Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06020/USCOURTS-ca10-15-06020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cortez L. Franklin
Appellant
Robert Patton
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

 TENTH CIRCUIT

CORTEZ L. FRANKLIN,

 Petitioner - Appellant,

v.

ROBERT PATTON,

Respondent - Appellee.

No. 15-6020

(D.C. No. 5:12-CV-00865-F)

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

Cortez L. Franklin, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se,1

 seeks a 

certificate of appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a 

COA to appeal “the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court”). Exercising jurisdiction 

 

* This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive 

value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

1

 Because Mr. Franklin is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings liberally. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also United States v. 

Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e must construe [a pro se litigant’s] 

arguments liberally; this rule of liberal construction stops, however, at the point at which 

we begin to serve as his advocate.”).

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 27, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a), we deny his request for a COA and dismiss this 

matter. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Mr. Franklin is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole for firstdegree murder under Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 

(“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. 

Mr. Franklin then filed a federal habeas action in the District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma, raising seven grounds for relief. On November 25, 2014, 

a magistrate judge entered a report and recommendation, recommending that the habeas 

petition be denied. On January 8, 2015, the district court accepted, adopted, and affirmed 

the report and recommendation, denying habeas relief and COA. On January 16, 2015, 

Mr. Franklin filed a “Notice of Right to Object.” ROA, Vol. I at 127. The district court 

interpreted this filing as an objection to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. On January 21, 2015, the district court rejected Mr. Franklin’s 

objections to the magistrate judge’s report, said that habeas relief and COA remained 

denied, and noted the January 8 final judgment was unchanged. On February 12, 2015, 

Mr. Franklin filed a notice of appeal. 

Mr. Franklin seeks a COA from this court to appeal three of his original seven 

grounds for relief: (1) the State’s use of peremptory strikes against only minority jurors, 

(2) the denial of a fair trial based upon the trial court’s refusal to grant a mistrial, and (3) 

cumulative error. 

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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 

A COA is necessary to appeal from a district court’s denial of a § 2254 habeas 

petition. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). “This is a jurisdictional 

prerequisite . . . .” Id.; see Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1). To receive a COA, a petitioner must 

make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(2), by “showing that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that 

matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the 

issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted). In other words, the applicant 

must show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either 

“debatable or wrong.” Id. 

Where, as here, the petitioner’s federal habeas claims were adjudicated on the 

merits in state court proceedings, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the 

state court’s decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the 

facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). 

III. DISCUSSION 

We deny COA on all three issues presented and dismiss this matter. 

A. Peremptory Strikes 

Mr. Franklin argues the State impermissibly used its peremptory challenges to 

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strike minority jurors in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 In particular, a juror 

was struck over the defense counsel’s objection that she was “the only black juror out of 

the thirty jurors making up the venire.” Aplt. Br. at 3. As a result, Mr. Franklin was tried 

before a jury “lack[ing] any member of his racial background or any ethnic group other 

than Caucasians.” Id. 

The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a prosecutor from exercising a peremptory 

strike on a prospective juror on account of the juror’s race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 79, 89 (1986). Batson challenges are subject to a three-step review process: 

Once the opponent of a peremptory challenge has made out a prima facie 

case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of production shifts to 

the proponent of the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation 

(step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must 

then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has proved 

purposeful racial discrimination. 

Black v. Workman, 682 F.3d 880, 894 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations and alterations 

omitted). Here, the magistrate judge agreed with the trial court and the OCCA that the 

prosecution’s stated reasons for exercising its peremptory strikes were race-neutral. 

Further, the magistrate judge noted Mr. Franklin had failed to challenge the trial court’s 

findings at Batson step three. As such, the magistrate judge recommended and the 

 2

 Although Mr. Franklin also argues the use of peremptory challenges violated his 

“right to be tried before a jury composed of a fair cross section of the community,” Aplt. 

Br. at 3, evoking the Sixth Amendment, we construe his argument to implicate only the 

Fourteenth Amendment. A Sixth Amendment, fair-cross-section challenge concerns the 

composition of the jury pool, not the use of peremptory challenges. See Duren v. 

Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-64 (1979). Mr. Franklin makes no argument as to the 

composition of the jury pool. In any case, we would agree with the magistrate judge that 

Mr. Franklin failed to demonstrate that any racial or ethnic underrepresentation in the 

jury was the product of systematic exclusion in the selection process, which is required to 

show a Sixth Amendment violation. See id. at 364. 

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district court held that the OCCA’s decision was not an unreasonable determination of 

the facts or contrary to clearly established federal law. 

We agree for substantially the same reasons. Mr. Franklin has not raised a 

debatable claim that he is entitled to habeas relief on this ground, so we deny COA on his 

first claim for habeas relief. 

B. Fair Trial 

Mr. Franklin argues the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair 

trial before an impartial jury by refusing to declare a mistrial after two incidents. 

The trial court refused to declare a mistrial after a prospective juror, Panelist L., 

said, in circumstances where other prospective jurors could hear, “I don’t know anything 

about this case, but I know about other cases.” ROA, Vol. I at 101. Mr. Franklin’s 

attorney argued this statement tainted the jury with a clear reference to other crimes 

committed by Mr. Franklin. The trial court ruled Panelist L. had made no statement 

connecting Mr. Franklin to these “other cases.” In any case, the court admonished the 

remaining prospective jurors that Panelist L. “had some beliefs based totally on 

speculations” and that the prospective jurors were to “disregard any comments that she 

had to say in open court.” Id. at 102 (quotations omitted). The OCCA affirmed, 

determining the reference to “other cases” “did not taint the panel with insinuations about 

[Mr. Franklin’s] criminal history.” Id. at 103. Further, it noted the trial court had 

admonished the prospective jurors out of an abundance of caution. 

The trial court also refused to declare a mistrial after a witness testified, “I was 

afraid of Mr. Franklin because of his background.” Id. at 102. The trial court determined 

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the witness’s “statement and use of the word ‘background’ clearly does not speak as to 

prior convictions, prior . . . cases, but it is an example of other evidence of the 

defendant’s bad character,” which is admissible. Id. at 102-03 (quotations omitted). It 

admonished the jury to disregard the “comment about a background.” Id. at 103 

(quotations omitted). The OCCA affirmed the trial court’s refusal to declare a mistrial. 

With respect to both incidents, the magistrate judge recommended and the district 

court found the “OCCA’s rejection of relief on the merits was not an unreasonable 

application of or contrary to clearly established federal law; nor was it based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state 

court proceedings.” Id. at 109. The magistrate judge made the following points. First, 

the trial court’s decision followed individualized consideration of Mr. Franklin’s 

arguments. Second, Mr. Franklin did not identify any actual bias on the part of any juror, 

and instead, argued that bias should be presumed. But the incidents did not rise to the 

extreme level needed to presume bias. Third, the trial court had specifically instructed 

the jury to disregard both comments. 

We agree for substantially the same reasons and determine no reasonable jurist 

could debate whether the district court properly resolved Mr. Franklin’s petition for 

habeas relief on this issue. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. We deny COA. 

C. Cumulative Error 

Mr. Franklin finally argues the accumulation of trial errors deprived him of a 

fundamentally fair trial. The OCCA denied this claim of error: “Because we have found 

no error in the preceding claims, there can be no accumulation of error.” ROA, Vol. I at 

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120. The magistrate judge recommended and the district court found that the OCCA’s 

decision was not unreasonable or contrary to clearly established law: “[N]o 

constitutional errors were present in the state-court proceedings, including with respect to 

[Mr. Franklin’s] claims where it is recommended that relief be denied based upon an 

insufficient showing of prejudice (or presumed prejudice). Lacking two or more errors to 

accumulate, Petitioner cannot show a violation of fundamental fairness.” Id. at 121-22 

(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 

We agree for substantially the same reasons. Mr. Franklin has not “made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). We 

deny COA on this issue. 

IV.CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Mr. Franklin’s application for COA and 

dismiss this matter. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. 

Circuit Judge 

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