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Parties Involved:
Grand Jury Subpoena
Appellee

Document Text:

~nitei) ~tates Qlourt of J\ppeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER. COLORADO 80294 

ROBERT L. HOECKER July 20, 1990 CLERK 

TO ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 89-5199, In Re: Grand Jury v. Anderson 

(Lower court docket: GJ-89-9-E) 

Filed July 2, 1990, by Judge Monroe G. McKay 

Attached is a new cover page to be substituted for the 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·3157 

<FTS) 564·3157 

cover page in the original opinion which was filed on July 2, 

1990. 

RLH:oac 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-5199 Document: 01019438959 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 1 
,... . 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

In re: GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

SCOTT M. ANDERSON, JAMES G. ) 

WALKER, JOHN ECHOLS, TEX ) 

McCONATHY, and STANLEY MONROE, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants- ) 

Relators. ) 

JUL 2 i990 

:&!OBE.F(t L . .HU~t-~.KER 

4:I~~rk· 

No. 89-5199 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. GJ-89-9-E) 

Bruce Anton, Dallas Texas, for Defendants-Appellants. 

John S. Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Northern District 

of Oklahomar Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

(D. Gregory Bledsoe and Laura E. Frossard, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the 

brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of 

Oklahoma.) 

(Michael L. Bender, Denver, Colorado, on the brief for Amicus 

Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.) 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-5199 Document: 01019438959 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

In re: GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

P l .t ED 

United Scat~ C:OtiJ:C of At:'pc.:~.l.s 

Temh Circuit 

1• ,, r) .. y·:l''1 '-. . : L ~~· - 1~ ~~ 

ROBERT L HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

) 

No. 89 -5199 

SCOTT M. ANDERSON, JAMES G. 

WALKER, JOHN ECHOLS, TEX 

McCONATHY, and STANLEY MOORE, 

Defendants-AppellantsRelators. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. GJ-89-9-E) 

Bruce Anton, Dallas Texas, for Defendants-Appellants. 

John S. Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney (Tony M. Graham, 

United States Attorney, with h im on the brief), Northern District 

of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

(D. Gregory Bledsoe and Laura E. Frossard, Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the 

brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of 

Oklahoma.) 

(Michael L. Bender, Denver, Colorado, on the brief for Amicus 

Curiae Nationa l Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.) 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge . 

Appellate Case: 89-5199 Document: 01019438959 Date Filed: 07/02/1990 Page: 3 
This case involves an emergency appeal by several attorneys 

who were held in contempt and placed in jail because they refused 

to reveal the source of payment of their fees incurred during 

their representation of four defendants on drug charges. 

I. Facts 

Beginning in approximately April of 1989 the grand jury in 

the Northern District of Oklahoma began investigating James 

Coltharp and the organization he controlled under a suspicion of 

connection with illegal drug activity. Mr. Coltharp allegedly 

employed a "crew" to assist him in his drug efforts. Relators 

represented four defendants, who were allegedly crew members in 

the Coltharp organization, on drug charges in the Eastern District 

of Oklahoma. The grand jury sought fee information from the relators under a suspicion that Mr. Coltharp may have paid the legal 

fees for his alleged crew members. 

On October 5, 1989, the grand jury issued subpoenas to the 

relators. The relators• clients had been convicted at trial and 

at least two of the relators had filed appeals for their clients. 

Each of· the relators filed motions to quash the subpoenas which 

were finally denied on November 21, 1989. The trial court ordered 

the relators to appear and testify before the grand jury on 

December 5, 1989. 

On December 5, 1989, the relators appeared before the grand 

jury as the trial court had ordered. However, each relator 

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refused to testify or to provide any of the documents requested in 

the subpoena. The trial court held each of the relators in contempt for thei r refusal to comply with the subpoenas and had them 

immediately incarcerated. Relators filed an emergency Motion to 

Stay Proceedings in thi s court. Later that same day we granted 

the stay and released each of the relators on their own recognizance. 

Our issuance of the stay allowed us to hear oral argument on 

the appeal of this case a few days therea fte r . Relators now chall enge the con t empt holding on several grounds. Re l ators claim 

that the fee informat ion sought by the grand jury is sub ject to 

the attorney-cli e nt privilege, infringes on the sixth amendment 

rights of their clients, and s hould not be disc losed because the 

governmen t failed to make the necessary showing o f need . In addit ion , relators c l aim that the trial court's proceed i ngs l eading up 

to the contempt holding violated their due process rights and that 

the trial court improperly den ied bail pending appeal . We will 

consider each of these arguments in turn. 

II. Standard of Review 

We review t he district court's findings of fact under the 

clearly erroneous standard. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 52{a )i see also 

United States v . Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 1457 (lO th Cir. 1985). 

We review the district court' s finding of con tempt under an abuse 

of discretion standard . 

Under the abuse of discret i on standard, a trial court's 

decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate 

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court has a defi nite and firm conviction that the lower 

court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the 

bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances. When 

we apply the ''abuse of discretion" standard , we defer to 

the trial court's judgment because of its fi rst-hand 

ability to view the witness or evidence and assess credibility and probative va lue. 

United States v. Ortiz , 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (lO t h Cir . 1986). 

However, in order to weigh the district court's exercise of its 

discretion , we must resolve several purely legal questions which 

we review de novo. Thus, we apply our own independent judgment to 

the legal questions raised by this appeal. See Ocelot Oil Corp. 

v . Sparrow Indus., 847 F . 2d 1458, 1464 (lOth Cir . 1 988). 

III . Attorney-Client Privilege 

I t is well recognized in every Gircu it , including our own , 

that the identity of an attorney's client and the source of payment for legal fees are not norma lly protec ted by the attorneyclient privilege. United States v . Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 

(lOth Cir . 1974) ; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493 , 496-98 

(9th Cir . 1986}; In re Sharge1, 742 F.2d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1984}; In 

re Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir . 1983); 84 

A. L .R. Fed. 852 , 859 (1987). However, some circuit courts have 

created exceptions to this general rule for unique circumstances . 

The three major exceptions are known as the legal advice exception, the last link exception, and the confidential communication 

exception. 

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A. Legal Advice Exception 

Several circuit courts have created an except ion to the general rule tha t client identity and fee informa tion are not protected by the attorney-client privilege where there is a strong 

probability tha t disclosure wou ld i mplicate the client in the ve r y 

criminal activity for which legal advice was sought . United 

States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 11- 12 {1st Cir. 1978), cert. 

denied, 440 U.S. 918 {1979); In re Grand Jury Inves tigation, 631 

F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied , 449 U.S. 1083 (1981), 

later questioned by , United States v. Li ebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d 

Cir. 1984}; In re Special Grand Jury No . 81-1, 676 F . 2d 1005 , 1009 

{4th Cir. 1982), vacated when target became a fugitive, 697 F.2d 

112 (4th Cir. 1982 ); In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of 

Fine, 641 F.2d 199 , 204 {5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F . 2d 447, 452 {6th Cir. 1983) , cert . 

denied, 467 u.s. 1246 (1984); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 

P . 2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). Some of these holdings are now 

of questionable validity, although they have not been overruled. 

For example, the Ninth Circu it has more recently interpre ted this 

exception to prohibit disclosure of the source of fees only when 

disclosure of the identity of the client would be i n substance a 

disclosure of a confidential communication in the professional 

relationship between the client and the attorney. See In re Grand 

Jury Subpoenas, 803 P.2d 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1986); In re 

Osterhoudt, 722 F . 2d 591, 593 {9th Cir . 1983). 

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We need not decide whether this exception will be adopted in 

this circuit because it does not apply to this case . In order for 

the legal advice exception to apply, the person seek ing the legal 

advice must be the client of the attor ney involved . In this case, 

the record before us contains no evidence that relators have made 

a c l aim that the person paying their fees was a client of any 

kind. At a minimum relators mus t assert that the fee was paid by 

a client. 

Relators must also assert that the client sough t legal advice 

about the very activity for which the fee information is sought. 

For example, in Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 {9th Cir. 1960), 

the Ninth Circui t refused to require an attorney to divulge the 

identity of his client when that client had consu lted him regarding improperly paid taxes, and the attorney had forwarded an anonymous check to the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS sought the 

name of the client to allow further review of the questionable tax 

returns. Identifying this client would have implicated the client 

in the very activity for which the client consulted the 

attorney--income tax problems. Id. 

The facts of this case dictate that we refuse to adopt the 

legal advice exception in this case for precisely the same reasons 

on which the Third Circuit relied i n In re Grand Jury Investigation, 631 F. 2d 17 (3d Ci r. 1980). "The fact of an at tor ney-clien t 

relationship between [attorney) and ( client] has been freely 

admitted and no contention has been made that disclosure of the 

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fee arrangement would further implicate [client] in the matter for 

which he consul ted [attorney]. Furthermore, it has never been 

suggested that individuals who may have made payments on 

[client's) behalf were clients of [attorney]. Therefore, disclosure of the names of any third parties would not disrupt any 

other attorney-client relationship.~ Id. at 19. 

B. Last Link Exception 

Relators argue in this court, and in the dist rict court, that 

this circuit should adopt the last l ink exceptio n which has been 

adopted in a t least two other circuit s. The last link exception 

was largely formulated by the Fifth Circuit in two cases. See In 

re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982) 

("Pavlick''), and In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666 (5th 

Cir. 1975) {"Jones"). 1 Partial ly relying on the Baird case, the 

Jones court held that "information , not norma l ly pri vileged, 

should also be protected when so much of the substance of the communications is already in the government's possession that additiona! disclosur es would yield substantially probative links in an 

existing chain of inculpatory events or transact ions." Jones, 517 

1 The test has also been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. 

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351 (11 t h Cir. 1982). 

However, the Eleventh Circuit has recently interpreted the last 

link exception to apply only in cases where the disclosure of the 

client's identity would expose other privileged communications, 

such as motive or strategy, and when the incriminating nature of 

privileged communications has created in the client a reasonable 

expectation that the information would be kept confidential. In 

re Grand Jury Proceedings , 896 F.2d 1267 (11th Cir. 1990) . This 

very recent decision is broadly supportive of the position we 

adopt on the last link exception. 

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F.2d at 674. This test was further refined in Pavlick in which 

the court stated that it "also recognized [in Jones] a limited and 

narrow exception to the general rule, one that obtains when the 

disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney would have 

supplied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to the client's indictment." Pavlick, 680 

F.2d at 1027. 

Contrary to relators' suggestion in their brief, the last 

link exception has been explicitly rejected by at least one circuit and implicitly rejected by others. In In re Grand Jury 

Investigation, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit 

explicitly rejected the last link exception as formulated by the 

Fifth Circuit. 

Upon careful consideration this Court concludes that, 

although language exists in Baird to support viability 

of Pavlick's "last link" exception, the exception is 

simply not grounded upon the preservation of confidential communications and hence not justifiable to support 

the attorney-client privilege. Although the last link 

exception may promote concepts of fundamental fairness 

against self-incrimination, these concepts are not 

proper considerations to invoke the attorney-client 

privilege. Rather, the focus of the inquiry is whether 

disclosure of the identity would adversely implicate the 

confidentiality of communications. Accordingly, this 

Court rejects the last link exception as articulated in 

Pavlick. 

Id. at 453-54 (footnote omitted). 

The last link exception has also been implicitly rejected in 

the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits. In In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 

61 (2d Cir. 1984), the court found that the purpose of the 

attorney-client privilege was to enable attorneys to offer 

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informed legal advice by encouraging full disclosure by clients. 

The court went on to conclude t hat attorney disclosure of the 

source of fees did not impair the attorney's abi lity to render 

informed legal advice. 

I t is, of course , true that payment of another person's 

legal fees may imply facts about a prior or present 

relationship with that person. However, an attorney 's 

ability to give informed legal advice is not impaired by 

a rule allowi ng disclosur e of such payments .... 

[T]he vi ew of the privilege we adopt thus denies protection to evidence indicating payment of one person's 

legal fee s by another. 

Id . at 64-6 5 . 

The Third Circuit refused to apply the last link exception 

because the exception went further in sustaining the attorneyc lient privilege than the cou rt had been willing t o accept in the 

past . Uni ted States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 810 n . 2 (3d Cir. 

1984). The court did not rely on the last link e xception beca use 

it found that there had been a protected communica tion . Id . 

The Ninth Circui t implici tly rejected the exception when it 

held that "[ f]ee arrangements usually fall outside t he scope of 

t he pr ivilege simply because such informat ion ordina r ily revea ls 

no confi dential professi onal communication between attorney a nd 

client , and not because such information may not be incriminating ." In re Osterhoudt, 722 F. 2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Thus, we recognize a spl it among the circui ts o ver the adoption of the last link exception. This cir cuit has not spoken 

directly to this issue , contrary to the claim by amicus curiae, 

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American Civil Libe rties Unio n, that we adopted the last link 

exception in Uni t ed States v. Hodgson , 492 F.2d 1175 (l Oth Cir. 

1974). In Hodgson we merely disti nguished the facts of that case 

from the facts of anot her case in which the re sponse to a summons 

wou ld have revealed the identi ty of an unknown client . Id . at 

1177. Merely drawing that distinction in that case cannot be 

construed to explicitly or implicitly adopt the last link 

exception. 

The government argues in its brief that this c i rcuit should 

reject the last link exception i n this case because the c lie nts of 

relators are not targets of the subpoenas. There has been some 

confusion throughout these proceedings whether t he cl ients of 

relators are or are not targets of the grand ju ry investigation. 

We think the argumen t is mere ly a matter of semantics. Th e United 

St ates At t o rney admitted during o ral argument that r elators' 

clients could be liable, at least f or money laundering , if the 

information r e vealed to the grand jury about attor ne y's fees 

incriminated t he clients. In fact , the government explained tha t 

it refused to give immunity to r elators' cli ents precisely becaus e 

it wanted to preserve the opti on of cha r ging them with money laundering or other crimes. To suggest that rela tors' clients are not 

targets of the grand jury investigation in one breath, while 

explaining that information revealed to the grand jury may be used 

against them in the next, approaches intellectua l d ishonesty. 

Relators' c l i ents are clearly " targe t s'' of the grand j ur y investigation if information gathered in that investiga tion could be used 

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to charge the clients with further crimes. Thus, we decline to 

follow the government's suggestion that we reject the last link 

test in this case based only on the fact that the relators' 

clients are not targets. 

The last l ink exception is a very narrow one which is carefully fact based. We need not ultimately decide whether even that 

narrow exception should apply in this circuit because we are of 

the view that the facts of this case take it outside the standards 

of whatever is left of Jones, which is the principle precedential 

base for the exception. Unlike our case, Jones invol ved payment 

of fees for one client by a person who was also a client of the 

same attorney. This is an important distinction. There is at 

least a stronger arguable basis on which to invok e the attorneyclient privilege to protect the i dentity of an actual client than 

there is to protect the identity of a third person who may irnplicate the attorney's actual client in some wrongdoing. 

In addition, the most recent Fifth Circuit case clarifying 

the exception, Pavlick, explained the unique fact situation which 

gave rise to the test and refused to apply it in a case in which 

the promise of legal services was made as a fringe benefit in 

recruiting criminal conspirators. The Pavlick court explained the 

Jones decision as follows: 

[O]ur decision rested on the peculiar facts of that case 

and "should not be taken as any indication of how we 

would decide a similar question if the inculpatory value 

of sought-aft er testimony were less obvious or largely 

attenuated." Among those "peculiar facts" was that the 

six attorneys drawn before the grand jury in Jones 

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represented a generous portion of the criminal l aw bar 

of the lower Rio Grande Valley area, and the project was 

a rather broad attempt to canvass that portion for 

information detrimental to certain of its clients 

Pav lick, 680 F.2d at 1027 (citation omitt ed ) . 2 Thus, even the 

Fifth Circuit has limited the last link exception to the facts of 

Jones which are very different from the facts of this case. Jones 

i nvolved a case in which a large part of the criminal bar in a 

certain area was s ubpoenaed to testify before the grand jury. 

This was merely a broad sear ch for incrimina ting ev i dence concer ning fee information . In addition , the attorneys in Jones claimed 

that the fees were paid by an indi vidual which they were currently 

representing professionally. In fact , the Jones court based its 

decision on the fac t that the attorneys were called "for the purpose of incriminating their undisclosed clients." Jones, 517 F.2d 

at 672 . 

The facts of the present case are different from Jones in 

three important respects. First , a large portion of the criminal 

bar in a specific area was not subpoenaed and the informa tion 

sought was specific and aimed at a specified third party . Second, 

relators do not claim that their c l ients' fees were paid by 

another of their clients. Finally, relators seek to assert the 

privilege for their known clients whose fees were paid. Relators 

2 The Eleven th Circu it has also recent ly clar ified the last 

link exception, limiting its appli cation to cases i n which the 

disclosure of the client's identity would result i n disclosure 

other priv ileged communications such as motive or strategy. In re 

Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267 ( 11 th Cir. 1 990). This 

holding is consistent with our resolution of this case . 

of 

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have never claimed tha t they were asse rting the privilege to protect the undisclosed source of t he fees, as in the Jones case. 

Given these factual differences, we do not believe t he Fifth 

Circui t would apply the last link except ion in this case. We too 

reject its application on these facts . 

We wish to clarify, however, t hat we do not reject what we 

consider to be the underlying principle supporting the last link 

exception. We believe that the Fifth Circuit's articulation of 

the "last l ink " exception fails adequately to discipl ine the 

thinki ng of lawyers and courts on this issue. The l ast link 

exception ultimately stems from Baird v. Koerne r, 279 F .2d 623 

(9th Cir. 1960), even in the Fifth Circuit. Rely ing on Baird, 

several circu it courts have backed away from both the legal adv ice 

and last link exceptions . These courts have carefully applied the 

facts and holding of Baird to create what is known as the confidential commun ication exception. The confidential communication 

exception holds that an exception to the genera l rule that a 

client's identity is not privileged exists in the sit uation where 

the disclosure o f the client ' s identity would be tantamou nt to 

disclosing an otherwise protected conf idential communication. See 

United States v . Strahl, 590 F . 2d 10 , 11- 12 (1st Cir. 1978}, cert. 

denied, 440 u.s. 918 (1979); In re Shargel, 742 F . 2d 61, 62-63 ( 2d 

Cir. 1984); United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 , 809 (3d Cir. 

1984) ; NLRB v . Harvey , 349 F.2d 900 , 905 (4th Cir. 1965) ; In re 

Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2- 35 , 723 F . 2d 447, 452-54 {6th 

Cir . 1983), cert. denied , 467 U.S . 1246 (1984); In re Witnesses 

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Before the Special Mar. 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 492-94 (7th 

Cir. 1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F .2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 

1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267, 1271-73 (llth 

Cir. 1990). We believe that the confidential communication exception represen ts a mor e disciplined interpretatio n o f Baird than 

does the Fifth Circuit 's last link exception. Thus, we reject t he 

l ast link exception to the extent it has deviated from the holding 

of Baird. 

We agree that a discipl ined exception to the attorney client 

p rivilege must mirror the facts and analysis o f Bai rd . In Baird 

the mere identification of the client would have disclosed the 

confidential communication from the client that he had committed 

the crime for which he sought advice. The client in Baird sought 

advice strictly concerning the . case then under invest igation. We 

hold that in o r der to invoke the attorney client privil ege under 

similar facts i n this Circuit, the a dvice sought must have been 

Baird-like. In other words, the a dvice sought must have concerned 

the case then under investigation and disclosure of the client's 

identity would now be, in substance , the disclosure of a confident ial communi ca tion by the c lient, s uch as establishing the identity of the client as the perpe trator of the alleged cri me at 

issue. This case does not involve any claim that the source of 

the fees was a clien t who sough t a dvice on any subject. Nor is 

there any cla im that advice was given concerning t h e case now 

under investigation. Given these facts , disclosure of t he source 

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of the fees would not disclose any confidential communication from 

client to attorney. 

The purpose behind the attorney-client privilege is to preserve confidential commun i cations between attorney and client . In 

re Grand Jury Investigation, 723 F.2d 447 , 453-54 (6th Cir . 1983); 

In re Osterhoudt , 722 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1983 ); In re 

Shargel, 742 F. 2d 61, 64-65 (2d Cir . 1984). Informatio n regarding 

the fee arrangement is not normal l y part of the professional consultation and therefore it is not privileged even i f it wou l d 

incrimi nate the client in wrongdoing. In re Oster houdt, 722 F. 2d 

at 593. In other words, while payment of a fee to an attorney is 

necessary to obtain legal advice , disclosure of the fee arrangement does not inhibit the normal communi cations necessary for the 

attorney to act effectively in representing the c li ent . In re 

Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247-48 (2d Cir . 

1985) . Absent one of those rare circumstances in which the payment of the fee i tself is unlawf ul or where an ac t ual client paid 

the fee and sought advice concerning the actua l case unde r investigation as in Baird , we hold that fee arrangements are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

In this case the subpoenas requested seven pieces of information from the relators. The subpoenas asked for the identity of 

the source of the fees , the amount of the fees, the manner of payment , the date of payment , the name of any others partially 

responsible for payment of the fee , and whether any part of the 

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fee came from the client or his family . 3 The subpoena also 

requested all documents relating to the payment or acceptance of 

the fees, includi ng checks, cashier's checks, d eposit slips, 

receipts, wir e transfers, fee con t racts , and IRS f orm 8300 's. We 

hold that none of these requests is protec ted by the a t torneyclient privilege and thus must be disclosed, with one exception. 

We believe tha t disclosing the actual fee contracts has the 

potential for revealing confident i al information along with 

unprotected fee information . Thus, we remand t h i s i ssue t o t h e 

district court for its determinatio n of whether , in light of thi s 

opinion, the fee contracts contain any confidential communications 

that are protected by the attorney-client privilege . See In re 

Witnesses Before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F .2d 489, 495 

(7th Cir. 1984) (remand ing to d i strict court for de t ermination of 

whether attorney-client privil ege prot ected disclosure of billing 

sheets or time sheets) ; In re Grand Jury Witnesses, 695 F.2d 359, 

362-63 (9th Cir. 1 982} ("Salas") (remanding to district court for 

determination of whether fee contract contained commu nications 

protected by attorney-client pri vilege}. The decision whether to 

review the fee contracts in camera i s within the d i screti on of t he 

trial court. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 723 F .2d 1461, 

1467 (lOth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984} 

("Vargas"). However, we believe that in camera review is 

3 There is no attorney-c l ien t privilege between an attorney and 

a member of the client's fami ly. Thus , the attorney-cli ent 

privilege does not prohibit the government from a s king if a family 

member paid part of the client ' s fee . 

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appropriate in this case. See In re Slaughter, 694 F.2d 1258, 

1260 n.2 (11th Cir. 1982) (refe rring to in camera review of possibly privileged documents in context of request for information 

relating to attorneys' fees). Nevertheless, the subpoena , with 

the exception noted, does not request privileged information. 

IV. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 

Relators' second challenge to the subpoenas is difficult to 

glean from their brief. However, amici curiae clearly raise the 

issue of a violation of relators' clients' r ights to couns e1. 4 

Relators challenge the subpoenas on the ground that they create a 

conflict of interest between relators and their clients. Relators 

argue that they will be forced to testify against their client's 

interests or possibly be forced to withdraw from representation of 

their clients. Relators claim that each of these possibilities 

interferes with their client s' rights to free l y chosen and effective assistance of counsel. 

No Tenth Circuit case has considered the precise issue of 

right to counsel in the context of a grand jury request for fee 

information. However, substantial guidance can be found in other 

circuits that have faced very similar issues. 

Several circuits have held that no right to counse l attaches 

prior to indictment. "At the pre-indictment stage, appellant's 

4 Hereafter, we attribute the arguments made by amici curiae to 

relators. 

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Sixth Amendment rights have not attached." In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 1985 ). See also 

In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985). In addition, the 

Fourth Circuit has held that a subpoena can be served after the 

completion of a criminal case. See United States v. (Under Seal), 

774 F.2d 624, 628 (4th Cir. 1985). Under Seal does not discuss 

the possibility of appeal, but the subpoena was served several 

years after the criminal case was decided and presumably all 

appeals were exhausted or expired. We agree with these circuits 

that no sixth amendment rights attach prior to indictment or after 

all appeals have been exhausted. 

After indictment and during actual representation--when sixth 

amendment rights have attached--the courts agree that a case-bycase analysis of prejudice should be undertaken. I n the most 

recent case, United States v. Perry, 857 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 

1988), the court upheld the issuance of a subpoena after an 

i ndictment had been made because the subpoena presented only the 

potential for attorney-client conflict which might violate the 

sixth amendmen t. The Perry court explained that: 

(O]ur decision is guided by our confidence t hat the 

potential f o r prejudice is not "so likely that case-bycase inquiry into prejudice is not worth the cost ." 

As the facts of this case illustrate, there will be 

many situati ons where an attorney's compliance with the 

subpoena will not require disqual ification. 

Id. at 1350. 

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The Second Circuit has followed a similar rule. 

Assessment of whet her the subpoena is unreasonable or 

burdensome, especially when sought to be enforced 

against counsel for an indicted defendant, c a n be determined under the standards of Rule l7(c), informed by 

Sixth Amendment conside r ations. The risk of disqualification should remain for determination at an in limine 

hearing by the trial judge who must weigh the probative 

value of the information the government seeks against 

the loss of couns e l of the accused's choice. 

In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 250 (2d 

Cir. 1985) ( 11 0oe"). 

The only t ime any of the circuits hav~ been willing to quash 

a subpoena on sixth amendment grounds is when the timi ng of the 

subpoena amounted to harassment or interference with trial prepara tion . In In re Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d 13 (lst Cir. 1984) , 

a subpoena was issued right before trial in circumstances arguably 

for purposes of intimidating the attorneys and inte rrup ting thei r 

preparation for trial . The court held that "[t }he distric t court 

could weigh those policies and conclude that the potential disruption of the attorneys ' relationships with their clients at this 

crucial period in their preparation of their clients' def ense made 

the subpoenas unreasonable and oppressive at the time they were 

served." Id. at 18. However, the First Circui t wen t on to point 

out that : 

There can be no absolute rule that frees an attorney, 

merely because he is such, to refuse to give unprivileged evidence to a grand jury. Even when trials are 

pending, the grand jury ' s right to unprivileged evidence may outweigh the right of the defense bar and its 

clients not t o be disturbed. The matter is one t hat 

turns on particular fac ts as evaluated by a district 

court . 

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Id. at 19. The Second Circuit also interprets the sixth amendment 

to include protection from harassing subpoenas. "[T]he Sixth 

Amendment assures [defendant] the right to be free of unduly burdensome interruption of his counsel's trial preparation .... " 

Doe, 781 F.2d at 250. 

According to the record before us, relator' s clients are not 

now under indictment for any crimes that are under investigation 

by the Grand Jury. However, the right to counsel implicated in 

this case involves the clients' rights to have relators represent 

them on appeal. Relators' client s are clearly under indi ctment--

they have actually been convicted--for the crimes now on appeal. 

We also believe that representa tion on appeal is very similar to 

representation at trial and thus, the clients' right to counsel 

has attached.s 

5 We hold that relators' clients do have a right to counsel on 

appeal even though the source of this right may not be the sixth 

amendment. Two prominent criminal commentators have concluded 

that there is a right to counsel for cases on appeal, although 

they believe it is not grounded in the sixth amendment. 

Although they were speaking to due process and equal 

protection claims, Douglas v. Cal ifornia, [372 U.S. 353 

(1963) ] , and Ross v. Moffitt, [ 417 U.S. 600 ( 1974) ] , certainly suggest that the defense appeal from a 

conviction is not part of the criminal prosecution. 

Thus, Ross spoke of the appeal as involving a shift in 

the funct1on of the process that would seem to mark the 

end of the Sixth Amendment gua rantee. 

2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Crimina l Procedure § ll.2(b) at 21 

{1984). However, equal protection and due process rights crea te a 

righ t to counsel during appeal that is iden tical to the sixth 

amendment right. Douglas, 372 U.S. 353, relied on equal 

protection grounds to find a constitutional right to appointed 

counsel on a first appeal provided as a matter of right. See 

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We are persuaded that the test adopted by other circuits for 

cases currently pending should also be applied to the right to 

counsel on appeal. Thus, we hold that a subpoena served upon 

counsel during representation of a client whose case is currently 

on appeal should be quashed only upon a showing that the subpoena 

would create actual conflict between the attorney and client. The 

determination of actual conflict should be made on a case-by-case 

basis. We agree with the Seventh Circuit that disqualification is 

not the most likely result of the subpoena. 

Why would the disclosure of unprivileged documents lead 

to the lawyer's disqualification? It might, if the Government called the lawyer at trial, but this is not the 

most likely consequence of the attorney's appearance 

before the grand jury. . • . We are loath to establish 

requirements going beyond the privilege on the off 

chance that they might prevent occasional disqualifications. 

In re Klein, 776 F.2d at 633 (footnote omitted). This is particularly true where trial is over and the only potential for the 

attorney to become a witness against his client is in the event a 

new trial is ordered. That eventuality is even more remote than 

in those cases where the subpoena has been upheld while the representation was still at the evidentiary {trial} stage. 

The record in this case is devoid of evidence that would 

establish an actual conflict between relators and their clients 

even if the fee information were disclosed; It is not clear that 

also, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). Thus, there is a 

right to "effective assistance that apparently extends to all 

proceedings for which there would be a right to appointed counsel 

under either the Sixth Amendment, due process, or some other 

constitutional provision." 2 LaFave & Israel, S ll.7(a), at 63. 

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relators would ever be required to testify against their clients 

or that the information would be incriminating. Without a showing 

of actual conflict in the pending representation, we hold that the 

subpoenas do not violate the clients' rights to effective assistance of counsel. 

In the absence of actual conflict, we hold that the subpoena 

must be quashed only if the subpoena itself is somehow harassing 

or interferes with counsel's preparation for trial. Relators present no evidence that their preparation for the appeals has suffered as a result of the subpoenas. We therefore conclude that 

the subpoenas were not harassing and should be upheld. 

V. Government Duty to Show Need and Lack of Other Source 

Relators claim that the government has the duty to show a 

need for the information requested by the subpoenas and to show a 

lack of any other source from which to obtain the information. 

Relators base this argument on two different grounds, although 

they are treated as one in all briefs. First, relators and amicus 

curiae, American Civil Liberties Union, claim that this circuit 

has adopted the requirement of a preliminary showing of need by 

the government. Second, they claim that the government failed to 

follow Department of Justice Guidelines. We treat these two 

arguments separately. 

Relators claim that our decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoena 

Duces Tecum, 697 F.2d 277 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("Dorokee") requires 

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the gover nment to show both a need for the information and a lack 

of any other source for it prior to issuing subpoenas to attorneys. Dorokee actually holds that the government must make some 

minimum showing of a proper purpose and relevance to a proper 

grand jury investigation before subpoenas to attorneys can be 

issued . Id . at 281 . In Dorokee, we went on to hold that this 

showing could be made by use of sworn testimony or affidavit. Id. 

Relators make much of the fact that in Dorokee we cited a Third 

Circuit case, In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85 {3d Cir. 

1973) ( "Schofield") to support our holding . Relators claim that 

Schofield holds that the government must ma ke some preliminary 

showing of need. However, we believe that relators miss the point 

of both Dorokee a nd Schofield. 

Schofi eld held that the government must show that evidence 

requested by a subpoena will have some relevance to a legitimate 

grand jury investigation. In Schofield , the court requir ed the 

government to show how a requested handwriting sample , fingerprints, and photo of the subpoenaed individual would be used to 

further a proper grand jury investigation . See Schofield , 486 

F.2d at 93. In other words, the court required the government to 

make some minimal explanation to the subpoenaed individual as to 

why they were requesting the information. Dorokee and Schofield 

did not create a requirement for a showing of need or lack of 

other sou rce by the government. Instead, these cases simply 

requir e the government to provide notice to the subpoenaed witness 

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showing that the information is relevant to a legitimate grand 

jury investigation. 

In this case, relators clearly had prior notice of the relationship of the subpoenaed information to a legitimate grand jury 

investigation. Relators knew that a legitimate i nvestigation of 

Mr. Coltharp was being conducted long before any subpoenas were 

issued. Relators were made aware during their clients' trial that 

fee information regarding their clients would be needed and would 

be used to show a continuing criminal enterprise by Mr. Coltharp. 

Relators received letters from the government requesting fee 

information and were told by other government agents during the 

trial of thei r clients exactly why the information was needed. 

During the fight over the subpoenas, relators offered newspaper 

articles and played a video tape of the government attorney 

explaining how the requested information would be used . In addition , government counsel made explicit statements--on the 

record--during these proceedings expla ining the releva nce~ of the 

requested fee informa tion. Thus, we conclude that relato rs had 

sufficient not i ce of the purpose for which the information was to 

be used and t he l egitimacy of the grand jury investigation regarding Mr. Coltharp. 

We also note that in Dorokee we adopted the requirements set 

out in United States v. Gurule, 437 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 

1970), for the minimum showing of relevancy in cases in which no 

privilege is shown . "A grand jury subpoena is not unreasonable 

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under the Fourth Amendment if i t : (l) commands the production 

only of things relevant to the investigation; (2} specifies the 

items with reasonable particularity; and (3) covers only a reasonable period of time.~ Dorokee, 697 F.2d at 281. We hold that the 

fee information requested in this case is relevan t to the grand 

jury investigation and that the subpoenas are both precise and 

cover a limited time period. Because we held earlier that no 

privilege exists for this informa tion, the subpoenas must be 

upheld under the Gurule requir ements . 

Our hol dings that relators had suff i cient notice of the re l -

evance of the subpoenaed information and that the gover nment made 

a satisfactory showing of relevance under Gurule require us to 

hold further that the governmen t is not required to make any fu rther showi ng of need or lack of another source for the subpoenaed 

information . This holding puts us into agreement with every other 

circuit that has addressed this issue. No circuit court has found 

a right to for ce the government to show a need or lack of anothe r 

source for the information. See Doe, 781 F.2d at 243- 49; Klein, 

776 F.2d at 632-33; Schofield, 721 F .2d 1221, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 

1983} ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 708 F.2d 1571 , 1575 (11th 

Cir. 1983) ( " Freeman"). 

We now address the relators ' second argument that the Departmen t of Justice Guidelines require the governmen t to attempt to 

secur e the information from alternative sources prior to issuing 

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attorney subpoenas. Relators c l aim that the requested fee information is available from many other sources. We need not resolve 

the issue of alternative sources because we hold that the Department of Justice Guidel ines create no rights in favor of grand jury 

witnesses. See Un i t ed States v . Caceres , 440 U.S. 741 (1979) 

(holding that agent's v iolation of IRS regulations did not mandate 

exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of vi o l ation}. We 

agree with the Seventh Circuit's holding that a viola tion of the 

Guidelines creates no cause of action based on the s ubpoenas and 

does not affect their validity . 

The subpoena i ssues f r om the grand jury and is enforced 

by a court; it does not draw i ts force from the will of 

the Department of Justice. Guidelines of this sort are 

similar to guidelines about the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. They may e nable the Departmen t to 

control those in the field, but once an agent of the 

Department acts , the legal status of that act depends on 

other rules of law. 

I n re Klein , 776 F.2d at 635. 

VI. Due Process Challenges 

Relators make several due process challenges to the procedures used to find relators in contempt . These challenges can be 

grouped into three gene ral categories. First , relators c laim that 

they did not receive adequate notice of the charges against them. 

Second, they assert that they had inadequate time to prepare for 

the contempt hearing and that the hearing was inadequa te. 

Finally, they claim that their ethical duty not to disclose confi -

dential information conflicts with the court's order to testify. 

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A. Inadequate Notice 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42(b) requires that the 

notice of criminal contempt shall state "the essential facts 

constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as 

such ." Fed. R. Crim. P . 42(b) . Relators claim that t he notice 

given in this case was not sufficient under Ru l e 42(b). We note, 

however, that each application stated that a subpoena had been 

served requiring the relator to testify before the grand jury. 

The application went on to explain the procedural posture of the 

case . 

(P]revious hereto said subpoena was chal lenged by a 

motion to quash which was denied and the said [relator] 

was recognized back to December 5, 1989, and directed to 

answer the questions and provide the information pertaining to such subpoena. That on said date and at said 

time, [relator], intentionally, refused and failed to 

answer such questions before the Grand Jury a f ter being 

sworn by the foreman thereof. 

Appl ication for Finding of Contempt, December 5, 1 989. We hold 

that this information clearly outlines the essential facts of the 

contempt charge and thus provides adequate notice to relators in 

accordance with Rule 42{b). 

B. Inadequate Time for Preparation and Inadequa t e Hearing 

Relators claim t hat they were given only thirt y minutes to 

prepare for the contempt hearing from the time they were found in 

contempt. They also claim that the hearing was inadequat e in that 

the trial court refused to hear evidence on all of the issues presented . Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42{b) r equires a reasonable time for the preparati on of the defense in a contempt 

hearing . See Fed . R. Crim. P . 42(b). Relators also point out 

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that reasonable time for preparation is the law in this circuit. 

In re Grand Jury, 524 F.2d 209, 218-19 (lOth Cir. 1975) {~Vigil»). 

Relators correctly assert that Vigil provides the law of this circuit. However, the facts of Vigi l indicate that relators' position is not well taken . 

In Vigil a subpoena was served on July 22, 1975. A motion to 

quash was filed on August 18, 1975, and denied during an 8:00 a.m. 

hearing on August 19, 1975. At 1:30 p.m. on August 19, 1975 the 

trial court granted the witness i mmunity and he l d another hearing 

at 4:30p.m., stating that the wi t ness was probabl y in contempt 

but that the court would allow her another chance to testify on 

August 22, 1975. When the witness refused to testify on the morning of August 22, 1975, the trial court held her in contempt at 

11 :00 a.m. We held that "' [r]easonable time' varies with each 

case, and the t i me allowed in the instant case was in our view 

reasonable under the circumstances." Vigil, 524 F .2d at 219. We 

concluded that the trial court had given the witness reasonable 

time to prepare for the contempt hearing because she had been 

warned that she might be in contempt and "[t]his is particularly 

so , in view of the fact that most o f the matters rel i ed o n as constituting just cause had been considered and ruled o n by the trial 

court in its early morning court session on August 19, 1975." Id. 

Vigil is controlling in this case . Here, the s ubpoenas were 

issued on October 5, 1989 , and s erved on November 1 , 198 9. Two 

hearings on the motions to quash were held on November 7, 1989 and 

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November 21, 1989. All arguments challenging the validity of the 

subpoenas were rejected by the trial court at these hearings. The 

relators were then ordered to testify on December 5, 1989. When 

they refused to testify on December 5, 1989, the relators were 

found in contempt. We held in Vigil that where most of the matters relied on to challenge a contempt finding had previously been 

ruled on by the trial court three days prior to the contempt hearing, adequate time to prepare a defense had been allowed. Here 

relators had sufficient time and an adequate hearing at both the 

November 7 and November 21 hearings. Relators were given "due 

process .. in regard to each of the issues litigated on those days. 

Vigil teaches us that issues which have been litigated prior to 

the contempt hearing do not require further review in the contempt 

hearing itself, and thus do not require adequate time to prepare 

for those issues. 

Relators attempted to raise two new issues at the contempt 

hearing that had not been raised in the prior hearings on the 

motions to quash. First, relators explained that there was some 

confusion over whether their clients were in fact targets of the 

grand jury investigation. Relators claimed that the determination 

of this fact changed the entire nature of the proceeding by creating the possibility of immunity. We find this argument unpersuasive and hold that the trial court correctly dealt with the issue 

summarily. As we held earlier in this opinion, relators' clients 

have always been targets of the investigation, in the sense that 

any information collected by the grand jury could be used against 

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them in later proceedings. Thus, relators• clients were not 

obviously entitled to immunity and the controversy over the semantics of 11 target 11 has no merit. Moreover, the United States 

attorney consistently refused to grant immunity to relators• 

clients, further indicating the weakness of relators' argument 

that immunity was a possibility. Finally, the status of relators' 

clients as targets or nontargets is irrelevant, notwithstanding 

the possibility of immunity, to the question addressed in the contempt hearing--disobedience to a court order to testify. Consequently, we hold that this issue did not require more time to prepare than was given. 

Relators also claimed at the contempt hearing that they 

needed to have access to all of the information then available to 

the grand jury in order to know whether to assert their fi f th 

amendment privileges against self-incrimination. We reject this 

contention. Relators ' statements may tend to incri minate them in 

wrongdoing or they may not, regardless of the other evidence 

available to the grand jury. In add ition, this is one area in 

which the government has steadfastly maintained that relators are 

not targets of the investigation. Relators never actually claimed 

their fifth amendment rights in refusing to testify. Therefore, 

the only issue before us is whether they have a right to further 

information in orde r to decide whether to claim their fifth amendment privilege. We hold that rela to rs have no right to further 

information. 

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We are satisfied that relators rece ived due process in the 

entire contempt ad judication. Two hearings were held to adjudicate the only substantial arguments presented by relators challenging the validity of the subpoenas. No new substantial issues 

necessitating a hearing were raised at the contempt hearing . 

Finally , we note that counsel was obviously prepared for the e ventuality of an actual contempt holding . Counsel's preparedness was 

evidenced by the fact that counsel filed a written notice of 

appeal during the hearing on contempt . Counsel was clearly awar e 

of the possibility of a contempt holding which is the purpose of 

the notice requirement. 

C. Conflicts with Ethical Duty not to Disclose 

Relators also claim that the order to comply with the subpoenas violates their ethical du ty not to 11 reveal information rela t -

ing to representation of a client unless the client consents after 

consul tation." Oklahoma Rule of Professi onal Conduct l.6{a). We 

held in this opinion that the fee information is not privileged 

and would not interfere with t he right to counsel . Thus, rela tors 

can only claim that this information is subject to the ethical 

duty of confidentiality of rule 1 .6. We now hold that this information is not subject to the ethical duty of confidentiality. 

Rul e 1.6(c) states that: "A lawyer sha ll reveal such [confidential] information when required by law or court order .'' This 

language negates the entire duty of confidentiality under the 

facts of this case--when a court orders a l awyer to testify. 

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Thus, we reject re lators' claim that the subpoena v i o l a tes the 

du ty o f confi dentiality . 

VII. Puni tive Sente nce 

Rela tors c laim t hat t he trial cou rt violated i ts discretion 

by imposing the maximum possible senten ce allowed and by not 

granti ng r elators bail during appeal. We deal wi th each challenge 

separately. 

First, we hold tha t the t rial cour t ' s 'max mu ~ s ente nce was 

not an a buse of discretion. Such a sentence is typical in contempt cases in ord er to coe rce compliance wit h the court's order 

to t e sti fy . 28 u.s.c. § 1826 (1982) spec ifically pr o v i des f or 

confinemen t intended to c o e rce testimony f or no l onger than the 

term o f the grand j ury. See id . This i s p recisely wha t the t rial 

court ordered, and we do not hold tha t i t was an abuse of d iscret ion. In a d diti on, t his i s not a case where the tri al j udge 

refused to give the defendants t he time or opportun i t y t o purge 

themselv e s. Relators made i t clear that they wou ld not compl y 

with the t r i a l judge's o r der . 

We hold that relators' bail argumen t is moot. We granted 

bai l to relators pending our resolu tion of this a ppeal . 

VIII. Conclusion 

We c onclude t ha t the a ttorney fee information in this case 

(with the e x ception o f actual fee contract s) is not s ubject to t h e 

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attorney-client privilege, and its d isclosure does not violate 

r elators' clients' rights to counsel . We remand to the district 

court the issue of whether the fee contracts contain protected 

information. We hold that the government is under no obligation 

to make a prelimi nary showing of need or lack of other source in 

order to s ubpoena attorney fee informat ion. We also hold that the 

procedures used in this case did not violate due process and that 

the sentence imposed was not an a buse of discre tion. 

The decision of the distri ct court i s AFFIRMED except to the 

extent that i t requires the disclosure of the fee contracts themselves. The fee contracts issue is REMANDED to the district 

court. 

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