Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-19-50182/USCOURTS-ca9-19-50182-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dominic Dorsey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

DOMINIC DORSEY, AKA Boo, 

AKA Boogaloo, AKA Dominic 

Cavanaughn Dorsey, 

Defendant-Appellant.

No.19-50182 

D.C. No. 

2:14-cr-00328-

CAS-1 

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 15, 2024

Pasadena, California

Filed December 4, 2024

Before: Daniel P. Collins, Holly A. Thomas, and Anthony 

D. Johnstone, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Johnstone;

Concurrence by Judge Collins

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2 USA V. DORSEY

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed Dominic Dorsey’s conviction for 

multiple federal crimes arising from a spree of robberies 

committed by two disguised men. 

The evidence at trial included video from security 

cameras that recorded the robberies. A police detective 

testified, as a lay witness, about his out-of-court review of 

the surveillance video. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, 

a lay witness may offer testimony in the form of an opinion 

if it is “helpful . . . to determining a fact in issue.” 

Based on his close and repeated out-of-court review, the 

detective opined on details in the video that the jury may 

otherwise have missed. The panel held that such lay opinion 

testimony is admissible because the witness’s out-of-court 

review of the video adds value beyond simply playing the 

video to the jury and may be helpful “to determining a fact 

in issue.” Fed. R. Evidence. 701(b). 

The detective also opined, based on his own comparison 

of those details that were in evidence before the jury, that the 

disguised robbers shown on the surveillance video were 

Dorsey and his codefendant, Reginald Bailey. When a 

witness identifies an unknown person in an image, that 

opinion is not “helpful” under Rule 701 unless the witness 

has some personal knowledge or experience that supports a 

more informed identification than the jury can make on its 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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USA V. DORSEY 3 

own. The panel held that the detective’s opinion testimony 

identifying Dorsey and Bailey as the disguised robbers was 

not “helpful” under Rule 701 because the detective testified 

based on evidence already in front of the jury, without the 

requisite personal knowledge or experience. The district 

court therefore abused its discretion by allowing the 

testimony.

The panel held that the admissible evidence at trial and 

the district court’s instructions rendered the inadmissible 

testimony harmless.

The panel addressed Dorsey’s additional bases for 

appeal in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 

Judge Collins concurred in the judgment. He wrote that 

he has substantial doubt that the majority is correct in 

holding that the district court abused its discretion in 

allowing the detective’s challenged testimony, but 

concluded that any error that may have occurred on that 

score was more likely than not harmless. 

COUNSEL

Suria M. Bahadue (argued) and David R. Friedman, 

Assistant United States Attorneys, Criminal Appeals 

Section; Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Justin R. Rhoades and 

Joseph D. Axelrad, Assistant United States Attorneys; E. 

Martin Estrada, United States Attorney; United States 

Department of Justice, Office of the United States Attorney, 

Los Angeles, California; Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky, Kendall 

Brill & Kelly LLP, Los Angeles, California; for PlaintiffAppellee.

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4 USA V. DORSEY

Michael Tanaka (argued), Law Office of Michael Tanaka, 

Los Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant. 

OPINION

JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Dominic Dorsey of multiple federal 

crimes arising from a spree of robberies committed by two 

disguised men. The evidence at trial included video from 

security cameras that recorded the robberies. A police 

detective testified, as a lay witness, about his out-of-court 

review of the surveillance video. Based on his review, the 

detective opined on details in the video that the jury may 

otherwise have missed. The detective also opined, based on

his own comparison of those details that were in evidence 

before the jury, that the disguised robbers shown on the 

surveillance video were Dorsey and his codefendant, 

Reginald Bailey. 

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, a lay witness may 

offer testimony in the form of an opinion only if it is

“helpful . . . to determining a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 

701(b). But when a witness identifies an unknown person in 

an image, that opinion is not “helpful” under Rule 701 unless 

the witness has some personal knowledge or experience that 

supports a more informed identification than the jury can 

make on its own. The detective opined that the disguised 

robbers were Dorsey and Bailey without having that

personal knowledge or experience. Thus, his identification 

opinions were not helpful and should not have been 

admitted. But the district court’s error in allowing the 

testimony was harmless, and Dorsey’s additional bases for 

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USA V. DORSEY 5

appeal lack merit.1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, and we affirm.

I. Dorsey was tried and convicted for a series of 

robberies.

In the fall of 2013, two disguised men robbed a series of 

gas stations in the Los Angeles area. The robbers would 

enter a store, brandish a “cowboy-style” revolver, and 

demand that employees give up the contents of the cash 

register. They wore dark clothing, gloves, and hooded 

sweatshirts. The taller robber wore a black ski mask; the 

shorter robber placed a blue bandana over his face. After 

targeting gas stations for two months, the men ended their 

spree of armed robberies at a bank, where they made off with 

more than $55,000. 

Dorsey came to the attention of law enforcement based 

on the robbers’ frequent use of a dark-colored sedan. A 

witness reported seeing a black Nissan Altima with a license 

plate ending in “435” parked in an unusual location by one 

of the gas stations on the night it was robbed. Detective 

Christopher Marsden, an investigator with the Los Angeles 

Police Department, identified a car matching this 

description. Further investigation showed that the car 

belonged to Dorsey’s girlfriend and that Dorsey was driving 

the vehicle around the time that the robberies took place. 

Although security cameras recorded each of the robberies, 

the robbers’ disguises prevented law enforcement from 

identifying them from the video, so they relied on other 

evidence to make the initial identification.

1 Dorsey raised two other bases for appeal in his opening brief which we 

have addressed in a separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently 

with this opinion. 

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6 USA V. DORSEY

Over the next few months, investigators discovered 

further evidence connecting Dorsey to the robberies and to a 

second suspect, Reginald Bailey. Law enforcement arrested 

Dorsey and Bailey in June 2014, and the trial at which they 

were convicted began in July 2016. At trial, Detective 

Marsden offered a wide range of lay opinions about the steps 

he took during his investigation and various conclusions that 

he reached. The detective also opined about the contents of 

the surveillance video of the robberies, which was admitted 

in evidence. 

Detective Marsden offered two types of opinions about 

the surveillance video, which he had pored over before trial. 

First, he opined about details that the jury might otherwise 

have missed, such as the markings on the robbers’ shoes.

These opinions were grounded in the video itself and the 

detective’s thorough out-of-court review of that video. The 

district court admitted this narrative testimony under Rule 

701. Second, Detective Marsden opined that the disguised 

robbers shown in the surveillance video were Dorsey and 

Bailey. These identification opinions rested on evidence 

already in front the jury: still images of the robbers and of

Dorsey and Bailey, and the detective’s own comparison of 

the details in those images. The district court also admitted 

this identification testimony under Rule 701, despite 

objections from the defense. 

After eight days of trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts 

on all charges against both Dorsey and Bailey. The district 

court sentenced Dorsey to a term of imprisonment of 40 

years. Dorsey timely appealed. Where, as here, the district 

court has admitted testimony over an objection, we review 

the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, and its 

interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence de novo. 

United States v. Waters, 627 F.3d 345, 351 (9th Cir. 2010).

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USA V. DORSEY 7

II. The detective’s identification opinions were 

inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 701.

Before Rule 701, courts distinguished between 

admissible fact testimony and inadmissible opinion 

testimony. United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1206 

(9th Cir. 2014) (noting the “then-prevailing evidentiary 

principles” which limited lay witness testimony to factual 

observations). Non-expert or “lay” witnesses were typically 

barred from presenting opinion testimony on the grounds 

that it “would mislead juries.” Id. Rule 701 rejected these 

rationales and liberalized the admission of lay opinion 

testimony. Id. Rule 701 permits a witness to offer lay 

opinions that are “rationally based on the witness’s 

perception.” Fed. R. Evid. 701(a); see also Fed. R. Evid. 602 

(requiring a lay witness to have “personal knowledge of the 

matter” testified to unless it is expert testimony). The 

opinions must also be “helpful” to the jury in “clearly 

understanding the witness’s testimony” or “determining a 

fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid 701(b). And they must be based 

on the witness’s personal knowledge or experience, rather 

than the “specialized” knowledge of an expert. Fed. R. Evid. 

701(c). Subject to these limitations, a wide range of lay 

opinion testimony—including by law enforcement officers 

in a criminal trial—is admissible under Rule 701. See 

Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1206–09 (describing the scope of 

admissible testimony under Rule 701).

Although much of Detective Marsden’s lay opinion 

testimony was properly admitted, the district court erred by 

allowing the detective to opine that Dorsey and Bailey were 

the disguised robbers. These identification opinions were

based on his assessment of still images from the robberies 

and pictures of Dorsey and Bailey that were in evidence 

before the jury. They did not meet “Rule 701’s requirement 

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8 USA V. DORSEY

of helpfulness,” because the detective was not “more likely 

to identify correctly the [robbers] than [was] the jury.” 

United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460, 1465 (9th Cir. 

1993). Instead, the detective merely “spoon-fed his 

interpretations” of the evidence to the jury. Gadson, 763 

F.3d at 1208 (quoting United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 

590, 597 (6th Cir. 2013)). Thus, the identification opinions 

should have been excluded. 

A. Detective Marsden’s narrative testimony about 

details appearing in the surveillance video of the 

robberies was admissible.

Law enforcement officers often testify in criminal trials 

about video footage. When a law enforcement officer points 

out particulars in a video that are based on a close and 

repeated out-of-court review and that a casual observer 

would likely miss, the testimony is lay opinion because the 

officer is contributing to the jury’s in-court perception of the 

video. See United States v. Torralba-Mendia, 784 F.3d 652, 

659 (9th Cir. 2015). Such lay opinion is admissible because 

a juror, without the benefit of the officer’s thorough review, 

might overlook the details highlighted by the officer’s 

testimony. Thus, the officer’s out-of-court review of the 

video adds value beyond simply playing the video to the jury 

and may be helpful “to determining a fact in issue.” Fed. R. 

Evid. 701(b).

In both United States v. Begay and Torralba-Mendia, we 

explained that where a witness had watched video many 

times, the witness’s narrative description of it was helpful 

because the witness could point out details that a casual 

observer was likely to miss. See 42 F.3d 486, 502–03 (9th 

Cir. 1994); Torralba-Mendia, 784 F.3d at 659–661. In 

Begay, the video at issue captured a chaotic and complex 

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USA V. DORSEY 9

mass demonstration, and we determined that a person 

“viewing a videotape of a demonstration involving over 200 

people would likely not see certain details.” 42 F.3d at 503. 

Because the testifying officer had viewed the original 

videotape “over 100 times,” as well as “about 800 

photographs” from the demonstration, he was allowed to 

create and narrate an enhanced video exhibit at trial. Id. at 

502. We held that this was admissible lay opinion testimony. 

Id.

We reiterated this holding in Torralba-Mendia. There, a 

series of surveillance tapes recorded over several days 

showed cars “arriving and departing” from surveilled 

locations. Id. at 659. The testifying officer had “watched 

each video roughly fifty times.” Id. The court permitted the 

officer to opine about “unique characteristics of the 

vehicles,” point out “the length of time lapses between video 

clips,” and highlight details like “the particular clothing of 

certain passengers.” Id. at 559–60. We held that this 

testimony was “helpful” to the jury in “determining a fact in 

issue,” Fed. R. Evid. 701(b), because it “helped the jury 

understand the import of the videos,” id. at 660.

Detective Marsden took the witness stand on the third 

day of trial. The detective, who was not qualified as an expert 

witness, opined about the entire scope of his investigation 

into the so-called “Cowboy Gun Bandits.” His testimony ran 

from his initial insights into the methods of the unknown 

robbers to the eventual arrest and post-arrest interview of 

Dorsey. Much of the detective’s testimony described 

surveillance video of the robberies. Detective Marsden 

highlighted visible features of the disguised robbers: the 

taller robber consistently wore a pair of gray sneakers with 

silver eyelets, separated from a white sole by a black line;

the shorter robber often wore gray or dirty white sneakers,

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10 USA V. DORSEY

and a frame-by-frame review of the video revealed that he 

had glasses, was bald, and was missing a finger on his left 

hand. 

As in Begay and Torralba-Mendia, Detective Marsden’s 

narrative testimony was an opinion because he drew on his 

extensive out-of-court review of the surveillance video in 

contributing to the jury’s perceptions of that evidence. This 

thorough review allowed him to highlight salient, but minor, 

details that the jury might otherwise have missed. In turn, his 

testimony helped the jury to “discern correctly and 

efficiently” those details. Begay, 42 F.3d at 503. It was 

therefore properly admitted under Rule 701. See id.;

Torralba-Mendia, 784 F.3d at 659–60.

B. Detective Marsden’s testimony identifying 

Dorsey and Bailey as the disguised robbers was 

inadmissible.

Much of Detective Marsden’s testimony about his 

observations was properly admitted, including his narrative 

testimony about the details of the surveillance video. But he 

also made several forays into improper identification 

throughout his three days of testimony. On appeal, Dorsey 

directs his challenge to this testimony. 

A witness may, with sufficient background knowledge 

of a person, offer a lay opinion identifying that person in an 

image subject to the limits of Rule 701. Such an 

identification may be admissible opinion testimony when it 

evaluates evidence before the jury by contributing to that 

evidence the witness’s personal knowledge that the jury 

lacks. See United States v. Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 326–27 

(9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that an officer had “substantial 

knowledge” about the defendant’s appearance that “the jury 

was unable to see”); Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1208 (explaining 

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USA V. DORSEY 11

that lay opinion testimony connects the evidence before the 

jury to “the witness’s own understanding, including a wealth 

of personal information, experience, and education”). Such 

testimony is “helpful . . . to determining a fact in issue,” Fed. 

R. Evid. 701(b), when the witness’s personal knowledge 

means that “the witness is more likely to identify correctly 

the person than is the jury.” LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465. 

Whether a lay witness’s identification opinion is 

“helpful” to the jury under Rule 701 depends on the totality 

of the circumstances. United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008, 

1015 (9th Cir. 2005). We have previously recognized two 

situations in which an identification opinion has met “Rule 

701’s requirement of helpfulness.” LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 

1465. An identification opinion may be helpful, and 

therefore admissible, where “the witness has had substantial 

and sustained contact” with the defendant; or where “the 

defendant’s appearance in the photograph is different from 

his appearance before the jury and the witness is familiar 

with the defendant as he appears in the photograph.” Id.

(collecting cases); see also Beck, 418 F.3d at 1015. Even so, 

we have explained that this kind of identification testimony 

is of “dubious value,” especially when provided by a law 

enforcement officer, because it can create unfair prejudice 

and discourage jurors from drawing their own conclusions. 

LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465; see also United States v. 

Butcher, 557 F.2d 666, 670 (9th Cir. 1977) (cautioning that 

“lay opinion identification by [law enforcement] is not to be 

encouraged”).

1. Detective Marsden’s testimony identified Dorsey

and Bailey as the disguised robbers. 

After Detective Marsden highlighted the robbers’ 

sneakers and other details in his narrative testimony about 

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12 USA V. DORSEY

the surveillance video, he went further to opine that his 

review of the video and images led him to identify Dorsey 

as the taller robber. Detective Marsden addressed two 

images that had been placed side-by-side before the jury. 

One showed the disguised robbers. The other showed 

Dorsey. Referring to the picture of the disguised robbers, 

Detective Marsden testified that the taller robber wore the 

“same sneakers” during every robbery. Then, turning to the 

picture of Dorsey, the detective testified that Dorsey was 

wearing the “same sneakers” as the taller robber. Finally, 

Detective Marsden testified that his assessment of the 

totality of the video—especially his conclusion that the taller 

robber and Dorsey wore the same sneakers—led him “to 

believe that Dominic Dorsey was the taller suspect.” Thus, 

Detective Marsden’s opinion testimony identified Dorsey 

based on surveillance video and still photos, evidence 

already in front of the jury.

As to the shorter robber, Detective Marsden’s narrative 

testimony had specified that the suspect was bald, with 

glasses, dirty white sneakers, and a missing finger on his left 

hand. But, as with his testimony about Dorsey, Detective 

Marsden went even further and opined that his review of the 

video and images led him to identify Bailey as the shorter 

robber. For instance, the prosecution pulled up three pictures 

of the shorter robber taken from surveillance video at one of 

the gas stations. These three pictures were juxtaposed 

against a fourth, this one showing Bailey at another time and 

place. The prosecution elicited the detective’s opinion, 

asking him to explain how the pictures “play[ed] a part in 

[his] investigation.” Detective Marsden opined that he had 

identified Bailey as the shorter robber because Bailey, like 

the shorter suspect, was “bald and wearing glasses and 

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USA V. DORSEY 13

wearing the white shoes.” Once again, this opinion identified 

Bailey based on evidence already in front of the jury. 

2. Detective Marsden’s identification opinions 

were inadmissible.

Detective Marsden’s lay opinions identifying Dorsey 

and Bailey as the disguised robbers were “unhelpful” and 

therefore inadmissible under Rule 701 because that 

testimony did not provide reason to believe that Detective 

Marsden was more likely to identify correctly the robbers 

than was the jury. See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465. The 

detective did not identify the disguised robbers based on his 

“sustained contact” with Dorsey and Bailey, LaPierre, 998 

F.2d at 1465, nor any other personal knowledge about their

appearance that the jury lacked, Henderson, 68 F.3d at 326–

27. Detective Marsden served as the “lead investigator” of 

the crimes, and in that capacity testified to tracking down 

Dorsey through phone and vehicle records as well as 

unsuccessful attempts to follow his car. But these 

investigative steps focused on Dorsey’s identity on paper. 

They did not provide the detective with personal knowledge 

of Dorsey’s appearance, the basis of the detective’s

identification opinion.

Although Detective Marsden had arrested Dorsey, and 

interviewed him post-arrest, he did not testify that this 

limited personal contact helped him identify Dorsey as the 

taller suspect in the video. The government also relied on 

driver’s licenses and booking photos, not the detective’s 

personal recollection, to establish Bailey’s appearance at the 

time of the crimes. While “we have not provided clear 

guidance as to the extent of contact sufficient to render lay 

opinion testimony rationally based and helpful to the jury,” 

Beck, 418 F.3d at 1014, our “case-by-case approach” has 

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14 USA V. DORSEY

relied on multiple contacts over a long time to establish 

“sufficient contact” to support personal knowledge of 

identity, id. at 1015 n.4 (collecting cases). Instead, after 

comparing the images of the disguised robbers to images of 

Dorsey and Bailey, the detective opined about the identities 

of the robbers without the benefit of such personal 

knowledge. He did so based only on his own belief that there 

were enough similarities to say the same features, even the 

same people, were visible in both sets of images. 

These identification opinions were based on the 

surveillance video, still images, and the detective’s extensive 

review of that evidence. But the jury had access to all the 

same evidence and, through the detective’s narrative 

testimony, the jury had been directed to important details of 

that evidence they might otherwise have missed. The 

detective’s additional identification opinions, therefore, did 

not “offer[] to the jury ‘a perspective it could not acquire in 

its limited exposure’ to the defendant.” Beck, 418 F.3d at 

1015 (quoting United States v. Allen, 787 F.2d 933, 936 (4th 

Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds, 479 U.S. 1077

(1987)). Thus, the identity of the disguised robbers “was a 

determination properly left to the jury.” LaPierre, 998 F.2d 

at 1465.

These restrictions on the admissibility of identification 

opinions reflect a basic limitation on the scope of testimony 

admissible as lay opinion. Rule 701 reduced courts’ reliance 

on the slippery distinction between admissible factual 

testimony and inadmissible opinion testimony. See Gadson, 

763 F.3d at 1206 (“[T]he distinction between ‘fact’ and 

‘opinion’ proved to be unworkable in practice.”). But the 

rule does not allow non-expert witnesses to offer conclusory 

opinions “which amount to little more than choosing up 

sides.” Id. at 1208 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701 advisory 

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USA V. DORSEY 15

committee’s notes). When a witness opines about an issue 

“within the common knowledge of the jury” based on 

evidence already in front of the jury, the opinion is unhelpful 

because the witness has “essentially ‘spoon-fed his 

interpretations of the [evidence] to the jury.’” Id. at 1207–08 

(quoting Freeman, 730 F.3d at 597); see also United States 

v. Earls, 704 F.3d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing LaPierre 

for the conclusion that “[o]ur sister circuits have consistently 

held that Rule 701 does not extend so far as to allow a 

witness to serve as the thirteenth juror and compare two 

pieces of evidence that are already available to the jury”). 

Here, the detective’s identification opinions raised exactly 

these concerns: weighing evidence already in front of the 

jury, choosing a side, and spoon-feeding that conclusion to 

the jury.2 The admission of the detective’s identification 

opinions thus was improper under Rule 701.

C. The district court’s error was harmless.

“For errors that are not of constitutional magnitude, the 

government must show that the prejudice resulting from the 

2 We disagree with the government’s assertion that vigorous crossexamination could safeguard against the issues with Detective 

Marsden’s testimony. Cross-examination may, in some cases, address 

the concern that opinion testimony could “mislead juries.” Gadson, 763 

F.3d at 1206; see also Beck, 418 F.3d at 1015 (“[C]ross-examination 

exists to highlight potential weaknesses in lay opinion testimony.”). But 

cross-examination is unlikely to be effective where, as here, the 

detective’s identification opinions—based on the officer’s assessment of 

evidence that the jury was equally competent to assess—borrows 

credibility from other testimony reflecting the detective’s role as the 

“lead investigator” into the crimes. See LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465

(“[L]ay opinion identification by policemen or parole officers is not to 

be encouraged, and should be used only if no other adequate 

identification testimony is available to the prosecution.” (quoting 

Butcher, 557 F.2d at 670)).

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16 USA V. DORSEY

error was more probably harmless than not.” United States 

v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 905 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United 

States v. Mett, 178 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999)); see also 

28 U.S.C. § 2111. We conclude that the admission of the 

detective’s improper identification testimony, “when viewed 

in the context of the entirety of [the detective’s] testimony 

and other evidence offered by the [G]overnment,” was 

harmless. Freeman, 498 F.3d at 905.

Here, “the evidence as a whole” provides a “fair 

assurance that the jury was not substantially swayed by the 

error.” Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Freeman, 498 

F.3d at 905). The evidence at trial established that Dorsey 

drove a black Nissan Altima with a license plate ending in 

“435” around the time of the robberies, and a witness 

reported seeing a car of the same description near one of the 

gas stations on the night it was robbed. A video recording 

from another of the gas station crime scenes showed Dorsey, 

undisguised, paying for fuel in cash. Minutes later, the 

shorter, bandana-wearing robber entered, brandished the 

cowboy-style revolver, and robbed the cash register. Cell 

records also showed that Dorsey and Bailey often 

communicated with one another before and after, but never 

during, the robberies. Rental car records revealed that Bailey 

rented a Nissan Versa the week of the bank robbery, and a 

911 caller reported that the robbers used a silver Nissan 

Versa as their getaway vehicle.

Even when Detective Marsden discussed the 

surveillance video of the robberies, most of his narrative 

testimony was admissible, and the video itself was properly 

admitted into evidence. See United States v. Rodriguez, 971 

F.3d 1005, 1020 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the erroneously 

admitted testimony was harmless when it played a small role

in the trial and most of the officers’ testimony was 

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USA V. DORSEY 17

admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence). The 

district court also mitigated the prejudice resulting from the 

inadmissible testimony with repeated admonitions to the 

jury that questions of fact—including the identity of the 

disguised robbers—were to be answered by the jury. 

Given this overwhelming evidence, and the precautions 

the district court took to limit the effect of the improper 

identification opinions, we conclude that the Government 

met its burden to prove that “the error was more probably 

harmless than not.”3 Freeman, 498 F.3d at 905.

III.Conclusion

We affirm Dorsey’s conviction. The district court abused 

its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce lay 

identification opinions inadmissible under Rule 701. Lay 

identification opinions are “helpful” to the jury in 

“determining a fact in issue” only in limited circumstances. 

Fed. R. Evid. 701; see, e.g., LaPierre, 998 F.2d at 1465

(explaining the contexts in which such testimony has been 

held admissible). And we have explained that Rule 701 does 

3 Before the trial at which Dorsey and Bailey were convicted, a previous 

trial had ended in a mistrial because of a deadlocked jury. Dorsey argues 

that we can infer the detective’s improper identification opinions were 

crucial to his conviction because they were not presented at the first trial 

but were presented at the second. Even if we begin with that 

presumption, however, multiple aspects of the charges, trial strategy, and 

evidence changed from the first trial to the second. And, as we have 

discussed, the evidence admitted at the second trial is more than adequate 

to assure us “that the jury was not substantially swayed by the error.” 

Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Freeman, 498 F.3d at 905). Finally, 

unlike in United States v. Marsh, to which Dorsey directs us, the 

evidentiary error here was not a constitutional error, and so we need not 

determine that “the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 144 

F.3d 1229, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 1998).

Case: 19-50182, 12/04/2024, ID: 12916226, DktEntry: 86-1, Page 17 of 18
18 USA V. DORSEY

not permit witnesses to spoon-feed their interpretations of 

the evidence to the jury. See Gadson, 763 F.3d at 1208. But 

here, that is exactly what the detective accomplished through 

his improper identification opinions. His opinion testimony 

identifying Dorsey and Bailey was not “helpful” within the 

meaning of Rule 701 and should have been excluded. We 

affirm only because the admissible evidence at trial and the 

district court’s instructions rendered the inadmissible 

testimony harmless. 

AFFIRMED.

COLLINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: 

I have substantial doubt that the majority is correct in 

holding that the district court abused its discretion in 

allowing the testimony of Detective Christopher Marsden 

that Defendant-Appellant Dominic Dorsey challenges on 

appeal. But I need not decide that issue, because, for 

substantially the reasons stated in section II(C) of the 

majority opinion, any error that may have occurred on that 

score was more likely than not harmless. On that basis, I 

concur in the court’s judgment affirming Dorsey’s 

conviction. 

Case: 19-50182, 12/04/2024, ID: 12916226, DktEntry: 86-1, Page 18 of 18