Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06068/USCOURTS-ca10-91-06068-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sharon Sue Cook
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

DEC 3 1 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SHARON SUE COOK, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 91-6068 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CR-90-185-A) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS: 

William P. Earley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma 

City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, and John E. Green, 

First Assistant u.s. Attorney, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 1 
Sharon Sue Cook pled guilty to three counts of a forty-three 

count indictment that charged her with embezzling her deceased 

father-in-law's social security benefits between June 1986 and 

January 1990 in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 641 (1988). Pursuant to 

the plea agreement, the other forty counts were dismissed. The 

court sentenced Ms. Cook to three years probation on each count, 

the sentences to run concurrently, and ordered her to pay 

restitution to the United States in the amount of $23,208, the 

total amount of the forty-three embezzled checks. 

Ms. Cook subsequently moved the district court to correct its 

sentence, arguing that under Hughey v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 

1979 (1990), she could only be required to make restitution for 

the three counts to which she pled guilty. In denying the motion, 

the district court held that the first count of the indictment 

embraced all forty-three counts and that ordering reparations for 

the full amount charged by the indictment was thus fully 

consistent with Hughey. We reverse.

1 

We apply a de novo standard of review to questions of a 

sentence's legality. United States v. Jalilian, 896 F.2d 447, 448 

1 The parties agreed to submit this case on the briefs. After 

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); lOth 

Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without 

oral argument. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 2 
(lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Teehee, 893 F.2d 271, 273 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). If we conclude the sentence is legal, we review 

conditions of probation for an abuse of discretion. Jalilian, 896 

F.2d at 448 (court abused discretion by deporting defendant as a 

condition of probation because it lacked the statutory authority 

to do so). Ms. Cook argues that the district court's restitution 

order is not statutorily permissible. 

We must first determine under which statute restitution was 

awarded. Restitution for offenses committed prior to November 1, 

1987 could have been awarded under two different statutory 

regimes. In addition to the Victim and Witness Protection Act 

(VWPA), 18 u.s.c. § 3663 (1988) (formerly 18 u.s.c. § 3579 

(1982)), the Federal Probation Act (FPA), 18 u.s.c. § 3651 (1988) 

(repealed effective November 1, 1987), permitted courts to order 

restitution as a special condition of probation. Although the 

district court never specified the statutory basis for its order 

of restitution, the court's form for a petition to enter a plea of 

guilty reflects its awareness of the two possible sources of 

statutory authority for such an order: "Do you realize that if 

you plead GUILTY the judge may require you to make restitution to 

any victim of the offense (18 U.S.C. §§ 3579, 3663, and 3671 

[sic)). " 2 Rec., vol. I, doc. 9 at 4. 

2 The reference to 18 U.S.C. § 3671 appears to be an error. 

That section is entitled "[v)essels carrying explosives." The 

form properly should have referenced the FPA, 18 U.S.C. § 3651. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 3 
In cases like Ms. Cook's, where both statutes authorize 

restitution, district courts should specify whether the FPA or 

VWPA governs. As a matter of course, however, "unless a clear 

intention appears to the contrary, we will assume restitution 

orders are made pursuant to the broader provisions of the VWPA." 

United States v. Padgett, 892 F.2d 445, 448 (6th Cir. 1989); see 

United States v. Kress, 944 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1991), petition 

for cert. filed, 60 u.s.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1991) (No. 

91-837). This principle makes particular sense here, where only 

one of the counts to which Ms. Cook pled guilty took place prior 

to the repeal date of the FPA. Neither party suggests that the 

FPA governs this case, and the sentencing court never discussed 

it. As a result, unless the VWPA authorizes the award of 

restitution in this case, we must reverse. 

In Hughey, the Supreme Court held "that the language and 

structure of the [VWPA] make plain Congress' intent to authorize 

an award of restitution only for the loss caused by the specific 

conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction." 110 S. 

Ct. at 1981. Ms. Cook may therefore only be ordered to make 

restitution for the loss connected to the three counts to which 

she pled guilty. 3 Nevertheless, the district court ordered 

3 Even were we to conclude that the district court had ordered 

restitution under the FPA, we would apply Hughey's limitation to 

restitution awards under that statute and reach the same result. 

The FPA's provision for restitution is more specifically tied to 

-4-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 4 
restitution for the full amount of loss charged by the indictment. 

Although the court apparently agreed with Ms. Cook that Hughey 

limited its authority to award restitution, it denied her motion 

to correct her sentence because of its reading of the indictment. 

See Rec., vol. I, doc. 21. The court concluded that by pleading 

guilty to count I of the indictment, Ms. Cook effectively pled 

guilty to all of the other counts. In support of its 

construction, the court quoted the indictment, Count I 11 1: 

"'[I]n each of Counts I through XXXXIII, •.. [the 

defendant] herein, did unlawfully ... convert to her own 

use ••. Social Security benefits ... as listed more 

specifically below in Counts I through XXXXIII and each 

of a value greater than $100.00.'" 

Id. This language is immediately followed in the indictment by 

forty-three separately numbered and dated counts, specifying each 

the offense of conviction than the language of the VWPA. The FPA 

provides that "the defendant- • • . May be required to make 

restitution or reparation to the aggrieved parties for actual 

damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was 

had." 18 u.s.c. §3651 (emphasis added). Prior to Hughey, this 

language led several circuits to conclude that restitution as a 

condition of probation could only be ordered for the amount of the 

loss occasioned by the offense for which the defendant was 

convicted. See United States v. Black, 767 F.2d 1334, 1343-44 

(9th Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985); United States v. 

Missouri Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542, 1547 (8th Cir. 1984); 

United States v. Johnson, 700 F.2d 699, 701 (11th Cir. 1983). 

After Hughey, any other conclusion seems unsupportable. But see, 

United States v. Hunt, 940 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir. 1991); United 

States v. Duvall, 926 F.2d 875, 876-77 (9th Cir. 1991). As a 

result of Hughey, we believe that United States v. Vance, 868 F.2d 

1167, 1170 (lOth Cir. 1989), no longer controls restitution orders 

under the FPA. 

-5-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 5 
of the checks Ms. Cook was charged with wrongfully converting. 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 9/18/90. 

The district court's reading of the indictment is 

countertextual. The circumstances leading to Ms. Cook's plea 

suggest that the quoted language is introductory, and that the 

more specific counts of the indictment should be controlling for 

sentencing purposes. Ms. Cook initially pled not guilty to all of 

the indictment, and changed her plea to guilty on three counts in 

exchange for dismissal of the other forty counts. The district 

court's construction renders meaningless the dismissal of the 

other counts. 

Moreover, the plea agreement and the comments made by the 

district court and Assistant United States Attorney Green at the 

guilty plea hearing further indicate that the more specific counts 

comprise the substance of the indictment, and that the language 

the district court relied on was merely introductory. The plea 

agreement, which is simply one paragraph incorporated in the 

petition to enter a plea of guilty, states: 

"In exchange for a plea of guilty to Counts 1, 25 and 

37, the government will dismiss the remaining counts at 

sentencing. I will not be prosecuted for any other 

offenses arising out of this investigation. The 

government will make no recommendation as to the 

sentence to be imposed." 

-6-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 6 
Rec., val. I, doc. 9 at 6. The district court commented at the 

guilty plea hearing that the amount of $23,208 "encompass[es] the 

total loss, not just for the three counts that we're discussing 

for the purpose of the guilty plea." 4 Rec., supp. val. II, 4-5 

(emphasis added). At the same hearing, the district court 

wondered aloud about the means by which the plea agreement was 

reached: 

"THE COURT: I'm asking this question 

curiosity than for any legalistic reason. 

world did Counts One, 25 and 37 come to be 

=o-=f'--"t=h=e"-4:..:3::;..,_;c=-o=-u=n-=t=s-=-? Dart board, co in toss ? " 

more out of 

How in the 

selected out 

"MR. GREEN: Well, it was more of a time span. 

"THE COURT: In other words, one at the beginning 

and one sort of in the middle and one towards the end of 

the transactions?" 

Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). 

We review the district court's construction of the underlying 

plea agreement under a clearly erroneous standard. United States 

v. Chavez, 862 F.2d 1436, 1438 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 

u.s. 1099 (1989); Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 479 u.s. 1017 (1986). It is abundantly clear 

that Ms. Cook pled guilty to only three of the forty-three listed 

transactions. While the introductory paragraph of the indictment 

is unfortunately labelled "Count I," there is a separate "Count I" 

4 The total loss attributable to the three specific counts was 

$1585. See Rec., vol. I, doc. 9/18/90. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 7 
which refers to the specific date of June 3, 1986, and the amount 

of $510. Rec., val. I, doc. 9/18/90. This "Count I" is in the 

same form as each of the other forty-two counts, indicating that 

it is to this "Count I" that Ms. Cook pled guilty. See id. 

Nothing suggests that in pleading guilty to three counts she 

intended to plead guilty to the whole of the indictment. The 

district court's construction of the plea agreement is clearly 

erroneous, and we do not follow it here. 

Under the VWPA, as interpreted in Hughey, the district court 

may only order restitution for the charges of which Ms. Cook was 

convicted. United States v. Novey, 922 F.2d 624, 629 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 111 s. Ct. 2861 (1991). Here, those three charges, 

dated June 3, 1986, June 3, 1988, and July 3, 1989, resulted in a 

loss totaling $1585. See Rec., val. I, doc 9/18/90. The district 

court's order of restitution in the amount of $23,208 exceeds its 

statutory authority and is therefore an abuse of discretion. 

Compare Jalilian, 896 F.2d at 448-49 with United States v. Jack, 

868 F.2d 1186, 1188-89 (lOth Cir.) (probation order of district 

court expressly authorized by FPA), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112 

(1989). 

As a result, we VACATE the district court's order of 

restitution and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this 

opinion. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 91-6068 Document: 01019338946 Date Filed: 12/31/1991 Page: 8