Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07024/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Neal F. Gasser
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 8, 2005 Decided March 31, 2006

No. 04-7018

NEAL F. GASSER,

APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE

Consolidated with

04-7024

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cv00534)

Donna M. Murasky, Senior Assistant Attorney General,

Office of Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued

the cause for appellant/cross-appellee. With her on the briefs

were Robert J. Spagnoletti, Attorney General, and Edward E.

Schwab, Deputy Attorney General.

Gregg D. Adler argued the cause for appellee/crossappellant. On the briefs was Michael P. Deeds. James L.

Kestell entered an appearance.

USCA Case #04-7024 Document #959608 Filed: 03/31/2006 Page 1 of 15
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Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judge, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The District of Columbia

appeals from the judgment entered after a verdict in favor of

Neal F. Gasser, a sergeant in the D.C. Metropolitan Police

Department, finding the District liable to him under the

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“Disabilities Act”), 42

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. Gasser cross-appeals from the district

court’s order refusing to direct the Police Department to

promote him to Lieutenant. Among the matters in controversy

is the proper application of the evidentiary standard laid down

in Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority,

240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc).

I.

Gasser’s complaint alleged that the Police Department

violated the Disabilities Act when it refused to return him to full

duty. See Gasser v. Ramsey, 125 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1-2 (D.D.C.

2000). After a jury failed to reach a verdict, the case was set for

retrial. The district court denied the District’s motions for

judgment as a matter of law after Gasser presented his case-inchief and after the close of all the evidence. The jury returned

a special verdict in Gasser’s favor and awarded him $34,096 for

emotional distress.

The evidence, viewed most favorably to Gasser, see Reeves

v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-51

(2000), showed as follows. Gasser joined the Police Department

as a patrol officer in 1986 and was promoted to master patrol

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1

 A patrol officer is a first-responder, handling the day-to-day

activities on the street as calls come in on the radio. A master patrol

officer has the same responsibilities, but also takes on supervisory

responsibilities if a sergeant is not on the scene. A sergeant’s

responsibilities are more supervisory, with less involvement in day-today activities on the street. Gasser, for example, made only three or

four arrests each year as a sergeant.

2

 Dr. Mirsky is a board-certified hematologist with more than

thirty-nine years of experience treating patients with blood disorders.

officer in 1991 and to sergeant in 1994.1 Police Department

policy requires that all officers be “street ready” or “fit for full

duty” regardless of rank. This means that all officers –

including the Chief of Police – must be able to perform patrol

functions from time to time. Each officer is expected to be able

to subdue a suspect within a matter of minutes, with or without

assistance.

In July 1996, Gasser suffered a mesenteric vein thrombosis

– a blood clot in his abdomen. Though Gasser twice previously

had been treated for discrete clots in his legs, this time doctors

diagnosed a protein S deficiency. Protein S deficiency is an

inherited disorder that tends to cause blood to clot. Doctors treat

protein S deficiency with anticoagulants – blood thinners – of

which Coumadin is the most commonly prescribed. Gasser’s

hematologist, Dr. Harold S. Mirsky,2

 prescribed Coumadin in

1996 to treat Gasser’s blood disorder, and Coumadin has been

part of Gasser’s regimen ever since.

Gasser went on limited duty for six months after he began

taking Coumadin. Limited duty is a temporary status, intended

to provide sick or injured officers an opportunity to recover

completely while preparing to return to full duty. An officer

cannot be promoted or earn overtime on limited duty. The

District’s Police and Fire Clinic provides care for, and makes

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3

 Dr. Smith-Jeffries testified that the Clinic’s documentation

concerning Gasser’s return to full duty is, at best, inconsistent. She

stated that the “physician’s note clearly states that no full duty while

on coumadin, that he should be returned to limited duty.” She further

testified that a different physician noted on Gasser’s chart that Gasser

should be returned to full duty; although this was crossed out and

“limited duty” circled, “the police officer who was on duty at that

time” wrote “return to full duty” on the form.

4

 At trial, Dr. Mirsky explained that his assessment was based

on Gasser’s international normalized ratio (“INR”), which is a way to

decisions concerning the duty status of, sick or injured officers.

Because limited duty is not a full-time status, once the doctors

at the Clinic provide all the medical care they can, a patient still

unable to fulfill the obligations of his rank is involuntarily

retired – a process involving multiple levels of recommendation

and review. At all times relevant to this case, Dr. Michelle

Smith-Jeffries was the Clinic physician who decided when

officers should be placed on limited duty.

By the end of 1996, Clinic physicians agreed to return

Gasser to full-duty status upon receiving a letter from Dr.

Mirsky urging them to do so.3

 Clinic physicians knew Gasser

continued to take Coumadin after returning to full duty. He

performed at full duty without incident for a number of years.

But when he sprained his wrist in an off-duty car accident in

December 1998, he again reported to the Clinic.

At the Clinic, Gasser met Dr. Craig Thorne, a physician

specializing in occupational medicine, who thought Gasser

should be on limited duty because he was taking Coumadin. Dr.

Mirsky wrote a letter to Dr. Smith-Jeffries, Dr. Thorne’s

supervisor, regarding Gasser’s condition. In the letter, Dr.

Mirsky stated that Gasser was “not at any excessive risk of

bleeding” unless he experienced “significant trauma.”4 Because

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measure blood’s ability to clot. Dr. Mirsky stated that when Gasser’s

INR tests between two and three he “is not at risk of excessive

bleeding.” He also testified that Gasser “regularly tested” at that level

and that over time a patient’s INR level stabilizes. At the time of trial,

Gasser had been on Coumadin for six years without experiencing “any

excessive bleeding.”

Dr. Mirsky understood Gasser’s responsibilities to be

supervisory, Dr. Mirsky saw no reason to “restrict [Gasser] from

working as a full duty sergeant.” Although Dr. Thorne was

inclined to leave Gasser on limited duty, he consulted Dr. SmithJeffries because “Gasser really wanted to work.”

Dr. Smith-Jeffries agreed with Dr. Thorne’s preliminary

diagnosis and was not convinced by Dr. Mirsky’s letter that

Gasser should return to full duty. The letter “perplexed” Dr.

Smith-Jeffries because Dr. Mirsky acknowledged that Gasser

was at an excessive risk of bleeding if he experienced

“significant trauma,” but nevertheless urged his return to full

duty. Dr. Mirsky believed Gasser could resume his

responsibilities as a “full duty sergeant,” based on what Gasser

told him about his supervisory duties as a sergeant. The relevant

question for Dr. Smith-Jeffries, however, was not whether

Gasser could resume supervisory duties, but whether he was “fit

for full duty,” which includes patrol duty.

Ultimately, Drs. Thorne and Smith-Jeffries decided to refer

Gasser to another hematologist, Dr. Joseph P. Catlett, for an

“independent opinion.” After examining Gasser in late June

1999, Dr. Catlett sent a letter to Dr. Smith-Jeffries in which he

concluded that Gasser had an increased risk of “traumaassociated bleeding due to Coumadin use.” However, rather

than giving Dr. Smith-Jeffries an independent opinion of

Gasser’s fitness for full duty, Dr. Catlett “defer[red] to [her]

expertise” and told her “the decision lies with [her] office.” Dr.

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Smith-Jeffries was not satisfied with this deferential position

and decided to have another physician render an independent

judgment.

She contacted the occupational health clinic at Johns

Hopkins and scheduled Gasser to see Dr. Virginia Weaver in

August 1999. Dr. Weaver is a board-certified physician in

internal and occupational medicine. After meeting with Gasser,

Dr. Weaver concluded that he faced an “increased risk for

bleeding” as a police officer taking Coumadin. She was

concerned that he might suffer severe trauma and excessive

bleeding when “engaging in high speed pursuits, participating in

raids, [or] discharging firearms at persons.” For these reasons,

Dr. Weaver believed Gasser “would be a threat to coworkers and

to the public [because] he could become incapacitated very

quickly and then he would not be there to assist coworkers.”

Given Gasser’s experience and desire to return to full duty, Dr.

Weaver thought that it “would have been wonderful” if he could

have maintained a job as a trainer or supervisor without any time

on the street. But recognizing that this was not possible under

the Police Department policy, she recommended that he not

return to full duty.

Based on Dr. Weaver’s report, Dr. Smith-Jeffries

concluded that her original assessment was correct, that Gasser

faced an “increased risk for harm, and that he should not work

as a full duty police officer.” The consequences to Gasser were

severe. Beyond making Gasser ineligible for overtime pay and

further promotion, the Police Department took Gasser’s

uniform, badge, and gun. It also confined him to desk duty and

did not allow him to visit crime scenes. The Police Department

also generally prohibited him from riding in a squad car for fear

that a car in which he was riding might, in an emergency, be

diverted to a crime scene where he could suffer life-threatening

physical trauma.

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Although the Police Department never returned Gasser to

full duty, it did return his uniform, badge, and gun in December

1999. Shortly thereafter, however, the Police Department

initiated the process of involuntary retirement. Gasser brought

this suit before that process could be completed.

At trial, Gasser presented to the jury the deposition

testimony of Dr. Francis A. Thomas, a vocation rehabilitation

specialist. Gasser used the testimony to establish the number of

jobs the Police Department regarded him as unable to perform.

Dr. Thomas began his analysis by determining the universe of

jobs in the Washington-D.C. area for which Gasser was

qualified absent any impairment. He found 206,000 such jobs.

Dr. Thomas then removed from this group those jobs the Police

Department regarded Gasser as unable to perform. Rather than

removing jobs that involve a risk of physical trauma, however,

Dr. Thomas presumed that Gasser would be able to perform

only those jobs with responsibilities that resembled the desk

duties he performed while on limited duty. He therefore

removed from consideration all “heavy duty jobs” and “medium

type jobs” and presumed that the Police Department regarded

Gasser as able to perform only “light and sedentary type jobs.”

So restricted, Gasser could perform only 28.6% of the 206,000

jobs for which Dr. Thomas determined he was otherwise

eligible. Dr. Thomas did not take into account the driving

restriction the Police Department placed on Gasser, nor did he

specifically analyze the types of law enforcement jobs Gasser

was able to perform.

After entry of judgment on the verdict, the District renewed

its motion for judgment as a matter of law. The district court

ruled that (1) even though Dr. Thomas erred in assuming that

Gasser could perform only light and sedentary jobs, this error

was offset by evidence that, in the District’s view, Gasser could

not perform jobs involving driving, and (2) that Gasser

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5

 The court awarded Gasser $64,179.71 in lost overtime wages

and prejudgment interest, and $157,397.20 in attorney fees and costs.

presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude he was not

a direct threat to his own safety.

Gasser filed a post-trial motion to alter or amend the

judgment to include his immediate reinstatement to full-duty

status, lost overtime wages and prejudgment interest, attorney

fees and costs, and promotion to Lieutenant. The court amended

the judgment to include all the relief requested except for the

promotion, finding insufficient evidence in the record to justify

this.5

The District now appeals the district court’s order denying

judgment as a matter of law. Gasser cross-appeals, claiming the

district court should have ordered the Police Department to

promote him to Lieutenant.

II.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of the

District’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Curry v.

District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 658-59 (D.C. Cir. 1999). If

the evidence supporting the verdict is “significantly probative,”

the verdict will stand “unless the evidence and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn therefrom are so one-sided that

reasonable men and women could not disagree on the verdict.”

Id. at 659 (quoting Smith v. Wash. Sheraton Corp., 135 F.3d

779, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our duty is to “draw all reasonable inferences” in Gasser’s favor

without “mak[ing] credibility determinations or weigh[ing] the

evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S.

133, 150 (2000). We will therefore “disregard all evidence

favorable to” the District “that the jury is not required to

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6

 The Supreme Court has recognized two ways an individual

may be “regarded as” disabled. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (employer’s mistaken belief either that

employee has a disability or that employee’s actual disability

substantially limits major life activity); see also Murphy v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521-22 (1999); Haynes v. Williams,

392 F.3d 478, 481 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission’s regulations suggest a third. 29 C.F.R.

§ 1630.2(l)(2) (substantial limitation arising from others’ attitudes

about impairment).

believe” and “give credence to the evidence favoring” Gasser.

Id. at 151.

The District asks us to vacate the judgment below for either

of two reasons: because Gasser presented insufficient evidence

that his disability, if any, substantially limited his ability to

work, see Duncan v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 240 F.3d

1110, 1114-16 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc), or because the

District adequately showed that he poses a direct threat to his

own safety, which the Supreme Court has held is an affirmative

defense to Disabilities Act liability, see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.

Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86-87 (2002). We reach only the

District’s first argument.

The Disabilities Act provides that a covered employer shall

not “discriminate” against a disabled individual because of his

disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4. A

“disability” is not just a “physical or mental impairment,” as

common usage might suggest. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1). The Disabilities Act also prevents

employers from taking adverse employment actions against

those they “regard[] as having” a physical or mental

impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (emphasis added); 29

C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(3).6

 The purpose of “regarded as” claims is

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7

 What constitutes a “major life activity” is not at issue in this

appeal, although the District raised the issue before the district court.

Gasser claims that the District discriminated against him because of a

perceived disability that would substantially limit his ability to work.

Whether “working” is a “major life activit[y]” under the Disabilities

Act, as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s regulations

suggest, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i), is a question we have not yet decided.

Like the Supreme Court, see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, we have

assumed arguendo that it is, see Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1114 n.1, despite

the “difficulties the issue presents,” id. at 1117 (Randolph, J.,

concurring); see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. We do so again in this case.

to protect employees from “misperceptions [that] often ‘resul[t]

from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of . . .

individual ability.’” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.

471, 489 (1999) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7)) (second and

third alterations in original). An employer therefore may run

afoul of the Disabilities Act “when it makes an employment

decision based on a physical or mental impairment, [whether]

real or imagined.” Id. at 490.

In “regarded as” cases, not every adverse employment

action gives rise to liability under the Disabilities Act. The

“regarded as” disability must “substantially limit[]” a “major life

activit[y].” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1);

see Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 2004).7

The District argues that any limitations it regarded Gasser as

having were not “substantial[],” see Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91,

and that Gasser did not prove that they were, as he must, see

Haynes, 392 F.3d at 482.

In Sutton, the Supreme Court, relying on Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission regulations, held that a

Disabilities Act plaintiff like Gasser must demonstrate that he is

precluded from a “substantial class of jobs” or a “broad range of

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8

 Gasser urges affirmance based on his preclusion from a

substantial class or broad range of jobs. The District claims Gasser is

limited to arguing only that he has been precluded from a broad range

of jobs because he did not present the other theories to the jury. The

usual rule is that a prevailing party may support the judgment on any

ground raised or decided in the district court. See, e.g.,

Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1989); Mass.

Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 426 U.S. 479, 481 (1976); Nat’l Fed’n

of Fed. Employees v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The record sufficiently supports Gasser’s having raised his contention

regarding a substantial class of jobs. 

jobs,”8 not just “one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular

job of choice.” 527 U.S. at 492; Duncan, 240 F.3d at 1115; see

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). “If jobs utilizing an individual’s

skills . . . are available, one is not precluded from a substantial

class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are

available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs.”

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.

It is not very precise to define a “substantial” limitation as

preclusion from a “substantial” class or “broad” range of jobs.

Whether a limitation precluding a plaintiff from 100 jobs is

“substantial” depends, in part, on whether the plaintiff is

otherwise qualified for 200 jobs or 200,000. In Duncan we

explained that the relevant inquiry “depends primarily on the

availability of jobs for which the impaired person qualifies,”

which must be an “individualized inquiry.” 240 F.3d at 1114

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our holding in

Duncan was as follows:

[T]he [Disabilities Act] requires a plaintiff . . . to produce

some evidence of the number and types of jobs in the local

employment market in order to show he is disqualified

from a substantial class or broad range of such jobs; that is,

the total number of such jobs that remain available to the

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plaintiff in such a class or range in the relevant market

must be sufficiently low that he is effectively precluded

from working in the class or range.

Id. at 1115-16 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92). The

plaintiff’s evidence must be “significantly probative” so that the

jury is not “left in the dark” about the vocational limitations the

plaintiff faces. Id. at 1115.

Gasser concedes that the District’s liability was premised

on its view that he is “medically unable to perform jobs having

duties or even possible duties with potential for trauma.”

Corrected Br. of Appellee/Cross-Appellant 22. But rather than

looking to the reason Gasser was precluded from being a fullduty officer – potential for trauma – Dr. Thomas based his jobs

analysis on the functions Gasser performed as a limited-duty

officer. Dr. Thomas’s analysis treated Gasser as precluded from

“heavy duty jobs” and “medium type jobs” because, in Dr.

Thomas’s words, “[Gasser’s] job now is to fill out forms on

injured police officers.” Dr. Thomas assumed Gasser was

“restricted from a vast number of . . . jobs that require hard,

outside kind of work, given the limitations that are placed on

him.”

This was error, as the district court recognized. Under

Duncan, if the perceived impairment is, as Gasser concedes, that

he cannot be exposed to risk of trauma, then the question is

whether his preclusion from exposure to a risk of trauma

“disqualified him from a substantial class or broad range of

jobs.” 240 F.3d at 1115. Dr. Thomas answered a different

question – whether preclusion from engaging in heavy physical

exertion disqualified Gasser from a substantial class or broad

range of jobs. Dr. Thomas’s testimony therefore was probative

of jobs that require physical exertion, not just jobs that involve

risk of trauma. Compare Giordano v. City of New York, 274

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9

 Gasser also claims that placing him on limited duty violated

the Disabilities Act because the District “based its decision entirely on

‘myths, fears and stereotypes.’” Corrected Br. of Appellee/CrossAppellant 33 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app.). The record does not

bear him out. All indications are that the District sought informed,

objective, individualized medical judgments from multiple physicians

about the risks to which Gasser was exposed.

F.3d 740, 749 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff] introduced evidence

that establishes at most that the defendants regarded him as

disabled from police or other investigative or security jobs that

involve a substantial risk of physical confrontation.”). Gasser

should have presented evidence of the number of jobs he would

be unable to perform because they involve a risk of trauma. It

is not sufficient to short-cut this analysis by looking at Gasser’s

responsibilities in his limited-duty role. There may well be

medium- and heavy-duty jobs that do not involve risk of trauma.

Dr. Thomas’s analysis therefore was not probative –

significantly or otherwise – of whether Gasser was precluded

from a broad range or a substantial class of jobs, as Duncan

requires. See 240 F.3d at 1115; Giordano, 274 F.3d at 749

(“The record contains no evidence from which we can infer that

the [police department] thought, or had grounds for thinking,

that other jobs in the public or private sector . . . carry the same

nature or degree of risk.”); Colwell v. Suffolk County Police

Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 644 (2d Cir. 1998) (concluding that police

officer’s back injury “disqualifies him from only a narrow range

of jobs (those involving physical confrontation) and thus his

impairment is not a substantially limiting one”) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).9

Gasser argues that Duncan’s evidentiary standard applies

only to plaintiffs claiming preclusion from a broad range of jobs.

Based on that premise, he urges us to uphold the judgment

below despite the flaws in Dr. Thomas’s analysis because the

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District regarded Gasser as unable to perform two classes of

jobs: driving jobs and law enforcement jobs. The premise is

mistaken. The class-of-jobs limitations he alleges must be

“substantial” under the Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(2)(A), (C). Duncan’s evidentiary standard applies to

all claims of “substantial limitation,” whether from a broad

range or a substantial class of jobs. 240 F.3d at 1115-16.

Gasser therefore failed to satisfy his evidentiary burden.

The district court reached the same conclusion but decided

that the “error was more than offset by the fact that [Dr.

Thomas] did not omit from his consideration positions

involving driving, which [the District] has precluded Plaintiff

from doing.” Gasser v. Ramsey, No. 00-534, mem. op. at 6 n.2

(D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2003). We do not believe this is correct. As

discussed above, Gasser presented no evidence of the number

of jobs erroneously included in Dr. Thomas’s tally of jobs he

could not perform – that is, medium- and heavy-duty jobs

without a risk of trauma. Nor did Gasser present evidence of

the number of jobs “involving driving” the District regards him

as unable to perform. In fact, Dr. Thomas testified that when he

conducted his analysis he did not know that the District had

restricted Gasser from driving. The district court’s ruling that

one unquantified number can somehow “offset” another is

inconsistent with Duncan’s requirement that the plaintiff

present “some evidence” that is “significantly probative” of the

“number and types of jobs” unavailable to the plaintiff. 240

F.3d at 1115. The District claims the limitation was not on

driving generally, but on being in a squad car that, in an

emergency, could be diverted to a crime scene where Gasser

could be exposed to life-threatening trauma. Gasser presented

no evidence justifying an inference that the driving limitation

was more substantial than this. Compare Murphy v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 524 (1999) (“At most,

petitioner has shown that he is regarded as unable to perform

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the job of mechanic only when that job requires driving a

commercial motor vehicle – a specific type of vehicle used on

a highway in interstate commerce.”).

In a case like this, in which the jury-verdict loser was

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we have discretion to

“instruct the district court to enter judgment against the juryverdict winner” or to “return the case to the trial court” for it to

assess “whether a new trial, rather than judgment for [the]

defendant, should be ordered.” Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528

U.S. 440, 443-44 (2000). The latter disposition is appropriate

if “the district court is better positioned” than we are to decide

whether circumstances warrant a new trial. Id. Here it is not.

Gasser was on “notice, before the close of evidence, of the . . .

evidentiary deficienc[ies]” repeatedly alleged by the District in

its motions for judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 454. The

expert testimony he elicited from Dr. Thomas was insufficient.

“It is implausible to suggest . . . that parties will initially present

less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a

second chance should their first try fail.” Id. at 455. Gasser

“had a full and fair opportunity to present [his] case,” and

“further proceedings are unwarranted.” Id. at 444.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment on

the verdict entered July 24, 2003, and its post-trial orders

awarding reinstatement, lost overtime wages and prejudgment

interest, and attorney fees and costs, are reversed. The case is

remanded to the district court with instructions to enter

judgment for the District of Columbia.

So ordered.

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