Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10464/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10464-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlon Moore
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARLON MOORE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10464

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-01335-

DGC-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

David G. Campbell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 8, 2014—Phoenix, Arizona

Filed October 23, 2014

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Barry G. Silverman,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Silverman

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2 UNITED STATES V. MOORE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion

to suppress evidence obtained through a search of the

defendant’s residence.

The defendant argued that the search was unlawful under

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), because, even

though his fiancée consented to the search of their joint

residence, the defendant was present and did not consent. 

Noting that Randolph requires that the resident who is

refusing consent both be present at the house and expressly

refuse to allow the search, the panel held that the district

court correctly determined that the search of the defendant’s

residence did not violate the Fourth Amendment, where the

defendant refused to come to the door and acquiesced in

letting his fiancée deal with the police.

COUNSEL

Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, and Daniel L. Kaplan

(argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney, Mark S.

Kokanovich, Deputy Appellate Chief, and Theresa Cole

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. MOORE 3

Rassas (argued), Assistant United States Attorney, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Marlon Moore appeals from his conviction and

sentence for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. Moore contends that the

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence that law enforcement officials obtained through a

search of his residence. Moore argues that the search of his

residence was unlawful under Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S.

103 (2006), because, even though his fiancée consented to the

search of their joint residence, he was present at the residence

and did not consent.

We hold today that the district court correctly determined

that the search of Moore’s residence did not violate the

Fourth Amendment. Randolph requires that the resident who

is refusing consent both be present at the house and expressly

refuse to allow the search. See 547 U.S. at 122–23. Here,

Moore never expressly refused to consent. To the contrary,

he refused to come to the door and acquiesced in letting his

fiancée, who also lived there, deal with the police. 

Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence.1

1

In a separate memorandum contemporaneous with this opinion, we

addressed and rejected Moore’s remaining challenges to his conviction

and sentence.

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4 UNITED STATES V. MOORE

BACKGROUND

In January of 2012, Moore was living in a house in

Laveen, Arizona, with his fiancée Kristen Jones, their ninemonth old daughter, and three more of Jones’ children (ages

nine, four, and three). Moore worked in construction, ran a

taxi business, and was the primary caretaker of the children.

The Department of Homeland Security had been tracking

Moore since the fall of 2011 as a suspect in a marijuana

distribution ring. On January 18, 2012, DHS started

conducting surveillance on Moore’s residence based on a tip

from a confidential informant that a large quantity of

marijuana had been delivered there. At 6:00 a.m. the next

day, DHS Special Agent Scott Wagoner continued the

surveillance. He was joined an hour later by nine other

federal law enforcement officials and two local law

enforcement officials. At approximately 8:04 a.m., the

officers watched as Jones left the house and drove off in a

Ford Crown Victoria. At approximately noon, Moore exited

the house, opened the garage door, pulled a Honda Accord

into the garage, and closed the garage door.

A couple of hours later, around 2:00 p.m., some of the

officers knocked on the door of the house and rang the

doorbell. They heard people inside, children crying, and

“shuffling around,” but no one came to the door. After a few

minutes, the officers returned to their cars. At this point,

Wagoner decided to go back to his office to start working on

an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant. 

During that time, however, his supervisor suggested that

Wagoner try calling the phone number that was listed on a

taxi cab that had been parked in front of the home all day.

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UNITED STATES V. MOORE 5

Wagoner dialed that number at 7:07 p.m., and Jones

answered. Agent Wagoner identified himself, explained that

the house was under surveillance for possible drug

trafficking, and that he was “in the middle of writing a search

warrant.” Jones said that her three children, her sister, and

possibly “her boyfriend Marlon [Moore]” were at the house. 

Wagoner later testified that Jones “seemed deeply concerned

for her kids being in the house and the fact that the search

warrant was going to happen.” Jones told Wagoner that she

would leave work and asked him to meet her at the house.

Soon thereafter, at 7:44 p.m., Jones called her sister, who

was in the house. One minute later, the officers watching the

house saw a person run through the backyard, from the house

to the edge of the yard, and heard a loud sound consistent

with something or someone coming over the fence and

landing on the ground in the adjacent backyard. The officers

were concerned that someone had fled the house and thus

increased the law enforcement presence, including bringing

in a helicopter. At the location where the officers heard the

sound, they found two large boxes, each of which contained

a 20-pound bundle of marijuana wrapped in green cellophane

and surrounded by pink foam.

Wagoner returned to the scene and called Jones at 8:26

p.m. Jones told him she was on her way there. She arrived

around 8:40 p.m. After a short conversation regarding the

situation, Jones signed a Consent to Search form at 8:45 p.m.

Jones and some officers then went to the front door of the

residence. When she arrived at the front door, Jones called

her sister and Moore, but neither answered their respective

phone. Jones then attempted to unlock the door with her

keys, but she could not do so because the door had been

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6 UNITED STATES V. MOORE

locked with a dead-bolt that could not be unlocked from the

outside. Jones continued to knock on the door and then called

out – in a voice that “was very, very loud” and “definitely

could be heard from inside” – “Marlon, Nikki, the police are

out here, open the door, open the door.”2 When still no one

answered the door, the officers requested permission from

Jones to break through the front door with a battering ram. 

Jones consented to the use of the ram.

The officers used the ram to open the door. Jones then

called out again, and Moore, Jones’ sister, the children, and

another man came out of the house. Once they were inside

the house, the officers found three boxes of marijuana that

were identical to the two that had been found in the backyard

of the neighboring house, along with digital scales, packing

material, and shrinkwrap. Following Miranda warnings,

Moore admitted that the marijuana was his and gave details

as to his sources and his shipping methods.

The government indicted Moore, charging him with

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D). Moore pled not

guilty, and proceeded towards trial.

Prior to trial, Moore moved to suppress the evidence

seized from the home on the grounds that the officers’ search

of his house violated the Fourth Amendment. After holding

an evidentiary hearing where Wagoner was the sole witness,

the district court denied the suppression motion.

A jury found Moore guilty of count one of the indictment,

which charged him with possession of marijuana with intent

 

2

 “Nikki” is Jones’ sister.

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UNITED STATES V. MOORE 7

to distribute. The district court subsequently sentenced

Moore to 46 months of incarceration, followed by three years

of supervised release.

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

On September 3, 2013, Moore timely appealed the district

court’s judgment filed that same day. See Fed. R. App. P.

4(b). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion

to suppress evidence, but review the district court’s

underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v.

Brown, 563 F.3d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 2009).

II. Search of Moore’s Residence

On appeal, Moore argues that the search of his residence

was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme

Court’s decision in Georgia v. Randolph because, although

his fiancée consented to the search, he was present at the

residence and did not consent.

“The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless

entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary

consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed

to share, authority over the area in common with a

co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so

obtained.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 106. In Georgia v.

Randolph, the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to

this rule and held that “a physically present inhabitant’s

express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as

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8 UNITED STATES V. MOORE

to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” Id.

at 122–23; accord Fernandez v. California, __ U.S. __, 134

S. Ct. 1126, 1129 (2014) (“In Georgia v. Randolph, we

recognized a narrow exception to this rule, holding that the

consent of one occupant is insufficient when another

occupant is present and objects to the search.” (citation

omitted)).

Like the district court, we conclude that the search of

Moore’s residence was lawful under the Fourth Amendment. 

The search did not violate Randolph because Moore never

expressly refused consent to the search. Randolph requires

that the co-occupant both be physically present and expressly

refuse consent. See 547 U.S. at 120 (“We therefore hold that

a warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over

the expressrefusal of consent by a physically present resident

cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of

consent given to the police by another resident.” (emphasis

added)); id. at 122–23 (“This case invites a straightforward

application of the rule that a physically present inhabitant’s

express refusal of consent to a police search is dispositive as

to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.”

(emphasis added)). No such express refusal occurred here. 

The relevant conduct by Moore on that day is as follows: he

did not respond to the police officers’ “knock and talk” at

2:00 p.m.; he did not answer Jones’ phone calls; and he did

not open the door for Jones when she, accompanied by police

officers, knocked on the door at approximately 8:45 p.m. 

Moore never expressly refused to consent to the search and

simply acquiesced in letting his fiancée deal with the police.

The facts at best show that Moore implicitly refused to

allow the police to search the residence. However, Randolph

requires an express, not implicit, refusal. See 547 U.S. at

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UNITED STATES V. MOORE 9

120, 122–23. Moreover, the Supreme Court has subsequently

emphasized that Randolph represents a “narrow exception”

to the rule that “police officers may search jointly occupied

premises if one of the occupants consents.” Fernandez,

134 S. Ct. at 1129 (footnote omitted); see also Randolph,

547 U.S. at 121 (“we are drawing a fine line”). Therefore, we

decline to extend the Supreme Court’s holding in Randolph

to include implicit refusals in addition to express refusals.

Further, Moore’s reliance on United States v. Williams,

521 F.3d 902 (8th Cir. 2008), is unpersuasive. In Williams,

the defendant, after speaking to the police officers, slammed

the door shut on the officers and put the dead-bolt on. Id. at

905. The Eighth Circuit found that this action was sufficient

to invalidate a co-occupant’s consent to search the premises. 

See id. at 907. Unlike in Williams, here, Moore never met the

police officers at the door, nor did he engage in any

affirmative conduct to physically prevent the police officers

from coming inside the house. Moore simply remained in the

house while Jones worked with the police officers to gain

entry to the house. Acquiescence in a co-occupant’s consent

and police officers’ subsequent actions is insufficient to

satisfy the narrow exception set forth in Randolph.

Relying on Randolph, Moore also argues that commonly

held understandings regarding a fellow occupant’s right to

invite third parties to enter a shared residence do not extend

to the use of a battering ram. We disagree. There is nothing

in Randolph that prevents police officers from using a

battering ram to gain access to a residence when the cooccupant is locked out and expressly consents to the use of

such methods.

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10 UNITED STATES V. MOORE

The search of Moore’s residence was lawful and did not

violate the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the district court

correctly denied Moore’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED.

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