Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41653/USCOURTS-ca5-15-41653-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramiro Castaneda-Morales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-41653

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

RAMIRO CASTANEDA-MORALES, also known as Marco Vargas-Bustos,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:15-CR-660-1

Before JONES, WIENER, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Ramiro Castaneda-Morales appeals the 18-month 

within-guidelines sentence imposed following his guilty plea conviction of 

illegal reentry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1), (b)(2). The two issues raised on 

appeal were not raised in the district court, so we review for plain error. See 

United States v. Arviso-Mata, 442 F.3d 382, 384 (5th Cir. 2006). To 

demonstrate plain error, a defendant must show (1) an error or defect, i.e., 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 20, 2017

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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“some sort of deviation from a legal rule”; (2) that is clear or obvious; and that 

(3) affects his substantial rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 

135 (2009) (internal quotation marks, modification, and citation omitted). If 

the defendant makes such a showing, we have the discretion to correct the 

error, but we will do so only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. “In considering whether an error 

is clear or obvious we look to the state of the law at the time of appeal, and we 

must decide whether controlling circuit or Supreme Court precedent has 

reached the issue in question, or whether the legal question would be subject 

to reasonable dispute.” United States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 

2015) (internal quotation marks and footnoted citations omitted); see also 

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1130 (2013) (holding that the 

“requirement that an error be ‘plain’ means that lower court decisions that are 

questionable but not plainly wrong . . . fall outside” the scope of plain error).

First, Castaneda-Morales claims that the district court plainly erred in 

assigning criminal history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) to the sentences 

for three of his prior Oregon third-degree assault convictions, which 

necessarily required a finding that those convictions were for crimes of 

violence, as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and comment. (n.5) (Nov. 1, 2014). 

He contends that the only basis for characterizing his Oregon offenses as 

crimes of violence was § 4B1.2’s residual clause, which he insists is 

unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 

(2015). We have not addressed the constitutionality of § 4B1.2’s residual 

clause, so Castaneda-Morales cannot show error, if any, that is clear or obvious. 

See United States v. Howell, 838 F.3d 489, 492 (5th Cir. 2016) (declining to 

address the issue); Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1130; Fields, 777 F.3d at 802. 

Neither has he shown that the district court erred, clearly or otherwise, to the 

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extent it determined that the Oregon offenses were categorically crimes of 

violence, either as enumerated aggravated assault offenses or under the 

elements clause. See Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1130; Fields, 777 F.3d at 802.

Second, Castaneda-Morales asserts that the district court plainly erred 

by characterizing his prior Oregon convictions for third-degree assault as 

aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) for purposes of applying a 

sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) (Nov. 1, 2014) and for 

convicting and sentencing him under § 1326(b)(2). Relying primarily on 

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), he contends that the 

definition of a crime of violence in 8 U.S.C. § 16(b), which is incorporated by 

reference into § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s definition of an aggravated felony, is 

unconstitutionally vague on its face. Castaneda-Morales’s reasoning is 

foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670

(5th Cir. 2016) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (Sept. 29, 2016) (No. 16-6259). 

The recent grant of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court on the issue 

whether § 16(b) is unconstitutional in light of Johnson in Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 

S. Ct. 31 (2016), does not alter this analysis. We are bound by our own 

precedent unless and until that precedent is altered by a decision of the 

Supreme Court. See Wicker v. McCotter, 798 F.2d 155, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED.

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