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Parties Involved:
TSI, Incorporated
Appellee
Aleksandr L. Yufa
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALEKSANDR L. YUFA,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

TSI, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1784

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 4:09-cv-01315-

KAW, Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore.

______________________ 

Decided: November 9, 2016

______________________ 

ALEKSANDR L. YUFA, Colton, CA, pro se.

COURTLAND COLLINSON MERRILL, Anthony Ostlund 

Baer & Louwagie P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for defendantappellee. Also represented by DANIEL RYAN HALL. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 YUFA v. TSI, INC. 

PER CURIAM. 

This appeal concerns the appointment of a receiver to 

satisfy a judgment awarding attorney fees and costs. 

Appellant Dr. Aleksandr L. Yufa appeals an interlocutory 

order issued by the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California (“District Court”), which granted-inpart and denied-in-part Appellee TSI, Inc.’s (“TSI”) renewed motion to appoint Greyhound IP LLC (“Greyhound”) as receiver and to compel the assignment of Dr. 

Yufa’s patents to Greyhound. Appellant’s App. 31–35 

(Order). We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Yufa owns U.S. Patent Nos. 7,573,573, 7,439,855, 

6,034,769, 5,969,665, 5,946,091, 5,767,967, and 6,346,983 

(“the ’983 patent”) (collectively, “the Patent Portfolio”). 

He has filed at least nine suits for patent infringement, 

involving no less than eight appeals to this court related 

to the Patent Portfolio. 

The present appeal follows from Dr. Yufa’s filing of a 

complaint in the District Court alleging that TSI’s predecessor-in-interest infringed the ’983 patent. The District 

Court granted summary judgment of noninfringement in 

favor of TSI. See generally Yufa v. TSI, Inc., No. CV 09-

01315-KAW, 2014 WL 2120023 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2014). 

TSI moved for attorney fees and costs, and the District 

Court found that Dr. Yufa’s claims of infringement were 

“objectively baseless,” granted TSI’s motion, and awarded 

TSI $166,364.88. See Yufa v. TSI, Inc., No. CV 09-01315-

KAW, 2014 WL 4071902, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2014); 

Appellant’s App. 32. 

TSI filed a motion to appoint Greyhound as receiver 

and to compel the assignment of the Patent Portfolio to 

Greyhound to satisfy the Judgment. Appellant’s App. 32. 

The District Court denied TSI’s motion without prejudice 

pending Dr. Yufa’s appeal of the District Court’s grant of 

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YUFA v. TSI, INC. 3

summary judgment. Id. On appeal, we affirmed the 

District Court’s grant of summary judgment of noninfringement in favor of TSI. See Yufa v. TSI, Inc., 600 F. 

App’x 747, 754 (Fed. Cir. 2015). We did not reach the 

attorney fees and costs issue because Dr. Yufa waived this 

argument. Id.

Following that decision, TSI renewed its motion to 

appoint a receiver and to compel the assignment of the 

Patent Portfolio. Appellant’s App. 32. The District Court 

appointed Greyhound as receiver but “decline[d] to assign 

the [Patent Portfolio] until it is provided with a valuation,” at which time “TSI may file a second motion to 

compel the assignment of the [Patent Portfolio].” Id. at

35. 

Dr. Yufa timely appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(2), (c)(1) (2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

We review procedural matters not unique to patent 

law according to the law of the regional circuit. Juicy 

Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 382 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. 

Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit reviews district court 

orders appointing a receiver for abuse of discretion. Can. 

Life Assurance Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 

2009). “In deciding whether the district court abused its 

discretion, [the Ninth Circuit] employ[s] a two-part test.” 

Meritage Homes of Nev., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 

753 F.3d 819, 823 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). First, the court “determine[s] de novo whether the trial court identified the 

correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested.” Id. 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Second, 

the court “determine[s] whether the district court’s application of the correct legal standard was (1) illogical, 

(2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that 

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4 YUFA v. TSI, INC. 

may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

II. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When 

It Appointed Greyhound as Receiver

A. The District Court Identified the Correct Legal Rule

We begin by evaluating whether the District Court 

“identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief 

requested.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). It did.

The enforcement of a money judgment “must accord 

with the procedure of the state where the court is located, 

but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). Although Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 66 permits a court to appoint a receiver, it does 

not detail the procedures that must be followed. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 66. Therefore, as the District Court explained, 

California state law governs the appointment of a receiver. Appellant’s App. 33; see Hendricks & Lewis PLLC v. 

Clinton, 766 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2014) (“While Rule 66 

prevails over state law to the extent it applies, it does not 

provide a different standard for the appointment of a 

receiver than one found under Washington law. Therefore, we consider Washington law when reviewing the 

district court’s order appointing a receiver.”).

The District Court correctly identified the applicable 

California law. Appellant’s App. 33–34. Pursuant to the 

California Code of Civil Procedure, “[t]he provisions of 

Chapter 5 . . . of Title 7 govern the appointment, qualifications, powers, rights, and duties of a receiver.” Cal. Civ. 

Proc. Code § 708.610 (1983). In conducting its analysis,

the District Court evaluated both the propriety of the 

District Court’s appointment of a receiver, consistent with 

California Code of Civil Procedure § 708.620, and the 

receiver’s authorities, consistent with California Code of 

Civil Procedure §§ 568, 568.5. Appellant’s App. 33–34. 

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YUFA v. TSI, INC. 5

The District Court thus identified the correct legal standard.

B. The District Court Properly Applied the Correct Legal 

Standard

We next evaluate “whether the district court’s application of the correct legal standard was (1) illogical, 

(2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that 

may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Meritage 

Homes, 753 F.3d at 823 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We discern no error in the District 

Court’s application of the law. 

Dr. Yufa argues that the District Court’s decision to 

appoint a receiver conflicts with California Code of Civil 

Procedure § 708.620 because it is not in his interest and it 

“is not a reasonable method to obtain the fair satisfaction 

of judgment.” Appellant’s Br. 30 (emphasis omitted); see 

id. at 29–31. California Code of Civil Procedure § 708.620 

provides that “[t]he court may appoint a receiver to enforce the judgment where the judgment creditor shows 

that, considering the interests of both the judgment 

creditor and the judgment debtor, the appointment of a 

receiver is a reasonable method to obtain a fair and 

orderly satisfaction of the judgment.” Cal. Civ. Proc. 

§ 708.620. This provision does not mean that a debtor 

may avoid his legal liabilities, including any payment

owed. TSI was awarded a judgment for expenses from 

defending against Dr. Yufa’s infringement action, and 

“there is no dispute that Dr. Yufa has no . . . financial 

means” other than the Patent Portfolio “to satisfy the 

judgment at this time.” Appellant’s App. at 34, 35. The

District Court properly considered each parties’ arguments and determined that appointment of a receiver was 

in both parties’ interests. Id. at 34.

Second, Dr. Yufa asserts that appointing a receiver is 

premature because he is involved in litigation involving 

the Patent Portfolio. Appellant’s Br. 31–33. However, the 

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6 YUFA v. TSI, INC. 

California Code of Civil Procedure permits receivers to 

“take and keep possession of the property, . . . to make 

transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting the 

property as the Court may authorize,” Cal. Civ. Proc. 

Code § 568, such as to “sell real or personal property in 

the receiver’s possession,” id. at § 568.5. Dr. Yufa has not 

identified any authority supporting his argument that 

property involved in active litigation may not be assigned 

to a receiver. Appellant’s Br. 31–43. And a party’s legal 

obligations are case-dependent and do not evaporate 

when a party becomes involved in separate litigation. 

More importantly, the District Court did not order the 

assignment of any of Dr. Yufa’s patents; it only appointed 

the receiver and ordered a valuation of the Patent Portfolio. Appellant’s App. 35. Therefore, the District Court 

may elect not to assign patents involved in active litigation.

The District Court’s application of the law was not “illogical,” “implausible,” or “without support in inferences 

that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” Meritage 

Homes, 753 F.3d at 823 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). The District Court properly applied the 

correct legal standard and determined that appointing a 

receiver was a reasonable method to obtain a fair and 

orderly satisfaction of the Judgment. 

CONCLUSION

A pro se party typically will not possess the same 

skills as a seasoned litigant educated in the profession, 

and the Supreme Court has instructed the federal judiciary to assist such parties when appropriate. See Haines 

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, that assistance has limits and does not transform an inherently 

adversarial system into one that accommodates only the 

views of one party. See Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 

795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995). At some point, a pro se plaintiff 

has to recognize that when a court says a cause of action 

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YUFA v. TSI, INC. 7

is without merit, the defendant can no longer be forced to 

incur expenses associated with the litigation and must be 

allowed to collect money owed. Failure to accept that 

objective reality must necessarily result in the pro se 

plaintiff bearing the expenses the defendant is being 

forced to pay without good reason. This is such a case. 

We have considered Dr. Yufa’s remaining arguments to 

the contrary and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, 

the Order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern 

District of California is 

AFFIRMED

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