Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07047/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eva Alberty
Appellee
Tyson Foods, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L L j) 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT United St:t~f!~ AppealP 

EVA ALBERTY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TYSON FOODS, INC., a Delaware 

Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

DEC 3 0 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-7047 

(D .C. No. CV-90-584) 

( E. D. Okla. ) 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Defendant-appellant Tyson Foods, Inc. (Tyson) appeals the 

judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Oklahoma awarding compensatory and punitive damages to 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case , res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-7047 Document: 010110155933 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 1 
plaintiff-appellee Eva Alberty on her c laim of retaliatory 

discharge. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Ms . Alberty was employed by Tyson f or fourteen years as a 

chicken processor. In June 1989, she began experiencing 

difficulties with her wrists and hands. She was diagnosed as 

suffering from bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, and eventually 

underwent two surgeries. In April 1990, Ms. Alberty ceased 

working and filed a workers' compensation claim. 

Ms. Alberty was granted a leave of absence from Tyson in 

April 1990. This leave of absence was extended on several 

occasions, through August 20, 1990. On that date, the company 

alleges that it told Ms. Alberty's husband that she would be 

required to fill out a new request for leave of absence, with 

supporting documentation, every thirty days. On October 30, 1990 , 

Tyson sent Ms. Alberty a letter informing her that the failure to 

return to work after her leave of absence expired was deemed a 

voluntary termination of her employment. In May 1991, Ms. 

Alberty's doctor determined that she would never be able t o return 

to her former job. 

Ms. Alberty brought an action against Tyson, alleging that 

she had been discharged in retaliation for her filing of a 

workers' compensation claim. By agreement, the claim was referred 

to a magistrate judge , who found that Tyson's alleged reason for 

terminating Ms. Alberty was pretextual. Finding that the 

discharge was significantly motivated by retaliation for the 

exercise of her rights, the magistrate judge awarded Ms. Alberty 

$20 , 640.00 in future damages , including one year of 

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Appellate Case: 92-7047 Document: 010110155933 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 2 
rehabilitation, and $5,000.00 to compensate Ms. Alberty for her 

emotional distress. The court also awarded punitive damages in 

the amount of $50,000.00. 

Our jurisdiction over this diversity case stems from 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 1391 . We review de nova the 

district court's determination of Oklahoma state law. Salve 

Regina College v. Russell, 

(1991). 

U.S. 111 S . Ct. 1217, 1221 

Tyson first contends that Ms. Alberty was not entitled to 

bring the retaliatory discharge action because she was not 

physically capabl e of performing her job when she was terminated. 

When she was discharged, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Workers' 

Compensation Act provided that : 

No . corporation may discharge any employee because 

the employee has in good faith filed a c laim ... under 

the provisions of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes . . Provided no employer shall be required to rehire 

or retain any employee who is determined physically 

unable to perform his assigned duties. 

1976 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 217, § 1 (current version at Okla. Stat. 

tit. 85, § 5). 

Ms. Alberty was not terminated, however, because she was 

unable to perform her duties. Rather, the company expressly 

relied on her failure to renew her leave of absence application 

every thirty days. Thus, Ms. Alberty's inability to perform her 

job may not now be used to justify her termination from Tyson. 

See Buckner v. General Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 810 (Okla . 

1988) (although employer may discharge employee who is unable to 

perform job, such justification is unavailable when the "employer 

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Appellate Case: 92-7047 Document: 010110155933 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 3 
insists that the worker was fired for loitering rather than for 

any physical incapacity"). 

Tyson next contends that the magistrate judge erred in 

computing the damages to which Ms. Alberty was entitled. The 

Workers' Compensation Act set out the following remedies for a 

retaliatory discharge: 

[A] corporation who violates any provision of 

Section 5 of this title shall be liable for reasonable 

damages, actual and punitive if applicable , suffered by 

an employee as a result of the violation. An employee 

discharged in violation of the Workers' Compensation Act 

shall be entitled to be reinstated to his former 

position. Exemplary or punitive damage awards made 

pursuant to this section shall not exceed One Hundred 

Thousand Dollars ($100,000 . 00) . The burden of proof 

shall be on the employee. 

1986 Okla . Sess. Laws ch. 222, § 9 (repealed 1992). 

Tyson argues that because Ms. Alberty remained disabled from 

the time she was discharged until she was declared permanently 

disabled, no pecuniary loss resulted from her discharge and the 

$20,648 . 00 award was improper. We agree. 

The remedial statute authorized compensation only for those 

damages suffered "as a result" of the retali atory discharge. Id. 

Here, the magistrate judge awarded compensation for lost wages 

from the date of discharge until May 1, 1991 . Because Ms. Alberty 

remained totally disabled during this period, she could not have 

returned to work ev en if she had not been discharged. Rather, she 

would have been paid the same workers' compensation benefits that 

she has already received. Therefore, Ms. Alberty's lost wages did 

not result from the retaliatory discharge, and were not 

compensable. 

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Appellate Case: 92-7047 Document: 010110155933 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 4 
For the same reason, compensation for a year of 

rehabilitation should not have been awarded in this tort action. 

Although Ms. Alberty may be entitled to vocational rehabilitation 

at Tyson's expense, see Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 16, such costs stem 

directly from her injury and are more appropriately awarded as 

workers' compensation benefits. 

Tyson also argues that the evidence was insufficient to 

support an award of $5000.00 in damages for Ms. Alberty's 

emotional distress. Because the record contains more than enough 

evidence to support this award, we affirm this portion of the 

court's order. 

Finally, Tyson argues that the $50,000.00 punitive damages 

award should be reversed because the magistrate judge failed to 

find by clear and convincing evidence that Tyson acted 

fraudulently, oppressively, or with malice, citing Okla. Stat. 

tit. 23, § 9. Ms. Alberty argues that because the damages in this 

case were awarded under the more specific provisions of the 

Workers' Compensation Act, 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 222, § 9 

(repealed 1992), the general requirements of Okla. Stat. tit. 23, 

§ 9 did not apply. We conclude that the district court's award of 

punitive damages was proper. 

The first question is whether the court was required to find 

Tyson's conduct fraudulent, oppressive, or malicious before 

awarding punitive damages. The Workers' Compensation Act provided 

that an employer who is guilty of retaliatory discharge "shall be 

liable for reasonable damages, actual and punitive if applicable, 

suffered by [the] employee." 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 222, § 9 

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Appellate Case: 92-7047 Document: 010110155933 Date Filed: 12/30/1992 Page: 5 
(repealed 1992). The statute did not contain any threshold 

requirements before such damages could be awarded. In con trast, 

the more general damages statute required that a tort defendant 's 

conduct evince "a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of 

another, oppression, fraud or malice, actual or presumed" before 

exemplary damages were available. Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9. 

Tyson contends that inclusion of the words "if applicable" in the 

workers' compensation provision demonstrated an intent to 

incorporate the general statute's threshold requirement. 

In a diversity action, where there is no state supreme court 

ruling on a particular issue, '"the federal court must follow an 

intermediate state court decision unless other authority is 

convincing that the state supreme court would decide otherwise.'" 

Doyle v. Trinity Sav. & Loan Ass' n, 869 F.2d 558, 559 (10th Cir. 

1989) (quoting O'Neil v . Great Plains Women's Clinic. Inc ., 759 

F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1985 )) . Here, the Oklahoma Court o f 

Appeals has determined that malice and oppression, sufficient to 

support an award of punitive damages, are inherent in the concept 

o f a retaliatory discharge. Williams v . ABS Enters. Inc., 734 

P.2d 854, 856 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987); accord Rogers v. Welltech, 

Inc . , 813 P.2d 534, 537 (Okla . Ct. App. 1991) (following Williams) ; 

see also Malik v . Apex Int'l Alloys, Inc., 762 F.2d 77, 80 (10th 

Cir. 1985 ) ( "Malice is defined as a wrongful act done intentionally 

without just cause or excuse," citing Bliss v. Holmes, 156 Okla. 

40 , 41, 9 P.2d 718, 719 (1932 )). Discovering no authority to the 

con trary, we follow Williams to conclude that the magistrate 

judge 's finding of retaliatory discharge implicitly incorporated a 

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finding of oppressive or malicious conduct. Therefore, under 

either statute, the award of punitive damages was appropriate. 

Next, Tyson argues that the punitive damages award should be 

limited to the amount of actual damages because the magistrate 

judge failed to find, on the record, that the evidence of Tyson's 

malice was clear and convincing. Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9 limits 

the amount of exemplary damages to the amount of actual damages 

unless the court makes such a finding. The workers' compensation 

provision, on the other hand, placed a $100,000.00 cap on the 

award of punitive damages, but simply stated that "the burden of 

proof is on the employee." 1986 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 222, § 9 

(repealed 1992 ) . We must decide, therefore, whether the general 

exemplary damages statute imposed this additional requirement in a 

retaliatory discharge case. 

Oklahoma has long recognized that "where there are two 

statutory provisions, one of which is special and clearly includes 

the matter in controversy, and prescribes something different from 

the general statute, the special statute, and not the general 

statute, applies." City of Tulsa v. Smittle, 702 P.2d 367, 371 

(Okla. 1985 ) . Here, the Worker's Compensation Act provided very 

specific remedies for a retaliatory discharge, in contrast with 

the more general provisions of the exemplary damages statute. 

This leads us to the conclusion that the provisions of the general 

statute did not apply in a retaliatory discharge case. 

This conclusion is buttressed by Wise v. Johnson Controls, 

Inc., 784 P.2d 86 (Okla. Ct. App. 1989), in which the Oklahoma 

Court of Appeals held that the general exemplary damages statute 

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did not apply to reduce an award of punitive damages in a 

retaliatory discharge case. The court emphasized that the 

Oklahoma legislature had amended both the general statute and the 

retaliatory discharge statute during the same session, limiting 

the amounts which could be awarded under each, and had made both 

provisions effective on the same date. Id . at 88. 

Finally, Tyson argues that the exemplary damages award should 

be reduced because it is so grossly excessive that "it shocks the 

conscience of the court , " justifying a remittitur. Malik, 762 

F.2d at 81. The award in this case does not rise to such a level. 

Tyson' s motion for certification is denied. The motion to 

strike that portion of Ms. Alberty's brief addressing a cross 

appeal is granted. The judgment of the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED in part and 

REVERSED in part, and the cause is REMANDED with directions to 

reduce the judgment in favor of Eva Alberty by $20 , 648.00. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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