Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00194/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00194-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Placer County Office of Education
Defendant
Rocklin Unified School District
Defendant
E. W.
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

E.W., A minor, By and No. 2:05-cv-0194-MCE-DAD

Through C.W., his Guardian

Ad Litem,

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROCKLIN UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT and PLACER COUNTY

OFFICE OF EDUCATION,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This case arises from a dispute regarding the provision of

educational services to a disabled child, Plaintiff E.W.

(“Plaintiff”). Plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, has

sued the Rocklin Unified School District and the Placer County

Office of Education (hereinafter collectively referred to as

“Defendants” unless otherwise noted) for alleged violations of

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §

1401, et seq. (“IDEA”). 

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2

Plaintiff’s dispute was originally adjudicated through a lengthy

due process hearing conducted through the auspices of the

California Special Education Hearing Office (“SEHO”). Through

the present action, Plaintiff takes issue with most of the

Hearing Officer’s findings.

Defendants now move for summary judgment on grounds that the

preponderance of the evidence supports the Hearing Officer’s

findings that, with certain very limited exceptions, Defendants

complied with their obligations under the IDEA in providing

Plaintiff with a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 

Plaintiff has filed a cross motion for summary judgment seeking

to overturn the Hearing Officer’s decision. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court agrees with the defense position and

summary judgment in favor of Defendants will be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff E.W. was diagnosed with autism on November 8,

2002, just after he turned two on October 12, 2002. Plaintiff

has further been diagnosed with apraxia, a neurological disorder

which affects the planning and production of speech. He

consequently suffers from deficits in academics, expressive and

receptive language, motor skills, social and behavioral skills,

self-help, and sensory processing integration.

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3

As a child with disabilities who resided within the

boundaries of Defendant Rocklin Unified School District

(“District”), Plaintiff was entitled to receive special education

and related services, through the auspices of the District and

co-Defendant Placer County Office of Education (“PCOE”), in

accordance with the provisions of both the IDEA and state law as

set forth in California Education Code § 56000, et seq. 

Defendants were required under these provisions to provide, at

public expense, Plaintiff with a FAPE that includes both special

education and related services meeting his unique needs. 

Plaintiff, through his guardian ad litem, claims that Defendants

failed to satisfy these obligations in the provision of such

educational services prior to the administrative hearing in this

matter held in June and July of 2004.

Plaintiff began receiving behavioral intervention services

prior to his third birthday from the Lovaas Institute of Early

Intervention (“LIFE”) as well as occupational therapy, speech and

language therapy, and music therapy from several other private

providers. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts

(“SUF”) Nos. 4-6). On September 12, 2003, Defendants convened an

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) meeting in order to

develop a FAPE for Plaintiff. After reviewing information from

Plaintiff’s service providers and his parents, the IEP team

offered Plaintiff a thirty day transitional placement in a

Special Day Class operated by Defendant PCOE. 

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4

That class, denominated as Strategic Teaching by Educators and

Parents (“STEPS”), primarily serves preschool-aged students with

autism spectrum disorders and operates for three hours and fortyfive minutes per day, five days a week, for a total of 18.75

hours per week. Defendants also offered Plaintiff related

services, including occupational therapy, speech and language

therapy, and transportation. (See Defs.’ UF Nos. 7-10, 14-16).

Plaintiff’s parents did not consent to Defendants’ proposed

FAPE as outlined above, and instead requested that the District

continue to fund the in-home applied behavioral analysis (“ABA”)

services Plaintiff was already receiving from LIFE, as well as

the other clinic-based services he was already receiving. 

(Defs.’ UF No. 20). While Defendants contended that their

proposed transition plan would permit the development of a

longer-term FAPE, no such plan was proposed before Plaintiff

filed a request for a due process SEHO hearing and a motion for

stay-put order on March 10, 2004. Through that request,

Plaintiff formally asked SEHO to order that Defendants continue

to provide the same services previously offered before the

September 12, 2003 IEP meeting.

By decision dated March 24, 2004, SEHO issued the requested

stay-put order requiring that Defendants provide weekly services

including 23.5 hours of ABA services, two hours of speech and

language therapy, and one hour for each occupational and music

therapy. 

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 Further references to the Administrative Record in this 1

matter be abbreviated as “AR”, and the District’s Exhibits will

be referred to as “DE”.

5

SEHO permitted the District to offer these same in-home and

clinic-based services through its own providers, and with one

limited exception (for music therapy services), Plaintiff’s

parents rejected the District’s ensuing April 2, 2004 proposal to

change from Plaintiff’s existing therapists to services furnished

through the District and PCOE. (See Defs.’ UF Nos. 22-32).

On April 23, 2004, a second IEP meeting was convened. 

District Staff met prior to that meeting to discuss potential

placement and service options meeting Plaintiff’s needs. During

the course of the meeting itself a total of seventeen annual

goals, with 51 shorter-term objectives, was developed that

addressed Plaintiff’s needs in terms of academic, behavior,

social, communication, recreation, self-help, and motor skills. 

According to the IEP Summary, Plaintiff’s parents participated

and provided input at the meeting. (See Administrative Record,

District’s Exhibits at pp. 1039-1081). Caprice Schweiger, 1

LIFE’s Sacramento Director of Operations, also attended, and a

report from Plaintiff’s Speech and Language Therapist, Brodi

Wetherbee, was received and considered. (AR, DE at pp. 1064-66).

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6

The service offer formulated as a result of the April 23,

2004 IEP meeting included the following: 1) placement in the

STEPS classroom for 18.75 hours per week, with related speech and

language as well as occupational therapy to be provided in the

classroom setting; 2) an ABA trained one-on-one behavior

intervention aide in the STEPS classroom for Plaintiff’s benefit;

3) ten hours of additional ABA behavior intervention services at

the STEPS school site, along with a corresponding level of

consultation/supervision services; 3) co-treatment between a

speech therapist and occupational therapist; 4) staff training in

ABA, generalization, and functional language; and 5) an extended

year (“ESY”) program providing for additional services in the

summer. (Defs.’ UF Nos. 43-44). The District contracted with

Advance Kids, Inc., a nonpublic agency provider of ABA services,

to provide Plaintiff’s ABA services as an augmentation to the

STEPS program . Id. at No. 46. The IEP team further proposed

assessments in Plaintiffs’ areas of suspected disability since

the District had never assessed Plaintiff’s abilities. Id. at

39-40.

Plaintiff’s parents declined to accept the service plan

proposed by Defendants, and did not consent to any of the

contemplated assessments, instead maintaining their previously

voiced preference that the District continue funding ABA services

through LIFE, along with the other private therapies already

being furnished to Plaintiff in the speech and language,

occupational and music areas. Id. at Nos. 52-53.

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 The SEHO Decision is included within the Administrative 2

Record at Pleadings and Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 2-47.

7

The SEHO hearing on whether or not Defendants’ IEP offers

constituted viable FAPEs thereafter commenced on June 8, 2004

before SEHO Hearing Officer Christian Hurley. Approximately a

month before that hearing, on May 13, 2004, the District made an

unconditional offer to reimburse Plaintiff’s parents for

educational expenses they occurred since Plaintiff’s third

birthday (on October 12, 2003) in providing plaintiff with inhome ABA services, speech and language therapy, occupational

therapy and music therapy. (Defs.’ UF Nos. 22-23). Consequently

the Hearing Officer’s ultimate decision, rendered on November 4,

2004 after eleven hearing days spanning a two-month period, did

not address the issue of reimbursement as to the period between

October of 2003 and April of 2004. The SEHO Decision2

specifically states (at p. 44) that the issue was neither heard

or decided, and that accordingly no finding was made on that

issue as to prevailing party for purposes of any subsequent award

of attorney’s fees.

The SEHO Decision nonetheless found that the original

September 2003 IEP did not meet the prerequisites for a valid

FAPE, since the IEP plan did not extend past a transition plan

for Plaintiff and did not specifically address some of

Plaintiff’s identified deficits. The Hearing Officer noted that

Defendants neither prepared an assessment plan in September of

2003, or scheduled another IEP meeting within thirty days of

their interim transitional offer as required by California

Government Code § 56325. (SEHO Decision, p. 18). 

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8

Consequently, while Plaintiff prevailed at to that issue (except

with respect to the need for a transition plan for the stay-put

providers), the Decision went on to provide, as indicated above,

that there was no prevailing party as to the remedy of

reimbursement given Defendants’ unconditional offer, as stated

above, to pay for the interim services funded by Plaintiff’s

parents between October 12, 2003 and the time of the second IEP

hearing on April 23, 2004.

The Hearing Officer went on to determine, however, that the

April 23, 2004 IEP did meet the requirements of a FAPE. The

decision specifically rejects both the procedural and substantive

violations alleged by Plaintiff with respect to that IEP. 

Procedurally, the Officer found that the IEP team did

appropriately review and consider information presented by both

Plaintiff’s parents and his current service providers. 

(Decision, p. 21). The Hearing Officer further found that

testimony presented at the hearing led him to conclude that any

pre-IEP meeting held on April 21, 2004 was for preparation of

draft goals and objectives, only. Id. The SEHO Decision points

to the fact that both the “Present Levels of Performance” and the

“Discussion” sections of the IEP Summary indicate, as stated

above, that information concerning Plaintiff’s deficits and

present level of performance were presented by Plaintiff’s

parents, by Caprice Schweiger of LIFE, and by Plaintiff’s Speech

and Language Therapist, Brodi Wetherbee.

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9

On a substantive basis, the Hearing Officer found that the

IEP addressed the scope of Plaintiff’s identified areas of need,

a subject on which there was little disagreement between the

parties, who all conceded that Plaintiff has deficits in the

areas of academics, behavior and social skills, speech and

language skills, fine and gross motor skills, visual motor

skills, and sensory integration for which special educational

instruction, speech and language therapy, and occupational

therapy was needed. The only area of dispute between the parties

as to the scope of needed services concerns whether Defendants’

failure to include music therapy in their IEP offer constituted a

denial of FAPE. The SEHO decision found that there was no

evidence establishing that Plaintiff required music therapy to

meet his benchmark goals and objectives in various domains. 

(Decision, p. 24). The Hearing Officer noted testimony from Jean

Crouse, the STEPS teacher, to the effect that the long-term goals

of music therapy were similar to those of speech and language

therapy, which were already addressed in the IEP by specific

providers. Ms. Crouse further testified that many activities

utilized in music therapy were already incorporated within the

STEPS classroom. Consequently, the Hearing Officer determined

that Plaintiff did not require music therapy, and declined to

find that the omission of such therapy either impinged on

Plaintiff’s right to a FAPE or entitled him to compensatory

services to remedy any past deprivation of music therapy. Id. at

pp. 38-39.

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10

The real area of contention concerning provision of a FAPE,

according to the SEHO Decision, rests not with the identified

scope of Plaintiff’s needs but rather on whether the particular

services proposed by the IEP itself were designed to meet

Plaintiff’s particular needs in providing him with

educational/therapeutic benefit. In that regard, after hearing

extensive testimony, the Hearing Officer rejected Plaintiff’s

contention that the goals and objectives identified by the IEP

were inappropriate. Specifically, the Hearing Officer found

Defendants’ witnesses, including Betty DiRegolo, Susan Watts,

Linda Hess, and Jean Crouse, to have been persuasive in

testifying that the seventeen goals and objectives were designed

to appropriately target his areas of deficit, and that said

goals/objectives were sufficiently measurable. (Decision, pp.

28-29). Moreover, the Hearing Officer, after weighing the

testimony, concluded that the classroom-based instruction and

therapy (in the form of the STEPS class itself as well as speech,

language and occupational therapy to be provided in the

classroom) were suitable in that noise and distractions could be

effectively minimized. (Id. at pp. 30-33). Finally, in response

to Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants’ staff were not

appropriately qualified to teach Plaintiff, the Hearing Officer

concluded on the basis of the testimony presented that such

staff, including the STEPS teacher, Jean Crouse, and Speech and

Language Therapist Linda Hess, were qualified and that ABA

services to be provided by Advance Kids would be effective in

meeting his behavioral intervention needs. (Id. at pp. 31-32,

34).

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11

Finally, with respect to Defendants’ Assessment Plan dated

April 23, 2004 and updated June 3, 2004, the Hearing Officer

found that neither the District or the PCOE had ever formally

assessed Plaintiff before, and that prior assessments performed

by LIFE were distinguishable from those sought by Defendants,

which must comply with the requirements of California Education

Code § 56230. The SEHO decision consequently found that the

proposed assessments were indeed necessary. (Id. at p. 41).

Plaintiff timely commenced the present action, which seeks

to overturn the Hearing Officer’s decision, on January 27, 2005.

STANDARD

The standard for district court review of an administrative

decision under the IDEA is set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2),

which provides as follows:

“In any action brought under this paragraph the court shall

receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall

hear additional evidence at the request of a party, and,

basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence,

shall grant such relief as the court determines is

appropriate.”

This standard requires that “due weight” be given to the

administrative proceedings. Bd. Of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson

Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982). The

amount of deference so accorded is subject to the court’s

discretion. Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307,

1311 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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12

In making that determination, the thoroughness of the hearing

offer’s findings should be considered, with the degree of

deference increased where said findings are “thorough and

careful”. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d

884, 892 (9th Cir. 1995), citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15

F.3d 1519, 1524 (9th Cir. 1994). “Substantial weight” should be

given to the hearing officer’s decision when it “evicnes his

careful, impartial consideration of all the evidence and

demonstrates his sensitivity to the complexity of the issues

presented. County of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing

Office, 93 F.3d 1458,, 1466 (9 Cir. 1996), quoting Ojai Unified th

Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1993) Such

deference is appropriate because “if the district court tried the

case anew, the work of the hearing officer would not receive ‘due

weight,’ and would be largely wasted.” Capistrano, 59 F.3d at

891. 

Because of the deference potentially accorded the

administrative proceedings, complete de novo review is

inappropriate. Amanda J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d

877, 887 (9th Cir. 2001). Instead, the district court must make

an independent judgment based on a preponderance of the evidence

and giving due weight to the hearing officer’s determination. 

Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 892. After such determination, the court

is free to accept or reject the hearing officer’s findings in

whole or in part. Ojai Unified Sch. Dist., 4 F.3d at 1473-73. 

Even if the review is styled as a motion for summary judgment,

the procedure is in substance an appeal from an administrative

determination. Id.

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ANALYSIS

Both sides agree that this case should be resolved through

summary judgment. (See Pl.s’ Mot. for Summ. J., 4:3-5; Defs.’

Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., 2:6-7.) Because neither side

has sought submit any additional evidence, this Court in essence

reviews the decision of the Hearing Officer, and the

administrative record, on an appellate basis. As indicated

above, it must use its independent judgment to determine whether

the Hearing Officer’s decision is supported by a preponderance of

the evidence as evinced by the record. Capistrano, 59 F.3d at

892. 

Significantly, as also set forth above, it would be

inappropriate for this Court to try the case anew, and due weight

must be given to the hearing officer’s decision commensurate with

the level of careful consideration demonstrated by the decision

itself. Capistrano, 59 F.3d at 891-92.

In Capistrano, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district

court’s adoption of the Hearing Officer’s findings following an

administrative IDEA hearing that involved ten days of testimony

and the consideration of extensive exhibits. Noting that the

Hearing Officer issued a twenty-six page single spaced decision

that reviewed the evidence in detail (59 F.3d at 888), the Ninth

Circuit described said decision as “especially careful and

thorough”, so that the district court, in reaching the same

conclusions, “appropriately exercised [its] discretion to give it

quite substantial deference”. Id. at 892. 

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14

Similarly, County of San Diego, another Ninth Circuit case,

approved substantial weight being accorded by the district court

where the hearing officer’s analysis was “intensive and

comprehensive”. County of San Diego v. Special Ed. Hearing

Office, 93 F.3d at 1467.

The Hearing Officer’s decision in this matter, like the

Capistrano and San Diego cases, was not only “careful and

thorough” but also “intensive and comprehensive”. Its forty-five

singled space pages provide a thorough application of the facts

of this matter to the relevant legal contentions made by the

parties. The Hearing Officer explained the basis of his

opinions, the inferences he drew from the testimony and from the

documentary record, and his rationale for affording greater

weight to certain evidence and/or testimony. On the basis of all

those factors, the Hearing Officer’s decision is clearly entitled

to substantial deference, as discussed in more detail below.

A. Meaningful Participation/Predetermination in Development of 

 IEP.

Plaintiff first argues that the procedural safeguards of the

IDEA were violated because the April 23, 2004 IEP was developed

without meaningful participation either from his parents or on

the part of his current service providers. Plaintiff contends

that Defendants’ placement offer was in fact predetermined in

advance at a “pre-IEP” meeting held between District

representatives several days prior to the April 23, 2004 hearing. 

Neither Plaintiff’s parents or the individuals treating him

attended that meeting.

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15

In W.G. v. Bd. of Tr. of Target Range School District, 960

F.2d 1479, 1483 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit recognized the

requirement for parental participation in the IEP formulation

process, and found that procedural inadequacies which “seriously

infringe” on the opportunity for such parental participation may

constitute denial of a FAPE. The W.G. court further recognized

that participation must be meaningful, and not pro forma only, to

pass muster under the IDEA. See id. at 1485. A predetermined

placement decision obviously would not satisfy this standard.

In the present matter, it is uncontroverted that some of the

participants in the April 23, 2004 met beforehand. While

Defendants claim that the purpose of that pre-IEP meeting was

simply to develop goals and objectives for discussion at the

meeting, Plaintiff claims that the placement decisions were in

fact made in advance, without parental participation and in

violation of the IDEA. In support of that contention, Plaintiff

cites to certain unresolved differences between members of the

IEP team as to treatment recommendations that he claims can only

lead to the conclusion that the actual decisions were made

beforehand. Plaintiff’s mother also claims that Jan Lucas, the

District’s Director of Special Education, told her during a

telephone conversation that the District did not fund in-home

programs.

Based on testimony received from Defendants’ witnesses (Jean

Crouse, Laurie Ferrell, Susan Watts and Betty DiRegolo), the

Hearing Officer concluded that only draft goals and objectives

were identified at the pre-IEP meeting. (SEHO Decision, p. 21). 

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 This factor distinguishes the case at bar from Deal, where 3

the court found an unofficial policy on the school’s part of

refusing to even consider, let alone provide, on-on-one home

behavioral intervention services. Deal, 392 F.3d at 858.

16

School officials are permitted to form such opinions and compile

reports prior to the IEP meetings, as long as a meaningful IEP

meeting is subsequently conducted where various options are

discussed and considered. See Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of

Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 857-58 (6th Cir. 2005). Significantly, the

Hearing Officer also notes that the IEP Summary itself discusses

information concerning Plaintiff’s deficits and his present level

of performance as presented by Plaintiff’s parents, by Caprice

Schweiger of LIFE, and by Plaintiff’s private speech and language

therapist, Brodi Wetherbee. The Hearing Officer concluded that

Plaintiff identified no information that he was unable to

properly present at the IEP Hearing. (SEHO Decision, p. 21).

Examination of the April 23, 2004 IEP Summary shows that

some five different placement options, including the provision of

in-home services, were considered by the IEP team before making

its ultimate recommendation that Plaintiff participate in the

STEPS classroom along with other individualized services as

discussed above. (AR, DE at p. 1063). The IEP Summary also 3

shows that Ms. Schweiger, who at the time Operations Director for

LIFE, Plaintiff’s primary source of in-home care, attended and

participated in the hearing. The IEP Summary further received

and reviewed a report on Plaintiff’s progress from Ms. Wetherbee

(AR, DE at pp. 1065-66), and the discussion section of the

document (Id. at pp. 1065-74) is replete with references to input

provided by Plaintiff’s parents.

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17

As Defendants point out, the fact that there was disparate

testimony from Defendants’ providers with respect to Plaintiff’s

particular service needs, and what measures were in fact

necessary, points not to predetermination as to Plaintiff’s

placement offer but rather to development of a collaborative

offer at the IEP meeting itself on the basis of information

gleaned from various sources, including Plaintiff’s parents and

his service providers. Finally, Plaintiff’s mother’s claim that

she was told that the District never funded in-home programs is

rebutted by the District’s May 2004 unconditional offer to pay

for such services.

The Court agrees with the Hearing Officer’s determination

that no procedural violation occurred with respect to Defendant’s

April 23, 2004 IEP meeting in that the record supports a finding

that all relevant information was in fact considered.

B. Substantive Adequacy of April 23, 2004 IEP

In order to show that they offered Plaintiff a valid FAPE,

Defendants must demonstrate that the program, placement and

related services they proposed were both designed to meet

Plaintiff’s unique needs and did in fact provide some educational

benefit to Plaintiff. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 206-07; Gregory

K., 811 F.2d at 1314. Providing an appropriate public education

in this regard “does not mean the absolutely best or ‘potentialmaximizing’ education for the individual child.” Seattle Sch.

Dist. No. 1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1996). 

///

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 Plaintiff’s need for music therapy is one exception. In 4

concluding that the objectives of that therapy were already met

by speech and language therapy as well as occupational therapy

being offered to Plaintiff, however, the Hearing Officer accepted

testimony from Defendants’ representatives in that regard, and

fully explained why he did not believe separate music therapy was

necessary in Plaintiff’s case for the provision of a valid FAPE. 

(SEHO Decision, p. 24). The Court will not reweigh those

determinations, which appear appropriate, through the present

appeal.

18

Rather, school districts are simply required to provide a “basic

floor of opportunity” that provides specialized instruction and

related services individually designed to provide educational

benefit. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-208.

After weighing the evidence, the Hearing Officer found that

the services provided Plaintiff were tailored to his individual

needs and did provide the requisite educational benefit. The

Hearing Officer’s determination that a FAPE was accordingly

provided is both subject to deference and supported by a

preponderance of the evidence in the view of this Court.

As indicated above, the parties largely agree on the scope

of Plaintiff’s needs, and even the type of services he requires

as a result of those needs. The crux of their disagreement, 4

both at the time of the SEHO hearing and through the present

proceeding, concerns the particular goals and objectives targeted

by the April 23, 2004 IEP as well as the providers best suited to

address Plaintiff’s educational requirements. Plaintiff contends

that the IEP’s goals/objectives are not adequately tailored to

his needs on grounds that some of the skills identified have

already been mastered, and because the goals are not sufficiently

measurable in any event. 

///

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In addition, while Plaintiff asserts that only his preexisting

in-home providers can provide the FAPE to which he is entitled,

Defendants counter that their own personnel are well equipped to

address his needs.

The SEHO Decision shows that the Hearing Officer carefully

weighed the evidence in determining that the placement offered by

Defendants satisfied IDEA requirements. First, with respect to

the stated goals and objectives, the Hearing Officer determined

that Defendants’ witnesses, including Betty DiRegolo, Susan

Watts, Linda Hess, and Jean Crouse, “persuasively testified” that

the seventeen goals and objectives sufficiently targeted

Plaintiff’s unique educational needs on the basis of information

provided by Plaintiff’s providers in the form of assessments,

written progress reports, and verbal information provided both

prior to and at the time of the IEP hearing. (SEHO Decision, pp.

28-29). With respect to addressing Plaintiff’s needs in the

areas of expressive and receptive language, for example, the

Decision states:

“The Hearing Officer was persuaded by the testimony of the

District’s and PCOE’s witnesses, along with the written

reports and information provided at the IEP meeting

regarding [Plaintiff’s] present levels of performance, that

the goals and objectives appropriately target his areas of

deficit and that these goals and objectives will be finetuned following assessment of [Plaintiff].

(Id. at p. 29).

Similarly, the Hearing Officer concluded that the goals set

forth in the IEP were sufficiently measurable, noting for example

that the criteria established provides that objectives will be

considered mastered when Plaintiff succeeds on 80 percent of

presented opportunities over three consecutive days. Id.

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These detailed and well-reasoned findings are given

deference by the Court. It would be improper for this Court to

substitute its judgment for that of the Hearing Officer, who

listened to some eleven days of testimony and argument, examined

literally thousands of pages of exhibits, and authored a

comprehensive and thorough forty-five page single-spaced

decision.

The Court similarly declines to revisit the Hearing

Officer’s determination that Defendants’ proposed service

providers were suitably qualified to furnish Plaintiff services

constituting a FAPE. After hearing witnesses from both sides,

the Hearing Officer found, for example, that STEPS instructor

Jean Crouse was appropriately qualified to provide instruction to

Plaintiff given her experience in teaching autistic children and

the training she has received in instructional methodologies

geared to students with autism. (SEHO Decision, p. 30). The

Hearing Officer further determined that any classroom

distractions could be minimized through the use of partitions and

velcro covers. Id. In addition, the Hearing Officer analyzed

the credentials of the District’s speech and language therapist,

Linda Hess, and found her to be both appropriately qualified and

able to administer therapy in a classroom setting through use of

the mitigating measures outlined above to curb distraction. Id.

at pp. 31-32. Finally, with respect to the provision of behavior

intervention services, the Hearing Officer found, also after

weighing conflicting testimony, that ABA services provided by

Advance Kids were suitably appropriate. Id. at p. 34.

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 The only compensatory education at issue was for music 5

therapy, and as explained above in footnote 4,the Hearing Officer

determined that the provision of such therapy was not essential

to a finding of FAPE.

21

In sum, the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that the April 23,

2004 IEP met substantive IDEA requirements is amply supported. 

The Court consequently defers to his decision.

C. Plaintiff’s Entitlement to Reimbursement/Prevailing Party 

 Status

After Plaintiff’s parents declined to accept Defendants’

September 2003 IEP offer, they advised the District of their

intent to continue funding Plaintiff’s existing private services

and to seek reimbursement from Defendants for their costs

incurred in paying for those services. On May 13, 2004,

Defendants unconditionally agreed to reimburse Plaintiff’s

parents for such costs. (Defs.’ UF Nos. 22-23). Although the

Hearing Officer did conclude that the September 12, 2003 initial

IEP offer did not constitute a FAPE (that determination was not

appealed and consequently is not addressed herein other than by

way of background), he did not find Plaintiff entitled to a

remedy for that shortcoming either in the form of either

compensatory education or reimbursement. Because Defendant’s 5

offer of reimbursement was made nearly a month before the SEHO

hearing commenced on June 8, 2004, the Hearing Officer

specifically declined to make a finding as to the prevailing

party as to reimbursement for the period between Plaintiff’s

third birthday and the second April 23, 2004 IEP. (SEHO

Decision, p. 44). 

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22

Plaintiff challenges that decision as erroneous.

In Shapiro v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d

857 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit considered whether the

definition of prevailing party, enunciated by the Supreme Court

in Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health &

Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 600 (2001), applied to the IDEA’s

definition of prevailing party status for purposes of assessing 6

attorney’s fees. The Buckhannon court held that a party is not

considered prevailing unless he obtains a judgment or courtordered consent decree affording some relief or creating a

material alteration of the parties’ legal relationship. Id. at

604. Rejecting the so-called “catalyst theory” for conferring

prevailing party status on a party who merely accomplishes an

objective represented by his lawsuit, the high court explained

that “never have we awarded attorney’s fees for a nonjudicial

‘alteration of actual circumstances’. Id. at 605-06. In

Shapiro, the Ninth Circuit extended the Buckhannon standard for

assessing prevailing status to the IDEA. Shapiro, 374 F.3d at

865.

Shapiro held that in order to be a prevailing party in the

wake of Buckhannon, a plaintiff must not only achieve some

material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, but

that change must also be judicially sanctioned. Id. Subsequent

Ninth Circuit law has confirmed that some judicial sanction or

“imprimatur” is a prerequisite for determining that a plaintiff

is a prevailing party under the IDEA. 

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 Plaintiff also argues that he is a prevailing party under 7

Cal. Educ. Code § 56507(b), the state law counterpart to the IDEA

provision discussed herein. He cites Santisas v. Goodin, 17 Cal.

4th 599, 621 (1998) and Westside Cmty. For Indep. Living, Inc. v.

Obledo, 33 Cal. 3d 348, 353 (1983) as support for that

proposition. Both cases are distinguishable; neither have any

connection with California’s special education law. Westside

addresses under what circumstances the California private

attorney general doctrine, as codified at Cal. Civ. Proc. §

1021.5, provides for attorney’s fees to a “successful party” as

that term is used in the statute. Santisas involves

interpretation of prevailing party status where a contract

between the parties provided for attorney’s fees to the

“prevailing party” in litigation arising out of that contract,

but did not otherwise define the term “prevailing party”. The

fact that the California Supreme Court in Santisas, adopted a

“pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has

realized its litigation objectives”, for use in determining

prevailing party status under those circumstances, does not mean

that the same standard applies to a state law statutory scheme

linked specifically to the protections afforded by the IDEA. 

(See Cal. Educ. Code § 56000). In the case at bar, this Court

finds the federal cases as discussed above to be persuasive in

interpreting prevailing party status both under the IDEA and

state law. 

23

P.N. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2006), citing

Carbonell v. INS, 429 4.3d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 2005).

Here, any judicial imprimatur as to Defendants’

unconditional reimbursement offer would necessarily stem from the

underlying SEHO decision. As stated above, however, the Hearing

Officer expressly declined to make any finding as to prevailing

party status on the question of reimbursement given Defendants’

offer to pay for Plaintiff’s private services between the time of

the initial IEP and the subsequent April 23, 2004 hearing. 

Without such a finding, there can be no judicial imprimatur and

no entitlement to prevailing party status under the IDEA.7

///

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D. Additional Assessment of Plaintiff

Defendants’ April 23, 2004 IEP offer, in addition to

proposing services responsive to Plaintiff’s unique educational

needs, also called for formal assessments of Plaintiff in his

areas of suspected disability. (Defs.’ UF No. 38). The District

had not assessed Plaintiff beforehand, and provided an Assessment

Plan outlining needed assessment in academic, cognitive,

communication, motor development, health, social/emotional, and

pre-vocational/vocational areas. (AR, DE at p. 3078). According

to Defendants, assessments were required in order to obtain

further information as to Plaintiff’s present levels of

performance and to accordingly make any necessary adjustments to

Plaintiff’s educational program. (See SEHO Decision, p. 40). 

Plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that assessments were

unnecessary because his then providers had already provided

reliable information about his current educational needs.

The Hearing Officer was persuaded by the fact that

Defendants had never assessed Plaintiff before. He further noted

that California Education Code § 56320 requires assessment in all

areas of suspected disability before special education placement

is determined.

In Gregory K., the Ninth Circuit stated that “if parents

want [their child] to receive special education under the Act,

they are obligated to permit such testing.” Gregory K., 811 F.2d

at 1315. 

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Moreover, under state law, the Hearing Officer found that the

assessments performed by LIFE, which consisted primarily of

observations and parent interviews, were distinguishable from

those proposed by Defendants in order to comply with the

requirements of Cal. Educ. Code § 56320. The Hearing Officer

also specifically found the testimony of Defendants’ witnesses to

be persuasive in establishing the necessity of the proposed

assessments. (SEHO Decision, p. 41). He found unpersuasive

Plaintiff’s arguments that the assessments were requested for

litigation, only. Id. The Hearing Officer’s determination as to

Plaintiff’s need for assessment is well-reasoned and entitled to

deference.

E. Transition for Stay-Put Services

 Plaintiff contends that the Hearing Officer erred in

finding that Plaintiff’s right to an appropriate FAPE was not

violated by the failure to incorporate a transition plan within

SEHO’s stay-put order of March 24, 2004. As the Hearing Officer

pointed out, however, the purpose of a stay-put directive is

simply to maintain the status quo of a student’s education

program pending resolution of a due process hearing, which in

this case commenced on June 8, 2004 following Defendants’ second

April 23, 2004 IEP proposal. The SEHO directive at issue herein

hence authorized the continued provision of the same services

that had been offered to Plaintiff, and in the same setting. 

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The only difference was that the stay-put order permitted

Defendants to offer the same in-home and clinic-based services

that had been provided through private providers to providers of

Defendants’ choosing. Defendants ultimately elected to continue

provision of services through District therapists and through

Advance Kids, a private agency which provided behavioral

intervention, rather than through the therapists that had been

treating Plaintiff and though LIFE, another private agency that

provided behavioral intervention services. 

Plaintiff argues that because the Hearing Officer did

approve the April 23, 2004, which included a transition plan for

the provision of Plaintiff’s in-home and clinic-based services to

services provided in a classroom setting, the Office must

necessarily have erred in not providing an analogous transition

plan with respect to the stay-put directive. In his Decision,

however, the Hearing Officer found that he could find no law

establishing the right to transition services for a change in

providers, only. (SEHO Decision, p. 19). Plaintiff has not

cited any authority which establishing that proposition as

inaccurate. Moreover, despite Plaintiff’s apparent argument to

the contrary, any transition with respect to the stay-put (which

provided for continued services within the same educational

and/or therapeutic environment) is fundamentally different from

the transition entailed in moving from Plaintiff’s existing

modalities of care to care provided within a classroom setting,

as contemplated by the April 23, 2004 IEP.

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 8

the Court ordered this matter submitted on the briefing. E.D.

Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

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The Hearing Officer was not remiss in finding that no

transition plan was necessary in preserving Plaintiff’s

educational status quo through SEHO’s March 24, 2004 stay-put

order. 

CONCLUSION

Based on all the foregoing, and following exercise of its

independent judgment after fully reviewing the administrative

record in this matter, the Court finds that the Hearing Officer’s

decision dated November 4, 2004 is both entitled to substantial

deference and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Consequently this Court elects to accept the Hearing Officer’s

findings in their entirety. Ojai, 4 F.3d at 1473-73. Inasmuch

as the Court consequently rejects the entire premise of the

instant lawsuit, which alleges error on the part of the Hearing

Officer, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Because

the Court grants Defendants’ motion, it necessarily denies

Plaintiff’s cross-request that summary judgment be granted on his

behalf.8

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: September 29, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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