Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-57104/USCOURTS-ca9-13-57104-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Madonna Louise Ciccone
Appellee
Lexor Music, Inc.
Appellee
Shep Pettibone
Appellee
VMG Salsoul, LLC
Appellant
WB Music Corporation
Appellee
Warner Bros. Records, Inc.
Appellee
Warner Music Group
Appellee
Webo Girl Publishing, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

VMG SALSOUL, LLC, a

Delaware limited liability

company,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MADONNA LOUISE

CICCONE, professionally

known as Madonna, an

individual; SHEP PETTIBONE,

an individual; WB MUSIC

CORPORATION, a Delaware

corporation; WEBO GIRL

PUBLISHING, INC., a

California corporation;

LEXOR MUSIC, INC., a New

York corporation; WARNER

MUSIC GROUP, a Delaware

corporation; WARNER BROS.

RECORDS, INC., a Delaware

corporation,

Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 13-57104

14-55837

D.C. No.

2:12-cv-05967-BRO-CW

OPINION

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2 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Beverly Reid O’Connell, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 5, 2016

Pasadena, California

Filed June 2, 2016

Before: Barry G. Silverman and Susan P. Graber, Circuit

Judges, and David A. Ezra,*

 District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Graber;

Dissent by Judge Silverman

SUMMARY**

Copyright

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment

in favor of the defendants and vacated an award of attorney’s

fees on a claim that in the Madonna song Vogue, a modified

version of a horn segment allegedly copied from a song

known as Love Break violated the plaintiff’s copyrights to

Love Break.

* The Honorable David A. Ezra, United States District Judge for the

District of Hawaii, sitting by designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 3

Affirming the district court’s summary judgment, the

panel held that any copying that occurred was “de mimimis”

and not an infringement of either the composition or the

sound recording of Love Break. The panel agreed with the

district court that, as a matter of law, a general audience

would not recognize the brief snippet in Vogue as originating

from Love Break. Disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit, the

panel held that Congress did not eliminate the de minimis

exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound

recording in 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).

The panel held that the district court abused its discretion

in granting attorney’s fees to the defendants under 17 U.S.C.

§ 505. The panel held that a claim premised on a legal theory

adopted by the only circuit court to have addressed the issue

is, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable.

Dissenting, Judge Silverman wrote that the court should

follow the Sixth Circuit and hold that the use of an identical

copy of a portion of a copyrighted fixed sound recording is an

infringement.

COUNSEL

Robert S. Besser (argued) and Christopher Chapin, Law

Offices of Robert S. Besser, Santa Monica, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Alexander Kaplan (argued), Proskauer Rose LLP, New York,

New York; Richard S. Busch (argued) and Paul H. Duvall,

King & Ballow, San Diego, California; and Sandra A.

Crawshaw-Sparks and Susan L. Gutierrez, Proskauer Rose

LLP, Los Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

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4 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

In the early 1990s, pop star Madonna Louise Ciccone,

commonly known by her first name only, released the song

Vogue to great commercial success. In this copyright

infringement action, Plaintiff VMG Salsoul, LLC, alleges that

the producer of Vogue, Shep Pettibone, copied a 0.23-second

segment of horns from an earlier song, known as Love Break,

and used a modified version of that snippet when recording

Vogue. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Madonna, Pettibone,

and others thereby violated Plaintiff’s copyrights to Love

Break. The district court applied the longstanding legal rule

that “de minimis” copying does not constitute infringement

and held that, even if Plaintiff proved its allegations of actual

copying, the claim failed because the copying (if it occurred)

was trivial. The district court granted summary judgment to

Defendants and awarded them attorney’s fees under

17 U.S.C. § 505. Plaintiff timely appeals.

Reviewing the summary judgment de novo, Alcantar v.

Hobart Serv., 800 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2015), we agree

with the district court that, as a matter of law, a general

audience would not recognize the brief snippet in Vogue as

originating from Love Break. We also reject Plaintiff’s

argument that Congress eliminated the “de minimis”

exception to claims alleging infringement of a sound

recording. We recognize that the Sixth Circuit held to the

contrary in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films,

410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), but—like the leading copyright

treatise and several district courts—we find Bridgeport’s

reasoning unpersuasive. We hold that the “de minimis”

exception applies to infringement actions concerning

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 5

copyrighted sound recordings, just as it applies to all other

copyright infringement actions. Accordingly, we affirm the

summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

But we conclude that the district court abused its

discretion in granting attorney’s fees to Defendants under

17 U.S.C. § 505. See Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d

1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that we review for abuse

of discretion the district court’s award of attorney’s fees

under § 505). A claim premised on a legal theory adopted by

the only circuit court to have addressed the issue is, as a

matter of law, objectively reasonable. The district court’s

conclusion to the contrary constitutes legal error. We

therefore vacate the award of fees and remand for

reconsideration.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because this case comes to us on appeal from a grant of

summary judgment to Defendants, we recount the facts in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff. Alcantar, 800 F.3d at 1051.

In the early 1980s, Pettibone recorded the song Ooh I

Love It (Love Break), which we refer to as Love Break. In

1990, Madonna and Pettibone recorded the song Vogue,

which would become a mega-hit dance song after its release

on Madonna’s albums. Plaintiff alleges that, when recording

Vogue, Pettibone “sampled” certain sounds from the

recording of Love Break and added those sounds to Vogue. 

“Sampling” in this context means the actual physical copying

of sounds from an existing recording for use in a new

recording, even if accomplished with slight modifications

such as changes to pitch or tempo. See Newton v. Diamond,

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6 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

388 F.3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing the term

“sampling”).

Plaintiff asserts that it holds copyrights to the composition

and to the sound recording of Love Break. Plaintiff argues

that, because Vogue contains sampled material from Love

Break, Defendants have violated both copyrights. Although

Plaintiff originally asserted improper sampling of strings,

vocals, congas, “vibraslap,” and horns from Love Break as

well as another song, Plaintiff now asserts a sole theory of

infringement: When creating two commercial versions of

Vogue, Pettibone sampled a “horn hit”1from Love Break,

violating Plaintiff’s copyrights to both the composition and

the sound recording of Love Break.

The horn hit appears in Love Break in two forms. A

“single” horn hit in Love Break consists of a quarter-note

chord comprised of four notes—E-flat, A, D, and F—in the

key of B-flat. The single horn hit lasts for 0.23 seconds. A

“double” horn hit in Love Break consists of an eighth-note

chord of those same notes, followed immediately by a

quarter-note chord of the same notes. Plaintiff’s expert

identified the instruments as “predominantly” trombones and

trumpets.

The alleged source of the sampling is the “instrumental”

version of Love Break,

2 which lasts 7 minutes and 46

seconds. The single horn hit occurs 27 times, and the double

1 Plaintiff prefers the label “horn part,” but the label has no effect on the

legal analysis. For simplicity, we follow the district court’s convention.

2 The label “instrumental” is misleading: The recording contains many

vocals. But again we adopt the terminology used by the district court.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 7

horn hit occurs 23 times. The horn hits occur at intervals of

approximately 2 to 4 seconds in two different segments: 

between 3:11 and 4:38, and from 7:01 to the end, at 7:46. 

The general pattern is single-double repeated, double-single

repeated, single-single-double repeated, and double-single

repeated. Many other instruments are playing at the same

time as the horns.

The horn hit in Vogue appears in the same two forms as

in Love Break: single and double. A “single” horn hit in

Vogue consists of a quarter-note chord comprised of four

notes—E, A-sharp, D-sharp, and F-sharp—in the key of Bnatural.3 A double horn hit in Vogue consists of an eighthnote chord of those same notes, followed immediately by a

quarter-note chord of the same notes.

The two commercial versions of Vogue that Plaintiff

challenges are known as the “radio edit” version and the

“compilation” version. The radio edit version of Vogue lasts

4 minutes and 53 seconds. The single horn hit occurs once,

the double horn hit occurs three times, and a “breakdown”

version of the horn hit occurs once.

4 They occur at 0:56,

1:02, 3:41, 4:05, and 4:18. The pattern is single-doubledouble-double-breakdown. As with Love Break, many other

instruments are playing at the same time as the horns.

3

In musical terms, assuming that the composition was copied, Pettibone

“transposed” the horn hit in Love Break by one-halfstep, resulting in notes

that are half a step higher in Vogue.

4 The record does not appear to disclose the meaning of a “breakdown”

version of the horn hit, and neither party attributes any significance to this

form of the horn hit.

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8 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

The compilation version of Vogue lasts 5 minutes and 17

seconds. The single horn hit occurs once, and the double

horn hit occurs five times. They occur at 1:14, 1:20, 3:59,

4:24, 4:40, and 4:57. The pattern is single-double-doubledouble-double-double. Again, many other instruments are

playing as well.

One of Plaintiff’s experts transcribed the composition of

the horn hits in the two songs as follows. Love Break’s single

horn hit:

Vogue’s single horn hit:

Love Break’s double horn hit:

Vogue’s double horn hit:

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 9

In a written order, the district court granted summary

judgment to Defendants on two alternative grounds. First,

neither the composition nor the sound recording of the horn

hit was “original” for purposes of copyright law. Second, the

court ruled that, even if the horn hit was original, any

sampling of the horn hit was “de minimis or trivial.” In a

separate order, the district court awarded attorney’s fees to

Defendants under 17 U.S.C. § 505. Plaintiff timely appeals

both orders.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has submitted evidence of actual copying. In

particular, Tony Shimkin has sworn that he, as Pettibone’s

personal assistant, helped with the creation of Vogue and that,

in Shimkin’s presence, Pettibone directed an engineer to

introduce sounds from Love Break into the recording of

Vogue. Additionally, Plaintiff submitted reports from music

experts who concluded that the horn hits in Vogue were

sampled from Love Break. Defendants do not concede that

sampling occurred, and they have introduced much evidence

to the contrary.

5 But for purposes of summary judgment,

Plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence (including direct

evidence) to create a genuine issue of material fact as to

whether copying in fact occurred. Taking the facts in the

light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has demonstrated

actual copying. Accordingly, our analysis proceeds to the

next step.

5 For example, Plaintiff hired Shimkin and then brought this action,

raising doubts about Shimkin’s credibility; Pettibone and others testified

that Shimkin was not present during the creation of Vogue and was not

even employed by Pettibone at that time; and Defendants’ experts dispute

the analysis and conclusions of Plaintiff’s experts.

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10 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

Our leading authority on actual copying is Newton,

388 F.3d 1189. We explained in Newton that proof of actual

copying is insufficient to establish copyright infringement:

For an unauthorized use of a copyrighted

work to be actionable, the use must be

significant enough to constitute infringement. 

See Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc.,

126 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997). This

means that even where the fact of copying is

conceded, no legal consequences will follow

from that fact unless the copying is

substantial. See Laureyssens v. Idea Group,

Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992);

4 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,

Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[A], at 13-30.2. 

The principle that trivial copying does not

constitute actionable infringement has long

been a part of copyright law. Indeed, as [a

judge] observed over 80 years ago: “Even

where there is some copying, that fact is not

conclusive of infringement. Some copying is

permitted. In addition to copying, it must be

shown that this has been done to an unfair

extent.” West Publ’g Co. v. Edward

Thompson Co., 169 F. 833, 861 (E.D.N.Y.

1909). This principle reflects the legal

maxim, de minimis non curatlex (often

rendered as, “the law does not concern itself

with trifles”). See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at

74–75.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 11

Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192–93. In other words, to establish its

infringement claim, Plaintiff must show that the copying was

greater than de minimis.

Plaintiff’s claim encompasses two distinct alleged

infringements: infringement of the copyright to the

composition of Love Break and infringement of the copyright

to the sound recording of Love Break. Compare 17 U.S.C.

§ 102(a)(2) (protecting “musical works”) with id. § 102(a)(7)

(protecting “sound recordings”); seeErickson v. Blake, 839 F.

Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 n.3 (D. Or. 2012) (“Sound recordings

and musical compositions are separate works with their own

distinct copyrights.”); see also Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193–94

(noting the distinction). We squarely held in Newton,

388 F.3d at 1193, that the de minimis exception applies to

claims of infringement of a copyrighted composition. But it

is an open question in this circuit whether the exception

applies to claims of infringement of a copyrighted sound

recording.

Below, we address (A) whether the alleged copying of the

composition or the sound recording was de minimis,

(B) whether the de minimis exception applies to alleged

infringement of copyrighted sound recordings, and

(C) whether the district court abused its discretion in

awarding attorney’s fees to Defendants under 17 U.S.C.

§ 505.6

6 Because we affirm the judgment on the ground that any copying was

de minimis, we do not reach Defendants’ alternative arguments. 

Accordingly, we assume without deciding that the horn hits are “original.” 

See Newton, 388 F.3d at 1192 (assuming originality). We also assume

without deciding that Pettibone is not a co-owner of Love Break.

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12 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

A. Application of the De Minimis Exception

A “use is de minimis only if the average audience would

not recognize the appropriation.” Newton, 388 F.3d at 1193;

see id. at 1196 (affirming the grant of summary judgment

because “an average audience would not discern Newton’s

hand as a composer . . . from Beastie Boys’ use of the

sample”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 n.2 (9th Cir.

1986) (“As a rule, a taking is considered de minimis only if it

is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience

would not recognize the appropriation.”); see also Dymow v.

Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692 (2d Cir. 1926) (“[C]opying which

is infringement must be something which ordinary

observations would cause to be recognized as having been

taken from the work of another.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Accordingly, we must determine whether a

reasonable juror could conclude that the average audience

would recognize the appropriation. We will consider the

composition and the sound recording copyrights in turn.7

1. Alleged Infringement of the Composition Copyright

When considering an infringement claim of a copyrighted

musical composition, what matters is not how the musicians

actually played the notes but, rather, a “generic rendition of

the composition.” Newton, 388 F.3d at 1194; see id. at 1193

(holding that, when considering infringement of the

 

7

It appears that Plaintiff did not introduce into the summary judgment

record a copy ofthe copyrighted composition and did not introduce a copy

of one of the two allegedly infringing sound recordings. We need not

decide whether those omissions are fatal to Plaintiff’s claims. For

purposes of our analysis, we accept the partial transcription of the

composition by Plaintiff’s expert, and we analyze the sound recordings

that Plaintiff did submit.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 13

composition copyright, one “must remove from consideration

all the elements unique to [the musician’s] performance”). 

That is, we must compare the written compositions of the two

pieces.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, Defendants copied two distinct passages in the horn

part of the score for Love Break. First, Defendants copied the

quarter-note single horn hit. But no additional part of the

score concerning the single horn hit is the same, because the

single horn hit appears at a different place in the measure. In

Love Break, the notes for the measure are: half-note rest,

quarter-note rest, single horn hit. In Vogue, however, the

notes for the measure are: half-note rest, eighth-note rest,

single horn hit, eighth-note rest. Second, Defendants copied

a full measure that contains the double horn hit. In both

songs, the notes for the measure are: half-note rest, eighthnote rest, eighth-note horn hit, quarter-note horn hit. In sum,

Defendants copied, at most, a quarter-note single horn hit and

a full measure containing rests and a double horn hit.

After listening to the recordings, we conclude that a

reasonable jury could not conclude that an average audience

would recognize the appropriation of the composition. Our

decision in Newton is instructive. That case involved a

copyrighted composition of “a piece for flute and voice.” 

Newton, 388 F.3d at 1191. The defendants used a six-second

sample that “consist[ed] of three notes, C—D flat—C, sung

over a background C note played on the flute.” Id. The

composition also “require[d] overblowing the background C

note that is played on the flute.” Id. The defendants repeated

a six-second sample “throughout [the song], so that it appears

over forty times in various renditions of the song.” Id. at

1192. After listening to the recordings, we affirmed the grant

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14 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

of summary judgment because “an average audience would

not discern [the composer’s] hand as a composer.” Id. at

1196.

The snippets of the composition that were (as we must

assume) taken here are much smaller than the sample at issue

in Newton. The copied elements from the Love Break

composition are very short, much shorter than the six-second

sample in Newton. The single horn hit lasts less than a

quarter-second, and the double horn hit lasts—even counting

the rests at the beginning of the measure—less than a second. 

Similarly, the horn hits appear only five or six times in

Vogue, rather than the dozens of times that the sampled

material in Newton occurred in the challenged song in that

case. Moreover, unlike in Newton, in which the challenged

song copied the entire composition of the original work for

the given temporal segment, the sampling at issue here

involves only one instrument group out of many. As noted

above, listening to the audio recordings confirms what the

foregoing analysis of the composition strongly suggests: A

reasonable jury could not conclude that an average audience

would recognize an appropriation of the Love Break

composition.

2. Alleged Infringement of the Sound Recording

Copyright

When considering a claimed infringement of a

copyrighted sound recording, what matters is how the

musicians played the notes, that is, how their rendition

distinguishes the recording from a generic rendition of the

same composition. SeeNewton, 388 F.3d at 1193 (describing

the protected elements of a copyrighted sound recording as

“the elements unique to [the musician’s] performance”). 

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 15

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

by accepting its experts’ reports, Pettibone sampled one

single horn hit, which occurred at 3:35 in Love Break. 

Pettibone then used that sampled single horn hit to create the

double horn hit used in Vogue.

The horn hit itself was not copied precisely. According

to Plaintiff’s expert, the chord “was modified by transposing

it upward, cleaning up the attack slightly in order to make it

punchier [by truncating the horn hit] and overlaying it with

other sounds and effects. One such effect mimicked the

reverse cymbal crash. . . . The reverb/delay ‘tail’ . . . was

prolonged and heightened.” Moreover, as with the

composition, the horn hits are not isolated sounds. Many

other instruments are playing at the same time in both Love

Break and Vogue.

In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, Pettibone copied one quarter-note of a four-note

chord, lasting 0.23 seconds; he isolated the horns by filtering

out the other instruments playing at the same time; he

transposed it to a different key; he truncated it; and he added

effects and other sounds to the chord itself.8 For the double

horn hit, he used the same process, except that he duplicated

the single horn hit and shortened one of the duplicates to

create the eighth-note chord from the quarter-note chord. 

Finally, he overlaid the resulting horn hits with sounds from

many other instruments to create the song Vogue.

8 For all of those reasons, we decline to apply the “fragmented literal

similarity” test: Defendants did not copy “a portion of the plaintiff’s work

exactly or nearly exactly.” Newton, 388 F.3d at 1195; see also Dr. Seuss

Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1398 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1997) (rejecting the category of “fragmented literal similarity”).

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16 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

After listening to the audio recordings submitted by the

parties, we conclude that a reasonable juror could not

conclude that an average audience would recognize the

appropriation of the horn hit. That common-sense conclusion

is borne out by dry analysis. The horn hit is very short—less

than a second. The horn hit occurs only a few times in

Vogue. Without careful attention, the horn hits are easy to

miss. Moreover, the horn hits in Vogue do not sound

identical to the horn hits from Love Break. As noted above,

assuming that the sampling occurred, Pettibone truncated the

horn hit, transposed it to a different key, and added other

sounds and effects to the horn hit itself. The horn hit then

was added to Vogue along with many other instrument tracks. 

Even if one grants the dubious proposition that a listener

recognized some similarities between the horn hits in the two

songs, it is hard to imagine that he or she would conclude that

sampling had occurred.

A quirk in the procedural history of this case is

illuminating on this point. Plaintiff’s primary expert

originallymisidentified the source of the sampled double horn

hit. In his original report, the expert concluded that both a

single horn hit and a double horn hit were sampled from Love

Break. The parties later discovered the original tracks to

Vogue and were able to listen to the horn hits without

interference from the many other instruments. After listening

to those tracks, the expert decided that he had erred in opining

that a double horn hit was sampled. He concluded instead

that only a single horn hit was sampled, which was used to

create the double horn hit in Vogue. In other words, a highly

qualified and trained musician listened to the recordings with

the express aim of discerning which parts of the song had

been copied, and he could not do so accurately. An average

audience would not do a better job.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 17

In sum, the district court correctly held that summary

judgment to Defendants was appropriate on the issue of de

minimis copying.

B. The De Minimis Exception and Sound Recordings

Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that even if the copying

here is trivial, that fact is irrelevant because the de minimis

exception does not apply to infringements of copyrighted

sound recordings. Plaintiff urges us to follow the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension

Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), which adopted a brightline rule: For copyrighted sound recordings, any

unauthorized copying—no matter how trivial—constitutes

infringement.

The rule that infringement occurs only when a substantial

portion is copied is firmly established in the law. The leading

copyright treatise traces the rule to the mid-1800s. 4 Melville

B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright

§ 13.03[A][2][a], at 13-56 to 13-57, 13-57 n.102 (2013)

(citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, No. 4901 (C.C. Mass.

1841)); id. § 13.03[E][2], at 13-100 & n.208 (citing Daly v.

Palmer, 6 F. Cas. 1132, No. 3,552 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868)); see

also Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 674, 675–76 (1878)

(stating that a “copyright gives the author or the publisher the

exclusive right of multiplying copies of what he has written

or printed. It follows that to infringe this right a substantial

copy of the whole or of a material part must be produced.”);

Dymow, 11 F.2d 690 (applying the rule in 1926). We

recognized the rule as early as 1977: “If copying is

established, then only does there arise the second issue, that

of illicit copying (unlawful appropriation). On that issue the

test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer . . . .” Sid &

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18 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp.,

562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977) (alteration and internal

quotation marks omitted), superseded in other part by

17 U.S.C. § 504(b); see Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434 n.2 (using the

term “de minimis” to describe the concept). The reason for

the rule is that the “plaintiff’s legally protected interest [is]

the potential financial return from his compositions which

derive from the lay public’s approbation of his efforts.” 

Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1165 (quoting Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d

464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946)). If the public does not recognize the

appropriation, then the copier has not benefitted from the

original artist’s expressive content. Accordingly, there is no

infringement.

Other than Bridgeport and the district courts following

that decision, we are aware of no case that has held that the de

minimis doctrine does not apply in a copyright infringement

case. Instead, courts consistently have applied the rule in all

cases alleging copyright infringement. Indeed, we stated in

dictum in Newton that the rule “applies throughout the law of

copyright, including cases of music sampling.”9388 F.3d at

1195 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff nevertheless argues that Congress intended to

create a special rule for copyrighted sound recordings,

eliminating the de minimis exception. We begin our analysis

with the statutory text.

9 Defendants incorrectly assert that the quoted sentence controls the

outcome in this case. Newton considered an alleged infringement of the

composition only; it had no occasion to consider—and did not

consider—the argument that a different rule applies to the infringement of

sound recordings.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 19

Title 17 U.S.C. § 102, titled “Subject matter of copyright: 

In general,” states, in relevant part:

(a) Copyright protection subsists, in

accordance with this title, in original works of

authorship fixed in any tangible medium of

expression, now known or later developed,

from which they can be perceived,

reproduced, or otherwise communicated,

either directly or with the aid of a machine or

device. Works of authorship include the

following categories:

(1) literary works;

(2) musical works, including any

accompanying words;

(3) dramatic works, including any

accompanying music;

(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;

(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural

works;

(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual

works;

(7) sound recordings; and

(8) architectural works.

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20 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

(Emphasis added.) That provision treats sound recordings

identically to all other types of protected works; nothing in

the text suggests differential treatment, for any purpose, of

sound recordings compared to, say, literaryworks. Similarly,

nothing in the neutrally worded statutory definition of “sound

recordings” suggests that Congress intended to eliminate the

de minimis exception. See id. § 101 (“‘Sound recordings’ are

works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,

spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds

accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,

regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks,

tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied.”).

Title 17 U.S.C. § 106, titled “Exclusive rights in

copyrighted works,” states:

Subject to sections 107 through 122, the

owner of copyright under this title has the

exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of

the following:

(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in

copies or phonorecords;

(2) to prepare derivative works based upon

the copyrighted work;

(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of

the copyrighted work to the public by sale or

other transfer of ownership, or by rental,

lease, or lending;

(4) in the case of literary, musical,

dramatic, and choreographic works,

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 21

pantomimes, and motion pictures and other

audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted

work publicly;

(5) in the case of literary, musical,

dramatic, and choreographic works,

pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or

sculptural works, including the individual

images of a motion picture or other

audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted

work publicly; and

(6) in the case of sound recordings, to

perform the copyrighted work publicly by

means of a digital audio transmission.

Again, nothing in that provision suggests differential

treatment of de minimis copying of sound recordings

compared to, say, sculptures. Although subsection (6) deals

exclusively with sound recordings, that subsection concerns

public performances; nothing in its text bears on de minimis

copying.

Instead, Plaintiff’s statutory argument hinges on the third

sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), which states:10

 

10 The full subsection states:

The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a

sound recording under clause (1) of section 106 is

limited to the right to duplicate the sound recording in

the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or

indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the

recording. The exclusive right of the owner of

copyright in a sound recording under clause (2) of

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22 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright

in a sound recording under clauses (1) and (2)

of section 106 do not extend to the making or

duplication of another sound recording that

consists entirely of an independent fixation of

other sounds, even though such sounds imitate

or simulate those in the copyrighted sound

recording.

Like all the other sentences in § 114(b), the third sentence

imposes an express limitation on the rights of a copyright

holder: “The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in

a sound recording . . . do not extend to the making or

section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative

work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound

recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered

in sequence or quality. The exclusive rights of the

owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses

(1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making

or duplication of another sound recording that consists

entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds,

even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in

the copyrighted sound recording. The exclusive rights

of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under

clauses (1), (2), and (3) of section 106 do not apply to

sound recordings included in educational television and

radio programs (as defined in section 397 of title 47)

distributed or transmitted by or through public

broadcasting entities (as defined by section 118(f)): 

Provided, That copies or phonorecords of said

programs are not commercially distributed by or

through public broadcasting entities to the general

public.

17 U.S.C. § 114(b). Nothing in the other sentences advances Plaintiff’s

argument.

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 23

duplication of another sound recording [with certain

qualities].” Id. (emphasis added); see id. (first sentence: 

“exclusive rights . . . do not extend” to certain circumstances;

second sentence: “exclusive rights . . . do not extend” to

certain circumstances; fourth sentence: “exclusive rights . . .

do not apply” in certain circumstances). We ordinarily would

hesitate to read an implicit expansion of rights into Congress’

statement of an express limitation on rights. Given the

considerable background of consistent application of the de

minimis exception across centuries of jurisprudence, we are

particularly hesitant to read the statutory text as an unstated,

implicit elimination of that steadfast rule.

A straightforward reading of the third sentence in

§ 114(b) reveals Congress’ intended limitation on the rights

of a sound recording copyright holder: A new recording that

mimics the copyrighted recording is not an infringement,

even if the mimicking is very well done, so long as there was

no actual copying. That is, if a band played and recorded its

own version of Love Break in a way that sounded very similar

to the copyrighted recording of Love Break, then there would

be no infringement so long as there was no actual copying of

the recorded Love Break. But the quoted passage does not

speak to the question that we face: whether Congress

intended to eliminate the longstanding de minimis exception

for sound recordings in all circumstances even where, as here,

the new sound recording as a whole sounds nothing like the

original.

Even if there were some ambiguity as to congressional

intent with respect to § 114(b), the legislative history clearly

confirms our analysis on each of the above points. Congress

intended § 114 to limit, not to expand, the rights of copyright

holders: “The approach of the bill is to set forth the copyright

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24 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

owner’s exclusive rights in broad terms in section 106, and

then to provide various limitations, qualifications, or

exemptions in the 12 sections that follow. Thus, everything

in section 106 is made ‘subject to sections 107 through 118,’

and must be read in conjunction with those provisions.” H.R.

Rep. No. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976

U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674.

With respect to § 114(b) specifically, a House Report

stated:

Subsection (b) of section 114 makes clear

that statutory protection for sound recordings

extends only to the particular sounds of which

the recording consists, and would not prevent

a separate recording of another performance

in which those sounds are imitated. Thus,

infringement takes place whenever all or any

substantial portion of the actual sounds that

go to make up a copyrighted sound recording

are reproduced in phonorecords by repressing,

transcribing, recapturing off the air, or any

other method, or by reproducing them in the

soundtrack or audio portion of a motion

picture or other audiovisual work. Mere

imitation of a recorded performance would

not constitute a copyright infringement even

where one performer deliberately sets out to

simulate another’s performance as exactly as

possible.

Id. at 106, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5721 (emphasis

added). That passage strongly supports the natural reading of

§ 114(b), discussed above. Congress intended to make clear

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that imitation of a recorded performance cannot be

infringement so long as no actual copying is done. There is

no indication that Congress intended, through § 114(b), to

expand the rights of a copyright holder to a sound recording.

Perhaps more importantly, the quoted passage articulates

the principle that “infringement takes place whenever all or

any substantial portion of the actual sounds . . . are

reproduced.” Id. (emphasis added). That is, when enacting

this specific statutory provision, Congress clearly understood

that the de minimis exception applies to copyrighted sound

recordings, just as it applies to all other copyrighted works. 

In sum, the statutory text, confirmed by the legislative

history, reveals that Congress intended to maintain the de

minimis exception for copyrighted sound recordings.

In coming to a different conclusion, the Sixth Circuit

reasoned as follows:

[T]he rights of sound recording copyright

holders under clauses (1) and (2) of section

106 “do not extend to the making or

duplication of another sound recording that

consists entirely of an independent fixation of

other sounds, even though such sounds imitate

or simulate those in the copyrighted sound

recording.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphasis

added). The significance of this provision is

amplified by the fact that the Copyright Act of

1976 added the word “entirely” to this

language. Compare Sound Recording Act of

1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (Oct. 15,

1971) (adding subsection (f) to former

17 U.S.C. § 1) (“does not extend to the

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26 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

making or duplication of another sound

recording that is an independent fixation of

other sounds”). In other words, a sound

recording owner has the exclusive right to

“sample” his own recording.

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 800–01.

We reject that interpretation of § 114(b). Bridgeport

ignored the statutory structure and § 114(b)’s express

limitation on the rights of a copyright holder. Bridgeport also

declined to consider legislative history on the ground that

“digital sampling wasn’t being done in 1971.” 410 F.3d at

805. But the state of technology is irrelevant to interpreting

Congress’ intent as to statutory structure. Moreover, as

Nimmer points out, Bridgeport’s reasoning fails on its own

terms because contemporary technology plainly allowed the

copying of small portions of a protected sound recording. 

Nimmer § 13.03[A][2][b], at 13-62 n.114.16.

Close examination of Bridgeport’s interpretive method

further exposes its illogic. In effect, Bridgeport inferred from

the fact that “exclusive rights . . . do not extend to the making

or duplication of another sound recording that consists

entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds,”

17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (emphases added), the conclusion that

exclusive rights do extend to the making of another sound

recording that does not consist entirely of an independent

fixation of other sounds. As pointed out by Nimmer,

Bridgeport’s interpretive method “rests on a logical fallacy.” 

Nimmer § 13.03[A][2][b], at 13-61; see also Saregama India

Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340–41 (S.D. Fla.

2009) (critiquing Bridgeport’s interpretive method for a

similar reason). A statement that rights do not extend to a

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particular circumstance does not automatically mean that the

rights extend to all other circumstances. In logical terms, it

is a fallacy to infer the inverse of a conditional from the

conditional. E.g., Joseph G. Brennan, A Handbook of Logic

79–80 (2d ed. 1961).

For example, take as a given the proposition that “if it has

rained, then the grass is not dry.” It does not necessarily

follow that “if it has not rained, then the grass is dry.” 

Someone may have watered the lawn, for instance. We

cannot infer the second if-then statement from the first. The

first if-then statement does not tell us anything about the

condition of the grass if it has not rained. Accordingly, even

though it is true that, “if the recording consists entirely of

independent sounds, then the copyright does not extend to it,”

that statement does not necessarily mean that “if the

recording does not consist entirely of independent sounds,

then the copyright does extend to it.”

The Sixth Circuit also looked beyond the statutory text, to

the nature of a sound recording, and reasoned:

[E]ven when a small part of a sound recording

is sampled, the part taken is something of

value. No further proof of that is necessary

than the fact that the producer of the record or

the artist on the record intentionally sampled

because it would (1) save costs, or (2) add

something to the new recording, or (3) both. 

For the sound recording copyright holder, it is

not the “song” but the sounds that are fixed in

the medium of his choice. When those sounds

are sampled they are taken directly from that

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28 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

fixed medium. It is a physical taking rather

than an intellectual one.

Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 801–02 (footnote omitted).

We disagree for three reasons. First, the possibility of a

“physical taking” exists with respect to other kinds of artistic

works as well, such as photographs, as to which the usual de

minimis rule applies. See, e.g., Sandoval v. New Line Cinema

Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 216 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming summary

judgment to the defendant because the defendant’s use of the

plaintiff’s photographs in a movie was de minimis). A

computer program can, for instance, “sample” a piece of one

photograph and insert it into another photograph or work of

art. We are aware of no copyright case carving out an

exception to the de minimis requirement in that context, and

we can think of no principled reason to differentiate one kind

of “physical taking” from another. Second, even accepting

the premise that sound recordings differ qualitatively from

other copyrighted works and therefore could warrant a

different infringement rule, that theoretical difference does

not mean that Congress actually adopted a different rule. 

Third, the distinction between a “physical taking” and an

“intellectual one,” premised in part on “sav[ing] costs” by not

having to hire musicians, does not advance the Sixth Circuit’s

view. The Supreme Court has held unequivocally that the

Copyright Act protects only the expressive aspects of a

copyrighted work, and not the “fruit of the [author’s] labor.” 

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349

(1991). Indeed, the Supreme Court in Feist explained at

length why, though that result may seem unfair, protecting

only the expressive aspects of a copyrighted work is actually

a key part of the design of the copyright laws. Id. at 349–54

(explaining how “the ‘sweat of the brow’ doctrine flouted

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basic copyright principles”). Accordingly, all that remains of

Bridgeport’s argument is that the second artist has taken

some expressive content from the original artist. But that is

always true, regardless of the nature of the work, and the de

minimis test nevertheless applies. See Nimmer

§ 13.03[A][2][b], at 13-63 to 13-64 (providing a similar

critique of Bridgeport’s physical/intellectual distinction and

concluding that it “seems to be built on air”).

Because we conclude that Congress intended to maintain

the “de minimis” exception for copyrights to sound

recordings, we take the unusual step of creating a circuit split

by disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit’s contrary holding in

Bridgeport. We do so only after careful reflection because,

as we noted in Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Ltd. v.

Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013),

“the creation of a circuit split would be particularly

troublesome in the realm of copyright. Creating inconsistent

rules among the circuits would lead to different levels of

protection in different areas of the country, even if the same

alleged infringement is occurring nationwide.” (Citation,

internal quotations marks, and brackets omitted.) We

acknowledge that our decision has consequences. But the

goal of avoiding a circuit split cannot override our

independent duty to determine congressional intent. 

Otherwise, we would have no choice but to blindly follow the

rule announced by whichever circuit court decided an issue

first, even if we were convinced, as we are here, that our

sister circuit erred.

Moreover, other considerations suggest that the

“troublesome” consequences ordinarily attendant to the

creation of a circuit split are diminished here. In declining to

create a circuit split in Seven Arts, we noted that “the leading

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30 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

copyright treatise,” Nimmer, agreed with the view of our

sister circuits. 733 F.3d at 1255. As to the issue before us, by

contrast, Nimmer devotes many pages to explaining why the

Sixth Circuit’s opinion is, in no uncertain terms, wrong. 

Nimmer § 13.03[A][2][b], at 13-59 to 13-66.

Additionally, as a practical matter, a deep split among the

federal courts already exists. Since the Sixth Circuit decided

Bridgeport, almost every district court not bound by that

decision has declined to apply Bridgeport’s rule. See, e.g.,

Saregama, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340–41 (rejecting

Bridgeport’s rule after analysis); Steward v. West, No. 13-

02449, Docket No. 179 at 14 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 2014)

(unpublished civil minutes) (“declin[ing] to follow the per se

infringment analysis from Bridgeport” because Bridgeport

“has been criticized by courts and commentators alike”);

Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 625 (E.D. La. 2014)

(noting that, because some courts have declined to apply

Bridgeport’s rule, “it is far from clear” that Bridgeport’s rule

should apply); Pryor v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., No.

CV13-04344, 2014 WL 2812309, at *7 n.3 (C.D. Cal. June

20, 2014) (unpublished) (declining to applyBridgeport’s rule

because it has not been adopted by the Ninth Circuit); Zany

Toys, LLC v. Pearl Enters., LLC, No. 13-5262, 2014 WL

2168415, at *11 n.7 (D.N.J. May 23, 2014) (unpublished)

(stating Bridgeport’s rule without discussion); see also EMI

Records Ltd v. Premise Media Corp., No. 601209, 2008 WL

5027245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 8, 2008) (unpublished)

(expressly rejecting Bridgeport’s analysis). Although we are

the first circuit court to follow a different path than

Bridgeport’s, we are in well-charted territory.

Plaintiff next argues that, because Congress has not

amended the copyright statute in response to Bridgeport, we

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should conclude that Bridgeport correctly divined

congressional intent. We disagree. The Supreme Court has

held that congressional inaction in the face of a judicial

statutory interpretation, even with respect to the Supreme

Court’s own decisions affecting the entire nation, carries

almost no weight. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,

292 (2001) (“It is impossible to assert with any degree of

assurance that congressional failure to act represents

affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s statutory

interpretation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here,

Congress’ inaction with respect to a decision by one circuit

court has even less import, especially considering that many

other courts have declined to apply Bridgeport’s rule.

Finally, Plaintiff advances several reasons why

Bridgeport’s rule is superior as a matter of policy. For

example, the Sixth Circuit opined that its bright-line rule was

easy to enforce; that “the market will control the license price

and keep it within bounds”; and that “sampling is never

accidental” and is therefore easy to avoid. Bridgeport,

410 F.3d at 801. Those arguments are for a legislature, not a

court. They speak to what Congress could decide; they do

not inform what Congress actually decided.

11

11 It also is not clear that the cited policy reasons are necessarily

persuasive. For example, this particular case presents an example in

which there is uncertainty as to enforcement—musical experts disagree as

to whether sampling occurred. As another example, it is not necessarily

true that the market will keep license prices “within bounds”—it is

possible that a bright-line rule against sampling would unduly stifle

creativity in certain segments of the music industry because the licensing

costs would be too expensive for the amateur musician. In any event,

even raising these counter-points demonstrates that the arguments, as

Plaintiff concedes, rest on policy considerations, not on statutory

interpretation. One cannot answer questions such as how much licensing

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We hold that the “de minimis” exception applies to

actions alleging infringement of a copyright to sound

recordings.

C. Attorney’s Fees

Finally, we consider the district court’s award of

attorney’s fees to Defendants. The Copyright Act permits a

court to “award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing

party.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. “[A]ttorney’s fees are to be

awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court’s

discretion.” Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534

(1994). “In deciding whether to award fees under the

Copyright Act, the district court should consider, among other

things: the degree of success obtained on the claim;

frivolousness; motivation; objective reasonableness of factual

and legal arguments; and need for compensation and

deterrence.” Maljack Prods., Inc. v. GoodTimes Home Video

Corp., 81 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 1996).

Here, the district court concluded that Plaintiff’s legal

claim premised on Bridgeport was objectively unreasonable

because, in the court’s view, Plaintiff should have been aware

of the critiques of Bridgeport and should have declined to

bring the claim. In relying on that reasoning, the court erred

as a matter of law. It plainly is reasonable to bring a claim

founded on the only circuit-court precedent to have

considered the legal issue, whether or not our circuit

ultimately agrees with that precedent.

cost is too much without exercising value judgments—matters generally

assigned to the legislature.

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The district court also ruled that Plaintiff’s claim was

objectively unreasonable because of issues that hinged on

“disputed facts and credibility determinations.” Again, the

court erred as a matter of law. If a plaintiff has a claim that

hinges on disputed facts sufficient to reach a jury, that claim

necessarily is reasonable because a jurymight decide the case

in the plaintiff’s favor.

Because the district court erred in finding that Plaintiff’s

claim was objectively unreasonable, we vacate the award of

fees and remand for reconsideration.

JudgmentAFFIRMED; award offees VACATED and

REMANDED for reconsideration. The parties shall bear

their own costs on appeal.

SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

The plaintiff is the owner of a copyright in a fixed sound

recording. This is a valuable property right, the stock-intrade of artists who make their living recording music and

selling records. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants,

without a license or any sort of permission, physically copied

a small part of the plaintiff’s sound recording – which, to

repeat, is property belonging to the plaintiff – and, having

appropriated it, inserted into their own recording. If the

plaintiff’s allegations are to be believed, the defendants

deemed this maneuver preferable to paying for a license to

use the material, or to hiring their own musicians to record it. 

In any other context, this would be called theft. It is no

defense to theft that the thief made off with only a “de

minimis” part of the victim’s property.

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The majority chooses to follow the views of a popular

treatise instead of an on-point decision of the Sixth Circuit, a

decision that has governed the music industry in Nashville –

“Music City”

1

– and elsewhere for over a decade without

causing either the sky to fall in, or Congress to step in. And

just exactly what is the Sixth Circuit’s radical holding in

Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films that the majority

finds so distasteful? It’s this: if you want to use an identical

copy of a portion of a copyrighted fixed sound recording –

we’re not talking about “substantially similar” tunes or

rhythms, but an actual identical copy of a sound that has

already been recorded in a fixed medium – get a license. You

can’t just take it. 410 F.3d 792, 800–01 (6th Cir. 2005).

As the majority acknowledges, after Newton v. Diamond,

388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2003), it is an “open question” in the

Ninth Circuit whether a de minimis defense applies to fixed

sound recordings as it does to less tangible works. The

Bridgeport court explained why it should not.

First, by statute, sound recording copyright holders have

an exclusive right to sample their own recordings. It’s an

exclusive right; the statute does not give that right to others. 

410 F.3d at 800–01. Under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 114, the

holder of a copyright in a sound recording (but not others) has

the exclusive right to reproduce the work in copies or records

“that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed

in the recording,” as well as the exclusive right to prepare

derivative works “in which the actual sounds fixed in the

1 Nashville also describes itself as the “Songwriting Capital

of the World.” See The Story of Music City, Nashville Convention & V

isitors Corp., http://www.visitmusiccity.com/visitors/aboutmusiccity/sto

ryofmusiccity (last visited May 20, 2016).

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sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered

in sequence or quality.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1) and (2); 114(b). 

Congress clearly qualified these exclusive rights, writing that

“another sound recording that consists entirely of an

independent fixation of other sounds, even though such

sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound

recording” are not within the scope of the copyright holder’s

exclusive rights. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b). In other words, the

world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative work

fixed in the recording (like a tribute band, for example) so

long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not

made. 410 F.3d at 800.

The majority rejects this straightforward reading,

explaining by way of a rhetorical exercise that Bridgeport’s

reading of § 114(b) is a logical fallacy, expanding the rights

of copyright holders beyond that allowed under the judicial

de minimis rule. As Isee it, it is the majority that tortures the

natural reading of these provisions. Bear in mind that

§ 114(b) simply explains the scope of exclusive rights already

granted to copyright holders under § 106. These two

provisions must be read together, as the Sixth Circuit did. 

410 F.3d at 799–801. When read together, their message is

clear: copyright holders have exclusive rights to their

recordings, but cannot be heard to complain (i.e., there can be

no infringement of those exclusive rights) where a new

recording consists entirely of independently created sounds,

such as might be found in a very good imitation. By the same

token, if a new recording includes something other than

independently created sounds, such as a blatant copy, the

copyright holder whose work was sampled has a legitimate

gripe. That right was not invented by the Sixth Circuit: it

already exists in the statutes. And these statutes say nothing

about the de minimis exception.

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The second reason the Sixth Circuit gave for not adopting

the de minimis rule is that sound recordings are different than

their compositional counterparts: when a defendant copies a

recording, he or she takes not the song but the sounds as they

are fixed in the medium of the copyright holders’ choice. Id.

at 801–02. In other words, the very nature of digital sampling

makes a de minimis analysis inapplicable, since sampling or

pirating necessarily involves copying a fixed performance. 

See id. at 801 n.13. The defendants wanted horns to

punctuate their song, so they took the plaintiff’s copyrighted

recording of horns. The horn hit is brief, but clearly

perceptible and does its job. This is unlike indiscernible

photographs used, not for their content (which cannot be

made out), but to dress a movie set. See Sandoval v. New

Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1998).

This is a physical taking, not an intellectual one. Id. at

802. Sampling is never accidental. Id. at 801. As the Sixth

Circuit observed, it is not like the case of a composer who has

a melody in his head, perhaps not even realizing that the

reason he hears this melody is that it is the work of another

that he has heard before. Id. When you sample a sound

recording you know you are taking another’s work product. 

Id. Accordingly, the pertinent inquiry in a sampling case is

not whether a defendant sampled a little or a lot, but whether

a defendant sampled at all. Id. at 798 n.6, 801–02 and n.13.

Again, the majority disagrees, rejecting Bridgeport’s

characterization of a sample as a “physical taking” on the

basis that copyright protection extends only to expressive

aspects of a work, not the fruit of the author’s labor. 

According to the majority, copyright protection doesn’t

extend to the sweat of an author’s brow. Feist Publ’ns, Inc.

v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (discussing

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VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE 37

originality as applied to factual compilations, such as

telephone directories). But that’s irrelevant here, since there

is no question that the underlying sound recording can be

copyrighted, and it is the taking of that protectable work that

is at issue.

I find Bridgeport’s arguments well-reasoned and

persuasive. Equally compelling is, Ithink, Congress’s silence

in the wake of Bridgeport, especially in light of the fact that

the Sixth Circuit explicitly invited Congress to clarify or

change the law if Bridgeport’s bright-line rule was not what

Congress intended. 410 F.3d at 805. While it’s true that

congressional inaction in the face of judicial interpretation is

not ironclad evidence of Congressional approval, see

Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 292 (2001), it’s not

chopped liver either. In this case Bridgeport has not been

hiding out in the woods, waiting to be found: it has been

governing the music industry in Nashville and elsewhere for

eleven years. The majority now proposes to introduce a

different rule for this circuit, creating a circuit split, and

providing a lower level of protection for copyright holders in

a different area of the country. See Seven Arts Filmed

Entertainment Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d

1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2013). This inconsistent approach is

plainly in contravention of Congressional intent that

copyright laws be predictable and uniform, yet the majority

defends its rogue path on the ground that Congress must have

intended something other than what the Sixth Circuit has

concluded, even though we’ve heard not a peep from

Congress, or for that matter the Supreme Court, in the eleven

years since Bridgeport has been on the books.

In short, the majority’s fuzzy approach would require a

factual and largely visceral inquiry into whether each and

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38 VMG SALSOUL V. CICCONE

every instance of sampling was “substantial,” whereas

Bridgeport provides in the case of a fixed sound recording a

bright-line rule, and I quote: “Get a license or do not sample.” 

410 F.3d at 801. True, Get a license or do not sample doesn’t

carry the same divine force as Thou Shalt Not Steal, but it’s

the same basic idea. I would hold that the de minimis

exception does not apply to the sampling, copying, stealing,

pirating, misappropriation – call it what you will – of

copyrighted fixed sound recordings. Once the sound is fixed,

it is tangible property belonging to the copyright holder, and

no one else has the right to take even a little of it without

permission. I therefore respectfully dissent.2

2 Since I think that summary judgment was improperly granted on the

plaintiff’s sampling claims, I also would reverse the award of attorneys’

fees. However, I agree with the majority that the fee award was erroneous

in any event. I also agree that the district court properly granted summary

judgment on the plaintiff’s composition infringement claim.

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