Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01218/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Moualee Kottke
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1218

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Moualee Kottke, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: July 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Moualee Kottke was convicted of bank fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1344(2), and identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(7). After she

entered a guilty plea on April 9, 2003, Kottke opened a savings account in her name

at a credit union and cashed forged checks at the credit union. 

At sentencing, Kottke argued that she was entitled to a sentencing reduction

for acceptance of responsibility. United States Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1

provides that a court may decrease a defendant’s sentence by two levels if the

defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for [her] offense.”

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The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, presiding.

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Application Note 1 to § 3E1.1 provides that “appropriate considerations include, but

are not limited to . . . (a) truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offenses . . . ;

(b) voluntary termination or withdrawal from the criminal conduct or

associations . . . .” Although she admitted that she opened a bank account and cashed

forged checks after her guilty plea, Kottke offered expert testimony that she was

suffering from a pathological gambling disorder. Kottke claimed that her gambling

disorder resulted in an impairment of her judgment with respect to her attempts to

obtain money to gamble.

Kottke also argued that she should be given a downward departure from the

applicable sentencing guideline range because of her pathological gambling

addiction. Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, a “sentence below the applicable guideline

range may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering

from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental

capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.”

The district court1

 refused to decrease Kottke’s offense for acceptance of

responsibility because Kottke committed further acts of fraud after she was indicted

and pled guilty. The district court also declined to depart downward based on

Kottke’s gambling addiction. Although the court accepted that Kottke had a

gambling disorder, it did not find that Kottke’s gambling addiction substantially

contributed to her offense conduct. 

In a brief filed pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), Kottke’s

counsel argues that the district court erred by refusing to grant a downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Counsel also contends that “[t]he district

court’s refusal to grant acceptance of responsibility or a downward departure based

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on diminished capacity due to a pathological gambling addiction, and other issues the

appellant asserts through the affidavit of counsel, all implicate ineffective assistance

of counsel and should be preserved for a hearing in the district court under 28 U.S.C.

2255.” (Kottke Br. at 7). Counsel argues that “the record on appeal does not show

all of [former] counsel’s deficiencies,” and asserts that under the rule of Massaro v.

United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003), “all of her ineffective assistance of counsel

claims should be preserved for a hearing in the district [c]ourt under 28 U.S.C. 2255.”

(Id. at 12). 

Upon careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not

commit clear error in declining to award Kottke a downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility. Kottke’s continued criminal conduct after the entry of

her guilty plea was a sufficient basis to justify the district court’s decision. See

United States v. Ngo, 132 F.3d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir. 1997). The district court’s

discretionary decision not to depart downward from the applicable sentencing

guideline range is unreviewable on appeal. United States v. Charles, 389 F.3d 797,

800 (8th Cir. 2004). 

Consistent with our “oft repeated refrain,” United States v. Pherigo, 327 F.3d

690, 696 (8th Cir. 2003), we decline to address Kottke’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel, because they are more appropriately raised in a collateral

proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, where a better factual record can be developed.

Id.; United States v. Hughes, 330 F.3d 1068, 1069 (8th Cir. 2003) (claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel should not be considered on direct appeal “[e]xcept

where a miscarriage of justice would obviously result or the outcome would be

inconsistent with substantial justice”); United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863

(8th Cir. 1998) (“We will consider such a claim on direct appeal only in those

exceptional cases in which the district court has developed a record on the

ineffectiveness issue or where the result would otherwise be a plain miscarriage of

justice.”). Given that we routinely refuse to consider claims of ineffective assistance

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on direct appeal despite an appellant’s plea that we do so, we see no reason to

consider such claims in this case, where counsel specifically asserts that “the record

on appeal does not show all of counsel’s deficiencies” and urges that “all” of Kottke’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be preserved for a hearing in the

district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Kottke Br. at 11-12).

After filing an initial Anders brief, Kottke’s counsel sought leave to file a

supplemental brief in light of Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and then

moved for a “limited remand for resentencing” in light of United States v. Booker,

125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Kottke did not object to her sentence in the district court

based on the Sixth Amendment or the application of mandatory sentencing

guidelines, so we review her sentence under the plain-error standard. United States

v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 549-50 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 

Upon review of the record as a whole, we conclude that Kottke has not

established a reasonable probability that the district court would have imposed a more

favorable sentence under the advisory guideline system announced in Booker. See

Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553. In declining to depart downward from the then-mandatory

guidelines, the district court stated, “I have heard nothing to give me confidence that

a sentence below the guideline range would be safe for the financial well-being of the

community, so I am not going to depart downward.” (S. Tr. 48). The court then

imposed sentence in the middle of the applicable guideline range of 87 to 108

months, saying “[t]he low end is not appropriate given the extent of the uncharged

conduct and the severity of the fraud, and the fact that the defendant will continue to

perpetrate fraud on the community unless she is physically stopped from it. I see

absolutely no reason to believe that she would voluntarily stop.” (S. Tr. 48). In view

of these remarks by the district court, we hold that Kottke has failed to show that she

is entitled to relief under the plain-error standard of Pirani. We also conclude that

Kottke’s sentence, which was within the advisory guideline range, was reasonable

with regard to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

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Following our independent review of the record, see Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.

75 (1988), we find no non-frivolous issues for direct appeal. We thus affirm the

judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

Appellant’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief and motion for limited

remand are denied. We note that the district court may consider appointment of

counsel for purposes of a separate action seeking relief under § 2255, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 3006A(a)(2)(B), and because of the efficiencies involved, it often will be

appropriate to reappoint appellate counsel if he or she is not the subject of the claimed

ineffective assistance. In this case, we see no reason why the district court should not

reappoint appellate counsel to represent Kottke in connection with any § 2255 motion

that she may file. 

______________________________

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