Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03864/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03864-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Xavier Lightfoot
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3864

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Xavier Lightfoot, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 14, 2006

Filed: April 26, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RILEY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

This case is once again before us. In 1999, Xavier Lightfoot and Cornelius

Peoples were convicted of aiding and abetting the murder of a federal witness, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1)(A), 1512(a)(1)(C), 1512(a)(2), and 1111. We

reversed their convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. United States v.

Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 642 (8th Cir. 2001). Peoples eventually pled guilty to aiding

and abetting the murder of a federal witness. Lightfoot proceeded to trial and was

convicted of conspiracy to commit a bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,

conspiracy to murder a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1111,

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
1

The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., now Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Western District of Missouri. 

2

Although Ross was biologically male, she considered herself and presented

herself to others as a woman. Accordingly, we will use feminine pronouns when

referring to Ross. 

3

Lightfoot did not provide Peoples with the witness’s name. 

-2-

and the murder of a federal witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(1), 1111, and

2. Lightfoot was convicted on all counts and the district court1

 sentenced him to a

term of life in prison. Lightfoot appeals from his convictions, claiming numerous

evidentiary errors, error in the jury selection process, a violation of the Speedy Trial

Act, and improper questioning by the prosecutor. We affirm. 

I. 

Lightfoot and Peoples perpetrated several robberies in the fall of 1997. In

December 1997, Lightfoot was arrested and charged with one of these robberies (a

federally insured credit union in Omaha, Nebraska). While he was being held in a

pretrial detention facility, Lightfoot learned that his lover and housemate, Jovan Ross,2

had supplied information to law enforcement about the robbery. Lightfoot

subsequently informed Peoples (who had not yet been charged with participation in

the robberies) that he wanted a witness against him murdered.3

 Lightfoot suggested

that if this witness was not killed, Lightfoot might try to arrange some sort of deal

with law enforcement, which Peoples believed would entail Lightfoot’s “snitching”

on Peoples. Lightfoot provided Peoples with identifying information about Ross,

including her address and the kind of car she drove. Peoples contacted Anthony

Hunter about murdering Ross. Hunter declined to commit the murder himself.

Instead, he spoke with Curtis Barfield and Carl Haskell about killing Ross. It was

eventually agreed that Haskell would kill Ross. Hunter and Barfield provided Haskell

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-3-

with a car and Hunter gave him a firearm. Peoples testified that Lightfoot was

responsible for paying these individuals. 

On June 8, 1998, Haskell shot Ross to death. Lightfoot, still incarcerated

pending trial for robbery, was anxious for verification that the murder had in fact

occurred. When Peoples confirmed that Ross had been murdered, Lightfoot reacted

by saying “beautiful” five times and expressed his gratitude to Peoples, saying,

“[t]hat’s perfect, that’s perfect, I can’t ask for no more.” 

As noted above, Lightfoot and Peoples were convicted of aiding and abetting

Ross’s murder. After we reversed the convictions, Barfield and Haskell (who had

been previously indicted for their involvement in the murder), were joined with

Peoples and Lightfoot under a single superseding indictment. Barfield and Haskell

were later severed from the case and Peoples pled guilty. At the second trial, Peoples

was the government’s principal witness. Among other things, Peoples deciphered

recordings of telephone conversations between Lightfoot and Peoples in which the

two men, aware that their conversations were being recorded, spoke in an indirect,

veiled manner. Other witnesses at trial included Hunter and an individual named

Larry Platt, who had participated in a robbery with Lightfoot and Peoples. Lightfoot

testified on his own behalf and denied that he had wanted Peoples to kill Ross. He

stated that Ross’s murder was all Peoples’s doing and that Lightfoot had wanted Ross

to be bribed so that she would leave town. 

II.

Lightfoot argues first that the district court improperly restricted his crossexamination of government witnesses and erroneously precluded him from

introducing important evidence. We disagree. 

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
4

In support of his claims, Lightfoot reposes great reliance upon Holmes v. South

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 126 S. Ct. 1727 (2006), which Lightfoot argues supports a

defendant’s right to present evidence of third-party guilt. Lightfoot’s reliance on

Holmes is misplaced, however, because Holmes addressed an “arbitrary” rule of

evidence that unduly impinged upon the defendant’s ability to present evidence of

third-party guilt. 126 S. Ct. at 1735. The evidence at issue here, by contrast, was (as

set forth below) excludable pursuant to “well-established rules of evidence [that]

permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain

other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead

the jury.” Id. at 1732 (citations omitted). 

-4-

The Confrontation Clause guarantees defendants the opportunity to effectively

cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Triplett, 104 F.3d 1074, 1079 (8th

Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Willis, 997 F.2d 407, 415 (8th Cir. 1993)). The

“exposure of a witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of

the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.

308, 316-17 (1974). A defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights are not boundless,

however, and “trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on such

cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment,

prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is

repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679

(1986).4

 “We will not reverse a trial court’s decision to limit cross-examination absent

a ‘clear abuse of discretion and a showing of prejudice to [the] defendant.’” United

States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 753 (8th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting

United States v. Love, 329 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2003)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 433

(2006). “A key factor in determining whether a defendant’s right of confrontation has

been violated is whether the defendant had other means at his disposal to obtain the

effect that the excluded examination would have allegedly established.” United States

v. Warfield, 97 F.3d 1014, 1024 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Because Lightfoot’s principal evidentiary contention is that the district court

improperly impaired his ability to challenge the motivations and credibility of

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-5-

Peoples, Hunter, and Platt, we note at the outset that the jury was given a great deal

of information bearing on these witnesses’ reasons for cooperating with the

government and their credibility. The jury learned that Peoples was a gang-affiliated

criminal with a prior felony conviction for aggravated battery. Peoples acknowledged

that he had lied to law enforcement about the robberies. Peoples also stated that he

had reached a plea agreement with the government, that he had not wanted to risk the

death penalty for his involvement in Ross’s murder, and that he was hoping for a

sentencing reduction for his cooperation in the case. As for Hunter, he stated that he

had a prior conviction for aggravated robbery and testified that he had been an

“enforcer” in a street gang. Hunter also acknowledged that he had pled guilty to

aiding and abetting Ross’s murder pursuant to a plea agreement and that he had

received a sentencing reduction. The jury heard Platt testify that he had prior

convictions and that he had been involved in a number of crimes. Platt stated that he

had entered into a plea agreement with the government, pursuant to which he pled

guilty to transporting stolen property across state lines and agreed to testify against

others. Platt acknowledged that he hoped for a sentencing benefit in the case. He also

stated that he had cooperated against codefendants in another case, after which he

received probation. Platt also acknowledged that he had repeatedly lied to law

enforcement about what he knew about the bank robberies and that he had falsely

denied knowing anything about Ross’s murder. It is in light of the foregoing factual

background that we examine Lightfoot’s contention that he was unduly circumscribed

in examining Peoples, Hunter, and Platt. 

A. Exclusion of Evidence Pertaining to a Telephone Call from Michelle

Peoples to Lightfoot

The district court precluded Lightfoot from questioning Peoples about a

telephone call that Peoples’s wife, Michelle, placed to Lightfoot prior to trial while

Lightfoot was in jail. Lightfoot argues that this call – which was made at Peoples’s

behest – was relevant because, inter alia, it exposed Peoples’s motivation in testifying

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-6-

and reveals Peoples’s attempts to influence Lightfoot. Lightfoot also argues that

“[t]he conversation is significant because Peoples’s statements, made through his

wife, are lies.” We conclude that these arguments lack merit. 

First, even assuming that Michelle’s statements can be attributed to Peoples, it

is not clear that Lightfoot offered Peoples’s motivation for cooperating with the

government as a ground for cross-examining Peoples about the telephone call.

Instead, Lightfoot stated that the calls were relevant to show that Peoples was a

“schemer” and that he sought to exert some kind of influence over Lightfoot:

COUNSEL: I think I need to show that this guy is a schemer and that

he’s not just a forthcoming good citizen, and I think him putting his wife

up – 

THE COURT: Scheming about what?

COUNSEL: There are lies in the phone call that he had – as I have just

been reminded, there are attempts by Michelle on behalf of [Peoples] to

influence Mr. Lightfoot, which he resists, but I think it shows – 

THE COURT: Influence him to do what?

COUNSEL: It’s hard to tell.

THE COURT: Well, I’m going to deny that. Objection sustained.

In any case, even if the district court should have understood from this

exchange that Lightfoot was seeking to elicit evidence concerning Peoples’s

motivation in testifying, it is difficult to see how evidence that Peoples sought to

influence Lightfoot in some vague, unexplained manner would have contributed to or

differed from the other testimony regarding Peoples’s motivations. Peoples admitted

that he hoped for a sentencing reduction and acknowledged a concern that he might

be otherwise at risk for the death penalty. He also stated that he was suspicious of

Lightfoot and that he thought that Lightfoot might implicate him. In light of this

testimony, evidence of some indistinct, undefined effort to influence Lightfoot would

have likely done little to alter the jury’s appraisal of Peoples’s motivations. 

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
5

It bears mention that Lightfoot was obliged to “take” this answer. Rule 608(b)

“forbids the use of extrinsic evidence to prove that the specific bad acts occurred.”

Martz, 964 F.2d at 789 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 608(b)). A party attempting to impeach

a witness by questioning him about bad acts bearing on credibility is required to “take

his answer.” Id. (citations omitted). 

6

Lightfoot also contends that the district court should have allowed him to

question Peoples about the many calls Peoples had placed to Michelle from jail, as

well as about Michelle’s costly phone bills. Both the calls and Michelle’s telephone

-7-

We also reject Lightfoot’s claim that the telephone call was relevant to show

that Peoples was attempting to influence Lightfoot. Although we have previously

held that one witness’s attempts to influence another witness’s testimony may, in

some cases, bear on the credibility of both, United States v. O’Conner, 64 F.3d 355,

359-60 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam), Peoples does not appear to have been attempting

to influence Lightfoot’s testimony during the telephone call. Indeed, as Lightfoot’s

vague offer of proof implicitly reflects, it is difficult to say that Peoples was

attempting to influence Lightfoot to do anything at all. 

Also unavailing is Lightfoot’s assertion that he should have been able to

question Peoples about the telephone call because Michelle was telling Lightfoot lies.

Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence confers upon district courts discretion

to permit witness-credibility questioning on specific bad acts not resulting in a felony

conviction. United States v. Martz, 964 F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1992). We will

assume for the sake of argument that Michelle’s alleged lies are prior bad acts that

were admissible pursuant to Rule 608(b). There was no error in the exclusion of this

evidence, however, because Lightfoot was unable to elicit any probative testimony on

this topic when he questioned Peoples outside the presence of the jury. Peoples

acknowledged that he had asked his wife to call Lightfoot, but denied that he had

asked her to lie to him.5

 Accordingly, even if the district court had permitted

Lightfoot to question Peoples about the phone call, there is no indication that

Lightfoot would have elicited any evidence that Peoples (through his wife) had lied.6

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
bills are, as far as we can discern, completely irrelevant and thus not a proper subject

for cross-examination. We also reject the contention that Michelle’s failure to respond

to Lightfoot’s accusation that Peoples lied to law enforcement constituted an

admission on Peoples’s part that Lightfoot’s accusations were accurate. 

7

Most of the information pertaining to this claim was conveyed through exhibits

that were not admitted into evidence. 

-8-

B. Exclusion of Testimony Concerning the Wynadotte County Homicide 

Lightfoot contends also that the district court erred by precluding him from

questioning Peoples and Hunter about their involvement in an unrelated double

homicide in Wynadotte County, Kansas.7

 Neither Peoples nor Hunter has been

charged in the double homicide, and the murders evidently remain unsolved. Peoples

told law enforcement that the murders had been committed by Hunter and that he had

helped Hunter dispose of the bodies and the weapon. According to what appears to

be a police detective’s hand-written notes (of uncertain authorship), Hunter claimed

that it was Peoples and another individual who had committed the murders. Hunter’s

recorded witness statement, however, does not accuse Peoples of the murders. The

district court concluded that the probative value of any inquiry on the murders would

have been outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice and jury confusion. We

agree. 

Lightfoot’s claimed purpose in seeking to explore the uncharged double

homicide was to demonstrate that Hunter’s and Peoples’s cooperation in this case was

motivated by a hope for leniency – not just in this case, but in the Wynadotte County

case as well. Although Lightfoot alludes to unspoken understandings between the

government and the witnesses, the record reflects no agreements that Peoples or

Hunter would receive any leniency for the Wynadotte County murders, and neither

plea agreement contains provisions immunizing Peoples or Hunter from state or local

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
8

Lightfoot finds it significant that Peoples’s assistance in the investigation of

the Wynadotte County murders helped provide a basis for a motion filed by the

government pursuant to Rule 35 to reduce Peoples’s sentence in the Ross murder case.

The sentencing benefit may have encouraged Peoples to cooperate in the Wynadotte

County investigation, but it has no apparent bearing on Peoples’s reasons for

testifying in this case. 

-9-

prosecution. When Peoples was questioned about the murders outside the presence

of the jury, he stated that he had not been charged in the double homicide and that he

had never been asked to provide testimony about Hunter’s involvement. Lightfoot did

not ask Peoples about any deals or understandings he may have had with the

government about these murders. Nor did Lightfoot pursue an offer of proof with

regard to Hunter that would indicate what Hunter’s testimony might have been in this

regard. Accordingly, Lightfoot’s contention that cooperation in this case was a “twofor-one deal” that garnered the witnesses leniency in both the Ross and Wynadotte

County murders is mere speculation.8

 

Because Lightfoot was able to establish Hunter’s and Peoples’s hopes for

leniency as their motivation for testifying in this case through other means, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in precluding examination regarding collateral and

uncharged prior bad acts and speculative, unspoken agreements between the

government and the witnesses. See Purkey, 428 F.3d at 753-54 (holding that there

was no error in preventing a defendant from attempting to demonstrate that a witness’s

testimony was motivated by a desire to avoid punishment for uncharged acts where

the defendant was able to demonstrate that the witness sought a reduction in his

sentence on charged conduct); United States v. Rodriguez-Andrade, 62 F.3d 948, 953

(7th Cir. 1995) (“It is not an abuse of discretion to exclude speculative evidence of

government promises where there is already ample evidence of genuine plea bargains

and government benefits.”). 

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
9

Evidence that Peoples or Hunter had attempted to “frame” the other was

potentially relevant. Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975). In Johnson,

however, if the evidence conveyed in the defendant’s offer of proof had been admitted

into evidence and credited by the jury, it would have demonstrated that the witness

had previously framed an individual in an earlier case. Id. at 560-64. In this case, by

contrast, the offer of proof did not so clearly indicate that either Peoples or Hunter had

attempted to frame the other. 

10At trial, Lightfoot also suggested that Hunter could be questioned about his

statements to police about the murders because he denied on cross-examination that

-10-

 Lightfoot also sought to explore whether Hunter and Peoples were complying

with the requirement in their plea agreements that they disclose any information that

they might have about state, local, or federal criminal activity. Lightfoot argues that

because Peoples and Hunter told mutually inconsistent stories, either or both of them

must have been lying about the double homicide, in violation of their plea agreements,

and that the jury should have been made aware of this deceit. As noted earlier,

however, Lightfoot did not pursue an offer of proof with regard to Hunter’s testimony,

and it is therefore not clear what Lightfoot would have been able to accomplish had

he examined Hunter on this matter. Moreover, because Hunter’s statements to the

police concerning the homicides predated his plea agreement in this case, it is

questionable whether lies he may have told about the homicides would be probative

of his compliance with the plea agreement in the Ross homicide case. Although

Lightfoot asked Peoples about his involvement in the homicides, he did not ask

Peoples whether he had spoken truthfully about the Wynadotte County murders and

did not question him about Hunter’s statement.9

In sum, because there is little indication that an examination of Peoples or

Hunter on the Wynadotte County double homicides would have yielded anything

fruitful for the defense and the potential for undue prejudice and jury confusion was

substantial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Lightfoot from

pursuing this line of inquiry.10 

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
he had talked with law enforcement about crimes other than those at issue in this case.

Assuming, arguendo, that this is an accurate characterization of Hunter’s testimony

(the exchange between Lightfoot’s counsel and Hunter on this matter is somewhat

opaque), it was not an abuse of discretion to preclude further examination on this

collateral topic. 

-11-

C. Exclusion of Evidence of Peoples’s Juvenile Conviction for Involuntary

Manslaughter

Lightfoot contends next that he should have been allowed to question Peoples

about Peoples’s juvenile conviction for involuntary manslaughter. Lightfoot argues

that this conviction – which would have served as an aggravating factor for the death

penalty had Peoples proceeded to trial and been found guilty – contributed to

Peoples’s decision to plead guilty and testify against Lightfoot. We conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Lightfoot from exploring this

topic. Lightfoot was able to elicit testimony that Peoples did not want to risk the death

penalty. It is unlikely that the jury would have had an appreciably different view of

Peoples’s reasons for cooperating with the government had Lightfoot been able to

question Peoples about a juvenile involuntary manslaughter conviction. 

D. Excluded Evidence Pertaining to a Home Invasion Perpetrated by

Peoples, Platt, and Others

Lightfoot also sought to introduce evidence pertaining to a home invasion

perpetrated by Peoples, Platt, and others. Lightfoot contends that evidence of the

home invasion was admissible to show that Platt was testifying falsely when he stated

that he received a lenient sentence on that offense merely for pleading guilty and that

the sentence simply “fell in the grid.” This argument lacks merit, as Platt

acknowledged several times at trial that he had received probation after cooperating

with law enforcement. Lightfoot also suggests that testimony concerning the home

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-12-

invasion would be relevant to show that Platt was a “repeat deal maker” who knew the

value of cooperating with authorities. Lightfoot was able to question Platt about this

subject, however, and it is unlikely that testimony concerning the details of the home

invasion would have been of any significant probative value in Lightfoot’s case. 

In addition, Lightfoot suggests that he should have been able to introduce

evidence concerning the home invasion to rebut the government’s attempt to paint

Lightfoot as, in Lightfoot’s words, a “criminal mastermind who turned [Peoples and

Platt] from relatively small-time nighttime burglars into dangerous armed robbers who

brandished firearms.” The jury heard other evidence of Platt’s and Peoples’s violent

backgrounds, some of which was related to the home invasion. For example, Platt

admitted that he been charged with three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of

burglary, one count of kidnaping, and two counts of attempted robbery in relation to

the home invasion. The jury also heard Peoples admit that he spent time in prison for

aggravated battery and that he had owned a firearm prior to meeting Lightfoot.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Lightfoot

from developing testimony regarding the details of the home invasion. 

E. Preclusion of Evidence of Ross’s and Lightfoot’s HIV Status 

Finally, Lightfoot argues that he was improperly precluded from testifying that

both he and Ross were HIV positive. At trial, Lightfoot argued that their HIV status

was relevant because it explained why he committed the robberies, namely, to make

money before both he and Ross were incapacitated by illness. Lightfoot was

permitted to testify that he had an unspecified health problem that placed pressure on

him to make money. He also testified that he felt the need to help take care of his son

and Ross. Insofar as Lightfoot’s reasons for committing the robberies were relevant

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
11Lightfoot’s contention that evidence of Ross’s HIV status was relevant to

explain why Lightfoot thought that Ross would be likely to accept a bribe to leave

town does not appear to have been presented to the district court and thus will not be

considered on appeal. See United Fire and Cas. Co. v. Historic Pres. Trust, 265 F.3d

722, 728 (8th Cir. 2001) (observing that a claim of error in the exclusion of evidence

cannot be predicated on a ground that was not presented to the district court at trial).

-13-

to his defense, restricting him to testifying that he had an unspecified health condition

did not prejudice his case.11

III.

 

Lightfoot contends next that his conviction must be reversed because the district

court improperly excused for cause two venirepersons based on their written

questionnaires. This claim is unavailing.

“[A] sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or

recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they

voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious

scruples against its infliction." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). If

even one venirperson is improperly excluded for cause, the death penalty cannot be

imposed. Kinder v. Bowersox, 272 F.3d 532, 543 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Gray v.

Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 667-68 (1987)). A venireperson may be properly excluded

from sitting in a capital case, however, if the venireperson’s views on capital

punishment would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as

a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” Wainwright v. Witt, 469

U.S. 412, 424 (1985). “We review a district court’s removal of death-scrupled

venirepersons for an abuse of discretion,” even where the removal is based on the

venirepersons’ responses to written questionnaires rather than a face to face voir dire.

Purkey, 428 F.3d at 750. 

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 13 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-14-

We need not reach the merits of Lightfoot’s Witherspoon claim, because

Witherspoon error does not require the reversal of a conviction, but only that the death

sentence be vacated. See Gray, 481 U.S. at 668 (reversing judgment for Witherspoon

error “insofar as it imposes the death sentence”); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S.

543, 545 (1968) (“Our decision in Witherspoon does not govern the present case,

because here the jury recommended a sentence of life imprisonment.”). Because

Lightfoot was not sentenced to death, the remedy for Witherspoon error is not

applicable to this case. In any event, we have reviewed the challenged venirepersons’

questionnaires and are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

excusing them. 

 IV.

We turn next to Lightfoot’s speedy trial claim. Lightfoot contends that because

his 70-day speedy trial clock starting running on June 13, 2001, the date of the

mandate in the prior appeal, the government was required to try him by August 22,

2001, which was well before his trial date and before any continuances had been

requested or granted. Lightfoot does not appear to raise any claim regarding delays

that may have occurred subsequent to August 22, 2001. The district court rejected

Lightfoot’s speedy trial claim because it determined that when Barfield and Haskell

were joined with Lightfoot and Peoples in a superseding indictment on August 9,

2001, Lightfoot’s speedy trial clock was reset and a new clock began to run. In

arriving at this conclusion, the district court relied upon the following language from

the Second Circuit: “[I]n cases involving multiple defendants only one speedy trial

clock, beginning on the date of the commencement of the speedy trial clock of the

most recently added defendant, need be calculated under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).”

United States v. Piteo, 726 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1983). 

Lightfoot argues that because Barfield and Haskell had been indicted well

before their joinder with Lightfoot and Peoples, it was Lightfoot and Peoples (rather

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 14 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-15-

than Barfield and Haskell) who were the most recently added codefendants.

Accordingly, Lightfoot contends that joinder with Barfield and Haskell did not reset

his speedy trial clock. 

The Speedy Trial Act provides in pertinent part that 

[i]f the defendant is to be tried again following an appeal or a collateral

attack, the trial shall commence within seventy days from the date the

action occasioning the retrial becomes final . . . The periods of delay

enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time

limitations specified in this section.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(e). This 70-day time limit begins to run upon the district court’s

receipt of our mandate. United States v. Lozano, 413 F.3d 879, 882 (8th Cir. 2005).

The delays enumerated in section 3161(h) include “reasonable period[s] of delay when

the defendant is joined for trial with a codefendant as to whom the time for trial has

not run and no motion for severance has been granted.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

Pursuant to section 3161(h)(7), we have held that when a newly indicted or arraigned

defendant is joined with a defendant whose speedy trial clock has already started

running, the latter defendant’s speedy trial clock will be reset so that it reflects the

speedy trial clock of the newly added codefendant. See, e.g., United States v.

Patterson, 140 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Where multiple defendants are joined

for trial and no motion for severance has been granted, the statutory time period does

not begin to run until the last codefendant has been indicted or arraigned.”).

Thereafter, all of the defendants are subject to one controlling speedy trial clock and

any time periods excluded from the speedy trial calculations for one defendant will

be applicable to the other defendants. Id. 

This approach comports with the purpose of section 3161(h)(7), which is to

“insure that the Speedy Trial Act does not alter the present rules governing severance

of co-defendants by forcing the government to prosecute the defendants separately or

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 15 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-16-

be subject to a speedy trial dismissal motion.” United States v. Monroe, 833 F.2d 95,

100 (6th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 532 (1st

Cir. 2005) (noting that the purpose of section 3161(h)(7) is to“prevent the Speedy

Trial Act from becoming a sword that can be used to shred the joinder rules”), cert.

denied sub nom. Zuniga-Bruno v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 296 (2005).

Synchronizing all of the defendants’ speedy trial clocks so that they reflect the speedy

trial clock of a newly added co-defendant prevents speedy trial concerns from

deterring the government from seeking to join defendants. 

When all of the defendants intended to be joined have speedy trial clocks that

have already started running, we look to see which of the defendants has the most time

remaining. Cf. United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing

Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321, 323 n.2 (1986)) (“The Supreme Court has

interpreted this proviso to mean that when a joint trial is in prospect, the speedy trial

clock seeks the longest available span of time.”); Committee on the Administration

of the Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Guidelines to the

Administration of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, as amended, 106 F.R.D. 271, 298

(1984) (“In effect, the latest deadline for any of the joined defendants becomes the

deadline for all.”). In other words, once multiple defendants with time remaining on

their respective speedy trial clocks have been joined together, and if severance has not

been granted, their speedy trial clocks will, subject to section 3161(h)(7)’s

reasonableness requirement, be reset and synchronized with the clock of the defendant

with the most time remaining. This insures that speedy trial considerations will not

hamper the joinder of defendants who have different amounts of time left on their

respective speedy trial clocks. 

 In light of the foregoing, the section 3161(h)(7) analysis in this case should not

turn on which group of defendants was most recently added. Instead, the pertinent

question is which defendant (or defendants) had the most speedy trial time remaining.

The government appears to contend that the joinder of defendants under a single

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 16 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-17-

indictment not only synchronizes the defendants’ respective speedy trial clocks, but

automatically resets all of the clocks to zero. We acknowledge that this is the practical

result in those cases where a defendant whose speedy trial clock has not yet

commenced is joined with a defendant whose speedy trial clock had already started

running. For the defendant whose clock has not yet commenced running, of course,

the speedy trial clocks starts at zero days elapsed. The other defendant’s clock, for all

practical purposes, may be considered reset to zero because it will be synchronized to

the speedy trial clock of the codefendant. 

By contrast, when defendants, all of whose speedy trial clocks have already

commenced, are joined together, it is doubtful whether section 3161(h)(7) envisions

automatically resetting all of the speedy trial clocks to zero. One could imagine, for

example, a case where two defendants with very little speedy trial time remaining

were joined together. Resetting these defendants’ speedy trial clocks to zero would

arguably result in a significant speedy trial windfall for the government because the

government would be placed in a more advantageous speedy trial position than it

would been in without the joinder. It is one thing for section 3161(h)(7) to remove

speedy trial obstacles to joinder; it is quite another for it to be used to make joinder

affirmatively advantageous to the government, a result that might run afoul of section

3161(h)(7)’s reasonableness requirement. 

We need not resolve this issue, however, because Lightfoot has failed to meet

his burden under the Speedy Trial Act under any reasonable interpretation of section

3161(h)(7). Cf. United States v. Cordova, 157 F.3d 587, 599 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing

18 U.S.C. 3162(a)(2) and United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1042 (5th Cir. 1994))

(the “burden is on the defendant to show that his right to a speedy trial has been

violated”). Lightfoot’s speedy trial motion mentions neither Barfield nor Haskell and

offers no analysis regarding how their inclusion in the case may have affected the

running of Lightfoot’s speedy trial clock. Moreover, the time between the issuance

of the superseding indictment on August 9, 2001, and Lightfoot’s October 2001,

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 17 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056
-18-

initial appearance on this indictment was excludable. See United States v. Van

Someren, 118 F.3d 1214, 1219 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the period of time

between a superseding indictment and arraignment on that indictment is excludable).

Accordingly, Lightfoot’s speedy trial clock would have expired no earlier than

October 2001. 

V.

We have considered and find to be without merit Lightfoot’s contention that the

government improperly cross-examined him regarding his intention to go to trial on

the robbery charges. 

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

Appellate Case: 05-3864 Page: 18 Date Filed: 04/26/2007 Entry ID: 3303056