Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01214/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Willie Leon Green
Appellant
Larry Norris
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Henry L. Jones, Jr., United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Arkansas, sitting by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1214

___________

Willie Leon Green, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Larry Norris, Director *

Arkansas Department of *

Correction, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: January 12, 2005 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Willie Green appeals the district court's1

 denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition

for relief. We affirm.

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I. BACKGROUND

Green was convicted in Arkansas state court of first-degree murder and

attempted capital murder and was sentenced to life plus thirty years in prison. 

In January 1995, intruders broke into Green's apartment and stole money and

drugs from him at gun point. One month later, the police, acting on an informant's

tip, executed a search warrant at Green's apartment, looking for crack cocaine. The

police used a battering ram to break into the apartment because he would not answer

the door. Police insist (and some of the neighbors agree) that they yelled, "'police

. . . search warrant" before breaking in the door. But Green testified at trial that the

first thing he heard while watching television on his couch was the door being broken

down. According to Green, his recent robbery experience prompted him to whip out

a gun hidden in the couch and begin firing at the "intruders." He killed one police

officer and wounded another during this unfortunate encounter.

Green presented his version of these events to the jury, which rejected his selfdefense theory. The state called Green's girlfriend, Finney, who was present during

the shooting, as a witness to provide evidence of Green's drug-dealing activities.

While being questioned by the prosecution, Finney acknowledged that her testimony

differed from her original statement to the police. On cross-examination, defense

counsel asked about other matters mentioned in her original statement to the police.

The state objected that this was beyond the scope of the direct examination but the

trial court overruled the objection. However, the trial court then sua sponte asked

Finney if she knew what perjury was, defined it for her, and reminded her that she

was under oath. Defense counsel did not object to this exchange. Green was

eventually convicted of first-degree murder for the police officer's death, and

attempted capital murder for wounding another officer at the scene.

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On direct appeal, Green alleged that the "perjury exchange" between the trial

judge and Finney deprived him of a fair trial. The Arkansas Supreme Court declined

to review this issue because counsel did not preserve it by objecting. Green v. State,

956 S.W.2d 849, 854-55 (Ark. 1997) ( Green I).

Green next petitioned for state postconviction relief, challenging his trial

counsel's effectiveness for not objecting to the perjury exchange. In adjudicating

Green's ineffective assistance claim, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that Green

could meet Strickland's performance prong, but he could not establish Strickland's

prejudice prong because there was no reasonable probability that, absent counsel's

deficiencies, Green would have been acquitted. Green v. State, 33 S.W.3d 485, 491

(Ark. 2000) (Green II).

In the current habeas petition, Green again raises, inter alia, the ineffective

assistance claim. The district court denied the claim, finding that the Arkansas courts'

adjudication of the claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. Because the Arkansas court applied

Strickland, and its decision was not only reasonable, but correct, the district court

denied the petition and granted a certificate of appealability on this claim.

II. DISCUSSION

We cannot grant Green habeas corpus relief on any claim that was "adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . .

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The first step in this analysis is to compare the state

court decision with applicable Supreme Court precedent on the subject in question.

The state court decision is only "contrary to" established Supreme Court precedent

if the state court applied a rule that directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent

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containing "materially indistinguishable" facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

405 (2000) (O'Connor, J., for the Court). And a state court's application of the law

is not "unreasonable" if it is merely incorrect or erroneous in this court's independent

judgment; rather, it must be objectively unreasonable. Id. at 410-11 (O'Connor, J.,

for the Court). Nor is citation to any particular Supreme Court case necessary "so

long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court decision contradicts"

Supreme Court precedent. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam).

Factual findings by the state court "shall be presumed to be correct," and this

presumption will be rebutted only "by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. §

2254(e)(1). The district court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, McDowell

v. Leapley, 984 F.2d 232, 233 (8th Cir. 1993), and its factual findings are reviewed

for clear error, Couch v. Trickey, 892 F.2d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1989).

Green cannot meet the above-described standard. In order to succeed on his

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Green must show not only that his counsel's

performance was deficient, but that he was prejudiced by his counsel's incompetence.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, Green

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his attorney's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at

694. As previously noted, the Arkansas state courts correctly identified the two-part

Strickland test as the law applicable to Green's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claim. See Green II, 33 S.W.3d at 488-89. Because the state courts applied the

proper legal standard, the only issue we resolve under the AEDPA is whether the

courts' application of that standard to Green's claim was unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 417 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part

and dissenting in part) ("Generally, in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel case where

the state court applies Strickland, federal habeas courts can proceed directly to

'unreasonable application' review."). Our review of an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claim is "highly deferential." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

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In this case, the state courts made a specific factual determination that the trial

judge's comments were erroneous, and that counsel's performance was deficient by

not objecting to the comments. Green II, 33 S.W.3d at 491. In finding that there was

no reasonable probability that Green would have been otherwise acquitted, however,

the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the trial judge's comments "did little more

than note what was already obvious, that Finney's testimony was at such variance to

her statement as to call her veracity into question." Id. Green could rely only upon

his own testimony and Finney's to rebut evidence that the police announced

themselves before barging into his living room. Under the totality of the

evidence–including evidence that Green was dealing drugs and was afraid of being

raided by the police, and that neighbors heard the police announce themselves before

entering Green's living room–the Arkansas courts determined that there was not a

reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

Id. Reviewing this determination under the limited and deferential standard required

by the AEDPA, we hold that the Arkansas state courts reasonably concluded that

Green was not prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons indicated, we affirm the judgment of the district court denying

Green's petition for habeas corpus relief. 

______________________________

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