Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04097/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04097-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Avram C. Freedberg
Petitioner
J. Thomas Greene
Respondent
United States of America
Petitioner

Document Text:

' 

-. 

FILED 

United s.~aces Co~rt of Appeals 

r enth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

OCT 11 1990 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and AVRAM C. ) 

FREEDBERG, ) 

) 

Petitioners, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

HONORABLE J. THOMAS GREENE, United ) 

States District Court for the District ) 

of Utah, ) 

) 

Respondent. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

.ROBERT L. I-iOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-4097 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-112G) 

(D. Utah) 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App . P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

This matter is before us for consideration of a joint 

petition for writ of mandamus filed by the government and the 

defendant in case No. 88-CR-112G, Avram c. Freedberg. Petitioners 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-4097 Document: 010110059563 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 1 
seek an order of this court directing respondent to dismiss an 

indictment pending in the referenced district court case on 

several grounds, including the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq. The district court has previously considered and denied 

petitioners' joint motion to dismiss the indictment; however, 

denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on Speedy Trial Act 

grounds is not appealable, United States v. Hornung, 785 F.2d 868, 

869 (10th Cir. 1986). 

We have considered the record of the district court's 

proceedings 

petitioners. 

in this matter and the arguments advanced by 

Under the circumstances of this case, we are 

persuaded that further prosecution of this indictment would 

violate the Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, the petition for writ 

of mandamus is granted, and respondent is directed to dismiss the 

indictment in case No. 88-CR-112G. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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Appellate Case: 90-4097 Document: 010110059563 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 2 
No. 90-4097, United States of America and Avram C. Freedberg v. 

Hon. J. Thomas Greene, United States District Court 

for the District of Utah. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, concurring. 

Under the All Writs Act, 28 u.s.c. 165l(a), we may issue a 

writ of mandamus in aid of our appellate jurisdiction. The writ 

traditionally has been used in the federal courts "to confine an 

inferior court to lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction 

or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to 

do so." Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). 

"Only exceptional circumstances, amounting to a judicial 

usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this 

extraordinary remedy." Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 

U.S. 33, 35 (1980) (per curiam). In criminal cases, mandamus has 

been appropriate on occassion when a district court interferes 

with clear institutional prerogatives. See Will v. United States, 

389 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1967). 

Here, the district judge refuses to dismiss an eighteen-count 

indictment that has been pending against defendant Freedberg for 

over two years. Although the government has repeatedly indicated 

to the district court that it does not intend to prosecute the 

defendant, the district court will not grant leave to dismiss 

because it views the dismissal as contrary to the public interest. 

In my view, the district court's action is reviewable either 

by mandamus or by treating the mandamus petition as an appeal from 

the denial of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). 

See United States v. Carrigan, 778 F.2d 1454, 1466 n. 14 (10th 

Appellate Case: 90-4097 Document: 010110059563 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 3 
' . 

Cir. 1985); United States v. Dupris, 664 F.2d 169, 172-74 (8th 

Cir. 1981). 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) provides: 

Dismissal 

(a) By Attorney for Government. The Attorney 

General or the United States attorney may by leave of 

court file a dismissal of an indictment, information or 

complaint and the prosecution shall thereupon terminate. 

Such a dismissal may not be filed during the trial 

without the consent of the defendant. 

In Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam), the 

Supreme Court explained that the apparent and primary purpose of 

the "leave of court" language is "to protect a defendant against 

prosecutorial harassment,~, charging, dismissing and 

recharging, when the Government moves to dismiss an indictment 

over the defendant's objection." Id. at 22 n.15. This 

explanation portends limited discretion for the district court. 

Still, a district court may "withhold leave if the 

Government's decision to terminate this prosecution clearly 

disserved the public interest." Id. at 29. But in exercising 

this narrow discretion, the relevant inquiry for the district 

court is whether the government's dismissal is a product of bad 

faith or impropriety. Id. at 30, 30-31 n.16. Such a rule is 

essential to preserve the balance of power between the executive 

and judicial branches. United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 

512-13 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). A 

review of hearing transcripts and written materials in this case 

persuades me of an absence of evidence "that the prosecutor is 

clearly motivated by considerations other than his assessment of 

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Appellate Case: 90-4097 Document: 010110059563 Date Filed: 10/11/1990 Page: 4 
the public interest." United States v. Hamm, 659 F.2d 624, 631 

(5th Cir. Unit A 1981). While I understand the district court's 

concern about relative culpability, the executive must be 

entrusted to decide when to terminate a prosecution. See Cowan, 

524 F.2d at 513. The executive's "exercise of •.• discretion 

should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to 

manifest public interest." Id. The reasons relied upon by the 

district court plainly do not measure up under this deferential 

standard, thus I concur in granting the writ. 

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