Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04778/USCOURTS-ca4-07-04778-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sabri Benkahla
Appellant
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Amicus Supporting Appellant
Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation
Amicus Supporting Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SABRI BENKAHLA,

Defendant-Appellant.  No. 07-4778

COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC

RELATIONS; MUSLIM AMERICAN

SOCIETY FREEDOM FOUNDATION,

Amici Supporting Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge.

(1:06-cr-00009-JCC)

Argued: April 11, 2008

Decided: June 23, 2008

Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Motz and Judge Duncan joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: William Benjamin Moffitt, MOFFITT & BROADNAX,

Reston, Virginia, for Appellant. Gordon Dean Kromberg, OFFICE

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OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for

Appellee. ON BRIEF: Andrew L. Hurst, REED SMITH, L.L.P.,

Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States

Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. Mara VerheydenHilliard, PARTNERSHIP FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,

for Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation; John Kenneth

Zwerling, ZWERLING, LEIBIG & MOSELEY, P.C., Alexandria,

Virginia, Nadhira F. Al-Khalili, Washington, D.C., for Council on

American-Islamic Relations, Amici Supporting Appellant. 

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 

Sabri Benkahla was part of a network of people the government

was investigating for crimes connected to radical Islamic terrorism

and violent jihad. The FBI questioned him and prosecutors twice called him before grand juries. Then he was prosecuted himself for false

declarations, false statements, and obstructing justice. He raises three

main issues on appeal. First, he claims his prosecution violated the

collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause, as he

had already been prosecuted and acquitted for some of the activities

he was questioned about. Second, he claims the trial court admitted

irrelevant and unduly prejudicial evidence about terrorism and violent

jihad. Third, he claims the trial court erred in determining his sentence by applying the Sentencing Guidelines’ terrorism enhancement.

For the reasons below, we reject all three claims and affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I.

An organization in Falls Church, Virginia, known as the Dar alArqam Islamic Center, has figured in no fewer than fourteen terrorism

prosecutions so far. See, e.g., United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365

(4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006).

Some of those prosecutions centered on a group of young men who

assembled at Dar al-Arqam and, in early 2000, started training

together for violent jihad. The group escalated stepwise from an ideo2 UNITED STATES v. BENKAHLA

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logical attraction to religious violence to actually taking up arms

against nations they saw as enemies of Islam: Russia in Chechnya,

India in Kashmir, and the United States. They began by talking with

some of the more militant leaders at Dar al-Arqam. Then they started

conducting quasi-military exercises with paintball guns in the Virginia woods and practicing marksmanship with AK-47 style rifles on

Virginia shooting ranges. A few members traveled to Pakistan or

Afghanistan to train at jihadist camps run by Lashkar-e-Taiba (a designated terrorist organization since December 2001). 

Then came the attacks of September 11th and a schism at Dar alArqam between those who condemned and those who condoned the

attacks. Within a few days, the leader of the violent wing, a Dar alArqam founder named Ali Al-Timimi (later convicted of solicitation

to levy war against the United States), held a secret meeting at which

the core of the paintball group formally dedicated itself to violence.

More members went abroad to the jihadist camps. Some who went,

upon returning to the United States, purchased sophisticated aerial

surveillance technology to send to Lashkar-e-Taiba overseas. Then, in

2003, the group was arrested and eleven men indicted together. Six

of the men pled guilty. Three were convicted. One was acquitted. The

instant case concerns the eleventh man: Sabri Benkahla.

Benkahla’s case was severed from the other ten defendants. The

indictment charged the other members of the group chiefly with a

conspiracy, beginning in 2000, to engage in armed hostilities against

the United States, take part in military expeditions against nations

with which the United States was at peace, and provide material support to terrorists. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 960, 2339A, 2390 (2000). But

Benkahla was not charged with that conspiracy. He had taken a trip

to England in the summer of 1999, and, from there, had bought a

ticket to Pakistan, where he traveled with a man called "Abdullah."

According to the government, in August 1999 he crossed from Pakistan into Afghanistan and there attended a Lashkar-e-Taiba jihadist

training camp, where he fired an AK-47 and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher — conduct charged (since attending a Lashkar-e-Taiba

jihadist training camp was not necessarily illegal at the time) as supplying services to the Taliban and using a firearm in furtherance of

a crime of violence. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2000); Exec. Order No.

13,129 (July 4, 1999), 31 C.F.R. § 545.204 (prohibiting transactions

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with the Taliban); 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(B)(ii), 3238 (2000).

Benkahla was arrested in Saudi Arabia in 2003, where he had been

studying Islamic law and traveling with Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a

friend from Dar al-Arqam and a member of al Qaeda (eventually convicted of conspiracy to assassinate the President of the United States,

among other crimes). Ultimately, having waived his right to a jury

trial, Benkahla appeared before the U.S. District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia for a bench trial in March 2004. 

It was clear in the trial that Benkahla was drawn to violent jihad,

had traveled to Pakistan in August 1999, and had cultivated relationships with various individuals connected to terrorist organizations and

jihadist training. In its decision, the trial court indicated that it thought

he had attended a jihadist camp somewhere, either in Pakistan or

Afghanistan, and fired an AK-47 and rocket-propelled grenade

launcher while there. The court stated that "[i]f the standard of proof

for the government were by a preponderance of the evidence, I would

be able to find this defendant guilty." But the nature of the charges

required that the camp be located in Afghanistan and that Benkahla

have provided some meaningful form of support to the Taliban while

there. In the court’s judgment, there simply was not enough evidence

on those points to convict beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Within a few weeks of his March 2004 acquittal, Benkahla was

subpoenaed. The government had been unable to prove that he had

attended a jihadist training camp in Afghanistan, but it was by no

means convinced that he hadn’t attended a jihadist training camp at

all. Indeed, it was still investigating such camps, the individuals who

facilitated training at them, and several militants associated with Dar

al-Arqam. Specifically, the government had convened two grand

juries to investigate violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B,

which concern the provision of material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations. Thus over the next few months, the government

compelled Benkahla to testify before each of the grand juries and to

meet with the FBI several times in ancillary proceedings, with immunity from criminal prosecution for truthful testimony. 

The questions throughout the proceedings focused anew on

whether Benkahla had attended a jihadist training camp during that

August 1999 trip. But they no longer centered on the camp’s location,

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and the government took the approach of asking about the camp in

the disjunctive (as in "Did you participate in any training . . . during

your trip to Pakistan or Afghanistan in the summer of 1999?"). The

questions also concerned the individuals with whom Benkahla had

communicated in the course of exploring violent jihad and planning

the 1999 trip abroad. For his part, Benkahla consistently denied

attending any such camp anywhere, or knowing anything substantial

about the individuals. 

The proceedings ended in November 2004. A little over a year

later, in 2006, the government indicted Benkahla for making false

material declarations to the two grand juries, 18 U.S.C. § 1623

(2000), obstructing justice on account of the false declarations, 18

U.S.C. § 1503 (2000), and making false material statements to the

FBI, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000). Specifically, Benkahla stood

accused of a set of false denials: that he had participated in a jihadist

training camp somewhere in August 1999; that he had handled weapons while there and observed others doing the same; and that he knew

about the various people he had communicated with about training for

jihad (such as "Abdullah," Ali Al-Timimi, and other persons of interest to the FBI in terrorism-related investigations). Benkahla moved to

dismiss on collateral estoppel grounds and lost, and the case went to

a jury in January and February 2007. 

The jury trial lasted four days and included a good deal of background testimony on terrorism and violent jihad worldwide from the

government’s expert witness, Evan Kohlmann, as well as further testimony on the subject from an FBI agent working on Benkahla’s case,

Sarah Linden. After a day-and-a-half of deliberation, the jury convicted Benkahla on all counts, though it acquitted him of certain particular allegations in its special verdict form (each count alleged

multiple falsehoods). Post-trial motions also led the court to strike

Count II (concerning whether Benkahla handled weapons at the

camp) for being based on uncorroborated admissions. Benkahla’s

convictions under Counts I, III, and IV — false declarations to the

grand jury, obstruction of justice by virtue of the false declarations,

and false statements to the FBI — stood. 

At Benkahla’s sentencing, the pivotal issue was whether to apply

the terrorism enhancement of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

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§ 3A1.4 (2007): "If the offense is a felony that involved, or was

intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism," increase the

offense level to at least a 32 (and by no less than 12 levels) and the

criminal history category to a Category VI (the maximum). According

to Application Note 2, "[f]or purposes of this guideline, an offense

that involved . . . obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism, shall be considered to have involved, or to have been intended

to promote, that federal crime of terrorism." In Benkahla’s case,

applying the enhancement meant a Guidelines sentence over six times

longer than he otherwise would get — jumping from a range of 33

to 41 months to a range of 210 to 262 months. 

The court held that Benkahla qualified for the enhancement. See

United States v. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751-57 (E.D. Va.

2007). First, the investigations Benkahla obstructed concerned "federal crimes of terrorism" under the statutory definition of the term.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (2006). The investigations concerned

offenses enumerated in § 2332b(g)(5), namely the provision of material support to terrorists and terrorist groups. And the investigations

were sufficiently particular to satisfy § 2332b(g)(5), being oriented to

a set of people (particularly Abu Ali and Al-Timimi) who would ultimately be prosecuted. Furthermore, the court thought Benkahla’s

false statements had genuinely impeded the government’s investigation, preventing it from finding out about Lashkar-e-Taiba training

camps or uncovering the true identities of Benkahla’s correspondents.

Benkahla’s Guidelines range was thus 210 to 262 months. But the

court thought the case called for a downward departure under § 4A1.3

or (in the alternative) a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). "Sabri

Benkahla is not a terrorist," the court stated. Benkahla, 501 F. Supp.

2d at 759. He "has not committed any other criminal acts" and his

likelihood of doing so upon release is "infinitesimal." Id. Also,

Benkahla’s former co-defendants, the other ten members of the Dar

al-Arqam paintball group, had received lesser sentences for what were

more dangerous and more violent offenses, a disparity the court found

"staggering." Id. at 762. The court thus treated Benkahla as having a

Category I criminal history and sentenced him to 121 months.

Benkahla has appealed chiefly three issues: whether his second

prosecution violated principles of collateral estoppel; whether the trial

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court admitted irrelevant or unduly prejudicial evidence concerning

radical Islamic terrorism; and whether the court improperly applied

the terrorism enhancement of Sentencing Guideline § 3A1.4. A fourth

issue — Benkahla’s claim that the government’s evidence was insufficient as a matter of law — received only passing attention in the

briefs and argument, and we find it unpersuasive.1 For its part, the

government takes issue with the district court’s characterization of

Benkahla and calls its calculation of his criminal history category

"baseless" and "mystifying," but, on the grounds that the sentence

imposed "does not constitute an abuse of discretion" when treated as

a variance, filed no cross-appeal. Appellee’s Br. 62. 

II.

We begin with Benkahla’s collateral estoppel claim. Collateral

estoppel, in the criminal context, is one part of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against double jeopardy. The guarantee as a whole

prohibits twice prosecuting or punishing a person for the same

offense. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 695-96 (1993). Its

collateral estoppel strand "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment,

that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any

future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). Benkahla

argues that, since he was acquitted of attending a jihadist training

camp in Afghanistan, he could not afterwards be prosecuted for

falsely denying that he attended such a camp in (as the government

framed it) "Pakistan or Afghanistan." 

Benkahla’s claim arises in an area of legal tension. On the one

hand, there is some potential for abuse in the government’s procedure

of acquittal, questioning on matters related to the acquittal, and second prosecution for some form of perjury. Accusing someone of a

false denial does indeed assume the truth of the matter denied, and

1Only one part of Benkahla’s insufficiency of evidence argument is

substantive: the claim that the uncorroborated admissions that led the

trial court to strike Count 2 were repeated in Counts 1 and 4. In our judgment, however, the admissions were corroborated, and, in any case,

Counts 1 and 4 rest mainly on other, unrelated false denials and false

statements. 

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prosecutors frustrated at an acquittal should not lightly be able to take

a second bite at the apple by bringing perjury charges afterwards. Nor

may the device of the "or" be used to create a spurious appearance of

dissimilarity between prosecutions with a common core. 

On the other hand, a defendant does not win with acquittal a

license to commit perjury. Cf. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S.

87, 96 (1993) ("[A] defendant’s right to testify does not include a

right to commit perjury."); Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 72

(1969) ("Our legal system provides methods for challenging the Government’s right to ask questions — lying is not one of them."). Law

enforcement is entitled to keep investigating a criminal enterprise

even after one defendant is acquitted, and if that defendant is presented with a subpoena and cloaked with the dual protections of

court-ordered immunity and the guarantee against double jeopardy, he

may well be required to admit the very conduct he successfully

denied at trial.

Given this tension, a mechanical approach to the collateral estoppel

rule will not do — and the law has never required one. "[T]he rule

of collateral estoppel in criminal cases is not to be applied with the

hypertechnical and archaic approach of a 19th century pleading book,

but with realism and rationality. . . . The inquiry must be set in a practical frame and viewed with an eye to all the circumstances of the proceedings." Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (quotation omitted). A practical

approach means closely examining the record of both trials to discern

whether an "issue of ultimate fact" resolved in the first was indeed reopened in the second. Id. at 443. Thus our circuit has asked whether

the two trials involved an "identical" issue "necessarily adjudicated"

in the first, United States v. Nash, 447 F.2d 1382, 1386 (4th Cir.

1971); or whether an "identical" issue was "actually" and "necessarily

decided" in the first trial, after "a full and fair opportunity to litigate"

and a "final and valid" judgment, United States v. Fiel, 35 F.3d 997,

1006 (1994); or again whether "certain facts were necessarily determined in the first trial" that "constituted ultimate issues" in the second, United States v. Yearwood, 518 F.3d 220, 229 (4th Cir. 2008)

(quotation omitted). Consistent throughout these cases over nearly

forty years is the detailed, trial-specific look at the factual issues

asked and answered at each prosecution.

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Benkahla’s first prosecution was a bench trial that concluded with

a full judicial explanation of the verdict — a welcome thing, for a

good deal of the law in this area stems from the mysteries of the general jury verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Ruhbayan, 325 F.3d 197,

203 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[D]oubt as to what was decided by a prior judgment should be resolved against using it as an estoppel." (quotation

omitted)). There is no mystery as to why the court acquitted in the

first proceedings. What disturbed it was a lack of evidence showing

that the jihadist training camp was in Afghanistan rather than Pakistan, and, if it was in Afghanistan, that Benkahla provided any serious

form of support to the Taliban while there. "I would find . . . that at

some point, Mr. Benkahla has fired an automatic AK-47 and RPG"

while abroad, the court said. But much of the evidence "is equally

consistent in my view with going to a training camp in Pakistan as it

would be to go to Afghanistan." The question was nonetheless close;

the court stated that it "would be able to find this defendant guilty"

on a preponderance of the evidence standard. But the charges brought

required a high degree of certainty that the camp was located in

Afghanistan and that by attending Benkahla was actually fighting or

preparing to fight for the Taliban. At the factual heart of Benkahla’s

acquittal was a measure of uncertainty about those matters. In no way

did the court’s decision turn on doubt about whether Benkahla

attended a jihadist training camp somewhere.

The second prosecution, Benkahla argues, once again put whether

he attended a jihadist training camp in Afghanistan at issue. Asking

the second jury whether he falsely denied attending a camp in "Pakistan or Afghanistan," he claims, invited conviction on a thinly veiled

forbidden ground. But this argument mistakes the factual issues at

stake in both trials. An analogy helps: One may be quite uncertain

whether a man who always wears a blue or grey suit to work wore

the blue one on Monday — but quite certain that he wore one or the

other. In the same sense, the charges in the first trial required that the

court determine with some certainty whether Benkahla attended a

camp in Afghanistan and fought for the Taliban while there (the

equivalent of the "blue suit on Monday" question). It could not. But

the court was confident that Benkahla had attended a camp somewhere in the "Pakistan or Afghanistan" collective — and what mattered factually in the second trial, given the new charges, was that

collective. Indeed, the form the government’s questioning took, askUNITED STATES v. BENKAHLA 9

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ing about "Pakistan or Afghanistan," was not in this context a device

with which to evade a matter already decided. It was exactly the question suggested by the first acquittal, a question to which both the first

court and the second jury were prepared to answer "Yes." 

On that note, it is worth observing that the investigations in which

Benkahla was interviewed and the questions he was asked show no

sign of having been manufactured for the sake of a second prosecution. Given the character of the first court’s acquittal, the government

had every right to think Benkahla had attended a jihadist training

camp somewhere (it would have been anomalous for it to have

thought otherwise), and, for the best of reasons, the government was

still investigating those camps and the people involved in them.

Indeed, the two grand juries to which Benkahla testified were convened to investigate violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B,

which concern the provision of support to terrorists and terrorist organizations. And those investigations or connected ones eventuated in

indictments — including ones for serious terrorists like Al-Timimi

(whom Benkahla had been questioned about, leading to one of the

grounds for Benkahla’s false statements conviction), Abu Ali, and

Chandia. It was legitimate to ask Benkahla, even post-acquittal, about

his jihadist training in Pakistan or Afghanistan, and it was legitimate

to prosecute him when he spoke falsely about it. 

Thus the issue of ultimate fact in Benkahla’s two prosecutions was

distinct, and collateral estoppel presents no bar to the second.

III.

Benkahla next claims that the trial court admitted irrelevant and

unduly prejudicial testimony and exhibits. He takes special exception

to the government’s terrorism expert, Evan Kohlmann, who runs a

consulting company on Islamic terrorism and regularly testifies in

terrorism-related prosecutions. Kohlmann’s testimony was proffered

mainly under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 to "assist the trier of fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue," and he

gave background information on radical Islam and jihad generally

rather than discussing Benkahla individually. As to that background,

he spoke at length, beginning with the nature and history of the Taliban government in Afghanistan but ultimately touching on many of

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the individuals, ideologies, and organizations underlying the current

conflict. Benkahla takes special note of a passage in which Kohlmann

remarked that, for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, "Americans, no

matter where they are on earth, whether they’re civilian or military,

are considered to be a target. There are no innocent civilians."

Benkahla argues that this sort of testimony inflamed the jury and condemned him by association. It was too far afield from the issues in

his case to be relevant under Rules 401, 402, and 702, he claims, and

to the extent it was relevant, its probative value was substantially outweighed "by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,

. . . or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" under Rule 403.2

Benkahla makes a similar argument against the testimony and

exhibits admitted to prove that his false statements were material to

the government’s investigation — materiality being an element of

both the false declarations and false statements charges. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1001(a), 1623 (2000); United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301,

306 (4th Cir. 1998) ("An essential element in both grand jury perjury

and the crime of making false statements is materiality."). This testimony came mainly from Sarah Linden, an FBI agent working on

Benkahla’s case, who spoke at length about the set of investigations

connected to Dar al-Arqam and the network of terrorists and terrorist

organizations facilitating jihadist training abroad. The exhibits

included several dozen videos, photographs, and documents (how

many exactly is in dispute) in support of Linden’s testimony.

Benkahla argues that this evidence went well beyond what was necessary to establish materiality and became "a vehicle for placing irrelevant and prejudicial statements and events before the jury."

Appellant’s Br. 41. He particularly objects to a taped confession from

Abu Ali that was played for the jury. 

Judgments of evidentiary relevance and prejudice are fundamentally a matter of trial management, for "[t]rial judges are much closer

to the pulse of a trial than we can ever be and broad discretion is necessarily accorded them." United States v. Simpson, 910 F.2d 154, 157

(4th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). The standard of review therefore

2Benkahla also attacks Kohlmann’s qualifications as an expert, but

those qualifications were obviously substantial and the district court

acted well within its discretion in determining that they were sufficient.

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counsels deference to the discretion of trial courts: "In a criminal

appeal, we will not vacate a conviction unless we find that the district

court judge acted arbitrarily or irrationally" in admitting evidence.

United States v. Ham, 998 F.2d 1247, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993); see also

United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 2008) (requiring "extraordinary circumstances" where discretion was "plainly

abused") (quotation omitted). 

For Kohlmann, the relevance inquiry turns on Rule 702: His testimony had to "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to

determine a fact in issue." See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,

509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993). The trial court could fairly conclude that

it did. The evidence in this case was complicated, touching by necessity on a wide variety of ideas, terms, people, and organizations connected to radical Islam. The indictment alone refers to "jihad"; "jihad

training camp[s]" and the "organizations" participating in them;

"Lashkar-e-Taiba"; "other jihad organizations" espousing violence

toward "the United States and countries with whom the United States

was at peace"; "the Taliban"; "the territory of Afghanistan controlled

by the Taliban"; "the territory . . . across the border in Pakistan"; "the

area north of Peshawar in Pakistan"; "lectures at Dar Al-Arqam"; the

Arabic word "salaam"; and men named (or identified as) "Haroon,"

"Myunus," "Abdullah," "Ibrahim Buisir," "Muhammad Siddique,"

"Abdel Atti Al Bakai," "Emara Al Bashir Binkaid," and "Ali AlTimimi." Of course, the evidence required to evaluate the indictment

involved a broader frame of reference still. In these circumstances, the

trial judge could well conclude that lengthy testimony about various

aspects of radical Islam was appropriate, and indeed necessary, for the

jury "to understand the evidence" and "determine [the] fact[s]." 

For Linden and the exhibits that supported her testimony, the relevance inquiry turns on materiality under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a) and

1623. A statement is "material," the Supreme Court has held, "if it has

a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, the

decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed."

Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988). Thus it was Linden’s task, with the help of the exhibits, to "show[ ] a nexus between

the false statements and the scope of the grand jury’s [and FBI’s]

investigation," and she had some leeway in doing so: "Given the

wide-ranging investigative function of the grand jury, the materiality

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of any line of inquiry pursued by a grand jury must be broadly construed." United States v. Farnham, 791 F.2d 331, 333-34 (4th Cir.

1986) (citation omitted). Here, Linden essentially testified to the

FBI’s and grand juries’ investigations of jihadist camps abroad, the

people who facilitate training at them, and the militants associated

with Dar al-Arqam. These are exactly the subjects of Benkahla’s

alleged false denials and false statements. The relevance is clear. 

Thus we come to the Rule 403 heart of Benkahla’s argument

against the witnesses and exhibits. At base, his contention is that the

subject of terrorism arouses so much passion these days that its prominent presence at his trial put him at risk of a jury "excited to irrational behavior." Udeozor, 515 F.3d at 264 (quotation omitted). He cites

as analogy United States v. Ham, where we reversed a trial judge

under Rule 403 for admitting evidence of child molestation in a fraud

case. 998 F.2d at 1251-54. 

Undoubtedly, some of what Kohlmann and Linden had to say, and

some of what the exhibits showed, was alarming. Undoubtedly the

evidence’s scope was wide. But the jury in this case acquitted

Benkahla of several alleged falsehoods — not exactly the mark of

irrational fervor. Cf. United States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 375 (4th

Cir. 2008) (finding the claim that evidence of terrorism spurred an

emotional conviction "discredited to a significant extent by the jury’s

rejection of one of the four counts charged"). And more importantly,

Rule 403 is not an injunction to exclude prejudicial evidence but a

mandate, entrusted mainly to the trial court, to weigh prejudice

against probative value. See United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d

316, 341 (4th Cir. 2004) ("The mere fact that the evidence will damage the defendant’s case is not enough — the evidence must be

unfairly prejudicial, and the unfair prejudice must substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence." (quotation omitted,

emphasis in original)), vacated on unrelated grounds, 543 U.S. 1097

(2005). In this case, the relevance of the challenged evidence cannot

be doubted, and the same qualities that made it relevant gave it a probative value that the trial judge could fairly think outweighed its prejudicial risk. To reverse that judge for an abuse of discretion would

betray too much distrust of the ability of the adversary process to

reach just results when the evidence on both sides is in. 

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The trial judge managed the proceedings in this case with care and

skill, and we see no abuse of discretion in the testimony and exhibits

admitted.

IV.

Finally, Benkahla claims that the district court should not in his

case have applied the terrorism enhancement of U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 3A1.4 (2007). Under Gall v. United States, "a

district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range" and then decide whether "an

outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted." 552 U.S. _, 128 S. Ct. 586,

596-97 (2007). The appellate court must then "review the sentence

under an abuse-of-discretion standard" with an eye toward both "procedural" and "substantive reasonableness." Id. at 597. Here, Benkahla

argues that the terrorism enhancement led the district court to the

wrong starting point. 

The Guideline, adopted November 1, 1995, states:

§ 3A1.4. Terrorism

(a) If the offense is a felony that involved, or was intended

to promote, a federal crime of terrorism, increase by 12

levels; but if the resulting offense level is less than level 32,

increase to level 32.

(b) In each such case, the defendant’s criminal history category from Chapter Four (Criminal History and Criminal

Livelihood) shall be Category VI.

Two relevant application notes follow:

1. "Federal Crime of Terrorism" Defined. — For purposes

of this guideline, "federal crime of terrorism" has the

meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). 

2. Harboring, Concealing, and Obstruction Offenses. —

For purposes of this guideline, an offense that involved

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. . . obstructing an investigation of a federal crime of

terrorism, shall be considered to have involved, or to

have been intended to promote, that federal crime of

terrorism.

Application Note 1 took shape in response to the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual app. C, amend. 539 (2007). The statute it refers to, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2332b(g)(5) (2006), states:

[T]he term "Federal crime of terrorism" means an offense

that —

(A) is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate

against government conduct; and

(B) is a violation of . . . 2339A (relating to providing

material support to terrorists), 2339B (relating to providing material support to terrorist organizations) . . . .

Application Note 2 was passed in response to the USA Patriot Act of

2001 "to clarify that § 3A1.4 may apply in the case of offenses that

occurred after the commission of the federal crime of terrorism." U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C, amdt. 637 (2007). 

In light of these provisions, applying § 3A1.4 in Benkahla’s case

seems straightforward. He was convicted of obstruction offenses.

Application Note 2 says that obstruction offenses qualify for the

enhancement so long as the thing obstructed qualifies as an investigation into a "federal crime of terrorism." Application Note 1 tells us

that the term "federal crime of terrorism" has a statutory definition.

The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5), defines it in two parts. Benkahla

obstructed a grand jury investigation into violations of §§ 2339A and

2339B, which satisfies the second part. And the violations involved

jihadist camps training people to fight the governments of India, Russia, and the United States, which satisfies the first. 

Nonetheless, Benkahla presents several arguments against applying

the enhancement to him. First, with reference to the United States v.

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Booker line of cases, Benkahla contends that applying the enhancement depended on finding as a matter of fact that he "actually

obstructed an investigation of a federal crime of terrorism." Appellant’s Br. 22. The trial court, not the jury, found that fact. His sentence plainly would not survive reasonableness review, he argues, but

for that fact. And therein lies the problem, for if a sentence depends

on judge-found facts to survive reasonableness review, he contends,

it violates the Sixth Amendment. 

This argument is too creative for the law as it stands. Sentencing

judges may find facts relevant to determining a Guidelines range by

a preponderance of the evidence, so long as that Guidelines sentence

is treated as advisory and falls within the statutory maximum authorized by the jury’s verdict. Indeed, "many individual Guidelines apply

higher sentences in the presence of special facts" and "[i]n many

cases, the sentencing judge, not the jury, will determine the existence

of those facts." Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2456,

2465 (2007). That "does not violate the Sixth Amendment," however,

because "[a]s far as the law is concerned, the judge could disregard

the Guidelines and apply the same sentence . . . in the absence of the

special facts." Id. at 2465-66; see also United States v. Battle, 499

F.3d 315, 322-23 (4th Cir. 2007) ("When applying the Guidelines in

an advisory manner, the district court can make factual findings using

the preponderance of the evidence standard."). The point is thus that

the Guidelines must be advisory, not that judges may find no facts.

Here, in a case in which the district court slashed the defendant’s

Guidelines sentence in half, no one could doubt that the Guidelines

were advisory. There is no Sixth Amendment violation. 

Benkahla next argues that Application Note 2 contradicts Guideline

§ 3A1.4, and we should therefore hold Application Note 2 invalid.

See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 43 (1993) ("[If] commentary and the guideline it interprets are inconsistent in that following

one will result in violating the dictates of the other, the Sentencing

Reform Act itself commands compliance with the guideline."). The

two must contradict, he claims, because a person can obstruct an

investigation into a federal crime of terrorism without necessarily

committing, in § 3A1.4’s words, "a felony that involved, or was

intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism." 

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In general, we have a duty to harmonize Guidelines and commentary. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-46; United States v. Pedragh, 225

F.3d 240, 244-45 (2d Cir. 2000). One might wonder, in the abstract,

whether obstructing an investigation into a federal crime of terrorism

necessarily "involve[s]" a federal crime of terrorism, but plainly one

could think that it does, and Application Note 2 decides the matter.

Indeed, the language of Application Note 2 is identical in all material

respects to the language of § 3A1.4 itself. There is no inconsistency

of any kind.

Finally, Benkahla claims that Application Note 2, even if constitutional and consistent with § 3A1.4, does not apply to him. The argument rests less on Application Note 2 itself than on two conclusions

of law the district court came to in the course of its sentencing decision. The court reasoned that to qualify for the enhancement,

Benkahla had to actually obstruct a terrorism investigation (not just

attempt to obstruct one), and that the investigation itself had to be

specific and targeted, oriented to particular terrorism offenses rather

than to general intelligence-gathering. See United States v. Benkahla,

501 F. Supp. 2d 748, 751-54, 756 (E.D. Va. 2007). Benkahla echoes

these conclusions of law, but contrary to the district court, insists that

the investigation in his case was too general, and his obstruction too

ineffectual, for the enhancement to apply. 

There is no need to review the district court’s legal conclusions.

Whether those conclusions are correct or incorrect, the court’s factual

findings clearly support applying the enhancement. See Gall, 128 S.

Ct. at 597 (holding that appellate courts review district courts’ sentencing facts for clear error). All the evidence indicates that Benkahla

attended a jihadist training camp abroad, was acquainted with a network of people involved in violent jihad and terrorism, and lied about

both. Moreover, the sentencing judge, after a meticulous review of the

evidence, concluded that "[i]n the same investigation in which Defendant was questioned, eight individuals to whom he was connected

went to foreign jihad training camps and one was convicted of soliciting treason to fight against the United States." Benkahla, 501 F. Supp.

2d at 755. Testimony secured from some of those individuals led to

"convictions for specific terrorist acts in Australia, France, and

England." Id. And "[m]ost notable . . . at the time Defendant was

questioned, Ali Al-Timimi and Ahmed Abu-Ali were yet to be

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indicted." Id. Benkahla "had relationships with both." Id. The district

court also found that Benkahla’s falsehoods not only delayed some

parts of the investigation, but wholly frustrated others. When

Benkahla was questioned, "the Government did not know the details

about Lashkar-e-Taiba training camps, training techniques, curriculum, and locations," the court wrote. Id. at 757. In addition, "because

of Defendant’s false or intentionally misleading answers, the Government still does not know the identity or whereabouts of the persons

about whom Defendant was questioned, their involvement with

Lashkar-e-Taiba, and their role in aiding persons to obtain jihad training." Id.

This factual amplitude stands in contrast to the situation in United

States v. Chandia, 514 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 2008), on which Benkahla

relies. There we vacated and remanded an application of the terrorism

enhancement because the district court "appeared to assume (erroneously) that the enhancement automatically applies to a material support conviction" and so "did not make any factual findings related to

the intent element." Id. at 376. Here, the district court made extensive

factual findings and the terrorism enhancement is doing just what it

ought to do: Punishing more harshly than other criminals those whose

wrongs served an end more terrible than other crimes. 

We therefore approve the application of the terrorism enhancement

to Benkahla. As the government has not appealed the district’s court’s

downward departure or variance, we do not address it. 

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment is in all respects

AFFIRMED.

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