Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-21-11215/USCOURTS-ca11-21-11215-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raphyr Lubin
Appellee
Starbucks Corporation
Appellant
Ariel Torres
Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11215

____________________

RAPHYR LUBIN, 

individually and on behalf of all others

similarly situated,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

STARBUCKS CORPORATION, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-01311-CEH-TGW

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11215

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Ariel Torres, a former Starbucks employee, and Raphyr Lubin, the husband of another former Starbucks employee, brought

a putative class action against Starbucks in federal district court.

Torres and Lubin alleged that Starbucks sent them deficient healthinsurance notices under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended by the Consolidated Omnibus 

Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA). See 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a); 29 

C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. Starbucks responded by moving to compel arbitration, citing employment agreements that Torres and Lubin’s 

wife signed with Starbucks. Torres consented to arbitration, but 

Lubin opposed Starbucks’s motion. Although Lubin’s wife signed 

the employment agreement, Lubin was not a party to the agreement. This appeal requires us to determine whether Lubin must 

arbitrate his claims in light of his wife’s employment agreement. 

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument, 

we affirm the district court’s order denying Starbucks’s motion to 

compel arbitration of Lubin’s claim.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On June 8, 2020, Ariel Torres initiated a putative class action 

against his former employer, Starbucks, in federal district court. 

Torres alleged that Starbucks failed to provide him and similarly 

situated class members with adequate COBRA enrollment notices

under 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a) and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. In response,

Starbucks moved to compel arbitration. The motion to compel 

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21-11215 Opinion of the Court 3

became moot, however, when Torres amended his complaint and

Raphyr Lubin joined as an additional class representative. Starbucks moved to compel arbitration again. Torres consented, 

agreeing that his claim was covered by an arbitration clause in his 

employment agreement with Starbucks.1 However, Lubin opposed the motion. 

Unlike Torres, Lubin never worked for Starbucks. Instead, 

Lubin obtained coverage under Starbucks’s Welfare Benefits Plan 

because his wife worked for Starbucks, and she elected to cover 

Lubin as her spouse. Starbucks terminated Lubin’s wife in February 2019, which was a “qualifying event” that triggered Lubin’s 

right to a COBRA notice. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1163(2), 1166(a)(4). Accordingly, Starbucks’s COBRA administrator, Alight Solutions, mailed

Lubin the allegedly deficient COBRA notice. 

Importantly, because Lubin was never employed at Starbucks, he neversigned an employment agreement or an arbitration 

agreement with Starbucks. Rather, Lubin’s wife signed the employment agreement, which included an arbitration clause. Starbucks believes that Lubin must arbitrate in light of his wife’s employment agreement, which provides:

Starbucks and I agree to use binding individual arbitration to resolve any “Covered Claims” . . . “Covered 

Claims” are those brought under any statute . . . relating to my employment, including those concerning 

1 Torres is not a party to this appeal. 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11215

any element of compensation . . . or termination of 

employment. 

Except as provided herein, I understand and agree 

that arbitration is the only forum for resolving Covered Claims, and that both Starbucks and I waive the 

right to a trial before a judge or jury in federal or state 

court. 

The arbitration provision also contained a delegation clause:

Except as provided below, Starbucks and I agree that 

the Arbitrator—and not a court or agency—shall 

have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute regarding the formation, interpretation, applicability, 

enforceability, or implementation of this Agreement,

including any claim that all or part of this Agreement 

is void or voidable. 

Excluded from arbitration, however, are “actions to enforce this 

Agreement, compel arbitration, or enforce or vacate an arbitrator’s 

award under this Agreement.” 

The district court denied Starbucks’s motion to compel arbitration as to Lubin. The court noted that Lubin was neither a 

party to his wife’s employment agreement nor did he sue to enforce the employment agreement. Instead, Lubin sought to enforce his own, statutory right to an adequate COBRA notice. See 

29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. Accordingly, the 

court held that no equitable doctrine of Florida contract law—including equitable estoppel and third-party beneficiary doctrine—

required Lubin to arbitrate. Finally, the district court held that 

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Starbucks waived its argument that Lubin must arbitrate because 

he sought to enforce rights that were derivative of his wife’s rights. 

The court also noted that, in any event, Starbucks was wrong on 

the merits because Lubin sought to enforce his own rights under 

29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). 

Starbucks appealed. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration de 

novo. Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th 

Cir. 2016). We also review the district court’s reading of an arbitration clause de novo. JPay, Inc. v. Kobel, 904 F.3d 923, 928 (11th 

Cir. 2018).

III. ANALYSIS 

A. The Arbitration Agreement

The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., enshrines a 

“‘presumption of arbitrability’” such that “‘any doubts concerning 

the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.’” Dasher v. RBC Bank (USA), 745 F.3d 1111, 1115 (11th Cir. 

2014) (first quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 

475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986); then quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 

Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)). But that “‘presumption does not apply to disputes concerning whether an agreement 

to arbitrate has been made.’” Id. at 1116 (quoting Applied Energetics, 

Inc. v. NewOak Cap. Mkts., LLC, 645 F.3d 522, 526 (2d Cir. 2011)). 

And the threshold question of whether an arbitration agreement 

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exists at all is “simply a matter of contract.” First Options of Chicago, 

Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). Without an agreement to 

arbitrate, “a court cannot compel the parties to settle their dispute 

in an arbitral forum.” Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Klay v. 

All Defendants, 389 F.3d 1191, 1200 (11th Cir. 2004)).

On appeal, Starbucks argues that the district court erred in 

“ignor[ing] the strong presumption in favor of arbitration.” Lubin 

counters that he is not a party to the arbitration agreement. Also, 

according to Lubin, his claim has nothing to do with his wife’s employment agreement; rather, it centers on his statutory right to receive an adequate COBRA notice. See 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4); 29 

C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. And because he never signed an arbitration 

agreement with Starbucks, he is not required to arbitrate a matter 

concerning his rights under federal law.

We agree with Lubin. Lubin never signed or otherwise 

agreed to the arbitration agreement with Starbucks. Because he 

was not a party to the agreement, the Court cannot compel him to 

adhere to the terms of the agreement. See Advanced Bodycare Sols., 

LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 524 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]rbitration is a creature of contract; a party may not be compelled to 

arbitrate if he did not agree to do so.”). Starbucks fears that this 

outcome creates a loophole for its employees to stage an end run 

around their arbitration agreements. But Lubin’s wife is not a 

party to this action. If she were, she would be bound by the arbitration agreement. In contrast to his wife, Lubin is a non-party to 

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the arbitration agreement, and he seeks to vindicates his rights, not 

his wife’s. 

Starbucks argues, however, that the arbitration agreement’s

delegation clause grants exclusive jurisdiction to an arbitrator to 

determine whether Lubin must arbitrate. 

It is true that “parties may agree to commit even threshold 

determinations to an arbitrator, such as whether an arbitration 

agreement is enforceable.” Parnell v. CashCall, Inc., 804 F.3d 1142, 

1146 (11th Cir. 2015). But courts “should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clear and unmistakable’ evidence that they did so.” Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944 (alterations adopted) (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649); accord Martinez v. 

Carnival Corp., 744 F.3d 1240, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014). 

Starbucks argues that the delegation clause of the arbitration 

agreement makes clear that the parties agreed to arbitrate questions of arbitrability. The delegation clause provides that “Starbucks and I agree that the Arbitrator—and not a court or agency—

shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute regarding the 

. . . applicability . . . of this Agreement.” Starbucks also notes that 

the agreement incorporates the National Rules for the Resolution 

of Employment Disputes, which state that “[t]he arbitrator shall 

have the power to rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including 

any objections with respect to the existence, scope or validity of the 

arbitration agreement.” Am. Arb. Ass’n, Empl. Arb. R. and Mediation Procs. R-6(a). 

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Lubin responds, however, that the agreement’s exclusion

clause makes the application of the delegation clause neither 

“‘clear’” nor “unmistakable.” See Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 944 (alterations adopted) (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 649). The agreement’s 

exclusion clause provides that “[c]laims excluded from arbitration” 

include “actions to enforce this Agreement, compel arbitration, or 

enforce or vacate an arbitrator’s award under this Agreement.” In 

Wilson v. Starbucks Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 557 (E.D. Ky. 2019)—a 

case involving an arbitration agreement identical to the agreement 

here—the court refused to enforce the delegation clause because 

“[t]he arbitration agreement expressly exclude[d] ‘(c) actions to enforce this Agreement, compel arbitration, or enforce or vacate an 

arbitrator’s award under this Agreement.’” Id. at 561. As a result, 

“the arbitration agreement fail[ed] to provide clear and unmistakable evidence that” the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, and 

the court declined to “assume” that the parties intended to do so. 

Id. (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 

63, 71–72 (2019)).

We agree with Lubin. The language of the arbitration

agreement is ambiguous because the delegation clause conflicts 

with the exclusion clause. The delegation clause provides the arbitrator with authority to resolve disputes about the applicability of 

the arbitration agreement. But the exclusion clause expressly states 

that “actions” to “enforce” the agreement or “compel arbitration”

are excluded from arbitration. Because the arbitration agreement 

does not provide “‘clear and unmistakable evidence’” that the parties agreed to arbitrate the present dispute about arbitrability, we 

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“should not assume” that the delegation clause applies. See Kaplan,

514 U.S. at 944 (alterations adopted) (quoting AT & T, 475 U.S. at 

649).

Moreover, Lubin is not a party to the delegation clause. And 

absent an agreement between Lubin and Starbucks, “a court cannot compel the parties to settle their dispute in an arbitral forum.” 

Bazemore, 827 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Klay, 389 F.3d at 1200). Arbitration agreements are no more enforceable than an average contract, and we “may not devise novel rules to favor arbitration over 

litigation.” Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 418 (2022). The 

delegation clause, just like every other clause in the arbitration 

agreement, was between Starbucks and Lubin’s wife, not Lubin. 

We thus conclude that the terms of the arbitration agreement do 

not require Lubin to arbitrate his claim against Starbucks, absent 

another principle of law or equity.

Starbucks thus advances three arguments regarding why

principles of Florida contract law require Lubin to submit to arbitration anyway. 2 We address each in turn, starting with equitable 

estoppel.

B. Equitable Estoppel

“[E]quitable estoppel precludes a party from claiming the 

benefits of some of the provisions of a contract while 

2 State law controls on whether an arbitration clause in a contract can be enforced against a non-signatory to that contract. See Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. 

Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 845 F.3d 1351, 1354, 1355 n.1 (11th Cir. 

2017); Lawson v. Life of the S. Ins., 648 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (11th Cir. 2011). The 

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simultaneously attempting to avoid the burdens that some other 

provisions of the contract impose.” Bahamas Sales Assoc., 701 F.3d 

at 1342. In some cases, a non-signatory plaintiff can be bound to 

an arbitration agreement based on equitable estoppel. See, e.g., Allied Pros. Ins. v. Fitzpatrick, 169 So. 3d 138, 142 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. 

App. 2015). Under the equitable estoppel doctrine, Starbucks could 

force Lubin to abide by his wife’s employment agreement—including the arbitration clause—if it shows that Lubin “is relying on the 

[employment] agreement to assert [his] claims” and that “the scope 

of the arbitration clause covers the dispute.” Kroma Makeup EU, 845 

F.3d at 1354; see also Fitzpatrick, 169 So. 3d at 142 (“[E]stoppel applies here to bind the plaintiffs to arbitration . . . . [T]he plaintiffs 

cannot claim they are entitled to the benefit of the policy’s coverage provision while simultaneously attempting to avoid the burden 

of the policy’s arbitration provision.”).

On appeal, Starbucks argues that Lubin is attempting to 

claim the benefits of his wife’s employment agreement while simultaneously avoiding the agreement’s arbitration clause. Starbucks 

points to Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752 (Fla. 

2013), in support of its position. Laizure held that non-signatory 

heirs were bound to arbitrate a wrongful-death-claim because the 

heirs’ claim was derivative of the wrong committed against the 

district court held, and the parties agree, that Florida law applies. See Bahamas 

Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 701 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If the parties 

litigate the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, we will assume that that law applies.”). 

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decedent, who had signed an arbitration agreement. Id. at 759–62. 

Starbucks also highlights Gomez v. Allied Professionals Insurance Co., 

457 F. Supp. 3d 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2020), which relied on the equitableestoppel doctrine in holding that an arbitration agreement applied 

to a non-signatory plaintiff in his suit against a signatory defendant. 

Id. at 1360. Lubin responds that he is not suing Starbucks based on

any agreement, including his wife’s agreement with Starbucks, but, 

instead, that his claim arises under his independent statutory right 

to an adequate COBRA notice. See 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 2590.606-4.

Once again, we agree with Lubin. Equitable estoppel does 

not compel Lubin to submit to arbitration because he is not suing

to enforce or avoid any provision of his wife’s employment agreement. Lubin is not claiming the benefits of the agreement while 

simultaneously attempting to avoid its burdens. See Bahamas Sales 

Assoc., 701 F.3d at 1342. Rather, Lubin sues based on Starbucks’s 

failure to fulfill its notice duties under COBRA. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1166(a)(4); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. Those notice duties do not 

arise out of any provision of his wife’s employment contract.

Further, Laizure and Gomez are inapposite. Laizure is distinguishable because a wrongful-death claim is “dependent on a 

wrong committed against the decedent,” not the plaintiff. See 109 

So. 3d at 759–60. But here, Starbucks allegedly violated a statutory 

duty it owed to Lubin himself, not to his wife. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1166(a)(4) (creating the right to a COBRA notice for “any qualified beneficiary”). Moreover, Laizure is best understood as 

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addressing the derivative claim doctrine, which we discuss below, 

not the equitable estoppel doctrine. Gomez, a bad-faith insurance 

case, is also distinguishable because the non-signatory sought payments under an insurance policy that contained an arbitration 

clause. See Gomez, 457 F. Supp. 3d at 1360. Gomez emphasized that 

a non-signatory plaintiff could not avoid an arbitration clause contained in the very insurance policy that he sought benefits under. 

Id. Conversely, Lubin is seeking relief under a statute, 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1166(a)(4), not under a provision contained in his wife’s employment agreement.

We thus conclude that, because the employment agreement 

is not the source of Lubin’s right or legal claim, Florida’s equitable 

estoppel doctrine is inapplicable. See Kroma Makeup EU, 845 F.3d at 

1354.

C. Third-Party Beneficiary Doctrine

Starbucks next attempts to invoke the third-party beneficiary doctrine to compel Lubin to arbitrate. But “[a]s a general 

rule, a plaintiff cannot be bound by an arbitration clause in a contract he did not sign even if he is a third-party beneficiary of the 

contract.” Jacocks v. Cap. Com. Real Est. Grp., Inc., 310 So. 3d 71, 73 

(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2021). “[T]he third-party beneficiary doctrine enables a non-contracting party to enforce a contract against 

a contracting party—not the other way around.” Mendez v. Hampton Ct. Nursing Ctr., LLC, 203 So. 3d 146, 149 (Fla. 2016) (first citing 

Espinosa v. Sparber, Shevin, Shapo, Rosen & Heilbronner, 612 So.2d 

1378, 1380 (Fla. 1993); and then citing Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So.2d 

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713, 715 (Fla. 1969)). “The third-party beneficiary doctrine does 

not permit two parties to bind a third—without the third party’s 

agreement—merely by conferring a benefit on the third party.” Id.

Thus, under Florida law, the third-party beneficiary exception to the general rule against binding a non-party arises when “a 

third-party beneficiary sues to enforce a contract between other 

parties.” Jacocks, 310 So. 3d at 73. In that case, the third-party beneficiary “will usually be bound by an arbitration clause contained 

in that contract.” Id.; see Nat’l Gypsum Co.v. Travelers Indem. Co., 417 

So.2d 254, 256 (Fla.1982). But that exception is limited and “does 

not apply when a third-party beneficiary brings a claim other than 

to enforce the contract.” Jacocks, 310 So. 3d at 73; see Mendez, 203 

So. 3d at 149.

Mendez and Jacocks therefore foreclose Starbucks’s argument

that Lubin is bound by the arbitration clause as a third-party beneficiary. Lubin’s wife and Starbucks cannot bind Lubin to arbitrate 

merely by conferring spousal health coverage on him. And Lubin 

is not suing to enforce a contractual duty owed by Starbucks under 

its employment contract with his wife. Instead, he sues under federal law, alleging that Starbucks violated statutory duties that it 

owed him under COBRA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 2590.606-4. Thus, we conclude that the third-party beneficiary 

doctrine does not require Lubin to arbitrate his claim.

D. Derivative Claim

Finally, Starbucks argues that Lubin must arbitrate because 

his claim is “derivative” of his wife’s claim. In some cases, Florida 

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law requires a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate when the underlying action is “derivative” of a wrong committed against a signatory to an arbitration provision. See, e.g., Laizure, 109 So. 3d at 762. 

“Derivative claims” are claims where the plaintiff’s right to recover 

is predicated on another party’s right to recover. Id. at 760. For 

example, a wrongful-death claim flows from a tortious act committed against the decedent. Id. at 760–61. By virtue of the decedent’s 

death, that claim transforms from the decedent’s personal-injury 

claim to the heir’s wrongful-death claim. See id.

The district court rejected Starbucks’s “derivative” argument because Starbucks raised it for the first time in a supplemental

brief. See Stubbs v. Wyndham Nassau Resort & Crystal Palace Casino, 

447 F.3d 1357, 1364 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that a defendant 

waived its personal-jurisdiction argument by raising it for the first 

time in a reply brief). The district court also noted that, in any 

event, it would have rejected Starbucks’s argument on the merits. 

The court explained that Lubin’s claim is not “derivative” because 

“he seeks only to enforce his own statutory rights under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1166(a) and 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4.” (Emphasis added).

On appeal, Starbucks argues that the district court erred for 

a few reasons. First, Starbucks claims that it did not waive its derivative argument because that argument is subsumed under the 

third-party beneficiary argument and the equitable estoppel argument. Starbucks notes that it discussed the derivative nature of Lubin’s claims in its original motion to compel, and Starbucks stresses 

that it continued to argue the derivative theory in oral argument 

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before the district court. Next, Starbucks cites Eckel v. Equitable Life 

Assurance Society of the U.S., 1 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Mich. 1998), for 

support. There, under similar facts, a district court held that a 

plaintiff was required to arbitrate her COBRA claim in light of her 

husband’s arbitration agreement with his employer. Id. at 687 n.1. 

In a footnote, the court explained that the wife “was listed as a dependent under her husband[’s] . . . insurance policy,” and therefore, “her claims are derivative of her husband’s and also subject to 

arbitration.” Id. Finally, for the first time on appeal, Starbucks cites

Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2001), which 

held that when a court awards damages under 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1132(c)(1) for a § 1166(a)(4) violation, the court cannot separately 

award damages to a health-plan beneficiary if the court already 

awarded damages to the health-plan participant. Id. at 1343–44.

Therefore, Starbucks reasons, Lubin (a health-plan beneficiary) 

seeks to enforce statutory rights that are not his own, but rather,

derive from his wife (a health-plan participant). 

Assuming, without deciding, that Starbucks preserved its arguments about the “derivative” theory, Starbucks is incorrect on 

the merits. Lubin’s claim is not derivative of his wife’s claim. Lubin’s claim is premised on an independent statutory right under 29 

U.S.C. § 1166(a)(4). And the mere fact that Lubin was a beneficiary 

of his wife’s health plan does not mean that he sues to enforce his 

wife’s rights under her employment agreementrather than his own 

rights, as a “qualified beneficiary,” under § 1166(a)(4). Cf. Seifert v. 

U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999) (“[T]he mere fact 

that the dispute would not have arisen but for the existence of the 

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contract and consequent relationship between the parties is insufficient by itself to transform a dispute into one ‘arising out of or 

relating to’ the agreement. . . . [F]or a tort claim to be considered 

‘arising out of or relating to’ an agreement, it must, at a minimum, 

raise some issue the resolution of which requires reference to or 

construction of some portion of the contract itself.”); Jacocks, 310 

So. 3d at 73 (“Jacocks is suing the defendants for negligence, not to 

enforce the retainer agreement. The fact that Jacocks relies on his 

status as an intended third-party beneficiary of the retainer agreement to establish that the defendants owed him a duty of care does 

not transform the basic nature of his claim from negligence to 

breach of contract.”).

Starbucks’s citation to Eckel doeslittle to support its position. 

Eckel is a non-binding district court decision. See Camreta v. Greene, 

563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011); Georgia v. President of the United States, 

46 F.4th 1283, 1304 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[A] district court’s decisions 

do not bind other district courts, other judges on the same court, 

or even the same judge in another case.”). Eckel also has limited 

persuasive value because the court did not apply Florida law and 

the extent of its analysis about the “derivative” nature of the nonsignatory’s claim is limited to two lines in a footnote. See Eckel, 1 

F. Supp. 2d at 687 n.1.

Finally, we need not consider Starbucks’s statutory-damages 

argument under Wright. See 270 F.3d at 1343–44. Starbucks never 

raised an argument based on Wright in the district court. Nor did 

it rely on Wright’s reasoning about the text of 29 U.S.C. 

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§ 1132(c)(1). Thus, this argument is waived. See McGroarty v. 

Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Generally, arguments are considered ‘waived’ when they are not raised in the district court.”).3

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court correctly denied Starbucks’s motion to 

compel arbitration of Lubin’s claim. Because Lubin was not a party 

to the arbitration agreement, he cannot be compelled to arbitrate 

absent another principle of law or equity. No such principle applies 

here.

AFFIRMED.

3 Furthermore, even if Starbucks had preserved its argument, we doubt that 

Wright necessarily implies that a beneficiary’s right to a COBRA notice under 

§ 1166(a)(4) is derivative of a participant’s right to a COBRA notice. True, 

under Wright’s reading of § 1132(c)(1), a beneficiary cannot separately collect 

statutory damages for an inadequate notice if the participant collects statutory 

damages for the same violation. See 270 F.3d at 1343–44. But a beneficiary’s 

ability to collect damages is distinct from whether a beneficiary has a statutory 

right to a COBRA notice. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1), with id. § 1166(a)(4). 

Furthermore, § 1132(a)(1)(A) still grants a beneficiary the right to bring his

own civil action—as Lubin does here—for an inadequate COBRA notice under § 1166(a)(4). In short, although § 1132(c)(1) sometimes limits a beneficiary’s ability to separately collect damages for a violation of § 1166(a)(4), that 

does not mean that a beneficiary’s right to a notice derives solely from a participant’s right to a notice.

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TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with the Court’s disposition of this case on the basis 

that Lubin was not a party to his wife’s arbitration agreement and 

that his claim arises under federal statute, so Starbucks’s contractlaw arguments are inapplicable. But I write separately because I 

find it unnecessary to engage any further with principles of federal 

and state law that do not control this case.

This is a statutory case: Lubin sues to enforce a federal statutory right, the right to an adequate COBRA notice. See 29 U.S.C. 

§ 1166(a); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.606-4. His claim is not the product of 

any bargained-for exchange with Starbucks. That is why Starbucks 

cannot compel him to arbitrate under an agreement that is not his 

own. I would not speculate on how the law would apply under different circumstances.

The Court’s holding should be read narrowly to apply only 

where a party to an arbitration agreement seeks to compel a nonparty to arbitrate, and only where the non-party’s claim arises directly under federal law, as here. Any discussion in the Court’s 

opinion that could be read more broadly is unnecessary to the resolution of this dispute. Therefore, it is either dictum, which carries 

no precedential value, or an alternative holding, which I do not 

join. See, e.g., United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 931–35 (11th Cir. 

2023) (Newsom, J., concurring) (critiquing appellate courts’ practice of issuing alternative holdings).

For instance, I do not join the Court’s discussion of the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause. See Maj. Op. at 7–9. The 

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Court provides a well-reasoned explanation for why that clause 

does not apply in the first place: Lubin is not a party to the agreement. See Maj. Op. at 7, 9–10. I see no reason for us then to decide 

whether the agreement would require parties to arbitrate arbitrability. That question, which implicates all of Starbucks’s similar 

agreements, can and should be answered when it is more properly 

before a future court.

Similarly, I do not join the Court’s discussion of the thirdparty beneficiary doctrine. See Maj. Op. at 13–14. Once again, the 

Court provides an excellent explanation for why the doctrine does 

not apply: Lubin sues to enforce his statutory rights, not to obtain 

the benefits of a contract. See Maj. Op. at 14. Therefore, it is unnecessary to wade further into the waters of Florida common law, 

where we might find broad propositions that do not apply neatly 

to this dispute. Should the appropriate time come, we may even 

find it prudent to certify a question to the Florida Supreme Court. 

See, e.g., Peoples Gas Sys. v. Posen Constr., Inc., 931 F.3d 1337, 1340 

(11th Cir. 2019) (certifying a question because it was “the most prudent course of action in deciding a potentially novel application of 

Florida state law”).

In summary, I concur in the Court’s judgment and with 

much of its well-reasoned opinion. But it suffices to hold that Lubin 

cannot be bound by an arbitration agreement he did not sign, particularly when he sues to enforce a statutory right rather than a 

benefit of the contract. I would leave other questions for a later, 

more appropriate dispute.

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