Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02848/USCOURTS-ca8-03-02848-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Will H. Hawkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-2848

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States 

* District Court for the Western

Will H. Hawkins, * District of Missouri.

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 16, 2004

Filed: July 15, 2004 

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, MAGILL, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Will Hawkins appeals from the sentence that the district court1 imposed on him

for violating the conditions of his supervised release. We affirm.

After pleading guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, Mr. Hawkins

was sentenced to 30 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release. When he

completed the term of his incarceration, Mr. Hawkins began his supervised release.

Because he later violated the terms of his release, the district court modified its terms

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to include 3 months of immediate house arrest. A mere two weeks later, Mr. Hawkins

violated the conditions of his house arrest by removing his electronic monitoring

bracelet and leaving his residence; he was caught speeding in his automobile shortly

thereafter.

The district court held a revocation hearing at which Mr. Hawkins stipulated

that he violated the terms of his supervised release, and the court sentenced

Mr. Hawkins to 24 months of imprisonment, the statutory maximum, even though the

recommended range, according to United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 7B1.4(a) (policy statement), was 5 to 11 months. Mr. Hawkins argues that the

district court erred in sentencing him to 24 months in prison.

As a preliminary matter, we note that by their own terms the policy statements

in chapter 7 of the sentencing guidelines are merely advisory. See U.S.S.G. ch. 7,

pt. A(3)(a); see also United States v. Holmes, 283 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 2002);

United States v. Brown, 198 F.3d 713, 714 (8th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).

Nevertheless, district courts must take these policy statements into consideration

when sentencing a defendant whose supervised release has been revoked. See United

States v. Hensley, 36 F.3d 39, 42 (8th Cir. 1994). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the

district court must also consider virtually all of the matters set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a), the list of "[f]actors to be considered in imposing a sentence," id. See, e.g.,

Hensley, 36 F.3d at 42; cf. United States v. Tschebaum, 306 F.3d 540, 545 (8th Cir.

2002); U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. B, introductory comment.

Mr. Hawkins argues that the district judge did not properly consider chapter 7

and § 3553(a) in passing sentence. We have said that "[w]e know of no authority that

requires a court mechanically to list every consideration of § 3553(a) when it

sentences a defendant." United States v. Adams, 104 F.3d 1028, 1031 (8th Cir. 1997).

If a sentencing judge adverts to some of the considerations contained in § 3553(a),

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we have been satisfied "that the [sentencing] court ... was aware of the entire contents

of the relevant statute." Id. 

In United States v. Brown, 203 F.3d 557 (8th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), with

which the present case is more or less on all fours, we held that the district court's

decision to impose a 24 month sentence, despite the fact that the range recommended

by chapter 7 was 7 to 13 months, was not error. We deemed sufficient, moreover, its

specific mention of just a few of the matters listed in § 3553(a):

At the revocation hearing, the court discussed the seriousness of [the

defendant's] criminal history and the frequency of his violations of

supervised release. The court also inquired of [the defendant] whether

he would be helped by additional treatment, and [he] responded that

he had already been through the intensive substance abuse program

offered by the Bureau of Prisons and did not need further treatment.

These discussions demonstrate the court's consideration of the

relevant statutory factors, and show that the sentence imposed was a

carefully considered exercise of discretion.

Brown, 203 F.3d at 558.

 

In the instant case, the district court was explicitly advised by defense counsel

of both the statutory maximum of 24 months and chapter 7's recommended range of

5 to 11 months. In addition, the court had before it a worksheet from the probation

officer that made several references to chapter 7. We are therefore satisfied that the

court was aware of the provisions of chapter 7 and gave them ample consideration.

As far as the relevant considerations in § 3553(a) are concerned, we note that

the court discovered, in questioning Mr. Hawkins, that he had used drugs in the past.

The court also questioned Mr. Hawkins about his job skills, and determined that he

did not have a skill with which to earn a living. The court asked whether

Mr. Hawkins had attempted to learn a skill during his previous incarceration, and

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Mr. Hawkins replied that he had not had enough time, noting that "[y]ou got to have

at least two years left on your time to do that." The court replied, "[I]f I give you

24 months, you'd have time to do that ... [U]nless you can get a job and earn a decent

living, you'll be back ... in the penitentiary." Given that § 3553(a) calls for

considering the need "to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D),

"[t]hese discussions demonstrate the court's consideration of the relevant statutory

factors," and provide evidence that the sentence imposed was a carefully considered

exercise of discretion." Brown, 203 F.3d at 558.

The court also had before it a memorandum that detailed not only

Mr. Hawkins's unauthorized absence from his home, but also the prior violations that

resulted in his house arrest. These prior violations included "failure to complete a

halfway house program, failure to work, use of a controlled substance, failure to

answer truthfully all inquiries by the probation officer, and failure to notify the

probation officer 10 days prior to any change in residence." This series of violations

provided the court with information on the "history and characteristics of the

defendant," 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

Having examined the record with care, we think it plain that the district court

did not err in sentencing Mr. Hawkins. The district court is free to impose a sentence

outside the range suggested by chapter 7 "when, in its considered discretion, such a

departure is warranted," United States v. Carr, 66 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (per

curiam).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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