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Parties Involved:
Guadalupe Cervantes Soto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GUADALUPE CERVANTES SOTO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

NOV 8 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2254 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CR-89-136-1-JB) 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, and Peter Schoenburg, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for 

the Defendant-Appellant. 

William L. Lutz, United States Attorney, and Presiliano Torrez, 

Assistant United States Attorney, for the Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.* 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, District Judge of the 

United States District Court for the district of Utah, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant, Guadalupe Cervantes Soto (Soto), pleaded 

guilty to possession with intent to distribute less than five 

hundred grams of cocaine and aiding and abetting in violation of 

21 u.s.c. §§ 841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(C), and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Soto 

requested a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines 

based on the possibility he might be subject to deportation under 

8 u.s.c. § 1251 for his drug conviction because he is a resident 

alien. The district court decided not to depart downward from the 

guidelines and sentenced Soto to thirty-seven months followed by 

three years of supervised release. 

Soto claims the district court abused its discretion and 

incorrectly applied the sentencing guidelines because it did not 

not take into account his possible deportation and depart downward 

from the guidelines. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 1 

Soto contends this court has jurisdiction over his claim 

based on 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). This statute states: 

A defendant may file a notice of appeal in the district 

court for review of an otherwise final sentence if the 

sentence--

(1) was imposed in violation of the law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect 

application of the sentencing guidelines; or 

(3) is greater than the sentence specified in the 

applicable guideline range to the extent that the 

sentence includes a greater fine or term of 

imprisonment, probation, or supervised release than the 

maximum established in the guideline range, or includes 

a more limiting condition of probation or supervised 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 2 
release under section 3563(b)(6) or (b)(ll) than the 

maximum extablished in the guideline range; or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is 

no sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable. 

Soto argues this statute grants us jurisdiction to review the 

district court's refusal to depart downward both as an abuse of 

discretion and as an incorrect application of the sentencing 

guidelines. However, it is settled law in this circuit that 

section 3742 does not grant appellate jurisdiction over a trial 

court's discretionary refusal to depart downward from the 

'd 1· 2 gui e ines. See,~, United States Y..!.. D~yis, 900 F.2d 1524, 

1529-30 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 59 u.s.L.W. 3248 (U.S. Oct. 1, 

1990) (No. 90-312); United States Y..!.. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 870 

(10th Cir. 1990); United States Y..!.. Lowden, 905 F.2d 1448, 1449 

(10th Cir.) (Lowden II), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 

1, 1990) (No. 90-5480); United States Y..!.. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 

706-07; (10th Cir. 1990); -United States Y..!.. Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 

2 The lack of appellate jurisdiction over a sentencing court's 

refusal to depart downward from the guidelines is also settled law 

in all the other circuits that have addressed the jurisdictional 

issue. See, ~, United States Y..!.. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 63-64 

(D.C. Cir. 1990); United States Y..!.. Tucker, 892 F.2d 8, 11 (1st 

Cir. 1989); United States Y..!.. Colon, 884 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir.), 

cert. denied sub nom. Papathanasion Y..!.. United States, 110 s. Ct. 

553 (1989); United States Y..!.. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 271-72 (3d 

Cir. 1989); United States Y..!.. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 31 (4th Cir. 

1989), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1990) (No. 89-

1934); United States Y..!.. Draper, 888 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 

1989); United States Y..!.. Franz, 886 F.2d 973, 981 (7th Cir. 1989); 

United States Y..!.. Evidente, 894 F.2d 1000, 1003-05 (8th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1956 (1990); United States Y..!.. Morales, 

898 F.2d 99, 101-03 (9th Cir. 1990); United States Y..!.. Fossett, 881 

F.2d 976, 979-80 (11th Cir. 1989). The only circuit that has not 

addressed this issue in terms of appellate jurisdiction, the Fifth 

Circuit, upholds a district court's refusal to depart unless the 

sentence is imposed in violation of section 3742. ~, United 

States Y..!.. Buenrostro, 868 F.2d 135, 139 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 1957 (1990). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 3 
707, 710 (10th Cir. 1990); United States Y...!.. Westmoreland, 911 F.2d 

398, 398 (10th Cir. 1990). As we first explained in Davis, 

Congress did not grant appellate jurisdiction for refusals to 

depart downward. 900 F.2d at 1529. Nor did Congress intend to 

grant jurisdiction over departure-related decisions that are 

~characterized as 'an incorrect application of the sentencing 

guidelines'" merely to get around the specific terms of the 

statute. Id. 

Soto's claim differs from the situation we considered in 

Lowden ll• There, the district court did not exercise its 

discretion because it "thought itself powerless to depart" from 

the sentencing guidelines. 905 F.2d at 1449; ~also,~, 

Spedalieri, 910 F.2d at 710-11 (defendant argued district court 

never exercised its discretion in considering evidence of 

diminished capacity because jury verdict rejected insanity 

defense); Davis, 900 F.2d at 1530 n.7 (dictum) (suggesting that 

the district court's incorrect conclusion that it lacked 

discretion to depart would be reviewable under section 3742). In 

Lowden II we explained we have jurisdiction when a district court 

erroneously believes the guidelines do not permit a downward 

departure. Lowden II, 905 F.2d at 1449; see also United States Y...!.. 

Lowden, 900 F.2d 213, 217 (10th Cir. 1990) (Lowden I) (if district 

court believed it was powerless to depart, then appellate 

jurisdiction would be plenary). In such a case, the sentence 

imposed would be an incorrect application of the guidelines, 

reviewable under section 3742(a)(2). Lowden II, 905 F.2d at 1449. 

Here, in contrast, the district court clearly believed it could 

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Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 4 
exercise its discretion to depart downward. It chose not to 

because the facts do not warrant a departure. Thus, because Davis 

and its progeny apply, we hold we do not have jurisdiction over 

Soto's claim. 

The defendant further contends we have jurisdiction over this 

claim simply because his drug conviction might result in his 

deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1251. According to this argument, 

the district.court's refusal to depart downward constitutes an 

"extreme situation" in which a "minor drug conviction" could 

result in "banishment." If this were to happen, Soto argues, the 

sentence would violate the statutory purposes of the guidelines 

set forth in section 3553 -- punishment, deterrence, 

incapacitation, and rehabilitation -- and therefore would be 

appealable under section 3742 as a sentence imposed in violation 

of law. The defendant cites no authority to support his theory. 

Rather, he clings to dictum in a Davis footnote, 900 F.2d at 1530 

n.6 (leaving open question whether discretionary refusal to depart 

downward can ever violate section 3553), and a view proposed in a 

dissenting opinion from another circuit. United States Y.!.. 

Denardi, 892 F.2d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J., dissenting) 

(postulating that application of some guideline to some defendant 

might violate statutory requirement that sentences be no greater 

than necessary to satisfy purposes of sentencing). Moreover, the 

defendant fails to address persuasive authority that clearly 

rejects his argument. See United States Y.!.. Morales, 898 F.2d 99, 

101-03 (9th Cir. 1990) (discretionary refusal to depart downward 

is not reviewable on appeal as a violation of the sentencing 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 5 
mandates of section 3553); United States Y.!.. Bayerle, 898 F.2d 28, 

31 (4th Cir. 1989) (section 3742, when read with section 3553, 

does not convert unappealable exercise of discretion into an error 

of law "in some amorphous circumstances"; if Congress wants that 

result, it must say so), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3244 (U.S. Oct. 

1, 1990) (No. 89-1934). 

We find no merit in the defendant's argument. The district 

court carefully followed the sentencing guidelines, taking into 

account the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 

history and characteristics of the defendant. We find the 

sentence in no way violates the law or the statutory purposes of 

the guidelines. Congress has authority to regulate the 

deportation of aliens, as it has done in 8 u.s.c. § 1251. See, 

~, Galvan Y.!.. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954) (formulation of 

deportation policies entrusted exclusively to Congress). Congress 

has delegated authority to make deportation decisions to the 

executive branch. 8 u.s.c. § 1251(a). The federal courts will 

not interfere with these decisions as long as due process 

requirements have been met. LeTourneur Y.!.. INS, 538 F.2d 1368, 

1370 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1044 (1977); see also 

Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-32. Further, Congress has specifically 

stated the courts shall not recommend to the Attorney General that 

an alien convicted of a controlled substance offense not be 

deported. 8 u.s.c. § 1251(b). A sentencing court's downward 

departure for the purpose of avoiding possible deportation under 

section 1251 would be merely another way a district court might 

achieve what Congress has explicitly prohibited. Because Congress 

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Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 6 
clearly reserved drug-related deportation decisions to the 

Attorney General, see id. § 1251(a)-(b), a sentencing court shall 

not consider the possible deportation of an alien resident for a 

drug conviction in deciding whether to depart downward from the 

sentencing guidelines. 

We hold we lack jurisdiction to hear Soto's claim under 18 

U.S.C. § 3742 as the review of either a refusal to depart downward 

or a section 3553 violation. We therefore DISMISS. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2254 Document: 01019946677 Date Filed: 11/08/1990 Page: 7