Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01236/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01236-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frank Gunter
Appellee
John Francis Huckleberry
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED ,, Uniood States Coμrt <?f Appeab Tenth C1rcu1t 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT OCT 2 2 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JOHN FRANCIS HUCKLEBERRY, Clerk ) 

) 

Petitioner-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

FRANK GUNTER, Executive Director, ) 

Colorado Department of Corrections, ) 

Canon City, Colorado, ) 

) 

Respondent-Appellee. ) 

No. 90-1236 

(D.C. No. 89-B-935) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and TACHA, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.** 

Petitioner-appellant Huckleberry appeals from the district 

court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

On appeal, Huckleberry argues that the Supreme Court of the State 

of Colorado's holding that an alibi defense is not an affirmative 

defense unforeseeably deprived him of a defense available at the 

time of his trial. He contends that this deprivation was in 

violation of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 

Huckleberry further argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

support his conviction. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. 

S 1291 and affirm the district court's order denying relief. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, United States District 

Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-1236 Document: 010110091410 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 1 
This appeal arises out of a tragic accident in which 

appellant's wife was killed after apparently being run over by a 

motor vehicle. Appellant was tried and convicted of first-degree 

murder in the state courts of Colorado. In the trial court, 

Huckleberry requested a jury instruction that the State had the 

burden to refute appellant's alibi defense beyond a reasonable 

doubt. This would have placed the alibi defense in the status of 

an affirmative defense to be disproved by the State. The trial 

court refused the instruction. On appeal, the Colorado Court of 

Appeals held that an alibi defense is an affirmative defense and 

reversed the conviction because of the refusal to instruct 

separately on the alibi defense. The Colorado Supreme Court 

granted the State's petition for certiorari and held that an alibi 

defense is not an affirmative defense in Colorado. The Colorado 

Supreme Court based its decision on an 1897 Colorado Supreme Court 

decision and rejected two intervening Court of Appeals decisions 

to the contrary. Appellant argues here that the rejection of the 

two more recent Court of Appeals decisions results in an 

"unforeseeable" judicial elimination of a defense available at the 

time of trial. 

Although the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply directly to 

judicial actions, "all principles governing the ex post facto 

clause must be applied to judicial actions through the due process 

clause." Devine~ New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 866 F.2d 339 

(10th Cir. 1989) (citing Marks~ United States, 430 U.S. 188, 

191-91 (1977)). The Supreme Court has stated that a judicial 

decision should not be given retroactive effect if it is 

"'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-1236 Document: 010110091410 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 2 
• 

been expressed prior to the conduct at issue.'" Bouie Y..!.. City of 

Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964). In Devine, this court 

addressed this due process issue in terms of whether a judicial 

decision was "foreseeable." 866 F.2d at 345-46. There, we held 

that a state supreme court decision delaying a prisoner's 

eligibility for parole unforeseeably enhanced the prisoner's 

punishment. Id. at 347. We concluded that the judicial decision 

was unforeseeable because a person in the defendant's shoes "had 

no indication" that the supreme court would decide as it did and 

because "the decision was unforeseeable in light of all published 

sources of [state] law." Id. at 345-46. We simply do not arrive 

at the same conclusion in this case. 

Because of the existing precedent in Colorado's highest court 

that an alibi defense is not an affirmative defense, McNamara Y..!.. 

People, 24 Colo. 61, 48 P. 541 (1897), we agree with the district 

court that the reiteration of that position by the Colorado 

Supreme Court was neither unforeseeable nor a radical change in 

Colorado law. The Colorado Supreme Court merely applied the same 

interpretation that it applied to the same issue nearly a hundred 

years ago. We cannot conjecture as to why the Colorado Court of 

Appeals decided to depart from the higher court's precedent. 

In support of his due process argument, Huckleberry suggests 

that the Colorado Supreme Court misinterpreted its century-old 

McNamara decision in its Huckleberry opinion. He also cites to 

several Colorado Supreme Court cases that have referred to the 

alipi defense as an affirmative defense. We decline to consider 

the status of Colorado law after McNamara and prior to this case 

when the Colorado Supreme Court already has done so. In deciding 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-1236 Document: 010110091410 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 3 
that the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the 

Colorado Supreme Court clearly stated that it was reaffirming its 

conclusion in McNamara and that the two intervening Court of 

Appeals decisions -- decided "without stating ... reasons or 

making any reference to ... McNamara" are in conflict with 

the long-standing rule that the defense of alibi is not an 

affirmative defense. People~ Huckleberry, 768 P.2d 1235, 1239 

(Colo. 1989). The interpretation of the Colorado Supreme Court 

with respect to the meaning of its previous state law decisions is 

binding on this court. Wainright~ Goode, 464 U.S. 78, 84 

(1983). 

Appellant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him. He made this same claim unsuccessfully in all of the 

state court proceedings. "In a habeas corpus proceeding, we 

review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to determine 

'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

Cordoba~ Hanrahan, 910 F.2d 691 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 

S. Ct. 585 (1990) (quoting Jackson~ Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 

(1979) (emphasis in original)). Although the evidence is 

circumstantial, after reviewing the record we agree with the 

district court and all of the state courts who have reviewed this 

conviction that the evidence was clearly sufficient when viewed in 

the light most favorable to the State. We AFFIRM. 

-4-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-1236 Document: 010110091410 Date Filed: 10/22/1991 Page: 4