Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03182/USCOURTS-caDC-06-03182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne Byfield
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 15, 2008 

No. 06-3182 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

WAYNE BYFIELD, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 89cr00322-01) 

Wayne Byfield, pro se, was on the brief for appellant. 

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, 

III, Elizabeth Trosman, Patricia Stewart, and L. Jackson 

Thomas II were on the brief for appellee.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and BROWN and

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges. 

USCA Case #06-3182 Document #1110914 Filed: 04/15/2008 Page 1 of 5
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PER CURIAM: Wayne Byfield appeals the district court’s 

denial of his motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c)(2). Because Byfield did not timely file a notice of 

appeal, we dismiss his appeal. 

 In 1992, Byfield was convicted of possession with intent 

to distribute 607.8 grams of a “mixture or substance” 

containing cocaine base and sugar. The Sentencing Guidelines 

for drug-possession convictions at the time were based upon 

“the entire weight of [the] mixture or substance” possessed. 

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c), note A 

(2007). Using that standard, the Guideline range for Byfield’s 

conviction was a sentence between 292 and 365 months. The 

district court chose the lower end of that range and sentenced 

Byfield to 292 months in prison. In 1993, the Sentencing 

Commission revised the Sentencing Guidelines by excluding 

from the calculation of the weight of the “mixture or 

substance” all “materials that must be separated from the 

controlled substance before the controlled substance can be 

used.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL amend. 484 

(2007 Appendix C). Byfield asked the district court to modify 

his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which provides 

that a court may reduce a sentence when the Sentencing 

Commission has subsequently lowered the range that had 

been used to determine that sentence. Byfield argued that the 

district court was required to subtract the weight of the sugar 

from the calculation of his sentence because the cocaine base 

could not be used before the sugar had been separated. With 

the sugar subtracted, Byfield would qualify for a sentence of 

235 to 293 months, so he asked that his sentence be reduced 

to 235 months. 

 The district court denied Byfield’s motion, concluding, 

without holding an evidentiary hearing, that the sugar did not 

need to be separated to use the cocaine base. We held that the 

USCA Case #06-3182 Document #1110914 Filed: 04/15/2008 Page 2 of 5
3 

failure to take evidence on the issue was error, reversed the 

district court’s determination, and on remand instructed the 

court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. United States v. 

Byfield, 391 F.3d 277, 281 (D.C. Cir. 2004). On remand, the 

district court again denied Byfield’s motion for sentence 

reduction. Byfield now appeals that ruling. The only issue we 

address is whether his notice of appeal, filed 125 days after 

the district court’s order denying his motion, was timely. We 

hold that his notice of appeal was not filed within the time 

limit authorized by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

The time limit for filing a notice of appeal turns on the 

nature of the case. For criminal matters, “a defendant’s notice 

of appeal must be filed in the district court within 10 days 

after the later of” the entry of the district court’s order or the 

filing of the government’s notice of appeal. FED. R.

APP. P. 4(b)(1)(A). For civil matters in which the government 

is a party, the notice of appeal “may be filed by any party 

within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is 

entered.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(B). In either circumstance, 

the district court may extend the time period by 30 days for 

“excusable neglect or good cause.” FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5), 

4(b)(4). At most, therefore, Byfield had 90 days to file his 

notice. Because he waited 125 days, his filing was untimely, 

regardless whether a motion to modify a sentence under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) is properly characterized as criminal or 

civil. 

We have never decided whether a motion to modify a 

sentence under § 3582(c)(2) is civil or criminal in nature. 

Because the purpose of such a motion is to ask the sentencing 

court to reduce a sentence in light of changes to the 

Sentencing Guidelines, we conclude that it is part of the 

defendant’s criminal proceeding and therefore subject to the 

10-day time limit of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

USCA Case #06-3182 Document #1110914 Filed: 04/15/2008 Page 3 of 5
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4(b)(1)(A). With this decision, we join each of the other nine 

circuits that has addressed the issue. See United States v. Fair, 

326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. 

Arrango, 291 F.3d 170, 171–72 (2d Cir. 2002); United States 

v. Alvarez, 210 F.3d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. 

Petty, 82 F.3d 809, 810 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ono, 

72 F.3d 101, 102–03 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Benanti, 

No. 05-1965, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 11871, at *2 (3d Cir. 

June 21, 2005); United States v. Miller, No. 04-6917, 2004 

U.S. App. LEXIS 24560, at *1–2 (4th Cir. Nov. 24, 2004); 

United States v. Saffo, No. 04-6112, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 

23916, at *12 (10th Cir. Nov. 16, 2004); United States v. 

Damon, No. 02-5616, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 809, at *4 (6th 

Cir. Jan. 16, 2003). As the leading case on the issue explains, 

Because the purpose of a § 3582 motion is 

resentencing, a motion under § 3582(c)(2) is 

undoubtedly a step in the criminal case. 

Similarly, because a sentencing court’s 

consideration of a § 3582(c)(2) motion requires 

the court to reexamine the original sentence in 

light of changes to the applicable Guidelines 

. . . , an order granting or denying such a 

motion is criminal in nature. 

United States v. Ono, 72 F.3d at 102 (citations and quotation 

marks omitted). 

Byfield’s notice was untimely filed, and his appeal 

should be dismissed. He contends, however, that the 

government waived its right to challenge his appeal on this 

ground. Our local rules require that, absent good cause shown, 

any motion to dismiss Byfield’s appeal must have been filed 

by the government within 45 days of the docketing of his 

USCA Case #06-3182 Document #1110914 Filed: 04/15/2008 Page 4 of 5
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appeal.1

 That deadline came on March 30, 2007. The 

government, however, first challenged the timeliness of 

Byfield’s appeal in its August 28, 2007 motion to dismiss, and 

then again in its opening brief filed August 30, 2007. Byfield 

argues that these objections were themselves too late. But we 

do not require a party to raise Rule 4(b) issues in a motion to 

dismiss. To the contrary, in United States v. Singletary we 

held that “no rule, order, internal procedure, or published 

guidance from this court require[s] [the government] to object 

to the untimeliness of the appeal under FED. R. APP. P. 4(b) 

before it file[s] its initial brief.” 471 F.3d 193, 196 (D.C. Cir. 

2006).2 Here, the government’s objection was proper because 

it was raised in the government’s initial brief. Accordingly, 

this appeal is 

Dismissed.

 

1 See D.C. CIR. R. 27(g)(1) (“Any motion which, if granted, would 

dispose of the appeal or petition for review in its entirety, or 

transfer the case to another court, must be filed within 45 days of 

the docketing of the case in this court, unless, for good cause 

shown, the court grants leave for a later filing.”). 

2

 In Singletary, we assumed that Rule 4(b) is not jurisdictional and 

that the government may therefore forfeit its right to object to a late 

notice of appeal in a criminal case by not raising the issue properly. 

471 F.3d at 196. We now know this for sure after Bowles v. Russell, 

127 S. Ct. 2360 (2007). In that case, the Supreme Court decided 

that Rule 4(a) is jurisdictional because it has a statutory basis. See 

id. at 2366; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (statutory basis for Rule 

4(a)). In light of Bowles, we now hold that Rule 4(b) is not 

jurisdictional because it was judicially created and has no statutory 

analogue. Other circuits have also adopted this view. See United 

States v. Garduno, 506 F.3d 1287, 1290–91 (10th Cir. 2007); 

United States v. Martinez, 496 F.3d 387, 388–89 (5th Cir. 2007); 

United States v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932, 940 (9th Cir. 2007). 

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