Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01800/USCOURTS-ca10-85-01800-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John L. Marino
Appellant
Otis Engineering Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

RO B E RT L. HO E C K E R 

CLERK 

,uite~ jtates Qfourt of J\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

March 4, 1988 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: Nos. 85-1800, 85-1957 

Marino v. Otis Engineering 

Filed February 23, 1988, by Judge Anderson 

Dear Counsel: 

Enclosed is are new pages 3 and 4 which should be 

substituted for pages 3 and 4 in the published opinion 

filed February 23, 1988, by Judge Anderson. 

Sincerely, 

L. HOECKER, Clerk 

RLH/lb 

Enclosure 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

(FTS) 564·3157 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 1 
Nos. 85-1800, 85-1957 - Marino vs. Otis Engineering 

Filed February 23, 1988, by Judge Anderson 

party, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 940(A). It also seeks 

attorneys fees for its efforts on appeal. 

Before a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new 

trial will be reversed, it must have committed a clear abuse of 

discretion. See Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1424 (10th 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Latimer, 780 F.2d 868, 870 (10th Cir. 

1985). Because we find no such abuse here, we affirm the district 

court with the sole exception of its ruling denying attorneys fees 

to Otis. As to that issue, we are persuaded that the applicable 

Oklahoma statute requires an award in this case. 

I. 

The controversy in this case concerns an Otis manufactured 

and installed packer which became stuck in Marino's well located 

in Oklahoma. Because it became stuck, Marino had to mill it out. 

He claims that this operation destroyed the productivity of the 

well. Marino alleged that Otis was negligent in two respects, 

first, in installing the packer in the well with too many shear 

pins in it, so as to make it irretrievable, and second, in failing 

to clean sand from the top part of the packer assembly known as 

the tubing seal divider mandrel. Marino alleged that this sand 

caused the overshot tool, when it was sent to free the packer, to 

become stuck to the packer, making the whole assembly irretrievable.1 

1 Although a considerable amount of evidence was adduced on a 

number of issues at trial, most of the evidence involved in this 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 2 
On the other hand, Otis introduced evidence at trial showing 

that Marino modified the overshot tool by cutting triangular 

notches in the skirt of the overshot. Otis suggested as one of 

its theories of defense that these notches were responsible for 

the binding of the packer to the overshot. 

Nonetheless, in its answer to Marino's complaint which commenced this suit, Otis failed to assert any affirmative defenses. 

Although in discovery Otis stated that it would amend its answer 

to assert the defense of contributory negligence in the notching 

of the overshot component of the packer assembly, it failed to do 

so. Nor did either party prepare a pretrial order outlining the 

witnesses to be called and the issues to be tried. 2 Thus, Otis 

did not assert any affirmative defenses by way of pretrial order. 

Accordingly, at the commencement of trial, Marino made a motion in 

limine to prevent Otis from introducing any eviden~e related to 

Marino's contributory negligence, since contributory negligence 

must be pleaded according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 3 

In granting the motion the court noted: 

(cont'd from previous page) 

appeal concerns why the overshot tool sent to free the packer 

assembly became stuck to the packer's tubing seal divider. 

2 Otis did prepare and submit a pretrial order after trial had 

begun, but it was not accepted by the trial court. 

3 What is styled in this action as contributory negligence is 

more commonly known elsewhere as comparative negligence. See Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 23 §§ 13-14 (West 1987). This, however, does not 

alter Otis's obligation to plead such negligence as an affirmative 

defense. See A.D.E. Inc. v. Louis Joliet Bank and Trust Co., 742 

F.2d 395,~7 (7th Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 3 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLERK 

~luifr~ ~fates (lfourt of J\ppeaf s 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

February 25, 1988 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: Nos. 85-1800, 85-1957 

Marino v. Otis Engineering 

Filed February 23, 1988, by Judge Anderson 

Dear Counsel: 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

<FTSl 564·3157 

Enclosed is a new page 4 which should be substituted for 

page 4 in the published opinion filed February 23, 1988, by 

Judge Anderson. 

RLH:oac 

Enclosure 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 4 
85-1800, 85-1957 

Fiied 2/23/88 

On the other hand, Otis introduced evidence at trial showing 

that Marino modified the overshot tool by cutting triangular 

notches in the skirt of the overshot. Otis suggested as one of 

its theories of defense that these notches were responsible for 

the binding of the packer to the overshot. 

Nonetheless, in its answer to Marino's complaint which commenced this suit, Otis failed to assert ani affirmative defenses. 

Although in discovery Otis stated that it would amend its answer 

to assert the defense of contributory negligence in the notching 

of the overshot component of the packer assembly, it failed to do 

so. Nor did either party prepare a pretrial order outlining the 

witnesses to be called and the issues to be tried. 2 Thus, Otis 

did not assert any affirmative defenses by way of pretrial order. 

Accordingly, at the commencement of trial, Marino made a motion in 

limine to prevent Otis from introducing any evidence related to 

Marino's contributory negligence, since contributory negligence 

must be pleaded according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 3 

In granting the motion the court noted: 

2 Otis did prepare and submit a pretrial order after trial had 

begun, but it was not accepted by the trial court. 

3 What is styled in this action as contributory negligence is 

more commonly known elsewhere as comparative negligence. See Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 23 §§ 13-14 (West 1987). This, however, does not 

alter Otis's obligation to plead such negligence as an affirmative 

defense. See A.D.E. Inc. v. Louis Joliet Bank and Trust Co., 742 

F.2d 395,397 (7th Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 5 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHN L. MARINO, d/b/a/ 

WISHBONE OIL & GAS, . 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

Cross-Appel lee 

OTIS ENGINEERING CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

Cross-Appellant 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

FEB 2 3 1988 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 85-1800 

85-1957 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-84-1536-E) 

Robert D. Edinger (William R. Burkett and James w. Morris, III 

with him on the briefs) of Linn & Helms, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee 

Rodney J. Reggy of Cheek, Cheek & Cheek, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

for Defendant-Appellee~ Cross-Appellant. 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA and TIMBERS* Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

* Hon. William H. Timbers, Sr. Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, 

Second Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 6 
John L. Marino d/b/a/ Wishbone Oil and Gas ("Marino'') sued 

Otis Engineering Corp. ("Otis") in federal court, based on 

diversity of citizenship, alleging negligence in the manufacture . . 

and installation of a device known as a packer, which is installed 

in oil and gas wells to assist in the extraction of oil and gas. 

Marino sought damages of $1,985,146.00 resulting from the alleged 

failure of a packer installed by Otis in one of Marino's wells. 

Oklahoma law governs. 

Following a jury verdict in favor of Otis, Marino's motion 

for a new trial was denied. Marino appeals that denial, essentially relying on two arguments: First, that the trial court 

erred by admitting evidence of contributory negligence by Marino 

when Otis had not pleaded that defense, and the district court had 

previously granted a motion in limine prohibiting evidence on a 

contributory negligence defense. Second, Marino asserts that the 

court erred when, after an initial ruling allegedly restricting 

such testimony, the court permitted one of Otis's expert witnesses 

to testify about tests performed after his deposition and about 

which, therefore, Marino allegedly had no knowledge until the eve 

of trial, making effective trial preparation, and preparation of 

rebuttal evidence, impossible. Marino asserts it was surprised 

and prejudiced by this testimony, that the combined effect of 

these errors unfairly changed the course of the trial, affecting 

the outcome, and constituted "trial by ambush." 

Otis cross-appeals. It contends that the district court 

erred in not awarding attorneys fees to Otis, as the prevailing 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 7 
party, pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 940(A). It also seeks 

attorneys fees for its efforts on appeal. 

Before a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new 

trial will be reversed, it must have committed a clear abuse of 

discretion. See Ryder v. City of Topeka, 814 F.2d 1412, 1424 (10th 

Cir. 1987); United States v. Latimer, 780 F.2d 868, 870 (10th Cir. 

1985). Because we find no such abuse here, we affirm the district 

court with the sole exception of its ruling denying attorneys fees 

to Otis. As to that issue, we are persuaded that the applicable 

Oklahoma statute requires an award in this case. 

I • 

The controversy in this case concerns an Otis manufactured 

and installed packer which became stuck in Marino's well located 

in Oklahoma. Because it became stuck, Marino had to mill it out. 

He claims that this operation destroyed the productivity of the 

well. Marino alleged that Otis was negligent in two respects, 

first, in installing the packer in the well with too many shear 

pins in it, so as to make it irretrievable, and second, in failing 

to clean sand from the top part of the packer assembly known as 

the tubing seal divider mandrel. Marino alleged that this sand 

caused the overshot tool, when it was sent to free the packer, to 

become stuck to the packer, making the whole assembly irretrievable.1 

1 Although a considerable amount of evidence was adduced on a 

number of issues at trial, most of the evidence involved in this 

(cont'd on next page) 

-3-

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 8 
On the other hand, Otis introduced evidence at trial showing 

that Marino modified the overshot tool by.cutting triangular 

notches in the skirt of the overshot. Otis suggested as one of 

its theories of defense that these notches were responsible for 

the binding of the packer to the overshot. 

Nonetheless, in its answer to Marino's complaint which commenced this suit, Otis failed to assert any affirmative defenses. 

Although in discovery Otis stated that it would amend its 

complaint to assert the defense of contributory negligence in the 

notching of the overshot component of the packer assembly, it 

failed to do so. Nor did either party prepare a pretrial order 

outlining the witnesses to be called and the issues to be tried. 2 

Thus, Otis did not assert any affirmative defenses by way of 

pretrial order. Accordingly, at the commencement of trial, Marino 

made a motion in limine to prevent Otis from introducing any 

evidence related to Marino's contributory negligence, since 

contributory negligence must be pleaded according to Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(c) . 3 

In granting the motion the court noted: 

(cont'd from previous page) 

appeal concerns why the overshot tool sent to free the packer 

assembly became stuck to the packer's tubing seal divider. 

2 Otis did prepare and submit a pretrial order after trial had 

begun, but it was not accepted by the trial court. 

3 What is styled in this action as contributory negligence is 

more commonly known elsewhere as comparative negligence. See Okla. 

Stat. Ann. tit. 23 §§ 13-14 (West 1987). This, however, does not 

alter Otis's obligation to plead such negligence as an affirmative 

defense. See A.D.E. Inc. v. Louis Joliet Bank and Trust Co., 742 

F.2d 395,397 (7th Cir. 1984); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 9 
"I think it's a good motion in that the defendant has 

alleged or pled no affirmative defense whatever, just a 

general denial. So we'll just have to wait and see if 

any evidence is tendered on behalf of the defendant or 

attempted to [be] tendered by way of an affirmative 

defense. I'm not going to allow it because you didn't 

plead any. The burden is still on the plaintiff to 

prove his case." 

R. Vol. VI at 119-20. 

At trial, the court refused to permit Otis to enter into 

evidence Defendant's Exhibit Number Seven because it related to 

the modification by Marino of the overshot portion of the packer 

assembly. The court also refused to allow Otis's counsel to ask 

Marino's chief man at the rig, Bill Hicks, about his modifications 

to the overshot. R. Vol. VI at 142-50. 

During later testimony, however, Otis introduced photographs 

taken by one of Marino's witnesses which showed the modification 

to the overshot. Over Marino's objections the exhibits were 

admitted by the court because since the pictures were taken by 

Marino's witness the court found "there could be no surprise. 114 

Again, Marino objected when Otis introduced Defendant's Exhibits 

61 and 62 which were also photographs of the overshot. The judge 

nonetheless admitted the exhibits for a limited purpose noting: 

"The jury will be told again that the defendant 

herein has raised no defense. They have not pled any 

affirmative defense but they deny the plaintiff's claim, 

so they are entitled to try and disprove anything that 

the plaintiff has attempted to establish; and if it does 

tend to rebut or disprove any of the evidence that the 

plaintiff has offered, it will be received for that 

purpose; for no other." 

4 The specific photographs objected to were Plaintiffs' 

Exhibits, 90, 100, 98, 97, 83, 82, 81, 94 and 91. R. Vol. VI at 

207. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 10 
R. Vol. VI at 259. 

Later in the trial, Otis attempted to amend its answer and 

provide the court with a pretrial order, so that it could raise 

the notching issue as contributory negligence. In denying this 

request the court stated: 

"Now, I'm not going to allow the evidence on the notching for any purpose other than it may tend to disprove 

your claim that the negligence of the defendant 

proximally (sic) caused the whole thing; and as far as 

I'm concerned, you can get in almost as much evidence, 

the defendant can, as he could otherwise, except you're 

not going to be given any instructions on any affirmative defenses because you didn't plead any; but any 

evidence that might tend to show that it was not the 

defendant's negligence that caused this, is going to be 

received in evidence." 

R. Vol. VI at 395-96. After this clarification both sides 

referred to the notching of the overshot throughout the remainder 

of the trial. 

The court's decision to permit evidence of Marino's modification to the overshot for purposes of disproving causation only, 

supports Marino's contention that the broad sweep of the ruling on 

the motion in limine was altered during trial. However, the 

court's decision to admit the contested evidence was not error 

unless the admission constituted a clear abuse of discretion. See 

Robinson v. Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft, 739 F.2d 1481, 

1483 (10th Cir. 1984); May v. Interstate Moving & Storage Co., 739 

F.2d 521, 524 (10th Cir. 1984). "A ruling on the threshold of 

trial does not preclude the court changing its ruling based on 

other developments during trial." Thweatt v. Ontko, 814 F.2d 

1466, 1470 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 

640 P.2d 991, 995 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 11 
Marino argues that the court did abuse its discretion because 

according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) Otis's failure to plead Marino's 

negligence as an affirmative defense waives that defense and bars 

evidence on the point as a matter of law. Radio Corp. of Am. v. 

Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 (10th Cir. 1970); see 

also Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Locals 12, 111, 113 & 969 v. 

Professional Hole Drilling, Inc., 574 F.2d 497, 500 (10th Cir. 

1978), State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 

518 F.2d 292, 296 (10th Cir, 1975); C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure: Civil§ 1278 (1969). However, a distinction may be drawn -- and was drawn by the court below -- between 

the introduction of evidence in support of an affirmative defense 

and the introduction of the same evidence to refute the plaintiff's allegations of causation raised in the complaint and denied 

in the answer. Here, the court refused to permit the evidence in 

question to be considered for any purpose other than the refutation of the plaintiff's prima facie case. It refused to give an 

instruction to the jury regarding contributory negligence, thus 

guaranteeing that the evidence would not be used other than to 

disprove the plaintiff's case. See Radio Corp., 424 F.2d at 17. 

Thus, to the extent that Marino's notching of the overshot is 

relevant to the question of causation, the evidence of notching in 

the context accepted by the district court "merely negates an 

element of the plaintiff's prima facie case ... it is not truly 

an affirmative defense and need not be pleaded despite rule B(c)." 

Mausen v. E.L. Lien & Sons, Inc., 714 F.2d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1983) 

(quoting Sanden v. Mayo Clinic, 495 F.2d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1974). 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 12 
In short, the court'~ modifications to its ruling on the motion in limine appear to represent its best effort to accommodate 

the preclusive effect of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) with Otis's right to 

show that its actions were not the cause of Marino's harm. An 

examination of the circumstances in this case discloses that there 

was no abuse of discretion in that accommodation. 

Even if the evidence had been considered for purposes of 

establishing contributory negligence, the court did not abuse its 

discretion in admitting such testimony. The purpose behind rule 

8(c), that of putting "plaintiff on notice well in advance of 

trial that defendant intends to present a defense in the nature of 

an avoidance," State Distribs., Inc., v. Glenmore Distilleries, 

Co., 738 F.2d 405, 410 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing Hardin v. 

Manitowoc-Forsythe Corp., 691 F.2d 449, 458 (10th Cir. 1982)),·has 

been served in this case. Marino was advised at least three 

months prior to trial by Otis that it intended to raise the notching issue as an affirmative defense. See Deposition of Charles 

Roper, R. Vol. III at 594. And, the notching issue was repeatedly 

raised in the depositions before trial in some detail. See Deposition of William Hicks, Id. at 511-16; Deposition of John Harcourt, 

Id. at 521-28; Deposition of W.E. Goad, Id. at 671-73; Deposition 

of John L. Marino, id. at 687; Deposition of Alton Rex Jasper, 

Jr., Id. at 728-32. Thus, it would have been within the court's 

discretion, had it chosen to do so, to deny Marino's motion in 

limine and permit the amendment of Otis's answer allowing the 

notching to be considered not only to defeat causation but to 

affirmatively assert contributory negligence. "Allowance of 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 13 
amendments is discretionary but should be allowed if the opposing 

party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such 

evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his ... [case] upon 

the merits." Rio Rancho Estates, Inc. v. Beyerlein, 662 F.2d 700, 

705 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Monod v. Futura, Inc., 415 F.2d 

1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 1969)). 

The trial court, nonetheless, granted Marino's motion and 

refused to permit evidence for purposes of establishing contributory negligence or to give an instruction thereon. Because Marino 

would not have been prejudiced had the court denied his motion 

entirely, he cannot claim prejudice when the trial court excluded 

the issue of contributory negligence. "Neither side should, 

consistent with the spirit of the rules, be allowed to sit back 

and fail to take obvious action to ascertain facts. To fail to do 

so suggests an attempt to use the rules for the object of 

developing an error." Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 804 

(10th Cir. 1980) (Doyle, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 

918 (1981). Thus, in this case, there was no trial by ambush, and 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) merely gives Marino a hook on which to hang 

his appeal, albeit unsuccessfully. 

II. 

Marino also moved at trial to prohibit expert testimony which 

Marino anticipated from John Harcourt, one of Otis's expert witnesses. Harcourt had completed tests between his deposition and 

trial to determine specifically the effect which Marino's notching 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 14 
of the overshot had on the flow pattern of water pumped down the . well to clean debris off the packer. Otis failed to provide 

Marino with the results of this testing until the night before 

trial began. Marino requested that any results of such testing be 

excluded from trial. The court granted this request during 

Harcourt's trial testimony. 5 

Marino now claims that the court allowed Harcourt to testify 

impermissibly in at least two respects. First Marino complains 

5 The judge defined the scope of the excluded testimony by 

ruling that "no evidence will be allowed pertaining to any tests 

that were made subsequent to the date of the deposition of this 

witness.'' R. Vol. VIII at 37. At trial, Mr. Harcourt testified 

that the packer became stuck in the well and the overshot 

mechanism became stuck to the tubing seal divider because of three 

conditions caused by the modification to the overshot. Marino 

objected at this time saying that such testimony was prohibited by 

the motion in limine. The witness however, assured the judge that 

his testimony did not concern tests done between deposition and 

ttial. The judge then permitted the testimony but again clarified 

the scope of the limitation on Harcourt's testimony: 

THE COURT: All right ..•. I'll take your word 

for it. In other words, the ruling of the Court is 

intended to allow all the evidence that was known at the 

time that deposition was taken. I made that clear. 

Everybody understands that, and you were here and 

understood it. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: So you go ahead. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: The Court intended to and does exclude 

any testimony surrounding tests or studies or whatever 

made since your deposition was taken because it was not 

furnished to the other side. 

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 

THE COURT: All right. Within those parameters, 

you go right ahead. Go ahead counsel. 

R. Vol. VIII at 41-42. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 15 
that the trial court allowed Harcourt to testify about the results 

of testing which he completed between deposition and trial, and, 

second, Marino alleges that Harcourt, to Marino's prejudice, was 

allowed to testify about theories which Harcourt did not reveal in 

his deposition or other discovery. 

The first part of Harcourt's trial testimony, about which 

Marino now complains, was that the dirt that was present inside 

the packer assembly when it was pried apart indicated that the 

modified overshot had not succeeded in completely washing clean 

the tubing seal divider mandrel. Marino claims that this 

testimony was the result of the further testing undertaken by Otis 

between deposition and trial and was thus excluded by the court's 

order. We cannot agree. 

At ·his deposition, Harcourt testified that the notches would 

have affected the circulation of the water sent down the hole to 

clean the top of the packer assembly. However, he was unable to 

give any specific approximation of the venturi effect which he 

indicated that the notches would create in the flow pattern. It 

was to obtain such an approximation that Harcourt conducted the 

testing between deposition and trial. But in none of the testimony which Harcourt presented at trial was such evidence 

presented. It is true that Harcourt testified at trial that ''~he 

modified tool did not adequately wash the sand out of the 

J-grooves so that when the overshot was placed over it and latched 

on, the sand became an . impediment to the full engagement of 

the lugs into the J-slot," R. Vol. VIII at 43, but Harcourt had 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 16 
offered similar testimony at his deposition, 6 and he did not mention in his trial testimony any testing which he may have done 

between his deposition and trial to confirm his opinion. 

6 Q. And what is your understanding of the history of the 

problem in this well, if you have one, based upon these 

communications? 

• • 0 

A. Well, first, I guess, let me kind of start from the 

beginning and then wrap it around to the beginning -- Start with 

the end. 

The end is after the components are.removed from the 

well where the milling has taken place over the overshot, gone 

down, these particular tools are cut off from the packer and 

retrieved from the hole, removed from the hole, and that section 

longitudinally cut and opened up where we see stuck overshot into 

this tubing seal assembly and from that, I have information that 

there was a considerable amount of sand and what have you in the 

mechanism that would certainly have prevented a proper latch up -- unlatching of the tool • 

. • • [T]here may have been no circulation at the time 

that the overshot was set down on the tubing seal assembly, simply 

because the frac balls had plugged the -- in the Chiksan •..• 

so we certainly have the possibility that as we latched on, we did 

not have the material circulating sufficient such that we would 

not have interference when we sat down on the tool, and I believe 

as the evidence is, full of sand, that was very near the case, 

that we probably broke circulation right before set down on the 

tool. 

Something that complicated that is the notching of the 

bottom of the overshot where the -- maybe the proper turbulent 

flow that circulates in picking up frac balls, sand and debris 

just could not be accomplished with the -- with the degree of 

cleanliness that must take place. Basically the notches created a 

three point, a venturi affect, so that we did not create the 

proper turbulence to be clean, if we were real close to the tubing 

divider. 

And there, I think -- therein, I think lies the problem. 

R. Vol. III at 595-96. Harcourt further testified at deposition 

that: 

Q Well now, you say if you circulated long enough you 

might be able to get the sand? 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 17 
Therefore, such testimony was not prohibited by the court's 

previous order. 

The second part of Harcourt's trial testimony about which 

Marino complains, concerns the various theories which Harcourt 

offered to indicate how the notches or other causes might further 

have caused the packer to become stuck. For example, Harcourt 

testified that the notches might have caused the packer assembly 

to bind up because the notching of the overshot skirt made a space 

between the overshot and the well casing capable of catching frac 

balls and other well debris and causing the sections of the 

overshot in between the notches to deflect in upon the tubing seal 

divider mandrel as the overshot was forced down on top of it; he 

also testified that the notches themselves might catch debris 

. causing the overshot to become inappropriately wedged on top of 

the mandrel, and frustrating the release of the packer. Finally, 

he testified that the string shot explosions used by Marino in 

(cont'd from previous page) 

A. It might come clean and on the other hand, -- I'm saying 

I don't know the answer. 

On the other hand, you might get some backstreaming so 

that the sand would pull up higher than it would -- than you would 

think. Instead of finally sweeping it clean, it may just create a 

pile there, kind of a false feeling. You thought, ''Well, I've 

circulated long enough, now." but because its created this 

backstream, here, you set down on it, you would move right into a 

nice pile of sand. 

Q. Well, in that case, what you're saying is you'll be 

getting for instance, some clean flow returns at the top and what 

you're saying is that may not indicate that you're really clean, 

then? 

A. That's right. 

R. Vol III. at 523-24. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 18 
attempting to jar the packer loose, distorted the packer's shape 

causing it to become irremovable. Marino argues that this 

testimony was a prejudicial expansion of Harcourt's deposition 

testimony in that it incorporated theories of how the notches 

caused the overshot to stick to the mandrel which were not 

revealed at deposition or other discovery. Again, we disagree. 

The relatively brief extracts of Harcourt's deposition which 

are in the record do not support Marino's contention. By studying 

the thirteen pages of Harcourt's deposition which appear as 

exhibits to various motions in the record, we can gather that 

Harcourt indicated in his deposition a number of causes· explaining 

the binding up of the overshot to the tubing seal divider. 

Because the record does not contain a complete copy of Harcourt's 

deposition, we cannot tell whether Harcourt believed whether these 

causes were independent or interrelated. Nonetheless they 

include: (1) the presence of sand already in the overshot when it 

connected with the J-slot; (2) sand falling on top of the packer 

assembly from the well formation; (3) the possibility of this 

notching causing a change in the turbulation of the water sent to 

clean the overshot leaving sand on top of the assembly; (4) the 

possibility that a frac ball or other well debris caught in the 

notches·of the overshot could then be redeposited on top of the 

J-slot only to be caught in the attempted latch up; 7 (5) the 

7 Q. Now, do you have any other opinions aside from the sand 

inside the overshot and then you have also indicated sand falling 

on top of the tool is a problem and you have also indicated the 

possibility of this notching causing a change in the turbulation, 

turbulent flow of circulation down by the tool is a problem. 

(cont'd on next page) 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 19 
possibility that the string shots used by Marino in attempting to 

jar the packer loose swelled the tubing making the packer irremovable,8 and finally, (6) the suggestion that well debris would pack 

in against the overshot making it fit "tighter and tighter. 119 It 

is not clear to us that these very possibilities, or other aspects 

of them, are not the causes that Harcourt detailed in his courtroom testimony. And because we have only been given occasional 

and non-consecutive excerpts from Harcourt's deposition, we cannot 

say that they are not. 

The possible discrepancies which exist between Harcourt's 

deposition, as provided, and his trial testimony are not of such a 

scope that we can say that the judge prejudicially affected 

Marino's substantial rights in admitting Harcourt's testimony. 

(cont'd from previous page} 

Are there any other areas -- areas that are problem areas 

that you have discovered that may have caused this overshot to 

become stuck to the tubing seal divider? 

A. The other area is the possibility that large objects 

whether it be a frac ball or pieces of steel or whatever material 

it could be in the debris of the fracing or whatever, could be 

caught in those [notches] and redeposited. 

R. Vol. III at 599. 

8 

These forces have come about most probably from the 

firing of the string shots inside of the tubing itself, 

creating very high pressures, the overpressurization 

causing, swelling, belling of the tube, which you see 

also direct evidence here. If you put a straight edge 

on this, this is curved which means its swelled out. 

Deposition of John Harcourt, R. Vol. III at 683. 

9 "[T]here is also a problem of getting that down inside 

because ••• we're creating a sand pack on the outside 

continuously .•• filling in up the hole and this is becoming 

tighter and tighter." Id. at 684. 

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See Motive Parts Warehouse v. Facet Enterprises, 774 F.2d 380, 396 

(10th Cir. 1985); K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'l Corp., 763 F.2d 

1148, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1985). As the trial court instructed 

counsel, the possible discrepancies, at least in this case, go to 

the weight which should have been afforded Harcourt's testimony, 

not to its admissibility. 10 And on several occasions Marino used 

what he presumed to be such discrepancies in impeaching Harcourt 

on cross-examination. 11 

In any case, Marino never objected to the admission of any 

evidence on the basis of surprise, nor did he ask for a continuance. Our cases show that when a party requests a new trial 

on the basis of surprise testimony it must be able to show 

surprise, prejudice, and an attempt to cure the prejudice such as 

a motion for a continuance. Assuming arguendo, that Marino has 

10 

MR. BURKETT: He's identified them. I would like 

to object to the exhibits, Your Honor, because the witness has already testified that there is no evidence 

that frac balls had anything to do with the clogging up 

or sticking of this tool. 

THE COURT: Well, that goes to the weight of the 

testimony, though, rather than the admissibility of it. 

Overruled. Go ahead. 

R. Vol. VIII at 46-47 • 

. 11 For example, Marino used Harcourt's deposition testimony that 

the notching of the tool did not affect its hardness in attempting 

to impeach Harcourt's trial testimony that well debris caused the 

sections of the overshot in between the notches to deflect inward 

onto the mandrel. R. Vol. VIII at 55-56. He also used Harcourt's 

deposition testimony in attempting to show that Harcourt had no 

specific knowledge about the notches' affect on the circulation 

down the well, id., and to show that Harcourt's trial testimony 

about the possibility of a frac ball being caught in the notches 

was nothing more than a possibility unsupported by evidence. Id. 

at 60-61. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 21 
shown surprise and prejudice, 12 he did not move for a continuance 

or take other steps "to cure the alleged prejudice. 1113 Such a 

failure results in the waiver of surprise as a basis for appeal in 

these circumstances. As we said in Greenwood v. McDonough Power 

Equipment Inc., 731 F.2d 690, 697 (10th Cir. 1984): 

"Although counsel ... objected and alleged surprise 

when [defendant's witness changed his testimony at 

trial] there has been a failure to establish that [the 

witness's] testimony was prejudicial. [Plaintiffs] did 

not move for a continuance nor have they displayed the 

manner in which [the witness's] observation prejudiced 

them or what steps they may have pursued to cure the 

alleged prejudice." 

See also Id. at 698 (McKay, J., concurring) (trial court acted 

within discretion in admitting evidence that had not been revealed 

in the pretrial order or other discovery responses when the 

plaintiffs failed _to seek a continuance or other remedy); 6A J. 

Moore, Moore's Federal Practice~ 59.08[2] (2d ed. 1986). 

12 Marino asserts that he was surprised and prejudiced in that 

Harcourt's testimony "causally connected the alleged Notching and 

the failure of the Packer once and for all. There had been no 

notice that such testimony would be offered until the eve of 

trial." Brief for Appellant at 29. Nonetheless, a reading of 

Harcourt's deposition shows that it was the very thrust of his 

deposition testimony to establish such a causal connection; hence 

this connection could neither have been new or unexpected by 

Marino. Thus, this case is easily distinguished from Smith v. 

Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 

U.S. 918 (1981), where the surprise witness's deposition was never 

taken due to the misleading description of that witness's 

testimony included in the pretrial order. 

13 Rather than moving for a continuance, counsel began an 

immediate, vigorous, and effective cross-examination of the witness. See note 11, supra. Counsel's cross-examination does not 

bear the marks of one whose ability to test a witness has been 

impaired by surprise testimony and his failure to request a continuance suggests that he felt no such impairment. Again, unlike 

Smith, there is no suggestion that the witness could have been 

unavailable to testify had a continuance been granted. 

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Marino has received his day in court, and although his trial 

may not have been error free, it was sufficiently proper in all 

respects to afford his case a fair hearing before a jury. He 

presents no error sufficient to merit a new trial. 

III. 

As the prevailing party at trial, Otis moved pursuant to 

Okla. Stat. tit. 12 § 940(A) for recovery of its attorneys fees 

from Marino. The statute provides: 

"In any civil action to recover damages for the 

negligent or willful injury to property and any other 

incidental costs related to such action, the prevailing 

party shall be allowed reasonable attorney's fees, court 

costs and interest to be set by the court and to be 

taxed and collected as other costs of the action." 

(emphasis added). The court ruled that there was no entitlement 

to attorney's fees in this case. R. Vol. X at 5. Otis argues 

that the judge erred because the plain terms of the statute 

entitle Otis to recover its attorney's fees. Otis argues that 

this suit was brought for the negligent destruction of property, 

that it successfully defended the suit, and that the Oklahoma 

statute at issue makes the award of attorney's fees mandatory in 

cases such as these. See Clark v. Miller, 631 P.2d 1343, 1345 

(Okla. Ct. App. 1981). 

Marino, on the other hand, argues that the judge ruled correctly because an oil and gas lease is not in itself property but 

rather a property right which does not fall under the terms of the 

statute. He argues that his oil and gas lease is merely the right 

to obtain what oil and gas he can from his lease and that this ·oil 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 23 
and gas does not constitute property until it has been reduced to 

possession. Accordingly he argues, he was not suing for damage to 

property, but for damage to a property right not covered under 

§ 940(A). He cites for this proposition language from the 

Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in Woods Petroleum Corp. v. 

Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp., 700 P.2d 1011, 1012-13 (Okla. 1984). In 

Woods Petroleum, however, the plaintiff sued the defendant for 

mismeasuring and thus negligently taking gas which plaintiff was 

selling to the defendant. Plaintiff won the case and was awarded 

attorney's fees in the trial court below under§ 940(A). The 

Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the award .of attorney's fees, noting that the plaintiff had an ownership right in the gas, but the 

statute did not grant attorney's fees for any interference with an 

ownership right, it required actual physical damage to property 

before attorney's fees would be awarded to the prevailing party. 

Thus the court held that§ 940(A) applies only to prevailing parties in "actions for damages for the negligent or willful physical 

injury to property." Woods Petroleum, 700 P.2d at 1013 (emphasis 

in original). 

Marino's attempt to distinguish property from property rights 

in this case must fail. His lease has been devalued, if at all, 

because of the physical damage caused to the lease properties in 

milling out the packer from the well itself. Marino himself alleges that "Marino sought compensation for damages to geological 

formations which would have yielded oil and gas had Otis not 

ruined the well." Reply and Response Brief of Appellant at 25. 

Such allegations center around the physical injury to property and 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 24 
thus fall within the mandatory coverage of§ 940(A) authorizing 

the recovery of attorney's fees. Accordingly, ,Otis should have 

been granted such fees by the district court. 

On appeal, Otis also requests that it be awarded reasonable 

attorneys fees necessitated by the present appeal. The Oklahoma 

Supreme Court has interpreted§ 940(A) to allow additional fees to 

the prevailing party "for legal services rendered in the appellate 

court." Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Okla. 1984). Accordingly, we grant Otis's request and remand to the trial court 

to calculate the amount of reason~ble attorney's fees due to Otis 

for the proceeding in the trial court and on appeal according to 

the guidelines established in State ex rel. Burk v. City of 

Oklahoma City, 598 P.2d 659 (Okla. 1979), and Sisney, 690 P.2d at 

1051. 

It is thus ordered that the district court's judgment be 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 

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Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 25 
Nos. 85-1800, 85-1957; John L. Marino v. Otis Engineering 

TIMBERS, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 

I regret that I am unable to join in the majority's comprehensive, 

innovative opinion. Since I believe that the cumulative effect of the 

too errors conmitted at trial -- admission in evidence of an unpled 

defense and admission in evidence of surprise expert testimony --

unjustly prejudiced appellant, I would reverse the judgment entered on 

the jury verdict and remand the case for a new trial. 

(A) Evidence of Contributory Negligence of Appellant. 

Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 

"(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding 

pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and 

satisfaction, arbitration and award, ass1.1I1ption of risk, 

contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 

estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 

injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, 

release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 

limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an 

avoidance or affirmative defense. When a party has 

mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a 

counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if 

justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had 

been a proper designation." 

"If such defenses are not affirmatively pleaded, asserted with a 

motion under Rule 12(b) or tried by the express or implied consent of the 

parties, such defenses are deemed to have been waived and may not 

thereafter be considered as triable issues in the case." Radio 

Corporation of America v. Radio Station KYFM, Inc., 424 F.2d 14, 17 (10th 

Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court strictly enforces the rules it has 

prescribed. See Taylor v. Illinois, 56 U.S.L.W. 4118 (1988) (upholding 

sanction precluding witness from testifying where counsel had failed to 

comply with discovery rules). 

In the instant case I would hold that the defense of appellant's 

contributory negligence was waived and, accordingly, no evidence should 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 26 
have been admitted on the issue. The defense was never affirmatively 

pleaded nor was it asserted with a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b). 

Most assuredly, it was not tried with the consent of the parties. When 

it appeared, due to the opening statement of appellee's counsel, that 

appellee considered the defense to be an issue triable to the jury, 

appellant imnediately moved in limine to exclude any evidence of its own 

contributory negligence. Specifically, appellant urged that any defense 

based on an alleged alteration of the packer by so-called "notching" of 

that piece of equipnent should be excluded. After argtment in chambers, 

the court agreed with appellant and granted the motion, stating: "A 

gener·a1 denial • • • tells the other side nothing. You [ appellee] said you 

were going to [file an amended answer], pleading these defenses, and you 

didn't do it. So you're not going to be allowed to put on any evidence 

of it •••• " The court was eminently correct in this ruling. 

Notwithstanding the ruling, however, the court permitted evidence of 

appellant's contributory negligence in notching the packer to permeate 

the entire trial, under the guise of "causation".~/ To me, the 

difficulty in following the lower court's rationale is that, under its 

approach, contributory negligence oould never have to be pled. By 

emphasizing the notching evidence as a break in the chain of causation, 

appellee succeeded in trying and submitting to the jury the improper 

issue of "who was negligent -- Otis or Marino?" when the issue, as set 

forth clearly in the pleadings, was appellee's negligence alone. This 

was error. 

I. "What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name 

'i.Ould smell as sweet." W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene 

ii, line 43. 

2 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 27 
(B) The Surprise Expert Testimony. 

Rule 26(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly imposes 

a continuing duty on a person who responds to a discovery request to make 

seasonable s·upplemental responses with respect to, among other facts, 

"the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness 

at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, 

and the substance of the person's testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(l) 

(emphasis added). The rule further requires a party to amend a prior 

response seasonably if the party "obtains information upon the basis of 

which • • • the party knows that the response was incorrect when made". 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). In the instant case, the concealment of 

experiments, and the results thereof, performed by appellee's expert 

after his deposition, which results contradicted his deposition 

testimony, assured a trial by anbush when the expert was permitted to . testify to them. 

Two weeks prior to trial appellant took the deposition of appellee's 

expert, John Harcourt. At that time, when questioned regarding the 

passible impact of notching on the packer, Harcourt responded that he had 

not reached any conclusions on notching and therefore could not quantify 

the effect, if any. He. stated that sand which had been trapped in the 

packer "oould be enough by itself" to cause the packer to become stuck. 

This was precisely the conclusion appellant had reached and, in fact, was 

the basis of its lawsuit. 

Shortly after Harcourt's deposition, he performed a series of 

experiments which allegedly demonstrated that the notching of the packer 

created three conditions which caused the packer to malfunction. At no 

time prior to the eve of trial, however, did Harcourt amend his 

3 

Appellate Case: 85-1800 Document: 010110018264 Date Filed: 02/23/1988 Page: 28 
deposition testimony to enable appellant to be put on notice of 

Harcourt's findings. As soon as appellant was advised that Harcourt 

might testify in contradiction to his deposition testimony, appellant 

moved, as part of its motion in limine, to exclude such testimony. As 

stated above, that motion was granted. The court said: 

"I'm going to sustain any objection to further testimony 

that might tend to enlarge upon the testimony that this 

witness gave at deposition, the result of any test taken since 

then for the reasons that you didn't supply the other side 

with the results of the test or whatever, and the rules are 

clear that you have a continuing obligation to update the 

answers to interrogatories or the demand for production or 

whatever as new evidence that may come to light, and 

apparently didn't do it in this case." · 

Notwithstanding this ruling, however, appellee nevertheless was 

permitted to elicit testimony regarding the experiment's results. 

Harcourt -- having given deposition testimony which supported appellant's 

case -- was permitted to testify at trial that the notching caused the 

failure of the packer. The prejudice which redounded to appellant £rem 

this surprise testimony, for which it was unprepared, simply could not be 

overcome. It cast a reversible pall over the entire trial. 

To sunmarize: 

Appellant was unjustly prejudiced by the cLmulative effect of the 

too errors in the admission of evidence regarding the notching of the 

packer. First, in view of appellee's total failure ever to articulate an 

affirmative defense based on notching of the packer, the evidence was 

erroneously admitted under the guise of causation. Second, due to the 

breach of the duty to supplement, it was error to permit Harcourt to 

testify in contradiction to his deposition testimony. The cLmulative 

effect of these errors requires a new trial. 

I respectfully dissent. 

4 

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