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Parties Involved:
Raheem DaSheen Jackson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 23-10060

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

RAHEEM DASHEEN JACKSON, 

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00194-LGW-BWC-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 23-10060

Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Raheem Dasheen Jackson appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(l). He argues that the district court erred by denying his 

motion to suppress all evidence seized after his unlawful arrest. 

Jackson also argues that the government’s evidence, viewed in the 

light most favorable to the verdict, was insufficient to support his

conviction.

Jackson also appeals the calculation of his Guidelines offense 

level, under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1), based on the district court’s

finding that his Georgia convictions for terroristic threats and obstruction of law enforcement were crimes of violence, and thus 

could serve as predicate crimes to enhance the sentence for the instant felon-in-possession conviction. He argues that, because he 

pled guilty to both crimes under Alford,1 he did not admit to the 

conduct in the indictments. Further, he argues that because the 

Georgia terroristic threats statute is a divisible statute, and because 

he entered an Alford plea, the court cannot rely on the Shepard2 documents to determine which portions of the statute he was convicted under and must presume it was the least culpable offense, 

which is not a crime of violence.

1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

2 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005).

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23-10060 Opinion of the Court 3

I.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress 

evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s fact-finding 

for clear error and the application of the law to those facts de novo. 

United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2006). The 

court’s factual findings are construed in the light most favorable to 

the prevailing party. Id.

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence cannot be used against a defendant in a criminal trial where that evidence was obtained via an encounter with 

police that violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). However, “a warrantless 

arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

where there is probable cause to believe that a criminal offense has 

been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 

(2004). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the arresting 

officer at the time of the arrest.” Id. Unprovoked flight may serve 

as the basis for a reasonable suspicion that the person fleeing is involved in criminal activity. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-25 

(2000).

Here, the district court did not err by denying Jackson’s suppression motion. The evidence showed that police had probable 

cause to arrest Jackson because the facts, known to police at the 

time of the arrest, establish that Jackson (1) was a passenger in a 

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4 Opinion of the Court 23-10060

vehicle stopped, in a high-crime area, for having improper tags; (2) 

fled after police stopped the vehicle; (3) did not comply with the 

officer’s commands to stop; (4) discarded a liquor bottle; and (5) 

gripped his waistband in a manner that appeared as if he were concealing a weapon. See Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 152; see also Wardlow, 

528 U.S. at 124-25. Thus, probable cause existed for police to conclude that Jackson was engaged in criminal activity. See Devenpeck, 

543 U.S. at 152.

II.

We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction and the denial of a Rule 29 motion 

for judgment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict, and making all reasonable inferences and 

credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict. United States v. 

Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011). We will uphold the 

denial of a Rule 29 motion unless no reasonable factfinder could 

have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

We will not upset a jury’s decision to credit a witness’s testimony unless in the rare circumstance that the testimony is incredible as a matter of law. United States v. Isaacson, 752 F.3d 1291, 1304 

(11th Cir. 2014). “Testimony is incredible as a matter of law only 

if it concerns facts that the witness physically could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws 

of nature.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under § 922(g)(1), it is a crime for anyone who “has been 

convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for 

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23-10060 Opinion of the Court 5

a term exceeding one year” to possess any firearm or ammunition, 

in or affecting commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). To sustain a conviction under § 922(g)(1), the government must prove that: (1) the 

defendant was a felon; (2) the defendant knowingly possessed a 

firearm; and (3) the firearm affected or was in interstate commerce. 

United States v. Funches, 135 F.3d 1405, 1406-07 (11th Cir. 1998).

Here, Jackson only challenges whether sufficient evidence 

showed that he knowingly possessed a firearm. The government 

presented sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Jackson of possessing a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. See Gamory, 635 F.3d 

at 497. At trial, Officers Contreras and Altomare testified that they 

witnessed Jackson flee from Raymond Green’s car while gripping 

his waistband in a manner consistent with someone holding a gun. 

Officer Griffie also testified that he recovered a gun along Jackson’s 

flight path and that he believed the gun had been “recently discarded.” The evidence showed that the gun belonged to Jackson’s 

cousin, Brittney Johnson, and she testified that she left it in the 

glove compartment of Green’s car hours before Jackson was arrested. Finally, an ATF agent also testified that Jackson communicated with Johnson from jail via e-mail, and made jailhouse phone 

calls to another woman about the gun, instructing her to tell Johnson “not to report it stolen” and to “read between the lines about 

what that means.” The agent also testified that 3 weeks after Jackson’s arrest, law enforcement confirmed that the recovered gun belonged to Johnson.

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6 Opinion of the Court 23-10060

Although Johnson had trouble remembering the precise details of the day that Jackson was arrested, the jury still found her 

testimony credible and the testimony of Raymond Green less than 

credible. This Court does not reweigh the credibility of a witness’s 

testimony unless it pertains to “facts that the witness physically 

could not have possibly observed or events that could not have occurred under the laws of nature.” Isaacson, 752 F.3d at 1304. Jackson’s interactions with Johnson and Green were observable by her 

and did not violate the laws of nature. See id. 

Therefore we conclude that the district court did not err 

when it denied the motion for acquittal.

III.

We review de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction 

qualifies as a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. 

United States v. Diaz-Calderone, 716 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir. 2013).

Under the Guidelines, the base offense level for an unlawfulfirearm-possession offense is 26 if the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm that could accept a large capacity magazine and the 

defendant committed the instant offense after sustaining at least 

two felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled 

substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1). A “crime of violence” is 

defined, in relevant part, as any offense under federal or state law, 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that 

“has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 4B1.2(a)(1).

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“An Alford plea is a guilty plea where the defendant maintains a claim of innocence to the underlying criminal conduct 

charged but admits that sufficient evidence exists to convict him of 

the offense.” United States v. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1273 

(11th Cir. 2014). Because the collateral consequences flowing from 

an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary plea 

of guilty, a sentencing enhancement may be based on an Alford 

plea. Id. In Ramirez-Gonzalez, we held: “Under Georgia law, an 

Alford plea is ‘a guilty plea and places the defendant in the same 

position as if there had been a trial and conviction by a jury.’” Id.

(quoting Morrell v. State, 297 Ga.App. 592, 677 S.E.2d 771, 772 n. 3 

(2009)).

In United States v. Oliver, 962 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2020), 

we held that Georgia’s terroristic-threats statute, § 16-11-37(a) 

(2010), was divisible, “contain[ing] a list of divisible elements in the 

form of alternative threats, each one of which constitutes a separate crime.” And based on the indictment, we concluded that the 

defendant had been convicted “under the divisible portion of § 16-

11-37(a) that criminalizes a threat[ ] to commit any crime of violence . . . with the purpose of terrorizing another.” Id. We held that 

a conviction under this portion of § 16-11-37(a) had as an element 

the threatened use of physical force and therefore qualified as a violent felony under the ACCA. See id. at 1320–21.

Here, Jackson pled guilty under Alford to the violent crimes 

of making terroristic threats. Because the collateral consequences 

flowing from an Alford plea are the same as those flowing from an 

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8 Opinion of the Court 23-10060

ordinary plea of guilty, a sentencing enhancement may be based on 

an Alford plea. Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d at 1273. Further, because we have held that the collateral consequences of an Alford

plea are the same as those flowing from an ordinary guilty plea, we 

are permitted to look at the indictment when faced with a divisible 

statute, such as Georgia’s terroristic threats statute. In the instant 

case, that document indicates that Jackson was charged (and convicted pursuant to the Alford guilty plea) under the same subsection 

as in Oliver. And, as noted, we held in Oliver that crime constituted 

a crime of violence. Accordingly, Jackson’s argument is foreclosed 

by our prior precedent.3 

3 Jackson also pleaded guilty to felony obstruction of an officer three times, on 

two separate occasions. Jackson’s only argument against the use (as predicate 

prior crimes) of these obstruction convictions is that our law regarding the use 

of Alford pleas is erroneous but this argument is unavailing, as noted above. 

Moreover, Jackson has arguably forfeited any challenge to the district court’s 

reliance on the obstruction convictions. In his initial brief on appeal, his only 

challenge to reliance on the obstruction convictions is his Alford argument; he 

fails to argue that the obstruction statute that was violated encompassed not 

only crimes of violence but also nonviolent crimes; and he fails to address 

whetherthe obstruction statute was divisible or indivisible. Smith as next friend 

of MS v. Crisp Reg'l Hosp., Inc., 985 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2021)(issues not 

raised on appeal are deemed waived). Thus the obstruction convictions alone 

suffice to support the enhancement.

As an alternative holding (if the foregoing were not enough to affirm 

the judgment below), the district court stated that it would have imposed the 

same sentence, based upon the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors alone. United States v. 

Keene, 470 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding any guidelines calculation 

error is harmless where the sentence would be reasonable even if the district 

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23-10060 Opinion of the Court 9

AFFIRMED.

court’s guideline calculation was erroneous). Jackson never raised a challenge 

to this and thus any challenge to the sentence’s reasonableness is waived.

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