Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00317/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00317-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
IHOP Corp
Defendant
Mohammad Munir
Defendant
Munirs Company
Defendant
Jessica Rose
Plaintiff

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This matter was determined to be suitable for decision without *

oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).

Defendants had also moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against 1

Defendant Mohammad Munir for wrongful termination in violation of public

policy; however, Defendants withdrew that portion of their motion in

their Reply brief. (See Reply at 2:4-5.) 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JESSICA ROSE, )

) 2:07-cv-317-GEB-DAD

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) ORDER*

)

THE MUNIRS COMPANY; )

MOHAMMAD MUNIR; IHOP CORPORATION; )

and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, )

)

Defendants. )

)

Defendants move, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

(“Rule”) 12(b)(6), to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and

negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention. (Mot. at 1

1:26-27, 2:1-3.) Plaintiff opposes the motion. 

///

///

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FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN COMPLAINT

Plaintiff was employed as a food server at an IHOP

restaurant in Rocklin, California. (Compl. ¶ 17.) From January 2006

through April 8, 2006, Plaintiff was subjected to repeated whistles

and lewd stares by several IHOP cooks, physical touching by one of the

cooks, and sexist comments from the cooks and at least one male

server. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 21, 23.) On or about April 1, 2006,

Plaintiff called IHOP corporate headquarters and reported the cooks’

misconduct. (Id. ¶ 33.) On April 8, 2006, a representative from IHOP

corporate headquarters visited the Rocklin IHOP to discuss Plaintiff’s

complaint. (Id. ¶ 34.) The IHOP corporate headquarters

representative informed Plaintiff that the cooks denied all harassment

and that they accused Plaintiff of calling them “honey,” which

Plaintiff denied. (Id.) The representative also informed Plaintiff

that the cooks would continue to work on the same nights as Plaintiff. 

(Id. ¶ 37.) Plaintiff left the restaurant on April 8 and did not

return to work “because management failed to take steps to ensure her

safety.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff alleges she was constructively

“discharged [from IHOP] on or about April 8, 2006.” (Id. ¶ 17.) 

DISCUSSION

Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiff

failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory in her complaint, or

(2) plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. 

Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th

Cir. 1984). When considering a motion to dismiss, all material

allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins.

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, Plaintiff is

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given the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from

the allegations in the Complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local

1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for negligence and

negligent hiring, supervision, training, and retention are preempted

by the California’s Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). (Mot. at 5:11-

13.) Specifically, Defendants contend that the WCA “provides the sole

and exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by employees arising out

of and in the course of their employment.” (Id. at 5:14-15.) 

Plaintiff counters that her claims are not preempted since an

exception to WCA’s “exclusivity rules applies when the injury suffered

by an employee is the result of discrimination.” (Opp’n at 4:23-24.) 

“The [WCA], as a matter of policy, does not estop a

plaintiff from pursuing sexual harassment claims in civil actions.” 

Greenfield v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 2004 WL 2600135, at *8 (N.D. Cal.

Nov. 16, 2004) (finding that Plaintiff’s cause of action for negligent

supervision with regard to sexual harassment was not preempted by the

WCA and fell within a category of injuries arising in the course of

employment, as defined by the California Supreme Court in Fermino v.

Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal. 4th 701, 713-15 (1994)). Further, “the [WCA] does

not bar . . . allegations of a negligent response to sexual harassment

because these claims are based on accusations of discrimination, which

‘is not a normal risk of the compensation bargain.’” Doerflet-Casner

v. Placer County Dep’t of Pub. Works, 2006 WL 1581856, at *8, n.10

(E.D. Cal. June 2, 2006) (citing Fretland v. County of Humboldt, 69

Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1492 (1999)); see also Accardi v. Super. Ct., 17

Cal. App. 4th 341, 353 (1993) (finding that Plaintiff’s “claim for

emotional distress arising out of sexual harassment is not barred by

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the exclusivity provisions of workers’ compensation laws” because it

“is founded upon actions that are outside the normal part of the

employment environment and violate [California’s] policy against sex

discrimination”). Accordingly, since the challenged claims are based

on conduct that falls outside the normal part of the employment

environment, they are not barred by the WCA.

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is

denied. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2007

 

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR.

United States District Judge

 

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