Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03067/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03067-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Heyward Carzell Sanders
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 26, 2014 Decided February 27, 2015

No. 11-3067

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

HEYWARD CARZELL SANDERS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cr-00165-4)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Stephen F. Rickard, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne

Grealy Curt, Kenneth F. Whitted, and David Kent, Assistant

U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and WILLIAMS and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Chief Judge: Heyward Sanders appeals his

conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin. He contends that

the trial court erred by foreclosing a request for hybrid legal

representation, by denying his request for a multiple

conspiracies jury instruction, and by failing to give an adequate

response to a note from the jury. For the reasons set forth

below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

I

In November 2008, law enforcement authorities began to

investigate narcotics activity in and around Potomac Gardens, a

housing project in the District of Columbia. In August 2009,

agents obtained a wiretap on a telephone owned by Matthew

Joseph, a former Potomac Gardens resident known to his

associates as Fat Mack. The agents learned that Joseph

coordinated a network of people distributing heroin, suboxone

pills, and crack cocaine. Among his associates were

“lieutenants” who helped him procure narcotics and prepare

them for distribution, and “runners” who sold narcotics on the

street.1

 

In October 2009, a mutual acquaintance described appellant

Heyward Sanders to Joseph as a potential supplier of highquality heroin. Joseph received an initial test sample, which his

associates described as “some of the best heroin that they had

around that area in a long time.” 4/28 Trial Tr. 44. After a night

of gambling, Joseph asked his acquaintance to set up a deal with

Sanders, and the three of them met at a shopping center in

1

The facts recited in this and the following four paragraphs come

from wiretaps that were admitted into evidence, and/or Matthew

Joseph’s trial testimony.

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Greenbelt, Maryland on October 10. Joseph purchased 200

grams of heroin from Sanders for $15,000.

After this first transaction, Joseph dealt directly with

Sanders. The following day, Sanders warned Joseph that he

(Sanders) had a “lot of eyes” on him, but he agreed to meet

Joseph in an alley behind a school near Potomac Gardens. App.

212-14; see 4/28 Trial Tr. 61-63. Joseph purchased heroin from

Sanders five more times. Twice, he purchased 100 grams from

Sanders at the Greenbelt shopping center, paying $7500 on the

first occasion and $7000 on the second. Later in October,

Sanders began obtaining heroin from a new source and provided

Joseph with test samples. On October 27, Joseph told Sanders

he was out of heroin, and the two agreed to meet near the same

school. There, Sanders sold Joseph six grams of heroin,

“fronting” the drugs on credit. 4/28 Trial Tr. 47. Joseph later

paid $100 per gram, higher than the usual price because the

drugs were from Sanders’ personal supply. That evening,

Joseph told Sanders that the heroin was weaker than the initial

batch.

The wiretap on Joseph’s telephone recorded a number of

conversations with Sanders in late October and November. On

an unknown date during that period, Joseph and Sanders again

met near Potomac Gardens, and Joseph bought another 50 grams

of heroin for $4000. In their final transaction in December

2009, Joseph purchased 25 grams for $2250. Joseph testified at

trial that the quality of Sanders’ heroin had been deteriorating

over time, and that he stopped purchasing heroin from Sanders

because Sanders no longer had any available.

Joseph’s telephone conversations revealed that Sanders was

not his only heroin supplier. Around the same time, he was also

dealing with another supplier, Joseph Richardson. In a

December 10 transaction monitored by law enforcement, Joseph

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purchased 50 grams of heroin from Richardson for $3500. 

Police officers stopped Richardson after the sale and seized the

cash, prompting Richardson to call Joseph to complain. 

In late December 2009, agents obtained a wiretap on

Sanders’ phone. On March 15, 2010, when he was no longer

selling heroin to Joseph, Sanders had a conversation with James

Leak, with whom Sanders had also made heroin deals. Leak

mentioned that a man named “Fat somebody” had been “doing

real good for the last two years” in Potomac Gardens. App. 165. 

Sanders, aware of Joseph’s nickname, responded, “You talking

about Fat Mack?” Id. When Leak continued describing Fat

Mack’s success in Potomac Gardens, Sanders twice told Leak

that Fat Mack “use[d] to purchase from you.” Id. at 166. 

Officers searched Sanders’ house on May 13, 2010. On

June 15, a grand jury returned an indictment against Sanders and

eight others. Sanders was named only in Count One, which

charged all nine codefendants with conspiring to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute cocaine, 50 grams or more of

crack cocaine, and 100 grams or more of heroin. All eight of

Sanders’ codefendants pled guilty, and Joseph testified as a

cooperating witness at Sanders’ trial. Sanders represented

himself at trial, with standby counsel available. He did not

testify and did not present evidence in his defense. 

The jury convicted Sanders of conspiring to distribute and

possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin; it

acquitted him as to cocaine and crack cocaine. Sanders raises

three principal challenges on appeal, to which we now turn.

II

Sanders first contends that the district court erred by sua

sponte instructing him that he did not have a right to hybrid

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representation -- an arrangement in which he could represent

himself while also allowing his counsel to participate in the trial. 

Shortly before trial, Sanders expressed a desire to represent

himself, and his pretrial counsel accordingly filed a motion to

withdraw. At the motions hearing, the district court “strongly

urge[d]” Sanders to allow his lawyer to continue representing

him, without success. Supp. App. 115. Among other things, the

court told Sanders that, if he represented himself, he could get

help from standby counsel. But under that arrangement, the

court said, such counsel “could not actively participate in the

trial,” and Sanders would be responsible for organizing his

defense, picking a jury, calling witnesses, and making

arguments. Id. at 94-95. After asking again whether Sanders

wished to waive his right to counsel, the court found that

Sanders had “knowingly and voluntarily” waived that right. Id.

at 117. It then reiterated to Sanders the responsibilities of selfrepresentation. It advised Sanders that his counsel would serve

on a “standby” basis, that Sanders would be able to consult with

his standby counsel on “basic courtroom mechanics and routine

clerical procedural matters,” but that Sanders would have to

make motions, argue issues, select the jury, question witnesses,

and make objections himself. Id. at 118-19. Addressing

Sanders, the district court said: “You do not have the right to a

hybrid representation by which you represent yourself and ask

[your counsel] also to represent you and make some arguments

for you. You cannot do that.” Id. at 118. Neither Sanders nor

his pretrial counsel objected during the hearing. 

Sanders’ standby counsel remained available throughout the

trial, and, at least twice, the district court ensured that Sanders

had consulted with counsel on particular issues or advised him

to do so. See 4/28 Trial Tr. 187-88; 5/3 Trial Tr. 6-7. Sanders

never requested or expressed an interest in hybrid

representation. On appeal, Sanders claims that the district court

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“erred in informing Sanders he had no right to request hybrid

representation under any circumstances” -- “no right even to ask

the district court in its discretion to allow counsel to represent

him in part.” Sanders Br. 26 (emphasis added).

Because Sanders did not object to the district court’s

statements, and never indicated an interest in hybrid

representation, we review his claim for plain error only. FED.R.

CRIM. P. 52(b). This means that Sanders has the burden of

showing there is “‘(1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that

affect[s] substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an

appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affect[s] the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” 

United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). In most cases,

to affect the defendant’s substantial rights, “‘the error must have

been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings.’” Id. at 1183-84 (quoting United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)); see United States v.

Williams, 773 F.3d 98, 105 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 

But the standard of review does not matter here because

Sanders’ claim fails at the first step: there was no error at all. 

The district court did not instruct Sanders that he had no right

“even to ask” for hybrid representation. Instead, it simply told

him that he did “not have the right to a hybrid representation.” 

Supp. App. 118. That instruction correctly stated the law. See

McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984) (“Faretta [v.

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), the case establishing the right

of a defendant to conduct his own defense,] does not require a

trial judge to permit ‘hybrid’ representation . . . .”); United

States v. Washington, 353 F.3d 42, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“A

defendant does not have a right to combine self-representation

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with representation by counsel.”); United States v. Tarantino,

846 F.2d 1384, 1419-20 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that there is

no constitutional right to hybrid representation, and affirming a

conviction where the trial court told the defendant “that he had

to choose between representing himself and being represented

by appointed counsel” (emphasis added)). 

III

Sanders next contends that the district court erred in

denying his request for a multiple conspiracies jury instruction. 

Before Sanders’ pretrial counsel withdrew from representation,

he had requested a conspiracy charge that would have instructed

the jurors to acquit if they found “that the defendant was only a

member of some other conspiracy, and not a member of the

conspiracy charged in the indictment.” App. 143. At the close

of all the evidence, Sanders verbally renewed this request. The

district court denied the request, finding that the testimony did

not support the existence of other conspiracies. 4/29 PM Trial

Tr. 6. Sanders acknowledges that, at the time he made his

request, he did not identify for the court the other conspiracies

that he believed were supported by the evidence. Oral Arg.

Recording at 41:40-43:14. 

A district court must, if requested, give a multiple

conspiracies instruction when the “record evidence supports the

existence of multiple conspiracies.” United States v. Graham,

83 F.3d 1466, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The factors relevant to

determining whether there was a single conspiracy rather than

multiple conspiracies include “‘whether the participants shared

a common goal, were dependent upon one another, and were

involved together in carrying out at least some parts of the

plan.’” United States v. Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193,

207 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Brockenborrugh,

575 F.3d 726, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). On appeal, Sanders argues

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that the record evidence supported a finding of four separate 

and independent conspiracies: (1) a solely Joseph-Sanders

conspiracy, (2) a Joseph-Richardson conspiracy, (3) a SandersLeak conspiracy, and (4) a conspiracy among Joseph and his

associates in Potomac Gardens. 

For purposes of argument, we will assume that Sanders is

correct that the district court was required to give a multiple

conspiracies instruction in this case. We will also assume, again

for argument’s sake, that there was a variance between the

single conspiracy charged in the indictment and evidence at trial

that supported a finding of multiple conspiracies. See Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81 (1935); United States v. Cross,

766 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Nonetheless, neither of these related (assumed) errors

warrants automatic reversal. When a district court erroneously

rejects a request for a jury instruction, the “harmless error rule

provides that any error that ‘does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.’” Cross, 766 F.3d at 4 (quoting FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(a)). The same standard governs our determination

of whether a variance in proof is fatal to the defendant’s

conviction. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 82 (“The true inquiry . . . is

not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there

has been such a variance as to ‘affect the substantial rights’ of

the accused.”). Although Sanders advances several theories of

prejudice, we are ultimately unconvinced. 

A

One type of prejudice that may arise in variance cases is the

possibility that, although the evidence showed the existence of

multiple conspiracies, it was insufficient to convict the

defendant of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. See

Cross, 766 F.3d at 5. But in this case, even assuming that the

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evidence supported a finding of multiple conspiracies, it was

also “sufficient to permit the jury to find beyond any reasonable

doubt that the defendant was a member of the single conspiracy

alleged,” United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 454 (2d Cir.

1996); see Cross, 766 F.3d at 5. 

As Sanders notes, “[t]he government sought to prove the

existence of a single conspiracy, centered in Potomac Gardens

. . . and headed by Matthew Joseph.” Sanders Br. 28. The

government provided more than enough evidence for the jury to

conclude that Sanders agreed to join that conspiracy. In six

transactions over a period of three months, Sanders supplied

Joseph with significant quantities of heroin -- a total of

approximately 481 grams -- in exchange for a total of $36,350. 

Because that was far more than a single person would use for his

own consumption over that period,2

 the jury could reasonably

infer Sanders understood that the drugs would be redistributed

and that those subsequent sales were what generated the demand

for his product. See United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 712

n.4, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the large quantity of

drugs involved supported the jury’s conclusion that defendants

knew the scope of the conspiracy); see also United States v.

Baugham, 449 F.3d 167, 171-73 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States

v. Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

Sanders also supplied Joseph with test samples of the heroin

before requiring payment -- another fact “indicat[ing] his

comprehension that resale might have been contemplated.” 

United States v. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1989);

see Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1517 n.20. In addition, Sanders sold six

grams of heroin to Joseph on credit, suggesting a “level of

mutual trust” consistent with a conspiracy, Baugham, 449 F.3d

2

One trial exhibit suggested that a single gram of heroin could be

broken up into 40 individual servings. See App. 161.

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at 173. The jury could also have interpreted Sanders’ comment

to Joseph, that Sanders had a “lot of eyes” on him, App. 213, as

a warning to Joseph about the presence of police surveillance --

another indication of shared trust. See Graham, 83 F.3d at

1471-72. Finally, a jury could have understood Sanders’

subsequent telephone conversation with Leak, in which Sanders

told Leak that Fat Mack (Joseph) “use[d] to purchase from you”

for his Potomac Gardens operation, App. 166, as evidence that

Sanders had always understood that heroin he obtained from

Leak and supplied to Joseph was being distributed in Potomac

Gardens by Joseph’s crew. Together, this evidence was more

than sufficient to permit the jury to conclude that Sanders “had

the ‘specific intent to further the . . . objective’” of the Potomac

Gardens conspiracy and therefore was a member of that

conspiracy, United States v. Gaskins, 690 F.3d 569, 577 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (quoting Childress, 58 F.3d at 708).

Sanders’ principal challenge to this conclusion is that he did

not know the other members of the conspiracy. The Leak

conversation casts doubt on that claim, but even if it were true,

it would not be dispositive: participants in a drug-distribution

chain are generally considered coconspirators “even if they do

not all know one another, so long as each knows that his own

role in the distribution of drugs and the benefits he derives from

his participation depend on the activities of the others.” 

Childress, 58 F.3d at 709-10; see Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708

F.3d at 207 (“‘[T]here is no requirement that each conspirator

[even] know the identity of every other conspirator.’” (quoting

United States v. Jenkins, 928 F.2d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir.

1991))). As we have repeatedly explained:

Under the chain analysis, the government need not

prove a direct connection between all the conspirators. 

A single conspiracy may be established when each

conspirator knows of the existence of the larger

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conspiracy and the necessity for other participants,

even if he is ignorant of their precise identities. When

the conspirators form a chain, each is likely to know

that other conspirators are required. . . . The existence

of a chain helps us determine both the unlawful

objective and the conspirators’ intent. . . . [E]ach link

in the chain may rely upon the other links in

furtherance of the common interest. The street dealer

relies upon his supplier; the supplier relies upon his

supplier; and so on. The existence of such a vertically

integrated, loose-knit combination may raise the

inference that each conspirator has agreed with the

others (some whose specific identity may be unknown)

to further a common unlawful objective, e.g., the

distribution of narcotics.

Cross, 766 F.3d at 6 (quoting Tarantino, 846 F.3d at 1392); see,

e.g., Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1516; Childress, 58 F.3d at 709-10. In

this case, the government presented sufficient evidence to show

that Sanders was, understood he was, and intended to be, part of

the Potomac Gardens conspiracy. 

B

Sanders argues that another form of prejudice arising from

the court’s failure to provide a multiple conspiracies instruction

was the risk that the jury was not unanimous as to whether he

joined the particular conspiracy charged in the indictment. 

Although some jurors might have found him liable based on the

Potomac Gardens conspiracy, Sanders speculates that others

might have found him liable for an independent JosephRichardson conspiracy, an independent Sanders-Leak

conspiracy, or an independent Sanders-Joseph conspiracy. See

Sanders Br. 38.

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As the government notes, the jury’s unanimous finding on

the verdict form -- that Sanders was responsible (and only

responsible) for conspiring to distribute 100 grams or more of

heroin, see infra Part IV -- makes it implausible that some jurors

found him liable for a Sanders-Leak conspiracy. Because there

was no evidence at all about the quantity of heroin that Leak

sold to Sanders, see Oral Arg. Recording at 5:48-6:06 (statement

of Sanders’ counsel), there is no reason to believe that the jury

convicted Sanders of a separate conspiracy with Leak alone. Cf.

Sanders Br. 38 (acknowledging that, “[i]f some jurors found

Sanders liable for conspiring with Leak and not Joseph, they had

no evidence to support a finding that the offense involved more

than 100 grams of heroin”). Similarly, there is no reason to

believe that the jury found Sanders liable for a separate JosephRichardson conspiracy, as there was no evidence that Sanders

played any role in any Joseph-Richardson transactions (except

to the extent that all three were members of the larger Potomac

Gardens conspiracy).

That leaves only the possibility that some jurors convicted

Sanders of a conspiracy solely with Joseph, rather than the

Potomac Gardens conspiracy charged in the indictment. But

even if jurors had found a Sanders-Joseph conspiracy, that

conspiracy would merely have been a subset of the larger

charged conspiracy. And it is well settled that there is generally

no prejudice when the government proves a narrower conspiracy

that is within the scope of the conspiracy charged in the

indictment. The Supreme Court made this point in Berger v.

United States, noting that there is no fatal variance when “an

indictment charges a conspiracy involving several persons and

the proof establishes the conspiracy against some of them only.” 

295 U.S. at 81. Subsequent cases have reached the same

conclusion. See United States v. Carnagie, 533 F.3d 1231, 1241

(10th Cir. 2008) (“When a narrower scheme than the one alleged

is fully included within the indictment and proved, we have

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repeatedly held that a defendant’s substantial rights are not

prejudiced.”); see also United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635,

656-57 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Even if the jurors were of different

minds as to the precise parameters of the conspiracy, the

instruction required them all to agree that the defendant joined

a conspiracy that was within the ambit of the conspiracy alleged

in the indictment.”). 

In this case, the court told the jury that the indictment

contained the charges against the defendant, and then went on to

read the indictment, which charged Sanders with conspiring

with the other members of the Potomac Gardens crew. 4/27

Trial Tr. 13-16. In its arguments, the government likewise only

asked the jury to convict Sanders of the Potomac Gardens

conspiracy. Indeed, as Sanders acknowledges, “[i]n both

opening and closing arguments, the government focused on ‘the

drug trafficking network operated by Matthew Joseph in and

around the area of Potomac Gardens.’” Sanders Br. 20 (quoting

4/29 PM Trial Tr. 47 (government’s closing argument), and

citing 4/27 Trial Tr. 28-40 (government’s opening argument));

see Sanders Br. 20-21 (“‘[T]he conspiracy involved distributing

large quantities of heroin and other drugs in Potomac Gardens.’”

(quoting 4/29 PM Trial Tr. 49 (government’s closing

argument))). It is more than reasonable to conclude that the jury

focused its attention on the conspiracy that the court and the

government said was at issue. The government has therefore

carried its burden of demonstrating that prejudice with respect

to a non-unanimous jury did not result from the (assumed) error. 

Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1184.

C

Finally, other forms of prejudice that may stem from a

variance between the charged conspiracy and the evidence

proven at trial were also absent in this case. First, Sanders had

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ample notice of the scope of the evidence that would be used

against him at trial. All of the relevant conspirators were named

in the indictment, and the government disclosed all of the

recorded telephone calls before trial. See Cross, 766 F.3d at 7

(noting that “there rarely (if ever) will be [a notice problem] if

the trial proof ‘supports only a significantly narrower and more

limited’ charge than that stated in the indictment” (quoting

United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 131 (1985))). Second, the

risk of “transference of guilt from one [defendant] to another

across the line separating conspiracies,” Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946), was minimal. Sanders was

tried alone, and much of the evidence against him consisted of

his own words on the wiretaps. See Cross, 766 F.3d at 7-8 &

n.4; United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

see also Gaviria, 116 F.3d at 1533.3

* * *

In sum, even assuming that the district court erred in failing

to give a multiple conspiracies instruction, the error did not

prejudice Sanders and does not warrant reversal. 

IV

Sanders also challenges the district court’s instructions on

drug quantity, as well as its response to a note from the jury

regarding the verdict form. Sanders did not object to either at

trial. We therefore review the court’s statements for plain error

only.

The district court initially charged the jury that:

3

Sanders contends that various other pieces of evidence created

prejudicial spillover. We have considered that evidence and conclude

that the contention is without merit. 

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[T]he specific amount of any controlled substance

involved is not an element of the offense of conspiracy. 

So first you have to determine the conspiracy.

However, if you find the defendant guilty of the

offense of conspiracy to distribute or possess with

intent to distribute a controlled substance as charged in

the indictment, you must then determine whether the

government has proved the quantity of the controlled

substance was[:] . . . a detectable amount of cocaine; or

50 grams or more of . . . cocaine base, that is crack; or

100 grams or more of . . . heroin.

4/29 Trial Tr. 37-38. As this court has previously noted, 21

U.S.C. § 841, the federal drug distribution offense, “‘is a

tripartite statute that [effectively] establishes separate offenses

based on drug quantity” and type. United States v. Gibson, 353

F.3d 21, 29 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Webb, 255

F.3d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). “[D]rug quantity is an element

of the offense under § 841(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) and must be

submitted to the jury.” Gibson, 353 F.3d at 29. It is not,

however, an element of the base offense of distributing a

controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), or of conspiring

to do so, id. § 846. See Webb, 255 F.3d at 897. 

Consistent with the jury instruction, the district court

provided a verdict form that first asked the jury to indicate

whether it found Sanders guilty or not guilty of the base charge

of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

a controlled substance -- “Cocaine, or Cocaine Base, also known

as Crack, or Heroin.” App. 277. “If you find Mr. Sanders ‘not

guilty’” of that charge, the form went on, “then your

deliberations are complete.” Id. “If, however, you find Mr.

Sanders ‘guilty’ of [that charge], then you must determine

. . . whether the government has proven beyond a reasonable

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doubt” that the conspiracy involved Sanders’ agreement to

distribute or possess with intent to distribute one or more of the

following: (i) a detectable amount of cocaine; (ii) 50 grams or

more of crack cocaine; or (iii) 100 grams or more of heroin. 

App. 277. On page 2 of the form, the jury was given yes or no

options for each of those three. App. 278.

After deliberations began, the jurors sent the district court

a note asking whether, if they found Sanders guilty of

conspiracy, they also had to “answer yes to at least 1 of the

questions on page 2 of the verdict form.” App. 274. The district

court discussed the note with Sanders and the prosecutor. 

Sanders pointed the court to the paragraph in the initial

instructions stating that a specific amount of drugs is not an

element of the conspiracy offense. See 5/3 Trial Tr. 9. The

court then summoned the jury and responded to its question as

we will soon describe. 

At bottom, Sanders complains that the district court’s

response left “the jury unsure as to whether a complete verdict

required answering ‘yes’ to at least one of the identified drug

quantities.” Sanders Br. 59. The verdict form -- by providing

yes or no options for each of the identified quantities -- made it

clear that the jury did not have to answer “yes” to complete the

verdict. And we do not think that the court’s response to the

jury’s note muddied the waters.

First, the district court reminded the jurors that, as it had

told them in its initial instructions, “the specific amount of any

controlled substance involved is not an element of the offense of

conspiracy. ” 5/3 Trial Tr. 11. Only “if you find the defendant

guilty of the offense of conspiracy to distribute . . . a controlled

substance,” the court said, “must [you] then determine whether

the government has proved the quantity of controlled

substance.” Id. at 12 (emphasis added); see id. at 13. “And

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then,” the court continued, “you answer yes or no on the

[second] page, and if you cannot agree, then you cannot agree on

that part of the verdict.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Finally, the

court told the jury that its verdict as to each quantity had to be

unanimous: “[T]o answer yes or no to any one of [the

quantities,] you have to have a unanimous verdict.” Id.

(emphasis added). This response clearly and accurately

reiterated the earlier instructions and did not confuse the jury. 

V

In this Part, we address a number of Sanders’ miscellaneous

claims of error that he did not raise in the district court. 

Although he attempts to trace these claims to the absence of the

multiple conspiracies jury instruction that he did request in that

court, see supra Part III, we are unable to connect the dots. We

therefore briefly review them as stand-alone claims subject to

plain error review.

A

In addition to failing to give the multiple conspiracies

instruction, Sanders maintains that the district court erred in

failing to give two additional conspiracy-related instructions that

he did not request. First, he objects that the district court’s

instructions did not adequately define the crime of conspiracy. 

He recognizes, however, that the instructions were consistent

with circuit precedent describing the elements of conspiracy. 

See Sanders Reply Br. 21 (acknowledging consistency with

descriptions in Graham, 83 F.3d at 1471, and United States v.

Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The

fact that the district court did not sua sponte “adopt[] a more

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comprehensive set of elements for showing drug conspiracy,”

Sanders Br. 36, did not constitute plain error.4

Second, Sanders contends that the district court should have

instructed the jury that a simple buyer-seller relationship alone

does not constitute a conspiracy.5

 Although such an instruction

would have added clarity to the general conspiracy instruction,

the government would then have been entitled to a further

instruction that a buyer-seller relationship, combined with other

evidence, can prove knowing participation in a conspiracy, see

United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 928 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1997)

(citing United States v. Baylor, 97 F.3d 542, 547 (D.C. Cir.

1996)). That is, a jury may properly find a conspiracy, rather

than a buy-sell agreement, “where the evidence shows that a

buyer procured [or a seller sold] drugs with knowledge of the

overall existence of the conspiracy.” United States v. Thomas,

114 F.3d 228, 241 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Among the factors

demonstrating such knowledge are the existence of repeated,

regular deals; drug quantities consistent with redistribution; and

the extension of credit to the buyer. See Cross, 766 F.3d at 4;

4

Sanders argues that this issue should not be reviewed for plain

error because his counsel had proposed a conspiracy charge with more

elements than the district court listed. See Sanders Reply Br. 22 n.4. 

But the additional element that he proposed is not the one he argues

for here. Compare App. 140 (proposed charge), with Sanders Br. 36-

37 (citing Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit definitions of conspiracy,

but not indicating which he would prefer). 

5

Although he acknowledges that he did not request such an

instruction, Sanders contends that, “had the district court recognized

the need” for the multiple conspiracies instruction that he did request,

“it would have understood that a ‘buy/sell’ one was also required.” 

Sanders Br. 43. Sanders offers no support for this contention, and it

does not suffice to change the standard of review from plain to

harmless error.

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Baugham, 449 F.3d at 171-72; Baylor, 97 F.3d at 547; see also

United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1991)

(stating that the “rationale for holding a buyer and a seller not to

be conspirators” does not apply when “there is advanced

planning among the alleged co-conspirators to deal in wholesale

quantities of drugs obviously not intended for personal use”). 

As we set out in Part I and discussed in Part III, all of these

factors were present in this case. As a consequence, Sanders has

not satisfied his burden of showing that the absence of a buyerseller instruction “affected the outcome of the district court

proceedings,” Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1183-84 (quoting Olano,

507 U.S. at 734). See United States v. Hoyte, 330 F. App’x 248,

250 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that “[n]o plain error can be found”

in the failure to give a buyer-seller instruction where “the

government presented ample evidence beyond a mere buyerseller relationship and demonstrated that defendant engaged in

more than a single transaction”). 

B

Sanders also contends that the court erred in sending back

to the jury a compact disc that contained some unplayed

recordings of wiretapped telephone calls “not in evidence.” 

Sanders Br. 48. But there was no such error. The parties had

entered into a stipulation permitting all of the calls to be

admitted into evidence subject to subsequent, specific objections

about particular calls. 4/27 Trial Tr. 100-07. And Sanders 

never raised any objections at all. 

C

Finally, we reject Sanders’ contention that plain error arose

during each side’s closing arguments to the jury. 

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Sanders claims that the trial court improperly prevented him

from arguing that he made “little money from the drug trade,”

which he maintains “was relevant to whether he was involved in

a conspiracy with Joseph.” Sanders Br. 52. But the court did

not improperly limit him. The court permitted Sanders to

remind the jury of a photograph of the search of his house,

showing that he slept on a cot between the living room and

dining room. It stopped him only when he began arguing that

the house belonged to his family rather than to him, and that

they let him stay there without paying rent -- a point, he said,

that “was part of the case on the search and seizure.” 4/29 PM

Trial Tr. 79. The court properly cut this argument off, both

because the validity of the search was “not an issue” at the trial,

and because there was “no evidence” regarding the nonpayment

of rent. Id.; see Childress, 58 F.3d at 715 (holding that a party

may not use closing arguments to “argue facts not in evidence”).

Nor did the prosecutor plainly err in arguing that one of

Sanders’ sales of a large quantity of heroin to Joseph “by itself”

established Sanders’ participation in the conspiracy, 4/29 PM

Trial Tr. 51. Even if Sanders is correct that a single sale would

be insufficient to establish a conspiracy, he challenges only a

single reference in the prosecutor’s closing argument. The

remainder of that argument called the jury’s attention to the

myriad of other evidence that showed Sanders’ involvement in

the conspiracy, and stressed the fact that he sold Joseph heroin

on six different occasions. See, e.g., id. at 53-57. We do not

believe that the prosecutor’s single statement affected the

outcome of the trial. See Williams, 773 F.3d at 107.6

6

Sanders raises a number of additional miscellaneous arguments

or variants of the arguments discussed in the text. We have concluded

that they are without merit and do not warrant further discussion.

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VI

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court

is

Affirmed.

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