Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03135/USCOURTS-ca7-14-03135-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Austin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐3135  

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JASON AUSTIN,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No.1:10‐cr‐00971 — Joan Humphrey Lefkow, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED OCTOBER 1, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 20, 2015

Before POSNER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Jason Austin was convicted of

conspiracy to distribute heroin. He appeals only his sen‐

tence, challenging the quantity of drugs attributable to him

and the court’s finding that he played a leading role in the

organization. In particular, he contends that a key witness

has been so thoroughly discredited by alleged misstatements

and contradictions that it was error for the court to credit his

testimony at least in part. We disagree. We also reject Aus‐

tin’s contention that Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151

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2 No. 14‐3135

(2013), prohibited the judge from basing the Sentencing

Guideline calculations on a higher drug quantity than that

for which Austin was convicted. We therefore affirm Austin’s

sentence.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In 2008, defendant Austin was the leader of a street‐level,

retail drug‐trafficking operation. Working primarily from his

position at the intersection of Kedzie Avenue and Ohio Street

(“Kedzie–Ohio”) in Chicago, Austin received heroin and

crack cocaine from suppliers and sold the drugs to users,

with the help of many others. At the ground level of the op‐

eration were “pack workers,” who sold the drugs directly to

users seven days a week for over twelve hours a day. Money

was then passed up to “managers” or “bundle runners,”

who in exchange distributed drugs to the pack workers for

sales. Drug proceeds were then finally passed from the man‐

agers up to Austin as the leader of the Kedzie–Ohio opera‐

tion.

A double murder early in the morning on August 13,

2008 figures prominently in Austin’s arguments on appeal.

Off‐duty Chicago Police Detective Robert Soto and Kathryn

Romberg were shot and killed while sitting in Soto’s car on

the west side of Chicago. The investigation into their mur‐

ders focused on Austin and his operation. A number of wit‐

nesses suggested that Austin was responsible for the mur‐

ders. He was arrested a few days after the murders, but the

case quickly unraveled. Witnesses began to recant or contra‐

dict their previous statements. The state blamed the changes

on threats and witness tampering. Austin attributes the

changes to statements that had been coerced by the police.

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No. 14‐3135 3

Whatever the reasons, within a month the murder case

against Austin was dismissed.  

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chicago Police

Department then began what became a two‐year investiga‐

tion into Austin and the Kedzie–Ohio operation. The inves‐

tigation included numerous undercover drug purchases, ex‐

tensive surveillance, and interviews with informants and co‐

conspirators. At the end of the investigation in November

2010, over 100 people were arrested. Austin was indicted on

federal charges relating to his role in the drug‐trafficking

conspiracy, particularly for his participation from January

2008 through June 2010. A jury found Austin guilty of five

counts of drug distribution and one count of conspiracy to

distribute, but only for an amount of less than 100 grams of

heroin.

The sentencing hearing took several days. The testimony

ranged from the details of the drug‐trafficking operation to

Austin’s criminal background and the murders of Detective

Soto and Ms. Romberg. A key government witness

was Jeffrey Scott, who worked from 2008 to 2009 as a man‐

ager and bundle runner for the Kedzie–Ohio operation and

reported to Austin.

Scott’s testimony at trial and during sentencing provided

a detailed picture of the Kedzie–Ohio operation. Particularly

critical was Scott’s testimony at Austin’s trial regarding the

total drug sales of the conspiracy. The district judge found

this testimony credible, and it informed much of Austin’s fi‐

nal sentence. Scott testified that the organization’s sales rose

from $800 a day in April 2008 to $4000 a day in May, and

then higher still in June, July, and August. During that latter

period, the Kedzie–Ohio operation experienced a spike in

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sales to $8000 a day after a man overdosed near the sales lo‐

cation. (Addicts apparently reasoned that heroin strong

enough to cause an overdose was a particularly good prod‐

uct.) After Austin’s arrest on August 16, 2008, others took

over the operation temporarily and sales tapered off to ap‐

proximately $1600 a day. No later than May 2009, though,

Austin resumed leadership of the Kedzie–Ohio operation.

Scott also provided testimony as to Austin’s alleged role

in the murders of Detective Soto and Ms. Romberg. Austin

challenges Scott’s credibility as a witness in large part be‐

cause of this testimony, so it bears review even though it did

not directly affect the sentence in this drug case. Scott testi‐

fied that in 2008 a disagreement arose between Austin and a

rival dealer known as “Quick,” who had gone so far as to

shoot at Austin on one occasion. Austin then asked Scott to

bring him a gun he had previously given Scott for safekeep‐

ing. In the early morning of the Soto and Romberg murders,

Scott was awoken by his brother Terrance. Jittery and nerv‐

ous, Terrance told Jeffrey Scott that Austin had just shot

Quick and his girlfriend. Later that day, Scott claimed, Aus‐

tin confided that he had done something terrible: the people

he had thought were Quick and his girlfriend turned out to

be “a cop and a lady.” Scott understood Austin to be admit‐

ting to the murders. Austin insisted that Scott help keep the

incident quiet. Police quickly tracked Scott down, however,

and interviewed him at the police station.

Scott did not initially share with police what his brother

had told him. But after watching a video of his brother con‐

fess to his role in the shootings, Scott told the police what his

brother had told him the night of the murders. A few days

later, after Austin’s arrest, Austin’s brother Charles ap‐

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No. 14‐3135 5

proached Scott, angry that Scott had implicated Austin in the

murders. Charles tried to choke Scott, leading to a brief scuf‐

fle. Charles left Scott with instructions to fix the situation. He

continued to threaten Scott in the days to come. Finally,

Charles ordered Scott to recant his statement to the police

and to claim that his previous statement implicating Austin

was made as a result of beatings by police. Scott claimed that

he worked with Austin’s lawyer to prepare a statement—at

points being instructed to “exaggerate it and ... make it

seem[ ] like it was torture.” Scott signed the statement,

which he later claimed he knew to be false.

The district judge’s explanation of Austin’s sentence took

into account the extensive testimony available, including

Scott’s conflicting statements, to determine Austin’s proper

offense level. Judge Lefkow’s written decision contained a

detailed explanation for her estimate of the drug quantity

sold by Austin’s operation. From the beginning of April to

mid‐May 2008, the judge credited Scott’s trial testimony of

$800 in sales per day for the organization, yielding 0.7 kilo‐

grams of heroin sold for that period.1 For mid‐May to June

2008, again crediting Scott’s testimony, the judge estimated

that sales were approximately $4000 per day, yielding 3.6

kilograms for that period. For July through the August mur‐

ders, daily sales were estimated to have had a peak of $8000

and a conservative $5000 daily average, as supported by

Scott and testimony by other conspirators, Kevin Terry, Jr.

and Troy Davis. This yielded 4.5 kilograms for that period.  

                                                  1 The transcript reads that the judge found Austin responsible for “.7

grams for this time period,” but the explanation of how this amount was

reached and the judge’s ultimate quantity finding show that she meant

0.7 kilograms.

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Even though there was evidence that Austin may have

continued to sell drugs from August 2008 to May 2009, the

judge, relying in part on Scott’s testimony, conservatively

held Austin responsible for no heroin sales during this peri‐

od. According to Scott, the arrests in August 2008 led to low‐

er sales under new manager Kenneth Terry. After Terry was

arrested later that year on heroin charges, the Kedzie–Ohio

operation moved in December 2008 or January 2009 to a new

location under the management of Kevin Terry, Jr. In May

2009, Scott testified, Jason Austin decided to move the opera‐

tion back to Kedzie and Ohio. Adopting well‐known market‐

ing tactics from legitimate businesses, Austin attracted cus‐

tomers during the move by offering a “pass‐out,” giving free

heroin to buyers to promote the operation’s return. Video

recordings showed that Austin may have been involved with

drug sales before he resumed leadership in May 2009. Given

the testimony of Austin and Scott to the contrary, however,

the judge took the conservative approach of attributing no

drug quantity to Austin for those months.  

For the remainder of 2009 until the supply ran dry in Au‐

gust, the judge used Scott’s testimony in conjunction with

other government evidence to estimate 1.6 kilograms sold.

Based on these conservative estimates, the judge found that

Austin was responsible for 10.7 kilograms. The sum of 0.7 +

3.6 + 4.5 + 0 + 1.6 is 10.4 kilograms, not 10.7, but this minor

discrepancy does not affect the court’s finding that Austin

was responsible for over 10 kilograms of heroin and there‐

fore subject to a base offense level of 36 under the 2008 Sen‐

tencing Guidelines.

Other findings raised Austin’s guideline offense level.

The court found: that Austin had possessed a firearm in fur‐

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No. 14‐3135 7

therance of the conspiracy, adding two levels; that he was a

leader of the conspiracy, adding four more; and that minors

had been used in furtherance of the drug conspiracy, adding

two more levels, to 44, meaning that the Guidelines’ highest

level of 43 applied. Due to two previous convictions, one for

delivery of a controlled substance and one for aggravated

battery, Austin was considered a career offender with a crim‐

inal history of Category VI. Offense level 43 and criminal

history Category VI is as high as the Sentencing Guidelines

go, recommending a sentence of life in prison, though none

of the offenses of conviction authorized a life sentence. In the

end, the district court sentenced Austin to a term of thirty‐

five years in prison, including thirty years for the conspiracy

conviction, followed by ten years of supervised release.

II. Analysis

On appeal Austin argues that his sentence was based on

two errors in calculating the guideline offense level: drug

quantity and aggravating role. Austin argues there were two

errors in calculating the drug quantity. First, he insists that

the district judge incorrectly determined the drug quantity

attributable to him by erroneously relying on the testimony

of Jeffrey Scott. Second, Austin argues that the judge could

not lawfully have found him responsible for a higher drug

quantity than the quantity for which he was convicted. Fi‐

nally, Austin argues that in determining his role as a leader

or organizer of the conspiracy, the court erred again by rely‐

ing on Scott’s testimony. We find no error.

A. Drug Quantity

To apply the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court de‐

termined that Austin was responsible for more than 10 kilo‐

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grams of heroin. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c). A district court’s

calculation of drug quantity is a factual determination that

we review only for clear error. United States v. Clark, 538 F.3d

803, 812 (7th Cir. 2008). At sentencing, the government must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence the quantity of

drugs attributable to a defendant. United States v. Longstreet,

669 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2012), citing United States v. Krasin‐

ski, 545 F.3d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 2008). In a drug conspiracy, a

defendant is responsible under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 for “all rea‐

sonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in further‐

ance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” United

States v. Soto‐Piedra, 525 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2008). Accord‐

ingly, each conspirator is responsible for both the drug quan‐

tities directly attributable to him and amounts involved in

reasonably foreseeable dealings by co‐conspirators. United

States v. Turner, 604 F.3d 381, 385 (7th Cir. 2010), quoting

United States v. Acosta, 534 F.3d 574, 585 (7th Cir. 2008).

A district court may base its sentence only on infor‐

mation with “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its

probable accuracy.” U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a). But as we have often

said, determining drug quantities attributable to defendants

is “not an exact science.” United States v. Sewell, 780 F.3d 839,

849 (7th Cir. 2015). A district court may make reasonable es‐

timates of drug quantity based on evidence in the record. Id.,

citing Acosta, 534 F.3d at 582.

1. Scott’s Credibility

Relying upon co‐conspirator testimony, video records,

and evidence of Austin’s violent behavior toward rival drug

sellers, the district court determined that Austin controlled

the drug sales occurring at Kedzie and Ohio for much of

2008 and 2009. Austin therefore knew that drug sales were

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No. 14‐3135 9

occurring at that site in furtherance of the conspiracy, mak‐

ing him responsible for the quantity of all drugs sold by his

co‐conspirators during that time. The district judge said that

determining “an exact number is impossible,” but she con‐

cluded that Austin was responsible for more than ten kilo‐

grams of heroin sold at the location during his time in con‐

trol. In doing so, the judge drew upon evidence of controlled

buys, seizures, and co‐conspirator testimony and admis‐

sions. On appeal, Austin challenges whether the testimony

of one of these co‐conspirators—Jeffrey Scott—was credible.

Austin argues that Scott is simply so untrustworthy that the

judge could not reasonably have credited his testimony.

“Determining witness credibility is especially within the

province of the district court and ‘can virtually never be

clear error.’” Longstreet, 669 F.3d at 837, quoting United States

v. Clark, 538 F.3d at 813; see also United States v. Johnson, 342

F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2003) (granting “exceptional deference

to a sentencing judge’s credibility determinations”). The dis‐

trict court is best situated to make credibility determinations

in light of the totality of the evidence, including the witness’s

statements and behavior, other witness statements, and fur‐

ther corroborating or contrary evidence. See United States v.

Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 602 (7th Cir. 2001).

A district court may rely upon ambiguous testimony to

estimate drug quantity. See, e.g., United States v. Cross, 430

F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2005). A district court may even con‐

sider testimony that is “totally uncorroborated and comes

from an admitted liar, convicted felon, or large scale drug‐

dealing, paid government informant,” United States v. Clark,

538 F.3d at 813, quoting United States v. White, 360 F.3d 718,

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720 (7th Cir. 2004), as long as the court evaluates the evi‐

dence carefully.  

Austin first argues that Scott’s testimony as to the drug

quantity was so inconsistent and so thoroughly unreliable

that crediting it was clear error despite the deferential appel‐

late review of credibility findings. His argument is based on

Scott’s trial testimony about dividing the money from heroin

sales. Each bundle of heroin sold at retail brought in $960.

Austin characterizes Scott’s testimony as follows: the suppli‐

er received $700 per bundle (leaving $260), then Austin re‐

ceived one out of every three bundles as payment, for an av‐

erage of $320 per bundle (leaving a shortage of $60), then the

storehouse received an average of $192 per bundle (raising

the shortage to $252), then the runners and pack workers re‐

ceived $100 and $160 per bundle, respectively (leaving a

shortfall of $512 per bundle). Thus, Austin contends, because

Scott’s testimony about the money was mathematically im‐

possible, the judge clearly erred by relying on his testimony

to estimate sales volume.  

The accounting in Scott’s trial testimony was in fact quite

possible. Austin mischaracterizes Scott’s statements. Accord‐

ing to Scott’s testimony, every bundle of heroin contained 8

packs, and each pack contained 12 individual bags of heroin.

A total bundle would return $960 in proceeds. Pack workers

would keep $20 per pack sold, or $160 per bundle, and pass

the “rest of the money”—the remaining $800—to bundle

runners like Jeffrey Scott. Scott testified that he would then

receive $100 for every bundle sold for his work as a bundle

runner, leaving $700 in remaining proceeds to distribute. Fi‐

nally, Scott would turn over the remainder of the proceeds to

either Austin, as the leader of the operation, or Kenny Bell,

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No. 14‐3135 11

the supplier. Bell would be paid twice as much as Austin.

Bell would keep the proceeds from ten bundles ($7000), and

then Austin would keep the proceeds from the next five

bundles ($3500), and so on. Averaged per bundle then, pack

workers would receive $160, bundle runners $100, Bell about

$467 per bundle ($7000 / 15), and Austin about $233 per

bundle ($3500 / 15), totaling $960.  

Austin’s interpretation of Scott’s testimony arrives at an

impossible result by adopting the less probable version of

the order of payment. Under his understanding, Austin

would have been paid his one‐third share before the pack

workers or bundle runners were paid. If Austin had really

taken the entire share one third of the time, there would

have been no money left for other workers. Scott’s testimony,

however, also suggests a more reasonable interpretation:

that Austin and Bell were paid after the lower‐level members

had already been paid, making the payment division math‐

ematically possible. The judge did not clearly err by deem‐

ing credible Scott’s testimony on these points.  

Moreover, even if Austin were correct that Scott’s testi‐

mony on how profits were divided was impossible, it was

not clear error to find Scott credible on his testimony on

overall sales figures. In determining the reliability of Scott’s

testimony concerning gross sales volume, and therefore drug

quantity, the judge made clear that she found him “credible

in this respect.” She went on to note that she would specifi‐

cally address Jeffrey Scott’s credibility further and later com‐

pared Scott’s testimony to other witness testimony to test its

reliability. The judge made a narrow credibility determina‐

tion on the question of sales figures. Her quantity estimates

were quite conservative and not clearly erroneous.

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12 No. 14‐3135

Austin also challenges Scott’s drug quantity testimony by

pointing to inconsistencies in his statements regarding the

murders of Detective Soto and Ms. Romberg. Austin focuses

on Scott’s testimony about the make and color of the vehicle

driven by the shooter. Scott’s account was different from his

brother’s, which was different in turn from a dying declara‐

tion by Detective Soto. Because all of these accounts of the

vehicle cannot be true, and because Scott’s testimony regard‐

ing a number of other issues differed from that of other wit‐

nesses, Austin concludes that Scott’s testimony is so unrelia‐

ble that it was clear error to credit his testimony on drug

quantities.

To reiterate, though, the law gives the sentencing judge

the responsibility to determine the credibility of a testifying

witness on a particular issue, even in light of previous mis‐

conduct or misstatements. It is not unusual for witnesses in

drug cases to have all sorts of credibility problems. And any

witness may have been unable earlier to remember details

accurately, had reasons to bias his testimony, or just outright

lied, but his testimony on a separate drug quantity issue

may still be reasonably deemed credible. See, e.g., United

States v. Clark, 538 F.3d at 812–13. The judge carefully consid‐

ered Scott’s credibility and limited her credibility determina‐

tion to the drug quantity issue, as was proper. Again, we

find no clear error. Also, the judge’s guideline calculations

did not depend at all on whether Austin played any role in

the murders of Detective Soto and Romberg. Austin earned

the highest level of the Guidelines based solely on the drug

conspiracy and his criminal history.2

                                                  2 Austin briefly refers to Scott’s testimony on the use of weapons and

minors in the drug conspiracy. It is unclear from Austin’s brief if this is

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No. 14‐3135 13

2. Acquitted Conduct

The fact that the jury found Austin guilty of conspiring to

distribute no more than 100 grams of heroin did not bar the

court from finding, for guideline purposes, that Austin was

responsible for more than 10 kilograms of heroin. It is well

established that a sentencing court may treat conduct for

which the defendant has been acquitted as relevant conduct

for guideline purposes. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,

154 (1997); United States v. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d 732, 738 (7th

Cir. 2014). An acquittal means that a charge has not been

proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but a sentencing court

may rely on facts established by a preponderance of the evi‐

dence. Gonzalez, 765 F.3d at 738, quoting United States v.

Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007). For purposes of

calculating drug quantity, the offense level is determined by

the amount of drugs attributable to the defendant during his

entire course of relevant conduct, “not simply the amount

associated with the particular offenses of conviction.” United

States v. Redmond, 667 F.3d 863, 875 (7th Cir. 2012).

The Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States,

570 U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), did not change these prin‐

ciples of guideline sentencing. Alleyne held that facts that in‐

crease mandatory minimum sentences are elements of a

                                                 

being used to show Scott’s unreliability or if Austin is actually challeng‐

ing the weapons and minors enhancements in the guideline calculation.

If the former was intended, we reject this argument for the reasons dis‐

cussed above. If the latter was intended, Austin did not sufficiently de‐

velop these arguments. “As we have said numerous times, undeveloped

arguments are deemed waived on appeal.” United States v. Foster, 652

F.3d 776, 793 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481,

487 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010).

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14 No. 14‐3135

crime and therefore must be admitted or found beyond a

reasonable doubt by a jury. Id. at 2158. But the Court’s opin‐

ion was, by its own terms, narrow. Alleyne continued to en‐

dorse broad sentencing discretion, noting that such discre‐

tion is not unlawful even if its exercise depends on facts

found by the judge. Id. at 2163. Accordingly, while statutory

drug quantity issues affecting maximum and minimum sen‐

tences must be submitted to a jury, the scope of the narcotics

conspiracy and drug responsibility under the advisory Sen‐

tencing Guidelines is subject to judicial fact‐finding during

sentencing. In the wake of Alleyne, we have repeatedly con‐

sidered the type of challenge Austin is making here, and we

have repeatedly held that Alleyne does not apply to such

challenges to drug quantity determinations under the Sen‐

tencing Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d

560, 574–75 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hernandez, 731

F.3d 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2013).  

Austin finally argues that the district court erred by step‐

ping outside the bounds of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, which instructs

sentencing courts to consider conduct that was part of the

offense of conviction or the same course of conduct or com‐

mon scheme or plan. Because Austin’s conviction was for

conspiracy to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, Aus‐

tin contends, it is impossible for him to be sentenced on the

basis of responsibility for more than 100 grams. Sections

1B1.3 and 3D1.2 have been interpreted together, however, to

provide “that a district court must increase a defendant’s

base offense level to account for ‘relevant conduct,’ which

includes drugs from any acts that ‘were part of the same

course of conduct or common scheme or plan’ as the con‐

victed offense, regardless of whether the defendant was

charged with or convicted of carrying out those acts.” United

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No. 14‐3135 15

States v. Duarte, 950 F.2d 1255, 1263 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis

added), quoting United States v. Franklin, 902 F.2d 501, 504

(7th Cir. 1990). The judge did not err by determining for

purposes of the Guidelines that Austin was responsible for

more than 10 kilograms of heroin.

B. Leader or Organizer of Conspiracy

Finally, the district court also did not err in finding that

Austin had earned a four‐level aggravating role enhance‐

ment under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). According to Austin, the dis‐

trict court “cherry‐picked” among unreliable and inaccurate

testimony about his role in the conspiracy. This objection

was not raised during sentencing, however, and the district

judge reasonably described Austin’s leadership role as “un‐

disputed.” We therefore review this sentencing finding only

for plain error, which is a demanding standard. United States

v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387–88 (7th Cir. 2015) (failure to object

during sentencing to guideline calculation forfeited issue

and warranted plain‐error review). To demonstrate plain er‐

ror, the defendant must show: “(1) an error or defect that (2)

is clear or obvious and (3) affects the defendant’s substantial

rights.” Id. Even then, the appellate court has discretion to

correct the error if it seriously affected the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of the judicial proceedings, but it need

not do so. Id.  

A defendant is subject to a four‐level aggravating role

enhancement where he was the organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or

was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In determining

a defendant’s role in a criminal organization, the district

court should consider a number of factors, including “the

nature of the defendant’s participation in the offense, his

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claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, his

degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense,

and his degree of control and authority exercised over other

participants.” United States v. Reynolds, 714 F.3d 1039, 1043

(7th Cir. 2013).  

There is no dispute that the Kedzie–Ohio organization

involved more than five persons. And there is ample evi‐

dence that Austin was the leader of the organization under

§ 3B1.1(a). Numerous co‐conspirators identified Austin in

their plea agreements, statements to police, and testimony as

maintaining control of the organization. The judge specifical‐

ly determined this testimony to be credible. Further, Austin

received a larger share of the drug profits than any other

member of the organization. He used threats of violence

against competitors and rivals in the drug‐trafficking busi‐

ness to defend the operation. He had decision‐making au‐

thority over the organization, determining the operation’s

direction on strategy and marketing. In the face of such sub‐

stantial evidence, Austin’s protests that Jeffrey Scott’s testi‐

mony is unreliable fall far short of showing plain error.  

In the absence of some compelling evidence showing de‐

cisively that the aggravating role enhancement was wrong,

this plain‐error challenge is particularly weak. Without an

objection from Austin on the issue, the government had no

reason to waste the court’s time building an even more ex‐

tensive record on the issue. A defendant cannot show plain

error by merely pointing to possible gaps in evidence on an

issue that was not disputed in the trial court.

For the foregoing reasons, Austin’s sentence is

AFFIRMED.

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