Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02413/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02413-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Romero Brown
Appellee
David C. Brunt
Appellee
Lewis Calamity
Appellee
Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma
Amicus Curiae
Roselyn D. John
Appellee
Peter J. Korth
Appellee
Native Village of Venetie
Amicus Curiae
Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company
Appellant
Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Company
Amicus Curiae
State of New Mexico
Amicus Curiae
Kee Ike Yazzie
Appellee

Document Text:

RODERT L. HOECKER 

CT,ERJ( 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80204 

August 3, 1990 

TO: RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 88-2413, Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Company v. 

Kee Ike Yazzie, et al, 

Filed by Judge Anderson on May 30, 1990. 

Attached is an amended opinion in the captioned case. The 

amendment includes additional footnote at bottom of page 2, addition 

to footnote 7 on page 15, and the addition of appendices Band C. 

RLI-I:afw 

Enclosure 

(303) 844-3167 

FTS 664-3167 

Appellate Case: 88-2413 Document: 010110555284 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 1
PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Ir I l.i E D 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

PITTSBURG & MIDWAY COAL MINING 

COMPANY, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

KEE IKE YAZZIE, ROSELYN D. 

JOHN, ROMERO BROWN, LEWIS 

CALAMITY, PETER J. KORTH, and 

DAVID C. BRUNT, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

United fitM . .o,; Ct\tll't of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 88-2413 

88-8071 

(consolidated) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. NO. 86-1442m) 

Christopher Lane, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado (Mary J. 

Kelly and G. Sonny Cave, Sherman & Howard, Denver, Colorado, James 

G. di Zerega and Kent R. Olson, Englewood, Colorado, with him on 

the briefs), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Paul E. Frye, Nordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Frye, · Albuquerque, New Mexico (Michael P. Upshaw, Attorney General and 

Paull Mines, Navajo Nation Department of Justice, Window Rock, 

Arizona, with him on the brief), for Defendants-Appellees. 

Lynn H. Slade, Walter E. Stern, William C. Scott and George R. 

McFall, Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A., 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, on the brief for Amici Curiae, Santa Fe 

Pacific Railroad Company and Cerrillos Land Company. 

Hal Stratton, Attorney General, and Christopher D. Coppin, 

Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, New Mexico, on the brief for 

Amicus Curiae, the State of New Mexico. 

Melody L. McCoy and Robert T. Anderson, Native American Rights 

Fund, Boulder, Colorado, on the brief for Amici Curiae, CheyenneArapaho Tribes and Native Village of Venetie. 

Appellate Case: 88-2413 Document: 010110555284 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 2
Before MOORE, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

This case raises the question of whether a 1907-08 addition 

to the Navajo Reservation of nearly 1.9 million acres in northwestern New Mexico was terminated by two Executive Orders issued 

in 1908 and 1911.* The plaintiff-appellant is the Pittsburgh and 

Midway Coal Mining Company ( "P & M"), whose South McKinley mine is 

on the land in question and whose "source gains" from the mine's 

coal sales are taxed by the defendant Navajo Tribe Tax Commission 

("Tribe"). P & M has paid the tax under protest since 1986. 

Reply Brief at 20 n.17. P & M filed an action in federal court 

for an injunction and declaratory judgment that the Tribe lacked 

jurisdiction under federal law to tax the mine. The Tribe replied 

that the area in question was still part of the Navajo Reservation 

and that., therefore, the federal court should abstain pursuant to 

the "Indian abstention doctrine" and allow the taxation question 

to be heard first in Tribal forums. The Tribe asserted that, even 

if the mine were not on the Reservation, the Indian abstention 

doctrine should still apply because the mine was within "Indian 

country" as defined by 18 u.s.c. § 1151. After a two-week 

* For purposes of argument and consideration, we companioned 

this case with that of Blatchford v. Sullivan, No. 87-1547, slip 

op. (10th Cir., May 30, 1990), in which this same issue is raised. 

The district court in Blatchford made findings of fact and 

conclusions of law contrary to those reached by the district court 

in this case. See note 7 infra. The findings and conclusions of 

the district court in Blatchford are attached to this opinion as 

Appendix B. The opinion of the district court in this case is 

attached as Appendix C. 

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evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that the mine was 

located within the Reservation boundaries and that, therefore, 

abstention properly precluded the court from ruling initially on 

the tax question. It dismissed P & M's causes of action without 

prejudice and did not reach the issue of whether the mine, even if 

outside the Reservation boundaries, was nonetheless within Indian 

country. P & M appeals this final order. 1 We conclude that the 

mine is not within the Reservation boundaries. Therefore, we 

reverse the decision of the trial court and remand for consideration of whether the mine, although outside the Reservation 

boundaries, is nonetheless within Indian country and, if so, 

whether the district court should abstain and allow the Navajo 

legal system to address the taxation issue first. The remainder 

of this opinion is organized as outlined: 

I. Background 

A. History of the 1907-08 Addition to the Navajo Reservation 

B. The District Court Opinion 

1 Eight days after the district court issued its Memorandum 

Opinion and Order dismissing the case, the court issued a second 

order certifying the earlier Order for interlocutory appeal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). P & M then appealed the second order in case 

we found that the court's original order was properly converted 

into an interlocutory order. The original order, rather than 

holding further federal proceedings in abeyance, dismissed all the 

causes of action without prejudice. For purposes of this appeal, 

we view the original order as a final order subject to appeal as 

of right. See 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal 

Practice and Procedure§§ 3913, 3916 (1976); cf. Klein v. Heckler, 

761 F.2d 1304, 1305 (9th Cir. 1985) (dismissal for failure to 

exhaust administrative remedies is a final order giving jurisdiction to appellate court under 28 u.s.c. § 1291). We therefore 

deny P & M's petition No. 88-8071 and proceed under its original 

petition for review. 

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II. Legal Analysis 

A. Legal Standards 

B. General Intent of Executive Orders 709/744 and Subsequent 

Language "Restoring" Unallotted Lands "to the Public Domain" 

i. Restoration Language as Operative Language of 

Section Twenty-five and Executive Orders 1000/1284: Other Federal 

Court Cases Distinguished 

ii. Meaning of Restoration Language in Historical 

C-ontext 

a. Interpretation of Congressional Restoration 

Language by the Federal Courts 

b. Executive Branch Interpretation of Restoration 

Language Prior to Executive Orders 1000/1284 

iii. Restoration Language in the Context of Executive 

Orders 709/744, Section Twenty-five, and Executive Orders 1000/ 

1284: Legislative History and Surrounding Circumstances 

iv. Subsequent Congressional and Executive Action 

v. Summary 

C. Subsequent Demographics 

D. Specific Intent of Restoration Language with Respect to 

Allotted Lands 

E. Conclusion 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. History of the 1907-08 Addition to the Navajo 

Reservation. 

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The original Navajo Reservation in Arizona and New Mexico was 

created by the Treaty of 1868 and expanded by subsequent Executive 

Orders ("EOs"), particularly those of 1878, 1880, 1882, 1884, and 

1900. Between 1868 and 1907, the Reservation grew from the three 

million acres provided in the Treaty to more than eleven and onehalf million acres in Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. Ex. 64 at 

1-2. 2 Although extensive in area, the Reservation in 1907 

represented far less land than the Navajos had used and occupied 

in previous centuries. The Reservation and land surrounding it 

were largely desert with limited water supplies, and the Navajos 

needed large amounts of territory to graze their sheep successfully. See,~, Ex. 10 at 3-4. 

In March 1907, the Superintendent of the Navajo Agency at 

Fort Defiance, Arizona, W.H. Harrison, raised with Interior 

Department officials the plight of Navajos living on public domain 

lands to the east and south of the Reservation, whose livelihood 

as sheep grazers was threatened by the encroachment of white and 

Mexican stoclanen who were appropriating the limited water holes 

for themselves. See Exs. 6 at 2-3, 7 at 5-6, 10 at 4. Harrison 

asked the General Land Office to withdraw some 131 townships from 

general entry to allow Navajos on the land to receive 160-acre 

allotments in severalty without interference from white and 

Mexican stoclanen. Ex. 6 at 2-3. The Commissioner of the General 

Land Office, R.A. Ballinger, declined to do so, Ex. 11 at 2-3, 

! 

2 Numbered exhibits are those of P & M. Alphabetized exhibits 

are those of the Tribe. At times, the exhibits of both parties 

contain copies of the same document, in which case, for 

convenience, we generally cite to one rather than both. 

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stating that the Navajos were sufficiently protected by the 

allotting process established under section four of the General 

Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389, as amended by 

the Act of February 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794, 795 ("the 

General Allotment Act"). 3 Alternatively, Superintendent Harrison 

suggested to Francis Leupp, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 4 

that the grazing problem be solved either by (1) extending the 

Reservation into townships south and east of the existing 

Reservation and convincing the Santa Fe Railroad Company to 

exchange its holdings therein for others elsewhere, or (2) 

allotting the Indians all of the public lands near existing or 

potential water storage facilities. Ex. 7 at 6. 

By the time of the Harrison correspondence, the conflict 

between the public domain Navajos and white and Mexican stocJanen 

was already sharply drawn. On March 6th of the same year, the 

Territorial Governor of New Mexico had written to Interior 

Secretary James Garfield, enclosing a joint memorial of the New 

Mexico Territorial Legislature urging the federal government to 

keep the Navajos within the boundaries of their Reservation and to 

stop them from appropriating water for their sheep on public 

domain lands. Ex. 10 at 7-10. On July 9, 1907, New Mexico 

3 Ballinger reasoned that because all applicants were "required 

to make affidavit that the land applied for is not occupied or 

improved by any Indian," the Indians were sufficiently protected. 

Ex. 11 at 2. Under section four the nomadic Navajos were required 

to take the initiative to file for allotment with the General Land 

Office and could seek allotment only for lands on which they had 

"made settlement." 

4 Both the General Land Office and the Indian Office were 

subdivisions of the Department of the Interior. R. Vol. VII at 

1255-56. 

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Territorial Delegate to Congress W.H. Andrews wrote to the Acting 

Commissioner of Indian Affairs C.F. Larrabee protesting any 

enlargement or extension of the Reservation. Ex. 12 at 2. 

Larrabee responded that current Indian Office5 policy was to break 

up tribal relations and integrate the Indians into the communities 

in which they lived by alloting them lands in severalty as 

provided for by the General Allotment Act. Id. at 6. In this 

way, Larrabee said, the Office could secure permanent homes for 

off-reservation Indians on public domain land. Id. In other 

words, he evaded the issue of whether any extension to the 

Reservation was under consideration. 

Over the summer, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Leupp met 

with the Navajos in Council. It appears that Leupp--in contrast 

to Ballinger--accepted the view that withdrawal of the lands from 

the public domain was needed. See Exs. 13, 14. Leupp, however, 

told both the Navajos in Council and their staunch advocate Father 

Anselm Weber, a Franciscan priest at St. Michael's Mission near 

the Arizona-New Mexico line, that any recommendation to the 

President would be for only a temporary extension to the existing 

Reservation, limited to the purpose of completing the public 

domain allotments to the off-reservation Navajos without competition from other stockmen. Id. In August 1907, Leupp shared the 

same information with Superintendent Harrison, rejecting a 

permanent extension of the Reservation but supporting an extension 

I for temporary purposes.· Ex. 13. On November 6, 1907, Leupp 

5 In the course of the history recited in this opinion, the 

Indian Office came to be called the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 

avoid confusion, we stay with the term "Indian Office." 

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To 

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recommended to Interior Secretary Garfield an EO temporarily 

withdrawing lands and adding them to the Reservation in order to 

protect the off-reservation Indians until they could receive the 

allotments to which they were entitled. Leupp noted that the 

Indians had lived in the area for generations and had abstained 

from violence even though they were being driven from their homes 

and watering sites by whites. An EO was seen as the appropriate 

mechanism to secure their grazing lands and watering holes, free 

from the competing demands of non-Indians. Ex. 15 at 3. Leupp's 

letter to Garfield contained a draft EO which became EO 709. Ex. 

15 at 5-6. 

Secretary Garfield wrote to President Theodore Roosevelt, 

recommending Leupp's proposed EO. Ex. 16. Garfield enclosed 

Leupp's November 6th recommendation, along with a copy of 

Superintendent Harrison's letter of September 14, 1907 describing 

the lands involved. He also enclosed a copy of Father Weber's 

letter of September 5, 1907 to Superintendent Harrison, in which 

Father Weber reiterated his and Harrison's common understanding 

that the extension was to be made "only for the purpose of 

allotment, and is to last only till the allotments are made." 

Id.; Ex. 14 at 3. The EO was signed on November 9, 1907 by 

President Roosevelt and issued as Executive Order 709, "withdrawing from sale and settlement" certain lands in New Mexico and 

Arizona to the east and south of the Navajo Reservation and 

setting them apart "as an addition to the present Navajo 

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reservation. 116 Exec. Order No. 709 (1907) reprinted in 3 C. 

Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 669 (1913). 

Two months later, on January 28, 1908, the President issued 

EO 744, reducing the addition so that certain lands inadvertently 

included in the Navajo addition could be restored to the Jicarilla 

Reservation instead. See Exec. Order No. 744 (1908), reprinted in 

3 C. Kappler, supra, at 669. The remaining extension to the 

Navajo Reservation was referred to as the 709/744 area and 

consisted of approximately seventy-nine townships (1.9 million 

acres) in New Mexico and forty-seven (one million acres) in 

Arizona. (See Appendix for a map of the 709/744 area.) 

Predictably, political response in New Mexico to the 709/744 

extension was unfavorable. Within a few short months Delegate 

Andrews was forwarding to the Interior Department letters and 

petitions from opponents to the extension and was pressuring the 

Interior Department for reassurance that no Indians would be 

allotted who were not already residing on the land. See Exs. 19, 

20, FO. After being informed that a congressional resolution 

would be needed before the President could restore the unallotted 

709/744 lands, Andrews asked the Department to prepare one. Ex. 

FO. Commissioner Leupp drafted a joint resolution to reopen the 

709/744 extension to settlement and entry and "restore the surplus 

[i.e., unallotted] lands to the public domain." Exs. 22, 24 at 4. 

Before recommending passage of Andrews' joint resolution, the 

6 The withdrawal was made subject to valid existing 

Among them was railroad title to odd-numbered sections 

townships north of the Santa Fe railroad bed that were 

709 area. Thus, the extension to the Reservation was, 

inception, checkerboarded with private railroad lands. 

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rights. 

in certain 

within the 

from its 

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House Committee on Indian Affairs sought the opinion of the 

Interior Department's Office of Indian Affairs. The response from 

Acting Commissioner Larrabee was included in the Committee Report, 

and stated in pertinent part: 

"(I)t was necessary, in order to protect them [public 

domain Navajos) in their homes that a temporary 

reservation of the lands be made until such time as the 

Indian occupants could be allotted. It was not and is 

not the intention of the Department that lands which 

will not be needed for allotment purposes be withheld 

from settlement and entry any longer than will 

absolutely be necessary to insure the Indian's securing 

their homes under authority of law without interference 

from white settlers . 

. . . [I]f the joint resolution should become a law 

it will be possible to restore the surplus lands to the 

public domain as fast as the Indians in any particular 

tract have all been allotted." 

H. R. Rep. No~ 1663, 60th Cong, 1st Sess., 1-2 (1908) (emphasis 

added). The Committee reported that Larrabee's letter "authenticates the virtue of this resolution." Id. at 1. The Senate 

Report was virtually identical. See S. Rep. No. 681, 60th Cong., 

1st Sess. (1908). The resolution was enacted into law as section 

twenty-five of the Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444, 

457. 

Indications are that the Interior Department was in something 

of a hurry to complete the allotments. See,~, Exs. 19 at 3, 

39 at 9. Acting Commissioner Larrabee told the allotting agents 

in the field to first allot the area east of the New Mexico First 

Guide Meridian and at the earliest practicable date. Ex. 32 at 3. 

On December 30, 1908, less than fourteen months after EO 709 was 

issued, President Roosevelt issued EO 1000, which provided that 

the unallotted lands in the eastern third of the 709/744 area--

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east of the New Mexico First Guide Meridian--were "restored to the 

public domain" except for 110 allotments which had not been 

finally approved. Exec. Order 1000 (1908), reprinted in 3 C. 

Kappler, supra, at 685. Secretary Garfield's letter recommending 

EO 1000 focused on the need to reopen the lands to settlement and 

entry. See Ex. 35 at 3. 

In 1909 the Taft Administration replaced the Roosevelt 

Administration, and R.A. Ballinger, the former Commissioner of the 

General Land Office, became the Interior Secretary. R. Vol. VII 

at 1295. At the time of the transition, the Interior Department 

established a separate agency and superintendency for the 709/744 

area and the area further north of it in New Mexico. Ex. 84. The 

superintendent's jurisdiction was over all of the Navajos allotted 

or living on "public lands in New Mexico, east of the original 

Navajo Reservation; also those on the eastern Navajo extension 

established by [EOs 709/744]." Ex. FAC at 1. The area and agency 

were referred to as the Pueblo Bonito. From its inception, the 

Agency's jurisdiction extended not only to Navajos within the 

recently created 709/744 reservation but to those beyond it as 

well. The Pueblo Bonito Superintendent, Samuel Stacher, taking a 

policy position consistent with that of Navajo-Agency 

Superintendent Harrison a few years before, urged the Interior 

Department to reconsider its position and not restore the remaining 709/744 area to the public domain or open it to settlement. 

Exs. 43 at 2-4, FAL-2. Also, Senator Curtis of Kansas ~rged the 

Department not to "throw open the remainder of the reservation." 

Ex. 46 at 1. Father Weber took the same position, fearing that 

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opening of the reservation would deny to 709/744 Navajos the 

extended grazing lands necessary for their economic survival. Ex. 

40 at 3-7. The Interior Department response, however, was that 

section twenty-five of the Act of May 29, 1908 ("section twentyfive") dictated restoration of the lands to the public domain 

after the allotments had been completed, and, therefore, its 

position did not change. Ex. 46 at 4. 

Having been assured that the allotment work in New Mexico had 

been completed, Ex. 47 at 2, President Taft issued Executive Order 

1284 on January 16, 1911, declaring that all remaining unallotted 

lands added to the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico by EOs 709/744 

were "restored to the public domain." Exec. Order No. 1284 

(1911), reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, supra, at 686. The time from 

the issuance of EO 709, adding to the Reservation, until the 

issuance of EO 1284, completing the restoration of unallotted 

lands to the public domain, was slightly over three years. 

B. The District Court Opinion. 

In ruling that the New Mexico 709/744 area retained reservation status, the district court concluded that the absence of 

three kinds of statutory language was dispositive: (1) the 

absence of language in section twenty-five (and EOs 1000/1284) 

explicitly mentioning reservation "boundaries," (2) the absence of 

"cession" language or other language of total surrender of all 

tribal interests, and (3) the lack of any statutory plan for 

congressional reimbursement for the opened land. District Court 

Opinion at 4. The court also observed that Presidents Roosevelt 

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and Taft knew how to employ cancellation language in an EO rather 

than restoration language and had used it on at least one occasion 

apiece; to the court the absence of cancellation language indicated that the 709/744 boundaries remained intact. Id. at 6. 

Finally, the court did not read the events surrounding passage of 

the statute and issuance of the EOs as evidence of a widely held, 

contemporaneous understanding that the boundaries would shrink, 

primarily because it found no distinction between the temporary 

nature of the 709/744 area and the anticipated demise of the 

reservation system in general, and because the surrounding circumstances showed a focus on title rather than jurisdictional 

concerns. Id. at 7. 

On appeal, P & M argues that the narrow and limited allotment 

purpose of the 709/744 extension was clear from the beginning, 

never wavered, and that the "restoration to the public domain" 

language in both section twenty-five and EOs 1000/1284 was 

operative language that was explicitly understood to be language 

diminishing or terminating the New Mexico 709/744 boundaries. The· 

Tribe, on the other hand, supports the district court position, 

emphasizing that the actual language of the 709/744 orders never 

.. mentioned that the extension was temporary and arguing that 

"restoration to the public domain" language should be seen as no 

more than evidence of diminishment. In effect, it asserts that, 

in the context of the surrounding circumstances, the restoration 

language should be construed either as ambiguous or as limited to 

title concerns. See R. Vol. III at 369. 

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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 

A. Legal Standards. 

The Supreme Court has issued a number of pronouncements to 

guide lower court interpretations of statutes and EOs affecting 

the status of Indian reservations. First, it is well established 

that Congress has the power to diminish a reservation 

unilaterally, Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 n.11 (1984) 

(citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903)). Nonetheless, diminishment will not be lightly inferred. Solem, 465 U.S. 

at 472. Congress must clearly evince the intent to reduce 

boundaries, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 615 

(1977), and traditional solicitude for Indian rights favors the 

survival of reservation boundaries in the face of the opening up 

of reservation lands to settlement and entry by non-Indians. 

Solem, 465 U.S. at 472. Courts may not, however, "ignore plain 

language that, viewed in historical context and given a 'fair 

appraisal' clearly runs counter to a tribe's later claims." 

Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe, 473 U.S. 

753, 774 (1985) (quoting Washington v. Washington Commercial 

Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979)). 

In the above cases the Supreme Court has applied, without 

comment, a de novo standard of review in determining congressional 

intent. See also Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1298, 1301 

(trial conclusions are "persuasive," but not considered factual 

findings) (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd in part and aff'd in part en 

bane, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (no discussion of standard of 

review), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994 (1986). The ascertainment of 

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congressional intent is a matter of statutory construction, which 

typically involves a de novo review. To the extent that statutory 

construction turns on an historical record, however, it involves a 

mixed question of law and fact. Where a mixed question "primarily 

involves the consideration of legal principles, then a de novo 

review by the appellate court is appropriate." Supre v. Ricketts, 

792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1986). Such is the case here, where 

key district court legal conclusions, e.g., the need for explicit 

language .mentioning boundary reduction or evidence of cession and 

compensation, "rest on an erroneous view of the law." PullmanStandard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 7 

The issue before us is set in the context of the so-called 

"surplus land acts" passed by Congress in the 1890s and early 

1900s. In those acts Congress dealt with the question of surplus 

reservation lands on a reservation-by-reservation basis after 

allotments in severalty to Indians had been largely completed as 

authorized by the General Allotment Act. In disposing of 

unallotted or surplus lands on reservations, Congress invoked a 

variety of phraseology, but generally did not distinguish between 

7 Were we to use a clearly erroneous standard for review of the 

historical record, we would find clear error in the district 

court's key factual findings with respect to the circumstances 

surrounding passage of section 25 and EOs 1000 and 1284. In this 

context, we note that in the companion case of Blatchford v. 

Sullivan, No. 87-1547, slip op. (10th Cir., May 30, 1990), another 

judge in the federal district of New Mexico ruled that the New 

Mexico 709/744 area had lost reservation status. In other words, 

two separate judges from the same federal district, using much of 

the same evidence, made directly contrary findings of fact and 

conclusions of law with respect to the same issue of reservation 

status (see Appendices Band C hereto). Those conflicting 

findings and rulings are simultaneously before us in our joint 

consideration of these cases. 

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title and boundary concerns and, in fact, seemed oblivious to 

future disputes that might arise over Indian jurisdiction. 

Similarly, in the early federal court cases holding that a 

reservation had been diminished, potential problems that might 

arise from the fact that the remaining Indian lands were carved up 

in checkerboard fashion were not even acknowledged. See,~, 

Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 670 (1913); Collins v. Bubb, 73 F. 735 

(C.C.E.D. Wash. 1896). Both Congress and the courts appear to 

have assumed, as did their contemporaries, that the reservation 

system would be short-lived. See Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 

468. They failed to foresee that Indian tribes would be selfgoverning bodies indefinitely, with a variety of quasi-sovereign 

powers, including taxing authority, within their reservation· 

boundaries. 

In the mid-1800s, when most Indian reservations were created, 

the lands typically were "reserved for occupation and use by the 

Indians" to protect the possession of the land for the Indians as 

wards of the federal government, until such time as they could be 

integrated into American society as full citizens. See,~, 

Solem, 465 U.S. at 466-67; Navajo Tribe v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 

1455, 1458 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987). When Congress extinguished 

Indian title to various reserved lands, the most natural 

construction of the abrogation was that the lands so affected were 

no longer available, i.e., no longer reserved for Indian 

possession and use, and, therefore, the old reservation boundaries 

no longer existed. The most obvious reason for congressional 

failure to distinguish between title and boundary (jurisdictional) 

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interests is that Congress did not see a distinction and thought 

that both interests terminated when either one did; i.e., 

logically, if Congress had seen a distinction, it would have made 

clear what its intention was with respect to both. Yet since the 

demise of the reservations did not occur as expected, the Supreme 

Court, in disputes over reservation boundaries, has applied a 

long-standing presumption that ambiguous congressional action 

affecting the rights of Indians is to be resolved "to the benefit 

of the Indians." See Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 

425, 447 (1975); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); 

Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). 

Hindsight established that the distinction between title and 

boundary was an important one, and thus, the Supreme Court has 

required that specific congressional intent to diminish boundaries 

and not just Indian land titles be clearly established in each 

alleged diminishment statute whose meaning subsequently became a 

source of dispute. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 469. According to the 

Court, statutory "open to settlement" language alone does not 

clearly reflect congressional concern for boundaries because its 

language focuses on title concerns. See,~, Mattz v. Arnett, 

412 U.S. 481, 496 (1973); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 

355 (1962). The Court's specific intent requirement has the 

effect of negating consideration of the congressional presumption 

that all reservations were to be temporary and instead elevates 

another presumption that Congress intended to deal fairly with the 

Indians. In short, the presumption that all reservations would be 

temporary is irrelevant in determining whether the boundaries of a 

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specific reservation were being diminished by the language of a 

given statute or EO. 

To summarize, although around the turn of the century 

Congress anticipated the early demise of the reservation system, 

the Supreme Court has not extrapolated from this expectation a 

concomitant boundary diminish.ment in the passage of every surplus 

land act. Solem, 465 U.S. at 469. Instead it has examined each 

act on a case-by-case basis, holding that some of the acts 

diminished reservations and others did not. Compare Solem, 465 

U.S. at 466-76; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 496-504; and Seymour, 368 U.S. 

at 354-57 (each holding that the affected reservation lands had 

not been diminished by language opening them to sale and settlement) with Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 586-615; Decoteau, 420 

U.S. at 431-49 (both holding that the affected reservation lands 

had been diminished by language of cession and relinquishment), 

and Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, 473 U.S. at 766-74 (holding 

that former hunting and fishing rights within ceded lands had been 

terminated with the cession). 

The current analytic structure has been summarized in Solem. 

The overriding standard is that congressional intent at the time 

of the relevant statute governs. In determining intent, "[t]he 

effect of any given surplus land Act depends on the language of 

the Act and the circumstances underlying its passage." Solem, 465 

U.S. at 469. The "operative" language of the statute is more 

powerful than incidental language embedded in secondary provisions 

of the statute. Id. at 472. In the presence of statutory language that would otherwise suggest unchanged reservation 

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boundaries, 8 however, the Court is willing to infer a contrary 

congressional intent when events surrounding the passage of a surplus land Act "unequivocally reveal a widely held, contemporaneous 

understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a 

result of the proposed legislation." Id at 471. 

In addition to explicit statutory language and surrounding 

circumstances, the Court is willing to look to subsequent events, 

including congressional action and the demographic history of the 

opened lands, for clues to whether Congress expected the reservation boundaries to be diminished. The Court suggests, however, 

that these latt~r factors will not substitute for failure of "an 

Act and its legislative history ... to provide substantial and 

compelling evidence of a congressional intention to diminish 

I d . 1 d 119 n ian ans .... Id. at 472. In other words, subsequent 

8 Where the statutory language does not "suggest" unchanged 

boundaries but is simply ambivalent and could support an interpretation of either changed or unchanged boundaries, the Solem 

Court does not indicate whether unequivocal evidence of a widely 

held, contemporaneous understanding is needed or whether something 

less than unequivocal evidence is sufficient to resolve the 

ambiguity. We assume that the evidence, if not unequivocal, must 

be substantial and compelling. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 472. 

9 We assume that such factors also will not substitute for 

failure of the surrounding circumstances to provide substantial 

and compelling, if not unequivocal, evidence where an Act and its 

legislative history provide less than substantial and compelling 

evidence. Why the Court did not mention the "surrounding 

circumstances" in this context along with legislative history is 

unclear. It is unlikely that what the Court gave with one hand (a 

standard requiring analysis of the surrounding circumstances where 

an Act suggests unchanged boundaries), it would take away with the 

other by precluding "substantial and compelling evidence" provided 

by the surrounding circumstances. Especially where the 

legislative history contained in congressional documents is 

sparse, as is the case here, the surrounding circumstances can be 

critical to a determination of congressional intent. Of course, 

it may be that the term "legislative history" in Solem was meant 

[footnote continued] 

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events and demographic history can support and confirm other 

evidence but cannot stand on their own; by the same token they 

cannot undermine substantial and compelling evidence from an Act 

and events surrounding its passage. 

B. General Intent of EOs 709/744 and Language "Restoring" 

Unallotted Lands "to the Public Domain". 

With these standards in mind, we first determine whether EOs 

709/744 explicitly established a permanent reservation addition. 

We must then determine whether the "restore to the public domain" 

language in section twenty-five authorized diminishment or 

termination of the reservation boundaries of the 709/744 area.

10 

If so, the same restoration language in EOs 1000/1284 effectuated 

the diminishment or termination of the New Mexico portion of the 

709/744 area. To determine congressional intent, we look to 

explicit statutory language, to the common meaning of the phrase 

"restore to the public domain" in' the years 1907-11, and to the 

specific circumstances surrounding its use in section twenty-five. 

[footnote continued] 

to include not only congressional documents and debate but all 

other relevant documents and circumstances leading up to 

legislative action. In any event, we interpret the "substantial 

and compelling evidence" standard in Solem to include evidence 

provided by both the legislative history and the surrounding 

circumstances. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 505 (if statute 

is not clear on its face, the Court looks to the surrounding 

circumstances and to legislative history), on which Solem relied. 

10 The term diminishment refers to a reduction in the overall 

size of the New Mexico 709/744 reservation area. Termination 

refers to extinction of the reservation in the New Mexico 709/744 

area. We defer until section D of this opinion discussion of 

which one Congress intended to effectuate. 

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The Tribe asserts that the absence of the word "temporary" in 

EO 709 demonstrates that the reservation addition was meant to be 

permanent. We reject this assertion because, as discussed above, 

Supreme Court precedent establishes that intent can be ascertained 

from outside evidence where statutory language (or, presumably, EO 

language as well) suggests that boundaries were permanent. We 

also note that absence of the term "temporary" from EOs setting 

aside land as an Indian reservation has not prevented the Supreme 

Court from holding in the past that certain of such reservations 

conveyed only temporary and limited possessory interests in the 

lands affected. See Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United 

States, 330 U.S. 169, 176 (1947); 11 Sioux Tribe of Indians v. 

United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942). 12 In both Confederated Bands 

11 In Confederated Bands, lands were set aside in an 1875 EO 

"'as an addition to the present reservation'" and in an EO of 1882 

were "'restored to the public domain.'" Confederated Bands, 330 

U.S. at 173 n.1, 174 (quoting Exec. Orders of Nov. 22, 1875 and 

Aug. 4, 1882, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and 

Treaties, 834-35 (2d ed. 1904). The case concerned the impact of 

a mistaken boundary survey, which had led the President inadvertently in his 1875 EO to add land to the Ute Reservation beyond 

that provided for in the Treaty of 1868. The Court concluded that 

(1) the President had no authority to convey to the Utes a 

compensable interest in the lands lying north of the true 1868 

treaty boundary, (2) Congress had never intended title to flow to 

the Utes for any lands north of the treaty boundary, and (3) the 

EO was simply trying to give back to the Utes the land mistakenly 

excluded by the incorrect survey. Notably, executive as well as 

congressional intent was important to the outcome. 

12 Sioux considered whether the Sioux Tribe should have been 

compensated for loss of its alleged interest in some five and 

one-half million acres set aside as an addition to its present 

reservation in four EOs of 1875 and 1876 and then restored to the 

public domain by EOs of 1879 and 1884. Sioux, 316 U.S. at 320-23. 

The Court held that Congress had not intended the four EOs of 

1875-76 to convey tribal title to the land, thus differentiating 

the particular EO reservations from those established by statute 

or treaty. Id. at 331. That Congress never intended tribal title 

[footnote continued] 

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and Sioux, the Court concluded that no title interests had passed 

to the tribes. Interestingly, Sioux cites to various pages, 

including page 21, of U.S. Department of the Interior, Executive 

Orders Relating to Indian Reservations (1912), noting that neither 

the Government nor the Indians suggested that any compensation was 

due under the EOs on those pages and inferring that those EOs did 

not pass the same interest that was conveyed by statute or treaty. 

See Sioux, 316 U.S. at 330 n.15. Page 21 contains a copy of EO 

1000, at issue here. Because the explicit language of EOs 709/744 

does not establish that the 709/744 area was established as a 

temporary reservation, we must analyze the circumstances 

surrounding their issuance. 

The Tribe also argues that the intended permanence of EO 709 

is reflected in the fact that congressional authorization was 

required for restoration of the unallotted lands, inferring that 

[footnote continued] 

to pass by EO was evidenced by the fact that it was common 

practice not to award compensation when the existence of a 

reservation was canceled by EO, that the executive branch itself 

viewed Indian interests as less than those established by treaty 

or statute, that the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs shared a 

similar understanding, and that the General Allotment Act should 

not be read to suggest otherwise. Id. at 326-30. The Court 

observed that the additions were created for the limited purpose 

of suppressing illegal liquor traffic among the Indians. When the 

illegal traffic became otherwise preventable (through a law 

establishing penalties), the Commissioner of Indian Affairs wrote 

to the Interior Secretary that the "'necessity for so large a 

reservation ... does not now exist.'" Id. at 322 (quoting 

Letter from Commissioner to Secretary of the Interior dated June 

27, 1879). The Court also observed that Congress had provided in 

the Indian Appropriations Act of 1877, ch. 1289, 19 Stat. 176, 

192, adopted August 15, 1876 (prior to the EO of 1876 but after 

the three EOs of 1875) that no appropriation for the subsistence 

of the Sioux was to be made unless they agreed to relinquish all 

right and claim to any country outside the boundaries of the 

permanent reservation established by the Treaty of 1868. 

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if the EO were temporary, the President could have terminated it 

without congressional authorization. No legal authority is 

offered for this argument. The Tribe also asserts that section 

twenty-five ratified the alleged permanence of EOs 709/744 and 

authorized the restoration of unallotted lands for title purposes 

only. At most, the explicit language of section twenty-five may 

suggest that the boundaries were to remain unaffected by the 

restoration of title, that is, if the phrase "restored to the 

public domain" is limited to title concerns. Accepting the latent 

ambiguity of restoration language, we proceed to examine it more 

closely for clarification of its statutory context in section 

twenty-five and its historical usage. Then we analyze it in the 

context of the relevant legislative history and surrounding 

circumstances to see if there is unequivocal evidence of a widely 

held, contemporaneous view that the 709/744 boundaries would 

shrink. 

i. Restoration Language as Operative Language of Section twentyfive and EOs 1000/1284: Other Federal Court Cases Distinguished 

Preliminarily, we observe that the phrase "restore to the 

public domain" is clearly operative language in section twentyfive and not incidental language. Section twenty-five states: 

"That whenever the President is satisfied that all the 

Indians in any part of the Navajo Reservation in New 

Mexico and Arizona created by Executive orders of 

November ninth, nineteen hundred and seven, and January 

twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and eight, have been 

allotted, the surplus lands in such part of the 

reservation shall be restored to the public domain and 

opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of the 

President." 

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13 Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 25, 35 Stat. 444, 457. The 

statute contains two operative phrases: (1) "restored to the 

public domain," and (2) "opened to settlement and entry." Whether 

their meanings are synonymous is at issue here, but that both 

phrases are at the heart of the statute is obvious from its face. 

This fact alone differentiates this case from Solem v. Bartlett, 

465 U.S. 463 (1984), and other federal court cases dealing with 

diminishment, none of which controls the disposition of the case 

before us and all of which are distinguishable. 

In Solem, the operative language of the relevant statute 

authorized the Interior Secretary to "'sell and dispose'" of a 

portion of the Cheyenne River and Standing Rock Indian Reserva13 Restoration language is also the operative language of EOs 

1000 and 1284. Executive Order 1000 of December 30, 1908 reads 

pertinent part: 

"It is hereby ordered that the unallotted lands [in 

certain townships in New Mexico east of the New Mexico 

First Guide Meridian), withdrawn from sale and settlement, and set apart for the use of the Indians as an 

addition to the Navajo Reservation by Executive Orders 

dated November nine, nineteen hundred and seven, and 

January twenty-eight, nineteen hundred and eight, be, 

and the same are hereby, restored to the public domain, 

except the following described lands embracing one 

hundred and ten unapproved allotments ..•. " 

Exec. Order 1000 (1908), reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, Indian 

Affairs: Laws and Treaties 685 (1913). Executive Order 1284 of 

January 16, 1911 reads: 

"It is hereby ordered that all lands not allotted to 

Indians or otherwise reserved within the townships in 

New Mexico added to the Navajo Reservation by Executive 

Orders of November nine, nineteen hundred and seven, and 

January twenty-eight, nineteen hundred and eight, lying 

west of the first guide meridian west, be and the same 

hereby are restored to the public domain." 

in 

Exec. Order 1284 (1911), reprinted in 3 c. Kappler, supra, at 686. 

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tions in North and South Dakota and to deposit the proceeds "'to 

the credit of the Indians [having tribal rights on those 

reservations.]'" Id. at 472-73 (quoting Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 

218, §§ 1, 6, 35 Stat. 457, 460-61, 463). The Court concluded 

that the Secretary was "simply being authorized to act as the 

Tribe's sales agent." Solem, 465 U.S. at 473. Although at one 

point the statute referred to the reservations as '"thus 

diminished,'" Solem, 465 U.S. at 474 (quoting Act of May 29, 1908, 

§ 2, 35 Stat. at 461), the Court concluded that the reference did 

not make clear whether it was a reference to the boundaries of the 

reservations or simply to the extent of lands available for Indian 

occupancy. And although the statute stated that tribal members 

could harvest timber within the opened lands '"only as long as the 

lands remain part of the public domain,'" Solem, 465 U.S. at 475 

(quoting Act of May 29, 1908, § 9, 35 Stat. at 464), thereby 

assuming that the opened lands had been returned to the public 

domain, the Court noted that the phrase may have referred only to 

the fact that the lands were to be open to settlement. 14 

Therefore, the Court concluded that these terms, appearing in 

separate and incidental sections of the statute and capable of 

being interpreted in more than one manner, "cannot carry the 

burden of establishing an express congressional purpose to 

14 In other words, tribal members could not harvest timber on 

opened lands after they were sold to settlers because then those 

lands would no longer be in the public domain but rather in 

private ownership. The point is that the contextual focus of the 

term "public domain" seems to be on entry and settlement by 

non-Indians, and not on reservation boundaries. The phrase is not 

part of operative restoration language in the statute, since the 

statute never "restored to the public domain" the land in 

question. 

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diminish" when weighed alongside the more limited express goal of 

opening up reservation lands for sale to non-Indians. Solem, 465 

U.S. at 475. In short, when the act as a whole and its operative 

language clearly focus on land disposal rather than reservation 

diminishment, the statute cannot be said to diminish the 

reservation boundaries. Moreover, the Court's exploration of the 

circumstances surrounding passage of the statute confirmed its 

conclusion that the reservation had not been diminished. Id. at 

476-78. 

The Tribe analogizes the present case to Seymour v. 

Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), and Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 

481 (1973), each holding no diminishment occurred. Both cases, 

however, construed "opened for settlement" language rather than 

"restore to the public domain" language. The Seymour Court held 

that reservation boundaries were preserved in a 1906 act that 

opened the southern half of the Colville Reservation to settlement 

and entry. 15 Similarly, Mattz explored the circumstances 

surrounding an 1892 act "opening" the Klamath River Reservation. 

The Court observed that the Act was substituted for a series of 

earlier (1879-1884) efforts in the House of Representatives to 

terminate the reservation, efforts resisted by the U.S. Senate. 

The 1892 Act adopted the Senate language. In both Mattz and 

Seymour the Court found that subsequent events supported its 

15 In Seymour, the Court noted the difference between the 1906 

statutory language and 1892 language vacating the north half of 

the reservation and restoring it to the public domain. The Court 

also noted that proceeds from the 1906 act were deposited to the 

credit of the Indians having tribal rights on the Colville Indian 

Reservation, whereas the 1892 Act had provided that Congress could 

appropriate the net proceeds for general public use. 

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conclusion that Congress did not intend to diminish the 

reservation lands in question. 

Like Seymour and Mattz, neither of two subsequent cases, 

Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and 

Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), concerned 

statutes using restoration language. Unlike Seymour and Mattz, 

however, both subsequent cases held that reservation boundaries 

had been extinguished. Instead of opened-for-settlement language, 

cession language was the operative language. That is, the 

statutes stated that the respective tribes agreed to "cede" or 

"sell" certain reservation lands, and each statute provided for 

payment to the respective Tribe for the value of the ceded lands. 

Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 597 (quoting Act of April 23, 

1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254, 256); Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 439 n.22 

(quoting Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, 1036). 

These facts were deemed conclusive of Tribal relinquishment of 

jurisdiction as well as title. 16 We do not have such clear 

language of cession and compensation before us in this case. 

16 Notably, United States v. Grey Bear, 828 F.2d 1286 (8th 

Cir.), vacated in part and reh'g granted en bane, 836 F.2d 1088 

(8th Cir. 1987) (vacated only with respect to prejudicial 

misjoinder issue and reinstated in subsequent rehearing, 863 F.2d 

572 (8th Cir. 1988)), did not find cession language alone to be 

sufficient to disestablish. The Devils Lake Reservation at stake 

in Grey Bear was established by the Act of March 2, 1889. The 

government argued that it had been disestablished by treaty and by 

the Act of April 27, 1904, ch. 1620, 33 Stat. 319, 321, both of 

which provided that the Devils Lake Indians "hereby cede, 

surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all their claim, 

right, title, and interest in and to all that part of the Devils 

Lake Indian Reservation now remaining unallotted, .••• " 

Notwithstanding this clear language of cession, the court found 

that the statute did not contain an unconditional commitment to 

pay the tribe for ceded lands and, therefore, did not extinguish 

jurisdictional boundaries. 

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A recent Tenth Circuit case, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 

F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985) (en bane), is distinguishable as well. 

Diminishment issues were raised in Ute with respect to the Uintah 

and Uncompahgre Reservations in Utah. We held that a section of 

the Appropriations Act of 1905 opening the Uintah Reservation to 

non-Indian settlers was insufficient to establish congressional 

intent to diminish or disestablish the reservation. We observed 

that earlier statutory language had provided for the surplus land 

to be restored to the public domain if the Tribe's consent could 

be obtained. That consent was not forthcoming, and the 

congressional language used in the 1905 Act, "as contrasted with 

its use of 'public domain' [restoration] language in the 1902 Act, 

is evidence of a clear retreat from any desire to effect a 

wholesale diminishment of the Reservation." Id. at 1089 (quoting 

Indian Appropriations Act of ~902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263). 

In other words, restoration language was not the operative 

language of the statute being construed, although we were willing 

to infer that such restoration language would have effected a 

wholesale diminishment of the Uintah Reservation. Similarly, we 

held that language in the 1905 Act setting apart and reserving one 

million acres for the Uintah Forest Reserve prior to "'opening'" 

the Uintah Indian Reservation did not diminish the boundaries of 

the reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090 (quoting 

Indian Appropriations Act of 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1070). 

After examination of the statutory language, legislative history, 

and subsequent events, we concluded that withdrawal of forest 

lands for administration by the Department of Agriculture could be 

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consistent with continued reservation status. Again, no restoration language was present. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090. 

Finally, we held in Ute that the Uncompahgre Reservation had 

not been diminished by an 1897 act which opened unallotted lands 

"'for location and entry under all the land laws of the United 

States.'" Id. at 1092 (quoting Indian Appropriations Act of 1897, 

ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87). An earlier statute had authorized that 

portions "'unsuited'" or "' not . . . required for allotments 

... , by proclamation, be restored to the public domain and made 

subject to entry as hereinafter provided.'" Ute Indian Tribe, 773 

F.2d at 1091 n.3 (quoting Indian Appropriations Act of 1894, ch. 

290, § 20, 28 Stat. 286, 337). We did not find that the 1894 

statute provided a baseline for interpreting the 1897 statute, 

stating in addition that: "(T]he phrase 'restore to the public 

domain' is not the same as a congressional state of mind to 

disestablish. In other words, it doesn't disturb the ownership of 

land by the tribal group." Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1092 

(emphasis added). The latter sentence is imprecise, because 

restoration to the public domain unmistakably disturbs ownership 

by the tribal group, i.e., if title passes to non-Indians as a 

result of the restoration of certain lands, then ownership of the 

land is affected. What is arguably not disturbed is tribal jurisdiction over the lands, i.e., if private fee lands are still 

within the reservation, then the tribe presumably has jurisdiction 

over them for some purposes. Subsequent sentences clarify that we 

saw two alternative constructions of the phrase "restore to the 

public domain," the first limited to title and the second 

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extending to both title and jurisdiction. See id. Our conclusion 

in Ute that the generic phrase was ambiguous is undercut, however, 

by our conflicting statement earlier in the same opinion that 

public domain language implies "a wholesale diminishment of the 

Reservation." Id. at 1089. Moreover, our conclusion is 

unexamined and unsupported in the opinion. Furthermore, we view 

the comments about restoration language as extraneous because 

restoration language was not the operative language of the 

statutes being construed, unlike the situation now before us.

17 

In summary, none of the arguably analogous Supreme Court 

cases nor the Ute case involved the need to construe the meaning 

17 The concurrence in Ute, in which a majority of the en bane 

court joined, emphasizes the difference between the 1894 and 1897 

statutory language affecting the Uncompahgre Reservation as well 

as the strenuous objection of the Uncompahgres at the time to the 

terms of the 1894 statute. Ute Indian Tribe, -773 F.2d at 1095-96 

(Seymour, J., concurring). While the concurrence interprets Solem 

to stand for the proposition that '"public domain' language 

standing alone is insufficient to·support a finding of explicit 

congressional intent to disestablish," id. at 1095, this interpretation ignores the fact that the statute construed in Solem did 

not contain operative language restoring Indian lands to the 

public domain. At the same time, the concurrence acknowledges 

that Congress was "completely clear when it terminated Uintah 

rights in the Gilsonite Strip." Id. at 1098. The method used by 

Congress to terminate Uintah rights in the strip was to declare 

the lands "to be public lands of the United States and restored to 

the public domain," the restoration to take effect upon ratification by 3/4 of the male Indians on the reservation, with proceeds 

from the sale of the affected lands to be held in trust for the 

Indians. Act of May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157-58. We take 

judicial notice of the fact that after Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 

U.S. 553 (1903) (holding that Congress could terminate a reservation unilaterally), ratification by any affected Indian Tribe was 

no longer necessary. Thus, the need for Indian ratification does 

not apply in the context of this case. As Commissioner of Indian 

Affairs Francis Leupp stated: "From the 5th of January, 1903, the 

date of the Lone Wolf decision, to the present day, no more 

agreements have been made or sought with the Indians preliminary 

to the opening of a reservation." F. Leupp, The Indian and His 

Problem 84 (1910). 

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of the phrase "restore to the public domain" when used as the 

operative language of the statute at issue. And none, therefore, 

addressed the additional question of whether the phrase is 

ambiguous when unaccompanied by language of cession and reimbursement, or other language clearly addressing reservation boundaries. 

We must, therefore, analyze how this phrase is to be construed in 

such a context and must examine how the phrase, standing alone, 

was understood at the time and what the specific circumstances 

were surrounding its use in section 25 and EOs 1000/1284. 

ii. Meaning of Restoration Language in Historical Context 

In determining the meaning of words and phrases, commonly 

understood dictionary meanings can be a helpful starting point. 

According to Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1128 (1909), 

"restore" meant "to give or bring back, as that which has been 

lost; to bring back to the owner; to replace." A more modern 

dictionary definition of "restore" is to bring back or put back 

into a former or original state. See Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 1936 (1981). The question arises as to 

what the nature and function of that original state was. Can land 

returned to the public domain for purposes of sale and settlement 

simultaneously continue to be reserved land for jurisdictional 

purposes, or are the concepts mutually exclusive? Webster's 

dictionary from the relevant time period gives the legal 

definition of "domain" as "ownership of land; an estate or 

patrimony which one has in his own right; absolute proprietorship; 

paramount or sovereign ownership." Webster's Unabridged 

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Dictionary 403 (1909). Within the definition of "domain," the 

phrase "public domain" is singled out and defined as "the 

territory belonging to a state or to the general government; 

public lands." Id. The terms "domain" and "public domain" are 

not explicitly limited to possession and title ownership and seem 

to include the notion of control for all sovereign purposes. 

Obviously, what Congress and the Executive intended at the 

time by the words "restore to the public domain" cannot be 

determined merely from dictionary definitions, which do not 

clearly resolve the potential ambiguity with respect to title and 

jurisdiction. In some statutes and EOs, the potential ambiguity 

of the phrase is resolved by the use of additional language 

explicitly destroying reservation boundaries. That is, some EOs 

and statutes "cancel," "vacate," "discontinue," or "abandon" a 

reservation or a portion thereof and then restore it to the public 

domain. This linguistic structure is parallel to many statutes 

and EOs creating reservations by first withdrawing land (from 

either the public domain or from settlement and entry) and then 

establishing a reservation or adding to an existing one. 

Our job here would be easy were such a verb present in 

section twenty-five and EOs 1000/1284. For instance, language 

that "vacated and restored [reservation lands] to the public 

domain" has been interpreted as clear language of extinguishment 

by the Supreme Court. See Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 n.22 

(1973) (noting that vacate and restore to public domain is "clear 

language of express termination"); Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 

U.S. 351, 354 (1962) (noting that above language had terminated 

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the northern half of the Colville Reservation); Collins v. Bubb, 

73 F. 735, 738 (C.C.E.D. Wash. 1896) (holding that "vacate and 

restore" language terminated north half of Colville Reservation). 

Section twenty-five and EOs 1000/1284 did not, however, use the 

term "vacate" or some similar verb prior to use of the phrase 

"restore to the public domain," and we must determine whether the 

absence of such a word is a fatal omission. What are we to make 

of restoration language standing alone? Can we determine whether 

it was linked exclusively to termination of Indian title interests 

or was also linked to extinction or diminishment of reservation 

boundaries? 

As the following analysis will reveal, restoration language, 

when used alone as operative language, clearly has been linked to 

termination in numerous factual settings. Although in some early 

Supreme Court cases, restoration language appears in the factual 

context of title disputes, in a number of other factual contexts 

the Supreme Court has concluded that the term was linked to both. 

Furthermore, often one can deduce a tie to boundaries from the 

fact that there was a widely held contemporaneous understanding 

among the Indians and United States government that the boundaries 

were to be extinguished following use of the phrase as an 

operative phrase. Finally, one can deduce from linguistic 

analysis that Congress and the Executive Branch, when using the 

phrase as an operative phrase in statutes and EOs, frequently were 

linking it to boundaries as well as title. Since these deductions 

are largely based on inferential evidence and are not based on the 

universe of restoration statutes and EOs, we do not ground our 

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decision in this case on construction of the operative phrase as 

an accepted term of art comprehending both title and boundary 

diminishment. Nonetheless, examination of the historical use of 

the term is both instructive and influential. The district court 

undertook no such examination. 

a. Interpretation of Congressional Restoration Language by 

the Federal Courts 

Initially, we note that the early Supreme Court cases dealing 

with public lands neither refute nor establish that the phrase 

"restore to the public domain" was a term of art employed by 

Congress to cancel jurisdiction as well as title interests. See 

Missouri, Kan., & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Roberts, 152 U.S. 114, 119 

(1894); Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston R.R. Co. v. United 

States, 92 U.S. 733, 745-46 (1876) (creation of an Indian 

reservation removes it from the public lands and consequently from 

disposal in the usual way, e.g., sale or preemption). See 

generally Scott v. Carew, 196 U.S. 100, 114 (1905); Wilcox v. 

Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 511-512 (1839) (designating land 

for a particular use removes or withdraws it from public lands). 

The phraseology in all four cases is removal from or restoration 

to the "public lands" and not the public domain. Assuming the 

terms are synonymous, the cases link the term contextually only 

with title concerns; jurisdictional implications were not excluded 

but simply were not raised. 

Comparably, Starr v. Long Jim, 227 U.S. 613 (1913), does not 

address boundary concerns. Under the Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 

180, 23 Stat. 79, the Secretary of Interior was to assure that 

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Indians who chose to remain on the Columbia Reservation selected 

lands in as compact a form as possible, with the remainder to be 

restored to the public domain. The issue in the case was not 

diminishment, however, but whether Long Jim could convey legal 

title in his retained allotment under the Act. The Court held 

that the federal government retained legal title to the allotted 

land. There was no dicta as to whether Congress intended the 

boundaries to be terminated by its statutory language authorizing 

that surplus lands be restored to the public domain. 

In contrast, more recent Supreme Court cases assume in dicta 

that congressional restoration language extinguished boundaries. 

Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 490 (1973), cites language from the 

Indian Appropriations Act of July 27, 1868, ch. CCXLVIII, 15 Stat. 

198, 223, (Congress restored Mendocino Reservation lands "to the 

public lands") as clear and sufficient language of extinguishment 

of reservation boundaries. Similarly, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 

Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 589 n.5, 600 (1977), accepted restoration 

language in the Act of March 2, 1889, ch. 405, § 21, 25 Stat. 888, 

896 (portion of the Great Sioux Reservation "restored to the 

public domain") as language demonstrating congressional intent to 

extinguish prior boundaries. Even Justice Marshall's dissent in 

Rosebud acknowledges that section twenty-one of the Act of March 

2, 1889 expressly disestablished part of the Great Sioux 

Reservation by restoring it to the public domain. 18 Rosebud Sioux 

18 Justice Marshall also authored the Solem opinion several 

years later, but we see nothing in Solem undercutting his view in 

his Rosebud dissent that the section twenty-one language disestablished the Great Sioux Reservation. Section twenty-one of the Act 

[footnote continued] 

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Tribe, 430 U.S. at 618 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Furbhermore, 

in Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), Justice 

White's majority opinion (holding that cession of Lake Traverse 

Indian Reservation lands disestablished the reservation 

boundaries) assumed that restoration language was the equivalent 

of extinguishment of reservation status for the lands affected . 

The Court sta.ted: "That the lands ceded . were returned to the 

public domain, stripped of reservation status, can hardly be 

questioned The sponsors of the legislation stated 

repeatedly that the ratified agreements would return the ceded 

lands to the 'public domain.'" Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 446 

(emphasis added). 19 

Other Supreme Court cases suggest that affected Indian Tribes 

understood EO restoration language to be language cancelling 

former EOs. 20 In Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 

[footnote continued] 

specified that all lands outside of six designated reservations 

(carved out of the larger reservation) were "restored to the 

public domain" except for three islands that were given to 

municipalities for public parks. In context at least, it seems 

clear that the former Great Sioux Reservation was being diminished 

in size and that the restoration language was the operative 

language signaling the diminishment. 

19 The sponsors of the legislation, in addition to clearly 

indicating that the statute extinguished Indian title '"to a great 

domain,'" also referred to the statute as carrying out agreements 

made with the Indians '"for the surrender of a large portion of 

their reservations to the public domain.'" Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 

440-41 (quoting 22 Cong. Rec. 3784, 3879 (1891) (remarks of, 

respectively, Representative Perkins and Senator Dawes)). The 

references speak to both title and jurisdictional concerns. 

20 We note at this point that the National Indian Law Library 

compilation of allotment/cession statutes (cited in Justice 

Marshall's Rosebud dissent, 430 U.S. at 618 n.3), states that 

"restored to the public domain" statutes are those appearing to 

[footnote continued] 

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U.S. 317 (1942), the Sioux sought compensation for the value of 

lands "restored to the public domain" but did not contest in that 

action, or any other of which we are aware, the fact that whatever 

Tribal interest had been created by additions to the Great Sioux 

Reservation under EOs of 1875 and 1876 had been terminated by the 

restoration language of the subsequent EOs of 1879 and 1884. (The 

Court itself viewed such language as the equivalent of "cancelling 

or revoking" an EO establishing a Reservation or adding thereto. 

Sioux, 316 U.S. at 330.) See also Confederated Bands of Ute 

Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 176 (1947). 21 

Evidence that lower courts have accepted the view that 

restoration language is synonymous with extinction of reservation 

status is found in Russ v. Wilkins, 410 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Cal. 

1976). "On many occasions Congress has unilaterally terminated 

sections of reservations by restoring them to the public domain 

The Act of 1873 [pertaining to the Round Valley Reserva-

[footnote continued] 

have "the clearest language of disestablishment." Doc. No. 002279 

at 2. The compilation lists section 25 as a statute of that type. 

Id. at Table E. Of course, as with other subsequent Indian 

interpretations of restoration language, this does not necessarily 

demonstrate that Congress so understood the term at the time, but 

it does nothing to undermine this proposition. 

21 In Navajo Tribe of Indians v. New Mexico, 809 F.2d 1455 (10th 

Cir. 1987), we observed that "the Navajo Tribe apparently concedes 

in this case that the [restore to the public domain] phrase in 

Executive Orders 1000 and 1284 was intended to disestablish the 

addition to the Navajo Reservation created by Executive Order 709, 

as amended by Executive Order 744." Id. at 1459 n.7. In Navajo 

Tribe, the Tribe sought to establish equitable title in the 

unallotted lands by virtue of the fact that the EOs were issued 

before the Indian allotments were completed and thus were void for 

failure to comply with section twenty-five. The court held that 

the Tribe's title claim was time barred. What the Tribe 

apparently conceded in its title claim it pursues here in its 

jurisdiction claim. 

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tion in California) specifically 'restored to the public lands' 

the 12,000 acres it severed from the Reservation." Id. at 581. 

The court found that a subsequent 1905 act failing to employ 

restoration language did not terminate the reservation in 

t . 22 ques ion. 

In summary, federal court cases reveal that neither Congress, 

the courts, nor Indian tribes themselves have insisted that 

restoration language be accompanied by more explicit cancellation 

language. Rather, they have used or accepted simple, operative 

restoration language as language of reservation termination in 

many situations. We have found no case where operative 

restoration language was not accepted as language of termination. 

b. Executive Branch Interpretation of Restoration Language 

Prior to EOs 1000/1284 

Language restoring lands to the public domain was used over 

and over again in EOs in the decades preceding the statute and EOs 

in question here. Various predecessors of Presidents Roosevelt 

and Taft, including Ulysses s. Grant, Rutherford B. Hayes, Chester 

A. Arthur, Grover Cleveland, and Benjamin Harrison used the phrase 

frequently as the operative phrase of an EO. See 1 C. Kappler, 

Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 830-875 (2d ed. 1904). A study 

of executive branch usage of the phrase is helpful in ascertaining 

its meaning to Congress, especially where there is no evidence 

that Congress and the Executive held different interpretations. 

22 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that even in the absence 

of such explicit language the surrounding circumstances revealed 

clear Congressional intent to redraw the boundaries of the 

reservation. Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914, 917-20, 926 (9th Cir. 

1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981). 

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Cf. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 521 F.2d 87, 91 (8th Cir. 1975), 

aff'd, 430 U.S. 584 (1977) (official correspondence, administrative treatment, materials bearing on the historical context of 

passage of legislation are relevant to congressional intent). 23 

We begin with the Public Land Commission's history of the 

public domain, commissioned by Congress and issued in 1880. U.S. 

Pub. Land Comm'n, The Public Domain (1880). In the chapter on 

Indian reservations, the document gives the procedure for 

"abolishing" an Indian reservation. It states: "When (an EO] 

reservation is no longer required, and the President is so 

informed by the Secretary of Interior, an Executive order is 

23 We note that, to date, the requirement that congressional 

intent governs has been applied by the Supreme Court in the 

context of the statutory creation or diminishment of reservation 

lands. United States v. Celestine, 215 U.S. 278 (1909), is the 

seminal case, to which subsequent cases refer. In Seymour v. 

Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962), and Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 

481 (1973), although the reservations were created by EOs, the 

Court was construing congressional statutes purporting to open the 

land to settlement. In Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984), 

the reservation had been both created by statute and allegedly 

diminished by statute. In our case the 709/744 addition to the 

Navajo Reservation was neither created nor terminated by 

congressional action but rather by EO. The statute in question 

merely acknowledged EOs 709 and 744 and authorized the President 

to act in the future. Nonetheless, we assume that congressional 

intent also governs in a case such as this. Since, in the absence 

of explicit congressional directive, Executive Branch reservations 

of land for particular uses take their validity from congressional 

acquiescence, United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 235 U.S. 459, 469-

75 (1915), presumably actions undoing former EOs take their 

validity either from congressional acquiescence or authorization, 

as was the case here. In any event, Congress did not prohibit the 

Executive Branch from terminating reservation boundaries until the 

Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299, § 4, 44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 

u.s.c. § 398d). When lands are withdrawn by EO and then restored 

by an EO authorized by Congress, information about executive 

intent is relevant to the establishment of congressional intent. 

In fact, in such circumstances, we believe that executive intent 

can be inferred to be congressional intent and the formal actions 

of both branches construed as a whole where there is no evidence 

suggesting conflicting intent. 

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issued restoring the lands to the public domain. • • I after which 

the lands are disposed of as other public lands." Id. at 243-44. 

In contrast, the document states that an Indian reservation 

"existing by virtue of treaty stipulations" is usually abolished 

in another manner, i.e., by agreement between the Indians and 

Interior Department officials to relinquish the affected lands for 

valuable consideration, and subsequent ratification by Congress. 

Id. at 244. In other words, the abolition of an EO reservation 

was not seen to require either ratification by the Indians or by 

Congress. The Supreme Court shortly thereafter referenced the 

Commission's report in Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians v. 

United States, 117 U.S. 288, 300 (1886). 

Executive Orders throughout the late nineteenth and early 

twentieth century invoked restoration language. For instance, in 

dealing with reservations of land for the Mission Indians in 

California in the years from 1871-87, Presidents Grant, Hayes, 

Arthur, and Clevel.and reserved various tracts of land, and then 

frequently restored them to the public domain. At other times 

they simply cancelled prior EOs. See 1 C. Kappler supra, at 819-

24; see also U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating 

to Indian Reservations 43-49 (1912) (at least four EOs restored 

various tracts to the public domain, while at least four EOs 

cancelled various reservations of land). 

Whether "cancelling" and "restoring to the public domain" 

were synonymous is not ascertainable directly from the face of a 

given EO but can be gleaned by comparison of various EOs issued by 

at least three of the Presidents. For instance, under his EO of 

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March 22, 1886, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, supra, at 824, 

President Cleveland "cancelled" a previous EO so far as it related 

to certain specified lands. Then in his subsequent EO of January 

29, 1887, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, supra, at 824, he observed 

that his EO of March 22, 1886 had "restored [those same lands] to 

the public domain." The phrase "restored to the public domain" 

never appeared in the earlier Order, thereby suggesting that the 

terms were synonymous.

24 President Grant's understanding of 

restoration language in his Mission Indian EOs can be inferred 

from his use of such language in another context. In an EO of 

July 2, 1872, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, supra, at 916, he 

"restored to the public domain" part of the Colville Reservation 

established by EO of April 9, 1872 and "in lieu" of that land he 

set apart other land "as a reservation." This language in his 

July 2nd EO suggests that he viewed restoration language as having 

disestablished a portion of the reservation and "in lieu" of that 

portion, he had set aside other lands as a reservation. One can 

infer that President Harrison shared the same view of restoration 

language. In his EO of November 19, 1892, reprinted in 1 C. 

Kappler, supra, at 877, he clarified the meaning of restoration 

language by saying that certain lands within the Utah portion of 

the Navajo Reservation were "restored to the public domain, freed 

from the reservation made by [an earlier] order." 

24 While restoration language could be seen as a subset of 

cancellation language referring to the title implications of 

cancellation, this view is less plausible than the view that the 

terms were synonymous, given the understanding of the time as 

reflected in the Public Land Commission's report. 

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Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973), supports the view that 

the terms cancellation and restoration were being used synonymously. Mattz interprets the effect of various EOs affecting the 

Mission Indians by observing that "the boundaries of the Mission 

Reservation were altered repeatedly between 1870 and 1875, and 

even thereafter. In its final form, the Mission Reservation 

consisted of no less than 19 different and noncontiguous tracts." 

Id. at 493-94 n.15 (emphasis added). The designated boundary 

changes between 1870-75 were effected by restoration language and 

after that by both restoration and cancellation language. See 

U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Executive Orders Relating to Indian 

Reservations 43-51 (1912). Yet the Mattz Court made no attempt to 

distinguish between these two methods of diminishment. 

More important than the above examples of synonymous use of 

restoration and cancellation language is the evidence that 

Presidents Roosevelt and Taft used the terms synonymously too. 25 

President Roosevelt, in his EO of January 25, 1904, reprinted in 3 

C. Kappler, supra, at 681, "restored to the public domain" certain 

25 Also, during the same time period, a decision of the Interior 

Department and its General Land Office, Crichton v. Shelton, 33 

I.D. 205 (1904) similarly recognized restoration language as 

language of revocation (cancellation). Crichton stated that the 

lands specified in President Hayes' EO of August 3, 1878 had been 

"taken out of the reservation and restored to the public domain." 

Id. at 209. The EO itself, however, merely "restored [the 

specified lands] to the public domain." 1 C. Kappler, supra, at 

831. Moreover, Crichton referred to President Grant's EO of 

January 31, 1870 as having been "subsequently revoked" by his EO 

of February 17, 1871. President Grant's 1871 EO merely approved 

Interior Department language asking for "restoration to the public 

domain" of the lands specified in the earlier EO. 1 C. Kappler, 

supra, at 820. While a transmittal letter from the Interior 

Department indicated that the intent of the 1871 EO was to revoke 

the prior EO, id., the language approved by the President used 

only language of restoration and not of revocation. Id. 

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lands in Nebraska. Then in his EO of February 20, 1904, reprinted 

in 3 C. Kappler, supra, at 681, he modified and amended the 

earlier EO so as "to permanently reserve [those lands] from entry 

and settlement and to constitute a part of the Pine Ridge Sioux 

Indian Reservation in South Dakota." If restoration language 

dealt only with title and did not affect reservation boundaries, 

President Roosevelt would have had no need for the amendment 

establishing that the lands "constitute[d] part of the Pine Ridge 

Reservation." 

In turn, President Taft "restored to the public domain" land 

reserved to the Papagos under an earlier EO and "in lieu" thereof 

other land was "withdrawn and reserved," strongly suggesting that 

one land area was substituted for another as reservation land. 

Exec. Order No. 1655, (1912), reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, supra at 

673. See also Exec. Order No. 1296 (1911), reprinted in 3 C. 

Kappler, supra, at 667-68. 

Contrary to the district court's opinion, the fact that 

Presidents Roosevelt and Taft each also used "cancellation" 

language does not negate the likelihood that similar meaning 

attached to "restoration" language. True, President Roosevelt in 

his E~ of May 15, 1905, reprinted in 3 C. Kappler supra, at 690, 

cancelled an EO written two months earlier and "in lieu thereof" 

substituted other lands to be added to the Navajo Indian 

Reservation. Similarly, President Taft in EO 1649 of November 26, 

1912, reprinted iJ 3 C. Kappler, supra, at 682, 684, used 

cancellation language to substitute another tract of land for the 

tract added to the Moapa River Reservation four weeks earlier. As 

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already noted, however, cancellation language is typical language 

used to substitute one tract of land for another. Although we do 

not know for certain why cancellation language was not chosen to 

signal diminishment across all contexts, the absence of 

cancellation language does not undermine the evidence that 

restoration language also had the effect of cancelling reservation 

boundaries. 

111. Restoration Language in the Context of EOs 709/744, Section 

Twenty-five, and EOs 1000/1284: Legislative History and 

Surrounding Circumstances 

With the above historical material as background, we turn now 

to the specific factual context of EOs 709/744, section twentyfive, and EOs 1000/1284. Circumstances surrounding the issuance 

of EOs 709/744 establish that the 709/744 area was withdrawn from 

the public domain in order to allot land to off-reservation 

Indians needing protection from white encroachment on their water 

holes and grazing areas. The records of Indian Office 

correspondence with Indians and whites in New Mexico, with the 

U.S. Congress, and with the President all evidence that the 

withdrawal and reservation addition were to be temporary, not 

temporary in the sense that all reservations of land for the 

Indians would be temporary, but temporary in a far more specific 

and time-limited sense. See,~, Exs. 13, 14, 15, 16. After 

issuance of EOs 709/744 the records of the Indian Office, even 

with a change of administration in 1909, continue to evince a 

consistent position that the withdrawal was only temporary and for 

a limited purpose. See,~, Exs. 19 at 3, 20 at 7-9, 21 at 2, 

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23 at 5, 39 at 8, 40 at 7, 49 at 1, 56a at 2, FV at 2, FAB at 2. 

Rather than opening reservation lands to integration and assimilation, as contemplated by the General Allotment Act, EO 709 was 

meant to protect off-reservation Navajos from competing settlement. EO 709 was issued because the General Allotment Act was not 

working to protect the Navajos on public domain land, and less 

rather than more interaction was needed to protect their nomadic, 

grazing needs. Adding 709/744 lands to the Reservation in 

addition to withdrawing them from settlement was not intended to 

create a permanent addition of reservation land with tribal 

jurisdiction over all those lands, in spite of the Tribe's 

attempts to apply temporary status only to the withdrawal and not 

to the addition. It strains credulity to accept the view of the 

Tribe's expert witness, Mark Leutbecker, that Commissioner Leupp 

was recommending a temporary withdrawal for title purposes and a 

permanent addition to the reservation for jurisdictional purposes, 

R. Vol. III at 397-98, especially when the distinction was not 

clear or even extant at the time. Furthermore, Leutbecker's view 

is contradicted by Leupp himself, who, in explaining EO 709, 

specifically told Territorial Delegate Andrews that "[i]t is not 

intended that this is to be a permanent addition." Ex. 19 at 3 

(emphasis added). 26 

26 Additionally, allotments in the 709/744 area were limited to 

those living in the area and were not extended to those living 

within the older reservation boundaries. In other words, the 

withdrawal protected just the public domain Navajos and did not 

treat the new area as reservation open to any and all Navajos 

seeking allotment therein. See,~, Exs. FV at 2, 24 at 3, 64 

at 5. This fact lends support to the argument that the reservation was temporary until its limited purpose of allotting to 

former off-reservation Indians could be accomplished. 

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The Tribe argues that a temporary extension would have 

provided only illusory protection to the Navajos living on public 

domain lands, and urges us not to construe Executive Branch action 

as providing only illusory protection. We do not read the record 

as evidence that the extension necessarily provided only illusory 

protection. Admittedly, knowledgeable persons such as Superintendent Harrison and Father Weber knew that the 160 acres allowed 

for allotment by the General Allotment Act were insufficient to 

provide sufficient range land in desert country. That was why 

Superintendent Harrison urged that, if an extension could not be 

created, allotments should be granted in areas where a water 

supply existed or could be developed; if the Navajos controlled 

the water supply, then, in effect, they would be able to control 

more than the 160 acres allotted to them, and other stockmen would 

not find the area as desirable for their own grazing purposes. 

The protection offered by EO 709 need not have been ineffective if 

Harrison's purpose had been realized and if railroad lands in the 

709/744 area could have been exchanged for others outside it, but 

as it turned out, problems developed in the allotting process 

itself and in consummating land exchanges with the Santa Fe 

Railroad. See section iv, infra. 

Furthermore, even if the protection of a temporary extension 

was illusory, the President was well apprised of the temporary 

purpose of the EO, as evidenced by documentation supporting 

Secretary Garfield's recommendation, which included correspondence 

from Commissioner Leupp and Father Weber describing and 

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acknowledging the temporary nature of the Eo. 27 Exs. 14, 15, 16. 

Finally, the position of top Interior Department officials during 

the 1907-11 time period was consistent in describing the purpose 

of EO 709 as temporary. See,~, Exs. 13, 15, 19 at 3, 39 at 8, 

12, FV at 2. The record amply illustrates the political conflict 

in New Mexico at the time and the lobbying efforts directed to the 

Indian Office and Interior Department not to extend the reservation at all. See,~, Exs. 10, 12, 19, 20. Compromise is 

evident from the outset. 

Contrary to the Tribe's assertions, President Roosevelt's EO 

of November 14, 1901 does not undermine the conclusion that 

restoration language was synonymous with boundary diminishment. 

The 1901 EO, reprinted in 1 C. Kappler, supra, at 877, withdrew 

land in Arizona from the public domain until Indians residing 

thereon "shall have settled permanently under the provision of the 

homestead laws or general allotment act." The Tribe argues that 

if the Executive Branch intended to set aside 709/744 lands 

temporarily for allotment purposes, the 1901 EO was a model for 

doing so. The Tribe's argument, however, fails to consider that 

27 The Tribe's attempts to make a substantive distinction 

between Leupp's October 30th draft of h{s letter to Garfield and 

his final November 6th letter are not persuasive. The Tribe 

argues that in the October 30th draft, Leupp stated only that a 

"temporary withdrawal of the.lands" would be necessary, Ex. FD at 

2, while in his November 6th draft he wrote that a "temporary 

withdrawal of the lands ... and their addition to the Navajo 

reservation" would be necessary, Ex. 15 at 3. The reason we 

attach no special significance to the addition o~ the latter 

phrase in the November 6th letter is because essentially the same 

phrase appeared twice in the October 30th letter at both a prior 

and a subsequent place, e.g., "I have prepared ... a draft of an 

Executive Order adding the lands to the reservation •... " Ex. 

FD at 2-3. 

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withdrawal alone, without creation of a reservation, would have 

required the Navajos to be allotted under section four of the 

General Allotment Act. See Exs. 41 at 6-7, FAV. Section four did 

not sufficiently protect the nomadic Navajos in the 709/744 area 

from competition, for they did not necessarily meet the section 

four requirement that in order to be allotted lands off the 

reservation they had to "make settlement" of them. 24 Stat. at 

389. Not all of the water holes and potential dam sites that they 

wanted allotted to them were within the areas in which they had 

made "settlement." Even the Tribe's expert witness Leutbecker 

acknowledged this. R. Vol. III at 307-08; see also Ex. 41 at 6-7. 

An additional burden for off-reservation Indians, to which 

section four of the General Allotment Act applied, was that they 

had to apply to the local land office in order to be allotted. 

General Allotment Act,§ 4, 24 Stat. at 389, as amended by 26 

Stat. at 795; see also Ex. FBQ. In contrast, if the reservation 

were extended so that the off-reservation Indians could become 

reservation Indians, then they could be allotted under section one 

of the Act, which allowed the allotting agents to come to them. 

§ 1, 24 Stat. at 388. Finally, by adding the lands to the 

reservation rather than merely withdrawing them from sale and 

settlement, the privately owned railroad lands within the new 

reservation boundaries could be swapped for lands outside the 

boundaries under the Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 

189, 211, something both Navajo Agency Superintendent Harrison and 

Father Weber had urged. See Exs. 7 at 6, 14 at 3. For all these 

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reasons, EO language similar to the 1901 language would not have 

solved the problem facing the Navajos in the 709/744 area. 

The legislative history reflected in official congressional 

documents, although sparse, clearly supports the view that the 

extension was to remain only until the Navajos in the 709/744 area 

had been allotted. First of all, the joint resolution was drafted 

by Commissioner Leupp, whose pronouncements as to temporariness 

are consistent and unambiguous. Second, both the House and Senate 

reports on the restoration resolution incorporated a letter from 

Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs Larrabee stating that "a 

temporary reservation of the lands" was made "until such time as 

the Indian occupants could be allotted." S. Rep. No. 681, 60th 

Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1908); H.R. Rep. No. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st 

Sess. 1-2 (1908). Larrabee reported that the resolution had the 

approval of the Interior Department, and the Senate and House 

Committees adopted the recommendation of the Executive Branch as 

its own, stating that the recommendation authenticated the 

validity of the resolution authorizing restoration of the affected 

lands to the public domain. See H. R. Rep. No. 1663, supra, at 1. 

The resolution became a proposed amendment to an Indian bill. The 

Conference Report, reprinted in the Congressional Reoord, 

described the amendment thusly: "so soon as all the allotments 

have been made to the Navajo Indians upon the lands reserved by 

Executive order for that purpose so much of the reserve lands as 

I have not been needed for such allotments shall be restored to the 

public domain." 42 Cong. Rec. 7050 (1908) (emphasis added). The 

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amendment was adopted as section twenty-five of the Act of May 29, 

1908. 

In summary, under the rule of Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 

(1984), where the statutory evidence "suggest[s)" unchanged reservation boundaries, the surrounding circumstances must unequivocally reveal "a widely held, contemporaneous understanding" that 

the reservation would shrink. Id. at 471. Here, given the 

historic usage of restoration language to terminate boundaries and 

acceptance of such language by the federal courts as language of 

termination, the statutory evidence suggests changed boundaries. 

Nonetheless, because the evidence lacks explicit language of 

termination and merely suggests changed boundaries, we have 

examined the surrounding circumstances. We conclude that the 

district court erred in failing to differentiate the short-term 

temporary nature of the 709/744 addition from the expected demise 

of the reservation system in general. Finding unequivocal 

evidence of a widely held, contemporaneous understanding that the 

purpose of 709/744 was temporary and limited, we conclude that the 

operative restoration language of section twenty-five, combined 

with its legislative history and the circumstances surrounding its 

passage, establish that Congress intended to allow the President 

to terminate the reservation status of the 709/744 area. We 

further conclude that invocation of operative restoration language 

in EOs 1000/1284 did, in fact, cancel the 709/744 reservation 

boundaries in New Mexico. 

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iv. Subsequent Congressional and Executive Action 

According to Solem v. Bartlett, subsequent Congressional and 

Indian Office actions in the decades following EOs 1000/1284 have 

"some evidentiary value" but less than the events surrounding 

passage of the statute in question. See Solem, 465 U.S. at 471. 

Because the evidence provided by the Act and its legislative 

history is amplified in this case by subsequent history, we detail 

it. 

Evidence from the Interior Department, the Navajo Tribe, and 

Congress supports our conclusion that, in the decades following 

EOs 1000/1284, Congress and the Interior Department continued to 

view the 709/744 area in New Mexico as cancelled reservation. As 

will be summarized herein, the parties presented volumes of conflicting evidence in support of their own positions with respect 

to the subsequent actions of the legislative and executive 

branches. Were subsequent actions the sole measure of 

congressional intent, we might have some difficulty with certain 

ambiguities, but the requirement in Solem for unequivocal evidence 

is limited to the period surrounding passage of the statute in 

question. 28 Id. Since we have already concluded that 

congressional intent was clear at the time of section twenty-five 

and EOs 1000/1284, the ambiguities in the subsequent history, all 

of which are resolved or overwhelmed by other subsequent actions, 

do not undermine our conclusion. As will be seen, the occasional 

28 That the subsequent evidence need not be completely 

unambiguous on its face is demonstrated by the weighing of 

conflicting evidence in such as cases as Decoteau v. District 

County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 442 (1975), and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 

Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 603 (1977). 

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references in Interior Department correspondence, statistical 

tables, maps, and leases to the New Mexico 709/744 area as 

reservation or opened reservation pale in the face of consistent 

official pronouncements that the 709/744 area lacked reservation 

status. Moreover, the Indian Office was continually pushing for 

re-reservation status for the 709/744 area and continually being 

rebuffed by the Interior Secretary and by Congress. In such a 

context, its paradoxical references to the area as reservation 

must be heavily discounted as convenient colloquialisms because if 

it really believed that the area retained its reservation status 

it would not have labored so repeatedly to regain reservation 

status for the 709/744 area in New Mexico. 

Early confirmation of congressional and executive intent to 

cancel the New Mexico extension is offered by subsequent EOs 

dealing with the same land. President Taft in EO 1483, February 

17, 1912, refers to EO 1284 as having "eliminated" certain 709 

lands from the Navajo Reservation. Exec. Order No. 1483 (1912), 

reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, supra, at 686. The stated purpose of 

EO 1483 was to "restore[] to the status existing before [EO 1284]" 

various odd-numbered sections owned by the Santa Fe Railroad in 

order to allow an exchange of lands between the Railroad and the 

Navajos under the Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 189, 

211. The Act provided for the exchange of private lands within an 

Indian reservation for those outside the reservation. 29 As noted 

29 The relevant provision provided: 

"That any private lands over which an Indian reservation 

has been extended by Executive order, may be exchanged 

[footnote continued] 

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in the EO, a land exchange had been "initiated prior to said 

elimination." Nonetheless, it could not be consummated unless the 

railroad lands remained within the reservation. In his letter to 

the President recommending EO 1483 and submitting what became the 

adopted draft of the EO, Acting Interior Secretary Samuel Adams 

explained that the exchange had been approved by the Interior 

Department on April 12, 1909, and that subsequently the railroad 

company had executed a deed of relinquishment. Ex. 52 at 2-3. 

Adams stated that prior to the consummation of the exchange, 

however, EO 1284 "eliminated [the involved townships] from the 

Navajo Reservation." Id. at 3. He then explained that "a 

question has arisen as to the legal right of this Department to 

[c]onsummate the proposed exchange, the base lands being now not 

within an Indian reservation." Id. at 4. To dispose of the 

question, he recommended issuance of EO 1483. 

As pointed out by the Tribe, a letter written by Assistant 

Interior Secretary Frank Pierce in February 1911 took a different 

view as to whether the consummation could take place without an EO 

restoring the railroad lands to reservation status. Ex. FCC. The 

Tribe's invocation of Pierce's position, however, ignores the fact 

that a year later it was overridden within the Department. The 

position of the Executive Branch, embodied in the EO, was that in 

[footnote continued] 

at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior and 

at the expense of the owner thereof and under such rules 

and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of 

the Interior, for vacant, nonmineral, nontimbered, 

surveyed public lands of equal area and value and 

situated in the same State or Territory." 

33 Stat. at 211. 

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order to complete the exchange the railroad lands involved should 

first be restored to reservation status. 30 This decision 

necessarily implicates not just a conscious decision with respect 

30 Pierce's position was that since the land in question had 

been allotted to the Navajos before EO 1284, those lands could be 

seen as having reservation status. (It was not a position that 

unallotted lands retained reservation status.) As noted, his 

position was later overridden, primarily on the basis that to 

avoid any question as to the legality of the exchange it was 

better to assume that the land in question was no longer within a 

reservation. See Ex. 52 at 5. 

In 1916, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato Sells urged a 

position similar to that of Pierce's several years earlier. He 

learned that exchanges of some 226 additional allotments to 

Navajos of railroad sections in the 709/744 area had not been 

consummated prior to EOs 1000/1284, and he posited that, as 

allotted lands, they could be considered reservation for purposes 

of completing the exchange. See Exs. 59 at 4, FBE. The Interior 

Department again rejected this position. Ex. 59 at 7-8. To 

effectuate the desired exchange, the Department instead drafted EO 

2513 returning the affected lands to reservation status. 

President Wilson signed the order on January 15, 1917. See Exec. 

Order No. 2513 (1917), reprinted in 4 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs: 

Laws and Treaties 1030-31 (1929). In urging its issuance, 

Interior Secretary F. K. Lane noted that an earlier "temporary 

rewithdrawal" had been needed to accomplish a similar exchange (a 

reference to EO 1483) and urged parallel action to make possible 

another exchange with the railroad under the Act of 1904. Ex. 62 

at 2-3. In other words, like EO 1483 before it, EO 2513 reflected 

the Department's position that certain allotments to Indians made 

between 1908-11, i.e., after EO 709 and before EO 1284, could not 

become a basis for a swap under the Act of 1904 because the 

affected lands were no longer within a reservation. 

Five years later Congress demonstrated that it shared the 

Interior Department's understanding of the status of such allotments on railroad sections. In passing the Act of March 3, 1921, 

ch. 119, § 13, 41 Stat. 1225, 1239, Congress authorized the United 

States to accept reconveyances of railroad and other privately 

owned lands within the 709/744 area in order to consolidate lands 

for the Navajo Tribe. Such a statute would not have been 

necessary had the land retained reservation status. See also R. 

Vol. III at 330-35. As Special Commissioner to the Navajo Tribe 

Herbert J. Hagerman explained in a special report to Congress many 

years later, 

"In 1921 was passed another exchange law to take care of 

the railroad odd-sections, outside the boundaries of the 

[footnote continued] 

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to title but also with respect to jurisdiction, since title was 

held by the railroad company regardless of whether the land was 

within or without the reservation. Placing the land within 

reservation boundaries was what was required to consummate land 

exchanges under the Act of April 21, 1904. 31 

Another EO, No. 1482, issued along with EO 1483 on February 

17, 1912, supports the position that the 709/744 reservation 

status had been terminated by EOs 1000/1284. In EO 1482, 

President Taft, upon recommendation of both the Secretary of 

Agriculture and Acting Interior Secretary Adams, Ex. 51, modified 

the boundaries of the Zuni National Forest by excluding portions 

of ·the Navajo Indian Reservation previously included therein, with 

(footnote continued] 

then-existing reservation in the same way that the law 

passed on April 21, 1904, took care of the consolidations and exchanges within all of the extensions to the 

reservation. Had the 1907 (EO 709] extension not been 

annulled, the 1904 law would have permitted the 

necessary consolidations and exchanges in the eastern 

Navajo area; but with the nullification of the 1907 

extension, it was manifestly necessary to provide the 

means of securing these lands otherwise." 

s. Doc. No. 64, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1932). 

31 Shortly after issuance of EO 2513, see note 30, supra, the 

railroad announced that it was unwilling to exchange the isolated 

tracts described in the EO but "would be willing to relinquish its 

entire holdings" in the townships involved. Ex. 65 at 7. 

Therefore, the Interior Department prepared yet another EO that 

would have withdrawn twenty-two townships within the 709/744 area 

and parts of eleven other townships, together comprising some 

582,000 acres. See id. at 9-10. The withdrawal was never 

accomplished because the U.S. Congress passed a statute 

prohibiting the extension of reservations in New Mexico and 

Arizona by Executive Order. 25 U.S.C. § 211 (enacted May 25, 

1918). The statute was interpreted by Superintendent Stacher, 

Father Weber, and others as a political response by the Congress 

to attempts by the Indian Office to restore about a third of the 

709/744 area to reservation status. See,~, Exs. FGF, 70. 

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the exception of the Reservation lands described in EO 1284. See 

Exec. Order No. 1482 (1912), reprinted in 3 C. Kappler supra, at 

670. An earlier proclamation by President Taft on March 2, 1909, 

35 Stat. 2242, had placed various Zuni and Navajo Indian reservation lands into the Zuni National Forest, among them certain 

sections within Township 15 North, ranges 13 and 14 west, New 

Mexico Prime Meridian, which were, at the time, within the 709/744 

extension to the Navajo Reservation. Apparently there was some 

question as to the legality of this proclamation, see Ex. 51. The 

purpose of EO 1482, as described therein, was to undo the 

proclamation for the most part, i.e., 

"to restore in all respects the Zuni Indian Reservation 

and that part of the Navajo Reservation not affected by 

Executive order No. 1284 of January 16, 1911, to the 

status existing prior to the said proclamation of March 

2, 1909, as though the inclusion of the lands within the 

Zuni National Forest had not been ordered, and said 

Indian reservations are hereby fully recreated and 

restored to that status, with the exception above 

mentioned. " 

Exec. Order No. 1482, supra. In other words, although other 

Navajo lands were removed from the National Forest and returned to 

reservation status, the sections already restored to the public 

domain by EO 1284 were to be retained as National Forest lands. 

The clear inference in the EO and in Acting Interior Secretary 

Adams' recommendation of February 16, 1912 is that because the 

reservation status of the affected 709/744 lands had been terminated by EO 1284, those lands could be retained in the National 

32 Forest. See Ex. 51. Acting Secretary Adams took a similar 

32 The Tribe argues that language in President Woodrow Wilson's 

subsequent Proclamation of November 30, 1917 is evidence that the 

[footnote continued] 

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position as to the terminated reservation status of 709/744 lands 

in his letter of April 30, 1912 to New Mexico Congressman H.B. 

Ferguson, in which he referred to allotments within the 709/744 

area as falling "outside of the boundaries of existing Navajo 

Reservation in New Mexico." Ex. 53 at 4. 

Additional EOs in the first year or so following EO 1284, and 

Interior Department correspondence accompanying them, infer that 

[footnote continued] 

reservation status of the 709/744 lands had not been terminated by 

EOs 1000/1284. In adding certain sections within Township 15 

North, ranges 13 and 14 west, New Mexico Prime Meridian, to the 

Manzano National Forest (formerly Zuni National Forest lands), the 

Proclamation "vacate[d]" ·EOs 709/744 as they related to those 

particular sections. Proclamation No. 1412, at 1 (1917), 

reprinted in 4 C. Kappler, supra, at 984. 

For two reasons we do not give much weight to the Tribe's 

interpretation of this language. First, we note that the Manzano 

proclamation of November 30, 1917 followed within a month the 

Interior Department's position that railroad lands within the 709/ 

744 area were no longer within a reservation, supporting P & M's 

counter-argument that the proclamation was not prepared in the 

Interior Department and did not represent the view of the cabinetlevel department with the best historic understanding of the area. 

Even the Tribe's expert witness conceded that the proclamation was 

probably prepared by the Agriculture Department. See R. Vol. III 

at 440. 

Moreover, it appears that after EO 1482 was issued, the 

Agriculture Department became concerned as to whether some of the 

709/744 sections supposedly retained in the National Forest might 

have been allotted to Navajos while the lands were in reservation 

status, thus raising a question as to jurisdictional conflicts 

between the Agriculture and Interior departments over administration of lands within the forest preserve. Second Assistant 

Commissioner of Indian Affairs C.F. Hauke wrote to the Secretary 

of Agriculture in 1913 with respect to these lands, telling him 

that with the exception of one allotment, Indian Office 

jurisdiction over the lands had been "relinquished" under EOs 

1000/1284 and that the Indian Office had no objection to their 

being included in the Zuni National Forest. Ex. 56a at 2. 

Hauke's letter supports P & M's interpretation that reservation 

status of the lands in question had been terminated by EOs 1000 

and 1284. Notably, the Manzano Proclamation did not include the 

allotted section identified by Hauke. Cf. Exs. FDY, 56a. 

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the 709/744 reservation had been terminated. For instance, in EO 

1359, issued May 24, 1911, several sections or partial sections 

within townships that had been restored to the public domain under 

EO 1284 were "reserved from entry, sale or other disposition, for 

Indian purposes." Exec. Order No. 1359 (1911) (emphasis added), 

reprinted in 3 C. Kappler supra at 686. The lands described were 

set aside for administrative purposes in connection with the 

Navajo Indian Schools. 33 Ex. 53 at 4; see also Ex. FBZ. Included 

among them was land for the Pueblo Bonito Agency headquarters at 

Crownpoint, New Mexico. Use of the term "reserved" rather than 

"withdrawn" seems to indicate that no reservation for Indian 

purposes had remained under the former restoration language and, 

therefore, the land had to be re-reserved, as it were. Many years 

later Superintendent Stacher seems to confirm this interpretation 

in noting that after the restoration EOs, his Agency headquarters 

and Boarding School were located on two sections of land that had 

been reserved by EO but that were not located on the "reservation 

proper." Ex. 86 at 1. 

Similarly, EO 1700, February 10, 1913, set apart a section of 

land containing an Indian dam within the 709/744 area "as a 

reservation for use of the Navajo Indians in common." Exec. Order 

No. 1700 (1913), reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, supra at 688. Again, 

arguably, if 709/744 lands retained reservation status, EO 1700 

would not have been necessary; the land that had been opened to 

33 Exhibit FBZ documents that the General Land Office approved a 

temporary withdrawal of some of these lands while the Interior 

Department awaited full information from Superintendent Stacher as 

to the exact lands required for permanent withdrawal. 

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settlement could simply have been "withdrawn" from settlement but 

need not have been "reserved." 

Yet another EO, No. 1774, signed by Woodrow Wilson on May 6, 

1913, three months after EO 1700, "reserved" and "set aside for 

use of Navajo Indians living in the vicinity of Crownpoint, New 

Mexico" a section within the 709/744 area seen as desirable for 

the development of an artesian well. Exec. Order No. 1774 (1913), 

reprinted in 3 C. Kappler, supra, at 688. The Interior Department 

letter recommending the EO refers to the section as located within 

"that part of the former Navajo Reservation in New Mexico restored 

to the public domain by Executive Order No. 1284." Ex. 55 at 2 

(emphasis added). If the Reservation was a "former" one, then all 

attributes of reservation status, including jurisdiction, had been 

lost. 

The correspondence of Superintendent Stacher of the Pueblo 

Bonito Agency provides further evidence that the 709/744 extension 

in New Mexico had been terminated by EOs 1000/1284. The Agency 

had responsibility for New Mexico Navajos living in the 709/744 

area and east of the original reservation, which also took in an 

area north of the 709/744 area. (See map in Appendix.) After EOs 

1000/1284, the Agency continued to exercise administrative 

responsibilities over Navajos in the area. In his letter of April 

25, 1911 to the Superintendent of Indian Schools in Flagstaff, 

Arizona, discussing the plight of the Indians in his Pueblo Bonito 

region, Stacher first reiterates a telegram of the same date as 

stating "No Indian reservation here. Surplus lands restored 

public domain." Ex. 49 at 1. In the same letter, he states 

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"there being no reservation, wells or reservoirs should be placed 

on some of the allotments or Government sections reserved for this 

purpose, and, to control the range, the Indians should have leased 

the railroad sections." Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 

Chee Dodge, an important Navajo leader and spokesman at the 

time, also believed that the 709/744 in New Mexico was terminated 

reservation. He wrote to Interior Secretary F.K. Lane on January 

18, 1917, reviewing the history of the 709/744 area and complaining about renewed encroachments by absentee stockmen, which were 

having the effect of confining the Navajos to their allotments. 34 

The Dodge letter referred four times to the lands under the Pueblo 

Bonito Agency in New Mexico as "this former extension" and 

requested "the maint[e]nance of our means of making a living by 

extending the protection of a reservation over the lands of the 

Pueblo Bonito Agency 

railroad lands .. II 

. and securing the ownership of the 

Ex. 63 at 2-4. The request addresses 

reservation status as well as title interests. It seems unlikely 

that Dodge would have requested extension of the reservation had 

he thought that the 709/744 lands in New Mexico retained 

reservation status. 

During this same time period, Interior Secretary Lane asked 

Commissioner of Indian Affairs Sells to provide him with data 

34 Both Superintendent Stacher and the Navajos well understood 

that the Navajo allotments were insufficient to protect their 

nomadic life-style. Exs. 43, 63. In fact, in trying to prevent 

the 1911 restoration of the remaining 709/744 lands in New Mexico, 

Stacher had previously told the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 

that the allotments were "practically worthless if the Indians 

cannot control the range adjoining them." Ex. 43 at 2 (emphasis 

omitted). 

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about all Navajo Reservation additions. Sells' response of 

February 13, 1917 listed the 709/744 EOs and indicated that, as of 

that date, the reservation created by EOs 709/744 comprised only 

1,036,800 acres. Ex. 64 at 2. This acreage corresponded with the 

acreage remaining in the Arizona portion of the 709/744 addition. 

R. Vol. VIII at 1357. The original acreage prior to EOs 1000/1284 

had been more than 2.8 million acres, of which approximately 1.8 

million was again in the public domain or had been allotted. 

Sells stated that the table in which the one million acres was 

listed 

"shows the reservation as it exists today. Executive 

Order of January 15, 1917 [EO 2513] withdrew some 75,000 

acres on odd numbered sections, - railroad lands, -

largely in noncontinuous tracts, but this area was 

omitted from the table above as it does not lie adjacent 

to or form a part of the reservation proper." 

Ex. 64 at 2. The referenced railroad lands were within the 709/ 

744 area. If the Indian Affairs Office believed that the 709/744 

lands had retained reservation status after they were restored, 

Sells would not have stated explicitly that the railroad lands did 

not lie adjacent to the reservation or form part of the 

reservation proper. 

Five years later, the Board of Indian Commissioners, in its 

1922 report to the Interior Secretary, reported as follows on the 

"Pueblo Bonito Agency, New Mexico[:)" 

"The 2800 Navajos under this jurisdiction are all nonreservation Indians •... [N)early all of the townships involved in the problem of the nonreservation 

Indians ... are within this jurisdiction. This area 

includes over a hundred townships lying north of the 

Santa Fe Railroad, east and south of the Navajo Reservation, and the country is adaptable only for rough 

grazing." 

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U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fifty-Third Annual Report of the Board 

of Indian Commissioners 12-13 (1922). This area in which "all 

nonreservation Indians" were said to live included the New Mexico 

709/744 area plus twenty-two or more additional townships. 

Over the years, Superintendent Stacher pressed for an 

extension to the Navajo Reservation to protect various groups of 

public domain Navajos over whom he had jurisdiction. With Special 

Commissioner to the Navajo Tribe H.J. Hagerman, and Chief of the 

Land Division of the Indian Office W.A. Marshalk, he drafted a 

1923 memorandum referring to the fact that the lands sought for 

the extension had been withdrawn by an earlier EO "now cancelled." 

Ex. 76 at 5. The proposed extension would have taken in most of 

the lands restored by EO 1284, plus others just north of the Santa 

Fe Railroad line in western New Mexico. See Ex. 77 at 5. 

Although a congressional bill was prepared, the proposal was 

killed by opposition from within New Mexico. See Sen. Doc. No. 

64, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1932). 

In 1931 Stacher was still Superintendent of the Pueblo Bonito 

Agency. At congressional hearings held that year at the Agency 

headquarters in Crownpoint, New Mexico, he testified with respect 

to the conditions of Navajos under his jurisdiction and offered 

the following history: 

"[I]n 1907 an Executive order extended the reservation, covering a part of this Indian country. All 

Government land at that time within the area was withdrawn from entry until such a time that these Indians 

could be allotted .... 

The allotment work was never fully completed and 

nearly half of the Indians failed to secure allotments 

at that time. Pressure was brought upon the department 

from various angles to expedite the restoring of this 

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extension to the public domain. We urged that no such 

move be made but to keep it a reservation while there 

was a chance to do so, but this could not be done and in 

1911 the allotting crews were disbanded, and this work 

has never been completed. 

Later we urged the Indian Bureau to try to secure 

the Executive order reservation of this same area while 

Hon. Franklin K. Lane was Secretary of the Interior as 

he was favorable to the proposition, but when the people 

of New Mexico learned of what was about to be done, many 

telegrams, protesting the extension, were sent, and the 

result was that Congress relieved the President of the 

United States of his power to make Executive order 

reservations in the future." 

Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: 

Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 

United States Senate, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. 9625 (1932); see also 

Ex. FGE at 2. 

Final attempts were made during the 1930s to include within 

the Navajo Reservation all areas in which significant numbers of 

Navajos lived in Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico. The so-called 

boundary extension bills for Utah and Arizona were enacted. See 

Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: 

Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Indian Affairs, United 

States Senate, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 18120-21 (1937); ~ also Act 

of March 1, 1933, ch. 160, 47 Stat. 1418; Act of June 14, 1934, 

ch. 521, 48 Stat. 960. The New Mexico bill was not passed, 

although numerous attempts were made between 1933-38. See R. Vol. 

VIII at 1403. 

The area to be included within the New Mexico portion of the 

proposed reservation extension shifted somewhat from bill to bill, 

as attempts were made to gain the unanimous support of the New 

Mexico Congressional delegation, but the record indicates that all 

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the versions included the western portion of the New Mexico 709/ 

744 area. The boundary bills were attempting to bloc certain 

lands for use of the Navajos close to their EO 1880 reservation 

lands and to establish a definite limit to the exterior boundaries 

of the Navajo Reservation. In support of the 1934 House bill, the 

House Report of the Committee on Indian Affairs, incorporating the 

position of Interior Secretary Harold Ickes, stated: "This 

proposed boundary extension represents the ultimate line to which 

the Indians can hope to expand their reservation. This fact is 

realized by the Indians themselves as evidenced at their [last) 

tribal council." H. R. Rep. No. 1451, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 

(1934). The Senate Report accompanying S. 2213 in 1935 was 

similar. See S. Rep. No. 436, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1935). 

The Interior Department reintroduced the bill in successive 

years, explaining that only approximately 340,000 acres of public 

domain land were involved in the western portion (limited version) 

of the extension. See~, id.; H. R. Rep. No. 1451, supra, at 

2. The remainder of the land within the limited proposed 

extension was "largely within areas consolidated or purchased for 

the Indians ... , or else embraces an area heavily allotted to 

individual Indians.'' S. Rep. No. 436, supra, at 2. The 

Department was trying to reassure Congress that large amounts of 

public domain land were not involved in the proposed extension, 

and that title to most of the lands proposed for reservation 

status was already held by the United States for the benefit of 

the Tribe or held in trust for individual Indians. In other 

words, much of the land was already Indian country although not 

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within the borders of the Reservation. In return for 

congressional approval of the reservation of this checkerboarded 

land, the Navajos, according to Secretary Ickes, were "willing to 

legislate away [all their remaining off-reservation) allotment and 

homestead rights" in the New Mexico counties affected by the 

proposed legislation. Ex. FGP at 3; see also Ex. FGT at 2. 

In 1935, the then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John 

Collier, testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Indian 

Affairs in support of the New Mexico boundary bill, describing the 

history of the area as follows: 

"Mr. Collier. In the year 1907 Theodore Roosevelt 

created it as their reservation including the area 

within this proposed boundary, and not only that but a 

much wider area to the north of this. 

Senator Frazier. By Executive order? 

Mr. Collier. By Executive order. Then, by influences 

which were brought to bear, that Executive order was 

canceled, thus creating a situation of a 'no man's 

land.'" 

Survey of Conditions of the Indians in the United States: 

Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Indian Affairs, United 

States Senate, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 17440 (1937). 35 

The Director of Lands for the Indian Office, James M. 

Stewart, testified at the same hearing with respect to the 

existing boundaries of the Navajo Reservation in New Mexico. He 

stated that the east boundary followed the range line running 

between ranges 13 and 14, west of the principal meridian in New 

35 Previously, Superintendent Stacher, in his 1934 Annual 

Report, had expressed the hope that the New Mexico boundary bill 

would pass soon, as he said that "[u)pon the Public Domain we have 

one of the most complex situations found anywhere in the United 

States." Ex. 86 at 5. 

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Mexico, and the south boundary was approximately on the township 

line between townships 16 and 17 north. See id. at 17659. These 

boundaries mark the eastern and southern edge of the 1880 EO and 

exclude all of the 709/744 area. 

Despite various modifications in the proposed boundaries and 

attempts at compromise, the Interior Department apparently could 

not obtain the unanimous consent of the New Mexico Congressional 

delegation. See id. at 17524. The requirement of unanimous 

consent for passage of what was considered local legislation 

frustrated passage of the bill. Nowhere in the hearing excerpts 

in the record is there one iota of evidence that any member of the 

New Mexico delegation opposed the bills because he thought the 

reservation boundaries were larger than what was being proposed 

and should not be diminished by legislation. None of the bills 

ever became law. 

The Tribe's characterization of these bills as solely "titlerelated" initiatives ignores the fact that boundaries were 

explicitly discussed. Although at this period of time the 

underlying interests thought to be at stake continued to be titlerelated, title was intimately linked with boundaries throughout 

the political controversy over the bills. The Interior Department 

officials quoted above argued that the only way to secure the area 

for successful Indian grazing (and efficient federal management of 

the range) was by expanding the reservation boundaries since 

Indian attempts to purchase 709/744 lands and convince the 

railroad to swap its 709/744 lands for others had been only 

partially successful. Permanent withdrawal of the area by EO had 

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not been an option ever since congressional enactment in 1918 of 

the law prohibiting boundary expansion in New Mexico and Arizona 

by EO. 25 U.S.C. § 211. 

The Tribe's attempts to document ambiguity in the record 

subsequent to EOs 1000/1284 do not undermine the consistent and 

clear interpretation of the Interior Department that the 

reservation had terminated. The Tribe points to several letters 

from the Indian Office to persons in New Mexico referring to the 

extension in the present tense (e.g., "that part of San Juan 

County within what is known as the 'Navajo Extension' in New 

Mexico, lying east of the first guide meridian, was restored to 

the public domain," Ex. FAE at 1 (emphasis added)). See also Exs. 

41, 45, 46, 47, FAI at 1, FAL-1. 36 In the context of the many 

36 Sometimes Superintendent Stacher referred to the Pueblo 

Bonito as "reservation." For instance, in 1912 Stacher gave 

permission to one Dan Pipkin, Esq. to "purchase fat cattle from 

Navaho Indians living on the Indian Reservation under the jurisdiction of this agency .... " Ex. FCN. In correspondence with 

Second Assistant Commissioner of Indian Affairs C.F. Hauke in 

1912, both Stacher and Hauke referred to the allotments to Indians 

"on the reservation." See,~, Ex. FCQ. The reference was 

secondary to Hauke's request for descriptions of missing allotments in the 709/744 area. A number of years later, in Stacher's 

letter of October 16, 1920 to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 

he referred to the stock of the Indians "on this reservation." 

Ex. FEP. These "reservation" references appear to be convenient 

shorthand references to his Agency's jurisdiction because whenever 

an official query as to land status arose, Stacher was always 

careful to explain that most of his jurisdiction was over public 

domain Indians, and he made repeated attempts (already documented) 

to extend reservation status over New Mexico 709/744 lands. 

In a similar vein, E.B. Meritt, for many years the Assistant 

Commissioner of Indian Affairs, referred on a number of occasions 

to the area within Superintendent Stacher's jurisdiction as a 

"reservation," sometimes in response to the same characterization 

by Stacher. See,~, Exs. FDK, FEU, FEX, FFM, FFO. It is not 

clear, however, that Meritt was making any distinction between his 

use of the terms "reservation" and "Indian country," and Stacher's 

[footnote continued] 

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explicit statements that the reservation no longer existed, made 

in the context of management or policy decisions specifically 

addressing land status, these continuing references to the 

"extension" rather than the "former extension" are readily seen as 

colloquialisms, convenient ways to designate a geographic area in 

easily recognizable form. Use of the term "extension" is always 

incidental to the point being made and is itself not the focus of 

. . . 37 

any precise inquiry. 

Other attempts to demonstrate ambiguity by the introduction 

of Indian Office maps from annual reports in the years from 1911 

[footnote continued] 

jurisdiction included a lot of Indian country, as the term was 

then understood, i.e., area where Indians held title to land, 

either communally or as allotment in severalty under trust. See 

Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. (2 Otto) 204 (1877); Exs. FDK at 1, FDH. 

(In 1948 the Indian country definition was statutorily clarified, 

and the term "reservation" was distinguished from Indian 

allotments to which Indian title had not been extinguished. 

Compare 18 u.s.c. § 1151(a) and (c) (June 25, 1948).) In the 

formal context of congressional testimony in 1920, Meritt 

described the Pueblo Bonito country as "formerly within the 

reservation .... " The Indian Appropriation Bill, 1922: 

Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House 

of Representatives, 66th Cong., 3d Sess., 160 (1921). In 1925 

congressional testimony, however, he described the Pueblo Bonito 

lands in New Mexico as one of the "divisions of the Navajo 

Reservation." The Interior Department Appropriation Bill, 1927: 

Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, House of 

Representatives, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 421 (1926). We do not 

place much stock in thBse differing references, although we note 

that, after 1923, the Pueblo Bonito Agency included the southern 

portion of the Navajo Reservation set aside by the EO of 1880, so 

after that time it included at least 345,000 acres which clearly 

retained reservation status. See Ex. 86 at 9. 

Even the Tribe does not attempt to make much of these casual 

"reservation" references, placipg its emphasis instead on the 

arguments addressed in the body· of this opinion. 

37 We note that it would have been incorrect to 

entire 709/744 area as "former extension" because 

New Mexico had been restored to the public domain 

portion of the extension remained reservation. 

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refer to the 

only lands in 

and the Arizona 

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through 1917 and again in 1925 and 1927 are similarly 

unpersuasive. For the years between 1911 and 1917, reservation 

maps attached to the annual reports of the Commissioner of Indian 

Affairs show the EO 1284 portion of the 709/744 area as "opened." 

The designation as "opened" creates ambiguity as to whether the 

mapmaker saw the area as a reservation opened to settlement but 

still reservation or as a reservation that was opened and 

t . . h d 38 ex 1ngu1s e. The maps of the Pueblo Bonito area during these 

years do not include the eastern portion of the 709/744 area (the 

EO 1000 area) within reservation boundaries. See,~, Exs. FDB, 

39 FDE, FDN, FDU, FDZ. Morever, in 1919, 1920, and 1923, the maps 

in the annual reports show the 709/744 area in New Mexico as 

"former Indian reservation." In other words, the maps between 

1911-17 are not only inaccurate in their designations 40 but later 

ones are.inconsistent with them, reducing the reliability of the 

38 Both the Rosebud Sioux and the Sisseton 

Traverse) reservations are shown on the same 

the Supreme Court declared both reservations 

extinguished. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 

Decoteau v. Dist. County Court, 420 U.S. 425 

(also known as Lake 

maps as "opened," yet 

to have been 

430 U.S. 584 (1977); 

(1975). 

39 Ex. FDN represents that two maps were included in the 1915 

Annual Report, one of which includes the eastern portion and the 

other of which omits it. 

40 Errors appear in the 1925 and 1927 maps as well. Although 

the 1925 map includes the EO 1000 portion of the 709/744 area, it 

fails to include the southern portion of the 1880 EO reservation 

within the Pueblo Bonito jurisdiction, Ex. FFP, even though that 

portion had been added to the Pueblo Bonito jurisdiction in 1923. 

And although the 1927 map correctly shows the EO 1880 lands as 

part of the "Eastern Navajo" reservation (new name for the Pueblo 

Bonito Agency effective January 1, 1927), it incorrectly includes 

the 1880 lands as within "reservation opened or allotted." Ex. 

FFY. 

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41 

maps as sources of data. Given the uniform view of various 

Commissioners of the Indian Office and Secretaries of the Interior 

Department that a new extension to the Reservation was needed 

within the 709/744 area to protect Navajo grazing rights, any 

latent ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the position that 

restoration of the New Mexico portion of the 709/744 area had not 

only opened it to settlement but terminated it as a reservation. 

The same interpretation applies with respect to the designation of "Pueblo Bonito" under the printed category "states and 

reservations" in annual reports issued by the Indian Office in the 

decade after EOs 1000/1284. That Pueblo Bonito was listed under 

the state of New Mexico in a category marked "states and 

reservations" is not an official pronouncement on land status when 

authoritative statements from the Indian Office make explicit that 

the 709/744 had lost reservation status. The Indian Office 

maintained jurisdiction over Navajos living in the 709/744 area 

and kept statistics on them. The Pueblo Bonito Agency remained 

after restoration of unallotted lands to the public domain, and 

Superintendent Stacher continued to have supervisory responsibilities over the several thousand Indian allottees within his 

jurisdiction. It is reasonable to'suppose that for comparative 

reporting purposes the statistics on Pueblo Bonito Indians best 

fit into the charts under the existing designation of 

41 In referring to similarly inconsistent maps, letters, and 

memoranda, the Supreme Court stated in Decoteau v. District County 

Court, 420 U.S. 425, 443 n.27 (1975), "No consistent pattern 

emerges. The authors of these documents appear to have put no 

particular significance on their choice of a label." The same 

conclusion applies here. 

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t . 42 

reserva ion. Even Superintendent Stacher's 1934 annual report 

lists his Agency under the category marked Reservation, see Ex. 86 

at 7, although other sections of the same report make explicit 

42 Interpretation of the statistical tables in the annual 

reports is complicated by the fact that the accompanying maps 

designate the 709/744 area in Arizona as Pueblo Bonito reservation. Yet the record on appeal does not definitively establish 

whether Stacher's Pueblo Bonito jurisdiction was limited to 

Navajos living in New Mexico or extended to the 709/744 area in 

Arizona. If Stacher's Agency had jurisdiction over the Arizona 

709/744 reservation, then this would help to explain the 

references to the Pueblo Bonito area as reservation. Stacher's 

1934 Annual Report described the history of his Agency and stated 

that at its creation in April, 1909, his jurisdiction was over 

"all the Navajos living upon the Public Domain in Arizona and New 

Mexico." Ex. 86 at 1. Yet the January 1909 Interior Department 

letter establishing the superintendent's position and salary 

stated that the jurisdiction was "over all of the Navajo Indians 

allotted or living on public lands in New Mexico, east of the 

original Navajo Reservation; also those on the Eastern Navajo 

extension established by Executive Order of November 9, 1907 [No. 

709], and amended by Executive Order of January 17, 1908, No. 

744." Ex. FAC at 1 (emphasis added). This statement indicates 

that Stacher did not have jurisdiction over public domain Indians 

in Arizona, yet it may imply that the jurisdiction did extend to 

the Arizona 709/744 extension if the phrase "Eastern Navajo 

extension" refers to the entire 709/744 area. Perhaps this is 

what Stacher meant to say in his 1934 statement. On the other 

hand, perhaps the reference in the letter to the "Eastern Navaj·o 

extension" was a reference just to the New Mexico portion of the 

extension. Adding to the ambiguity, a 1922 Stacher letter states 

that the Roster of the Indian Service describes his jurisdiction 

as including those "on Navaho Extension." Ex. FEV at 1. The term 

"eastern" was omitted, perhaps suggesting that his jurisdiction 

extended over the entire Arizona-New Mexico extension area. In 

any event, it seems clear that Stacher, Father Weber, Chee Dodge, 

and the Indian Office concentrated their attention on the New 

Mexico portion, because the political situation in the checkerboard area there created so many problems for the Navajos living 

thereon. Nonetheless, the Arizona portion was referred to as 

Pueblo Bonito reservation in annual reports up until 1927, by 

which time a realignment of the San Juan, Navajo, and Pueblo 

Bonito jurisdictions into the Northern, Southern, and Eastern 

Navajo jurisdictions was being acknowledged by the mapmakers. Cf. 

Exs. FFP, FFY. In summary, we are unable, on the basis of the 

record before us, to ascertain whether Stacher's jurisdiction ever 

extended to the Arizona 709/744 lands. 

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that only a portion of his territory was actually located within 

the Navajo Reservation, see id. at 9, 11. 

We are similarly unpersuaded by the Tribe's evidence that on 

a number of oil and gas leases the term Pueblo Bonito had been 

written into the space preceding the printed word "reservation" on 

those leases. The lease forms were standard printed forms dealing 

with leases on allotted lands, and use of the term "reservation" 

was a convenient designation for the allotted lands being leased 

in the 709/744 area and a means of identifying the Indian Agency 

responsible for recommending approval of the lease arrangement. 

Given the fact that Superintendent Stacher sometimes referred to 

his Agency's jurisdiction as reservation, see note 36 supra, it 

follows that he would not see a need to modify the lease form. 

Contrary to the Tribe's position, congressional appropriations for water development on the Pueblo Bonito "Reservation" or 

"subdivision of the Navajo Reservation" in the years from 1919 to 

1927 do not show that Congress recognized the 709/744 area in New 

Mexico as maintaining reservation status. Congress was ap~ropriating much needed money for water development throughout the 

entire Navajo area in which the Indian Office maintained jurisdiction, and was appropriating one lump sum of mon~y that could be 

used anywhere within the five subdivisions identified. 43 Even if 

the 709/744 area in New Mexico may have been included in the 

references to the Pueblo Bonito "Reservation," the fact remains 

43 In 1919, 1920, and 1922, the appropriation was given to the 

Navajo, Moqui, "Pueblo, Bonito, San Juan, and Western Navajo" 

reservations, as if the Pueblo and Bonito were separate areas In 

other years, the incorrect comma between the terms was removed. 

See Exs. FFQ, FFR. 

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that (1) the 709/744 reservation in Arizona was also being designated in tables and maps in Indian Office annual reports as Pueblo 

Bonito Reservation until 1927, (2) the Agency had jurisdiction 

over Indians living on parcels of land within the New Mexico 709/ 

744 area that had been re-reserved under EOs subsequent to EOs 

1000/1284, and (3) after October 23, 1923, the southern portion of 

the EO 1880 Reservation was placed under the Pueblo Bonito Agency, 

Ex. FCC, so a significant portion of New Mexico land under the 

Pueblo Bonito Agency was unarguably reservation land when the 

appropriation acts of 1924-27 were passed. 

If subsequent treatment of the 709/744 area by all officials 

within the Executive Branch had to be unequivocal, the facial 

ambiguity in certain tables, maps, leases, and correspondence 

might be more troublesome, but minor facial inconsistencies within 

the Executive Branch in the years after _the issuance of EOs 1000/ 

1284 do not negate lack of ambiguity at the time the 709/744 

extension was created and restored, nor do they override the clear 

Interior Department position that the lands lacked reservation 

status. Furthermore, any possible congressional ambiguity in its 

appropriation acts for the Pueblo Bonito subdivision of the Navajo 

Reservation is overcome by congressional refusal on multiple 

occasions to allow any extension of the Navajo Reservation into 

the 709/744 area in New Mexico either by Executive Order or by 

statute in the decades following EOs 1000/1284. 

The argument of the Tribe that the primary focus of all the 

maneuvering was on title and land exchange to procure sufficient 

grazing land for the Navajos is beside the point. The Tribe 

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concedes that the Indian Office and Congress were not distinguishing clearly between title and jurisdiction in the legal sense that 

we do now. What it overlooks, however, is that concentration on 

title did not result in absence of intent with respect to 

boundaries. If intent can be shown to encompass both title and 

boundary matters, the fact that the primary problem was a title 

problem is irrelevant. Congressional, Interior Department, and 

Navajo attention to boundary issues in the decades following EOs 

1000/1284 boundary was absolutely explicit. 

v. Summary 

In the context of the legislative history and surrounding 

circumstances, we conclude that the phrase "restore to the public 

domain," as used in section twenty-five of the Act of May 29, 1908 

and in EOs 1000/1284 was widely understood to diminish or terminate the 709/744 boundaries. The district court's interpretation 

that the concern was with title transfers misses the mark by 

ignoring explicit evidence that the boundaries were considered to 

have been terminated. Together, the restoration language and 

legislative history reveal substantial and compelling evidence 

• 

that, although the primary focus of the federal government was on 

title interests, the operative phrase "restore to the public 

domain" in section twenty-five and EOs 1000/1284 encompassed the 

extinguishment of the New Mexico 709/744 boundaries. Furthermore, 

the circumstances surrounding section twenty-five and EOs 1000/ 

1284 reveal unequivocal evidence of a widely held contemporaneous 

understanding that the reservation would shrink as a result of the 

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restoration of unal·lotted lands to the public domain. The 

subsequent history of congressional and Interior Department action 

reinforces this view. Ambiguous references to reservation lands 

in the area within the jurisdiction of the Pueblo Bonito Agency do 

not negate the fact that the Indian Office attempted on numerous 

occasions to re-expand the reservation into the New Mexico 709/744 

area, only to be rejected each time by Congress. 

C. Subsequent Demographics. 

Having concluded that Congress evinced a clear intent to 

allow the 709/744 reservation in New Mexico to be diminished or 

terminated and that, in fact, it was diminished or terminated by 

EOs 1000/1284, actions which the New Mexico territorial delegate 

promoted, we need not linger over the subsequent demo~raphics of 

the area. No one is disputing the fact that the area has remained 

predominantly Navajo in character throughout the entire century. 

Some fifty-five percent of the land surface is presently either in 

Navajo fee ownership or held in trust for the Tribe or individual 

Navajos in severalty. An additional twenty-one percent is federal 

land controlled by the Bureau of Land Management (formerly the 

General Land Office) and leased to the Navajo Tribe and 

administered cooperatively. The small population (10-12,000) is 

approximately ninety percent Navajo. See Appellee's Brief at 25-

26. The land remains desert grazing land unsuited to agricultural 

pursuits and not conducive to permanent settlement by large 

numbers of non-Indians or Indians either. Over time the Interior 

Department and the Tribe have tried to consolidate as much land as 

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possible in Navajo ownership and have worked with the checkerboarded nature of the land as best they can. 

As for a variety of other governmental controls, the Tribe 

and the federal government have asserted criminal jurisdiction 

over the allotted areas and on trust lands, while New Mexico has 

d 't 1 d db h h ld . t 1 44 asserte 1 over ans owne y testate or e priva e y. 

Over the decades, New Mexico, the federal government, and the 

Tribe have carved out differing and sometimes overlapping 

responsibilities for provision.of government services in such 

fields as education, social services, health, and water and mining 

regulation; the acts of carving out these responsibilities suggest 

past understanding on the part of all parties that the area has 

checkerboard and not reservation status. Just because the area 

has remained predominantly Navajo has apparently not been a 

sufficient reason for Congress to establish a permanent 

reservation on the 709/744 lands in New Mexico. This court is not 

going to "remake history" and declare a de facto reservation in 

the face of clear congressional intent to the contrary. See 

Decoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 449 (1975), 

D. Specific Intent of Restoration Language With Respect to 

Status of Allotted Lands. 

A question remains as to the current status of the allotted 

lands. Were they terminated from reservation status when the 

unallotted lands were restored to the public domain, or did they 

44 The Navajo Tribe also has asserted criminal jurisdiction over 

Indians without regard to private land status in the EO 709/744 

area. See,~, the companion case of Blatchford v. Sullivan, 

No. 87-1547, slip op. (10th Cir., April , 1990). 

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retain reservation status? Arguably, since only the unallotted 

lands were restored, the allotted lands remain unrestored, i.e., 

retain their reservation status. On the other hand, the allotted 

lands could not have been restored to the public domain for title 

purposes because they were allotted in severalty and had been 

disposed of; i.e., since they were no longer public lands, they 

obviously could not be restored for sale and settlement purposes. 

Therefore, the title implications of the restoration language used 

in section twenty-five would have been inapplicable to the 

allotted lands. Yet the boundary implications of the restoration 

language could have affected their reservation status, terminating 

it as soon as the lands were allotted in severalty since the 

limited purpose of their reservation status had then been 

accomplished. Acting Interior Secretary Adams spoke to this 

point, when he stated in his letter of April 12, 1912 to New 

Mexico Congressman H.B. Ferguson that the more than 319,000 acres 

allotted to 2,004 Navajos in the 709/744 area "fall outside of the 

boundaries of existing Navajo Reservation In New Mexico." Ex. 53 

at 4. As noted earlier in this opinion, the views of Assistant 

Secretary Pierce in 1911 and Commissioner of Indian Affairs Cato 

Sells in 1916 that allotted lands on certain railroad odd-sections 

could be viewed as reserved lands for purposes of proposed 

exchanges of railroad land failed to prevail within the 

Department. 

That restoration of unallotted lands to the public domain 

also cancels reservation status for allotted lands is supported by 

the method of abolishing an EO reservation initially discussed in 

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The Public Domain 243-44 (1880), i.e., restoration language. 

Cession language such as that construed in Decoteau v. District 

County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975), and Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. 

Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977), need not be the only language clearly 

signalling the cancellation of reservation boundaries. Especially 

when a reservation addition is made only for the limited purpose 

of allotments of some of the land to individual Indians in 

severalty, the reservation is terminated when the lands are 

allotted and the remainder restored to the public domain. In the 

case of the 709/744 extension, there was nothing for the Navajo 

Tribe to cede, sell, relinquish, or convey back to the United 

States, unlike cases where reservation status was created by 

treaty or statute, or by EO for purposes broader than mere 

allotments in severalty. In seeking language of cession and a 

compensation plan under the circumstances here, the district court 

erred. 

Comparably, Decoteau v. District County Court concludes that 

the allotted lands within what was the Lake Traverse Indian 

Reservation lost their reservation status when the unallotted 

lands were ceded. What they did not lose, however, was their 

Indian country status under 18 u.s.c. § 115l(c). Decoteau 

observes that 

"historical circumstances make clear ... the tribe and 

the Government were satisfied that retention of allotments would provide an adequate fulcrum for tribal 

affairs. In such a situation, exclusive tribal and 

federal jurisdiction is limited to the retained allotments. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c). With the benefit of 

hindsight, it may be argued that the tribe and the 

Government would have been better advised to have carved 

out a diminished reservation, instead of or in addition 

to the retained allotments. But we cannot rewrite the 

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1889 Agreement and the 1891 statute. For the'courts to 

reinstate the entire reservation, on the theory that 

retention of mere allotments was ill-advised, would 

carry us well beyond the rule by which legal ambiguities 

are resolved to the benefit of the Indians." 

Decoteau, 420 U.S. at 446-47 (emphasis added and omitted) (citation omitted). In other words, Decoteau stands for the 

proposition that the entire reservation is terminated. It does 

not hold that the remaining allotments are reservation; instead, 

they are Indian country by virtue of being allotments under 18 

U.S.C. § llSl(c). 45 

Tooisgah v. United States, 186 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1950), 

reaches a similar result. In Tooisgah, Kiowa, Comanche, and 

Apache Indian tribes ceded and surrendered their claim to reservation land, subject to allotments in severalty to individual 

members of the tribes. We held that when the tribes ceded and 

surrendered their claims Congress "intended to dissolve the tribal 

government, disestablish the organized reservation, and assimilate 

the Indian tribes as citizens of the state of territory." Id. at 

97-98. The remaining allotments were not considered to be 

retained reservation lands. 

In conclusion, the allotted lands do not remain part of the 

reservation because the restoration of unallotted lands in the 

709/744 area left allotted lands under government protection as 

Indian country but cancelled reservation boundaries. As the 

Navajos understood at the time, the lands were withdrawn for 

45 

not 

18 u.s.c. § 1151 provides that "Except as otherwise provided 

., the term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means 

• (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have 

been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the 

same." 

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allotment purposes exclusively and none other. Under the 709/744 

EOs, they were "reserved" only for allotment purposes. 

That the Arizona portion of the original 709/744 area retains 

reservation status today is a product of history and not solely of 

its original inclusion in EO 709. Only the New Mexico portion of 

the 709/744 area was subject to EOs 1000/1284. Unlike the 

situation in New Mexico, there was never any promise to restore 

unallotted lands in Arizona, see Ex. 41, nor was there agitation 

for opening the Arizona portion, see Ex. 46. At the time the New 

Mexico portion was restored, restoration of the Arizona portion 

was impossible because the lands had not even been surveyed and, 

therefore, no legal description of lands subject to possible 

restoration was available. Ex. 46. The status of the Arizona 

portion was clarified when Congress conferred permanent reservation status under the Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 521, 48 Stat. 960. 

The fact that the 709/744 area in New Mexico remains checkerboarded Indian country in a way that may complicate jurisdictional 

questions in civil cases such as this one creates an issue for 

examination on remand. The Supreme Court has allowed such 

checkerboarding to stand in cases such as Decoteau v. District 

County Court, 420 U.S. 425, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 

584, and United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914). It is 

well to remember that Congress has authorized checkerboard jurisdiction under its definition of Indian country in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1151. Although subsection 1151(a) clarifies that checkerboard 

titles within an existing reservation do not affect the status of 

an Indian reservation as reservation, subsections 1151(b) and (c) 

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allow checkerboard jurisdiction outside reservation boundaries. 46 

Checkerboard title problems have been with the New Mexico 709/744 

area since the 1907-11 allotment period. The Tribe has been 

engaged in active land consolidation activity and fifty-five 

percent of the surface rights in the area are owned, at least 

beneficially, either by individual Navajos or by the Tribe. 

Nonetheless, the land is not Indian reservation, although 

presumably much of it is Indian country. To what extent the 

surface rights of the South McKinley Mine are held by the Navajo 

Tribe or by Navajo allottees is a factual determination to be made 

on remand. 

E. Conclusion. 

We hold that the district court erred in concluding that the 

709/744 area in New Mexico retained reservation status. We remand 

for consideration of whether some or all of P & M's South McKinley 

Mine is within Indian country under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151 (b) or (c) 

and, if so, whether the court is obligated to abstain from 

46 18 u.s.c. § 1151 provides in its entirety that 

"Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 

of this title, the term 'Indian country,' as used in 

this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of 

any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 

United States government, notwithstanding the issuance 

of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running 

through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian, 

communities within the borders of the United States 

whether within the original or subsequently acquired 

territory thereof, and whether within or without the 

limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 

Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, 

including rights-of-way running through the same." 

-81-

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initially deciding whether the Tribe can tax P & M's source gains 

from the mine. 

One final point remains to be made--about abstention at an 

earlier stage of the proceedings. In National Farmers Union 

Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), and Iowa Mutual 

Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), the Supreme Court 

held that issues of civil subject-matter jurisdiction over nonIndians on Indian reservations should be heard first, as a matter 

of comity, in tribal court when federal question or diversity 

jurisdiction is present. The holdings of the cases, however, did 

not extend to issues where reservation. boundaries, in contrast to 

subject-matter jurisdiction, were at issue, as is the case here. 

The Tenth Circuit has followed both cases in the context of civil 

disputes arising on reservation land but has not had the occasion 

to rule on whether the federal courts should abstain from an 

initial determination of the extent of a tribe's territorial 

jurisdiction. See Brown v. Washoe Housing Auth., 835 F.2d 1327 

(10th Cir. 1988); Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324 

(10th Cir. 1986). Because the Tribe did not appeal the district 

court's determination that it need not abstain from exercising 

federal question jurisdiction to decide whether or not the 709/744 

area was within Indian country, the Tribe is precluded from 

raising the issue on remand. We decline the invitation of amici 

Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma and the Native Village of 

Venetie to address this question sua sponte. Resolution of this 

issue can await another day. 

-82-

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A 

5 

AUG 02 1 '30 E;: 05 AHDERSCki SLC #2 

Odginar tre-,ty reservation. June I, 

1868. 

Execu1;vc-order 4ddilion. Octobo::r 29, 

1878. 

C Executive-order addition. January 6, 

l880. 

CC Origin11lly a part of "C"; withdrawn 

from the re,ervalion by cxecullve order, 

M•y 17, }884; restored by executive 

order, April 24, l 886. 

0 (two p1irh) Execulive-ordor addition. May 17, 1884. 

E 

f 

G 

lhE- Poiute S1tlp. Od9ir14Jly a part of 

'"D"; in l 872 restc,red lo the public 

dom~in; In l 908 withdrawn for the use 

of various Indians; restored to public 

domain In 1922; in 1?29 again withdrawn from entry; 1933 transferred 

permanently to the Navajo r~servotion. 

Executive-order addition. January 8, 

1900. . 

Executive-order oddition. November 14, 

1901. 

H 

J 

L 

M 

N 

P.2.24 

; l'UJNTiff'S 

' ~lffl 

COLORADq ___ , ______ _ 

·-·-·--·NEV7°MEXIC0 

J K 

Executive-order addition. March l 0, 

1905. 

Executive-0rder addition. November 9, 

1907. 

Exiecvtiv&<1rder addilion. November 9, 

1907; reslored to public domain by 

e,cec:ulive order of Januory 16, l 9_ 11. 

Executive-order eddilion. November 9, 

1907; restored to public domoln by 

executive order of December 30, 1908. 

Tvsayon For~sl oddilion. Act of M4y 23, 

1930. 

Executive-order addition. May 7, 1917. 

Act of March I, 1933. 

0 (threo parli) Arizona Boundary Act of June 14, 1934. 

p 

Q 

TuuyllO Foresl addition, Act of feb,. 

ruary 21,· 1933. 

Hopi reservation. EKectJlive-order reier• 

valion created on December 16, 1882. 

Appellate Case: 88-2413 Document: 010110555284 Date Filed: 08/03/1990 Page: 84
l 

I 

HU,; 02 '90 13: 07 Ar,mER'=Ol1 SLC #2. TUlTH CIRCLI IT 

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APPENDIX B 

P.3/24 

FILED 

UNrm> StAtei OtmlCT COQ&T' 

AllUQlJftlQUf_ NliW ~ 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

APR O 31987 a...11-~~ 

~~:g ~'10CKET 

HERBERT CHARLES BLATCHFORD, JR., 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

HARVEY WINANS, et al., 

Respondents. 

CV No. 84-0384 HB 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

This matter comes before the court on the Magistrate's 

Amended Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition and the 

parties' objections to same. The court, having considered the 

parties' objections, reviewed the record and the Magistrate's 

Proposed Findings~~, and being otherwise fully advised in the 

premises, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of 

law. 

1. Harvey Winans is no longer petitioner's custodian. 

George Sullivan is petitioner's custodian and should replace Harvey 

Winans as a respondent in this proceeding. 

2. Petitioner was convicted by jury in July 1978 of criminal 

sexual penetration of a child as an accessory and of kidnapping as 

an accessory. He was sentenced by the McKinley County District 

Court to life imprisonment on the first count and to imprisonment 

for 10 to 50 years on the second count. He is presently confined by 

the State at the New Mexico State Hospital in Las Vegas, New Mexico. 

, ~etitioner seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2254. 

Counsel has been appointed for petitioner. Respondent has filed a 

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motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that petitioner has 

failed to exhaust his state remedies. Petitioner has filed a motion 

for summary judgment. Both motions have been fully briefed by the 

parties. An evidentiary hearing has been held. The court has taken 

judicial notice of its file and the state court record as submitted 

by the parties. Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

3. Petitioner is an enrolled member of the Navajo Tribe, as 

were the victims of the crimes of which petitioner was convicted. 

4. Petitioner alleges in this federal petition that the 

crimes ·for which he was convicted occurred in the community of 

Yah-Ta-Hey. Yah-Ta-Hey lies within Section 7, Township 16 North, 

Range 18 West, N.M.P.M. 

5. As grounds for relief in this federal petition, petitioner argues that his conviction is invalid because the McKinley 

County District Court lacked j ur isd iction to try him. Petitioner 

asserts he was convicted of crimes over which the United States has 

exclusive criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the Major Crimes Act, 18 

U.S.c. S 1153. The Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal 

er iminal jurisdiction over the er imes of rape and kidnapping when 

those er imes are committed by an Indian perpetrator within Indian 

country. For purposes of S 1153, "Indian country" is defined in 18 

U.S.C. § 1151 as "(a) all land within the limits of any Indian 

reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government 

... , (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the 

United States •.• , and {c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles 

to which have not been extinguished " In Ground One of this 

?etition, petitioner asserts that the Yah-Ta-Hey area is Indian 

2 

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country within the purview of the Major Crimes Act because it lies 

within the Navajo Reservation as extended by Executive Order 709 

(November 11, 1907). In Ground Two, petitioner asserts that the 

Yah-Ta-Hey area is Indian country within the purview of the Major 

Crimes Act because it is a dependent Indian community. There is no 

claim that the crime occurred on allotted Indian lands. 

6. The state court procedural history underlying this 

federal habeas corpus proceeding may be summarized as follows: 

Petitioner was convicted in and sentenced by McKinley County 

District Court in July 1978. Petitioner took a direct appeal to the 

New Mexico supreme Court in August 1978. That appeal was premised 

solely upon trial errors, none of which are at issue in this federal 

habeas corpus proceeding. The state supreme court affirmed his 

,:;onv iction in March 1979. Petitioner next filed a petition for 

habeas corpus relief in San Miguel County District Court, the 

judicial district wherein he was confined, in January 1982. 

Following an evidentiary hearing, the state district court ruled in 

petitioner's favor in May 19 62. Respondent appealed the district 

court's action to the state supreme court in June 1982. The state 

supreme court reversed the district co~rt in July 1983. Blatchford 

v. Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (1983). Following the 

supreme court's order of reversal, petitioner filed a motion 

pursuant to Rule 57, New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure, in 

McKinley County District Court, the district wherein he was sentenced, in October 1983. That. motion was dismissed without a 

hearing in January 1984 and a judgment of dismissal was entered in 

3 

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February 1984. Petitioner took no further state court action. He 

filed this federal petition in March 1984. 

7. On May 1 7, 198 4, respondent filed his Answer to th is 

petition, conceding therein that petitioner had exhausted his state 

postconviction remedies "as to each ground on which he requests 

action by the federal government." Following a pre-trial status 

conference on November 20, 1985, this court, based on the record 

then bef-ore it and the representations of counsel with regard to 

that record, determined that the issues raised in this federal 

action had been exhausted in the state courts. By letter on 

November 29, 1985, the court so advised the parties. On February 6, 

1986, respondent filed a motion to dismiss alleging that petitioner 

has failed to exhaust his state postconviction remedies. In his 

supporting memorandum, respondent withdrew his earlier concession of 

exhaustion pursuant to Naranjo v. Ricketts, 696 F. 2d 83 ( 10th Cir. 

1982). 

8. Respondent bases his motion to dismiss on two arguments. 

First, he argues that Ground One of the petition should be dismissed 

because petitioner did not fairly present that claim to the state 

courts. Second, he argues that the petition should be dismissed in 

!£!2_ because petitioner failed to pursue a habeas corpus petition 

pursuant to N.M.R.Crim.Proc. 57(j) once his Rule 57 motion was 

dismissed. 

9. Respondent's argument for dismissal of Ground one 

of the petition because it was not fairly presented to the state 

~ourts is not well taken. Both the factual and the legal bases for 

petitioner's claim that, pursuant to 18 u.s.c. S llSl(a), Yah-Ta-Hey 

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is Indian country within the purview of the Major Cri~es Act because 

it is located within the Executive Order 709 extension to the Navajo 

Reservation have been fairly presented to the state courts as 

follows: 

In the course of deciding petitioner•s request for habeas 

corpus relief, San Miguel County District Judge Martinez by letter 

dated March 25, 1982, requested additional information regarding the 

territorial limits of the Navajo Reservation. Counsel for petitioner responded by providing the judge with copies of Executive 

Orders 709 and 744 and a brief arguing that Section 7 was made a 

part of the Navajo Reservation by those executive orders. Respondent now concedes that the issue of the reservation status of the 

Yah-Ta-lley area was raised in the state district court habeas corpus 

proceeding. See Respo:-ident' s letter of July 23, 1986 and attachmen ts thereto. 

The bases for petitioner's claim that the Yah-Ta-Hey area was 

made a part of the Navajo Resetvation by executive order were 

initially placed before the New Mexico Supreme Court by the San 

Miguel County District Court Findings and Conclusions from which 

r:espondent appealed. Finding Nos. 12, 27, 31, 32, 34 and 36 in 

general and Finding No. 2, 30, 33, 39 and 42 and Conclusion No. 2 in 

particular placed the issue of the reservation status of Yah-Ta-Hey 

before the state supreme court. In addition, pages 12-22 of 

petitioner/appellee's Answer Brief in the supreme court proceedings 

extensively argued the annexation of the Yah-Ta-Hey area by executi ve order. 

I 

It appea:::s from the court's opinion in Blatchford v. 

Gonzales, 100 N.M. 333, 670 P.2d 944 (1983), that the court did in 

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fact consider petitioner's reservation status argument within the 

context of determining whether Yah-Ta-Hey was a dependent Indian 

community. The court discussed whether Executive Order 2513 annexed 

the Yah-Ta-Hey area to the Navajo Reservation. 100 N.M. at 336-37. 

The supreme court did not specifically address Executive Orders 709 

and 744 in its opinion. However, it is clear from the court's 

discussion of Order 2513 that petitioner's evidence with regard to 

the reservatio~ status of Yah-Ta-Bey was considered by the court and 

was not stricken pursuant to respondent• s motion to do so. The 

exhaustion doctrine does not require that the state appellate court 

discuss every issue raised by petitioner's brief. See Smith v. 

Digman, 434 U.S. 332, 333 (1978) 

In October of 1983 petitioner filed a Rule 57 motion in 

McKinley County District Court. As a ground for that motion, 

petitioner stated that the court was without jurisdiction to try him 

because Section 7 is within the Navajo Resrvation as extended by 

executive order. In support of the motion, petitioner attached and 

incorporated therein his Answer Brief filed in Blatchford v. 

Gonzales r supra, with specific reference to those portions of the 

brief discussing the executive order extension. 

In sum, the court finds that petitioner has fairly presented 

his claim set forth as Ground One in this federal petition to the 

state courts. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982); Picard v. 

Connor, 404 U.S. 270 {1971); Jones v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 

1982}. 

6 

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10. Respondent's argument for dismissal of the petition in 

~ on grounds of procedural default also is not well taken. 

Despite the New Mexico Supreme Court's declaration in Blatchford v. 

Gonzales, supra, that the San Miguel County District Court was 

procedurally barred from hearing petitioner's cause, the court went 

on to discuss the merits of petitioner's jurisdictional claims. 

With regard to petitioner's S 115l(a) claim, set forth as Ground One 

in this federal petition, the court stated that Yah-Ta-Hey is not 

located on an Indian reservation. 100 N.M. at 335. The court 

further concluded that an executive order issued after the 1866 sale 

of Yah-Ta-Hey area land to the railroad failed to effect annexation 

of those lands to the Navajo Reservation. 100 N.M. at 336-38. With 

regard to petitioner's S 1151(b) claim, set forth as Ground Two in 

this federal petition, the court held that Yah-Ta-Hey is not a 

dependent Indian community. 100 N.M. at 336-35. Because the state 

supreme court considered the merits of petitioner's claims despite 

his failure to comply with N.M.R.Crim.Proc. 57(j), this court may 

properly reach the merits of those claims now. Hux v. Murphy, 733 

F.2d 737 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2331 (1985}, overruled 

on other grounds, Wiley v. Rayl, 767 F.2d 679 '(l 0th Cir. 1985); 

Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, (10th Cir. 1983). 

11. Even assuming, arguendo, that .lli!!, supra, and Morishita, 

supra, do not apply to overcome petitioner's state procedural 

default, it is clear that forcing petitioner to return to the state 

courts would be a futile act. A federal court may excuse a failure 

,o exhaust state remedies if it is affirmatively shown that resort 

to them would be an idle or useless effort. Clonce v. Presley, 640 

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(. I 

l''.2d 271, 273 (10th Cir. 1981); Lewis v. State of New Mexico, 423 

F. 2d 10 4 8, l O 4 9 ( 10th Cir . 19 7 0 ) • This court finds that the 

circumstances of this case constitute such a showing. The highest 

state court has addressed -- and rejected -- both of petitioner's 

federal claims, Blatchford v. Gonzales, supr~, thus rendering 

petitioner's chance of a hearing on the merits in a state forum 

negligible, at best. See generally, Adkins v. Bordenkircher, 67 4 

F.2d 279, 281-82 (4th Cir. 1982); Sweet v. Cupp, 640 F.2d 233, 236 

(9th Cir. 1981). That petitioner's return to state court would be a 

futile exercise is further evidenced by the McKinley County District 

Court's response to petitioner's October 1983 Rule 57 motion. The 

state district court denied petitioner's motion and in February of 

1984 entered a judgment of dismissal on the grounds that 

it appearing that the Supreme Court of New Mexico· has 

recently ruled against defendant on the precise issues 

raised by his motion in Blatchford v. Gonzales, 

N.M. --~ 670 P.2d 444 (1983), appeal dismissed sub 

nom. Blatchford v. Winans, 52 U.S.L.W. 3508 (Jan. 9, 

1983); and it further appearing that the motion is not 

well-taken ... 

Because it would be fruitless to require petitioner to return to 

state court, this court finds that petitioner has satisfied the 

exhaustion requirement imposed by S 2254 (b). Furthermore, petitioner should not be forced to resubmit issues already raised and 

decided by the state supreme court. The exhaustion requirement is 

met by providing the highest court in the state a fair opportunity 

to consider the federal issue, Wallace v. Duckworth, 778 F.2d 1215, 

1219 (7th Cir. 1985), which has been done in this instance. 

8 

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12. For the reasons set forth in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 of 

these findings, respondent's motion to dismiss for failure to 

exhaust state remedies sho~ld be denied. 

13. On Febrllary 7, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for 

summary judgment alleging that a writ of habeas corpus should issue 

to discharge petitioner from custody on the ground that he is 

illegally confined pursuant to a conviction void for lack of 

j ur .i.sd iction. A motion for summary j udgrnent is properly granted 

only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the 

movant. is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c). The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of 

a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 54 

U.S.L.W. 4775, 4777 (June 25, 1986). In ruling on a summary 

judgment motion the court must view the pleadings and the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. See 

Harsha v. United States, 590 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Summary judgment •1s considered a drastic relief to be applied with 

caution." Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc. , 511 F. 2d 230, 234 

( 10th Cir. 197 5). Respondent's response to petitioner's summary 

judgment motion demonstrates that genuine issues of fact exist with 

regard to essential elements of both grounds urged by petitioner as 

bases for habeas corpus relief. This court therefore finds that 

petitioner's motion for summary judgment should be denied. 

14. In Ground One of this federal petition, petitioner 

asserts that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 11531 vests the 

United States with exclusive jurisdiction to try him because the 

9 

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crimes for which he was charged occurred within the Navajo Reservation as extended by Executive Ord et· 709 (November 11, 1907), as 

amended by Executive Order 744 (January 28, 1908). Petitioner 

argues that neither a subsequent congressional enactment, S 25 of 

the Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, 35 Stat. 444, 457, nor two 

subsequent presidential proclamations, Executive Order 1000 

(December 30, 1908) and Executive Order 1284 (January 16, 1911), 

operated to withdraw the Executive Order 709 lands from the Navajo 

reservation. 

15. On November 9, 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt issued 

Executive Order Number 709 which added approxirna tely 1. 9 mill ion 

acres to the Navajo Indian Reservation in Arizona and New Mexico. 

On January 28, 1908, Executive Order Number 744 was issued amending 

Executive Order Number 709 to correct an encroachment on the 

J icar ill a Apache Reservation. By issuing these Executive Orders, 

the President intended that a temporary reservation of the lands be 

made until such time as the Indian occupants could receive allotments from the lands so set aside. 

16. In response to the concerns of non-Indian settlers, a 

joint resolution was introduced in Congress and passed which 

provided: 

That whenever the President is satisfied that all the 

Indians in any part of the Navajo Indian Reservation 

in New Mexico and Arizona created by Executive Orders 

of November ninth, nineteen hundred and seven, and 

January twenty-eighth, nineteen hundred and eight, 

have been allotted, the surplus lands in such part of 

the reservation shall be restored to the public domain 

and opened to settlement and entry by proclamation of 

the President. 

Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, S 25, 35 Stat. 444, 457. 

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On December 30, J.908, the President issued Executive Order 

Number 1000 •restoring to the public domain" unallotted lands within 

certain sections of the reservation created by Executive Order 

Number 709, as amended by Number 744, with certain exceptions. 

Three years later, on January 16, 1911, President Taft issued 

Exe cu ti ve Order Number 1284, restoring additional surplus lands to 

the public domain. The Yah-Ta-Hey area where the crime allegedly 

took place is within the acreage added to the reservation and 

subsequently restored to the public domain by the Executive Orders. 

17. The resolution of a dispute involving diminishment of 

reservation boundaries "turns on what Congress intended to accomplish at the time as a legal matter." Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 

F.2.d 1298, 1301 (10th Cir. 1983), reh. en bane, 773 F.2d 1087 

(1985), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3387 {U.S. Dec. 2, 1986). The 

effect of any given surplus land Act, which S 25 of the Act of May 

29, S 1908 was, depends on the language of the Act and the circumstances underlying its passage. 

(1984). 

Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 

Diminishrnent will not be lightly inferred. Analysis of 

surplus land Acts require that Congress clearly evince an intent to 

change boundaries before dirninishrnent will be found. Rosebud Sioux 

Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977). 

When both an Act and its legislative history fail to 

provide substantial and compelling evidence of a 

congressional intention to diminish Indian Lands, we 

are bound by our traditional solicitude for the Indian 

Tribes to rule that diminishment did not take place 

and that the old reservation boundaries survived the 

opening. 

11 

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Solem, supra, 465 U.S. at 472. Once land is set aside as an Indian 

reservation, what happens to the title of individual plots within 

the area does not change the reservation status of the area until 

Congress explicitly indicates otherwise. Solem, supra, 465 U.S. at 

470. 

18. The most probative evidence of congressional intent is 

the statutory language used to open the Indian lands. Solem, supra, 

465 U.S. at 470. The operative language of S 25 of the Act of May 

29, 1908, requires that the Executive Order 709 lands "shall be 

restored to the public domain and opened to settlement and entry by 

proclamation of th~ President." 

The United States Supreme Court has stated that "public 

domain" language is not dispositive when such references are 

isolated phrases within a statute as a whole. Solem, supra at 465 

U.S. at 475-76. In the instant case, the public domain wording is 

not isolated phraseology but is in fact the operative language of§ 

25. However, standing alone this language is not sufficient to 

indicate a clear congressional intent to subtract the Executive 

Order 709 area lands from the Navajo Reservation. 

our conclusion is that the phrase "restore to the 

public domain" is not the same as a congressional 

state of mind to disestablish. In other words, it 

doesn't disturb the ownership of the land by the 

tribal group. There are several competing meanings 

that could be implied from the phrase "restore to the 

public domain." But the most important one is that it 

permits the invasion of an area and purchase of land 

and general utilization. It is said that it is 

equally plausible that the phrase means that Indian 

lands would be available for settlement, but that the 

boundaries remain unchanged. The original expression 

"return to the public domain" does not reliably 

establish the clear ana unequivocal evidence of 

Congress' intent to change boundaries. 

12 

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Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087, 1092 (1985). (See also 

concurring opinion at 1095), cert. denied, 55 U.S.L.W. 3387 (U.S. 

Dec. 2, 1986}. Allotment and subsequent entry by non-Indians is 

consistent with continued reservation status. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 

U.S. 481, 497 (1973). 

19. This court, therefore, must consider whether contemporaneous events surrounding the passage of Executive Order 709 or 

the legislative history of S 25 unequivocally reveal a widely held 

contemporaneous understanding that the Executive Order 709 area 

lands would be removed from the Navajo Reservation. Taken as a 

whole, the contemporaneous historical documents presented to this 

court do reveal a clear congressional intent and understanding that 

the reservation status of the Executive Order 709 area lands was 

temporary and that the land not allotted would revert back to its 

pre 1907 non-reservation status. 

Roosevelt understood that the reservation was temporary when 

he signed Executive Orders 709 and 744. This understanding is 

evidenced by a letter from C. F. Larrabee, then acting Commissioner 

of Indian Affairs, to J. S. Sherman, Chairman of the House Committee 

on Indian Affairs. The President, the Secretary of the Interior and 

the Commissioner of Indian Affairs viewed the withdrawal as temporary in order to facilitate an ongoing allotment to the Navajos 

living on public domain land. There was a concern that the Navajos 

ware being pushed out by white settlers in the area and that 

temporary measures were necessary to protect the Navajos until the 

allotment project could be completed. Respondent's Exhibits G, B. 

J. and K. This understanding, although not dispositive in itself 

, ., 

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given its historical context, is evidence that the Executive Orders 

were never ·intended to enlarge permanently the reservation boundaries, but instead were meant as a temporary remedial measure. 

20. At that time in history, Congress assumed that assimilation would occur and that the reservation system would be dismantled. That was the purpose of the General Allotment Act of 1887. 

Therefore, all reservations were viewed as temporary until allotment 

could be completed. However, allotment did not in fact lead to the 

a ismantl ing of the reservations. Solem cautions that a specific 

congressional p~rpose to diminish reservations is not to be extrapolated from Congress' expectation of the imminent demise of the 

reservation system. Rather each surplus land Act needs to be 

examined in light of its particular context to see if Congress 

intended to absolutely terminate or diminish a particular reservation regardless of their ultimate understanding that the reservation 

system would soon be terminated. 

The legislative history of§ 25 and the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that Congress shared the Executive branch's 

concern with protecting the Navajos living on public land near the 

reservation and then reopening the area to settlement. Congress' 

intent was to disestablish Executive Order 709 land as soon as the 

Navajos who had settled off the reservation were secure in their 

land. 

You are advised that, because of the large number of 

Indians residing on public lands adjacent to the 

Navajo Reservation in New Mexico and Arizona without 

any title to the lands occupied by them, it was 

necessary, in order to protect them in their homes, 

that a temporary reservation of the lands be made 

until such time as the Indian occupants could be 

allotted. It was not and is not the intention of the 

Department that lands which will not be needed for 

14 

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allotment purposes be withheld fr.om settlement and 

entry any longer than will absolutely be necessary to 

insure the Indians securing their homes under authority of law without interference from white settlers. 

P.17/24 

H. R. Rep. No. 1663, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1980)(Excerpt of 

letter by C. F. Larrabeer Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs to 

the Honorable J. S. Sherman, Chairman, House Committee on Indian 

Affairs). 

This is not a case of long established reservation land. In 

fact, the Executive Order reservation remained in existence for less 

than four years, some of it less than 14 months. Executive Order 

709 land was never viewed as reservation land before Executive Order 

709. It was given its status as reservation land for the sole 

pJrpose of allotment to the Navajos then living there before public 

entry was allowed. There is no indication that the temporary 

withdrawal was viewed as anything more than a stop gap measure to 

insure that the Navajo's living on public land would be secure in 

that land in light of the pressure_ of new settlement in the area. 

21. The Executive Orders numbered 1000 and 1284 do not, by 

their language, lend any support to a finding that the intention of 

Congress in S 25 was to disestablish Executive 709 lands. The 

Executive Orders use the identical language of "restored to the 

public domain" which was used in§ 25 and has already been found not 

to evince a clear intent to disestablish. However, the speed with 

which allotment and restoration occurred through the Executive 

Orders indicates that the Executive branch continued to regard 

Executive Order 709 and 744 as only a temporary expedient to protect 

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Navajo settlers. See Respondents' Exhibit AA. This understanding 

is further evidenced by the correspondence of the Secretary to 

Representative Andrews from New Mexico. 

While it is true that lands have been withdrawn from 

public entry on the east and south of the Navajo 

Indian Reservation, the action is merely temporary and 

solely for the purpose of permitting the allotment of 

the Indians residing within the boundaries of the 

withdrawn tract undisturbed by contacts and interference of white citizens. It is the intention of the 

Department to expedite these allotments and when they 

shall have been completed to have the unallotted part 

of the tract restored to the public domain. 

Respo~dent's Exhibit P. See also Respondent's Exhibits R, T and U. 

22. During the time that the land was withdrawn, allotments 

were only made to Navajos who had previously 1 i ved in that area. 

Respondents' Exhibits X, Y and Z. This is in keeping with the 

government's understanding that the withdrawal was only for the 

purpose of protecting existing Navajo settlers and not for the 

purpose of expanding the reservation. 

23. Moreover, evidence before the court indicates that in 

the 1920' s and the 1930 's Congress rejected boundary legislation 

which would have established New Mexico Executive Order lands as a 

part of the Navajo Reservation. Although the court is mindful that 

subsequent congressional actions should be accorded less weight than 

the statutory language and attendant surrounding circumstances, the 

court finds that these subsequent events indicate a clear understanding on the part of the United States Congress that the lands in 

gu~stion had not become a permanent addition to the Navajo Reservation upon the issuance of Executive Order 709. 

, t:: 

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24. The executive branch also continued to function under 

the impression that the extension had been withdrawn. See, e.g., 

Executive Order 1483 (February 15, 1912) restoring certain Executive 

Ord,zr 709 land to the reservation which had been "eliminated from 

said reservation by Executive Order of January 16, 1911," in order 

to facilitate an exchange of railroad land under the Act of April 

21 r 1904, 33 Stat. 211. See also Respondent's Exhibits CG, CB and 

co. P.g a in by Executive Order 2513 ( January 15, 1917) President 

Wilson found it necessary to withdraw previously withdrawn Executive 

Order 709 land in order to negotiate an exchange of land with the 

railroad for the Navajos. Respondent's Exhibit CR. 

25. Peti ti oner's first claim for relief is without merit. 

The situs of the alleged crime is not a part of the Navajo reservation. The .legislative history of S 25 and the historical events 

surrouDding· the issuance of Executive Orders 709, 744, 1000 and 

123 4 show that Exercuti ve Order 7 0.9 was never intended to create a 

permanent reservation but was issued only to withdraw the lands 

temporarily to be allotted to individual Indians. It was always 

intended by Congress and the Executive branch that the unallotted 

lands be restored to the public domain as quickly as possible with 

the same status it occupied before it was withdrawn by Executive 

Order 709. 

26. In Ground Two of this federal petition, petitioner 

asserts that the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. S 1153, vests the 

United States with exclusive jurisdiction to try him because the 

crimes for which he was charged occurred within a dependent Indian 

,mmuni ty. In order to evaluate petitioner's dependent Indian 

17 

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community claim, the Court must initially decide what is the proper 

community of reference. The court notes that petitioner at paragraph 4 of his January 1982 San Miguel county District Court habeas 

petition alleged that the crimes of which he was convicted occurred 

at Yah-Ta-Hey, McKinley County, New Mexico. The State raised no 

argument with regard to this characterization of the crime situs by 

petitioner, and the San Miguel County District Court adopted this 

characterization in its May 1982 Findings of Fact. The same 

characterization was incorporated, without discussion or analysis, 

in all subsequent state court post-conviction proceedings. 

Upon a review of the entire record now before it, the court 

finds that the proper community of reference for purposes of 

petitioner's s ll5l(b) claim is Yah-Ta-Hey which includes the 

intersection of u. s. Highway 666 and State Highway 264, Navajo 

Estates and the surrounding area within a 3 to 5 mile radius of the 

crossroads. Although in a rural area such as this it is difficult 

to define with precision the exact boundaries of a community, this 

court finds that Yah-Ta-Hey and the surrounding area is a readily 

identifiable residential and trading community for purposes of 

petitioner's S ll5l{b) claim. ~ Unites States v. Mazurie, 419 

U.S. 544, 552 (1975); United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 170 

{8th Cir. 1980)(precise boundaries not required in concept of 

community). The magistrate's proposed finding that Navajo Estates 

is the relevant community is rejected on the grounds that Navajo 

Estates is nothing more than a small housing subdivision within the 

larger community of Yah-Ta-Hey, a community which includes the 

.;ubdivision of Navajo Estates, the commercial center which has 

18 

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grown up at the highway intersection and the rural community 

surrounding the intersection, which depends on the commercial center 

at the crossroads for certain community services such as. postal 

service and business trade. 

27. Having found that the proper community of reference is 

Yah-Ta-Hey the court must next find whether that community is a 

dependent Indian community pursuant to S 1151 (b). In making this 

determination, the court must consider evidence of the following 

factors: nthe nature of the area in question, the relationship of 

the inhabitants of the area to Indian Tribes and to the federal 

government, and the established practice of government agencies 

toward the area," United States v. Mar tine, 4 42 F. 2d 1022, 10 23 

(10th Cir. 1971); whether there is an element of cohesiveness in the 

community, as manifested by economic pursuits, common interests, or 

needs of the inhabitants, United States v. Morgan, 614 F.2d 166, 170 

(8th Cir. 1980): and whether the community has been set apart for 

the use, occupancy or protection of dependent Indians, Waddell· v. 

Meierhenry, 636 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 

U.S. 941 (1981). See also United States v. Levesque, 681 F.2d 75 

(1st Cir. 1982); United States v. State of South Dakota, 665 F.2d 

837 {8th Cir. 1981); United States v. Oceanside Oklahoma, Inc., 527 

F.Supp. 68 (W.D. Okla. 1981); United States v. Mound, 477 F.Supp. 

156 (D. S.D. 1979). 

,o 

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28. Title to the Land. 

The commercial crossroads area and Navajo Estates are 

located on non-Indian land. However the surrounding area is 

predominately Navajo allotment land upon which the Navajos continue 

to reside and graze livestock. 

29. Composition of the Community. 

The population at the crossroads itself is predominately 

non-Indian. The businesses in the area are owned by non-Indians and 

N,':l.vajo Estates is slightly more non-Indian than Navajo. However, 

the area around the crossroads is predominately rural Navajo. In 

1977, at the time of the incident in question, there was another 

small housing development at the crossroads which was predominately 

if not exclusively Navajo. 

30. Purpose of the Community. 

The community of Yah-Ta-Bey is mainly a trading post 

area where local merchants buy Navajo made goods, then distribute 

them in other locations. There is also evidence that Yah-Ta-Hey has 

become a suburb of Gallup, that Gallup is a source of jobs and the 

commercial center which the people living at Yah-Ta-Hey look to. 

31. Relationship of the Community to the Federal Government 

ana to the Navajo Nation. 

There is testimony by a number of witnesses that in 

recent years and at the present time the Navajo Tribe, independently 

and with federal monies, makes available and provides to residents 

of Yah-Ta-Hey a variety of health, social welfare and law enforcement services. However, except for law enforcement services, the 

residents must travel outside of the Yah-Ta-Hey vicinity to receive 

20 

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those services. Indeed Navajos at Yah-Ta-Hey must travel to Gallup 

to receive many of the services which are provided by the Navajo 

Nation. There does not· appear to be any special relationship 

between the Ya-Ta-Hey area and the federal government which would 

suggest a finding that the area is a dependent Indian community. 

32. Relationship of the Community to State and County 

Government 

The State of New Mexico, McKinley County and the City of 

Gallup also provide services to the inhabitants of Yah-Ta-Hey 

including law enforcement, water, roads, land fills and public 

schools. The businesses at Yah-Ta-Hey pay state gross receipts tax 

and McKinley County property tax. They are subject to state and 

county regulations regarding health standards, building codes, pawn 

shops, unemployment compensation, workman's compensation and liquor 

sales. 

33. Considering these factors against the statute and the 

case law, the court finds that petitioner has not met his burden of 

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that in December 1977, 

the date of the crimes for which he was convicted, the community of 

Yah-Ta-Hey was a dependent Indian community. Al though petitioner 

has established that Indians are predominant in the area and that 

those Indians receive services from the Navajo Nation, that by 

itself is insufficient to show that Yah-Ta-Hey is a dependent Indian 

community. See Weddell v. Meierhenry, 636 F.2d at 213; United 

States v. Martine, 442 F.2d at 1024. There is no evidence that this 

area has been set aside for the use occupancy or protection of the 

.. avajos or that the federal gov.ernment has any special relationship 

., , 

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wi t.h the community. The state asserts j ur isd iction over the area 

and provides many services to the residents and business at 

Yah-Ta-Bey. 

Now, Therefore, 

IT IS BY THE COURT ORDERED that: 

1. George Sullivan is now the respondent in this proceeding, 

replacing Henry Winans; 

2. Petitioner's motion for summary judgment and motions to 

strike are denied; 

3. Respondent's motion to dismiss is denied; 

4. Respondent's motion to subrni t additional evidence is 

granted; and 

5. The petition of Herbert Blatchford and this action are 

hereby dismissed with prejudice. 

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APPENDIX C 

I~ TD tnlITED STATES OIST~ICT COURT 

ron TD DIST!lICT OJ' n1f >a:XICO 

THE ?ITl'SBtJRGH, MIDWAY COAL ) 

M!Nl~lG COMPANY I ) 

) 

Plaintiff, ) 

) 

P.2/13 

F'ILEC 

AT AUUOllB?GUf 

AUG·),) · -~~ .. ,, ., -'"-J 

JESSc~ 

0"~ 

ENiERED ~~I ooc~ - (_ <: ._;3 - : _; 

V. ) 

) 

No. 86-1442-M Civil 

STELLA SAUNDERS, et al., ) 

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) 

Defendants. ) 

XZ.~OR2+fil?UJ1 OPIM!ON 

AtW 

QRPEB 

This matter came on for consideration on the def e:idants' 

motion to dismiss without prejudice. Having considered the ~c~ion, 

t.he response thereto, and being other-wise fully advised in t!"le 

premises, I find tha-e 'the motion is well taken and it ·w-ill be 

granted, 

Bac:kqrou.nct· 

The plaintiff, Pittsburgh & Midway Coal Mining Company (?&M), 

brought -:.his action for a declaratory judgment against the :lavajo 

Tax Commission (the T~ibe). P&M sought a judgment declaring that 

the Tribe acted illegall.y in taxing cer-:ain of P&M 1 s activities and 

enjcir,ing the Tribe froc further taxation of such activities. The 

.;T-: ... ., A -- DISTRICT COURT OPINION 

A-1 

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Tri.be moved for dismissal arguing that P&M must exhaust its tribal 

remedi.:;!:S before pursuing this matter in federal court. In so 

moving, the Tribe relied upon National ::rarner3 Union !nsu:rance 

Ccm.p~ni 1s v. crova T:rit>e, -&71 o.s. a.cs (1985) and Iowa Mutual 

D~~r~nca co, v, t3 Plante, 107 a.ct. 971 (1987). 

In du.e course, I infonied the parties that in both National 

farmer~ and Iowa xutual, as well as in all cases citing to National 

l1rm1=~ and Iowa Mutual, it was undisputed that the incident or 

transaction giving rise to the lawsuit had taken place on an Indian 

reservation. In order to entertain the Tribe's arguments concerning the so-called Indian Abstention Doctrine of National Far:ners/-

' !OY! Mutual abstention, it would be necessary to determine whether 

P,M 1 s South McKinley mine is in tact on the Navajo Reservation, or 

is at least in "Indian Country 11 within the meaning of 18 u:s.c. § 

llSl. I therefore called for an evidentiary hearing on the matter, 

which was held on May 

through July 18. The 

23 through 27, 1988 and continued on July l~; 

following opinion constitutes my Findings of . 

Fact and Conclusions of Law as a result of that hearing. 

opinion 

President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 709 on November 

9, 1907, adding 1.9 million acres to the Navajo Reservation 

(Reservation). Executive Order 709 states in relevant part that 

the area be "withdrawn from sale and settlement and set apart for 

the use of the Indians as an addition to the present Navajo 

Reservation ... Executive Order No. 744, issued on January 28, 1908, 

A-2 

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amended Executive Order 709 ~o cure an encroachment on the 

J icarilla Reservation. The P&M mine is located in part on the 

709/744 area. 

Act: 

" 

on May 29, 1908, Congress passed the following Surplus Land 

That whenever the President is satisfied 

that all the Indians in any part of the Navajo 

Indian Reservation in New Mexico and Arizona 

created by Executive orders o; November ninth, 

nine~een hundred and seven, and January twenty-eight, nineteen hundred and eight, have 

be~n allotted, the surplus 13nds in such part 

ot the reservation shall ba restored to the 

public domain and opened to settlement and 

entry by proclamation of the President. · 

Act of Kay 29, 1908, eh.215, § 25, 35 Stat. 4~4, 457. 

on December JO, 1908, President Roosevelt acted on the 

J authority granted under the 1908 Act (the Act). In Executive Ord~r 

1000 1 he directed that the u.nallotted lands ~ithin a portion of the 

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709/744 area "set a~art for the use of the Indians as an addition 

to their Navajo reservation . be . . . restored to the pub l i'c 

domain " Finally, on January 16, 1911, President Taft 

issued Executive Order No. 1284 and 11 restored to the public domain 11 

all remai~ing unallotted lands 0 added to the Navajo 'Reservation" 

by Executive Orders 709/744. 

The question for decision is whether the Act and the execution 

of it in Executive Orders 1000 and 1284, (1) shrunk the jurisdictional boundaries of the Navajo Reservation, or (2) merely opened 

·the unallotted portions of the 709/7 ~~ area to settlement, leavin'-] 

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the jurisdictional boundaries int::ict. The supreoe Court. established the analytical frame..,,,or!( .:.Jr deciding this question in 

Soly v. Bartlgtt, ~65 o.s. ~63 (1)1~). 

.~ proceeds !rom two basic principles. First, 'once land 

is set aside as an Indian Reservation, the land r2mains reservation 

"until Congress explicitly indicates other.rise." ~ at '•7 O citing 

:o.s. v. Celesti:ce, 215 t1.S. :Z78, 28S (1909). Second, the intent: 

of Congress to diminish 'the boundaries cf a reservation "~ill not 

be .Lightly in!erred. 111 Sgle.m. supra at 470. It is not enough that 

~ surplus land act show congressional intent to open unallotted 

lands to settlement, for every surplus land act does that. 

Diminlsh.ment requires "substantial a~d c~mpelling evidence" in the 

la.nguage of any such act and its legislative history of congressional intent to shrink the exterior jurisdictional boundaries. 

l.<b.. at ,,2. The absence ot sucn evidence mandates a finding that 

"the old reserva.tior. boundaries survived the opening." IA.:_ 

l. LaD,;'Jage of the Act. 

The s~rongest evidence of congressional intent is "the 

statuto~J language used to open the Indian lands." I_cL. at ,10. 

In this case, neither the act nor the implementing executive orders 

contains language referring to the boundaries of the reservaticn, 

let alone any "[e)xplicit re!erence to cession or other language 

evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests 

.... " ll!.t.. Neither is there language refer=ing to any congresiional plan to pay the tribe back for the opened land . .Iih 

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P&M argues that "restored to the public domain" in the Act and 

the executive orders indicates congressional intent to shrink the 

boundaries of the reservation. These ~ords are certainly evidence 

ot diminishment. li.a,. at 475. Ho~ever, isolated phrases such as 

"public domain" are not dispositive. solom1 475 o.s. at.463 11.17._ 

This is especially so where, as in this case, the purpose of the 

surplus land ac't is simply to open reser1ed lar..ds to non-Indian 

settlement. Solem, 4,3 U.S. at 475. The words "restored to the 

public domain and opened to settlement" can mean "available for 

settlement with no change in reservation boundaries" as easily as 

"available tor settlement because no longer reservation." See Ute 

' Indian Tri}?• v. Utah.. 773 J'.2d 1087, 1092 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Withdrawal and allotment fellowed by open settlement is consistent 

with reservation status. Mp.ttz v. Arnett, 412 o.s. 4ai'·, -497 

(1973). 

Further, the "public domain'' and "open !or settlement" 

language of the Act contrasts sharply ~ith the plain language of 

cession noted by the Supreme Court in Rosebud Sioux Tripe v, l.neip1 

,30 U.S. 584 (1977) and Decoteau v. District county Coyrt1 -420 u.s. 

"25 (l'J75). pecotaau involved an act stating that the Lake 

Traverse Indian Tribe had agreed to "cede, sell, relinquish, and 

convey" all its claims to w1allotted lands on the Lake Traverse 

Indian Reservation. Similarly, in Rosebud, the surplus land acts 

incorporated the tribe's agreement to cede a portion ot their land 

to the United States for a swn certain. ~ Solem, 4&5 o.s. at 

A-5 

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\69-70 n.10. In this case, neither the 1908 Act nor the legislative history shows either language of cession or a governmental 

undertaking to compensate the Navajo Tribe for ceded lands. 

Finally, Presidents Roosevelt and Taft knew how to use plain 

language of cession in executive orders. On May 15, 1905, 

President Roosevelt used the following -words to disestablish a 

porti1:in of 'the Navajo Reservation not involved in this litigation: 

The Executive O:-der of March 10, 1905, 

setting apart certain lands in Utah as an 

addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation, is 

hereby cancelled .... 

President Taft entered t.'1e following executive order on November 

26, 'l.912: 

Executive Order No. 1632, dated October 

2B, 1912, making an addition to the Moapa 

Riv~r Indian reservation, in Nevada, is hereby 

cancelled .•.. 

In both cases, the President-writer stated, »the Executive Order 

• is cancelled." No such plain reference to cession appears 

in either of the executive orders disputed here. 

~- Events Sur~ounding passage. 

The language of.the 1908 Act does net provide substantial and 

compelling evidence of intent to diminish the boundaries of the 

Navajo Reserv-a-i:ion. 

inferred when: 

However, intent to diminish may still be 

Events surrounding the passage of a surplus 

land Act--particularly the manner in which the 

transaction 'Was negotiated with the Tribes 

involved and the tenor of legislati'I.:? Reports 

presented to Congress--unequi vocal 1 ~., :'':!Veal a 

wid~1.v-held, conte!nporaneous ur.~ - -'."'..anding 

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that the affected Reservation ~ould shrink as 

a result of propos~d legislaeion .... 

-4?1 O',S, at .(63. Neither side in this case adduced any 

evidence o! negotiation bet·;1een the Navajo Tribe and the United 

States concerning cession ot the unallottad portions of 709/744. 

P&M mak.es no argument on the basis of any such negotiations. P&M 

does argue, however, an intent to di~inish based on legislative 

his~ory and executive correspondence. , 

P&M argues that the unequivocal contemporary understanding was 

that the 709/744 area was intended to be 19 a Reservation only for 

a limited time and purpose--allot~ent to individual Indians--and 

that' Reservation status would tenninate when that purpose ~as fulfilled." P,M 1 a Poat Hearing Mamo, at 7. Letters from the Indian 

Office to Congress, members of the public, and New Mexico officials 

refer to the reservation plan as "temporary." Further, the House 

Report refers to the "temporary reservation" of the 709/744 area . 

.§ll B.Rep. No. 16,3 1 60th Cong., 1st Seas. (1908). 

The first diffi~ulty with this argument is tha~ all reservations were considered temporary in 1908. Solem at -'68. The 

Congresses that passed the surplus land acts assumed that the 

enti.re Indian reservation system •,o1ould disappear within a generation. ~.: J!.ll also, Ota Indian Tribe, 773 r.2d at 1097 nn. 6-7 

(Seymour, J .• , concurring) . The second difficulty with the argument 

is that the letters involve concerns over land ownership and use. 

In short, they concern title and not jurisdictional boundaries. 

A-7 

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HUG 02 '9iJ E::32 AliDERSotl SLC #2 TEt,ffH CIRCUIT 

I P&M's expert urged eloquently that the distinction meant nothing 

I to the relevant actors at the turn c: the century. Nevertheless, 

it is settled law that, for purposes of this analysis, title and 

I boundaries are not coextensive. Sol~m, ,6s u.s. ~t 468. Again, 

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with~ra~al and allotwent tollowed by reopening for non-Indian use 

is consistent with continued Reservation status. ~-!~ tt;, sypra. 

I conclude that the Act contains neither language of cession 

nor a commitment to compensate the Nav,aj os for ceded lands. I 

co~clude turther that the events surrounding the passage of the Act 

do not unequivocally reveal a widely-held, contemporary understanding that the Reservation would shrink. 

:events Following Fassage. 

Solem held t.~at "to a lesser extent" we may have recourse to 

events occurring after the passage of surplus land acts to 'divine 

congressional intent: 

Congress' own treatment of the affected 

areas, particularly in the years i.:m.mediately 

following the opening, has some evidentiary 

value, as does the manner in which the Bureau 

of Indian Affairs and local judicial authorities dealt with unallotted open lands. 

80 l t!tll1, •Hi S tT. S. at 4 71 . P&:M offers its strongest evidence of 

disestablishment in this connection. 

P&M docu.mented that on five occasions bet~een 1911 and 1917 

the Interior Department needed certain lands in the 709/744 area 

to be Reservation in order to take action to~ard them. In each 

c.1.sa, the executive purported to re-withdraw the lands and make 

A- 8 

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:.hem Reservation. Again, from 1916 through the 19:30 1 s, Indian 

Office employees and others repeatedly urged c~ngress to extend the 

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Navajo Rese:::-vation 1n:t.2 the 709/744 area i:-: order to solve the 

"problem0 ot the "public domain Navajos." ~ill'• lleply 3::-iat, •t 

a. congress took no such action. 

The Tribe's research, however, makes it cleir that there never 

was a consistent congressional or Interior Department position on 

the jurisdictional status of the 709/744,area. Congresses between 

1919 and 1927 appropriated funds tor the "PUeblo Bonito" Reservation. "Pueblo Boni to" referred to the 709/7 44 area. Further, 

after 1927, ~hen the name of the agency was changed from "Pueblo 

" Boni~o" to "Eas~ern Navajo," .congressional reports began referring 

to the "Eastern Navajo Indian Reservation." As for subsequent 

treatlJlent by Interior, there has been a Bureau o! Indian Affairs 

(BIA) office in the 709/744 area continuously since 1907. The 

office provides the full panoply o! services to Navajos in the 

area. Fir1ally, betveen 1909 'and 1927, maps and reports of the 

Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Interior Departlllent depicted 

the. 709/744 area as an Indian Reservation. 

Subsequent treatlllent of the 709/744 area by congress and the 

Department of the Interior is therefore inconclusive. In any 

event, this history does not approach the standard of "substantial 

and compelling" evidence required for a finding of diminishment. 

~- I~dian Character of the Area, 

Scl ,~ prescribes one last inquiry: 

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(W) e have recog·nized that \ilho actually 

moved onto opened reservation lands is also 

relevant to deciding whether a surplus land 

Act diminished a reservation. Where nonIndian settlers flooded into the opened portion on a Reservation, and the area has long 

since lost its Indian character, we have 

ack.:."'lowledged that a gefac~, if not delur~ 

diminishment may have occurred. 

~lem, ~~pra at ~71. 

F'. 11/1::: 

The Court in 6<2,lJ!.m conducted this inquiry with respect to the 

Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation and canpluded that the opening of 

I that 1:·eservation "•.;as a failure." Solem, '465 o.s. at ~80. This 

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was because so fe~ settlers in tact "poured in" to the opened area. 

As a result of this and of the large numbers o! tribespeople .;ho 

cont1nued to live in the area, the population at the time of the 

decision in Soly was about evenly divided betveen Indians and nonIndi'lns. Considering these demographics and the fact that both 

the BIA and the Tribal government continued to have a strong 

presence in the area, the Court concluded that it was "impossible 

to say that the opened areas o! the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation have lost their Indian character."· ~ at -680. 

It the opening cf the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was a 

failure, the opening of the 709/744 area ct the Navajo Reservation 

was a monumental failure. Within a year of Executive Order 1000, 

only two whites had entered 709/744 for settlement. In 1939, the 

area had 280 ~hite residents and 9,000 Indians. Today the 709/744 

area remains 87% Navajo. Furthermore, despite the presence of a 

large portion of the P&M mine in the area and of a large Anglo 

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~1c..:1.; Ci2 -'':)fl 13: 34 Ar-mERSOf'l SLC *2 TENTH CIRCUIT 

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ranching concern, 75% of the land in 709/744 is either owned by 

I Indians or adlllinistered for their use. 

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Both the BIA and the tribal government have mai:-.s:.:lined a 

strong presence in the 709/744 area. As noted above, the BIA has 

had an agency in the area continuously since 1907. The BIA· for the 

Eastern Navajo Agency has a current annual budget of $8,000,000. 

f Three-fourths of the budget is expended on projects within the 

709/744 area. The BIA spends another' $24,000,000 annually for 

school progra~s in the Eastern Navajo Agency. 

The Tribe treats Navajos in the 709/744 area no differently 

than Navajos residing on tribal trust lands. This involves 

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providing services through a host of tribal programs, including 

community development, child development, social servic~s, health, 

education, youth development, and water resources. Some of the 

money comes !rom t.~e Navajo general fund. A large portion of the 

funds comes from the federal government, being administered by the 

Tribe. The contribution ot the State of New Mexico is small. For 

exampl~, the Navajo Division of Social Welfare spends in excess of 

$41,000,000 annually. New Mexico's contribution is but $390,000. 

The prominent law enforcement agency in the 709/744 area is 

the Navajo Nation Police. The vast majority of civil and criminal 

disputes are litigated in Navajo Tribal Court. The Tribe proved 

up many more indications, too numerous to det~il here, of the 

dominance of the Navajo Nation over life in the 709/744 area. 

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r conclude that the 709/744 area has never lost its Navajo 

character. 

Nothing in the 1908 Act, its legislative history, subsequent 

congressional and executive conduct, nor in the subsequent history 

I of the 709/744 area itself provides subst.antial or compelling 

evidence of a congressional purpose to shrink the boundaries of the 

I Navajo Reservation. Therefore, the old reservation boundaries 

survived the opening of the 709/744 area. The 709/744 area lies 

within t.he exterior bowidaries of the Navajo Reservation. 

~cause I have decided that the 709/744 area lies within the 

Navajo Reservation, I need not address the Tribe's claim that the 

.. area is .'?1 "dependent Indian comm.unity" \o/i thin the meaning of 18 

t1. S. C. § l l.51 (b) . 

conclusion 

Because the South McKinley Mine is on the Navajo Reservation, 

the Indian Abstention Doctrine of 11.ational farmers 'Onion and Iowa 

HUtuaJ., ~pp lies in· this case. I hereby abstain. This case shall 

be dismissed \o/ithcut prejudice. No~, Therefore, 

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint and its causes of action 

shall be, and hereby are, dismissed without prejudice. 

SENIOR UNI~ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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