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Parties Involved:
Gene M. Erekson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FILED . United States Court of Appca.:J 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 2 1 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 94-4228 

GENE M. EREKSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-82) 

Submitted on the Briefs. 

Robert E. Lindsay (Alan Hechtkopf and Jeffrey A. Breinholt with 

him on the brief), Tax Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for appellee. 

Edwin F. Guyon, Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

KERN*, District Judge. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Terry C. Kern, United States District Judge for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-4228 Document: 01019279156 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 1 
Gene M. Erekson (Erekson) appeals from his conviction and 

sentence following a jury trial on charges of conspiracy to defraud the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 371, and presenting a false social security number, in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a) (7) (B). 

Facts 

In the fall of 1991, IRS Special Agent John Howard (Howard) 

was involved in a criminal investigation of possible tax offenses 

by Michael K. Jensen (Jensen). On September 25, 1991, Howard 

contacted Erekson and requested a meeting to discuss Jensen's 

business affairs. Erekson agreed to meet with Howard at the IRS 

office that afternoon. 

At the meeting, Howard identified himself as an IRS Special 

Agent and displayed his credentials showing he was with the 

Criminal Investigation Division. During the interview, Howard 

asked Erekson what types of services he had performed for Jensen, 

whether he had been paid, in what form had he been paid, and how 

much. The questions were designed to determine whether Jensen was 

entitled to business expense deductions to offset any income he 

had earned through his tape duplicating business, Sound Concepts. 

In addition, Howard asked Erekson about several bank accounts 

for which Howard had obtained the bank records. The bank records 

showed that checks payable to Jensen or Sound Concepts were deposited into these bank accounts and that Erekson had signatory 

authority over these accounts. Erekson denied having any bank 

accounts which Jensen used. 

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On April 7, 1993, Erekson was indicted on one count of conspiring to defraud the IRS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and 

one count of presenting a false social security number, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 408(a) (7) (B). The conspiracy count charged 

several overt acts, including: 

24. On or about September 25, 1991, during an interview 

conducted by a representative of the Internal Revenue 

Service, GENE M. EREKSON falsely denied that he had 

checking or savings account [sic] into which MICHAEL K. 

JENSEN deposited money. 

(R., Vol. I at 6). 

On June 16, 1994, Erekson filed a Motion to Suppress his interview statements. The motion was referred to United States 

Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba, who held an evidentiary hearing on 

the morning of July 15, 1994. The Magistrate presented his Report 

and Recommendation to the district court at a hearing that afternoon: 

I heard the testimony of Mr. Erekson, the defendant, and Special Agent Howard of the Internal Revenue 

Service. Based on the testimony that was presented, I 

have made the following findings of fact. I have also 

relied on [sic] making these finding on other documents 

that were submitted, exhibits that were introduced and 

memoranda that were submitted by both the defendant and 

by the government in response to the motion to suppress. 

I've also listened to the arguments of counsel. 

* * * 

3. Erekson voluntarily appeared at the meeting at 

Howard's office. Howard introduced himself to Erekson 

as John Howard, special agent, and showed Erekson his 

credentials. 

4. The meeting took place in an office with 

Erekson, Howard and Revenue Agent Hayes present. The 

parties· were all seated in the office. Erekson brought 

a tape recorder with him to the interview, which he held 

in his hand and on his lap. Howard noticed the recorder 

and at that point decided that he would also tape the 

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Appellate Case: 94-4228 Document: 01019279156 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 3 
interview. Howard placed a tape recording device on the 

table. 

5. During the course of the interview, Howard did 

not press Erekson to answer any questions ·that he did 

not want to answer. Howard made no threats or intimidating gestures to Erekson. Erekson was free to leave 

at any time during the interview. Howard's revolver was 

not displayed in any way. Erekson did not appear distressed at any point during the interview. 

* * * 

8. At no time during the interview did Howard 

consider Erekson to be the subject of a criminal investigation. Howard did not deceive Erekson regarding the 

nature of the interview on September 25, 1991. Additionally, Howard did not deceive Erekson regarding the 

nature of the criminal investigation concerning Jensen. 

Erekson did not become the focus or target of an IRS 

criminal investigation until approximately December 

12th, 1991, where, during a meeting with Howard and his 

superiors to discuss the Jensen case, it was determined 

that the investigation should be expanded to include 

Erekson. On or about December 19th, 1991, a criminal 

case was officially opened concerning Erekson. 

9. Once Erekson was identified as the focus of a 

criminal investigation, there was no further contact 

with Erekson warranting either Miranda warnings or such 

other warnings required by IRS regulations. 

For an analysis of this case, I have the following: 

In viewing the circumstances surrounding Howard's interview of Erekson on September 25th, '91, there is no 

evidence to suggest that Erekson was either taken into 

custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any 

significant way. This was a noncustodial interview 

which did not require Erekson be advised of his Miranda 

rights. [citations omitted] 

For the second portion of the analysis based on the 

evidence presented in Howard's testimony concerning the 

purpose of the interview, the representations made to 

Erekson concerning the nature of the interview and the 

nature of the criminal investigation of Jensen, I find 

that defendants have failed to establish by clear and 

convincing evidence that Howard affirmatively and intentionally misled Erekson or that Erekson was in any 

way the· subject of fraud, deceit or trickery on the part 

of Howard. [citations omitted] 

Therefore, based on this, it is my recommendation 

that defendants' motion to suppress be denied. 

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Appellate Case: 94-4228 Document: 01019279156 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 4 
(R., Vol. III at 3-7). 

The district court adopted the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation in full. (R., Vol. VIII at 167). 

At trial, the transcript of the September 25, 1991, interview 

was authenticated and admitted in evidence. (R., Vol. VI at 45-

46). Erekson testified that he made the statements attributed to 

him in the interview transcript and that they were accurate. (R., 

Vol. VIII at 118). 

On July 22, 1994, Erekson was convicted on both counts. He 

was sentenced to a term of 12 months imprisonment, to be served as 

six months of imprisonment followed by six months of supervised 

release, plus three years of supervised release. 

Issues 

On appeal, Erekson contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion to suppress the statements he made during the 

September 25, 1991, interview. Erekson argues that his Fifth 

Amendment rights were violated because he was not given a Miranda 

warning; the statements he made were not voluntary; and the 

statements obtained during the interview constituted an illegal 

search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because any consent 

obtained from him was obtained through deception. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 

the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

district court's findings. United States v. Higgins, 2 F.3d 1094, 

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Appellate Case: 94-4228 Document: 01019279156 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 5 
1096 (lOth Cir. 1993); United States v. Gonzalez-Acosta, 989 F.2d 

384, 387 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

Discussion 

a. 

Erekson contends that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because he was not given a Miranda warning. He asserts that 

a Miranda warning was required because the IRS agents knew or 

should have known that their questions would produce incriminating 

responses and because of the close relationship between the questions and the criminal acts charged. 

It is well established that under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 444 (1966), in order to protect the privilege against 

self-incrimination, law enforcement officers must administer prophylactic warnings regarding the privilege to any suspect subjected to 11 custodial interrogation.nl The Court explained that 

such interrogation is 11 questioning initiated by law enforcement 

officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise 

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 11 Id. 

If the warnings are not administered, the prosecution may not use 

statements made by the suspect, 11 whether exculpatory or inculpatory. 11 Id. 

1 Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), before any 

custodial interrogation, a defendant must be warned that he has 

the right to.remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 

used as evidence against him, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one 

will be provided for him. 

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In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court applied the Miranda requirements to interviews with IRS agents concerning tax liability, when the suspect is in custody. The Court 

held that "[t]ax investigations, which frequently lead to criminal 

prosecution, are not immune from the Miranda warning requirement 

to be given to a person in custody, whether or not such custody is 

in connection with the case under investigation." Id. 

In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), the Court 

reiterated that the requirements of Miranda are applicable only 

when the suspect is "in custody." In Beckwith, the defendant was 

questioned by IRS agents at his home. Id. at 342. The agents 

identified themselves and informed the defendant that they were 

attached to the Intelligence Division where one of their functions 

was to investigate the possibility of tax fraud. Id. at 343. 

They specifically informed the defendant that they were assigned 

to investigate his federal tax liability for the years 1966 

through 1971. Id. The Court held that statements made to IRS 

agents during the course of a noncustodial interview in a criminal 

tax investigation were admissible against the defendant in the 

ensuing criminal tax fraud prosecution even though when he was 

interviewed, the "focus" of the investigation may have been on the 

defendant. Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 

Therefore, in order to have triggered the Miranda warning 

requirements, Erekson must have been "in custody" at the time of 

the September 25, 1991, interview. See Higgins, 2 F.3d at 1096 

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Appellate Case: 94-4228 Document: 01019279156 Date Filed: 11/21/1995 Page: 7 
(where defendant conceded that a custodial encounter had not occurred, Miranda and its progeny did not apply and no constitutional violation occurred) . The district court ·found that the 

interview was noncustodial and we are satisfied that these findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Erekson came to the interview voluntarily and was free to leave at any time. No force 

or threat of force was used to compel Erekson's attendance at the 

interview or to keep him there once he had arrived. Erekson was 

permitted to tape record the interview without any objection from 

Howard. Erekson knew that he was not the 11 focus 11 of the interview 

and that he was not a suspect in any criminal investigations at 

the time of the interview. Under the circumstances of this interview, a reasonable person would believe he was free to leave. 

In fact, Erekson did freely leave the office when the interview 

was over. 

b. 

Even though Erekson's Miranda rights were not violated, his 

statements would nevertheless be inadmissible if they were made 

involuntarily. See United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 

(lOth Cir. 1987). When determining the admissibility of a 

defendant's statements, voluntariness depends upon an assessment 

of 11 the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, 11 including 

11 both the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the 

interrogation. 11 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 

(1973). When a defendant claims that his statements to investigators were involuntary and· thus improperly admitted at trial 11 it 

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is the duty of an appellate court . . . 'to examine the entire 

record and make an independent determination of the ultimate issue 

of voluntariness.'" Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 348 (quoting Davis v. 

North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 741-42 (1966)); Chalan, 812 F.2d at 

1307. 

We conclude, based upon our independent evaluation of the 

record and with appropriate deference to the district court's 

findings of fact, that Erekson's September 25, 1991, statements 

were voluntary. Several key facts lead us to this conclusion. 

First, Erekson was not forced or pressured to answer any questions 

he did not wish to answer. Erekson specifically declined to answer six questions stating, "I decline to answer that question on 

the grounds that it might tend to incriminate me;" Howard merely 

moved on to his next question without comment. (Brief for 

Defendant/Appellant, Exhibit B at 4-8). Second, the environment 

in which the interview took place was not coercive. There were no 

threats or intimidating gestures made to Erekson and Howard did 

not display his revolver in any manner. Third, the twenty minute 

interview was not excessively long. Finally, Erekson was not unusually susceptible to coercion because of his age, lack of education or intelligence. In sum, we agree with the district court 

that Erekson's September 25, 1991, statements were voluntarily and 

freely given. 

c. 

Erekson argues that the statements obtained from him during 

the September 25, 1991, interview constituted an illegal search in 

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violation of the Fourth Amendment because any consent obtained 

from him was obtained through deception. Although presented as an 

alleged Fourth Amendment violation, our review of the record reveals that Erekson's statements should be properly analyzed under 

a Fifth Amendment standard of conformity with Miranda and voluntariness. 

Although we have held that Erekson's Miranda rights were not 

violated and that his statements were freely and voluntarily 

given, his statements may be 11 involuntary11 and therefore inadmissible if they were induced by deceit or misrepresentations of the 

IRS agents. 

In order to prevail on this claim, a defendant 

must produce clear and convincing evidence that the 

agents affirmatively mislead him as to the true nature 

of their investigation. Defendant must also prove that 

the misinformation was material in his decision to speak 

with the agents. Simple failure to inform defendant 

that he was the subject of the investigation, or that 

the investigation was criminal in nature, does not 

amount to affirmative deceit unless defendant inquired 

about the nature of the investigation and the agents' 

failure to respond was intended to mislead. 

United States v. Serlin, 707 F.2d 953, 956 (7th Cir. 1983) (internal citations omitted) . 

Erekson's claim fails under this standard. The record indicates that Howard truthfully responded to Erekson's inquiry into 

the nature of the investigation. According to the transcript of 

the interview, Howard responded to Erekson's inquiry that Erekson 

was not the focus of the investigation at that time. In fact, the 

record reflects that Erekson did not become a focus of the investigation until two months after the interview and Erekson has 

produced no evidence to the contrary. 

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Since a true statement cannot be equated with affirmative 

deceit, Erekson failed to produce clear and convincing evidence of 

affirmative governmental deception. See Serlin,· 707 F.2d at 957 

(citing United States v. Mapp, 561 F.2d 685, 689 (7th Cir. 1977)). 

Therefore, his statements were voluntary and admissible. 

AFFIRMED. 

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