Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00791/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-00791-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Veronica Wells
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

VERONICA WELLS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-00791 AC 

ORDER 

 Petitioner seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental security income (“SSI”)1 under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 1381-1383f. For the reasons that follow, 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment will be denied and defendant’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment will be granted. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff initially applied for SSI on September 1, 2011 alleging her disability began on 

 

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 SSI is paid to financially needy disabled persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a); Washington State Dept. 

of Social and Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 375 (2003) ( Title 

XVI of the Act, § 1381 et seq., is the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) scheme of benefits for 

aged, blind, or disabled individuals, including children, whose income and assets fall below 

specified levels). 

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that date. Administrative Record2 (“AR) at 13 (ECF No.13-3 at 14). The claim was initially 

denied on December 20, 2011, and on reconsideration on September 18, 2012. Id. Plaintiff then 

filed a request for hearing on October 18, 2012. 20 CFR 416.1429 et seq. Id. Administrative 

Law Judge (“ALJ”) Nancy Lisewski presided over a hearing on May 12, 2014 attended by 

plaintiff’s attorney and Impartial Vocational Expert (“IVE”) Thomas G. Linvill, who testified. 

AR 31-32 (ECF No. 13-3 at 32-33). Plaintiff testified by telephone after waiving the notice of 

hearing. AR 13 (ECF No. 13-3 at 14). 

 Originally the plaintiff had applied for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) as well as 

SSI. She alleged the onset of her disability for DIB purposes was December 31, 2010. 

Administrative Record (“AR”) 185 (ECF No. 13-6 at 2). However, earnings reports showed that 

plaintiff had earnings through 2012, AR 201-207 (ECF No. 13-6 at 18-24). Ultimately the ALJ 

determined that plaintiff was eligible for SSI from January 1, 2013. AR 13 (ECF No. 13-3 at 14). 

Plaintiff does not contest these findings. 

 On May 21, 2014, ALJ Lisewski found plaintiff “not disabled” and plaintiff requested 

review by the Appeals Council, AR 8 (ECF No. 11-3 at 9), which request was denied on January 

28, 2015. AR 1 (ECF No. 13-3 at 2). Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on April 11, 2015. 

ECF No. 1. The parties consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge. ECF Nos. 9 

(plaintiff) and 7 (defendant). The cross-motions for summary judgment based upon the 

Administrative Record filed by the Commissioner have been fully briefed. ECF No. 15 

(plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment), ECF No. 16 (defendant’s cross-motion for summary 

judgment), and ECF No. 19 (plaintiff’s reply memorandum). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff was born in 1976 and thus was under fifty years of age at all relevant times. ECF 

No. 15 at AR 20 (ECF No. 13-3 at 21). She has at least a high school education and can 

communicate in English. Id. 

 

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 The Administrative Record, comprising 523 pages was filed in ten (10) parts and is found at 

ECF No. 13. 

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III. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 The Commissioner’s decision that a plaintiff is not disabled will be upheld “if it is 

supported by substantial evidence and if the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards.” 

Howard ex rel. Wolff v Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1011 (9th Cir. 2003). “The findings of the 

Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . . .” Andrews 

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 406(g)). 

 Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla [but] may be less than a 

preponderance.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 

omitted). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 

as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal 

quotations omitted). “While inferences from the record can constitute substantial evidence, only 

those ‘reasonably drawn from the record’ will suffice.” Widmark v. Barnhart, 454 F.3d 1063, 

1066 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Although this court cannot substitute its discretion for 

that of the Commissioner, the court nonetheless must review the record as a whole, “weighing 

both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the [Commissioner’s] 

conclusion.” Desrosiers v. Secretary of HHS, 846 F2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988); Jones v. Heckler, 

760 F.2d 993, 95 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The court must consider both evidence that supports and 

evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion; it may not affirm simply by isolating a specific 

quantum of supporting evidence.”) 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massnari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports 

the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

954 (9th Cir. 2002). However, the court may review only the reasons stated by the ALJ in his 

decision “and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” Orn v. Astrue, 

495 F3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007); Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003) (“It was 

error for the district court to affirm the ALJ’s credibility decision based on evidence that the ALJ 

did not discuss”). 

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 The court will not reverse the Commissioner’s decision if it is based on harmless error, 

which exists only when it is “clear from the record that an ‘ALJ’s error was inconsequential to the 

ultimate nondisability determination.’” Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Stout v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 1050-1056 (9th Cir. 2006)); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 

F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). 

IV. RELEVANT LAW 

 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every 

individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner 

uses a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine whether an applicant is disabled and 

entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 

20, 24-25 (2003) (setting forth the “five-step sequential evaluation process to determine 

disability” under Title II and Title XVI). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation 

steps. 

Step one: Is the plaintiff engaging in substantial gainful activity? 

If so, the plaintiff is not disabled. If not proceed to step two. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b). 

Step two: Does the plaintiff have a “severe” impairment? If so, 

proceed to step three. If not, the plaintiff is not disabled. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g) 

Step three: Does the plaintiff’s impairment or combination of 

impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, plaintiff is disabled. If not, proceed to 

step four. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). 

Step four: Does the plaintiff’s residual functional capacity make 

him capable of performing his past work? If so, the plaintiff is not 

disabled. If not, proceed to step five. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e), (f). 

Step five: Does the plaintiff have the residual functional capacity to 

perform any other work? If so, the plaintiff is not disabled. If not, 

the plaintiff is disabled. 

Id. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g). 

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 The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. 20 C.F.R § 404.1512(a) (“In general, you have to prove to us that you are blind or 

disabled”), 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a) (same). However, “[a]t the fifth step of the sequential 

analysis, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate that the plaintiff is not disabled 

and can engage in work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” Hill v. 

Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2012). 

V. THE ALJ’S FINDINGS 

 The ALJ made the following findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social 

Security Act through December 31, 2015. 

2. [Step One] The claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity 

during the following periods: throughout 2011 and 2012 (20 

CFR 404.1520(b), 404.1571 et seq., 416.920(b) and 416.971 et 

seq.). [...] 

3. [Step One, continued] However, there has been a continuous 

12-month period(s) during which the claimant did not engage in 

substantial gainful activity. The remaining findings address the 

period(s) the claimant did not engage in substantial gainful 

activity, i.e. from January 1, 2013. 

4. [Step Two] The claimant has the following severe impairments: 

asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, hypertension, 

diabetes mellitus type II, degenerative disk disease of the 

lumbar spine, and obesity. (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 

416.920(c)). [...] 

5. [Step Three] The claimant does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the 

severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404-1525, 

404.1526, 416 920(d), 416.925 And 416.926). [...] 

6. [Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”)] After careful 

consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform 

medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(c) and 

416.967(c). The claimant can lift and/or carry fifty pounds 

occasionally and twenty-five pounds frequently. She can sit 

and/or walk for six hours in an eight hour work day. She can sit 

six hours in an eight hour work day. She can frequently climb 

ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can frequently 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch or crawl. She must avoid 

concentrated exposure to workplace hazards and pulmonary 

irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. 

[...] 

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7. [Step Four] The claimant is capable of performing past relevant 

work as a care giver. This work does not require the 

performance of work related activities precluded by the 

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). [...]3 

8. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, from December 31, 2010, through the date 

of this decision (20 CFR 401.1520(f) and 416.920(f). 

AR 12- 26 (ECF No. 13-3 at 12-27) (excerpted). 

VI. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff seeks summary judgment on the sole ground that the ALJ improperly found 

plaintiff’s mental limitations to be nonsevere at Step Two of the sequential analysis, in disregard 

of Dr. Azevedo’s opinion. 

A. Step Two of the Sequential Evaluation Process 

“The step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims.” 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996). The purpose is to identify claimants 

whose medical impairment is so slight that it is unlikely they would be disabled even if age, 

education, and experience were taken into account. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987). 

At Step Two the ALJ determines which of claimant’s alleged impairments are “severe” within the 

meaning of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “An impairment is not severe if it is merely ‘a slight 

abnormality (or combination of slight abnormalities) that has no more than a minimal effect on 

the ability to do basic work activities.’” Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(quoting Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-3p). The Step Two severity determination is “merely 

a threshold determination of whether the claimant is able to perform his past work. Thus, a 

 

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 The ALJ noted that although the claimant is capable of past relevant work, which requires a 

finding of non-disability and obviates the need for Step Five findings, there are other jobs that she 

is also able to perform. The ALJ therefore made the following alternative Step Five findings: (1) 

the claimant was born on December 22, 1967 and was 43 years old, which is defined as a younger 

individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date; (2) the claimant has at least a high 

school education and is able to communicate in English; (3) transferability of job skills is not an 

issue in this case because the claimant’s past relevant work was unskilled; and (4) considering the 

plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are other jobs 

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the plaintiff can also perform. AR 

24 (ECF No. 13-3 at 25). 

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finding that a claimant is severe at step two only raises a prima facie case of a disability.” Hoopai 

v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2007). 

At the Second Step, plaintiff has the burden of providing medical evidence of signs, 

symptoms, and laboratory findings that show that his or her impairments are severe and are 

expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months. Ukolov v. Barnhart, 420 F.3d 1002, 

1004-05 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1509, 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), 416.909, 

416.920(a)(4)(ii). An ALJ’s finding that a claimant is not disabled at Step Two will be upheld 

where “there are no medical signs or laboratory findings to substantiate the existence of medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment.” Ukolov, 420 F.3d at 1005. 

If the ALJ determines that the claimant does have a medically determinable mental 

impairment, he then rates the degree of the claimant’s functional limitations in four areas, known 

as the “Paragraph B Criteria”: (1) activities of daily living; (2) social functioning; (3) 

concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520a(b)-(c); see also Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, 12.00 Mental Disorders. In the first three 

areas, the ALJ rates the limitations as either none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. The 

fourth functional area, episodes of decompensation, is rated on a four point scale of none, one or 

two, three, and four or more. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520a(c)(3) and (4)). 

If a severe impairment exists, all medically determinable impairments must be considered 

in the remaining steps of the sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. The ALJ “must consider 

the combined effect of all of the claimant’s impairments on her ability to function, without regard 

to whether each alone [i]s sufficiently severe.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1290; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1523. 

Accordingly, the erroneous failure to find an impairment severe at Step Two will constitute 

harmless error if the ALJ finds other severe impairments, and goes on to consider the non-severe 

impairments at subsequent steps. Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007). 

B. The Mental Health Evidence 

Plaintiff was assessed by two consultative mental health examiners, Drs. Amy Ahlfield 

and Timothy Canty, prior to the hearing before the ALJ. Following the hearing, the ALJ ordered 

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a third examination to include psychometric testing of the plaintiff’s cognitive ability. Dr. Jose 

Azevedo conducted that evaluation. 

1. Opinion of Amy Ahlfield, Psy.D. 

 Dr. Ahlfield examined plaintiff on January 24, 2012. AR 318 (ECF No. 13-8 at 14). She 

reported that plaintiff wore a hood over her head throughout the examination, had poor eye 

contact, rocked, and often laughed. Id. Plaintiff told Dr. Ahlfield that she took care of her own 

hygiene, although her roommate did the cooking, that she was active in raising her 4 and 7 year 

old children with the help of her roommate, and that she napped throughout the day. Plaintiff also 

told this examiner that she had stopped working as an in-home care provider in 2010 because 

“she was ‘stressed out’ and could not do it any more.” AR 320 (ECF No. 13-8 at 16). 

Plaintiff performed extremely poorly on a mental status exam,4

 and Dr. Ahlfield suspected 

she was exaggerating her level of impairment. Dr. Ahlfield also noted incongruity between 

plaintiff’s stated mood (depressed) and her affect (inappropriate laughter). AR 319-320 (ECF No. 

13-8 at 15-16). In the discussion/prognosis section of her report, Dr. Ahlfield stated that it was 

“possible that [plaintiff] is honestly depicting her symptoms,” however “some of her presentation 

throughout the interview and in particular, the incongruity between her affect and her presenting 

mood made this interviewer question whether or not she was exaggerating her symptoms and 

being dishonest in her representation of the facts and symptoms.” AR 322 (ECF No. 13-8 at 18) 

(emphasis added). She also noted that plaintiff’s report of her own symptoms indicated a degree 

of debilitation inconsistent with her reported activities of daily living (specifically, her care for 

her children). Id. 

Nonetheless, based primarily on plaintiff’s historical representations and her performance 

during the tasks, Dr. Ahlfield diagnosed PTSD and assigned a GAF score5 of 60. AR 321-322 

 

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 Plaintiff, who reported completing two years of college, could not multiply 5 x 8, correctly 

calculate the number of quarters in $1.75, spell the word “world” either forward or backward, or 

perform a simple three-step command, and “gave up” when asked to explain simple proverbs. 

AR 321 (ECF No. 13-8 at 17). Dr. Ahlfield found this performance “highly unusual” and “odd” 

in the absence of psychotic symptoms. AR 322 (ECF No. 13-3 at 18). 

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(continued...) 

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(ECF 13-8 at 17-18). Her functional assessment (again apparently assuming the accuracy of 

plaintiff’s presentation) was that plaintiff was not capable of performing even simple and 

repetitive tasks on a regular basis, would have difficulty working with others, and appeared 

unable to handle routine stressors. AR 322 (ECF 13-8 at 18). 

2. Opinion of Timothy Canty, M.D. 

Dr. Canty examined plaintiff on November 19, 2012. AR 399-402 (ECF No. 13-8 at 95-

98). He found that plaintiff’s responses on the cognitive portion of the examination “were not 

credible.” AR 400 (ECF. No. 13-8 at 96). For instance, plaintiff didn’t know the date, month or 

year, and when the doctor mentioned a major holiday in 3 days she claimed not to know what 

holiday he was referring to; she couldn’t recall even two digits forward; she could recall none of 3 

objects after 1 minute; she could not identify the current president; said a bus was bigger than a 

bicycle and a cat bigger than a horse; and in response to what 1 + 3 equals she responded “I don’t 

keep up with things like that.” AR 401 (ECF No. 13-8 at 97). Dr. Canty also questioned 

plaintiff’s veracity because she stated her children had been removed from her custody but 

couldn’t explained why, and claimed she had completed all CPS mandates but was allowed only 

one supervised visit with her children each week, which he found to be internally inconsistent 

representations. AR 402 (ECF No. 13-8 at 13). His diagnosis was “malingering,” AR 401 (ECF 

No. 13-8 at 97), which led him to the following functional assessment: “[Plaintiff’s] functional 

status is unknown. She appears to be malingering.” AR 402 (ECF No. 13-8 at 98). 

3. Opinion of Jose Azevedo, Ph.D. 

 After reviewing the reports of Drs. Ahlfield and Canty and hearing plaintiff’s testimony, 

the ALJ ordered a third psychological consultative examination to include psychometric testing of 

 

psychological, social and occupational functioning, used to reflect the individual’s need for 

treatment. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1003 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Vargas v. 

Lambert, 159 F.3d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1998)). A GAF score of 41-50 describes “serious 

symptoms” or “any serious impairment in social, occupational or social functioning,” while 

scores of 51-60 describe “moderate symptoms.” Id. Because GAF scores “are typically assessed 

in controlled, clinical sets that may differ from work environments in important respects,” they 

are not determinative of disability. However, they are “a useful measurement” of functioning. Id. 

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the claimant’s cognitive ability. AC 16 (ECF No. 13-3 at 17). Dr. Azevedo had access to 

plaintiff’s very minimal mental health records6 and the reports of both of the other appointed 

mental health examiners. 

 Dr. Azevedo found plaintiff to be cooperative and pleasant, open and spontaneous, a 

capable informant and historian; her effort on his testing protocols was adequate, and the results 

provided a fair estimate of her current cognitive abilities. AR 440-442 (ECF No. 13-9 at 4-6). 

After administering multiple tests, Dr. Azevedo concluded that plaintiff had a functional IQ of 

71.7 His diagnostic impression was PTSD and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. AR 444 (ECF No. 

13-9 at 8). He found only one area of concern, which was that plaintiff denied a history of legal 

problems although the records he reviewed noted CPS issues with custody of her children. AR 

443 (ECF No. 13-9 at 6). 

 In his Medical Source Statement of Ability to Do Work Related Activities (Mental), AR 

446-447 (ECF No. 13-9 at 10-11), Dr. Azevedo found that plaintiff was mildly impaired in the 

areas of understanding and remembering simple instructions, carrying those instructions out, 

making judgment on simple decisions; and moderately impaired in understanding and 

remembering complex instructions, carrying those instructions out, making judgments on 

complex work-related decisions, interactions with the public, supervisors and co-workers and in 

responding to usual work situations and changes in the routine work setting. He found no marked 

or extreme impairments. Id. He assessed plaintiff a GAF score of 54. AR 445 (ECF No. 13-9 at 

9). 

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 These consisted of the Progress Notes of the Sacramento Department of Health and Human 

Services, which diagnosed plaintiff with PTSD and gave her a GAF score of 55 on January 19, 

2012, AR 306-306 (ECF No. 13-8 at 2-3), and another diagnosis from the Department’s Primary 

Health Services Division on the same date, finding Depressive Disorder Other and Anxiety State 

Unspecified, AR 308-310 (ECF No. 13-8 at 4-6). 

7

 As the ALJ noted, Dr. Azevedo did not give a diagnosis of borderline intellectual functioning, 

or explain his failure to do so, despite a qualifying IQ score. See AR 17 (ECF No. 13-3 at 18) 

(Decision); AR 443, 444 (ECF No. 13-9 at 7, 8) (report of Dr. Azevedo, noting IQ score falls in 

borderline range); compare AR 445 (ECF No. 13-9 at 9 (Azevedo diagnoses). 

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C. The ALJ’s Step Two Findings 

The ALJ’s review of all three medical source statements was informed by his 

consideration of plaintiff’s overall pattern of inconsistent statements. AR 15 (ECF No. 13-1 at 

16) (“The claimant cannot keep her story straight when reporting her symptoms to various 

consultative examiners.”). He specifically noted that plaintiff had made directly contradictory 

statements to the different examiners about when she stopped working, about custody of her 

children, about her activities of daily living, and about her smoking history. Id. She had also 

made representations to examiners about when she stopped working that the ALJ independently 

found to be false based on her earnings records. Id. 

In light of this context and Dr. Ahlfield’s expressed doubts about plaintiff’s veracity, the 

ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Ahlfield’s functional assessment. AR 17 (ECF 13-3 at 18). 

The ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Canty’s opinion that plaintiff was malingering. AR 

17 (ECF No. 13-3 at 18). The ALJ found this conclusion to be consistent with plaintiff’s variable 

performance on the three exams, with Dr. Ahlfield’s concerns about possible exaggeration, with 

the fact that plaintiff had never received ongoing mental health treatment, and with plaintiff’s 

numerous inconsistent statements to the examiners and to the ALJ. Id. 

The ALJ assigned “some weight” to Dr. Azevedo’s opinion, AR 18 (ECF No. 13-9 at 19), 

and noted that his diagnosis was consistent with that of Dr. Ahlfield. AR 17 (ECF No. 13-3 at 

18). However, the ALJ did not credit Dr. Azevedo’s findings regarding functional limitations. In 

support of his conclusion in this regard, the ALJ noted that (1) Dr. Azevedo had opined that “the 

claimant is quite functional for greater than simple tasks;” (2) Dr. Azevedo’s finding that plaintiff 

would have moderate difficulty interacting with others in the workplace was inconsistent with the 

evidence that plaintiff had in fact worked through 2012; and (3) Dr. Azevedo indicated that 

“although the claimant herself states she is unable to perform activities of daily living, he finds 

she has no psychometric impediment to doing such tasks.” AR 17-18 (ECF No. 13-3 at 18-19). 

After evaluating the examiners’ opinions and effectively concluding that plaintiff was 

exaggerating her mental health symptoms, the ALJ considered the “Paragraph B” criteria. The 

ALJ found that plaintiff had no mental limitation in activities of daily living; mild limitation in 

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social functioning; mild limitation in concentration, persistence or pace; and no episodes of 

decompensation which have been of extended duration. AR 18 (ECF No. 13-9 at 19). 

The ALJ concluded that “[plaintiff’s] medically determinable mental impairment[s] of 

PTSD, depression, generalized anxiety disorder, and avoidant personality disorder do not cause 

more than minimal limitation in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities and 

are therefore nonsevere.” AR 18 (ECF No. 13-3 at 19). 

D. Discussion 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to credit Dr. Azevedo’s opinion and 

accordingly find a severe mental impairment at Step Two. Because there were conflicting 

medical opinions regarding the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairment and whether she was 

malingering, the ALJ was required to articulate “specific and legitimate reasons,” supported by 

substantial evidence, for rejecting the portions of Dr. Azevedo’s opinion that he disregarded. See 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ did so here. 

 As set forth above, the ALJ specifically identified the evidence that supported his 

conclusion regarding the weight to be given to Dr. Azevedo’s opinion, and his ultimate 

determination that plaintiff had not met her burden of proving a severe mental impairment: Dr. 

Canty’s diagnosis of malingering, which was supported by his exam findings; Dr. Ahlfield’s 

suspicion of exaggeration, which was supported by her exam findings; plaintiff’s frequent and 

extensive inconsistent statements regarding her symptoms, her activities of daily living, and the 

historical facts regarding child custody, her work history, and her smoking, among other things; 

and the lack of ongoing mental health treatment in light of allegedly severe mental debilitation. 

This is “more than a scintilla” of evidence. Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111. The specific evidence 

cited by the ALJ supports a reasonable conclusion that plaintiff was malingering, see Richardson, 

42 U.S. at 401, and provides a legitimate reason to discount Dr. Azevedo’s opinion, see Lester, 81 

F.3d at 830.. 

 Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s 

decision must be upheld. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039-40. The ALJ’s conclusion here that plaintiff 

was exaggerating her symptoms, and that Dr. Azevedo’s opinion regarding the functional severity 

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of her symptoms was therefore based on unreliable information, constitutes a perfectly rational 

interpretation of the evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision must be upheld. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 18) is DENIED; 

2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No.24 ) is 

GRANTED; and 

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment for defendant and close this case. 

DATED: September 27, 2016 

Case 2:15-cv-00791-AC Document 25 Filed 09/28/16 Page 13 of 13