Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30001/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30001-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Anthony LaCoste
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSEPH ANTHONY LACOSTE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-30001

D.C. No.

6:11-cr-60048-AA-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Ann L. Aiken, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 11, 2016

Portland, Oregon

Filed May 12, 2016

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Paul J. Watford, Circuit

Judges, and Donald E. Walter,*

 Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Watford

* The Honorable Donald E. Walter, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Western District ofLouisiana, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel vacated conditions of supervised release

prohibiting the defendant from using the Internet without

prior approval from his probation officer and precluding him

from residing in certain counties upon his release from

prison, in a case in which the defendant pleaded guilty to

conspiracy to commit securities fraud.

Reviewing for plain error, the panel held that the facts of

this case do not permit a total ban on Internet access, where

the defendant’s use of the Internet played only a tangential

role in his commission of the underlying fraud offense, the

defendant does not have a history of using the Internet to

commit other offenses, and nothing in the record suggests that

his use of the Internet to post disparaging comments about

some of his victims rose to the level of a criminal offense. 

The panel wrote that the proviso allowing the defendant to

use the Internet so long as he first obtains his probation

officer’s approval does not save what is otherwise a plainly

overbroad restriction on his liberty. The panel remanded for

the district court to craft a more narrowly-tailored condition

if it concludes that such a condition is warranted and valid.

Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the panel held that

simply declaring that the defendant is likely to resume a life

of crime if he returns to a given area is not enough to support

a residency restriction, unless the reasons are obvious from

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 3

the record. The panel held that the residency restriction is

also flawed because the record does not make clear why such

a restriction, if one is warranted, should encompass two

counties beyond the counties around which the district court’s

stated concerns revolve. The panel could not uphold the

restriction on the basis of the community’s need to heal,

where the defendant will not return to the community until

2019 after he serves his prison sentence for conduct that

occurred in 2006 and 2007. The panel instructed that if the

district court seeks to reimpose the condition on remand, it

should explain more fully its reasons for doing so.

The panel rejected the defendant’s challenges to the

validity of his conviction and the length of his prison sentence

in an unpublished memorandum.

COUNSEL

Robert Warren Rainwater (argued), Rainwater Law Group,

Portland, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.

Scott Edward Bradford (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney; Kelly A. Zusman, Appellate Chief, United States

Attorney’s Office; and Billy J. Williams, Acting United

States Attorney, Portland, Oregon, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

Joseph LaCoste pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy

to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. 

The district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison

followed by a three-year term of supervised release. In an

unpublished memorandum, we reject LaCoste’s challenges to

the validity of his conviction and the length of his prison

sentence. Here we resolve LaCoste’s challenges to two of the

supervised release conditions the district court imposed: one

prohibiting him from using the Internet without prior

approval from his probation officer, the other precluding him

from residing in certain counties upon his release from

prison.

I

Not much is needed by way of background. LaCoste

solicited money from individuals to invest in various real

estate projects in Oregon. In soliciting the money, LaCoste

was not fully candid about his background, and after the

projects ran into financial trouble he misled investors about

the solvency of the projects. The government charged

LaCoste with (among other offenses) conspiracy to commit

securities fraud, securities fraud, bankruptcy fraud, and

multiple counts of mail and wire fraud. LaCoste agreed to

plead guilty to the conspiracy charge in exchange for

dismissal of the remaining charges.

At sentencing, the court heard from five individuals—two

victims of the fraud and three supporters of LaCoste. The

remarks by these individuals suggested that LaCoste’s

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 5

criminal conduct had caused significant financial and

emotional strife among residents of Albany, Oregon, the

community in which LaCoste lived. In addition, when

discussing LaCoste’s post-indictment behavior, one of the

victims stated: “When I did not respond to his—his letters,

I would get—we would go on the Internet, and on Craig’s

List on rants and raves, on church—on Sundays, there would

be comments about my husband and myself in church. I

don’t know anybody else that would do that except

[LaCoste].”

That comment appeared to form the sole basis for the

district court’s decision, at the end of the hearing, to impose

the first of the challenged supervised release conditions: 

“[Y]ou shall have no Internet access or posting ability on any

Internet device unless [you receive] prior approval from the

probation officer.” (The written judgment states the

condition in these terms: “The defendant is prohibited from

using the internet without the prior approval of the U.S.

Probation Officer.”) The court gave the following

explanation for imposing this condition: “If, in fact, there are

postings at this point, and when you come out we’ll revisit

that provision, because what I want [to] do is de-escalate

what may be happening in the community and you’re not to

have any access unless you’re given specific permission to

have access through probation and through ways in which we

can secure who you’re communicating with.”

The court also imposed a residency restriction as a

condition of supervised release: “And, finally, you shall not

reside in Linn, Benton, Lane, or Marion Counties, and you

shall find—when you return to the community, there will be

a placement and we will take a look at where it will be at that

time.” (The written judgment states that LaCoste “shall not

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6 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

be in Linn, Benton, Lane or Marion Counties without prior

approval of the U.S. Probation Officer.” Given the conflict

between the two, the oral pronouncement controls. See

United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 668 (9th Cir. 1998).) 

The district court gave two reasons for imposing this

condition: (1) to ensure that LaCoste did not resume his

criminal behavior; and (2) to give the community in which he

lived a chance to heal. The court stressed in particular that it

did not want LaCoste to return to Albany:

So one of the provisions I have in here

that I have entertained is I don’t want you

necessarily going back and living in that

community while you’re on supervised

release. You need to start fresh and get out of

that community.

I don’t think it’s healthy. I don’t think

anybody trusts. I think it only exacerbates

things. And I think you need to start over and

get a job and lead a different life.

So when I looked at this last night, I

circled Linn, Benton, Lane, and Marion

County as places that you’re not to do your

supervised release. You’re to find another

community because it’s too much—there’s

too much baggage, too much likelihood to get

you back being the same old guy with those

same old behaviors.

And on balance, for the community’s

sake, it gives them a chance to heal, instead of

taking sides in the community.

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 7

LaCoste challenges both the Internet-use restriction and

the residency restriction. Neither of those supervised release

conditions had been recommended in the Presentence Report

or suggested by the government, so the district court’s

remarks at sentencing provide the only explanation for why

the conditions might be warranted. LaCoste’s lawyer

objected to the residency restriction but not to the Internet-use

restriction.

II

We address the Internet-use restriction first. Because

LaCoste failed to object to this condition at sentencing, plain

error review applies. United States v. Barsumyan, 517 F.3d

1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To

prevail, he must show that the district court’s error was plain

and that it affected his substantial rights. If he makes that

showing, we have the discretion to correct the error if it

“‘seriouslyaffect[s]the fairness, integrityor public reputation

of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). We conclude that relief is

warranted under this standard.

District judges enjoy broad discretion in fashioning the

conditions needed for successful supervision of a defendant,

and we owe substantial deference to the choices they make. 

That is as it should be, since district judges gain far more

familiarity with the defendant’s criminal conduct and life

circumstances than appellate judges do. Congress has

nonetheless set limits on the exercise of that discretion, which

we are bound to enforce. A district judge may impose any

supervised release condition she deems appropriate, subject

to three primary constraints. First, the condition must be

reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the

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8 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, or

the sentencing-related goals of deterrence, protection of the

public, or rehabilitation. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(1),

3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d

608, 618 (9th Cir. 2003). Second, the condition must be

consistent with the Sentencing Commission’s policy

statements. § 3583(d)(3). And finally, the condition may

involve “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary” to serve the goals of supervised release. 

§ 3583(d)(2); see United States v. Riley, 576 F.3d 1046, 1048

(9th Cir. 2009).

The district court concluded that the Internet-use

restriction was reasonably related to LaCoste’s history and

characteristics—namely, his apparent use of the Internet to

disparage the victims of his offense. That, at least, is what we

infer from the district court’s brief explanation for imposing

the condition, which referred to LaCoste’s “postings,” the

desire to “de-escalate what may be happening in the

community,” and the need to “secure who you’re

communicating with.” A district judge undoubtedly has the

authority to stop a defendant from disparaging his victims

through communications directed to the victims personally. 

LaCoste, however, does not appear to have engaged in any

one-to-one communications of this sort. He appears instead

to have posted disparaging comments about some of his

victims on the Internet. Although the record is a bit hazy on

this score, that is what one of the victims seemed to state at

the sentencing hearing. She alleged that LaCoste had posted

“rants and raves” about her and her husband through online

channels and that those posts had reached an audience at least

as broad as members of their church.

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 9

We need not decide (because the issue has not been

raised) whether First Amendment concerns constrain a

district judge’s authority to stop a defendant from posting

disparaging remarks about his victims on the Internet. Even

if the district court could impose a supervised release

condition prohibiting such conduct here, the condition it

actually imposed sweeps far more broadly. The court

prohibited LaCoste from making any use of the Internet

without first getting his probation officer’s approval. In our

view, that condition involves a greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary to address the district court’s

concerns. Use of the Internet is vital for a wide range of

routine activities in today’s world—finding and applying for

work, obtaining government services, engaging in commerce,

communicating with friends and family, and gathering

information on just about anything, to take but a few

examples. Cutting off all access to the Internet constrains a

defendant’s freedom in ways that make it difficult to

participate fully in society and the economy.

Precisely because access to the Internet has become so

vital, courts have upheld conditions prohibiting all use of the

Internet only in limited circumstances. Thus far, such

conditions have been permitted in one of two scenarios: when

use of the Internet was “essential” or “integral” to the offense

of conviction, or when the Internet played no role in the

offense of conviction but the defendant had a history of using

the Internet to commit other offenses. See United States v.

Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005); United States

v. Perazza-Mercado, 553 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 2009). 

Published decisions in our circuit have upheld conditions

barring all Internet use only when the offenses at issue

involved child pornography or sexual abuse of minors. See

Barsumyan, 517 F.3d at 1161 n.11; United States v. Sales,

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10 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

476 F.3d 732, 736 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007). Other circuits have

refused to uphold total bans on Internet access even in cases

involving the receipt of child pornography. See, e.g., United

States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2003); United

States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003);

United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2002);

United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206–07 (10th Cir.

2001).

The facts of this case do not permit imposition of a total

ban on Internet access. LaCoste’s use of the Internet played

only a tangential role in his commission of the underlying

fraud offense. The record suggests that LaCoste used the

Internet to communicate by email with investors and his coconspirators, but using the Internet to that extent was no more

integral or essential to the commission of the offense than use

of the telephone or the mails was. Nor does LaCoste have a

history of using the Internet to commit other offenses. He

may have used the Internet to post disparaging comments

about some of his victims, but nothing in the record suggests

that such conduct rose to the level of a criminal offense. On

remand, the district court can attempt to craft a more

narrowly tailored condition directed at LaCoste’s offensive

Internet posts, but a total ban on all use of the Internet is

unwarranted.

The government seeks to defend the condition as drafted

by arguing that it is not really a total ban, since it allows

LaCoste to use the Internet so long as he first obtains his

probation officer’s approval. That proviso does not save what

is otherwise a plainly overbroad restriction on LaCoste’s

liberty. When a total ban on Internet access cannot be

justified, as is the case here, we have held that a proviso for

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 11

probation-officer approval does not cure the problem. See

Sales, 476 F.3d at 737. And for good reason: If a total ban

on Internet use is improper but a more narrowly tailored

restriction would be justified, the solution is to have the

district court itself fashion the terms of that narrower

restriction. Imposing a total ban and transferring open-ended

discretion to the probation officer to authorize needed

exceptions is not a permissible alternative. See United States

v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003).

The two remaining requirements for granting relief under

the plain error standard are satisfied as well. Because the

Internet-use restriction as currently drafted affected his

sentence and may not lawfully be imposed, it necessarily

affects LaCoste’s substantial rights and the perceived fairness

of the judicial proceedings. See Barsumyan, 517 F.3d at

1162; United States v. Burroughs, 613 F.3d 233, 245–46

(D.C. Cir. 2010). We vacate the Internet-use restriction and

remand for the district court to craft a more narrowly tailored

condition if it concludes that such a condition is warranted

and valid.

III

We turn next to the supervised release condition barring

LaCoste from residing in Linn, Benton, Lane, or Marion

Counties. LaCoste objected to this condition at sentencing,

so we review the district court’s decision to impose it for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d

915, 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2008). We conclude that this

condition, too, must be vacated.

Residency restrictions are unquestionably permissible as

a general matter. Congress has authorized district courts to

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12 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

impose conditions requiring that a defendant “reside in a

specified place or area, or refrain from residing in a specified

place or area.” 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(13); see § 3583(d). But

such restrictions can impose a severe burden on a defendant’s

liberty interests. Most defendants have a strong interest in

returning to the area where they previously lived. A

defendant’s established community ties—the presence of

family, friends, and other support networks—can often play

an important role in making the transition from prison to life

as a productive member of society.

There are of course situations in which a defendant’s ties

to his former community may not be a positive influence, and

in such cases a condition of supervised release barring the

defendant’s return may well be justified. Courts have

typically upheld so-called “banishment” conditions when the

defendant’s ties to a particular area contributed to his past

criminality, thus increasing the likelihood that he will reoffend if he returns. See, e.g., United States v. Watson,

582 F.3d 974, 983–85 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Sicher, 239 F.3d 289, 291–92 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v.

Cothran, 855 F.2d 749, 752 (11th Cir. 1988).

The district court relied on similar considerations here,

stating that LaCoste would likely go back to “being the same

old guy with those same old behaviors” if he were to return

to Albany. But the court did not adequately explain the basis

for its view. Simply declaring that a defendant is likely to

resume a life of crime if he returns to a given area is not

enough, unless the reasons are obvious from the record. See

United States v. Collins, 684 F.3d 873, 890 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Here they are not. It is not obvious why LaCoste would be

more likely to engage in another fraudulent scheme if he

returns to Albany as opposed to someplace else. We cannot

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UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE 13

tell from the record before us, for example, whether the

Albany area offers LaCoste unique opportunities (or

temptations) for resuming his criminal behavior. Without a

more detailed explanation of the district court’s reasons for

choosing this condition, we are unable to affirm the

imposition of a residency restriction.

The residency restriction as currently framed is flawed for

another reason. The district court’s stated concerns seemed

to revolve solely around LaCoste’s return to Albany, which

is located in Linn and Benton Counties. However, the

residency restriction extends to Lane and Marion Counties as

well. The record does not make clear why a residency

restriction, if one is indeed warranted, should encompass

those two counties. The government argues that the

restriction justifiably includes all four counties because the

real estate projects LaCoste promised to build were to be

located in those counties. That may be true, but it does not

explain why forbidding LaCoste to live within the fourcounty region will further any of the purposes of supervised

release. Nor can we uphold the residency restriction on the

basis of the court’s other reason for imposing it—the

community’s need to heal. As things stand, LaCoste will not

return to the community until 2019, after he serves his fiveyear prison sentence. That seems like a sufficiently long

period on its own to allow the community to heal, particularly

since the conduct for which LaCoste was sentenced occurred

in 2006 and 2007.

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14 UNITED STATES V. LACOSTE

We vacate the residency restriction. If the district court

seeks to reimpose it on remand, the court should explain more

fully its reasons for doing so.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and

REMANDED.

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