Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00582/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00582-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Minnie R. Austin
Defendant
Benjamin F. Payton
Defendant
Peter Spears
Defendant
Barbara Sykes
Plaintiff
Vernon Sykes
Plaintiff
Emilia Strong Sykes
Plaintiff
Tuskegee University
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

EMILIA STRONG SYKES, )

et al., )

 )

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 3:06cv582-MHT

BENJAMIN F. PAYTON, etc., ) (WO) 

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit, brought under state law by plaintiffs

Emilia Strong Sykes, Barbara Sykes, and Vernon Sykes

against defendants Tuskegee University and Tuskegee

University administrators Benjamin F. Payton, Peter

Spears, and Minnie R. Austin, concerns the results of a

university beauty pageant. Jurisdiction is invoked

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity of citizenship).

This case is currently before the court on the

defendants’ motion to dismiss. That motion will be

granted in part and denied in part.

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I. MOTION-TO-DISMISS STANDARD

In considering a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the

court accepts the plaintiff’s allegations as true, Hishon

v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes

the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor, Duke v. Cleland,

5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). “The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the

claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

The complaint may be dismissed “only if it is clear that

no relief could be granted under any set of facts that

could be proved consistent with the allegations.”

Hishon, 467 U.S. at 73. 

II. BACKGROUND

According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, Emilia Sykes

was crowned Miss Tuskegee University, but the results

were called into question. Although Emilia and her

parents, Barbara and Vernon Sykes, were subsequently

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assured in unequivocal terms by defendant Spears that the

results would stand, an official inquiry was ultimately

launched. The investigation revealed a scoring error in

another entrant’s score, that error was corrected, and

the title of Miss Tuskegee University was taken from

Emilia and bestowed upon the other entrant, whose

corrected score was higher than Emilia’s. 

The plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit, in which they

ask the court to prevent the university from taking the

title of Miss Tuskegee University from Emilia. They

subsequently amended their complaint to include claims

for compensatory damages arising from mental and physical

anguish and financial losses attributable to their belief

that Emilia would be Miss Tuskegee University, namely

Emilia’s decision not to pursue a $ 2,600 stipend for the

upcoming academic year, out-of-pocket expenses by the

family to enhance Emilia’s wardrobe in expectation of

appearances she would make as Miss Tuskegee University,

Emilia’s decision not to remain on the cheerleading

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1. The complaint also asserted a procedural-dueprocess claim, but the plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned

that claim (Doc. No. 21). Accordingly, it is also due to

be dismissed.

2. At a hearing held on July 31, 2006, plaintiffs’

counsel acknowledged that the plaintiffs seek mentalanguish damages as to only their claim for intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

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squad, and Emilia’s decision not to take advantage of a

summer program that would have given her research

experience and exposed her to other colleges. 

III. DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs advance two legal theories of

liability.1

 First, they rely on the tort of intentional

infliction of emotional distress, arguing that the

defendants should be liable for any mental anguish

suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the defendants’

decision to take the title from Emilia; this cause of

action has been recognized as the tort of ‘outrage’ by

Alabama courts.2

 Second, the plaintiffs invoke the

doctrine of promissory estoppel to suggest that Tuskegee

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University should be required to let Emilia retain the

title of Miss Tuskegee University because the plaintiffs

relied on defendant Spears’s representations that the

results of the pageant would stand and the plaintiffs

suffered from such reliance.

A. Outrage

In American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d

361, 365 (Ala. 1980), the Alabama Supreme Court first

recognized the tort of outrage and set forth the

following elements: (1) that the defendant’s conduct was

intentional or reckless; (2) that the conduct was extreme

or outrageous; and (3) that it caused emotional distress

so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to

endure it. In order to satisfy the second element, the

conduct must be “so outrageous in character and so

extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly

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intolerable in a civilized society.” Id. (citing

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46).

The tort of outrage is a “very limited cause of

action that is available only in the most egregious

circumstances.” Thomas v. BSE Industrial Contractors,

Inc., 624 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Ala. 1993). According to

the Alabama Supreme Court, it has found a jury question

on an outrage claim in only three categories of cases:

(1) cases having to do with wrongful conduct in the

context of family burials; (2) cases where insurance

agents employed heavy-handed, barbaric means in

attempting to coerce the insured into settling an

insurance claim; and (3) cases involving egregious sexual

harassment. Id. Thus, to recognize the tort of outrage

under the circumstances alleged in the complaint would

constitute a significant expansion of this “very limited

cause of action.” Id. 

In light of the foregoing, the court has no

difficulty concluding that on no set of facts could the

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plaintiffs prove that the conduct of Tuskegee University

or its employees was “so outrageous in character and so

extreme in degree as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly

intolerable in a civilized society,” Inmon, 394 So. 2d at

365. A university’s decision to correct an error, even

after telling a person that benefitted from the error

that no such correction would be forthcoming, does not

offend all bounds of decency and cannot be considered

intolerable in a civilized society. 

Although it certainly would have been better had no

such error occurred and had the plaintiffs not been told

unequivocally that the decision would not be reviewed,

this court holds that such conduct does not rise to the

level of outrage as defined under Alabama law.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claim for outrage will be

dismissed.

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B. Promissory Estoppel

i.

Although the full contours of the doctrine of

promissory estoppel are ill-defined and still developing

as part of Alabama’s common law, see 3 Corbin on

Contracts § 8.12, Alabama clearly follows the definition

of the doctrine set forth in the Restatement of

Contracts: “A promise which the promisor should

reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of

definite and substantial character and which does so is

binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement

thereof.” Bush v. Bush, 177 So.2d 568, 570 (Ala. 1964)

(quoting Restatement (First) of Contracts § 90). “[T]he

gravamen of the claim of promissory estoppel [in Alabama]

is detrimental reliance.” Wyatt v. BellSouth, Inc., 18

F.Supp.2d 1324, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (Carroll, M.J.).

Indeed, the court in Bush characterized promissory

estoppel as a “doctrine of action in reliance.” 177

So.2d at 570.

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3. Legal remedies include all judicial remedies.

Thus, damages, restitution, and specific performance are

all “legal remedies.” 11 Corbin on Contracts § 55.1.

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In Wyatt v. BellSouth, Inc., 757 So. 2d 403 (Ala.

2000), the Alabama Supreme Court for the first time

considered the scope of damages available under

promissory estoppel. There, the court held that courts

may award such damages as justice requires to make the

promisee whole relative to how he or she stood before the

promisor made the promise, that is, that courts should

award reliance damages in promissory-estoppel cases. Id.

at 408. Alabama therefore appears to have completed the

transition from using promissory estoppel as a substitute

for consideration in a contract action to treating

promissory estoppel as a claim independent of contract (a

quasi-contractual action) to recover damages for

detrimental reliance. See 3 Corbin on Contracts § 8.11.

Two principles guide Alabama courts when crafting

remedies in promissory-estoppel cases. First, although

“the full range of legal remedies3

 may be available,

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promissory estoppel plaintiffs are not entitled to them

as of right.” Wyatt, 757 So.2d at 407 (footnote added).

Instead, “[a] remedial order in a promissory estoppel

case must be fashioned carefully to achieve fairness to

all parties according to the circumstances of a

particular case.” Id. Put differently, “full-scale

enforcement by normal contractual remedies [are] often

appropriate for promises binding [under promissory

estoppel], but relief may be limited.” Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 90, cmt. d (cited favorably in

Wyatt, 757 So.2d at 407). 

Second and relatedly, recovery under promissory

estoppel is limited to what could have been recovered had

there in fact been a contract. Wyatt, 757 So.2d at 408

“The doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be used

as a basis for awarding damages that would not, under

general principles of contract law, be recoverable in an

action for breach of contract. Otherwise, the plaintiff

in an action founded on promissory estoppel would be in

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a better position than if he had been entitled to recover

in an action on a contract.” Id. 

Thus, traditional contract remedies form the outer

limit of relief in a promissory-estoppel case, and, using

those as a baseline, courts may then limit the remedies

as justice requires.

ii.

For ease of analysis, the court will break the

doctrine down into its component elements and consider

each element in turn. To state a claim for promissory

estoppel, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant

made a promise (2) that the defendant should have

reasonably expected to induce action or forbearance of

definite and substantial character; (3) the promise did,

in fact, induce action or forbearance; (4) and injustice

can be avoided only by enforcing the promise. Bush, 177

So.2d at 570.

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As to the first element, the complaint does not

allege that the defendants promised that Emilia would

retain her title, but rather that defendant Spears stated

“unequivocally” that no investigation would be launched.

However, “[a]n express promise is not necessary to

establish a promissory estoppel. It is sufficient that

there be promissory elements which would lull the

promisee into a false sense of security.” Mazer v.

Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So.2d 770, 774 (1976). The

statements of defendant Spears, as set forth in the

complaint, are sufficient to satisfy this element.

As to the second element, Corbin notes that “[a]ny

reliance is evaluated objectively both for reasonableness

and foreseeability. Customarily, that evaluation is done

by the jury as fact issues based on all surrounding

circumstances.” 3 Corbin on Contracts § 8.11. This

fact-based inquiry could be decided on a motion to

dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. However, at

this early stage, the court concludes that the plaintiffs

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may be able to prove that it was both reasonable and

foreseeable that they would rely on defendant Spears’s

assurances that the results would stand to their

detriment. 

In their complaint, the plaintiffs note that Emilia

did not avail herself of a $ 2,600 stipend, did not

participate in cheerleading, and did not take part in a

summer program that would have given her valuable

experience because she believed she would be Miss

Tuskegee University. Certainly, at this stage of the

proceedings, without knowing more about the duties and

benefits of Miss Tuskegee University, the court cannot

conclude that such actions were unreasonable and

unforeseeable. Likewise, the court cannot say that

spending money on new clothes for Emilia was unreasonable

or unforeseeable; perhaps because of her responsibilities

and public appearances such expenditures are commonplace.

On the third element, actual reliance, the plaintiffs

have alleged that they took the actions outlined above in

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4. Obviously, litigation is not necessary to obtain

a remedy. The court hopes the parties will pursue

discussions to resolve this matter without further

litigation. 

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reliance on defendant Spears’s unequivocal

representations. Thus, they have sufficiently pled this

element of promissory estoppel.

Finally, the plaintiffs have alleged that injustice

cannot be avoided without enforcing the promise. Indeed,

the court can see no way for the plaintiffs to recover

the money spent on Emilia’s wardrobe or for Emilia to

avail herself of the stipend, summer program, and

cheerleading squad now that the deadlines have passed

without some remedial action.4

Accordingly, the court concludes that the plaintiffs

have stated a claim for promissory estoppel resulting in

detrimental reliance. Therefore, the motion to dismiss

will be denied as to the promissory-estoppel claim. 

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iii.

Notwithstanding the court’s conclusion that the

plaintiffs have stated a claim for promissory estoppel,

it does not necessarily follow that the plaintiffs are

entitled to all the relief that they seek. The

plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief in addition to

damages. Indeed, by asking this court to prevent

Tuskegee University from taking the title of Miss

Tuskegee University from Emilia, the plaintiffs are

essentially seeking specific performance of the

gratuitous promise made by defendant Spears.

This particular relief is problematic for several

reasons. First, as a general matter, the presumptive

remedy for a breach of contract is damages. See General

Securities Corp. v. Welton, 135 So. 329, 330 (Ala. 1931)

(“‘Ordinarily the innocent party to a breached contract

is entitled only to compensatory damages obtainable in an

action at law.’”) (quoting Lewman & Co. v. Ogden Bros.,

42 So. 102 (Ala. 1904). A decree for specific

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5. Indeed, this court has identified only one case

where an Alabama court awarded injunctive relief based on

promissory estoppel, and that case involved the use and

enjoyment of private residences. Mazer v. Jackson Ins.

Agency, 340 So.2d at 771. (enjoining a developer that had

promised not to develop a strip of forested land abutting

a residential development in order to induce the

residents to cease their opposition to a much larger

development of nearby property from developing the

strip).

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performance is appropriate only if “the character of the

property be such that the loss [from the breach] will not

be fairly compensated in damages, based upon an estimate

of its market value.” Id. Here, it appears that the

loss suffered by the plaintiffs (that is, their reliance

interest) can be measured in monetary damages. 

Second, as noted, reliance damages are the preferred

remedy for promissory estoppel. Wyatt, 757 So. 2d at

408.5

 The reluctance of Alabama courts to order specific

performance based on promissory estoppel is consistent

with the understanding of promissory estoppel as a

“doctrine of action in reliance,” Bush, 177 So.2d at 570,

under which courts award such relief as justice requires

to make the promisee whole relative to how he or she

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stood before the promisor made the promise, Wyatt, 757

So. 2d at 408. To award specific performance would

actually be to award the expectation interest, as opposed

to the reliance interest, since the plaintiff would

receive ‘the benefit of the bargain’ (even though there

was no bargain) instead of compensation for the losses

incurred in reliance on a promise that is later broken.

Third, in weighing whether to award specific

performance, the court must also ensure that the

consideration warrants such a remedy. Welton, 135 So. at

335. In promissory-estoppel cases, there is no

consideration given by the promisee. This factor,

therefore, weighs heavily against awarding specific

performance instead of some other form of relief such as

reliance damages.

Finally, the inquiry for specific performance

requires a balancing of the equities: “[In Alabama] the

specific performance of contracts will be decreed when,

under all the circumstances of that case, such action and

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decree better subserve the ends of justice; and it will

be denied when, from a like view, it appears that it will

produce hardship or injustice to either of the parties.”

Welton, 135 So. at 331. Even at this early stage, the

court can begin to balance the equities.

To award specific performance, the court would have

to award the title of Miss Tuskegee University to Emilia

despite the fact that she scored lower than another

contestant; necessarily the court would have to take the

title away from that contestant who had the highest score

during the Miss Tuskegee University pageant. Put

succinctly, in order to right the alleged wrong arising

from the broken promise, the plaintiffs, in seeking

specific performance of the promise, would have this

court wrong another person who had the highest score at

the Miss Tuskegee University contest. The plaintiffs

contends that the school committed an error but

nonetheless promised them that it would not correct the

error. The defendants argue that, despite any

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representation to the contrary, it had not choice but to

correct the “clear error” in its pageant. 

Both sides’ positions share one thing in common: they

acknowledge that only one person can be crowned Miss

Tuskegee University and that someone else, either Emilia

or the other contestant, must lose. Simply put, one

person will be hurt, and one person will miss out on the

opportunities and benefits attendant to the crown.

Should it be the person that actually won, or should it

be the person who was promised that, despite a scoring

error, she would retain the crown? Both the defendants

and the plaintiffs can invoke positive and negative

arguments of fairness to answer this question. 

Schools, including universities, exist to educate,

and in winning and in losing people certainly learn about

life, the world, and themselves. Perhaps, then, the

question of who should prevail as Miss Tuskegee

University is best left to the people who set up the

pageant and made the rules governing it, that is the

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university and its administrators. In any event, such a

question seems ill-fit for judicial resolution.

Nonetheless, Alabama case law makes clear that courts

should consider “all the circumstances of [a] case”

before ruling on an action for specific performance.

Welton, 135 So. at 331. Although the court has strong

doubts that specific performance is warranted here, all

the facts are not in and not all the circumstances are

known at this early stage in the litigation. Especially

because this case will proceed forward on the question of

reliance damages under the promissory-estoppel claim, the

court concludes that it would be premature to dismiss

outright the plaintiffs’ request for specific

performance.

C. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

The court notes that the question of whether the

plaintiffs have met the amount-in-controversy requirement

of diversity jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 1332, has been

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raised. The court declines to reach this question at

this juncture, particularly in light of the uncertain

nature/status of the claims and without better

articulation of the issues by the parties. Of course,

the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time in

the future, should further litigation of this matter

prove necessary.

IV. CONCLUSION

Consistent with the analysis above, it is ORDERED

that the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) is

granted as to the plaintiffs’ claim for outrage and

denied as to the plaintiffs’ claim for equitable

estoppel.

Furthermore, based on the representations of

plaintiffs that they have abandoned their due-process

claim, it is ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ claim arising

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under procedural due process is dismissed without

prejudice.

DONE, this the 1st day of August, 2006.

_____________________________ /s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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