Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03179/USCOURTS-caDC-05-03179-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lorenzo Pickett
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 2006 Decided February 13, 2007

No. 05-3179

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LORENZO PICKETT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00181-01)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Valinda Jones, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W.

McLeese, III and Rachel Carlson Lieber, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

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1

 Pickett also contended, as he does on appeal, that Congress

engaged in unconstitutional discrimination in passing the

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Under one of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines it takes 100 times more powder

cocaine to get a drug trafficker the same sentence he would

receive for dealing crack cocaine. The issue in this appeal is

whether a judge considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) may ignore how the 100-to-1 ratio affects those

factors in crack cocaine cases.

I.

In 2002, Lorenzo Pickett pled guilty to distributing more

than five grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii). Pickett agreed that for sentencing

purposes he was accountable for more than fifty grams but less

than 150 grams of crack. Using the Guidelines, the district court

calculated Pickett’s sentencing range as 140 to 175 months, and

sentenced him to 158 months. On Pickett’s appeal, the

government conceded that his criminal history score should have

been reduced by three points. Both parties agreed that the

correct Guidelines range after this adjustment was 121 to 151

months.

We remanded the case. Before resentencing, the

Supreme Court decided United States v. Booker. The parties

filed new sentencing memoranda. Pickett argued that the district

court should impose a sentence below the Guidelines range,

taking into account the unwarranted disparity between Guideline

sentences based on the weight of crack as opposed to powder

cocaine.1

 The district court declined to rule on the issue because

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“Disapproval Act,” Pub. L. No. 104-38, § 1, 109 Stat. 334 (Oct. 30,

1995), which rejected the Sentencing Commission’s proposed

amendment to eliminate the crack/powder cocaine disparity. His

arguments are similar to those the defendant made in United States v.

Johnson, 40 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and we reject them again.

Now, as then, “scattered pieces of legislative history are quite

inadequate to serve to attribute a discriminatory purpose to the

Congress.” Id. at 440. Just as Congress had race-neutral reasons for

adopting a 100-to-1 ratio in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L.

No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207, see Johnson, 40 F.3d at 441, it had raceneutral reasons for declining to adopt the 1-to-1 ratio the Sentencing

Commission proposed. 

it “has been decided by at least one, and maybe more than one

of my colleagues on the bench. . . . So therefore, that issue is

going up to the Court of Appeals. And I am not prepared to

decide it at this time.” The court sentenced Pickett to 121

months, the bottom of the Guidelines range. 

II.

A.

Before the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.

98-473, 98 Stat. 1987, criminal penalties typically were

indeterminate – for instance, five years to life, or not more than

twenty years. Within the statutory range, federal judges had

discretion to impose whatever term of imprisonment they saw

fit. Their judgment could be based on the personal

characteristics of the defendant, the nature of the crime, the need

to deter others, their sentencing philosophy, and so forth. No

rule of law required a sentencing judge to give reasons for a

sentence, and appellate review was not available. The time a

defendant actually served depended only partly on the sentence.

With the United States Parole Commission determining release

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dates, the typical defendant served only fifty-eight percent of the

sentence imposed. U.S.SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS

OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING xviii (Nov. 2004) (“2004 Report”).

“The first and foremost goal of the sentencing reform

effort was to alleviate the perceived problem of federal criminal

sentencing disparity. . . . Evidence that similar offenders

convicted of similar offenses received, at times, grossly

dissimilar criminal punishment struck a critical nerve among

key legislators.” Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal

Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United States Sentencing

Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 295 (1993). To

eliminate these disparities and to accomplish the other

objectives of sentencing, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984

charged the Sentencing Commission with the task of

promulgating guidelines federal judges would be required to

apply. 

In formulating its first set of guidelines, “the

Commission decided to base guideline ranges on the existing

average time served,” as revealed in a study the Commission

conducted. 2004 Report at 47. The Commission had begun

work on a guideline for drug trafficking offenses when Congress

passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570,

100 Stat. 3207, of which 21 U.S.C. § 841 was a part. In § 841,

Congress specified mandatory minimum sentences for a wide

range of drug trafficking offenses, each triggered by the weight

of the “mixture or substance containing a detectable amount” of

the particular drug. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). 

The 1986 Act created a problem for the Commission. As

is well understood, mandatory minimum sentencing statutes are

inconsistent with the objectives of the Guidelines to provide “a

substantial degree of individualization in determining the

appropriate sentencing range” and to impose “graduated,

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proportional increases in sentence severity for additional

misconduct or prior convictions.” U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,

MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL

JUSTICE SYSTEM 25 (Aug. 1991). “The application of lengthy

penalties to all persons based solely on whether they fit the

statute-defined criteria (drug type and amount) results in a

problem that is common to all mandatory minimum statutes –

unwarranted uniformity.” U.S.SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE

AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 166-68 (Feb. 1995) (“1995

Report”); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal

Sentencing Process: The Problem is Uniformity, Not Disparity,

29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 847-48 (1992). Whether in passing

the 1986 Act Congress considered these problems, and others,

is unknown and unknowable. In the Commission’s view, the

purpose of the Act was “to establish a two-tiered penalty

structure for most drugs,” with a five-year mandatory minimum

for managers of retail trade and a ten-year minimum for heads

of organizations and wholesalers. 2004 Report at 48; 1995

Report at 118. 

The drug trafficking guideline the Commission

ultimately promulgated did not follow this two-tiered approach.

Instead, it extended the § 841 drug “quantity-based approach

across 17 different levels [of quantity] falling below, between,

and above the two amounts specified” in the statute as triggers

for mandatory minimum sentences. 2004 Report at 49. For

example, defendants receive a base offense level of thirty-two

for dealing at least 1,000 but less than 3,000 grams of heroin, or

at least 500 grams but less than 1,500 grams of

methamphetamine, or at least 5,000 but less than 15,000 grams

of powder cocaine, or – as in Pickett’s case – at least fifty but

less than 150 grams of crack cocaine. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4)

(Drug Quantity Table). Put another way, for purposes of

sentencing, 1,000 grams of heroin equals fifty grams of crack

cocaine equals 5,000 grams of powder cocaine. 

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2

 In 1995 the average retail price for five grams of crack,

which yielded ten to fifty doses, was in the range of $225 to $750; the

average retail price for 500 grams of powder cocaine, which yielded

2,500 to 5,000 doses, was in the range of $32,500-$50,000. 1995

Report at 175.

At the time it issued this Guideline the Commission did

not explain why it decided to extend the 1986 Act’s “quantitybased approach in this way.” 2004 Report at 49. But it soon

became clear that with respect to cocaine, the Guideline’s use of

the 100-to-1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine raised

significant problems. See id. at 50. As a result of the Guideline,

“the sentencing guideline range (based solely on drug quantity)

is three to over six times longer for crack cocaine offenders than

powder cocaine offenders with equivalent drug quantities,

depending on the exact quantity of the drug involved.” U.S.

SENTENCING COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING

POLICY 11 (May 2002) (“2002 Report”). With respect to all

drug trafficking offenses, the emphasis on drug quantity

distorted the importance of that element as compared with other

offense characteristics. 2004 Report at 50. With respect to

cocaine, the Commission concluded that although powder

cocaine, which is usually snorted, was less addictive than crack

cocaine, which is smoked, see United States v. Brisbane, 367

F.3d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2004), this difference could not account

for the 100-to-1 ratio. All forms of cocaine are addictive. The

“current penalty structure – which yields a five-year mandatory

minimum sentence for ten to fifty doses of crack cocaine

compared to 2,500 to 5,000 doses of powder cocaine – greatly

overstates the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine.”2

 2002

Report at 93.

For these and other reasons we will mention later, the

Commission issued a report in 1995 criticizing the ratio. Later

that year the Commission proposed to Congress an amendment

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to the Guidelines eliminating the differential treatment of crack

and powder cocaine. See 60 Fed. Reg. 25,074 (May 10, 1995).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), Congress rejected the

Commission’s proposal and directed it to study the matter

further. See Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (Oct. 30, 1995).

The Commission did so and sent another report to Congress in

1997, this time recommending an amendment to the mandatory

minimum statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841: “the current 500-gram

trigger for the five-year mandatory minimum sentence [for

powder cocaine] should be reduced to a level between 125 and

375 grams, and for crack cocaine, the five-gram trigger should

be increased to between 25 and 75 grams.” U.S. SENTENCING

COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 9 (Apr.

1997). Congress did not amend § 841 in response. In 2002 the

Commission issued an even more extensive report setting forth

in detail the defects in the current system for sentencing cocaine

trafficking offenders and recommending an amendment to § 841

incorporating a 20-to-1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine.

2002 Report at A1-A10. Again Congress did not act on the

recommendation. The Commission’s 2004 report on fifteen

years of sentencing under the Guidelines also advocated altering

the 100-to-1 ratio, see 2004 Report at 132, but Congress took no

action.

B. 

If matters stood as they were in 2004, we would have no

choice but to reject Pickett’s claim. We held in United States v.

Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1996) – over Judge Wald’s

dissent – that the problems caused by the 100-to-1 ratio did not

justify a sentencing judge in departing from the Guidelines. The

Guidelines were then mandatory and the Sentencing

Commission’s criticism of its own product in its 1995 report to

Congress did not render the Guidelines any less so. 

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In light of Booker, Anderson is no longer controlling.

On the merits, a 5-4 majority in Booker held that the Guidelines

violated the Sixth Amendment because they required judges to

make factual findings that had the effect of lengthening

sentences beyond what the jury-found facts would support. 543

U.S. at 244. As a remedy for this constitutional violation, a

different 5-4 majority gave sentencing judges even more

discretion. Before Booker, judges made factual findings and

were required to adhere to the Guidelines in determining

sentences; after Booker, judges continue to make findings but

must treat the Guidelines as “effectively advisory.” Id. at 245;

see Cunningham v. California, No. 05-6551, 2007 WL 135687

(U.S. Jan. 22, 2007); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess,

83 DENVER U. L. REV. 665, 677 (2006).

If we looked only to the Booker merits opinion, Pickett

would have no case. The merits majority held that defendants

in his situation have not suffered a Sixth Amendment violation.

In his plea agreement, Pickett admitted possessing with intent to

distribute more than fifty grams but less than 150 grams of crack

cocaine. Under the Guidelines, his base offense level was

therefore thirty-two. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). From this and

in light of his criminal history and acceptance of responsibility,

the district court calculated his Guideline range and sentenced

him at the bottom end of the range. A defendant like Pickett,

who admits each fact needed to support his sentence, has not

been deprived of his right to a jury trial. See Booker, 543 U.S.

at 244. As the Court put it in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.

296, 310 (2004), if “a defendant pleads guilty, the State is free

to seek judicial sentence enhancements so long as the defendant

. . . stipulates to the relevant facts,” which is what Pickett did.

Even though Pickett suffered no loss of a constitutional

right, Booker gave him a remedy. The Court’s remedial opinion

required the district court to treat the Guidelines as advisory

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3

 At the end of the Booker remedial opinion, the Court stated

that “in cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation, whether

resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be sufficient to

review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon application of

the harmless-error doctrine.” 543 U.S. at 268. 

4

 With the possible exception of § 3553(a)(2)(C) & (D), the

broadly stated purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a)(2) are not

confined to any particular defendant’s situation. The Commission in

fact took those § 3553(a)(2) purposes into account in formulating the

Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A, intro. cmt.; U.S. SENTENCING

COMM’N, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE REDRAFTING OF THE

PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES (Dec. 1986) (“The Guidelines seek to

insure that all sentences imposed will fulfill the purposes of

only and as simply one factor to be considered in sentencing.

Our role under Booker is to determine whether the sentence the

court ordered was “unreasonable.” 543 U.S. at 261. We have

held that a sentence resting on a legal error is unreasonable, if

the error was not harmless.3 See United States v. Price, 409 F.3d

436, 442 (D.C. Cir. 2005). The question in this appeal is

therefore whether the district court committed a legal error when

it declined to consider the 100-to-1 ratio perpetuated in § 2D1.1

of the Guidelines and the problems it raises in sentencing crack

cocaine dealers like Pickett. 

Under Booker, a sentencing court in any one case will be

considering many of the same factors the Sentencing

Commission took into account in formulating the Guidelines for

all cases. For instance, when the Commission promulgated the

Guidelines it had to “meet” the broad sentencing purposes set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(A),

994(g). Under Booker, district courts must also “take account

of” the same purposes, 543 U.S. at 259, which the Court has

described as “broad” and “open-ended,” Koon v. United States,

518 U.S. 81, 108 (1996).4 One, but only one, of the factors

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sentencing mandated by Congress.”), reprinted in Stephen Breyer, The

Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon

Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L.REV. 1, 47 (1988). The Commission

took the § 3553(a)(2) factors into account because the Sentencing

Reform Act required it to do so. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991(b)(1)(A),

994(g). But see United States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 355-56 (2d

Cir. 2006). 

sentencing courts must also consider is the sentencing range

under the Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(A). After Booker,

543 U.S. at 254, a court is “no longer . . . tied to the sentencing

range indicated in the Guidelines,” Cunningham, 2007 WL

135687, at *10. The relevant factors in § 3553(a) are:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed – 

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for

the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the

defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational

or vocational training, medical care, or other

correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

(3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range

established for– 

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by

the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the

guidelines– 

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant

to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, United States

Code, subject to any amendments made to such

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guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of

whether such amendments have yet to be

incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into

amendments issued under section 994(p) of title

28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are

in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised

release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements

issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking

into account any amendments made to such guidelines

or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of

whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated

by the Sentencing Commission into amendments

issued under section 994(p) of title 28);

(5) any pertinent policy statement– 

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to

section 994(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code,

subject to any amendments made to such policy

statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether

such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the

Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under

section 994(p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in

effect on the date the defendant is sentenced.

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been

found guilty of similar conduct; and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the

offense. 

While Booker and § 3553(a) instruct sentencing courts

to consider all these “multiple and vague” factors, United States

v. Johnson, 471 F.3d 764, 764 (7th Cir. 2006), neither the

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5 See United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir.

2006); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Mykytiuk,

415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d

716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Rita, 177 F. App’x

357 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006)

(No. 06-5754); United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir.

2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-

5618).

Supreme Court nor the statute assigns any weight or ranking to

the factors. So how is a court to determine how much influence

the factor we are concerned with – the advisory-only Guideline

range – should have in sentencing a particular defendant? One

might answer that the Guideline range should be considered

presumptively reasonable. But that would be to confuse the

standard this court and several others have adopted for appellate

review5 with the standard to be applied by the sentencing court.

A sentencing judge cannot simply presume that a Guidelines

sentence is the correct sentence. To do so would be to take a

large step in the direction of returning to the pre-Booker regime.

See United States v. Demaree, 459 F.3d 791, 794-95 (7th Cir.

2006); United States v. Brown, 450 F.3d 76, 81-82 (1st Cir.

2006); United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676 (7th Cir.

2005). Another approach, the correct one in our view, is to

evaluate how well the applicable Guideline effectuates the

purposes of sentencing enumerated in § 3553(a). 

When it comes to the application of Guideline § 2D1.1

in crack cocaine cases, the Commission is one of its severest

critics. For more than a dozen years, it has strongly

recommended against retaining the 100-to-1 ratio. In its 2002

Report the Commission put the matter bluntly: “the Commission

firmly and unanimously believes that the current federal cocaine

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sentencing policy is unjustified and fails to meet the sentencing

objectives” in § 3553(a). 2002 Report at 91. The reasons are

several. For one thing, “[c]rack’s unique distribution pattern, in

combination with the 100-to-1 quantity ratio, can lead to

anomalous results in which retail crack dealers get longer

sentences than the wholesale drug distributors who supply them

the powder cocaine from which their crack is produced.” 1995

Report at 174. Although crack is more addictive than powder

cocaine, the 100-to-1 ratio “greatly overstates the relative

harmfulness of crack cocaine.” 2002 Report at 93. Also, the

“fact that a significant proportion of federal crack cocaine

offenders are responsible for relatively small drug quantities is

troublesome because they receive especially disparate penalties

in comparison to similar powder cocaine offenders.” Id. at 98.

The disparities are not only between crack and powder

cocaine dealers. In the Commission’s opinion § 2D1.1 of the

Guidelines is also a failure in distinguishing among crack

offenders. The Guideline treats “all crack cocaine offenders as

if they committed [harmful conduct such as violence], even

though most crack cocaine offenders in fact had not.” Id. at vii.

In addition to serving “no clear purpose,” § 2D1.1’s use of the

100-to-1 ratio and its quantity-based approach threatens “public

confidence in the federal courts” because it has had a

disproportionate impact on African-American offenders, who in

2002 made up eighty-one percent of those sentenced for

trafficking crack. 2004 Report at 131, 135. Although the

Guidelines were meant to promote uniformity in sentencing, not

to increase the length of sentences, § 2D1.1 also “had the effect

of increasing prison terms far above what had been typical in

past practice . . ..” Id. at 49.

In terms of the sentencing factors of § 3553(a), the

Commission thus believes that its Guideline for crack

distributors generates sentences that are “greater than necessary,”

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exaggerates “the seriousness of the offense” of crack trafficking,

does not “promote respect for the law,” and does not “provide

just punishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(2)(A).

The Commission’s self-assessment does not rest on the

particulars of any one offender. The sentencing factors just

mentioned, as well as § 3553(a)(2)(B), which deals with

deterrence in general, and § 3553(a)(6), which deals with

“unwarranted sentence disparities,” are not entirely confined to

the individual characteristics of the particular defendant. See

United States v. Simpson, 430 F. 3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

It therefore seems to us beyond doubt that the district court erred

in refusing to evaluate whether sentencing Pickett in accordance

with Guideline § 2D1.1, and its 100-to-1 ratio, would effectuate

the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a). 

The government has a counter-argument. It is this:

§ 2D1.1 of the Guidelines is required by 18 U.S.C. § 841(b), the

provision setting the mandatory minimum sentences for crack

and powder cocaine (and many other illicit drugs). Actually, we

put the argument too strongly. The government’s position is

more subtle than a direct assertion that Congress required the

Commission to formulate the Guideline as it did. The

government tells us first that allowing district courts to examine

or consider or take into account the untoward results of the 100-

to-1 ratio in the Guideline would frustrate “the will of Congress.”

Br. for Appellee 35. Second, whatever the Commission may

believe, Congress has not approved the Commission’s views. Id.

at 36-37. Third, the Guideline “reflect[s] a congressional policy

choice that trafficking in crack cocaine should be punished more

severely than trafficking in powder cocaine.” Id. at 37. And

fourth, judges have no business making “policy choice[s],”

which are for the legislature. Id. at 39.

We will take up each of these points in the same order.

As to frustrating the will of Congress, the Sentencing

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6

 One cannot treat the Guideline as a manifestation of

congressional intent merely because the 1987 Congress did not object

to it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p). Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,

975 n.11 (1983); North Haven Bd. of Educ., 456 U.S. 512, 533-34

(1982). Congress did take such action when it rejected the

Commission’s proposed Guideline amendment in 1995 to reflect a 1-

to-1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine. See § 1, 109 Stat. at

334. But in doing so Congress directed the Commission to “propose

Commission does not believe that and neither do we. In the case

of a crack dealer who pleads guilty to distributing more than fifty

grams of crack, Congress’s will is that his sentence should be

between ten years’ and life imprisonment. 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Congress has set statutory minimums and

maximums. As to where within that range a particular

defendant’s sentence should fall, § 841(b) is silent. Over the

years, the Commission itself has recognized that it was unclear

what Congress intended with respect to sentencing within the

ranges set in § 841(b). See, e.g., 2004 Report at 49; 2002 Report

at 90. It may be logical to suppose that, given the structure of

§ 841, the greater the weight of the mixture containing the drug,

the greater the sentence should be. But at least with respect to

cocaine offenses, that approach entails the adverse consequences

mentioned above. Other approaches were possible, such as

having the sentence depend on whether the dealer was a retailer

or wholesaler.

The government is right that Congress has not approved

the Commission’s reports on the problems caused by using the

100-to-1 ratio in the Guideline. But we do not understand why

this matters. As far as the intent of Congress is concerned, it is

the intent of the 1986 Congress, which enacted the mandatory

minimums for crack and powder cocaine, that controls. The

intent of later Congresses that failed to act on Commission

recommendations is of no moment.6

 But it remains of great

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revision of the drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine to powder

cocaine.” Id. § 2(a)(2), 109 Stat. at 334.

importance that, in its recommendations, the Commission

candidly and forthrightly exposed the weaknesses and failings of

its Guideline with respect to crack cocaine sentencing.

True enough, the mandatory minimums reflect a

congressional policy choice that crack cocaine offenses should

be punished more severely than powder cocaine offenses

involving the same weight of drugs. But this entirely evades the

question. How much more severely? That point, made in each

of the Commission’s reports we have cited, is the critical

consideration about which Congress has had nothing to say,

except what the minimum and maximum punishment will be.

Judges have no business making “policy” choices, so the

government tells us. What is the “policy” choice the government

has in mind? It cites cases in which courts of appeals have

rejected attempts by district judges to adopt and apply a ratio

different from the current 100-to-1. See, e.g., United States v.

Spears, 469 F.3d 1166, 1178 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United

States v. Pope, 461 F.3d 1331, 1335-37 (11th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Castillo, 460 F.3d 337, 357-60 (2d Cir. 2006); United

States v. Jointer, 457 F.3d 682, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Eura, 440 F.3d 625, 633-34 (4th Cir. 2006); United

States v. Pho, 433 F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2006). But we do not

have such a case before us. Instead we have a case in which a

district judge refused to consider the problems that arise from

applying the Guideline in crack cases. In that respect our case is

very close to United States v. Gunter, which held that the

Guideline with respect to crack cocaine is not mandatory and that

a sentencing court “errs when it believes that it has no discretion

to consider the crack/powder differential incorporated in the

USCA Case #05-3179 Document #1022741 Filed: 02/13/2007 Page 16 of 20
17

Guidelines – but not demanded by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) . . ..” 462

F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2006).

The government also argues that if district judges have

discretion to vary from the Guidelines range in crack cases, the

result may be “unwarranted sentence disparities among

defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

similar conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). That sentences after

Booker will not be as uniform as sentences before Booker is

doubtless true, but this is a consequence of the Supreme Court’s

decision to treat the Guidelines as advisory rather than

mandatory. As we have mentioned, the Commission concluded

that disparities existed before Booker – disparities between

powder and crack traffickers and among crack dealers. The

Supreme Court’s giving district courts discretion may or may not

ameliorate those disparities and may or may not create new ones.

Whether these would be “unwarranted” disparities we cannot say

at this point. It is enough that under Booker and § 3553(a), the

district court erred in Pickett’s case. His sentence therefore must

be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent

with this opinion.

So ordered.

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1

 United States Sentencing Commission, Special Report to the

Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (1995).

2

 Special Report at xii-xiii, xiv.

3

 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to Congress:

Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Guidelines at v-ix (2002); United

States Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines

Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal Justice

System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform at xv-xvi, 113-

114, 131-132, 141 (2004). 

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: It has taken many

years, but the court finally has concluded that it is

authorized to hold, and does hold, that a district court, in

sentencing a defendant, may properly take into account the

fact that the 100-to-1 ratio embedded in the Sentencing

Guidelines for crack-to-powdered cocaine offenses bears

no meaningful relationship to a defendant’s culpability. 

As early as 1995, the Sentencing Commission issued

a Special Report stating that the ratio was unfair and

produced extreme sentencing anomalies, thereby failing to

accomplish the purposes set forth in the Sentencing

Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).1

 In 1996, when the

Guidelines were mandatory, Judge Wald explained why

the 100-to-1 ratio, which the Commission itself had

identified as a source of unfairness and unnecessarily high

sentences under § 3553(a),2

 established grounds for a

departure from the crack/cocaine Guideline. United States

v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436, 445-50 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Wald,

J., dissenting). The Sentencing Commission continued to

document the unfairness and irrationality of the ratio in its

2002 and 2004 reports, repeating that the crack/cocaine

Guideline does not adequately reflect the relative

culpability of crack offenders.3

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2

4

 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 264-65; Fifteen Years at iv-v. 

Absent en banc review, Anderson remained binding on

panels of this court. See LaShawn v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). In Booker v. United States,

543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005), however, the Supreme Court

held that the mandatory Guidelines violated a defendant’s

rights under the Sixth Amendment and that, as a remedy,

the Guidelines scheme could be treated as advisory only.

In the wake of Booker, the court today holds that under an

advisory Guidelines scheme, a district court, in sentencing

a defendant, may take into account when considering the

sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that the 100-to-1

ratio in § 2D1.1 bears no meaningful relationship to a

defendant’s culpability. The plain text of § 3553(a)

presents no bar to a district court’s consideration of the

problems with the ratio that applies to all crack offenders,

see Op. at 9 n.4, and were the court to reach any other

conclusion it would frustrate the overarching purpose of a

sentencing scheme to impose just punishments reflecting

the seriousness of an offense and be contrary to the

sentencing factors that Congress established in

§ 3553(a)(2).4

 

As to Pickett’s challenge to the ratio on equal

protection grounds, this court has previously rejected it.

See United States v. Holton, 116 F.3d 1536, 1548 (D.C. Cir.

1997); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 440 (D.C.

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1041 (1996). Absent en

banc review, the court is bound by its precedent. See

LaShawn, 87 F.3d at 1395. 

Accordingly, for these reasons, I concur in holding that

the district court erred when, in sentencing Pickett, it

declined to consider the problems that arise in applying the

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3

100-to-1 ratio in Guideline § 2D1.1 to crack cases under

the advisory Guidelines scheme, and that his sentence must

be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for

resentencing. 

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