Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02980/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-02980-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darin Bright
Defendant
Gerard Jones
Plaintiff
J. Lewis
Defendant
W. Tarrar
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GERARD JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

DARIN BRIGHT, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-02980-JST (PR) 

ORDER OF SERVICE

Plaintiff, an inmate at the California Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”), filed this pro

se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he has been provided inadequate 

medical care for a shoulder injury. This case is now before the Court for initial review of the 

pleadings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis 

by separate order.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 

the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 

may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

§ 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed, however. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police 

Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 

statement need only “„give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon 

which it rests.‟” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although 

in order to state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff‟s 

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obligation to provide the grounds of his „entitle[ment] to relief‟ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . 

Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint 

must proffer “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that 

the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

B. Legal Claims

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment‟s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 

A “serious medical need” exists if the failure to treat a prisoner‟s condition could result in further 

significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 

F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104), overruled in part on other 

grounds by WMX Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A 

prison official is “deliberately indifferent” if he knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of 

serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Farmer v. 

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 

Neither negligence nor gross negligence warrant liability under the Eighth Amendment. 

Id. at 835-36 & n4. An “official‟s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have 

perceived but did not, . . . cannot under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.” 

Id. at 838. Instead, “the official‟s conduct must have been „wanton,‟ which turns not upon its 

effect on the prisoner, but rather, upon the constraints facing the official.” Frost v. Agnos, 152 

F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302-03 (1991)). Prison 

officials violate their constitutional obligation only by “intentionally denying or delaying access to 

medical care.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. 

According to the complaint, plaintiff sustained a shoulder injury several years ago causing 

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a separation of his right clavicle. Due to persistent severe pain, prison doctors authorized for 

plaintiff to receive a CT scan and an appointment with a specialist. In August 2010, plaintiff was 

examined by a specialist, Dr. Swan, who diagnosed plaintiff with “right sternoclavicular anterior 

superior subluxation” and noted “osteoarthritic” change in the shoulder joint area. Dr. Swan 

recommended injections to decrease inflammation and possibly give longstanding pain relief. Dr. 

Swan noted, however, that plaintiff might need soft tissue reconstruction surgery in the future if 

the soft tissue was not “controlled.” Plaintiff received numerous injections beginning in October 

2010. He reports that they were effective in the beginning but eventually became ineffective, 

resulting in the return of extreme pain.

When the injections ceased to be effective, plaintiff made a request to return to Dr. Swan 

for consideration of soft tissue reconstruction surgery, as previously recommended by Dr. Swan. 

Prison doctors denied plaintiff‟s request. Defendants Dr. Darin Bright, Dr. W. Tarrar, and Deputy 

Director J. Lewis proceeded to deny plaintiff‟s inmate healthcare appeals requesting to return to 

Dr. Swan. These allegations, liberally construed, state a claim of deliberate indifference against 

Dr. Bright, Dr. Tarrar, and J. Lewis. 

The potential liability of defendants is under the Eighth Amendment, and is not under the 

Fourteenth Amendment‟s Due Process Clause. There is no constitutional right to a prison or jail 

administrative appeal or grievance system in California, and therefore no due process liability for 

failing to process or decide an inmate appeal properly. See Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 

(9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). It is alleged here, however, 

that by denying or improperly handling such appeals, defendants Dr. Bright, Dr. Tarrar, and J. 

Lewis denied medical care that plaintiff alleges was sorely needed. Thus, it is for the denial of 

medical care that these defendants may be held liable, not simply for denying administrative 

appeals. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

1. Plaintiff‟s complaint states a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate 

indifference to serious medical needs as against Dr. Bright, Dr. Tarrar, and J. Lewis. 

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2. The Clerk shall issue summons and the United States Marshal shall serve, without 

prepayment of fees, a copy of the complaint and a copy of this order upon the following 

defendants at CTF: Dr. Darin Bright, Dr. W. Tarrar, and J. Lewis.

The Clerk shall also mail a courtesy copy of the complaint and this order to the California 

Attorney General‟s Office.

3. In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the Court orders as follows:

a. No later than 91 days from the date this order is filed, defendants must file 

and serve a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. A motion for summary 

judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand notice so that plaintiff will have fair, timely and 

adequate notice of what is required of him in order to oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 

F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out in Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th 

Cir. 1998), must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment).1 

If defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

defendants must so inform the Court prior to the date the motion is due. 

b. Plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment or other dispositive motion 

must be filed with the Court and served upon defendants no later than 28 days from the date the 

motion is filed. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment 

provided later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 

c. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than 14 days after the date the 

opposition is filed. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. No 

hearing will be held on the motion. 

4. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you must 

 

1

 If defendants assert that plaintiff failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies as 

required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), defendants must raise such argument in a motion for summary 

judgment, pursuant to the Ninth Circuit‟s opinion in Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.

2014) (en banc) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held 

that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 

should be raised by a defendant as an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Such a motion should 

also incorporate a modified Wyatt notice in light of Albino. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 

1108, 1120, n.14 (9th Cir. 2003); Stratton v. Buck, 697 F.3d 1004, 1008 (9th Cir. 2012).

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do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be 

granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact – that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict the facts shown in the defendants‟ declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand v. 

Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (App. A).

(The Rand notice above does not excuse defendants' obligation to serve said notice again 

concurrently with a motion for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 939).

5. All communications by plaintiff with the Court must be served on defendants‟

counsel by mailing a true copy of the document to defendants‟ counsel. The Court may disregard 

any document which a party files but fails to send a copy of to his opponents. Until defendants‟

counsel has been designated, plaintiff may mail a true copy of the document directly to 

defendants, but once defendants are represented by counsel, all documents must be mailed to 

counsel rather than directly to defendants. 

6. Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

No further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 

before the parties may conduct discovery.

7. Plaintiff is responsible for prosecuting this case. Plaintiff must promptly keep the 

Court informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court‟s orders in a timely 

fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). Plaintiff must file a notice of change of address in every 

pending case every time he is moved to a new facility.

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8. Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than the deadline sought 

to be extended and must be accompanied by a showing of good cause.

9. Plaintiff is cautioned that he must include the case name and case number for this 

case on any document he submits to the Court for consideration in this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 30, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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