Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01645/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01645-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joel Pulido-Trujillo
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Joel Pulido-Trujillo, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CR 05-0170-PHX-FJM

CV 07-1645-PHX-FJM (BPV) 

REPORT AND

RECOMMENDATION

On August 27, 2007, Joel Pulido-Trujillo, (“Movant”), presently confined in the

Rivers Correctional Institution, Winton, North Carolina, filed a pro se Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion") (Doc. #150). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court enter an order denying the Motion.

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files

and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ...."

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively

establish that Miranda-Martinez is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878

F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Hence, no hearing is required. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

On December 22, 2005, Pulido-Trujillo pled guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment,

Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or more of Cocaine.

(Doc. No. 92.)

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 The plea agreement contained a waiver of Pulido-Trujillo’s' appeal rights: The

defendant ...waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court’s entry of judment against

defendant; (2) any right to appeal the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title

18, United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to

collaterally attack defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States

Code, Section 2255, or any other collateral attack.” (Doc. No. 157, Ex. A, Plea

Agreement, at 4.) 

 On May 1, 2006, Pulido-Trujillo was sentenced to 120 months imprisonment,

followed by five years of supervised release. (Doc. No. 115.) 

On May 9, 2006, Pulido-Trujillo filed a Notice of Appeal. (Doc. No. 117.) The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal

in light of the valid appeal waiver. (Doc. No. 147.) 

Pulido-Trujillo next filed the present § 2255 action. (Doc. No. 150.) He raises

four grounds for relief: First, he alleges that he received ineffective assistance in

connection with plea agreement based on counsel’s failure to adequately investigate the

underlying facts and law and at sentencing by wrongly conceding Movant was

ineligible for the safety valve. Second, he alleges that his guilty plea was not voluntary

and intelligent. Third, he alleges that he was actually innocent of the crime to which he

pleaded guilty. Lastly, he alleges that the government breached the terms of the plea

agreement by opposing application of the safety valve to his sentence. (Id.) 

On December 18, 2007 the District Court called for an answer from the United

States Attorney. (Doc. No. 153.) The Government filed a Response to Defendant's

Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence on April 16, 2008, with exhibits A

through F attached. (Doc. No. 157.) Movant filed his reply on May 7, 2008. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a one

year period of limitations from the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes

final has been imposed on the filing of motions for collateral relief by prisoners in

federal custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Magistrate Judge finds the Motion timely filed.

B. Waiver

The Government asserts that the Court should deny the Motion because Movant

expressly waived his right to collaterally attack his sentence. Additionally, the

Government argues that Pulido-Trujillo’s claims that his plea was not knowing and

voluntary or that the United States breached the plea agreement are meritless and should

be denied. 

Movant has waived challenges to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has found that there are “strict standards for waiver

of constitutional rights.” United States v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th

Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume waiver from a silent record, and the Court

must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental

constitutional rights. Id. In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally

be enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory

right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v.

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). The only claims that cannot be waived are

claims that the plea or waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of

counsel rendered the plea or waiver involuntary. See Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d

864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a

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federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver);

Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that

counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea

bargain); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (declining to decide whether waiver

of all § 2255 rights included ineffective assistance of counsel claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver).

“Collateral attacks based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims that are

characterized as falling outside [the category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims

challenging the validity of the plea or the waiver] are waivable.” United States v.

Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001). See also Williams v. United States,

396 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2005) (joining the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and

Tenth Circuits in holding that “a valid sentence-appeal waiver, entered into voluntarily

and knowingly, pursuant to a plea agreement, precludes the defendant from attempting

to attack, in a collateral proceeding, the sentence through a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel during sentencing.”).

"'Generally, courts will enforce a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal if 1)

the language of the waiver encompasses the defendant's right to appeal on the grounds

claimed on appeal, and 2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made."' United

States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation

omitted). Although waiver of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal where the

sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, a waiver is valid

even if a defendant does not know the exact nature of what appellate issues might later

arise at the time the defendant enters the waiver. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. 

The Plea Agreement expressly waived Movant's right to collaterally attack the

conviction or sentence. (Doc. No. 157, Ex. A, at 4.) The Plea Agreement further stated

that Pulido-Trujillo agreed that his attorney had fully advised him of the nature of the

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charges to which he was entering a plea, that the guilty plea was not the result of force,

threats, assurances or promises, that his acceptance of the plea was voluntary, and that

he agreed to be bound by its provisions. (Id., at 8.) 

At Pulido-Trujillo’s' change of plea hearing, he was placed under oath and the

Court informed him of the importance of understanding the proceedings, and that at any

time if he didn’t understand or had a question about anything in the case, he was to

interrupt, and let the Magistrate Judge know. (Doc. No. 157, Ex. B., Change of Plea

Hearing, R/T 12/22/05, at 2.) Pulido-Trujillo responded that this was “fine.” (Id.) The

Court asked Pulido-Trujillo if someone had read the plea agreement to him in Spanish,

and if he had understood it. (Id. at 5.) Pulido responded affirmatively to both

questions. (Id.) Pulido-Trujillo signed the plea agreement, with his true name, in court.

(Id. at 4-5.)

The Court informed Pulido-Trujillo that if the District Court accepted the plea

agreement, then his conviction and sentence would be final, not appealable or subject

to attack. (Id. at 17.) The Court further informed Pulido-Trujillo of the constitutional

rights he would forfeit by pleading guilty. (Id. at 17-19.) The Court specifically

directed Pulido-Trujillo's attention to the waiver of appeal rights. (Id. at 19-20). PulidoTrujillo acknowledged that he understood all of the rights he was giving up by pleading

by pleading guilty. (Id. at 19-20) The plea colloquy indicates Pulido-Trujillo was

aware of the waiver provision in the plea agreement. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431

U.S. 63, 74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of

verity.”). 

Counsel for Movant has executed an affidavit in this case, avowing to the

following: 1) counsel discussed the case and nature of the charges, potential sentence,

applicability of the Sentencing Guidelines, the possibility of mandatory minimum

sentences, and issues related to the possession of a firearm in relation to narcotics

activity; 2) with the help of a Spanish interpreter counsel ensured that each and every

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provision of the plea agreement was read to Pulido-Trujillo; 3) counsel explained each

provision of the plea agreement to Pulido-Trujillo and obtained acknowledgment that

Pulido-Trujillo understood the plea agreement; 4) counsel did not instruct PulidoTrujillo to answer the Court’s questions untruthfully during the change of plea

proceedings, nor did he fool or trick Pulido-Trujillo into pleading guilty; and 5) counsel

discussed the factual basis for the plea with Pulido-Trujillo, and he indicated that he

understood and agreed with the facts to which he would plead guilty. (Doc. No. 157,

Ex. C,)

The court concludes Pulido-Trujillo was aware of the waiver provision in the

plea agreement when he pleaded guilty. The Plea Agreement signed by the Movant

demonstrates that Movant entered a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his

right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter pertaining to the prosecution or

sentence. The Magistrate Judge finds that the Movant knowingly, intelligently, and

voluntarily waived his right to collaterally attack his conviction or sentence. The

allegations in grounds one, three and four of Movant's § 2255 motion to vacate do not

pertain to the voluntariness of the plea agreement or the waiver. Movant's plea

agreement expressly waived his right to raise these issues by way of a direct appeal or

collateral attack and his guilty plea pursuant to the agreement was accepted as

knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made. Consequently, the court finds that

Movant waived the claims in grounds one, three and four of his § 2255 motion and

recommends that they be denied.

Out of an abundance of caution, to the extent that ground one raises an issue that

Pulido-Trujillo’s plea was not knowing and voluntary because of counsel’s ineffective

representation, the merits of ground one will be addressed alternatively as a claim that

Pulido-Trujillo’s plea was not knowing and voluntary due to the ineffective assistance

of counsel. 

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

The two-prong test for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel was set

forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To

prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a convicted defendant must show (1) that

counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. There is

a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. The Strickland test also applies to

challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart,

474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). A defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel

may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the

advice he received from counsel fell below the level of competence demanded of

attorneys in criminal cases. Id. at 56. To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test,

"the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Id.

at 59.

In ground one, Movant contends that his attorney was uninterested in advocating

for his cause, as evidenced by his acquiescence in the Government’s interpretation of

the discussion of the safety valve language in the plea agreement. Movant claims that

defense counsel took “no steps to ensure that the Government had a clear contractual

obligation to recommend the safety valve in petitioner’s case.” (Doc. No. 150, at 7.)

Movant further alleges that the “true facts to this case were never known to the court

because petitioner had been coerced into pleading guilty by his attorney by stating if

petitioner didn’t plead guilty that he would receive a lot of time, never once did counsel

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entertain the fact that petitioner was innocence [sp] of these charges and that petitioner

was pleading to a charge he didn’t know anything about.” (Id.) 

In ground two, Movant further alleges that he does not speak English, and is

quite limited in his ability to read and write Spanish, and did not understand what he

was pleading guilty to, but only followed the instructions of his retained counsel to

make the necessary recitations to the court in order for the court to accept his guilty

plea, “otherwise, as petitioner’s trial counsel had stated, the court would not accept the

guilty plea and petitioner would be found guilty and face a lot of time.” (Doc. No. 150

at 20.) Pulido-Trujillo further asserts that counsel never attempted to discuss the case

with him, nor did counsel make any attempts to explain the nature of the charges

against him, and that he went into the proceedings “deaf-dumb and blind.” (Id.)

Pulido-Trujillo further argues that the government violated the terms of the plea

agreement by actively opposing application of the “safety valve” despite PulidoTrujillo’s eligibility for application of the “safety valve.” 

Movant's claims are undermined by the change of plea hearing transcript.

Movant was asked if his lawyer went through the plea agreement and explained it to

him, and he responded "yes." (Doc. No. 157, Ex. B., Change of Plea Hearing, R/T

12/22/05, at 5.) The court asked Movant if his lawyer had answered all of his questions

about the plea agreement, and he responded “yes.” (Id. at 5-6.) The Court further

asked Movant if he believed that he understood the plea agreement, and he responded,

“yes.” (Id. at 6.) The Court asked Movant if he had been satisfied with his

representation so far; if Movant’s counsel had “done the things in [his] case that [he’s]

asked him to do”; and if he had enough time to talk with his lawyer about whether he

should plead guilty - Movant responded “yes” to each question (Id. at 7-8.) Movant

acknowledged that he understood the charges. (Id. at 8.) The Court further explained

to Movant that “If you have no convictions or a very insignificant conviction, if you did

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not use violence or threats of violence or possess a firearm or dangerous weapon during

this offense, if no one was injured during this offense, and if you were not an organizer

or leader in this crime, then you have an opportunity to get less than ten years.

Otherwise, the least you can get is ten years. Do you have any questions?” Movant

replied: “No. Everything’s fine.” (Id. at 13-14.) The Court asked counsel if he had

explained to his client that “unless he qualifies for the safety valve, he’s going to get the

ten years?” (Id. at 14.) Counsel responded “yes.” (Id.) 

Regarding the safety valve language placed into the plea agreement, which the

Court considered “superfluous,” the Court asked the Government if Movant qualified

for safety valve, “then you’re going to recommend the low sentence in the guideline

range?” (Id.) The Goverment responded “That’s correct.” (Id.) The Court asked

counsel if that was how he had explained it to his client, and counsel explained “yes”

because, that was how he understood the language, as did the Government, because it

was a recommendation, and not a stipulation. The Court responded “Okay. I guess I

would have written it differently, but that’s okay, as long as everybody understands.”

(Id. at 15.) The Court asked counsel if he understood; counsel responded “yes.” (Id.)

The Court asked counsel if his client understood, and counsel responded that “That’s

how I explained it to him.” (Id.) The Court explained to Movant that if he qualified for

safety valve, the government would recommend to the Court that he get the low number

in the sentencing range. (Id. at 15-16.) 

As to Movant’s claim that his counsel stated if he did not make the necessary

recitation, the Court would not accept the guilty plea, and he would be found guilty and

face a lot of time; even if his lawyer said this, it does not show that Movant was

intimidated into accepting the plea. When asked directly if anyone threatened him or

in any way forced him to enter the plea agreement, Movant answered "no." (Doc. No.

157, Ex. B. at 20.) Additionally, Movant fails to even allege that he would not have

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entered the plea agreement if his lawyer had not advised him that way. For these

reasons, Movant has failed to show that his lawyer provided ineffective assistance of

counsel by “coercing, tricking, or inducing him to plead guilty,”and has failed to

establish prejudice.

At the time of sentencing, Pulido-Trujillo did not raise any claim of

involuntariness of his plea, neither did he raise any factual objection to the presentence

report’s recommendation that he was ineligible for the “safety valve” provision based

upon the presence of a firearm at the drug stash house for which he possessed house

keys at the time of his arrest. (See Doc. No. 157, Ex. D., Sentencing Transcript, R/T

5/1/2006) 

Thus, the evidence fails to support Movant's claim that counsel was ineffective

by “acquiescing” in the Government’s interpretation of the discussion of the safety

valve language in the plea agreement. It is clear from the record that the agreement was

that the Government would recommend the low end of the range if Movant were

“safety valve” eligible. The transcript indicates that all parties, including Movant

understood this. 

The plea agreement also belies that fact that Movant claims he was pleading to

a charge he did not know anything about. It is clear from the transcript that PulidoTrujillo understood the charges, and intended to plead guilty. (Doc. No. 157, Ex. B. at

8.) 

Movant’s claim that his inability to speak English, or read and write Spanish, and

that he only followed the instructions of his counsel is also not supported by the

evidence. Both his lawyer and the court advised Movant of the potential consequences

of his guilty plea. The Court adequately ascertained that Movant’s plea was knowingly,

voluntarily, and intelligently made. Movant has failed to demonstrate that his attorney

provided ineffective assistance in this regard.

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For the above reasons, the court finds that Movant's allegations of ineffective

assistance of counsel are unsupported by the record. Accordingly, the court will

recommend that Movant's allegations in grounds one and two of his motion to vacate

be denied.

RECOMMENDATION

After careful consideration of the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence and all papers filed in this action, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court deny Movant's motion.

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived.

If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case numbers: CR 05-

170-PHX-FJM and CV 07-1645-PHX-FJM. 

DATED this 21st day of September, 2009.

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