Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cr-00018/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cr-00018-19/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dean Lynn Christiansen
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

v.

DEAN LYNN CHRISTIANSEN,

 Defendant.

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CASE NO. 2:13-CR-00018-MCE

STIPULATION AND ORDER CONCERING 

RESTITUTION

Date: AUGUST 25, 2016

Time: 10:00 a.m.

Court: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr. 

STIPULATION

The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Dean Lynn 

Christiansen (“Defendant”), by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. On or about January 17, 2013, a grand jury empaneled in the Eastern District of 

California returned an Indictment that charged Defendant with a single-count of Receipt of Child 

Pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). 

2. On or about September 24, 2015, Defendant pled guilty to the charge in the 

Indictment, pursuant to a written plea agreement. 

3. On or about July 7, 2016, the Court sentenced Defendant to a 97-month term of 

imprisonment, to be followed by a 5-year term of supervised release. After imposing sentence, the 

Court scheduled a restitution hearing in this matter for August 25, 2016. 

4. Under the Mandatory Restitution for Sex Crimes portion of the Violence Against 

Women Act of 1994, the Court must order restitution for child pornography offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 

PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

ANDRÉ M. ESPINOSA

Assistant U.S. Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

(916) 554-2700

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

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2259(a). Restitution is mandatory in child pornography cases to any person “harmed as a result of” a 

defendant’s crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (c). Restitution is required for “the full amount of the 

victim’s losses,” including any costs incurred by the victim for: (A) medical services relating to 

physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical or occupational therapy or rehabilitation; 

(C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) 

attorneys’ fees, as well as other costs incurred; and (F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a 

proximate result of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3).

5. In 2014, the United States Supreme Court determined that the plain language of 

Section 2259 limits restitution only to those losses proximately caused by an individual defendant’s 

conduct. See Paroline v. United States, –––U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (2014). The Court 

rejected the victim’s proposed approach – that each possessor should be liable for her entire losses –

but also rejected a strict “but-for” causation requirement. Id. at 1725-1727. Instead, the Court held 

that where it can be shown that (a) the defendant possessed a victim’s images and (b) the “victim has 

outstanding losses caused by the continuing traffic in those images but where it is impossible to trace 

a particular amount of those losses to the individual defendant,” a district court “should order 

restitution in an amount that comports with the defendant’s relative role in the causal process 

underlying the victim’s general losses.” Id. at 1727. In other words, the Court rejected requiring the 

government to prove that a victim would not have suffered harm “but for” the particular conduct of 

an individual defendant, overruling the strict standard established by the Ninth Circuit in United 

States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that although the “defendant’s 

conduct need not be the sole cause of the loss, it must be a material and proximate cause, and any 

subsequent action that contributes to the loss, such as an intervening cause, must be directly related 

to the defendant’s conduct”).

6. The Court explained that in a case such as Paroline, where the defendant was 

convicted of possessing a number of images, two of which depicted the victim “Amy,” the ultimate 

amount “would not be severe . . . given the nature of the causal connection between the conduct of a 

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possessor like the defendant in Paroline and the entirety of the victim’s general losses from the trade 

in her images, which are the product of the acts of thousands of offenders.” Paroline, 134 S.Ct. at 

1727. However, the Court also stated that the award should not be “a token or nominal amount.” Id. 

The Court held that district courts should use “discretion and sound judgment” in determining the 

proper amount of restitution, as it cannot be a precise mathematical inquiry. Id. at 1728. A variety 

of factors may serve as rough guideposts, but the Court declined to articulate a “precise algorithm” 

for determining the proper restitution amount at this point in the law’s development, particularly any 

algorithm that would result in “trivial restitution orders.” Id. 

7. Rather, the Court suggested that district courts first “determine the amount of the 

victim’s losses caused by the continuing traffic in the victim’s images,” then “set an award in 

consideration of factors that bear on the relative causal significance of the defendant’s conduct in 

producing those losses.” Id. at 1728. Pertinent factors could include (a) the number of past 

defendants contributing to the victim’s general losses; (b) reasonable predictions of the number of 

future offenders likely to be caught and convicted for crimes contributing to those losses; (c) any 

available and reasonably reliable estimate of the broader number of offenders (including those never 

apprehended) involved; (d) whether the defendant reproduced or distributed images of the victim; (e) 

whether the defendant had any connection to the initial production of the images; (f) how many 

images of the victim the defendant possessed; and (g) other facts relevant to the defendant’s relative 

causal role. Id. 

8. On November 4, 2015, the Ninth Circuit clarified Paroline in United States v. Galan, 

804 F.3d 1287 (2015). Galan imposed a loss disaggregation requirement before restitution may be 

awarded, and held that: “distributors and possessors of child pornography cannot be ordered to pay 

restitution to their victims without the Government first disaggregating the harms caused by these 

individuals from the harms caused by the so-called ‘original abuser.’” See United States v. Chan, 

2016 WL 370712, at *1 (D. Haw. Jan. 26, 2016) (citing Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291). In arriving at its 

holding, the Galan panel acknowledged the extraordinary difficulty associated with such 

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disaggregation: “We have no illusion that the task will be easy ... we can only say that precision is 

neither expected nor required.” Galan, 804 F.3d at 1291. 

9. After the disaggregation required under Galan is complete, and the district court 

knows the loss amount attributable to the distributors and possessors, it may apply the Paroline

factors to determine the proper restitution amount due to the victim. Galan at 1289, n. 10. It is the 

government’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the loss amounts the original 

abuser caused the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).

10. While this matter was pending, counsel for two known victims portrayed in certain of 

the images of child pornography received by Defendant – the victim in the “Jan_Feb” series and a 

victim in the “Marineland” series – submitted separate requests for restitution to the government. 

The materials submitted by the victims’ counsel did not include evidence of loss disaggregation, as 

required under Galan. 

11. To meet its burden under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e), the government contacted counsel for the 

victims and requested supplemental material demonstrating loss disaggregation. Counsel for each 

victim declined to provide such supplemental material. Neither requested additional time to prepare 

and submit such supplemental material. Rather, on behalf of their clients, counsel for each victim 

submitted written withdrawals of their earlier submitted restitution requests.

12. Consequently, in the absence of evidence demonstrating loss disaggregation, the 

government cannot meet its burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence what amount of the 

victims’ losses were caused by the original abuse. As a result, this Court cannot engage in the 

disaggregation required under Galan, which in turn prevents the Court from proceeding to the Paroline

analysis. Thus, it is not possible on the current record and under the currently controlling case law, to 

calculate a restitution amount in this matter that will withstand appellate scrutiny. See, e.g., United 

States v. Grovo, --- F.3d --- , No. 15-30016, 2016 WL 3443691, at *11 (9th Cir. June 23, 2016) (“Under 

Galan, ... failure to disaggregate losses caused by the initial abuse was an abuse of discretion...”); 

United States v. Blurton, 623 F. App'x 318, 318–19 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding district court erred by 

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ordering restitution without disaggregating losses as required under Galan). 

13. Accordingly, the parties stipulate and agree that, under the current state of the law, this

Court may not lawfully order restitution under the present circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. 

Kugler, No. CR 14-73-BLG-SPW, 2016 WL 816741, at *2 (D. Mont. Feb. 29, 2016) (“Here, three of 

the five victims ... failed to provide the government with any documentation or information to assist in 

disaggregating their losses. Without this information, the government cannot prove by a preponderance 

of the evidence what amount of the victims’ losses was caused by the original abuse. As a result, the 

court cannot engage in the disaggregation required under Galan, which in turn prevents the court from 

proceeding to the Paroline analysis. Restitution is not allowed under these circumstances and it is 

denied.”) (citation omitted). 

14. Consequently, the parties stipulate and agree that the Court should deny the restitution 

requests in this matter and vacate the restitution hearing currently scheduled for August 25, 2016.

DATED: August 21, 2016

By:

Respectfully Submitted,

PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ André M. Espinosa

ANDRÉ M. ESPINOSA

Assistant U.S. Attorney

Dated: August 22, 2016 /s/ Greg Foster

GREG FOSTER

Attorney for Defendant

For the reasons set forth in the parties’ stipulation and for good cause shown, restitution in this 

matter is DENIED and the restitution hearing currently scheduled for August 25, 2016, is VACATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2016

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