Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01091/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01091-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B.B. Andersen Construction Co., Inc.
Not Party
Bank IV, Topeka, N.A.
Appellee
Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council
Not Party
Regional Transportation District
Appellant

Document Text:

PlL ... 1'J0 .. ·"<I 

Uoited Statf:s Court of Appeals 

Tench Circuit PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 2 0 1989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

COLORADO BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION ) 

TRADES COUNCIL, an unincorporated ) 

labor organization, ) 

Garnisher-Plaintiff, 

vs. 

B.B. ANDERSEN CONSTRUCTION CO., 

INC., a Kansas corporation, 

Defendant. 

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) 

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~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 

BANK IV, TOPEKA, N.A., 

Intervenor-Appellee, 

vs. 

REGIONAL TRANSPORTATION DISTRICT, 

Garnishee/Assignee-Appellant. 

) 

) 

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No. 89-1091 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 83-M-2497) 

Jan E. Montgomery of Hamilton, Myer, Swanson, Faatz & Clark, 

Denver, Colorado, for Intervenor-Appellee. 

Robert H. Winter of Wolf & Slatkin, Denver, Colorado, for 

Garnishee/Assignee-Appellant. 

Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.* 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal presents the issue of whether the United States 

Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639, empowers a magistrate to 

enter a final appealable order in a post-judgment dispute among 

competing creditors of a judgment debtor without the creditors' 

express consent. We hold that it does not. 

I • 

Pursuant to a Stipulation and Consent ~o Eritry of Judgment 

dated November 4, 1986, the Colorado district court in this 

diversity action for breach of contract entered judgment for 

plaintiff, Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council 

(Colorado Building), and against defendant, B.B. Andersen 

Construction (BBA), in the amount of $606,036.16. Colorado 

Building as garnisher thereafter served a writ of garnishment upon 

appellant, Regional Transportation District (RTD) as garnishee, to 

which RTD responded by depositing $141,712.86 into the district 

court's registry. Alleging status as a prior perfected secured 

creditor of BBA, intervenor-appellee, Bank IV Topeka (Bank IV), 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 2 
filed a motion to intervene which asserted Bank IV's entitlement 

to the deposited funds as against the judgment creditor and 

garnisher, Colorado Building. Colorado Building subsequently 

assigned its interest in the judgment to RTD. 

Under the authority of D. Colo. R. 606(C), a United States 

magistrate entered a post judgment order on March 6, 1988, holding 

that Bank IV's security interest had priority over RTD's 

garnishment and directing that the clerk of court disburse the 

deposited funds to Bank IV. Rec. vol. I doc. 17. RTD submitted a 

motion to reconsider on March 16, 1989. Prior to the magistrate's 

ruling, however, RTD filed its notice of appeal on April 5, 1989, 

presumably to avoid expiration of the thirty day time limit for 

appeals prescribed in Fed. R. App. P. 4. Subsequently, we 

directed Bank IV and RTD to submit briefs addressing the 

appealability under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 of the magistrate's March 6 

post-judgment order. 1 

1 Because we hold the magistrate had no power to enter a final 

appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 in this instance, the fact 

that RTD moved for reconsideration of the magistrate's order is 

inconsequential. 

Assuming arguendo, however, that the March 6 order was 

appealable, we also directed the parties to address whether the 

April 5 notice of appeal was prematurely filed in light of the 

March 16 motion for reconsideration. Since ten days had not 

elapsed prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration, see 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), we construe the motion as arising under Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Wilson v. Al McCord Inc., 858 F.2d 1469, 

1478 (10th Cir. 1988). Because RTD's notice of appeal was filed 

while the motion was still pending, the notice is considered a 

nullity on this basis as well. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4); Martinez 

v. Sullivan, 874 F.2d 751, 753-54 (10th Cir. 1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 3 
II. 

Rule 606 of the District of Colorado's local rules reads in 

relevant part: 

Each magistrate shall have authority to: . . . C. Handle post-judgment matters arising under Rule 69 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure including: 

3. Making necessary orders directing that funds be 

disbursed from the registry of the court. 

Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 69 does not address the resolution of 

claims between competing creditors, but rather only the execution 

of judgments, the magistrate apparently believed Rule 606 

authorized him to conclusively resolve the priority dispute 

between Bank IV and RTD. The district court undoubtedly had the 

power to enter a final appealable order resolving Bank IV and 

RTD's post-judgment dispute. See generally, 15 c. Wrigh~, A. 

Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 3916 (1976). 

But that a district court cannot by rule confer on a magistrate 

jurisdiction not permitted by statute is equally fundamental. 

~., United Steelworkers of America v. Bishop, 598 F.2d 408 (5th 

Cir. 1979).2 

Section 636 of the Magistrates Act addresses the jurisdiction 

and powers of federal magistrates. Subsection (c} authorizes a 

magistrate to enter final judgments appealable to the circuit 

court in "any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil 

2 Because we base our decision regarding the magistrate's 

authority to enter final appealable post-judgment orders on the 

lack of a congressional mandate, we have no occasion to address 

the constitutionality of the action at issue in this instance. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 4 
matter," where the (1) the district court designates the 

magistrate to do so and (2) the parties consent to such an 

exercise of jurisdiction. 28 u.s.c. § 636(c)(l). But because 

Bank IV and RTD did not consent to the magistrate's adjudication 

of the civil post-judgment proceedings in this case, subsection 

(c) in inapplicable. See King v. Ionization Int'l, Inc., 825 F.2d 

1180, 1184-85 (7th Cir. 1987) (parties belated consent held 

sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon magistrate to adjudicate 

post-judgment dispute between creditors}. 

Section 636 does not expressly authorize a district court to 

designate a magistrate to handle post-judgment matters. 

Subsection (b) does have an inclusive provision which allows a 

district court to assign a magistrate "such additional duties as 

are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 

States." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3). See generally Gomez v. United 

States, 109 S. Ct. 2237, 2240-47 (1989) (holding that§ 636(b)(3) 

does not permit a magistrate to preside over jury selection in 

felony trial without defendant's consent). Still, we have 

consistently recognized that "[a] magistrate exercising 

'additional duties' jurisdiction remains constantly subject to the 

inherent supervisory power of the district judge and the judge 

retains the 'ultimate responsibility for decision making in every 

instance. 111 Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 

1979) (quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976)). 

Accord United States v. Southern Tanks, Inc., 619 F.2d 54, 55 

(10th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jones, 581 F.2d 816, 817-18 

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Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 5 
(10th Cir. 1978). Our sister circuits agree. ~'Gleason v. 

Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 777 F.2d 1324 (8th Cir. 1985) 

(decision issued pursuant to § 636(b) is subject to initial review 

by district court); Glover v. Alabama Dept. of Corrections, 734 

F.2d 691, 693 (11th Cir. 1984) (findings of magistrate under 

§ 636(b) are subject to de novo review by the district court), 

vacated and remanded on other grounds, 474 U.S. 806 (1985), 

judgment reinstated, 776 F.2d 964, 965 (11th Cir. 1985) (judgment 

reinstated as to all matters other than award of attorney fees). 

Because a magistrate is not authorized to render final 

appealable decisions within the meaning of 28 u.s.c. § 1291, 

absent both designation by the district court and consent of the 

parties under 28 u.s.c. § 636(c), we are not empowered to address 

the merits of RTD's appeal from the post-judgment proceedings 

until the district court has reviewed the magistrate's proposed 

ruling in favor of Bank IV. RTD shall be given an opportunity 

before the district court to make timely objection to the 

magistrate's decision. 

Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for want of 

jurisdiction. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1091 Document: 01019568398 Date Filed: 07/20/1989 Page: 6