Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01028/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Lee Canterbury
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

RICHARD LEE CANTERBURY 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FIL~ D 

United States C.OUrtof Appeal! Tenth Circuit 

JAN 14 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-1028 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-313) 

Charles S. Szekely, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Mark J. 

Rosenblum, Assistant Federal Public Defender, and Michael G. Katz, 

Federal Public Defender, on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for 

Defendant-Appellant. 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant United States Attorney (Michael J. 

Norton, United States Attorney, and Craig F. Wallace, Assistant 

United states Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before BALDOCK and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and O'CONNOR, Senior 

District Judge.• 

O'CONNOR, Senior District Judge. 

* The Honorable Earl E. O'Connor, Senior United States District 

Judge, United States District Court for the District of Kansas, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 1 
Defendant was convicted by a jury for possession of an 

unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 u.s.c. S 5861(d). 

Defendant appeals his conviction on the ground that he was denied 

due process when the prosecutor made an impermissible comment on 

his post-arrest silence. Specifically, defendant contends that his 

rights were violated when the prosecutor asked him why he did not 

"make a clean breast of it" and tell the arresting officers that he 

had been set up. In addition, defendant contends the trial court 

erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after a government 

witness identified himself as an agent with the Drug Task Force, 

thereby injecting drugs into the case when drugs were not relevant 

to the offense charged. 

We hold that the prosecutor's comment on the defendant's postarrest silence was a violation of Canterbury's due process rights, 

and the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and the case remanded 

for a new trial. 

Background 

Defendant Richard Lee Canterbury was a friend of an individual 

named Steven Enrici. Bad blood developed between the two men when 

a business deal turned sour and Enrici refused to pay Canterbury a 

previously agreed upon sum of money. Later, Enrici went to the 

police, claiming that Canterbury had threatened him and his family 

over the de~t. In the course of his conversation with the police, 

Enrici stated that Canterbury had asked him about acquiring a 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 2 
silencer. Hearing this, the police contacted Special Agent Thomas 

Lindsey of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. 

Enrici arranged a meeting between Canterbury and Special Agent 

Lindsey (posing undercover) to discuss whether Canterbury was 

interested in acquiring a silencer from Lindsey. Enrici had led 

Canterbury to believe that Agent Lindsey was a friend of his who 

made silencers at a local machine shop. The understanding between 

Enrici and Canterbury was that Enrici would provide the silencer to 

Canterbury in partial payment of his debt. 

Lindsey, Canterbury, and Enrici met in a parking lot behind an 

abandoned K-Mart. Lindsey asked Canterbury if he was "looking for 

something that muffles," and Canterbury responded that he was. 

Lindsey displayed a silencer to Canterbury, and asked Canterbury if 

that was what he wanted . Canterbury responded affirmatively, and 

told Lindsey that he wanted silencers for his 9mm handgun and also 

for his 20 gauge shotgun. 

The three men met a second time to consummate the transaction. 

After a brief conversation, Lindsey handed a silencer to Canterbury 

and asked him if this was what he wanted. Canterbury replied that 

it was. Agent Lindsey then gave the arrest signal and Canterbury 

was arrested by the surveillance team and taken into custody. 

Canterbury was advised of his Miranda rights at the time of 

arrest and again at the police station. At the station, he signed 

a written advisement form, indicating he had been advised of his 

rights. Canterbury responded to several questions posed by 

Detective Schuelke of the local police. According to Detective 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 3 
Schuelke, Canterbury made three oral statements. First, Canterbury 

was asked whether he had any more silencers; the answer to this 

question was no. Next, Canterbury admitted buying the silencer in 

question. Finally, Detective Schuelke asked Canterbury why he 

needed a silencer, to which Canterbury responded, "for protection." 

On the witness stand, Canterbury denied making this last statement. 

At trial, Canterbury raised an entrapment defense. He 

testified that Enrici owed him money and that Enrici told him the 

only way he could repay the debt would be to provide him with a 

silencer. According to Canterbury, he was not interested at first, 

but eventually decided to accept the silencer from Enrici as a last 

resort to collect on the debt. 

The jury rejected Canterbury's defense and convicted him as 

charged. 

Discussion 

Canterbury's principal point on appeal is that his due process 

rights were violated when the trial court permitted the prosecutor 

to ask a series of questions about his failure to tell the 

arresting officers that he had been set up. The trial court 

overruled Canterbury's timely objection to this line of 

quest i oning. Generally, we review rulings pertaining to the scope 

of c :::- ss examination for abuse of discretion. See United States v. 

Atwell, 766 F. 2d 416, 419 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U. S. 

921; United States v. Falcon, 766 F. 2d 1469, 1477 (10th Cir. 1985). 

However, where the error results in a violation of the defendant's 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 4 
constitutional rights, it is the government's burden to prove that 

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th cir. 1991), cert. denied, __ u.s. 

__ , 112 S.ct 1702 (1992); United States v . Massey, 687 F . 2d 1348, 

1353 (10th Cir. 1982). 

Canterbury's assertion of error concerns the following 

exchange on cross-examination: 

"Q: [by the Prosecutor] Did you tell Detective Schuelke that 

you did buy that silencer for protection? 

A: [Canterbury] No. 

Q: Did you give him any reason for buying that silencer? 

A: No. 

Q: Yet, before the contact by Mr. Enrici, you had never 

intended to buy a silencer illegally, isn't that correct? 

A: No. I wouldn't have been, no. 

Q: Why didn't you make a clean breast of it to Detective 

Schuelke right then? 

A: Because Detective Schuelke came at me with saying you 

have another silencer. Where is it at? I want to search your 

house. I want to search your car and this sort of thing. And, I 

didn't know what had happened. 

Q: But, didn't you feel that you'd been set up? 

A: Well, I didn't know because when they arrested me, they 

knocked Steve down also. 

Q: They knocked him down? 

A: Or took him to the ground. 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 5 
Q: Okay. But you knew you were in the Denver Police 

Department, correct? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Where people work who are tasked with enforcing the law? 

A: Yes. 

Q: And protecting citizens? 

A: Yes. 

Q: Why didn't you just say I 'm so glad this is over. I have 

been set up. You can't believe what I've been through and I want 

to straighten this out?" 

At this point, defense counsel objected on the grounds that 

the questioning was an improper comment on the defendant's postarrest silence. The objection was overruled, and cross-examination 

of the defendant concluded with this exchange: 

"Q: (by the Prosecutor] Mr. Canterbury, isn't it -- I' 11 

just rephrase it. Isn't it a fair statement that at no time after 

your arrest on August 29, either at the Burger King or at the 

police station, did you ever state to the police officer I've been 

set up? 

A: (Canterbury] No, I did not. I didn't realize it at the 

time." 

The use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's post-arrest 

silence violates the Fourteenth Amendment's mandate of due process 

i f the silence follows the administration of Miranda warnings. 

United States v . Massey. 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982) 

(citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982); Doyle v. Ohio , 426 

- 6 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 6 
U.S. 610, 619 (1976)). This rule is based upon a recognition that 

it is fundamentally unfair for the government to inform a defendant 

of his right to remain silent and then ask at trial that a negative 

inference be drawn from that silence. ~ (citing Anderson v. 

Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1980)); TM Doyle, 426 u.s. at 618-

19 (quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 182-83 

(1975) (White, J., concurring). Silence in the wake of Miranda 

warnings is "insolubly ambiguous" because it may indicate no more 

than an arrestee's exercise of the Miranda rights. Doyle, 426 u.s. 

at 610. 

While due process permits no comment on the defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence, a prosecutor may impeach a 

defendant's trial testimony with prior inconsistent statements. 

Charles, 447 u.s. at 408. "Such questioning makes no unfair use of 

silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving 

Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent. As to the 

subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not remained 

silent at all." Id. In Anderson v. Charles, the defendant told 

police he stole a car from a certain neighborhood, but testified at 

trial that he stole the car from a parking lot near the jail where 

he was held awaiting trial. On cross-examination, the prosecutor 

pointed out that the defendant could see the parking lot from his 

cell window, and suggested that the defendant's new story was a 

fabrication. The prosecutor asked why the defendant did not tell 

the same story at the time of his arrest. The Supreme Court found 

this line of questioning proper because "[t]he questions were not 

- 7 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 7 
designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation 

"or a prior inconsistent statement." Id. at 409. 

Application of the foregoing principles to the instant case is 

complicated by the fact that Canterbury did not remain totally 

silent, but instead made several statements to the police after he 

received Miranda warnings. This court has recognized that when a 

defendant answers some questions and refuses to answer others, or 

in other words is "partially silent," this partial silence does not 

preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process rights 

under Doyle. United States v. Harrold, 796 F.2d 1275, 1279 n.3 

(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1037 (1987). Therefore, 

this case turns on whether the cross-examination was designed to 

impeach the defendant's trial testimony by calling attention to 

prior inconsistent statements or, instead, was designed to suggest 

an inference of guilt from the defendant's post-arrest silence. 

The cross-examination in this case was improper. The 

questions were not designed to point out inconsistencies between 

Canterbury's trial testimony and his statements at the time of 

arrest. In fact, Canterbury's post-arrest statements are not 

inconsistent with his entrapment defense. The inference suggested 

by the line of questioning is that Canterbury was guilty because an 

innocent person would have presented the set-up theory to the 

arresting of::icers. The focus of the examination was therefore not 

on inconsistent stories as in Charles, but on Canterbury's failure 

to present his exculpatory story at the time of arrest. Because 

the examination was designed to discredit the defendant's trial 

- 8 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 8 
testimony by drawing attention to his post-arrest silence, it was 

a violation of his due process rights under Doyle. 

Because the error is of constitutional dimension, a new trial 

is required unless from the record as a whole we are convinced that 

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Massey, 68 7 F. 2d 

at 1353 . This court has delineated factors to consider in making 

this determination: 

"1. The use to which the prosecution puts the 

postarrest silence. 

2. Who elected to pursue the line of questioning. 

3. The quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt. 

4. The intensity and frequency of the reference. 

5. The availability to the trial judge of an 

opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial or to give 

curative instructions." 

Massey. 687 F . 2d at 1353 . The essence of this inquiry is usually 

the purpose for which the defendant's silence was introduced, and 

the quantum of other evidence supporting the guilty verdict. 

Harrold, 796 F.2d at 1280. As discussed above, the purpose of the 

offending cross-examination in this case was to discredit the 

entrapment defense by drawing attention to Canterbury's silence at 

the time of arrest. Because the success of the defense hinged 

almost entirely on the defendant's credibility, we are not 

satisfied that this violation of Canterbury's due process rights 

was harmless beyor 

not a case where 

a reaaonable doubt. Unlike Harrold. this is 

the defendant's theory is "transparently 

- 9 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 9 
frivolous" and the evidence of g,"" ilt overwhelming. ~ l£.:.. on the 

contrary, the evidence in the case was not inconsistent with 

Canterbury's entrapment defense, and the jury could have acquitted 

him had it believed his testimony. By using Canterbury's postarrest silence to impeach his testimony, the government attacked 

the heart of his defense. Cf. Massey, 687 F.2d at 1353-54. ~~e 

error cannot be considered harmless, and a new trial is required. 

Because the case must be reversed, our consideration of 

appellant's other point on appeal is unnecessary. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED. 

- 10 -

Appellate Case: 92-1028 Document: 010110157231 Date Filed: 01/14/1993 Page: 10