Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01122/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Ortiz
Appellee
Mark Thompson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 23, 2015*

Decided October 26, 2015

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1122

MARK THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JORGE ORTIZ,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 C 6929

Edmond E. Chang,

Judge.

O R D E R

Mark Thompson appeals the dismissal of his civil-rights suit seeking declaratory 

and injunctive relief against an Illinois state-court judge who presided over a state-court 

case that Thompson had filed against his former employer a year earlier. The district 

court concluded that Thompson’s suit should be dismissed based on the Rooker-Feldman

 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-1122 Page 2

doctrine as well as grounds of standing and judicial immunity. We affirm, though on 

partially different grounds.

In August 2013 Thompson was discharged from his teaching position with 

Chicago Public Schools after being accused of sexual assault. He sued the Chicago Board 

of Education and several other defendants in Illinois state court for, among other claims,

conspiracy, defamation, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. He later moved in 

this state litigation to amend his complaint and add employment-discrimination claims

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1924. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2-a(1). In August 2014 

Judge Jorge Ortiz, the state judge presiding over the case, denied Thompson’s motion to 

amend because it was procedurally defective (Thompson had failed to timely serve the 

proposed order on the defendants and the court) and because delay caused by 

Thompson’s actions would prejudice the defendants and undermine judicial economy.

A month later Thompson sued Judge Ortiz in federal court under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, asserting that the judge had deprived him of due process by denying his motion 

to amend his complaint to include his Title VII claims. Thompson sought a declaration 

that the judge had violated his due-process rights, an injunction barring the judge from 

refusing future plaintiffs leave to amend in similar circumstances, and “costs” for the 

litigation Thompson had initiated (including his appeal of his state-court case, this 

federal suit and appeal, and a separate federal case that he filed in order to pursue his 

Title VII claims).

In late 2014 the district court dismissed Thompson’s complaint. Regarding 

Thompson’s request for declaratory relief, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction 

under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Thompson essentially was challenging a 

state-court judgment. Regarding Thompson’s request for injunctive relief, the court 

concluded that he lacked standing to assert the rights of future plaintiffs and that he had 

not brought this suit as a class action. Finally, with regard to any money damages 

(presuming that is what Thompson meant by “costs”), the court ruled that Judge Ortiz 

was entitled to absolute judicial immunity. 

In the meantime, in the state-court litigation, Judge Ortiz entered final judgment 

dismissing Thompson’s complaint against the Chicago Board of Education, a judgment 

that Thompson promptly appealed. His state-court appeal is ongoing.

On appeal Thompson generally challenges the district court’s application of the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar his claim for declaratory relief. As Judge Ortiz now 

acknowledges, Rooker-Feldman does not apply here because it does not bar the claims of 

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No. 15-1122 Page 3

federal-court plaintiffs who, like Thompson, file a federal suit when state-court 

proceedings are ongoing. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 

281–82 (2005); Parker v. Lyons, 757 F.3d 701, 705–06 (7th Cir. 2014).

But we uphold the dismissal of Thompson’s request for declaratory relief on 

another ground: lack of standing. The purpose of declaratory judgment is to deprive the 

defendant of delay as a weapon by declaring the parties’ legal rights in anticipation of 

some future conduct. See Med. Assurance Co. v. Hellman, 610 F.3d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 2010). 

A plaintiff lacks standing to seek declaratory judgment where a declaration of the 

parties’ legal rights will provide no relief. See Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 761 (7th 

Cir. 2002); Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 313–14 (7th Cir. 2000). Thompson has no use for 

a declaration of rights because he has no continuing relationship with Judge Ortiz. 

See Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding district court’s denial 

of declaratory judgment against warden where it would grant no relief because plaintiff 

was transferred out of warden’s prison); Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003)

(plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory judgment against probate judge where 

likelihood of future encounters was speculative). Thompson’s only use for declaratory 

relief is as a predicate to his claim for costs, but declaratory judgments may not be used 

as simply a predicate to a damages claim because “that would circumvent the rule that a 

judgment in a suit for damages is not final and appealable until the amount of damages 

is determined and the defendant ordered to pay it.” Bontkowski, 305 F.3d at 761; 

see also Ill. Dunesland Pres. Soc'y v. Ill. Dep’t. of Nat’l Res., 584 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Thompson next challenges the district court’s dismissal of his request for 

injunctive relief based on lack of standing and continues to seek an injunction barring 

Judge Ortiz from denying him leave to amend in the future. But a plaintiff such as 

Thompson lacks standing for injunctive relief where he alleges only a past injury and 

where there is no threat that the challenged future conduct will in fact recur and harm 

him. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102–03 (1983); Perry, 222 F.3d at 313. There is 

no “realistic threat” that Judge Ortiz again will deny a motion to amend Thompson’s 

complaint to add Title VII counts. Perry, 222 F.3d at 313.

Finally, Thompson challenges the district court’s dismissal of his claim for costs 

on grounds of judicial immunity. First, he cites to Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 519, 544

(1984), in which the Supreme Court held that judicial immunity is not a bar to an award 

of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. But the portion of the Court’s opinion 

addressing costs was superseded by the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996.

See 42 U.S.C § 1988(b) (“In any action . . . enforcing a provision of Section 

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1981 . . . brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 

judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any costs, including attorney’s 

fees, unless such action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”); Knox v. 

Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011). Judge Ortiz acted well within his judicial 

capacity in denying Thompson’s motion to amend; denying a motion is an act “judicial 

in nature” and a “function normally performed by a judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 

349, 362 (1978).

AFFIRMED.

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