Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10365/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10365-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Eugene Lundin
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ERIC EUGENE LUNDIN, AKA

Whitey,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 14-10365

D.C. No.

4:13-cr-00402-

JST-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Jon S. Tigar, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

September 18, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed March 22, 2016

Before: William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

In an interlocutory appeal by the government, the panel

affirmed the district court’s order suppressing handguns

seized from the defendant’s home, and remanded for further

proceedings.

The panel held that the warrantless search of the

defendant’s home was not justified by exigent circumstances. 

The panel explained that the “knock and talk” exception to

the warrant requirement does not apply when officers

encroach upon the curtilage of a home with the intent to arrest

the occupant. The panel saw no reason to disturb the district

court’s finding that the officers’ purpose in knocking on the

defendant’s door at 4:00 a.m., in response to a deputy’s

request that the defendant be arrested, was to find and arrest

him. The panel held that the officers therefore violated the

defendant’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from

unlawful searches when they stood on his porch and knocked

on his front door. Since this unconstitutional conduct caused

the allegedly exigent circumstance— crashing noises in the

backyard—the panel concluded that that circumstance cannot

justify the search resulting in the seizure of the handguns.

The panel held that the warrantless search was not

justified as a protective sweep, because the officers lacked a

reasonable ground for believing that there was a danger that

would have justified the sweep of the defendant’s home.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 3

The panel held that the inevitable discovery exception to

the exclusionary rule does not apply, because the officers

knew they had probable cause to arrest the defendant but

failed to obtain anywarrant before coming onto his porch and

knocking on his door with the intention of arresting him.

COUNSEL

Barbara J. Valliere (argued), Chief, Appellate Division, and

Melinda Haag, United States Attorney, San Francisco,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Geoffrey A. Hansen (argued), Chief Assistant Federal Public

Defender, Steven G. Kalar, Federal Public Defender, and

Steven J. Koeninger, Research and Writing Attorney, San

Francisco, California, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Around 4:00 a.m. on April 23, 2013, three northern

California law enforcement officers approached Defendant

Eric Lundin’s home without either an arrest warrant or a

search warrant. They came onto his front porch and knocked

on his door with the intent of arresting him. From the front

porch where they were standing, the officers heard crashing

noises coming from the back of the house. They ran to the

back, ordered Lundin to come out of the fenced-in backyard,

and arrested him. After putting Lundin in a patrol car, several

officers briefly searched Lundin’s home, including the back

patio where they found two handguns in open view. The

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4 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

district court suppressed the handguns as the result of an

illegal search. The United States appeals. We hold that the

officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they knocked

on the door at 4:00 a.m. without a warrant with the intent of

arresting Lundin, and that the immediately ensuing search

was illegal. We therefore affirm.

I. Background

At 12:24 a.m. on April 23, 2013, Deputy Sheriff Scott

Aponte of the Humboldt County Sheriff’s Office (“HCSO”)

was dispatched to the Mad River Community Hospital to

interview Susan Hinds, a 63-year-old patient who claimed she

had been kidnapped several hours earlier. In a tape-recorded

statement, Hinds told Deputy Aponte that sometime after

8:00 p.m. on April 22, shortly after her son, Joseph Miller,

had left to go to the store, Eric “Whitey” Lundin knocked on

the door of her mobile home. When Hinds opened the door,

Lundin grabbed her by the neck, forced his way inside, and

accused Miller of stealing marijuana from him.

Hinds told Deputy Aponte that, once inside the mobile

home, Lundin took two firearms from his pockets — a

compact silver handgun and a large black handgun. He then

took out a bottle of pills and forced Hinds to ingest one of the

pills. He described the pills to Hinds as “methadone” and

told her that they were the easiest way to overdose. After

forcing Hinds to ingest the pill, Lundin broke her television

by striking it with one of the handguns. Lundin then pressed

the black handgun against Hinds’s temple and forced her to

call Miller to tell him to come home. When the call ended,

Lundin snatched Hinds’s cell phone and threw it across the

room.

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 5

Hinds told Deputy Aponte that Lundin repeatedly said

that she was going to die and that, as a member of the

Mongols motorcycle gang, he does not “leave witnesses.” 

Lundin received two calls on his cell phone while still at the

mobile home. Hinds heard him say during one of the calls,

“I’m taking care of it. I’ve got her right here on the couch.”

Hinds said that Lundin then forced her into his Dodge

truck. They passed Miller as they drove out of the mobile

home park. Lundin told Hinds, “Wave good-bye to your son. 

You’ll never see him again.” During the drive, Lundin forced

Hinds to ingest two more pills and pointed out locations

where he could safely dispose of her body. Lundin then

spoke with Miller on his cell phone and accused Miller of

stealing his marijuana. After ending the call with Miller,

Lundin told Hinds that he no longer believed Miller had

stolen his marijuana. Lundin drove Hinds back to her mobile

home, told her that he only meant to scare her, and warned

her not to call the police. He told her that he would buy her

a new television. Hinds had been in the truck a total of about

fifteen minutes.

After concluding the interview with Hinds at the hospital,

Deputy Aponte interviewed Miller, who had come to the

hospital to see his mother. Miller told Aponte that Hinds had

called him while he was at the grocery store and had told him

to come home immediately. When he returned, the mobile

home was in disarray, and the television was broken. Miller

then called Lundin on his cell phone. Miller recounted to

Aponte that Lundin had accused him of stealing marijuana

and had told him that Lundin was going to send his “Mongol

brothers” to get Miller. After concluding the interview with

Miller, Aponte visited Hinds’s mobile home to photograph

the damage.

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6 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

DeputyAponte asked dispatch to issue a “Be On the Look

Out” (“BOLO”) for Lundin and a request for Lundin’s arrest

under California Penal Code § 836. Section 836 authorizes

a warrantless arrest when there is probable cause to believe a

suspect has committed a felony. However, § 836 does not —

because it may not — authorize a warrantless arrest of a

suspect in his own home. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,

589–90 (1980). Aponte believed there was probable cause to

arrest Lundin for burglary, false imprisonment, kidnapping,

vandalism, brandishing a firearm, administering a drug to

commit a felony, administering a controlled substance, and

battery. HCSO dispatch issued the BOLO and arrest request

just before 2:00 a.m.

Upon receiving the BOLO and arrest request, Arcata

Police Department (“APD”) Officer Matthew O’Donovan

used vehicle registration files to determine Lundin’s address. 

O’Donovan then drove to Lundin’s home. When he arrived,

he saw a vehicle matching the description of Lundin’s Dodge

truck parked in the driveway and saw that lights were on

inside the house. O’Donovan called for backup. APD

Officer Jeremiah Kasinger, APD Sergeant Keith Altizer, and

HCSO Deputy Matthew Tomlin responded to the call,

arriving just before 4:00 a.m.

Officer O’Donovan wrote in a declaration that he, Officer

Kasinger, and Deputy Tomlin approached Lundin’s front

door. O’Donovan wrote that without identifying themselves

they stood on the porch, knocked loudly, waited thirty

seconds for an answer, and then knocked more loudly. After

the second knock, the officers heard several loud crashing

noises coming from the back of the house. The officers ran

to the back of the house and heard someone moving around

in the backyard. The officers identified themselves and

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 7

ordered Lundin “to put his hands in the air and come out

slowly.” When Lundin did so, Tomlin handcuffed him and

placed him in a patrol car.

OfficersO’Donovan andKasinger then searched Lundin’s

backyard and patio, which were enclosed by a high fence.

They also searched inside the house. At the end of the search,

O’Donovan saw on the patio, in open view and within arm’s

reach of a common walkway, a clear plastic freezer bag

containing a silver revolver and a black semiautomatic

handgun. The bag was lying admidst a number of five-gallon

buckets that had been knocked over. The crashing noises

heard by the officers had likely been the buckets falling over. 

O’Donovan notified Deputy Tomlin that he had found a bag

containing handguns, which Tomlin then photographed and

seized. When Deputy Aponte arrived, he confirmed that the

handguns matched Hinds’s description of the guns used

during the earlier incident. Aponte then advised Lundin of

his Miranda rights.

On the morning of April 24, HCSO Deputy Todd Fulton

prepared an affidavit, statement of probable cause, and an

application for a warrant to search Lundin’s home. The

statement of probable case described Hinds’s report to

Deputy Aponte and stated, inter alia, that two firearms had

been located during the arrest at Lundin’s residence. A

California magistrate judge approved the warrant. At about

10:30 a.m. that morning, state and federal law enforcement

officers executed the warrant and seized numerous items from

inside the house, including guns, cell phones, a prescription

pill bottle for methadone, computers and hard drives, and

various Mongols paraphernalia.

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8 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

On June 20, Lundin was charged with being a felon in

possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lundin moved to suppress the

evidence obtained from the patio and inside the house, as well

as statements he had made before he was read his Miranda

rights. Lundin contended that the two handguns seized from

the patio on April 23 should be suppressed as the fruits of an

unreasonable warrantless search, that the evidence seized

from his house on April 24 should be suppressed as the fruits

of an invalid search warrant, and that the pre-warning

information elicited by officers should be suppressed under

Miranda. On June 26, the district court suppressed the two

handguns seized on the patio. It otherwise denied Lundin’s

motion.

On July 24, a grand jury returned a superseding

indictment charging Lundin with kidnapping in aid of

racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1)), assault in aid of

racketeering (18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3)), kidnapping (18 U.S.C.

§ 1201(a)(1)), possession with intent to distribute and

manufacture marijuana (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)),

use or possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of

violence or a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)),

and being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C.

§ 922(g)(1)). On July 25, after Lundin was arraigned on new

charges, the government timely took an interlocutory appeal

under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.

II. Standard of Review

“Whether the exclusionary rule applies to a given case is

reviewed de novo, while the underlying factual findings are

reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Perea-Rey,

680 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “We

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 9

review the district court’s application of the inevitable

discovery doctrine for clear error because, although it is a

mixed question of law and fact, it is essentially a factual

inquiry.” United States v. Reilly, 224 F.3d 986, 994 (9th Cir.

2000); see United States v. Ruckes, 586 F.3d 713, 716 (9th

Cir. 2009); United States v. Lang, 149 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th

Cir. 1998).

III. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const.

amend. IV. “At [its] very core stands the right of a [person]

to retreat into his own home and there be free from

unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v. United

States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). “[S]earches and seizures

inside a home without a warrant are,” therefore,

“presumptively unreasonable.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 586. 

Evidence derived from an illegal search cannot “constitute

proof against the victim of the search.” Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).

It is undisputed that the officers seized the two handguns

during a warrantless search of Lundin’s home. The handguns

are therefore the product of a presumptively unreasonable

search. To avoid suppression of the handguns, the

government must demonstrate that either an exception to the

warrant requirement or an exception to the exclusionary rule

applies. The government argues that the warrantless search

of Lundin’s home was justified either due to exigent

circumstances or as a protective sweep. In the alternative, the

government contends the handguns are admissible under the

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10 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. We

agree with the district court that these arguments fail.

A. Exigent Circumstances

Law enforcement officers may conduct a warrantless

search of a home when “the exigencies of the situation make

the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a]

warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011)

(alteration in original) (citation omitted). However, exigent

circumstances cannot justify a warrantless search when the

police “create the exigency by engaging . . . in conduct that

violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 462.

The officers in this case had no reason other than the

crashing noises coming from the backyard to believe that

there were exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless

search of Lundin’s home. However, the evidence shows that

the officers’ knock at Lundin’s front door caused him to make

the crashing noises. Thus, to show that exigent circumstances

justified the warrantless search, the government must show

that the officers lawfully stood on Lundin’s front porch and

knocked on his door.

The area “immediately surrounding and associated with

the home” — the “curtilage” — is treated as “part of [the]

home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Oliver v.

United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). Like searches and

seizures inside the home itself, “searches and seizures in the

curtilage without a warrant are also presumptively

unreasonable.” Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1184. The

presumption against warrantless searches and seizures “would

be of little practical value if the State’s agents could stand in

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 11

a home’s porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with

impunity.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. —, —, 133 S. Ct.

1409, 1414 (2013).

A government agent conducts a “search” within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the agent infringes

“an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to consider

reasonable,” United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113

(1984), or “physically occupie[s] private property for the

purpose of obtaining information.” United States v. Jones,

565 U.S. —, —, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). It is undisputed

that the officers physically occupied the curtilage of Lundin’s

home when they stood on the front porch and knocked on his

door. Indeed, the front porch of a home is the “classic

exemplar” of curtilage. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. The

district court concluded that the officers’ clear purpose was

to determine whether Lundin was home and, if so, to arrest

him. Thus, the officers’ presence on Lundin’s front porch

and their knock at his door constituted a presumptively

unreasonable search.

The government contends that the officers were permitted

to knock on Lundin’s door under the so-called “knock and

talk” exception to the warrant requirement, which permits law

enforcement officers to “‘encroach upon the curtilage of a

home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants.’” 

Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d at 1187 (quoting United States v.

Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2001)). The “knock

and talk” exception resembles to some degree the exception

for consensual searches. The relevant “consent” in a “knock

and talk” case is implied from the custom of treating the

“knocker on the front door” as an invitation (i.e., license) to

approach the home and knock. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415

(citation omitted). The scope of the exception is coterminous

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12 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

with this implicit license. Stated otherwise, to qualify for the

exception, the government must demonstrate that the officers

conformed to “‘the habits of the country,’” id. (quoting

McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.)), by

doing “‘no more than any private citizen might do,’” id. at

1416 (quoting King, 563 U.S. at 469). In the typical case, if

the police do not have a warrant they may “approach the

home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be

received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.” 

Id. at 1415. For two reasons, we agree with the district court

that the officers exceeded the scope of the customary license

to approach a home and knock.

First, unexpected visitors are customarily expected to

knock on the front door of a home only during normal waking

hours. This does not mean that the “knock and talk”

exception never applies when officers knock on the door of

a home in the earlymorning. In some circumstances, an early

morning visit may be “consistent with an attempt to initiate

consensual contact with the occupants of the home.” PereaRey, 680 F.3d at 1188. For example, officers may have

reason to believe that the resident in question generally

expects strangers on his porch early in the morning —

perhaps he sells fresh croissants out of his home. Or the

officers may have a reason for knocking that a resident would

ordinarily regard as important enough to warrant an early

morning disturbance — perhaps a fox has gotten into the

resident’s henhouse. Here, however, the officers knocked on

Lundin’s door around 4:00 a.m. without evidence that Lundin

generally accepted visitors at that hour, and without a reason

for knocking that a resident would ordinarily accept as

sufficiently weighty to justify the disturbance. Indeed, the

officers here acted for a purpose that virtually no resident

would willingly accept.

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 13

Second, the scope of a license is often limited to a specific

purpose, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416, and the customary

license to approach a home and knock is generally limited to

the “purpose of asking questions of the occupants,” PereaRey, 680 F.3d at 1187 (citation omitted). Officers who knock

on the door of a home for other purposes generally exceed the

scope of the customary license and therefore do not qualify

for the “knock and talk” exception.

“Reasonableness” under the Fourth Amendment “is

predominantly an objective inquiry.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,

563 U.S. 731, —, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (citation

omitted). A court’s task is usually to determine only

“whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the

challenged] action.” Id. (alteration in original) (citation

omitted). However, the Supreme Court has recognized

several “limited exception[s]” to this general rule, where

“actual motivations” matter. Id. (alteration in original)

(citation omitted). For example, police do not need a judicial

warrant or probable cause to conduct a search or seizure that

is justified by “special needs,” see, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist.

47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (deterring drug use in

public schools), or to conduct an administrative inspection,

see, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984)

(authorizing fire inspection).

Before Jardines, it was not clear whether the proper

application of the “knock and talk” exception is an entirely

objective inquiry, or whether, as in special-needs-search and

administrative-inspection cases, the actual motivation of the

officers matters. The Court answered the question in

Jardines, explaining that the scope of the license to approach

a home and knock “is limited not only to a particular area but

also to a specific purpose.” 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (emphasis

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14 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

added). That is, the application of the “knock and talk”

exception ultimately “depends upon whether the officers

ha[ve] an implied license to enter the [curtilage], which in

turn depends upon the purpose for which they enter[].” Id. at

1417 (emphasis added). After Jardines, it is clear that, like

the special-needs and administrative-inspection exceptions,

the “knock and talk” exception depends at least in part on an

officer’s subjective intent.

The “knock and talk” exception to the warrant

requirement does not apply when officers encroach upon the

curtilage of a home with the intent to arrest the occupant. 

Just as “the background social norms that invite a visitor to

the front door do not invite him there to conduct a search,” id.

at 1416, those norms also do not invite a visitor there to arrest

the occupant. We do not hold that an officer may never

conduct a “knock and talk” when he or she has probable

cause to arrest a resident but does not have an arrest warrant. 

An officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by

approaching a home at a reasonable hour and knocking on the

front door with the intent merelyto ask the resident questions,

even if the officer has probable cause to arrest the resident.

In this case, however, Deputy Aponte had asked dispatch

to broadcast a request that Lundin be arrested. The officers

who arrived at Lundin’s home were responding to that

request. Rather than obtain a warrant or wait for a time of

day when strangers might ordinarily visit, the officers

approached Lundin’s door at about 4:00 a.m. without a

warrant, immediately after they arrived at his home. Based

on this evidence, the district court found, as a matter of fact,

that the officers’ purpose in knocking on Lundin’s door was

to find and arrest him, and we see no reason to disturb that

finding. Thus, the officers violated Lundin’s Fourth

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 15

Amendment right to be free from unlawful searches when

they stood on his porch and knocked on his front door. And

since this unconstitutional conduct caused the allegedly

exigent circumstance — the crashing noises in the backyard

— that circumstance cannot justify the search resulting in the

seizure of the two handguns.

We note that our decision in United States v. Vaneaton,

49 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995), may be on infirm ground after

Jardines. In Vaneaton, officers had probable cause to arrest

the defendant for receiving stolen property and for violating

his parole, and they had reason to believe that he was staying

at the Rainbow Motel. Id. at 1425. The officers approached

the defendant’s motel room, knocked on the door, and

arrested him when he opened the door. Id. Our opinion did

not expressly note the officers’ purpose in knocking on the

defendant’s door, but it is fairly clear from our description of

the facts that they intended to arrest him. Although the

defendant was standing inside the doorway of his room, we

held that the officers lawfully arrested him because he

“‘voluntarily exposed himself to warrantless arrest’ by freely

opening the door of his motel room to the police.” Id. at 1426

(quoting United States v. Johnson, 626 F.2d 753, 757 (9th

Cir. 1980)).

Unlike the officers in Jardines and in this case, the

officers in Vaneaton were standing in the common space of

a motel when they knocked, rather than in the curtilage of a

home. We therefore have no need to overrule Vaneaton. See

Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en

banc) (holding that “a three-judge panel is free to reexamine

the holding of a prior panel” when the Supreme Court has

“undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit

precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly

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16 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

irreconcilable”). Whether Vaneaton remains good law after

Jardines is therefore a question for another case and another

day.

B. Protective Sweep

The protective sweep doctrine authorizes “quick and

limited” warrantless inspections “of those spaces where a

person may be found” when “there are articulable facts

which, taken together with the rational inferences from those

facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing

that the area to be swept harbor[ed] an individual posing a

danger to those on the arrest scene.” United States v. Lemus,

582 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted)

(alteration in original). In this case, the officers had no

“reasonable, articulable suspicion” that anyone other than

Lundin was present at his residence. Maryland v. Buie,

494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990). Thus, the only plausible threat to

the safety of those on the scene was Lundin himself. By the

time the officers conducted the sweep of Lundin’s home,

however, he had already been handcuffed and placed in a

police vehicle. Thus, the officers lacked a reasonable ground

for believing that there was a danger that would have justified

the sweep of Lundin’s home.

C. Inevitable Discovery

The inevitable discovery exception does not apply when

officers have probable cause to apply for a warrant but simply

fail to do so. See United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320

(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Echegoyen, 799 F.2d 1271,

1280 n.7 (9th Cir. 1986). The government erroneously

suggests our decision in United States v. Merriweather,

777 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1985), holds to the contrary.

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 17

In Merriweather, federal agents performed a lawful

protective sweep of a motel room incident to an arrest. 

During the sweep, an agent unlawfully searched the inside of

a toilet tank and found money hidden there. Id. at 505. The

police then obtained a search warrant for the motel room

without relying on the discovery of the money, and officers

who were unaware of the money executed the search warrant

and found it. Id. We held that the money was admissible. In

our opinion, we inaccurately characterized our decision as an

application of the “inevitable discovery doctrine.” Id. at 506. 

Our decision in Merriweather is, instead, properly

characterized as an application of the independent source

doctrine. Unlike the inevitable discovery doctrine, which

asks whether evidence “would have” been discovered by

lawful means rather than by means of the illegal search, Nix

v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447 (1984) (emphasis added), the

independent source doctrine asks whether the evidence

actually was “obtained independently from activities

untainted by the initial illegality.” Murray v. United States,

487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).

The two doctrines are, of course, related. See id. at 539

(“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct

requirements, is in reality an extrapolation from the

independent source doctrine.”). But the distinction between

the two doctrines is important because they create different

incentives. We do not apply the inevitable discovery doctrine

to warrantless searches where probable cause existed and a

warrant could therefore have been obtained because “[i]f

evidence were admitted notwithstanding the officers’

unexcused failure to obtain a warrant, simply because

probable cause existed, then there would never be any reason

for officers to seek a warrant.” Mejia, 69 F.3d at 320. Thus,

“to excuse the failure to obtain a warrant merely because the

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18 UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN

officers had probable cause and could have inevitably

obtained a warrant would completely obviate the warrant

requirement of the fourth amendment.” United States v.

Young, 573 F.3d 711, 723 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). 

Put differently, allowing the government to claim

admissibility under the inevitable discovery doctrine when

officers have probable cause to obtain a warrant but fail to do

so would encourage officers never to bother to obtain a

warrant.

The independent source rule, by contrast, does not create

this incentive. As the Supreme Court has explained, a

rational officer who already has probable cause to obtain a

search warrant will ordinarily not enter the premises without

a warrant because “his action would add to the normal burden

of convincing a magistrate that there is probable cause the

much more onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no

information gained from the illegal entry affected either the

law enforcement officers’ decision to seek a warrant or the

magistrate’s decision to grant it.” Murray, 487 U.S. at 540.

The officers here knew they had probable cause to arrest

Lundin. Deputy Aponte received corroborated information

from two witnesses that hours earlier Lundin had committed

numerous violent felonies. Aponte therefore requested

Lundin’s arrest under California Penal Code § 836. 

However, the officers who arrived at Lundin’s home had no

right, absent an arrest warrant, to arrest Lundin in his home,

or, absent a search warrant, to search his home. Payton,

445 U.S. at 589–90. The officers nonetheless failed to obtain

anywarrant before coming onto Lundin’s porch and knocking

on his door with the intention of arresting him. Thus, the

district court correctly held that the inevitable discovery

exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Indeed, it

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UNITED STATES V. LUNDIN 19

would have erred had it held to the contrary. See Reilly,

224 F.3d at 995 (“[T]he district court committed clear error

in applying the inevitable discovery doctrine based on the

agents’ actual but unexercised opportunity to secure a search

warrant.”).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

grant of Lundin’s motion to suppress the two handguns seized

from Lundin’s home on April 23. We remand for further

proceedings.

AFFIRMED.

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