Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01830/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01830-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Lee Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1830

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota.

David Lee Anderson, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 16

 Filed: March 1, 2006 

___________

Before 

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

David Paul Anderson pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court1

 found that Anderson had three

prior convictions for violent felonies and imposed the mandatory minimum sentence

of 180 months under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

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North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (permitting a defendant to

maintain his or her claims of innocence while admitting that the government possesses

the evidence necessary to successfully prosecute the charged offense). 

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Anderson appeals, arguing that the district court should not have classified two of his

prior convictions as violent felonies. Based upon our de novo review, United States

v. Abernathy, 277 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir. 2002), we affirm the district court’s

determination that the prior convictions qualify as violent felonies.

The challenged prior convictions are for Criminal Sexual Conduct in the

Second Degree in violation of Minnesota Statutes 609.343(1)(a) (1996). Anderson’s

Minnesota convictions followed his entry of an Alford plea2

 on two counts of

Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree for conduct that occurred on separate

dates and involved separate acts. In section 609.343(1)(a), Minnesota defines

Criminal Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree as sexual contact with a complainant

under the age of 13 years by an actor more than 36 months older than the complainant.

Minnesota defines sexual contact as “the intentional touching by the actor of the

complainant’s intimate parts” directly or through “the clothing covering the immediate

area of the intimate parts” if the touching occurs with “sexual or aggressive intent.”

Minn. Stat. 609.341(11)(a) (1996).

Anderson argues first that the district court improperly used Minnesota’s

statutory definition for Criminal Sexual Conduct in the First Degree when analyzing

the applicability of § 924(e). He also argues that the statutory definition for Criminal

Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree is not a violent felony under § 924(e). Because

our review is de novo and because we find that the statutory definition for Criminal

Sexual Conduct in the Second Degree is a violent felony, we need not address

Anderson’s first argument.

The Armed Career Criminal Act defines a violent felony as a crime that “(i) has

as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

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Guideline Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) n.1 (1998) defined the term aggravated

felony through reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), which in turn relied upon the

crime of violence definition then found in 18 U.S.C. § 16. In its present form,

Guidelines Section 2L1.2(b) includes reference to crimes of violence, and the notes

to that section expressly set forth sexual assaults as qualifying crimes of violence.

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person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,

or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). We have repeatedly stated that we

interpret the term violent felony in § 924(e) in the same manner that we interpret the

term crime of violence in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 422

F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The guidelines definition of ‘crime of violence’ found

in § 4B1.2 is also viewed as interchangeable with the statutory definition of ‘violent

felony’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).”); United States v. Johnson, 326 F.3d 934, 936

(8th Cir. 2003) (“The definition of ‘violent felony’ and ‘crime of violence’ are almost

identical[.]”). 

Our court has never held that a conviction under the specific Minnesota statute

at issue in this case qualifies as a violent felony under § 924(e) or as a crime of

violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. We have, however, held that a conviction under an

almost identical Nebraska statute qualifies as a crime of violence within the meaning

of another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 16. See United States v. Alas-Castro, 184 F.3d

812, 813 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that a conviction under Nebraska Revised Statutes

§ 28-320.01(1) (1995) qualified as an aggravated felony within the meaning of

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (1998), and therefore as a crime of violence under §16).3

The Nebraska statute at issue in Alas-Castro is materially indistinguishable from the

Minnesota statute at issue here, the only difference being that under the Nebraska law,

the complainant’s age must be 14 years or younger and the actors age must be 19

years or older. See Neb. Rev. St. § 28-318(5) (defining sexual contact for the purpose

of Neb. Rev. St. § 28-320.01(1)).

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18 U.S.C. § 16 does not define the term crime of violence in the same manner

that § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 define the terms violent felony and crime of

violence, respectively. Whereas the latter provisions include offenses that involve

serious risk of physical injury, § 16 encompasses offenses that involve “substantial

risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the

course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16. Although these definitions differ,

we have previously stated that “[a]ll crimes which by their nature involve a substantial

risk of physical force share the risk of harm.” United States v. Rodriguez, 979 F.2d

138, 141 (8th Cir. 1992). Further, our analysis in Alas-Castro demonstrates that the

differences between the definitions for crime of violence in § 16 and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2

do not matter in the context of felony sexual contact with children. See Alas-Castro,

184 F.3d at 813 (“ . . . this type of contact between parties of differing physical and

emotional maturity carries a substantial risk that physical force . . . may be used in

committing the offense.”). We believe it is clear that the risk of harm or physical

injury in this case is inseparable from the risk of use of physical force.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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