Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02735/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02735-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Gonzales
Defendant
Harley G. Lappin
Defendant
David Carroll Stephenson
Plaintiff

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 A “writ of praecipe” is a writ that is sought “by the party to whom lands are to be

conveyed by fine, the foundation of which is a supposed agreement or covenant that the one shall

convey the land to the other.” Black’s Law’s Dictionary 1611 (6th ed. 1990). 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID CARROLL STEPHENSON,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-2735 LKK EFB PS

vs.

HARLEY G. LAPPIN, et al., ORDER AND FINDINGS

& RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendants.

 /

This action, in which plaintiff is proceeding pro se, was referred to this court under Local

Rule 72-302(c)(21), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). By this order and findings and

recommendations, the court addresses several pending documents filed by plaintiff. 

First, plaintiff filed what he styles as a “writ of praecipe” on March 26, 2007, in which he

demands that the Clerk of Court enter default as to both defendants Alberto R. Gonzales and

Harley G. Lappin.1

 In the “writ,” plaintiff demands that the Clerk enter an “order of default”

against the defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Obviously, the relief requested by the

writ has no relation to a “writ of praecipe” as it is defined above. Construing the writ as a

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 It appears from the proof of service filed with plaintiff’s many requests for entry of

default judgment, that personal service may have been made on defendant Lappin at a residential

address in Annapolis, Maryland (3102 Ervin Court), on January 7, 2007. Assuming it was,

plaintiff has still failed to effect service as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). If plaintiff

attempts to perfect service, he must do so in accordance with Rule 4(i), and should also serve the

most recent version of the complaint. Bullen v. De Bretteville, 239 F.2d 824, 833 (9th Cir. 1956)

(“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as

non-existent. . . .Once amended, the original no longer performs any function as a pleading.”). 

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renewed request by plaintiff for the court to enter default against both defendants, it is denied as

discussed herein.

In addition to the “writ of praecipe,” plaintiff has filed the following documents

concerning his request that default be entered against defendant Harley G. Lappin: a Notice of

Default, filed February 1, 2007; a Demand for Default Judgment, filed February 1, 2007; an

affidavit in support of the “notice” and “demand;” and, an Amended Notice of Default and an

amended affidavit in support thereof, both filed on February 7, 2007. 

The court addresses each in turn. In both the notice of default and demand for default

judgment filed on February 1, 2007, plaintiff requests that default be entered against defendant

Lappin pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a) for his failure to answer or otherwise respond to either

the original complaint filed on December 5, 2006, or the amended complaint filed on January 8,

2007. In support of his request, plaintiff submits a “certificate of service” purporting to show

that a copy of the First Amended Complaint was served on defendant Lappin on January 9, 2007. 

Plaintiff also attaches a proof of service purporting to show that defendant Lappin was

personally served with the original complaint and summons on January 7, 2007.2

 Plaintiff also

attaches a declaration of non-service of summons, sworn to by the process server, showing that

an officer at the Federal Bureau of Prisons refused to allow service on December 18, 2006. The

documents filed on February 1, 2007, with the demand for default judgment and affidavit in

support thereof, provide similar evidence regarding plaintiff’s attempts to serve defendant

Lappin. 

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Defendant Lappin is the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. As an officer and

employee of the United States, service of process on defendant Lappin is governed by Fed. R.

Civ. P. 4(i).

Based on the documents filed by plaintiff with this court, it appears that plaintiff failed to

effect service of process on defendant Lappin as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). Pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i): 

Service on an officer or employee of the United States sued in an individual

capacity for acts or omissions occurring in connection with the performance of

duties on behalf of the United States – whether or not the officer or employee is

sued also in an official capacity – is effected by serving the United States in the

manner prescribed by Rule 4(i)(1) and by serving the officer or employee in the

manner prescribed by Rule 4(e) . . . .

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B). 

Based on a cursory review of plaintiff’s amended complaint, it appears that he seeks to

sue both Alberto R. Gonzales and Harley G. Lappin in their individual capacities for acts or

omissions that allegedly occurred in connection with the performance of their duties on behalf of

the Untied States. Accordingly, Rule 4(i) applies. Even if plaintiff means to sue defendants

Gonzales and Lappin in their official capacities, he must effect service of process as set forth in

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(A). 

Under the relevant provisions of Rule 4(i)(2)(B), service of process must be effected by: 

(1) delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the United States Attorney for the district

in which the action is brought; (2) sending a copy of the summons and complaint by registered or

certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States; and (3) effecting personal service

against the defendant(s) as required under California law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B); 4(e). 

Again, even if plaintiff means to sue defendants in their official capacities, plaintiff must satisfy

those first two requirements, and must also send a copy of the summons and complaint by

registered or certified mail to the officer or employee. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(A). 

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 “It is axiomatic that service of process must be effective under the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure before a default or a default judgment may be entered against a defendant.” Maryland

State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353, 354 (D. Md. 1996). Nothing that plaintiff has

filed with this court – including the more recent “amended notice of default” and affidavit in

support thereof, both filed on February 2, 2007 – demonstrates that service of process was

properly effected on defendant Lappin. Accordingly, plaintiff’s requests for entry of default

against defendant Lappin are denied. Based on the foregoing, plaintiff’s “demand for default

judgment” made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b), filed February 1, 2007, should also be denied. 

The court now turns to plaintiff’s requests for entry of default as to defendant Gonzales. 

To the extent the “writ of praecipe” renews plaintiff’s request for entry of default against

defendant Gonzales, the court denies that request as well. On February 1, 2007, plaintiff filed

the “demand for default judgment” discussed above. That “demand” also seeks entry of default

judgment against defendant Gonzales. The documents attached to that demand include a proof

of service showing that a clerical employee in the Attorney General’s office was served with the

summons and a copy of the original complaint on December 18, 2006. Again, despite this proof

of service, plaintiff has failed to establish that he effected service of process on Attorney General

Alberto Gonzales – an officer of the United States – as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i). 

On February 2, 2007, plaintiff’s first request for default was denied as premature. The

current request for entry of default pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), against defendant Gonzales

is not proper at the present time, and is also denied. Maryland State Firemen’s Ass’n, 166

F.R.D. at 354 (service of process must be effective under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

before a default or a default judgment may be entered against a defendant). Entry of a default

under Rule 55(a) is a prerequisite to entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b). Ramada

Franchise Sys. v. Baroda Enters., LLC, 220 F.R.D. 303, 305 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Because

plaintiff has not established default as to either defendant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), as

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discussed above, his “demand for default judgment” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) should be

denied. 

In conclusion, IT IS ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s “writ of praecipe” filed on March 26, 2007, is denied; 

2. Plaintiff’s demand for a hearing on his “demand for default judgment” filed February

1, 2007, is denied. 

3. Plaintiff’s “demand for entry of default” against defendant Harley G. Lappin, filed

February 1, 2007, is denied; and, 

4. Plaintiff’s “amended demand for entry of default” as to defendant Harley G. Lappin is

denied. 

Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiff’s “demand for default judgment”

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) against both defendants, filed February 1, 2007, be denied. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within ten (10)

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections

shall be served and filed within ten (10) days after service of the objections. The parties are

advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the

District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst,

951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 13, 2007.

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