Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00584/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-00584-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Gwendolyn Annette Mason
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GWENDOLYN ANNETTE MASON,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:12-cv-584-GSA

ORDER GRANTING ATTORNEY’S FEES

(Docs. 21 & 24) 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff’s counsel, Lawrence Rohlfing, Esq., filed a Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant 

to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) and an amended Motion for Attorney’s Fees.

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(Docs. 21 and 24). 

Gwendolyn Mason (“Plaintiff”) and the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant”) were 

served with both motions. (Doc. 21, pg.10, Doc. 24, pg. 3). The motion advised Plaintiff that 

any objections must be filed with the Court within fourteen days. (Doc. 21, pg. 2). In keeping 

with the role resembling that of a trustee for Plaintiff, the Commissioner filed a response to Mr. 

Rohlfing’s motion. (Docs. 20 & 23). See generally, Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 798 n. 

 

1 The parties have consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction. (See, Docs. 10 and 12).

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6 (2002). Plaintiff did not file any objections. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion for 

Attorney’s Fees is GRANTED.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brought the underlying action seeking judicial review of a final administrative 

decision denying her claim for disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income payments 

under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1.) This Court issued an order in favor of the Plaintiff and 

against the Social Security Administration . (Doc. 17). Subsequently, Plaintiff’s counsel was 

awarded attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) in the amount of 

$4,433.57. (Doc. 20.) In the Amended Motion for Attorney’s Fees Plaintiff’s counsel now seeks 

an award of attorney fees in the amount of $8,500.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b).

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(Doc. 24, 

pg. 2). In support of the motion, Plaintiff’s counsel indicates that Plaintiff was awarded 

$58,085.00 in retroactive disability benefits. (Doc. 21, pg. 3). Counsel is seeking approximately 

15% of the retroactive benefits awarded for attorney’s fees.

III. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to the Social Security Act, attorneys may seek a reasonable fee for cases in 

which they have successfully represented social security claimants. Section 406(b) provides the 

following in relevant part: 

Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under 

this subchapter who was represented before the court by an 

attorney, the court may determine and allow as part of its judgment 

a reasonable fee for such representation, not in excess of 25 percent 

of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is entitled 

by reason of such judgment, and the Commissioner of Social 

Security may ... certify the amount of such fee for payment to such 

attorney out of, and not in addition to, the amount of such past-due 

benefits .... 

 

2 Counsel initially requested $12,000.00 in attorney’s fees, but in the Amended Motion for Attorney’s Fees he 

requests only $8,500.00. (Compare Docs. 21 and 24).

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42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting 

provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits 

awarded; the losing party is not responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 

1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en banc) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 789, 802. However, the 

Commissioner has standing to challenge the award, despite the fact that the Section 406(b)

attorney's fee award is not paid by the government. Craig v. Sec ‘y Dep't of Health & Human 

Servs., 864 F.2d 324, 328 (4th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 

807. The goal of fee awards under Section 406(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent 

claimants while ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly 

depleted. Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in

Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 

The twenty-five percent (25%) maximum fee is not an automatic entitlement, and courts 

are required to ensure that the requested fee is reasonable. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808–09

(Section 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements within the statutory ceiling; instead, 

Section 406(b) instructs courts to review for reasonableness fees yielded by those agreements). 

“Within the 25 percent boundary ... the attorney for the successful claimant must show that the 

fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. at 807; see also Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (holding that Section 406(b) “does not specify how courts should determine whether a 

requested fee is reasonable” but “provides only that the fee must not exceed 25% of the past-due 

benefits awarded”). 

Generally, “a district court charged with determining a reasonable fee award under § 

406(b)(1)(A) must respect ‘the primacy of lawful attorney-client fee arrangements,’ ... ‘looking 

first to the contingent-fee agreement, then testing it for reasonableness.’ ” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 

1148 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). The United States Supreme Court has identified 

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several factors that may be considered in determining whether a fee award under a contingent-fee 

agreement is unreasonable and therefore subject to reduction by the court: (1) the character of the 

representation; (2) the results achieved by the representative; (3) whether the attorney engaged in 

dilatory conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits; (4) whether the 

benefits are large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the 

attorney's record of hours worked and counsel's regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent 

cases. Id. (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807–08).

Here, Plaintiff and counsel have entered into a fee agreement that provides for attorney’s 

fees in the amount of 25% of the past-due benefits. (Doc. 21-1, pg.1). The Court has considered 

counsel's representation of Plaintiff and the results achieved by counsel. Plaintiff's counsel 

indicates he expended a total of 25.2 hours litigating Plaintiff's case and he seeks only 

approximately 15% of the total amount of past-due benefits. (See Doc. 21, pg. 3 and Doc. 21-4,

pgs. 1-2). There is no indication that a reduction of the award is warranted due to any 

substandard performance by counsel in this matter. Counsel is an experienced attorney who 

secured a successful result for Plaintiff. There is also no evidence that counsel engaged in any 

dilatory conduct resulting in excessive delay. Thus, the $8,500.00 is not excessive in relation to 

the past-due award. See generally, Whiteside v. The Comm’n of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-cv-1337-

BAM, 2015 WL 36545054 (E.D. Cal., June 11, 2015) (granting $6,000.00 in attorney’s fees 

pursuant to Section 406(b)); Deardon v. The Comm’n of Soc. Sec., No. 1:12-cv-120-BAM, 2014 

WL 6612036, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Nov. 20, 2014) (granting attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 

406(b) in the amount of $16,474.00); Taylor v. Astrue, No. 1:06–cv–00957–SMS, 2011 WL 

836740, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Mar.4, 2011) (granting attorney's fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the 

amount of $20,960.00); Jamieson v. Astrue, No. 1:09–cv–00490–LJO–DLB, 2011 WL 587096, 

at *2 (E.D. Cal., Feb.9, 2011) (recommending an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Section 

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406(b) in the amount of $34,500.00). In making this determination, the Court recognizes the 

contingent-fee nature of this case and counsel's assumption of risk in agreeing to represent 

Plaintiff under such terms. See Hearn v. Barnhart, 262 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal.2003)

(“Because attorneys like Mr. Sackett contend with a substantial risk of loss in Title II cases, an 

effective hourly rate of only $450 in successful cases does not provide a basis for this court to 

lower the fee to avoid a windfall.”). 

An award of Section 406(b) fees, however, must be offset by any prior award of 

attorney's fees granted under the EAJA. 28 U.S.C. § 2412; Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, the 

Court previously ordered Plaintiff's counsel was entitled to EAJA fees in the amount of $4,433.

57. (Doc. 20). Therefore, $4,433.57 shall be refunded back to the Plaintiff.

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IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the fees sought by Mr. Rohlfing pursuant to Section 406(b)

are reasonable. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. The Motion for Attorney’s Fees pursuant to Section 406(b) in the amount of 

$8,500.00 is GRANTED;

2. Plaintiff’s counsel is ordered to refund $4,433.57 of the Section 406(b) fees 

awarded to Plaintiff as an offset for EAJA fees previously paid pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2412(d); and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve this order on Plaintiff, Gwendolyn 

Annette Mason, 300 Beech Street, #G4 Bristol, Virginia 24201.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2015 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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