Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01167/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01167-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tshombe M. Kelley
Petitioner
Lee Ann Lundy
Respondent

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TSHOMBE M. KELLEY, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

LEE ANN LUNDY, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:23-cv-1167 SCR P 

ORDER AND FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition. For the 

reasons set forth below, this court will recommend the motion be granted because the court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim. 

BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is serving an indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life with the possibility of 

parole. (See ECF No. 9 at 6-8.1

) He filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus in June 2023. 

(ECF No. 1.) Petitioner challenges the 90-day loss of good time credits resulting from a February 

//// 

1

 With the motion to dismiss, respondent filed an abstract of the 2001 judgment against petitioner. 

Petitioner does not challenge the validity of that exhibit. The court may take judicial notice of 

matters of public record. Fed. R. Evid. 201. 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 1 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2 

2023 prison disciplinary conviction. He contends the loss of credits is affecting possible 

resentencing and his parole eligibility. 

In February 2024, petitioner submitted a supplement to the petition. (ECF No. 5.) It 

appears to be pages from a January 2024 report prepared by the Executive Office of the Board of 

Parole Hearings. Petitioner states that it supports his argument that the challenged disciplinary 

conviction would be considered at his April 2024 parole eligibility hearing. 

 In April 2024, respondent filed the present motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 9.) Respondent 

argues that the petition should be dismissed because it is not cognizable in a §2254 action. 

Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion (ECF No. 10) and respondent filed a reply (ECF No. 

11). 

 Recently, petitioner filed a request to expedite findings and recommendations in this case. 

(ECF No. 14.) Petitioner states that a magistrate judge in the Central District of California 

recently recommended denial of a habeas petition he filed there on essentially the same issue 

raised in this case.2 Petitioner wants to join any appeal in the present case with an appeal of the 

Central District’s decision. Because this court is issuing findings and recommendations in due 

course, petitioner’s request to expedite is moot. 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

I. Legal Standards for Motion to Dismiss 

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a 

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the 

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 

construes a motion to dismiss a habeas petition as a request for the court to dismiss under Rule 4. 

See O‘Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the court will review 

respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

2

 In the Central District case, petitioner challenged a November 2, 2022 disciplinary conviction. 

Kelley v. Lundy, No. 2:23-CV-08674-SVW-SP (C.D. Cal.). In August 2024, Magistrate Judge 

Pym recommended granting a similar motion to dismiss on the same grounds this court cites 

herein. See Kelley, 2024 WL 4467600, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2024). A review of the docket 

in the Central District case shows that the district judge has not yet ruled on the magistrate 

judge’s recommendation. 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 2 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3 

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court “must accept factual allegations in the [petition] 

as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Fayer v. 

Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 

Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1030 (9th Cir. 2008)). In general, exhibits attached to a pleading are “part of 

the pleading for all purposes.” Hartmann v. Cal. Dept. of Corr. and Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1124 

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c)). 

II. Legal Standards for Habeas Jurisdiction 

Claims in a federal habeas petition must lie at the core of habeas corpus in order to 

proceed. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487 (1973); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 

931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc). Specifically, habeas jurisdiction extends only to claims 

challenging the validity or actual duration of a prisoner’s confinement. Muhammad v. Close, 540 

U.S. 749, 750 (2004); Dominguez v. Kernan, 906 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). This 

requirement is readily met when a prisoner challenges his conviction or sentence. When the 

challenge is to internal prison disciplinary proceedings, however, habeas jurisdiction exists only if 

success on the petitioner’s claims would necessarily result in his speedier release from custody. 

Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934-35; see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003). 

The Ninth Circuit has found habeas jurisdiction lacking where a California petitioner was 

serving an indeterminate sentence and had not been found suitable for parole. Nettles, 830 F.3d 

at 934-35. In such circumstances, expungement of disciplinary findings and restoration of credits 

might increase the likelihood of a future grant of parole, but would not guarantee parole or 

otherwise “necessarily result in speedier release” under state law. Id. 

III. Discussion 

This court can entertain petitioner’s challenge to his 2023 prison disciplinary proceeding 

only if its outcome has a necessary effect on the duration of petitioner’s confinement. See 

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 & n.13 (2011) (federal habeas jurisdiction lies only where 

success on claim would “necessarily spell speedier release from prison” (internal quotations 

omitted)). A loss can have a “necessary” effect on the duration of confinement only if there is an 

otherwise certain release date which is necessarily postponed as the result of credit recalculation. 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 3 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4 

In California this requires either a determinate sentence or, in the case of an indeterminately 

sentenced inmate, a prior finding of parole suitability. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934-35. Because 

petitioner is serving an indeterminate life sentence, and has not previously been found suitable for 

parole and granted a concrete release date, his credit forfeiture can have no more than a 

speculative relationship to the ultimate duration of his incarceration. See id. at 935 (because 

future parole suitability decisions turn on multiple factors, “the presence of a disciplinary 

infraction does not compel the denial of parole, nor does the absence of an infraction compel the 

grant of parole.”); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that 

relief which would improve future parole eligibility does not “guarantee parole or necessarily 

shorten ... prison sentences by a single day”). 

In his opposition, petitioner argues that at the April 2024 hearing, the Board of Parole 

Hearings did, in fact, consider his disciplinary conviction in denying him parole for five years. 

(See ECF No. 10 at 3.) Petitioner argues that if his disciplinary conviction were overturned, he 

would be entitled to a new parole hearing immediately or within three, rather than five, years. 

(Id. at 2.) However, entitlement to a parole hearing does not necessarily mean petitioner will be 

granted parole. A new parole hearing would not “necessarily” result in a shorter sentence. 

Because restoration of petitioner’s forfeited good time credits would not “necessarily spell 

speedier release from prison,” his challenge to the disciplinary hearing falls outside the core of 

federal habeas corpus. See Nettles, 830 F.3d at 934-35. The petition should be dismissed on that 

basis. 

IV. No Conversion to Civil Rights Action 

Although this court has discretion to construe petitioner’s habeas application as a civil 

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, this court recommends declining to do so in this case. 

See Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 251 (1971) (district courts have discretion to construe 

a habeas petition attacking conditions of confinement as a complaint under section 1983 despite 

deliberate choice by petitioner to proceed on habeas), superseded by statute on other grounds as 

recognized in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006). Due to the Prison Litigation Reform 

Act’s filing fee requirements, its provisions requiring screening of complaints, and its limits on 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 4 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5 

the number of actions a prisoner may be permitted to file in forma pauperis, a prisoner should not 

be obligated to proceed with a civil rights action unless they clearly express a desire to do so. See 

28 U.S.C. §§1915, 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §1997e. In the present case, this court does not recommend 

recharacterizing petitioner’s habeas petition as a federal civil rights action. Instead, this court 

recommends that the habeas corpus petition be dismissed without prejudice to filing a §1983 

action should petitioner choose to do so. 

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 

1. Petitioner’s motion to expedite findings and recommendations (ECF No. 14) is denied 

as moot. 

2. The Clerk of the Court shall randomly assign a district judge to this case. 

Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 9) be 

granted and the petition be dismissed without prejudice to its renewal as an action under 42 

U.S.C. §1983. 

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty-one days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 

objections shall be filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties 

are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in waiver of the 

right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In the 

objections, the party may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event 

an appeal of the judgment in this case is filed. See Rule 11, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases (the 

//// 

//// 

//// 

//// 

//// 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 5 of 6
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6 

district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse 

to the applicant). 

Dated: November 4, 2024 

Case 2:23-cv-01167-TLN-SCR Document 15 Filed 11/05/24 Page 6 of 6