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Parties Involved:
Edwin Allen Hill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

,/" 

J PI LED 

Uciited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 111990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v . 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-5133 

) (D.C. No. 86-CR-112-C) 

EDWIN ALLEN HILL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) (N.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted withput oral argument. 

Defendant-appellant Edwin Allen Hill appeals from the 

dist rict court's denial of his motion seeking sentence 

modification pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a} . 1 In the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

no t be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36. 3 . 

1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 was amended by the Comprehensive Crime 

(Continued on next page} 

Appellate Case: 89-5133 Document: 010110038268 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 1 
, ,-

district court, defendant pled guilty to three charges including: 

1) violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 for conspiracy to distribute 

heroin and cocaine; 2) violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 for conspiracy 

to impair and impede the Internal Revenue Service, and 3) 

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) for possession of schedule II 

narcotics with intent to distribute. 

On September 2, 1987, defendant was sentenced to serve 

concurrent prison terms on each of the counts. In addition, the 

court imposed a ten-year special parole term for the violation of 

21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l). The court also assessed a $50 special fee 

for each count pursuant to 18 u.s.c. § 3013(a)(2)(A). Defendant 

now seeks modification of his sentence, asserting the district 

court imposed both the special parole term and fee assessments 

without statutory authority. We affirm. 

In Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980), the Supreme 

Court held 21 u.s.c. § 846 does not authorize the imposition of 

special parole terms for persons convicted of drug-related 

conspiracies even though special parole is 

violations of the target offense involved. 2 

(Continued from previous page) 

sanctioned for 

Id. at 387-401. 

Control Act of 1984. See Pub.L. No. 98-473 § 215(b). The 

amendment does not apply, however, to offenses committed prior to 

November 1, 1987. 

2 Because the offenses committed in this case occurred in 1985 

and 1986, we review the applicable penalty provisions of sections 

846 and 84l(a)(l) as they existed prior to enactment of the 

amendments contained in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 which 

became effective on November 1, 1987. See United States v. 

Garcia, 879 F.2d 803, 804 (10th Cir. 1989}(explaining history of 

the penalty provisions of section 841); United States v. 

Guilmartin, 727 F. Supp. 134, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(sentencing 

guidelines eliminate distinction between penalty provisions of 

sections 846 and 841.) 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5133 Document: 010110038268 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 2 
Therefore, imposing special parole as regards the section 846 

c o nspiracy conviction in this case would be unauthorized. United 

States v. Quintana, 673 F.2d 296, 298 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

457 U.S. 1135 (1982). 

However, the judgment and commitment filed in this case 

c l early shows the special parole term was imposed only as to the 

vi o lation of section 84l(a)(l). Under the penalty provisions of 

section 841 in effect at the time these offenses were committed, a 

special parole term was not only authorized, it was mandatory. 3 

Defendant's claim that the judgment and commitment is somehow 

ambiguous because the sentences run concurrently is without merit. 

Consequently, we uphold the district court's ruling on this issue. 

Likewise, defendant's argument that the special assessment 

statute does not apply to his convictions is without merit. The 

special assessment statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3013, went into effect on 

November 12, 1984. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 1405(a), 

October 12, 1984. It applies to offenses committed after that 

date. As stated, the offenses in this case were committed in 1985 

and 1986. Therefore, the assessments were appropriate. 

Accordingly, the order of the District Court for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

3 See 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(B) (1984); Garcia, 879 F.2d at 804-05. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5133 Document: 010110038268 Date Filed: 07/11/1990 Page: 3