Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03080/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03080-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Deere Company, a Delaware Corporation
Appellee
Stephen Brent Wheeler
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED 

FILED 

PUBLISH United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 161991 

---------&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

STEPHEN BRENT WHEELER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant 

and Cross-Appellee, 

vs. 

JOHN DEERE COMPANY, a 

Delaware Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee 

and Cross-Appellant. 

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Nos. 90-3080 

90-3120 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 82-1790) 

Jefferson D. Sellers (Jack B. Sellers, with him on the brief), of 

Jack B Sellers Law Associates, Inc., Sapulpa, Oklahoma for 

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

Eric J. Magnuson (and Richard J. Nygard of Rider, Bennett, Egan & 

Arundel, Minneapolis, Minnesota and Paul s. McCausland, Young, 

Bogle, McCausland, Wells & Clark, Wichita, Kansas, with him on the 

brief), for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Before MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges and ANDERSON, District 

Judge.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Alden J. Anderson, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3080 Document: 01019292974 Date Filed: 05/16/1991 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-appellant and cross-appellee Stephen Brent Wheeler 

(Wheeler) lost his right arm while servicing a John Deere Titan 

series model 7720 combine. He brought this diversity case against 

the combine manufacturer, defendant-appellee and cross-appellant 

John Deere Company (Deere), on a strict products liability theory, 

alleging that the combine was unreasonably dangerous and that any 

warnings were inadequate. In the first trial, a jury found Deere 

75% at fault and Wheeler's employer 25% at fault. The jury 

calculated Wheeler's damages at $3.1 million and the district 

court entered judgment of $2.3 million against Deere. We reversed 

the judgment and remanded for a new trial. Wheeler v. John Deere 

Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1415 (lOth Cir. 1988) (Wheeler I). On 

retrial, the second jury found Deere 68% at fault, Wheeler's 

employer 32% at fault, and determined that Wheeler suffered 

damages of $2,883,407. The district court entered judgment of 

$1,960,717 against Deere. 

Wheeler appeals arguing that the district court should have 

(1) entered judgment in the amount of the first jury verdict, and 

(2) calculated postjudgment interest beginning from the date of 

the first judgment. Deere cross-appeals contending that the 

district court erred in (1) denying its motion to withdraw a 

stipulation made before the first trial, (2) admitting into 

evidence Deere's internal design and safety manuals as well as 

certain expert testimony, (3) formulating the special verdict and 

jury instructions, and (4) denying Deere's motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.). 

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Our appellate jurisdiction arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. We 

find no error in the district court's entry of judgment for 

Wheeler, nor in its calculation of postjudgment interest. 

Likewise, the district court did not abuse its discretion in {1) 

holding Deere to the factual admissions contained in Deere's 

previous stipulation, {2) admitting Deere's design and safety 

manuals, and {3) allowing the testimony of Wheeler's expert 

witnesses. The district court's jury instructions provided a 

comprehensive statement of the governing legal principles and, 

together with special interrogatories, allowed the jury to 

consider all material issues. Finally, after reviewing the 

record, we conclude that Wheeler produced sufficient evidence to 

raise a jury question as to whether the danger giving rise to 

Wheeler's injury was open and obvious. We therefore affirm. 

Background 

The John Deere Titan series model 7720 combine is a 

self-propelled grain combine powered by a turbo-charged diesel 

engine. The 7720 combine drives through a field where it cuts and 

gathers the crop, separates the grain and deposits it into a tank 

located at the bottom of the combine. Two horizontal augers move 

the grain from the tank into a sump. A vertical auger then 

propels the grain through a spout and into a truck driving 

alongside. The grain augers are engaged by a lever located in the 

cab. The 7720 combine is equipped with a five-by-five inch 

cleanout door located at the bottom of the vertical auger. Deere 

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affixed a decal approximately twenty-six inches from the cleanout 

door warning the operator to "[k]eep all shields in place," and 

"[d]isengage and shut off all engine and/or motor power before 

servicing or unclogging [the] machine." Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 

1407. 

Wheeler spent the summer of 1981 working as a truck driver 

for Fenton Custom Combining Crew. The crew followed the wheat 

harvest from Oklahoma to Montana. On September 14, 1981, the 

Fenton crew had just completed harvesting wheat in Leoti, Kansas 

and was preparing a 7720 combine to harvest pinto beans. These 

preparations required the removal of residual wheat and chaff from 

the grain tank, vertical auger and sump. Larry Fenton, Wheeler's 

employer, removed the cleanout door from the vertical auger and 

reached inside the opening. In an attempt to dislodge the 

remaining wheat residue, Fenton removed his hand and directed 

Steve Milner, a combine operator, to start the engine and engage 

the auger from the combine's cab. Fenton and Wheeler stepped back 

while wheat residue spewed from the auger. The clogging 

persisted, however, and Fenton directed Wheeler to dig the grain 

from the auger and sump manually while Fenton attempted to kick 

the grain down into the sump from the grain tank. Milner 

disengaged the auger, but left the engine running. Unaware that 

Wheeler's hand was in the cleanout door, Fenton instructed Milner 

to engage the auger for a second time. Wheeler's arm immediately 

was drawn into the auger housing causing severe injuries which 

resulted in amputation. 

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Based upon strict products liability, Wheeler alleged that 

his injuries resulted from Deere's defective and unreasonably 

dangerous design of the 7720 combine. He claimed that the 

location and size of the cleanout door exposed consumers to an 

unreasonable danger, and that practicable design alternatives 

existed which would have eliminated this risk. Wheeler also 

alleged that Deere failed to provide adequate warnings of the 

hazards associated with the vertical auger cleanout door. Deere 

countered that the 7720 combine was not unreasonably dangerous and 

that Wheeler's injury resulted from his own negligence and that of 

his coworkers. Deere steadfastly insists that the danger of 

losing a hand while manually cleaning the combine's vertical auger 

and sump with the engine running is open and obvious to any 

reasonable operator; therefore, recovery is barred. 

Prior to the first trial, Wheeler and Deere entered into a 

stipulation agreement which provided in pertinent part: 

In 1979 when the John Deere Model 7720 combine • . . was 

manufactured, it was technologically and economically 

feasible to design the vertical auger of the combine by 

incorporating a smaller rear cleanout door, trimming the 

auger flighting, and adding a second cleanout door on 

the front of the auger sump. 

The technological and economic feasibility of using a 

cleanout door on the front of the auger sump housing 

would have prevented the accident from happening in this 

fashion. 

IV R. doc. 160 at 34-35. Prior to the second trial, Deere sought 

to withdraw this portion of the stipulation; however, finding the 

stipulation to be factually accurate, the district court 

determined that the statements contained therein were "judicial 

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Appellate Case: 90-3080 Document: 01019292974 Date Filed: 05/16/1991 Page: 5 
admissions of fact" which could not be revoked. II R. doc. 149 at 

18. 

At trial, Wheeler presented ten witnesses, all of whom had 

lost portions of their arms in the vertical augers of John Deere 

Titan series combines. Each of these witnesses had extensive 

experience with farming equipment. From these witnesses, the jury 

heard testimony that some grain always remained in the auger and 

sump of the 7720 combine, even after running the auger after each 

1 

use. If not removed from the auger, this residual grain could 

swell and clog the mechanism, 2 or contaminate later harvests. 3 

Despite the need to remove residual grain from the auger and sump, 

Deere provided no instructions to users of the combine on how to 

accomplish this task. 4 In the absence of such instructions, the 

common technique was to remove the lower cleanout door, engage the 

auger and allow the residual grain to escape through the door. 

Although this procedure violated Deere's admonition that all 

shields remain in place when the engine was running, several 

1 

376 

2 

447 

3 

405 

See, ~' III R. doc. 152 

(Giesbrecht), 447 (Melton). 

See, ~I III R. doc. 152 

(Melton). 

See, ~I III R. doc. 152 

(Lockley), 421 (Ball). 

at 547 (Milner); II R. doc. 

at 548 (Milner); II R. doc. 

at 550 (Milner); II R. doc. 

51 at 

51 at 

51 at 

4 See, ~' III R. doc. 152 at 548 (Milner); II R. doc. 51 at 

373 (Giesbrecht), 382 (Adams), 390, 400 (Johnson), 405 (Lockley), 

447 (Melton). 

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• < 

witnesses testified that it was impossible to clean completely the 

lower auger and sump while complying with this warning. 5 

Several witnesses testified that a thorough cleaning was 

possible only by reaching into the auger and sump and scooping out 

the residual grain manually. 6 This procedure often involved two 

7 

or more people because the auger had to be engaged from the cab. 

It was impossible for the operator in the cab to observe the lower 

cleanout door to see if the second person was clear. 8 Although 

the auger was disengaged while the grain was being scooped out 

manually, the combine engine remained running because restarting a 

turbo-charged diesel engine in rapid succession may result in 

costly damage. 9 No warning label was near the lever engaging the 

auger to remind the cab operator to insure that no one was around 

the auger.

10 All of Wheeler's witnesses testified as to 

5 See, ~' III R. doc. 152 at 549, 590 (Milner); II R. doc. 

51 at 376 (Giesbrecht), 383-84 (Adams), 405 (Lockley); 421 (Ball). 

6 See, ~, III R. doc. 152 at 548 (Milner); II R. doc. 51 at 

376 (Giesbrecht), 405 (Lockley), 429 (Ball), 447 (Melton). 

7 See,~, III R. doc. 152 at 557 (Milner). 

8 See, ~, III R. doc. 152 at 583 (Milner); II R. doc. 51 at 

402 (Layton). 

9 See, ~' III R. doc. 152 at 550-51 (Milner); II R. doc. 51 

at 405 (Lockley), 421 (Ball). But see III R. doc. 156 at 1092 

(expert testimony that turbocharged diesel may be restarted in 

rapid succession without harm). 

10 See II R. doc. 51 at 421. 

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unexpected danger when, in the process of manual cleanout, the 

auger suddenly was engaged while the engine was running. 11 

Wheeler's evidence was corroborated in significant respects 

by deposition testimony of two Deere engineers. Thomas Hitzusen, 

a product design engineer, admitted that certain maintenance 

functions on Titan series combines, including cleaning the 

vertical auger, required the engine to be engaged. Indeed, 

Hitzusen admitted having placed his hand inside the lower cleanout 

door while cleaning grain out of the auger when the engine was 

running. See IV R. doc. 160 at 12. Wayne Slavens, the other 

engineer, also admitted that opening the cleanout door and then 

engaging the auger "is a reasonable thing to do" when cleaning the 

vertical auger and sump. Id. at 13. The jury also saw an on-site 

demonstration of the 7720 combine and was permitted to examine it. 

Over Deere's objection, the district court admitted portions 

of Deere's design and safety manuals. Wheeler's expert, John B. 

Sevart, consulted these manuals and testified that the 7720 

combine's vertical auger and cleanout door violated Deere's own 

safety standards by posing an unnecessary danger and failing 

clearly to warn of such danger. Id. at 40. Relying upon a Deere 

manual, Sevart indicated that Deere was aware of the phenomenon 

that, when two people simultaneously service machinery, accidents 

often result from miscommunication. Id. at 42. Sevart then 

expressed an opinion on the design of the cleanout door: 

11 See, ~' III R. doc. 152 at 710 (Wheeler), 557 (Milner); II 

R. doc. 51 at 362 & 371 (Giesbrecht), 385 (Adams), 391 (Layton), 

405 (Lockley). 

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Q. And have you an opinion as to whether it was 

unnecessarily dangerous, more dangerous than it 

needed to be at that location on this combine as it 

was designed and made and sold? 

A. [M]y professional opinion [is] that the design was 

more dangerous than necessary in light of the 

available alternatives. 

Q. And have you an opinion whether the machine as 

made, designed . was dangerous beyond the 

expectation of the ordinary user of that machine? 

A. It would be my opinion that the danger associated 

with the cleanout door would exceed the expectation 

of the owners and operators of such combines. 

Id. at 57-58. Deere timely objected to Sevart's testimony on 

consumer expectations as lacking foundation; however, the district 

court concluded that such testimony lay within the ambit of 

Sevart's expertise. See Id. at 5-9. Deere also objected to 

testimony of Wheeler's treating psychiatrist concerning human 

factors such as "momentary forgetfulness" which should have been 

reflected in the design the 7720 combine. 

I. 

Wheeler argues that, because Deere did not appeal the amount 

of damages in Wheeler I, Deere conceded the validity of the amount 

of damages awarded by the first jury. He therefore seeks to 

collect $2,325,000 based upon the first jury award instead of 

$1,960,717 based upon the second. This argument overlooks our 

reversal in Wheeler I. To "reverse" a judgment means to 

"overthrow, vacate, set aside, make void, annul, repeal, or revoke 

it." Black's Law Dictionary 1319 (6th ed. 1990). A judgment 

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.. 

reversed by a higher court is "without any validity, force or 

effect, and ought never to have existed." Butler v. Eaton, 141 

u.s. 240, 244 (1891). See Leroy v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 

1068, 1076 (5th Cir. 1990); Riha v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 533 

F.2d 1053, 1054 (8th Cir. 1976). Reversal of a judgment and 

remand for a new trial places the parties in the same position, 

insofar as relief is concerned, as if the case had never been 

tried. See Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 u.s. 543, 546 (1947). 

In Wheeler I, we "reverse[d] the judgment of the district 

court and remand[ed] for a new trial." 862 F.2d at 1415. Once we 

reversed the original judgment incorporating the first jury's 

verdict and our mandate issued, the first verdict became null and 

void in its entirety. The district court could no more reinstate 

the damages portion of the first verdict than it could substitute 

the second jury's award with a larger sum pulled out of a 

magically appearing hat. See Dr. Seuss, The 500 Hats of 

Bartholomew Cubbins (1938). 

With only slightly more seriousness, Wheeler next contends 

that postjudgment interest should run from the date of the first 

judgment (February 1986), rather than from the date of the second 

(October 1989). "Interest shall be allowed on any money judgment 

in a civil case recovered in a district court. . • . Such 

interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the 

judgment •••• " 28 u.s.c. § 1961(a). The purpose of§ 1961 is 

to compensate successful plaintiffs for the lost time between the 

ascertainment of damages and the receipt of payment. Kaiser 

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Appellate Case: 90-3080 Document: 01019292974 Date Filed: 05/16/1991 Page: 10 
Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 110 s. Ct. 1570, 1576 (1990). 

Where an award of damages is based on an invalid judgment "[i]t 

would be counterintuitive • • • • to believe that Congress 

intended postjudgment interest to be calculated from such a 

judgment." Id. (citing FDIC v. Rocket Oil Co., 865 F.2d 1158, 

1161-62 (lOth Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the extent 

to which a judgment is invalidated on appeal determines whether 

the first judgment or the remand judgment triggers the accrual of 

postjudgment interest. See Ashland Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 

607 F.2d 335, 336 (lOth Cir. 1979) , cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 

(1980). Where a case is reversed completely on the merits, 

postjudgment interest commences on the date of the remand 

judgment. Kaiser Aluminum, 110 S. Ct. at 1576; Rocket Oil Co., 

865 F.2d at 1161-62. In contrast, postjudgment interest accrues 

on the date of the first judgment when "the reversal is not on any 

basic liability errors or errors in procedure which affected the 

basic issues but on a dollar value, a matter of degree." Northern 

Nat. Gas v. Hegler, 818 F.2d 730, 737-38 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. 

dismissed, 486 u.s. 1063 (1988). 

In Wheeler I, we held that the district court erred by (1) 

allowing Wheeler to impeach Deere's expert with other accidents 

which the court had not found in advance to be substantially 

similar, and (2) admitting exhibits reflecting Deere's subsequent 

design changes, when Deere had stipulated to their feasibility. 

862 F.2d at 1115. Finding neither of these errors harmless, we 

"reverse[d] the judgment of the district court and remand[ed] for 

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a new trial." Id. Our reversal in Wheeler I was not based upon 

minor liability errors or procedural oversights by the district 

court; rather, our disposition resulted from errors "which 

affected the basic issues" of the trial. See Hegler, 818 F.2d at 

737. Therefore, because Wheeler I was a complete reversal on the 

merits, postjudgment interest properly commenced on the date of 

the remand judgment. 

II. 

We next consider various admissibility questions raised by 

Deere. 

A. 

Deere argues that the district court abused its discretion by 

denying its request to withdraw the portion of its stipulation 

conceding the feasibility of a safer design. Deere claims that 

the only reason it entered into the stipulation was to comply with 

our holding in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., 716 F.2d 1322, 

1326-30 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958 (1984), that 

subsequent remedial measures are admissible in a products 

liability action unless the defendant stipulates expressly to 

their feasibility. Deere contends that Wheeler I overturned 

Herndon and that the enactment of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3307 (1990 

Cum. Supp.) altered Kansas law in product liability actions by 

prohibiting evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See Kan. 

Stat. Ann. § 60-3307(a). Deere contends that the legal rationale 

motivating its entry into the stipulation was vitiated between the 

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first and second trials, and consequently the district court 

should have set the stipulation aside. 

A stipulation is an admission which "cannot be disregarded or 

set aside at will." Lyles v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 614 

F.2d 691, 694 (lOth Cir. 1980); Vallejos v. C.E. Glass Co., 583 

F.2d 507, 510 (lOth Cir. 1978); Stubblefield v. Johnson-Faqq, 

Inc., 379 F.2d 270, 272 (lOth Cir. 1967). Stipulations are not 

absolute, however, and may be withdrawn whenever necessary to 

prevent manifest injustice. United States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 

753, 757 (lOth Cir. 1980). Cf. Vallejos, 583 F.2d at 510-11 

(holding party to stipulation where no manifest injustice would 

result). District courts consequently are vested with broad 

discretion in determining whether to hold a party to a stipulation 

or whether the interests of justice require that the stipulation 

be set aside. Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708,709 

(11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 1025 (1988). 

Whether a stipulation entered into for a particular trial 

should remain binding during a retrial of the same case depends on 

the nature of the stipulation and the circumstances underlying its 

formulation: 

• • • where a stipulation is distinctly and formally 

made for the express purpose of relieving the opposing 

party from proving some fact or facts, or where a formal 

admission of facts is made by counsel and becomes a part 

of the record, such a stipulation or admission, provided 

it is not by its terms limited to a particular occasion 

or a temporary object, can be introduced in evidence and 

is available as proof of the facts admitted upon a 

subsequent trial of the same action, unless the court 

permits its withdrawal upon proper application. 

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73 Am. Jur. 2d Stipulations§ 10 at 545-46 (1974). When a 

stipulation is limited expressly to a single trial and phrased in 

terms of conclusory, rather than evidentiary, facts, district 

courts may on retrial free a party from the stipulation. See Hunt 

v. Marchetti, 824 F.2d 916, 917-18 (11th Cir. 1987); Aetna Life 

Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 361 F.2d 685, 690 (5th Cir. 1966). Finally, 

"[w]here a stipulation is entered into under a mistake of law 

induced by the then existing state of the case law a [party] is 

entitled to be relieved of the stipulation if no prejudice 

results." Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 F.2d 846, 855 

(5th Cir. 1966). 

As a initial matter, we question the degree of reliance that 

Deere placed upon our holding in Herndon when Deere stipulated to 

feasibility. Although Herndon interpreted Fed. R. Evid. 407, it 

was a New Mexico diversity case. 716 F.2d at 1324, 1326. Herndon 

expressly noted an absence of New Mexico law on point. Id. at 

1326. Shortly after Herndon, we held that the admissibility of 

subsequent remedial measures in a products liability case 

implicates a question of state policy which must inform the 

application of Rule 407 in diversity. Moe v. Avions Mercel 

Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932-33 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 469 u.s. 853 (1984). When Deere entered into its 

stipulation, the Kansas Supreme Court had adopted the general rule 

that evidence of subsequent design changes is inadmissible in a 

products liability case unless the defendant controverts 

feasibility. See Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 659 P.2d 799, 808-09 

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(Kan. 1983). Although this rule was not codified until amendment 

of the Kansas Products Liability Act in 1986, it nevertheless 

comprised Kansas law at the time Deere entered into the 

stipulation. See Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1410 n.2. Against this 

legal backdrop, Deere's rationale for the stipulation does not 

ring true as a reasonable mistake of law for which relief from 

this factual stipulation might be appropriate. 12 

Deere places primary reliance on Hunt v. Marchetti, 824 F.2d 

916. In Hunt, the plaintiff brought a libel action against a 

newspaper for implying that he was involved in the assassination 

of President Kennedy. During opening argument, the defense 

stipulated that "'[w]e are not going to prove that [Hunt] was in 

Dallas'" on the day of the assassination. Id. at 917. The case 

was reversed on appeal following a verdict for the plaintiff. On 

retrial, the district court allowed the defendant to withdraw the 

oral stipulation and permitted the evidence that plaintiff was in 

Dallas on the day of the assassination. A defense verdict issued 

12 This case is unlike Logan Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 365 

F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1966) in which the taxpayer stipulated that 

legal and accounting expenses incurred in the unsuccessful defense 

of a criminal prosecution were not deductible given Tax Court 

precedent on the issue. Subsequently, the Supreme Court rejected 

the Tax Court's position and the Fifth Circuit held that the 

taxpayer should be relieved from the stipulation given the 

supervening change in the law. Id. at 855. 

In Logan Lumber, the taxpayer stipulated concerning the leaal 

effect of defense expenses. Here, Deere stipulated as to facts 

(not governing law), and admitted that it was possible to design a 

safer product. Given the truth-seeking function of a trial, we 

fail to see how manifest injustice results if Deere is held to 

facts which it admitted as true in the first trial, and which the 

district court found to be true in the second trial. See II R. 

doc. 149 at 8. 

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on retrial. In the second appeal, plaintiff argued that defendant 

should not have been allowed to withdraw from the stipulation. 

The Eleventh Circuit looked to the language of the stipulation 

and, deferring to the interpretation of the district court, found 

that defendant's statements in opening argument were not 

stipulations of fact; rather they merely were stipulations that 

particular facts would not be contested at trial. Id. at 918. 

Unlike the defendant in Hunt, Deere made an affirmative, 

formal, factual statement that it was a feasible to design a safer 

product and reduced the statement to writing. Such factual 

statements are judicial admissions, normally binding on a party. 

Significantly, Deere does not controvert the truth of its 

admission, ~ supra note 12; it only complains of being 

disadvantaged tactically through Wheeler's adroit use of the 

stipulation agreement before the jury. Under these circumstances, 

we cannot say that holding Deere to its judicial admissions 

resulted in manifest injustice. Thus, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in declining Deere's request to withdraw from 

the stipulation. 

B. 

Deere also challenges evidentiary rulings by the district 

court allowing Wheeler to (1) introduce Deere's design and product 

safety manuals into evidence, and (2) present expert testimony on 

consumer expectations and momentary forgetfulness. The admission 

or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the 

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trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1408. 

Deere contends that the admission of its design and safety 

manuals improperly diverted the jury's attention from reasonable 

consumer expectations to Deere's "fault" despite the fact that 

negligence is not at issue in strict products liability cases. A 

manufacturer's compliance with industry standards is irrelevant in 

a strict products liability case where the determinative question 

is whether a product is unreasonably dangerous; such standards are 

germane only in determining a manufacturer's duty of care under a 

negligence theory. Rixrode v. American Laundry Press Co., 674 

F.2d 826, 831 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 459 u.s. 862 (1982); 

Raney v. Honeywell. Inc., 540 F.2d 932, 938 (8th Cir. 1976). See 

also McHargue v. Stokes Div., 912 F.2d 394, 395 n.3 (lOth Cir. 

1990). If Deere's design and safety manuals were admitted to 

prove industry standards, such admission would have been 

inappropriate. See id. However, Wheeler was attempting to prove 

not only that the 7720 combine was unreasonably dangerous, but 

also that Deere provided inadequate warnings of the danger giving 

rise to his injury. In Wheeler I, we upheld the admission of 

Deere's safety committee meeting records to show the company's 

awareness of a possible problem and consequent need for a suitable 

warning. We stated: 

In Kansas, the imposition of liability upon a 

manufacturer for inadequately warning a consumer or user 

regarding the dangers associated with its product is 

dependent upon the manufacturer's actual or constructive 

knowledge of the risk: "[T]he adequacy of a warning is 

• • . judged under a reasonableness standard--even if 

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\ 

the claim is made under the rubric of a strict products 

liability defect." Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 

239 Kan. 279, 718 P.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1986). 

Consequently, the trial judge properly admitted ... exhibits ... which refer to Deere's awareness of a 

possible problem . . . . This evidence is relevant to 

the issue of whether the combine's warning as it existed 

at the time of Wheeler's accident was adequate. 

862 F.2d at 1411 (footnote omitted). See also Kan. Stat. Ann. 

§ 60-3305 (1983) (reasonable user or consumer test for adequacy of 

warning); O'Gilvie v. International Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 

1441-42 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 u.s. 1032 (1988). 

This reasoning is equally pertinent with respect to the admission 

of Deere's design and product safety manuals; they pertain to 

whether Deere knew of the dangers associated with the vertical 

auger, sump and cleanout door. Such knowledge is a relevant 

factor in considering the adequacy of any warning. 

Deere also argues that the district court erred in allowing 

Wheeler's expert John Sevart to testify that the combine was 

dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary user. According 

to Deere, because Sevart's skill and expertise lay in mechanical 

engineering and not consumer sampling, his testimony on consumer 

expectations lacked foundation. 

"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by 

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 

thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Fed. R. Evid. 

702. District courts are accorded broad discretion in determining 

the competency of expert witnesses. Quinton v. Farmland Indus., 

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928 F.2d 335, ___ (lOth Cir. 1991); Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 

898 F.2d 1452, 1458 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In a products liability action, an expert witness is not 

strictly confined to his area of practice, but may testify 

concerning related applications; a lack of specialization does not 

affect the admissibility of the opinion but only its weight. See 

Quinton, 928 F.2d at ___ (veterinarian need not be specialist in 

toxicology to testify on toxic effect of substance on dairy 

cows.); Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 

167, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1990) (in products liability action against 

manufacturer of press brake, witnesses may testify on safety of 

brake design despite lack of personal design experience); Exum v. 

General Electric, 819 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 

(registered engineer experienced in industrial safety and product 

design, but lacking any specific expertise in kitchen design, 

qualified to testify in products liability action against 

manufacturer of industrial fryer); Dixon v. International 

Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985) (design engineer 

may provide expert testimony on safety of crawler tractor in 

product liability action against manufacturer despite lack of 

prior experience approving crawler tractor designs); Martin v. 

Fleissner GMBH, 741 F.2d 61, 64 (4th Cir. 1984) (mechanical 

engineers were qualified to present expert testimony in product 

liability action against manufacturer of synthetic fiber crimper 

although they lacked previous background in either crimpers or the 

textile industry); Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 

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F.2d 646, 653 (3d Cir. 1982) (witness who had sold automotive and 

agricultural equipment and taught automobile repair at local high 

school could render expert opinion on safety of loader despite 

lack of formal education in either engineering or physics). An 

expert must, however, stay within the reasonable confines of his 

subject area and cannot render expert opinions on an entirely 

different field or discipline. See,~' Stull v. Fuqua Indus., 

Inc., 906 F.2d 1271, 1275 (8th Cir. 1990) (mechanical engineer may 

testify to some degree about interaction between human body and 

mower but may not testify about human anatomy). 

Sevart was a mechanical engineer with special expertise in 

the safe design of farm equipment. Inherent in the safe design of 

mechanical equipment is some anticipation of how such equipment 

will be perceived and used by consumers. Sevart's testimony that 

the combine was more dangerous than anticipated by ordinary 

consumers was within his expertise and, given the technical nature 

of the case, could have assisted the jury. The district court did 

not abuse its discretion in admitting his testimony. See Fed. R. 

Evid. 704(a) (expert witness may testify concerning ultimate 

issue); Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co. 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (lOth Cir. 

1987) (in products liability action, court allowed expert 

testimony that defendant's product was dangerous beyond the 

expectation of average user; "facts were of a sufficiently 

technical nature that expert testimony could be expected to assist 

the jury in deciding the case"). 

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Deere next contends that the district court erred in allowing 

Wheeler's psychiatrist, Dr. Dominic Losacca, to testify that 

"momentary forgetfulness" is a human factor which Deere should 

have considered in designing the 7720 combine. Though Dr. Losacca 

was not a specialist in cognitive psychology, we agree with the 

district court that his testimony was "fair game" for a 

psychiatrist testifying on the subject of human judgments. III R. 

doc. 153 at 770. See LeMaire v. United States, 826 F.2d 949, 951-

52 (lOth Cir. 1987) (district court did not err in permitting 

cardiologist to render expert opinion on neurological matters 

given the undisputed relationship between patient's neurological 

and cardiovascular condition). Dr. Losacca may not have been the 

optimal witness to speak to cognitive factors that govern product 

design, but such lack of specialization only affected the weight, 

not the admissibility of his testimony. 

III. 

Deere next challenges the jury instructions. 

A. 

Deere argues that the district court erred in refusing to 

submit a special interrogatory to the jury on whether the danger 

posed by the vertical auger and cleanout door was open and 

obvious. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49. Because of this oversight, 

Deere contends that there is no way to determine how the jury 

resolved the dispositive issue of open and obvious danger. 

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"The submission of special interrogatories lies within the 

discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an 

abuse of discretion." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pearson, 769 

F.2d 1471, 1483 (lOth Cir. 1985). Once a trial court elects to 

use such interrogatories on a given element of a plaintiff's 

claim, all material issues must be included in the 

interrogatories. Menne v. Celotex Corp., 861 F.2d 1453, 1473 

(lOth Cir. 1988). On the other hand, when jury instructions 

comprehensively cover all material issues in the case, a district 

court does not abuse its discretion in denying a request for 

special interrogatories. Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour 

Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 101 (lOth Cir. 1958). See,~ Pearson, 

769 F.2d at 1483 (no abuse of discretion in denying requested 

special interrogatories where "the instructions given adequately 

guided the jury's deliberations"); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & 

Co., 512 F.2d 276, 294-95 (5th Cir. 1975) (district court did not 

abuse its discretion in products liability action by declining to 

submit special interrogatories concerning theory of recovery); 

Perzinski v. Chevron Chern. Co., 503 F.2d 654, 660 (7th Cir. 1974) 

(district court did not err in refusing to submit special 

interrogatory on plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence where 

issue adequately was covered in other instructions); Rude v. 

Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 245 F.2d 778, 779-81 (7th Cir. 1957) 

(in view of court's instruction that speed was factor to be 

considered in deciding whether defendant was negligent in 

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• 

automobile accident case, district court did not err in declining 

to submit special interrogatory on question of speed). 

Deere places principal reliance on this court's holding in 

Martinez v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 714 F.2d 1028, 1032 (lOth Cir. 

1983), in arguing that it was entitled to a special interrogatory 

on the open and obvious question. Martinez was a personal injury 

action arising out of a collision between an automobile and a 

freight train. The plaintiff contended that the accident resulted 

from the negligent operation of the train. The railroad contended 

that the contributory negligence of the driver led to the 

accident. At trial, a factual dispute arose as to whether 

plaintiff or a third-party defendant was driving the car at the 

time of the accident. Although negligence of a driver could not 

be imputed to a passenger under Wyoming law, the district court 

declined to submit a special interrogatory on the question of who 

was driving the car at the time of the collision. We held that 

the identify of the driver was a material factual issue, the 

explicit resolution of which was required for the jury to make 

proper findings on both contributory and primary negligence. Id. 

at 1033. We further held that the district court abused its 

discretion in failing to submit a special interrogatory to the 

jury. Id. 

Here, the district court instructed the jury that, in order 

to find Deere liable, it had to find that the combine was "in a 

defective condition and unreasonably dangerous to persons who 

might be expected to use the product." I R. doc. 128, instr. 10. 

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.. 

The court then instructed the jury on what made a product 

unreasonably dangerous. 

[A] product is "unreasonably dangerous" if it is 

dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be 

contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it 

or uses it with the ordinary knowledge common to the 

community as to its characteristics. In other words, ~ 

product is not "unreasonably dangerous" when its degree 

of danger is obvious or generally known and 

recognized • . • • 

Id. instr. 12 (emphasis supplied). Clearly, whether Wheeler's 

injury resulted from an open and obvious danger within the 

cognition of a reasonable user was a question material to Deere's 

liability, however, unlike the situation in Martinez, the jury was 

not precluded from considering the issue. The obviousness, if 

any, of the danger associated with the vertical auger, sump and 

cleanout door on the 7720 combine adequately was covered in the 

jury instructions. Following instructions 10 and 12, the jury 

could not have concluded that the combine was unreasonably 

dangerous without rejecting Deere's contention that the danger was 

open and obvious and within the cognition of a reasonable user. 

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Deere's request for special interrogatories. See Wichita 

Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d at 101; Pearson, 769 F.2d at 1483. 

B. 

Deere next argues that the district court erred by failing to 

instruct the jury that Deere had no duty to warn of open and 

obvious dangers and by substituting the term "unsafe" for the term 

"unreasonably dangerous" in its definition of a defective product. 

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In reviewing the adequacy of jury instructions, we consider the 

instructions as a whole. Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1411. We do not 

inquire whether the instructions were faultless in every 

particular respect; rather "'[t]he test is •.• whether the jury 

was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the 

issues and its duty to determine those issues."' Meene, 861 F.2d 

at 1470-71 (quoting Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 

F.2d 1076, 1100 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 

(1974)). 

Deere contends that the trial court's refusal to instruct the 

jury that a manufacturer is not required to warn of open and 

obvious dangers deprived Deere of an opportunity to have its 

theory of the case presented to the jury. The district court 

instructed the jury that "a product is not 'unreasonably 

dangerous' when its degree of danger is obvious or generally known 

and recognized; nor is it 'unreasonably dangerous' if the 

manufacturer has given adequate warnings or instructions that 

sufficiently alert the user to the risk of danger in using the 

product." I R. doc. 128, instr. 12. Fully implicit in this 

instruction is that Deere was not required to warn of open and 

obvious dangers. We therefore hold that Deere was not precluded 

from presenting its theory of the case to the jury. 

Deere next challenges the court's instruction defining 

product defects. The instruction read: 

A product is in a "defective" condition if, at the 

time it leaves the manufacturer's hands, it is in a 

condition which is unreasonably dangerous to the 

ordinary user. A product is "defective" if, when it 

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• 

leaves the manufacturer's hand, it is unsafe when used 

for a purpose for which it was intended or when used for 

some other reasonably foreseeable purpose. 

A product may be defective in its design, in its 

preparation, or by virtue of the inadequacies of the 

defendant's warnings necessary for the product's safe 

use. 

Id. instr. 11 (emphasis supplied). Deere argues that the trial 

court's substitution of the term "unsafe" for the term 

"unreasonably dangerous" mislead the jury by connoting a lesser 

degree of danger. According to Deere, the court's instruction 

left the jury free to impose liability if they found that the 7720 

combine was "unsafe," despite that fact that large and complex 

machines such as the 7720 combine are inherently more dangerous 

than many consumer products. 

Deere's focus on one word in a single instruction ignores the 

broader context in which the jury was instructed. When reading 

the instructions in their entirety, it is clear that the jury was 

informed that a product had to be unreasonably dangerous in order 

to be defective. Instruction 10 informed that jury that, to 

impose liability on Deere, it had to find that the combine was 

defective and unreasonably dangerous. Instruction 11 cautioned 

the jury to view the safety of a product in light of its intended 

purpose. Viewed as a whole, these instructions adequately 

apprised the jury that a certain level of danger is inherent in 

complex farm machinery and that, in order to find Deere liable, 

the jury would have to determine that the 7720 combine exceeded 

the degree of danger reasonable for farm combines. 

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... 

IV. 

Deere argues that the district court erred in denying its 

motion for j.n.o.v., given a lack of evidence on whether the 

combine was more dangerous than would be expected by an ordinary 

user. According to Deere, Wheeler never presented evidence 

controverting Deere's evidence that the danger of injury from 

cleaning the vertical auger and sump with the engine running was 

open and obvious. 

"A directed verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 is proper 

"'only if the proof is all one way or so overwhelmingly 

preponderant in favor of the movant as to permit no other rational 

conclusion."' Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1414 (quoting J. I. Case 

Credit Corp. v. Crites, 851 F.2d 309, 311 (lOth Cir. 1988)). When 

reviewing a district court's denial of j.n.o.v., we view the 

evidence, together with the inferences therefrom, in the light 

most favorable to the jury's verdict. See McAlester v. United Air 

Line, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 347-48 

(1965), adopted by the Kansas Supreme Court in Brooks v. Dietz, 

545 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Kan. 1976), provides in pertinent part: 

(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition 

unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his 

property is subject to liability for physical harm 

thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to 

his property, if 

(a) the seller is engaged in the business of 

selling such a product, and 

(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 

consumer without substantial change in the condition in 

which it is sold. 

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.. • 

Comment i to § 402A provides in pertinent part: 

The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond 

that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 

consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge 

common to the community as to its characteristics. 

See Lester v. Magic Chef, Inc., 641 P.2d 353, 361 (Kan. 1982) 

(adopting§ 402A comment i). Under Kansas law, a manufacturer is 

not liable for "dangers, hazards or risks which are patent, open 

or obvious and which should have been realized by a reasonable 

user or consumer or the product." See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-

3305(c) (emphasis supplied). A manufacturer cannot be held liable 

for injuries which result from patent dangers, inherent in the 

product, completely within the cognition of a reasonable user, and 

incapable of being economically alleviated. See, ~' Linegar v. 

Armour of America, Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1153-1154 (8th Cir. 1990) 

(purported dangerous defect, that bullet-resistant vest would not 

protect exposed portions of the body, was open and obvious and 

within full cognition); Elliot v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505 

1506-07 (11th Cir. 1990) (danger of rotating boat propeller 

sufficiently obvious and within cognition to preclude imposition 

of§ 402A liability upon manufacturer of outboard motor), cert. 

denied, 111 S. Ct. 756 (1991). 

As noted by the Kansas Supreme Court, a product which 

contains an open and obvious danger still can be unreasonably 

dangerous. Siruta, 659 P.2d at 806 ("Simply because the hazard on 

a piece of equipment is open and obvious does not prevent it from 

being dangerous to the operator or consumer."). Although an open 

and obvious danger certainly is material to whether a product is 

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. . 

. 

unreasonably dangerous, it is not conclusive. See Lockley v. 

Deere & Co., 927 F.2d 1430, ____ , (8th Cir. 1991). Rather, 

[w]hether a danger is open and obvious depends not just 

on what people can see with their eyes but also on what 

they know and believe about what they see. In 

particular, if people generally believe that there is a 

danger associated with the use of a product, but that 

there is a safe way to use it, any danger there may be 

in using the product in the way generally believed to be 

safe is not open and obvious. 

Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F.2d 1241, 1249 (5th Cir. 1989) 

(Reavley, J., dissenting) (quoting Corbin v. Coleco Indus., 748 

F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1984)). Moreover, merely because a 

product is misused does not render a particular danger open and 

obvious. Under Kansas law, a manufacturer can be held liable for 

the foreseeable misuse of its product. Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 

1413 n.6. 

In this case, the jury heard testimony from ten witnesses, 

all whom suffered injuries substantially similar to Wheeler's. 

Under both Kansas and federal law, evidence of substantially 

similar accidents in strict products liability actions is relevant 

to refute testimony that a given product was designed without 

safety hazards. See C. A. Associates v. Dow Chern. Co., 918 F.2d 

1485, 1489 (lOth Cir. 1990) ("Both federal and state courts 

routinely permit introduction of substantially similar acts or 

occurrences in product liability actions to demonstrate the 

existence of a defect, to prove notice, or to refute testimony 

given by defense witnesses."): Ponder v. Warren Tool Corp., 834 

F.2d 1553, 1560 (lOth Cir. 1987) (citing numerous cases). The 

jury also heard testimony that, in order to clean the vertical 

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. . ' 

auger and sump, the cleanout door had to be removed, the engine 

turned on and the auger engaged. This procedure clearly 

circumvented Deere's warning that all shields be in place while 

the engine was running. However, such misuse was foreseeable 

because no other apparent method existed to perform this vital 

maintenance function; indeed, the jury was presented with evidence 

that Deere's engineers used this same method. Several of 

Wheeler's witnesses were experienced farmworkers who testified 

upon belief that it was safe to clean the 7720 combine's vertical 

auger and sump while the engine was running. All expressed 

surprise about the manner in which they were injured. Finally, 

the jury viewed an actual 7720 combine and a demonstration 

concerning its operation. This evidence, together with the 

testimony of Wheeler's expert (Sevart), indicates that a jury 

could conclude rationally that the 7720 combine was more dangerous 

than would be reasonably expected by an ordinary user of the 

combine. 

Deere argues that the proximate cause of the accident was the 

negligence of Wheeler's coworker who actually engaged the auger, 

Milner, rather than defective design of the 7720 combine. See 

generally Lockley, 927 F.2d at n.7. However, under the 

Kansas foreseeable misuse doctrine, negligent use of a product 

which is foreseeable does not preclude a manufacturer from 

liability. Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1413 n.6. The jury heard 

evidence that the auger had to be engaged in the cab from where it 

was impossible to see whether a person cleaning the auger and sump 

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.. .. 

was clear. Testimony also revealed that no warnings were posted 

next to the lever used to engage the auger, despite Deere's 

knowledge that many accidents resulted from miscommunication. 

Under these circumstances, we must conclude that a reasonable jury 

could find that, given the design of the vertical auger, sump and 

cleanout door, it was foreseeable that an operator in a cab 

negligently could engage the auger while his coworker's hand 

remained in harm's way. 

Deere next asks us to follow Melton v. Deere & Co. and hold 

that there was insufficient evidence to submit the case to the 

jury. The plaintiff in Melton suffered a similar injury while 

cleaning the vertical auger and sump of a John Deere Titan series 

7720 combine. Applying Mississippi products liability law, the 

district court granted judgment to Deere, finding that no 

reasonable jury could find the combine unreasonably dangerous. A 

divided panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the 

danger of being injured while cleaning the vertical auger and sump 

with the engine running was open and obvious; therefore, the 7720 

combine could not be unreasonably dangerous under § 402A. Melton, 

887 F.2d at 1243-44. 

Consistent with what we believe to be the proper standard for 

granting j.n.o.v., see Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 1414; Melton, 887 

F.2d at 1249-50 (Reavley, J., dissenting), we have found 

sufficient evidence in this record to raise a jury question on 

whether the danger surrounding the vertical auger, sump and 

cleanout door was patent, open or obvious and within the cognition 

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I 

• 

of a reasonable user. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 

of the jury's verdict, the proof simply is not all one way, nor 

does it overwhelmingly preponderate in Deere's favor so as to 

permit but one rational conclusion. 

Even if the danger giving rise to Wheeler's injury was 

apparently patent, open or obvious, we could not follow Melton. A 

plaintiff still may establish that a product with an apparently 

patent, open or obvious danger is unreasonably dangerous if he can 

prove that the danger is not within the cognition of a reasonable 

user. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3305(c); Siruta, 659 P.2d at 

806-07; Lester, 641 P.2d at 361. See also Wheeler I, 862 F.2d at 

1414. Applying Kansas law, we therefore must join with the Eighth 

Circuit in rejecting the analysis of the panel majority in Melton. 

See Lockley, 927 F.2d at ------- (applying Arkansas law, open and 

obvious danger rule does not bar recovery in strict products 

liability action; Wheeler I cited with approval). 

AFFIRMED. 

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