Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02152/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02152-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Berton Mays
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2152

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BERTON MAYS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13-cr-00230-JMS-TAB-1 — Jane E. Magnus-Stinson, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 14, 2016 — DECIDED APRIL 11, 2016

____________________

Before FLAUM and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges, and PETERSON,

District Judge.∗

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. Berton Mays left the scene of a fight 

and was followed by an investigating officer who wanted to 

 ∗ The Honorable James D. Peterson of the United States District Court for 

the Western District of Wisconsin, sitting by designation.

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interview him about the altercation. Mr. Mays repeatedly declined to stop and talk to the officer, expressing his declination in colorful and abusive language. After observing 

Mr. Mays’s demeanor and suspecting that he might be armed, 

the officer told him to stop and touched his shoulder in order 

to keep a distance between the two. Mr. Mays’s manner of 

turning made the officer concerned for his safety, and he employed his already drawn Taser. A semi-automatic firearm 

fell to the ground. 

Mr. Mays ultimately was prosecuted in federal court for 

possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty to the offense, but reserved the 

right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the firearm, which he contended was the product of an 

illegal seizure. He also reserved the right to appeal the district 

court’s denial of his motion to suppress a statement he had 

made to federal agents while he was in pretrial confinement.

Mr. Mays now appeals, raising these preserved challenges. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court. As the district 

court determined, the officer’s stop was supported by reasonable suspicion as required by the Fourth Amendment. With 

respect to the statement, there was no independent violation 

of Mr. Mays’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

I

BACKGROUND

A.

On August 8, 2013, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Matthew Coffing was on patrol in his police 

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car on the southeast side of Indianapolis.1 His area of patrol 

was designated a “problem area or a hot spot” because of the 

high number of “dispatched runs [to the area] that may involve violent crimes, robberies, narcotic investigations.”2 At 

approximately 6:00 p.m., Officer Coffing observed a fight in 

progress involving three individuals: a female on the ground, 

a male on top of her, and a second male attempting to pull the 

first man off her. A fourth individual, Mr. Mays, was also present. At the time of Officer Coffing’s approach, Mr. Mays, 

while present, did not appear to be an active participant in the 

fight. Officer Coffing requested backup and exited his car. As 

he approached the four individuals, Mr. Mays began to walk 

away. Officer Coffing asked Mr. Mays to stop, but he continued to walk. Officer Lepsky then arrived at the scene as 

backup; Officer Coffing described Mr. Mays to Officer Lepsky 

and asked him to make contact with Mr. Mays and to inquire 

about his involvement, if any, with the fight.

Officer Lepsky initially followed Mr. Mays in his marked 

police car, but soon parked, exited the car, and followed

Mr. Mays on foot. As he drew near, Officer Lepsky asked 

Mr. Mays to stop and to identify himself, but Mr. Mays continued to walk at a quick pace and said over his shoulder, “F-

-k you. I don’t have to stop. What the f--k do you want?”3

Officer Lepsky continued to follow Mr. Mays, asking him several times to stop and to talk with him about the fight, but 

 

1 The facts we recite are taken from testimony given during the suppression hearing, credited by the district court, as well as the court’s findings 

of fact in its order denying the motion to suppress.

2 R.62 at 11.

3 Id. at 15–16.

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Mr. Mays refused to stop, responding again, “F--k you. You 

don’t have any reason to stop me.”4

As he got closer to Mr. Mays, Officer Lepsky, relying on 

his training, noticed that Mr. Mays’s body language was 

“[v]ery tight, aggressive looking,” and that his hands were in 

the pockets of his shorts.5 Officer Lepsky again asked 

Mr. Mays to stop and to remove his hands from his pockets.

Mr. Mays continued to walk away from the officer, removed 

only his left hand from his pocket, and again cursed, “[F]--k 

you.”6 Officer Lepsky observed that Mr. Mays continued to 

keep his right hand in his pocket and angled his body away 

from Officer Lepsky in a manner that the officer interpreted 

as an attempt to shield the right side of his body from view. 

To the officer, this demeanor suggested that Mr. Mays “may 

be concealing something, a possible weapon.”7 Officer 

Lepsky told Mr. Mays to remove his right hand from his 

pocket, and Mr. Mays again stated, “F--k you. I don’t have to 

stop.”8

Now within an arm’s length of Mr. Mays, Officer Lepsky 

ordered Mr. Mays to stop. At this point, Mr. Mays stopped 

walking forward but “continued to move in a circular motion 

as his right side was going away from” the officer.9 With his 

 4 Id. at 17.

5 Id. at 16.

6 Id. at 18.

7 Id. at 19.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 20.

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right hand, Officer Lepsky reached down and readied his 

Taser. He then reached across his body and placed his left 

hand on Mr. Mays’s right shoulder in order to prevent him 

from turning around and to keep distance between the two 

men. At the same time, Officer Lepsky again directed

Mr. Mays to take his hand out of his right pocket. Mr. Mays, 

however, turned his right shoulder away from Officer Lepsky 

and said, “Get the f--k off me.”10 As Mr. Mays continued to 

turn his body around toward Officer Lepsky, and as Officer Lepsky stepped back to create distance, the officer observed a metallic object in Mr. Mays’s right hand, which he 

recognized as a handgun. Officer Lepsky then utilized his 

Taser, striking Mr. Mays in the chest. He then stepped back 

and pulled out his service-issued firearm. The handgun observed in Mr. Mays’s hand landed on the ground nearby and 

was recovered by officers.

B.

Mr. Mays was placed under arrest for resisting law enforcement and for possessing a firearm as a felon. He was read 

his Miranda rights and questioned about the gun and the fight, 

but he claimed to have no knowledge of either. On August 9, 

2013, Mr. Mays was charged in state court with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious felon and resisting law enforcement. Several days later, two federal agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives visited 

Mr. Mays in jail. He signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and 

made an inculpatory statement. On August 21, 2013, 

 10 Id. at 23.

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Mr. Mays was charged with possessing a firearm as a felon in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Later, a federal grand jury 

indicted him on that charge; the state court charges against 

him were dropped.

Mr. Mays filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the 

firearm recovered on the ground that it was the product of an 

illegal seizure. He also moved to suppress the inculpatory 

statement made to federal agents as fruit of the unconstitutional seizure or, alternatively, on the independent ground 

that it was made in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel. The district court denied Mr. Mays’s motion to suppress. The court explained that because “Mr. Mays never submitted to any show of authority,” he was not seized for purposes of the Fourth Amendment until “Officer Lepsky used 

physical force to stop Mr. Mays from moving by placing his 

hand on Mr. Mays’[s] shoulder.”11 The court then concluded 

that “based on an objective analysis of the totality of the circumstances, at the time Officer Lepsky seized Mr. Mays, reasonable suspicion existed to conclude that Mr. Mays might 

have had a weapon and been about to use physical force 

against Officer Lepsky.”12 Because there was no Fourth 

Amendment violation, the court determined that the inculpatory statement could not be suppressed as the fruit of that seizure. The court also concluded that the Sixth Amendment was 

not violated because Mr. Mays knowingly and voluntarily 

had waived his right to counsel.

 

11 R.61 at 9–10.

12 Id. at 13.

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Mr. Mays pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and was sentenced to ninety-six 

months’ imprisonment to be followed by a two-year term of 

supervised release. Mr. Mays reserved the right to appeal the 

district court’s denial of his suppression motion and, in due 

course, timely filed an appeal in this court. 

II

DISCUSSION

We review the district court’s denial of Mr. Mays’s motion 

to suppress under a two-pronged standard of review; we review de novo the court’s ultimate conclusion that Officer Lepsky had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Mays; we 

review the court’s findings of historical fact under the clear 

error standard. United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 797 (7th 

Cir. 2011); United States v. Ford, 333 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 

2003).

A.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has made clear that an investigatory stop, which 

constitutes only a limited intrusion into an individual’s privacy, is reasonable, and therefore permissible, “if the officer 

making the stop is ‘able to point to specific and articulable 

facts’ that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” United States v. Tilmon, 19 F.3d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1994) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)). “[R]easonable 

suspicion requires more than a hunch but less than probable 

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cause and considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Gentry v. Sevier, 597 F.3d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When determining 

whether an officer had reasonable suspicion, courts examine 

the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the 

time of the stop, including the experience of the officer and 

the behavior and characteristics of the suspect.” United States 

v. Lawshea, 461 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 2006). This assessment 

requires that the court engage in an objective analysis that is 

“based on common-sensical judgments and inferences about 

human behavior.” United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791 

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 

(2000)).

The Fourth Amendment only protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. Therefore, “[o]ur first task is to ascertain the point at which Fourth Amendment concerns became implicated.” Ford, 333 F.3d at 844. A Fourth Amendment 

seizure is “not a continuous fact”; it is a single act that occurs 

at a discrete point in time. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 

625 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A seizure may 

be effected in either of two ways: “through physical 

force...[or] through a show of authority and submission to the 

assertion of authority.” Griffin, 652 F.3d at 798 (emphasis 

omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). As we have explained:

[T]he Supreme Court applie[s] a two-part test to 

decide whether a person had been seized such 

that Fourth Amendment protections are triggered (whether that seizure be an arrest, a Terry 

stop, or otherwise): first, determine whether 

any physical force simultaneously accompanied 

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the officer’s show of authority, and second, determine whether the defendant failed to comply 

with that show of authority. If no physical force 

accompanied the show of authority and a person chose to ignore or reject that show of authority, the defendant is not seized until the officer applied physical force and the person submitted to the officer’s show of authority....

...[U]nder this test, a fleeing suspect—even one 

who is confronted with an obvious show of authority—is not seized until his freedom of 

movement is terminated by intentional application of physical force or by the suspect’s submission to the asserted authority.

United States v. $32,400.00, in U.S. Currency, 82 F.3d 135, 138–

39 (7th Cir. 1996) (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The parties agree that, during the early stages of the encounter, Mr. Mays did not submit to Officer Lepsky’s repeated requests that he speak with him. Their disagreement 

centers on the proper characterization of the final seconds of 

the officer’s interaction with Mr. Mays. The Government contends, and the district court agreed, that the seizure occurred 

when Officer Lepsky placed his hand on Mr. Mays’s shoulder 

as he began to turn. Mr. Mays asserts that, when he ceased to 

walk forward, he was submitting to Officer Lepsky’s authority and that, consequently, any Fourth Amendment assessment must be made at that precise moment. Mr. Mays argues 

that the district court’s conclusion to the contrary is unsupported, given the variations in Officer Lepsky’s sworn accounts as to whether the officer ever physically touched 

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Mr. Mays. In neither his initial incident report13 nor his taped 

statement made in connection with the state charges14 did Officer Lepsky mention any touching. However, the officer later 

swore in a supplemental affidavit that he placed his left hand 

on Mr. Mays’s right shoulder immediately prior to Mr. Mays 

turning around.15 Finally, Officer Lepsky’s testimony at the 

suppression hearing, which included a physical reenactment 

of the encounter, was that Mr. Mays stopped and began to 

turn in a circular motion, which prompted Officer Lepsky to 

place his left hand on Mr. Mays’s right shoulder to maintain 

distance. The district court credited Officer Lepsky’s hearing 

testimony, a factual determination that Mr. Mays contends 

was clearly erroneous.

We generally defer to the district court’s credibility determinations at suppression hearings “because we recognize 

that, unlike our review of transcripts, the district court had 

the opportunity to listen to testimony and observe the demeanor of witnesses.” United States v. Garrett, 757 F.3d 560, 

568 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will 

therefore only reverse if we are “left with the definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made,” such as when “a 

district court credited exceedingly improbable testimony.” 

United States v. Bass, 325 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2003) (internal 

quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Biggs, 491 

F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that “determinations of 

witness credibility can virtually never be clear error” (internal 

 

13 R.40-1 at 1.

14 R.50-1 at 4.

15 R.48-1 at 3.

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quotation marks omitted)). With this deference in mind, we 

cannot say that Officer Lepsky’s hearing testimony was so improbable that the district court clearly erred in crediting it.

At the suppression hearing, Mr. Mays’s defense counsel 

took the opportunity to confront Officer Lepsky with the discrepancies in his accounts of the incident. When specifically 

asked why his description of the incident in the taped statement did not include the physical touching, Officer Lepsky 

responded that the attorney conducting the interview “did 

not ask me if I put my hands on Mr. Mays.”16 Defense counsel 

pressed Officer Lepsky on the issue several more times, but 

after receiving the same answer abandoned the line of questioning. Ultimately, the district court found the discrepancies 

in Officer Lepsky’s accounts “understandable given the quick 

succession of events.”17 The district court, having listened to 

this testimony and observed both the demeanor of the officer 

and the reenactment of the encounter, was on solid ground in 

accepting the testimony at the suppression hearing as true. 

The district court was also correct in determining that the officer’s show of force by placing his hand on Mr. Mays’s shoulder while asserting his authority constituted the seizure of 

Mr. Mays for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.

B.

Having ascertained the point at which the Fourth Amendment was implicated, “we must now evaluate, under an objective standard, the totality for the circumstances known to 

 

16 R.62 at 33.

17 R.61 at 3 n.4.

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Officer [Lepsky] at that time and determine if a reasonable officer in those circumstances would have been suspicious.” 

Ford, 333 F.3d at 844 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 

district court concluded that when Officer Lepsky physically 

seized Mr. Mays, “reasonable suspicion existed to conclude 

that Mr. Mays might have had a weapon and been about to 

use physical force against Officer Lepsky.”18 We agree with 

the court’s conclusion.

First, although the Government concedes that Officer Lepsky did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that 

Mr. Mays actually was involved in the fight, he knew that 

Mr. Mays had left the scene upon the arrival of Officer Coffing, a factor that we have held can be “suggestive of wrongdoing and can be...considered in a court’s determination of 

...reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Carlisle, 614 F.3d 750, 

756 (7th Cir. 2010); see Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (holding that 

“unprovoked flight upon noticing the police” is pertinent to 

the reasonable suspicion analysis); Lawshea, 461 F.3d at 860 

(refusing to draw a constitutional distinction between running from the police and walking away evasively); United 

States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, we must also take into 

account that Valentine and the two men with him immediately began walking away from the patrol car when it arrived. 

Walking away from the police hardly amounts to the headlong flight considered in Wardlow and of course would not 

give rise to reasonable suspicion by itself, even in a high-crime 

area, but it is a factor that can be considered in the totality of 

the circumstances.”). Officer Lepsky also knew that the fight 

 18 Id. at 13.

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had taken place in a high-crime area. Although this fact alone 

“cannot, in and of itself, support a particularized suspicion...an officer is permitted to consider a location’s characteristics when assessing a situation.” United States v. Oglesby, 

597 F.3d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 2010).

Further, as Officer Lepsky testified at the suppression 

hearing, Mr. Mays’s repeated refusal to stop, his agitated, profane responses, and his aggressive demeanor all provided additional cause for concern. See United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 

725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) (“A suspect’s failure to halt upon police command to do so...support[s] a finding of reasonable 

suspicion.”). Indeed, these factors, filtered through the officer’s training and experience, caused Officer Lepsky to ask 

Mr. Mays to remove his hands from his pockets. See Oglesby, 

597 F.3d at 894 (“Police officers are permitted to rely on their 

experience and training in forming a reasonable suspicion.”).

And Mr. Mays’s response—to remove only his left hand but 

not his right, and to angle the right side of his body away as 

he continued walking—“made it reasonable for [Officer Lepsky] to infer that [Mr. Mays’s] stance was potentially 

calculated to keep a weapon hidden or out of reach.” Id. at 

894–95.

Finally, when Officer Lepsky and Mr. Mays were only an 

arm’s length apart, Mr. Mays, after repeatedly rebuffing the 

officer’s requests to stop walking, abruptly stopped moving 

forward but “continued to move in a circular motion” as he 

turned his body around toward the officer.19 It was at that 

 19 R.62 at 20.

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point that Officer Lepsky seized Mr. Mays by reaching out 

and grabbing his shoulder.

Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Lepsky at that moment, it was reasonable for the officer 

to infer that Mr. Mays had a weapon in his right hand and 

was rounding to use physical force. It was reasonable to suspect that the man who was turning toward him in such a fashion was not merely having a change of heart and acquiescing 

in the officer’s request for a consensual interview. Rather, the 

officer had an articulable reason to believe that the man before 

him was armed and a danger to his safety. The seizure was 

therefore permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

C.

Because we find no Fourth Amendment violation, 

Mr. Mays’s contention that his inculpatory statement was the 

fruit of an illegal seizure must fail. As for Mr. Mays’s independent argument under the Sixth Amendment, he offers no 

evidence that his waiver of his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 

U.S. 778, 786 (2009). Absent such evidence, “when a defendant is read his Miranda rights...and agrees to waive those 

rights, that typically does the trick.” Id.

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

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