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Parties Involved:
Daniel D. Rostenkowski
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Decided October 17, 1995

Nos. 94-3158 and 94-3160

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANIEL D. ROSTENKOWSKI,

APPELLANT

On Petition for Rehearing

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, BUCKLEY and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Supplemental Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: This case was argued on March 17, 1995, and decided in an

opinion issued on July 18, 1995. United States v. Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Between those two dates, the Supreme Court decided Hubbard v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 115

S. Ct. 1754 (1995), in which it concluded that the Congress is not a "department or agency of the

United States" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits making a false or misleading

statement to any such entity. In six counts of the indictment brought against Rostenkowski it is

alleged that he violated § 1001 when he made certain statements either to the House Disbursing

Office or to the Federal Election Commission. In order to avoid prematurely reaching

Rostenkowski's challenge to the constitutionality of § 1001 as applied to a Member of Congress, we

remanded those six counts to the district court to determine in the first instance whether any of them

survives Hubbard. 59 F.3d at 1302.

The Government now petitions for rehearing, urging the court, among other things, to

reconsider the import of Hubbard and to address the constitutional issues that Rostenkowski raises

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relating to § 1001. According to the Government, we would thereby conserve judicial resources and

potentiallyavoid the delaythat would result ifRostenkowskiwere to file anotherinterlocutoryappeal

after the district court rules upon these issues. We decline the Government's invitation to reach these

issues on the present appeal.

InUnited States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1957), the Supreme Court had held that the term

"department" as used in § 1001 refers to all three branches of Government. In Hubbard the Court

overruled Bramblett to hold that the term"department" refers only to a "component ofthe Executive

Branch." 115 S. Ct. at 1757-59. With respect to the term"agency" in § 1001, upon which Bramblett

was silent, the Supreme Court held in Hubbard only that a court is not an "agency," id. at 1757; it

"express[ed] no opinion as to whether any other entity within the Judicial Branch might be an

"agency,' " id. at 1758 n.3. By parity of reasoning, it would seem that the Congress is not an

"agency" as that term is used in § 1001. See id. at 1761 ("it would be curious indeed if Congress

truly intended [§ 1001] to work a dramatic alteration in the law governing misconduct in the court

system or the Legislature"). Still, the Supreme Court withheld judgment upon the question whether

any other entity within the Legislative Branch might be an "agency"; indeed, the Court remarked that

the House Disbursing Office, one of the entities involved in this case, "arguably [is] an agency within

the meaning of § 1001." Id. at 1759 n.5.

Thus the status of the House Disbursing Office remains unresolved. The Supreme Court

reserved the question in Hubbard, as did we in Rostenkowski. Nevertheless the Government now

suggeststhat the district court is precluded fromholding on remand that the House Disbursing Office

is an agency for the purpose of § 1001 because in United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640, 659 (D.C. Cir.

1995), we stated that Hubbard "narrowed the reach of § 1001 to matters within the Executive

Branch, a coverage consistent with both the common usage of "department' and that term's definition

in Title 18." That is an overreading of Dean. As the last-quoted clause indicates, we stated in Dean

only that Hubbard controls our interpretation of § 1001 with respect to the question of what is a

"department" of the United States. We had no occasion in Dean to interpret the term "agency"the

indictment alleged that Dean had made false statements to a "department of the United States," viz.

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the Senate Banking Committeeand we did not do so.

The Government errs also in suggesting that it would serve judicial economy for this court

to determine in the first instance whether the House Disbursing Office is an agency within the

meaning of § 1001. That question has never been briefed or argued in this court. As the Government

well knows, however, it was fully briefed and submitted to the district court before the Government

filed the present petition for rehearing. Moreover, while the issue is ultimately one of statutory

construction, it would not be surprising ifthe court found it necessarypenultimatelyto resolve factual

issues. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (holding entity that functions solely to advise and assist President is not an agency under the

Freedom of Information Act, and remanding case for district court to develop facts necessary to

determine whether National Security Council is such an entity). Therefore, contrary to the

Government's claim, there is little reason to think that we could economize on judicial resources by

resolving the question whether the House Disbursing Office is an "agency" within the meaning of §

1001 before the district court has passed upon that question.

The Government raises various other arguments for rehearing, none of which warrants

treatment in a published opinion. Accordingly, the petition for rehearing is

Denied.

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