Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04738/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04738-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Ibanga
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-4738

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL IBANGA,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District

Judge. (2:04-cr-00227-WDK)

Argued: March 21, 2008 Decided: April 1, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges, and C. Arlen BEAM,

Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ARGUED: Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Trey Robert Kelleter,

VANDEVENTER & BLACK, L.L.P., Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Alexandria,

Virginia, Laura M. Everhart, Assistant United States Attorney,

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for

Appellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 1 of 8
2

PER CURIAM:

This appeal by the government arises out of a drug

trafficking and money laundering prosecution of a group of

individuals that included Michael Ibanga. The jury convicted

Ibanga of conspiracy to launder money and acquitted him of the drug

trafficking charges. Nonetheless, the district court found at

sentencing that the government had proven by a preponderance of the

evidence that Ibanga had trafficked in 124.03 grams of

methamphetamine (meth). Although acquitted conduct proven by a

preponderance of the evidence may be taken into account in

sentencing, the district court sentenced Ibanga to a prison term

that did not reflect any drug trafficking. The government appeals

Ibanga’s sentence, arguing that the district court contravened 18

U.S.C. § 3661 by categorically refusing to consider acquitted

conduct -- Ibanga’s drug trafficking found by the court -- in

determining his sentence. Because it appears that the district

court applied a standard that would categorically exclude

consideration of acquitted conduct in every case, we vacate

Ibanga’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

I.

On January 27, 2005, a grand jury sitting in Norfolk,

Virginia, returned a superseding indictment charging Ibanga, among

others, with conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 2 of 8
3

distribute 50 grams or more of meth and 500 grams or more of a

substance containing meth (count 1); conspiring to conduct

financial transactions involving the proceeds of meth distribution

(count 2); conducting a financial transaction involving the

proceeds of an unlawful activity (count 19); distribution of

approximately 20.1 grams of meth (count 28); aiding and abetting

the possession of approximately one kilogram of a substance

containing meth with intent to distribute (count 36); and aiding

and abetting the possession of approximately 500 grams of a

substance containing meth with intent to distribute (count 48).

After a jury trial Ibanga was convicted of conspiracy to launder

money (count 2) and acquitted on all other counts. 

Under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 the base offense level for a money

laundering conviction is established by using the underlying

offense that produced the laundered funds if the defendant

committed the underlying offense. Here, the underlying offense was

drug trafficking, but the jury acquitted Ibanga on the drug

trafficking counts. Nevertheless, acquitted conduct may be used at

sentencing if the sentencing court finds the conduct has been

established by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v.

Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). Based upon the trial testimony,

the presentence report (PSR) recommended attributing 7.67613

kilograms of trafficked meth to Ibanga and therefore assigned a

base offense level of 38 according to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c), the drug

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 3 of 8
4

trafficking quantity table. The PSR also recommended a two-step

increase in offense level for possession of a dangerous weapon, a

two-step increase for the money laundering conviction, and a threestep increase for Ibanga’s supervisory role in the offense. The

PSR assigned Ibanga a criminal history category of II based upon

several recent driving offenses. 

The district court engaged in an exhaustive sentencing

effort, conducting three sentencing hearings and holding several

off-the-record status conferences. Of the co-conspirators who

testified at trial, the district court found only John Gelardi to

be credible; and, based on Gelardi’s testimony, found, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that 124.03 grams of meth were

attributed to Ibanga. The court also found that Ibanga was a minor

player in the conspiracy and sustained Ibanga’s objection to the

sentencing enhancement for having a supervisory role in the

offense. Finally, the court sustained Ibanga’s objection to the

firearm possession enhancement and reduced his criminal history

category to I. 

After these findings and adjustments made by the district

court were taken into account, the resulting Guidelines range was

a sentence of 151 to 188 months in prison. The district court

asked the probation officer to calculate the Guidelines range

without considering the acquitted conduct (the 124.03 grams of

trafficked meth), and this calculation produced a range of 51 to 63

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 4 of 8
5

months. The court then confined itself to the 51 to 63 months

range, noting that sentencing based upon acquitted conduct “makes

the constitutional guarantee of a right to a jury trial quite

hollow.” J.A. 1515. In considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

factors, the court found that Ibanga’s religious conversion and

“model” behavior since being released on bond seemed “quite

genuine.” J.A. 1516-17. This conduct, the court determined,

alleviated any concern about the need to protect the public with a

longer sentence. However, the court also described Ibanga’s money

laundering activities as “very serious” and found no reason to

depart from the Guidelines range (51 to 63 months) that did not

include acquitted conduct. J.A. 1517. The court imposed a

sentence of 55 months. In a written opinion issued after the

notice of appeal was filed, the district court further explained

its reasoning, stating that sentencing based upon acquitted conduct

would not promote respect for the law as it would thwart the

historic roles of the jury as finder of fact, protector against

government overreaching, and arbiter of guilt or innocence. The

government appeals Ibanga’s sentence, contending that the district

court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3661 by applying a standard that would

categorically exclude the consideration of acquitted conduct at

sentencing.

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 5 of 8
6

II. 

Since Ibanga was sentenced, the Supreme Court has issued

opinions clarifying the appropriate procedures and standards for

federal sentencing and the appellate review of sentences. In Gall

v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007), the Court explained that:

a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings

by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.

As a matter of administration and to secure nationwide

consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point

and the initial benchmark. The Guidelines are not the

only consideration, however. Accordingly, after giving

both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever

sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should

then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine

whether they support the sentence requested by a party.

In so doing, he may not presume that the Guidelines range

is reasonable. He must make an individualized assessment

based on the facts presented. If he decides that an

outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must

consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the

justification is sufficiently compelling to support the

degree of the variance. . . . After settling on the

appropriate sentence, he must adequately explain the

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review

and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. 

Id. at 596-97 (citations omitted); see also Kimbrough v. United

States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564, 570 (2007) (While a district court

must “include the Guidelines range in the array of factors

warranting consideration” and “give respectful consideration to the

Guidelines,” it “may vary [from Guidelines ranges] based solely on

policy considerations, including disagreements with the

Guidelines.” (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted)).

An appellate court reviews any sentence, whether inside

or outside the Guidelines range, “under a deferential abuse-ofAppeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 6 of 8
7

discretion standard.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 591. The reviewing

court must first ensure that the sentencing court did not commit a

significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or

improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, or neglecting to explain adequately the

sentence imposed. Id. at 597. If the sentence is procedurally

sound, the appellate court then considers the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence under an abuse of discretion

standard, “giv[ing] due deference to [a] District Court’s reasoned

and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole,

justified the sentence.” Id. at 597, 602. 

Section 3661 of Title 18 provides that “[n]o limitation

shall be placed on the information concerning the background,

character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a

court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose

of imposing an appropriate sentence.” This information includes

acquitted conduct proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See

Watts, 519 U.S. at 151-57. 

The district court conducted Ibanga’s sentencing

proceedings with great deliberation, but the court committed

significant procedural error, see Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597, by

categorically excluding acquitted conduct from the information that

it could consider in the sentencing process. Therefore, we vacate

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 7 of 8
8

Ibanga’s sentence and remand for resentencing in accordance with

the guidance provided by Gall and Kimbrough.

VACATED AND REMANDED

Appeal: 06-4738 Doc: 57 Filed: 04/01/2008 Pg: 8 of 8