Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02379/USCOURTS-azd-2_09-cv-02379-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anasazi Foundation
Defendant
Elizabeth Marie Hogan
Plaintiff

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Plaintiff has filed a Complaint, a First Amended Complaint, and a Third Amended

Complaint, but no Second Amended Complaint. (Docs. 1, 17, 24.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Elizabeth Marie Hogan, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Anasazi Foundation, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV-09-02379-PHX-NVW

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint1

by Defendant Anasazi Foundation (“Anasazi”) (Doc. 27). 

I. Legal Standard

On a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), all allegations of material

fact are assumed to be true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). To avoid dismissal, a

complaint must contain “only enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on

its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). 

However, the principle that a court accepts as true all of the allegations in a

complaint does not apply to legal conclusions or conclusory factual allegations. Id. at

1949, 1951. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 1949. “A plaintiff’s obligation to provide

the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555. 

II. Analysis

Hogan’s response to Anasazi’s motion to dismiss her Third Amended Complaint is

that she has corrected the deficiencies identified in the Court’s June 23, 2010 Order, i.e.,

her failure to allege a prima facie case of gender-based disparate treatment and

enforcement of the Anasazi policy requiring trail walkers to “refrain from sexual

intimacies outside of marriage.” She contends she has cured these deficiencies by adding

or slightly editing the following conclusory allegations:

43. On information and belief, DEFENDANT does not ask similarly

situated male applicants for employment about their marital status

prior to extending an offer of employment.

44. On information and belief, DEFENDANT does not require similarly

situated male applicants for employment to agree to abide by a

celibacy policy prior to extending an offer of employment.

45. On information and belief, DEFENDANT does not require similarly

situated male applicants for employment to provide information

about their marital status.

46. On information and belief, DEFENDANT does not enforce its

celibacy policy against its male employees, whether married or

unmarried.

47. DEFENDANT violated Title VII because the plaintiff was in the

protected group (FEMALE), was qualified to do the work, was doing

the work in a satisfactory manner, was terminated, was treated less

favorably than [sic.] situated employees who were male, and

DEFENDANT was motivated by illegal discrimination because of

sex.

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48. DEFENDANT violated Title VII because the plaintiff was in the

protected group (FEMALE), was qualified to do the work, was

denied employment, was treated less favorably than [sic.] situated

applicants for employment who were male, and DEFENDANT was

motivated by illegal discrimination because of sex. 

49. DEFENDANT violated Title VII by asking about PLAINTIFF’s

marital status, contrary to EEOC Guidelines which specifically

forbid any inquiry into an applicant’s sex, marital status, pregnancy,

medical history of pregnancy, future child bearing plans, number

and/or ages of children or dependents, provisions for child care,

abortions, birth control, ability to reproduce, and name or address of

spouse of children.

(Doc. 24) The Third Amended Complaint does not include any factual allegations

different from or additional to those in the previous complaint. It alleges only bare

conclusions and no factual allegations that demonstrate favorable treatment was given to

male employment applicants or male employees. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.”). 

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Hogan received the Anasazi policy

statement requiring trail walkers to “refrain from sexual intimacies outside of marriage”

in her pre-hire training packet. It further alleges that Mr. Howard told her the policy

“specifically meant that until a trail walker is married, they are not to engage in sexual

intimacies.” It does not allege that Mr. Howard told her, indicated, suggested, or implied

that the policy applied, or was enforced against, only female employees. It alleges that

Mr. Merchant told Hogan “that Anasazi had hired trail walkers before who had been open

about their homosexual orientation,” but it does not allege that Mr. Merchant indicated

that the openly homosexual trail walkers included only males. It also alleges that Hogan

asked Mr. Merchant whether Anasazi would change its policy to recognize same-sex

marriages or committed relationships—not that she asked Mr. Merchant whether Anasazi

would discontinue its disparate, gender-based enforcement of the policy.

Further, the Third Amended Complaint alleges that on the second day of training,

not on the first day, Mr. Howard asked Hogan about the ring on her finger, not

specifically about her marital status. It further alleges that Hogan volunteered the

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information that she was married to a woman. It does not allege that Anasazi asked

Hogan about her marital status, asked other women at the training about their marital

status, or did not ask men at the training about their marital status.

In spite of Hogan’s insistence she is alleging discrimination based on gender, not

sexual orientation, the Third Amended Complaint continues to allege discrimination

based on sexual orientation:

39. It is not stated anywhere in the pre-employment packet, job

requirements, or at the Anasazi website that sexual orientation is a

condition of employment. Up until the very moment PLAINTIFF

stated plaintiff’s partner’s gender to Mr. Howard, PLAINTIFF had

been considered a favorable candidate en route to becoming a trail

walker.

. . . .

42. PLAINTIFF was told that PLAINTIFF will not be employed because

PLAINTIFF did not possess a qualification that was not disclosed

when PLAINTIFF applied for this position. 

(Doc. 24)

 Moreover, the Third Amended Complaint does not allege that Hogan was actually

employed by Anasazi, only that she was qualified to be hired and was invited to attend

pre-hire training. Therefore, she was not “terminated” as summarily alleged in paragraph

47. Further, the Third Amended Complaint alleges she was told that she would remain

eligible for employment if she chose to comply with the Anasazi policy, and Hogan

agrees that the policy on its face does not discriminate on the basis of gender, but

apparently she did not choose to comply with the policy. Thus, she was not “denied

employment” as alleged in paragraph 48.

Because Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint fails to meet pleading requirements

under Twombly, it will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted.

IV. Leave to Amend

Leave to amend should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(a)(2). But, “[l]eave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint would

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cause the opposing party undue prejudice . . . or creates undue delay.” Ascon

Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). The district court’s

discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint is “especially broad” where the plaintiff

already has had one or more opportunities to amend her complaint. Id. at 1161. “Leave

to amend need not be given if a complaint, as amended, is subject to dismissal.” Moore,

885 F.2d at 538. Hogan already has amended her complaint twice without success. 

Further opportunity to amend would cause Anasazi undue prejudice and likely would be

futile. Therefore, Hogan will not be granted further leave to amend.

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Complaint (Doc. 27) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 24)

is dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk to enter judgment dismissing this

action with prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The

Clerk shall terminate this case.

DATED this 17th day of September, 2010.

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