Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cr-00412/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cr-00412-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Valentino Johnson
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

VALENTINO JOHNSON, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cr-00412-TEH 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS CELL 

PHONE EVIDENCE 

 

 This matter is before the Court on Defendant Valentino Johnson’s motion to 

suppress cell phone evidence. (Docket No. 136). The Government responded and 

Defendant timely replied. (Docket Nos. 140, 175). After carefully considering the Parties’ 

written arguments, the Court finds further argument unnecessary and hereby DENIES 

Defendant’s motion for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND 

As the Parties are familiar with the factual background of this case, the Court 

provides only a brief summary of the facts. On February 2, 2014, San Francisco Police 

Department (“SFPD”) officers responded to a 911 call about a potential suicide at the 

residence of Luana McAlpine. Upon arrival, Officers Wise and Cader spoke with 

McAlpine and Defendant, who was on parole and appeared to be staying at the house. The 

police conducted a parole search of the home, during which Lieutenant Braconi was 

handed a cell phone that another officer had seized from Defendant. Ex. A to Lynch Decl. 

at 28 (Hr’g Tr.). Lieutenant Braconi told Defendant that the SFPD had received a call 

from Defendant’s ex-girlfriend claiming that he had called her threatening to commit 

suicide. Id. Defendant claimed that he had not made any calls to his ex-girlfriend that day, 

and consented when Lieutenant Braconi asked to see his phone to verify. Id. After 

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Defendant provided the lock code for the phone, Lieutenant Braconi “looked through the 

call history at that point.” Id. 

During the parole search of the home, the officers found a handgun (“the firearm”) 

and arrested Defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm. That evening, 

Defendant was interviewed by Sergeant Jonas at the police station. Sergeant Jonas 

interrogated Defendant regarding the false 911 call and Defendant’s relationship with his 

ex-girlfriend. Ex. C to Lynch Decl. at 2-3 (Interview Tr.). Defendant explained that he 

had been having relationship problems with his ex-girlfriend since January 21, 2014, and 

offered to show Sergeant Jonas the text messages he had sent her around that date. Id. at 3. 

The next morning, Sergeant Jonas sent Defendant’s cell phone to Officer Steve 

Wood at the SFPD Multimedia Unit to be downloaded. See Ex. B to Lynch Decl. at 0045. 

Officer Wood could not download the entire contents of the phone because it was too new. 

Id. However, Officer Wood informed Sergeant Jonas that he would download the SIM and 

SD cards and contact Sergeant Jonas when it was ready. Id. On February 5, 2014, Officer 

Wood informed Sergeant Jonas that he had partially downloaded the cell phone data. 

Sergeant Jonas manually examined the phone and discovered incriminating text messages, 

including one in which Defendant is seeking a clip for his “PT 92 Taurus.” Id. at 0047. 

Approximately one year later, on February 2, 2015, the Government obtained a 

search warrant for all of the electronic data stored on Defendant’s cell phone. Ex. D to 

Lynch Decl. at 0630. The text messages discovered by Sergeant Jonas on February 5, 

2014, were listed as evidence in support of probable cause for the issuance of the search 

warrant. Id. at 0636. The warrant request also noted the passage of time since the initial 

search of the phone. Ex. D to Lynch Decl. 

Defendant has been charged with two counts. Count One charges Defendant with 

being a felon in possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On this count, 

the Government seeks an Armed Career Criminal Enhancement. Count Two charges 

Defendant with obstruction of justice for tampering with official proceedings under 18 

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U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The Court severed these counts to prevent prejudice from joinder. 

(Docket No. 111). The trial for Count One is set to begin on August 24, 2015. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 The Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. 

Const. amend. IV. A “search” occurs for Fourth Amendment purposes “when an 

expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.” Sodal 

v. Cook Cnty., Illinois, 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

Exceptions to the warrant requirement are “few in number and carefully 

delineated.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984). “The burden of proving that a 

warrantless search or seizure falls within an exception to the warrant requirement is on the 

government.” United States v. Scott, 705 F.3d 410, 416 (9th Cir. 2012). The 

government’s failure to meet this burden requires that all evidence illegally seized and 

derived from the search or seizure be excluded. Id. at 416-17; Elkins v. United States, 364 

U.S. 206, 223-24 (1960). 

DISCUSSION 

I. The challenged searches cannot be justified on the basis of affirmative consent. 

As an initial matter, the challenged searches cannot be justified on the basis of 

Defendant’s consent to the limited search of his phone by Lieutenant Braconi and Sergeant 

Jonas. “It is a violation of a suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights for a consensual search to 

exceed the scope of the consent given.” United States v. McSweeney, 454 F.3d 1030, 1034 

(9th Cir. 2006) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 250, 252 (1991)). “The scope of 

consent is determined by asking ‘what would the typical reasonable person have 

understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?’” United States v. LopezCruz, 730 F.3d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251). The test is an 

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objective one, and “a search pursuant to consent is limited by the extent of the consent 

given for the search by the individual. Id. at 809, 810. 

The Court agrees with Defendant that the scope of the consent given to Lieutenant 

Braconi and Sergeant Jonas extended only to his call history on February 2, 2014, and text 

messages sent to his ex-girlfriend on or around January 21, 2014. See Hr’g Tr. at 28; 

Interview Tr. at 3. The contested searches included text messages sent and received on 

other dates. Accordingly, the Court rejects any justification for the February 5, 2014, and 

February 2, 2015 searches on the basis of affirmative consent. Nonetheless, this finding is 

not dispositive of Defendant’s motion to suppress. 

II. The SFPD’s search of Defendant’s cell phone was constitutional. 

“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a 

suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 857 (2006). 

California’s warrantless, suspicionless parole search condition is justified by the large 

number of inmates on parole in the State of California, as well as the high recidivism rate 

of past offenders. Id. at 853-54. “[A] requirement that searches be based on 

individualized suspicion would undermine the State’s ability to effectively supervise 

parolees and protect the public from criminal acts by reoffenders.” Id. at 854. 

Consequently, parolees subject to a parole search condition do not have “an expectation of 

privacy,” in property covered by the search condition, “that society would recognize as 

legitimate.” Id. at 852; see also United States v. Sullivan, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4547498, 

at *7 (9th Cir. 2015) (parolee’s interest in property is “reduced”). 

However, “parolees are not exempt from Fourth Amendment protection,” United 

States v. Grandberry, 730 F.3d 968, 975 (9th Cir. 2013), and parole search conditions do 

not give “officers unbridled discretion to conduct searches.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 856-57. 

In particular, parole searches may not be “arbitrary, capricious or harassing.” Id. at 856. 

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A. Riley does not apply to the parole search condition at issue in this case. 

Defendant asks the Court to apply Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014), to the 

present case. Mot. at 4-6. Defendant’s request is misguided. Riley addressed the 

“reasonableness of a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest.” Id. at 2482. Nothing in 

Riley provides any indication that it applies to parole searches. Indeed, every federal court 

that has addressed the application of the parole search exception in the wake of Riley has 

found that the exception remains valid. See United States v. Johnson, 579 Fed. App’x 920, 

926 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The recent Supreme Court case, Riley . . . has no application to the 

instant case because here Johnson waived his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of 

parole.”) (unpublished); United States v. Martinez, No. 13-CR-00794-WHA, 2014 WL 

3956677, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2014) (concluding Riley was “inapplicable to [the 

defendant] because he was on parole and subject to a parole search condition”). 

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit continues to approve warrantless searches of parolees’ cell 

phones even after Riley. See United States v. Luna, 602 Fed. App’x 363, 365 (9th Cir. 

2015) (holding warrantless search of parolee-defendant’s cell phone “was a constitutional 

parole search”) (unpublished). 

As it is beyond dispute that Riley’s holding does not apply to parole searches, 

Defendant argues that Riley’s reasoning should instead. Mot. at 5-6. This Court disagrees. 

The holding in Samson relied upon the unique nature of the parole search exception, as 

well as the legitimate and compelling interests of the state that necessitate such an 

exception - justifications that were neither analyzed nor disposed of by Riley. See Samson, 

547 U.S. at 854. Indeed, Defendant identifies only one justification of the parole search 

exception that aligns with the primary justification for warrantless searches incident to 

arrest: preventing the disposal of evidence. Mot. at 5. Defendant errs in assuming that 

because this single justification was insufficient to overcome the warrant requirement for 

search of a cell phone seized after arrest in Riley that parole searches must also be 

unconstitutional. Defendant’s argument ignores the other bases for the parole search 

exception, and makes far too much out of the Supreme Court’s narrow holding in Riley. 

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Even if higher courts one day determine that Riley applies to parole searches, the 

cell phone evidence is still admissible in this case because the SFPD searched Defendant’s 

phone in good faith based upon binding appellate precedent at the time. In Davis v. United 

States, 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011), the Supreme Court barred application of the exclusionary 

rule to “searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate 

precedent.” Id. at 2434. At the time the SFPD searched Defendant’s phone, Riley had not 

yet been decided. Instead, the binding precedent under which the SFPD justifiably 

operated was Samson, which authorized law enforcement to conduct warrantless, 

suspicionless searches of all parolee property. “To the extent Riley changed the law 

regarding the constitutionality of cell phone searches, suppressing evidence because of the 

officers’ pre-Riley actions would serve little deterrent purpose.” United States v. Garcia, 

68 F. Supp. 3d 1113, 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 

Indeed, other courts have declined to suppress cell phone evidence resulting from 

pre-Riley searches incident to arrest, even though that is the precise conduct deemed 

unconstitutional by Riley. See United States v. Spears, 31 F. Supp. 3d 869, 874–75, No. 

4:14–CR–82–O, 2014 WL 3407930, at *4 (N.D. Tex. July 14, 2014) (suppression 

inappropriate since, before Riley, a 2007 Fifth Circuit opinion held that an officer was 

permitted to search a cell phone pursuant to lawful arrest); United States v. Clark, 29 F. 

Supp. 3d 1131, 1145–47, No. 1:13–CR–84, 2014 WL 2895457, at *12–13 (E.D. Tenn. 

June 26, 2014) (suppression inappropriate under Davis); United States v. Brown, No. 14–

CR–20007, 2014 WL 3924635, at *2 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2014) (reaching the same 

conclusion, but possibly in dicta). Here, Riley is not even on point given the unrelated 

warrant exception at issue, making a denial of suppression all the more appropriate. 

B. The SFPD’s February 5, 2014 search was not unduly delayed. 

Defendant does not dispute that he was on parole at the time of his arrest, or that he 

had a search consent provision included in his parole conditions. California law provides 

that every prisoner eligible for release on state parole be given notice that they are “subject 

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to search or seizure by a probation or parole officer or other peace officer at any time of 

the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with or without cause.” Cal. Penal 

Code § 3067(b)(3) (West). Neither does Defendant dispute that the cell phone at issue was 

his, and in fact claimed ownership of the cell phone on multiple occasions. 

Instead, Defendant argues that the SFPD search of his cell phone “three days” after 

its seizure was “arbitrary, capricious or harassing,” Samson, 547 U.S. at 856, because it 

was unreasonably prolonged. Reply at 3-4. The Court disagrees. Defendant was arrested 

in the early evening on February 2, 2014, and Sergeant Jonas received the cell phone at 

7:30 PM that night. Ex. B to Lynch Decl. at 0044. At 9:30 AM the next morning, 

Sergeant Jonas sent the cell phone to the SFPD Multimedia Unit for its contents to be 

downloaded. Id. at 0045. A few hour later, Sergeant Jonas was informed that the contents 

of the phone could not be fully downloaded, but that the Multimedia Unit would download 

what it could. Id. Two days later, Sergeant Jonas retrieved the downloaded portions from 

the Multimedia Unit and conducted a manual search of the cell phone. Id. Even setting 

aside the fact that the Multimedia Unit’s attempted retrieval of data from the phone the 

morning after its seizure likely constituted an appropriately timed search of the phone, 

Sergeant Jonas’s manual search of the phone less than three days after its seizure was 

reasonable. This is especially true given the officer’s transfer of the phone to the 

Multimedia Unit so that it could be appropriately searched and documented, and the 

excusable delay caused by the difficulty the Unit encountered trying to do so. See United 

States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (11th Cir. 2009) (“if the assistance of another 

law enforcement officer had been sought, we would have been sympathetic to an argument 

that some delay in obtaining that assistance was reasonable”). The cases cited by 

Defendant do not suggest otherwise, as none of them addressed delays in conducting a 

parole search. 

Defendant does cite United States v. Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir. 1983), for 

the proposition that the SFPD was required to conduct an immediate search of the phone 

contemporaneous with Defendant’s arrest. Reply at 2. Burnette, citing United States v. 

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Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1981), explained as legal background that where 

“a container is not searched immediately[] but is instead taken to the police station and 

searched later, a warrant is required.” Burnette, 698 F.2d at 1049. The context of this rule, 

however, demonstrates why it does not apply to Defendant’s cell phone. 

In Monclavo-Cruz, the Ninth Circuit held that property seized incident to arrest

must be searched contemporaneously with that arrest; if the property is instead taken to the 

police station and searched later, a warrant is required. 662 F.2d at 1287-88. The court 

explained that this contemporaneous search is required because the search incident to 

arrest exception is predicated upon the need to preserve evidence and protect law 

enforcement. Id. at 1287. “‘Once law enforcement officers have reduced [an arrestee’s 

property] to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee 

might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that 

property is no longer an incident of the arrest.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Chadwick, 

433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977)). Therefore, Burnette explains, the initial search serves to diminish 

the suspect’s privacy interest in the item, allowing for subsequent warrantless searches 

long after the exigencies of arrest have faded. Burnette, 698 F.2d at 1049 (“Because [the 

defendant’s] expectation of privacy in the purse had been significantly reduced by the 

initial search . . . the subsequent warrantless search at the police station was valid.”). 

Because the condition precedent of a parole search is a parole search condition, 

which diminishes a suspect’s privacy interest in property in a way that does not fade with 

time like the exigencies of arrest, Burnette’s “immediate initial search” requirement does 

not apply to parole searches. Consequently, Defendant’s cell phone did not need to be 

searched contemporaneous with his arrest for the SFPD to search it three days later. 

While Burnette’s initial search requirement does not apply, the same is not true of 

Burnette’s broader holding, which allows subsequent warrantless searches of an item that 

has been lawfully seized as long as the suspect’s privacy interest in the item remains 

sufficiently diminished and the item stays in legitimate police custody. Id. at 1049. All of 

these factors were met in Defendant’s case. Accordingly, the less than three day delay in 

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searching Defendant’s cell phone was not only reasonable under the circumstances, it was 

allowed under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Burnette. 

III. The Government’s 2015 search of Defendant’s cell phone was constitutional. 

A. The Government’s search was not fruit of the poisonous tree. 

 Defendant next argues that the Government’s search a year later was invalid. He 

first contends that it was “fruit of the poisonous tree” because it listed the SFPD’s 

February 2014 search as part of the basis for probable cause. Mot. at 8-9; Ex. D. to Lynch 

Decl. Because the Court has found that the SFPD search was constitutional, it rejects 

Defendant’s fruit of the poisonous tree argument. 

B. The Government’s search was permissible despite the passage of time. 

 Defendant also asserts that too much time passed between the warrantless seizure of 

the phone and the Government’s search of the phone pursuant to the search warrant 

authorized by Judge Spero. Mot. at 9-10. This Court disagrees. 

 For support, Defendant cites Sullivan, a recent Ninth Circuit opinion that found 

“[a]n unreasonable delay between the seizure of a package and obtaining a search warrant 

may violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.” 2015 WL 4547498, at *6. In 

Sullivan, a parolee-defendant’s laptop was seized at the time of his arrest, but a search 

warrant was not obtained until 21 days later. Id. at *2-3. The Ninth Circuit explained that 

the constitutionality of the delay in securing a warrant depends upon whether it “was 

‘reasonable’ under the totality of the circumstances, not whether the Government pursued 

the least intrusive course of action.” Id. at *6 (citing United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 

1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2002)). To determine reasonableness, courts “must balance ‘the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against 

the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Id. (citing 

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). 

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 The Sullivan court considered that the extent of the intrusion in that case was 

“minimal” because the defendant remained in custody the entire time the laptop was 

retained. Id. In this respect, the appellate court cited United States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 

796, 813 (1984), which held that the possessory interests of the defendants in their 

apartment were “virtually nonexistent” while they were in custody. This diminished 

possessory interest is especially true, Sullivan explained, where a defendant makes no 

effort to seek the return of the seized property. Id. (citing United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 

478, 487 (1985) (an individual who did “not even allege [ ], much less prove[ ], that the 

delay in the search of packages adversely affected legitimate interests protected by the 

Fourth Amendment” and “never sought return of the property” has not made a sufficient 

showing that the delay was unreasonable). The Sullivan court then compared these limited 

considerations with the legitimate government interests discussed in Samson, including the 

need to efficiently monitor parolees and protect the public. Id. at *7. Sullivan also 

observed that “the government had a reasonable basis for retaining and searching the 

laptop based on the likelihood that it contained evidence of Sullivan’s parole violations.” 

Id. Ultimately, the court in Sullivan concluded that “[t]he government’s course of conduct 

was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances . . . . Even if the government could 

have moved faster to obtain a search warrant, the government is not required to pursue ‘the 

least intrusive course of action.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

 Like the defendant in Sullivan, Defendant had substantially diminished privacy 

interests because of his parole status. See also Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 (finding paroleepetitioner did not have “an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 

legitimate”). Also like in Sullivan, the search’s intrusion was exceedingly minimal, as 

Defendant’s possessory interest in the phone was “virtually nonexistent” by virtue of the 

fact that he remained in custody during the entirety of the cell phone’s retention, and never 

sought its return. In both cases, the retention and search of the property was reasonable 

based upon the likelihood that it contained evidence of the alleged parole violation. See 

Withrow Decl. ¶ 3 (Docket No. 141) (“individuals who illegally possess firearms often 

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leave evidence of that possession on their cell phones in the form of photographs or text 

messages concerning the firearms”). Finally, as in Sullivan, while the Government could 

have moved faster in securing a search warrant of Defendant’s cell phone, it was not 

required to pursue the least intrusive course of action, only one that involved a reasonable 

intrusion given the totality of the circumstances. Hernandez, 313 F.3d at 1213. 

 In light of this analysis, there is no compelling reason to reach a different outcome 

from the court in Sullivan, even though that case dealt with a shorter delay. In fact, at least 

one court in this district has found lengthy delays permissible in analogous circumstances. 

In Martinez, 2014 WL 3956677, the cell phone of a parolee was seized and later searched 

on the day of his arrest. Id. at *1. Seven days later, the police searched the cell phone 

again. Id. “Another eight months passed before the police searched his cell phone on 

November 13, 2012.” Id. “There was no warrant for any of these three cell-phone 

searches.” Id. The court found that because the initial search and seizure was legal, even 

post-Riley, “the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the search of [the defendant’s] cell 

phone [on the day of the arrest]. Nor did the later two searches of that phone . . . offend 

the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at *4. 

Martinez relied upon the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Burnette, 698 F.2d 1038, which 

as mentioned above, held that subsequent warrantless searches of an item may be 

conducted at any time “once [that] item . . . has been lawfully seized and searched” and 

“remains in the legitimate uninterrupted possession of the police.” Id. at 1049. The Court 

has already explained why the “immediate initial search” requirement discussed in 

Burnette does not apply to parole searches. See supra. However, Burnette’s broader 

holding still applies: a lawful seizure combined with diminished privacy interests and 

legitimate uninterrupted police possession renders subsequent warrantless searches 

constitutional. Here, the ATF’s search of Defendant’s phone followed a lawful SFPD 

parole search and seizure; Defendant had ongoing diminished privacy interests as a parolee 

and a virtually nonexistent possessory interest in the phone as a result of his ongoing 

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custody; and the phone remained in the legitimate uninterrupted possession of the police 

from the moment of its seizure until its search pursuant to a warrant in February 2015. 

 

C. Even if too much time had passed, the objectively reasonable good-faith 

exception applies. 

 Finally, even if too much time had passed between the seizure of the cell phone and 

the Government’s request for a search warrant, the ATF searched the phone in good faith, 

relying upon a search warrant issued by Judge Spero. 

 Suppression imposes a “costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement 

objectives” by “letting guilty and possibly dangerous defendants go free.” Herring v. 

United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009). Consequently, a court must find that “the 

benefits of deterrence . . . outweigh the costs” before excluding evidence. “[W]hen the 

police act with an objectively reasonable good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful, . . . 

the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay its way.” Davis 

v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2011). In this case, the ATF submitted an 

affidavit in support of its request for a search warrant that explicitly noted the “passage of 

time” since the seizure of Defendant’s cell phone. Ex. D to Lynch Decl. The ATF also 

understood that the SFPD search was allowed under Defendant’s parole search conditions. 

Id. at 00635 (stating that the SFPD search was conducted “pursuant to Johnson’s parole 

search condition”). Ultimately, Judge Spero, provided with all of this information 

transparently provided by the Government, granted the search warrant. Having done 

nothing wrong, the Government, and more importantly society, should not be punished if 

the court’s decision was incorrect. Moreover, exclusion would do nothing to deter future 

law enforcement misconduct. Accordingly, even if the Government’s search of 

Defendant’s cell phone in February 2015 was a violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

suppression would still be inappropriate. 

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27 

28 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the February 2014 and February 

2015 searches of Defendant’s cell phone were constitutional and suppression is otherwise 

inappropriate. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to suppress is hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 08/13/15 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge 

Case 3:14-cr-00412-TEH Document 202 Filed 08/13/15 Page 13 of 13