Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02566/USCOURTS-cand-4_15-cv-02566-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lesley Duke
Plaintiff
Pilot Travel Centers LLC
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LESLEY DUKE,

Plaintiff,

 v.

FLYING J, INC.,

Defendant. _______________________________

LESLIE DUKE,

Plaintiff,

v.

PILOT TRAVEL CENTERS, LLC,

Defendant,

_______________________________/

No. C 15-2564 PJH

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE;

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

No. C 15-2566 PJH

Before the court is plaintiff's motion to transfer venue of the above-entitled actions to

the Eastern District of North Carolina, and defendants' motion for summary judgment as to

all claims asserted by plaintiff in these actions. Having read the parties' papers and

carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court hereby

DENIES plaintiff's motion to transfer and GRANTS defendants' motion for summary

judgment.

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For the Northern District of California

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BACKGROUND

The Constitution grants the Weights and Measures power to Congress in U.S.

Constitution art. I, § 8, cl.5. In exercising this power, Congress established the National

Bureau of Standards ("NBS" – now known as the "NIST"), and empowered it to "develop,

maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement, and provide the

means and methods for making measurements consistent with those standards. See 15

U.S.C. § 272(b)(2). 

Congress directed NIST to "cooperate with the other departments and agencies of

the Federal Government, with industry [and] with state and local governments . . . in

establishing standard practices, codes, specifications, and voluntary consensus standards." 

15 U.S.C. § 272(b)(10). NIST has defined the "customary" "gallon" as "231 cubic inches"

without reference to temperature. 33 Fed. Reg. 10755 (July 28, 1968); 40 Fed. Reg. 3486

(July 22, 1975). 

NIST established the National Conference on Weights and Measures ("NCWM") to

"ensure that uniform standards are applied to commercial transactions by developing

regulatory standards for consideration by each jurisdiction." NIST Handbook 44, which has

been adopted by every state at issue in the present case, (a) provides technical

requirements for weighing and measuring devices, including motor fuel dispensers, 

(b) requires that motor fuel be dispensed to retail customers in gallons or liters; and 

(c) defines "gallon as a unit of volume equal to 231 cubic inches "exactly" and that "a unit is

fixed by definition and is independent of such physical conditions as temperature" and

provides as examples, "the meter, the liter, . . . the gallon." 

Rushing v. Alon, Case No. 06-7621, was originally filed in this court on December

13, 2006, as a proposed class action, asserting claims against numerous defendants under

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For the Northern District of California

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 This court granted summary judgment in Case No. C-06-7621 on March 25, 2016,

and Case No. C-15-2567 was dismissed on December 16, 2015, pursuant to stipulation. 

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the consumer protection laws of Arizona, California, Florida, New Jersey, North Carolina,

Texas, and Virginia. The original plaintiffs' claims all arose from the retail sale of gasoline

and diesel fuel. Plaintiffs alleged that because the volume of motor fuel expands as its

temperature rises, selling a gallon of motor fuel (231 cubic inches at 60 degrees

Fahrenheit) at a temperature exceeding 60 degrees Fahrenheit ("hot fuel") without

disclosing that fact to consumers or adjusting the price to compensate constituted an

unlawful and deceptive business practice. In the first amended complaint, filed March 4,

2007, plaintiffs added claims under the consumer protection laws of Arkansas, Nevada,

New Mexico, the District of Columbia, plus a claim of breach of contract. 

On July 9, 2007, the case was transferred to MDL No. 1840 in the District of Kansas,

Case No. 07-MD-1840, where it was coordinated for pretrial proceedings. On August 30,

2013, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a conditional remand order,

directing that the claims asserted against certain defendants be remanded to this court. 

The MDL court subsequently severed the claims asserted against each of four defendants,

created three new cases, and remanded all four to this court. The sole remaining plaintiff

in the remanded cases was Lesley Duke.1

 

MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

Plaintiff seeks an order transferring the above-entitled actions to the Eastern District

of North Carolina. He references both 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 

However, he provides no basis for a transfer under § 1406(a), and his sole argument in

support of transfer under § 1404(a) is that "[i]t would be an inconvenience for plaintiff to

travel approx. 3000 miles to appear in California court" and "it would also be an

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 At the time this litigation commenced in 2006, Pilot and Flying J were separate

entities. It is the court's understanding that they are presently owned by the same company.

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inconveni[en]ce for possible witnesses to travel to CA."

Defendants Pilot Travel Centers LLC and Flying J, Inc. ("Pilot/Flying J")2

 oppose the

motion. First, they assert, § 1406(a) provides no authority for this case to be transferred,

because plaintiff chose to commence this case in this court nine years ago, and thus

waived the right to allege "improper" venue. Moreover, they contend, improper venue is an

affirmative defense, which a defendant can raise either in its answer or in a motion prior to

its answer. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).

Second, Pilot/Flying J contend that this case cannot be transferred under 

§ 1404(a), for the additional reasons that plaintiff has not established that the suit "could

have been brought" in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and has not established that

the "convenience" factors warrant transfer. Defendants also note that a transfer for

"convenience" should be brought as soon as the convenience becomes apparent, but that

here, plaintiff has unduly delayed in seeking transfer. 

In addition, Pilot/Flying J assert that plaintiff has not identified any witnesses who will

be inconvenienced by the transfer, or the locations of any fuel purchases in North Carolina,

or explained why, of all the possible states, North Carolina is the most convenient for

witnesses and parties, including defendants. They contend that because defendants and

witnesses will most likely have to travel no matter what venue is chosen, California is not

materially worse than any other venue at this late stage of the litigation (particularly in view

of the fact that all discovery is complete). They assert further that plaintiff knew he would

have to travel to California from North Carolina when he filed the original complaint in 2006,

when he filed the second amended complaint in 2009, and when he filed the operative

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complaint in his individual cases in the MDL (prior to the remand).

Finally, Pilot/Flying J argue, a change of venue so late in the case would prejudice

them because such a change would substantially increase the expense of the litigation, as

they would have to file another motion for summary judgment in the new venue. 

The court finds that the motion must be DENIED. Plaintiff has not met his burden of

showing that transfer is warranted under either § 1406(a) or § 1404(a). First, by choosing a

particular forum to commence the action, a plaintiff is generally considered to have waived

objections to proceeding in that forum. See Olberding v. Illinois Cent. Ry. Co. 346 U.S.

338, 340 (1953). Indeed, while a plaintiff may be permitted to challenge venue where the

defendant misled the plaintiff as to its residence, causing the action to be filed in an

improper venue, it is rare to see a motion to transfer venue made by a plaintiff. See

Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial (2015 ed.) § 4:678.

Thus, plaintiff cannot show that the chosen venue is "improper," such that transfer is

warranted under § 1406(a). In addition, plaintiff in this case has not established that the

case "might have been brought" in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and has made no

showing to support the "convenience" factors as required under § 1404(a). 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Pilot/Flying J seek summary judgment against plaintiff, as to all claims asserted

against them. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion, despite having agreed to the

briefing schedule set by the court at the further case management conference held on

November 19, 2015. 

 In the second amended complaint ("SAC"), filed while the case was pending in the

MDL court, plaintiffs asserted breach of contract claims against Flying J and Pilot Travel

Centers under the laws of a number of states, including Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,

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Oklahoma, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 

Plaintiffs also alleged that Flying J had violated the Florida Deceptive and Unfair

Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq,; the North Carolina Unfair

and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“NCUDTPA”), N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 75-1.1 et seq.;

the (3) Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“TDTPA”), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 

§ 17.46 et seq.; and (4) the Virginia Consumer Protection Act, Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-196 et

seq., and that Pilot had violated the FDUTPA. 

In their motion, Pilot/Flying J make three main arguments – that summary judgment

is appropriate on the breach of contract and consumer protection claims; that all of

plaintiff's claims present nonjusticiable political questions; and that all of plaintiff's claims

are preempted. 

In their first main argument, Pilot/Flying J assert that summary judgment is

appropriate on the breach of contract and consumer protection claims. In the contract

claim, plaintiff alleges that each time he contracted to purchase motor fuel from defendants,

the parties' understanding was that he would pay a specified price for, and that defendants

would deliver a unit of, a measure expressed in "gallons." SAC ¶¶ 241-245. He asserts

that the definition of "gallon" under the petroleum industry standard known as ASTM-IP D

1250 is 231 cubic inches of fuel at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, SAC ¶¶ 88-93, 251, and that

selling 231 cubic inches at a temperature greater than 60 degrees results in a "gallon" that

contains less fuel, SAC ¶ 95. Thus, he asserts, because a "gallon" defined by volume

without reference to temperature is "not a standard unit of measure," such a volumetric

"gallon" is not the meaning of "gallon" intended by the parties in their agreements for sale of

motor fuel, and thus constitutes a breach of the sales agreement. SAC ¶ 257-264.

Pilot/Flying J argue that plaintiff's breach of contract claim is meritless, for three

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reasons. First, they assert, the relevant legal framework in the states at issue is the same

as that found in California, and that this court should grant summary judgment as to the

contract claim for the same reasons that the MDL court granted summary judgment as to

the California claim of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

asserted against Chevron USA. See C-07-MD-1840 (D. Kan., Doc. 4600, Jul. 19, 2013)

("Rushing SJ Order"), at 33-34.

Second, Pilot/Flying J argue, just like California, the states at issue define "gallon" as

exactly 231 cubic inches; have each adopted into their respective states' laws NIST

Handbook 44; and have each defined "gallon" to exclude temperature consideration. Thus,

they contend, as explained by the MDL court, any attempt by plaintiff to construe the term

"gallon" to mean temperature-adjusted gallon is contrary to law and facially unreasonable. 

See id. 

Third, Pilot/Flying J assert, the contract claim fails because, as plaintiff conceded in

his deposition, he knew that defendants were dispensing non-temperature-adjusted motor

fuel, yet he freely paid the price per gallon shown on the station's price sign and dispenser. 

That is, he deliberately entered into transactions with full knowledge that the retailers

understood "gallon" to mean one thing but now claims he secretly believed the term to

mean something else (temperature adjusted fuel). Defendants contend that no viable

breach-of-contract claim can stand under these circumstances.

Pilot/Flying J also contend that the statutory claims fail as a matter of law. They note

that the MDL court dismissed the California unfair competition claim in the Rushing case

because California law protected the defendants from liability for claims regarding the

manner in which defendants dispense motor fuel – by the gross gallon, without disclosing

or adjusting for, temperature. See id. at 19-29. 

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 NIST Handbook 130 lists uniform laws and regulations in the area of legal metrology

and engine fuel quality developed by the National Conference of Weights and Measures

(NCWM), and summarizes the adoption of those laws and regulations by the states.

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Pilot/Flying J reiterate that all the states at issue (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi,

South Carolina, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia) define "gallon"

as "a volume of liquid – 231 cubic inches to be exact – regardless of temperature; have

adopted the NTIS Handbook 44 into their state law; and have defined "gallon" to exclude

temperature considerations. Thus, defendants argue, each of these states' laws authorizes

the conduct at issue, and plaintiff's attempt to change the law regarding the terms of this

retail transaction (purchase of motor fuel) is facially unreasonable.

Pilot/Flying J note that Handbooks 44 and 1303

 draw bright lines between retail and

wholesale transactions, and between retail motor fuel and other fuel products; and that the

Handbooks expressly recognize automatic temperature compensation ("ATC") to 60

degrees Fahrenheit in wholesale motor fuel and other fuel-delivery applications, but that in

contrast, the provisions applicable to retail motor fuel sales make no mention of ATC, and

actually require a non-temperature compensated method of sale.

Pilot/Flying J assert that North Carolina and Texas provide for virtually identical

common law protections, and demand the same result as California law; that Florida and

Virginia law provide even more persuasive protections via an express statutory safe harbor,

and that both the FDUTPA and the VCPA expressly bar plaintiff's consumer protection

claims. Defendants reiterate that there can be no violation of FDUTPA, VCPA, NCUDTPA,

or TDTPA where the alleged misconduct is required or specifically permitted by federal or

state law, and that each of these states' laws require that motor fuel be sold on a volumetric

basis (without reference to temperature).

Finally, Pilot/Flying J argue that the method of sale that plaintiff is seeking to foist

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upon defendants is itself illegal, as defendants cannot lawfully sell fuel at retail with

reference to temperature, and cannot use an ATC device for the retail sale of motor fuel in

Florida, Virginia, North Carolina, and/or Texas, without third-party regulators first changing

the law to permit ATC and a temperature-reference method of sale. Pilot/Flying J contend

that in 2007 and 2009, the NCWM rejected proposals to change the law to permit or

mandate a temperature-compensated method of sale for retail fuel sales, and that these

attempts to change the law occurred after multiple studies had been conducted on the

costs and benefits of a temperature-compensated method of sale. They assert that the

NCWM vote left in place the current law, which permits only the retail sale of fuel in

volumetric gallons, without reference to temperature.

In their second main argument, Pilot/Flying J contend that all of Mr. Duke's claims

present nonjusticiable political questions. The "political question" doctrine prevents courts

from making policy choices and value determinations that are committed to the political

branches. 

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court laid down the following six

independent tests, any one of which renders a case a non-judiciable "political question," as

follows:

Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political

question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable

and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding

without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial

discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of

government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question.

Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar,

there should be no dismissal for non-justiciability on the ground of a political

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question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of "political

questions," not one of "political cases." 

Id. at 217, quoted in U.S. Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 443, 456 (1992). 

Defendants contend that the first two factors are present here. They assert that it is

undisputed that there is a "textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to a coordinate

political department," as the Constitution explicitly commits to Congress the power to fix

"Standards of Weights and Measures." 

In addition, they argue, resolving plaintiff's claims requires a "quantifying judgment

that is unguided and ill-suited to the development of judicial standards." They contend that

numerous technical and logistical issues must be determined for retail temperature

compensation that defy resolution by any judicial standard – including product densities,

volume correction factors, and specifications for field inspection test procedures and

disclosures in labeling, signage, and receipts. They assert that evaluating the pros and

cons of alternative retail sale methods is a quintessential legislative function, and moreover,

that it would be improper for the court to re-evaluate the need to adopt temperature

compensations requirements for the retail sale of motor fuel when the political branches

have already rejected such a requirement. 

In their third main argument, Pilot/Flying J argue that all Mr. Duke's claims are

preempted. They note that federal law can preempt state law in three ways – express

preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption, and assert that this case involves

both field preemption and conflict preemption. They contend that field preemption applies

because of the broad grant of congressional authority to NIST to "secur[e] uniformity in

weights and measures," see 15 U.S.C. § 272(c)(4), and argue that because of this broad

grant of authority, plaintiff's interference with the policy choice of allowing sales of retail

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motor fuel without reference to temperature is preempted. They assert that conflict

preemption also applies, to the extent that compliance with both federal and state law is

impossible. 

The court finds that the motion must be GRANTED, as to both the claims of breach

of contract, and the claims under the consumer protection statutes of the states at issue. 

First, plaintiff cannot establish breach of contract. As is true under California law, the

fundamental goal of contract interpretation in the states at issue is to give effect to the

mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time they entered into the contract. 

See La. Civ. Code art. 2045; Royer Homes of Miss., Inc. v. Chandeleur Homes, Inc., 857

So. 2d 748, 752 (Miss. 2003); Cossey v. Cherokee Nation Enters., LLC, 212 P.3d 447, 468

(Okla. 2009); Progressive Max Ins. Co. v. Floating Caps, Inc., 747 S.E.2d 178, 183-84

(S.C. 2013); Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., Inc., 78 S.W.3d 885,

890 (Tenn. 2002). 

Moreover, the court interprets the parties’ intent based on objective, rather than

subjective criteria. See La. Civ. Code art. 2045 (2013), Revision Comments – 1984, (b);

Tupelo Redev. Agency v. Abernathy, 913 So.2d 278, 284 (Miss. 2005); Whitehorse v.

Johnson, 156 P.3d 41, 47 (Okla. 2007); Laser Supply and Servs., Inc. v. Orchard Park

Assocs., 382 S.C. 326, 334 (S.C. App. 2009); Moody v. Realty Co., Inc. v. Huestis, 237

S.W.3d 666, 674 (Tenn. App. 2007). 

Further, the Court construes the words of a contract according to their ordinary and

popular sense, and when the words of a contract are clear, the agreement’s language

controls. See La. Civ. Code arts. 2046, 2047; Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Britt, 826

So. 2d 1261, 1266 (Miss. 2002); Whitehorse, 156 P.3d at 47 (Oklahoma); Baugh v.

Columbia Heart Clinic, P.A., 402 S.C. 1, 23 (S.C. App. 2013); Perkins v. Metro. Gov’t of

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Nashville, 380 S.W.3d 73, 85 (Tenn. 2012). 

In addition, generally speaking, the law existing at the time and place the contract

was made is part of the contract. See Breaux v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 880 So. 2d 36, 37

(La. App. 2004); Ivison v. Ivison, 762 So. 2d 329, 335 (Miss. 2000); Pub. Serv. Co. of Okla.

v. State ex rel. Okla. Corp. Com’n,, 115 P.3d 861, 884 (Okla. 2005); Catawba Indian Tribe

of S.C. v. State, 372 S.C. 519, 591 (S.C. 2007); Ellis v. Pauline S. Sprouse Residuary Tr.,

280 S.W. 3d 806, 814 (Tenn. 2009). 

Second, just like California, the states at issue define “gallon” as exactly 231 cubic

inches, have each adopted into their respective state’s laws NIST Handbook 44, and have

each defined “gallon” to exclude temperature considerations. See Fla. Stat. § 531.40; La.

R.S. 3:4604; LAC XXXV.129 (2011); 2-1-4:09 Miss. Admin. Code § 116.01; 2-1-4:08 Miss.

Admin. Code § 100.02.5; Miss. Code § 75-27-5; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 81A-2; Okla. Stat. tit. 2,

§§ 14-34; 14-3; 14-32B; Okla. Admin. Code tit. 165, §§ 15-15-7, 15-7-1; and tit. 35

§§10-15-1, 10-15-2, 10-15-3; S.C. Code Ann. § 39-9-60; Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-26-907(a);

Tex. Agric. Code Ann. §§ 13.024, 13.02; 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 12.10; Tex. Tax Code 

§ 16.001(27); Va. Code Ann. §§ 3.2-5604, 3.2-5606, 3.2-5620, 3.2-5700.

Thus, any attempt by plaintiff to construe the term “gallon” to mean "temperatureadjusted gallon" is contrary to law and facially unreasonable. See Rushing SJ Order at

33-34 (“[P]laintiffs’ attempt to construe the term ‘gallon’ to mean temperature-adjusted

gallon is both contrary to [] law . . . and facially unreasonable.) The MDL court explained

that the law defines “gallon” as exactly 231 cubic inches and found that no reasonable

consumer could understand it to mean something different. Id.

Finally, plaintiff’s contract claim fails for the additional reason that he knew the

defendants were dispensing non-temperature-adjusted motor fuel – a fact plaintiff freely

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admitted in his deposition. See Deposition of Lesley Duke, Exh. B to Declaration of Tammy

B. Webb (Doc. 36-4), filed herein on December 16, 2015, at 86-88, 133-135. Yet plaintiff

nonetheless concluded his purchases by paying the price per gallon shown on the station’s

price sign and dispenser. He deliberately entered into transactions with full knowledge that

the retailers understood gallon to mean one thing, when he claims he secretly believed the

term to mean something else (i.e., that "gallon" signified temperature- adjusted fuel). No

viable breach-of-contract claim can stand under these circumstances.

Nor can plaintiff prevail on his claim of violation of state consumer laws. As

indicated above, the MDL court dismissed the California unfair competition claim in Rushing

because California law protected the defendants from liability for claims regarding the

manner in which defendants dispense motor fuel – by the gross gallon, without disclosing

or adjusting for temperature. See Rushing SJ Order, at 19-29. The court pointed the

California Supreme Court's decision in Cel-Tech Commcn's, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co.,

20 Cal. 4th 163, 182 (1999), which stands for the principle that conduct expressly

authorized by law cannot be subject to liability. As the court noted, “in statutory

construction, specific governs general.” Rushing SJ Order at 19. Similarly, conduct

authorized via a specific consumer protection statutory scheme, i.e., the Weights and

Measures regime, cannot impose liability under a general consumer protection statute. 

See id. at 19-20, 24. Conduct cannot be lawful and unlawful at the same time.

Handbooks 44 and 130 draw bright lines between retail and wholesale transactions

and between retail motor fuel and other fuel products. The Handbooks expressly recognize

ATC in wholesale motor fuel and other fuel-delivery applications. In stark contrast, the

provisions applicable to retail motor fuel sales make no mention of ATC. Instead, the

provisions applicable to retail motor fuel sales require a non-temperature compensated

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(non-ATC) method of sale. The express recognition of ATC for other fuel-delivery

applications, yet their silence on ATC for retail transactions, must be construed as

intentional – as a prohibition against ATC at retail. 

Both North Carolina and Texas provide for virtually identical common law (specific

authorization) protections and demand the same result as under California law. Florida and

Virginia law provide even more persuasive protections via an express statutory safe harbor. 

There can be no violation of the FDUTPA, VCPA, NCUDTPA, or TDTPA where the alleged

misconduct is required or specifically permitted by federal or state law. See Fla. Stat. §

501.212; Prohias v. Pfizer, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Va. Code

Ann. § 59.1-199; Smith v. U.S. Credit Corp., 626 F. Supp. 102, 103 (E.D. Va. 1985);

Strategic Outsourcing, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 414 F. Supp. 2d 545, 554-55 (W.D.N.C.

2006); Boales v. Brighton Bldrs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 159, 165 (Tex. App. – Houston 14th Dist.

2000). 

Each of these state’s laws and administrative regulations/procedures require that

motor fuel be sold on a volumetric basis (without reference to temperature), and provide

specific penalties if motor fuel is sold on another basis. They have all adopted the NIST

definitions of basic units of weights and measures, including Handbook 44, which provides

that one gallon of retail motor fuel is defined as exactly 231-cubic-inches, irrespective of

temperature. See Handbook 44, § 3.30 ¶ S.1.2.1; id., App. B at B-3; id., App. C at C-5,

C-11, C-17; see also Fla. Stat. § 531.40 (adopting Handbook 44); Va. Code Ann. 

§§ 3.2-5604, 3.2-5606, 3.2-5620, 3.2-5700 (adopting Handbook 44); N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 81A-2 (adopting Handbook 44); Tex. Agric. Code Ann. §§ 13.024, 13.025 (“[t]he gallon

contains 231 cubic inches.”); 4 Tex. Admin Code § 12.10 (adopting Handbook 44); Tex.

Tax Code § 16.001(27) ("'Gallon' means a unit of liquid of measurement as customarily

Case 4:15-cv-02566-PJH Document 44 Filed 04/11/16 Page 14 of 15
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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used in the United States and that contains 231 cubic inches by volume.”). Thus, the

specific statutory consumer protection scheme that authorizes the challenged business

practices at issue here is the same for all states at issue.

Finally, while not necessary to the decision, the court finds that summary judgment

is appropriate for the additional reasons argued by defendants – that the claims present

nonjusticiable political questions, and that they are barred under the doctrine of field

preemption. 

CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that plaintiff's motion to transfer

venue must be DENIED, and that defendants' motion for summary judgment must be

GRANTED. This order terminates these cases and any pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 11, 2016

____________________________

Phyllis J. Hamilton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:15-cv-02566-PJH Document 44 Filed 04/11/16 Page 15 of 15