Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35199/USCOURTS-ca9-14-35199-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ray Barrios
Appellee
Corrections Corporation of America, Inc.
Appellant
Randy Enzminger
Appellee
Andrew Ibarra
Appellee
Joshua Kelly
Appellee
Michael Miera
Appellee
Jose Pina
Appellee
Prisoner A
Appellee
Prisoner F
Appellee
Timothy Wengler
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSHUA KELLY; JOSE PINA;

ANDREW IBARRA; RAY BARRIOS;

RANDY ENZMINGER; MICHAEL

MIERA; PRISONER A; PRISONER F,

Individually and on behalf of a

class of all other persons similarly

situated,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

TIMOTHY WENGLER;

CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF

AMERICA, INC.,

Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 13-35972

14-35199

D.C. Nos.

1:11-cv-00185-EJL

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 13, 2015

Seattle, Washington

Filed May 23, 2016

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2 KELLY V. WENGLER

Before: William A. Fletcher and Raymond C. Fisher,

Circuit Judges, and Claudia Wilken,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

SUMMARY**

Prisoner Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s contempt order and

its order awarding plaintiffs attorney’s fees, which the district

court entered after finding that defendants in the underlying

putative class action, Timothy Wengler and the Corrections

Corporation of America, Inc., had violated a settlement

agreement. 

In the underlying § 1983 action, plaintiffs alleged that

defendants staffed the Idaho Corrections Center with an

inadequate number of security guards, in deliberate

indifference to the health and safety of prisoners. The parties

settled, and defendants agreed to staff Idaho Corrections

Center with a specified number of security personnel. After

learning that staffing reports at Idaho Corrections Center had

been falsified over a seven-month post-settlement period,

* The Honorable Claudia Wilken, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Northern District of California, sitting by

designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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KELLY V. WENGLER 3

plaintiffs moved the district court to hold defendants in

contempt.

The panel held that defendants’ non-compliance with the

settlement agreement justified a finding of contempt. The

panel held that defendants failed to take all reasonable steps

that would have allowed it to discover that records had been

falsified. 

The panel held that the district court’s ordered remedy – 

the extension of the settlement agreement for two years – 

was a compensatory civil sanction that returned plaintiffs to

the position they would have occupied had defendants not

violated the agreement from its inception. The modification

of the settlement agreement was well within the court’s

inherent power and was narrowly drawn, necessary, and the

least intrusive means to rectify defendants’ continued Eighth

Amendment violations. 

Affirming the award of attorney’s fees, the panel held that

the Prison Litigation Reform Act allows enhancement of the

lodestar figure in appropriate circumstances. While the Act

limits the hours and the hourly rate used in calculating the

lodestar figure, it does not cap the total amount of attorney’s

fees awards in cases seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,

and it continues to authorize a court to enhance the lodestar

figure based on non-subsumed factors. The panel concluded

that in this case the district court provided clear reasons,

supported by specific evidence in the record, for enhancing

the lodestar figure.

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4 KELLY V. WENGLER

COUNSEL

Nicholas D. Acedo (argued), Daniel P. Struck, Tara B.

Zoellner, Struck Wienecke & Love, P.L.C., Chandler,

Arizona, for Defendants-Appellants.

Stephen L. Pevar (argued), American Civil Liberties Union

Foundation, Hartford, Connecticut; Richard Alan Eppink,

American Civil Liberties Union of Idaho Foundation, Boise,

Idaho, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellees (“Plaintiffs”) brought a putative class

action in the District of Idaho under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against

Defendants-Appellants TimothyWengler and theCorrections

Corporation of America, Inc. (collectively “CCA”), alleging

that CCA staffed the Idaho Corrections Center (“ICC”) with

an inadequate number of security guards, in deliberate

indifference to the health and safety of prisoners. The parties

settled, and CCA agreed to staff ICC with a specified number

of security personnel. The district court dismissed the case

with prejudice, incorporating the parties’ settlement

agreement into its dismissal order.

After learning that staffing reports at ICC had been

falsified over a seven-month post-settlement period, Plaintiffs

moved the district court to hold CCA in contempt for

violating the dismissal order. After a two-day hearing, the

district court found CCA in contempt, ordered remedial

measures, and awarded Plaintiffs attorney’s fees and costs. 

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KELLY V. WENGLER 5

CCA challenges various aspects of the district court’s orders,

including the award of attorney’s fees. We affirm.

I. Background

A. Initial Suit and Settlement

ICC is a state-owned prison in Kuna, Idaho. When this

suit was filed in April 2011, CCA operated ICC under a

contract with the Idaho Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). 

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged CCA failed to hire an adequate

number of security guards and, as a result, ICC staff failed to

protect inmates from assault by other inmates. The complaint

alleged CCA was deliberately indifferent to the safety and

health of ICC inmates in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

Plaintiffs requested declaratory relief and an injunction

ordering, inter alia, that CCA hire an adequate number of

security personnel.

In September 2011, the parties met with a judicial

mediator, District Judge David O. Carter of the Central

District of California. They reached a settlement after three

days of negotiation. In a signed settlement agreement, CCA

agreed to comply with the staffing requirements contained in

its contract with IDOC. CCA also agreed to provide three

additional officers, known as the “Warden’s Crew,” whom

the warden could use in his discretion to enhance security. 

The parties signed a stipulation for dismissal. The stipulation

incorporated the settlement agreement, which was attached as

an exhibit to the stipulation. District Judge Edward J. Lodge

of the District of Idaho signed an order on September 20,

2011, dismissing the case with prejudice. His order explicitly

incorporated the parties’ stipulation.

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6 KELLY V. WENGLER

B. Order to Show Cause

Between December 2012 and January 2013, CCA and

IDOC received reports that staffing records at ICC had been

falsified during the post-settlement period. IDOC initiated an

audit of ICC’s staffing records, and CCA hired an

investigator. On April 11, 2013, IDOC issued a press release,

stating that CCA’s employees had falsified staffing records to

represent that correctional officers were staffing mandatory

security posts when, in fact, those posts had been vacant for

a total of nearly 4,800 hours during a seven-month period in

2012. That same day, CCA issued its own press release

stating there were “some inaccuracies” in its staffing records.

In June 2013, Plaintiffs moved in the district court for an

order to show cause (“OSC”) whyCCA should not be held in

contempt for violating the court’s dismissal order. The

district court referred the motion to Judge Carter, sitting by

special designation in the District of Idaho. CCA opposed the

motion, partly on the ground that the district court did not

have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The

district court held it had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement and issued the requested OSC.

C. Contempt Order

After a two-day hearing, the district court entered an order

on September 16, 2013, holding CCA in contempt and

ordering remedial measures. The order was entered almost

exactly two years after the entry of the order dismissing the

suit and incorporating the settlement agreement.

The district court found CCA had materially breached the

settlement agreement and, indeed, that there was “serious

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KELLY V. WENGLER 7

doubt” whether CCA had ever substantially complied with it. 

The court relied in part on CCA’s own investigative report,

which indicated that from April to October 2012

approximately 4,800 mandatory post hours had been left

vacant. The reported 4,800-hour figure included only nightshift hours during that seven-month period. In addition,

evidence presented at the hearing showed vacancies had

occurred during day-shifts over the period covered by the

report, and additional vacancies had occurred after that

period. For example, with respect to vacancies during the

period covered by the report, ICC Warden (and Defendant)

Timothy Wengler testified that CCA’s investigation revealed

roughly 150 vacant day-shift hours in May 2012 and 300

vacant day-shift hours in June 2012. IDOC official Timothy

Higgins testified that IDOC had received reports from

inmates at ICC that “the only time there was . . . full staffing

was when our monitors were there.” Higgins testified, with

respect to vacancies after the period covered by the report,

that daily staffing reports showed vacant mandatory post

hours at ICC for June and July 2013 ranged from 18 to 41

hours per day.

The district court found further that CCA had “compelling

reasons to regularly and thoroughly check that” it was in

compliance, and that it knew or should have known it was in

material breach of the settlement agreement. Before the

parties executed the settlement agreement, multiple sources

had informed the warden and assistant wardens at ICC that

the facility was experiencing acute staffing shortages, and

indications of ICC’s staffing difficulties continued even after

the parties entered into the settlement agreement. According

to CCA’s internal investigative report, members of ICC’s

senior management were aware of acute personnel shortages

in the post-settlement period, during the spring, summer, and

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8 KELLY V. WENGLER

fall of 2012. The report was corroborated by several

witnesses who testified they informed CCA officials,

including Warden Wengler, about staffing shortages.

Finally, the district court found CCA had not taken all

reasonable steps to comply with the settlement agreement. 

For example, Higgins testified that CCA’s reports of shift

rosters indicated whether a post was covered by two or more

employees but did not indicate the hours worked by each

employee. This manner of reporting made it difficult to

determine whether an employee was reported as having been

simultaneously posted at more than one post (“double

posted”). Warden Wengler, Assistant Warden Thomas

Kessler, and Managing Director Kevin Myers testified that

they neither checked for vacancies nor reviewed staffing

records to ensure that the prison was fully staffed.

CCA eventually took a number of steps to ensure

compliance with the settlement agreement, but it did so only

after there had been an investigation into its staffing and

recordkeeping. After the investigation, CCA implemented a

“corrective action plan” including hiring more guards,

maintaining more detailed staffing records, comparing

staffing rosters with actual staffing, maintaining open lines of

communication about potential staffing difficulties, and

reviewing incidents resulting in vacancies. The district court

found CCA should have taken these measures before the

investigation.

The district court ordered several remedial measures. The

settlement agreement was supposed to last for only two years,

but the court extended it for another two years. The court

appointed an independent monitor, to be paid by CCA. 

Finally, the court established a fine schedule. Under the

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KELLY V. WENGLER 9

schedule, CCA would be required to pay $100 for each hour

that a mandatory post was left vacant in excess of twelve

hours in any calendar month. The court indicated it would

increase the amount of the fines, if $100 per hour proved

insufficient to compel compliance. In the end, the court never

imposed fines for noncompliance. The court declined to

impose several remedies requested by Plaintiffs, including

ordering CCA to discipline more of its staff, conducting an

audit to determine the total number of vacant hours since the

execution of the settlement agreement, and requiring the

submission of reports to the district court.

D. Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs’ counsel, American Civil Liberties Union

(“ACLU”) attorneys Stephen Pevar and Ritchie Eppink,

requested attorney’s fees and costs associated with the

contempt proceedings. Pevar sought compensation for 533.9

hours, and Eppink sought compensation for 253.2 hours. 

They also sought compensation for 174.1 hours of work

performed by legal assistants, as well as $16,598.13 in costs. 

Plaintiffs’ counsel based their attorney’s fees request on an

hourly rate of $213 per hour, which, at the time of the

contempt proceedings, was 150 percent of the hourly rate set

for counsel appointed in criminal cases, the maximum base

rate allowed in cases governed by the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (“PLRA”). They based their request for

paralegal and student-intern fees on an hourly rate of $65 per

hour. The court did not award fees for some of the hours

Plaintiffs’ counsel claimed because several time entries were

vague, but otherwise determined Plaintiffs’ requested hours,

rates, and costs were reasonable.

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10 KELLY V. WENGLER

Plaintiffs’ counsel also requested a 2.0 multiplier of their

fees. The court agreed to enhance the fee award, though not

by the full amount requested. The court gave two reasons for

the enhancement. First, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided superior

performance under extreme time pressure and with very

limited resources. Second, prisoners in Idaho have such

difficulty obtaining counsel for civil rights cases seeking

declaratory and injunctive relief that Plaintiffs’ counsel were

likely the only attorneys willing to accept Plaintiffs’ case.

Based on evidence of the hourly rates of Idaho attorneys

with similar experience, the district court applied a 2.0

multiplier to the fees associated with Pevar’s work and a 1.3

multiplier to the fees associated with Eppink’s work, on the

ground that these fees would compensate Plaintiffs’ counsel

for their superior performance and would be sufficient to

induce competent Idaho attorneys to accept appointment in

meritorious prisoner civil rights cases seeking declaratoryand

injunctive relief. In total, the court awarded $349,018.52 in

attorney’s fees and costs.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, CCA timely appealed the

district court’s orders finding the court had subject matter

jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement, findingCCA

in contempt, and awarding attorney’s fees and costs. See

Stone v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 854

(9th Cir. 1992) (holding that post-judgment contempt orders

imposing sanctions are final for purposes of § 1291).

II. Standards of Review

We review de novo whether a district court has subject

matter jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement,

Kirkland v. Legion Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir.

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KELLY V. WENGLER 11

2003), a district court’s interpretation of federal statutes, San

Luis &Delta Mendota Water Auth. v. United States, 672 F.3d

676, 699 (9th Cir. 2012), and its interpretation of a settlement

agreement, City of Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251,

1261 (9th Cir. 2010). We review for abuse of discretion a

district court’s civil contempt order, FTC v. EDebitPay, LLC,

695 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2012), and its award of attorney’s

fees, Bouman v. Block, 940 F.2d 1211, 1235 (9th Cir. 1991). 

We review the district court’s factual findings in connection

with a contempt order for clear error. EDebitPay, 695 F.3d

at 943.

III. Discussion

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit with prejudice

after the parties reached a settlement. CCA contends the

district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to

enforce the settlement agreement because the court’s

jurisdiction terminated when it dismissed the case. In other

words, CCA maintains the parties’ agreement is not

enforceable in federal court. We disagree. The district court

had federal question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ suit under

28 U.S.C. § 1331; the settlement agreement was incorporated

into the court’s dismissal order; and the district court

therefore had ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement

agreement.

Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter

jurisdiction. A party alleging subject matter jurisdiction has

the burden of establishing it. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). When a district court

dismisses an action with prejudice pursuant to a settlement

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12 KELLY V. WENGLER

agreement, federal jurisdiction usually ends. O’Connor v.

Colvin, 70 F.3d 530, 532 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, a

dispute arising under a settlement agreement is “a separate

contract dispute requiring its own independent basis for

jurisdiction.” Id.

However, federal district courts have ancillaryjurisdiction

over certain matters “otherwise beyond their competence”

that are “incidental to other matters properly before them.” 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 378. A federal court has jurisdiction

to “manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and

effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 380. When a court’s order

dismissing a case with prejudice incorporates the terms of a

settlement agreement, the court retains ancillary jurisdiction

to enforce the agreement because a breach of the incorporated

agreement is a violation of the dismissal order. Id. at 381.

CCA contends the district court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement in this

case because the court’s dismissal order did not incorporate

the terms of the settlement agreement. CCA is wrong as a

matter of law. Under federal law, a document incorporated

into a dismissal order is part of the order. See Saint John’s

Organic Farm v. Gem Cnty. Mosquito Abatement Dist.,

574 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court’s

order explicitly incorporated the parties’ stipulation for

dismissal. The stipulation is therefore part of the dismissal

order.

Stipulations for dismissal are construed according to the

“basic contract principles” of local law. Jeff D. v. Andrus,

899 F.2d 753, 759 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, we apply Idaho

contract law, because the parties entered into the stipulation

in Idaho, Plaintiffs are Idaho residents, and the stipulation

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KELLY V. WENGLER 13

relates to CCA’s business in Idaho. Under Idaho law,

incorporation of a document into a contract makes the

document part of the contract. City of Meridian v. Petra Inc.,

299 P.3d 232, 242 (Idaho 2013). The stipulation for

dismissal explicitly incorporated the parties’ settlement

agreement and attached the agreement as an exhibit, thereby

making the settlement agreement part of the stipulation. 

Thus, the parties’ settlement agreement is incorporated into

the court’s dismissal order, and by violating the settlement

agreement, CCA violated the order.

The district court dismissed this case under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), which provides that an

action may be dismissed when the plaintiff files “a stipulation

of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared.” The

Supreme Court has held that a district court that dismisses a

case under this rule may “embody the settlement contract in

its dismissal order . . . if the parties agree.” Kokkonen,

511 U.S. at 381–82 (emphasis added). Here, the parties

agreed the district court would retain ancillary jurisdiction to

enforce the agreement. Paragraph 15 of the agreement

establishes a three-step procedure for resolving disputes. 

Under this procedure, the parties must first attempt to resolve

the dispute themselves. If they are unable to do so, they must

then attempt to resolve the dispute with the Alternative

Dispute Resolution Coordinator for the District of Idaho. If

that attempt fails, the parties may “submit the dispute to the

Honorable David O. Carter, who shall have authority to

enforce the terms of this agreement in his capacity as a

Federal District Court Judge.” (Emphasis added.) Paragraph

15 thus provides that the district court shall have authority to

enforce the agreement once the parties have taken a dispute

through the first two steps of the dispute-resolution process.

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14 KELLY V. WENGLER

Paragraph 1 of the agreement supports this interpretation

of Paragraph 15. Paragraph 1 provides that the agreement

will “extend no further than necessary to satisfy the

requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).” Under this

provision of the PLRA, a federal district court may not order

“prospective relief” unless it finds the relief is “narrowly

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the

violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means

necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); id. § 3626(g)(7) (defining

“prospective relief”). These limitations on “prospective

relief” do not apply to private settlement agreements. Id.

§ 3626(c)(2). Paragraph 1’s reference to § 3626(a)(1)(A) thus

evinces the parties’ intention to make the settlement

agreement enforceable in federal court. We therefore

conclude the district court had ancillary jurisdiction to

enforce the settlement agreement, the terms of which were

incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order. For

convenience, we hereafter refer only to the settlement

agreement, with the caveat that the court’s jurisdiction was

based on CCA’s violation of the dismissal order incorporating

the agreement’s terms.

B. Finding of Contempt and Ordering of Remedies

The district court found by clear and convincing evidence

that CCA was in civil contempt because it violated the

settlement agreement and had failed to take all reasonable

steps to comply. It is not seriously disputed that CCA was in

substantial violation of the settlement agreement. The only

serious disputes concern whether CCA’s non-compliance

justified a finding of contempt and whether the remedies

ordered were appropriate. Because CCA has ceased

providing staffing for ICC, the contempt and remedies

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KELLY V. WENGLER 15

ordered by the district court are no longer relevant to CCA’s

operation of ICC. However, they remain relevant for

purposes of CCA’s appeal because the attorney’s fees award

depends on the correctness of the court’s conclusion that

CCA was in contempt and on the appropriateness of the

remedies ordered.

1. All Reasonable Steps

CCA first contends the district court’s contempt finding

was an abuse of discretion because CCA implemented a

number of corrective measures immediately after discovering

that it was not in compliance with the settlement agreement. 

CCA’s argument is based on a misunderstanding of well

established law.

A contemnor in violation of a court order may avoid a

finding of civil contempt only by showing it took all

reasonable steps to comply with the order. See Inst. of

Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y,

774 F.3d 935, 945 (9th Cir. 2014). CCA emphasizes the steps

it took to comply with the settlement agreement, but fails to

mention other reasonable steps it could have taken. For

example, after the parties signed the settlement agreement,

CCA increased the number of budgeted security staff

positions at ICC. CCA failed, however, actually to fill a

substantial number of those budgeted positions. Further,

although Warden Wengler convened meetings to review

staffing requirements, in some of those meetings he was

informed that ICC was experiencing acute staffing

difficulties. Yet CCA failed to address those difficulties. 

Finally, CCA contends its senior management may not have

known that ICC staff members were falsifying staffing

rosters. CCA failed, however, to take all reasonable steps

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16 KELLY V. WENGLER

that would have allowed it to discover that records had been

falsified.

Citing our decision in Vertex Distributing, Inc. v. Falcon

Foam Plastics, Inc., 689 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1982), CCA

contends it should not have been found in contempt because

it took immediate corrective action after learning of the

inaccurate staffing reports. The facts in Vertex, however, are

far afield from the facts here. In Vertex, the plaintiff

requested the court find the defendant in contempt for

violating a consent judgment that prohibited the defendant

from using a particular trade name for publicity purposes. 

689 F.2d at 887–88. Although the plaintiff proved the

defendant was listed under that name in a local yellow pages

directory, in violation of the judgment, we upheld the district

court’s decision not to find the defendant in contempt because

the defendant had otherwise complied with the consent

judgment and had taken steps to remove the trade name from

its yellow pages listing as soon as it discovered the listing. 

Id. at 891–92.

Here, by contrast, the district court found CCA had not

substantially complied with the settlement agreement and had

failed to take several reasonable steps to ensure compliance. 

Moreover, the court found CCA’s “corrective action plan”

was itself inadequate. Indeed, just one month before the

contempt proceedings began, mandatory posts at ICC were

still left vacant between 18 and 41 hours per day.

2. Nature of the Sanctions

CCA objects to two of the ordered remedies — the

extension of the settlement agreement and the prospective

fine schedule — on the ground that they are criminal

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KELLY V. WENGLER 17

sanctions and that the district court did not follow procedures

that would have allowed it to hold CCA in criminal contempt.

Unlike civil contempt, criminal contempt requires the

procedural safeguards applicable in criminal proceedings,

including proof beyond a reasonable doubt. F.J. Hanshaw

Enters., Inc. v. Emerald River Dev., Inc., 244 F.3d 1128, 1139

(9th Cir. 2001). It is undisputed that when the district court

found CCA in contempt the court did not provide all of the

procedural protections required in criminal proceedings. 

Thus, if the district court’s contempt finding and the

associated remedies were criminal in nature, the finding and

remedies were improper and would have to be reversed.

Whether contempt is civil or criminal turns on the nature

of the sanction or sanctions involved. Int’l Union, United

Mine Workers v. Bagwell (Bagwell), 512 U.S. 821, 827–28

(1994). “[A] sanction generally is civil if it coerces

compliance with a court order or is a remedial sanction meant

to compensate the complainant for actual losses. A criminal

sanction, in contrast, generally seeks to punish a ‘completed

act of disobedience.’” Ahearn ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Int’l

Longshore & Warehouse Union, Locals 21 & 4, 721 F.3d

1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bagwell, 512 U.S. at

828).

We conclude the extension of the settlement agreement is

a compensatory civil sanction. Rather than punishing CCA,

this sanction sought to return Plaintiffs as nearly as possible

to the position they would have occupied had CCA not

violated the agreement. The settlement agreement required

CCA to provide a certain number of security personnel at ICC

for two years. CCA failed to provide the required number of

personnel during that two-year period. By extending the

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18 KELLY V. WENGLER

settlement agreement for two years, the district court thus

ordered the relief to which Plaintiffs were originally entitled

under the agreement but that CCA had failed to provide.

We need not reach the question whether the fines would

have been coercive and therefore civil, for the district court

never actually imposed fines. The court merely informed

CCA of the fines that would have resulted had CCA

continued to violate the settlement agreement after the

conclusion of the contempt proceedings. Informing CCA of

the prospective fine schedule was not itself a sanction. Cf.

S.E.C. v. Hickey, 322 F.3d 1123, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 2003)

(holding a contempt order announcing a fine is not final for

purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 until the court imposes the

fine).

We therefore conclude the court’s contempt finding is

civil in nature.

C. Extension of the Settlement Agreement

CCA contends the district court’s decision to extend the

settlement agreement by two years was an abuse of

discretion. We disagree.

The settlement agreement’s original terms, which were

incorporated into the district court’s dismissal order, provided

that the agreement would terminate “on the two year

anniversary of the date” it was executed. The extension of

the settlement agreement was therefore a modification of a

court order.

Courts have long had inherent power to modify court

orders in changed circumstances. See United States v. Swift

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KELLY V. WENGLER 19

& Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1932). This power is now

codified at Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Bellevue Manor Assocs. v. United States,

165 F.3d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1999). Under well established

law, substantial violation of a court order constitutes a

significant change in factual circumstances. See Labor/Cmty.

Strategy Ctr., 564 F.3d at 1120–22; Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t

of Hous. & Urban Dev., 404 F.3d 821, 828–29 (4th Cir.

2005); David C. v. Leavitt, 242 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir.

2001); Holland v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corrs., 246 F.3d 267,

283–84 (3d Cir. 2001); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of

Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (6th Cir. 1994). Further,

a modification of a court order is “suitably tailored to the

changed circumstance” when it “would return both parties as

nearly as possible to where they would have been absent” the

changed circumstances. Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918,

927 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (emphasis omitted). Here, the court’s

extension of the settlement agreement returned Plaintiffs to

the position they would have occupied had CCA not violated

the agreement from its inception. The modification of the

settlement agreement was therefore well within the court’s

inherent power.

CCA further contends the district court abused its

discretion by extending the entire settlement agreement

instead of extending only the staffing requirements embodied

in paragraph 4. In particular, CCA argues there is no

evidence that it failed to comply with the settlement

agreement’s other provisions, including requirements that

CCA investigate and prepare a report on all inmate-on-inmate

assaults, encourage good behavior by inmates, report

aggravated batteries to the Ada County Sheriff’s Office, and

make housing assignments consistent with IDOC’s Standard

Operating Procedure.

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20 KELLY V. WENGLER

The district court’s findings were not confined to the

failure of CCA to fulfill the staffing requirements. The court

found, in addition, that the “same supervisors who signed

falsified record sheets remain[ed] on the job,” and that CCA’s

shoddy record keeping “obscured who was working at what

posts and at what times.” In light of these findings, the

district court doubted CCA’s “compliance in other respects,

such as whether every violent incident is reported.” Further,

the district court was reasonably concerned that CCA’s

failure to comply with staffing requirements affected its

ability to comply with the settlement agreement’s other

requirements. The court’s conclusion that the extension of

the entire agreement was suitably tailored to correct CCA’s

non-compliance was thus not an abuse of discretion.

For the same reason, we reject CCA’s contention that

extending the entire settlement agreement violates 18 U.S.C.

§ 3626(a)(1)(A)’s limitations on prospective relief. Plaintiffs

brought this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged

violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. When the

district court and the parties approved the settlement

agreement, there was no dispute that its remedies were

narrowly drawn, necessary, and the least intrusive means to

bring ICC into compliance with the Eighth Amendment, in

accordance with § 3626(a)(1)(A). The same remedies remain

narrowly drawn, necessary, and the least intrusive means to

rectify CCA’s continued Eighth Amendment violations.

D. Attorney’s Fees

The district court awarded Plaintiffs attorney’s fees and

costs associated with the contempt proceedings. CCA

contends the attorney’s fees award violates the PLRA. We

disagree.

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KELLY V. WENGLER 21

1. Attorney’s Fees in Prisoner Civil Rights Cases

The PLRA was enacted “to deter frivolous prisoner

lawsuits that needlesslywasted judicial resources.” Woods v.

Carey, 722 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2013). Congress sought

to “reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner

suits.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Toward

this end, Congress introduced a “variety of reforms designed

to filter out the bad [prisoner] claims and facilitate

consideration of the good.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204

(2007). Among the reforms were changes to the manner in

which attorney’s fees are determined in prisoner civil rights

cases.

The PLRA’s provisions relating to attorney’s fees apply

to “any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any

jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney’s

fees are authorized under [42 U.S.C. § 1988].” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d)(1). Section 1988 is an exception to the

“American Rule” that each party ordinarily bears its own

attorney’s fees. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429

(1983). Section 1988 authorizes courts to award “a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs” to a “prevailing

party” in cases brought under various civil rights statutes,

including § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Section 1988 is

asymmetrical, awarding attorney’s fees to civil rights

plaintiffs if they are prevailing parties, but awarding

attorney’s fees to prevailing civil rights defendants only if

plaintiffs’ claims are frivolous. See Hughes v. Rowe,

449 U.S. 5, 14–15 (1980). The purpose of § 1988 is “to

ensure that federal rights are adequately enforced.” Perdue

v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 550 (2010). Thus, “a

reasonable attorney’s fee” is one that is “sufficient to induce

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22 KELLY V. WENGLER

a capable attorney to undertake the representation of a

meritorious civil rights case.” Id. at 552.

Federal courts employthe “lodestar” method to determine

a reasonable attorney’s fees award under § 1988. The

lodestar method is a two-step process. Fischer v. SJB-P.D.

Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 2000). First, a court

calculates the lodestar figure by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended on a case by a reasonable hourly

rate. Id. A reasonable hourly rate is ordinarily the

“prevailing market rate[] in the relevant community.” 

Perdue, 559 U.S. at 551 (citation omitted). The lodestar

figure “roughly approximates the fee that the prevailing

attorney would have received if he or she had been

representing a paying client who was billed by the hour in a

comparable case,” id. (emphasis omitted), and is therefore a

presumptively reasonable fee. Gonzalez v. City of Maywood,

729 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2013). Second, the court

determines whether to modify the lodestar figure, upward or

downward, based on factors not subsumed in the lodestar

figure. See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 553–54; Morales v. City of

San Rafael, 96 F.3d 359, 363–64 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1996), as

amended on denial of reh’g, 108 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1997).

The PLRA alters the lodestar method in prisoner civil

rights cases in three fundamental ways. First, rather than

hours reasonably expended in the litigation, hours used to

determine the fee award are limited to those that are

(1) directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual

violation of the plaintiff’s rights and (2) either

proportionately related to court-ordered relief or directly and

reasonably incurred in enforcing such relief. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d)(1). Second, in actions resulting in monetary

judgments, the total amount of the attorney’s fees award

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KELLY V. WENGLER 23

associated with the monetary judgment is limited to 150

percent of the judgment. Id. § 1997e(d)(2); see Jimenez v.

Franklin, 680 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). This

limitation does not apply to actions (or parts of actions)

resulting in non-monetary relief. Third, the hourly rate used

as the basis for a fee award is limited to 150 percent of the

hourly rate used for paying appointed counsel under the

Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (the “CJA rate”). 

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(3). Hereafter, we refer to 150 percent

of the CJA rate as the “PLRA rate.” Notably, the PLRA is

silent as to the second step of the lodestar method, in which

a court may adjust the lodestar figure based on factors not

subsumed in that figure.

2. The Fee Enhancements Under the PLRA

The district court concluded Plaintiffs were entitled to

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs because they were

“prevailing part[ies]” in a case brought under § 1983. See

42 U.S.C. § 1988. The court used the lodestar method, as

modified and limited by the PLRA, to determine reasonable

attorney’s fees. The court first multiplied the number of

hours directly and reasonably expended in enforcing the

settlement agreement by the PLRA rate to arrive at the

lodestar figure. The court then enhanced the lodestar figure

based on factors not already subsumed in that figure.

CCA contends the attorney’s fees award violates the

PLRA. According to CCA, in a suit for injunctive or

declaratory relief, the PLRA prohibits an attorney’s fees

award exceeding the amount determined by multiplying the

number of hours permitted under § 1997e(d)(1) by the PLRA

rate specified in § 1997e(d)(3). That is, CCA contends the

PLRA forbids a court from enhancing the lodestar figure,

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even if the enhancement is based on factors not subsumed in

that figure. We disagree and conclude the PLRA allows

enhancement of the lodestar figure in appropriate

circumstances. Our conclusion follows from two principles

of statutory interpretation.

First, a “party contending that legislative action changed

settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature

intended such a change.” Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co.,

490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989). When Congress enacted the

PLRA, the lodestar method for determining a reasonable

attorney’s fees award under § 1988 had already “achieved

dominance in the federal courts.” Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002). As explained above, the lodestar

method is a two-step process. A court first determines the

lodestar figure bymultiplying the hours reasonably expended

by a reasonable hourly rate; it then determines whether to

adjust that figure upward or downward. See, e.g., Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892–96 (1984) (addressing hourly

rates); id. at 896–902 (addressing enhancements); Hensley,

461 U.S. at 433–34 (addressing hourly rates); id. at 434–37

(addressing enhancements). There is nothing in the

attorney’s fees provisions of the PLRA that instructs a court

not to take both steps in this process.

A comparison to the attorney’s fees provision of the

Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”) is

instructive. The IDEA specifies that attorney’s fees awarded

under that statute shall be “based on rates prevailing in the

community.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(C). The next sentence,

in language not found in the PLRA, then specifies: “No

bonus or multiplier may be used in calculating the fees

awarded under this subsection.” Id. As this sentence

illustrates, Congress knows how to instruct a court not to

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KELLY V. WENGLER 25

adjust the lodestar figure. Yet such instruction is

conspicuously absent from the PLRA. Congress’ silence is

“strong evidence that the usual practice should be followed.” 

Jones, 549 U.S. at 212. That is, Congress’ silence is strong

evidence that the PLRA contemplates the continuation of the

normal practice under § 1988 of adjusting the lodestar figure

by factors not subsumed in that figure.

Second, when “Congress includes particular language in

one section of a statute but omits it in another — let alone in

the very next provision — [federal courts presume] that

Congress intended a difference in meaning.” Loughrin v.

United States, — U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 2384, 2390 (2014)

(citation omitted). In cases involving monetary judgments,

the PLRA expressly limits the total amount of the attorney’s

fees award associated with the monetary judgment to 150

percent of the judgment. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2); see

Jimenez, 680 F.3d at 1100. By contrast, § 1997e(d)(3),

addressed to attorney’s fees awards not associated with

monetary judgments, does not express a limitation on the

total amount of those awards. Instead, it limits only the

hourly rate that an award may be “based on.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(d)(3). We infer from the presence of an express

limitation on the total amount of attorney’s fees awards in

§ 1997e(d)(2), and the absence of such a limitation in

§ 1997e(d)(3), that Congress did not intend the latter section

— the section relevant to this appeal — to “cap” the total

amount of attorney’s fees awards. We therefore hold that,

while the PLRA limits the hours and the hourly rate used in

calculating the lodestar figure, it does not cap the total

amount of attorney’s fees awards in cases seeking declaratory

and injunctive relief, and it continues to authorize a court to

enhance the lodestar figure based on non-subsumed factors.

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CCA makes several specific objections to this conclusion,

none of which is persuasive. First, CCA contends the

Supreme Court’s decision in Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343

(1999), compels us to treat the hourly rate prescribed in

§ 1997e(d)(3) as a maximum hourly rate that cannot be

enhanced by a non-subsumed factor. The Court’s opinion in

Martin stated that the PLRA “places a cap on the size of

attorney’s fees that may be awarded in prison litigation suits.” 

Id. at 350. CCA contends this statement tells us that

§ 1997e(d)(3) caps the total amount of attorney’s fees awards,

but CCA quotes the statement out of context. The Court

continued: “Court-appointed attorneys in the Eastern District

of Michigan are compensated at a maximum rate of $75 per

hour, and thus, . . . the PLRA fee cap for attorneys working

on prison litigation suits translates into a maximum hourly

rate of $112.50.” Id. When read in context, the Court’s

statement merely invokes the undisputed proposition that

§ 1997e(d)(3) limits the hourly rate that may be used for

determining the lodestar figure.

Second,CCA contends § 1997e(d)(3) alreadyprovides for

the possibility of an enhancement. According to CCA, the

CJA rate is the presumptive hourly rate under the PLRA, and

§ 1997e(d)(3) affirmatively authorizes fee enhancements not

exceeding 150 percent of that rate. CCA does not cite, nor

have we been able to find, any authority supporting this

contention. As we have noted above, the PLRA explicitly

refers to § 1988 as the governing framework for determining

a reasonable attorney’s fees award. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1). 

Attorney’s fees awards under § 1988 are determined by first

multiplying the relevant hourly rate by the number of hours

reasonably spent. Section 1997e(d)(3) provides only that fee

awards may not “be based on an hourly rate greater than 150

percent” of the CJA rate. That is, the rate limited by

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KELLY V. WENGLER 27

§ 1997e(d)(3) is the base rate used to calculate the lodestar

figure, which is the PLRA’s counterpart to the prevailing

market rate used in non-PLRA cases. Only after calculating

the lodestar figure using this base rate does a court then

determine whether to apply an enhancement to that figure.

Third, CCA contends allowing enhancements under the

PLRA renders the 150 percent limitation in § 1997e(d)(3) a

dead letter. The 150 percent limitation on the base hourly

rate for calculating an attorney’s fees award is meaningless,

CCA contends, if the district court may enhance that hourly

rate. CCA overstates the matter, ignoring important

limitations on a district court’s determination of attorney’s

fees awards and its discretion to enhance them. Not only

does the PLRA limit the hours for which attorney’s fees may

be awarded and the total fees that may be awarded in a case

resulting in a monetaryaward, see § 1997e(d)(1) & (d)(2), but

enhancements to the lodestar figure are available only “in

those rare circumstances in which the lodestar does not

adequately take into account a factor that may properly be

considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Perdue,

559 U.S. at 554. Further, the fee applicant bears the “the

burden of proving that an enhancement is necessary” and

“must produce specific evidence that supports the award.” Id.

at 553 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, even when an enhancement is appropriate, of course,

it may not be based on considerations already subsumed in

the PLRA rate.

3. Justifications for the Enhancement

The remaining question is whether the district court in

this case provided clear reasons, supported by specific

evidence in the record, for enhancing the lodestar figure. We

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conclude it did. The district court relied on two nonsubsumed factors to justify its attorney’s fees enhancement

— superior performance and the need to attract competent

counsel. We consider these factors in turn.

a. Superior Performance

The district court enhanced the lodestar figure in part

because it found Plaintiffs’ counsel had provided superior

performance. In Perdue, the Supreme Court held, although

the lodestar figure typically subsumes “the novelty and

complexity of a case” and “the quality of an attorney’s

performance,” a court may enhance the lodestar in “rare” and

“exceptional” circumstances when the lodestar figure does

not adequatelyrepresent counsel’s “superior performance and

commitment of resources.” 559 U.S. at 553–54 (citation

omitted). The Court gave several examples of such

circumstances, including one that is relevant here. A court

may enhance the lodestar figure when “the method used in

determining the hourly rate employed in the lodestar

calculation does not adequately measure the attorney’s true

market value, as demonstrated in part during the litigation.” 

Id. at 554–55. Thus, in non-PLRA civil rights cases, a court

may enhance the lodestar figure if plaintiff’s counsel

demonstrates the value of her services exceeds what the court

determines to be the prevailing market rate for otherwise

comparable attorneys.

In PLRA cases, the analysis is similar to that in other civil

rights cases, though a court must calculate the lodestar figure

using a base rate no greater than the PLRA rate specified in

§ 1997e(d)(3). In other words, the PLRA rate virtually

always replaces the prevailing market rate as the

presumptively reasonable rate in the court’s determination of

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KELLY V. WENGLER 29

the lodestar figure because actual prevailing rates are very

unlikely to be as low as the PLRA rate. See, e.g., Webb v.

Ada Cnty., 285 F.3d 829, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2002); Graves v.

Arpaio, 633 F. Supp. 2d 834, 854–55 (D. Ariz. 2009); Ilick v.

Miller, 68 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1174 (D. Nev. 1999); Lozeau v.

Lake Cnty., 98 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1171 (D. Mont. 2000);

Rodriguez v. Cnty. of L.A., 96 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1021 (C.D.

Cal. 2014). Like the prevailing rate in a non-PLRA case, the

PLRA rate generally subsumes the factors relevant to the

determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee, including the

novelty and complexity of the case and the quality of the

attorney’s performance. However, as in non-PLRA cases, the

district court may enhance the lodestar figure when plaintiff’s

counsel’s “superior performance and commitment of

resources” is “rare” and “exceptional” as compared to the

run-of-the-mill representation in such cases. Perdue,

559 U.S. at 553–54 (citation omitted).

CitingPerdue, the district court found “Plaintiffs’ counsel

achieved excellent results for their clients under extreme time

pressure and with very limited resources.” The court found

further that Plaintiffs’ counsel provided “extraordinary

performance yielding extraordinary results,” and that “the

quality of the work that produced these results [was]

underrepresented in the hourly fee.” We conclude the district

court did not abuse its discretion in so finding.

The district court’s justification for enhancing the lodestar

figure was supported by specific evidence in the record. The

court’s statement that Plaintiffs’ counsel labored “under

extreme time pressure and with very limited resources” was,

if anything, an understatement. Plaintiffs’ counsel had only

twenty-six days to conduct discovery in preparation for the

contempt hearing. During that period, Plaintiffs’ two

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attorneys not only engaged in extensive motions practice,

writing numerous pre-trial briefs; they also conducted an

extraordinary amount of discovery. They interviewed,

deposed, and prepared numerous witnesses in three states and

obtained and reviewed roughly 7,000 pages of discovery. 

Most of the documents were produced for their review only

five days before the beginning of the hearing. Some were

even produced for review on the first evening of the hearing. 

Despite these constraints, Plaintiffs’ counsel uncovered

substantial evidence of noncompliance with the settlement

agreement. Based on this evidence, they obtained a contempt

finding and secured significant remedies for their clients.

CCA does not dispute the constraints under which

Plaintiffs’ counsel labored, but it contends counsel did not

achieve extraordinary results. First, CCA contends the

remedies obtained did “nearly nothing” for Plaintiffs because

Plaintiff Miera was the only named Plaintiff who remained

incarcerated at ICC during the contempt hearing. CCA is

wrong in so contending. The parties settled the suit before

the district court decided whether to certify a class, but the

suit had been filed as a putative class action, and the

settlement agreement’s intended beneficiaries were all

prisoners at ICC. Plaintiffs’ counsel achieved significant

results for these beneficiaries byobtaining a contempt finding

against CCA and a two-year extension of the settlement

agreement. See Hook v. Ariz. Dep’t of Corr., 972 F.2d 1012,

1014–15 (9th Cir. 1992) (intended beneficiaries may enforce

a court order).

Second, CCA seeks to minimize the importance of the

relief obtained by Plaintiffs’ counsel by pointing to an offer

it made during negotiations preceding the contempt hearing. 

Three weeks before the start of the hearing, CCA offered, in

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KELLY V. WENGLER 31

exchange for not being subject to a finding of contempt, to

extend the settlement agreement for one year; to hire a

monitor of its own choosing to review staffing at ICC; and to

payPlaintiffs’ reasonable attorney’s fees and costs associated

with the OSC. CCA compares this offer to the relief

ultimately granted by the court and contends the additional

relief ordered by the court, over and above CCA’s offer, was

insignificant. Again, CCA is wrong in so contending. After

the hearing, Plaintiffs obtained an express finding of

contempt and a two-year extension of the settlement

agreement. This relief is substantially more than was offered

by CCA. Moreover, Plaintiffs’ counsel had initiated

contempt proceedings a month before CCA made its offer of

settlement, and CCA’s offer was the product of the work

Plaintiffs’ counsel had already put into the case.

b. Attracting Competent Counsel

The district court also enhanced the lodestar figure

because it found the limited fees available in prisoner civil

rights cases, without enhancement, are insufficient to induce

private attorneys in Idaho to accept cases, such as this one,

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The court found

Plaintiffs’ counsel “were likely the only attorneys willing to

accept” Plaintiffs’ case.

CCA contends the district court’s rationale is an

impermissible ground for enhancing the lodestar figure in a

case governed by the PLRA because it undermines the

PLRA’s goal of reducing the number of prisoner lawsuits. 

CCA’s position would maximize one of the PLRA’s goals by

eviscerating the other. The PLRA’s purposes are to “reduce

the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.” 

Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added). Thus, while the

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32 KELLY V. WENGLER

PLRA was an effort to “eliminate frivolous lawsuits,” it was

not an effort to “eliminate the ameliorative effect achieved by

valid constitutionally-based challenges.” Cano v. Taylor,

739 F.3d 1214, 1219 (9th Cir. 2014); see Woods, 722 F.3d at

1182–83.

Improving the quality of prisoner suits requires that

plaintiffs with meritorious civil rights cases be able to secure

competent counsel. When the lodestar figure based on the

PLRA rate is insufficient to induce competent attorneys to

accept appointment in meritorious civil rights cases, it is by

definition not a reasonable fee. See Perdue, 559 U.S. at 552. 

When a plaintiff demonstrates with specific evidence that no

competent attorney is willing to take on a meritorious civil

rights case because of insufficient fees, the district court

furthers the PLRA’s purpose by enhancing the lodestar figure

by an amount reasonably calculated to induce competent

lawyers in the relevant community to take such cases. See id.

at 554 (a fee enhancement is appropriate when there is

“specific evidence that the lodestar fee would not have been

adequate to attract competent counsel” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Based on evidence in the record, the district court found

that, due to the inadequacy of the unenhanced PLRA rate,

Idaho attorneys, save for Plaintiffs’ counsel, have been

unwilling to accept appointment in prisoner civil rights cases

seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs’ lead

counsel, Stephen Pevar, stated in a declaration that he was not

aware of any attorney or organization, other than his

organization and attorneys associated with Idaho Legal Aid

Services, Inc., that had filed a prisoner class action in Idaho

seeking injunctive relief since the PLRA was enacted. 

However, Legal Aid Services is now unable to represent

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KELLY V. WENGLER 33

prisoners in PLRA cases. Howard Belodoff, the Associate

Director of Idaho Legal Aid Services, Inc., stated in a

declaration that since 1996 a federal regulation has prohibited

his organization from representing plaintiffs in cases

governed by the PLRA, on pain of losing its primary source

of funding. Finally, J. Walter Sinclair, Jason Monteleone,

and Jason Wood, three Idaho practitioners, stated in

declarations that they were unaware of any attorney or

organization in Idaho, other than the ACLU, that would

litigate PLRA suits seeking only declaratory and injunctive

relief. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not

abuse its discretion in enhancing the attorney’s fees award to

ensure that it was adequate to attract competent counsel in

comparable cases.

4. Challenges To Line Items in the Fee Request

CCA contests some of the line items for which Plaintiffs

were awarded attorney’s fees. Specifically, CCA contends

Plaintiffs should not have been awarded attorney’s fees for

two attorneys to attend depositions, and they contend

Plaintiffs should not have received attorney’s fees for the

performance of certain clerical tasks. We conclude the

district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees for

these items.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s

contempt order and its order awarding attorney’s fees.

AFFIRMED.

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