Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03047/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ronald James Toms
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 22, 1998 Decided February 27, 1998 

No. 97-3047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

RONALD JAMES TOMS, A/K/A BLOCK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 93cr00367-01)

Veronice A. Holt argued the cause and filed the brief for 

appellant.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and 

John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, were on 

the brief.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD, and ROGERS, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Ronald James Toms ("Toms") was 

convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent 

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base; possession of 

50 grams or more of cocaine base with intent to distribute; 

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug 

trafficking crime; and carrying a pistol without a license. 

Because of the amount of drugs the district court found to be 

involved in the conspiracy, Toms was assigned a base level of 

38 under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("the 

Guidelines"). Toms now appeals his convictions and his 

sentence, contending that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him of using or carrying a firearm, that the district 

court improperly admitted expert testimony as to his intent to 

distribute, and that the district court made an incorrect 

finding as to the amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy. 

Because we find these claims to be without merit, we affirm 

Toms's convictions and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 9, 1993, a grand jury returned a thirteencount superseding indictment against Toms and two codefendants, Jimmy Thomas, Jr. ("Thomas"), and Keith Donnell Bradley ("Bradley"). All three men were charged with 

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 

50 grams or more of cocaine base from 1987 to October 1993 

in the Paradise and Mayfair housing complexes in northeast 

Washington, D.C. (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846 

(1994)). Toms and Thomas were also charged with distributing cocaine base on two dates in 1993 (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(iii), (b)(1)(B)(iii) (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)), and 

Toms and Bradley were charged with possession of 50 grams 

or more of cocaine base with intent to distribute (18 U.S.C. 

§ 2 (1994); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) (1994)); 

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug 

trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c) (1994)); and carrying 

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a pistol without a license (D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3204(a), 105 

(1996)). Thomas and Bradley both pled guilty.1

Among the evidence put forward by the government to 

prove the conspiracy was the testimony of Thomas, Toms's 

co-defendant. Thomas testified that Toms had supplied him 

with at least an ounce (28 grams) of cocaine base for distribution on "hundreds" of occasions from 1987 to 1993. Transcript ("Tr.") 1/13/95 at 123-24.

The remaining charges against Toms stemmed from an 

incident on September 10, 1993. On that date, Elbert Kibler, 

a cooperating witness, saw Toms, Bradley, and a third man 

enter Thomas's apartment building in northeast Washington. 

Kibler called the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), 

which had been investigating the conspiracy. FBI agents set 

up a surveillance of the area and watched as Toms and 

Bradley left the building, got into a Toyota Land Cruiser 

(with Toms in the driver's seat and Bradley in the passenger's seat), and drove off. The agents followed the car, which 

they had initially intended to trail to its destination; when 

Toms began speeding and weaving in and out of traffic, the 

agents initiated a traffic stop. After removing Toms and 

Bradley from the car, the agents noticed a loaded, ninemillimeter, semi-automatic pistol on Bradley's seat.

A search of Toms incident to arrest yielded approximately 

$2,000 in cash, an identification card, and an electronic pager. 

The FBI later searched the Land Cruiser pursuant to warrant and retrieved a plastic bag containing 67.8 grams of 

cocaine base from under the rear seat and over $8,000 in cash 

from an air vent.

Both Toms and Bradley testified that Toms had no knowledge that the gun was in the car and that the gun belonged to 

Bradley. See Tr. 1/23/95 at 130, 157 (Toms); id. at 12, 83 

(Bradley). Toms also denied any involvement in drug dealing 

__________

1 Thomas pled guilty to the indictment. Bradley pled guilty to 

the charge of possession with intent to distribute on September 10, 

1993; the remaining charges against him were dismissed pursuant 

to plea agreement.

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or knowledge of the drugs found in the Land Cruiser. See id.

at 101, 130. He claimed that the money found in the air vent 

of the car was to be used to cover the costs of recording a 

compact disc and was in the air vent for safekeeping. See id.

at 131, 150. The jury subsequently convicted Toms of the 

conspiracy and the three counts related to the September 

10th incident. Toms's motion for a new trial was denied.2

The presentence report assigned to Toms a base offense 

level of 38 under the Guidelines based on Thomas's testimony 

that he had received at least 28 grams of cocaine base from 

Toms on "hundreds" of occasions. See Tr. 1/13/95 at 123-24; 

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter "U.S.S.G."] 

§ 2D1.1(c)(1) (1997). On April 7, 1995, Toms moved for a 

hearing, seeking to question Thomas and Bradley and gain 

access to their presentence reports and alleging that Thomas's testimony was unreliable. The district court denied 

Toms's motion on March 4, 1997, crediting Thomas's testimony and concluding that even taken at its most conservative 

(28 grams on each of one hundred occasions), Thomas's 

testimony supported a finding that Toms had distributed 2.8 

kilograms of cocaine base, resulting in a base offense level of 

38. The district court also adopted the report's recommendation that Toms's base offense level be enhanced by four levels 

for his role in the conspiracy, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), and by 

two levels for obstruction of justice, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 

yielding a total offense level of 44.3 Because Toms had 

reached the Guidelines' sentencing cap of level 43, see

U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, intro. comment (offense level greater 

than 43 to be treated as offense level of 43), he was sentenced 

to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for the conspiracy 

and possession convictions, to be followed by concurrent, fiveyear terms of supervised release. Toms also received a 

consecutive five-year term for using or carrying a firearm, to 

__________

2 Toms's motion to vacate his convictions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 (1994) is still pending in the district court.

3 Toms does not challenge these two enhancements on appeal.

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be followed by three years of concurrent supervised release, 

and a concurrent, one-year term for carrying a pistol without 

a license.

Toms now appeals his convictions, contending that there 

was insufficient evidence to prove that he had knowledge of 

the pistol found in the Land Cruiser and that the district 

court improperly admitted expert testimony as to his intent 

and knowledge. He also challenges his sentence, renewing 

his argument that Thomas's testimony was an insufficient and 

unreliable basis for the district court's conclusion as to the 

amount of drugs involved in the conspiracy.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Weapon Convictions

Toms raises two challenges to his convictions arising from 

the pistol found in the Land Cruiser. We agree with his 

contention that a portion of the jury instructions was given in 

error, but because we find this error harmless and his second 

challenge meritless, we reject both challenges.

Toms's first challenge is to the jury instruction given on the 

section 924(c) charge,4 which included the following:

The essential elements of the offense of use and carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, each of which the government must prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt are:

1. That the defendant used or carried a firearm;

2. That the defendant did so knowingly and intentionally; and

3. That the defendant did so during and in relation to a 

drug trafficking crime.

You're instructed that the word "use" can mean any 

use, such as the maintenance of a firearm for security or 

protection purposes.

__________

4 Section 924(c) prohibits the use or carrying of a firearm "during 

and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).

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The government need not show that the defendant 

actively employed the firearm or that the firearm was 

fired. It is sufficient to show the defendant actually or 

constructively possess[ed] a firearm in order to prove 

that he used it.

You're instructed that the word "carry" means to bear 

on or about one's person. A firearm is carried on or 

about one's person if it is located in such proximity to the 

person as to be convenient of access or within reach....

Tr. 1/24/95 at 128 (emphases added). As the government 

concedes, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), which 

the Supreme Court decided after Toms's conviction, renders 

the district court's instruction on "use" error. See id. at 505 

(conviction for "use" of a firearm under section 924(c) "requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of 

the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an 

operative factor in relation to the predicate offense").

Toms, unremarkably, did not object to this instruction, as it 

was consistent at the time with the prevailing law in this 

circuit. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). In United States v. 

Smart, 98 F.3d 1379 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 

1271 (1997), under similar circumstances, we noted that we 

would, under the supervening-decision doctrine,5apply Bailey

retroactively "to vacate any prior conviction in which such an 

instruction was given where it might have caused the jury to 

conclude that the defendant's awareness of and proximity to a 

gun nearby in a drug transaction constituted a forbidden 'use' 

of the gun"in other words, if the error could not be said to 

be harmless. Smart, 98 F.3d at 1393.6 The evidence intro-

__________

5

See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. 

Cir. 1994) (court will consider issue not raised at trial "where a 

supervening decision has changed the law in appellant's favor and 

the law was so well-settled at the time of trial that any attempt to 

challenge it would have appeared pointless").

6 The government cites Johnson v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1544 

(1997), for the proposition that where a defendant fails to object to a 

jury instruction later rendered erroneous by a supervening decision, 

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duced at trial was that the gun was found in the seat where 

Bradley had been sitting after he was removed from the car, 

a decidedly nonactive employment. Thus, if Toms's section 

924(c) conviction rested wholly on the jury's conclusion that 

he "used" a firearm during the drug trafficking incident, that 

conviction would have to be vacated.

Nevertheless, as we noted in Smart, any error in the "use" 

instruction would be harmless if the jury necessarily found 

that Toms "carried" the firearm within the meaning of section 

924(c).7Smart, 98 F.3d at 1393. The "necessarily" is crucial, 

for "a verdict [is required] to be set aside in cases where the 

verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and 

it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected." Yates 

v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312 (1957), overruled on other 

grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); see 

also United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1013 (D.C. 

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 446 (1997). In Washington, for 

example, we upheld the convictions of the defendant police 

officers under section 924(c) because the only evidence in 

support of their convictions showed that the officers were 

wearing service pistols on their persons during the drug 

trafficking incidents; as a result, the jury could not have 

found that they "used" the pistols without also finding that 

they "carried" the weapons. Toms now argues that the jury 

could not have reached a similar conclusion in his case.

We can easily reject this contention. As in Smart, the jury 

also convicted Toms of carrying a pistol without a license in 

violation of section 22-3204(a) of the D.C. Code.8 The jury 

__________

the instruction is reviewed for plain error rather than for harmless 

error. The fact that the instruction given in this case survives even 

a harmless error analysis makes consideration of this contention 

unnecessary.

7 The indictment charged Toms with both the use and carrying of 

a firearm during the drug trafficking offense on September 10, 

1993, and so a valid conviction could have been obtained under 

section 924(c) if the jury concluded that Toms had carried the 

firearm during the offense.

8 Section 22-3204(a) provides, in pertinent part:

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was instructed that in order to obtain a conviction on this 

charge, the government had to prove, inter alia, (1) that 

Toms carried a pistol openly or concealed on or about his 

person; and (2) that he carried the pistol knowingly and 

intentionally. See Tr. 1/24/95 at 130; see also Butler v. 

United States, 614 A.2d 875, 885 (D.C. 1992). Under the 

prevailing law of this circuit and of the District, "carry" is 

interpreted identically for both section 924(c) and section 

22-3204(a): the weapon must be convenient of access and 

within reach. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 881 F.2d 

1128, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Henderson v. United States, 687 

A.2d 918, 920-21 & n.6 (D.C. 1996); see also Tr. 1/24/95 at 128 

(jury instruction). Thus, in order to find that Toms "carried" 

the gun under section 22-3204(a), the jury had to credit the 

officers' testimony regarding the location of the gunon the 

passenger's seat of the car Toms was drivingand conclude 

that Toms was aware of the gun's presence. These are the 

same findings the jury would have had to make in order to 

find that Toms "carried" the gun for purposes of section 

924(c). Thus, by returning a guilty verdict on the section 

22-3204(a) charge, the jury necessarily concluded that Toms 

also carried the gun under section 924(c). The district court's 

instruction on "use" was harmless error.

Notwithstanding this conclusion, however, Toms argues 

that he was wrongly convicted of both of the weapon charges 

because there was insufficient evidence to support a finding 

that he had the requisite knowledge that the gun was in the 

car.9 As the government notes, trial counsel did move for a 

__________

No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either 

openly or concealed on or about their person, a pistol, without a 

license issued pursuant to District of Columbia law, or any 

deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so concealed.

D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3204(a).

9 Both the section 924(c) charge and the section 22-3204(a) charge 

require proof that the defendant possessed the weapon knowingly 

and intentionally. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 

727 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Butler, 614 A.2d at 885. Toms does not 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the remaining elements 

of either charge (i.e., that the weapon was within his reach, that his 

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judgment of acquittal on this basis as to "the gun charge" at 

the close of the government's evidence,10 but he failed to 

renew this motion at the close of all evidence. As a result, 

Toms's challenge would normally be reviewed for plain error. 

See, e.g., United States v. White, 1 F.3d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 

1993). However, Toms has claimed that this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which, as the government 

concedes, requires that his challenge be analyzed under the 

two-part test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 

(1984). Under that test, Toms must show both (1) that trial 

counsel's performance was deficientthat counsel's representation "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness"

and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the client

"that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different." Id. at 687-88, 694. Because ineffective 

assistance claims typically require an evidentiary hearing, we 

"normally do not resolve them on direct appeal, instead 

remanding to the district court." United States v. Gaviria,

116 F.3d 1498, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 

865 (1998). However, this tendency to remand has two 

__________

possession was "during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime," 

that the pistol was operable, and that he was not licensed to carry a 

pistol in the District of Columbia), and, in any event, there was 

ample evidence that these elements were satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 476 (3d Cir. 1997) (gun within reach 

inside passenger compartment of car satisfies "carry" element of 

section 924(c)); United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 617 (11th Cir. 

1996) (same); Henderson, 687 A.2d at 921 n.6 (same with regard to 

section 22-3204(a)).

10 "As to the gun charge, I think there is insufficient evidence that 

there be [sic] joint possession of the weapon. So I think there's 

been insufficient evidence on that. The government's entire theory 

in this case, which goes beyond what the actual evidence is of Mr. 

Bradley sitting on the weapon, is that that's evidence that he's the 

enforcer, and that the gun would not be in the possession, dominion 

and control of the defendant. It's not even consistent with their 

theory of the case. So I move for acquittal on that." The motion 

was denied. Tr. 1/20/95 at 153-54.

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exceptions: "when the trial record alone conclusively shows 

that the defendant is entitled to no relief and when the record 

conclusively shows the contrary." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Thus, we need not decide whether Toms's trial counsel 

was deficient if, upon reviewing the record, we can conclude 

that there is no reasonable probability that Toms would have 

prevailed on a motion for judgment of acquittal even if one 

had been madein other words, we arrive at Toms's insufficient evidence argument by an alternate route. We thus 

review "the evidence de novo, in [the] light most favorable to 

the Government, in order to determine whether a rational 

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Moore,

97 F.3d 561, 563-64 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotes and 

citations omitted). Our review is deferential and draws no 

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 

United States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 71 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Because the gun was not found on Toms's person, the 

government's case necessarily rested on a theory of constructive possession. In order for the government to prove that 

Toms constructively possessed the gun discovered in the 

Land Cruiser, it needed to establish that he "knowingly [was] 

in a position to exercise dominion and control over the object 

possessed, either personally or through others." Harrison,

931 F.2d at 71; see also Brown v. United States, 546 A.2d 

390, 394 (D.C. 1988). The government offers two theories as 

to Toms's knowledge. First, it contends that the jury's 

return of a verdict of guilty as to the section 924(c) charge 

must necessarily be interpreted to mean that the jury discredited Toms's testimony that he knew nothing of the gun 

and instead found that he knowingly possessed it. Second, 

the government argues that the jury could infer knowledge 

by looking to the evidence that Toms and Bradley were 

involved in an ongoing drug-selling operation and concluding 

that Toms therefore controlled the gun either directly or 

through Bradley. The first of these arguments is not a 

sufficient basis upon which to affirm Toms's conviction. In 

United States v. Zeigler, 994 F.2d 845 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we 

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declined to allow the jury's discrediting of the defendant's 

testimony to make up for a shortfall in the sufficiency of the 

government's evidence. "There is no principled way of deciding," we noted, "when the government's proof, less than 

enough to sustain the conviction, is nevertheless enough to 

allow adding negative inferences from the defendant's testimony to fill the gaps." Id. at 850. To be sure, the jury is 

free to discredit any witness before it on the stand and even 

to believe the exact opposite of the matter to which the 

witness has testified. Our review as an appellate court, 

however, would be frustrated if we were to allow such discrediting to constitute an essential part of the government's 

casewe cannot tell, from the lifeless words on the printed 

page of the transcript, whether the testimony memorialized 

therein is worthy of belief. The government therefore cannot 

rely on the jury's discrediting of Toms's testimony to prove 

an element of its case.

The government's second argument, however, ultimately 

proves more compelling, although viewed as an argument for 

co-conspirator liabilitythat because Toms was engaged in a 

drug distribution conspiracy, he is responsible for any acts 

committed by his co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy, see, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 

646-48 (1946)it fails. As the indictment makes clear, and 

as the government concedes, the gun charges stemmed only 

from the September 10th incident and were not predicated on 

the conspiracy. In order for it to obtain a conviction on the 

gun charges, then, the government had to present evidence 

that could lead a jury to conclude that Toms himself was 

aware of the presence of the gun in the car, not simply that 

he was involved in a conspiracy with the person under whom 

the gun was found. Cf. In re Sealed Case (Sentencing 

Guidelines' "Safety Valve"), 105 F.3d 1460, 1464-65 (D.C. Cir. 

1997) ("Linking participation in an ongoing drug trafficking 

enterprise to constructive possession of a gun requires an 

additional inferential step, one that we think should not be 

made ... without some additional evidence supporting that 

step.").

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As the second prong of the government's argument suggests, however, there was sufficient evidence of Toms's drugselling activities such that the jury could have concluded that 

Toms was aware of the gun's presence in the Land Cruiser on 

September 10th and thus constructively possessed the gun.11

As we have noted elsewhere, although "mere proximity" to a 

gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession, evidence of an additional factor establishing that the defendant 

was in a position to exercise dominion or control over the 

gun" 'including connection with a gun [or] proof of motive' "coupled with proximity may be sufficient. Moore, 104 

F.3d at 381 (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 904 F.2d 52, 56 

(D.C. Cir. 1990)); see also United States v. Jenkins, 981 F.2d 

1281, 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Where, as here, the gun is found 

in a place occupied by more than one person, the sufficiency 

of the evidence analysis depends on whether the evidence 

plausibly suggests " 'the likelihood that in some discernible 

fashion the accused had a substantial voice vis-à-vis the 

[gun].' " United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087, 1089 (D.C. 

Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Staten, 581 F.2d 878, 884 

(D.C. Cir. 1978)) (emphasis in Foster).

The government introduced evidence both as to connection 

and as to motive to show that Toms, because of his drug 

activities, was accustomed to keeping a gun nearby for protection. Thomas, for example, one of Toms's co-conspirators, 

testified that he had seen Toms carrying a gun "[a] lot of 

times" and that Toms often kept a gun hidden in his car. Tr. 

1/13/95 at 139. In addition, the wealth of testimony that 

connected Toms to drug dealingcredited by the jury in its 

conviction of Toms for the conspiracy as well as for the drugs 

recovered from the Land Cruiserprovided a motive for 

Toms to have a gun close at hand, namely, protection of the 

__________

11 Toms did not challenge the admissibility of this evidence during 

the trial, nor does he do so on appeal. In any event, although Rule 

404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the admission of 

"other crimes, wrongs, or acts ... to prove the character of a 

person in order to show action in conformity therewith," the rule 

permits such evidence to prove, among other things, intent, knowledge, and motive. Toms put his knowledge at issue in the case 

when he testified that he did not know that the pistol was in the car.

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drugs and money in the car.12 Admittedly, the government's 

case was not as overwhelming as it would have been had the 

gun been located under Toms's seat or on his person rather 

than on Bradley's seat; we have noted that "[o]ther factors 

being equal, it is less likely that one exercises a right of 

control over an item physically held by another than over an 

item in some common area readily accessible to all present." 

Harrison, 931 F.2d at 72. Nonetheless, given the evidence 

presented, the jury was entitled to conclude that despite the 

fact that the gun was found where Bradley had been sitting, 

it was there for Toms's benefitin other words, that Toms 

knew of the gun's presence and intended to use it, or direct 

that it be used, should it become necessary to do so. We 

reached much the same conclusion in Harrison, which also 

involved the discovery of guns and drugs in a vehicle stopped 

by the police. Although the only guns recovered in that case 

were found on the persons of the other occupants of the 

vehicle, we held that because the jury found that the defendant intended to distribute the drugs recovered from the 

vehicle, the jury could reasonably have concluded that if it 

became necessary, the defendant would either "use one of his 

confederates' guns to shoot back, or else instruct one of them 

to do so"in other words, the jury could have inferred that 

the defendant had " 'some appreciable ability to guide the 

destiny' of the weapons." Id. at 73 (quoting Staten, 581 F.2d 

at 883). We see no reason to reach a different conclusion in 

this case.

Because the record is clear on the sufficiency of the evidence to support the weapon charges, we need not remand 

for further factfinding on the adequacy of trial counsel. 

__________

12 To be clear on this point: This evidence was not introduced to 

show that because Toms had carried a gun on other occasions or 

because he had dealt drugs, he was the type of person who would 

carry a gun on the date in question; admission for this purpose is 

specifically forbidden by the first part of Rule 404(b) of the Federal 

Rules of Evidence. Rather, the evidence was introduced to show 

intent, motive, knowledge and/or absence of mistake with respect to 

the gun found in the Land Cruiser. Admission for these purposes 

is permitted under the second part of Rule 404(b).

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Considering the evidence presented at trial in the light most 

favorable to the government, we conclude that there was 

sufficientalthough not overwhelmingevidence to convict 

Toms on the section 924(c) and section 22-3204(a) charges.

B. Expert Opinion Testimony

As part of its case-in-chief, the government called Johnny 

St. Valentine Brown, an officer with the Metropolitan Police 

Department, as an expert in the distribution schemes of illicit 

drugs.13 The prosecutor then posed the following hypothetical, the facts of which mirrored the September 10th incident:

Now, assume a person is driving in a vehicle, and is 

pulled over for driving recklessly, Detective Brown, and 

when the passenger in that vehicle is pulled out, he is 

found to be sitting on a gun. Now, assume later 67 

grams of crack are found under the rear seat, over $8,000 

is found in the air conditioning vents, and the driver of 

the vehicle has $2,000 on his person. What would be the 

relationship there between, let's say, the gun and the 

drugs and the roles of these various individuals?

Tr. 1/20/95 at 99. At this point, defense counsel objected, 

stating, "I note an objection to ultimate conclusion; don't 

object to what it could be." His objection was overruled. Id.

Brown then responded:

In my opinion, the individual sitting on the gun, that 

individual in that particular instance is the enforcer. 

That is the reason he's sitting on that gun. The individual operating the vehicle in that situation would be the 

supplier of those substances. This individual is this 

supplier's enforcer. So again, guns and drugs go hand in 

hand, and of [course], the way in which drugs are transported is by various modes of transportation such as 

cars, vans and the like. So to find drugs in the vehicle, 

__________

13 As we have often noted, the modus operandi of drug dealers is 

a suitable topic for expert testimony because it is "not within the 

common knowledge of the average juror." United States v. Boney,

977 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

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an individual possessing a weapon, and monies, that's 

pretty much standard par for the course.

Id. Toms now argues that the district court improperly 

admitted the testimony of Officer Brown under Rule 704(b) of 

the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 704(b) provides:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental 

state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may 

state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant 

did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense 

thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of 

fact alone.

Toms contends that because the hypothetical posed to Brown 

mirrored the facts of the September 10th incident, Brown's 

testimony that the driver was the "supplier" and that the 

passenger was the "enforcer" constituted impermissible testimony as to Toms's mental statespecifically, his intent to 

distribute the drugs found in the car and his knowledge as to 

the presence of the gun. The government, however, argues 

that Brown testified only to the modus operandi of a typical 

drug operation and the roles of the individuals involved in 

such an operation and therefore did not encroach on the 

realm of impermissible testimony adverted to in Rule 704(b).

We should note, to begin, that we have several times 

disapproved of the method of questioning used by the government in this case. Although in earlier cases we held that an 

expert is permitted to state "that certain conduct fits a 

specific role in a criminal enterpriseeven though the conduct described exactly parallels conduct that other evidence 

explicitly links to a defendant," United States v. Mitchell, 996 

F.2d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1993), we have more recently, 

beginning in 1995, recognized that mirroring hypotheticals 

often present " 'a line that expert witnesses may not cross.' " 

United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 

(quoting Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 422). The danger, as we noted 

in Boyd, is that even when an expert does not explicitly 

identify the defendant in her answer, her testimony in response to such a hypothetical will suggest that the expert 

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possesses knowledge of the defendant's mental state, which 

may be used by a jury "to cure the ambiguity that they face." 

Id. at 672. Because it is the job of the jury to decide whether 

a defendant has a particular mental state, such mirroring 

hypotheticals often violate Rule 704(b): Although framed as a 

hypothetical, they call for the expert essentially to testify as 

to the mental state of the defendant.

We review a trial judge's admission of evidence for abuse of 

discretion. Smart, 98 F.3d at 1386. Moreover, as we noted 

in Smart, we consider

two key elements in deciding whether expert testimony 

violates Rule 704(b): (1) the language used by the questioner and/or the expert, including use of the actual word 

"intent" and (2) whether the context of the testimony 

makes clear to the jury that the opinion is based on 

knowledge of general criminal practices, rather than 

some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes.

Id. at 1388 (internal quotes omitted). Although, as in so 

many cases involving expert witnesses on drug distribution, 

the question is close, we conclude that the admission of 

Officer Brown's testimony here did not violate Rule 704(b). 

To begin with, Toms's trial took place in January 1995; at 

that time, we had not yet issued our opinion in Boyd, which 

clearly held that such mirroring hypotheticals were impermissible.14 Second, this case can be distinguished from recent 

cases involving the same issue in that neither the question 

posed to Officer Brown nor his answer referred explicitly to 

intent. By contrast, in most of our previous cases warning 

about the danger of mirroring hypotheticals, the question 

concluding each hypothetical was clearly intended to elicit 

__________

14 We trust that we can rely on government counsel's representation that the end of the line is in sight as far as appellate review of 

this litigation strategy is concerned. Boyd was decided four months 

after the trial in this case, and government counsel assured us at 

oral argument that the government no longer asks mirroring hypotheticals of its expert witnesses in drug cases.

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testimony as to the defendant's intent. In Boyd, for example, 

the mirroring hypothetical was followed by a question asking 

the expert whether, in his opinion, "that person's possession 

of the mixture or substance [is] possession for personal use or 

is it consistent with possession with intent to distribute?" 

Boyd, 55 F.3d at 670. Similarly, in Mitchell, both the prosecutor's question and the expert's response contained the word 

"intent." See Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 422.

It is not necessary, of course, that the precise word "intent" 

be used for a Rule 704(b) violation to occur. We held in 

Smart, for example, that an expert's testimony, in response to 

a mirroring hypothetical, that the individual "met the elements" was impermissible because the legal connotations of 

the word "elements" could easily have led the jury to interpret the word to refer to statutory elementsin other words, 

that the individual possessed the necessary intent to distribute. Smart, 98 F.3d at 1387-89. In this case, however, 

neither the question asked nor the answer given crossed 

Smart's line of impermissibility. The government asked 

Brown for his opinion as to the "relationship" between the 

people mentioned in the hypothetical; Brown's answerin 

which he identified the driver as the "supplier" and the 

passenger as the "enforcer"was responsive to this question 

without purporting to describe Toms's intent. Indeed, in the 

remainder of his answer, Brown testified that guns, drugs, 

and large amounts of money were typically found in tandem. 

In context, then, his testimony as to the roles of the people in 

the car is more properly viewed as testimony on the elements 

of a drug operation, based on "knowledge of general criminal 

practices," rather than an opinion on the intent of the individuals described. We thus hold that Officer Brown's testimony 

did not violate Rule 704(b) and affirm Toms's convictions.

C. Toms's Sentence

Finally, Toms argues that it was error for the district court 

to sentence him based on the testimony of Thomas who, Toms 

contends, was an unreliable witness. As a result of this 

error, Toms argues, he was ultimately sentenced for more 

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than ten times the amount of drugs alleged in the indictment 

and more than forty times the amount for which he was 

convicted as a result of the September 10th traffic stop.

Our review of the district court's sentence is guided largely 

by our decision in United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 966 

F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In Lam, we noted that in United 

States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1992), this circuit 

had joined the majority of other circuits in holding that 

because the quantity of drugs involved in a conspiracy or 

distribution charge "is not a basic element of the offense," its 

determination is relevant only to the issue of punishment and 

thus is "a sentencing factor to be determined by the judge." 

Lam, 966 F.2d at 685 (citing cases). Toms does not dispute 

this conclusion but argues that because his case constituted 

an "extraordinary upward departure," Lam requires that the 

judge's factual determinations be supported by clear and 

convincing evidence, rather than by simply a preponderance 

of the evidence.

While we acknowledged in Lam the possibility that "extraordinary circumstances" might call for the application of a 

higher standard, we concluded that no such circumstances 

were present in Lam's case. Lam, 966 F.2d at 688. Lam 

had been convicted of conspiracy to distribute heroin; the 

district court, concluding that Lam "knew or reasonably could 

have foreseen" that 3.4 kilograms were slated for the first 

delivery, id. at 685, based Lam's sentence on that amount. In 

rejecting Lam's claim that a higher standard of proof was 

required in his case due to the impact of that finding on his 

sentence, we distinguished United States v. Kikumura, 918 

F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), in which the Third Circuit required 

a heightened burden of proof, by noting that while Kikumura's sentence was based in part on conduct for which he was 

not charged (namely, terrorist acts), Lam's sentence "was 

determined solely on the basis of conduct of which he was 

actually convicted"the conspiracy to distribute heroin. 

Lam, 966 F.2d at 687-88. We also noted that Lam's counsel 

had conceded that Lam had scienter as to enough heroin to 

support a base offense level of 28; the 3.4 kilogram quantity 

assigned him a base offense level of 34. "While a six-level 

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increase [was] not insignificant," we noted, it did not present 

the "enormous" twenty-two level disparity involved in Kikumura that warranted the satisfaction of a higher burden of 

proof. Id. at 688.

The circumstances of Toms's case are virtually indistinguishable from Lam's. As in Lam, Toms's sentence was 

determined "solely on the basis of conduct of which he was 

actually convicted"the conspiracy to distribute and possess 

with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. 

Moreover, Toms concedes that he was convicted of possession 

with intent to distribute of 67.8 grams (the amount retrieved 

from the Land Cruiser), a conviction that yields a base level 

of 32. The 2.8 kilogram amount found by the district judge 

yields a base level of 38as in Lam, a six-level difference. 

Given the parallel between these two cases, we can see no 

reason to conclude that Toms's case, unlike Lam's, requires 

application of a clear and convincing evidence standard.

Toms next argues that the district court's reliance on 

Thomas's testimony was reversible error. He contends that 

Thomas's estimate of the amount of cocaine base he had 

received from Toms was inconsistent with other portions of 

his testimonyfor example, the amount of money Thomas 

stated that he, as a dealer, had made during the course of the 

conspiracy15and that Thomas admitted on the stand that 

certain statements he had previously made to an undercover 

officer were untrue.16 Given these indicia of unreliability, 

Toms argues, the district court erred in using Thomas's 

testimony as the basis for determining Toms's sentence.

We noted in Lam that in reviewing factual determinations 

supporting a Guidelines sentence, we give substantial deference to the findings of the district court. Lam, 966 F.2d at 

__________

15 Thomas testified that he did not make more than $20,000 over 

the course of the conspiracy, see Tr. 1/13/95 at 174, although he 

later testified that he could not estimate the amount.

16 Thomas admitted that he had previously lied to the officer 

about whether he had any drugs available for sale. See Tr. 1/13/95 

at 165.

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688. We reverse the district court's conclusions "only if we 

are left with a definite and firm conviction that it is mistaken" 

and give full recognition to the fact that determining credibility and weighing evidence is a job for the factfinder, not for 

this court on review. Id. at 689 (internal quotes omitted). In 

light of these principles, we reject Toms's challenge. In its 

memorandum opinion denying Toms's motion, the district 

court found Thomas to be a credible witness for several 

reasons. First, the court noted that Thomas had told a 

cooperating witness and an undercover officer in mid-1993 

about the amount of drugs Toms could supply him for sale, a 

point in time before Thomas was himself charged with any 

crime and thus might have had a reason to shift the blame to 

another participant. Thomas's information proved to be accurate when the witness and the undercover officer successfully 

purchased 84.58 grams of cocaine base from him. Second, 

the court noted that future attempts by the undercover 

officer to purchase drugs from Thomas after Toms was 

arrested were unsuccessful, further lending credibility to 

Thomas's testimony that Toms was his supplier. And finally, 

the court noted that additional evidence presented at trial, 

including a tally sheet found on Toms's person, bolstered 

Thomas's credibility as to the amount of drugs involved in the 

conspiracy. Toms, for his part, does not point to any evidence in the record that directly contradicts Thomas's testimony as to the amount of drugs involved; rather, he simply 

asserts that Thomas was not to be believed given the doubtful 

nature of some of his other testimony. Whether that testimonyor, indeed, any of Thomas's testimonywas open to 

question, however, is not for us to decide, given that Thomas's 

credibility can be assessed only by judging his demeanor on 

the witness stand. As we have already noted, such a determination in a sentencing proceeding properly belongs to the 

district court that participated in the trial, and we see no 

reason in this case to disturb its judgment.17

__________

17 In fact, it is not inconceivable that, given the illegitimacy of the 

drug trade, Thomas would be unable to estimate the amount of 

money he had made from drug dealing; nor is it surprising that he 

would at times be reluctant to inform a potential customer and/or 

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III. CONCLUSION

Because we reject Toms's challenges to the sufficiency of 

the evidence presented at trial, the expert testimony, and his 

sentence, we affirm his convictions and his sentence.

It is so ordered.

__________

rival of the extent of his supply. In any event, neither statement on 

its face provides sufficient reason to doubt the veracity of the 

remainder of Thomas's testimony.

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