Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02386/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-02386-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tamalyn Charmaine Campbell
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAMALYN CHARMAINE CAMPBELL, No. 2:14-CV-2386-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. 

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 17). 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

1

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 1 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on January 27, 2011. In the

application, plaintiff claims that disability began on April 8, 2008. Plaintiff’s claim was initially

denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative hearing, which

was held on April 25, 2013, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mark C. Ramsey. In a

June 6, 2013, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled based on the following

relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): major depression

disorder, anxiety disorder, and substance addiction disorder;

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: full range of

simple unskilled work at all exertional levels; and

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, residual

functional capacity, and the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, there are jobs

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant

can perform.

After the Appeals Council declined review on August 15, 2014, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

2

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 2 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly

rejected the opinions of Drs. Cleveland and Singer, as well as LuWanna Airheart, LMFT. 

 The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are

proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual,

than the opinion of a non-treating professional. See id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285

(9th Cir. 1996); Winans v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1987). The least weight is given

to the opinion of a non-examining professional. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 & n.4

(9th Cir. 1990).

In addition to considering its source, to evaluate whether the Commissioner

properly rejected a medical opinion the court considers whether: (1) contradictory opinions are

in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. The Commissioner may reject an 

uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and

convincing” reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. 

3

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 3 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted

by an examining professional’s opinion which is supported by different independent clinical

findings, the Commissioner may resolve the conflict. See Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035,

1041 (9th Cir. 1995). A contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be

rejected only for “specific and legitimate” reasons supported by substantial evidence. See Lester,

81 F.3d at 830. This test is met if the Commissioner sets out a detailed and thorough summary of

the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, states her interpretation of the evidence, and makes a

finding. See Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1989). Absent specific and

legitimate reasons, the Commissioner must defer to the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. The opinion of a non-examining professional,

without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining

professional. See id. at 831. In any event, the Commissioner need not give weight to any

conclusory opinion supported by minimal clinical findings. See Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111,

1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting treating physician’s conclusory, minimally supported opinion);

see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. 

A. Dr. Cleveland

As to Dr. Cleveland, the ALJ stated:

. . .[I]n March 2013, treating professional, R. Cleveland, noted he had

treated the claimant for 3 months (or since approximately December

2012). Mr. Cleveland indicated the claimant was diagnosed with

depression and anxiety, and taking psychotropic medication to address

these issues. The report showed the claimant underwent office visits once

every 2-3 weeks (Ex. 15F). 

The ALJ added:

. . . Mr. Cleveland opined as follows: the claimant has mild impairment in

the abilities to follow work rules, relate to co-workers, use judgment,

maintain concentration/attention, and relate predictably in social

situations. The claimant has moderate impairment in the abilities to deal

with public, interact with supervisors, deal with work stresses, function

independently, complete simple tasks, and behave in an emotionally stable

manner. Mr. Cleveland advised the claimant is capable of work in a low

4

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 4 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

stress environment. He opined the claimant would be absent more than 3

times per month (Ex. 15F). This assessment is given little weight. First, it

appears that Mr. Cleveland is not an acceptable source per 20 CFR

404.1513(a) and 416.913(a), as there is no degree set forth after his name. 

Secondly, Mr. Cleveland does not provide ample evidence to substantiate

his extreme findings. In fact, aside from the claimant’s diagnosis and

medication(s), there is no reference to objective testing or clinical findings

whatsoever. Additionally, the undersigned finds Mr. Cleveland’s extreme

limitations contrast with daily activities. Specifically, Mr. Cleveland

found the claimant would be absent more than 3 times per month, which

contrasts with the fact that she is able to care for herself nearly every day

of the month. Lastly, the assessment contrasts with the claimant’s

treatment recommendations insomuch as she attended intermittent office

visits for counseling and medication management. 

The undersigned emphasizes at the time of the assessment, the claimant

had attended (approximately) 3 office visits with Mr. Cleveland. 

Accordingly, his treatment history was quite brief, and not necessarily

indicative of a longitudinal understanding of the claimant’s condition. 

The ALJ cited the following reasons for rejecting Dr. Cleveland’s opinions: (1) he

is not an acceptable source; (2) his opinion is unsupported; (3) his extreme limitations contrast

with plaintiff’s daily activities; (4) his extreme limitations contrast with plaintiff’s conservative

and intermittent care history; and (5) he did not have a longitudinal understanding of plaintiff’s

condition. Defendant concedes that the first reason is not supported by substantial evidence

because, in fact, Mr. Cleveland is a medical doctor. Plaintiff argues the remaining reasons are 1

not supported by substantial evidence. 

A review of the record reflects that Dr. Cleveland completed a “Medical

Assessment of Ability to do Work Related Activities (Mental)” in March 2013. The report

indicates that Dr. Cleveland treated plaintiff over a three-month period. For various findings, the

form asks the doctor to report medical and clinical findings supporting the assessment. The

Defendant states: “Although the ALJ mistakenly stated that Dr. Cleveland was not 1

a medical doctor, this was harmless error as he provided specific and legitimate reasons for

assigning Dr. Cleveland’s opinion little weight (AR 22-23). The court agrees. See Stout v.

Comm’r Soc. Sec., 454 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2006). The court also agrees with defendant that this

error did not result in application of the wrong legal standard to evaluation of Dr. Cleveland’s

opinions insofar as the ALJ articulated rationale applicable to acceptable treating medical

sources. 

5

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 5 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

doctor reported either no findings or indicated “see note” without providing any such note. 

According to plaintiff, “see note” refers to treatment notes at pages 471, 478 482,

and 488 of the record. Plaintiff states that these treatment notes “routinely discuss his

observations of plaintiff’s mental health symptoms.” Contrary to plaintiff’s characterization,

however, these notes largely reflect plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Where an examination

regarding psychiatric issues is indicated in the notes, the observations are consistently

unremarkable. For example, Dr. Cleveland reported on December 24, 2012, that plaintiff was

appropriately dressed, did not appear anxious or withdrawn, and demonstrated no psychosis. Dr.

Cleveland made the same observations verbatim on January 7, 2013, January 22, 2013, February

12, 2013, and March 5, 2013. Given that Dr. Cleveland’s opinions are not supported by

references to objective clinical evidence, the ALJ properly discounted them. 

B. Dr. Singer

As to Dr. Singer, the ALJ stated:

. . .Dr. Singer reported symptoms of depression, difficulty with sleep,

hearing voices, panic attacks, mood swings, social anxiety, and a history of

substance abuse. Dr. Singer indicated the claimant was living alone in a

studio apartment, and obtaining some assistance from her family. Clinical

testing showed a full scale IQ score of 75, consistent with borderline

intellectual functioning. The doctor noted the claimant has mild

impairment in abstract reasoning and severe impairment in math

computation. After examination, Dr. Singer diagnosed the claimant with

depression. Dr. Singer reported the claimant had not sought mental health

treatment, and encouraged her to do so (Ex. 12F). 

The ALJ also stated:

. . .In his assessment, Dr. Singer concluded the claimant was

“unemployable;” however, [he] failed to discuss limitations in social

functioning (Ex. 12F). 

The ALJ added:

. . .[E]xamining physician, Dr. Singer rendered a functional assessment,

wherein he concluded the claimant was “unemployable” for a period of 6

months (Ex. 12F, page 3). This assessment is given little weight. First, it

is broad and ambiguous, not expressing specific limitations, which would

render the claimant “unemployable.” Furthermore, it only addresses a

6

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 6 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

period of 6 months, which does not meet temporal requirements for a

severe mental impairment under applicable regulations. Lastly, the

assessment conflicts with Dr. Singer’s report insomuch as he indicated the

claimant was capable of living alone without any mental health treatment

(at the time). Such evidence certainly suggests the claimant is at least

capable of simple repetitive tasks. 

A review of the record reflect that Dr. Singer prepared a “Consultation Summary”

of three consultations with plaintiff in October and November 2012. For “Impressions,” the

doctor reported:

Ms. Campbell’s presentation is consistent with a diagnosis of depression. 

She experiences depressed mood nearly every day, sleep disturbances,

diminished ability to concentrate, loss of energy, and daily feelings of

worthlessness and guilt. In addition, while her mood can become quickly

irritable with periodic bouts of anger, she also experiences social anxiety

that can lead to panic episodes. Finally, these are paired with mildly

limited cognitive ability. 

Ms. Campbell has not had any mental health treatment and has not been

evaluated for medication. Given her history and profile she was

encouraged to seek such treatment. In the interviews she displayed a

number of positive qualities, including good conversation abilities and a

generally pleasant personality. Her optimal functioning may be higher

than she presently displays if she had treatment and training. Until she

secures this assistance, given her profile, her likelihood of having a

successful work experience is extremely problematic. 

Dr. Singer also prepared a letter on October 15, 2012, in which he stated: “Given the information

available to me at this time, Ms. Campbell appears presently unemployable.” 

On this record, the court finds that the ALJ properly concluded that Dr. Singer’s

assessment is vague and generalized. In particular, the doctor offers no specific opinions as to

plaintiff’s functional capabilities except the conclusory statement that plaintiff is

“unemployable.” 

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

7

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 7 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

C. Ms. Airheart

As to Ms. Airheart, the ALJ stated:

In February 2013, treating professional, L. Airheart, M.S., reported the

claimant had three counseling sessions from December 2012 and February

2013 at her facility. She advised the claimant was undergoing cognitive

behavior therapy, and noted the claimant demonstrated reliability to

attending scheduled appointments (Ex. 16F). 

The ALJ also stated:

In February 2013, treating professional, Ms. Airheart, opined the

claimant’s “current diminished capacity inhibits productivity in the

workplace,” and added the claimant demonstrated “unemployability”

beyond a 30-day timeframe (Ex. 16F). This assessment is given little

weight. It is broad and ambiguous, not expressing specific limitations,

which would render the claimant unemployable. . . .

In March 2013, Ms. Airheart rendered a functional assessment. In the

report, she opined as follows: the claimant has mild impairment in the

ability to complete simple repetitive tasks. She has moderate impairment

in the abilities to follow work rules and functional independently. The

claimant has marked impairment in the abilities to interact with others in

the workplace, use judgment, deal with stress, maintain concentration,

attention, behave in an emotionally stable manner, and demonstrate

reliability. She is incapable of a lower stress job. She will be absent more

than 3 times per month (Ex. 18F). This assessment is given little weight. 

First, as a marriage and family therapist, Ms. Airheart is not considered an

acceptable medical source per 20 CFR 404.1513(a) and 416.913(a). 

Furthermore, her reports are inconsistent. Specifically, Ms. Airheart found

the claimant has marked impairment in the ability to demonstrate

reliability and will miss work more than 3 times per month. By contrast,

Ms. Airheart specifically noted the claimant was demonstrating reliability

in her report of February 2013 (Ex. 16F). Moreover, the assessment

contrasts with the claimant’s treatment recommendations insomuch as she

attended intermittent office visits for counseling and medication

management. Lastly, the assessment contracts with the claimant’s own

account of activities of daily living. 

The undersigned emphasizes at the time of the assessment, the claimant

had attended a total of 3 office visits with Ms. Airheart’s facility (Ex.

16F). Accordingly, Ms. Airheart’s treatment history was quite brief, and

not necessarily indicative of a longitudinal understanding of the claimant’s

condition.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

8

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 8 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

The record contains a February20, 2013, report from Ms. Airheart. In the report

she states that plaintiff attended three counseling sessions at her facility. Ms. Airheart also states:

While Tamalyn demonstrates reliability by attending scheduled counseling

appointments and a teachable spirit, in my opinion, her current diminished

capacity inhibits productivity in the workplace. At this time, Tamalyn

demonstrates unemployability that extends beyond the next 30 days. Due

to the many contributing variables, that include medication management, I

am unable to predict the duration of Tamalyn’s current unemployability or

future employment status at this time. 

Ms. Airheart also completed a “Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work Related Activities

(Mental)” on March 20, 2013. Ms. Airheart reported:

Patient describes immobilizing fear and anxiety when interacting with

others and when going out into the public. Ability to stay on task and to

be self-governing is impaired by depressive symptoms and very high

degree of anxiety. Patient lacks self-confidence and social skills necessary

to work independently. 

Ms. Airheart also stated:

I have not observed patient in a task-oriented environment, however lack

of self-confidence and low social skills would likely be problematic for

complex job skills.

Ms. Airheart opined that plaintiff has marked limitations in her ability to demonstrate reliability

and added:

Personal appearance – Patient presents appropriate grooming and dress

when attending sessions. Patient described panic, isolation, and

depressive symptoms that interfere with daily routine – keeping her world

very small and interactions with others are minimal. 

As the ALJ noted, Ms. Airheart’s reports are inconsistent with respect to

plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate reliability. In the February 2013 report, Ms. Airheart indicates

that plaintiff is reliable in terms of keeping her appointments. In the March 2013 report,

however, Ms. Airheart opines that plaintiff is markedly limited in her ability to demonstrate

reliability. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ took the February 2013 statement out of the full context

in which Ms. Airheart also stated that, despite plaintiff’s ability to keep her appointments,

plaintiff’s “current diminished capacity inhibits productivity in the workplace.” The court does

9

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 9 of 10
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

not agree. The latter part of Ms. Airheart’s vague statement that plaintiff’s workplace

“productivity” is “inhibited” is not inconsistent with her report of plaintiff’s ability to reliably

attend her scheduled appointments. 

Given Ms. Airheart’s inconsistent reports, the ALJ did not err in discounting her

opinion. The ALJ was also permitted to discount her opinions because Ms. Airheart is not an

acceptable medical source. Finally, as defendant correctly notes, the ALJ properly accounted for

Ms. Airheart’s brief treatment relationship with plaintiff. See Crane v. Shalala, 76 F.3d 251 (9th

Cir. 1996). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 17) is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: March 21, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

Case 2:14-cv-02386-CMK Document 20 Filed 03/22/16 Page 10 of 10