Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02616/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-02616-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elaine Parker-Reed
Plaintiff
Sprint Corporation
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ELAINE PARKER-REED,

NO. CIV. S 03-2616 MCE PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SPRINT CORPORATION, GEORGE

WHITE, and DOES 1-49,

inclusive,

Defendant(s).

----oo0oo----

In bringing the present action, Plaintiff Elaine Parker-Reed

(“Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Sprint Corporation

(“Defendant”), and George White as its agent, subjected Plaintiff

to discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation and a hostile

work environment in violation of her rights under Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et.

seq., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”),

29 U.S.C § 621 et. seq., the American’s with Disabilities Act

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq., and the California Fair

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The federal claims that are the subject of this motion 1

are Discrimination Based on Sex (first cause of action);

Discrimination Based on Race and Ancestry (second cause of

action); Discrimination Based on Age (third cause of action);

Discrimination Based on Medical Condition and Mental Disability

(fourth cause of action); Harassment Based on Sex (fifth cause of

action); Retaliation (sixth cause of action); Failure to Stop

Discrimination, Harassment, Retaliation, and Hostile Work

Environment (eighth cause of action);(collectively, “Federal

Claims”). The state claim that is the subject of this motion is

Breach of the Employment Agreement and of the Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing (tenth cause of action)(“State Claim”). 

Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), California Government Code

§§ 12900-12996. Defendant now moves to dismiss certain of

Plaintiff’s claims or, in the alternative, for summary

adjudication as to those claims. For the reasons set forth 1

below, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s Federal Claims and

State Claim in favor of Defendant is granted.2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was hired by Defendant in May of 1989. In late

2001, Plaintiff went on medical leave pursuant to instructions

from her physician. By February 15, 2002, Plaintiff’s employment

was terminated by Defendant. On August 20, 2002, Plaintiff filed

a complaint with the California Department of Fair Employment and

Housing ("DFEH") alleging claims of discrimination and otherwise

wrongful conduct on the part of Defendant. On September 12,

2002, the DFEH issued Plaintiff a “right-to-sue” letter (“DFEH

letter”). The DFEH letter explained that Plaintiff had one year

from the date it was issued to seek legal redress on state law

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

causes of action. The DFEH letter also provided that, should

Plaintiff wish to pursue remedies under federal law, she was

required to file a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 30 days of receipt of the

DFEH letter. Due to an error in her address, Plaintiff did not

receive her DFEH letter until some forty-five (45) days after the

issuance thereof. Plaintiff did not then, nor has she ever,

filed a claim with the EEOC.

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary adjudication on

part of a claim or defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party

seeking to recover upon a claim ... may ... move ... for a

summary judgment in the party’s favor upon all or any part

thereof.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp.

374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995); France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter

Township of Monroe, 790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323(quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448, 20

L.Ed. 867 (1872)). As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the

moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its

opponent must do more that simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find

for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” 

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Defendant first contends that Plaintiff's Federal Claims

should be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies. In reply, Plaintiff urges that her DFEH

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

complaint and subsequent DFEH right-to-sue letter satisfy both

her state and federal administrative exhaustion requirements.

Plaintiff has brought causes of action under Title VII, the

ADA and the ADEA. In order to assert a cause of action under any

of these federal statutes, an individual must file a charge of

discrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged

unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)(Title

VII filing requirement); 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)(ADA filing

requirement); 29 U.S.C. § 262(d)(ADEA filing requirement). 

Failure to meet these filing requirements acts as a limitation

period and bars subsequent actions in federal court. 

Plaintiff’s axial argument is that, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.

1626.10(c), the DFEH and the EEOC are engaged in a workshare

agreement meaning that a filing with one agency is deemed

received or filed with the other. In fact, section 1626.10(c)

provides as follows:

When a worksharing agreement with a State agency is in

effect, the State agency will act on certain charges

and the Commission will promptly process charges which

the State agency does not pursue. Charges received by

one agency under the agreement shall be deemed received

by the other agency for purposes of § 1626.7.

29 C.F.R. 1626.10(c)(emphasis added).

Plaintiff is correct that the DFEH is an approved state

agency and has entered into a workshare agreement with the EEOC. 

Plaintiff’s contention, however, that the foregoing provision

acts to transform her DFEH filing into an EEOC filing such that

it satisfies her EEOC administrative exhaustion requirement is

unavailing. While this provision does provide that a claim

received by a state agency is "deemed received" by the EEOC, it

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

is only deemed received "for purposes of Section 1626.7." 29

C.F.R. 1626.10(c). Section 1626.7 refers solely to the

timeliness, as opposed to the existence, of an EEOC charge. 

Specifically, that section provides that in the event an

aggrieved party initially files a charge with a state agency,

that party has 300 days from the date of the alleged violation to

file a charge with the EEOC as opposed to the statutorily

proscribed 180 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R.

1626.7. This provision extended Plaintiff’s time to file her

EEOC charge from 180 days to 300 days. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has

never filed a claim with the EEOC and this provision does nothing

to cure that procedural defect.

2. Equitable Estoppel

Next, Plaintiff argues that her DFEH claim should act to

equitably estop Defendant from claiming that her Federal Claims

are time barred. Again, Defendant correctly rebuts that

equitable estoppel "arises as a result of some conduct by the

defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, which induces the belated

filing of the action." Prudential-Lmi Com. Ins. v. Superior

Court, 51 Cal. 3d 674, 690 (Cal. 1990)(internal citations and

quotations omitted). The California Supreme Court has also

explained that "[t]he estoppel cases appear to fall roughly into

three classes: (1) Where the plaintiff is aware of his cause of

action and the identity of the wrongdoer, but the latter by

affirmative acts induces the plaintiff to refrain from suit. (2)

Where the plaintiff is unaware of his cause of action and his

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

ignorance is due to false representations by the defendant. (3)

Where the plaintiff is unaware of the identity of the wrongdoer

and this is due to fraudulent concealment by the defendant." Id.

It is undisputed that Defendant did not engage in any

conduct or affirmative act that would have induced Plaintiff not

to file her claim timely. Similarly, Plaintiff was clearly aware

of her cause of action no later than her August 20, 2002, DFEH

filing. Because Plaintiff has failed to establish any element of

equitable estoppel, she is not entitled to rely thereon to save

her Federal Claims.

3. Equitable Tolling

Similarly, Plaintiff argues that this Court should apply the

doctrine of equitable tolling to toll the statutory bar on her

Federal Claims. Equitable tolling focuses on a plaintiff's

excusable ignorance and lack of prejudice to the defendant. The

doctrine of equitable tolling "has been consistently applied to

excuse a claimant's failure to comply with the time limitations

where she had neither actual nor constructive notice of the

filing period." Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir.,

2003)(internal citations and quotations omitted). If a

reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a

possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable

tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations until the

plaintiff can gather what information she needs. Id.

There is no question that Plaintiff was aware of the

circumstances that gave rise to her Federal Claims at the time

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

she filed her complaint with the DFEH on August 20, 2002. At the

latest, she was made aware of the EEOC filing requirement when

she received her DFEH letter in late October 2002. In fact, the

DFEH letter included the following statement:

“If a federal notice of Right-To-Sue is wanted, the

U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)

must be visited to file a complaint within 30 days of

receipt of this DFEH notice of Case Closure or within

300 days of the alleged discriminatory act, whichever

is earlier.”

Am. Compl., ¶ 7.

Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the time limit for filing

her EEOC complaint by late October 2002. Nonetheless, she did

not file her EEOC claim within the mandatory time period or at

any time thereafter. Consequently, she is not entitled to have

the statutory time for filing a charge with the EEOC equitably

tolled and, thus, her Federal Claims are barred.

4. Breach of Employment Agreement and of the Covenant of Good

Faith and Fair Dealing

Defendant has moved for summary adjudication as to

Plaintiff’s tenth cause of action for breach of the employment

agreement and of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Defendant claims that Plaintiff is an at-will employee and

can be terminated at any time with or without cause. As evidence

of the at-will nature of the relationship, Defendant has produced

a copy of Plaintiff’s signed acknowledgment which provides that

either party may, with or without notice, terminate the

employment relationship. Jones Decl., ¶2, Exh. A. In addition,

Defendant relies on the presumption of an at-will relationship

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

created by California Labor Code section 2922 which provides that

“... employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at

the will of either party on notice to the other.”

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that during the entire course

of her employment with Defendant, supervisors rated her

performance as over and above normal expectations and told her

that she was an asset to the company. Plaintiff asserts that, as

a result of the above representations, she came to rely on the

promise of job security. Plaintiff also alleges that there

existed an implied agreement that Plaintiff would not be

terminated without cause.

Defendant correctly notes that under California law, an

express at-will provision in a written contract cannot be

overcome by allegations of an implied understanding to the

contrary. The California Supreme Court recently explained that

"most cases applying California law . . . have held that an

at-will provision in an express written agreement, signed by the

employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an implied contrary

understanding." Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 368

n. 10, 8 P.3d 1089 (Cal. 2000). Plaintiff’s assertion that

statements by her supervisors intimated that she could be fired

only for cause cannot create an implied contract in the face of

the written, signed at-will employment contract. See id.; see

also Starzynski v. Capital Pub. Radio, 88 Cal. App. 4th 33, 105

Cal. Rptr. 2d 525 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

Plaintiff further alleged in her complaint that even if her

employment is considered at-will, the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, destroyed her

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

right to receive the benefits of her employment agreement and

thwarted her reasonable expectation of continued employment,

salary, promotions, pay raises, bonuses, health benefits, and

retirement benefits. While an implied covenant requires mutual

fairness in applying a contract's actual terms, it cannot

substantively alter those terms. See Guz, 24 Cal. 4th at 326-

327. If an employment is at-will, thereby allowing either party

to terminate the relationship for any reason, the implied

covenant cannot decree otherwise. Id. 

Even viewing all the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff as we must when considering a motion for summary

adjudication, Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that

she was other than an at-will employee subject to termination for

any lawful reason with or without notice. Given Plaintiff’s

failure to present any evidence whatsoever that Defendant

violated the employment agreement or the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing, summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s State

Claim is appropriate.

5. Request to Seal Court Records

On September 30, 2005, the Court received a request from

Plaintiff to seal the record in this case. Specifically,

Plaintiff requests that the record be sealed as it contains

factual, family, agency and otherwise sensitive information. The

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to provide good cause to

seal the record. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request is denied.

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

CONCLUSION

For the reasons more fully explained above, Defendant’s

motion for summary adjudication as to Plaintiffs Federal Claims

and State Claim is GRANTED. In light of the dismissal of all of

Plaintiff’s Federal Claims, the Court remands this case to the

state court for all remaining state law claims.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: October 14, 2005

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:03-cv-02616-MCE -PAN Document 23 Filed 10/17/05 Page 12 of 12