Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01451/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01451-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Crone
Plaintiff
Brian Stephens
Defendant
Tracy Unified School District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER CRONE,

Plaintiff,

v.

TRACY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT

and BRIAN STEPHENS, an 

individual,

Defendants.

No. 2:20-cv-01451-JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Brian 

Stephens’ (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Mot. to Dismiss 

(“Mot.”), ECF No. 7. Christopher Crone (“Plaintiff”) filed an 

opposition to Defendant’s motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 10, to which 

Defendant replied, Reply, ECF No. 11. After consideration of 

the parties’ briefing on the motion and relevant legal 

authority, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.1

///

///

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was scheduled 

for November 24, 2020.

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Christopher Crone filed suit against the Tracy 

Unified School District (“TUSD”) and its Superintendent Brian 

Stephens following termination of his job as TUSD’s special 

education director. First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶ 1, ECF No. 

6. Plaintiff was hired as the District’s special education 

director in November 2018 and was terminated in September 2019. 

FAC ¶ 7. Plaintiff alleges he was terminated in retaliation for 

his advocacy on behalf of special education students, 

particularly minority students and students with disabilities. 

FAC ¶¶ 1, 16-18. 

Plaintiff brings only one claim against Stephens for 

violation of California Labor Code Section 1102.5. FAC ¶¶ 34-

38. Stephens seeks dismissal of this lone claim against him. 

See Mot.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion attacks the complaint as not 

alleging sufficient facts to state a claim for relief. Fed. R. 

Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss [under 

12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relied that is plausible 

on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Dismissal is 

proper where there is no cognizable legal theory or insufficient 

facts supporting a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief. 

Hinds Invs., L.P. v. Angiolo, 654 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2011).

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B. Analysis

Defendant argues Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for 

relief because California Labor Code Section 1102.5 precludes

individual liability. Mot. at 4-5. Section 1102.5, which

prohibits retaliation against employees for whistleblowing, 

provides in relevant part: 

An employer, or any person acting on behalf of the 

employer, shall not retaliate against an employee for 

disclosing information, or because the employer 

believes that the employee disclosed or may disclose 

information, to a government or law enforcement 

agency, to a person with authority over the employee 

or another employee who has the authority to 

investigate, discover, or correct the violation or 

noncompliance, or for providing information to, or 

testifying before, any public body conducting an 

investigation, hearing, or inquiry, if the employee 

has reasonable cause to believe that the information 

discloses a violation of state or federal statute, or 

a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, 

or federal rule or regulation, regardless of whether 

disclosing the information is part of the employee's 

job duties. 

Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.5(b). The statute was amended, effective 

January 1, 2014, to include the addition of “or any person 

acting on behalf of the employer” instead of referring solely to 

“[a]n employer.” Id. Since the 2014 amendment, federal courts 

predicting how state courts would decide the issue of individual 

liability post-amendment have concluded that section 1102.5 does 

not impose individual liability. See, e.g., Tillery v. Lollis, 

No. 1:14-CV-02025-KJM, 2015 WL 4873111, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

13, 2015) (after extensive review of the legislative history and 

pertinent caselaw, dismissing individual supervisors from the 

plaintiff’s section 1102.5 claim); Toranto v. Jaffurs, 297 

F.Supp.3d 1073, 1105 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (granting motion to dismiss 

section 1102.5 claim brought against an individual defendant); 

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United States ex rel. Lupo v. Quality Assurance Servs., Inc., 

242 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1030 (S.D. Cal. 2017) (dismissing individual 

defendants from section 1102.5 claim). This Court, too, in 

Bales v. County of El Dorado explicitly found that “section 

1102.5 does not impose individual liability.” No. 2:18-cv01714-JAM-DB, 2018 WL 4558235, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2018). 

In Bales, the plaintiff sued her supervisor at the Public 

Defenders’ Office for retaliatory termination in violation of 

Section 1102.5. 2018 WL 4558235, at *1. The defendant

supervisor moved to dismiss, arguing, as Defendant Stephens does 

here, that Section 1102.5 precludes individual liability. Id. 

In opposition, the Bales plaintiff made almost identical 

arguments to the ones Plaintiff now makes, insisting the plain 

language of the amended Section 1102.5 provides for individual 

liability. Id. at *2. This Court squarely rejected plaintiff’s

arguments in Bales, instead following Judge Mueller’s extensive 

analysis in Tillery and dismissing plaintiff’s claim against her

supervisor with prejudice. Id. at *2-3.

Here, Plaintiff does not dispute the clear holdings of

Bales and Tillery that Section 1102.5 precludes individual 

liability. See Opp’n at 4. Instead, Plaintiff appears to ask 

this Court to reconsider its analysis in Bales and Judge 

Mueller’s analysis in Tillery. Id. at 4-5. But, Plaintiff has 

not provided the Court with any compelling reason to do so. 

Plaintiff has not presented any intervening caselaw since Bales

in support of his position. Nor has Plaintiff made any arguments 

that the Bales plaintiff did not already make and consequently 

that this Court did not already reject. Therefore, this Court

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finds no reason to revisit Bales.

Because a claim under Section 1102.5 cannot be brought 

against an individual, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant

Stephens fails as a matter of law. 

C. Leave to Amend

The Court need not grant leave to amend where amendment 

would be futile. Deveraturda v. Globe Aviation Sec. Servs., 454 

F.3d 1043, 1049 (9th Cir. 2006). Because this Court once again

finds that Section 1102.5 precludes individual liability, 

amendment would be futile. Accordingly, dismissal with 

prejudice is appropriate.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 7, 2020

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