Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01161/USCOURTS-ca10-15-01161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phelps Oil and Gas, LLC
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re: PHELPS OIL AND GAS, LLC, 

on behalf of itself and a class of similarly 

situated royalty owners,

Petitioner.

No. 15-1161

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-02604-REB-CBS)

(D. Colo.)

ORDER

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, LUCERO and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.

This matter comes before the court on a petition for writ of mandamus filed by 

Phelps Oil and Gas, LLC. Phelps has also filed a motion seeking a stay of district 

court proceedings pending our adjudication of its mandamus petition. We previously 

directed Noble Energy, Inc., and DCP Midstream, LP, the opposing parties in the 

underlying litigation, to file responses to the mandamus petition and the stay motion. 

We have received their respective responses, as well as Phelps’ replies.

Phelps originally filed the underlying action in Colorado state court. It 

asserted claims against Noble, which pays royalties to Phelps and the other class 

members for natural gas production, and against DCP Midstream, which provides 

post-wellhead services to Noble. Phelps sought damages from each defendant, as 

well as declaratory relief against both of them. DCP Midstream removed the case to 

federal court with Noble’s consent. Phelps challenged the removal and sought a 

remand to state court, arguing that DCP Midstream had not established the requisite 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

June 10, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

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amount in controversy for the district court to exercise diversity jurisdiction. The 

district court denied Phelps’ motion to remand, concluding that the allegations of the 

complaint, coupled with the relevant evidence provided by DCP Midstream, 

“present[ed] a combination of facts that likely support a claim in excess of 75,000 

dollars.” Order Denying Mot. To Remand, Dct. Doc. 53, at 5-6. The district court 

then proceeded with the litigation and has pending before it a report and 

recommendation from the magistrate judge recommending that Phelps’ claims 

against DCP Midstream be dismissed. 

Phelps now seeks a writ of mandamus from this court directing the district 

court to vacate its order denying Phelps’ motion to remand and to remand the case to 

the Colorado state court. Phelps also seeks a stay of the district court proceedings 

while we consider the mandamus petition. Because we conclude that mandamus 

relief is not warranted here, we deny the mandamus petition. And because the stay 

motion is now moot, we deny it as well.

“Mandamus is not a substitute for appeal after a final judgment and is a drastic 

remedy that is invoked only in extraordinary circumstances.” United States v. Copar 

Pumice Co., 714 F.3d 1197, 1210 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “The writ of mandamus issues only in exceptional circumstances to correct 

a clear abuse of discretion, an abdication of the judicial function, or the usurpation of 

judicial power.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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For the writ to issue, three conditions must be met: Phelps “must have no other 

adequate means of relief”; Phelps’ “right to the writ must be clear and indisputable”; 

and “we must be convinced that, in the exercise of our discretion, it is appropriate 

under the circumstances for the writ to issue.” In re Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 

568 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). These 

conditions are not met here.

First and foremost, Phelps has not shown that it has no other means to attain 

the relief it seeks. Even when a mandamus petition challenges the district court’s 

exercise of jurisdiction, as here, “appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with the 

decision of a lower court on jurisdictional questions which it was competent to 

decide and which are reviewable in the regular course of appeal.” Roche v. 

Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). 

The district court’s denial of Phelps’ motion to remand is reviewable on appeal 

from the final judgment. See Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 F.3d 893, 

897-98 (10th Cir. 2006) (addressing on direct appeal propriety of district court’s 

denial of motion to remand that raised issues concerning the amount in controversy 

similar to those here). And if this court were to conclude on appeal that the district 

court erred in exercising jurisdiction, we could order the district court to vacate its 

orders and remand the action to the state court. See Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum

Gr. Brit. PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 2005) (remanding with directions 

that district court vacate all post-removal orders and remand case to state court 

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because district court lacked diversity jurisdiction over removed action); Conagra 

Foods, Inc. v. Americold Logistics, LLC, 776 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2015) 

(same), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 22, 2015) (No. 14-1382). For this reason, 

the Supreme Court “has consistently refused to sustain the use of mandamus as a 

means of reviewing the action of a district court in denying a motion to remand a 

cause to the state court from which it had been removed.” Roche, 319 U.S. at 30. 

Phelps contends that an appeal is not an adequate remedy because Phelps and 

the other class members would be prejudiced by having the district court adjudicate 

their claims “only to have any orders and final judgments vacated because the court 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” Mandamus Pet. at 17. Phelps does not elaborate 

further, however. And while Phelps will have to endure the inconvenience and 

expense of litigating the case in federal court before it can obtain appellate review of 

its jurisdictional challenge, “that inconvenience is one which we must take it 

Congress contemplated in providing that only final judgments should be reviewable,” 

Roche, 319 U.S. at 30; see also In re Crystal Power Co., 641 F.3d 82, 83-84 (5th Cir. 

2011) (“The [Supreme] Court has instructed that our review of an erroneous refusal 

to remand must await appeal from a final judgment, even when this forces the parties 

to submit to proceedings before a tribunal that lacks competent jurisdiction over their 

dispute. To the same end, the [Supreme] Court has advised that the ordinary costs of 

trial and appeal are not a sufficient burden to warrant mandamus relief.”). Phelps 

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does not point to any special circumstances that make appeal an inadequate remedy 

to address its challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the petition for writ of mandamus is denied. This court having 

ruled on the mandamus petition, the motion for stay is denied as moot. 

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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