Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01232/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01232-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cathy
Appellee
Richard Demarest
Appellant
James Manspeaker
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

-1-;ov f 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD DEMAREST, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JAMES MANSPEAKER, Clerk of the 

United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado; 

CATHY, last name unknown, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 91-1232 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-F-843) 

On the briefs: 

Richards. Demarest, Pro Se. 

Michael J. Norton, United States Attorney and George E. Gill, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendants-Appellees. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-1232 Document: 010110096849 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 1 
Richard Demarest appeals an order of the district court 

denying his request for fees pursuant to the Equal Access to 

Justice Act (EAJA), 28 u.s.c. § 2412(d) (1988). Mr. Demarest 

contends on appeal that the statutory language requires the court 

to award him prose fees as a prevailing party. For the reasons 

discussed below, we affirm. 1 

The relevant statutory section provides: "[A] court shall 

award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and 

other expenses." Id.§ 2412(d)(l)(A). The subsection further 

explains that "'fees and other expenses' includes the reasonable 

expenses of expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, 

analysis, engineering report, • and reasonable attorney fees." 

Id. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Mr. Demarest claims to seek "fees," not 

"attorney fees," and he argues that the plain language of the 

statute compels such an award. Not only does Mr. Demarest fail to 

consider the statutory definition of "fees," but his application 

for fees and costs states: "Petitioner seeks attorney fees in the 

amount of$ 75.00 per hour. 112 Rec., vol. I, doc. 3 at 2. 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 Mr. Demarest seeks fees only for his efforts prose. He does 

not seek fees here for his legal represent,ati ves in the Supreme Court. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1232 Document: 010110096849 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 2 
We join other circuits in holding that attorney fees are not 

available for prose litigants under the EAJA. 3 See Sommer v. 

Sullivan, 898 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.) (EAJA fees under§ 2412(b)), 

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 508 (1990); Naekel v. Department of 

Transp., 845 F.2d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (EAJA fees under§ 

2412(d)(l)(A)); Merrell v. Block, 809 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1987) 

(same); Crooker v. EPA, 763 F.2d 16, 17 (1st Cir. 1985) (same). 

The language of the statute indicates that Congress intended for 

prose litigants to have retained an attorney in order to recover 

fees under the statute. See Merrell, 809 F.2d at 642. Moreover, 

the legislative history supports limiting the award of attorney 

fees to litigants who have retained an attorney. See H.R. Rep. 

No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 11, reprinted in 1980 Code Cong. & 

Adm. News 4984, 4988-89. "A primary purpose in enacting the EAJA, 

and particularly section 2412(d)(l)(A) was to remove the obstacle 

of litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, so that 

litigants may challenge unreasonable governmental action and 

vindicate their rights in court." Crooker, 763 F.2d at 17. 

Awarding fees to Mr. Demarest would not further the statutory 

purpose. The statute attempts to enable meritorious litigation to 

take place, not to reward individuals who obtain legal redress. 

While Mr. Demarest's prose efforts have been successful,~ 

3 Our opinion only considers the availability of attorney fees 

under the EAJA. We do not address the availability of other 

expenses. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1232 Document: 010110096849 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 3 
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 111 s. Ct. 599 (1991), they do not entitle 

him to compensation. As we said in Turman v. Tuttle, 711 F.2d 

148, 149 (10th Cir. 1983), the policy supporting fees under 42 

u.s.c. § 1988 is "not to compensate prose litigants but to enable 

litigants with valid claims to present their claims without having 

to bear the burden of the costs." The Supreme Court endorsed this 

view of§ 1988 in Kay v. Ehrler, 111 S. Ct. 1435, 1437 (1991) 

(holding that a prose litigant who is an attorney is not entitled 

to fees under§ 1988). We see no reason to hold differently in 

the context of the EAJA, and we decline to do so. 

The district court did not err by refusing to award Mr. 

Demarest fees. We AFFIRM. 

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Appellate Case: 91-1232 Document: 010110096849 Date Filed: 11/01/1991 Page: 4