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Parties Involved:
Robert Morris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 18, 1997 Decided June 13, 1997 

No. 96-3070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT MORRIS,

APPELLANT

Consolidated with

No. 96-3071

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 88cr00404-01) 

(No. 91cr00008-01)

August E. Flenjte, student counsel, argued the cause for 

appellant. With him on the brief were Steven H. Goldblatt,

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appointed by the court, and Jennifer K. Godsil, student 

counsel.

Mary-Patrice Brown, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Eric H. 

Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., and John M. Facciola, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge: Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), 

a person guilty of certain offenses (mainly drug offenses) 

could also be found guilty of "us[ing]" a firearm in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) if the weapon were sufficiently accessible 

to the defendant to be available for active use during commission of the predicate crime. See id. at 505, citing United 

States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 

The § 924(c) violation carried a mandatory five-year term, 

which Congress explicitly directed should not run concurrently with any other sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). A common 

collateral effect of the § 924(c) conviction, however, was to 

relieve the defendant of an otherwise mandatory two-level 

enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines, for possession of a gun during a drug trafficking crime. 

"To avoid double counting, when a sentence under [§ 924(c)] 

is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying 

offense, any specific offense characteristic for firearm discharge, use, or possession is not applied in respect to such 

underlying offense." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual 

("U.S.S.G") § 2K2.4, Background.

Bailey changed the rules of the game, making clear that 

"use" for purposes of § 924(c) required the defendant's "active employment" of the gun. 116 S. Ct. at 505. The present 

case addressesnot for the first timethe question whether 

a court that vacates a five-year § 924(c) sentence as a result 

of Bailey can proceed to apply the Guidelines' two-level 

enhancement. In United States v. Rhodes, 106 F.3d 429, 

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1Appellant Staton received 12 months on the third count, to be 

served concurrently with the drug-trafficking penalty. 

432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we held that 28 U.S.C. § 2106 

authorizes a district court to apply the enhancement to a 

defendant who successfully challenges a § 924(c) conviction 

on direct appeal. Here we consider whether it may do so 

when the § 924(c) conviction is vacated as a result of a 

collateral challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Although the 

operative statutory language is slightly different, the reasoning of Rhodes calls for the same result here.

The two appellants' sentencing histories are textbook instances of post-Bailey substitutions of a two-level enhancement for a § 924(c) convictionin both cases reducing the 

aggregate sentence. Robert Staton, on his conviction for 

drug-trafficking in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) & 

(b)(1)(A)(iii), for a § 924(c) violation and for a third count not 

at issue here, received a 211-month term. It consisted of a 

151-month sentence for the § 841 violation (at the bottom of 

the applicable guideline range based on an offense level of 

321), plus 60 months under § 924(c). When Staton challenged his § 924(c) conviction under § 2255, the government 

conceded that it was not sustainable under Bailey. Vacating 

the § 924(c) conviction and sentence, the court added the twolevel enhancement and sentenced him to 188 months, at the 

bottom of the Guidelines range for the new offense level of 34 

and providing a net reduction of 23 months.

Robert Morris originally received a 130-month sentence, 

consisting of 70 months for his violation of §§ 841(a) & 

(b)(1)(B)(iii) (the bottom of the range for offense level 26), 

plus 60 months under § 924(c). After vacating the § 924(c) 

sentence on Morris's motion, the court resentenced him to 87 

months under the drug charge, at the bottom of the range for 

the new offense level of 28 and yielding a net diminution of 43 

months. (The change was more valuable to Morris because a 

two-level increase at a low offense level adds fewer months 

than at a higher level. An increase of six levels roughly 

doubles the sentence, regardless of the starting level. See 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, § 4(h).)

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Appellants first question whether the trial court had authority to increase their § 841 sentences. Under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3582(c) a court may modify a sentence only in three circumstances: (1) on motion of the Bureau of Prisons, (2) "to the 

extent otherwise expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 

of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure," and (3) to 

reflect a post-sentence reduction in the applicable sentencing 

guidelines. No one contends that either of the first or third 

possibilities, or Rule 35, is applicable. The only statute 

offered as a possible source of authority is the federal habeas 

statute:

A prisoner ... claiming the right to be released upon the 

ground that the sentence ... is ... subject to collateral 

attack, may move the court ... to vacate, set aside or 

correct the sentence.

[If the court grants the motion it] shall vacate and set 

the judgment aside and shall discharge the prisoner or 

resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence 

as may appear appropriate.

28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Appellants, focussing on the word "sentence," argue that 

the statute is quite narrow and allows the judge to impose a 

new sentence only as a substitution for the vacated penalty 

for a single, specific offense. Rhodes, they argue, was based 

on the authorization in 28 U.S.C. § 2106 for courts on direct 

appeal to revisit a "judgment, decree, or order," a set of 

seemingly broader terms.

Even the narrow linguistic distinction urged by appellants 

misses; § 2255 explicitly directs the court to vacate the 

"judgment," and appellants do not dispute the singularity of 

the judgments under which each is imprisoned. Presumably 

the power to "resentence" the prisoner and to "correct the 

sentence as may appear appropriate" must be construed in 

that light. Quite apart from that, appellants are simply 

wrong in their claim that the word "sentence" necessarily 

refers to the punishment for a single count. Sometimes it 

does, sometimes it doesn't; the answer is completely contextual. For example, while the sentencing guideline regarding 

sentencing on multiple counts talks of "[t]he sentence to be 

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imposed on a count," see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(a) (emphasis supplied), it also requires that the judge add up the available 

punishments on each count to "produce a combined sentence

equal to the total punishment." See id. at § 5G1.2(d) (emphasis supplied). And § 3D1.5 instructs judges to "[u]se the 

combined offense level to determine the appropriate sentence." Indeed, it was a purpose of the Guidelines to aggregate multiple counts in a way that sensibly fits penological 

goals; among other things, the Guidelines seek to minimize 

"the possibility that an arbitrary casting of a single transaction into several counts will produce a longer sentence," 

U.S.S.G. Ch. 1, Pt. A, § 4(e) (policy statement), referring 

obviously to the sentence as a single aggregate. Of course 

the Sentencing Commission is not Congress, and its work 

came after the enactment of § 2255 in 1948. See Judiciary 

Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869, 967. But the 

various uses of the word "sentence" by a body constituted by 

Congress for rationalizing sentencing clearly demonstrates 

the elastic quality of the word.

Here, the provisions for an enhancement under 

§ 2D1.1(b)(1) and for sentencing under § 924(c) are interdependent and, as we said in Rhodes, "mutually exclusive." See 

Rhodes, 106 F.3d at 432. If there is a conviction under 

§ 924(c), there is a mandatory five-year term and an equally 

mandatory block on any § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Remove the § 924(c) conviction, and the block disappears, bringing the mandatory § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement into play. Under these circumstances, § 2255's grant of power to the court 

to "correct the sentence as may be appropriate" necessarily 

includes the power to apply the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement at 

the same time as it removes the hitherto blocking § 924(c) 

conviction. Compare U.S.S.G. § 2 C1.1, Application Note 3 

(noting that two-level enhancement for crimes that involve 

abuse of public trust should generally not be applied in cases 

of a bribery conviction).

Every circuit to have considered the issue has approved 

application of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement to a defendant 

who has secured reversal of a § 924(c) conviction under 

§ 2255. The reasoning has varied. See United States v. 

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Rodriguez, No. 96-30878, 1997 WL 265121, at *2 (5th Cir. 

May 20, 1997) (court authorized by § 2255 to impose "correct" sentence); United States v. Harrison, No. 96-2544WM, 

1997 WL 232266, at *2 (8th Cir. May 9, 1997) (interdependence of § 924(c) sentence and § 841 enhancement means 

that terms of imprisonment imposed under both constitute a 

"sentence"); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 96-2150, 1997 

WL 203301, at *3-4 (1st Cir. April 30, 1997) (finding that 

"sentencing package" doctrine makes it "appropriate" to modify sentences related to the one challenged under § 2255); 

United States v. Davis, No. 96-1721, 1997 WL 195397, at *3 

(3d Cir. April 23, 1997) (finding that resentencing is authorized under § 2255 because of interdependence of § 924(c) 

sentence and § 841 sentence); United States v. Handa, 110 

F.3d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that § 2106 gives authority in a § 2255 case for remanding for resentencing); United 

States v. Hillary, 106 F.3d 1170, 1171 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding 

that plain language does not restrict word "sentence" to a 

particular sentence and that § 2255 gives court broad powers 

to resentence as may be "appropriate"); United States v. 

Smith, 103 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 1996) (relying on "sentencing package" doctrine). Cf. United States v. Binford, 108 

F.3d 723, 729-30 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying "sentencing package" theory but expressing doubts). Counsel for appellants 

suggested at oral argument that the variety of reasoning 

showed the shakiness of the courts' conclusion. We think, 

rather, that the uniformity of result suggests the implausibility of any other outcome. For our purposes, the outcome is 

compelled by the complete interdependence and mutual exclusivity of the two provisions. Less plain cases must await 

another day.

The appellants' double-jeopardy and substantive due process claims fare no better. In United States v. Fogel, 829 

F.2d 77, 87 (D.C. Cir. 1987), we distilled from Supreme Court 

cases the principle that a defendant's double jeopardy attack 

on an increase in a sentence depended upon his having "a 

legitimate expectation of finality" in the prior sentence. We 

assume arguendo that for purposes of this analysis the "sentence" in question was each appellant's § 841 sentence rather 

than his aggregate sentence (each defendant, of course, enjoyed a reduction in his aggregate sentence). Because of the 

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interdependency and mutual exclusivity of the § 924(c) conviction and the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the moment the 

court accepted appellants' challenges to their § 924(c) convictions it removed the condition underlying the original legality 

of their unenhanced § 841 sentences. Whether those § 841 

sentences actually became illegal at that moment may be too 

metaphysical a question to answer. But given the interdependency, the appellants could notat the moment of launching their challengeshave entertained any reasonable expectation in the finality of their § 841 sentences. Rhodes, 106 

F.3d at 432 n.3. It makes no difference that these defendants 

challenged their § 924(c) sentences under § 2255, while in 

Rhodes the challenge occurred on direct appeal. In both the 

defendant "voluntarily" brought the challenge, id., and that 

controls. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 

(1969) (holding that fact that conviction has been overturned 

at "defendant's behest" removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial).

Appellants make much of certain language in United States 

v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), from which they try to 

derive a principle that any increase on resentencing violates 

the double jeopardy clause unless a statute specifically authorizes the increase. If any such specificity criterion can 

properly be derived from DiFrancesco, it is satisfied here. 

There the sentence was increased as a result of a government

appeal, and the Court, responding to an argument that a 

defendant's perception of his sentence jells at the point where 

he starts serving it, observed:

Although it might be argued that the defendant perceives 

the length of his sentence as finally determined when he 

begins to serve it, and that the trial judge should be 

prohibited from thereafter increasing the sentence, that 

argument has no force where, as in the dangerous special 

offender statute, Congress has specifically provided that 

the sentence is subject to appeal. Under such circumstances there can be no expectation of finality in the 

original sentence.

Id. at 139. Although the Court used the words "specifically 

provided" in beating down the proposition that it had said 

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"might be argued," the opinion contains no hint that the 

Court meant to create a new doctrine requiring specificity. 

It gives every appearance of simply looking to the defendant's 

reasonable expectations, in accordance with prior cases. In 

any event, the language of § 2255, as applied to penalties 

with the interdependent and mutually exclusive character of 

§ 924(c) and § 2D1.1(b)(1), satisfies any specificity requirement that might exist.

Analysis under the due process clause appears to add only 

one special concern to double jeopardy considerationsconcern that a resentencing precipitated by a defendant's exercise of a right (such as appeal) be free of vindictiveness, lest 

fear of an increase chill the exercise of the right. See Pearce, 

395 U.S. at 725. Imposition of exactly the sentence that the 

defendant would have received but for the erroneous application of § 924(c)in each case at the bottom of the Guidelines 

rangereflects no glimmer of vindictiveness. There is no 

due process violation.

Morris makes an argument unique to his circumstances. 

The district judge before whom he was tried died before his 

§ 2255 motion was heard, so the motion was reassigned to 

another district judge. In finding the possession that is 

necessary for a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement, the district court 

relied on the jury verdict convicting Morris under § 924(c), 

plus our decision upholding that conviction. We had held 

that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, satisfied our then-prevailing standards for a 

§ 924(c) conviction. See United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 

617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1992). "[B]ased upon the finding of the 

jury in the case," the § 2255 court said, "the court can find by 

a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Morris had knowing 

possession, either actual or constructive possession, of a gun."

The government says we should apply plain error analysis 

because Morris failed to object to the court's not exercising 

independent judgment. Indeed, counsel appeared to argue 

simply that the jury instructions' noncompliance with Bailey

impaired the value of the jury verdict as an indicator of 

possessionbut without explaining how, even under a preUSCA Case #96-3070 Document #278714 Filed: 06/13/1997 Page 8 of 10
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Bailey instruction, a jury could have found a § 924(c) violation on the evidence here without also finding possession. It 

was only in this context that counsel said that "the court 

needs [a] firm ... footing to enhance this sentence." Accordingly, we review only for plain error.

Any possible error on this point is not plain. Under the 

Supreme Court's and our cases it is far from clear or obvious 

that the defendant has a right to an independent judicial 

finding on a sentencing fact that the jury has necessarily 

found beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. Johnson v. United 

States, 65 U.S.L.W. 4305, 4307 (U.S. May 12, 1997) (to be 

"plain" error must be "clear" or "obvious"). It is true that in 

the face of a jury verdict of exoneration (i.e., a finding that 

the prosecution has not proved conduct beyond a reasonable 

doubt), a sentencing court can find for sentencing purposes 

that the conduct occurred (by a preponderance). See United 

States v. Watts, 117 S. Ct. 633, 637-38 (1997) (per curiam). 

This suggests a norm of independent determinationalthough any such implication is qualified by the differing 

burdens of persuasion. See id. On the other hand, in dictum 

we have suggested that it "might be anomalous" for a trial 

court to withhold a sentencing enhancement for perjury 

where the defendant told a story on the stand that was totally 

at odds with the jury verdict. See United States v. Thompson, 962 F.2d 1069, 1071-72 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The dictum 

suggests limits to the judge's independence. But in the same 

case we noted that the decision to let the case go to the jury 

(like an appellate decision upholding such a ruling) "says only 

that a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt, not that a reasonable judge would necessarily agree." 

Id. at 1072.

Further, even if there were a general norm requiring 

independent judicial determination, it might be qualified in 

the narrow circumstances presented herewhere, because of 

the death of the trial judge, insistence on an independent 

finding would require a substantial repetition of the trial if 

the issue turned on credibility. Indeed, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

25(b) authorizes a replacement judge to take over after the 

verdict if the judge before whom the case was tried dies or is 

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similarly disabled. The rule also permits the grant of a new 

trial if the replacement judge is satisfied that "a judge who 

did not preside at trial cannot perform those duties." In 

United States v. Thomas, No. 93-3206 (D.C. Cir. June 3, 

1997), where the defendant claimed that credibility disputes 

in the trial evidence made the replacement judge's reading of 

the transcript an inadequate substitute for a new trial, we 

reviewed the new judge's decision to proceed for abuse of 

discretion and found none. Slip op. at 39-41. If there was 

error here, it could not have been plain.

The revised judgments of conviction are

Affirmed.

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