Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03120/USCOURTS-caDC-98-03120-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wilbert Jerome Drew
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 15, 1999 Decided January 25, 2000

No. 98-3120

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Wilbert Jerome Drew,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00471-01)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the

cause for the appellant.

Florence Pan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued

the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United States

Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for the appellee.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Silberman and Henderson,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Opinion filed by Chief Judge Edwards concurring in the

judgment.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Wilbert J.

Drew pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a firearm

while subject to a court order in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8). For the first time on appeal Drew argues that

section 922(g)(8) is unconstitutional under the Second and

Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Drew

also argues that the district court made several sentencing

errors: (1) in finding under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) that Drew's relevant conduct included attempted first degree murder; (2) in applying

the cross-reference provisions, sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1, of

the Guidelines; (3) in violating his right to due process by

sentencing him based on attempted first degree murder

supported by hearsay evidence; and (4) in applying the twolevel enhancement for restraint of victim pursuant to U.S.S.G.

s 3A1.3. We conclude that, because of his guilty plea, Drew

waived his right to challenge the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8). We further conclude that the district court

properly applied the Guidelines' cross-reference provisions

and that Drew's due process challenge to his conviction is

meritless. Because we believe the district court improperly

applied section 3A1.3's two-level enhancement for restraint of

victim, however, we remand for resentencing without the

enhancement.

I.

On December 2, 1997 a grand jury returned a single-count

indictment charging Drew with violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8). Two days later the government filed a thirteencount superseding indictment charging inter alia burglary,

kidnapping and violation of a protective order. The charges

arose from Drew's armed forced entry into his estranged

wife's house and his subsequent actions. At the time of the

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offense Drew had been married to Renay Short-Drew for

eleven years. He had physically abused her at least four

times by "smacking, hitting, punching [and] kicking" her.

PSR 4.1 On October 14, 1997 Mrs. Drew petitioned the

District of Columbia (District) Superior Court for a civil

protection order (CPO) against Drew and obtained a temporary protection order pending a hearing. On October 27,

1997 the Superior Court issued a one-year CPO with standard

conditions, using the form used by the Family Division of the

Superior Court. The CPO required Drew to vacate the

family premises and retrieve his belongings therefrom with a

police escort, ordered Drew to stay at least 100 feet away

from his wife and their three children, ordered Drew not to

"assault, threaten, harass or physically abuse" his wife or the

children in any manner and allowed Drew to contact her only

through counsel. Id. Family counseling was also ordered

and was scheduled to begin on November 19, 1997.

On November 2, 1997 Drew telephoned Mrs. Drew at about

2:30 a.m. Distraught, Drew said that he needed help right

away and could not wait until the November 19th family

counseling session. Drew told her that the system had failed

him, everyone was turning their back on him and he was

contemplating suicide. See id. Mrs. Drew suggested he

contact their family doctor. See id. When she told him that

she intended to hang up, he threatened to do something

"drastic." Id. A few minutes later, Drew broke into their

house by shattering a window. Mrs. Drew heard the sounds

of breaking glass and someone running up the stairs. She

locked her bedroom door, grabbed her portable phone and

hid in a closet. She dialed 911 and requested help. While

she was on the telephone with the emergency dispatcher,

Drew broke through the bedroom door and then through the

closet door. He pointed a shotgun in her face and said,

__________

1 "PSR" refers to the amended presentence investigation report.

"A" refers to the Public Appendix and Record Material. "R. Drew

Tr." refers to the grand jury testimony of Renay Short-Drew.

"Szala Tr." refers to the grand jury testimony of Paul Szala, a law

enforcement officer with the District of Columbia Metropolitan

Police Department (MPD).

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"Bitch, get up. Get out of this closet." R. Drew Tr. 9. She

pleaded with Drew, saying "Please, please don't shoot me.

Don't kill me. Don't shoot me with the shotgun." Id. When

she attempted to stall by saying that she had to put on her

shoes, Drew declared, "You don't need shoes where you are

going." A 117. At gunpoint, Drew forced his wife to walk

out of the bedroom and into the upstairs hallway. There they

met their 19-year-old son, Tamarkus, and their 15-year-old

son, Jerral. Still pointing the gun at his wife, Drew said,

"Bitch, walk." R. Drew Tr. 10. Drew went down the stairs

in front of Mrs. Drew, continuing to point the shotgun at her,

and told her again to come downstairs. See A 39. Eventually she walked down the stairs, stopping a few steps from the

bottom. Their two sons also walked downstairs, trying to

talk to Drew. Drew again complained that he was tired, the

system had failed him and he couldn't take it anymore. He

seemed "unfocused" and his "eyes were glazed over." Mrs.

Drew cried out again, "Please don't shoot me." A 118. At

one point, Drew pointed the gun in his wife's face. See R.

Drew Tr. 11. He also pulled the trigger of the gun. See

Szala Tr. 7, 8. Mrs. Drew heard a "tick" or a "pop" but the

gun did not discharge. See R. Drew Tr. 11.2 When the gun

did not discharge, Mrs. Drew and her sons jumped on Drew

and attempted to take the gun away from him. MPD Officer

Paul Szala arrived as they were struggling with Drew and

with his assistance they subdued Drew and Szala placed

Drew under arrest.

The government and defense counsel entered into plea

negotiations. The government initially offered to allow Drew

to plead guilty to two charges--Count One (possession of a

firearm while subject to a court order in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8)) and an Information charging burglary while

armed--noting that the Guidelines' base offense level for

Count One would "probably be 24." Tr. 5/5/98 at 17. Drew

rejected the offer. The government then offered to let him

__________

2 Forensic testing subsequently established that one of the shells

had been struck by the firing pin, confirming that the trigger had

been pulled. See Szala Tr. 7.

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plead guilty to Count One only. Drew first declined and

informed the trial court that he no longer wished to be

represented by his counsel. After an on the record discussion involving the court, all counsel and Drew, Drew's counsel

and Drew agreed to confer again. When the parties appeared in court again, one of Drew's lawyers, Assistant

Federal Defender Gregory William Spencer, advised the

court that, pursuant to a written plea agreement, Drew

wanted to plead guilty to Count One. In exchange for Drew's

guilty plea, the government dismissed all other charges

against him. The plea agreement reserved the government's

right of allocution at Drew's sentencing but provided that the

government would not oppose a three-level reduction in

Drew's offense level for acceptance of responsibility. Spencer

also indicated:

I believe that I was able to review for him the calculations that we believe would be appropriate in this case. I

believe that I was able to discuss with him the calculations that we have tried to foresee that the government

may argue, including various reasons for upward departures and various reasons for downward departures.

Tr. 6/2/98 at 28. Before accepting Drew's guilty plea, the

district court referred to the proffer of facts and informed

Drew that, by pleading guilty, he waived the right to appeal

his conviction but retained the right to appeal an illegal

sentence. Drew agreed with the factual proffer and stated

that he understood he was waiving his right to appeal his

conviction. See Tr. 6/2/98 at 42. The court then accepted

Drew's guilty plea.

On September 28, 1998 the district court sentenced Drew

to 80 months in prison followed by three years of supervised

release. In sentencing Drew pursuant to the Guidelines'

cross-reference provisions for firearm offenses, U.S.S.G.

ss 2K2.1 and 2X1.1, the court applied the base offense level

for attempted first degree murder, added a two-level enhancement for restraint of victim under U.S.S.G. s 3A1.3 and

allowed a three-level reduction based on acceptance of reUSCA Case #98-3120 Document #492202 Filed: 01/25/2000 Page 5 of 19
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sponsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 27 and a

Guidelines range of 70-87 months.

II.

The standard of review applicable to Drew's constitutional

challenge to his conviction is discussed infra. We review the

district court's application of the Guidelines as follows:

"[P]urely legal questions are reviewed de novo; factual findings are to be affirmed unless 'clearly erroneous'; and [the

Court] give[s] 'due deference' to the district court's application of the guidelines to facts." United States v. Becraft, 117

F.3d 1450, 1451 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted).

A. Waiver

Drew argues that his conviction should be vacated because

the statute under which he pleaded guilty, 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8), violates the Second and Fifth Amendments to the

United States Constitution. The government responds that,

by pleading guilty, Drew waived his constitutional challenge.

"It is well settled that a voluntary and intelligent plea of

guilty made by an accused person, who has been advised by

competent counsel, may not be collaterally attacked." Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998) (quotation

omitted). The United States Supreme Court has recognized

one exception to the general rule where the defendant's

claimed right is "the right not to be haled into court at all

upon the felony charges." United States v. Broce, 488 U.S.

563, 574-75 (1989) (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,

30-31 (1974)); see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-

63 n.2 (1975) ("[A] plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a

claim that--judged on its face--the charge is one which the

State may not constitutionally prosecute."). Drew contends

that his constitutional challenge falls within the

Blackledge/Menna exception. We disagree. In United

States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1996), we noted the

error in labeling a challenge to the constitutionality of a

statute a jurisdictional issue. In Baucum we did not apply

the Blackledge/Menna exception because Baucum challenged

a sentencing statute. But subsequent cases have made clear

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that Drew waived his constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(8) because he failed to raise his challenge below.

See United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471, 1476 (D.C. Cir.

1996) ("[B]ecause Ishmeal Badru's facial constitutional challenge to the 'school-yard statute,' ... is raised for the first

time on appeal, it is barred by" Baucum, 80 F.3d 539)

(internal citation omitted.); see also United States v. David,

96 F.3d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("We do not reach David's

Commerce Clause challenge to his 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1)

conviction because he failed to raise the claim in the lower

court.").

B. Attempted First Degree Murder

Drew argues that no evidence established that he pulled

the shotgun trigger while pointing the gun at his wife.

Because the district court's determination that Drew attempted to commit first degree murder is a factual finding, we

review it for "clear error" and accord it "due deference." See

id.3 Mrs. Drew's grand jury testimony supports the finding

that Drew attempted to murder her:

[Prosecutor]: But what I do need to ask you, you told me

that at one point your husband had the gun pointed at

you, and you heard the trigger?

[Mrs. Drew]: Yeah.

R. Drew Tr. 11. Furthermore, Officer Szala testified before

the grand jury that Mrs. Drew told him that Drew had

pointed the gun at her face and pulled the trigger. See Szala

Tr. 7-8. At sentencing Drew did not contest that the gun

was pointed at Mrs. Drew when he pulled the trigger. Also

at sentencing the government introduced in evidence the

shotgun recovered from the Drew residence the night of the

offense as well as the indented shell. Based on this evidence,

the sentencing court did not err, at least not clearly so, in

finding that Drew "took sufficiently premeditated actions to

__________

3 The district court noted that although sentencing facts must be

proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the findings here had

been proved "beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Drew,

23 F. Supp. 2d 39, 43 n.2 (D.D.C. 1998).

constitute attempted first degree murder." Drew, 23

F. Supp. 2d at 44.

C. Cross-Reference Provisions

Under the Guidelines, the sentence for a violation of 18

U.S.C. s 922(g) is calculated by reference to section 2K2.1,

entitled "Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of

Firearms or Ammunition." Section 2K2.1 is divided into

three subsections: subsection (a) assigns the base offense

level for firearms offenses; subsection (b) lists specific offense characteristics to increase or decrease the base offense

level; and subsection (c) is a cross-reference provision, which,

as an alternative to subsections (a) and (b), assigns a potentially higher base offense level to a defendant who uses or

possesses a firearm in connection with the commission or

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attempted commission of another crime. Section 2K2.1 provides in relevant part:

(a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest):

....

(6) 14, if the defendant ... is a prohibited person;

....

(b) Specific Offense Characteristics

....

(4) If any firearm was stolen, or had an altered or

obliterated serial number, increase by 2 levels.[4]

(5) If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or

ammunition in connection with another felony offense

..., increase by 4 levels.

....

(c) Cross Reference

(1) If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or

ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense ..., apply--

(A) s 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy)

in respect to that other offense, if the resulting

__________

4 The shotgun had an obliterated serial number.

offense level is greater than that determined

above.

Section 2X1.1 in turn provides:

(a) Base Offense Level: The base offense level from the

guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense

conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty.[5]

....

(c) Cross Reference

(1) When an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is

expressly covered by another offense guideline section,

apply that guideline section.

Under section 2K2.1(c), the cross-reference provision, a defendant who uses a firearm to commit or attempt to commit

another crime is assigned the offense level that corresponds

"to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater

than that determined" under subsections (a) and (b). Specifically, section 2K2.1(c) provides that the defendant's offense

level should be determined under section 2X1.1. Section

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2X1.1, in turn, provides that the base offense level for a crime

involving attempt, solicitation or conspiracy should be calculated either by reference to the offense level of the substantive offense, see U.S.S.G. s 2X1.1(a), or "[w]hen an attempt,

solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered by another

offense guideline section, apply that guideline section," id.

s 2X1.1(c).

Drew argues that the district court erred in applying the

cross-reference provisions of sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1 to

sentence him under the attempted murder guideline. See

Drew, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44. Drew contends that he

should have been sentenced under section 2K2.1(a) & (b)(5)

and that the sentence imposed by the district court violated

his right to due process.

__________

5 Application Note 2 of section 2X1.1 defines "substantive offense"

as "the offense that the defendant was convicted of ... attempting

... to commit."

1. Application of sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1

The district court's interpretation of sections 2K2.1 and

2X1.1 involves a question of law that we review de novo. See

Becraft, 117 F.3d at 1451. We must first determine which

subsection of 2K2.1 to apply. Drew argues that under subsections (a) and (b), his total offense level should be 17 and

his sentencing range should be 30 to 37 months.6 Subsection

(c) of section 2K2.1, however, is the applicable provision

because: (1) Drew "used or possessed [the] firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense" namely, attempted first degree

murder, and (2) the resulting base offense level under subsection (c) would be greater than 17. Section 2K2.1(c) then

refers the sentencing court to section 2X1.1.

Section 2X1.1(c) instructs the court to apply the guideline,

if any, that "expressly cover[s]" an attempt to commit "another offense" as used in section 2K2.1(c). The government

argues that, as the district court determined, Drew attempted

to commit first degree murder because "he had the requisite

state of mind, and took sufficiently premeditated actions to

constitute attempted first degree murder." Drew, 23

F. Supp. 2d at 44. As discussed supra, we conclude that the

district court did not clearly err in determining that Drew's

relevant conduct constituted attempted first degree murder.

Referring to the guideline for "Assault With Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder," U.S.S.G. s 2A2.1,7 the

__________

6 The level 17 is calculated from the base offense level of 14

because Drew was a prohibited person, see U.S.S.G. s 2K2.1(a), to

which is added a two-level adjustment for the gun's obliterated

serial number, see id. s 2K2.1(b)(4), and a four-level adjustment for

use of the weapon in connection with another felony offense. See

id. s 2K2.1(b)(5). With a three-level credit for acceptance of responsibility, see id. ss 3E1.1(a) and (b), Drew's offense level would

be 17. We agree with Drew that the district court erroneously

added a two-level adjustment for physical restraint of the victim

pursuant to section 3A1.3 of the Guidelines. See infra at 13-14.

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7 U.S.S.G. s 2A2.1 provides:

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court applied the base offense level (28) for attempted first

degree murder. After the two-level increase for restraint of

victim and the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Drew's total offense level is 27 and his sentencing

range is 70 to 87 months. See Drew, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 44.

Drew further argues, however, that even if section 2K2.1(c)

is applicable, the sentencing court erred in interpreting section 2K2.1(c)'s cross reference to section 2X1.1 because section 2X1.1(a) uses the offense level for the "substantive

offense." Application Note 2 of section 2X1.1 defines "substantive offense" as "the offense that the defendant was

convicted of ... attempting ... to commit." Therefore, in

Drew's view, the sentencing court should have applied the

base offense level for the offense of conviction only--possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Instead, the

sentencing court, applying section 2X1.1(c), used the base

offense level for attempted first degree murder. Drew's

argument rests upon the applicability of "substantive offense." But "substantive offense" relates only to section

2X1.1(a) and (b); "substantive offense" is not mentioned in

section 2X1.1(c). Application Note 2, which defines "substantive offense," "applies only if section 2X1.1 is applied directly,

rather than as a cross-reference from section 2K2.1." United

States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 743 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation

omitted); see also United States v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264,

1266 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, section 2X1.1(c) requires the

court to apply the offense level for attempted first degree

murder prescribed in section 2A2.1.

2. Due process

Drew next argues that his sentence violates his right to due

process because the district court "[i]n effect ... convicted

appellant of attempted murder, and then sentenced him to

the far greater offense," see Petitioner's Br. 26, and relied

upon hearsay evidence in doing so. Drew concedes that he

never raised his due process claim below but argues that his

__________

(a) Base Offense Level:

(1) 28, if the object of the offense would have constituted

first degree murder.

general challenge to the applicability of the cross-reference

provisions preserved the issue. See id. 25. Nevertheless,

because the district court lacked the opportunity to rule on

the issue, we review Drew's challenge for plain error only.

See United States v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir.

1991). In the sentencing context, we have held that error is

"plain" where it "is obvious under settled law and would

result in grave prejudice or a miscarriage of justice if not

corrected on appeal." United States v. Watson, 57 F.3d 1093,

1097 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Drew's challenge falls substantially short of this standard.

First, the United States Supreme Court has held that a

sentencing court may consider a defendant's conduct apart

from his offense conduct without violating due process. See

United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-53 (1997); Witte v.

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United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395 (1995) (consideration of

"relevant conduct" under Guidelines bears on character of

offense of conviction and does not punish for different offense); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994)

(reaffirming propriety of sentencing court's consideration of

"a defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction

resulted from that behavior"); see also 18 U.S.C. s 3661 ("No

limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the

background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of

an offense which a court of the United States may receive and

consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.").

Second, the district court indeed relied in part on Szala's

hearsay testimony. His testimony corroborated Mrs. Drew's

testimony regarding Drew's actions. The Supreme Court has

specifically held that the rules of evidence do not restrict the

evidence a sentencing court may consider. See Nichols, 511

U.S. at 747 ("As a general proposition, a sentencing judge

may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely

unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come."). The sentencing

court did not consider any prohibited evidence in sentencing

Drew and, accordingly, we reject his due process claim.

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D. Physical restraint

Finally, Drew argues that the sentencing court improperly

added a two-level adjustment under U.S.S.G. s 3A1.3 for

"physically restrain[ing] [the victim]"8 because he did not

physically touch his wife and any restraint was part of the

offense itself. The government responds that Drew physically restrained Mrs. Drew by ordering her to leave her bedroom and walk down the stairs at gunpoint. Whether the

district court properly added the two-level adjustment is a

mixed question of law and fact. On a mixed question of law

and fact we use a sliding scale depending on the "mix" of the

question. See United States v. Kim, 232 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C.

Cir. 1994). Because the facts on this issue are not significantly in dispute, the issue is primarily a question of law and

therefore review closer to de novo is required. See id.

Application Note 1 to section 3A1.3 defines "physically

restrained," referencing commentary to section 1B1.1, as "the

forcible restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound,

or locked up." U.S.S.G. s 1B1.1. We agree that "the use of

the modifier 'such as' in the definition of 'physical restraint'

found in s 1B1.1, Application Note 1(i), indicates that the

illustrations of physical restraint are listed by way of example

rather than limitation." United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d

154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). Nevertheless, the phrase "being tied, bound, or

locked up" indicates that physical restraint requires the defendant either to restrain the victim through bodily contact or

to confine the victim in some way. See United States v.

Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 265 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (victim was "physically restrained" when defendant's coconspirators beat victim

and detained him for seven days). While the Ninth Circuit

has decided that forcing someone to move by gunpoint constitutes physical restraint, see United States v. Thompson, 109

F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 1997), no other circuit has found

physical restraint without some type of confinement accompanying the forced movement at gunpoint. See Anglin, 169

__________

8 U.S.S.G. s 3A1.3 states, "If a victim was physically restrained in

the course of the offense, increase by 2 levels."

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F.3d at 163-64. As the Second Circuit noted in Anglin, "The

most pertinent definition of 'physical' is 'of the body as

opposed to the mind, as, physical exercise.' " Id. at 164

(quoting Webster's Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary (1979) at

1353) (emphasis in original). The required restraint must, as

the language plainly recites, be physical. While Mrs. Drew

no doubt felt restrained by Drew, she was "not subject to

physical restraint, as we interpret the Guideline's use of that

phrase." Id. at 164-65. Any other interpretation would

effectively add the two-level adjustment to almost any attempted murder because presumably any victim would feel

restrained if directed to move at gunpoint. Because we

conclude that Drew's actions did not include physical restraint, we remand to the district court to resentence without

the two-level adjustment.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Drew's conviction.

We vacate his sentence, however, because of the incorrect

addition of a two-level adjustment for physical restraint of the

victim and remand for resentencing in accordance with this

opinion.

So ordered.

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Edwards, Chief Judge, concurring in the judgment: I

concur in the judgment of the court. I write separately,

however, because I feel that the court's disposition of the socalled Blackledge/Menna issue under the rubric of "waiver"

warrants further explanation.

Appellant Drew has argued to the court that his conviction

for violating 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(8), pursuant to a plea of

guilty, must be vacated because the statute, both on its face

and as applied in this case, violates the Second and Fifth

Amendments to the Constitution. The Government, citing

United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989), argues that Drew

is barred from raising these constitutional challenges, because, normally, a guilty plea is not subject to later challenge

before an appellate court. Drew, citing Blackledge v. Perry,

417 U.S. 21 (1974), and Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61

(1975), responds that a defendant normally retains the right

to challenge the constitutionality of a statute even following a

guilty plea.

The majority opinion holds that Drew's attempt to invoke

the Blackledge/Menna exception fails for two reasons: first,

the constitutional issues now raised by Drew were "waived"

when he failed to raise them first with the trial court; and,

second, the constitutional questions need not be reached by

this court, because they do not present a "jurisdictional"

question. I fail to comprehend this line of analysis in light of

my understanding of the Blackledge/Menna exception.

There are a number of potential theories of "waiver" and

"forfeiture" in the criminal context. One is the well-known

"plain-error" rule, most recently explained in full in United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993). As the Court noted

there, "[n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this Court

than that a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort,

may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the

failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal

having jurisdiction to determine it." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent "plain error," objections not timely raised at trial normally cannot be raised on

appeal.

Another theory of forfeiture/waiver arises in the context of

post-trial, collateral attacks. In such cases, absent a showing

of "cause and prejudice," a defendant is barred from raising a

constitutional challenge that could have been raised at trial.

See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982).

An entirely different line of inquiry arises with respect to

challenges that follow a guilty plea. As noted above, the

general rule in such cases is that a conviction pursuant to a

guilty plea is not subject to later challenge bfore an appellate

court. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998).

The principal exception to this rule is the so-called Blackledge/Menna principle that "a plea of guilty to a charge does

not waive a claim that--judged on its face--the charge is one

which the State may not constitutionally prosecute." Menna,

423 U.S. at 62-63 n.2. The Blackledge/Menna exception does

not depend upon whether the objection is labeled "jurisdictional," at least the Supreme Court has never said this.

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Rather, the critical issue seems to be whether the constitutional challenge involves a claimed right by the defendant

"not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge."

Broce, 488 U.S. at 575 (quoting Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30-

31). In Broce, the Court made it clear that the Blackledge/Menna exception is not without limits, holding that a

guilty plea barred a later double jeopardy claim where the

violation was not clear on the face of the indictment. 488

U.S. at 576.

The question that we face is whether there should be an

additional barrier to the invocation of the Blackledge/Menna

exception, i.e., whether a defendant must raise the constitutional objection before the trial court first in order to be able

to raise it later before an appellate court. The Supreme

Court has never addressed this issue.

Nor has this court ever addressed this issue. The majority's reliance on United States v. Baucum, 80 F.3d 539 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d 1471 (D.C. Cir.

1996), and United States v. David, 96 F.3d 1477 (D.C. Cir.

1996), is misplaced. Baucum, Badru, and David are simple

"plain error" cases. Even though they talk in terms of

"waiver" and "bar," they can mean nothing more than "forfeiture." As the Supreme Court said in Olano, "[w]aiver is

different from forfeiture. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to

make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional

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relinquishment or abandonment of a known right." 507 U.S.

725, 733 (1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). If the majority means to suggest that, in a post-trial

context, constitutional challenges raised on appeal that were

not raised below are automatically waived--with no possible

inquiry into plain error--that is simply wrong. The Supreme

Court has made it clear that "[a] rigid and undeviating

judicially declared practice under which courts of review

would invariably and under all circumstances decline to consider all questions which had not previously been specifically

urged would be out of harmony with ... the rules of fundamental justice." Id. at 732 (quoting Hormel v. Helvering, 312

U.S. 552, 557 (1941)). The forfeiture analysis as articulated in

Olano is the law of the land, and our circuit has no authority

to change it to some rigid standard of waiver.

In any case, Baucum, Badru, and David have nothing

whatsoever to do with the application of the Blackledge/

Menna exception. The court in Baucum discussed

Blackledge/Menna because the defendant in that case raised

the novel question of whether a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a criminal statute is a jurisdictional question

that can be raised at any time. 80 F.3d at 540. The panel in

Baucum recognized that the Blackledge/Menna line of authority lent some support to the defendant's claim. But

Baucum does not purport to apply the Blackledge/Menna

exception. In fact, Blackledge/Menna has no direct bearing

on the issues in Baucum--it is discussed merely by way of

analogy. So I fail to understand the majority's reliance on

these three cases in its resolution of the Blackledge/Menna

issue.

The majority opinion appears to suggest that the mere

failure to raise a constitutional challenge before the trial court

automatically "waives" a defendant's right to pursue the

issues in a subsequent attack under the Blackledge/Menna

exception. The Supreme Court has never said this, and, so

far as I can tell, none of our sister circuits subscribe to such a

rule.

If a court faces a situation in which a defendant has pled

guilty to a charge with respect to which it is facially clear that

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he could not be prosecuted--i.e., as that is understood under

the Blackledge/Menna principle--it would be an extraordinary proposition to say that the defendant will nonetheless go

to jail because he failed to object before the trial court. The

Fifth Circuit seemed to recognize this problem in United

States v. Knowles, 29 F.3d 947 (5th Cir. 1994). The defendant there pled guilty to possession of a firearm in a school

zone. Shortly after judgment in Knowles, the court of appeals, in another case, ruled that the underlying statute upon

which the charge in Knowles was based was unconstitutional,

because Congress had not properly invoked its power under

the Commerce Clause when it enacted the statute. The

defendant in Knowles never raised this constitutional challenge before the trial court. The court of appeals, however,

first employed the "plain error" rule to determine whether to

entertain the challenge, then, finding no forfeiture, the court

considered the claim on the merits pursuant to the

Blackledge/Menna exception. The Fifth Circuit flatly rejected the Government's claim that the defendant's guilty plea

barred consideration of the constitutional claim:

Noting that a guilty plea generally waives defects in the

underlying proceedings, the government also claims that

Knowles's conviction on Count Two is proper because

Knowles pleaded guilty. This argument is not persuasive. We have reversed other convictions against defendants who had pleaded guilty to charges brought under

the Gun Free School Zones Act. See United States v.

Handy, 8 F.3d 20 (5th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). We

have done so for the well-established reason that a guilty

plea does not waive the right of the defendant to challenge the constitutionality of the statute under which he

is convicted. See Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62-

63 n.2, 96 S. Ct. 241, 242 n.2, 46 L.Ed.2d 195 (1975) ("[A]

plea of guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that--

judged on its face--the charge is one which the State

may not constitutionally prosecute.").

Id. at 952.

In other words, the court in Knowles addressed the forfeiture issue through the normal "plain error" lens, and then

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applied the Supreme Court's "judged on its face/the charge is

one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute" test

in allowing an invocation of the Blackledge/Menna exception.

I think this is the correct approach. There are not many

cases in which a defendant is going to be able to satisfy both

the plain error rule and the Blackledge/Menna standard to

gain review where no objection has been raised in the trial

court. Nonetheless, the Knowles approach ensures protection for those few defendants whose alleged "guilt" is illusory,

because it is clear on the face of the charge that the State had

no constitutionally sound basis upon which to prosecute.

Drew argues that section 922(g)(8) violates the Second and

the Fifth Amendments. These challenges raise no plain

error. As the Supreme Court has noted, a challenge not

raised below will not meet the plain error standard unless it

"seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation

of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). The issues raised by

Drew do not come close to meeting the high standards of

plain error. Indeed, as the Government noted in its brief,

Drew's constitutional challenges are largely baseless. See

Br. and Addendum for Appellee at 11 n.5.

I concur in the judgment in the instant case, not simply

because Drew failed to raise his constitutional claims before

the trial court, but because he has failed to demonstrate any

plain error in the judgment based on his guilty plea. Absent

plain error, I agree that Drew forfeited his right to raise his

claims before this court. Because there is no plain error in

this case, there is no reason to address whether Drew's claim

on its face implicates the constitutional power of the Government to prosecute. In short, Drew cannot resort to the

Blackledge/Menna exception to raise his constitutional claims.

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