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Parties Involved:
Dwight L. Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 25, 1996 Decided January 14, 1997

No. 95-3185

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ALLEN R. HAWKINS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 95-3186

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00026-02)

(No. 95cr00026-04)

Ralph Drury Martin, appointed by the court, argued the cause and filed the briefsfor appellant Allen

R. Hawkins.

Kenneth D. Auerbach, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellant Dwight L. Thomas.

Elaine R. Lubin, appointed by the court, was on the brief.

Anjali Chaturvedi, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric H.

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were

on the brief.

Before: GINSBURG, HENDERSON, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Allen R. Hawkins was convicted of conspiring to distribute and

to possess with the intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; unlawful possession

with intent to distribute and unlawful distribution of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and

possession with intent to distribute and unlawful distribution of heroin within 1,000 feet of a school,

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860, otherwise known as the Drug Free School-Zones Act or the

"schoolyard statute." Hawkins challenges the two schoolyard convictions on the grounds, first, that

the Congress does not have the authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the

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United States to prohibit heroin sales that do not affect interstate commerce and, second, that the

Government failed to prove that the school building near which he had been distributing heroin was

in fact a school. Dwight L. Thomas was also convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin and of

possession with intent to distribute heroin within 1,000 feet of a school. Thomas joins Hawkins'

challengesto the schoolyard statute and additionally contends that there wasinsufficient evidence to

support his convictions. None of these challenges has any merit.

I. BACKGROUND

Officer Ralph Nitz testified at trial that, from a police observation post, he watched Hawkins

and one Lionel Green sitting together on the front steps of the apartment building at 9010 Ninth

Street in Northwest Washington, D.C. on the evening ofJanuary 3, 1995. A woman approached and

handed Green some money, which he put into his coat pocket. Green then removed an object from

under a patch of carpeting on the steps of the apartment building and from it withdrew a smaller

object, which he handed to the woman. After the woman left the area, Green returned the object to

its hiding place.

Several minutes later Officer Nitz saw a man approach Hawkins and Green. Hawkins

retrieved a folded piece of paper from under the carpeting, opened the paper, and removed a light

colored object. He handed the object to Green, who then handed it to the man, who gave Green

some money and departed. The police stopped and searched the man and discovered that the object

he had received from Green contained heroin.

Next, a car stopped in front of the apartment building. A passenger got out and Green got

into the passenger seat. At this point, the police converged and detained Hawkins, Green, and the

driver of the car, appellant Thomas.

In the ensuing search of the car, the police recovered several ziplock bags of heroin from

behind the driver's side visor and from behind a notepad secured to the dashboard. From under the

carpeting on the steps of the apartment building the police recovered eight additional ziplock bags

of heroin.

Officer Nitz returned to the area on January 30, 1995 in order to measure the distance from

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the front steps of the apartment building to the Garnett Patterson Junior High School. At trial, he

testified that he had found this distance to be 397.8 feet.

II. ANALYSIS

Hawkins and Thomas both argue, based upon United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995),

that the Drug Free School-Zones Act exceedsthe power ofthe Congress under the commerce clause.

Hawkins maintains in the alternative that his conviction should be overturned because the

Government failed to establish that his conduct occurred within 1,000 feet of an operating school.

For his part, Thomas challenges his convictions on the ground that there was insufficient evidence

to establish that he possessed the drugs that were found in his car and to link him to the underlying

conspiracy to sell those drugs.

A. The Constitutionality of the Schoolyard Statute

The appellants argue that The Drug Free School-Zones Act is unconstitutional because the

sale of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school does not substantially affect interstate

commerce. The schoolyard statute, they say, is nothing more than an attempt by the Congress to

exercise the police power reserved in the Constitution to the several States.

In Lopez, the Supreme Court delineated the three broad categories of activity that the

Congress is authorized by the commerce clause to regulate:

First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels ofinterstate commerce. Second,

Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate

commerce or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may

come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress' commerce authority includes

the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate

commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.

115 S.Ct. at 1629 (citations omitted). The Court readily concluded that possession of a gun within

1,000 feet of a school, which the Congress had sought to prohibit in the Gun Free School-Zones Act,

21 U.S.C. § 922(q), falls into neither the first nor the second category. Id. at 1630. The Court then

turned to the closer question whether such possession substantially affects interstate commerce.

The Court noted that "section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do

with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms."

115 S.Ct. at 1630-31. Nor was § 922(q) "an essential part of a larger regulation of economic

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activity." Id. at 1631. It could not therefore "be sustained under [the Court's line of] cases upholding

regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which

viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce." Id. Therefore, the commerce

clause did not confer upon the Congress the power to enact the Gun Free School-Zones Act.

The appellants try to bring the Drug Free School-Zones Act within the scope of the Court's

holding in Lopez by arguing that, although § 860(a) is concededly part of a larger scheme regulating

the interstate commerce in drugs, it is not an essential part of that scheme. Zoning the traffic in

controlled substances at the local level is not, the appellants maintain, an essential element of the

larger scheme to control the interstate traffic in drugs.

The appellants err in thinking that Lopez controlsthis case. The Gun Free School-Zones Act

punished simple possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school; it did not purport to regulate

commerce or anything incident thereto. The Drug Free School-Zones Act, in contrast, regulates

distribution of, and possession with intent to distribute, illicit drugs within 1,000 feet of a school; it

is not, therefore, "a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with "commerce' or any sort

of economic enterprise." Indeed, the schoolyard statute is directed specifically at a particular type

of commercial activity.

Thomas argues that the prohibited activity is not commercial, at least insofar as the Act

punishes possession with intent to distribute rather than actual distribution. This is like saying that

warehousing goods prior to their finalsale is not a part of interstate commerceyet it, too, is a form

of possession with intent to distribute. While mere possession, that is without intent to distribute,

may be non-commercial and its prohibition in a federalstatute would arguably implicate the rationale

of Lopez, the fact remainsthat in the schoolyard statute the Congress punished possession only when

it is incident to a commercial activity.

The appellants conclude by pointing out that the Congress made no findings in the course of

passing the Drug Free School-Zones Act. The appellants err, however, in suggesting that this

matters. Congressional findings are not a prerequisite to the exercise of an Article I power. See

Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1631, quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). We look to

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congressional findings only for aid in assessing the validity of the Congress's claim of authority.

Asit happens, moreover, theCongress hasmade extensive findingsregarding the relationship

between local drugs sales and interstate drug traffic. The Congress concluded that the majority of

the drugs that are distributed locally have traveled or will travel in interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C.

§ 801(3). "Local distribution and possession of controlled substances," even when those substances

have not traveled in interstate commerce, "contribute to swelling the interstate traffic in such

substances." Id. at § 801(4). Finally, because it is difficult to differentiate between controlled

substances that have traveled in interstate commerce and those that have not, see id. at § 801(5),

federal control over local distribution is essential to effective federal control over the interstate

commerce in controlled substances. Id. at § 801(6).

These findings illuminate the close relationship between the local distribution of controlled

substances and the interstate commerce in those substances. This provides ample support for the

Congress's claim of authority to regulate that local distribution. See, for example, Minor v. United

States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969); Reina v. United States, 364 U.S. 507, 512 (1960); United

States v. Owens, 996 F.2d 59, 61 (5thCir. 1993); United States v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014, 1019-1020

(D.C. Cir. 1977).

Because we accept that the Congress has the authority to regulate all of the commerce in

controlled substances, there is no need to considermuch less any need for particularized findings

to aid in consideringwhetherthe Congress hasthe authorityto regulate a portion ofthat commerce.

The legislature has the discretion, absent some competing constitutional constraint, to decide when,

how, and how much of an activity that affects interstate commerce to regulate. See, for example,

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 197 (1824).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Hawkins

Hawkins contendsthat in order to prove a violation ofthe schoolyard statute the Government

must show that he possessed or distributed heroin within 1,000 feet of an actual school, not just a

school building that is no longer (or not yet) in use as a school. We agree. The Act applies not only

to schools but also to "swimming pools," "playgrounds," "youth centers," and "video arcade

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facilities." While neither school nor swimming pool is defined in the Act, the other three terms are

defined in a way that clearly implies that the whole statute is directed only to facilities where one

would expect young people to congregate. See 21 U.S.C. § 801(e)(1) (defining playground as "any

outdoor facility ... intended for recreation ... containing three or more separate apparatus intended

for the recreation of children including, but not limited to, sliding boards, swingsets, and

teeterboards"); id. at § 801(e)(2) (defining "youth center" to include facilities "primarily for use by

persons under 18 years of age"); id. at § 801(e)(3) (defining "video arcade facility" to include "any

facility, legally accessible to persons under 18 years of age"). The Congress is understandably

concerned with drug dealing where it might attract children, not with its effect upon abandoned or

unfinished schoolbuildings. Reading the statute as a whole, therefore, we conclude that the Congress

intended to subject drug dealersto enhanced punishment onlyfor conduct occurring within 1,000 feet

of an operating school (or other listed facility).

This court cannot, however, agree with Hawkins' assertion that, viewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prosecution, no rationaltrier offact could have found the essential element

of this crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Officer Nitz testified that Hawkins' drug offenses occurred

within 1,000 feet ofthe "Garnett-Patterson Junior High School." He clarified his statement by adding

"a middle school." As here used and qualified, a reasonable juror could take the word "school" to

refer to an operating school. We therefore reject Hawkins' challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence against him.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence Against Thomas

Thomas arguesthat there wasinsufficient evidence that he wasinvolved in the conspiracy and

that he possessed the heroin that was found in his car. Thomas claims that he simply came on the

scene in order to speak with his brother-in-law, appellant Hawkins; he stayed in the car in order to

keep warm, not for any illicit purpose. Furthermore, he says, there was no evidence that he, rather

than his passenger, possessed the drugsthat were in the car. Indeed, Thomas seems to think it helpful

to his case that the drugs were concealed behind a notepad and a visor rather than in plain view ("the

drugs could just asreadily have been under the control of the front seat passenger who exited the car

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to make way for Green"), even though the visor was on the driver's side of the car.

Thomasrelies upon several casesin which a defendant's mere presence on the scene has been

held insufficient to establish his possession of an item found there. See, e.g., United States v.

Johnson, 952 F.2d 1407, 1411-12 (D.C. Cir. 1992). He also contends that expert testimony to the

effect that drug dealers are typically resupplied at intervals during the night should not have been

permitted to fill this putative evidentiary gap.

First, we do not agree that the testimony of the Government's expert witness filled an

evidentiary gap; rather, the expert supported the Government's explanation of the defendants'

behavior following Thomas's arrival on the scene, viz., that Thomas was resupplying Green and

Hawkins with drugs.

Second, we note that the cases from which Thomas has sought support for his argument all

involved situations in which the defendant had at best tenuous control over the premises where the

contraband wasfound. In Johnson, for example, we reversed the conviction of a defendant who was

found in an apartment not his own, in which drugs and a gun were also discovered. The testimony

of an expert witnessto the effect that a drug dealer would never let an outsider get near hisstash was

insufficient by itself to establish the defendant's possession of the drugs discovered in the apartment.

Johnson, 952 F.2d at 1411-12.

In the case now before us, in contrast, there was ample evidence suggesting that Thomas

"knew of, and was in a position to exercise dominion and control over, the contraband." United

States v. Byfield, 928 F.2d 1163, 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Thomas was driving the car in which the

drugs were found. The drugs were within arm's reachindeed, behind the visor on his side of the

car. Although it is conceivable that someone else might have possessed the drugs, the jury could

reasonably conclude, as it did, that the drugs were in Thomas's possession.

Finally, the evidence supports Thomas's role in the on-going conspiracy to distribute the

drugs. In addition to possessing the drugs, Thomas drove the car and its illicit contents to the scene

of the drug trafficking. Hawkins and Green immediately approached Thomas's car. Although

Thomas had a familialrelationship with Hawkins and claimsthat he came to talk with Hawkins, it was

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Green who got into the car with Thomas. Moreover, chemical analysis revealed that the drugs found

in Thomas's car bore a striking similarity in quality to the drugs found in the stash at the scene of the

transactions.

In sum, there was adequate evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that

Thomas was part of the on-going conspiracy to distribute drugs in front of 9010 Ninth Street, N.W.

We therefore affirm Thomas's conviction in all respects.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is in all respects

Affirmed.

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