Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03085/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Burroughs
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 26, 2010 Decided July 16, 2010 

No. 08-3085 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

AARON BURROUGHS, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cr-00126-RJL-1) 

Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. 

Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Roy W. McLeese 

III, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, BROWN and GRIFFITH, 

Circuit Judges. 

 Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge BROWN. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Aaron Burroughs pled guilty to 

several offenses involving the sexual abuse of a minor and 

was sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by 

supervised release. On appeal Burroughs challenges his 

sentence, including several special conditions of his release. 

For the reasons set forth below, we vacate two of the 

conditions and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. Otherwise, we affirm. 

I. 

S.G. was fourteen years old in the fall of 2005 when she 

met Burroughs, then a volunteer assistant football coach at her 

high school in Maryland. Not long afterwards, Burroughs 

introduced S.G. to prostitution. He became her pimp, taught 

her how much she could charge for various sex acts, and 

repeatedly took her to an area of the District of Columbia 

known for its high levels of prostitution. This misconduct 

continued until July 31, 2006, when police discovered S.G. 

engaged in prostitution in an automobile in Takoma Park, 

Maryland. S.G. directed the police to Burroughs, who was 

arrested later that evening. 

Burroughs confessed to having vaginal and oral sex with 

S.G. and to arranging “dates” between her and several of his 

friends. He also led authorities to one of those friends, 

Michael Malloy, a U.S. Capitol Police Officer. Burroughs 

admitted to twice videotaping himself and Malloy engaging in 

sex acts with S.G. 

Burroughs pled guilty to one count each of sexual 

exploitation of a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2006); 

transportation of a minor to engage in prostitution, id.

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§ 2423(a); and first degree child sexual abuse, D.C. CODE

§ 22-3008. His guideline range was 235 to 293 months’ 

imprisonment. Based on Burroughs’s substantial assistance in 

the investigation and prosecution of Malloy and others, the 

government authorized the court to grant a downward 

departure under § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and to 

impose a sentence below the statutory minimum in 

accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). The government 

proposed imprisonment for 180 months, the statutory 

minimum for sexual exploitation of a minor. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2251(e). Burroughs asked for a sentence of no longer than 

120 months. 

In granting the § 5K1.1 departure and selecting a 

sentence of 192 months’ imprisonment and 120 months’ 

supervised release, the district court explained that Burroughs 

deserved a longer sentence than Malloy’s 180 months. See 

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 30 (“[Y]our sentence has to be greater 

than Malloy’s to some degree to reflect the seriousness of 

your conduct, especially vis-à-vis his. But in light of your 

cooperation, it shouldn’t be much greater.”). The court also 

imposed, without explanation, numerous conditions of 

supervised release. 

On appeal, Burroughs alleges his counsel at sentencing 

rendered ineffective assistance and challenges some of the 

conditions of his supervised release. We have jurisdiction 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). See United States v. 

Hankerson, 496 F.3d 303, 304–05 (3d Cir. 2007) (ineffective 

assistance at sentencing); United States v. Love, 593 F.3d 1, 

5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (conditions of supervised release). 

II. 

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel in “all criminal 

prosecutions” is the right to the effective assistance of 

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counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–86 

(1984). To prevail on a claim that he was denied this right, a 

defendant must show that his lawyer’s representation was 

deficient in a way that caused him prejudice. See id. at 687. 

“To establish deficiency, [he] must show his ‘counsel’s 

representation fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness.’ To establish prejudice, he ‘must show that 

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.’” Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 

(2009) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694) (citations 

omitted). 

Because the record will not often “disclose the facts 

necessary to decide either prong of the Strickland analysis,” a 

claim of ineffective assistance ordinarily cannot be resolved 

on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 

(2003). When a “defendant raises on appeal a colorable and 

previously unexplored claim of ineffective assistance,” United 

States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2003), our 

practice has been to remand to the district court to give the 

defendant an opportunity to develop the factual basis for his 

claim, see United States v. Geraldo, 271 F.3d 1112, 1115–16 

(D.C. Cir. 2001). But “[w]e do not reflexively remand.” 

United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 

To raise a colorable claim, the defendant must make “factual 

allegations that, if true, would establish a violation of his sixth 

amendment right to counsel.” United States v. Poston, 902 

F.2d 90, 99 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Once that threshold is 

cleared, we remand for an evidentiary hearing unless the 

“record alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is 

or is not entitled to relief.” Rashad, 331 F.3d at 909–10 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

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Burroughs alleges that his lawyers should have had him 

evaluated by a mental health expert before he was sentenced. 

Although Burroughs could not have afforded the evaluation, 

the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) makes funding available for 

expert services “necessary for adequate representation” when 

the defendant “is financially unable to obtain them.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). According to Burroughs, his lawyers 

“realized” that his “mental health was relevant” to the 

sentencing decision and went so far as to suggest he undergo 

a mental health evaluation, but they failed to request CJA 

funding for one. Reply Br. at 5. If their failure to seek funding 

under the CJA “reflected ignorance of the law, rather than a 

reasonable strategic decision, . . . then the [attorneys’] 

performance must be deemed deficient.” United States v. 

Williams, 358 F.3d 956, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (emphasis 

omitted). 

We assume, without deciding, that Burroughs’s lawyers 

erred, but we do not remand because Burroughs has not raised 

allegations that, if proven at an evidentiary hearing, would 

show prejudice. Burroughs contends that a mental health 

evaluation could have led to evidence that could have resulted 

in a downward variance from the guideline range in addition 

to the downward departure he received under § 5K1.1. But 

this argument rests on the assumption that the district court 

would have provided funding for an evaluation. 

Because “[i]t cannot be true . . . that a defendant always 

has a right to a psychiatrist under § 3006A,” United States v. 

Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the CJA 

requires a showing of necessity, see, e.g., United States v. 

Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he 

defendant must do more than allege that the services would be 

helpful.”). “Necessity is made out where . . . a reasonable 

attorney would engage such services for a client having the 

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independent means to pay for them.” United States v. 

Anderson, 39 F.3d 331, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal 

quotation marks omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 59 F.3d 

1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). Burroughs points to four 

factors he thinks demonstrate that expert mental health 

assistance was necessary in his case: the nature of the offense, 

his lack of prior convictions, his post-incarceration 

depression, and his request to enter a sex offender treatment 

program. See Reply Br. at 4. Setting aside for a moment his 

depression, the factors Burroughs invokes are present in the 

case of nearly every first-time sex offender seeking a mental 

health evaluation. Paid counsel regularly and ably represent 

their clients in these circumstances without the aid of expert 

psychologists. Clearly these allegations do not suffice to show 

the necessity of expert services under the CJA. 

About his depression, the Presentence Investigation 

Report notes that Burroughs was briefly treated for 

“depression and adjustment disorder with depressed mood” 

following “a difficult adjustment to incarceration.” PSR ¶ 41. 

Burroughs provides no reason to think that his trouble 

acclimating to prison indicates that he suffers from other, 

underlying mental health issues. Indeed, his initial difficulties 

may reflect nothing more than the normal course of 

adjustment to life in prison. See Craig Haney, The 

Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for 

Postprison Adjustment, in PRISONERS ONCE REMOVED 33, 37–

40 (Jeremy Travis & Michelle Waul eds., 2003). Without 

more—and Burroughs offers nothing more—his postincarceration depression provides no basis for concluding that 

a mental health evaluation was necessary for adequate 

representation at sentencing. See United States v. Anderson, 

547 F.3d 831, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2008).

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Should an evidentiary hearing demonstrate the truth of 

everything Burroughs alleges, it still would not be reasonably 

probable that the district court would have granted him 

funding under the CJA. Without “any substantial issue that 

requires a determination of facts,” Poston, 902 F.2d at 99 n.9, 

a remand is unwarranted. Burroughs’s claim of ineffective 

assistance fails because he has not raised a colorable claim of 

prejudice under the second prong of Strickland. 

III. 

A sentencing court has discretion to impose any 

condition of supervised release “it considers to be 

appropriate” so long as the condition is reasonably related to 

factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), involves no 

greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, 

and is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(d). Burroughs challenges several conditions of his 

release as inconsistent with the relevant § 3553(a) factors. 

Before turning to his arguments, we address our standard of 

review. 

A. 

In United States v. Sullivan, we explained that the 

standard of review for a challenge to a special condition of 

supervised release depends on whether the defendant first 

objected in the district court. 451 F.3d 884, 892–95 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). When the defendant has done so, we review for abuse 

of discretion “how the trial court measured the conditions 

imposed against the statutorily enumerated sentencing goals.” 

Id. at 895. But when the defendant has failed to raise the issue 

in the district court, we ask whether the condition “is so 

plainly out of sync with the statutory goals enumerated in 

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§ 3553(a) as to warrant reversal under a plain error standard 

of review.” Id.; accord Love, 593 F.3d at 11, 14.1

 

Burroughs concedes that his lawyers did not contest in 

the district court the conditions he now challenges and that 

Sullivan calls for plain error review. He argues, however, that 

Sullivan is in tension with our subsequent decision in United 

States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In Bras, we 

held that a defendant need not lodge with the district court a 

specific objection to the reasonableness of the length of his 

prison sentence in order to avoid plain error review on appeal. 

See id. at 113. The argument over the length of imprisonment 

that ordinarily precedes sentencing is sufficient to preserve 

the issue. Requiring another challenge—expressly couched in 

terms of “reasonableness”—after the court has pronounced 

the sentence would exalt form over substance. Id. Burroughs 

argues that the logic of Bras likewise applies to challenges to 

supervised release conditions, eliminating the need to 

challenge such conditions before the district court. According 

to Burroughs, under this reasoning, a condition may be 

 

1

 Every circuit agrees that the plain error standard governs when the 

defendant fails to make his position on a condition of supervised 

release known to the district court. See United States v. 

Garrasteguy, 559 F.3d 34, 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Warren, 

186 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Smathers, 351 F. 

App’x 801, 802 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2009) (unpublished); United 

States v. Balderas, 358 F. App’x 575, 578–81 (5th Cir. Dec. 23, 

2009) (unpublished); United States v. Kingsley, 241 F.3d 828, 837–

38 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 370 (7th 

Cir. 2008); United States v. Alvarez, 478 F.3d 864, 866–68 (8th Cir. 

2007); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 618–19 (9th Cir. 

2003); United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 

1999); United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1137, 1139–40 

(11th Cir. 2009). 

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challenged in the first instance on appeal, where it will be 

reviewed for abuse of discretion rather than plain error. 

 We think Burroughs misreads Bras and adhere to the 

view that “[t]he proper standard of review here is plain error.” 

Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 894. When a defendant fails to preserve 

a substantive challenge to a special condition of supervised 

release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1), the court of appeals can 

vacate the condition only if it is “plainly out of sync with” the 

relevant statutory factors. Id. at 895. 

“The very word ‘review’ presupposes that a litigant’s 

arguments have been raised and considered in the tribunal of 

first instance.” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 895 (1991) 

(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 

The federal rules require that a party timely inform the trial 

court of either “the action the party wishes the court to take, 

or the party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds 

for that objection.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b). Errors “not 

brought to the court’s attention” are subject to review only for 

plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). The Bras court did not 

suggest otherwise. The government argued in Bras that the 

length of a sentence should be reviewed only for plain error 

when the defendant did not object that the sentence imposed 

was “unreasonable.” We disagreed. “Reasonableness,” we 

explained, “is the standard of appellate review, not an 

objection that must be raised upon the pronouncement of a 

sentence.” Bras, 483 F.3d at 113 (citation omitted). The 

defendant need not “label his sentence ‘unreasonable’ before 

the sentencing hearing adjourn[s]” “[s]ince the district court 

will already have heard argument and allocution from the 

parties and weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors before 

pronouncing sentence.” Id. (quoting United States v. CastroJuarez, 425 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). 

In other words, objecting to the “reasonableness” of the 

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sentence is unnecessary because a defendant’s arguments that 

the § 3553(a) factors favor a shorter sentence have already 

notified the court of the grounds for “the action the party 

wishes the court to take.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 51(b). The rules 

require no more to avoid plain error review. See United States 

v. Rashad, 396 F.3d 398, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States 

v. Morgan, 581 F.2d 933, 939 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also

United States v. Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(requiring a “reasonableness” objection from a defendant who 

has already argued for a lower sentence would be inconsistent 

with Rule 51(b)). 

United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 

which we decided after oral argument in this case, is of no 

help to Burroughs. In Russell, we reviewed a defendant’s 

challenge to the reasonableness of the length of his supervised 

release. See id. at 633–36. The defendant was sentenced to a 

term of supervised release of thirty years despite having 

argued at his sentencing hearing that five years would be 

more appropriate. See Reply Br. at 4 n.1, United States v. 

Russell, 600 F.3d 631 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3120); see 

also Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 13, United States v. Russell, Crim. 

No. 06-176 (Sept. 28, 2006) (“I was going to ask you for a 

period of three years supervised release, but if you think that 

that would be too short, to impose a period of five years 

supervised release, and require counseling when he’s 

released.”). Like Bras, however, Russell did not expressly 

object to the reasonableness of the district court’s sentencing 

determination after it was made. Russell, 600 F.3d at 633. As 

to the standard of review, “we [found] the reasoning in Bras

to be persuasive,” id. at 634, and held “that we review claims 

of substantive reasonableness for abuse of discretion, 

regardless of whether an objection on those terms was made,” 

id. at 633 (emphasis added). 

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Under Bras and Russell, a defendant’s argument to the 

district court regarding the length of his term of imprisonment 

or supervised release preserves for appeal the issue of whether 

the sentence imposed was unreasonable. He need not also take 

exception to the reasonableness of the sentence once it is 

pronounced. Even if the same principle applied to conditions 

of supervised release, the defendant in this case did not 

oppose the challenged conditions at any point—not in his 

sentencing memorandum, not in allocution before the 

sentence was pronounced, and not after it was imposed. 

Where, as here, the defendant altogether fails to inform the 

court that he opposes a condition of supervised release, Bras

and Russell are inapposite. Instead, Sullivan controls, and the 

“appellate court reviews for plain error under [Rule 52(b)].” 

Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 894 (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted).

In applying Rule 52(b), we will vacate a plainly 

erroneous condition of supervised release only if it impinges 

upon the defendant’s “substantial rights,” FED. R. CRIM. P. 

52(b), in a way that “‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity 

or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’” United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (quoting United States v. 

Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)). 

B. 

Burroughs challenges three conditions that restrict his 

computer use. These conditions require him (1) to submit to 

Probation Office monitoring of his computer use and to pay 

for the monitoring technology himself; (2) to keep a daily log 

of any Internet activity unrelated to his employment; and 

(3) to inform potential employers of any computer-related 

conditions of his supervised release.2

 We consider the 

 

2

 The challenged conditions read: 

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monitoring and log-keeping conditions together and vacate 

both, but we affirm the employer-notification requirement. 

Burroughs did not use a computer to facilitate his crimes. 

We are told that he owns a computer, that the government 

searched it after his arrest, and that the search turned up 

nothing illegal. The government did not recommend that the 

court impose any supervised release conditions related to 

computers. See Gov’t Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing at 

17. The Probation Office did, but neither the Probation Office 

nor the district court explained its reasons for restricting 

Burroughs’s computer access. Not knowing the court’s 

reasons for imposing these conditions, finding the 

government’s reasons unsupported by the record, and unable 

to identify any ourselves, we vacate the conditions as plainly 

out of sync with the relevant factors and remand for further 

proceedings. 

Section 3583(d)(1) of Title 18 requires that discretionary 

conditions of supervised release be “reasonably related to the 

factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), 

and (a)(2)(D).” Those factors are: “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and 

 

Computer Search – . . . . Defendant shall allow installation of 

any hardware or software systems to monitor his computer use 

and shall pay for the cost of such monitoring equipment. 

Computer Restriction – Defendant shall maintain a daily log 

of all addresses accessed by way of any computer, other than 

those authorized for employment, and he shall make the log 

available to the Probation Office for review. Defendant shall 

consent to third party disclosure to any employer or potential 

employer, concerning any computer related restrictions that 

are imposed upon defendant. 

Judgment at 4. 

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characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); the 

need “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,” id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B); the need “to protect the public from further 

crimes of the defendant,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(C); and the need 

“to provide the defendant with needed educational or 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment in the most effective manner,” id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

The government does not even attempt to argue that the 

computer restrictions are reasonably related to two of the 

statutory factors: the history and characteristics of the 

defendant and the need to provide general deterrence to 

criminal conduct. We can nevertheless affirm, the government 

contends, because the restrictions are consistent with the 

nature and circumstances of the offense, the need to protect 

the public from further crimes of the defendant, and the need 

to provide the defendant with needed educational and 

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 

treatment. 

We disagree that the computer restrictions are reasonably 

related to “the nature and circumstances of the offense.” Id.

§ 3553(a)(1). The government argues that these restrictions 

are related to Burroughs’s conduct because the Internet can be 

used to arrange sexual encounters with minors and to 

advertise minors for prostitution. Of course it can. But from 

drug dealers to Ponzi schemers and smugglers to stalkers—

nearly any criminal can use the Internet to facilitate illegal 

conduct. That an offense is sometimes committed with the 

help of a computer does not mean that the district court can 

restrict the Internet access of anyone convicted of that 

offense. 

If Internet restrictions were appropriate for every 

defendant convicted of a sex offense against a minor, we 

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think the Sentencing Guidelines would say so. See United 

States v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 77 (1st Cir. 2009) 

(“The Sentencing Commission creates such generally 

applicable conditions of supervised release, not appellate 

judges.”). Section 5D1.3(d)(7) of the Guidelines recommends 

conditions of supervised release for every defendant 

convicted of a sex offense against a minor. U.S. SENTENCING 

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5D1.3(d)(7) (2007); see also id.

§ 5D1.2 cmt. n.1. Conditions “limiting the use of a computer 

or an interactive computer service” make the list, but only “in 

cases in which the defendant used such items.” Id.

§ 5D1.3(d)(7)(B). By implication, restrictions on computer or 

Internet access are not categorically appropriate in cases 

where the defendant did not use them to facilitate his crime. 

The government points to no facts making the computer 

restrictions reasonably related to the nature and circumstances 

of Burroughs’s offense that would not also make computer 

restrictions appropriate for every defendant convicted of the 

same crimes. We cannot affirm the conditions on this ground.

Cf. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) 

(holding that a restriction on computer and Internet use was 

not “reasonably necessary” to protect the public or the family 

of a defendant convicted of incest or to serve any other 

§ 3553(a)(2) goal when the offense lacked “any connection to 

computers or to the Internet”). 

Nor can it be said that restricting Burroughs’s computer 

access satisfies a need “to protect the public from further 

crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). This 

sentencing factor turns on “the likelihood that [the defendant] 

will . . . commit crimes in the future.” United States v. Mason, 

966 F.2d 1488, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see, e.g., United States 

v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (noting 

that the district court’s finding that the defendant “posed no 

risk of recidivism” was “directly relevant” to the need to 

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protect the public and other § 3553(a) factors). The 

government suggests that because Burroughs’s contact with 

minors will be restricted after his release from prison, “the 

Internet is a likely avenue for obtaining the access he will not 

otherwise have” should he “choose to resume the behavior 

that resulted in his convictions.” Appellee’s Br. at 30. This is 

nothing but post hoc conjecture. The district court did not find 

Burroughs, a first-time offender, likely to recidivate let alone 

use a computer in doing so. Indeed, in explaining its decision 

to sentence Burroughs to 192 months’ imprisonment, the 

court mentioned nearly every § 3553(a) factor but the need to 

protect the public. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 28–30. Because 

the court did not find Burroughs likely to return to his illegal 

course of conduct and did not explain why it deemed the 

computer restrictions appropriate, we have no reason to think 

the court shared the government’s speculation. 

The government finally suggests that the computer 

restrictions will provide Burroughs with needed correctional 

treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). Making passing 

reference to this factor, the government refers us to United 

States v. Johnson, which states that “[r]estrictions on Internet 

use may serve several sentencing objectives, chiefly therapy 

and rehabilitation, as well as the welfare of the community 

(by keeping an offender away from an instrumentality of his 

offenses).” 446 F.3d 272, 281 (2d Cir. 2006). In affirming an 

Internet ban for a defendant who repeatedly used the Internet 

to lure minors for sex, see id. at 274, the Johnson court 

explained that an Internet restriction would “serve[] as an 

external control to predatory Internet behavior, standing in for 

[his] deficient internal controls,” id. at 281–82. But 

Burroughs, unlike Johnson, did not use the Internet as an 

instrument of his offense. There is no reason to think that 

restricting his computer use would have any therapeutic 

value. 

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Having determined that the Internet monitoring and logkeeping conditions are not reasonably related to the statutory 

factors, we ask whether the district court’s error was plain. 

The government first argues that the absence of controlling 

precedent from this court or the Supreme Court prevents us 

from answering ‘yes.’ The lack of case law squarely on point 

does “militate against” finding plain error, United States v. 

Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1982), but it is not 

dispositive, In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851–52 (D.C. 

Cir. 2009). It is sufficient that the challenged conditions of 

supervised release are “plainly out of sync” with the factors 

listed in § 3583(d)(1). Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 895; see also

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734 (“‘Plain’ is synonymous with ‘clear’ 

or, equivalently, ‘obvious.’”). 

We agree with the circuits that have held similar 

computer restrictions to be plainly erroneous in closely 

analogous circumstances. Like Burroughs, the defendant in 

United States v. Smathers was convicted of sexual 

exploitation of a minor; like Burroughs, he did not use a 

computer in committing the offense of conviction; and like 

Burroughs, he had no prior history of illicit computer use. 351 

F. App’x 801, 802 (4th Cir. Nov. 13, 2009) (unpublished). 

The Fourth Circuit held that the condition was plainly 

inconsistent with the statutory factors and inconsistent with 

§ 5D1.3 of the Guidelines. Id. And in United States v. 

Barsumyan, the Ninth Circuit vacated a computer restriction 

imposed on a defendant twice convicted of credit card frauds 

in which he did not use a computer, holding that the 

sentencing court had plainly erred. 517 F.3d 1154, 1160–62 

(9th Cir. 2008). In some cases involving computer restrictions 

imposed on a defendant with no history of illegal computer 

use, courts have remanded for clarification, United States v. 

Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 2004), or for the 

district court to consider less burdensome alternatives, 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 16 of 25
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Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d at 73–74. But the government 

does not direct us to a single case in which a court of appeals 

has affirmed the imposition of such a condition, and its 

inability to articulate a reasonable justification for the 

condition that finds support in the record leads us to conclude 

the district court plainly erred. 

Contrary to the government’s contention, Stanfield does 

not support the district court’s decision. In Stanfield, we 

remanded for clarification of an Internet restriction imposed 

on a defendant who had a “history of identity theft” but “had 

not used the internet in the commission of those crimes.” 360 

F.3d at 1349. The court expressly declined “to address the 

validity of the internet restriction [under § 3583 and the First 

Amendment] in the absence of a clearer understanding of its 

scope.” Id. at 1353. We decline to read into that act of judicial 

restraint an implicit conclusion that the condition was 

reasonable under the statutory factors. Cf. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 

at 895. In any case, even the government’s reading of 

Stanfield suggests nothing more than that in some cases 

restrictions on a defendant’s Internet access may be 

reasonably related to some of the § 3583(d)(1) factors even 

when he does not use a computer to commit his crime. We do 

not foreclose that possibility. On remand, the district court 

may reconsider whether the vacated conditions are 

appropriate in light of the statutory factors. But when the 

sentencing court does not explain why it imposes a special 

condition of supervised release, the government is unable to 

offer a reasonable justification supported by the record, and 

this court cannot discern the basis for the condition, we 

cannot affirm even under the plain-error standard. 

We turn next to whether the district court’s error 

impacted the defendant’s “substantial rights.” FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52(b); see also United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. ___ 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 17 of 25
 18 

(2010). A sentencing error affects substantial rights when 

there is a reasonable likelihood it impacted the sentence. See 

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 1994); 

see also id. at 288 (“[T]he burden of persuasion in showing 

‘prejudice’ should be somewhat lighter in the sentencing 

context [than for errors committed at trial].”). The district 

court imposed the challenged conditions without explaining 

its reasons, and the record does not allow us to infer what 

those reasons might have been. It might be that no 

explanation is possible. Although the district court may 

ultimately decide on remand that Internet monitoring and logkeeping conditions are appropriate, it is reasonably likely that 

the court will reconsider its previous decision and decline to 

impose these conditions a second time. See Perazza-Mercado, 

553 F.3d at 78 (“[T]here is a reasonable probability that the 

court might not have imposed the prohibition if it had fulfilled 

its obligation to explain the basis for the condition or at least 

made sure that the record illuminated the basis for the 

condition.”).

Our final consideration is whether “the error seriously 

affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 852. The district 

court imposed supervised release conditions that were 

inconsistent with the statutory factors and did so without 

explanation. A sentencing court’s failure to explain its 

reasoning may hinder effective appellate review and 

undermine the perceived fairness of sentencing proceedings. 

See In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2008). To 

avoid those “institutional harm[s],” id., we will exercise our 

discretion to correct the error by vacating the conditions 

requiring Burroughs to keep a daily log of his Internet activity 

and to submit to monitoring of his computer use. If the district 

court chooses to impose the same conditions on remand, it 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 18 of 25
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should explain its reasoning and develop the record in support 

of its decision. 

That leaves the related requirement that Burroughs notify 

potential employers of “any computer related restrictions” 

imposed as conditions of his supervised release. Judgment at 

4. We leave this condition intact. The district court provided 

for periodic, unannounced examinations of Burroughs’s 

computer—a condition he has not appealed. When the 

Probation Office conducts its searches, it will have access not 

only to Burroughs’s personal data but to any work-related 

information stored on his computer as well. We see no reason 

why potential employers should not be made aware of that 

fact. 

C. 

Burroughs also challenges the condition requiring that he 

not have direct or indirect contact with children or loiter in 

places where children congregate.3

 This condition is both 

overly broad and impermissibly vague, Burroughs argues, and 

would inhibit his reintegration into the community following 

 

3

 The condition on contact with children is part of a broader 

restriction, which reads in full: 

Contact Restriction – Defendant shall have no direct, or 

indirect, contact with children, age 18 or younger, and refrain 

from loitering in any place where children congregate, 

including but not limited to residences, arcades, parks, 

playgrounds, and schools. Defendant shall not reside with a 

child or children under the age of 18 without the expressed 

and written approval of the minor’s legal guardian and the 

written permission of the Court. 

Judgment at 4 (emphasis added). Burroughs contests only the 

italicized portion of the condition. 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 19 of 25
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imprisonment. We affirm the imposition of this condition but 

do so only after clarifying its scope. 

The government tells us that associational restrictions 

like this one do not prohibit incidental or unintentional 

contact with minors. Appellee’s Br. at 36–38. That 

observation finds support in our survey of the case law. See, 

e.g., Johnson, 446 F.3d at 281 (“Generally, supervised release 

provisions are read to exclude inadvertent violations.”); 

United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 269 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[I]t 

is well established that associational conditions do not extend 

to . . . chance meetings.” (citing Arciniega v. Freeman, 404 

U.S. 4, 4 (1971) (per curiam))). Read against the backdrop of 

this assumption about associational conditions, the restriction 

on “indirect” contact was clearly meant to reach contact by 

means of a computer, phone, other device, or a third-party 

intermediary—not inadvertent or chance contact. Cf. Johnson, 

446 F.3d at 280–81; United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 166 

(5th Cir. 2001). Burroughs says the condition would be 

unobjectionable if it did not encompass unintentional or 

incidental encounters. Reply Br. at 14 n.2. Construing the 

condition in a manner acceptable to both parties, we affirm 

the imposition of the restriction on contact with children. 

D. 

We conclude by briefly addressing the contention that 

Burroughs’s lawyers were ineffective in failing to object to 

the challenged conditions of supervised release. A reasonable 

attorney would have objected, according to Burroughs, and 

thereby avoided plain error review on appeal. Our resolution 

of the appeal moots this argument with respect to all the 

challenged conditions except the employer-notification 

requirement. As to that condition, counsel was not deficient in 

failing to object. “The Sixth Amendment . . . does not pledge 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 20 of 25
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perfection,” United States v. Hurt, 527 F.3d 1347, 1357 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008), and any defect in the condition is not so obvious 

that counsel’s silence signals incompetence, see id. 

IV. 

We vacate the supervised release conditions that require 

the defendant to “allow installation of any hardware or 

software systems to monitor his computer use and . . . pay for 

the cost of such monitoring equipment” and to “maintain a 

daily log of all addresses accessed by way of any computer, 

other than those authorized for employment, and . . . make the 

log available to the Probation Office for review,” and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all 

other respects, we affirm. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 21 of 25
 BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part: I agree appellant has not presented any colorable 

claim that his counsel at trial or at sentencing was 

unconstitutionally ineffective. I also agree unpreserved 

challenges to his supervised release conditions should be 

reviewed under a plain error standard. I disagree, however, 

with the result of this decision and would affirm the district 

court’s sentence in all respects. My disagreement operates at 

two levels. First, I do not believe appellant identified any 

errors so obvious that they satisfy the demanding plain error 

standard. Second, the plain error the court identifies is 

chimerical: at the same time substantive and procedural. This 

oddity, I believe, raises a broader question regarding how this 

circuit treats procedural sentencing challenges. 

 Although the principle is familiar, it bears restating that 

courts rarely grant relief when reviewing for plain error. 

Such relief is appropriate only in exceptional cases in which 

the district court has been so egregiously derelict that it 

causes a miscarriage of justice to hang like a specter over the 

judicial process. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 

163 (1982); United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 

(1936). In appellant’s case, it is difficult to characterize the 

monitoring and logging of his Internet usage as plainly and 

obviously illegal as a substantive matter. And when such 

modest conditions are placed on the freedom of a criminal 

who preyed upon and sexually exploited a child for fun and 

profit, I see no specter. 

 In my view, the computer conditions at issue are not akin 

to the full computer use bans found to be unreasonable in the 

cases to which the court analogizes. See Maj. Op. at 16. 

Appellant is not restricted from using a computer or from 

visiting any Internet site; he is only subject to monitoring. So 

while the court is correct that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

suggest limits on computer use only for sex offenders who 

used computers in their crimes, this suggestion is irrelevant. 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 22 of 25
2 

More helpful is the Guidelines’ suggestion that all sex 

offenders be subject to “a search, at any time, with or without 

a warrant . . . [of any] computer, or other electronic 

communication or data storage devices or media . . . by any 

probation officer in the lawful discharge of the officer’s 

supervision functions.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 

MANUAL § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). That suggestion opens a wide 

avenue for the conditions appellant challenges in this case. 

 

 To counter that reasoning, appellant cites no case—and 

the court finds none—in which monitoring and logging of a 

sex offender’s Internet usage was found to be 

incommensurate with the generally worded factors referenced 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). The court recognizes this, 

volunteers that a lack of precedent militates against a finding 

of plain error, and even cites a case of this court holding that 

issues of first impression present plain error only when they 

tread upon “a well-established constitutional or legal 

principle,” United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1342 

(D.C. Cir. 1982). See Maj. Op. at 16. However, the court 

goes against the grain of precedent by stating that the 

conditions at issue “are ‘plainly out of sync’ with the factors 

listed in § 3583(d)(1).” Even putting aside that the conditions 

can be easily justified on the basis of the statute’s deterrence 

and public protection factors, the court’s statement is hard to 

square with its later contention that it is not foreclosing the 

possibility that the conditions “may be reasonably related to 

some of the § 3583(d) factors” on remand, Maj. Op. at 17. If 

the court is not foreclosing reasonableness, it is a fortiori

foreclosing plain error. 

 My opinion up to this point treats appellant’s appeal as a 

substantive challenge to his release conditions, and the court 

insists it does the same in its opinion. But by contemplating 

that the conditions could be rehabilitated on remand with 

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3 

further explanation, the court appears to ascribe procedural

plain error to the district court for not connecting the 

conditions to the relevant statutory factors. See Maj. Op. at 

12 (“Not knowing the court’s reasons for imposing these 

conditions . . . we vacate the conditions as plainly out of sync 

with the relevant factors.”). This wrinkle in the court’s 

opinion deserves more discussion, first because a proper 

procedural analysis would still not result in a finding of plain 

error and, second, because it sheds light on a latent problem 

in this circuit’s caselaw regarding procedural sentencing 

appeals. 

 If viewed as a procedural challenge, appellant’s argument 

for plain error would be stronger, but ultimately unsuccessful. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553—the portion of the U.S. Code pertaining to 

the imposition of a sentence—mandates that a court “at the 

time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons of its 

imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 

This court has held that failure to provide such a statement to 

support the length of a prison sentence is plain error. See In 

re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2008). But 

what we have not yet held is that failure to provide reasons 

for conditions of release is plain error. In fact, we have held 

the opposite, albeit in a brief dismissal of an equally brief 

argument. See United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884, 896 

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding no plain error where appellant 

proffered a “terse contention” that the district court failed to 

“substantiate” conditions of supervised release). 

 There is tension between those two holdings, and it 

hinges on whether conditions of supervised release are part of 

the “sentence” that § 3553 requires to be supported by a 

statement of reasons. It is arguable they are, since the 

statutory section regulating release conditions authorizes 

courts to include conditions “as part of the sentence.” 18 

USCA Case #08-3085 Document #1255575 Filed: 07/16/2010 Page 24 of 25
4 

U.S.C. § 3583(a). And it seems logical that if courts must 

explain one deprivation of liberty, they must explain others as 

well. 

But the question is also arguable the other way. The 

structure of Title 18 indicates sentences and release 

conditions are separate concepts: it discusses them in 

separate, non-consecutive sections. Looking specifically at 

§ 3583, it does not contain a requirement that courts explain 

the imposition of release conditions and it does not reference 

the explanation requirement in § 3553. When § 3583 does 

reference § 3553, it only borrows factors to be considered in 

crafting release conditions, see id. § 3583(c), implying that 

the omission of a reference to § 3553’s explanation 

requirement is deliberate. 

 The point of this opinion is not to resolve this question. 

The only issue in this case, assuming a procedural challenge, 

is whether the district court’s failure to explain release 

conditions was an obvious enough error to constitute plain 

error. As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, any 

procedural error was far from clear. But there will no doubt 

be a case—perhaps in the near future—in which this court 

will have to provide clarity. 

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