Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03068/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cornell Francis Evans
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 20, 2000 Decided June 27, 2000

No. 99-3068

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Cornell Francis Evans,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00378-01)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Jennifer M. Blunt,

Assistant Federal Public Defender. Evelina J. Norwinski,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A.

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 1 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Before: Randolph, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: The defendant in this case, Cornell Evans, was convicted of multiple felonies relating to the

possession and distribution of illegal narcotics. The principal

issue on appeal concerns the testimony of an FBI agent who

stated at trial that the government "had received information" that defendant was involved in drug trafficking. Defendant contends that this testimony was hearsay and that its

admission was erroneous. Defendant is correct. We conclude, however, that the error was harmless, and therefore

affirm his convictions.

I

This case arose out of an undercover narcotics operation

conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the

fall of 1996, special agents of the FBI met with Thomas "Tee"

Rose, a former District of Columbia resident who was serving

a federal prison sentence at the Fairton Correctional Institution and who had two additional state cases pending against

him. The agents agreed to help Rose with his sentence and

pending charges in return for his assistance in the investigation of other crimes. Thomas Rose told the agents that

defendant Evans was involved in drug trafficking, and he

referred them to his uncle, George Rose of Pennsylvania, who

agreed to assist the FBI provided that his incarcerated

nephew would receive the benefit of his cooperation.

George Rose contacted the defendant by telephone in early

March 1997. In that and subsequent conversations, all taped

by the FBI, Rose arranged to purchase crack cocaine from

Evans at a barber shop where Evans worked. The subject of

drugs first arose when Rose complained that "[t]he quality of

stuff" in Pittsburgh was "terrible." Evans then said: "I got a

few people I can talk to ... depending on what you want."

Defendant noted that the "going price was forty-five for an

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 2 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

eighth" but that there was a shortage, so prices were rising.

He agreed to look into current prices, and in a series of

further calls the two worked out the details of the transaction.

On March 18, 1997, Rose met Evans outside the barber shop

and gave him $1,800 in cash for 62 grams of crack. The

purchase was captured on tape by a body recorder worn by

Rose and on film by FBI surveillance cameras.

Ten days later, George Rose telephoned Evans and the two

discussed another drug transaction. On April 1, 1997, Rose

again met Evans at the barber shop, where he purchased

approximately 124 grams of cocaine powder for $3,600. As

before, Rose wore a body recorder that taped the transaction.

Rose tried to arrange a third transaction on April 23, but

Evans said that his drug supply had dried up.

The FBI arrested Evans more than a year later, on October 13, 1998. In a search incident to the arrest, agents

discovered four small bags of cocaine powder rolled up in

Evans' pants leg. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted the March 18, 1997 transaction but claimed not

to remember the subsequent deal on April 1. He told the

agents that "Tee" had called him from jail and asked him to

"show around" his uncle, George Rose. He said that George

Rose had then contacted him and expressed an interest in

obtaining cocaine, and that he had agreed to help Rose out.

According to Evans, someone in the barbershop whom he did

not know had given him the names of two people who could

supply him with cocaine. Evans then contacted those people,

whose names he also did not remember. The suppliers

brought the drugs to Evans at the shop, where he delivered

them to Rose. Evans said that he had provided the drugs "as

a favor to Tee and George Rose." 2/4/99 a.m. Tr. at 80.

Evans was charged with unlawful use of a communications

facility, distribution of cocaine and cocaine base, and possession of cocaine. The case went to trial on February 4, 1999,

and defendant was convicted on all counts.

II

On appeal, Evans raises four challenges to his convictions

and sentence. Of these, only one merits considerable attenUSCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 3 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tion: Evans' claim that the district court committed reversible error by admitting certain government testimony into

evidence. We address that contention first, beginning with a

recitation of the relevant facts.

A

The government's first witness at trial was FBI Special

Agent Neil Darnell. After Darnell testified about the origins

of the undercover operation, including the FBI's contact with

Thomas Rose and George Rose's agreement to cooperate, the

prosecutor asked the agent how he "came about knowing Mr.

Evans." 2/4/99 a.m. Tr. at 26. Defense counsel objected on

the ground that the question necessarily called for hearsay as

to what Thomas Rose had told the FBI. The defense emphasized that Rose was not a witness and would not be available

for cross-examination. In response, the prosecutor argued

that the evidence was not hearsay because it was only offered

"to establish where the FBI met with George Rose and why

they did what they did with George Rose." Id. The district

court overruled the objection.

The prosecutor resumed his questioning by asking Darnell

why he had specifically discussed Evans with George Rose.

Agent Darnell answered: "We had received Mr.--or information that Mr. Evans was involved in drug trafficking and--."

Id. at 27. Defense counsel interrupted with an objection,

which was again overruled. Agent Darnell then added: "And

Mr. Rose was in a position to directly go in and approach Mr.

Evans about narcotics." Id. The prosecutor then asked

whether the FBI's "information" had come from Thomas

Rose, and Darnell answered that it had. The court sustained

an objection to this question and answer, and directed the

jury to disregard the latter.

Shortly thereafter, the defense requested a bench conference and moved for a mistrial based on the admission of

Darnell's hearsay testimony that the FBI "had received information" that Evans was involved in drug trafficking. Counsel

argued that the jury could infer that Thomas Rose was the

one who had identified Evans as a drug dealer, that this made

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 4 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

it appear more likely that Evans had committed the charged

acts, and that Evans would be unable to cross-examine his

accuser "because this guy is not going to be here to testify."

Id. at 39-40. Again, the government argued that it had

elicited the testimony not to prove the truth of the matter

asserted, but rather "to prove why the FBI did what they

did." Id. at 40. The court denied the mistrial motion without

prejudice to its being renewed later in the proceedings. At

the end of the government's case-in-chief, defense counsel

renewed the motion, and the court made the same ruling.

Evans' defense consisted of the testimony of three witnesses, each of whom said they had never seen any indication

that defendant distributed drugs, as well as Evans' testimony

on his own behalf. On the witness stand, Evans admitted to

his participation in the two charged drug transactions. He

testified that Thomas Rose had told him that his uncle,

George Rose, was coming to D.C. and had asked him to show

George around. Evans said he had not expected George to

ask him to supply drugs, but that he had been able to obtain

some for him from sources whose names he did not remember. Evans maintained that the two transactions with

George Rose were the only times he had ever distributed

drugs, and specifically denied that he had ever sold drugs

with Thomas Rose. He further stated that he had agreed to

participate in the two sales because he and Thomas Rose

"had a good friendship." 2/5/99 Tr. at 112; see also id. at

124.

The defense renewed its motion for a mistrial two more

times--after it rested and at the close of all the evidence. In

one colloquy, the court acknowledged that it "might have

been a mistake to overrule the objection" to Darnell's testimony, but allowed the testimony to stand. 2/4/99 a.m. Tr. at

41.

In closing argument, defense counsel conceded Evans' participation in the two drug transactions. He argued, however,

that defendant had been unlawfully entrapped into participating. Although the district court gave instructions regarding

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 5 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the entrapment defense, the jury returned a guilty verdict on

every count.

B

Defendant contends that Agent Darnell's testimony that

the FBI "had received ... information that Mr. Evans was

involved in drug trafficking" was inadmissible hearsay--that

is, "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while

testifying at the trial ..., offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801 (defining

hearsay); see Fed. R. Evid. 802 (making hearsay inadmissible). We review this allegation under the abuse of discretion

standard. See United States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C.

Cir. 1994).

The problem with hearsay is that it deprives the defendant

of the opportunity to cross-examine the person who uttered

the statement at issue. Here, the government presented

allegations of prior drug dealing, and the defendant was

unable to cross-examine the person who made them. At the

time of the testimony, that person--the less-than-reputable

convict, Thomas Rose--was sitting in a federal correctional

institution. Meanwhile in court, telling Rose's story, was the

clean-cut FBI agent, Neil Darnell. Thus, Evans had no

opportunity to "test[ ] the recollection and sift[ ] the conscience" of his accuser, nor could he compel him "to stand

face to face with the jury in order that they [might] look at

him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the

manner in which he [gave] his testimony whether he [was]

worthy of belief." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158

(1970) (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43

(1895)). Cross-examination may be the "greatest legal engine

ever invented for the discovery of truth," Green, 399 U.S. at

158, but it is not of much use if there is no one to whom it can

be applied.

The government contends that Darnell's statements did not

constitute hearsay because they were not "offered in evidence

to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid.

801(c). That is, they were not offered to prove that Evans

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 6 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

actually had been involved in drug trafficking. But if Darnell's testimony about the FBI's "information" did not go to

the truth of that assertion, to what did it go? The trial

prosecutor said he offered the testimony to establish "why

they did what they did with George Rose." For testimony to

be admissible for any purpose, however, it must be relevant.

See Fed. R. Evid. 402. And to be relevant, it must have a

"tendency to make the existence of [a] fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or

less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R.

Evid. 401. How was "why they did what they did with

George Rose" related to such a fact of consequence? Three

possible, interconnected explanations can be inferred from the

government's appellate brief and oral argument. We consider each in turn.

First, the government suggests that the testimony was

relevant to show that Evans had not been improperly targeted or selectively prosecuted--that is, it was offered to show

the state of mind of the FBI agents, rather than the truth of

the allegations upon which their state of mind was based.

While selective prosecution may qualify as an issue of consequence in some proceedings, see generally United States v.

Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494-95 (D.C. Cir. 1983), it was not

an issue in Evans' trial. Defendant did not raise such an

allegation through argument or testimony, nor did he "open

the door" to the matter through inferences made during

cross-examination. See United States v. Forrester, 60 F.3d

52, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65,

69-70 (2d Cir. 1994). Indeed, the hearsay at issue here was

elicited during the direct examination of the government's

first witness, before Evans had presented a case or even

begun to cross-examine. Moreover, when Evans eventually

did put on a defense, it was not selective prosecution but

entrapment. Hence, why the agents did what they did--i.e.,

the agents' motives for investigating Evans--never became a

fact of consequence to the determination of the action.

Approving the admission of Agent Darnell's testimony under these circumstances would open a large loophole in the

hearsay rule. If we were to accept the government's ratioUSCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 7 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

nale here, then explaining why government agents "did what

they did" through reference to statements of absent informants would be acceptable in almost any case involving an

undercover operation, and in many others as well. That is a

loophole this circuit has previously refused to open.

In United States v. Hilliard, a case involving an armed

robbery, government witnesses effectively told the jury that

"as a result of information ... obtained by the police," the

defendant's picture had been included in the photographic

array shown to the victim. 569 F.2d 143, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

The defendant objected on the ground that this suggested

that information outside the record proved his guilt. This

court agreed, concluding that the prosecutor had violated the

hearsay rule by "insinuat[ing] that information obtained from

unknown witnesses identified the robber as [the defendant]."

Id. at 144. There, as here, the government argued that the

testimony was not hearsay because it had not been offered for

its truth. Rather, the government said, it had been "offered

merely to explain why the police took the action they did in

placing [the defendant's] picture in a photographic array."

Id. at 146. Speaking for the court, Judge Robb responded:

We reject this argument. There was no issue as to the

presence of [the defendant's] picture in the array, and

therefore no occasion for any explanation. In any event,

explanation of a photographic array cannot be allowed to

repeal the hearsay rule.

Id.; see United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1317 (D.C.

Cir. 1975) (reversing conviction because, inter alia, police

testimony recounting witness tip was hearsay and inadmissible to explain why police went to defendant's house), vacated

on other grounds, 598 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir 1979).1 The same

response is warranted in this case.

__________

1 See also United States v. Lovelace, 123 F.3d 650, 652-53 (7th

Cir. 1997) (finding admission of informant's tip unnecessary to

correct impression of racial bias because bias was not at issue in

case); Forrester, 60 F.3d at 59-61 (reversing conviction where

informant evidence was admitted to show officer's state of mind,

which was not "relevant to the determination of any material fact");

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 8 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

The government's second relevance argument is that Agent

Darnell's testimony was necessary to combat the threat of

"jury nullification." We are not certain what the government

means by this contention. If this is just another way of

saying that the government did not want the jury to think it

had engaged in selective prosecution, we have already addressed the point above. It appears, however, that the

government may mean something more: that the testimony

was necessary to ensure that the jury did not miss the

context of the events and the moral significance of the

allegations, and thus render an unjustified acquittal. It is

true, of course, that as a general matter the prosecution is

entitled to present the "whole story" of criminal misconduct

in order to guard against just such an eventuality. See Old

Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186-89 (1997); United

States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en

banc). But in presenting that story, the government is as

much bound by the rules of evidence as it is on any other

issue. No matter how important it is for the government to

present a complete, morally compelling narrative, it must

present that narrative through admissible evidence, not

through hearsay.

Finally, the government contends that the evidence of "why

they did what they did" was relevant as "background"--

merely for the value of giving the jury a complete picture of

the events in question. Sometimes courts excuse the use of

hearsay evidence for background purposes where the evidence is on an uncontroverted matter, where hearsay is the

most efficient means of transmitting it, and where there is

little chance of prejudice to the defendant. See generally

United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 1523-24 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (concluding that trial court's error in permitting witnesses to testify about prior statements by nonparty witnesses was "at most harmless" and served to "provide back-

__________

United States v. Johnson, 439 F.2d 885, 888-89 (5th Cir. 1971)

("The desire of the government to show the jury why its agents

were on the lookout for Johnson can in no way justify the use of

prejudicial hearsay.").

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 9 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ground"). But where those conditions are not met--as they

are not here--the government must prove "background" the

same way it would any other set of relevant facts.

The government correctly notes that when the "background" being offered is the state of mind of the police, it is

technically not hearsay at all. See Gatling, 96 F.3d at 1524.

Nonetheless, to be admissible it must still be relevant, and if

"background" was related to a fact "of consequence to the

determination" of this case, it was only barely so. Even the

government concedes that the probative value of Agent Darnell's statement as background was "not significant." Br. for

Appellee at 15.

At this point we must consider the role of Rule 403,

compliance with which we again review under the abuse of

discretion standard. See United States v. Davis, 181 F.3d

147, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Under that Rule, evidence is

excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice." Fed. R. Evid. 403. Regardless of the reason for which the court and the prosecutor

thought the evidence was being offered, the prejudice inquiry

asks whether "the jury [was] likely to consider the statement

for the truth of what was stated with significant resultant

prejudice." Reyes, 18 F.3d at 70. In this case, the answer is

yes: There was considerable danger that the jury would

consider the information about Evans' prior drug crimes for

its truth, and hence as evidence of his propensity to commit

the crimes with which he was charged.2 When that danger is

weighed against the insignificant probative value of the testimony as background, the Rule 403 balance comes out clearly

against admission.3

__________

2 Such consideration would be improper not only under Rules

801 and 802, but also under Rule 404(b). The latter states that

"[e]vidence of other crimes ... is not admissible to prove the

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); see Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 181-82.

3 See Lovelace, 123 F.3d at 653 (holding that admission of

informant's tip that defendant would have drugs at specified location violated Rule 403, notwithstanding that it was offered to

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 10 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Moreover, the use of that testimony to establish propensity

was not the only danger in this case. As the trial judge

properly instructed the jury, one element of the entrapment

defense is a lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime. See United States v. Glover, 153

F.3d 749, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Agent Darnell's statement

could not permissibly have been used to establish predisposition, since the issue of predisposition goes to Evans' state of

mind (why he did what he did with George Rose), not to that

of the agents (why they did what they did with him). See

United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981)

(en banc). There was considerable risk, however, that the

__________

explain basis for police action); Reyes, 18 F.3d at 72 (reversing

conviction where "resulting prejudice from the receipt of ... incriminating [out-of-court] declarations was considerable and far

exceeded the minimal or non-existent probative value of the [declarations'] non-hearsay uses" as background evidence); United States

v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that if a

statement "is both permissible background and highly prejudicial,

otherwise inadmissible hearsay, fairness demands that the government find a way to get the background into evidence without the

hearsay"); United States v. Mancillas, 580 F.2d 1301, 1310 (7th Cir.

1978) (holding that although giving "the jury a sense of the context

of the activities to be described may provide some incidental benefit

...[,] any such value ordinarily is substantially outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice"); 2 McCormick on Evidence s 249 (5th

ed. 1999) ("[Officers] should not ... be allowed to relate historical

aspects of the case, such as ... reports of others containing

inadmissible hearsay. Such statements are sometimes erroneously

admitted under the argument that the officers are entitled to give

the information upon which they acted. The need for this evidence

is slight, and the likelihood of misuse great."); cf. Gatling, 96 F.3d

at 1524 (upholding conviction where "any error that the court

made" in admitting out-of-court statements for background purposes was harmlessly cumulative); Clarke, 24 F.3d at 267 (affirming

where admission of police background testimony, although "questionable," was harmlessly cumulative); United States v. Freeman,

816 F.2d 558, 563-64 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding no error where

admission of informant's statements for background purposes was

nonprejudicial).

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 11 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

jury would use the agent's testimony in that impermissible

way. Indeed, the prosecutor explicitly sought to use Darnell's testimony to establish Evans' predisposition in his

closing argument. See 2/5/99 p.m. Tr. at 18-19. Although

the court correctly barred the government from making that

argument, it did not caution the jury against drawing the

connection on its own. In failing to do so, the court may have

committed error under Rules 801 and 802 by permitting the

jury to use the testimony for its truth. See Fed. R. Evid. 801,

802.4 In any event, without a limiting instruction, the risk

that Evans would be unfairly prejudiced by the jury's use of

the testimony for its truth substantially outweighed the testimony's minimal value as background. See Webster, 649 F.2d

at 351; United States v. Catanzaro, 407 F.2d 998, 1000-01 (3d

Cir. 1969) (reversing conviction where jury may have used

hearsay statement as evidence of defendant's predisposition).

The danger of unfair prejudice was further compounded by

the instruction that was given to the jury. The entrapment

instruction informed the jury that "willingness to commit the

crimes may be shown in many ways, including by evidence of

the defendant's prior similar conduct." 2/5/99 p.m. Tr. at 37.

Since Agent Darnell's testimony that the FBI "had received

... information that Mr. Evans was involved" in prior drug

trafficking was certainly "evidence of the defendant's prior

similar conduct," the jury could reasonably have concluded

that this was the evidence to which the judge was referring.5

Thus, the jury was effectively instructed that it could use the

agent's testimony for its truth, in violation of Rules 801 and

__________

4 Cf. Reyes, 18 F.3d at 69 (holding that even where there have

been limiting instructions, "when the likelihood is sufficiently high

that the jury will not follow the limiting instructions, but will treat

the evidence as proof of the truth of the declaration, the evidence is

functionally indistinguishable from hearsay").

5 Darnell's testimony was not the evidence the court actually

had in mind when giving the instruction. See 2/5/99 p.m. Tr. at 20

(advising counsel that instruction "pertains to the defendant's admission with respect to the exportation of drugs and not testimony

from Agent Darnell"). The instruction, however, did not specify

which prior conduct it encompassed.

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 12 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

802.6 This, of course, also greatly increased the risk that the

jury would actually use the testimony for that impermissible

purpose, further compounding the error committed under

Rule 403.

In sum, we conclude that the admission of Special Agent

Darnell's testimony was error under the Federal Rules of

Evidence: under Rules 801 and 802 because the jury was

effectively told that the testimony could be used for its truth,

and under Rule 403 because the probative value of the only

relevant nonhearsay purpose--general background--was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

C

In addition to constituting error under the Federal Rules,

the admission of Agent Darnell's testimony may have violated

Evans' rights under the Confrontation Clause. See U.S.

Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused

shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses

against him...."). The purpose of that clause is to "ensure

the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by

subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary

proceeding before the trier of fact." Lilly v. Virginia, 527

U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999) (internal quotation omitted). As we

have already noted, such testing is not possible where, as

here, the government presents the testimony of an out-ofcourt declarant through the mouth of another witness. See

__________

6 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes is admissible to

prove the defendant's state of mind, and therefore his predisposition. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d

903, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Like other facts, however, the prior

crimes must themselves be proven through admissible (nonhearsay) evidence. See Webster, 649 F.2d at 349-50. As noted in

the text, Agent Darnell's testimony could not have been used to

prove that the prior crimes occurred (the truth of the matter

asserted), and hence had no relevance to the question of defendant

Evans' state of mind (predisposition). The most for which Darnell's

testimony could have been used would have been to establish his

state of mind--a fact not relevant to the state of mind of the

defendant. See id.

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 13 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

id. at 124 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158

(1970)).

Nonetheless, not every use of hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause. "[W]here proffered hearsay has sufficient

guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 (1992); see also

Lilly, 527 U.S. at 124-25; Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66

(1980). In this case, the government has not suggested any

hearsay exception that might apply to Darnell's testimony.

Instead, it contends that Darnell's testimony was not hearsay

at all because it was not offered to prove the truth of the

matter asserted. If that contention were correct, there would

be no violation of Evans' confrontation rights. See Tennessee

v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985) (holding that the nonhearsay aspect of a confession, not offered to prove its truth,

"raises no Confrontation Clause concerns"). As noted above,

however, the jury was effectively told that it could use the

evidence as proof of defendant's predisposition--i.e., for its

truth. That erroneous instruction, coupled with the admission of Darnell's testimony, may well have deprived Evans of

his right to confront his true accuser--Thomas Rose. See id.

(noting that had jury been asked to infer that defendant's

confession proved his participation in the crime, the evidence

would have been hearsay and Confrontation Clause concerns

would have been implicated); United States v. Jordan, 810

F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

D

We need not resolve whether the error at issue in this case

violated only the Rules of Evidence, or whether it also ran

afoul of the Confrontation Clause. Because an error clearly

occurred, the dispositive question is whether it was harmless.

If it was, it cannot result in the reversal of Evans' convictions

regardless of how we classify it. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52;

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993).

It is true that the distinction between constitutional and

nonconstitutional error can be quite important, since the

standards for testing whether such errors are harmless are

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 14 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

different. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 438 (1995);

Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622-23, 637-38 (1993).

The standard for determining whether a constitutional error

is harmless is whether it appears "beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967);

see Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999). For

nonconstitutional errors, the standard is whether the error

did not have "substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict." Kotteakos v. United States,

328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946); see Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637.

In the instant case, however, the difference between the

standards does not matter because the error was harmless

under both. Although the jury could have used the hearsay

testimony to conclude that defendant had a propensity to

commit the charged drug offenses, Evans conceded that he

committed those offenses, thereby removing the question of

propensity from the case. Rather than contest that he sold

drugs to George Rose, Evans claimed he was entrapped. The

entrapment defense comprises two elements: "government

inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the

part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct."

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); see Glover,

153 F.3d at 754. While the admission of Agent Darnell's

testimony could have been prejudicial with respect to predisposition, the jury does not consider predisposition unless the

defendant has first satisfied the burden of showing government inducement. See Glover, 153 F.3d at 754 ("[T]he defendant bears the initial burden of showing government inducement; if he is successful, the burden then shifts to the

government to prove the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime."); United States v. Whoie, 925 F.2d 1481, 1485

(D.C. Cir. 1991). Evans' jury was instructed accordingly.

See 2/5/99 p.m. Tr. at 37. Hence, the key question is whether

the defendant presented sufficient evidence of inducement.

At oral argument, Evans' counsel conceded that the evidence of inducement was "slight." We see none at all.

"Even when a government agent repeatedly requests that the

defendant engage in criminal conduct, inducement is not

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 15 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

established unless the requests are coupled with persuasive

overtures." United States v. McKinley, 70 F.3d 1307, 1312

D.C. Cir. 1995). The only "persuasive overture" proffered by

defense counsel was Evans' claim that he provided the drugs

because he and Thomas Rose "had a good friendship." Although we have in the past indicated that "pleas based on ...

friendship" can satisfy the inducement prong of an entrapment defense, we have never found such a plea sufficiently

strong to do so. United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 517

(D.C. Cir. 1996); see, e.g., Glover, 153 F.3d at 755; McKinley,

70 F.3d at 1314.

But here there was no plea to friendship at all. According

to Evans' own account, his friend, Thomas Rose, "never

mentioned" drugs to him. 2/5/99 a.m. Tr. at 124. Rather, he

"just asked me to look out for [his uncle], show him around

the city." Id. at 123. Evans does not contend that this

constituted an implied request to provide George Rose with

drugs. To the contrary, defendant testified that he had not

expected his friend's uncle to bring up the subject. See id. at

111. Hence, even accepting defendant's version of the facts,

it establishes only that he independently decided to provide

the drugs out of friendship for George Rose's nephew--not

because of any plea from that nephew. This is insufficient to

raise a jury question as to inducement, and because the jury

was correctly instructed that inducement is a prerequisite for

entrapment, defendant's entrapment defense necessarily

failed for want of proof. See McKinley, 70 F.3d at 1309.

Indeed, under these circumstances, defendant was not entitled to an entrapment instruction in the first place. See

Glover, 153 F.3d at 755; McKinley, 70 F.3d at 1309. Because

entrapment was Evans' only defense (given his concession to

having participated in the charged drug transactions), we can

say with certainty that the erroneous admission of Agent

Darnell's testimony did not contribute to the result in this

case.

III

The other issues raised on appeal require only brief discussion. In his opening brief, Evans' principal claim was that

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 16 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

the trial judge committed reversible error by denying his

request to strike a potential juror for cause. Evans ultimately used a peremptory challenge to strike the juror, who was

not seated. After the opening brief was filed, the Supreme

Court decided United States v. Martinez-Salazar, which held

that a defendant cannot assert error after using a peremptory

challenge to remove a juror who he alleges should have been

excused for cause. See 120 S. Ct. 774, 782 (2000). Evans

concedes that Martinez-Salazar resolves this claim.

Second, Evans contends that he should have received the

benefit of the "safety valve" provisions of the federal sentencing guidelines, which would have allowed him to obtain a

sentence below the statutory minimum of 120 months. See

U.S.S.G. s 5C1.2; see also 18 U.S.C. s 3553(f); 21 U.S.C.

s 841(b). For a defendant to receive the benefit of the safety

valve, the trial court must find, inter alia, that "the defendant

has truthfully provided to the Government all information and

evidence the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses

that were part of the same course of conduct." U.S.S.G.

s 5C1.2(5). The court declined to make that finding, and

there is more than sufficient evidence in the record to support

the court's decision. Compare, e.g., 5/14/99 Tr. at 10 (defense's contention that Evans did not know the names of the

two men who supplied the drugs for the charged transactions), with id. at 33 (court's conclusion that taped conversations showed Evans knew "fully what the nature and source

of supply was ... and whom he has been dealing with and

whom he has done other transactions with").

Finally, Evans argues that he should have received a

downward departure from the applicable guideline range due

to extraordinary family circumstances. Our review of a

denial of a downward departure is limited. See In re Sealed

Case, 199 F.3d 488, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1999); United States v.

Leandre, 132 F.3d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Although Evans

contends that the district court erroneously thought itself

without authority to depart, the record reveals that the court

knew it had the authority but that it concluded a departure

was unwarranted after examining the relevant circuit precedents. See 5/14/99 Tr. at 33-34. We again concur with the

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 17 of 18
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

district court and find no error in its decision. See Leandre,

132 F.3d 796; United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462 (D.C. Cir.

1996).

IV

In closing, we take this opportunity to make a suggestion

similar to one made by the Second Circuit in analogous

circumstances. See United States v. Reyes, 18 F.3d 65, 72 (2d

Cir. 1994). The analysis that has led us to conclude that the

agent's testimony was improperly admitted is complicated,

and we are well aware that trial courts do not have the

opportunity we do to explore such intricacies at length. In

this case, as in many, the issue arose without warning in the

form of an objection to a question that the examiner had

already posed. If the trial was not to be disrupted, the court

had to resolve the issue on the spot without benefit of

research. Yet, had the error not been harmless, its prejudicial impact would have required reversal of Evans' convictions.

When the government wishes to offer incriminating evidence of uncertain admissibility, these kinds of risks can be

obviated through the submission of a motion in limine (written or oral) prior to the offer and before the jury is seated for

the session at which the offer is to be made. In some

situations, such advance notice is required by the Federal

Rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).7 Even where it is not, this

procedure would advance the government's dual interests in

ensuring that defendants are accorded justice at trial, while

protecting the integrity of verdicts on appeal.

__________

7 Rule 404(b) provides that, with respect to evidence of "other

crimes, wrongs, or acts,"

upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case

shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during

trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of

the general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce

at trial.

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Although there may have been a Rule 404(b)

violation here, defendant has not alleged one.

In the case of Cornell Evans, although we find that error

occurred, we also find that the error was harmless. Accordingly, defendant's convictions and sentence are affirmed.

USCA Case #99-3068 Document #525973 Filed: 06/27/2000 Page 18 of 18