Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01124/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-01124-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hieu Trung Nguyen
Petitioner
David L. Runnels
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

HIEU TRUNG NGUYEN,

Petitioner,

 v.

DAVID L. RUNNELS, WARDEN,

Respondent.

 

No. 04-1124 SBA

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY

[Docket No. 36]

Petitioner Nieu Trung Nguyen has filed a notice of appeal of the denial of his petition for the writ

of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b) provides that if

an appeal is taken by a petitioner in a habeas corpus action, the district judge who rendered the judgment

shall either issue a certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) or state reasons why such

a certificate should not issue. If no express request is made for a certificate of appealability, the notice

of appeal shall be deemed to constitute a request for a certificate. United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268,

1270 (9th Cir. 1997). For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the application for a certificate

of appealability.

BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2001, following a jury trial, Nguyen was convicted of one count of second-degree

murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187) and one count of assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code §

245(a)(1)), along with enhancements for personally using a knife (Cal. Penal Code § 12022(b)(1)) and

inflicting great bodily injury (Cal. Penal Code § 12022.7), to which charges he had pleaded not guilty.

Clerk’s Transcript (CT) 980, 984. On September 21, 2001, Nguyen was sentenced to state prison for

a total of 23 years to life. Reporter’s Transcript (RT) 1131. 

Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal, arguing

that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel at trial when his attorney failed to seek

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appropriate jury instructions and failed to object to inadmissible lay opinion testimony from a police

officer to the effect that Nguyen was lying. The Court of Appeals denied his petition, without issuing

an order to show cause, on June 25, 2003. Resp’t Ex. 7. Nguyen petitioned the California Supreme

Court for review of the denial of his habeas petition but was denied review on September 17, 2003.

On March 22, 2004, Nguyen filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, asserting

violations of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Docket No. 1. On March 21, 2007, this

Court issued an Order denying Nguyen’s petition on all claims. See Docket No. 34. 

On April 19, 2007, Nguyen filed a request for a certificate of appealability in this Court. See

Docket No. 36.

LEGAL STANDARDS

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding without first

obtaining a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). When a

petitioner files a notice of appeal from an order dismissing or denying a petition, the district judge who

rendered the judgment denying the petition must either issue a certificate of appealability or state why

a certificate should not issue. See FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1). A court shall grant a certificate of

appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable

jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable . See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The certificate must indicate which issues

satisfy this standard and the Court of Appeals is limited to considering only those claims. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(3); Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). 

“Where a district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required

to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would

find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack, 529 U.S.

at 484. Except for substituting the word “constitutional” for the word “federal,” section 2253(c)(2)

codified the standard announced by the United States Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.

880, 893-94 (1983). See Slack, 529 U.S. at 483. In Barefoot, the Court explained that “a substantial

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showing of the denial of [a] federal right” means that a petitioner “must demonstrate that the issues are

debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that

the questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” 463 U.S. at 893 n.4 (citations

and internal quotations omitted). Any doubts about whether the Barefoot standard has been met must

be resolved in petitioner’s favor. Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1025 (9th Cir. 2000).

ANALYSIS

A. Standard for Request for Certificate of Appealability

In his request for a COA, a petitioner must attempt to “demonstrat[e] that reasonable jurists

would find that his constitutional claims are debatable.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. Nguyen has

not attempted to prove that constitutionally debatable questions exist; rather, he has simply reiterated

selected arguments from his original petition for habeas [Docket No. 1], which were all dealt with in the

Order denying him relief [Docket No. 34].

B. Merits of Petitioner’s Argument

Even if Nguyen’s request for a COA had properly attempted to demonstrate debatable

constitutional claims, his arguments--that jury instructions were deficient regarding the victim’s

assaultive character, imperfect self-defense, and assault, and that his counsel was inadequate,

particularly in not objecting to certain testimony--are insufficient such that no reasonable jurist would

support his petition for habeas corpus.

1. Jury Instructions

The substance of Nguyen’s motion is that his sentence is illegal because of several errors in jury

instruction, to which his counsel did not object. 

a. Assaultive Character Instruction

Nguyen argues that evidence demonstrating his victim’s violent propensities supported his selfdefense claim, and that a judicial explanation as to how the jury should take such evidence into account

was required. See Pet’r’s Req. for COA 5 [Docket No. 36].

“A defendant is entitled to an instruction on his theory of the case ‘provided that it is supported

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by law and has some foundation in the evidence.’” United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th

Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Dees, 34 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir.1994)). Yet “[i]t is not reversible

error to reject a defendant's proposed instruction on his theory of the case if other instructions, in their

entirety, adequately cover that defense theory.” Id. 

Like the defendant’s in Del Muro, Nguyen’s proposed instruction was not a “theory of the

defense” instruction: it merely highlighted the particular evidence of Rogers’s prior assaultive conduct

that Nguyen believed supported his claim of innocence. The California Court of Appeal called these

pinpoint instructions, because “they merely directed the jury on how to view specific evidence in

relation to the elements of the offense and/or the affirmative defenses raised by defendant.” Resp’t Ex.

7 at 6-7. The jury had already been instructed “to consider the evidence as reflecting upon Rogers’s

current behavior and there was nothing to prevent the jury from considering the evidence as

demonstrating the victim’s propensity.” Id. at 7.

Nguyen cites People v. Wright, 39 Cal. 3d 576 (1985), in support of the propositions that

evidence of a victim’s violent character is admissible and that it is not necessary for a defendant to have

known of this character trait. See Pet’r’s Req. for COA 5 [Docket No. 36]. “Under Evidence Code §

1103, such character traits can be shown by evidence of specific acts of the victim on third persons as

well as by general reputation evidence.” People v. Wright, 39 Cal. 3d at 587. United States v. Keiser,

57 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1029 (1995), more thoroughly supports the latter

proposition, while simultaneously holding that only if “proof, or failure of proof, of the character trait

by itself actually satisf[ies] an element of the charge, claim, or defense,” is it admissible; if not, then

character is not essential and evidence should be limited to opinion or reputation.” Keiser, 57 F.3d at

856. Once the court has determined that the victim’s violent character is not an “essential element” of

the defense [FED. R. EVID. 405(B)], exclusion is proper. Here, as in Keiser, the “claim of self-defense

neither rises nor falls on [the defendant’s] success in proving that [the victim] has a penchant for

violen[ce]. Thus, [the defendant] ha[s] no right to introduce evidence of the incident . . . to buttress his

defense.” Keiser, 57 F.3d at 857.

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Since there is no federal right to present such evidence in support of a defense, it cannot be said

that failure to instruct on the use of such evidence is “contrary to” established federal law. Hence,

reasonable jurists would not find “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” [28

U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)]. Therefore, Nguyen is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this ground.

b. Imperfect Self-Defense Instruction

Nguyen argues that the jury was given an overly broad definition of “unlawful or wrongful

conduct,” such that the jury might have believed it could make a moral judgment that it was wrong of

Nguyen merely to join the fight or pick up a machete, rather than the definition of the “initiation of a

physical confrontation,”described in In re Christian, 7 Cal. 4th 768, 773 n.1 (1994).

The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court had no duty to sua sponte clarify the

instruction for the jury, since “the standard instruction correctly and adequately explained the applicable

law.” Resp’t Ex. 7 at 8 (citing People v. Kelly, 822 P.2d 385 (Cal. 1992)). “Having failed to request

clarification, defendant cannot now complain about the wording of the instruction,” due to the state

procedural default rule. Resp’t Ex. 7 at 8 (citing People v. Bolin, 956 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1998)).

Nguyen cannot now argue the merits of this claim, for “in all cases in which a state prisoner has

defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule,

federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default

and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to

consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.

722, 750 (1991). Both federal and state law are clear, and Nguyen has demonstrated neither actual

prejudice attributable to the default caused by his counsel’s lack of objection nor potential for a

fundamental miscarriage of justice: no reasonable jurist would dispute this Court’s previous finding.

c. Assault Instruction

Nguyen argues that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the prosecution must prove

he had knowledge of the essential facts, i.e., that people were close enough to be struck by the sword,

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removed an element of the case from the jury’s consideration, thus violating his right to due process.

The trial court instructed the jury that a defendant “could be convicted of assault if he

intentionally did an act which was ‘probably’ or was ‘substantially certain’ to result in a battery. Such

a defendant might be acting recklessly or negligently, but an “assault requires actual knowledge of the

facts sufficient to establish that the defendant's act by its nature will probably and directly result in

injury to another,” People v. Williams 26 Cal. 4th 779, 782 (2001); thus, the “issue in this case . . . is

whether [Nguyen] knew that he was probably going to hit someone and [swung the machete] anyway,

or whether he was just swinging wildly and struck someone negligently or recklessly.” Pet’r’s Req. for

COA [Docket No. 36]. 

The California Court of Appeal recognized that California Jury Instruction 9.00 ambiguously

describes the mens rea of assault and applied a harmless error standard, i.e., whether the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict similar to that used in

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Resp’t Ex. 7 at 7. As the Court of Appeal explained,

however,

The evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated [Nguyen’s] knowledge of those facts

establishing that his act by its very nature would directly, naturally, and probably result

in battery. [He] swung a two-foot sword in a group of people during a melee. [He]

testified that he thought the sword made contact with people, “Because when I was

swinging around it, [sic] could have hit someone.”

Resp’t Ex. 7 at 7-8. This evidence strongly supports a finding that Nguyen had knowledge of the facts

that an error-free instruction would have directed the jury to find. Thus, it was not objectively

unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

the instructional error did not contribute to Nguyen’s assault conviction.

A reasonable jurist would not conclude the issue should have been resolved differently; thus,

Nguyen is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this ground.

2. Inadequacy of Counsel

Nguyen asserts that his trial counsel should have objected to the police officer’s statement that

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he disbelieved Nguyen’s claim of self-defense. The state appellate court found that there was a

legitimate tactical reason for not objecting, i.e., demonstrating officer bias in order to prove that

“Sergeant Sequeira intentionally misrepresented and misinterpreted defendant’s interview responses to

get defendant to incriminate himself.” Resp’t Ex. 7 at 11. An appellate court “will affirm the judgment

‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be

no satisfactory explanation.’” People v. Hart, 20 Cal. 4th 546, 623-24 (1999) (citing People v. Pope,

23 Cal. 3d 412, 426 (1979)). 

Nguyen’s charge that his counsel acted unreasonably is insufficient to overcome the “strong

presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984), because “on appeal, a conviction will be reversed

on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel ‘only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses

that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission.’” People v. Fosselman, 33 Cal. 3d

572, 581 (1983). A reasonable jurist would not find this issue debatable; Nguyen is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on this ground.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the application for a COA is DENIED. Nguyen has not demonstrated

that reasonable jurists would find this Court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or

wrong. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The Clerk of the Court shall forward to the

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the case file with this Order. See United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268,

1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

June 25, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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