Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02195/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02195-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Klein Tools, Inc
Appellee
Robert E. Murphy
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ROBERT E • MURPHY, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

. PILED Ut~~t&J lftta Coun of Appeals 

Tench Circuit 

JUN 71991 

AOBBRT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

vs. ) No. 90-2195 

) 

KLEIN TOOLS, INC., previously known as ) 

Mathias Klein & Sons, Inc., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 89-1135-SC) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Robert L. Pottroff, of Myers, Pottroff & Ball, Manhattan, Kansas 

and David J. Stout, of Carpenter & Goldberg, P.A., Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Robert J. O'Connor & David E. Bengtson, of Hershberger, Patterson, 

Jones & Roth, Wichita, Kansas and Robert E. Arroyo, of Keck, Mahin 

& Cate, Chicago, Illinois, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

* After exam1n1ng the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument and plaintiff-appellant's request 

for oral argument is denied. 

Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant Robert E. Murphy appeals the district 

court's grant of summary judgment to defendant-appellee Klein 

Tools, Inc. and subsequent dismissal of plaintiff's action with 

prejudice. We affirm. 

Plaintiff was injured in a fall from an electrical 

transmission tower near Farmington, New Mexico on August 14, 1980. 

Plaintiff claims his fall and resulting injuries were caused by a 

defective swivel hook designed and manufactured by defendant. 

Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Kansas and defendant is a 

Delaware corporation. Plaintiff filed his initial complaint 

against defendant, almost three years after the accident, on 

August 12, 1983, in the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas. Upon motion of defendant, the action was 

dismissed for failure to comply with the two-year limitation 

period of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513. The court also denied 

plaintiff's motions to transfer the action to the United States 

District Court for the District of New Mexico and to amend his 

complaint. Prior to entry of final judgment, plaintiff moved the 

court requesting judgment be entered without prejudice. The court 

denied this request and final judgment of dismissal was entered 

with prejudice on September 5, 1989. Plaintiff failed to appeal 

any of these decisions. 

On February 20, 1989, prior to entry of judgment in Kansas, 

plaintiff filed an identical complaint in New Mexico state court 

which he amended on April 24, 1989. Neither the complaint nor the 

amended complaint was ever served on defendant. Although the 

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Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 2 
record lacks any formal dismissal of this state action, plaintiff 

filed a second state action on September 1, 1989, which was 

ultimately served on defendant. Defendant removed this action to 

the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico 

based on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy. 

Defendant then moved for dismissal or in the alternative for 

summary judgment, based 

judicata. The district 

on statute of limitations and res 

court granted summary judgment, finding 

plaintiff's action to be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 

It is this decision that is before this court on appeal. 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same legal standards used by the district court. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). We resolve all factual disputes and draw all inferences 

in favor of the nonmoving party. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue 

Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 979 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 

3241 (1990); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 

(lOth Cir. 1990). 

The district court, relying heavily and exclusively on Shoup 

v. Bell & Howell Co., 872 F.2d 1178 (4th Cir. 1989), concluded 

that plaintiff's action was barred because the Kansas court's 

dismissal on statute of limitations grounds was an adjudication on 

the merits. In Shoup, the Fourth Circuit held that a dismissal on 

statute of limitations grounds by one federal court bars the same 

claim from litigation in another federal court, stating that 

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Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 3 
"pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4l(b) 1 the earlier statute of 

limitations ruling is a judgment on the merits subject to claim 

preclusion." Id. at 1178. We agree that when the preclusive 

effects of federal court dismissal decisions are at issue, Rule 

41(b) must be considered. See Sack v. Low, 478 F.2d 360, 364 (2d 

Cir. 1973). Bertha Bldg. Corp. v. National Theatres Corp., 248 

F.2d 833, 835 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 936 (1958). 

Plaintiff argues that our determination in Stokke v. Southern 

Pacific Co., 169 F.2d 42 (lOth Cir. 1948), should control. In 

Stokke, we held that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds 

bars only "the legal remedy for the enforcement of the right of 

action" in the dismissing forum, and is not res judicata as to an 

action in another forum. Id. at 43. As Professor Moore has 

noted, however, our determination in Stokke relied upon principles 

(and authority) predating the adoption of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure and did not reference Rule 41(b). lB J. Moore, J. 

Lucas & T. Currier, , 0.409[6] at 339-40 (1991). We hold that 

Stokke is no longer controlling on this point. 2 We now decide the 

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) provides in part: 

Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 

specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 

dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, 

or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates 

as an adjudication on the merits. 

2 We are authorized to state that, in light of Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4l(b) and modern federal authority, the en bane court approves of 

overruling the following statement: 

It is the general rule that a judgment dismissing an 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 4 
issue according to Rule 41(b). 

"[T]he scope of a federal judgment is governed by Rule 41(b), 

Fed. R. Civ. P .... and . . . the Federal Rule supplies the 

controlling principle .... " Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 

F.2d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978). This court's decision in DeVargas 

v. Montoya, 796 F.2d 1245 (lOth Cir. 1986), applying New Mexico 

law, determined that a dismissal with prejudice by the state court 

constituted an adjudication on the merits for the purpose of claim 

preclusion in a later federal court action. Id. at 1249. We 

therefore agree with the Sixth Circuit and other circuits in 

holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on 

the merits. See Steve D. Thompson Trucking, Inc. v. Dorsey 

Trailers, Inc., 870 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir. 1989)(res judicata 

effect shall be given to judgments which are dismissed on statute 

of limitations grounds); Rose v. Town of Harwich, 778 F.2d 77, 80 

(1st Cir. 198S)(limitations-based dismissal is one with claim 

preclusive effect), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986); Johnson v. 

Burnley, 887 F.2d 471, 474 (4th Cir. 1989)(dismissal on statute of 

limitations grounds operates as res judicata); PRC Harris, Inc. v. 

Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896 (2d Cir.)(dismissal on statute of 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

action on the ground that it is barred by limitations 

merely determines that the legal remedy for the 

enforcement of the right of action is barred in that 

forum; that it does not extinguish the right; and that 

it therefore does not constitute res judicata which 

forecloses the maintaining of a subsequent action in 

another state where the right is not barred by local 

law. 

Stokke, 169 F.2d at 43. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 5 
l~itations grounds is adjudication on the merits unless it is 

specifically stated to be without prejudice), cert. denied, 464 

u.s. 936 (1983). 

Plaintiff further argues that his New Mexico case is saved by 

New Mexico's savings statute, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-14, 3 and 

cites this court's decision in Prince v. Leesona Corp., 720 F.2d 

1166 (lOth Cir. 1983) in support. We conclude that the holding in 

Prince, that state savings statutes are applicable to actions 

originally filed in sister states, is inapposite in this case. 

See id. at 1169. The facts in Prince are distinguishable. In 

Prince, plaintiff's action was timely filed in the original forum 

and dismissed on grounds other than statute of l~itations. Id. 

at 1167. 

The Supreme Court stated, in discussing savings statutes in 

general, "[s]uch a statute specifically gives to a plaintiff whose 

t~ely action is dismissed for procedural reasons such as ~proper 

venue a specified t~e in which to bring a second action." 

Burnett v. New York Central R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 432 

(1965)(emphasis added). As we have determined that plaintiff's 

cla~ is barred on res judicata grounds, he cannot invoke the 

3 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 37-1-14 provides: 

If after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff 

fails therein for any cause, except negligence in its 

prosecution, and a new suit be commenced within six 

months thereafter, the second suit shall, for the 

purposes herein contemplated be deemed a continuation of 

the first. 

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Appellate Case: 90-2195 Document: 01019297904 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 6 
savings statute to claim continuation of an action which never 

existed. See DeVargas v. Montoya, 796 F.2d at 1250. 

We have reviewed Bracken v. Yates Petroleum Corp., 760 P.2d 

155 (N.M. 1988), cited by plaintiff to support his contention that 

the statute of limitations in New Mexico was tolled by the filing 

of his Kansas action, and find, as did the district court, that we 

have no need to reach the issue of the New Mexico statute of 

limitations due to our holding that plaintiff's action is barred 

by res judicata. We have reviewed plaintiff's other arguments and 

find them also meritless. 

The district court of Kansas dismissed plaintiff's claim, 

specifying that the dismissal judgment was with prejudice. We do 

not decide whether this decision was correct. However, we must 

assume that plaintiff had no quarrel with the decision as he 

elected not to appeal. "[A]n erroneous judgment fairly and 

regularly entered by a court of competent jurisdiction is 

nevertheless an effective bar under the doctrine of res judicata 

to a subsequent action between the same parties on the same cause 

of action." Stokke, 169 F.2d at 43. When plaintiff took no 

appeal, the Kansas judgment became final. We conclude the 

judgment was on the merits and thus res judicata as to subsequent 

actions. Plaintiff cannot forum shop in an effort to remedy his 

unexplained delay. 

Defendant's request for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. App. 

P. 38 is DENIED. The judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

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