Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04624/USCOURTS-ca4-08-04624-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerred Mondee Jarmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 08-4624

JERRED MONDEE JARMON,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Durham.

James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief District Judge.

(1:07-cr-00268-JAB-1)

Argued: January 29, 2010

Decided: February 26, 2010

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Davis joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Thomas Norman Cochran, OFFICE OF THE

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A. DeFranco, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North CaroAppeal: 08-4624 Doc: 40 Filed: 02/26/2010 Pg: 1 of 8
lina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Anna Mills Wagoner, United

States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

Jerred Mondee Jarmon pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. Jarmon challenges only his sentence on

appeal. He argues that the district court erred in counting his

prior North Carolina conviction for larceny from the person

as a "crime of violence" under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines"). We affirm.

I.

On May 5, 2007, police officers in Durham, North Carolina, responding to a citizen’s tip that she had observed a

young man with a gun, approached Jarmon and two others. As

the officers approached, Jarmon attempted to flee. The officers detained him and noticed a handgun protruding from his

pocket. Further investigation revealed that the pistol had been

stolen from a police officer and had traveled in interstate commerce.

A federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Jarmon with possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006). Jarmon’s

predicate felony was a 2002 North Carolina conviction for

larceny from the person.

Jarmon pled guilty to being a felon in possession. At his

sentencing hearing, Jarmon objected to the district court’s

determination that his 2002 conviction constituted a crime of

violence for sentencing purposes. The district court overruled

the objection and sentenced Jarmon to 40 months in prison

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and three years of supervised release. Jarmon timely noted

this appeal.

II.

The Guidelines state that a sentencing court shall assign a

felon in possession of a firearm a base offense level of 20 if

"the defendant committed any part of the instant offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of . . . a crime of

violence." U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A). A "crime of violence"

is any offense punishable by more than one year in prison,

that

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another, or

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,

involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2009) (emphasis added). We review de

novo the district court’s interpretation of these provisions. See

United States v. Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 286 (4th Cir. 2002).

To obtain a larceny conviction in North Carolina, the prosecution must prove that the defendant "(1) took the property of

another; (2) carried it away; (3) without the owner’s consent,

and (4) with the intent to deprive the owner of the property

permanently." State v. Rawlinson, 679 S.E.2d 878, 882 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Larceny

from the person requires proof of an additional element: "‘the

property stolen must be in the immediate presence of and

under the protection or control of the victim at the time the

property is taken.’" State v. Carter, 650 S.E.2d 650, 654 (N.C.

Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Barnes, 478 S.E.2d 188, 190

(N.C. 1996)).

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Accordingly, "larceny from the person" does not include as

one of its elements the threatened, attempted, or actual use of

physical force; nor does the Guideline list this crime as a

crime of violence. Therefore, neither § 4B1.2(a)(1) nor the

first clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2) applies here. Rather, to constitute

a crime of violence, larceny from the person must qualify

under the "otherwise" clause of § 4B1.2(a)(2), i.e., it must

"otherwise involve[ ] conduct that presents a serious potential

risk of physical injury to another." Id.

Jarmon acknowledges that six years ago, in United States

v. Smith, 359 F.3d 662 (4th Cir. 2004), we held that larceny

from the person constitutes a crime of violence for sentencing

purposes because it presents a risk of violent confrontation,

and therefore a serious risk of physical injury. Id. at 665-66.

Jarmon argues, however, that the Supreme Court’s recent

decision in Begay v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008),

effectively overruled Smith.

In Begay, the Supreme Court held that conviction under a

state statute prohibiting driving under the influence of alcohol

was not a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal

Act ("ACCA").*See id. at 1588. The Court reasoned that Congress included the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson,

extortion, and the use of explosives to "limit[ ] the crimes that

[the second] clause . . . covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples

themselves." Id. at 1585. The Court found that the enumerated

felonies "typically involve purposeful, ‘violent,’ and ‘aggressive’ conduct," id. at 1586, and thus distinguished those

crimes from offenses, like driving under the influence of alco-

*The ACCA defines "violent felony" in a manner substantively identical to the definition of a "crime of violence" in § 4B1.2. Compare 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. We have therefore

held that precedents evaluating the ACCA apply with equal force to

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. See, e.g., United States v. Seay, 553 F.3d 732, 739 (4th

Cir. 2009). 

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hol, that "impose strict liability, criminalizing conduct in

respect to which the offender need not have had any criminal

intent at all," id. at 1586-87.

Begay thus requires a sentencing court, in determining

whether an offense falls under the "otherwise" clause, to

engage in a different analysis than that followed in Smith. The

Begay Court held that the sentencing court must "decide

whether, as a categorical matter," the prior offense "is

‘roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed[,]’

to the enumerated offenses." United States v. White, 571 F.3d

365, 370 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1585).

To assess whether the prior offense is similar "in kind" to the

enumerated offenses, "we must . . . determine whether the

statute at issue involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive

conduct, such that the offense can be found similar to the enumerated crimes." United States v. Roseboro, 551 F.3d 226,

234 (4th Cir. 2009). To determine whether a prior offense

presents the same "degree of risk" as an enumerated offense,

we examine whether "the prior crime, like the enumerated

offenses, creates an ‘immediate, serious, and foreseeable

physical risk[ ] that arise[s] concurrently with the commission

of the crime[ ]’ itself." White, 571 F.3d at 370 (quoting United

States v. Thornton, 554 F.3d 443, 449 (4th Cir. 2009)) (alterations in original).

III.

Jarmon contends that our holding in Smith cannot stand

after Begay because larceny from the person does not involve

purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. Jarmon argues

that this must be true because the addition of "violence" to a

larceny-from-the-person offense would transform that offense

into a robbery.

Jarmon’s arguments fail. Of course, violence is not an element of larceny from the person; if it were, U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.2(a)(1) would apply. The relevant question under the

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"otherwise" clause in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), which applies

here, is not whether the offense involves as much violence as

robbery, but whether it typically involves the type of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct that would support an

inference that this offender would be more dangerous with a

gun. See Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1587.

We conclude that larceny from the person typically

involves such conduct. The crime is purposeful because it is

not a "strict liability" crime devoid of criminal intent. See id.

And while larceny from the person entails less violence than

robbery, that fact does not prove that larceny from the person

is nonviolent. Indeed, Jarmon acknowledges that larceny from

the person can involve violence because it encompasses forceful takings like the snatching of a purse from a shoulder. See

State v. Robertson, 531 S.E.2d 490, 493 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).

The act of snatching a purse (or any other property) from the

victim’s person may not inflict severe pain or injury, but it

may do so, and in any event it is certainly aggressive. A

defendant willing to confront his victims so directly is likely

more dangerous with a gun than a defendant whose only prior

crime is a strict liability offense like drunk driving. See

Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1588.

Jarmon next contends that offenders typically accomplish

larceny from the person by stealth, not aggression. But this

argument applies with equal force to the enumerated offense

of burglary. Indeed, courts considering this question after

Begay have found larceny from the person similar to burglary,

as both crimes "raise[ ] the possibility of a violent confrontation between the victim and perpetrator or someone who witnesses the offense." See, e.g., United States v. Thrower, 584

F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that larceny from the person is "surely purposeful" and "is as inherently violent and

aggressive as burglary").

Nevertheless, Jarmon asserts that the comparison to burglary is "illusory" for two reasons. First, he maintains that

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burglary entails more violence than larceny from the person

because, unlike larceny from the person, burglary requires the

offender to violate the sanctity of the victim’s home, while the

victim is present, with intent to commit a felony therein. Second, Jarmon contends that burglary requires breaking and

entering, and thus destruction of property, which larceny from

the person does not.

These arguments rest on a faulty premise. Jarmon compares

larceny from the person with the North Carolina offense of

first degree burglary. But the Supreme Court has expressly

rejected the contention that the meaning of burglary "depend[s] on the definition adopted by the State of conviction."

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 590 (1990). The Court

has held instead that to ensure uniformity in sentencing, federal courts should give burglary a "generic" meaning encompassing "any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label,

having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry

into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to

commit a crime." Id. at 599. This definition of burglary,

which we use today, does not require that the dwelling be

occupied or property destroyed.

Comparing generic burglary with larceny from the person

compels us to reaffirm our conclusion in Smith. Burglary does

not necessarily involve violence, but it always requires that

the offender intentionally enter a building where a victim

might be present. This purposeful, aggressive act creates a

serious risk of violent confrontation. Similarly, larceny from

the person does not necessarily involve violence, but it

requires the offender to make purposeful, aggressive moves to

part the victim from his or her property, creating a similar risk

of violent confrontation. In fact, because larceny from the person requires that the offender take the property from the protection or control of the victim, the victim’s presence is

assured, and the odds of a violent confrontation are even

higher than in a generic burglary, where the victim is often

absent.

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We therefore hold that larceny from the person resembles

the enumerated offense of burglary both in kind and in degree

of risk, and so constitutes a "crime of violence" under the

"otherwise" clause of § 4B1.2 of the United States Sentencing

Guidelines.

IV.

The district court reached the proper conclusion. Its judgment is

AFFIRMED.

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