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Parties Involved:
Ronnie Allen Stephens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

Uaited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 51991 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RONNIE ALLEN STEPHENS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Clerk 

No. 90-5242 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-86-3-B) 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs:** 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit_Judges~ 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** Neither of the briefs submitted by both sides complies with Fed. 

R. App. P. 28(a)(3) and (b). The so-called "statement of facts" 

filed by both parties is an abstract of the testimony and not "a 

statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 

review." The court has not been aided by these briefs. 

Appellate Case: 90-5242 Document: 010110130244 Date Filed: 08/05/1991 Page: 1 
The premise advocated by the defendant in this case is 

"ignorance of the law is a defense." A revolution is at hand! 

Defendant Ronnie Allen Stephens was convicted with three 

other persons of one count of mail fraud, 18 u.s.c. § 1343, and 

one count of aiding and abetting, 18 u.s.c. § 2. The government's 

evidence established that the defendants participated in a scheme 

to defraud an insurance company by filing a false claim for the 

theft of an automobile owned by one of the defendants. 

Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, stating 

baldly and without citation of authority: 

The general rule of law in the United States, in 

any criminal case is that the individual in some way 

must be aware he is in violation of the criminal law 

before he can become liable for his actions. The fact 

that an individual is merely present with a friend or is 

helping out a friend, without having knowledge that the 

friend is doing wrong, is not a breech (sic) of the 

penal statutes. To have a rule of law to the contrary 

would open the door to abuses far to [sic] extensive to 

elaborate on in this brief. 

Counsel then follows this proposition with a jury argument based 

upon the facts in a light most favorable to the defendant, 1 the 

essence of which is that the defendant did not know he was taking 

part in an insurance fraud. 2 On appeal, however, we must view the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the government. United 

1

The government's brief in response is worthless. Instead of 

helping the court with a citation of the evidence supporting the 

conviction, the government merely argues the defendant "bears a 

heavy burden" and he has not "met it in this case." Such efforts 

are not worth the time spent in their preparation or our time 

spent reading them. 

2

His testimony at trial was, in effect, that he acted merely as a 

middleman in a transaction between friends, and he did not know a 

false claim of theft was to be asserted as a result of that 

transaction. Obviously, the jury did not believe him. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5242 Document: 010110130244 Date Filed: 08/05/1991 Page: 2 
,. 

States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991). In so 

doing, we see substantial evidence to support the verdict. 

We have great difficulty understanding the argument of 

appellant's counsel. His contention that the evidence is 

insufficient is based upon quotes from two headnotes of older 

cases from the D.C. and Second Circuits. 

To support his contention that to be guilty of an offense, a 

person must know he is committing a crime, counsel first quotes a 

part of headnote 1 from United States v. Lumpkin, 448 F.2d 1085 

(D.C. Cir. 1971), stating: "[m]ere presence at the scene of crime 

is not sufficient to convict one of aiding and abetting." 

However, that statement in context reads: 

Lumpkin was actually present at the scene of this 

crime but of course mere presence alone is not 

sufficient to convict one of aiding and abetting. What 

is required is evidence that the accused knowingly 

associate himself in some way with the criminal venture, 

that he participate in it as in something that he wishes 

to bring about and the he seek by his action to make it 

succeed. 

Id. at 1090. Then, counsel follows with a quote of headnote 2 of 

United States v. Terrell, 474 F.2d. 872 (2d Cir. 1973): "Knowledge 

that crime was committed even when coupled with presence at scene 

is, without more, generally insufficient to prove aiding and 

abetting." The text of that quotation, in context, reads: 

The question of the sufficiency of the evidence 

against appellant McDonald is, however, on a different 

footing. She was present at the time of the transfer 

and by ready inference ... knew that it was taking 

place. "[K]nowledge that a crime is being committed, 

even when coupled with presence at the 

scene," ... without more, however, is generally 

insufficient to prove aiding and abetting .... But in 

addition to being present at the scene, McDonald 

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Appellate Case: 90-5242 Document: 010110130244 Date Filed: 08/05/1991 Page: 3 
operated the Toronado, thereby enabling the sale to be 

effectuated in the relative concealment of a moving 

automobile in the early morning hours. 

Id. at 875 (citations omitted). Neither the headnotes, nor the 

cases themselves, have any bearing on whether the evidence in this 

case was sufficient to convict the defendant of mail fraud. More 

importantly, they do not support counsel's theory that a person 

must know his actions constitute a crime before he can be 

convicted. 

Nevertheless, we have reviewed the record and find the 

government's evidence showed the defendant assisted a friend in 

disposing of an automobile in a way that allowed the owner to 

claim the car had been stolen. As a consequence of the claim, the 

owner collected the proceeds of an insurance policy. The 

transaction was conducted by telephone and facsimile transmissions 

made to representatives of the insurance company in another state. 

A codefendant, Bobby Lee Martin, testifying for the 

government, stated his boss was having financial difficulties and 

wanted to have "something done with his car." Martin then told 

defendant "that my boss needed a car stolen, was he interested." 

Martin explained the theft was "an insurance deal." Two days 

later defendant called Martin and asked for the keys to the car, 

saying he would dispose of it. Defendant subsequently obtained 

the keys, took another defendant to a location furnished him by 

Martin, where the car was obtained by the third defendant. That 

person ultimately sold the vehicle to an undercover Tulsa 

policeman. This conduct constituted "a scheme or artifice to 

defraud" within the ambit of the wire fraud statute, 18 u.s.c. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5242 Document: 010110130244 Date Filed: 08/05/1991 Page: 4 
§ 1343. Defendant also abetted the commission of the wire fraud 

within the meaning of 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

Counsel next attacks defendant's sentence, arguing: "[T]here 

is no reason why the defendant should not have been given the 

extra two points for acceptance of responsibility." This argument 

is made in the face of this statement in the presentence report: 

"Stephens has consistently denied having any knowledge about being 

a participant in auto insurance fraud activities despite numerous 

statements to the contrary by more than one defendant. 113 There is 

at least one significant reason why the trial court did not give 

the two-point adjustment, and that is because at no time did the 

defendant accept responsibility for his criminal act. 

Defendant's argument is specious. He bluntly asserts that 

the two-point reduction was "absolutely critical to the Defendant. 

[It] meant the difference between the judge being able to put the 

Defendant on probation or having to incarcerate him." 

Nonetheless, counsel fails to indicate where and to whom the 

defendant acknowledged his responsibility so the trial court could 

have granted the two-point adjustment. Moreover, he asks, "So why 

was the Defendant denied the two points? The Defendant would 

suggest that is [sic] was based solely on the subjective thoughts 

of the Probation Office who did the presentence investigation. 

3

oefendant made no objection to the presentence report. 

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Appellate Case: 90-5242 Document: 010110130244 Date Filed: 08/05/1991 Page: 5 
.... 

Objectively, there is no reason why the Defendant should have been 

denied." This rhetoric is offensively fatuous. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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