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Parties Involved:
Lloyd Michael Reid
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~ D 

Unit.ed Staws Court of Appeal:; 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Te~t.li. Cireui~ 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

LLOYD MICHAEL REID, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 12 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKEP-. 

Cler]: 

No. 91-5140 

(N.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. 89-CR-33-C) 

Before ANDERSON, BRORBY, Circuit Judges, and CAMPOS,** District 

Judge. 

Lloyd Michael Reid appeals from the denial of his motion for 

a new trial. Reid was convicted of conspiracy to distribute 

controlled substances and maintaining a place for drug distribution in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846. After sentencing, and 

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P . 33, he filed a timely motion for a 

new trial based on newly discovered evidence. He claims that this 

evidence establishes that contrary to the government's position at 

trial, an undisclosed deal existed between the government and a 

key prosecution witness. The district court denied the motion 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishi ng the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** Honorable Santiago E. Campos, United States District Judge 

for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

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holding that the government's failure to disclose the cooperation 

agreement had no bearing on the testimony of the witness. The 

court found that Reid had neither suffered any prejudice as a 

result of the nondisclosure nor been denied a fair trial. Order 

of Aug. 19, 1991 at 3. We conclude that the post-trial discovery 

of the cooperation agreement constitutes newly discovered 

evidence. However, since we are unsure whether the district court 

applied the proper standard in analyzing the effect of this 

evidence and since we have not been furnished a transcript of the 

trial, we vacate the order and remand for a reconsideration of 

Reid's motion. 

FACTS 

Reid characterizes as new evidence a letter sent by the 

government approximately eight months after the trial to the state 

court sentencing judge of the key prosecution witness, Rhonda 

Grimmett. The letter "strongly urge[d]" the judge to exercise 

leniency on Grimmett's behalf because of her cooperation and 

testimony at Reid's trial. 1 Letter of March 8, 1990, at 1. Rei d 

first learned of this letter approximately fifteen months after 

his trial. Reid asserts that this letter constitutes newly 

discovered evidence because: (1) the letter indicates that the 

government in fact made a deal with Gr immett inducing her to 

1 The March 8, 1990, letter refers to Grimme tt by the name of 

Rhonda Hawkins. Ms. Hawkins used both the surnames Hawkins and 

Grimmett, her maiden name, to identify herself. R. Supp. Vol. II 

at 3, 44. Throughout this opini on, we refer to her as Grimmett. 

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testify: (2) this agreement was concealed from Reid preventing him 

from properly impeaching Grimmett on the basis of bias: (3) the 

government repeatedly denied the existence of any agreement both 

at trial and on appeal in United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 

1458-59 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991) 

(Reid I); and (4) the letter was not disclosed by the government 

until after oral argument in Reid I. Appellant's Principal Br. at 

2. 

At trial, the government represented to the court that it had 

not entered a cooperation agreement with Grimmett. Grimmett 

testified vigorously on both direct and cross-examination that she 

was not appearing pursuant to any agreement with the government. 

R. Supp. Vol. II at 4-5, 28, 36-38, 46 . 

On direct appeal, Reid sought a new trial arguing that having 

previously indicated its intention to enter into an agreement with 

Grimmett, the government should have disclosed that it failed to 

consummate that agreement. Reid I at 1460-61. We noted the 

district court's finding that consistent with the evidence 

presented to it at the time, although the government had initially 

indicated the presence of an agreement, the state court sentencing 

judge had never been contacted on Grimmett's behalf. Id. at 1460. 

We also noted that Reid "offered no evidence to undercut this 

finding." Id. Apparently, the government's position on direct 

appeal was consistent with its position at trial that no deals had 

been made with Grimmett to induce her testimony. 

Subsequent to our decision in Reid I, Reid learned that the 

government had sent a lette r to Grimmett's state court sentencing 

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judge. That letter seemed to satisfy the government's obligation 

under the cooperation agreement with Grimmett, an agreement which 

the government denied having entered in arguments presented before 

two courts. 

Reid then brought his timely Rule 33 motion. The government 

responded to the motion restating its position that Grimmett "had 

testified truthfully that no promises had been made to her." 

Order of August 19, 1991 at 2. The district court found that 

Grimmett's testimony had not been influenced by the government's 

post-trial letter and that Reid's new evidence did not show that 

Grimmett had testified falsely about this matter. Id. at 3. 

As set out above, at trial, on direct appeal, and in 

responding in the district court to the motion now on appeal, the 

government took the position that it had not entered a cooperation 

agreement with Grimmett inducing her to testify. On this appeal, 

however, the government has altered its stance. The new 

government position is that "[t]he letter [Reid characterizes] as 

'newly discovered' simply does exactly what the government said it 

would do in return for witness Grimmett's cooperation and 

testimony in the government's case-in-chief." Appellee's Br. at 

6 • 

DISCUSSION 

A. Newly Discovered Evidence 

As a threshold question, we must decide whether the alleged 

undisclosed cooperation agreement was in fact newly discovered 

evidence. At first blush it seems it was not since in May 1989, 

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the Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting the case informed 

Reid, in response to his pretrial motion for discovery of 

inducements, promises, and payments to prospective witnesses, of 

the existence of just such a cooperation agreement with Rhonda 

Grimmett. The government stated: 

The government anticipates using Rhonda Grimmett as a 

witness in its case-in-chief. There is no written plea 

agreement with this witness, however, assurances were 

made to her that in return for her cooperation and 

testimony, if called as a witness in this case, the fact 

of her assistance to the federal government would be 

made known to her sentencing judge in state court. 

Appellee's Br. at 3 (emphasis added).2 

However, at trial in June 1989, Grimmett testified on both 

direct and cross-examination that she had made no deal with the 

government for her testimony. R. Supp . Vol. II at 4-5, 28, 36-38, 

46. Such testimony was, of course, subject to clarification by 

the government and impeachment by Reid . But, the government not 

only failed to clarify its arrangement with Grimmett, it actively 

obscured the situation by leading the court to believe that the 

arrangement disclosed to Reid before the trial was no longer in 

effect. That point is revealed by the following colloquy between 

the court and Reid's defense counsel when counsel unsuccessfully 

2 The promise to Grimmett "in return for" her "cooperation and 

testimony" clearly constitutes an agreement. "A plea agreement 

involves ffi!.ig pro ID!Q_." United States v. Broce, 781 F.2d 792, 817 

(10th Cir. 1986) (Barrett, J., dissenting) (citing United States 

v. Cross, 638 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1981)). While this case 

concerns a cooperation agreement and not a formal plea agreement, 

the quid in this case was the government's post-trial letter to 

the state court sentencing judge in exchange for the quo of 

Grimmett's helpful trial testimony. The government conceded the 

existence of this agreement both in its brief and at oral 

argument. 

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sought to elicit testimony from the government that the agreement 

in question did exist: 

MR SHORT: [The Assistant U.S. Attorney's testimony 

as to whether there was an agreement] is very relevant 

if promises have been made. 

THE COURT: Well, there were none. That is what 

the problem is. As far as -- Mr. Swartz [the AUSA] has 

assured the Court [that] no promises have been made 

[that] he knows of. Their witness has said no promises 

[have been] made, agent said no promises made. Mr. 

Swartz has explained why that is in the letter and that 

he intended to do it in the future, and it never 

occurred. 

R. Supp. Vol.Vat 4 (emphasis added). Thereafter, government 

counsel represented and argued to the jury that Grimmett had not 

been offered any inducement by the government for her testimony. 

R. Supp. Vol. III at 87-88, 92-94. 

Government counsel repeatedly stressed the absence of an 

agreement with Grimmett during closing argument. In the opening 

portion of his summation, the prosecutor stated: 

[Grimmett) said she's not getting any kind of deal. No 

promises were made to her. She's not getting her time 

cut back or not getting her charges dismissed or 

anything. Her words were, "It's too late for that now. 

They didn't promise me anything." This man, the 

investigator didn't promise her anything. She said I 

didn't promise her. She said nobody promised her 

anything. That's the evidence in this case and she 

testified and she told you what happened out there. 

Id. at 87-88 (emphasis added). 

In his rebuttal summation, the prosecutor again stressed that 

Grimmett's testimony was especially credible because she had 

received no inducement to procure her testimony: 

Alvin Clemmons, for a deal, for leniency, told you what 

he knew about this defendant's activities. 

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But, on the other hand, it's not a classic 

narcotics case, because Rhonda Grimmett came in here and 

testified with absolutely no deal. She told you she was 

doing 50 years. There was no way that anybody could 

help her at that point. That's what she told you. 

There's no evidence to the contrary of that position 

whatsoever except counsel's argument that there's got to 

be a deal, but there's no evidence of it, and he asked 

everybody in the case including the main person to 

benefit by it, Rhonda Grimmett. 

There is no plea agreement. There's no deal. He 

never proved any evidence at all that she had any kind 

of a deal, and he attempted to do that through his cross 

examination of her. She told you, ladies and gentlemen, 

she's here to testify to the truth, and her motive, I 

suppose, is that she wants to see justice occur to this 

Defendant as it occurred to her. She's doing a lot of 

time for her acts out there, and she doesn't want to see 

him get away with it. 

Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added) . 

The prosecutor returned a final time to the absence of any 

agreement with Grimmett in attacking the credibility of Reid's 

main witness. The AUSA asked the jurors, "Is he a believable 

witness in the face of Rhonda Grimmetts (sic] with no deals, in 

the face of those two 17 year old girls and in the face of Alvin 

Clemmons' testimony?" Id. at 94 (emphasis added). 

Essentially, then, what we have is a situation where the 

court was given the impression that whatever agreement may have 

existed pretrial was no longer in effect, and both the court and 

jury evaluated Grimmett's testimony under the impression that no 

agreement for Grimmett's testimony existed. The effect of the 

government's misrepresentation was to prevent Reid's counsel from 

pursuing effective cross-examination and impeachment on this 

issue. See United States v. DeSoto, 950 F.2d 626, 630-31 (10th 

Cir. 1991). 

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The post-trial discovery of the letter, which the government 

now concedes was executed in compliance with the original pretrial 

agreement, shows that the agreement was in effect at the time 

Grimmett testified. Accordingly, the letter constitutes newly 

discovered evidence as to that important matter. 

B. Effect of the Newly Discovered Evidence 

The critical question is whether this newly discovered 

evidence of the government's promise to put in a good word for 

Grimmett in exchange for her cooperative testimony requires a new 

trial. 

The mere fact that a given piece of evidence is newly 

discovered does not by itself compel a district court to grant a 

motion for a new trial. However, when the nondisclosure of a 

cooperation agreement with key prosecution witnesses implicates a 

defendant's due process rights under Brady v. Macyland, 373 U.S. 

83 (1963), the proper inquiry is whether the evidence that was 

suppressed would "undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

trial. " United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985); see 

also United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168, 1179 (10th Cir. 

1991); United States v. Thornbrugh, Nos. 89-5166, 89-5173, 1992 

U.S. App. LEXIS 6623, at *15-16 (10th Cir. April 13, 1992). 

In Abello-Silva, we addressed the proper standard to apply in 

a case like this, where the prosecution fails to disclose impeachment evidence useful to the defense that was specifically 

requested by the defense. There, we adopted the view that "'[t]he 

evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability 

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that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different. A "reasonable 

probability" is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence 

in the outcome.'" Id. at 1180 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). 

A court should make its assessment of "reasonable probability" in light of "the totality of the circumstances." Id. 

(quoting Bagley at 683). A court could reasonably conclude that 

the jury's judgment was not affected by a faulty disclosure or 

nondisclosure of a cooperation agreement if the remaining evidence 

in the case is "overwhelming and not subject to any reasonable 

doubt by the impeachment or elimination of [the witness'] 

testimony." Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 661 (10th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 484 U. S. 1069 (1988). 

The district court did not make any findings on these issues. 

Instead, relying on the government's position that there was no 

agreement with Grimmett it found that without Grimmett's knowledge 

of any promises her testimony could not have been affected by the 

letter, and that Reid therefore suffered no prejudice sufficient 

to justify a new trial. It made no finding on the record 

regarding either its confidence in the outcome of the trial given 

this new evidence or whether the remaining evidence in the case 

was overwhelming. 

As the Supreme Court and this court have made clear, promises 

to witnesses are undeniably important matters. They must be 

disclosed to the defendant, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 

(1972), and the disclosure must include "all the promises that 

have been made, not only those which they happen to consider 

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important." United States v. Blackner, 721 F.2d 703, 708 (10th 

Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 999, 1007 

(D.C. Cir. 1977)). This is so because "[p]romises made by the 

state to a witness in exchange for [her] testimony relate directly 

to the credibility of the witness." Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 

719 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987). When 

promises of favorable treatment are not disclosed, the trier of 

fact lacks evidence necessary to make a fair assessment of the 

witness' credibility and testimony. See generally, Note, A 

Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Promises of Favorable Treatment Made 

to Witnesses for the Prosecution, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 887, 891 

(1981). Nondisclosure is especially serious when the "reliability 

of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or 

innocence." Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). 

This case is troubling to say the least. The finding that 

Grimmett did not know she had an agreement with the government is 

not persuasive because Reid's counsel was prevented from testing 

both her knowledge and her concept of an agreement by confronting 

her with the specific promise which the government admits was made 

to her. Thus, it is impossible to assess the existence or extent 

of this inducement on her testimony. And, the court could not 

fully assess the credibility of her denials. 

Grimmett was not the only witness against Reid, but she was 

apparently the most prominent, and the government has done little 

in this appeal to demonstrate that other evidence against Reid was 

"overwhelming." Wilson, at 661. In particular, the government 

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has not even bothered to obtain and submit to us a transcript of 

the trial so that we can review the evidence it presented. 

From the briefs and partial record furnished to us we glean 

that the government's main witness was Grimmett and that the 

primary supporting witnesses were her daughter and another woman 

Grimmett considered to be her daughter. While in no way conclusive, it is at least plausible that these two individuals would 

follow Grimmett's lead. But that is a speculation on a 

speculation: that Grimmett was wholly or partially lying for a 

government promise, and that the other two witnesses tailored 

their testimony accordingly. 3 

3 We note that the prosecution bolstered Grimmett's credibility 

to the jury during closi ng argument by stressing that her testimony was supported by that of her daughters. The prosecutor 

noted: 

Now, she wasn't the only one that said that . She wasn't 

the only one that witnessed that, that told you about 

that . Both of her daughters, her 17 year old daughter 

-- or her daughter and her niece that she was raising 

like a daughter, came in here and told you precisely the 

same thing . Girls with no reason to lie, nothing to 

gain, with no felony convictions. Two young girls, both 

of them with children, young children, came in here and 

said . . . . 

They confirmed in every imoortant respect the 

testimony of Rhonda Grimmetts (sic] . All three of them 

said the same thing. 

R. Supp. Vol . III at 86-87 (emphasis added) . The AUSA also 

commented: 

But what about the 17 year old girls? They don't have 

any felony convictions, like Alvin Clemmons and like 

Rhonda Grimmett. They ' re not working off any kind of 

deal . . .. There's no deal with them. They were never 

impeached .. . . They were telling you the truth I 

submit, ladies and gentlemen . You must be the judge of 

that. 

[footnote continued] 

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On this record, we are unable to conclude whether this 

possibility is more than a speculation. In denying Reid's motion 

for a new trial, the district court found that Reid had not been 

prejudiced by the post-trial discovery of the government's 

agreement with Grimmett . It is likely that the district court, 

which is highly experienced in these matters, used prejudice in 

the sense required by Bagley and Abella-Silva, but we are unable 

to determine that for a certainty. And, lacking a transcript of 

the trial, we are unable to make an appropriate assessment 

ourselves. Accordingly, we vacate the order of the district court 

and remand the case for reconsideration of Reid's motion for a new 

trial. 

VACATED and REMANDED. 

[footnote continued] 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Id. at 93. These arguments prove little. Having misled the court 

about the presence of a cooperation agreement with Grimmett, the 

prosecutor prevented defense counsel from engaging in effective 

cross-examination of the daughters on their possible bias in 

structuring their testimony to benefit Grimmett. 

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