Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03218/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03218-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard C. Avalos
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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1

 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-13, this order maynotbe cited exceptas provided by

Civil Local Rule 3-4(e). 

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD C. AVALOS,

Plaintiff, No. C 04-3218 PJH

v. ORDER RE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT1

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social

Security Administration, 

Defendant.

_______________________________/

Plaintiff Richard Avalos (“Avalos”) seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final

decision denying him disability benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The action is

before the court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment, and Avalos’

alternative motion for remand. Having read the parties’ papers and administrative record

and having carefully considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, the court

remands this case to the Commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with the

court’s order. 

BACKGROUND

This is the second time that Avalos has appeared before this court for review of the

Commissioner’s decision regarding his Title II Social Security disability insurance benefits

(“DIB”) application. Avalos applied for DIB on March 21, 2000, alleging disability

beginning December 17, 1996, due to a work-related back injury. Avalos was found

eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) on psychiatric grounds as of the date of his

Title XVI application filed at the same time as his DIB application. However, his Title II

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2 SocialSecurity“DIB” is insurance against lost income caused byphysicalor mental

disability. However, SSI may provide benefits for persons who are not covered by DIB, or who

are entitled to DIB inanamount less thanthatpaid underSSI. Harvey L. McCormick, Scope

and Purpose of SSI Benefits, Social Security Claims and Procedures, 5th Ed., § 17.12

(1998). 

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application for DIB was denied because the Social Security Administration deemed him

capable of “do[ing] light work activities and the evidence was insufficient to show severe

mental impairment.”2 Subsequently, Avalos requested and was granted a hearing before

an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ rendered an unfavorable decision on

January 18, 2002, finding Avalos “not disabled,” thereby denying his application. 

Subsequently, Avalos requested review by the Appeals Council, which denied review. 

Thereafter, on May 29, 2002, Avalos filed his first appeal before this court, C02-

2575 PJH. In July 2003, instead of responding to Avalos’ motion for summary judgment,

the Commissioner stipulated to a remand for further proceedings before an ALJ to reevaluate Avalos’ credibility, re-evaluate lay witness reports, consult a medical examiner

regarding Avalos’ onset date, and to further develop the record as necessary. On July 10,

2003, this court signed the stipulated order for remand and judgment pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Following remand, the ALJ conducted a re-hearing, and denied Avalos’ application

on April 12, 2004. The Appeals Council again denied review. Subsequently, Avalos filed

this second appeal of the ALJ’s April 12, 2004, decision on January 28, 2005. 

At the time of the second ALJ hearing on March 17, 2004, Avalos was forty-six

years old, and had “a high school equivalent education acquired while incarcerated and

completed one year of college-level study.” A.R. at 422. He had been employed in the

past as a mechanic, and was working as a janitor at the time of his alleged back injury in

December 1996. As noted, Avalos had been receiving workers’ compensation benefits

as a result of his successful SSI claim for mental impairment. Id. 231, 352, 422. 

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

The Social Security Act (“Act”) provides for the payment of DIB to people who have

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contributed to the Social Security system and who suffer from a physical or mental

disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To evaluate whether a claimant is disabled within

the meaning of the Act, the ALJ is required to use a five-step analysis. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520. The ALJ may terminate the analysis at any stage where a decision can be

made that the claimant is or is not disabled. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 504 (9th

Cir. 1990). 

At the first step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in any

“substantial gainful activity,” which would automatically preclude the claimant from receiving

disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If not, at the second step, the ALJ must

consider whether the claimant suffers from a severe impairment which “significantly limits

[the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(c). The third step requires the ALJ to compare the claimant’s impairment to a

Listing of Impairments in the regulations. If the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments meets or equals the severity of any medical condition contained in the Listing,

the claimant is presumed disabled and is awarded benefits. See 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(d). 

If the claimant’s condition does not match the Listing, the ALJ must proceed to the

fourth step to consider whether the claimant has sufficient “residual functional capacity”

(“RFC”) to perform his past work despite the limitations caused by the impairment(s). 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant cannot perform his past work, at step five,

the Commissioner is required to show that the claimant can perform some other work that

exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into consideration the

claimant’s “residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience.” See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). 

Overall, in steps one through four, the claimant has the burden to demonstrate a

severe impairment and an inability to engage in his previous occupation. Andrews v.

Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir. 1995). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the

burden shifts to the Commissioner to demonstrate the claimant can perform other work. Id.

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3 The worker must show a recent connection to the work force (among other

requirements) to maintain insured status to receive DIB payments. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)

and 423(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.130. 

4

 SGA is work that involves doing significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1572. Work can be substantialevenif less moneyis earned, and gainful work activity

is usually done for pay. Id.

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ALJ’S FINDINGS

Avalos alleged physical disability arising from low back pain and mental disability

from depression. A.R. 101, 109, 167, 423. He satisfied the nondisability requirements set

forth in Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, and, thus, was insured for disability

benefits through December 31, 1998, his date last insured (“DLI”).3 Id. at 427. However,

he was not deemed insured after that date. Id. Accordingly, Avalos was required to

demonstrate disability on or before his DLI, December 31, 1998, in order to become

eligible for Title II DIB benefits. Id. at 422. At the hearing, the ALJ analyzed Avalos’

alleged physical and mental disabilities separately. Id. at 421-28, 652-83. 

At the first step in the five-step evaluation, the ALJ analyzed whether Avalos had

been performing substantial gainful activity (“SGA”). Id. at 423. Based on evidence in the

record concerning Avalos’ meager earnings (See id. at 113-22), the ALJ found that Avalos

had not been engaged in SGA since his alleged disability onset date4. Id. at 423. Neither

party contests the ALJ’s finding at this step of the evaluation. 

Next, the ALJ considered whether Avalos suffered from a severe impairment which

significantly limited his physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities. With

respect to Avalos’ alleged physical impairment of low back pain, Avalos provided the ALJ

with medical evidence that chronicled his history of low back injury with chronic low back

pain prior to his DLI. Id. at 175-405. Because the ALJ found that the impairment “cause[d]

more than minimal effects on Avalos’ ability to do work-related activities,” the ALJ found it

to be severe at Step Two. Id. at 423. Neither party contests this finding, either. 

On the other hand, at Step Two, the ALJ did not find Avalos’ mental impairment to

be severe based on his analysis of the evidence and his credibility assessment. 

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5 Dr. Spencer (Avalos’ treating physician) referred Avalos to Dr. Sussman, Clinical

Psychologist, for a one-time medical examination. 

6 Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) is a scoring scale within a multiaxial

assessment system that provides a domainof informationto help the clinicianplantreatment

and predict outcome. A score in the range of 60-70 would indicate thatthe patient has “some

mild symptoms.” AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL

OF MENTAL DISORDERS 25, 32 (4th ed. 1994).

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Significantly, the ALJ found Avalos’ “medical evidence of an impairment prior to the DLI [to

be] minimal.” Id. at 424. Although the ALJ acknowledged Dr. Sussman’s5 June 1997

diagnosis of Avalos’ dysthymic disorder and difficulty in functioning, the ALJ nevertheless

found Avalos’ GAF score of 656 to indicate Avalos’ capability of “functioning pretty well.” 

Id. at 425. Moreover, the ALJ found little evidence of psychiatric treatment until February

2000, the time at which Avalos began to see Dr. Stolzman (his general practitioner at the

VA Mental Health Clinic). Id. at 253-74, 425. The ALJ made this finding despite evidence

that during the time prior to February 2000, Dr. Spencer (Avalos’ treating physician at

Native American Health Center) (Id. at 313-63, 396-405) had indeed been treating Avalos’

depression and anxiety since October 1995, a medical history to which the ALJ did

acknowledge. Id. Nonetheless, the ALJ stated that Dr. Spencer “failed to establish any

significant psychiatric limitations.” Id. Finally, the ALJ stated that the state agency medical

consultants did not find any severe mental impairment prior to Avalos’ DLI. Id. 

Similarly, in assessing Avalos’ credibility, the ALJ found little evidence of severe

mental impairment prior to Avalos’ DLI. Id. at 425. The ALJ relied on the hearing

testimony of the Commissioner’s nonexamining psychiatrist, Dr. Shapiro, to conclude that

throughout the entire period from December 1995 until approximately January 31, 2000,

there were insufficient medical records to support a finding of a severe mental impairment. 

Id. The ALJ indicated that Dr. Shapiro noted that the only records available for the period

prior to Avalos’ DLI were the worker’s compensation records, which stated a GAF score of

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7

 The ALJ was referring to Dr. Sussman’s examination conducted in May 1997, prior

to Avalos’ DLIof December 1998. Id. at 182,677-78. However, Dr. Shapiro also considered

Avalos’ medical treatment prior to Avalos’ DLIwith Dr. Spencer, his treating physician. Id. at

666. 

8 Dr. Shapiroappearedto have beenunderthe impressionthatAvalos’ DLIwas 1996,

rather than December 1998. Id. at 662, 666-68. 

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65.7 Id. The ALJ added that Dr. Shapiro noted that this score was inconsistent with a

disabling impairment. Id. Moreover, the ALJ found Dr. Shapiro’s opinion regarding

Avalos’ history of depression and Dr. Spencer’s prescribed medication for Avalos’

depression to be insufficient for a diagnosis of depression. Id. Finally, the ALJ indicated

that Dr. Shapiro’s diagnosis of Avalos’ severe mental impairment in 2000 could not relate

back to the earlier pre-DLI period.8 Id. 

The ALJ also considered the March 1999 state agency reports. Although the ALJ

“d[id] not dispute that [Avalos] had a disabling mental impairment in January 1999,” he did

not find the impairment to relate back to the period prior to Avalos’ DLI. Id. at 382, 425-26. 

Additionally, the ALJ considered other factors, such as subjective symptoms, in

assessing Avalos’ credibility, but gave them no weight because they did not relate back to

the period before Avalos’ DLI either. Id. at 123-32, 425. For the above reasons, the ALJ

did not find that, prior to Avalos’ DLI, his alleged physical or mental impairments were

either credible or severe. Id. at 426.

At the third step, the ALJ did not find Avalos’ physical or mental impairments to

have met the severity of any medical condition contained in the regulation’s Listing of

Impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). With respect to Avalos’ physical impairment,

the ALJ found no documentation or evidence in the record that would have met the

Listing’s physical impairment criteria. Id. at 423, 661. Moreover, because Avalos’

attorney made no arguments and conceded this issue, the ALJ did not find disability at this

step. Id. at 172-74, 423, 661. Neither party contests this finding today. 

At the fourth step, the ALJ found Avalos to lack residual functional capacity (“RFC”)

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due to his physical limitations to perform medium-level exertion as would have been

required by his past work. Id. at 424, 427. The ALJ found minimal evidence in the record

to substantiate Avalos’ claim of physical impairment. Id. at 424. The ALJ reviewed

medical opinions and symptoms in making this finding. Id. He noted that in January 1997,

Dr. Wiesner of Kaiser Permanente treated Avalos after he injured his low back. Id. at 175,

424. The ALJ also noted that Dr. Wiesner recommended physical therapy and predicted

Avalos’ return to work in nine days. Id. 

The ALJ noted the following evidence in support of his finding that Avalos did not

have any physical impairment. After Avalos participated in physical therapy, he reported a

decrease in pain. Id. at 178, 424. Also, in April 1997, Dr. Spencer, Avalos’ treating

physician, found: (1) no limitations in Avalos’ ability to walk or stand; (2) his ability to lift up

to 25 lbs.; (3) his ability to sit or drive for one half hour at a time; and (4) his ability to

occasionally bend, squat, or kneel. Id. at 346, 424. She found him able to return to “light

duty” days later. Id. at 347, 424. Subsequently, in May 1997, she found his back condition

stable and labeled him fit to pursue vocational rehabilitation. Id. at 340, 342, 424. 

Moreover, the state agency medical consultants concluded that Avalos was physically able

to perform a full range of light work activities. Id. at 231, 424. 

Moreover, the ALJ noted that Avalos had received only a minimal amount of

treatment with physical therapy. Id. at 424. He further stated that Avalos’ doctors did not

consider his injury a permanent disability, and they anticipated Avalos’ prompt return to

work. Id. at 175, 347. The ALJ also found that Avalos’ daily activities were not limited by

his back condition. Id. at 145-56, 185. For these reasons, the ALJ found Avalos’

credibility and testimony to be unpersuasive with respect to his alleged physical limitations. 

Id. at 424. 

However, taking into account Avalos’ RFC as affected by Avalos’ physical

capability for light work, the ALJ ultimately concluded that Avalos “was unable to do his

past relevant work as an automobile mechanic” because the past work would have

required medium-level exertion. Id. at 426. 

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9 Avalos challenges the ALJ’s credibility determination regarding his mental

impairments only. 

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At the fifth step, the ALJ demonstrated through consideration of Avalos’ RFC, age,

education, and past work experience that Avalos could have performed a full range of light

work that had existed in the national economy. With this, the ALJ found that Avalos was

not disabled at the fifth step, and therefore not disabled under Title II. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court has jurisdiction to review final decisions

of the Commissioner of Social Security. The ALJ’s ruling must be affirmed if the ALJ’s

findings are “supported by substantial evidence and if the [ALJ] applied the correct legal

standards.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial

evidence” means more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, or evidence which a

reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the evidence is susceptible to more

than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's conclusion must be upheld. Id.

B. Issues

Avalos seeks reversal of the Commissioner’s denial of Social Security disability

benefits, arguing as follows: 

(1) the ALJ’s finding that Avalos did not have a severe mental impairment prior to

Avalos’ DLI at Step Two was not supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ

improperly discounted Avalos’ credibility regarding his mental impairments;9

(2) the ALJ failed to adhere to the prescribed procedures for determining the onset

date of Avalos’ mental impairment; 

(3) the ALJ improperly excluded consideration of Avalos’ mental impairments from

his RFC analysis at Step Four; 

(4) the ALJ improperly applied the rules in the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

(“grids”) at Step Five; and

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(5) the ALJ failed to follow the court’s remand order.

In the cross-motion, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision should be

upheld because it is supported by substantial evidence.

C. Analysis

1. The ALJ’s Finding of No Severe Mental Impairment Is Not

Supported by Substantial Evidence

a. The ALJ Failed to Provide Specific, Legitimate Reasons

for Discounting Avalos’ Examining Physician’s Opinions

Avalos contends that the ALJ improperly disregarded the medical opinion of one of

his examining physicians, Dr. Sussman. Avalos claims Dr. Sussman’s opinion provided

evidence of longstanding mental impairments with very significant limitations that would

substantiate a finding of severe impairment. Avalos argues that the ALJ failed to set forth

specific, legitimate reasons for disregarding those aspects of Dr. Sussman’s opinion. 

Moreover, he claims that his examining physician’s opinion was entitled to controlling

weight despite the contradictory assessments by nonexamining physicians, Drs. Shapiro

and Brodzinsky, and the inconsistencies between Dr. Sussman’s opinion and the

nonexamining physicians’ objective medical findings. On the other hand, the

Commissioner contends that the ALJ was entitled to resolve any inconsistency between

medical reports with respect to the finding of a severe mental impairment. 

Ninth Circuit case law distinguishes amongst the weight to be accorded to the

opinions of three types of physicians: (1) those who treat the claimant (treating physicians);

(2) those who examine but do not treat the claimant (examining physicians) and (3) those

who neither examine nor treat the claimant (nonexamining physicians). Lester v. Chater,

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1996). Generally, an examining physician’s opinion is entitled

to greater weight than a nonexamining physician regarding a claimant’s medical disability. 

Id. The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted

opinion of the examining physician. If a discrepancy exists between the opinions of the

different physicians, the ALJ may discount a physician’s opinion by setting forth “specific

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10 Drs. Shapiro and Brodzinsky, the nonexamining physicians who reviewed portions

of Avalos’ medical record seemingly for the first time at the hearing, found no evidence of

severe mental impairment. Id. at 662, 664. 

11It appears that the ALJ mayhave discounted Dr. Sussman’s opinionbecause it was

issued in 1997,one year after Avalos’ alleged 1996 DLI, as testified to byDr. Shapiro. Id. at

662, 664. However, for the reasons discussed later in this order, the ALJ’s reliance on the

1996 DLI was in error. 

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and legitimate reasons” based upon substantial evidence. Id. at 830-31. The ALJ can

fulfill his responsibility by “setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and

conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” 

Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600-01 (9th Cir. 1999).

Here, Dr. Sussman, Avalos’ examining physician in 1997, stated his opinion that

Avalos’ condition was “strongly suggestive of a longstanding preexisting personality

disorder, Depressive type,” while Avalos’ “personality scales show[ed] a chronic pattern of

moderate depression [ ] characterized by long-term symptoms [ ] that have progressed

over the years.” A.R. 195, 198. Moreover, “his disorder ha[d] played a major role in his

psychiatric disability.” Id. at 198. Because he was an examining physician, Dr. Sussman’s

opinion was entitled to greater weight than the opinions of Drs. Shapiro and Brodzinsky.10 

The ALJ not only failed to provide the requisite specific and legitimate reasons for

rejecting the gravity and materiality of Dr. Sussman’s findings, he failed to address Dr.

Sussman’s opinions entirely. Thus, the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Sussman’s opinion

without providing the reasons for doing so. See, e.g., Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d at 831

(finding that the Commissioner erred when he rejected the opinion of the examining

physician in favor of a nonexamining physician without providing “specific and legitimate

reasons” supported by substantial evidence in the record).11

b. The ALJ Failed to Provide Specific, Legitimate

Reasons for Rejecting Avalos’ Treating Physician’s

Opinion

Avalos argues, based on three Ninth Circuit cases, that when the ultimate question

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of a claimant’s disability turns on the degree of impairment, a treating physician’s medical

opinion may not be disregarded by the ALJ. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226 (9th

Cir. 1987); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1987); Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d

498 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit, however, ruled in all of these cases that a treating

physician’s opinion may be rejected so long as the ALJ cites specific, legitimate reasons

based on substantial evidence in the record. See Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1230; Winans,

853 F.2d at 647; Hammock, 879 F.2d at 502. In each of these cases, the reviewing court

found that the ALJ either failed to note any specific reasons at all for rejecting the treating

physician’s opinion or made inadequate references to the treating physician’s findings

without providing legitimate reasons for rejecting those findings. See Sprague, 812 F.2d

at 1231; Winans, 853 F.2d at 647; Hammock, 879 F.2d at 502. 

Dr. Spencer, Avalos’ treating physician, documented a long history of Avalos’ battle

against depression that dated back as early as 1995. Dr. Spencer found that Avalos’

depression was exacerbated by his low back pain, was related to his injury, and was

acute. A.R. at 344, 350, 360. However, the ALJ, without citing any specific, legitimate

reasons based on substantial evidence in the record, discounted Dr. Spencer’s six-years’

worth of material medical diagnoses with the single conclusory finding that the doctor

“failed to establish any significant psychiatric limitations.” Id. at 425. Thus, the ALJ erred

by failing to cite specific reasons for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion. 

c. The ALJ Failed to Provide Specific, Legitimate

Reasons for Discounting Avalos’ Credibility

Avalos also contends that the ALJ erred in rejecting his testimony regarding his

mental condition prior to his DLI. While the ALJ is responsible for determining credibility,

the ALJ’s findings “must be supported by specific, cogent reasons.” Reddick v. Chater,

157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Also, “[g]eneral findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ

must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s

complaints.” Id.

Here, the evidence supported a finding that Avalos had a mental impairment prior

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to his DLI. Avalos’ testimony included many accounts of his mental impairments prior to

his DLI (A.R. 35-57, 671-678). He described that he had trouble being around others and

trusting them (Id. at 674) and had heard voices coming from the television when it was not

even powered (Id. at 41). Moreover, Dr. Sussman’s report in 1997 was available to

confirm many of Avalos’ statements particularly those regarding Avalos’ lackluster power

to concentrate and his depressed mood. Id. at 189. Accordingly, Avalos provided

sufficient evidence such that the ALJ was duty-bound to provide “specific, cogent reasons”

for rejecting Avalos’ testimony. The ALJ’s general finding that Avalos’ statements

described his condition after, as opposed to before, his DLI does not suffice. 

Moreover, absent affirmative evidence of malingering, the ALJ can reject the

claimant’s testimony regarding the severity of his symptoms only by offering clear and

convincing reasons. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. Evidence that can be considered in

evaluating a claimant’s credibility includes inconsistencies in the claimant’s testimony, the

extent of the claimant’s daily activities, observations of physicians, or any unexplained

failure to follow a course of prescribed treatment. Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 346. 

Here, the ALJ did not find malingering or discredit Avalos’ testimony in its entirety. 

A.R. 650-84. Rather, the ALJ even suggested that he would consider “th[e] claimant [as]

being credible, as credible as he [could have been].” Id. at 679. Nonetheless, the ALJ

rejected Avalos’ testimony regarding his mental health because it “d[id] not relate to the

period at issue, [and] gave them no weight.” Id. at 425, 426, 669-70. Furthermore, the

ALJ simply concluded that the impairments prior to Avalos’ DLI were not credible. Id. at

426. Additionally, the ALJ erroneously concluded that the relevant case law or Social

Security Rulings did not require him to list reasons and factors in rejecting a claimant’s

credibility. To the contrary, Ninth Circuit law requires such specificity. See Bruton v.

Massanari, 268 F.3d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lester, 81 F.3d at 834) (ALJ must

provide specific, cogent reasons in discounting claimant’s credibility regarding his

impairments).

2. The ALJ Improperly Determined the Onset Date of Avalos’

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12 Although the Commissioner contends that Dr. Shapiro acting in the capacity of a

medical advisor had indeed offered his services and testified, Dr. Shapiro made no

determination of a disability onset date because he found no mental impairment prior to the

erroneous DLI. Thus, the ALJ inferred Avalos’ disability onset date of January 1999 on his

own, without the assistance of a medical advisor, which was at odds with SSR 83-20, Ninth

Circuit case law, and this court’s prior remand order. 

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Mental Impairment

Avalos also contends that the ALJ erred when he determined his disability onset

date without seeking the assistance of a medical advisor. In evaluating the state agency

medical consultants’ psychological examination, the ALJ stated that he did “not dispute

that [Avalos] had a disabling mental impairment in January 1999.” A.R. 426. Because the

ALJ accepted Avalos’ mental impairment as of that date, it is reasonably inferred that the

ALJ would have found a severe mental impairment but for the fact that the January 1999

examination took place after Avalos’ DLI of December 1998. Id. 

According to Social Security Ruling 83-20, the ALJ must call upon a medical

advisor to determine the disability onset date when the medical evidence is not definite

concerning the date and medical inferences have to be made. SSR 83-20; Armstrong v.

Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Adm., 160 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 1998). Here, the onset date

was not clear, and the ALJ was required to make certain inferences. He was thus required

to consult a medical advisor before doing so. It does not appear that the ALJ consulted an

advisor, as argued by the Commissioner;12 instead, the ALJ’s decision suggests that he

made the onset date determination based on Avalos’ state agency medical consultation. 

For this reason, the ALJ’s determination contravenes the prior stipulated remand order

which required him to consult a medical advisor to assist in making this determination. 

A.R. at 493. 

3. The ALJ Improperly Excluded Consideration of Avalos’ Mental

Impairments from His RFC Analysis

Avalos also contends that the ALJ erred when he failed to review the limiting effects

of all of Avalos’ impairments, both severe and non-severe, and both physical and mental, in

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his RFC findings. 

When the applicant has a severe impairment, but the symptoms, signs, and findings

do not meet those of a listed impairment, the ALJ is required to consider the limiting

effects of all impairments in the RFC determination. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(e) (emphasis

added). The RFC assessment must address the remaining nonexertional capacities that

include all work-related mental limitations and restrictions. S.S.R. 96-8p. 

Here, however, the record reveals that the ALJ did not properly assess Avalos’

RFC or consult the medical examiner, Dr. Shapiro, regarding Avalos' RFC based on a

combination of Avalos’ low back pain and depression. Instead, in his decision, the ALJ

relied only upon Avalos’ severe physical impairment caused by his low back injury, id. at

423, 426, and did not consider Avalos’ depression, despite acknowledging the mental

impairment in his assessment of Avalos’ credibility at Step Two. Id. at 426. Nor could this

court locate any discussion of the combined effects of Avalos’ mental and physical

impairment on his RFC and ability to perform other work, in the pertinent hearing

transcripts. Id. at 652-83. The ALJ thus erred by failing to consider the collective impact of

Avalos’ impairments. Id. at 421-28; see also, e.g., Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d

789, 793 (9th Cir. 1997) ("In determining [the claimant's] residual functional capacity, the

ALJ must consider whether the aggregate of [the claimant's] mental and physical

impairments may so incapacitate him that he is unable to perform available work.");

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding ALJ committed

reversible error by not only failing to consider whether combination of impairments was

"severe" at step two, but also failing to consider how combination of impairments affected

the claimant's RFC). 

4. The ALJ Improperly Applied the Rules in the MedicalVocational Guidelines (“Grids”)

Avalos further argues that the ALJ improperly applied the rules in the MedicalVocational Guidelines (“grids”). 

Under the regulations, once a claimant has established that a severe impairment

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prevents him from doing his previous work, the burden shifts to the Commissoner at step

five to demonstrate that the claimant can perform other work that exists in “significant

numbers” in the national economy, taking into account the claimant’s RFC, age, education

and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(3). The ALJ can meet this burden by

using the grids at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, or by relying on the testimony of a

vocational expert (“VE”). See, e.g., Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The grids present a short-hand method to resolve individual claims that involve

standardized levels of impairment, taking into account a claimant’s age, education, and the

transferability of a claimant’s vocational skills, if any. Id. The grids categorize jobs by their

physical-exertion requirements and consist of a series of three tables: one for claimants

who can perform “sedentary work,” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 subpt. P, app. 2, table 1; one for

claimants who can perform “light work,” id. table 2; and one for claimants who can perform

“medium work,” id. table 3. Use of the grids encourages the uniform treatment of claims

and promotes efficiency. Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1101. However, the grids are to be used

only where they “completely and accurately describe the claimant’s abilities and

limitations.” Id. at 1101-02 (citing Desrosiers v. Sec’y of HHS, 846 F.2d 573, 577-78

(Pregerson, J., concurring) (9th Cir. 1988). When the grids do not fully describe a

claimant’s limitations, the ALJ must rely on the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”). 

Moore v. Apfel, 216 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2000).

Moreover, Ninth Circuit law suggests that the existence of significant non-exertional

impairments make an ALJ’s reliance on the grids inappropriate. Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at

578. However, the fact that non-exertional limitation is alleged does not automatically

preclude application of the grids. Id. The ALJ should first determine if a claimant’s nonexertional limitations significantly limit the range of work permitted by his exertional

limitations. Id. 

In this case, the ALJ failed to address whether Avalos’ mental limitations

significantly limited the range of work permitted by his physical exertional limitations.

Because the ALJ failed to evaluate the medical evidence properly before deciding whether

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the use of the grids would be appropriate, the ALJ’s reliance on the grids was

inappropriate. 

5. The ALJ Failed to Follow the Court’s Remand Order

Avalos claims that the stipulation and court order required the Commissioner to

reevaluate his credibility and to consult a medical expert to help determine the disability

onset date. As discussed above, the ALJ failed to complete both of these tasks. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the court finds that the ALJ erred. Although Avalos

requests reversal of the Commissioner’s decision and an award of benefits, because the

record is incomplete, the court finds that remand is appropriate. Because the ALJ clearly

did not fulfill his responsibilities under the first stipulated order of remand, the

Commissioner is advised that the court expects her full compliance with this order. 

Accordingly, Avalos’ motion for summary judgment and/or remand is GRANTED. The

Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED. On remand, the ALJ

must:

1. Reconsider the testimony of Avalos, his treating physician and his examining

physician, and accord them the proper weight and if their testimony is again

rejected, articulate specific cogent reasons for the rejection;

2. Consult a medical advisor before re-determining the onset date of Avalos’

mental impairment;

3. Re-assess Avalos’ RFC afer considering the collective impact of Avalos’

impairments;

4. Make appropriate medical findings regarding Avalos’ mental impairment

before employing the vocational grids;

5. Consider all of the relevant evidence pertaining to Avalos’ mental health prior

to Avalos’ correct DLI.

This order fully adjudicates the motions listed at nos. 14 and 19 of the clerk’s docket

for this case. The clerk shall close the file. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2005

_________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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