Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03835/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03835-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James W. Fort
Petitioner
Kathy Prosper
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES W. FORT,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY PROSPER, warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 05-3835 MHP (pr)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

INTRODUCTION

James W. Fort filed this pro se action seeking a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254, claiming that his right to due process was violated because he was sentenced in

breach of a plea agreement he entered. For the reasons discussed below, the sentence

imposed did not breach the plea agreement as written. The petition will be denied.

BACKGROUND

The domestic violence incident that led to Fort's conviction was described in the

probation officer's report: "In the present offense, the [58 year old] defendant punched [his

wife] several times in the face, beat her and kick[ed] her, causing her to suffer swelling to her

face and her right eye was swollen shut. She was also bleeding from her mouth. The

defendant resisted arrest until backup officers and a K-9 Unit arrived. While at the police

department, officers located .07 grams of cocaine in his shirt pocket." Resp. Exh. C, p. 8. 

Fort's criminal record included four DUI misdemeanor convictions, a misdemeanor domestic

violence conviction, and a misdemeanor conviction for battery on a peace officer. Id. at 5. 

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Fort was charged with violations of California Penal Code §§ 273.5(a), 241(b), and

148(a)(1) and California Health & Safety Code § 11350. He entered into a plea bargain

pursuant to which he agreed to plead no contest to the domestic violence charge (Cal. Penal

Code § 273.5) and the prosecution dismissed the other charges. On November 9, 2004, Fort

was given a suspended sentence with three years of supervised probation, and as a condition

of probation he was to serve six months in county jail, "the remaining portion of this

sentence, as indicated by the probation department is modifiable to a residential treatment

program." Resp. Exh. D, RT 4. The sentencing judge stated that the "timing of the

modification and the specific program in question" was left to the discretion of the probation

department. Id. The court also ordered various conditions of probation, including that Fort

participate in 104 hours of domestic violence training, and that he pay various fees and fines. 

Id. at 5-6. 

Within about a month of sentencing, Fort refused to sign a form to accept the terms

and conditions of probation. His probation was revoked on February 4, 2005 and he was

sentenced to two years in prison. 

Fort filed state petitions for writ of habeas corpus. The San Mateo County Superior

Court denied his petition in a written decision. The California Court of Appeals and the

California Supreme Court summarily denied Fort's habeas petition. 

Fort then his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. He claimed that the sentence

violated due process because it violated his plea bargain. The court issued an order to show

cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent filed an answer and petitioner filed a

traverse. The matter is now ready for a determination on the merits of the petition. 

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged

conviction occurred in San Mateo County, California, within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 84, 2241(d).

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EXHAUSTION

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are required first to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). The parties do not

dispute that state court remedies were exhausted for the claim asserted in the petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus "in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).

The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits

in state court unless the state court's adjudication of the claim: "(1) resulted in a decision that

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that

was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of

law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). 

 “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in

its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established

federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” 

Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask

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whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was "objectively

unreasonable." Id. at 409.

DISCUSSION

Fort contends that he understood that his “sentence would be no more than 6 months

in jail, 104 hours of domestic violence training and 3 years of supervised probation.” 

Petition, pp. 6 - 6A. He also contends that when he entered the plea agreement, he did not

know the judge was going to order an additional six months in a residential treatment

program.

The plea form and original sentence reflected that the sentencing court and the parties

wanted flexibility to get a sentence that would address the problem of Fort abusing his wife

(which was thought to be related to his substance abuse problem), but in a way more

constructive than simply sending him to state prison. See generally Resp. Exh. F, RT 37-39.

The record also indicates Fort was unaware of the actual terms of his probation until he was

sentenced. He apparently thought he still had a right of refusal over the particular terms of

his probation, but had already given up any such right in his plea form. 

A. The Plea Agreement And Sentencing

A form was used to memorialize Fort's understanding of the change of plea. Resp.

Exh. A. The form listed all the charges against Fort and stated that he wanted to change his

plea to no contest to the charge of violating California Penal Code § 273.5(a). Resp. Exh. A,

p. 1. The form had these paragraphs regarding the sentence:

10. My attorney has explained that the maximum penalty, including penalty

assessments, which could be imposed as a result of my plea(s) of guilty or no

contendere is 4 years prison, 4 years parole, $10,000 fine, $10,000 restitution fine,

$220 min. fine, D.V. counseling, actual restitution.

11. I have not been induced to plead guilty or nolo contendere by any promise or

representation of a lesser, sentence, probation, regard, immunity, or anything else

except: 6 month county jail top, consider R.T.P. (residential treatment program). 

Refer for probation report.

(NOTE: Any agreement on sentence where state prison is imposed included parole,

and where probation is granted may still subject a defendant to the maximum penalty

(see # 10) if probation is later violated.)

* * *

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13. I do understand that the matter of probation and sentence is to be determined

solely by the Court and will not be decided until the report and recommendation by

the Probation Department has been considered.

The Court reserves the right to withdraw its consent to any sentence limitation

agreement; and, in the event, I will be permitted to withdraw my plea(s) of guilty or

nolo contendere and all charges will be reinstated.

Resp. Exh. A, pp. 1-2. 

 A change of plea hearing was held on September 16, 2004, the day the form was

completed and filed. Resp. Exh. B. The judge noted that the form said Fort would be

pleading to the violation of California Penal Code § 273.5(a) and he would receive "six

months top." Resp. Exh. B, RT 2-3. The prosecutor interjected that the matter was to be

referred to the probation department for a probation report. Id. at 3. After confirming to the

court that he had discussed with his attorney the possibilities if he pled no contest, Fort

entered his no contest plea. Fort also confirmed that there were no promises other than those

written on the form. Id. at 3-4. The court referred the matter for a probation report. Id. at 4. 

A probation officer's report and recommendation was filed on November 9, 2004. 

Resp. Exh. C. The report recommended that the court impose a suspended sentence with

three years of supervised probation. The report recommended sixteen conditions of

probation, including a requirement that Fort serve nine months in county jail "modifiable to a

residential treatment program" and pay several fines and restitution amounts. Id. at 1-2.

Fort was sentenced on November 9, 2004. Resp. Exh. D, 11/9/04 RT. The court

indicated that the 9-month sentence recommended by the probation officer "exceeds what the

court had indicated." Id. at 3. Defense counsel argued for a four-month sentence with

mandatory domestic violence, drug and alcohol counseling. Id. The court then sentenced

Fort:

Accordingly, Mr. Fort, your sentence is as follows: Imposition of sentence suspended,

you are placed on three years supervised probation. As a condition of that probation,

you are sentenced to serve six months in the county jail. You will be given credits for

50 actual, 24 good time work time, totaling 74 days of credit for time served. 

Now, the remaining portion of this sentence, as indicated by the probation

department, is modifiable to a residential treatment program. However, the timing of

the modification and the specific program in question I'm going to leave to the

discretion of the probation department. 

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Further ordered to obey all rules and regulations of the jail facility or any

institution in which you may be placed. You are to participate in counseling or

treatment as may be directed.

As a separate and distinct term and condition of probation, you are ordered to

enter and complete a residential treatment program and remain until release is

approved by the probation officer and the program director.

* * *

You are to participate in 104 hours of domestic violence counseling, with

notice of involvement to the Court or your probation officer within 30 days from your

date of release from custody. And are to complete that program within one year of

enrolling in that program.

Id. at 4-5. The court also imposed other terms, including fees and fines. After the court

listed all the terms and conditions of the sentence, the following occurred:

[THE COURT:] You understand, Mr. Fort, and do you now accept those terms

and conditions?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't like them.

THE COURT: I don't care whether you like them. Do you accept them?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't accept them.

THE COURT: Under the circumstances, Mr. Fort, you would leave me no

option but to sentence you to the Department of Corrections.

THE DEFENDANT: Let me speak to the attorney. I don't understand what this

means.

THE COURT: It means if you are not – just listen to me, if you would, please. 

It means that if you are not prepared to be placed on probation, then the option I have

would be to sentence you to the low term of two years in the Department of

Corrections, state prison.

THE DEFENDANT: Can we put this over a couple weeks –

[DEFENSE COUNSEL] MR. MORALES: No.

THE DEFENDANT – so I can think about it?

THE COURT: You either accept it or you don't, sir. [¶] Do you understand

and do you now accept those terms and conditions of probation?

THE DEFENDANT: I accept them.

THE COURT: And you understand them, as well?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah.

Id. at 7-8. 

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A little over a month later, on December 13, 2004, the probation department

recommended that Fort's probation be revoked because he refused to sign a form to agree to

the terms and conditions of probation. Resp. Exh. E. A probation revocation hearing was

held on February 4, 2005. At the hearing, Fort's probation officer testified that Fort had

refused to sign the judge's order admitting him to probation, stating that he didn't want to do

a residential treatment program and just wanted to do his jail time and see the judge. Fort did

not dispute the probation officer's description of their encounter. He testified that he had

never accepted any terms other than 104 hours of domestic violence, three years of probation

and not more than six months in county jail. Resp. Exh. F, RT 16. Fort denied hearing the

judge say at the sentencing hearing that the six-month county jail sentence could be modified

to a residential treatment program. Id. at 22. In the next breath, however, Fort agreed that he

heard the judge tell him that he "had to enter and complete a residential treatment program

and not leave without the permission of the probation officer and the program director." Id.

at 23. Fort acknowledged that, after listing the terms and conditions of probation, the judge

asked him if he accepted them. Id. at 25. He stated that he only agreed when the judge

threatened him with prison if he didn't and agreed "just so he can sentence me." Id. at 26. 

After hearing the testimony, the court at the probation revocation hearing noted that

the original sentencing judge apparently had tried to work out a sentence with probation that

would prove more beneficial to Fort than simple imprisonment. The court noted that "if Fort'

doesn't want to agree with terms and conditions of probation that [the probation officer] and

he can work together with, then I have to make then another decision," i.e., the amount of

time in prison he would get. The court found that Fort had violated probation and sentenced

him to the lower term of two years in state prison. Id. at 50. 

B. State Court Rejection of Fort's Petition

The San Mateo County Superior Court rejected Fort's breach-of-plea claim in a

reasoned order. 

The plea form completed by Petitioner shows that he understood that after he pled, his

case was to be referred for a probation report. He was promised a 6 month top

sentence and there is also a notation on the form that a residential treatment program

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could also be part of the sentence. There is nothing on the form that indicates any

limitations on counseling or treatment programs. At his sentencing on November 9,

2004 Petitioner accepted the terms and conditions of the probationary sentence

imposed by the court including a 6 month jail term, a residential treatment program,

domestic violence counseling, and anger management classes. . . .

Consequently , there is nothing to indicate that Petitioner's initial probationary

sentence was unlawful as it was in compliance with his plea bargain.

Resp. Exh. H.

C. Constitutional Law On Plea Agreements

When a guilty plea "rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the

prosecutor, so that it can be said to be a part of the inducement or consideration, such

promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Under

Santobello, the defendant has a due process right to enforce the terms of his plea agreement. 

Buckley v. Terhune, 441 F.3d 688, 694 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). Santobello provides

clearly established federal law for habeas purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Buckley, 441

F.3d at 694. 

 Plea agreements are subject to contract law standards of interpretation. See United

States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986). Because

Daniels’ plea agreement was made in California, the court applies California’s state contract

law, which was outlined as a 3-step process in Buckley.

A court must first look to the plain meaning of the agreement’s language. Cal. Civ.

Code §§ 1638, 1644. If the language in the contract is ambiguous, “it must be

interpreted in the sense in which the promisor believed, at the time of making it, that

the promisee understood it.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1649. The inquiry considers not the

subjective belief of the promisor but, rather, the “objectively reasonable” expectation

of the promisee. . . . Courts look to the “objective manifestations of the parties’ intent.

. . . If after this second inquiry the ambiguity remains, “the language of a contract

should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to

exist."

Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695-96 (citations omitted). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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C. Analysis

Applying contract law to Fort's plea agreement leads to the conclusion that the

sentence imposed did not breach the plea agreement. Even though Fort privately believed he

had some sort of right to refuse particular terms of parole, he had given up any such right in

the written document memorializing the plea agreement. 

Fort's argument has some appeal at first blush, under a theory that there was never a

meeting of the minds on the specific terms of probation. "Where any of the terms are left for

future determination and it is understood that the agreement is not to be deemed complete

until they are settled, or where it is understood that the agreement is incomplete until reduced

to writing and signed by the parties, no contract results until this is done." B. Witkin,

Summary of California Law (Contracts) § 134 (10th ed. 2005). Here, however, the written

agreement shows that the parties left the terms of probation for the court to decide and did

not contemplate further negotiation by the parties or approval by Fort of the particular

probation terms. 

The plea form is not a model of clarity, but paragraph 13 of it is fatal to Fort's claim. 

Paragraph 10 set out the maximum sentence for the charge as to which Fort was pleading no

contest. Paragraph 11 purported to list the parties' agreement as to any limits on the

sentence. It stated, "I have not been induced to plead guilty or nolo contendere by any

promise or representation of a lesser, sentence, probation, regard, immunity, or anything else

except: __." The list is not grammatically correct, due in part to the apparently misplaced

comma after the word "lesser," the omission of a colon or other punctuation to signal where

the list began, and the inclusion of the word "regard." However, paragraph 11 did state that

the matter was to be referred for a probation report. Fort understood that he was going to be

put on probation, as he has consistently maintained that he agreed to three years of

supervised release, although the 3-year time frame was not mentioned in the form. Paragraph

13 stated that Fort understood "that the matter of probation and sentence is to be determined

by the Court and will not be decided until the report and recommendation by the Probation

Department has been considered." The plain meaning of paragraph 13 was that the parties

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were going to let the probation department recommend terms of probation and the court had

exclusive power to determine which of those recommended terms would become part of the

sentence.

One thing that is quite clear from the record is that Fort balked at the probation terms

as soon as he heard them. He protested at the sentencing hearing, he promptly tried to

contact his public defender to complain about the sentence, See Resp. Exh. F, RT 17-18, he

protested when the probation officer came to his jail cell to get him to sign the probation

agreement, and he protested at the probation revocation hearing. He filed his first state

habeas petition asserting his breach of plea agreement claim within two months of the

probation revocation. Fort's activity has been consistent in his position that he did not

understand that he could be subjected to the terms of probation that became part of his

sentence.

The problem for Fort is that, although he may have believed in his mind that he

retained a right of refusal on the particular terms or that probation had no terms, he signed a

form that reflected otherwise. Because the plain meaning of paragraph 13 of the plea form

gave to the probation department the power to recommend terms of probation and gave to the

judge the exclusive power to determine which of the recommended terms would become part

of the sentence, the contract analysis ends there. See Buckley, 441 F.3d at 695-96. Even if

the plea form was considered ambiguous in that it did not specify that Fort had no right of

refusal over the particular terms of probation to which he would be sentenced, and therefore

required one to proceed to the second step of a contract analysis under California law, Fort

would not prevail. The objective manifestations of the parties' intent included: (a) the form

left probation and sentence to the judge's discretion, (b) Fort confirmed that there were no

promises other than those written in the report, (c) Fort did not object at the change of plea

hearing to the referral of the matter to the probation department, (d) Fort knew he was going

on probation, (e) at the sentencing hearing after the probation terms were listed by the judge,

Fort's attorney told Fort "no" when Fort asked if the matter could be put over for a couple of

weeks so he could think about it – thus reflecting that his attorney did not think Fort had any

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right of refusal on the terms of probation, (f) Fort never alerted anyone to his belief he had a

right of refusal on the terms of probation, (g) Fort had been on probation before, and (h) Fort

never expressed that he thought probation had no terms. Under the circumstances, the

prosecutor would have had no reason at all to believe that Fort understood he had a right to

refuse the terms of probation or that probation came without any terms. Although this court

can use 20-20 hindsight to figure out that Fort's problem was that he thought he had some

right of refusal on the particular terms of probation or that there were not to be any terms, he

never actually articulated that. 

The state habeas court erred in two ways, but neither warrants habeas relief here. The

first problem concerns the anger management course, which the state habeas court said was

part of the sentence. The judge at the probation revocation hearing stated that the 32 hours of

anger management was part of the sentence imposed earlier.1

 However, the anger

management course (which is different from the 104 hours of domestic violence training)

was not mentioned in the probation officer's report, in the plea form, at the change of plea

hearing, or at the sentencing hearing. Even the prosecutor doubted that an anger

management course had been part of the sentence. See Resp. Exh. F, RT 4-5. The state

habeas court's statement that an anger management course was one of the terms of the

sentence was "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The second problem with the state

habeas court's decision is the determination that Fort accepted the terms of the sentence. To

the extent this implies a voluntary acceptance, it was unreasonable in light of the fact that

Fort "accepted" when presented with the alternative of an imprisonment. However, it was

not legally necessary for Fort to accept the sentence after he had filled out the form and

entered his no contest plea, so any error in this regard was irrelevant. 

The original sentence imposed did not violate the terms of the plea agreement. And

when Fort violated probation, the sentence imposed thereafter was consistent with the terms

of the plea agreement, which had provided that Fort could be subjected to the maximum

penalty described in paragraph 10 if probation was violated. He is not entitled to the writ of

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habeas corpus. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied on the

merits. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 9, 2007 

Marilyn Hall Patel

United States District Judge

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1. The confusion stems from an apparent error in the sentencing court's minutes. At the

probation revocation hearing, the judge stated that the minutes showed that the sentence

included 32 hours of anger management. See Resp. Exh. F, RT 4-5. The prosecutor

indicated his understanding that it was 104 hours of domestic violence counseling. Id.

Fort also makes the same mistake about the anger management course, arguing that he

did not expect to be required to take 32 hours of anger management training. Fort's reliance

on the alleged inclusion of the 32 hours of anger management to show that the sentence

imposed violated the plea agreement is misguided because it wasn't part of the sentence. 

Further, Fort had already violated probation before he ever learned of that alleged term of

probation with which he didn't agree. 

NOTE

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