Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03194/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03194-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Health and Human Services
Respondent
Jaime Gumbs
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JAIME GUMBS,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3194

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-0752-13-0648-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 12, 2015

______________________ 

 JAMES MASON LOOTS, Law Office of James M. Loots, 

PC, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner.

WILLIAM JAMES GRIMALDI, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON KIDD-MILLER; NIGEL GANT,

TONYA SAVAGE, Office of General Counsel, United States 

Department of Health and Human Services, Dallas, TX.

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2 GUMBS v. HHS

______________________ 

Before DYK, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge CHEN. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

CHEN, Circuit Judge.

Dr. Jaime Gumbs appeals from a final order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) which adopted

the initial decision of an administrative judge and sustained Dr. Gumbs’ removal from the Indian Health Service, Pawnee Health Center (agency) based on the charges 

of failing to maintain a valid medical license and practicing medicine without a valid license. Gumbs v. Dep’t of 

Health and Human Servs., No. DA-0752-13-0648-I-1 

(MSPB July 10, 2014) (Final Order). Because substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s findings sustaining the 

agency’s charges against Dr. Gumbs, and the Board did 

not abuse its discretion in determining that the penalty 

for Dr. Gumbs’s misconduct was reasonable, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Dr. Gumbs was employed with the Indian Health Service (IHS) as a General Practice Medical Officer in the 

Pawnee Service Unit in Pawnee, Oklahoma (clinic) for 

almost 22 years. The clinic operates with the permission 

of several Native American tribes in the area to provide 

medical care for members of those tribes. Joint Appendix 

(J.A.) 55. As a medical officer, Dr. Gumbs was subject to 

the Bylaws, Rules, and Regulations of the Medical Staff of 

the United States Public Health Service, Pawnee Service 

Unit, IHS (bylaws). Under these bylaws, Dr. Gumbs was 

required to have a current, full, and unrestricted medical 

license. J.A. 111. The bylaws also required Dr. Gumbs to 

be fully credentialed prior to seeing patients at the clinic. 

J.A. 116.

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GUMBS v. HHS 3

For most of his employment at the agency, Dr. Gumbs 

was licensed to practice medicine by the Commonwealth 

of Puerto Rico (Puerto Rico). He is not licensed by any 

other state or territory to practice medicine. At some 

point, Dr. Gumbs began to experience administrative 

difficulties and delays in renewing his medical license 

with the Puerto Rico Department of Health, Office of 

Regulation and Certification of Health Professionals 

(medical board). J.A. 93.

According to Dr. Gumbs, when seeking to renew his 

medical license in 2007, the Puerto Rico medical board’s 

computer system failed to timely process his application, 

and as a result, his license lapsed. Dr. Gumbs informed 

his supervisor, Dr. Steven P. Sanders, director of the IHS 

clinic, that his license had inadvertently expired. Dr. 

Gumbs was without an active medical license for about a 

month as he waited for the Puerto Rico medical board to 

renew his license. During this period, Dr. Gumbs did not 

see patients or perform any of his job responsibilities. At 

this time, Dr. Sanders did not place Dr. Gumbs on leave 

without pay status or file a formal disciplinary action 

against him.

The next renewal date for Dr. Gumbs’ license was in 

2010. According to Dr. Gumbs, the medical board’s web 

site again failed during the renewal application process, 

and thus the renewal of his license was again delayed. Id. 

Despite these administrative difficulties, Dr. Gumbs

received his renewed license three days before it was 

scheduled to expire. Id.

In 2013, Dr. Gumbs again allowed his medical license 

to lapse. Dr. Gumbs’ license was set to expire on May 8, 

2013, and he began the application process for renewal of 

his license in February of that year. According to Dr. 

Gumbs, the Puerto Rico medical board’s online portal was 

experiencing technical difficulties when he attempted to 

access the site during the month of February. Dr. Gumbs 

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4 GUMBS v. HHS

next attempted to access the site three weeks later in 

March. According to Dr. Gumbs, the site was again 

experiencing difficulties. In April, Dr. Gumbs enlisted the 

help of a physician co-worker at the clinic who also had 

experience renewing his license with the Puerto Rico 

medical board. Nevertheless, even with his co-worker’s 

help, Dr. Gumbs was unable to complete his license 

renewal application online. During this period of time, 

Dr. Gumbs informed Dr. Sanders as well as Kristie Choate, the clinic’s credentialing officer, that he had not yet 

renewed his medical license. 

Unable to complete his license renewal online, on 

April 22 Dr. Gumbs sent a paper copy of his license renewal application to the medical board with a money 

order of $150 to cover what he believed to be the renewal 

fee. The application was received by the medical board on 

April 29. On May 7, Dr. Gumbs informed Dr. Sanders 

and Ms. Choate that his license had not been renewed, 

and that it would expire by the next day. 

Dr. Gumbs’ license expired at midnight on May 7. 

Although aware that his license had expired, Dr. Gumbs 

arrived at work on May 8 and began his normal rounds. 

He evaluated a patient, prescribing medication to treat 

that patient. J.A. 99–105. Dr. Gumbs was in the middle 

of examining a second patient when he was interrupted 

by Dr. Sanders, who ordered him to stop treating patients. Dr. Sanders had just been informed by Ms. Choate 

that Dr. Gumbs’ license had not been renewed and thus

had expired. Dr. Gumbs was thereafter reassigned to the 

medical records department, and was not permitted to see 

any other patients.

Dr. Gumbs then learned he had not yet submitted a 

complete license application because he had not included 

the full required renewal fee with his application. J.A. 95. 

On May 9, Dr. Gumbs purchased a money order for an 

additional $100—the amount still owed to the Puerto Rico 

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GUMBS v. HHS 5

medical board. The medical board received Dr. Gumbs’ 

full renewal fee on May 15, which completed his license 

renewal application. Id. The next day, on May 16, the 

medical board called Dr. Gumbs to inform him that his 

now-completed application had been accepted and that he 

would receive a renewal of his medical license by e-mail. 

Id. The renewal was dated May 16, the day the licensing 

authority received and cashed the money order submitted 

by Dr. Gumbs in order to complete his license renewal 

application. Id.

In a letter dated May 22, 2013, Dr. Sanders notified 

Dr. Gumbs that he was proposing to remove him based on 

his failure to maintain a valid medical license and his 

practice of medicine without a valid medical license. On 

June 18, 2013, Dr. Travis Scott, Chief Executive Officer of 

the clinic, notified Dr. Gumbs that he had decided to 

remove him from his position for “(1) Failure to maintain 

a valid medical license, and (2) Practice of medicine 

without a valid medical license.” J.A. 82.

Dr. Scott explained that “[m]aintaining a valid medical license [wa]s a condition of employment,” and although Dr. Gumbs was aware of the difficulties in 

renewing his medical license from the Puerto Rico medical 

board, he had not accepted responsibility for the untimeliness in obtaining that renewal. Id. Dr. Scott noted that 

Dr. Gumbs treated a patient after expiration of his medical license, and was in the middle of evaluating another

patient when Dr. Sanders instructed him to stop. Id. Dr. 

Scott explained that it was Dr. Gumbs’ “responsibility to 

recognize that [he] d[id] not have authorization to practice 

medicine without a medical license.” Id. Dr. Scott continued that “[t]hese requirements are clearly stated in the 

Medical Staff By-laws.” Id. Dr. Scott explained that Dr.

Gumbs’s misconduct exposed the clinic to liability. Id.

When selecting removal over a lesser penalty, Dr. 

Scott explained that Dr. Gumbs held a position that 

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6 GUMBS v. HHS

required a medical license, and that his failure to maintain such a license adversely impacted the clinic. Dr. 

Scott considered Dr. Gumbs’s lengthy service and awareness of the clinic’s bylaws, and also provided an analysis 

justifying Dr. Gumbs’s proposed removal under eleven of 

the twelve factors identified in Douglas v. Veterans Admin., 5 M.S.P.B. 313, 332 (1981).

Dr. Gumbs timely appealed the agency’s action removing him from service. Gumbs v. Dep’t of Health and 

Human Servs., No. DA-0752-13-0648-I-1 (MSPB Nov. 7, 

2013) (Initial Decision). An administrative judge found 

the agency had proven both charges forming the basis of 

Dr. Gumbs’s removal by a preponderance of the evidence: 

that Dr. Gumbs failed to maintain a valid medical license 

and that Dr. Gumbs practiced medicine without a license. 

Initial Decision at 2–10. The judge determined that in 

view of the sustained charges, the agency’s penalty of 

removal was reasonable. Id. at 10–12.

Dr. Gumbs petitioned for review of the Board’s initial 

decision, arguing that it was contrary to evidence, that 

the clinic’s action did not promote the efficiency of the 

service, and that the penalty of removal was not reasonable. The Board denied this petition and affirmed the 

initial decision, finding that Dr. Gumbs had not shown 

error in the administrative judge’s findings, that the 

agency had established a nexus between Dr. Gumbs’ 

misconduct and an adverse effect on the agency’s operations, and that in view of the sustained charges, the 

penalty of removal was reasonable. Final Order at 2–6. 

Dr. Gumbs timely appealed the Board’s Final Order. We 

have jurisdiction over Dr. Gumbs’ appeal pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

DISCUSSION

Our review of Board decisions is defined narrowly and 

limited by statute. E.g., Graybill v. United States Postal 

Serv., 782 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Maddox v. 

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GUMBS v. HHS 7

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). We 

must affirm a Board decision unless it is 1) arbitrary or 

capricious or not in accordance with law, 2) obtained 

without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation 

having been followed, or 3) unsupported by substantial 

evidence. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7703(c)(1)–(3); Hayes v. Dep’t of the 

Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

I 

Dr. Gumbs does not challenge the Board’s finding that 

his medical license expired, which supported the agency’s 

charge that Dr. Gumbs failed to maintain a valid medical 

license. Appellant’s Br. 2 (“[T]here was a seven-day lapse 

between expiration of [Dr. Gumbs’s] existing license and 

issuance of a renewed one.”). Indeed, there is no dispute 

that Dr. Gumbs did not submit a complete license renewal 

application until May 15, 2013, when the medical board

received Dr. Gumbs’ full license renewal application fee. 

J.A. 95; see also Letter from parties, Dkt. No. 72 (“[T]he 

parties agree the record shows that, as of the morning of 

May 8, 2013, Dr. Gumbs owed the Puerto Rico licensing 

authority an additional $100.”). 

Instead, Dr. Gumbs challenges the Board’s finding 

that he practiced medicine without a license. Dr. Gumbs 

argues that he only saw a single patient. He notes that 

Dr. Sanders eventually reviewed and completed the 

medical records associated with that patient. Dr. Gumbs 

also asserts there is no evidence he actually performed 

any services or engaged in any activities that morning for 

which a medical license was expressly required. However, 

the record shows that Dr. Gumbs reviewed a patient’s 

medical history, conducted a physical, and then prescribed and signed off on treatment and medication to 

that patient. J.A. 32–33; 99–105. There is no dispute he 

was purporting to act as a doctor, and not a paraprofessional or medical assistant. Second, while Dr. Sanders 

subsequently reviewed the medical records for the patient 

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8 GUMBS v. HHS

evaluated by Dr. Gumbs, Dr. Sanders’ subsequent review 

does not erase the fact that it was Dr. Gumbs—and not 

Dr. Sanders—who actually saw, evaluated, and prescribed treatment for the patient. Thus, although Dr. 

Gumbs attempts to justify his conduct on the morning of 

May 8, his explanation does not negate the substantial 

evidence supporting the Board’s finding that he practiced 

medicine without a valid license.

II

Dr. Gumbs also challenges the Board’s finding that 

his removal promoted the efficiency of the agency’s service. A federal agency may discipline an employee “only 

for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). The agency must demonstrate a 

“nexus” between the employee’s misconduct and “an 

adverse effect upon the agency’s functioning.” Mings v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 813 F.2d 384, 389–90 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 

We uphold a Board’s finding of a “nexus” if it is supported 

by substantial evidence. Brown v. Dep’t of Navy, 229 F.3d 

1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2000).

Dr. Gumbs argues that because nothing in the record 

shows that he provided anything but routine, quality 

medical care at the clinic on May 8, there was no risk of 

negative repercussions from his action. Dr. Gumbs minimizes, however, the potential negative repercussions that 

could have resulted from his misconduct. As the Board 

found, Dr. Gumbs’ misconduct “not only threatened the 

trust of the Native American community, but also exposed 

the agency to liability.” Final Order at 5.

The failure to maintain a valid medical license and 

the practice of medicine without such a license were “a 

violation of [the] Joint Commission Accreditation Standard[s],” J.A. 36, and a violation of the clinic’s bylaws. 

Final Order at 4; J.A. 82. For example, the clinic’s bylaws 

require all medical professionals to “[h]old a current, full 

and unrestricted license to practice as a licensed indeCase: 14-3194 Document: 73-2 Page: 8 Filed: 08/12/2015
GUMBS v. HHS 9

pendent practitioner (i.e., Medical / Osteopathic Physician 

. . .) in the United States, or Territory of the United 

States.” J.A. 111. The bylaws also require medical practitioners to “be fully credentialed prior to seeing patients 

in the [clinic].” J.A. 116. Thus, even accepting that Dr. 

Gumbs provided “routine quality care” without his license, it is the practice of medicine without a license itself

that forms the basis of his misconduct.

As Dr. Scott explained in his proposal to remove Dr. 

Gumbs from his position, the mission of the agency is to 

provide “the best health care possible at the highest level 

for the American Indian/Alaska Natives in the tribal 

community.” J.A. 85. Dr. Gumbs occupied a position with 

regular contact with the public and became well-known to 

the patients and to the population of the community atlarge. Id. Dr. Scott explained that Dr. Gumbs’ “lack of 

responsibility to ensure he maintained a valid license 

affect[ed] the mission of the [clinic] to provide clinical 

services” to those in this community. In particular, Dr. 

Scott asserted that if Dr. Gumbs’ unlicensed practice of 

medicine became known to the Native American community, it was “the experience of the [agency] that this 

becomes newsworthy and adversely impacts the reputation of the agency.” J.A. 86.

In addition, Dr. Scott noted that Dr. Gumbs was well 

aware of the requirements to maintain his medical license, and even though he knew that his license had 

expired, chose to place the clinic at risk by providing

unlicensed medical care. J.A. 85. This placed the clinic in 

violation of its own bylaws and exposed the agency to tort 

liability by creating a presumption that both Dr. Gumbs 

and the clinic were providing negligent care. J.A. 82–83. 

Dr. Gumbs’ characterization of the harm from his unlicensed practice of medicine as “speculative” misses the 

point because it does not account for the mission of the 

agency. As explained by Dr. Scott, it is important to the 

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10 GUMBS v. HHS

clinic to maintain the trust of the Native American community, and any lapse of responsibility to maintaining 

adequate standards—such as by violating its own bylaws—threatened to break that trust. See J.A. 36. Even 

if no harm to the agency specifically resulted from his 

treatment of the patient on May 8, on a more general 

level, Dr. Gumbs’ misconduct had the potential to cause 

significant harm to the agency if it caused the Native 

American community to perceive that the clinic was not 

adhering to its internal procedures and was not dedicated 

to providing responsible medical care. In short, substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding of a nexus

between Dr. Gumbs’ misconduct and an adverse effect on 

the agency.1

III

Dr. Gumbs also argues that the penalty of dismissal 

was disproportionate and unreasonable. He contends 

that his misconduct did not warrant removal from his 

position and that Dr. Scott should have given consideration to alternative penalties. Consideration of an appropriate penalty is a matter committed primarily to the 

discretion of the employer and can be reversed only for an 

abuse of discretion. See Lachance v. Devall, 178 F.3d 

1246, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Villella v. Dep’t of the Air 

Force, 727 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The penalty 

1 Dr. Gumbs also argues that his removal denigrated the agency’s mission by delaying patient care and 

increasing the workload of the remaining care providers 

while IHS was hiring a new physician. But the focus of 

the efficiency inquiry is its impact of the employee’s 

misconduct on the agency, not the impact of the imposed 

penalty itself. See Mings, 813 F.2d at 389–90. While Dr. 

Gumbs’ allegations may be true, they do not negate 

evidence of a nexus between Dr. Gumbs’ misconduct and 

an adverse effect on the agency. 

 

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GUMBS v. HHS 11

must be reasonable in light of the sustained charges, and 

we have “effectively defined reasonable in this context to 

mean merely that the agency’s choice of penalty not be 

grossly disproportionate to the offense.” Webster v. Dep’t 

of Army, 911 F.2d 679, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (internal 

quotations omitted).

Here, the Board evaluated the reasonableness of the 

agency’s penalty after consideration of several relevant 

factors laid out in Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332.2 In partic2 The Douglas factors are: 1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, and its relation to the employee’s 

duties, position, and responsibilities, including whether 

the offense was intentional or technical or inadvertent, or 

was committed maliciously or for gain, or was frequently 

repeated; 2) the employee’s job level and type of employment, including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts 

with the public, and prominence of the position; 3) the 

employee’s past disciplinary record; 4) the employee’s past 

work record, including length of service, performance on 

the job, ability to get along with fellow workers, and 

dependability; 5) the effect of the offense upon the employee's ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its 

effect upon supervisors’ confidence in the employee’s work 

ability to perform assigned duties; 6) consistency of the 

penalty with those imposed upon other employees for the 

same or similar offenses; 7) consistency of the penalty 

with any applicable agency table of penalties; 8) the 

notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the reputation 

of the agency; 9) the clarity with which the employee was 

on notice of any rules that were violated in committing 

the offense, or had been warned about the conduct in 

question; 10) the potential for the employee’s rehabilitation; 11) mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense such as unusual job tensions, personality problems, 

mental impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or 

 

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12 GUMBS v. HHS

ular, because Dr. Gumbs failed to maintain a condition of 

his employment—holding a valid medical license—the 

Board determined the most relevant Douglas factors were 

1) the nature of the offense, 2) its effect on his job performance, and 3) the availability and effect of alternative 

sanctions. Final Order at 6. The Board found that the 

agency properly considered the seriousness of the charge 

of practicing medicine without a license, the fact that Dr. 

Gumbs, as a condition of his employment was required to 

maintain his license and be fully credentialed before 

treating patients, and the fact that Dr. Gumbs knew his 

license had expired yet still decided to practice medicine, 

which exposed the agency to liability and jeopardized the 

Native American community’s trust in the clinic. Id. The 

Board explained that although Dr. Scott was aware that 

other options existed, based on the sustained charges, 

removal was not an unreasonable penalty due to the 

gravity of Dr. Gumbs’ misconduct. Id. at 7.

Dr. Gumbs argues that because the lapse of his medical license was unintentional and inadvertent, and that 

his misconduct was not willful and did not appear to 

result in any actual harm, a lesser sanction would have 

been more appropriate. But our role is not to reweigh 

anew the evidence before the Board. Dr. Scott explained 

provocation on the part of others involved in the matter; 

and 12) the adequacy and effectiveness of alternative 

sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the 

employee or others. Douglas, 5 M.S.P.B. at 332. We have 

approved the use of these factors for determining the 

reasonableness of a penalty. Zingg v. Dep’t of Treasury, 

IRS, 388 F.3d 839, 841 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, the 

factors listed in Douglas are not exhaustive, and an 

agency is required only to consider those factors relevant 

to the action. Bryant v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 105 F.3d 1414, 

1418 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

 

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GUMBS v. HHS 13

that although a lesser sanction was possible, he believed 

Dr. Gumbs need to be removed “to make sure that [Dr. 

Gumb’s misconduct] d[idn’t] happen again at [the clinic].” 

J.A. 48. We find no abuse of discretion in the Board’s 

determination that the agency’s penalty, in view of the 

sustained charges that Dr. Gumbs let his license expire 

and then practiced medicine without a license, is not 

unreasonable. 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JAIME GUMBS,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 

SERVICES,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3194

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DA-0752-13-0648-I-1.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The majority affirms a decision of the Merit Systems 

Protection Board (“Board”) sustaining the Department of 

Health and Human Service’s (the “agency”) removal of Dr. 

Jaime Gumbs from his position as a medical officer at the 

Indian Health Service, Pawnee Health Center, in Oklahoma, for allowing his medical license to lapse and treating one or two patients after the license had lapsed. I 

respectfully dissent.

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2 GUMBS v. HHS

I 

The agency and the Board viewed Dr. Gumbs’ allowing his medical license to lapse and treating one or two 

patients as a serious matter. The agency’s deciding 

official relied on a finding that “practicing medicine 

without a license is illegal in all states,” J.A. 82, and a 

“violation of laws regulating licensure requirements,” J.A. 

86. The deciding official further found that Dr. Gumbs’ 

conduct exposed the agency to “potential liability issues,” 

J.A. 85. The Board’s initial decision relied on the agency’s 

finding that Dr. Gumbs’ conduct was “a violation of law.” 

J.A. 22. And the full Board affirmed, finding that removal 

was reasonable under the circumstances in part because 

of “the seriousness of the charge of practicing medicine 

without a license and the fact that the appellant’s actions 

exposed the agency to liability.” J.A. 6.

It is far from clear that, as the Board assumed, Dr. 

Gumbs’ license had in fact lapsed. Dr. Gumbs applied to 

renew his medical license no later than April 22, 2013, 

prior to its expiration on May 7, 2013, and submitted a 

$150.00 fee. If the proper amount had been submitted, it 

appears that the license would have been extended automatically. Under both Oklahoma (where all of the conduct at issue occurred) and Puerto Rico (where Dr. Gumbs 

was licensed to practice medicine) law, it appears that the 

filing of a timely renewal application extends the license 

term. Oklahoma Stat. tit. 75, § 314(B) provides:

Except as otherwise prohibited by law, if a licensee has made timely and sufficient application for 

renewal of a license or a new license with reference 

to any transfer of an activity of a continuing nature, the existing license does not expire until the 

application has been finally determined by the 

agency.

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GUMBS v. HHS 3

Id. (emphasis added). Under Puerto Rico law, the Medical Discipline and Licensure Board “may suspend the 

license of any physician . . . who does not submit the 

information required for the register every three years, 

for the term it deems convenient, contingent upon the 

facts involved in each case.” P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 20, 

§ 134(c) (emphasis added). But “once the person meets 

the requirement of submitting such information, his/her 

license shall be activated by the Board.” Id. Thus, it 

appears that under Puerto Rico law, even when a physician fails to timely renew a medical license, it is likely 

that the license does not automatically terminate. 

According to Dr. Gumbs’ May 27, 2013, letter to the 

deciding official regarding the notice of proposed removal, 

he “sent the required application and documents with the 

money that was asked for on the web site well in advance 

of any deadline for renewal.” J.A. 95. Dr. Gumbs also 

acknowledged that he “later found out” that the licensing 

authority “wanted another $100.00,” so he sent the remaining $100 on May 15th, 2013. Id.

The government argues on appeal, and the majority 

agrees, that the failure to make the additional $100 

payment resulted in the lapse of his license. But it is not

clear under either Oklahoma or Puerto Rico law that the 

failure to make the full payment caused the license to 

lapse since the application was otherwise complete. This 

is a matter for the Board in the first instance, and the 

Board did not address the issue. In my view, the majority 

errs by deciding the issue without a remand.

Even if we could properly assume that Dr. Gumbs’ license lapsed because he failed to timely submit $100 of 

the license renewal fee, the Board’s action in sustaining 

the penalty of removal would have been arbitrary and 

capricious. 

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4 GUMBS v. HHS

First, it is unclear whether either Oklahoma or Puerto 

Rico law would have regarded Dr. Gumbs’ continuing to 

practice as criminal, or even particularly serious. Here, 

neither the agency nor the Board cited any criminal 

statute or regulation that Dr. Gumbs violated. Instead, 

the agency relied on its conclusory assumption that Dr. 

Gumbs’ conduct was “illegal in all states,” J.A. 82, but did 

not even attempt to analyze his conduct under Oklahoma 

or Puerto Rico law, where his conduct may not have 

constituted a criminal violation. We have held that where 

an agency removes an employee based on a finding that 

conduct was criminal, but the conduct may or may not 

have been criminal, a remand is required. See Doe v. 

Dep’t of Justice, 565 F.3d 1375, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009)

(reversing and remanding “[b]ecause it seems probable 

that Doe was disciplined at least in part because the 

deciding official mistakenly believed that his misconduct 

was in violation of the law”). Under Doe, therefore, since

part of the basis for Dr. Gumbs’ removal was the agency’s 

potentially mistaken belief that his conduct was criminal, 

a remand for consideration of a lesser penalty is required.

Second, even if the Board properly assumed that Dr. 

Gumbs’ actions were technically illegal, the penalty of 

removal was still arbitrary and capricious, particularly 

since Dr. Gumbs may have assumed that his license 

renewal was complete.1 It is true that we “defer[] to the 

1 The majority asserts that Dr. Gumbs was “aware 

that his license had expired,” Maj. Op. 4, but the record is 

unclear on this point. According to Dr. Gumbs, he “was 

expecting that [he] would be receiving the renewal” on 

May 8, 2013, and did not realize until later that he still 

owed $100 for the license renewal. J.A. 95; see also Letter 

from parties at 2, Dkt. No. 72 (“As of [May 8, 2013], 

despite repeated inquiry Dr. Gumbs had no reason to 

 

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GUMBS v. HHS 5

agency’s choice of penalty unless the penalty exceeds the 

range of permissible punishment specified by statute or 

regulation, or unless the penalty is so harsh and unconscionably disproportionate to the offense that it amounts 

to an abuse of discretion.” Archuleta v. Hopper, 786 F.3d 

1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But even where all of the agency’s charges are 

sustained, that deference is not absolute. See, e.g.,

O’Keefe v. U.S. Postal Serv., 318 F.3d 1310, 1313 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (“When all of the agency’s charges are sustained, the agency’s original penalty may nevertheless be 

mitigated to a maximum reasonable penalty when the 

agency’s penalty is too severe.” (citing Lachance v. Devall, 

178 F.3d 1246, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999)). In prior cases, we 

have reversed agency penalty determinations in similar 

circumstances where the punishment did not fit the 

crime, even where the employee’s conduct was unlawful. 

In Miguel v. Department of the Army, 727 F.2d 1081 

(Fed. Cir. 1984), a cashier was removed for “unauthorized 

possession of U.S. Government property” for admittedly 

stealing two bars of soap with a total value of $2.10. Id.

at 1082. We reversed: “We do not condone theft regardless of the amount involved, but the relatively minor 

nature of the theft leads us to the conclusion that this 

harsh discharge of a 24-year employee with an otherwise 

unblemished record was a penalty grossly disproportionate to the offense and thus was an abuse of discretion.” 

Id. at 1084; see also Abrigo v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 88-

3390, 1989 WL 59271, at *1 (Fed. Cir. June 7, 1989) 

(unpublished) (vacating and remanding removal for 

misdemeanor unauthorized entry “where the penalty 

imposed [wa]s so disproportionate as to constitute an 

know that there was anything amiss with his application 

for renewal.”).

 

Case: 14-3194 Document: 73-2 Page: 18 Filed: 08/12/2015
6 GUMBS v. HHS

abuse of discretion” and “[t]he agency and the [B]oard 

gave absolutely no consideration to the . . . apparently 

technical nature of the violation”).

Similarly, in VanFossen v. Department of Housing & 

Urban Development, 748 F.2d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984), an 

appraiser (VanFossen) was removed “based on three 

charges of violating the standards of conduct: engaging in 

outside employment without authorization; engaging in 

improper outside employment; and failing to disclose 

financial interests.” Id. at 1580. VanFossen had more 

than nineteen years of federal service with no prior disciplinary record. Id. He had previously requested and 

received approval for outside employment from an area

manager, but under applicable regulations this approval 

was not legally sufficient because it needed to come from 

the agency’s regional counsel. Id. We vacated and remanded to determine an appropriate lesser penalty. Id.

at 1581.

Here, Dr. Gumbs has had nearly twenty-two years of 

federal service, with no prior disciplinary record. At 

worst, his medical license lapsed for a period of nine days

because he failed to pay $100 of the application fee, despite his “many attempts to get his medical license renewed” prior to the deadline. J.A. 3. And on the morning 

after his license may have expired, Dr. Gumbs saw a 

patient or two, whose records were then reviewed by his 

supervisor. 

Our prior cases reflect an important responsibility to 

remand for determination of a more appropriate penalty 

in the rare case where the agency’s choice of penalty is 

grossly disproportionate to the offense. In my view, this is 

such a case, and I respectfully dissent. 

Case: 14-3194 Document: 73-2 Page: 19 Filed: 08/12/2015