Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01304/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01304-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert J. Printz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued December 16, 2014

Decided March 9, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14‐1304

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ROBERT J. PRINTZ,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 11‐10095‐001

James E. Shadid,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Robert Printz pleaded guilty to wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and money

laundering, id. § 1957. He was sentenced to 121 months’ imprisonment and ordered to

pay $6.8 million in restitution. He makes just one claim on appeal: that the Constitution

required a jury to decide the amount of restitution. Not only has this court explicitly

rejected this argument, but Printz waived any conceivable jury entitlement by pleading

guilty and through his plea agreement. Thus, his claim is meritless, and we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 14-1304 Document: 39 Filed: 03/09/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14‐1304    Page 2

I

Printz was a grain farmer. In December 2008 he obtained a multimillion dollar

line of credit from CNH Capital to fund operating expenses. The line of credit was

secured by Printz’s harvests, which he promised to deliver only to grain elevators

approved by CNH. One such elevator was Towanda Grain Company Cooperative. By

October 2009, Printz had exhausted his borrowing authority with CNH, which refused

to make additional advances. In order to raise more cash Printz began delivering grain

to elevators that were not on CNH’s approved list and did not know about CNH’s lien.

Printz did not tell CNH about these deliveries or pass along the payments he received

from the unapproved elevators. Meanwhile, Printz also was delivering some of his

grain to Towanda. Somehow he persuaded Towanda’s manager, Timothy Boerma, to

disregard CNH’s lien and write checks payable to him alone. He also persuaded

Boerma to advance amounts significantly more than the value of the grain he delivered.

The checks Boerma wrote were drawn on Towanda’s own line of credit with

CoBank, ACB (an agricultural credit bank). CNH did not know about these deliveries to

Towanda. The scheme fell apart when Printz no longer could pay down his CNH credit

line or repay Towanda the funds Boerma had advanced. CNH, CoBank, and members

of the Towanda co‐op all lost money. Towanda fired Boerma, and the Department of

Agriculture suspended Towanda’s license and arranged its sale to another company.

Printz and Boerma were charged together with multiple crimes, most related to

the scheme described above. The government dismissed the remaining counts against

Printz in exchange for his pleas of guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of

money laundering. The parties’ written plea agreement includes this language:

The defendant understands and agrees that he may be ordered by the

sentencing judge to make restitution to any victim of the offenses,

including victims of those offenses which are uncharged or counts which

are dismissed pursuant to this plea agreement. The parties to this

agreement have not reached a determination on the issue of restitution.

The parties acknowledge that the Court may order restitution in whatever

amount it deems proper.

The plea agreement also includes Printz’s acknowledgment “that by pleading guilty” he

was surrendering his “right to trial by jury.” During the plea colloquy the district court

discussed the restitution paragraph of the plea agreement and made sure that Printz

Case: 14-1304 Document: 39 Filed: 03/09/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14‐1304    Page 3

understood it, in particular the language stating that the court would determine at

sentencing the amount of restitution if the parties had not agreed on a figure. The court

also ensured that Printz understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial by

pleading guilty.

A probation officer prepared a presentence report calculating a guidelines

imprisonment range of 188 to 235 months. The probation officer also recommended that

just over $7 million in restitution be imposed under the Mandatory Victims Restitution

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. The probation officer compiled a list of victims (principally

CNH, CoBank, and members of the Towanda co‐op) and detailed their individual

losses. Printz did not object to the probation officer’s calculation of restitution, and at

sentencing his lawyer even told the district court that the probation officer’s figure

($7,038,537) “appears to be correct.” He said nothing at all about how—or by

whom—total restitution was calculated. The district court imposed a below‐guidelines

prison sentence of 121 months and initially ordered Printz to pay the $7 million figure.

Twelve days later, though, the court amended the judgment because of a clerical error,

see FED. R. CRIM. P. 36, and reduced the restitution amount to $6,894,537.

II

As noted, Printz does not contest the amount of restitution imposed by the

district court. Instead he contends, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), that

restitution is a criminal penalty and thus the Sixth Amendment requires a jury to

determine the amount of restitution. He likens restitution to the statutorily authorized

fine of $50,000 per‐day analyzed in Southern Union Company v. United States, 132 S. Ct.

2344 (2012), which holds that criminal fines are subject to the rule of Apprendi, see id. at

2357. (Printz also suggests in passing that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was

necessary as well. We cannot tell whether these references are intended as a separate

argument about the standard of proof, but as we explain below, it makes no difference.)

As a fallback, Printz argues that if restitution is a civil penalty, then imposing it without

the benefits of a jury trial violates the Seventh Amendment.   

Printz has waived his right to have this claim heard, several times over. First, by

not objecting to the probation officer’s proposed calculation of $7 million and then

telling the district court that the figure appeared to be correct, Printz did more than

forfeit his constitutional claim; he waived it. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733

(1993) (holding that waiver is “the intentional relinquishment” of a known right); United

States v. Cook, 406 F.3d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that waiver is a “deliberate

Case: 14-1304 Document: 39 Filed: 03/09/2015 Pages: 4
No. 14‐1304    Page 4

decision not to present a ground for relief”). Moreover, Printz waived any right to a jury

determination of sentencing issues just by pleading guilty. See United States v. Parker,

245 F.3d 974, 976–77 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that defendant who pleaded guilty to

charged offense also surrendered right to jury trial on sentencing issues); United States v.

Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049, 1054 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). And even if this were not the case,

Printz expressly agreed, as part of his plea agreement, that the district court—not a

jury—would decide the amount of restitution. See United States v. Peterson, 268 F.3d 533,

534–35 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that defendant’s plea agreement gave district court

authority to decide all matters concerning restitution). And by affirmatively stating that

the probation officer’s $7,038,537 figure “appear[ed] to be correct,” Printz also waived

any objection to the standard of proof used by the district court (a preponderance,

presumably, but the court did not say). See United States v. Warneke, 310 F.3d 542, 550

(7th Cir. 2002) (“An admission is even better than a jury’s finding beyond a reasonable

doubt; it removes all contest from the case”); United States v. Longstreet, 567 F.3d 911, 929

(7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Warneke).   

Waivers aside, this court repeatedly has held, even after Southern Union, that

restitution is a civil penalty, not a criminal one, and so Apprendi does not apply. United

States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1216–17 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bonner, 522 F.3d

804, 807 (7th Cir. 2008). And we are not alone in this assessment: all other circuits that

have analyzed Southern Union agree that this decision does not extend Apprendi to

restitution. See United States v. Rogers, 580 F. App’x 347, 352 (6th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Rosbottom, 763 F.3d 408, 420 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Basile, 570 F. App’x 252,

258 (3d Cir. 2014); United States v. Green, 722 F.3d 1146, 1149–51 (9th Cir. 2013); United

States v. Day, 700 F.3d 713, 732 (4th Cir. 2012). Printz gains nothing by re‐casting his

point as one under the Seventh Amendment. In Bonner, which Printz does not

acknowledge, we explained that the Seventh Amendment applies to suits at common

law for damages, a class to which restitution orders do not belong. Bonner, 522 F.3d at

807; see   United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v.

Dubose, 146 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that enforcement provisions of

Mandatory Victim’s Restitution Act did not convert sentencing into an action at

common law within meaning of Seventh Amendment).   

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Case: 14-1304 Document: 39 Filed: 03/09/2015 Pages: 4