Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03082/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03082-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifford Theophilus Bogle
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 24, 1997 Decided June 17, 1997 

No. 96-3082

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CLIFFORD THEOPHILUS BOGLE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00298-01)

Richard K. Gilbert, appointed by the court, argued the 

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Barbara J. Valliere, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, John R. Fisher, and Thomas C. Black, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE, and HENDERSON, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: The appellant challenges his convictions for second degree murder while armed, possession of 

a firearm during a crime of violence, assault on a federal 

officer, and use of a firearm during a crime of violence, on the 

grounds that the district court erroneously denied his motion 

to suppress an incriminating statement he made to the police 

on the night of his arrest and improperly refused to admit a 

prior inconsistent statement of the Government's rebuttal 

witness. We hold that the district court correctly denied the 

appellant's suppression motion because the appellant was not 

being interrogated when he made the incriminating statements, and that the district court's decision not to admit into 

evidence the prior inconsistent statement was, if an error, 

harmless. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are largely undisputed. The appellant's brother, Delroy Bogle, was murdered on June 5, 1995. 

That same day the appellant, a California resident, flew to 

D.C. in order to make funeral arrangements.

On June 8 at around 2 p.m. undercover police officers heard 

gunshots and saw a man later identified as Cordell Johnson 

limping down the street and another man later identified as 

the appellant running right behind him. Bogle shot Johnson 

several times; when Johnson collapsed to the ground, Bogle 

shot him again and continued running. The officers chased 

Bogle, exchanged gunfire, lost sight of him, and around 4:30 

p.m. captured him.

Six hours after Bogle was arrested and placed in police 

custody he met with Detective Lazaro Gonzales. The detective told the appellant that the police had a lot of evidence 

against him and that, although he did not need to talk to 

Bogle, he would like to hear his version of what happened. 

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At that point Detective Gonzales read the appellant his 

Miranda rights from a card containing four questions and a 

space after each for the suspect to write "yes" or "no." When 

the detective asked Bogle the first two questions, "Have you 

read or had read to you the warning as to your rights?" and 

"Do you understand these rights?," Bogle wrote "yes" in the 

corresponding spaces. When the detective asked the appellant, "Do you wish to answer any questions?", Bogle said that 

he did not want to talk then and complained of a toothache. 

In response to the question, "Are you willing to answer 

questions without having an attorney present?," Bogle reiterated he did not want to talk right then, added that he would 

talk later, and requested something for his toothache. The 

detective told Bogle that he would have to go to a hospital to 

receive treatment for his toothache; Bogle then signed the 

bottom of the rights card. Detective Gonzales left and did 

not speak to Bogle again.

That same night Detective Robert Louis Parker asked 

Detective Gonzales if he could speak to Bogle about the 

murder of Bogle's brother Delroy. Detective Gonzales told 

Detective Parker that Bogle had already been read his Miranda rights and that Bogle had said that he did not want to 

talk about the Cordell Johnson murder; Detective Gonzales 

then introduced the appellant to Detective Parker around 

midnight. Detective Gonzales told Bogle that Detective Parker wanted to talk to him about the murder of his brother 

and then left Detective Parker and the appellant alone in the 

room. Detective Parker told the appellant that he was 

investigating the murder of his brother and that he wanted to 

talk to him only about that murder and not about Johnson's 

murder. Detective Parker asked Bogle whether he had any 

information about who shot his brother; Bogle responded by 

asking, "What did Mickey"a friend of the Bogles who had 

been shot at the same time that Delroy was killed"tell 

you?" Detective Parker told Bogle that Mickey said that he 

did not know who had shot Delroy. While Detective Parker 

was relating what he had learned from Mickey, Bogle interrupted him and said, "Let me tell you what happened," and 

proceeded to make the statement he later sought to suppress.

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The district court denied Bogle's suppression motion after 

a two-day evidentiary hearing. The court first rejected Bogle's argument that the officers had violated his right to 

counsel because he had "never even made a vague reference 

to an attorney." The court then rejected Bogle's argument 

that the police had violated his right to remain silent; when 

Bogle said that he did not want to talk, the court found, 

Detective Gonzalez immediately stopped questioning him. 

The court held that it was not necessary for Detective Parker 

to read Bogle his Miranda rights again because Parker 

wanted to ask Bogle only about the murder of his brother, a 

crime for which Bogle was not a suspect. The court also 

found that Parker told Bogle that he did not want to talk 

about, and that he never asked Bogle any questions about, 

the murder of Cordell Johnson; rather, Bogle spontaneously 

confessed. The court concluded that Bogle had knowingly 

and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights and that he had 

given his confession "freely, voluntarily, and without any 

improper compelling influences."

At trial Bogle claimed that he had shot Johnson in selfdefense, and testified as follows: On June 8 he drove a black 

Nissan Pathfinder to a restaurant where he picked up some 

food; five or ten minutes later he walked back to the restaurant in order to get some juice. Two men approached him 

after he left the restaurant the second time. One of the men 

asked him if he was Delroy's brother, and he said that he 

was. At this point one of the men tried to strike him with a 

knife. Bogle knocked the knife out of the man's hand, 

whereupon the man reached for his side pocket, where he had 

a gun. As Bogle was trying to prevent this man from 

drawing the gun, the other man struck him on the neck, and 

the blow sent both Bogle and the man with the gun to the 

ground. Bogle then grabbed the man's gun and stood up. 

He shot at one of the men, who was running away. Then he 

shot at the man who was on the ground. That man stood up 

and also began to run away. Bogle chased both men, firing 

more shots at them as he ran.

The Government called as a rebuttal witness Donovan 

Lorenzo Campbell, who testified as follows: He was at the 

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restaurant with Johnson on June 8 when he saw Bogle and 

two other men pull up in a black Nissan Pathfinder. The 

three men came into the restaurant and, with facial expressions that were not "pleasant," walked past him and Johnson. 

The men got back in the truck and drove off, soon after which 

he and Johnson went their separate ways, Campbell by car 

and Johnson on foot. When Campbell returned to the area 

25 to 30 minutes later he saw Johnson lying in the street with 

several police officers around him. Johnson did not have a 

gun with him when they were in the restaurant.

On cross-examination Bogle's lawyer, Richard Gilbert, 

asked Campbell about a four-page written statement summarizing what Campbell had told the police on the day of 

Johnson's murder. Campbell answered that he had signed 

the statement without reading it. Gilbert asked Campbell 

specifically about his statement to the police that he believed 

that Johnson had been killed by "Fiddler" and "Junior 

White," the people who had shot Campbell in March 1995. 

Campbell said that the police must have misunderstood him 

because he could not say that the individuals who shot him 

were the same ones who shot Johnson. Gilbert then asked 

Campbell about his statement to the police that he knew that 

the men who shot him in March were the same men who 

killed Johnson "[b]ecause they were driving the same black 

Nissan van." Campbell again said that the police must have 

misunderstood him because he had never seen that van 

before the day Johnson was killed. Gilbert also asked Campbell if he remembered the police asking him whether he had 

anything to add to his statement. Campbell responded that 

he did remember the question and that he had told the police 

that at that moment he "couldn't remember anything because 

[he] was so emotional." Campbell conceded that he did not 

tell the police that he had seen Johnson 20 minutes before he 

was shot or that the men who walked into the restaurant had 

unpleasant looks on their faces.

After Campbell was excused, the appellant moved to admit 

into evidence Campbell's statement to the police as a prior 

inconsistent statement. The district judge sustained the Government's objection, holding that "based upon his statement 

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that he never read it," she did not "know whether it accurately reflects his testimony."

II. ANALYSIS

As we mentioned at the outset, Bogle challenges his convictions on two grounds. First, he claims that the district court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress the statement he 

made to Detective Parker. Second, he contends that the 

district court erred in denying his motion to admit Donovan 

Campbell's prior inconsistent statement.

A. Motion to Suppress

The appellant argues that the district court's denial of his 

suppression motion was erroneous because his statement was 

obtained without a valid waiver of his fifth amendment Miranda rights and because the police did not respect his 

invocation of the right to counsel. In Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court decided that certain 

prophylactic warnings are necessary in order to safeguard a 

defendant's right against self-incrimination. The Court held 

that the prosecution may not use an incriminating statement 

that the defendant made during a custodial interrogation 

unless the prosecution demonstrates that (1) the defendant 

was informed that he had the right to remain silent, anything 

he said could be used against him, he had the right to have an 

attorney present, and if he could not afford an attorney one 

would be appointed for him; and (2) the defendant waived 

these rights. Id. at 479. If a person in custody indicates that 

he wants to remain silent he may not be questioned further 

unless he initiates communication, or (1) a significant period 

of time has passed after the initial questioning ceased, (2) the 

suspect is given a fresh set of Miranda warnings, and (3) the 

second interrogation concerns a crime that was not a subject 

of the first interrogation. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 

106 (1975). If the suspect invokes the right to counsel, 

questioning may resume when an attorney has been provided 

or the suspect has knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his 

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right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 

(1981).

Bogle contends that the district court erroneously denied 

his suppression motion because Detective Gonzales did not 

"scrupulously honor" his invocation of the right to remain 

silent or obtain a waiver of his right to counsel. Although 

Detective Gonzales ceased questioning him immediately after 

Bogle indicated that he did not want to talk, it is undisputed 

that Detective Parker soon thereafter questioned Bogle without again reading him his Miranda rights or obtaining a 

waiver of these rights. The Government contends that Detective Parker was not required to read Bogle his Miranda

rights anew, however, because Detective Parker did not 

actually "interrogate" him within the meaning of Miranda; 

the Government argues in the alternative that Bogle knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

In Miranda the Supreme Court defined custodial interrogation as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." 384 

U.S. at 444. The Court expanded upon this definition in 

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1979), where it held 

that the term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers "not only 

to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to 

arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."

The appellant points out that he made his incriminating 

statement in response to "express questioning," and urges us 

to adopt a per se rule that all express questions constitute 

interrogation. Although we have adverted to this issue before, see United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d 115, 124 (D.C. 

Cir. 1982); United States v. Foskey, 636 F.2d 517, 522 n.3 

(D.C. Cir. 1980), we have not heretofore resolved it. Several 

other circuits, however, have rejected the appellant's proposed per se approach, particularly in cases involving routine 

booking questions, and have held that even in cases involving 

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express questioning, there is no interrogation triggering the 

protections of Miranda unless, in the totality of the circumstances, the officer's questions were "reasonably likely to 

elicit an incriminating response." See, e.g., United States v. 

Ventura, 85 F.3d 708, 711 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 

Sweeting, 933 F.2d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1991) (routine booking 

questions); United States v. Cota, 953 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 

1992); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 342 (7th Cir. 

1989) (routine booking questions); United States v. Taylor,

799 F.2d 126, 128 (4th Cir. 1986) (routine booking questions); 

United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th 

Cir. 1984).

We agree with these circuits that only questions that are 

reasonably likely to elicit incriminating information in the 

specific circumstances of the case constitute interrogation 

within the protections of Miranda. As the Supreme Court 

explained in Innis, " 'Interrogation,' as conceptualized in the 

Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above 

and beyond that inherent in custody itself." 446 U.S. at 300. 

A question that is not likely to elicit an incriminating response is not inherently coercive and therefore should not 

trigger the protections of Miranda.

Because we hold that express questioning constitutes interrogation only when it is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, we must consider whether Detective Parker's questioning about the murder of the appellant's brother 

runs afoul of that standard. This is an objective inquiry; the 

subjective intent of the officer is relevant but not dispositive. 

See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 n.7. Applying this standard, we 

conclude that Detective Parker's discussion with Bogle did 

not constitute interrogation. There is no evidence in the 

record indicating that when Parker and Bogle met, the detective (or any other police officer) had reason to believe that 

there was any connection between the murders of Bogle's 

brother and of Cordell Johnson. Furthermore, Detective 

Parker was careful to inform Bogle that he was not there to 

ask about the murder of Cordell Johnson and that he wanted 

to talk only about the murder of Bogle's brother.

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Because we conclude that Bogle was not subject to interrogation when he made the incriminating statements he seeks 

to suppress, we need not consider whether the police failed to 

obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain 

silent or of his right to counsel.

B. Prior Inconsistent Statement

Bogle also argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 

613(b) and Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), the 

district court was required to admit extrinsic evidence of the 

prior inconsistent statement of the Government's rebuttal 

witness Donovan Campbell. Bogle claims that the district 

court's failure to do so was prejudicial for two reasons: in the 

prior statement, unlike his trial testimony, Campbell identified other men as Johnson's murderers; and there were 

things Campbell mentioned at trial that he did not tell the 

policeparticularly that the men who came into the restaurant, including Bogle, had unpleasant looks on their faces. 

The Government responds that the district court did not err 

in rejecting Bogle's proffer because the statement contained 

hearsay and because the defense never established either that 

Campbell actually made the statement the police recorded or 

that the statement was inconsistent with Campbell's trial 

testimony.

We need not decide whether the district court erred in 

excluding Campbell's prior statement because its exclusion 

was clearly harmless. Bogle was able to point out during 

cross-examination, without presenting the statement to the 

jury, that Campbell did not tell the police about the encounter 

in the restaurant, and Campbell conceded that the statement 

differed significantly from the testimony he gave in court. In 

addition, Campbell's statement to the police that Fiddler and 

Junior Whiteas opposed to the appellantkilled Cordell 

Johnson, was of little importance if any because Bogle admitted at trial that he was the one who killed Johnson. The only 

potential relevance of this statement is in its bearing upon 

Campbell's credibility; without seeing the actual statement 

the jury was aware, however, that Campbell had given the 

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police a signed statement that Fiddler and Junior White shot 

Johnson, and that he had tried to repudiate it at trial. 

Accordingly, we conclude that Bogle was in no way prejudiced 

by the court's refusal to admit the written statement into 

evidence.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is in all respects

Affirmed.

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