Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00157/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-00157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert A. Horel
Respondent
James Richard Porter
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES RICHARD PORTER, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

ROBERT A. HOREL, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

___________________________________)

1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG HC

ORDER REQUIRING PETITIONER TO FILE

AN AMENDED PETITION

ORDER REQUIRING AMENDED PETITION

TO BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on

January 31, 2008. (Doc. 1). A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the petition

may contained unexhausted claims and may also be untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 1 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 2

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. 

I. Exhaustion.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158,

1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v.

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full

and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the

claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504

U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669

(9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.

1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998). In Duncan, the United States

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion of state

remedies requires that petitioners “fairly presen[t]” federal claims to the state courts in order

to give the State the “opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of the prisoners'

federal rights” (some internal quotation marks omitted). If state courts are to be given the

opportunity to correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be

alerted to the fact that the prisoners are asserting claims under the United States Constitution.

If a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied

him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not

only in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. Recently, the Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 2 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 3

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not “fairly presented” (and thus exhausted) his

federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that court that those claims

were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000).

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must

make the federal basis of the claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of

federal courts, even if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882,

889 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would control

resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir.

1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to the fact that

the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the state and federal

standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

In his petition, Petitioner alleges that, in his direct appeal, he raised issues regarding the trial

court’s failure to give two limiting instructions. (Doc. 1, p. 3-A). He also alleges that he filed state

habeas petitions in the Kern County Superior Court and the California Court of Appeal raising three

issues of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel and one issue relating to the trial court’s

failure to conduct a competency hearing. (Doc. 1, pp. 3-4). Petitioner does not allege that he

presented these issues to the California Supreme Court. In the instant federal petition, Petitioner

raises three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and one claim that the trial court erred in

failing to give a limiting instruction. (Doc. 1, pp. 6-7). 

From the foregoing, it appears that Petitioner’s three claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel were never presented to the California Supreme Court. If Petitioner has not presented these

three claims for federal relief to the California Supreme Court, the Court must dismiss the petition. 

See Calderon v. United States Dist. Court, 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Greenawalt

v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 1268, 1273 (9th Cir. 1997). If Petitioner has presented these federal claims to

the California Supreme Court and simply neglected to inform this Court, Petitioner must inform the

Court which constitutional claims have been presented to the California Supreme Court and, if

possible, provide the Court with a copy of the petition filed in the California Supreme Court, along

with a copy of any ruling made by the California Supreme Court. From the instant petition, this

Court cannot determine which claims, if any, have been presented to the California Supreme Court;

thus, the Court is unable to proceed to the merits of the petition. 

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 3 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 4

At the very least, the instant petition appears to be a mixed petition, containing both

exhausted and unexhausted claims. Even though the instant habeas petition appears to state

cognizable federal claims, the Court would nevertheless be required to dismiss a mixed petition

without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the claims. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 521-22 (1982); Calderon, 107 F.3d at 760. 

II. Statute of Limitations.

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on January 31, 2008, and thus, it is subject to the provisions

of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

///

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 4 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 5

Here, Petitioner asserts that he was convicted on June 3, 1997, and that the California Court

of Appeal affirmed his conviction on January 28, 2000, and that subsequently the California

Supreme Court denied his petition for review. Therefore, direct review would have concluded when

the ninety day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired following the

date on which his petition for review was denied by the California Supreme Court. Barefoot v.

Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.1999); Smith v.

Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8th Cir.1998). Under normal circumstances, a petition for review

must be filed within forty days of the date of the Court of Appeal’s decision, and is ruled upon

within a relatively short period of time, usually no longer than ninety days. Thus, although Petitioner

did not specify the date when his petition for review was denied, it would probably have been in

Spring 2000. Petitioner would then have one year from that date in which to file his federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus. The instant case was filed on January 31, 2008, approximately seven years

after the statute of limitations would have expired. 

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). See

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (the Court held that a petitioner is normally entitled to one

“full round” of collateral review in state court without federal interference. While the “full round” is

properly in progress, the AEDPA’s one-year statute is tolled.). Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th

Cir. 2003) cert. denied by Welch v. Carey, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3930 (June 1, 2004). 

Petitioner asserts that he sought collateral state review in Superior Court and the Court of

Appeal regarding the claims in the instant petition. However, Petitioner does not indicate on the

form petition the dates on which those two petitions were filed in the state courts; hence, the Court

cannot calculate the amount of statutory tolling, if any, to which Petitioner is entitled during the

pendency of those petitions. 

Moreover, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling for state petitions filed after the oneyear statute has expired. Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); see Webster v. th

Moore, 199 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9 Cir. th th

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 5 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In the event Petitioner has not exhausted his state remedies, he may wish to withdraw the instant petition because 1

of the one-year period of limitations in which a petitioner must file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). As mentioned, the limitations period is tolled during the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending

in state court. However, it is not tolled for the time a federal petition is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121

S.Ct. 2120, 69 USLW 4473 (2001). 

 6

2003)(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended

before the state petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8 Cir. 1999) th

(petitioner fails to exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year

limitations period). Since the Court cannot determine from the information in the petition when the

statute would have commenced and when it would have expired, the Court is unable to determine

whether Petitioner is entitled to any statutory tolling whatsoever. 

Because Petitioner may have exhausted his claims by presenting them to the California

Supreme Court and simply neglected to inform the Court of this fact, and because Petitioner needs to

provide more information in order for this Court to make a preliminary determination whether the

petition was filed within the one-year limitation period, the Court will grant Petitioner leave to file

an amended petition so that Petitioner may include the specific dates on which state court collateral

proceedings were pending so that the Court can ascertain whether the statute of limitations has

expired with respect to Petitioner’s claims and whether those claims are exhausted. 

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner is granted thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended petition. Petitioner must inform the Court what claims have been presented to

the California Supreme Court as well as the dates when the California Supreme Court

ruled on those claims. 

1

Petitioner is advised that the amended petition should be clearly entitled “Amended Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus.” Petitioner is advised that the petition must set forth his claim(s),

including all the facts and arguments in support of said claim(s). With respect to any claims raised in

an amended petition, Petitioner must have presented those claims, either in his original state court

appeal or through a subsequent state habeas corpus petition, to the California Supreme Court prior to

raising them in this Court. It is Petitioner’s responsibility to advise the Court in his amended petition

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 6 of 7
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 7

of the dates when the state courts ruled on the issues Petitioner raised. The Court will not consider

the original petition. Petitioner’s failure to file an amended petition in a timely fashion will result in

a recommendation that the petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2008 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case 1:08-cv-00157-AWI-TAG Document 5 Filed 03/25/08 Page 7 of 7