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Parties Involved:
City of Chicago
Appellant
Robert P. Hillmann
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494

ROBERT P. HILLMANN,

Plaintiff-Appellee/

Cross-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant-Appellant/

Cross-Appellee.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 C 6671 — Rubén Castillo, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 17, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 23, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. For nearly three decades, Robert 

Hillmann worked for the City of Chicago in its Department 

of Streets and Sanitation. In July 2002 the City eliminated his 

position in a citywide reduction in force (“RIF”). Two years 

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2 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

later he sued the City alleging that he was targeted for 

inclusion in the RIF because he asserted his rights under the 

Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (“IWCA”), 820 ILL.

COMP. STAT. 305/1 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.

This long-running case twice proceeded to trial. In the 

first trial, a jury found for the City on the IWCA retaliatorydischarge claim. For reasons not entirely clear to us, the 

ADA claim was tried to the court at the same time. But the

judge died before issuing a decision, and a successor judge 

ordered a new trial on both claims based on an evidentiary 

error. The second trial yielded a split result. The jury found 

in Hillmann’s favor on the IWCA claim and returned a 

seven-figure damages verdict. The judge found for the City 

on the ADA claim.

Both sides appealed. The City contends that the judge’s 

new-trial order was improper and asks us to reinstate the 

first jury’s verdict. Alternatively, the City argues that the 

IWCA claim fails as a matter of law because Hillmann

produced no evidence of causation. As a fallback argument, 

the City seeks a new trial limited to damages. Hillmann’s 

cross-appeal asks us to reverse the judge’s bench decision 

rejecting his ADA claim. 

We decline the City’s invitation to second-guess the successor judge’s decision to order a new trial. The first judge 

had excused two of the City’s managerial employees from 

testifying based on their invocation of the Fifth Amendment; 

the second judge reasonably questioned the breadth of that 

ruling. Regardless, we agree with the City on the merits:

Neither of these claims should have been tried. To prevail on 

his claim that he was discharged for exercising his rights 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 3

under the IWCA, Hillmann needed to prove causation. At a 

minimum this required proof that the relevant decisionmaker knew about his workers’ compensation claim. But no 

evidence suggests that the RIF decision-maker knew about

Hillmann’s claim. The ADA claim likewise fails for lack of 

proof of causation. Hillmann has no evidence that the City 

withheld merit raises or targeted him for the RIF based on 

his request for an ADA accommodation. The City is entitled 

to judgment across the board. 

I. Background

Hillmann began working for the City of Chicago’s Parks 

District in 1973. About five years later he moved to a job as a 

truck driver in the City’s Department of Streets and Sanitation. In 1984 he developed cervical radiculopathy, a workrelated injury that caused pain, weakness, limited mobility,

and loss of sensation in his right arm. In 1995 he entered into

an accommodation agreement with the City that allowed 

him to avoid repetitive work with his injured right arm. As 

part of this agreement, Hillmann was reassigned to the 

position of chief timekeeper in the Bureau of Electricity, a 

division of the Streets and Sanitation Department. He never 

performed all of the timekeeping duties required by the job

description, but he performed the essential functions and 

did other tasks as directed by his supervisor.

Hillmann’s supervisor during this time was Deputy 

Commissioner Jim Heffernan. In May 2000 Heffernan was 

reassigned to a different post and Bart Vittori was temporarily assigned to run the Bureau. Vittori gave Hillmann

additional duties that required repetitive use of his injured 

right arm, but Hillmann did not immediately inform Vittori 

of his physical restrictions. Instead, he went to Heffernan 

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4 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

and Hugh Donlan, the Bureau’s personnel liaison to the 

Department. Heffernan told Hillmann that he was no longer 

in charge and couldn’t help. For the next two months, Hillmann performed the additional tasks Vittori assigned to

him, exacerbating his condition.

On July 1, for the first time in his career, Hillmann did 

not receive a merit raise. On August 8 Hillmann finally went 

to Vittori and told him that he could not physically perform 

the additional duties he was assigned. In response Vittori 

reassigned a supervising timekeeper to other responsibilities

and assigned the supervisor’s duties to Hillmann. About ten

days passed before this shift of responsibilities could be 

accomplished, however, so Hillmann reported for work but 

performed no tasks.

On August 15 Hillmann’s attorney sent a letter to 

Barbara Smith in the City’s Corporation Counsel’s office

requesting that Hillmann’s 1995 accommodation agreement 

be honored. The next day Smith discussed the matter with 

Catharine Hennessey, the Department’s labor-relations 

liaison. In response Hennessey instructed Donlan to write a 

new job description for Hillmann. The first paragraph of the 

description covered the duties Hillmann had performed as 

chief timekeeper; the second paragraph covered the reassigned duties of a supervising timekeeper. This paragraph 

also anticipated the Department’s planned implementation 

of the Kronos computerized payroll system. Hillmann 

testified that the second paragraph of his new job description included tasks that he could not physically perform.

On August 16 Brian Murphy replaced Heffernan as 

Deputy Commissioner. In that role Murphy was responsible 

for supervising all Bureau of Electricity employees. 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 5

Murphy’s direct supervisor was John Sullivan, the Managing Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Streets and 

Sanitation.

On August 23 Hennessey instructed Hillmann to report 

for a fitness-for-duty medical examination to reassess the 

question of his accommodation. During this time, Hillmann 

also saw his own physician, who noted that his condition 

had worsened. On September 1 Hillmann was transferred to 

the Construction Division of the Bureau of Electricity where 

he was assigned to answer phones. That same day Hillmann 

filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission. On October 1 another merit raise was 

denied. On October 7 he was again transferred within the 

Bureau, this time to the Transportation Division, where he 

was assigned to answer phones.

Throughout the late summer and fall, Hillmann continued to see his treating physician and was examined by 

medical professionals in connection with his workers’ 

compensation claim. On December 21 Hillmann received a 

letter signed by Hennessey and delivered by Donlan acknowledging his inability to perform the tasks in his new job 

description and advising him that “the most viable option 

for you is to apply for a Leave of Absence[] and to return to 

work when your physical condition allows you to perform 

the duties of your job title.” The letter also suggested that

Hillmann could “request a Work Evaluation from the Department of Personnel to determine if your physical restrictions will allow you to perform in some other capacity in 

another job title.” Hillmann testified that when Donlan gave 

him the letter, he advised him not to report to work. HillCase: 14-3438 Document: 68 Filed: 08/23/2016 Pages: 15
6 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

mann stopped reporting for work but did not apply for a 

leave of absence.

For the next two months, Hillmann underwent further

medical evaluations in connection with his workers’ compensation claim. In January 2001 he was referred to 

Dr. Damon Arnold, director of occupational health at Mercy 

Works, an agency the City consults with on workers’ compensation matters. On February 26, 2001, Dr. Arnold issued 

a “discharge sheet” clearing Hillmann to perform sedentary 

work with limited use of his right upper arm—in other 

words, a desk job with minor office work. The discharge 

sheet was sent to Jack Drumgould, the Department’s Assistant Commissioner in charge of personnel. Drumgould 

wrote the following on the discharge sheet: “Cannot accommodate with restrictions” but “CAN accommodate in 

Bureau of Traffic Services with restrictions as of 3–02–01.”

Cleared to return to work, Hillmann reported to 

Drumgould and was “detailed” to the Bureau of Traffic 

Services. A “detail” is just a temporary work assignment;

Hillmann remained an employee of the Bureau of Electricity

with the title of chief timekeeper. When Hillmann showed 

up for work in the Bureau of Traffic Services, he was directed to the auto pound where he was verbally assigned 

minor, menial duties. In this assignment he racked up a 

pattern of tardiness and absenteeism due to sick leave. In the 

late spring he applied for and was granted a transfer from 

the 8 a.m.-to-3 p.m. shift to the noon-to-8 p.m. shift. He was 

denied merit raises in January 2002, March 2002, and May 

2002.

In 2002 the City faced a serious budget shortfall necessitating a citywide RIF. Each department was given a target 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 7

for reducing its workforce, and department heads were 

directed to identify which positions to include in the RIF and 

submit a list to the Office of Budget and Management. 

Sullivan was the Department’s main contact for its RIF list, 

but Al Sanchez, the Streets and Sanitation Commissioner,

made the final decision about which departmental positions 

would be included.

Murphy prepared a preliminary list of positions he 

thought could be eliminated from the Bureau of Electricity

without damaging the delivery of services. He included the 

chief timekeeper and supervising timekeeper positions

because no one was then performing those functions and the 

Department was completing its transition to Kronos, a

computerized payroll system, making these positions obsolete. Jack Kenney, the Department’s Deputy Commissioner 

of Administration, reviewed Murphy’s preliminary list and 

agreed with the recommendation to include the timekeeping 

positions in the RIF. Kenney approved the list and sent it up 

the chain of command. Sullivan, in turn, reviewed the list 

and recommended that Sanchez approve it. Sanchez, the 

final authority, reviewed and approved the list and sent it to 

the Office of Budget and Management. Sanchez did not 

know that Hillmann had filed a workers’ compensation 

claim.

On July 1, 2002, Hillmann received a letter from Sanchez 

notifying him that he was being placed on administrative 

leave until further notice and that his chief timekeeper’s 

position would be eliminated effective July 31, 2002, as a 

part of the citywide RIF. 

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8 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

A. The First Trial

In 2004 Hillmann filed suit in state court alleging that the 

City violated his rights under the First Amendment, the 

ADA, and state law. The City removed the case to federal 

court, and Judge William J. Hibbler was assigned to preside. 

A long period of discovery and motions litigation followed. 

Judge Hibbler eventually allowed two claims to move 

forward to trial: (1) Hillmann’s claim that he was discharged

in retaliation for exercising his rights under the IWCA, and 

(2) his claim that he was denied merit raises and discharged 

because of his request for an ADA accommodation.

During discovery, Sullivan and Drumgould invoked 

their Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to testify in

deposition, citing potential criminal exposure in connection 

with a political-patronage scandal involving the Department 

of Streets and Sanitation. The City moved in limine to preclude their testimony and any reference to their Fifth 

Amendment invocation at trial. Judge Hibbler held a hearing 

on the motion, with counsel for the two witnesses present to 

address the claim of privilege. After hearing from all parties, 

Judge Hibbler granted the City’s motion, excused the two 

witnesses from testifying, and ruled that the issue could not 

be raised in front of the jury.

The City also moved in limine to exclude Hillmann’s 

pension-damages expert, arguing that his testimony was 

irrelevant because Hillmann was not entitled to pension 

damages. In the alternative the City sought to exclude the 

expert’s testimony as unreliable and based on improper 

calculations. Judge Hibbler granted this motion as well but 

offered no reasons.

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 9

The case proceeded to trial in June 2011. The judge submitted the IWCA retaliatory-discharge claim to the jury, 

which returned a verdict for the City. The jury was not 

asked to decide the ADA claim (we’re not sure why), so that 

part of the case was converted to a court trial and Judge 

Hibbler took the matter under advisement. He died before 

issuing a decision.

B. The Second Trial

Chief Judge Rubén Castillo assumed responsibility for 

the case after Judge Hibbler’s death. Hillmann moved for a 

new trial, arguing that it was error to excuse Sullivan and 

Drumgould from testifying based on their blanket assertions

of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Chief Judge Castillo 

agreed and granted the motion. He also revisited and reversed Judge Hibbler’s decision to exclude the testimony of

Hillmann’s pension-damages expert.

The two claims were retried in April 2013. Sullivan and 

Drumgould testified, as did Hillmann’s pension-damages 

expert. This time the jury returned a verdict for Hillmann on 

the IWCA retaliatory-discharge claim and awarded 

$2 million in damages. Chief Judge Castillo submitted the 

ADA claim to the jury for an advisory verdict; the jury found 

for the City on this claim.

Posttrial proceedings followed. The City moved for 

judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the IWCA 

retaliatory-discharge claim. On the ADA claim, the City 

urged the court to accept the jury’s advisory verdict and 

enter findings and conclusions rejecting Hillmann’s claim. 

Hillmann moved for judgment in his favor on both claims.

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10 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

Chief Judge Castillo split the difference. He denied the 

City’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the IWCA 

claim. He did, however, reduce the damages award to 

$1.6 million. On the ADA claim, the judge accepted the 

jury’s advisory no-liability verdict and entered detailed 

findings and conclusions of his own. He denied Hillmann’s 

motion for judgment on the ADA claim.

The resulting judgment left something for both sides to 

appeal. And they did, raising multiple claims of error.

II. Analysis

A. IWCA Retaliatory-Discharge Claim

The City’s opening salvo is a challenge to Chief Judge 

Castillo’s decision to order a new trial. The district court has 

the discretion to “grant a new trial on all or some of the 

issues—and to any party,” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a), and a new 

trial should be granted if a prejudicial error occurred,

Bankcard Am., Inc. v. Universal Bancard Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 477,

480 (7th Cir. 2000). We usually review an order granting a 

new trial for abuse of discretion, but normally the same 

judge presides at trial and also decides the posttrial motion. 

McClain v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp., 139 F.3d 1124, 1126 

(7th Cir. 1998). Here, Chief Judge Castillo ordered a new trial

after the original trial judge died. His ruling, moreover, was 

based on a legal determination concerning the Fifth 

Amendment privilege. In these circumstances de novo

review applies. See Bankcard Am., 203 F.3d at 481.

Chief Judge Castillo concluded that a new trial was warranted because Judge Hibbler should not have wholly 

excused Sullivan and Drumgould from testifying based on

blanket assertions of their Fifth Amendment privilege 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 11

against self-incrimination. That ruling correctly understands

how the privilege works in this situation; in a civil case, the 

jury is permitted to hear evidence of a witness’s invocation 

of the privilege and may draw an adverse inference from it. 

See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth 

Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against 

parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify ... .”);

Empress Casino Joliet Corp. v. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 

No. 15-2526, 2016 WL 4097439, at *14 (Aug. 2, 2016) (“The 

Fifth Amendment allows adverse inference instructions 

against parties in civil actions.”); Evans v. City of Chicago, 

513 F.3d 735, 745 (7th Cir. 2008); Harris v. City of Chicago, 

266 F.3d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Awerkamp,

497 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1974).

The City suggests that the error was harmless and therefore not a good reason to order a new trial. As a remedy, the 

City asks us to reinstate the verdict of the first jury, which 

found in the City’s favor on the IWCA retaliatory-discharge 

claim. We don’t need to decide whether the chief judge

correctly construed this legal error as serious enough to 

justify a new trial. The undisputed evidence shows that this 

claim should not have gone to a jury at all.

A claim for retaliatory-discharge is not authorized by the 

IWCA itself. Rather, “[t]he Illinois Supreme Court has 

recognized a common-law cause of action for retaliatory 

discharge where an employee is terminated because of his 

actual or anticipated exercise of workers’ compensation 

rights.” Beatty v. Olin Corp., 693 F.3d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 2012). 

The cause of action is “a ‘narrow’ and ‘limited’ exception to 

the at-will employment doctrine,” and the state high court 

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12 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

has been “disinclined to expand” it. Id. (quoting Zimmerman 

v. Buchheit of Spart, Inc., 645 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ill. 1994)).

To prevail on his claim that he was fired in retaliation for 

exercising his rights under the IWCA, Hillmann had to 

prove three elements: (1) he was employed by the City at the 

time of his injury; (2) he exercised a right granted by the 

IWCA; and (3) his discharge was causally related to the

exercise of his rights under the IWCA. Grabs v. Safeway, Inc.,

917 N.E.2d 122, 126 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). Hillmann’s case, like 

many others, turns on the element of causation. The ultimate 

question in the causation inquiry “is the employer’s motive 

in discharging the employee.” Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co.,

704 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. 1998). It’s not enough for the plaintiff to establish that his workplace injury and initiation of a 

workers’ compensation claim set in motion a chain of events 

that ended in his discharge. Phillips v. Cont’l Tire The Americas, LLC, 743 F.3d 475, 478 (7th Cir. 2014); Casanova v. Am. 

Airlines, Inc., 616 F.3d 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2010). That is, but-for 

causation is necessary but not sufficient to prove the causation element of a retaliatory-discharge claim. Phillips, 

743 F.3d at 478; Casanova, 616 F.3d at 697.

Accordingly, under Illinois law a claim for retaliatory 

discharge requires—at a minimum—that the relevant decision-maker knew that the employee intended to file or had 

filed a workers’ compensation claim. Beatty, 693 F.3d at 753; 

Hunt v. Davita, Inc., 680 F.3d 775, 779 (7th Cir. 2012); Hiatt v. 

Rockwell Int’l Corp., 26 F.3d 761, 769 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Evidence that those responsible for an employee’s termination 

knew he intended to file, or, as in this case, had filed, a 

workers’ compensation claim is essential to a retaliatory 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 13

discharge action under Illinois law.” (citing Marin v. Am. 

Meat Packing Co., 562 N.E.2d 282, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990))).

In Hillmann’s case the relevant decision-maker was 

Sanchez, who as Commissioner of Streets and Sanitation

made the final decision about which positions within his

department would be eliminated in the RIF. No evidence 

suggests that Sanchez knew that Hillmann had filed a 

workers’ compensation claim. Hillmann hammers away on 

the evidence that Murphy and Hennessey were aware of his 

injury and gave him less prestigious and more physically 

rigorous assignments that seemed designed to aggravate his 

injury rather than to accommodate it. But they were not the

RIF decision-makers. Illinois courts haven’t recognized a 

cat’s paw theory of liability in this context,1 and that theory

is hard to reconcile with the cases holding that the causation 

element requires evidence that the relevant decision-maker 

knew about the plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. In 

any event, Hillmann hasn’t litigated his case on a cat’s paw 

theory, so we have no reason to consider the question here.

Because Commissioner Sanchez made the final decision 

to include the timekeeper positions in the RIF and no evidence suggests that he knew about Hillmann’s workers’ 

compensation claim, the IWCA retaliatory-discharge claim 

fails as a matter of law. It should not have been submitted to 

one jury, let alone two. This conclusion makes it unnecessary 

for us to consider the City’s more limited argument for a 

new trial on the issue of damages.

 1 One recent opinion of the Illinois Appellate Court considered the cat’s 

paw theory of liability but concluded that the facts did not support it. See

Cippola v. Village of Oak Lawn, 26 N.E.3d 432, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).

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14 Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 

B. The ADA Claim

Hillmann’s cross-appeal seeks review of the judge’s decision rejecting his ADA claim. We will not disturb findings of 

fact made after a bench trial unless they’re clearly erroneous. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Conclusions of law are reviewed de 

novo. Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2004).

Hillmann alleged that he was denied merit-pay increases 

and targeted for inclusion in the RIF because he requested an 

ADA accommodation when his workplace injury worsened 

in the summer of 2000. Here again, the sticking point is 

causation. To prevail on this claim, Hillmann had to prove 

that his request for an accommodation was the but-for cause 

of the merit-pay denials and his inclusion in the RIF. See 

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2528 

(2013). “[T]he ADA renders employers liable for employment decisions made ‘because of’ a person’s disability, ...

[which] require[s] a showing of but-for causation.” Serwatka 

v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). 

Put differently, Hillmann needed to prove that the City 

would not have taken these adverse employment actions

“but for his actual or perceived disability; proof of mixed 

motives will not suffice.” Id.

Chief Judge Castillo accepted the jury’s advisory verdict

on this claim but also entered detailed findings and conclusions to support his decision. He first found that Hillmann’s 

request for an accommodation did not cause the July 1, 2000 

merit-pay denial because Hillmann waited until August 8 to 

notify Vittori—his supervisor from May to August 16—that 

he could not perform the extra duties Vittori had assigned.

The subsequent merit-pay denials, the judge found, resulted 

either from the City’s confusing practice of “detailing” 

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Nos. 14-3438 & 14-3494 15

employees to other departments or Hillmann’s excessive 

tardiness and absenteeism. Finally, the judge found that 

there was “no nexus” between Hillmann’s request for an 

accommodation and the inclusion of his timekeeper’s position in the RIF.

These findings are well supported by the record. The

judge noted that Hillmann produced no evidence from 

which to infer that any of the merit-pay denials were retaliatory or that the City’s reasons for including his position in 

the RIF were pretextual. The RIF was necessitated by a 

budget shortfall and entailed 300–400 jobs. Hillmann was 

not singled out; all timekeeping positions in the Bureau of 

Electricity were included on the RIF list. The evidence 

established that no one was performing these functions

anyway, and the implementation of the Kronos computerized payroll system made these positions obsolete. The 

judge’s decision easily survives clear-error review. 

To sum up, Hillmann lacked evidence to prove the element of causation on either claim, so the City was entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law on both. Accordingly, we

REVERSE in part and REMAND with instructions to enter 

judgment for the City on the IWCA retaliatory-discharge 

claim. In all other respects, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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