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Parties Involved:
Margie Izard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILE.D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UnitOO States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MARGIE IZARD, as personal 

representative of the Estate 

of ROGER KEITH GILLIN, and 

as guardian of RYAN KEITH 

GILLIN, a minor, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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OCT 1 i 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6211 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV 88-377-A) 

Elizabeth Bradford Dunning of Holloway, Dobson, Hudson & Bachman, 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Gary C. Bachman and John D. Sullivan of 

Holloway, Dobson, Hudson & Bachman, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on 

the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Vicki Zemp Behenna, Assistant United States Attorney for the 

Western District of Oklahoma (Robert E. Mydans, United States 

Attorney, and Robert A. Bradford, Assistant United States 

Attorney, Western District of Oklahoma, with her on the brief), 

for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, LOGAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Chief Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6211 Document: 01019291030 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff Margie Izard, as personal representative of the 

estate of Roger Keith Gillin (decedent) and as guardian of Ryan 

Keith Gillin, a minor child of decedent, brought this action under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (FTCA), against 

the United States. The sole issue presented on appeal is whether 

the United States was decedent's statutory employer under the 

Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85 § 1, et 

~' which is an exclusive remedy. The district court concluded 

that the United States was the statutory employer and granted 

summary judgment for the United States. Izard v. United States, 

711 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (W.O. Okla. 1989). 

This court reviews a grant of summary judgment under the same 

standard applied by the trial court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. 

Auto. Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (lOth Cir. 1988). Summary 

judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if . there is no genuine 

issue as to any material fact a~d . . . the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

The factual record must be viewed in the light most favorable to 

the party opposing summary judgment. Gray v. Phillips Petroleum 

Co., 858 F.2d 610, 613 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

The facts pertinent 

certain particulars, are 

decedent suffered fatal 

to this appeal, while controverted in 

essentially undisputed. Briefly, 

injuries as a result of a fall from a 

ladder provided by the United States at Tinker Air Force Base in 

Oklahoma. At the time of his death, decedent was employed by 

Frost & Keeling Associates, Inc. The United States, acting 

through the Department of the Air Force, had contracted with Frost 

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Appellate Case: 89-6211 Document: 01019291030 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 2 
& Keeling to install a 1,000-ton hydraulic press to be used in 

connection with the repair, maintenance, modification, and 

reclamation of the sheet metal components of aircraft. Decedent 

fell from the ladder while assisting in the installation of the 

press. Plaintiff's position is that the United States' negligent 

and defective design of the ladder was the proximate cause of 

decedent's death. 

Under the FTCA, the United States is liable only as a private 

person would be liable in accordance with the law of the place 

where the act or omission occurred. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). 

Under Oklahoma law, the principal for whom a contractor is 

performing work is immune from tort liability for injuries 

suffered by the contractor's employees in the course of that work, 

if the work performed by the contractor was "necessary and 

integral" to the principal's operations. Murphy v. Chickasha 

Mobile Homes, Inc., 611 P.2d 243, 244-45 (Okla. 1980). 

Accordingly, the principal is the statutory employer of the 

injured employees and is liable to the injured employees only 

under the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act. Id. Tasks 

performed by a contractor are a "necessary and integral" part of a 

principal's operation when they "[1] are directly associated with 

the day-to-day activity carried on by the [principal's] line of 

trade, industry or business or [2] would customarily be done in 

that line of business." Id. at 248. 

To assist in implementing this two-part standard, the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court, while this appeal was pending, adopted a 

three-level analysis crafted by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 

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Appellate Case: 89-6211 Document: 01019291030 Date Filed: 10/11/1991 Page: 3 
Berry v. Holston Well Serv., Inc., 488 So. 2d 934 (La. 1986). See 

Bradley v. Clark, 804 P.2d 425, 427-28 (Okla. 1990). Under the 

Louisiana approach, in order to determine whether a principal is a 

statutory employer of a contractor's employees, a court must first 

inquire whether the contract work is specialized or 

nonspecialized. Id. at 428 n.10 (citing Berry, 488 So. 2d at 937-

39 and Rowe v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 226 (La. 

1985)). This inquiry takes into consideration whether the level 

of skill, training, and experience required to perform the work at 

issue is not ordinarily possessed by workers outside the contract 

field. Id. If the contract work is specialized per se, it is 

not, as a matter of law, part of the principal's trade, business, 

or occupation. Id. 

If the contract work is not specialized per se, the court 

must then compare the contract work with the principal's trade, 

business, or occupation to determine whether the contract work 

could be considered a part thereof. Id. Finally, the court must 

inquire whether the principal was actually engaged at the time of 

the injury in the trade, business, or occupation of the hired 

contractor. Id. 

In this case, the district court applied the Oklahoma law 

which predated Bradley and concluded that the United States was 

decedent's statutory employer simply because the work performed by 

Frost & Keeling "was a necessary and integral part of [the United 

States'] day-to-day business operations." Izard, 711 F. Supp. at 

1047. At oral argument, neither side was aware of Bradley. The 

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threshold question presented is whether Bradley should apply 

retroactively here. 

When applying state law, this court must apply a state 

supreme court's most recent statement of state law. Robinson v. 

Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 803 F.2d 572, 574 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

Bradley is the Oklahoma Supreme Court's most recent statement 

concerning that state's statutory employer defense. Our task is 

to predict whether the Oklahoma Supreme Court would apply Bradley 

retroactively. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d 

352, 354 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1320 (1990). 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court provided no obvious indication in 

Bradley whether it intended the decision to be applied 

retroactively. Because Bradley does not expressly require 

retroactive application beyond that case, Oklahoma law must be 

examined for further guidance. Under Oklahoma law, the general 

rule is that an appellate court must apply the law in effect at 

the time it renders its decision. Griggs v. Oklahoma ex rel. 

Okla. Dep't of Transp., 702 P.2d 1017, 1022 n.21 (Okla. 1985). 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the three factors from 

Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), for determining when 

retroactivity of a decision should be restricted in a noncriminal 

case involving nonconstitutional questions: 

(1) [A]t the threshold, the [new] decision must 

establish a new principle of law, either by overruling 

clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, 

or on an issue of first impression whose decision is not 

clearly foreshadowed; (2) the court must weigh the 

merits and demerits of applying the rule retroactively 

by considering the rule's prior history, its purpose and 

effect, and whether retroactivity will further or retard 

its operation; and (3) the court must consider the 

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inequity flowing from retroactive application, including 

unfairness and hardship to the parties. 

Griggs, 702 P.2d at 1020. 

Applying these factors to this appeal, none of them preclude 

retroactive application of Bradley. First of all, Bradley does 

not even meet the threshold test for nonretroactive application, 

i.e., establishment of a new principle of law. Bradley did not 

overrule clear past precedent--it did not specifically reverse any 

prior case--nor did Bradley decide an issue of first impression. 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court, instead, stated in Bradley that the 

approach adopted from Louisiana was "harmonious with our own 

institutional design fashioned [earlier] in Murphy." Bradley, 804 

P.2d at 428. Because Bradley is more a clarification of rather 

than a change in Oklahoma law, retroactivity is not an issue. 

Even if Bradley were interpreted as establishing new law, 

retroactive application would still be proper under the other 

prongs of Chevron. The purpose of Bradley is to narrow the scope 

of tort immunity available to the hirers of contractors. This 

purpose would obviously be furthered by retroactive application of 

Bradley. Similarly, retroactive application of Bradley would not 

necessarily produce an inequitable result in this case. Bradley's 

stringent definition of a statutory employer works only against 

the United States, and reversal or vacatur of the district court's 

decision would not preclude a judgment in favor of the United 

States on the basis of Bradley's approach to the statutory 

employer defense after further development of the issue at trial 

or even by further summary judgment evidence. 

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Because we conclude that Bradley is applicable to this case, 

the next question is who is the principal, i.e., to what entity do 

we apply Bradley's statutory employer test? Plaintiff insists 

that the Accessory Division at Tinker, where the hydraulic press 

was installed and is used, should be treated as the principal, and 

we should focus on that organization's regular business. 

According to plaintiff, the evidence in the record indicates that 

the installation of heavy equipment like a 1,000-ton hydraulic 

press was not within the realm of activities performed by the 

Accessory Division. The United States, on the other hand, 

contends that the Plant Management Division at Tinker is the 

principal, and the installation of heavy equipment is within the 

realm of that organization's activities. In support of its 

position, the United States cites an Air Force regulation which 

charges the Plant Management Division with the responsibility of 

installing industrial production equipment and maintaining a work 

force capable of accomplishing such installation. See Defendant's 

Exhibit F to Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Vol. I., Doc. 34). 

Both plaintiff and the United States are, for lack of a 

better description, aiming too low. Where, as here, the United 

States claims statutory employer status, the proper focus is on 

the agency or department of the United States which contracted for 

the work. See, e.g., Rivera v. United States Army Corps of 

Eng'rs, 891 F.2d 567, 568 (5th Cir. 1990) (statutory employer 

defense in FTCA cases depends on "the missions provided by law of 

the governmental agency in question"); Pendley v. United States, 

856 F.2d 699, 702 (4th Cir. 1988)(analyzing the Department of the 

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Air Force's status as statutory employer), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 

1005 (1989); Griffin v. United States, 644 F.2d 846, 848 (lOth 

Cir. 1981)(analyzing General Services Administration's status as a 

statutory employer); Nofsinger v. United States, 727 F. Supp. 586, 

588 (D. Kan. 1989) (analyzing the Department of the Army's status 

as a statutory employer). In this case, therefore, the principal 

is the Department of the Air Force. Furthermore, we are not 

required to splinter the Department of the Air Force's activities 

into discrete geographical regions. Our focus is on the 

connection between the vast activities of the Department of the 

Air Force at all of its facilities, including Tinker, and the work 

Frost & Keeling contracted to perform. See, e.g., Mozeke v. 

International Paper Co., 856 F.2d 722, 727-28 (5th Cir. 1988) 

("the plain language of Berry . requires that we look at the 

activities of the [principal] as a whole" rather than the 

principal's activities at a particular facility). 

Treating the Department of the Air Force as the principal, 

the final question is whether the record, at this juncture, 

permits a judgment in favor of the United States as a matter of 

law under Bradley's definition of a statutory employer. In our 

view, the record does not. With respect to the first prong of the 

Bradley analysis, i.e., whether the contract work is specialized 

or nonspecialized, it is undisputed in the record that employees 

of the Department of the Air Force, indeed those at Tinker, were 

fully capable of performing the work Frost & Keeling was hired to 

perform. See Defendant's Exhibit A to Motion for Summary Judgment 

at p. 3 (Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 34). Therefore, the work performed by 

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Frost & Keeling was not specialized per se. See Mozeke, 856 F.2d 

at 725 (under Berry, work is not specialized per se when 

principal's own employees are capable of performing the contract 

work). 

However, with respect to the second and third prongs of the 

Bradley analysis, the record is not sufficiently developed to 

permit resolution of the pertinent questions. As indicated above, 

the second stage of the Bradley analysis requires a comparison of 

the principal's trade, business, or occupation with the contract 

work to determine if the latter can be considered part of the 

principal's trade, business, or occupation. Bradley, 804 P.2d at 

428 n.lO. The overriding question at this stage of the analysis 

is "whether [the contract work] is, in that business, normally 

carried on through employees rather than independent contractors." 

Id. (quoting Berry, 488 So. 2d at 938) (emphasis in original). 

The third level of the analysis under Bradley asks whether the 

principal, at the time of the injury, was engaged in the business 

or occupation of the hired contractor. Id. 

In this case, the record contains information about the 

functions of the Accessory Division and the Plant Management 

Division at Tinker. Specifically, the United States submitted a 

sworn declaration from the chief and deputy chief of the Plant 

Management Division which states in part that the "[i]nstallation 

of industrial production equipment, such as the 1,000-ton 

hydraulic press installed by Frost & Keeling Associates, Inc., is 

a task customarily carried out by the Plant Management Division 

{MAD), either by its own installation branch or through the medium 

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of an independent contractor such as Frost and Keeling Associates,· 

Inc." See Exhibit A to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 

p. 8 (Rec. Vol. I, Doc. 34). This statement and the remainder of 

the record, however, do not provide any information regarding 

whether employees of the Department of the Air Force at Tinker, or 

elsewhere, normally installed 1,000-ton hydraulic presses rather 

than independent contractors. Nor does the record contain any 

information regarding whether the Department of the Air Force at 

Tinker, or elsewhere, was actually engaged in work like the 

installation of a 1,000-ton hydraulic press at the time decedent 

was fatally injured. 

The United States, as the party asserting the statutory 

employer defense, bears the burden under Bradley of establishing 

that employees of the Department of the Air Force normally 

performed and, at the time of decedent's fall, actually were 

performing the work Frost & Keeling was hired to perform. 

Bradley, 804 P.2d at 427. Obviously, the United States, at the 

time it moved for summary judgment, was unaware that its status as 

a statutory employer depended on this information. In any event, 

the absence of such information in the record before us presents 

unresolved genuine issues of material fact, and precludes an 

affirmance of the summary judgment entered in favor of the United 

States. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, 

and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings. As discussed 

above, our determination does not necessarily preclude a judgment 

in favor of the United States on the basis of the statutory 

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employer defense after further development of the record. · We 

speak only to the record as it is now before us. 

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