Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04161/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04161-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Emma Chacon
Appellee
John Davies
Appellant
Michael C. Johns
Appellant
Michael Stewart
Appellee
Robert Witbeck
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

United St•tel Cuurt or APP'-1111 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

MICHAEL C. JOHNS; and JOHN DAVIES, ) 

individually and on behalf of all ) 

other persons similarly situated, ) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

and 

ROBERT WITBECK, individually, 

Plaintiffs, 

vs. 

MICHAEL STEWART, in his capacity 

as Executive Director of the Utah 

Department of Human Services; 

EMMA CHACON, in her capacity as 

Director of the Office of Recovery 

Services, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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T!!htfl ~ll'eult · 

JUN~O 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-4161 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 92-CV-80) 

Michael E. Bulson, (Thomas McWhorter with him on the brief) of 

Utah Legal Services, Inc., Ogden, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Billy L. Walker, Assistant Attorney General (Jan Graham, Attorney 

General, Tamara K. Prince, Assistant Attorney General with him on 

the brief), Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before TACHA, ALDISERT,* and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States 

Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs Michael C. Johns and John Davies brought a class 

action suit on behalf of all persons who have received or will 

receive federal Supplemental·Security Income ("SSI") benefits and 

who have had or will have some portion of their SSI benefits 

withheld by Defendants as reimbursement for public assistance 

provided to Plaintiffs by the State of Utah. Plaintiffs alleged 

Defendants, Michael Stewart and Emma Chacon, in their capacities 

as directors of the Utah Department of Human Services ("DHS") and 

Office of Recovery Services ("ORS"), respectively: (1) wrongfully 

withheld their SSI benefits, and (2) unlawfully compensated 

Plaintiffs below minimum wage for the hours they participated in 

two Utah public assistance programs. The district court granted 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 

I. 

Congress established the SSI program in 1972 to provide cash 

grants to blind, disabled, or elderly persons (age 65 or older) 

with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83. Congress failed to 

provide, however, a mechanism whereby eligible individuals could 

obtain immediate cash assistance. Persons who applied for SSI 

benefits with the Social Security Administration often waited 

months, and sometimes years, for a determination of eligibility 

while their applications were being processed. Although benefits 

were paid retroactively once a determination of eligibility was 

made, this did not help the individuals in the interim period 

while they were incurring living expenses. As a result, many 

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states, including Utah, voluntarily established state assistance 

programs to help the individuals during that interim period.1 

Utah established two programs to provide temporary, emergency 

assistance to needy persons: the Financial Assistance General 

Assistance/Self-Sufficiency Program ("GA") and Financial 

Assistance Emergency Work Program ("EWP"). Utah Admin. Code 

§§ R810-216, R810-218 (1991 version); Utah-DHS-OFS Vol. II§§ 808, 

810 (1991 version) (hereinafter "Vol. II"). Plaintiffs are 

recipients of public assistance under Utah's GA and EWP programs. 

GA provides temporary cash assistance to individuals with low 

income to help them meet their basic needs while they are 

qualifying for SSI. Utah Admin. Code§ R810-218-802(1); Vol. II 

§ 810. To obtain assistance under GA, one must complete an 

application for financial assistance at a local Office of 

Financial Services. Utah Admin. Code § R810-214-401. To be 

eligible for GA, one must: (1) meet a needs test; (2) be 

"unemployable,"2 "marginally employable 11 3 or 60 years of age or 

older; and (3) agree to participate in rehabilitative and 

self-sufficiency activities. Id. at §§ R810-218-802 (1), (5) (c); 

1 For a general discussion of the SSI program's lack of an 

emergency assistance procedure and state interim assistance 

programs, see 120 Cong. Rec. 20967-68 (1974) (statement of 

Senators Long and Taft) . 

2 A person is "unemployable" if he has a physical or mental 

impairment that is so severe that he cannot do his previous work 

or "reasonably hope" to find other "substantial work" ($500 or 

more a month) given his age, education, and work experience. Utah 

Admin. Code § R810-218-810(3) (a) (1991 version). 

3 A person is "marginally employable 11 if he is employable but 

unable to compete in the regular labor market. Utah Admin. Code 

§ R810-218-810 (4). 

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Vol. II § 810. Persons participating in GA complete a 

self-sufficiency plan with a case worker. Utah Admin. Code 

§§ R810-218-810(6) (a). The self-sufficiency plan sets forth the 

various rehabilitative and self-sufficiency activities the 

individual will participate in, such as medical or mental health 

care programs, alcoholism or drug treatment programs, job search 

and job training activities, or a Work Experience and Training 

("WEAT") project. Id. Participants required to perform a WEAT 

project as part of their self-sufficiency plan,4 must participate 

in 96 hours per month of community work, adult education, and 

skills training activities. Id. at§§ R810-212-212(4) (c); 

R810-218-810(10) (c), R810-212-212(5). In exchange for their 

participation in GA-WEAT, Utah provides persons $233 per month GA 

benefits plus an additional $45 per month WEAT work allowance. 

In addition to other requirements, all GA participants must 

apply for SSI benefits from the Social Security Administration and 

follow through with efforts to obtain them. Utah Admin. Code 

§ R810-218-810(7) (a). SSI benefits are available for blind, 

disabled, and elderly persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1381, 

et ~- Moreover, SSI benefits cannot be seized, executed, 

attached, levied, or reached by any other legal process by a state 

4 Participation in a WEAT project is determined on a 

case-by-case basis by the case worker assigned to the particular 

applicant. Some GA applicants may be exempted or excused from 

participating in a WEAT project for various reasons, such as if 

the applicant and case worker agree that it.is not practical or 

appropriate, or if no WEAT project is available, or if the 

applicant is ill or incapacitated and will be unable to work on a 

project for more than 30 consecutive days. See Utah Admin. Code 

§§ 810-212-212 (7) (a), (b). 

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or other creditor. See 42 U.S.C. § 4075; Philpott v. Essex County 

Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1973). A state may recoup, 

however, "interim assistance 11 6 it has provided to individuals 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (g) (1). Specifically, § 1383 (g) (1) 

provides: 

the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] may, upon 

written authorization by an individual, withhold 

benefits due with respect to that individual and may pay 

to a State . . . from the benefits withheld an amount 

sufficient to reimburse the State for interim assistance 

furnished on behalf of the individual by the State.7 

Pursuant to this procedure, Utah requires all GA participants to 

complete a Form 75 "Agreement to Repay Interim Assistance," 

whereby the participants authorize Utah to recover public 

assistance provided to them out of their retroactive SSI benefits. 

Utah Admin. Code §§ R810-218-810(8). 

5 Under 42 U.S.C. § 407(a): 

The right of any person to any future payment under this 

subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at 

law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable 

or rights existing under this subchapter shall be 

subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or 

other legal process. 

See also 42 U.S.C. § 1383 (d) (1) (§ 407 applies to SSI benefits). 

6 "Interim assistance" is "assistance financed from State or 

local funds and furnished for meeting basic needs." 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1383 (g) (3). 

7 Aside from§ 1383(g) (1) 's requirement that an individual 

supply written authorization, § 1383(g) (4) requires the state to 

enter into a formal reimbursement agreement with the Secretary in 

order to be able to obtain interim assistance reimbursement. See 

also Rivers v. Schweiker, 692 F.2d 871, 872 (2d Cir. 1982) (state 

must obtain individual's written authorization and enter into 

formal reimbursement agreement with Secretary in order to obtain 

reimbursement for interim assistance provided), cert. denied, 460 

U.S. 1088 (1983). The parties do not dispute that Utah has 

entered into a formal reimbursement agreement with the Secretary. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 5 
Plaintiff Davies applied for SSI benefits in February 1990.8 

In July 1991, while awaiting determination of his SSI benefit 

application, Davies applied ·for GA, met the needs test and was 

deemed otherwise qualfied for GA. Davies completed Form 75 and 

specified that: 

I, John E. Davies ... agree to have the Social 

Security Administration (SSA) send the first payment of 

my Supplemental Security Income (SSI) payment to the 

Utah State Department of Social Services (DSS), Office 

of Recovery Services (ORS) . 

I will repay the public assistance paid to me or paid in 

my behalf to meet my basic need while my application is 

pending with SSI. To do this, I agree that ORS will 

receive my first SSI check. This check will cover the 

time I will receive interim assistance. ORS will deduct 

the amount I received in interim assistance not financed 

by federal funds and refund my balance that may exist. 

I understand that I will receive the amount of SSI that 

exceeds the interim payment of public assistance paid to 

me. 

Aplt. App. at 79.9 Davies developed a self-sufficiency plan with 

a case worker, which included a WEAT project. As a participant in 

WEAT, he was required to perform 96 hours per month of community 

work, adult education, and skills training activities. For the 

community work aspect of his WEAT project, Davies was assigned to 

drive a van transporting senior citizens for the Weber County 

Division of Aging. In all, Davies participated 750 hours in WEAT 

8 Davies suffers from depression, alcohol dependence, 

adjustment disorder, dependent personality, hiatal hernia, 

gastrointestinal problems, and arthritis. Aplt. App. at 11, 27. 

9 In Utah, the ORS coordinates interim assistance withholding 

from individuals' retroactive SSI benefits.· When the Social 

Security Administration sends the ORS an SSI benefits check on 

behalf of an individual, the ORS determines the amount of 

assistance Utah has provided, withholds that amount from the 

individual's SSI benefits and remits him the remaining amount. 

Aplt. App. at 118-19. 

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between July 1991 and May 1992. He received a total of $2,765 in 

GA benefits and WEAT work allowances, which Defendants concede 

amounts to less than minimum wage. 

In April 1992, the Social Security Administration determined 

Davies was eligible for SSI benefits and mailed an $8,407.33 

benefits check to the ORS. Pursuant to§ 1383(g) (1) and Davies' 

written authorization supplied in Form 75, the ORS withheld $2,765 

of Davies' SSI benefits check as reimbursement for GA-WEAT 

benefits provided to him, and remitted to him the $5,642.33 

balance. 

Like GA-WEAT, EWP is a Utah public assistance program that 

provides temporary10 cash assistance to individuals to help them 

meet their basic needs in exchange for their participation in a 

broad range of adult education, short-term skills training, 

community work and job search activities. Utah Admin. Code 

§ 810-216-601(2); Vol. II § 808. To obtain assistance under EWP, 

one must complete an application for financial assistance at a 

local Office of Financial Services. Utah Admin. Code 

§ R810-214-401. To be eligible as an individual participant, a 

person must meet a needs test, have no dependent children, be able 

to perform a work project, and agree to comply with EWP 

participatory standards. Id. at § R810-216-601, 620; Aplee. Supp. 

App. at 159. Specifically, persons in EWP are required to perform 

thirty-two hours per week of community work, adult education, and 

skills training activities, and eight hours per week of job search 

10 

EWP. 

Individuals may participate only six months out of a year in 

Utah Admin. Code § R810-216-601(4). 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 7 
activities. Id. at§ R810-216-620(8); Vol. II§ 808.27. In 

exchange, Utah provides EWP participants $130 bi-weekly assistance 

(for a single individual in 1991) . Utah Admin. Code 

§ R81 0- 216- 6 6 0 ( 1) . 

Plaintiff Johns applied for assistance, met the needs test, 

was deemed otherwise qualified for EWP, and agreed to comply with 

EWP participatory requirements. Aplt. App. at 50. For his 

community work project, Johns was assigned in September 1990 to 

perform maintenance and painting duties at the Brigham City 

Corporation ("BCC"). In October 1990, Johns fell from a ladder 

while painting at BCC and sustained injuries leading him to apply 

for SSI benefits. Johns participated 413 total hours in EWP 

through January 1991 and received $1,124 EWP benefits, which 

Defendants concede amounts to less than minimum wage. 

Johns withdrew from EWP in January 1991 as a result of a 

hernia and applied in February 1991 for GA benefits. Johns was 

approved for GA benefits (but not assigned to WEAT) and completed 

Form 75. Aplt. App. at 52-53. Between February and May 1991, 

Johns received $542.14 in GA benefits. 

In May 1991, the Social Security Administration notified 

Johns that he had been approved for SSI benefits and mailed a 

$1,647.94 SSI benefits check to the ORS. Pursuant to§ 1383(g) (1) 

and Johns' written authorization supplied in Form 75, the ORS 

initially withheld all of Johns' $1,647.94 SSI benefits check as 

reimbursement for $1,666.14 in EWP and GA benefits provided to 

him. Aplt. App. at 76. The ORS later sent Johns $680 for reasons 

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not made clear by the record and retained the balance of his SSI 

benefits check. Aplee. Supp. App. at 147. 

In July 1992, Plaintiffs brought a class action suit against 

Defendants. In their first amended complaint, Plaintiffs alleged 

Defendants violated: (1) the Social Security Act ("SSA"), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 407, 1383, by wrongfully withholding Plaintiffs' SSI 

benefits as reimbursement for GA-WEAT and EWP benefits provided to 

Plaintiffs; (2) the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"), 29 

U.S.C. § 206, by paying Plaintiffs less than minimum wage for the 

hours they participated in EWP and GA-WEAT; and (3) the Utah 

Administrative Rulemaking Act ( 11 UARA11 ), Utah Code. Ann. 

§ 63-46a-1, et ~' by implementing a policy to withhold EWP and 

GA-WEAT benefits without first submitting the policy to rule 

making.11 Aplt. App. at 13-15. 

Plaintiffs requested the court to certify the suit as a class 

action and order appropriate notice be given to class members. On 

March 7, 1994, the parties filed a stipulation and agreement for 

partial settlement with the court. The parties agreed to the 

11 Plaintiffs also alleged Defendants violated their Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, but 

later abandoned these claims. 

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court's certification of class12 and the partial settlement of 

Plaintiffs' claims.13 The court approved the partial settlement 

and ordered the parties to submit the unresolved issues on 

cross-motions for summary judgment. 

In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs asserted 

that: (1) Defendants' practice of withholding SSI benefits as 

reimbursement for GA-WEAT benefits violated § 407 of the SSA 

because GA-WEAT benefits do not constitute 11 interim assistance 11 

pursuant to§ 1383(g) (1); (2) Defendants violated§ 206 of the 

FLSA by paying Plaintiffs less than minimum wage for the hours 

they participated in EWP and GA-WEAT; (3) Defendants violated the 

UARA by implementing a policy to withhold EWP and GA-WEAT benefits 

without first submitting the policy to rule making; and (4) Form 

75 is void under state and federal contract law because it fails 

12 Specifically, the parties agreed to the court's certification 

of class of all persons who, since June 1, 1991: (1) have been, 

are now, or will be applicants for, or recipients of SSI; and, (2) 

have had or will have some portion of their retroactive SSI award 

withheld by Defendants as reimbursement for benefits and/or 

monthly expense allowances received by such persons while 

participating in EWP or GA-WEAT. Aplt. App. at 34-35. 

13 Specifically, Defendants agreed: (1) to settle Plaintiff 

Johns' claims by mailing him a check for $759.94; (2) to partially 

settle Plaintiff Davies' claim by returning to him the amount of 

WEAT work allowances withheld from his SSI benefits; (3) to 

discontinue their policy of recovering EWP benefits and WEAT work 

allowances from EWP and GA-WEAT participants' SSI benefits; (4) to 

refund to class members EWP benefits and WEAT work allowances 

withheld from their SSI benefits; (5) to prospectively prohibit 

individuals who have or will apply for SSI benefits from 

participating in EWP; and (6) to prospectively prohibit 

individuals qualifying for GA from participating in WEAT if they 

have applied or will apply for SSI, unless they sign a statement 

volunteering to participate in WEAT. Aplt. App. at 35-36. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 10 
to define essential terms.14 Plaintiffs sought declaratory and 

injunctive relief under each of their claims, retroactive monetary 

reimbursement of their withheld assistance benefits and notice to 

class members of the outcome of the litigation. In their motion 

for summary judgment, Defendants denied Plaintiffs' claims. 

The district court ruled in favor of Defendants on all 

issues. The court held that GA-WEAT benefits provided to 

Plaintiffs constituted "interim assistance" pursuant to 

§ 1383(g) (1). The court further ruled Defendants were not 

required to compensate Plaintiffs at minimum wage for their 

participation in EWP and GA-WEAT because Plaintiffs were not 

"employees" for purposes of the FLSA. Lastly, the court concluded 

Defendants did not violate the UARA and that the Form 75 contracts 

signed by Plaintiffs were not void. Aplt. App. at 121-23. The 

court therefore granted Defendants' motion and entered summary 

judgment against Plaintiffs. This appeal followed. 

II. 

On appeal, Plaintiffs re-assert the arguments they made in 

their motion for summary judgment. At the outset we note that 

because Plaintiffs have brought suit in federal court against 

Defendants in their official capacities as directors of Utah state 

agencies, Plaintiffs' suit may be barred in part or whole by the 

Eleventh Amendment. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. 

Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984). Although Defendants have not 

posed an Eleventh Amendment bar, we may examine sua sponte whether 

the Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs' claims. Mascheroni v. 

14 Plaintiffs added the contract claim at summary judgment. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 11 
Board of Regents of Univ. of California, 28 F.3d 1554, 1559 (lOth 

Cir. 1994); see also Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99 n.8 (Eleventh 

Amendment deprives federal courts of jurisdiction to hear claims 

against state and thus may be raised at any stage of the 

proceedings) . 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution 

provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or 

prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another 

State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. 

Const. amend. XI. "Even though the clear language does not so 

provide, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to bar a suit 

by a citizen against the citizen's own State in Federal Court." 

AMISUB (PSL), Inc. v. State of Colorado Dep't of Social Servs., 

879 F.2d 789, 792 (lOth Cir. 1989) (citing Hans v. State of 

Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 (1890)). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment 

bars a suit brought in federal court by the citizens of a state 

against the state or its agencies, Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 100, and 

applies "'whether the relief sought is legal or equitable.'" 

Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dept. of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 588 (lOth 

Cir. 1994) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986)). 

The Eleventh Amendment does not, however, bar a suit brought 

in federal court seeking to prospectively enjoin a state official 

from violating federal law. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 

(1908); In re Crook, 966 F.2d 539, 542 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 

113 S. Ct. 491 (1992). The Ex Parte Young exception enables 

federal courts to end continuing violations of federal law by 

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state officials, Green v. Mansour, 106 S. Ct. 423, 426 (1986), so 

as "to permit the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and 

hold state officials responsible to 'the supreme authority of the 

United States.'" Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 105 (quoting Ex Parte 

Young, 209 U.S. at 160). Because Ex Parte Young is designed to 

end continuing violations of federal law, when there is "no 

ongoing violation of federal law," Green, 106 S. Ct. at 425, "a 

suit against a state officer--a suit the decision of which will as 

a practical matter bind the state--should be treated for what it 

is: a suit against the state." Watkins v. Blinzinger, 789 F.2d 

474, 484 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1976 (1987); 

see also Green, 106 S. Ct. at 425-29. 

Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars a suit against a state 

official "when 'the state is the real, substantial party in 

interest.'" Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 101 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. 

Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)). A suit for 

retroactive monetary reimbursement of withheld assistance benefits 

brought against a state official in his official capacity is a 

suit against the state because the funds to satisfy the award 

"must inevitably come from the general revenues" of the state. 

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 665 (1974); see also Ford, 323 

U.S. at 464 ("When the action is in essence one for the recovery 

of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party 

in interest . even though individual officials are nominal 

defendants."). Thus, the Eleventh Amendment bars: (1) a suit for 

retroactive monetary reimbursement of withheld assistance 

benefits, (2) brought by citizens of a state, (3) against state 

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officials in their official capacities, (4) in federal court. 

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662-71. 

In addition, the Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought in 

federal court seeking to enjoin a state official from violating 

state law. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06. In such a case, the 

"need to promote the supremacy of federal law" underlying the Ex 

Parte Young exception is absent. Id. at 106. Indeed, the Court 

has noted "it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on 

state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state 

officials on how to conform their conduct to state law." Id. 

Moreover, neither notice15 nor declaratory relief is the 

"type of remedy designed to prevent ongoing violations of federal 

law." See Green, 106 S. Ct. at 427-29. Thus, the Eleventh 

Amendment bars a federal court from ordering notice relief in a 

suit against the state, unless it is ancillary to a judgment 

awarding prospective injunctive relief. Id. The Eleventh 

Amendment "does not permit judgments against state officers 

declaring that they violated federal law in the past." P.R. 

Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy. Inc., 113 S. Ct. 684, 

688 (1993). 

However, "[t]he sovereign immunity afforded by the Eleventh 

Amendment is not absolute." AMISUB, 879 F.2d at 792; Port Auth. 

Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). A state 

may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity and consent to suit in 

federal court. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 

15 Notice relief, in general, is simply notice to the members of 

a class of the outcome of the litigation. Green, 106 S. Ct. at 

429 n.l. 

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238 (1985). In addition, Congress may abrogate the states' 

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. "[B]ecause the Eleventh 

Amendment implicates the fundamental constitutional balance 

between the Federal Government and the States," id. at 238-39, the 

court applies a stringent test to determine if the exceptions are 

met. See Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99-100. Thus, any waiver by the 

state of its Eleventh Amendment immunity must be unequivocal, 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99--i.e., a state may waive its Eleventh 

Amendment immunity "only where stated 'by the most express 

language or by such overwhelming implication f.rom the text [of a 

state statutory or constitutional provision] as [will] leave no 

room for any other reasonable construction.'" Atascadero, 473 

U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673). Constructive 

consent is insufficient. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673. Congress may 

abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in 

federal court "only by making its intention unmistakeably clear in 

the language of the statute." Id. at 242. With these Eleventh 

Amendment principles in mind, we address the jurisdictional 

propriety of Plaintiffs' claims. 

III. 

A. 

Plaintiffs' SSA claim seeks, in part, retroactive monetary 

reimbursement of withheld SSI benefits from Defendants in their 

official capacities as directors of state agencies. A claim for 

retroactive monetary reimbursement asserted against state 

officials in their official capacities constitutes a suit for 

monetary damages against the state. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. 

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Absent waiver or congressional abrogation, this portion of 

Plaintiffs' SSA claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 

662-71. 

We have found no Utah statutory or constitutional provision 

that expressly waives the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity with 

respect to claims seeking reimbursement of withheld SSI 

benefits.16 Although Utah has several general consent to suit 

provisions in its Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 

§ 63-30-1 to 63-30-38, which waive its immunity to suits brought 

in Utah state courts,17 "a state's consent to be sued in the 

state's own courts does not serve to waive its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity." Richins v. Industrial Constr., Inc., 502 F.2d 1051, 

1055 (lOth Cir. 1974); see also Port Auth., 495 U.S. at 306 

(same) . Indeed, Utah law expressly provides that its state 

district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over suits 

brought against it. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-16. This provision 

clearly evidences Utah's intent to retain its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity. Richins, 502 F.2d at 1055 (Utah's statutory provision 

16 If Utah had wanted to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity 

with respect to claims for withheld SSI benefits, it clearly knew 

how to do so, as it has done in the Ute Indian Water Compact, Utah 

Code Ann. § 73-21-2, Article IV ("For purposes of compelling 

compliance with the terms of this Compact, each party [--i.e., the 

Ute Indian Tribe, State of Utah, and United States Government] 

waives the defense of sovereign immunity as to actions brought by 

any other party, including any defense under the Eleventh 

Amendment to the United States Constitution."). 

17 For example, Utah has generally waived its immunity to suit 

as to contractual obligations, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-5, certain 

property actions, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-6, and under certain 

circumstances actions for injuries caused by the negligence of an 

employee acting within the scope of his employment, Utah Code Ann. 

§ 63-30-10. 

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that suits against it be brought in its own courts "is a positive 

expression of policy against suits against Utah in United States 

Courts."). 

In addition, because constructive consent is insufficient, 

Edelman, 415 U.S. at 674, Utah's partial settlement of claims in 

the instant case does not constitute waiver of its Eleventh 

Amendment immunity. See Saahir v. Estelle, 47 F.3d 758, 762 (5th 

Cir. 1995) (state's participation in settlement agreement 

insufficient to constitute waiver of its Eleventh Amendment 

immunity); Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1560 (state's participation in 

suit insufficient to constitute waiver of Eleventh Amendment 

immunity) . We find no unequivocal expression of waiver by Utah in 

the instant case. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 99. 

Moreover, Congress has not abrogated the states' sovereign 

immunity with respect to claims for withheld SSI benefits in any 

provision of the Social Security Act. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 

674 (no provision of Social Security Act provides for waiver of 

state's Eleventh Amendment immunity); Granados v. Reivitz, 776 

F.2d 180, 183 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Nor were we able to find in the 

Social Security Act any indication of congressional intent to 

waive the state's immunity to suit in federal court."). 

As a result, the portion of Plaintiffs' SSA claim that seeks 

retroactive monetary reimbursement of withheld assistance benefits 

from Defendants is barred by.the Eleventh Amendment. Edelman, 415 

U.S. at 662-71; Green, 474 U.S. at 68; P.R. Aqueduct, 113 S. Ct. 

at 688. We therefore dismiss this portion of Plaintiffs' SSA 

claim. Masheroni, 28 F.3d at 1560. We remand with instructions 

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to the district court to vacate its judgment as to this portion of 

Plaintiffs' SSA claim and dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id. 

B. 

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that Defendants violated the 

SSA in the past by withholding Plaintiffs' SSI benefits as 

reimbursement for GA-WEAT benefits provided to them. Because the 

Eleventh Amendment "does not permit judgments against state 

officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past," 

P.R. Agueduct, 113 S. Ct. at 688, we dismiss the declaratory 

portion of Plaintiffs' SSA claim. Id. We remand with 

instructions to the district court to vacate its judgment as to 

the declaratory portion of Plaintiffs' SSA claim and dismiss for 

lack of jurisdiction. Id. 

c. 

On the other hand, the portion of Plaintiffs' SSA claim that 

seeks to prospectively enjoin Defendants from violating the SSA 

constitutes a suit against state officials in their official 

capacities to prevent the ongoing violation of federal law. This 

claim, therefore, falls within the Ex Parte Young exception and is 

not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 

159-60. As a result, we address the prospective portion of 

Plaintiffs' SSA claim on the merits. 

Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in granting 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment because Defendants have 

violated and are violating § 407 of the SSA; Specifically, 

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants cannot withhold their SSI 

benefits consistent with § 407, which prevents SSI benefits from 

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being subject to "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or 

other legal process." See Philpott, 409 U.S. at 415-16. While 

Plaintiffs acknowledge that§ 1383(g) (1) carves out an exception 

to § 407 that allows states to reimburse themselves "for interim 

assistance furnished on behalf of the individual by the State" out 

of an individual's retroactive SSI benefits check, Plaintiffs 

maintain that GA-WEAT benefits do not constitute "interim 

assistance" pursuant to§ 1383(g) (1). Because GA-WEAT benefits do 

not constitute "interim assistance," Plaintiffs contend Defendants 

violate § 407 by withholding their SSI benefits as reimbursement 

for GA-WEAT benefits provided. 

The district court concluded GA-WEAT benefits constitute 

"interim assistance" pursuant to§ 1383(g) (1) and granted 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment. We review the district 

court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Reich v. 

Parker Fire Protection Dist., 992 F.2d 1023, 1026-27 (lOth Cir. 

1993). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine 

issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

Plaintiffs' argument that GA-WEAT benefits do not constitute 

"interim assistance" within the meaning of§ 1383(g) (3) presents a 

question of statutory interpretation. "In interpreting a statute, 

our initial inquiry begins with the language of the statute and if 

that language is clear, we give effect to its meaning." Phillips 

Petroleum Co. v. Lujan, 4 F.3d 858, 861 (lOth Cir. 1993). Only if 

after "employing traditional tools of statutory construction," 

Chevron. U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 19 
n.9 (1984), we cannot discern congressional intent, do we need 

turn to the agency's construction of the statute. Id. at 843; 

KMART Corp. v. Cartier. Inc.~ 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988). 

"A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, 

unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking 

their ordinary ... meaning." Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 

37, 42 (1979); Bartlett v. Martin Marietta Operations Support. 

Inc., 38 F. 3d 514, 518 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("The court is obliged to 

give terms their plain meaning whenever possible."). Thus, we 

will not restrict the plain meaning of the language chosen by 

Congress absent "clearly expressed legislative intent to the 

contrary." United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81, 593 

(1981). 

Section 1383(g) (3) defines "interim assistance" as 

"assistance financed from State or local funds and furnished for 

meeting basic needs." 42 U.S.C. § 1383(g) (3) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiffs concede GA-WEAT benefits are "financed from State or 

local funds." Pl. Br. at 13. Plaintiffs argue, however, that 

GA-WEAT benefits are not "furnished" because they earn their 

benefits by working for them. Plaintiffs contend that the term 

"furnish" implies a gift and cite the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services' definition of interim assistance as support: 

"Interim assistance means assistance the State gives you." 20 

C.F.R. § 416.1902 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs argue that Utah 

does not give GA-WEAT participants their benefits; instead, 

participants must work for and earn the benefits. As a result, 

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GA-WEAT benefits are not "furnished" to Plaintiffs and therefore 

do not constitute interim assistance under§ 1383(g) ~3). 

We reject Plaintiffs' argument because it is premised upon an 

artificially narrow construction of the plain, unambiguous meaning 

of the term "furnish." Black's Law Dictionary defines furnish as 

11 [t]o supply, provide, or equip, for accomplishment of a 

particular purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 466 (6th ed. 1990). 

Webster's dictionary defines furnish as "to provide with what is 

needed" and lists as synonyms "supply" and "give." Webster's 

Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 498 (1984) . Applying these 

definitions, Utah supplies or provides GA-WEAT participants 

benefits for accomplishment of meeting their basic needs and 

helping them become self-sufficient. Thus, GA-WEAT benefits are 

"furnished" to its participants under the p_lain meaning of that 

term. As the district court noted: 

State funded General Assistance granted to General 

Assistance Work Experience and Training (GA-WEAT) 

participants is interim assistance under the federal 

statutes and regulations and therefore recoverable from 

a participants' retroactive SSI award. GA-WEAT is 

state-funded assistance based upon need. The fact that 

it contains a self-sufficiency component does not take 

it out of the plain meaning of the federal Interim 

Assistance Reimbursement program (IAR). The IAR couches 

the authorization in terms of recovery of interim 

assistance furnished on behalf of the individual by the 

state. The plain and statutory meaning of the word 

"furnish" can clearly encompass assistance given under 

the terms of GA-WEAT. 

Aplt. App. at 121. We agree. Simply because participants perform 

a work component as one requirement of their assistance plans does 

not change the nature of the assistance as provided to them to 

meet their basic needs. 

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Moreover, we must apply the term "furnish" according to its 

ordinary meaning and not restrict its definitional scope in the 

absence of "clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary." 

Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81; Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42. We find 

nothing in the language of § 1383, its legislative history, or 

interpretive case law to indicate that Congress intended to 

restrict the definitional scope of the term "furnish" to exclude 

benefits provided to "workfare" participants. Turkette, 452 U.S. 

at 580-81. Because congressional intent is clear from the plain 

language of § 1383, we give effect to that intent and do not turn 

to the Secretary's definition of "interim assistance.n18 

Turkette, 452 u.s. at 580-81; Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9 ("The 

judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 

construction and must reject administrative constructions which 

are contrary to clear congressional intent.")·. We hold the 

district court correctly concluded that benefits provided to 

GA-WEAT participants are "furnished" to them and therefore 

constitute "interim assistance" under§ 1383(g) (1). We therefore 

hold Utah may properly withhold, from Plaintiffs' SSI benefits, 

amounts sufficient to reimburse it for GA-WEAT benefits provided. 

IV. 

Plaintiffs' FLSA claim seeks both declaratory and injunctive 

relief. The declaratory portion of Plaintiffs' claim is not 

barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Congress has abrogated 

18 In any event, we do not believe the Secretary's use of the 

term "give" interchangeably with "furnish" in any way limits the 

scope of the term "furnish." "Give" is merely the simplest synonym 

for "furnish." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 498 

(1984). 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 22 
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to claims 

brought under the FLSA. Brinkman v. Department of Corrections of 

Kan., 21 F.3d 370, 372 (lOth·Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 315 

(1994). We therefore turn to the merits of Plaintiffs' FLSA 

claim. 

Plaintiffs contend the district court erred in granting 

Defendants' motion for summary judgment because the FLSA mandates 

Defendant DHS compensate them at minimum wage for the hours they 

participate in GA-WEAT and EWP. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend 

that, as participants in GA-WEAT and EWP programs, DHS is their 

11 employer 11 and they are DHS's 11 employees 11 within the meaning of 

§ 203 of the FLSA. Thus, § 206 of the FLSA mandates DHS 

compensate them at minimum wage. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1) 

( 11 employer 11 required to pay his 11 employee 11 a minimum 

wage--currently $4.25 per hour). We disagree·. 

We review the district court's grant or denial of summary 

judgment de novo. Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026-27. Summary judgment 

is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review de novo the district court's 

determination whether an individual qualifies as an employee for 

purposes of the FLSA. Dole v. Snell, 875 F.2d 802, 805 (lOth Cir. 

1989). 

Under the FLSA, an 11 employer 11 is 11 any person acting directly 

or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an 

employee and includes a public agency. 11 Id. at§ 203(d). A 

11 public agency 11 is, inter alia, any agency of a State. Id. at 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 23 
§ 203(x). Because DHS is a public agency of the State of Utah/ it 

qualifies as an "employer" for purposes of the FLSA. Thus/ the 

determinative question is wh€ther Plaintiffs qualify as 

"employees" of DHS for purposes of the FLSA. 

Whether Plaintiffs constitute "employees" of DHS for purposes 

of the FLSA presents a question of statutory interpretation. We 

begin with the plain language of the FLSA. Phillips 1 4 F.3d at 

861. Under the FLSA1 an "employee" is "any individual employed by 

an employer."19 Id. at§§ 203(e) (1). "Employ" is defined as to 

"suffer or permit to work." Id. at§ 203(g). Thus/ an employee 

is an individual who an employer suffers or permits to work. The 

definition "suffer or permit to work" was intended to make the 

scope of employee coverage under the FLSA very broad. See United 

States v. Rosenwasser/ 323 U.S. 360 1 362 1 363 n.3 (1945) (quoting 

statement of then Senator Hugo Black that the·term "employee" as 

used in the FLSA "had been given 1 the broadest definition that has 

ever been included in any one act. 1 ") (citation omitted). Courts 

19 We note that the FLSA provides that: 

The term "employee" does not include any individual who 

volunteers to perform services for a public agency which 

is a State 1 or an interstate governmental agency/ if--

(i) the individual receives no compensation or is 

paid expenses 1 reasonable benefits 1 or a nominal fee to 

perform the services for which the individual 

volunteered; and 

(ii) such services are not the same type of 

services which the individual is employed to perform for 

such public agency. 

29 U.S.C. § 203(3) (4) (a) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs are not 

employed by DHS to perform any services; therefore/ this provision 

is inapplicable to exclude Plaintiffs from the definition of 

"employee." 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 24 
have interpreted the definition of employee broadly in order to 

effectuate the broad remedial purposes of the FLSA. Dole, 875 

F.2d at 804. The Supreme Court has noted, however, that although 

the FLSA's definition of "employee" is quite broad, "it does have 

its limits." Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 

U.S. 290, 295 (1985). Thus, although some persons are literaily 

"suffer[ed] or permit[ted] to work," they do not qualify as 

"employees" for purposes of the FLSA. See Marshall v. Regis Educ. 

Corp., 666 F.2d 1324, 1328 (lOth Cir. 1981) (resident-hall 

assistants did not constitute employees of Regis College for 

purposes of the FLSA); Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026-27 (persons 

training to be firefighters did not constitute employees of fire 

protection district for purposes of the FLSA); Dole, 875 F.2d at 

812 (independent contractors do not constitute employees for 

purposes of the FLSA) . 

Because the definition of "employee" under the FLSA is broad, 

but not precise, courts apply the Supreme Court's "economic 

reality" test to determine the scope of employee coverage under 

the FLSA in particular cases. Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop .. 

Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1966); Dole, 875 F.2d at 804. Under that 

test, we focus "upon the circumstances of the whole activity," 

Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 730 (1947), with 

the ultimate criterion being the economic reality of the 

relationship. Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33; Doty v. Elias, 733 F.2d 

720, 722 (lOth Cir. 1984). 

In Marshall, we applied the economic reality test to 

determine whether student resident-hall assistants ("RA's") were 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 25 
employees of Regis College ("Regis") for purposes of the FLSA. At 

Regis, the RA's were required to distribute mail, answer phones, 

unlock doors, maintain discipline in the halls, be available 

twenty hours a week, and maintain a specified grade point average. 

In exchange, Regis gave them a reduced room rate, free telephone 

use, and a $1,000 tuition credit. Marshall, 666 F.2d at 1326. 

The Secretary of Labor brought suit against Regis alleging 

that the college violated the FLSA by, inter alia, failing to 

compensate the RA's at minimum wage for their services. The 

Secretary argued that the RA's were employees because their 

services economically benefited Regis. Id. at 1326-27. We 

disagreed, however, and explained that the government's view 

ignored the "expressed educational objectives of the student 

resident assistant program" and did not focus upon the whole 

circumstances of the activity. We noted that·although the RA's 

services benefited Regis, the relationship between the RA's and 

Regis must be considered in light of the educational context. Id. 

at 1327. We quoted the reasoning of the district court: 

The RA's ... did not come to Regis to take jobs. 

They enrolled as full-time students seeking growth and 

development . . . and desiring to earn the recognition 

of an academic degree. The opportunity to reduce the 

cost of college by being helpful to other students and 

to the administration in assisting the residence hall 

program is only one circumstance in the w~ole activity. 

Id. at 1328. Thus, the students' participation in the RA program 

was simply one component of their entire educational experience. 

Focusing upon the circumstances of the whole activity and applying 

the economic reality test, we concluded that the students who 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 26 
participated in the RA program were not employees of Regis for 

purposes of the FLSA. Id. 

Marshall's reasoning compels a similar result in the instant 

case. As in Marshall, Plaintiffs' narrow focus on the work 

component of the GA-WEAT and EWP programs fails to take into 

consideration the circumstances of the whole activity. The work 

component of GA-WEAT and EWP is just one requirement of the 

comprehensive assistance programs. GA-WEAT and EWP recipients are 

also required to: (1) meet a needs test; (2) be unemployable, 

marginally employable, or 60 years old or older (for GA); (3) have 

no dependent children and be able to perform a work project (for 

EWP); and (4) agree to participate in adult education, training, 

skills development, and job search activities. All of these 

requirements are conditions for receipt of benefits under GA-WEAT 

and EWP. Utah Admin. Code§§ R810-218-810(10) (c), 

R810-212-212(5). Applying Marshall, Plaintiffs participation in 

WEAT and EWP work projects is simply one component of their 

comprehensive assistance plans. The overall nature of the 

relationship between Plaintiffs and Defendants is assistance, not 

employment. 

Indeed, GA-WEAT and EWP participants are completely unlike 

state employees in every respect. GA-WEAT and EWP participants 

apply for public assistance, not for a state job. GA-WEAT and EWP 

participants receive their financial assistance checks through the 

Public Assistance Case Management Information System, not from the 

state payroll. Aplee. Supp. App. at 149, 165-66. State and 

federal taxes are not withheld from GA-WEAT and EWP participants' 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 27 
benefits as they are from state employees' salaries. Aplee. Supp. 

App. at 148, 199, 200-01. GA-WEAT and EWP participants do not 

accrue sick or annual leave like state employees. Id. at 149. In 

sum, as we noted in Klaips v. Bergland, 715 F.2d 477 (lOth Cir. 

19 8 3) : 

[W]e cannot accept plaintiffs' argument that the 

relationship between [Utah] . . . and the WEAT 

participants . . . [is] that of employer to employee 

. . . . [A]lthough WEAT participants may perform the 

same functions as regular employees at some of the 

projects to which they are assigned, they differ from 

state employees in that they do not receive the same 

salary, safe working conditions, job security, career 

development, Social Security, pension rights, collective 

bargaining, or grievance procedures as do the actual 

employees. 

Id. at 483.20 Although Klaips referred only to WEAT participants, 

its reasoning applies with equal force to EWP. Aplee. Supp. App. 

at 149 (affidavit of David Moffitt, program specialist for EWP and 

GA-WEAT). Focusing upon the circumstances of·the whole activity 

and applying the economic reality test, we hold the district court 

correctly concluded that Plaintiffs are not employees of DHS for 

purposes of the FLSA. See Marshall, 666 F.2d at 1328; Rutherford, 

20 We recognize that in Klaips, we were not presented with the 

question whether GA-WEAT and EWP participants were employees of 

Utah for purposes of the FLSA. Instead, we held GA-WEAT 

participants were not employees of Utah for purposes of obtaining 

an income deduction under the Food Stamp Act of 1964, 7 U.S.C. 

§§ 2011-2032. Nonetheless, Klaips reasoning is relevant to our 

application of the economic reality test in the instant case. 

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331 u.s. at 73o.21 

v. 

Plaintiffs' UARA claim-asserts that Defendants violated Utah 

state rule making procedures by implementing a policy to withhold 

SSI benefits as reimbursement for GA-WEAT and EWP benefits 

provided without'first submitting the policy to rule making 

procedures. Because this claim asserts that Defendants have 

violated state law alone, it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06. We therefore dismiss Plaintiffs' 

UARA claim. We remand for the district court to vacate its 

judgment as to Plaintiffs' UARA claim and dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1560. 

VI. 

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the Form 75 contracts are void 

under state and federal contract law because they fail to define 

essential terms--i.e., "public assistance" and "interim 

assistance." To properly bring their claim under Ex Parte Young, 

21 Plaintiffs ask us to apply the four-factor test set forth in 

Bonnette v. California Health & Welfare Agency, 704 F.2d 1465, 

1470 (9th Cir. 1983) to determine whether they are DRS's employees 

for purposes of the FLSA. We have not adopted the Bonnette test 

in this circuit. Instead, we have adopted a five-factor test in 

Doty, 733 F.2d at 722-23, which applies when the issue is whether 

an individual is an employee or independent contractor, and a 

six-factor test which applies when the issue is whether an 

individual is an employee or trainee. Reich, 992 F.2d at 1026-29. 

These tests are helpful analytical guides, but not rigid 

criteria which must be mechanically applied to each case. 

Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470; Reich, 992 F.2d at 1027; Dole, 875 

F.2d at 805. In the instant case, none of the tests fits the 

circumstances we are confronted with. We therefore simply follow 

the analysis of Marshall and Klaips, which comport with the 

Supreme Court's direction to focus upon the circumstances of the 

whole activity and the economic reality of the relationship. 

Rutherford, 331 U.S. at 730; Goldberg, 366 u.s. at 33. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4161 Document: 01019279516 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 29 
Plaintiffs must assert an ongoing violation of a federal right. 

Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06. Plaintiffs do not claim that 

Defendants are violating the United States Constitution or a 

federal statute. Instead, Plaintiffs assert violations of federal 

common law. Plaintiffs have identified no case, however, holding 

that under the application of federal common law, an interim 

assistance authorization that fails to define essential terms is 

void.22 Plaintiffs cite Respect Inc. v. Committee on the Status 

of Women, 781 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1992) for the proposition 

that a contract lacking essential terms is void. The Respect case 

applied Illinois contract law to a contract-based claim pendent to 

federal copyright, trademark, and Lanham Act claims. Id. at 

1364-65. Respect does not, however, support Plaintiffs' claim 

that federal contract law governs the validity of the Form 75 

authorizations. As a result, Plaintiffs' contract claim fails to 

identify an ongoing violation of a federal right. Instead, 

Plaintiffs essentially allege various defects in the Form 75s 

under state contract law. The Eleventh Amendment therefore bars 

Plaintiffs contract claim. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 104-06. We 

dismiss Plaintiffs' contract claim, Mascheroni, 28 F.3d at 1560, 

22 We are doubtful that federal common law would govern the 

question whether an interim assistance authorization entered into 

between an individual and a state is void if it fails to define 

essential terms. In this instance, there is no "unique[] federal 

interest" in the outcome of the suit. Boyle v. United 

Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). Even if an interim 

assistance authorization entered into by a person and a state was 

declared void, it would not impact in any way the federal 

government's obligation to grant an eligible person SSI benefits. 

Because the determination that an interim assistance authorization 

was void would "have no direct effect upon the United States or 

its Treasury," Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 29 (1977), 

state, not federal common law, would govern. Id. at 28-33. 

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and remand with instructions for the district court to vacate its 

judgment as to Plaintiffs' contract claim and dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction.23 Id. 

VII. 

In sum, we DISMISS the portions of Plaintiffs' SSA claim 

seeking retroactive monetary reimbursement of withheld assistance 

benefits and declaratory relief. We DISMISS Plaintiffs' UARA and 

contract claims in their entirety. We DISMISS the portion of 

Plaintiffs' suit seeking notice relief. We REMAND for the 

district court to vacate its judgment as to the aforementioned 

claims and portions of Plaintiffs' suit and dismiss for lack of 

jurisdiction. In all other respects, we AFFIRM the decision of 

the district court. 

23 Because we do not grant Plaintiffs injunctive relief under 

any of their claims, the Eleventh Amendment bars the portion of 

Plaintiffs' suit seeking notice relief. Green, 106 S.Ct. at 

426-29. 

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