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Parties Involved:
Jarren L. Austin
Appellant
City of Fort Wayne, Indiana
Appellee
John Niblick
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted September 2, 2015*

Decided October 7, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐1957

JARREN L. AUSTIN,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN NIBLICK,

Defendant,

CITY OF FORT WAYNE,

Intervenor‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Indiana,

Fort Wayne Division.

No. 1:93‐cv‐217

William C. Lee,

Judge.

O R D E R

Jarren Austin obtained a default judgment in 1995 against John Niblick, a police

officer for the City of Fort Wayne, Indiana, who violated his civil rights during an arrest.

Austin was unable to collect on the judgment from Niblick. Years later, he asked the

district court to enforce the judgment against Fort Wayne, Niblick’s former employer, on

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐1957    Page 2

the theory that local law required the city to indemnify Niblick. The district court denied

Austin’s request, reasoning in part that the law applies to only state‐law liabilities.

Construing Austin’s pro se filing as a motion for supplemental proceedings under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69, we conclude that he may proceed against the city to

enforce his judgment, and so we vacate and remand.

The procedural history is simple. Austin, with the assistance of counsel, sued John

Niblick and other unnamed officers of the Fort Wayne Police Department for beating

him while arresting him in 1991. The complaint stated claims under both 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and state tort law. An attorney for the city entered an appearance on behalf of

only the unnamed officers, and Austin agreed to dismiss them from the suit with

prejudice after the city’s attorney argued that the claims against them were time‐barred.

The claims continued against Niblick, who apparently no longer worked for the police

department and had moved to Florida. Austin spent two years trying to locate Niblick,

but was able to achieve service only through publication. Niblick never responded to the

suit, and the district court entered a default judgment against Niblick in 1995, awarding

Austin $16,998.36.

After efforts to find and collect from Niblick failed, Austin filed a pro se motion

19 years after the judgment, asking the district court to enforce the judgment against the

City of Fort Wayne. He raised three arguments, but only one requires extended

discussion; we address the other two at the end of this order. Austin argued that the city

must pay him on his judgment against Niblick because the city indemnifies its

employees for their adjudicated liabilities. Austin relied on a state statute, IND. CODE

§ 34‐4‐16.7‐1 (1997) (it has since been amended and renumbered IND. CODE § 34‐13‐4‐1

(2015)), and a city ordinance, FORT WAYNE, IND., ORDINANCE § 31.05 (2015). Alerted to

the proceeding when Austin served the city with a copy of his motion, the city

intervened in the suit and opposed Austin’s motion. The district court rejected Austin’s

argument, reasoning that the indemnification statute did not create a private right of

action to sue a governmental entity to compel it to pay a judgment and that the city

ordinance applied only to state‐law claims, not claims under § 1983.

Before we reach the merits of Austin’s appeal, we clarify the nature of his motion

and the district court’s jurisdiction. “[C]ourts should look to the substance of the filing

rather than its label” in “determining the character of a pro se filing.” United States v.

Antonelli, 371 F.3d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 2004). Because Austin has asked the court to enforce

his judgment against a nonparty, his request is properly construed as a motion for

supplemental proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a). Rule 69(a)

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allows successful litigants to collect on a judgment by using supplemental proceedings

based on the procedures of the state in which the district court sits. See Resolution Trust

Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1223 (7th Cir. 1993). Supplemental proceedings under

Rule 69(a) may be used “to collect a judgment from a third person not party to the

original suit.” Yang v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1998). So long as “‘the

additional proceeding does not inject so many new issues that it is functionally a

separate case,’” the proceeding is within the district court’s ancillary jurisdiction. Id.

(quoting Wilson v. City of Chicago, 120 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1997)). In Yang, we

concluded that a plaintiff with a civil‐rights judgment against Chicago police officers

could use Rule 69(a) to enforce his judgment against the city, a nonparty indemnitor of

the judgment debtor. Id. at 524, 526–27. A local indemnification law required Chicago to

indemnify its officers if they had acted within the scope of their employment, and we

held that the scope‐of‐employment issue may be determined during the supplemental

proceeding. Id. Based on Yang, the district court had jurisdiction to consider Austin’s

indemnification claim.

On the merits, the district court’s and the city’s two reasons for preventing Austin

from enforcing his judgment through indemnification are incorrect. The first reason they

identified was the proposition that state law provides Austin with no right to have the

city pay his judgment. That is incorrect. The indemnification statute in force at the time

of the judgment, IND. CODE § 34‐4‐16.7‐1 (1997), provided that a “governmental entity...

shall ... pay any judgment” if “the governing body” of the entity “determines that

paying the judgment ... is in the best interest of the governmental entity.” We have held

previously, in the context of Rule 69(a) proceedings, that this statute requires a

municipality to pay for a judgment against one of its employees if (but only if) it has

agreed to do so. Kapitan v. City of Gary, 12 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 1993); see also City of

Muncie v. Peters, 709 N.E.2d 50, 56 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Fort Wayne, by its local

ordinance, has agreed. It has chosen to “hold harmless” any employee from “any

liability” if the employee acted “in good faith in the performance of duty.” FORT WAYNE,

IND. ORDINANCE § 31.05(B). Under this state law and local ordinance, Austin may pursue

the city for indemnification by showing that Niblick was performing duties in good

faith, and, as in Yang, that issue may be decided in supplemental proceedings.

Under the present version of the indemnification statute, IND. CODE § 34‐13‐4‐1

(2015), (neither party addresses which version should apply) the city’s obligation to pay

judgments is even more plain. The new version largely eliminates a municipality’s

option to decline to pay the judgments of employees acting within the scope of

employment. It provides that in a suit against a public employee, the public employer

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“shall ... pay ... any judgment,” unless it is for punitive damages, in which case

indemnification remains voluntary. Id. (Indemnity is also not required if the city had no

notice of the suit against the employee. Id. But the city’s counsel appeared on behalf of

the unnamed officers in this suit, and the city has not argued here that it lacked the

opportunity to defend Niblick.) Accordingly, regardless of which version of the state law

applies, the city must pay the judgments of covered employees.

The district court’s and city’s second reason for rejecting Austin’s motion is also

incorrect. They suggest that the city’s ordinance indemnifies only state‐law liabilities.

But this argument is refuted by the text of the ordinance, which expressly covers “any”

liability. Here is the full text:

The city shall hold harmless any officer, employee or agent, or former

officer, employee or agent, from any liability or damages if it is determined

that the act or failure to act which gave rise to liability or damages was

done in good faith in the performance of duty; provided, that this section

shall have no application to any case where the city or state may bring an

action against an officer, employee or agent, or former officer, employee or

agent.

FORT WAYNE, IND. ORDINANCE § 31.05(B). And even if the ordinance were limited to

state‐law claims, the district court was wrong to think that it therefore did not apply to

Austin’s judgment, which was based on a complaint that included claims under state

law.

The case must therefore be remanded, but we briefly address Austin’s remaining

two contentions. First, he contends that respondeat superior is a basis for municipal

liability under § 1983. But his complaint did not allege that Niblick followed a custom or

policy of the Fort Wayne Police Department, and he did not obtain a judgment against

the city on that (or any other) basis. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691

(1978). Supplemental proceedings are not the proper forum for determining new

substantive theories of liability. See Lewis v. Rex Metal Craft, Inc., 831 N.E.2d 812, 817

(Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Gallants Ins. Co. v. Wilkerson, 720 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App.

1999). Second, Austin maintains that the city must pay for the judgment against Niblick

because, he asserts, his attorney entered into a stipulation dismissing the other unnamed

officers from the suit without his authority. That is an issue between Austin and his

attorney, not the city.

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We close with an observation about the remand. We have addressed only those

arguments raised here and adopted by the district court; the parties are free to litigate

other issues about the indemnity obligation. For example, if it is properly raised, the

district court may consider the timeliness of Austin’s motion, given that he filed it 19

years after the judgment was issued. We note that federal courts adopt the time limits

specified in state law for proceedings under Rule 69(a). See Dexia Credit Local v. Rogan,

629 F.3d 612, 627 (7th Cir. 2010); Andrews v. Roadway Express, Inc., 473 F.3d 565, 568 (5th

Cir. 2006). And at least some Indiana authority treats supplemental proceedings as part

of the original action and therefore not subject to the ten‐year statute of limitations that

otherwise governs “actions” on judgments. See IND. CODE § 34‐11‐2‐11; Lewis, 831 N.E.2d

at 821; but see Borgman v. Aikens, 681 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding

that party is barred from executing on judgment after ten years because such execution

requires leave of court, see IND. CODE § 34‐55‐1‐2 (formerly § 34‐1‐34‐2), and requesting

leave of court is an action on the judgment within the scope of § 34‐11‐2‐11). Other issues

that may arise on remand include which version of the indemnification statute applies

and whether the city had an opportunity to defend Niblick, as required under the new

statute.

The district court’s order denying Austin’s motion requesting that the City of

Fort Wayne pay the judgment against Niblick is VACATED. The case is REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this order.   

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