Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01527/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01527-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Align Technology, Inc.
Intervenor
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC
Appellant
ClearCorrect Pakistan (Private), Ltd.
Appellant
International Trade Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC,

CLEARCORRECT PAKISTAN (PRIVATE), LTD.,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2014-1527

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-833.

______________________ 

Decided: November 10, 2015

______________________ 

MICHAEL D. MYERS, McClanahan Myers Espey, LLP ̧ 

Houston, TX, argued for appellants. Also represented by 

ROBERT HENRY ESPEY, II; GARY HNATH, PAUL WHITFIELD 

HUGHES, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, DC.

SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG, Office of the General Counsel, 

United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by WAYNE 

W. HERRINGTON, DOMINIC L. BIANCHI. 

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2 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

STEPHEN BLAKE KINNAIRD, Paul Hastings LLP, Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented by 

THOMAS A. COUNTS, IGOR VICTOR TIMOFEYEV. 

CHARLES DUAN ̧ Public Knowledge, Washington, DC, 

for amici curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public 

Knowledge. 

JOHN THORNE, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans 

& Figel, PLLC, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae The 

Internet Association. Also represented by MATTHEW A.

SELIGMAN; AARON M. PANNER ̧ Law Office of Aaron M. 

Panner, PLLC, Washington, DC.

JEFFREY A. LAMKEN, MoloLamken LLP, Washington, 

DC, for amicus curiae Business Software Alliance. 

STEVEN METALITZ, Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 

LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Association of 

American Publishers.

JOHN D. HAYNES, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for 

amici curiae Nokia Corporation, Nokia USA, Inc. Also 

represented by ADAM DAVID SWAIN ̧ BENN C. WILSON, 

Washington, DC.

JONATHAN J. ENGLER, Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP, Washington, DC, for amici curiae Motion 

Picture Association of America, Recording Industry Association of America. Also represented by THOMAS RICHARD 

BURNS, JR., TOM M. SCHAUMBERG. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and O’MALLEY,

Circuit Judges

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

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Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge O’MALLEY. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge NEWMAN. 

PROST, Chief Judge. 

The Tariff Act of 1930 provides the International 

Trade Commission (“Commission”) with authority to 

remedy only those unfair acts that involve the importation of “articles” as described in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 

Here, the Commission concluded that “articles” “should be 

construed to include electronic transmission of digital 

data. . . .” In re Certain Digital Models, Inv. No. 337-TA833 at 55 (Apr. 3, 2014) (“Final Comm’n Op.”). We disagree. 

The Commission’s decision to expand the scope of its 

jurisdiction to include electronic transmissions of digital 

data runs counter to the “unambiguously expressed intent 

of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Under step one of 

Chevron, “[w]e begin with the text of [the statute].” King 

v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015). Here, it is clear

that “articles” means “material things,” whether when 

looking to the literal text or when read in context “with a 

view to [the term’s] place in the overall statutory scheme.” 

Id. We recognize, of course, that electronic transmissions 

have some physical properties—for example an electron’s 

invariant mass is a known quantity—but commonsense 

dictates that there is a fundamental difference between 

electronic transmissions and “material things.” Our 

analysis is therefore complete. However, even under step 

two of Chevron, an analysis of the Commission’s opinion 

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makes clear that it is unreasonable and therefore not 

entitled to deference.1 

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the Commission’s decision and conclude that the Commission does not 

have jurisdiction over this case.2 

I. BACKGROUND

The Commission instituted the present investigation 

based on a complaint filed by Align Technology, Inc. 

(“Align”). Align alleged a violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 

(“Section 337”) by reason of infringement of various 

claims of seven different patents.3 The respondents to the 

1 While this court recently interpreted the phrase 

“articles that infringe” in Suprema, Inc. v. International 

Trade Commission, that opinion does not control here. 

2015 WL 4716604, at *5. In Suprema, we were dealing 

with the single issue of whether the respondent violated 

19 U.S.C. § 1337 by inducing a direct patent infringement 

that did not occur until after a tangible item was imported into the United States. Our opinion turned exclusively 

on the term “infringe” as used in 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(1). Conversely, here we are exclusively 

looking to the meaning of the term “articles.” Furthermore, the “articles” in question in Suprema were physical 

objects, and thus do not inform the question now before 

the court. Indeed the analysis in Suprema supports the 

decision here, as discussed infra. 2 As we do not overcome the threshold issue of the 

Commission’s jurisdiction, we do not reach the Appellant’s 

appeal regarding the Commission’s analysis of estoppel, 

contributory infringement, or invalidity. Appellant’s Br. 

17-59.

3 U.S. Patent No. 6,217,325 (“’325 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 6,705,863 (“’863 patent); U.S. Patent No. 

 

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investigation were ClearCorrect Operating, LLC 

(“ClearCorrect US”), and Clear Correct Pakistan (Private), Ltd. (“ClearCorrect Pakistan”) (collectively 

“ClearCorrect”). 

The technology at issue in this case relates to the production of orthodontic appliances, also known as aligners. 

The aligners in question “are configured to be placed 

successively on the patient’s teeth and to incrementally 

reposition the teeth from an initial tooth arrangement, 

through a plurality of intermediate tooth arrangements, 

and to a final tooth arrangement.” ’880 patent (abstract). 

ClearCorrect is a producer of these aligners.

ClearCorrect makes its aligners through the following 

process. ClearCorrect US scans physical models of the 

patient’s teeth and creates a digital recreation of the 

patient’s initial tooth arrangement. This digital recreation is electronically transmitted to ClearCorrect Pakistan, where the position of each tooth is manipulated to 

create a final tooth position. ClearCorrect Pakistan then 

creates digital data models of intermediate tooth positions. One intermediate tooth position is created for each 

incremental aligner. ClearCorrect Pakistan then transmits these digital models electronically to ClearCorrect 

US. ClearCorrect US subsequently 3D prints these 

digital models into physical models. Then an aligner is 

manufactured by thermoplastic molding using the physical model. Here, the accused “articles” are the transmission of the “digital models, digital data and treatment 

plans, expressed as digital data sets, which are virtual 

three-dimensional models of the desired positions of the 

6,626,666 (“’666 patent”); U.S. Patent No. 8,070,487 (“’487 

patent); U.S. Patent No. 6,471,511 (“’511 patent); U.S. 

Patent No. 6,722,880 (“’880 patent”); and U.S. Patent No. 

7,134,874 (“’874 patent”). 

 

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patients’ teeth at various stages of orthodontic treatment”

(“digital models”), from Pakistan to the United States. 

Final Comm’n Op. at 17. 

The parties and the Commission agreed to divide the 

patent claims into four Groups: Group I contains those 

claims that relate to methods of forming dental appliances,4 Group II contains those claims that relate to methods 

of producing digital data sets,5 Group III contains those 

claims that relate to a treatment plan based on a series of 

digital data sets on a storage medium,6 and Group IV 

contains those claims that relate to methods of producing 

dental appliances.7 The Commission found the Groups I 

and II claims8 to be infringed and not invalid. It is these 

claims that are at issue in this appeal. The Commission 

found the Groups III and IV claims to be either beyond 

the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction or not infringed. The Commission’s ruling concerning Groups III 

and IV are at issue in companion case Align Technology, 

4 Claims 21 and 30 of the ’325 patent and claim 1 of 

the ’880 patent.

5 Claims 31 and 32 of the ’325 patent, claims 1 and 

4-8 of the ’863 patent, claims 1, 3, 7, and 9 of the ’666 

patent, and claims 1, 3, and 5 of the ’487 patent.

6 Claims 7-9 of the ’487 patent.

7 Claims 1-3, 11, 13-14, 21, 30-35, and 38-39 of the 

’325 patent, claims 1 and 3 of the ’880 patent, claim 1 of 

the ’511 patent, and claims 1-2, 38-39, 41, and 62 of the 

’874 patent. 

8 To the extent that Group I and II claims overlap 

with Group IV claims, the Commission found that these 

claims were infringed and not invalid. Because of the 

posture of this appeal, the nature of the overlap is not 

relevant to this case and thus will not be discussed.

 

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Inc. v. International Trade Commission, No. 2014-1533, 

and not at issue in this case. 

While the Group I9 and Group II10 claims differ, for 

purposes of this appeal it is the similarity in Align’s 

9 Claim 1 of the ’880 patent is representative of the 

Group 1 claims and reads:

A method for making a predetermined series of 

dental incremental position adjustment appliances, said method comprising:

a) obtaining a digital data set representing an initial tooth arrangement;

b) obtaining a repositioned tooth arrangement based on the initial tooth arrangement;

c) obtaining a series of successive digital 

data sets representing a series of successive tooth arrangements; and

d) fabricating a predetermined series of 

dental incremental position adjustment 

appliances based on the series of successive digital data sets, wherein said appliances comprise polymeric shells having 

cavities shaped to receive and resiliently 

reposition teeth, and said appliances correspond to the series of successive tooth 

arrangements progressing from the initial 

to the repositioned tooth arrangement.

’880 patent col. 22 ll. 13-29. 10 Claim 21 of the ’325 patent is representative of 

the Group II claims and reads: 

 

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allegations of ClearCorrect’s infringement that are relevant—namely, ClearCorrect Pakistan’s electronic transmission of digital models to ClearCorrect US. 

The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted an 

evidentiary hearing in February 2013, and on May 6, 

2013, issued its Initial Determination. The ALJ found 

that—but for the claims related to the ’666 patent—

ClearCorrect infringed the Groups I and II patent claims. 

In so finding, the ALJ determined that the Commission 

had authority to order ClearCorrect to stop electronically 

importing digital models into the United States. The ALJ 

recommended that the Commission issue a cease and 

desist order directed to ClearCorrect to prohibit the 

importation of digital models. 

In response, both ClearCorrect and Align filed petitions for Commission review. The Commission initiated a 

review of the entire Initial Determination and solicited 

briefing from the parties and the public. While the public 

did not respond to the initial request by the Commission, 

the Commission extended its deadline and issued another 

A method for fabricating a dental appliance, said 

method comprising:

providing a digital data set representing a 

modified tooth arrangement for a patient;

controlling a fabrication machine based on 

the digital data set to produce a positive 

model of the modified tooth arrangement; 

and

producing the dental appliance as a negative of the positive model.

’325 patent col. 17 ll. 7-16.

 

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notice to the public. In response to this notice, the Commission received briefing from various nonparties including: the Association of American Publishers, Google Inc., 

Andrew Katz, The Motion Picture Association of America, 

and Nokia Corp.

On April 3, 2014, the Commission terminated the investigation finding the Groups I and II patent claims 

infringed. Specifically, the Commission found that 

ClearCorrect US directly infringed the Group I patents 

and ClearCorrect Pakistan contributed to that infringement.11 The Commission determined that, because 

ClearCorrect US’s infringement occurred in the United 

States, it was not a violation of Section 337. The Commission instead exerted its authority over ClearCorrect 

Pakistan as a contributory infringer for importing the 

data models. Additionally, the Commission found that 

ClearCorrect Pakistan practiced the Group II method 

claims in Pakistan and found that the importation of the 

resulting digital models violated 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). Finally, the Commission agreed with 

the ALJ that the Commission had jurisdictional authority 

over electronically imported data under Section 337. The 

Commission has stayed its cease and desist order until 

this appeal is resolved. 

Following the Commission’s decision, this case was 

timely appealed to us. We have jurisdiction to review the 

Commission’s findings under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(6).

II. DISCUSSION

“Section 337 declares certain activities related to importation to be unlawful trade acts and directs the Commission generally to grant prospective relief if it has 

11 Commissioner David S. Johanson dissented in the 

Commission’s findings. 

 

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found an unlawful trade act to have occurred.” Suprema, 

Inc., 2015 WL 4716604 at *5. “As a trade statute, the 

purpose of Section 337 is to regulate international commerce. Section 337 necessarily focuses on commercial 

activity related to cross-border movement of goods.” Id. 

(citation omitted). Congress established Section 337 to 

“curb[] unfair trade practices that involve the entry of 

goods into the U.S. market via importation. In sum, 

Section 337 is an enforcement statute enacted by Congress to stop at the border the entry of goods, i.e., articles, 

that are involved in unfair trade practices.” Id. Section 

337(a)(1) reads as follows:

Subject to paragraph (2), the following are unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist 

shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provision of law, as provided in this section:

(A) Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts 

in the importation of articles (other than articles 

provided for in subparagraphs (B), (C), (D), and 

(E)) into the United States, or in the sale of such 

articles by the owner, importer, or consignee, the 

threat or effect of which is— 

. . .

(B) The importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within the United 

States after importation by the owner, importer, 

or consignee, of articles that— 

. . .

(C) The importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within the United 

States after importation by the owner, importer, 

or consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and 

enforceable United States trademark registered 

under the Trademark Act of 1946 [15 U.S.C. 1051 

et seq.].

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. . . 

(E) The importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within the United 

States after importation by the owner, importer, 

or consigner, of an article that constitutes infringement of the exclusive rights in a design protected under chapter 13 of title 17.

19 U.S.C. § 1337 (alteration in original) (emphases 

added).

The Commission’s jurisdiction to remedy unfair international trade practices is limited to “unfair acts” involving the importation of “articles.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). 

Thus, when there is no importation of “articles” there can 

be no unfair act, and there is nothing for the Commission 

to remedy. Here, the only purported “article” found to 

have been imported was digital data that was transferred 

electronically, i.e., not digital data on a physical medium 

such as a compact disk or thumb drive. The Commission’s 

April 3, 2014, majority opinion devotes twenty-one pages 

of analysis to the question of whether “articles” encompasses digital data and ultimately concludes that it does. 

We have exclusive jurisdiction over “final determinations of the United States International Trade Commission relating to unfair practices in import trade made 

under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(6) (1994). However, when dealing with the 

interpretation of Section 337, “the ITC is entitled to 

appropriate deference.” Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998). As we 

recently held in Suprema, “[t]here is no dispute that 

Congress has delegated authority to the Commission to 

resolve ambiguity in Section 337 if the Commission does 

so through formal adjudicative procedures.” Suprema, 

Inc., 2015 WL 4716604 at *6. Furthermore, because the 

“Commission’s investigations under Section 337 require 

adequate notice, cross-examination, presentation of 

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evidence, objection, motion, argument, and all other 

rights essential to a fair hearing,” “we review the Commission’s interpretation pursuant to Chevron . . . .” Id. 

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Under Chevron, in reviewing an agency’s construction 

of its organic statute, we address two questions. City of 

Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2013). The 

two questions are as follows:

The first is whether Congress has directly spoken 

to the precise question at issue. If the answer is 

yes, then the inquiry ends, and we must give effect to Congress’ unambiguous intent. If the answer is no, the second question is whether the 

agency’s answer to the precise question at issue is 

based on a permissible construction of the statute. 

The agency’s interpretation governs in the absence of unambiguous statutory language to the 

contrary or unreasonable resolution of language 

that is ambiguous.

Suprema, Inc., 2015 WL 4716604 at *6 (citations omitted) 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets omitted). 

A. Chevron Step One

“In construing a statute, we begin with its literal text, 

giving it its plain meaning.” Hawkins v. United States, 

469 F.3d 993, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 

If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce 

it according to its terms. But oftentimes the 

meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or 

phrases may only become evident when placed in 

context. So when deciding whether the language 

is plain, we must read the words in their context 

and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.

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King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Here we conclude that the literal text by itself, when 

viewed in context and with an eye towards the statutory 

scheme, is clear and thus answers the question at hand. 

“Articles” is defined as “material things,” and thus does 

not extend to electronic transmission of digital data. 

1 

The term “articles” is not defined in the Act. “In the 

absence of such a definition, we construe a statutory term 

in accordance with its ordinary or natural meaning.” 

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 (1994) (citing Smith v. 

United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993)). When looking to 

the term’s plain meaning we must look first not to the 

1930 Tariff Act but instead its predecessor, the 1922 

Tariff Act. That is because the term “articles,” as used in 

Section 337 of the Tariff Act, originates in section 316 of 

the Tariff Act. Section 316(a) reads in part:

That unfair methods of competition and unfair 

acts in the importation of articles into the United 

States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, 

consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an 

industry, efficiently and economically operated, in 

the United States, or to prevent the establishment 

of such an industry, or to restrain or monopolize 

trade and commerce in the United States, are 

hereby declared unlawful, and when found by the 

President to exist shall be dealt with, in addition 

to any other provisions of law, as hereinafter provided.

Tariff Act of 1922, Ch. 356 § 316 (1922) (emphasis added). 

The Commission found that contemporaneous definitions of “articles” “embrace a generic meaning that is 

synonymous with a particular item or thing, such as a 

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unit of merchandise.” Final Comm’n Op. at 39. In doing 

so, the Commission relies on the 1924 edition of Webster’s 

that defines “article,” in pertinent part, as “something 

considered by itself and as apart from other things of the 

same kind or from the whole of which it forms a part; also, 

a thing of a particular class or kind; as an article of merchandise; salt is a necessary article.” Id. (citing Article, 

WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1924)). Based on this definition, the

Commission concluded that “the term ‘article’ was understood at the time of the enactment of the Tariff Act to 

carry the meaning of an identifiable unit, item or thing, 

with examples indicating that such articles may be traded 

in commerce or used by consumers” and thus would 

include digital data. Id. We disagree. 

Contemporaneous dictionaries indicate that the term 

“articles” is limited to a “material thing,” and thus could 

not include digital data.12 One such dictionary is cited in 

a footnote of the Commission’s Opinion, FUNK &

WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 

LANGUAGE published in 1931. Id. at n.20. This dictionary

defines “article” in relevant part as “a particular object or 

substance; a material thing or class of things . . . .” Article, FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE 

ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1931) (emphasis added). Other 

contemporaneous dictionaries provide similar definitions, 

notably THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA from 

1911. This dictionary defines “article” as “[a] material 

thing as part of a class, or, absolutely, a particular sub12 While normally we would turn to the Second Edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, as it was contemporaneous with passage of the 1922 Tariff Act, that dictionary 

only defines “article” in regard to written documents, not 

with respect to trade. 

 

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stance or commodity . . . .” Article, THE CENTURY 

DICTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA (1911) (emphasis added).13 

Additionally, WEBSTER’S NEW MODERN ENGLISH 

DICTIONARY, published in 1922, defines an “article” as “a 

material thing, as one of a class.” Article, WEBSTER’S NEW 

MODERN ENGLISH DICTIONARY (1922) (emphasis added). 

As the contemporaneous dictionaries demonstrate, the 

meaning of the term “article” at the time of the passage of 

the 1922 Tariff Act was a “material thing” and thus would 

not include digital data.

The contemporaneous dictionary definition upon 

which the Commission relied, the 1924 edition of Webster’s, does not aid our search for the definition of “articles” because it is imprecise at best. It is notable, 

however, that both examples provided in Webster’s dictionary are of material things, indicating that the vague 

language used was in reference to tangible items. 

More modern dictionaries also support the conclusion 

that an “article” is a tangible thing, including the three 

that are referenced by the Commission in footnotes 20

and 21 of its final opinion. The Commission refers to 

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY which 

defines “article” as “one of a class of material things . . . 

piece of goods; COMMODITY.” Article, WEBSTER’S THIRD 

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1966) (italicized emphasis added). The Commission additionally refers to the 

2002 edition of WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 

DICTIONARY which defines “article” as “a material 

thing . . . .” Article, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (emphasis added). 

13 The Supreme Court cited to this dictionary exclusively for the definition of “manufacture” when interpreting the Plant Patent Act of 1930. Am. Fruit Growers v. 

Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931).

 

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Finally, the Commission refers to RANDOM HOUSE 

WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY as published in 2001, 

which defines “article” as “an individual object, member 

or portion of a class; an item or particular: an article of 

food; articles of clothing. . . . an item for sale; commodity.” 

Article, RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED 

DICTIONARY (2001) (emphases added). The Random House 

dictionary’s use of the term “individual object” further 

supports “article” being defined as a “material thing.”

Defining “articles” as “material things” is further consistent with the United States Tariff Commission’s14 own 

definition of the term “articles” as laid out in its 

DICTIONARY OF TARIFF INFORMATION, issued September 

1924. While this dictionary is not a “regular dictionary”—

because it was published by the Commissioners—nor 

perfectly contemporaneous—as it was published in 1924—

it does provide us with guidance as to how a person in the 

respective field would have interpreted “articles” close to 

the time of the passage of the Tariff Act. The DICTIONARY 

OF TARIFF INFORMATION defines “articles” as follows:

The word “article” as ordinarily used in tariff acts 

embraces commodities generally, whether manufactured wholly or in part or not at all. (Jungle v. 

Heddon, 146 U.S., 233, 239.) It is used in this 

sense in section 1 of Title I of the tariff act of 

1922, subjecting to duty “all articles when imported from any foreign country into the United States 

or into any of its possessions (except the Philippine Islands, the Virgin Islands, and the islands of 

Guam and Tutuila),” and in section 201 of Title II 

of that act, exempting from duty “the articles 

14 The United States Tariff Commission is the predecessor of the International Trade Commission.

 

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mentioned in the following paragraphs, when imported in the United States or into any of its possessions (except the Philippine Islands, the Virgin 

Islands, and the islands of Guam, and Tutuila).”

This broad use of the word is also shown in paragraph 1514 of the act of 1922, exempting from duty under stated conditions “articles of growth, 

produce, or manufacture of the United States.”

As defined in section 318 of Title III of the act of 

1922, which enlarges the duties of the Tariff 

Commission, the word “article” includes any 

commodities grown, produced, fabricated, manipulated, or manufactured.

There are however, tariff provisions in which the 

word “article” is used in a restricted sense, such as 

those distinguishing articles from materials. 

Thus, in paragraphs 920 of the act of 1922, the 

words “articles” and “fabrics” are applied, respectively, to finished manufactures and to partial 

manufactures, and in paragraph 1015 provision is 

made for “fabrics with fast edges: and also for “articles made therefrom.”

The restricted use of the word “article” has been 

recognized by the courts and the rule laid down 

that where an intention appears from the text of 

the law to give the word “article” a narrower 

meaning than its ordinarily has, such meaning 

shall be applied in the administration of the law.

The word “article,” as commonly accepted in trade 

and elsewhere, has been declared to be something 

different from bulky and heavy commodities. 

(Harrison Supply Co. v. United States, 171 Fed. 

406, 407.)

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Vessels arriving at ports of the United States in 

the ordinary course of navigation are not imported 

articles. (The conqueror, 166 U.S. 110, 115.)

Articles, DICTIONARY OF TARIFF INFORMATION (1924)

(emphasis added). The aforementioned definition provides both the “ordinary” use of the term “articles” and 

the possible scope of the term “articles,” i.e., its broadest 

and narrowest definition. At its broadest, which the 

dictionary deems its ordinary meaning, “articles” “embraces commodities generally, whether manufactured 

wholly or in part or not at all.” The plain understanding 

of this phrase is that it covers material items that are 

fully manufactured, material items that are altered in 

some way, or raw materials. This understanding of the 

term is further established by the dictionary’s definition 

of the narrowest use of the term “articles.” The dictionary 

indicates that narrower definitions of “articles” “distinguish articles from materials.” Consequently, if the 

narrowest definition is defined as a subset of “materials,” 

there is an implication that the broadest understanding of 

the term is confined to “materials.” 

Finally, while the contemporaneous second edition of 

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY does not shed light on the 

definition of “article,” the third edition does. The third 

edition of the dictionary, published in 1933, defines “article” in relevant part as “A particular object or substance, 

a material thing or a class of things.” Article, BLACK’S 

LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) (emphasis added). Again, 

this definition provides further support that the term 

“articles” is defined as a “material thing” and thus excludes purely digital data.

The aforementioned dictionaries make clear that the 

ordinary meaning of the term “articles” is “material 

things.” It is not a question of whether there are multiple 

definitions for us to choose between. Instead, every 

dictionary referenced by the Commission, with the excluCase: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 18 Filed: 11/10/2015
CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 19

sion of one imprecise definition, along with all the other

relevant dictionaries point to the fact that “articles” 

means “material things.” As we “must presume that [the]

legislature says in a statute what it means and means in 

a statute what it says,” Conn. Nat’l Bank v Germain, 503 

U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992), we conclude that “articles” does 

not cover electronically transmitted digital data. 15

2 

As the presence of ambiguity in the meaning of a term 

“may only become evident when placed in context” with 

the statute, we turn next to how “articles” is used 

15 We briefly address two arguments raised by the 

dissent regarding the proper definition of the term “articles” in Section 337. First, the dissent argues that in 

Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 

1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009), we “rejected the argument that 

digital files such as computer software are not a ‘material 

or apparatus’ subject to infringement as set forth in the 

Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. §271(c).” Dissent at 7. Lucent

involved a patent infringement suit. Thus, Lucent had 

nothing to do with the scope of the Commission’s jurisdiction. Indeed, it never even considered the term “article,” 

instead assessing the meaning of the unrelated term 

“material or apparatus.” Second, the dissent argues that 

the term “‘article’ in the Tariff Act was intended to be allencompassing.” Id. at 10 (discussing United States v. 

Eimer & Amend, 28 CCPA 10, (1940)). The “sole question” in Eimer was whether the term “articles” should 

cover “glass wool” objects, since such objects “do not have 

definite form and shape.” Eimer, 28 CCPA at 12. Because the “glass wool” at issue in Eimer was undisputedly 

a material object, Eimer is inapposite to the present 

question of whether the term “articles” encompasses 

intangible data.

 

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20 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

throughout Section 337. King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. The 

use of the word “articles” in other sections of the 1930 

Tariff Act reinforces the conclusion that Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent was for “articles” to mean 

“material things.” 

The Supreme Court has consistently held that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are 

intended to have the same meaning.” Sullivan v. Stroop, 

496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990) (quoting Sorenson v. Sec’y of 

Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)); Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U.S. 84, 87 (1934); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 

(1932). For “[i]t is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so 

construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, 

or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” TRW 

Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). The statutory context in which Congress 

uses “articles” makes clear that Congress’s unambiguously expressed intent was for “articles” to mean “material 

things,” not intangibles, for if “articles” had a broader 

definition, numerous subsections would be rendered 

inoperative. 

The Commission concluded that because the term “articles” appears in the statutory provisions defining a 

violation of Section 337, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(a)(1)(A), (B), 

(C), and (E), with the terms “importation” and “sale,” the 

term “articles” is meant to encompass all “imported items 

that are bought and sold in commerce.” Final Comm’n 

Op. at 40. The Commission then stated that, in accordance with various Supreme Court and circuit court cases, 

“articles of commerce” includes digital files. We disaCase: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 20 Filed: 11/10/2015
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gree.16 The context in which “articles” is used throughout 

the chapter, not just this singular subsection, indicates 

that “articles” means “material things.” 

If the term “articles” was defined to include intangibles, numerous statutory sections would be superfluous at 

best. One such example is the forfeiture subsection of 

Section 337. This section reads in part:

(i) Forfeiture

(1) In addition to taking action under subsection 

(d) of this section, the Commission may issue an 

order providing that any article imported in violation of the provisions of this section be seized and 

forfeited to the United States if— 

16 The Commission made this conclusion based upon 

definitions of “articles of commerce” found in one Supreme 

Court case and one Seventh Circuit case, Reno v. Condon, 

528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000), and Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, 

695 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2012). Final Comm’n Op. at 

40. These two cases are not relevant to the analysis at 

hand; they interpret the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act 

rather than the statute at issue in this case. See Sapna

Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, FLA. L. REV., at 34

(Mar. 29, 2015) (Forthcoming) (discussing how the “courts 

in these cases were looking at whether information could 

be regulated as an ‘article of commerce’ under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause” and that the term “article of 

commerce” does not appear in either the Driver’s Privacy 

Protection Act or the Constitution, thus making the cases 

irrelevant to the determination of the definition of the 

term “article”), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2586740. 

 

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22 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

(A) the owner, importer, or consignee of the article 

previously attempted to import the article into the 

United States;

(B) the article was previously denied entry into 

the United States by reason of an order issued 

under subsection (d) of this section; and . . . . 

19 U.S.C. § 1337(i) (emphasis added). This section permits the Commission to exclude “articles” from importation into the United States; however, it is difficult to see 

how one could physically stop electronic transmissions at 

the borders under the current statutory scheme. Furthermore, if articles included digital data, it would render 

the section’s use of the terms “forfeited” and “seized”

hollow, as an electronic transmission cannot be “seized” or 

“forfeited.” By way of example, digital transmissions from 

satellites do not move through border crossings, nor can

they be stopped at our borders via any enforcement mechanism contemplated in the statutory scheme. As Commissioner David S. Johanson points out in his dissent, an 

“exclusion order directed against electronic transmissions 

could not only have no effect within the context of Section 

337—it simply would make no sense as it would not be 

enforce[able].” Final Comm’n Op. Dissent at 6 (David S. 

Johanson, dissenting). 

A construction of the term “articles” that includes 

electronically transmitted digital data is also not reasonable when applied to Section 337(i)(3). This section reads, 

“[u]pon the attempted entry of articles subject to an order 

issued under this subsection, the Secretary of the Treasury shall immediately notify all ports of entry of the 

attempted importation and shall identify the persons 

notified under paragraph (1)(C).” Not only can an electronic transmission not be subject to an “attempted entry” 

through a “port of entry,” it also cannot be intercepted at 

a “port of entry” as contemplated in the statute. Returning to our satellite example, once the transmission is 

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made from a satellite and directed to the United States, it 

is illogical to consider its entry as an “attempted entry.” 

The transmission either passes through our border or it 

does not. If the term “articles” was intended by Congress 

to be inclusive of nonmaterial objects, such as electronic 

transmissions, it would render this section moot. 

Align further argues that because “articles” is used in 

connection with “articles that infringe,” “articles” must be 

read broadly enough that it encompasses all possible 

forms of infringement. We disagree. The question before 

us is not what types of infringement are covered, but what 

goods are protected from infringement under Section 337. 

It is perfectly reasonable that Congress only intended 

that some subset of infringing goods be covered by Section 

337. “Further, were we to adopt [the Commission’s] 

construction of the statute, we would render the word 

‘[articles]’ insignificant, if not wholly superfluous. It is 

our duty to give effect, if possible, to every clause and 

word of a statute.” Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174

(2001) (citation omitted).

3 

We further look to the Tariff Act in its entirety as “the 

words of a statute must be read in their context and with 

a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” 

King, 135 S. Ct. at 2492. As when defining words in a 

statute, their ultimate meaning should remain consistent 

with the remainder of the statute as a term’s meaning 

must be “compatible with the rest of the law.” Util. Air 

Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442 (2014). 

Here, the basic statutory scheme, and specifically its 

original remedial scheme, provides further support for the 

conclusion that Congress understood “articles” to mean

“material things” and not to include intangibles such as 

digital data. 

The original version of Section 337 provided only a 

single remedy for violations:

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24 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

Whenever the existence of any such unfair method 

or act shall be established to the satisfaction of 

the President he shall direct that the articles concerned in such unfair methods or acts, imported 

by any person violating the provisions of this Act, 

shall be excluded from entry into the United 

States, and upon information of such action by the 

President, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, 

through the proper officers, refuse such entry. 

Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. 71-361, 46 Stat. 704 (1930). 

This sole remedy of exclusion could only have an impact 

on material things. Obviously, intangibles, such as electronic transmissions, do not pass through United States

ports and cannot be excluded by Customs. Thus, as 

electronic transmissions of digital data could not be 

excluded in the fashion contemplated by the Act, an 

expansion of the term “articles” beyond “material things” 

would mean that Congress included an entire set of 

commodities in the statute without providing a method to 

curtail their importation. The impossibility of this result 

supports confining “articles” to “material things.”

The Commission points to the 1974 authorization of 

cease and desist orders as support for its conclusion that 

“articles” includes digital data. The Commission argues 

that the addition of this section “strengthened the statute 

to protect against unfairly traded imports by providing 

additional remedies for a violation . . . .” Final Comm’n 

Op. at 47. We disagree. 

Congress’s 1974 authorization of cease and desist 

orders supports the conclusion that the statutory scheme 

is premised upon “articles” being defined as “material 

things.” Fifty-two years after the creation of Section 337 

Congress added a second remedial tool to the Commission’s arsenal, the cease and desist order. See Trade Act 

of 1974, Pub. L. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2055 (1975). This 

tool was meant to be used as a lesser and “softer remedy” 

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than exclusion orders rather than the exclusive remedy

which would be the case were digital data considered an 

article. Textron, Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 753 F.2d 

1019, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he contemplated range of 

remedies was expanded by the Trade Act of 1974 to 

include ‘softer’ sanctions such as cease-and-desist orders . 

. . .”); see S. Rep. 93-1298 at 198 (1974). In fact, in passing 

the bill, Congress made clear that “[n]o change [was] 

made in the substance of the jurisdiction conferred under 

Section 337(a) with respect to unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the import trade.” S. Rep. No. 93-

1298, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7186, 7327 (1974). Instead, the 

purpose of the provision, according to the Senate Report, 

was to add “needed flexibility” because “the existing 

statute, which provides no remedy other than the exclusion of articles from entry, is so extreme or inappropriate 

in some cases that it is often likely to result in the Commission not finding a violation of this section.” Id. at 

7331. Furthermore, while the Commission cites to the 

repeated updates in the amount of the fine associated 

with cease and desist orders as support for the fact that 

this section expanded the scope of “articles,” there is no 

logical connection between the amount of the fine and 

whether cease and desist orders expanded the Commission’s jurisdiction.

The text of the cease and desist language further supports the conclusion that “articles” cannot be defined in 

such a way as to include electronic transmissions. This is 

because if “articles” was defined to include electronic 

transmissions, the addition of cease and desist orders 

would not be a lesser alternative for exclusion orders, but 

an expansion of the exclusion power. We agree with 

Commissioner David S. Johanson who argued in his 

dissent that “[i]ndeed, [the cease and desist] provision 

demonstrates that the definition of articles for Section 

337(f) must be the same as the rest of the statute; otherwise the provision for replacement [of cease and desist 

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26 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

orders with exclusion orders] would be rendered a nullity 

and read out of the statute.” Final Comm’n Op. Dissent 

at 8 (David S. Johanson, dissenting). The fact that a 

definition of “articles” that includes intangibles would 

read out the very purpose behind the inclusion of cease 

and desist orders yields further evidence that the term 

article is meant to be limited to tangibles. 

Finally, Section 337’s connection to what is now 

known as the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 

States (HTSUS) supports a narrower definition of the 

term “articles” than provided by the Commission. When 

the Tariff Act of 1930 was first passed it was, at its heart, 

a tariff provision that imposed duties on specific imports. 

Section 1 of the title reads: 

That on and after the day following the passage of 

this Act, except as otherwise specially provided for 

in this Act, there shall be levied, collected, and 

paid upon all articles when imported from any 

foreign country into the United States or into any 

of its possessions . . . the rates of duty which are 

prescribed by the schedules and paragraphs of the 

dutiable list of this title, namely: 

46 Stat. 590 (emphasis added). Congress then provided 

ninety-five pages of schedules identifying specific dutiable 

and non-dutiable goods. Every single item in these 

schedules was a material thing. See 46 Stat. 590-685. 

Furthermore, Congress assumed that these schedules 

were not comprehensive and thus included catchall clauses. One such clause can be found in paragraph 1559, 

which reads in relevant part, “That each and every imported article, not enumerated in this Act, which is similar, either in material, quality, texture, or the use to 

which it may be applied to any article enumerated in this 

Act . . . shall be subject to the same rate of duty which is 

levied on the enumerated article . . . .” Id. at 672. Similarly, paragraph 1558 states, “That there shall be levied, 

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collected, and paid on the importation of all raw or unmanufactured articles not enumerated or provided for . . .

.” Id. Both of these catchalls are premised on the notion 

that articles are tangible and dutiable. This provides 

further evidence that the statutory scheme was to solely 

regulate “material things” and thus not electronic transmission of digital data, which is not dutiable. 

Tariff Schedules have continued to limit articles to 

tangibles. The dutiable schedules in the Tariff Act of 

1930 were later replaced in 1963 with the Tariff Schedule 

of the United States, Pub. L. 87-456. Accompanying this 

revision was the Tariff Classification Study Submitting 

Report. In this report, the Commission wrote, “General 

headnote 5 sets forth certain intangibles which, under 

various established customs practices, are not regarded as 

articles subject to treatment under the tariff schedules.” 

Id. at 18. This subsection includes items such as electricity, securities, and similar evidences of value. Id. at 12. 

The Tariff Schedule of the United States was in turn 

replaced by the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 

States in 1988, pursuant to the Omnibus Trade and 

Competitiveness Act. Pub. L. 100-418 § 1206, 102 Stat. 

1151, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3006. While this schedule 

included a heading for electrical energy, it specifically 

removed it from the purview of section 484 of the Tariff 

Act of 1930 and placed its regulation purely in the hands 

of the Secretary of the Treasury. Section 484 regulates 

the entry requirements under the Tariff Act. This succession of tariff schedules provides further evidence that the 

Act’s scheme was not meant to include intangibles. 

4 

The clarity of the statutory context obviates the need 

to turn to the legislative history. The Tariff Act’s legislative history further confirms the conclusion that “articles” 

is limited to “material things,” however, and thus not 

inclusive of electronic transmissions of digital data. This 

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28 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

is supported by two distinct points in the Tariff Act’s 

legislative history: (1) the period of time when “articles” 

first appeared in Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 

inclusive of section 316 of the 1922 Tariff Act; and (2) the 

legislative history from 1988 in which for the first time 

the Tariff Act was expanded to explicitly cover IP infringement. 

The Commission argues that, because Congress treated the terms “goods” and “articles” as synonymous within 

the legislative history, articles must be read broadly. 

Final Comm’n Op. at 39. We agree with the Commission 

in part and disagree in part. We agree with the Commission that Congress used “goods” and “articles” synonymously at the time of the passage of the Act;17 18 however, 

we disagree that this mandates a definition of “articles”

that is broader than “material things.” 

At the time of enactment “goods” had a clear definition. The second edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 

17 “The House and Senate Reports of the 1922 and 

1930 Acts and Congressional debate refer to articles as 

synonymous with goods . . . . See S. Rep. 67-595 at 3 

(1922); H.R. Rep. 71-7 at 3 (1929); 71 Cong. Rec. S. 3872, 

4640 (1929).” Final Comm’n Op. at 43. For example, the 

Senate Report stated its amendments were meant to 

“prohibit the importation of particular goods for the 

purpose of preventing unfair methods of competition in 

the importation of goods.” S. Rep. 67-595 at 3. The report 

further noted that, “The provision relating to unfair 

methods of competition in the importation of goods is 

broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair 

practice.” Id. at 3. 

18 Our recent opinion in Suprema also uses “goods” 

synonymously with “articles.” See Suprema, Inc., 2015 

WL 4716604, at *1. 

 

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which was contemporaneous with the passage of the 

Tariff Act, states that “goods” “[are] not so wide as ‘chattels,’ for it applies to inanimate objects, and does not 

include animals or chattels real.” Goods, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910). Black’s dictionary divides 

“chattels” into two groups “chattels real” and “chattels 

personal.” Id. at Chattels. “Chattels real” are “interests 

in land which devolve after the manner of personal estate, 

as leaseholds” while “chattels personal” are “movables 

only.” Id. The clear conclusion to draw from this is that 

“goods” are also limited to movables, i.e., material things. 

Thus, both words used by Congress at the time of enactment to describe the bounds of Section 337, “goods” and 

“articles,” were limited to “material things.”

The Commission argues that the legislative history 

relating to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act

of 1988 reaffirmed that “articles” was meant to include 

digital data. The Commission relies on the relevant 

Senate Report’s statement that the will of Congress was 

to block any United States sale of a product covered by an 

IP right, because “[t]he importation of any infringing 

merchandise derogates from the statutory right, diminishes the value of the intellectual property, and thus 

indirectly harms the public interest.” Final Comm’n Op.

at 48 (quoting S. Rep. 100-71 at 12-29 (1987); H.R. Rep. 

100-40 at 156 (1987)). The Commission argues that the 

use of the word “commerce” indicates that “articles” 

should be read broadly. We disagree.

While the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act 

made numerous changes to the Tariff Act, it included no 

language that increased the scope of “articles.” The 

Commission’s argument fails to take into account the 

contemporaneous definition of the term “merchandise.” 

“Merchandise” was defined at the time as “[a]ll goods 

which merchants usually buy and sell . . . , [b]ut the term 

is generally not understood as including real estate” and 

“goods,” while “a term of variable content and meaning,” 

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30 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

is ultimately defined as “[i]tems of merchandise, supplies, 

raw materials, or finished goods. Merchandise, Goods,

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). Sometimes the 

meaning of ‘goods’ is extended to include all tangible 

items, as in the phrase ‘goods and services.’” Id. at Goods. 

This definition makes clear, that at its broadest the 

definition of “goods,” and thus merchandise, was limited 

to tangible items. 

This analysis comports with our opinion in Bayer. In 

Bayer we analyzed the history of section 271(g) along with 

its overlap with Section 337. We found that Congress 

adopted the definition of “article” from Section 337 and 

imported it into section 271(g). Bayer AG v. Housey 

Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Our 

opinion concludes that “there is no indication of any 

intent to reach products other than tangible products 

produced by manufacturing processes.” Id. at 1375. 

Furthermore we stated: 

We recognize that section 1337 covers both articles that were “made” and articles that were “produced, processed, or mined.” While this language 

in section 1337 perhaps suggests a broader scope 

for section 1337 than for section 271(g), nothing in 

section 1337 suggests coverage of information, in 

addition to articles under section 271(g).

Id. at 1367, n.9. 

In sum, the literal text, the context in which the text 

is found within Section 337, and the text’s role in the 

totality of the statutory scheme all indicate that the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress is that 

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“articles” means “material things” and does not extend to 

electronically transmitted digital data.19 20

B. Chevron Step Two

As Congress’s expressed intent is unambiguous, we 

need not address step two of Chevron. However, even if 

we were to address step two, it is clear that the Commission’s interpretation of the term “articles” was unreasonable. 

Step two of Chevron requires us to determine “whether the [Commission’s] answer is based on a permissible 

construction of the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S. 

Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). Because the 

Commission failed to properly analyze the plain meaning

of “articles,” failed to properly analyze the statute’s legislative history, and improperly relied on Congressional 

debates, the Commission’s analysis does not warrant 

deference. 

The Commission’s analysis of dictionary definitions 

evidences the irrationality of the Commission’s interpretation of the term “article.” While the Commission ostensibly analyzes various dictionary definitions, it fails to 

adopt a definition consistent with any of the definitions it 

references. For example, as discussed in the prior section, 

the Commission turns to the 1924 edition of the Webster’s 

dictionary for the definition of “article,” but rather than 

adopt that definition it concludes that it will “embrace a 

broader meaning that describes something that is traded 

19 This is markedly different from Suprema where 

we concluded that the relevant text was ambiguous. See 

Suprema, Inc., 2015 WL 4716604, at *4-6.

20 We note that we do not limit the parties’ other legal remedies, such as a possible action in district court.

 

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in commerce.” Final Comm’n Op. at 39. In other words, 

it generates its own definition, unrelated to the definition 

provided by the dictionary. 

Furthermore, the Commission inexplicably cites to 

several dictionaries in two footnotes that support “articles” being defined as “material things,” but provides no 

analysis as to why these dictionaries should not be considered. 

 Footnotes 20 and 21 read: 

20 Some definitions of “article,” in addition to stating a broader generic meaning, also set forth a 

more granular meaning of a material thing. For 

example, a 1929 edition of Funk and Wagnall’s defines “articles,” in pertinent part as: “A particular 

object or substance; a material thing or class of 

things; as, an article of food.” The Federal Circuit, 

interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), noted one definition of “article” in Webster’s Third New Dictionary 

(a more recent edition of Webster’s). “Article” is 

there defined as “one of a class of material 

things . . . pieces of goods; COMMODITY.” Thus, 

while an “article” was understood to include something material, as shown in the text above, the 

term was also understood to embrace a broader 

meaning that describes something that is traded 

in commerce.

21 More recent context relevant definitions of “articles” are in accord. See, e.g. WEBSTER’S THIRD 

NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“5: a material thing”; . . . “6a: a thing of a particular class 

of kind as distinct from a thing of another class of 

kind”); RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED 

DICTIONARY (2nd Edition 2001) (“2. An individual 

object, member, or portion of a class; an item or 

particular; an article of food; articles of clothing; . . . 4. An item for sale; commodity”).

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Id. (citation omitted). 

Despite the definitions quoted in the footnotes running directly counter to the definition adopted by the 

Commission, the Commission provides virtually no analysis as to why they should not control. It is not reasonable 

for the Commission to conclude that the dictionary definitions that it cites “embrace a broader meaning that describes something that is traded in commerce,” when the 

Commission’s definition cannot be found in any dictionary 

cited by the Commission and the Commission’s conclusion 

is not logically connected to any of the definitions cited by 

the Commission. 

Additionally, the Commission fails to properly analyze 

the legislative history regarding the Tariff Act. This 

failure is echoed in its briefing to the court. The Commission concludes, based in large part on a Senate Report 

from 1922, that “The central purpose of Section 337, since 

the enactment of the original statute in 1922, has been to 

prevent every type of unfair act or practice in import 

trade that harms U.S. industries.” Final Comm’n Op. at 

44—45. The Commission’s Opinion cites the Senate 

Report, S. Rep. 67-595, as authority for this conclusion 

and then quotes it as follows:

The provision relating to unfair methods of competition is broad enough to prevent every type and 

form of unfair practice and is, therefore, a more 

adequate protection to American industry than 

any antidumping statute the country ever had.

However, the actual quote reads as follows:

The provision relating to unfair methods of competition in the importation of goods is broad 

enough to prevent every type and form of unfair 

practice and is, therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry than any antidumping 

statute the country ever had.

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34 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

S. Rep. 67-595, at 3 (1922) (emphasis added). The Commission’s omission of the phrase, “in the importation of 

goods” is highly misleading; not only was a key portion of 

the quote omitted, but it was omitted without any indication that there had been a deletion.21 Furthermore, while 

we may agree that the quote, as incorrectly stated by the 

Commission, would indicate a broad authority for the 

Commission, the phrase “in the importation of goods”

clearly limits the Commission’s authority. And as we 

discussed above, it limits it in such a way as to exclude 

non-material things. Because the Commission uses this 

misquote as its main evidence that the purpose of the act 

was to cover all trade, independent of what form it takes, 

the Commission’s conclusion regarding the purpose of the 

Act is unreasonable. 

Finally, the Commission wrongly focuses on current 

debates in Congress as indicative of what “articles” 

means. The Commission comments as follows:

We note recent developments that show the acceptance of digital goods traded in commerce as 

falling within international trade. Senators Baucus and Hatch and Congressman Camp have introduced Trade Promotion Authority bills that 

instruct the Administration to seek increased protection for digital trade in future trade agreements. Moreover, Congress has requested that 

21 It is noteworthy that this is not the Commission’s 

only failure to cite evidence correctly. The Commission 

additionally states that “goods, commodities, and merchandise” have the same definition as “articles” as defined 

in the second edition of BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY. Final 

Comm’n Op. at 43. However, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY

does not provide the cited definition. 

 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 35

the Commission study the impact of digital trade 

under Section 332, another part of Title 19.

Final Comm’n Op. at 43, 44 (citation omitted). This 

analysis is improper. First, Congress has not passed any 

of the cited bills. Second, even if the bills were passed, 

they would not have informed us as to whether the Commission has jurisdiction over digital goods.

In sum, the Commission repeatedly and unreasonably 

erred in its analysis of the term “article.” It is not simply 

a question of the Commission having the choice between 

two “right” definitions, but instead it represents a systematic pattern of the Commission picking the wrong 

conclusion from the evidence. Here the Commission has 

not offered a reasoned explanation for its definition of 

“articles” and thus is owed no deference. 

III. CONCLUSION

While Congress’s intent regarding “articles” is unambiguous, it is worth repeating what we said in Bayer: 

Under these circumstances we think it is best to 

leave to Congress the task of expanding the statute if we are wrong in our interpretation. Congress is in a far better position to draw the lines 

that must be drawn if the product of intellectual 

processes rather than manufacturing processes 

are to be included within the statute.

Bayer, 340 F.3d at 1376-77.

For the reasons stated above, we reverse and remand 

the Commission’s decision, finding that the Commission 

does not have jurisdiction over this case. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 35 Filed: 11/10/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC,

CLEARCORRECT PAKISTAN (PRIVATE), LTD.,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2014-1527

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-833.

______________________ 

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge, concurring.

I agree with the majority’s well-reasoned conclusion 

that the International Trade Commission (“the Commission”) lacks jurisdiction over this case. The majority’s 

analysis under the Chevron framework correctly reveals 

that the Commission’s interpretation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 

(“Section 337”) is not entitled to deference. I write separately, however, because I believe we need not resort to 

Chevron steps one and two to resolve this matter. 

Deference to an agency interpretation under the 

Chevron framework “is premised on the theory that a 

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2 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation 

from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.” 

King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting 

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 

159 (2000)). There are “extraordinary cases,” however, 

where we should “hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such an implicit delegation.” Id. at 

2488-89 (quoting FDA, 529 U.S. at 159). In other words, 

there are times when courts should not search for an 

ambiguity in the statute because it is clear Congress could 

not have intended to grant the agency authority to act in 

the substantive space at issue. This is one of those extraordinary cases. Where, as here, Congress has not 

delegated authority to an agency, courts need not apply 

the Chevron framework to the agency’s interpretation of 

its governing statute. See id. at 2489. 

The Commission has concluded that it has jurisdiction 

over all incoming international Internet data transmissions. It reaches this conclusion despite never having 

purported to regulate Internet transmissions in the past,

despite no reference to data transmissions in the statute 

under which it acts, despite an absence of expertise in 

dealing with such transmissions, and despite the many 

competing policy concerns implicated in any attempt to 

regulate Internet transmissions. The Internet is “arguably the most important innovation in communications in a 

generation.” Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 661 

(D.C. Cir. 2010). If Congress intended for the Commission 

to regulate one of the most important aspects of modernday life, Congress surely would have said so expressly. 

Utility Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 

(2014) (rejecting EPA’s vast expansion of its program of 

requiring clean air permits because such an expansion 

“would bring about an enormous and transformative 

expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear 

congressional authorization”). The Supreme Court has 

noted that “[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a longCase: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 37 Filed: 11/10/2015
CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 3

extant statute an unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we typically greet 

its announcement with a measure of skepticism.” Id. The 

Court further indicated that Congress must “speak clearly 

if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” Id. (quoting FDA, 529 

U.S at 160). Here, far from clearly addressing the issue of 

whether the Commission should have jurisdiction over the 

international exchange of data on the Internet, Congress’s 

last major amendment to Section 337 was in 1988, one 

year before the invention of the World Wide Web. See 

Sapna Kumar, Regulating Digital Trade, 67 FLA. L. REV., 

at 28-32 (forthcoming 2015) (reviewing legislative history 

of the Tariff Act with respect to the term “articles”).

Although the Commission’s jurisdiction over imported 

physical goods is undeniable, it is very unlikely that 

Congress would have delegated the regulation of the

Internet to the Commission, which has no expertise in 

developing nuanced rules to ensure the Internet remains 

an open platform for all. See King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489. 

Instead, the responsibility lies with Congress to decide

how best to address these new developments in technology. See Microsoft v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458-59 

(2007) (“If the patent law is to be adjusted better to account for the realities of software distribution, the alteration should be made after focused legislative 

consideration.”) (quotation omitted); see also Gottschalk v. 

Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972) (“If [computer] programs 

are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised 

which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad 

powers of investigation are needed, including hearings 

which canvass the wide variety of views which those 

operating in this field entertain.”). 

Indeed, Congress has enacted laws and debated bills 

whose intent is to balance an interest in open access to 

the Internet and the need to regulate potential abusers. 

See, e.g., Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 38 Filed: 11/10/2015
4 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

§ 230(b)(1), (c)(1) (2012) (statute enacting immunity from 

liability for Internet service providers in order to “promote 

the continued development of the Internet and other 

interactive computer services and other interactive media”); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (statute limiting copyright infringement liability based on a similar policy); The Digital 

Trade Act of 2013, S.1788, 113th Cong. (2013–2014) (bill 

seeking to have agencies “staffed with experts and leaders 

to fulfill the mission of promoting an open, global Internet 

that facilitates commerce and digital trade”); Online 

Protection and Enforcement of Digital Trade Act, S. 

2029/H.R. 3782 (112th Cong. 2011–2013) (bill proposing 

amendment of the Tariff Act to formally confer the ITC 

with jurisdiction over digital importation). Not once in 

these debates has Congress said or implied that it need 

not concern itself with these issues because it had already 

delegated the authority to do so to the Commission. 

Because Congress did not intend to delegate such authority to the Commission, I would find the two step Chevron

inquiry inapplicable in this case; I would find that we 

never get past what some refer to as Chevron step zero 

when assessing the propriety of the Exclusion Order 

before us.1

1 Chevron “step zero” has been defined as “the initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework applies 

at all.” See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA.

L. REV. 187, 191 (2006). Some scholars believe this additional inquiry aids and streamlines review of administrative decision making. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, 

Symposium, Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking 

Forward: Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM 

L. REV. 731, 744 (2014) (opining that the announcement of 

the Chevron step zero inquiry in United States v. Mead 

Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) was a “positive” step forward 

 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 5

Assuming, arguendo, that the Chevron framework 

does apply to the Commission’s interpretation, however, I 

agree with the majority’s ruling that the Commission 

erred when it determined that it had jurisdiction over the 

disputed digital data.

in administrative law, and critiquing more recent developments in Chevron step zero jurisprudence).

 

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 40 Filed: 11/10/2015
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC,

CLEARCORRECT PAKISTAN (PRIVATE), LTD.,

Appellants

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2014-1527

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-833.

______________________ 

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

Today’s culture, as well as today’s economy, are 

founded on advances in science and technology. As the 

Industrial Revolution advanced, and recognizing the 

importance to the nation of technology-based industry, 

the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930 were enacted to provide 

additional support to domestic industries that dealt in 

new and creative commerce, by providing an efficient 

safeguard against unfair competition by imports that 

infringe United States patents or copyrights. The International Trade Commission correctly applied the Tariff 

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2 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

Act and precedent to encompass today’s forms of infringing technology.

The new technologies of the Information Age focus on

computer-implemented methods and systems, whose 

applications of digital science provide benefits and conveniences not imagined in 1922 and 1930. Throughout 

this evolution, Section 337 served its statutory purpose of 

facilitating remedy against unfair competition, by providing for exclusion of imports that infringe United States 

intellectual property rights.

Until today.

The court today removes Section 337 protection from 

importations that are conducted by electronic transmission. The court’s reason is that electronically transmitted 

subject matter is not “tangible,” and that only tangible 

imports are subject to exclusion. This holding is contrary 

to Section 337, and conflicts with rulings of the Supreme 

Court, the Federal Circuit, the Court of Customs and 

Patent Appeals, the Court of International Trade, the 

International Trade Commission, the Customs authorities, and the Department of Labor. I respectfully dissent.

Infringement is not here at issue; the only issue is the Section 337 cease and desist order. 

The imports are infringing “digital models, digital data, and treatment plans for use in making incremental 

dental positioning adjustment appliances,” produced for 

ClearCorrect in Pakistan and imported into the United 

States by electronic transmission. The International 

Trade Commission found, and it is not disputed, that the

imported data sets are “virtual three-dimensional models” 

of a patient’s teeth, and that the imports are used in the 

United States to make a three-dimensional physical 

model of the dental appliance. Certain Digital Models, 

Digital Data, & Treatment Plans for Use in Making 

Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances, 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 3

the Appliances Made Therefrom, & Methods of Making the 

Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, at 17 (April 10, 2014)

(“Comm’n Op.”). 

Infringement of the Align Technology patents is not at 

issue. The only issue is whether the Section 337 remedy 

is available to exclude the infringing digital subject matter. The Commission, reviewing the “plain language of 

the statute, its legislative history and purpose, pertinent 

case law, and the arguments of the parties and public 

commenters,” held that “the digital data sets at issue . . . are true articles of international commerce that 

are imported into the United States, and their inclusion 

within the purview of section 337 would effectuate the 

central purpose of the statute.” Comm’n Op. at 55. 

The Commission issued a Cease and Desist Order 

against “importing (including through electronic transmission)” the digital models, digital data, and orthodontic 

plans that were found to infringe the Align patents. 

Order (April 3, 2014). The panel majority now revokes 

that Order, holding that imports reaching the United 

States by electronic transmission are not subject to Section 337. This ruling is contrary to the statute and contrary to precedent; and if there were there doubt as to the

intended scope of Section 337, the Commission’s ruling 

requires deference. 

The Commission correctly held that section 

337 applies to imports of infringing digital 

goods. 

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 

makes unlawful: 

(B) The importation into the United States, the 

sale for importation, or the sale within the United 

States after importation . . . of articles that— 

(i) infringe a valid and enforceable United 

States patent or . . . copyright . . . ; or 

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4 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

(ii) are made, produced, processed, or mined 

under, or by means of, a process covered by 

the claims of a valid and enforceable United 

States patent. 

19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). 

The Commission determined that ClearCorrect’s infringement of the Align patents in the United States, and 

infringement by the process practiced for ClearCorrect in 

Pakistan, is subject to Section 337. The court’s rejection 

of that ruling is in contravention of the text and the 

purpose of Section 337 of the Tariff Act.

Section 337 was enacted to facilitate the protection of 

American industry against unfair competition by infringing imports. The statute was designed to reach “every 

type and form” of unfair competition arising from importation. The Senate Report stated: “The provision relating 

to unfair methods of competition in the importation of 

goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form of 

unfair practice and is, therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry than any antidumping statute 

the country has ever had.” S. Rep. No. 67-595 at 3 (1922).

Our predecessor Court of Customs and Patent Appeals emphasized that this purpose is “to give to industries of the United States, not only the benefit of the 

favorable laws and conditions to be found in this country, 

but also to protect such industries from being unfairly 

deprived of the advantage of the same and permit them to 

grow and develop.” Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 

F.2d 247, 259 (CCPA 1930).

Until today, this Tariff Act provision has been interpreted to implement this protective incentive. In In re 

Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (CCPA 1934), the 

court applied Section 337 to reach products produced

abroad by a process patented in the United States, stating 

that “if unfair methods of competition or unfair acts in the 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 5

importation of articles into the United States are being 

practiced or performed by any one, they are to be regarded as unlawful, and the section was intended to prevent 

them.” Id. at 455. This ruling is codified at Section 

1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), supra. 

Over the decades, the International Trade Commission and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals implemented Section 337 “to provide an adequate remedy for 

domestic industries against unfair methods of competition 

and unfair acts initiated by foreign concerns operating 

beyond the in personam jurisdiction of domestic courts.” 

Sealed Air Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 645 F.2d 976, 985 

(CCPA 1981). The Federal Circuit reiterated this purpose, stating in Lannom Mfg. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 

799 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1986), that “the purpose of 

section 337 from its inception was to provide relief to 

United States industry from unfair acts, including infringement of United States patents by goods manufactured abroad.” Id. at 1580.

Congress again considered Section 337 during the 

process of enacting the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 § 1341, 102 Stat. 

1107, stating that:

As indicated by the scope of its language, section 

337 was intended to cover a broad range of unfair 

acts not then covered by other unfair import laws. 

However, over the years, patent, copyright, and 

trademark infringement were recognized as unfair trade practices within the meaning of section 

337, and today section 337 is predominantly used 

to enforce U.S. intellectual property rights. 

S. Rep. No. 100-71 (1987) at 130. The Act itself reiterated 

the purpose to provide “a more effective remedy for the 

protection of United States intellectual property rights” 

through exclusion of infringing imports. Omnibus Trade 

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6 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418 §

1341(b), 102 Stat. 1107, 1212. 

This court recently reaffirmed that “the legislative 

history consistently evidences Congressional intent to 

vest the Commission with broad enforcement authority to 

remedy unfair trade acts.” Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 796 F.3d 1338, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc). 

The purpose of Section 337 to provide a facilitated 

remedy against infringing imports is beyond dispute. The 

panel majority’s removal of this remedy from a preeminent form of today’s technology is a dramatic withdrawal of existing rights, devoid of statutory support and 

of far-reaching impact. The majority’s ruling, that digital 

goods cannot be excluded under Section 337 because 

digital goods are “intangible,” is incorrect. 

The Commission correctly held that Section 

337 is not limited to the kinds of technology

that existed in 1922 or 1930. 

Patents are for things that did not previously exist, 

including kinds of technology that were not previously 

known. The panel majority, rejecting today’s digital 

technologies and overruling the International Trade 

Commission, holds that Section 337 does not apply to 

digital technology forms that the majority describes as 

“intangible.” It is not disputed that digital information,

such as the data sets and models here imported, is patentable subject matter and can be infringing subject 

matter. There is no basis for excluding imported infringing subject matter from Section 337, whatever the form of 

the subject matter. 

The Supreme Court in Fortnightly Corp. v. United 

Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968), considered “a 

statute that was drafted long before the development of 

the electronic phenomena with which we deal here,” 

stating that “[w]e must read the statutory language . . . in 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 7

the light of drastic technological change.” Id. at 395-96. 

This rule aptly applies to the Tariff Acts of 1922 and 

1930.

The Court has referred to adaptation of the copyright 

statute to new technologies, observing in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S, 151 (1975), that 

although Congress did not revise the Copyright Act of 

1909 following the advent of radio (and television), “copyright law was quick to adapt to prevent the exploitation of 

protected works through the new electronic technology.” 

Id. at 158. The Court noted the “ultimate aim” of the 

copyright law “to stimulate artistic creativity for the 

general public good,” and stated that “[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the 

Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic

purpose.” Id. at 156.

The Commission has previously dealt with Section 

337 importation in the form of digitally distributed software and digital files, stating that “[h]aving found that 

respondents’ software contributorily infringes the claims 

in issue, we are of the view that our remedial orders must 

reach that software.” Certain Hardware Logic Emulation 

Systems, Inv. No. 337-TA-383, USITC Pub. 3089, at 18 

(March 1998). The court’s ruling today contravenes 

Commission precedent, as well as our own.

The Federal Circuit dealt with the nature of digital 

files in Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 

1301, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009). The court rejected the argument that digital files such as computer software are not 

a “material or apparatus” subject to infringement as set 

forth in the Patent Act at 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). This reasoning applies to the “articles” subject to infringement as set 

forth in the Tariff Act at 19 U.S.C. § 1337. The court’s 

decision today is a distortion of the statute’s language and 

purpose, for Section 337 is designed to cover infringing 

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8 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

subject matter; and digital software, as noted in Lucent, 

can be infringing subject matter. 

Until today, Section 337 applied to all patented technologies, including digital technologies, whatever the path 

of importation. The court’s exclusion of digital products 

and data technologies imported by electronic transmission 

has no support in statute, precedent, or policy.

The Commission correctly held that “articles” in the Tariff Act means “articles of 

commerce.” 

The Commission held that the term “articles” in the 

Tariff Act is intended to include all infringing imported

“articles of commerce.” The Commission stated that “the 

statutory construction of ‘articles’ that hews most closely 

to the language of the statute and implements the avowed 

Congressional purpose for Section 337 encompasses 

within its scope the electronic transmission of the digital 

data sets at issue in this investigation.” Comm’n Op. at 

36.

The panel majority holds that the term ”articles” in 

the Tariff Act excludes imported digital articles, but in a 

different section, the Tariff Act definition of “article” is 

unchanged from the 1922 and 1930 statutes: 

The term “article” includes any commodity, 

whether grown, produced, fabricated, manipulated, or manufactured.

19 U.S.C. § 1332(e)(1); Tariff Act of 1930, Part II, § 332, 

46 Stat. 590, 699 (1930); Tariff Act of 1922, Part II, § 

318(b), 42 Stat. 858, 947 (1922). This definition is striking in its breadth, and is commensurate with the stated 

purpose to reach “every type and form of unfair practice,” 

see Senate Rep. No. 67-595, supra. 

Digital articles of commerce did not exist when the 

Tariff Act was first enacted. However, the intention to 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 9

omit unforeseen, later-discovered technologies cannot be

imputed to this statute, and is negated by the allinclusive breadth of the definition that was written.

Nonetheless, the panel majority rules that the digital 

data sets and digital models that are here imported are 

not “material things” and therefore are excluded from 

Section 337. Maj. Op. at 27. Citing definitions in dictionaries of the 1920s, the majority rules that digital goods 

are “intangible,” and that infringing imports when electronically transmitted are excluded from the Tariff Act. 

However, the Tariff Act did not lock Section 337 into 

the technology in existence in 1922 or 1930. It cannot 

have been the legislative intent to stop the statute with 

the forms of “article” then known. Further, the particles

and waveforms of electronics and photonics and electromagnetism are not intangible, although not visible to the 

unaided eye.1

Section 337 was written in broad terms, whereby no 

field of invention, past, present, or future, was excluded. 

It is not reasonable to impute the legislative intent to 

exclude new fields of technology, and inventions not yet 

made, from a statute whose purpose is to support invention.

The court nonetheless imputes this legislative purpose to the Tariff Act, placing weight on selected definitions of “article” in dictionaries of the 1920s, while 

dismissing unselected definitions as “imprecise at best.” 

1 It is reported that the elusive Higgs boson, a fundamental particle of matter, has been detected by observing its effects. By the same laws of physics, digital matter

is most readily observed in its effects. The panel majority’s ruling that such matter is not “material” is contrary 

to the law of the courts, the Customs agency, and the 

Commission.

 

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10 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

Maj. Op. at 15. Thus the court arbitrarily rejects the 

definition in the leading dictionary of the era, Webster’s 

New International Dictionary of the English Language, 

1924 Edition, and the 1934 Second Edition, which define 

“article” broadly and generally, as “a thing of a particular 

class or kind as distinct from a thing of another class or 

kind; a commodity; as, an article of merchandise.” Merchandise, in turn, is defined as “the objects of commerce; 

whatever is usually bought and sold in trade; wares; 

goods.” 

Precedent has long recognized that “article” in the 

Tariff Act was intended to be all-encompassing. The 

Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in 1940, citing 

Webster’s New International Dictionary, explained that, 

in the Tariff Act of 1930, “Congress said: ‘and paid upon 

all articles when imported from any foreign country.’ 

Unquestionably, Congress meant, by employing that

language, to include under the word ‘articles’ any provided-for substance, material or thing of whatever kind or 

character that was imported into this country.” United

States v. Eimer & Amend, 28 CCPA 10, 12 (1940).

The Commission defined “articles” in Section 337 to 

encompass “articles of commerce.” Comm’n Op. at 40. 

The Supreme Court defined “articles of commerce” to 

include pure information, holding in Reno v. Condon, 528 

U.S. 141 (2000), that the Commerce Clause applies to 

interstate transmission of information in motor vehicle 

records sold or released “into the interstate stream of 

business.” Id. at 148. 

Although data sets carrying information, imported by 

electronic or photonic or electromagnetic transmission, 

are not mentioned in the dictionaries of the 1920s, no 

reason has been shown to exclude them from articles of 

commerce. No dictionary, and no statutory constraint,

limits “articles” to items that are grossly “tangible.” Data 

carried by electronic particles or waves constitute articles 

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 11

of commerce, and may be imported, bought and sold, 

transmitted, and used.

My colleagues’ removal of digital goods from the Tariff 

Act is devoid of definitional or statutory support. The 

Commission correctly defined “articles” in Section 337 as 

meaning articles of commerce, including digital articles 

and electronic commerce.

The Commission correctly held that importation of infringing articles is not restricted to 

specific kinds of carriers or modes of entry. 

It is not disputed that the digital data sets and digital 

models of teeth are imported. Importation subject to 

Section 337 does not depend on the mode of entry into the 

territory of the United States: 

Importation . . . consists in bringing an article into 

a country from the outside. If there be an actual 

bringing in it is importation regardless of the 

mode in which it is effected. Entry through a customs house is not of the essence of the act.

Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 122 (1923).

The Bureau of Customs and Border Protection has established that Internet transmission is “importation” into 

the United States. See HQ 114459 (Sept. 17, 1998) (“We 

further find that the transmission of software modules 

and products to the United States from a foreign country 

via the Internet is an importation of merchandise into the 

customs territory of the United States”). The Customs

rulings reflect the accepted view that digital products are 

“articles of commerce,” “goods,” or “merchandise.”

The Customs statute classifies software as “merchandise” under 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c). See HQ114459 (“we find 

that the subject software modules and products are ‘merchandise’ and ‘goods’ . . .”); see also Heading 8523, USHTS 

(2015) (Rev. 2) (classifying software for importation 

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12 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

duties). Although the panel majority argues that the 

Tariff Schedule exempts telecommunications transmissions from import duties, see General Note 3(e)(ii), 

HTSUS (2015) (Rev. 2), it is established that telecommunications transmissions, including electronically imported 

software, are within the purview of the Customs service. 

The Court of International Trade stated in Former Employees of Computer Sciences Corp. v. U.S. Secretary of 

Labor, 30 Ct. Int’l. Tr. 124, 414 F. Supp. 2d 1334, (2006): 

General Note 3(e) supports the conclusion that 

telecommunications transmissions, which would 

include transmissions of software code via the Internet, are exempt from duty while acknowledging 

that they are goods entering into the Customs 

boundaries of the United States.

Id. at 131.

Exemption from import duty is not exemption from 

patent infringement. The court now discards established 

protocols and practices concerning electronic and digital 

technologies, although it is beyond debate that digital 

articles are “goods” or “merchandise” and may be bought 

and sold and patented and imported. Today’s ruling

discards the Tariff Act’s purpose of protecting domestic 

industry from unfair trade in the importation of this vast 

and powerful body of commercial articles that may infringe United States patents.

The Commission correctly held that electronic importation of digital goods is subject to 

the trade laws. 

My colleagues on this panel do not dispute that the 

Patent Act applies to the subject matter that is imported, 

although they hold that the Tariff Act does not apply, 

thereby rendering Section 337 incapable of performing its 

statutory purpose.

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CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 13

Section 337 does not distinguish between digital goods 

imported electronically and digital goods imported as 

embedded in a physical medium. My colleagues hold that

importation of infringing digital data can be excluded 

when the data are carried on discs or other storage media, 

but cannot be excluded when carried in packets or waves 

by wired or wireless transmission. This distinction has 

long been discarded as unjustifiable, and in the context of 

Section 337 and other Trade statutes and rulings, precedent is universally contrary.

The Commission explained in Hardware Logic Emulation Systems, supra, that “it would be anomalous for the 

Commission to be able to stop the transfer of a CD-ROM 

or diskette containing respondents’ software, but not be 

able to stop the transfer of that very same software when 

transmitted in machine readable form by electronic

means.” Id. at 29. 

Reaching the same logical conclusion, the Department 

of Labor, interpreting the Trade Act for purposes of Trade 

Adjustment Assistance, stated that “[s]oftware and similar intangible goods that would have been considered 

articles, for the purposes of the Trade Act, if embodied in 

a physical medium will now be considered to be articles 

regardless of their method of transfer.” IBM Corporation 

Global Services Division, Piscataway, NJ; Middletown, 

NJ; Notice of Revised Determination on Remand, 71 FR 

29183-01 (May 19, 2006). And as mentioned supra, the 

Customs service holds that “[t]he fact that the importation of the merchandise via the Internet is not effected by 

a more ‘traditional vehicle’ (e.g., transported on a vessel) 

does not influence our determination.” HQ 114459 at 2. 

To further illustrate, Congress rejected the distinction 

the court creates, in the context of trade negotiations. 

The recently enacted Bipartisan Congressional Trade 

Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 covers “digital 

trade in goods and services” and states that “[t]he princiCase: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 53 Filed: 11/10/2015
14 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

pal negotiating objectives of the United States . . . are . . .

to ensure that electronically delivered goods and services 

receive no less favorable treatment under trade rules and 

commitments than like products delivered in physical 

form." Pub L. No. 114-26, § 102(a)(6) and (a)(6)(B)(i), 129 

Stat. 320, 325 (2015). 

Although various forms of wired and wireless transmission have become commonplace, within nations and

across borders, the panel majority has locked the International Trade Commission into technological antiquity. 

The court ignores precedent and logic, and removes a vast 

body of technology from the protection of a statute designed for its protection.

Difficulty of enforcement is not grounds for 

discarding a remedial statute. 

The court argues that violation of Section 337 by electronic transmission into the United States, such as via 

the Internet or other cloud technologies, may be difficult 

to track and enforce. This argument, whatever the present state of science, cannot apply to the facts of this case, 

for the electronically imported digital goods are produced 

by the Pakistani affiliate of the United States importer, 

who is subject to the Commission’s Cease-and-Desist 

Order.

Cease-and-desist orders as a remedy for Section 337 

violations are not new, including orders relating to infringement by digital importation. See Hardware Logic 

Emulation Systems, supra, at 3 (ordering that respondent 

“shall not ... import (including electronically) into the 

United States, or use, duplicate, transfer, or distribute by 

electronic means or otherwise, within the United States, 

hardware logic emulation software that constitutes covered product”).

Even if enforcement were difficult, difficulty of enforcing a remedial statute is not grounds for judicial eliminaCase: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 54 Filed: 11/10/2015
CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 15

tion of all remedy. See Bally/Midway Mfg. Co. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n, 714 F.2d 1117, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 1983)

(rejecting the position that absence of remedy precludes a 

finding of violation of Section 337). The court stated that 

“Congress did not intend the Commission to consider 

questions of remedy when the agency determines whether 

there is a violation.” Id. at 1123.

My colleagues’ reliance on possible difficulty of enforcement against electronic transmission of infringing 

digital data and related articles, although not at issue in 

this case, merely adds imprecision to judicial guidance in 

this commercially important area.

The Commission’s ruling requires judicial 

deference in accordance with Chevron.

It is not disputed that the digital data sets and digital 

models for teeth alignment, produced in Pakistan and 

imported into the United States, infringe the patents of 

Align Technology. The Commission recognized that this

technology is subject to Section 337. This ruling is a 

reasonable statutory interpretation. 

If Section 337 were deemed ambiguous as applied to 

these fields of technology and commerce, the Commission’s well-reasoned interpretation, amid extensive corroboratory rulings, is entitled to judicial deference. “[I]f 

the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 

specific issue, the question for the court is whether the 

agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of 

the statute.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). A permissible construction is one that is “rational and consistent with the 

statute.” Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 88-89 (1990) 

(quoting N.L.R.B. v. United Food & Commercial Workers 

Union, Local 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987)). “If 

the agency interpretation is not in conflict with the plain 

language of the statute, deference is due.” Nat’l R.R. 

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 55 Filed: 11/10/2015
16 CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC

Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 

417, (1992).

The rule of deference to the Commission’s reasonable 

statutory interpretation has long been recognized by the 

Federal Circuit. E.g., TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade 

Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“We have 

held that the Commission's reasonable interpretations of 

section 337 are entitled to deference.”); Kinik Co. v. Int’l 

Trade Comm’n., 362 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“To 

the extent that there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in 

the interpretation of § 337(a) and its successor 

§ 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii), deference must be given to the view of 

the agency that is charged with its administration.”); 

Enercon GmbH v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 151 F.3d 1376, 

1381 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“As the agency charged with the 

administration of section 337, the ITC is entitled to appropriate deference to its interpretation of the statute.”). 

“Congress cannot, and need not, draft a statute which 

anticipates and provides for all possible circumstances in 

which a general policy must be applied to a specific set of 

facts. It properly leaves this task to the authorized agency.” Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 

1312 (Fed. Cir. 2001). To the extent that new technologies are involved in these infringing importations, deference is appropriate to the agency’s reasonable application 

of the statute it is charged to administer. See Nat’l Cable 

& Telecommunications Ass’n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 

U.S. 327, 339 (upholding agency interpretive authority 

where the statute involved “technical, complex, and 

dynamic” subject matter that “might be expected to evolve 

in directions Congress knew it could not anticipate.”).

On any standard, the Commission’s determination is 

reasonable, and warrants respect. The panel majority’s 

contrary ruling is not reasonable, on any standard.

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 56 Filed: 11/10/2015
CLEARCORRECT OPERATING, LLC v. ITC 17

CONCLUSION

The Commission’s ruling is consistent with the language, structure, and purpose of Section 337, and decades 

of precedent concerned with digital data, electronic 

transmission, and infringing importation. From the 

court’s erroneous departure from statute and precedent, I 

respectfully dissent.

Case: 14-1527 Document: 126-2 Page: 57 Filed: 11/10/2015