Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06246/USCOURTS-ca10-07-06246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phillip Bernard Carthen
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

PHILLIP BERNARD CARTHEN,

Movant.

No. 07-6246

(D.C. No. CIV-07-596-R)

ORDER

Filed December 18, 2007

Before BRISCOE, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

Phillip Bernard Carthen, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, has

filed a motion for remand to the district court and a motion for authorization to

file a second or successive habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

We deny both motions. 

In 1998, Mr. Carthen pleaded guilty to one count of assault and battery

upon a police officer. He was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment in the county

jail. He did not appeal, but he did, nearly four years later, unsuccessfully, seek

state post-conviction relief. 

In his first federal habeas petition, filed in 2003, Mr. Carthen argued that

the state district court improperly used his expired 1998 conviction to enhance a

sentence imposed for an unrelated conviction in 2000. Carthen v. Workman,

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121 F. App’x 344, 345 (10th Cir. 2005). He contended that although the 1998

conviction was a misdemeanor, it was improperly characterized as a felony to

enhance his current sentence. Id. The federal district court dismissed the

petition. We denied a certificate of appealability and dismissed the appeal,

concluding Mr. Carthen failed to prove his argument came within one of the

narrow exceptions to the general rule precluding the use of a habeas petition to

attack an expired conviction. Id. at 347. Additionally, we noted that Mr. Carthen

had not shown that his 2000 sentence was enhanced by the expired 1998

conviction. Id. at 347 n.2. Mr. Carthen then returned to state court and again

unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. 

After being denied relief by the Oklahoma courts, Mr. Carthen filed a

proposed habeas petition in federal district court asserting that (1) the Oklahoma

Court of Criminal Appeals should have allowed his application for an out-of-time

appeal of his 1998 conviction and for an evidentiary hearing, because he did not

have effective assistance of counsel at the time he appealed his “in custody case”

and (2) his petition contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Underlying

these arguments is his contention that his 1998 conviction was a misdemeanor and

not a felony and therefore it cannot be used to enhance a subsequent sentence. 

Adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court determined

that the proposed habeas petition was a second or successive petition and

transferred it to us because Mr. Carthen had not obtained our authorization to file

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a second or successive habeas petition. See Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d

339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (directing district courts to transfer

unauthorized second or successive habeas petitions to Tenth Circuit in interest of

justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631). 

Mr. Carthen filed in this court both a motion to remand to the district court

and a motion for authorization to file a second or successive habeas petition. In

his motion for remand, he argues that remand is appropriate because this case is

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and it is not a second or successive habeas petition. 

It is true, as Mr. Carthen argues, that an attack on the execution of a state

sentence must be brought in a petition filed under § 2241. See Bradshaw v. Story,

86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). But he is not attacking the execution of his

sentence; he is attacking the validity of his 1998 conviction and its resulting use

to enhance the sentence he is currently serving. See United States v. Torres,

282 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 2002) (deciding prisoner could not avoid second

or successive bar by styling petition under different name). Because

Mr. Carthen’s proposed habeas petition challenges the same criminal conviction

challenged in his first habeas petition, the second habeas petition is a second or

successive petition, and he must receive authorization from us before filing the

petition in federal district court. Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793, 796 (2007)

(per curiam) (discussing second or successive habeas petitions and need for

authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)). 

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In his motion for authorization to file a second or successive habeas

petition, Mr. Carthen reasserts the two claims he raised in his proposed habeas

petition. We conclude that Mr. Carthen has not made a prima facie showing of

either an entitlement to relief under any newly recognized and retroactively

applied rule of constitutional law or newly discovered evidence of his actual

innocence that could not have been discovered previously. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(2). 

Contrary to Mr. Carthen’s argument, neither Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S.

524 (2005), nor Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), meet the new-rule

requirement. Gonzalez addresses the applicability of § 2244(b) to motions for

relief from judgment filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at

526, 530, 538. A Rule 60(b) motion is not at issue in this case. Rompilla

addresses counsel’s duties in the second stage of a capital case. Rompilla,

545 U.S. at 377. Mr. Carthen was not convicted of a capital offense in 1998 or in

the case for which he is in custody. 

Although Mr. Carthen argues that the alleged ineffectiveness of his

appellate counsel in the “in custody” case is newly discovered evidence, any

evidence concerning this argument was available at the time he filed his first

habeas petition. His failure to present the evidence previously does not make it

new evidence. 

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Mr. Carthen’s motion for remand and motion for authorization to file a

second or successive habeas petition are DENIED. The denial of authorization is

not appealable and may not be the subject of a petition for rehearing or for a writ

of certiorari. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(E).

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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