Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02018/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Doyle Eugene Champlain
Plaintiff
City of Folsom
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DOYLE EUGENE CHAMPLAIN,

NO. CIV. S-03-2018 FCD DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CITY OF FOLSOM, a public entity,

and DOES 1-50,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant City of

Folsom’s (“defendant”) motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff

Doyle Eugene Champlain resigned from his position as a

Infrastructure Supervisor with defendant on November 11, 2002. 

Subsequently plaintiff filed this action alleging claims for

relief against defendant under (1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 et seq.

(“Title VII”); (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 

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Except where otherwise indicated, the facts described 1

below are undisputed. 

2

§ 12101 et seq. (“ADA”); and (4) state law for constructive

termination. The court heard oral argument on the motion on

December 2, 2005.

For the reasons set forth below, the court grants

defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND1

In 1996, plaintiff Doyle Champlain worked for defendant as a

supervisor for the Sewer Division within defendant’s Public Works

Department. (Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s SUF [“SUF”] # 1, filed

November 14, 2005.) In April of 2002, plaintiff underwent wrist

surgery for an on-the-job injury. (SUF # 3.) Plaintiff returned

to work after recovering from that surgery on July 8, 2002. (SUF

#4, 15.) Upon returning to work, plaintiff became aware that he

would be reassigned to a different job position. (SUF #13.)

In addition, when he returned to work, defendant issued a

notice of intent to discipline plaintiff for his handling of a

sewer spill that occurred on November 24, 2001. (SUF #5.) 

Defendant contends plaintiff was the supervisor responsible for

investigating and stopping the overflow caused by the sewage

spill. (SUF #7.) According to defendant, in responding to the

spill, plaintiff instructed some sewer department personnel to

only work until 4:00 p.m. that day and instructed them to go

home. (SUF #8.) 

Regarding the notice of intent to discipline, plaintiff

received a “Skelly” hearing, which is a disciplinary hearing

provided by defendant and designed to ensure plaintiff’s due

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process rights were protected. (SUF #9.) In July 2002,

plaintiff appeared at the hearing and had some opportunity to

defend himself. (SUF #10.) After the hearing concluded,

defendant withdrew its notice of intent to discipline plaintiff. 

(SUF #11.) Thereafter, defendant reassigned plaintiff to the

position of Infrastructure Supervisor within defendant’s Street

Division in July or August of 2002. (SUF # 17.) Plaintiff

resigned his employment with defendant on November 11, 2002. 

(SUF #2.) 

On July 5, 2002, before plaintiff returned to work and

received formal notice of discipline and reassignment, plaintiff

applied for an Operations Manager position with the City of

Lincoln. (SUF #14.) The City of Lincoln interviewed plaintiff

twice, and plaintiff ultimately accepted the City’s offer of

employment on October 15, 2002, before formally resigning his

position with defendant. (SUF #18-20.) 

Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 25, 2003.

On May 11, 2005, plaintiff pled guilty in state court to worker’s

compensation fraud, relating to his employment with defendant,

but claims the judge changed his plea to “no contest.” (SUF

#23.) 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see California v.

Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998). The evidence must

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be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 

See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

banc).

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating

the absence of a genuine issue of fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the moving party fails to

meet this burden, "the nonmoving party has no obligation to

produce anything, even if the nonmoving party would have the

ultimate burden of persuasion at trial." Nissan Fire & Marine

Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). 

However, if the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial,

the moving party only needs to show "that there is an absence of

evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp.,

477 U.S. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden of proof, the

nonmoving party must produce evidence on which a reasonable trier

of fact could find in its favor viewing the record as a whole in

light of the evidentiary burden the law places on that party. 

See Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th

Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party cannot simply rest on its

allegations without any significant probative evidence tending to

support the complaint. See Nissan Fire & Marine, 210 F.3d at

1107. Instead, through admissible evidence the nonmoving party

"must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

///

///

///

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Although plaintiff’s opposition is overly lengthy, 2

confusing, and at times barely intelligible, the court has

nonetheless attempted to discern and adjudicate, in the light

most favorable to plaintiff, his claims as accurately as

possible.

5

ANALYSIS

I. Section 1983

Plaintiff brings a claim against defendant under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 for the apparent violation of his free speech rights under

the First Amendment, his procedural and substantive due process

rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and his right

to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the

Fourth Amendment. (Pl.’s Compl., filed September 18, 2003, at 2

8-9.) Defendant alleges that it is not liable for said

violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights under Monell and

its progeny. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658

(1978) (finding a municipality may be liable under Section 1983

as a result of a governmental policy or custom). The Ninth

Circuit has recognized three ways that a municipality can be held

liable under Section 1983:

A section 1983 plaintiff may establish municipal 

liability in one of three ways. First, the plaintiff 

may prove that a city employee committed the alleged

constitutional violation pursuant to a formal governmental

policy or a longstanding practice or custom which

constitutes the standard operating procedure of the 

local governmental entity. Second, the plaintiff may

establish that the individual who committed the

constitutional tort was an official with final policymaking authority and that the challenged action itself

thus constituted an act of official governmental policy. 

Whether a particular official has final policy-making

authority is a question of state law. Third, the 

plaintiff may prove that an official with final policymaking authority ratified a subordinate's unconstitutional

decision or action and the basis for it.

Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346-1347 (9th Cir. 1992)

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(internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiff fails to establish municipal liability through any

of the three modes described in Gillette. Even construed in the

light most favorable to plaintiff, only the first theory is even

arguably applicable to plaintiff’s allegations under Section

1983. However, with respect to alleging and demonstrating that

defendant maintained a “governmental policy” under Section 1983,

plaintiff first argues that it is not necessary to establish that

a policy exists. “Folsom did not need to adopt a policy; the

policies are in place under the Constitution and the laws of the

United States and the State of California.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 11

and at 20.) Plaintiff’s argument is wholly without merit. 

Pursuant to the clear dictates of Monell, to establish municipal

liability under Section 1983, plaintiff must show that the

defendant City acted pursuant to a formal governmental policy or

longstanding practice or custom. 

While plaintiff states on one hand that he is not required

to demonstrate a City “policy,” he also states in other portions

of his opposition, and attempted to do so at oral argument, that

defendant had several unconstitutional “policies” in place. 

However, these policies are given short shrift by plaintiff. For

example, plaintiff alleges in conclusory form that defendant (1)

had a policy of “ignoring federally protected rights” (Pl.’s Opp.

at 14); (2) had “no policy” prohibiting the City from making

false reports regarding its employees (Id.); (3) had a policy of

prohibiting an employee from having a second job (Id. at 15); and

(4) had a policy that when it had a suspicion of worker’s

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compensation fraud to request the employee resign, and only if no

resignation was received to file criminal charges (Id. at 19).

Plaintiff does not demonstrate how these alleged “policies”

relate to a deprivation of his constitutional rights nor what

precise rights were affected; how defendant deliberately or

consciously instituted these policies; how these policies caused

the constitutional violation; and in many cases does not provide

sufficient evidence that these alleged policies even exist. See

generally Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347, 1349 (analyzing whether

there was sufficient evidence to establish a policy or custom);

Collins v. City of San Diego, 841 F.2d 337, 341 (1988)

(describing when a policy or custom is sufficient to establish

liability under Monell).

Moreover, it is noteworthy that plaintiff raises alleged

governmental “policies,” that were not alleged in his complaint,

for the first time in his opposition and admits that he lacks

sufficient evidence at this stage to establish the existence of a

policy. “The complaint does not directly cite the practices of

the City of Folsom . . . but he can provide this proof upon

trial.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 14.) Obviously, the court cannot

entertain plaintiff’s eleventh-hour promise to establish

municipal liability at some future date. Even after construing

the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a genuine

issue of material fact simply does not exist. Therefore,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED pertaining to

plaintiff’s claims for violation of his “constitutional rights.”

///

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However, in a State, such as California, that has an 3

entity (the Department of Fair Employment and Housing [“DFEH”])

with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to the

alleged unlawful employment practice, an employee who initially

files a grievance with that agency must file the charge with the

EEOC within 300 days of the employment practice. Id. at 109.

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II. Title VII

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint a Title VII claim based

on theories of harassment, extortion, retaliation, and

defamation. (Pl.’s Compl. at 9-12.) Under Title VII, plaintiff

is required to file an administrative complaint to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) within 180 days of the

alleged unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1);

National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 119

(2002).3

Plaintiff admits he has failed to timely exhaust his

administrative remedies under Title VII as he concedes that he

has not filed a DFEH or EEOC complaint to date. (Pl.’s Opp. at

22; Def.’s SUF # 25.) Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED as to plaintiff’s Title VII claims.

III. ADA Claim

Plaintiff alleged a claim under the ADA against defendant in

his complaint. (Pl.’s Compl. at 13.) In his opposition,

plaintiff requests dismissal of his ADA claim because “he no

longer wishes to pursue this claim in federal court.” (Opp. at

23.) Importantly, plaintiff also admits that his work injury did

not render him “disabled” under the ADA. (Def.’s SUF # 27-29.) 

Thus, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

ADA claim is GRANTED.

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The court recognizes it could decline to exercise 4

supplemental jurisdiction over this claim in light of the fact

that all federal claims for relief have been dismissed. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c) (providing that when a court “has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction” it has discretion

to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction). However,

here, the balance of factors weigh in favor of retaining

jurisdiction over this claim, including the length of time this

case has been pending in this court (since September 2003), the

stage of the litigation (discovery has closed, the dispositive

motion cut-off has passed, trial is set for March 21, 2006), and

the overlapping nature of this claim with the others adjudicated. 

See Acri v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 114 F.3d 999 (9 Cir. 1994). th

Accordingly, the court resolves, on the merits, defendant’s

motion with respect to this state law claim as well.

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IV. State law claim - Constructive Termination4

While plaintiff labeled his fourth claim for relief for

“constructive termination,” it is more properly considered as a

claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy,

pursuant to Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167

(1980). Pursuant to Tameny, for plaintiff to prevail on this

claim, he must show: (1) he was subjected to working conditions

that violated public policy, in that he was treated intolerably

in retaliation for complaining about defendant’s alleged

environmental violations; (2) defendant intentionally created or

knowingly permitted these working conditions; (3) the conditions

were so intolerable that a reasonable person in plaintiff’s

position would have had no reasonable alternative except to

resign; (4) plaintiff resigned because of these working

conditions; (5) plaintiff was harmed; and (6) the working

conditions were a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. 

See also Turner v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 7 Cal. 4 1238, 1251 th

(1994).

In moving for summary judgment, defendant argues, among

other things, that plaintiff cannot demonstrate he resigned

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It is noteworthy that plaintiff failed to discuss in 5

any respect the Wagner case in his papers; instead, in discussing

this claim he raised wholly inapplicable cases involving

retaliation claims, rather than constructive termination claims. 

(continued...)

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because of the alleged intolerable working conditions (even

assuming plaintiff had evidence of said conditions). As support,

defendant relies on Wagner v. Sanders Assoc., Inc., 638 F. Supp.

742, 745-46 (C.D. Cal. 1986), a case presenting similar facts

where the plaintiff after suffering the alleged intolerable

working condition (a transfer to another position) chose, instead

of resigning, to stay in the position, to look for other

employment, to accept other employment, and then resign. The

court held that such facts did not support a “constructive

termination” claim:

If an employee wishes to claim that an employer’s act

should be deemed a constructive discharge, he must

‘put up or shut up.’ If he wishes to claim that he

had no choice but to leave, he must leave when the

choice is posed, not after he has afforded himself

the chance to avoid the unpleasant consequences of 

leaving [by obtaining another job].

Id. at 746.

This is precisely what plaintiff did in this case: he

applied for a job with the City of Lincoln on July 5, 2002, while

working for defendant; during the course of the alleged

intolerable conditions (his reassignment and the disciplinary

action against him), he interviewed twice for the City of Lincoln

position; he thereafter accepted the City of Lincoln’s offer of

employment on October 15, 2002; yet, he waited nearly a month

later to formally resign from defendant on November 11, 2002. 

Under Wagner, said facts do not support a finding of constructive

termination. Plaintiff appears to have taken his time, weighed 5

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(...continued) 5

At oral argument, the court gave plaintiff’s counsel one last

opportunity to distinguish Wagner which she attempted to do on

the facts but the court was not persuaded.

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his options for employment, and only after he secured another job

did he resign from his employment with defendant. Defendant is

entitled to summary judgment on this claim because a reasonable

jury could not find that plaintiff resigned because of the

alleged intolerable conditions.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close

this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 6, 2005.

/s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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