Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01026/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01026-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Fresno County
Defendant
Margaret Mims
Defendant
Jeffery Frank Snyder
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFERY FRANK SNYDER,

Plaintiff,

v.

FRESNO COUNTY, et al.,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:12-cv-01026-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 12)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 12.) Plaintiff has declined 

Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction. (ECF No. 4.) No other parties have appeared in the 

action. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

The conduct giving rise to this suit occurred when Plaintiff was detained, awaiting

re-commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP), at Fresno County Jail from April 2 

through April 6, 2012. During this five-day period, Plaintiff was not permitted many of the 

privileges he had been allowed at Coalinga State Hospital, where he had previously 

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been committed and where he is committed now. To wit, he received no outdoor or 

indoor recreational opportunities; was not permitted to bring his personal property or 

clothing with him; had restricted use of the phone; was constantly cold because he did 

not have enough blankets; slept badly because the bed was less comfortable and the 

environs noisier than at Coalinga; was denied one of his medications, causing constant 

pain; and was unable to continue his sex offender treatment. He was also subjected to a 

strip search and some of his belongings were apparently seized. As a result, “Plaintiff 

suffered environmental deprivation and extreme isolation in Defendants’ custody.”

Plaintiff alleges that “inmate workers,” who were either “pretrial detainees” or 

“convicted criminals” received more considerate treatment than him.

Plaintiff attributes his treatment to Margaret Mims, the Sherriff of the Fresno 

County Jail, and to Does 1-50.

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that his conditions of confinement at the Fresno County Jail 

violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights. He

alleges that the strip search and seizures of his belongings were unreasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Plaintiff has failed to link his Fourteenth Amendment claims to particular defendants, 

and has failed to plead sufficient facts to support his Fourth Amendment claim. The 

Court will therefore dismiss the complaint, but give Plaintiff leave to amend. The Court 

explains its reasoning and describes the relevant legal standards below.

A. Plaintiff’s Status

Plaintiff was held at Fresno County Jail pending commitment proceedings under the 

Sexually Violent Predator Act. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600 et seq. Pursuant to this 

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statute, an individual convicted of certain enumerated crimes and meeting other criteria

may be civilly committed indefinitely for involuntary treatment as a “sexually violent 

predator” (SVP). CAL. CODE. WELF. & INST. §§ 6604-6604.1. The Act requires “treatment 

and confinement in a secure facility designated by the Director of State Hospitals.” CAL.

CODE. WELF. & INST. § 6604.1.

Although the state retains custody of SVPs in part because of the criminal behavior

that led to their incarceration, the object of their involuntary commitment is “not punitive

or penal in nature.” See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 368-369 (1997)(holding that 

civil commitment pursuant to Kansan sexually violent predator statute was not punitive in 

nature); Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 932 (9th Cir. 2004)(same for California’s 

Sexually Violent Predator Act); People v. McKee, 223 P.3d 566, 576-577 (Cal. 

2010)(same). Instead, the purpose of committing the offender is to “hold the person until 

his mental abnormality no longer causes him to be a threat to others.” McKee, 223 P.3d 

at 577 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-364).

In keeping with civil commitment’s non-punitive purpose, “persons who have been 

involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of

confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.” 

Jones v. Blanas , 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 

U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). Civil detainees awaiting re-commitment are entitled to still more 

solicitous treatment because their status as SVPs has not been formally adjudicated: 

although the precise conditions to which such detainees are entitled are unclear, “it 

stands to reason that an individual detained awaiting civil commitment proceedings is 

entitled to protections at least as great as those afforded to a civilly committed individual, 

and at least as great as those afforded to an individual accused but not convicted of a 

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crime.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932; see also Cerniglia v. Cty. of Sacramento, 566 F.Supp.2d 

1034, 1043 (E.D. Cal. 2008)(noting “confusion” about the conditions in which SVP 

detainees may be housed). 

Because of his status as a pre-commitment detainee, Plaintiff was subject to more 

considerate treatment than prisoners, and comparably considerate treatment to pretrial 

detainees.

B. Linkage

Under § 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 

participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons, 609 

F.3d at 1020-21; Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff may not attribute liability to a 

group of defendants, but must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” 

deprivation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988); see also 

Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Liability may not be imposed on 

supervisory personnel under the theory of respondeat superior, as each defendant is 

only liable for his or her own misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing, 588 F.3d at 

1235. Supervisors may only be held liable if they “participated in or directed the 

violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor, 880 F.2d at

1045 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-08 (9th Cir. 2011);

Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009); Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. 

Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 

1204 (9th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff should also attempt to identify Doe Defendants by name. “As a general 

rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” Wakefield v. 

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Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999)(quoting Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 

637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)); accord Lopes v. Vieira, 543 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1151-1152 (E.D. 

Cal. 2008). Although filing a complaint against a Doe defendant is not strictly prohibited, 

Wakefield, 177 F.3d at 1163, an unidentified defendant cannot be served until Plaintiff 

has identified him and amended his complaint to substitute a name for the pseudonym. 

See, e.g., Castaneda v. Foston, No. 1:12-cv-00026 2013 WL 4816216, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 6, 2013). If Plaintiff cannot identify defendants by name, he must distinguish 

among them by, e.g, referring to them as “John Doe 2”, “John Doe 3”, and so on, and 

describe what each did or failed to do to violate Plaintiff’s rights.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process

Like pretrial criminal detainees, pre-commitment civil detainees may avail 

themselves of “the more protective fourteenth amendment standard,” rather than the 

Eighth Amendment, when challenging their conditions of confinement. Jones, 393 F.3d 

at 931. Under this standard, “due process requires that the nature and duration of 

commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is 

committed.” Id. (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)). “At a bare 

minimum, then, an individual detained under civil process, like an individual accused but 

not convicted of a crime, cannot be subjected to conditions that amount to punishment.” 

Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 536). A rebuttable presumption arises 

that an SVP is being punished when he “is confined in conditions identical to, similar to, 

or more restrictive than, those in which his criminal counterparts are held.” Jones, 393 

F.3d at 932.

However, there is no outright prohibition on housing SVPs in jails or prisons, see 

Jones, 393 F.3d at 932, and some restrictive conditions may be justified on the basis of 

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“legitimate, non-punitive government interests,” such as “ensuring a detainee’s presence 

at [his commitment proceeding], maintaining jail security, and effective management of a 

detention facility.” Jones, 393 F.3d at 932. Moreover, “the actual treatment a prisoner [or 

detainee] experiences will depend upon predictions about him based upon his known 

history and the correctional officer’s experience with him in the institutional setting.” 

Cerniglia , 566 F.Supp.2d at 1043-1044. Detainees “whose history suggests a risk of 

escape or the likelihood of violence within the institution will be subjected to closer 

security than those whose history is free of violence and whose institutional history has 

been free of problems.” Id.

Here, because Plaintiff was a pre-commitment detainee, the Fourteenth 

Amendment standard applies to his conditions of confinement. However, the Court 

declines to analyze whether the restrictions Plaintiff faced over a 5-day period at the 

Fresno County Jail were reasonably related to the purpose for which he was confined 

there because Plaintiff has failed to link his allegations of mistreatment to particular 

defendants, specified the actions for which he holds each responsible, nor differentiated 

among Doe defendants in his allegations. Therefore he fails to state a Fourteenth 

Amendment due process claim.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s due process claims without prejudice. 

If Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must plead sufficient facts to adequately link 

defendants to particular conduct and specifically describe that conduct, and, to the 

extent possible, identify Doe defendants by name.

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D. Equal Protection

 Plaintiff claims his confinement at the jail was more restrictive than that of 1) other 

inmates at the jail; and 2) other SVPs at Coalinga, and that this differential treatment 

violated a fundamental right.

The Equal Protection Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be 

treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 

However, “[u]nless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or implicates a 

suspect classification, to meet constitutional challenge the law in question needs only 

some rational relation to a legitimate state interest.” Nelson v. City of Irvine, 143 F.3d 

1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 1998)(citations omitted). Even though SVPs do not constitute a 

suspect classification, heightened scrutiny may be required where fundamental interests 

are at issue. See Harper v. Va. Bd. Of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Police Dept. 

of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 92 (1972); Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 998 (9th 

Cir. 2007), vacated and remanded by 129 S.Ct. 2431 (2009).

Plaintiff appears to be claiming a violation of at least one clearly established 

fundamental right: a liberty interest in personal security and freedom from bodily 

restraint. See Youngberg , 457 U.S. at 315-316; Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 998. Accordingly,

heightened scrutiny may apply to his equal protection claims implicating these 

fundamental rights. Some differential treatment between a Plaintiff and other SVPs may 

violate equal protection if it does not meet heightened scrutiny. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 

998; Lombardi v. Sacramento Cty., No. 2:12-cv-1610 2012 WL 5906801, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

Nov. 26, 2012)

Where heightened scrutiny is not applicable, the challenged classification or 

differential treatment need only bear a rational relation to a legitimate state interest. 

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Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); Nelson, 143 F.3d at 1205. 

Under this theory, a plaintiff must allege (1) membership in an identifiable class; (2) 

intentional different treatment from others similarly situated; and (3) that there was no 

rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564.

Thus, where Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement do not implicate fundamental rights, he 

may only challenge the conditions of his confinement on equal protection grounds if the 

differential treatment is irrational or arbitrary. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276 

(1973); Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 998; see also Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th 

Cir. 2004)(finding that even if conditions of confinement do not violate due process, 

inmates may nonetheless invoke the Equal Protection clause to challenge arbitrary 

action).

The Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of housing SVPs in prison 

facilities. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001). California’s SVPA, moreover, 

only specifies that its SVPs are to be held in “secure facilities” and does not expressly 

prohibit SVPs from being held in jails. See Jones, 393 F.3d at 932; Munoz v. Kolender, 

208 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2002). Thus, an SVP’s equal protection claim 

based solely on his temporary confinement in a jail or prison does not appear

cognizable. See id., at 1144.

Here, the Court will not analyze the validity of Plaintiff’s potential equal protection 

claims because he has not sufficiently linked them to individual defendants, as required 

under § 1983. To the extent he challenges policies and practices at the Fresno County 

Jail, he has only alleged the existence of such policies in very general terms, and has 

not identified the individuals he holds responsible for creating, implementing, or 

enforcing these policies. To the extent he alleges that his differential treatment was due 

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to inadequate training or supervision, again, he has not identified 1) the individuals he 

believed were violating prison rules; or 2) the supervisory personnel he thinks knew or 

ought to have known of the violations.

Accordingly the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claims without 

prejudice. If plaintiff chooses to amend, he must plead sufficient facts to link his claims 

to particular conduct and defendants.

E. Fourth Amendment

Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts to state a claim that Defendants 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to a strip search or taking his 

belongings. 

Under certain circumstances, searches of detainees may violate the Fourth 

Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Fowlkes, 770 F.3d 748, 756-757 (9th Cir. 2014); 

United States v. Scott, 450 F.3d 863, 870-871 (9th Cir. 2005). Here, however, Plaintiff 

has provided no details about any searches to which he was subjected, other than 

conclusory assertions that the searches were unreasonable. Without allegations 

describing each allegedly unconstitutional search, the circumstances under which it took 

place, and the individual or individuals who carried it out, and the reason, if any, given by 

them for the search, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. See Hydrick v. Hunter, 669 F.3d 937, 

942 (9th Cir. 2012).

Accordingly the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims without 

prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff fails to state a due process, equal protection, or Fourth Amendment claim 

against any defendant.

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The Court grants Plaintiff the opportunity to correct the deficiencies analyzed 

above in an amended complaint. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 

2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff amends, he 

may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his amended 

complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007)(no “buckshot” complaint). 

An amended complaint supersedes the prior complaint. Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 

F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the 

prior or superseded pleading.” Local Rule 220. 

VI. ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's signed first amended complaint (ECF No. 12) is DISMISSED for 

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

2. The Clerk's Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights amended 

complaint form and (2) a copy of his complaint filed November 14, 2013;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days from service 

of this order, and 

4. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, the Court will recommend that this 

action be dismissed, without prejudice, for failure to obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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