Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05093/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Public Service Company of Oklahoma
Appellee
Thurman L. Rowe
Appellant

Document Text:

THURMAN L. ROWE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF OKLAHOMA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

~E: 2 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-5093 

(D.C. No. 89-C-332-C) 

(N .D. Okla.) 

Before LOGAN, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff-appellant Thurman L. Rowe appeals the district 

court's award of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee 

Public Service Company of Oklahoma on his claims under Title VII 

of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and his state law claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. We affirm. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Oklahoma Human Rights 

Commission on June 16, 1987. He asserted that he had been 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-5093 Document: 010110097278 Date Filed: 12/20/1990 Page: 1 
discriminated against by his employer on several occasions. He 

made claims based on the following incidents: 

1. 

2. 

Hiring the plaintiff as an Engineer I 

Engineer II in October 1984; 

Promoting another employee to the 

Technical Supervisor rather than the 

February 1985; 

rather than 

position of 

plaintiff in 

3. Requiring the plaintiff to carry heavy boxes after 

surgery in April 1985; 

4. Giving the plaintiff low performance evaluations 

and negative reprimands. These reprimands occurred 

in December 1985, February 1986, and May 1986; 

5. Refusing the plaintiff's request to transfer in 

September 1986; 

6. Laying the plaintiff off from employment in January 

1987. 

In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we 

apply a de nova standard of review to legal determinations. 

Wheeler Y.:.. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

484 U.S. 986 (1987). Our view of the facts must indulge all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. 

Franks Y.:.. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986). 

We first consider whether any of the plaintiff's claims are 

barred by the applicable statute of limitations. An employee who 

believes he has been discriminated against must file a charge with 

the appropriate administrative agency within three hundred days of 

the alleged discriminatory act. 42 u.s.c. S 2000e-S(e). In the 

present case, the plaintiff did not file his charge until June 16, 

1987. The first two incidents of which plaintiff complains, the 

hiring decision and the promotion decision, occurred over three 

hundred days before the charge was filed. See Delaware State 

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Appellate Case: 90-5093 Document: 010110097278 Date Filed: 12/20/1990 Page: 2 
College Y..!.. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (limitations period 

begins to run when employer makes discriminatory decision). There 

is no basis in the record for tolling the running of the statute 

of limitations in this case. See Zipes Y..!.. Trans World Airlines. 

Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-95 (182). The doctrines of waiver and 

estoppel also do not prevent the defendant from asserting this 

defense . See id. We therefore conclude that these two claims are 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

We next consider the four remaining claims under Title VII. 

The plaintiff relies solely on inferential evidence of 

discriminatory intent in support of his claim for relief. He 

asserts he is entitled to relief under the individual disparate 

treatment theory. To recover under this theory, a plaintiff must 

first establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence 

supporting the inference of racial discrimination. See McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. Y..!.. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the 

plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant then has the burden of 

articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the 

decision. See id. at 802-03; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs Y..!.. 

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). If the defendant meets this 

burden, the plaintiff must then prove the reason given by the 

defendant is pretextual. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-05; 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. 

The plaintiff failed to meet his initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie case of discrimination on the first two 

of these four claims: requiring the plaintiff perform heavy 

manual labor and giving the defendant low performance evaluations 

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Appellate Case: 90-5093 Document: 010110097278 Date Filed: 12/20/1990 Page: 3 
and negative reprimands. Reading the record in a light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot find any evidence supporting 

the inference of racial discrimination. The district court 

properly granted summary judgment on these claims. 

The district court also properly granted summary judgment on 

the two remaining Title VII claims: refusing the transfer request 

and laying the plaintiff off. The plaintiff did establish a prima 

facie case of discrimination on these two claims by presenting 

evidence supporting the inference of racial discrimination. The 

defendant, however, met its burden of articulating legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons for the treatment about which the 

plaintiff complains. First, the defendant had a legitimate motive 

for refusing the plaintiff's request for a transfer. The 

employees transferred had significantly more seniority than the 

plaintiff. They were also better qualified for the new position. 

Second, defendant also had a valid reaason for laying off the 

plaintiff. The layoffs were a necessary cost savings measure. 

The plaintff's job was eliminated as a result of restructuring 

within the company. The other engineers who retained their 

positions had more seniority and were better qualified than the 

plaintiff. 

Because the defendant met its burden, the plaintiff was 

required to prove the legitimate reasons articulated by the 

defendant were pretextual. Our review of the record in a light 

most favorable to the plaintiff reveals nothing to rebut the 

reasons given by the defendant for its decision not to transfer 

the plaintiff and later to lay .him off. In his deposition, the 

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Appellate Case: 90-5093 Document: 010110097278 Date Filed: 12/20/1990 Page: 4 
plaintiff stated he did not believe the defendant's employees were 

bigots and he did not know whether the decisions were the result 

of racial discrimination. The only evidence plaintiff presented 

to the district court was the affidavit of a coworker, Alfred 

Jones, (not in the appellate record) which the district court 

noted but did not find sufficient to create a material issue of 

fact. The district court did not err in entering summary judgment 

in favor of the defendant. 

Finally, we consider the plaintiff's state law claim of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Oklahoma 

Supreme Court has held that liability for the tort of outrage does 

not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, and 

petty oppressions. Eddy Y..:.. Brown, 715 P.2d 74, 77 (Okla. 1977). 

The conduct must be beyond all possible bounds of decency before 

it will be considered tortious. Id. We agree with the district 

court's conclusion that there was not evidence indicating that the 

defendant's actions rose to this level. Sununary judgment was 

therefore also proper on this claim. We thus AFFIRM the ruling of 

the district court. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-5093 Document: 010110097278 Date Filed: 12/20/1990 Page: 5