence arising from his 

conviction for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been 

removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). In sentencing ErizaGomez, the district court concluded that his prior conviction under Florida’s 

cocaine trafficking statute—Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)—is a “drug trafficking 

offense” for purposes of § 2L1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

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Based on this finding, the district court imposed a 16-level sentencing 

enhancement on him pursuant to § 2L1.2. On appeal, Eriza-Gomez argues that the

district court erred in imposing this enhancement because his Fla. Stat. § 

893.135(1)(b) conviction is not a § 2L1.2 “drug trafficking offense.” He also 

asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. After reviewing the record 

and considering the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the district court did not 

commit reversible error in sentencing Eriza-Gomez. Accordingly, we affirm.

I

We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction constitutes a 

“drug trafficking offense” under § 2L1.2. See United States v. Aguilar-Ortiz, 450 

F.3d 1271, 1272 (11th Cir. 2006). Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i) increases the 

guideline range for a defendant by 16 levels if the defendant was removed after a 

conviction for a “drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed exceeded 

 1 Eriza-Gomez was convicted for trafficking between 200 and 400 grams of cocaine, in 

violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(b).

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13 months” of imprisonment.2 U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). The Application 

Notes to § 2L1.2 define a “drug trafficking offense” as “an offense under federal, 

state, or local law that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or 

dispensing of, or offer to sell a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a 

controlled substance . . . with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or 

dispense.” Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv) (emphases added). 

We hold that Eriza-Gomez’s conviction for trafficking cocaine in violation 

of Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) is a “drug trafficking offense” under § 2L1.2 because 

it is an offense that prohibits the “possession of a controlled substance . . . with 

intent to . . . distribute.” See id. This is dictated by our decisions in United States 

v. Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2003) and United States v. James, 

430 F.3d 1150 (11th Cir. 2005). 

In Madera-Madera, we held that a conviction under Georgia’s drug 

trafficking statute constitutes a § 2L1.2 “drug trafficking offense” because the

statute (1) requires “possession of a significant quantity of drugs,” (2) “infers an 

intent to distribute,” and (3) treats trafficking as a “more serious offense . . . than 

either simple possession or possession with intent to distribute.” See 333 F.3d at 

1231–32. Then, in James, we relied on Madera-Madera in determining that a 

violation of Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) likewise requires “possession of a significant 

 2 Convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b)(1)(b) have a “mandatory minimum term of 

imprisonment of 3 years.” Thus, § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i)’s “13-month” requirement is not at issue.

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quantity of drugs,” “infers an intent to distribute,” and treats trafficking as a “more 

serious offense . . . than either simple possession or possession with intent to 

distribute.” See 430 F.3d at 1154–55 (quoting Madera-Madera, 333 F.3d at 1232). 

Given the key similarities between Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)(b) and Georgia’s drug 

trafficking statute, we conclude that under Madera-Madera Eriza-Gomez’s

conviction is a § 2L1.2 “drug trafficking offense.” Therefore, the district court did 

not err in imposing a 16-level enhancement pursuant to § 2L1.2. 

II

We apply the abuse of discretion standard to a defendant’s claim that his 

sentence is substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 

1188–89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In reviewing a sentence for reasonableness, 

“we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)

factors.” United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006). “[W]e 

are to vacate the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 

reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190

(internal quotation mark omitted).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not abuse

its discretion when sentencing Eriza-Gomez. First, “[w]e ordinarily expect a 

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sentence within the Guidelines range to be reasonable,” and Eriza-Gomez’s 57-

month sentence is at the bottom of the applicable 57- to 71-month advisory 

guideline range. See United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 

2008) (per curiam). Second, the sentence is well below the 20-year statutory 

maximum for convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). United States v. Valnor, 

451 F.3d 744, 751–52 (11th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that a sentence being

“appreciably below” the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness). 

Finally, this is Eriza-Gomez’s fourth conviction for illegal entry into the United 

States—a fact that militates against a downward variance from Eriza-Gomez’s 

advisory guideline range. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing the “history” of the 

defendant, the need for “adequate deterrence,” and the need to “protect the public 

from further crimes of the defendant” as relevant sentencing factors).

In light of the foregoing, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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