Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03158/USCOURTS-caDC-94-03158-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel D. Rostenkowski
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 1995 Decided July 18, 1995

Nos. 94-3158 and 94-3160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANIEL D. ROSTENKOWSKI,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00226)

Dan K. Webb and Howard M. Pearl argued the cause for appellant. With them on the briefs were

Thomas M. Buchanan and R. Kenneth Mundy.

John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the

briefs were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, Roy W. McLeese, III, Larry R. Parkinson,

Wendy L. Wysong, Randall D. Eliason, and Leslie A. Blackmon, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Daniel D. Rostenkowski, a former United States Congressman

from Illinois, brings this interlocutory appeal of two district court orders that in effect allow the

Government to proceed with his prosecution for misappropriation of congressionalfunds. In the first

order, the district court held that Rostenkowski's indictment on its face violates neither the Speech

or Debate Clause nor the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution nor the doctrine of the separation

of powers. In the second order, the court denied Rostenkowski's motions for in camera review of

grand jury materials and for a review of the evidence to be presented against him at trial, both of

which he argues are necessary to the full development of the constitutional issues he raises. 

Asto the first order: (1) in light ofthe Supreme Court's recent decision in Hubbard v. United

States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995), we decline to determine at this time the constitutionality of those

counts of the indictment alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which counts we remand to the

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district court for the purpose of entertaining such motions as the parties may wish to make; (2) we

hold that the remaining counts present no problem under the Speech or Debate Clause; but (3) we

conclude that certain portions ofthose counts are non- justiciable under the doctrine ofthe separation

of powers and the Rulemaking Clause. As to the second order: (1) we affirm the court's denial of

Rostenkowski's motion for in camera review of the grand jury materials; but (2) we hold that we do

not have jurisdiction at thisjuncture to review the district court's denialofRostenkowski's evidentiary

motion.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 31, 1994 the grand jury returned an indictment alleging generally that Rostenkowski

and others had "devised ... a scheme" to defraud the United States of its money, its property, and its

right to Rostenkowski's "fair and honestservices." Specifically, the indictment charges Rostenkowski

withseventeenseparate violations ofsix federalstatutessix ofwhich are associated with the general

scheme to defraud and eleven of which are each associated with one of four subsidiary "schemes" to

misappropriate funds, as follows.

The General Scheme to Defraud: Counts 1-6. Counts One through Six of the indictment

focus upon certain communications that Rostenkowski allegedly made in furtherance of the general

scheme to defraud the United States and the United States House of Representatives. Counts One,

Two, Three, and Five charge Rostenkowskiwith mailfraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1346,

& 2. Count Four charges Rostenkowski with wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346,

& 2. Count Six charges that Rostenkowski tampered with a government witness, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)(1) and (b)(2)(A). Specifically, Count Six alleges that Rostenkowski attempted

to persuade an employee of the House of Representatives not to tell the grand jury that he had been

paid as a member of Rostenkowski's congressional office staff for performing personal services for

the Congressman.

The Congressional Payroll Scheme: Counts 7 and 8. Rostenkowski, like every Member of

the House, authorized payment of his staff out of his "Clerk Hire Allowance" by submitting the

appropriate formsto the House Finance Office. The indictment alleges generally that Rostenkowski

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instructed certain members of his staff to cash their paychecks and to deposit the proceeds with

Rostenkowski's office manager, who then "paid these individuals later, in cash and in substantially

smaller dollar amountsthan the checksthemselves, asthey performed servicesfor ... Rostenkowski."

Count Seven charges specifically that by submitting Payroll Certification Forms stating that certain

employees did official work when in fact they performed services for Rostenkowski, his family, or

his campaign, the Congressman concealed a materialfact fromthe House Finance Office, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2. Count Eight charges that by improperly using his Clerk Hire Allowance

to pay employeesfor personalservicesrather than officialwork, Rostenkowskistole, embezzled, and

converted funds of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 & 2.

The House Stationery Store Scheme: Counts 9 and 10. As a Congressman, Rostenkowski

could purchase office suppliesfor officialuse fromthe Office SupplyService ofthe House, commonly

called the House Stationery Store, by charging those supplies to his "Official Expenses Allowance."

If a particular item was not in stock, Rostenkowski could cause the Store to order that item by

completing a "Special Order Request" form stating that the item was necessary for the conduct of

official business. Although a Member of Congress could also purchase items for personal use from

the Store, he was required to pay for such items (plus a 10% service charge) himself.

Count Nine allegesthat by purchasing for personal use fromthe House StationeryStore more

than $40,000 of goodsincluding crystal sculptures, wooden armchairs, and fine chinaand

representing that those goods were for officialbusiness, Rostenkowski concealed a materialfact from

the House Finance Office, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2. Count Ten alleges that by using

his Official Expenses Allowance to purchase items that were used by him, his family, or his friends,

Rostenkowski embezzled and converted funds of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641

& 2.

The House Post Office Scheme: Counts 11-14. As a Member of Congress, Rostenkowski

could use government funds to purchase postage stamps for use on official mail. He needed only to

submit to the Office of the Postmaster of the U.S. House of Representatives a signed voucher

representing that the stamps would be used for an officialpurpose. The amount of postage purchased

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would then be charged by the House Finance Office to Rostenkowski's Official Expenses Allowance.

The indictment alleges generally that Rostenkowski submitted vouchers (or stamps that he had

purchased with vouchers) to the House Post Office and received cash in return.

Count Eleven alleges that by covering up the fact that he received cash rather than postage

stampsin exchange for the vouchersthat he had submitted, Rostenkowski concealed a material fact,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2. Count Twelve alleges that by submitting fraudulent vouchers

in exchange for cash, Rostenkowski embezzled and converted funds ofthe United States, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 & 2. Count Thirteen alleges that Rostenkowski conspired with then-House

Postmaster Robert V. Rota to exchange vouchers for cash, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. Count

Fourteen alleges that Rostenkowski exchanged funds from both his campaign committee and his

political action committee for cash from the House Post Office and then concealed this fact from the

Federal Election Commission, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 & 2. More specifically, Count

Fourteen allegesthat Rostenkowski exchanged checks drawn upon the accounts ofthose committees

for over $28,000 in cash; that those checks bore his notation indicating that they had been used to

purchase postage stamps; and that this notation caused those committees to submit inaccurate

campaign expenditure reports to the FEC.

The Vehicle Purchase Scheme: Counts 15-17. A member of the House of Representatives

may, by submitting a valid lease agreement to the House Finance Office, use funds from his Official

Expenses Allowance to lease a motor vehicle to be used as a "mobile district office" for the conduct

of official business. The indictment alleges generally that Rostenkowski bought vehicles for his

personal use and, by submitting fraudulent lease agreements to the House Finance Office, caused

$73,500 in funds of the United States to be paid to an auto dealership for their purchase.

Count Fifteen alleges that Rostenkowski made false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

1001 & 2, based upon the lease agreements that he submitted to the House Finance Office. Count

Sixteen alleges that by using his Official Expenses Allowance both to purchase motor vehicles that

he and his family used and to rent garage space for a van that he owned, Rostenkowski embezzled

and converted funds of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 & 2. Count Seventeen

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allegesthat Rostenkowskispent $28,267 in fundsfrom his campaign committee to purchase vehicles

for his personal use; that he caused his campaign committee to represent to the FEC that those

campaign funds had been used to rent vehiclesfor campaign purposes; and that he thereby concealed

a material fact from the FEC, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 & 2.

* * *

At issue in this appeal are three motions Rostenkowski filed in the district court. In the first,

he moved to dismiss the indictment upon two independent grounds. He argued first that the

indictment is, in its entirety and on its face, invalid under the Speech or Debate Clause of Article I,

Section 6 of the United States Constitution; that clause provides that "for any Speech or Debate in

either House, [a Member of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other place," and thus protects

the Member fromprosecution for hislegislative acts. Rostenkowski also argued that the prosecution

of all of the counts of the indictment other than Count Six will depend upon judicial interpretation

of the Rules and Regulations of the House of Representatives, and that those Rules and Regulations

are non-justiciable under the doctrine of the separation of powers and the Rulemaking Clause of

Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that "Each House may determine the Rules

of its Proceedings."

In the second motion, Rostenkowski sought in camera review of "all evidence presented to

the grand jury." In the third motion, he requested a bill of particulars, the production of

"constitutionally exculpatory information," and a pretrial hearing. He argued that those procedures

are necessary to his ability fully to develop the constitutional arguments set out in his first motion.

The district court denied Rostenkowski's motion to dismiss in one order and his other two

motions in a separate order. Rostenkowski appeals those decisions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. JURISDICTION

We first examine the basis for our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. Generally, the

court of appeal has jurisdiction to review only a final judgment of the district court. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), however, the Supreme

Court "carved out a narrow exception to the normal application of the final judgment rule, which has

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come to be known as the collateral order doctrine." Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489

U.S. 794, 798 (1989). Under that doctrine, an interlocutory order of the district court may be

appealed immediately if it: (1) "conclusively determine[s] the disputed question"; (2) "resolve[s] an

important issue completely separate from the merits of the action"; and (3) would be "effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468

(1978); see Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546-47; cf. In re Continental Inv. Corp., 637 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.

1980) ("the possibility of irreparable harm resulting froma delay in appellate review isthe dispositive

criterion of interlocutory appealability"). We now consider whether the orders appealed by

Rostenkowski satisfy that three-part test for review pursuant to Cohen.

A. The Order Denying the Motion to Dismiss

We clearly have jurisdiction to review the order of the district court denying Rostenkowski's

motion to dismiss. Because the Speech or Debate Clause protects a Member of Congress "not only

from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending [himself],"

Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967), post-trial review of an order denying a claim of

immunity under that Clause is insufficient to vindicate the rights that the Clause is meant to protect,

see Midland Asphalt Corp., 489 U.S. at 800-01 ("deprivation of the right not to be tried satisfiesthe

... requirement of being effectively unreviewable on appealfrom a final judgment"). For that reason,

and because the order in question self-evidently satisfies the first two requirements of Cohen, it is

subject to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500,

506-08 (1979) (Helstoski I); see United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir.

1995). For similar reasons, an order denying a claim of immunity based upon the separation of

powers doctrine is appealable as a collateral order. See United States v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 185

(D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Like speech or debate immunity, separation of powers immunity should protect

legislatorsfrom the burden of litigation and diversion from congressional duties"); Durenberger, 48

F.3d at 1242; see also United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932, 935-36 (2d Cir. 1980).

B. The Order Denying the Supplemental Motions

Our jurisdiction overRostenkowski's challenge to the trial court'ssecond order is not as clear.

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In that order the district court denied both Rostenkowski's motion for in camera review of the grand

jury materials and his compound motion for a bill of particulars, the production of "constitutionally

exculpatory information," and a pretrial hearing to review the evidence to be presented at trial.

Rostenkowski now appeals the denial only of his requests for in camera review of the grand jury

materials and for an evidentiary hearing. We address our jurisdiction over each of those two

decisions separately, bearing in mind that the collateral order doctrine is to be applied "with the

utmost strictness" in a criminal case. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 265 (1984).

1. Review of the grand jury materials

The order denying Rostenkowski's motion to review the grand jury materials clearly satisfies

the first two elements of the Cohen test: the decision "conclusively determines the disputed issue,"

which is collateral to the merits of the case, i.e., to guilt or innocence. See United States v.

Deffenbaugh Industries, Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1992) (first two Cohen elements met

where district court denied defendant access to certain grand jury materials). Whether that decision

is also effectively unreviewable on appealfroma final judgment depends upon whether an indictment

would be deemed invalid solely because it was procured by the use of material protected by the

Speech or Debate Clause. If so, then to delay review until after trial would be to deny the

Congressman the protection from "the cost and inconvenience of litigation" to which he is entitled

under that Clause. Rose, 28 F.3d at 185. We turn, therefore, to the question whether the protection

of the Speech or Debate Clause extends beyond the face of the indictment to limit the materials that

may lawfully be presented to a grand jury.

To repeat, Article I, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate

in either House, [a Member of Congress] shall not be questioned in any other Place." The Speech

or Debate Clause is designed to "prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a

possibly hostile judiciary," United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1974), and to ensure "that

legislators are not distracted from or hindered in the performance of their legislative tasks by being

called into court to defend their actions." Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969). In order

fully to secure those purposes, it seems that a court may find it necessary, at least under some

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circumstances, to look beyond the face of an indictment and to examine the evidence presented to

the grand jury. See United States v. Dowdy, 479 F.2d 213, 223 (4th Cir. 1973) ("If the speech or

debate clause ... is to be given meaning, the validity of an indictment must be determined in the

context of the proof which is offered to sustain it, or in the context of facts adduced on a motion to

dismiss it"). Otherwise, a prosecutor could with impunity procure an indictment by inflaming the

grand jury against a Member upon the basis of his Speech or Debate, subject only to the necessity of

avoiding any reference to the privileged material on the face of the indictment.

The suggestion that the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause extends to grand jury

materials finds strong support in the decisions ofseveral other circuits and less directly in one of our

own precedents. In Rose we stated broadly that the use of protected testimony "as background

material for a [civil] complaint would clearly violate the Speech or Debate Clause," 28 F.3d at 186;

a fortiori it would violate the Clause to use such material in order to procure a criminal indictment.

Meanwhile, the circuits that have focused their attention more precisely upon the use of Speech or

Debate material before a grand jury are unanimousin their condemnation of the practice. See United

States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1992) (indictment must be dismissed where

decision to indict based upon submission of Speech or Debate material to grand jury); United States

v. Helstoski (Helstoski II), 635 F.2d 200, 204-06 (3d Cir. 1980) (dismissing indictment based upon

wholesale violation of Speech or Debate Clause before grand jury); Dowdy, 479 F.2d at 223 (4thCir.

1973) ("it may be necessary to go beyond the indictment [in looking for Speech or Debate material]

in order to obtain the full meaning of what appear facially to be perfectly proper allegations"); see

also United States v. Durenberger, Crim. No. 3-93-65, 1993 WL 738477 at * 3-4 (D. Minn. 1993)

(submission of any Speech or Debate material to grand jury requires dismissal of indictment). Both

the purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause and all the most relevant decisions of the other circuits

point forcefully to the conclusion that the Clause protects not only against the reference to Speech

or Debate material on the face of the indictment but also against its use before the grand jury, at least

under some circumstances.

As compelled asthat conclusion may seem, the Government understandably contestsit upon

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three separate grounds. First, the Government contends generally that "an indictment returned by

a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, ... if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the

charge on the merits" and that the "validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the

evidence considered" by the grand jury, quoting respectivelyCostello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,

363 (1956), and United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 344-45 (1974). While we accept the

validity of those propositions in general, of course, we do not think that they are applicable where

they would undermine the important purposes served by the Speech or Debate Clause. Moreover,

as one court has noted, it is significant that Calandra involved the use of evidence seized in violation

of the Fourth Amendment rather than the use of Speech or Debate material:

Under the Speech or Debate Clause ... the constitutional violation is the use of

legislative acts against a legislator. Unlike a violation of the Fourth Amendment,

which the Calandra court held to be a past abuse and thus the lawful basis for

subsequent grand jury questioning, it is the very act of questioning that triggers the

protections of the Speech or Debate Clause.

In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 598 (3d Cir. 1978). For the moment, we express no

view upon the question of when the presentation of Speech or Debate Clause material to a grand jury

invalidates a facially valid indictment; we conclude only that at some point the presentation of such

material requires the court to dismiss the resulting bill. Even the Government seems willing to

concede that pervasive violations of the Speech or Debate Clause before the grand jury would

invalidate the indictment; that said, we do not see how it can also maintain that we lack the

jurisdiction necessary to protect a Member of Congress from having to stand trial because of

something said or done in the course of speech or debate in the national legislature. Nor does our

decision significantly threaten the "historical independence" of the grand jury. See United States v.

Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47-50 (1992). Cases that implicate the Speech or Debate Clause are

thankfully rare; to the extent that our decision will have any impact upon grand jury proceedings, it

will be limited to those few proceedings in which grand jury secrecy must be reconciled with Speech

or Debate immunity, which is, after all, also a value of constitutional dimension.

Next, the Government contends that the possibility that the submission of Speech or Debate

material to a grand jury could invalidate an otherwise valid indictment is precluded by United States

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v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 185 (1969). In that case the Supreme Court, having determined that

Speech or Debate material had been presented to the grand jury and introduced at trial, nonetheless

merely reversed the appellant's conviction and remanded the matter for retrial with the privileged

material expunged from the indictment. The Government argues from the terms of the remand in

Johnson that the Court did not consider the grand jury proceedings relevant to its analysis under the

Speech or Debate Clause. We disagree.

Johnson speaks only to the question of when a facially valid indictment must be set aside

because Speech or Debate materials were put before the grand jury. The Court did not consider the

violations that took place in that case sufficient to invalidate the entire indictment; rather the Court

was confident that its modification of the indictment cured any problem created by the use of Speech

or Debate materials before the grand jury. See id. at 185 ("With all references to [Speech or Debate

material] eliminated, we think the Government should not be precluded froma new trialon this count,

thus wholly purged of elements offensive to the Speech or Debate Clause"); see also Helstoski II,

635 F.2d at 204-05 (Johnson does not always limit court review to face of indictment). The Court

in Johnson did not address the anterior question relevant to our jurisdictional analysis. Indeed, the

Government admits as much when it allows as how the SupremeCourt "has neversquarely addressed

the argument that ... presentation of Speech or Debate material to the grand jury invalidates the

indictment."

Finally, the Government points to United States v. Carney, 665 F.2d 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1981),

a two-page per curiam opinion, in which this court said that "only those parts of an indictment which

are facially invalid should be dismissed on Speech or Debate Clause grounds," and held that a "ruling

denying ... a motion to inspect grand jury minutes[for Speech and Debate material] is unappealable"

prior to trial. Id. at 1065. We must agree with the Government that a decision here that grand jury

materials are subject to the limitations of the Speech or Debate Clause would be inconsistent with

Carney. We note also the conflict between Carney and our more recent decision in Rose, in which

we undertook a close review of the testimony used in the preparation of a civil complaint. In order

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*This holding has been considered and approved by the full court and thus constitutes the law

of the circuit. See Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 

to resolve these conflicts, however, we think the better choice isto overrule Carney.* The simple fact

is that the court in Carney announced its conclusion without offering a reason, and we are unable to

imagine any consideration, other than those that the Government advances and we find wanting

above, for adhering to that opinion. As we have seen, Carney failed adequately to secure for

Members of Congress the full protection of the Speech or Debate Clause; accordingly, it has not

been regarded either by this circuit or by any other as an absolute bar to a court reviewing grand jury

records for material protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

In summary, for the purpose of our jurisdictional analysis, we conclude that at least under

some circumstances the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits not only reference to protected material

on the face of an indictment but also the use of that material before the grand jury. Because delaying

until after trial the appeal of an order refusing to review grand jury materials for Speech or Debate

material could expose a legislator to a prosecution based upon his legislative acts, we hold that the

district court order denying Rostenkowski's motion satisfies the third requirement of Cohen.

Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to hear Rostenkowski's interlocutory appeal of that order.

2. Evidentiary hearing

We turn now to the district court's denialofRostenkowski's discoverymotion. Rostenkowski

argues that, insofar as the Government may present Speech or Debate material at trial, the district

court's denial of his evidentiary motion fails fully to protect his rights under the Speech or Debate

Clause in the same way as does the denial of his motion to review the grand jury materials.

The analogy is not convincing, however. Assuming that the indictment is untainted by the

submission of Speech or Debate material to the grand jury, but that a preview of the evidence that

the Government proposes to present at trial would revealsome Speech or Debate material, it would

still not be appropriate for the district court to dismissthe indictment; rather, the court would merely

prohibit the Government from presenting that evidence at trial. Rostenkowski can obtain the same

relief by objecting to the introduction of Speech or Debate material at such point(s) in the trial asthe

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Government may propose to put protected material into evidence. See United States v. Tom, 787

F.2d 65, 68 (2d Cir. 1986) (defendant is "not entitled to an interlocutory appeal to avoid ... having

to defend against allegations made or evidence presented in connection with a count on which trial

will in any event occur"). Because the district court can adequately protect the defendant against the

admission of Speech or Debate material as the need arises in the course of trial, Rostenkowski's

motion to review the Government's evidence prior to trial is not properly subject to interlocutory

appeal. Hence, we reject his claim that "the government must specifically show before a trial its

ability to omit all danger of implicating Speech or Debate materials"; prior to trial, the Government

need show only that the indictment is valid under the Speech or Debate Clauseboth on itsface and,

as we have held, in its provenance.

Rostenkowski also suggests an analogy to Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460

(1972), which provides that immunized testimony may not be used to support an indictment. Under

Kastigar the Government must show that it has an independent (i.e., non-immunized) source for all

of the evidence that it plans to present at trial; in that legal setting, the need for a pre-trial hearing

is quite compelling. Here, however, the Government does not have to establish an independent

source for the information upon which it would prosecute a Member ofCongress. Rather, the burden

of proof is the other way round: the Member must show that the Government has relied upon

privileged material. See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Lee, 775 F.2d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 1985)

("burden of establishing the applicability oflegislative immunity, by a preponderance ofthe evidence,

rests with [legislator]").

Rostenkowski points out that some courts have indeed ordered a pre-trial evidentiary hearing

in order to determine whether dismissal of a particular charge is required by the Speech or Debate

Clause. See McDade, 28 F.3d at 298; Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25. In those cases, however, a hearing

was necessary only because the face of the indictment was insufficiently specific for the court to

determine whether "any charge in the indictment ... [was] based on conduct that is protected by the

Speech or Debate Clause." McDade, 28 F.3d at 298; Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25 (ordering hearing

because court could not determine from face of indictment whether alleged acts are legislative).

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Therefore, the pre-trial hearings held in those cases are best understood as being in aid of a challenge

to the facial validity ofthe indictment, and we will consider Rostenkowski'sreliance upon those cases

in the context of his motion to dismiss.

Finally, we decline to assert jurisdiction over the denial of Rostenkowski's motion for a

pre-trial hearing upon the ground that it is pendant to the collateral orders over which we do have

jurisdiction. In Myers, 635 F.2d at 936, the Second Circuit accepted pre-trial appellate jurisdiction

ofthe defendant's claim that the indictment failed to state an offense, apparently upon the ground that

the claim was pendant to an interlocutory appeal under the Speech or Debate Clause. As even the

Myers court recognized, however, pendant appellate jurisdiction is generally unavailable, see Abney

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); McDade, 28 F.3d at 288-89; indeed, it is particularly

disfavored in the context of a criminal prosecution. See Abney, 431 U.S. at 657 ("the delays and

disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal ... are especially inimical to the effective and fair

administration ofthe criminal law"). The Myers court may be correct that because of the "small class

of criminal cases brought against Members of Congress"most of which involve pre- trial appeals

under the Speech or Debate Clausethere would be "little [to] be lost in the way of judicial

efficiency" if pendant jurisdiction were to be entertained, Myers, 635 F.2d at 936; but we do not see

in that consoling thought any affirmative reason why a Member of Congress should be exempt from

the rule against pendant appellate jurisdiction. As we have already explained, the district court is fully

capable of protecting the Congressman against the admission into evidence of Speech or Debate

material; to allow the appeal of an order denying wholesale review of the evidence in limine would

needlessly delay the start of the trial with no discernable benefit.

In sum, we agree with the district court that, assuming that the indictment is valid on itsface,

the Speech or Debate Clause does not require pre-trialreview of the evidence to be presented at trial.

See United States v. Rostenkowski, Crim. No. 94-0226 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 1994). The Government's

use of Speech or Debate material in the course of a prosecution based upon a valid indictment

implicates only the substantive protection of the Speech or Debate Clause against conviction, not its

procedural protection against prosecution. Therefore, we hold that the district court's order denying

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Rostenkowski's discovery motion is not a collateral order subject to appellate review at this time.

III. THE MERITS

Before addressing the merits ofRostenkowski's appeal, we note that since oral argument was

had in this case the Supreme Court, in Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754 (1995), has held

that a false statement made to the Congress is not within the ambit of the statute prohibiting false

statements to "any department or agency of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1001. See Hubbard,

115 S. Ct. at 1764 (overruling United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955)); see also United

States v. Dean, No. 94-3021, slip op. at 30-31 (D.C. Cir. May 26, 1995) (Hubbard "narrowed the

reach of § 1001 to matters within the executive branch"). Four counts of the present indictment

(Seven, Nine, Eleven, and Fifteen) allege that Rostenkowski violated § 1001 when he made certain

statements to the Congress; two other counts (Fourteen and Seventeen) allege violations of § 1001

that are predicated upon statements he allegedly made to the FEC. It appears that Hubbard may

affect the status of all of the § 1001 counts, both those involving the Congress and, because of the

uncertain status of the FEC at the time the statements were allegedly made, perhaps even the counts

involving that body. See Federal Election Commission v. NRA political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821,

823 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("composition oftheCommission" with both executive and legislative members

"violatesseparation of powers"). Therefore, and because a "fundamental and longstanding principle

of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the

necessity of deciding them," Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Prot. Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 445

(1988), we do not now review the district court's orders as they relate to those counts. Instead, we

remand them to the district court to entertain such motions as the parties may make in light of

Hubbard and to consider the relevance of that case in the first instance. Of course, if the district

court determinesthat any ofthe § 1001 countssurvives Hubbard , then Rostenkowski may file a new

interlocutory appeal in order to determine whether the prosecution of those counts would violate the

Speech or Debate Clause, the Rulemaking Clause, or the doctrine of the separation of powers.

A. The Motion to Dismiss

Rostenkowski arguesthat his prosecution violatesthe Speech or Debate Clause, and that the

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indictment (other than Count Six, tampering with a witness) violates the doctrine of the separation

of powers and the Rulemaking Clause. In this section, we consider those arguments only insofar as

they are based upon the face of the indictment, and, of course, we do not consider the § 1001 counts

at thistime. Although we find no merit to Rostenkowski's claim under the Speech or Debate Clause,

we hold that certain portions of hisindictment are non-justiciable under the doctrine ofthe separation

of powers and the Rulemaking Clause.

1. The Speech or Debate Clause

The Speech or Debate Clause, which is a Member of Congress's primary source of

constitutionalprotectionfromcriminalprosecution, protectsthe legislatorfromexecutive and judicial

recrimination for his "legislative acts." See, e.g., Johnson, 383 U.S. at 185. The Speech or Debate

Clause protects more than just words spoken on the floor of the House, however; it extends to all

mattersthat are "an integral part ofthe deliberative and communicative processes by which Members

participate" in their constitutional duties. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)

(committee reports protected); see Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973) (committee hearings

protected). Nevertheless, "the Court has been careful not to extend the scope of [the Speech or

Debate Clause] further than its purposes require," Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).

Hence, its "shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the integrity ofthe legislative

process," United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 517 (1972), and it does not protect

extra-legislative communications,such as newsletters or pressreleases. Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443

U.S. 111 (1979).

First, Rostenkowski arguesthat Count Eight, which chargesthat he used fundsfromhis Clerk

Hire Allowance to pay for personal services, runs afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause because it

intrudes into his constitutionally protected discretion over staffing decisions and because its

prosecution would "impede his ability to deliberate and communicate, and will thus impair the

legislative process." The Government disputes those claims and also makes the broader argument

that "in light of recent Supreme Court precedent ... personnel decisions are never protected by the

Speech or Debate Clause."

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This court has held that a staffing decision of a Member of Congress is protected by the

Speech or Debate Clause only insofar as the employee's duties are "directly related to the due

functioning ofthe legislative process." Browning v. Clerk, House of Representatives, 789 F.2d 923,

929 (1986) (discharge of Official Reporter protected under Speech or Debate Clause). Browning

built upon our earlier decision in Walker v. Jones, 733 F.2d 923, 931 (1984), where we held that the

Speech or Debate Clause did not protect the decision to discharge the general manager of the House

of Representatives restaurant system, stating that:

Auxiliary services attending to human needs or interests not peculiar to a Congress

member's work qua legislator may advance a member's general welfare. To

characterize personnel actions relating to such services as "legislative" in character,

however, is to stretch the meaning of that word beyond sensible proportion.

The Government contends that we must narrow the Browning/Walker standard for reviewing

congressional staffing decisions in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Forrester v.

White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988), which holds that a judge's discharge of a probation officer is not a

"judicial act" immune from suit under the common law. We decline the Government's invitation,

however, because Rostenkowski's argument is unpersuasive even under the Browning /Walker

standard.

The indictment specifically identifies several members of Rostenkowski'sstaff who allegedly

performed personal services for him. There is no suggestion on the face of the indictment that any

of those persons had any, even the most tangential, relationship to the "legislative process." Indeed,

it would appear that their placement on his staff was a mere pretext for their payment out of

congressional funds. At most, one might infer that some of them performed some "[a]uxiliary

services ... not peculiar to [Rostenkowski's] work qua legislator." Walker, 733 F.2d at 931. In any

event, Rostenkowski neither claimsthat he cannot determine who the employees are from the details

to be found in the indictment nor argues that any of those employees was in fact involved in the

legislative process. The Speech or Debate Clause presents no bar to the prosecution of Count Eight,

therefore.

Second, Rostenkowski argues that the indictment improperly relies upon his status as a

Member of Congress in order to prove his knowledge of House Rules, and thereby to establish that

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he knew that his use of congressional funds was unauthorized. He builds that claim upon a dictum

in United States v. Swindall , 971 F.2d at 1543, that the Speech or Debate Clause "protectslegislative

status as well as legislative acts."

The Swindall court, however, considered only whether the Government may prove that a

Member of Congress knew about a certain law by demonstrating his membership on a particular

congressional committee. (The court ruled against the Government). We do not understand that case

to prohibit any and all mention of a Member'sstatus as a legislator. See McDade, 28 F.3d at 291-94.

It was well-settled before Swindall was decided that the Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit

proof of a defendant's status as a legislator, see Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, and it has since been held

that proof of a congressman's status as a member of a particular committee does not violate the

Speech and Debate Clause. See McDade, 28 F.3d at 289-94.

Next, Rostenkowski argues that the indictment must be dismissed because his prosecution

would require him "to offer proof of his legislative acts to defend himself." Rostenkowski points to

nothing on the face of the indictment, however, to show that such a defense is necessary or that his

legislative acts will ever be at issue in the trial. Moreover, to the extent that Rostenkowski himself

chooses to present evidence of his status or activities as a legislator, we agree with the Second and

Third Circuitsthat the constitutional protection against his being "questioned" for his legislative acts

"does not prevent [a Member of Congress] from offering such acts in his own defense, even though

he thereby subjects himself to cross-examination." McDade, 28 F.3d at 295; see Myers, 635 F.2d

at 942.

Finally, Rostenkowski argues that the indictment is impermissibly vague, and "does not

contain sufficient factual information for the court to determine whether dismissal of all or part of it

isrequired under the Speech or Debate Clause." In this regard, he notes that the indictment does not

define the type of "official" work performed by his staff and that it does not name the participants in

the phone call alleged inCount Four. But this is hardly the type of vagueness that makes it impossible

for usto determine whether "any charge in the indictment ... [was] based on conduct that is protected

by the Speech or Debate Clause." See McDade, 28 F.3d at 298 (indictment not vague); compare

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Lee, 775 F.2d at 524-25 (indictment vague where it alleged that legislator went on "legislative

fact-finding" trip without identifying which acts were not "legislative"). Moreover, the information

Rostenkowskiseeksshould be well-known to him, yet he makes no specific claimthat either omission

implicates a "legislative act." Nor does our independent review of the indictment reveal any other

instance of vagueness suggesting a violation of the Speech or Debate Clause. Therefore, we find no

merit in Rostenkowski's claim that the indictment is vague in any way that might raise a concern

under the Speech or Debate Clause.

2. The separation of powers and the Rulemaking Clause

Rostenkowski next contends that the indictment is non- justiciable under the doctrine of the

separation of powers and the Rulemaking Clause. His argument proceeds from Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. 186 (1962), in which the Supreme Court considered the justiciability of claims potentially

implicating the political question doctrine. After noting that the various formulations of the political

question doctrine were "essentially a function of the separation of powers," the Court held that an

issue is non-justiciable if "prominent on the surface" of that issue one finds:

[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate

politicaldepartment; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of

a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect

due coordinate branches ofthe government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning

adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of

embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one

question.

Id. at 217. Contending that all six of these factors are present in this case, cf. Nixon v. United States,

113 S. Ct. 732, 735 (1993) (different factors not "completely separate" from one another),

Rostenkowski makes alternative arguments for dismissing the indictment under the doctrine of the

separation of powers and the Rulemaking Clause: (1) that the Rulemaking Clause is an absolute bar

to judicial interpretation of the House Rules; and (2) that the particular Rules at issue in this case are

ambiguous and, because there are "no judiciallydiscoverable and manageable standardsfor resolving"

those ambiguities, not subject to judicial interpretation.

a. The Rulemaking Clause as an absolute bar to judicial interpretation of

the House Rules.

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Rostenkowski argues that the Rulemaking Clause, which provides that "each House may

determine the Rules of its proceedings," is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" to

the House of the power to interpret House Rules. Therefore, he contends, "absent a narrowly

tailored statute empowering the executive branch to act, the Rulemaking Clause of the Constitution

commits solely to the House the interpretation of its Rules and the decision whether to discipline a

member for their violation." Pointing to laws that provide criminal sanctions applicable specifically

to Members of Congress, see, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 437g (campaign financing requirements); 18 U.S.C.

§ 203 (bribery); 18 U.S.C. § 602 (solicitation of political contributions), Rostenkowski argues that

in the absence of such a law, the executive and judicial branches may not "interfer[e] with the

discretionary decisions of Congress," such as how to interpret House Rules.

Rostenkowski relies for this proposition principally upon United States v. Eilberg, 507 F.

Supp. 267 (E.D. Penn. 1980), in which the Government brought a civil action against a congressman

for misrepresenting as "official" a number of toll telephone calls. The court noted that the

Government had conceded in that case that "[e]nforcement of a purely internal House Rule by the

executive and courts would be an encroachment on the powers of the House, a violation of the

separation of powers, and a violation of the textual commitment [presumably the Rulemaking]

clause." Id. at 276.

The Government's concession in the earlier case notwithstanding, see United States v.

Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239, 1245 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Eilberg is inconsistent with law of this

circuit), it is perfectly clear that the Rulemaking Clause is not an absolute bar to judicial interpretation

of the House Rules. See Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) ("It haslong been settled

... that rules of Congress and its committees are judicially cognizable"). Rostenkowski's argument

seems also to rest upon the mistaken premise that the Government seeks to impose criminal liability

upon him for violating the House Rules themselves. That is not the case, however. The indictment

alleges that he violated various federal laws of general application; in no count does it predicate

criminal liability upon a nonstatutory violation. Therefore, Rostenkowski's reliance upon Brown v.

Hansen, 973 F.2d 1118, 1122 (3d Cir. 1992) (claim that Virgin Islands legislators violated internal

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rules of legislature, based solely upon those rules, held non-justiciable), is irrelevant, as is his

observation that there is no federal common law of crimes, see United States v. Hudson & Goodwin,

11 U.S. 32 (7 Cranch 32) (1812).

At trial, the Government will almost certainly rely upon the House Rulesin its effort to prove

the statutory violations it has alleged. Often, in a prosecution for fraud or embezzlement, the

Government must show that the defendant diverted the funds of an institutionsuch as his

employerfrom an authorized to an unauthorized purpose. In order to make that showing it is

typically necessary to enter into evidence the institution's internal rules governing the expenditure of

funds. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 23-24, 27 (1987) (official policy and

practice at newspaper used to prove misappropriation of prepublication information); United States

v. DeFries, 43 F.3d 707, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (mail fraud may be determined from use of union

ballots in violation of union by-laws). A congressman's prosecution for fraud and embezzlement of

official funds is no different: in order to prove several of the counts against Rostenkowski, the

Government must show that he diverted congressional funds from authorized to unauthorized

purposes. As the regulations governing the use of official funds by a congressman, the House Rules

are necessary and proper evidence to make that showing. Indeed, if Rostenkowski's argument were

accepted it would effectively insulate every Member of Congressfrom liability under certain criminal

laws. Neither the Rulemaking Clause nor the doctrine of the separation of powers requires that

result.

This conclusion is well-grounded in the case law of this circuit. In United States v. Diggs,

613 F.2d 988 (1981), a Congressman who greatly increased the salaries nominally paid to his staff

out of the Clerk Hire Allowance and used the increases himself for personal expenses, and also paid

members of hisstafffor performing personalservicesrather than officialwork, was convicted of mail

fraud and of making false statements to the Congress. This court saw no problem in referring to the

House Rules in order to determine whether Diggs's use of congressional funds was authorized. See

id. at 994-96. Indeed, after finding that "no House regulation or order authorized" Diggs's use of the

Clerk Hire Allowance, the court held that "[t]he legal standard is the law and rules Congress has

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passed." Id. at 996 n.41. The court also rejected Diggs's argument that he had effectively been

convicted for violating the House Rules: "The defendant clearly was tried not for violating the

internal rules of the House of Representatives but for violating the mail fraud and false statements

statutes." Id. at 1001.

We very recently revisited the question resolved in Diggs and confirmed the conclusion first

reached there. Specifically, we rejected former Senator Durenberger's claim that his indictment for

violating the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, should be dismissed because his

prosecution would require reference to the Senate Rules. See Durenberger, 48 F.3d 1239. Any

reference at trial to the Senate Rules would not change the fact that "Durenberger's prosecution is

grounded in a substantive federal statute." Id. at 1245. We also interpreted the Senate Rules to

"impose a duty of honesty and ... [to] operate on the assumption that [Senators] will not lie." Id. at

1244.

Rostenkowski would distinguish Durenberger on the ground that the standard stated in the

Senate Rules implicated by that case could also be found in a statute, see 2 U.S.C. § 58(e), whereas

the House Rules at issue here have no statutory counterpart. The purported distinction is surely

irrelevant, however; in Durenberger the court did not find reference to the Senate Rules

unobjectionable even in part because those Rules were mirrored in a federal statute. Moreover,

Rostenkowski's distinction does not apply to Diggs, a case upon which the court expressly relied in

Durenberger. See id. at 1245 & n.5; see also United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373

(D.C.Cir. 1981)(canvassingHouseRulesforstandard bywhichto measure Member's allegedlyillegal

conduct).

Finally, we reject as overbroad Rostenkowski's contention that if a prosecution may in any

way depend upon reference to the content of the House Rules then congressmen will "forego

legitimate legislative action out of fear that judicial or executive interpretation of [the House] Rules

will subject them to criminal liability." The Rules at issue in this trial have no direct connection to

the legislative processthey govern only the internal payment of staff salaries and office expenses.

Moreover, the Speech or Debate Clause adequately protects a legislator's "legitimate legislative

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action[s]." Our conclusion here merely requires Members of Congress to abide by certain laws (e.g.,

against fraud and embezzlement) of general application.

b. Are the House Rules involved in this case too vague for judicial

interpretation?

Rostenkowski's second argument under the doctrine of the separation of powers is

significantly less ambitious(and somewhat more successful) than hisfirst. Here he contends not that

the House Rules are completely off-limits to the judiciary, but instead that the Rules involved in this

case do not provide a "judicially discoverable and manageable standard for" determining whether his

use of congressional funds was unauthorized, so that the interpretation of those Rules at his trial

would require a policy determination unfit for judicial discretion. The Government's response is

two-fold. First, it argues that the Speech or Debate Clause is the only constitutional protection

provided to a Member of Congress; hence, the doctrine of the separation of powers cannot bar the

prosecution of aCongressman. Alternatively, the Government contends that the Rules at issue in this

case are clear, or at least clear enough to allow the court to interpret and apply themwithout invading

the province of the House.

We note first that we agree with the intuition behind Rostenkowski's argument: a sufficiently

ambiguous House Rule is non-justiciable. Of course, under Article III of the Constitution the courts

are the final arbiters of the law and may not shirk their duty to interpret the law merely because it is

ambiguous. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch) (1803). At the same time, however, the

Rulemaking Clause of Article I clearly reservesto each House of the Congressthe authority to make

its own rules, and judicial interpretation of an ambiguous House Rule runs the risk of the court

intruding into the sphere of influence reserved to the legislative branch under the Constitution. See

Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1385 ("In the absence of any discernible legal standardor even of a

congressional policy determinationthat would aid consideration and decision ofthe question ... we

are loathe to give the [statute] an interpretation that would require the judiciary to develop rules of

behavior for the Legislative Branch"). If a particular House Rule is sufficiently clear that we can be

confident of our interpretation, however, then that risk is acceptably low and preferable to the

alternative risk that an ordinary crime will escape the reach of the law merely because the malefactor

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holdslegislative office. See Durenberger, 48 F.3d at 1244 (court mayinterpret Senate'sinternalrules

where it "requires no resolution of ambiguities"). Where, however, a court cannot be confident that

its interpretation is correct, there is too great a chance that it will interpret the Rule differently than

would the Congress itself; in that circumstance, the court would effectively be making the Rulesa

power that the Rulemaking Clause reserves to each House alone.

Therefore, we reject the Government's argument that the Speech or Debate Clause stands as

the only protection from prosecution that the Constitution provides to a Member of Congress.

Though that Clause may be most directly concerned with the question, it does not supplant the

doctrine of the separation of powers nor authorize a court to set to naught the allocation of authority

in the Rulemaking Clause. Because we agree with Rostenkowski that for a court to interpret a House

Rule in the absence of "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" would require the court

to make "an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion," and would run

the risk of intrusion into the legislative sphere, we must review the individual counts charged in the

indictment in order to determine whether the trial court willbe required to interpret ambiguous House

Rules.

Counts One through Five. These counts are associated with the broad scheme to defraud the

United States, which overarches the four specific schemes involving the Clerk Hire Allowance, the

House Stationery Store, the House Post Office, and the vehicle leases. In order to prove that

Rostenkowski participated in the broad scheme, the Government must show that he participated in

at least one of the four component schemes. Therefore, we shall delay our consideration of Counts

One through Five until we have considered the other counts and thereby determined whether (or to

what extent) any House Rule may be used to prove Counts One through Five.

Count Eight. Because Rostenkowski does not challenge Count Six as a violation of the

separation of powers, we turn next to Count Eight. There it is alleged that Rostenkowski embezzled

fundsfrom the Clerk Hire Allowance and converted them to his own use, viz., to pay members of his

staff for the performance of personal services and not for the performance of official work. See 18

U.S.C. § 641.

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Rostenkowski argues that in order to prove Count Eight, the Government must draw a line

between "official work" and "personalservices," and that this line can be drawn only by reference to

ambiguous House Rules. He invokes two earlier decisions of this circuit in support. In United States

ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373 (1981), the plaintiff brought a qui tam action under the

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1976), alleging that Senator Cannon had paid a staff member for

the performance of purportedly "official legislative and representational duties" when in fact the

assistant was working "extensively and exclusively for the Senator's reelection." Id. at 1375. The

court first noted that there was "no judicial decision or administrative ruling" to guide itsinquiry into

whether Cannon's use of congressional funds was authorized. After conducting a review of the

relevant rules, regulations, and internal policies of the Senate, the court found that

[T]here were ... no "manageable standards" for a court to apply when viewing staff

participation in a Senate reelection campaign. Moreover, the inability of the

Senatea body constitutionally authorized and institutionally equipped to formulate

national policies and internal rules of conductto solve the problem demonstrates

"the impossibility of deciding" the issue appellant poses "without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion.

Id. at 1383-84. Concluding that the adjudication of the plaintiff's claim would require "the courts to

monitor every action taken by a Senator and his aide in an effort to determine whether it issufficiently

"official' or too "political,' " the court dismissed the case. Id. at 1384.

In Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (1980), the plaintiffs argued that members of

President Carter's cabinet were improperly "using the resources of the federal government [to]

provide the Carter-Mondale Committee with federal support." Id. at 136. The court dismissed the

plaintiffs' claim, holding that its resolution would require the court to determine whether executive

actions were motivated by a genuine concern for the public interest or by "political expediency," and

that this determination would impermissibly intrude the judiciary into the affairs of a coordinate

branch of government.

The Government essentially concedes the first part of Rostenkowski's argument, admitting

in its brief that the "difference ... between official work and personal services ... is ... the key

distinction in this prosecution." In the Government's view, however, the court is well-equipped to

apply this distinction. Count Eight, we are told, is less like the claim in Cannon or Winpisinger than

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it is the claim in Diggs that the congressman had unlawfully used his Clerk Hire Allowance. Diggs

argued that he had lawful authority to increase the salaries of his staff and to use that increase to pay

official expenses. The court disagreed:

The defendant's argument erroneously equates a congressman's discretion to define

the duties of an employee with the unfettered power to divert moniesintended for one

purpose to another completely unauthorized purpose. ... [T]he allowance for

clerk-hire and the allowance for district office expenses were separate and distinct.

No House regulation or ordinance authorized the commingling of these funds, either

directly, or asin this case, indirectly. Had Congress intended that the clerk-hire funds

be used to pay expenses of the district office it could have so provided.

Diggs, 613 F.2d at 995-96 (emphases omitted). Diggs also argued that he had the discretion to

employ staff members to render "concededly ... personal services," and therefore that his "failure to

reveal the exact nature of [those] employees' responsibilities" to the House did not amount to the

concealment of a material fact. Id. at 1002. The court rejected this argument as well: "The

defendant'srepresentationsthat ... [the employees] were bona fide congressional employees... were

fraudulent and material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001". Id. at 1002.

The Government distinguishes Cannon on the ground that there wasin that case a "complete

absence" of standards to determine the key issue, namely whether campaign activity could be

considered "official." Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1379. According to the Government, the court in

Cannon was being asked to draw a line between "official" work and "campaign-related" work

although it was not clear that the Congressitself had recognized such a distinction. Here, in contrast,

the House Rules assertedly make it clear that the House recognizes a line between "official" and

"personal" work.

The Government documents its point as follows. First, 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) requires

generally that "[a]ppropriationsshall be applied only to the objectsfor which the appropriations were

made except as otherwise provided bylaw." Next, the annual Legislative Branch Appropriations Acts

authorize a specific level of funding "[f]or staff employed by each Member in the discharge of his

official and representational duties." See, e.g., 1991 Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, Public

Law 101-520, 104 Stat. 2254 (1990). Finally, the law provides that "the Committee on House

Administration may ... fix and adjust ... the amounts of allowances [for clerk hire] (including the

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terms, conditions, and other provisions pertaining to those allowances)," 2 U.S.C. § 57, which the

Committee on House Administration did when it prohibited the personal use of funds from that

allowance in the Congressional Handbook. The Handbook "provides in a single source the

Regulations and Proceduresfor Allowances andExpensesforMembers, Committees, and Employees

of the House," U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on House Administration, Congressional

Handbook, at III (1985). The Government argues that the House Rules contained therein draw a

clear line between "personal services" and "official work":

The Clerk Hire Allowance is provided for the employment of staff in the

Member'sWashingtonD.C. congressionaloffice and district office(s). ... [It] may not

be used to defray any personal, political or campaign related expenses, nor expenses

related to the conduct of committee business.

Id. at 2.1.

Thus, while Rostenkowski and the Government agree that the resolution of Count Eight

requirestheCourt to draw a line between "officialwork" and "personalservices," they disagree about

whether we can draw that line without interpreting ambiguous House Rules. Let us see.

First, although Diggs, Cannon, and Winpisinger are all relevant to our analysis of the

question, we think that none of them is controlling. In Diggs, the court never had to determine

whether the work performed by the employees was "official." Diggs's first argument was rejected

because the phony salary increases were used to pay for office expenses, not because they were used

to pay for services that were not "official." Nor did the court need to distinguish personal services

from official work in order to reject his second argument: Diggs conceded that the services

performed by the members of his staff were "personal" and therefore not "official"; hence, the only

question before the court was the materiality of that fact.

Similarly, Cannon is not controlling because the court did not need to determine whether the

particular activities alleged were "official" or "campaign-related" but onlywhether any congressional

rule distinguished between "official work" and concededly "campaign-related" work. In

Rostenkowski's case, we know from the Rule cited by the Government that the Congress has

distinguished "personal" from "official" expenses; the harder question before us is whether those

terms are sufficiently clear, either inherently or as interpreted by the House itself, that we may

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proceed to apply them to the facts alleged in the indictment. Winpisinger is unhelpful because there

the court had no standard at all by which to decide whether the defendants' conduct was "official."

Here, asthe Government hasshown, both the Appropriations Acts and the Handbook provide us with

at least some guidance.

Whether we can discern a line between "official work" and "personal services" that is

sufficiently clear to allow us to classify the activities of a congressman's staff is a question of first

impression. The Government contends that the Appropriations Acts and the Handbook provide a

"judicially discoverable and manageable standard[ ]" for resolving that question. We are not so sure.

It is clear enough that the Congress has drawn a line between use of the Clerk Hire Allowance to

employ staff assisting "in the discharge of official and representative duties" (permissible under the

Annual Appropriations Acts) and use of that allowance "to defray personal, political or campaign

related allowances" (prohibited by 2 U.S.C. § 57; 31 U.S.C. § 1301; and the Handbook ). Precisely

where the Congress drew that lineessentially the line between "official work" and "personal

services"is not so clear, however. The Government has pointed us to very little in the Handbook

or elsewhere that would help us to determine whether the activities allegedly performed by

Rostenkowski'sstaffwere "officialwork" or "personalservices." Moreover, as Rostenkowski notes,

the House has not attempted to define a Member's "official and representative duties," and has in

large measure vested Members with "discretion to fix the terms and conditions of employment" of

staff members. Handbook at 2.3, 2.14. Without more guidance from the House, there may well be

allegations as to which the court may not venture to interpret the terms "official" and "personal"

without making an "initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion" or inviting

the "embarrassment [of] multifarious pronouncements by various departments." Baker v. Carr, 369

U.S. at 217; see also United States v. Eilberg, 553 F.Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1981) ("strictly official"

standard clearly applicable to some congressional phone calls but not so clearly applicable to others).

We turn now to consider whether the activities allegedly performed by the staff members

identified inCount Eight can clearly be classified as "personalservices." (Although Count Eight does

not itself detail the specific activities in question, the allegations of Count Eight relate back to the

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activities of the fourteen employees identified in Count Seven, the other Congressional Payroll

Count). Because eight of those fourteen employees were no longer allegedly on the Congressional

Payroll during the period covered by Count Eight (beginning "on or about December 1, 1988") we

presume that the Government does not plan to prove Count Eight by proffering evidence relating to

any but the six other identified employees; therefore, we limit the scope of our analysis to the

activities that they allegedly performed.

Where, after reviewing the alleged activity of a particular employee, we find that the Rules

provide a "judicially discoverable and manageable" standard clearly indicating that the activity was

a "personalservice" (or was not "official work"), the allegation may stand and the Government may

attempt to prove its case. Where, however, we conclude that the Rules do not provide a standard

that isjusticiable or the indictment istoo vague to enable usto determine whether the alleged activity

may clearly be labeled as a "personal service" under the Rules, the allegation is non-justiciable and

Rostenkowski may not be tried upon that basis. In sum, unless we can determine that the facts set

out in a particular allegation could not be authorized under anyreasonable interpretation ofthe House

Rules, we must find that allegation non-justiciable.

(1) Employee Two is alleged to have performed "personalservices" for Rostenkowski, "such

as engraving gift items and mounting souvenirs on plaques." For our resolution of the latter

allegation, the Government refers us only to § 2.I.A, the General Introduction to the Handbook, in

which the distinction between "personal" and "official" isreflected but not explained. For all we can

tell, "mounting souvenirs" might well be considered "official work"much like decorating the

officein the context of an institution to which tens of thousands of visitors come every year, many

of them stopping specifically to see their congressman's office.

For our resolution ofthe allegation that Employee Two "engrav[ed] gift items," however, the

Handbook offers greater guidance, for it clearly prohibits (at § 2.III.F.10) the use of the Official

Expenses Allowance to purchase gifts (except under certain circumstances). Insofar as the "gift

items" allegedly engraved by Employee Two were (or were to be) given away by Rostenkowski as

gifts (and do not come under the exceptions listed in § 2.III.F.10), we can be certain that the gifts

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themselves were personal rather than official, and that Employee Two's engraving of those items

constituted "personal services." Therefore, only the allegation that Employee Two performed

"personal services" such as "engraving gift items" is justiciable.

(2) Employees Eight, Ten, and Twelve are alleged to have performed "little or no official

work in the congressional office." From this allegation it is not clear whether the Government means

to show that these employees performed work but that the work they performed was not "official."

Because the Government has not shown us that what "little" work they may have done was not

"official," we must hold that the allegations relating to Employees Eight, Ten, and Twelve are

non-justiciable except to the extent that the Government may prove that they did "no ... work at all."

(3) Employee Eleven is alleged to have done "little or no official work" and to have

"performed regular bookkeeping duties" for a private insurance company that Rostenkowski owned.

No reasonable interpretation of "official work" performed by a congressional staffer could include

the performance of bookkeeping work for a private company owned by a Congressman. Therefore,

insofar as the Government seeks to show that Employee Eleven was paid from the Clerk Hire

Allowance for the performance of such work, the House Rules are clear and no barrier to

prosecution.

(4) Employee Thirteen is alleged to have done "little or no official work" and to have

performed "personalservices for ... Rostenkowski, such as picking up his laundry, driving hisfamily

members around Washington, and working at campaign events." Because the performance of those

activities might, in some circumstances, directlyeven vitallyaid a Congressman in the

performance of his official duties, we cannot say that the services allegedly performed by Employee

Thirteen could not be considered "official" rather than "personal" under any reasonable interpretation

ofthe House Rules. In addition, we cannot be confident, without more information, that the allegedly

"campaign-related" activities were in fact "campaign-related" under the Rules. For these reasons, we

hold that the allegations relating to Employee Thirteen are non-justiciable.

Count Ten. Rostenkowski is charged with having embezzled and converted funds from the

Official Expenses Allowance by:

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causing a variety of valuable consumer goods and gift merchandise obtained by him

from the House Stationery Store, including armchairs, luggage, sets of china, and

crystal sculptures of the U.S. Capitol ... to be paid for as supplies necessary for the

official use, when in fact the goods he obtained were for the personal use of himself,

his family, or his friends.

More specifically, the indictment alleges that Rostenkowski either kept these items for his personal

use or "gave [them] as personal gifts to friends and associates." Like Count Eight, Count Ten

requires the court to draw a line between "official" and "personal"here, the line lies between

"official use" and "personal use" rather than between "official work" and "personalservices." Again,

the Government contends that the House Rules provide a manageable standard.

The Government begins with an annual Legislative Appropriations Act, such as Public Law

101-520, 104 Stat. 2254 (1990), which providesfunds "[f]or allowances and expenses as authorized

by House resolution or law," and with three sections of the Handbook. First, the Government points

usto § 2.I.A. ofthe Handbook, which states both that "[t]he OfficialExpenses Allowance is provided

to pay ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred by the Member (and/or the Member's

employees) ... in support of the Member's official and representational duties to the district from

which he/she was elected," and that the allowance "may not be used to defray any personal political

or campaign related expenses." Second, the Government refers us to § 2.III.C.5.a(6) of the

Handbook, which provides that items ordered from the House Store "not for official use" should be

identified and paid for (along with a service charge of 10%) from the Member's personal funds.

Once again it seems that while the House Rules certainly contemplate a line between the

"official" and the "personal," they do little to indicate where that boundary lies. The third Regulation

to which the Government points provides some guidance, however. Under the heading of "General

Expenses and Procedures," § 2.III.F.10, the Handbook states:

Expenses for gifts or donations of any type, except U.S. flags flown over the Capitol

and items purchased for presentation when on official travel for the House of

Representatives outside the U.S., itsterritories and possessions, are not payable from

the Official Expenses Allowance.

(Emphasis in original). This statement could hardly be clearer: funds from the Official Expenses

Allowance may not be used to purchase gifts except under certain clear and limited circumstances.

Hence, the Government mayproveCount Ten byshowing that Rostenkowskipurchased gifts outside

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the exception in the above-quoted provision with funds from his Official Expenses Allowance. To

the extent, if any, that the Government's case depends upon showing that Rostenkowski purchased

items for his "personal" use, however, Count Ten is non-justiciable; as we have already seen in our

consideration ofCount Eight, without explanation in the Rulesthat termistoo ambiguousto support

the prosecution of a Member of Congress.

Counts Twelve and Thirteen. The House Post Office Counts allege that Rostenkowski

violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 & 2 ("willfully stole, embezzled, and converted to his own use ... funds

of the United States") by submitting postage stamp vouchers to get cash. Essentially, the

Government must show that the House Rules did not authorize the disbursement of cash from the

Official Expenses Allowance in exchange for those vouchers. Cf. United States v. Faust, 850 F.2d

575, 580 (9th Cir. 1988) (affirming conviction for embezzlement under § 641 where defendant,

although ultimately entitled to the funds, "intentionally deprived the government of the rights of

supervision and control upon which the government insisted"). That showing requires no

interpretation of ambiguous House Rules: Section 2.III.F.16.d of the Handbook provides that a

congressman may submit a voucher and receive "postage or postage stamps for the mailing costs of

official mail." Under no reasonable interpretation of that Rule (or of any other of which we are

aware) would a congressman be authorized to submit a voucher for postage stamps and get cash in

exchange.

Count Sixteen. In this count the Government alleges that Rostenkowski, through two

schemes related to the leasing of vehicles for official use, embezzled congressional funds and

converted themto his own use. In the first scheme alleged, Rostenkowski submitted fraudulent lease

agreements, thereby causing the House Finance Office to make monthly payments from the Official

Expenses Allowance to lease a mobile district office for Rostenkowski's official use when in fact "no

vehicles were being leased at all, and the payments were being used to cover the cost of purchasing

vehicles that were titled to, and owned by, Rostenkowski." In the second scheme alleged,

Rostenkowski caused the House Finance Office to pay for garaging a vehicle he owned by

representing that the vehicle was "leased by Congress" as a mobile district office for his use.

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Adjudication of Count Sixteen requires no judicial interpretation of any House Rule at all.

In order to prove Count Sixteen, the Government needs to show only that Rostenkowski purchased

a vehicle (titled in his name) with funds authorized for leasing a vehicle; and that the garaged vehicle

was owned by Rostenkowski rather than leased. A court is well able to discern the difference

between "leasing" a vehicle and "purchasing" (or "owning") a vehicle, and there is no need to

determine whether Rostenkowski used the purchased vehicles for "official" or for "personal"

purposes. Rostenkowski has pointed us to no section of the House Rules that could be interpreted

to authorize a Congressman to cause the Government to pay for his purchase of a vehicle (by falsely

representing that he is leasing the vehicle, no less) for use as a mobile district office. So long as the

Government does not try to show that the vehicles in question were used for "personal" rather than

"official" purposes, the House Rules are no bar to the justiciability of Count Sixteen.

We recur now to Counts One through Five. Those counts are justiciable to the extent that

they are consistent with the conclusions above: the Government may not prove those counts at trial

by reference to any House Rule that we have determined is not subject to judicial interpretation.

Otherwise, Counts One through Five are justiciable.

If we seemto have been overly cautiousin our analysis or to have allowed that some activities

that were most likely "personal" might have been "official" depending upon the circumstances, we

have good reason. First, because the doctrine of the separation of powers lies at the very heart of our

constitutional system, we must avoid interpreting the term "personal" any more broadly than

necessary. If there can be a reasonable doubt about whether, assuming that the allegations of the

indictment are true, a Member used congressional resources for his own benefit in violation of a

House Rule, then the court cannot presume to interpret the rule.

Second, the life of a congressmanasincumbent legislator and perpetual candidate for office,

whose official day ends only after a round of nominally "social" events at which he is obliged to

appear, and his weekends and holidays are only an opportunity to reconnect with his

constituentsmakesthe line between "official work" and "personalservices" particularly difficult to

draw. Anticipating the point, the Government makes a rhetorical feint: "Ordinary people understand

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the difference between official duties and personal services...." That is, however, an invitation to

"mobocracy," and after-the-fact mobocracy at that. For the "ordinary person," unlike a legislator, the

distinction between work and life may be relatively clear. For a Congressman, it is not so clear;

service in the United States Congressis not a job like any other, it is a constitutionalrole to be played

upon a constitutionalstage. Therefore, the Executive may not expect the Judiciary to resolve against

a Member of Congress an ambiguity in the Rules by which the Legislature governs itself, if reason

allows otherwise.

B. In Camera Review of Grand Jury Materials

We determined above (in Part II.B.) that we have jurisdiction to hear Rostenkowski's

interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying his motion for in camera review of grand

jury materials. We now consider the merits of that appeal, i.e., whether the district court should have

reviewed those materials.

As a threshold matter, we reject Rostenkowski's argument that the district court must review

the grand jury materials solely because he is a Member of Congress. Rostenkowski asserts that

"when a defendant moves to dismiss an indictment on Speech or Debate grounds, a court must look

beyond the face of the indictment to determine whether protected materials were used in the

preparation of the indictment"; indeed, he contends that we so held in Rose. But that is not correct.

(Or as better put by Robert Herrick in "The Rose" (1647), "Ne'er the rose without the thorn"). In

that case we considered only whether the use of Speech or Debate material in the preparation of a

civil complaint would invalidate the complaint. We did not consider, much less determine the

question with which we are concerned herewhether or when the district court must grant a motion

for in camera review, made by a defendant searching for Speech or Debate materials. Nor need we

answer that question today in order to conclude that the district court did not err by denying

Rostenkowski's motion for in camera review. For regardless of the precise showing that a defendant

must make in order to compel in camera review of grand jury material, we are confident that

Rostenkowski has not made it.

As we have already seen, there is no reason on the face of the indictment to suggest that any

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Speech or Debate materialwas presented to the grand jury. Moreover, Rostenkowski offers virtually

no specific reason to believe that such material was presented to the grand jury. Instead, he gives us

only the general warning that "courts should be wary of accepting prosecutorial assurances that

constitutionalviolations have not occurred" before the grand jury. Although Rostenkowski obviously

cannot be expected to know exactly what transpired before the grand jury or what was presented to

that body, he must be able to provide, either from the allegations of the indictment or from some

other source, at least some reason to believe that protected information was used to procure his

indictment. To give him a right to in camera review without any particular reason apart from his

status as a Member of Congress and therefore a person protected by the Speech or Debate Clause

would completely disregard the "long-established policy" in favor of grand jury secrecy, see

Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959), and would fail to strike an

appropriate (indeed any) balance between the grand jury's "functionalindependence fromthe Judicial

Branch," United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992), and a Congressman's right to be free

from prosecution for his legislative acts. Lacking any reason to think that prohibited material was

submitted to the grand jury, we have no reason to believe that the district court's denial of his motion

was in error, and we affirm that decision. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We remand this case to the district court with instructionsto consider in the first instance the

impact of Hubbard upon Counts Seven, Nine, Eleven, Fourteen, Fifteen, and Seventeen of the

indictment; and in further proceedings to disregard the allegations of the indictment that we have

determined are non-justiciable under the doctrine of the separation of powers and the Rulemaking

Clause. In all other respects, we affirm the orders of the district court.

So ordered.

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