Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06024/USCOURTS-ca10-04-06024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael A. Soderstrand
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

PUBLISH 

United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

June 16, 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

No. 04-6024 

V. 

MICHAEL A. SODERSTRAND, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

D.C. NO. CR-03-059-L 

Arlene Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney, (Robert G. McCampbell, United States 

Attorney and Randal A. Sengel, Assistant United States Attorney, with her on the briefs), 

Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Mack K. Martin, Martin Law Office, (James L. Hankins, Coyle Law Firm, with him on 

the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before O'BRIEN, HOLLOWAY and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

Dr. Michael A. Soderstrand, an Oklahoma State University professor, was charged 

with possessing child pornography, based on material found in a safe he kept in a supply 

room at work, and subsequently on other material found during a search of Dr. 

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Soderstrand' s laptop and desktop computers and computer files stored on disk. The 

United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma denied Dr. 

Soderstrand's motion to suppress the evidence found in the safe, and upon Dr. 

Soderstrand's subsequent guilty plea, sentenced him to 35 months' incarceration. Dr. 

Soderstrand now appeals from his conviction on his conditional plea of guilty, alleging 

error in the denial of his suppression motion. He also appeals, pursuant to Blakely v. 

Washington, 125 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), from his sentence challenging the validity of the 

district court's factual findings in sentencing. United States v. Booker, 124 S.Ct. 738 

(2005), which applies Blakely to the federal sentencing guidelines, was decided the day 

after oral argument before us in Dr. Soderstrand's case and Booker's holding is also 

applicable here. For reasons discussed below, we affirm the rulings below in all respects. 

I. Background 

Dr. Soderstrand was head of the Electrical Engineering Department at Oklahoma 

State University (OSU). On July 3 or 4, 2002, Doris Al-Harake, a clerical employee in 

the same department, observed a gray, fireproof safe behind a punch bowl on some boxes 

in a department supply room. Aplt. App. at 11. Al-Harake claims that the key was in the 

lock of the safe when she found it, although Dr. Soderstrand disputes this contention. Id. 

Al-Harake also stated that an informal inquiry had been conducted by the Department 

earlier in the year to try to ascertain who owned it, but to no avail. Id. 

On this occasion, Ms. Al-Harake decided to open the safe, ostensibly to determine 

who owned it. Inside she found three compact disks, five Polaroid photos, twenty-seven 

35mm photos, four personal letters and sixty-three 3.5mm computer diskettes. Aplt. App. 

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15, 16. Three of the letters were marked as addressed to "Michael"or "Dr. Michael 

Soderstrand," or signed as "M. Soderstrand." Id. There were also two photos of Dr. 

Soderstrand. After opening the safe and observing the contents, Al-Harake decided to 

remove one of the CDs and view its contents on her office computer. On it she found an 

image that appeared to be several nude Asian children about 10-12 years old. Id. 

Al-Harake returned the disc to the safe in the supply room and subsequently 

attempted to anonymously notify OSU authorities about the contents of the safe. She sent 

two emails under false names to Karl Reid, Dean of the College of Engineering, in which 

she alleged that Dr. Soderstrand kept child pornography in a safe in the storage room next 

to his office. Aplt. App. 14, 17, 18. Reid received the emails on July 8 and notified 

campus police chief Everett Eaton. Id. The next day, Eaton dispatched Officer Larry 

Crites to meet with Dean Reid at the College of Engineering. Officer Crites and another 

college official retrieved the safe from the supply room and locked it in the evidence 

locker at the campus police department. Aplt. App. at 12, 15. The next day, July 10, 

2002, Officer Crites signed an affidavit in support of a search warrant for a state 

magistrate judge, in which he stated: 

On the CD Al-Harake saw a [sic] image (photo) with several Asian persons 

that appeared to Al-Harake to be around 10-12 years of age. In the image 

the Asian children were nude and did not have any pubic hair on their 

genital area. 

Aplt. App. at 53. Based upon this information, the magistrate authorized a search warrant 

on July 10, 2002, and Crites called the OSU Key Shop, which opened the safe and 

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disclosed the contents. Aplt. App. at 13, 16. The contents of the safe then formed the 

evidentiary basis for subsequent investigation and prosecution of Dr. Soderstrand. 

On March 19, 2003, prosecutors obtained a 13-count indictment of Dr. Soderstrand 

for possession of computer disks and other material containing images of child 

pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Following the indictment, Dr. 

Soderstrand moved to suppress the evidence yielded by the search of the safe. By Order 

entered on July 23, 2003, the district court denied Dr. Soderstrand's suppression motion. 

Dr. Soderstrand then entered a conditional plea of guilty, waiving his right to appeal but 

reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress in this appeal from his 

conviction and sentence. Aplee. Supp. App. at 13-21. 

At a combined plea and sentencing hearing, Dr. Soderstrand objected to 

paragraphs 24 and 25 of the Pre-Sentence Report, which recommended sentencing 

enhancements because the material involved minors under the age of 12, and because Dr. 

Soderstrand possessed ten or more images of child pornography. Aplt. App. at 89-92. 

The Government presented evidence through the testimony of Mark McCoy, Deputy 

Inspector with the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) computer crimes unit. 

Aplt. App. at 93-94. McCoy testified he found approximately 2,700 images of child 

pornography on Dr. Soderstrand's CDs, laptop and desktop computers. Aplt. App. at 95-

96. Of these, the IBM computer contained 176 images, the laptop contained 226 images; 

and the two CDs contained 2500 images in 24 folders. Aplt. App. at 96-97. Upon 

completion of the sentencing hearing, the district court sentenced Dr. Soderstrand to 35 

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months' incarceration, three years' supervised release, 104 hours of community service 

and a special assessment of $100. Aplt. App. at 141-148. 

II. Jurisdiction 

The United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma had 

jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231 because Dr. Soderstrand was charged with 

violating the federal child pornography statute. Dr. Soderstrand entered a conditional 

plea pursuant to Rule 11(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, retaining limited 

rights to appeal his conviction and sentence. 1 The district court denied Dr. Soderstrand's 

motion to suppress on July 23, 2003. The resulting conviction and sentence entered 

following the guilty plea constitutes a final decision from which appeal to this court is 

proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Dr. Soderstrand filed a timely notice of appeal on 

January 16, 2004. This court is thus vested with jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See 

United States v. Rosborough, 366 F.3d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004). 

III. Discussion 

A. The motion to suppress the contents of the safe 

The district court denied Dr. Soderstrand's motion to suppress the contents of the 

safe, concluding that the police properly obtained a warrant to search the safe after acting 

upon a tip from Al-Harake, who had observed the safe's contents. The court rejected Dr. 

1 While Dr. Soderstrand agreed to waive appeal of aspects of his conviction and sentence, 

nevertheless, he retained the right to appeal the district court's denial of his suppression 

motion. Aplt. App. at 84. Also, the Government concedes that Dr. Soderstrand may 

appeal the constitutionality of his sentencing under Blakely and Booker, for plain error 

review. Aplee. Br. at 24. 

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Soderstrand's contention that Al-Harake's initial search of the safe violated the Fourth 

Amendment, concluding that although Al-Harake was employed by a state university, she 

was acting as a private person, not on behalf of the Government or the State, when she 

first opened the safe and perused its contents. The district court also concluded that even 

if the search warrant was not constitutionally valid, it was not so facially invalid that the 

police could not have reasonably relied on it and acted in good faith by searching the 

contents of the safe pursuant to it. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court views the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party and accepts the district court's factual 

findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Jackson, 381 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir., 

2004). The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment, 

however, is reviewed de novo. Id. This court also reviews de novo the district court's 

legal conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the search warrant. United States v. 

Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir. 2000). 

We will now set out the substance of Dr. Soderstrand's objections to the validity of 

the search warrant and the evidence its execution produced. Dr. Soderstrand argues that 

the search warrant was facially deficient because it alleged only that the CD contained in 

the safe depicted nude children. The statutory definition of child pornography we are 

concerned with requires that images depict minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, 

such as graphic or simulated lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2256(2)(B)(iii). It is true that other circuits have concluded that depictions of mere 

nudity is not sufficient to constitute child pornography; rather, the nudity must be 

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depicted in a lascivious manner in order to be criminal. See United States v. Horn, 187 

F .3d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1999) (nudity alone does not suffice; there must be both an 

"exhibition" of the genital area and such exhibition must be lascivious); United States v. 

Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 124 (3 rd Cir. 1989) (noting that the statute requires more than mere 

nudity because the phrase "exhibition of the genitals or pubic area" in § 2256(2)(E) is 

qualified by the word "lascivious."). As a result, Dr. Soderstrand urges, the warrant did 

not allege that the safe contained evidence of an actual crime, only that it contained an 

image which, absent further description, was not presumptively illegal to possess, and 

arguably was even protected by the First Amendment. 

Dr. Soderstrand further argues that the impetus for and sole source of information 

supporting the search warrant were the observations of Al-Harake, which were relayed 

first to Dean Reid, and then by Reid to Officer Crites. According to Dr. Soderstrand, 

Officer Crites's reliance on Reid's representation of Al-Harake's observations was 

nothing more than "third party hearsay" (Aplt. Br. at 6) and insufficient to support a 

search warrant. 

Finally, Dr. Soderstrand argues, the basis for Al-Harake's observation was her own 

allegedly unconstitutional search of the safe. Al-Harake was an employee of Oklahoma 

State University, which is funded and administered by the State of Oklahoma. Dr. 

Soderstand urges that this means Al-Harake was a state actor. Further, Dr. Soderstand 

argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the contents of the safe; 

he analogizes the safe to a purse or a briefcase, for which the Supreme Court recognized 

in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) a heightened expectation of privacy, 

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even in the workplace context.2 As a result, Dr. Soderstrand argues that the above factors 

rendered the search warrant that was later issued by the magistrate judge so lacking in 

probable cause that officers could not claim reasonable reliance on it under the "good 

faith" exception recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984 ). 

We are not persuaded by Dr. Soderstrand's arguments, which we have noted 

above. Even if we assume that Dr. Soderstrand had a reasonable expectation of privacy 

in the safe, which he never identified as belonging to him and which he left unattended in 

a common storage room accessible to a number of employees, we find that Al-Harake 

was not a state actor in her initial search of the safe, and the later search of the safe by law 

enforcement officers was supported by a valid search warrant or the officers' good faith 

reliance on that warrant under Leon, supra. 

An affidavit establishes probable cause for a search warrant if the totality of the 

information it contains establishes the "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found in a particular place." See United States v. Rice, 358 F.3d 1268, 1274 

(10th Cir. 2004). Although we review the district court's ruling on the sufficiency of the 

search warrant de novo, we do not review the issuing judge's determination of probable 

2 Specifically, the Court noted: 

Not everything that passes through the confines of the business address can be 

considered a part of the workplace context, however. An employee may bring 

closed luggage to the office prior to leaving on a trip, or a handbag or briefcase 

each workday. While whatever expectation of privacy the employee has in the 

existence and the outward appearance of the luggage is affected by its presence 

in the workplace, the employee's expectation of privacy in the contents of the 

luggage is not affected in the same way. 

Id. ( emphasis in original). 

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cause de novo. Instead, this court grants the magistrate's determination of probable cause 

"great deference" such that we ask only "whether the issuing magistrate had a 'substantial 

basis' for determining probable cause existed." United States v. Le, 173 F .3d 1258, 1265 

(10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Wittgenstein, 163 F .3d 1164, 1172 (10th Cir. 1998). 

The affidavit in question indicated that Al-Harake had opened the safe and 

examined its contents, that the safe contained photographs and computer disks, that on 

one of the computer disks was an image of naked children, that Al-Harake contacted the 

Dean, and the Dean contacted the police. This was sufficient for the issuing judge to 

reasonably conclude that images of child pornography might reasonably be expected to be 

contained within the computer disks, CDs or other data storage devices contained in the 

safe. Neither Horn, 187 F.3d supra, nor Villard, 885 F.2d supra, are apposite to this 

case, because both of those cases involved the quantum of evidence at trial. As the 

Supreme Court noted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983): 

"the quanta. . . of proof' appropriate in ordinary judicial proceedings are 

inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant. Finely-tuned standards such 

as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, 

useful in formal trials, have no place in the magistrate's decision. While an 

effort to fix some general, numerically precise degree of certainty 

corresponding to "probable cause" may not be helpful, it is clear that "only 

the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the 

standard of probable cause." 

Id. at 235 (citations omitted). 

We also find without merit Dr. Soderstrand's argument that Al-Harake was a 

Government actor whose initial search of the safe violated Dr. Soderstrand's Fourth 

Amendment rights. While Al-Harake may be an employee of the Government due to her 

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State employment at OSU, she was in this case acting solely on her own account. To 

determine whether a private person's search becomes a Government search, the court 

examines "( 1) whether the Government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, 

and (2) whether the person searching intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to 

further his [or her] own ends." United States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 

2000). Dr. Soderstrand does not contend that law enforcement officers coerced, 

dominated or directed Al-Harake, or that she otherwise conducted her search pursuant to 

any law enforcement or other governmental objective. Rather, as he admits, "Al-Harake 

simply became curious about the safe and its contents." Aplt. Br. At 19. 

Finally, even if the search warrant was not valid, the police officers who acted on 

the warrant nonetheless did so in good faith. When officers execute a search warrant in 

reasonably good faith reliance on its validity, evidence obtained through the warrant will 

not be suppressed even if the search warrant is ultimately determined to be invalid. See 

Leon, 468 U.S. supra at 922. "Just as reviewing courts give 'great deference' to the 

decisions of judicial officers who make probable cause determinations, police officers 

should be entitled to rely upon the probable-cause determination of a neutral magistrate 

when defending an attack on their good faith for either seeking or executing a search 

warrant." United States v. Tuter, 240 F.3d 1292, 1300 (10th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Here, the police did everything they were supposed to do. They were made aware 

that there may be evidence of a crime (possession of child pornography) contained in the 

safe. Rather than opening it immediately, they secured it, presented the information they 

had available to a neutral magistrate, and finally conducted a search of the safe only upon 

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the magistrate's approval. Dr. Soderstrand introduced no countervailing evidence of any 

bad faith conduct by the police officers in question. As a result, even were Dr. 

Soderstrand's objections sufficient to cast doubt on the validity of the search warrant, he 

would not be entitled to the exclusionary remedy he seeks. 

B. The Constitutionality of Dr. Soderstrand's Sentence 

The district court below, rather than a jury, made the following findings of fact in 

the course of its sentencing determination: ( 1) the material involved prepubescent minors 

or minors under the age of 12 years; (2) the offense involved possessing ten or more 

books, magazines, periodicals, films, videotapes, or other items, containing a visual 

depiction involving the sexual exploitation of a minor; and (3) a computer was used for 

the transmission of the material.3 On appeal, Dr. Soderstrand argues that he did not admit 

to any of these findings. Aplt. Br. at 28. However, in his guilty plea, Dr. Soderstrand 

admitted "[k ]nowingly possessing computer disks and material containing images of child 

pornography that had been mailed, shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 

commerce by any means, including by computer." Aplt. App. at 141. We find that this 

amounts to an admission to the substance of the third finding - that a computer was used 

in the transmission of the material.4 

3 As we explain, each of these findings of fact carried with them a two level enhancement 

under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The district court also found an off-setting two 

level reduction applicable to Dr. Soderstrand, on the basis that he accepted responsibility 

for his actions. This finding is not at issue on appeal. 

4 We note that not only does Dr. Soderstrand admit by the plain language of his plea that 

the material was transmitted "by any means, including by computer," but that virtually all 

of the evidence against Dr. Soderstrand was in the forms of computer files and computer 

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Dr Soderstrand objected below to the Pre-Sentence Report findings, later adopted 

by the district court, which concerned the age of the minors depicted in the material he 

possessed, and the quantity of material he possessed. Aplt. App. at 90-91. He did not 

argue below, however, that the district court's findings of fact on these or any other issues 

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Taking into account the facts admitted by Dr. 

Soderstrand, but excluding the contested facts regarding the age of the minors and the 

quantity of material, Dr. Soderstrand would have been subject to a total offense level of 

15. In a case such as his, where there is no prior criminal record, this offense level would 

have had a guideline sentencing range of 18-24 months. Considering all the district 

court's findings, however, Dr. Soderstrand was subject to a total offense level of 19, with 

a resulting sentencing range of 30-37 months. The district court sentenced Dr. 

Soderstrand within this latter range, to a total of 3 5 months' incarceration. 

For the first time on appeal, Dr. Soderstrand argues that this sentence violated his 

Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 125 S.Ct. supra. 

See also United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. supra; United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 

F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005) (en bane). Because he failed to raise this issue below, we 

review the district court's sentencing determination for plain error. Gonzales-Huerta, 

supra at 732. "Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) 

affects substantial rights, and which ( 4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. See also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 

disks. Dr. Soderstrand raised no objection below to any portion of the PSR which stated 

that the material in question was transmitted by computer. 

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732 (1993). We apply this analysis "less rigidly when reviewing a potential constitutional 

error." United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1174 (10th Cir. 2005). 

Here there is error and it is plain. A more difficult question follows under the third 

prong of Olano, as applied in Gonzalez-Huerta and subsequent cases - whether the error 

affected Dr. Soderstrand's substantial rights. We have held that a defendant may make 

this showing in at least two ways: 

First, if the defendant shows a reasonable probability that a jury applying a 

reasonable doubt standard would not have found the same material facts 

that a judge found by a preponderance of the evidence, then the defendant 

successfully demonstrates that the error below affected his substantial 

rights.... Second, a defendant may show that the district court's error 

affected his substantial rights by demonstrating a reasonable probability 

that, under the specific facts of his case as analyzed under the sentencing 

factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court judge would reasonably 

impose a sentence outside the Guideline range. 

Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1175 (footnote omitted). The defendant bears the burden to establish 

that his substantial rights were affected to satisfy the third Olano prong. Dazey, supra. 

Dr. Soderstrand does not argue that the district court would have imposed a lesser 

sentence under the facts it found, had the judge been aware of his discretion to do so. In 

order to demonstrate that the error here affected his substantial rights (to satisfy the third 

prong of Olano), Dr. Soderstrand must therefore show a reasonable probability that a jury 

applying a reasonable doubt standard would have found either that he did not possess 

more than ten images which met the standard for child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 

§2256(2)(B)(iii), or that none of the images he possessed were of a child under 12, or that 

if he did possess any images of children under 12, those images did not meet the standard 

for child pornography under 18 U.S.C. §2256(2)(B)(iii). 

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Before the district court, Dr. Soderstrand did not introduce any affirmative 

evidence which would have supported any of these contentions. Rather, Dr. Soderstrand 

argued principally that the Government failed to prove the element of"lasciviousness" 

necessary for an image or depiction to constitute child pornography under the statute and 

as explained by United States v. Dost, 636 F .Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986); accord 

United States v. Wolf, 890 F.2d 241, 245 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying the Dost factors to the 

tenn "lascivious"). The Government, by contrast, contends that the evidence and 

testimony it introduced was "overwhelming," and that "any fact-finder, under any 

standard would have reached the same sentencing determinations that the district court 

did at sentencing." Aplee. Br. at 31, 33. 

Ultimately, we need not reach a decision on the third Olano prong- whether Dr. 

Soderstrand's substantial rights were affected. Even assuming that Dr. Soderstrand could 

show that the sentencing below affected his substantial rights, we find that Dr. 

Soderstrand has not met his "burden of persuading us that the error seriously affected the 

fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings," United States v. Mozee, 

405 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2005), thus failing to satisfy the fourth prong of Olano. 

As we have explained, in the context of a constitutional Booker error "the question before 

us is whether a reversal and remand for resentencing by the district court under a 

discretionary guidelines regime would advance the fairness, integrity or public reputation 

of the courts." Mozee, 405 F.3d supra. "[C]ourts have held that sentencing error meets the 

fourth prong of plain-error review only in those rare cases in which core notions of justice 

are offended." Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d supra at 739. 

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Here the district court determined that the guideline range applicable to Dr. 

Soderstrand's offense was 30-37 months. It sentenced him toward the upper end of that 

range, imposing a sentence of 35 months. The district judge stated that he chose not to 

sentence Dr. Soderstrand to the maximum penalty because there was no evidence Dr. 

Soderstrand had exchanged or trafficked in any of the pornographic material, rather than 

simply possessing it for his own use, and because Dr. Soderstrand had otherwise had an 

"outstanding career" with no evidence of any past misconduct. Aplt. App. at 133. 

However, the judge did not sentence Dr. Soderstrand to the minimum or close to the 

minimum penalty under the guideline range, either. He noted that child pornography is 

produced for profit, and the reason why it can be made for profit is because people like 

Dr. Soderstrand will view it. Id. at 132. The judge emphasized the "many victims" 

ultimately impacted by Dr. Soderstrand's conduct, with the "saddest of all" being the 

many young children who were abused in the making of the pornographic material Dr. 

Soderstrand was convicted of possessing. Id. As a result, the judge stated he believed a 

sentence of 35 months' incarceration was appropriate. Id. at 133. 

Thus the district judge exercised his discretion and determined that a sentence of 

35 months was appropriate, although he obviously could have sentenced Dr. Soderstrand 

to a lesser term of imprisonment. Accordingly, "there is no basis for us to assume [Dr. 

Soderstrand] would receive a lesser sentence if he were resentenced under a discretionary 

sentencing regime in which the district court is required to 'consider' the guidelines when 

it exercises its discretion." Mozee, 405 F.3d supra at 1092. Dr. Soderstrand has failed to 

establish that there is an appearance of unfairness in his sentence, and accordingly, he has 

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failed to satisfy the fourth prong of Olano. We therefore decline to exercise our 

discretion to notice the Booker constitutional error here. 

Accordingly, the conviction and sentence of the district court are AFFIRMED. 

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