Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04157/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04157-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clyde Scott Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4157

___________

*

United States of America, *

* 

Plaintiff-Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the District

* of Minnesota. 

Clyde Scott Thompson, * 

* 

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 16, 2006 

Filed: June 20, 2006

___________

Before MURPHY, JOHN R. GIBSON, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. 

Clyde Scott Thompson was convicted by a jury of bank robbery, use of a

firearm during a crime of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm, and the

district court1

 sentenced him to 444 months. Thompson appeals, based on the district

court's failure to strike a bank teller from the jury panel and its failure to protect his

rights under the Sixth Amendment and Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by

permitting the government to strike the only minority juror. We affirm. 

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At approximately 11:30 or 11:45 a.m. on April 1, 2005 a TCF bank located in

a Cub Foods grocery store in Minneapolis was robbed. The teller identified the robber

as a Caucasian man with gray hair who was wearing thick framed glasses, a blue

windbreaker with white stripes, a gray T-shirt, and a beige hat. She testified that the

robber had approached her, handed over a bag, and then pulled out a gun with a long

barrel which he pointed at her. The teller placed $3,768 in the bag, including bait and

dye packs. After the robber thanked the teller for remaining calm, he put the bag in

his jacket and walked out of the bank. The teller called the police and described the

robber. 

 FBI agents received a call alerting them to the robbery and informing them that

a Volkswagen Golf with a license plate beginning "NBX" had been seen leaving the

area of the robbery. The description matched the vehicle that the agents had seen

Thompson driving while he was under surveillance for other robberies in which he

was a suspect. One agent went to his residence, and the others set up surveillance

positions on the route from the Cub store. When Thompson arrived at his residence

at 12:10 p.m., the agents stopped his car and told him to put his hands out the window.

Thompson was then removed from the car and patted down. He told the agents there

was a gun in a bag in the car, and one of the agents testified at trial that Thompson

also said "something to the effect that, we were on him very quick, that we must have

been watching the bank ... [and that] we had ruined his April Fool's Day." 

 Search warrants were obtained for Thompson's car and residence. During the

search of his car, agents found a windbreaker and a black denim shirt which both

appeared to have dye stains, a dark blue baseball cap, a pair of glasses, currency which

appeared to have been dye stained and burned ($3,666 in U.S. dollars and $135

Canadian), a .357 Magnum revolver and ammunition, an air pistol with a CO2

cannister, and a police scanner. 

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During voir dire one of the prospective jurors, Joyce Smith, was asked about

her employment as a teller at a Wells Fargo bank in Red Wing, Minnesota. In

response to the court's question whether the fact that she was a driveup teller was

"going to interfere at all with [her] ability to be a fair and impartial juror", she

answered that she could be fair. After a recess, the court inquired again about her

ability to be fair. In response to the question whether her occupation was "going to

play a role", she responded that she thought she could be fair. Defense counsel also

asked Smith whether "given the type of crime" at issue she could be fair, and she

assured her that she could. Defense counsel nevertheless moved to strike Smith for

cause because she held the "exact same job" as the teller victim of the defendant. The

court denied the motion, and defense counsel used a peremptory strike to remove

Smith. 

The government used the first of its peremptory strikes to remove Paufue Thao,

a twenty year old Hmong immigrant. Thao had stated in his written juror

questionnaire that he was twenty, that he had finished high school, that he had a

girlfriend, that he did not have children and that he was currently unemployed.

Defense counsel asserted its right under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to

question the government about its reason for striking the only minority member of the

jury pool. The government responded that its reason was not based on race but on

Thao's age and on the fact that he "has not had many of life's experiences." In

response to further comments from defense counsel, including counsel's statement that

he believed there were some younger prospective jurors who had not been stricken,

the government elaborated that its decision "was also based on a lack of life

experiences, no children, not employed, not married, no prior service. [Thao]

answered no to almost everything." 

The district court denied the Batson challenge, and the trial proceeded. The jury

convicted Thompson of single counts of bank robbery, use of a firearm during a crime

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of violence, and unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

2113(a), 2113(d), 924(c)(1)(A), 922(g)(1), and 924(e)(1). He was sentenced to 444

months. 

On appeal, Thompson argues that the district court denied his right to an

impartial jury composed of his peers by its decisions on prospective jurors Smith and

Thao. The government responds that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

not excusing Smith for cause because there was no showing of implied bias and that

there was no clear error in allowing the prosecutor to strike Thao for the race neutral

reasons provided. 

Thompson argues that the district court denied his right to an impartial jury by

denying his request to strike Smith for cause. The Sixth Amendment guarantees the

right to trial by an impartial jury. United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 922 (8th

Cir. 2005). In order to make a proper challenge for cause, "a party must show actual

partiality growing out of the nature and circumstances of [the] particular case," United

States v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir. 1990) (internal citation omitted), and we

review district court decisions regarding juror qualification for abuse of discretion.

See id. In this case Thompson's sole argument for excluding Smith was the fact that

she was a teller for a different bank located in a different part of the state. He asserts

that the court should have found implied bias because Smith's employment "created

too great an emotional involvement with the facts in this case to allow her to be

impartial" and relies on United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977). The

doctrine of implied bias is reserved for extreme and exceptional circumstances, see

Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 987 (10th Cir. 1996), and the fact that someone

holds a position similar to that of a key witness is not a basis for excluding her where

there is no indication of bias. See generally United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101 (2d

Cir. 1981) (upholding the district court's determination that an employee of a different

branch of the victim bank need not be excused for cause). 

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Thompson also claims that his ability to obtain an impartial jury was

circumscribed by his being "forced to use one of his challenges to remove" Smith.

This claim fails, however, because a defendant's "exercise of peremptory challenges

pursuant to Rule 24(b) is not denied or impaired when the defendant chooses to use

a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been excused for cause."

United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 317 (2000); see also United States

v. Sithithongtham, 192 F.3d 1119 (8th Cir. 1999). 

Thompson argues that the government's strike of prospective juror Thao denied

his sixth amendment right to a jury of his peers. A defendant is entitled to an

"impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community." Taylor v.

Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 536 (1975). A violation of this right requires a showing that

the allegedly excluded group is distinctive and is underrepresented on juries due to

systematic exclusion. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). Thompson

alleges that the Hmong people are a distinctive group who are often excluded from

juries based on their limited English abilities and the fact that they are

"disproportionally among the less privileged in society in socioeconomic terms."

These allegations were not bolstered by any evidence, however, and they consequently

do not demonstrate error by the district court. See generally United States v.

Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 875 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Finally, Thompson asserts that his equal protection rights under Batson were

violated by the exclusion of Thao from the jury. A trial court addressing a Batson

claim must "determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the

prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race"; if so, the burden

is on the government to provide a race neutral reason and the court "must then

determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful

discrimination." Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct. 969, 973-74 (2006). We review the

district court's determination for clear error. United States v. Campbell, 270 F.3d 702,

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706 (8th Cir. 2001). Since the government provided a race neutral explanation for its

peremptory challenge, we need not consider whether Thompson made out a sufficient

prima facie case by showing that the only minority jury member had been stricken.

See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion). The

government's explanation that Thao was young, lacked life experience, did not have

children, and was not married or employed is facially valid and was sufficient to meet

its burden. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995) (per curiam) (internal

quotation omitted). Since the government presented specific race neutral reasons for

its strike, the district court did not commit clear error by denying Thompson's

Batson challenge. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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