Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01274/USCOURTS-ca13-19-01274-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Jean Kuriakose
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

JEAN KURIAKOSE,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________

2019-1274

______________________

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CH-1221-17-0287-W-2.

______________________

Decided: January 17, 2020

______________________

ARIEL E. SOLOMON, Solomon Law Firm, PLLC, Albany, 

NY, for petitioner. 

 NATHANAEL YALE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC for respondent. Also represented by JOSEPH H.

HUNT, ALLISON KIDD-MILLER, ROBERT EDWARD 

KIRSCHMAN, JR. 

 ______________________

Before DYK, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

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2 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

TARANTO, Circuit Judge.

This appeal comes to us from the Merit Systems Protection Board. Appellant Jean Kuriakose worked as a parttime radiologist at the Department of Veterans Affairs’ 

Health Care System in Ann Arbor, Michigan. According to 

her allegations at the Board, on December 6, 2013, she was 

sexually assaulted by a co-worker—who, the Board subsequently found, was placed on leave by the VA as soon as 

the incident was reported and whose employment was terminated shortly thereafter. In December 2014, Dr. Kuriakose resigned from her position at the VA. In 2017, after 

exhausting administrative remedies, she sought corrective 

action from the Board under the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2303 et seq. (WPA), based on 

allegations that she had made certain protected disclosures 

to her supervisors and been subjected to several adverse 

personnel actions by the VA as a result. The Board rejected 

Dr. Kuriakose’s request for corrective action, finding that 

Dr. Kuriakose had made one protected disclosure that resulted in an adverse personnel action, but that the VA 

proved that it would have taken that personnel action regardless of Dr. Kuriakose’s protected disclosure. Because 

we find no reversible error, we affirm.

I

A

Dr. Kuriakose began working at the VA as a radiologist 

in 2010. The Ann Arbor VA Health Care System has an 

academic affiliation with the University of Michigan Medical School, and the VA’s radiologists, including Dr. Kuriakose, are also on staff at the University. Dr. Kuriakose’s 

immediate VA supervisor was Dr. Venkataramu Krishnamurthy, and her immediate University supervisor was Dr. 

Ella Kazerooni. 

Before the Board, Dr. Kuriakose alleged that, on December 6, 2013, at the VA facility, she was the victim of a 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 3

sexual attack—groping and exposure—by a male radiologist at the facility. J.A. 3. About a week later, Dr. Kuriakose told a radiology technician that the co-worker 

radiologist had exposed himself to her. Id. Independently, 

but contemporaneously, the VA questioned him about his 

treatment of women. Id. at 4. Around January 10, 2014, 

Dr. Kuriakose told her University supervisor, Dr. 

Kazerooni, about the December 6th incident. Id. at 4. Dr. 

Kazerooni immediately contacted both the police and Dr. 

Kuriakose’s VA supervisor, Dr. Krishnamurthy; and the 

same day, the police began an investigation, Dr. Kuriakose 

filed a criminal complaint, and the VA placed the co-worker 

radiologist on administrative leave. Id. at 4–5. The VA 

conducted an investigation, in which it received denials 

from the co-worker radiologist as well as other information 

about his behavior toward women. Id. On January 21, 

2014, the VA terminated his appointment, effective February 4, 2014. Id. at 6.

In the period just discussed, VA supervisor Dr. Krishnamurthy had been attempting to resolve Dr. Kuriakose’s 

ongoing timekeeping issues, including her refusal to request leave for time she took off for vacation. See J.A. 

1493–94. Around that time, Dr. Kuriakose has also alleged, she applied to be a member of the VA’s Peer Review 

Committee and what Dr. Kuriakose refers to as the “Lung 

Cancer Committee.” On January 13, 2014, Dr. Krishnamurthy offered to move Dr. Kuriakose’s workstation away 

from the workstation of the co-worker she had just alleged 

had assaulted her the month before. Dr. Kuriakose expressed concern that moving her work station might hamper the assault investigation. Dr. Krishnamurthy assured 

Dr. Kuriakose that moving workstations would not affect 

the investigation and recommended that she move “if that 

would make the environment better.” J.A. 1656. Dr. Kuriakose decided to remain at her then-current workstation. 

J.A. 143; see J.A. 475.

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On February 26, 2014, Dr. Kuriakose met with her second-level supervisor at the VA, Dr. Eric Young. During the 

meeting, she discussed the assault as well as her concerns 

regarding how her direct supervisor, Dr. Krishnamurthy, 

was assigning codes to medical procedures he performed. 

Dr. Young informed Dr. Kuriakose that he would send a 

memorandum of their conversation to Dr. Krishnamurthy, 

and he did so on March 5, 2014. J.A. 1639.

In May 2014, the University sought to increase the professional development time allotted to its physicians for research and other scholarly activities. The University asked 

the VA to permit some physicians, including Dr. Kuriakose, 

to use up to twenty percent of their VA tour for professional 

development. The VA generally permitted use of only 

about ten percent of a physician’s VA tour for professional 

development. Given the apparent discrepancy, the VA, 

through Drs. Krishnamurthy and Young, decided that the 

best practice was to implement a formal “Rules of Engagement” to set standards for professional development time 

and to clarify the relationship between the University and 

the VA’s radiology department. J.A. 122–23. Dr. Krishnamurthy placed Dr. Kuriakose’s professional development 

time on hold until the Rules of Engagement were officially 

implemented. On August 11, 2014, Dr. Krishnamurthy approved Dr. Kuriakose’s request to use professional development time to participate in a COPDGene study. 

On September 12, 2014, Dr. Kuriakose told Dr. Young 

that another VA co-worker, Dr. David Jamadar, had made 

inappropriate comments to her during an argument. She 

alleges that she later overheard Dr. Jamadar making derogatory comments about her on October 2, 2014.

On October 10, 2014, Dr. Kuriakose asked Dr. Krishnamurthy if she could attend a training session related to 

the COPDGene study. Dr. Kazerooni also needed to approve Dr. Kuriakose’s participation in the session. According to an email exchange between Drs. Krishnamurthy and 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 5

Kazerooni, Dr. Kuriakose had to find other doctors to cover 

the shifts that she would miss while attending the session; 

and Dr. Kazerooni stated that she would withhold her official approval until after Dr. Kuriakose had obtained proper 

coverage for her shifts. J.A. 30–31; J.A. 1610. Dr. Kuriakose asked Dr. Krishnamurthy for permission to move one 

patient to another time and close off the patient’s previous 

time slot so that she could care for the patient before leaving for her training and so that no patients would be scheduled while she was at the training session, but Dr. 

Krishnamurthy did not do so. J.A. 508.

On October 14, 2014, four staff radiologists reported to 

Dr. Young that Dr. Kuriakose was causing an uncomfortable environment, noting that they tried to limit communication and interactions with her. Dr. Young began 

investigating the working environment of the radiology department. When radiology staff members were asked if 

they had seen or experienced any hostility in the workplace, Dr. Kuriakose’s name was the only one mentioned 

several times.

On November 28, 2014, Dr. Kuriakose sent Dr. Young 

an email that included a notice of resignation. Dr. Kuriakose sent a formal letter of resignation to both the VA and 

the University on December 10, 2014. Her resignations became effective on December 28, 2014. Dr. Kuriakose’s husband began a new out-of-state job on January 5, 2015, and 

Dr. Kuriakose joined him out of state after her resignations 

became effective.

B

On January 23, 2015, Dr. Kuriakose filed a complaint 

with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. § 1214(a), seeking corrective action for alleged prohibited personnel practices. J.A. 1760–70. Specifically, Dr. 

Kuriakose alleged that from October 2012 to February 

2014, she had made numerous protected disclosures indicating that VA doctors were abusing their authority, 

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6 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

committing gross mismanagement, violating laws or rules, 

and creating substantial and specific dangers to public 

health and safety. J.A. 1761–64. She also alleged that, as 

a result of her protected disclosures, the VA subjected her 

to certain retaliatory adverse personnel actions, namely: 

(1) a letter from Dr. Krishnamurthy to Dr. Kazerooni disparaging her; (2) denial of membership on VA committees 

necessary for promotion and advancement; (3) a reduction 

in professional development time; (4) interference with her 

promotion to Assistant Professor at the University; (5) isolation from other VA staff; and (6) denial of patient coverage needed to enable her to attend the COPDGene study 

training session. J.A. 1765–66. Dr. Kuriakose later added 

an additional allegation of constructive termination resulting from a hostile work environment. See J.A. 1727.

About two years later, on January 6, 2017, OSC provided Dr. Kuriakose with a letter containing proposed factual and legal determinations pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1213(c). J.A. 1726–27. Dr. Kuriakose did not respond to 

OSC’s letter. See J.A. 1728. On January 20, 2017, OSC 

provided Dr. Kuriakose with a closure letter, terminated 

its inquiry, and notified Dr. Kuriakose that she had exhausted her claims before OSC and that she had a right to 

file an individual right of action with the Board to request 

corrective action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3) and 

1221. J.A. 1728; J.A. 1730–31; see 5 C.F.R. § 1209.5.

C

Dr. Kuriakose timely filed an appeal with the Board. 

On August 31, 2017, Administrative Judge Chase found 

that Dr. Kuriakose was entitled to a hearing. J.A. 1692. 

On June 13, 2018, Administrative Judge Puglia held a prehearing conference at which she ruled that the Board 

lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Kuriakose’s constructive-termination claim. See J.A. 1222. Administrative Judge Puglia also denied Dr. Kuriakose’s request to call Drs. 

Kazerooni, Pernicano, and Kaza as witnesses, finding their 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 7

proposed testimony “immaterial.” See J.A. 1224. The rulings were set out in a prehearing order dated June 15, 

2018. J.A. 1221–24.

Dr. Kuriakose filed a motion for certification of interlocutory appeal to the Board on June 21, 2018, seeking confirmation of Board jurisdiction over her constructivetermination claim. J.A. 1217–19. The next day, Dr. Kuriakose filed an objection to the prehearing order. J.A. 1201–

03. On June 22, 2018, the administrative judge denied the 

motion and clarified that the Board did in fact have jurisdiction to hear Dr. Kuriakose’s constructive-termination 

claim, as the claim had been included in OSC’s closure letter to Dr. Kuriakose. J.A. 1213–14. 

The administrative judge held a two-day hearing on 

June 25 and 26, 2018. During the hearing, Administrative 

Judge Puglia stated that she would hear evidence of a hostile work environment only to adjudicate Dr. Kuriakose’s 

constructive-termination claim, not as its own separate 

claim. J.A. 285–87. Administrative Judge Puglia also excluded testimony regarding Dr. Krishnamurthy’s character 

and other employees’ complaints about Dr. Krishnamurthy. E.g., J.A. 239–41; J.A. 278–81.

The administrative judge issued an initial decision on 

August 27, 2018, J.A. 1–39, which became the final decision 

of the Board on October 1, 2018, and for that reason we will 

hereafter generally refer to the administrative judge as the 

Board. The Board found that Dr. Kuriakose had made a 

protected disclosure to Dr. Young during their February 

26, 2014 meeting, that the subsequent reduction in professional development time was an adverse personnel action, 

and that the protected disclosure was a contributing factor 

to the reduction in professional development time (because 

of the knowledge/timing test). J.A. 27–28; J.A. 31–32; J.A. 

36. The Board found, however, that the VA had proven by 

clear and convincing evidence that it would have reduced 

Dr. Kuriakose’s professional development time regardless 

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8 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

of her protected disclosure because the reduced professional development time applied to all VA physicians. J.A. 

37–39. 

The Board found that Dr. Kuriakose’s remaining alleged personnel actions all failed even before the stage at 

which it fell to the VA to prove that it would have taken the 

action regardless of the alleged protected disclosure. In 

particular, the Board found that Dr. Kuriakose was unable 

to attend the COPDGene study training session because of 

her own failure to obtain patient-care coverage, not because of a VA personnel action. J.A. 30–31. The Board also 

found that the alleged interference with Dr. Kuriakose’s 

promotion at the University is not a covered personnel action under the WPA. J.A. 31. The Board further found that 

Dr. Kuriakose failed to “establish that she requested to join 

any VA committees from December 2013 [the date of her 

alleged attack predating her protected disclosure] to December 2014 [the date of her formal resignation].” J.A. 32. 

Finally, the Board found that Dr. Kuriakose had not 

proven her constructive-termination claim because she had 

failed to rebut the presumption that her resignation was 

voluntary. J.A. 34–36. The Board recognized Dr. Kuriakose’s sense of isolation from and difficulty communicating 

with her co-workers and her resulting concerns for patient 

safety, but it also found that she had received a “satisfactory” performance evaluation before her resignation and 

was considered a valuable member of the radiology department. J.A. 35–36. The Board also acknowledged Dr. Kuriakose’s allegation that Dr. Jamadar had yelled at her 

during an argument in September 2014. J.A. 35. The 

Board observed, as well, that Dr. Kuriakose’s resignation 

did not become effective until one month after her initial 

notice of resignation, that her husband had recently accepted a new job in another state, and that she had simultaneously resigned from the University even though she 

did not find the work environment at the University intolerable. J.A. 35.

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 9

Dr. Kuriakose timely appealed to this court. We have 

jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 7703 and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

II

A Board decision must be affirmed unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; or 

(3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable mind may take as sufficient to establish a conclusion.” 

Grover v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 828 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016).

The WPA prohibits an agency from taking a personnel 

action in retaliation for any whistleblowing “disclosure” or 

activity. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)–(9). An employee in Dr. Kuriakose’s position has to show by a preponderance of the 

evidence that she made a protected disclosure that contributed to a personnel action against her. See Whitmore v. 

Dep’t of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “If the 

employee establishes this prima facie case of reprisal for 

whistleblowing, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 

agency to show by clear and convincing evidence that it 

would have taken ‘the same personnel action in the absence of such disclosure.’” Id. at 1364 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1221(e)). If the agency does not make that showing, the 

agency’s personnel action must be set aside. See Siler v. 

Envtl. Prot. Agency, 908 F.3d 1291, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 

The Board may consider whistleblowing charges only if the 

claimant presented them to OSC. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); 

Ward v. M.S.P.B., 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992).

III

Dr. Kuriakose presents several challenges to the 

Board’s findings and evidentiary rulings. We do not find 

these challenges persuasive.

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10 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

A

As an initial matter, we reject Dr. Kuriakose’s contention that she lacked notice adequate to enable her to present her constructive-termination claim. On June 13,

2018, after a year of preparations, and shortly before the 

hearing was to occur, the administrative judge stated that 

the Board lacked jurisdiction over Dr. Kuriakose’s constructive-termination claim. Dr. Kuriakose immediately 

challenged that ruling, and the administrative judge 

changed her conclusion nine days later, with the hearing 

taking place three days after that. Dr. Kuriakose has not 

shown that the nine-day period of scope restriction, during 

which the restriction was actively being contested, prejudiced her ability to present the constructive-termination 

claim.

Nor has she shown prejudice from the absence of written confirmation of the burdens of proof or the elements 

necessary to prove her claim. Dr. Kuriakose laid out the 

burdens and her proffered evidence in an earlier response 

to the Board’s initial jurisdictional order. J.A. 1709–11. 

Dr. Kuriakose has not identified any additional evidence or 

arguments that she would have relied on had she been 

given written confirmation of the burden of proof and elements to be proven. See Wynn v. U.S. Postal Serv., 115 

M.S.P.R. 146, 150–51 (2010) (“When an administrative 

judge fails to inform the parties of their burden and methods of proof, the Board typically remands the appeal so the 

administrative judge can afford such notice and an opportunity to submit evidence and argument under the proper 

standard.” (emphasis added)).

Dr. Kuriakose also argues that the Board erred in not 

considering a separate claim of hostile work environment. 

OSC’s January 6, 2017 letter, however, confirms that she 

relied on a hostile work environment only as part of a constructive-termination claim, not as a separate claim. J.A. 

1727 (discussing Dr. Kuriakose’s claim that “agency 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 11

officials subjected [her] to a hostile work environment, 

leaving [her] no choice but to resign”). The Board thus 

lacked jurisdiction over a separate hostile work environment claim. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); see Ward, 981 F.2d at 

526. 

B

Dr. Kuriakose argues that a number of the Board’s 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence. We 

disagree.

1

Cutting an employee off from training may be a covered 

personnel action if the training “may reasonably be expected to lead to an appointment, promotion, performance 

evaluation, or other [covered personnel action].” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(a)(2)(A)(ix). Dr. Kuriakose challenges the Board’s 

findings about her effort to attend the COPDGene study 

training session. We reject the challenge. 

The Board thoroughly reviewed the testimony and documentary evidence regarding Dr. Kuriakose’s failure to obtain patient-care coverage that would free her to attend the 

COPDGene study training session. J.A. 30–31. Email 

communications show that it was Dr. Kuriakose’s responsibility to obtain coverage for her VA shifts in order to attend the session. J.A. 1610 (email from Dr. Kazerooni to 

Dr. Krishnamurthy noting that Dr. Kazerooni “told [Dr. 

Kuriakose] to arrange coverage” and that Dr. Kazerooni 

would “only sign off on [her] end once the coverage arrangements [we]re sent to [her]”). Dr. Kuriakose was aware of 

this responsibility. J.A. 507. Indeed, she asked Dr. Krishnamurthy to close off a slot that would have allowed Dr. 

Kuriakose to perform a procedure on one of her patients 

before she left for her training. J.A. 508. Dr. Krishnamurthy testified that he did not close off the slot because 

the physician schedule had already been set by the time 

Dr. Kuriakose made the request. J.A. 129–30. The Board 

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reasonably found, based on this evidence, that Dr. Kuriakose had not proven that the VA prevented her from attending the COPDGene study training session.

Dr. Kuriakose faults the Board for relying on some of 

Dr. Krishnamurthy’s testimony without considering an alleged inconsistency. All that Dr. Kuriakose cites, however, 

is a possible minor inconsistency that is not specifically 

about the effort to attend the COPDGene study training 

session. See J.A. 124; J.A. 1164. The Board was entitled 

to make credibility determinations, and the decision to 

credit the key testimony of Dr. Krishnamurthy was not an 

abuse of that discretion. See Bieber v. Dep’t of the Army, 

287 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

2

Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s determination that Dr. Kuriakose failed to prove that her departure from the VA was something other than the voluntary 

resignation that it was on its face. “Resignations are presumed voluntary, and the burden of showing that the resignation was involuntary is on the petitioner.” Terban v. 

Dep’t of Energy, 216 F.3d 1021, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Our 

cases look at the circumstances, objectively considered, and 

focus on whether the resignation was shown to have resulted from misinformation, deception, or coercion by the 

agency. Id. 

Here, Dr. Kuriakose notified Dr. Young of her impending resignation in late November 2014, but did not send a 

formal letter until mid-December, and the resignation took 

effect on December 28, 2014. J.A. 17; J.A. 1596. The Board 

could properly consider it significant that Dr. Kuriakose’s 

husband began a new out-of-state job approximately one 

week after Dr. Kuriakose’s resignation became effective. 

J.A. 35; J.A. 547–48. In addition, Dr. Kuriakose simultaneously resigned from her position at the University even 

though she testified that the working conditions at the University were not intolerable. J.A. 522–23.

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The Board properly determined that the events to 

which Dr. Kuriakose points do not add up to intolerable 

conditions that would make her resignation involuntary. 

Although Dr. Kuriakose had concerns that her difficult 

working environment negatively affected her patients’ 

safety, the evidence shows that she was objectively providing satisfactory care and meeting deadlines. J.A. 35–36; 

J.A. 136; J.A. 499. Difficulties in getting along with coworkers do not on their own amount to an objectively intolerable work environment. See Miller v. Dep’t of Defense, 85 

M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 32 (2000). And that conclusion is not undermined by the alleged remarks of Dr. Jamadar to her in 

September 2014 (or about her shortly thereafter).

Nor is a different conclusion supported by the evidence 

concerning the VA’s attempt to move her workstation. To

the extent that Dr. Kuriakose is arguing that the attempt 

to move workstations was itself a personnel action, she did 

not so allege in her complaint to OSC and cannot raise such 

a challenge before this court for the first time. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 1214(a)(3); see J.A. 1727. To the extent that she is arguing that the attempt to move workstations contributed to 

her intolerable work environment, record evidence does not 

support her allegation. Dr. Krishnamurthy offered to have 

Dr. Kuriakose’s workstation moved if she felt that the move 

would improve her environment; Dr. Kuriakose declined; 

and she was not in fact required to move her workstation. 

J.A. 7; J.A. 143–44; J.A. 475; J.A. 1656. That incident does 

not justify finding an objectively intolerable work environment, even when considered with the other facts.

Dr. Kuriakose also takes issue with the Board’s assessment of the timekeeping and leave procedures to which Dr. 

Kuriakose was subjected. Dr. Kuriakose did not separately 

allege changes in timekeeping and leave policies as a personnel action in her complaint to OSC and cannot raise the 

issue for the first time here. 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3); see J.A. 

1727. To the extent that Dr. Kuriakose argues that 

changes in timekeeping and leave policies contributed to 

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an intolerable work environment, that allegation is unsupported by the record. Dr. Krishnamurthy had repeatedly 

expressed concerns that Dr. Kuriakose was not following 

the VA’s rules for timekeeping and leave. J.A. 7; J.A. 1493–

94. Dr. Kuriakose has not alleged that the rules applied to 

her were any different from the rules applied to all VA physicians. Requiring her to comply with the agency’s rules is 

not evidence of an objectively intolerable work environment.

3

Dr. Kuriakose also disagrees with the credibility determinations made by the Board regarding Dr. Kuriakose’s 

exclusion from VA committees and her isolation from coworkers. We give great deference to such credibility determinations. Bieber, 287 F.3d at 1364. We see no reversible 

error here.

The Board found that there were no requests to join 

committees in the relevant time period. J.A. 32. Its decision in that respect is supported by substantial evidence. 

Nor did the Board err in assessing Dr. Kuriakose’s testimony that she was isolated from co-workers. In fact, the 

Board credited Dr. Kuriakose’s testimony on this topic, noting that she had “demonstrated that colleagues avoided interacting with her.” J.A. 35–36. But, as discussed above, 

the Board properly found that this did not rise to the level 

of a constructive termination, noting, among other things, 

Dr. Kuriakose’s own role in her isolation, evinced by the 

information Dr. Young received on the subject. J.A. 1592; 

J.A. 1606–08. And even with the noted isolation, Dr. Kuriakose received “satisfactory” performance reviews, was 

considered a “valuable member” of the radiology team by 

Dr. Krishnamurthy, and met patient deadlines. J.A. 35; 

J.A. 136; J.A. 499. There is no error in the Board’s assessment of the evidence on this topic.

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4

Finally, Dr. Kuriakose argues that an allegedly disparaging letter from the VA to the University in 2013 constituted a personnel action. Dr. Kuriakose has not challenged 

the Board’s finding that her only protected disclosure was 

to Dr. Young on February 26, 2014. Any actions before that 

date, including the 2013 letter, cannot be retaliatory personnel actions. J.A. 31; J.A. 1712. Further, a disparaging 

letter without more is not a personnel action under 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(a). Dr. Kuriakose’s additional allegations 

that the VA otherwise interfered with her advancement at 

the University are not supported by record evidence.

C

Dr. Kuriakose argues that the Board overlooked several pieces of significant evidence. See Whitmore, 680 F.3d 

at 1376 (noting duty to consider evidence). We disagree.

Regarding Dr. Kuriakose’s claim that the VA prevented her from attending the COPDGene study training 

session, she argues that the Board did not consider the fact 

that Dr. Kuriakose could not attend the training session 

because Dr. Krishnamurthy failed to close off a slot for her 

if she moved a patient from that slot to complete the patient’s treatment before she left for the training session. 

But the Board did consider that fact, as discussed above. 

J.A. 30–31.

With respect to the constructive-termination claim, Dr. 

Kuriakose argues that the Board did not consider (1) the 

totality of circumstances, (2) the offer to move her work station, (3) evidence regarding her date of resignation, (4) the 

impact that her work environment had on patient care, (5) 

changes in timekeeping and leave practices, (6) an overall 

change in working conditions, (7) Dr. Jamadar’s allegedly 

derogatory comments and behavior, (8) Dr. Young’s investigation into other radiology staff’s complaints about Dr. 

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Kuriakose, (9) her exclusion from VA committees, and (10) 

interference with promotion at the University.

Several of Dr. Kuriakose’s arguments go to the weight 

the Board gave to the evidence. Those arguments have already been reviewed above. And we see no failure of the 

Board to consider all the relevant circumstances in ruling 

on the constructive-termination claim. The Board considered Dr. Krishnamurthy’s offer for Dr. Kuriakose to move 

workstations (J.A. 7–9), the timing of Dr. Kuriakose’s resignation (J.A. 35), allegations of discrimination as far back 

as 2012 (J.A. 35), Dr. Kuriakose’s concerns for patient 

safety (J.A. 35), the particular timekeeping and leave procedures put in place to help Dr. Kuriakose comply with the 

VA’s requirements (J.A. 7, 17), whether Dr. Kuriakose had 

objectively experienced a change in working conditions 

(J.A. 35), allegedly derogatory comments made by Dr. Jamadar (J.A. 12–15, 35), Dr. Kuriakose’s feelings of isolation 

and poor communication with her co-workers (J.A. 36), Dr. 

Young’s investigation into Dr. Kuriakose’s interactions 

with her co-workers (J.A. 35–36), whether Dr. Kuriakose 

was excluded from VA committees (J.A. 32–34), and 

whether the VA interfered with Dr. Kuriakose’s promotion 

at the University (J.A. 31). That the Board did not find this 

evidence persuasive does not mean that it failed to consider 

it.

D

The Board, and specifically an administrative judge, 

may exclude witness testimony and evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or repetitious, and we review such exclusion for abuse of discretion. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(10); 

Curtin v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 846 F.2d 1373, 1378 (Fed. 

Cir. 1988) (“Procedural matters relative to discovery and 

evidentiary issues fall within the sound discretion of the 

board and its officials.”). Even if there were an abuse of 

discretion in excluding witnesses or testimony, Dr. Kuriakose could obtain relief here only by showing that the error 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 17

caused “substantial harm or prejudice to [her] rights which 

could have affected the outcome of the case.” Id. at 1379. 

Dr. Kuriakose challenges the Board’s exclusion of Drs. 

Kazerooni, Pernicano, and Kaza from testifying at Dr. Kuriakose’s hearing. J.A. 1224. She also challenges the exclusion of certain evidence regarding retaliatory animus 

and harassment. For the reasons discussed below, we do 

not find any of these challenges persuasive.

1

The Board did not err in excluding Dr. Kuriakose’s University supervisor, Dr. Kazerooni, who, Dr. Kuriakose said, 

would testify about “her communications with the VA on 

Dr. Kuriakose’s behalf regarding allegations of sexual harassment and whistleblower retaliation.” J.A. 1538. Dr. 

Kuriakose now claims that Dr. Kazerooni also could have 

testified about the specific incidents that Dr. Kuriakose alleges led to her constructive termination, including the reduction in professional development time, denial of 

training, harassment by co-workers, the totality of the circumstances experienced by Dr. Kuriakose, the timing of 

Dr. Kuriakose’s resignation, and interference with Dr. Kuriakose’s promotion at the University. Dr. Kazerooni, however, is not an employee of the VA, and Dr. Kuriakose has 

not shown what information on the above-described topics 

she could supply that was from personal knowledge, was

relevant, and was not duplicative of Dr. Kuriakose’s and 

other witnesses’ testimony. Dr. Kazerooni might have personal knowledge of and non-duplicative testimony about 

the alleged interference with Dr. Kuriakose’s promotion at 

the University, but as discussed above, the Board properly 

found that the alleged interference was not a personnel action covered by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). Testimony from Dr. 

Kazerooni on that topic could not have changed the Board’s 

conclusion.

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18 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

2

Dr. Kuriakose sought to have Dr. Perry Pernicano, one 

of her VA co-workers, testify about “retaliatory actions 

taken against Dr. Kuriakose following her protected disclosures.” J.A. 1537. Dr. Kuriakose now claims that Dr. Pernicano’s testimony was necessary to show that she followed 

proper procedures for obtaining patient-care coverage prior 

to the COPDGene study training session, that she was excluded from the Lung Cancer Committee, and that she was 

subjected to derogatory comments and isolation by her coworkers. The facts about those topics were all in the record 

before the Board and discussed by other witnesses, including Dr. Kuriakose. J.A. 30–33; J.A. 36. There is no indication that the Board discounted Dr. Kuriakose’s account of 

those incidents for lack of corroboration. Further, the 

Board found that Dr. Kuriakose failed to obtain coverage 

for herself and failed to show that she had actually applied 

to the Lung Cancer Committee. J.A. 30–33. Dr. Kuriakose 

has not made a persuasive showing that Dr. Pernicano had 

specific testimony to offer that could reasonably have altered the assessment of the facts. Finally, the Board in fact 

credited Dr. Kuriakose’s testimony that she was subjected 

to derogatory comments and was isolated from her coworkers. J.A. 35–36. Additional testimony by Dr. Pernicano would have been duplicative on that point and could 

not have changed the decision.

3

Dr. Kuriakose sought to have Dr. Asha Kaza, another 

VA co-worker, testify about “how the VA, and Eric Young 

handled her disclosures of sexual harassment and the subsequent acts of retaliation taken against her.” J.A. 1537. 

Dr. Kuriakose now claims that Dr. Kaza also would have 

testified about the overall work environment at the VA, the 

state of the workstation offered to Dr. Kuriakose, and the 

VA’s retaliatory animus toward Dr. Kaza after a protected 

disclosure. But there was ample other testimony about the 

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KURIAKOSE v. DVA 19

VA work environment and workstations, including from 

Dr. Kuriakose, and there is no indication that the Board 

discounted Dr. Kuriakose’s testimony about those matters 

for lack of corroboration. J.A. 7; J.A. 34–36. Dr. Kuriakose 

has not shown that Dr. Kaza’s testimony would have added 

something significant to the facts about the environment 

Dr. Kuriakose experienced.

We also see no abuse of discretion in excluding the suggested testimony about retaliation against Dr. Kaza for her 

disclosures of sexual harassment. “[W]hen determining 

whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same personnel action 

in the absence of whistleblowing, it will consider . . . the 

strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its personnel 

action; the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate 

on the part of the agency officials who were involved in the 

decision; and any evidence that the agency takes similar 

actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but 

who are otherwise similarly situated.” Carr v. Social Security Admin., 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Here, 

the Board could conclude that Dr. Kuriakose had not 

shown that Dr. Kaza was similarly situated to Dr. Kuriakose. Compare Sharpe v. Dep’t of Justice, 916 F.3d 1376, 

1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (evidence of hostility toward similarly 

situated reservist was relevant evidence in a Uniformed 

Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act case). 

Moreover, evidence of retaliatory animus bears on whether 

the agency would have taken a personnel action regardless 

of the appellant’s protected disclosure. Carr, 185 F.3d at 

1323. In this case, that issue is focused on one personnel 

action—the reduction in professional development time for 

Dr. Kuriakose. The Board could properly conclude, in the 

exercise of its discretion about the bounds of the proceeding, that Dr. Kaza’s testimony about a retaliatory animus 

with respect to other personnel actions against others was 

too remote in significance to the issue presented here and 

could not have changed the decision.

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20 KURIAKOSE v. DVA

4

Dr. Kuriakose’s challenges to the exclusion of certain 

testimony regarding other employees’ complaints about Dr. 

Krishnamurthy, J.A. 239–40; J.A. 278–81, are unavailing 

for essentially the reasons noted above with respect to exclusion of Dr. Kaza’s testimony. Dr. Kuriakose’s argument 

that the Board improperly excluded testimony regarding 

harassment from before 2014 mischaracterizes the record. 

At the hearing, during a colloquy about training and leave 

at the VA, the Board merely directed that the testimony be 

focused on the relevant timeframe. J.A. 420–21. And the 

Board’s decision notes that Dr. Kuriakose had complained 

of harassment since 2012. J.A. 35.

IV

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

Board.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

AFFIRMED

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