Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01390/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01390-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald Kielar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1390

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RONALD KIELAR,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:10-cr-00691-1 — Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2014 — DECIDED JUNE 29, 2015

____________________

Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Ronald Kielar was convicted in the 

United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on charges arising out of a scheme to defraud two 

health insurance companies by submitting fraudulent claims 

for the prescription drug Procrit. He now appeals his conviction, alleging several procedural and evidentiary errors. For 

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment 

of the district court. 

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I

BACKGROUND

Ronald Kielar was a licensed pharmacist at the Cartagena 

Pharmacy in Chicago, Illinois. Many of Mr. Kielar’s patients 

came from the medical practice of Dr. Camilo Barros, whose 

office was located in the same building as the Cartegena 

Pharmacy. Starting in November 2004, Mr. Kielar began defrauding two health insurance companies, Blue Cross and 

Blue Shield of Illinois (“BCBS”) and United Food and Commercial Workers Union and Employers Midwest Health 

Benefit Fund (“UFCW”), by submitting fraudulent claims for 

the prescription drug Procrit.1 In particular, Mr. Kielar 

forged prescriptions for Procrit under Dr. Barros’s name and 

then submitted those prescriptions to BCBS and UFCW for 

payment. He knew at the time that Procrit had neither been 

prescribed, nor provided, to any of the individuals under 

whose policies he sought reimbursement. His scheme continued over roughly six years and resulted in losses to BCBS 

and UFCW of approximately $1,678,549. 

In August 2010, Mr. Kielar was indicted on five counts of 

health care fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. This indictment also contained a forfeiture allegation, pursuant to 

18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7), for any proceeds of Mr. Kielar’s fraudulent scheme. This allegation specifically identified three of 

Mr. Kielar’s properties as subject to forfeiture, including a 

property located at 12786 NW 75th Street, Parkland, Florida 

(the “Florida Property”).

1 Procrit is an intravenous drug used to treat patients suffering from 

chronic kidney failure, cancer, or HIV infection.

 

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Later that month, the Government filed a notice of lis 

pendens for the Florida Property based on the indictment’s 

forfeiture allegation. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Kielar filed a 

motion requesting permission to sell the Florida Property, 

stating that he needed the proceeds of the sale in order to 

pay his attorneys’ legal fees. In its response, the Government 

stated that it did not object to the sale, provided that 

Mr. Kielar deposit the sale proceeds in an escrow account 

with the United States Marshals Service.

In October 2010, the district court granted Mr. Kielar’s 

motion to release the lis pendens and allow for the sale of his 

Florida Property. Consistent with the Government’s request, 

however, the court ordered that the proceeds of the sale be 

placed in an escrow account with the United States Marshals 

Service. Shortly after doing so, Mr. Kielar filed another motion asking the district court to vacate its earlier order and 

allow him to use the sale proceeds “for taxes, legal fees and 

other expenses.”2 After several rounds of briefing, the district court denied Mr. Kielar’s request and, shortly thereafter, 

also denied his motion for reconsideration. 

In March 2013, a grand jury returned a ten-count superseding indictment against Mr. Kielar, charging him with six 

counts of health care fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347; 

three counts of aggravated identify theft, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1); and one count of using false records to 

impede a federal investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1519. Like the initial indictment, the superseding indictment also contained a forfeiture allegation pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 982(a)(7).

2 R.36 at 2.

 

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Following a week-long jury trial, Mr. Kielar was convicted on all charges.3 He timely appealed.4

II

DISCUSSION

Mr. Kielar contends that the district court erred on three 

separate grounds: (1) by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his request to release his escrowed funds, (2) by limiting his cross-examination of Dr. Barros, a key government 

witness, and (3) by preventing him from calling Fernando 

Perez as a defense witness. We address these issues in turn. 

A.

We begin with Mr. Kielar’s contention that the district 

court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his 

request to release his escrowed funds. Because this contention concerns the scope of Mr. Kielar’s rights under the Due 

Process Clause, our review is de novo. United States v. 

Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d 784, 792 (7th Cir. 1998).

1.

Mr. Kielar first requested that the district court release 

his escrowed funds in November 2010, shortly after the sale 

of his Florida Property. In particular, Mr. Kielar filed a motion asserting that the restraint on his access to those funds

3 The district court’s jurisdiction was premised on 18 U.S.C. § 3231.

4 Our jurisdiction over this appeal is secure under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

 

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impeded his ability to pay his attorneys’ legal fees in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Notably, this 

motion contained neither documentary evidence nor specific 

factual allegations demonstrating Mr. Kielar’s need for the 

sale proceeds to finance his defense.

The Government opposed the motion. It submitted that 

the restraint on Mr. Kielar’s assets did not violate his Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel because he had not shown,

“beyond the conclusory statements in his reply,” a “bona 

fide need” for the assets.5 The Government’s brief also explained how it could trace the proceeds of Mr. Kielar’s 

fraudulent scheme from the corporate bank account of the 

Cartegena Pharmacy to mortgage payments on the Florida 

Property. 

In December 2010, the district court held a status hearing 

at which defense counsel stated that Mr. Kielar’s motion 

“may require a more detailed hearing.”6 Counsel then requested that the district court allow for additional briefing 

on the issue. The district court granted the request.

In January 2011, Mr. Kielar submitted a brief in support 

of his November 2010 motion. Although the brief contained 

several legal arguments, the only allegations in the brief concerning Mr. Kielar’s need for the funds to pay his legal fees

were as follows:

Over the past four and a half months, Defendant Kielar has fallen behind in payments 

to his attorneys and is now in arrears for a sub5 R.40 at 4.

6 R.168 at 4.

 

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stantial sum. Defendant Kielar’s inability to 

pay is due to the forfeiture clause which the 

Government included in the Indictment....

....

...Defendant Kielar has demonstrated a bona 

fide need for those funds because his attorneys 

can no longer afford to represent him on an essentially pro bono basis. Defendant Kielar’s 

counsel has invested immense time and substantial money in his defense. To prevent the 

release of funds in escrow to Defendant 

Kielar’s attorneys would be to force them to 

withdraw from this case. As such, the court is 

essentially depriving Defendant Kielar of his 

Sixth Amendment right to the counsel of his 

choice and such a deprivation cannot stand. 

This Court must allow the release of sale proceeds from the Florida Property in order to allow the defendant to continue to retain his 

chosen counsel.[7]

Mr. Kieler did not submit any documentary evidence to substantiate these claims.

In response, the Government again submitted that 

Mr. Kielar’s motion should be denied because he had failed 

to demonstrate a bona fide need for the assets at issue. The 

Government further asserted that, assuming that Mr. Kielar

had shown a bona fide need, it had already demonstrated 

adequately the basis for its forfeiture allegation.

7 R.42 at 2, 4 (emphasis in original).

 

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In reply, Mr. Kielar submitted a one-and-a-half-page affidavit in which he swore to the following facts: (1) that the 

combined pharmacy salaries for him and his ex-wife (with 

whom he lived) were only enough to pay minimal living expenses, (2) that he derived the down payment for the Florida 

Property from refinancing his house in Illinois, which was 

purchased in 1999, (3) that he owned a 2002 automobile with 

200,000 miles, (4) that he owned two Met Life insurance policies with limited equity, and (5) that he was unable to pay 

his attorneys’ fees without the release of funds. Mr. Kielar

did not submit any further documentary evidence to substantiate these assertions.

In February 2011, the district court denied Mr. Kielar’s

request to release the proceeds from the sale of his Florida 

Property. In doing so, the district court relied on our decision in United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 

1988), as setting forth the relevant legal standard for assessing Mr. Kielar’s claim:

[A] defendant whose assets may be subject to 

forfeiture may make out a Sixth Amendment

right-to-counsel claim only if (1) he can establish “a bona fide need to utilize assets subject to 

the restraining order to conduct his defense” 

and (2) the Government fails to “demonstrate 

the basis for its assertion, contained in the indictment, that the assets are subject to forfeiture.”[8]

8 R.46 at 2 (quoting United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 730 (7th 

Cir. 1988).

 

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With regard to the first prong of this test, the district 

court noted that the only evidence of a bona fide need submitted by Mr. Kielar was his one-and-a-half-page affidavit. 

Although the court acknowledged that this “affidavit 

lack[ed] detail and [was] not supported by any additional 

materials (e.g., bank statements, pay stubs, etc.) that might 

make a more convincing showing of need,” it nonetheless 

“assume[d], without deciding, that Defendant [had] shown a 

bona fide need for the restrained assets to support his defense.”9 From there, the court went on to conclude that the 

Government had offered sufficient evidence to show that the 

seized assets at issue were subject to forfeiture and, accordingly, that Mr. Kielar was not entitled to the release of his

escrowed funds. In a footnote to this discussion, the court 

noted that Mr. Kielar had “not requested a formal evidentiary hearing on this issue,” yet concluded that such a hearing was unnecessary given that Mr. Kielar had been afforded

“ample opportunity to present argument (in four briefs) and 

evidence (in the form of his affidavit).”10

At a subsequent status hearing, Mr. Kieler requested that 

the district court reconsider its February 2011 order. The district court agreed to do so and suggested additional briefing. 

Shortly afterward, Mr. Kielar filed a written motion for reconsideration. However, he still did not submit any further 

evidence to substantiate his need for the escrowed funds to 

finance his defense, nor did he request an evidentiary hearing on the issue. Notably, however, his motion did state that

he, as the defendant, did “not bear the burden to request a 

9 Id. at 3.

10 Id. at 4 n.1.

 

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formal evidentiary hearing on this issue as the court [previously had] indicate[d].”11

In May 2011, the district court again denied Mr. Kielar’s 

request to release his escrowed funds. Once again, the court 

assumed without deciding that Mr. Kielar had established a 

bona fide need for the assets at issue. Turning to the second 

step of the Moya-Gomez analysis, the court determined that

the Government adequately had demonstrated the factual 

basis for its forfeiture assertion and that “[a]t no time in any 

of the written submissions or hearings before the 

Court...ha[d the] Defendant come forward either with argument or evidence to rebut the Government’s contentions.”12 Further, the court again noted that Mr. Kielar had 

not “at any time, including at the most recent status hearing..., requested an evidentiary hearing to challenge the 

Government’s analysis or develop the factual basis for a 

counterargument.”13

At a subsequent status hearing, defense counsel asserted

that the district court’s order “le[ft] open a couple of questions” including “whether [Mr. Kielar] would be seeking an 

evidentiary hearing.”14 In response, the district court noted 

that Mr. Kielar had neither previously requested a hearing 

nor offered any argument or evidence to dispute the Government’s showing of traceability. This being the case, the 

court asked what would happen at a hearing beyond the 

11 R.52 at 3.

12 R.55 at 2.

13 Id.

14 R.165 at 3.

 

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Government’s simply presenting the same evidence that it 

already had provided in its briefs. Defense counsel initially 

responded that if an evidentiary hearing were held,

Mr. Kielar would not present any evidence because it was 

not his burden to do so. Defense counsel then acknowledged 

that he and Mr. Kielar had not yet decided how to pursue 

this issue and therefore asked for “some time to go over this 

with Mr. Kielar.”15 The district court granted this request

and gave defense counsel thirty days to confer with his client. 

At the next status hearing on July 8, 2011, defense counsel stated that he had conferred with Mr. Kielar and that 

they would “not be asking for an evidentiary hearing concerning the funds.”16

2.

Mr. Kielar now contends that the district court erred by 

failing to order, sua sponte, an evidentiary hearing on his 

request to release his escrowed funds. Specifically, he contends that the court’s failure to do so “violated his Fifth 

Amendment due process rights by depriving [him of] his 

liberty interest under the Sixth Amendment to obtain counsel of his choice.”17

With regard to certain federal criminal offenses, including the health care fraud offense at issue here, a district 

15 Id. at 11.

16 R.166 at 2.

17 Appellant’s Br. 12.

 

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court, upon the filing of an indictment containing a forfeiture allegation, may enter a protective order to preserve the 

availability of a defendant’s assets that are subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(7), (b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A). 

In Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d at 730, we held that a defendant in 

such circumstances has a limited due process right to contest 

the Government’s forfeiture allegation if the pretrial seizure 

of his assets would prevent him from hiring the counsel of 

his choice. In particular, Moya-Gomez held that if “the defendant presents a bona fide need to utilize assets subject to 

the restraining order to conduct his defense” and “the district court finds that the defendant does not have other assets from which such payments can be made,” the court 

“then must require the government to demonstrate the basis 

for its assertion, contained in the indictment, that the assets 

are subject to forfeiture.” Id. With regard to the specific process that was due, we held that such a defendant was entitled to “an immediate, postrestraint, adversary hearing” upon making the requisite showing of bona fide need. Id. at 

731. In subsequent cases, we have clarified that in order to 

demonstrate a “bona fide need” a defendant must do more 

than “submit[] a bare-bones affidavit asserting that he personally lack[s] sufficient funds to obtain counsel of his 

choice.” Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d at 792.

The Government submits that Mr. Kielar waived his 

right to a hearing under Moya-Gomez when, on July 8, 2011, 

his counsel informed the district court that Mr. Kielar would 

“not be asking for an evidentiary hearing concerning the 

funds.”18 Further, the Government contends that, waiver 

18 R.166 at 2.

 

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aside, Mr. Kielar was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing 

because he never presented sufficient evidence to establish a 

bona fide need for the assets at issue.

The Government’s assertion of waiver is correct. Indeed, 

the waiver here hardly could have been clearer. After having 

thirty days to confer with his counsel over whether to request an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Kielar expressly declined to 

request one. The record contains, moreover, no indication 

that this decision was not a knowing and voluntary one. Nor 

does Mr. Kielar contend otherwise. This decision thus falls 

squarely within the definition of waiver: it was “the intentional relinquishment of a known right.” United States v. Rodriguez-Gomez, 608 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2010).

Mr. Kielar now attempts to avoid this conclusion by asserting that the hearing right described in Moya-Gomez is 

mandatory and nonwaivable. In his view, any time a criminal defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 

Moya-Gomez, the district court must hold such a hearing on 

its own initiative even in the absence of a request from the 

defendant. Mr. Kielar offers no reason why any value protected by the Due Process Clause would require a mandatory hearing in this context. Rather, he merely contends that 

our decision in Moya-Gomez mandates this result. 

This argument is without merit. The defendant in MoyaGomez specifically requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing. 

See 860 F.2d at 717. Nowhere in our opinion did we state or 

suggest that the due process right that we acknowledged 

was immune from the ordinary rules of waiver. “Constitutional rights like other rights can be waived, provided that 

the waiver is knowing and intelligent, as it was here.” United 

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States v. Barnett, 415 F.3d 690, 691 (7th Cir. 2005). We therefore consider the issue waived. 

Even if this objection had been preserved, Mr. Kielar has 

not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a bona fide 

need for the assets at issue. He has offered no documentary 

evidence, other than an unsubstantiated affidavit, to demonstrate that the restrained assets were needed to conduct his 

defense. In Moya-Gomez, we stressed that the right to a hearing was “very limited” and required as a prerequisite that 

“the district court find[] that the defendant does not have 

other assets from which” he could pay for his defense. 860 

F.2d at 730. Mr. Kielar’s one-and-a-half-page affidavit does 

not provide enough information, much less enough reliable 

information, to allow the district court to make this finding. 

See Kirschenbaum, 156 F.3d at 792. Accordingly, even if we 

were to presume that Mr. Kielar had preserved this objection, he still would not have been entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing.19

19 In his opening brief, Mr. Kielar offers a secondary argument concerning his right to a post-indictment hearing on the pretrial restraint of his 

assets. He contends that, regardless of his right to counsel of choice, he 

nonetheless has a “general right” to a post-indictment, pretrial hearing 

before being deprived of his property. 

This issue need not detain us long. Because Mr. Kielar did not raise 

this issue before the district court, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Borostowski, 775 F.3d 851, 865 (7th Cir. 2014). “An error is 

plain if it is clear or obvious.” Id. Here, Mr. Kielar has acknowledged that 

whether the Due Process Clause requires a hearing in this context is an 

“open question.” Appellant’s Br. 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because any error, therefore, was not obvious, the plain error standard 

has not been met. See Borostowski, 775 F.3d at 865.

 

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B.

We turn now to Mr. Kielar’s contention that the district 

court impermissibly limited his cross-examination of 

Dr. Barros.

1.

Dr. Barros was one of the Government’s key witnesses at 

trial. Prior to trial, the Government had produced records 

showing that the Illinois Department of Public Aid (“IDPA”) 

had recommended that Dr. Barros be terminated from participating in IDPA’s Medical Assistance Program, which 

consisted of Medicaid and other associated programs. 

Among the reasons cited for Dr. Barros’s termination were 

that he (1) had failed to obtain and document adequately patient histories and physical examinations and (2) had prescribed medications without appropriate indications. 

In July 2013, the Government filed a motion in limine in 

which it sought two limitations on the cross-examination of 

Dr. Barros. First, it wanted to restrict any examination concerning his termination from the IDPA program to the sole 

ground of his recordkeeping. Second, it requested that crossexamination on Dr. Barros’s recordkeeping be permitted only if the Government sought to introduce his records. In the 

Government’s view, the other grounds for Dr. Barros’s termination were not probative of his character for truthfulness 

but rather only went to his qualifications and competency as 

a physician. In response, Mr. Kielar submitted that he should 

be able to cross-examine Dr. Barros about all of the grounds 

for termination from these programs because the inforCase: 14-1390 Document: 34 Filed: 06/29/2015 Pages: 25
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mation was “relevant to show bias and self-interest in falsely 

testifying that he did not prescribe Procrit in this case.”20

The district court denied in part and granted in part the 

Government’s motion in limine. It precluded the introduction of extrinsic evidence if that evidence was intended solely to impeach Dr. Barros with regard to his character for 

truthfulness. The court, however, “decline[d] to categorically 

bar any cross-examination of [Dr. Barros] concerning the 

IDPA recommendations,” noting that some of Mr. Kielar’s 

“proposed lines of cross-examination may demonstrate bias 

or self-interest on the part of [Dr. Barros].”21

On the first day of trial, the Government and defense 

counsel informed the district court that they had “worked 

out a solution” in which Dr. Barros would “testify that he 

was terminated from Medicare and Medicaid in the early 

2000–2001 time period” “and then that [would] be the end of 

the issue as far as defense counsel and the government 

[were] concerned.”22

When asked by the district court whether this compromise would “essentially substitute” for any use of the IDPA 

recommendation to impeach Dr. Barros, defense counsel responded, “We believe it will, Judge.”23

On direct examination, Dr. Barros testified that he had 

never written a prescription for Procrit and that all of the 

20 R.100 at 6.

21 R.107 at 5–6.

22 R.151 at 2.

23 Id. at 3.

 

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prescriptions submitted under his name to BCBS and UFCW 

contained forged signatures. He further testified that he was 

terminated as a provider by Medicaid in 2000 and Medicare 

in 2001.

On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Barros 

a series of questions about these terminations. At that point, 

the Government objected. At a sidebar, it stated its understanding that defense counsel had agreed not to crossexamine Dr. Barros on this topic. Defense counsel replied 

that he had “never agreed not to ask any questions on this 

issue.”24 The court then inquired whether this was defense 

counsel’s last question on the topic. Counsel responded that 

all he wanted to do was to clarify the dates when Dr. Barros 

was terminated from Medicaid as opposed to Medicare because he believed that the doctor had confused those dates 

during his direct testimony. The court then stated, “How 

about one last question, all it would establish is that as of 

2001 he could no longer submit whatever it is, Medicare to 

the state or Medicaid to the federal or whatever the right 

way to go and just tie up and then move on. Fair enough?”25

Defense counsel did not object to this proposed solution. 

Upon resuming his cross-examination, defense counsel clarified the correct dates of Dr. Barros’s termination and moved 

on to another line of questioning. 

24 R.153 at 29.

25 Id. at 30.

 

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2.

Mr. Kielar now contends that, by limiting his crossexamination of Dr. Barros, the district court violated both

Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 608(b) as well as his right to 

confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. He contends that the district court should not have prevented him 

from further inquiring about the doctor’s termination from 

Medicare and Medicaid. In his view, further inquiry into the 

circumstances of the doctor’s termination was necessary to 

show that Dr. Barros had a motive to “falsely testify[] that he 

did not prescribe Procrit,” so as to “maintain[] his medical 

license” and “regain[] eligibility for Medicaid.”26

Before proceeding to the merits of Mr. Kielar’s argument, 

we first must address the Government’s contention that 

Mr. Kielar waived, or at least forfeited, this objection by failing to raise it before the district court. “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, whereas forfeiture is 

the failure to timely assert a right.” Rodriguez-Gomez, 608 

F.3d at 972. “Forfeited errors may still be reviewed for plain 

error, while waived errors are extinguished and cannot be 

reviewed on appeal.” United States v. Berg, 714 F.3d 490, 494 

n.1 (7th Cir. 2013) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Here, the Government first points out that, other than 

precluding the admission of extrinsic impeachment evidence 

against Dr. Barros (which Mr. Kielar does not challenge), the 

district court never restricted Mr. Kielar’s right to crossexamine Dr. Barros about his termination from Medicare or 

Medicaid, or any other issue for that matter. Thus, the only 

26 Appellant’s Br. 24.

 

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reason why these questions were not asked, the Government 

submits, was because “defendant’s trial counsel made the 

strategic decision not to ask [them].”27

The Government’s assessment is correct. As the record 

clearly demonstrates, Mr. Kielar reached an agreement with 

the Government about how the parties would handle 

Dr. Barros’s termination from Medicare and Medicaid. 

When the Government objected that defense counsel’s crossexamination of Dr. Barros was treading beyond the scope of 

that agreement, the district court merely asked defense 

counsel whether this was his last question on the matter. In 

response, defense counsel stated that all he wanted to do 

was clarify the dates on which Dr. Barros was terminated 

from Medicaid as opposed to Medicare, because he believed 

that the witness had confused those dates during his direct 

examination. The court allowed defense counsel to clarify 

this issue, suggesting that he “tie it up” in “one last question” “and then move on.”28 Notably, the court concluded its 

suggestion by asking the parties, “Fair enough?”, to which 

defense counsel expressed no objection.29 In light of the parties’ earlier acknowledgement that they had “worked out a 

solution” in which Dr. Barros would “testify that he was 

terminated from Medicare and Medicaid in the early 2000–

2001 time period” and “then that [would] be the end of the 

issue,”30 defense counsel’s decision not to object to the 

court’s proposed solution, or to otherwise attempt to further 

27 Appellee’s Br. 41.

28 R.153 at 30.

29 Id.

30 R.151 at 2.

 

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question Dr. Barros on this issue, was intentional. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Kielar has waived any objection 

concerning this issue.31

In any event, even if the district court had precluded 

Mr. Kielar from questioning Dr. Barros about his termination 

from Medicare and Medicaid, that decision would not have 

constituted reversible error under either Rule 608(b) or the 

Confrontation Clause. Rule 608(b) bars the admission of extrinsic evidence “to prove specific instances of a witness’s 

conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character 

for truthfulness.” Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). Under this rule, however, a district court may permit, in its discretion, a party to 

cross-examine a witness about such prior conduct so long as 

it is probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness. Id. 

Rule 608(b) operates subject to the limitations imposed by 

the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which 

protects the right of a criminal defendant “to be confronted 

with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

As a general matter, we review a district court’s limitation on the scope of cross-examination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sasson, 62 F.3d 874, 882 (7th Cir. 1995). 

31 See United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 418 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding 

“that a defendant’s attorney can waive his client’s Sixth Amendment 

confrontation right so long as the defendant does not dissent from his 

attorney’s decision, and so long as it can be said that the attorney’s decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 

936, 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding that a defendant waived any 

objection concerning the district court’s failure to consider adequately 

his mitigation arguments at sentencing by not raising that objection 

when the court asked the parties “whether they had any objection to the 

sentence or required ‘any further elaboration’ of the judge’s reasons”).

 

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Where, however, a limitation “directly implicates the core 

values of the Confrontation Clause,” our review is de novo. 

United States v. Recendiz, 557 F.3d 511, 530 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining the appropriate standard of review, it is important, therefore, to “distinguish between the core values of the confrontation right 

and more peripheral concerns which remain within the ambit of the trial judge’s discretion.” United States v. Degraffenried, 339 F.3d 576, 581 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. 

Saunders, 973 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir. 1992)).

It is well established that “[e]xposing witness bias lies 

within the protected core of the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Sanders, 708 F.3d 976, 990 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We also have recognized, however, that the constitutional guarantee is limited to the opportunity to expose the bias: “a limitation on cross-examination 

implicates the core of the Confrontation Clause when the defense is completely forbidden from exposing the witness’s 

bias.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “So long as the 

accused is given the opportunity to expose bias, further cross 

examination is at the discretion of the district court.” United 

States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 530 (“[O]nce a trial court permits a defendant to expose a witness’s motivation, it is of peripheral 

concern to the Sixth Amendment how much opportunity defense counsel gets to hammer that point home to the jury.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

In this case, the fact that Dr. Barros was terminated from 

participating in Medicare and Medicaid was exposed to the 

jury; both the Government and defense counsel questioned 

the doctor on this topic. Thus, because Mr. Kielar was “given 

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No. 14-1390 21

the opportunity to expose [this potential ground for] bias, 

further cross examination [was] at the discretion of the district court.” Smith, 308 F.3d at 738. A district court does not 

abuse its discretion in this context so long as “the jury had 

sufficient information to make a discriminating appraisal of 

the witness’s motives and biases.” Recendiz, 557 F.3d at 530 

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the fact of 

Dr. Barros’s termination alone gave the jury enough information to appraise the witness’s motive to lie. Mr. Kielar’s 

counsel could well have argued forcibly to the jury that 

Dr. Barros’s removal from the government programs gave 

him a strong motive to deny writing the prescriptions in 

question because any such admission might have resulted in 

further problems with federal or state regulatory authorities. 

Indeed, an examination of the transcript at closing argument 

indicates that his counsel made some attempt to do so.32 In 

any event, assuming for the sake of argument that this issue 

was not waived, it is clear that the cross-examination that 

did take place gave defense counsel enough opportunity to 

make his point. 

Therefore, assuming the district court had restricted 

Mr. Kielar’s cross-examination of Dr. Barros, that limitation 

would not have been an abuse of discretion. See Sanders, 708 

F.3d at 991 (noting that just because “[t]he jury might not 

have possessed all the information [the defendant] wanted it 

to have” does not mean that the jury lacked “sufficient information to evaluate [the witness’s] testimony”). Accord32 See R.154 at 148 (“And Dr. Barros. [The prosecutor] also asked what 

does Dr. Barros have to gain. Well, what Dr. Barros has to gain is he is 

not sitting right here.”).

 

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22 No. 14-1390

ingly, waiver aside, Mr. Kielar’s evidentiary challenge fails 

on its merits. 

C.

Finally, Mr. Kielar contends that the district court erred 

by preventing him from calling Fernando Perez as a defense 

witness. We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings 

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Khan, 771 F.3d 367, 

377 (7th Cir. 2014).

1.

Prior to trial, the Government listed Fernando Perez as a 

potential witness. Perez, a former patient of Dr. Barros and a 

customer at the Cartagena Pharmacy, was slated to testify 

that Dr. Barros never had prescribed Procrit for him. When 

the Government later elected not to call Perez, defense counsel informed the Government of his intent to call the witness. 

In response, the Government moved to preclude Mr. Kielar 

from calling Perez. When asked by the district court why he 

intended to call Perez, defense counsel explained that he intended to impeach the witness’s credibility. In particular, defense counsel stated that, when called, Perez would “deny 

that he was ever prescribed Procrit, [or] that he ever got any 

Procrit,” and that defense counsel would then impeach the 

witness by asking whether he had stolen his cousin’s identity and whether he was an illegal alien (both of which defense counsel believed were true).33

33 R.153 at 126.

 

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No. 14-1390 23

The Government objected to this proffer, asserting that 

defense counsel was “calling [Perez] solely for the purpose 

of impeaching him.”34 In response, the court asked defense 

counsel whether “that[ was] all there [was] to it,” to which 

defense counsel responded, “That’s all there is to it, 

Judge.”35

When asked whether he intended to ask Perez any other 

questions, defense counsel responded that he also might ask 

the following: “The government told you that they were going to call you as a witness and then sometime during the 

trial you were—on a certain date you were interviewed and 

the government told you that they were not going to call you 

as a witness.”36

The next day, the court granted the Government’s oral 

motion in limine. Relying on our decision in United States v. 

Giles, 246 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 2001), the district court ruled that 

Mr. Kielar’s counsel could not call Perez as a defense witness 

because his only reason for doing so was to impeach him.

2.

It is well established that “a party may not call a witness 

for the sole purpose of impeaching him.” Id. at 974. In Giles, 

as here, a defendant sought to call as a witness an individual 

who was slated to testify for the Government but whom the 

Government chose not to call at trial. Id. We affirmed the dis34 Id.

35 Id. at 127.

36 Id.

 

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trict court’s decision to preclude the defendant from calling 

this individual, concluding that the defendant’s “true defense reason...for wanting to put [this witness] on the stand 

was to expose his warts to the jury and float the inference 

that the [Government] should not play footsie with a sleazeball.” Id.

Mr. Kielar attempts to avoid Giles’s clear holding by asserting that impeachment was not the “only reason” that he 

wanted to call Perez as a witness.37 In particular, he contends 

that although “trial counsel believed Mr. Perez would likely

testify that he was never prescribed Procrit by 

Dr. Barros...[,] trial counsel was willing to make the tactical 

decision that under oath Mr. Perez may testify that he was 

prescribed Procrit.”38

Mr. Kielar never communicated to the district court this 

reason for permitting Perez’s testimony. We therefore refuse 

to consider this theory of admissibility for the first time on 

appeal. See United States v. Biesiadecki, 933 F.2d 539, 544 n.1

(7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Marrera, 768 F.2d 201, 209 (7th 

Cir. 1985); see also Stephens v. Miller, 13 F.3d 998, 1008 n.5 (7th

Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Rovner, J., concurring) (“A defendant 

cannot advance one reason for admitting evidence during 

trial and then advance a wholly separate basis for admission...on appeal. An evidentiary rationale not raised before 

the trial judge at the time of ruling is waived.”). Because 

Mr. Kielar’s only proffered reason for calling Perez as a defense witness was to impeach him, we conclude that the dis37 Appellant’s Br. 26 (emphasis in original).

38 Id. at 26–27 (emphasis in original).

 

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No. 14-1390 25

trict court’s decision to grant the Government’s motion in 

limine was proper. 

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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