Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03025/USCOURTS-caDC-00-03025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Olanike Kayode
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2001 Decided June 29, 2001

No. 00-3025

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Olanike Kayode, a/k/a Laura Black,

a/k/a Nikkie Kayode,

a/k/a Kayode Olanike,

a/k/a Sandra Foster,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00395-02)

Lexi Negin-Christ, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for the appellant.

Mary B. McCord, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United

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States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R.

Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on brief for the appellee.

Before: Ginsburg and Henderson, Circuit Judges, and

Silberman, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: A jury convicted Olanike O. Kayode of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1956(h), money structuring

in violation of 31 U.S.C. s 5324(a)(3), access device fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1029(a)(2) and possession of false

identification in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1028(a)(3). On appeal she challenges certain evidentiary rulings of the district

court, asserts the evidence was insufficient to support two

counts of her conviction and argues her sentence was erroneously imposed. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

In October 1998 Christopher Miller, posing as an individual

named Peter Taschner, applied for a $10,000 unsecured loan

with a Nationsbank branch office located in Washington, D.C.

Because of mistakes in the application, the loan officer became suspicious and contacted the real Peter Taschner.

Upon learning the real Taschner had not applied for a loan,

the bank informed the Metropolitan Area Fraud Task Force

(Task Force)1 which arranged to be on the premises on the

date the loan check was scheduled to be picked up.

On October 13, 1998 Miller, together with Jonathan Adeosun and Ayodele Hambolu, arrived at the bank in a black

Toyota Camry. After the vehicle was parked briefly in an

illegal space and circled the block once, Miller got out,

entered the bank and met with the loan officer. A few

minutes later, Adeosun also entered the bank and waited in

__________

1 The Task Force consists of agents from the United States

Secret Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as

local law enforcement officers.

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line for a teller to make a deposit and get some change.

While in the bank, Adeosun looked around continuously but

did not have any contact with Miller. After Miller completed

his transaction, Task Force members placed both him and

Adeosun under arrest.

In the meantime, outside the bank, other Task Force

members learned of the arrests. Approaching the Camry

where Hambolu was waiting, one of the Task Force members

saw two "victim profiles"2 (including one for Peter Taschner)

on the center console. They then arrested Hambolu and

searched the vehicle. In the glove compartment, Task Force

members found a car rental agreement that listed Kayode as

the lessee, provided her home address and named Adeosun,

her husband, as an authorized driver. In the trunk they

found a briefcase containing documents with names and biographical information about various people.

After the arrests, Miller admitted he was involved in bank

fraud3 and, pursuant to information obtained from him, Task

Force members were able to recover other evidence located

at a room in a Days Inn motel in the District. They also

learned Adeosun's real identity (he had given them a false

name when arrested) and reviewed information about Adeosun's activities provided by two confidential informants.

Based on this information as well as the evidence seized from

the Camry, the Task Force sought a warrant to search

Adeosun's apartment, a storage unit next to his apartment

and Kayode's car. Upon obtaining a signed warrant later

that day, they began their search.

From the apartment and the storage unit the Task Force

recovered hundreds of items, including a notebook containing

__________

2 A victim profile was described at trial as a document containing

identifying information about a person such as his name, Social

Security number, address, date of birth, previous address, employer, annual income and nearest relative. Joint Appendix (JA) tab T

at 360.

3 Miller later pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1344 and agreed to testify for the government during the trial.

approximately 500 individuals' personal profiles. Also recovered were Massachusetts and California driver's licenses in

the name "Laura Black" and bearing Kayode's photograph; a

New Jersey driver's license in the name "Sandra Foster" and

bearing Kayode's photograph; as well as Neiman Marcus,

Saks Fifth Avenue, World Perks and Macy's credit cards in

the name "Sandra Foster." The Task Force also seized a

Mercedes-Benz and a Toyota Camry both registered in Kayode's name.

How the Mercedes-Benz came to be registered in Kayode's

name merits some discussion. According to the government,

around September 18, 1998 Adeosun and Hambolu attempted

without success to purchase a Mercedes-Benz at American

Service Center in Virginia. On September 24, however,

Adeosun--identifying himself as Joseph Cole--successfully

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negotiated the purchase of a 1999 Mercedes-Benz at Euro

Motorcars in Bethesda, Maryland. He executed the purchase

order in Kayode's name and gave the salesperson a $1000

cash deposit. The following day, after receiving credit for a

trade-in vehicle, Adeosun and Kayode gave the dealership a

$44,300 cashier's check drawn on Kayode's Citibank account

and obtained possession of the vehicle.4

II.

On February 19, 1999 a federal grand jury returned an

eight-count superseding indictment against Kayode, Adeosun,

Hambolu and Miller. All of the defendants were charged

with four counts of bank fraud and aiding and abetting as

part of a scheme to defraud financial institutions in violation

of 18 U.S.C. ss 2, 1344 (counts one through four). Kayode,

__________

4 In order to cover the cashier's check, during the preceding two

weeks, Kayode had made five cash deposits into her account. On

September 11 Kayode made a $9500 deposit at the Reston, Virginia

Citibank branch. On September 12 Kayode made two $9500 deposits at two Citibank branches in the District within a 90-minute

period. On September 14 Kayode made an $8500 deposit at one of

the District branches that was followed on September 24, 1998 by a

$7300 deposit at the Reston branch.

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Adeosun and Hambolu were charged with one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 1956(h) (count five). Kayode and Adeosun were charged

with one count of possession of false documents with intent to

use unlawfully in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1028(a)(3) (count

seven). Finally, Kayode was charged with one count of

structuring transactions to evade reporting requirements in

violation of 31 U.S.C. s 5324(a)(3) (count six) and one count of

access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1029(a)(2)

(count eight).

Kayode moved to suppress the evidence seized at her

apartment and storage unit and to sever her trial from the

other defendants and to sever some of the counts against her

from others. Both motions were denied. See United States

v. Adeosun, 49 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.C.C. 1999), aff'd, 2000 WL

1838220 (D.C. Cir. Nov 13, 2000) (No. 99-3136). Kayode

renewed her motion for severance on the day of the trial. It

was denied once again.

A jury trial began on July 12, 1999. Kayode pleaded not

guilty to all charges. She testified that she rarely used the

storage unit, that all the boxes had been placed there by

Adeosun and that Miller also had a key to the unit and used it

from time to time.

With regard to the false identification documents charge,

she admitted that the California driver's license in the name

of "Laura Black" was hers but denied having ever seen the

Massachusetts driver's license in that name. Moreover, she

claimed she had not seen the other identification documents

and the credit cards in the name of "Sandra Foster" until the

search of the apartment and the storage unit. Finally, she

denied using any of the credit cards mentioned above or

having posed for the "Sandra Foster" New Jersey driver's

licence.

Testifying about the ownership of the Mercedes-Benz, Kayode maintained that the car was purchased for one of her

husband's cousins, a certain Adelani. As a Nigerian businessman who was only visiting the United States, Adelani could

not register the car in his own name and for that reason

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Adeosun asked Kayode to be the nominal owner for about one

year, until the vehicle could be shipped to Nigeria. But, as

far as Kayode knew, the money deposited in her account

came from traveler's checks Adelani had cashed.

As already noted, Kayode was convicted on counts five

through eight and acquitted on counts one through four.5 On

March 3, 2000 she was sentenced to thirty months' imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. This

appeal followed.

III.

On appeal, Kayode raises six arguments: (1) she challenges

the district court's denial of her motion to suppress the

evidence uncovered from the search of the rental car; (2) she

argues the district court erred in denying her misjoinder and

severance motion; (3) she contends the district court erred in

permitting a government "summary witness" to characterize

the evidence and to testify about evidence without first-hand

knowledge or a proper foundation; (4) she asserts the district

court erred when it denied her motion for judgment of

acquittal on counts seven (false identification documents) and

eight (access device); (5) she finds fault with the district

court's refusal to give the jury a unanimity instruction on

count seven (false identification documents); and (6) she

challenges the district court's sentencing conclusion that her

case fell within the "heartland" of money laundering cases.

We address each argument in turn.

A. Suppression Motion

Before trial, Kayode moved to suppress the evidence found

in the black Toyota after Hambolu's arrest. Because no

probable cause existed to arrest Hambolu, she maintained, his

arrest was unlawful; any evidence recovered from the Camry

after the arrest was unlawfully obtained and should be excluded. The district court denied the motion concluding that

__________

5 The jury convicted Adeosun on all accounts but was unable to

reach a verdict as to Hambolu, with respect to whom the district

court declared a mistrial.

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there was probable cause for Hambolu's arrest and that the

search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle was

lawful as a search incident to arrest.6 See Adeosun, 49 F.

Supp. 2d at 11. Kayode contends this was error. Moreover,

she argues that, because the warrant authorizing the search

of the apartment and the storage unit was based upon

evidence obtained from the Camry, any evidence recovered in

the apartment and the storage unit should have been excluded. See Final Brief of Appellant at 20.

The government supports the district court decision on two

independent grounds. First, Hambolu's arrest was supported

by probable cause and therefore the subsequent search was

valid as a search incident to a lawful arrest. Second, even if

the district court was incorrect on that basis, the warrant

authorizing the search of Kayode's apartment and storage

unit was valid because independent grounds supported its

issuance.

We agree with the government's first argument and need

not reach the second. "We review the legal conclusion of

probable cause de novo, the district court's findings of historical fact for clear error, and we give due weight to inferences

drawn from the evidence by law enforcement officers and the

district court." United States v. Gilliam, 167 F.3d 628, 633

(D.C. Cir.) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699

(1996); United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 989 (D.C.

Cir. 1997)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 845 (1999), and cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1164 (1999). "Whether the police have probable

cause for an arrest is determined by viewing the totality of

the circumstances from the perspective of a prudent police

officer and in light of the police officer's training and experience." United States v. Catlett, 97 F.3d 565, 573 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983)).

Probable cause exists if the arresting officer possesses infor-

__________

6 The district court also found probable cause for the search of

the trunk of the vehicle. Because Kayode does not appear to

challenge that ruling, see Final Brief of Appellant at 15-20, we limit

our discussion to the search of the passenger compartment. See

Adeosun, 49 F. Supp. 2d at 12-13.

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mation "sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that

the [suspect has] committed or [is] committing an offense."

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964); accord United States v.

Lincoln, 992 F.2d 356, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam).

" 'Conduct which appears innocent to a lay person may have

entirely different significance to an experienced ... officer.' "

Catlett, 97 F.3d at 573 (quoting United States v. Hicks, 752

F.2d 379, 384 (9th Cir. 1985)). "Moreover, 'a combination of

factors may establish probable cause even if each factor

standing alone is insufficient.' " Id. (quoting United States v.

Halliman, 923 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

At the first suppression hearing, Special Agent Brendan

Pickett of the United States Secret Service testified that a

Task Force member saw a victim profile for Peter Taschner

in plain view when he first approached the Camry. The

arresting Task Force members were aware of the activities

going on inside the bank and knew of the name Peter

Taschner. Based on this information, and the fact that Miller

and Adeosun had arrived at the bank in the car driven by

Hambolu, they concluded Hambolu was involved in criminal

activity and arrested him. The district court credited Pickett's testimony. In our view, the district court did not clearly

err in its factual findings and correctly concluded that there

was probable cause for Hambolu's arrest. Furthermore,

because the passenger compartment search was incident to a

lawful arrest, the evidence recovered therefrom was lawfully

obtained. Accordingly, the district court did not err in

denying Kayode's motion to suppress evidence recovered

from her apartment and storage unit.

B. Motion to Sever Defendants

On the morning of the trial, Kayode renewed her attempt

to have the district court sever her trial from that of Adeosun.

Her lawyer informed the court that Adeosun could provide

testimony favorable to his client and that, according to Adeosun's counsel, "it [was] not likely that Mr. Adeosun [was]

going to be testifying." JA tab T at 210. The district court

denied the motion. Kayode now challenges that decision.

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Under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

a district court may grant a motion to sever "[i]f it appears

that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder of ...

defendants." Fed. R. Crim. P. 14; see United States v.

Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1133 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 513

U.S. 828 (1994). Because of the permissive language of Rule

14, "we accord great deference to a district court's decision to

deny severance." Washington, 12 F.3d at 1133 (citing United

States v. Harrison, 931 F.2d 65, 67 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

502 U.S. 953 (1991)).

In United States v. Ford, 870 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the

court set forth "four preconditions necessary for a movant to

establish a prima facie case for severance based on an

asserted need for a co-defendant's testimony." Washington,

12 F.3d at 1133. The movant must show "(1) a bona fide need

for the testimony; (2) the substance of the testimony; (3) the

exculpatory nature and effect of the testimony; and (4) the

likelihood that the co-defendant will testify if the cases are

severed." Ford, 870 F.2d at 731; accord Washington, 12

F.3d at 1133. "A failure to demonstrate any one of these

elements is dispositive." Washington, 12 F.3d at 1133 (citing

Harrison, 931 F.2d at 67). "Once the movant makes that

threshold showing, the trial court must then: (1) examine the

significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's

theory of the case; (2) assess the extent of prejudice caused

by the absence of the testimony; (3) consider the effects on

judicial administration and economy; and (4) give weight to

the timeliness of the motion." Ford, 870 F.2d at 731 (citations omitted). In this balancing analysis, the court also

considers "the extent to which proffered exculpatory testimony could be impeached." Id. at 732-33.

Kayode argues the district court correctly found her proffer sufficient to satisfy the threshold showing required by

Ford but abused its discretion when it failed to carry out the

four-factor balancing analysis. The government responds

that the district court merely assumed, but did not decide,

that Kayode had made the threshold showing but, in any

event, the court did carry out the appropriate balancing

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analysis and concluded the four factors weighed against severance.

Ruling on Kayode's request, the district court stated:

I'm not sure I can evaluate the likelihood that the

codefendant would actually give this testimony if the

cases were severed. And most important, in the context

of the case pretrial before other testimony has been

received, I am not really in a position to rule on whether

there is a bona fide need for the testimony. Assuming

for the sake of the discussion that the prima facie case

outlined in United States versus Ford has been proffered, I have to find at this point that the significance of

the testimony, the extent of prejudice without the testimony, are [sic] unclear. The effect on judicial administration and economy are [sic] negative, and I've said I

won't rule on the basis of the timeliness of the motion,

and I won't, but they certainly come late.

JA tab T at 235. The record plainly manifests the district

court performed the required balancing analysis and, in our

view, did not abuse its discretion in denying Kayode's request. As the district court concluded, the interest in judicial

economy militated against severance, especially in view of the

fact that the renewed motion was made on the morning of the

trial. Accordingly, the district court's ruling stands.7

C. Summary Witness

At the trial, the government relied on Pickett to testify

both as a fact witness and as a "summary witness."8 As a

__________

7 Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not resolve

whether Kayode's proffer met the threshold showing required

under Ford.

8 Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:

The contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be

presented in the form of a chart, summary, or calculation. The

originals, or duplicates, shall be made available for examination

summary witness, he identified a number of documents found

in the apartment or storage unit and often referred to those

documents using law enforcement terms like "templates" or

"phone scripts." Kayode challenges the district court's decision to allow Pickett's testimony on two grounds. First, she

argues the testimony consisted of speculation as to the significance and the characterization of exhibits, allowing the government in effect to present two closing arguments. Second,

Pickett's testimony about the location from which the exhibits

were seized was inadmissible hearsay because Pickett himself

did not seize all of the evidence and he did not have personal

knowledge of the location where each exhibit was found (i.e.,

the apartment or the storage unit). Moreover, later in the

trial, the government failed to establish a foundation for the

exhibits Pickett introduced.

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As to the characterization argument, the government counters that Kayode made no specific objection at trial and

therefore review should be for plain error only. We agree.

Despite the assistance of the district court, JA tab T at 488-

90, Kayode never objected to Pickett's use of law enforcement

terms. Nor did she timely object to the testimony as a

whole. Pickett's use of the terms "templates" and "phone

scripts" did not invade the province of the jury and on this

record we find no plain error.9

As to the hearsay and foundation issues, although we agree

with Kayode that the government failed to provide a proper

foundation to introduce the exhibits because Pickett had no

firsthand knowledge of the exact location from which they

__________

or copying, or both, by other parties at reasonable time and

place. The court may order that they be produced in court.

Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

9 We are not persuaded by Kayode's argument that Pickett's

testimony about the "significance" of the exhibits was in essence an

extra closing argument. His testimony on this point was merely

attempting to show, albeit awkwardly, how the numerous exhibits

were related to each other, an appropriate function of a "summary"

witness. See United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C.

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984).

were seized and subsequent government witnesses failed to

fill this gap, see United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1349

(D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984), we nonetheless conclude the error was harmless. See United States

v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (summarizing our standard of review). Regardless whether the documents were all found in the storage unit, the driver's license

bearing Kayode's picture and the name "Sandra Foster" is

overwhelming evidence of her complicity in the criminal

scheme. There is no plausible alternative explanation: indeed, to find otherwise, the jury would have had to believe

that Adeosun appropriated Kayode's picture and then obtained the driver's license by forgery. Yet Kayode made no

claim that the license was a forgery. On this record, in light

of the overwhelming evidence of Kayode's violation of 18

U.S.C. s 1029(a)(2), see infra pages 12-13, we conclude the

district court's error was harmless.

D. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

1. Count Eight (Access Device Fraud)

At the end of the trial, Kayode moved for judgment of

acquittal on count eight arguing the government failed to

present sufficient evidence to support a conviction for access

device fraud.10 The district court denied the motion and

Kayode now challenges that decision.

"We review a trial court's denial of [a motion for judgment

of acquittal] de novo, considering the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government and determining whether,

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so read, it is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find

all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

__________

10 18 U.S.C. s 1029(a)(2) provides "Whoever ... knowingly and

with intent to defraud traffics in or uses one or more unauthorized

access devices during any one-year period, and by such conduct

obtains anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that

period ... shall, if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce, be punished [as provided in another subsection of the

statute]." The statute defines "access devices" to include credit

cards. See 18 U.S.C. s 1029(e)(1).

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doubt." United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1464

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979); United States v. Lucas, 67 F.3d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir.

1995)). Here, the government presented overwhelming evidence of Kayode's guilt, including the following items found in

the storage unit: (1) four handwritten sheets containing

biographical information about Sandra M. Foster, (2) a New

Jersey driver's license in the name of Sandra Foster bearing

a picture of the defendant, (3) credit cards in the name of

Sandra M. Foster, (4) an account statement in the name of

Sandra Foster from Macy's, (5) a receipt from Neiman Marcus and an accompanying credit card application in the name

of Sandra Foster and (6) a confirmation of a CompUSA credit

card in the name of Sandra Foster as well as a CompUSA

receipt. The government also showed that the Nieman Marcus credit card was obtained through the use of a New Jersey

driver's license and Visa card for identification. Finally, the

government established that the credit cards were used to

obtain items having an aggregate value of $1000 or more

during a one year period. Based on these facts, the jury

could rationally find each element of the crime beyond reasonable doubt. We accordingly conclude that, "considering

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government,"

the evidence "is sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to

find all of the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt," Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1464, and the

district court did not error in denying Kayode's motion for

judgment of acquittal on count eight.

2. Count Seven (Five False Identification Cards)

Kayode also sought judgment of acquittal on count seven.

The district court denied her motion and again she appeals.

18 U.S.C. s 1028(a)(3) prohibits "knowingly possess[ing]

with intent to use unlawfully ... five or more identification

documents (other than those issued lawfully for the use of the

possessor) or false identification documents," 18 U.S.C.

s 1028(a)(3), when the possession "is in or affects interstate

or foreign commerce." Id. s 1028(c). Kayode contends the

government failed to prove that she had "an intent to use [the

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identifications] unlawfully." See Final Brief of Appellant at

35. She argues the government was required to demonstrate

that one or more of the intended uses was unlawful and to

point out what federal, state or local law would be violated

through the particular use. Kayode's argument relies on

United States v. Rohn, 964 F.2d 310 (4th Cir. 1992).

We find Kayode's reliance on Rohn misplaced. As the

government correctly points, unlike Rohn--where the sole

charge against the defendant was the violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 1028(a)(3) and where the jury was not instructed on how

the defendant's intended use of the false identifications would

violate the law--here Kayode was concurrently charged with,

and tried before the jury on, an intended unlawful use of the

false identification, namely access device fraud. Thus, the

jury was adequately informed both of "the uses to which

appellant intended to put the identifications" and that the

"intended uses would violate one or more federal ... laws."

Rohn, 964 F.2d at 313. Moreover, as already discussed,

evidence of her access device fraud was compelling, thus more

than adequately grounding her conviction. See Holland v.

United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954). Accordingly, the

district court's ruling on the motion for acquittal on count

seven stands.

E. Unanimity Instruction

Kayode argues the district court erred in denying her

request for a unanimity instruction. The argument runs as

follows. She was charged with the possession of false identification documents with the intent to use them unlawfully.

See 18 U.S.C. s 1028(a)(3). The statute makes unlawful the

possession of five or more false documents. In order to

convict, the jury must find as to each identification document

that the document was false, that the defendant possessed it

and that the defendant intended to use that document unlawfully. Here, the jury heard evidence about more than five

identification documents and Kayode offered different defenses with respect to each. Thus, she asserts, the district court

should have given a unanimity instruction requiring all memUSCA Case #00-3025 Document #606952 Filed: 06/29/2001 Page 14 of 19
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bers of the jury to agree as to which five documents satisfied

all elements of the statute.

We review the denial of a requested jury instruction de

novo. See United States v. Dickerson, 163 F.3d 639, 641 n.3

(D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Joy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,

999 F.2d 549, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). The government concedes that Kayode requested the instruction at issue, see

Final Brief for Appellee at 42, but argues that the Sixth

Amendment does not require the jury to agree unanimously

on which five false identification documents Kayode possessed

with intent to use unlawfully. And, in any event, any error in

failing to give the instruction was harmless. We agree with

the government's first proposition and need not reach the

second.

In United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.) (per

curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 932 (1992), the defendant was

convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise

(CCE), a crime requiring action "in concert with five or more

other persons." 21 U.S.C. s 848(c). The district court there

instructed the jury that it must unanimously agree on which

five (or more) persons belonged to the enterprise. See Harris, 959 F.2d at 254. The government appealed arguing that

neither the CCE statute nor the Sixth Amendment required

such particularized agreement among jurors. We agreed.

Relying on Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991), we concluded that all the jury was required to agree on was that the

defendant had committed the offense as defined in the statute, not how the defendant had done so. See Harris, 959

F.2d at 255 ("Because each member of the jury found that

Palmer had acted in concert with 'five or more persons,' the

jury unanimously agreed that he had committed the offense

as Congress defined it."). The reasoning of Harris is applicable here as well. The statute makes relevant only the

number of false identification documents intended to be used,

not the identity of each particular document. The district

court therefore did not err in declining to give a unanimity

instruction.

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F. Sentencing

Finally, Kayode argues the district court erred in refusing

to grant a downward departure in sentencing her. As the

Supreme Court explained in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.

81 (1996), when reviewing sentencing departure decisions, "in

most cases" we owe the district court "substantial deference."

Id. at 98; accord United States v. Bridges, 175 F.3d 1062,

1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999). "We must uphold a district court's

findings of fact unless clearly erroneous[ ] and must give due

deference to its application of the Guidelines to the facts."

Bridges, 175 F.3d at 1069 (citing Koon, 518 U.S. at 97 (citing

18 U.S.C. s 3742(e)); United States v. Dozier, 162 F.3d 120,

123 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). But, when a district court makes an

error of law, it " 'by definition abuses its discretion' " and we

" 'need not defer to the district court's resolution' " of such

legal issues. Id. (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 100). Rather,

"our review of questions of law is de novo." Id. (citing

United States v. Becraft, 117 F.3d 1450, 1451 (D.C. Cir.

1997)).

A district court makes a mistake of law, inter alia, "when it

misconstrues the language of a guideline and consequently

mischaracterizes the boundaries of the heartland created by

the guideline." United States v. Jaderany, 221 F.3d 989, 995

(7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1095 (2001); see also

United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 951 (1st Cir. 1993)

("Plenary review is ... appropriate where the appellate

court, in deciding whether the allegedly special circumstances

are of a 'kind' that permits departure, will have to perform

the 'quintessentially legal function' of interpreting a set of

words, those of an individual guideline, in light of their

intention or purpose, in order to identify the nature of the

guideline's 'heartland' (to see if the allegedly special circumstance falls within it)." (citations omitted)); United States v.

Collins, 122 F.3d 1297, 1303 n.4 (10th Cir. 1997) (review of

determination of guideline's heartland not deferential because

inquiry is legal in nature; citing Rivera, 994 F.2d at 951)).

Kayode's sentencing argument essentially challenges the

district court's interpretation of the "heartland" of section

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2S1.2 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines),

under which she was sentenced.11 She contends section 2S1.2

applies only when a defendant knowingly launders large sums

of money from drug trafficking or serious organized crime.

Because this case involved neither drug nor organized crime

proceeds, it was "atypical" within the meaning of Appendix A

(as it existed at her sentencing) and, she continues, the

district court should have computed her sentence under the

fraud or money structuring guideline instead. See U.S.S.G.

ss 2F1.1, 2S1.3. Reviewing de novo, we find no error in the

district court's refusal to depart.12

__________

11 In relevant part, U.S.S.G. s 2S1.2 provides:

Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from

Specified Unlawful Activity

(a) Base Offense Level: 17

Because Kayode was sentenced in 1998, all references are to the

1998 version of the Guidelines unless otherwise noted.

12 Because we find Kayode's argument unpersuasive under the

1998 version of the Guidelines, we need not consider the effect of

Amendment 591 to the Guidelines, U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 591,

effective November 1, 2000, which changes the introduction to the

Statutory Index (Appendix A) and makes Kayode's position even

more untenable. See also United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 301-

33 (3d Cir. 2001) (highlighting changes). Compare United States v.

Smith, 186 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 1999) (concluding that guidelines

require sentencing court to perform heartland analysis in making

initial choice of appropriate guideline to apply in order to determine

whether conduct being punished falls within set of typical cases

embodying conduct described in each guideline) with United States

v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 496 (3d Cir. 2001) (recognizing that

Amendment 591 "directs the sentencing court to focus on the

offense of conviction and apply the 'applicable' guideline as determined by the Statutory Index in Appendix A without conducting the

heartland analysis we required under Smith") and Diaz, 245 F.3d at

302 ("The amendment reflects a change from the permissive to the

mandatory. The sentencing court no longer uses the Statutory

Index (Appendix A) as an aid in finding the most applicable

guideline among several possibilities; the Statutory Index (AppenAt the time of Kayode's sentencing, the Statutory Index

(Appendix A) to the Guidelines explained that "[t]his index

specifies the guideline section or sections ordinarily applicable

to the statute of conviction." U.S.S.G. App. A, intro. comment. The Statutory Index (Appendix A) also directed that

"[i]f, in an atypical case, the guideline section indicated for

the statute of conviction is inappropriate because of the

particular conduct involved" the sentencing court should "use

the guideline section most applicable to the nature of the

offense conduct charged in the count of which the defendant

was convicted." Id.

Kayode was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. s 1956(h)

which provides that a conspiracy to commit the offenses

defined in 18 U.S.C. s 1957 is subject to the same penalties

as the completed offense. The Statutory Index (Appendix A)

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provides that U.S.S.G. s 2S1.2 applies to a defendant convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. s 1957.13 Section 2S1.2 is entitled

__________

dix A) now conclusively points the court to the one guideline

applicable in a given case.").

13 Section 1957 provides in relevant part:

Engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from

specified unlawful activity

(a) Whoever, in any of the circumstances set forth in subsection (d), knowingly engages or attempts to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value

greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful

activity, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).

...

(c) In a prosecution for an offense under this section, the

Government is not required to prove the defendant knew that

the offense from which the criminally derived property was

derived was specified unlawful activity.

(d) The circumstances referred to in subsection (a) are--

(1) that the offense under this section takes place in the

United States or in the special maritime and territorial

jurisdiction of the United States ...

...

"Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived

from Specified Unlawful Activity" and establishes an offense

level of 17. Application note 1 explains that "specified unlawful activity" is defined in 18 U.S.C. s 1956(c)(7) and includes

inter alia racketeering offenses. See U.S.S.G. s 2S1.2, comment. (n.1). 18 U.S.C. s 1961(1), in turn, defines "racketeering activity" to include an act indictable under 18 U.S.C.

s 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud).

In our view, this case falls within the heartland outlined in

U.S.S.G. s 2S1.2. Kayode engaged in monetary transactions

involving property derived from defrauding federally insured

financial institutions. On five separate occasions, she deposited fraudulently obtained funds in her bank account. She

then used a certified check to withdraw the deposited funds

and purchase a vehicle registered in her name. The plain

language of section 2S1.2 includes her activity within its scope

and we are not persuaded the money laundering guideline

covers only proceeds from drug or organized crimes. See

United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 587-88 (6th Cir. 1999)

(affirming refusal to depart from section 2S1.2; gambling

within section 2S1.2 heartland because commentary to section

expressly refers to 18 U.S.C. s 1961(1) which includes gam-

__________

(f) As used in this section--

(1) the term "monetary transaction" means the deposit, withdrawal, transfer, or exchange, in or affecting interstate or

foreign commerce, of funds or a monetary instrument (as

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defined in section 1956(c)(5) of this title) by, through, or to a

financial institution (as defined in section 1956 of this title),

including any transaction that would be a financial transaction under section 1956(c)(4)(B) of this title, but such term

does not include any transaction necessary to preserve a

person's right to representation as guaranteed by the sixth

amendment to the Constitution;

(2) the term "criminally derived property" means any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a

criminal offense; and

(3) the term "specified unlawful activity" has the meaning

given that term in section 1956 of this title.

bling as indictable offense; fact that proceeds did not come

from drugs or organized crime by itself not sufficient to take

offense out of heartland), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1161 (2000);

see also United States v. Prince, 214 F.3d 740, 768-69 (6th

Cir.) (application of s 2S1.1 proper where defendants attempted to conceal proceeds of wire fraud), cert. denied, 121

S. Ct. 417 (2000); United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1102

(11th Cir. 1996) ("We agree with our colleagues in the First

and Eighth Circuits that Congress intended to criminalize a

broad array of money laundering activity," including laundering of misapplied funds belonging to Resolution Trust Corporation and district court erred when it departed from section

2S1.1 on ground that case before it did not involve "classic

money laundering."); United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340,

346-47 (1st Cir.) (error not to sentence depositor of gambling

proceeds under money laundering guidelines since section

1956 covers broader array of crimes than "classic money

laundering" involving drug proceeds), cert. denied, 513 U.S.

896 (1994); United States v. Morris, 18 F.3d 562, 569 (8th

Cir. 1994) (remanding for resentencing after district court

failed to apply U.S.S.G. s 2S1.1 to defendant who committed

bank fraud and who for purpose of concealment transferred

proceeds of bank fraud into separate account; noting that

Congress intended cumulative punishment for unspecified

unlawful activities). But see United States v. Woods, 159

F.3d 1132, 1134-37 (8th Cir. 1998) (affirming departures

based in part on fact that underlying offenses, although

literally within statute, were not drug-trafficking, "organized

crime," "serious money-laundering," or "unusually severe

fraud"); United States v. Hemmingson, 157 F.3d 347, 361-63

(5th Cir. 1998) (same). We therefore hold that the offense of

money laundering arising from a violation of 18 U.S.C. s 1344

falls within the heartland of section 2S1.2 and the district

court did not err in refusing to depart downward.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment is

Affirmed.

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