Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15918/USCOURTS-ca9-08-15918-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joe McGrath
Appellee
Felix Solorio Valdovinos
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FELIX SOLORIO VALDOVINOS, 

No. 08-15918 Petitioner-Appellant,

D.C. No.

v.  4:02-CV-01704-CW

JOE MCGRATH,

OPINION Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Claudia Wilken, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 1, 2009—San Francisco, California

Filed March 10, 2010

Before: Betty B. Fletcher and Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge B. Fletcher

*The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, United States District Judge for

the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Christopher J. Cannon, Sugarman & Cannon, San Francisco,

California, for the petitioner-appellant. 

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Dane R. Gillette, Gerald A. Engler,

Peggy S. Ruffra, and Jeremy Friedlander, San Francisco, California, for the respondent-appellee.

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner-Appellant Felix Solorio Valdovinos appeals from

the district court’s denial of his amended habeas corpus petition challenging his jury conviction of first degree murder. He

contends that the government withheld potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83

(1963), and that his trial counsel’s performance fell below the

level required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). Because a reasonable probability exists that the undisclosed Brady material could have altered the result of the proceeding, we reverse in part and remand with instructions to

the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

I.

On December 1, 1998, a jury convicted Valdovinos of the

first degree murder of Nelson Caballero. On May 11, 1998,

Caballero was shot outside a San Jose nightclub. The shooter

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fired two shots from a .380 caliber semi-automatic handgun,

hitting Caballero once in the stomach and once in the head.

The murder investigation ultimately led to the arrest of Valdovinos in Oregon in June 1998.

At trial, the prosecution relied heavily on eyewitness testimony implicating Valdovinos in the killing. The prosecution

called as eyewitnesses four of Caballero’s acquaintances who

were present at the shooting. Three of these witnesses identified Valdovinos as the shooter at both the preliminary hearing

and trial.

One witness, Joaquin Diaz, testified that the shooter wore

a black cowboy hat and a black leather jacket, and had a mustache. Diaz stated that the gunman was approximately the

same height as Diaz, who stood five feet, six inches. Diaz also

testified that one of the shooter’s companions wore cowboy

garb and a hat, but was taller than Diaz, and that a third man

talking to Caballero at the time of the shooting did not wear

any cowboy apparel and was Diaz’s height.

Tracy Castro and Kyong “Say” Miranda also witnessed the

shooting outside the club. At trial, Castro testified that, as she

exited the club that night, she observed a man wearing a white

cowboy hat, jeans, and a black waist-length jacket shoot

Caballero in the stomach and then in the temple. Castro also

testified that the shooter was six feet tall. After the shooting,

Castro saw the shooter leave with another person in a gray

car.

Miranda testified at trial that the shooter was a Hispanic

male wearing a light tan straw cowboy hat, a short leather

jacket, and jeans. She said he was tall and slender and had a

mustache, and that he drove away in a gray car with a male

passenger.

Caballero’s girlfriend, Blanca Torres, told the police the

shooter wore a black hat, a dark jacket, was a bit muscular,

and had a mustache.

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Diaz, Castro, and Miranda all identified Valdovinos as the

shooter at both the preliminary hearing and trial. Torres could

not identify the shooter.

During the course of the investigation, Detective Ernesto

Alcantar presented two of the eyewitnesses each with two

photographic lineups. A few days after the shooting, Detective Alcantar showed Castro and Diaz each a photo lineup of

six Hispanic males with mustaches and short to medium black

hair. At that time, Castro did not identify Valdovinos but

selected another photograph. Diaz chose the photo of Valdovinos but said he was not certain of the identification.

Several months later, in advance of the preliminary hearing,

Detective Alcantar showed Castro and Diaz each a second

photographic lineup using a different photograph of Valdovinos. Again, Diaz chose Valdovinos’s photo but said he

was not sure and Castro identified someone other than Valdovinos.

At the preliminary hearing, Valdovinos’s defense attorney,

in the presence of the prosecutor and Detective Alcantar,

requested a blackboard preliminary hearing, in which a screen

prevents the witnesses from seeing the defendant.1 Defense

counsel made the request based on a review of police reports

indicating the witnesses had never seen a lineup or photo

lineup. Neither the prosecutor nor Detective Alcantar

informed the court or defense counsel that the witnesses

already had seen photo lineups including Valdovinos’s photo,

or that Diaz tentatively had identified Valdovinos’s photo

whereas Castro had chosen different photographs. The court

denied the defense attorney’s request.

1A blackboard preliminary hearing takes place when the witnesses have

not made any prior identifications of the defendant. A screen blocks the

witness’s view of the defendant so that when the witness later is asked to

make an identification at trial, the witness will not already have seen the

defendant at the preliminary hearing. 

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Defense counsel did not learn of the photo lineups until

cross-examination of Diaz during trial. Detective Alcantar

later testified he had administered two separate photo lineups.

Upon learning of the non-disclosure of the previous photographic lineups, defense counsel moved for a dismissal. The

trial court determined that the non-disclosure of the photo

lineups fell within the purview of Brady v. Maryland, 373

U.S. 83 (1963). However, the court denied the motion to dismiss because it found that the prosecution did not intentionally conceal the exculpatory evidence and therefore did not

act in bad faith. The court read a corrective jury instruction

and offered defense counsel a continuance, which counsel did

not take.

Also at trial, the prosecution read into the record the preliminary hearing testimony of Aurelio Lopez and his unsworn

statement to the police. Lopez and another man, Isidro Garcia,

both of whom resided with Valdovinos, were at the club on

the night of the shooting. Lopez was scheduled to testify for

the prosecution at trial, but could not be located once the trial

started. Defense counsel objected to the court declaring Lopez

unavailable and permitting the introduction of his preliminary

hearing testimony, but did not object to the admission of

Lopez’s out-of-court statement.

As part of the investigation, Detective Alcantar and Police

Sergeant Pete Ramirez visited Valdovinos’s apartment. Valdovinos was not home, but Lopez and Garcia were present.

The police received consent to search the apartment and

found an ounce of methamphetamine and a nine millimeter

gun in Lopez’s bedroom. They arrested Lopez on an outstanding warrant for drug and gun possession. Police never brought

new gun and drug possession charges against Lopez.

The same day, the detectives interviewed Lopez and Garcia

at the police station. When they asked Lopez if he had seen

Valdovinos with a weapon on the night of the shooting, Lopez

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said he did but did not know what kind. When questioned further, Lopez stated that the weapon was a gun. Lopez later

contradicted this statement while testifying at the preliminary

hearing.

At trial, Garcia testified that many people at the nightclub

on the night of the shooting were dressed similarly, and that

both Valdovinos and Lopez wore hats and black jackets. Garcia was wearing a black leather jacket, black pants, and boots,

but no hat. Garcia testified that he and Lopez were exiting the

club when Caballero was shot. Garcia said he had heard two

shots and had seen Caballero on the ground. 

At the preliminary hearing, Lopez admitted that he told

Detective Alcantar that he had seen Valdovinos with a gun,

but testified that his statements to Detective Alcantar were not

truthful. Lopez explained that he was afraid that he himself

might be a suspect and told Detective Alcantar what he

wanted to hear. Detective Alcantar did not include a photograph of Lopez in either lineup, but testified at trial that Lopez

was similar in size and stature to Valdovinos.

At trial, Detective Alcantar testified that Sergeant Ramirez

had found methamphetamine and a gun in Lopez’s bedroom

when police arrested Lopez. This testimony was the first time

defense counsel had heard of the methamphetamine and gun

found in Lopez’s bedroom.

Again, based on the untimely disclosure of favorable evidence, Valdovinos’s defense counsel moved for a mistrial,

arguing that Lopez’s possession of the gun and drugs could

have been used to impeach his testimony at the preliminary

hearing and that, without this evidence, counsel had been

unable to cross-examine Lopez effectively at the preliminary

hearing. The court denied the request for a mistrial, finding

that the prejudicial impact of the untimely disclosure did not

warrant a mistrial. The jury convicted Valdovinos at the close

of the seven-day trial.

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A state appellate court affirmed the judgment on August

23, 2000. Valdovinos filed a pro se petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court on June 29,

2001, which the state Supreme Court denied on December 19,

2001. Valdovinos’s pro se federal habeas corpus petition followed on April 10, 2002.

The district court appointed habeas counsel for Valdovinos.

After a review of the prosecution’s case file yielded additional

undisclosed evidence, Valdovinos’s habeas counsel amended

the habeas petition to include this new evidence. In a traverse

accompanying the amended petition, counsel pointed to four

types of newly discovered evidence.

First, the prosecutor’s case file contained an undisclosed

anonymous letter purportedly sent to Caballero’s family stating that Caballero’s murder was a contract killing over a debt.

Second, habeas counsel obtained a written statement from a

man named Juan Ledezma stating that Lopez had told

Ledezma that Lopez had two guns of different calibers, Lopez

had killed someone at a bar in San Jose and blamed Valdovinos, and Lopez had told his brother to throw out the gun

used in the killing. The third piece of newly discovered evidence was a photograph from the police file taken by police

on the night of the shooting. The man in the photo, identified

as Jose Mongia, is wearing a black hat and black leather

jacket in the photo — the same items eyewitnesses testified

the shooter wore. Habeas counsel also included in the

amended petition additional information regarding the gun

and drugs found in Lopez’s possession during the apartment

search in 1998.

The district court found the new evidence rendered Valdovinos’s claims unexhausted and ordered a stay on December 3, 2004, to allow Valdovinos to exhaust his remedies in

state court. Nine months later, on September 9, 2005, Valdovinos filed his second state habeas petition, this time containing the previously unexhausted claims. The Supreme

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Court denied this petition on July 26, 2006. On August 23,

2006, the district court ordered Valdovinos to file a motion to

amend the stayed petition within two weeks. Valdovinos filed

his motion to amend three weeks later, on September 14,

2006.

The district court denied relief on March 12, 2008, and certified two issues for appeal: (1) whether the Brady violations

denied Valdovinos due process; and (2) whether Valdovinos’s

trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to

object to the prosecution’s introduction of Lopez’s out-ofcourt statements.2

 In addition, the state appeals the district

court’s decision to allow Valdovinos to amend his habeas petition.3

 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253.

II.

We first determine whether the district court erred in staying Valdovinos’s petition while he exhausted additional

claims in state court and allowing Valdovinos to amend his

habeas petition. We review for abuse of discretion a district

court’s stay and abeyance of a mixed petition containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S.

269, 279 (2005). We also review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to allow a habeas petitioner to amend his

petition. Hebner v. McGrath, 543 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir.

2008). We find the district court did not abuse its discretion

in granting the stay or allowing the amendment.

A.

The district court ordered a stay on December 3, 2004, to

permit Valdovinos to exhaust his remedies in state court. Nine

2Valdovinos raises an uncertified issue in his opening brief. We decline

to expand the scope of the COA to include the uncertified issue. 

3The state is not required to obtain a COA before raising an issue on

appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(3). 

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months later, on September 9, 2005, Valdovinos filed a second state habeas petition containing the unexhausted claims

with the California Supreme Court. The state Supreme Court

denied this petition on July 26, 2006 and, on August 23, 2006,

the district court ordered Valdovinos to file a motion to

amend the stayed petition within two weeks. Valdovinos filed

his motion to amend on September 14, 2006.

The state opposed the motion to amend, arguing that Valdovinos did not act within a reasonable time to exhaust his

state remedies because he did not file his second state habeas

petition until nine months after the district court entered the

stay. The district court rejected this argument, finding that the

delay provided insufficient grounds upon which to deny Valdovinos’s motion to amend the petition.

[1] In Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005), the Supreme

Court examined the manner in which courts should treat

mixed petitions containing both exhausted and unexhausted

claims in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AEDPA”) one-year time limit on the filing of

federal habeas corpus petitions. The Supreme Court held that

a district court has discretion to grant a stay and abeyance of

a mixed petition so that a petitioner may exhaust the unexhausted claims in state court before returning to federal court

for review of a “perfected petition.” Id. at 278. Rhines struck

a balance between the congressional intent behind AEDPA —

to “reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly in capital cases,” id. at 276 (citations omitted) — and the preservation of petitioners’ rights to

federal review of their claims. Id. at 277.

Rhines opined that a district court would likely abuse its

discretion in denying such a stay where “the petitioner had

good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims

are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the

petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory tactics.” Id. at 278.

Although Rhines directed district courts to “place reasonable

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time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court and back,” id.

at 278, the Court left the determination of that time limit to

the discretion of the district court.

[2] Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

finding Valdovinos satisfied the elements of Rhines. First, the

Supreme Court decided Rhines after the district court here

issued the stay without imposing a specific time limit within

which Valdovinos had to file his petition in state court. The

district court reasoned that retroactively imposing a time limit

would have been inappropriate and emphasized that Valdovinos had not engaged in dilatory tactics and had no motivation for delay, as he is not a capital defendant. The court

also noted that Valdovinos did not bear the blame for omitting

the additional evidence rendering his claims unexhausted

because he had no knowledge of it due to the misconduct of

the prosecution. We agree. Thus, we hold that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the amendments

to the original habeas petition.

B.

We next must determine if the amendments arise “from the

same core facts as the timely filed claim” such that they relate

back to the original, timely petition. Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S.

644, 657 (2005). Following the Supreme Court’s test in

Mayle, we hold that the new evidence in the amended habeas

petition properly relates back to the claims raised in the initial

petition. 

[3] Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governs amendments to pleadings in habeas proceedings, which are characterized as civil in nature. 28 U.S.C. § 2242. Rule 15(c)

instructs: “An amendment of a pleading relates back to the

date of the original pleading when . . . the amendment asserts

a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction,

or occurrence set out — or attempted to be set out — in the

original pleading.” Fed. Rule Civ. P. 15(c). In Mayle, the

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Supreme Court held that “claims added by amendment [must]

arise from the same core facts as the timely filed claims,” and

must not be “separate in both time and type from the originally raised episodes.” Mayle, 545 U.S. at 657 (quotation and

citation omitted). Thus, we review the district court’s finding

that the new claims related back under the Mayle standard.

1.

We first examine Valdovinos’s Brady claims. The original

petition alleged that Valdovinos was denied due process and

a fair trial by the prosecution’s withholding of the prior photo

lineups, evidence of the drugs and gun found in Lopez’s possession, and the favorable treatment Lopez received for his

testimony. The amendments seek to add that the prosecutor

violated Brady by not disclosing the anonymous letter and the

Mongia photograph.

The district court held that Valdovinos’s revised Brady

claim related back to the Brady claim in the original petition.

We agree.

This case is similar to Mandacina v. United States, 328

F.3d 995 (8th Cir. 2003), which the Mayle court cited with

approval. Mayle, 545 U.S. at 664, n.7. In Mandacina, the

original petition alleged that the government had failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Mandacina, 328 F.3d at 1000.

The petitioner sought to amend his habeas petition to include

the “Borland Report,” to which the original petition made no

reference. Id. The Eighth Circuit concluded that the amended

claim related back to the original petition because the content

of the report was “evidence of other suspects obtained by” the

police department during the murder investigation. Id. at

1001.

[4] Here, both the original and amended claims pertain to

suppressed exculpatory evidence originating from materials

from the police investigation. Each claim, therefore, is of the

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same type — exculpatory information the government had in

its file — that the government failed to disclose at the

required time. As in Mandacina, “[t]he Brady claims in the

original [petition] . . . satisfy Rule 15(c) by providing the government with the notice that the statutes of limitation were

intended to provide.” Id. Therefore, we hold that the district

court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the amendments to the Brady claims.

2.

[5] We next examine Valdovinos’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. The original petition alleged ineffective

assistance of counsel; the amended petition seeks to add new

evidence supporting the claim. The claim has not changed,

but habeas counsel argues the four pieces of newly discovered

evidence “provide a more concrete basis for demonstrating

prejudice” under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). The four new pieces of evidence are: (1) the photograph of Mongia; (2) the statement by Ledezma implicating

Lopez; (3) the anonymous letter; and (4) police documents

concerning the drugs and gun found in Lopez’s possession.

[6] The district court found that the amended claim arose

from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as set forth

in the original pleading, and that the government had received

notice of the claim in the original pleading. The original ineffective assistance of counsel claim alleged counsel did not

adequately investigate suppressed exculpatory evidence upon

learning of it. The amended petition simply adds more evidence that counsel did not uncover in its original investigation. The original petition provided notice of this claim, as the

district court found. Therefore, the district court did not abuse

its discretion in permitting amendment of the original habeas

petition to add newly discovered evidence supporting both the

Brady and the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

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III.

In accordance with the standard set forth in AEDPA, a

court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the state

court’s ruling:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “The question under AEDPA is not

whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable — a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v.

Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)). Habeas relief is warranted

only if the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quotations and citations omitted). 

In the event that the state court issues a summary denial of

the habeas petition, the district court conducts an independent

review of the record. Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944, 952

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Id.

A.

[7] We turn now to the substance of Valdovinos’s Brady

claim. As the Supreme Court recently articulated, “[a]lthough

the State is obliged to ‘prosecute with earnestness and vigor,’

it ‘is as much [its] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every

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legitimate means to bring about a just one.’ ” Cone v. Bell,

___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1782 (2009) (quoting Berger

v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). The Court has long

held that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused

violates due process of law, regardless of whether the prosecution suppresses the evidence in good or bad faith. Brady,

373 U.S. at 87. As the Supreme Court explained in Brady,

“[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but

when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration

of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.” Id.

Thus, “when the State withholds from a criminal defendant

evidence that is material to his guilt or punishment, it violates

his right to due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1782 (citing Brady, 373

U.S. at 87).

[8] A Brady claim is composed of three necessary elements: “(1) [t]he evidence at issue must be favorable to the

accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is

impeaching, (2) that evidence must have been suppressed by

the State, and (3) prejudice must have ensued.” Jackson v.

Brown, 513 F.3d 1057, 1071 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and

citation omitted). “To determine whether prejudice exists, we

look to the materiality of the suppressed evidence.” Id.

“[E]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1783; United States v. Jernigan, 492

F.3d 1050, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). In other words,

a defendant need not show that he “would more likely than

not have received a different verdict with the evidence.”

Jernigan, 492 F.3d at 1054 (quotation and citation omitted).

Instead, he must show only that “the government’s evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). A court must consider the materiality of the Brady violations collectively rather

than item by item. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 436-37

(1995).

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The four new pieces of evidence are: (1) the photograph of

Mongia; (2) the anonymous letter; (3) police documents concerning the drugs and gun found in Lopez’s possession; and

(4) the Ledezma statement implicating Lopez. The last piece

of evidence, however, is not Brady material because it was

obtained by Valdovinos’s habeas counsel and never was part

of the prosecution’s file.

1.

Valdovinos’s habeas counsel stated in a declaration in support of the amended petition that the prosecution’s file contained photographs of several of the witnesses police

interviewed at the nightclub on the night of the shooting. One

such photo shows a man named Jose Mongia wearing a black

cowboy hat and a black leather jacket, the same items allegedly worn by the shooter.

Valdovinos argues that the prosecution’s failure to disclose

the Mongia photograph was material because the state court

found that Valdovinos was the only one at the crime scene

consistently described as wearing a cowboy hat. The district

court rejected Valdovinos’s Brady claim as to the Mongia

photo because any evidence indicating the authenticity of the

photograph is lacking and therefore the court could not conclude the photograph would have affected the trial in any

way. The state contends that the non-disclosure was not material because Mongia cannot be the shooter because several

witnesses stated the shooter fled the scene of the crime;

Mongia did not flee since he was available for questioning.

[9] In conducting its Brady analysis, the district court

ignored the possibility that the disclosure of the photo could

have added uncertainty to the identifications of Valdovinos as

the shooter. Various inconsistencies existed between the witnesses’ testimony about the shooter’s appearance: one witness

testified the shooter wore a black cowboy hat and a black

leather jacket, stood five-and-a-half feet tall, and had a mus3836 VALDOVINOS v. MCGRATH

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tache; another testified that the shooter wore a white cowboy

hat, a black leather jacket, and was six feet tall, and initially

insisted the shooter had no facial hair; a third witness testified

that the shooter wore a light tan straw hat, a black leather

jacket, and stood over six feet; and a fourth witness hesitantly

described the shooter as wearing a black hat and black leather

jacket. These inconsistencies bolster a finding of materiality

with regard to the Mongia photo. The photograph has the

potential to undermine the significance of the single commonality of these descriptions — the cowboy hat — that the court

identified as one of the stand-out characteristics of the

shooter. The fact that many people at the scene that night

actually shared this characteristic, including Mongia, tends to

“undermine[ ] confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Kyles,

514 U.S. at 434 (quotation and citation omitted). Furthermore,

had the prosecution fulfilled its obligations under Brady and

turned this photograph over in a timely manner, the defense

could have elicited testimony from the police to authenticate

it.

2.

The second piece of evidence added in the amended petition is an anonymous letter addressed to Eulalio Caballero

found in the prosecution’s file. The letter suggests that Nelson

Caballero owed a debt to someone named Ramon Balemos,

and that Balemos paid someone with money and drugs to kill

Caballero. Valdovinos’s trial attorney stated in a declaration

that he had never seen the letter.

The district court found that the letter qualified as Brady

material, but rejected the claim because its disclosure did not

raise any doubt about the verdict, given that the letter was

ambiguous and anonymous and thus inadmissable. The district court further concluded the letter would not have led to

any admissible exculpatory evidence.

Valdovinos puts forth several arguments tending to show

the letter’s materiality. First, he argues that the prosecution’s

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non-disclosure prevented the defense from conducting a

proper investigation, and there is no way to know whether the

trial could have been affected by the results of that investigation. Valdovinos next argues that the letter impeached the testimony of Detective Alcantar, who testified that there was no

evidence in the case indicating that the murder was drug

related. Defense counsel argued during closing arguments that

Caballero was a drug dealer and that Lopez was a known drug

user, and that drugs could have been the motive for the crime.

In addition, police found a small baggy of a powdery substance containing cocaine between two cars near a corner of

the club. And blood reports showed that Caballero had

ingested cocaine and methamphetamine in the hours before

his death.

[10] Undeniably, the letter at this point is unauthenticated

and unreliable. Nonetheless, the letter could have been of

some value to the defense, particularly if disclosed at the time

police received it. Given the conflicting identification testimony and a letter pointing to another culprit, the nondisclosure of the letter denied the defense important investigative opportunities that had the potential to lead to admissible

evidence. Moreover, only law enforcement officials are in a

position to authenticate the letter, to say how and when the

letter came to be in the file — a task that might have been

possible had the prosecution disclosed the letter when it was

received.

3.

We next turn to the suppressed evidence revealed during

trial. The prosecutor did not disclose before trial that, when

arrested, Lopez was found in possession of an ounce of

methamphetamine and a handgun. Defense counsel learned of

this evidence during the direct examination of Detective

Alcantar. Defense counsel immediately moved for a mistrial,

which the trial court denied.

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Valdovinos’s direct appeal raised this issue in the form of

a Confrontation Clause issue, arguing that the non-disclosure

prevented a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Lopez

at the preliminary hearing. The California Court of Appeals

rejected this argument because it found that a crossexamination of Lopez that included this information would

not have affected the trial. The court reasoned that defense

counsel raised the issue at closing and suggested to the jury

that Lopez might be the killer, that Lopez’s statements at the

preliminary hearing were conflicting and indicated Lopez

might have been covering for Valdovinos, and that defense

counsel used the information to argue to the jury that Lopez

was telling the authorities what they wanted to hear to escape

charges for this possession.

[11] The Supreme Court has held that a Brady violation is

material if it “undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quotation and citation omitted).

Here, the appellate court found that further impeachment of

Lopez would not have affected the trial or outcome. On its

own, this finding is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable

application of established federal law. However, we include

the prosecutor’s failure to disclose the gun and methamphetamine in the cumulative analysis below.

4.

We now review the materiality of the suppressed evidence

collectively. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436; see also Jackson, 513

F.3d at 1071. The California court did not have cause to consider the cumulative Brady impact because it had before it

only the Brady claim based on the undisclosed photo lineups.

The district court considered the collective impact of the

photo lineups, the Lopez impeachment information, the anonymous letter, and the photograph of Mongia. The district

court concluded that, given the strength of the evidence

against Valdovinos, the cumulative impact of the evidence did

not cast doubt on the trial verdict.

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This court reviews the district court’s holding de novo.

Richter, 578 F.3d at 951. In conducting the prejudice inquiry,

“[w]e may find a ‘reasonable probability’ [of a different

result] even where the remaining evidence would have been

sufficient to convict the defendant. Moreover, we may find a

‘reasonable probability’ without finding that the outcome

would more likely than not have been different.” Jackson, 513

F.3d at 1071 (citations omitted). The question is whether, in

light of the suppressed evidence, the defendant “received a

fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of

confidence.” Id. at 1079 (quotation and citation omitted). 

[12] When considered collectively, the suppressed evidence undermines confidence in the verdict. The Mongia photograph has the potential to weaken the identification

testimony by showing that the stand-out characteristic of the

shooter — the cowboy hat — was not unique to Valdovinos.

The district court relied on the fact that the anonymous letter

and the photograph would have been inadmissible at trial. But

that conclusion is a product of the circumstances under which

they were discovered — belatedly, in the prosecution’s file at

a police station, by an associate habeas counsel. And while

the non-disclosure of the photo lineups did not result in a

finding of materiality on its own, as this court has noted,

“each additional . . . Brady violation further undermines our

confidence in the decision-making process.” Id. at 1072.

[13] Significantly, both the state court and the district

court’s findings of no prejudice relied heavily on the “strong”

eyewitness testimony. But the eyewitness testimony was contradictory about the shooter’s physical appearance, his size,

build, and what he was wearing. The photo lineup evidence

renders the identifications questionable. Castro identified Valdovinos as the shooter at the preliminary hearing, but she

picked a person other than Valdovinos in both lineups. Diaz

also identified Valdovinos at the preliminary hearing, but

could not identify him from the photo lineups with any degree

of certainty. And Valdovinos was the only person included in

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both photo lineups, despite the fact that Lopez, who also was

present at the nightclub that night, was similar in build and

stature to Valdovinos. The failure to disclose the gun and

drugs found in Lopez’s possession, even if not prejudicial on

its own, only further solidifies our finding of collective prejudice.

[14] We find the cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence denied Valdovinos a fair trial. The prosecution’s

repeated failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense

leads us to conclude that Valdovinos did not receive a fair

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Thus, we

reverse with regard to the Brady claim and remand with

instructions to the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus.

B.

Valdovinos claims his trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to object to pre-trial statements that

Lopez made to investigating police, which the prosecution

introduced through the testimony of Sergeant Ramirez. 

Valdovinos initially raised this claim in the state appellate

court, challenging the trial court’s decision to permit the introduction of Lopez’s out-of-court statements. In its ruling, the

court first held that Valdovinos had waived the right to appeal

the introduction of Lopez’s statement to police. The court

then held that, “[a]ny argument that counsel was ineffective

for failing to object is also unavailing.”

[15] To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, a petitioner must establish: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, that is, that it fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness; and (2) that he was prejudiced by

the performance, that is, that “there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. WashVALDOVINOS v. MCGRATH 3841

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ington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Trial counsel’s failure to

object to evidence inadmissible under state law can constitute

deficient performance under Strickland. See Rupe v. Wood, 93

F.3d 1434, 1444-45 (9th Cir. 1996).

The state court observed that Valdovinos’s trial counsel

highlighted the inconsistencies in Lopez’s statement to police

at the preliminary hearing. Lopez testified during the preliminary hearing that he told police he saw Valdovinos with a

gun, but that he did not actually know if it was a gun. Sergeant Ramirez’s testimony at trial about Lopez’s statement

revealed the same: While Lopez ultimately stated that Valdovinos had a gun, Lopez was anything but convincing. Sergeant Ramirez testified that Lopez told police he had seen

Valdovinos with a small pistol. However, Lopez also stated

during his police interview that he could not see Valdovinos

at the time of the shooting. When Detective Alcantar asked

Lopez during the interview to describe the gun, Lopez initially stated he did not know and could not say.

[16] While the state court failed to conduct the inquiry

under the Strickland framework, the result of the analysis

would be the same. The court found trial counsel’s failure to

object did not prejudice Valdovinos. The district court agreed:

“Lopez’s testimony was internally contradictory and did not

strongly incriminate Petitioner.” There did not exist, therefore, “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Having found no prejudice, the state court did not err in declining to investigate the

deficient performance prong. Id. at 697 (“[T]here is no reason

for a court . . . to address both components of the inquiry if

the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”).

[17] Therefore, we affirm the district court’s finding that

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the state court’s decision was neither contrary to federal law

nor an unreasonable application of the law to the facts.4

Conclusion

A pattern of non-disclosure permeated the proceedings

against Valdovinos. “By suppressing this evidence, the prosecution arrogated to itself a central function belonging to the

criminal jury and pursued its role as adversary to the exclusion of its role as architect of a just trial.” Jernigan, 492 F.3d

at 1057. In so doing, the government deprived Valdovinos of

his due process rights. Because the collective effect of the

Brady evidence was material, we remand this case to the district court with instructions to issue the writ of habeas corpus,

unless California elects to retry Valdovinos within a time

period the district court specifies.

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and

REMANDED with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless California elects to conduct a new trial within the

time period the district court specifies.

4We note, however, that both the state court and the district court relied

on the eyewitness evidence against Valdovinos to support a finding of no

prejudice. The Brady violations warranting habeas relief negate the

strength of this evidence. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] verdict or

conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have

been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”).

However, because we find the Brady violations alone warrant habeas

relief, we need not consider the cumulative prejudice of the Brady violations with the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Whelchel v.

Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1212 (9th Cir. 2000). 

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