Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-03444/USCOURTS-ca2-18-03444-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Pilcher
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

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18-3444-cr 

United States v. Pilcher

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2019

No. 18‐3444‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

JOHN PILCHER,

Defendant‐Appellant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Vermont

   

SUBMITTED: JANUARY 28, 2020

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 6, 2020

   

Before: LEVAL, CABRANES, AND SACK, Circuit Judges.

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Defendant‐Appellant John Pilcher (“Pilcher”) appeals from an August 6,

2018 judgment of the District Court (Geoffrey W. Crawford, Chief Judge) affirming

the May 22, 2018 decision of the magistrate judge (John M. Conroy, Magistrate

Judge) denying Pilcher’s motion to file a habeas petition through the use of a

pseudonym. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the District Court’s

judgment.

   

         Lauren Almquist Lively, Assistant U.S. Attorney, for

Christina E. Nolan, United States Attorney, for the

District of Vermont, Burlington, VT, for Appellee.

John W. Pilcher, pro se, Essex, VT.

   

PER CURIAM:

This appeal calls for us to answer a jurisdictional question of first

impression: whether the denial of a motion to file a habeas petition under a

pseudonym is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We

join several of our Sister Circuits in concluding that such denials are appealable

under the collateral order doctrine. Having determined that we have jurisdiction

in this appeal, we AFFIRM the August 6, 2018 decision of the United States

District Court for the District of Vermont (Geoffrey W. Crawford, Chief Judge)

affirming the decision of the magistrate judge denying Pilcher’s motion to file a

habeas petition through the use of a pseudonym.

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I. Background

Appellant John Pilcher, pro se, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion under seal

challenging conditions imposed on him as a registered sex offender and certain

special conditions of supervised release following his guilty plea to one count of

possession of child pornography. He attached a letter to the motion requesting to

proceed anonymously. In light of his pro se status, the magistrate judge construed

Pilcher’s letter as a formal motion and denied it. The magistrate judge noted that

Pilcher was “not a plaintiff but a person who ha[d] plead[ed] guilty in open court

and been sentenced for the commission of a crime.”1 The magistrate judge

considered Pilcher’s request pursuant to the law governing public access to court

proceedings and records under the First Amendment and federal common law,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)2, and the test governing the exception to the presumption of

disclosure set forth in Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir.

2008). After weighing applicable factors identified in Sealed Plaintiff, the

magistrate judge denied Pilcher’s motion reasoning that: (1) his conviction was

“already in the public domain and his identity had not been confidential”; (2) his

claim that he would be subject to retaliation and his children would be subject to

physical and psychological danger if he were publicly identified in the

proceeding on his pending § 2255 motion was “unsubstantiated speculation”; (3)

1 Supplemental Appendix (“SA”) at 74.

2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 states that “[e]very pleading must have a caption with the courtʹs name, a

title, a file number, and a Rule 7(a) designation. The title of the complaint must name all the

parties; the title of other pleadings, after naming the first party on each side, may refer generally

to other parties.”

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his claim that his marriage might fail but for his filing under a pseudonym was

“purely personal” and “insufficient to overcome the public’s right of access

under the First Amendment and common law”; and (4) his comparison of his

effort to advance the post‐release rights of individuals convicted of child

pornography offenses to that of the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade was “utterly

meritless.”3 Pilcher appealed, and the District Court affirmed. This appeal

followed.   

II. Discussion

Our appellate jurisdiction is generally limited to “final decisions of the

district courts.”4 However, a district court order other than a final decision under

§ 1291 is appealable if the order falls within the “collateral order doctrine.”5

Under the collateral order doctrine, the order sought to be appealed must “(1)

conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue

completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.”6    

Although we have not decided, in a precedential opinion, whether an

order deciding a motion to proceed under a pseudonym is immediately

appealable under the collateral order doctrine, other Circuits have held that

denials of anonymity, using fictitious names, or proceeding under a pseudonym

3 SA at 75–76.

4 28 U.S.C. § 1291; In re Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany, N.Y., Inc., 745 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2014).

5 See e.g., United States v. Culbertson, 598 F.3d 40, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2010).

6 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).   

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fall under the collateral order doctrine.7   

The district court’s decision here conclusively determined the issue of

whether Pilcher could proceed under a pseudonym; that issue is completely

separate from the merits of his § 2255 motion; and it will be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from final judgment on his § 2255 motion. We therefore

hold that the denial of Pilcher’s motion to proceed anonymously was an

appealable collateral order. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider this

appeal.

A. Standard of Review

We review “a district court’s decision to grant or deny an application to

litigate under a pseudonym . . . for abuse of discretion.”8 A district court abuses

its discretion when it “base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence” or when its decision—though not

necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—

“cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”9 Additionally, a

district court judge may reconsider any pretrial matter adjudicated by a

magistrate judge “where it has been shown that the magistrate judge’s order is

clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”10   

7 See Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000); James v.

Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 237–38 (4th Cir. 1993); S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women Law Students v.

Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712–13 (5th Cir. 1979).

8 Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190.

9 Virginia Properties, LLC v. T‐Mobile Ne. LLC, 865 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

10 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).

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B. Applicable Law

Rule 10(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “‘[t]he title

of [a] complaint must name all the parties,’” which “serves the vital purpose of

facilitating public scrutiny of judicial proceedings[.]”11 Identifying parties in a

proceeding “is an important dimension of publicness,” as “people have a right to

know who is using their courts.”12   

Sealed Plaintiff set forth a balancing test under which courts should weigh

“the plaintiff’s interest in anonymity” against “both the public interest in

disclosure and any prejudice to the defendant” and noted with approval the

following ten “non‐exhaustive” factors that courts could consider when

assessing a party’s request to proceed with a pseudonym:

(1) whether the litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive

and of a personal nature; (2) whether identification poses a risk of

retaliatory physical or mental harm to the party seeking to proceed

anonymously or even more critically, to innocent non‐parties; (3)

whether identification presents other harms and the likely severity of

those harms, including whether the injury litigated against would be

incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s identity; (4)

whether the plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms

of disclosure particularly in light of his age; (5) whether the suit is

challenging the actions of the government or that of private parties;

(6) whether the defendant is prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to

press his claims anonymously, whether the nature of the prejudice (if

11 Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 188 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)).

12 Id. at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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any) differs at any particular stage of the litigation, and whether any

prejudice can be mitigated by the district court; (7) whether the

plaintiff’s identity has thus far been kept confidential; (8) whether the

public’s interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the plaintiff

to disclose his identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature

of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak

public interest in knowing the litigants’ identities; and (10) whether

there are any alternative mechanisms for protecting the

confidentiality of the plaintiff.

Id. at 189, 190 (internal quotation marks, brackets, ellipses, and citations omitted).

C. Merits‐Based Argument

In his brief on appeal, Pilcher does not directly challenge the rationale of

the magistrate judge’s decision in denying his motion to proceed under a

pseudonym, or its affirmance by the district court. The closest Pilcher comes to

challenging the court’s rationale is in arguing that the magistrate judge erred in:

(a) viewing his motion to proceed under a pseudonym as a “criminal motion”,

when habeas is a civil matter; and (b) in commenting that he was not a plaintiff

but someone who had pleaded guilty and was sentenced. According to Pilcher,

those comments betrayed the magistrate judge’s view of his motion as a criminal

motion, an error that underlay the entire ruling and prevented the magistrate

judge from considering the balancing test that courts apply when determining

whether a plaintiff would be allowed to maintain an action under a pseudonym.   

Pilcher’s arguments are without merit. The magistrate judge referred to

Pilcher having pleaded to, and having been convicted of, a criminal charge only

as background, not as the rationale underpinning his analysis. Indeed, the

magistrate judge noted that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not

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have any provision on proceeding under a pseudonym. He then expressly

turned to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Sealed Plaintiff balancing

test to adjudicate Pilcher’s motion. The magistrate judge then explicitly and

properly applied several of the Sealed Plaintiff factors in denying Pilcher’s request

to proceed under a pseudonym. Recognizing that there was “undoubtedly some

social stigma and embarrassment surrounding” the nature of Pilcher’s child

pornography conviction (implicating the first factor), the magistrate judge also

reasoned that, during the criminal proceeding, Pilcher’s identity had not been

kept confidential (implicating the seventh factor). The magistrate judge rejected

as “unsubstantiated speculation” Pilcher’s claim that he would be retaliated

against, and that his family (particularly his children) would be harmed if he

were denied the right to proceed anonymously (implicating the second, third

and fourth factors). He similarly rejected Pilcher’s claim that his marriage might

otherwise fail as “purely personal” (implicating the first and fifth factors).    

Accordingly, it is clear that the magistrate judge considered the proper

legal principles governing the motion, including a presumption in favor of public

access to court proceedings and records, and the exceptions to that presumption

set forth in Sealed Plaintiff. In reviewing the magistrate’s decision for clear error

or to determine if the ruling was contrary to law, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(A), the District Court properly held that the magistrate judge’s order

did not rest “on an error of law . . . or a clearly erroneous factual finding”; that

the conclusion was “located within the range of permissible decisions”; that the

circumstances identified by Pilcher were insufficient to support an exception;

and that it found “no error—clear or otherwise—in the magistrate judge’s

decision.”13 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in affirming the denial

13 Special Appendix at 102–103.

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of the motion.14   

D. Procedural Arguments

Pilcher also raises several procedural arguments that reflect a

misunderstanding of the legal process, and the magistrate judge’s role in that

process. He argues that the District Court made three “unfair unilateral

decisions” that violated his rights: (1) it interpreted his letter seeking to proceed

under a pseudonym as a motion; (2) it assumed the letter was complete; and (3) it

“outsourced” the review and decision of the motion to a magistrate judge

without his consent. He claims that the court could have acknowledged his letter

and required him to file a complete motion; had he known that his request

would be met with “resistance” and “require a legal argument,” he would have

“provided [a] detailed rationale for his request with supporting

documentation.”15   

It is well established that courts “liberally construe pleadings and briefs

submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest

arguments they suggest.”16 Accordingly, because Pilcher’s letter requested that

he be allowed to proceed under a pseudonym and discussed in sufficient detail

the reasons for that request, the magistrate judge properly construed the letter as

a motion and considered Pilcher’s arguments.   

14 Virginia Properties, LLC, 865 F.3d at 113.

15 Appellant’s Brief at 11–13.

16 McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (internal

quotation marks omitted); Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)

(“[T]he submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed liberally[.]”).

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Pilcher’s argument that the District Court “outsourced” his request for a

pseudonym to an “administrative court” without his consent is also without

merit. Consent of the parties was not required for the magistrate’s adjudication

of Pilcher’s anonymity motion. Under Rule 10 of the Rules Governing Section

2255 Cases, “[a] magistrate judge may perform the duties of a district court

under these rules, as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636.” 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A)

states that, with the exception of certain motions listed in the statute, “a judge

may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial matter

pending before the court.”17 Courts interpreting that provision have concluded

that “dispositive motions” are excluded from the grant of that authority.18 “The

Supreme Court has construed this statutory grant of authority to mean that

‘nondispositive’ pretrial matters are governed by § 636(b)(1)(A) and ‘dispositive’

matters are covered by § 636(b)(1)(B).”19 To the extent Pilcher’s pro se complaint

can be construed to argue that his motion to proceed anonymously was a

17 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) provides that:

[A] judge may designate a magistrate judge to hear and determine any pretrial

matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment

on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or

information made by the defendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to

dismiss or to permit maintenance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A

judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph (A)

where it has been shown that the magistrate judgeʹs order is clearly erroneous or

contrary to law.

18 Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2010) (Cabranes, J., concurring); Id. at 92 n.3 (Leval, J.

concurring) (noting that the monikers “dispositive” and “nondispositive” are shorthand not to

be taken literally).

19 Id. at 84 (Cabranes, J., concurring) (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873–74 (1989))

(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).   

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dispositive motion not properly delegated under § 636(b)(1)(A), we reject that

contention. The non‐exhaustive list of dispositive motions excluded under

§ 636(b)(1)(A) is often considered in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72(a), which requires a district court to consider a partyʹs timely

objections to a magistrate judgeʹs order deciding a “pretrial matter not

dispositive of a partyʹs claim or defense” and to “modify or set aside any part of

the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.”20 Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 72(a) defines a nondispositive matter as one that is “not dispositive of

a party’s claim or defense.”21 Pilcher’s underlying claim is for modifications of

the conditions of his supervised release; the motion to proceed anonymously

concerns only the manner in which Pilcher will proceed on his underlying claim.

The motion is not dispositive of his claim.22

Whereas the Federal Magistrates Act, § 636(c)(1), states that a magistrate

judge may conduct “any or all proceedings . . . in a civil matter” “upon the

consent of the parities,”23 § 636(b)(1)(A) has no such consent requirement.

20 Williams v. Beemiller, Inc., 527 F.3d 259, 264 (2d Cir. 2008).

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72

22 In considering the strongest arguments Pilcher’s pro se submissions may suggest, Weixel v. Bd.

of Educ. of City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2002), we note that it is at least plausible to

argue that by denying Pilcher’s motion, the magistrate has deterred Pilcher—who raises the

“chilling effect” in his brief and is reluctant to press his claim without anonymity—from

bringing his habeas claim. In that manner, it may be argued that the magistrate judge disposed

of his underlying claim. See Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 92 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring)

(“[C]ourts have generally concluded that other rulings which would have the same effect of

disposing of a party’s claim (or of a defense) were also intended by Congress to be excluded

from the powers of magistrate judges.”). We do not, however, find that argument persuasive in

the circumstances presented in this appeal.

23 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

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Because Pilcher’s motion to proceed anonymously was a nondispositive pretrial

motion, the District Court was within its authority to designate the magistrate

judge to adjudicate that motion without seeking Pilcher’s consent.24   

Pilcher next asserts that the Government’s argument that the need for

public transparency outweighs his need for a pseudonym is “disingenuous”

because, Pilcher argues, “federal court documents are kept hidden behind

PACER’s paywall.”25 This argument is meritless. Pilcher erroneously conflates

the court charging fees for access to the Public Access to Court Electronic

Records (“PACER”) system, and thus the ability to retrieve records

electronically, with First Amendment and common law protections of the right to

access proceedings and copy public records. Charging fees for PACER access is

authorized by statute, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1913, 1914, 1926, 1932 (notes), and

has no bearing on the right to gain access to court proceedings and documents.

Finally, Pilcher contends that, without pseudonyms, the speech of people

(like himself) who make unpopular arguments challenging the government or

unconstitutional statutes will be chilled; that such persons should be afforded

special protections; and that the default position should be anonymity whenever

such a person can argue that he has a reasonable fear of harm that would

otherwise cause him not to file a petition. In Sealed Plaintiff, we held that

pseudonyms are the exception and not the rule, and in order to receive the

protections of anonymity, a party must make a case rebutting that presumption.

Here, the magistrate judge considered, but rejected as speculative, Pilcher’s

24 The relevant local rules also provide that a “full‐time United States magistrate judge is

authorized to exercise all the powers and perform all duties conferred upon magistrate judges

by 28 U.S.C. § 636, and to exercise the powers stated in the rules governing proceedings under

28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255.” D. Vt. L.R. 72(a)(1).   

25 Appellant’s Brief at 8, 13–15.

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arguments that harm would befall him and his family if his name came to be

public, and thus that Pilcher failed to rebut the presumption of disclosure.   

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered all of Pilcher’s remaining arguments and find them to

be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the August 6, 2018 judgment of the

District Court.

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