Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01588/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01588-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Leonard Penny
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Ann D. Montgomery, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1588

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Frank Leonard Penny, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 28, 2007

Filed: March 29, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BYE, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Frank Leonard Penny challenges the sentence the district court1

 imposed after

he pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Penny, who is

represented by counsel, has filed several motions asking this court to accept his pro

se filings, in which he raises additional claims. We grant Penny’s motions, and we

affirm.

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Penny’s sentence reflected a significant downward departure in recognition of

his substantial assistance to the government.

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Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Penny pleaded guilty to one count of

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and

924(a)(2). The probation officer who prepared the presentence report recommended

enhancing Penny’s sentence after concluding that Penny was an armed career criminal

due to his state felony convictions for theft of a motor vehicle, fleeing police in a

motor vehicle, second degree assault, and hit and run. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

(defendant with three felony convictions for violent felony or serious drug offense, or

both, is armed career criminal; providing for minimum sentence of 15 years in prison);

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(a) (any defendant with three prior violent felonies or serious drug

offenses, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), is armed career criminal). The

probation officer further recommended assessing a base offense level of 34 because

Penny had been arrested on the instant offense after an informant entered his vehicle

to purchase $450 worth of cocaine base, and a subsequent search revealed the firearm

hidden in the rear portion of the car’s passenger compartment. See U.S.S.G. §

4B1.4(b)(3)(A) (mandating offense level of 34 if firearm was possessed “in

connection with” another felony offense). Over Penny’s objections, the district court

imposed both enhancements and sentenced him to 110 months in prison and 5 years

of supervised release.2

 

At the outset, we disagree with the government that Penny waived the right to

raise the arguments he pursues in this appeal. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d

886, 890 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (burden of proof is on government to show that

issue raised on appeal is “clearly and unambiguously” within scope of agreement;

where agreement is ambiguous, it must be strictly construed against government).

Penny’s plea agreement contained a general appeal waiver “unless the Court sentences

the defendant as an Armed Career Criminal.” Penny was so sentenced, and thus by

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The analysis of whether a firearm is possessed “in connection with” another

offense is the same under U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and 2K2.1. United States v.

Howard, 413 F.3d 861, 865 (8th Cir. 2005).

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its terms--and construing any ambiguity against the government--the appeal waiver

does not apply.

For reversal, Penny first argues that the district court erred in finding that the

firearm at issue was connected to another felony offense, namely, his attempted

delivery of cocaine base. We find no clear error in the district court’s determination.

See United States v. Mack, 343 F.3d 929, 936 (8th Cir. 2003) (standard of review).

It is undisputed that the gun was found hidden in the car where Penny attempted to

sell cocaine base to an informant. Penny claims that the gun was left in the car by a

friend for Penny’s protection, unrelated to the transaction, and that the gun was not

readily accessible to him. The district court was free to consider, however, that the

gun’s proximity to Penny and the drugs during the would-be drug transaction had the

purpose or effect of facilitating that felony offense. See United States v. Jones, 327

F.3d 654, 657-58 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 enhancement for

possessing firearm in connection with another felony offense, where approximately

30 ounces of crack were found under vehicle’s driver seat and firearm was recovered

from duffel bag in trunk; close physical proximity of the two provided sufficient

nexus to support enhancement).3

Penny also takes issue with the district court’s conclusion that he had three

qualifying predicate offenses triggering armed-career-criminal status. We disagree.

Penny concedes that his prior conviction for second-degree assault was a violent

felony for purposes of sections 924(e) and 4B1.4, and circuit precedent establishes

that his convictions for theft of a motor vehicle and fleeing a police officer are

similarly both violent felonies. See United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 752-53

(8th Cir. 2002) (theft of motor vehicle is crime of violence for purposes of career

offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2); United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d 803,

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808-09 (fleeing police officer is crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2); United

States v. Sprouse, 394 F.3d 578, 580 (8th Cir. 2005) (definition of “crime of violence”

under § 4B1.2 and “violent felony” under § 924(e) is identical; same analysis applies

to both determinations). 

Last, Penny argues that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated

because his armed-career-criminal predicate offenses were neither alleged in the

indictment nor proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, and the enhancement for

possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense had to be either

admitted to by him during his plea hearing or proven to a jury. These arguments are

likewise foreclosed by our cases. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 551 n.4

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“Nothing in Booker suggests that sentencing judges are

required to find sentence-enhancing facts beyond a reasonable doubt under the

advisory Guidelines regime.”); United States v. Varnedore, 422 F.3d 1143, 1144 (8th

Cir. 2005) (sentencing judge is entitled to act as fact-finder for purpose of sentencing);

United States v. Perry, 437 F.3d 782, 786-87 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court’s

determination of fact and nature of prior convictions for sentencing purposes does not

run afoul of Booker or Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005);

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), remains good law).

Finally, we reject Penny’s pro se arguments, which we find merit no additional

discussion.

______________________________

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