Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-03053/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-03053-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gena Jones
Defendant
Ruiz
Defendant
Aaron Earl Woods
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AARON EARL WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v. 

GENA JONES, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 2:23-CV-3053-DMC-P

ORDER

 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 

 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 

against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 

initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 

Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 

portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 

complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 

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concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 

of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 

1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 

overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 

to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 

required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 

I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

 The incident at issue in this case occurred on August 26, 2023, at the California 

Health Care Facility (“CHCF”) in Stockton, California. See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1-3. Plaintiff names 

the following two parties as Defendants: (1) Warden Gena Jones (“Defendant Jones”), and (2) 

Correctional Officer Ruiz (“Defendant Ruiz”). See id. at 1-2. 

 On August 26, 2023, Plaintiff was housed at CHCF. See id. at 3-5. At 

approximately 10:30 am – 11:00 am, Defendant Ruiz began driving Plaintiff and two other 

inmates1 in a transport cart, without seatbelts or safety restraints. See id. Then, Defendant Ruiz 

attempted to drive the transport cart at full speed through an arched entrance. See id. With 

considerable speed and the wide size of the transport cart, Defendant Ruiz crashed the transport 

cart into both sides of the arched entrance. See id. On impact, Plaintiff’s body was thrown 

forward and slammed into various parts of the transport cart. See id. Plaintiff’s leg was 

subsequently caught and twisted by a side rail. See id. Eventual medical examinations revealed 

bodily injuries to Plaintiff’s left leg, left foot, and ankles. See id. Plaintiff also suffered emotional 

and mental trauma from the crash. See id. 

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 One of whom is Deshawn Campbell, who has filed a separate action arising from 

this incident. See Campbell v. Ruiz, et al., 2:24-cv-0119-DMC-P.

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 Plaintiff asserts Defendant Ruiz acted with deliberate indifference when Defendant 

Ruiz crashed the transport cart carrying Plaintiff. See id. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Ruiz’s 

conduct constituted health and safety issues, in violation of Plaintiff’s rights. See id. Additionally, 

Plaintiff claims Defendant Jones had a responsibility to ensure the safety of CHCF staff and 

inmates. See id. 

II. DISCUSSION

 Accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a 

plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Ruiz. For the reasons discussed below, 

however, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim against Defendant Jones. 

 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 

employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no 

respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional 

violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The 

Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on 

knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government 

officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct 

and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory 

personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 

constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be 

liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v. 

Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such 

defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. 

Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 

1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in 

civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th 

Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the 

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official’s own individual actions, has violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676. 

 Here, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Jones appears to rest entirely on a 

respondeat superior theory of liability. As discussed above, such a theory is not cognizable under 

§ 1983. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to allege what, if any, specific 

conduct on the part of Defendant Jones caused or contributed to a constitutional violation. 

III. CONCLUSION

 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 

amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is informed that, as a general rule, an 

amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 

1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Therefore, if Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the 

prior pleading in order to make Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An 

amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 

 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 

each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 

between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 

164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

 Because the complaint appears to otherwise state cognizable claims, if no amended 

complaint is filed within the time allowed therefor, the Court will issue findings and 

recommendations that the claims identified herein as defective be dismissed, as well as such 

further orders as are necessary for service of process as to the cognizable claims.

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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff may file a first amended 

complaint within 30 days of the date of service of this order.

Dated: January 16, 2024

____________________________________

DENNIS M. COTA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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