Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03073/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francis Perez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 8, 2009 Decided April 23, 2010 

No. 08-3073 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

FRANCIS PEREZ, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cr-00013-JR-1) 

Jenifer Wicks, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the brief for appellant. 

Leslie Ann Gerardo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roy W. 

McLeese III and Mary B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GINSBURG, BROWN and GRIFFITH, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

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GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Francis Perez challenges his 

drug convictions on two grounds. He argues the district court 

erred by failing to order a hearing to evaluate his competency 

to stand trial, and he asserts that his trial counsel’s 

performance fell short of what is required by the Sixth 

Amendment. We reject both arguments and affirm his 

conviction. 

I. 

On September 16, 2006, officers of the Metropolitan 

Police Department executed a search warrant for Perez’s 

apartment and found him washing a white, powdery substance 

down his kitchen sink. The police discovered two kilograms 

of cocaine in the kitchen sink, on plates above the kitchen 

cabinets, and in a bag in the bedroom closet. The search also 

revealed acetone (a bleaching agent to whiten cocaine), an 

electronic scale, and approximately $3600 in cash. The police 

arrested Perez, and while in custody he admitted, “[T]hose 

drugs were given to me by a guy, [so] that I, sell it for the guy 

so I could help myself with something, because I can’t work.” 

Tr. of Interview of Perez at 12 (Sept. 16, 2006). 

 Perez pleaded guilty to possession with intent to 

distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in violation of 21 

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006), and unlawful 

destruction, alteration, or concealment of tangible objects 

with intent to obstruct a federal investigation in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1519. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Perez 

signed a proffer acknowledging that he had admitted his 

intent to sell the cocaine found in his apartment. Perez also 

waived the protection of Federal Rule of Evidence 410 by 

agreeing that his plea and the statements he made during the 

course of plea negotiations would be admissible against him 

in the event of a trial. 

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Against the advice of counsel, Perez moved to withdraw 

his guilty plea. His lawyer, who told the court the motion was 

ill-advised, suggested Perez had difficulty understanding “the 

evidence against him,” Tr. at 11 (May 27, 2008), and “certain 

abstract concepts” such as “constructive possession and 

aiding and abetting,” Tr. at 5, 7–8 (Jan. 24, 2008). He also 

speculated that Perez’s desire to withdraw the plea might stem 

from “a lack of understanding of certain basic concepts or . . . 

a psychological impediment.” Id. at 6. 

For his own part, Perez remained, in the words of his 

counsel, “very firm” in his desire to withdraw his plea. Id. at 

3. Perez told the court, “I was pressured into pleading guilty, 

and I wanted to take my case to trial. . . . I have a family, and 

I want to have a life with them. Six years [the low end of 

Perez’s sentencing guideline range] will be a lot of time. . . . I 

know that what they found in the house was not mine. It 

belonged to someone else.” Tr. at 12–13 (May 27, 2008). 

Perez also told the court he wished to withdraw his plea 

because the sentence under the plea would be “too much,” 

and, in any event, the cocaine found in the apartment was not 

his. Tr. at 8 (Jan. 24, 2008). 

The district court considered the matter during the course 

of three hearings before eventually granting the motion. Trial 

then began on May 28, 2008. Perez faced only the drug count 

because the government dropped the obstruction charge. The 

government put on evidence that the police found Perez in his 

apartment with cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and $3600 in 

cash, and that he admitted his intent to sell the drugs. The 

government also introduced Perez’s proffer and guilty plea. 

Acting against his counsel’s advice a second time, Perez 

asserted his right to testify. Just before he took the stand, 

Perez, frustrated by his attorney’s handling of the case, asked 

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the court to declare a mistrial: “My attorney told me last week 

that he wasn’t prepared for trial, that he didn’t have enough 

evidence and that he had not prepared for a trial. I need that 

evidence to be shown, and he doesn’t have it in his hand.” Tr. 

at 198 (May 29, 2008). Perez wanted his attorney to put on 

evidence that the cash found in the apartment was from the 

sale of his car and that he was leasing the apartment from its 

owner. In response, his counsel acknowledged that Perez 

“expressed a great deal of dissatisfaction with the way that 

this case has gone. He is very upset that certain testimony and 

certain items of evidence that he thought would be 

exculpatory have not been presented.” Id. at 195. The district 

court refused to declare a mistrial. 

Upon taking the stand, Perez testified that the cocaine 

was not his, but belonged instead to the owner of the 

apartment, who stayed there occasionally. He stated that the 

drugs found on top of the kitchen cabinets could not have 

been his because he could not reach that high due to his leg 

amputation. He also maintained that the money found in the 

apartment came from the sale of his car. To impeach Perez’s 

credibility, the government offered evidence that he had been 

arrested again for selling cocaine, even after pleading guilty in 

this case. 

 

The jury found Perez guilty, and the district court 

sentenced him to 97 months’ imprisonment and 48 months’ 

supervised release. We have jurisdiction over his appeal under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II. 

Perez argues that the district court should have ordered a 

competency hearing. The Due Process Clause prohibits the 

trial of a person who lacks the mental capacity to participate 

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in legal proceedings. See, e.g., Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 

375, 378 (1966). A criminal defendant is legally incompetent 

to stand trial if he lacks “a rational as well as factual 

understanding of the proceedings against him” or “sufficient 

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable 

degree of rational understanding.” Drope v. Missouri, 420 

U.S. 162, 172 (1975); see United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 

1333, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In judging a defendant’s 

competence, courts consider “evidence of a defendant’s 

irrational behavior, [the defendant’s] demeanor at trial, and 

any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial.” 

Drope, 420 U.S. at 180. 

In 18 U.S.C. § 4241, Congress created procedures to 

safeguard this right. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 

447 (1992) (“The Federal Government and all 50 States have 

adopted procedures that address the issue of a defendant’s 

competence to stand trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241.”); United 

States v. Weissberger, 951 F.2d 392, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 

Section 4241(a) requires the district court, on its own motion, 

to order a hearing to evaluate a defendant’s competency “if 

there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may 

presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect 

rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is 

unable to understand the nature and consequences of the 

proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 

18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Perez argues that his counsel’s 

statements questioning his understanding of the case provided 

such reasonable cause and that the district court therefore 

erred in failing to call for a competency hearing. We review 

the district court’s failure to order a competency hearing 

under § 4241 for abuse of discretion, United States v. Klat, 

156 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and find none. 

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Perez displayed ample understanding of “the nature and 

consequences of the proceedings against him.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 4241(a). He showed a familiarity with governing legal 

principles. For example, he probed the evidentiary basis of the 

government’s case by asking counsel whether the police had 

video tapes or audio recordings linking him to the crime. He 

knew it was the government’s burden to prove that the 

cocaine belonged to him, telling the court that the government 

had to prove that the drugs did not belong to the owner of the 

apartment. He asked for a mistrial, arguing that his attorney 

was unprepared and had not obtained evidence that Perez 

thought exculpatory. He also showed a clear appreciation of 

the consequences of conviction when he protested that the 

likely sentence under his guilty plea would keep him from his 

family for too long. 

Perez also demonstrated an ability “to assist properly in 

his defense.” Id. He actively participated in every stage of the 

trial. He even developed his own defense by arguing that the 

cocaine belonged to the apartment’s owner and that the 

money in the apartment was from the sale of his car. As both 

Perez and his attorney told the court, Perez discussed with his 

lawyer what evidence might support these arguments, and he 

was frustrated when it was not obtained. 

Perez tries to make much of his counsel’s statement that 

Perez might not understand the nuances of complex legal 

concepts. But neither the Constitution nor § 4241 requires that 

defendants have such legal acumen. See Caldwell, 543 F.2d at 

1348 n.63 (“The phrase ‘to assist in his defense’ we have said 

‘does not refer to legal questions involved but to such phases 

of a defense as a defendant usually assists in such as accounts 

of the facts, names of witnesses, etc.’” (quoting Lyles v. 

United States, 254 F.2d 725, 729–30 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). Even 

defense counsel’s vague suggestion that Perez might suffer 

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from “a psychological impediment,” Tr. at 6 (Jan. 24, 2008), 

did not create reasonable cause to believe Perez was 

incompetent to stand trial in light of his demonstrated 

understanding of the proceedings and engagement with 

counsel before and during trial. Although Perez may have 

held dubious legal views and pursued an inadvisable strategy, 

none of this provided reasonable cause for the district court to 

question his competence to stand trial. As the Seventh Circuit 

has recognized, “‘persons of unquestioned competence have 

espoused ludicrous legal positions,’ but the articulation of 

unusual legal beliefs is a far cry from incompetence.” United 

States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting 

United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 2003)). 

The statements of Perez’s counsel, considered along with 

Perez’s understanding of the proceedings against him and his 

ability to assist counsel before and during trial, preclude 

reasonable cause to believe Perez was incompetent to stand 

trial. The district court’s failure to order a competency hearing 

was not an abuse of discretion. 

III. 

 Perez argues that he was deprived of his Sixth 

Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. To 

prevail, Perez must show his counsel’s conduct was 

unreasonably deficient, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 688 (1984), and that “there is a reasonable probability 

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different,” id. at 694. When a 

defendant challenges the effectiveness of his trial counsel for 

the first time on appeal, as Perez does here, our “general 

practice is to remand for an evidentiary hearing” in the district 

court. United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909–10 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003). Remand is often necessary because the trial record 

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reflects primarily an inquiry into the defendant’s guilt or 

innocence, rather than counsel’s performance. See Massaro v. 

United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505 (2003). Nonetheless, we 

have no need to remand if “‘the trial record alone 

conclusively shows’ that the defendant is or is not entitled to 

relief.” Rashad, 331 F.3d at 910 (quoting United States v. 

Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1303–04 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). No remand 

is warranted here because the record conclusively shows that 

Perez cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance claim. 

Perez first argues his counsel should have sought a 

competency hearing, but we have already determined that the 

record shows there was no reasonable cause to believe that 

Perez was incompetent to stand trial. Because there was no 

reason for the court to believe a hearing was required, there 

can be no prejudice in his counsel’s decision not to seek one. 

 Perez next takes issue with the fact that his counsel 

sought the exclusion of the key elements of the government’s 

case against him—the cocaine discovered in Perez’s 

apartment, Perez’s admission that he intended to sell the 

drugs, and the withdrawn guilty plea—through oral, and not 

written motions. But oral motions to suppress are expressly 

authorized under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 47(b), 

which permits oral motions “made during a trial or hearing.” 

Because the rules treat oral and written motions the same, 

counsel was not deficient for offering an oral motion. 

Counsel’s remaining alleged deficiencies, assuming they 

were, in fact, deficiencies, could not have affected the 

outcome of Perez’s trial. The government’s evidence linking 

Perez to the drugs was simply too strong. For instance, 

counsel’s alleged failure to produce a lease without Perez’s 

name may have bolstered Perez’s defense that the drugs 

belonged to the apartment’s owner, and evidence that Perez 

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had recently sold his car may have provided an alternative 

explanation for the cash the police found, but these are, in the 

end, only collateral issues. There was no “reasonable 

probability” that if such testimony had been presented to the 

jury, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

 

IV.

Because the district court lacked reasonable cause to 

order a competency hearing, and because the trial record 

conclusively establishes that any alleged deficiencies of 

counsel did not result in prejudice, the conviction is 

Affirmed. 

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