Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07040/USCOURTS-ca10-93-07040-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramon Medina Molina
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH • F I L E Ji) Va•ted States Court c•A ... ,.. ..... __ T .111 .,.,~\..,.u_ 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS enth Circuit • 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

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FEB 0 5 1996 

PATRICK FISHEll 

Clerit 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

vs. No. 93-7040 

RAMON MEDINA MOLINA, 

also known as Ray Molina, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-92-32-S) 

Gene V. Primomo of Wilcoxen, Wilcoxen & Primomo, Muskogee, 

OKlahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert J. Erickson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, 

D.C. (John Raley, United States Attorney, Sheldon J. Sperling and 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorneys, Muskogee, 

Oklahoma, with him on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and KELLY, Circuit Judges. 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant Ramon Medina Molina challenges his 

convictions for drug conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846; interstate 

travel to promote racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952, 2; conspiracy, 

18 U.S.C. § 371; interstate travel with intent to commit murder, 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1958, 2; and killing an individual in furtherance of 

a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. §§ 848(a), (e) (1) (A), 

18 U.S.C. § 2. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, 

and we affirm. 

Appellate Case: 93-7040 Document: 01019276555 Date Filed: 02/05/1996 Page: 1 
Background 

The basic facts of this case are set out in United States v. 

McCullah, F. 3d , No. 93-7118 (lOth Cir. 1996), and need not 

be restated here. 

Discussion 

I. Brady Violation 

Mr. Molina claims that the government failed to disclose 

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 

and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). We review a 

claim that the government failed to disclose exculpatory evidence 

de novo. United States v. DeLuna, 10 F.3d 1529, 1534 (lOth Cir. 

1993). 11 [T]he materiality of withheld evidence under Brady and 

its possible effect on the verdict are mixed questions of fact and 

law reviewed de novo. 11 United States v. Buchanan, 891 F.2d 1436, 

1440 (lOth Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990). 

Under Brady and Giglio, the government must furnish to the 

defense evidence regarding the credibility of government 

witnesses. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154. Mr. Molina contends that the 

government suppressed evidence of plea agreements, or its 

intention to offer such agreements, to two key prosecution 

witnesses, Mr. Wiscowiche and Mr. Shiew. It is undisputed that no 

agreements were in place at the time of trial, but Mr. Molina 

claims that the government avoided its disclosure obligation by 

waiting until after trial to enter into the plea agreements. 

Although no evidence of this claim was adduced, Mr. Molina urges 

us to extend Giglio and require the government to advise the 

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Appellate Case: 93-7040 Document: 01019276555 Date Filed: 02/05/1996 Page: 2 
defense in advance of trial if it intends to offer plea 

agreements, even if no such agreement is in place at trial. We 

decline to do so. 

In DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 (1974), the 

Supreme Court held that whether a plea or cooperation agreement 

was "made after or before [a defendant's] trial" was "dispositive" 

in determining whether there was a Giglio violation. Requiring 

the government to disclose potential plea agreements and offers of 

plea agreements would place an unreasonable burden on the 

government, and such offers are too speculative and uncertain to 

be material. The mere fact that the witnesses were subsequently 

allowed to plead on favorable terms is not evidence that the plea 

agreements were secretly reached prior to the witnesses' testimony 

and improperly withheld from the defense. See United States v. 

Ramirez, 608 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1979). 

II. Evidence of Other Crimes 

Mr. Molina contends the trial court erred in allowing the 

government to present evidence of other crimes in violation of 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404. We generally review a trial court's 

evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, United States v. 

Scott, 37 F.3d 1564, 1581 (lOth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 

Ct. 773 (1995), but because Mr. Molina failed to timely object to 

the evidence, the instant claim is reviewable only for plain 

error, United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776 (1993). 

The government presented evidence from Rene Villa, Mr. 

Molina's son-in-law, that Mr. Molina regained possession of an 

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Appellate Case: 93-7040 Document: 01019276555 Date Filed: 02/05/1996 Page: 3 
automobile from Mr. Villa at gunpoint. Mr. Villa worked in the 

Arvizu drug trafficking organization with Mr. Molina, and Mr. 

Molina's actions in repossessing the car at gunpoint were related 

to the drug conspiracy. Contrary to Mr. Molina's assertion, Mr. 

Villa's testimony about the repossession at gunpoint is not 

subject to Rule 404(b). 11 An act ... done in furtherance of the 

alleged conspiracy ... is not an 'other' act within the meaning 

of Rule 404(b); rather, it is part of the very act charged. 11 

United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992), 

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 163 (1993). See also United States v. 

Oles, 994 F.2d 1519, 1522 (lOth Cir. 1993). Further, Mr. Villa's 

testimony did not constitute improper character evidence under 

Rule 404(b). Rather, the evidence was properly admitted as it 

demonstrated Mr. Molina's organizational role and his use of 

violence as a tool against underlings and others. 

III. Statements of Coconspirators 

Mr. Molina contends that statements made by his codefendants, 

Mr. McCullah and Mr. Sanchez, to Mr. Lozano were improperly 

admitted and violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment because they were not made in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. The Supreme Court has held that the requirements for 

admission of evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d) (2) (E) 

are identical to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, so 

if the evidence meets the requirements of Rule 801(d) (2) (E), the 

evidence is constitutionally admissible. Bourjaily v. United 

States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987). 

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Mr. Molina contends that Mr. Lozano was not a member of the 

conspiracy, so his testimony regarding statements made by members 

of the conspiracy should be inadmissible. This contention is 

unavailing. There is no requirement that a witness be a member of 

the conspiracy before he can testify about statements made by 

participants in the conspiracy. United States v. Williamson, 53 

F.3d 1500, 1519 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 218 (1995). 

All that must be shown is that a conspiracy existed, that the 

declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy, and 

that the declaration was made during and in furtherance of the 

conspiracy. Id. at 1517-18; Fed. R. Evid. 80l(d) (2) (E). The 

trial court properly found that all of these elements were met in 

this case; the statements were made by Mr. McCullah and Mr. 

Sanchez in furtherance of a conspiratorial purpose, namely to 

discover what went wrong with the ambush in Oklahoma. 

IV. Issues Raised by Codefendants 

Mr. Molina adopts all arguments advanced by his codefendants 

applicable to him. We have carefully considered these arguments 

and find them without merit. See United States v. McCullah, 

F.3d , No. 93-7118 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

AFFIRMED. 

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