Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01770/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01770-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Intellectual Ventures I LLC
Appellant
Trend Micro Incorporated
Appellee
Trend Micro, Inc. (USA)
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SYMANTEC CORP.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

TREND MICRO INCORPORATED, TREND MICRO, 

INC. (USA),

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1769, 2015-1770, 2015-1771

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in Nos. 1:10-cv-01067-LPS, 1:12-cv01581-LPS, Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark.

______________________ 

Decided: September 30, 2016

______________________ 

ERIC F. CITRON, Goldstein & Russell, P.C., Bethesda, 

MD, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

THOMAS GOLDSTEIN; BROOKE ASHLEY MAY TAYLOR,

PARKER C. FOLSE III, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Seattle, 

WA; RICHARD W. HESS, JOHN PIERRE LAHAD, Houston, TX. 

DOUGLAS ETHAN LUMISH, Latham & Watkins LLP, 

Menlo Park, CA, argued for defendant-cross appellant. 

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2 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

Also represented by JEFFREY G. HOMRIG; DEAN G.

DUNLAVEY, Costa Mesa, CA; GABRIEL BELL, ROBERT J.

GAJARSA, Washington, DC. 

YAR ROMAN CHAIKOVSKY, Paul Hastings LLP, Palo Alto, CA, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented 

by DARYL STUART BARTOW, BRYAN KEITH JAMES; BLAIR 

MARTIN JACOBS, Washington, DC. 

JAY P. KESAN, University of Illinois, College of Law, 

Champaign, IL, for amici curiae Jay P. Kesan, Shubha 

Ghosh, Richard Gruner, Carol M. Hayes, Adam Mossoff, 

Kristen Osenga, Michael Risch, Mark F. Schultz, Ted 

Sichelman. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, MAYER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge MAYER. 

Opinion dissenting-in-part filed by Circuit Judge STOLL. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC (“IV”) sued Symantec 

Corp. and Trend Micro1 (together, “appellees” or “defendants”) for infringement of various claims of U.S. Patent 

Nos. 6,460,050 (“the ’050 patent”), 6,073,142 (“the ’142 

patent”), and 5,987,610 (“the ’610 patent”). The district 

court held the asserted claims of the ’050 patent and the 

’142 patent to be ineligible under § 101, and the asserted 

claim of the ’610 patent to be eligible. We affirm as to the 

1 We refer to Trend Micro Incorporated and Trend 

Micro, Inc. (USA) together as a singular defendant “Trend 

Micro.” 

 

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asserted claims of the ’050 patent and ’142 patent, and 

reverse as to the asserted claim of the ’610 patent. 

BACKGROUND

I 

IV owns the three patents at issue: the ’050 patent, 

the ’142 patent, and the ’610 patent. IV sued Symantec 

and Trend Micro, two developers of anti-malware and 

anti-spam software, for infringement of various claims of 

those patents. Against Symantec, IV asserted claims 9, 

16, and 22 of the ’050 patent; claims 1, 7, 21, and 22 of the 

’142 patent; and claim 7 of the ’610 patent. Against Trend 

Micro, IV asserted claims 9, 13, 16, 22, and 24 of the ’050 

patent; and claims 1, 7, 17, 21, 22, 24, and 26 of the ’142 

patent. 

With respect to the two defendants, a § 101 patent eligibility issue arose at different stages of the proceedings. 

The case against Symantec went to trial. The jury found 

that Symantec had not proven by clear and convincing 

evidence that any asserted claims were invalid under 

§§ 102 and 103. The jury found Symantec had infringed 

the asserted claims of the ’142 patent and ’610 patent, 

and had not infringed any asserted claims of the ’050 

patent.2 After trial, Symantec brought a motion under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) for a judgment that all the asserted 

claims of the three patents-in-suit are unpatentable under 

35 U.S.C. § 101, an issue not addressed in the jury verdict. 

The case against Trend Micro did not go to trial. 

Trend Micro brought a motion for summary judgment of 

2 The jury awarded $9 million for infringement of 

the ’142 patent and $8 million for infringement of the ’610 

patent. 

 

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invalidity under § 101 for all of the asserted claims.3 After 

Trend Motion had submitted its motion, IV withdrew its 

assertion of claim 7 of the ’610 patent against Trend 

Micro, the only claim of the ’610 patent asserted against 

Trend Micro. Thus the motions raised issues of patent 

eligibility as to the ’050 and ’142 patents with respect to 

both defendants, and as to the ’610 patent only with 

respect to Symantec.

II

The ’050 patent is entitled, “Distributed Content Identification System.” The patent application was filed on

December 22, 1999, and the ’050 patent issued on October 

1, 2002. The patent is directed to methods of screening 

emails and other data files for unwanted content. 

The ’142 patent is entitled, “Automated Post Office 

Based Rule Analysis of E-Mail Messages and Other Data 

Objects for Controlled Distribution in Network Environments.” The patent application was filed on June 23, 

1997, and the ’142 patent issued on June 6, 2000. The 

patent is directed to methods of routing e-mail messages

based on specified criteria (i.e., rules). 

The ’610 patent is entitled, “Computer Virus Screening Methods and Systems.” The patent application was 

filed on February 12, 1998, and the patent issued on 

November 16, 1999. The patent is directed to using computer virus screening in the telephone network. 

In both cases the district court determined that the 

asserted claims of the ’050 patent and ’142 patent claimed 

3 While Trend Motion did not state under which 

rule it brought its motion, the district court applied the 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment standard, and the 

parties did not dispute the application of that standard. 

 

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ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and 

granted appellees’ motions with respect to those patents. 

The district court held, however, that Symantec had failed 

to establish that the asserted claim of the ’610 patent is 

patent-ineligible under § 101, and denied Symantec’s

motion with respect to that patent. 

Final judgment was entered in favor of Symantec and 

Trend Micro that the asserted claims of the ’050 and ’142 

patents are patent-ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id. 

See Final Judgment Following Jury Trial (“Symantec 

Final Judgment”), Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., No. 10-cv-1067-LPS (D. Del. March 24, 2016), 

ECF No. 770 at 2;4 Judgment, Intellectual Ventures I LLC 

v. Trend Micro Inc., No. 12-cv-1581-LPS (D. Del. June 17, 

2015), ECF No. 234 at 2. This resolved all claims against 

Trend Micro. With respect to Symantec, the district court 

entered final judgment in favor of IV that Symantec 

infringed claim 7 of the ’610 patent with damages in the 

amount of $8 million, and that claim 7 was also not 

proved invalid by Symantec under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 or 

103, or patent-ineligible under § 101. See Symantec Final 

Judgment at 2. 

IV now appeals the district court’s ineligibility determinations with respect to the ’050 patent and ’142 patent

as to Symantec and Trend Micro, and Symantec crossappeals the determination of eligibility for the ’610 patent. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

4 The entry of final judgment ripened Symantec’s 

cross-appeal. See Pause Tech. LLC v. TiVo Inc., 401 F.3d 

1290, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

 

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DISCUSSION

I 

 We review the grant or denial of summary judgment 

de novo. See Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 

2000) (en banc). For the district court’s entry of judgment 

under Rule 52(c), we review the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. 

See EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 273 

(3d Cir. 2010). Patent eligibility under § 101 is an issue of 

law which we review de novo. See OIP Techs., Inc. v. 

Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

II

Section 101 of title 35 defines patent-eligible subject 

matter. It provides, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any 

new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 

thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 101. For over 150 years, the Supreme Court has recognized an implicit exception to these broad categories

encompassing “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and 

abstract ideas[, which] are not patentable.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 

1293 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601–02 

(2010). 

In Mayo and in Alice, the Court set forth a framework 

for “distinguishing patents that claim laws of nature, 

natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those that 

claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts.” Alice 

Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 

(2014). At Mayo/Alice step one, a court must “determine 

whether the claims at issue are directed to one of those 

patent-ineligible concepts.” Id. The category of abstract 

ideas embraces “fundamental economic practice[s] long 

prevalent in our system of commerce,” id. at 2356 (quotCase: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 6 Filed: 09/30/2016
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ing Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611), including “longstanding 

commercial practice[s]” and “method[s] of organizing 

human activity,” id. But the category of abstract ideas is 

not limited to economic or commercial practices or methods of organizing human activity. See infra note 5. 

If a claim is directed to a patent-ineligible concept, the 

court must proceed to Mayo/Alice step two, and ask, 

“what else is there in the claims before us?” Alice, 134 S. 

Ct. at 2355 (citation and internal quotation citation 

omitted). Step two is “a search for an inventive concept—

i.e., an element or combination of elements that is sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to 

significantly more than a patent upon the ineligible 

concept itself.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

At Mayo/Alice step two, the search is for “an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” Id. at 2357 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). And 

“[s]imply appending conventional steps, specified at a 

high level of generality,” which are “well known in the 

art” and consist of “well-understood, routine, conventional 

activit[ies]” previously engaged in by workers in the field,

is not sufficient to supply the inventive concept. Id. at 

2357, 2359 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 

1. THE ’050 PATENT

The district court held patent-ineligible the asserted 

claims of the ’050 patent—claims 9, 13, 16, 22, and 24—

directed to filtering e-mails that have unwanted content. 

We agree with the district court. The parties agree that

independent claim 9 is representative. It recites: 

9. A method for identifying characteristics of data 

files, comprising:

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receiving, on a processing system, file content 

identifiers for data files from a plurality of file 

content identifier generator agents, each agent 

provided on a source system and creating file content IDs using a mathematical algorithm, via a 

network; 

determining, on the processing system, whether 

each received content identifier matches a characteristic of other identifiers; and 

outputting, to at least one of the source systems 

responsive to a request from said source system, 

an indication of the characteristic of the data file 

based on said step of determining. 

’050 patent, col. 8, ll. 13–26. According to IV, this method 

of filtering emails is used to address the problems of spam 

e-mail and the use of e-mail to deliver computer viruses. 

We agree with the district court that receiving e-mail 

(and other data file) identifiers, characterizing e-mail 

based on the identifiers, and communicating the characterization—in other words, filtering files/e-mail—is an 

abstract idea. 

 The Supreme Court has held that “fundamental . . . 

practice[s] long prevalent” are abstract ideas. Alice, 134 S. 

Ct. at 2356. The Supreme Court and we have held that a 

wide variety of well-known and other activities constitute

abstract ideas.5 

5 See, e.g., Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611 (claims directed to 

risk hedging); Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (claims directed to 

idea of intermediated settlement); In re TLI Commc’ns

LLC Patent Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 

(claims directed to classifying a digital image and storing 

the image based on its classification); Mortg. Grader, Inc. 

 

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v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016) (claims drawn to well-known idea of anonymous loan shopping); Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., 

Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (claims directed 

to idea of determining a price using organizational and 

product group hierarchies); Internet Patents Corp. v. 

Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 

(claims directed to idea of retaining information in the 

navigation of online forms); OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1362–

63 (claims directed to offer-based price optimization); 

Content Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo 

Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2014) 

(claims directed to the idea of collecting data, recognizing 

certain data within the collected data set, and storing that 

recognized data in a memory); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu 

LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 714–15 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claims directed to displaying an advertisement in exchange for 

access to copyrighted media); buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, 

Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (claim directed 

toward guaranteeing a party’s performance in a transaction); Accenture Global Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (claims 

directed to automated methods for generating task 

lists); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (claims directed to processing information 

through a clearinghouse); CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 

Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 

2011) (claims directed to a method for verifying the validity of a credit card transaction). See also McRO, Inc. v. 

Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., No. 2015-1080, 2016 WL 

4896481, at *8–10 (claims “focused on a specific asserted 

improvement in computer animation, i.e., the automatic 

use of rules of a particular type” held not to be directed to 

ineligible subject matter). 

 

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Here, it was long-prevalent practice for people receiving paper mail to look at an envelope and discard certain 

letters, without opening them, from sources from which 

they did not wish to receive mail based on characteristics 

of the mail.6 The list of relevant characteristics could be 

kept in a person’s head. Characterizing e-mail based on a 

known list of identifiers is no less abstract. The patent 

merely applies a well-known idea using generic computers 

“to the particular technological environment of the Internet.” DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 

1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

The asserted claims of the ’050 patent also resemble 

claims we have held were directed to an abstract idea.

Recently, in BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. 

AT&T Mobility LLC, we held that a claim to a “content 

filtering system for filtering content retrieved from an 

Internet computer network[, e.g., to prevent users from 

accessing certain websites] . . . is [directed to] an abstract 

idea.” 827 F.3d 1341, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2016).7 And in 

Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1347, cert. denied, 136 S. 

Ct. 119 (2015), we found that the asserted patents were 

“drawn to the abstract idea of 1) collecting data, 2) recog6 For example, it is common for “an occupant who 

receives generically addressed mail [to] discard it as junk 

mail.” Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 248 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

7 In BASCOM, we found the claims patent-eligible 

because, at step two, the patent claimed “a technologybased solution (not an abstract-idea-based solution implemented with generic technical components in a conventional way) to filter content on the Internet that 

overcomes existing problems with other Internet filtering 

systems.” 827 F.3d at 1351. 

 

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nizing certain data within the collected data set, and 3) 

storing that recognized data in a memory.” 

Because we hold the asserted claims of the ’050 patent 

are directed to an abstract idea, we proceed to Mayo/Alice

step two to determine whether the claims contain an 

“inventive concept” that renders them patent-eligible. 

Claims that “amount to nothing significantly more than 

an instruction to apply [an] abstract idea . . . using some 

unspecified, generic computer” and in which “each step 

does no more than require a generic computer to perform 

generic computer functions” do not make an abstract idea 

patent-eligible, Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359–60 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted), because “claiming the 

improved speed or efficiency inherent with applying the 

abstract idea on a computer” does not “provide a sufficient 

inventive concept.” Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital 

One Bank (USA) (“Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One 

Bank”), 792 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

IV argues that the jury verdict determined that Symantec’s proffered prior art did not anticipate or render 

obvious the asserted claims of the ’050 patent, and that 

the jury’s anticipation and obviousness determination is 

inconsistent with a determination that the claims are 

patent-ineligible. While the claims may not have been 

anticipated or obvious because the prior art did not disclose “determining . . . whether each received content 

identifier matches a characteristic” or “outputting . . . an 

indication of the characteristic of the data file,” that does 

not suggest that the idea of “determining” and “outputting” is not abstract, much less that its implementation is 

not routine and conventional. 

Indeed, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a 

process, or even of the process itself, is of no relevance in 

determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls 

within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject 

matter.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–89 (1981)

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(emphasis added); see also Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1303–04

(rejecting “the Government’s invitation to substitute 

§§ 102, 103, and 112 inquiries for the better established 

inquiry under § 101”).8 Here, the jury’s general finding

that Symantec did not prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that three particular prior art references do not 

disclose all the limitations of or render obvious the asserted claims does not resolve the question of whether the 

claims embody an inventive concept at the second step of 

Mayo/Alice. 

The steps of the asserted claims of the ’050 patent do 

not “improve the functioning of the computer itself,” Alice, 

134 S. Ct. at 2359, for example by disclosing an “improved, particularized method of digital data compression,” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1259, or by improving 

“the way a computer stores and retrieves data in 

memory,” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 

1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Rather, these claims use generic 

computers to perform generic computer functions. 

In Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One Bank, we 

found abstract an Internet-based method for “tracking 

financial transactions to determine whether they exceed a 

pre-set spending limit (i.e., budgeting).” 792 F.3d at 1367. 

The fact that “the claims recite[d] budgeting using a 

‘communication medium’ (broadly including the Internet 

and telephone networks), . . . [did] not render the claims 

any less abstract.” Id. We also found abstract claims 

8 See also Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978) 

(“This case turns entirely on the proper construction of 

§ 101 . . . . It does not involve the familiar issues of novelty and obviousness that routinely arise under §§ 102 and 

103 when the validity of a patent is challenged. For the 

purpose of our analysis, we assume that respondent’s 

formula is novel and useful and that he discovered it.”).

 

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related to “customizing [website] information based on (1) 

information known about the user and (2) navigation 

data,” and similarly held that “a generic web server with 

attendant software . . . ‘tasked with tailoring information 

and providing it to the user’ provides no additional limitation beyond applying an abstract idea, restricted to the 

Internet, on a generic computer.” Id. at 1370–71. 

The claims here are also distinguishable from those in 

BASCOM, which allegedly improved an existing technological process by describing “how [a] particular arrangement of elements is a technical improvement over prior 

art ways of filtering [Internet] content,” i.e., “a filter 

implementation versatile enough that it could be adapted 

to many different users’ preferences while also installed 

remotely in a single location.” 827 F.3d at 1350. There is 

not, in the ’050 patent, any “specific or limiting recitation 

of . . . improved computer technology,” CLS Bank Int’l v. 

Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 

(en banc) (Lourie, J., concurring), as the asserted claims 

describe only generic computer elements.

Finally, IV argues that the ’050 patent “shrink[s] the 

protection gap and moot[s] the volume problem.” IV’s 

Opening Br. at 14. According to IV, the protection gap is 

“the period of time between identification of a computer 

virus by an anti-malware provider and distribution of that 

knowledge to its users.” Id. at 10. The volume problem is 

the “exponential growth in malware and spam,” increasing the amount of antivirus signatures to be downloaded. 

Id. at 12–13. However, the asserted claims do not contain 

any limitations that address the protection gap or volume 

problem, e.g., by requiring automatic updates to the 

antivirus or antispam software or the ability to deal with 

a large volume of such software. We have explained that, 

“for a perceived abstract idea, if the claim ‘contains an 

“inventive concept” sufficient to “transform” the claimed 

abstract idea into a patent-eligible application,’ then the 

claims pass the test of eligibility under section 101.” 

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Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1347 (emphasis added) 

(quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2357). But when a claim 

directed to an abstract idea “contains no restriction on 

how the result is accomplished . . . [and] [t]he mechanism 

. . . is not described, although this is stated to be the 

essential innovation[,]” id. at 1348, then the claim is not 

patent-eligible. 

The asserted claims of the ’050 patent are not patenteligible under § 101. 

2. THE ’142 PATENT

The district court held ineligible claims 1, 7, 17, 22, 

24, and 26 of the ’142 patent, which relate to systems and 

methods for receiving, screening, and distributing e-mail, 

and we agree. According to IV, claim 1 is representative of 

how the ’142 patent screens e-mail,9 and recites:

1. A post office for receiving and redistributing email messages on a computer network, the post 

office comprising: 

a receipt mechanism that receives an e-mail message from a sender, the e-mail message having at 

least one specified recipient; 

9 Defendants agree, and IV does not dispute, that 

“[a]ll of the claims are substantially similar and no party 

claims that they differ in any manner relevant” to the 

§ 101 analysis. Opening Br. of Cross-Appellant Symantec 

Corp. at 10. We focus on claim 1 of the ’142 patent, which 

IV states is representative. Addressing each of the asserted claims is unnecessary when “all the claims are substantially similar and linked to the same abstract idea.” 

Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1348 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

 

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a database of business rules, each business rule 

specifying an action for controlling the delivery of 

an e-mail message as a function of an attribute of 

the e-mail message; 

a rule engine coupled to receive an e-mail message 

from the receipt mechanism and coupled to the 

database to selectively apply the business rules to 

the e-mail message to determine from selected 

ones of the business rules a set of actions to be 

applied to the e-mail message; and 

a distribution mechanism coupled to receive the 

set of actions from the rule engine and apply at 

least one action thereof to the e-mail message to 

control delivery of the e-mail message and which 

in response to the rule engine applying an action 

of deferring delivery of the e-mail message, the 

distribution engine automatically combines the email message with a new distribution list specifying at least one destination post office for receiving the e-mail message for review by an 

administrator associated with the destination post 

office, and a rule history specifying the business 

rules that were determined to be applicable to the 

e-mail message by at least one rule engine, and 

automatically delivers the e-mail message to a 

first destination post office on the distribution list 

instead of a specified recipient of the e-mail message.

’142 patent, col. 27, ll. 2–32. 

The written description is particularly useful in determining what is well-known or conventional. See, e.g., 

Internet Patents Corp., 790 F.3d at 1348. The ’142 patent’s

abstract describes the invention as “[a] system, method

and various software products . . . for automatic deferral 

and review of e-mail messages and other data objects in a 

networked computer system, by applying business rules 

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to the messages as they are processed by post offices.” 

’142 patent, Abstract. Claim 1 also describes the patented 

system as a “post office”—albeit an electronic one. ’142 

patent, col. 27, ll. 2. The district court held that “the 

asserted claims of the ’142 patent are directed to humanpracticable concepts, which could be implemented in, for 

example, a brick-and-mortar post office.” J.A. 35. 

We agree, and think the district court’s analogy to a 

corporate mailroom is also useful. Such mailrooms receive 

correspondence, keep business rules defining actions to be 

taken regarding correspondence based on attributes of the 

correspondence, apply those business rules to correspondence, and take certain actions based on the application of 

business rules. Those actions include gating the message 

for further review,10 as in claim 1, and also releasing, 

deleting, returning, or forwarding the message, as described elsewhere in the ’142 patent, see, e.g., col. 3, ll. 30–

39. 

Indeed, in recounting the background of the invention, the patent states, 

[m]any corporate organizations have elaborate 

methods to control the flow of memorandum, publications, notices, and other printed information 

within the organization. An organization may limit the types of documents employees can distribute 

at work, and in some cases, control which persons 

within an organization communicate with each 

other. . . . These various rules are typically docu10 The specification states, “[f]or example, a business 

rule to gate an e-mail for further review may be triggered 

for any e-mail message that is addressed to the president 

of the company.” ’142 patent, col. 3, 45–48. 

 

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mented as part of the organization’s business 

communication policies. 

Id. at col. 1, ll. 15–33. Thus, the ’142 patent itself demonstrates that the claimed systems and methods of screening messages are abstract ideas, “fundamental . . . 

practice[s] long prevalent in our system” and “method[s] 

of organizing human activity.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Intellectual Ventures v. Capital One Bank, 792 F.3d at 

1369. 

And IV itself informed the district court, in its technology tutorial, “[i]n the typical environment, the post 

office resides on a mail server, where the company’s 

emails are received, processed, and routed to recipients. 

Conceptually, this post office is not much different than a 

United States Postal Service office that processes letters 

and packages, except that the process is all computerimplemented and done electronically in a matter of seconds.” J.A. 40. 

This demonstrates that the concept is well-known and 

abstract. Furthermore, with the exception of generic 

computer-implemented steps, there is nothing in the 

claims themselves that foreclose them from being performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper. See

CyberSource, 654 F.3d at 1371–72. Indeed, the specification expressly states that one type of post office, the

gatekeeping post office, which “provides for administrative review and processing of gated messages . . . provides 

for both manual review by a gatekeeper—a person designated to review gated messages—and automatic review 

and processing.” ’142 patent, col. 7, ll. 31–35; see also id.

at col. 11, ll. 7–10. The ’142 patent is directed to a conventional business practice—the screening of messages by 

corporate organizations—in the context of electronic 

communications. 

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Since the claims are directed to an abstract idea, we 

proceed to Mayo/Alice step two. According to the specification, the claims can “operate[] on a conventional communications network.” Id. at col. 5, l. 46. The post offices 

are “[c]ommunicatively coupled to the network through 

conventional e-mail protocols,” and “conventional mail 

servers and conventional post office/mail server combinations may be present.” Id. at col. 5, ll. 48–49, 55–57. The 

patent discloses only generic computers performing generic functions: “[t]he [Rule Enforcing Post Offices] and 

[Gatekeeping Post Offices] are preferably implemented as 

software products executing on conventional server-class 

computers, such as . . . IBM compatible computers based 

on Intel Inc.’s PentiumTM processors. The servers operate 

in conjunction with conventional operating systems, such 

as UNIXTM, or Microsoft Corp.’s Windows95TM or WindowNTTM.” Id. at col. 9, ll. 51–58. The specification thus 

confirms that the implementation of the abstract idea is 

routine and conventional. The ’142 patent does not “improve the functioning of the computer itself.” Alice, 134 S. 

Ct. at 2359 (citation omitted). Nor does it solve a “challenge particular to the Internet.” DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d 

at 1257.

IV argues that the claims do not merely require routine and conventional use of computers and the Internet 

because “applying business rules to email is not what 

computers and the Internet do in the absence of this claim 

limitation” and “because computers and the Internet do 

not have ‘rule engines’ as a matter of course.” IV’s Opening Br. at 54. But the inquiry is not whether conventional 

computers already apply, for example, well-known business concepts like hedging or intermediated settlement. 

Rather, we determine whether “each step does no more 

than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359 (emphasis 

added). Here that is the case. 

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The asserted claims of the ’142 patent are not patenteligible under § 101. 

3. THE ’610 PATENT

Claim 7 is the only asserted claim of the ’610 patent. 

The district court held eligible claim 7 of the ’610 patent. 

Claim 7 depends from claim 1, which provides:

1. A virus screening method comprising the steps 

of: 

routing a call between a calling party and a called 

party of a telephone network; 

receiving, within the telephone network, computer 

data from a first party selected from the group 

consisting of the calling party and the called party; 

detecting, within the telephone network, a virus

in the computer data; and 

in response to detecting the virus, inhibiting 

communication of at least a portion of the computer data from the telephone network to a second 

party selected from the group consisting of the 

calling party and the called party.

’610 patent, col. 14, ll. 34–47. Claim 7 recites:

7. The virus screening method of claim 1 further 

comprising the step of determining that virus 

screening is to be applied to the call based upon at 

least one of an identification code of the calling 

party and an identification code of the called party.

Id. at col. 14, l. 66–col. 15 l. 3. 

 Unlike the asserted claims of the ’050 and ’142 patents, claim 7 involves an idea that originated in the 

computer era—computer virus screening. But the idea of 

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virus screening was nonetheless well known when the 

’610 patent was filed. Performing virus screening was a 

long prevalent practice in the field of computers, and, as 

the patent admits, performed by many computer users. 

The patent acknowledges that, prior to the invention, 

“[m]any computer users [had] virus screening and detection software installed on their computers.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 

10–11. Claim 7 of the ’610 patent, however, does not claim 

a new method of virus screening or improvements thereto—in fact, it requires only “detecting . . . a virus in the 

computer data.” Id. at col. 14, ll. 40–41. The specification 

recites conventional “virus screening software.” See, e.g.,

’610 patent, col. 3, ll. 35–39. By itself, virus screening is 

well-known and constitutes an abstract idea.

At step two of Mayo/Alice, there is no other aspect of 

the claim that is anything but conventional. 

The ’610 patent is directed to the use of well-known 

virus screening software within the telephone network11

or the Internet. We have previously determined that 

performing otherwise abstract activity on the Internet 

does not save the idea from being patent-ineligible. As we 

said in Intellectual Ventures v. Capitol One Bank, “[a]n 

abstract idea does not become nonabstract by limiting the 

invention to a particular . . . technological environment, 

such as the Internet. . . . [W]hile the claims recite budgeting using a ‘communication medium’ (broadly including 

the Internet and telephone networks), that limitation 

does not render the claims any less abstract.” 792 F.3d at 

1366–67. See also Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716 (Fed. Cir. 

11 The district court construed “within the telephone 

network” to mean “in the voice or data network connecting the calling party and called party, exclusive of the 

networks and gateway nodes of the called party and 

calling party.” J.A. 276.

 

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2014) (“The claims’ invocation of the Internet also adds no 

inventive concept. As we have held, the use of the Internet is not sufficient to save otherwise abstract claims from 

ineligibility under § 101.”).12 

Just as performance of an abstract idea on the Internet is abstract, so too the performance of an abstract 

concept in the environment of the telephone network is 

abstract, as Intellectual Ventures v. Capitol One Bank

recognized. Our recent decision in TLI Communications 

involved a similar situation. There, we held that a challenged claim was “drawn to the concept of classifying an 

image and storing the image based on its classification.” 

823 F.3d at 611. This was abstract because “[w]hile the 

[asserted claim] requires concrete, tangible components 

such as ‘a telephone unit’ and a ‘server,’ the specification 

makes clear that the recited physical components merely 

provide a generic environment in which to carry out the

abstract idea of classifying and storing digital images in 

an organized manner.” Id. Here, the recitation of a “telephone network,” like the telephone unit and server in TLI 

Communications, merely provides a “generic environment” in which to carry out the well-known and abstract 

idea of virus screening. 

Nor does the asserted claim improve or change the 

way a computer functions. Claim 7 recites no more than 

generic computers that use generic virus screening technology. But the “mere recitation of a generic computer 

cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a 

patent-eligible invention.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358. “For 

12 See also, e.g., buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (“The 

computers in Alice were receiving and sending information over networks connecting the intermediary to the 

other institutions involved, and the Court found the 

claimed role of the computers insufficient.”). 

 

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the role of a computer in a computer-implemented invention to be deemed meaningful in the context of this analysis, it must involve more than performance of ‘wellunderstood, routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Content Extraction, 776 

F.3d at 1347–48 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359). 

As the district court determined, claim 7 calls for at 

least three computers: the computer of the first party or 

sending party, the virus screening computer, and the 

computer of the second or receiving party. The sending 

and receiving computers can be generic—they perform 

only sending and receiving functions. See buySAFE, 765 

F.3d at 1352, 1355. The virus screening computer fares no 

better. According to the specification, “[v]irus screening 

can be facilitated in the telephone network using either a 

conventional telephone network processor adapted to run 

associated virus screening software or an additional 

processor which runs virus screening software. . . . The 

processor can augment conventional circuit-switched 

network elements . . . .” ’610 patent, col. 3, ll. 35–39, 49–

50 (emphasis added). “As is well known, each of the virusscreening processors can have one or more associated 

modems to modulate computer data for transmission, and 

to demodulate received computer data.” Id. at col. 4, ll. 

58–61. There is no indication that the virus screening 

software installed on a conventional telephone network 

processor is any different than the virus screening software “[m]any computer users have . . . installed on their 

computers.” Id. at col. 1, ll. 10–11. These “generic computer components [are] insufficient to add an inventive 

concept to an otherwise abstract idea.” TLI Commc’ns, 

823 F.3d at 614. 

IV argues that “[t]he claims of the ’610 Patent include 

meaningful limitations that narrow the claimed invention 

to a specific way of screening for computer viruses within 

the telephone network . . . and does not preempt all virus 

detection.” IV’s Response and Reply Br. at 55. A narrow 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 23

claim directed to an abstract idea, however, is not necessarily patent-eligible, for “[w]hile preemption may signal 

patent ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete 

preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” 

Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 

1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at

1362–63 (“[T]hat the claims do not preempt all price 

optimization or may be limited to price optimization in 

the e-commerce setting do not make them any less abstract.”). 

In summary, unlike the claims at issue in Enfish, 

which involved a “specific type of data structure designed 

to improve the way a computer stores and retrieves data 

in memory,” 822 F.3d at 1339, claim 7 of the ’610 patent 

does not improve or change the way a computer functions. 

Nor does claim 7 overcome a problem unique to the Internet as was the case in DDR Holdings. 773 F.3d at 1258–

59. 

Citing BASCOM, the dissent argues that “claim 7 

constitutes an improvement of the network itself and, 

thus, focuses on improving computers as tools.” Dissenting Op. at 5. Contrary to the dissent, this case is unlike 

BASCOM, where, “[o]n [a] limited record” and when 

viewed in favor of the patentee, the claims alleged a 

“technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering 

[Internet] content.” 827 F.3d at 1350. The patent in 

BASCOM did not merely move existing content filtering 

technology from local computers to the Internet,13 which 

“would not contain an inventive concept,” but 

“overc[a]me[] existing problems with other Internet 

13 Indeed, in BASCOM, the patent specification 

acknowledged that several prior art systems already 

performed content filtering at either local or remote 

servers. See 827 F.3d at 1344.

 

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24 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

filtering systems”—i.e., it solved the problem of “inflexible 

one-size-fits-all” remote filtering schemes (caused by 

simply moving filtering technology to the Internet) by 

enabling individualized filtering at the ISP server. Id at 

1350–51. In other words, the patent in BASCOM did not 

purport to improve the Internet itself by introducing prior 

art filtering technology to the Internet. Rather, the 

BASCOM patent fixed a problem presented by combining 

the two. Here the record does not indicate that claim 7 

recites any improvement to conventional virus screening 

software, nor does claim 7 solve any problem associated 

with situating such virus screening on the telephone 

network. 

The dissent nonetheless urges that there are two advantages to using virus screening on the telephone network that qualify as inventive concepts: (1) shifting virus 

detection away from the networks of the sender and 

recipient, which allows users to communicate over a 

network without concern of receiving computer viruses; 

and (2) closing the “protection gap,” i.e., the problem of 

individual computer users having to periodically update 

their virus screening software. Dissenting Op. at 2. 

Regarding shifting virus detection to the telephone 

network, the claimed inventive solution of claim 7 is to 

utilize an intermediary computer in forwarding information. But that solution is perfectly conventional and is 

applied any time an e-mail recipient performs virus 

screening and, acting as an intermediary, forwards the email to another recipient. As discussed above, there is no 

claim here describing a particular method of incorporating virus screening into the Internet.14 To be sure, it may 

14 See Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DirecTV, LLC, 

No. 2015-1845 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 23, 2016), slip op. at 16 

(holding patent ineligible where it “d[id] not provide an 

 

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be that other claims that recite particular features of 

intermediate computers (e.g., modeling to match the 

recipient’s computer architecture) incorporate an inventive concept, but those claims are not before us. 

As to the protection gap, claim 7 of the ’610 patent 

does not describe or require a solution to the protection 

gap. See supra at 13–14 (explaining that the language of 

the challenged claims of the ’050 patent do not address 

the protection gap). The district court erred in relying on 

technological details set forth in the patent’s specification 

and not set forth in the claims to find an inventive concept. See Accenture, 728 F.3d at 1345 (“[T]he complexity of 

the implementing software or the level of detail in the 

specification does not transform a claim reciting only an 

abstract concept into a patent-eligible system or method.”); Content Extraction, 776 F.3d at 1346 (“We focus

here on whether the claims of the asserted patents fall 

within the excluded category of abstract ideas.”) (emphasis added).

As we explained in TLI Communications, the claim 

here is “not directed to a specific improvement to computer functionality. Rather, [it is] directed to the use of 

conventional or generic technology in a nascent but wellknown environment, without any claim that the invention 

reflects an inventive solution to any problem presented by 

combining the two.” 823 F.3d at 612

Claim 7 of the ’610 patent is not patent-eligible under 

§ 101. 

inventive solution to a problem in implementing the idea 

of remote delivery of regional broadcasting; it simply 

recite[d] that the abstract idea of remote delivery will be 

implemented using the conventional components and 

functions generic to cellular telephones.”).

 

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26 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART AND REVERSED-IN-PART

COSTS

Costs to defendants. 

Case: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 26 Filed: 09/30/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

 

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SYMANTEC CORP.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

TREND MICRO INCORPORATED, TREND MICRO, 

INC. (USA),

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1769, 2015-1770, 2015-1771

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in Nos. 1:10-cv-01067-LPS, 1:12-cv01581-LPS, Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark.

______________________ 

MAYER, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I agree that all claims on appeal fall outside of 35 

U.S.C. § 101. I write separately, however, to make two 

points: (1) patents constricting the essential channels of 

online communication run afoul of the First Amendment; 

and (2) claims directed to software implemented on a 

generic computer are categorically not eligible for patent. 

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2 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

I.

“[T]he Constitution protects the right to receive information and ideas. . . . This right to receive information 

and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental 

to our free society.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 

(1969) (citations omitted). Patents, which function as 

government-sanctioned monopolies, invade core First 

Amendment rights when they are allowed to obstruct the 

essential channels of scientific, economic, and political 

discourse. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 

529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000) (“The distinction between laws 

burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of 

degree.”); see also In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321, 1340 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015) (en banc) (explaining that the government may 

impermissibly burden speech “even when it does so indirectly”).

Although the claims at issue here disclose no new 

technology, they have the potential to disrupt, or even 

derail, large swaths of online communication. U.S. Patent 

No. 6,460,050 (the “’050 patent”) purports to cover methods of “identifying characteristics of data files,” ’050 

patent, col. 8 l. 13, whereas U.S. Patent No. 6,073,142 (the 

“’142 patent”) broadly claims systems and methods which 

allow an organization to control internal email distribution, ’142 patent, col. 1 ll. 15–34. U.S. Patent No. 

5,987,610 (the “’610 patent”) describes, in sweeping terms, 

screening a communication for viruses or other harmful 

content at an intermediary location before delivering it to 

an addressee. See ’610 patent, col. 14 ll. 34–47. The 

asserted claims speak in vague, functional language, 

giving them the elasticity to reach a significant slice of all 

email traffic. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 

(1972) (“Benson”) (explaining that claims are patent 

eligible only if they contain limitations “sufficiently definite to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite 

bounds”). Indeed, the claims of the ’610 patent could 

reasonably be read to cover most methods of screening for 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 3

harmful content while data is being transmitted over a 

network. See ’610 patent, col. 1 ll. 59–61 (describing 

“screen[ing] computer data for viruses within a telephone 

network before communicating the computer data to an 

end user”).

Suppression of free speech is no less pernicious because it occurs in the digital, rather than the physical, 

realm. “[W]hatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to ever-advancing technology, the basic principles 

of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary when a new and different 

medium for communication appears.” Brown v. Entm’t 

Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). Essential First 

Amendment freedoms are abridged when the Patent and 

Trademark Office (“PTO”) is permitted to balkanize the 

Internet, granting patent owners the right to exact heavy 

taxes on widely-used conduits for online expression.

Like all congressional powers, the power to issue patents and copyrights is circumscribed by the First 

Amendment. See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 889–93

(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–21 (2003). 

In the copyright context, the law has developed “built-in 

First Amendment accommodations.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 

219; see also Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 

469 U.S. 189, 201 (1985) (noting that the Lanham Act 

contains safeguards to prevent trademark protection from 

“tak[ing] from the public domain language that is merely 

descriptive”). Specifically, copyright law “distinguishes 

between ideas and expression and makes only the latter 

eligible for copyright protection.” Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219; 

see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 

471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985) (explaining that “copyright’s 

idea/expression dichotomy” supplies “a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright 

Act by permitting free communication of facts while still 

protecting an author’s expression” (citations and internal 

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4 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

quotation marks omitted)). It also applies a “fair use” 

defense, permitting members of “the public to use not only 

facts and ideas contained in a copyrighted work, but also 

expression itself in certain circumstances.” Eldred, 537 

U.S. at 219; see 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies 

. . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 

use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of 

copyright.”). 

Just as the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair use 

defense serve to keep copyright protection from abridging 

free speech rights, restrictions on subject matter eligibility can be used to keep patent protection within constitutional bounds. Section 101 creates a “patent-free zone” 

and places within it the indispensable instruments of 

social, economic, and scientific endeavor. See Alice Corp. 

v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (emphasizing that the “building blocks of human ingenuity” are 

patent ineligible); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (stating that 

“mental processes . . . and abstract intellectual concepts 

are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific 

and technological work”). Online communication has 

become a “basic tool[],” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, of modern 

life, driving innovation and supplying a widely-used 

platform for political dialogue. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. 

Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 716 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting 

that the Internet “is a ubiquitous informationtransmitting medium”); see also U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. 

Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 825 F.3d 674, 698 (D.C. Cir. 2016)

(explaining that online communication “has transformed 

nearly every aspect of our lives, from profound actions 

like choosing a leader, building a career, and falling in 

love to more quotidian ones like hailing a cab and watching a movie”). Section 101, if properly applied, can preserve the Internet’s open architecture and weed out those 

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patents that chill political expression and impermissibly 

obstruct the marketplace of ideas.

As both the Supreme Court and this court have recognized, section 101 imposes “a threshold test,” Bilski v. 

Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010), one that must be satisfied before a court can proceed to consider subordinate 

validity issues such as non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 103 or adequate written description under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978) 

(“Flook”) (“The obligation to determine what type of 

discovery is sought to be patented” so as to determine 

whether it falls within the ambit of section 101 “must 

precede the determination of whether that discovery is, in 

fact, new or obvious.”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 973 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“Only if the requirements of § 101 are 

satisfied is the inventor allowed to pass through to the 

other requirements for patentability, such as novelty 

under § 102 and . . . non-obviousness under § 103.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); State St. 

Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 

1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (explaining that section 

101 is “[t]he first door which must be opened on the 

difficult path to patentability” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, if claimed subject 

matter is not even eligible for patent protection, any 

pronouncement on whether it is novel or adequately 

supported by the written description constitutes an impermissible advisory opinion. See, e.g., Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (emphasizing that Article III 

courts “do not render advisory opinions” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

The public has a “paramount interest in seeing that 

patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate 

scope.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 

2144 (2016) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family

Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843, 851 (2014). Nowhere is 

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that interest more compelling than in the context of 

claims that threaten fundamental First Amendment 

freedoms. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326–27 

(1937) (“[F]reedom of thought and speech . . . is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other 

form of freedom.”). “As the most participatory form of 

mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves the 

highest protection from governmental intrusion.” ACLU 

v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d, 521 

U.S. 844 (1997). A robust application of section 101 at the 

outset of litigation will ensure that the essential channels 

of online communication remain “free to all men and 

reserved exclusively to none,” Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 

Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).

II.

Most of the First Amendment concerns associated 

with patent protection could be avoided if this court were 

willing to acknowledge that Alice sounded the death knell 

for software patents. The claims at issue in Alice were 

directed to a computer-implemented system for mitigating 

settlement risk. 134 S. Ct. at 2352–53. Although the 

petitioners argued that their claims were patent eligible 

because they were tied to a computer and a computer is a 

tangible object, the Supreme Court unanimously and 

emphatically rejected this argument. Id. at 2358–60. The 

Court explained that the “mere recitation of a generic 

computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract 

idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. at 2358. Accordingly, “[t]he fact that a computer necessarily exist[s] 

in the physical, rather than purely conceptual, realm is 

beside the point” in the section 101 calculus. Id. 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Software is a form of language—in essence, a set of 

instructions. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 

437, 447 (2007) (explaining that “software” is “the set of 

instructions, known as code, that directs a computer to 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 7

perform specified functions or operations” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); see also 17 U.S.C. 

§ 101 (defining a “‘computer program,’” for purposes of the 

Copyright Act, as “a set of statements or instructions to be 

used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring 

about a certain result”). It is inherently abstract because 

it is merely “an idea without physical embodiment,” 

Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). Given that 

an “idea” is not patentable, see, e.g., Benson, 409 U.S. at 

67, and a generic computer is “beside the point” in the 

eligibility analysis, Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358, all software 

implemented on a standard computer should be deemed 

categorically outside the bounds of section 101.

The central problem with affording patent protection 

to generically-implemented software is that standard 

computers have long been ceded to the public domain. 

See Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15 (“[I]n granting patent 

rights, the public must not be deprived of any rights that 

it theretofore freely enjoyed” (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Because generic computers 

are ubiquitous and indispensable, in effect the “basic 

tool[],” Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, of modern life, they are not 

subject to the patent monopoly. In the section 101 calculus, adding software (which is as abstract as language) to 

a conventional computer (which rightfully resides in the 

public domain) results in a patent eligibility score of zero. 

See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2358 (“Stating an abstract idea 

while adding the words ‘apply it with a computer’ simply 

combines those two steps, with the same deficient result.”).

Software lies in the antechamber of patentable invention. Because generically-implemented software is an 

“idea” insufficiently linked to any defining physical structure other than a standard computer, it is a precursor to 

technology rather than technology itself. See Mackay 

Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939) 

(“While a scientific truth, or the mathematical expression 

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8 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful 

structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific 

truth may be.”). It is well past time to return software to 

its historical dwelling place in the domain of copyright. 

See Benson, 409 U.S. at 72 (citing a report from a presidential commission explaining that copyright is available 

to protect software and that software development had 

“undergone substantial and satisfactory growth” even 

without patent protection (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 

F.3d 1339, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (noting that “several 

commentators” have “argue[d] that the complex and 

expensive patent system is a terrible fit for the fastmoving software industry” and that copyright provides 

“[a] perfectly adequate means of protecting and rewarding 

software developers for their ingenuity” (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted)); Peter S. Menell, An 

Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1076 (1989) (explaining that patents were historically “not seen as a 

viable option for the protection of most application program code” and that many software programs “simply do 

not manifest sufficient novelty or nonobviousness to merit 

patent protection”). 

Software development has flourished despite—not because of—the availability of expansive patent protection. 

See Brief of Amicus Curiae Elec. Frontier Found. in 

Support of Respondents, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-

298), 2014 WL 828047, at *6–7 (“EFF Brief”) (“The software market began its rapid increase in the early 1980s

. . . more than a decade before the Federal Circuit concocted widespread software patents in 1994. . . . Obviously, 

no patents were needed for software to become a $60 

billion/year industry by 1994.”); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 

2013 Wis. L. Rev. 905, 935 (2013) (“Software patents . . .

have created a large number of problems for the industry, 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 9

particularly for the most innovative and productive companies. . . . [T]he existence of a vibrant open source 

community suggests that innovation can flourish in 

software absent patent protection.” (footnote omitted)); 

Wendy Seltzer, Software Patents and/or Software Development, 78 Brook. L. Rev. 929, 930 (2013) (“Seltzer”) 

(“Present knowledge and experience now offer sufficient 

evidence that patents disserve software innovation.”); Arti 

K. Rai, John R. Allison, & Bhaven N. Sampat, University 

Software Ownership and Litigation: A First Examination, 

87 N.C. L. Rev. 1519, 1555–56 (2009) (“While most small 

biotechnology firms that receive venture financing have 

patents, the available empirical evidence indicates that 

most software start-ups that receive venture financing, 

particularly in the first round, do not have patents.”).

From an eligibility perspective, software claims suffer 

from at least four insurmountable problems. First, their 

scope is generally vastly disproportionate to their technological disclosure. In assessing patent eligibility, “the 

underlying functional concern . . . is a relative one: how 

much future innovation is foreclosed relative to the contribution of the inventor.” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 

Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303 (2012); see 

also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 

Co., 243 U.S. 502, 513 (1917) (“[T]he inventor [is entitled 

to] the exclusive use of just what his inventive genius has 

discovered. It is all that the statute provides shall be 

given to him and it is all that he should receive, for it is 

the fair as well as the statutory measure of his reward for 

his contribution to the public stock of knowledge.”). 

Software patents typically do not include any actual code 

developed by the patentee, but instead describe, in intentionally vague and broad language, a particular goal or 

objective. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent 

Law Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1155, 

1164–65 (2002) (“Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit’s 

peculiar direction in the software enablement cases has 

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10 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

effectively nullified the disclosure requirement for software patents. And since source code is normally kept 

secret, software patentees generally disclose little or no 

detail about their programs to the public.” (footnote 

omitted)). Here, for example, the ’610 patent discusses 

the objective of “screen[ing] computer data for viruses . . . 

before communicating the computer data to an end user,” 

’610 patent, col. 1 ll. 59–61, but fails to disclose any specific, inventive guidance for achieving that goal. In effect, 

the ’610 patent, like most software patents, describes a 

desirable destination but neglects to provide any intelligible roadmap for getting there.

A second, and related, problem with software patents 

is that they provide incentives at the wrong time. Because they are typically obtained at the “idea” stage, 

before any real inventive work has been done, such patents are incapable of effectively incentivizing meaningful 

advances in science and technology. “A player focused on 

patenting can obtain numerous patents without developing any of the technologies to useful levels of deployment 

or disclosure, leaving a minefield of abstract patent claims 

for others who actually deploy software.” Seltzer, 78 

Brook. L. Rev. at 931. Here, for example, it took no 

significant inventive effort to recognize that communications should be screened for harmful content before delivery. The hard work came later, when software developers 

created screening systems capable of preventing our email 

boxes from being overrun with spam or disabled by viruses. Granting patents on software “ideas”—before they 

have been actually reduced to practice—has created a 

perverse incentive scheme. Under our current regime, 

those who scamper to the PTO early, often equipped with 

little more than vague notions about using computers to 

automate well-known business and social practices, can 

reap hefty financial dividends. By contrast, those who 

actually create and deploy useful computer-centric products are “rewarded” with mammoth potential infringeCase: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 36 Filed: 09/30/2016
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 11

ment liability. See id. at 972 (“In software . . . the long 

road from idea to implementation often snags on patents 

early in the course. Engineers can describe what they 

want software to do—in terms that have been sufficient 

for the PTO—well before they have made it work. Pressures to patent early produce a thicket of preimplementation claims.”); EFF Brief, 2014 WL 828047, at 

*23 (describing a study which “found that between 2007 

and 2011, 46 percent of patent lawsuits involved software 

patents, accounting for 89 percent of the increase in the 

number of patent defendants during this timeframe”). 

Yet another intractable problem with software patents is their sheer number. See Brief Of Amici Curiae 

Checkpoint Software, Inc. et al. in Support of Respondents, Alice, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (No. 13-298), 2014 WL 828039, 

at *8 (“[B]ecause computer products—as opposed to 

patents—inevitably integrate complex, multicomponent 

technology, any given product is potentially subject to a 

large number of patents. . . . Some industry experts have 

estimated that 250,000 patents go into a modern 

smartphone.” (citations omitted)). Given the vast number 

of software patents—most of which are replete with 

broad, functional claims—it is virtually impossible to 

innovate in any technological field without being ensnared by the patent thicket. See id. (describing the 

“overwhelming set of overlapping patent rights that 

impede innovation”). Software patents impose a 

deadweight loss on the nation’s economy, erecting often 

insurmountable barriers to innovation and forcing companies to expend exorbitant sums defending against 

meritless infringement suits. See Shawn P. Miller, 

“Fuzzy” Software Patent Boundaries and High Claim 

Construction Reversal Rates, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 809, 

810 (2014) (“Patent litigation is so expensive it has been 

described as the sport of kings. . . . These expenses, 

however, may be dwarfed by the social cost of patent 

litigation in reducing incentives for producers to bring 

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12 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

innovative products to market.” (footnote and internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

Fourth, and most fundamentally, genericallyimplemented software invariably lacks the concrete 

borders the patent law demands. See, e.g., Digital Equip. 

Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. 

Mass. 1997) (“The Internet has no territorial boundaries. 

To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is 

concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the 

‘there’ is everywhere where there is Internet access.”). 

Patent protection is all about boundaries. An applicant 

has the right to obtain a patent only if he can describe, 

with reasonable clarity, the metes and bounds of his 

invention. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo 

Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (explaining that 

the patent “monopoly is a property right[] and like any 

property right, its boundaries should be clear”). A properly issued patent claim represents a line of demarcation, 

defining the territory over which the patentee can exercise the right to exclude. See Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig 

Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (emphasizing that “a patent must be precise enough to afford clear 

notice of what is claimed, thereby appris[ing] the public of 

what is still open to them” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Software, however, is akin to a work of literature or a 

piece of music, undeniably important, but too unbounded, 

i.e., too “abstract,” to qualify as a patent-eligible invention. See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 447–48 (explaining that 

software “instructions . . . detached from any medium” are 

analogous to “[t]he notes of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony”). And, as discussed previously, given that generic 

computers are both omnipresent and indispensable, they 

are incapable of providing structure “sufficiently definite 

to confine the patent monopoly within rather definite 

bounds,” Benson, 409 U.S. at 69. In short, because directing that software should be applied via standard computCase: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 38 Filed: 09/30/2016
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 13

er elements is little different than stating that it should 

be written down using pen and paper, genericallyimplemented software lacks the concrete contours required by section 101. See Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2352 (emphasizing that “merely requiring generic computer 

implementation” does not remove claims from the realm 

of the abstract).

Declaring that software implemented on a generic 

computer falls outside of section 101 would provide muchneeded clarity and consistency in our approach to patent 

eligibility. It would end the semantic gymnastics of trying 

to bootstrap software into the patent system by alleging it 

offers a “specific method of filtering Internet content,” see 

BASCOM Global Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility 

LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016), makes the 

computer faster, see Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 

F.3d 1327, 1337–39 (Fed. Cir. 2016), or the Internet 

better, see DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 

F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014), just to snuggle up to a 

casual bit of dictum in Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. Software 

runs computers and the Internet; improving them up to 

the current limits of technology is merely more of the 

same. The claims at issue in BASCOM, Enfish, and DDR, 

like those found patent ineligible in Alice, do “no more 

than require a generic computer to perform generic computer functions,” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2359. Eliminating 

generically-implemented software patents would clear the 

patent thicket, ensuring that patent protection promotes, 

rather than impedes, “the onward march of science,” 

O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853), and 

allowing technological innovation to proceed apace. 

Case: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 39 Filed: 09/30/2016
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SYMANTEC CORP.,

Defendant-Cross-Appellant

TREND MICRO INCORPORATED, TREND MICRO, 

INC. (USA),

Defendants-Appellees

______________________ 

2015-1769, 2015-1770, 2015-1771

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in Nos. 1:10-cv-01067-LPS, 1:12-cv01581-LPS, Chief Judge Leonard P. Stark.

______________________ 

STOLL, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 

I concur in the result reached by the majority except 

with respect to the ’610 patent. I would affirm the judgment of the district court that asserted claim 7 of the ’610 

patent is eligible under § 101.

The ’610 patent confirms that the claimed invention 

“advantageously screen[s] computer data for viruses 

within a telephone network before communicating the 

computer data to an end user.” ’610 patent col. 1 ll. 59–

61. The patent explains that this was a fundamental 

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2 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

architectural shift from prior-art virus screening, which 

occurred locally on an end user’s computer rather than 

centrally as in the invention. Id. col. 1 ll. 10–11. This 

shift improved the overall security of telecommunication 

networks by thwarting the ability of viruses to reach and 

exploit end users. Using the patented invention, end 

users could communicate over a network “without concern 

of receiving various predetermined computer viruses.” Id. 

col. 1 ll. 63–64; see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. 

Symantec Corp. (Dist. Ct. Op.), 100 F. Supp. 3d 371, 400 

(D. Del. 2015). As IV’s expert, Dr. McDaniel, testified at 

trial, “the key about the ’610[] is because it’s actually on a 

network, . . . it’s out on the cloud. So that’s a big advantage, because all of the dangerous code goes out there” 

and it becomes “somebody else’s problem to deal with it,” 

not the end users’. J.A. 800 (Trial Tr. 518 ll. 9–16). 

Additionally, as the district court noted, the patent helped 

solve “the problem of individual computer users having 

periodically to update their virus screening software 

locally on their computers in order to ensure adequate 

protection from computer viruses.” Dist. Ct. Op., 100 

F. Supp. 3d at 400; see also ’610 patent col. 1 ll. 20–23 

(explaining that in prior art configurations “each computer user has to repeatedly upgrade the virus screening 

software installed on his/her computer to ensure protection from recently-discovered viruses”). Dr. McDaniel 

described this improvement as closing the virus “protection gap” that existed in computer networks before the 

’610 patent because “as soon as Symantec knows about a 

virus, you have got protection in your e-mail immediately.” J.A. 808 (Trial Tr. 526 ll. 2–7); see also id. 800 (Trial 

Tr. 518 ll. 2–6).

I agree with the district court that the claimed invention is eligible under § 101. Dist. Ct. Op., 100 F. Supp. 3d 

at 396–400. Analyzing claim 7 under the Mayo/Alice 

framework, I accept the majority’s step-one determination 

that the patent is directed to the abstract idea of “virus 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 3

screening.” Maj. Op. 20. But I depart from the majority’s 

analysis at step two—the “search for an ‘inventive concept’” that “‘transform[s]’ the claimed abstract idea into a 

patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 

2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus 

Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294, 1298 (2012)). The 

majority gives short shrift to the Supreme Court’s instruction that in step two we must “consider the elements of 

each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination.’” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (emphasis added) (quoting 

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). The Supreme Court explained 

that this approach “is consistent with the general rule 

that patent claims ‘must be considered as a whole.’” Alice, 

134 S. Ct. at 2355 n.3 (quoting Diamond v. Diehr, 450 

U.S. 175, 188 (1981)) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 

594 (1978)).

 Claim 7 is eligible as an ordered combination. While 

the network components and virus screening software 

recited by the claim may themselves be conventional, “an 

inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional 

and non-generic arrangement of known, conventional 

pieces.” BASCOM Glob. Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T 

Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). As 

described above, claim 7’s inventive concept is moving 

virus screening software from its typical location on end 

users’ computers and deploying it instead “within the 

telephone network” itself. ’610 patent col. 14 l. 37. Thus, 

the invention harnesses network architecture and exploits 

it by utilizing a non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of virus screening components, which improves overall network security and usability. As to this 

arrangement being non-conventional and non-generic, the 

district court had before it IV’s expert testimony that the 

invention provided a novel solution to the protection gap 

problem and greatly reduced the likelihood of an end user 

receiving a virus when it held claim 7 eligible. I also note 

that the jury verdict in the Symantec case—the only one

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4 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

of the consolidated cases that went to trial—found the 

’610 patent not invalid over the asserted prior art. While 

I recognize that validity under §§ 102 and 103 is a distinct 

inquiry from eligibility under § 101, and may not be 

dispositive of § 101, the jury verdict nonetheless supports

the notion that this particular ordering of the components 

in claim 7 was not conventional at the time. See Internet 

Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1347 

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“[P]ragmatic analysis of § 101 is facilitated by considerations analogous to those of §§ 102 and 

103 as applied to the particular case.”). 

The claimed invention is also markedly similar to that 

in BASCOM, where we vacated the district court’s ineligibility determination on the basis of a step-two ordered 

combination. Compare ’610 patent col. 1 ll. 59–61 (“Embodiments of the present invention advantageously screen 

computer data for viruses within a telephone network 

before communicating the computer data to an end user.”), with BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348 (“The claims of the 

’606 patent are directed to filtering content on the Internet,” i.e., not on a user’s local computer). We found the 

abstract idea in BASCOM to be “filtering content,” 

BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1348–49, similar to the abstract 

idea of “virus screening” in this case, Maj. Op. 20. Unlike 

the majority here, this court in BASCOM recognized that 

although “the limitations of the claims, taken individually, recite generic computer, network and Internet components,” the patent’s “particular arrangement of elements 

is a technical improvement over prior art ways of filtering 

such content.” BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1349, 1350. The 

court in BASCOM identified several concrete problems 

that the patent in that case addressed, much like how the 

patent before us addressed specific technological issues 

with virus screening, such as the protection gap. Thus, 

the court found the claims of the BASCOM patent to be 

“more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the 

[abstract idea],” id. at 1350–51 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. 

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INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 5

at 2357), because they “may be read to ‘improve an existing technological process,’” id. at 1351 (quoting Alice, 134 

S. Ct. at 2358 (discussing claims in Diehr, 450 U.S. 175)). 

There is no meaningful difference between BASCOM and 

this case in terms of eligibility because claim 7 also “purport[s] to improve the functioning of the computer itself,” 

or, at the very least, the functioning of the network. Dist. 

Ct. Op., 100 F. Supp. 3d at 400 (quoting Alice, 134 S. Ct. 

at 2359); see also Oral Argument at 25:30–26:17, available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.

aspx?fl=2015-1769.mp3 (counsel for Symantec acknowledging that, under Alice, a patent that improves the 

functioning of a network may be patent eligible under 

§ 101). 

I disagree with the majority’s characterization of this 

case as fitting within our line of cases rendering ineligible

patents that merely “perform[] otherwise abstract activity 

on the Internet.” Maj. Op. 20. The claims at issue in 

those cases, like the claims at issue in Alice, simply 

invoked the Internet as a means to an end; they did not 

improve the security and functioning of the Internet itself. 

Patents that fall within that paradigm are ineligible 

because “the focus of the[ir] claims is not on such an 

improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract ideas that use computers as tools.” 

Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., No. 2015-1778, 

2016 WL 4073318, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 1, 2016). In 

contrast, claim 7 constitutes an improvement of the 

network itself and, thus, focuses on improving computers 

as tools. See BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351 (describing 

similar patent as “not claiming the idea of filtering content simply applied to the Internet” but rather “a technology-based solution . . . to filter content on the Internet 

that overcomes existing problems with other Internet 

filtering systems”). Describing claimed inventions similar 

to the one at issue here, we have said that we “are not 

persuaded that the invention’s ability to run on a generalCase: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 44 Filed: 09/30/2016
6 INTELLECTUAL VENTURES I LLC v. SYMANTEC CORP. 

purpose computer dooms the claims” if the claims “are 

directed to an improvement in the functioning of a computer.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 

1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing collection of 

cases involving claims which “simply add[] conventional 

computer components to well-known business practices”). 

For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion regarding the ’610 patent and would affirm 

the judgment of the district court holding that asserted 

claim 7 of the ’610 patent is eligible under § 101. 

Case: 15-1770 Document: 9-2 Page: 45 Filed: 09/30/2016