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Parties Involved:
Larry A. Fields
Appellee
Todd S. Floberg
Appellant
Larry R. Meachum
Appellee
Oklahoma Department of Corrections
Appellee
Denise Robinson
Appellee
Deborah Robison
Appellee

Document Text:

F I .u -~ μA -"'t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~nited Stat~ Co~rt(?~ p;v ... ' 

Te:.l'1 C1r.:u1, 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

APR 1 4 i992 

TODDS. FLOBERG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

LARRY R. MEACHUM; LARRY A. FIELDS; 

DENISE ROBINSON; DEBORAH ROBISON, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

ROBERT L. HOECKEE 

) Clerl~ 

) 

) 

) 

) Nos. 89-6111 & 

) 90-6401 

) (D.C. No. CIV-87-1409-P) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and SAM,** District 

Judge. 

**Honorable David Sam, District Judge, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. 1 See Fed. R. App. P. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

1 Plaintiff filed case No. 89-6111 following an erroneous order 

of the district court administratively closing the case . This 

court issued a partial remand to allow the district court to 

(continued on next page) 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 1
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cases are therefore ordered 

Plaintiff Todd S. Floberg commenced this action under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against his former employer, Oklahoma Department of 

Corrections (DOC), and against Larry R. Meachum, Larry A. Fields, 

Denise Robinson, and Deborah Robison, employees of the DOC, in 

their individual and official capacities. In his complaint, 

Plaintiff alleged that his dismissal from the DOC was motivated 

primarily by his refusal to sign a polygraph waiver of 

responsibility in violation of his constitutional right to access 

to the courts. Plaintiff demanded judgment for declaratory and 

injunctive relief, reinstating Plaintiff to his former position 

with full back pay and benefits, and enjoining Defendants from 

further retaliatory actions. He also requested compensatory 

damages in the sum of $150,000, punitive damages in the sum of 

$250,000, and attorney's fees and costs. 

Prior to answering Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants filed a 

motion to dismiss the DOC on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. 

The district court granted the motion by minute order. Following 

a hearing, the remaining Defendants, presumably in their 

individual capacities, were granted summary judgment based upon 

qualified immunity as to all claims. Subsequent to the summary 

judgment order, the district court issued its decision that the 

DOC's practice of requiring employees to sign polygraph 

(continued from previous page) 

correct its error. Following the remand proceedings, Plaintiff 

filed case No. 90-6401. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 2
responsibility waivers is unconstitutional as a deprivation of 

court access. Finally, following trial to the court, the district 

court reached the merits of Plaintiff's complaint. We presume 

this decision related to the individual defendants in their 

official capacities. 2 

Plaintiff appeals, claiming the district court erred in (1) 

dismissing the DOC based on Eleventh Amendment immunity as to 

Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief; (2) 

granting summary judgment to the remaining Defendants in their 

individual capacities based on qualified immunity; and (3) 

determining that Plaintiff's refusal to sign a polygraph release 

was not a substantial and motivating factor in his termination. 

Plaintiff also claims a right to jury trial in the event this 

court reverses the judgment and remands the cause of action . 

Because we affirm, we do not address Plaintiff's jury trial issue. 

2 The chronology of the district court decisions in 

is as follows: 

1. Minute Order, May 2, 1988--dismissal of 

against the DOC based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

this case 

all claims 

2. Order Granting Summary Judgment, September 15, 

1988--grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity. 

3 . Order Regarding Constitutionality of Polygraph Release 

Requirement, and Setting Status Conference, August 13, 

1990--determination that the DOC's polygraph release requirement 

as a condition of employment is unconstitutional. 

4. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, 

November 5, 1990--determination that, even though polygraph 

release requirement is unconstitutional, Plaintiff failed to meet 

his burden of proving that his refusal to sign the release was a 

substantial and motivating factor in h i s termination. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 3
At the time of his employment termination, Plaintiff was 

employed in the mail room of the Mabel Bassett Correctional Center 

(the Center) in Oklahoma City. Prior to his termination, 

Plaintiff had been the subject of several disciplinary actions, 

i.e., a one-day suspension for an inadequate search of an incoming 

vehicle thereby allowing a firearm to enter the Center, a 

reprimand for interfering with a drug investigation, and a 

reprimand for allowing money orders to reach inmates undetected. 

There also had been several allegations that Plaintiff had made 

inappropriate remarks to female inmates and employees. Lastly, 

Plaintiff's supervisor generated an incident report regarding a 

female inmate's allegation that Plaintiff had made an 

inappropriate sexual remark to her. The ensuing investigation of 

this allegation culminated in Plaintiff's dismissal. 

During the course of this investigation regarding the 

inmate's accusation, Plaintiff agreed to take a polygraph 

examination. Upon reporting for the examination, Plaintiff was 

asked to sign a liability release. 3 Upon advice of counsel, 

Plaintiff refused to sign the release. At this point it becomes 

unclear whether Plaintiff refused to take the polygraph 

3 The relevant portion of the liability release states: 

I fully understand the examiner's opinion may be that I 

have not been truthful. Knowing this, I do hereby 

release, absolve, and agree to forever hold harmless, 

KENNETH WOODRUM and WOODRUM POLYGRAPH SERVICE, INC. from 

any liability resulting either from the operation of the 

equipment or use of the results obtained therefrom. 

Appellant's App. at 144. The release also required that Plaintiff 

attest to his own good health. 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 4
examination or whether the polygrapher refused to administer the 

examination without the signed release. The record indicates that 

Plaintiff subsequently obtained an independent polygraph 

examination which indicated truthful responses regarding the 

inmate's allegation. 

Following Plaintiff's refusal to sign the waiver of 

responsibility, the Warden of the Center, Defendant Larry Fields, 

held a hearing on the disciplinary charges emanating from the 

investigation of the inmate's allegation and from Plaintiff's 

failure to cooperate with the polygraph examination. Plaintiff 

was subsequently terminated. The main reasons stated for 

Plaintiff's dismissal were sexual harassment and failure to 

cooperate in an investigation by refusing to submit to a polygraph 

. t" 4 examina ion. 

Plaintiff claims that the inmate's sexual harassment 

accusation was in retaliation for his refusal to allow alcohol to 

be delivered to the inmate through the mail room for her birthday. 

He denies making the inappropriate remark. However, the inmate 

4 The Oklahoma Department of Corrections 

states that an employee can be terminated for 

Employee Handbook 

[f]ailing or refusing to cooperate in an investigation 

into alleged illegal activitie s or violations of 

Department rules and regulations. 

Refusal to submit to a polygr aph examination will be 

considered a violation of this rule. Refusal to sign a 

standard examiner's waiver of r e sponsibility form will 

not be accepted as an excuse for not submitting to a 

polygraph examination. 

See Terminati on letter, Appel lant's App. at 99. 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 5
was administered a polygraph examination which also indicated 

truthful responses. In addition, Plaintiff claims that the 

Center's requirement that he sign the polygrapher's release, in 

violation of his constitutional right to access to the courts, was 

the substantial and motivating factor in his termination. 

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 

By minute order dated May 2, 1988, the district court 

dismissed all claims against the DOC based on Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power 

of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 

in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the 

United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 

Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The 

Eleventh Amendment has been applied consistently to bar suits 

against a state or state agency by citizens of the same state. 

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S . 265, 276 (1986). 

Plaintiff's first argument on appeal is that the DOC should 

not have 

Plaintiff's 

disagree. 

been granted Eleventh Amendment immunity as to 

claims for prospective, injunctive relief. 5 We 

5 We can find no indication in the record that this issue was 

argued or ruled on below. The record indicates that the district 

court invited briefing on the issue at the close of its summary 

judgment decision. Appellant's App. at 125. There is no further 

indication that the issue was briefed or argued, and we can find 

no appealable ruling by the district court. However, because it 

concerns a question of subject matter jurisdiction, we do not deem 

the issue abandoned. See Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 

F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988)( even if parties do not raise issue 

of subject matter jurisdiction, the court has a duty to do so sua 

sponte), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080 (1989) . 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 6
Section 1983 provides a federal forum to remedy 

many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does not 

provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy 

against a State for alleged deprivations of civil 

liberties. The Eleventh Amendment bars such suits 

unless the State has waived its immunity, or unless 

Congress has exercised its undoubted power under§ 5 of 

the Fourteenth Amendment to override that immunity. 

Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 

(1989)(citation omitted). We can find no authority affording 

bifurcated treatment to claims against states or state agencies 

dependent upon the nature of the relief sought. On the contrary, 

this jurisdictional bar applies to the DOC regardless of whether 

the kind of relief Plaintiff seeks is legal or equitable. See 

Papasan, 478 U.S. at 276 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-101 (1984)). 

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 

Next, Plaintiff contends that the district court erred in 

granting summary judgment to the remaining defendants on the basis 

of qualified immunity. "[W]hether an official protected by 

qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly 

unlawful official action generally turns on the 'objective legal 

reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of the legal rules 

that were 'clearly established' at the time [the action] was 

taken." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)(quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 819 (1982)); see also 

Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1991)(burden rests 

on plaintiff to establish that law was violated and that law was 

clearly established at the time of the violation). If the 

plaintiff does not meet this burden, the official is not required 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 7
to proceed further and summary judgment is appropriate. 

922 F.2d at 1460. 

Dixon, 

Whether the law was clearly established is a legal question 

which we review de novo. Miller v. City of Mission, 705 F.2d 368, 

375 n.6 (10th Cir. 1983). Once the plaintiff has met his burden, 

the defendant must then show that no material issues of fact 

remain which would defeat the claim of qualified immunity. Pueblo 

Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 

(10th Cir. 1988). 

Plaintiff's contention that Defendants violated clearly 

established law is based on the district court's decision, 

subsequent to the grant of summary judgment, that the DOC's 

regulation requiring employees to sign polygraph examination 

releases is unconstitutional as a denial of access to the courts. 

Our question is whether this determination of unconstitutionality 

was apparent at the time of Plaintiff's termination such that 

Defendants, as reasonable persons, should have known they were 

violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id., 847 F.2d at 

645. 

Defendants do not dispute the district court's determination 

that the DOC's policy of initiating disciplinary actions against 

employees who refused to sign polygraph waivers was in violation 

of the employees' access to the courts. However, officials cannot 

be "'expected to anticipate subsequent legal 

developments, ... (or] fairly be said to "know" that the law 

forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful.'" Powell 

v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1456 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting Harlow, 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 8
457 U.S. at 818). "A defendant in a§ 1983 action is not required 

to anticipate changes in the law, and the reasonableness of his 

conduct is to be judged by the state of the law at the ti.me of his 

conduct." Hidahl v. Gilpin County Dep't of Social Servs., 938 

F.2d 1150, 1155 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 

U.S. 335, 341 (1986)(Qualified immunity "provides ample protection 

to all but . . . those who knowingly violate the law. ") . 

Plaintiff supports his argument by citing cases holding that 

employees cannot be terminated in violation of their 

constitutional rights. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 

391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968)(teachers could not be compelled to give 

up constitutional right to comment on matters of public concern); 

Buckley v. Coyle Pub. Sch. Sys., 476 F.2d 92, 96 (10th Cir. 

1973)(state must show compelling interest to terminate public 

employee due to pregnancy); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 

480-81 (7th Cir. 1972)(public employee cannot be discharged in 

violation of right to free speech), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 

(1973). "(W]hile there need not be 'strict (or precise] factual 

correspondence between the cases establishing the law and the case 

at hand,' there must nonetheless be 'some ... factual 

correspondence.'" Hidahl, 938 F.2d at 1155 (quoting Eastwood v. 

Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1988)). 

In Anderson v. Creighton, the Supreme Court stated that "in light 

of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 483 U.S. 

at 640. However, "[p]laintiff's burden cannot be met merely by 

identifying in the abstract a clearly established right and then 

alleging defendant violated that right." Patrick v. Miller, Nos. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 9
90-6359 and 90-6388, slip op. at 6 (10th Cir. Jan. 27, 

1992)(citing Losavio, 847 F.2d at 645); see also Hilliard v. City 

& County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir.)(same), cert. 

denied, 112 s. Ct. 656 (1991). 

The right to access the courts is guaranteed by the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments. See Shaw v . Neece, 727 F.2d 947, 949 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 976 (1984). This fact alone is 

insufficient, however, to defeat Defendants' summary judgment 

motion. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (test of qualified immunity 

must be established in a particularized and relevant sense). Our 

review of the record in this case, and the applicable law, has 

failed to convince us that the law regarding this type of 

employment practice was so clear at the time of Plaintiff's 

termination as to have placed the Defendants on notice that they 

were violating it. See Lutz v. Weld County Sch. Dist. No. 6, 784 

F.2d 340, 342-44 (10th Cir. 1986). Thus, we affirm the district 

court's grant of qualified immunity to Defendants. 

SUBSTANTIAL AND MOTIVATING FACTOR 

Finally, Plaintiff appeals the district court's Findings of 

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in which the court 

determined that Plaintiff's refusal to sign the release of 

liability for the polygraph examination was not a substantial or 

motivating factor in his termination and that he would have been 

t e rminated on other grounds. 6 

6 We must presume that the 

pertains to the individual 

capacities, because, at the time 

Defendants had been dismissed from 

district court's decision only 

Defendants in their official 

of this de cision, all other 

the case on immunity grounds. 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 10
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 

evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 

judge the credibility of the witnesses." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); 

see also Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 857 (10th Cir. 

1989)(whether defendant met burden of showing that plaintiff would 

have been dismissed in the absence of the protected activity is 

question of fact). 

We agree with the district court and the parties that the 

analytical framework this court set forth in Wulf is the proper 

one to follow in this case. In Wulf, we stated that, upon a 

conclusion that the activity is protected, the plaintiff must show 

that the protected activity was "a substantial and motivating 

factor in the challenged employment decision." Id. at 856-57. 

The employer then has the burden of proving that the employee 

would have been terminated even if the constitutional violation 

were absent. Id. at 857. 

Defendants do not dispute the district court's conclusion 

that the requirement that employees sign a waiver of 

responsibility upon submitting to a polygraph examination is a 

constitutional violation of the employee's right to court access. 

The only question in contention is whether Plaintiff's refusal to 

sign the waiver was a substantial and motivating factor in the 

DOC's decision to terminate his employment. The district court 

found that even if Plaintiff's refusal to cooperate with the 

examination by signing the waiver were of import in the decision 

to terminate his employment, there was substantial evidence of 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 11
additional misconduct supporting a termination decision, and 

Defendants met their burden of proving that Plaintiff would have 

been terminated despite the polygraph incident. 

The district court had numerous opportunities in this case to 

hear and evaluate the evidence and testimony and we cannot 

ascertain any indication that its decision lacked support or 

substance. See Ebert v . Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 338 

(10th Cir. 1989)(deference must be given to district court's 

opportunity to judge credibility). The district court's finding 

that Plaintiff would have been subject to dismissal regardless of 

his refusal to sign the polygraph waiver was not 

erroneous. 

clearly 

Therefore, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

12 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-6111 Document: 010110242315 Date Filed: 04/14/1992 Page: 12