Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cr-00183/USCOURTS-almd-2_09-cr-00183-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Walter Ohoro
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

)

v. ) CRIMINAL ACTION NO.

) 2:09cr183-MHT

WILLIAM WALTER OHORO ) (WO)

OPINION AND ORDER

Four of the six counts of an indictment against

defendant William Walter Ohoro are based on guns and

drugs seized during a July 2009 search of his residence,

conducted pursuant to a warrant. The issue now before

the court is whether Ohoro is entitled to a hearing,

pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), on

the veracity of the affidavit submitted in support of the

warrant. For the reasons that follow, Ohoro’s request

for a Franks hearing will be granted in part and denied

in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On the morning of July 28, 2009, Officer Tijuan Jones

of the Autauga County Sheriff’s Office was changing the

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1. It is unclear at what point Officer Jones

realized that the man in the vehicle was Ohoro.

2

tape in a recording device that was positioned to monitor

Ohoro’s residence. Officer Jones had initiated video

surveillance of the house approximately two weeks before,

based on a tip from a confidential informant. Up to that

point, the recording device had not captured any criminal

activity.

While changing the tape, Officer Jones noticed Ohoro

leaving the residence in a vehicle.1

 Based on his

surveillance, he concluded that “it was uncommon for a

person to be exiting or leaving that residence that early

in the morning[,] ... [so he] got into a vehicle and [he]

attempted to make contact with that vehicle.” Evid. Hr’g

Tr. at 13:9-14 (Doc. No. 62). 

Because he left shortly after the vehicle, it took

Officer Jones “a while to gain sight of [it] again.” Id.

at 13:16. At some point, he determined that the vehicle

was traveling at a speed in excess of the posted 55-

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2. Officer Jones later explained that, “Due to the

fact I didn’t have the radar or certified calibration, I

wrote [Ohoro] a warning citation for going approximately

seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five mile an hour

speeding zone.” Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 15:12-15. He could

not “recall whether the warning ticket was given on the

side of the road or back at the office.” Id. at 57:7-9.

3. According to Officer Jones, pacing is a technique

commonly used in law enforcement by “those who do not

have a radar detector.” Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 14:16. He

explained this technique as follows: “I counted one

second, two seconds before my vehicle passed the same

fixed object and got a distance between my vehicle and

his vehicle to establish a pace on that vehicle.” Id. at

14:9-11. 

3

miles-per-hour speed limit. Officer Jones’s car was not

equipped with a radar gun, nor was the speedometer

“certified and calibrated.”2

 Nonetheless, he used a

technique called “pacing” to determine that the vehicle

was moving at “about seventy miles an hour or

thereabout.” Id. at 13:24-25.3

 After failing “to get a

marked unit to respond, ... [he] pulled [the car] over

about two miles from the point where the initial pace

started.” Id. at 15:8-10. 

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4

Officer Jones then approached the vehicle and asked

Ohoro to present his driver’s license and proof of

insurance. He maintains that, “When the window came down

there was the odor of [burnt] marijuana coming from the

cockpit area of the vehicle.” Id. at 16:16-18. He then

requested the assistance of a canine unit. His partner,

Officer James Steele, arrived on the scene with a dog

identified as K-9 Hobbs. Officer Jones later explained

that, “Once I smelled the odor of marijuana, burnt

marijuana, I didn’t need [Ohoro’s] permission to search

that vehicle at that particular time. I called the

canine just for secondary precautions.” Id. at 57:19-22.

When Officer Steele arrived, Officer Jones informed

him “that upon his approach to the vehicle and in talking

with the driver ... he thought he had smelled an odor of

marijuana.” Id. at 82:14-15. Officer Steele walked

Hobbs around the vehicle and the dog “alerted” in “the

vicinity of the door seams ... on the passenger and also

on the driver’s side of the vehicle.” Id. at 83:9-10. 

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4. The 2004 certificate also indicates that Hobbs

was certified to detect heroin.

5. Officer Steele explained the gaps in Hobbs’s

records, testifying that:

“There was a period of time after having

(continued...)

5

Officer Steele later provided documentary proof that

he had completed a 160-hour “K-9 Detection Handler

Course” conducted by the Central Alabama Police K-9

Training Association (“CAP”) in April of 2000, see Gov.’s

Ex. 13, and testified that he had completed the course

with K-9 Hobbs. Documents also show that, on March 31,

2004, and March 28, 2008, Hobbs was certified by CAP to

detect marijuana, methamphetamine and cocaine. See

Gov.’s Exs. 14 & 15.4 Despite the lack of additional

documentary evidence, Officer Steele testified that Hobbs

was certified “annually up to the year two thousand and

nine.” Evid. Hr.’g Tr. at 97:7.; id. at 77:19-20

(“[Hobbs] was certified every year from our acquisition

of the canine until his retirement.”).5

 In addition to,

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(...continued)

Hobbs, that it was easier to maintain

his records on computer because I would

work out of the office and out of the

vehicle. I maintained his records on

... what I would call a thumb drive.

And unfortunately that thumb drive was

lost during a call. So some of those

records were lost.” 

Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 94:10-15. He further explained that:

“We have also moved our office space two times moving out

of our old facility to a temporary facility back to a new

facility. So I know a lot of things could have been

misplaced.” Id. at 98:18-21.

6

or as part of, the yearly certification, Officer Steele

and Hobbs also received a minimum of 16 hours of training

from CAP each month. Both officers testified that Hobbs

had been a reliable drug-detecting dog. Indeed, Officer

Steele testified that he “would ... be surprised if

[Hobbs’s] false [positive] rate was more than five, eight

per cent.” Id. at 107:4-5. 

Following Hobbs’s alert on the door seams, Officer

Jones and Officer Steele conducted a search of Ohoro’s

vehicle. They did not “find any joints or evidence of

burned marijuana in the car.” Id. at 57:23-24. Nor did

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7

they discover any other drugs or drug paraphernalia

during their search. However, the officers did discover

a bag containing $ 4,400.00. 

When asked about the money, “Ohoro stated that he was

about to make a [bank] deposit and get groceries.” Id.

at 20:23-25. He later admitted that he was unemployed,

but also told officers “that he had recently sold two

computers–-one for nine hundred dollars, and the other

for twelve hundred and fifty dollars,” and “that he

recently received two cash advances from credit[] cards

totaling twelve thousand dollars.” Id. at 64:2-4, 6-8.

Officer Jones admitted that he had no reason to doubt

these statements.

At some point during the vehicle search, Hobbs

alerted on both the money and the bag. Officer Jones

does not recall Hobbs alerting on anything in the car

“other than the bag of money.” Id. at 58:6-7. Moreover,

Officer Steele indicated that, “If the money was inside

the vehicle at the time [he] did [his] exter[n]al search,

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8

then [it is] possible [Hobbs] smelled the money in the

vehicle.” Id. at 84:23-25. 

Following the search, Ohoro, driving his own vehicle,

accompanied the officers to the sheriff’s office. While

Officer Steele was talking with Ohoro, Officer Jones

typed a search-warrant affidavit for Ohoro’s residence.

The affidavit states, in pertinent part, that:

“The facts tending to establish the

foregoing grounds for the issuance of a

search warrant are as follows:

“Within the past two weeks, the Autauga

County Sheriff’s Office has received

information concerning the illegal sale

of narcotics being sold and/or concealed

at the residence of William Walter

Ohoro. This source of information

related to this office that Walter Ohoro

has sold Marijuana and Methamphetamine

to them in the past. [The source] also

stated that William Ohoro is a convicted

felon and possess[es] firearms at the

residence of 2837 River Bend Road

Autaugaville, Alabama. This information

was confirmed through a check of NCIC

revealing numerous felonies.

“While on routine patrol contact was

made with William Ohoro for speeding,

there was a[n] odor of burnt marijuana

emitting from the cock pit area of the

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9

vehicle. Sgt. J. Steele was called to

utilize his K-9 to conduct a[n] exterior

sniff around the vehicle driven by

William Ohoro. The K-9 alerted on both

driver and passenger doors. While

conducting a search of this vehicle, a

money bag was located containing a large

amount of U.S. Currency totaling

$ 4,400. K-9 Hobbs gave a positive

alert on the money bag and currency.

Mr. Ohoro stated that he had just left

home and was on his way to the bank and

[to] get groceries[.] Mr. Ohoro also

stated that he is not gainfully

employed.” 

Aff. at 1 (Doc. No. 36-2). Officer Jones then presented

the affidavit to a judge, who issued the requested search

warrant. Officer Jones later explained that he had not

previously sought a search warrant for Ohoro’s residence

because, “I didn’t have the information that I had at

this particular time due to the traffic stop and the odor

of marijuana with him leaving that residence.” Evid.

Hr’g Tr. at 28:10-12. Law enforcement officers

subsequently searched Ohoro’s home, discovering the guns

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6. The drugs supporting counts five and six were

discovered during a later search of the residence.

10

and drugs that provide the basis for counts one through

four of the indictment against Ohoro.6 

In the days that followed, Ohoro was interviewed by

law enforcement agents. During an interview on August 3,

Ohoro spoke at length about his involvement in the sale

of marijuana and his use of methamphetamine. He also

stated that, “It’s been over 20 years since I’ve smoked

pot.” Interview Tr. at 66:5-7 (Doc. No. 66-6); see also

Gov.’s Ex. 11. He explained that: “It makes me stupid,

slow. And I don’t like that.” Id. at 66:12-14. 

Following his arrest, Ohoro filed a “Motion To

Suppress And For Return Of Property.” Mot. to Suppress

at 1 (Doc. No. 36). This motion included a request for

a hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154

(1978), on the veracity of the affidavit supporting the

search warrant. Mot. to Suppress at 10 n.6. Somewhat

confusingly, Ohoro “based” his request for the Franks

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7. The order noted that Ohoro had “filed the

following pretrial motions: Motion To Inspect Jury List

For Both The Grand Jury And The Petit Jury, Motion To

Disclose Information Related To Confidential Informant[,]

... and Motion To Suppress And For Return Of Property.”

Order at 1 (docket citations omitted). 

11

hearing “on the information provided in [the] motion and

on the information expected to be elicited at an

evidentiary hearing on this matter.” Id. (emphasis

added). He added that he did “not object to the two

hearings being conducted simultaneously.” Id.

The magistrate judge assigned to consider Ohoro’s

suppression motion ordered “that a hearing on [Ohoro’s]

Motions is set for February 4, 2010.” Order at 1 (Doc.

No. 38).7

 He later granted a motion to continue the

hearing and eventually ordered “that a hearing on the

Motions is set for March 2, 2010.” Order at 1 (Doc. No.

48). Neither order made reference to Ohoro’s request for

a Franks hearing or his stated intention to base said

request, in part, “on the information expected to be

elicited at an evidentiary hearing on this matter.” 

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12

On March 1, counsel met for a pre-trial conference

before the magistrate judge. During the hearing, the

magistrate judge informed defense counsel that “there

hasn’t been a sufficient showing under Franks[,] ... [s]o

the only thing we’re going to be arguing tomorrow is a

motion to suppress.” Pre-trial Conf. Tr. at 2:12-14

(Doc. No. 56). When defense counsel responded, “I’m

sorry. Under Franks, Your Honor?,” the magistrate judge

stated, “Yes. We cannot talk about all of it tomorrow.

The only thing [you should] be prepared to argue is the

motion to suppress itself. All right?” Id. at 2:19-20.

There was no immediate response from defense counsel. 

Later in the conference, however, the following

exchange took place between defense counsel and the

magistrate judge:

“Mr. Karakatsanis: ... [W]e’ll be

arguing and eliciting a lot of testimony

at the hearing tomorrow concerning the

reliability of ... [the confidential

informant and the traffic stop]. And it

was my understanding at least that the

hearing tomorrow was to test–-all of the

circumstances of the case, including–-

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13

“The Court: Wrong. You have to make a

showing ... to even determine whether

you’re going to get an evidentiary

hearing. We don’t think that that’s

been shown already.

“Mr. Karakatsanis: Your Honor –-

“The Court: But we can deal with this

tomorrow. Today’s the time for the

pretrial. So tomorrow we’ll take up any

of the issues, but that’s how we’re

going to deal with it. All right.”

Id. at 6:6-19. 

During the hearing on the following day, the

magistrate judge reiterated his position that Ohoro had

not met the requisite burden for a Franks hearing.

Defense counsel later stated, “I would ... like to

proffer a number of facts for the record that would have

been shown I believe to support the Franks claim[,] ...

[a]nd if the Court prefers, I can submit that proffer in

writing at the end of the day.” Evid. Hr’g. Tr. at 9:3-

8. The magistrate judge responded: “Well the proffer is

made before an evidentiary hearing because that’s what

needs to be done in order to get the evidentiary hearing,

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14

and we’ve basically gone over that before. But we can

take that issue up later.” Id. at 9:9-12. 

The issue was taken up later when defense counsel

again attempted to offer evidence that he asserted would

“be very relevant for the Franks issue.” Id. at 121:20.

The magistrate judge refused the evidence, stating that:

“[T]he Court has already said that you haven’t presented

initial information to get an evidentiary hearing which

is what you’re trying to do through this witness now for

Franks. Read the law on Franks. Now let’s proceed,

please.” Id. at 121:22-122:1. Shortly thereafter, the

hearing concluded.

The magistrate judge filed a recommendation to the

court that Ohoro’s motion for a Franks hearing be denied.

Ohoro objects to that recommendation. He also proffers

additional evidence to the court. See Proffer (Doc. No.

66). According to Ohoro, this evidence was rejected by

the magistrate judge “because it related to challenging

the veracity, credibility, and completeness of the

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15

information contained in the search warrant ... [and]

[t]he Court determined that it would not hear any

evidence or argument relating to Mr. Ohoro’s invocation

of Franks v. Delaware.” Notice at 1 (Doc. No. 65). The

government has not objected to Ohoro’s proffer.

The question now before the court is whether Ohoro

has proffered evidence sufficient to entitle him to an

evidentiary hearing on the veracity of the affidavit

supporting the above-discussed warrant to search his

home. 

 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Franks v. Delaware

The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution protects, “The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.

amend IV. It states, in pertinent part, that this right

“shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but

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16

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.”

Id. (emphasis added).

In order to give meaningful effect to the protection

provided by the Fourth Amendment, the United States

Supreme Court has recognized a “right ... to challenge

the truthfulness of factual statements made in an

affidavit supporting a warrant.” Franks v. Delaware, 438

U.S. 154, 155 (1978). As the Court observed, “a flat ban

on impeachment of veracity could denude the probablecause requirement of all real meaning.” Id. at 168.

“The requirement that a warrant not issue ‘but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,’ would

be reduced to a nullity if a police officer was able to

use deliberately falsified allegations to demonstrate

probable cause.” Id.

While Franks thus rejected “an absolute ban on postsearch impeachment of veracity,” the “rule it announced

... has a limited scope, both in regard to when exclusion

of the seized evidence is mandated, and when a hearing on

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17

allegations of misstatements must be accorded.” Id. at

167 (emphasis in original). With respect to evidentiary

hearings, the limited scope of the Franks rule was driven

largely by the practical observation that “[t]he weight

of criminal dockets ... militate against ... added

burden[s] on the trial courts,” and the concern that,

“[if] conducted routinely, ... [such hearings] would be

misused by defendants as a convenient source of

discovery.” Franks, 438 U.S. 168.

In part to alleviate these concerns, the Franks court

ultimately held that a defendant is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on the “veracity of an affidavit in

support of a search warrant [only] if he makes a

‘substantial preliminary showing’ that (1) the affiant

deliberately or recklessly included false statements, or

failed to include material information, in the affidavit;

and (2) the challenged statement or omission was

essential to the finding of probable cause.” United

States v. Arbolaez, 450 F.3d 1283, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006)

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(citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). At the hearing, a

search warrant will be voided, and evidence suppressed,

only if “the allegation of [material] perjury or reckless

disregard is [then] established by the defendant by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 156.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has “noted that

[the threshhold] substantiality requirement is not

lightly met.” Arbolaez, 450 F.3d at 1294. That court

explained that,

“To mandate an evidentiary hearing, the

challenger’s attack must be more than

conclusory and must be supported by more

than a mere desire to cross-examine.

There must be allegations of deliberate

falsehood [or omission] or of reckless

disregard for the truth, and those

allegations must be accompanied by an

offer of proof. They should point out

specifically the portion of the warrant

affidavit that is claimed to be false;

and they should be accompanied by a

statement of supporting reasons.

Affidavits or sworn or otherwise

reliable statements of witnesses should

be furnished, or their absence

satisfactorily explained.” 

Id. (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). 

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19

The magistrate judge recommends that the court find

that Ohoro has failed to make the requisite preliminary

showing. Before addressing this recommendation, the

court must determine whether to include evidence now

proffered by Ohoro in support of his motion–-evidence he

did not present to the magistrate judge--in its analysis.

B. Ohoro’s Proffer of Additional Evidence

When a magistrate judge submits his proposed findings

and recommendations on a pretrial matter, “any party may

serve and file written objections to such proposed

findings and recommendations.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

The district judge is then required to “make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or

specified proposed findings or recommendations to which

objection is made.” Id. In so doing, the district judge

“may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” Id.

“The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit

the matter to the magistrate with instructions.” Id.

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While a district judge has the discretion to receive

further evidence, courts have appropriately observed that

“there are substantial reasons for declining to do so as

a general matter.” Morris v. Amalgamated Lithographers,

Local One, 994 F. Supp. 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (Kaplan,

J.); see also Virgin Enters., Ltd. v. Virgin Cuts, Inc.,

149 F. Supp. 2d 220, 223 (E.D. Va. 2000) (Friedman, J.).

“First, permitting such piecemeal presentation of

evidence is exceptionally wasteful of the time of both

the magistrate and district judges.” Morris, 994 F.

Supp. at 163. Second, “there would be instances in which

parties would be encouraged to withhold evidence ... in

the expectation of using it before the district judge

only if they failed to prevail before the magistrate

judge on a more abbreviated showing.” Id. “Finally, the

routine consideration of evidence in support of

objections which could have been presented before the

magistrate judge would reward careless preparation of the

initial papers.” Id.

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In this case, it is noteworthy that defense counsel

explicitly stated that his request for a Franks hearing

was based in part on information that he expected to

elicit at a hearing on the motion to suppress, evidence

that he was not, in fact, permitted to elicit.

Nonetheless, it is plain that the bulk of the evidence he

now offers was (or could have been) available to him

prior to the evidentiary hearing. Indeed, defense

counsel has not explained why the affidavits he now

proffers were not submitted with his initial motion for

a Franks hearing, or as a supplement to that motion. The

magistrate judge apparently expected to see this evidence

before any hearing was held, and given the practical

concerns that motivated the limitations on the right

articulated in Franks, this expectation was not

unreasonable. 

However, the record also suggests the possibility of

miscommunication between defense counsel and the

magistrate judge. For example, the magistrate judge

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22

twice followed an apparently clear ruling on the Franks

question with the potentially misleading statement that

they would deal with the issue later. Moreover, it is

noteworthy that counsel persistently attempted to provide

the evidence to the magistrate judge--including an offer

to present it in writing–-before the magistrate judge

began writing his recommendation. Thus, the magistrate

judge had the opportunity to examine the evidence without

prolonging the hearing, but prior to making his ultimate

recommendation. 

It is also significant that the government has raised

no objection to Ohoro’s proffer. The evidence was filed

with the court on April 26, giving the government ample

time to raise its voice in protest. 

For these reasons, the court will exercise its

discretion to “receive further evidence,” pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), and will consider Ohoro’s full

proffer in ruling on his request for a Franks hearing.

In so ruling, however, the court does not condone the

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23

approach taken by defense counsel. Counsel is warned

that, in the future, he is expected to attach his full

evidentiary proffer to his initial motion for a Franks

hearing, or appropriately supplement his proffer as

evidence becomes available. 

The court now turns to whether Ohoro has shown that

he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under Franks.

(It is only because Ohoro’s trial is imminent that the

court will conduct this analysis itself, rather than

remanding the issue to the magistrate judge.)

C. Applying Franks

Ohoro has clearly alleged deliberate or reckless

falsehoods and omissions, pointing to specific portions

of the warrant. In particular, he contends that Officer

Jones (1) omitted information regarding the confidential

informant’s unreliabilty; (2) omitted information

regarding K-9 Hobbs’s unreliability and lack of training;

(3) included false information when he alleged that he

smelled burnt marijuana emanating from Ohoro’s car; and,

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8. Having conducted a de novo review of the record,

and having considered Ohoro’s objections, the court will

adopt the report and recommendation of the magistrate

judge with respect to the other falsehoods and omissions

that Ohoro identified in his motion to suppress. See Mot.

to Suppress at 10-14. 

24

(4) included false information when he alleged that K-9

Hobbs alerted on the door seams of Ohoro’s car.8

To be sure, the last of these alleged falsehoods, and

presumably the second alleged omission, are based on

information provided to, or withheld from, Officer Jones

by the K-9 handler, Officer Steele. But in conducting a

Franks analysis, the court will “hold the government

accountable for statements made not only by the affiant

but also for statements made by other government

employees which were deliberately or recklessly false or

misleading insofar as such statements were relied upon by

the affiant in making the affidavit.” United States v.

Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1997); Hart v.

O’Brien, 127 F.3d 424, 449 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A

governmental official violates the Fourth Amendment when

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 24 of 50
9. At least one scholar has argued that, “Many lower

courts have elevated the substantial preliminary showing

(continued...)

25

he deliberately or recklessly provides false, material

information for use in an affidavit in support of a

search warrant, regardless of whether he signs the

affidavit.”); cf. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (“The

deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose

impeachment is permitted today is only that of the

affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant.”

(emphasis added)). “[A] different rule would permit

government officials deliberately to keep from affiants

or the court information material to the determination of

probable cause and by such conduct avoid the necessity of

a Franks hearing.” United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d

761, 764 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Having alleged specific falsehoods and omissions,

Ohoro must clear two hurdles. The first is the offer of

proof. To the extent that the court evaluates the

strength of Ohoro’s offer of proof,9

 the requisite showing

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(...continued)

requirement into a virtually insurmountable barrier by

misconstruing the requirement as an authorization to

determine the factual merits of the criminal defendant’s

claim before the evidentiary hearing mandated by Franks.”

Stephen W. Gard, Bearing False Witness: Perjured

Affidavits and the Fourth Amendment, 41 Suffolk U. L.

Rev. 445, 464 (2008). He contends that, “The very notion

that a court may properly decide questions of fact before

conducting an evidentiary hearing is contrary to the

American system of justice.” Id.

10. See United States v. Tate, 524 F.3d 449, 457 (4th

Cir. 2008) (finding a “substantial preliminary showing,”

but “express[ing] no opinion with regard to whether

[defendant] will prevail at the evidentiary hearing,

where he faces a higher burden of proof and will be

required to prove his allegations by a preponderance of

the evidence.”) (emphasis in original).

26

is “less, of course, than a preponderance of the

evidence.” Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A

Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 4.4(d). This is

clear, as “Franks expressly states that in order to

prevail at the hearing the defendant must prove his claim

of perjury by a preponderance of the evidence.” Illinois

v. Lucente, 506 N.E. 2d 1269, 1276 (Ill. 1987) (emphasis

added).10 On the other hand, “it is clear that Franks

demands something more than a request, and even more than

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 26 of 50
27

a defendant’s unsubstantiated denial.” Id. “If

‘substantial’ meant no more than that, Franks hearings

would be held in every case.” Id. “Thus, the precise

standard lies somewhere between mere denials on the one

hand and proof by a preponderance on the other[;] ... the

preliminary burden must be sufficiently rigorous to

preclude automatic hearings in every case, but not so

onerous as to be unachievable.” Id. at 1276-77. 

The second hurdle is materiality; Ohoro “bears the

burden of showing that, ‘absent [the alleged]

misrepresentations or omissions, probable cause would

have been lacking.’” United States v. Kapordelis, 569

F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

“If, when material that is the subject of the alleged

falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there

remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to

support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is

required.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-172.

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 27 of 50
11. See also Objections at 5 n.1 (“Ohoro incorporates

the argument and citations on pages 10-15 of his Motion

to Suppress concerning Franks”).

28

With the above in mind, the court turns to the

falsehoods and omissions alleged by Ohoro. 

1. Reliability of the Confidential Source 

Ohoro argues that, “Officer Jones failed to include

any information concerning the reliability of the

confidential source or the informant’s basis of

knowledge.” Mot. to Suppress at 11.11 He contends that,

“If any factors about that confidential source impeach

the source’s credibility–-such as pending criminal

charges, recent arrests, or an offer of favorable

treatment–-that information would be highly relevant to

a judicial officer’s decision concerning probable cause.”

Id. (emphasis added).

It is clear from the text of Ohoro’s argument that

it is based almost entirely on speculation. The closest

he comes to an offer of proof that such information

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 28 of 50
29

exists, or that it was deliberately or recklessly

omitted, is his claim, in a footnote, that, “Portions of

the discovery in this case suggest that an informant had

recently been arrested by Autauga County.” Objections at

15 n.9 (emphasis added). He has not made the threshold

offer of proof and thus is not entitled to a Franks

hearing on this issue.

The court appreciates, of course, that Ohoro’s

ability to discover and offer proof is hamstrung by the

fact that the informant is confidential. The court also

recognizes that “it is in precisely this situation that

the Government has the greatest opportunity to falsify

affidavits.” United States v. Brian, 507 F. Supp. 761,

767 (D.R.I. 1981) (Pettine, J.), aff’d sub nom. United

States v. Southhard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). But

Ohoro has not alleged that Officer Jones manufactured the

informant or even that he knew or should have know that

the informant was lying. Compare Brian, 507 F. Supp. at

766 (“[D]efendants contend that they never did or said

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 29 of 50
12. To be sure, the affidavit lacked the sort of

specific allegations from the informant that Ohoro could

have contested. However, as discussed below, this lack

of specificity does the government more harm than good.

30

some of the things attributed to them by these

informants.”).12 Rather, he alleges only that the officer

might have omitted information that might have impacted

the issuing judge’s evaluation of the informant’s

reliability. And, perhaps most significant in this case,

there is little reason to conclude that the type of

information that Ohoro alleges might have been omitted

would have a material impact on the probable-cause

determination. As the government points out, “The

affidavit already states that the informant has been

purchasing drugs from the defendant so the [issuing

judge] knows he has committed criminal conduct.” U.S.

Resp. at 8 (Doc. No. 44). 

Although he is not entitled to a Franks hearing on

this issue, it is worth noting that Ohoro has identified

a potentially significant weakness in the affidavit. It

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31

is well established that: “If an informant is mentioned

in the affidavit, the affidavit must also demonstrate the

informant’s ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge.’” United

States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2002).

In this case, there is no dispute that the affidavit

fails to provide any evaluation–-positive or negative–-of

the informant’s reliability. See U.S. Resp. at 8

(“Although the affidavit makes no reference to the past

reliability of the informant ... [that] is simply a part

of what the magistrate has to evaluate.”).

To be sure, such a failure is not necessarily of

great significance. The magistrate judge correctly noted

that, “where there is sufficient independent

corroboration of an informant’s information there is no

need to establish the veracity of the informant.”

Martin, 297 F.3d at 1314; see also Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 233 (1983) (holding that “veracity” and “basis

of knowledge” are “better understood as relevant

considerations in the totality-of-the-circumstances

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32

analysis that traditionally guided probable-cause

determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated

for ... by a strong showing as to the other, or by some

other indicia of reliability.”). As discussed below,

however, the court finds that Ohoro has made a threshold

Franks showing with respect to allegations that might

otherwise provide the necessary “independent

corroboration.” 

2. The Reliability of K-9 Hobbs 

As in the case of the confidential informant, Officer

Jones’s affidavit contains no information–-positive or

negative–-regarding K-9 Hobbs’s reliability as a drugdetecting dog. Courts have held that, “To establish [a]

dog’s reliability, the affidavit need only state the dog

has been trained and certified to detect drugs.” United

States v. Sundby, 186 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 1999);

United States v. Kennedy, 131 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir.

1997) (“[A] search warrant based on a narcotics canine

alert will be sufficient on its face if the affidavit

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 32 of 50
33

states that the dog is trained and certified to detect

narcotics.”); United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d

632, 639 (9th Cir. 1993) (“A canine sniff alone can

supply the probable cause necessary for issuing a search

warrant if the application for the warrant establishes

the dog’s reliability.”); see also United States v.

Anderson, 2010 WL 597230 at *2 (11th Cir. 2010) (“While

a dog sniff must be sufficiently reliable in order to

establish probable cause, we have held in dicta ‘that

training of a dog alone is sufficient proof of

reliability.’”). The affidavit in this case merely

refers to Hobbs as a “K-9” and indicates that he

“alerted” on the car door seams, money, and bag.

Presumably, the issuing judge was to infer from the term

“K-9," and the context in which Hobbs was used, that the

dog was trained to identify drugs. 

Regardless of whether such an inference is

reasonable, Ohoro’s Franks argument goes beyond the

failure to establish reliability; he argues that Officer

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 33 of 50
13. A subpoena in this case required production of

“All records pertaining to the training of the drug dog

employed in this case[,] [a]ll reports concerning all

stops involving the drug dog involved in this case[,] and

any files concerning standard drug dog procedure and

files of the drug dog’s error rates.” Subpoena at 1

(continued...)

34

Jones “failed to disclose that Hobbs was not properly

trained and certified as a drug-detecting dog.”

Objections at 14; United States v. Donnelly, 475 F.3d

946, 955 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (The

“defendant would have been entitled to a Franks hearing

had he shown that officers withheld negative information

casting into doubt the dog’s reliability.”). In support

of this argument, he offers the affidavit of his expert,

Steven D. Nicely, which, he contends, “detail[s] the

deficiencies in the dog’s training and certification.”

Objections at 14.

With respect to proper certification, Ohoro notes

that Officer Steele failed to produce documentation that

Hobbs was certified as a drug-detecting dog after March

28, 2008.13 Nicely states, in his sworn affidavit, that

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 34 of 50
(...continued)

(Doc. No. 19); see also Order (Doc. No. 20) (granting

requested subpoena with respect to the dog’s records). 

35

“a dog that goes longer than a year without evidence of

certification is not considered, by [some] industry

standards, to be certified.” Nicely Aff. at 2 (Doc. No.

66-3). 

As noted above, however, Officer Steele testified

under oath that Hobbs was certified “annually up to the

year two thousand and nine.” Evid. Hr.’g Trans. at 97:7.

Both officers also testified that Hobbs had been a

reliable drug-detecting dog. Indeed, Officer Steele

testified that he “would ... be surprised if [Hobbs’s]

false [positive] rate was more than five, eight per

cent.” Id. at 107:4-5. See Anderson, 2010 WL 597230 at

*3 (finding that a dog with “a 55% accuracy rate in

finding measurable amounts of drugs” was sufficiently

reliable).

“[W]hile training and performance documentation would

be useful in evaluating a dog’s reliability,” it is not

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 35 of 50
14. Significantly, and as noted above, Officer Steele

provided an explanation for the missing records.

36

necessary. United States v. Diaz, 25 F.3d 392, 396 (6th

Cir. 1994) (finding that “the testimony of [the dog’s

handler] sufficiently established the dog’s

reliability.”); see also United States v. Boxley, 373

F.3d 759, 761 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[I]n order to admit

evidence of a dog’s alert to an aroma of drugs, it is not

necessary to provide the dog’s training and performance

records, as it is similarly unnecessary to qualify a

human expert in this way. Rather, testimony as to the

dog’s record is sufficient.”). Thus, the lack of

documentation is not, in-and-of-itself, proof that Hobbs

is unreliable.14

Given the officers’ testimony and the fact that

documentation shows that Hobbs was trained and certified

through March 28, 2008 (just 16 months before the alerts

at issue in this case), the court finds that Ohoro has

failed to make a substantial preliminary showing that

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 36 of 50
37

Officer Jones deliberately or recklessly failed to inform

the issuing judge that Hobbs was not certified, or that

he was unreliable, as a drug-detecting dog.

Ohoro also argues that, “The warrant affidavit ...

omitted that Hobbs had not been trained off general

circulation currency.” Objections at 14. Although

hardly a model of clarity, the gist of his argument

appears to be that, due to deficiencies in the dog’s

training, Hobbs’s alert on the money was of little

probative value (that is, it was an unreliable indication

that the money had recently been contaminated by drugs)

and thus the officers should have somehow communicated

this information to the issuing judge in the affidavit.

See Objections at 15 (“Without the necessary information

concerning the uselessness of such a purported ‘alert,’

both the state-court judge and the U.S. Magistrate Judge

were misled by Officer Jones’s affidavit.”). 

In support of this argument, Ohoro offers Nicely’s

sworn statement that “It is common knowledge in the

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 37 of 50
15. Indeed, this conclusion is suggested by Ohoro’s

separate and more general argument that a “drug dog’s

(continued...)

38

detector-dog training industry that currency in general

circulation is contaminated with significant amounts of

illegal narcotics,” Nicely Aff. at 3, and that “research

demonstrates that the canine nose ... is capable of

detecting the trace amounts of narcotics present on

nearly all general circulation currency,” id. at 4. He

also points to Officer Steele’s testimony that Hobbs was

trained using actual cocaine and not pseudo cocaine, see

Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 92:20-25, and argues that the dog thus

“would not have been able to make a reliable alert to

general circulation currency,” Objections at 15 n.8. 

The court need not address whether Ohoro has, with

this evidence, made a substantial preliminary showing of

deliberate or reckless omission, as it finds that this

information is not material. The fact that Hobbs alerted

on the money adds little to the probable-cause

determination.15 Put somewhat differently, it is the

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 38 of 50
(...continued)

‘alert’ to a large amount of currency is meaningless

because the vast majority of currency is contaminated

[with drugs].” Objections at 16, n.10; Mot. to Suppress

at 21-23 (citing multiple cases questioning the

reliability of a drug-dog’s alert to currency given drug

contamination); Nicely Aff. at 4 (“[T]he canine nose is

capable of detecting the trace amounts of narcotics

present on nearly all general circulation currency.”);

see also U.S. Resp. at 14 n.2 (“The alert on the money is

but one fact in that affidavit. Taken out of context of

the other facts in the affidavit, the frequency with

which currency is found to be contaminated with narcotics

residue might seem of vital importance. However, when

placed in the context of this case, it is of little

importance.”).

39

possession of $ 4,400 in cash by an unemployed man that

plays a significant role in determining whether there is

probable cause to search Ohoro’s home, and not the fact

that Hobbs also “alerted” to the money.

3. The Smell of Burnt Marijuana

Ohoro offers a variety of circumstantial evidence as

proof that Officer Jones lied about smelling “burnt

marijuana” emanating from Ohoro’s car. First, he notes

that no drugs–-or other evidence of burnt marijuana–-were

found in his car. Second, he points to the apparently

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 39 of 50
16. Officer Jones admitted that, “Due to the fact I

didn’t have the radar or certified calibration, I wrote

[Ohoro] a warning citation for going approximately

seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five mile an hour

speeding zone.” Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 15:12-15; see also

United States v. Monzon-Gomez, 244 Fed. Appx. 954, 959

n.3 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (noting “that visual

observation alone, unaccompanied by evidence of speeding

generated by a properly tested ‘speed measuring device,’

Ala. Code § 32-5A-177, would be insufficient as an

evidentiary matter to successfully prosecute a speeding

violation in court under Alabama law.”). 

40

pretextual nature of the traffic stop, arguing that

“Officer Jones followed [him] 14.8 miles from his home

and pulled him over for ‘speeding’ even though Officer

Jones had neither a radar gun nor a calibrated

speedometer (and thus no valid tools from which to

determine that a car was speeding).” Objections at 12

(emphasis in original).16 Third, he emphasizes the

context in which the allegation was made, noting that

before the stop, Officer Jones had engaged in “two weeks

worth of surveillance [of Ohoro’s residence] that

indicated nothing illegal.” Id. As Ohoro describes it,

“the only break in the case occurred when Officer Jones

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 40 of 50
41

decided to follow Mr. Ohoro, pulled him over, and claimed

to have smelled burnt marijuana.” Id. Ohoro reasonably

maintains that, “An officer’s claim to smell that odor in

a completely unrelated, coincidental interaction with an

unknown driver [sh]ould be weighed differently than the

same claim with respect to a driver whom that officer is

already investigating for marijuana-related charges.”

Mot. to Suppress at 14. Fourth, he offers the sworn

affidavit of Howard Jones, who “describes several

fabricated traffic stops, illegal searches, harassing

behavior, and improper use of the drug dog by Officer

Jones,” thereby attacking the officer’s credibility.

Objections at 13; see generally Jones Aff. (Doc. No. 66-

2).

Examined together, this evidence clearly raises

questions about the veracity of Officer Jones’s

allegation. And one additional proffer clearly pushes

the combined evidence across the threshold: Ohoro’s

credible assertion that he does not smoke marijuana. See

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 41 of 50
42

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (stating that offers of proof

should be accompanied by “[a]ffidavits or sworn or

otherwise reliable statements of witnesses”) (emphasis

added). As Ohoro explains,

“[I]n the days after his arrest, [he]

confessed to agents that he used

methamphetamine on the weekends and said

that he did not like that because he was

struggling with his will power and that

methamphetamine was easy to abuse. He

also discussed in detail, at the agent’s

request, his marijuana-selling

activities. However, he told agents:

‘it’s been over 20 years since I smoked

pot.’ [He] told officers that he did not

like the way marijuana made him feel.

This conversation occurred well into

[his] interrogation concerning the

details of his marijuana distribution.

[He] had no reason to lie to officers

about that fact, especially considering

that he had just admitted to much more

serious felony offenses (possession of

methamphetamine and distribution of

marijuana) and to using a much more

serious drug (methamphetamine).”

Objections at 11-12 (internal citation omitted). To be

sure, the instant discussion belies his assertion that he

“had no reason to lie.” But his statement does bear

strong indicia of reliability; it seems unlikely that he

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 42 of 50
43

would confess to more serious criminal activities and lie

about his marijuana use. At the very least, this

statement is more reliable than a self-serving affidavit

prepared for the express purpose of obtaining a Franks

hearing. Compare Lucente, 506 N.E. 2d at 1277 (“Had the

defendant’s proffer consisted solely of his own affidavit

asserting ‘I didn’t do it,’ that would amount to an

unsubstantiated denial, and that would be plainly

insufficient.”).

The court finds that Ohoro has made a substantial

preliminary showing that Officer Jones deliberately

included false information in the warrant affidavit when

he alleged that he smelled burnt marijuana emanating from

Ohoro’s car. It is arguable whether removal of this

allegation alone would have a material impact on the

determination of probable cause. However, if the

allegation discussed below is also removed, the impact is

clearly material. 

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 43 of 50
17. This argument and the associated offer of proof

appear in a section of Ohoro’s brief titled, “The

Magistrate Judge Improperly Denied Ohoro’s Submission of

Relevant Evidence at the Suppression Hearing,” see

Objections at 15-17, not in the preceding section titled,

“Mr. Ohoro Is Entitled to a Franks Hearing,” see id. at

5-15. Nonetheless, it is clear that Ohoro views them as

an extension of his Franks claim. See id. at 17 (“[T]he

evidence demonstrates that Hobbs likely did not ‘alert’

at all in this case, which constitutes another material

inaccuracy in the warrant affidavit that would have been

relevant to probable cause.”). 

44

4. K-9 Hobbs’s “Alerts” on the Door Seams

Finally, Ohoro argues that, “Hobbs could not have

alerted in the manner claimed, including the dog’s

purported ‘alert’ to door seams on opposite sides of the

vehicle.” Objections at 16.17 As proof, Ohoro again

offers the affidavit of Nicely, who states that:

“Officer Steele ... testified that,

after walking Hobbs around the vehicle,

the dog responded to the door seams on

the passenger and drivers doors. In all

my combined 35 years experience with

detector dogs, including military

service, law enforcement, and detectordog training, which includes thousands

of vehicle sniffs, I have never observed

a dog respond or ‘alert’ to both door

seams on opposite sides of a vehicle

based on narcotics located in the

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 44 of 50
45

vehicle. As Officer Steele acknowledged

during his testimony, odor travels with

wind and air currents. Thus air leaving

a vehicle is detectable to the dog only

moving in one direction.” 

Nicely Aff. at ¶ 13.

Ohoro also offers evidence that the officers have

manufactured alerts in the past. In a sworn affidavit,

Howard Jones discussed three traffic stops involving

himself, Officer Jones, and Officer Steele. He states

that during one of those stops, 

“Jim Steele walked his dog around our

car. Jim Steele stopped at the drivers

door and tapped the door. The dog got

excited, jumping up and down, and

yelping. Officer Steele told Officer

Jones that the dog ‘hit’ on my door.

The two officers then began search our

car. They searched our car for at least

2 or 2 1⁄2 hours. ... Officers found no

illegal narcotics.”

Howard Jones Aff. at ¶ 15-16.

When combined with the information discussed above--

particularly the pretextual nature of the stop, the

failure to locate drugs or drug paraphernalia in the car

and the fact that Officer Jones had been monitoring

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 45 of 50
18. It should be noted that the magistrate judge

found corroboration, in part, in the fact that the

informant accurately “told the officers that Ohoro was a

convicted felon ... and gave the officers the correct

address of Ohoro’s residence.” Report at 11. But this

information is publicly available and thus provides only

the weakest form of corroboration. See, e.g., United

States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1297 (10th Cir. 2001)

(continued...)

46

Ohoro’s residence for two weeks with no sign of criminal

activity–-the court finds that Ohoro has made a

substantial preliminary showing that Officer Jones

deliberately included false information when he stated

that K-9 Hobbs alerted on the seams of Ohoro’s car doors.

The court also finds that the allegations regarding

the smell of burnt marijuana and K-9 Hobbs’s door seam

alerts are material to the issuing judge’s finding of

probable cause to search Ohoro’s home. Without these

allegations, all that is left to corroborate the

informant’s story and independently contribute to the

probable-cause determination is that a drug-dog made a

questionable alert on $ 4,400 carried by an unemployed

man with unspecified prior convictions.18 More

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 46 of 50
(...continued)

(“Almost anyone can describe the residents of, and

vehicles at, a particular home without having any special

knowledge of what goes on inside.”); United States v.

Ingram, 1993 WL 5914 at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1993) (per

curiam) (unpublished) (“[M]erely verifying public

information such as addresses, phone numbers, license

numbers, and even criminal records is not sufficient to

corroborate an informant’s statement.”).

47

importantly, if Ohoro establishes that these allegations

were false, the officers lacked probable cause to search

his car and thus could not rely upon evidence discovered

during that search to obtain a search warrant for his

residence. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719

(1984) (Unlawfully obtained “information, which was

included in the warrant affidavit, would ... invalidate

the warrant for the search of the house if it proved to

be critical to establishing probable cause for the

issuance of the warrant.”); see also Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (The question is

“‘whether, granting establishment of the primary

illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is

made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 47 of 50
48

or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be

purged of the primary taint.’”) (citation omitted). 

Thus, Ohoro is entitled to a hearing on the veracity

of the above-discussed allegations. “Whether he will

prevail at that hearing is, of course, another issue.”

Franks, 438 U.S. at 172. (Again, it is only because

Ohoro’s trial is imminent that the court will conduct

this hearing itself, rather than remanding the issue to

the magistrate judge.)

***

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendant William Walter Ohoro’s objection to the

magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court deny his

request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (doc. no. 67), is sustained

in part and overruled in part. The court’s rulings on

defendant Ohoro’s additional objections will be addressed

in a later opinion. 

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 48 of 50
49

(2) The magistrate judge’s recommendation (doc. no.

64) is adopted in part and rejected in part as to

defendant Ohoro’s motion for a Franks hearing.

(3) Defendant Ohoro’s motion for a Franks hearing

(doc. no. 36) is granted to the extent that he is

entitled to a hearing on the veracity of Officer Tijuan

Jones’s allegations that, during a traffic stop on July

28, 2009, “there was a[n] odor of burnt marijuana

emitting from the cock pit area of [Ohoro’s] vehicle,”

and that, “K-9 [Hobbs] alerted on both driver and

passenger doors.” Aff. at 1 (Doc. No. 36-2). 

(4) Defendant Ohoro’s motion for a Franks hearing

(doc. no. 36) is denied with respect to the other

falsehoods and omissions that he alleged in his motion to

suppress. Having conducted a de novo review of the

record and having considered defendant Ohoro’s

objections, the court agrees with the magistrate judge’s

recommendation to this extent.

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 49 of 50
(5) A Franks hearing, to the extent authorized by

this order, is set for July 22, 2010, at 10:00 a.m. in

Courtroom 2FMJ of the Frank M. Johnson Jr. United States

Courthouse Complex, One Church Street, Montgomery,

Alabama.

DONE, this the 16th day of July, 2010.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:09-cr-00183-MHT-WC Document 82 Filed 07/16/10 Page 50 of 50