Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41320/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41320-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Manuel Garcia-Vargas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41320

No. 15-41322

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

versus

VICTOR MANUEL GARCIA-VARGAS,

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:14-CR-220-1

USDC No. 5:09-CR-686-1

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

On the ground that he was incompetent to stand trial, Victor GarciaVargas challenges his conviction of attempted illegal reentry and the 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 

5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 19, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

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No. 15-41320

No. 15-41322

revocation of his supervised release. He contends that the district court erred 

in crediting the opinion of the government’s expert on whether he “suffered 

from delusional disorder or merely held a strong belief” that his lawfulpermanent-resident status was erroneously revoked because of a wrongful 

state drug conviction. 

Whether Garcia-Vargas was suffering from delusional disorder is irrelevant, however, if he was both able to understand the nature and consequences 

of the proceedings and had sufficient present ability to assist counsel in his 

defense with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. See Moody v. 

Johnson, 139 F.3d 477, 481 (5th Cir. 1998); 18 U.S.C. § 4241; see also Mays v. 

Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 216 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 951 (2015) 

(“A defendant can be both mentally ill and competent to stand trial.”). The 

parties agreed that Garcia-Vargas was able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings, but they disputed whether he had sufficient present ability to assist counsel. As explained below, the finding of such ability 

was not clearly arbitrary or unwarranted. See United States v. Joseph, 333 

F.3d 587, 589 (5th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, we do not reach Garcia-Vargas’s

arguments concerning his alleged delusional disorder. 

To the extent Garcia-Vargas challenges the opinions of the government’s 

expert generally based on the number of interviews and tests conducted, we 

find no authority for his claim that the doctor’s two personal interviews of the 

defendant and close supervision of two or three other interviews by a psychology intern, along with the administration of a test evaluating the defendant’s 

intellectual functioning, were insufficient to reach an opinion on competency. 

Indeed, Garcia-Vargas was interviewed by his own expert only once, for an 

hour.

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We are also unconvinced by Garcia-Vargas’s reliance on the record from

his 2009 illegal-reentry case. According to him, the district court and the government’s expert failed to give adequate weight to evidence from the earlier 

case purportedly showing that he lacked the ability to assist counsel. But the 

district court found in the 2009 case that, although Garcia-Vargas was “somewhat confused” and required “a little bit longer to explain certain things,” a

competency hearing was unnecessary. The court observed that Garcia-Vargas 

presented not “a competency issue but an obstinacy one,” and his attorney

agreed. 

Garcia-Vargas did not challenge the ruling on appeal. Likewise, to the 

extent the record shows that he insisted on disputing his prior conviction 

against the advice of counsel, his refusal to cooperate with counsel did not rise 

to the level of incompetence. See United States v. Simpson, 645 F.3d 300, 306 

(5th Cir. 2011). Finally, to the extent that he relies on events that occurred 

after the competency determination, he did not move for a new competency 

hearing in light of those events and does not claim that the court erred by 

failing to conduct a new hearing sua sponte.

AFFIRMED. 

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 Case: 15-41320 Document: 00513599434 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/19/2016