Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cr-00376/USCOURTS-azd-4_22-cr-00376-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Ernesto Dessens-Romero
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Jesus Ernesto Dessens-Romero,

Defendant.

No. CR-22-00376-001-TUC-JCH (JR)

ORDER 

In this case Defendant is charged with 12 counts related to conspiracy to transport 

and transportation of illegal aliens resulting in a death. See Doc. 60 at 1. Before the Court 

is Defendant's "Motion to Suppress Statements Taken in Violation of Miranda." Doc. 69. 

Defendant argues primarily that his statements were coerced and taken despite his 

unambiguous request for counsel. See Doc. 69 at 1, 8–9. The Court disagrees and will deny 

Defendant's motion accordingly. 

Defendant's motion is appropriate for decision without a hearing because the 

statements at issue were video recorded, and there were no factual disputes. See United 

States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2000) (evidentiary hearing on motion to suppress 

required only when contested issues of fact exist). Neither party requested a hearing, see 

Doc. 70, and the Government submitted that the issue is appropriate for decision without 

witness testimony. Doc. 76 at 10. Finally, Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure provides that the court "shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to 

the decision of the motion." Here, the circumstances of Defendant's interrogation and 

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Miranda waiver were the subject of a video-taped interview. Doc. 69 at 1. The Court has 

received transcripts of the interview, translated as necessary from Spanish to English, and 

viewed a copy of the video. Docs. 69-1, 69-2, 69-3, 74-2. All evidence necessary to decide 

the motion is thus before the Court. 

I. Legal Standards

A defendant's constitutional rights are violated if police interrogation tactics render 

the confession involuntary, or if a defendant's confession is obtained in violation of his

Miranda rights. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432–35 (2000) (citing 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The Court will suppress involuntary statements 

obtained by "techniques and methods offensive to due process." Haynes v. Washington, 

373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963). A statement is involuntary if "the defendant's will was overborne 

at the time he confessed." Id. at 513. There is no "talismanic definition of 'voluntariness'"

that is "mechanically applicable." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). 

Rather, the Court assesses the totality of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 226. 

Those circumstances include "not only the crucial element of police coercion," but also the 

length of the interrogation, its location, and its continuity. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 

680, 693 (1993). They may also include the failure of the police to advise the suspect of 

his rights, Haynes, 373 U.S. 503, 516–17 (1963), as well as any direct or implied promises 

of a benefit. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).

A defendant's constitutional rights are also violated by failure to comply with

Miranda. Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during 

custodial interrogation. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432. Statements made while a defendant is 

in "custody or otherwise deprived of [his] freedom of action in any significant way" that 

are not preceded by Miranda warnings are inadmissible in evidence. Miranda, 384 U.S. at

444. For incriminating statements obtained during a custodial interrogation to be 

admissible, any waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See

id. at 479. A waiver of Miranda rights "is knowing and intelligent if, under the totality of 

the circumstances, it is made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being 

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abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it." United States v. RodriguezPreciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted).

After a defendant has been informed of his Miranda rights, officers conducting a 

custodial interrogation have no obligation to stop and clarify an ambiguous invocation by 

the defendant of his right to have counsel present. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 

459–60 (1994). Instead, they must cease interrogation only upon an objectively 

unambiguous, unequivocal invocation of that right. See id. at 462("maybe I should talk to 

a lawyer" is ambiguous); Petrocelli v. Baker, 869 F.3d 710, 723 (9th Cir. 2017) ("I'd sort 

of like to know what my ... lawyer wants me to do" is ambiguous); United States v. 

Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[B]ut, excuse me, if I am right, I can 

have a lawyer present through all this, right?" is ambiguous); United States v. Doe, 170 

F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) ("What time will I see a lawyer" is ambiguous). By 

contrast, an unequivocal invocation requires law enforcement officers to immediately cease 

questioning. See Jones v. Harrington, 829 F.3d 1128, 1137–39 (9th Cir. 2016). The Court 

recognizes that this standard "might disadvantage some suspects who—because of fear, 

intimidation, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons—will not clearly 

articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present."

Davis, 512 U.S. at 460.

II. Analysis

This dispute is somewhat academic because the Government does not intend to 

introduce Defendant's statements made during the video-taped interview on November 1, 

2021. Doc. 76 at 4. In any event, the Government is entitled to do so. 

Here is what happened. On November 1, 2021, Defendant was in Tennessee custody 

on an unrelated matter. Doc. 69 at 1. Two Tennessee agents interviewed Defendant, with 

agents from Arizona, including Assistant United States Attorney Rui Wang, appearing 

telephonically. Doc. 76 at 2. Shortly after the interview began, AUSA Wang sought to 

clarify that the Arizona agents were interested in a matter unrelated to Defendant's 

Tennessee case. See Doc. 69-2 at 2. AUSA Wang said, 

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[M]y guess is he's represented, and he's already pending charges on [] some 

other stuff, so ... if you can let him know that we're only here to ask him 

questions about ... completely separate things from whatever ... he's in 

[Tennessee custody] for. .... I just wanted to clarify that.

Id. A Tennessee agent asked Defendant, "[D]id you understand what she said?" Id.

Defendant replied, "I did." Id. The Tennessee agent repeated, "We're not here to ask you 

any questions about your case that's going on right now. Because you already have a 

lawyer." Id. at 3. Defendant replied, "Alright." Id. The Tennessee agent repeated, "[T]he 

questions that we ask you, even though we might have asked you before, they're not related 

to this case at all." Id. Defendant replied, "Alright." Id. Defendant then asked, "It's 

something else?" Id. The Tennessee agent confirmed, "It's ... something else." Id. at 4.

The Tennessee agent then read Defendant his Miranda warnings in Spanish. Doc. 

69-2 at 4. The agent said, "I'm gonna read you your rights one more time, okay? .... And 

my Spanish is not as good as yours." Id. Defendant replied, "I already ... hear you the last 

time." Id. Both Defendant and the agent are referring to Miranda warnings given in Spanish 

in a previous interview. See Doc. 76 at 2; Doc. 74-1. The Tennessee agent said, "I'll let you 

look at [the Miranda warnings] with me, so while I read it you can ... read it along with 

me, okay?" Id. at 4–5. The agent then read Defendant the Miranda warnings in Spanish. 

See id. at 5. At one point, the agent stumbled in Spanish, and Defendant offered the correct 

word. Compare id., with Doc. 74-2 at 10:25:37–39. The warnings concluded, "[If you 

decide to answer the questions now, you still have the right to stop the questioning at any 

time, or to stop the ... questioning to consult with [an] attorney]." Id. (English translation). 

At this point, the following contested interaction occurred in English. 

[Defendant]: And where is my lawyer now?

[Agent]: Where is your lawyer? 

[Defendant]: Yeah.

[Agent]: Your- your lawyer for Robertson County, for this case?

[Defendant]: Yeah.

[Agent]: I have no idea. Again, we are not asking questions about that case.

[Defendant]: Alright. No, I'm gonna answer to you. I'm believing you. I'm gonna 

answer to you. 

Doc. 69-2 at 5–6; Doc. 74-2 at 10:26:15–10:26:31. Defendant then signed and dated a 

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Spanish-language Miranda waiver. See id. at 6; Doc. 76-4 at 2. 

Considering the totality of the circumstances, Defendant's statements and his

Miranda waiver were voluntary. There is no evidence of coercion. The mere presence of 

police at a police interrogation is not inherently coercive. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 

U.S. 492, 495 (1977). The total interview is not long, just under two hours, Doc. 76 at 8, 

Doc. 74-1 at 10:22:30–12:18:15, and Defendant was kept waiting less than half an hour 

before it began. See Doc. 69-1 at 1. The agents repeatedly confirmed Defendant's 

understanding of the difference between the Tennessee case and the interview's purpose. 

And the agents read the Miranda warning in Spanish to Defendant and allowed Defendant 

to read the warning in Spanish. Defendant read along while the Tennessee agent read aloud, 

as evidenced by Defendant's quick correction of the agent's Spanish pronunciation of 

"judicial." Defendant demonstrated his comprehension of English and familiarity with 

Miranda throughout the start of the interview. Finally, the agents did not promise or 

threaten any result if Defendant did or did not talk to them. Cf. United States v. Okafor, 

285 F.3d 842, 846-47 (9th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing between threats and accurate 

descriptions of a potential sentence given the charges). 

Whether Defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent is a closer question. Right 

to counsel is offense specific. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). Defendant 

argues, in essence, that he did not understand that distinction or realize that he was entitled 

to a lawyer in both the Arizona case and the Tennessee case. See Doc. 69 at 9. Some aspects 

of the record could support that view. For example, before receiving the Miranda warnings 

Defendant says, "I already ... hear you the last time." That could suggest that Defendant 

did not understand why Miranda warnings were newly required. Similarly, after receiving 

the Miranda warnings Defendant asks, "And where is my lawyer now?" That could suggest 

that Defendant did not understand that his Tennessee lawyer or any other lawyer would not 

appear unless he invoked his right to counsel. 

Despite a limited basis in the record, the Court finds any inference that Defendant 

did not understand his rights unwarranted. First, the Miranda warnings Defendant heard 

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clearly apply to all cases. For example, the Tennessee agent told Defendant, "[You have 

the right to consult with an attorney before you make any statement or answer any 

question]," Doc. 69-2 at 5 (English translation). The words "any statement or answer any 

question" are sufficiently universal to convey the universal contours of the right. Second, 

the context of the Miranda warnings made clear that Defendant could request an attorney 

before answering questions about the Arizona case. Before Defendant heard the Miranda 

warnings, AUSA Wang takes care to explain the difference between the two cases. There 

is no indication that Defendant could not hear that portion of the discussion, or that his 

English comprehension was inadequate to understand it. Defendant even confirms he 

understands that it is a different issue. And, as discussed in more detail below, Defendant's 

question about his lawyer was immediately clarified. The Tennessee agent confirms 

Defendant is referring to his Tennessee lawyer and emphasizes that the questions do not 

have to do with the Tennessee matter. Defendant replies, "Alright. No, I'm gonna answer 

to you. I'm believing you." In context, Defendant means that he believes the agents will not 

question him about the Tennessee matter and will answer their questions about the Arizona 

matter. The final question, then, is whether Defendant invoked his right to an attorney 

unambiguously, such that questioning should have ceased.

Defendant's statement "And where is my lawyer now?" was ambiguous because it 

could have meant at least (1) "If I am entitled to a lawyer, why isn't one here?" or (2) 

"Where is the lawyer from my Tennessee case?" Notably, neither question implies "I want 

my lawyer before proceeding further." Even had Defendant's interrogation begun at that 

point, no reasonable officer would think Defendant's right to counsel had been invoked. 

Instead, faced with an ambiguous question, the Tennessee agent reasonably followed up 

by asking a clarifying question. Defendant clarified that he was asking where his Tennessee 

lawyer was. When the agent said he did not know where Defendant's Tennessee lawyer 

was and emphasized "We are not asking you questions about that case," Defendant 

immediately said, "Alright. No, I'm gonna answer to you. I'm believing you." In that 

context, "I'm believing you" meant that Defendant believed the agents were not questioning 

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him about his Tennessee case. Together with "Alright" and "I'm gonna answer to you,"

Defendant's statements clearly signaled that he was not invoking his right to counsel, 

ambiguously or otherwise.

For those reasons, Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated either through

police interrogation tactics rendering his statements involuntary, or through violation of 

Defendant's Miranda rights.

III. Order

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED DENYING Defendant's Motion (Doc. 69). 

Dated this 23rd day of October, 2023.

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