Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-72286/USCOURTS-ca9-11-72286-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Javier Arellano Hernandez
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JAVIER ARELLANO HERNANDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 11-72286

Agency No.

A017-214-318

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted April 12, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 1, 2016

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Mary M. Schroeder,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge N.R. Smith

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2 ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH

SUMMARY*

Immigration

The panel denied Javier ArellanoHernandez’s petition for

reviewofthe Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding

him removable and ineligible for cancellation of removal

because his conviction for attempted criminal threats

constitutes a crime of violence and aggravated felony.

The panel held that Arellano Hernandez’s conviction for

criminal threats under California Penal Code § 422 is a

categorical crime of violence, and that the § 664 “attempt”

portion did not alter the crime of violence determination. The

panel also held that Arellano Hernandez’s § 422 conviction,

which is a wobbler offense punishable under California law

as a felony or misdemeanor, is an aggravated felony because

the superior court designated it a felony and sentenced him to

365 days in jail. The panel thus found Arellano Hernandez

removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) and

ineligible for cancellation of removal.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

John Gore (argued), Jones Day, Washington, D.C.; BeongSoo Kim, Jones Day, Los Angeles, California; for Petitioner.

Don Scroggin (argued) and Sarah Maloney, Attorneys; Linda

S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Office of Immigration

Litigation, Civil Division, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Javier Arellano Hernandez’s conviction for attempted

criminal threats, pursuant to California Penal Code sections

422 and 664, constitutes an aggravated felony for which he is

removable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). First, attempted

criminal threats is categorically a crime of violence as defined

under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Second, the California superior

court designated the conviction as a felony and imposed a

sentence of “at least one year.”

I.

In 1967, Arellano Hernandez entered the United States

with his parents as a legal permanent resident. In March

2009, Arellano Hernandez pleaded guilty to unlawful

possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to six

days’ imprisonment. In September 2009, a jury convicted

him of three separate crimes: (1) attempted criminal threats,

a felony in violation of California Penal Code sections 422

and 664; (2) simple assault, a misdemeanor in violation of

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4 ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH

California Penal Code section 240; and (3) false

imprisonment, a misdemeanor in violation ofCalifornia Penal

Code section 236. The superior court imposed a suspended

sentence for attempted criminal threats and placed Arellano

Hernandez on probation for a period of three years with

certain terms and conditions, including 365 days in jail. The

court stayed sentencing the misdemeanor counts of simple

assault and false imprisonment pendingArellano Hernandez’s

probation.

As a result of these convictions, the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) began removal proceedings and

issued a Notice to Appear. DHS alleged that Arellano

Hernandez was removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F),

(U), because of his March 2009 drug paraphernalia

conviction and his September 2009 attempted criminal threats

conviction.

At a hearing before the immigration judge (“IJ”),

Arellano Hernandez conceded removability based on the drug

paraphernalia conviction. However, Arellano Hernandez

contested whether his criminal threats conviction constituted

an aggravated felony; therefore he requested cancellation of

removal.1 The IJ ultimately concluded that Arellano

Hernandez was sentenced to 365 days in jail for the attempted

criminal threats conviction. Thus, Arellano Hernandez had

been convicted of a crime of violence and an aggravated

felony.

 

1

 In a Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) letter, Arellano Hernandez also challenged

his removability based on the drug paraphernalia conviction in light of

Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 1980 (2015). Because we affirm the BIA on

the aggravated felony charge, we need not address this issue.

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ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH 5

The Board ofImmigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed the

appeal and affirmed the IJ’s conclusion that Arellano

Hernandez was convicted of a crime of violence and an

aggravated felony. Arellano Hernandez was therefore

ineligible for cancellation of removal.

II.

In its decision, the BIA reviewed the IJ’s findings of fact

for clear error and questions of law de novo. Where the BIA

conducts de novo review of the IJ’s decision, we limit our

review to the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that the

BIA expressly adopted the IJ’s decision. Hosseini v.

Gonzales, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 2006). However,

where the BIA conducts a clear error review, it relies “upon

the IJ’s opinion as a statement of reasons”; therefore, we can

“look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay behind

the BIA’s conclusion.” Tekle v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1044,

1051 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kozulin v. INS, 218 F.3d 1112,

1115 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In so doing, we review here the

reasons explicitly identified by the BIA, and then examine the

reasoning articulated in the IJ’s oral decision in support of

those reasons.” Id.

We review de novo whether a particular conviction under

state law is a removable offense. Coronado-Durazo v. INS,

123 F.3d 1322, 1324 (9th Cir. 1997). We defer to the BIA’s

interpretation of its own regulation when that interpretation

“is neither clearly erroneous nor inconsistent with the

regulation[].” Singh-Bhathal v. INS, 170 F.3d 943, 945 (9th

Cir. 1999). “We review de novo claims of due process

violations in immigration proceedings.” Simeonov v.

Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). Factual findings

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6 ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH

are reviewed for substantial evidence. Zehatye v. Gonzales,

453 F.3d 1182, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 2006).

III.

Arellano Hernandez argues that his conviction under

California Penal Code sections 422 and 664 is not an

aggravated felony or a crime of violence. We disagree. We

affirmour prior precedent, which held that a conviction under

sections 422 and 664 is categorically a crime of violence. 

Further, because the superior court designated Arellano

Hernandez’s conviction as a felony and sentenced him to 365

days in jail, his conviction is also an aggravated felony.

A.

A “crime of violence” includes any “offense that has as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 16(a). California Penal Code section 422(a) (2009)

provides:

Any person who willfully threatens to commit

a crime which will result in death or great

bodily injury to another person, with the

specific intent that the statement, made

verbally, in writing, or by means of an

electronic communication device, is to be

taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of

actually carrying it out, which, on its face and

under the circumstances in which it is made,

is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate,

and specific as to convey to the person

threatened, a gravity of purpose and an

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ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH 7

immediate prospect of execution of the threat,

and thereby causes that person reasonably to

be in sustained fear for his or her own safety

or for his or her immediate family’s safety,

shall be punished by imprisonment in the

county jail not to exceed one year, or by

imprisonment in the state prison.

In our prior precedent regarding section 422, we have held

that a conviction under this statute is a crime of violence. 

See, e.g., United States v. Villavicencio-Burruel, 608 F.3d

556, 563 (9th Cir. 2010); Rosales-Rosales v. Ashcroft,

347 F.3d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 2003). In Villavicencio-Burruel,

we concluded that, based on the plain language of the statute,

“section 422’s elements necessarily include a threatened use

of physical force ‘capable of causing physical pain or injury

to another person.’” 608 F.3d at 562 (quoting Johnson v.

United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)). Arellano

Hernandez challenges the validity of this holding in light of

(1) other California criminal threat statutes, which are not

crimes of violence; (2) Fourth and Fifth Circuit law,

concluding section 422 is not a crime of violence; and (3) our

recent case Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015). 

None of these arguments provide a basis for us to overturn

our prior precedent.

First, neither of the other California criminal threat

statutes, California Penal Code sections 692or 71,3are

2 Penal Code section 69 is titled “Obstructing or Resisting Executive

Officer in Performance of Duties.”

3 Penal Code section 71 is titled “Threatening Public Officers and

Employees and School Officials.”

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8 ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH

analogous to section 422. As we have previously recognized,

neither section 69 nor section 71 include the elements of a

threatened use of physical force. See Flores-Lopez v. Holder,

685 F.3d 857, 863 (9th Cir. 2012); Bautista-Magallon v.

Holder, 584 F. App’x 300, 301 (9th Cir. 2014).

Second, contrary decisions of our sister circuits have no

effect on our jurisprudence. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits

reasoned that section 422 does not qualify categorically as a

crime of violence under the element test, because one could

threaten to poison another, which is not (under their

precedent) “force,” and therefore not a crime of violence. See

United States v. Torres-Miguel, 701 F.3d 165, 168–69 (4th

Cir. 2012); United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 625 F.3d 274,

276 (5th Cir. 2010). However, this reasoning has been

rejected by the Supreme Court. United States v. Castleman,

134 S. Ct. 1405, 1415 (2014) (“The ‘use of force’ . . . is not

the act of ‘sprinkling’ the poison; it is the act of employing

poison knowingly as a device to cause physical harm. That

the harm occurs indirectly, rather than directly (as with a kick

or punch), does not matter.” (alteration omitted)); see also

United States v. De La Fuente, 353 F.3d 766, 770–71 (9th

Cir. 2003) (concluding that a threat of anthrax poisoning

constituted a “threatened use of physical force” because the

defendant’s “letters clearly threatened death by way of

physical contact with anthrax spores”). Further VillavicencioBurruel remains the law of this circuit. Absent intervening

higher authority, “a three-judge panel may not overrule a

prior decision of the court.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

899 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Finally, Dimaya does not compel a different conclusion. 

In Dimaya, we concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)’s

definition of “crime of violence” was void for vagueness as

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ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH 9

it related to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).4803 F.3d at 1120 (citing

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015)); see

also United States v. Hernandez-Lara, 817 F.3d 651, 652 (9th

Cir. 2016) (per curiam). However, Dimaya did not “cast any

doubt on the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)’s

definition of a crime of violence.” 803 F.3d at 1120 n.17. 

Arellano Hernandez does not challenge the constitutionality

of § 16(a). Thus, applying our precedent, section 422 is

categorically a crime of violence.

The “attempt” portion of Arellano Hernandez’s

conviction does not alter our determination that the

conviction is a crime of violence. We have “generally found

attempts to commit crimes of violence, enumerated or not, to

be themselves crimes of violence.” United States v. Riley,

183 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999); cf. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(U) (providing that an aggravated felony

includes the attempt to commit the offense). California’s

attempt statute is coextensive with an “attempt” at common

law. United States v. Saavedra-Velazquez, 578 F.3d 1103,

1110 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Arellano Hernandez’s

conviction for attempted criminal threats is categorically a

crime of violence.

B.

Arellano Hernandez was convicted of violatingCalifornia

Penal Code section 422, which can be punished as either a

felony or misdemeanor offense. See Cal. Penal Code

4 Crime of violence under subsection (b) is defined as “any other offense

that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that

physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the

course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).

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§ 422(a). This dual classification is also known as a

“wobbler” under California law. See Ewing v. California,

538 U.S. 11, 16 (2003). “Under California law, a ‘wobbler’

is presumptively a felony and ‘remains a felony except when

the discretion is actually exercised’ to make the crime a

misdemeanor.” Id. An offense is “deemed a felony” when a

defendant is convicted and “granted probation without the

imposition of a sentence.” People v. Feyrer, 226 P.3d 998,

1007 (Cal. 2010), superseded by statute on another ground as

stated in People v. Park, 299 P.3d 1263, 1266 n.4 (Cal.

2013). The offense remains a felony unless the sentencing

court subsequently reduces it to a misdemeanor. Id.

Here, Arellano Hernandez’s conviction was “deemed a

felony.” The superior court suspended Arellano Hernandez’s

sentence and placed him on probation. As part of Arellano

Hernandez’s terms and conditions of probation, the superior

court ordered him to serve 365 days in the county jail. At no

time did the superior court ever declare the offense to be a

misdemeanor nor did the superior court ever subsequently

reduce the felony offense. See Cal. Penal Code § 17(b).

Arellano Hernandez argues that the superior court’s

judgment designated his conviction as a misdemeanor. 

Arellano Hernandez misreads the superior court’s judgment. 

First, the court acknowledged that the jury found Arellano

Hernandez guilty of three separate counts: (1) attempted

criminal threats “in violation of Penal Code section 664/422,

a felony”; (2) simple assault “in violation of Penal Code

section 240, a misdemeanor”; and (3) false imprisonment “in

violation of Penal Code section 236 . . . , a misdemeanor.” 

Second, as part of the superior court’s sentence, it ordered

“the misdemeanor counts stayed.” Thus, the record is clear

that the superior court sentenced Arellano Hernandez to 365

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ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH 11

days in jail for the attempted criminal threats, and it did not

reduce the crime to a misdemeanor either directly or

implicitly.

C.

A crime of violence is an aggravated felony if “the term

of imprisonment [is] at least one year.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43)(F). “Any reference to a term of imprisonment

or a sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include

the period of incarceration or confinement ordered by a court

of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or

execution of that imprisonment or sentence in whole or in

part.” Id. at § 1101(a)(48)(B).

Arellano Hernandez was found guilty of a felony offense

under sections 422 (criminal threats) and 664 (attempt). 

California Penal Code section 422(a) outlines the punishment

for this charge as either “imprisonment in the county jail not

to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison.”5

Arellano Hernandez argues that the IJ erred in concluding

the 365-day jail term was for the attempted criminal threats

conviction. We disagree. The record shows that the superior

court imposed a 365-day jail term. This sentence of 365 days

equates to imprisonment of “at least one year.” See Habibi v.

Holder, 673 F.3d 1082, 1085–86 (9th Cir. 2011). If the

superior court had concluded that the conviction was to be

treated as a misdemeanor, the maximum sentence Arellano

Hernandez could have received was six months. Cal. Penal

Code §§ 422, 664. However, the superior court did not

5 Section 664 reduces the penalty, where the crime is merely

“attempted.” Cal. Penal Code § 664(a).

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12 ARELLANO HERNANDEZ V. LYNCH

impose a misdemeanor sentence (as discussed above), but

rather imposed probation on the sole count of attempted

criminal threats.

The superior court was not imposing a sentence on all

three convictions, because it ordered “the misdemeanor

counts stayed.” There is no ambiguity to this statement; the

superior court suspended the sentence and only placed

Arellano Hernandez on probation with regard to the felony

conviction.6 Thus, Arellano Hernandez was sentenced to at

least one year. See United States v. Mendoza-Morales,

347 F.3d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding, in the context of

United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4A1.2(b)(1), days in

incarceration as a term of probation should be counted in

calculating the term of imprisonment).

The BIA properly denied Arellano Hernandez’s

application for cancellation of removal based on his

conviction for an aggravated felony offense.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

6

 Whether the court was applying California Penal Code section 654 is

not relevant to this court’s determination. California Penal Code section

654(a) provides that an act “that is punishable in different ways by

different provisions of law shall be punished under the provision that

provides for the longest potential term of imprisonment.” Section 654

therefore provides that a person can only be punished (to the “longest

potential term of imprisonment”) for one crime arising out of the same

conduct. Cal. Penal Code § 654; see also People v. Correa, 278 P.3d 809,

812 (Cal. 2012).

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