Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-05040/USCOURTS-ca10-19-05040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanley Glanz
Appellee
Ladona A. Poore
Appellant
Michelle Robinette
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

LADONA A. POORE, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

STANLEY GLANZ, former sheriff of 

Tulsa County, in his individual capacity; 

MICHELLE ROBINETTE, in her official 

capacity as Acting Sheriff, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 19-5040 

(D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00797-JED-PJC) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Plaintiff Ladona Poore appeals from the order of the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Oklahoma capping her attorney-fee award under the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d). She brought a civil-rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Tulsa County Sheriff Stanley Glanz, in 

his individual and official capacities, based on her sexual assaults by a detention officer 

 

*

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

January 30, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 19-5040 Document: 010110297593 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 1
2 

while incarcerated in the Tulsa county jail in 2010. The jury rendered a verdict in her 

favor and awarded $25,000 in compensatory damages. The district court denied 

Defendant’s postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, and this 

court affirmed. See Poore v. Glanz, 724 F. App’x 635, 638 (10th Cir. 2018). 

As the prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Plaintiff moved for attorney fees 

of $659,159.56. Although she had not retained counsel until she was released from the 

incarceration giving rise to her complaint, she happened to be imprisoned on the day she 

filed. This triggered application of the PLRA fee cap, so the district court limited the 

attorney-fee award to 150% of the money judgment (with a portion of that award taken 

from the $25,000 money judgment). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d); Murphy v. Smith, 138 S. 

Ct. 784, 790 (2018). On appeal Plaintiff does not dispute that she was incarcerated when 

she filed her complaint. She argues only that a higher fee award was warranted because 

(1) Defendant waived or forfeited application of the PLRA fee cap, and (2) the absurdity 

doctrine renders the PLRA inapplicable to her case. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived application of the PLRA fee cap by failing 

to assert it in responsive pleadings. But she admits that Defendant raised the PLRA 

attorney-fee issue in the pretrial order. Because the pretrial order controls the issues for 

trial, and the issue was clearly presented there, we must reject her argument that it was 

Appellate Case: 19-5040 Document: 010110297593 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 2
3 

not properly presented in district court.1

 See Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1215 

(10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he inclusion of a claim in the pretrial order is deemed to amend any 

previous pleadings which did not include that claim.”). 

Plaintiff also contends that application of the PLRA fee cap under these 

circumstances is absurd, and that this court should construe the fee-cap provision 

differently to avoid the purportedly absurd result. But we have held that “there is nothing 

absurd about applying the [PLRA] restriction on attorney-fee awards to prisoner civilrights claims arising before incarceration as well as to such claims arising during 

incarceration.” Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 

Plaintiff does not attempt to distinguish Robbins, and we conclude that it controls the 

outcome here. 

We AFFIRM the district court’s award of attorney fees. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

 

1

 Because the issue was set forth in the pretrial order, we need not address Plaintiff’s 

arguments that the PLRA fee cap must be raised before verdict and is an affirmative 

defense. 

Appellate Case: 19-5040 Document: 010110297593 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 3