Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00088/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00088-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K. Chappell
Respondent
Scott P. McKinstry
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SCOTT P. MCKINSTRY,

Petitioner,

v.

K. CHAPPELL,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00088 AWI MJS (HC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent is represented by Tami Krenzin of the 

office of the California Attorney General. The parties declined magistrate judge 

jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 8, 14.)

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections 

pursuant to a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Merced, following 

his conviction by jury trial on December 16, 2008, for second degree murder with various 

enhancements. (Clerk's Tr. at 669-72.) On June 19, 2009, Petitioner was sentenced to

an indeterminate term of fifty-one (51) years to life in state prison. (Id.) 

Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 1 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

District, on April 14, 2010. (Lodged Doc. 2.) On March 7, 2011 the appellate court 

affirmed the conviction. (Lodged Doc. 1.) Petitioner sought review by the California 

Supreme Court on April 19, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 5.) The petition for review was 

summarily denied on June 8, 2011. (Lodged Doc. 6.)

Petitioner then sought collateral relief in the form of a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus filed with the California Supreme Court on September 7, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 7.) 

The petition was denied on November 20, 2012. (Lodged Doc. 8.)

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on January 11, 2013. (Pet., ECF No. 1.)

Petitioner raised the following four claims for relief: 

1) That the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth and 

Fourteenth Amendments;

2) The trial court violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by not 

dismissing a non-English speaking juror;

3) That the trial court violated Petitioner's Constitutional rights by denying 

Petitioner's motion to unseal personal juror identifying information; and 

4) That the trial court erred by instructing the jury on an invalid theory for second 

degree murder.

Respondent filed an answer to the petition on June 5, 2013. (Answer, ECF No. 

17.) Petitioner filed a traverse to the answer on June 19, 2013. (Traverse, ECF No. 19.)

II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1

Defendant and his girlfriend, Stephanie Sarabia Day, lived together 

in Livingston. They started seeing each other in March 1995. Defendant 

was a tow truck driver and Stephanie worked at a bank. Defendant knew 

many Livingston police officers because of his contact with them in the 

course of his work, such as when officers impounded vehicles and called 

for a tow.

On October 27, 1995, defendant came into the police department 

with a gun, a Japanese police model .38 special. He said he had received 

the gun as payment for a tow, and he wanted to make sure it was not 

 

1 The Fifth District Court of Appeal‟s summary of the facts in its March 7, 2011 opinion is presumed correct. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 2 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

stolen or used in a crime. Officer Harbin, who knew defendant, ran a 

background check on the serial number, determined the gun was clear,

and wrote up a report. Officer Harbin went to his sergeant and asked him 

what he should do with the gun. The sergeant told him it was payment for 

services rendered and he should give it back to defendant.

On January 5, 1996, defendant told Shannon Millican he was going 

to celebrate his birthday that night with some friends at a nightclub in 

Modesto called Gilligan's. Shannon had met defendant at a pool hall in 

April 1995, and they had had sexual intercourse at a hotel in October 

1995. During the time Shannon knew defendant, he never told her he was 

seeing someone else, had another girlfriend, or was living with someone. 

Shannon had his pager number, but not his telephone number. She would 

page him and he would call her back. Defendant did not invite her to

Gilligan's that night, but she and a couple of her friends decided to show 

up.

At about 10:00 p.m. that night, defendant and Stephanie arrived at 

Gilligan's with defendant's friend, Officer Paul Carmona, and his girlfriend, 

Barbara. Officer Carmona and defendant had met through their contact at 

work. Gilligan's was a large warehouse converted into a nightclub. A lot of 

people were there and the music was loud. Defendant, Officer Carmona, 

and Stephanie were all drinking, but Barbara was not. Defendant had 

several drinks.

Shannon saw defendant with a group of people and she 

approached and greeted him, then went to another area of the nightclub. 

At some point, she saw Stephanie in the restroom, and Stephanie told her 

she was defendant's girlfriend. Shannon did not mention her relationship 

with defendant, but she left the restroom and confronted him. She 

approached him and said, "How would your girlfriend like to know about 

me?" Defendant insisted he did not have a girlfriend and he did not know 

what she was talking about. Defendant was with John Mardakis, who told 

Shannon that Stephanie was in fact defendant's girlfriend. Shannon 

returned to defendant and told him that his friend said Stephanie was his 

girlfriend. Shannon and defendant screamed and cussed at each other. 

Defendant screamed at Shannon that he did not have a girlfriend, that 

everybody was mistaken, that he did not live with her, and that they had 

just dated at one time. Over the course of 30 to 45 minutes, wherever 

Shannon went in the nightclub, defendant followed and told her again that 

Stephanie was not his girlfriend and that Shannon did not know what she 

was talking about. On one occasion, Shannon noticed Stephanie in the 

vicinity. Shannon and defendant's discussions were getting so loud that 

the bouncers were noticing them. Shannon was very upset and she was 

becoming afraid. Her friends escorted her to her car, where she started 

crying, and then she left by herself. She did not drink any alcohol while 

she was at the nightclub.

In Officer Carmona's opinion, everything seemed normal between 

defendant and Stephanie at the nightclub. Officer Carmona, who had 

experience recognizing the signs of drug use, did not see any signs of 

methamphetamine use in either defendant or Stephanie.1 Officer Carmona

 

1 Officer Carmona testified that the effects of methamphetamine use varied. A habitual user needs 

to use methamphetamine just to stay normal. A beginner exhibits signs of intoxication, hyperactivity, 

(continued...)

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 3 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

did not see either of them arguing with another person, but there were 

times when he was not with them. He did notice that defendant seemed 

preoccupied and kept going off to be with other people.

Barbara also thought defendant and Stephanie seemed normal that 

night. She spoke with Stephanie a little, but the music was loud. There 

were periods of time that defendant and Stephanie would leave and then 

return. Defendant had several drinks. All four of them left Gilligan's around 

12:00 or 12:30 a.m.

At about 1:47 a.m., defendant called the police. He said, "This is 

Scot[t]. Someone just shot my girlfriend in the face." The dispatcher, who 

knew defendant, asked, "On a drive-by Scott or what?" Defendant said, 

"Yeah I'm at home right now and she's ...." The dispatcher interrupted him 

to say the police were on their way.

When Officer Broughton arrived at defendant's residence, 

defendant ran into the road to flag him down. The gates to the driveway 

were completely open. Defendant was excited and distressed. He said 

Stephanie had been shot and he led Officer Broughton into the master 

bedroom, where Stephanie was lying on the bed with a towel or cloth on 

her head. She was bleeding heavily, but she had a pulse and she was still 

breathing. She was gurgling, as though liquid was obstructing her airway. 

She did not utter any words. Officer Broughton and defendant both 

attempted to keep pressure on her wound. Within five minutes, firemen 

arrived and moved Stephanie to the floor. Officer Broughton asked for 

Stephanie's identification. He remembered that defendant left the room at 

some point, but he did not know who handed him Stephanie's driver's 

license. In about 10 or 15 minutes, Stephanie was removed from the 

scene.

Officer Broughton observed a large blood stain on the bed where 

Stephanie had lain, and he also saw blood on a pillow in the living room.

After the firemen's arrival, Officer Broughton spoke briefly with 

defendant, who was wearing jeans and a T-shirt. Defendant said he and 

Stephanie had been out drinking for his birthday. When they got home, 

Stephanie told him she was going to the store to get something to drink. 

Defendant went into the house to use the bathroom and he heard what he 

believed was a gunshot. He ran outside and found Stephanie face down 

next to the car, which was now facing the street, positioned to leave 

through the gates. He carried her into the living room and laid her on the 

floor, then moved her into the bedroom. Defendant said there were only 

two firearms in the house, a shotgun in the corner of the bedroom and a 

small-caliber handgun under the mattress.

When Officer Moore arrived, the gates to the property were open 

 

(...continued)

excessive talking, teeth grinding, eye twitching, and pupil dilation. Methamphetamine users can, but do not 

necessarily, become violent. They do not become suicidal unless they are using another drug as well.

On cross-examination, Officer Carmona explained that methamphetamine is not a hallucinogenic 

drug, but it can cause people to become paranoid and possibly violent. If a petite female beginner ingested 

a large amount quickly, it could have a big impact on her body.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 4 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

and a compact car was in the driveway pointing toward the street. Officer 

Moore knew defendant because he interacted with him in the course of his 

work. Officer Moore secured the front of the residence and stayed outside 

to control the scene.

Defendant came outside and stood by Officer Moore. Defendant 

was visibly upset and crying. He told Officer Moore that he and Stephanie 

had just returned from Modesto, where they had gone drinking with some 

other people. Defendant fell asleep in the car and woke up when they got 

home. He opened the gates and Stephanie drove the car in. He got back 

in and she drove around to the back of the house. As they were getting 

out of the car, Stephanie said she wanted to go to the convenience store 

to get something to drink. Defendant went inside to use the bathroom. As 

he was coming out of the bathroom, he heard a gunshot. He looked out 

the front door and saw the car, which was still running with the lights on, 

and Stephanie lying on the ground. When he approached her, he saw she 

was bleeding. He reached into the car and turned off the lights and 

engine. He picked up Stephanie, took her into the house, and called 911.

After Stephanie was removed and the scene was stabilized, Officer 

Broughton took defendant to his patrol car and recorded a conversation 

with him. Defendant said he and Stephanie went to Modesto to meet 

Officer Carmona and his girlfriend. Defendant drank at the nightclub, but 

Stephanie was the designated driver so she had only one beer. They left 

Gilligan's at about 12:30 or 12:35 a.m. and came straight home. 

Defendant slept all the way home until Stephanie slowed down and pulled 

into the driveway. At that point, defendant got out and opened the gates. 

After Stephanie drove through, he closed the gates and got back in the 

car. She drove around to the back of the house and parked. She turned off 

the car and they both got out. She told defendant she wanted to go to the 

convenience store because she was "a little bit thirsty because she drank 

that beer and said she had cottonmouth." Defendant explained that did not 

know what she wanted to drink. There were drinks in the house, but he 

knew she liked Pepsi and he did not have any. She got back in the car 

and defendant entered the back door of the house. He heard her start the 

car. He walked through the house and used the bathroom. As he walked 

out, he heard what sounded like a gunshot. He ran outside and saw 

Stephanie lying on the front lawn. The car was running, the headlights 

were on, and the car door was open. He explained that Stephanie must 

have walked from the car to the gates because the gates were open. 

Defendant went to her, then realized the car was in neutral and rolling 

backward. He turned off the car's engine and lights. He returned to 

Stephanie, grabbed her, and tried to talk to her. He could not see because 

it was dark, but he did see blood on her hair. He asked her if she knew 

who he was and she responded that he was Scott. She was gurgling and 

she spoke as if she had had a stroke. She said her eyes hurt. Defendant 

could not see where the blood was coming from. He picked her up and 

carried her into the living room and laid her on a pillow. He repeatedly 

asked her to say his name and she did. He did not want to leave her, so 

he took her to the bedroom. She was still gurgling, but she had quit talking 

and could not move. He laid her on the bed and checked her again. He 

grabbed a towel from the bathroom floor and wiped the blood from her 

head. Then he could see the hole over her eye. He did not leave her until 

he went outside to flag down Officer Broughton. Defendant stated that he 

and Stephanie did not fight that day.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 5 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Defendant was upset and emotional during the interview. By the 

end of it, he was distressed and began to hyperventilate and rub his hands 

together, apparently realizing he had blood on his hands and shirt. Officer 

Broughton was afraid defendant was going to pass out. Medical personnel 

gave him oxygen and washed the blood off his hands. An officer brought 

him a clean shirt from the house. He was standing outside in the cold, so 

Officer Broughton instructed that he be taken to the police station and 

defendant agreed. At some point, Officer Broughton took a gunshot 

residue sample from defendant's hands.

Detective Brown arrived at the scene around 2:20 a.m., when 

defendant was hyperventilating at the curb and being treated by the fire 

department personnel.

Detective Brown asked defendant about any firearms other than 

those found in the house. Defendant told him there were no other 

firearms. In the house, officers found ammunition for both the .12-gauge 

shotgun and the .25-caliber handgun, but they found no .38-caliber 

ammunition. Defendant was extremely agitated or upset, but he seemed 

to calm down a little.

Officer Moore spoke to neighbors in the six nearby residences. No 

one had seen anything, although one neighbor had heard an unusual 

noise.

Officer Moore took defendant to the police department in his patrol 

car. It was Officer Moore's habit, custom, and protocol for officer safety to 

pat down every person he transported in his patrol vehicle. He did not, 

however, specifically remember patting defendant down that night.

Detective Brown described defendant's residence for the jury as 

they watched a video. He described the large lot, the gates, and the turnaround driveway. The area was extremely dark. There were no lights 

illuminated on the property (the driveway landscape lights did not work 

and the porch light was turned off) and there were no street lights. 

Stephanie's car was in front of the house, pointing toward the street, which 

was 103 feet away. The car was dirty and there were no marks on it to 

indicate anyone had bumped or pressed up against it in a struggle. In the 

soft ground, there appeared to be heel drag marks, suggesting a person 

fell down near the car and was dragged toward the front door. There were 

shoe impressions just outside the car. Blood was on the ground, the car 

door handle, and the driver's side of the steering column. Blood splatters 

tracked from the blood stain on the ground up to the front door. Inside, 

blood splatters led into the living room, where Detective Brown believed 

Stephanie was laid. The blood then led through the kitchen and into the 

master bedroom, where there was a lot of blood and some brain matter on 

the mattress. In the master bathroom, there was some blood that might 

have been cast off while someone was washing bloody hands.

A purse was on the bed in the master bedroom. Inside the purse 

was a small baggie containing a white substance, which was found to be 

0.14 grams of methamphetamine.

Officer Harbin impounded and searched the car, which was 

registered to Stephanie. The car contained numerous clothing articles, 

shoes, mail, bills, sunglasses, and some trash.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 6 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

At about 2:30 a.m., Officer Carmona got a call to come to the police 

station in Livingston in his official capacity. When he arrived, he saw 

defendant there.

At 3:55 a.m., Officer Broughton interviewed defendant at the police 

station. Officer Carmona was present at the interview. Defendant 

explained that he and Stephanie arrived at Gilligan's at about 10:00 p.m. 

Stephanie was the designated driver for the return trip. Defendant drank 

beer and three shots. They left around 12:30 a.m. Defendant passed out 

when they got on the freeway and woke up when they got to the lights of 

Livingston. He just lay there until they got to the house, at which point he 

got out and opened the gates. Stephanie drove in, defendant closed the 

gates, and got back in. She pulled around to the back and they both got 

out. Then she told him she was going to the store to get something to 

drink. She was going to get some bottled water, which she usually drank.

Defendant entered the unlocked back door and walked to the bathroom. 

He was just leaving the bathroom when he heard the pop. He immediately 

ran outside and saw Stephanie lying face up on the ground. There were 

lights on the driveway, so it was not dark outside. The car was still 

running. He asked Stephanie what was wrong, but the car started rolling 

backward toward them (it would have rolled over Stephanie's feet), so he 

got in and turned off the car. That was when he realized the gates had 

been opened. He got out and shut the car door. He could tell Stephanie's 

face was dark and she was gurgling. He talked to her and asked if she 

was alright. She gurgled, but could not speak. He asked her if she knew 

who he was and she tried to answer "Scott" but it was as though she could 

not speak. Defendant picked her up and put her head by his shoulder. As 

he carried her, he asked her to help him. She moved her legs and was 

trying to walk, but her legs were dragging. Once inside the living room, 

defendant could see all the blood. Stephanie quit saying his name. He 

carried her into the bedroom so he could put her on the bed and call 911. 

He put a towel on her face and could now see that she was bleeding from 

a hole. When he grabbed the telephone, Stephanie tried to grab it. He 

kept asking her if she was okay and she kept saying that her eyes hurt. He 

called 911.

Officer Broughton asked defendant if he or Stephanie had 

experienced trouble with anyone recently. Defendant had made a citizen's 

arrest on someone and his dog had bitten someone. Defendant also 

mentioned someone Stephanie was having trouble with at work. When 

Officer Broughton asked whether there were any problems between 

defendant and Stephanie, defendant said they did not argue while they 

were out that night or after they got home. He then admitted there was a 

girl at the nightclub who "got in [his] ass a little bit ...." He explained that 

the girl was angry "because I set her up with a buddy of mine, and my 

buddy's got a girlfriend and she came up and chewed my ass because I 

set her up and set him up, I set her up with a guy who had a girlfriend. [¶] 

... [¶] She just told me I was a piece of shit."

Officer Broughton told defendant it struck him as odd that 

Stephanie would stop the car in front of the porch (near the house and far 

from the gates), where she would have to walk all the way to the gates to 

open them, then all the way back to the car, rather than drive up to the 

gate, open it, and drive out. Defendant answered that he had never seen 

Stephanie open the gates when she left in the mornings so he did not 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 7 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

exactly know her standard method of opening them.

Later in the morning, defendant asked Officer Carmona to take him 

to the hospital. They got to the hospital around 6:00 a.m., and stayed for 

one and one-half or two hours. Defendant kept telling Officer Carmona he 

could not believe that this had happened, that someone would do this to 

Stephanie. Officer Carmona did not recall defendant's crying or appearing 

distraught. Officer Carmona took defendant to his father's house in 

Modesto, as defendant requested.

Officer Johnston was called to the hospital. At about 6:00 a.m., he 

met Detective Brown and they went into the neurotrauma unit, where 

Stephanie had been stabilized. Officer Johnston took gunshot residue 

samples from her hands.

Officer Johnston then joined the ongoing search at defendant's 

residence. In a bathroom near the back door, he found a blue and black 

flannel shirt jacket with a quilted lining—with blood, dirt, water, and 

cobwebs on it—stuffed behind the door.

Several officers searched the large lot using metal detectors, but no 

gun was found. The presence of other metal—such as the metal fence, 

metal poles on the ground, and nine vehicles—caused interference 

because the detectors responded to metal within five or eight feet.

Later that day, Herman Hoerth told the police that on about January 

3, 1996, he saw defendant with a .38 revolver. Defendant took the gun out 

of his truck and showed it to him. It was in a leather case. Defendant told 

Herman he got the gun in a trade for a tow.

Stephanie died that evening, about 17 hours after the shooting.

At some point, defendant went to the home of a friend, Edward 

Arellano, and told him that his girlfriend had been shot in a drive-by 

shooting by a "load of Mexican guys [who] pulled up and shot" her soon 

after she and defendant got out of the car. Arellano did not recall his 

mentioning that Stephanie died. Arellano thought defendant seemed 

nervous, shaken up, and a bit paranoid. Defendant was with a man named 

John.

On January 7, 1996, the officers ended their search of the 

residence at about 6:00 p.m. They left a message with defendant's 

parents that they needed to speak with defendant.

On the morning of January 8, 1996, defendant came to the police 

station with his father. Defendant was interviewed again, this time by 

Detective Brown. Defendant explained that he and Stephanie went out to 

Gilligan's with Officer Carmona and his girlfriend. They met defendant's 

friend, John Mardakis. Defendant had two or three beers and three shots. 

Defendant and Stephanie left at 12:30 or 12:45 a.m. and they went 

straight home. Defendant slept most of the way and woke up when they 

reached the lights of Livingston. Stephanie said she was going to stop and 

get something to drink, but defendant convinced her to take him home 

because he had to use the bathroom. Defendant opened the gate. The 

porch light was not on, but they had "little lights that mark the driveway." 

Stephanie drove around to the back of the house. When she got out of the 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 8 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

car, she told him she was going to go back to the store. Defendant 

explained that Stephanie usually drank bottled water and she would not 

have wanted any other drink, including the ones that were in the house, 

right before going to bed. Defendant went into the house through the back 

door. While he hurriedly walked to the bathroom, he heard Stephanie start 

the car. While he was urinating in the bathroom, he heard a pop. He went 

into the living room, opened the front door, and saw Stephanie lying face 

up in the front yard. He ran outside and asked her what was wrong. The 

car rolled a little, so he reached in and turned the ignition off. The gates 

were opened enough for her to drive through. (He later opened them fully 

when he was expecting the police.) He grabbed Stephanie and could see 

that her face was dark. He picked her up and carried her into the house. 

He laid her in the living room, then moved her into the bedroom. She said 

that she had to go to the bathroom, that her eyes hurt, and that she 

needed to get her contacts out. He took a towel from the bedroom floor 

and put it on her head. She talked to him and kept grabbing onto him. He 

tried to hold her and hug her. When she quit talking to him, he called 911. 

He hung up the telephone and almost immediately heard the siren. He ran 

outside and waved down the officer.

Defendant explained that a girl named Shannon was at Gilligan's 

that night. He did not remember her last name or have her telephone 

number. He recognized her and she greeted him. Defendant's friend, 

John, was interested in meeting her, so defendant introduced them and 

walked away. That night, he and Stephanie were apart only when one of 

them was in the restroom.

Detective Brown told defendant he did not believe his story and he 

was going to charge him with murder. He told defendant he should help 

himself by telling the truth. Defendant seemed frightened. Defendant said 

he did not have the .38-caliber revolver anymore because the man who 

gave it to him had called for it. Defendant could not provide an 

approximate time frame for the call. Detective Brown said he knew 

defendant had tried to sell the gun to someone on Wednesday, two days 

before the shooting. Defendant sobbed and trembled, and said, "I didn't 

shoot her!" He admitted showing the gun to a friend, but he denied trying 

to sell it to him. He also admitted fighting with Stephanie. She was mad 

and they argued while they were stopped at a light. She accused him of 

cheating with Shannon. At home in the driveway, Stephanie was getting 

ready to leave him. She had the gun when they went out to the car. He 

grabbed and opened the car door and asked her where she was going. He 

did not want her to leave. She said she did not believe that he had not 

cheated on her. She was very mad. She got out of the car and yelled at 

him. She had the gun, so defendant backed away. She said he cheated 

on her and she was not going to put up with it. She was waving the gun 

around and screaming. (Defendant explained to Detective Brown that she 

carried a .25-caliber gun (the one under the mattress) all the time.) 

Defendant was standing between the car and Stephanie. He grabbed the 

gun from her because he did not want to get shot and he did not want her 

to get shot. She grabbed him and he tried to pull away from her. She had 

the handle of the gun and his hands were around her hand. She was 

yelling at him. He tried to turn the gun, but it went off and she fell right by 

the car. He explained, "I didn't shoot her ... I was just ... it just ... POW ... it 

...." He was not trying to point the gun at her. She just kept thrashing 

around and they both had their hands on the gun. He should have just let 

her go, but he did not want her to leave. Their relationship had been going 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 9 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

well and they never had any problems. She always asked him not to cheat 

on her because she had been hurt in previous relationships, and he told 

her he never would. He tried to give her everything she wanted. He did not 

cheat on her; he just knew Shannon and tried to set her up with his friend.

Detective Brown asked defendant where the gun was, but 

defendant would not answer. He said no one would believe him anyway. 

He said he felt bad because he gave Stephanie the gun. Finally, he 

explained that he went back outside for the gun after he put Stephanie in 

the bedroom. The holster was in the car. He had already called 911 and 

he could hear the sirens. It happened so fast. But still, defendant would 

not reveal the gun's location. He explained: "I owe it to her to try and save 

her face. She was not that mad, it didn't happen, we [didn't] have the 

argument. She didn't pull out the gun, don't they owe that to her[?] Her 

own people, the family." Eventually, defendant said the gun was still at the 

house. He said he buried it with his hands and had not touched it since, 

but he would not divulge its location. An officer asked him why he refused, 

and he answered, "It's not that I don't [want] to tell you guys. Just that I'm 

trying to figure out what to do." An officer encouraged him to help them. 

Defendant said he was trying to. When an officer asked if defendant would 

take them to the gun, he said, "I don't want you guys to think that I was 

hiding it ...." He explained that he had lied about the whole thing because 

it was easier to believe that it had not happened and that a "stupid 

asshole" had done it. Detective Brown asked him if the gun was on his 

property. Defendant responded, "Oh God, I didn't shoot her. I just didn't 

shoot her!" Detective Brown said they would go to the residence to 

retrieve the gun, and he concluded the interview.2

Officer Johnston and some other officers returned to the residence 

with defendant. Defendant pointed to an area in the rear of the backyard 

with a big piece of concrete, metal pipe, and shrubbery. The officers 

recovered the gun in a shoulder holster, directly beneath a downed metal 

clothesline post.

The same day, a forensic pathologist performed an autopsy on 

Stephanie's body. He observed a gunshot wound above her right eye, 

which he determined was the cause of her death. He also observed 

bruising to her arms, but he explained that it was common for ordinary 

handling at the hospital to cause such bruises on a dying body. In 

addition, he saw a faint discoloration on her right hand near her ring finger.

The pathologist explained that gunshot wounds are classified into 

four types—(1) contact/near-contact, (2) close range (a couple of inches 

away), (3) intermediate range (eight to 18 inches away), and (4) distant 

range (18 or more inches away). Contact/near-contact wounds result in 

the deposition of a black sooty material on the skin (which can be washed 

off) and a stellate appearance to the wound, but no powder stippling. 

When a gun is fired while contacting or nearly contacting the skin, an 

 

2 Detective Brown testified that he used bluffs during the interview in an attempt to provoke 

defendant into revealing more information.

On cross-examination, Detective Brown admitted that some of his suspicions were later 

contradicted. Stephanie's purse was in the bedroom, but he later learned it had been brought inside. The 

discolored water in the bathtub was feline blood, not blood washed from defendant's hands. The bruises 

on Stephanie's arms might have been caused by being carried.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 10 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

expanding ball of hot gas immediately follows the bullet into the tissue, 

tearing the tissue and causing a stellate appearance to the wound. The 

hot gas can also dissect the skin away from the bone, causing a 

hemorrhage between them. Close-range wounds exhibit both black soot 

and powder stippling (which, unlike the soot, cannot be washed off). 

Intermediate-range wounds result in powder stippling only. Distant-range 

wounds exhibit only a bullet strike, with no soot or stippling.

Because Stephanie's wound had no soot and no stippling, it was 

either a contact/near-contact wound from which the soot had been 

cleaned away or a distant-range wound. Based on the stellate pattern of 

the wound and the hemorrhage between the skin and the bone, the 

pathologist favored the conclusion that the wound was a contact/nearcontact wound from which the soot had been cleaned away. He did, 

however, explain that a wound to the bony prominence over the eye can 

result in a stellate pattern, complicating a pathologist's determination 

whether a wound is in fact a contact/near-contact wound. What convinced 

him that Stephanie's wound was a contact/near-contact wound was the 

large hemorrhage (the size of his hand) between the skin and the bone 

that he observed when he reflected Stephanie's scalp.

The pathologist determined that the bullet travelled straight from the 

front of Stephanie's head to the back and slightly upward, lodging in her 

brain. The wound would have rendered her unconscious instantly and 

then her brain activity would have ceased within seconds. She might have 

exhibited seizure activity, but she would not have been able to use her 

limbs in any meaningful manner. The pathologist believed she would not 

have been able to speak a single word. On cross-examination, the 

pathologist explained that a person not medically trained might perceive 

seizure activity following a shooting as a sign that the victim is still capable 

of moving. Similarly, the victim could make some gurgling and gasping 

sounds that could cause their lips to move.

The pathologist explained that contact/near-contact wounds to the 

head are not usually seen in homicides because victims generally will not 

allow someone to put a gun to their head. They usually back away or 

move their head. But in suicides, contact/near-contact wounds are very 

common; however, in 95 percent of those cases, the wound is to the side 

of the head, under the chin, or in the mouth. On cross-examination, the 

pathologist agreed that if a person who was holding a gun to the side of 

her own head (which is typical in suicides) turned her head straight into 

the gun, she would be shot straight in the forehead.

The pathologist demonstrated how the gun could have created a 

wound like Stephanie's. When he did so, he noted that he had trouble 

reaching the trigger. He explained that if someone grabbed his hands or 

the gun and they struggled, the movement would change the nature of the 

wound. In the pathologist's experience, struggles usually result in wounds

to the chest and abdomen, and only rarely to the head. In a struggle, the 

gun gets pushed up or down, away from the head.

Stephanie's blood was found to contain 0.10 milligrams of 

methamphetamine per liter. Drugs she received at the hospital would have 

diminished her body's ability to metabolize the methamphetamine, and it 

was not possible to extrapolate from her postmortem methamphetamine 

blood concentration what her methamphetamine blood concentration had 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 11 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

been 17 hours before she died. On cross-examination, the pathologist 

agreed that 17 hours before her death, her blood contained at least as 

much methamphetamine (but possibly the same amount) as it did at the 

time of her autopsy.

A forensic toxicologist testified that in a low-level or recreational 

user, a methamphetamine concentration of 0.10 to 0.20 milligrams per liter 

would cause euphoria and greater alertness and focus. This euphoric 

state would last about six hours, although chronic users would experience 

a shorter euphoric state. After the euphoric state, chronic users could 

exhibit aggressive behavior if they were binging.

A criminalist explained that the gun was a double-action .38-caliber 

revolver in a holster. The trigger of the gun tested positive for blood. The 

.38-caliber bullet recovered from Stephanie's brain had been fired by the 

gun. The gun required four and one-half pounds of force to pull the trigger 

after manual cocking, and nine and one-half to 11 pounds of force to pull 

the trigger without manual cocking.

The gunshot residue tests revealed one particle on defendant's 

right hand and two particles on his left hand, and one particle on 

Stephanie's right hand and none on her left hand. This type of test could 

show that a person was in the vicinity (within four to six feet) of a firearm 

when it was fired, but it could not establish whether a person was holding 

the firearm or was involved in a struggle. Because the particles could 

easily be removed or transferred, the test could merely mean that a 

person handled the firearm later, touched clothing with particles on it, or 

was exposed to particles in some other manner. There were many ways to 

come in contact with the particles. Testing for these particles had fallen 

out of favor because it could not provide enough helpful evidence and the 

results were often misinterpreted.

A fingerprint expert testified that no fingerprints were found on the 

gun, which was the case with 95 percent of firearms tested.

Sandra Rice testified that she was married to Stephanie's brother, 

Steve. Sandra owned the towing business that employed defendant. On 

January 6, 1996, in the early morning, defendant called her and told her 

that someone drove by and shot Stephanie when she was going to get 

some water. He was anxious and talking fast. He told her that the last 

thing Stephanie uttered was his name. On cross-examination, Sandra said 

Stephanie told her she had tried methamphetamine once, a long time 

before the shooting.

Carrie Henshaw testified that she worked at the bank with 

Stephanie for about three years. Carrie never saw Stephanie using drugs. 

They were friends and they spent a lot of time together. Except for a 

couple of arguments, they got along well. But when Stephanie started 

seeing defendant, Carrie would call and she could hear defendant telling 

Stephanie to hang up, and she would. Carrie and Stephanie quit spending 

time together outside of work. On cross-examination, Carrie said 

Stephanie lost weight after she started seeing defendant. Stephanie once 

made a threat against Carrie to another employee, but they got over it.

Prior Domestic Violence Evidence

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 12 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

Katina Connel, who was granted immunity, testified that she met 

defendant when she was 17 years old. They became involved and moved 

in together. On March 20, 1993, when they had been together for about 

two years and Katina was pregnant with defendant's child, they got into an 

argument. At some point, Katina decided to leave. Defendant did not want 

her to leave, so he pulled her arm, hair, and clothing. He pulled her back 

into the house and hit her repeatedly on her face and upper body. She sat 

on the floor on some cushions, her face swollen and her nose bleeding. 

When defendant stopped hitting her, he assembled a shotgun that was on 

the couch. He verbally taunted her with the gun, telling her he could kill 

her if he wanted to and no one would do anything about it. She was very 

frightened. He taunted her, threw a shoe at her, kicked her, and hit her 

some more. Then he picked up the gun again, held the barrel about eight 

inches from her leg, and fired the gun, hitting the floor just a few inches 

from her. Eventually, she was able to leave the house by convincing 

defendant she was going to a friend's house to shower because they did 

not have running water in the bathroom at the time. When she left, she 

went straight to her parents' house and told them what happened. She did 

not call the police because defendant had told her many times he would 

hurt her family members. But Katina's parents did call the police and 

Katina told the police the truth about the assault. Defendant was arrested. 

He was convicted of shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 

246.3, a felony) and he pled guilty to domestic violence against Katina (§ 

243, subd. (e), a misdemeanor).

Defendant called Katina many times from jail, instructing her to tell 

his attorneys she had exaggerated the incident. Defendant told her he was 

facing so much jail time and she should try to get him out so he could be 

there when their child was born. Defendant scared her when he told her 

that if she refused, John Mardakis would "take care of things if they 

needed to be taken care of." Katina had met John, been to his house, and 

seen and heard things about him that scared her. John was a little highstrung and he said things that were inappropriate and scary. He would talk 

about things he could do to people with his guns, snakes, and books on 

torture and killing. She took defendant's comments to mean that John 

might poison her through the mail or do one of the other things she had 

seen and heard about. She decided to contact the attorneys as defendant 

instructed. She signed a declaration stating everything she had told the 

police was greatly exaggerated and defendant had not threatened her with 

a firearm or threatened to harm her family. Katina signed the declaration 

to protect herself and her family because she was afraid of defendant.

When defendant got out of jail, Katina resumed her relationship 

with him for a few months. But eventually she was able to break off the 

relationship and she ultimately married someone else. She had had no 

contact with defendant since their breakup.

Katina admitted she owed a lot of money in 1993. In March 1993, 

she was involved with defendant in a plan to burn her car for insurance 

money. Defendant told her she could not have the baby if she still had the 

car and the car payment. But she then told the truth and her parents took 

care of getting her out of trouble.

In December 2005, Katina was rear-ended and she received an 

insurance payment. In January 2006, her car caught fire in her driveway 

during the night, damaging the awning of the garage. She did not have 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 13 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

coverage for the fire, so she did not file a claim and she received no 

insurance payment for the loss.

Defense Evidence

On March 20, 1993, Officer Protine and his trainee were called out 

to a house in Modesto. The officers interviewed Katina. Officer Protine did 

not remember Katina's telling him that defendant said he could kill her at 

any time and no one would ever find out, or that defendant taunted her 

with a gun. Officer Protine would have included this information in his 

report.

On cross-examination, Officer Protine stated that Katina told him 

she tried to leave after an argument. Defendant dragged her back into the 

house and hit her seven to 10 times with a closed fist. She said he 

assembled a shotgun while she was crying and holding her face, and then 

he pointed it at her and fired it. The gunshot hit the floor about eight to 10 

inches from her foot. She told Officer Protine she was afraid defendant 

was going to kill her, and she was afraid he would hurt her or her family 

because he had made threats in the past. He had beaten her the week 

before too. She told the officers she was pregnant with defendant's child. 

Officer Protine saw the injuries on her face and leg and the dried blood on 

her nose. Katina later sought medical treatment.

After speaking to Katina, the officers went to defendant's house. 

They saw the bloody cushions on the floor that Katina had described. 

They found a hole in the floor, apparently made by the gunshot, about six 

inches in front of the cushions. When Officer Protine asked defendant 

about the incident, he was calm and he completely denied beating Katina. 

He suggested that someone else beat her up. Officer Protine found the 

shotgun at defendant's house.

While the officers were at defendant's house, Katina came back for 

her things. Officer Protine had found some property from a car and Katina 

became hysterical. She told Officer Protine she had been forced to be part 

of a conspiracy.

Robert Wildman, an attorney, prepared the motion to modify 

defendant's probation in 1993. After defendant made a plea bargain, 

Katina came into Wildman's office. She was very emotional and upset. 

She told Wildman she wanted to get defendant out of jail. Wildman told 

her the only way to do that was to file a motion to modify defendant's 

probation. He told her to write a letter to the judge. The motion was filed 

with the court and a hearing was set, although it was never held. Wildman 

thought the district attorney submitted on the declaration and the judge 

modified the terms of defendant's probation.

Greg Davis, a fire investigator, testified that on January 3, 2006, at 

2:52 a.m., the Modesto Fire Department responded to a vehicle fire at 

Katina's house. Davis's partner, Doug Machado, had begun the 

investigation, but he came to Davis and told him he had a history with both 

Katina and defendant. He asked Davis to take over the investigation. 

During the course of the investigation, the fire investigators called Katina 

repeatedly and finally reached her at work. She never came into the office 

for a taped interview.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 14 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

On cross-examination, the fire investigator stated that the case was 

closed because they had no information or leads, and Katina had left the 

state and was not pursuing the case. The fire investigator testified that his 

wife knew and worked with Katina, and Machado knew defendant. 

Machado told Davis he knew both defendant and Katina, and he wanted 

someone else to finish the case.

John Mardakis testified that he had known defendant since about 

1988. They had been friends for a long time. John met Katina when she 

was dating defendant, but he did not spend substantial time with her. John 

had served in the military from 1991 through 1994, and he was familiar 

with firearms, but he never spoke to Katina in a threatening way and he 

never spoke to her about torturing animals or people.

John knew Stephanie for about one year, when she was 

defendant's girlfriend. When he saw her at Gilligan's on January 5, 1996, 

he noticed she was a lot thinner. That evening, a blond woman walked by 

and John thought she was pretty. He talked to defendant about her and 

John eventually met Shannon. Later in the evening, Shannon and 

Stephanie were standing right next to John, talking to each other. At some 

point, Shannon asked John if defendant had a girlfriend. She was very 

angry and John did not want to "get yelled at too," so he told her he was 

not sure. Then she and Stephanie both yelled at defendant. Defendant 

backed up and looked nervous. John did not see defendant follow 

Shannon around and scream at her. When defendant and Stephanie were 

preparing to leave, John could tell Stephanie was angry. She had her 

arms crossed and was "just eyeballing" defendant. John said goodbye to 

her but she did not respond. She continued staring at defendant and John 

assumed there would be trouble. After defendant and Stephanie left, John 

went back into the nightclub and spoke to Shannon. She was upset and 

crying. He felt bad and tried to console her. He followed her home 

because of the heavy fog.

On cross-examination, John explained that he had several 

conversations with Stephanie that evening. She was talkative and friendly, 

and they got along. He had met her several times and he thought she was 

very nice. That night, she asked him to teach her how to shoot because 

defendant had refused. John believed that he, Shannon, and Stephanie all 

sat at a table together for a while. The conversation was amiable and the 

women talked about clothes. John did not detect any hostility or anything 

out of the ordinary. At some point, John saw defendant speaking with 

Shannon, but they were 40 to 50 feet away. Shannon was shaking her 

finger at defendant. In fact, both Shannon and Stephanie were yelling at 

defendant and pointing their fingers at him at the same time. John was not 

present when the women yelled at defendant; he could only see what was 

happening. The noise in the nightclub made it difficult to hear people who 

were more than a few feet away. John knew not to get involved when 

Shannon came to him and yelled, "Does he have a girlfriend?" But he 

thought he did tell her later that defendant had a girlfriend.

John testified that he had taught defendant how to shoot and they 

had gone shooting together. John used to have a number of firearms.

Another forensic toxicologist determined that Stephanie's blood 

contained 0.10 milligrams methamphetamine per liter, and her vitreous 

humor contained 0.03 milligrams methamphetamine per liter. The vitreous 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 15 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

humor concentration would be closer to the circulating concentration 

before death. The concentration of 0.03 milligrams per liter was in the 

middle of the therapeutic range for methamphetamine when used to treat 

attention deficit disorder. On cross-examination, the toxicologist explained 

it was difficult to estimate the blood concentration at the time of death, 

extrapolating back from the postmortem concentrations, especially when 

the person was in a state of trauma for many hours. He explained that the 

adverse effects of methamphetamine can start occurring at a 

concentration of 0.2 to 0.6 milligrams per liter, depending on the user.

A psychiatrist explained that methamphetamine is a 

sympathomimetic drug (i.e., it mimics the sympathetic nervous system). 

Initially, it produces a heightened sense of awareness and a sense of 

euphoria. These are replaced by hyperactivity and lack of focus, then 

irritability and anxiety. Continued use of the drug produces a 

suspiciousness and, ultimately, it can cause paranoia and physical 

violence. In addition, high doses can lead to aggressive and 

confrontational behavior. When methamphetamine is snorted, the user 

feels its effects in less than one minute. A person who uses 

methamphetamine only occasionally could generally function at a job and 

even hide their use from a mate, although the user may lose weight and 

be easily annoyed.

In the psychiatrist's opinion, Stephanie's possession of 0.14 grams 

of methamphetamine (about 28 doses), her weight loss, her threat against 

a female coworker, and her statement to her sister-in-law that she had 

tried methamphetamine were indicia of possible drug abuse. Due to the 

fluids and drugs Stephanie received in the hospital, the psychiatrist 

believed the concentration of methamphetamine in her blood would have 

been significantly higher at the time she was shot compared to the time of 

her autopsy.

Rebuttal Evidence

Karen Underwood testified that she knew Stephanie for about one 

year. They got along well and were good friends. Stephanie was always 

positive and upbeat. Karen never saw her use any drugs. Stephanie would 

usually just drink beer. Karen never saw Stephanie with a gun and never 

talked about guns with her. Stephanie and defendant lived with Karen for 

a couple of months, during which time Stephanie and defendant argued a 

lot. Karen saw bruises on Stephanie once in a while, but she did not know 

how they were inflicted. Stephanie and defendant moved out in the 

summer of 1995.

Brenda Rodriguez testified that she worked with Stephanie at the 

bank for about three years. They were friends and they would see each 

other outside of work. Stephanie had trained for a new position and was 

going to be promoted in early 1996. She was happy and very professional. 

Brenda never saw her engage in any inappropriate behavior at the bank. 

She always had a good disposition and did not exhibit any mood swings or 

depression. Brenda, Stephanie, and another employee were always trying 

to diet and lose weight. In 1995, Stephanie lost five or ten pounds. Brenda 

never saw Stephanie with a gun and they never talked about guns. 

Brenda worked with Stephanie on January 5, 1996, her last day at work. 

They spent all day together. Stephanie was excited and happy. She did 

not seem nervous, fidgety, or tense. On cross-examination, Brenda said 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 16 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

she was not aware Stephanie had threatened physical violence against a 

coworker, Carrie. Brenda never saw Stephanie with any drugs. Brenda 

noted that Stephanie was not a push-over. She stood up for herself.

Kathleen Sivils testified that Stephanie was a longtime friend of 

Kathleen's daughter. Stephanie was like a daughter to Kathleen and she 

came to Kathleen's home often. Stephanie was very caring, generous, and 

nonconfrontational. Kathleen had never seen her yell or scream at 

anyone. Kathleen had never seen Stephanie shoot a gun and she never 

talked about guns. As an emergency room nurse, Kathleen was familiar 

with the symptoms of people under the influence of drugs, and she never 

saw any signs of methamphetamine use in Stephanie and they never 

talked about drugs. Stephanie confided in Kathleen about her life. They 

had many conversations in 1995, and following a conversation on January 

3, 1996, Kathleen emptied a bedroom in her house for Stephanie. On 

cross-examination, Kathleen explained that Stephanie left her previous 

boyfriend because he used drugs. Stephanie was strictly against drug use 

and would not tolerate it. Kathleen knew Stephanie had been around 

guns, but she refused to shoot them and probably did not even know how 

to load a gun. She never showed an interest in guns.

People v. McKinstry, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1549, 9-44 (Cal. App. 5th Dist., Mar. 

4, 2011).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the 

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 

2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he 

suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. In addition, the 

conviction challenged arises out of the Merced County Superior Court, which is located 

within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); 2254(a). Accordingly, the Court 

has jurisdiction over the action. 

B. Legal Standard of Review

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus 

filed after its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 

114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of 

the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions. 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 17 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

Under AEDPA, an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

under a judgment of a state court may be granted only for violations of the Constitution 

or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 375 n. 

7 (2000). Federal habeas corpus relief is available for any claim decided on the merits in 

state court proceedings if the state court's adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 

court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

1. Contrary to or an Unreasonable Application of Federal Law

A state court decision is "contrary to" federal law if it "applies a rule that 

contradicts governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases" or "confronts a set of facts 

that are materially indistinguishable from" a Supreme Court case, yet reaches a different 

result." Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005) citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. 

"AEDPA does not require state and federal courts to wait for some nearly identical 

factual pattern before a legal rule must be applied. . . . The statue recognizes . . . that 

even a general standard may be applied in an unreasonable manner" Panetti v. 

Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 953 (2007) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The 

"clearly established Federal law" requirement "does not demand more than a „principle' 

or „general standard.'" Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 839 (2009). For a state 

decision to be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 

2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court's prior decisions must provide a governing legal principle 

(or principles) to the issue before the state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-

71 (2003). A state court decision will involve an "unreasonable application of" federal 

law only if it is "objectively unreasonable." Id. at 75-76, quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 

409-10; Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). In Harrington v. Richter, the 

Court further stresses that "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 18 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

an incorrect application of federal law." 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011), (citing Williams, 529 

U.S. at 410) (emphasis in original). "A state court's determination that a claim lacks 

merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as „fairminded jurists could disagree' on the 

correctness of the state court's decision." Id. at 786 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 653, 664 (2004)). Further, "[t]he more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reading outcomes in case-by-case determinations." Id.; Renico v. Lett, 130 S. 

Ct. 1855, 1864 (2010). "It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established 

Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 

squarely established by this Court." Knowles v. Mirzayance, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 

(2009), quoted by Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.

2. Review of State Decisions

"Where there has been one reasoned state judgment rejecting a federal claim, 

later unexplained orders upholding that judgment or rejecting the claim rest on the same 

grounds." See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This is referred to as the 

"look through" presumption. Id. at 804; Plascencia v. Alameida, 467 F.3d 1190, 1198 

(9th Cir. 2006). Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an 

unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, "does not require that there be an opinion from 

the state court explaining the state court's reasoning." Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85. 

"Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas

petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the 

state court to deny relief." Id. ("This Court now holds and reconfirms that § 2254(d) does 

not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have been 

„adjudicated on the merits.'").

Richter instructs that whether the state court decision is reasoned and explained, 

or merely a summary denial, the approach to evaluating unreasonableness under § 

2254(d) is the same: "Under § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what arguments 

or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court's decision; then 

it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 19 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court." Id. at 786. 

Thus, "even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75). AEDPA "preserves 

authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could 

disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents." Id. To put 

it yet another way:

As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus relief from a federal 

court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.

Id. at 786-87. The Court then explains the rationale for this rule, i.e., "that state courts 

are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions." Id. at 

787. It follows from this consideration that § 2254(d) "complements the exhaustion 

requirement and the doctrine of procedural bar to ensure that state proceedings are the 

central process, not just a preliminary step for later federal habeas proceedings." Id.

(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977).

3. Prejudicial Impact of Constitutional Error

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether 

the error had "a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's 

verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 

U.S. 112, 121-22 (2007) (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the 

state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). Some constitutional 

errors, however, do not require that the petitioner demonstrate prejudice. See Arizona v. 

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 

(1984). Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective 

assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the 

Strickland prejudice standard is applied and courts do not engage in a separate analysis 

applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n. 7 (2002). Musalin 

v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d at 834.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 20 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

III. REVIEW OF PETITION

A. Claims 1 through 3 – Procedural Bar

Respondent asserts that the first, second, and third claims presented in the 

petition are subject to procedural default. Petitioner presented the claims in his petition 

for writ of habeas corpus filed before California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 7.) 

In its decision, the California Supreme Court denied the petition based on a state 

procedural bar. The court addressed Petitioner‟s claims as follows:

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. (See People v. Duvall

(1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474; In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225; In re 

Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759.)

(Lodged Doc. 8.)

Based on the cases cited by the California Supreme Court, it appears that the 

California Supreme Court found the claims procedurally barred for failure to raise the 

claims on direct appeal. 

1. Legal Framework for Procedural Default

The Supreme Court recently described the legal requirements that prevent review 

of claims that were rejected on state court grounds:

"A federal habeas court will not review a claim rejected by a state 

court 'if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law ground that is 

independent of the federal question and adequate to support the 

judgment.' " Kindler, 558 U.S., at 55, 130 S.Ct., at 615 (quoting Coleman 

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 

(1991)). The state-law ground may be a substantive rule dispositive of the 

case, or a procedural barrier to adjudication of the claim on the merits. 

See Sykes, 433 U.S., at 81-82, 90, 97 S.Ct. 2497.

***

To qualify as an "adequate" procedural ground, a state rule must be 

"firmly established and regularly followed." Kindler, 558 U.S., at 60, 130 

S.Ct., at 618 (internal quotation marks omitted). FN4 [omitted] "[A] 

discretionary state procedural rule," we held in Kindler, "can serve as an 

adequate ground to bar federal habeas review." Ibid. A "rule can be 'firmly 

established' and 'regularly followed,'" Kindler observed, "even if the 

appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal 

claim in some cases but not others." Ibid. California's time rule, although 

discretionary, meets the "firmly established" criterion, as Kindler

comprehended that requirement. 

Walker v. Martin, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L. Ed. 2d 62 (2011) 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 21 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

(abrogating Townsend v. Knowles, 562 F.3d 1200 (9th Cir. 2009)).

2. Failure to Raise Claims on Direct Review

Claims one, two, and three are potentially procedurally barred by the California 

Supreme Court's decision to deny state habeas review because the claims were not 

raised on direct review.

Here, the California Supreme Court applied the Dixon rule to deny the claims in 

the petition. Dixon states that: 

[t]he general rule is that habeas corpus cannot serve as a substitute for an 

appeal, and, in the absence of special circumstances constituting an 

excuse for failure to employ that remedy, the writ will not lie where the 

claims errors could have been, but were not, raised upon a timely appeal 

from the judgment of conviction.

41 Cal. 2d at 759. Thus, pursuant to Dixon, a California court will not review the merits of 

a claim in a state habeas proceeding if it could have been raised in a timely appeal but 

was not. The Court must determine whether the Dixon rule is an adequate and 

independent state rule to serve as a procedural bar.

a. Is the Dixon Rule Adequate?

The Supreme Court explained that "a discretionary rule can serve as an adequate 

ground to bar federal habeas review," and that a rule may be adequate "even if the 

appropriate exercise of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some 

cases but not others." Beard v. Kindler, 130 S. Ct. 612, 618 (2009); see also Martin, 131 

S. Ct. at 1128-29. As the Supreme Court recently observed in Martin, 131 S. Ct. at 1130, 

"[d]iscretion enables a court to home in on case-specific considerations and to avoid the 

harsh results that sometimes attend consistent application of an unyielding rule." Such 

discretion is applicable to the Dixon rule because a state court may find that special 

circumstances excuse a petitioner's failure to raise a ground on appeal. See, e.g., 

Fleeman v. Castro, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1278, 2009 WL 33241, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 

2009) (the Dixon rule is "discretionary in that it admits of the possibility of exceptions for 

'special circumstances constituting an excuse' for failure to raise a claim by way of direct 

appeal and when such circumstances are found, the California Supreme Court may 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 22 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

entertain the claim"); Jones v. Ayers, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26772, 2008 WL 906302, at 

*28 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2008) (finding the Dixon rule to be discretionary because, as set 

forth in Park, 202 F.3d at 1152, the California Supreme Court explained in Harris that 

exceptions are applicable to the Dixon rule that admit the possibility that the California 

Supreme Court may entertain a claim not raised on direct appeal). Accordingly, the 

Court may look to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Martin for guidance in 

evaluating the adequacy of the state courts' application of the Dixon rule. See, e.g., Lee 

v. Mitchell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83503 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2012); Jensen v. Hernandez, 

2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45673, 2012 WL 1130599, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) 

(citing Martin in considering, in part, a Dixon bar); Peyton v. Lopez, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 50350, 2012 WL 1203484, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012) (same).

Second, to be "adequate," the procedural rule in question must be "firmly 

established and regularly followed." Martin, 131 S.Ct. at 1127 (citing Kindler, 130 S.Ct. at 

618). "In determining the adequacy of the procedural bar, state cases applying the 

procedural bar after the time of the petitioner's default are irrelevant." Bennett v. Mueller, 

364 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1167 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Here, Petitioner has not presented 

evidence regarding the regular application of the procedural bar either before or after 

filing his petition.

The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a state procedural rule 

can serve as an adequate bar to federal habeas review "even if the appropriate exercise 

of discretion may permit consideration of a federal claim in some cases but not others." 

Kindler, 130 S. Ct. at 618; see also Martin, 131 S. Ct. at 1128, 1129 ("We see no reason 

to reject California's time bar simply because a court may opt to bypass the 

[untimeliness] assessment and summarily dismiss a petition on the merits, if that is the 

easier path."). Moreover, as Judge Kozinski recently noted, there is no "existing Ninth 

Circuit precedent holding that the Dixon rule is inadequate." Cree v. Sisto, 2011 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 3648, 2011 WL 66253, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan 7, 2011) (Kozinski, J., sitting by 

designation).

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 23 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

The Court finds that the evidence reflects that the Dixon rule was well established 

and regularly followed in the time leading up to Petitioner's default.

b. Is the Dixon Rule an Independent State Ground?

Prior to 1998, the Dixon rule was determined to not be independent of federal law. 

Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 2000). In Park, the Ninth Circuit 

reasoned that application of the Dixon rule necessarily was interwoven with federal law 

because there was a fundamental constitutional error exception to the Dixon rule under 

state law. See id. at 1152-53. However, in In re Robbins, 18 Cal. 4th 770 (1998), the 

California Supreme Court held "that henceforth California courts would no longer 

determine whether an error alleged in a state petition constituted a federal constitutional 

violation." See Bennett, 322 F.3d at 581. In Bennett, the Ninth Circuit held, "we respect 

the California Supreme Court's sovereign right to interpret its state constitution 

independent of federal law" and, as a result found California untimeliness rule was 

independent. See id. at 581-83. Thus, under these particular circumstances, the 

California Supreme Court's invocation of Dixon after Robbins was decided would also be 

an independent state ground. See id. at 582-83; see also Park, 202 F.3d at 1153 n. 4 

(9th Cir. 2000). See Cree v. Sisto, Civ. No. 08-487, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3648, 2011 

WL 66253, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan 7, 2011) (Kozinski, J., sitting by designation); see also

Rhodes v. Uribe, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36921, 2012 WL 928434, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 

10, 2012) (finding that the Dixon rule was independent and adequate); Cantrell v. Evans, 

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35955, 2010 WL 1170063, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2010) 

(same) (McKeown, J., sitting by designation); Lee v. Mitchell, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

83503 (C.D. Cal. May 1, 2012) (same). 

As the Dixon rule is an independent and adequate state ground, the petition is 

deemed procedurally defaulted unless Petitioner can show cause for the default and 

actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law or that failure to 

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750. 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 24 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

2. Reasons to Overcome Procedural Default

Even when a federal claim has been procedurally defaulted, "[t]he bar to federal 

review may be lifted, if 'the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the [procedural] default 

[in state court] and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law.' " 

Maples v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 922, 181 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 

U.S. at 750, 746-47); see also Schneider v. McDaniel, 674 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 

2012). Adequate "cause" for a default must be an "external" factor that cannot fairly be 

attributed to the petitioner. Coleman, 501 US. at 753. 

a. Cause

In Coleman, the court noted that attorney error which rises to the level of 

ineffective assistance of counsel is considered "cause" within the meaning of this rule. 

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753-54. This is because a defendant has a right to effective 

assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, and a violation of that must be seen 

as an external factor, and thus the error must be imputed to the state. Id.; Murray, 477 

U.S. at 488. Here, Petitioner has alleged a Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel

claim. He asserts that appellate counsel, despite his requests, did not pursue his claims 

on direct appeal. (See Pet. at 4.) The Court shall assume, without deciding, that 

Petitioner has shown cause for the procedural default. 

b. Prejudice

In addition to cause, Petitioner must show prejudice to overcome a procedural 

bar. In order to establish prejudice that can overcome a procedural default, Petitioner 

must show "not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but 

that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with 

error of constitutional dimensions." See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 

S. Ct. 1584, 71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982) (discussing prejudice where defendant failed to 

object to jury instructions in proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255); Schneider v. McDaniel, 

674 F.3d 1144, 1153 (9th Cir. 2012). "Prejudice [to excuse a procedural default] is actual 

harm resulting from the alleged error." Vickers v. Stewart, 144 F.3d 613, 617 (9th Cir. 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 25 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

1998).

1. Right to a Speedy Trial

Petitioner cannot establish prejudice from a failure to present his first claim that 

his federal right to a speedy trial was violated.

"The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 

shall enjoy the right to a speedy ... trial." Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89, 129 S. Ct. 

1283, 173 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted, 

alterations in original); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 120 

L. Ed. 2d 520 (1992); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 

101 (1972). The court must balance four factors in determining whether there has been 

a violation of the right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the 

delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the 

defendant suffered prejudice as a result of the delay. See Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651 

(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530). No one factor is necessary or sufficient and there is no 

affirmative demonstration of prejudice necessary to prove a violation of the right to a 

speedy trial; instead, the four related factors "must be considered together with such 

other circumstances as may be relevant." Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 26, 94 S. Ct. 

188, 38 L. Ed. 2d 183 (1973) (per curiam) (citation omitted).

The Supreme Court split the first inquiry, the length of delay, into two steps. First, 

in order to trigger a full speedy trial analysis, "an accused must allege that the interval 

between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from

'presumptively prejudicial' delay." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651-52. If this threshold is not 

met, the court does not proceed with the other Barker factors. United States v. Beamon, 

992 F.2d 1009, 1012 (9th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has observed that courts 

generally have found delays approaching one year sufficient to trigger the Barker inquiry. 

Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n.1. The Ninth Circuit has found a six-month delay to constitute 

a "borderline case" sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the remaining Barker factors, see

United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417 (9th Cir. 1986), although it also has 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 26 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

observed that there is a general consensus among the courts of appeals that eight 

months constitutes the threshold minimum. United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 

1162 n.3 (9th Cir. 2003).

If the delay passes this minimum threshold, then the court must consider "as one 

factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum 

needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim." Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; see also

Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1287 (overall delay of nearly three years between arrest and trial 

triggered Barker evaluation of reasons for delay); United States v. Mendoza, 530 F.3d 

758, 762 (9th Cir. 2008) ("If the length of delay is long enough to be considered 

presumptively prejudicial, an inquiry into the other three factors is triggered."). In other 

words, the first Doggett/Barker factor directs that if the period between accusation and 

trial is sufficiently long to be presumptively prejudicial, the court must then inquire further 

as to all four factors.

In reviewing the factors, the court must consider "whether the government or the 

criminal defendant is more to blame" for the delay. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. Deliberate 

delay by the government "'to hamper the defense' weighs heavily against the 

prosecution." Brillon, 129 S. Ct. at 1290 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531). A more 

neutral reason such as negligence should be considered as well, although its weight 

should be less heavy. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. "[A] valid reason, such as a missing 

witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay." Id. "In contrast, delay caused by the 

defense weighs against the defendant under standard waiver doctrine." Brillon, 129 S. 

Ct. at 1290. Because defense attorneys act as a defendant's agent, and are not state 

actors, "delay caused by the defendant's counsel is also charged against the defendant" 

whether counsel is privately retained or appointed by the state. Id. at 1290-91. The Ninth 

Circuit considers the reason for delay to be the focal point of the inquiry. See United 

States v. King, 483 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007) (reasons for delay weigh heavily 

against finding a Sixth Amendment violation where district judge granted defendant's 

requests for continuances, defendant was explained his right to a speedy trial before 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 27 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

agreeing to continuances, the case was extraordinarily complex, and defendant 

substituted a new attorney halfway through the proceedings).

Here, Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial by 

denying his motion to dismiss for failure to retry him within sixty days of the grant of his 

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, as described above, a delay of sixty 

days does not implicate Petitioner's federal right to a speedy trial. To the extent that 

Petitioner is claiming that the delay violated his right to a speedy trial under California 

law, the claim must fail. Errors in the application of state law do not state a federal 

question cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S. Ct. 13, 16, 

178 L. Ed. 2d 276 (2010) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine 

state-court determination on state-law questions.") (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 

62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In examining the record, Petitioner was granted habeas relief by the United States 

District Court on April 12, 2007. Trial commenced on November 17, 2008, over a year 

and a half later. (See Rep. Tr. at 1-3.) The delay in Petitioner's case is presumptively 

prejudicial and triggers the consideration of the factors set forth above. Doggett v. U.S., 

505 U.S. at 652 n.1.

In reviewing the record, with regard to the second factor, i.e., reason for the delay, 

it does not appear to weigh in Petitioner's favor. On July 23, 2007, Petitioner filed a 

motion to dismiss based on the delay to bring Petitioner back to court and appoint him 

an attorney. (See Rep. Tr. at 370.) However, the trial court denied the motion citing 

California Penal Code § 1382, on August 7, 2017. (Id. at 394.) After the hearing, it 

appears that Petitioner, through his counsel, continued the matter, including vacating a 

November 26, 2007 trial date while procuring Petitioner's file and trial transcripts to

prepare for trial. (Id. at 395, 400.) Further, on May 23, 2008, Petitioner filed a motion to 

continue the June 9, 2008 trial date to perform further discovery. (Id. at 409-413.) The 

motion was granted and the jury trial was scheduled for August 18, 2008. (Id. at 414.) 

The trial was again continued to September 30, 2008, at which time defense counsel 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 28 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

informed the court that he was not ready to begin trial. (Id. at 440.) Ultimately, the jury 

trial was moved to November 17, 2008, and proceeded on that date. (Id. at 441)

Accordingly, the record demonstrates that defense counsel‟s need to prepare for trial 

was the primary reason for the delay. Further, with regard to the third factor, the

assertion of the right to a speedy trial, Petitioner stopped asserting the right after the 

motion to dismiss was filed. After that time, the defense either requested or consented to 

delaying the trial. The third factor does not weigh in Petitioner's favor.

The final factor, i.e., prejudice, does not weigh in Petitioner's favor. The Supreme 

Court has identified three types of prejudice caused by excessive delay: (1) oppressive 

pretrial incarceration; (2) anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) impairment of the 

defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. As Petitioner was seeking re-trial and had already 

spent significant time in custody, the much shorter time spent in custody waiting for the 

second trial likely had little additional impact on the prejudice factors listed above. With 

regard to the impairment of the defense based on witnesses fading memory, over seven 

years passed from the criminal act until his conviction was overturned and lead to retrial. 

The additional delay attributed to postponing the second trial was not likely a substantial 

factor impairing Petitioner's defense. 

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that Petitioner would not be 

successful in his claim that his federal speedy trial rights were violated. As the claim 

would not be successful, Petitioner is unable to show prejudice from his appellate 

counsel's failure to present the claim on direct appeal.

2. Right to English Speaking Jurors

Petitioner next asserts that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because a 

juror stated "in broken English" that she could not understand what was being stated. 

(Pet. at 6.) Petitioner claims that the Sixth Amendment should require that all jurors 

understand the language in which the trial is conducted. (Id.) While the Sixth 

Amendment ensures the right to a unbiased jury (See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 

(1961)) and that the jurors be representative of the community (Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 29 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

U.S. 522, 538 (1975)), the Court is unaware of any Supreme Court authority requiring 

jurors to understand English. Had Petitioner's counsel presented this claim on appeal, 

this Court could not grant relief under § 2254(d)(1), as the Supreme Court has not 

provided prior decisions providing a governing legal principle to the issue before the 

state court. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). As Petitioner cannot show 

that the denial of this claim would be an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, he is unable to 

show that he was prejudiced by the failure to present this claim on direct appeal. 

3. Right to Jurors' Personal Information

Petitioner also asserts that the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights 

in not releasing juror contact information to allow him to determine if one of the jurors did 

not speak English, as he previously contends. Petitioner provides no federal authority in 

support of his claim. Like Petitioner's claim for a English speaking jury, the Court is 

unaware of Supreme Court authority requiring jurors identifying information to be 

disclosed. California Code of Civil Procedure § 237 governs requests to unseal personal 

juror information. However, issues of state law are not generally reviewable in federal 

habeas corpus proceedings. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 

479, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). As such, Petitioner cannot show denial of this claim 

would be an "unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," and he is unable to show that 

he was prejudiced by the failure to present this claim on direct appeal. See, e.g., Serna 

v. McDonald, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34547 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2014). 

c. Miscarriage of Justice

Finally, Petitioner can avoid a procedural default if he can demonstrate that a 

fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from the default. The United States 

Supreme Court has limited the "miscarriage of justice" exception to petitioners who can 

show that "a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is 

actually innocent." Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S. Ct. 851, 130 L. Ed. 2d 808 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 30 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

(1995). "In order to pass through Schlup's gateway, and have an otherwise barred 

constitutional claim heard on the merits, a petitioner must show that, in light of all the 

evidence, including evidence not introduced at trial, "it is more likely than not that no 

reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Majoy 

v. Roe, 296 F.3d 770, 775-76 (9th Cir. 2002), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327. In 

applying this standard, "A petitioner need not show that he is "actually innocent' of the 

crime he was convicted of committing; instead, he must show that ""a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.'" Majoy, 296 F.3d at 776, quoting Carriger v. 

Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 478 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316.

Petitioner has not presented any credible evidence to undermine the factual 

assertions that form the basis of his convictions. Without presenting reliable, credible 

evidence of his innocence, Petitioner has not made a sufficient showing of actual 

innocence to serve as an equitable exception to procedural default. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 

324 ("To be credible, such a claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of 

constitutional error with new reliable evidence — whether it be exculpatory scientific 

evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence — that was not 

presented at trial. Because such evidence is obviously unavailable in the vast majority of 

cases, claims of actual innocence are rarely successful.") Petitioner has not shown that it 

is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt in light of the alleged errors at trial described above. Id. at 314-15. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is procedurally barred from presenting his first, second and third

claims.

B. Claim 4 – Felony Murder Instruction

Petitioner, in his last claim, asserts that the trial court erred by instructing the jury 

on second degree felony murder on the underlying felony of discharging a firearm in a 

grossly negligent manner. 

1. State Court Decision

Petitioner presented this claim by way of direct appeal to the California Court of 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 31 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. The claim was denied in a reasoned decision by the 

appellate court and summarily denied in a subsequent petition for review by the 

California Supreme Court. (See Lodged Docs. 1, 5.) Because the California Supreme 

Court‟s opinion is summary in nature, this Court “looks through” that decision and 

presumes it adopted the reasoning of the California Court of Appeal, the last state court 

to have issued a reasoned opinion. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804-05 & n.3 

(1991) (establishing, on habeas review, “look through” presumption that higher court 

agrees with lower court‟s reasoning where former affirms latter without discussion); see 

also LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding federal courts 

look to last reasoned state court opinion in determining whether state court‟s rejection of 

petitioner‟s claims was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). 

In denying Petitioner‟s claim, the California Court of Appeal explained:

I. Facts

A. Instructions

The trial court instructed the jurors that defendant had been 

prosecuted for second degree murder3under two theories: malice murder 

and felony murder.

Under the malice-murder theory, the court instructed with 

CALCRIM No. 520:

"The defendant's charged with murder. To prove that the 

defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: 

Number One, the defendant committed an act that caused 

the death of another person; Number Two, when the 

defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice 

aforethought; and Number Three, he killed without lawful 

justification.

"There are two kinds of malice aforethought: Express malice 

and implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish 

the state of mind required for murder.

 

3 Defendant had been acquitted of first degree murder and was therefore not charged with that 

crime at this trial.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 32 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

33

"The defendant acted with express malice if he unlawfully 

intended to kill. The defendant acted with implied malice if he 

intentionally committed an act; Number Two, the natural and 

probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human 

life; Number Three, at the time he acted he knew his act was 

dangerous to human life; and Number Four, he deliberately 

acted with conscious disregard for human life." (Italics 

added.)

Under the felony-murder theory, the court instructed with CALCRIM 

No. 541A:

"To prove that the defendant is guilty of ... second degree 

murder under this theory, the People must prove that: 

Number One, the defendant committed the offense of 

shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner; Number 

Two, the defendant intended to commit the offense of 

shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner; Number 

Three, the defendant did an act that caused the death of 

another person; and Number Four, the act causing the death 

and the offense of shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent 

manner were part of one continuous transaction."

The court then instructed with CALCRIM No. 970 on the underlying felony 

of shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3):

"To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the 

People must prove that: Number One, the defendant 

intentionally shot a firearm; Number Two, the defendant did 

the act with gross negligence; and Number Three, the 

shooting could have resulted in the injury or death of a 

person.

"Gross negligence involves more than ordinary 

carelessness, inattention or mistaken judgment. A person 

acts with gross negligence when: Number One, he or she 

acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or 

great bodily injury; and Number Two, a reasonable person 

would have known that acting in that way would create such 

a risk. In other words, a person acts with gross negligence 

when the way he or she acts is so different from the way an 

ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that 

his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or 

indifference to the consequences of that act." (Italics added.)

...

II. Analysis

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 33 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

34

A. Malice Murder and Felony Murder

"'Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being

with malice, but without the additional elements (i.e., willfulness, 

premeditation, and deliberation) that would support a conviction of first 

degree murder. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189; [citation].)' [Citation.]" (Chun, 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1181.) "Ill will toward, or hatred of, the victim are 

not prerequisites of malice as that term is used in the statutory definition of 

murder. [Citations.]" (People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103.) 

Malice may be express or implied. Express malice exists "when there is 

manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a 

fellow creature." (§ 188.) "Malice is implied when the killing is proximately 

caused by '"an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to 

life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his 

conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious 

disregard for life."'" (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143.) "'[A] 

finding of implied malice depends upon a determination that the defendant 

actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard. 

[Citation.]' [Citation.] [¶] It is the '"'conscious disregard for human life'"' that 

sets implied malice apart from gross negligence. [Citations.] 'Even if the 

act results in a death that is accidental, as defendant contends was the 

case here, the circumstances surrounding the act may evince implied 

malice. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (People v. Contreras (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 

944, 954.) "Implied malice ... involves an element of wantonness which is 

absent in gross negligence." (People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290, 

296.) "The very nature of implied malice ... invites consideration of the 

circumstances preceding the fatal act. [Citations.]" (People v. Nieto

Benitez, supra, at p. 107.) Malice "'may be implied when a person, 

knowing that his [or her] conduct endangers the life of another, 

nonetheless acts deliberately with conscious disregard for life.' [Citations.]" 

(People v. Watson, supra, at p. 296.) "In short, implied malice requires a 

defendant's awareness of engaging in conduct that endangers the life of 

another—no more, and no less." (People v. Knoller, supra, at p. 143.)

"A defendant may also be found guilty of murder under the felonymurder rule. The felony-murder rule makes a killing while committing 

certain felonies murder without the necessity of further examining the 

defendant's mental state.... Second degree felony murder is 'an unlawful 

killing in the course of the commission of a felony that is inherently 

dangerous to human life but is not included among the felonies 

enumerated in section 189 ....' [Citation.] [¶] ... 'The second degree felonymurder rule eliminates the need for the prosecution to establish the mental 

component [of implied malice]. The justification therefor is that, when 

society has declared certain inherently dangerous conduct to be felonious, 

a defendant should not be allowed to excuse himself by saying he was 

unaware of the danger to life because, by declaring the conduct to be 

felonious, society has warned him of the risk involved. The physical 

requirement, however, remains the same; by committing a felony 

inherently dangerous to life, the defendant has committed "an act, the 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 34 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

35

natural consequences of which are dangerous to life" [citation], thus 

satisfying the physical component of implied malice.' [Citation.]" (Chun, 

supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1182.) "The felony-murder rule renders irrelevant 

[implied] malice, but it does not render malice itself irrelevant. Instead, the 

felony-murder rule 'acts as a substitute' for [implied] malice. [Citation.] It 

simply describes a different form of malice under section 188. 'The felonymurder rule imputes the requisite malice for a murder conviction to those 

who commit a homicide during the perpetration of a felony inherently 

dangerous to human life.' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 1184.)

B. Chun and The Merger Doctrine

In Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 1172, the Supreme Court reassessed 

the historic merger doctrine adopted in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 

522, and held that all assaultive-type crimes merge with the charged 

homicide and cannot be the basis for a second degree felony-murder 

instruction. (Chun, supra, at p. 1178.) Accordingly, under Chun, as the 

parties in this case agree, defendant's assaultive-type behavior merged 

with the homicide and was not a proper basis for a felony-murder 

instruction, the giving of which was error.

Chun also established the standard for reviewing cases such as 

this one, where the trial court instructed the jury with an invalid felonymurder theory but also a valid malice-murder theory: the instructional error 

is harmless if the record demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

jury based its verdict on a legally valid theory (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 

p. 1203), or "[i]f other aspects of the verdict or the evidence leave no 

reasonable doubt that the jury made the finding necessary" for a legally 

valid theory (id. at p. 1205). Thus, to find the error harmless, we must 

determine beyond a reasonable doubt that this jury actually made the 

necessary findings under a valid theory, or that a reasonable jury would 

have made the necessary findings under a valid theory. (People v. 

Concha (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1089.) In other words, we must be 

confident that if this jury or a reasonable jury had considered a valid 

theory, it would have convicted defendant.

C. The Verdict and the Evidence

In cases where the felony underlying the felony-murder theory 

requires the equivalent of malice, the murder verdict alone, even if made 

under the felony-murder theory, demonstrates that the jurors found malice. 

(See, e.g., People v. Hach (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1456-1458 [error 

in instructing on felony murder was harmless because any juror who relied 

on felony murder necessarily found defendant willfully shot at an occupied 

vehicle, meaning he did so knowing the danger and with conscious 

disregard for life; the underlying felony (§ 246) required that the person 

"maliciously and willfully discharge[d] a firearm"].) But in this case, the 

felony underlying the prosecution's felony-murder theory was section 

246.3, shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, which requires 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 35 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

36

"'(1) the defendant unlawfully discharged a firearm; (2) the defendant did 

so intentionally; (3) the defendant did so in a grossly negligent manner 

which could result in the injury or death of a person.' [Citation.]" (People v. 

Overman (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1361, 1363.) 4 Unlike implied 

malice, in which a subjective standard is applied, gross negligence is 

found "'by applying an objective test: if a reasonable person in defendant's 

position would have been aware of the risk involved, then defendant is 

presumed to have had such an awareness. [Citation.]'" (People v. Watson, 

supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 296.) "'Gross negligence, as a basis for criminal 

liability, requires a showing that the defendant's act was "'such a departure 

from what would be the conduct of an ordinarily prudent or careful [person] 

under the same circumstances as to be incompatible with a proper regard 

for human life, or, in other words, a disregard of human life or an 

indifference to consequences.'" [Citation.]'" (People v. Ramirez, supra, 45 

Cal.4th at p. 989.)

Because section 246.3 does not require a finding that the 

defendant subjectively appreciated the risk involved, as required for 

implied malice (People v. Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 143), the murder 

verdict in this case does not in itself demonstrate that the jurors found 

implied malice.

The People, however, contend the evidence that defendant 

intentionally shot Stephanie in the head at very close range supported 

malice murder. We agree that this evidence could establish a conscious 

disregard for life, if not an intent to kill. (See, e.g., People v. Halvorsen

(2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 439 [sudden gunshot to head or neck at close 

range strongly indicates an intent to kill]; People v. Smith (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 733, 742 ["act of purposefully firing a lethal weapon at another 

human being at close range, without legal excuse, generally gives rise to 

an inference that the shooter acted with express malice"]; People v. 

Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 955-957 [deliberate intent to kill is also 

shown by firing at vital body parts such as the head and neck and 

evidence of an execution-style killing to the head and neck from close 

 

4

"Section 246.3 was enacted in 1988 ... to address the 'growing number of urban California 

residents engaged in the dangerous practice of discharging firearms into the air during festive occasions.' 

[Citation.] ... Section 246.3 thus 'presupposes that there are people in harm's way.... [I]t must appear that 

the defendant's act "actually had the potential for culminating in personal injury or death."' [Citation.]" 

(People v. Overman, supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1361, 1363 [because defendant fired rifle in general 

vicinity of several persons, he fired his rifle under circumstances that had potential for resulting in personal 

injury or death, and jury could reasonably have inferred defendant fired rifle under circumstances showing 

a grossly negligent disregard for human life].) "The risk element of section 246.3 was included to ensure 

that the statute would not apply to hunting or target practice in remote locations, posing no foreseeable 

risk of human injury, based on abstract theories of criminal negligence. The risk element requires the likely 

presence of people in the area, not the actual presence of a specific person." (People v. Ramirez (2009) 

45 Cal.4th 980, 987.) "It is beyond dispute that shooting a gun in a commercial area where people are 

present constitutes gross negligence under this definition." (People v. Alonzo (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 535, 

540 [shooting gun into the air in a commercial area of city presented possibility of hitting member of public; 

this was precisely the type of behavior the statute was intended to deter].)

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 36 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

37

range is sufficient alone to support a finding of premeditation and 

deliberation], overruled on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 82, 89.)

But, as defendant counters, the evidence that he shot Stephanie at 

very close range was not conclusive. The pathologist testified that 

Stephanie's wound could also have been a distant-range wound that 

exhibited a stellate pattern due to the nature of the bony prominence over 

the eye. The pathologist believed it was a contact/near-contact wound due 

to the hemorrhage, but he could not rule out the other. Also, the gunshot 

residue particle on Stephanie's hand did not establish that defendant shot 

her at extremely close range. This uncertainty means we cannot conclude 

beyond a reasonable doubt that reasonable jurors would necessarily have 

found that defendant put the gun to Stephanie's head and intentionally 

fired it, rather than intentionally shot at her to scare her (as he had done 

with Katina) and the shot ended up hitting her—the scenario proposed by 

the prosecutor to support the felony-murder theory.

Nevertheless, other evidence in this case convinces us beyond a 

reasonable doubt that the jurors either did find malice under a valid theory 

or would have found malice if they had been required to consider a valid 

theory.

First, we note that the jury's murder verdict establishes that the 

jurors entirely rejected defendant's theory that Stephanie had the gun and 

was shot as defendant attempted to defend either her or himself from 

getting shot.

Second, the jurors who did not rely on the erroneous felony-murder 

theory necessarily found malice, either express or implied, under a valid 

malice-murder theory to reach a murder verdict.

Finally, any jurors who did rely on the erroneous felony-murder 

theory, although required only to find gross negligence, would have found 

malice if they had been required to do so. Any jurors who relied on the 

felony-murder theory necessarily found that defendant intentionally fired 

the gun in a grossly negligent manner, which means a reasonable person 

would have known defendant's act endangered Stephanie's life. The 

prosecutor's scenario under this theory was that defendant intentionally 

fired the gun at Stephanie with the intent to merely scare her and the shot 

instead hit her. He shot straight at her head, not just in her general vicinity,

in the extreme darkness. This scenario supported not just felony murder, 

but a finding of implied malice. (See People v. Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at 

p. 1205 [error in instructing the jury on felony murder is harmless when, on 

the evidence, no juror could find felony murder without also finding implied 

malice].) Under this scenario, we are convinced the jurors would have 

found, if asked to consider the question, that defendant knew he was 

engaging in conduct that endangered Stephanie's life. (See People v. 

Laws (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 786, 793-794 ["if one simply wishes to scare 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 37 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

38

another by shooting a gun in the direction of the other person intending 

the bullet to just miss that person (i.e., without the intent to kill or injure), 

the shooter can be guilty of murder if, accidentally, the bullet strikes and 

kills the person"].)

This is all that is required for implied malice, but other 

circumstances further support the implied malice finding. Defendant was 

no stranger to guns or domestic violence. He kept two guns in the house 

and carried one in his truck, and he went shooting with John, who trained 

him. He was likely familiar and competent with a gun. The nature of 

Stephanie's head wound and the absence of defensive wounds showed 

she did not have the opportunity or ability to struggle or move away from 

the shot. Defendant was prone to using a gun against women who tried to 

leave him, and he resorted to it again when Stephanie attempted to leave 

him. Despite knowing his conduct would endanger Stephanie's life, 

defendant proceeded with conscious disregard for her life. This disregard 

was again demonstrated when he left the gravely wounded Stephanie in 

the house and took the time to retrieve the gun from the front yard and 

bury it in the back of the large lot, and to hide his bloody, dirty jacket 

behind the bathroom door on the opposite side of the house from where 

Stephanie lay dying.

Because we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jurors 

not relying on the felony-murder theory did find malice, and the jurors 

relying on the erroneous felony-murder theory would have found implied 

malice, any error in instructing on felony murder was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

People v. McKinstry, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1549, 45-47, 55-67 (Cal. App. 5th 

Dist. Mar. 4, 2011).

2. Relevant Legal Standard

This Court's review of Petitioner's claim of state instructional error is "limited to 

deciding whether [his] conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991); 

28 U.S.C. § 2241. In order to grant federal habeas relief on the basis of faulty jury 

instructions, the Court must first conclude that the alleged error was of constitutional 

magnitude. See California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S. Ct. 337, 136 L. Ed. 2d 266 (1996).

In order to grant federal habeas relief on the basis of faulty jury instructions, the 

Court must conclude that the alleged error "had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict." Roy, 519 U.S. at 5; Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 38 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

39

Federal habeas relief is warranted only if the Court, after reviewing the record, has 

"grave doubt" as to the error's effect. Stanton v. Benzler, 146 F.3d 726, 728 (9th Cir. 

1998). "The burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial 

that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's 

judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on direct 

appeal." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 97 S. Ct. 1730, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203 

(1977). The trial court's error in omitting a jury instruction is less likely to be prejudicial 

than the trial court's misstatement of the law. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 155; see also

Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997) (habeas petitioner whose claim 

involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an especially heavy burden).

To evaluate the effect of jury instructions, the Court must look at the context of the 

entire trial and overall charge to the jury. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; Prantil v. California, 843 

F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988). They may not be judged in artificial isolation. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 72. In addition, a reviewing court's principal constitutional inquiry is whether there 

is a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged instructions in a way that 

violates the Constitution. See id.

While a state is generally free to define the elements of an offense, once the state 

has defined the elements, due process requires that the jury be instructed on each 

element and instructed that they must find each element beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313, 105 S. Ct. 1965, 85 L. Ed. 2d 344 (1985); In re 

Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1970); United States v. 

Perez, 116 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 1997); Stanton, 146 F.3d at 728. 

It necessarily follows, therefore, that constitutional trial error occurs when a jury 

makes a guilty determination on a charged offense without a finding as to each element 

of the offense. According to the Supreme Court, a jury instruction that omits an element 

of the offense constitutes such an error. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 

1827, 144 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1999). However, such an error "does not necessarily render a 

criminal trial fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or 

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 39 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

40

innocence." Id. at 9. Provided that such an error occurred, Petitioner's conviction can 

only be set aside if the error was not harmless under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 

18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. Under the Chapman

harmless error test, it must be determined "beyond a reasonable doubt" whether "the 

error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.

Here, Petitioner contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the felonymurder theory of murder which only required a showing of gross negligence and not 

malice. The trial court noted that the felony-murder instructions were incorrect and that 

the Court could not rely upon the jury's verdict to establish malice, a required element for 

murder. People v. McKinstry, 2011 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1549 at 55-67 ("Because 

section 246.3 does not require a finding that the defendant subjectively appreciated the 

risk involved, as required for implied malice, the murder verdict in this case does not in 

itself demonstrate that the jurors found implied malice.") (citation omitted). 

However, the state court held that the instructional error was harmless. 

Respondent argues that the verdict illustrated that the jury rejected Petitioner's theory 

that he was attempting to prevent himself or the victim from being shot. (Answer at 26.) 

The state court explained that any juror who relied on the felony-murder theory would 

have found malice rather than gross negligence if they had been required to do so. The 

state court relied on the fact that Petitioner shot at the victim's head, which inferred that 

he was firing the gun in a manner that would show that he acted deliberately with 

conscious disregard for life in shooting at critical area of the victim's body. In addition to 

the act of shooting the victim, Petitioner's prior conviction involving shooting in the 

direction of a former girlfriend and his actions after the incident to hide the gun 

demonstrated his express or implied malice required for second degree murder. Upon 

review, the state court's holding was a reasonable application of federal law as the 

instructions, while incorrect, were harmless. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24. Based on the 

evidence presented, Petitioner has not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

instructional error contributed to the verdict obtained. Id.

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 40 of 41
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

41

Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that the trial court committed an 

instructional error such that the resulting conviction violated due process. See Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 72. It is recommended that Petitioner's fourth claim for relief be denied.

IV. RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is hereby recommended that the petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED with prejudice. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, 

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after 

being served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written 

objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply 

to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the 

objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time 

may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2014 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00088-AWI-MJS Document 22 Filed 10/29/14 Page 41 of 41