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Parties Involved:
Club Productions
Appellee
Wendy Hoyt
Appellee
THE ROBSON COMPANIES, INC.
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L ... . .J ~ 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT U 'ted StatfS Co~rt~ Appea m Tenth C1rcu1t 

WENDY HOYT, an individual, doing 

business as Club Productions, a sole 

proprietorship; CLUB PRODUCTIONS, a 

Missouri General Partnership, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

THE ROBSON COMPANIES, INC., an 

Oklahoma Corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

DEC 2 3 1992 

~ ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 92-7031 

) (D.C. No. CV-91-300-S ) 

) (E.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant, The Robson Companies, Inc., appeals from the 

district court's judgment entered against it following a jury 

trial. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P. 

34(a) ; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-7031 Document: 010110154893 Date Filed: 12/23/1992 Page: 1 
In January of 1990, The Robson Companies, Inc. ( "Robson 11 ) 

entered into an agreement with Wendy Hoyt d/b/ a Club Productions 

( "Hoyt" ) , pursuant to which Hoyt was to develop and implement a 

marketing plan for Forest Ridge, a master-planned community. The 

agreement provided that it could be terminated with or without 

cause. However, in the event of termination, Hoyt would receive a 

sum equal to $2,500 times the number of months remaining from the 

date of termination to and including December 31, 1992. Robson 

terminated the agreement and instituted suit 

seeking a declaration that all contractual 

settled and that no further obligations remained. 

in state court 

disputes had been 

The action was 

removed to federal district court under the court's diversity 

jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C . 1332. 

Hoyt counterclaimed, seeking to recover those sums due her 

under the contract. Robson asserted several affirmative defenses 

and also counterclaimed alleging that the agreement was void or 

voidable due to alleged misrepresentations. Answering special 

interrogatories, the jury found that Robson had failed to prove 

that the parties had entered into a settlement, and found for Hoyt 

on her breach of contract claim and against Robson on its 

counterclaim. 

On appeal, Robson argues (1) that the evidence does not 

support the jury's finding that Hoyt did not breach her fiduciary 

duties of good faith and fair dealing to Robson, (2) that the 

termination provision in the agreement is either a penalty 

provision unenforceable in Oklahoma or a liquidated damages 

provision for which Hoyt failed to lay a proper foundation at 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-7031 Document: 010110154893 Date Filed: 12/23/1992 Page: 2 
trial and, (3) that the district court erred in failing to give 

Robson's requested jury instructions. 

Our review as to the sufficiency of the evidence is 

necessarily limited. In its appendix, Robson included only brief, 

unidentified excerpts of the transcript consisting primarily of 

motions and jury instructions. When an appellant intends to argue 

that the jury's finding is unsupported by or is contrary to the 

evidence, the appellant "shall include in the record a transcript 

of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion." 

Fed. R. App. P. l0(b) (2); Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 969 F.2d 

977 , 979 (10th Cir. 1992). 

Under the terms of the agreement, Hoyt was to "advise and 

consult with [Robson] in determining the method and timing of 

developing and marketing" the planned community. Appellant's App. 

at 90. Five areas were listed in which Hoyt was to make 

recommendations to Robson. No testimony is present in the record 

before us of disparate bargaining power and a resulting trust and 

confidence in Hoyt such that Robson could not review Hoyt's 

recommendations before acting on them. Devery Implement Co. v. J. 

I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724, 731 (10th Cir. 1991). 

The evidence that has been presented shows no more than a 

normal commercial transaction. Lacking evidence of the existence 

of a fiduciary relationship, and viewed in the light most 

favorable to Hoyt, see Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Teles., Inc., 931 F . 2d 

655, 663 (10th Cir. 1991), substantial evidence exists to support 

the jury's verdict that no breach of fiduciary duties occurred. 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-7031 Document: 010110154893 Date Filed: 12/23/1992 Page: 3 
Robson next argues that the district court erred i n denying 

its motion f or partial summary judgment and motion for a directed 

verdict on the ground that the terminat ion paragraph1 of the 

agreement was a liquidated damages provision which amounted t o a 

penalty provision unenforceable by statute in Oklahoma. The 

district court correctly held that the provision represented a 

negotiated compensation package prepared in the event Robson 

wished t o exercise its rights under the contract to terminate 

Hoyt's employment, with or without cause. The court held that the 

provision was not to become operative upon a breach, but upon 

performance of a permitted act. 

The provision did not address remedies in the event of a 

breach, see Okla. Stat . tit. 15, §§ 213-215 (addressing liquidated 

damage and penalty provisions included in contracts in 

anticipation of breach) , but rather compensated Hoyt in the event 

that the agreement was terminated prior to December 31, 1992. See 

22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages§ 710 (1988) (stipulated payment may be for 

privilege of cancelling a right granted under contract and is 

neither a penalty nor liquidated damages). 

1 This provision read: 

4. The term of the agreement shall be for three (3 ) 

years, expiring December 31, 1992 . Club Productions may 

be terminated only after December 31 , 1990, but prior to 

the expiration of this Agreement, with or without cause, 

upon thirty (30 ) days written notice . In the event of 

termination, and contemporaneously therewith, Forest 

Ridge shall pay to Club Productions a sum equal to 

$2,500.00 times the number of months remaining to be 

paid from the date of termination, to and including, 

December 31, 1992. 

Appe llant's App. a t 92. 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-7031 Document: 010110154893 Date Filed: 12/23/1992 Page: 4 
Robson also argues that the agreement violated Okla. Stat. 

tit. 15, § 216 because its right to seek legal redress was 

restricted by the agreement. This argument, not presented to the 

trial court, will not be considered for the first time on appeal. 

Anschutz Land & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac. R.R., 820 F.2d 338, 

344 n.5 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987). 

Finally, Robson argues the district court erred in not giving 

five of its proposed jury instructions. "Instructions are to be 

given only if they are supported by authorities and the evidence 

presented at trial." FDIC v. Clark, Nos. 89-1342, 89-1343, 1992 

WL 297997, at *9, (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 1992) (citing Higgins v. 

Martin Marietta Corp., 752 F.2d 492, 496 (10th Cir. 1985)). Three 

of the proposed instructions addressed whether the termination 

provision was a liquidated damages or a penalty provision, an 

issue previously decided by the district court as a matter of law. 

The other two instructions addressed agency issues. Because the 

evidence failed to support an agency relationship, the district 

court properly refused to give these instructions. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Paul J. Kelly, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

5 

Appellate Case: 92-7031 Document: 010110154893 Date Filed: 12/23/1992 Page: 5