Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04226/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-04226-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sofie Liu
Defendant
A Marie Wilson
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A MARIE WILSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOFIE LIU,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-04226-PJH 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT

MATTER JURISDICTION

Re: Dkt. No. 13

Defendant Sofie Liu’s (“defendant”) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3) (the 

“motion”) came on hearing before this court on September 25, 2019. Plaintiff appeared 

on her own behalf. Defendant appeared through her counsel, John S. Richards. Having 

read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their arguments and the 

relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby DENIES the motion 

for the following reasons.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her form complaint for a civil case on July 23, 2019. Dkt. 1

(“Compl.”). In it, plaintiff generally alleges claims under Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 

3631 (the “Federal Fair Housing Act” or the “FHA”) and California Civil Code § 1942.5. 

Compl. ¶ II.A. To support such claims, plaintiff specifically alleges only that “the constant 

harassment and retaliation by my landlord has [sic] my living conditions to be 

uninhabitable.” Id. ¶ III (emphasis added). In her complaint’s civil cover sheet, plaintiff 

notes “racial discrimination and retaliation” as a brief description of its cause of action. 

Dkt. 1-1 ¶ VI. The complaint does not include any allegations of specific acts of 

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discrimination or retaliation by defendant or any additional allegations of such conduct 

generally. 

However, in her July 23, 2019 motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff does detail 

a specific incident of race-based discrimination. In particular, plaintiff describes a 

situation on April 13, 2019 where defendant’s boyfriend, during a visit with defendant at 

the subject premises, stated to a third-party property manager (“Mr. Wong”) the following:

• He does not like “to do business with black folks.” Dkt. 3 at 8.

• “I know these kinds of black folks that’s what they do . . . if you don’t think 

they staged the house because we are coming and look at the make shift 

repairs on the garage.” Id.

Plaintiff then adds that, immediately after defendant’s boyfriend made these 

statements, he “stated to Mr. Wong you need to issue a three day notice to pay or quit . . 

. go now and tell them . . . if you need to, we will go with you.” Id. Plaintiff further adds 

that, on May 7, 2019, she received a phone call from defendant’s boyfriend threatening to 

terminate her lease. Id. at 9. Plaintiff adds that she received a similar phone call on May 

8, 2019 and, on that same day, plaintiff sent defendant an email stating that she 

overheard defendant’s conversation with her boyfriend and she did not appreciate the 

racial slur. Id. 

Plaintiff states that, on May 9, 2019, she received eviction-related papers, 

including a 60-day notice to end tenancy. Id. at 9, Ex. K. Plaintiff states that such notice 

“is clearly a retaliation from the email that I sent [defendant] on Wednesday, May 8, 2019 

that I overheard Jeff’s [boyfriend] conversation with the racial slur and defamation of my 

character. This is arbitrarily discriminating against my husband and me.” Id. at 9.

Plaintiff adds that, on May 11, 2019, she received another phone call from 

defendant’s boyfriend threatening to evict her. Id. Plaintiff adds that she received a 

similar call from defendant’s boyfriend again on June 20, 2019. Id. at 11. Plaintiff adds 

that she and her husband received three additional calls from defendant’s boyfriend on 

July 16, 2019 and July 18, 2019. Id.

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A federal court may dismiss an action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Pro. 12(b)(1). Rule 

12(h)(3) similarly provides that a court “must dismiss the action” if it “determines at any 

time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. 12(h)(3). Because “[a] federal court is 

presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively 

appears,” the burden to prove its existence “rests on the party asserting federal subject 

matter jurisdiction.” Pac. Bell Internet Servs. v. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc., 2003 

WL 22862662, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 2003). 

A jurisdictional challenge may be facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 

373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). When the attack is facial, the court determines 

whether the allegations contained in the complaint are sufficient on their face to invoke 

federal jurisdiction. Id. Where the attack is factual, however, “the court need not presume 

the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Id. 

When resolving a factual dispute about its federal subject matter jurisdiction, a 

court may review extrinsic evidence beyond the complaint without converting a motion to 

dismiss into one for summary judgment. McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 

(9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a court “may review any evidence, such as affidavits and 

testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction”). “Once 

the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by presenting 

affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party opposing the 

motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its burden of 

establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The 

Ninth Circuit has noted that “jurisdictional dismissals in cases premised on federalquestion jurisdiction are exceptional, and must satisfy the requirements specified in Bell 

v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) . . . In Bell, the Supreme Court determined that 

jurisdictional dismissals are warranted ‘where the alleged claim under the constitution or 

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federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of 

obtaining federal jurisdiction or where such claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.’” 

Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. 

B. Analysis

As a threshold matter, the court finds that plaintiff has proffered sufficient facts to 

establish federal subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff brings claims against defendant for 

violation of Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631. Section 3604 provides the following in 

relevant part:

“As made applicable by section 3603 of this title and except as 

exempted by sections 3603(b) and 3607 of this title, it shall be 

unlawful--

. . .

(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, 

or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of 

services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, 

color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 

42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).

Here, plaintiff testified to experiencing a specific incident of racially disparaging 

comments by defendant’s boyfriend, Dkt. 3 at 8, and that, shortly after such comments, 

she received a 60-day notice to end her tenancy from a purported agent of defendant, id.

3, Ex. L, as well as various follow-up calls threatening eviction, id. at 8-11. These facts—

which defendant fails to dispute—demonstrate that plaintiff’s assertion of her FHA 

Section 3604 claim is not frivolous. As a result, this court maintains subject matter 

jurisdiction over this action. 

Defendant’s jurisdictional challenge does not change this conclusion. Defendant 

argues that the FHA’s exemption for certain landlords of single-family homes (42 U.S.C. 

§ 3603(b)(1)) eliminates this court’s federal subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s FHA 

claim. That argument is mistaken.

“[C]ourts have consistently characterized exemptions to the FHA as affirmative 

defenses.” United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 2005); 

Massaro v. Mainlands Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass’n, Inc., 3 F.3d 1472, 1474, 1476 n. 6 (11th 

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Cir. 1993) (the “housing for older persons” exemption qualified as an affirmative defense); 

Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. 

Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d 877, 882-85 (3d Cir. 1990) (the “religious organization” 

and “private club” exemptions qualified as affirmative defenses); Ho v. Donovan, 569 

F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Section 3603(b) is captioned ‘Exemptions,’ which makes it 

an affirmative defense . . . That § 3603(b)(1) requires facts outside the pleadings, facts 

likely in the possession of the respondent rather than the agency, also shows why it is 

best treated as an affirmative defense”). Given such characterization, exemptions under 

the FHA do not limit an otherwise proper exercise of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 

United States v. Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Defendants, and 

the district court, regard this exemption as a limitation on subject matter jurisdiction. We 

conclude that it is an affirmative defense having no bearing on jurisdiction”).

Here, defendant failed to identify any authority or reason to support a construction 

of Section 3603(b)(1) as anything other than an affirmative defense. Because Section 

3603(b)(1) is an exemption under the FHA, it has “no bearing” on this court’s jurisdiction. 

In any event, defendant faces questions about the applicability of Section 

3603(b)(1) in the first instance. That section provides the following in relevant part:

“(b) Exemptions

Nothing in section 3604 of this title (other than subsection (c)) 

shall apply to--

(1) any single-family house sold or rented by an 

owner: Provided, That such private individual owner does not 

own more than three such single-family houses at any one 

time: . . . Provided further, That after December 31, 1969, the 

sale or rental of any such single-family house shall be excepted 

from the application of this subchapter only if such house is 

sold or rented (A) without the use in any manner of the sales 

or rental facilities or the sales or rental services of any real 

estate broker, agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or 

services of any person in the business of selling or renting 

dwellings . . .” 

42 U.S.C § 3603(b)(1) (bold added) (italics in the original).

In her affidavit in support of her motion for preliminary injunction, plaintiff 

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repeatedly identifies a property manager by the name of Mr. Wong. Dkt. 3 at 7. Indeed, 

as an attachment to her affidavit, plaintiff even attached a letter from Mr. Wong that 

included a letterhead describing his role as a “property manager.” Id., Ex. A. Defendant 

failed to offer any evidence disputing Mr. Wong’s apparent role in managing the property, 

much less any evidence generally showing that the property did not “use in any manner . 

. . [the] services of any person in the business of selling or renting dwellings.” 42 U.S.C § 

3603(b)(1). As a result, even if the court were to qualify the Section 3603(b)(1)

exemption as a potential limitation on its federal subject matter jurisdiction, defendant has 

failed to show that such exemption would apply here in the first instance. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 3603(c) (defining a person “deemed to be in the business of selling or renting 

dwellings”). As a result, the court maintains its subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES defendant’s motion to dismiss. If 

defendant files a motion for summary judgment before the parties’ November 14, 2019 

case management conference, the court may vacate such conference.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 28, 2019

/s/ Phyllis J. Hamilton

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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