Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03056/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-03056-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Robin L. Tyler
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ROBIN L. TYLER,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 06-3056 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S

CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

Plaintiff Robin L. Tyler has filed a motion for summary

judgment. Defendant Jo Anne Barnhart, in her capacity as

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA), opposes

the motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court

DENIES Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and GRANTS

Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2001, Plaintiff filed an application for

Disability Insurance Benefits under Title II of the Social

Security Act (the Act). Plaintiff alleges that she became

disabled on July 14, 1999, due to carpal tunnel syndrome,

bilateral repetitive motion syndrome in both upper extremities

because of ulnar nerve damage and depression. On September 4,

2001, her claim was denied for lack of a disability. Plaintiff

filed for reconsideration, which was denied on November 30, 2001. 

Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 1 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Judge (ALJ), which took place on April 25, 2002. Plaintiff

appeared and was represented by counsel. On September 23, 2002,

the ALJ issued an opinion finding that Plaintiff was not disabled

within the meaning of the Act because she could perform a full

range of light or sedentary work.

On November 2, 2002, Plaintiff filed a timely request with

the Appeals Council for review of the ALJ's decision, arguing

that it contained legal errors and was not supported by

substantial evidence. On May 13, 2004, the Appeals Council

remanded the case to the ALJ for the purpose of: (1) further

evaluating Plaintiff's mental impairment, (2) further evaluating

the testimony of Plaintiff's husband and providing germane

reasons for the weight given to his testimony, (3) obtaining

supplemental evidence from a vocational expert (VE) if warranted,

and (4) preparing an Exhibit List. 

Plaintiff's second hearing before the ALJ occurred on

January 26, 2005. Plaintiff was represented by counsel, and both

Plaintiff and her husband testified. A VE also testified. On

April 4, 2005, the ALJ issued an opinion in which he found that

Plaintiff was "not disabled" as defined in the Act and applicable

regulations. Plaintiff again filed a timely request with the

Appeals Council for review of the ALJ's decision, alleging that

the ALJ's evaluation of the testimony of Plaintiff's husband was

insufficient, and that her mental impairment was severe. On

March 14, 2006, the request for review was denied. On May 5,

2006, Plaintiff initiated the instant action for judicial review

under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking remand to the Commissioner for

a new hearing. 

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 2 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. Plaintiff's Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff was born in San Francisco, California on December

25, 1961. (Transcript (Tr.) 243, 68.) She graduated from Novato

High School in 1980. (Tr. 119.) After a brief stint as an

executive secretary, Plaintiff worked for seventeen years as a

legal secretary for law firms and solo practitioners. Id. She

was able to type 90-100 words per minute during this period. Id.

According to Plaintiff, the medical problems with her hands began

in 1998 when she started using a computer mouse on a regular

basis at her last legal secretary position. (Tr. 119.) 

II. Plaintiff's Medical History

On September 2, 1998, Plaintiff underwent an orthopedic

medical evaluation at the Gordon-Bickel Hand Clinic. (Tr. 159.) 

She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome on her right side. 

(Tr. 161.) The examining physician, Dr. Leonard Gordon,

concluded that the carpal tunnel syndrome was likely caused by

Plaintiff's frequent use of a computer mouse at work. Id. Dr.

Gordon recommended the use of an ergonomic mouse, and noted that

surgery might become necessary. Id. 

Plaintiff also sought treatment for the pain in her hands at

the Hill Park Clinic. (Tr. 3.) She visited the clinic ten times

between January and April, 1999. (Tr. 163-73.) The clinic

diagnosed her with wrist tendonitis, cervical strain, and somatic

dysfunction. Id. It is not clear whether Plaintiff's treatment

during this period significantly alleviated her pain and

discomfort. After a period of temporary disability, Plaintiff

returned to work on a part-time basis, working approximately four

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 3 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

The clinic discharge summary sheet gives four options for

assessing the patient's overall response to treatment: poor,

fair, good, and excellent. (Tr. 175.) 

2According to Dr. Weiss, this evaluation addressed "the

issues of causation, permanent disability, work restrictions,

apportionment and future medical treatment." (Tr. 260.) 

4

hours per day. (Tr. 261.) 

On September 7, 1999, Plaintiff underwent surgery in the

Sonoma Valley Hospital District for right carpal tunnel syndrome

and right ulnar tunnel syndrome. (Tr. 175.) The procedures

performed included a right open carpal tunnel release, and a

right open ulnar nerve decompression. Id. Dr. Noah Weiss

performed the surgery. Id. In the six months following her

surgery, Plaintiff completed sixty-one occupational therapy

visits with the goal of physically rehabilitating her right hand. 

(Tr. 203.) Though eventually discharged, Plaintiff continued to

complain of pain in her hand, and the clinic discharge summary

noted that her overall response to treatment was "fair."1

 Id.

Plaintiff regularly visited Dr. Weiss in the months

following her surgery. (Tr. 249-82.) His medical records note

slow improvement in her right hand, but increasing problems with

her left hand. (Tr. 267.) On September 28, 2000, Dr. Weiss

conducted a comprehensive "permanent and stationary" evaluation2

of Plaintiff on behalf of the State Compensation Insurance Fund. 

(Tr. 260.) He stated that Plaintiff's nerve conduction studies

had returned to normal and that she had recovered good range of

motion, but that she had lost approximately twenty-five percent

of her pre-injury capacity for lifting, pushing, pulling, and

other activities requiring comparable physical effort. (Tr.

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 4 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

264.) 

During Dr. Weiss' examination on October 2, 2000, Plaintiff

reported pain in her hands despite working only two hours a day. 

Id. In his report of that examination, Dr. Weiss stated that his

examination "indicated a normal neurological examination with no

evidence of ongoing carpal tunnel syndrome or ulnar tunnel

syndrome." Id. Dr. Weiss said that he could not explain the

deterioration of Plaintiff's symptoms, and stated that it was

"inconceivable" to him that Plaintiff's two hours of work per day

could cause such marked deterioration in function and increase in

subjective complaints. (Tr. 258.) He doubted that the grip

strengths obtained from Plaintiff during her examination on

October 2 were of maximal effort, and felt that her current work

restrictions were adequate. Id. Furthermore, Dr. Weiss stated

that "it is my impression that there is most likely a strong

psychiatric component to Ms. Tyler's complaints." Id. 

 On January 10, 2001, Dr. Weiss referred Plaintiff to

another orthopaedic surgeon, Dr. Jerry L. Roberts, for a second

medical opinion. (Tr. 256.) On February 1, 2001, Plaintiff was

examined by Dr. Roberts. (Tr. 228.) In a letter to the State

Compensation Insurance Fund regarding that examination, Dr.

Roberts concluded that bilateral repetitive motion syndrome

continued to exist in both upper extremities. (Tr. 232.) The

post-operative right carpal tunnel and right ulnar release showed

no improvement, and Plaintiff's ability to grip was limited by

pain and lack of strength. (Tr. 231-32.) Dr. Roberts pointed to

both objective and subjective factors of disability. (Tr. 233.) 

Objectively, Dr. Roberts noted tremendous loss of grip strength

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 5 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

Tinel's sign is a sensation of tingling felt at a lesion

site or along the course of a nerve when the latter is percussed

(i.e. lightly banged). Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 1640 (27th

ed. 2000) (Stedman's). 

6

and positive Tinel's sign3 over the median and ulnar nerves

bilaterally over the volar aspect of the wrist. Id.

Subjectively, he concluded that Plaintiff's symptoms prevented

her from doing anything with her hands. Id. Dr. Roberts

concluded that Plaintiff was ninety percent disabled from any

meaningful work activities involving her upper extremities. Id.

 Plaintiff returned to Dr. Weiss for a follow up appointment

on March 15, 2001. (Tr. 255.) According to his medical records,

Dr. Weiss completely concurred with Dr. Roberts' findings. Id.

It was his belief at this point that Plaintiff suffered from

bilateral repetitive motion syndrome of the upper extremities,

and he concurred with Dr. Roberts' objective and subjective

findings of disability, as well as his assessment of her overall

level of disability. Id. Drs. Weiss and Roberts both concluded

that Plaintiff's disability was permanent and stationary, meaning

that further medical care would not provide relief. Id. In a

letter dated April 3, 2001, Dr. Weiss confirmed this assessment

and stated that he considered Dr. Roberts' opinion "to be my

own." (Tr. 253.) 

On June 26, 2001, Plaintiff underwent a residual functional

capacity (RFC) assessment by Disability Determination Services

(DDS). (Tr. 235.) Plaintiff's RFC assessment concluded that she

could lift twenty pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently,

could stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour work day,

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 6 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

and had frequent but not constant limitations in her upper

extremities. (Tr. 236.) The assessors disagreed with the

findings of Drs. Weiss and Roberts, asserting that those doctors'

diagnoses were mainly based on subjective factors and not

objective findings. (Tr. 241-42.) A second RFC assessment

performed on November 27, 2001, reached the same conclusions. 

On August 19, 2001, Dr. Asha Prabhu, a psychiatrist,

performed a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation of Plaintiff on

behalf of DDS. (Tr. 243.) The report noted that Plaintiff's

mood was depressed, but that her prognosis was good and would

likely improve over the coming year. (Tr. 244-45.) 

Functionally, Dr. Prabhu found that Plaintiff could perform

simple and repetitive tasks, interact appropriately with

supervisors and co-workers, and could perform in the workplace

without psychiatric problems. (Tr. 245.) 

On December 14, 2001, Dr. Weiss sent a letter to the State

Compensation Insurance Fund regarding Plaintiff's disability

status. (Tr. 313.) In that letter, Dr. Weiss confirmed

Plaintiff's diagnosis of bilateral repetitive motion syndrome of

the upper extremities. Id. Dr. Weiss cited both subjective and

objective factors of disability. (Tr. 313-14.) Subjectively,

Dr. Weiss characterized Plaintiff's complaints as "slight in

intensity on a frequent basis, increasing to moderate on an

intermittent basis. Her pain is aggravated with most activities

of the upper extremities." (Tr. 313.) Objectively, Dr. Weiss

noted that Plaintiff lost about two-thirds of anticipated grip

strength in the upper extremities, had tenderness in her

forearms, and maintained positive Tinel's sign over the median

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 7 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4Electrodiagnosis is used to determine the nature of a

disease through observation of changes in electrical activity. 

Stedman's 575. 

8

and ulnar nerves bilaterally. (Tr. 314.) In assessing

Plaintiff's work restrictions, Dr. Weiss maintained that she was

restricted from lifting more than five pounds with either upper

extremity, but felt that she could do light grasping and other

similar activities. Id. He felt that she was not capable of

keyboarding for more than ten to fifteen minutes at a time

without a significant break. Id. 

One week later, in response to a specific follow-up question

posed by the State Compensation Insurance Fund, Dr. Weiss stated

that it was his belief that Plaintiff was medically able to

pursue the vocational goal of freelance candle and home accessory

sales. (Tr. 315.) 

On April 24, 2002, Dr. Weiss completed a chronic pain RFC

questionnaire about Plaintiff for the SSA. (Tr. 316.) In

addition to reiterating many of the aforementioned symptoms and

assessments, Dr. Weiss expressed his belief that Plaintiff was

not malingering, and that emotional factors did not contribute to

the severity of her symptoms and functional limitations. Id.

Dr. Weiss expressed concern over the deterioration of Plaintiff's

symptoms and recommended a repeat electrodiagnostic4 study of her

upper extremities. (Tr. 382.) 

On October 3, 2002, Dr. Kevin Satow performed an

electrodiagnostic evaluation of Plaintiff. (Tr. 371.) The

results were normal save for (mild) bilateral ulnar entrapments

across the elbow. (Tr. 372.) 

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 8 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Thoracic outlet syndrome is a collective title for a number

of conditions attributed to the compromise of blood vessels or

nerve fibers at any point between the base of the neck and the

axilla. Stedman's 1769. 

9

On August 28, 2003, on behalf of the State Compensation

Insurance Fund, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. James R. Doyle. 

(Tr. 384.) Dr. Doyle concluded that Plaintiff's disability

remained stable, that she was precluded from forceful gripping or

pinching, and that he could not "find any objective basis for

precluding her from working as a legal secretary." (Tr. 387.) 

On September 3, 2003, Plaintiff was referred by her attorney

to Dr. Helmer W. S. Huseby for a medical evaluation. (Tr. 389.) 

After reviewing the records and conducting a physical

examination, Dr. Huseby concluded that Plaintiff suffered from

bilateral thoracic outlet syndrome,5 a new diagnosis. (Tr. 392.) 

He cited both objective and subjective evidence for this finding. 

(Tr. 393.) Dr. Huseby concluded that Plaintiff was precluded

from engaging in work involving repetitive handling of a mouse,

the use of her hands at or above shoulder level, and repetitive

keyboarding work, and that lifting should be consigned to under

ten pounds on an occasional and non-repetitive basis. (Tr. 393-

94.) A second opinion by Dr. David L. Nelson on April 1, 2004,

likewise concluded that Plaintiff suffered from thoracic outlet

syndrome. (Tr. 402.) Dr. Nelson stated that he had "never seen

a patient who has such flagrant thoracic outlet syndrome in my

life." Id. 

From mid-August until November 26, 2003, Plaintiff visited

Kaiser Permanente Hospital on eleven occasions for treatment for

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 9 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Waddell signs identify non-organic, non-structural causes

of pain. P. Douglas Kiester, M.D., & Alexandra Duke, M.D., Is it

Malingering or is it Real?, Postgraduate Medicine, Vol. 106 No.

7, December 1999. Although Waddell signs seem to indicate

underlying behavioral causes for the pain, it is not clear

whether they are definitive proof of malingering. 

10

depression, sleep disorder, and viral syndrome. (Tr. 405-415.) 

Hospital records indicate that different combinations of antidepression drugs were prescribed for Plaintiff with each visit. 

Id.

On September 8, 2004, DDS conducted a neurological

consultative examination of Plaintiff. (Tr. 484.) The examining

neurologist, Dr. Edward L. Spencer, concluded that Plaintiff had

good musculature, full range of motion of the extremities,

positive Waddell signs6 when testing the right grip, minimal

evidence of right carpal tunnel syndrome, and mild slowing of the

ulnar nerve across the elbow. (Tr. 486.) Dr. Spencer stated

that Plaintiff's complaints were subjective and "other than the

physical findings would suggest." Id. In Dr. Spencer's opinion,

Plaintiff could lift twenty-five pounds occasionally, ten pounds

frequently, and had the unlimited ability to reach in all

directions (including overhead) and handle items. (Tr. 487-89.) 

On September 21, 2004, Plaintiff was examined once more by

Dr. Nelson. (Tr. 520.) In a letter to the State Compensation

Insurance Fund concerning that examination, Dr. Nelson reported

that Plaintiff still had long-standing thoracic outlet syndrome

but was doing somewhat better. (Tr. 521.) Dr. Nelson expressed

the hope that proper treatment with the Edgelow Technique would

have a positive effect on Plaintiff, and implored the insurance

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 10 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

company to fund such treatment. Id. 

On November 15, 2004, Plaintiff underwent the last physical

examination she would receive before her second ALJ hearing. 

(Tr. 537.) She was examined by Dr. David L. Kneapler, who was

the approved medical examiner (AME) in Plaintiff's ongoing

workers compensation claim. Id. Dr. Kneapler found that

Plaintiff suffered from progressive ulnar nerve damage in both

elbows and median nerve damage in the carpal tunnels. (Tr. 541.) 

However, Dr. Kneapler professed concern about Plaintiff's "over

representation" of her complaints. Id. He also disagreed with

the diagnosis of thoracic outlet syndrome. Id. Dr. Kneapler

found no definitive evidence of thoracic outlet syndrome, and

considered Plaintiff's injuries as instead reflecting multiple

nerve entrapments and cervical spine disc damage. (Tr. 542.) He

recommended repeat electrodiagnostic studies and possibly further

surgery. (Tr. 543.) 

III. Plaintiff's Testimony

On January 26, 2005, at the second ALJ hearing, Plaintiff,

who was represented by counsel, was the first witness. 

Additional witnesses included Jeffrey Tyler, Plaintiff's husband,

and Steven Davis, a VE. Plaintiff testified that the pain in her

hands was like "somebody has flames underneath my wrist" and

stated that she could not feel the top portion of her pinky

finger. (Tr. 576-77.) She said that her fingers would start

tingling, and then go numb. (Tr. 578.) 

In describing her capabilities around the house, Plaintiff

stated that she could only prepare meals with the help of her

children, that she could dust if she did not pick up and move

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 11 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

items, and that she was unable to vacuum or scrub the floor. 

(Tr. 594.) Doing laundry for the family took "all day." (Id.) 

She testified that it takes her two or three hours to get ready

in the morning because of her hand problems, and that she no

longer wears anything with buttons or laces. (Tr. 596-97.) She

could drive for about half an hour before it started bothering

her hands. (Tr. 603.) Plaintiff said that she was taking

antitryptaline, topomax, and effexor for her pain. (Tr. 602.) 

Plaintiff testified that she was depressed and tearful

during the week. (Tr. 606-07.) She also stated that she was not

currently seeing anyone to treat her depression. (Tr. 611-12.) 

However, she said that she had taken Wellbutrin and Prozac to

treat her depression in the past. (Tr. 564.) 

Plaintiff's husband testified without her present in the

room. (Tr. 612.) He said that she was demoralized, that her

moods varied starkly between happiness and depression, and that

the depression was getting worse. (Tr. 614-15.) Mr. Tyler

testified that he "didn't see any benefit" from psychological

counseling, but suggested to Plaintiff that she keep "trying." 

(Tr. 622.) He noted that Plaintiff felt that counseling was not

"working." Id. He acknowledged that the co-payment at Kaiser

for each counseling session was not cost-prohibitive. (Tr. 621.)

In describing Plaintiff's physical limitations, Mr. Tyler

stated that she walks regularly with one of her friends, although

he noted that her legs and hands recently started going numb

during these walks. (Tr. 617.) He testified that she could

still type, but only for four or five minutes before it became

too physically taxing. (Tr. 619.) He said that she could not

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 12 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

pick up anything in excess of two pounds for more than a few

seconds, that she has dropped plates and other items, and that

she was incapable of ironing. (Tr. 623.) Mr. Tyler stated that

it was difficult when they went out to dinner because the chairs

at restaurants were not designed for people with arm impairments. 

(Tr. 625.) He also testified that Plaintiff's previous

occupation selling homemade candles was too physically burdensome

because of the traveling and carrying the candle tray. (Tr.

627.) 

In response to questioning from the ALJ, Mr. Tyler stated

that he and Plaintiff occasionally went out to dinner, that she

could eat on her own (with the exception of cutting steak), and

that she participated in the children's school activities. (Tr.

629-30.) 

The final testifying witness was Steven Davis, the VE. He

testified that he reviewed the vocational portion of the record

and listened to all the testimony presented at the hearing. (Tr.

633.) The ALJ asked him to discuss employment opportunities for

someone of Plaintiff's age, vocational and educational background

who was unable to lift more than five pounds, could not grasp,

and could only occasionally reach or engage in overhead work. 

(Tr. 636-37.) In response, Mr. Davis offered information clerk,

case aide and food management aide as employment options. (Tr.

637-38.) Gate guard was added to the list in response to a

question by the ALJ. (Tr. 639.) However, Mr. Davis added an

erosion factor of fifty percent to these positions because of the

possibility that they would require up to six pounds of lifting. 

(Tr. 638.) 

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 13 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

The VE also testified that restricting lifting to only one

or two pounds and adding a mild to moderate concentration

impairment would substantially erode those positions even

further, to the point of eliminating the information clerk

position from the list altogether. (Tr. 639-40.) The erosion

factor for the remaining positions was eighty-five percent for

case aide, eighty percent for food management aide, and seventy

percent for gate guard. (Tr. 644.) Applying these erosion

factors to the VE's testimony of the total number of jobs in

California, it appears that Plaintiff is eligible for 3,075 case

aide, 3,000 food management aide, and 7,200 gate guard positions

in California.

IV. The ALJ's Findings

In his decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not

engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset

of her disability. (Tr. 30.) He found that Plaintiff's right

hand carpal tunnel and bilateral hand repetitive motion syndrome

were severe impairments, that Plaintiff might have thoracic

outlet syndrome, and that she did not have a severe mental

impairment. Id. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's medically

determinable impairments did not meet or medically equal any one

of the listed impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulation

No. 4. Id. He found that her allegations regarding her

limitations were not persuasive for a finding of disability. Id.

The ALJ considered all of the medical records and found that,

although Plaintiff could not perform any of her past work, she

had the RFC to perform a narrow range of light work. Id.

Finally, based on the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that,

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 14 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7Sedentary work involves lifting no more than ten pounds at

a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket

files, ledgers, and small tools. 20 CFR § 404.1567(a). Light

work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a time with

frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to ten

pounds. 20 CFR § 404.1567(b).

15

although Plaintiff's limitations did not allow her to perform the

full range of light or sedentary work,7 there was a significant

number of jobs in the national economy that she could perform. 

(Tr. 32.) Thus, Plaintiff was not disabled. Id. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the

ALJ's findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989);

Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v. Weinberger,

514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum

of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 15 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

Cir. 1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that

supports the ALJ's conclusions and that which does not. 

Martinez, 807 F.2d at 772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one

rational interpretation, it is well-settled that the decision

must be upheld. Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial evidence, the findings

of the ALJ as to any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" is defined as

the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by

reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has

lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The

impairment must be so severe that the claimant "is not only

unable to do his previous work but cannot . . . engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the

national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the

impairment must result "from anatomical, physiological, or

psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically

acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques." 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 

To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act, the Social Security

Regulations set out a five-step sequential process. 20 C.F.R. 

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 16 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

§ 404.1520 (b)-(f); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1395 (9th

Cir. 1991). The burden of proof is on the claimant in steps one

through four. Sanchez v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs.,

812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). In step one, the claimant

must show that he or she is not currently engaged in substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). In step two, the

claimant must show that he or she has a "medically severe

impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limits his or her ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c);

Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987); Smolen v. Chater, 80

F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). If the claimant does not, he or

she is not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues to step

three for a determination of whether the impairment meets or

equals a "listed" impairment which the regulations acknowledge to

be so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity. 

Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R.

§ 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If this requirement is met, the

claimant is conclusively presumed disabled; if not, the

evaluation proceeds to step four. At step four, it must be

determined whether the claimant can still perform "past relevant

work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If

the claimant can perform such work, he or she is not disabled. 

If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to

perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 142;

20 C.F.R. § 1520(g).

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 17 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

DISCUSSION

I. Prior Remand Order of the Appeals Council

Plaintiff argues that the Appeals Council committed legal

error by not discussing whether the ALJ followed its initial

remand order, which Plaintiff avers was the "law of the case." 

The Commissioner contends that the Appeals Council was not

legally obliged to discuss its remand order because (1) the

remand order was not a final decision by the Commissioner, and 

(2) the "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to

administrative proceedings. 

If the Appeals Council grants a request for review, it will

either make a decision or remand the case to the ALJ. 20 CFR 

§ 404.979. It may remand a case in which additional evidence is

needed or additional action by the ALJ is required. 20 CFR

§ 404.977. A plaintiff may appeal in federal district court only

if the Appeals Council either denies the request for review, or

issues an unfavorable decision, because those actions are final

and binding. 20 CFR § 404.981; 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

The initial remand order issued by the Appeals Council on

May 13, 2004 was not a final decision by the Commissioner, and

therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction to review that order. 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This Court has jurisdiction only to consider

the Appeals Council's denial of Plaintiff's request for review of

the second ALJ decision. Id. The "law of the case" doctrine

applies is not applicable.

Under the "law of the case" doctrine, "a court is generally

precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 18 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical

case." Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 154 (9th Cir. 1993). In

the Social Security context, neither the Appeals Council nor the

ALJ can re-decide an issue that was decided in remand orders from

the district court. Ischay v. Barnhart, 383 F. Supp. 2d 1199,

1215 (C.D. Cal. 2005). This case does not involve a remand order

from the district court, but rather a remand order from the

Appeals Council itself. The remand order did not decide any

legal or factual issues. Instead, it remanded for the ALJ to

make specific findings, provide germane reasons, and obtain

supplemental evidence as necessary. (Tr. 340-41.) Accordingly,

the "law of the case" doctrine does not require this Court to

consider whether the initial remand order was followed. 

II. Plaintiff's Husband's Credibility

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's determination of her

husband's credibility failed to meet the standard of SSR 96-7p

and thus was legally erroneous. 

In a claim for disability benefits, the ALJ may consider

observations by "non-medical sources" as evidence of the

claimant's impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(4). Lay witness

testimony by friends, neighbors, and family members in a position

to observe the claimant's symptoms is competent evidence. 

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987). 

"Disregard of this evidence violates the Secretary’s regulation

that he will consider observations by non-medical sources as to

how an impairment affects a claimant’s ability to work.” Id.; 20

C.F.R. § 404.1513(e)(2). The ALJ can reject the testimony of lay

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 19 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

witnesses only if he or she gives reasons germane to each witness

whose testimony is rejected. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1288.

The ALJ adequately summarized Mr. Tyler's testimony in his

opinion. (Tr. 27.) With the apparent exception of Mr. Tyler's

characterization of Plaintiff's depression as "getting worse,"

the ALJ did not reject his testimony, but explained that it

supported his finding that Plaintiff's mental impairment was not

severe and that she had the RFC to perform a narrow range of

light and/or sedentary work. (Tr. 28.) He pointed out the

numerous activities that Mr. Tyler acknowledged that Plaintiff

still performed. Id. These included light cooking and

housework, involvement with the school activities of her

children, regular walks with her friends, and occasional social

activities. Id. The ALJ considered this testimony as evidence

that Plaintiff was not severely depressed and could perform work

"at the modified light exertional level." Id. The Court finds

that Mr. Tyler's testimony about the specific daily activities

Plaintiff performed is a germane reason for not accepting Mr.

Tyler's general characterization of Plaintiff's depression as

"getting worse." 

 Plaintiff correctly notes that Mr. Tyler's testimony from

the first administrative hearing was not included in the record

before this Court. According to the Appeals Council's remand

order, at the first hearing Mr. Tyler testified that Plaintiff

was unable to load the dishwasher and complained of fatigue,

irritability, and lack of alertness. (Tr. 340.) Nonetheless,

Mr. Tyler's testimony appears to have been substantially similar

in the two hearings, and the ALJ "adopted and incorporated by

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 20 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

reference" evidence from the first hearing (Tr. 22.). 

Accordingly, the ALJ's assessment of Mr. Tyler's credibility was

legally sufficient. 

III. Plaintiff's Mental Impairment

Plaintiff argues that she suffers from depression and that

in his second opinion, the ALJ did not incorporate evidence of

her mental impairment from the first hearing, did not use the

statutorily prescribed special technique for evaluating the

severity of her mental impairment, did not consider Plaintiff's

husband's testimony concerning her depression, did not analyze

certain medical findings relevant to her ability to work, and did

not rate the degree of functional loss resulting from her

impairment in areas deemed essential for work. 

At every level in the administrative review process, the

regulations require a special technique to evaluate the possible

mental impairment of applicants. 20 CFR § 404.1520a(b)(1).

First, the pertinent symptoms, signs and laboratory findings are

evaluated to determine whether there is a medically determinable

mental impairment. Id. If it is determined that a medically

identifiable impairment exists, the symptoms, signs and

laboratory findings that substantiate the presence of the

impairment are specified and documented for use during the

administrative review process. Id. Second, the degree of

functional limitation resulting from the impairment is rated. 20

CFR § 404.1520a(b)(2). Functional limitation is rated in four

broad functional areas: activities of daily living; social

functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 21 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8Decompensation is "the appearance or exacerbation of a

mental disorder due to failure of defense mechanisms." Stedman's

462. 

22

decompensation.8 20 CFR § 404.1520a(c)(3). The regulations rate

the degree of limitation in the first three functional areas

using the following five-point scale: none, mild, moderate,

marked, and extreme. 20 CFR § 404.1520a(c)(4). The regulations

rate the degree of limitation in the fourth functional area

(episodes of decompensation) using the following four-point

scale: none, one or two, three, four or more. Id. The last

point on each scale represents a degree of limitation that is

incompatible with the ability to do any gainful activity. Id.

A mental impairment may be found not severe when it is only

a "slight abnormality" that has "no more than a minimal effect"

on a plaintiff's ability to perform basic work. Bowen, 482 U.S.

at 153. 

In evaluating the signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings

of mental impairment in his second opinion, the ALJ first 

adopted and incorporated by reference the medical evidence from

his prior decision. (Tr. 22.) In his first decision, the ALJ

had cited Dr. Prabhu's observation that Plaintiff's memory and

concentration were intact notwithstanding her depression. (Tr.

327.) In his second opinion, the ALJ referred to Dr. Catlett's

diagnosis of "reactive depression," and mentioned Plaintiff's

adverse reactions to the anti-depressants that he prescribed

during her treatment at Kaiser. (Tr. 23.) He also discussed

both Plaintiff's and her husband's testimony that she is

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 22 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

depressed. (Tr. 27.) The ALJ found that their characterization

of the degree of Plaintiff's depression was inconsistent with the

objective evidence and undermined by their testimony about the

extent of Plaintiff's daily living and social activities. (Tr.

29.) The ALJ also doubted Plaintiff's testimony because she "was

vague about needing help or seeking help" for her depression. 

(Tr. 28.) 

Based on these factors, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did

not have a severe mental impairment. (Tr. 27.) The ALJ found

that Plaintiff had no functional limitations in the activities of

daily living and social functioning, and had no decompensation

due to her depression. (Tr. 28.) He found that her attention

and concentration were mildly impaired, but that this impairment

was not severe; rather it was a "slight abnormality" that had "no

more than a minimal effect" on her ability to perform basic work

activities. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 153. 

The ALJ properly employed the language of 20 CFR 

§ 404.1520a, and there is substantial evidence to support his

conclusions. The record contained scant evidence that

Plaintiff's daily living or social activities were significantly

affected by depression. Likewise, decompensation was not

discussed in any medical opinion or by Plaintiff. The finding of

only mildly impaired concentration accords with the medical

opinion of Dr. Prabhu, the only psychiatrist who diagnosed

Plaintiff with depression. (Tr. 244.) Dr. Prabhu found

Plaintiff's mood to be depressed, but noted that her memory and

concentration were "intact," and opined that she could "perform

work activities on a consistent basis" and "maintain regular

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 23 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

attendance in the workplace . . . without interruptions from her

psychiatric condition." (Tr. 245.) 

Despite Plaintiff's testimony that she was depressed and her

husband's testimony that her depression was "getting worse," the

ALJ had adequate reasons for finding that her depression was not

severe. Beyond the objective medical evidence, their testimony

about Plaintiff's daily activities does not support a finding of

severe mental impairment. Furthermore, Plaintiff acknowledged

that she was not seeking treatment for her depression. (Tr.

612.) The ALJ properly applied the special technique for

assessing mental impairment, and substantial evidence supports

his conclusion that Plaintiff does not suffer from a severe

mental impairment that would render her disabled. 

IV. Credibility of Plaintiff's Pain Testimony

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly evaluate her

testimony concerning the severity of her pain. 

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)(per

curiam), the Ninth Circuit developed a threshold test to

determine the credibility of a claimant's subjective symptom

testimony. Under Cotton, a claimant "must produce objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment 'which could

reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms

alleged.'" Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc) (quoting Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-08); see also

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Cotton requires "only that the causal

relationship be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven

phenomenon." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Therefore, a claimant is

not required to produce objective medical evidence of the pain

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 24 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

itself or its severity. Id. (citing Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 347-

48). "It is improper as a matter of law for an ALJ to discredit

excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is not fully

corroborated by objective medical findings." Cotton, 799 F.2d at

1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, "the Commissioner may

not discredit the claimant's testimony as to subjective symptoms

merely because they are unsupportable by objective evidence. 

Unless there is affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is

malingering, the Commissioner's reason for rejecting the

claimant's testimony must be 'clear and convincing.'" Lester, 81

F.3d at 834 (quoting Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th

Cir. 1989)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. When outlining the

findings supporting a conclusion that a plaintiff's testimony is

incredible, the ALJ must consider "all of the evidence" in

analyzing the severity of the claimed pain. SSR 88-13. Factors

to be analyzed include: (1) the nature, location, onset,

duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; 

(2) precipitating and aggravating factors; (3) type, dosage,

effectiveness and adverse side effects of any pain medications;

(4) treatment, other than medication, for relief of pain; 

(5) functional restrictions; and (6) the plaintiff's daily

activities. Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d at 603 (types of activities

ALJ may rely on to find pain allegations credible include the

type of daily activities performed by plaintiff and whether

plaintiff sought or followed treatment); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240

F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding rejection of plaintiff's

pain testimony justified where plaintiff had little evidence of

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 25 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

spinal abnormalities, had not used strong pain medication, had

not participated in pain management or physical therapy, and

limited daily activities by choice). 

The ALJ found Plaintiff's testimony that she was precluded

from all work not "100% persuasive." (Tr. 29.) Plaintiff meets

the Cotton test in regards to her physical impairments. The

objective medical evidence strongly suggests the existence of

right carpal tunnel syndrome, bilateral upper extremity and neck

pain, and possible thoracic outlet syndrome. The ALJ accepted

these medical diagnoses. (Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, the ALJ

cannot reject Plaintiff's testimony concerning the severity of

her pain and the limitations that it imposes merely because it is

not supported by objective medical evidence. Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1281. However, medical evidence is still relevant in determining

the severity of a plaintiff's alleged pain and its disabling

effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Rollins v. Massanari, 261

F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Here, although the expert opinions vary by degrees in their

assessment of Plaintiff's ability to reach, grasp, carry, and

lift, no evaluation concludes that Plaintiff is completely

incapacitated in her upper extremities. The ALJ properly

considered this medical evidence in assessing the extent of

Plaintiff's disabilities, notwithstanding her testimony that she

is incapable of all forms of work. 

The ALJ highlighted objective medical evidence in the record

that was inconsistent with Plaintiff's subjective complaints. He

noted that Dr. Doyle did not find that she was precluded from

continuing work as a legal secretary, and that Dr. Huseby's RFC

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 26 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

was consistent with the ALJ's findings. (Tr. 28.) The ALJ also

mentioned the nerve conduction and ulnar nerve study performed by

Dr. Spencer, who concluded that Plaintiff had good musculature,

full range of motion of the extremities, and positive Waddell

signs when testing the right grip. (Tr. 25.) He also pointed to

Plaintiff's activities, including walking, reading, socializing,

and participating in her children's school activities, as

evidence that she was "coping with her alleged pain" and

therefore was not totally incapable of working. Id; see also

Fair, 885 F.2d at 603. 

The ALJ did not need "clear and convincing" evidence for

discounting Plaintiff's pain testimony because there is evidence

of malingering in the record. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281. Dr.

Kneapler expressed concern over Plaintiff's "overrepresentation"

(Tr. 541.), and Dr. Spencer found positive Waddell signs and

concluded that Plaintiff's "subjective complaints are other than

the physical findings would suggest." (Tr. 486.) The ALJ also

noted potentially "self-interested allegations" in the context of

an ongoing worker's compensation claim. (Tr. 29.) 

Between the medical evaluations and the evidence of

malingering, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's adverse

credibility determination. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision to

discount Plaintiff's pain testimony was not error.

V. Plaintiff's RFC

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination was

improper and not based on substantial evidence. 

A claimant's RFC represents the most an individual can do

despite his or her limitations. A proper RFC assessment must

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 27 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

include: 

A narrative discussion describing how the evidence supports 

each conclusion, citing specific medical facts and nonmedical evidence. In assessing RFC, the adjudicator must

discuss the individual's ability to perform sustained work

activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and

continuing basis and describe the maximum amount of each

work related activity the individual can perform based on

the evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator

must also explain how any material inconsistencies or

ambiguities in the evidence in the case record were

considered and resolved. 

SSR 96-8p. 

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's determination of

Plaintiff's RFC. Her RFC included mildly impaired concentration

due to her depression. Furthermore, the ALJ concluded that,

although Plaintiff's physical impairments were severe, she

retained the ability to: (1) perform the standing and walking

requirements of light work, (2) lift five pounds or less, and 

(3) occasionally perform gross handling, fine manipulation, and

overhead reach. (Tr. 28.) In issuing this RFC, the ALJ resolved

the inconsistencies in the record by adopting the medical opinion

most favorable to Plaintiff, that of her treating orthopaedic

surgeon, Dr. Weiss. Id. Substantial evidence, both medical and

non-medical, supports the ALJ's RFC assessment. 

VI. Step Five

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to meet his step five

burden of demonstrating that she could perform other work. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's hypothetical

question to the VE did not set out all of her limitations and

restrictions. 

A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must

set out all of the claimant’s limitations. Andrews v. Shalala,

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 28 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

53 F.3d 1035, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995). “If the assumptions in the

hypothetical are not supported by the record, the opinion of the

vocational expert that claimant has a residual working capacity

has no evidentiary value.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422

(9th Cir. 1988). However, excluding a claimant’s subjective

complaints in a hypothetical question posed to a VE is not

improper if the ALJ makes specific findings explaining his or her

rationale for disbelieving any of the claimant’s subjective

complaints not included in the hypothetical. Light v. Social

Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Copeland

v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 536, 540 (9th Cir. 1988). It is proper for an

ALJ to limit a hypothetical to restrictions supported by

substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427

F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). 

The ALJ asked the VE to discuss employment opportunities for

someone of Plaintiff's age, vocational and educational background

who was unable to lift more than five pounds, could not grasp,

and could only occasionally reach or engage in overhead work. 

(Tr. 636-37.) This hypothetical question mirrored the ALJ's RFC

assessment, discussed above, except that it omitted his finding

that Plaintiff had mildly impaired concentration due to

depression. However, the ALJ later narrowed the hypothetical

question to restrict lifting to only one to two pounds, and to

include mildly impaired concentration. (Tr. 639-40.) 

The ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE was both

appropriately constructed and properly relied upon. The most

restrictive hypothetical contained all of the limitations that

were supported by substantial evidence in the record, as well as

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 29 of 30
United 

States District 

Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

a lower lifting capacity than the ALJ included in his RFC. The

only limitation not included was Plaintiff's testimony that she

was unable to perform all forms of work. As described above, the

ALJ gave specific reasons supported by substantial evidence for

not accepting this claim. Accordingly, the ALJ met his step five

burden based on the VE's expert testimony. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff'S

motion for summary judgment and GRANTS Defendant's cross-motion

for summary judgment. Judgment shall enter accordingly. Each

party shall bear her own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 4/27/07 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:06-cv-03056-CW Document 18 Filed 04/27/07 Page 30 of 30