Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03246/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lori Ann Merryman
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3246

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Plaintiff - Appellant *

 * Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the 

 * Northern District of Iowa.

Lori Ann Merryman, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Defendant - Appellee. * 

___________

Submitted: June 20, 2005

 Filed: June 29, 2005

 ____________

Before MURPHY, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

 ____________

PER CURIAM. 

Lori Ann Merryman pled guilty to conspiracy to manufacture and attempt to

manufacture 5 grams or more of actual methamphetamine. Her sentence was imposed

after issuance of the panel opinion in United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, (8th Cir.

Aug. 5, 2004), vacated, 406 F.3d 543 (2005) (en banc). The district court, applying

the then existing precedent, refrained from imposing any guideline sentencing

enhancements and sentenced Merryman to 87 months. The government appeals, and

we remand for resentencing. 

Appellate Case: 04-3246 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2005 Entry ID: 1921940
-2-

The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a base offense level

of 26 and enhancements of two levels for obstruction of justice and for reckless

endangerment during flight, for a total offense level of 30. Merryman’s criminal

history was calculated at category II and her resulting sentencing range was 108-135

months. Merryman did not object to the offense level or dispute that she committed

the acts underlying the recommended enhancements, but she made a “conditional

objection” to imposition of any enhancements if “upward adjustments were to be

required to be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

The parties agreed that without enhancements the sentencing range with a base

level of 26 and criminal history category II would be 70-87 months. They also agreed

that if the federal sentencing guidelines were later determined to be constitutional, the

total offense level with her two enhancements would be 30 with a resulting

sentencing range of 108-135 months. The government asked the court to impose

alternative “pure guidelines” and purely discretionary sentences in the event that

future legal developments warranted them. Defense counsel asked for an alternative

sentence around the low point of the range. 

The district court imposed a sentence of 87 months. It also issued two “standby sentences in the event there are further developments in sentencing law.” If the

court were to be “sentencing her under pure guidelines” as in effect before the panel

decision in Pirani, Merryman’s total offense level would be 30 and her sentence

would be 108 months. If the court had “pure discretion and used the guidelines only

as advisory guidelines, [the] sentence would also be 108 months.” 

Now that the Supreme Court has decided United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct.

738, 757 (2005), holding the mandatory guidelines unconstitutional and rendering

their use “effectively advisory,” the government requests that Merryman’s sentence

be reversed and the case remanded for imposition of the court’s alternative sentence

Appellate Case: 04-3246 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2005 Entry ID: 1921940
-3-

of 108 months. Merryman objects, arguing that the district court did not err under the

governing law at the time of the sentencing. 

The sentencing hearing in this case occurred during a period of uncertainty

about whether the Supreme Court would extend its reasoning in Blakely v.

Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), to the federal sentencing guidelines. It did so

in Booker, but its remedy for the Sixth Amendment infirmities it identified was to

make the federal guidelines advisory and to change the standard of review. Since the

precedent under which the district court sentenced Merryman prohibited sentencing

enhancements on facts not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant even if the

court treated the guidelines as advisory only, the sentence is not consistent with

Booker and must be remanded for imposition of the court’s alternative sentence. 

Accordingly, we reverse the sentence originally imposed and remand for

imposition of the alternative sentence of 108 months. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-3246 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2005 Entry ID: 1921940