Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02654/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02654-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Berkeley
Defendant
John Ettare
Defendant
Kyle Howe
Defendant
Juan Lucero, Jr.
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JUAN LUCERO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN ETTARE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02654-KAW 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

SUBSTITUTE PARTY; REFERRING 

CASE TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR 

SETTLEMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 19

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion to substitute CSO Kyle Howe for one of the doe 

defendants named in his complaint. Defendants oppose the motion, which is suitable for 

disposition without hearing pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). The Court, therefore, VACATES 

the hearing currently scheduled for January 21, 2016. Having reviewed the papers filed by the 

parties and the relevant legal authority, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion for the reasons set 

forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

On September 7, 2013, Plaintiff attended an event at the Pyramid Ale House. (1st Am. 

Compl. ("FAC") ¶ 5, Dkt. No. 9.) When the event was over, he got some food and began walking 

to his car. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was not intoxicated. (Id.) As he was walking, a 

confrontation had broken out in the street in front of him. (Id. ¶ 6.) There was a crowd and police. 

(Id.) Plaintiff attempted to walk around the group, but the crowd started to disperse, and some 

people ran. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that he was grabbed, violently slammed to the ground, and handcuffed by 

officers for no apparent reason and without warning. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff was shoved in the back of 

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a police car, his cell phone and wallet were taken and never returned, and his car was towed. (Id. 

¶ 8.)

At the police station, Plaintiff was chained to a chair and forced to sit for more than an 

hour while handcuffed. (Id. ¶ 9.) When he told the officers that the handcuffs were too tight and 

causing pain, he was told to be quiet. (Id.) Plaintiff complained some more, and he was told that 

he would be put in the "restraint chair" if he persisted. (Id. ¶ 10.) At that point, Plaintiff had 

enough and told the officers that he was going to sue them. (Id.) Officers immediately grabbed 

him, pulled him by the handcuffs, and carried him into a concrete room, where he was slammed to 

the floor. (Id. ¶ 11.) According to Plaintiff, the officers hit and kicked him while handcuffed, and 

they twisted his ankle until it made a loud popping noise. (Id.) Plaintiff screamed and lost 

consciousness. (Id.) When Plaintiff woke up, he found himself in a small pool of blood, he was 

no longer handcuffed, and he had no shoes. (Id. ¶ 12.) He tried to stand, but he was unable to as a 

result of the intense pain in his ankle. (Id.) He also coughed up some blood. (Id.)

At some point, an officer came to Plaintiff's cell, noticed that Plaintiff needed medical 

attention, and called for assistance. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff was quickly processed and transported to 

the hospital, where it was determined that Plaintiff had suffered an ankle fracture, abrasions, and 

contusions. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 14.)

B. Procedural background

Plaintiff commenced this action on June 12, 2015. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) He filed a first 

amended complaint on August 19, 2015, asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 

defendant officers for violation of his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 

amendments, a Monell claim against the City of Berkeley ("City"), and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 

1981 against the defendant officers for violation of his rights to full and equal benefit under the 

law. (FAC ¶¶ 22-24, 25-27, 28-32.) The City, John Ettare ("Ettare"), John Doe, and Richard Roe 

are named as defendants ("Defendants").

1

 (Id. ¶¶ 3-4.)

On December 1, 2015, Plaintiff filed an administrative motion to enlarge the time for 

 

1

These same Defendants are named in the original complaint filed on June 12, 2015. Compl. ¶¶ 

3-4.

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naming additional parties. (Admin. Mot., Dkt. No. 16.) The Court denied the motion without 

prejudice to the re-filing of a properly noticed motion. (Order, Dkt. No. 18.)

That motion followed on December 14, 2015.2 (Pl.'s Mot., Dkt. No. 19.) Defendants filed 

their opposition to the motion on December 24, 2015, to which Plaintiff replied on January 4, 

2016. (Defs.' Opp'n, Dkt. No. 20; Pl.'s Reply, Dkt. No. 23.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Leave to amend

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that leave to amend a complaint should 

be "freely given when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). "This policy is to be applied 

with extreme liberality." Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 

2003). The courts consider five factors when determining whether leave to amend should be 

granted: "(1) bad faith, (2) undue delay, (3) prejudice to the opposing party, (4) futility of 

amendment[,] and (5) whether plaintiff has previously amended his complaint." Allen v. City of 

Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990). "A motion for leave to amend may be denied if 

it appears to be futile or legally insufficient." Spitzer v. Aljoe, No. 13-cv-5442-MEJ, 2015 WL 

1843787, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2015) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "Claims barred 

by the statute of limitations are futile." Id. (citations omitted).

B. Relation back

Rule 15(c)(1)(A) provides that "[a]n amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of 

the original pleading when . . . the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows 

relation back." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit has explained:

Rule 15(c)(1) incorporates the relation back rules of the law of a state when that 

state's law provides the applicable statute of limitations and is more lenient. As a 

result, if an amendment relates back under the state law that provides the applicable 

statute of limitations, that amendment relates back under Rule 15(c)(1) even if the 

amendment would not otherwise relate back under the federal rules.

Butler v. Nat'l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2014).

 

2 On October 1, 2015, the Court set December 14, 2015 as the deadline for amending the 

pleadings. Scheduling Order at 8, Dkt. No. 15.

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As § 1983 contains no independent statute of limitations, "the applicable limitation period 

is determined by borrowing the forum state's limitation period, including its tolling provisions, for 

the most analogous personal injuries." Ellis v. City of San Diego, 176 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 

1999) (citation omitted). In California, that statute of limitation is two years, and it begins to run 

on the date the wrongful conduct occurred. See Spitzer, 2015 WL 1843787, at 6 (citations 

omitted). "[B]ecause the limitations period [applicable here] derives from state law, Rule 15(c)(1) 

requires [courts] to consider both federal and state law and employ whichever affords the more 

permissive relation back standard."

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See Butler, 766 F.3d at 1201.

"Amendments of pleadings under California law are generally governed by California 

Civil Procedure Code section 473(a)(1)." Id. (footnote and citation omitted). The section 

provides:

The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow 

a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of 

any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any 

other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. 

The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, 

upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in 

other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the 

time limited by this code.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 473(a)(1). The statute "does not contain any express provision for relation 

back of amendments, and California courts have held that it does not authorize the addition of a 

party for the first time whom the plaintiff failed to name in the first instance." Butler, 766 F.3d at 

1201 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 

California courts, however, have also recognized an exception to the general rule of no 

relation back under California Civil Procedure Code section 474. See id. Section 474 provides:

When the plaintiff is ignorant of the name of a defendant, he must state that fact in 

the complaint, or the affidavit if the action is commenced by affidavit, and such 

defendant may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name, and when 

his true name is discovered, the pleading or proceeding must be amended 

accordingly . . . .

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 474. "Thus, section 474 of the California Code of Civil Procedure allows 

 

3 Accordingly, as Plaintiff has met the requirements for relation back under state law, the Court 

has not addressed relation back under federal law.

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plaintiffs to substitute a fictional 'Doe' defendant in a lawsuit with a named defendant, so long as 

the plaintiff was unaware of the defendant's true identity at the time the prior complaint was filed." 

Felarca v. Birgeneau, No. 11-CV-05719-YGR, 2014 WL 7140262, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 

2014) (citation omitted); see also Butler, 766 F.3d at 1201 (internal quotations, citation, and 

footnote omitted). Relation back under section 474 is only available, however, if the plaintiff is 

"genuinely ignorant of the defendant's identity at the time the original complaint is filed." Butler, 

766 F.3d at 1202 (internal quotations and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

In the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks to substitute CSO Kyle Howe for John Doe or

Richard Roe, the doe defendants named in the operative complaint. (Pl.'s Mot. at 1.) Plaintiff 

asserts that he was aware of Officer Ettare's identity but unaware of his other assailants. (Pl.'s 

Mot. at 1; Boskovich ¶ 3, Dkt. No. 19-1.) Plaintiff also asserts that Defendants did not identify a 

single jailor in their initial disclosures or in any supplemental disclosures, despite his allegation 

that officers beat him while at the jail. (Id. at 4; Boskovich Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff also asserts that 

Defendants nonetheless admitted that CSO Howe was one of the individuals who "placed or 

assisted in [placing] plaintiff in a safety cell" in their discovery responses.4 (Id.; Boskovich Decl.

¶ 6 & Ex. A.) Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not prejudiced by any amendment, that such 

amendment is proper given that Plaintiff only recently learned of Howe's involvement in the case, 

and that the addition of CSO Howe clearly relates back under California law. (Pl.'s Mot. at 5.)

In opposition, Defendants argue that amendment would be futile in this case because the 

statute of limitations on Plaintiff's federal claims lapsed on September 7, 2015 and the relation 

back doctrine does not apply under federal or state law. (Defs.' Opp'n at 3-5.) Defendants further 

argue that Plaintiff lacks any factual basis for adding CSO Howe as a defendant, given that 

Plaintiff could not identify him as one of the individuals who allegedly beat him. (Id. at 5-7.) 

 

4

The City interpreted the relevant interrogatory "as seeking the identity of any officer, deputy, 

jailer and first responder employee who had involvement in plaintiff's detention, arrest, medical 

treatment, booking, jailing, and transport[,]" and it named CSO Howe in its responses. Boskovich 

Decl., Ex. A. In its response to another interrogatory, the City identified, on information and 

belief, CSO Howe and Officer Ettare as the individuals who "placed or assisted in placing plaintiff 

in a safety cell on September 7, 2013." Defs.' Opp'n at 5; Boskovich Decl., Ex. A.

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According to Defendants, evidence that Howe was working in the jail on the day of Plaintiff's 

arrest and that he may have had a part in placing Plaintiff in a safety cell does not warrant adding 

him as a defendant. (Id. at 7.)

These arguments fail. To the extent Defendants contend state law does not allow relation 

back because plaintiff is seeking to add a new party instead of merely correcting a misnamed 

party, Defendants misunderstand the law. "[S]ection 474 of the California Code of Civil 

Procedure allows plaintiffs to substitute a fictional 'Doe' defendant in a lawsuit with a named 

defendant, so long as the plaintiff was unaware of the defendant's true identity at the time the prior 

complaint was filed." Felarca, 2014 WL 7140262, at *3. 

That is what Plaintiff seeks to do here, and he has satisfied section 474's requirements. In 

both iterations of his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that:

OFFICERS immediately grabbed plaintiff and pulled him up by the handcuffs, 

which was against policy, causing him extreme pain. OFFICERS then carried 

plaintiff into a concrete room with a drain in the floor and slammed him to the 

floor. OFFICERS proceeded to hit and kick the still handcuffed plaintiff, and also 

twisted his ankle until it made a loud popping sound. Plaintiff screamed and lost 

consciousness. He was allowed to lay there injured and bleeding without an attempt 

to summon medical attention.

(Compl. ¶ 11, FAC ¶ 11.) Despite this allegation, Defendants did not identify a single jailor in its 

initial disclosures or supplemental disclosures. (Boskovich Decl. ¶ 4.) The City does not dispute 

this, but instead attempts to justify its non-disclosure because plaintiff alleged "that he was beaten 

by unidentified 'officers,' not jailers." (Defs.' Opp'n at 6 n.2.) This hyper-technical approach to 

litigation does not aid Defendants here. Rather, it bolsters Plaintiff's claim that he was unaware of 

CSO Howe's identity, which is supported by Plaintiff's counsel's declaration indicating that at the

time each complaint was filed, he was aware only aware of Officer Ettare's identity and unaware 

of the identifies of the Plaintiff's other assailants. (Boskovich Decl. ¶ 3.) Defendants do not 

dispute this.5

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff was genuinely ignorant of CSO 

Howe's identity, bringing the proposed amendment within the scope of section 474. The proposed 

 

5

In fact, Defendants state that "Plaintiff failed to even attempt to identify other parties through 

discovery until September 17, 2015 . . . . " Defs.' Opp'n at 4.

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amendment, therefore, relates back to the filing of the original complaint, which occurred on June 

12, 2015, well within the two year statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims, which as Defendants 

correctly note, elapsed on September 7, 2015. The proposed amendment, then, is not futile.

Defendants' argument that Plaintiff lacks a factual basis for naming CSO Howe as a 

defendant also fails. Defendants concede that CSO Howe was working in the jail during the time 

Plaintiff was incarcerated and that due to his assignment that afternoon, he likely placed or helped 

place Plaintiff in his cell. (Defs.' Opp'n at 5.) While this may be a thin factual basis for Plaintiff's 

claims, especially given that Plaintiff testified at his deposition that CSO Howe looked familiar 

but he could not identify him as one of the officers who beat him,

6 Defendants are free to attack 

Plaintiff's claims against CSO Howe at trial. The other arguments Defendants advance here, i.e., 

that no beating occurred and that Plaintiff was injured before he was arrested, are also more 

appropriately raised at a later stage of the case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED. CSO Kyle Howe is 

substituted for defendant John Doe. This matter is also referred to a randomly-assigned magistrate 

judge for the purposes of conducting a settlement conference, which shall occur within 90 days or 

as soon as is convenient to the assigned judge's calendar. The case management conference 

currently set for February 2, 2016 is continued to April 12, 2016 at 1:30 p.m.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

 

6

Plaintiff explains that no photographs were produced in time for him to examine them prior to 

his deposition.

01/12/16

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