Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05503/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05503-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Susan M. Borgo
Appellee
Daniel S. Goldin
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 1999 Decided March 3, 2000

No. 98-5503

Susan M. Borgo,

Appellee

v.

Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator,

National Aeronautics and Space Administration,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cv00155)

Wyneva Johnson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellant. With her on the briefs were Wilma A.

Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S.

Attorney.

Douglas B. Huron argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was Richard A. Salzman.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams, and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Alleging violations of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Susan Borgo sued her former

employer, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration

(NASA), for firing her from her position at the agency. The

case was prosecuted on the theory that NASA had mixed

motives for Borgo's termination. Concluding that NASA was

at least partially motivated by a desire to retaliate against

Borgo for protected activity, the district court granted summary judgment for plaintiff. Further concluding that Borgo

would not have been fired in the absence of the retaliatory

motive, the court granted her motion for judgment as a

matter of law on her request for a damages remedy. Because we conclude that NASA's motivation is a disputed issue

of fact that a reasonable jury could decide either of two ways,

we reverse and remand for a trial on the merits.

I

On October 18, 1992, NASA hired Borgo as a probationary

employee to work in its Office of Small and Disadvantaged

Business Utilization. When hired, she was expected to serve

primarily as Executive Secretary of the NASA Minority

Business Resources Advisory Committee (NMBRAC). But

Borgo's relationships with her superiors soon deteriorated.

On February 8, 1993, she was removed as Executive Secretary of NMBRAC because of tension between her and

NMBRAC's chairman. Tension also developed between Borgo and her supervisor, Ralph Thomas. Thomas criticized

plaintiff for shortcomings "that included missed deadlines,

unexplained absences, and a generally inappropriate attitude

in dealings with superiors." Borgo v. Goldin, No. 95cv0155,

slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Aug. 21, 1996).1

__________

1 Although plaintiff disputed those criticisms, for purposes of her

motion for judgment as a matter of law she "accept[ed] as true

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On April 29, 1993, Thomas sent Borgo a memorandum

complaining that she had involved his office in a governmentwide conference without informing him. Thomas wrote that

he was "very displeased that you did not tell me about this

meeting until you had already sent out letters announcing it."

"In the future," he instructed, "please inform me of any and

all affairs like this" at their inception. "It would have been

very embarrassing to me to have heard about a governmentwide meeting sanctioned by my office which I knew nothing

about." J.A. at 127.

On the following Monday, May 3, 1993, Borgo sent Thomas

a response. Her letter consisted of five paragraphs on two

pages. See J.A. at 31-32. The first paragraph characterized

Thomas' April 29 memorandum as ordering that "all professional actions on my part must be cleared by you before I

may proceed." The second noted that she had received her

prior employer's "highest award for performance," and that

she had "made it perfectly clear in [her] employment interview" with NASA that she "would not accept a job in a typical

bureaucratic operation." She was unable, she said, "to be idle

and waste taxpayers' dollars while wait[ing] for specific work

assignments." The third paragraph complained that she had

"not been assigned any action items" during the past two

weeks, "ha[d] not been included as a participate [sic] in any

outreach efforts," and had taken action on the conference

because she "had little else to do." The letter's penultimate

paragraph, central to this litigation, stated in relevant part as

follows:

It is my opinion, that if I, a white female, was your

manager, and I did not include you, an African-American

male, as a full member of the team, and treat you as a

competent professional, that, by now, I would have been

severely reprimanded or fired by senior management.

Id. at 32.

On May 25, 1993, Thomas sent Borgo a termination letter,

stating that she was being discharged as a result of "unaccep-

__________

every pre-May 3rd criticism made by Mr. Thomas." 2/3/98 Trial

Tr. at 46 (J.A. at 312).

table conduct and performance during your probationary

period." J.A. at 128. He wrote that there were "serious

deficiencies in your attitude, behavior and conduct which

adversely impact the performance of your assigned duties and

responsibilities." Thomas noted Borgo's "inability to effectively interact and work with the Chairman" of NMBRAC,

her "inability to conform to established deadlines on work

assignments," and her "general negative behavior and attitude in the office." He listed specific examples of

"dates/deadlines which you have missed that have adversely

impacted the office," as well as multiple instances of unexplained absences from work. He further cited examples of

behavior "bordering on insubordination," including continuing

to work on NMBRAC matters after having been expressly

directed not to do so, as well as initiating without authorization the government-wide conference discussed above. With

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respect to the latter, Thomas wrote: "Despite my counseling

to you on this matter, your letter to me on May 3, 1993 still

did not indicate that you understood the necessity that I be

kept fully informed and would cooperate and give me notice

of any future meetings." Id. at 128-29.

Plaintiff challenged her termination on two fronts. First,

before the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) she

charged that NASA had retaliated against her for whistleblowing.2 At the MSPB hearing on those charges, Thomas

testified regarding his reaction to Borgo's May 3, 1993 letter

and his reasons for firing her. See J.A. at 119-20. He

described the letter as a "purported answer" to his April 29

memorandum. It was "[p]urported," he said, because "it

doesn't answer it." Referring to the government-wide conference, he stated: "I told her, first of all, this was a good

idea, but she should tell me about things as important as this.

And she writes me back pretty much telling me where to go."

Counsel then asked for clarification, and Thomas explained

that he interpreted the letter as a declaration that plaintiff

__________

2 The MSPB adjudicates charges brought under 5 U.S.C. s 2302

alleging, inter alia, that a federal agency has taken a personnel

action against an employee for disclosing a violation of law. The

substance of Borgo's charge was that NASA fired her because she

reported acts of misconduct relating to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. II, ss 1 et seq.

was going to do as she pleased. It was, he said, "full of

things that were inaccurate and were not addressing my

memo at all." Id.

In an exchange that would later prove pivotal in the Title

VII litigation, counsel read the penultimate paragraph of the

May 3 letter aloud and then asked:

Q: Did you form any opinion about that statement?

THOMAS: Well, yes. In this whole--during her whole

tenure, I had never mentioned her race at all, and, if

anything it was the other way around. This letter, and

the reason I think you saw a lot of emotion coming out--

and I apologize to you Mr. Gorman--but that was how I

felt while reading the letter. It was the straw that broke

the camel's back. I mean, after all of this, after all--

after not producing any substantive thing in the office

and just giving everyone an overall hard time and making excuses for everything she did that she was supposed

to do, but didn't do, just the whole--and then this, you

know, and all I did was tell her--let me know about

activities as important as this, she writes me a letter like

this. That--in my mind, that was it.

Q: When you say that was it, how did you regard this

language? Did you regard it as misconduct in any way?

THOMAS: Yes, misconduct, insubordinate.

J.A. at 122-23 (emphasis added). The MSPB did not decide

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Borgo's case until February 3, 1998. On that date it rejected

her allegations, ruling that NASA had not retaliated against

her for whistleblowing, but rather had discharged her for the

reasons stated in Thomas' May 25, 1993 termination letter.

In the meantime, Borgo had filed suit in United States

District Court. There, she alleged that NASA had discriminated against her because of her race and sex, and then had

retaliated for her complaint of discrimination by discharging

her, all in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e-5, 2000e-16. Plaintiff

moved for partial summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

Applying Title VII's framework for analyzing allegations of

mixed motives on the part of an employer, see 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-2(m), the district court granted Borgo's motion. Relying on Thomas' MSPB testimony, the court held that no

reasonable juror could conclude other than that "retaliation

was at least part of the defendant's motivation for firing her."

Borgo, slip op. at 13.

Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial on the question of

remedy, applying Title VII's rules for determining appropriate remedies in mixed-motive cases.3 NASA contended that

even if retaliation had been one motive for terminating Borgo,

under Title VII the court could not "award damages or issue

an order requiring ... reinstatement" because the agency

"would have taken the same action in the absence of

[that] impermissible motivating factor." 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). At the end of the testimony of Ralph

Thomas, NASA's first witness, the district court took the case

from the jury and entered judgment for plaintiff as a matter

of law. "No reasonable juror could conclude," it held, "that

NASA would have decided to fire [plaintiff], even absent

retaliation." 2/3/98 Trial Tr. at 47 (J.A. at 313).

II

We review de novo both the district court's decision to

grant summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, and its decision to grant judgment as a matter

of law pursuant to Rule 50(a). See Hall v. Giant Food, Inc.,

175 F.3d 1074, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (summary judgment);

Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255, 259 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (judgment as a matter of law). Summary judgment may be

granted only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact [and] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 247 (1986) (quoting Rule 56). A dispute about a material

fact "is 'genuine' ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."

__________

3 The trial was limited to plaintiff's cause of action for retaliation.

Prior to trial, Borgo abandoned her underlying claims of race and

sex discrimination. See Joint Pretrial Statement at 1 n.1 (Jan. 8,

1998).

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Id. at 248. As the Supreme Court noted in Anderson, "this

standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that .... [i]f

reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence

... a verdict should not be directed." Id. at 250-51 (citations omitted). The "primary difference between the two

motions is procedural," the Court explained; "summary judgment motions are usually made before trial and decided on

documentary evidence, while directed verdict motions are

made at trial and decided on the evidence that has been

admitted." Id. at 251 (citation omitted). In both situations,

the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party and must not assess witness credibility. See Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288,

1298 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (summary judgment); Mackey v. United States, 8 F.3d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (judgment as a

matter of law).

Title VII states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer to discriminate against any of [its]

employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an

unlawful employment practice by this subchapter." 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-3(a).4 The amendments to Title VII contained in the

Civil Rights Act of 1991 address the proper disposition of

cases in which there may be a mixture of legitimate and

illegitimate motives for an employer's actions. See Civil

Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, s 107, 105 Stat.

1071, 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)).

As codified at 42 U.S.C s 2000e-2(m), the statute provides

that liability for "an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,

color, religion, sex or national origin was a motivating factor

__________

4 The same section makes it unlawful to discriminate against an

employee because the employee "participated" in any proceeding

under the subchapter. See 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-3(a). As the district

court held, it is the "opposition" rather than the "participation"

clause that applies to this case. Plaintiff complained of retaliation

"not against her official EEO complaints, but against [the May 3]

memorandum she wrote to her supervisor opposing discrimination

she perceived from him." Borgo, slip op. at 5.

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for any employment practice, even though other factors also

motivated the practice." Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) then addresses the question of remedy, providing that when the

plaintiff proves that an impermissible consideration was a

motivating factor, but the defendant demonstrates that it

"would have taken the same action in the absence of" that

factor, a court may not award certain kinds of relief including

damages and reinstatement (but may grant other specified

relief, including costs and attorney's fees).5 The parties and

the district court assumed that the 1991 Act's mixed-motives

framework applies both where the allegedly impermissible

motivation is retaliation, as it is here, and where it is race,

color, religion, sex or national origin, as expressly set forth in

the statute. Accordingly, we make the same assumption for

purposes of this appeal.6

In the following sections, we examine two questions. First,

we consider whether the district court properly granted

__________

5 The three provisions of Title VII cited above apply only to

private employers, see id. s 2000e(b); a separate provision provides

that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... in executive

agencies ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin," id. s 2000e-16(a).

"Despite the differences in language ... we have held that Title

VII places the same restrictions on federal and District of Columbia

agencies as it does on private employers, and so we may construe

the latter provision in terms of the former." Bundy v. Jackson, 641

F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981). We have specifically applied that

principle in the context of retaliation claims. See Brown v. Brody,

199 F.3d 446, 452-53 (D.C. Cir. 1999).

6 In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that

once a plaintiff proves that an impermissible motive was a substantial or motivating factor in an adverse employment decision, the

burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate it would have made

the same decision in the absence of the unlawful motive. See 490

U.S. 228, 249-58 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 259

(White, J., concurring). It further held that if the employer satisfies that burden, it may avoid a finding of liability altogether. See

id. at 258 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 260 (White, J.);

id. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Thomas v. National

Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 202-04 (D.C. Cir.

summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that NASA violated

Title VII because retaliation was a motivating factor in her

termination. Second, we consider whether the court properly

granted judgment as a matter of law against NASA's contention that the scope of the remedy should be limited because

the agency would have fired Borgo even in the absence of a

retaliatory motive.

A

In seeking summary judgment on her retaliation claim,

Borgo construed Thomas' MSPB testimony as stating that

the penultimate paragraph of her May 3 letter, which arguably charged him with "reverse" discrimination, was "the

straw that broke the camel's back." Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of

Partial Summ. J. at 8-9 (J.A. at 19-20). NASA defended by

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__________

1997), this court applied Price Waterhouse to pre-1991 claims of

retaliation under Title VII.

In 1991, Congress overturned Price Waterhouse in part, amending Title VII to provide that once a plaintiff proves discrimination to

have been a motivating factor, liability is established. See Civil

Rights Act of 1991, s 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-2(m)); see

also H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 45-49 (1991). Although an

employer cannot thereafter avoid liability, it can avoid a damages or

reinstatement remedy by demonstrating that it would have taken

the same action in the absence of that factor. See 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). As noted in the text above, while discrimination claims based on protected status, such as race or sex, were

covered by the 1991 Act, Congress did not expressly include retaliation claims in the provision that modified Price Waterhouse. Some

circuits have held that retaliation claims are not covered by the

Civil Rights Act of 1991 and are still governed by Price Waterhouse. See, e.g., McNutt v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 706, 709

(7th Cir. 1998); Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 932-36

(3d Cir. 1997). This circuit has not addressed that question.

Because both parties agreed below that the Civil Rights Act of 1991

provided the appropriate framework for decision, see Joint Pretrial

Statement at 4, and neither asks us to address the issue here, we

have no need to resolve the question to decide this case. See also

Borgo Br. at 13 n.3 (stating that resolution of the issue is not

required).

arguing that Thomas' testimony was that it was Borgo's

"entire" letter--not the controverted paragraph--"that was

the final straw." Def.'s Opp. to Partial Summ. J. at 11 (J.A.

at 48) (emphasis in original).7 Accepting Borgo's argument,

and relying solely on Thomas' MSPB testimony, the district

court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. We

cannot sustain that decision because, viewed in the light most

favorable to NASA, Thomas' MSPB testimony on this question was at best ambiguous. A genuine issue regarding

Thomas' motivation therefore remained for determination at

trial.

At the MSPB hearing, Thomas testified at length about

what he regarded as the unresponsiveness of Borgo's letter.

Rather than acknowledging her failure to advise him of the

government-wide conference, or promising to do better in the

future, she had sent him a letter declaring that she was

"unable to be idle and waste the taxpayers' money." J.A. at

120. In essence, he said, "she writes back pretty much telling

me where to go.... She is going to do what she wants to

do." Id.

Then came the fateful question and answer. It is true that

counsel read the penultimate paragraph of the May 3 letter

and then asked: "Did you form any opinion about that

statement?" Id. at 122. It is also true that counsel asked

Thomas how he regarded "this language." Id. at 123. But it

is not at all clear that those were the questions Thomas

answered. Instead, he said:

This letter, and the reason I think you saw a lot of

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emotion coming out--and I apologize to you Mr. Gorman--but that was how I felt while reading the letter. It

was the straw that broke the camel's back. I mean, after

all of this, after all--after not producing any substantive

thing in the office and just giving everyone an overall

hard time ... and then this, you know, and all I did was

__________

7 NASA also defended on the ground that the controverted

paragraph did not constitute protected opposition to an unlawful

employment practice under 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-3(a). In light of our

reversal of summary judgment, we do not reach that question.

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tell her--let me know about activities as important as

this, she writes me a letter like this. That--in my mind,

that was it.

Id. at 122-23 (emphasis added).

Thomas' testimony does make clear that Borgo's letter was

the final straw. But he did not state that the paragraph

complaining of reverse discrimination was that straw. Nor

was the letter a single, unitary complaint of discrimination.

Only one paragraph of the letter can be characterized as such

a complaint. The balance, although phrased as a response to

Thomas' original memorandum, communicates a message of

continuing resistance to Thomas' right to supervise her.

From Thomas' testimony, a jury could infer that he was

retaliating for the paragraph alleging discrimination. But it

could also reasonably infer that he was responding to the

letter's overall nonresponsiveness and message of nonacquiescence. That was precisely the point Thomas made in the

testimony leading up to his reference to the proverbial straw.8

Accordingly, even focusing solely on Thomas' MSPB testimony as the district court did, we cannot agree that any reasonable jury would have to find him motivated at least in part by

__________

8 Referring to Borgo's May 3, 1993 letter, Thomas testified:

This is her purported answer to my April 29th memo....

[Purported] [b]ecause it doesn't answer it. You know, I told

her ... she should tell me about things as important as this.

And she writes back pretty much telling me where to go....

She is going to do what she wants to do.... [R]ather than

addressing what I've said, ... she goes over why she was hired

at NASA, you know, which is irrelevant.... And she talks

about ... what she did in her last job and how qualified she

was. And then she says very curious things like she is unable

to be idle and waste the taxpayers' money while she waits for

specific work assignments while at the same time she was late

with most of the work assignments. She talks about ... how

she was not included to participate in outreach efforts and that

was totally untrue.... So the memo was full of things that

were inaccurate and were not addressing my memo at all.

J.A. at 119-21.

a desire to retaliate against plaintiff for including the offending paragraph.

Moreover, Thomas' MSPB testimony was not the only

evidence before the court. NASA's filings included an affidavit from Thomas asserting that he fired Borgo for "the

reasons specified in my termination letter to her." Thomas

Aff. p 63 (J.A. at 72). That May 25, 1993 letter listed the

grounds for termination as including missed deadlines, unexplained absences, inability to work with others, behavior

"bordering on insubordination," and, with specific reference

to Borgo's May 3 letter, the failure to indicate that she would

cooperate with Thomas in the future. J.A. at 128-29. It did

not, however, mention Borgo's suggestion that he was guilty

of reverse discrimination. A jury considering this list of

reasons could conclude that retaliation was simply not in the

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mix. Of course, a jury could also conclude that Thomas was

not being forthright in omitting the discrimination complaint

from that list. For purposes of summary judgment, however,

the statement in Thomas' affidavit--that he fired Borgo for

the reasons set out in the termination letter--must be accepted as true. See Hall v. Giant Food, Inc., 175 F.3d 1074, 1078

(D.C. Cir. 1999); Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 674 (D.C.

Cir. 1999).

In sum, we cannot reach a conclusion that Thomas had a

retaliatory motive without both construing ambiguity against

NASA and discounting Thomas' credibility. We may not do

either, however, at the summary judgment stage. Because

there remains a genuine issue of material fact, and because a

reasonable jury could find that NASA did not have, even in

part, a retaliatory motive, we reverse the grant of summary

judgment.

B

In addition to granting Borgo's motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability, the district court also granted

Borgo's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the

question of remedy, finding that NASA would not have fired

Borgo in the absence of a retaliatory motive. Our reversal of

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the grant of summary judgment necessarily requires reversal

of the grant of judgment as a matter of law. The latter,

which goes only to the question of an appropriate remedy,

cannot be considered until a jury first finds for Borgo on the

issue of liability. Moreover, if a reasonable jury could conclude that NASA did not have, even in part, a retaliatory

motive, it necessarily could conclude that NASA would have

fired Borgo in the absence of such a motive.

This logic aside, at trial there was more than sufficient

evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that

NASA would have fired Borgo in the absence of retaliation.

At the trial stage, NASA was not limited to Thomas' MSPB

transcript, affidavit, and termination letter. Testifying in

person, Thomas conceded that he could not say he would have

fired plaintiff absent the May 3 letter. The letter, he said,

was "the final thing that swung me." J.A. at 278. But he

steadfastly resisted the suggestion that his true motivation

was the letter's penultimate paragraph. To the contrary, he

repeatedly insisted that Borgo was fired because of the

letter's overall refusal to acknowledge his supervisory authority, not because of the statement suggesting he was guilty of

reverse discrimination:

Q: And it was this statement here that you considered

to be misconduct?

THOMAS: No, I've never said that. I never referred to

that sentence.

Q: You did consider this statement to be misconduct?

THOMAS: No. I've always referred to the letter. I've

always referred to the letter, and I've always said that

it's because the letter did not say she would do what I

said to do.

Id. at 271.9

Moreover, when specifically confronted with his MSPB

testimony, Thomas insisted that, although he had been asked

__________

9 See also id. at 254 ("There is no sentence or paragraph in that

letter where she says that she was going to do what I said."); id. at

261 ("[I]t was clear to me that she had indicated that she was not

going to be supervised by me."); id. at 265 (stating that the

about the statement in the controverted paragraph, his answer about the last straw was directed to the letter as a

whole:

THOMAS: Every time I said "letter," didn't I? When

did I say this paragraph?

Q: You were asked specifically about this statement in

the letter, and that was your response.

THOMAS: But what was my answer? My answer was

"letter." My letter [sic] was never this paragraph.

....

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It was the letter. The letter. Once again she was

saying she wasn't going to do what I said to do. How

can you supervise someone after that?

....

Q: Mr. Thomas, when you were asked in the prior

proceeding about this particular language, you said that

it was the straw that broke the camel's back, didn't you?

THOMAS: I did not say this language. I said the letter,

and that's what I've always said.

Id. at 274-75.

Thomas' admission that the May 3 letter was "the final

thing that swung me" is not the equivalent of an admission

that it was the letter's disputed paragraph that did the

swinging--not unless unless one disbelieves Thomas' repeated protestations to the contrary. The latter, however, is

a question of credibility for the jury, not a question of law for

the court. See Hayman v. National Academy of Sciences, 23

F.3d 535, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Because a reasonable jury

could find that NASA would have terminated Borgo in the

absence of a retaliatory motive, we reverse the grant of

judgment as a matter of law.

_________

termination letter's description of Borgo's conduct as "defiant and

border[ing] on insubordination" referred to Borgo's suggestion in

the May 3 letter that "to answer my memo is a waste of her time, is

a waste of taxpayers' money").

III

What was the straw that broke the camel's back? The

answer, we conclude, is for the jury to decide. We therefore

reverse the orders granting plaintiff summary judgment and

judgment as a matter of law, and remand the case for a trial

on the merits.

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