Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10463/USCOURTS-ca5-09-10463-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Del Campo-Ramirez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. *

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not **

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-10463

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

JUAN DEL CAMPO-RAMIREZ, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:08-CR-261-1

Before JOLLY and GARZA, Circuit Judges, and MILLER, District Judge.*

PER CURIAM:**

In this appeal, Juan Del Campo-Ramirez challenges the 27-month

sentence he received after pleading guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326(a). Campo-Ramirez alleges that the district court improperly

calculated his guidelines range after erroneously adding two points to CampoUnited States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

May 26, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 09-10463

 This provision reads: 1

 

(a) In general 

Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who - (1) has been denied

admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States

while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and

thereafter (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United

States, unless (A) prior to his reembarkation at a place outside the United

States or his application for admission from foreign contiguous territory, the

Attorney General has expressly consented to such alien’s reapplying for

admission; or (B) with respect to an alien previously denied admission and

removed, unless such alien shall establish that he was not required to obtain

such advance consent under this chapter or any prior Act, shall be fined under

title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both.

2

Ramirez’s criminal history on the basis that he committed the instant offense of

illegal reentry while under a criminal justice sentence of probation. U.S.S.G. §

4A1.2(d). By the district court’s calculation, Campo-Ramirez’s total offense level

was 14 and his criminal history category was IV, resulting in a guidelines range

of 27 to 33 months. Without the two points challenged by Campo-Ramirez, his

criminal history category would be III and the guidelines range 21 to 27 months.

Campo-Ramirez did not challenge these points in the district court and so our

review is for plain error. Because Campo-Ramirez has failed to show that the

error affected his substantial rights, his sentence is AFFIRMED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On January 1, 2005, Campo-Ramirez unlawfully entered the United States

near Brownsville, Texas. In 2007 Campo-Ramirez was arrested by Dallas police

officers for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and retaliation. He was

eventually released into the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

In 2008 Campo-Ramirez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after removal from the

United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).1

At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report

(PSR)—which contained factual findings and a proposed guideline

range—without change. The PSR detailed Campo-Ramirez’s criminal history.

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No. 09-10463

 The PSR also recounted post-offense misconduct; namely, the 2007 retaliation charge 2

for which he was originally arrested.

 §4A1.1. Criminal History Category 3

. . .

(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any

criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release,

imprisonment, work release, or escape status.

 Because of these two criminal history points, Campo-Ramirez fell within Criminal

4

History Category IV. Without the two additional points, he would have been within Criminal

History Category III.

3

His most recent prior offense was a vehicle burglary in 1993 for which CampoRamirez was sentenced to a 10-year term of probation, case number F-9334940.2

According to the PSR, on June 28, 2000, this 10-year probation term was

revoked and Campo-Ramirez was sentenced to two years imprisonment. On

December 16, 2000, a prior order of removal was reinstated and Campo-Ramirez

was removed to Mexico where he remained until his illegal reentry in 2005.

Despite having already explained that the term of probation associated

with Campo-Ramirez’s 1993 vehicle burglary was revoked in 2000, in calculating

his guideline range the PSR assessed Campo-Ramirez two criminal history

points under § 4A1.1(d) because “[t]he defendant committed the instant offense 3

while under a criminal justice sentence of probation, Case No. F-9334940.” The 4

specific reference by case number to the 1993 burglary makes the error

unmistakable. Nevertheless, both Campo-Ramirez’s counsel and the district

court failed to recognize the mistake. Accordingly, when deciding CampoRamirez’s sentence, the district court adopted a guideline range of 27 to 33

months. The correct guideline range was 21 to 27 months.

At sentencing, Campo-Ramirez pointed to the circumstances of his prior

illegal entries and changes in Texas law on his prior offenses and asked the court

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 Campo-Ramirez also made three challenges to the PSR, all of which were overruled 5

as foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent, and none of which are relevant to his appeal.

4

to vary downward from the guideline range. The court declined to do so, briefly 5

explaining that “under the circumstances . . . the guideline calculation . . .

adequately reflects the seriousness of the offense as well as other statutory

sentencing factors . . . .” However, the court did note that “for the reasons

[counsel] argued for a variance, that a sentence at the low end of the range is

appropriate,” and sentenced Campo-Ramirez to 27 months followed by

deportation and two years of supervised release.

Campo-Ramirez appealed and for the first time challenges the addition of

two criminal history points under § 4A1.1(d).

II. DISCUSSION

Because the issue was not raised at sentencing, we review for plain error.

Plain error exists where (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) the error

affects substantial rights, and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Redd,

562 F.3d 309, 314 (5th Cir. 2009). 

(1) There was error and it was plain.

On appeal the government concedes that the district court erred, but

argues that the error was factual and so not remediable on plain error review.

Campo-Ramirez argues that the district court correctly identified his term of

probation as being terminated in 2000, but improperly applied § 4A1.1(d) after

making this factual finding. Errors in interpreting or applying the guidelines

are, of course, legal errors. See United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d

751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008).

The government is correct when it asserts that “[q]uestions of fact capable

of resolution by the district court upon proper objection at sentencing can never

constitute plain error.” United States v. Vital, 68 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir. 1995)

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 The authority the government cites, Rodriguez-Parra, dealt with legal complexity, not 6

factual complexity. See 581 F.3d at 231 (explaining that error is not plain where error is

discovered only by a “careful parsing of all the relevant authorities”).

5

(internal citations omitted). Here, however, there was no error in the district

court’s (PSR’s) recitation of the factual circumstances of Campo-Ramirez’s

offense. The error came later, when the district court (PSR) applied the

guidelines to those circumstances to compute Campo-Ramirez’s criminal history

score. An error of this kind is legal error, capable of resolution on plain error

review. See United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 385 (5th Cir. 2006)

(applying plain error review to an error in calculating criminal history points

when the PSR’s facts were unchallenged); United States v. Lee, No. 09-40099,

2010 WL 742592, at *4 (5th Cir. 2010) (comparing a challenge to the PSR’s facts,

which is not subject to plain error review, with a challenge to the PSR’s criminal

history calculation, which is subject to plain error review). Campo-Ramirez has

thus met his burden under the first prong of our plain error review.

He has also met his burden under the second prong: the error in this case

was plain. Error is plain if it is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to

reasonable dispute.” United States v. Rodriguez-Parra, 581 F.3d 227, 231 (5th

Cir. 2009)(internal citations omitted). As Campo-Ramirez was not under

probation when he reentered the United States, it was obvious error to apply §

4A1.1(d). The government has argued that “even the most prudent person

tasked with traversing” the “muddled path” of Campo-Ramirez’s criminal history

“could miss the critical time frame” for relating his current offense with his prior

term of probation. However, we are aware of no authority for the principle that

mere factual complexity can make an otherwise “clear or obvious” legal rule

subject to “reasonable dispute” under the second prong of our plain error test,

and decline to recognize such a principle in this case.6

(2) The error did not affect Campo-Ramirez’s substantial rights.

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Nevertheless, plain error is remediable only where the defendant shows

the error has affected his substantial rights. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52. To meet this

standard, Campo-Ramirez must show “the probability of a different result is

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome,” United States v. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004) (internal citations omitted); that is, he must show

there is a “reasonable probability that, but for the district court’s misapplication

of the Guidelines, he would have received a lesser sentence.” United States v.

Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 364 (5th Cir. 2005). In order to make this showing,

evidence cannot be of ambiguous or uncertain effect; “the defendant must prove

that the error affected the sentencing outcome.” United States v.

Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 365 (5th Cir. 2009).

Our court has often reversed, on plain error review, sentences tainted by

guideline calculation errors. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Ortenza, 563 F.3d

112, 116 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Gonzalez-Terrazas, 529 F.3d 293,

298-99 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Garza-Lopez, 410 F.3d 268, 275 (5th Cir.

2005); United States v. Villegas, 404 F.3d 355, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2005). These

cases recognize that, although non-binding, the guidelines play a significant role

in the district court’s determination of a proper sentence. Under certain

circumstances a district court might, if faced with a different guideline, choose

a different sentence.

However, in most of our prior cases the defendant’s sentence did not, as is

the case here, fall within both the correct and incorrect guideline ranges. When

that is the case, we have shown considerable reluctance in finding a reasonable

probability that the district court would have settled on a lower sentence. In our

first case to consider the effect of overlapping ranges on a defendant’s ability to

show a probability of a lesser sentence, United States v. Price, we vacated and

remanded. 516 F.3d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 2008). In Price the sentence fell near the

top of the correct range and we expressed concern that the difference between

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the bottoms of the two ranges was substantial—18 months. Id. at 289 n.28.

Price, however, seems to stand alone. In United States v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706,

714 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Jones, 596 F.3d 273, 277-79 (5th Cir.

2010), we faced similar errors and refused to reverse. In both cases we noted

that there was no evidence that the district court believed the bottom of “any

range to be appropriate.” Jasso, 587 F.3d at 714 n.11; Jones, 596 F.3d at 279.

These varying outcomes show that our review in cases of overlapping guidelines

has been highly fact sensitive.

In the closest case on point, United States v. Cruz-Meza, we again refused

to reverse. 310 F. App’x. 634, 637–38 (5th Cir. 2009). In Cruz-Meza, the district

court calculated a guideline range of 24 to 30 months. After rejecting the

defendant’s arguments for a downward variance, the court sentenced Cruz to 24

months. On appeal, Cruz demonstrated that the correct range was 18 to 24

months. However, the court declined to correct the error on plain error review.

By pointing to the narrow overlap (one month) the defendant had shown “a

possibility of a lesser sentence[, ] but . . . not the requisite probability.” Id. at

637 (emphasis in original). Cruz’s request for a variance had been denied and

he could point to nothing in the record “to bolster his assertion that the district

court would have imposed a lower sentence” in the light of the proper guideline

range. Id.

We are not bound by Cruz, but we find its logic persuasive. CampoRamirez has pointed out that the ranges at issue only overlap by a single month

and that the district court decided to sentence him at the bottom of the

applicable guideline range. Thus, although it is possible that Campo-Ramirez

would receive a different sentence were we to vacate his sentence and remand

for resentencing, “this evidence alone [is] insufficient to show a reasonable

probability” of a lower sentence. Jones, 596 F.3d at 279. And there is nothing

else in the record to elevate Campo-Ramirez’s case from possible to probable. We

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note that the district court considered his arguments for a variance and declined

to depart downward.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, the district court plainly erred by assessing Campo-Ramirez two

criminal history points under § 4A1.1(d) after finding, as a matter of fact, that

Campo-Ramirez’s probation terminated five years before the offense at issue.

However, Campo-Ramirez has failed to show that this error affected his

substantial rights. The district court’s sentence fell within both the correct and

incorrect guideline ranges. That the district court sentenced Campo-Ramirez at

the bottom of the incorrect range is not enough, on its own, to demonstrate a

reasonable probability of a lesser sentence if we were to remand for

consideration of the correct range. Accordingly, Campo-Ramirez’s sentence is

AFFIRMED.

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