Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00707/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00707-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeanie Bernal
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD FRANK BERNAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:13-cv-00707-BAM

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE PARTY

(Doc. 17)

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S 

APPLICATION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES 

(Doc. 18)

Plaintiff Richard Frank Bernal (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint challenging the denial of his 

claim for supplemental security income on May 14, 2015. (Doc. 1.) On March 6, 2015, the Court 

issued an order reversing the ALJ’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. (Doc. 

15.) Judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor on the same date. (Doc. 16.) 

Plaintiff now seeks attorney’s fees pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. § 

2412(d)) (“EAJA”) in the amount of $6,715.50.

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(Doc. 18.) The Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) objects to Plaintiff’s request, contending that Plaintiff is not entitled to fees and 

that the amount requested is excessive and unreasonable. (Doc. 21.) For the reasons that follow, the 

Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s application.

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1 On May 6, 2015, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff in this action. Counsel reportedly learned 

that Plaintiff Richard Bernal passed away on December 6, 2014, and counsel now requests to substitute Plaintiff’s wife, 

Jeanie Bernal, in his stead. (Doc. 17.) The Commissioner of Social Security has not opposed the request. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s motion to substitute party is GRANTED. Jeanie Bernal o/b/o Richard Frank Bernal is substituted in place of 

Richard Frank Bernal. 

Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 1 of 10
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Discussion

A. Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a 

prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to 

any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action 

(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of 

agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction 

of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was 

substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

When a claimant wins a remand based on an incorrect decision by the Commissioner (a 

“sentence-four” remand), attorneys’ fees are to be awarded unless the Commissioner shows that she 

was “substantially justified” in her position. Lewis v. Barnhart, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 

2002). Here, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. The Commissioner 

contends, however, that the government’s position was substantially justified.

The EAJA does not define “substantial justification.” The Supreme Court, however, has 

defined it to mean “justified in substance or in the main” or “to a degree that could satisfy a 

reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). “A position can be justified 

even though it is not correct, and we believe it can be substantially (i.e., for the most part) justified if 

a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.” Id. at 

566 n. 2. The Seventh Circuit restated this standard as “whether the agency had a rational ground for 

thinking it had a rational ground for its action.” Kolman v. Shalala, 39 F.3d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1994). 

A. The ALJ’s Step Four Determination Lacked Substantial Justification

At step four of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the 

residual functional capacity to perform his past relevant work as a hand packager. AR 16. In 

reaching this determination, the ALJ found as follows:

The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a hand packager. This 

work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the 

claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 416.965). [¶] Pursuant to the 

vocational expert’s testimony comparing the claimant’s residual functional capacity with 

the physical and mental demands of this work, the undersigned finds that the claimant is 

able to perform it as actually performed. 

Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 2 of 10
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AR 16. The Commissioner did not defend this position. 

Plaintiff challenged the ALJ’s decision and argued that the record failed to establish that 

Plaintiff performed work as a hand packager at substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) levels. (Doc. 13 

at 6.) The Court agreed and concluded that the ALJ failed to make specific factual findings to 

support the conclusion that Plaintiff could perform his past relevant work as a hand packager. See 

Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Court does not find that that ALJ had substantial justification for his position. As an 

initial matter, and noted by the Court, the ALJ failed to make any findings with respect to Plaintiff’s 

past relevant work in his decision denying benefits. AR 16. Further, the ALJ did not elicit 

clarifying testimony from Plaintiff sufficient for the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff’s work as a 

hand packer constituted SGA. Further, the record itself was unclear as to whether Plaintiff’s 

earnings as a hand packer were presumptively performed at SGA levels. Although the ALJ appeared 

to rely on the testimony of the Vocational Expert (“VE”), that testimony was speculative and 

undermined by conflicting reports in the record, including the Summary Earnings Query. AR 55,

139, 151-52. 

Defendant now argues that the record demonstrates Plaintiff’s earnings in 2005 created a 

presumption that his work as a hand packer constituted substantial gainful activity. Defendant also 

argues that it was reasonable for the ALJ to rely on the VE’s testimony to support the step four 

finding that Plaintiff’s previous work as a hand packager constituted past relevant work. See, e.g., 

Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005). However, the ALJ did not make any 

express findings in reliance on Plaintiff’s earnings or the VE’s testimony to support the 

determination that Plaintiff’s hand packer work was performed at substantial gainful activity levels 

or constituted past relevant work. Just as the Commissioner cannot rely on post-hoc rationalization

to defend an ALJ’s finding of nondisability, she may not do so to show that the government’s 

position was substantially justified. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). The ALJ’s position with respect to Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a hand packer was not 

substantially justified.

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Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 3 of 10
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C. The “Position of the United States” Was Not Substantially Justified

In deciding whether the “position of the United States” was justified, “district courts should 

focus on whether the government’s position on the particular issue on which the claimant earned 

remand was substantially justified.” Hardisty v. Astrue, 592 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2010); see

Flores v. Shalala, 49 F.3d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

Here, in defending the ALJ’s decision, the Commissioner did not respond to Plaintiff’s 

argument related to the step four finding that Plaintiff’s previous work as a hand packer constituted 

past relevant work. Instead, the Commissioner argued that any error at step four was harmless 

because Plaintiff would not be disabled under the medical-vocational guidelines at step five of the 

sequential evaluation. (Doc. 14 at 12.) Although the Commissioner correctly asserts that harmless 

error principles apply in Social Security cases, this is not sufficient to demonstrate that the position 

of the United States was substantially justified. In fact, the Court rejected the Commissioner’s 

harmless error argument because the ALJ did not make any determination at step five in the first 

instance. (Doc. 15 at 12; AR 16.) Accordingly, the Court finds that the position of the United States 

was unjustified, and Plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable fees.

D. Plaintiff’s Fee Request is Reasonable

As the Court has determined that Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorney’s fees for the work 

performed, the Court must next determine what constitutes a reasonable award of attorneys’ fees. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A); Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1401 (9th Cir. 1992) (district

court has an independent duty to review plaintiff’s fee request to determine its reasonableness).

1. Legal Standard

Under the EAJA, attorneys’ fees must be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); PerezArellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2002). The applicant bears the burden of 

demonstrating the reasonableness of the request. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984). The 

Ninth Circuit has held that the lodestar method should be used to determine what constitutes a 

reasonable fee under the EAJA. See Costa v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 690 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th 

Cir. 2012). To calculate the lodestar amount, the court multiplies the number of hours reasonably 

Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 4 of 10
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expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. The request should exclude hours that are 

excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. Id.

2. Hourly Rates

The EAJA provides that fee awards should be “based upon prevailing market rates for the 

kind and quality of the services furnished,” and that “attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of 

$125 per hour unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor ... 

justifies a higher fee.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). Although the cost-of-living increase can be 

calculated, the Ninth Circuit maintains a list of the maximum hourly rates for each year. See

Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2005); http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov.

Here, Plaintiff requests a rate of $185.00 per hour for work performed in 2013, 2014 and 

2015, which is less than the published statutory maximum rates under EAJA adjusted for cost-ofliving in those years. The Court finds the Plaintiff’s request for a cost of living adjustment to be 

reasonable in light of the kind and quality of services furnished, as well as the lack of argument 

suggesting otherwise by Defendant. The Court applies the requested rate of $185.00. 

3. Number of Hours

Plaintiff seeks compensation for a total of 36.3 attorney hours, or $6,715.50. (Doc. 18 at 2.) 

Counsel details these hours and activities as follows:

Date Activity Description Time Spent

3.4.13 Receipt and review of Appeals Council decision; Review of file; 

conference w client re appeal to district court.

2.0

5.14.13 Preparation of complaint. n/c

12.23.13 Receipt and preliminary review of the Administrative Transcript. 5.2

3.19.14 Review of file, issue identification. 8.0

3.21.152Legal Research 6.5

3.25.14 First draft of brief. 7.0

3.29.14 Draft and edit brief. 5.0

 

2 The Court presumes counsel intended the time entries to be in date order. Therefore, the Court construes this entry as 

occurring on 3.21.14. 

Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 5 of 10
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3.31.14 Final edit; preparation of Plaintiff’s brief and filing; Correspondence to 

the claimant re same.

1.1

4.29.14 Receipt and review of Defendant’s Brief. 1.0

3.6.15 Receipt and review of Memorandum Order remanding case: Telephone 

conference with client re: same

.5

3.8.15 Preparation of Plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees under the EAJA n/c

TOTAL 36.3

(Doc. 18-1.) 

Defendant now argues that the hours claimed are not reasonable and should be reduced by 

13.2 hours. First, Defendant argues that a reduction of at least 5.2 hours is appropriate for work 

completed on December 23, 2013 reviewing the administrative record because counsel subsequently 

spent 8.0 hours reviewing the file and identifying issues on March 19, 2014. Defendant claims that 

this is duplicative or otherwise unnecessary work. A reasonable fee request does not include hours 

that are “excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434

(1983). 

Contrary to the Commissioner’s assertion, it is not evident that Plaintiff’s counsel conducted

unnecessary or duplicative work. According to the record, counsel’s work on December 23, 2013, 

corresponds with preparation of the confidential letter brief, while counsel’s work on March 19, 

2014, corresponds with preparation of the opening brief filed in this action. Thus, hours expended 

on those dates were necessary to the prosecution of this action. Accordingly, the Court does not find

it appropriate to reduce the hours expended on December 23, 2013. 

Defendant next argues that a reduction of at least 8 hours is appropriate because Plaintiff’s 

opening brief included contentions about the ALJ’s residual functional capacity and credibility 

findings that the Court abstained from considering. To support this argument, Defendant cites 

Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1077, and contends that the EAJA’s fee shifting provisions do not apply to 

issues that the reviewing court left unaddressed. 

In Hardisty, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of an EAJA fee petition. In affirming the 

denial, the Ninth Circuit held that the provisions of the fee-shifting statute do not extent fee awards 

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to “positions of the United States challenged by the claimant but unaddressed by the reviewing 

court.” Hardisty, 529 F.3d at 1077. The Ninth Circuit based the decision, in part, on the Supreme 

Court’s command “that a request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major litigation.” 

Id. at 1077–1078 (citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that requiring the district court to 

determine whether the government’s position on unadjudicated issues was substantially justified 

would put the court “in the position of conducting essentially de novo review of the entire case for 

purposes of the fee litigation, contrary to the command against ‘spawn[ing] a second litigation’ of 

the Supreme Court and to the far more streamlined ‘substantial justification’ review envisioned by 

the EAJA itself.” Id. at 1078 (internal citations omitted).

The Court declines to extend Hardisty to this action. The district court in Hardisty found that 

the government’s position was substantially justified on the issue upon which remand was based, 

and the issue was therefore not a basis for EAJA fee-shifting. Hardisty, 592 F.3d at 1075. Here, 

Defendant’s position was not substantially justified on the issue upon which remand was based. 

Moreover, extending Hardisty to the reasonableness analysis is contrary to Supreme Court 

precedent and unfeasible. In Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, the Supreme Court explained that an attorney 

may not be entitled to an award for work on “distinctly different claims for relief that are based on 

different facts and legal theories.” The Hensley court recognized, however, that some cases present 

a single claim for relief that involves a common core of facts and is based on related legal theories:

Much of counsel's time will be devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it 

difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis. Such a lawsuit cannot 

be viewed as a series of discrete claims. Instead the district court should focus on the 

significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours 

reasonably expended on the litigation.

Where a plaintiff has obtained excellent results, his attorney should recover a fully 

compensatory fee. Normally this will encompass all hours reasonably expended on the 

litigation . . . 

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435. Social Security appeals have been likened to a single claim for relief based 

on one set of facts and involving related legal theories. See, e.g., Trefcer v. Colvin, No. 2:11-cvCase 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 7 of 10
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1436 AC, 2013 WL 6623823, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2013); Singmoungthong v. Astrue, No. 

1:09cv1328 DLB, 2011 WL 2746711, *8 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 13, 2011).

Defendant invites this Court to reduce the award by 8 hours to account for the time not

dedicated to briefing the issue upon which remand was based. Doing so in the absence of time 

records itemized by specific arguments, or engaging in any other method for determining the amount 

of time spent on a single argument, amounts to speculation. 

For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees shall be granted.

E. Proper Payee Under the EAJA

The Commissioner contends that any award under EAJA must be made payable to Plaintiff, 

rather than Plaintiff’s counsel. (Doc. 21 at 9.) Plaintiff does not address this issue, but indicates that 

there has been an assignment to counsel of his rights to any EAJA fee. (Doc. 18 at 2 and Ex. B.) 

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a Section 2412(d) fee award is payable to the litigant. 

Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 130 S.Ct. 2521, 177 L.Ed.2d 91, (2010). Under Ratliff, a plaintiff is 

normally awarded the fees, subject to any offset for applicable government debts. However, after 

Ratliff, courts in this district have ordered payment of EAJA fees directly to the plaintiff’s counsel 

pursuant to the plaintiff’s assignment of EAJA fees in a fee agreement, provided that the plaintiff has 

no debt that requires offset. See, e.g., Blackwell v. Astrue, No. CIV 08–1454 EFB, 2011 WL 

1077765, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Mar.21, 2011); Dorrell v. Astrue, No. CIV 09–0112 EFB, 2011 WL 

976484, at *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Mar.17, 2011); Calderon v. Astrue, No. 1:08–cv–01015 GSA, 2010 WL 

4295583, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Oct.22, 2010).

Other courts have refused to award EAJA fees directly payable to the plaintiff's counsel, 

noting, however, that the government could, after subtracting any offset, waive the requirements of 

the Assignment of Claims Act and make payment directly to the plaintiff's counsel. See Matthews v. 

Astrue, No. CIV 11–290–TUC–LAB, 2013 WL 500955, at * 1 (D. Ariz. Feb. 11, 2013); see also 

Smith v. Astrue, No. C–10–4814 PJH, 2012 WL 3114595, at * 6 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 31, 2012) (“Based 

on Ratliff and the Supreme Court's interpretation of EAJA, Smith is considered the prevailing party 

in the action before this court. Accordingly, Smith is entitled to direct payment of the EAJA award 

and not Sackett.”)

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In this case, Plaintiff has assigned the right to receive EAJA fees to his attorney. However, 

the Commissioner has not ascertained whether Plaintiff owes a federal debt. Under these factual 

circumstances, the Court concludes that the EAJA fee award shall be made payable to Plaintiff. 

However, if Plaintiff does not owe a government debt, this order shall not be construed to preclude 

the payment directly to Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to Plaintiff's assignment should the government 

waive the requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

1:12-cv-1715 BAM, 2014 WL 6833596, *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2014). 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

As a prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under EAJA because 

the ALJ’s decision and the Commissioner’s position were not substantially justified. Plaintiff is 

entitled to an award of $6,715.50, which represents compensation for 36.3 attorney hours at $185.00 

per hour. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to substitute party, filed on May 6, 2015, is GRANTED;

2. Jeanie Bernal o/b/o Richard Frank Bernal is substituted in place of Richard Frank Bernal;

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to update the caption in this matter to reflect the 

substitution; 

4. Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees, filed on June 4, 2015, is GRANTED in the amount 

of $6,715.50; 

5. This amount shall be paid to Plaintiff pursuant to Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010); 

and 

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6. If the government determines that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt and waives the 

requirements of the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C § 3727, the fee award shall be made 

payable to Plaintiff’s counsel pursuant to Plaintiff’s assignment of interest in the fee 

award. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 10, 2015 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-00707-BAM Document 25 Filed 11/10/15 Page 10 of 10