Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01963/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01963-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Amicus on Behalf of Appellant
Willie Gordon
Appellant
Shafer Contracting Co.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1963

___________

Willie Gordon, *

*

Plaintiff-Appellant, *

*

v. * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

Shafer Contracting Co., Inc., * District of Minnesota.

*

Defendant-Appellee. *

*

-------------------------------------------------*

*

Equal Employment Opportunity *

Commission, *

*

Amicus on Behalf of Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2006

Filed: December 6, 2006 

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, LAY and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

LAY, Circuit Judge.

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
1

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota.

-2-

Willie Gordon appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Willie Gordon is a fifty-two year old African American male. Gordon worked

for Shafer Contracting Co. (“Shafer”), a construction company, during the

construction season from June 1994 to June 2003. Shafer’s employees are unionized

and governed by collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”). 

After Gordon failed to attend a 2003 kick-off meeting for prospective

employees and transferred his union membership to Kentucky, Shafer did not hire

Gordon as a laborer for the 2003 season. Subsequently, Shafer hired Gordon as a

roller operator, a position represented by the 49ers union, to which Gordon did not

belong. Following a confrontation with a 49ers union agent, Gordon stopped working

as a roller operator. Gordon asked Shafer for a laborer position, but was told that none

remained available.

Gordon subsequently submitted an intake questionnaire to the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in which he alleged he was the

victim of race- and age-based discrimination at Shafer. He subsequently brought suit

in district court, claiming that the failure to rehire him as a laborer for the 2003 season

constituted age and race discrimination; that he was paid less than similarly-situated

white laborers while at Shafer; and that he was subjected to a hostile work

environment while at Shafer. The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of Shafer on all claims.

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
-3-

ANALYSIS

In this timely appeal, Gordon contends that he has raised issues of fact on all

of his claims. Shafer contends that summary judgment was properly granted and that

Gordon’s claims are time-barred. “Summary judgment is appropriate when the

evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that

there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Clark v. Kellogg Co., 205 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir.

2000); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Reviewing the district court’s grant of summary

judgment de novo, see Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151, 1156

(8th Cir. 1999), we affirm.

I. Statute of Limitations Issues

We first address Shafer’s contention that Gordon’s Title VII and Age

Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) claims are time-barred because he did

not file a formal charge with the EEOC within the deadline. Claims of discrimination

must be made in the form of a “charge” with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged

wrong. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). While Gordon’s formal charge was outside the

deadline, he did fill out an EEOC Intake Questionnaire, which he signed under penalty

of perjury, within the deadline. In an amicus brief, the EEOC urges us to accept such

a verified Intake Questionnaire as satisfying the charge requirement.

As we affirm the dismissal of Gordon’s claims on the merits, we need not

decide this question, for the charge requirement is not jurisdictional. See Zipes v.

Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (stating that “filing a timely

charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in

federal court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling”).

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
-4-

II. Gordon’s Hostile Work Environment Claims

A hostile environment exists when “the workplace is permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.” Palesch v. Mo. Comm’n on Human Rights, 233 F.3d 560, 566 (8th Cir.

2000) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal

quotations and further citation omitted)). Hostile work environments created by

supervisors or coworkers have the following elements in common: (1) the plaintiff

belongs to a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was subject to unwelcome harassment;

(3) a causal nexus exists between the harassment and the plaintiff’s protected group

status; and (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.

Al-Zubaidy v. TEK Indus., Inc., 406 F.3d 1030, 1038 (8th Cir. 2005). In addition, for

claims of harassment by non-supervisory personnel, Gordon must show that his

employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take proper

action. See Carter v. Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999). To constitute

a hostile work environment, the harassment must be “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive

to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working

environment.’” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).

Shafer is vicariously liable for harassment by its supervisory personnel unless

it can establish that (1) Shafer exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly

correct any harassing behavior; and (2) Gordon unreasonably failed to take advantage

of the preventive or corrective opportunities provided by Shafer. Burlington Indus.,

Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998). An employer may assert the affirmative

defense only “[w]hen no tangible employment action is taken.” Faragher v. City of

Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807-08 (1998).

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
-5-

Gordon alleges that statements by Boyd Heilig, a coworker, and Gary Heilig,

a supervisor, created a hostile work environment. Gordon contends that Boyd Heilig

made three to four racially offensive comments to him and additional sexually

offensive comments to him. This limited number of offensive comments is

insufficient to create a hostile work environment. See Burkett v. Glickman, 327 F.3d

658, 662 (8th Cir. 2003) (“Offhand comments and isolated incidents of offensive

conduct (unless extremely serious) do not constitute a hostile work environment.”).

Gordon testified that Gary Heilig greeted him with racially offensive remarks

two or three times a week, as well as making other offensive remarks to him.

Crediting this testimony, as we are required to do on review of a summary judgment,

we assume that these remarks are sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work

environment. Shafer argues that its antidiscrimination policies, and Gordon’s failure

to attempt to use its remedies, establish the Ellerth-Faragher defense with respect to

alleged harassment by Gary Heilig. We agree. 

Shafer publishes an Employee Policy Manual (“Manual”) that describes its

antidiscrimination policies and reporting procedures, including a policy against

harassment. This manual is distributed to all employees at the beginning of each

construction season; Gordon acknowledges receiving the policy before the 2002

season. The Manual identifies three company officials to whom harassment can be

reported and provides their work and home telephone numbers. Gordon never

reported the alleged harassment to any of these officials. He claims he failed to do so

because he believed reporting would be ineffective. Such bare assertions are

insufficient to avoid summary judgment. We affirm the district court’s holding that

Shafer established the Ellerth-Faragher defense with respect to alleged harassment by

Gordon’s supervisor. 

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
-6-

III. Gordon’s Discriminatory Discharge Claim

Gordon contends that Shafer’s failure to hire him for the entire 2003 season

constitutes a racially-discriminatory discharge. The McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting framework governs claims of race discrimination under Title VII and Section

1981. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Griffith v. City

of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2004) (reaffirming applicability of

McDonnell Douglas to Title VII race discrimination claims); Patterson v. McLean

Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186-87 (1989) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework

to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Under McDonnell Douglas, Gordon must first

establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to

Shafer to present a legitimate reason for the allegedly discriminatory action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If Shafer does so, the burden shifts back to

Gordon to establish that the asserted legitimate reason was merely a pretext for a

discriminatory action. Id. at 804.

A prima facie case of discrimination in a failure-to-hire context requires Gordon

to show that (1) he belongs to a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for

a job for which the defendant was seeking applicants; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the

defendant sought applications from others. Chambers v. Wynne Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d

1214, 1216 (8th Cir. 1990). 

Assuming that Gordon has set out a prima facie case, his claim fails because he

has failed to present evidence that Shafer’s reasons for failing to hire him were a

pretext for unlawful discrimination. Gordon did not attend the pre-season meeting

and did not contact Shafer for a laborer position until after those jobs had been filled.

Officials at Shafer were informed that Gordon intended to transfer his union

membership to Kentucky and believed that he did not seek work for 2003. After

working as a roller operator for two weeks, Gordon left following a confrontation with

a 49ers union agent. Gordon’s departure further convinced Shafer that he did not wish

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856
-7-

continued employment with Shafer. As Gordon failed to offer evidence of pretext, we

affirm the grant of summary judgment.

IV. Gordon’s Age Discrimination Claim

The McDonnell Douglas framework also governs Gordon’s claim that Shafer’s

failure to hire him for the 2003 season constituted age discrimination. Haas v. Kelly

Servs., Inc., 409 F.3d 1030, 1035 (8th Cir. 2005). A prima facie case of age

discrimination requires Gordon to show that (1) he was at least forty years old; (2) he

suffered an adverse employment action; (3) he was meeting Shafer’s reasonable

expectations at the time of his termination; and (4) he was replaced by someone

substantially younger. Id. As with his race discrimination claim, Gordon fails to offer

evidence that Shafer’s reasons for not offering him a laborers’ position were a pretext

for illegal discrimination. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on this claim.

V. Gordon’s Wage Discrimination Claim

Title VII and Section 1981 prohibit wage discrimination based on race. See 42

U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 1981. Gordon claims that he was paid less for his work as a gate

guard than white gate guards. Shafer offers undisputed evidence, however, that all the

gate guards received the wage mandated by the CBA. Accordingly, we affirm the

dismissal of this claim. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1963 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/06/2006 Entry ID: 2115856