Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01251/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alphabet Inc.
Appellee
Apple, Inc.
Appellee
Lakshmi Arunachalam
Appellant
Citibank, N.A.
Appellee
Citigroup, Inc.
Appellee
Eclipse Foundation, Inc.
Appellee
Facebook, Inc.
Appellee
Fiserv, Inc.
Appellee
Fulton Financial Corporation
Appellee
International Business Machines Corporation
Appellee
JPMorgan Chase & Co.
Appellee
Microsoft Corporation
Appellee
SAP America, Inc.
Appellee
Samsung Electronics America, Inc.
Appellee
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

APPLE, INC., SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 

AMERICA, INC., FACEBOOK, INC., ALPHABET 

INC., MICROSOFT CORPORATION, 

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES 

CORPORATION, SAP AMERICA, INC., JPMORGAN

CHASE & CO., FISERV, INC., WELLS FARGO 

BANK, N.A., CITIGROUP, INC., CITIBANK, N.A., 

FULTON FINANCIAL CORPORATION, ECLIPSE 

FOUNDATION, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees

______________________

2019-1251

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of California in No. 5:18-cv-01250-EJD, 

Judge Edward J. Davila.

______________________

Decided: February 13, 2020

______________________

LAKSHMI ARUNACHALAM, Menlo Park, CA, pro se. 

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2 ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC.

 BRIAN E. FERGUSON, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee Apple, Inc. Also 

represented by ROBERT T. VLASIS, III. 

 PHILIP A. IRWIN, Covington & Burling LLP, New York, 

NY, for defendant-appellee Samsung Electronics America, 

Inc. 

 HEIDI LYN KEEFE, Cooley LLP, Palo Alto, CA, for defendant-appellee Facebook, Inc. 

 RYAN R. SMITH, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, 

PC, Palo Alto, CA, for defendant-appellee Alphabet Inc. 

 KRISTIN L. CLEVELAND, Klarquist Sparkman, LLP, 

Portland, OR, for defendant-appellee Microsoft Corporation. 

 KEVIN J. CULLIGAN, Maynard, Cooper & Gale, PC, New 

York, NY, for defendant-appellee International Business 

Machines Corporation. Also represented by MARK J.

ABATE, Goodwin Procter LLP, New York, NY. 

 THARAN GREGORY LANIER, Jones Day, Palo Alto, CA, for 

defendant-appellee SAP America, Inc. Also represented by 

JOSEPH BEAUCHAMP, Houston, TX. 

 DOUGLAS R. NEMEC, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & 

Flom LLP, New York, NY, for defendant-appellee JPMorgan Chase & Co. Also represented by EDWARD TULIN; 

JAMES Y. PAK, Palo Alto, CA. 

 RAMSEY M. AL-SALAM, Perkins Coie, LLP, Seattle, WA, 

for defendant-appellee Fiserv, Inc. 

 DAVID SPENCER BLOCH, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, San 

Francisco, CA, for defendants-appellees Wells Fargo Bank, 

N.A., Fulton Financial Corporation. 

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ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC. 3

 ERIC SOPHIR, Dentons US LLP, Washington, DC, for 

defendants-appellees Citigroup, Inc., Citibank, N.A. Also 

represented by NICHOLAS HUNT JACKSON. 

 BALDASSARE VINTI, Proskauer Rose LLP, New York, 

NY, for defendant-appellee Eclipse Foundation, Inc. Also 

represented by FABIO ENRIQUE TARUD. 

 ______________________

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

Dr. Lakshmi Arunachalam, proceeding pro se, appeals 

multiple decisions from Judge Davila of the U.S. District 

Court for the Northern District of California, including his

dismissal of a patent infringement claim, dismissal of civil 

claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), dismissal of a claim of treason, and 

various other rulings. Dr. Arunachalam also challenges 

the decisions of other courts or other cases such as the denial of her writ for mandamus by the Ninth Circuit. For 

the reasons explained below, we affirm.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Complaint

Dr. Arunachalam filed an initial complaint (Complaint) on February 26, 2018. The Complaint was filed 

against thirteen named defendants, including Apple, Inc., 

Samsung Electronics America, International Business Machines Corporation, SAP America, Inc., and JPMorgan 

Chase & Co., as well as unnamed Does 1–100 (collectively, 

Defendants). The Complaint is over 140 pages long and 

identifies a host of accusations against not only the named 

parties, but also numerous others including judges and attorneys involved in Dr. Arunachalam’s other cases. Despite the voluminous discussion and plethora of 

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accusations, the Complaint only listed fourteen counts. 

The district court grouped these counts as a patent infringement claim (Count I), antitrust claims (Counts II and 

VIII–XIII), RICO Act claims (Count III), a trade secret misappropriation claim (Count IV), a claim of False Designation of Origin (Count V), claims of fraud regarding various 

Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) proceedings (Count 

VI), and claims of treason and obstruction of justice 

(Counts VII and XIV). Arunachalam v. Apple Inc., No. 

5:18-cv-01250-EJD, 2018 WL 5023378, at *2–5 (N.D. Cal. 

Oct. 16, 2018). The patent infringement claim alleged that 

the Defendants had infringed Dr. Arunachalam’s U.S. Patent No. 7,930,340 (the ’340 patent). 

B. Motion to Dismiss

The Defendants filed for, and were granted, a motion 

to dismiss the Complaint. The district court first dismissed 

the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8

and 41(b), explaining that the Complaint “is confusing, disorganized, and contains legal terminology without setting 

forth facts showing that she is entitled to relief.” Arunachalam, 2018 WL 5023378, at *2. Accordingly, the district court held that “dismissal [was] proper under Rule 8.” 

Id.

However, the district court provided even further consideration and analyzed the pleadings under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In this analysis, the district 

court determined that Dr. Arunachalam failed to allege 

facts sufficient to support the patent infringement claim, 

antitrust claims, and false designation of origin claim. The 

district court also dismissed the RICO and fraud claims as 

barred by the four-year statute of limitations because “[t]he 

only purported evidence of the conspiracy is the ‘Common 

Public License Agreement Version 0.5,’ which is dated August 29, 2002, and publicly available code from 2002. 

Plaintiff either knew or should have known of this evidence 

as early as 2002.” Id. at *4. The district court also

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dismissed Dr. Arunachalam’s trade secret claim with prejudice because it was barred by the three-year statute of 

limitations and because Dr. Arunachalam failed to allege 

that a trade secret existed or that she had taken steps to 

keep it a secret. Id. Finally, the district court dismissed 

the claims of treason and obstruction of justice for lack of 

standing because there is no private cause of action for 

treason or obstruction of justice. Id. at *5.

The district court dismissed Dr. Arunachalam’s patent 

infringement claim, antitrust claims, and false designation 

of origin claim without prejudice and dismissed her remaining claims with prejudice. The district court gave Dr. 

Arunachalam leave to file an amended complaint that 

amended the claims dismissed without prejudice in compliance with Rules 8 and 12 and that removed the claims dismissed with prejudice. The district court warned Dr. 

Arunachalam in no uncertain terms that “[f]ailure to file 

and serve an amended complaint in accordance with this 

Order will result in dismissal of the action with prejudice 

pursuant to Rules 8 and 41(b).” Id. at *6. 

Dr. Arunachalam then filed an amended complaint 

that included all original fourteen counts. In fact, the 

amended complaint was mostly unchanged except that it 

added allegations, but no specific counts, against Judge 

Davila, claiming that he also participated in various conspiracies against Dr. Arunachalam. 

The district court then dismissed Dr. Arunachalam’s 

case with prejudice for failure to comply with its previous 

order under Rule 8 and 41(b). This appeal followed. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal Under Rules 8 and 41(b)

We apply the law of the regional circuit when reviewing 

a motion to dismiss. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 

788 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Ninth Circuit 

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6 ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC.

reviews motions to dismiss under Rule 41(b) for failure to 

comply with Rule 8 for abuse of discretion. Hearns v. San 

Bernardino Police Dep’t, 530 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 

2008); see also Cafasso, U.S. ex rel. v. Gen. Dynamics C4 

Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2011). Pleadings made by pro se litigants are “held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Rule 8 requires 

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief,” and Rule 41(b) allows a district 

court to dismiss a case for failure to follow the court’s order. 

FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 41(b). 

As the district court correctly found, Dr. Arunachalam’s “robust 144-page complaint is confusing, disorganized, and contains legal terminology without setting 

forth facts showing that she is entitled to relief.” Arunachalam, 2018 WL 5023378, at *2. The Complaint describes alleged conspiracies that have been perpetrated by 

numerous companies and members of the judiciary, the 

legislature, the PTO, and the bar. Yet no facts are presented to support these allegations other than Dr. Arunachalam’s assertions that it is so. Under the 

circumstances, the district court was justified in dismissing 

the Complaint under Rule 8. See Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 

1058–59; Hearns, 530 F.3d at 1130–31.

When the district court dismissed the Complaint for 

failure to follow Rule 8, the district court specifically 

warned Dr. Arunachalam that failure to follow the court’s 

order would result in dismissal of the case. Id. at *6. But 

rather than follow the district court’s instructions, Dr. Arunachalam used her amended complaint to levy additional 

attacks against Judge Davila, who was not a named party 

in the action. 

On appeal, Dr. Arunachalam has not attempted to 

identify any error by the district court, instead making 

vague statements about a “non-existent manufactured 

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ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC. 7

Rule 8 and 41 falsity.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 2. Dr. Arunachalam, though pro se, is required to follow the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure the same as every other party that 

litigates in the federal courts. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 

F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). We do not see any error in the 

district court’s thorough evaluation of the Complaint or its 

decision to dismiss the Complaint in view of Dr. Arunachalam’s failure to comply with the court’s instructions. 

B. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)

We also review the district court’s dismissal based on 

Rule 12(b)(6). We review a district court’s “order granting 

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim . . . under 

the applicable law of the regional circuit.” K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 

1282 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting R+L Carriers, Inc. v. 

DriverTech LLC, 681 F.3d 1323, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012)). 

The Ninth Circuit reviews a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Eichenberger 

v. ESPN, Inc., 876 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2017). Again, 

pleadings made by pro se litigants are “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). A motion to 

dismiss may only be granted if the court, accepting all wellpleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing 

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, concludes 

that those allegations “could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

558 (2007). However, Dr. Arunachalam’s obligation “to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of [her] ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Id. at 555.

1. Failure to Allege Facts

As described above, the patent infringement claim, antitrust claims, and false designation of origin claim were 

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8 ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC.

initially dismissed without prejudice because they failed to 

allege facts that supported the cause of action. 

Dr. Arunachalam’s patent infringement allegations accuse several companies relating to the companies’ app distribution platforms, such as Apple’s App Store. It is not 

clear whether Dr. Arunachalam was alleging that these 

platforms merely sell infringing apps or if the platforms

themselves infringe the ’340 patent. Regardless, the Complaint never identified even a single specific app, nor did it 

specifically allege how such an app (or platform) actually 

infringes the ’340 patent. Such overly broad allegations are

insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

For similar reasons, dismissal of any remaining patent 

infringement allegations, and the remaining counts dismissed without prejudice, lack factual support in the Complaint. As such, these counts fail to meet the requirements 

for Rule 12(b)(6) and the Supreme Court’s standard in 

Twombly. See 550 U.S. 544.

2. Other Allegations

The district court also dismissed some of the counts 

with prejudice. For the RICO and fraud claims, the district 

court was correct in noting that Dr. Arunachalam’s claim 

was barred by the four-year statute of limitations based on 

the fact that the accused conduct occurred in 2002. Living 

Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 

353, 365 (9th Cir. 2005). For the trade secret claims, we 

also agree with the district court that the statute of limitations bars the claims because the accused conduct occurred 

in 2002, and because Dr. Arunachalam failed to allege that 

a trade secret existed or that she took steps to keep it a 

secret. Cal. Civ. Code § 3426.6; see Ultimax Cement Mfg. 

Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg., Corp., 587 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009). Regarding the treason and obstruction of justice claims, the district court correctly determined that Dr. 

Arunachalam does not have standing to bring these claims. 

Laine v. City of Livermore, 695 F. App’x 260, 261 (9th Cir. 

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ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC. 9

2017) (citing Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th 

Cir. 1980)); McDonald v. Coyle, 175 F. App’x 947, 949 (10th 

Cir. 2006); Chapman v. Chronicle, No. 4:07-cv-04775-SBA, 

2009 WL 102821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2009); see also 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[I]n 

American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a 

judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or 

nonprosecution of another.”).

As such, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

the Complaint based on Rule 12(b)(6). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the rest of Dr. Arunachalam’s arguments and find them unpersuasive.1 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the claims and all other 

district court rulings challenged by Dr. Arunachalam in 

this appeal. We also acknowledge that Dr. Arunachalam 

has attempted to appeal the Ninth Circuit’s denial of her 

writ for mandamus, but we do not have the authority to 

review that decision. We have also considered Dr. Arunachalam’s remaining motions and deny those motions.

1 We further note that Dr. Arunachalam’s challenges 

under Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and 

Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 

2017), are not within the scope of this appeal because the 

validity of the ’340 patent was not addressed by the district 

court. Moreover, we have previously rejected these constitutional challenges. Arunachalam v. Int’l Bus. Machs. 

Corp., 759 F. App’x 927, 932–33 (Fed. Cir. 2019). We also 

decline to reach Dr. Arunachalam’s arguments on the merits of unrelated cases, which are not properly on appeal before us. See Pers. Audio, LLC v. CBS Corp., 946 F.3d 1348 

(Fed. Cir. 2020); Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 759 F. App’x at 

932–33.

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10 ARUNACHALAM v. APPLE, INC.

AFFIRMED

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