Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01425/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01425-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Appellee
Innovative Wireless Solutions, LLC
Appellant
Ruckus Wireless, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC., CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1425, 2015-1438

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Texas in Nos. 1:13-cv-00492-LY, 1:13-

cv-00504-LY, Judge Lee Yeakel.

______________________ 

Decided: May 31, 2016

______________________ 

 MATTHEW YUNGWIRTH, Duane Morris LLP, Atlanta, 

GA, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also represented by L.

NORWOOD JAMESON; DIANA SANGALLI, Houston, TX.

 JONATHAN DANIEL BAKER, Farney Daniels PC, San 

Mateo, CA, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by MICHAEL D. SAUNDERS, Georgetown, TX.

______________________ 

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2 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

Before PROST, Chief Judge, REYNA, Circuit Judge, and 

STARK, Chief District Judge.1

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge REYNA. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Chief District Judge STARK. 

REYNA, Circuit Judge. 

Innovative Wireless Solutions (“IWS”) appeals the final judgment of non-infringement of the district court in 

the Western District of Texas. IWS challenges the district 

court’s conclusion that the asserted patent claims are 

limited to wired rather than wireless communications. 

Because we find no error in the district court’s construction, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

IWS owns U.S. Patent Nos. 5,912,895; 6,327,264; and 

6,587,473 (“Terry patents”). The patents are a line of 

continuations beginning with the ’895 patent. All share 

the ’895 specification.

In April 2013, IWS commenced a litigation campaign 

against several dozen hotels and coffee shops doing business in the Eastern District of Texas. IWS alleged that 

each defendant infringed the Terry patents by providing 

WiFi Internet access to its customers using off-the-shelf 

WiFi equipment sold by Ruckus and Cisco (“Ruckus”). 

Ruckus responded by filing for declaratory judgment of 

invalidity and non-infringement in the Western District of 

Texas. On the issue of non-infringement, Ruckus argued 

that its wireless equipment does not infringe the Terry 

patents because the Terry patents are limited to wired 

rather than wireless communications. 

1 The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief District 

Judge, United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware, sitting by designation.

 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 3

The Terry patents concern techniques for providing 

access to a local area network (LAN) from a relatively 

distant computer. ’895 patent col. 3 ll. 13–31. A LAN is a 

group of computers connected by a shared short-range 

transmission medium and configured to communicate 

using a given LAN protocol. Id. col. 1 ll. 13–31. When 

two computers on the LAN transmit onto the medium 

concurrently, they create interference known as a “collision,” and the concurrent communications may be lost. 

Id. col. 3 ll. 47–53. To deal with these collisions, a LAN 

protocol may define a contention scheme. Id. col. 8 ll. 4–

25. For instance, in a “collision detection” scheme, a 

transmitting computer that detects a collision waits for a 

given period before reattempting the transmission. Id.

col. 7 ll. 66–67, col. 8 ll. 1–18. “Carrier Sense Multiple 

Access with Collision Detection” (CSMA/CD) is an IEEE 

standard LAN protocol that uses collision detection. Id.;

id. col. 1 ll. 25-33.

The further apart two devices are on a LAN, the longer it takes transmissions between those devices to traverse the transmission medium. Id. col. 1 ll. 61–67, col. 2 

ll. 1–18. When the devices are sufficiently far apart, the 

long transmission delays may render collision detection 

ineffective. Id. col. 8 ll. 26–43. Consequently, it is not 

practical to use LAN protocols with collision detection 

over long distances, such as those spanned by telephone 

lines. Id.

The Terry patents describe an approach by which a 

computer may communicate with a LAN over the long 

distances covered by telephone lines. The inventors 

propose using a collision avoidance scheme rather than a 

collision detection scheme. Id. col. 9 ll. 32–51. Under the 

avoidance scheme, a “master” modem in the LAN dictates 

the timing of one-way communications between the 

master modem and a “slave” modem in the distant computer. Id. Although the patents only describe connecting 

the master and slave modems over physical wires, such as 

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4 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

a telephone line, the claims recite that the two modems 

are connected via a “communications path.” Claim 1 of 

the ’895 patent is representative: 

1. A method of providing communications with a 

CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with 

Collision Detection) network via a bidirectional 

communications path, comprising the steps of:

at a first end of the communications path, providing a CSMA/CD interface to the network, buffering information packets received from the 

network via the interface in a first buffer, supplying information packets from the first buffer 

to the communications path, and supplying 

control information to the communications 

path;

at a second end of the communications path, buffering information packets received via the 

communications path in a second buffer, receiving the control information from the communications path, buffering information packets to 

be supplied via the communications path to the 

network in a third buffer, and supplying information packets from the third buffer to the 

communications path in dependence upon the 

control information; and

at the first end of the communications path, supplying information packets received via the 

communications path to a fourth buffer, and 

supplying the information packets from the 

fourth buffer to the network via the interface;

wherein the control information and the dependence on the control information for supplying 

information packets from the third buffer to the 

communications path are arranged to avoid collisions on the communications path between inCase: 15-1425 Document: 43-2 Page: 4 Filed: 05/31/2016
RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 5

formation packets communicated from the first 

buffer to the second buffer and information 

packets communicated from the third buffer to

the fourth buffer.

Id. col. 21 ll. 5–37 (claim 1). The Terry patents make no 

mention of wireless communication.

The central dispute during claim construction was 

whether the recited “communications path” captures

wireless communications or is limited to wired communication. The district court adopted the latter view by 

construing “communications path” to mean “communications path utilizing twisted-pair wiring that is too long to 

permit conventional 10BASE-T or similar LAN (Local 

Area Network) interconnections.” Cisco Sys., Inc. v. 

Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC, No. 1:13-CV-00492-LY, 

2015 WL 128138, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015). The 

district court reasoned that the specification’s “repeated 

reference to two-wire lines and telephone lines emphasizes that the inventor was focused on this transmission 

medium as the core of the new technology,” and it therefore concluded that, in view of the entire specification,

“the Terry Patents are solely focused on communicating 

information packets long distances over wired communication paths.” Id. at *7. The district court found particularly persuasive a passage from the written description 

regarding the scope of alternative embodiments. That 

passage states that, “although as described here the line 

12 is a telephone subscriber line, it can be appreciated 

that the same arrangement of master and slave modems 

operating in accordance with the new protocol can be used 

to communicate Ethernet frames via any twisted pair 

wiring which is too long to permit conventional 10BASE-T 

or similar LAN interconnections.” Id. The district court 

considered this passage evidence that the inventors 

contemplated different types of communication paths but

chose to limit those types to “any twisted-pair wiring that 

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6 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

is too long to permit conventional LAN interconnections.” 

Id. at 8. 

Based on the district court’s construction, the parties 

stipulated jointly to a final judgment of non-infringement. 

IWS appeals the construction limiting the term “communications path” to wired communication.

DISCUSSION

Where the district court’s claim construction relies only on intrinsic evidence, the construction is a legal determination reviewed de novo. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015). Although the 

district court here heard a technology tutorial with expert 

testimony, it relied only on intrinsic evidence to construe 

the term “communications path.” We therefore review 

that construction de novo. 

“[T]he words of a claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,” which is “the meaning 

that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in 

the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips 

v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005)

(en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 

F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The ordinary meaning 

may be determined by reviewing various sources, such as 

the claims themselves, the specification, the prosecution 

history, dictionaries, and any other relevant evidence. 

See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 

1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Ultimately, “[t]he only meaning 

that matters in claim construction is the meaning in the 

context of the patent.” Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Legal 

error arises when a court relies on extrinsic evidence that 

contradicts the intrinsic record. See Lighting Ballast 

Control LLC v. Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp., 790 F.3d 

1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015); On-Line Techs., Inc. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer GmbH, 386 F.3d 1133, 1138–39 

(Fed. Cir. 2004).

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 7

IWS argues that the district court erred by importing 

the wired limitation into the claims. IWS argues it is 

improper to read a limitation into the claims on the basis 

that every disclosed embodiment includes that limitation. 

Finally, it argues that because several dependent claims 

limit the communications path to “two-wire line” or “twowire telephone line,” the unmodified “communications 

path” term must encompass more, including wireless 

communications. 

Ruckus counters the term “communications path” 

does not have a plain and ordinary meaning to a person 

having ordinary skill in the art. Ruckus also argues that 

the wired limitation was proper because that limitation is 

a “core feature” of the invention, which is a solution to a 

problem arising in long-distance communication over 

wires. It echoes the district court’s reasoning that the 

specification limits the scope of the invention to “any 

twisted pair wiring which is too long to permit conventional . . . LAN interconnections.” It dismisses IWS’s 

claim differentiation arguments because “two-wire telephone line” is only one type of several wired lines disclosed in the specification, meaning that the term

“communications path” need not cover wireless communications to be broader than “two-wire telephone line.” 

IWS’s argument relies on the assumption that “communications path” has an ordinary meaning which encompasses both wired and wireless communications. But 

we see no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence to support IWS’s 

assumption that a person of ordinary skill at the time of 

invention would have understood the plain and ordinary 

meaning of “communications path” to include wireless 

communications. We see nothing in the intrinsic record

that would have suggested to one of ordinary skill that 

“communications path” refers to wireless communications. 

To the contrary, the intrinsic record militates powerfully 

against that understanding. First, the title of the Terry 

patents indicates that they are directed to “CommuniCase: 15-1425 Document: 43-2 Page: 7 Filed: 05/31/2016
8 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

cating Information Packets Via Telephone Lines.” ’895 

patent col. 1 ll. 1–4 (emphasis added).2 Second, the 

specification describes “[t]his invention” as one “particularly concerned” with “two wire lines such as telephone

subscriber lines.” Id. col. 1 ll. 6–10. Third, every embodiment described in the specification utilizes a telephone 

wire, and when the specification clarifies that the full 

breadth of the invention is not limited to the expressed 

embodiments, it declares only that the patents may also 

reach any wired connection. Id. col. 9 ll. 45–51. Though 

these statements do not expressly exclude wireless communications from the meaning of “communications path,” 

they do not include it, and they discourage that understanding. Further, IWS did not present—nor did the 

district court consult—any extrinsic evidence, such as 

dictionaries, trade literature, expert testimony, or any 

other evidence showing that “communications path” was a 

term of art or otherwise understood to include wireless 

communications at the time of invention.

Considering the claims as a whole provides no additional clue that “communications path” includes wireless 

communications. Though several dependent claims limit 

the communications path to a “two-wire telephone subscriber line” (’895 patent, claims 13, 21, 23, 25) or a “twowire line” (’473 patent, claims 6, 21, 27, 28), we agree with 

Ruckus that these dependent claims could merely exclude 

other types of wired communications paths disclosed in 

the specification, such as coaxial cable. See id. at col. 3 ll. 

13–23. The doctrine of claim differentiation—which 

encourages us to construe independent claims more 

2 We have used the title of a patent to aid in claim 

construction. See, e.g., Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. 

Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995); 

Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 

780 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 

 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 9

broadly than their dependent claims—therefore does not 

necessarily suggest that the “communications path” 

recited in the independent claim encompasses wireless 

communications. We also have no evidence that the 

underlying purpose and disclosed solution of the Terry 

patents might evoke wireless communication in the mind 

of a skilled artisan. IWS presents no evidence that the 

inability to execute collision detection protocols over long 

distances was a problem in wireless communication or 

that collision detection was even used in that context. We 

therefore have no reason to believe that the purpose of the 

patents would have implicated wireless communications 

within the meaning of “communications path.” 

The canons of claim construction provide additional 

reason to limit the scope of the claims to wired communication. If, after applying all other available tools of claim 

construction, a claim is ambiguous, it should be construed 

to preserve its validity. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327. Because the specification makes no mention of wireless 

communications, construing the instant claims to encompass that subject matter would likely render the claims 

invalid for lack of written description. See Gentry Gallery, 

Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (holding that a claim “may be no broader than the 

supporting disclosure”). The canon favoring constructions 

that preserve claim validity therefore counsels against 

construing “communications path” to include wireless 

communications.

We conclude that no intrinsic or extrinsic evidence 

suggests that “communications path” encompasses wireless communications. Accordingly, we affirm the district 

court’s claim constructions and final judgment of noninfringement based thereon.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

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10 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

No costs.

Case: 15-1425 Document: 43-2 Page: 10 Filed: 05/31/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC., CISCO SYSTEMS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees

v.

INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS, LLC,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1425, 2015-1438

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Texas in Nos. 1:13-cv-00492-LY, 1:13-

cv-00504-LY, Judge Lee Yeakel.

_______________________ 

STARK, Chief District Judge, dissenting.∗

The dispositive issue in this case is whether a person 

of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention of 

the Terry patents would understand the “plain and ordinary” meaning of the disputed claim term, “communications path,” to include wireless communications. If 

wireless communications are not within the scope of the 

patent claims, then the judgment of non-infringement 

∗ The Honorable Leonard P. Stark, Chief District 

Judge, United States District Court for the District of 

Delaware, sitting by designation.

 

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2 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

must be affirmed. However, if the properly construed 

claims include wireless embodiments, then this case 

should proceed.

In affirming the district court’s conclusion that wireless communications are outside the scope of the claims, 

the majority emphasizes that there is no extrinsic evidence to support the “assumption” of the patentee, Innovative Wireless Solutions (“IWS”), that the plain and 

ordinary meaning of “communications path” to a person of 

skill in the art at the pertinent time included wireless 

communications. I agree that the record lacks this extrinsic evidence.

However, rather than supporting affirmance, I believe 

that the majority’s view requires this court to vacate the 

judgment of non-infringement, and the claim construction 

order on which it is based, and remand for the district 

court to decide whether to provide the parties an opportunity to present extrinsic evidence. Two factors persuade me that this is the proper approach.

First, in the district court, there was no dispute as to 

the plain and ordinary meaning of “communications 

path.” Instead, the parties agreed that this meaning 

included wireless communications—but disagreed as to

whether that undisputed meaning should be adopted as 

the claim construction. Even on appeal, the appellees, 

Ruckus Wireless, Inc. and Cisco Systems, Inc. (“Ruckus”), 

principally argue for a disclaimer of claim scope, and not 

that wireless communications are outside the plain and 

ordinary meaning of “communications path.” In these 

circumstances, we should not fault the patentee for failing 

to come forward with extrinsic evidence. Instead, we 

should give the patentee a chance to do so—particularly 

because the district court may have to make subsidiary 

findings of fact in order to construe the claims. For that 

to occur, remand is necessary.

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 3

Second, although I do not believe the parties’ dispute 

should now be resolved on the intrinsic evidence alone, I 

disagree with the majority’s assessment of that evidence. 

In the unusual circumstances here, it would be preferable 

to develop the record instead of making a decision solely 

on the basis of inconclusive intrinsic evidence.

For these reasons, which I explain more fully below, I 

respectfully dissent.

I 

The majority characterizes Ruckus’s position as being 

that “the term ‘communications path’ does not have a 

plain and ordinary meaning to a person having ordinary 

skill in the art.” Majority Op. at 7. The majority emphasizes that “IWS did not present—nor did the district court 

consult—any extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, 

trade literature, expert testimony, or any other evidence

showing that ‘communications path’ was a term of art or 

otherwise understood to include wireless communications 

at the time of invention.” Id. at 8. It further observes 

that “IWS’s argument relies on the assumption that 

‘communications path’ has an ordinary meaning which 

encompasses both wired and wireless communications” 

and faults IWS for not producing evidence to “support 

IWS’s assumption that a person of ordinary skill at the 

time of the invention would have understood the plain 

and ordinary meaning of ‘communications path’ to include 

wireless communications.” Id. at 7. 

But the majority makes its own implicit assumption: 

that IWS’s failure to present extrinsic evidence is a concession that such supportive evidence does not exist. In 

my view, it is far more probable that IWS chose not to 

present extrinsic evidence of the plain and ordinary 

meaning of the disputed term because Ruckus never 

challenged this meaning below.

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4 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

A 

The reason there is no extrinsic evidence as to the 

plain and ordinary meaning of “communications path” to 

a person of ordinary skill in the art1 at the time of the 

Terry patents’ invention is almost certainly that there 

was no dispute on this point in the district court. In the

district court, IWS made clear that it believed the plain 

and ordinary meaning of “communications path” was 

broad enough to include wireless embodiments. Ruckus 

never disputed this. Instead, Ruckus argued that the 

specification required a narrower construction. That the 

parties’ dispute pertained to whether the term “communications path” should have its plain and ordinary meaning—as opposed to what that plain and ordinary meaning 

was—is evident from the parties’ briefing below, the 

transcript of the claim construction hearing, and the 

district court’s opinion. 

1 The parties provided the district court with very 

little assistance in determining the qualifications or 

experience of the person of ordinary skill in the art. In 

their briefing, neither side offered a proposed identification of such a person. At the claim construction hearing, 

when the district court asked, “Who is the person ordinarily skilled in the art at the time of the invention?” counsel 

for IWS responded that this was “a factual issue” on 

which “neither side has presented a proposal.” Cisco Sys., 

Inc. v. Innovative Wireless Sols., LLC, No. 1:13-CV-00492-

LY, D.I. 54 (“Tr.”) at 35, 37 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 8, 2015). 

Ruckus eventually provided its perspective on the qualifications of one of ordinary skill, but did not explain how 

those qualifications should inform the district court’s 

construction. See id. at 55-56. On remand, the district 

court could direct the parties to develop the record on this 

issue. 

 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 5

From at least the time the parties submitted their 

joint claim construction statement, IWS advocated that 

“communications path” be given its “plain and ordinary 

meaning in the field.” J.A. 625; see also J.A. 619-22, 626-

27, 633, 655-58. Ruckus did not contend that the content 

of IWS’s proposed “plain and ordinary meaning” was in 

any way unclear or disputed. Instead, Ruckus proposed 

an alternative construction, to limit the claim scope to 

wired communications.2

In its opening claim construction brief, IWS further 

asserted that there was “no reasonable dispute that the 

plain and ordinary meaning of ‘communications path’ is 

not limited to a wired path.” J.A. 877. Ruckus, in its 

briefs, did not disagree.

Consistent with its briefing, Ruckus did not challenge 

IWS’s contention at the claim construction hearing. 

Rather, Ruckus characterized the dispute as being that

IWS “say[s] plain and ordinary meaning, and we say 

‘wired communication path,’” and argued that “the intrinsic record” consisted of “an unmistakable teaching that 

this patent is confined to a wired network.” Tr. at 7-9. 

When it was his turn,3 counsel for IWS reaffirmed its 

view that:

[T]here’s no real dispute [about whether] the 

plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase “com2 Ruckus’s proposed construction of “communications path”—“a wired communications path for exchanging information between two endpoints,” J.A. 625—

incorporates the disputed term itself, another indication 

that Ruckus agreed with IWS as to the plain and ordinary 

meaning of this term.

3 At the claim construction hearing, Ruckus presented its position on this dispute before IWS. Ruckus did 

not have a rebuttal.

 

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6 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

munications path” is limited to “wired.” There’s 

no requirement in the word “communication” or 

“path” or “communications path” that’s limited to 

“wired.” There’s been no suggestion or evidence 

that generally in the field of network, if you say 

the phrase “communications path,” that you mean 

“wired.”

Id. at 15.4

Reflecting what the parties did and did not argue, the 

district court’s opinion notes no dispute as to whether the 

plain and ordinary meaning of “communications path” 

includes wireless communications. In describing the 

parties’ dispute, the court explained that Ruckus relied on 

the specification as “clearly demonstrat[ing]” that the 

invention’s “sole purpose” related to wired paths. J.A. 19. 

The court also noted Ruckus argued that “the patents-insuit disclaim” certain embodiments, that “a wired communication path is the defining characteristic of all variations of the disclosed embodiments,” and that there was a 

“purposeful intent to limit the invention’s scope to a wired 

communication path.” Id. The district court summarized 

IWS’s position as being that “the term should be given its 

broadest ordinary meaning consistent with the written 

description,” which IWS contended includes wireless 

embodiments. Id.

4 As the majority states, the district court heard a 

tutorial just before the claim construction hearing, at 

which Ruckus presented expert testimony. Majority Op. 

at 6; see also Appellees’ Br. 9, 11; J.A. 807; J.A. 1365 at 

Dkt. 49; J.A. 1372 at Dkt. 51. Although the parties have 

not provided us with a transcript of the tutorial, there is 

no basis to believe it addressed the plain and ordinary 

meaning of “communications path” to a person of ordinary 

skill in the art.

 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 7

When it turned to resolving the dispute before it, the 

district court stated that it could “depart from the plain 

and ordinary meaning of a claim term in only two instances: lexicography and disavowal.” J.A. 20. As neither 

side argued that the patentee here was its own lexicographer, “to conclude that the term requires construction 

beyond its plain and ordinary meaning, the court would 

need to find ‘that the specification [or prosecution history] 

make[] clear that the invention does not include a particular feature, or is clearly limited to a particular form of the 

invention.’” Id. (quoting Hill-Rom Servs., Inc. v. Stryker 

Corp., 755 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). Based on 

the specification, the court concluded that the Terry 

patents “are solely focused on communicating information 

packets long distances over wired communication paths” 

and, accordingly, construed the claims as being limited to 

wired communications. J.A. 20-22. 

At no point in its analysis did the district court mention any dispute as to whether the plain and ordinary 

meaning of “communications path,” to a person of ordinary skill in the art reading the Terry patents at the 

pertinent time, included wireless communications. There 

simply was no dispute on this point.5 Hence, IWS’s 

decision not to present extrinsic evidence as to the plain 

and ordinary meaning of “communications path” is entirely understandable.

5 Counsel for IWS confirmed this at oral argument 

before this court, repeatedly stating it was uncontested 

below that the ordinary meaning of “communications 

path” included wireless communications. Oral Argument 

at 12:00, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1425.mp3; see also id. at 00:40; 01:25. Ruckus expressed no disagreement with these representations.

 

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8 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

B 

In this appeal, as below, Ruckus’s principal argument 

remains that the intrinsic evidence demonstrates that the 

patentee implicitly disclaimed wireless communications. 

Ruckus argues that the claims are limited to wired communications because a wired path “is an important core 

feature of the invention,” and it is proper to “limit[] claims 

to the scope consistently prescribed by the patentee in the 

intrinsic record.” Appellees’ Br. 10. 

Ruckus has, however, raised a new argument in this 

appeal. Ruckus now faults IWS for “suggest[ing],” without proving, that there is a plain and ordinary meaning of 

the disputed claim term “that would be understood by one 

of ordinary skill in the art as broad enough to encompass 

a wireless path.” Appellees’ Br. 16-17; see also id. at 17 

(“IWS, however, did not identify any support that shows 

these phrases have a plain and ordinary meaning readily 

understood by one of ordinary skill in the art without the 

benefit of the context provided by the intrinsic record.”). 

Ruckus argues that these evidentiary deficiencies compel 

affirmance of a construction excluding wireless embodiments. The majority agrees with Ruckus.

In my view, the state of the record instead warrants a 

remand. As the majority writes, “‘[T]he words of a claim 

are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,’ which is ‘the meaning that the term would have to a 

person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time 

of the invention.’” Majority Op. at 6 (quoting Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 

banc)). If there is a lack of proof as to that meaning, it is 

due to the lack of dispute on this issue below. Hence, we 

should remand. See generally Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. 

Bancorp Servs., LLC, 527 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(declining to consider claim construction issue that district court did not “expressly” address and remanding to 

district court for further proceedings). 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 9

C 

Remand is particularly appropriate in this case because, if the issue in dispute is whether the disputed term 

does or does not have a plain and ordinary meaning, 

subsidiary factfinding may be necessary to construe the 

claim. Although factfinding is often unnecessary in claim 

construction, the Supreme Court in its recent decision in 

Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., explained that sometimes a district court may

need to look beyond the patent’s intrinsic evidence 

and to consult extrinsic evidence in order to understand, for example, the background science or 

the meaning of a term in the relevant art during 

the relevant time period. In cases where those 

subsidiary facts are in dispute, courts will need to 

make subsidiary factual findings about that extrinsic evidence. These are the “evidentiary underpinnings” of claim construction that we 

discussed in Markman . . . .

135 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2015) (emphasis added) (citation 

omitted). Thus, if the claim construction in this case 

turns on the previously-unaddressed question of the plain 

and ordinary meaning of the disputed term in the relevant art during the relevant time period, then it is quite 

possible that extrinsic evidence will be necessary to 

resolve the question.

Notably, the entirety of the claim construction proceedings below occurred before the Supreme Court decided Teva. Remand would allow the district court to 

consider these issues in light of the guidance in that case. 

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10 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

II

In the absence of extrinsic evidence, the majority resolves this case based solely on the intrinsic evidence. I 

believe this is premature. The intrinsic evidence can only 

be fully evaluated after determining what, if anything, is 

the plain and ordinary meaning of “communications path” 

to one of skill in the art. See Teva, 135 S. Ct. at 841 

(explaining that court must resolve disagreements about 

knowledge, experiences, and understandings possessed by 

person of ordinary skill in the art before proceeding to 

“legal analysis [of] whether a skilled artisan would ascribe that same meaning to that term in the context of the 

specific patent claim under review”); Phillips v. AWH 

Corp., 415 F.3d at 1313 (stating that claim construction 

“begins” with perspective of person of ordinary skill in the 

art).

But even if this term has no plain and ordinary meaning outside of the context provided by the intrinsic record, 

I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the 

intrinsic record “militates powerfully against” a construction that encompasses wireless communications. Majority 

Op. at 7. As the majority recognizes, the intrinsic evidence “do[es] not expressly exclude wireless communications from the meaning of ‘communications path.’” Id. at 

8. Yet, applying “[t]he canons of claim construction,”6 the 

majority finds in the intrinsic evidence sufficient basis “to 

6 The majority opinion does not mention disclaimer, 

although this was the principal basis on which the district 

court arrived at the construction which the majority 

affirms. Like the majority, I do not decide whether the 

record here meets the “exacting” standards for finding a 

disclaimer. Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am. LLC, 

669 F.3d 1362, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Because of the 

need for further proceedings, the decision as to whether 

there is a disclaimer should wait.

 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 11

limit the scope of the claims to wired communication.” Id.

at 9. I disagree.

The majority cites as evidence of the claims’ scope the 

patents’ title: “Communicating Information Packets Via 

Telephone Lines.” Id. at 7-8. But even the majority 

concedes that the claim scope extends beyond telephone 

lines to other “twisted pair wirings.” Furthermore, patent 

titles are accorded no more weight in claim construction 

than other portions of the specification. See Moore U.S.A., 

Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091, 1111 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000) (“[T]he bar on importing limitations from the 

written description into the claims applies no less forcefully to a title.”); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard 

Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (patent title is 

“near irrelevancy” in claim construction). 

Next the majority observes that the specification describes “[t]he invention” as “particularly concerned” with 

“two wire lines such as telephone subscriber lines.” 

Majority Op. at 8 (citing ’895 patent col. 1 ll. 6-10). But 

this court does not usually limit claim scope to preferred 

embodiments, lest it commit the “cardinal sin” of importing limitations from the specification into the claims. See, 

e.g., Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d at 1371 (“[W]e do not read limitations from the embodiments in the specification into the 

claims.”); Thorner, 669 F.3d at 1366 (“We do not read 

limitations from the specification into claims . . . .”); 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320 (describing “reading a limitation from the written description into the claims” as “one 

of the cardinal sins of patent law”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Finally, the majority emphasizes that “every embodiment described in the specification utilizes a telephone 

wire.” Majority Op. at 8. However, again, claims are not 

typically limited to the embodiments disclosed in the 

specification, even when just one such embodiment (or 

type of embodiment) is disclosed. See Hill-Rom, 755 F.3d 

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12 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

at 1373 (“The absence of an embodiment teaching a 

wireless receiver does not prevent the claimed datalink 

from being given its plain and ordinary meaning at the 

relevant time.”); see also generally Ormco Corp. v. Align 

Tech., Inc., 498 F.3d 1307, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“This 

court . . . has rejected a claim construction process based 

on the ‘essence’ of an invention.”); Allen Eng’g Corp. v. 

Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 

(“It is well settled that there is no legally recognizable or 

protected essential element, gist or heart of the invention 

in a combination patent.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). 

Moreover, there is intrinsic evidence that supports 

IWS’s position. As is undisputed, wireless technology was 

known at the time the Terry patents were invented. See, 

e.g., J.A. 19 (“[Ruckus] argues that wireless communication paths were well-known at the time.”); J.A. 1022. At 

least one of the Terry patents, the ’473 patent, includes an 

examiner citation to a prior art reference relating to a 

wireless local area network (“LAN”) system. See J.A. 86. 

In the absence of any express disclaimer, or even disparagement of wireless embodiments, this fact supports 

finding wireless communications to be within the scope of 

the claims. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 

F.3d 898, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent a clear disclaimer of particular subject matter, the fact that the inventor 

may have anticipated that the invention would be used in 

a particular way does not mean that the scope of the 

invention is limited to that context.”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

The doctrine of claim differentiation also favors remand. Certain dependent claims—for example, claim 6 of 

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RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS 13

the ’473 patent7—differ from the claims from which they 

depend solely by substituting “two-wire line” for “communications path.” This suggests that the lower court’s “twowire” construction is overly narrow. See Phillips, 415 

F.3d at 1315 (“[T]he presence of a dependent claim that 

adds a particular limitation gives rise to a presumption 

that the limitation in question is not present in the independent claim.”).

Lastly, I disagree that the claims’ validity is a relevant consideration at this stage of this case. See Majority

Op. at 9. Whether the Terry patents’ written description 

is adequate presents a factual question. GlaxoSmithKline 

LLC v. Banner Pharmacaps, Inc., 744 F.3d 725, 729 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014). The record at present is devoid of clear and 

convincing evidence that construing the claims to include 

wireless communications would render them invalid for 

lack of written description.8 

As importantly, while this court has “acknowledged 

the maxim that claims should be construed to preserve 

their validity,” it has “certainly not endorsed a regime in 

which validity analysis is a regular component of claim 

construction.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1327. “Instead, we 

have limited the maxim to cases in which the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim 

construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.” Id.

7 See ’473 patent col. 20 ll. 12-13 (“6. A method as 

claimed in claim 1, wherein the bidirectional communications path comprises a two-wire line.”).

8 On remand, if the district court shares the concern as to the adequacy of the Terry patents’ written 

description, it might efficiently resolve that question by 

staying all discovery and motions practice other than that 

relating to the construction of “communications path” and 

the written description defense.

 

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14 RUCKUS WIRELESS, INC. v. INNOVATIVE WIRELESS SOLUTIONS

The majority does not show that the claims here are 

ambiguous. To the contrary, the majority appears to find 

the intrinsic evidence to be unambiguous. Hence, the 

maxim does not apply. 

III

I fear that the majority’s decision today deprives a patentee of the full scope of its patent claims based on the 

patentee’s failure to present extrinsic evidence on an issue 

that was never in dispute in the district court. On the 

current record, it appears that IWS had an entirely reasonable basis to believe it did not need to present extrinsic 

evidence.9 In the proceedings below, nobody—not IWS, 

not Ruckus, nor the district court—expressed any doubt 

that the plain and ordinary meaning of “communications 

path” included wireless communications.

Accordingly, I believe the most appropriate course of 

action is to vacate the district court’s judgment of noninfringement and its construction of “communications 

path” and remand for the district court to provide the 

parties an opportunity to present extrinsic evidence before 

again construing “communications path.” Thus, I respectfully dissent.

9 It may be that there were facts or circumstances, 

not evident from the record before us, that made IWS’s 

approach to claim construction unreasonable. It may be, 

then, that on remand the district court would find IWS 

waived its opportunity to present extrinsic evidence. 

Alternatively, the district court might find that Ruckus 

effectively stipulated to what IWS has always contended 

is the plain and ordinary meaning, avoiding the necessity 

of considering extrinsic evidence even on remand. I would 

leave these decisions to the district court, which is in the 

best position to make them.

 

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