Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50461/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50461-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Peter Hugh Pocklington
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PETER HUGH POCKLINGTON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50461

D.C. No.

5:09-cr-00043-VAP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 6, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 2, 2015

Before: Andrew J. Kleinfeld, M. Margaret McKeown,

and Milan D. Smith, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge McKeown

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2 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the district court’s order retroactively

revoking a defendant’s probation and imposing penalties for

purported probation violations.

The panel held that 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c), which conditions

the “power of the court” to adjudicate probation violations

after the probation period expires on the issuance of “a

warrant or summons” before the expiration date, is

jurisdictional, and that because the government did not get a

warrant or summons before the defendant’s probation

expired, the district court lacked jurisdiction to extend the

defendant’s probation beyond its termination date.

COUNSEL

BeckyWalker James (argued), James & Stewart LLP, Pacific

Palisades, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Joseph B. Widman (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, Riverside California; Stephanie Yonekura, Acting

United States Attorney, and Robert E. Dugdale, Assistant

United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Riverside

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 3

OPINION

McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:

The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of

1994 conditions the “power of the court” to adjudicate

probation violations after the probation period expires on the

issuance of “a warrant or summons” before the expiration

date. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(c). In this appeal, we consider the

court’s authorityto retroactivelyrevoke probation and impose

a criminal sentence after the period of probation has expired. 

We hold that § 3565(c) is jurisdictional and that when

Congress used the words “warrant or summons,” it meant

them. Close enough doesn’t fly under the statute. If the

government suspects wrongdoing and wants to extend the

probation period, § 3565(c) provides easy-to-follow

instructions: get a warrant or summons before the probation

expires. Because the government did not do so, the district

court lacked jurisdiction to extend Peter Pocklington’s

probation beyond its termination date. We reverse and vacate

the district court’s post-termination order revoking

Pocklington’s probation and imposing penalties for purported

probation violations.

BACKGROUND

In his heyday a few decades ago, Pocklington built a

billion-dollar financial empire and was one of the most

famous businessmen in Canada. By the 1980s, he owned the

country’s largest car dealership, an array of real estate

holdings and food manufacturing companies, and, in a

hockey-crazed country, the NHL’s Edmonton Oilers—a team

that, under his ownership, won a record five StanleyCups but

also earned a slice of sports infamy by trading away the

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4 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

game’s all-time greatest player, Wayne Gretzky. By 2008,

Pocklington’s riches had run out, and he had amassed over

$19 million in liabilities. He filed for bankruptcy that year

after he moved south to Indian Wells, California.

As part of his bankruptcy petition, Pocklington certified

that he did not hold or control property owned by another

person. In truth, though, Pocklington controlled two storage

units containing almost $10,000 of his wife’s property—

including clothes, pictures, china, fishing gear, and sports

memorabilia—and $9,344.63 in two undisclosed bank

accounts. When these assets were unearthed, Pocklington

was charged with two counts of bankruptcy fraud. He

averted these charges by pleading guilty to the lesser offense

of perjury. Pocklington was sentenced to a two-year term of

probation, running from October 27, 2010 to October 26,

2012.

In June 2012, toward the end of Pocklington’s probation

period, the Probation Office received a letter from an attorney

representing Pocklington’s creditors. The letter alleged that

Pocklington failed to disclose his ownership interest in his $2

million house, a majority ownership stake in a nutritional

drink company, and positions on four corporate boards. 

Pocklington also failed to disclose millions of dollars in

assets and income, according to the letter.

The Probation Office notified the district court about the

letter, but asserted that despite the allegations, “there is no

violation of Probation” and requested that the court “allow

supervision to expire as scheduled on October 26, 2012.” 

The district court disagreed, noting that Pocklington may

have violated the probation term that he “shall not commit

any violation of local, state or federal law or ordinance.” In

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UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 5

response, the Probation Office assigned an FBI agent to

review the matter; he “spent several days combing over the

allegations” set forth in the letter. The agent concluded that

he “did not see any obvious violations of Mr. Pockington’s

probation” and that investigating the matter would take a year

or more. Nevertheless, the Probation Office requested that

the court extend Pocklington’s probation for 90 days “in an

effort to work with the U.S. Attorney and their agents to

determine if any additional information can be discovered

regarding possible violations.”

On October 19, 2012, the district court issued an “order

to show cause”—in effect, ordering a hearing on whether

Pocklington’s probation should be extended. However, the

district court did not conduct that hearing until October

31—five days after Pocklington’s probation expired. At the

hearing, the court ordered a 90-day extension to run

retroactively from October 26, 2012 to January 24, 2013. 

After further investigation, the Probation Office alleged that

Pocklington violated the terms of his probation by failing to

submit truthful written reports and failing to provide accurate

financial statements. Almost a year after the show-cause

order, in September 2013, the district court revoked

Pocklington’s probation and sentenced him to six months

imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release,

including six months of home detention.

ANALYSIS

The central issue in this appeal is whether the

requirements for extending probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3565

are jurisdictional. Section 3565(c) provides:

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6 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

The power of the court to revoke a sentence of

probation for violation of a condition of

probation, and to impose another sentence,

extends beyond the expiration of the term of

probation for any period reasonably necessary

for the adjudication of matters arising before

its expiration if, prior to its expiration, a

warrant or summons has been issued on the

basis of an allegation of such a violation.

We conclude that the plain language limiting the “power

of the court” sets out a jurisdictional rule. Because the

government did not comply with the statute’s strictures, the

district court did not have the power to extend retroactively

and later revoke Pocklington’s probation.

Although Pocklington did not raise his jurisdictional

argument below, we “review subject matter jurisdiction de

novo despite any failure to object . . . in the trial court.” 

Schnabel v. Lui, 302 F.3d 1023, 1029 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1996)

(noting that, in criminal case, “[w]e review de novo a district

court’s assumption of [subject matter] jurisdiction.” (second

alteration in original) (quoting United States v.

Vasquez–Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 838–39 (9th Cir. 1994)); but

see United States v. Madden, 515 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.

2008) (applying plain-error review to jurisdictional inquiry

under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i)).

Jurisdictional provisions set out “the courts’ statutory or

constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” United States v.

Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002) (emphasis in original)

(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

89 (1998)). Although the Supreme Court has warned against

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UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 7

overuse of the term jurisdictional, Congress “need not use

magic words” to make a jurisdictional rule; all that is required

is a “‘clear’ indication that Congress wanted the rule to be

‘jurisdictional.’” Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki,

562 U.S. 428, 435–36 (2011) (quoting Arbaugh v. Y&H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006)). Central to the inquiry

is whether the provision “speak[s] in jurisdictional terms . . .” 

Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World

Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982)). To speak the

language of jurisdiction, Congress can do no better than

frame a provision in terms of the power of the court. 

Landgraf v. USI Film. Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 274 (1994)

(“[J]urisdictional statutes ‘speak to the power of the court

rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties.’”

(quoting Republic Nat’l Bank of Miami v. United States,

506 U.S. 80, 100 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)).

The unmistakable language of § 3565(c)—defining the

“power of the court to revoke a sentence of probation”—

could hardly speak more clearly to the district court’s

jurisdiction-defining “power to adjudicate the case.” Cotton,

535 U.S. at 630. We have characterized the statute as

jurisdictional, explaining that § 3565(c) “allows the court to

retain jurisdiction” if its requirements are met. United States

v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014). In

the same vein, we described identical language in the

companion provision dealing with supervised release, see

§ 3583(i), as “extend[ing] the jurisdiction of the federal

court.” United States v. Garrett, 253 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir.

2001); see also United States v. Vargas-Amaya, 389 F.3d 901,

907 (9th Cir. 2004). Our precedent is aligned with that of the

Second and Third Circuits, which both treat § 3583(i) as

jurisdictional. United States v. Merlino, 785 F.3d 79, 81 (3d

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8 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

Cir. 2015); United States v. Janvier, 599 F.3d 264, 267 (2d

Cir. 2010).

The government’s argument that plain-error review

nevertheless applies is unavailing. Its citation to a single

published case, the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Madden, is not

persuasive. 515 F.3d at 608. To begin, that case did not

involve the timing or retroactive extension of probation. 

Rather, in Madden, there was “no dispute that the [] warrant

was issued before [the defendant’s]supervised-released term

expired, and it therefore met the requirements set out in

§ 3583(i).” Id. at 607–08. Of course, that is precisely the

problem in this case—no warrant was issued before

Pocklington’s probation expired. Significantly, the Sixth

Circuit repeatedly described § 3583(i) as a jurisdictional

provision, labeling the question on appeal as “[t]he district

court’s jurisdiction over Madden’s supervised-release

violation” and its “[j]urisdiction to sanction Madden under

18 U.S.C. §3583(i).” Id. at 605, 606.

As the government acknowledges, we have “no authority

to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements.” 

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007); see also

Merlino, 785 F.3d at 87–88 (holding that, as a jurisdictional

rule, § 3583(i) is not subject to equitable tolling). That

wiggle room falls within Congress’s province. Here,

Congress has prescribed a specific procedure for extending

the jurisdiction of the district court beyond the expiration of

probation: the issuance of a “warrant” or “summons” before

the probation period expires.1

1 The government argued, for the first time in a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j)

letter three days before oral argument, that § 3565(c) is susceptible to what

it terms “extra-textual” tolling, citing two cases where we applied the

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UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 9

Our precedent is clear: A warrant must comply with the

Fourth Amendment, which provides that “no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see Vargas-Amaya,

389 F.3d at 906–07. Hence, a warrant “must have been based

upon sworn allegations that the person violated a condition

of” supervised release or probation; it “cannot allege

something less than” such a violation. Vargas-Amaya,

389 F.3d at 905–06. A summons similarly requires

allegations supported by probable cause. United States v.

Greenberg, 320 F.2d 467, 471 (9th Cir. 1963) (holding that

rules for “issuance of a warrant are the same” as with

“issuance of a summons . . . insofar as the requirement of

probable cause is concerned.”); see also see Fed. R. Crim. P.

4 (describing summons and warrant interchangeably).

The Probation Office’s request to extend probation issued

October 18, 2012 can hardly be classified as a warrant

because the Probation Office lacks the power to issue one. 

See Sherman v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 502 F.3d 869, 875 (9th

Cir. 2007) (noting that a judge or court must issue a warrant).

The Probation Office was crystal clear about the absence

of anything resembling probable cause. The Probation Office

first stated unequivocally that Pocklington had not violated

his probation and then, upon prodding by the district court

fugitive tolling doctrine to the supervised release statute. See United

States v. Watson, 633 F.3d 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v.

Ignacio Juarez, 601 F.3d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). In both

Watson and Ignacio Juarez, however, the defendants conceded the general

validity of the fugitive tolling doctrine without reference to Bowles. 

Fugitive tolling is inapposite to the facts of Pocklington’s case, so we need

not resolve any tension between Watson and Ignacio Juarez and the

Supreme Court’s statements in Bowles.

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10 UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON

and an FBI review, confirmed that it “did not see any obvious

violations of Mr. Pocklington’s Probation.” The ultimate

request for more time to “determine if any additional

information can be discovered regarding possible violations”

expressed, at most, the aspiration that wrongdoing might be

uncovered at some unknown future date.

The district court’s response to the Probation Office—a

one-sentence handwritten note for an “order to show cause

hearing”—has none of the indicia of a warrant. Rather than

confirming the existence of probable cause, that note simply

contemplated giving the Probation Office extra time to

“determine if there are any violations of Probation.”

The government’s argument that § 3565(c) permits the

extension of probation any time a court issues the “functional

equivalent” of a warrant falls flat. This approach would

require us to ignore the provision’s plain language—a

cardinal sin of statutory interpretation. “We decline to ‘read

words into a statute that are not there.’” United States v.

Schales, 546 F.3d 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting United

States v. Watkins, 278 F.3d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

Congress pegged jurisdiction to the issuance of a “warrant”

or “summons”—not the functional equivalent of a warrant or

summons. See Merlino, 785 F.3d at 87–88 (rejecting

“functional equivalence” test for warrant or summons);

Janvier, 599 F.3d at 268 (same).

We are not alone in our adherence to the statutory text. 

In Janvier, the district court ordered the issuance of a warrant

before the defendant’s probation expired, but the order wasn’t

carried out until two days after expiration. 599 F.3d at 265. 

Although the government argued that the district court’s

warrant order was an “analogous circumstance[]” to the

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UNITED STATES V. POCKLINGTON 11

actual issuance of the warrant, the Second Circuit disagreed

and noted that “[t]he statute states that the extension of

jurisdiction occurs when ‘a warrant or summons has been

issued,’ clearly referencing the issuance of a warrant as an

action that has been perfected.” Id. at 267–68 (quoting

18 U.S.C. § 3583(I)). The Third Circuit is in accord. See

Merlino, 785 F.3d at 84 (noting “strict application” of

jurisdictional requirements in supervised release cases). Like

our sister circuits, we decline to fudge the plain language of

§ 3565(c). If anything, the government is on weaker ground

than in Janvier because no warrant or summons was even

issued, much less “perfected,” before Pocklington’s probation

expired.

The district court lacked jurisdiction under § 3565(c) to

extend Pocklington’s probation beyond its October 26, 2012

expiration date. We vacate the September 13, 2013 order

revoking Pocklington’s probation and sentencing him to six

months in prison and two years of supervised release.2

VACATED.

2

In light of our holding, we need not consider Pocklington’s remaining

arguments that his due process rights were violated, the government broke

grand jury secrecy rules, and his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

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