Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06241/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06241-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanford Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

" 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FIL l.1 

United SrateJ Cotti£ of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FE9 19 g 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-6241 

v. 

STANFORD JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-866-A) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Stanford Johnson, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated 

at FCI Bastrop, Texas, appeals from a June 28, 1990, district 

court order which denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, 

se t aside, or correct sentence with respect to his conviction upon 

a guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute heroin. The district 

court denied the motion on the grounds that is was successive and, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 1 
alternatively, that Johnson's guilty plea forecloses collateral 

attack. We affirm. 

I. Background 

On May 26, 1988, Johnson entered a guilty plea to conspiracy 

to distribute heroin. Subsequently, he was sentenced to a 15 year 

prison term. Johnson did not appeal. On October 19, 1988, 

Johnson filed his first 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set 

aside, or correct the earlier imposed sentence. Defendant alleged 

ineffective assistance of counsel and misinformation in his 

presentence report. With respect to the former ground, Johnson 

claimed that his counsel was ineffective for not raising double 

jeopardy or collateral estoppel bars to the federal prosecution. 

On January 25, 1989, the district court denied Johnson's 

first§ 2255 motion. Because Johnson had entered a guilty plea, 

the district court, citing Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 

(1973), explained that it would first examine "the voluntary and 

intelligent character of the plea . and the adequacy of the 

assistance rendered by counsel in advising the entry of the guilty 

plea." See January 25, 1989 opinion attached hereto for purposes 

of convenient reference. Second, in order to resolve the 

ineffectiveness claim, the district court addressed Johnson's 

double jeopardy claims on the merits. Third, the district court 

addressed the presentence report misinformation claim. 

The district court found that Johnson's guilty plea was 

voluntary and intelligent, his court-appointed counsel had 

effectively represented him, and that Johnson could not claim 

double jeopardy or collateral estoppel defenses. January 25, 1989 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 2 
Memorandum Opinion at 8. The court also found no merit to 

Johnson's claim that the presentence report was in error. 

On May 25, 1990, Johnson filed a second§ 2255 motion. In 

that motion, he alleged as grounds for relief: 1) double jeopardy; 

2) collateral estoppel; and 3) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11 violations. 

The district court denied Johnson's second§ 2255 motion as 

successive. See June 28, 1990 opinion attached hereto for 

purposes of convenient reference. Alternatively, the district 

court cited United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), to hold 

that despite Johnson's double jeopardy defense claim, its previous 

holding that 11 [d]efendant's guilty plea, was voluntarily entered 

with the advice of competent counsel ... forecloses the 

collateral attack. 111 June 28, 1990 Memorandum Opinion at 4. 

On appeal, Johnson claims that the district court erred in 

finding his second§ 2255 motion successive . He requests this 

court to reverse the June 28, 1990 district court order and to 

remand this matter to the district court to hear his double 

jeopardy claims. 

II. Discussion 

The initial question is whether every argument raised in 

Johnson's second collateral attack on his guilty plea was 

adequately addressed by the district court when it decided 

Johnson's first§ 2255 motion and thus successive or, if not, an 

abuse of the writ. 

1 United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) was decided on 

January 23, 1989, two days before the district court denied 

Johnson's first§ 2255 motion. 

-3-

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On appeal, Johnson makes four arguments. First, he argues 

that because he did not specify double jeopardy as a ground for 

relief in his first§ 2255 motion, the first motion must be 

regarded as alleging only ineffective assistance of counsel as a 

ground for relief. Second, Johnson asserts that the district 

court did not adjudicate the merits of his double jeopardy claims 

when it denied his first§ 2255 motion. 

Third, Johnson asserts that the ends of justice require the 

district court to review the merits of his second§ 2255 motion. 

To support this assertion, Johnson reiterates his allegation that 

the district court did not previously adjudicate his double 

jeo pardy claims. 

Johnson's fourth argument in his amended appeal questions the 

sufficiency of his Rule 11 hearing. Johnson appears to argue that 

if, at his Rule 11 hearing, the district court had ascertained the 

facts, i.e., his contention that he sought to obtain heroin for 

personal use, and explained to him that this did not constitute 

conspiracy to distribute heroin, then he would not have pled 

guilty to conspiracy. 

In Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), the Court 

articulated the standards for deciding whether§ 2255 motions are 

successive. The Court stated: 

Controlling weight may be given to denial of a 

prior application for ... § 2255 relief only if (1) 

the same ground presented in the subsequent application 

was determined adversely to the applicant on the prior 

application, (2) the prior determination was on the 

merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served 

by reaching the merits of the subsequent application. 

-4-

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Id. at 15 (footnote omitted). The Court further specified that 

"[t]he prior denial must have rested on an adjudication of the 

merits of the ground presented in the subsequent application." 

Id. at 16. "The judge [,however,] is not required to limit his 

decision on the first motion to the grounds narrowly alleged. 112 

Id. at 22. Consequently, Johnson's first argument, that his first 

§ 2255 motion raised only one ground for relief and, therefore , 

the grounds articulated in his second§ 2255 motion could not 

properly be found successive, fails. As earlier discussed, when 

the district court denied Johnson's first§ 2255 motion, it ruled 

on the merits that double jeopardy and collateral estoppel 

arguments would be unsuccessful. 

Likewise, "nothing in§ 2255 requires that a sentencing court 

grant a hearing on a successive motion alleging a ground for 

relief already fully considered on a prior motion and decided 

against the prisoner." Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 9. 

Therefore, Johnson's second argument, that "the district court 

failed to provide appellant a full and fair hearing ... of his 

double jeopardy claims," also fails because it acted within its 

discretion to deny a hearing of these successive claims . 

2 The Court continued: 

[The judge] is free to adopt any appropriate means for 

inquiry into the legality of the prisoner's detention in 

order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the 

prisoner might claim to be entitled to relief .... The 

disposition of all grounds for relief ascertained in 

this way may then be spread on the files and records of 

the case. 

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 22-23. 

-5-

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With respect to Johnson's third argument, the Court in 

Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. at 16, stated that "[e)ven if 

the same ground was rejected on the merits on a prior application, 

it is open to the applicant to show that the ends of justice would 

be served by permitting the redetermination of the ground." 

Johnson did not meet this burden but merely reiterated his allegation that the district court did not adjudicate the double 

jeopardy claims on the merits. 3 

Johnson's fourth argument, which he advances in his amended 

appeal regarding his claim that he only personally used heroin, 

attacks the sufficiency of his Rule 11 hearing, i.e., the 

voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea. The district court 

found that Johnson's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent 

following his first§ 2255 motion and Johnson did not appeal that 

decision which became final. Now, Johnson urges as a new ground 

the overturned conviction of co-defendant Barbara Baggett. 4 

Although the disposition of her conviction happened after 

3 Johnson attempts to revive the merits of this claim on appeal 

by stating that "he was acquitted on the facts of any involvement 

as a conspirator ... in the State Court." The district court, 

however, disposed of this claim in its first§ 2255 motion denial. 

January 25, 1989 Memorandum Opinion at 8-9. 

4 On August 13, 1990, Johnson filed a "Motion for leave to 

amend original appeal brief." We grant defendant's motion. 

Defendant urges the court to review the decision in United 

States v. Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1989), concerning the 

conviction reversal of a co-defendant to the original indictment. 

Johnson argues that this decision supports his contention that 

even though he transacted business on the telephone, he only 

sought heroin for personal use and therefore could not be guilty 

of conspiracy to distribute heroin. He argues that because he did 

not know that personal use alone could not constitute conspiracy 

to distribute heroin, his Rule 11 proceeding was in error. 

-6-

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Johnson's first collateral attack, the essence of this argument, 

that he was just a user, was in fact rejected by the district 

court in his first collateral attack. See January 25, 1989 

Memo randum and Opinion at 8. The mere fact that in a separate 

case a co-defendant's conviction was overturned has no bearing on 

this matter. Johnson's second attempt to characterize his plea as 

involuntary is successive. 

Following careful examination of the briefs and record on 

appeal, we conclude that each argument raised in the second collateral attack was decided by the district court in its disposition of Johnson's first§ 2255 collateral attack. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing defendant's 

second§ 2255 motion as successive. 5 

There is no need to address the district court's alternative 

holding that Johnson's voluntary and intelligent guilty plea 

entered with the advice of competent counsel forecloses collateral 

attack. Because Johnson's second§ 2255 motion is entirely successive to his first§ 2255 motion, that argument is pertinent 

only to his initial collateral attack. 

5 The district court did not discuss, and this court does not 

apply, the Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963), abuse of 

writ standards. These apply only if a successive motion raises 

either a different ground or a ground that was not previously 

adjudicated on the merits. Id. at 17. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 7 
Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

-8-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 8 
,J- -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN 

DISTRICT OF OKIAH~~; Fl LED 

J} f)i'l (P '71'!t'}fi JAN 2 s 89 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 

) 

) 

STANFORD JOHNSON, 

Defendant-Movant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

(JJl4 jJJ}_ .Jn 1D1ERr n OENNfS 

CLERIC, U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

, ...,~,s~OF~~ 

IIY o,-,,, JTY~ 

/ e. U ~ 

CR-88-81-A 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Defendant Stanford Johnson has moved to vacate his sentence 

pursuant to 28 u.s.c. §2255, alleging denial of effective 

assistance of counsel in grounds one and two of the Motion and 

"misinformation in Movant's P.S.I. Report" in ground three. 

On May 26, 1988, Defendant waived the filing of a grand jury 

indictment and entered a plea of guilty to a criminal information 

charging him with a single violation of 21 u.s.c. §846, a 

conspiracy to distribute heroin under 21 u.s.c. §84l(a). Defendant 

was sentenced on August 1, 1988, to a fifteen-year term of 

imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal the conviction. 

The government has responded to the prose Motion to Vacate 

and has also caused the filing of the affidavit of Defendant's 

court-appointed counsel, Larry Tedder, and transcripts of the plea 

and sentencing proceedings. · A certified copy of the pre~entence 

investigation report has also been submitted by the government 

under seal. This report has been reviewed by the Court, resealed, 

and attached to this Opinion as Court's Exhibit No. 1. ·-' -: . - .- • _;; 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 9 
.. 

It ia well established that following the entry of a plea of 

guilty, a collateral challenge is restricted to the voluntary and 4 

intelligent character of the plea itself and the adequacy of the 

assistance rendered by counsel in advising the entry of the guilty 

plea. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 u.s. 2sa, 267 (1973). In 

assessing the validity of the plea, the court applies a strong 

presumption of truthfulness to the defendant's sworn testimony in 

open court. Blackledge y. Allison. 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). A 

challenge to the validity of a plea may be dismissed where only 

conclusory allegations unsupported by the record are subsequently 

presented. I.g. 

I 

Defendant contends that his court-appointed counsel was 

ineffective. Specifically, Defendant contends that his counsel ( 1) 

"threatened movant with being convicted under a Reco (sic) Act, if 

movant did not elect to plead guilty to the charges brought against 

him;" (2) "promised [him] that he would not receive no more than 

3 yrs. ; " ( 3) "induced and threatened the movant into pleading 

guilty; to one count of conspiracy to distribute drugs, knowing 

movant was only trying to purchase two $20.00 caps of heroin for 

his own personal use;" ( 4) "was aware of the fact that movant 

violated no Federal Narcotic Laws in the State of Oklahoma;" (5) 

"told movant ••. to tell the Judge under oath that no one threatened 

him to plead guilty, and that no one promised him as to what1amount 

' 

of time he would receive in prison;" (6) "Movant•s attorney if 

effective, would have argued, it was unconstitutional for ... _movant ·-.... ~ 

·. ,,,-

2 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 10 
to be indicted and prosecuted in Federal Court, by the same 

Prosecuting Attorney, that tried to convict movant in State Court 

of Oklahoma, whereas the State charges were dismissed by the State 

Court Judges;" ( 7) "The evidence at its best in a trial, would have 

only showed a tape (sic) conversation between movant' s female 

coconspirator and another person, stating that movant could not 

have any more heroin, because movant owed her $40.00 from before." 

Defendant's claim is governed by the two-part standard 

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 u.s. 668 (1984), for 

judging attorney ineffectiveness claims. Hill v. Lockhart. 474 

U.S. 52, 58 (1985). The first prong of the Strickland standard 

requires a showing that counsel's assistance and advice, viewed 

from the attorney's perspective at the time it was given, was not 

"within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases." .Ig. at 56, 58-59; McMann v, Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 

(1970). The second prong requires a showing that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional conduct, the Defendant would not have 

pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial. Hill v. 

Lockhart. supra at 59. Where the defendant alleges a failure to 

advise him of a potential defense, the Defendant must show that the 

defense likely would have succeeded at trial. I,d. 

Defendant was charged in a multi-count Indictment but entered 

a plea to a one-count Informa~ion charging him with conspiracy to 

distribute heroin as a result of a plea agreement entered with the 

prosecution. At the plea proceeding, Defendant entered sworn 

testimony in response to the court's inquiry, affirmatively ~tating 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 11 
·, 

-:" 

his underatanding of the charge against him as described in the 

Information and of the maximum punishment applic~?le to the charge, 

affirmatively waiving the grand jury process and indictment, 

affirmatively stating his satisfaction with his attorney and with 

his attorney's advice and knowledge of the charge, affirmatively 

stating his understanding of the rights he was waiving by entering 

a guilty plea, and affirmatively stating that his plea was being 

made voluntarily and completely of his own free choice, without any 

force, threat, or promise of a benefit in return for the plea and 

without any promise, suggestion, or prediction from any government 

officer or agent of a lighter sentence or other leniency in return 

for the plea. Defendant also responded affirmatively when asked 

if he understood that even if a promise or prediction as to 

sentence had been made to him, only the judge determines the 

sentence pursuant to a guilty plea. Defendant affirmatively 

testified under oath that he was willing to accept the punishment 

imposed by the Court and that he understood the plea agreement and 

understood that he could retain his not guilty plea. Following the 

court's description in open court as to the nature of the 

conspiracy charge against Defendant and his co-defendants also 

entering pleaa, Defendant affirmatively stated his understanding 

of the charge and the government's burden of proof in a trial and 

then stated hi• deaire to enter a guilty plea. The prosecutor then 

described what the government's proof would be at trial --~gainst 

,. 

Defendant and his co-defendants entering pleas, and Defendant 

stated that this description of the government's ·evidence 

·. ~ ... 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 12 
represented what he knew to be the government's evidence against 

him. Th•• description given by the prosecution of the evidence 

against Defendant placed him in the direct line of distribution of 

heroin from the "kingpins" of a large heroin distribution ring 

operating out of Oklahoma City for some nine years. As a part of 

his plea agreement, Defendant testified for the government against 

six co-defendants who proceeded to trial as a result of the same 

Indictment naming Defendant. During that testimony, Defendant 

admitted not only buying heroin from several co-defendants but also 

redistributing the drug in Tulsa. 

In his Affidavit in response to Defendant's allegations, 

Defendant's court-appointed counsel avers that in his consul tat ions 

with the government during his representation of Defendant he 

learned that the government was considering the filing of a RICO 

count against Defendant and he so informed the Defendant. 

Defendant's allegation that his attorney "threatened" him with the 

filing of a RICO charge in order to coerce him into pleading guilty 

is an incredible allegation, since, obviously, Defendant's counsel 

could not charge the Defendant with a crime and could only, as was 

his professional duty to Defendant, inform him of the possible 

charges against him. Defendant has shown neither unprofessional 

conduct or prejudice with this allegation. 

Defendant alleges in his "Statement of Facts" that his 

attorney "assured movant that he only face (sic) four years m~ximum 

for a telephone conspiracy, if tried and convicted, and le~s ~ime 

than that if he pleaded guilty." Defendant .then alleges ' tjtat he 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 13 
/ , . ; · entered a plea "in hopes that he would receive probation or one 

year in pri on" ••• The plea agreement between Defendant and the 

government states that no promise or representations had been made 

by the government to Defendant or his attorney. In the Petition 

to Enter Plea of Guilty, Defendant denied having been promised any 

sentence or any leniency in sentencing in exchange for the plea. 

Defendant was clearly informed during the plea proceeding that any 

promise made concerning sentencing was not binding on the Court and 

that the Court would be the sole determiner of his sentence. The 

record shows Defendant chose to enter the plea with a full 

understanding of the Court's sentencing authority and the possible 

sentence he could receive if he entered the plea. Defendant denied 

under oath that any "promise" as to sentencing was made to him, and 

his counsel denies ever promising Defendant a certain sentence. 

Defendant has not overcome the presumption attached to the record. 

Defendant's expectation as to the sentence he would receive if he 

entered a plea does not render his plea involuntary. Wellnitz v. 

~, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970). Even if his counsel made a 

faulty prediction as to the sentence Defendant might receive, 

Defendant was not prejudiced by advice the Court told him would 

have no bearing on the sentence the Court would alone impose. See 

Worthen v, Meachum. 842 F.2d 1179 (10th cir. 1988) (same for 

inaccurate prediction of parole). 

Defendant's counsel avers in his affidavit that in light of .-. 

his consultations with the government during his representition of 

Defendant, he was aware of substantial evidence implicating 

6 · . .:,"' 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 14 
/ . - - Defendant in a conspiracy to distribute drugs and revealing 

Defendant had been a purchaser and distributo~_of drugs from the 

"kingpin" of the conspiracy, Johnny Sanders, for several years. 

Defendant stated under oath during the plea proceeding that his 

counsel was fully informed as to the charge against Defendant and 

had adequately advised Defendant. Defendant's conclusory 

allegation that his counsel "induced and threatened" him into 

pleading guilty is unsupported by the record and contrary to 

Defendant's presumptively truthful sworn testimony at the plea 

proceeding. There is no evidence in the record that Defendant's 

will was overborne by his counsel or any other individual. Rather, 

the record supports the conclusion that Defendant and his counsel 

assessed the evidence accumulated by the government and concluded 

that a trial was not in his best interest. 

Defendant's sworn statement in the Petition to Enter Plea of 

Guilty, filed on the same date his plea was accepted, was that he 

entered into a plea agreement in order to "minimize possible 

punishment" and "keep additional charges from being filed . " 

Defendant's plea is not involuntary because it was entered in order 

to minimize the risk of greater punishment following a conviction 

at a trial. Brady v. United states, 397 u.s. 742 (1970). 

Likewise, Defendant'• counsel's advice to Defendant to enter a plea 

in order to minimize the pun~shment that Defendant might receive 

following a conviction at a trial is not unprofession~l or 

unreasonable conduct of a criminal defense attorney. 

7 

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I 

I 

111111111111 

Defendant•• attempt in the instant motion to characterize his 

culpability a• that of a mere purchaser of a small amount of heroin 4 _ 

for personal use is incredible in the face of the record, including 

the Defendant's own testimony in the trial of six co-defendants. 

Defendant's admission of guilt is a part of the record, and 

Defendant has not overcome the presumption attached to the record. 

Defendant was not prejudiced by his attorney's failure to argue 

that the evidence did not support his conviction as there is no 

indication that such a defense would have been successful at a 

trial. 

Defendant's remaining allegations of attorney ineffectiveness 

are based on his belief that double jeopardy or collateral estoppal 

bar the federal prosecution. Defendant attaches the double 

jeopardy allegations to a claim of ineffectiveness due to his 

counsel's failure to assert double jeopardy or collateral estoppal 

as defenses to the federal charge against Defendant. Defendant 

cannot establish actual prejudice on his claim, in light of both 

his failure to establish that a double jeopardy defense would have 

been successful and his failure to allege that even if the defense 

was available he would not have entered the plea. 

The supreJae Court has recognized on numerous occasions that 

succeaaiv•pro ecutions in state and federal courts do not violate 

the protection• against double jeopardy • .E...t_g_._, Moore y, Illinois, 

55 u.s. 13 (1852); united states v, Lanza, 260 u.s. 377 -{1922): 

~ ..... 

Jerome v. united states, 318 u.s. 101 ·(1943); Abbate Y, ·:united 

states, 359 u.s. 187 (1959). Even an acquittal in the first 

- -- -'~. 

8 -~ -~: 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 16 
prosecution does not bar the second in the court of a separate 

jurisdiction. Bartkus v. Illinois. 359 u.s. ~l (1959); cummings 

v, united states, 289 F.2d 904 (10th cir. 1961), ~- denied, 368 

U.S. 850. Thus, a double jeopardy and/or collateral estoppal 

defense based on the prior state court prosecution of Defendant 

would not have been successful. 

This Court can find no authority to support Defendant's bare 

proposition that Mr. Wintory did not have authority to act as a 

Special Assistant United States Attorney because of his position 

as an Assistant District Attorney for Oklahoma County. The 

Attorney General has the authority to appoint a state prosecutor 

under 28 u.s.c. §515(a). United States v. Bestway Disposal Corp,, 

681 F.Supp. 1027, 1033 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). No conflict of interest 

is inherent in Mr. Wintory•s dual employment status, and there is 

nothing in the record upon which to base a claim of actual conflict 

of interest. 

The Supreme Court has uniformly recognized that 

courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as 

to whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference 

are well-known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are 

rarely simple. In addition to assessing the strength and 

importance of a case, prosecutors also must consider 

other tangible and intangible factors, such as government 

enforcement priorities. See Wayte v, United States [470 

U.S. 598, 607 (1985)]. Finally they also must decide 

how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal 

justice system that simply cannot accommodate the 

litigation of every serious criminal charge. [footnote 

omitted]. , ,;-

Town o! Newton v, Rumery, 55 U.S.L.W. 4304, 4306 (U.S. March 9, 

1987). Judicial evaluation of ·pretrial prosecutorial ~~cis~ons 

9 

~ 

-• .A:.-

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 17 
"should be ••p•cially deferential." I.!l- at 4307 n. 7. Accordingly, 

no preaWllption ot vindictive motive is appl}.cable to pretrial 

decision• .to prosecute • .I.sl. The only evidence of prosecutorial 

misconduct put forth by Defendant is the charge itself. The Court 

cannot find any reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness in the 

decision to prosecute Defendant's case in federal court. See 

United States v, Billy Ng. 699 F.2d 63 (2nd Cir. 1983) (federal 

government's election to prosecute defendant because of 

dissatisfaction with state's plea bargain following defendant• s 

entry of guilty in state court was not based on hostility or animus 

toward the defendant but rather on public interest in seeing that 

sufficient jail term is imposed); United States Y, DeMichael, 692 

F.2d 1059, 1062 (7th Cir. 1982) (there is no vindictivenesa where 

prosecutor takes into consideration the results of a prosecution 

in another jurisdiction and decides to proceed because inadequate 

result was obtained in first prosecution) • The nature, complex! ty, 

and duration of the drug conspiracy, in which Defendant admitted 

his participation, certainly warranted the serious charges brought 

against Defendant and his co-conspirators by the federal 

government. Accordingly, Defendant has suffered no prejudice as 

a result of his counsel'• failure to assert double jeopardy, 

collateral· eatoppel, or prosecutorial misconduct aa defenses to the 

charge againat him. 

Defendant alleges that his counsel was ineffective beca~se he 

did not assert the lack of federal jurisdiction as to the charge 

against Defendant. Defendant apparently believe• that ha a!d not -- ..,:: 

:. .... .... · 

10 

<;-, -.. ; 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 18 
violate federal law since he did not use interstate travel or 

interatate C01Dlunication devices during the coni:piracy. Defendant 

also suggaata that he should not have been prosecuted in federal 

court because federal law cannot proscribe the possession of 

heroin. 

Defendant cannot establish that he has suffered prejudice as 

a result of Mr. Tedder'• failure to challenge the federal 

prosecution of Defendant on jurisdictional or constitutional 

grounds. Congress' power to regulate for the general purpoae of 

preventing harm to the public has been recognized at least since 

Ex parte Jackson, 96 u.s. 121 (1878) [the "Lottery case•]. 

Although the Commerce Clause of the Constitution is the basia for 

Congress' power to regulate the possession, manufacture, and 

distribution of narcotics, proof of an interstate nexus is not a 

necessary prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction. United 

states y, King. 485 F.2d 353, 356 (10th cir. 1973); united states 

v. Montes-Zarate, ss2 F.2d 1330, 1331 (9th cir. 1977), ~-

denied. 435 u.s. 947; united ~tates v. Davis, 561 F.2d 1014, 1019-

1020 (O.C.Cir. 1977), grt. denied, 434 U.S. 929; United States Y, 

Leisner. 469 u.s. 336 (5th cir. 1972), ~- denied, 410 u.s. 942. 

In pa••~;Titl• II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 

and Control Act o~ 1970, 21 u.s.c. 184l(a){l) and 1846, Congress 

made exprua, finding■ that a major portion of drug trafficking 

occurs in interstate commerce and that even the- manufacture;}.iocal 

... 

distribution, and possession of controlled substances has ·a 

"substantial and direct effect• on interstate-commerce. 2~u.s.-c. 

11 

· - . '""'t 

; --: j ·• 

•. --t:' 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 19 
§801. Congr••• had a rational basia for these findings baaed on 

statiaticai reports and testimony received by congress. United •. 

states y. Lopez. 459 F.2d 949, 951 (5th cir. 1972). congr••• has 

the power to make this determination and to take the action it did 

to protect and control this class of activities. .s.u Perez v, 

United States, 402 u.s. 146 (1971) (where in the judgment of 

Congress purely intrastate activities [loan sharking] affect 

interstate commerce, Congress can provide criminal penalties for 

such activities commensurate with the Commerce Clause). 

Defendant has not shown that his counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for failing to challenge the federal prosecution of 

Defendant, as Defendant has not shown that a defense of lack of 

federal jurisdiction would have been successful. Moreover, 

Defendant has never alleged that if counsel had raised such a 

defense or would have advised Defendant of any possible defenses 

to the charge, Defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would 

have proceeded to trial. The Court finds that the Defendant's 

allegations do not overcome the presumed truthfulness of his incourt statements reflecting that his plea was voluntarily and 

knowingly mad• with the advice of competent counsel •. 

II 

In Ground 'l'hr .. of the Motion, Defendant alleges in conclusory 

fashion that the proaecutor's version of the offense appearing in 

the presentence report is "totally wrong and erroneous." oeqtndant ~ 

does not allege in what respects the presentence report is in 

error. Defendant had the opportunity at sentencing to controvert - - . -: -_..:;. 

12 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 20 
the content• o:t the report. Defendant and his counsel did 

controvert the report in three instances, regarding his military 

service, hia criminal. record, and the personal history given as to 

his prior marriages. Defendant expressly declined to make further 

corrections to the report. Defendant's role in the conspiracy as 

described in the presentence report was consistent with Defendant's 

testimony during the trial of his co-conspirators. This contention 

is without merit. 

Accordingly, the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct 

Sentence is denied. In light of the foregoing, Defendant's Motion 

for Summary Judgment and/or Judgment by Default; based on the 

government's alleged failure to file a timely response to the 

Motion, is overruled. 

rEntered this ?S: day of January, 1989. 

wiYNECALLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

13 

-i 

., 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 21 
illlliJJi .... ._..;,~ · "', .......... ------- ----- --------··- -·---

~ :.... .... ,... ., 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKIAHOMA F B l E D 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

STANFORD JOHNSON, 

Defendant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

JUN 2:31990 

U.S.lllln:·~~FOKU, 

~~:DEPUTY 

CR-88-81-A 

.> "· :. 

Defendant, a federal prisoner currently incarcerated at FCI Bastrop, Texas, filed 

prose this 28 U.S.C. §2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence challenging 

his conviction upon a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin. Defendant was 

sentenced on August 1, 1988, to a 15-year sentence and a $50.00 special assessment. 

The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not required because the issues raised may 

be resolved on the basis of the record and the law. 

Defendant raises the following as grounds for relief: Double jeopardy bars the 

federal government from subsequently recharging and retrying the defendant; the 

collateral estoppel clause of the Fifth , Amendment bars the federal government from 

·'· ~ 

"' 

subsequently recharging Defendant on the same facts; Defendant's guilty p1ea -was 

involuntary. 

,, . - IZ'Pif ue, .. M;ue ±a cw~------~ 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 22 
l --~~~......------- · f : . ~ · - ------------ ----

t 

In response, the government asserts that this is Defendant's second §2255 motion 

challenging the instant conviction, the first having been deni-ed on the merits by this 

Court on January 25, 1989. That prior §2255 motion alleged ineffective assistance of 

counsel, double jeopardy and misinformation in the presentence report. 

Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, provides: 

.. 

(b) Successive Motions. A second or successive motion may be dismissed 

if the judge finds that it fails to allege new or different grounds for 

relief and the p~or determination was on the merits or, if new and 

different grounds are alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the 

movant to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an 

abuse of the procedure governed by these rules. 

Court's will give controlling weight to the prior determination of a claim raised in a 

§2255 petition where the same ground presented in the subsequent petition was 

determined adversely to the petitioner in the prior petition, the prior determination was 

on the merits, and the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the 

subsequent petition. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963). 

In Sanders, the Supreme Court defined "ground": 

By "ground," we mean simply a sufficient legal basis for granting the relief 

sought by the applicant. For example, the contention that an involuntary 

confession was admitted in evidence against him is a distinct ground for 

federal collateral relief. But a claim of involuntary confession predicated 

on alleged psychological coercion does not raise a different "ground" than 

does one predicated on alleged physical coercion. In other words, identical 

grounds may often be proved by different factual allegations. So also, 

identical grounds may often be supported by different legal arguments 

(citations omitted),or be couched in different language (citations omitted);.:. 

or vary in immaterial respects. (citation omitted). - '{ 

373 U.S. at 16. ~- ·-"'--: ; - . .,., - :_:.,. 

· ..... -. 

2 

A! 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 23 
Thus, the addition of a new fact or legal argument to support a claim does not transform 

the claim into a new "ground." See~ Lonberger v. Marshall, 808 F.2d 1169, 1174, 

(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1055 (1987)(ground that plea was involuntary because 

of failure to inform prisoner of nature of charges was not sufficiently different, under 

Sanders, from ground that plea was involuntary because of failure to inform prisoner of 

possible double jeopardy violation); [n re Shriner, 735 F.2d 1236, 1240 (11th Cir. 

1984)(where ground of involuntariness of confession has been raised previously and 

rejected on the merits, prisoner could not assert the same ground simply by varying facts 

on which the claim was based). Cunningham v. Estelle, 536 F.2d 82, 83 (5th Cir. 

1976) ( under Sanders, a prisoner may not reassert grounds of ineffective assistance of 

counsel "simply by varying the factors that he claims demonstrate incompetency''). 

[n the prior §2255 motion, Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for 

failure to argue that double jeopardy or collateral estoppel barred the federal prosecution. 

This Court rejected the argument, ruling that a double jeopardy and/or collateral estoppel 

defense based on the prior state court prosecution of Defendant would not have been 

successful. The Court agrees with the government that Defendant's double 

jeopardy/collateral estoppel argument, though no longer raised in the context of an 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, has been previously denied on the merits by this 

Court by the January, 1989 Ord~r o~ the previous §2255 motion and the attempt to 

relitigate the issue is successive for purposes of Rule 9(b). Nor has the Defendctnt s~own 

that the ends of justice would be served· by permitting the redetermination of ·the 

~ 

previously rejected ground for relief. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. ar ·1~-17. 

-. o; 

.. 3 

Appellate Case: 90-6241 Document: 010110100015 Date Filed: 02/19/1991 Page: 24 
I • r... I 

j 

. 

Moreover, in the recent case of United States v. Broce, __ U.S._, 109 S.Ct. 

757, 762 (1989), the Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled proposition that: 

When the judgment of conviction upon a guilty plea has become final and 

the offender seeks to reopen the proceeding, the inquiry is ordinarily 

confined to whether the underlying plea was both counseled and voluntary. 

rf the answer is in the affirmative then the conviction and the plea, as a 

general rule, foreclose the collateral attack. 

In Broce, the Supreme Court noted that the exceptions to the general rule were those set 

forth in Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 

(1975) (per curiam); but the exceptions have no application to a subsequent charge made 

in federal court after a dismissal without prejudice in state court, as in this case. 

In Broce, supra, the Supreme Court held that despite the counsel's failure to advise 

defendants of a double jeopardy defense, the guilty plea did waive their right to 

collaterally attack the judgment based on this double jeopardy claim. Likewise, this 

Court has previously held that Defendant's guilty plea was voluntarily entered with the 

advice of competent counsel, the guilty plea forecloses the collateral attack. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Defendant's §2255 motion is 

successive. Moreover, Defendant's guilty plea, voluntarily and intelligently entered, 

forecloses collateral attack. 

Accordingly, Defendant's 28 U.S.C. §2255 motion is denied. 

Entered this 'J.-~ day of Jun~, 1990. 

WAYNE E. ALLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT .. Jl.JDGE 

.. 4 

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