Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73131/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73131-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maria Arce Fuentes
Petitioner
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA ARCE FUENTES,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 11-73131

Agency No.

A092-969-907

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 3, 2015*

Pasadena, California

Filed June 10, 2015

Before: Harry Pregerson, Ferdinand F. Fernandez,

and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam Opinion

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied Maria Arce Fuentes’ petition for review

of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision finding that

her conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) qualified as an aggravated

felony because the amount of funds exceeded $10,000 as

required by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D). 

The panel held that the BIA correctly found that the

$10,000 monetary threshold refers to the “specific

circumstances” of a money laundering offense, as opposed to

an element of a generic crime, and that the BIA was thus not

limited to examining the language of the conviction under the

categorical approach but rather properly relied on the presentence report (PSR) to determine whether the threshold

amount was met.

The panel held that an overt act is not an element of a

money laundering conspiracy, and thus to sustain a

conviction under § 1956(h) one need not be proved. The

panel held that the BIA erred in relying on the indictment and

judgment to find that Arce conspired to launder more than

$10,000, but that the error was harmless because the BIA

properly relied on the PSR to find that she conspired to

launder more than that amount. The panel noted that it joined

the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits in concluding that the

BIA’s reliance on a PSR in conducting the circumstance-

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH 3

specific approach does not render a removal proceeding

fundamentally unfair.

COUNSEL

David B. Landry, San Diego, California, for Petitioner.

Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney, Linda S. Wernery,

Assistant Director, Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant

Attorney General, Office of Immigration Litigation, United

States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Maria Arce Fuentes challenges the Board of Immigration

Appeals’ (“BIA”) finding that she was removable on the

ground that she was convicted of an aggravated felony. 

Arce’s conviction for conspiracy to commit money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) qualifies as an

aggravated felony “if the amount of the funds exceeded

$10,000.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D). Following the

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S.

29 (2009), we conclude that the BIA correctly found that the

$10,000 monetary threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D)

refers to the “specific circumstances” of a money laundering

offense as opposed to an element of a generic crime. Thus,

the BIA was not limited to the categorical approach of

examining the language of the statute of conviction, and

instead properly relied on the presentence report (“PSR”) to

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4 ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH

determine whether the $10,000 threshold amount was met. 

We deny the petition for review.

I

Arce, a native and citizen of Mexico, became a lawful

permanent resident on December 1, 1990. In 2006, Arce was

indicted in the United States District Court for the District of

Puerto Rico. Count one charged Arce and 15 other

defendants with conspiracy to commit money laundering, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Arce and her coconspirators allegedly recruited others in a scheme to wire

proceeds of drug sales through Western Union locations

throughout San Juan. The wire transfers were in amounts less

than $10,000 to avoid transaction reporting requirements. 

Count one of the indictment incorporated by reference the

remaining 74 substantive counts of money laundering in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a). Particularly relevant here

are counts 17 through 21 of the indictment, which allege that

Arce, “together with other individuals, known and unknown

to the Grand Jury,” conducted five wire transfers totaling

approximately $25,000.

In 2007, pursuant to a plea agreement, Arce pled guilty to

count one of the indictment, the conspiracy charge, in

exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts against her by

the government. Citing the plea agreement, the PSR states

that the parties “agreed that an eight (8) level increase [in

offense level] is warranted . . . since the defendant laundered

more than $70,000.”

Based on this conviction, the government initiated

removal proceedings on August 14, 2008, alleging

removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) for having

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ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH 5

been convicted of a controlled substance offense, and

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) for having been convicted of an

aggravated felony, as defined in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(D)

and (a)(43)(U). Before the immigration judge (“IJ”), Arce

conceded the controlled substance offense conviction, but

contested the aggravated felony conviction on the ground that

there was no evidence that she laundered funds in excess of

$10,000.

After examining the indictment and the judgment of

conviction, the IJ concluded that Arce conspired to launder

money totaling more than $10,000, and had therefore been

convicted of an aggravated felony. In turn, the IJ found her

statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The BIA

affirmed. Citing Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009), the

BIA found that the $10,000 monetary threshold was a specific

circumstance of a money laundering offense. Relying on the

indictment, the judgment indicating that Arce pled guilty to

count one, and the PSR, the BIA concluded that Arce was

involved in conspiring to launder more than $70,000, and was

therefore an aggravated felon. The BIA also affirmed the IJ’s

determination that Arce was ineligible for cancellation of

removal. This appeal followed.

II

We lack jurisdiction to review a final order of removal

against an alien who is removable based on an aggravated

felony conviction. Barragan-Lopez v. Holder, 705 F.3d

1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C)). 

However, we “retain jurisdiction to determine whether a

particular offense constitutes an aggravated felony.” Id. We

review such “purely legal questions . . . de novo.” Rendon v.

Mukasey, 520 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2008). “Our review is

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confined to the BIA’s decision except to the extent the BIA

incorporated the IJ’s decision.” Li v. Holder, 656 F.3d 898,

900–01 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds,

Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).

III

The term “aggravated felony” is defined in the

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) to include a money

laundering offense “described in section 1956 of Title 18 . . .

or section 1957 of that title . . . if the amount of the funds

exceeded $10,000,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(D), or a

“conspiracy to commit [that] offense,” id. § 1101(a)(43)(U). 

The INA’s monetary threshold amount refers to the specific

circumstances in which a money laundering offense was

committed, rather than a required element of the offense. 

This conclusion is dictated by the Supreme Court’s decision

in Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29 (2009). There, the Court

considered similar language in the same subparagraph of the

INA, which states that an aggravated felony includes “an

offense that . . . involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to

the victim . . . exceeds $10,000.” Id. at 33–40 (discussing

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i)). The Court approved a

“circumstance-specific,” fact-based approach that looks to the

facts underlying the conviction, rather than a “generic” or

“categorical” approach, to determine whether the alien was

convicted of an offense involving loss to the victim exceeding

$10,000. Id. The Court reasoned that the reference to a

$10,000 threshold must refer to a circumstance, rather than an

element of an offense, because the words “in which” suggest

a reference to circumstances of the offense, no “widely

applicable federal fraud statute . . . contains a relevant

monetary loss threshold,” and, at the time of the enactment of

the relevant section of the INA, only eight states had fraud or

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ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH 7

deceit statutes with a $10,000 loss threshold. Id. at 38–40. 

The Court stated, “We do not believe Congress would have

intended [the definition of a crime involving fraud or deceit]

to apply in so limited and so haphazard a manner.” Id. at 40.

Similarly, here, we hold that the INA’s $10,000 threshold

for money laundering offenses refers to a specific

circumstance.1 The statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 1956,

makes no reference to a $10,000 threshold, except in the

context of a requirement for “extraterritorial jurisdiction.” Id.

§ 1956(f). Thus, if the INA’s reference to a $10,000

threshold described an element of a money laundering

offense, then the INA’s entire reference to 18 U.S.C. § 1956

as constituting an aggravated felony would be nonsensical,

because 18 U.S.C. § 1956 contains no monetary threshold as

an element. See Nijhawan, 557 U.S. at 37, 40.

We recognize that 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which appears in the

same clause as § 1956, refers to engaging “in a monetary

transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater

than $10,000.” Even so, a conclusion that the $10,000

threshold for money laundering offenses refers to an element

of a generic offense, based solely on the threshold contained

in § 1957, would essentially read the INA’s reference to

§ 1956 out of the statute, thereby running afoul of the rule

that “a statute should not be construed so as to render any

provision of that statute meaningless or superfluous.” See

Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 506 (2000). We thus conclude

that the BIA correctly relied on the Supreme Court’s

reasoning in Nijhawan to find that the $10,000 threshold

1 Our conclusion is consistent with decisions of the Second and Third

Circuits. Varughese v. Holder, 629 F.3d 272, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2010);

Munez-Morales v. Atty. Gen., 379 F. App’x 210, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2010).

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amount is a specific circumstance of the offense of

conspiracy to commit money laundering.

IV

We now turn to whether the BIA correctly applied the

circumstance-specific approach to find that Arce is an

aggravated felon.

In Nijhawan, the Supreme Court rejected the argument

that an IJ should be limited to the set of documents

permissible in conducting the “modified categorical

approach.” 557 U.S. at 41. Instead, the Court held that the

procedures for determining whether the threshold amount has

been met should be “fundamentally fair,” and should “give an

alien a fair opportunity to dispute a Government claim”

regarding the relevant factual basis of a conviction. Id. The

Government must also meet a “clear and convincing”

standard in proving the specific circumstances of the offense. 

Id. at 42. The Court allowed the immigration court’s use of

“earlier sentencing-related material” including “Petitioner’s

own stipulation” and a restitution order to determine the loss

amount by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 42–43

(noting also that the alien presented no conflicting evidence

suggesting the loss amount was less than $10,000); see also

Kawashima v. Holder, 615 F.3d 1043, 1056 (9th Cir. 2010)

(noting that the “BIA is not limited to only those documents

which a court applying the modified categorical approach

may review,” and remanding to the BIA so that it could

determine, in the first instance, what evidence it may consider

under the Nijhawan standard).

Here, the BIA erred in relying on the indictment and

judgment as support for a finding that Arce conspired to

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launder more than $10,000. The BIA incorrectly considered

counts 17 through 21 of the indictment to support its finding

that Arce conspired to launder more than $10,000. The BIA

mistakenly determined that it could rely on counts 17 through

21 because they were incorporated by reference as overt acts

into count one, to which Arce pled guilty. In United States v.

Cazares, we reaffirmed that “allegations not necessary to be

proved for a conviction . . . are not admitted by a plea.” 

121 F.3d 1241, 1247 (9th Cir. 1997). In Cazares, one of the

conspirators pled guilty to a count in an indictment charging

drug conspiracy and alleging overt acts including possession

of a gun. Id. at 1246. The government argued that the

defendant’s guilty plea to an indictment that alleged gun

possession as an overt act was sufficient to prove by a

prepondera§§nce of the evidence that the defendant had

possessed a gun and was thus subject to a two-level increase

in the offense level under the Guidelines. Id. However, a

guilty plea only “admits the facts constituting the elements of

the charge.” Id. And committing an overt act is not an

element of conspiracy under the drug conspiracy statute. Id.

(citing United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1994)). 

Thus, proof of an overt act is not required for a conviction

under the drug conspiracy statute. Id. Therefore, the district

court’s reliance on the overt act alleged in the indictment to

enhance the defendant’s sentence was improper because

“allegations not necessary to be proved for a conviction—in

this case the overt acts—are not admitted by a plea.” Id. at

1247.

Arce’s conspiracy statute of conviction similarly does not

require proof of an overt act. See Whitfield v. United States,

543 U.S. 209, 214 (2005) (“Because the text of § 1956(h)

does not expressly make the commission of an overt act an

element of the conspiracy offense, the Government need not

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prove an overt act to obtain a conviction.”). Since an overt

act is not an element of a money laundering conspiracy, the

same analysis in Cazares applies here. Thus, to sustain a

conviction under § 1956(h), an overt act need not be proved,

and overt acts alleged in a money laundering conspiracy

indictment are “not admitted by a plea.” Cazares, 121 F.3d

at 1247. For this reason, the BIA erred in using the overt acts

alleged in count one through the incorporation by reference

of counts 17 through 21 of the indictment to find that Arce

had necessarily conspired to launder more than $10,000. The

BIA’s reliance on these counts incorporated by reference was

not fundamentally fair and does not establish by clear and

convincing evidence, as required under Nijhawan to prove

specific circumstances, that Arce conspired to launder more

than $10,000.

This error was harmless, however, because the BIA

permissibly relied on the PSR to find, by clear and

convincing evidence, that Arce conspired to launder more

than $10,000, and is therefore an aggravated felon. See

Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972–74 (9th Cir. 2001)

(explaining that the relevant inquiry for (a)(43)(D) is the total

amount of funds laundered by the petitioner, as opposed to

the loss to a victim). First, it is undisputed that Arce pled

guilty to count one of the indictment, which charges a

conspiracy to commit money laundering. Second, the PSR

states that the plea agreement stipulated to an amount of

funds laundered of “more than $70,000.” Arce presented no

evidence contradicting the accuracy of these documents.

Arce challenges the BIA’s reliance on the PSR in

determining whether petitioner was convicted of an

aggravated felony. However, an IJ conducting the

circumstance-specific approach is not restricted to documents

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ARCE FUENTES V. LYNCH 11

used for the modified categorical approach. See Kawashima,

615 F.3d at 1056. And the Supreme Court’s approving

reference in Nijhawan to the immigration court’s reliance on

“sentencing-related material,” 557 U.S. at 42, strongly

suggests that consideration of a PSR is appropriate. We

therefore join the Second, Third, and Tenth Circuits in

concluding that the BIA’s reliance on a PSR in conducting

the circumstance-specific approach does not render a removal

proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Polanco De Los

Angeles v. Holder, 543 F. App’x 26, 28 (2d Cir. 2013)

(holding that PSR is admissible in conducting circumstancespecific approach); Kaplun v. Atty. Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 266

(3d Cir. 2010) (same); Hamilton v. Holder, 584 F.3d 1284,

1287–88 (10th Cir. 2009) (same).

V

The BIA did not err in concluding that the specific

circumstances of Arce’s conviction met the monetary

threshold of $10,000 or more, and she is therefore an

aggravated felon. It follows that the BIA also correctly found

her ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(a)(3). Finding no legal error, we lack jurisdiction to

review the BIA’s decision any further.

PETITION DENIED.

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