Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-06062/USCOURTS-ca10-93-06062-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Business Machines Corporation
Appellee
Darlene Thomas
Appellant

Document Text:

- PUBLISH 

FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UD.Ited States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DARLENE THOMAS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES, 

a New York corporation doing 

business in the State of 

Oklahoma, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

FEB 21 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-6062 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-844-C) 

Submitted on the Briefs 

Lewis Barber, Jr. and Guinise M. Marshall of Barber & Marshall, 

P.A., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Jeffrey G. Huvelle and Thomasenia P. Duncan of Covington & 

Burling, Washington, D.C., and MonaS. Lambird and Carolyn Gregg 

Hill of Andrews Davis Legg Bixler Milsten & Price, and Douglas G. 

Vetter of IBM Corporation, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before MOORE and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and VRATIL, District 

Judge.* 

EBEL, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Kathryn H. Vratil, United States District Court 

Judge, District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant Darlene Thomas ("Thomas"), an employee of 

Defendant-Appellee International Business Machines Corporation 

("IBM"), appeals the district court's summary judgment dismissal 

of her claim that IBM violated the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act ("ADEA"), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-

634. Thomas also appeals the court's grant of IBM's motion for a 

protective order to relieve John F. Akers, Chairman of the Board 

of Directors of IBM, from the necessity of complying with Thomas' 

notice to take deposition. We affirm.l 

I. Background 

Since 1979, Thomas has performed clerical and administrative 

duties in IBM's Oklahoma City office. In early 1990, IBM merged 

the Oklahoma City National Service Division, where Thomas had 

worked under the supervision of Dorothy Warren ("Warren"), into 

the Marketing Branch. In the Marketing Branch, Thomas' new direct 

supervisor was Mark Beck ("Beck"), who in turn reported to Dan 

Aleta ("Aleta"), the branch operations manager. 

Before Thomas was hired, IBM implemented an employee 

performance rating system pursuant to which each employee received 

an annual written evaluation that included a performance score 

between 1 and 5. An employee who "far exceeds" expectations 

receives a "1," whereas a "5" reflects unsatisfactory performance, 

and a "4" means that the employee has met his or her requirements, 

1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously to honor the parties' request for a 

decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(f); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 2 
and no more. During her thirteen-year tenure with IBM, Thomas has 

never received an annual performance rating of "1" or "2," but 

also never received a "5." 

In May 1991, Aleta ranked the thirty-three administrative 

employees in the Marketing Branch according to their "relative 

contribution to IBM's business." A critical component of Aleta's 

evaluation was each employee's most recent performance rating. 

IBM admonished employees that if they received a performance 

rating of "4" and a low rank vis-a-vis their colleagues, their 

positions would be at risk. A 1991 company memo entitled 

"Determining Employee Contribution in IBM" informed employees that 

the ranking was precipitated by IBM's aim to enhance its 

performance in what had become a keenly competitive computer 

market. In his evaluation of Thomas' department, Aleta ranked 

Thomas thirtieth out of thirty-three, which placed her in the 

bottom quartile. Among all the employees included in this May 

1991 ranking of her department, only Thomas and two others had 

never received a ranking of "1" or "2." 

Just two months later in July 1991, Beck completed his annual 

review of Thomas and evaluated her performance at level "4." In 

April 1992, Thomas again received a "4" rating in her annual 

review. This time Warren, who had replaced Beck as Thomas' 

supervisor, conducted the evaluation. 

Also during the early 1990s, IBM instituted a voluntary 

separation incentive program known as Individual Transition 

Options ("ITO"). Pursuant to ITO, IBM offered employees the 

opportunity to retire and receive a severance payment based on 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 3 
their length of service and salary level. Alternatively, the 

program allowed employees not yet eligible for retirement to take 

an unpaid leave of absence for up to eight years, during which 

time they would accrue service credits toward retirement and enjoy 

coverage under IBM's medical plan. IBM offered ITO to all 

employees, regardless of age. 

Between June 1991 and May 1992, Thomas' supervisors 

periodically encouraged her to pursue the ITO program because IBM 

was contemplating a reduction in the number of administrative 

employees in its Oklahoma City office. Although Thomas knew that 

her undistinguished performance evaluations and ranking placed her 

job at risk, she nonetheless opted to remain at IBM and is today 

one of thirteen administrative employees in the Oklahoma City 

office. 

On May 12, 1992, Thomas commenced this action, alleging the 

following federal and state law claims: (1) IBM violated the ADEA 

by giving her undeservedly low performance evaluations in order to 

coerce her to resign under the ITO program; (2) IBM engaged in 

intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (3) IBM 

committed fraud and deceit in its evaluations of her performance. 

After the parties conducted written discovery and exchanged 

witness and exhibit lists, they filed myriad pretrial motions 

between November 1992 and January 1993. The two critical motions 

for this appeal are IBM's motion on December 4, 1992 for a 

protective order to relieve IBM Chairman Akers from complying with 

Thomas' notice to take his deposition and IBM's December 14, 1992 

motion for summary judgment. On December 8, 1992, the court 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 4 
granted IBM's motion for a protective order to block the Akers 

deposition and subsequently denied Thomas' two motions for 

reconsideration. After ruling on numerous additional motions to 

compel and extend discovery, the court granted summary judgment in 

favor of IBM on all claims on January 20, 1993. 

In this appeal, Thomas contends that the court abused its 

discretion in preventing the Akers deposition and that genuine 

issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in favor of IBM 

on the ADEA claim.2 

II. Discussion 

A. The Protective Order to Block the Akers Deposition 

Because the decision to grant a protective order under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 26(c) is vested in the district court's discretion, we 

will only reverse the court's ruling if that discretion was 

abused.3 Wang v. Hsu, 919 F.2d 130, 130 (lOth Cir. 1990). Under 

the abuse of discretion standard, we will not disturb a trial 

2 Because Thomas does not appeal the court's summary judgment 

dismissal of her claims of intentional infliction of emotional 

distress and fraud, we do not address these issues. Abercrombie 

v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (lOth Cir. 1990) (failure 

to argue an issue in the appellate brief or at oral argument 

constitutes waiver, even when the appellant lists the issue in the 

notice of appeal). 

3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) provides in pertinent part: 

Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom 

discovery is sought, accompanied by a certification that the 

movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer 

with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the 

dispute without court action, and for good cause shown, the 

court in which the action is pending or alternatively, on 

matters relating to a deposition, the court in the district 

where the deposition is to be taken may make any order which 

justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, 

embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense .... 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 5 
court's decision absent "a definite and firm conviction that the 

lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds 

of permissible choice in the circumstances." United States v. 

Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

To place the district court's grant of IBM's protective order 

in proper perspective, we briefly review what transpired prior to 

its ruling. Thomas filed her complaint on May 12, 1992 and IBM 

filed its answer on June 4, 1992. In a pretrial conference in 

early July, the court scheduled discovery to end on December 1, 

1992 and set trial for January 1993. On November 16, 1992, IBM 

and Thomas filed a joint application to extend the discovery 

deadline and the trial date. On November 17, 1992, the court 

denied this application. On November 24, 1992, the court granted 

IBM's counsel's request to withdraw from the case. The next day, 

new IBM counsel entered an appearance and requested both a ten-day 

extension in the discovery deadline and permission to file a 

summary judgment motion on December 17, 1992; counsel did not 

request an extension in the trial date. On November 30, 1992, the 

court granted this discovery extension, but required all summary 

judgment motions to be filed on December 14, 1992. On December 1, 

1992, Thomas also requested a ten-day discovery extension, which 

the court granted that same day.4 Also on December 1st, Thomas 

gave notice in violation of Local Rule 15(a) to depose Akers in 

Oklahoma City on December 7th, fewer than five business days 

4 Given that the court granted Thomas the same discovery 

extension afforded to IBM, Thomas' claim that the court abused its 

discretion in granting IBM a unilateral discovery extension is 

without merit. 

- 6 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 6 
later. IBM responded on December 4th with its motion for a 

protective order. On December 4th, Thomas served IBM with a 

second deposition notice and also requested the court to waive the 

five-day notice requirement in Local Rule 15(a). On December 8th, 

the court granted IBM's motion for a protective order. 

We conclude that the record amply supports the court's 

protective order. First, Thomas does not dispute that her notice 

to depose Akers in Oklahoma City on December 7th violated the 

court's Local Rule 15(a), which requires opposing counsel to give 

five-days notice to deponents who are outside the jurisdiction. 

Additionally, Thomas' notice to conduct the deposition in Oklahoma 

City clashes with the normal procedure that the "deposition of a 

corporation by its agents and officers should ordinarily be taken 

at its principal place of business." SA Charles Alan Wright, 

Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and 

Procedure: Civil § 2112 at 81 (1994) (citations omitted). 

Thomas attempts to justify her deposition request by arguing 

that the lack of adequate notice arose from the court's expedited 

discovery schedule and that Akers would not be inconvenienced by 

traveling to IBM's Oklahoma City office. However, noticeably 

absent from Thomas' opposition to IBM's protective order motion is 

any explanation as to why she waited until December 1st to set·the 

deposition date and why her counsel could not have conducted the 

deposition at IBM's principal place of business in White Plains, 

New York. Indeed, the district court noted that Thomas not only 

waited until after the expiration of the original discovery 

- 7 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 7 
deadline to give notice of Akers' deposition, but also had not 

taken the deposition of any other IBM personnel. 

Furthermore, IBM submitted an affidavit from Akers in which 

he testified that he lacked personal knowledge of Thomas and was 

unaware of her age, her performance ranking, ~ny work evaluations 

that she might have received, or that she even worked for IBM.s 

See Lewelling v. Farmers Ins. of Columbus. Inc., 879 F.2d 212, 218 

(6th Cir. 1989) (upholding district court's exercise of discretion 

in granting protective order to bar plaintiffs from deposing their 

employer's chief executive officer, who lacked knowledge about any 

pertinent facts); Salter v. Upjohn Co., 593 F.2d 649, 651 (5th 

Cir. 1979) (upholding protective order in a wrongful death action 

against a drug manufacturer that barred the deposition of the 

defendant's president because he was extremely busy and lacked 

direct knowledge of facts in dispute, and other employees had more 

direct knowledge) . Nothing in the record indicates that IBM did 

not make available for deposition Thomas' direct supervisors, who 

conducted the performance evaluations and ranking. Also, Akers 

explained that the deposition would have imposed "severe hardship" 

because he was required to attend previously scheduled meetings 

with IBM senior management in New York from December 3, 1992 to 

December 14th. 

Thomas argues that Akers' deposition was critical for her 

case because he had allegedly authored an IBM policy designed to 

discriminate against older employees. Thomas notes that Akers 

5 In a corroborating affidavit, Aleta testified that he never 

informed Akers about Thomas' evaluation and ranking. 

- 8 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 8 
testified in Rathemacher v. IBM, No. 88-3463, 1992 WL 41719 (D. 

N.J. Feb. 28, 1992), in which a former IBM manager prevailed on a 

constructive discharge claim that the company forced him to accept 

an early retirement plan by demoting him from management, 

transferring him, and harassing him in the workplace.6 

Although it is conceivable that Akers' testimony about the 

genesis of the ITO program could be relevant to a disparate impact 

claim against IBM, the district court concluded that Thomas did 

not allege disparate impact in her complaint, in the parties' 

Joint Status Report, or in her Final Contentions filed on 

November 2, 1992. Moreover, Thomas made no attempt to demonstrate 

that the information she seeks to obtain from Akers could not be 

gathered from other IBM personnel, for whom a deposition might 

have been less burdensome. 

When we add to these factors Thomas' failure to give Akers 

adequate notice, the burden that a hurried deposition would have 

imposed on Akers, the fact that Thomas waited until the eleventh 

hour to request the deposition, and her failure to depose any 

other IBM personnel, including her own direct supervisors, it was 

clear beyond peradventure that the district court did not abuse 

its discretion in issuing the protective order. 

B. The ADEA Claim 

We review de novo the district court's summary judgment 

ruling in favor of IBM on Thomas' ADEA claim and apply the same 

6 Thomas submitted a transcript of Akers' testimony in 

Rathemacher in opposition to IBM's summary judgment motion in the 

instant case. 

- 9 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 9 
standard used by the district court. Applied Genetics Int'l. Inc. 

v. First Affiliated Sec .. Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (lOth Cir. 

1990). Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 

entitled to a judgment as matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

We examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom 

in the light most favorable to Thomas, who opposed summary 

judgment. Applied Genetics, 912 F.2d at 1241. 

IBM, as the moving party, has the initial burden to show 

"that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 

(1986) . Once IBM meets this burden, the burden shifts to Thomas 

to identify specific facts that show the existence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. "The party opposing the motion must 

present sufficient evidence in specific, factual form for a jury 

to return a verdict in that party's favor." Bacchus Indus .. Inc. 

v. Arvin Indus .. Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (lOth Cir. 1991). "Where 

the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of 

fact to find for the nonmoving party," summary judgment in favor 

of the moving party is proper. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. 

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

The ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment" or to "classify his 

employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any 

- 10 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 10 
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 

affect his status as an employee," because of the individual's 

age. 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a) (1)- (2). 

To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, Thomas "must prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that IBM had a discriminatory 

motive or intent." Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 943 F.2d 1230, 

1236 (lOth Cir. 1991). Absent direct proof of discriminatory 

intent, we evaluate Thomas' claim under the burden-shifting 

analytical framework of McDonnell Douglas CokP. v. Green, 411 U.S. 

792 (1973). "The framework for assessing the evidence in an age 

discrimination case parallels that applicable in a Title VII 

case." Spulak v. K Mart CokP., 894 F.2d 1150, 1153 (lOth Cir. 

1990). 

A typical claim of age discrimination against an employer 

arises when the employer discharges an employee on the basis of 

age, in which case the employee establishes a prima facie case by 

showing that (1) the employee belongs to the protected age group; 

(2) the employee's job performance was satisfactory; (3) the 

employee was discharged; and (4) the employee was replaced by a 

younger person. MacDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 

F.2d 1115, 1119 (lOth Cir. 1991). 

Here, the gravamen of Thomas' ADEA claim is not that she was 

discharged, but rather that IBM unsuccessfully sought to induce 

her to accept the ITO program and discriminated against her by 

giving her undeservedly low performance evaluations, to wit: the 

July 1991 and April 1992 performance ratings of "4" and the May 

- 11 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 11 
1991 ranking, which placed her in the bottom quartile.? Thus, we 

modify the third prong to require proof that adverse employment 

action was taken against her. Similarly, we modify the fourth 

element to require proof that comparable employees who were not in 

a protected age category did not receive comparable adverse 

employment action. Alternatively, Thomas could present direct 

proof of intent to discriminate against her based on her age. 

Thomas has satisfied the first prong of the prima facie case 

because she was over 40 years of age when the alleged 

discrimination occurred. She arguably meets the third prong 

insofar as IBM gave her two undistinguished annual reviews and a 

poor departmental ranking. To support the second and fourth 

prongs of her prima facie case, Thomas relies on her own five-page 

affidavit, the affidavit of Professor Phil McCormack, an expert 

witness, and Akers' testimony in Rathemacher. She advances no 

direct evidence showing that IBM intended to discriminate against 

her based on her age. 

Before exploring Thomas' proffered evidence, we address IBM's 

claim that Thomas' affidavit contains inadmissible hearsay that 

may not be used to defeat summary judgment. At the summary 

judgment stage, affidavits must "set forth facts as would be 

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 

affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Committee for the First Amendment v. 

7 In her complaint, Thomas requested the following relief: an 

injunction barring IBM from "reprisal and further acts of 

discrimination"; expungement of unsatisfactory performance 

ratings; nominal, compensatory, and liquidated damages; and 

attorney's fees. Aplt. App. at 5-6. 

- 12 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 12 
Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526 n.ll (lOth Cir. 1992) ("In opposing 

a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant must make a showing 

that, 'if reduced to admissible evidence,' would be sufficient to 

carry the nonmovant's burden of proof at trial.") (guoting 

Celotex, 477 u.s. at 327) (emphasis added). 

To be sure, the nonmoving party need not produce evidence "in 

a form that would be admissible at trial," Celotex Cor.p., 477 U.S. 

at 324, but the content or substance of the evidence must be 

admissible. Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1267-68 (7th 

Cir. 1994). For example, hearsay testimony that would be 

inadmissible at trial may not be included in an affidavit to 

defeat summary judgment because "[a] third party's description of 

[a witness'] supposed testimony is not suitable grist for the 

summary judgment mill." Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 

50 (1st Cir. 1990). Furthermore, "generalized, unsubstantiated, 

non-personal affidavits are insufficient to successfully oppose a 

motion for summary judgment." Stevens v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 

879 (lOth Cir. 1975). 

The purported hearsay that IBM and the district court 

identifies in Thomas' affidavit is her statement that colleagues 

under the age of 40 received transfer opportunities from IBM, 

whereas colleagues over 40 years of age who ranked in the third 

and fourth quartile of the May 1991 ranking did not receive 

transfer offers. From the record before us, however, we cannot 

determine whether this statement is necessarily hearsay. If 

Thomas is testifying to what an authorized agent for IBM told her, 

the statements would constitute an admission by a party-opponent 

- 13 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 13 
and therefore be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2). 

However, if Thomas is testifying to what other employees told her 

about what IBM agents in turn told them, then the testimony could 

constitute inadmissible hearsay. Because we must examine the 

record in the light most favorable to Thomas, we assume for 

purposes of this appeal that this statement is not hearsay. 

Nevertheless, Thomas' affidavit merely contains conclusory 

allegations without specific supporting facts and thus lacks 

probative value. Nichols v. Hurley, 921 F.2d 1101, 1113 (lOth 

Cir. 1990). Perhaps most revealing is the absence of any proof by 

Thomas that her direct supervisors deflated her July 1991 and 

April 1992 performance evaluations, or her status in the May 1991 

ranking, on the basis of her age. To the contrary, Thomas 

testified during a deposition that neither Beck, Warren, nor Aleto 

-- the individuals who conducted the evaluations and ranking 

treated her unfairly because of her age. 

Further, Thomas acknowledged that she agreed with Beck's 1991 

evaluation of her performance in at least two of the categories. 

In fact, Thomas failed to identify any employee above whom she 

should have been ranked. Thomas' claims in her affidavit that her 

supervisor told her in January 1991 that she was performing at 

level "2," although in her July 1991 annual review she received a 

"4" rating. However, she does not show that this "4" rating was 

undeserved, nor does she show, or even allege, that the supervisor 

acted with discriminatory animus or intent. 

The empirical data on which Thomas relies likewise offers no 

support for her prima facie case. Thomas testified that all 

- 14 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 14 
employees ranked in the third and fourth quartile in the May 1991 

ranking either belonged to a protected group under Title VII or 

the ADEA, had suffered from extensive illness, or had previously 

filed an EEOC complaint. However, she has grouped so many 

classifications of employees together that this statistic offers 

no proof of age discrimination. In fact, this data undermines her 

age discrimination argument because the distribution in all four 

quartiles according to age is evenly balanced.B In fact, five of 

the nine employees in the fourth quartile, and five of the six 

lowest ranked employees, were under 40 years of age. 

Additionally, Thomas offers no evidence that any employee in the 

third and fourth quartile should have received a higher ranking 

and she conceded that Aleta, who conducted the ranking, did not 

treat her unfairly on the basis of her age. 

The two-page affidavit of Thomas' expert witness is similarly 

inadequate. Just three weeks prior to the submission of his 

affidavit, McCormack testified that "the evidence is lacking as 

far as showing whether or not the evaluation as received by Ms. 

Thomas was merited or not merited." Aplt. App. at 232. 

McCormack's affidavit neither amended nor retracted this 

deposition testimony. Instead, McCormack's affidavit is silent 

8 The distribution is as follows: 

Quartile 

First 

Second 

Third 

Fourth 

Aplt. App. at 96. 

Employees Under 40 

5 

5 

4 

5 

- 15 -

Employees Over 40 

3 

3 

4 

4 

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 15 
about Thomas' 1991 and 1992 performance evaluations or the May 

1991 departmental ranking -- the critical events in this ADEA 

claim. In fact, McCormack testified that IBM's appraisal system 

contained safeguards to minimize the possibility for unlawful bias 

or discrimination, such as a written performance plan, objective 

criteria, a requirement that the supervisor specify in writing the 

reasons for each rating, and an independent review of the 

supervisor's evaluation by the second-level manager. 

McCormack's affidavit did state that, on the basis of 

interviews with "approximately 11 past and present employees of 

IBM," he believed that "Thomas was subjected to discrimination 

based on her age ... as a result of said ITO plan." Aplt. App. 

at 331. Aside from the minimal sample size of his study, 

McCormack failed to support this conclusory allegation with any 

specific facts or empirical evidence other than the generalized 

statement that "some employees under 40 were offered transfer 

options that were not offered to the majority of employees over 

40." Id. Likewise, Akers' testimony in Rathemacher, a case 

involving constructive discharge, does not speak to Thomas' 

performance evaluations, ranking, or the ITO program. 

Next, Thomas states in her affidavit that IBM conducted the 

May 1991 ranking before informing her of its intent to implement a 

ranking system and that her July 1991 performance evaluation was 

eight months late. However, Thomas fails to show a nexus between 

these two acts and her age discrimination claim -- i.e. she 

demonstrated no plausible evidence of an unlawful discriminatory 

motive on IBM's part to rank Thomas before informing her of the 

- 16 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 16 
system or to delay the performance evaluation. At summary 

judgment, the inquiry is not whether the parties dispute certain 

facts, but instead whether the evidence establishes a genuine 

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it "might affect 

the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute 

about a material fact is "genuine" only "if the evidence is such 

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party." Id. 

Finally, we reject Thomas' protestation that the district 

court's pretrial denial of IBM's motion in limine to exclude the 

testimony of four witnesses is irreconcilable with the court's 

subsequent summary judgment ruling. In denying IBM's motion in 

limine, the court correctly relied on Spulak, 894 F.2d at 1156, 

for the proposition that the testimony of other employees about 

their treatment by the defendant may, under some circumstances, be 

relevant to the issue of the employer's discriminatory intent. 

Because Thomas' proposed witnesses were either present or former 

IBM employees who allegedly experienced age discrimination, the 

court reasoned that their testimony at trial could be relevant. 

However, insofar as Thomas did not attempt to defeat IBM's summary 

judgment motion by proffering affidavits or depositions from these 

witnesses, the court properly gave no weight to Thomas' summary 

prediction of these witnesses' expected trial testimony. 

Because Thomas has not provided any facts from which we can 

infer that IBM's performance evaluations and ranking were driven 

by age discrimination, we conclude that "the record taken as a 

- 17 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 17 
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for" Thomas 

on her disparate treatment ADEA claim. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 

587.9 

III. Conclusion 

The district court's protective order and summary judgment 

order are AFFIRMED. 

9 Although Thomas made a belated attempt to argue to the 

district court that she was also asserting a disparate impact 

claim, we agree with the district court that Thomas' complaint 

does not state a disparate impact claim. In her complaint filed 

on May 12, 1992, Thomas confined her ADEA claim to a disparate 

treatment theory, namely, that IBM unjustifiably deflated her 

performance evaluation and ranking because of her age. As the. 

district court noted in its December 29, 1992 order, Thomas did 

not allege a disparate impact theory in her initial complaint, the 

parties' Joint Status Report, or her Final Contentions filed on 

November 2, 1992. Although Thomas made some attempt to assert a 

disparate treatment claim in the weeks before trial, the district 

court quite properly declined to allow Thomas to switch her 

theories at that late date. In any event, the statistics 

presented would not support a genuine dispute of material fact as 

to a disparate impact claim even if one were asserted. 

- 18 -

Appellate Case: 93-6062 Document: 01019280734 Date Filed: 02/21/1995 Page: 18