Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01396/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01396-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sidney R. Bell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SIDNEY R. BELL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SCOTT J. ZIEBARTH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 88-1396 

No. 88-1585 

r1 rt.no 

Ut·1itcrj ~>Jat.t.,i t,11if! <if Appf.Mh 

Temh Ci~r,,~it 

DEC ·r~ 2 1989 

ROBERT L lIOECK.ER 

Cler'< 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 87-CR-007W) 

Kenneth R. Brown, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant 

Sidney R. Bell 

Ronald J. Yengich, Yengich, Rich, Xaiz & Metos, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Defendant-Appellant Scott J. Ziebarth 

Bruce C. Lubeck, A~sistant· United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, 

Utah (Brent D. ward, United states Attorney, Salt Lake City, Utah, 

was also on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee United States of 

America 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT and EBEL, Circuit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 1 
. These cases were companioned on appeal. Both defendants were 

found guilty by the court after waiving their rights to a jury 

trial. The trial court found defendant Scott Ziebarth (Ziebarth) 

guilty of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841 (a)(l) (1982). Defendant Sidney Bell 

(Bell) was found guilty of attempt to possess with intent to 

distribute cocaine, a violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841 (a)(l) and 846 

(1982). Both defendants challenge the trial court's denial of 

their pre-trial motions to suppress and Bell additionally 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence 

conviction. We affirm both convictions. 

I. 

Factual Background 

supporting 

Utah State Narcotics Agent Mark Whittaker (Whittaker) was 

profiling flights arriving from Los Angeles at the Salt Lake 

International Airport when Ziebarth deplaned. Ziebarth walked to 

a group of phones, looked around, and. then turned and walked 

across a hallway to another group of phones. While looking around 

he picked up two or three phones, but did not appear to be placing 

a call. Ziebarth then went into a restroom for approximately two 

minutes and after leaving, went back to the phones. II R. 7-8. 

Whittaker said that Ziebarth appeared to be dialing this time, but 

did not appear to be talking. Ziebarth was carrying a nylon 

shoulder bag and appeared to Whittaker to be nervous. II R. 8-9. 

Whittaker followed Ziebarth as he walked toward the east exit 

of the concourse. As Ziebarth got to the top of the concourse 

ramp he went into a lounge, looked around and then walked toward 

the top of an escalator where he met a man later identified as 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 2 
Sidney Bell. They greeted each other and then rode down the 

escalator. Whittaker was behind them and said that on the way 

down they turned away from each other and stopped speaking. II R. 

10. 

When he reached.the bottom of the escalator, Whittaker met 

Deputy Bart Palmer (Palmer) of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 

Office and Police Officer Terry Steed (Steed) of Murray City and 

explained his observations. Ziebarth and Bell walked to the east 

side of the building, turned around, and walked back to the far 

west end of the·building. Whittaker said that Ziebarth was again 

looking over his shoulder and that Bell was turning around and 

looking. II R. 11-12. 

N~ither Ziebarth nor Bell went to the luggage area before 

going out the west exit of the terminal. As they were walking 

toward a parking lot, Bell noticed Whittaker and Palmer walking 

toward him and Ziebarth, and he turned and walked away from 

Ziebarth. II R. 13. At that point Whittaker and Palmer 

approached Ziebarth. Steed, who was nearby, approached Bell. 

A. 

Facts Leading to Bell's Arrest 

Steed walked up to Bell with his badge showing and said ''I'm 

a police officer, do you mind if I talk to you a minute" and Bell 

said yes. Steed testified that he then asked if Bell was a 

friend of Ziebarth's. III R. 50, When Bell said "No," Steed 

asked "Aren't you a friend of his, aren't you with him or a friend 

3 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 3 
of his?" Bell responded "Not really". 1 III R. 50. A brown paper 

bag wa~ protruding from a rolled-up levi jacket under Bell's arm. 

Steed said that Bell was turning his right shoulder in an attempt 

to hide the jacket. III R. 50. When asked, Bell said there was 

nothing in the bag. Steed a9ain· inquired about the contents of 

the bag and Bell told him it was personal. III R. 51. Steed then 

asked: "Do you mind if I touch that bag for my own safety, assure 

myself that it's-not a weapon or anything that could be used as a 

weapon?" Bell said "No, it~s person~l, it's not a weapon. You 

don't have to worry about it." III R. 51. 

At this point Steed told Bell that he was a narcotics officer 

assigned to keep narcotics from entering Utah through the airport. 

Steed testified that Bell's "level of nervousness seemed to 

increase dramatically. I noticed that he was breathing -- started 

breathing a little heavier." III R. 51-52. Steed then asked Bell 

why he was so nervous and Bell said, "I'm always nervo·us when I'm 

confronted by police." Bell then changed the word confronted to 

"talked to." III R. 52 .. Steed asked if there was anything in the 

bag to cause him to be nervous and he said no, almost blurting it 

out, according to Steed. !JI R. 52. Steed then motioned 

1 

There is a conflict in the testimony at this point. The 

parties stipulated that Bell would testify that when he was 

confronted by Officer Steed outside the airport on the day of · the 

arrest, "that he did not deny knowing Mr. Ziebarth, that the 

question was 'Did you come in with Mr. Ziebarth,' and to that 

question he responded 'No.'" V R. 3. This conflict was not 

resolved by the Magistrate's findings. The Magistrate's report 

did state that as to the conflict between Officer Whittaker's 

testimony and Bell's as to whether Bell made a statement that 

Whittaker could open the package, it was found the facts were as 

stated by Whittaker, not as stated by Bell. I R. 50, p.12. 

Whittaker had testified that Bell said "that was fine" (opening 

the package and counting the money). Id. at 12. 

4 

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Whittaker over, introduced him to.Bell, and told him about the 

package. He also told Whittaker that Bell had first denied 

knowing Ziebarth and then, when asked again, said that he did not 

really know him. III R. 52. 

Whittaker told Bell that he was going to "detain the package 

and that [they] would go over into the other building right next 

to [them], and [that he] was going to run his narcotics dog over 

the package at that time." III R. 16-17. Whittaker testified 

that Bell "didn't want me to do it at first" and that Bell asked 

if Whittaker could legally talk to him and if he could det-ain the 

package. III R. 11. Whittaker said he could and told Bell that 

he could either have a receipt for the package and could get it 

back when the dog was done, or could accompany him to the office. 

III R. 17. 2 Bell said "·I don't want you to look at the 

package. II . . . III R. 43. Whittaker did not tell Bell he was 

free to leave, III R. 42, but he did tell him that it would only 

take a few minutes for the dog to go over the package. Whittaker 

said that Bell agreed to go to th~ office. III R. 17-18. 

Carrying his package, Bell walked to the security office, 

located approximately 200 feet away in the main terminal. When 

they got to the office Whittaker told Bell that he would "take the 

package upstairs and run the dog over it." III R. 17-19. 

Whittaker said that Bell "didn't want me to take the package. He 

knew I was going to have the package." III R. 19. Bell told 

Whittaker that he wanted to go with him to the office and was 

2 

The parties stipulated that Bell would testify that Whittaker 

requested that he go to the security office and did not give him 

the option. V R. 3-4. The magistrate specifically credited 

Whittaker's testimony on this point. IR. 50, p. 12. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 5 
advised that "it .was just [Whittaker's] policy that [he] did not 

have anyone else around the dog when [he] was working ... II III 

R. 20. Whittaker said: "He told me, again, that I wasn't going to 

have the package. At this time I took out my radio and I was 

going to call for assistance. He said, 'oh well, never mind,' and 

he handed me the package." I I I R. 20. By now Whit taker and ·Bell 

had been together for approximately two or three minutes. III R. 

25. 

The narcotics dog, "Blue," alerted to the·package. Blue was 

then taken to the far side of the room and let go and again 

alerted to Bell's package. Whittaker had placed the package on 

the floor among two other pieces of luggage. This process took 

approximately one and .one half minutes. III R. 21, 25, 26. 

Whitt~ker then went downstairs and told Bell that he wanted 

him to come up. They went upstairs to the security office and 

Whittaker informed Bell that Blue had alerted to the package. 

Bell again denied that the package contained narcotics. Whittaker 

told Bell that because Blue had alerted to the package, he would 

place Bell under arrest. He then read Bell his Miranda warnings. 

At that point Bell told Whittaker that the package contained 

money. III R. 27-28. 

During this time the package was on the floor, five to ten 

feet away. Whittaker said that he would open the package, count 

the money, and give Bell a receipt, and Bell indicated that would 

be fine. III R. 28. 3 The package contained $13,8p0. III R. 30. 4 

3 

There is an important factual dispute here. The parties 

agreed that Bell would testify, if called, that Whittaker dumped 

the contents of the. package out. The magistrate specifically 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 6 
Bell was given a receipt for the money, he asked a few questions, 

and was released. III R. 30. 

B. 

Facts Leading to Ziebarth's Arrest 

AS officer Palmer approached Ziebarth, he identified himself 

and asked Ziebarth if he would mind talking for a ~oment. 

Ziebarth said no, and Palmer asked if he was waiting for someone. 

Ziebarth responded that Bell had picked him up and that he was not 

waiting for anyone. Palmer then asked if he could see Ziebarth's 

plane ticket. II R. 38, 39. Whittaker, who at that point had not 

yet gone over to help with Bell, said that Ziebarth was "just a 

little nervous" at this point. II R. 28. Ziebarth found the 

ticket and showed it to Palmer, who then checked Ziebarth's 

driver's license to verify the nam·e on the ticket. II R. 39. 

Palmer handed the license back to Ziebarth and told him that 

he was a narcotics officer and that he of·ten stopped people in an 

attempt to locate narcotics. According to Palmer, Ziebarth then 

became "visibly nervous" and started looking around. II R. 39-40. 

Palmer asked if he could look through Zie~arth's nylon bag and 

advised him of his right to refuse. II R. 29, 40. Ziebarth 

handed the bag to Palmer who searched it, found nothing, and 

returried it -to Ziebarth. II R. 30, 40. It was at this point that 

Whittaker went to help Steed with Bell. ·II R. 30. 

(Footnote continued): 

credited Whittaker's testimony. IR. 50, p. 12. This finding is 

not clearly erroneous. 

4 

There was testimony that Blue could alert to either narcotics 

or money that had any connection to narcotics. III R. 54. The 

magistrate found that Blue was "responding to the stimulus, the 

fact that the subject matter was different was not of 

consequence." IR. 50, p. 37, n.22. · 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 7 
Palmer noticed some zippered pockets on the shoulder of 

Ziebarth's jacket and he asked if he could search them. Ziebarth 

asked why and was told by Palmer that he-was looking for drugs. 

II R. 40. Ziebarth reached up to unzip one of the pockets and as 

he did, Palmer noticed his hand "shaking very badly and he was 

unable to get a hold of the zipper for a couple of seconds. II 

He pulled out partially what appeared to be a manila envelope. 

Palmer asked what was in it and Ziebarth said money, about $3,000. 

II R. 41. Palmer questioned Ziebarth about the money (Ziebarth 

ha~ previously said he did not have large amounts of ~oney), and 

Ziebarth responded, "well, it's not a large amount of money to 

me." Palmer pointed to the other pocket and. Ziebarth responded 

"more money," but· did not explain. Palmer then said "well, do you 

think it's about the.same as in the manila envelope" and Ziebarth 

said he had about $7,000 total on him. II R. 41. 

Palmer asked ·ziebarth what he was doing with the money and 

Ziebarth indicated that it .was for an attorney who had done some 

mortgage foreclosure work in Hawaii. Ziebarth had just come from 

Hawaii and Palmer asked him why he had not paid the attorney while 

there. He exp·lained that he was going to get a cashier.' s check 

and mail it and he pulled but a pre-addressed enve~ope and showed 

it to Palmer. Palmer then told Ziebarth that he was going to 

detain him until he could determine "whose money.it was and why he 

had it." II R. 42-43. He told Ziebarth it would probably be just 

a few minutes. II R. 57. For all that Palmer knew, there was 

money in the packages in Ziebarth's shirt or coat. 5 II R. 56. 

5 

Ziebarth asserts throughout his brief that Palmer had 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 8 
By that time Whittaker was taking Bell to the office. Palmer 

informed Ziebarth of that fact and asked him if he would mind 

going to the office to get this ''money situation straightened 

out." II R. 43. According to Palmer, Ziebarth said "fine and 

(they] walked over to the office." II R. 43. At that point they 

had been together for seven or eight minutes. II R. 44. 

When they got to the office Whittaker was upstairs with Blue 

and Bell was waiting. II R. 44. By then, two other security 

people were present. While they were standing there, Ziebarth 

dropped his bag and bolted down the concourse. II R. 45. He was 

tackled by one of the security officers 70 or 80 feet down the 

concourse and arrested. A subsequent search revealed ten and one 

half ounces of cocaine. II R. 46-47. 

The magistrate's Report states, p. 7, that in addition ''the 

money'' was found in Ziebarth's pockets. Howevei, the Memor~ridum 

Decision of the trial judge at p. 5 says that at oral argument the 

parties stipulated that Ziebarth was carrying "only cocaine and no 

money." See VI R. 35-36. The government attorney said the 

magistrate's Report was in error on this point. 

c. 

The Trial Court's Ruling 

Adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation after a 

de novo review of the record, with the correction noted above that 

money was not found on Ziebarth, the trial court denied both 

motions to suppress. The magistrate found Ziebarth's conduct 

(Footnote continued): 

possession of the money. We find nothing in the record to support 

this assertion and the magistrate specifically found that at "no 

time did any officer take possession of the defendant's property, 

at least at this time." IR. 50, p. 33. 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 9 
consensual up to the point where Palmer said he was going to 

detain him to check the source of the money. The magistrate found 

that from that point on Palmer had reasonable suspicion to 

temporarily detain Ziebarth. When Ziebarth bolted, probable cause 

was supplied for his arrest and the narcotics were seized pursuant 

thereto. IR. 50, p. 33-34. 

With respect· to Bell, the magistrate found the initial 

encounter a consensual police-citizen encounter. IR. 50, p. 35. 

The magistrate reasoned that Bell, who was given the option of 

accompanying Whittaker or taking a ~ec~ipt for the package, was 

never detained. The magistrate found sufficient justification to 

temporarily detain the package for a dog sniff, reasoning that 

Ziebarth's and Bell's conduct could be added together to determine 

whether there was reasonable suspicion to believe the package 

contained narcotics or narcotics money. The magistrate found that 

when Blue alerted, there was probable cause to arrest Bell. IR. 

50, p. 36. The magistrate held, however, that the search .of the 

package was not incident to Bell's artest. Rather, the magistrate 

reasoned that the "search of the package was voluntary and 

consented to by Bell,'' who told Whittaker (after Blue alerted) 

that the package contained money. IR. 50, p. 37. The trial 

court agreed. IR. 55, p. 6. 

Both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. The 

prosecution relied on the evidence presented in connection with 

the motion~ to suppress. It also proffered some additional 

testimony and exhibits, to which the defendants agreed. VII R. 9-

18. The defense put on no evidence, but did object to some of the 

evidence proffered by the government .. VII R. 18-24. The court 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 10 
found Ziebarth guilty of possession with intent to distribute and 

Bell guilty of an attempt to possess with intent to distribute. 

VII R. 30-32. 6 

On appeal, Ziebarth argues that he was detained without 

reasonable suspicion when Palmer asked to inspect his ticket and 

identification and that the intrusion escalated further when 

Palmer asked if he could search his person and luggage. He also 

argues that he was arrested without probable cause when he was 

asked to accompany Palmer to the security office. Bell says that 

his package was seized without consent or reasonable suspicion and 

that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. 

II. 

Analysis 

When reviewing the de~ial of a motion to suppress we ~ccept 

the trial court's findings of fact· unless. they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Maez, 872 F.2d 1444, 1455-1456 n. 15 

(10th Cit. 1989). We must consider the evidence adduced at the 

suppression he~ring and the trial in the light most favorable to 

the ruling made. 

Cir. 1985). 

United States v. Gay, 774 F.2d 368, 375 (10th 

A. 

Ziebarth's Detention and Arrest 

The initial contact between Palmer and Ziebarth, where Palmer 

asked Ziebarth if he would mind talking for a moment, was clearly 

the sort of encounter that implicates no Fourth Amendment 

interests, as the magistrate reasoned. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 

U.S. 1, 5-6 (1984)(per curiam). "[L]aw enforcement officers do 

6 

The court announced its decision orally. Neither defendant 

requested detailed findings under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c). 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 11 
not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an 

individual on the street or in another public place,· by asking him 

if he is willing ·to answer some questions, [or] by putting 

questions to him if the person is willing to listen. " 

Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983)(opinion of White, J., 

in which Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, JJ., joined). See also 

United States v. Santillanes, 848 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir. 

1988)(citing United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th 

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984) and United States 

v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986), (recognizing 

three types of police-citizen encounters). 

Ziebarth argues that any consent ended when Palmer requested 

permission to inspect his ticket and identification. He contends 

that the intrusion escalated further when Palmer identified 

himself as a narcotics officer and asked to inspect his luggage 

and search his person. The government argues, and the magistrate 

and trial judge found, that Ziebarth consented to the examination 

of his ticket and identification, as well as the search of his bag 

and coat pockets. IR. 50, p. 32-33; IR. 55, p.3. 

Where a valid consent is obtained, no Fourth Amendment rights 

are violated. Gay, 774 F.2d at 376. Whether consent is voluntary 

or is the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is to 

be determined by the totality of the circumstances and is a matter 

which the government has the burden of proving. United States v. 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980)(opinion of STEWART, J., in 

which BLACKMON, POWELL, and REHN.QUIST, JJ., joined)(citing 

Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 227 (1973)). 

Knowledge of the right to refuse consent is "one factor to be 

12 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 12 
taken into account. II Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227. This· 

court has explicated a three-tier standard for determining whether 

the government has sustained the burden of showing that consent 

was voluntary: 

First, there must be clear and positive testimony that. 

the consent was unequivocal and specific. Second, the 

Government must·establish that the consent wa~ given 

without duress or coercion. Finally, we evaluate those 

first two standards with the traditional indulgence of 

the courts against a presumption of waiver of 

constitutional rights. 

Gay, 774 F.2d at 376 (citing United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 

1448, 1453 (10th Cir. 1985) and United ·states v. Abbot, 546 F.2d 

883, 885 (10th Cir. 1977)). 

· As with the initial encounter in Mendenhall, the events here 

took place in a public.concourse and without a display of weapons. 

See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (opinion of STEWART, J., in which 

REHNQUIST, J., joined). Considering the evidence in the light 

favorable to the trial court's ruling, Officers Palmer and 

Whittaker did not summon Ziebarth to their presence, but rather 

approached him. Id. They requested, but did not demand to see, 

Ziebarth's ticket and identification. After verifying the name on 

the ticket and identifying himself as a narcotics officer, Palmer 

asked Ziebarth's permission to look through his bag. He ad~ised 

Ziebarth of his right to refuse consent. II R. 29, 40. Ziebarth 

handed the bag to Palmer who, after finding nothing, returned it. 

II R. 30, 40. When Ziebarth was asked about the zippered pockets 

on his jacket, he reached up himself, unzipped the pockets and 

handed Palmer the envelope which he said contained about $3,000. 

II R. 41. And when Palmer pointed to the other pocket, Ziebarth 

responded "more money" and then explained that he had a total of 

13 

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about $7,000 which he was going to use to-pay an attorney. II R. 

42. 

We think there is ample support in the record to sustain the 

trial court's finding that Ziebarth's consent was valid. See 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 557(opinion of Stewart, J.)(examining the 

record to determine whether it sustains the trial court's firiding 

of consent); Gay, 774 F.2d at 377. Ziebarth's knowledge of the 

right to refuse consent is "highly relevant to the determination 

that there had been consent." Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558-

559(opinion of Stewart, J.)._ And there was no testimony showing 

threats or a show of force, id. at 558, or mere "submission to a 

claim of lawful authority." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 

(opinion-of White, J.). 7 We therefore uphold the finding that 

Ziebarth consented to the examination of his ticket, as well as 

the search of his bag and coat pockets. 

7 

We are unpersuaded by Ziebarth's argument that Florida v. 

Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)(opinion of White, J.) is controlling 

here. In Royer, the Court rejected the state's claim of consent, 

reasoning that ''[a]sking fbr and examining Royer's ticket and his 

driver's license were n6 doubt permissible in themselves~ but when 

the officers· identified themselves as narcotics agents, told Royer 

that he was· suspected of transporting narcotics, and asked him to 

accompany· them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and 

driver's license and without indicating in any way that he was 

free to depart, Royer was effectively seized. " Id at 501 

(opinion of White, J.). 

Ziebarth's argument is premised in part upon his contention 

that "instead of returning [Ziebarth's] money the police kept it."· 

Appellant's Brief, p. 14. As we have noted, see supra n. 5, the 

magistrate specifically found to the contrary and we have found 

nothing in the record to indicate that this factual finding is 

clearly erroneous. Maez, 877 F.2d at 1455-1456 n. 15. Unlik~ 

defendant Royer, who was told he was being taken to the security 

office and did not respond, Ziebarth was asked if he would go and 

said yes. II R. 43. 

14 

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We shall assume, without deciding, that Ziebarth's conduct 

was no longer consensual when Palmer told him he was going to be 

detained until it could be determined to whom the money belonged. 8 

Ziebarth argues that at this point he was under arrest without 

probable cause. We disagree. Ziebarth was being temporarily 

detained only so that Palmer could confirm the explanation about 

the money he said he had. Palmer told Ziebarth that he would be 

detained only a few minutes. Then they went to the security 

office, located approximately 200 feet away in th~ main terminal. 

The entire encounter took place in public. 

A temporary detention for questioning is "permissible because 

of the 'public interest involved in the suppression of illegal 

transactions in drugs or of any other serious crime.'" Florida v. 

Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5 (per curiam) (quoting Roye~, 460 U.S. at 

498-499 1opinion of White, J.))~ Such investigative detentions 

must "last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose 

of the stop." Royer, 460 U.S. at 500. And the scope of such a 

detention must be "carefully tailored to its under"lying 

justification." Id. Here, Ziebarth's detention was a temporary 

investigatory one, lasting only appoximately eight minutes, and 

was carefully tailored to its underlying justification. 

It remains to be determined whether the temporary detention 

of Ziebarth was justified. Temporary detentions for questioning 

may be justified if "'there is articulable suspicion that a person 

has committed or is about to commit a crime.'" Florida v. 

8 

The magistrate found that consent had 

while the trial court found (as the 

Ziebarth's conduct was consensual until he 

bolted. IR. 55, P~ 3~ 

15 

ceased at this point, 

government argues) that 

dropped his bag and 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 15 
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. at 5 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 

498) (opinion of White, J.). In United States v. Sokolow, 109 

S.Ct. 1581 (1989), the Court stated that the concept of reasonable 

suspicion cannot be reduced to a neat set of legal rules, but 

rather, depends on the ''totality of the citcumstances -- the whole 

picture." Id. at 1585. The Fourth Amendment requires "some 

minimal level of objective justification" for making a stop and 

the officer must be able to "articulate something more than an 

'inchoate and unpar ticular i zed suspicion or· 'hunch' . ' " Id. 

(quoting INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984) and Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). "That level of suspicion is 

considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of 

the evidence." Id. 

Under pokolow, we think Palmer had reasonable suspicion to 

detain Ziebarth. After deplaning Ziebarth repeatedly went to a 

group of phones and did not appear to be talking. He appeared 

nervous to Palmer and had no luggage besides his shoulder bag. 

After meeting Bell, who was carrying a package in a rolled-up levi 

jacket, they walked to the east side of the building, turned 

around, and walked back to the west side. Ziebarth was again 

looking around and Bell turned around. When Bell saw Palmer and 

Whittaker approaching, he turned away from Ziebarth, apparently 

trying to conceal the fact that they had been together. Upon 

being told Palmer was a narcotics officer, Ziebarth became 

"visibly nervous" and started looking around. Palmer said that 

when Ziebarth went to unzip his pockets his hand was shaking 

badly. And when asked to explain the money he said he was 

16 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 16 
carrying, Ziebarth said that he was going to use it to pay an 

attorney in Hawaii, the place from which he had just come. 

It is true, as in Sokolow, that any one of these. facts is 

"not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite 

consistent with inriocent travel.'' Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1586. 

But even wholly lawful conduct may justify the suspicion that 

criminal activity is afoot. Id. at 1586-1587. We hold that 

Palmer had a reasonable suspicion that Ziebarth was transporting 

illegal drugs and that ~he scope of the detention was reasonable. 

When Ziebarth dropped his bag and ran down the concourse, probable· 

cause was supplied for his arrest. The cocaine was thereafter 

validly seized in a search of Ziebarth's person, incident to his 

arrest. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The 

detention and arrest of Ziebarth did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment and we find no error in the trial court's denial of his· 

motion to suppress. 

B. 

The Detention of Bell's Package 

and Bell's Arrest 

The magistrate found that Steed's initial encounter with 

Bell, whom he questioned about Ziebarth and the package he was 

carrying, was a permissible police-citizen encounter, implicating 

no FoGrth Amendment rights. IR. 50, p. 35. We agree. 

When Steed and Whittaker took Bell's package, however, a 

seizure occurred. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707-709 

17 

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(1983). 9 In Place, the Court recognized that "some brief 

detentions of personal effects may be so minimally intrusive of 

Fourth Amendment interests that strong countervailing governmental 

interests will justify a seizure based only on specific 

articulable. facts that the property contains contraband or 

evidence· of a crime." Id. at 706. The Court applied the 

principles of Terry, reasoning that when the nature and extent of 

a detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth 

Amendment interests, "the opposing law enforcement interests 

support a seizure based on less than probable cause." Id. at 703. 

We think the detention of Bell's package was such that the 

seizure required only a "reasonable, articulable suspicion, 

premised on objective facts" that the package contained ·contraband 

or evidence of a crime. Id. at 702. Bell was not travelling, so 

there was no intrusion on any travel plans as in some cases. See 

~' id. at 708. The detention lasted only some five minutes. 

Id. at 709. Bell was told that the package was being taken to a 

security office arid that it would take only a few minutes for the 

dog to go over the package. III R. 17-18. The seizure required 

only re~sonable articulable suspicion. 

Under Sokolow, officers Steed and Whittaker had the requisite 

"minimum level of objective justification" to seize Bell's 

package. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585. As the magistrate reasoned, 

Ziebarth's conduct could be added to Bell's, up to the point at 

9 

Both the magistrate and the trial ·judge found that Bell had 

not been detained. IR. 50 p.36; IR. 55 p.6. Bell was.given the 

choice of taking a receipt for the package or accompanying 

Whittaker to the security offic~. III R. 17. The findings are 

not clearly erroneous. · 

18 

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which Whittaker left Ziebarth to assist Steed with Bell, for the 

purpose of determining whether reasonable suspicion existed. 

Ziebarth and Bell walked to the east side of the building 

together, turned around, and walked back again. Bell turned, and 

when he saw Palmer and Whittaker approaching, turned away from 

Ziebarth, apparently trying to conceal the fact that they had been 

together. Steed testified that Bell's "level of nervousness 

seemed to increase dramatically" when he was told that Steed was a 

narcotics officer. III R. 52.· Bell turned his body in an attempt· 

to keep the package away from Steed. III R. 50. Taken together, 

see Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1586, these facts supplied reasonable 

suspicion to seize Bell's package for a limited examination by the 

dog .. See Place, 462 U.S. at 706-708. Accord United States v. 

Stone, 866 F.2d 359, 362-363 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The detention lasted only a few minutes and was minimally 

intrusive. It did not exceed the permlssible limits of a Terrytype investiative stop. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708-710; Florida 

v. Royer, 460 U.S. at 506 (opinion of White, J.) ("If [trained 

narcotics detection dogs] had been used, Royer and his luggage 

could have been momentarily dBtained while this investigative 

procedure was carried out."). When Blue alerted to the package, 

see III R. 25~26, probable cause was supplied for Bell's arrest. 

The package was then searched incident to Bell's arrest. Chimel 

v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-763 (1969). The temporary 

investigative detention of Bell's package for a limited dog sniff, 

Bell's subsequent arrest, and the search of the package incident 

19 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 19 
to the arrest, did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Again there 

was no error in the denial of the motion to suppress. 10 

C. 

The Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Bell 

Bell was found guilty of attempt to possess a controlled 

substance with intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 84l(a}(l) and 846 (1982). He argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction. The evidence showed that 

Ziebarth possessed ten and one half ounces of cocaine and had a 

piece of scratch paper with $13,800 written on it. VII R. 16. 

Bell had $13,800. III R. 30. The trial judge could reasonably 

.infer that Bell was going to purchase Ziebarth's cocaine and there 

was testimony that such an amount of cocaine would not be for 

persohal use, but insi~ad, for distribution. VII R. 17. Viewed 

in the light most favorable to the government, the evid'ence was 

sufficient for the trial court to find Bell ·guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. United States v. Veroz, 740 F.2d 772, 774-775 

(10th Cir. 1984). 

AFFIRMED. 

10 

The government argues, and the magistrate a_nd trial cour·t 

found, see IR. 50, p. 37; IR. 55, p. 6, that Bell consented to 

the search of the package. See footnote 3, supra. This provides 

an additional ground for the search of the package. We need not 

discuss the issue in detail, however. Probable cause for Bell's 

arrest was supplied when Blue alerted.to the package. The package 

was only five or ten feet away from Bell when he was arrested and 

was properly searched incident to his arrest. 

20 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 20 
EBEL, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 

The majority has carefully and objectively detailed the 

relevant facts in these combined appeals. Although I join the 

portion of the majority opinion affirming the conviction of 

defendant Ziebarth, I respectfully dissent from the majority's 

conclusion that the officers had a "reasonable, articulable 

suspicion'' ju~tifying the seizure1 of defendant Bell's package. 

The district court adopted the magistrate's report and 

recommendation, concluding that the officers had a "reasonable 

suspicion to believe the package contained either narcotics or 

money." R. I at 36, 55. On the basis of Bell's total conduct, 

the ~ajority affirms the district court'i legai conclusion 2 that 

1 _ Bell's decision to surrender his package to the officers was 

not voluntary. Originally, Bell told officer Steed that he did 

not want him to inspect the package. III R. at 43. Officer Steed 

then summorted officer Whittaker. III R. at 52. In response to 

Bell's inqairies about whether the officers could legally detain 

hjs package and subject it to a dog sniff, officer Whittaker told 

Bell that they could. III R. at 16-17. Officer Whittaker told 

Bell he could either surrender the package in exchange for a 

- receipt, or accompany it to the terminal. III R. at 17. Because 

·sell reasonably believed he haq no choice but to comply at this 

point, his. consent to the seizure was not voluntary. See United 

States v~ Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, ·1453-54 (10th Cir. 1985). 

Although Bell retained physical possession of his package while 

walking to the terminal, the actual seizure occurred in the 

·parking lot once the officers announced their intention to take 

control of the package. 

2 Our review of the district court's ultimate conclusion that 

there was reasonable suspicion to seize the package is a de novo 

review. "Whether reasonable suspicion ... exists to justify a 

seizuie is a mixed question of fact and law. The findings with 

respect to the historical facts are reviewed under the clearly 

erroneous standard; the ultimate conclusion, however is subject to 

de novo review." United States v. Campbell, 843 F.2d 1089, 1092 

(8th Cir. 1988); People of the Territory of Guam v. Ichiyasu, 838 

F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1988) (same). 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 21 
the facts ''supplied reasonable suspicion to seize Bell's package 

for a limited examination by the dog." IR. at 36; Maj. op. at 

19. Reviewing all of the objective facts introduced at trial 

together, I do not believe that reasonable suspicion is 

established in this case. Of course, I recognize that individual 

acts consistent with innocent travel, when viewed together, may 

give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See 

United Stat~s v. Sokolow, U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 

(1989). Nevertheless, I believe a review of Bell's conduct 

c1emcnstrates that this is not ·such a case. 

After Ziebarth met Bell in the lounge, they rode down the 

escalator together. R. II at 10. Evidently, on the way down they 

turned away from e~ch other and stopped speaking. II R. at 10. 

The defendants failure to sustain conversation is not particularly 

suspicious behavior. Cf., Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438·, 440-41 

(1980) (agent's hunch tha~ defendant and companion were attempting 

to conceal the fact that they were traveling together insufficient 

to support "reasonable and articulable suspicion" justifying 

seizure of detendant). 

Similarly, the defendants walk through the airport was not 

suspicious. They walked first to the east end of the airport 

terminal and then turned and walked to the west end. Once 

outside, they returned to the east end of the terminal. II R. at 

lJ. This behavior cannot be characterized as strange or peculiar, 

particularly in light of the officers testimony at trial that the 

terminal was small. III R. at 33-34. Occasionally they were 

"looking around" and looking over their shoulders. III R. at 13, 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 22 
40. Because that type of conduct is commonly obse_rved at 

airports, it cannot fairly be considered suspicious. 

Officer Whittaker then testified that while following the 

defendants toward the parking lot, "Mr. Bell turned around and 

noticed us walking up behind them. At that time he held b~ck from 

Hi. Ziebarth, about .five, ten feet behind him, and then turned and 

started walking to the east, as we had passed Mr. Bell and 

actually approached Mr. Ziebarth." III R. at 14-15. Given the 

numerous imaginable re~sons why two people might separate and walk 

in opposite directions in an airport parking lot, see United 

Stat~s v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1586 (1989), -it troubles me to 

attribute wrongful motive to this type of conduct simply because 

officer Whittaker testified that Bell did this after "noticing" 

the officers following them. There was no testimony that the 

de!endants ran, quickened their pace, or btherwise attempted to 

flee. Cf., Florida v. Rodriguez, '469 U.S .. 1, 3-5 (1984) 

(reasonable, "articulable suspicion" based in part on defendant rs 

unsuccessful attempt to run). Characterizing such behavior as 

"suspect" will in too many cases permit a finding of a 

"reasonable, articulable suspicion 11 • of er iminal activity based 

only on the subjective beliefs of an investigating officer. 

Reliance on officer Steed's testimony concerning Bell's 

"nervousness" and increased breathing raises the same problem. 

III R. at 51-52. Such a characterization is too dependent on the 

subjective perceptions or "hunches" that may be colored by the 

subsequent investigation. That, combined with the fact that it is 

natural to display some degree of perceptible nervousness when one 

3 

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is stopped and questioned by a police officer, convinces me that 

this cannot be cast as the type of behavior giving rise to a 

"reasonable, articulable suspicion." 

For me, the critical distinction b~tween the detention of 

Ziebarth and the seizure of Bell's package is their respective 

responses to the officers' questions. Although Ziebarth made a 

false representation to the officers about a matter material to 

the suspected criminal activity, Bell did not. Ziebarth told 

officers Palmer and Whittaker that he did not have large amounts 

of money~ but he later acknowledged to officer Palmer that he was 

. h 3 carrying about $7,000 .1n cas . II R. at 41. Although Ziebarth 

insisted this was not· a lot of money for him, qy reasonable 

standards it was a large sum. This additional fact, 4 when added 

to the other facts, did give officer Palmer a ''reasonable, 

articulable suspicion based on objective facts" that Zeibarth was 

engaged in criminal activity justifying his detention. 5 

3 Because officer Whittaker had departed from the Ziebarth 

interrogation prior to the discovery of the $7,000, Ziebarth's 

misrepresentation cannot be aggregated with Bell's own conduct for 

purposes of determining whether agents Whittaker and Steed had a 

"reas·onable, articulable suspicion" justifying the seizure of 

Bell's package. II R. at ~O. 

4 While the mere possession of large sums of cash alone might not 

suggest criminal activity, Ziebarth had been informed that he ~as 

being questioned as part of a narcotics investigation. Therefore, 

at the time he made the misstatement of fact to the'officers he 

was on notice that it was related to the suspected criminal 

activity. 

5 See United States v. Cooper, 873 F.2d 269, 275 (11th Cir.), 

cer~denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 118 (1989). (fact that 

defendant liedto. officer about the number of pieces of luggage 

she was traveling with contributed to reasonable suspicion that 

defendant's luggage contained narcotics). 

4 

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By contrast, Bell did not make inconsistent or demonstrably 

untrue statements to _the police officers before his package was 

seized. Officer Steed asked Bell if he was a friend of the "other 

gentleman'', while pointing at Ziebarth. Bell said no. Officer 

Steed then asked Bell, "Aren't you a friend of his, aren't you 

with him or a friend of his?" Bell said "not really." III R. at 

50. This was not the kind of material misrepresentation that 

Ziebarth made. Given the ambiguity of officer Steed's second 

question, Bell's two responses do not directly contradict one 

anoth~r. 6 Moreover, the officers had no objective evidence that 

either statement was false. 

Finally, officer Steed testified that Bell was turning his 

right shoulder in an attempt to hide the jacket. that was covering 

the package. Once again, resting a finding of a· "reasonable, 

articulable suspicion" on this type of conduct is too dependent on 

the subjective characteri~ations of an investigating officer. 

A harmless readjustment of a jacket can become a furtive attempt 

to conceal when viewed with the benefit of hindsight. 

I recognize that the majority considered all of those facts 

together, rather than in isolation, in concluding that there was 

a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" justifying the seizure of 

Bell's package. However, even considered as a whole, I do not see 

6 Officer Whittaker testified that while escorting Bell from the 

parking 16t back to the terminal building, Bell told him that 

Ziebarth "was an old friend." III R. at 18. This statement does 

contradict Bell's first statement to officer Steed denying that 

Ziebarth was a friend of his. However, because Bell made that 

statement after the officers seized th~ package, it cannot be 

considered in deciding whether there was a "reasonable, 

articulable suspicion" justifying the seizure. 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 25 
that Bell's behavior was any different from that of thousands of 

other travelers who pass daily through air terminals. Likewise, 

his !esponses and behavior upon being confronted by the police 

o£ficers was no different from that which qould reasonably be 

expected of a law abiding citizen. Thus, I do not believe that 

the government established grounds for a "reasonable, articulable 

suspicion'' that Bell was engaged in criminal activity at the time 

his package was seized. 

I have not found ~ny cases holding that there was a 

''ieasonable, articulable suspicion" sufficient to justify an 

investigative seizure based on facts as neutral as those involved 

in Bell's case. 7 To the con~rary, as the cases cited by the 

majority suggest, a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" is 

typically based on behavior far more suggestive of criminal 

activity than that present here. 8 Therefore, I respectfully 

7 See United States~- Gooding, 695 F,2d 78, 82-84 (4th Cir. 

1982), and United States v. Jefferson, 650 F.2d 854, 856-58 (6th 

Cir. 1981), where seizures we~e invalidated upon facts similar to 

those here. 

The majority relies primaiily on United States v. Sokolow, 

U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). In Sokolow,.the defendant paidfor two round-trip tickets costing $2,100 in twenty-dollar bills 

in order to travel from Hawaii to Miami, a source city for illegal 

drugs, in July. Id. at 1586. Sokolow traveled twenty hours round 

trip, with only carry-on luggage, and spent a mere forty-eight 

hours in Miami. Id. Sokolow appeared nervous and was apparently 

traveling under analias. Id. The Supreme Court stated that 

Sokolow's cash purchase of aticket, and his travel from Honolulu 

to Miami for such a short stay were both "out of the ordinary." 

Id. at 1586. The Sokolow Court held that these factors, in 

conjunction with Sokolow's other more neutral conduct, supported a 

"reasonable suspicion." · Id. Because I do not find any of Bell's 

behavior "out of the ordinary", I conclude that Sokolow's course 

of conduct is much more suspicious than the observed actions of 

Bell. 

The majority also relies on United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 

[Footnote continued ... ] 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-1396 Document: 010110192609 Date Filed: 12/22/1989 Page: 26 
dissent from the majority's decision affirming the denial of 

Bell's suppression motion. 

[. . footnote continued] 

696 (1983). Place was the first case in which the Supreme Court 

specifically extended the "reasonable, articulable suspicion" 

standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to brief, 

investigative seizures of a traveler's luggage. Id. at 706. 

However, the Place Court faund the seizuie there to be 

unreasonable becaus& of the length of the detention without ever 

~iscussing whether the investigating officers had a ''reasonable, 

articul~ble suspicion'' that Place's luggage contained narcotics. 

See id. at 708-10. Therefore, I do not believe that Place can be 

relied on to conclude that officers Whittaker and Steed had a 

"reasonable, articulable suspicion" that Bell's package contained 

either harcotics or cash for the purchase of narcotics-. Moreover, 

even if Place is read as implicitly recognizing a "reasonable, 

articulable suspicion'', I believe Place's actions in listing fake 

addresses on the tags to his checked luggage is more suspicious 

than Bell's apparently innocent activities. Id. at 698. 

Finally, the majority relies on United States v. Stone, 866 

F.2d 35~ (10th Cir. 1989). In Stone, this court held that the 

officer who stopped Stone 1or speeding had a reasonable suspicion 

justifying detention of the car for inspection by a narcotics dog. 

Id. at 362. The officer knew that Stone had been Stopped earlier 

and that a fragrant oil commonly used to mask the smell of 

narcotics had been discovered. Id. at 361-62. Second, the 

officer knew that a DEA computerhad indicated that Stone was 

suspected of drug involvement and was associated with known drug 

dealers. Id. at 362. Again, the facts in Stone were more 

suggestiveof criminal activity than those leading up to the 

seizure of Bell'~ package. 

7 

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