Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30319/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30319-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Aucoin
Appellant
Misay Chandakham
Appellant
Duc Huu Pham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee
Bounthong Xaphilom
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30319

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

CHRISTOPHER AUCOIN, also known as C; BOUNTHONG XAPHILOM,

also known as Nick; MISAY CHANDAKHAM; DUC HUU PHAM,

Defendants - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

No. 6:07-CR-60037-8

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

In this appeal, four defendants convicted of participating in a conspiracy

to distribute methamphetamine in the New Iberia, Louisiana, area ask us to

reverse their convictions. They bring a variety of challenges to their convictions

and sentences, which we consider defendant by defendant, proceeding in

alphabetical order. After reviewing the trial record, briefs, and oral arguments

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 2, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

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relating to each defendant, we affirm the judgment of the district court as to

each defendant.

I.

We begin with a recitation of the facts based on the evidence presented at

trial, drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s verdict.

By 2002, Bounthong Xaphilom was manufacturing methamphemine,

commonly known simply as “meth,” in a shed behind his home in New Iberia and

selling it through at least one local dealer, Eng Champkungsing. On February

26, Iberia Parish sheriff’s deputies went to Xaphilom’s home in the course of

investigating reports that Xaphilom was involved in meth distribution. They

found him outside the shed, holding money with crystalline powder on it. After

his arrest, Xaphilom gave officers permission to search the shed. Inside, they

discovered the shed to be a meth lab, and called in a hazmat team. They also

discovered meth buried at various locations on the property, seizing 1,028 grams

total.

After a state conviction, Xaphilom found himself in jail in Iberia Parish,

where he met Phanut Phonchinda some time in 2002. At some point during

their time together Xaphilom told Phonchinda that he had been in the fourth

year of a five-year plan at the time of his arrest. He wanted to unite the Asian

gangs of southwest Louisiana into a drug-dealing alliance called the Nineteen

Dragons, and he told Phonchinda that he planned to resume his plan when he

was released. In the meantime, Champkungsing continued to sell meth,

obtaining it from sources other than Xaphilom.

Xaphilom also met a man named Arthur Basaldua in the Iberia Parish jail.

Basaldua, who was from California, arrived in 2004. According to Phonchinda,

the two discussed their experience in the drug business and began plans to work

together. Xaphilom was not the only one talking to Basaldua about drugs.

Through phone calls arranged by Dominic Sonemangkhala, Basaldua, while in

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jail, contacted various associates, including Duc Pham, regarding the possibility

of selling drugs in Louisiana. These calls often concerned the “construction

business” (i.e., the drug trade) and “windshield wipers” (i.e., meth).

Sonemangkhala was no stranger to the drug trade or to law enforcement. A

narcotics task force—a partnership between local authorities and the FBI—had

hired Sonemangkhala as an informant after his arrest on drug charges to help

them dismantle the Asian drug trade in southwest Louisiana. As he helped

Basaldua contact the outside world, he helped the FBI monitor Basaldua’s

communications.

After his release, Xaphilom found himself incarcerated again, this time in

Bakersfield, California. He and Basaldua stayed in touch, however, through the

mail and Sonemangkhala-arranged phone calls. One of Basaldua’s letters, dated

February 13, 2006, asked if Xaphilom was “still down with that power move that

we have plan[n]ed out for that world.” They also discussed plans to unite after

the two regained their freedom. In early 2006, after they were both out of jail,

they moved into a house on Henry Street in New Iberia, Louisiana, and began

selling meth. Whereas Xaphilom manufactured meth before his arrest in 2002,

he and Basaldua now turned to sources in California, including Pham, to supply

their new business. Basaldua generally handled the drugs, while Xaphilom used

his local connections to find customers and dealers. Xaphilom told his former

customer and dealer Champkungsing about Basaldua, and Champkungsing

purchased from Basaldua on several occasions, selling to support his habit.

Xaphilom also contacted a former coworker, Sammy Thibodeaux, another userdealer, to tell him he had the “hook up.” When Thibodeaux hesitated to buy

from Basaldua, whom he did not know, Xaphilom told him that the only way he

would get any meth was through Basaldua. Thibodeaux began purchasing an

eight ball or two each week from Basaldua, using some and selling the rest,

paying about $200 each time. Other times, Thibodeaux would make larger

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purchases, up to a half-pound at a time, costing $8,000. The pair also sold to

Phonchinda, whom Xaphilom had told about his Nineteen Dragons ambitions in

jail, seven times over a three-week period before Phonchinda was arrested.

Aucoin, who had met Basaldua in jail, also purchased an eight ball a month,

using some and selling the rest to fund his habit.

Another customer was Sonemangkhala, the informant. At a meeting

arranged by Basaldua, Basaldua and Xaphilom agreed to sell and

Sonemangkhala agreed to purchase an ounce of meth for $2,000.

Sonemangkhala, as an informant, first purchased an ounce on June 9, 2006, at

the Henry Street residence. On June 30, he purchased another ounce at Henry

Street. For his third purchase, he traveled to Los Angeles, California, to

purchase directly from Pham. He met Pham behind a gas station and purchased

three ounces at a discounted price of $2,400. For each purchase, the FBI gave

him cash immediately before and received the drugs immediately after.

As time went on, Basaldua became increasingly fearful that the FBI was

watching him. Meth is known to cause paranoia, and like his dealers, Basaldua

used the drug frequently. To quell his anxiety, he required female

acquaintainces to empty their purses to make sure they were not wired, and he

forced a coconspirator, Israel Perez, to ingest meth to prove he was not a police

officer. To protect the Henry Street residence, he hired Aucoin to install security

cameras. When that proved unsatisfactory, Xaphilom arranged for Basaldua to

spend several nights a week with Misay Chandakham, in her Lafayette,

Louisiana, townhouse. In January 2007, Basaldua moved there full- time with

his girlfriend and her children. Chandakham was an addict, and he paid her

1

in meth. She also pooled her money with her friends to purchase “party packs”

of meth that they would consume. Finally, after Basaldua paid to bail her out

Xaphilom relocated to Dallas, Texas, but he continued to consult with Basaldua on 1

the drug business by telephone.

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of jail after an arrest for passing bad checks, Basaldua made her move out of the

townhome. He changed the locks and attempted to install a security camera on

the roof, though he could not get it to work. All through Basaldua’s residency,

Chandakham had paid the rent on time and in full, even though she lacked a job

or any other apparent source of income.

The conspiracy began to unravel in February 2007. On February 26,

Basaldua and Perez were arrested after a high-speed chase in Youngsville,

Louisiana. Officers found a bag containing 121 grams of meth, a scale, and a

handgun, all of which had been thrown from the car. Basaldua managed to get

out of jail, but on March 19 he shot two bail bondsmen. A manhunt involving

approximately fifty law-enforcement personnel ensued. Hoping Aucoin could tell

them where to find Basaldua, members of the task force went to Aucoin’s father’s

home to ask Aucoin if he could help. Although they received no help from

Aucoin, they did see some success, as Aucoin agreed to a meeting two days later

to discuss his relationship with Basaldua. At that meeting, without notice of his

Miranda rights, Aucoin gave the task force information that would eventually

be key to his conviction.

The task force interviewed other members of the conspiracy and the grand

jury handed down an indictment on October 11. In addition to the appellants,

the indictment named Basaldua, Perez, Pham, Champkungsing, Phonchinda,

and Joseph—all of whom pleaded guilty, and some of whom would testify against

their coconspirators at trial. The indictment charged all of the appellants with

one count of conspiring to possess meth with the intent to distribute, see 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. It also charged Pham with three counts of unlawful use

of a communication facility, see § 843(b). Before trial, Chandakham moved to

sever her trial from her coconspirators, but the district court denied the motion.

Aucoin moved to suppress his statement to the task force. The district court

assigned the motion to a magistrate judge, who recommend denying the motion

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after an evidentiary hearing. Aucoin did not object, and the district court denied

the motion on the magistrate’s recommendation.

The case proceeded to trial. Evidence before the jury consisted primarily

of testimony from members of the task force and coconspirators who had pleaded

guilty. At the close of the government’s evidence, the appellants moved for

judgment of acquittal. Aucoin also moved for a severance, though he did not

explain the basis. The district court also denied this motion. The jury returned

a guilty verdict against the defendants on all counts, and the district court

denied the motions for a judgment of acquittal. Aucoin and Chandakham moved

for a new trial, and the district court denied those motions. The appellants

timely appealed.

II.

We first consider Aucoin’s appeal. The indictment charged him with

participating in the conspiracy and specifically attributed to him one affirmative

act: installing video surveillance cameras at the Henry Street residence. The

2

government argues that it presented evidence showing that his actions

supported the aims of the conspiracy in at least three ways: selling meth,

installing cameras to protect the Henry Street residence, and selling property

to raise money to get Basaldua out of jail. Although there was other evidence at

trial, the record shows that the testimony regarding Aucoin’s confession was the

most significant evidence against him. In an interview with two members of the

task force, he described his relationship with Basaldua. The two met in prison.

When they were free, Aucoin purchased an eight ball of meth per month from

Basaldua, using some and selling the rest to customers he refused to name. He

also admitted installing security cameras at Henry Street in exchange for

The indictment reads,“On or about October 27, 2006, CHRISTOPHER AUCOIN, a/k/a

2

“C”, installed video surveillance cameras on ARTHUR BASALDUA’S, a/k/a Yogi, a/k/a Joey,

a/k/a Art, a/k/a Artie, a/k/a Leo Perez, a/k/a Joe Perez, House[.]”

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another eight ball of meth and selling an amplifier to help raise bail for

Basaldua. On appeal, Aucoin raises essentially three challenges, two of which

relate to his confession. First, he says the district court should have granted his

motion to sever. Second, he says the district court should have suppressed his

confession. Third, he says that, if the confession was admissible, the government

failed to present sufficient evidence to corroborate his confession. Reviewing

these arguments in order, we find no error and affirm Aucoin’s conviction.

A.

Aucoin first argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the court

should have severed his trial from his coconspirators. A defendant must move

for severance before trial, unless he can show cause why he should be able to file

at a later date. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12 (b)(5) & (f). Here, Aucoin moved for

severance after the government put on its evidence. Because he makes no

argument on appeal why such a delay was justified, he is not entitled to a new

trial. United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1198-99 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated

and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Moore v. United States, 519 U.S. 802,

802 (1996).

B.

We turn now to whether Aucoin’s confession should have been suppressed.

The district court referred the motion to a magistrate judge, who held a

suppression hearing. At the hearing, two members of the task force, Douglas

Carr and Shane Landry, testified for the government, and Aucoin testified on his

own behalf. The evidence showed that members of the task force went to

Aucoin’s father’s house looking for Basaldua after he shot the bail bondsmen on

March 19, 2007. Carr explained that the task force urgently needed help finding

Basaldua. Carr also told Aucoin that he was a target of an investigation into

meth distribution, a crime that carried serious penalties. Aucoin told Carr that

he had heard from Basaldua that evening but did not know where to find him.

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Carr and the rest of the task force left soon afterward, but before leaving, Carr

told Aucoin that the task force would like to interview him. The task force also

left with Aucoin’s driver’s license, which one member had requested but failed

to return. Aucoin arranged a meeting at the office of a lawyer who previously

represented him in a personal injury matter.

At the meeting were five or six members of the task force, Aucoin, and his

lawyer. The lawyer asked Agent Carr if Aucoin was a suspect in the

investigation. After Agent Carr indicated that Aucoin was a target, the lawyer

told Aucoin he would be better served by a lawyer familiar with criminal law.

Nevertheless, Aucoin was willing to speak to the agents. Carr told Aucoin and

the lawyer that it would be better to speak without the lawyer present so he

could develop Aucoin as an informant, a condition Aucoin apparently did not

protest. Although Aucoin wanted to speak to Carr only, Carr told him that such

interviews should involve two agents. Aucoin chose Landry to participate in the

interview, which was outside so Aucoin could smoke. During the interview,

Aucoin was generally cooperative, confessing his involvement in the conspiracy

but refusing to identify those who purchased meth from him. The three

witnesses agreed that the task force members never gave him a Miranda

warning.

After the hearing, the magistrate recommended denying the motion to

suppress. The report and recommendation notified Aucoin that failing to object

to the recommendation would result in plain-error review on appeal. Aucoin did

not object to the recommendation, and the district court denied the motion.

Because Aucoin did not ask the district court to reconsider the magistrate’s

ruling, which notified Aucoin of forfeiture for failing to ask for review, we review

for plain error only. United States v. Francis, 183 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. 1999).

For us to consider reversing Aucoin’s conviction, Aucoin must show that the

magistrate’s conclusion that he was not in custody was erroneous, that the error

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was plain, and that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v.

Scher, 601 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2010). Upon such a showing, we have the

discretion to reverse if we determine “the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citations and

quotations omitted).

On this record, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred.

Miranda warnings are necessary only if “a reasonable person in the suspect’s

position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on

freedom of movement to the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.”

United States v. Stevens, 487 F.3d 232, 241 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United

States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). As Aucoin

points out, “a statement by a law enforcement officer that an individual is

suspected of illegal activity is persuasive evidence” that a suspect is in custody.

United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 1996). But the totality of

the circumstances indicates enough voluntariness that any error in the district

court’s decision was not plain. It was Aucoin’s decision when and where to meet,

and it was his decision to speak to law enforcement without a lawyer, even after

his lawyer told him he should find a criminal lawyer. Moreover, the interview

took place outside at Aucoin’s request, where he was free to smoke and evidently

felt comfortable enough to refuse to answer certain questions. Even assuming

the district court erred, the error is not plain. We will not reverse on this

ground.

C.

Aucoin next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him, arguing

that the government failed adequately to corroborate his confession. Before

addressing that argument, we must address Aucoin’s contention that the

government’s introduction of evidence tending to prove overt acts not alleged in

the indictment amounts to a variance between the indictment and proof. We

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have long held that the government’s proof is not limited to evidence of the overt

acts alleged in the indictment. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 657 F.2d 755,

763 (5th Cir. 1981). Accordingly, in considering the sufficiency of the

government’s evidence, we are not limited to evidence concerning Aucoin’s

alleged installation of the cameras at Henry Street.

As noted above, Aucoin confessed that he bought meth from Basaldua to

use and sell it; installed cameras at Henry Street; and sold property to raise bail

for Basaldua. Although confessions can be crucial to a conviction, a conviction

cannot stand on the confession alone. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 152

(1954). This rule reflects the reality that defendants sometimes confess to

crimes they did not commit. Id. When the government offers a defendant’s

confession as part of its evidence, it must also offer evidence that “fortifies the

truth of the confession.” United States v. Deville, 278 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir.

2002) (quoting United States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1479 (5th Cir. 1985)). This

evidence does not, however, need to prove every element of the offense, so long

as there is substantial evidence to show the offense was committed and all the

evidence is sufficient for the jury to convict. Id. In this case, the evidence had

to show a conspiracy to possess and distribute meth as defined by 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1) and 846. Thus, the government had to prove as to each defendant the

existence of an agreement to possess meth with the intent to distribute, that the

defendant knew of the agreement, and that the defendant voluntarily

participated in the agreement. See United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397, 409 (5th

Cir. 1998). There is no need for direct evidence; circumstantial evidence may

suffice to show the agreement. Id. Evidence that the defendant merely

associated with members of the conspiracy is not enough, but such associations

can be circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy. See United States v. WilliamsHendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1986).

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A review of the record discloses sufficient corroboratory evidence. First,

phone records showed 105 phone calls between Basaldua and Aucoin from

December 18, 2006, to February 17, 2007—almost two per day—demonstrating

a close relationship between the two. Basaldua’s girlfriend at the time of the

shootings also testified that she went to Aucoin’s home to try to get money for

Basaldua’s bail, showing that people close to Basaldua expected Aucoin to help

pay to get Basaldua out of jail. In addition, testimony from Perez that Aucoin

installed cameras at Henry Street and FBI surveillance photographs of the

installation support Aucoin’s admission that he installed the cameras for

Basaldua. Futher testimony attested to Basaldua’s paranoia, and the jury could

reasonably infer that someone who regularly spoke to Basaldua and had a

relationship with him was at least generally aware of Basaldua’s activities and

his fear of law-enforcement detection. Taken together, this evidence supports

an inference that he installed the cameras to protect Basaldua’s illegal drug

activities. In view of this corroboratory evidence, the jury had sufficient

evidence to conclude he joined Basaldua in the conspiracy to distribute meth.

Finding no error, we affirm Aucoin’s conviction.

III.

Next, we consider Chandakham’s appeal. Chandakham’s townhouse is

where Basaldua moved as he became increasingly concerned with his safety,

eventually displacing Chandakham. She makes two arguments against her

conviction: first, that the district court should have granted her motion for a

separate trial, and second, that the evidence before the jury was insufficient to

support her conviction. In addition, she argues that her ten-year mandatory

minimum sentence violates the Eighth Amendment. Finding no error, we

affirm.

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A.

Chandakham first argues that the district court should have severed her

trial. Unlike Aucoin, Chandakham presented her motion at the appropriate

time, so we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sudeen, 434 F.3d

384, 387 (5th Cir. 2005). Generally, judicial economy calls for trying

coconspirators together and “the mere presence of a spillover effect does not

ordinarily warrant severance.” United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 863

(5th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). To merit reversal,the defendant must show

“clear, specific, and compelling prejudice that resulted in an unfair trial.” Id.

She argues that such prejudice existed in two ways: first, that the evidence

regarding bad acts of her coconspirators overwhelmed the jury’s ability to

consider separately the evidence against her, and second, that she was unable

to call key witnesses to testify on her behalf. We find no error.

Regarding the first, although Chandakham is certainly correct that the

lion’s share of evidence concerned other members of the conspiracy, that

spillover was not out of the mainstream of conspiracy cases. Especially in the

light of the district court’s instruction to the jury to consider the evidence

separately as to each defendant, we think the “jury could . . . be expected to

compartmentalize the evidence as it related to separate defendants.” United

States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1084 (5th Cir. 1987). Similarly, Chandakham

has not demonstrated a need for a separate trialto obtain exculpatory testimony.

To prevail, she must show: “(1) a bona fide need for the testimony; (2) the

substance of the testimony; (3) its exculpatory nature and effect; [and] (4) that

the co-defendant would in fact testify if severance were granted.” United States

v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 732 (5th Cir. 1992). Regarding the need for a

severance to obtain exculpatory testimony, Chandakham’s motion stated only:

“Counsel for your defendant believes there is potential exculpatory evidence from

a co-defendant which will not be available if the co-defendant asserts his 5th

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Amendment rights at trial.” This brief statement failed to argue any of the four

necessary factors. On appeal, her brief and oral argument also omitted any

specific argument on the relevant factors. Accordingly, we will not reverse for

failure to grant a severance.

B.

We next consider Chandakham’s claim of the insufficiency of the evidence.

Our analysis of Aucoin’s sufficiency of the evidence argument contains the

relevant legal standard for conspiracy to distribute meth, so we will not repeat

it here. Chandakham argues there was no evidence sufficient to allow the jury

to infer an agreement to participate in the conspiracy to distribute meth. We

disagree. Perez, a coconspirator, testified that “Arthur [Basaldua] would give

Misay methamphetamine . . . so she could pay the rent,” i.e., from sales of meth.

Perez further testified that Chandakham became angry when someone she knew

started purchasing directly from Basaldua, suggesting that the friend was also

her customer who earlier might have been purchasing meth from her. Given her

unemployment and her landlord’s testimony that her rent was always paid on

time, the jury reasonably could infer an agreement that Basaldua would give

Chandakham meth, which she would sell to pay the rent. The jury had more

than enough evidence to conclude that Chandakham joined the conspiracy to

distribute meth.

C.

Chandakham also says that her ten-year mandatory minimum sentence

violates her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual

punishment. We disagree. The Eighth Amendment embraces a “narrow

proportionality principle,” that tolerates severe sentences so long as they are not

“grossly disproportionate.” Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997, 1000-01

(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). We

cannot say that Chandakham’s sentence is so grossly disproportionate that it is

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unconstitutional in the light of other severe sentences we have approved. See,

e.g., United States v. Cathey, 259 F.3d 365, 368-69 (5th Cir. 2001). We affirm her

sentence.

IV.

Pham raises two challenges to his sentence, neither of which merits

reversal. First, he argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment

rights by finding that he possessed a gun in the commission of his crime and

applying U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). He says the jury, not the court, should have

made the factual finding. “Booker contemplates that, with the mandatory use of

the Guidelines excised, the Sixth Amendment will not impede a sentencing judge

from finding all facts relevant to sentencing.” United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d

511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). There is no error. Next, he argues that his counsel was

ineffective in failing to object to the amount of drugs used to calculate his

sentence. The record contains insufficient to evaluate that claim on direct

appeal. United States v. Hughes, 602 F.3d 669, 674 (5th Cir. 2010).

V.

We turn now to Xaphilom’s arguments against his conviction and sentence.

We should reverse his conviction, he argues, because the evidence at trial proved

two conspiracies, whereas the indictment alleged only one. Regarding his

sentence, he makes two arguments. First, if we find that two conspiracies

existed but decline to reverse his conviction, he says he at least deserves to be

sentenced only for the conduct relating to the later activity. Second, he argues

that the district court erred by attributing his brother’s conviction to him,

causing it to deny his request for a variance. After a review of the record and

consideration of the briefs and oral argument, we find no error.

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A.

We first consider Xaphilom’s argument that the proof at trial varied from

the indictment. Specifically, he argues that whereas the indictment charged

only one conspiracy, the evidence presented at trial showed two. He contends

that his 2002 conduct—manufacturing meth for distribution in New

Iberia—involved a conspiracy different from his later activities with Basaldua.

We determine whether there is a variance by comparing the proof at trial to the

allegations in the indictment. United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769 (5th

Cir. 2007). The number of conspiracies is a question of fact, and in the face of a

jury’s determination that only one conspiracy existed, we will find multiple

conspiracies only if the jury lacked sufficient evidence to conclude the activities

were part of a single conspiracy. Id. In evaluating the evidence, we consider

principally three factors: the purposes, means, and composition of the

conspiracy. Id. at 771. In addition to a variance, Xaphilom would have to show

prejudice for us to vacate his conviction. Id. We need not, however, reach the

issue of prejudice, because we conclude that sufficient evidence exists for the

jury to conclude there was a single, continuing conspiracy to profit from the sale

of meth in the New Iberia, Louisiana, area.

In 2002, Xaphilom was manufacturing meth in a shed behind his house on

a fairly significant scale, as evidenced by seizure of more than a kilogram of the

drug at his arrest. Although the government did not introduce much evidence

as to the character of the conspiracy in 2002, Champkungsing, who pleaded

guilty to the conspiracy charged in this case, told the jury he both consumed and

sold meth obtained from Xaphilom both before and after Xaphilom’s

incarceration, demonstrating a clear connection between the 2002 conduct and

the conduct after Xaphilom got out of jail. Once in jail, Xaphilom recruited

others to join his meth distribution ring after his release. Phonchinda testified

that Xaphilom told him of his incomplete plan to create a Nineteen Dragons

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gang to dominate the meth trade in southwest Louisiana and that he planned

to continue dealing meth after his release. Xaphilom’s pitch seems to have

worked, as Phonchinda bought drugs from the conspiracy after his release.

Xaphilom’s most significant jailhouse recruit, of course, was Basaldua, who

helped to bring other new members to the conspiracy and provided the

connections to import meth from California. Once released, Xaphilom

reconnected with his old dealer, Champkungsing, and resumed dealing through

him, but now with Xaphilom’s jail-mate, Basaldua, as the primary contact in this

continuing and growing arrangement. The evidence sufficiently establishes a

single conspiracy, both alleged and proved, and we affirm Xaphilom’s conviction.

B.

We next consider Xaphilom’s sentence. We review sentences for abuse of

discretion, reviewing factual findings for clear error and application of the

guidelines de novo. United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 433 (5th Cir. 2010)

(per curiam). We will not reverse for harmless error. Id. Because we have

determined that the jury had sufficient evidence to conclude that there was only

one ongoing conspiracy, we address only briefly Xaphilom’s argument that the

the district court should not have considered the drugs seized in 2002. Because

possession of those drugs was part of the conspiracy, the district court did not err

in considering those drugs to sentence Xaphilom. We turn now to his second

argument.

Xaphilom’s argument that he should get a new sentence concerns a 1999

conviction for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. His presentence

report attributed the conviction to him, but Xaphilom contends it belongs to his

brother, Bounnong. He acknowledges that the sentence made no difference to

his criminal history category, but he says that the district court might have

granted his request for a variance had it not concluded that the 1999 conviction

was his. The record, briefs, and oral arguments convince us that the district

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 Case: 09-30319 Document: 00511190936 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/02/2010
No. 09-30319

court did not clearly err in rejecting Xaphilom’s argument, and even if it did, the

error would be harmless.

As noted above, the presentence report attributed the conviction to

Xaphilom. The district court is permitted to rely on the report unless the

defendant shows it is materially unreliable. United States v. Ford, 558 F.3d 371,

377 (5th Cir. 2009). Xaphilom filed an objection to the report, stating that he

“d[id] not think he pled to this offense.” At the sentencing hearing, he provided

an uncertified record from the Lafayette Parish Clerk of Court that showed the

social security number and date of birth associated with the plea matched those

of Xaphilom’s brother, Bounnong. The probation officer explained that the

presentence report attributed the conviction to Xaphilom because it was in his

name and the address also matched. The district court asked Xaphilom if he had

any other evidence, but he did not. Having reviewed the record, we cannot say

that Xaphilom carried his burden to show that the presentence report was

materially unreliable, so we find no clear error. Moreover, the record discloses

no reason to believe that the district court would have granted a variance had

it not concluded the conviction belonged to Xaphilom. Consequently, even if the

district court had erred, that error would have been harmless. Accordingly,

Xaphilom’s sentence stands.

VI.

In this appeal, we have thoroughly considered the trial record, the briefs

and the oral arguments. We are satisfied that the district court did not commit

error, and certainly not reversible error, so the judgment is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.

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 Case: 09-30319 Document: 00511190936 Page: 17 Date Filed: 08/02/2010