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Parties Involved:
Eulogio Garces Hurtado
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-13160

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EULOGIO GARCES HURTADO, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:17-cr-00176-TPB-JSS-2

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-13160

Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Eulogio Garces Hurtado appeals the district court’s denial of 

his motion to compel the government to file a motion for 

reduction of sentence under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure. After careful review, we conclude that the 

district court did not err in denying Garces Hurtado’s motion. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Background

In April 2017, a federal grand jury indicted Garces Hurtado 

on one count each of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a vessel 

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in violation of 46 

U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 70506(a), (b), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); 

and (2) possession with the intent to distribute five kilograms or 

more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction 

of the United States, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a)(1), 

70506(a), and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). 

Garces Hurtado agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy 

count. In exchange for the plea, the government agreed to drop 

the possession count. The plea agreement also stated that Garces 

Hurtado “agree[d] to cooperate fully with the United States in the 

investigation and prosecution of other persons.” And in return, the 

government “agree[d] to consider” whether his cooperation 

qualified as “substantial assistance” warranting the government’s 

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23-13160 Opinion of the Court 3

support for a lesser sentence. If any cooperation occurred before

sentencing, the government agreed to “consider whether such 

cooperation qualifie[d] as ‘substantial assistance’” that warranted 

filing a motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, 

a motion for the imposition of a sentence below the statutory 

minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), or both. And if any 

cooperation occurred after sentencing, the government agreed to 

“consider whether such cooperation qualifie[d] as ‘substantial 

assistance’” that warranted filing a motion for reduction of 

sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b). The 

plea agreement clarified that

[i]n any case, the defendant understands that the 

determination as to whether “substantial assistance” 

has been provided or what type of motion related 

thereto will be filed, if any, rests solely with the 

United States Attorney for the Middle District of 

Florida, and the defendant agrees that defendant 

cannot and will not challenge that determination, 

whether by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise. 

In accordance with the plea agreement, Garces Hurtado 

pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count before a magistrate judge. 

At the hearing, he acknowledged that he understood the plea 

agreement and confirmed that no one had “promised [him] 

anything different[]” than what was in the agreement “in order to 

get [him] to plead guilty.” On the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation, the district court accepted the guilty plea. 

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The district court then held a sentencing hearing. As 

relevant here, the government declined to move for a downward 

departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, though counsel for Garces 

Hurtado remarked that “there was some hope and expectation for 

a [U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1] adjustment.” Despite the government’s 

refusal, counsel stated that there were ultimately “no objections to 

present to the” court. Counsel maintained, though, that Garces 

Hurtado “d[id] expect a probable Rule 35” motion for reduction of 

sentence for substantial assistance. The government then stated 

that it would “consider future information for Rule 35 purposes” 

but that at that time, “there [was] none anticipated.” Ultimately, 

the district court announced that it would sentence Garces 

Hurtado to the mandatory minimum of 240 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by ten years of supervised release. The 

court later entered judgment imposing the sentence. 

Years later, in May 2023, Garces Hurtado moved to compel 

the government to file a motion for reduction of sentence under 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).1 He argued that he had 

provided substantial assistance to the government in connection 

with the prosecutions and convictions of others. According to 

Garces Hurtado, “an agent” told him that he would receive a 

sentence reduction for the assistance he allegedly provided. He 

1 Rule 35(b) allows a district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the 

defendant provides “substantial assistance” to the government “in 

investigating or prosecuting another person.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1). But 

the rule requires that the government first move for any reduction. See Fed. 

R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1), (2).

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argued that the district court should compel specific performance 

of the agent’s alleged promise. 

The government responded by arguing that Garces Hurtado 

had not provided substantial assistance. The government also 

argued that even if he had, the district court could not grant the

motion to compel the Rule 35(b) motion because Garces Hurtado 

had not alleged or shown that the government refused to file the 

motion for unconstitutional reasons.

The district court concluded that Garces Hurtado had not 

adequately shown that the government refused to file the Rule 

35(b) motion based on an unconstitutional motive. It therefore 

denied Garces Hurtado’s motion to compel.

Garces Hurtado then appealed.

II. Standard of Review

We review de novo whether a district court had the authority 

to compel the government to file a motion for reduction of 

sentence under Rule 35(b). See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 

1498–1500 (11th Cir. 1993). We also review de novo whether the 

government has breached a plea agreement. United States v. 

Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Discussion

On appeal, Garces Hurtado argues that the district court 

erred in denying his motion to compel the government to file a 

motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35(b). Specifically, he 

argues that he “was told by an agent [that] he would receive” a 

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substantial-assistance reduction for “provid[ing] information 

[about] several individuals” that led to “those individuals being 

convicted.” He claims that the agent’s promise was binding and 

that the district court should have “compel[led] specific 

performance” of that promise.2 

The government makes several arguments in response. 

First, relying on Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185–86 (1992),

the government argues that courts can review the government’s 

refusal to file Rule 35(b) motions only when there is a “substantial 

threshold showing” that the refusal was “based upon an 

unconstitutional motive.” Here, the government argues that no 

such showing was made. Second, the government argues that to 

the extent that Garces Hurtado alleges a breach of the written plea 

agreement, that argument fails because the government promised 

only to considerfiling a Rule 35(b) motion, not that it would indeed 

file one. And third, the government argues that Garces Hurtado’s 

allegation that “an agent” promised that the government would file 

a Rule 35(b) motion is conclusory and thus also fails.

After review, we agree with the government.

2 Garces Hurtado relies primarily—if not exclusively—on the alleged promise 

from “an agent” to argue that the government should be compelled to file a 

Rule 35(b) motion. But he also makes broad statements that he and the 

government executed a “plea agreement,” that he cooperated with the 

government as required by that agreement, and that the government never 

filed a Rule 35(b) motion. Because it is unclear which agreement Garces 

Hurtado relies on here, we address both the written plea agreement and the 

alleged promise from “an agent.” 

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b) provides that 

“[u]pon the government’s motion,” a district court may reduce a 

defendant’s sentence if the defendant provides “substantial 

assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 35(b)(1), (2). Rule 35(b), when standing alone, “gives the 

government a power, not a duty, to file a motion when the 

defendant has substantially assisted.” United States v. McNeese, 547 

F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Indeed, the 

Supreme Court held in Wadev. United States that, at least absent an 

agreement placing an affirmative duty on the government to file a 

substantial-assistance motion, courts can review the government’s 

refusal to file such a motion only when there is an allegation and a 

“substantial threshold showing” that the government’s refusal is 

based on an “unconstitutional motive,” such as “race or religion,”

or the refusal is “not rationally related to any legitimate 

[g]overnment end.” Wade, 504 U.S. at 185–86; see also Forney, 9 F.3d 

at 1502–03 (applying the Wade standard); McNeese, 547 F.3d at 

1308–09 (extending Wade’s reasoning to the Rule 35(b) context).

To be sure, though, Wade did not involve an allegation of an 

“agreement on the [g]overnment’s behalf to file a substantialassistance motion,” which is what Garces Hurtado alleges here. 

504 U.S. at 185. And other Supreme Court precedent holds that 

“when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 

agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 

inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” 

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). In such a case, 

according to Garces Hurtado, the agreement provides the grounds 

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to compel the government to file a substantial-assistance motion. 

See United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1527 (11th Cir. 1990) 

(ordering specific performance of plea agreement’s terms based on 

the Supreme Court’s holding in Santobello).

We need not address the interplay between Wade and 

Santobello. For here, neither the written plea agreement nor the 

alleged promise from “an agent” adequately shows that the

government unconditionally agreed to file a Rule 35(b) motion in 

the first place. Therefore, Wade applies. See Forney, 9 F.3d at 1499–

1500 (holding that Wade applies where the government retains 

discretion to file a substantial-assistance motion). And because 

Garces Hurtado has not shown that the government refused to 

move for a substantial-assistance reduction based on an 

unconstitutional motive or for an illegitimate reason, his

arguments fail.

To begin, Garces Hurtado has not adequately shown that 

the government made an unconditional promise to file a Rule 35(b) 

motion. Put another way, he has not shown that the government 

“bargain[ed] away its discretion” to refuse to file the motion. 

United States v. Grant, 493 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2007) (quotation 

omitted). Any reliance on the written plea agreement fails because, 

as in Forney, that agreement provided “only that the government 

would ‘consider’ whether [Garces Hurtado’s] aid qualified [as] 

substantial assistance and that this determination was ‘solely’ that 

of the government.” 9 F.3d at 1499. Garces Hurtado does not 

allege that the government did not “consider” filing a Rule 35(b) 

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23-13160 Opinion of the Court 9

motion for his alleged assistance, “which is all that it promised to 

do.” Id. at 1499 n.2. Thus, to the extent that he relies on the written 

plea agreement to argue that the government must file a Rule 35(b) 

motion, he is incorrect.

Further, Garces Hurtado’s conclusory allegation that “an 

agent” promised him that the government would file a Rule 35(b) 

motion is insufficient. Garces Hurtado has alleged neither when 

nor by whom the alleged promise was made. And his motion 

below was not sworn or accompanied by an affidavit or 

declaration. We have held in other contexts that “conclusory 

allegations unsupported by specifics” do not entitle a movant to an 

evidentiary hearing, much less to relief. Cf. Lynn v. United States, 

365 F.3d 1225, 1238–39 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that evidentiary 

hearing was not required before denying § 2255 motion based on 

“mere conclusory allegations”); Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 

F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2014) (same). The same principle applies 

here. Garces Hurtado’s conclusory allegation that “an agent” 

promised that the government would file a Rule 35(b) motion on 

his behalf lacks the required “specifics.” Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1238–39. 

Also, as mentioned above, Garces Hurtado confirmed that no one 

“promised [him] anything different[]” than what was in his written 

plea agreement “in order to get [him] to plead guilty.” Any reliance 

on the alleged promise from “an agent” thus fails.

Because there was no agreement requiring the government 

to file a Rule 35(b) motion, Garces Hurtado had to satisfy the 

principle announced in Wade. That is, he had to show that the 

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government’s refusal to file the motion was based on an 

unconstitutional motive or that the refusal was “not rationally 

related to any legitimate [g]overnment end.” Wade, 504 U.S. at 

185–86. Here, he has done neither. Indeed, he has disclaimed any 

reliance on Wade. The district court therefore did not err in 

denying his motion to compel.

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of 

Garces Hurtado’s motion to compel the government to file a 

motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35(b).

AFFIRMED.

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