Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41477/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41477-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brice, Vander, Linden & Wernick, P.C.
Appellee
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Incorporated
Appellee
Kendall L. Parker
Appellant
Monica Dawes Parker
Appellant
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41477

Summary Calendar

In the Matter of: KENDALL L. PARKER; 

MONICA DAWES PARKER,

 Debtors

---------------------------------------------------------

KENDALL L. PARKER; 

MONICA DAWES PARKER, 

 Appellants

v.

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.; BRICE, VANDER, LINDEN & WERNICK, 

P.C.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, 

INCORPORATED, 

 Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:13-CV-281

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, ELROD and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 

* Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. 

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 14, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

2

Appellants Kendall and Monica Parker filed suit against Wells Fargo 

Bank, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), and Wells

Fargo’s counsel1 to quiet title over their property and recover damages in 

related causes of action over a dispute regarding their mortgage loan. Plaintiffs 

moved for summary judgment on their suit to quiet title, which the district 

court denied. Simultaneously, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’

remaining claims under Rule 12(b)(6), which the court granted. On appeal, the 

Parkers argue that the lower court’s denial of summary judgment and the 

grant of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal was in error. We affirm.

I.

On February 25, 2004, the Parkers signed a promissory note (titled 

“Note”) as the borrower-mortgagor of $173,468.00 from CH Mortgage Company 

I, Ltd. (“CH”), the lender.2 The Note also referenced and utilized a Deed of 

Trust, executed on the same day, as the “security instrument” means of 

enforcing payment with regard to real property located at 4405 Rancho Del 

Norte Trail (“the Property”) in McKinney, Texas.3 The Deed of Trust itself 

listed MERS as the trustee beneficiary on behalf of CH and the assignee of CH.

MERS subsequently assigned the deed to Wells Fargo on March 12, 2012, an 

assignment of which the Parkers claimed they were never made aware. 

However, they also admitted in their amended complaint to making continuous 

monthly mortgage payments to Wells Fargo from February 25, 2004 to 

 

1 Brice, Vander Linden, and Wernick, P.C. is now Buckley Madole, P.C. (“BMPC”). 

2 The definition of “Lender” includes, according to the Note, the “successors and 

assign[ees]” of CH Mortgage Co. I, Ltd.

3 The Deed of Trust also internally referenced the Note and also provided that any 

covenants would pass to successors and assigns. Both documents also expressly provided that 

a default of payments by the Borrower could result in acceleration on the full remaining debt. 

The Deed of Trust specifically listed foreclosure procedures and the right to collect fees upon 

default. The record indicates it was properly recorded in Collin County, Texas. 

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

3

November 1, 2011. According to Wells Fargo, the Parker’s last payment was 

made on November 25, 2011.

Citing concern over the housing bubble crisis, Plaintiffs sent 

correspondence titled “RESPA Qualified Written Request, Complaint, Dispute 

of Debt & Validation of Debt Letter” (“the Parker’s QWR letter”) on November 

29, 2011.4 Primarily, the letter questioned whether Wells Fargo in fact owned 

the promissory note and had any authority to continue to collect payments. 

The letter also threatened legal action under RESPA for a failure to comply. 

Wells Fargo responded to the Parkers dated December 29, acknowledging the 

receipt of the QWR and promising to look into the matter. The Parkers sent 

correspondence on February 27, 2012, titled “Notice of Default / Notice of 

Opportunity to Cure,” which was signed and notarized. The Notice alleged that 

Wells Fargo was in default of its contractual obligations and provided ten days 

to cure. A failure to cure, according the Parkers, would be taken as an implicit 

“acceptance and agreement.” The Parkers then sent a notarized “Certificate of 

Default” on April 2, 2012, stating that Wells Fargo was in default. Dated on 

that same day, the Parkers also signed their “Memorandum of Contract” with 

a third party individual as a witness. The document purported to transfer title

of the Property to the Parkers and foreclose all of Wells Fargo’s interests in it

based on their “tacit acceptance” of default.5

In early June 2012, Wells Fargo sent notice that they had elected to 

accelerate the debt. Later that month, the Parkers sent return correspondence 

stating that they were willing to satisfy the full debt, but conditioned the 

tender of payment upon the receipt of proof that Wells Fargo indeed was the 

 

4 Plaintiffs claim that this letter constitutes a valid Qualified Written Request 

(“QWR”) and is therefore an entitlement to the protections and provisions of the Real Estate 

Settlement Protection Act (“RESPA”). 

5 The memorandum of contract claimed that the impending transfer of title and 

foreclosure would be “lawful” under RESPA, NRS, and the UCC. Id.

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

4

owner of the promissory note.6 Wells Fargo sent notice and set an auction sale 

for the Property on July 3, 2012. One day prior to the sale, the Parkers filed 

for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 disputing the mortgage with Wells Fargo and

thereby causing an automatic stay.7 The proceedings were converted to a 

Chapter 7 bankruptcy on August 21, 2013. Wells Fargo moved for relief from 

stay which was denied in October. However, on October 30, the bankruptcy 

trustee abandoned the Property back to the Parkers resulting in a lifted stay. 

The case was removed to the district court in February of 2014. In their 

Amended Complaint, the Parkers listed their claims against Wells Fargo and 

their co-defendants: (1) to quiet title, (2) violation of RESPA, (3) breach of 

contract, (4) fraud, and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. 

Defendants subsequently moved to dismiss all of the Parker’s claims. The 

Parkers moved for summary judgment solely on their claim to quiet title. The 

district court denied summary judgment to the Parkers and granted 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss on all of the Parkers’ claims with prejudice. The 

Parkers made timely appeal to this Court alleging erroneous summary 

judgment denial for quieting title and dismissal of all claims of relief.

 

6 The Parkers contend that their offer was for an unconditional tender of payment 

which Wells Fargo refused. However, as correctly stated in Wells Fargo’s brief, “[a] valid and 

legal tender of money consists of the actual production of the funds and offer to pay the debt 

involved.” Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of New York, 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963). The 

tender, moreover, must not be dependent on another variable; it must be unconditional. Id. 

A “mere offer to pay” is not a tender. Vilbig v. Trumble Steel Erectors, 464 S.W.2d 676, 677 

(Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1970, no writ). The Parkers’ offers were, therefore, not valid 

tenders.

7 The Parkers also contend that the district court erred in stating that Wells Fargo 

had filed a proof of claim during the bankruptcy proceedings. They imply that the lack of a 

proof of claim listing on the bankruptcy court’s docket sheet is further evidence against Wells 

Fargo’s lien creditor status. However, whether a proof of claim was filed is irrelevant here. 

As a secured creditor, Wells Fargo was not required to file a proof of claim. In re Simmons, 

765 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §501(a) and 

Bankr. R. 3002(a)).

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

5

II.

On appeal, this Court reviews the grant or denial for a motion of 

summary judgment de novo under the same criteria used by the district court.8

Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows that there are no genuine 

disputes of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.9 Evidence and inferences are drawn under this standard in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.10 The Court may consider other 

materials presented in the record as well as the materials cited in the motion.11

Similarly, we review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo.12 Under this 

standard, this Court affirms unless the allegations, where all well-pleaded 

facts are assumed true in favor of the plaintiff, “support relief on any possible 

theory.”13 “Dismissal is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding a 

required element necessary to obtain relief . . . . And, conclusory allegations or 

legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to 

prevent a motion to dismiss.”14

III.

Under Texas law, a suit to quiet title is a request to invoke the court’s 

powers of equity in removing a “cloud” on plaintiff’s title to the Property.15 In 

order to prevail, the Parkers must show that Well Fargo’s claim “(1) constitutes 

a hindrance having the appearance of a better right to title than its own, that 

 

8 Johnson v. Odom, 910 F.2d 1273, 1277 (5th Cir. 1988).

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

10 Id. 11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2).

12 Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.2d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). 

13 Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994).

14 Blackburn, 42 F.2d at 931.

15 Wright v. Matthews, 26 S.W3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2000, pet. ref’d).

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

6

(2) appears to be valid on its face, and that (3) for reasons not apparent on its 

face, is not valid.”16

The court below properly dismissed the suit to quiet title. The Parkers 

have admitted that a creditor has a valid interest in this Property;17 they only 

dispute whether Wells Fargo is the rightful holder of this interest. As the 

district court observed, a suit to quiet title is not the appropriate way to resolve 

this dispute. Even if it were, the Parkers have failed to show that Wells Fargo’s

interest was invalid.18 Their argument rests entirely on the legitimacy of Wells 

Fargo as the assignee to the Property interests under the mortgage, but they 

offer nothing but conclusory allegations to support their claim.19 Therefore, as 

a matter of law, the Parkers’ suit to quiet title failed to meet summary 

judgment standards. 

IV.

The Parkers’ claims of fraud against Wells Fargo and its counsel, BMPC,

are deficient. As correctly stated by the district court, it was Parkers’ burden 

to show: 

(1) the defendant made a false material representation; (2) 

knowingly or recklessly; (3) that was intended to induce plaintiff 

 

16 Gordon v. W. Houston Trees, Ltd., 352 S.W.3d 32, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2011, no pet.).

17 The Parkers, for instance, made a conditional offer to satisfy the accelerated 

mortgage debt in order to avoid foreclosure post-execution of their “Memorandum of 

Contract” if Wells Fargo could prove they were the holder of the Note.

18 The Parkers have stated numerous times that they were willing to pay upon proof 

that Wells Fargo was the true holder of the promissory note. Wells Fargo has offered to allow 

visual inspection by the Parkers of the promissory note in their offices, but seems to have 

been turned down in each instance. 

19 See Appellants’ Br. at 11 (maintaining that the Parkers have met the burden of 

proof for summary judgment by simply making the allegation that Wells Fargo had an 

illegitimate claim with no further evidence). Additionally, in their Motion for Summary 

Judgment (referencing their pleadings), the Parkers are essentially stating that the absence 

of evidence is evidence of absence.

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

7

to act upon the representation; and that (4) plaintiff actually and 

justifiably relied upon the representation and suffered injury.20

As the lower court correctly noted, the Parkers “have not sufficiently pleaded 

a claim for fraud.”21 The Parkers allege that the Defendants misrepresented 

that Wells Fargo had the right to foreclose. But the Parkers never 

demonstrated that Well Fargo’s asserted right to foreclose was actually false,22

despite the conclusory argument that since Defendants didn’t show them the 

note, there is no note.23 Furthermore, they failed to demonstrate any actual 

injury as a result of any reliance on this assertion. In fact, the facts seem to 

show that the harm the Parkers suffered—foreclosure—was the result of their 

own default. The court below, therefore, was correct in dismissing the fraud

claim for failing to meet the required elements.

V.

The Parkers also alleged a violation of RESPA as a basis for recovering 

damages on the grounds that Wells Fargo failed to properly respond to their 

Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) letter. To succeed under such a claim, 

plaintiffs have to show that “their correspondence met the requirements of a 

QWR, that Wells Fargo failed to make a timely response, and that this failure 

caused them actual damages.”24 However, a valid QWR “must be related to the 

servicing of the loan.”25 “Servicing,” as defined in RESPA, “means receiving 

any scheduled periodic payments from a borrower pursuant to the terms of any 

 

20 Ernst & Young v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., 51 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. 2001). 21 Mem. Op. and Order at 11. 22 The record shows that BMPC offered the Parkers multiple opportunities to examine 

the Note, which the Parkers did not accept. 

23 In their Amended Complaint, the Parkers’ concluded that defendants were guilty 

on all of the misconduct claims because they “failed to prove” their respective assertions to 

the contrary. 24 Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 560 Fed. App’x 233, 241 (5th Cir. 2014).

25 Hurd v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 880 F. Supp. 2d 717, 768 (N.D. Tex. 2012) 

(citing12 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(1)(A)). 

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

8

loan . . . and making the payments of principal and interest and such other 

payments with respect to the amounts received from the borrower as may be 

required pursuant to the terms of the loan.”26

Here, the Parker’s QWR letter is deficient in meeting RESPA’s express 

requirements. The letter requests proof of Wells Fargo’s authority to collect 

payments under the promissory note and deed of trust, which does not relate 

to “servicing of the loan” under RESPA. Even assuming the letter was a valid 

QWR, the Parkers’ claim fails because they did not show any facts “giving rise 

to a reasonable inference that [they] suffered actual damages from the alleged 

violation of the RESPA.”27 The lower court was correct to deny relief.28

VI.

Finally, the Parkers’ claims for breach of contract and for the intentional 

infliction of emotional distress are waived on appellate review. The appellants’ 

brief failed to sufficiently argue these claims.29 Similarly, appellants’ brief also 

failed to bring argument against the lower court’s dismissal of claims against 

 

26 12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(3); see Hurd v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 880 F. Supp. 2d 717, 

768 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (citing12 U.S.C. § 2605(i)(3)) (denying plaintiffs’ allegation of a RESPA 

violation because (1) the alleged QWR letter—seeking confirmation defendant was the holder 

of the promissory note—did not qualify as a valid QWR under RESPA, and (2) plaintiff failed 

to show facts they she suffered actual injury); see also Reed v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. 1:10-

cv-217, 2011 WL 817357 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (dismissing RESPA violation claim because the 

invalid QWR letter did not relate to “servicing” of the loan); Allen v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 

EP-14-cv-429-KC, 2015 WL 1726986, (W.D. Tex. 2015) (“Courts have consistently held that 

a borrower’s written demand for the production of certain loan documents does not relate to 

the ‘servicing’ of a loan, and therefore does not trigger a loan servicer’s response obligations 

under [RESPA].”). 27 Hurd, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 768. 28 The Parkers also have implicitly claimed a RESPA violation for not being notified 

of the assignment of rights of the original lender to Wells Fargo. The record here is silent on 

whether actual notice was sent to the Parkers. However, just like in Hurd, the Parkers’ claim 

still fails for failure to show any facts “giving rise to a reasonable inference that [they] 

suffered actual damages from the alleged violation of the RESPA.” Hurd, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 

768–69.

29 Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/14/2016
No. 15-41477

9

MERS. Therefore, any claim of error in the dismissal of claims against MERS 

is also waived.30

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

 

30 Id.

 Case: 15-41477 Document: 00513592120 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/14/2016