Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01364/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01364-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ron Davis
Respondent
Essie Patrick-Bell
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ESSIE PATRICK-BELL, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

)

v. )

)

RON DAVIS, Warden, ) 

 )

Respondent. )

)

 )

1:12-cv—01364-SKO-HC

ORDER DISMISSING THE FOURTH,

FIFTH, AND SIXTH CLAIMS IN THE

PETITION WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(DOC. 1)

ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE

TO FILE A FIRST AMENDED PETITION

NO LATER THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS

AFTER SERVICE OF THIS ORDER

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Petitioner has consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct

all further proceedings in the case, including the entry of final

judgment, by manifesting consent in a signed writing filed by

Petitioner on August 31, 2012 (doc. 5). Pending before the Court

is the petition, which was filed on August 21, 2012. 

I. Screening the Petition 

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the

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effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty

Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v.

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d

1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United

States District Courts (Habeas Rules) requires the Court to make

a preliminary review of each petition for writ of habeas corpus.

The Court must summarily dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court....” 

Habeas Rule 4; O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir.

1990). Habeas Rule 2(c) requires that a petition 1) specify all

grounds of relief available to the Petitioner; 2) state the facts

supporting each ground; and 3) state the relief requested. 

Notice pleading is not sufficient; the petition must state facts

that point to a real possibility of constitutional error. Rule

4, Advisory Committee Notes, 1976 Adoption; O’Bremski v. Maass,

915 F.2d at 420 (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75

n.7 (1977)). Allegations in a petition that are vague,

conclusory, or palpably incredible are subject to summary

dismissal. Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d at 491.

The Court may dismiss a petition for writ of habeas corpus

either on its own motion under Habeas Rule 4, pursuant to the

respondent's motion to dismiss, or after an answer to the

petition has been filed. Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas Rule

8, 1976 Adoption; see, Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039, 1042-43

(9th Cir. 2001). A petition for habeas corpus should not be

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dismissed without leave to amend unless it appears that no

tenable claim for relief can be pleaded were such leave granted. 

Jarvis v. Nelson, 440 F.2d 13, 14 (9th Cir. 1971).

Petitioner alleges she is an inmate of the Valley State

Prison for Women (VSPW) serving a twelve-year sentence imposed in

October 2009 in the Superior Court of the State of California,

County of Fresno pursuant to Petitioner’s guilty plea to a charge

of committing manslaughter in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 192. 

Petitioner alleges the following claims in the petition: 1)

imposition of the upper term violated Petitioner’s rights under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to a fair hearing and to due

process because the sentencing court did not consider

Petitioner’s fear for her life and the lives of her family

members or the fact that Petitioner was provoked by the victim’s

attack upon her; 2) Petitioner’s trial attorney did not explain

the consequences of Petitioner’s plea, including that Petitioner

would receive the upper term, and thereby provided ineffective

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment; 3)

Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to investigate and interview

the other people who were involved in the fight that precipitated

the homicide and thereby provided ineffective assistance of

counsel; 4) the trial court failed to give Petitioner access to

the court in violation of Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments when it refused to consider Petitioner’s

motion for modification of sentence pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code §

1170(d); 5) the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth

Appellate District (CCA) failed to notify Petitioner and thereby

violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth

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Amendments; and 6) imposing an upper term erroneously pursuant to

Petitioner’s plea without holding a hearing pursuant to Cal. Pen.

Code § 1170(d) violated Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendments because Apprendi applies to Petitioner’s

case. (Pet., doc. 1, 12-21, 31-34.) Petitioner asks this Court

to amend the abstract of judgment to reduce Petitioner’s sentence

from an upper term to the middle term. 

II. Access to the Courts 

In her fourth claim, Petitioner alleges that the trial court

failed to give Petitioner access to the courts in violation of

Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

when it refused to consider Petitioner’s motion for modification

of sentence pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1170(d).

A claim that a right of access to the courts has been

violated implicates conditions of confinement and not a

conviction or sentence. Thus, such a claim would not generally

be appropriate in a habeas petition, which is the correct method

for a prisoner to challenge not conditions of confinement, but

rather the legality or duration of confinement. Badea v. Cox,

931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez,

411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); Advisory Committee Notes to Habeas

Rule 1, 1976 Adoption. However, in this case, Petitioner’s claim 

appears to include an argument that the trial court’s failure to

rule on her motion to modify her sentence was in effect a denial

of the motion and thus a constitutional violation. (See pet.,

doc. 1, at 32 [statement of claim as presented to the California

Supreme Court in a petition for writ of habeas corpus].)

///

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Although Petitioner generally claims that her rights under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the trial

court’s ruling, Petitioner does not allege any specific facts 

showing that there was a constitutional violation. Allegations

in a petition that are vague, conclusional, or palpably

incredible, and that are unsupported by a statement of specific

facts, are insufficient to warrant relief and are subject to

summary dismissal. Jones v. Gomez, 66 F.3d 199, 204-05 (9th Cir.

1995); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994).

Further, to the extent that Petitioner is claiming that the

trial court violated § 1170(d) or that a violation of state law

constitutes a constitutional violation, Petitioner has not stated

facts entitling her to relief in a proceeding pursuant to § 2254. 

Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue

that does not rise to the level of a federal constitutional

violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. — , 131 S.Ct. 13, 16

(2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Alleged

errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in

federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 623 (9th

Cir. 2002) (an ex post facto claim challenging state court’s

discretionary decision concerning application of state sentencing

law presented only state law issues and was not cognizable in a

proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Langford v. Day, 110

F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court accepts a state

court's interpretation of state law. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d

1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). In a habeas corpus proceeding, this

Court is bound by the California Supreme Court’s interpretation

of California law unless the interpretation is determined to be

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untenable or a veiled attempt to avoid review of federal

questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir.

2001).

Thus, to the extent that Petitioner is claiming that a state

court’s interpretation or application of § 1170(d) was erroneous

and thus a violation of her constitutional rights, Petitioner has

failed to state facts that point to a real possibility of

constitutional error. The claim should be dismissed.

Although Petitioner has not alleged facts tending to show a

constitutional violation, Petitioner may be able to allege a

tenable claim if leave to amend were granted. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s fourth claim, alleging that the trial court failed

to give Petitioner access to the court in violation of

Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

when it refused to consider Petitioner’s motion for modification

of sentence, will be dismissed with leave to file an amended

petition. 

III. Failure to Give Notice 

In her fifth claim, Petitioner alleges that the CCA failed

to notify Petitioner, thereby violating Petitioner’s rights under

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Petitioner appears to be

referring to a failure to receive notification that her appeal

had been ruled on by the CCA; the CCA subsequently recalled the

remittitur and re-issued the decision to give Petitioner time to

file a petition for review. (Pet. at 38-42, 50, 60-62.)

The failure to give notice appears to have been cured by the

CCA’s subsequent recall and re-issuance of the remittitur. In

the appellate proceeding in December 2011, the CCA took judicial

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notice of a petition for writ of habeas corpus then pending in

the CCA in which Petitioner claimed that she did not receive

notice of the ruling on her appeal in time to file a petition for

review. (Id. at 50.) The CCA deemed the Attorney General to

have consented to a recall of the remittitur in the writ

proceeding and ordered the remittitur recalled in the appellate

proceeding. (Id.) Reference to the official website of the

California courts reflects that the remittitur was re-issued on

April 10, 2012. 

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The California Supreme Court (CSC) returned unfiled a

petition for review received on April 4, 2011. (Pet. at 61.) 

The Court takes judicial notice of the official website for the

California Courts, which reflects that in In re Patrick-Bell

(Essie) on Habeas Corpus, case number S202018, Petitioner filed a

petition for a writ in the CSC on April 25, 2012, which the CSC

construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and denied on

July 11, 2012. It thus appears that Petitioner has received any

relief she could seek with respect to the failure to receive

notice of the ruling in her appeal.

Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide cases that are

moot because the courts’ constitutional authority extends to only

actual cases or controversies. Iron Arrow Honor Society v.

Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70-71 (1983). Article III requires a case

The Court may take judicial notice of facts that are capable of

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accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot

reasonably be questioned, including undisputed information posted on official

websites. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331,

333 (9th Cir. 1993); Daniels-Hall v. National Education Association, 629 F.3d

992, 999 (9th Cir. 2010). It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the

docket sheet of a California court. White v Martel, 601 F.3d 882, 885 (9th

Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 332 (2010). The address of the official

website of the California state courts is www.courts.ca.gov.

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or controversy in which a litigant has a personal stake in the

outcome of the suit throughout all stages of federal judicial

proceedings and has suffered some actual injury that can be

redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Id. A petition for

writ of habeas corpus becomes moot when it no longer presents a

case or controversy under Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. 

Wilson v. Terhune, 319 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir. 2003). A petition

may also be rendered moot where a petitioner’s claim for relief

cannot be redressed by a favorable decision of the court issuing

a writ of habeas corpus. Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 1000-

01 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7

(1998)). Mootness is jurisdictional. See, Cole v. Oroville

Union High School District, 228 F.3d 1092, 1098-99 (9th Cir.

2000). Thus, a moot petition must be dismissed because nothing

remains before the Court to be remedied. Spencer v. Kemna, 523

U.S. 1, 18 (1998). 

Here, it appears that Petitioner’s claim concerning a

failure of notice is moot and thus should be dismissed.

Although Petitioner has failed to state facts that point to

a real possibility of constitutional error, it is possible that

if given leave to amend, Petitioner could state a tenable claim

concerning her lack of notice. Accordingly, Petitioner’s fifth

claim concerning lack of notice of the CCA’s appellate decision

will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

IV. Imposition of the Upper Term 

 In her sixth claim, Petitioner argues that imposing an upper

term erroneously pursuant to Petitioner’s plea without holding a

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hearing pursuant to Cal. Pen. Code § 1170(d) violated 2

Petitioner’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments

because Apprendi applies to Petitioner’s case. 3

To the extent that Petitioner is contending that a state

court’s application or interpretation of § 1170(d) was erroneous, 

as previously noted, Petitioner fails to state facts that would

entitle her to relief in this proceeding because this Court is

bound by the state court’s ruling.

If Petitioner is attempting to argue that her sentence

violated Apprendi and its progeny, Petitioner has failed to state

facts entitling her to habeas corpus relief. Petitioner has

failed to allege the facts that were relied upon by the

sentencing judge that exceeded the facts admitted by the

Petitioner. Petitioner has alleged only a conclusion that her

rights were violated. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim should be

dismissed. 

Although Petitioner has failed to state facts that point to

a real possibility of constitutional error, it is possible that

if given leave to amend, Petitioner could state a tenable claim.

Accordingly, it will be ordered that the claim concerning

lack of notice be dismissed with leave to amend.

///

Cal. Pen. Code § 1170(d) relates to the authority of the sentencing

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court on its own motion to recall a sentence and commitment and re-sentence

the defendant to eliminate disparity of sentences and promote uniformity of

sentencing.

The reference is to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), in

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which it was held that any fact other than a prior conviction that is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts

established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by a

defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. at 490.

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V. Amendment of the Petition 

The instant petition must be dismissed for the reasons

stated above. Petitioner will be given an opportunity to file a

first amended petition to cure the deficiencies. Petitioner is

advised that failure to file a petition in compliance with this

order (i.e., a completed petition with cognizable federal claims

clearly stated and exhaustion clearly alleged) within the

allotted time will result in a recommendation that the petition

be dismissed and the action be terminated. Petitioner is advised

that the amended petition should be entitled, “First Amended

Petition,” and it must refer to the case number in this action. 

Further, Petitioner is informed that Local Rule 220 provides that

unless prior approval to the contrary is obtained from the Court,

every pleading as to which an amendment or supplement is

permitted shall be retyped or rewritten and filed so that it is

complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded

pleading.

VI. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: 

1) Petitioner’s fourth, fifth, and sixth claims are

DISMISSED with leave to amend; and

2) Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of

service of this order to file an amended petition in compliance

with this order; and

///

///

///

///

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3) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to send Petitioner a

form petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 2, 2012 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

ie14hj UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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