Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01438/USCOURTS-caDC-04-01438-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
Michael O. Leavitt
Respondent
Methyl Bromide Industry Panel of the American Chemistry Council
Intervenor
Natural Resources Defense Council
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed August 29, 2006

No. 04-1438

NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL,

PETITIONER

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND

MICHAEL O. LEAVITT, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

RESPONDENTS

METHYL BROMIDE INDUSTRY PANEL OF THE AMERICAN

CHEMISTRY COUNCIL,

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Rehearing

Before: HENDERSON and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Concurring opinion filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

USCA Case #04-1438 Document #988679 Filed: 08/29/2006 Page 1 of 23
2

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: The United States and other

countries entered into the Montreal Protocol on Substances that

Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO.

100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (“Montreal Protocol”), a treaty in

which the signatory nations agreed to reduce the use of certain

substances, including methyl bromide, that degrade the

stratospheric ozone layer. The Environmental Protection

Agency issued a rule implementing “critical use” exemptions

from the treaty’s general ban on production and consumption of

methyl bromide. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for

Exempting Critical Uses From the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide,

69 Fed. Reg. 76,982 (Dec. 23, 2004) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.

82) (“Final Rule”). We dismissed the Natural Resources

Defense Council’s petition for judicial review for lack of

standing. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 440 F.3d 476, 477-

78 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“NRDC I”). In their respective petition for

and opposition to rehearing, NRDC and EPA offered new

information that has led us to change our view of the standing

issue. We therefore grant the petition for rehearing, withdraw

our previous opinion, and decide the merits. FED. R. APP. P.

40(a)(4)(A); see, e.g., Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d

310, 311-12 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

I.

In the mid-1970s, scientists discovered that certain manmade chemicals can destroy the layer of ozone gas in the

stratosphere approximately ten to twenty-five miles above the

Earth’s surface. Stratospheric ozone absorbs ultraviolet

radiation; as the ozone layer thins, less radiation is absorbed.

Increased human exposure to ultraviolet radiation is linked to a

range of ailments, including skin cancer and cataracts.

Amidst growing international concern about ozone

depletion, the United States and twenty-four other nations

USCA Case #04-1438 Document #988679 Filed: 08/29/2006 Page 2 of 23
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1

 “Production” is defined as “the amount of controlled

substances produced, minus the amount destroyed [under the Protocol]

and minus the amount entirely used [to produce other chemicals].”

Montreal Protocol art. 1(5). “Consumption” is “production plus

imports minus exports of controlled substances.” Id. art. 1(6).

2

 Current article 2H was added by “adjustment” at the Ninth

Meeting of the Parties. See U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the

Ninth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances

that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, Annex

III (Sept. 25, 1997) (“Ninth Report”). The Protocol allows

“adjustments” to be made without formal amendment and ratification.

See Montreal Protocol art. 2(9). In incorporating the Protocol into

domestic law, Congress defined the Protocol to include “adjustments

adopted by the Parties thereto and amendments that have entered into

force.” 42 U.S.C. § 7671(9).

entered into the Montreal Protocol. The Protocol requires

signatory nations – which now number 189 – to reduce and

eliminate their production and use of ozone-depleting chemicals

in accordance with agreed-upon timetables. Montreal Protocol

arts. 2-2I. The Senate ratified the treaty in 1988, and Congress

incorporated its terms into domestic law through the Clean Air

Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, tit. VI, 104 Stat.

2399, 2648. Since then, the United States has reduced its use of

methyl bromide to less than 39% of its 1991 baseline.

In 1997, the Parties “adjusted” the Protocol to require

developed-country Parties to cease “production” and

“consumption”1

 of methyl bromide by 2005. See Montreal

Protocol art. 2H(5).2 In response, Congress amended the Clean

Air Act to require EPA to “promulgate rules for reductions in,

and terminate the production, importation, and consumption of,

methyl bromide under a schedule that is in accordance with, but

not more stringent than, the phaseout schedule of the Montreal

USCA Case #04-1438 Document #988679 Filed: 08/29/2006 Page 3 of 23
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Protocol Treaty as in effect on October 21, 1998.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7671c(h). 

Methyl bromide is a naturally occurring gas produced by

oceans, grass and forest fires, and volcanoes. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., Agric. Research Serv., Soil Physics & Pesticide

Research: Methyl Bromide 1 (2005),

http://www.ars.usda.gov/Research/docs.htm?docid=10408. It is

also man-made and used as a broad-spectrum pesticide. See

Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 76,983. Methyl bromide is typically

injected into soil as a fumigant before several types of crops are

planted. The United States regulates methyl bromide as a “class

I” ozone-depleting substance. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(h).

Methyl bromide has an “ozone depletion potential” (“ODP”) of

0.38-0.60. This puts it in the middle range of substances

scheduled for elimination under the Protocol. It is not nearly as

destructive as chlorofluorocarbons and most other class I

substances, almost all of which were phased out in 2000. 42

U.S.C. § 7671c(b). On the other hand, it is significantly more

destructive than “class II” substances, which are to be phased

out in 2030. See 42 U.S.C. § 7671d(b). 

In light of methyl bromide’s wide use and the lack of

comparable substitute pesticides, see Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at

76,985, the Protocol allows exemptions from the general ban “to

the extent that the Parties decide to permit the level of

production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses

agreed by them to be critical uses.” Montreal Protocol art.

2H(5); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(d)(6) (“To the extent

consistent with the Montreal Protocol, the [EPA] Administrator

. . . may exempt the production, importation, and consumption

of methyl bromide for critical uses.”). The Parties to the

Protocol meet annually to “decide to permit the level of

production or consumption that is necessary to satisfy uses

agreed by them to be critical uses.” Montreal Protocol art.

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2H(5). At one of these meetings the Parties set general

guidelines for implementing the critical-use exemptions, see

Ninth Report, supra note 2, at 26-27 (“Decision IX/6”), and at

another the Parties approved exemptions for 2005. The United

States formally began the process of establishing its 2005

critical-use exemptions in May 2002, when EPA published a

notice in the Federal Register seeking applications for 2005 and

2006 critical uses of methyl bromide and the amounts of new

production and consumption needed to satisfy those uses. See

Protection of Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting

Critical Uses From the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 67 Fed.

Reg. 31,798 (May 10, 2002). EPA teams composed of

biologists and economists reviewed each application and

decided which to include in the aggregate U.S. nomination to the

Parties. The final U.S. nomination, submitted to the Montreal

Protocol’s administrative body (the “Ozone Secretariat”) in

February 2003, requested a total exemption of about tenthousand metric tons of methyl bromide for sixteen different

uses. 

The process then moved to the international stage. Two

working groups operating under the auspices of the Ozone

Secretariat – the “Methyl Bromide Technical Options

Committee” and the “Technology and Economic Assessment

Panel” – evaluated each country’s nomination and made a

recommendation to the Parties at their November 2003 meeting.

At that meeting, the Parties deadlocked over the proposed

critical-use exemptions and called an “extraordinary meeting”

to make the final decisions. See U.N. Env’t Programme, Report

of the Fifteenth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol

on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc.

UNEP/OzL.Pro.15/9, at 8-11, 77-78 (Nov. 11, 2003). 

The Parties reached agreement at their First

Extraordinary Meeting in March 2004. They granted the United

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3

 Decision IX/6 permits exemptions only when all technically

and economically feasible steps have been taken to minimize the

required use and when methyl bromide is not available from existing

stocks. Id. ¶ 1(b)(i), (ii).

4

 After NRDC filed its petition for judicial review, the Parties

met again and approved 2006 critical uses, see U.N. Env’t

Programme, Report of the Second Extraordinary Meeting of the

Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.ExMP/2/3, at 5-6 (July 1,

States critical uses in sixteen categories, amounting to 8,942

metric tons of methyl bromide. To satisfy these critical uses, the

Parties authorized 7,659 metric tons of new production and

consumption, with the remainder (1,283 metric tons) to be made

up from existing stocks of methyl bromide. See U.N. Env’t

Programme, Report of the First Extraordinary Meeting of the

Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the

Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.ExMP/1/3, at 14-15, 26

(Mar. 27, 2004) (“Decision Ex.I/3”). Decision Ex.I/3 noted that

“each Party which has an agreed critical use should ensure that

the criteria in paragraph 1 of decision IX/6[3] are applied when

. . . authorizing the use of methyl bromide and that such

procedures take into account available stocks.” Id. ¶ 5.

With Decision Ex.I/3 in hand, EPA proposed rules to

implement the critical-use exemption. See Protection of

Stratospheric Ozone: Process for Exempting Critical Uses From

the Phaseout of Methyl Bromide, 69 Fed. Reg. 52,366 (Aug. 25,

2004). Many parties, including NRDC, submitted comments.

The Final Rule, issued in December 2004, authorized new

production and consumption up to the limit established in

Decision Ex.I/3. Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 76,990 tbl.1. It

also authorized the use of stocks as permitted by the decision, id.

at 76,986, 76,991 tbl.2, and permitted noncritical users to draw

upon existing stocks, id. at 76,988.4

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2005) (“Second Extraordinary Report”), with no apparent comment

on the United States’s 2005 domestic process. EPA has issued a rule

to implement the 2006 exemptions. See Protection of Stratospheric

Ozone: The 2006 Critical Use Exemption from the Phaseout of Methyl

Bromide, 71 Fed. Reg. 5985 (Feb. 6, 2006) (to be codified at 40

C.F.R. pt. 82).

5

 EPA argues that the decisions do not require that a party

exhaust existing stocks of methyl bromide before carrying out

exempted production and consumption or that existing stocks be

restricted to critical uses.

NRDC believes the Final Rule violated Decision IX/6

and Decision Ex.I/3 because EPA failed to disclose the full

amount of existing stocks, failed to offset new production and

consumption by the full amount of these stocks, and failed to

reserve the stocks for critical uses, and because the total amount

of methyl bromide critical use the Final Rule authorized is not

the technically and economically feasible minimum.5

 These

claims depend upon the legal status of Decisions IX/6 and

Ex.I/3.

After oral argument, we ordered supplemental briefing

to address the question whether consensus decisions of the

Parties are “cognizable in federal court actions brought to

enforce the Protocol and the relevant terms of the Clean Air

Act.” EPA and NRDC agree that the decisions are not

“adjustments” to the Protocol. But they disagree on the legal

consequences of the decisions. 

II.

In order for this court to have Article III jurisdiction,

NRDC had to establish that at least one of its members has

standing to sue in his own right, the interests the association

seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and individual

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members need not participate in the lawsuit themselves. Sierra

Club v. EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Hunt v.

Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43

(1977)). We have no reason to doubt that NRDC meets the

second and third requirements. As to the first, NRDC had to

demonstrate that at least one member satisfied the “irreducible

constitutional minimum” of standing: injury-in-fact, causation,

and redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,

560 (1992).

NRDC claimed that its members faced increased health

risks from EPA’s rule. Although this claim does not fit

comfortably within the Supreme Court’s description of what

constitutes an “injury in fact” sufficient to confer standing –

such injuries must be “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or

‘hypothetical,’” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155

(1990) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-

02 (1983)) – we have recognized that increases in risk can at

times be “injuries in fact” sufficient to confer standing. See

Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1234-

35 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Environmental and health injuries often are

purely probabilistic. See NRDC I, 440 F.3d at 483; cf. 520 S.

Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961, 962-63 (7th

Cir. 2006). We have cautioned that this category of injury may

be too expansive. “[W]ere all purely speculative ‘increased

risks’ deemed injurious, the entire requirement of ‘actual or

imminent injury’ would be rendered moot, because all

hypothesized, nonimminent ‘injuries’ could be dressed up as

‘increased risk of future injury.’” Ctr. for Law & Educ. v. Dep’t

of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2005). We therefore

generally require that petitioners demonstrate a “substantial

probability” that they will be injured. See Sierra Club, 292 F.3d

at 898, 899; Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 216 F.3d 50, 63-64, 67

(D.C. Cir. 2000); La. Envtl. Action Network v. EPA, 172 F.3d

65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Mountain States Legal Foundation v.

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Glickman, which found that an increased risk of forest fire

created by a Forest Service logging rule was enough to support

standing, held that the relevant variations in risk must be “nontrivial,” 92 F.3d at 1235, and “sufficient . . . to take a suit out of

the category of the hypothetical,” id. at 1234-35 (quoting Vill. of

Elk Grove Vill. v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993)). 

NRDC’s expert quantified the increased risk posed by

EPA’s rule in an affidavit stating that “it is reasonable to expect

more than 10 deaths, more than 2,000 nonfatal skin cancer

cases, and more than 700 cataract cases to result from the 16.8

million pounds of new production and consumption allowed by

the 2005 exemption rule.” Aff. of Dr. Sasha Madronich ¶ 8.

Intervenor Methyl Bromide Industry Panel argued that the

probability of injury to NRDC’s members is too small. In

NRDC I, we found the annualized risk posed to NRDC members

to be trivial. 440 F.3d at 481-82 & n.8, 484. The parties

vigorously dispute whether we were correct to hold as a

quantitative matter that NRDC’s alleged injury was trivial or

whether, in NRDC’s words, any “scientifically demonstrable

increase in the threat of death or serious illness,” Pet. for Reh’g

or Reh’g En Banc 4, is sufficient for standing. This question has

given rise to a conflict among the circuits. Compare Baur v.

Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 634 (2d Cir. 2003); Cent. Delta Water

Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2002);

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp.,

204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc), with Shain v.

Veneman, 376 F.3d 815, 818 (8th Cir. 2004); Baur, 352 F.3d at

651 & n.3 (Pooler, J., dissenting). On reconsideration, we have

determined that the question is one we do not have to answer in

this case. EPA’s expert, who built the quantitative model on

which both sides rely, now informs us that “[e]xpressing the risk

in annualized terms is not practical” and “it is more appropriate

to express the risk as a population’s cumulative or lifetime

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6

 Both EPA and the intervenor argue that NRDC has

procedurally defaulted or waived the arguments it makes in its

rehearing petition. Although petitioners bear the burden of

demonstrating their standing “by affidavit or other evidence,” Sierra

Club, 292 F.3d at 899-90 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 561 (1992)), that does not preclude NRDC (or its opposing

parties) from correcting a panel’s misperception of the evidence in a

petition for rehearing. See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 401 F.3d 489,

493-94 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

risk.”6 Decl. of Reva Rubenstein ¶ 20. The lifetime risk that an

individual will develop nonfatal skin cancer as a result of EPA’s

rule is about 1 in 200,000 by the intervenor’s lights, see Aff. of

Dr. Louis Anthony Cox, Jr. ¶ 13, or 1 in 129,000 by EPA’s,

Decl. of Reva Rubenstein ¶¶ 8-9. Even if a quantitative

approach is appropriate – an issue on which we express no

opinion – this risk is sufficient to support standing. One may

infer from the statistical analysis that two to four of NRDC’s

nearly half a million members will develop cancer as a result of

the rule. 

As to causation, NRDC’s asserted injuries are linked to

EPA’s action through a fairly straightforward chain: EPA has

permitted too much new production and consumption of methyl

bromide, which will result in more emissions, which will

increase ozone depletion, which will adversely affect the health

of NRDC’s members. This injury can be redressed if EPA does

not permit such excessive production and consumption of

methyl bromide.

III.

On the merits, NRDC argues that “EPA’s 2005 criticaluse rule violates the express terms of the Montreal Protocol

Parties’ unanimous Decisions,” Final Opening Br. for Pet’r 20,

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and therefore is “not in accordance with law.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(d)(9)(A); see Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA,

215 F.3d 61, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Decision Ex.I/3, in which the Parties reached agreement

on methyl bromide critical-use exemptions for 2005, stated that

the United States had a critical need for 8,942 metric tons of

methyl bromide. Id. Annex II.A. To meet this need, the Parties

agreed to allow new production and consumption in the amount

of 7,659 metric tons, id. Annex II.B, with the remaining critical

uses to be met by drawing down existing stocks. Id. ¶ 2. The

decision also stated that each Party “which has an agreed critical

use should ensure that the criteria in paragraph 1 of decision

IX/6 are applied” when implementing the exemption, “and that

such procedures take into account available stocks.” Id. ¶ 5

(emphasis added). Paragraph 1 of Decision IX/6 directs the

Parties to authorize new production and consumption of methyl

bromide only if it “is not available in sufficient quantity and

quality from existing stocks,” Decision IX/6 ¶ 1(b)(ii), and only

after “[a]ll technically and economically feasible steps have

been taken to minimize the critical use,” id. ¶ 1(b)(i).

NRDC believes EPA’s rule departs from these posttreaty agreements in three respects. First, the rule authorizes

7,659 metric tons of new production and consumption – the

maximum agreed upon in Decision Ex.I/3 – without offsetting

this amount by existing stocks. See Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at

76,989. EPA declined to disclose the size of the total

nationwide methyl bromide stockpile, see id. at 76,990 – an

action NRDC claims is itself a violation of the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i). Still, the record suggests that the

stockpile is at least as large as the United States’ total criticaluse allocation for 2005. Second, EPA’s rule allows noncritical

users to draw down existing stocks. See Final Rule, 69 Fed.

Reg. at 76,987-88. NRDC claims that the “decisions” implicitly

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7

 The Montreal Protocol includes the Protocol itself and any

“adjustments adopted by Parties thereto and amendments that have

entered into force.” 42 U.S.C. § 7671(9). NRDC and EPA agree that

the “decisions” are not “adjustments” to the Protocol. Supp. Br. for

Pet’r 1; Supp Br. for the Resp. 2-5.

reserve the stocks for critical users only. Third, EPA approved

8,942 metric tons of critical uses – again the maximum agreed

upon in Decision Ex.I/3 – without considering anew whether

this was the minimum amount feasible. Id. at 76,989. EPA

counters that it adhered to the agreed-upon critical-use and new

production and consumption levels, and that the remainder of

the decisions are “hortatory.” Id. at 76,987.

NRDC fashions the entirety of its argument around the

proposition that the “decisions” under the Protocol are “law.”

This premise is flawed. The “decisions” of the Parties – postratification side agreements reached by consensus among 189

nations – are not “law” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act

and are not enforceable in federal court.

The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA to “exempt the

production, importation, and consumption of methyl bromide for

critical uses” only “[t]o the extent consistent with the Montreal

Protocol.” 42 U.S.C. § 7671c(d)(6); see also id. § 7671m(b).7

The Protocol bans the production or consumption of methyl

bromide after December 31, 2004, except “to the extent that the

Parties decide to permit the level of production or consumption

that is necessary to satisfy uses agreed by them to be critical

uses.” Montreal Protocol art. 2H(5). NRDC argues that because

the Clean Air Act requires EPA to abide by the Protocol, and

because the Protocol authorizes future agreements concerning

the scope of the critical-use exemption, those future agreements

must “define the scope of EPA’s Clean Air Act authority.”

Supp. Br. for Pet’r 4. 

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NRDC’s interpretation raises significant constitutional

problems. If the “decisions” are “law” – enforceable in federal

court like statutes or legislative rules – then Congress either has

delegated lawmaking authority to an international body or

authorized amendments to a treaty without presidential signature

or Senate ratification, in violation of Article II of the

Constitution. The Supreme Court has not determined whether

decisions of an international body created by treaty are judicially

enforceable. But there is a close analogy in this court. The

United States is a party to a treaty establishing the International

Court of Justice (ICJ). In Committee of United States Citizens

Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988),

we held that rulings of the ICJ do not provide “substantive legal

standards for reviewing agency actions,” id. at 942, because the

rulings, though authorized by the ratified treaty, were not

themselves self-executing treaties. Id. at 937-38; see, e.g.,

Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 682-84 (2005) (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting). 

Although Committee of United States Citizens is highly

suggestive of the outcome in this case, several features of the

Montreal Protocol “decisions” may distinguish them from ICJ

“adjudications.” For one thing, Congress implemented the

Montreal Protocol with a direction to EPA to abide by its terms.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671c(d)(6), 7671m(b). For another, Montreal

Protocol “decisions” are not adjudications between parties;

instead, they purport to set rules for implementing ongoing

treaty commitments.

The legal status of “decisions” of this sort appears to be

a question of first impression. There is significant debate over

the constitutionality of assigning lawmaking functions to

international bodies. See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of

Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems

with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000); Edward T.

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Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104

COLUM. L. REV. 1492 (2004). A holding that the Parties’ postratification side agreements were “law” would raise serious

constitutional questions in light of the nondelegation doctrine,

numerous constitutional procedural requirements for making

law, and the separation of powers. 

We need not confront the “serious likelihood that the

statute will be held unconstitutional.” Almendarez-Torres v.

United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998); see also id. at 250

(Scalia, J., dissenting). It is far more plausible to interpret the

Clean Air Act and Montreal Protocol as creating an ongoing

international political commitment rather than a delegation of

lawmaking authority to annual meetings of the Parties. Cf.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).

Nowhere does the Protocol suggest that the Parties’ postratification consensus agreements about how to implement the

critical-use exemption are binding in domestic courts. The only

pertinent language in Article 2H(5) states that the Parties will

“decide to permit” production and consumption necessary to

satisfy those uses that they “agree[]” to be critical uses. The

Protocol is silent on any specific conditions accompanying the

critical-use exemption. Post-ratification agreements setting

these conditions are not the Protocol.

To illustrate, suppose the President signed and the Senate

ratified a treaty with Germany and France to conserve fossil

fuel. How this is to be accomplished the treaty does not specify.

In a later meeting of representatives of the signatory countries

at the United Nations, a consensus is reached to lower the speed

limits on all major highways of the signatory nations to a

maximum of 45 miles per hour. No one would say that United

States law has thus been made. 

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EPA characterizes the decisions as “subsequent

consensus agreements of the Parties that address the

interpretation and application of the critical use provision . . ..”

Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. at 76,985. This may be so. Like any

interpretive tool, however, the “decisions” are useful only to the

extent they shed light on ambiguous terms in the Protocol. But

the details of the critical-use exemption are not ambiguous.

They are nonexistent. The “decisions” do not interpret treaty

language. They fill in treaty gaps. 

Article 2H(5) thus constitutes an “agreement to agree.”

The parties agree in the Protocol to reach an agreement

concerning the types of uses for which new production and

consumption will be permitted, and the amounts that will be

permitted. “Agreements to agree” are usually not enforceable

in contract. See 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON

CONTRACTS § 3:5, at 223-24 & n.17 (4th ed. 1990); cf. El Al

Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167

(1999); Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 516 U.S. 217,

226 (1996); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)

(“A treaty is in its nature a contract between . . . nations.”). And

the fruits of those agreements are enforceable only to the extent

that they themselves are contracts. There is no doubt that the

“decisions” are not treaties. 

The Parties’ post-ratification actions suggest their

common understanding that the decisions are international

political commitments rather than judicially enforceable

domestic law. See Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644,

650 (2004); Tseng, 525 U.S. at 167; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(2)

(1987) (“Any subsequent . . . practice between the parties in the

application of the agreement [is] to be taken into account in its

interpretation.”). The Parties met to decide the 2006 critical-use

exemptions well after EPA’s rule went into effect. See Second

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8

 NRDC points to a change in the language from Decision

Ex.I/3 (the 2005 decision) to Decision Ex.II/1 (the 2006 decision).

Compare Decision Ex.I/3 ¶ 5 (“[Each Party] should ensure that the

criteria in paragraph 1 of decision IX/6 are applied . . ..” (emphasis

added)), with Second Extraordinary Report, supra note 4, at 5-6 ¶ 5

(“Decision Ex.II/1”) (“[Each Party] renews its commitment to ensure

that the criteria in paragraph 1 of decision IX/6 are applied . . ..”

(emphasis added)). But this change in diplomatic language can hardly

be said to change the United States’ substantive commitments under

the Protocol.

Extraordinary Report, supra note 4. Yet they did not invoke the

Protocol’s internal noncompliance procedure against the United

States, see Montreal Protocol art. 8, nor did they admonish the

United States to change its interpretation of the previous

decisions.8

 This course of dealing suggests that the Parties

intended the side agreements to be enforceable as a political

matter at the negotiating table.

Our holding in this case in no way diminishes the power

of the Executive to enter into international agreements that

constrain its own behavior within the confines of statutory and

treaty law. The Executive has the power to implement ongoing

collective endeavors with other countries. See LOUIS HENKIN,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 219-

20 (2d ed. 1996). Without congressional action, however, side

agreements reached after a treaty has been ratified are not the

law of the land; they are enforceable not through the federal

courts, but through international negotiations. 

IV.

NRDC claims that EPA violated the Clean Air Act when

it failed to disclose the amount of existing domestic stockpiled

methyl bromide. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(i). In doing so,

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17

EPA merely followed its own regulation that precluded

disclosure of the information pending the resolution of reverse

FOIA litigation. See 40 C.F.R. § 2.205(f)(2). NRDC’s own

FOIA request for the aggregate stockpile information was

denied on this basis. See NRDC v. Leavitt, No. 04-01295, 2006

WL 667327 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2006). EPA’s actions were in

accordance with law and neither arbitrary nor capricious.

* * *

Because we now conclude that NRDC has standing to

pursue its claim, we grant the petition for rehearing and

withdraw our prior opinion. Because the post-ratification

agreements of the parties are not “law,” EPA’s rule – even if

inconsistent with those agreements – is not in violation of any

domestic law within the meaning of the Clean Air Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A), the petition for review is denied.

So ordered.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring: I agree that

increases in risk can be “injuries in fact” sufficient to confer

Article III standing, and I concur in the judgment that the risk

demonstrated by petitioners in this case is sufficient to support

standing. 

I also agree that, on the merits, petitioners’ claim fails. As

the majority opinion notes, NRDC’s principal argument is that

“EPA’s 2005 critical-use rule violates the express terms of the

Montreal Protocol Parties’ unanimous Decisions,” Final

Opening Br. for Pet’r at 20, and therefore is “not in accordance

with law,” 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A). In rejecting this claim,

our holding is precise and limited:

The “decisions” of the Parties – post-ratification side

agreements reached by consensus among 189 nations – are

not “law” within the meaning of the Clean Air Act and are

not enforceable in federal court.

Maj. Op. at 12.

On the record before us, this holding is eminently correct

for two reasons. First, “[n]owhere does the Protocol suggest that

the Parties’ post-ratification consensus agreements about how to

implement the critical-use exemption are binding in domestic

courts.” Maj. Op. at 14. Second, and, in my view, most

important, the disputed “decisions” do not shed light on any

ambiguous terms in the Protocol:

[T]he details of the critical-use exemption are not

ambiguous. They are nonexistent. The “decisions” do not

interpret treaty language. They fill in treaty gaps. 

Article 2H(5) thus constitutes an “agreement to agree.”

. . . And the fruits of those agreements are enforceable only

to the extent that they themselves are contracts. There is no

doubt that the “decisions” are not treaties. 

Maj. Op. at 15. As I see it, these two points control our

disposition of petitioners’ claim on the merits.

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2

_______________

Absent procedural defaults, the Supreme Court has

indicated that “we should give respectful consideration to the

interpretation of an international treaty rendered by an

international court with jurisdiction to interpret such.” Breard

v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam). As the

majority opinion makes clear, however, the disputed “decisions”

in this case do not involve “interpretations” of a treaty “by an

international court with jurisdiction to interpret such.” 

The Supreme Court has yet to explain whether, “once the

United States undertakes a substantive obligation (as it did in the

Vienna Convention), and at the same time undertakes to abide

by the result of a specified dispute resolution process (as it did

by submitting to the [International Court of Justice’s]

jurisdiction . . .), it is bound by the rules generated by that

process no less than it is by the treaty that is the source of the

substantive obligation.” Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 683

(2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). In other words, it is unclear

whether a judgment by a body such as the ICJ, “decided on the

back of a self-executing treaty, . . . must be given effect in our

domestic legal system just as the treaty itself must be.” Id. The

bewildering array of views found in the per curiam, concurring,

and dissenting opinions filed in Medellin make it clear that the

Court has not yet come to grips with this issue. Nor do we. 

_______________ 

The majority opinion should not be taken to suggest that

this court’s decision in Committee of United States Citizens

Living in Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1988),

offers an answer to the perplexing issue that was skirted in

Medellin. Committee of United States Citizens does not address

the issue that was left open in Medellin, nor does it address the

issue raised by petitioners in this case.

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3

The dispute in Committee of United States Citizens

originated with 

a 1986 decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

which held that America’s support of military actions by the

so-called “Contras” against the government of Nicaragua

violated both customary international law and a treaty

between the United States and Nicaragua. The ICJ

concluded that the United States “is under a duty

immediately to cease and to refrain from all such acts as

may constitute breaches of the foregoing legal obligations.”

. . . 

Prior to the ICJ’s decision, the United States withdrew

from the merits phase of the court’s proceedings,

contending that the court lacked jurisdiction over

Nicaragua’s application. . . . [T]he President [then]

requested and Congress . . . approved continued funding for

the Contras of the sort that the ICJ found illegal. . . .

Unhappy with their government’s failure to abide by

the ICJ decision and believing that continued funding of the

Contras injures their own interests, appellants filed suit in

the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia. The suit sought [inter alia] injunctive and

declaratory relief against the funding of the Contras on

grounds that such funding violates . . . Article 94 of the

U.N. Charter. . . .

859 F.2d at 932. The court rejected this claim on narrow

grounds: 

Since appellants allege that Congress has breached Article

94, we must determine whether such a claim could ever

prevail. The claim could succeed only if appellants could

prove that a prior treaty – the U.N. Charter – preempts a

subsequent statute, namely the legislation that funds the

Contras. It is precisely that argument that the precedents of

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4

the Supreme Court and of this court foreclose. We

therefore hold that appellants’ claims based on treaty

violations must fail.

Id. at 937. 

There is no suggestion in the present case that Congress

modified or denounced the disputed Protocol and that, as a

result, a prior treaty obligation has been overridden by a

subsequent act of Congress. See Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461,

466-67 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Congress can denounce treaties if it

sees fit to do so, and there is nothing the other branches of

government can do about it.”), overruled on other grounds,

Dellums v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 863 F.2d 968

(D.C. Cir. 1988). The decision in Committee of United States

Citizens is therefore inapposite.

_______________

Petitioners’ claim in this case seems more akin to the claim

raised in Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31 (2d Cir.

1975). The dispute in Day concerned whether an airline was

liable for damages to passengers who were injured during a

terrorist attack while waiting to board an international flight

after surrendering their tickets and passing through passport

control. The Warsaw Convention assigns liability to the airline

for injuries sustained “on board the aircraft or in the course of

any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Id. at 33.

TWA argued that the Warsaw convention did not apply because

the passengers had not started the embarking process that, in

their view, began when a passenger “steps through the terminal

gate.” Id. The court looked to a subsequent agreement entered

into by the world’s major airlines as clear evidence that the

purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to provide maximum

protection to the passengers.

Those called upon to construe a treaty should . . . strive

to give the specific words of a treaty a meaning consistent

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5

with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting

parties. These expectations can, of course, change over

time. Conditions and new methods may arise not present at

the precise moment of drafting. . . . The conduct of the

parties subsequent to ratification of a treaty may, thus, be

relevant in ascertaining the proper construction to accord

the treaty’s various provisions. 

In divining the purposes of the Warsaw treaty, we find

the adoption in 1966 of the Montreal Agreement

particularly instructive. This Agreement did not alter the

language of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. But it

provides decisive evidence of the goals and expectations

currently shared by the parties to the Warsaw Convention.

Id. at 35-36 (internal quotation and citation omitted). But see

Buonocore v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 900 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir.

1990) (noting that Day had come “under some criticism over the

years on the ground that it construed Article 17 too broadly in

favor of liability”). Even the broadest reading of Day, however,

offers no solace for petitioners in this case. 

In Day, the court was asked to divine the meaning of an

ambiguous term of the Warsaw Convention and then to enforce

the term in accordance with the parties’ intent. In this case, the

disputed “decisions” do not purport to interpret any treaty

language, nor do they purport to adjudicate disagreements

between the parties over the meaning of the Protocol. The

Protocol provision upon which petitioners rely is nothing more

than an “agreement to agree.” Therefore, on the facts of this

case, we have no authority to address a claim that rests on side

agreements that extend beyond the enforceable terms of the

Protocol. 

_______________

In sum, we do not decide here whether, once the United

States undertakes a substantive obligation in a treaty, and at the

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6

same time undertakes to abide by the result of a specified

dispute resolution process before an international tribunal, it is

bound by the judgments of the tribunal no less than it is by the

treaty that is the source of the substantive obligation. That

question is not before us. 

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