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Parties Involved:
Jose Archie Diaz
Appellant
Secretary of Health & Human Services
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOSE ARCHIE DIAZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

FILED 

Uoircd Sraces C-O~rr of Appeals 

Tench C1r.'1ii~ 

JAN l O 1980 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN 

SERVICES, 

No. 89-2144 

(D.C. No. 87-980-JP) 

(D. N.M.) 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR, TACHA, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unani~ously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The ~ase is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Jose Archie Diaz appeals from the order of the district court 

declining to reverse the decision of the Secretary of Health and 

Human Services, which denied Diaz's request for SSI benefits. 

Diaz contends on appeal that the Secretary's decision is not 

supported by substantial evidence, that the Secretary failed to 

meet his burden of proof in showing that Diaz had residual 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2144 Document: 01019960721 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 1 
functional capacity and was capable of holding a sedentary job, 

and that the Secretary erred in refusing to order a psychological 

examination. We affirm. 

We will uphold decisions of the Secretary denying SSI 

benefits if that decision has substantial support in the record. 

See Knipe~ Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 144-45 (10th Cir. 1985). We 

agree with Diaz that where, as here, the Secretary determines that 

the applicant cannot return to his prior work activity, the 

Secretary bears the burden to prove that the applicant can find 

other employment in the economy. See Channel v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 

577, 579 (10th Cir. 1984). 

In this case, the Secretary determined that Diaz could obtain 

sedentary employment, and thus denied Diaz's SSI application. 

Because of the nature of Diaz's impairments, the Secretary rested 

his decision on evidence presented by a vocational expert and 

several consulting physicians. Diaz challenges the testimony of 

the vocational expert, urging that the Secretary's reliance is 

misplaced because the ALJ failed to include Diaz's pain, 

headaches, blurred vision, poor control over epileptic seizures, 

and drug side effects in a hypothetical questions .. We disagree. 

Initially, we note that the vocational expert revised her 

opinion of Diaz's functional capacity after listening to the 

hearing testimony, finding that Diaz was at most capable of 

sedentary, rather than medium or light work. This change in the 

vocational expert's testimony suggests that the expert was 

cognizant of Diaz's other impairments and that she was making an 

individualized assessment. The fact the vocational expert was 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2144 Document: 01019960721 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 2 
present and heard testimony concerning Diaz's alleged impairments 

suggests that the effect of the error, if any, in the 

administrative law judge's (ALJ) hypothetical, was minimal. 

Diaz's principal contention is that the Secretary improperly 

discounted the impairment due to his poorly controlled seizures. 

The Secretary discounted Diaz's claim because of his determination 

that Diaz was failing to follow the prescribed treatment. The 

Secretary relied on Social Security Ruling 84-27 in making this 

determination. Ruling 84-27 provides that where an applicant's 

blood medication levels are below therapeutic levels, there is a 

rebuttable presumption that the low levels are caused by the 

applicant's failure to follow the prescribed treatment regime. 

The Secretary found that Diaz had failed to rebut this 

presumption. No evidence was introduced to show that the nonther_apeutic medication levels were organically caused. Diaz 

argues on appeal that the non-therapeutic levels were caused by 

failure of the treating physician to prescribe a sufficient 

dosage. The Secretary rejected this contention, however, because 

therapeutic levels were obtained at the same dosage while Diaz 

resided in the hospital. This determination is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

Diaz also challenges the Secretary's discounting of the 

impairments caused by headaches, pain, and blurred vision. The 

Secretary did, however, consider these factors. The Secretary 

discounted their significance, however, because of the lack of 

objective corroborative evidence. See Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 

(10th Cir. 1987). Diaz presented little or no objective evidence 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2144 Document: 01019960721 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 3 
• 

in support of these claims. We cannot say that the Secretary's 

action is unsupported by substantial evidence. 

Diaz also contests the Secretary's disregard of the alleged 

side effects from the medication. The Secretary determined, 

however, that the side effects occurred either at a time when Diaz 

was not under proper medication or when Diaz was on Depakene, a 

treatment period that lasted only two months, and which is now 

discontinued. The Secretary's determination is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

The Secretary also discounted the seriousness of Diaz's nonexertional impairments because he determined that Diaz's 

credibility was suspect. The Secretary noted that Diaz's 

statements about the frequency of seizures varied, that his 

representations about lifting capacity ranged from 10 to 25 pounds 

at different times. The Secretary also noted that one of the 

consulting physicians had suspected Diaz of "malingering.'' 

Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the 

finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when 

supported by substantial evidence. We find no error in the 

Secretary's treatment of Diaz's non-exertional claims. 

Diaz contends that the Secretary incorrectly underweighted 

the testimony of Diaz's treating physician, Dr. Novosad. The 

Secretary gave adequate reasons for giving greater weight to the 

testimony of the consulting physicians. 1 See Byron v. Heckler, 

l We note that the Secretary also declined to give full weight 

to the treating physician's opinion because of fears that the 

"family doctor" would act as an advocate. As we have repeatedly 

stressed, such fears are not a legitimate reason for discounting 

the treating physician's recommendations. See Frey~ Bowen, 816 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2144 Document: 01019960721 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 4 
742 F.2d 1232, 1235 (10th Cir. 1984}~ We find no error in the 

Secretary's determination. 

Finally, Diaz challenges the Secretary's failure to order a 

consultative examination of Diaz's depression. We find no error. 

The Secretary has broad latitude in ordering a consultative 

examination. In this situ~tion, Diaz presented no objective 

evidence supporting the conclusion that he suffers from 

depression. In fact, Diaz's own treating physician, Dr. Novosad, 

stated that the depression was due to difficulties in bringing 

Diaz's seizures under control. In this situation, where the 

depression is not separable from the applicant's other nonexertional impairments, we cannot say the Secretary erred in 

refusing to order the examination. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court 

upholding the decision of the Secretary denying benefits is 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987). 

5 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 89-2144 Document: 01019960721 Date Filed: 01/16/1990 Page: 5