Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00716/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00716-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Muharem Kurbegovich
Petitioner
Unknown
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MUHAREM KURBEGOVICH,

Plaintiffs,

v.

UNKNOWN “POLICIANS”,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00716-SAB

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION, 

GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE TO 

AMEND ON HIS CLAIM CONCERNING 

THE DENIAL BY THE BOARD OF 

PAROLE, CONSTRUING PETITIONER’S 

CLAIM CONCERNING RESTRICTIONS 

TO MAIL AS A CIVIL RIGHTS 

COMPLAINT AND DISMISSING THE 

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE

On April 23, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

Sacramento Division of the Eastern District. Petitioner also filed an application for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2). On May 11, 2015, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. 

Hollows issued an order noting that the petition appeared to challenge the conditions of 

confinement and transferred the action to this Court. (ECF No. 5). On May 11, 2015, this Court 

issued an order authorizing Petitioner to proceed in forma pauperis in this habeas action. (ECF 

No. 7). Petitioner has consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c). (ECF No. 8). 

I.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner filed this action as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Rule 4 of the Rules 

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Governing § 2254 Cases requires the Court to make a preliminary review of each petition for 

writ of habeas corpus. The Court must dismiss a petition "[i]f it plainly appears from the petition 

. . . that the petitioner is not entitled to relief." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 

Cases; see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990). A federal court may only 

grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner can show that "he is in custody in 

violation of the Constitution . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

A. Restrictions to Mail Privileges

Petitioner alleges that his mail privileges have been restricted because he has been “held 

incommunicado for all mail, except mail to and from court clerks.” (ECF No. 1 at 3). Petitioner 

has raised similar claims in previous petitions in this Court. See Kurbegovich v. Unknown 

Politicians, 1:14-cv-01202-LJO-SKO-HC; Kurbegovich v. “Unknown Policians,” 1:15-cv-0539-

LJO-SAB-HC. 

A habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or 

duration” of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Preiser 

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973)); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules 

Governing Section 2254 Cases. In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is 

the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v. 

Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574; 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Here, Petitioner’s claim concerning the restrictions to his mail is a claim which 

challenges the conditions of his confinement. As this claim challenges the conditions of his 

confinement, Petitioner is not entitled to raise this claim in a habeas petition. A habeas petition 

may be construed as a Section 1983 civil rights complaint. Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 

249, 251 (1971). However, the fee is now $400 ($350.00 filing fee plus $50.00 administrative 

fee) for civil rights cases, and under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, the prisoner is required 

to pay it by way of deductions from income to the prisoner’s trust account, even if granted in 

forma pauperis status. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). In this case, the Court will construe 

Petitioner’s claim concerning the restrictions to his mail as a Section 1983 civil rights complaint, 

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which has the $400 fee. 

Plaintiff is not entitled to proceed in forma pauperis in a civil rights action like the instant 

case. Section 1915(g), Title 28 of the United States Code provides that “[i]n no event shall a 

prisoner bring a civil action . . . under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior 

occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of 

the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state 

a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of 

serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). In order to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled 

to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court may take judicial notice of court records in other cases. 

See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004).

Here, Petitioner has on more than three occasions, while incarcerated, brought an action 

that was dismissed for being frivolous or failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 

granted. The Court takes judicial notice of cases Muharem E. Kurbegovich v. Alameida, No. 

3:04-cv-00537-TEH (N.D. Cal.) (dismissed on October 27, 2004, for failure to state a claim and 

failure to comply with Rule 8); Muharem Kurbegovich v. Deputy Director, No. 2:04-cv-05662-

UA-CW (C.D. Cal) (dismissed on August 4, 20004, because Petitioner was denied leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis on the ground the complaint is legally and/or factually patently 

frivolous, lacks a short and plain statement under Rule 8, and fails to state a claim); and 

Muharem Kurbegovich v. Dinko Bozanich, No. 2:03-cv-04742-UA-CW (C.D. Cal.) (dismissed 

on July 28, 2003, when Petitioner was denied leave to proceed in forma pauperis on the ground, 

inter alia, that the complaint is legally and/or factually patently frivolous). 

These strikes were final prior to the date Petitioner filed this action. See Silva v. Di 

Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1098-1100 (9th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Petitioner is subject to section 

1915(g) and is precluded from proceeding in forma pauperis unless he was, at the time the 

complaint was filed, under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Andrews v. 

Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s petition 

and finds that he does not meet the imminent danger exception. Petitioner’s complaint alleges 

that he has been “held incommunicado for all mail, except mail to and from court clerks.” (ECF 

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No. 1 at 4). Because Petitioner alleges no facts supporting a finding that he is under imminent 

danger of serious physical injury, Petitioner is ineligible to proceed in forma pauperis in this 

action.1

B. Challenge to Duration of Confinement and Denial by Parole Board 

Petitioner asserts that his claims concerning restrictions to his mail will affect the 

duration of his confinement. Petitioner argues that the mail restrictions have caused him to be 

unable to communicate with academics. He asserts that unless he has academics “glamorizing” 

his discoveries, he has nothing to show the Parole Board to persuade them to release him. (ECF 

No. 1 at 4). 

Petitioner raised a similar argument in the objections to the findings and recommendation 

in his previous case, Kurbegovich v. Unknown Politicians, 1:14-cv-01202-LJO-SKO-HC. In the 

Order Re: Findings and Recommendations, the District Judge noted that although Petitioner 

argued that his claims concerning mail delivery affect the duration of his confinement, any effect 

is entirely speculative, and therefore, he was not entitled to habeas relief. See Kurbegovich v. 

Unknown Politicians, 1:14-cv-01202-LJO-SKO, ECF No. 11). 

To the extent that Petitioner’s claim about the mail affecting his duration of confinement 

is a challenge to his parole denial, this claim must be denied. The Supreme Court has 

characterized as reasonable the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that 

California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected by the Fourteenth Amendment Due 

Process Clause, which in turn requires fair procedures with respect to the liberty interest. 

Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 861-62, 178 L. Ed. 2d 732 (2011).

However, the procedures required for a parole determination are the minimal 

requirements set forth in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 

U.S. 1, 12, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 60 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1979). Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. In Swarthout, 

the Court rejected inmates' claims that they were denied a liberty interest because there was an 

absence of "some evidence" to support the decision to deny parole. The Court stated: 

 

1 The Court notes that parts of the petition are unintelligible. 

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There is no right under the Federal Constitution to be conditionally 

released before the expiration of a valid sentence, and the States 

are under no duty to offer parole to their prisoners. (Citation 

omitted.) When, however, a State creates a liberty interest, the Due 

Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication-and 

federal courts will review the application of those constitutionally 

required procedures. In the context of parole, we have held that the 

procedures required are minimal. In Greenholtz, we found that a 

prisoner subject to a parole statute similar to California's received 

adequate process when he was allowed an opportunity to be heard 

and was provided a statement of the reasons why parole was 

denied. (Citation omitted.) 

Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. The Court concluded that the petitioners had received the process 

that was due as follows: 

They were allowed to speak at their parole hearings and to contest 

the evidence against them, were afforded access to their records in 

advance, and were notified as to the reasons why parole was 

denied.... 

That should have been the beginning and the end of the federal 

habeas courts' inquiry into whether [the petitioners] received due 

process. 

Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. 

Here, Petitioner argues that the restrictions on his mail have caused him to be unable to 

receive documentation from academics which would support his theories. Petitioner asserts that 

he would have presented the documentation from academics to the Parole Board. Petitioner is 

not asserting that he was denied access to his records or that he was not able to contest the 

evidence at the hearing. Petitioner does not allege a violation of due process that is a permissible 

federal habeas challenge. See Swarthout, 131 S.Ct. at 862. In this regard, Petitioner does not 

state facts that point to a real possibility of constitutional error or that otherwise would entitle 

Petitioner to habeas relief. Petitioner’s claims in the instant petition about whether he was able 

to receive documentation from academics which he would have presented to the Parole Board is 

not within the scope of this Court's habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Federal habeas relief is not available to retry a state issue that does not rise to the level of 

a federal constitutional violation. Wilson v. Corcoran, 131 S.Ct. at 16 (2010); Estelle v. 

McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S. Ct. 475, 116 L. Ed. 2d 385 (1991). Alleged errors in the 

application of state law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 

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616, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (an ex post facto claim challenging state court's discretionary decision 

concerning application of state sentencing law presented only state law issues and was not 

cognizable in a proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254); Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 

(9th Cir. 1996). The Court accepts a state court's interpretation of state law. Langford, 110 F.3d 

at 1389. In a habeas corpus proceeding, this Court is bound by the California Supreme Court's 

interpretation of California law unless the interpretation is deemed untenable or a veiled attempt 

to avoid review of federal questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 

2001). 

In this case, when the Court liberally construes the petition, Petitioner may be arguing

that the state courts improperly denied his release under California parole laws. However, 

Petitioner does not specifically raise any federal challenges to the application of the state laws. 

Petitioner does not set forth any specific facts concerning his attendance at the parole hearing, his 

opportunity to be heard, or his receipt of a statement of reasons for the parole decision. 

Petitioner has not alleged facts pointing to a real possibility of a violation of the minimal 

requirements of due process set forth in Greenholtz, 442 U.S. 1. Without alleging a federal basis 

for his claims, Petitioner has not presented claims entitled to relief by way of federal habeas. 

The Court concludes that to the extent that Petitioner’s claim that the duration of his confinement

is affected by the mail restrictions actually is a challenge to the Parole Board’s denial of parole,

this claim fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. However, the Court will grant Petitioner 

leave to file an amended habeas petition for his claim concerning the Parole Board’s denial of 

parole before the Court dismisses this claim and the action.

II.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Petitioner’s claim concerning the restrictions to his mail is CONSTRUED as a 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint; 

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), Petitioner is NOT AUTHORIZED to proceed in 

forma pauperis in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint concerning the 

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restrictions to Petitioner’s mail;

3. The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint concerning Petitioner’s restrictions to 

his mail is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, to Petitioner refiling his claim

concerning the restrictions to his mail as a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint

with the submission of the $400.00 fee in full; and 

4. Petitioner’s petition is DISMISSED with leave to amend;

5. Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order in 

which to file an amended habeas petition for his claim concerning the duration of 

confinement and the denial by the Parole Board. As a general rule, an amended 

pleading supersedes the original pleading. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 

(9th Cir. 1967). Once Petitioner files an amended petition, the original petition no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended petition, as in an 

original petition, each claim must be sufficiently alleged; and

6. Petitioner is forewarned that the failure to comply with this order will result in 

dismissal of the action for failure to comply with a court order. Local Rule 110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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