Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01840/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-01840-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Josh Prudhel
Respondent
Jeff Lamonte Sigler
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEFF LAMONTE SIGLER, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

JOSH PRUDHEL, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:24-cv-1840 DJC AC 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Petitioner is a California state prisoner proceeding pro se with an application for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The action proceeds on a petition challenging 

petitioners’ 2022 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and dissuading a witness. ECF No. 

1. Respondent has answered, ECF No. 12, and petitioner has filed a traverse, ECF No. 14. 

BACKGROUND 

I. Proceedings in the Trial Court 

A. Preliminary Proceedings 

Petitioner was charged in San Joaquin County with assault with a deadly weapon in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1) and dissuading a witness from prosecuting a crime in 

violation of Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(2). In relation to the assault charge, it was alleged that 

petitioner inflicted great bodily injury under circumstances involving domestic violence, and as to 

both counts that petitioner had been previously convicted of a serious felony. The amended 

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information further alleged seven aggravating circumstances, four of which related to both counts 

and three of which related to the assault charge only. On January 3, 2022, petitioner entered not 

guilty pleas and denied the allegations. 

B. The Evidence Presented at Trial 

The jury heard evidence of the following facts.1 Sometime around April or May 2021, 

petitioner and his then-girlfriend Leanna were driving together near Lodi. An argument between 

the two resulted in petitioner driving Leanna’s car off the road and into a vineyard. The car 

sustained extensive damage. Around the same time, Leanna’s trailer was stolen. Petitioner 

regained possession of the trailer and told Leanna it now belonged to him. Leanna began staying 

at various motels and withdrew $800 from petitioner’s bank account using his bank card. 

Late on the night of July 11, 2021, petitioner sent Leanna a text message saying he was 

going to give her “one opportunity” to return his bank card, daring her to claim she did not have 

it. He then sent three text messages during the early morning hours of July 12, 2021, threatening 

to kill her if she did not return his money. Leanna did not respond. 

About 90 minutes later, while driving down Hammer Lane in Stockton, Leanna noticed 

petitioner’s gold Buick behind her. Petitioner drove into the back of her Acura. Leanna 

accelerated to get away from him, but petitioner pursued her. When Leanna reached a dead end, 

petitioner got out of his car and tried to open her car door. Leanna managed to turn around and 

drive away. Petitioner caught up to her and drove into the rear passenger side quarter panel of her 

car, causing her to spin out and crash into a brick structure. Petitioner drove away. Leanna was 

seriously injured in the crash and was treated for a fractured hip. 

Petitioner was charged with assault with a deadly weapon on July 23, 2021, and his 

arraignment took place three days later. On September 6, petitioner called Leanna from jail. He 

said he loved her and would choose her over a million dollars. Leanna said he was lying: “You 

fucking made me spin out and crash my car over money ....” Petitioner denied causing the crash 

1

 This factual summary is adapted from the opinion of the California Court of Appeal, ECF No. 

11-18. Petitioner challenges the accuracy of the facts as “found” by the Court of Appeal, and that 

issue is addressed below in discussion of his claim for relief. 

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and claimed he was “nowhere near [her] car.” Leanna again said he was lying. Petitioner asked 

her what was going to happen when he went to court the next day. Leanna said she did not know. 

Petitioner asked whether she would be there. Leanna said she would, but she did not want the 

prosecution to know she was there because she “didn’t want to be part of it.” 

Petitioner told Leanna, “[T]hey’re tripping on some messages that you said I sent you. 

And I told them, I told them they were tripping .... I didn’t send you no messages like that.” 

Petitioner continued, “That’s the only thing that they, that they were tripping on. They said they 

were going to give me two years for that message ... because I have a strike.” Petitioner told 

Leanna, “if you don’t fix that tomorrow that’s what they’re going to give me,” but she said she 

did not “have to fix it at all” and added “You told me, you said that you were looking at more 

than two years, you said 10 years, that’s the only reason why I started feeling sorry thinking about 

it again cause that would be fucked up.” 

Petitioner and Leanna again argued over whether he hit her car and caused the crash. 

Petitioner repeatedly denied it. Leanna was adamant that he did. Petitioner then asked her 

whether she was “going to help [him] tomorrow or not” and added, “I could sink your ship just as 

fast as you[ ] were trying to sink mine for some reason.... Quit lying to them.” Leanna asked, 

“About what?” Petitioner said he needed Leanna “to fucking go in there” and tell the prosecution 

that he “didn’t send [her] no messages with ill intentions.” Petitioner told Leanna, “They’re not 

worried about the car, they’re worried about the messages. They’re going to give me two years.” 

Leanna replied, “You are going to have to explain the messages yourself. I don’t know how to 

explain messages that came from your phone.” Petitioner said, “How did they get ... it doesn’t 

have my name on it?” Leanna explained, “In my phone it does.” Petitioner and Leanna then 

argued over whether that was true. Eventually, petitioner made a final request: “Can you go over 

there and tell them that I didn’t send the messages to you, tomorrow or not? That’s all.” 

Although Leanna had reported to responding officers and a detective that petitioner was 

the one who chased her and twice ran into her car, at trial she denied that petitioner caused the 

crash. But portions of the car chase were captured on various traffic cameras along the route, and 

an accident investigator testified that the damage to petitioner’s Buick and the gold paint transfer 

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on Leanna’s car indicated that petitioner had caused the crash. 

In connection with the assault count, the prosecution presented testimony from an expert 

in domestic violence, David Cropp, as well as testimony from another one of petitioner’s former 

girlfriends and her mother, recounting prior incidents of domestic violence. 

C. Outcome 

The jury found petitioner guilty of both counts and found the great bodily injury allegation 

to be true. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true all seven alleged aggravating 

circumstances and the allegation that petitioner had been previously convicted of a serious felony. 

On April 11, 2022, petitioner was sentenced to a total term of 20 years in state prison 

comprised of six years on count 1 (the middle term of three years doubled because of the strike 

prior), four years on count 2 (the middle term of two years doubled because of the strike prior), 

the upper term of five years for the great bodily injury enhancement, and five years for the prior 

serious felony enhancement. 

II. Post-Conviction Proceedings 

Petitioner timely appealed, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of 

conviction on March 14, 2024. ECF No. 11-18. The California Supreme Court denied review on 

May 29, 2024. ECF No. 11-20. Petitioner made no applications for state collateral relief. 

STANDARDS GOVERNING HABEAS RELIEF UNDER THE AEDPA 

28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 

1996 (“AEDPA”), provides in relevant part as follows: 

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person 

in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim – 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 The statute applies whenever the state court has denied a federal claim on its merits, 

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whether or not the state court explained its reasons. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 

(2011). State court rejection of a federal claim will be presumed to have been on the merits 

absent any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary. Id. (citing Harris v. Reed, 

489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear whether a 

decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis)). “The presumption 

may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's 

decision is more likely.” Id. at 99-100. 

 The phrase “clearly established Federal law” in § 2254(d)(1) refers to the “governing legal 

principle or principles” previously articulated by the Supreme Court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Only Supreme Court precedent may constitute “clearly established 

Federal law,” but courts may look to circuit law “to ascertain whether...the particular point in 

issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 

(2013). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if the decision 

“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A state court decision “unreasonably applies” federal law “if the state 

court identifies the correct rule from [the Supreme Court’s] cases but unreasonably applies it to 

the facts of the particular state prisoner’s case.” Id. at 407-08. It is not enough that the state court 

was incorrect in the view of the federal habeas court; the state court decision must be objectively 

unreasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). 

Review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that was before the state court. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180-181 (2011). The question at this stage is whether the state court 

reasonably applied clearly established federal law to the facts before it. Id. at 181-182. In other 

words, the focus of the § 2254(d) inquiry is “on what a state court knew and did.” Id. at 182. 

Where the state court’s adjudication is set forth in a reasoned opinion, §2254(d)(1) review is 

confined to “the state court’s actual reasoning” and “actual analysis.” Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 

724, 738 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). A different rule applies where the state court rejects claims 

summarily, without a reasoned opinion. In Richter, supra, the Supreme Court held that when a 

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state court denies a claim on the merits but without a reasoned opinion, the federal habeas court 

must determine what arguments or theories may have supported the state court’s decision, and 

subject those arguments or theories to § 2254(d) scrutiny. Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Preliminary Considerations 

Petitioner sets forth a single putative ground for relief: that the California Court of Appeal 

unreasonably determined the facts of the case within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2) “with regard to 

the evidence presented at the trial and what led to the conviction.” ECF No. 1 at 5, 7. An 

unreasonable determination of facts by a state court lifts the bar to federal habeas relief interposed 

by the AEDPA, but it does not constitute a ground for relief. Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 

(2007) (the federal habeas statute establishes a precondition to relief, not grounds for entitlement 

to relief). Where a federal habeas petitioner demonstrates an unreasonable state court denial of 

relief under either prong of § 2254(d), he must go on to demonstrate his conviction’s 

constitutional infirmity under a de novo standard. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(en banc). 

It is plain from the attachments to the petition that petitioner is pursuing his appellate 

argument that the dissuasion conviction was unsupported by sufficient evidence. See ECF No. 1 

at 9-19 (excerpt of Petition for Review). Accordingly, the court construes the petition as alleging 

substantively that the dissuasion conviction is unsupported by evidence sufficient to satisfy due 

process. Petitioner’s argument under § 2254(d) is addressed in discussion of the state court’s 

opinion, below. 

II. Petitioner’s Allegations and Pertinent State Court Record 

Petitioner’s appellate challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence turned on the theory that 

because Cal. Penal Code § 1361(b)(2) applies only to pre-charging dissuasion, the jail-house 

conversation between petitioner and Leanna could not support criminal liability. ECF No. 11-15 

(Appellant’s Opening Brief) at 61-69. In his petition for review in the California Supreme Court, 

and here, he argued that the Court of Appeal improperly drew a “weak and speculative” inference 

regarding the state of the evidence. ECF No. 1 at 14, 17. Petitioner contends in sum that the 

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prosecutor failed to produce evidence sufficient for the jury to conclude that petitioner was 

attempting to dissuade Leanna from causing charges additional to the ones pending at the time of 

the phone call from being brought and pursued. Id. 

III. The Clearly Established Federal Law 

 Due process requires that each essential element of a criminal offense be proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). In reviewing the sufficiency of 

evidence to support a conviction, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979). If the evidence supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court must presume “that 

the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution,” and the court must “defer 

to that resolution.” Id. at 326. “A reviewing court may set aside the jury’s verdict on the ground 

of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.” Cavazos 

v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011) (per curiam). 

IV. The State Court’s Ruling 

 This claim was raised on direct appeal. Because the California Supreme Court denied 

discretionary review, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal constitutes the last reasoned 

decision on the merits and is the subject of habeas review in this court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797 (1991); Ortiz v. Yates, 704 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012). The appellate court 

ruled in pertinent part as follows: 

Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to support his 

dissuasion conviction. 

Defendant was charged with dissuasion under Penal Code section 

136.1, subdivision (b)(2). As relevant here, that provision makes it 

unlawful for any person to attempt to prevent or dissuade a crime 

victim or witness to a crime from “[c]ausing a complaint, 

indictment, information, probation or parole violation to be sought 

and prosecuted, and assisting in the prosecution thereof.” (§ 136.1, 

subd. (b)(2).) 

Relying on People v. Reynoza (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 181 

(Reynoza), review granted May 11, 2022, S273797, defendant 

argues the evidence is insufficient to support his dissuasion 

conviction because the jailhouse phone call between defendant and 

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Leanna took place after his arrest and the filing of the criminal 

complaint, and after Leanna had shown the detective incriminating 

text messages from defendant. As explained in Reynoza, section 

136.1, subdivision (b)(2) “requires proof that, among other things, 

the defendant attempted to prevent or dissuade another person from 

causing [one of the enumerated charging documents] to be filed. If 

the defendant was aware the relevant charging document had 

already been filed, and the defendant did not attempt to prevent or 

dissuade the filing of any amended or subsequent charging 

document, the defendant has not violated [this provision].” 

(Reynoza, at p. 189.) In that case, after the defendant’s brother was 

charged with a firearms offense and made several court 

appearances, the defendant and two others approached a witness in 

his brother’s case and told him to drop the charges. (Id. at p. 184.) 

However, because the relevant charging document had already been 

filed at the time of the alleged dissuasion, and because there was no 

evidence that the defendant was either unaware of that fact or 

intended to prevent or dissuade the filing of an amended or 

subsequent charging document, the evidence was insufficient to 

support the dissuasion conviction. (Id. at p. 187.) 

Here, although defendant was already charged with assault with a 

deadly weapon at the time of his phone call with Leanna, his 

statements during the phone call indicate he intended to dissuade 

her from causing an amended charging document to be filed. At the 

time of the phone call, defendant was charged with a single offense, 

assault with a deadly weapon based on driving his car into Leanna’s 

car and causing her to crash. During the phone call, however, 

defendant expressed his belief that the People were more interested 

in prosecuting him for the text messages he sent Leanna prior to the 

car chase and collision: “They’re not worried about the car, they’re 

worried about the messages.” Those messages arguably contained a 

criminal threat. But in order to prosecute defendant for making a 

criminal threat, the People would have had to amend the complaint 

to charge that offense. Moreover, although defendant and Leanna 

argued during the phone call about whether he hit her car, his 

specific request was for her to tell the prosecution that he did not 

send the text messages: “Can you go over there and tell them that I 

didn’t send the messages to you, tomorrow or not? That’s all.” 

The evidence is sufficient to support a conclusion that defendant 

intended to dissuade Leanna from causing an amended charging 

document “to be sought and prosecuted, and assisting in the 

prosecution thereof.” (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(2).) Accordingly, we need 

not address an issue pending in the California Supreme Court 

regarding the differing interpretations of section 136.1, subdivision 

(b)(2) in Reynoza and in People v. Velazquez (2011) 201 

Cal.App.4th 219, 232-233 [the provision encompasses an attempt to 

dissuade a victim or witness from assisting in the prosecution of a 

charging document that has already been filed].) 

ECF No. 11-18 at 4-6. 

//// 

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V. Objective Reasonableness Under § 2254(d) 

A. The State Court Did Not Unreasonably Apply Clearly Established Federal Law 

The California Court of Appeal did not cite Jackson v. Virginia, but neither its reasoning 

nor its result is inconsistent with Jackson and progeny. That is what matters. See Early v. 

Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam) (AEDPA’s limitations on relief apply even where the 

state court is unaware of applicable U.S. Supreme Court precedents, “so long as neither the 

reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”); see also Bell v. Cone, 543 

U.S. 447, 455 (2005) (“Federal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply 

with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.”). 

Under Jackson v. Virginia, state law provides the elements of the substantive criminal 

offense and the federal due process question is whether there was sufficient evidence to prove 

each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 983 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16); Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d 1210, 1214 (2011). 

Because the elements which must be proved in a prosecution under Cal. Penal Code § 136.1 are 

exclusively a matter of California law, they are unreviewable here; this court must accept the state 

courts’ construction of state law. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1278 n.14 (9th Cir. 2005); 

see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam) (“We have repeatedly held that 

a state court’s interpretation of state law... binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”). 

In this case, the state appellate conducted its sufficiency review according to the plain 

language of Cal. Penal Code § 136.1(b)(2). As the trial court instructed the jury, also directly 

pursuant to the statutory language: 

The Defendant is charged in Count 2 with intimidating a witness in 

violation of Penal Code section 136.1(b)(2). 

To prove that the Defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must 

prove that: 

1. The defendant tried to prevent or discourage Leeanna from 

cooperating or providing information so that an information could 

be sought and prosecuted, and from helping to prosecute that 

action. 

2. Leeanna was a crime victim; 

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AND 

3. The defendant knew he was trying to prevent or discourage 

Leeanna from cooperating or providing information so that an 

information could be sought and prosecuted, and from helping to 

prosecute that action and intended to do so. 

CT 314 (ECF No. 11-2 at 28) (emphasis added). 

 People v. Reynoza, 75 Cal.App.5th 181 (2022), on which petitioner relies, interprets this 

statutory language and holds that a § 136.1(b)(2) charge does not lie where the dissuasion from 

cooperation with law enforcement relates to charges that have already been filed and of which the 

defendant is aware.2 Reynoza does not require that a jury be instructed in terms beyond the 

statutory language on the necessary intent to dissuade cooperation with future, as opposed to 

pending, charges. Reynoza does not hold that the charges must specify, or the jury unanimously 

agree on, the potential additional charge that the defendant sought to avoid. 3 Reynoza certainly 

provides a basis for a California defendant to seek dismissal of § 136.1(b)(2) charges where the 

underlying conduct involves only post-charging dissuasion.4 It also provides a basis for a motion 

for directed verdict or an appellate challenge on the same grounds. Petitioner brought such an 

appellate challenge, and he lost because the evidence presented at trial does support a conclusion 

that he was trying to dissuade Leanna from providing information related to potential charges that 

he was not facing at the time of the jailhouse phone call: charges arising from the text messages. 

The court of appeal’s reasoning on this issue accords fully with clearly established federal 

law. Jackson affirmatively required the reviewing court to view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, and to defer to the jury’s judgment that all inferences from 

conflicting evidence were resolvable in the prosecution’s favor. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 326. 

Petitioner has not identified any failure of proof on an essential element of the charge, nor any 

inference that was impermissible or irrational. See Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2. Particularly in light 

2

 Following petitioner’s appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed Reynoza, resolving a split 

of authority in the California appellate courts. People v. Reynoza, 15 Cal. 5th 982 (2024). 

3

 Moreover, petitioner has not argued in any court that the jury was improperly instructed 

regarding the elements of § 136.1(b)(2) liability. 

4

 Other subsections of § 136.1 might apply in such circumstances, as might other sections of the 

penal code that address witness intimidation. 

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of the “double dose of deference” to the verdict that is required under Jackson and the AEDPA, 

Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011), petitioner has not overcome § 2254(d)(1)’s 

bar to federal habeas relief. 

B. The State Court Did Not Base Its Decision on Unreasonable Factual Determinations 

Petitioner argues that the appellate court’s decision was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts of the case, satisfying § 2254(d)(2)’s alternative exception to AEDPA’s 

limitation of federal habeas relief. ECF No. 1 at 5, 7. Petitioner does not, however, identify any 

issue of disputed fact that the appellate court independently resolved, nor any material error in the 

appellate court’s recitation of the facts of the case.5 

Section 2254(d)(2) applies where a state court’s denial of a federal constitutional claim is 

predicated on factual findings by that court or a lower state court which are objectively 

unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528 

(2003) (state court denied Strickland claim6 on basis of “clear factual error” regarding the 

contents of social service records); Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305 (2015) (state court denied 

Atkins hearing7 on basis of unreasonable factual determinations that petitioner’s IQ was 

inconsistent with mental retardation and that petitioner had presented no evidence of adaptive 

impairment); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240 (2005) (state court denied Batson claim8 on 

basis of unreasonable factual finding that the prosecutor’s asserted race-neutral reasons for 

striking African-American jurors were true). Section 2254(d)(2) also applies where the state 

court made its factual findings according to a flawed process. See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 

992, 999-1001 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004). 

Here, the California Court of Appeal made no independent factual findings that could be 

5

 To the contrary, petitioner has expressly adopted the appellate court’s factual summary for 

purposes of sufficiency review. See ECF No. 1 at 9. 

6

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984) (ineffective assistance of counsel violates Sixth 

Amendment rights of criminal defendants). 

7

 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of 

intellectually disabled defendants). 

8

 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (racial discrimination in jury selection violates equal 

protection). 

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subject to § 2254(d)(2) scrutiny. Rather, it reviewed the jury’s verdict for consistency with due 

process in light of the evidence presented at trial. Sufficiency of the evidence claims are recordbased claims which are evaluated under § 2254(d)(1). See Emery v. Clark, 643 F.3d at 1213-

1214; see also Polina v. Montgomery, 833 F. App’x 51, 55 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] state court’s 

resolution of an insufficiency of the evidence claim is evaluated under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 

not § 2254(d)(2)”) (citing Emery). 

The inferences petitioner attacks as unreasonable or unsupported by evidence were drawn 

not by the state court but by the jury. Section 2254(d)(2) accordingly has no application here. 

For the reasons already explained, the inferences necessary to the verdict—most importantly that 

petitioner was trying to persuade Leanna not to provide information that might result in charges 

arising from his text messages—were not irrational, and therefore the state court’s denial of relief 

cannot have been objectively unreasonable. See Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 2. 

CONCLUSION 

For all the reasons explained above, the state courts’ denial of petitioner’s claims was not 

objectively unreasonable within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Even without reference to 

AEDPA standards, petitioner has not established any violation of his constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be 

denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” If petitioner files objections, 

he shall also address whether a certificate of appealability should issue and, if so, why and as to 

which issues. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed 

within fourteen days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: January 14, 2025 

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