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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Patricia R. Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

• 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPE7uYnited States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT APR 31991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

). 

v. ) 

) 

PATRICIA R. WILLIAMS, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

No. 90-1152 

(D.C. No. 90-CR-15) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Patricia Williams appeals her jury conviction, in 

the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, for 

possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting 

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams of cocaine. Ms. 

Williams complains the trial court erred in finding: (1) the 

search warrant was supported by probable cause; (2) the officers 

acted in good faith even if the warrant was not supported by 

probable cause; and (3) the informant was not a government agent 

when she entered Ms. Williams' apartment. We affirm. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or e used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of es~ablishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or coi1ateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1152 Document: 010110031725 Date Filed: 04/03/1991 Page: 1 
I. Background 

In April 1990, defendant Patricia Williams was convicted of 

possession with intent to distribute, and aiding and abetting 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 

u.s.c. § 841(a) (1) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. She appeals the trial 

court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant 

to a search warrant. 

In the early morning hours on November 29, 1989, Denver 

police executed a search warrant at Ms. Williams' apartment, 

finding large amounts of crack cocaine, cocaine powder, cash, and 

drug paraphernalia. The warrant was based on Detective Stephen 

Conner's affidavit, the supporting facts of which were provided by 

Sabrina Lloyd. 

Ms. Lloyd had been arrested on November 18, 1989, during a 

larceny investigation in Aurora. About three grams of crack 

cocaine and $2,700 in cash were found in her possession. 

Detective Conner advised Ms. Lloyd of her rights and the charges 

she faced. He then told her if she would supply information about 

her sources of crack cocaine, he would not require her to post a 

$10,000 bond. If her information led to the recovery of crack 

cocaine, Detective Conner stated he would notify the district 

attorney of her assistance. Ms. Lloyd provided Detective Conner 

with a little information and was released on her own 

recognizance, having been given Detective Conner's business card 

and pager number. 

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According to Detective Conner, Ms. Lloyd contacted him on 

November 28, 1989, and told him she knew about a residence which 

contained about one pound of cocaine. Detective Conner and 

another officer, at Ms. Lloyd's direction, drove with her to an 

apartment · complex located at 3300 South Tamarac. Pointing to a 

second-floor apartment, Ms. Lloyd explained that while moving some 

belongings out of the apartment that day, she had noticed a large 

freezer-sized plastic bag containing smaller plastic bags of crack 

cocaine. She also identified the occupant of the apartment as a 

person named Pat. 

Later that day, Detective Conner applied for a search 

warrant. His affidavit began with the address of the apartment, a 

description of the complex, and a general description of cocaine 

substances and paraphernalia. Detective Conner then related his 

experience handling over two hundred drug-related cases, including 

six months with the Metropolitan Crack Task Force and special 

training for search and arrest procedures in drug cases. Next, he 

recited Ms. Lloyd's name, the pending charges against her, and 

the information she had provided. Specifically, Detective Conner 

stated Ms. Lloyd had observed about one-half kilogram of cocaine 

in the apartment that day, and that "(she] advised that she was 

familiar with the address as she used to be in the business of 

selling narcotics with another black female named 'Pat' at that 

location." Detective Conner also noted that Ms. Lloyd was 

familiar with the appearance and packaging of crack cocaine 

because of her prior possession, and that she could not carry out 

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a crack purchase from Pat because Pat knew she had been arrested 

and owed Ms. Lloyd $5,000 from previous drug transactions. 

II. Admissibility of Seized Evidence 

We do not address defendant's contention that the warrant was 

not supported by probable cause because we hold that even if the 

warrant were invalid, the search was protected by the good faith 

of the officers. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The 

applicability of Leon is a question of law which we review de 

novo. United states v. Corral-Corral, 899 F.2d 927, 929 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

In Leon, the Supreme Court established that "when an officer 

acting with objective goo~ faith has obtained a search warrant 

from a judge or magistrate," the evidence obtained need not be 

suppressed even if the warrant is later found to be invalid. 468 

U.S. at 920. The Court reasoned that police misconduct, the 

target of the exclusionary rule, would not be deterred by 

excluding evidence which the police reasonably believed they had 

obtained legitimately. However, the Leon court specified certain 

situations in which suppression would still be appropriate. 468 

U.S. at 923. Ms. Williams contends two of those situations exist 

in her case. 

A. Deliber_ately or Recklessly False Affidavit 

The Supreme Court relied on its previous decision in Franks 

v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) to conclude that if the affiant 

knowingly or recklessly misleads the magistrate or judge who 

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issues the warrant, the results of the search should be 

suppressed. Detective Conner committed that wrong, Ms. Williams 

contends, by declaring in the affidavit that "Lloyd advised that 

she was familiar with the address as she used to be in the 

business of selling narcotics with another black female named 

'Pat' at that location. 111 Ms. Williams argues that Detective 

Conner's answers to the prosecution's questions at the suppression 

hearing were at variance with this statement: 

Q: Did [Ms. Lloyd) 

regarding her use 

cocaine? 

make any admissions to you 

or distribution of crack 

A: She didn't. I approached her on it. With 

that amount that she's talking about and 

the amount referred back to November 18 -- I 

basically advised her that it was my belief 

that she was probably selling the cocaine as 

well from that apartment complex. 

Q: What did she indicate in response to this? 

A: I don't think she even responded yes or no. 

Although the government correctly notes that Ms. Williams did 

not raise this issue at trial, we address it nevertheless. We 

conclude the defendant has failed to establish knowing or reckless 

falsity by a preponderance of the evidence. See Corral-Corral, 

899 F.2d at 933. The affidavit statement and Detective Conner's 

testimony are not necessarily inconsistent. The affidavit refers 

11n her reply brief, Ms. Williams also claims there was no proof 

Ms. Lloyd told Detective Conner she could not purchase crack from 

Pat because Pat knew she had been arrested and owed Ms. Lloyd 

$5,000. At the suppression hearing, Detective Conner testified 

that Ms. Lloyd said she had a "falling out" with Pat. However, 

the affidavit and testimony do not contradict each other. The 

fact that Detective Conner did not testify about each and every 

one of Ms. Lloyd's remarks does not prove statements in the 

affidavit were false. 

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to Ms. Lloyd's past involvement in drug sales, which she could 

have conveyed to Detective Conner at some time other than the 

specific incident discussed at the suppression hearing. Detective 

Conner's testimony at the suppression hearing arguably related 

only to Ms. Lloyd's present involvement in drug dealing. While 

another interpretation is arguable, it is evident the ambiguity of 

these interpretations· preclude a conclusion of knowing or reckless 

falsehood on the part of Detective Conner. 

B. Lack of Indicia of Probable Cause 

The Leon Court also sanctioned suppression of evidence if an 

affidavit is "'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'" 

468 U.S. at 923 (citation omitted). Ms. Williams argues Detective 

Conner's affidavit fits this description, emphasizing that the 

police did not independently corroborate Ms. Lloyd's information 

beyond going to look at the apartment. Although investigation of 

tips strengthens an affidavit, see Leon, 468 U.S. at 926, we cannot say its absence in this case made reliance on the information 

"entirely unreasonable." The affidavit contained several indicia 

of probable cause. 

III. Relationship Between Government and Informant 

Ms. Williams asserts Ms. Lloyd became a government agent when 

she agreed to provide information in exchange for mitigation of 

her own punishment. Thus, her warrantless "search" of the 

apartment was illegal. The question of agency is a matter of law 

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in the context of motions to suppress criminal evidence, subject 

to de novo review. Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 799 (10th 

Cir. 1989); United States v. Lamport, 787 F.2d 474 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied 479 u.s. 846 (1986). 

In Pleasant, we reiterated the test for determining when a 

private person has become an instrument or agent of the 

government, turning a search into government action subject to the 

strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Two critical factors in 

determining agency are: "'l) whether the government knew of and 

acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2) whether the party 

performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts 

or to further his own ends.'" 876 F.2d at 797, quoting United 

States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir. 1982). 

We hold that the government's relationship with Ms. Lloyd did 

not constitute knowledge of and acquiescence in her actions under 

the first prong of Pleasant. As the trial court reasoned, the 

government did not tell Ms. Lloyd to look for cocaine in Ms. 

Williams' apartment; indeed, they did not even know of her 

presence there. Detective Conner simply made a general suggestion 

to Ms. Lloyd that she might benefit from sharing any information 

she had about cocaine dealers. Compare Lamport, 787 F.2d at 476 

(trial court properly suppressed a list of patients which 

secretaries obtained in response to a specific request by 

investigators); see Miller, 688 F.2d at 657 (police knowledge of a 

private person's plan to pose as a buyer to seek out a stolen 

trailer did not create agency relationship in part because officers did not encourage or plant the idea of conducting a private 

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Appellate Case: 90-1152 Document: 010110031725 Date Filed: 04/03/1991 Page: 7 
search). Therefore, we reject defendant's argument that Ms. Lloyd 

was a government agent and that the seized evidence should be 

suppressed. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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