Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00060/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-00060-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nicholas P. Kostielney
Defendant
Michael E. Otte
Defendant
Rachel Amanda Quintana
Plaintiff
Jose M. Velasquez
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RACHEL AMANDA QUINTANA,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL E. OTTE, JOSE M. 

VELASQUEZ, AND NICHOLAS P. 

KOSTIELNEY, and DOES 1 through 20,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-CV-00060 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

This case arises from Plaintiff Rachel Quintana’s arrest by the San Mateo County 

Sheriff’s Office in August 2015. Mot. to Dismiss (“Mot.”) (Dkt. 39) at 1. Plaintiff claims 

that she was singled out due to Plaintiff’s complaints to unnamed Sheriff’s Deputies on 

two occasions. Id. Plaintiff asserts four claims for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) 

Retaliatory and false arrest; (2) Excessive use of force; (3) Retaliation in prosecution; and 

(4) Retaliation. Id.; First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶¶ 101-145 (Dkt. 38). Defendants 

seek to dismiss each claim. Mot. at 1. The Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Claims I, III, and IV with prejudice. The Court hereby DENIES Defendants’

motion to dismiss Claim II. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges the following. Her older brother, “O”, was once “stopped by San 

Mateo County Sheriff’s Deputies, arrested, and brought to the local substation.” First 

Amended Complaint (“FAC”) ¶ 21. The arrest was “without reasonable suspicion and 

without probable cause,” and O was released without charges. Id. Plaintiff “went to the 

substation and complained to the sheriffs that there was no reason for them stopping O or 

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taking O in.” Id. Plaintiff’s younger brother, “Y”, and his friends had also been stopped 

by San Mateo County Sheriff’s Deputies “on multiple occasions,” and, on one occasion, 

deputies “forced the two friends to be handcuffed and to sit down on the public street for 

questioning,” subsequently releasing one friend and taking the other to the substation. Id.

¶ 22. Plaintiff upon observing this “warrantless and unwarranted seizure complained to 

the deputies that there was no basis or reason for stopping, detaining, or taking the young 

men in.” Id.

Plaintiff’s family home was “in early 2015 the subject of a threatened citation” by

Code Enforcement Officer Patty Camacho. Id. ¶ 16. Camacho said that the County 

“would cite and prosecute her for having older vehicles” in the yard and “for having a 

fence that was higher than 4 feet,” even though other properties in the area “were in 

essentially the same condition.” Id. Plaintiff’s complaints to the deputies regarding the 

treatment of her brothers “immediately pre-dated the 2015 threatened citation and 

prosecution,” and Plaintiff believes that the threats were “at least in part” due to Plaintiff 

exercising her constitutional rights” by commenting on the actions taken by the sheriffs. 

Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.

On August 28, 2015, Defendants “interviewed Plaintiff Rachel Quintana’s longtime partner and alleged complaining witness, Enrique Puluc.” Id. ¶ 25. Puluc’s police 

complaint to Defendants concerned “an event that had happened the prior evening.” Id. 

¶ 26. The FAC alleges that Puluc was a “complaining witness” and was interviewed in 

creating a Felony Report. Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiff’s FAC does not explain what, specifically, 

Puluc’s complaint alleged. See id. It states only that:

Defendants knew when they took this report that Mr. Puluc 

specifically said that Rachel Quintana would say that he, Mr. 

Puluc hit her. Defendants knew when they took this report that 

the event that Mr. Puluc spoke to them about was an event that 

had happened the prior evening. Defendants knew when they 

took this report that Mr. Puluc specifically said that he did not 

want to prosecute any criminal charge against Plaintiff Rachel 

Quintana.

Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff states that “from what [Defendants] had been told by Mr. Puluc, there 

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was no reasonable or viable basis for finding any criminal violation by [Plaintiff].” Id.

¶ 27. Additionally, though the FAC does not so allege, Plaintiff’s Opposition to 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss states that “the complaining witness hit Plaintiff.” Opp. at 

3. 

After receiving Puluc’s complaint, Defendants went to Plaintiff’s home on August 

28 at about 11:00 AM “with the intent to arrest Plaintiff.” FAC ¶¶ 29, 30. Plaintiff alleges 

that a “substantial motivating factor in the Defendants’ intent to arrest Plaintiff was in 

retaliation for the exercise by Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and the Defendants’ 

association of Plaintiff with” her brothers. Id. ¶31. She also alleges that Defendant Otte 

“knew at the time that he arrived [at Plaintiff’s home] that he did not have probable cause 

to arrest Plaintiff, that he had not applied for and would not have been able to obtain a 

warrant to arrest Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 32.

Plaintiff answered the door wearing a shirt and sweatpants. Id. ¶ 42. She alleges it 

was obvious to the Defendants that “she was not armed and did not have with her anything 

that could be used as a weapon.” Id. Plaintiff “did not at any time threaten the 

defendants,” nor did she “flee or attempt to flee.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. Plaintiff was “standing at 

the front door, partially inside the door, with her back turned to the officers, when she was 

suddenly and unexpectedly forcefully grabbed by two officers by her upper arms and 

back.” Id. ¶ 49. She “was violently pulled back and out of the door of her home” and was 

handcuffed. Id. ¶¶ 50, 52. Plaintiff then “fell to the ground, ending up sitting cross 

legged.” Id. ¶ 53. The officers “then acted in concert to forcefully push Plaintiff over,” 

where Defendant Kostielney “pulled her from the other direction” while Defendant 

Velasquez “pushed Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 55. The force of this “unexpected push and pull of 

Plaintiff caused her feet to be jammed against the cement porch floor and her legs and 

knees, particularly and especially her left knee, were unnaturally twisted, causing a sprain 

and stretching of ligaments and cartilage in her left knee.” Id. ¶ 57. 

On February 2, 2016, Plaintiff was charged with violations of California Penal Code 

§ 273.5 (willful infliction of corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant), § 243(e)(1) 

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(battery committed against a spouse), § 243(b) (battery against a peace officer), and 

§ 148(a)(1) (resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer). Id. ¶ 65. A supplemental 

report after the arrest by Defendant Kostielney stated that “no cellular telephones 

possessed any video footage of the incident.” Id. ¶ 72. Plaintiff requested all video and 

audio recordings, but none were provided to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 71. Plaintiff subsequently 

filed a Trombetta motion1 based on the “failure to preserve, destruction of, or withholding 

of a video-recording made by Sergeant Otte via a cellular telephone, as documented in a 

recording captured by Plaintiff’s brother.” Id. ¶ 73. On January 5, 2017, a San Mateo 

Superior Court Judge granted Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the alleged charge of battery on 

a peace officer, finding that “[Otte] misrepresented under oath that he recorded a video.” 

Id. ¶¶ 82, 84. On April 20, 2018, prosecutors then dismissed “the remaining charges 

against Plaintiff” on the basis of the prosecution’s “motion to dismiss for insufficient 

evidence.” Id. ¶ 91.

Plaintiff subsequently brought the present action. Plaintiff asserts four claims: (1) 

retaliatory and false arrest (FAC ¶¶ 101-111); (2) excessive force (FAC ¶¶ 112-121); (3) 

retaliation in prosecution (FAC ¶¶ 122-137); and (4) retaliation (FAC ¶¶ 138-145). While 

retaliatory arrest and false arrest are two distinct claims, Plaintiff combines both into Claim 

I.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must ask whether the 

complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

 

1 The Supreme Court decisions in California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984), and Arizona v. 

Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), established that the police have a duty to preserve evidence that 

may have “exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such 

a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably 

available means.” Rupe v. Borg, 1993 WL 170949, at *1 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Trombetta, 467 

U.S. at 489). Due process is violated if the “police act in bad faith.” Id. (quoting Youngblood, 

488 U.S. at 58). 

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Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). All factual inferences must be drawn 

in favor of the non-moving party. Western Reserve Oil & Gas Co., 765 F.2d at 1430. But 

courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends in Claims I, III, and IV both that her arrest and prosecution were

unlawful and that the Defendants acted in retaliation for commenting on the actions taken 

by unnamed sheriffs. See generally FAC. She further contends in Claim II that the 

Defendants used excessive force in effectuating her arrest. Id. at ¶¶ 112-21. While Claims 

I, III, and IV fail as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, Claim II, is 

sufficiently pled and survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

A. Claim I: Retaliatory and False Arrest

Plaintiff claims that she was arrested in “retaliation for Plaintiff exercising her 

constitutional rights under the First Amendment” for commenting on the actions taken by 

the sheriffs in relation to the arrest of her brother. FAC ¶ 107. She also alleges that her 

arrest was unlawful in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. Id. ¶ 108. Both of these 

claims fail because the facts alleged indicate that Defendants did have probable cause to 

arrest her.

The Supreme Court recently held that to prevail on a claim alleging a violation of 

the First Amendment arising out of a retaliatory arrest, “a plaintiff must establish a ‘causal 

connection’ between the government defendant’s ‘retaliatory animus’ and the plaintiff’s 

‘subsequent injury.’” Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1722 (2019) (quoting Hartman v. 

Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006)). Due to the “complex causal inquiries,” a “plaintiff 

pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for 

the arrest.” Id. at 1724. Thus, when there is “probable cause to arrest [a plaintiff], [a 

plaintiff’s] retaliatory arrest claim fails as a matter of law.” Id. at 1728. The Court 

outlined one exception: “[W]hen a plaintiff presents objective evidence that he was 

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arrested when otherwise similarly situated individuals not engaged in the same sort of 

protected speech had not been.” Id. at 1727. So, too, with false arrest claims: “[P]robable 

cause is an absolute defense to a false-arrest claim.” Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 

984 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff.” 

FAC ¶ 32; Opp. at 10-11. Plaintiff argues that Puluc’s complaint to Defendants 

demonstrated “there was no imminent threat or harm or exigent circumstances.” Opp. at 

10-11. But outside of that conclusory statement in FAC ¶ 32, nowhere does Plaintiff 

support the claim that Defendants did not have probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. See

generally FAC. Nor does Plaintiff’s FAC illustrate why Puluc was not a reliable witness 

and why his report should not have served as the basis for probable cause for Plaintiff’s 

arrest. Mot. at 9. This conclusory statement is insufficient to adequately plead that 

Defendants lacked probable cause. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555) (courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a 

factual allegation.”).

Nor has Plaintiff alleged that, if given leave to amend, she would be able to 

adequately allege that Defendants lacked probable cause to arrest her. See generally Opp. 

Indeed, Plaintiff avers that her “long-time partner,” Puluc, was an “alleged complaining 

witness” against her to the police. FAC ¶¶ 25-27; see also Opp. at 2. On this basis, 

Defendants had reason to believe that Plaintiff committed some crime based on Puluc’s 

complaint. FAC ¶¶ 25, 26; See Maxwell v. Cnty. Of San Diego, 697 F.3d 941, 951 (9th 

Cir. 2012) (“Probable cause exists if the arresting officers ‘had knowledge and reasonably 

trustworthy information of facts and circumstances sufficient to lead a prudent person to 

believe that [the arrestee] had committed or was committing a crime.’” (quoting United 

States v. Ricardo D., 912 F.2d 337, 342 (9th Cir. 1990))); accord Peng v. Mei Chin 

Penghu, 335 F.3d 970, 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “facts sufficiently detailed to 

cause a reasonable person to believe a crime had been committed and the named suspect 

was the perpetrator” support a finding of probable cause). 

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Both because Plaintiff does not sufficiently plead an absence of probable cause, and 

because the FAC in fact alleges that Defendants had probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, 

the Court concludes that further leave to amend is not warranted as to Claim I. Claim I is 

therefore dismissed with prejudice. 

B. Claim II – Excessive Force

Plaintiff next alleges that the Defendants used excessive force in violation of her 

constitutional rights. FAC ¶ 113. Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts demonstrating that 

the force Defendants used to effectuate her arrest was objectively unreasonable. See id. 

¶¶ 42-62. And though Defendants urge that they are entitled to qualified immunity, Mot. 

at 10, Ninth Circuit precedent clearly establishes that the force Plaintiff alleges that 

Defendants used was excessive. See generally Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 

2002). As a result, Defendants’ qualified immunity defense fails. 

As discussed above, the FAC alleges the following: Plaintiff got to the front door 

“wearing a shirt, old sweats, and underwear. She did not have on socks or shoes.” FAC 

¶ 42. Plaintiff avers that it was “obvious to anyone who saw her,” including Defendants, 

that she was “not armed and did not have with her anything that could be used as a 

weapon.” Id. Plaintiff “did not at any time threaten the defendants,” nor did she “flee or 

attempt to flee.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 44. Plaintiff was “standing at the front door, partially inside the 

door, with her back turned to the officers, when she was suddenly and unexpectedly 

forcefully grabbed by two officers by her upper arms and back.” Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff avers

she “was violently pulled back and out of the door of her home” and was handcuffed. Id.

¶¶ 50, 52. Plaintiff then “fell to the ground, ending up sitting cross legged.” Id. ¶ 53. The 

officers “then acted in concert to forcefully push Plaintiff over,” where Defendant 

Kostielney “pulled her from the other direction” while Defendant Velasquez “pushed 

Plaintiff.” Id. ¶ 55. The force of this “unexpected push and pull of Plaintiff caused her 

feet to be jammed against the cement porch floor and her legs and knees, particularly and 

especially her left knee, were unnaturally twisted, causing a sprain and stretching of 

ligaments and cartilage in her left knee.” Id. ¶ 57. 

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1. Reasonableness of Defendants’ Use of Force

Whether a defendant’s use of force was excessive requires asking “whether the 

officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 

confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. 

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (internal quotations omitted). This requires “balancing 

of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests 

against the countervailing government interests at stake.” Id. at 396 (internal quotations 

omitted). Courts may consider a non-exhaustive list of considerations that bear on the 

reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used, colloquially referred to as the 

Graham factors: 

[T]he relationship between the need for the use of force and the 

amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; any 

effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of 

force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat 

reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff 

was actively resisting. 

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 

The “most important factor,” however, is “whether [a plaintiff] posed an immediate threat 

to the safety of officers or others.” Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1032 

(9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied sub nom. City of Newport Beach, Cal. v. Vos, No. 18-672, 

2019 WL 2166407 (U.S. May 20, 2019). Determining whether the use of force was 

objectively reasonable or unreasonable is usually a question for the jury, as a “finding for a 

plaintiff in an excessive force case may unquestionably rest on inferences drawn from 

circumstantial evidence.” Santos, 287 F.3d at 852. Whether or not the evidence in the 

record establishes liability on the part of the defendants “depends on the resolution of 

disputed questions of fact and determinations of credibility, as well as on the drawing of 

inferences, all of which are manifestly the province of a jury.” Id. (quoting United States 

v. Goode, 814 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1987)).

Defendants argue that the use of handcuffs is warranted in inherently dangerous 

settings to minimize the risk of harm to suspects, officers, and innocent third parties, and 

when weighed against “the government’s interest in this case (detaining and arresting a 

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domestic violence suspect), the intrusion alleged by Plaintiff, even assuming the facts as 

pled are true, was objectively reasonable.” Mot. at 11. Defendants urge that the right to 

make an arrest “necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical 

coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Id. (citing Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 99 

(2005)). Defendants therefore argue that Plaintiff does not allege facts that could lead to 

the conclusion that Defendants used a degree of force that “no reasonable officer would 

have believed to be necessary or appropriate.” Mot. at 12. They further argue that the push 

was permissible, citing to an instance where officers who “dragged [plaintiff] off of her 

seat and handcuffed her,” were found not to have used excessive force in violation of the 

plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Rep. at 7-8 (citing Abdel-Shafy v. City of San Jose, 

2019 WL 570759, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2019)). Defendants also cite to a number of 

cases from the Ninth Circuit rejecting excessive force as to conduct such as grabbing a 60-

year-old-woman’s arm and applying physical force to handcuff her, Arpin v. Santa Clara 

Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 921 (9th Cir. 2001), or shoving a suspect to the 

ground and handcuffing him, Bennett v. Gow, 345 F. App’x 286, 287 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Accordingly, they argue Claim II should be dismissed. Id.

Plaintiff responds that she was “compliant, handcuffed, [and] in a cross-legged 

position” when the officers pushed her over. Opp. at 12-13; FAC ¶¶ 53-57. Plaintiff 

argues that none of the factors as articulated in Graham were present to justify the use of 

force. Opp. at 13. Plaintiff urges that the severity of the crime at issue is mitigated by the 

fact that “there was no crime committed,” that Plaintiff was “unarmed” and that Plaintiff 

“was not resisting arrest or fleeing.” Id. As a result, Plaintiff urges that the use of force to 

push Plaintiff over “was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 14.

Plaintiff is correct that she has adequately pled that Defendants’ force was excessive 

in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Santos v. Gates, 287 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2002), 

the Ninth Circuit held that the question whether the force applied by officers, who 

“grabbed” a Plaintiff’s arm and shoulder and “‘guided’ him down to the ground,” was 

“properly for the jury” and reversed summary judgment previously granted for the 

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Defendants. Id. at 849, 856. 

Santos reached that conclusion in light of three Graham factors: 1) “the crime at 

issue was not at all serious.”; 2) “the officers admitted that Santos did not pose a 

significant or immediate safety risk.”; and 3) “there is no evidence that Santos actively 

resisted arrest; under any account of the events he did not struggle with the officers but in 

fact evinced a willingness to submit to their assertions of authority.” Id. at 854. The court 

also considered “the nature of the intrusion,” and found it “quite severe: as a result of 

being taken to the ground, Santos suffered a broken vertebra which caused him both pain 

and immobility.” Id. at 853-54; see also Alexis v. McDonald’s Restaurants of 

Massachusetts, Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 353 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that police officers used 

excessive force when they “abruptly pulled” a plaintiff, “then handcuffed [her] with her 

hands behind her back and dragged and carried to a police cruiser and pushed [her]

inside[.]”).

Taking Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC as true, the force Defendants used was 

unreasonable in context under Santos and Graham. See generally Graham, 490 U.S. 386; 

Santos, 287 F.3d 846. According to the FAC, Plaintiff “did not at any time threaten either 

the defendants or the other officers who were present,” Plaintiff “did not at any time flee or 

attempt to flee,” and “nothing that was said by anyone, and nothing that was done by 

anyone” would lead the Defendants to believe that Plaintiff posed “an immediate threat to 

the safety of officers.” FAC ¶¶ 43-45. Furthermore, the extent of the plaintiff’s injury is 

severe: she suffers from “permanent injury to her left knee.” Id. ¶ 57. Nor does the FAC

indicate there was “any effort made by the [Defendants] to temper or to limit the amount of 

force.” Kingsley, 135 S. Ct. at 2473 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). So, as in Santos, the 

FAC here alleges that Defendants had no reason to believe that Plaintiff was an immediate 

risk to their safety, particularly after she was handcuffed and sitting on the ground, that 

Plaintiff did not resist arrest or “struggle with the officers,” Santos, 287 F.3d at 854, and 

yet she suffered a serious injury: permanent harm to her knee. FAC ¶ 57. A reasonable 

jury, taking these allegations as true, could therefore find that the force Defendants are 

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alleged to have used was objectively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 

2. Qualified Immunity

The foregoing conclusion does not, however, end the inquiry, because Defendants 

argue that the affirmative defense of qualified immunity mandates the dismissal of Claim 

II, even if the force applied was unreasonable. Mot. at 10.

The doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for 

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. 

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). “For a right to be clearly 

established, case law must ordinarily have been earlier developed in such a concrete and 

factually defined context to make it obvious to all reasonable government actors, in the 

defendant’s place, that what he is doing violates federal law.” Shafer v. Cty. of Santa 

Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Shafer v. Padilla, 138 

S. Ct. 2582 (2018). Thus, a Plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under 

similar circumstances. . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” White v. 

Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). And while this does not necessarily “require a case 

directly on point,” “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional 

question beyond debate.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft 

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). Therefore, “Plaintiffs must point to prior case law 

that articulates a constitutional rule specific enough to alert these deputies in this case that 

their particular conduct was unlawful. To achieve that kind of notice, the prior precedent 

must be controlling—from the Ninth Circuit or Supreme Court—or otherwise be embraced 

by a consensus of courts outside the relevant jurisdiction.” Sharp v. Cty. of Orange, 871 

F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). 

Even if an individual’s “use of force was not objectively reasonable,” defendants 

may “nonetheless be entitled to qualified immunity.” Cortesluna v. Leon, 2018 WL 

6727824, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2018). “Use of excessive force is an area of the law in 

which the result depends very much on the facts of each case, and thus police officers are 

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entitled to qualified immunity unless existing precedent squarely governs the specific facts 

at issue.” Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1153 (2018) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). In making this determination, courts consider “the state of the law at the 

time of the alleged violation” as well as the information that the official possessed “to 

determine whether a reasonable official in a particular factual situation should have been 

on notice that his or her conduct was illegal.” Inouye v. Kemna, 504 F.3d 705, 712 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, “the plaintiff bears the burden to 

show that the contours of the right were clearly established.” Clairmont v. Sound Mental 

Health, 632 F.3d 1091, 1109 (9th Cir. 2011).

Of particular note for qualified immunity defenses to excessive force claims, the 

Ninth Circuit has cautioned that whether an officer acted reasonably “nearly always 

requires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and to draw inferences 

therefrom.” Santos, 287 F.3d at 853; Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 701 (9th Cir. 

2005) (“such cases almost always turn on a jury’s credibility determinations”); Liston v. 

County of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 976 n.10 (9th Cir. 1997) (as amended) (“We have held 

repeatedly that the reasonableness of force used is ordinarily a question of fact for the 

jury.”); Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[W]hether a particular use of 

force was reasonable is rarely determinable as a matter of law.”). So, in the context of 

excessive force claims, “[i]f a jury ultimately finds that Santos’s injuries were caused by 

the officers’ use of excessive force, there will in all likelihood be no basis for qualified 

immunity.” Santos, 287 F.3d at 852 n.7.

That is precisely the case here. As discussed, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that 

the officers used unreasonable force in arresting her. See supra at III.B.2. And so, 

[w]hether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity may depend in large part on 

factual determinations the jury will be required to make.” Smith, 394 F.3d at 704. If the 

use of force is found to be excessive, any reasonable officer would know that the force was 

excessive, and that officer would not be entitled to qualified immunity. See id.; LaLonde 

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v. Cty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 961 (9th Cir. 2000).

2 Thus, Defendants are not entitled 

to qualified immunity on Claim II at this time. Defendants motion to dismiss Claim II is 

therefore denied.

C. Claim III – Retaliatory Prosecution

Claim III alleges that the Defendants were a substantial cause of the continued 

prosecution of each of the criminal charges against Plaintiff. FAC ¶ 129. 

To plead a claim of retaliatory prosecution, a plaintiff “must show that the 

nonprosecuting official acted in retaliation, and must also show that he induced the 

prosecutor to bring charges that would not have been initiated without his urging.” 

Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 262 (2006). Furthermore, due to the “complexity of 

causation in a claim that prosecution was induced by an official bent on retaliation,” “an 

absence of probable cause . . . must be pleaded and proven.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265–

66. A plaintiff must therefore demonstrate that the prosecution occurred not only without 

probable cause, but also that the prosecution was “motivated by retaliation against the 

plaintiff's protected speech.” Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2008).

As with Claim I, because Plaintiff does not plead the absence of probable cause for 

her prosecution, and because Plaintiff fails to connect the Defendants to Plaintiff’s past 

speech the prosecution allegedly retaliated against, the Court GRANTS the motion to 

dismiss Claim III with prejudice.

3

 

2

 The case Defendants rely on is not to the contrary. They argue that there is no clearly 

established law stating that “the act of pushing an arrestee violates a Constitutional right,” and cite 

to a Ninth Circuit case that held that “a little shove” or a “push shove” was not unconstitutional. 

Mot. at 10 (quoting Parker v. City of Los Angeles, 726 F. App’x 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2018)). But 

that argument misstates the alleged facts; Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants gave her a 

“little shove;” she alleges that they performed a “violent and unexpected pushing.” FAC ¶ 57.

3

 While the conduct of Defendants in destroying and covering up cell phone evidence is puzzling 

and concerning, it bears little relation to her claim for retaliatory prosecution due to the presence 

of probable cause for her arrest. Plaintiff alleges that the actions and statements of the Defendants 

were “a substantial cause of the prosecution and continued prosecution of each of the charges,” 

and further urges that the prosecution of each of the charges “would not have been pursued but for 

defendants’ destruction of evidence.” FAC ¶¶ 93, 94. Plaintiff, however, does not support this 

averment with any facts. Furthermore, that probable cause for the arrest existed forecloses the 

retaliatory prosecution claim. 

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D. Claim IV – Retaliation

Claim IV alleges retaliation in violation of Plaintiff’s First and Fourth Amendment 

rights. FAC ¶¶ 138-143. Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants retaliated 

against her due to her complaints to unnamed sheriffs, Claim IV fails.

To plead a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [s]he engaged in 

constitutionally protected activity; (2) as a result, [s]he was subjected to adverse action by 

the defendant that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in 

the protected activity; and (3) there was a substantial causal relationship between the 

constitutionally protected activity and the adverse action.” Mulligan v. Nichols, 835 F.3d 

983, 988 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has held that a 

plaintiff “likely could not have maintained a retaliation claim against [an] arresting 

officer,” because the officer appears to have acted in good faith, and because “there is no 

showing that the officer had any knowledge of [plaintiff’s] prior speech or any motive to 

arrest him for his earlier expressive activities.” Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 138 

S. Ct. 1945, 1954 (2018). 

Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants Velasquez and Kostielney stopped and detained 

Plaintiff” for questioning on a frequent and repeated basis between August of 2015 and 

May of 2018 without a reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was then engaged in criminal 

activity.” FAC ¶ 139. Plaintiff alleges they did so to “silence Plaintiff in asserting her 

First Amendment rights to petition for redress of grievances.” Id. ¶ 141. Plaintiff’s 

grievance ultimately arises from her allegation that “the threatened citation and 

prosecution stated by Code Enforcement Officer Camacho” was “at least in part for 

Plaintiff exercising her constitutional rights under the First Amendment to free speech and 

to comment on the actions taken by the sheriffs in performance of their duties performed in 

public.” Id. ¶ 24. The threatened citation occurred immediately after Plaintiff voiced her 

complaints to deputies for detaining her brother and his friends. Id. ¶¶ 16-24. Plaintiff 

further alleges her ultimate arrest, after Puluc’s complaint to the Sheriff, “was in retaliation 

for the exercise by Plaintiff of her constitutional rights and the Defendants’ association of 

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Plaintiff with” her brothers. Id. ¶ 31. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff “failed to plead that her alleged complaint about the 

deputies’ treatment of her brothers’ friends was a substantial or motivating factor for the 

alleged questioning by Defendants.” Mot. at 15. As a result, Defendants argue, Plaintiff 

cannot establish a claim for First Amendment retaliation. Id. Defendants are correct. 

Plaintiff only alleges that Defendants Velasquez and Kostielney made “frequent and 

repeated stops of Plaintiff,” and that a substantial motivating factor in Defendants’ conduct 

“was retaliation for Plaintiff exercising her constitutional rights under the First 

Amendment to free speech and to comment on the actions taken by sheriffs in performance 

of their duties performed in public, retaliation for associating Plaintiff with her older 

brother.” Id. ¶ 107. However, Plaintiff fails to connect the named Defendants with the 

past alleged harassment of her brother. See generally FAC. Plaintiff thus faces precisely 

the same problem that the Supreme Court explained in Lozman: when there “is no showing 

that [Defendants] had any knowledge of [Plaintiff’s] prior speech or any motive to arrest 

[her] for [her] earlier expressive activities,” a retaliation claim likely cannot survive. 138 

S. Ct. at 1954. Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the officers who 

allegedly retaliated against her exercise of free speech did so because she complained 

about the unnamed deputies’ treatment of her brothers. Mot. at 15. Because Plaintiff has 

not indicated that it can remedy this issue with amendment, the Court grants the motion to 

dismiss Claim IV with prejudice.

4

 

4

 Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants “stopped and detained Plaintiff” on a frequent and 

repeated basis between August of 2015 and May of 2018. FAC ¶ 139. Plaintiff cites to Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) to argue that the stops by Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment 

rights. Opp. at 17-18. Defendants argue that the FAC does not allege facts establishing that 

Plaintiff was detained. Rep. at 7. Defendants are correct, as Plaintiff alleges, without factual 

support, that the Defendants actions constituted detentions but fails to explain how or why these 

actions constituted Fourth Amendment violations. See FAC ¶¶ 136-145.

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