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Parties Involved:
Carlos DeJesus-Gaul
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 15, 1995 Decided January 12, 1996

No. 95-3045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CARLOS DEJESUS-GAUL,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(94cr00235-02)

Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her

on the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Geoffrey Bestor, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr.,

Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: SILBERMAN, SENTELLE, and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: With respect to certain statutory minimum sentences, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f), and its guideline equivalent, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, provide that the sentencing court "shall"

disregard the mandatory minimum and impose a sentence within the guideline range if the court

makes five specified findings favorable to the defendant. The question is whether, in sentencing

DeJesus-Gaul, the district judge properly refused to give him the potential benefit of this "safety

valve."

DeJesus-Gaul and his co-defendant Ingrid Lopez pled guilty to one count of distributing 50

grams or more of cocaine base. The government agreed in writing to drop the other two counts in

the indictment and four state prosecutors (three in New York and one in Rhode Island) agreed not

to prosecute DeJesus-Gaul on pending chargesso long as he received "at least a mandatoryminimum

term of ten years."

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The district judge sentenced Lopez first. Her conviction carried with it a statutory minimum

sentence of 120 months' imprisonment, as did DeJesus-Gaul's. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) &

(b)(1)(A)(iii). Lopez asked the district judge to invoke the "safety valve," as her presentence

investigation report had recommended. She testified at the sentencing hearing that she was merely

a go-between who controlled neither the means nor the proceeds of the drug conspiracy. Her role

was limited to that of a translator, and she was at all times subject to DeJesus-Gaul's direction.

According to her testimony and counsel's representations, it was DeJesus-Gaul who went to New

York to acquire the drugs, cooked the powder cocaine into cocaine base, and took charge of the

money. Finding that Lopez had satisfied the five criteria in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, the judge disregarded

the mandatoryminimumand sentenced her to 108 months' imprisonment, the bottomofthe guideline

range.

DeJesus-Gaul had been set for sentencing on the same day as Lopez, before the same judge.

At DeJesus-Gaul'srequest, this was put off for several weeks. In the meantime, on March 31, 1995,

counsel for DeJesus-Gaul filed a memorandum asking the judge to invoke the safety valve provision

and to impose a sentence at the low end of the guideline range of 108-135 months, rather than the

mandatory minimum of 120 months.

The government filed a memorandumon the same day opposing lenient treatment and urging

the judge to view this defendant "with a harsher eye" than Lopez: DeJesus-Gaul "did not cooperate

with authorities; he lied about his true identity in a[n] attempt to avoid his multiple pending cases in

several jurisdictions"; the district judge had already credited Lopez's testimony that DeJesus-Gaul

controlled the drug conspiracy, received the proceeds, and engaged in major narcotic transactionsin

New York.

The government's representations related to subsections (4) and (5) of the safety valve

provisionsin U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and the corresponding statute (18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(4) & (5)). These

subsections state that in order to disregard the statutory minimum sentence the court must find that:

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of

others in the offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines and was not

engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in 21 U.S.C. § 848; and

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(5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has

truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence the defendant has

concerning the offense or offensesthat were part of the same course of conduct or of

a common scheme or plan, but the fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful

other information to provide or that the Government is already aware of the

information shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has

complied with this requirement.

The sentencing hearing took place on April 6, 1995. Defense counsel continued to maintain

that DeJesus-Gaul qualified for the safety valve, asserting at one point that her client had fully

disclosed all information in his possession. When the district judge asked the Assistant United States

Attorney whether DeJesus-Gaul had satisfied subsection (5), the prosecutorwho had not signed

the plea agreement or handled the guilty plea proceeding or filed the sentencing memorandumtold

the judge "I don't know." After a further exchange with defense counsel, the judge sentenced the

defendant to "the minimum term under the guideline range of 120 months."

Defense counsel's argument here is that, given the "shall" in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (and the

statute), the district judge was required to disregard the mandatory minimum. This of course

assumescorrectly, we believethat the judge did not choose the 120 month sentence on some

other basis. In other words, the judge determined that the permissible sentence was between 120 and

135 months rather than 108 to 135 months, which would have been DeJesus-Gaul's guideline range

without the mandatory minimum. That the judge so concluded is apparent because he said the 120

month sentence was the "minimum term." It is apparent as well because otherwise DeJesus-Gaul's

guideline range of 108 to 135 months would have exceeded 24 months, and thus would have required

the judge to "state in open court the reasons" for imposing "the particular sentence." 18 U.S.C. §

3553(c)(1). Yet the only reason the judge gave for choosing 120 months was that this represented

the "minimum term under the guideline range."

Whether the judge erred in not invoking the safety valve is another matter. We place no great

importance on the prosecutor's statement that he did not know if DeJesus-Gaul had "truthfully

provided to the Government all information and evidence" concerning his offenses. U.S.S.G. §

5C1.2(5); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5). The context shows that rather than a concession on behalf of the

United States, the remark was merely an admission of personal ignorance. Six days before the

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hearing the government, initssentencing memorandum, expressed in the strongest possible termsthat

this defendant had been neither truthful nor cooperative. There is no indication that DeJesus-Gaul

began traveling the road to Damascusthereafter. To be sure, at one point during the hearing defense

counselsaid that her client had "finally come forward with his true identity" and had "given every bit

ofinformation that he has concerning thisincident." But this last assertion contradicted what she had

alreadytold the court. Stating merely that Lopez's testimony about DeJesus-Gaul was not "accurate,"

defense counsel said her client would provide no details. DeJesus-Gaul did not want to "impu[gn]

Ms. Lopez in anyway"; "she is his fiance"; he "loves her"; he "does not wish to in any way undercut

her." In other words, DeJesus-Gaul decided to withhold information about the offense. Lopez had

not been so reticent during her sentencing hearing. And when DeJesus-Gaul had his turn, he neither

refuted her testimony nor offered any alternative explanation of who bought the drugs, who cooked

the powder cocaine into cocaine base, or who controlled the proceeds. Whether this deprived him

of a favorable finding under subsection (4) or (5) of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, or both, is of no particular

moment. The district judge stressed subsection (5). Given the deference due a district court's

factfinding in sentencing, United States v. Broumas, 69 F.3d 1178, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United

States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994), we conclude that the record adequately supported

the judge's decision that DeJesus-Gaul did not qualify for sentencing in disregard of the statutory

minimum.

Affirmed.

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