Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03056/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States Postal Service
Respondent
Eric Vaughan
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ERIC VAUGHAN,

Petitioner

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3056

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. NY-0752-14-0377-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: June 4, 2015

______________________ 

ERIC VAUGHAN, Elmont, NY, pro se.

ROBERT C. BIGLER, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., CLAUDIA 

BURKE. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

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2 VAUGHAN v. USPS

PER CURIAM. 

Eric Vaughan appeals from the final decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing his removal 

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because Mr. Vaughan has 

not demonstrated that the Board had jurisdiction to hear 

his appeal or otherwise committed legal error in its decision, we affirm.

I 

On July 7, 2010, Mr. Vaughan was removed from his 

position as a postal supervisor at the United States Postal 

Service for engaging in a physical altercation with a 

coworker. Mr. Vaughan appealed the removal action to 

the Board shortly thereafter. The matter was resolved by 

settlement agreement, under which the Postal Service 

agreed to rescind the removal and permit Mr. Vaughan to 

resign from his position. In exchange, Mr. Vaughan 

would receive a modest lump-sum payment in lieu of back 

pay, and he would surrender his right to challenge the 

circumstances of his resignation. By entering into the 

settlement agreement, Mr. Vaughan also waived his right 

to seek employment again at the Postal Service, he 

acknowledged he understood the final and binding effect 

of the agreement, and attested that he was entering into 

the agreement voluntarily. Mr. Vaughan executed the 

settlement agreement and voluntarily resigned, indicating that he was resigning due to “personal reasons.”

Several years later, in September 2014, Mr. Vaughan 

filed a second appeal with the Board challenging his July 

2010 removal. The Board issued a show cause order 

indicating that prior to initiating this action, 

Mr. Vaughan had entered into a settlement agreement 

waiving future appeal rights. Mr. Vaughan responded 

that, on the date of the altercation, he was suffering from 

the effects of his bipolar disorder. He also indicated that 

during the prehearing conference prior to his appeal, he 

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VAUGHAN v. USPS 3

cause the administrative judge advised him that a videotape of the altercation “speaks a thousand words.” J.A. 

5. 

In an initial decision, an administrative judge found 

that Mr. Vaughan did not show “a non-frivolous allegation 

that the waiver of his appeal rights should not be enforced 

pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement.” Id. 

The administrative judge concluded that the settlement 

was voluntary because Mr. Vaughan accepted the lump 

sum payment and signed a resignation form, and because 

the settlement agreement indicates that Mr. Vaughan 

understood and agreed to sign the agreement of his own 

free will. The administrative judge found that 

Mr. Vaughan’s coercion claim lacked merit, and that his 

“signature on the [settlement] agreement is evidence of 

his conscious and voluntary waiver of his Board appeal 

rights.” J.A. 7. Thus, the administrative judge dismissed 

the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Mr. Vaughan did not 

file a petition for review of the administrative judge’s 

decision. As a result, the decision became the final decision of the Board. Mr. Vaughan appeals. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II

The scope of our review of an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We may only set aside the Board’s 

decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Briggs v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an 

appeal is a question of law, which we review de novo. 

Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir.

1995). But we are bound by the Board’s factual findings 

on which a jurisdictional determination is based “unless 

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4 VAUGHAN v. USPS

those findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” 

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed.

Cir. 1998). Further, the petitioner carries the burden of 

establishing the Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance 

of the evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2).

The Board ordinarily does not have jurisdiction over 

an action subject to a voluntarily executed settlement

agreement except pursuant to an enforcement petition. 

See Mays v. United States Postal Serv., 995 F.2d 1056, 

1059–60 (Fed. Cir. 1993); McCall v. United States Postal 

Serv., 839 F.2d 664, 665, 669 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where settlement agreement resolving prior MSPB appeal waived right to appeal). But a party may nevertheless establish jurisdiction 

if the party can show that the agreement was not voluntarily executed. Asberry v. United States Postal Serv., 692 

F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1982).

On appeal, Mr. Vaughan argues that he did not voluntarily execute the settlement agreement because of his 

disability, and because he was informed by the administrative judge via telephone that a video recording of the 

incident giving rise to the removal “spoke a thousand 

words.” 

Mr. Vaughan failed to present sufficient evidence to 

establish that any disability he may have had impaired 

his decision-making capability at the time he executed the 

settlement agreement. The plain language of the settlement agreement establishes that Mr. Vaughan “acknowledges that he is . . . mentally competent to execute” the 

agreement, and “that he has entered into this Settlement 

Agreement freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and without 

coercion, threat or duress.” J.A. 17 at ¶10. Moreover, 

Mr. Vaughan accepted the benefits provided to him under 

the settlement agreement, including a modest lump-sum 

payment, and submitted a signed resignation form. The 

administrative judge’s finding that such behavior is 

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VAUGHAN v. USPS 5

indicative of his voluntary acceptance, J.A. 5, is supported 

by substantial evidence. Thus, the Board properly dismissed the appeal. 

We have considered Mr. Vaughan’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

AFFIRMED

No costs.

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