Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01308/USCOURTS-ca7-16-01308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric T. Alston
Appellant
Judy P. Smith
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 16‐1308

ERIC T. ALSTON,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

JUDY P. SMITH,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:15‐cv‐00325‐bbc — Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2016

Before BAUER, POSNER, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.    Petitioner‐appellant, Eric Alston,

challengedthe revocation of his probationby anadministrative

law judge (ALJ), claiming that certain information the ALJ

learned prior to his revocation hearing created a risk of bias in

violation of his due process rights. Alston’s appeal was denied

by the Administrator of the Wisconsin Division of Hearings

and Appeals, the Dane County Circuit Court, and finally the

Wisconsin Court of Appeals. After the Wisconsin Supreme

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Court declined to review the case, Alston filed a petition for a

writ of habeas corpus in federaldistrict court.Thedistrict court

denied the petition, holding that the Wisconsin Court of

Appeals was not unreasonable in concluding that there was no

impermissibly high risk of bias. We affirm.

I.  BACKGROUND

On June 28, 2010, Alston was placed on probation by the

Dane County Circuit Court after his conviction on five criminal

charges. Shortly thereafter, Dane County law enforcement

agencies established a “Special Investigation Unit” (SIU) to

monitor and offer resources to ten probationers whom they

identified as “serious, assaultive offenders.” In November

2011, Alston was identified for participation in the SIU pro‐

gram through which he was offered community resources

aimed at deterring him from reoffending. Alston’s participa‐

tion, however, also came with the admonition that any

probation violation would result in the Department of Correc‐

tions vigorously seeking full revocation of probation.

Alston was arrested on December 6, 2011, for violating his

probation. On April 24, 2012, a revocation hearing was held

before Beth Whitaker, an ALJ for the Wisconsin Division of

Hearings and Appeals. Alston’s participation in the SIU was

discussed at the hearing, after which ALJ Whitaker informed

the parties that she had previously attended a presentation

about the program given by law enforcement members of the

SIU. In explaining the presentation, ALJ Whitaker stated:

It was two law enforcement officers, if I remember

correctly, and they gave us an informational presen‐

tation. And it may have been at the request of our

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No. 16‐1308 3

agency, and it may have been initiated by someone

else. I don’t know, I just went along with the other

[hearing examiners] in my office and we were given

information about this program right around the

time that it came out in the newspaper. And the

summary of it as I remember it is we were told

aboutthe vastresources that were being providedto

these folks that were at high risk, and that the

program was intended as a last chance, and that

violations should be treated as sort of a last straw.

And in the case of supervision that it would be

expected that they wouldn’t be given another

chance. In other words, [they] would be revoked,

and in the case of a criminal case they would be

prosecuted. What I didn’t hear is that we’re ex‐

pected, that they expected us to revoke people when

the violations weren’t proven, so I think to that

extent, I mean I don’t think at any point that they

suggested that we revoke people that hadn’t done

anything. So there’s part of my decision making

that’s not relevant to what their program is about,

part of it that I guess you could say is [relevant].

Alston then requested a suspension of the proceedings to

allow for the substitution of a “neutral party” who had not

attended this presentation. His request was denied.

ALJ Whitaker issued a written order revoking Alston’s

probation, and Alston appealed to the Administrator of the

Division on Hearings and Appeals. The Administrator af‐

firmed the revocation and found that ALJ Whitaker’s atten‐

dance atthe SIUtraining was notproblematic.Afterthe Circuit

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Court ofDane County also affirmedthe order,Alston appealed

to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected Alston’s argu‐

ment that ALJ Whitaker’s attendance at the SIU training

created a risk of bias that violated his due process rights. First,

the courtfound that ALJWhitaker was not biased in fact, citing

the explanation of the SIU meeting she provided at Alston’s

hearing. The court then concluded that her attendance at the

meeting did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias. It

explained that members of the legal profession, including the

judiciary, regularly attend trainings, seminars, and meetings

regarding developments in legal policy and law enforcement

tactics. The law enforcement officials at the SIU training did

not discuss any specifics of Alston’s case and provided only

general information about the workings and goals of the

program. The court held, therefore, that ALJ Whitaker’s

attendance did not create an impermissibly high risk of bias in

violation of Alston’s due process rights.

After the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied Alston’s

petition forreview, he sought federal habeas relief. The district

court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision did

not involve an unreasonable application of federal law nor an

unreasonable determination of the facts. It held that because

fair minded jurists could agree with the conclusion that ALJ

Whitaker’s attendance at the SIU training did not give rise to

an impermissibly high risk of bias against Alston, he was not

entitled to habeas relief.

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II.  DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s denial of a habeas petition

de novo. Gonzales v. Mize, 565 F.3d 373, 379 (7th Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides that a federal court may only

grant habeas relief if the adjudication of petitioner’s claim by

a state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the

United States;” or if the adjudication “resulted in a decision

that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed‐

ing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We apply this analysis to the decision

of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, as that was the last state

court that substantively adjudicated Alston’s claim. Gonzales,

565 F.3d at 379 (citation omitted).

Alston seeks relief under all three of § 2254(d)’s exceptions.

He argues that (1) the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision

was contrary to established federal law governing his due

process right to an impartial adjudicator; (2) the decision

involved an unreasonable application of that body of law; and

(3) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination

of the relevant facts. We address each argument individually

below, but first, it is important to set forth the established law

governing the due process right to an unbiased adjudicator.

A fair hearing before a fair and unbiased adjudicator is a

basic requirement of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975) (citation

omitted). This principle applies to administrative tribunals, id.

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(citation omitted), andproceedings involving the revocation of

probation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782–86 (1973).

Due process is violated not only where an adjudicatoris biased

in fact, but also where a situation presents a particularly high

probability of bias. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. The inquiry as to

whether such a probability exists is an objective one. Caperton

v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009). The

question is “whether the average judge in [this] position is

‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is in unconstitutional

‘potential for bias.’” Id. The facts showing a probability of bias

must be strong enoughto “overcome apresumption of honesty

and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow, 421

U.S. at 47.

A. § 2254(d)(1) Exception for Decision “Contrary to”

Clearly Established Federal Law

Alston first argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’

decision was “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court

precedent. Under § 2254(d)(1), a decision is “contrary to”

clearly established Federal law if the state court “applies a rule

that contradicts the governing law setforth in [Supreme Court]

cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). This excep‐

tion to AEDPA applies only if the state court decision is

“diametrically different,” “opposite in character or nature,” or

“mutually opposed” to clearly established precedent. Id. at

405–06.

Alston contends that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’

decision was contrary to rules established by two specific

Supreme Court cases. First, he argues that the decision was

contrary to Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, in that the decision

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did not specifically address the potential for bias as to each

individual component of the revocation decision. In Gagnon,

the Supreme Court confirmed that probationers are entitled to

minimum due process rights at revocation hearings. Id. at 786

(citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and extending its

holdings to the probation context). In the context of determin‐

ing the scope of a probationer’s right to counsel at those

hearings, the Court also recognized that a revocation decision

has “two analytically distinct components:” (1) the determina‐

tion as to whether the probationer violated a condition of

probation; and (2) the determination as to whether to revoke

probation or find another alternative. Id. at 784 (citing

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479–80). Alston mistakenly relies on this

recognition to argue that the state court was required, but

failedto make specific andseparate findings thatALJWhitaker

was not biased when deciding each of those two components.

However, Gagnon imposes no such duty on a reviewing court

and Alston cites no other authority to support that contention.

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals made clear that it found no

bias, nor an unconstitutional potential for bias, at any juncture

of Alston’s revocation hearing. That conclusion is not “diamet‐

rically different” or “mutually opposed” to any clearly estab‐

lished Supreme Court precedent.

Alston then argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’

decision was contrary to the rule from Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881,

that the probability of bias is to be determined objectively.

Alston claims that the court primarily, and improperly,

focused on “actual bias.” That argument is without merit.

While the court did make a finding that ALJ Whitaker was not

biased in fact, it also concluded “that the hearing examiner’s

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attendance [at the SIU meeting] did not create an imper‐

missibly high risk of bias in violation of the due process

clause.” As support for that conclusion, the court cited the

frequency with which members of the judiciary attend educa‐

tional seminars on legal policy and the fact that the SIU

meeting presented only general information. It found, objec‐

tively, that no impermissible risk of bias was presented by

attendance at such a meeting. That the court found no actual

bias, in addition to no objective risk of impermissible bias, does

not render its decision contrary to clearly established federal

law.

B. § 2254(d)(1)Exceptionfor “UnreasonableApplication”

of Clearly Established Federal Law

Alston also argues that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’

decision “involvedanunreasonable application” offederallaw

governing his due process right to an impartial adjudicator.

Under § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable application of federal law

is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”

Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. It is not enough that a state court

simply may have applied the law erroneously or incorrectly.

Id. at 411. It must also be unreasonable, “which means some‐

thing like lying well outside the boundaries of permissible

differences of opinion.” Jackson v. Frank, 348 F.3d 658, 662

(7th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). “If

this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant

to be.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

On this point, Alston takes issue with three elements of

the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision. First, he argues

that the court mischaracterized the SIU meeting as simply an

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“educational seminar,” ratherthan aprejudicial encounterthat

created an impermissible risk of bias against him. Second, he

argues that it was unreasonable forthe court to rely on the fact

that the specifics of his case were not discussed at the meeting.

Finally, he argues that the court should not have relied on ALJ

Whitaker’s explanation that she would decide Alston’s case

impartially because her subjective assessment of her own

potential bias is irrelevant.

None of these arguments is persuasive. As the Wisconsin

Court of Appeals noted, members of the judiciary and other

administrative adjudicators regularly attend informational

programs on developments in the law and initiatives in law

enforcement. The SIU meeting presented general information

about a new probation initiative. Despite Alston’s argument to

the contrary, it was proper for the court to rely on the fact that

the officers at the meeting neitheridentified Alston nor offered

any details of his case. Because she learned nothing specific

about Alston or his case, ALJ Whitaker was no more disquali‐

fied by attending that meeting than if she had learned about

the SIU from a news article or bulletin. As to ALJ Whitaker’s

explanation at the hearing, it may be true that her own belief

is not wholly instructive on the potential for bias. As was just

discussed, however, the court had ample support, aside from

that statement, forits conclusion that there was no unconstitu‐

tionalrisk of bias created by her attendance at the SIU meeting.

The court’s application of the law in reaching that conclusion

was neitherincorrectnorunreasonable. Certainly, its reasoning

and holding do not lie “well outside the boundaries of permis‐

sible differences of opinion,” such that habeas relief is war‐

ranted. Jackson, 348 F.3d at 662.

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C. § 2254(d)(2) Exception for Unreasonable Determina‐

tion of Facts

Finally, Alston argues that, under § 2254(d)(2), the Wiscon‐

sin Court of Appeals’ decision relied on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. Under this section, habeas relief

may be granted only ifthe state court decision “rests upon fact‐

finding that ignores the clear and convincing weight of the

evidence.” McManus v. Neal, 779 F.3d 634, 649 (7th Cir. 2015)

(citation omitted). The decision must be “so inadequately

supported by the record as to be arbitrary and therefore

objectively unreasonable.” Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 704

(7th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted).

Alston takes issue with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’

finding that ALJ Whitaker’s explanation of the SIU meeting

confirmed that she would decide Alston’s case like any other.

In Alston’s view, ALJ Whitaker directly contradicted that

assessment when she said, “there’s part of my decision making

that’s not relevant to what their program is about, part of it

that I guess you could say is [relevant].” Therefore, he argues,

it was unreasonable for the court to find that she was not

biased in fact.

This argument fails to overcome the deference we must

afford the state court. Even if ALJ Whitaker considered some

of the information she learned about the SIU as relevant to her

decision, it was not objectively unreasonable for the court to

find that she was not biased. No specifics about Alston or his

case were presented at the meeting and there was no evidence

of prejudgment on ALJ Whitaker’s part. Based on the record

before the court, we cannot say that its interpretation of ALJ

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Whitaker’s statement was arbitrary or that it ignored the clear

and convincing weight of the evidence.

III.  CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision was consistent

with, and did not involve an unreasonable application of the

relevant Supreme Court precedents, nor did it rely on an

unreasonable determination of the facts before it. Therefore,

we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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