Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02954/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02954-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Inc.
Appellee
Sahran I. Shaoul
Appellant

Document Text:

. FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

Urnted Stares Courr of Appeals 

Tenth Cirmit 

FEB 2 8 1990 

SAHRAN I. SHAOUL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

GOODYEAR TIRE AND RUBBER, INC., 

a Ohio corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

> Clerk 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 88-2954 

) (D.C. No. 86-M-1459) 

) (D. Colo.) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, Circuit Judges, and THOMPSON,** Chief Judge. 

**The Honorable Ralph G. Thompson, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

This appeal is taken from the district court's determination 

that plaintiff failed to establish his termination from 

defendant's employment violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e, et ~ (Title VII), i.e., that he was fired because of 

his national origin and religion (disparate treatment), that 

defendant's employment practices operated to discriminate against 

him (disparate impact), and that the termination was motivated by 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 1 
plaintiff's opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII 

(retaliation). 

The district court specifically found that defendant's 

discharge of plaintiff was not based on religion or national 

origin, noting that 

[t]he statute under which this case is brought is a 

statute to prevent discrimination against protected 

groups based on race, religion, origin and gender. It's 

not a statute for fair treatment. It's not a statute 

that requires some sort of industrial due process. It's 

not a statute that seeks to preserve individuality and 

human dignity on any basis other than these matters of 

race, religion, origin and sex. 

On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the district court 

failed to state whether plaintiff had established a prima facie 

case of discrimination or retaliation. The prima facie case 

element of a Title VII action is merely part of a scheme of 

shifting evidentiary burdens designed to facilitate the orderly 

consideration of relevant evidence. Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & 

Trust, 108 S. Ct. 2777, 2784 (1988). Once a defendant fails to 

persuade the district court to dismiss an action for lack of a 

prima facie case and responds by offering its own evidence, the 

presumption of discrimination drops from the case, and the court 

is then in a position to decide the ultimate factual issue: did 

the defendant intentionally discriminate against plaintiff because 

of his "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." United 

States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 

714-15 (1983)(footnotes and citations omitted). 

In this case, both parties presented considerable evidence 

and testimony to support their versions of why plaintiff was 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 2 
discharged. The court was not required to follow the sequential 

analysis of prima facie case, articulated legitimate reason, and 

pretext. Thompson v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 811 F.2d 1345, 1349 

(10th Cir. 1987). 

Discriminatory intent, although the ultimate issue in a Title 

VII case, is nonetheless a factual question subject to the clearly 

erroneous standard of review of Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 

Pullman-Standard, Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 

285-90 (1982)(issue of intent is pure question of fact); Thompson 

v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 811 F.2d at 1350; see also Pitre v. 

Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988)(same); 

Whatley v. Skaggs Cos., 707 F.2d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir.)(clearly 

erroneous review standard applies to the ultimate fact findings in 

a Title VII action), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). Great 

deference is afforded the factfinder, who has the exclusive 

abil i ty to assess the demeanor and tone of the witnesses' 

testimony. Thompson v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 811 F.2d at 1350; 

Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d 1051, 1058 (10th Cir. 1987). 

We have reviewed the record, which consists chiefly of 

testimony of defendant's employees and plaintiff. Notwithstanding 

plaintiff's citations to his version of the facts, there were many 

disputed factual allegations proper for the district judge to 

resolve. We cannot say that the determination that plaintiff 

failed to establish intended discrimination was clearly erroneous. 

See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 

(1985)(when trial judge's finding based on decision to credit 

testimony of one of two witnesses each of whose stories is 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 3 
plausible, that finding, if not internally consistent, can 

virtually never be clear error). 

Plaintiff also claimed that defendant's employment practices 

created a disparate impact. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 

424, 431 (197l)(Title VII proscribes not just overt discrimination 

but practices fair in form but discriminatory in operation). He 

argues that he was the only minority member of the Denver staff, 

that defendant used subjective evaluation factors in its decision 

to discharge him, and that no one else in a management position 

had ever been terminated for similar reasons. 

To succeed on a disparate treatment theory, plaintiff must 

establish intent or motive; a disparate impact theory requires 

only that the employment practice had a discriminatory effect. 

Williams v. Colorado Springs School Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 839-40 

(10th Cir. 198l)(citing cases). We conclude that plaintiff's 

statistical evidence (that he was the only minority in the small 

office and that he was the only upper management person terminated 

for the reasons given) is insufficient to establish a violation of 

Title VII. Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 

(10th Cir. 1987)(discussing sizes of samples). 

Plaintiff's burden is to offer statistical evidence of a kind 

and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has 

caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions (here, 

termination) because of membership in a protected group. Watson 

v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct. at 2788-89 (1988). The 

district court found that it was plaintiff's failure "to be on the 

team, to adhere to the chain of command, to follow the leader" 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 4 
which resulted in his termination and that the record failed to 

show that plaintiff's minority status made it more difficult to be 

on the team. As concerns the use of subjective factors in the 

decision to discharge plaintiff, this court has upheld the use of 

subjective criteria. See Lujan v. Walters, 813 F.2d at 1057. 

Subjective employment decisions are not illegal per se, the 

ultimate issue in each case being whether the subjective criteria 

were used to disguise discriminatory actions. 

of Dev. of City of Columbus, 699 F.2d 836, 837 

Grano v. Department 

(6th Cir. 1983}; 

Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1046 (10th Cir. 198l)(subjective 

considerations not unlawful per se). See also Burrus v. United 

Tel. Co., 683 F.2d 339, 342-43 (10th Cir.)(subjective evaluation 

applicant lacked ability to get along with others constituted 

legitimate business reason amply supported by evidence and not 

rebutted by showing of pretext}, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 

(1982}; Verniero v. Air Force Academy School Dist., 705 F.2d 388, 

392 (10th Cir. 1983}(subjective evaluations play legitimate part 

in employer's determination whether employee has ability to get 

along with others}. 

All that evidence of subjective decision-making does, 

however, is create an inference of discrimination requiring the 

defendant to come forward with legitimate reasons for its actions. 

See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 

(198l}(if plaintiff establishes prima facie case, burden shifts to 

defendant 

employee's 

substantial 

to articulate legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for 

rejection}. In this case, defendant produced 

evidence that plaintiff was discharged for failing to 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 5 
support and cooperate with his supervisor and to remain within the 

chain of command at the company. 

Defendant admitted that no other upper-management person had 

ever been terminated for undermining morale. Defendant also 

explained that plaintiff's behavior had never before been seen in 

someone at his level. Courts are not free to second-guess the 

business judgment of an employer. Thus, plaintiff's belief that 

his performance was good is irrelevant. It is the perception of 

the decision-maker which is relevant, not plaintiff's perception 

of himself. See Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 

772 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The district court held that the factors underlying 

plaintiff's termination were refusal to be a team player, 

challenging his supervisor, confronting fellow employees, 

unwillingness to stay within the chain of command and "sacrifice 

sense of individual dignity to the collective welfare of the 

organization." That plaintiff had a personality conflict with his 

supervisor is undisputed. As with the disparate treatment claim, 

the district court's finding of no disparate impact is not clearly 

erroneous. 

Finally, plaintiff alleged that his discharge was, 

in retaliation for his 

employment discrimination 

position 

action 

in connection with 

against defendant 

in part, 

another 

and for 

complaints lodged about alleged discriminatory treatment. The 

district court made short work of this claim, concluding there was 

no evidence to support it. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 6 
In establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, plaintiff 

must show 

1. Protected opposition to discrimination 

participation in a proceeding arising out 

discrimination; 

or 

of 

2. Adverse action by the employer contemporaneously or 

subsequent to the employee's protected activity; 

3. A causal connection between such activity and the 

employer's action. 

Anderson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 861 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 

1988), citing Burrus, 683 F.2d at 343. 

Plaintiff contended that his participation in the other 

employment discrimination lawsuit (the Albrecht litigation), in 

which he (as Ms. Jo Albrecht's supervisor) and defendant were 

alleged to have discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, 

was protected activity, as was his lodging of complaints of 

alleged discriminatory treatment. Assuming plaintiff's letter 

writing would come within the first requirement, he did not 

otherwise meet his burden of proof. He claims that he sought to 

prevent Ms. Albrecht's attorneys from asking questions which might 

require plaintiff to state that the defendant had discriminated 

against him, but there is no proof that plaintiff was called upon 

to testify to anything other than the truth. There is no 

substance in this contention, and we agree with the district court 

that it is specious. 

As for the second element, the Albrecht litigation settled 

over three months before plaintiff was terminated. Furthermore, 

plaintiff had been counseled a year before his termination on the 

need to be loyal to his district manager and not cause problems in 

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Appellate Case: 88-2954 Document: 01019964572 Date Filed: 02/28/1990 Page: 7 
the district, the same behavior which ultimately led to 

plaintiff's termination. 

The evidence simply did not support plaintiff's allegations 

of discrimination on the basis of race or religion, 

notwithstanding plaintiff's repeated complaints and use of the 

word discrimination. The focus of the alleged "discriminatory'' 

actions were a promotion he did not receive, a pay raise the 

amount of which he disputed, and his general dissatisfaction with 

his supervisor. 

The district court carefully and thoughtfully considered 

testimony and demeanor of all the witnesses. His findings and 

conclusion issued from the bench reflect a thorough review of the 

relevant evidence in the case. The determination that plaintiff 

failed to establish discrimination in violation of Title VII is 

not clearly erroneous. See Brown v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 

850 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1988)(not function of appellate court 

to determine issues anew, nor will it disturb factual decision 

supported by the evidence). 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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