Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04607/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-04607-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gamaliel Elizalde
Petitioner
William Muniz
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAMALIEL ELIZALDE,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Defendant.

Case No. 16-cv-04607-WHO 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Re: Dkt. No. 1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Gamaliel Elizalde seeks federal habeas relief from his state conviction on the 

grounds that the trial court erroneously admitted uncorroborated accomplice testimony and 

hearsay evidence; there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction as a co-conspirator;

defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance; the trial court erroneously instructed the jury; and 

the cumulative effect of errors denied his right to due process. His claims fail because they do not 

allege a violation of any clearly established federal law, because they are procedurally defaulted, 

or because they do not demonstrate that the state court decision was contrary to or involved an 

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. For the reasons set forth below, I will 

deny the petition. 

BACKGROUND

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Elizalde was convicted of the murders of Antonio Centron, Luis Perez, and Rico McIntosh

based on co-conspirator liability. Opinion (“Opn.”), Response to Order to Show Cause (“Ans.”)

Ex. 13 [Dkt. No. 35-8]. The following facts are excerpted from the court of appeal decision

affirming his conviction: 

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A. The Murders

Defendants [Jose] Mota[-Avendano] and Elizalde were convicted of three murders that 

occurred over a four-month period between December 22, 2007, and April 25, 2008. Javier

Gomez was convicted of one of the three, that of Rico McIntosh. The most significant 

testimony regarding these murders came from fellow gang members and/or friends, Jorge 

Sanchez (Centron murder), Victor Cervantes (Centron murder), Oscar Menendez (McIntosh 

murder), and Larry Valencia (Perez murder).

1. Antonio Centron Murder

Jorge Sanchez testified that in exchange for his testimony he pled to accessory after the fact 

to murder, and received a three-year suspended sentence. Sanchez, who was not in the 

country legally, also had a “parole in place” arrangement with Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and, as a result, wore an ankle bracelet monitor. Sanchez testified that he was 

a member of Varrio Frontero Loco, a subset of the Sureño gang, which is active in Contra 

Costa County.

The evening of December 22, 2007, Francisco Romero, who was also a Varrio Frontero 

Loco, gathered together a number of people and went to North Richmond. When he arrived, 

Molina phoned defendant Gamaliel (Gama) Elizalde “because supposedly he was going to 

put a meeting to go up there, just fight them [the Richmond Sur Trace members].” After 

speaking to Romero, Elizalde came to North Richmond. Elizalde then tried to call a 

Richmond Sur Trace member in order to arrange a fight but was not able to reach anyone.

After the failed effort to engage the Richmond Sur Trace, Sanchez, Romero and Molina 

eventually drove to the Broadway area of San Pablo, which was known to be Norteño 

territory. Sanchez understood that if they found Norteños there they would beat them up or 

shoot them. He understood this “was part of the deal of being a ... [Varrio Frontero Loco] 

Sureño at this time.”

That same evening, the victim, Antonio Centron, along with two friends, Neil Wixson and 

Adrian Espinoza, attended a party in the Broadway area of San Pablo. They stayed at the 

party for a couple of hours and then walked down Lake Street, toward 19th Street to buy 

beer. This area of San Pablo was a stronghold of the Norteño gang. Wixson and Centron 

wore red shirts, a color associated with Norteños. Centron walked a little ahead of his friends.

Romero drove by Centron, Wixson and Espinoza. Molina, who was in the right front 

passenger seat, told Romero he knew one of the three men. Molina pulled out a handgun and 

directed Romero to park down the next street. Romero parked and Molina ran out, and hid 

behind a fence, waiting for Centron, Wixson and Espinoza to come to the corner. When they 

did, Molina told them he was “VFL” and emptied his gun in their direction. His first shot hit 

Centron in the head. Centron died almost immediately. Nine more shots hit Espinoza in the 

back. Molina’s final shot hit Wixson in the arm. Espinoza, who was still conscious (and 

ultimately survived his injuries), called 911.

After killing and wounding the men he believed were rival gang members, Molina ran back 

to the car and they sped off. In the car, Molina was jumpy and excited. According to Sanchez, 

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Molina said “to watch the newspaper. That’s—that was going to be his trophy.” A newspaper 

article about a killing was “[l]ike a signature that you did it.” The killing would give Molina 

“more respect” in the gang. Molina called Elizalde to tell him what he had done. Elizalde 

arrived “and just started telling him just be quiet, stop, you know, screaming and just lay 

low.”

The next day, the police detained and searched Molina. They found in his possession a .45 

caliber chrome Colt semiautomatic handgun, a blue bandana, and a blue baseball hat. The 

police arrested him and charged him with possession of a concealed firearm. Molina was 

released from jail four days later.

Victor Cervantes testified that right after Molina got out of jail, he called Cervantes and 

asked for a ride home. Molina told him that he had killed one man and another was in a 

coma. He also told Cervantes that he had been with Francisco Romero when he had killed 

the man. Cervantes asked him how he got out of jail when he had been caught with a gun. 

Molina told him that he got caught with a different gun than the one used in the killing and, 

as a result, he had gotten away with murder.

In an interview with the police, Luis Ruelas testified that Molina admitted to him that he was 

in the car with Romero and Sanchez that evening and that Molina said he had shot at three 

men and killed one of them.

Defendants Elizalde and Mota were found guilty of Centron’s murder as coconspirators.

2. Luis Perez Murder

Larry Valencia was one of the prosecution’s main witnesses with regard to the murder of 

Luis Perez. Valencia had not made a plea bargain with the district attorney's office, nor was 

he receiving any witness protection or money from the district attorney's office.

Valencia testified that late on the night of February 16, 2008, he decided to visit friends in 

North Richmond. After an evening of drinking beer, smoking marijuana and taking Ecstasy 

someone said, “[l]et’s jump for a ride. Let's go find some females to party.” Hector Molina, 

Jorge Camacho, and Jose Mota got into Mota’s black, two-door Kia. Molina sat in the 

driver’s seat, with Jorge Camacho next to him in the passenger seat and Mota in the back. 

Cole Azamar and Luii Hernandez got into Azamar’s car, with Azamar driving and 

Hernandez sitting in the passenger seat. All five men were members of Varrio Frontero Loco. 

They encouraged Larry Valencia (who testified that he was not a gang member) to join them 

and he got into the backseat of Azamar’s car. After the two cars drove around for a while, 

with Azamar following Molina, they arrived in San Pablo. Valencia was aware that this was 

Norteño territory.

Molina stopped the car and Valencia saw the people in Mota’s car arguing with a man in a 

red jacket—the victim, Luis Perez—who was standing next to the car. He saw Camacho get 

out of the car and say to the man, “[s]how me your hands, show me your hands.” The man 

yelled “[w]hat the fuck is going on?” Valencia heard three loud shots and saw Camacho 

shoot the man three or four times. In fact, Camacho hit Perez seven times: two bullets to the 

abdomen, two to the back and three to the back of his arms. The bullets passed through 

Perez’s lungs, heart and liver. Perez died en route to John Muir Medical Center in Walnut 

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Creek.

Camacho got back into the car with Molina and Mota and Molina drove away. Valencia had 

never seen anyone killed before. Valencia told Azamar to take him back to his car so he 

could go home.

Mota was found guilty of Perez’s murder on an aider and abettor theory. Elizalde was found 

guilty as a coconspirator.

3. Lisa Thayer

The third victim, Lisa Thayer, died when Jorge Camacho, a member of Varrio Frontero 

Loco, exchanged shots with several unidentified men in a Toyota minivan.

This altercation began late in the afternoon of February 27, 2008. Camacho and his friend 

Antonio Solomon, were walking on San Pablo Avenue in San Pablo.6 Solomon was wearing 

a New York Yankees hat. In that area, that kind of hat was understood to stand for “Young 

Narfer,” a reference to North Richmond, which was Sureño territory.

A burgundy Toyota minivan with a Hispanic driver and front seat passenger and African–

American passenger in the backseat passed Solomon and Camacho. Solomon and Camacho 

ran.

The men in the minivan chased them. Eventually, the minivan pulled up behind Solomon 

and Camacho. The side door opened, revealing that the backseat passenger had a gun. 

Camacho shot at the van with the same nine-millimeter semiautomatic handgun he used to 

kill Perez. He fired nine times. The man in the van also fired a .40-caliber semiautomatic 

handgun several times.

Lisa Thayer, who was walking on San Pablo about half a block from the shooting, was hit 

by a bullet. The bullet hit her in the back, went through her right lung and came out at her 

chest. Thayer died soon afterwards.

Solomon and Camacho ran from the scene with the van following them. Someone in the van 

fired several more shots at them. Soloman and Camacho climbed a fence and ran to the 

apartment of a friend—Ignacio Mendoza. When Mendoza's mother told them to leave, 

Camacho gave his gun to Mendoza and left with Solomon. The police arrived nearby, a 

witness pointed them out and they were arrested. Camacho had a blue bandana in his pocket.

The jury found defendants Mota and Elizalde not guilty of Thayer’s murder.

4. Rico McIntosh

The fourth shooting occurred in the early morning hours of April 26, 2008. Oscar Menendez, 

who was present at the shooting, testified that he had pleaded to accessory to the murder of 

McIntosh with a gang enhancement. He was given three years’ probation. As a condition of 

his plea, he agreed to testify in court. At the time he testified he was in “parole in place,” 

which meant he wore an ankle monitor required by Immigrations, Customs and 

Enforcement. The People were assisting him in obtaining a work permit. Menendez had not 

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violated any of the terms of his probation or the terms and conditions imposed by 

Immigration, Customs and Enforcement. He did not receive any money from the district 

attorney’s office.

Menendez testified that he had known Mota for several years. Mota was a member of Varrio 

Frontero Loco. Menendez also knew Javier Gomez. The three of them hung out together and 

“sometimes we used to get in the car and just cruise around.” Gomez belonged to a Sureño 

subset called Mexican Loco. Menendez had been at parties where members of the two 

Sureño subsets would brag “about crimes they have done during the week or, you know, any 

stuff that they doing, you know, like beating somebody up or robbing people or whatever 

crimes they do, they used to brag about all of the time.” Six months before the McIntosh 

murder, Menendez became a Sureño.

Menendez described an incident that occurred about a week and a half before the McIntosh 

murder. He, Gomez and Mota went to visit Gomez’s cousin who lived in Montalvin, which 

was Norteño territory. Mota drove his Kia, and Gomez sat in the front passenger seat. 

Menendez sat in the back. The cousin was not home, so they turned around to return to 

Richmond. As they did so, Gomez and Mota saw a man wearing red who was fixing his car. 

Mota and Gomez “said he was a Buster. He was wearing red....” Menendez did not agree 

and when he saw that Gomez and Mota had a gun8 in the front seat he told them to drop the 

gun. Menendez tried to grab the gun and in the ensuing scuffle, someone shot Menendez in 

the leg.

Menendez was bleeding heavily, so Mota and Gomez took him to the hospital. The police 

questioned Menendez and he lied and told them that they had been jumped and he had been 

shot in the leg because he told his assailants that he did not have any money.

Several weeks later, Gomez and Mota pulled up to where Menendez was hanging out with 

some friends and “they were calling me, right, and I went to the car and they say get in the 

car. I was like where are you guys going? They said don’t trip.” As on the other occasion, 

Mota was driving and Gomez was in the front passenger seat. Menendez asked if his friend 

could go too, and Mota told him he could not. Menendez got in the car and they decided to 

go to a McDonald’s on San Pablo near Broadway. Instead of turning right into the 

McDonald’s, however, Mota turned left onto Broadway. Menendez asked Mota were he was 

going and he said “don't trip.” Mota kept driving. At this point, they were driving into 

Norteño territory and Menendez thought “they were looking for some Norteños ... or they 

were trying to do something again.”

Gomez spotted three men wearing red at a stop sign. Mota stopped the car and asked the 

men if they were “busters.” The men said they were not, and Menendez recognized one of 

them and told Mota that “they don’t bang....” Mota drove away but “he kept on mugging 

them.”

Mota then spotted Rico McIntosh, who looked, to Menendez, like he was wearing a red 

bandana and had some “red on his pants, too.” Mota and Gomez thought he looked like a 

Norteño. They pulled alongside McIntosh and Gomez asked him “if he is a buster.” 

McIntosh said “what the fuck is a buster?” Menendez thought he heard Mota say “pull it 

out.” He then saw Gomez reach down toward his leg. McIntosh made a gesture as though to 

reach for something and Menendez thought it was a gun. Gomez began to fire the gun out 

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of the window of the car. Menendez heard four or five shots. McIntosh fell and Mota and 

Gomez began to laugh. Menendez told them it was not funny and they told him he was a 

“pussy.” Menendez said he wanted to go home. “I told them what they just did, it was wrong 

because I never seen somebody kill another person like that.”

Mota and Gomez “seemed pretty happy, like they just won the lottery or something. They 

were really excited about it.” Mota and Gomez wanted to celebrate, but Menendez asked to 

go home. On the way, Mota and Gomez talked and said, “Oh, you know, what the homies 

are going to say when they find out, or was he good, was he bad, you know they were saying 

that it was like, you know, it was like perfect. Perfect is no one sees them. [¶] No one seen 

us when we were there. When that happened there was no people at all, just that guy.”

When they arrived at Menendez’s house, Mota left the gun with Menendez. He told 

Menendez that he was on parole and could not have it.

A week or so later, Menendez went to a party with members of Varrio Frontero Loco and 

Mexican Loco. At the party, Gomez “started talking about it.” Ruelas was also present, along 

with a number of other Varrio Frontero Loco and Mexican Loco members. Mota was also 

there.

Gomez confessed to the McIntosh murder. He told the police that Mota picked him up the 

night of the murder and the two of them went to look for Norteños. Mota gave him the gun 

he used to shoot Rico McIntosh. Mota’s job was to drive until he saw a Norteño and then 

stop. Gomez did not plan to shoot anyone who was not a Norteño. After driving around for 

a while Mota and Gomez picked up Menendez. Menendez sat in the backseat. They 

continued to look for Norteños, slowing down to look and then ruling out a number of groups 

of people who were out that night. Eventually, either Mota or Menendez spotted McIntosh, 

who was walking down the street. Mota told him that McIntosh had some red on. Gomez 

“asked him, are you a Buster? And he said, what the fuck is a buster? He, he had a hoodie. 

Then he like, he pulled the hoodie down as if he wanted to do something, so I just shot him.” 

He shot McIntosh until there were no bullets left in his gun.

After the shooting they went to a store and bought some beer and drank it at the cemetery. 

He gave the gun to Menendez. Menendez saw the whole thing from the backseat.

McIntosh was hit in the hip and buttocks. He was taken to John Muir Medical Center and 

released on April 28, 2008. The next day, McIntosh collapsed and died after blood clots 

caused by the gunshot wounds traveled to his lungs.

Gomez was convicted of second degree murder. Mota was convicted of first degree murder 

as an aider and abettor and Elizalde was convicted as a coconspirator.

B. Conspiracy and Gang Evidence

Several witnesses testified to a conspiracy on the part of Mota and Elizalde to commit 

murders of rival Norteño gang members in order to restore the reputation and fortunes of the 

Varrio Frontero Loco.

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1. Jorge Sanchez

Jorge Sanchez was a member of Varrio Frontero Loco.10 He joined because his older brother 

was in the gang. Sanchez’s brother was a member of the Mexican Loco, another Sureño 

gang, and he joined the Varrio Frontero Loco because he wanted his own “name.” He was 

“jumped in” to Varrio Frontero Loco, through a process he described as “[j]ust imagine three 

guys beating on one person, kicking him, beating him, just thumping on him” for 13 seconds. 

He had also helped jump people into the gang. Sanchez showed the jury a number of tattoos 

that signified his membership in Varrio Frontero Loco. Gang tattoos were important so 

people “won’t mess with us.”

A Sureño who wanted to prove himself would “[j]ust go to the streets. Beat up any Norteño 

you can think of to start with.... [¶] Just you earn respect and your stripes. Start shooting or 

just doing whatever you want.” You would do this with other people “[t]o make sure you do 

it. Just to make sure you ain’t lying about what you did.” When Sanchez went out to attack 

Norteños, he would take a fellow Varrio Frontero Loco with him. He would do that for 

“backup.” He would also do it to “make sure they do it, too. Make sure they look at you.”

Sanchez understood that at the time of trial, Mota and Elizalde had “green lighted” him; that 

is, they had ordered him killed for talking to the police. Green lighting did not occur until 

the actual text of a statement made to the police was distributed “to the streets,” generally 

through a defendant who received the statement from his lawyer.

Sureños were enemies with Norteños because they were “mixed people”: “part Mexican ... 

they mix with Mexican black, Mexican white.” You could tell who they were by “[t]he hair, 

the clothes, the grill that is like the gold teeth they wear. [¶] And if they got tattoos you look 

at tattoos, belts.” In particular, Norteños had long hair, “all of the new clothes the black 

people be coming out with,” and wore the color red, including red belts. Sureños identified 

themselves with blue bandanas and blue belts.

Sanchez was familiar with a number of Norteño subgangs including West Side Berkeley, 

Montalvin, and Varrio San Pablo. Each of them claimed a particular area. Varrio San Pablo 

claimed the area near Broadway and the Hilltop Mall.

As a Sureño, when he saw a Norteño he was supposed to “[t]ake off, just don’t even think 

about it, just hit them up.... Just whoop his ass.”

Varrio Frontero Loco used violence to scare “[j]ust the people, Norteños whoever—

everybody, the blacks, the whites, the Asians.” They did so “[j]ust so they won't mess with 

us.... [P]eople be picking on people. Sometimes people just look for a way out. And just 

make sure they scared of you instead of you being scared of them.”

Fame mattered because it was a way of “representing my hood,” “[j]ust to let people know 

... where you are from.” You did that by “doing a lot of things, shooting, selling drugs, 

getting money, cars, just whoop—whooping people in front of other people.” A Varrio 

Frontero Loco would “throw it up” by telling someone who they were, just make sure they 

know it. Being feared by rival gang members was a good thing—“[y]ou can be walking the 

streets with no one, no one is trying to hit you up or something.”

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Gang members would get together and brag about what they had done in order to let people 

know that “if they mess with you they will get the same ... treatment.” He would also get 

together with other Varrio Frontero Loco and plan future crimes “to get respect or to make 

people afraid.”

With regard to nongang members, it was important to “let them know that ... we don’t mess 

with you and you just don't mess with us.”

Drug sales were a part of being a Varrio Frontero Loco. Sanchez “wasn’t into that,” but he 

had seen fellow gang member Gamaliel Elizalde selling drugs out of his backyard. He would 

sometimes give drugs to Mota to sell and Mota would brag about it. The drug sales were run 

out of Elizalde’s house.

Varrio Frontero Loco held meetings to “check in with each other, to make sure what was 

going on with each other and just what kind of problems, like people got problems with 

someone, different rivals or with a Norteño or something.” Sometimes the members would 

put money together for people in jail to use for “hygienes like toothpaste, soap, shampoo....” 

Elizalde was in charge of putting money “on the books” for the Varrio Frontero Loco 

members who were in jail. The meetings were not held often. Sometimes the meetings would 

take place at Victor Valencia's house and sometimes at Elizalde's house.

Occasionally, he and other members would “check,” or beat up, a member who was not 

“putting in work or he ain’t kicking it with us a lot....”

At the time Sanchez joined Varrio Frontero Loco in 2005 or 2006, it was led by a number of 

men, including Gamaliel Elizalde. Elizalde was an “OG” or leader, “the one you look up 

to.... The one[ ] that you go ask for advice.” One of the benefits of being a leader was that 

he “get to kickback or just don't do a lot of things no more.” A leader would not “fight 

somebody or put a lot of work in the streets, shooting, whatever, just get to just relax and let 

the other generation do their work.”

A leader would have money from “things going on the side .... [¶] ... like they were selling 

drugs....” The leaders would use the “pee wees” or younger members “to distribute it....”

In 2007, there were several subsets of Sureños with whom Sanchez was familiar: his own 

gang, Varrio Frontero Loco, another gang called Mexican Loco and a third called Richmond 

Sur Trece. Although they were all Sureños, they did not always get along. In 2007, a Varrio 

Frontero Loco leader called “Toby” shot a member of a Richmond Sur Trece and fled, along 

with his brothers, to avoid being killed in retaliation for murdering a fellow Sureño. This left 

a void in the leadership of Varrio Frontero Loco, which was filled by Elizalde. As Sanchez 

put it, after Toby fled, “everybody was just going to Gama, so that's the only one who we 

look up to and who was there with us.” Nevertheless, after Elizalde took over, Varrio 

Frontero Loco began to dissolve. “[E]verybody just try to take it their own way. It was—just 

disappeared. Some of them went to some other towns. People got scared because they got 

shot at, who was getting stomped on.” At this point, Varrio Frontero Loco were “getting 

hurt” and “things were bad.”

Sanchez testified that “we just had to get it back together.” He and others referred to this as 

“bring[ing] the hood back.” To do this, it was necessary to “recruit[ ] new people and try to 

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do more damage to the Norteños, to the streets.” All of the Varrio Frontero Loco wanted to 

bring the hood back, including Elizalde. In terms of the hierarchy of Varrio Frontero Loco, 

Elizalde was the leader, and Sanchez was directly under him along with Mota, Ruelas, and 

several others.

Elizalde told the Varrio Frontero Loco that they had to “put in more work,” “go to the streets, 

ride around the streets,” “[m]ake sure they [the Norteños and everybody] know we around, 

we ain’t gone.” They would do this by “hit[ting] the streets, ride around, especially in 

Norteño territory.” Sanchez explained that this was effective because the Norteños “don't 

expect us to go. They think we going to be scared. They think we going to just lay back. And 

we go there and they go, oh, man, they coming back and they coming back hard.” In Norteño 

territory, “[i]f you see them just shoot them or whoop them, whatever you got. If you don't 

got no gun you just get out and do what you got.”

Sanchez discussed this plan with all the Varrio Frontero Loco, including Mota. He did not 

talk to Elizalde about why he wanted to bring the hood back; he only knew that Elizalde 

“wanted it done.”

According to Sanchez, he and Mota, along with Luis Ruelas, Luii Hernandez, and Cole 

Azamar were “the ones who was going to bring them back ... just the ones who got to take 

care of everything.” They covered different parts of Richmond. In addition to attacking 

Norteños, they also recruited and “guided” “pee wees.” Elizalde wanted them to “get into 

the high schools and expand the Sureños and hurt the Norteños.”

Shortly before Sanchez was arrested, Mota came to his house. He was nervous because the 

police had been to his house. Mota told him that he (Mota) “went in the shootout.” He also 

spoke to Jorge Camacho who told him that he “shot a lady.”

2. Oscar Menendez

Oscar Menendez testified that at the time of the Rico McIntosh murder, he “was undecided” 

about being a Varrio Frontero Loco. He “didn't want it for my future ... it was just fine being 

with them, you know, being with girls and having parties, but I didn't like the rest that they 

used to do.” He had a lot of Sureño mentions on his MySpace page, and he liked being 

around the gang because it “was fun because they always used to hang around with a lot of 

girls and they always used to have parties every weekend and, you know, beers and music.”

He was aware that gang members “hunted and attacked Norteños.” However, no one ever 

“told me to do it.” He was never “jumped in.” He associated with the Varrio Frontero Loco 

for six or seven months beginning in November 2007 until his arrest about a week after the 

McIntosh murder.

It was typical for gang members to brag about their crimes. He explained, “they say that’s 

what they get respect because when they—when the rest of the guys knew what you were 

doing they will respect you more than what they do.” This was a “big deal” to the Varrio 

Frontero Loco.

The Norteños were the Varrio Frontero Loco’s rivals. Menendez knew what areas were 

Norteño territory. He also knew that if a Varrio Frontero Loco found a Norteño or saw one 

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he was to “beat him up and if you have a gun you have to use it.” That is because the Varrio 

Frontero Loco “wanted to get rid of Norteños.”

He knew both Javier Gomez and Victor Cervantes, both of whom were members of the 

Sureño gang, Mexican Loco. When he associated with these gangs he knew they got along 

“but not that much” at first.

According to Menendez, Varrio Frontero Loco “wasn’t that much organized.” He “never 

knew who was the shot-caller....” He was aware that the members “used to receive orders 

from some older guys....” When he asked what they were doing, the members would say 

“don’t trip ... that’s something that I got to do and that’s it.” In his own mind, he thought that 

Elizalde was the shot-caller because he once heard him giving orders to someone. At one 

point, Elizalde told Menendez that “in order to be a Sureño you have to get down, you know, 

don’t have to be a fear of anybody, if you see a Norteño on the street you have to put him on 

check, beat him up or anything that is in your hands to get him away from Richmond, and 

to don't let them come to Richmond, let them stay in San Pablo.” Specifically Elizalde told 

him that if he saw a Norteño he was to beat him up and if he had a gun to use it. Elizalde 

once told him that in order to be a Sureño he had to “stick with them all the time and commit 

sort of a crime that he used to commit—I had to do the crime that they used to do in the week 

and stick around with them and, you know, do whatever they—they were doing during the 

week.” This would include “[s]tealing cars and robbing people, shooting Norteños, beat 

them up.” Mota told him the same thing. He also told him that he had to “earn” a Varrio 

Frontero Loco tattoo by doing something “big” like kill a Norteño.

On three occasions, he heard Elizalde instruct someone to beat up a Norteño or to look for 

him. He also heard Elizalde say that Richmond was Sureño territory.

Menendez named a number of Varrio Frontero Loco as those with the most respect in the 

gang. They were Molina, Azamar, Camacho, Ruelas and Sanchez. He also knew Larry 

Valencia, who he did not think was a gang member.

He felt that he had to do what Elizalde told him to do. He did not, however, think that he had 

to hunt Norteños in San Pablo. When he went with Mota and Javier Gomez on April 13, 

2008, which was the day he shot himself by accident, he did not know that they were looking 

for Norteños to kill. Nor did he think that was the case on April 26, 2008. He did not realize 

that they were looking for Norteños to kill until the car did not turn toward the McDonald's 

on Broadway as he had expected.

In jail, Menendez received a message on the module where he was housed from the Sureño 

shot caller. The message laid out in detail how he was to behave while incarcerated. Among 

other things, he was to contribute money to buy food and supplies for other Sureños, he was 

not to speak to the police, he was to follow orders from the shot caller and if he was asked, 

he was to beat people up the shot caller told him to attack. He was also required to give the 

shot caller a copy of the police report on his arrest as well as any other legal materials in 

order to permit the shot caller to determine whether he was a snitch. Menendez refused to 

give these materials to the shot caller and, several days later, he was beat up by several 

Sureños. He entered protective custody afterwards.

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3. Luis Ruelas

Luis Ruelas testified that he was a member of Varrio Frontero Loco for six years until 2008. 

He was 14 or 15 years old when he was jumped into the gang. Jose Valencia brought him 

into the gang.

Ruelas’s testimony before the grand jury was admitted into evidence. In that testimony, 

Ruelas told the grand jury that he had “earned” a tattoo that said “Chap Killa” on his arm. 

He worked his way up from the bottom of the gang by earning “respect” through shooting 

and beating up Norteños. Norteños were identified by the color red, while Sureños wore the 

color blue. Ruelas became close to one of the top people in Varrio Frontero Loco at the time, 

Victor Valencia. Valencia had secured their territory by running out another gang that had 

previously been there.

Ruelas was deported to Mexico and Victor Valencia fled the country. When Ruelas returned, 

Elizalde “was the main—was the kingpin at that time, but everything else was a mess on the 

streets.” Elizalde was “moving all the drugs.” With Victor Valencia gone, “[h]e took over 

all our stuff.” Ruelas did not like Elizalde. Elizalde gave orders to kill people, including one 

occasion when Elizalde told Ruelas to “kill somebody because they popped his tires.” He 

did not do it because at the time he was working as an informant with the San Pablo police. 

As part of his deal with the police, he promised not to participate in the commission of any 

crimes. Elizalde also would send Ruelas out to collect debts using violence.

On one occasion, before he returned to Richmond, Ruelas spoke to Hector Molina, who told 

him, “We miss you.... We bringing the hood back.” According to Ruelas, “the whole part of 

being a Sureño” was to “assault or kill Norteños.”

Ruelas’s testimony at an earlier gang prosecution was also admitted into evidence. At that 

time, Ruelas testified that violence was an important part of bringing the hood back 

“[b]ecause if ... you don't have people be scared of you, they ain’t going to respect you. They 

going to be like, you know, whatever. As long as you show them you really about it, they 

will think about it twice before they come at you.” Violence also helped recruit new members 

who “seen what we were doing and they knew we had money. We had girls, we had 

everything. And they wanted it, too, so they started joining in.”

At trial, Ruelas was reluctant to testify because of threats to his family. In general, he either 

outright denied or claimed to forget testimony he had earlier given about Varrio Frontero 

Loco. At trial, he testified that Varrio Frontero Loco did not have a structure in which there 

was a shot caller. Instead, there were people he looked up to, including Victor Valencia. 

Ruelas also had respect for Elizalde because he was his elder.

Ruelas showed the jury tattoos on his forearms that said “Chap Killa.” A Chap, he explained, 

is a Norteño gang member. He had done a lot of crimes to earn the tattoo.

One of the rules of being a Sureño “is just you got to represent yourself the right way.” To 

do that, you had to have respect, which you earned through loyalty. If a Varrio Frontero 

Loco saw a Norteño he was expected to get into a fight with the Norteño. He would 

sometimes go out and look for Norteños to fight. The Broadway area in San Pablo was one 

place the Norteños hung out.

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He knew Elizalde because they “used to kick it outside his house.” Elizalde was a Varrio 

Frontero Loco. He was older and “some guys came up to him for advice.” Although he had 

earlier told the police that Elizalde was “running the streets,” he had done so because “I was 

just trying to save my life from being prosecuted, but it was—what I said was wrong....” In 

general, he retracted a number of statements he made earlier in which he had identified 

Elizalde as the person who had taken over drug sales, the person to whom he would go if he 

needed a gun quickly, and as having a list of people that needed to be hit. He also did not 

remember telling the police that Mota brought a pound of methamphetamine to his house 

along with a gun and said he was going on a drug deal.

Opn. 18–28.

After Molina was arrested and being held for the murder of Luis Perez, he made six phone 

calls to his mother. Supplemental Clerk’s Transcript (“Supp. CT”), Ans. Ex. 2 [Dkt. No. 31-5] 

522–531. During the first phone call, Molina instructed his mother to contact Elizalde and used 

the three-way call feature to leave Elizalde a voicemail informing him that Molina was in jail. Id.

at 526. During the second phone call, Molina’s mother told Molina, “Uh, my god, but (Gama) 

says that you should—you should say no, no, no, I didn’t do it, it couldn’t have been me. I didn’t 

do anything. To keep your word, and no, no, no.” Id. at 527. Molina also spoke with Elizalde on 

this call, who instructed him to say that he did not commit the murder and did not know anything 

about it. Id. at 529. 

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 20, 2010,

1

the jury found Elizalde guilty of the following: count one, murder 

of Rico McIntosh on April 26, 2008; count two, conspiracy to commit murder and assault with a 

deadly weapon on April 26, 2008; count three, criminal street gang conspiracy on April 26, 2008; 

count four, murder of Antonio Centron on December 22, 2008; count five, murder of Jose 

Mendoza-Lopez on January 16, 2008; and count seven, attempted dissuasion of witness Victor 

Cervantes on July 21, 2008.2 Opn. 17. Petitioner was tried with co-defendants Gomez and Mota, 

although there was a separate jury for Gomez because he had given a confession implicating Mota. 

 

1 The petition incorrectly cites the date as December 20, 2011.

2 The jury did not convict on count six, murder of Lisa Thayer on February 27, 2008. Petition 

(“Pet.”) ¶ 2 [Dkt. No. 1].

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Id. at 37 n.1.

At trial, the State called Cervantes, Menendez, Ruelas, Valencia, and Sanchez to testify 

about their involvement with Varrio Frontero Locos and the killings. Opn. 25–31. The court 

instructed the jury that Sanchez was an accomplice as a matter of law. Answer (“Ans.”) Ex. 4 

6093 [Dkt. No. 35]. It submitted to the jury the question of whether Ruelas, Menendez, and 

Cervantes were accomplices as a matter of law. Opn. 26. The government cited to a Myspace 

post by Ruelas to corroborate his testimony. 

3

See Opn. 65–66.

On November 19, 2013, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the trial 

court on charges pertaining to Elizalde. Id. at 18. The Supreme Court of California denied 

Elizalde’s petition for review. Ans. Ex. 22 [Dkt. No. 35-9] ECF page 158; People v. Elizalde, 321 

P.3d 344 (Cal. 2014). This petition followed. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Pet.”) [Dkt. 

No. 1]. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), this Court 

may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution 

or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(a). The petition may not be granted 

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court’s 

adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court 

of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

 

3 According to the court of appeal: “Luis Ruelas testified that he posted a message on his 

MySpace page in order to warn gang members not to harm his family. The gist of the message 

was that if gang members ‘touch my family their family can be touched, too.’ The post read as 

follows: ‘but dis goes to all da lil homies, stop listening to da big homies,they dnt give a fuck bout 

ya lil niggas, dnt listen to Stranger, dat nigga is a nobody in VFL. Just cus hes close to Gama dnt 

mean shit. He never did no, jales . . . and Gama just uses ya to take care of his shit. He dnt give a 

fuck bout ya.’ He posted that the true members of VFL were ‘Sleepy, Richy, Toby, Ruelas, 

Camacho, all do other VFLs except da pee wees are fucken suckas niggas.’” Opn. 65–66. 

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arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if 

the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). “Under the 

‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court 

identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably 

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court 

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the 

relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making 

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly 

established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

DISCUSSION

I. CLAIMS BASED IN STATE LAW 

The majority of Elizalde’s claims center around alleged errors in the state court’s 

application of state law. He asserts that the following errors denied him due process of laws: (i) 

admission of uncorroborated testimony in violation of California Penal Code section 1111; (ii) 

insufficient evidence to show the killings were committed in furtherance of a conspiracy; (iii)

unlawful admission of hearsay in the form of phone calls between Elizalde, Molina, and Molina’s 

mother; and (iv) admission of evidence of a prior drug arrest to show Elizalde’s participation in 

the conspiracy.

A. Uncorroborated Testimony

Elizalde argues that Luis Ruelas, Oscar Menendez, and Victor Cervantes were accomplices 

as a matter of law, and the prosecution failed to present independent evidence to corroborate their 

testimony as required by California Penal Code section 1111. Pet. m-4; see Cal. Penal Code § 

1111 (“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated 

by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the 

offense.”). He asserts that his conviction rested on uncorroborated accomplice testimony in 

violation of state law, and the error in turn violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process right. 

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Id. at m-2.

The court of appeal addressed this claim in its November 19, 2013 opinion, and the 

Supreme Court of California summarily denied Elizalde’s petition for review. Ans. Ex. 22. When 

a lower state court issues a written opinion, an unexplained order from a higher court that upholds 

the judgment is presumed to rest upon the same grounds. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 

(1991); Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether a state court 

decision is contrary to federal law, we look to the state’s last reasoned decision . . . as the basis for 

its judgment.”). The court of appeal’s opinion is the proper subject of my review of this claim.

Elizalde’s claim lacks merit. He is only entitled to relief if he can show that the court of 

appeal’s ruling was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of “clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

2254(d)(1). But the Ninth Circuit has determined that corroboration requirement embodied in 

California Penal Code section 1111 “is not required by the Constitution or federal law” as long as 

the uncorroborated testimony is not “incredible or insubstantial on its face.” Laboa v. Calderon, 

224 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Elizalde does 

not assert that the allegedly uncorroborated testimony was incredible or insubstantial on its face. 

Accordingly, he is entitled to relief only if the alleged violation denied him his due process right to 

fundamental fairness. See id.

“A State violates a criminal defendant’s due process right to fundamental fairness if it 

arbitrarily deprives the defendant of a state law entitlement.” Id. (citing Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 

U.S. 343, 346 (1980). The Supreme Court has “long recognized that a mere error of state law is 

not a denial of due process.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 222 (2011) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Instead, an error violates due process if it was a “denial of ‘that 

fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.’” Gonzalez v. Wong, 667 F.3d 965, 

995 (9th Cir. 2011). 

In order for my inquiry to reach Elizalde’s due process arguments, he would have to show 

that there was a violation of section 1111. He cannot do this. The court of appeal refused to 

address his arguments on the merits because it found that he had waived his arguments by failing 

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to object at trial as required by California law. It wrote, “Elizalde has waived any objection to the 

trial court’s ruling that Menendez, Ruelas, Sanchez, and Valencia were not accomplices as a 

matter of law. Elizalde told the court that he would ‘rather leave it [the determination of whether 

these witnesses were accomplices] up to the jury.’” Opn. 25–26 n.15. Because California’s 

contemporaneous objection requirement is an “independent and adequate state procedural rule,” 

federal habeas review of Elizalde’s underlying due process claim is barred unless he can show 

cause and actual prejudice. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), holding 

modified by Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012); Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806 (concluding that federal 

review was barred where the California Court of Appeal found procedural default because of 

failure to object during trial). Specifically, he must “demonstrate cause for the default and actual 

prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider 

the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. He did 

not do so. His petition raises no arguments related to cause, prejudice, or fundamental miscarriage 

of justice. 

For all of these reasons, Elizalde has failed to show that there was a state law violation,4

much less one that rises to the level of a due process violation. 

B. Insufficient Evidence

Elizalde claims that “even if the court rejects the accomplice corroboration argument” of 

the previous section, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings that the killings 

were committed in furtherance of or were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a conspiracy. 

Pet. m-9. The Due Process Clause “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 

charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). A state prisoner therefore must allege that the 

evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a 

 

4 The court of appeal did address the merits of Mota’s claim under section 1111 because he had 

objected during trial. Opn. 26 n. 15. It found no error. Id. at 26–30. In addition, even assuming 

the trial court had erred in putting the accomplice question to the jury, the appellate court found 

there was no prejudice because the testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Id. at 30; see Ans. 

[Dkt. No. 30-1] 16. 

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rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

321, 324 (1979). 

The government argues that Elizalde did not exhaust this claim because on appeal, he 

“never claimed that there was insufficient evidence even if [the four accomplices’] testimony 

could be considered.” Answer 25. However, “new factual allegations do not render a claim 

unexhausted unless they fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state 

courts.” Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1117 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, Ayers 

v. Belmontes, 549 U.S. 7, 11 (2006)); see Lee v. Adams, No. C 08–1200 PJH (PR), 2009 WL 

3762416, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2009) (“Although petitioner did not cite precisely the same 

facts in support of his federal claim as he cited in support of his state court appeal, he presented 

the same fundamental legal claim, that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s 

verdict.”). For this reason, I will consider the merits of the claim. 

The court of appeal determined that the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial 

evidence that the conspiracy existed and that the murders were the foreseeable consequence of the 

conspiracy:

Our review of the record indicates that substantial evidence supports 

the jury’s conclusion that (1) Elizalde conspired with Mota to 

reestablish Varrio Frontero Loco by, among other things, murdering 

rival gang members and (2) the deaths of Centron, Perez and 

McIntosh were the natural and probable consequence of that 

conspiracy.

Officer Brady of the San Pablo Police Department testified as a gang 

expert that in late 2007 and early 2008, Varrio Frontero Loco and the 

Mexican Locos were beginning to “clique up” together. Based on 

several murders that occurred as well as informant information, he 

believed that Gamaliel Elizalde was the “head shot-caller” of Varrio 

Frontero Loco. The gang was recruiting members and committing 

murders. He believed Elizalde and other members of Varrio Frontero 

Loco were attempting to “reestablish the gang.”

Sanchez testified that in the year leading up to the murder of Centron 

Perez and McIntosh, Elizalde was the leader of Varrio Frontero Loco. 

The gang was on the decline—members were being hurt and territory 

was disappearing. To counteract this state of affairs, Elizalde, along 

with Sanchez, Mota, Ruelas, and others, began to recruit new 

members. They also embarked on a campaign to “do more damage 

to the Norteños.” Elizalde encouraged Varrio Frontero Loco 

members to make sure that the Norteños were aware that they were a 

present and powerful force by going into Norteño territory to beat up 

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or shoot anyone who appeared to be a Norteño. Menendez confirmed 

that this was, indeed, the understanding of the Varrio Frontero Loco 

members who “wanted to get rid of Norteños.” Although Menendez 

was not sure, he believed that Elizalde was the “shot-caller.” Ruelas 

confirmed Menendez’s suspicion regarding Elizalde’s role in the 

Varrio Frontero Loco. Ruelas also testified that Molina told him that 

they were “bringing the hood back” and violence against rival gang 

members was an important part of this effort.

In addition to substantial evidence that Elizalde was a significant 

player in a conspiracy to re-establish Varrio Frontero Loco as a 

powerful gang through violence—including murder—against 

Norteños, substantial evidence also supports the jury’s conclusion 

that the deaths of Centron, Perez and McIntosh were the foreseeable 

consequence of the conspiracy to “bring[] the hood back.” Centron, 

Perez and McIntosh were targeted because they appeared to be 

Norteños, the principal target of the Varrio Frontero Loco. Elizalde’s 

argument that these murders were not foreseeable because the victims 

were outside Richmond, which was the area claimed by the Sureños, 

makes little sense. San Pablo was well known to be Norteño territory. 

Given that the Varrio Frontero Loco conspired to kill Norteños, they 

would generally do so in San Pablo, rather than Richmond.

The jury’s verdict, therefore, is supported by substantial evidence. Opn. 60–61.

“Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to 

two layers of judicial deference”: the court of appeal’s deference to the jury’s verdict and the 

federal court’s deference to the state court’s decision. Coleman v. Johnson, 566 U.S. 650, 651

(2012) (per curiam). The initial question is whether, “after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The state court’s determination 

that the verdict is supportable “in turn is entitled to considerable deference under AEDPA.” 

Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656. 

In support of his Jackson claim, Elizalde merely argues that the jury reached the wrong 

verdict. Yet to succeed, he would have to show that the jury’s conviction was “so insupportable as 

to fall below the threshold of bare rationality,” see Coleman, 566 U.S. at 656, and that the court of 

appeal’s decision reaching the opposite conclusion “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law,” see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d). Given all of the 

considerations outlined above, it was not objectively unreasonable for the court of appeal to 

determine that a rational trier of fact could have found Elizalde guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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C. Evidence Code

Elizalde alleges that the following misapplications of state law violated his due process 

rights: (i) admission of hearsay in the form of phone calls between Elizalde, Molina, and Molina’s 

mother; and (ii) admission of evidence of a prior drug arrest. Pet. m-11–18, m-22–24.

“A state court’s procedural or evidentiary ruling is not subject to federal habeas review 

unless the ruling violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or 

statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due 

process.” Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); see Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 

1021, 1031 (9th Cir. 1999). Even where evidence was admitted in error, a federal court can only 

grant the petitioner relief if “its admission violated fundamental due process and the right to a fair 

trial.” Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; see also Johnson v. Chappell, No. C 95-0305 TEH, 2014 WL 

1920551, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is 

whether the admission of evidence was so arbitrary or prejudicial that it rendered the trial 

fundamentally unfair.”). “Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the 

evidence can its admission violate due process.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

Admission of the phone call and 2007 drug arrest evidence did not violate Elizalde’s due 

process rights. See Pet. m-22. The court of appeal did not find that the trial court abused its 

discretion in its decision to admit the evidence, and it is not my role to evaluate the admissibility 

of the evidence under California law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (noting that a 

federal habeas court does not inquire into whether evidence was improperly admitted pursuant to 

state law). There were permissible inferences for a jury to draw from the evidence, and Elizalde

does not argue that its admission violated a constitutional guarantee or otherwise rendered his trial 

fundamentally unfair. This claim fails. 

D. Jury Instructions

Elizalde next argues that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury regarding (i) 

accomplice testimony and (ii) use of Elizalde’s prior arrest.

“[T]he fact that the instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for 

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habeas relief.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71–72; see also Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 744 (9th Cir. 

1995) (“The fact that a jury instruction is inadequate by Ninth Circuit direct appeal standards does 

not mean a petitioner who relies on such an inadequacy will be entitled to habeas relief from a 

state court conviction.”). Instead, the question is “‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so 

infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 

(citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (“[I]t must be established not merely that the 

instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even ‘universally condemned,’ but that it violated some 

[constitutional] right.”). The challenged instruction should be viewed in the context of the 

remaining instructions as well as the entire trial. See id. 

Elizalde argues that the court erred in instructing the jury on CALJIC No. 3.13 because it 

incorrectly allowed the jury to rely on Ruelas’s Myspace post as corroboration. Pet. m-26. His 

claim fails. It is based entirely in state law, and any state law error is not the subject of habeas 

review unless it implicates due process. See Laboa, 224 F.3d at 979 (noting that neither the 

Constitution nor federal law usually requires corroboration for accomplice testimony). Due 

process is implicated in the context of jury instructions where they have the effect of lowering the 

burden on the prosecution to obtain a conviction, which was not the case here. See Sullivan v. 

Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–278 (1993) (finding that the failure to instruct correctly the 

reasonable doubt standard was constitutional error); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 

(1989) (holding that instructions on presumptions related to elements of the crime relieved the 

government of its burden of proof). The court of appeal considered this claim and found not only 

that it was procedurally defaulted because of Elizalde’s failure to object to the instruction at trial, 

but also that the instruction could not have been construed in the problematic way that Elizalde 

suggested. See Opn. 65–66. He presents no arguments to show that this determination was 

objectively unreasonable. 

Elizalde next argues that the trial court violated his due process rights by instructing the 

jury that they could use his 2007 drug arrest as evidence to prove his motive, intent, and 

participation in a conspiracy. Pet. m-26–27. As noted by the court of appeal, the trial court 

warned the jury that they could use the evidence for a limited purpose: 

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The court warned the jury that the evidence was “not admissible to 

suggest [that] Mr. Elizalde . . . has a bad character or a propensity to 

commit crimes, buy only on the predicate act elements of the gang 

charge and the gang enhancements . . . .” At the end of the trial, the 

court instructed the jury on the use of evidence that was admitted for 

a limited purpose (CALJIC No. 2.09 10) and evidence of other crimes 

(CALJIC No. 2.50).

Opn. 67. Elizalde argues that when the court instructed the jury as to the more general CALJIC 

No. 2.50, it effectively overrode the limiting instruction and told the jury they could use the 2007 

arrest as substantive corroboration. Pet. m-27. 

I agree with the government that the court of appeal effectively rejected this claim. It fails 

in any event. Jury instructions based in state law only give rise to habeas relief in the limited 

circumstances of a due process violation, and individual instructions are not to be viewed in 

isolation. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71–72. “In evaluating the instructions, we do not engage in a 

technical parsing of this language of the instructions, but instead approach the instructions in the 

same way that the jury would—with a ‘commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light 

of all that has taken place at the trial.’” Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993). Viewing the 

instructions together, the jury would have understood that they should apply the more general 

instruction where the specific one did not apply. For all of these reasons, Elizalde has not shown 

that he is entitled to habeas relief. 

II. ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Elizalde argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel based on two errors by 

counsel and because of a change in the court’s jury instructions. 

To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that (i) his 

counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and (ii) this deficient performance prejudiced his 

defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s performance was 

deficient if it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” as measured under “prevailing 

professional norms.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). It is the petitioner’s burden to 

show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 

guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. There is “a 

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strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (internal quotations 

omitted). To establish prejudice, the petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (internal quotations omitted). The 

question is whether the deficient performance resulted in a probability of error “sufficient to 

undermine confidence in the outcome” of the trial. Id. (internal quotations omitted). “That 

requires a substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a different result.” Id. (internal 

quotations omitted). 

Elizalde argues that defense counsel failed to (i) request redaction of the phone call 

between Molina and his mother and (ii) object to irrelevant and prejudicial evidence of uncharged 

crimes. Pet. m-29–33. The court of appeal considered and rejected Elizalde’s claims under 

Strickland. Opn. 69–70. It determined that counsel was not deficient because the evidence 

Elizalde says counsel failed to object to was admissible. Id. It held that the phone calls were 

admissible because Elizalde’s statements were a party admission and Molina’s mother’s 

statements were excited utterances.5 Modification of Order (“Modif.”) [Dkt. No. 35–8] 185. The 

evidence of uncharged acts of violence were admissible because they were relevant to Elizalde’s 

participation and role in the conspiracy, and they were not overly prejudicial because of other

evidence of other similar conduct by Elizalde. Opn. 69–70. Accordingly, the court determined 

that an objection to the evidence would have been futile. The question I must answer on habeas 

review is whether that determination was objectively unreasonable. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

105 (“The standards created by Strickland and [AEDPA] are both highly deferential, and when the 

two apply in tandem, review is doubly so.”) (internal quotations omitted). It was not. 

Elizalde also claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because a change in 

the court’s jury instructions rendered his counsel’s legal strategy ineffective. Pet. m-27–29. The 

court initially indicated that evidence of Elizalde’s 2007 drug arrest would be used only as a 

 

5

In its modification, the appellate court mistakenly referred to Mota instead of Molina

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predicate offense, but later allowed it to be used as evidence of his participation in the conspiracy. 

Id. at m-28. In reliance on the earlier ruling, counsel conceded that Elizalde was a drug dealer but 

argued that he was not the VFL shot-caller. Id. When the instruction changed, this strategy 

effectively sealed Elizalde’s fate. Id. The government counters that “[Elizalde] had no choice but 

to concede the prior drug crime” because there was ample evidence to demonstrate the arrest. 

Answer 57. 

As noted above, the jury would not have understood the court’s instructions as indicating 

that the 2007 drug arrest could be used as substantive evidence of the conspiracy. In addition, 

Elizalde’s assertion that his counsel would have adopted a different strategy but for the court’s 

jury instruction is speculative, and the evidence in the record about the drug arrest additionally 

undermines his argument. Even assuming he is correct, he cites no authority showing that 

potentially conflicting jury instructions rise to the level of a structural error, which arises when 

there is an error as great as a complete denial of the right to counsel. See United States v. Cronic, 

466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (noting that circumstances such as a complete denial are “so likely to 

prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified”). 

These claims are denied. 

III. CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERROR

Finally, Elizalde argues that even if none of the alleged errors violated due process on its 

own, the cumulative effect was a denial of due process. Pet. m-33. 

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, 

the cumulative effect of several errors may prejudice a defendant to the extent that his conviction 

must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that 

multiple constitutional errors “undermine[d] every important element of proof offered by the 

prosecution” and “left [the court] with the unambiguous conviction that the verdict in this case 

was not the result of a fair trial.”). “[C]umulative error warrants habeas relief only where the 

errors have ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 

process.’” Parle v. Runnels, 505 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The court of appeal rejected Elizalde’s cumulative error claim. The only error was related 

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to Mota’s booking statement, and the court determined that “along with being the sole error in this 

case, it was harmless.” Opn. 70. Elizalde makes no arguments showing that this determination 

was objectively unreasonable. This claim is denied. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Elizalde’s petition lacks merit. It is DENIED. A certificate of 

appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find it debatable whether the petition 

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right” or whether the procedural rulings herein 

are correct. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Elizalde may seek a certificate of 

appealability from the Ninth Circuit.

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2019

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

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