Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01530/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01530-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.
Petitioner
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 17, 2002 Decided July 23, 2002

No. 00-1530

A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,

Petitioner

v.

Secretary of Labor,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Sally J. Scott argued the cause for petitioner. With her on

the briefs was Robert E. Mann.

Scott Glabman, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Bruce F.

Justh, Counsel.

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Before: Edwards, Henderson, and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: A.E. Staley Manufacturing Company petitions for review of a final order of the Occupational

Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC). The Commission found that Staley committed 89 willful violations of 29

C.F.R. s 1910.307(b) (the "hazardous locations standard"),

which mandates that electrical equipment in hazardous locations be approved for use in such locations. OSHRC also

concluded that Staley committed two willful violations of 29

C.F.R. s 1910.1200(h) (the "hazard communication standard"), which requires employers to provide employees with

effective information and training regarding hazardous chemicals in their work areas. Staley does not dispute that it

committed the violations, but contends that the Commission

erred in deeming them willful. Finding no error, we deny the

petition for review.

I

Staley is a corn refiner that produces corn starch, corn oil,

fructose, and dextrose at a number of facilities. This case

concerns Staley's Decatur, Illinois plant. In 1990, the plant

included over 130 buildings and had approximately 833 hourly

employees. In July of that year, the Occupational Safety and

Health Administration (OSHA)1 began an inspection of the

__________

1 As the Supreme Court has explained, the OSH Act "assigns

distinct regulatory tasks to two different administrative actors":

the Secretary of Labor and OSHRC. Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S.

144, 147 (1991). The Secretary, who has delegated certain statutory duties to OSHA, is responsible for setting and enforcing workplace health and safety standards. If the Secretary determines

that an employer is not complying with a standard, she is authorized to issue a citation and assess a penalty. 29 U.S.C. ss 658,

659. OSHRC is responsible for "carrying out adjudicatory functions" under the Act. Id. s 651(b)(3). If an employer contests a

citation, an ALJ appointed by the Commission makes an initial

decision, which becomes a final order of the Commission unless it

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plant, prompted by a May 1990 accident in which an employee

was fatally asphyxiated. As a result of the inspection, the

Secretary of Labor, acting through OSHA, issued two sets of

citations alleging hundreds of violations of the Occupational

Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act"), 29 U.S.C. ss 651-678.

One set of citations alleged violations of safety standards,

including the hazardous locations standard, 29 C.F.R.

s 1910.307(b). The other set charged violations of health

standards, including the hazard communication standard, id.

s 1910.1200(h), and the asbestos standard, id.

s 1910.1001(j)(2), (k)(1).

Partial settlements led to the withdrawal of all citations for

non-willful violations. Staley contested the remaining 177

safety and four health citations, and the Commission assigned

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to hear the case. The

ALJ upheld 171 of the safety citations and all four of the

health citations. However, he concluded that only 87 of the

safety violations (all for hazardous locations) and two of the

health violations (both for asbestos) were willful. He found

the remaining violations, including the two violations of the

hazard communication standard, to be serious but not willful.2

Both parties appealed the ALJ's decision to OSHRC.

The Commission affirmed all of the ALJ's findings of

violations, as well as all of his findings of willfulness. In

addition, it upgraded several violations from serious to willful,

including two further hazardous locations violations (making a

total of 89) and the two hazard communication violations

(which it grouped as one for penalty purposes). In finding

willfulness, the Commission relied on evidence that previous

__________

grants discretionary review. Id. s 661(j). Both employers and the

Secretary may seek review of Commission orders in the courts of

appeals. Id. s 660(a), (b).

2 An employer guilty of a "serious" violation of a health or

safety standard "shall be assessed a civil penalty of up to $7,000 for

each such violation." 29 U.S.C. s 666(b). An employer who "willfully or repeatedly" violates such a standard, however, "may be

assessed a civil penalty of not more than $70,000 for each violation,

but not less than $5,000 for each willful violation." Id. s 666(a).

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dust explosions, internal audits, and a survey by the National

Institute for Occupational Safety and Health had put Staley

on notice of serious safety and health problems, including the

location of non-approved electrical equipment in the vicinity

of combustible dust and a lack of employee training concerning dangerous chemicals. The Commission concluded that

Staley's continued failure to take corrective action in the face

of these widespread problems supported a determination of

willfulness. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1199,

1221-22 (OSHRC 2000). Staley then filed a petition for

review in this court pursuant to section 10(c) of the OSH Act,

29 U.S.C. s 659(c).

II

A reviewing court must uphold the factual findings of the

Commission if they are "supported by substantial evidence on

the record considered as a whole," 29 U.S.C. s 660(a), and

must uphold its other conclusions as long as they are not

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise

contrary to law, 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A). See Anthony Crane

Rental, Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1298, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

Moreover, "[w]e defer to the Secretary's interpretation of the

Act and regulations, upholding such interpretations so long as

they are consistent with the statutory language and otherwise

reasonable." Id. (citing Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144,

150-51 (1991)).

Staley does not contest the Commission's findings that it

committed serious violations of the OSH Act. It disputes

only the findings that the 89 hazardous locations and two

hazard communication violations were willful. In the OSH

Act context, a willful violation is "an act done voluntarily with

either an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, the

Act's requirements." Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Secretary

of Labor, 268 F.3d 1123, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Conie

Constr., Inc. v. Reich, 73 F.3d 382, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). The

Commission based its findings of willfulness on its determination that Staley was plainly indifferent to the requirements of

the Act.

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Staley argues that the Commission committed two errors in

deeming its violations willful. First, Staley contends that

substantial evidence does not support the Commission's determination that the company was plainly indifferent to its

violations of OSHA standards. Second, with respect to the

hazardous locations standard, Staley maintains that even if

there were evidence of its plain indifference to that standard,

the Commission legally erred in finding willfulness without

finding that the company knew of each specific violation cited

by OSHA. We consider these two arguments in Parts III

and IV below.

III

The Commission found Staley willful because it demonstrated plain indifference to its violations of the standards

requiring it: (1) to use only approved electrical equipment in

hazardous locations, and (2) to train and inform its employees

regarding hazardous chemicals in their work areas. Staley

maintains that there is an absence of substantial evidence to

support findings of plain indifference with respect to either

standard. We disagree.

A

The 89 violations of the hazardous locations standard, affirmed by the Commission and undisputed by Staley, all

involved the presence of non-approved electrical equipment in

Class II, Division 2 locations.3 The equipment at issue

included exposed wiring, bulbs without protective globes, and

improperly sealed junction boxes--all potential ignition

__________

3 Class II, Division 2 locations include locations where "dust

may be in suspension in the air as a result of infrequent malfunctioning of handling or processing equipment, and dust accumulations resulting therefrom may be ignitible by abnormal operation or

failure of electrical equipment," as well as locations "where dust

accumulations might form on or in the vicinity of electric equipment." 29 C.F.R. s 1910.399.

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sources for combustible dust. The evidence of Staley's plain

indifference to those violations is as follows.

In May 1987, Staley conducted a mock OSHA inspection

and found unsafe electrical equipment in places that Staley

considered Class II, Division 2 locations, including the elevators and Buildings 9, 44, and 75--all places in which OSHA

inspectors subsequently found violations at issue in this case.

Joint Appendix (J.A.) at 325, 327-28, 339. Two years later, in

April 1989, an internal audit conducted by Staley safety

engineer Ken Page turned up more instances of unprotected

electrical equipment in hazardous locations. Page's handwritten report warned that Building 44 had "literally gone to hell

in a handbasket" and contained "hundreds of safety type

violations." J.A. at 361. Page testified that those violations

included uncovered electrical boxes and exposed wires. Supplemental Appendix (S.A.) at 47-48. He recommended that a

wall-to-wall audit of the plant be conducted as soon as possible, and noted that Staley's potential liability for OSHA

penalties was very high. J.A. at 361-62.

Page's recommendation for a wall-to-wall audit was not

approved. Page testified that his supervisor, Lynn Elder,

director of Staley's department of environmental sciences and

safety, told Page that he had advised Bob Jansen, corporate

vice president of operations, of Page's findings. Jansen

reportedly replied that he was aware of the problems in the

plant, but that another Staley project had priority. Page also

testified that Elder told him that he should not distribute his

report because "the legal department would crucify us."

Instead, Elder suggested that Page's report be either destroyed, or stamped "privileged and confidential" and sent to

the legal department. Page, however, did not destroy the

report. He kept a copy for himself and gave copies to three

others, including Bob Trent, Decatur's chief of plant protection, and Jim Brinkmeyer, the corporate industrial hygienist.

Elder did permit Page to make an oral presentation to plant

staff during which he explained his findings in detail. But

Elder assigned another auditor, J.B. Webb, the supervisor of

the Decatur safety department, to revise Page's written report. The revised report substantially toned down Page's

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language and omitted references to hundreds of the specific

electrical and safety violations that Page had observed. J.A.

at 363-65; S.A. at 38-43, 51-52.

In May 1989, a major dust explosion and fire occurred at

the Decatur plant. It was not the first: other explosions and

fires had occurred in several buildings over the years. In the

same month, an insurance loss-control report for Building 44

noted open electrical junction boxes, and warned that "[m]oisture, lint, dust and combustible materials can easily come in

contact with the exposed wiring and create a potential ignition." S.A. at 10-11, 56-58. The following year, after the

fatal May 1990 accident, Staley's president instructed Page to

conduct another audit of the plant. Page submitted a report

that identified exposed wires, conduits, breaker boxes, junction boxes, and bulbs in hazardous locations. The locations

again included the elevators and Buildings 9 and 75. J.A. at

122, 373-74, 390, 417-19; S.A. at 59-67.

Two months later, OSHA conducted the inspection that

resulted in the findings of 89 violations of the hazardous

locations standard. That inspection also revealed that many

of Staley's supervisory personnel were not properly trained

regarding the hazards presented by Class II, Division 2

areas. Some were not even aware that the areas they

supervised were classified locations. Others received no

training on the classification of areas or the requirements for

such areas. For example, Michael Slimbarski, the plant

operations manager, had not been trained concerning the

hazardous locations standard and, with one exception, did not

know which areas of the plant were classified. J.A. at 269-70.

Shift coordinators Gordon Green and Ron Young were also

untrained on the standard and unaware that faulty electrical

equipment could produce dust explosions. J.A. at 283-89,

304-05. Even electricians lacked training regarding the existence of classified hazardous locations in the plant. S.A. at

183.

We agree with the Commission that the evidence just

recited constitutes substantial evidence that the 89 hazardous

locations violations were part of a pattern or practice of plain

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indifference to violations of that standard. A.E. Staley Mfg.

Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1222.4 The series of internal

reports between 1987 and 1990 put Staley on notice of unsafe

electrical equipment in hazardous locations, and of the persistence of that problem over the years covered by those

reports. A series of dust explosions and fires, although not

themselves caused by faulty electrical equipment, also put the

company on heightened notice of the dangers of combustible

dust. Yet despite this notice, the company failed to train its

employees about such hazards, attempted to suppress Page's

internal audit report, and ignored his recommendations for

correction. Within months of Page's last audit, OSHA inspectors found the same kinds of unsafe equipment in many

of the same locations that Page did. This evidence is more

than sufficient to sustain the Commission's determination of

willfulness. See, e.g., Caterpillar, Inc. v. OSHRC, 122 F.3d

437, 441 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the fact that an employer "rejected or ignored the recommendations of the very

person" it had asked to make safety recommendations showed

plain indifference to employee safety).

Staley's principal attacks on the sufficiency of the evidence

require only brief mention. First, the company contends that

the 89 violations were too few to demonstrate plain indifference, as the equipment involved represented only a small

percentage of all of the company's electrical equipment. That

is not an adequate defense. Even a single violation of the

OSH Act may be found willful, regardless of whether the

workplace is otherwise safe. See Kaspar Wire Works, 268

F.3d at 1128 (holding that an employer cannot "contend that

it was entitled to rely on its lack of prior violations to

undermine a finding of willfulness," because then "an employer with no prior citations could choose to violate a regulatory

obligation without risking a finding of willfulness"); Valdak

Corp. v. OSHRC, 73 F.3d 1466, 1469 (8th Cir. 1996).

__________

4 The Commission specifically found that the hazardous locations violations "have a similar factual basis and are reflective of a

pattern or practice by Staley of ignoring the hazard of explosive

dust." 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1213 n.28.

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Staley also argues that Page's report did not heighten its

awareness of safety problems at Decatur because his handwritten notes were never given to plant staff. As described

above, there is substantial evidence to the contrary: Page

gave his notes to both Bob Trent and Jim Brinkmeyer; they

were read by his supervisor, Lynn Elder; they were orally

reported by Elder to vice president Jansen; and Page recounted them in a detailed oral presentation to the staff.

That knowledge is properly imputed to the company. See

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Herman, 154 F.3d 400, 402 (7th Cir. 1998).

Moreover, to the extent that Page's report was not more

widely disseminated, it was only because Elder directed that

it not be distributed, and that a revised report--omitting

references to hundreds of specific violations--be distributed

instead. S.A. at 38-43, 51-52. Such willful blindness is no

defense at all. See United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197,

203 (4th Cir. 1993).

Finally, Staley argues that the Commission ignored evidence of its good faith efforts to comply with the hazardous

locations standard, pointing specifically to its plant-wide

(joint) safety committee and to the 25 separate departmental

safety committees that were scheduled to meet monthly to

address safety issues. The joint committee, however, lacked

authority to initiate or direct corrective action, while the

departmental safety committees held their meetings only half

the time. S.A. at 115-16. Moreover, the record shows that

many members of the departmental committees were dismayed at Staley's safety program: many resigned because

safety problems were not corrected, meetings were canceled,

and management either did not attend meetings or sent

different managers each month. S.A. at 103-04, 120-21. Far

from being evidence of good faith, then, the record of Staley's

safety committees offers only further evidence of the company's plain indifference to its violations of safety standards.

B

Staley also contends that substantial evidence does not

support the Commission's determination that the company

exhibited plain indifference to the two hazard communication

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violations. Those violations were: (1) failing to provide hazard communication training for twelve substances (including

silica sand, filteraid,5 asbestos, and feed dust) for which Staley

did not have material safety data sheets (MSDSs);6 and (2)

failing to train employees regarding the meaning of the

hazard communication symbols used on the company's ethylene oxide, propylene oxide, caustic, and sulfuric acid storage

tanks. The evidence of Staley's plain indifference is as

follows.

In November 1988, the Decatur plant's joint health and

safety committee warned of serious deficiencies in Staley's

hazard communication program. In a memorandum, the

committee noted that bags of filteraid were strewn around

and that the material was tracked all over Building 11--one

of the buildings specifically named in OSHA's 1990 hazard

communication citation. The committee further noted that

"[b]uilding personnel need to be trained on the danger of this

product." A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at

1204; S.A. at 22.

In March 1989, the National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH) conducted an evaluation of health

hazards at the Decatur plant. NIOSH industrial hygienists

observed that Staley employees were improperly trained with

respect to the hazards of toxic chemicals. NIOSH also found

that employees disregarded an alarm that sounded when

ethylene oxide and propylene oxide leaked into the air, that

they did not have immediately available respirators, and that

they engaged in work practices that increased their exposure

to chemicals. S.A. at 3-5. Following its evaluation, NIOSH

__________

5 Filteraid is the generic name for a filtering material used in

the beverage industry. Staley's filteraid is composed largely of

silica, exposure to which may result in silicosis, a potentially lifethreatening lung disease. See A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) at 1204 n.10, 1205 n.13.

6 The hazard communication standard requires employers to

make available to their employees MSDSs for hazardous chemicals

in the employees' work areas. 29 C.F.R. s 1910.1200(h)(2)(iii). An

MSDS must contain detailed information about the physical characteristics and health hazards of the chemical. Id. s 1910.1200(g)(2).

sent J.B. Webb, the Decatur safety supervisor, a summary of

its findings:

[W]e feel there is significant potential for chemical overexposures in the starch reaction area, and possibly

throughout the starch stream. This appears to be due to

improper work practices, poor management oversight,

and emphasis of production over worker safety. Included among the chemicals used in this area are ethylene

oxide, propylene oxide, and vinyl acetate. Ethylene oxide is currently regulated as a cancer hazard by [OSHA].

Propylene oxide is very similar in chemical structure to

ethylene oxide and is currently being evaluated by

NIOSH with regard to potential carcinogenicity.... In

addition, lack of training and demand for product seems

to have circumvented measures which were specifically

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implemented to reduce potential exposure.

S.A. at 5.

Ken Page's April 1989 audit disclosed further serious deficiencies in employee training regarding hazardous substances. Page noted that hazardous chemicals were not

properly labeled, annual training was not being conducted in

several buildings, and employees lacked access to MSDSs.

He also observed large quantities of filteraid on the floor of

two buildings, including Building 11, and continuing problems

with the material in a third. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19 O.S.H.

Cas. (BNA) at 1205; J.A. at 341-45, 347-48, 350-53, 359-60.

A second auditor, Robert Moore, notified his supervisor about

the results of the audit and the presentation Page made to

plant staff:

The staff was told that the Hazard Communications

Compliance, Respiratory Protection Compliance, and

Hazardous Material Control had deteriorated since we

last conducted such a survey (1986). In our opinion, an

OSHA inspection prompted by the NIOSH visit could

potentially result in the assessment of major penalties.

S.A. at 6 (emphasis added).

Notwithstanding these warnings, Staley management told

Page that completing another project had priority over correcting the problems he had identified. A year later, when

Page undertook another audit following the fatal May 1990

accident, he found that containers of hazardous materials

were improperly labeled in two buildings, updated MSDSs

were absent in two buildings, and hazard communication

training had not been conducted for years. Page received no

feedback from Staley regarding his May 1990 report. J.A. at

400, 406, 415; S.A. at 43, 87.

As noted above, when OSHA inspected the plant in July

1990, it cited Staley for failing to train employees regarding

twelve hazardous substances for which Staley did not have

MSDSs, including silica sand, filteraid, asbestos, and feed

dust; and for failing to train employees concerning the symbols used to label the ethylene oxide, propylene oxide, caustic,

and sulfuric acid storage tanks. The inspection found that

many of Staley's managers had received little or no training

about OSHA compliance, and that both managers and hourly

employees were untrained regarding the cited hazardous

chemicals. MSDSs were mostly either unavailable or kept in

locked offices. Of particular concern, employees working in

the vicinity of hazardous chemicals like ethylene oxide and

propylene oxide were untrained in the labeling system and

had no idea what the colors and numbers meant. As a

consequence, they were unaware of the hazards posed by the

chemicals and of how to protect themselves. J.A. at 186-207,

234-40, 277, 298; S.A. at 105-14, 169-86.

We again agree with the Commission that this record

evidence is more than sufficient to sustain its findings that

Staley was plainly indifferent to its violations of the hazard

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communication standard. The NIOSH evaluation and internal surveys and audits gave Staley a heightened awareness of

its hazard communication problems, including problems with

the specific chemicals for which Staley was later cited. Yet,

the company responded unappreciatively to those warnings

and substantially failed to ensure the required training of its

managers and employees. In the Commission's words, "Staley's HazCom program remained grossly deficient." A.E.

Staley Mfg. Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1205.

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Staley seeks to minimize the scope of its failure by noting

that the training violations concerned "only" 15 of 120 buildings and 12 of 1200 hazardous materials used at the Decatur

plant. As we have already noted, however, an otherwise safe

workplace does not prevent findings of willfulness with respect to those violations that do occur. Moreover, five of the

chemicals cited in the two health violations--ethylene oxide,

propylene oxide, sulfuric acid, asbestos, and silica--are among

Staley's "mean fifteen" chemicals, the most dangerous in the

plant. All five may produce acute or chronic health effects in

exposed employees. S.A. at 22-23, 88-89; see 29 C.F.R.

s 1910.1200(c). Accordingly, Staley's effort to minimize its

violations of OSHA's health standards is unavailing, and we

conclude that the Commission was justified in describing

Staley's attitude toward its violations as "plain indifference

to[ ] the Act's requirements." Kaspar Wire Works, 268 F.3d

at 1127.

IV

Staley's second major argument is that, even if it was

plainly indifferent to the requirements of the OSH Act, its

violations of the hazardous locations standard were not willful

because it was unaware of the specific conditions for which it

was cited. There is no evidence in the record, Staley notes,

that its management knew of the precise uncovered electrical

boxes and exposed wires discovered by the OSHA inspectors.

Although these conditions were of the same kind and in the

same locations as problems found in earlier internal audits,

Staley stresses that OSHA cannot prove that they were the

same pieces of noncompliant equipment. In the company's

view, "implicit to a finding of willfulness is employer knowledge of the existence of a condition, an awareness that the

condition does not meet the Act's requirements ..., and a

conscious decision not to correct the condition...." Staley

Br. at 14.

Staley offers little support for this position, and we reject

it. The OSH Act authorizes its most severe civil penalties for

any employer who "willfully" violates a health or safety

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standard. 29 U.S.C. s 666(a); see supra note 2. The Act

does not itself define "willfully." In its decision below, the

Commission, citing its own precedents, defined a willful violation as one "committed with intentional, knowing or voluntary

disregard for the requirements of the Act, or with plain

indifference to employee safety." A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1202 (quoting Falcon Steel Co., 16

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1179, 1181 (OSHRC 1993), and A.P.

O'Horo Co., 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2004, 2012 (OSHRC 1991))

(emphasis added).7 Under this definition, "plain indifference"

to violations of the Act is an alternative to "knowing or

voluntary disregard" (also referred to as "conscious disregard"), and willfulness can be inferred from evidence of plain

indifference without direct evidence that the employer knew

of each individual violation. See also A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 19

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1202 (describing the "state of mind"

required as "conscious disregard or plain indifference for the

safety and health of employees" (citing General Motors, 14

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 2168)).

Staley seeks to undermine the Commission's formulation by

pointing to a definition of "willfully" that this court has often

cited in OSH Act cases: "an act done voluntarily with either

an intentional disregard of, or plain indifference to, the Act's

requirements." Kaspar Wire Works, 268 F.3d at 1127 (quoting Conie Constr., 73 F.3d at 384). Placing great stress on

the location of the word "voluntarily" in the Kaspar Wire

Works formulation, Staley contends that this definition requires that an act be both voluntary and done with plain

indifference to be regarded as willful. Moreover, for a violation to be "voluntary," Staley insists, the company's management must know that the specific piece of equipment at issue

was noncompliant and then must decide not to correct it.

__________

7 Accord Branham Sign Co., 18 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2132, 2134

(OSHRC 2000); Pepperidge Farm Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1993,

1998 (OSHRC 1997); J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 15 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA)

2201, 2209 (OSHRC 1993); General Motors Corp., Electro-Motive

Div., 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2064, 2068 (OSHRC 1991).

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The Secretary of Labor agrees that Kaspar Wire Works

applies here, but she does not regard its definition of willful

as different from that applied by the Commission. In the

Secretary's view, as in the Commission's, there are two

prongs to the definition: conscious disregard and plain indifference. Only the former requires direct evidence that the

employer knew of the specific noncomplying condition. If

proven, plain indifference substitutes for knowledge of the

specific condition as a means of inferring the employer's

willful intent.

Because the OSH Act is silent as to the meaning of

"willful," we are required to defer to the Secretary's interpretation as long as it is reasonable. Anthony Crane Rental, 70

F.3d at 1302 (citing Martin, 499 U.S. at 150-51). Where "the

Secretary and the Commission agree, there is no question but

that we must accord deference to their joint view." RAG

Cumberland Res. LP v. Federal Mine Safety & Health

Review Comm'n, 272 F.3d 590, 596 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (referring

to a parallel statutory scheme under the Mine Act). We find

that joint view reasonable in this case.

The use of a state of mind like plain indifference as a

substitute for knowledge of a specific condition is well recognized in other legal contexts.8 In Daskalea v. District of

Columbia, for example, this court held that the District of

Columbia was "deliberately indifferent" to, and hence liable

under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 for, its jail guards' sexual abuse of a

female prisoner--even without evidence that District policymakers knew of the harassment of the particular prisoner.

227 F.3d 433, 441-43 (D.C. Cir. 2000). In Daskalea, indifference was proven by evidence that the District had been on

notice of prior incidents against other prisoners, that similar

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8 See, e.g., McGinty v. New York, 193 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 1999)

(holding that to prove a willful violation of the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, evidence of "reckless disregard" is an alternative

to evidence of actual knowledge); Saba v. Compagnie Nationale

Air France, 78 F.3d 664, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that "reckless

disregard" is equivalent to "willful misconduct" for purposes of

liability under the Warsaw Convention).

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incidents nonetheless continued, and that the District failed to

train or supervise its officers adequately. Id. The parallels

to the evidence of Staley's indifference, as recounted in Part

III above, are obvious.

Staley notes that in many cases under the OSH Act,

employers have been found liable for willful violations where

they "were aware of the requirements of the standard and

the noncompliant condition, but deliberately chose not to

comply with the requirements." Staley Br. at 13 (emphasis

added) (citing Donovan v. Williams Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d

170, 179-80 (D.C. Cir. 1984), and Conie Constr., 73 F.3d 382).

Staley's observation is correct, but nondispositive. The fact

that cases have found willfulness where both kinds of knowledge were proven does not mean that both are required.

Staley points to no case in which, although an employer was

plainly indifferent to compliance with an OSHA standard, a

violation was found non-willful because the employer did not

know of the specific unlawful condition. Indeed, Staley concedes that many OSH Act cases have found violations willful

even without evidence that the employer was aware of the

applicable standard.9 In those cases, plain indifference substituted for employer knowledge, even though the cases proclaimed--as Staley proclaims with respect to knowledge of

conditions--that "there must be evidence that an employer

knew of an applicable standard." Williams Enters., Inc., 13

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1249, 1257 (OSHRC 1987); see id. (stating

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9 See Valdak, 73 F.3d at 1269 ("Valdak's claimed ignorance of

the OSHA standard does not negate a finding of willfulness. Willfulness can be proved by 'plain indifference' to the Act's requirements."); Georgia Elec. Co. v. Marshall, 595 F.2d 309, 320 (5th Cir.

1979) (rejecting the claim that a company "cannot be held liable for

willfully violating provisions of which it was unaware," and holding

that it "is precisely because the Company made no effort whatsoever to make anyone with supervisory authority ... aware ... that

the Company can be said to have acted with plain indifference and

thereby acted willfully"); Staley Reply Br. at 4 (agreeing that

"plain indifference is applicable in situations where the employer

did not know of the standard's requirements but had a reckless

disregard for employee safety").

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that evidence of "reckless disregard" can substitute for evidence of "familiarity with the standard's terms").

Moreover, although Staley cannot point to a case that

directly supports its position, the Secretary of Labor can

point to several that support hers. One is Kaspar Wire

Works itself. In that case, we upheld the Commission's

finding that Kaspar committed hundreds of willful violations

of the OSH Act by failing to record serious injuries on an

OSHA reporting form. The Commission noted the volume of

violations, the seriousness of the unreported injuries, and the

abundant evidence of Kaspar's actual knowledge of what was

required under OSHA's reporting regulations. Kaspar Wire

Works, 268 F.3d at 1126. Although the employer claimed

that it had not purposely changed its recordkeeping practices

to omit the injuries, we held that "[f]rom this evidence, the

Commission could reasonably infer" that "Kaspar Wire's

recordkeeping practices underwent a dramatic" and intentional change. Id. at 1128.

Another case to which the Secretary directs our attention is

Pepperidge Farm Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1993, 1998

(OSHRC 1997). In that case, the Commission again found

the employer to have committed numerous willful violations of

the Act by failing to report occupational injuries. The Commission deemed the violations willful notwithstanding that "no

one at Pepperidge checked the accuracy" of the firm's report

form--and thus, in Staley's terms, notwithstanding that the

company lacked knowledge of the specific cited conduct. Id.

at 1999. Willfulness was established by evidence that, despite the fact that its officials had a "heightened awareness"

of OSHA recordkeeping requirements, the employer failed to

provide basic training to those making the entries and "made

no attempt to remedy" the recordkeepers' lack of understanding. Id. at 2000. The parallels to Staley's conduct are, again,

obvious.

Ironically, given its focus on the Kaspar Wire Works

formulation, Staley's principal response to the Secretary's

citation of Kaspar Wire Works and Pepperidge Farm is to

suggest that the Commission decided them wrongly. Staley

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Br. at 21. Since this court affirmed Kaspar Wire Works, that

is not a winning argument. Alternatively, Staley argues that

recordkeeping cases should be treated differently from equipment cases. But since both involve violations by omission, it

is reasonable for the Secretary and the Commission to regard

them as of a piece. Indeed, we see little distinction between

Kaspar Wire Works and Pepperidge Farm, where the willful

violations were failures to include serious injuries in reports,

and this case, where the violation was a failure to use only

approved equipment in hazardous locations.

Finally, we are also persuaded by the Secretary's argument

that, were she not permitted to substitute plain indifference

for knowledge of specific conditions, cases like this one--in

which the citation is for failing to act rather than for affirmatively acting--would be difficult if not impossible to prove.

Cf. Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.3d 664,

668 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (noting that, if recklessness were not

permitted as a proxy for intent in Warsaw Convention cases,

"it might be all too easy for the wrongdoer to deliberately

blind himself to the consequences of his tortious action").

Indeed, to adopt Staley's position would be to write the

doctrine of "willful blindness," well known in the criminal law,

out of OSH Act enforcement. That doctrine "allows the jury

to impute the element of knowledge to the defendant if the

evidence indicates that he purposely closed his eyes to avoid

knowing what was taking place around him." Schnabel, 939

F.2d at 203. As we pointed out at oral argument, under

Staley's formulation, a company could avoid liability for willful

violations of OSHA standards by literally blindfolding its

safety inspectors: because the inspectors could not see the

unsafe conditions, the conditions could not be regarded as

"voluntary." Although Staley's counsel conceded that, under

her client's proposed rule, those violations would not be

willful, she suggested that Staley might make an exception

for such an egregious case. But both the making of exceptions and the crafting of general rules are tasks the statute

delegates to the Secretary, not to Staley. And as long as

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those rules are reasonable, as they are here, we are bound to

defer.

V

The record in this case contains ample evidence that Staley's violations of the hazardous locations and hazard communication standards were committed with plain indifference to

the requirements of the OSH Act. The Commission was

therefore well within its discretion to find those violations

willful and to assess the attendant penalties. Accordingly,

the petition for review is

Denied.

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