Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-08044/USCOURTS-ca10-15-08044-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stryker Corporation
Appellee
Jeanette Tolman
Appellant
Wallace Tolman
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WALLACE TOLMAN; JEANETTE 

TOLMAN, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants, 

v. 

STRYKER CORPORATION, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 15-8044 

(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00013-ABJ) 

(D. Wyo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

After Wallace Tolman broke his hip and femur in an ATV accident, a surgeon 

implanted a nail to stabilize the bones while they healed. Some months later, Mr. 

Tolman’s doctor told him he had healed enough to begin walking without crutches, so 

as to put mild stress on the bones and encourage further healing. But the stress 

proved too much: the nail broke, the bone broke with it, and Mr. Tolman, despite 

three more surgeries, suffered permanent injury. Mr. Tolman and his wife sued the 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

February 19, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 15-8044 Document: 01019573796 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Page: 1 
2 

nail’s manufacturer, Stryker Corporation, asserting claims of negligence, strict 

products liability, and loss of consortium. 

The district court granted summary judgment to Stryker Corporation on all 

three claims. The negligence and strict liability claims, it held, failed because the 

Tolmans had not produced evidence the nail was defective. The loss-of-consortium 

claim also failed since it depended on the negligence and strict liability claims. The 

Tolmans have not challenged the district court’s ruling on the consortium claim, so 

their appeal depends entirely on whether the district court erred in granting summary 

judgment as to negligence and strict liability. We hold that it did not. 

The Tolmans acknowledge that, under Wyoming law, both negligence and 

strict products liability require them to prove the nail was defective. See McLaughlin 

v. Michelin Tire Corp., 778 P.2d 59, 64 (Wyo. 1989). Although the Tolmans have no 

evidence of any specific defect, they can still make a prima facie case by relying on 

an inference of defect. See Sims v. Gen. Motors Corp., 751 P.2d 357, 361 (Wyo. 

1988). To do so, however, “[i]t is not enough to show that an injury occurred during 

use of the product,” Rohde v. Smiths Med., 165 P.3d 433, 437 (Wyo. 2007), or even 

that “the product failed ‘to perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light 

of [its] nature and intended function,’” id. at 438 (quoting Sims, 751 P.2d at 361). 

They must also present “proof” that the product’s failure occurred “in the absence of 

. . . reasonable secondary causes.” Id. (quoting Sims, 751 P.2d at 361). 

Stryker has identified a reasonable secondary cause: “bone nonunion,” the 

failure of Mr. Tolman’s fractures to heal adequately. To show this secondary cause is 

Appellate Case: 15-8044 Document: 01019573796 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Page: 2 
3 

reasonable, Stryker points to the warning it distributed with the nail: “These devices 

can break when subjected to the increased loading associated with delayed unions 

and/or non-unions. . . . If healing is delayed or does not occur, the appliance may 

eventually break due to metal fatigue.” (Appellants’ App. at 114.) Cf. id. at 438 

(quoting a similar medical device warning as evidence that a particular secondary 

cause was reasonable). 

To show that nonunion was in fact a secondary cause of the nail’s failure, 

Stryker cites Mr. Tolman’s medical records. Before the nail broke, Mr. Tolman’s 

doctor wrote that the fractures showed signs of healing and expressed optimism they 

would eventually heal, but he plainly did not believe they had finished healing. 

(Appellants’ App. at 81, 82.) After the nail broke, the doctor’s diagnosis was “Failed 

gamma nail with nonunion.” (Id. at 83.) He explained this diagnosis as follows: 

“We have been watching this. There was a bony defect, and our plan had been for 

him to return to clinic, and if he was showing no sign of healing, we would consider 

bone grafting. However, the gamma nail has now failed.” (Id.) Later records tell the 

same story: “[Mr. Tolman] had a severely comminuted extended right 

subtrochanteric hip fracture which underwent fixation. He healed everything distally, 

but there was a nonunion of the subtrochanteric and he failed the gamma nail.” (Id.

at 86 (emphasis added).) 

 We can express all this in less technical terms: Mr. Tolman’s injury was not a 

clean break, but rather a “comminuted” fracture that broke the bone into several 

pieces. Much of the damage healed before the nail broke, but the doctor was 

Appellate Case: 15-8044 Document: 01019573796 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Page: 3 
4 

concerned that a particular part of the fracture was not healing adequately. The 

doctor’s concern was justified, and the inadequate healing contributed to the failure 

of the nail. 

The Tolmans contest this line of reasoning with two arguments. They argue 

first that Stryker has misinterpreted the medical records—that in fact, the bones had 

healed adequately, and that the “nonunion” mentioned in the records was a 

consequence of the nail breaking rather than a cause. But we are not persuaded. As 

the above discussion shows, the Tolmans’ characterization of the medical records is 

not plausible.1

The Tolmans argue second that, even if nonunion was a secondary cause of the 

nail’s failure, it was not a reasonable secondary cause. According to the Tolmans, the 

nail “failed at its designed task, during its normally designated time frame. It failed 

during the normal healing process when Mr. Tolman’s bones where [sic] healing, and 

needed the stability of the nail more than ever.” (Appellants’ Br. at 16.) 

This argument might be persuasive, except that it has no foundation in the 

record. The Tolmans try to support it with a series of citations to Mr. Tolman’s 

medical records, but the records speak neither to the “designed task” and “time 

frame” of the nail nor to the reasonableness of nonunion as a cause of the nail’s 

failure. The Tolmans also try to support their assertions with a series of citations to 

 1

 Stryker has argued that the medical records were not authenticated and thus 

should not be considered, leaving the Tolmans with no evidence to support their 

claim. However, the district court did not consider this argument—presumably 

because it ruled for Stryker on other grounds—and we will follow its lead. 

Appellate Case: 15-8044 Document: 01019573796 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Page: 4 
5 

their expert witness designations, but such designations are not evidence. The 

Tolmans never deposed their designated experts, and the experts’ actual opinions 

remain unknown to us. 

In short, the Tolmans have not produced sufficient evidence to qualify for an 

inference of defect under Wyoming law. Consequently, they have not made a prima 

facie case for negligence or strict products liability, and we must AFFIRM. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 15-8044 Document: 01019573796 Date Filed: 02/19/2016 Page: 5