Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00151/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00151-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Fernando Gomez-Moreira
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

LAURA D. WITHERS

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

JOSE FERNANDO GOMEZ-MOREIRA,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00151-NONE-SKO

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS 

CONFERENCE AND REGARDING 

EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY 

TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

This case was previously scheduled for a status conference on April 21, 2021. On May 13, 2020, 

this Court issued General Order 618, which indefinitely continues the prior suspension of all jury trials 

in the Eastern District of California and the prior courthouse closures as set forth in General Order 617. 

These and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID19.

Although the General Orders addressthe district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

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orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through their counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows.

1. This case was previously set for a status conference on April 21, 2021.

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until May 19, 

2021, and to exclude time between April 21, 2021 and May 19, 2021, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

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a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case has 

been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, 

including an additional recording, which it recently helped counsel for defendant obtain.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery and consult 

with his client about a possible resolution in this case. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 21, 2021 to May 19, 2021, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 14, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ LAURA D. WITHERS

LAURA D. WITHERS

Assistant United States Attorney

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Dated: April 14, 2021 /s/ Benjamin Gerson

BENJAMIN GERSON

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE FERNANDO GOMEZMOREIRA

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this ____ day of ___________, _____. 

THE HONORABLE SHEILA K. OBERTO

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16th April 2021

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