Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01093/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Florida Power & Light Company
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 22, 1998 Decided June 26, 1998

No. 95-1093

Florida Power & Light Company,

Petitioner

v.

Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of Actions of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Douglas H. Green argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner with whom Norman L. Rave, Jr. was on the brief.

Seth M. Barsky, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent, with whom Lois J. Schiffer,

Assistant Attorney General, and Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, were on the

brief.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Sentelle and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Petitioner Florida Power and Light

Company ("Florida P&L" or "the company") petitions for

review of two statements made in the preamble to a proposed

rule relating to the requirements a state must meet to be

authorized to administer certain aspects of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580,

90 Stat. 2795 (1976) ("RCRA"). We dismiss the petition for

lack of statutory jurisdiction because the preamble statements are not final regulations within the meaning of RCRA

s 7006(a), 42 U.S.C. s 6976(a) (1994). Moreover, even assuming that the court otherwise had jurisdiction, it is clear

that Florida P&L's claims are not ripe for review.

I. Background

A.Statutory and Regulatory Background

Congress enacted the RCRA to address increasingly serious environmental and health dangers arising from waste

generation, management, and disposal. Congress was particularly concerned with the management and disposal of "hazardous wastes," for which it provided comprehensive "cradleto-grave" regulation in RCRA Subtitle C. See 42 U.S.C.

ss 6921-6934 (1982) (current version at 42 U.S.C. ss 6921-

6939e (1994)); United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d

714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

1.Interim Status of Waste Treatment Facilities

The RCRA requires facilities that treat, store, or dispose of

hazardous waste to obtain a permit from either the United

States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA" or "the

Agency") or an authorized state. 42 U.S.C. s 6925(a)-(c)

(1994). Recognizing that EPA could not issue permits to all

affected facilities before the RCRA's effective date, Congress

provided that existing facilities meeting certain requirements

could operate on an "interim status" basis until final agency

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action could be taken on a facility's permit application. 42

U.S.C. s 6925(e).

2.Corrective Action Authority

"As originally enacted, RCRA did not require permittees to

take significant remedial action to correct past mismanagement of hazardous waste." American Iron & Steel Inst. v.

EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). In part to address the concern

that releases from RCRA facilities posed a threat to human

health and the environment, Congress amended the RCRA

with the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984) ("HSW Amendments"). Id. In the HSW Amendments, Congress significantly expanded EPA's authority to require facilities to undertake "corrective action" to address hazardous releases at

RCRA treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. With respect to permitted facilities, section 3004(u) provides that any

permit issued to a facility after November 8, 1984 "shall

require ... corrective action for all releases of hazardous

waste or constituents from any solid waste management unit

at a treatment, storage, or disposal facility seeking a permit

under this subchapter, regardless of the time at which waste

was placed in such unit." 42 U.S.C. s 6924(u). In section

3008(h), Congress provided EPA with corresponding authority to require corrective action at interim status facilities. See

42 U.S.C. s 6928(h).

3. State Authorization

Under the RCRA, EPA may authorize states to administer

and enforce their own hazardous waste programs within the

state. 42 U.S.C. s 6926(b). EPA will approve a state's

request for authorization if it determines, among other things,

that the state's program is equivalent to and consistent with

the federal one and provides for "adequate enforcement of

compliance" with the RCRA's requirements. Id. Following

authorization, EPA retains its full enforcement authority,

although authorized states have primary enforcement responsibility. See Waste Management of Illinois, Inc. v. EPA, 945

F.2d 419, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

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Florida received authorization to administer the "base"

RCRA program in 1985. See 50 Fed. Reg. 3,908 (1985). This

authorization gave Florida responsibility for permitting facilities and certain other aspects of the RCRA program. Id. at

3,908-09. However, Florida never has been authorized to

administer any aspect of the corrective action program under

RCRA s 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. s 6928(h). See 63 Fed. Reg.

2,896, 2,897 (1998). Accordingly, administration and enforcement of the corrective action program in Florida has been

and remains the responsibility of EPA.

B.Development of EPA Policy Pertaining to EPA's Corrective Action Authority

1. The 1990 Proposed Rule

On July 27, 1990, EPA proposed regulations to govern the

corrective action program and included in the preamble a

discussion addressing several issues related to section

3008(h). 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798 (1990) ("1990 Proposed Rule").

In setting forth the background for the proposed rule, EPA

explained that "[s]ection 3008(h) provides EPA with authority

... to require corrective action or other measures, as appropriate, when there is or has been a release of hazardous waste

or hazardous constituents from a RCRA facility operating

under interim status." Id. at 30,799. The preamble then

noted that a "detailed discussion of the Agency's interpretation of the section 3008(h) authority was provided in a December 16, 1985 guidance memorandum entitled "Interpretation

of section 3008(h) of the Solid Waste Disposal Act." Id. at

30,800 (citing Memorandum from J. Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency

Response, dated December 16, 1985 (hereinafter "Porter

Guidance"), reprinted in Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 24)). The

proposal's preamble also addressed the reach of EPA's section 3008(h) authority, stating that "[c]orrective action may be

required under section 3008(h) whether the facility is operating (prior to receiving a permit) under interim status, is

closing or is closed under interim status, has lost interim

status, or failed to properly obtain interim status." Id. at

30,855 (emphasis added).

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EPA has promulgated only a few sections of its 1990

Proposed Rule in final form. See 58 Fed. Reg. 8,658 (1993).

On May 1, 1996, EPA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking outlining EPA's strategy for promulgating

future regulations governing the corrective action process.

See 61 Fed. Reg. 19,432 (1996).

2. The 1994 Proposed Rule

On November 8, 1994, as part of EPA's efforts to create a

consistent approach to cleanups at RCRA permitted and

interim status facilities, EPA proposed revisions to the requirements for state authorization. 59 Fed. Reg. 55,778

(1994) ("1994 Proposed Rule"). Since July 15, 1985, EPA has

required states to have corrective action authority over permitted facilities comparable to EPA's section 3004(u) authority for the state to obtain authorization for that portion of the

HSW Amendments corrective action program. Id. at 55,788.

The 1994 Proposed Rule would have for the first time required states also to have corrective action authority at

interim status facilities comparable to EPA's section 3008(h)

authority to obtain state authorization. Id.

Florida P&L challenges two preamble statements in the

1994 Proposed Rule concerning requirements for authorization of state corrective action programs. The first statement

recites EPA's interpretation that the RCRA's interim status

corrective action provision, section 3008(h), 42 U.S.C.

s 6928(h), authorizes EPA to respond to releases from "facilities that have, had, or should have had authorization to

operate under interim status." 59 Fed. Reg. at 55,789 (citing

Porter Guidance). The second statement provides EPA's

view that section 3008(h) enables EPA to respond to "releases

of hazardous waste or hazardous constituents" at interim

status facilities. Id.

EPA has yet to take final action on the 1994 Proposed

Rule.

C.EPA Investigation of Florida P&L Facilities

Until approximately 1988, Florida P&L operated surface

impoundments for the management of corrosive hazardous

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wastes at nine different facilities in Florida. Each of these

facilities had obtained interim status shortly after EPA's

promulgation of RCRA hazardous waste regulations in 1980.

According to Florida P&L, each of these interim status

facilities was "clean closed" in conformance with 40 C.F.R.

Part 264.

As part of its inspection and enforcement program, EPA

Region 4 notified the company that it intended to conduct

visual site inspections at several Florida P&L facilities. EPA

officials at Region 4, with the consent of Florida P&L, have

conducted these inspections at some, but not all, of Florida

P&L's nine facilities. Although company officials have consented to EPA investigations, they have never agreed that

EPA has the authority to pursue these actions. In particular,

company officials have maintained that EPA has no authority

under section 3008(h) to inspect the facilities in question.

The parties have been engaged in negotiations over the last

few years in an effort to resolve this and other issues. To

date, EPA has not issued a RCRA s 3008(h) order to any

Florida P&L facility.

II. Analysis

A. Finality

Florida P&L seeks review of preamble statements in the

1994 Proposed Rule under RCRA s 7006(a), 42 U.S.C.

s 6976(a). Section 7006(a) provides for judicial review of

final regulations issued pursuant to the RCRA. 42 U.S.C.

s 6976(a). This court has recently identified three criteria

for determining when an EPA regulatory action constitutes

promulgation of regulations within the meaning of section

7006(a): (1) the Agency's own characterization of the action;

(2) whether the Agency published the action in the Federal

Register or the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR"); and

(3) whether the action has binding effects on either private

parties or the Agency. See American Portland Cement

Alliance v. EPA, 101 F.3d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see also

Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. DOI, 88 F.3d 1191, 1207

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (interpreting "regulation" under an analogous

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judicial review provision as "a statement that has general

applicability and that has the legal effect of binding the

agency or other parties") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Here, the Agency has never characterized the challenged

statements as final or applied them as binding. While the

statements were published in the Federal Register, American Portland Cement indicated that "the real dividing point

between regulations and general statements of policy is publication in the Code of Federal Regulations." American Portland Cement, 101 F.3d at 776. In deciding that the regulatory determination in that case was not a final regulation for

the purposes of judicial review under RCRA s 7006(a), 42

U.S.C. s 6976(a), the court found the fact that the regulatory

determination had not been published in the CFR to be more

important than that it had been published in the Federal

Register. See id. at 776-77.

1.The Challenged Statements Have Never Been Characterized as a Final Rule

On its face, the action at issue is merely a proposed, not a

final, rulemaking. Although the challenged statements are

consistent with previous policy statements of EPA, the parties agree that the challenged preamble statements appear

for the first time in a proposed rulemaking, and are not

simply a reiteration of existing interpretive rules. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that EPA intended to

promulgate a definitive rule concerning the scope of its

section 3008(h) authority. Indeed, that EPA is still in the

process of clarifying the scope of its own corrective action

authority is evidenced by the fact that it has yet to promulgate final rules on many of the issues addressed in the 1990

Proposed Rule.

2.EPA Has Not Applied the Challenged Statements as

Binding

In addition, Florida P&L has failed to show that the

challenged statements have any binding effects on either

private parties or the Agency. Florida P&L claims that the

preamble statements are "final interpretive rules" because

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EPA purportedly has applied the challenged statements as

binding on the company. Significantly, however, Florida

P&L does not claim that the preamble statements themselves

had a binding effect on the company. Rather, Florida P&L

relies on a September 30, 1994 letter from EPA Region 4

notifying the company of EPA's intention to conduct a visual

site inspection at one of Florida P&L's facilities and a June

21, 1996 letter from EPA Region 4 responding to objections

raised by the company to EPA's inspections at its facilities.

See Pet. Br. at 11 & Appendix at 1, 10.

It is worth noting that the September 30, 1994 letter

predates the challenged November 8, 1994 preamble statements. Thus, it is unclear how this EPA letter can be seen to

apply statements that had yet to be published when the letter

was sent.

Moreover, to the extent that both letters can be read as

preliminary steps to taking enforcement action against Florida P&L pursuant to section 3008(h), the enforcement action is

being taken by EPA directly, and not by the state of Florida

pursuant to a state corrective action program authorized

under the challenged proposed regulations. Thus, if anything, the letters follow from EPA's understanding of its

section 3008(h) authority as explained in the 1990 Proposed

Rule, which discusses EPA's authority to enforce section

3008(h), not the EPA's proposed requirements that states

have similar authority in order to be authorized to enforce

section 3008(h), which is the topic of the 1994 Proposed Rule

challenged here. If Florida P&L's petition were to be construed as a challenge to the 1990 Proposed Rule, it would be

time-barred. See RCRA s 7006(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. s 6976(a)(1)

(requiring petitions for review of final regulations promulgated pursuant to the RCRA to be "filed within ninety days");

American Iron & Steel, 886 F.2d at 397-98 (dismissing for

lack of jurisdiction late-filed challenge to RCRA regulations).

In any event, these letters, without more, have no binding

effect on Florida P&L. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 449

U.S. 232, 242-43 (1980) (agency action that only serves to

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initiate proceedings is not binding); Air California v. DOT,

654 F.2d 616, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1981) (agency letter alleging

statutory violations and warning of possible injunctive and

civil penalty remedies did not constitute final agency action).

Florida P&L asserts that EPA "has coerced [Florida P&L]

into performing corrective action under the threat of enforcement of [the challenged statements]." Reply Br. at 7. It

describes its present "predicament" as one in which it "must

voluntarily comply with undertaking a corrective action program it believes to be unlawful or face the imposition of an

enforcement order and associated civil penalties." Id. at 13.

However, Florida P&L does not and cannot deny that it could

choose not to permit EPA to access its facilities, in which case

EPA would have to decide whether to issue a 3008(h) order

against Florida P&L or move on to other enforcement priorities.

If EPA issued a 3008(h) order against Florida P&L, the

company would have ample opportunity to raise its objections

to EPA's interpretation of its section 3008(h) authority in

administrative and, ultimately, judicial proceedings challenging the order. EPA regulations provide for informal adjudication prior to the issuance of a final corrective action order.

See 40 C.F.R. Part 24; Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.

EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding informal hearing procedures contained in 40 C.F.R. Part 24).

Even after becoming final, however, a RCRA s 3008(h) corrective action order is not self-executing. To compel compliance with an order, the EPA must seek appropriate relief

through either a civil action or in an administrative proceeding before an administrative law judge appealable to EPA's

Environmental Appeals Board. See RCRA s 3008(a), (h), 42

U.S.C. s 6928(a), (h); 40 C.F.R. Parts 22, 24. A decision of

the Environmental Appeals Board concerning a corrective

action order would presumptively be reviewable under the

Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), as there is no indication that Congress intended to preclude review of such decisions or otherwise commit such decisions solely to agency

discretion. See 5 U.S.C. s 701(a) (agency actions are judicially reviewable "except to the extent that (1) statutes preclude

judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency

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discretion by law"); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (APA "creates a

strong presumption of reviewability that can be rebutted only

by a clear showing that judicial review would be inappropriate").

The cases on which Florida P&L relies in support of its

contention that the challenged preamble statements are reviewable by this court in the present context are clearly

distinguishable. In McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the binding nature of the

policy statement at issue was exhibited through EPA's denial

of the petitioner's petition for delisting, a formal agency

action similar to a RCRA order. No equivalent agency action

has been taken to date in the instant case. JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320 (D.C. Cir. 1994), involved judicial

review of final agency action (summary dismissal of a license

application) and was not construed as review of a regulation

or rule--in fact, the JEM court held that the petitioner's

attempt to challenge the rule providing the basis for dismissal

in the context of the adjudication was time-barred. See 22

F.2d at 324; see also id. at 325 (distinguishing cases in which

earlier challenge to rule found to be unripe). The central

issue in Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 801 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.

1986) was what procedures the agency must follow before

imposing penalties on a regulated entity. In contrast, in the

instant case, Florida P&L is clearly entitled to challenge the

EPA's alleged interpretation of its corrective action authority

under RCRA s 3008(h) in an adjudicatory procedure before

any penalties could be enforced against Florida P&L pursuant to this authority. In Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127

F.3d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the court addressed whether the

policy statement at issue was an interpretive rule subject to

the governing statute's notice and comment rulemaking requirements. Here, Florida P&L does not urge that the

challenged preamble statements were not subject to notice

and comment--indeed, the company offered comments on the

proposed rule--and thus Syncor is inapposite. Finally, in

Edison Electric Inst. v. EPA, 996 F.2d 326 (D.C. Cir. 1993),

the court's decision that the policy statement at issue was

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reviewable hinged on a determination that the challenged

statement effectively reopened a prior regulation and, thus,

the challenge was really to the substance of the prior final

regulation. See 996 F.2d at 331-32 (explaining "reopener

doctrine"). Florida P&L does not invoke the reopener doctrine here.

Florida P&L also attempts to rely on Kennecott. In fact,

this case supports EPA's position, not that of Florida P&L.

In Kennecott, this court held that "a preamble may under

some circumstances be reviewable." 88 F.3d at 1222. However, where the petitioners "have not demonstrated that the

[challenged] preamble has a direct and immediate rather than

a distant and speculative impact upon them," the court "must

await a concrete case where we can probe the limits of the

rule in the context of a live controversy involving actual

events." Id. at 1223. The court reasoned:

Unless and until [the agency] invokes the preamble in an

attempt to affect the outcome of a real dispute, there is

little need for and no factual basis to inform our inquiry

into its validity. Moreover, by awaiting a concrete case,

we will then be able to ascertain with assurance that [the

agency] intended to bind a party and that the party was

thereby aggrieved.

Id. Thus, Kennecott demonstrates how, in cases such as this,

"the issues of reviewability and ripeness converge." Id.

B.Ripeness

Even assuming that Florida P&L were challenging a final

interpretive rule, it is clear that its claims are not ripe for

review. The ripeness doctrine "represents a prudential attempt to balance the interests of the court and the agency in

delaying review against the petitioner's interest in prompt

consideration of allegedly unlawful agency action." Cronin v.

FAA, 73 F.3d 1126, 1131 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The Supreme Court established the framework for reaching this balance in Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), where the

Court set forth a two-pronged test that requires a reviewing

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court first to evaluate the "fitness of the issues for judicial

decision." Id. at 149. When a challenged decision is not "fit"

for review, the petitioner must show "hardship" in order to

overcome a claim of lack of ripeness. See id.; City of

Houston v. HUD, 24 F.3d 1421, 1430-31 & n.9 (D.C. Cir.

1994). The claims of Florida P&L fail the test of ripeness.

Under the fitness prong, we inquire into whether the

disputed claims raise purely legal, as opposed to factual,

questions and "whether the court or the agency would benefit

from postponing review until the policy in question has sufficiently 'crystallized.' " Cronin, 73 F.3d at 1131. "The court's

interests in avoiding unnecessary adjudication and in deciding

issues in a concrete setting militate in favor of postponing

review if, for example, the court finds that resolution of the

dispute is likely to prove unnecessary or that the court's

deliberations might benefit from letting the question arise in

some more concrete form." Id. (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). The present petition for review is not

based on crystallized EPA interpretations, but, rather, on

Florida P&L's own interpretations of the preamble statements and what could happen if those statements--as interpreted by Florida P&L--are applied to the company in an asyet-to-be-issued section 3008(h) order. The challenged rule is

unclear with regard to whether or not it applies to "cleanclosed" facilities, and EPA has yet to issue or defend a formal

order applying this rule to such facilities. Since it remains

uncertain whether, or on what grounds, EPA would even

apply this rule to clean-closed facilities, the specific question

raised by Florida P&L is not fit for review at this time.

In light of the lack of fitness of its claims, Florida P&L

must demonstrate that postponing review will cause the

company "hardship" in order to overcome a claim of lack of

ripeness and obtain review of the challenged rule at this time.

See City of Houston, 24 F.3d at 1431 n.9. Florida P&L is

unable to demonstrate hardship because the company suffers

no harm unless and until EPA or an authorized state issues a

3008(h) corrective action order against it. See W.R. Grace &

Co. v. EPA, 959 F.2d 360, 365-67 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting lack

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of ripeness where EPA has yet to take any final action under

RCRA corrective action process). As explained above, in the

event that the EPA takes such action, Florida P&L will have

an opportunity to make the same arguments raised here in

either district court or administrative proceedings. Civil

penalties cannot be imposed on Florida P&L unless it chooses

to disregard a corrective action order against it. The only

conceivable hardship Florida P&L will endure as a result of

postponement is the burden of participating in further administrative and judicial proceedings. Such claims, however, do

not constitute sufficient hardship for the purposes of ripeness.

Cronin, 73 F.3d at 1133 (challenge is unripe where complaining party is free to challenge agency's regulations in context

of specific enforcement action). Thus, Florida P&L's claims

are not ripe for review at this time.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is dismissed.

So ordered.

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