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Parties Involved:
General Electric Company
Intervenor for Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 7, 1997 Decided July 18, 1997 

No. 96-1247

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,

PETITIONER

v.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

RESPONDENT

UNITED ELECTRICAL, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA,

INTERVENOR 

Consolidated with 

No. 96-1354

On Petitions for Review and Cross-Application for

Enforcement of an Order of the

National Labor Relations Board

-

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Dorothy Rosensweig argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for petitioner General Electric Company.

Polly J. Halfkenny argued the cause for petitioner United 

Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. With 

her on the briefs was Mary E. Leary.

Steven B. Goldstein, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the 

brief were Linda R. Sher, Associate General Counsel, Aileen 

A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel and Margaret G. Neigus, Supervisory Attorney.

Polly J. Halfkenny argued the cause for intervenor United 

Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America. With 

her on the brief was Mary E. Leary.

Harold P. Coxson, Jr. filed the brief for amicus curiae 

Council on Labor Law Equality.

Before: GINSBURG, SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: In these consolidated petitions for 

review, we consider several National Labor Relations Board 

rulings arising out of a union representation election and its 

aftermath. The NLRB ruled that certain statements made 

by the company during the campaign and a post-election gift 

to employees violated the National Labor Relations Act. The 

company's firing of a pro-Union employee, the Board ruled, 

did not violate the Act. Concluding that some of the company's campaign statements were protected speech, we grant 

the company's petition in part and deny it in part. We deny 

the company's petition with respect to the post-election gift to 

employees, as well as the Union's petition regarding the 

company's firing of the pro-Union employee.

I

For the past fifty years, General Electric and the United 

Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America have had 

a national collective bargaining agreement that applies to any 

newly organized bargaining unit, provided that the new local 

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ratifies the agreement within 30 days. New locals have 

always ratified the National Agreement. Among other 

things, the National Agreement allows ten holidays per year 

and establishes procedures for determining vacation pay. All 

hours worked in excess of eight hours per day or forty hours 

per week are paid at time-and-one-half, as is Saturday work. 

Sunday work is paid at double time.

General Electric operates a plastics plant in Washington, 

West Virginia. The company gives its Washington employees 

eleven holidays a year and provides for a two percent vacation bonus. Production and maintenance employees work in 

twelve-hour shifts. The company pays overtime for hours in 

excess of forty per week and for all Sunday work; Saturday 

work is paid at straight time.

In 1989, the Electrical Workers began a campaign to 

organize the Washington plant's production and maintenance 

employees. Conducting their own campaign against the Union, plant supervisors met with workers, gave speeches about 

the effect of unionization on the plant, and distributed handbills. The company warned that if the Union won the election, employees would lose their eleventh holiday, two percent 

vacation pay, and twelve-hour shifts, and might face temporary layoffs.

After losing the March 1992 election by a considerable 

margin, the Union filed objections and an unfair labor practice charge. Almost two years later, the company fired a 

vocal Union supporter, Fernando DaCosta, and the Union 

responded with a second unfair labor practice charge. Following a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge found that 

General Electric had violated section 8(a)(1) of the National 

Labor Relations Act by threatening employees with loss of 

benefits and changes in conditions of employment, discontinuance of investment in the plant, and temporary layoffs, as 

well as by giving benefits to employees while election objections were pending and warning employees against protesting 

or discussing DaCosta's termination. Finding that the General Counsel failed to show that GE fired DaCosta because of 

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nation allegations. With only minor changes, the NLRB 

adopted the ALJ's findings.

GE petitions for review of the Board's finding of multiple 

section 8(a)(1) violations. The Union petitions for review of 

the dismissal of the unfair labor practice charges stemming 

from DaCosta's termination. We uphold the Board unless its 

findings are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,

340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951); Allegheny Ludlum Corp. v. NLRB,

104 F.3d 1354, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1997), or unless the Board 

" 'acted arbitrarily or otherwise erred in applying established 

law to the facts.' " Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d at 1358 

(quoting International Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. 

& Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1532, 1536 (D.C. Cir. 

1994)). Although our review is deferential, we are not merely 

"the Board's enforcement arm. It is our responsibility to 

examine carefully both the Board's findings and its reasoning...." Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 42 

(D.C. Cir. 1980). In particular, we must take account of 

anything in the record that "fairly detracts" from the weight 

of the evidence supporting the Board's conclusion. Universal 

Camera, 340 U.S. at 488.

II

Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA prohibits employers from 

"interfer[ing] with, restrain[ing], or coerc[ing] employees in 

the exercise of the[ir] rights" to form, join, or assist unions. 

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1994); see also id. § 157 (1994) (guaranteeing employees the right to organize). While section 

(8)(a)(1) thus protects employees' associational rights, section 

8(c) protects employers' rights to express their views as long 

as such expression "contains no threat of reprisal or force or 

promise of benefit." Id. § 158(c). Addressing the relationship between sections 8(a)(1) and 8(c), the Supreme Court in 

NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969), held 

that employers' rights to speak freely on the effects of 

unionization cannot trump employees' rights to unionize:

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[A]n employer is free to communicate to his employees 

any of his general views about unionism or any of his 

specific views about a particular union, so long as the 

communications do not contain a "threat of reprisal or 

force or promise of benefit." He may even make a 

prediction as to the precise effects he believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however, 

the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of 

objective fact to convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable consequences beyond his control or to 

convey a management decision already arrived at to close 

the plant in case of unionization. If there is any implication that an employer may or may not take action solely 

on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic 

necessities and known only to him, the statement is no 

longer a reasonable prediction based on available facts 

but a threat of retaliation based on misrepresentation 

and coercion, and as such without the protection of the 

First Amendment.

See also Laborers' Dist. Council of Georgia and South Carolina v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 868, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (employers' 

opinions and predictions of unfavorable consequences will not 

violate Act "if they have some reasonable basis in fact and are 

in fact predictions or opinions and not veiled threats of 

employer retaliation").

Two of our post-Gissel cases, Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. 

NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Allegheny Ludlum, 

provide the framework for analyzing the statements at issue 

in this case. Crown Cork & Seal arose from the Steelworkers' attempt to organize Crown's Vineland, New Jersey, 

manufacturing plant. The Steelworkers had a Master Agreement that automatically extended to newly unionized Crown 

plants. The Master Agreement included a wage scale higher 

than Vineland's. During its campaign to organize the Vineland plant, the Union circulated a flyer raising the issue of job 

security. The company responded with a letter of its own: 

"WE WILL NOT BRING WORK INTO THIS PLANT

AND OUR CUSTOMER WILL SEEK OTHER ALTERNATIVESIF THAT WORK CAN'T BE DONE AT A REAUSCA Case #96-1354 Document #285233 Filed: 07/18/1997 Page 5 of 20
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SONABLE COST...." Crown Cork & Seal, 36 F.3d at 

1133. "NO union," the letter concluded, "can keep you 

employed and NO union can guarantee you a paycheck every 

week if we cannot provide our customers with the high 

quality products at competitive prices they have come to 

expect from us here at Vineland." Id. In a separate statement, Crown informed its employees that pending the election, it would suspend plans to transfer two projects to the 

Vineland plant and that the projects would be "re-evaluated

[after the election] because they are very sensitive to increased costs." Id. at 1136. The company also told employees that if the Union won the election, they could no longer 

participate in the company's retirement thrift plan because it 

was not provided for in the Master Agreement. Id. at 1140.

The NLRB ruled that the letter, as well as the company's 

statements that it would suspend certain projects pending the 

outcome of the election and that it would discontinue the 

retirement thrift plan if the union won, violated section 8(a)(1) 

of the NLRA. Vacating the Board's decision, we held first 

that the company's letter could not be read as threatening to 

close the plant but was instead "defensive," designed to 

respond to the Union's effort to "seize the job security issue 

as its own." Id. at 1134. As to the company's statement that 

it would suspend certain projects pending the election, we 

concluded, relying on Gissel, that the statement did no more 

than predict "a standard company response to increased 

prices." Id. at 1139. And although finding the Master 

Agreement ambiguous regarding whether Crown's Vineland 

employees could retain their retirement benefits, we concluded that because evidence of past practice supported Crown's 

reading of the Agreementno Crown plant had retained a 

retirement plan after unionizationthe company's statement 

that it would take away the retirement thrift plan was a 

" 'reasonable' one 'based on available facts,' and [could] not be 

the basis of an unfair labor practice." Id. at 1141 (quoting 

Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618).

Attempting to stave off unionization of its salaried employees, the employer in Allegheny Ludlum stated in a newsletter 

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that despite poor business conditions, layoffs of unionized 

employees, and a recent strike, it had always "found ways to 

manage the situation without resorting to layoffs of its salaried employees." Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d at 1357. The 

newsletter included a quotation from an employee: "if it came 

to a layoff due to lack of work, the first people to be laid off 

would be those in the Union." Id. A cartoon depicted a 

Union rat pulling a blanket marked "Secure Job at AL" off a 

sleeping Allegheny Ludlum worker. Id.

We agreed with the Board that the statements and cartoon 

"combined to create an unlawful threat that the Company 

would retaliate against salaried employees if they elected to 

be represented by the Union." Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d 

at 1364. We pointed out that Crown Cork and a similar case, 

Somerset Welding & Steel, Inc. v. NLRB, 987 F.2d 777 (D.C. 

Cir. 1993), presented a very different situation, i.e., "employer 

statements that linked unionization to the loss of job security 

by referring expressly to factors outside of the employer's 

controlunion pressure to increase wages and market conditions." Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d at 1367. As we observed, "[t]he employers in those two cases were communicating to employees their prediction that if the employees voted 

to unionize, the companies would be obliged to increase wages 

for the newly-unionized employees, and this in turn would 

damage the employers' ability to attract business in light of 

market conditions." Id. In contrast, because Allegheny 

Ludlum's predictions of decreased job security were not 

"linked" to objective facts beyond the employer's control, we 

viewed them as threats unprotected by the Act.

With Gissel, Crown Cork, and Allegheny Ludlum in mind, 

we turn to the statements at issue in this case. We ask 

whether GE based its predictions about the effect of unionization on objective facts about consequences beyond its control, 

Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618; Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1137, or 

whether its predictions were unrelated to economic necessity, 

thus amounting to threats of reprisal unprotected by the 

NLRA. Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d at 1367.

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Eleventh Holiday and Vacation Pay

Several months before the election, the Washington plant's 

general manager, Robert Smith, held a number of meetings 

with the plant's production and maintenance workers. At 

each meeting, Smith used transparencies stating, "GE-UE 

National Agreement would automatically change the following 

practices ... Eliminate 11th Holiday. Eliminate 2% Vacation 

Pay. Change overtime and nightshift premiums. Change all 

local pay practices to conform to National Agreement." J.A. 

591. Terry Hindmarch, the company's labor relations officer, 

also held employee meetings where he too displayed transparencies to show differences between the National Agreement 

and practices at the Washington plant. One of his transparencies included a reference to "HolidaysAutomatically Lose 

One" and "2% Vacation Payment." J.A. 768.

Finding that GE failed to show that the loss of the extra 

holiday or the two percent vacation pay was "likely to result 

from negotiations with the Union or that the GE-UE [National] Agreement mandated such losses and changes," the 

ALJ concluded that Smith's and Hindmarch's statements 

violated the Act. J.A. 73-74. We cannot square this conclusion with the record. A product of bargaining between the 

Union and GE, the National Agreement provides for ten 

holidays, one fewer than the Washington plant allows, and 

makes no provision for a two percent vacation bonus. Moreover, the Agreement automatically kicks in after ratification 

by a new local, and the ALJ found that new locals always 

ratify the Agreement. In one of its handbills, the Union even 

conceded that employees would lose their two percent vacation pay under the National Agreement. See J.A. 645. While 

the Agreement provides for "local understandings," such understandings come about only after formal negotiations between the Union local and management, and a Union representative conceded that General Electric has no obligation to 

negotiate local understandings. J.A. 1346-47 (Test. of Stephen Tormey). GE's predictions that employees would lose 

their eleventh holiday and two percent vacation pay if they 

came under the National Agreement were thus grounded in 

objective fact. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618; Crown Cork, 36 

F.3d at 1137.

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Smith's Speech

Shortly before the election, Robert Smith held several 

more meetings with the plant's production and maintenance 

employees, at which he read a prepared speech stating in 

part:

[O]ur business (like many others) has been rocked by a 

world-wide recession that has made winning even tougher. When we started taking these [revitalization] actions 

last year, I said that change would not be easy and not 

everything we did would be perfect, but together we 

would work to fix our mistakes. I believe we can still do 

that and do it without the UE. A union that doesn't, in 

my opinion, understand our business or what we believe 

in here.

The choice we make this (next) week will have a 

profound impact on our future. The people who buy our 

products, our sales force that sells our products and the 

company that supplies the investment dollars for our 

growth are all watching what happens here. We need to 

send them a signal, a clear signal that tells them they can 

count on us to be a dependable supplier, committed to 

continuous improvement without the threat of possible 

strikes. The best way to send this signal is to vote "NO" 

on Thursday and Friday.

In every difficult situation there are lessons to be 

learned. This long campaign has taught us all the need 

for more open, straightforward communications and the 

necessity to be responsive. We must learn to work 

together and get everyone involved in the business. I'm 

afraid if we can't do thatwe won't have a business here 

ten years from now.

....

The Union promises the comfort of the past and a 

return to a world that no longer exists in the plastics 

industry. If you choose the UE, we could be heading in 

the wrong direction.

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I believe there is tremendous potential in this organization and there is nothing we cannot do together. But 

if the UE divides our forces, I honestly do not know what 

could happen to this site.

J.A. 726, 727-29. Finding this speech to have sent a message 

that choosing the Union "would result in disharmony among 

the Washington plant employees and cause GE to shut [the 

plant] down," the ALJ ruled that the speech violated the Act. 

J.A. 75. According to the ALJ, Smith "warned the listening 

employees that they 'must learn to work together and get 

everyone involved in the business' or 'we won't have a business here ten years from now.' " Id. (emphasis added). The 

ALJ further concluded that Smith's "warning" that GE would 

withhold further investment in the plant if employees voted in 

the Union "raise[d] the spectre of a loss of jobs." Id.

(emphasis added).

Again, we cannot square the ALJ's conclusions with the 

record. Smith did not "warn" employees that General Electric would retaliate if the Union won the election. He instead 

conveyed to employees the risks of voting in the Union, risks 

that were, as in Gissel, beyond the employer's control. According to Smith, those risks included the possibility of 

strikes interrupting shipments to customers, as well as of 

GEoperating in an increasingly competitive environment

reducing its investment in the plant. These concerns with 

maintaining competitive position are quite similar to those 

voiced by the employer in Crown Cork. See Crown Cork, 36 

F.3d at 1134 (work will only be done at Vineland plant "if we 

can maintain our competitive advantage"); id. ("[Y]our job 

security depends on our being able to provide [our buyer] 

with the best product and the best service at the best price."). 

But in this case, the ALJ turned the company's concerns into 

warnings, for example, that if the employees failed to keep 

the peace at the Washington plant, " 'we won't have a business.' " J.A. 75 (quoting Smith speech). As we said in 

Crown Cork, "[i]f the Board may take management statements that very emphatically assert a risk, twist them into 

claims of absolute certainty, and then condemn them on the 

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ployer's section 8(c)] free speech right is pure illusion." 

Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1140.

Not only do General Electric's statements resemble 

Crown's, but they differ from the statements at issue in 

Allegheny Ludlum where the employer made no attempt to 

ground its warnings of loss of job security in objective 

circumstances, such as the competitive environment and need 

to contain costs. Allegheny Ludlum "in effect told salaried 

employees that unionization would lead to layoffs and a loss of 

job security because once the salaried employees chose union 

representation the Company would no longer 'find ways' to 

avoid laying them off in hard times." Allegheny Ludlum, 104 

F.3d at 1367 (emphasis added). The "because" in Allegheny 

Ludlumthat the company would not work as hard to keep 

Union members on the payrollwas entirely within the company's control. Here, as in Crown Cork, the "because" was a 

set of objective factors beyond the employer's control: unionization increased the risk of strikes, which would in turn 

increase costs, lower production, and lead customers to buy, 

and the parent company to invest, elsewhere. Crown Cork

thus controls this aspect of the case.

Twelve-Hour Shifts

Also shortly before the election, a low-level plant supervisor, Marvin Brannon, told an employee that if the Union won, 

the company "would close the plant and do away with the 12-

hour days within two weeks." J.A. 934 (Test. of Dale Ramsey). When the employee replied that Brannon could not 

believe that himself, Brannon changed the subject. The ALJ 

found that because Brannon failed both to qualify his statement as presenting only his opinion and to assure the employee that Brannon himself did not believe the company would 

resort to such tactics, Brannon "spoke as a member of 

management, who was in a position to hear higher management's expressed intentions," and that through Brannon, the 

company "was threatening to punish the Washington plant 

employees with plant closure and discharge." J.A. 79.

We considered a virtually identical situation in Avecor, Inc. 

v. NLRB, 931 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1991). There, answering 

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an employee's question regarding the impact of unionization, 

a supervisor stated that the Union "would cause the company 

to close the doors.' " Id. at 931 (quoting ALJ Decision at 8). 

In a decision that "[gave] us pause," the ALJ found the 

supervisor's remark to have threatened reprisals. Avecor,

931 F.2d at 932. As we pointed out, the evidence showed 

nothing more than that "one supervisor, on one occasion, in 

response to a direct question, in the hearing of one employee, 

said that the plant would close if the union were elected." Id.

Warning that it "skirt[ed] the outermost boundaries of our 

deference," we nevertheless deferred to the ALJ's conclusion. 

Id. Perceiving no principled way to distinguish Avecor, and 

warning that the facts of this casea low-level supervisor 

threatening a single employee who apparently did not even 

believe the threat was made seriouslyagain push our deference to its limit, we uphold the Board's conclusion that 

Brannon's statement violated the Act. Because we affirm the 

Board with respect to Brannon's statement, we have no need 

to address the ALJ's separate finding that GE manager 

Richard Young's statements about discontinuing twelve-hour 

shifts violated the Act. See General Elec. Co., 321 N.L.R.B. 

1, 1 n.7 (1996) (declining to address same issue).

Temporary Layoffs

In response to Union claims that Union victory would 

improve workers' job security, GE distributed three handbills 

raising the possibility of temporary layoffs. Captioned "The 

Score Card," the first handbill contains two columns of text. 

The left column reads:

[The Union] Stands To Gain: $182,000 per year. You 

Get: Temporary Layoffs; The obligation to pay dues or 

agency fees every month for the rest of your working 

life; All the obligations of union membership in the union 

constitution and by-laws; Super-Seniority for Union Officers; Possible Strikes.

J.A. 28 (emphasis added). The right column reads: "What 

You Have At Risk: Non-exempt status; Prescription Drug 

Card; Taxi Allowance; Meal Tickets; 20 Sick Days and 5 

Personal Days; Salary Continuation for Sick Leave; 2% 

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Vacation Pay; 11th Paid Holiday; General Pay Increases for 

union-free employees." Id. The bottom of the handbill 

reads, "The UE Doesn't Add Up! You Be The Judge! Vote 

for the Future. VOTE NO!" Id.

The second handbill, captioned "Temporary Layoffs? 

Yes!!," reproduces a Union bulletin sent to members of a 

unionized GE plant in Erie, Pennsylvania, warning that 

"[m]any buildings will be affected by temporary L.O.W. [lay 

off work]." J.A. 29. Appearing at the bottom of the handbill 

is this question: "What is the UE telling you about temporary [layoffs] now? It happens in Erie and could happen at 

the Washington Site if you vote for the UE." J.A. 29.

Captioned at the top and bottom "Don't Be Fooled ... 

Demand the Facts!!", the third handbill reads:

Have you ever been sent home because your production 

line is not running or your job is temporarily stopped? 

Then why would you want to start now? The UE says 

temporary layoffs don't occur. If this is true, then why 

are temporary layoffs frequently referred to in the UEGE national contract?

J.A. 30. The right side of the handbill reproduces the 

National Agreement's provisions dealing with temporary layoffs.

The ALJ found that each handbill violated the Act. We 

agree, although the issue is close. As General Electric points 

out, the company's handbills discussing temporary layoffs 

responded to Union statements about job security, including 

one statement, made in a Union videotape shown to employees, that Union members would face no temporary layoffs. 

See J.A. 1271 (Test. of Richard Young). As we recognized in 

Crown Cork, a company's right to free speech includes the 

right to respond to Union claims about job security in unionized plants. Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1134. Although GE's 

references to the National Agreement could be viewed as this 

sort of "defensive" campaigning, see id., the defensive character of Crown's letter was not what ultimately protected it 

under the Act. Crown's letter was protected because it was 

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"supported by objective fact." Crown Cork, 36 F.3d at 1135. 

In accordance with Gissel, 395 U.S. at 618, Crown's letter 

sounded "themes of competition and consciousness of cost," 

emphasizing that " 'union or no union,' " if the company could 

continue to provide its customers with quality products at 

reasonable prices, employees' jobs would be secure. Crown 

Cork, 36 F.3d at 1135 (quoting employer letter). This link to 

objective circumstances beyond the employer's control distinguishes Crown Cork's letter from GE's handbills which nowhere explain the potential for temporary layoffs in terms of 

competition or cost-saving devices. The handbills simply 

threaten temporary layoffs.

Inclusion of the National Agreement's temporary layoff 

provisions in one of the handbills does not insulate them from 

challenge. Going further than simply pointing out that the 

National Agreement contains procedures for temporary layoffs, the handbills threaten layoffs if the Union wins the 

election. Moreover, the handbills have the same sort of 

cumulative impact we found troubling in Allegheny Ludlum,

threatening that if the Union wins, employees will "get" 

temporary layoffs (the "Score Card" handbill), that temporary 

layoffs "could happen" (the "Temporary Layoffs? Yes!!" 

handbill), and that employees "would [not] ... want to start" 

being laid off (the "Don't Be Fooled" handbill). As in Allegheny Ludlum, these statements combine to create the threat 

that General Electric would temporarily lay off employees 

simply because the employees chose to unionize, rather than 

because of the likely economic consequences of unionization. 

See Allegheny Ludlum, 104 F.3d at 1367. Especially in light 

of the deference we owe the Board, we agree that the 

handbills violated the Act by threatening reprisals in the form 

of temporary layoffs. See Gissel, 395 U.S. at 620 (a "reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first 

instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the 

context of the employer-employee relationship") (citing 

NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 479 

(1941)). 

Threat of Strikes

Titled "The Real QUESTION," a fourth handbill says:

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You know the union's position on 12-hour shifts, wages, 

benefits ... You know the company's position on these 

very same issues ... The company and the union organizers are MILES APART! Are you willing to see this 

Site possibly become another victim in long, bitter negotiations? Are you willing to face the possibility of a long 

and ugly strike? VOTE NO!

J.A. 31. According to the ALJ, this handbill violated the Act 

because it "implie[d] that the employees' only way of retaining [certain] benefits and conditions of employment would be 

by engaging in 'a long and ugly strike.' " J.A. 83 (emphasis 

added); see also id. (handbill "suggest[ed] that the employees 

faced futile bargaining and an inevitable strike" if they voted 

for the Union) (emphasis added).

As in the case of Smith's speech, the ALJ erred by 

converting a possibility into a certainty, then declaring it a 

violation of the Act. In other cases, moreover, the NLRB has 

held that statements nearly identical to GE's were lawful. In 

UARCO, Inc., 286 N.L.R.B. 55, 76-79 (1987), the Board found 

no problem with the employer's statements that "[t]he UAW 

has a long and tragic recordright here in Kentuckyof 

forcing lengthy, vicious and destructive strikes.... If you 

have friends or relatives at UARCO, please urge them to vote 

'NO' this Thursday! For their own sake," and urging employees not to "let this outside union force you and your 

Company into a knock-down and drag-out fight!" "Mere 

references to the possibly negative outcomes of unionization," 

the Board ruled, "do not deprive [a company's] materials of 

the protections of section 8(c)." Id. at 58. The Board 

reached the same conclusion in Coleman Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 

1056 (1970), where a company manager told employees that 

"a vote for the [Union] would put us back to the bargaining 

table which is a long and expensive process, and who knows, 

we might wind [up] in another strike." Because Coleman 

"merely state[d] that the Union might elect to strike to 

enforce its demands, and in no way convey[ed] the impression 

that action will be taken by the Employer to cause a strike," 

the Board found its remarks lawful. Id.

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The ALJ made no attempt to distinguish the "Real Question" handbill from the statements the Board found lawful in 

UARCO and Coleman. Although we perceive no way to 

distinguish these cases, but see, e.g., Chauffeurs Local 633 v. 

NLRB, 509 F.2d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("employer assertions that 'serious harm' will result from unionization are 

generally not an unfair labor practice while assertions that 

the employer will 'bargain from scratch' are unfair labor 

practices"), because we are loath to preclude the Board from 

explaining apparent departures from precedent, we will remand this finding to the Board for reconsideration in light of 

UARCO and Coleman. See Daily News v. NLRB, 979 F.2d 

1571, 1576 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (where Board appeared to have 

"altered course" from prior precedent without explanation, 

court remanded to Board for further consideration).

III

Two weeks before the election, plant manager Smith ordered 1100 acrylic desk clocks for all plant employees, approximately half of whom would have been in the bargaining 

unit the Union sought to represent. Before distributing the 

clocks, Smith issued the following instructions to his managers:

What I would like to see happen is each clock is hand 

carried by a team manager, supervisor, or section manager, etc. to an employee with a hand shake and a thank 

you.

.... Now, we'll need to explain our reason for this 

reward and tell people what to say. 

ReasonTheme of Pride in Past and Vision for the 

Future is carried forward.

This past year has been a difficult one because of 

economy and change. The organization has done well 

through everything and has shown the ability to adapt to 

change, get involved and continuously improve. Our 

performance trend is positive and we'd like to thank 

people for their efforts.... Our customers and the 

business is counting on us. 

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.... To personally cover everyone will take some 

time. I would prefer not to do a mass, impersonal 

handoutwe'd lose some of the real reason for the 

reward.

.... Let's do itthe sooner the better, it must be 

well communicated up front.

J.A. 761. After the Union lost the election and filed its 

objections with the NLRB, management distributed the 

clocks.

The NLRA prohibits employers not just from threatening 

employees who support unions, but also from granting benefits to employees "with the express purpose of impinging 

upon [employees'] freedom of choice for or against unionization...." NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 

(1964); see also Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 

678, 686 (1944) ("The action of employees with respect to the 

choice of their bargaining agents may be induced by favors 

bestowed by the employer as well as by his threats or 

domination."). "The danger inherent in well-timed increases 

in benefits," the Supreme Court said in Exchange Parts, "is 

the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove. Employees 

are not likely to miss the inference that the source of benefits 

now conferred is also the source from which future benefits 

must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged." 

Exchange Parts, 375 U.S. at 409; see also Skyline Distrib. v. 

NLRB, 99 F.3d 403, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1996); St. Francis Fed. of 

Nurses v. NLRB, 729 F.2d 844, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1984). As we 

have held, General Teamsters Local 992 v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 

582, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (citing Northwest Eng'g Co., 148 

N.L.R.B. 1136, 1145 (1964)), even post-election benefits fall 

within section 8(a)(1)'s prohibition if given while objections to 

the election remain pending, precisely what happened in this 

case; although Smith ordered the clocks before the election, 

they were not given to employees until after the election 

while the Union's objections were still pending.

The record contains sufficient evidence to support the 

ALJ's finding that the gift violated the Act. The ALJ 

emphasized the timing of the order and the one-on-one methUSCA Case #96-1354 Document #285233 Filed: 07/18/1997 Page 17 of 20
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od of distribution, finding both suspicious, and we give " 'substantial deference' " to the ALJ's inferences of impermissible 

motive. Laro Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Gold Coast Restaurant Corp. v. 

NLRB, 995 F.2d 257, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). The ALJ also 

credited the testimony of an employee at another General 

Electric plant who said a Washington plant manager told him 

and other workers that the gift to Washington employees was 

"to show there were no hard feelings" stemming from the 

election. J.A. 920.

IV

An employee at the Washington plant since 1987, Fernando 

DaCosta supported the Union visibly and vocally. Appearing 

as a witness for the General Counsel during the early stages 

of the administrative hearings, DaCosta authenticated several 

of GE's anti-Union handbills and described the company's 

pre-election meetings. Ten months laterover a year and a 

half after the electiona co-worker accused DaCosta of intentionally slowing production one day in early October 1993. 

According to the co-worker, DaCosta narrowed the "feeding 

strips" on his mill, which in turn caused Kathy Carr, an 

employee operating a machine which sent liquid plastic to 

DaCosta's station, to slow her pace. Investigating these 

charges, GE managers obtained a written statement from 

Carr that DaCosta had indeed narrowed the feeding strips 

for no apparent reason. When confronted with this charge, 

DaCosta told his supervisors that he had information about 

the alleged slowdown but that it was "part of his defense." 

J.A. 93. The company fired him.

Although section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA prohibits discharging 

workers because of union activity, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), 

employers may "apply their usual rules and disciplinary standards to a union activist just as they would to any other 

employee." NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 901 (1st 

Cir. 1981); see also NLRB v. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 

U.S. 393, 398 (1983). The NLRB General Counsel bears the 

burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence 

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that " 'antiunion animus contributed to the employer's decision to discharge an employee.' " Avecor, 931 F.2d at 928 

(quoting Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. at 395). If the 

General Counsel makes such a showing, the employer may 

avoid an unfair labor practice finding by establishing that it 

would have fired the employee even if he or she had not been 

involved with the union. Transportation Mgt. Corp., 462 U.S. 

at 402-03; see also Parsippany Hotel Mgt. Co. v. NLRB, 99 

F.3d 413, 422-23 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Finding that the General Counsel failed to prove that 

DaCosta's firing was motivated by anti-union animus, the 

ALJ, affirmed by the Board, ended his inquiry at the first 

step of this analysis. In view of the supervisors' testimony, 

as well as employee Carr's signed statement, the ALJ's 

conclusion was rational and supported by substantial evidence. See District 65, Distrib. Workers v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 

1155, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Board's determination that no 

violation of Act occurred must be upheld "unless it has no 

rational basis") (quoting ILGWU v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907, 919 

(D.C. Cir. 1972)). Although Carr later attempted to repudiate her signed statement, the ALJ discredited her testimony, 

relying instead on the supervisors' testimony. We will not 

disturb credibility findings unless they are " 'hopelessly incredible' or 'self-contradictory,' " Teamsters Local Union No. 

171 v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 946, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (quoting 

Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1983)), 

a standard the ALJ's findings in this case fall far short of 

meeting. Moreover, because DaCosta was fired almost two 

years after the election and ten months after he testified, his 

firing did not follow the election or proceedings so closely as 

to be remotely suspect. See Parsippany Hotel Mgt. Co., 99 

F.3d at 422; see also Yesterday's Children, Inc. v. NLRB, 115 

F.3d 36, 48 (1st Cir. 1997) (timing of reprimand, coming soon 

after protected activities, "raise[d] suspicions").

V

Responding to an employee's question the day after DaCosta's firing, supervisor Michael Huff said that he "didn't want 

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to see any petitions" protesting DaCosta's discharge because 

it "wouldn't do any good." J.A. 1527 (Test. of James Cogar). 

Two weeks later, a different GE supervisor, James Eaton, 

told another employee that there had been complaints that 

the employee had been talking with warehouse workers about 

DaCosta's discharge, and that he "wasn't allowed to go [to the 

warehouse] and talk about Fred DaCosta anymore." J.A. 

1541 (Test. of Carl Yates).

The ALJ found that Huff's statements violated section 

8(a)(1) because they prohibited employee protest of DaCosta's 

discharge. Emphasizing Huff's statement that petitions 

"wouldn't do any good," GE argues that Huff was not prohibiting employees from filing petitions, but simply expressing 

his view that petitions would be futile. We disagree. Huff's 

statement that he "didn't want to see any petitions," together 

with Eaton's warning to another employee against discussing 

DaCosta's discharge, supports the ALJ's finding of a section 

8(a)(1) violation. To be sure, DaCosta's firing did not violate 

the NLRA; but section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from 

discouraging employees from talking about another worker's 

discharge and circulating protesting petitions, no matter the 

reason for the discharge. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 277 

N.L.R.B. 136, 137 (1985) (overturning ALJ's finding of discriminatory discharge, but concluding that employees had 

been unlawfully discouraged from protesting employee's discharge).

VI

We vacate the Board's findings that the company's comments on the eleventh holiday and two percent vacation pay 

and Smith's speech violated the Act. Regarding the Board's 

finding that the company's "Real Question" handbill violated 

the Act, we grant the company's petition and remand to the 

Board for reconsideration in accordance with this opinion. 

The company's petition is denied in all other respects. The 

Union's petition for review of the Board's dismissal of its 

challenge to DaCosta's termination is denied.

So ordered.

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