Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-10-70902/USCOURTS-ca9-10-70902-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gilberto Acosta-Olivarria
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GILBERTO ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney 

General,

Respondent.

No. 10-70902

Agency No.

A079-657-188

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

May 8, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed August 26, 2015

Before: Carlos T. Bea and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit 

Judges and Thomas O. Rice,

* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Friedland

Dissent by Judge Rice

 * The Honorable Thomas O. Rice, United States District Judge for the 

Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

 

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2 ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Gilberto Acosta-Olivarria’s petition 

for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision 

denying adjustment of status pursuant to its published 

opinion In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007), 

which held that adjustment under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) was 

not available to an alien who was inadmissible under 8 

U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I). 

The panel held that petitioner reasonably relied on this 

circuit’s law in effect at the time he applied for adjustment, 

Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2006), under 

which he could apply for adjustment despite being 

inadmissible, because he was eligible for a visa. Petitioner 

applied within the 21-month period between Acosta, later 

overruled by this court’s decision in Garfias-Rodriguez v. 

Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and the 

BIA’s opinion in Briones, which directly disagreed with 

Acosta. The panel noted that during the relevant period the 

BIA’s decision in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866 

(BIA 2006), which held that inadmissible noncitizens could 

not obtain adjustment, was in tension with Acosta, but did 

not directly disagree with it. 

 ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 3

Applying the Montgomery Ward retroactivity analysis, 

the panel held that the BIA’s decision in Briones should not 

apply retroactively to bar petitioner’s application. 

Weighing all factors, the panel held that petitioner’s 

reliance interests and the burden retroactivity would impose 

on him outweighed the interest in uniform application of 

the immigration laws.

Dissenting, Judge Rice would find that the Montgomery 

Ward factors do not weigh in favor of departing from 

general retroactivity principles, and would hold that the 

BIA properly found petitioner inadmissible and ineligible 

for adjustment of status.

COUNSEL

Gary Finn (argued), Law Office of Gary Finn, Indio, 

California, for Petitioner.

Yedidya Cohen (argued), Margot L. Carter, and Allison 

Frayer, Trial Attorneys, Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting 

Assistant Attorney General, Tony West, Assistant Attorney 

General, Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, Department of 

Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

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OPINION

FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge:

In Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 

2012) (en banc), we reserved the question whether a 

noncitizen applying for adjustment of immigration status 

could reasonably rely on an opinion of this court during a 

period in which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 

had issued a decision that was in tension with our opinion 

but before the BIA issued a decision directly disagreeing 

with our opinion. See id. at 522. We now answer that 

question with respect to Petitioner Acosta-Olivarria and 

hold that he reasonably relied on the law of this circuit 

when he applied for adjustment of status during that period.

I. Facts

Gilberto Acosta-Olivarria, a native and citizen of 

Mexico, entered the United States in 1995 and took up 

residence in Arizona with his wife and child. His wife is a 

lawful permanent resident and two of his now-three 

children are United States citizens.

Between 1995 and 2005, Acosta-Olivarria made 

multiple trips to and from Mexico. During that period, he 

was unlawfully present in the United States for a total of 

over one year, and he reentered the country without being 

admitted at least once. In 2006, he was arrested for illegal 

entry and was placed in removal proceedings.

While in removal proceedings, Acosta-Olivarria applied 

for adjustment of status pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) and 

paid the required $1,000 fee. At the time, our precedent 

had interpreted § 1255(i) as allowing individuals who had 

been unlawfully present in the United States for more than 

a year, but who were eligible for a visa, to apply for an 

adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 5

See Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550, 556 (9th Cir. 2006), 

overruled by Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Acosta-Olivarria was eligible for 

a visa because of a petition that his wife had filed based on 

her permanent-resident status.

In December 2006, an immigration judge (“IJ”) 

considered Acosta-Olivarria’s application. Although 

Acosta-Olivarria was “inadmissible” because he had been 

unlawfully present in the United States for more than one 

year and reentered without being admitted, 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I), the IJ held that he was nonetheless 

eligible for adjustment of status. In doing so, the IJ relied 

on our court’s decision in Acosta, which allowed 

noncitizens to seek relief under § 1255(i) despite being 

inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I).1 See Acosta, 

439 F.3d at 556. Because his status as inadmissible did not 

bar his application, the IJ went on to consider the merits of 

the application and granted discretionary relief.

The Department of Homeland Security appealed the 

IJ’s decision. Before the BIA ruled on the appeal, a BIA 

panel issued a published opinion, In re Briones, 24 I. & N. 

Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007), in which it held that an alien who 

is inadmissible under § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) is not eligible 

for adjustment of status under § 1255(i). See Briones, 24 I. 

& N. Dec. at 371. Based on Briones, the BIA remanded 

Acosta-Olivarria’s case to the IJ for further proceedings.

 1 Title 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) is the codification of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(9)(C)(i). Title 

8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) is the codification of INA § 245(i).

 

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On remand, the IJ applied Briones and denied AcostaOlivarria’s application for adjustment of status. AcostaOlivarria appealed that decision, but the BIA agreed that 

Briones controlled. Acosta-Olivarria timely filed a petition 

for review of the BIA’s decision.

II. Legal Background

Tension between 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i) and 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)2

In 1994, Congress created a path to legal status for 

noncitizens who had entered the United States without 

inspection but were nonetheless eligible for a visa. See

Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the 

Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1995, 

Pub. L. No. 103-317, § 506(b), 108 Stat. 1724, 1765–66 

(1994) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)). To 

qualify for this type of relief, noncitizens must be 

“admissible” for permanent residence. § 1255(i)(2)(A).

When Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform 

and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), it 

created new categories of noncitizens who were 

inadmissible. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C., 

§ 302(b)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-576 to -578. Section 

1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)—which we will refer to as the “oneyear bar”—makes noncitizens inadmissible if they have 

been “unlawfully present in the United States for an 

aggregate period of more than 1 year.” Section 

1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)—which we will refer to as the 

 2 A fuller summary of this legal background is provided in GarfiasRodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 509-12 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

 

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“removal-order bar”—makes noncitizens inadmissible if 

they have been ordered removed from the United States. 

Congress did not specify what should happen when 

noncitizens who are inadmissible under either provision 

apply for adjustment of status under § 1255(i).

The Ninth Circuit and the BIA Weigh In

In Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 

2004), overruled by Gonzales v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 

508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), we held that noncitizens 

could apply for adjustment of status despite being 

inadmissible under the removal-order bar. Id. at 792–95. 

We held that interpreting inadmissibility under that 

provision as a bar to adjustment of status would conflict 

with certain regulations implementing the Immigration and 

Nationality Act and lead to illogical results. See id. at 793–

94.

The BIA disagreed. In a published opinion, In re 

Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866 (B.I.A. 2006), the BIA 

rejected Perez-Gonzalez’s interpretation of the regulations. 

See Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 874–75. 

Accordingly, it held that inadmissibility under the removalorder bar precluded noncitizens from obtaining adjustment 

of status under § 1255(i). See Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. 

Dec. at 870, 876.

Less than one month after the BIA’s decision in TorresGarcia, we addressed the corresponding question with 

respect to inadmissibility under the one-year bar. In Acosta 

v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by 

Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) 

(en banc), we relied on Perez-Gonzalez to hold that 

noncitizens inadmissible under the one-year bar were not 

precluded from seeking adjustment of status under 

§ 1255(i). Acosta, 439 F.3d at 553–56. Our decision in 

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Acosta did not acknowledge the BIA’s decision in TorresGarcia.

Twenty-one months after our decision in Acosta, the 

BIA addressed whether noncitizens inadmissible under the 

one-year bar are prohibited from seeking adjustment of 

status under § 1255(i). Again, the BIA disagreed with us. 

In In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007), the 

BIA held that inadmissibility under the one-year bar 

prevents a noncitizen from obtaining adjustment of status 

under § 1255(i). See Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 370.

When we next were presented with the questions from 

Perez-Gonzales and Acosta, we applied the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Brand X3 and deferred to the BIA’s 

interpretations in Torres-Garcia and Briones, adopting 

them as our own. Thus, in Gonzales, we held that our 

decision in Perez-Gonzales was no longer valid in light of 

Torres-Garcia. See Gonzales, 508 F.3d at 1235–42. And 

in Garfias-Rodriguez, we overruled Acosta because of the 

BIA’s decision in Briones. See Garfias-Rodriguez, 

702 F.3d at 512–14.

Retroactivity

Neither Briones nor our adoption in Garfias-Rodriguez

of the BIA’s interpretation from Briones ends the analysis 

 3 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 

545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a 

statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron

deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction 

follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no 

room for agency discretion.”).

 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 9

for petitioners, such as Acosta-Olivarria, who filed their 

applications for adjustment of status before the BIA 

decided Briones. In Garfias-Rodriguez, we held that to 

determine whether Briones applies retroactively to a 

particular applicant for adjustment of status, we apply the 

test set forth in Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Federal 

Trade Commission, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). See 

Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 517–18. Montgomery 

Ward’s five-factor balancing test requires that we consider:

(1) whether the particular case is one of first 

impression, (2) whether the new rule 

represents an abrupt departure from well 

established practice or merely attempts to 

fill a void in an unsettled area of law, (3) the 

extent to which the party against whom the 

new rule is applied relied on the former rule, 

(4) the degree of the burden which a 

retroactive order imposes on a party, and 

(5) the statutory interest in applying a new 

rule despite the reliance of a party on the old 

standard.

Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 518 (quoting Montgomery 

Ward, 691 F.2d at 1333). Because the test requires that a 

court look at an individual’s own reliance, this retroactivity 

analysis is applied “on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 519; 

see also id. at 523 n.13 (“We express no opinion whether 

other applicants may avoid the retroactive effect of 

Briones.”).

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III. Discussion

Applying the Montgomery Ward retroactivity analysis 

to Acosta-Olivarria’s case,4 we hold that the BIA’s 

decision in In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 

2007), does not apply retroactively to bar his application.

The First Factor: Whether the Issue Is One of First 

Impression

As we recognized in Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 

702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), the first factor was 

developed in the context of private-party litigation before 

the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and is not 

well suited for immigration rulings. See id. at 520–21. In 

the NLRB context, this factor is meant to ensure that the 

party responsible for a change in law receives the benefits 

of the new rule. Id. at 520. In the immigration context, in 

which the government is always a party, this concern is less 

relevant. Id. at 521. Accordingly, this factor does not 

weigh in either direction for purposes of determining 

whether to apply the rule from Briones retroactively.

The Second and Third Factors: Whether the New Rule 

Represents an Abrupt Departure and the Extent of the 

Petitioner’s Reasonable Reliance on the Former Rule

The second and third Montgomery Ward factors are 

“closely intertwined.” Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 521. 

 4 Although the BIA did not rule on the retroactivity question, we may 

address it in the first instance. The parties have filed supplemental 

briefs on the issue, and the BIA has no special expertise regarding 

retroactivity. See Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 514-15 

(9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).

 

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“If a new rule ‘represents an abrupt departure from well 

established practice,’ a party’s reliance on the prior rule is 

likely to be reasonable, whereas if the rule ‘merely attempts 

to fill a void in an unsettled area of law,’ reliance is less 

likely to be reasonable.” Id.

Acosta-Olivarria applied for adjustment of status in 

July 2006. At the time, our decision in Acosta v. Gonzales, 

439 F.3d 550 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled by GarfiasRodriguez, 702 F.3d 504, held that noncitizens in his 

position could apply to become lawful permanent residents, 

see id. at 556, and the BIA had not yet issued its contrary 

decision in Briones.

Acosta-Olivarria argues that he relied on our decision in 

Acosta in two ways. First, he filed his application for 

adjustment of status, along with the corresponding $1,000 

fee, at a time when the law in our circuit allowed 

noncitizens to apply for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1255(i) despite being inadmissible under the one-year bar 

(8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)). Indeed, in granting his 

request for adjustment of status, the IJ specifically relied on 

Acosta in holding that Acosta-Olivarria was eligible for 

relief under § 1255(i), despite being inadmissible under the 

one-year bar. Retroactive application of the rule from 

Briones would cause Acosta-Olivarria’s application for 

adjustment of status to be denied, without any refund of the 

$1,000 fee. Second, Acosta-Olivarria gave up the 

opportunity to voluntarily depart the United States and start 

a ten-year clock after which he could have sought 

admission. Had he voluntarily departed in 2006 instead of 

staying and filing his application for adjustment of status, 

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Acosta-Olivarria would have been able to seek admission 

starting in 2016.5

The government does not contest that Acosta-Olivarria 

subjectively relied on Acosta. Rather, it contends that no 

one who applied for adjustment of status between our 

decision in Acosta and the BIA’s decision in Briones could 

have reasonably relied on Acosta because the BIA’s 

decision in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866 

(B.I.A. 2006), held that inadmissibility under the removalorder bar precludes the noncitizen from applying for 

adjustment of status under § 1255(i). See Torres-Garcia, 

23 I. & N. Dec. at 870–71, 876. In the government’s view, 

Torres-Garcia should have enabled noncitizens such as 

Acosta-Olivarria to predict that Acosta would not survive.

We disagree. It was reasonable for Acosta-Olivarria to 

rely on our decision in Acosta. At the time he applied for 

adjustment of status, a published opinion of this court 

allowed noncitizens in his position to apply for adjustment 

of status despite being inadmissible, and there was no 

contrary BIA decision interpreting the one-year bar because 

Briones had not yet been decided. When we announce a 

legal rule, we do so not only for the benefit of courts, but 

also for the benefit of the general public. People within the 

Ninth Circuit should be able to rely on our opinions in 

making decisions. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner 

 5 The inadmissibility bars in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and (II) 

are subject to a relevant exception: if the noncitizen has been outside of 

the United States for more than ten years, he or she may apply for 

admission without being subject to the two bars. See 

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii).

 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 13

Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994) (“Judicial precedents 

are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal 

community as a whole.”).

Consistent with this, we noted in Garfias-Rodriguez

that reliance “might have been reasonable” if the petitioner 

had applied within the 21-month period between this 

court’s decision in Acosta and the BIA’s decision in 

Briones. Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 522. There, we 

rejected the petitioner’s particular reliance argument 

because he had filed his application before Perez-Gonzalez 

v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004), or Acosta had 

been decided. See Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 522.

The petitioner in Garfias-Rodriguez could not have taken 

any actions in reliance on an earlier rule of law from our 

court because there was no such earlier rule. But that is not 

true of Acosta-Olivarria.

The dissent argues that the government is correct that 

Acosta-Olivarria could not have relied on Acosta, because 

the landscape of the law on this general issue was changing 

rapidly. In particular, Perez-Gonzalez, which held that 

inadmissibility under the removal-order bar did not 

preclude applications for adjustment of status, had been 

drawn into question by the BIA’s decision in TorresGarcia by the time Acosta-Olivarria filed his application. 

This argument, however, conflates the two bars to 

admissibility in § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). Perez-Gonzalez and 

Torres-Garcia were about the effect of the removal-order 

bar. See Perez-Gonzalez, 379 F.3d at 792–95; TorresGarcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 868. Acosta-Olivarria was 

inadmissible under the one-year bar. At the time he applied 

for adjustment of status, Acosta was the only decision in 

this jurisdiction on the interaction between the one-year bar 

and the relief he sought. The dissent argues that the two 

subsections of § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i) cannot be treated 

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differently. But this would be a reason for arguing that 

Acosta was wrongly decided in light of Torres-Garcia and 

Brand X, not a reason why reliance on Acosta would be 

unreasonable—particularly given that Acosta was decided 

after Torres-Garcia and Brand X. Our task here is not to 

grade our court’s performance in deciding Acosta, but 

rather to decide whether it was reasonable for AcostaOlivarria to rely on that decision.

We hold that it was reasonable for Acosta-Olivarria to 

rely on the law of this circuit deciding the precise legal 

question he faced, so the second and third Montgomery 

Ward factors weigh against applying Briones retroactively.

The Fourth Factor: The Degree of the Burden That a 

Retroactive Order Imposes on a Party

The fourth Montgomery Ward factor cuts strongly 

against applying the rule from Briones retroactively 

because doing so would substantially burden AcostaOlivarria. See Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 523 

(“[D]eportation alone is a substantial burden that weighs 

against retroactive application of an agency adjudication.”). 

Before the BIA applied Briones, the IJ had granted AcostaOlivarria’s application for adjustment of status and thus 

allowed him to remain in the United States with his family. 

If the Briones rule is applied retroactively, he will face 

deportation.

The Fifth Factor: Interest in Applying the New Rule 

Consistently

We recognized in Garfias-Rodriguez that retroactive 

application of the rule from Briones helps ensure 

uniformity in the application of the immigration laws. But 

we emphasized that, because the new rule in Briones does 

not follow from the plain language of the statute, this factor 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 15

“only leans” in favor of retroactive application. GarfiasRodriguez, 702 F.3d at 523.

* * *

Weighing all the factors, we hold that Briones should 

not be applied retroactively in this case. Acosta-Olivarria’s 

reliance interests and the burden that retroactivity would 

impose on him outweigh the interest in uniform application 

of the immigration laws.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the petition for 

review and REMAND with instructions to reinstate the IJ’s 

2006 order granting adjustment of status.

RICE, District Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. On balance, the Montgomery 

Ward factors do not weigh in favor of departing from the 

general principles of retroactivity. Applying In re Briones, 

24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007), the BIA properly found 

Acosta-Olivarria inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) and thus ineligible for adjustment of 

status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i).

As an initial matter, it is important to recognize “[t]he 

general rule. . . that an appellate court must apply the law in 

effect at the time it renders its decision.” Thorpe v. Hous. 

Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969); see also id. at 

282 (quoting Justice Marshall’s explanation of the rule, 

delivered 150 years earlier in United States v. Schooner 

Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 110 (1801)). This rule “applies with 

equal force where the change is made by an administrative 

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agency acting pursuant to legislative authorization.” Id. at 

282. Only when application of a new rule would work a 

“manifest injustice” may the court withhold retrospective 

application. Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. 

FERC, 826 F.2d 1074, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) 

(quoting Thorpe, 393 U.S. at 282).

The D.C. Circuit’s Retail, Wholesale & Department 

Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir 1972) 

decision, from which the Ninth Circuit adopted its 

Montgomery Ward analytical framework, “set forth a nonexhaustive list of five factors to assist courts in determining 

whether to grant an exception to the general rule permitting 

‘retroactive’ application of a rule enunciated in an agency 

adjudication.” Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1081 (emphasis 

added). Once again, that exception, according to the 

Supreme Court, is for “manifest injustice.” Thorpe, 

393 U.S. at 282. This non-exhaustive list of factors “boil[s] 

down . . . to a question of concerns grounded in notions of 

equity and fairness,” Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1082 n.6, 

such that the general rule of retroactivity would apply 

unless its application would result in manifest injustice.

I contend the majority’s balancing of the Montgomery 

Ward factors here is no longer tethered to the general rule 

applied for over 200 years. Rather, the majority’s 

analysis—in which the factors are divorced from the 

general rule and allowed to become a framework in and of 

itself—loses sight of the guidance centuries of 

jurisprudence have offered. With this background, I will 

analyze the factors.

I agree with the majority’s analysis of the first, fourth, 

and fifth Montgomery Ward factors. The first factor—

whether the issue presents one of first impression—does 

not weigh in favor of either party as it is one “not . . . well 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 17

suited to the context of immigration law.” See GarfiasRodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504, 521 (9th Cir. 2012). In

any event, any question of unfairness in applying a new 

rule, regardless of whether it is a case of first impression, 

“is fully captured in the second and third Montgomery 

Ward factors.” Id. Similarly, I concede that the fourth 

factor—the degree of burden on the alien—favors AcostaOlivarria, albeit not as strongly as the majority and past 

precedent so characterize.1 See id. at 523. Finally, I agree 

that the fifth factor “points in favor” of the government. 

See id. “[N]on-retroactivity impairs the uniformity of a 

statutory scheme, and the importance of uniformity in 

immigration law is well established.” Id.

I seriously depart from the majority, however, on the 

application of the second and third Montgomery Ward

factors. I contend these factors weigh strongly in favor of 

retroactively applying Briones: Because Briones was not an 

abrupt departure from any “well established practice,” any 

reliance Acosta-Olivarria may have had on the Ninth 

Circuit’s reasoning in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 

783 (9th Cir. 2004), or Acosta v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 550 

(9th Cir. 2006), cannot be considered reasonable. To the 

 1 The Immigration Judge, under the old rule, had granted AcostaOlivarria’s application for adjustment of status and thus allowed him to 

remain in the United States with his family; conversely, upholding the 

BIA’s retroactive application of Briones would cause him to face 

certain deportation. But deportation has always been the consequence 

at the heart of Acosta-Olivarria’s proceedings. Our system of justice 

does not allow an initial wrong decision to dictate the final result, 

especially when that decision is subject to timely review by a higher 

authority, as was the case here.

 

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contrary, the BIA’s decision in Briones should have come 

as no surprise in light of the BIA’s previous rejection of the 

Circuit’s interpretation of the statutory scheme, which 

rejection it announced in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. 

Dec. 866 (BIA 2006), prior to Acosta-Olivarria’s July 2006 

application.

The second and third Montgomery Ward factors are 

most appropriately analyzed together. The second factor 

analyzes whether a rule is an “abrupt departure from well 

established practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an 

unsettled area of law.” Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 518 

(quoting Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 

1322, 1333 (9th Cir. 1982)). The third factor, focusing on 

the alien’s reliance, is “closely intertwined” with this 

analysis: “If a new rule represents an abrupt departure from 

well established practice, a party’s reliance on the prior rule 

is likely to be reasonable, whereas if the rule merely 

attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of law, reliance is 

less likely to be reasonable.” Id. at 521 (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). As the Garfias-Rodriguez court properly 

noted, “these two factors will favor retroactivity if a party 

could reasonably have anticipated the change in the law 

such that the new requirement would not be a complete 

surprise.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see 

Clark-Cowlitz, 826 F.2d at 1082–83 (“The second factor 

requires the court to gauge the unexpectedness of a rule and 

the extent to which the new principle serves the important 

but workaday function of filling in the interstices of the 

law.”). The D.C. Circuit offers the following guidance to 

courts conducting this analysis:

From our experience in applying the 

[retroactivity analysis], there has emerged a 

basic distinction between (1) new 

applications of law, clarifications, and 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 19

additions, and (2) substitution of new law 

for old law that was reasonably clear. In the 

latter situation, which may give rise to 

questions of fairness, it may be necessary to 

deny retroactive effect to a rule announced 

in an agency adjudication in order to protect 

the settled expectations of those who had 

relied on the preexisting rule. By contrast, 

retroactivity in the former case is natural, 

normal, and necessary, a corollary of an 

agency’s authority to develop policy through 

case-by-case adjudication rather than 

rulemaking.

Williams Nat. Gas Co. v. FERC, 3 F.3d 1544, 1554 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993) (alterations, citations, and internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Importantly—and contrary to the majority’s 

protestations—the retroactivity analysis does not treat mere 

precedent and well-established practice alike.

When Acosta-Olivarria applied for adjustment of status, 

there was no settled practice upon which he could 

reasonably rely. The Ninth Circuit’s pre-Briones opinions 

hardly constitute a well established practice, especially in 

light of the tension created by the BIA’s contrary view. 

True, the Circuit’s opinion in Acosta affirmed its previous 

reasoning in Perez-Gonzalez, but the BIA’s decision in 

Torres-Garcia cannot be discounted. Given the unsettled 

tension between the BIA and this Circuit at the time of 

Acosta-Olivarria’s application, as well as the resulting 

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confusion from the two unreconcilable decisions,62 Briones

cannot be called an abrupt break from any well established 

practice. See Local 900, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & 

Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 

1984) (“Given the confusion in the Board’s and courts’ 

decisions over the years, the new rule cannot be called an 

abrupt break with a well-settled policy.”). As such, AcostaOlivarria’s reliance on contrary Ninth Circuit decisions was 

not reasonable.

The majority primarily faults me for conflating the two 

bars to admissibility. True, the Circuit’s opinion in PerezGonzalez and the BIA’s contrary decision in Torres-Garcia

addressed the tension between eligibility for status 

adjustment under a different bar to admissibility—

subsection II, rather than subsection I of 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i). However, as companion provisions, 

both subsections present the same conflict, see GarfiasRodriguez, 702 F.3d at 509 n.4, and thus their similar 

treatment should have come as no surprise, see id. at 530 

(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (“No one should have been 

surprised by the interpretation announced in Briones. It 

was clearly foreshadowed by the BIA’s earlier ruling in In 

re Torres-Garcia, which predated Acosta by a month . . . .” 

(citation omitted)). And as the Circuit emphasized in 

Acosta when concluding that Perez-Gonzalez controlled, 

“any attempt to distinguish the present case from Perez-

 2 The Acosta court did not distinguish—let alone mention—the BIA’s 

decision in Torres-Garcia, which had been issued one month before 

Acosta.

 

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ACOSTA-OLIVARRIA V. LYNCH 21

Gonzalez based on the different grounds of inadmissability 

involved would be unpersuasive.” Acosta, 439 F.3d at 554.

In reaching its conclusion that Acosta-Olivarria’s 

reliance was reasonable, the majority overstates the effect 

of the dicta in Garfias-Rodriguez regarding the 

reasonableness of reliance during the 21-month period 

between the Circuit’s opinion in Acosta and the BIA’s 

decision in Briones. Although the en banc court noted that 

reliance during this period “might” have been reasonable—

perhaps in an attempt to further highlight the 

unreasonableness of Garfias-Rodriguez’s reliance—the 

opinion far from binds this Court to a holding that such 

reliance during this 21-month window is, as a blanket rule, 

reasonable. See Garfias-Rodriguez, 702 F.3d at 522. 

Rather, any discussion of the reasonableness of reliance 

during this period was quickly tempered by the following:

From the outset, the tension between 

§ 212(a)(9)(c) and § 245(i) was obvious. 

That ambiguity in the law—which resulted 

in a six-year dialogue between the BIA and 

us—should have given Garfias no 

assurances of his eligibility for adjustment 

of status. Garfias might have had reason to 

be encouraged after our generous reading of 

the statute in Perez-Gonzalez and Acosta, 

but, even then, any reliance he placed on our 

decisions held some risk because our 

decisions were subject to revision by the 

BIA under Chevron and Brand X.

Id. at 522–23; see also Carrillo de Palacios v. Holder, 

708 F.3d 1066, 1072 (9th Cir. 2013) (similarly holding that 

the tension between the two provisions was “obvious” and 

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that the ambiguity in the law should have given an alien 

“no assurances”).

Because the BIA’s opinion in Briones cannot justifiably 

be characterized as an abrupt break from any well 

established practice but rather should have been no 

surprise, the reasonableness of Acosta-Olivarria’s reliance 

is greatly diminished. The extent of Acosta-Olivarria’s 

reliance—a $1,000 application fee incurred after removal 

proceedings had already commenced and years beneficially 

spent in the United States when he hypothetically could 

have voluntarily departed and started the ten-year 

readmission clock under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii)—is 

insufficient to outweigh this conclusion.

In light of the foregoing, no manifest injustice has been 

shown here. The more equitable and fair approach would 

be to treat Acosta-Olivarria like all other aliens who are 

ineligible for adjustment under Briones. Retroactivity is 

the general rule and has been for over 200 years. An 

exception is not warranted in the case of Acosta-Olivarria. 

Accordingly, I would not disturb the BIA’s decision.

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