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Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
Precision Concrete
Respondent

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided April 6, 2004

No. 02-1164

& No. 02-1203

PRECISION CONCRETE,

PETITIONER/CROSS–RESPONDENT

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT/CROSS–PETITIONER

SOUTHWEST REGIONAL COUNCIL OF CARPENTERS F/K/A

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA–NEVADA REGIONAL COUNCIL OF

CARPENTERS, AND LABORERS LOCAL UNION NO. 872,

INTERVENORS

On Petitioner’s Application for Attorneys’ Fees

–————

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-1203 Document #814110 Filed: 04/06/2004 Page 1 of 10
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Per Curiam: We decided the merits of this controversy in

Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 88 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

We now consider petitioner’s application for attorneys’ fees

and expenses pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act

(‘‘EAJA’’), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Because we find that as to a

substantial portion of the litigation the General Counsel was

not substantially justified in issuing and prosecuting a complaint and the Board was not substantially justified in defending its decision through litigation in this court, we award a

portion of the fees sought in the application for the reasons

more fully set forth below.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of the controversy is set forth in

some detail in Precision Concrete v. NLRB, 334 F.3d at 89–

90, but we need to make brief reference to pertinent portions

of the background facts in order to analyze the application

before us. Briefly put, after a contentious organization drive,

approximately 100 of Precision’s work force undertook a

strike called by the Building Trades Organizing Project (‘‘Union’’). The strike was not successful. The company hired

replacement workers and refused to reinstate the strikers.

The Union filed a series of unfair labor practice charges. The

General Counsel of the Board filed a complaint which in

addition to the charges filed by the Union alleged that the

company had committed an unfair labor practice in an incident involving an employee wearing a union t-shirt (the

‘‘Pulido–Mendez t-shirt incident’’). This was not included in

any formal unfair labor charges filed against the company.

The Administrative Law Judge (‘‘ALJ’’) hearing the complaint held that the Pulido–Mendez t-shirt incident was an

unfair labor practice, that it was ‘‘closely related’’ to previously filed formal charges, and that the incident was a cause of

the strike. Because ‘‘an unfair labor practice striker who

unconditionally offers to return to work is entitled to reinstatement,’’ Gibson Greetings, Inc. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 385, 389

(D.C. Cir. 1995), this finding was critical to the claimed right

of the strikers to a reinstatement remedy, which they could

not obtain if the strike were economic, and not in response to

USCA Case #02-1203 Document #814110 Filed: 04/06/2004 Page 2 of 10
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an unfair labor practice or practices. On appeal, the Board

upheld the decision of the ALJ. As neither the Board nor the

ALJ found any other unfair labor practice to have been a

cause of the strike, the Board’s major remedy of reinstatement depended entirely on the Board’s jurisdiction over the

‘‘t-shirt’’ claim. Precision appealed to this court arguing that

the t-shirt incident was not properly before the Board. We

agreed, holding that the Board did not have jurisdiction to

adjudicate the t-shirt incident and therefore did not have

jurisdiction to enter the reinstatement relief against the

petitioning employer. See, e.g., Drug Plastics & Glass Co.,

Inc. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (‘‘Where

the Board is unable to connect the allegations in its complaint

with the charge allegation, we are unable to find that the

Board has jurisdiction over the unrelated complaint allegations.’’). Based on our decision in its favor in Precision, the

employer now petitions this court for reimbursement of its

attorneys’ fees incurred in the matter in the amount of

$143,430.50 in attorneys’ fees and $7,994.05 in expenses.

Under the EAJA,

a court shall award to a prevailing party TTT fees and

other expenses TTT incurred by that party in any civil

action TTT including proceedings for judicial review of

agency action, brought by or against the United States in

any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the

court finds that the position of the United States was

substantially justified or that special circumstances make

an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Precision argues that the Board

was not ‘‘substantially justified’’ in litigating this matter and

that it is therefore entitled to reimbursement of the fees and

expenses prayed for. In support of this argument, Precision

asserts that ‘‘the Board’s insistence that it had jurisdiction

over the Mendez t-shirt incident is the primary reason Precision continued to pursue this case,’’ and that ‘‘[i]t would not

have been necessary for Precision to incur any fees beyond

the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge absent this

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jurisdictional error by the Board.’’ Precision Concrete’s Reply in Support of its Application at 4–5.

The NLRB disagrees, arguing that no fees should be

reimbursed for litigating the Pulido–Mendez t-shirt incident

because the Board was substantially justified in bringing that

action. The NLRB also argues that no fees should be

awarded for time spent on four unfair labor practices found

by the ALJ/Board. The Board also argues that Precision’s

counsel expended uncompensible hours on other arguments in

support of its petition for review of the Board’s holding on the

t-shirt incident and that petitioners should not be awarded

fees for the time spent on those arguments. Because we

agree with Precision that the NLRB acted without substantial justification, we hold that it is entitled to fee reimbursement under the Equal Access to Justice Act, although we will

order some reduction to the amount prayed.

II. ANALYSIS

Subject to other statutory criteria which are not in dispute

in this matter, the EAJA provides that a ‘‘prevailing party’’ in

actions ‘‘including proceedings for judicial review of agency

action, brought by or against the United States’’ are entitled

along with the customary costs of litigation to a recovery of

fees and other expenses incurred. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

As Precision is obviously the prevailing party, and as there is

no dispute as to any other statutory criterion, the governing

issue in this case is whether the position of the NLRB was

substantially justified. We hold that beginning with the

review of the ALJ’s decision by the Board, it was not.1

As we made clear in the merits decision of this case, the tshirt incident which was the only foundation for the principal

remedy ordered by the Board and brought to us for review

first arose in an amended complaint more than six months

after the alleged incident. Section 10(b) of the National

Labor Relations Act requires that ‘‘no complaint shall issue

1 EAJA recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs is available in

adversary administrative adjudications as well as litigation in the

article III courts. See 5 U.S.C. § 504.

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based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six

months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board.’’ 29

U.S.C. § 160(B) (emphasis added). While it is well established that a complaint need not be filed within six months of

the incident and may be amended more than six months after

the incident, see NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 491

(2d Cir. 1952), the statute does require ‘‘that the complaint be

based upon an unfair labor practice charge filed within six

months of the allegedly unlawful conduct.’’ Precision, 334

F.3d at 91. Not only was there no timely charge filed as to

the t-shirt incident, no charge was ever filed alleging that

incident. The t-shirt incident appeared for the first time in

the complaint, an appearance not timely and not valid.

We have long held that ‘‘when the Board ventures outside

the strict confines of the’’ charges before it, ‘‘it must limit

itself to matters sharing a significant factual affiliation with

the activity alleged in the charge.’’ Id., quoting G.W. Galloway Co. v. NLRB, 856 F.3d 275, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The

Supreme Court long ago dealt with the standard of relatedness governing the Board’s ability to pass on allegations of

unfair labor practices raised for the first time in a complaint

but not part of the timely filed charge underlying the complaint. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959). In

Fant Milling, the Supreme Court held that the Board may

prosecute unfair labor practices not specifically alleged in a

charge where such practices are ‘‘ ‘related to those alleged in

the charge and TTT grow out of them while the proceeding is

pending before the Board.’ ’’ Precision, 334 F.3d at 92,

quoting Fant Milling, 360 U.S. at 309. In Precision, we held

that the only link between the t-shirt incident and the other

charged unfair labor practices was that ‘‘all occurred during

the course of the Union’s organizing drive in 1988.’’ 334 F.3d

at 93. Since that connection was obviously insufficient under

well-established precedent, the Board had no jurisdiction to

pass on the alleged incident as an unfair labor practice and

hence no jurisdiction to enter the reinstatement order.

Therefore, Precision was plainly entitled to the relief sought

in the merits action. Id.

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The principal question before us today is whether the

Board was substantially justified in its invalid assertion of

jurisdiction. The best evidence on that subject is the justification which the Board offered in the merits argument.

Without rehashing that entire case, after a full review of the

Board’s arguments and the record we held that ‘‘[t]he only

link we can see is that the alleged incidents all occurred

during the course of the union’s organizing drive in 1998.’’

Precision, 334 F.3d at 93. It is well established that ‘‘coincidence of the two separate violations during the same organizing campaign’’ does not meet the test of Fant Milling. Ross

Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 235 F.3d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Fant Milling made it clear in 1959 that the Board cannot

pass on allegations of unfair labor practices outside those

alleged in a timely filed charge. While this requirement has

been relaxed to the extent of permitting the Board to ‘‘include

allegations in the complaint that are not specifically asserted

in the charge,’’ Galloway, 856 F.2d at 280 (emphasis added), it

has not been abolished. The Board does not have ‘‘carte

blanche to expand the charge as [it may] please, or to ignore

it all together.’’ Id. When the Board goes beyond this clear

jurisdiction to proceed on the complaint rising out of the

timely filed charge, it can act only where there is a ‘‘ ‘significant factual affiliation’ between the charged conduct and the

allegations in the complaint.’’ Precision 334 F.3d at 92,

quoting Galloway, 856 F.2d at 280. In the face of an

unbroken line in authority to that effect, see Drug Plastics, 30

F.3d at 172–73; Ross Stores, Inc., 235 F.3d at 674; and

Galloway, 856 F.2d at 280, the Board acted where it clearly

did not have jurisdiction. As we have stated before in an

EAJA case against another agency, ‘‘while a string of losses

is not determinative, it can be indicative that an agency’s

position lacks substantial justification.’’ Contractor’s Sand &

Gravel, Inc. v. FMSHRC, 199 F.3d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir.

2000) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Absent

some compelling argument for asserting jurisdiction where it

has long been held to have none, the Board cannot substantially justify its action. It has offered no such compelling

justification here. We therefore conclude that Precision is

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entitled to an award of attorneys fees and expenses under the

EAJA.

III. AMOUNT

To say that Precision is entitled to an award of attorneys’

fees is not to say that Precision is entitled to an award in the

amount prayed. ‘‘Even if an applicant meets the threshold

EAJA requirements, [it] can collect only a ‘reasonable’ fee.’’

Anthony v. Sullivan, 982 F.2d 586, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(quoting Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization

Service v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161 (1990)). Precision seeks

compensation for 1,151.4 hours of attorney time at the statutory rate of $125 per hour (see 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)) for

a total of $143,925.00.2

 While the rate is fixed by statute, the

NLRB contends, and we agree, that the hours asserted are

excessive. We therefore will make several deductions from

the amount prayed.

First, as to the time spent in preparation and argument

before the ALJ, the issues at that point were not limited to

the t-shirt incident and the affidavit filed by counsel for

Precision does not very clearly delineate time spent on the

specific issues. While the General Counsel did not have

substantial justification for the inclusion of the t-shirt incident, as to the other issues, regardless of whether Precision

won or lost, there is no claim that they were filed without

substantial justification. Precision’s counsel has given us

little help in allocating the hours before the ALJ between the

t-shirt incident and other parts of the case. Presumably at

that early stage much of the background work would have

been the same with or without the invalid issue. We therefore deduct 200 of the 341.3 hours prayed for preparation and

argument before the ALJ.

The next block of time is attributed to preparation and

argument before the Board as well as contemporaneous set2 The amount sought by Precision in its Application for Attorneys’

Fees is slightly different, $143,430.50. Considering the number of

hours sought (1,151.4), we calculate this amount to be underestimated by $495.00.

USCA Case #02-1203 Document #814110 Filed: 04/06/2004 Page 7 of 10
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tlement discussions. As the Board points out to us, other

issues remained in the case at that time–issues as to which

the substantial justification of the Board’s position is not at

issue. We therefore reduce by half the 280.6 hours prayed

and deduct from the available relief the attorneys’ fees for

140.3 hours.

As to the next phase, that is time spent on the brief and

oral argument for the petition for review in this court, the

Board asserts that other issues remain, specifically procedural and due process claims. We cannot agree with the Board

that the presence of the other issues should occasion a pro

rata reduction in the fees sought for appearance before this

court. Precision credibly argues that it would not have

pursued the petition for review in the absence of the clearly

erroneous jurisdictional argument upon which it did prevail.

It is not the case that the time spent on Issue A inevitably

equals the time spent on Issue B or that an appeal or petition

raising three issues would have been brought on the two

weakest of them had the first and strongest argument not

been there. Nonetheless, we agree with the Board that the

total of 500.53

 hours which Precision claimed its counsel

expended on the appellate brief and argument is ‘‘unreasonable and excessive and should be reduced.’’ As the Supreme

Court has long recognized, ‘‘cases may be overstaffed, and the

skill and experience of lawyers vary widely.’’ Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 443 (1983). Therefore, we must

exclude from fee awards ‘‘hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.’’ Id. The attorneys representing Precision in the court proceedings had litigated this

case in its earlier stages and were familiar with the facts and

law involved. The case was not one of great complexity or

3 The NLRB calculates the number of hours claimed for this

phase as 578, but we have recalculated the prayer of Precision and

believe the figure 500.5 more fairly represents the portion attributable to the petition for review. The Board’s calculation and ours

have been made quite difficult by the failure of Precision anywhere

to total its hours claimed, let alone subtotal the same into workable

units. Therefore, both the Board and the court have done the best

we can with the raw data supplied by Precision.

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based on an unusually voluminous record. We see nothing in

this case that warranted the expenditure of over twelve and a

half weeks at forty hours per week of professional time.

Obedient to Hensley v. Eckerhart, that we should exclude

‘‘hours that were not ‘reasonably expended’ ’’ and consider the

possibility of overstaffing, id., we have reviewed the nature of

this litigation and the quality of the representation. In light

of counsel’s familiarity with the case, the lack of complexity

and the product presented to this court, we order reduction of

the time spent in litigation before this court by fifty percent,

or rounding to the nearest tenth, 250.2 hours.

We therefore reduce the total compensable hours by 590.6

hours, to 560.8 hours and award counsel fees in the total

amount of $70,100.00.

IV. EXPENSES

Precision seeks expenses in the amount of $7,994.05. Application for Attorneys’ Fees at 31–35. The NLRB notes that

Precision’s request includes expenses for travel, courier expenses, overnight delivery, facsimile transmissions, telephone

costs, and taxis, which the NLRB argues are not reimbursable under the EAJA. See Epilepsy Found. of Northeast Ohio

v. NLRB, 2002 WL 1331873 at *2 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Mass. Fair Share v. Law Enforcement Admin., 776 F.2d 1066, 1069–70 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

Precision replies the NLRB is correct that these expenses

are not recoverable under this court’s prior decisions, but

argues that ‘‘in this era where facsimile and FedEx are the

standard means of delivery in most law offices, these expenses are in line with the statutory objectives.’’

Be that as it may, the NLRB has correctly listed Precision’s requested expenses that are not reimbursable under

the EAJA. Opposition of NLRB to Precision Concrete’s

Application, Exhibit B at 3–4. It would appear that, pursuant

to the EAJA and this court’s prior decisions, the NLRB’s

calculation that $2,462.83 in expenses should be deducted is

correct.

We therefore award expenses in the amount of $5,531.22.

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we hold that petitioners

are entitled to attorneys’ fees in the amount of $70,100.00 and

expenses in the amount of $5,531.22.

So ordered.

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