Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01793/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01793-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Barker
Plaintiff
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
Defendant
Mark Green
Defendant
State of California
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIAM BARKER,

Plaintiff,

v.

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS AND 

REHABILITATION, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:13-cv-1793 KJN P

ORDER &

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner, who is represented by counsel in this action. Plaintiff proceeds 

on his First Amended Complaint, in which he raises claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title 

II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 

California state law. 

 Presently before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth 

below, the undersigned recommends that the motion to dismiss be granted in part, and that 

plaintiff be denied leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.

I. Background

A. Procedural History

This case proceeds on plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC,” ECF No. 9), against 

defendants State of California, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 

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(“CDCR”), and Mark Green. The FAC includes claims pursuant to Title II of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 

1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and state law claims under the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. 

Civ. Code §§ 51 et seq. (“Unruh Act”), and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code 

§§ 54.1 et seq. (“CDPA”) (all alleged against defendants CDCR and the State of California), and 

an Eighth Amendment claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (alleged against defendant Green).

On September 11, 2014, the court, after screening the FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A, issued an order directing service on defendants State of California, CDCR, and Green. 

(ECF No. 14.)

Now pending before the court is defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint on

the following grounds:

 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against 

CDCR and the State of California for failure to state a claim.

 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims against CDCR and the 

State of California as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity

 Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against defendant 

Green in his official capacity as barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

(Motion, ECF No. 19.) 

B. Factual Allegations

In the operative First Amended Complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows.

At all pertinent times, plaintiff was an inmate at California Medical Facility (“CMF”) in 

Vacaville, California. (FAC, ECF No. 9-1 at 2.)

Plaintiff is confined to a wheelchair, and has been designated “DPW” under the remedial 

plan ordered by the court in Armstrong v. Brown, No. C 94–2307 CW (N.D. Cal.). As a result of 

this designation, plaintiff is prescribed a wheelchair at all times, and requires wheelchairaccessible housing and paths of travel. (Id. at 2.)

Defendant Mark Green is a Material and Stores Supervisor I at CMF, who is allegedly 

responsible for issuing wheelchairs to CMF inmates. (Id. at 2.)

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On May 23, 2012, plaintiff purchased a new wheelchair (“Initial Wheelchair”) from CMF. 

The Initial Wheelchair was equipped with a regular frame and a 20-inch wide seat. (Id. at 3.)

In the course of testing the Initial Wheelchair, plaintiff found that it responded as if it had 

a bent axle. According to plaintiff, he therefore made several informal requests for a heavy-duty 

wheelchair, as he suspected that he weighed too much to safely use a regular wheelchair. (Id. at 

3, 4.) Plaintiff describes a heavy-duty wheelchair as having “a higher weight capacity than a 

regular wheelchair.” He adds that the “rear wheels [of a heavy-duty wheelchair] have a dual axel 

whereas a regular wheelchair has a single axel.” (Id. at 3.) 

On June 18, 2012, plaintiff made a formal request for a heavy-duty wheelchair. Plaintiff 

alleges that, in support of his request, he indicated that his weight exceeded the weight capacity of 

the Initial Wheelchair, that the wheels of the Initial Wheelchair did not roll properly, that portions 

of the Initial Wheelchair had become torn after less than one month of use, and that the Initial 

Wheelchair’s right rear wheel rolled as though its axel was bent. (Id.) 

On October 12, 2012, nearly four months later, defendant Green issued plaintiff a 

replacement wheelchair with a 22-inch-wide seat (“Replacement Wheelchair”). Plaintiff alleges 

that he immediately told Green that the Replacement Wheelchair was too large and that he

(plaintiff) required a wheelchair with a seat that was only 20 inches wide. Plaintiff alleges on 

information and belief that Green knew that a wheelchair with a 22-inch wide seat, unlike a 

wheelchair with a 20-inch wide seat, would be too wide to pass through all doorways at CMF. 

Plaintiff also alleges on information and belief that defendant Green knew that plaintiff is 

designated DPW and therefore requires a wheelchair that can pass through all doorways at CMF. 

(Id. at 4.)

According to plaintiff, as a result of being issued the Replacement Wheelchair, i.e., a

wheelchair that was too large to pass through all doorways at CMF, he was unable to access the 

B-1 eye clinic, as well as religious services. (Id. at 4-5.)

On October 25, 2012, plaintiff filed a Reasonable Modification or Accommodation 

Request Form, requesting a wheelchair with a 20-inch seat. On November 5, 2012, defendant 

Green responded by again providing plaintiff with the Initial Wheelchair. Plaintiff alleges that, 

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despite pointing out to Green that he was being provided with the same wheelchair he had 

previously received, he was not given a different wheelchair. (Id. at 5.)

According to plaintiff, on November 19, 2012, the Initial Wheelchair “failed” by veering 

abruptly to the left and almost rolling over. Plaintiff alleges that his hand became lodged in the 

wheel, causing him to sustain injuries which included, but were not limited to, “a bony avulsion 

of the ulnar collateral ligament of the left thumb and comminuted fracture of the proximal 

phalanx of the left thumb with volar displacement of the proximal phalanx . . . .” Plaintiff 

consequently required surgery under general anesthesia at San Joaquin General Hospital to repair 

the damage. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, and costs. (Id. at 

10.)

III. Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1provides for motions to dismiss for 

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In 

considering a motion to dismiss pursuant Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true the 

allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the 

pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 

(1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1999). Still, to survive 

dismissal for failure to state a claim, a pro se complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007). In other words, 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 

statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim 

upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678. Attachments to a complaint are considered to be part of the complaint for purposes 

 

1 Hereinafter, the term “Rule” refers to the applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.

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of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Reiner & Co., 

896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted unless it appears 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims which would 

entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In general, pro se 

pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The court has an obligation to construe such pleadings liberally. Bretz 

v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). However, the court’s liberal 

interpretation of a pro se complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not 

pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

IV. Analysis

A. Has plaintiff stated a claim against the State of California or CDCR under Title II of 

the ADA and/or under the Rehabilitation Act?

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims against CDCR and the State of California 

under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Defendants argue: “Plaintiff 

does not allege any facts in his complaint against the State or CDCR, and Plaintiff has alleged no 

nexus between his allegations against Green and his conclusory allegation that the State and 

CDCR discriminated against him solely based on his disability.” (Motion, ECF No. 19 at 5.)

Plaintiff counters that “the court already said the Amended Complaint states a potentially 

cognizable claim for relief against the Defendants pursuant to the ADA, [the Rehabilitation Act], 

and parallel state laws.”

2

(Opposition, ECF No. 20 at 4.)

Plaintiff misconstrues the nature of the preliminary screening called for by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A. A court’s determination, upon screening, that a complaint may state cognizable claims 

does not preclude a defendant from subsequently bringing a motion to dismiss one or more of 

 

2

Plaintiff unhelpfully justifies his opposition by adding, “This isn’t some frivolous lawsuit filed 

by a drugged out meth head with nothing better to do in Administrative Segregation than file 

lawsuits all day. This Amended Complaint was drafted by a lawyer with fourteen years of 

experience, who has filed thousands of lawsuits, and knows what he’s doing.” (ECF No. 20 at 4.) 

For reasons that do not bear mention, the undersigned does not rely on this argument herein.

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those claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Norsworthy v. Beard, __ F.3d 

__, 2015 WL 1478264 at *3 n. 4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2015) (“The issuance of a screening order 

under the Prison Litigation Reform Act finding that [plaintiff] has stated a cognizable claim does 

not foreclose Defendants from moving to dismiss the complaint.”); Teahan v. Wilhelm, 481 

F.Supp.2d 1115, 1119 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (“[T]he sua sponte screening and dismissal procedure is 

cumulative of, not a substitute for, any subsequent Rule 12(b)(6) motion that the defendant may 

choose to bring.”); James v. Perez, No. No. 2:08–CV–01857–RRC, 2012 WL 5387676 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 1, 2012) (“To adopt [plaintiff]’s position [and hold that screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

precludes defendants from subsequently filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion] would deprive 

[d]efendants of the basic procedural right to challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings.”). It is for 

this reason that the undersigned noted, in the earlier screening order, that the FAC “states a 

potentially cognizable claim for relief against defendants CDCR and the State of California 

pursuant to the ADA, [Rehabilitation Act], and the alleged state law claims, and against defendant 

Green pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged Eighth Amendment violation.” (ECF No. 14

at 1-2) (emphasis added). Plaintiff cannot rely solely on the court’s screening as a basis for 

overcoming a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability, as follows: “[N]o 

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from 

participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In order to state a 

claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified 

to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s 

services, programs, or activities; (3) he was either excluded from 

participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, 

programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by 

the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or 

discrimination was by reason of [his] disability.

Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011, 1021 (9th Cir. 2010).

“Title II of the ADA was expressly modeled after [Section] 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act.” Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2001). In order to state a claim 

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under Section 504, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) he is an individual with a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified 

to receive the benefit; (3) he was denied the benefits of the program 

solely by reason of his disability; and (4) the program receives 

federal financial assistance.

Id. In general, a complaint that properly states a claim under Title II of the ADA also states a 

claim under Section 504. See Zukle v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 n. 11 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“[C]ourts have applied the same analysis to claims brought under both statutes”); 

Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Congress has directed that the ADA 

and [Rehabilitation Act] be construed consistently.”).

Plaintiff has satisfactorily pled claims under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the 

ADA against CDCR and the State of California. The Ninth Circuit has held that a prison inmate 

may state claims under both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA based on allegations “that [the 

inmate] was improperly excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of, a prison 

service, program, or activity on the basis of his physical handicap.” Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 

F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453-56 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

The Ninth Circuit has also held that “[w]hen a plaintiff brings a direct suit under either [the 

Rehabilitation Act] or Title II of the ADA against a municipality . . . the public entity is liable for 

the vicarious acts of its employees.” Duvall, 260 F.3d at 1141. Subsequent courts have extended

this holding to other types of public entities, including CDCR. See, e.g., Orr v. Cal. Highway 

Patrol, No. No. 2:14–585 WBS EFB, 2015 WL 848553 at *16 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2015) (“Public 

entities are vicariously liable for the acts of their employees under both acts.”); Bohnert v. 

Mitchell, No. CV–08–2303–PHX–LOA, 2010 WL 4269569 at *6 (D. Ariz. Oct. 26, 2010) (“The 

State Defendants acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has ruled that public entities can be held

vicariously liable if their employees discriminate against disabled persons.”) (internal quotation 

omitted); Brown v. CDC, No. 1:04-cv-5215-LJO-DLB, 2008 WL 681840 at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

11, 2008) (“[T]heir employer, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, is also a 

defendant and is liable under Title II as a public entity for the discriminatory acts of its 

employees.”). 

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Defendants have provided no rationale for the court to deviate from these holdings and to 

find that CDCR – and by extension, the State of California, of which CDCR is an agency –

cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of defendant Green, who, according to the FAC, is a

CMF employee. (ECF No. 9-1 at 2.) Plaintiff has alleged that he requires a wheelchair at all 

times, and that he was excluded from an eye clinic and religious services at CMF because the 

wheelchair Green issued him would not allow him access to the pertinent locations. These 

allegations are sufficient to state a claim for vicarious liability under Title II of the ADA and 

Section 504 against the State of California and CDCR. Defendants’ argument that plaintiff has 

failed to specifically allege discriminatory intent on the part of the State of California and/or 

CDCR (Motion, ECF No. 19-1 at 7-8) is also unavailing due to vicarious liability.

Defendants next argue for dismissal because “[p]laintiff does not have the right to sue for 

the failure to provide him with a wheelchair that would allow him to access all of CMF’s services 

under the ADA or [the Rehabilitation Act].” (ECF No. 19-1 at 6.) In support, defendants point to 

a regulation, promulgated by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the ADA 

and the Rehabilitation Act, which provides that “[t]his part does not require a public entity to 

provide to individuals with disabilities personal devices, such as wheelchairs” 28 CFR § 35.135 

(2015).

Defendants’ argument does not appear to be well-founded. The DOJ has issued a 

technical assistance manual that provides guidance in complying with ADA regulations. Per the 

Ninth Circuit, “The guidance provided in the technical assistance manual is an interpretation of 

the DOJ’s regulation, and, as such, is entitled to significant weight as to the meaning of the 

regulation.” Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861, 875-76 

(9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted). The manual provides, in a section addressing the 

regulation in question, that:

A public entity is not required to provide individuals with 

disabilities with personal or individually prescribed devices, such as 

wheelchairs, prescription eyeglasses, or hearing aids, or to provide 

services of a personal nature, such as assistance in eating, toileting, 

or dressing. Of course, if personal services or devices are 

customarily provided to the individuals served by a public 

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entity, such as a hospital or nursing home, then these personal 

services should also be provided to individuals with disabilities. 

Americans with Disabilities Act Title II Technical Assistance Manual, § II-3.6200, available at

http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ada/taman2.html (emphasis added). The situation presented in 

California prisons is analogous to the highlighted provision. CDCR and the State of California 

have undertaken the provision of wheelchairs to disabled inmates: the court-ordered remedial 

plan in Armstrong requires CDCR, among other things, “to ensure that prisoners and parolees 

with disabilities . . . . are able to obtain and keep necessary assistive devices,” Armstrong v. 

Brown, 857 F. Supp. 2d 919, 925 (N.D. Cal. 2012), including wheelchairs. As defendants CDCR 

and the State of California have undertaken the provision of wheelchairs, it would appear that the 

regulation cited by defendants cannot insulate defendants CDCR and State of California from 

liability in the instant lawsuit.

Defendants next argue that plaintiff “has not alleged facts that would demonstrate the 

State and CDCR discriminated against him solely on the basis of his disability . . . but, at most, 

that the treatment he received for his disability – the wheelchair – was inadequate. . . . [T]his 

does not give rise to an ADA or [Section 504] claim.” (ECF No. 19-1 at 6.) Defendants 

misconstrue the substance of plaintiff’s claim, which is that defendants failed to make services, 

programs, and activities at CMF accessible to him by issuing him improper wheelchairs. Both the 

Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA prohibit CDCR and the State of California from 

denying inmates the benefits of services, programs, and activities solely by reason of their 

disabilities. See Penn. Dep’t of Corr., 524 U.S. 206 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 12132 

applies to state prisons); Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F. 3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that both 

42 U.S.C § 12132 and the Rehabilitation Act apply to state prisons), cert. denied, Wilson v. 

Armstrong, 524 U.S. 937 (1998). Given that plaintiff has a qualifying disability, he must be 

provided access to the services, programs, and activities available to non-disabled inmates at 

CMF; the wheelchair is merely an instrumentality for provision of access, and such, the fact that 

plaintiff was given a wheelchair is not dispositive of liability. Consequently, defendants’ citation 

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to Simmons, 609 F.3d at 1011, is inapt. That case concerns a minor who suffered from 

depression and committed suicide while in jail. The decedent’s parents sued jail authorities for, 

among other things, violating the ADA by allegedly depriving the decedent of programs or 

activities to treat his depression. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that “[t]he ADA prohibits 

discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.” Id. at 1022. The 

latter sentence is quoted, and relied upon, by defendants in their moving papers. The distinction 

with the instant case is evident. Plaintiff herein sues because he has been deprived of access to 

existing services, programs, and activities at CMF, not because defendants have failed to take 

affirmative steps to treat his disability. Again, the wheelchair in question is not a treatment, but 

per the Armstrong court, an “assistive device,” 857 F. Supp. 2d at 925, i.e., a means to facilitate 

plaintiff’s participation in prison life on a nondiscriminatory basis. Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss on this ground must therefore be denied.

Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims ought to be 

dismissed because plaintiff has failed to allege systemic discrimination against disabled inmates 

on the part of CDCR and/or the State of California. This argument ignores the numerous 

individual claims brought by prisoners under the ADA and/or the Rehabilitation Act that have 

survived dismissal motions. See, e.g., Yeskey, 524 U.S. at 206 (reversing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 

on the grounds that the plaintiff could state a claim under ADA for being excluded from program 

run by state prison); Becker v. Oregon, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Or. 2001) (denying motion to 

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that plaintiff, a below-the-knee amputee, could state a 

claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act for prison’s failure to provide accessible 

showers). Defendants’ citation to Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487 (10th 

Cir. 1992), is unpersuasive. The sentence from that opinion which defendants quote – “If others 

with the same handicap do not suffer the discrimination, then the discrimination does not result 

solely by reason of the handicap,” id. at 1493 (internal quotation omitted) – addresses the Johnson

plaintiffs’ contention that their children were discriminated against both because of their 

disabilities and their low socioeconomic status. The Tenth Circuit disagreed and dismissed the 

plaintiffs’ claims under Section 504, finding that “[t]he word solely provides the key: the 

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discrimination must result from the handicap and from the handicap alone.” Id. (emphasis in

original). In the instant case, plaintiff alleges ADA and Section 504 violations solely because of 

his disability; as plaintiff does not simultaneously allege another basis for discrimination beyond 

disability, Johnson’s holding is irrelevant to this case.

Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s 

claims against CDCR and the State of California under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act 

should be denied.

B. Are the State of California and CDCR entitled to sovereign immunity as to plaintiff’s 

state law claims?

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s claims under the Unruh Act and the CDPA, 

contending that they are barred on grounds of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 

Amendment.

Plaintiff counters that, (i) because Congress explicitly abrogated state sovereign 

immunity in enacting the ADA, and (ii) because the California legislature explicitly incorporated 

the ADA into the Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f), and the CDPA, Cal. Civ. Code § 54.1(d),3

therefore (iii) California consented to waive sovereign immunity for claims under these statutes to 

the extent that such claims are based on alleged ADA violations. (Opposition, ECF No. 20 at 10.) 

The courts that have considered plaintiff’s argument have rejected it. See, e.g., 

Hutchinson v. Cal. Dep’t Corr. and Rehab., No. 2:13-cv-00620-MCE-AC, 2013 WL 5569984 at 

*3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2013) (“Any consent to suit must be ‘unequivocal,’ and Plaintiff does not 

explain how mandating that the baseline substantive standards under the Unruh Act and the 

CDPA comport with the ADA unequivocally demonstrates that the State of California intended to 

subject itself to all suits brought under those provisions.”); Myers v. Cal. Dep’t of Rehab.,

No. 2:12–cv–00497–GEB–GGH, 2012 WL 3529784 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2012) (“[Plaintiff] 

fails to demonstrate that California made a ‘clear declaration’ in the Unruh Act [or CDPA] of an 

 

3

Plaintiff argues that the adoption-by-incorporation of the ADA into these statutes ensured that 

California laws regarding disabled persons’ civil rights would not be preempted by the ADA. 

(Opposition, ECF No. 20 at 7-10.)

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intent to waive its sovereign immunity concerning any of these statutes. Therefore, this portion of 

[defendant]’s dismissal motion is GRANTED.”); McColm v. Marin Cnty., No. 01-cv-1108-SI, 

2002 WL 243627 (N.D. Cal. Feb 14, 2002) (invoking Eleventh Amendment immunity as basis 

for dismissing disabled plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim). See also Munson v. California, No. 2:09-cv0478-JAM-EFB, 2011 WL 284591 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2011) (holding that Cal. Gov’t Code 

§ 844.6, which provides that public entities are not liable for injury to a prisoner, required 

dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the California Disabled Persons Act.)

Plaintiff has failed to provide the court with a convincing rationale for deviating from 

these precedents. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s state law claims 

against the State of California and CDCR be dismissed with prejudice based on Eleventh 

Amendment immunity.

As it appears that defendants State of California and CDCR are entitled to immunity from 

plaintiff’s state law claims, the court need not reach defendants’ argument that plaintiff failed to 

properly state a claim under these statutes. (See Motion, ECF No. 19-1 at 10.)

C. Can defendant Green be sued in his official capacity under Section 1983?

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against defendant Green to the 

extent that it is alleged against Green in his official capacity. Defendant argues that such a claim 

is barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Plaintiff concedes that defendant Green cannot be sued in official capacity under Section 

1983.

Accordingly, to the extent that it is alleged against defendant Green in his official 

capacity, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim be dismissed with 

prejudice.

D. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff’s counsel has requested leave to file an amended complaint. (ECF No. 20 at 5.)

The Ninth Circuit has made clear that “[d]ismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is 

not appropriate unless it is clear . . . that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” 

Eminence Capital, 316 F.3d at 1052 (citing Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1996)).

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Here, plaintiff faces dismissal of his claims under the Unruh Act and the CDPA against

defendants CDCR and the State of California, and his claim under Section 1983 against 

individual defendant Green in Green’s official capacity. As dismissal of these claims is

warranted as a matter of law based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, it appears that they cannot 

be saved by amendment. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff be denied leave 

to file an amended complaint.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall 

appoint a district judge in this action.

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Plaintiff’s claims under California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51 et 

seq. and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54.1 et seq., be 

dismissed with prejudice.

2. Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendant Mark Green in his official 

capacity be dismissed with prejudice.

3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 19) otherwise be denied.

4. Defendants be directed to file an answer to the remaining claims within twenty days of 

adoption of the these Findings and Recommendations.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 

parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: June 25, 2015

/bark1793.mtd

Case 2:13-cv-01793-KJM-KJN Document 22 Filed 06/25/15 Page 13 of 13