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Parties Involved:
Charles Gene Maines
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

CHARLES GENE MAINES, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth ci~<'nit 

DEC 1 0 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-5089 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D. C. No. 89-CR-80-B) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Tony M. Graham, United States Attorney, and Susan w. Pennington, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

June E. Tyhurst, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Tulsa, 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, and BRIMMER, 

Chief District Judge*. 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge. 

* Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 1 
I 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

On June 8, 1988, the defendant-appellant, Charles Gene Maines 

(Maines), was charged in a one-count indictment with having 

violated 18 u.s.c. § 922(g)(l), which prohibits the possession of 

a firearm by a convicted felon. 1 That section subjects violators 

to a statutory sentencing range of zero to five years' 

imprisonment. In January 1989 the government filed an enhancement 

of sentence information pursuant to § 924(e)(l), charging that 

Maines had committed three previous "violent felonies." 2 Section 

924(e)(l) provides for significantly greater punishment than 

§ 922(g)(l), subjecting Maines, inter alia, to a mandatory minimum 

1 

2 

Section 922(g) provides: 

It shall be unlawful for any person--

(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or 

foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, 

any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or 

ammunition which has been shipped or transported in 

interstate or foreign commerce. 

The government initially alleged in its sentence enhancement 

information that Maines had committed four prior "violent 

felonies." The government later agreed that two of the four 

convictions should be combined into one because they arose out of 

the same set of circumstances. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 2 
sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment to life, 

opportunity for probation. 3 18 u.s.c. § 924(e) (1). 

with no 

On January 9, 1989, Maines entered a plea o f guilty to the 

one-count indictment involving§ 922(g)(l), but pled not guilty to 

the government's information for sentence enhancement under 

§ 924( e)(1) . Maines asserted that one of the three previous 

''violent felonies" that the government charged him with in the 

sentence enhancement information, a 1973 conviction for burglary 

in Texas, was not a "violent felony" as defined in§ 924(e}(1). 

He conceded that the two other prior convictions contained in the 

Information constituted "violent felonies" under§ 924(e){l). 

II 

On February 1, 1989, the court held a hearing on the 

appropriateness of applying § 924(e)(1) to Maines. The trial 

court entered a written order on May 10, 1989, addressing the 

contentions concerning sentence enhancement under § 924(e)(i). 

The court found that by stipulation and introduction of court 

documents three felony convictions were introduced: (1) 

3 

Section 924(e)(1) states: 

In case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this 

title and has three previous convictions by any court 

referred to in§ 922(g)(l) of this title for a violent 

felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on 

occasions different from one another, such person shall 

be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less 

than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, the court shall not suspend the 

sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such 

person with respect to the conviction under section 

922(g), and such person shall not be eligible for parole 

with respect to the sentence imposed under this 

subsection. 

a 

Section 1402 of Subtitle I (the Career Criminals Amendment Act of 

1986) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 18 u.s.c. § 924(e)(l). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 3 
December 1973 conviction in Grayson County, Texas, "of burglary 

.. [of a residence ]J " (2} a 1978 conviction i n Bryan County, 

Oklahoma, of manslaughter in the first degree; and (3) a 1984 

conviction in Bryan County, Okla homa, "of shooting with intent to 

kill AFCF." The court noted that convictions (2) and (3) were 

.conceded to f all within the violent felony provisions of 

§ 924(e) (i ) , but that defendant Maines asserted a constitutional 

challenge to the government's r e liance on conviction (1). 

The order quoted from the Information of December 19, 1973, 

which charged defendant with the offense in Grayson County, Texas, 

and contained the following terms: 

on or about the 7th day of October A. D. 1973,. and 

anterior to the filing of this information, in the 

County of Grayson, and State of Texas, CHARLIE GENE 

MAINES did then and there unlawfully, by force, threats, 

and fraud, break and enter a house then and there 

occupied and controlled by Marion Harris hereinafter 

called "Injured Party" with the intent then and there to 

fraudulently take therefrom corporeal personal property 

therein being and then and there belonging to the said 

Injured Party from the possession of the said Injured 

Party, without the consent of said Injured Party, and 

with the intent then and there to deprive the said 

Injured Party, of the value of the same, and to 

appropriate the same to the use and benefit of the said 

Defendant, CHARLIE GENE MAINES against the peace and 

dignity of the State. 

Defendant does not dispute that it was this 1973 charge 

respecting conviction (1) to which defendant pled guilty in the 

Texas court and was sentenced to five years' confinement, the 

defendant being placed on probation by the Texas court. The order 

of the federal district court noted a discourse by the court with 

defense counsel. The order referred to the charge document, 

quoted above, and stated that defense counsel conceded that 

conviction (1) was a result of a guilty plea or a verdict and 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 4 
finding of guilty "of that particular residential burglary." 

Order at 4. 

The district court's order rejected defendant Maines' 

constitutional claims that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) violated due 

process in that defendant was denied the right to be sentenced on 

the particular facts of his case, and that due process was 

infringed because§ 924{e}(l) does not bear a reasonable relation 

to a legitimate legislative purpose. The order concluded that 

defendant's claim of violation of the equal protection component 

of the Due Process Clause also failed. It was argued that there 

is a wide disparity between the stat·es as to the elements of 

burglary. The court held, however, that the concluding provision 

of § 924 (e) ( 1) was applicable here because the defendant's conduc·t 

concerning conviction ( 1 )· in Texas presented a serious potential 

risk of personal injury to another within the meaning of the 

concluding catchall provision of§ 924(e)(l). The order lastly 

held that the sentencing enhancement mandated by § 924{e)(l) did 

not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 

The district judge sentenced Maines to 15 years' imprisonment 

without parole, with credit for time served in jail under the 

federal offense, and four years' supervised release. 

III 

Maines appeals his enhanced sentence, reasserting objections 

to application of§ 924(e)(l) in his sentencing. He argues: that 

his 1973 Texas conviction for "burglary" was not common law 

burglary, which definition the statute adopted, and thus not a 

"violent felony" under§ 924(e)(l); that construing burglary as 

variously defined by the several states violates equal protection 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 5 
principles; and that the district court erred in holding that nts 

1973 Texas conviction was for an offense that "otherwise involves 

conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 

to another," under the concluding catchall provision of the 

enhancement statute. 

We are of the opinion that our review is one of legal 

determinations made by the district court in its order and 

sentence, in considering the claims of error asserted here by 

M • 4 a~nes. In doing so we have a controlling recent decision of the 

Supreme Court, which the district judge did not have, Taylor v. 

United States, ---u.s. _____ , 110 s.ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607. 

Taylor made several rulings of particular significance here. 

Because of the decision it is unnecessary to address specifically 

the district court's thoughtful review of Maines' equal protection 

concerns since Taylor established a uniform definition of the term 

"burglary" for the purpose of sentence enhancement under 

§ 924(e). 5 The Court made clear its construction of the term 

"burglary" in Taylor, slip op. at 22: 

4 

We review de novo questions of law such as the district 

court's statutory interpretation of § 924(e) of the Armed Career 

Criminal Act in this case. See United States v. Irwin, 906 F.2d 

1424, 1426 (lOth Cir. 1990). See also United States v. Smith, 900 

F.2d 1442, 1445-46 (lOth Cir. 1990) (interpretation of sentencing 

guidelines is closely analogous to statutory interpretation, 

involving questions of law subject to de DQYQ review). The 

related constitutional claims are reviewed on the same basis. 

5 

See, ~.g., United States v. Silex, 907 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 

1990) (citing Taylor, court overrules holding in United States v. 

Leonard, 868 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1989) that "burglary" under 

§ 924(e) is defined by various states); United States v. O'Neal, 

910 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting Taylor, court overrules 

United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1989) and its 

common law definition of "burglary" under§ 924(e)). 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 6 
We conclude that a person has been convicted of 

burglary for purposes of § 924(e) enhancement if he is 

convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact 

definition or label, having the basic elements of 

unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a 

building or structure, with intent to commit a crime. 

This court had previously applied the definition of burglary 

as it appeared in the Armed Career Criminal Act: "'burglary' is 

'any felony punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one 

year and consisting of entering or remaining surreptitiously 

within a building that is the property of another with intent to 

engage in conduct constituting a Federal or State offense.'" 

United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245, 250 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

This definition is similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court in 

Taylor, quoted above, but we will, of course, apply the precise 

definition from Taylor, as we do here. 

Taylor is also instructive in holding that § 924(e) mandates 

a formal categorical approach in deciding whether a prior crime 

may be considered for enhancement purposes - "looking only to the 

statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the 

particular facts underlying those convictions." Taylor, slip op. 

at 23. 

IV 

Following the approved procedure, we conclude that Maines' 

1973 burglary conviction does come within the enhancement 

provisions of§ 924(e). The evidence offered by the government 

consisted of the 1973 Information, quoted earlier, which charged 

that Maines did "by force, threats, and fraud, break and enter a 

house II The Texas court did not state which statute the 

conviction of Maines was under, saying only that his guilty plea 

was received and entered, and finding that "Defendant is guilty of 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 7 
the offense of burglary . . . " The court imposed a sentence of 

five years' confinement but placed Maines on prqbation. 6 Maines' 

brief on appeal states that the offense must be for a violation of 

Article 1390, Vernon's Texas Statutes Annotated, which provides: 

"Buralarv" by breakinq. He is also guilty of burglary 

who, with intent to commit a felony or theft,7 by 

breaking, enters a house in the daytime. 

We agree that Article 1390 is the burglary statute that 

appears to apply, considering the Information to which Maines pled 

6 

The Texas Penal Code provided that "[o)ne guilty of burglary 

shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more 

than twelve years." Art. 1397. 

7 

At the time of Maines' 1973 burglary conviction, the Texas 

Penal Code defined theft as "the fraudulent taking of corporeal 

personal property belonging to another from his possession, or 

from the possession of some person holding the same for him, 

without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value 

of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the 

person taking." Tex. Penal Code Ann. art. 1410 (Vernon 1970) 

(repealed in 1974). Theft by burglary was long considered a 

serious crime in Texas. See, ~, Shannon v. State, 338 S.W.2d 

462 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960) (theft and larceny are substantially 

the same offense); Davis v . State, 321 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Crim. 

App . 1959) (burglary with intent to commit theft and robbery are 

offenses of the same nature). See generally Robles v. State, 664 

S.W.2d 91, 94-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (current burglary statute , 

Section 30.02(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, retained many 

characteristics of the former pertinent penal code sections, and 

requires only unlawful entry with intent to commit theft) . 

As noted earlier, the Information charging Maines with the 

1973 offense alleged in part that he did "by force, threats, and 

fraud , break and enter a house then and there occupied and 

controlled by Marion Harris . . . with the intent then and there 

to fraudulently take therefrom corporeal personal property therein 

being and then and there belonging to the said Injured Party from 

the possession of the said Injured Party, without the consent of 

said Injured Party, and with the intent then and there to deprive 

the said Injured Party, of the value of the same .•.• " Thus, 

the Information charged an offense including the element of theft. 

And the allegations of the Information came within the definition 

of "'[b]urglary' by breaking" in Article 1390 of the Texas Penal 

Code, which provided that one was guilty of burglary "who , with 

intent to commit a felony or theft, by breaking, enters a house in 

the daytime. " 

B 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 8 
guilty and the terms of that Texas " ' Burglary' by breaking" law. 

The Information did not allege entry of a house at night, or that 

during either day or night Maines entered and remained concealed 

therein. These are requirements, among others, of Article 1389, 

"Burglary," and are not alleged. Therefore , we agree with Maines 

that Article 1390 should be viewed as the statute of conviction. 

The government makes no argument addressing the applicable Texas 

statute. 

Turning back to the generic burglary definition adopted in 

Taylor, we are satisfied that Maines' 1973 Texas burglary 

conviction comes within the enhancement requirements as a 

"burglary" under § 924(e)(l). Maines pled guilty to burglary as 

alleged in the Information, and these allegations fit within 

Article 1390 which covers one "who, with intent to commit a felony 

or theft, by breaking, enters a house in the daytime." We are 

convinced that these elements satisfy Taylor's generic burglary 

definition "of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining 

in a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime." 

As noted earlier, however, the federal district court here 

did not make a determination concerning a particular type of 

burglary having been committed, coming within § 924(e)(l). 

Indeed, the federal district court's order said that this was 

unnecessary due to "the additional language of§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

which states a 'violent felony' means any crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year involving conduct that 

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 

Order at 9. The court further found that Maines' Texas 1973 

felony conviction, when examined in light of the allegations in 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 9 
the Information and the stipulation of counse1, 8 established t~?t 

the Texas offense was a crime involving conduct that presented a 

serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 

Accordingly, the court concluded that the 1973 burglary conviction 

was a "violent felony" qualifying as a predicate felony 

sufficient, when combined with the other felony convictions, to 

implicate § 924(e)(l) sentencing enhancement. Id. Defendant 

Maines' constitutional challenges being rejected, the court 

followed the mandatory minimum sentencing structure of§ 924(e)(l) 

and imposed the fifteen year sentence, and a four year period of 

supervised release. 

Maines argues that this conclusion - that there was a crime 

involving conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 

physical injury to another - was error. He says his 1973 Texas 

conviction was not a crime which involved conduct .presenting such 

a risk of physical injury to another; that the proper categorical 

procedure under § 924(e) is to consider only the elements of ·the 

statute of conviction; and that here, proof of an Article 1390 

offense under the Texas statute could be made without establishing 

conduct posing a serious potential risk of harm to others. It is 

improper, M.aines argues, to inquire into particular conduct 

involved in committing the prior offense, citing United States v. 

Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1988), inter alia. 

Brief of Appellant at 35-39. 

8 

The district court's order recited statements of defendant's 

counsel in response to the judge's inquiry about his understanding 

that the 1973 Texas conviction "was a conviction of burglary of a 

residence?" Defense counsel replied: "That 's correct, Your 

Honor, based upon a reading of the certified copy of the 

information in the case." Order at 4. 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-5089 Document: 01019655599 Date Filed: 12/10/1990 Page: 10 
The government does not appear to object to the categorical 

approach analysis. It says that approach simply precludes a 

factual inquiry beyond the fact of conviction and the statute 

establishing the crime; 

with the approach by 

and that here the district court complied 

looking only to the fact of Maines' 

conviction and the language of the Information to find that there 

was a violent felony under § 924(e). The government cites no 

Texas statute in its analysis. Brief of Appellee at 24-27. 

Taylor has resolved the basic issues, we feel. It approved 

the categorical approach of "looking only to the statutory 

definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts 

underlying those convictions," citing the Sherbondy opinion of the 

Ninth Circuit with approval, inter alia. Slip op. at 23. And, as 

noted, Taylor laid down the generic burglary definition within 

which we hold that Maines' 1973 Texas burglary conviction comes. 

It is true that the district court here went into details alleged 

in the Texas Information, arguably going into the underlying 

circumstances improperly, contrary to Taylor. We are not 

persuaded, however, that any prejudicial error was committed. In 

any event, the Texas burglary conviction was properly held by the 

district court to be a "violent felony" under§ 924(e)(1), calling 

for sentence enhancement. 

AFFIRMED. 

11 

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