Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01153/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-01153-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sheri Gaffney
Defendant
Hud
Defendant
James Karim Muhammad
Plaintiff
North Richmond Senior Housing
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JAMES KARIM MUHAMMAD,

Plaintiff,

v.

NORTH RICHMOND SENIOR HOUSING, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-01153-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

DISMISS

Dkt. No. 18

INTRODUCTION 

 Plaintiff James Karim Muhammad has filed a complaint against defendants North 

Richmond Senior Housing and Sheri Gaffney (“defendants”) alleging elder abuse, wrongful 

eviction, seizure of property without just compensation, and discrimination. Defendants move to 

dismiss Muhammad’s claims because they arise from a state unlawful detainer action that 

Muhammad has already tried, and failed, to remove to federal court and which resulted in his 

eviction in state court, that Muhammad has failed to state a claim of discrimination, and that this 

court lacks jurisdiction to hear Muhammad’s claims. I agree and GRANT defendants’ motion to 

dismiss WITH PREJUDICE. I VACATE the hearing because the legal issues are clear and further 

argument will not be helpful. 

BACKGROUND 

 Muhammad’s complaint in this case is one in a series of attempts to obtain relief from an 

unlawful detainer action filed against him in Superior Court. N. Richmond v. Muhammad, Case 

No. RS13-1488 Superior Court for Contra Costa County. 

(1) Muhammad removed the unlawful detainer case to federal court on January 21, 2014, 

but Judge Armstrong remanded it as removal was not timely and the court lacked subject 

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matter jurisdiction, N. Richmond Senior Hous. v. Muhammad, No. 14-cv-0299-SBA, 2014 

WL 595867 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 02, 2014); 

(2) He attempted to stay the unlawful detainer case by filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, but 

the Bankruptcy Court concluded that defendants could pursue the unlawful detainer case 

without violating the stay, In re James Karim Muhammad, Bankruptcy Court, Northern 

Dist. Cal., Case No. 14-41311 CN; 

(3) He filed an ex parte motion for an emergency protective order in the Northern District 

but this motion was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, In re James Karim Muhammad, 

Case No. 15-mc-80070-JST, Dkt. No 3; and 

(4) He removed the case a second time on February 10, 2015, but I remanded again, for 

lack of federal jurisdiction and because Muhammad’s claims were frivolous. Muhammad

v. N. Richmond Senior Hous., No. 15-cv-00629-WHO, 2015 WL 1154209, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 13, 2015). 

 Muhammad then filed this action on March 9, 2016, again challenging the legality of the 

unlawful detainer claim brought against him in Superior Court, and alleging a “class of one” equal 

protection claim. Complaint Dkt. No. 1. On April 21, 2016, Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Laporte 

issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that this case be dismissed with leave to 

amend on the basis that Muhammad had failed to allege sufficient facts to state a “class of one” 

equal protection claim. Dkt. No. 9. I adopted the Report and Recommendation on June 24, 2016, 

dismissed Muhammad’s claim, granted leave to amend, and advised Muhammad to “describe the 

facts that lead him to believe that he has been intentionally treated differently than others and why 

there is no rational justification for difference in treatment.” Dkt. No. 13 at 1. Muhammad filed 

his First Amended Complaint on July 28, 2014 and defendants moved to dismiss on August 24, 

2014. I now GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss because this court lacks subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear Muhammad’s claims and Muhammad has failed to allege an equal protection 

violation. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a complaint 

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if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.” See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A claim is facially plausible 

when the plaintiff pleads facts that “allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

(citation omitted). There must be “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully.” Id. While courts do not require “heightened fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff 

must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” See Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555, 570. 

In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, the 

Court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). However, the court 

is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of 

fact, or unreasonable inferences.” See In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 

2008).

 If the court dismisses the complaint, it “should grant leave to amend even if no request to 

amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured 

by the allegation of other facts.” See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). In 

making this determination, the court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of 

undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous 

amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” See 

Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.1989). 

DISCUSSION 

 The majority of Muhammad’s claims aim to challenge the outcome of the unlawful 

detainer case filed against him in Superior Court. First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 7-35, Dkt. 

No. 16. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, district courts do not have jurisdiction to hear claims 

of this kind. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of 

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in 

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federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings in the state 

court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a forbidden de 

facto appeal.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003). Muhammad’s claims 

attempting to relitigate the merits of his unlawful detainer case, challenging the validity and 

constitutionality of the Superior Court proceedings, and contesting the validity of defendants’ 

enforcement of the judgment against him must be dismissed. 

 Muhammad has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain his remaining equal protection 

claim as he has not alleged facts indicating that there was no rational basis for the difference in 

treatment between him and the other tenants at North Richmond Senior Housing. A “class of one” 

equal protection claim arises when a plaintiff is “intentionally treated differently than others 

similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. Of 

Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). In my order adopting Judge Laporte’s Report 

and Recommendation, I suggested that Muhammad provide additional details and facts explaining 

what “leads him to believe that he has been treated differently than others and why there is no 

rational justification for this difference in treatment.” Dkt. No. 13 at 1. 

 In his First Amended Complaint Muhammad alleges that the defendants “discriminated 

against plaintiff, James karim Muhammad by singling him out from the other approximately 49 

residents to pay $684.00 per month as rent while only requiring the remaining 49 residents to pay 

30% of their income as rent.” FAC ¶ 38. While this allegation indicates that Muhammad was 

treated differently than the other residents at North Richmond, it does not indicate that these 

residents were similarly situated, or that there was no rational basis for the difference in rents 

among the residents. 

 A letter from Sheri Gaffney, which Muhammad attached to his original complaint, 

indicates that North Richmond residents’ rent is determined on a case-by-case basis, based on their 

family income and composition, and that residents must comply with HUD requirements to obtain 

monthly rental assistance. Dkt. No. 1 at 19. In the letter, sent to Muhammad shortly before his 

rent increased, Gaffney advises Muhammad to “Please visit the site office within 7 days of receipt 

of this notice to sign and receive a copy of the HUD-50059.” Id. She also notes that this form 

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“must be signed,” and explains that it “provides the information on your income that we used to 

calculate your new rent and amount of rental assistance, if any, that HUD pays monthly on your 

behalf.” Id. This letter indicates that the rents at North Richmond are determined on a case-bycase basis, based on the information residents supply in their HUD-50059 forms, in line with HUD 

guidelines. It also indicates that Muhammad had not yet supplied this necessary information 

shortly before his rent increased. Id.

 While it cannot be conclusively determined from Muhammad’s pleadings, the documents 

Muhammad attaches to his own complaint indicate that his rent possibly increased because he 

failed to timely submit a HUD-50059 form to his landlord. Muhammad’s failure to submit a 

necessary form would certainly be a rational basis for North Richmond to raise Muhammad’s rent 

but not others’. Further, as the letter from Gaffney indicates that rent and the level of HUD 

assistance is determined on an individualized basis, Muhammad’s allegation that his rent increased 

while others did not is not sufficient to state a “class of one” discrimination claim, as there are 

many reasons that rent would vary among the residents. 

 Muhammad’s conclusory allegation that defendants’ discriminated against him and singled 

him out with no rational basis is not sufficient to state a claim for relief. See In re Gilead Scis. 

Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (The court is not required to accept as true 

“allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 

inferences.”). He did not respond to defendants’ motion to dismiss on this issue, which I consider 

to be a concession that his real intent in filing this case was to attack the underlying eviction, 

which for the reasons stated earlier and in the other cases he has filed he cannot do in federal 

court. Muhammad has failed to state an equal protection claim and his claim must be dismissed 

under 12(b)(6). 

 CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, I GRANT defendants’ motion to dismiss Muhammad’s 

First Amended Complaint. 

Muhammad’s claims are dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. I have already granted 

Muhammad leave to amend his complaint. In determining whether to grant further leave to amend 

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a court should consider factors such as “the presence or absence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory 

motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the 

opposing party and futility of the proposed amendment.” See Moore v. Kayport Package Express, 

885 F.2d 531, 538 (9th Cir.1989). Muhammad’s complaint appears to be another in a series of 

attempts to appeal or avoid the unfavorable unlawful detainer action brought against him in 

Superior Court. I, and several of my colleagues in this district, have already determined that he 

cannot litigate these claims in federal court. He has failed to allege sufficient facts to sustain his 

claims despite leave to amend. I conclude that further amendment would be futile. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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