Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-70855/USCOURTS-ca9-18-70855-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cecilia Aguilar Fermin
Petitioner
William P. Barr
Respondent
Enedino Mateo Diaz Aguilar
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CECILIA AGUILAR FERMIN; ENEDINO

MATEO DIAZ AGUILAR,

Petitioners,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 18-70855

Agency Nos.

A208-604-206

A208-604-207

CECILIA AGUILAR FERMIN,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 18-73266

Agency No.

A208-604-206

OPINION

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2 AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 13, 2020*

Pasadena, California

Filed May 5, 2020

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Jay S. Bybee, and

Daniel P. Collins, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying Cecilia Aguilar Fermin’s petitions for review of

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum and

related relief, as well as the denial of her motion to reopen

seeking termination of proceedings in light of Pereira v.

Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the panel concluded that

substantial evidence supported the denial of relief, and held

that a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) lacking the time, date, and

location of a petitioner’s initial removal hearing does not

deprive the agency of jurisdiction over removal proceedings.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 3

The panel concluded that the evidence did not compel the

conclusion that Aguilar was credible, for purposes of asylum

and withholding relief, due to inconsistencies and

implausibilities in the record. The panel also concluded that

substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that

Aguilar could relocate in Mexico to avoid future torture.

The panel also concluded that the Board did not abuse its

discretion in denying Aguilar’s motion to reopen for

termination of proceedings, in light of the Supreme Court’s

decision in Pereira. Fermin contended that the Supreme

Court in Pereira redefined the requirements for a valid NTA

and rendered hers insufficient to vest the immigration court

with jurisdiction because it lacked the time, date, and location

of her hearing. The panel rejected Fermin’s contention,

noting that Pereira addressed the requirements for an

NTA in regards to the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(d)(1)(A), and not the requirements for an NTA to

vest an immigration court with jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.14. The panel observed that in Karingithi v. Whitaker,

913 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2019), this court held that Pereira

simply has no application in challenges to immigration-court

jurisdiction because such jurisdiction is defined by regulation,

whereas Pereira interpreted a provision of the INA. The

panel further observed that Karingithi concluded that an NTA

need not include time and date information to satisfy the

regulations, because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b) does not require

that the time and date of proceedings appear in the initial

notice, and 8 C.F.R. §1003.18(b) compels inclusion of such

information only where practicable. 

The panel noted that the only difference between

Karingithi and the present case is that Aguilar’s NTA was not

only missing the time and the date, but also the location. 

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Aguilar contended that the omission of location information

was different because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6) provides that

the NTA must also include the address of the immigration

court. The panel considered the Board’s recent opinion in

Matter of Rosales Vargas, 27 I. & N. Dec. 745 (B.I.A. 2020),

rejecting this argument. There, the Board pointed out that

§ 1003.14(a) vests jurisdiction when a charging document is

filed, but provides no other specifications regarding the scope

of the document, and nothing in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6)

mandates that the address of the immigration court is a

jurisdictional requirement or that it cannot be provided

subsequent to service of the NTA. The Board found that its

rules, including § 1003.15, were promulgated as procedural

rules and should be read in the context of other internal

docketing, procedural, and venue rules for the immigration

courts. Accordingly, the Board read § 1003.15(b)(6) in

conjunction with § 1003.18(b), which provides that if time,

place, and date information is not contained in the NTA, the

immigration court shall schedule the initial removal hearing

and provide notice to the government and the alien of the

time, place, and date of hearing. The Board thus concluded

that § 1003.18(b) anticipates that when the address of the

immigration court is not included in the NTA, the court can

provide notice of that information at a later time in a

subsequent Notice of Hearing. 

The panel pointed out that in Karingithi this court also

read § 1003.15(b)(6) in conjunction with § 1003.18(b). The

panel observed that Rosales Vargas and Karingithi are

consistent, as under both decisions, an omission of some of

the information required by § 1003.14(a) and § 1003.15(b)(6)

can be cured and is not fatal. The panel stated that, as in

Karingithi, it could find nothing in Rosales Vargasto suggest

that the Board’s interpretation of its own regulation was

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 5

“plainly erroneous,” “inconsistent with the regulation,” or did

“not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment.” 

The panel acknowledged that § 1003.15(b)(6) appears to

be a clear statement that an NTA must include the address of

the immigration court, but stated that the Board has carefully

explained why that provision does not deprive an immigration

court of jurisdiction. Given that the regulations expressly

state that the omission of an address from an NTA may be

fixed by a later hearing notice, the panel concluded that it was

reasonable to construe the regulatory provisions as allowing

the immigration judge to assert jurisdiction in circumstances,

such as this, where Aguilar was provided complete notice at

a later time and appeared for her hearings. The panel held

that the Board therefore did not err in concluding that the

Immigration Court had jurisdiction over her case.

Based on the same reasoning, the panel also gave

deference to the Board’s interpretation in Rosales Vargas of

a similar provision, § 1003.14(a), which separately requires

a charging document to include a certificate of service

indicating the immigration court in which the charging

document was filed. 

COUNSEL

Christopher J. Stender,Federal ImmigrationCounselors APC,

Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioners.

Enitan O. Otunla, Trial Attorney; Bernard A. Joseph, Senior

Litigation Counsel; Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney

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6 AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR

General; Office of Immigration Litigation, United States

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Cecilia Aguilar Fermin fled Mexico after being

threatened by persons seeking to recruit her brother-in-law

into a gang. She and her minor son arrived in the United

States without documentation and were charged as

inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7). Aguilar conceded

removability but applied for asylum, withholding of removal

(withholding), and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. 

An immigration judge (IJ) denied Aguilar relief and ordered

her and her son removed. The Board of Immigration Affairs

(BIA) affirmed. In No. 18-70855, Aguilar now petitions for

review of that decision.1

To initiate removal proceedings, the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) sent Aguilar a notice to appear

(NTA). The NTA did not provide Aguilar with the time,

date, or location of her removal hearing, though that

information was later provided to her and Aguilar appeared

at her hearings. Aguilar alleges that this deficiency in the

NTA rendered the immigration court without jurisdiction to

order her removed. The BIA disagreed. In No. 18-73266,

Aguilar now petitions for review of that decision as well.

1 As a derivative beneficiary of Aguilar’s application for relief before

the IJ, Aguilar’s minor son is a co-petitioner in this petition for review.

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 7

Because we conclude that the decision to remove Aguilar

is supported by substantial evidence, and because we agree

with the BIA that an initial NTA need not contain time, date,

and place information to vest an immigration court with

jurisdiction if such information is provided before the

hearing, we deny both petitions.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner Cecilia Aguilar Fermin is a native and citizen

of Mexico who, until 2015, lived in El Naranjo, Guerrero,

with her minor son, sister, and brother-in-law. Her brotherin-law previously served as a soldier in the Mexican armed

forces. Because military experience is valuable to gangs,

Aguilar’s brother-in-law began facing pressure from a gang

to join their ranks. When he refused, the gang threatened to

kill his family. In response to this threat, the family fled.

Aguilar and her son moved to the town of Palos Altos,

Guerrero, where they lived for several months. While living

in Palos Altos, Aguilar claims that she continued to receive

threats relating to her brother-in-law. For example, on one

occasion three men threatened to kill her and her son if her

brother-in-law did not join their gang. These same men also

demanded a one million peso ransom from Aguilar, though

they allegedly did so through a ransom note that provided no

instruction to Aguilar on whom to pay or how to pay it. 

Aguilar reported this incident to the local police, who

conducted an investigation but ultimately made no arrests.

Aguilar then fled Palos Altos with her son and traveled to

Mexico City, where she stayed with her sister-in-law for

several weeks. She received no threats while in Mexico City. 

A few weeks later she returned briefly to Palos Altos, where

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she claims she was again threatened. At this point, she fled

to the United States.

On December 8, 2015, Aguilar and her son arrived at the

San Ysidro port of entry without valid entry documents. Two

days later, they were served an NTA charging them as

removable under § 212(a)(7) of the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA),which renders inadmissible all persons

who enter without appropriate documentation. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). The NTA did not provide a date and

time for Aguilar’s removal hearing, stating only that the

hearing would occur “at a date to be set [and] at a time to be

set.” It also did not provide the address of the immigration

court at which she was to appear, stating only that the hearing

would be “[a]t a place and time to be determined.” Three

months later, on March 14, 2016, Aguilar received a

supplemental notice providing the date, time, and location of

her hearing.

After a full hearing—in which Aguilar was the only

witness to testify—the IJ found Aguilar inadmissible as

charged and denied her petition for asylum, withholding, and

CAT relief. The IJ made an adverse credibility finding

against Aguilar based on inconsistencies and implausibilities

in her testimony. For example, the IJ noted that Aguilar

averred in her asylum application that she had been

personally threatened by the gang, even though when

questioned at the port of entry, Aguilar stated that only her

brother-in-law had received threats. Similarly, when asked

on cross-examination whether “she ever received a piece of

paper” from the gang, she replied that she had not, in spite of

the assertion in her asylum application that the gang had

given her a written ransom note for one million pesos. The

IJ found Aguilar’s explanationsfor these inconsistencies—the

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 9

former inconsistency was because “she was nervous” and the

latter was because “she had forgotten”—unconvincing. The

IJ also found aspects of Aguilar’s testimony implausible. For

example, Aguilar claimed that the Mexican government

would not protect her from future persecution because the

local police were “in cahoots with” the gangs, yet she had

chosen to report the threats she received in Mexico to the

local police, who responded by promptly investigating her

claim. The IJ also expressed doubts about Aguilar’s claim

that she received a ransom note providing no instructions. 

Based on the adverse credibility finding, the IJ denied

Aguilar’s asylum and withholding claims.2 The IJ denied

Aguilar CAT relief because (1) Aguilar failed to show that it

was more likely than not that she would be tortured upon

return to Mexico and (2) she could successfully internally

relocate. Aguilar appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA.

Citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A.

1994), the BIA “adopt[ed] and affirm[ed] the decision of the

Immigration Judge” in full. It concluded that “[t]he

Immigration Judge provided sufficient bases to support an

adverse credibility finding,” highlighting Aguilar’s

inconsistent testimony about receiving a ransom note. The

BIA also agreed with the IJ’s alternative holding that Aguilar

“did not establish that the threats, harassment, recruitment,

and extortion that she and her family suffered and fear in

Mexico was or will be on account of a ground protected by

2

In the alternative, the IJ also held that even if Aguilar were credible,

she was ineligible for asylum and withholding because (1) she failed to

establish a nexus between the threat of violence she suffered and her

membership in a particularized social group (PSG), (2) she failed to show

that the Mexican government was unwilling or unable to protect her, and

(3) she could internally relocate within Mexico.

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the” INA. The BIA affirmed the denial of CAT relief

because Aguilar’s “fear of torture in Mexico is speculative

and unsupported by adequate objective evidence.”

On June 21, 2018, several months after the BIA’s

decision, the Supreme Court decided Pereira v. Sessions, in

which it held that “[a] putative notice to appear that fails to

designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s

removal proceedings is not a notice to appear under

section 1229(a).” 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113–14 (2018) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Aguilar then filed with the BIA a

motion to reopen the proceedings in her case, arguing that the

NTA she had received was inadequate under Pereira. 

Although Pereira concerned the stop-time rule under 8

U.S.C. § 1229b—a provision of the INA irrelevant to

Aguilar’s petition—Aguilar argued that Pereira’s reasoning

should be extended to other provisions of immigration law. 

Specifically, Aguilar argued that Pereira should be applied to

8 C.F.R. § 1003.14, which vests jurisdiction in an

immigration court upon the filing of a “charging document,”

a term defined to include an NTA. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.13. 

Thus, Aguilar claimed, because the NTA here was

insufficient to satisfy Pereira, it was insufficient to vest

jurisdiction in the immigration court, and so Aguilar’s

ordered removal was in error.

The BIA disagreed. It held that Pereira’s holding did not

extend to matters of jurisdiction. Instead, the BIA cited its

own 2018 decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N.

Dec. 441, 442–47 (B.I.A. 2018), to conclude that an NTA

“that does not specify the time and place of an alien’s initial

removal hearing vests an Immigration Judge with jurisdiction

over the removal proceeding . . . so long as a notice of

hearing specifying this information is later sent.” Because it

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 11

was “undisputed that [Aguilar] received proper notices of her

removal hearings, which provided the dates, times and

locations of [her] scheduled hearings,” the BIA concluded

that the immigration court had jurisdiction, and thus the

removal order was proper and no grounds existed to reopen

the proceedings.

Aguilar timely petitioned for review of both decisions.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The BIA had jurisdiction over the appeal of the IJ’s

removal order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3). The BIA had

jurisdiction over Aguilar’s motion to reopen proceedings

under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This Court has jurisdiction under

8 U.S.C. § 1252.

“Where, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also provides

its own review of the evidence and law, we review both the

IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025,

1028 (9th Cir. 2011). “We review denials of asylum,

withholding of removal, and CAT relief for substantial

evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable,

substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered

as a whole.” Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1152 (9th

Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n adverse

credibility finding is conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 

Bassene v. Holder, 737 F.3d 530, 536 (9th Cir. 2013)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

A denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Bonilla v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 581 (9th Cir.

2016). A decision is an abuse of discretion if it is “arbitrary,

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12 AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR

irrational, or contrary to law.” Id.; see also Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996) (“A[] court by definition

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law.”). Purely

legal questions are reviewed de novo. Alali-Amin v.

Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Aguilar appeals two decisions of the BIA: (1) the denial

of asylum, withholding, and CAT relief, and (2) the denial of

her motion to reopen proceedings. We will take each issue in

turn.

A

To establish eligibility for asylum, Aguilar must show

that she is unable or unwilling to return to Mexico “because

of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on

account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42). Aguilar bears the burden to establish

eligibility for relief. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a). Aguilar may

satisfy her burden with testimony alone only if her

“‘testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific

facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a

refugee.’” Ming Dai v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 858, 867 (9th Cir.

2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii)).

Here, the IJ found that Aguilar was not credible, and the

BIA agreed. They each identified inconsistencies and

implausibilities in Aguilar’s account,some ofwhich reach the

heart of her claim for relief. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d

1034, 1047 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]hen an inconsistency is at

the heart of the claim it doubtless is of great weight.”). As is

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 13

required, Aguilar was given an opportunity to explain the

inconsistencies and implausibilities in her testimony, see

Campos-Sanchez v. INS, 164 F.3d 448, 450 (9th Cir. 1999),

superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Xiu Xia

Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (per

curiam), but the IJ found her explanations, including that “she

was nervous” and “she had forgotten” certain facts, were

unconvincing.

We may only upset this adverse credibility finding if we

conclude that “any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled” to do so. Bassene, 737 F.3d at 536 (internal

quotation marks omitted). Nothing in the record compels that

conclusion. The adverse credibility finding must stand. The

BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of Aguilar’s claim

for asylum.

Separately, to establish eligibility for withholding,

Aguilar must “demonstrate[] a ‘clear probability’ that, if [she]

returns to [her] home country, [her] ‘life or freedom would be

threatened’ on account of race, religion, nationality,

membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 

Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citation omitted). As with asylum, an adverse credibility

finding may be grounds to deny a petition for withholding of

removal. See, e.g., Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1183

(9th Cir. 2008). Thus, as with the asylum claim, the BIA did

not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of Aguilar’s claim for

withholding.

For CAT relief, Aguilar must demonstrate “that it is more

likely than not that [s]he . . . would be tortured if removed to

the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). 

Relevant to this inquiry is whether “the applicant could

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relocate to a part of the country of removal where . . . she is

not likely to be tortured.” Id. § 1208.16(c)(3)(ii). Though

she claims she was threatened when living elsewhere in

Mexico, Aguilar concedes that she was never threatened or

harmed when living in Mexico City, and she acknowledges

that she has family members who continue to live in Mexico

City without issue. Thus, substantial evidence supports the

conclusion that Aguilar could internally relocate within

Mexico. The BIA did not err in affirming the IJ’s denial of

Aguilar’s claim for CAT relief.

B

The BIA may grant a motion to reopen proceedings if the

petitioner presents new evidence that “is material and was not

available and could not have been discovered or presented at

the former hearing.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1). Here, Aguilar

asserts that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira provides

grounds to reopen her case. She argues that Pereira

redefined the requirements for a valid NTA and rendered the

one issued here insufficient to vest the immigration court with

jurisdiction.

Aguilar misreads Pereira. The Court in Pereira

articulated the requirements for an NTA in regards to the

stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A). It did not

address the requirements for an NTA to vest an immigration

court with jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14. See

Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2109–10. In Karingithi v. Whitaker, we

considered whether, in light of Pereira, a “notice to appear

[that] does not specify the time and date of the proceedings”

is sufficient to vest an immigration court with jurisdiction

over removal proceedings. 913 F.3d 1158, 1158 (9th Cir.

2019). We noted that immigration court jurisdiction is

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 15

defined by DOJ regulation, while Pereira interpreted a

provision of the INA. Id. at 1160–61. Because the INA and

the DOJ regulation define the term “notice to appear” slightly

differently, we reasoned that case law interpreting the term in

the former context does not control in the latter. Id. 

Accordingly, we held that “Pereira simply has no

application” in challenges to immigration-court jurisdiction. 

Id. at 1161.

In Karingithi, we observed that “the regulation does not

require that the time and date of proceedings appear in the

initial notice.” 913 F.3d at 1160 (citing 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.15(b)). “Rather, the regulation compels inclusion of

such information ‘where practicable.’” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.18(b)). We concluded that “[a] notice to appear need

not include time and date information to satisfy [the

regulations].” Id. We also looked to the BIA’s published

decision in Matter of Bermudez-Cota, 27 I. & N. Dec. 441

(B.I.A. 2018), to which we owed deference unless its

interpretation of its regulation was “plainly erroneous,”

“inconsistent with the regulation,” or did “not reflect the

agency’s fair and considered judgment.” 913 F.3d at 1161

(quotation marks and citation omitted). We concluded that

“Bermudez-Cota easily meets this standard and is consistent

with our analysis.” Id.

The only difference between this case and our decision in

Karingithi is that Aguilar’s NTA was not only missing the

time and the date, but also the location. Aguilar argues that

this omission is different from omitting the time and place

because 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6) provides that “The . . .

Notice to Appear must also include . . . [t]he address of the

Immigration Court.”

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The BIA has recently addressed Aguilar’s argument in a

published decision. In Matter of Rosales Vargas, 27 I. & N.

Dec. 745 (B.I.A. 2020), the BIA acknowledged that our

decision in Karingithi “[d]id not explicitly address the

specific issue raised here—whether a notice to appear that

does not include the address of the Immigration Court where

the notice to appear will be filed is sufficient to vest

jurisdiction in the court.” Id. at 748 (footnote omitted).3 The

BIA rejected the argument Aguilar makes here. It pointed out

that § 1003.14(a) vests jurisdiction in an immigration judge

“when a charging document is filed” and that sentence

“provides no other specifications regarding the scope of the

document.” Id. The BIA further observed that “nothing in 8

C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6) mandates that the address of the

Immigration Court is a jurisdictional requirement or that it

cannot be provided subsequent to the service of the notice to

appear.” Id. at 749.

Having concluded that compliance with § 1003.15(b)(6)

was not a condition for vesting jurisdiction in the immigration

court, the BIA considered “the consequences of omitting the

‘place’ information from the notice to appear” and “whether

termination would be the appropriate remedy.” Id. at 751. 

The BIA found that its rules “including § 1003.15 were

promulgated as procedural rules for the Immigration Courts

. . . . to outline the steps needed to docket a case . . . and to

ensure the efficient administrative handling of cases.” Id.

at 752. Accordingly, § 1003.15(b) “[should not be read] in

isolation, but in the context of the other internal docketing,

3 The BIA, on the other hand, had already addressed this issue in

Matter of Bermudez-Cota, in which it concluded that an NTA lacking time

and place information was not defective so long as that information was

later provided. See 27 I. & N. Dec. at 447.

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 17

procedural, and venue rules for the Immigration Courts.” Id.

at 750. The BIA quoted § 1003.12, which provides that the

rules “are promulgated to assist in the expeditious, fair, and

proper resolution of matters coming before Immigration

Judges,” id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.12), and a summary of

an earlier version of the rules, which stated that “[t]he rules

of procedure are interrelated” and “intended to be construed

harmoniously,” id. (quoting 57 Fed. Reg. 11,568, 11,568

(Apr. 6, 1992)). The BIA thought it appropriate to read

§ 1003.15(b)(6) “in conjunction with” § 1003.18(b). That

latter section provides:

[DHS] shall provide in the Notice to Appear,

the time, place and date of the initial removal

hearing, where practicable. If that

information is not contained in the Notice to

Appear, the Immigration Court shall be

responsible for scheduling the initial removal

hearing and providing notice to the

government and the alien of the time, place,

and date of hearing.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b) (emphasis added). The BIA concluded

that

the regulation anticipates that when the

address of the Immigration Court is not

included in the notice to appear, the court can

provide notice of that information at a later

time. Accordingly, we hold that a notice to

appear that does not include the address of the

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18 AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR

Immigration Court can be remedied by a

subsequent notice of hearing that includes that

information.

Rosales Vargas, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 750.

In Karingithi we also read § 1003.15(b)(6) in conjunction

with § 1003.18(b). 913 F.3d at 1160. Rosales Vargas and

Karingithi are consistent. Under both decisions, an omission

of some of the information required by § 1003.14(a) and

§ 1003.15(b)(6) can be cured and is not fatal. As in

Karingithi, we can find nothing in Rosales Vargas that

suggests that the BIA’s interpretation of its own regulation is

“plainly erroneous,” “inconsistent with the regulation,” or

does “not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment.” 

Id. at 1161. We acknowledge that § 1003.15(b)(6) appears to

be a clear statement that a notice to appear must include the

address of the Immigration Court, but the BIA has carefully

explained why that provision does not deprive an immigration

court of jurisdiction.4 The question then, is what is the

remedy when the address is omitted from the NTA?—and the

BIA has fully explained that § 1003.18(b) supplies the

4 As Aguilar notes, § 1003.14 separately requires a charging

document to include “a certificate showing service on the opposing party

. . . which indicates the Immigration Court in which the charging

document is filed.” 8 C.F.R. §1003.14(a). For the same reasons that it

held that lack of time, date, and place information in violation of

§ 1003.15 did not strip an immigration court of jurisdiction, the BIA in

Rosales Vargas also held that “lack of compliance with this portion of

[§1003.14(a)], standing alone or read with the other regulations, does not

provide a reason for terminating proceedings.” 27 I. & N. Dec. at 753

(footnote omitted). Because nothing in this interpretation of the regulation

is “plainly erroneous,” is “inconsistent with the regulation,” or does “not

reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment,” Karingithi, 913 F.3d

at 1161, we give deference to this holding as well.

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AGUILAR FERMIN V. BARR 19

appropriate remedy: providing the alien and the government

with the complete notice at a later time. Aguilar was

provided with that notice and appeared for her scheduled

hearings. Given that the regulations expressly state that the

omission of an address from an NTA may be fixed by a later

hearing notice, it is reasonable to construe the regulatory

provisions about when jurisdiction vests as allowing the IJ to

assert jurisdiction in such circumstances.

We thus hold that there was no error in the BIA’s

determination that the lack of time, date, and place in the

NTA sent to Aguilar did not deprive the immigration court of

jurisdiction over her case. Accordingly, we conclude that the

BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Aguilar’s motion

to reopen proceedings, and the petition for review of that

decision is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The petition for review of Aguilar’s asylum, withholding,

and CAT claims is denied (No. 18-70855). The petition for

review of the motion to reopen is denied as well (No. 18-

73266).

PETITIONS DENIED.

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