Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01849/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01849-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur Harris
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ARTHUR HARRIS,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-1849

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 15-4588, Judge Mary J. Schoelen.

______________________ 

Decided: October 11, 2016

______________________ 

ARTHUR HARRIS, Seattle, WA, pro se.

JANA MOSES, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, 

DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., SCOTT D.

AUSTIN; Y. KEN LEE, CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Case: 16-1849 Document: 23-2 Page: 1 Filed: 10/11/2016
 2 HARRIS v. MCDONALD

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

Arthur Harris filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals 

for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) to challenge a 

Regional Office denial of a claim. The court dismissed the 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction, because the Veterans 

Court’s jurisdiction is limited to review of decisions of the 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals and the Board had not decided 

the claim. Harris v. McDonald, No. 15-4588, 2016 WL 

1118625 (Vet. App. Mar. 22, 2016). Mr. Harris appeals to 

this court, contending that he does not have to wait for a 

Board decision in order to present his appeal to the Veterans Court because the Board has not decided, or will not 

decide, his claim quickly enough to comport with the Fifth 

Amendment’s guarantee of due process. We conclude that 

the Veterans Court committed no legal error in holding 

that it lacked jurisdiction. We therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

The record before us indicates that on November 12, 

2015, the Seattle Regional Office of the Department of 

Veterans Affairs issued a rating decision that denied 

Mr. Harris’s claim that certain benefit payments to him 

should not be reduced by the amounts of certain pension 

payments to him and of dependent-benefit payments to 

his daughter. The record does not clearly indicate whether Mr. Harris ever filed an appeal with the Board, but his 

informal reply suggests that he did. Appellant’s Reply Br. 

at 2–3 (stating that the rating decision informed him 

“that he did not have to file a new appeal because they 

had on record his prior one”). On November 30, 2015, less 

than a month after the Regional Office decision, 

Mr. Harris filed a Notice of Appeal with the Veterans 

Court, challenging the Regional Office’s November 12 

decision.

Case: 16-1849 Document: 23-2 Page: 2 Filed: 10/11/2016
HARRIS v. MCDONALD 3

On January 8, 2016, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs

asked the Veterans Court to dismiss the appeal for lack of 

jurisdiction because there was no decision by the Board on 

Mr. Harris’s claim. In response to the Veterans Court’s

order to explain why it should not dismiss the appeal, 

Mr. Harris confirmed that there was no such Board 

decision. On March 22, 2016, the Veterans Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, citing 38 U.S.C. 

§§ 7252 and 7266(a). Harris, 2016 WL 1118625, at *1. 

The court entered final judgment on April 13, 2016. 

Mr. Harris now appeals to this court.

DISCUSSION

We interpret Mr. Harris’s appeal as challenging the 

Veterans Court’s interpretation of its jurisdictional statutes as requiring a Board decision that actually decides 

his claim even where delay in Board decision-making

amounts to a due-process violation, which he asserts has 

occurred or will occur here. We have jurisdiction to 

entertain those contentions about the Veterans Court’s 

ruling—contentions that involve a matter of statutory 

interpretation and a constitutional issue. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(1), (2). But we reject Mr. Harris’s contentions 

and affirm the Veterans Court’s holding that it lacked 

jurisdiction.

The only potential statutory basis for Veterans Court 

jurisdiction identified here is 38 U.S.C. § 7252. By its 

terms, that statute requires a “decision” by the Board. 

And we have long held that “decision” refers to a grant or 

denial of the veteran’s claim. See Kirkpatrick v. Nicholson, 417 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2005). There is indisputably no such decision here. Section 7252 is therefore 

inapplicable, and that is so whether or not the “decisions” 

covered by section 7252 must be “final”—a term used in 

the time-for-appeal rule of 38 U.S.C. § 7266, but not in the 

text of section 7252. See Tyrues v. Shinseki, 732 F.3d 

1351, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (decision definitively 

Case: 16-1849 Document: 23-2 Page: 3 Filed: 10/11/2016
 4 HARRIS v. MCDONALD

denying a claim on one ground is a “final decision” under 

§ 7266 despite remand on another ground); Howard v. 

Gober, 220 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 

Mr. Harris’s constitutional contention, premised on 

Department delay in ruling on his claim, provides no 

basis for reversing the Veterans Court’s holding of no 

jurisdiction. Nothing in section 7252 states an exception 

for constitutional challenges from the jurisdictional 

precondition of a Board decision. And we have held that 

at least some constitutional challenges can be presented 

to the Board and, based on that conclusion, upheld the

Veterans Court’s dismissal of an appeal for lack of jurisdiction where there was no relevant Board decision, 

including on the constitutional issue. Ledford v. West, 136 

F.3d 776 (Fed. Cir. 1998). We do not see how Mr. Harris’s 

unconstitutional-delay challenge could justify an exception to the “decision” requirement of 38 U.S.C. § 7252. 

Indeed, Mr. Harris has not alleged facts sufficient to 

support his constitutional challenge. Under Mr. Harris’s 

premise that he has a constitutionally protected property 

interest in the benefits he alleges have been improperly 

reduced, see Cushman v. Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1296–

97 (Fed. Cir. 2009), the pertinent requirement of due 

process is that the individual receive notice and a fair 

opportunity to be heard “‘at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner,’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 

332–33 (1976); see Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1296–97. But 

even if that requirement could be found violated by delays 

in some situations, we see no colorable basis for finding a 

violation here. Mr. Harris cannot complain of delay by 

the Board in reviewing the November 12 Regional Office 

rating decision: he gave the Board hardly any time, filing 

an appeal to the Veterans Court only a few weeks after 

that Regional Office decision. A complaint about expected 

delay by the Board is speculative at this point, both as to 

duration and as to reasons, making any due-process 

evaluation impossible. If Mr. Harris’s complaint is inCase: 16-1849 Document: 23-2 Page: 4 Filed: 10/11/2016
HARRIS v. MCDONALD 5

stead about delays in the Regional Office, he has not 

furnished specifics allowing evaluation of the course of 

events and reasons for any delays; and in any event, he 

has given us no basis for concluding that Board review 

was or is unavailable as a remedy for any unconstitutionally excessive delay. See Lamb v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1378, 

1383 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (upholding Veterans Court denial of 

mandamus relief, noting Board’s authority to require 

expedition in some circumstances).

CONCLUSION

We affirm the Veterans Court’s dismissal of 

Mr. Harris’s appeal.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

Case: 16-1849 Document: 23-2 Page: 5 Filed: 10/11/2016