Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-36006/USCOURTS-ca9-13-36006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Weldon Marc Gilbert
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WELDON MARC GILBERT,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-36006

D.C. Nos.

3:12-cv-05900-BHS

3:07-cr-05732-BHS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 3, 2015—Seattle, Washington

Filed December 7, 2015

Before: M. Margaret McKeown, Ronald M. Gould,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Gould

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 1 of 11
2 UNITED STATES V. GILBERT

SUMMARY*

28 U.S.C. § 2255

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a federal

prisoner’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as time barred.

The panel held that a sentence of incarceration coupled

with an unspecified amount of restitution is a sufficiently

final judgment to support a direct appeal, and that it follows

that once the time for filing a direct appeal of this type of

judgment expires, the one-year limitation period under

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) to file a collateral attack on a federal

conviction is triggered. The panel held that when a judgment

imposes a sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be

determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a § 2255

motion does not restart when the specific amount of

restitution is later entered.

The panel held that the prisoner waived his claim that he

is entitled to equitable tolling, but that even if not waived, the

claim has no merit. The panel wrote that assuming prisoner’s

counsel gave erroneous advice on the filing deadline, this is

not the kind of extraordinary circumstance that compels

equitable tolling.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 2 of 11
UNITED STATES V. GILBERT 3

COUNSEL

Paula T. Olson (argued), Law Office of Paula T. Olson,

Tacoma, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.

Michael Dion (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Seattle, Washington, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

GOULD, Circuit Judge:

Federal prisoner Weldon Gilbert appeals the district

court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as time barred. 

On April 23, 2009, Gilbert pleaded guilty in federal court to

multiple counts of the production of child pornography,

transportation of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity,

and obstruction of justice. The plea agreement recommended

a sentencing range of 228 to 300 months and required Gilbert

to forfeit various properties—including his home, helicopter,

seaplane, and speedboat—to pay restitution to his victims. 

On November 16, 2009, the district court sentenced Gilbert

to 300 months of imprisonment and lifetime supervision. 

Because Gilbert’s assets were still in the process of being

liquidated, the district judge left the exact amount of

restitution “TBD” (to be determined).

Gilbert claims that while he was in state court on related

charges that his counsel advised him that he could not file a

§ 2255 motion challenging his federal sentence until the final

amount of restitution was entered. Gilbert also claims that

counsel advised that the one-year limitation to file a § 2255

motion would “toll” pending the outcome in state court. 

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 3 of 11
4 UNITED STATES V. GILBERT

Gilbert states that he relied on this advice and delayed filing

a § 2255 motion. The state proceedings concluded on

November 6, 2012.

Liquidating Gilbert’s assets and working out the details of

restitution took considerable time. On October 7, 2011, the

district court entered an amended judgment setting Gilbert’s

total restitution to victims at $1,072,175.76. With the

exception of the amount of restitution, the rest of Gilbert’s

sentence remained unchanged.

On October 10, 2012, Gilbert filed a § 2255 motion in

federal court, alleging that his plea was involuntary, that the

plea agreement was violated, and that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel at the pleading stage. After briefing

was completed, the district court denied the motion as time

barred. Relying on dictum in Dolan v. United States,

560 U.S. 605 (2010), the district court concluded that the

November 16, 2009 sentencing was a final judgment that

triggered the one-year statute of limitations. The court

reasoned that because Gilbert did not file his § 2255 motion

until almost three years after the imposition of judgment, his

petition was untimely. However, recognizing the lack of

precedent on this issue, the district court granted a certificate

of appealability on whether Gilbert’s petition is time barred. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 2253(a) and

2255(d), and review the district court’s dismissal of Gilbert’s

habeas petition on timeliness grounds de novo. See United

States v. LaFramboise, 427 F.3d 680, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), there is a one-year period of

limitation to file a collateral attack on a federal conviction

that runs from the latest of four events, including the date on

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 4 of 11
UNITED STATES V. GILBERT 5

which the judgment of conviction becomes final. If the

movant pursues a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals but

does not file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United

States Supreme Court, the conviction becomes final when the

time for filing such a petition lapses. See Clay v. United

States, 537 U.S. 522, 532 (2003); United States v. Garcia,

210 F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000). However, if the movant

does not pursue a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals, the

conviction becomes final when the time for filing a direct

appeal expires. See United States v. Schwartz, 274 F.3d

1220, 1223 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4).

The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether a

judgment that imposes a period of incarceration and an

unspecified amount of restitution is a “final” judgment for

appellate purposes. See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618 (“We leave

all such matters for another day.” ) However, the Court noted

that “strong arguments favor the appealability of the initial

judgment irrespective of the delay in determining the

restitution amount.” Id. at 617. The Court pointed to the

language of several statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b),

which states that a “sentence to imprisonment” is a “final

judgment.” Id. at 618. The Court mentioned its concern with

requiring incarcerated defendants to delay their appeals until

the restitution amount is set. Id. This dictum in Dolan is in

line with previous Supreme Court precedent holding that a

judgment that imposes a sentence is a final judgment. See

Corey v. United States, 375 U.S. 169, 174, 175 (1963) (a

judgment that imposes “discipline” is “freighted with

sufficiently substantial indicia of finality to support an

appeal”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted);

Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) (“Final

judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is

the judgment.”) (citations omitted).

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 5 of 11
6 UNITED STATES V. GILBERT

Corey and Berman support our conclusion that a

judgment that includes a sentence but leaves the amount of

restitution open is sufficiently final for appellate purposes. 

Also, we afford any dictum of the Supreme Court due

deference, see United States v. Baird, 85 F.3d 450, 453 (9th

Cir. 1996), and agree that there is a serious policy concern

with requiring incarcerated defendants to delay their appeals

until the district court has finalized the amount of restitution. 

Dolan, 560 U.S. at 618; see also United States v. Cheal,

389 F.3d 35, 51–52 (1st Cir. 2004).

We note that several of our sister circuits have held that

a judgment that imposes a sentence and an unspecified

amount of restitution is a sufficiently final judgment for

appellate purposes. See, e.g., Cheal, 389 F.3d at 51–52;

Gonzalez v. United States, 792 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 2015)

(per curiam); United States v. Muzio, 757 F.3d 1243, 1250

(11th Cir. 2014). We join our sister circuits in holding that a

sentence of incarceration coupled with an unspecified amount

of restitution is a sufficiently final judgment to support a

direct appeal. It follows that once the time for filing a direct

appeal of this type of judgment expires, the one-year

limitation period under § 2255(f) is triggered. Schwartz, 274

F.3d at 1223 & n.1.

Gilbert’s November 16, 2009 sentence, which imposed

restitution but left the exact amount to be determined, became

a final judgment for habeas purposes once the deadline for

filing a notice of appeal expired 14 days later. See Fed. R.

App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). The one-year statute of limitations to file

a § 2255 motion began to run with this expiration, and

Gilbert’s counsel was incorrect if he advised Gilbert to the

contrary. However, this case also presents a second question:

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 6 of 11
UNITED STATES V. GILBERT 7

whether the one-year limitations period restarts for § 2255

motions once a final order of restitution is entered.

The Second Circuit has answered this question in the

affirmative. In Gonzalez v. United States, Efrain Gonzalez

was sentenced to a period of incarceration and an unspecified

amount of restitution on May 25, 2010. 792 F.3d at 233. 

Gonzalez appealed the initial judgment and amended his

appeal once the restitution order was finalized. Id. The

Second Circuit affirmed the sentence but vacated the

restitution order on July 22, 2011, and Gonzalez did not seek

a writ of certiorari. Id. at 233–34. On remand, the district

court revised the amount of restitution, and Gonzalez filed a

§ 2255 motion on September 4, 2013, alleging that the

government had intimidated a defense witness. Id. at 234. 

The district court dismissed the motion as time barred under

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), and Gonzalez appealed. Id. 

The Second Circuit held that the motion was timely

because the limitations period began to run when the time for

Gonzalez to file a direct appeal of the revised restitution order

expired. Id. The court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in

Corey, which held that a defendant committed to custody but

awaiting a final sentence could appeal the initial imposition

and also appeal the final sentence. Id. at 237 & n.25 (citing

Corey, 375 U.S. at 174–75). The Second Circuit further

noted that the Eleventh Circuit relied on Corey to hold “that

a judgment imposing a sentence without setting restitution is

sufficiently final as to be immediately appealable, but an

appeal also could be taken following entry of the subsequent

restitution order.” Id. (citing Muzio, 757 F.3d at 1249–50). 

Extrapolating from Corey and Muzio, the Second Circuit held

that the same rule should apply to § 2255 motions: that

defendants should be permitted to file a habeas petition after

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 7 of 11
8 UNITED STATES V. GILBERT

the initial judgment, but that they should also be “free to

await the conclusion of the criminal proceedings”—i.e., until

after the district court amends the order of restitution—

before filing a § 2255 motion. Id.

The procedural posture of this case is different. In

Gonzalez, the Second Circuit characterized Gonzalez’s initial

judgment as vacated on direct appeal and determined that the

substantively new judgment on remand restarted the one-year

limitations period. 792 F.3d at 235–36. We have similarly

held that if an appellate court “either partially or wholly

reverse[s] a defendant’s conviction or sentence, or both, and

expressly remand[s] to the district court . . . . the judgment

does not become final, and the statute of limitations [under

§ 2255] does not begin to run, until the district court has

entered an amended judgment and the time for appealing that

judgment has passed.” United States v. Colvin, 204 F.3d

1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 2000). But in Gilbert’s case there was

never a direct appeal, and no part of his sentence was vacated. 

The judgment was merely amended to include the specific

restitution amount, and the procedural posture is therefore

distinguishable from both Gonzalez and Colvin.

Also, the Second Circuit has left open the possibility that

defendants can file § 2255 motions to challenge restitution,

see Gonzalez, 792 F.3d at 237 (quoting Kaminski v. United

States, 339 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 2003)), whereas we have

squarely held that restitution cannot be challenged through a

§ 2255 motion. See United States v. Thiele, 314 F.3d 399,

401 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129,

1130 (9th Cir. 1999). Gilbert argues that these precedents do

not apply because he is seeking relief from incarceration, not

challenging his restitution. However, restarting the clock for

§ 2255 motions from the amended order of restitution would

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 8 of 11
UNITED STATES V. GILBERT 9

still be inconsistent with our precedents in Thiele and

Kramer. Because Gilbert is not permitted to challenge his

restitution with a § 2255 motion, it would make no sense to

let him restart the statute of limitations under § 2255 from an

amended judgment that addressed only the specific amount of

restitution. We hold that when a judgment imposes a

sentence but leaves the amount of restitution to be

determined, the one-year statute of limitations to file a § 2255

motion does not restart when the specific amount of

restitution is later entered.1

Gilbert argues for the first time on appeal that if his

§ 2255 motion is time barred, he is entitled to equitable

1

In Dolan, the Supreme Court stated in a dictum that an order of

restitution, like a sentence of imprisonment, is a final judgment. 560 U.S.

at 618 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3664(o)). The Court further said that “[t]hus,

it is not surprising to find instances where a defendant has appealed from

the entry of a judgment containing an initial sentence that includes a term

of imprisonment; that same defendant has subsequently appealed from a

later order setting forth the final amount of restitution; and the Court of

Appeals has consolidated the two appeals and decided themtogether.” Id. 

(citations omitted).

However, this passage of Dolan concerned direct appeals, not

collateral attacks under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because Dolan is

distinguishable in that sense, we cannot say that our prior precedents in

Thiele and Kramer are clearly irreconcilable with its reasoning. See

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (“where the

reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable

with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-judge

panel should consider itself bound by the later and controlling authority,

and should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively

overruled.”) We therefore adhere to circuit precedent, and on the basis of

that precedent it would be unwarranted to allow Gilbert to restart the

§ 2255 clock from the amended restitution order, when our extant

precedent says that he cannot use § 2255 to challenge a restitution order.

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 9 of 11
10 UNITED STATES V. GILBERT

tolling. As a general rule, “a federal appellate court does not

consider an issue not passed upon below.” Dodd v. Hood

River Cty., 59 F.3d 852, 863 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation and

quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Gilbert waived

this claim. Even if it were not waived, we conclude that it

has no merit. To be entitled to equitable tolling, a habeas

petitioner bears the burden of showing “(1) that he has been

pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary

circumstance stood in his way.” Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S.

631, 649 (2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Equitable tolling is available “only when extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time and the extraordinary circumstances

were the cause of [the prisoner’s] untimeliness.” Bills v.

Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in the

original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). This is a

very high threshold. Id.

Gilbert alleges that his trial counsel provided incorrect

legal advice regarding the deadline to file a § 2255 motion

and that this is an extraordinary circumstance that warrants

equitable tolling. Binding case law holds otherwise. See,

e.g., Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336–37 (2007)

(citation omitted) (“Attorney miscalculation is simply not

sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the

postconviction context where prisoners have no constitutional

right to counsel.”); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146

(9th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling was not warranted when

defendant’s attorney miscalculated the deadline to file a

habeas petition). Assuming that Gilbert’s counsel did give

erroneous advice on the filing deadline, this is not the kind of

extraordinary circumstance that compels equitable tolling.

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 10 of 11
UNITED STATES V. GILBERT 11

We conclude that Gilbert’s § 2255 motion is time barred

and that he is not entitled to equitable tolling. The district

court is therefore AFFIRMED.

 Case: 13-36006, 12/07/2015, ID: 9781188, DktEntry: 37-1, Page 11 of 11