Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04162/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04162-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel G. Adams
Respondent
Mark Anthony Jones
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARK ANTHONY JONES,

Petitioner,

 v

DARREL G ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 06-4162 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner, a state prisoner incarcerated at California

State Prison, Corcoran, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC 

§ 2254 (2006). For the reasons set forth below, a writ is DENIED. 

I

On December 14, 2001, petitioner was convicted by a jury

in Sonoma County Superior Court of one count of possession of

cocaine, pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 11350(a). 

The court found true allegations that petitioner had three prior

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felony convictions, two for robbery and one for attempted murder,

but struck the two robbery convictions based on its reading of thenrecent Ninth Circuit decisions on the application of California’s

Three Strikes law. The court sentenced petitioner to six years in

state prison. Both petitioner and the state appealed. 

On September 19, 2003, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the conviction, but remanded for resentencing based on

intervening decisions of the United States Supreme Court reversing

the Ninth Circuit. The Supreme Court of California denied review,

and the trial court resentenced petitioner to 25 years to life in

state prison. 

On February 8, 2005, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the sentence of the trial court. Petitioner did not seek

further direct review; however, he continued to seek collateral

review from the state courts until the Supreme Court of California

denied his final petition for a writ of habeas corpus on April 16,

2006. 

On July 5, 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition

under § 2254. On December 5, 2006, the court found petitioner’s

claims were cognizable under § 2254 when liberally construed and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show

cause and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

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II

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows: 

On December 11, 1999, Sonoma County Sheriff

Deputies Mike Krean and Brad James were conducting

surveillance on a house in Santa Rosa that was

known for drug activity. The deputies observed

three vehicles pull up to the house and leave

again in the span of about five minutes. One car,

driven by Jones, had one headlight out and drove

past the house twice before it pulled into the

driveway and parked. Krean testified that this

driving pattern is characteristic of someone

“doing the counter surveillance in the area....

Driving slow through the neighborhood looking

around seeing if there's any cops hanging out.”

After about five minutes, when the car pulled away

from the house, the officers followed it. They

pulled the car over because of the inoperable

headlight and because it had been parked at a

house that was known for drug activity. The car

slowed and coasted for some time before the driver

stopped. As they pulled the car over, Krean

observed the driver's right shoulder move toward

the passenger. After the car stopped, the deputies

approached it. Krean asked Jones for his

identification, and a few minutes later was

advised by the dispatcher that Jones recently had

been paroled upon a conviction for attempted

murder. At that point, Krean directed Jones to

step out of the car and patsearched him. He then

placed Jones in the back of the police car.

Krean then asked the passenger, Christine

Smith, to get out of the car. When she did, he

noticed her shirt was tucked into the front of

her pants, but not in the back, and that her

pants were partly unzipped. She was shaking and

seemed to be nervous and upset. Krean spoke with

Smith for about five minutes. When he suggested

she had drugs hidden in her pants, she did not

initially agree, but a short time later pulled

from the front of her pants a bag that was later

determined to contain cocaine.

Krean then placed Smith in the back of his

patrol car with Jones and activated a tape

recorder. While in the car, Smith said to Jones,

“You bought the drugs. Listen to what I'm saying.

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You handed it to me.” There was an inaudible

response from Jones, and then Smith says again,

“But when you handed it to me, what am I supposed

to do with it?” Jones's response again was

inaudible. Smith also stated, “Markie, I didn't

have time to do it.” Jones replied, “You didn't

have time? We rolled a little distance to put it

in your pussy.” Jones also asked Smith twice “You

going to tell on me?” He told her, “I'll be in

San Quentin by tomorrow. You see what I'm

saying?” He told Smith, “I already know that

you're going to tell on me. They gonna give me

life. Give me life. You tell them ... I look at

life. I can give you all the money you want when

I get out.” Smith said to Jones, “You shouldn't

have handed that shit to me. Everybody knew they

were going to ... search me too.” Based on this

conversation, Krean arrested Jones for possession

of a controlled substance

People v Jones, No A098322, 2003 WL 22162346 at *1 (Cal App Sept 19,

2003) (hereinafter Jones I). 

III

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

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may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams at 412-13.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Williams at 411. A federal habeas court making

the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Williams at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Williams at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th

Cir 2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an

unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, only the

Supreme Court's holdings are binding on the state courts and only

those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. Clark at 1069. 

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IV

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based on ten

claims: (1) petitioner’s sentence of 25 years to life, pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes law, is cruel and unusual punishment in

violation of the Eighth Amendment; (2) introduction of the tape

recorded conversation between petitioner and Smith violated

petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against

him; (3) the trial court erred in refusing petitioner’s request for

jury instructions on accomplice statements; (4) hearsay evidence was

erroneously admitted against petitioner; (5) petitioner’s waiver of

jury trial on the question of prior convictions was invalid; (6) the

information charging petitioner failed to allege the quantity of

cocaine possessed by petitioner; (7) evidence was erroneously

introduced and petitioner was detained unlawfully in violation of

the Fourth Amendment; (8) trial counsel was ineffective in failing

to request a jury trial on the question of petitioner’s prior

convictions, and failing to advise petitioner adequately on the

nature of a bifurcated proceeding; (9) petitioner should have been

Mirandized before being taken into custody by officers Krean and

James; and (10) use of felonies committed by petitioner prior to the

enactment of California’s Three Strikes law to enhance his sentence

violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution.

A

Petitioner claims that his sentence of 25 years to life,

pursuant to California’s Three Strikes law, is cruel and unusual

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punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

A criminal sentence that is not proportionate to the crime

for which the defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment.

Solem v Helm, 463 US 277, 284 (1983) (“[The Eighth Amendment]

prohibits not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are

disproportionate to the crime committed.”) But, the Eighth

Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

disproportionate’ to the crime.” Ewing v California, 538 US 11, 23

(2003) (adopting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Harmelin v

Michigan, 501 US 957, 1001 (1991)). 

For purposes of federal habeas corpus review, the gross

disproportionality principle is “the only relevant clearly

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable

application of’ framework” under 28 USC § 2254(d)(1). Lockyer v

Andrade, 538 US 63, 73 (2003) (reversing 9th Circuit and holding

that California Court of Appeal’s decision affirming two consecutive

terms of 25 years to life in prison for third “strike” conviction

was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, the gross

disproportionality principle set forth in prior Supreme Court

decisions). A sentence will be found grossly disproportionate only

in “exceedingly rare” and “extreme” cases. Lockyer at 73.

In determining whether a sentence is grossly

disproportionate under a recidivist sentencing statute such as

California’s Three Strikes law, the court looks to whether such an

“extreme sentence is justified by the gravity of [an individual’s]

most recent offense and criminal history.” Ramirez v Castro, 365

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F3d 755, 768 (9th Cir 2004). In Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held

that a sentence of 25 years to life upon conviction of petty theft

with prior convictions was grossly disproportionate to the current

crime where the previous two strikes did not involve violence and

where both strikes were the result of one negotiated plea resulting

in a one-year county jail sentence. Ramirez at 767-770. The court

noted that this was the, “extremely rare case that gives rise to an

inference of gross disproportionality.” Ramirez at 770. By

contrast, in Rios v Garcia, the Ninth Circuit held that a sentence

of 25 years to life upon conviction of petty theft with prior

convictions not grossly disproportionate. Rios v Garcia, 390 F3d

1082, 1086 (9th Cir 2004). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Ramirez

because the defendant in Rios struggled with a guard to prevent

apprehension, his prior convictions of robbery “involved the threat

of violence, because his cohort used a knife” and because the

defendant had a lengthy criminal history. Rios at 1086. 

Petitioner in the instant case was sentenced pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes law, which is triggered when a defendant

is convicted of a felony, and has suffered one or more prior

“serious” or “violent” felony convictions. See Cal Penal Code §

667(e)(2)(A). Under the Three Strikes sentencing scheme, any felony

conviction can constitute the third “strike” and subject a defendant

to a sentence of 25 years, or three times the term otherwise

permitted for the current offense, to life in prison. See Cal Penal

Code § 667(e)(2)(A). 

Petitioner’s triggering offense was possession of cocaine,

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in violation of the California Health and Safety code, properly

charged as a felony under California law. See Cal Health & Safety

Code § 11350(a); see also Cal Health & Safety Code § 11055(b)(6)

(listing cocaine as a Schedule II drug). The prior convictions that

were alleged as “strikes” were two robbery convictions and one

conviction for attempted first-degree murder. Petitioner’s priors

are all violent and serious, and his criminal history is quite

lengthy. See People v Jones, No A106690, 2005 WL 299825 at *2 (Cal

App Feb 8, 2005) (hereinafter Jones II). (“Jones has a criminal

history that began at the age of ten and includes 18 juvenile

offenses and 10 adult convictions.”).

Based on petitioner’s history of criminal recidivism,

which includes crimes of violence, his sentence cannot be said to be

grossly disproportionate in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See

Rios, 390 F3d at 1086; see also Taylor v Lewis, 460 F3d 1093, 1098-

1100 (9th Cir 2006) (holding that sentence of 25 years to life for

possessing 0.036 grams of cocaine pursuant to California’s Three

Strikes law was not unnecessarily severe in relation to the gravity

of the offense of felony drug possession.) The California Court of

Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim was not

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this Eighth

Amendment claim. 

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B

Petitioner claims that introduction of the tape recorded

conversation between petitioner and Smith violated his Sixth

Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides

that in criminal cases the accused has the right to “be confronted

with witnesses against him.” US Const Amend VI. The Confrontation

Clause applies to all "testimonial" statements. Crawford v

Washington, 541 US 36, 50-51 (2004). "Testimony . . . is typically

a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of

establishing or proving some fact." Crawford at 51 (citations and

quotation marks omitted). The Confrontation Clause applies to all

out-of-court testimonial statements offered for the truth of the

matter asserted. See Crawford at 51. It does not bar the use of

testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the

truth of the matter asserted, however. Crawford at 59 n9. 

The tape recorded conversation between petitioner and 

Smith was admitted pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule for

adoptive admissions. See Jones I, at *3 (citing Cal Evid Code §

1221). The California Court of Appeal noted that petitioner had

offered the jury an explanation why he did not deny that the drugs

belonged to him in the tape recorded conversation, and that the jury

apparently rejected the explanation. See Jones I, at *4. The court

concluded that “the trial court did not err in allowing the jury to

hear and evaluate the recorded conversation.” Jones I, at *4. 

The state court’s rejection of petitioner’s Sixth

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Amendment Confrontation Clause claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent. See 28 USC § 2254(d). Smith’s recorded statements

were not testimony; they merely provided context for petitioner’s

responses; these responses were admitted into evidence as an

adoptive admission of petitioner’s guilt. Because Smith’s recorded

statements did not constitute testimonial statements against

petitioner, petitioner had no Sixth Amendment right to confront her

as a witness against him. Cf Crawford, 541 US at 51. Petitioner is

not entitled to federal habeas relief on this Sixth Amendment

Confrontation Clause claim.

C

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred in refusing

his request for jury instructions on accomplice statements with

respect to the tape recorded conversation between petitioner and

Smith. Petitioner’s requested instructions effectively stated that

a defendant cannot be found guilty based on uncorroborated testimony

of an accomplice. See CALJIC Nos 3.10, 3.11, 3.12. 

Respondent contends that petitioner’s claim is not

exhausted. Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge their

confinement collaterally in federal habeas proceedings are first

required to exhaust state judicial remedies by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the

merits of each claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28

USC § 2254(b), (c). Petitioner’s claim may be denied without

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reaching the exhaustion issue if it is not cognizable, however. See

28 USC § 2254(b)(2). See also Cassett v Stewart, 406 F3d 614, 624

(9th Cir 2005) (“a federal court may deny an unexhausted petition on

the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does

not raise even a colorable federal claim.”). 

A state trial court's refusal to give a requested jury

instruction does not, by itself, create a cognizable claim in a

federal habeas corpus proceeding. See Dunckhurst v Deeds, 859 F2d

110, 114 (9th Cir 1988). To state a federal habeas claim, the error

must so infect the trial that the defendant is deprived of due

process under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Dunckhurst at 114. 

In addition, a habeas petitioner must establish that the

instructional error "'had substantial and injurious effect or

influence in determining the jury's verdict.'" Brecht v Abrahamson,

507 US 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v United States, 328 US

750, 776 (1946)). The error must have resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht at 637 (citation omitted). 

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s

decision not to give the jury the requested instructions on

accomplice liability because Smith’s statements were not testimony.

Jones I, at *4. Smith’s statements were admitted solely to give

context to petitioner’s adoptive admission that the cocaine belonged

to him. Jones I, at *4. The court reasoned that because the truth

of Smith’s statements was not at issue, jury instructions on

accomplice statements were inappropriate. Jones I, at *4.

Petitioner’s claim may be denied even if unexhausted. 

There is no clearly established Supreme Court decision holding that

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a trial court has a federal constitutional obligation to give an

instruction, requested or not, cautioning the jury about the

veracity or reliability of accomplice statements. See Smith v

Gibson, 197 F3d 454, 460 (10th Cir 2000); see also United States v

Augenblick, 393 US 348, 352 (1969) (“When we look at the

requirements of procedural due process, the use of accomplice

testimony is not catalogued with constitutional restrictions”). 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his jury

instruction claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d); Carey v Musladin, 127 S Ct

649, 653-54 (2006). 

 

D

Petitioner claims that introducing into evidence the tape

recorded conversation between petitioner and Smith erroneously

admitted hearsay evidence against petitioner. 

A state court's evidentiary ruling is not subject to

federal habeas review unless the ruling violates federal law, either

by infringing upon a specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair

trial guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v Harris, 465 US 37, 41

(1984). 

Respondent argues that petitioner’s claim was presented to

the California Supreme Court as a matter of state evidentiary law

only, and the claim therefore is not exhausted. Whether or not

petitioner fairly raised his federal claim to the state high court,

the claim may be dismissed as not colorable. See Cassett, 406 F3d

at 624. 

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As discussed in the context of petitioner’s Confrontation

Clause claim, Smith’s statements on the tape recording are not

hearsay because they are not testimony. Petitioner is not entitled

to federal habeas relief on his admission of hearsay claim.

E

Petitioner claims that his waiver of jury trial on the

question of prior convictions was invalid. 

Petitioner waived jury trial as to his prior “strike”

offenses. CT 450. In a bench trial, the trial judge found true

that petitioner had suffered three prior “strike” convictions: two

for robbery and one for attempted murder. CT 453. Petitioner

argues that his waiver of jury trial on the question of his prior

“strike” offenses was misinformed, and that he was entitled to a

jury trial on those issues. 

Petitioner does not have a constitutional right to have

the veracity of his prior convictions found by a jury. Apprendi v

New Jersey, 530 US 466, 488-90 (2000) (other than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,

and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). Prior convictions and

recidivist behavior that increase the maximum penalty need not be

presented to the jury because they are not considered an element of

the offense charged. See Almendarez-Torres v United States, 523 US

224, 243-44 (1998), United States v Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d 411,

414-15 (9th Cir 2001) (holding that Almendarez-Torres remains good

law after Apprendi and provides that prior convictions, whether or

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not admitted by the defendant on the record, are sentencing factors

rather than elements of the crime). Determinations about prior

convictions, including whether a prior conviction operates as a

“strike” offense, are sentencing factors that fall within the

Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi’s jury requirement. See 

Almendarez-Torres 523 US at 243-44, Pacheco-Zepeda, 234 F3d at

414-15. 

Petitioner’s claim fails even if he were entitled to a

jury trial on the prior conviction determination. The failure to

submit a sentencing factor to the jury, like the failure to submit

an element to the jury, is subject to harmless-error analysis. 

Washington v Recuenco, 126 S Ct 2546, 2553 (2006). Here, there is

no indication that the jury would have reached a result more

favorable to petitioner had they determined the facts of the prior

convictions rather than the trial judge. Any error in having a

bench trial on the issue was harmless. Washington at 2553.

The state court’s rejection of petitioner's jury trial

claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his jury

trial claim.

F

Petitioner claims that the information failed to allege

the quantity of cocaine possessed by petitioner. 

Petitioner was convicted of possession of “any controlled

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substance” pursuant to the California Health and Safety Code. See

Cal Health & Safety § 11350(a)(1); see also Cal Health & Safety §

11055 (b)(6) (listing cocaine as a Schedule II drug). The statute

makes possession of any quantity of a controlled substance an

offense, regardless of the amount actually possessed by petitioner. 

See Cal Health & Safety § 11350; see also People v Palaschak, 9 Cal

4th 1236, 1242 (“The essential elements of possession of a

controlled substance are dominion and control of the substance in a

quantity usable for consumption or sale”) (internal citations

omitted). The quantity of cocaine possessed by petitioner was not

relevant to the question of guilt, and so failure to allege quantity

in the charging documents has no bearing on petitioner’s conviction.

The state court’s denial of petitioner's claim was not

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Supreme Court precedent, nor was it based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim

that the information failed to allege the quantity of cocaine he

possessed.

G

Petitioner claims erroneous introduction of evidence and

unlawful detention in violation of the Fourth amendment.

Stone v Powell, 428 US 465, 481-82, 494 (1976), bars

federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment claims unless the state

did not provide an opportunity for full and fair litigation of those

claims. California state procedure provides an opportunity for full

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litigation of any Fourth Amendment claim. See Cal Penal Code §

1538.5 (defendant may move to suppress evidence on the basis that it

was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment). Even if the

state court’s determination of the Fourth Amendment issues is

improper, it will not be remedied in federal habeas corpus actions

so long as the petitioner is provided a full and fair opportunity to

litigate the issue. See Locks v Sumner, 703 F2d 403, 408 (9th Cir

1983). 

The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s

denial of petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims on the merits. See

Jones I, at **2-4. The court explained that, “the detention was

supported by specific and articulable facts supporting the deputies’

suspicion that Jones was involved in criminal activity.” Jones I,

at *5. Because petitioner was given a full and fair opportunity to

litigate his Fourth Amendment claims in state court, the claims are

barred from federal habeas review under the rationale of Stone v

Powell. 

H

Petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel based

on trial counsel’s failure to request a jury trial on the question

of petitioner’s prior convictions, and to advise him adequately on

the nature of a bifurcated proceeding.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness

of counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he

must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i e, that

it fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

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prevailing professional norms. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,

687-88 (1984). Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by

counsel's deficient performance, i e, that "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland at

694. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland at 694. Petitioner

has the burden of “showing” that counsel’s performance was

deficient. Toomey v Bunnell, 898 F2d 741, 743 (9th Cir 1990). 

Similarly, he must “affirmatively prove prejudice.” Strickland, 466

US at 693. Conclusory allegations that counsel was ineffective do

not warrant relief. Jones v Gomez, 66 F3d 199, 205 (9th Cir 1995). 

Petitioner fails to allege how counsel’s performance at

trial was deficient. He also fails to allege, let alone show, that

there is a reasonable probability that, had the question of

petitioner’s prior strike convictions been found by a jury rather

than a judge, within a single rather than a bifurcated proceeding,

the result of the proceeding would have been different. See

Strickland, 466 US at 693, 694. Moreover, in view of the evidence

presented at trial, it simply cannot be said that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to request a

jury trial on petitioner’s prior strike convictions, or proceed in a

single proceeding, the result of the trial would have been

different. See Strickland at 693, 694. 

The state court’s denial of petitioner’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, the Strickland standard. See 28 USC §

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2254(d). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 

I

Petitioner claims that he should have been Mirandized

before being taken into custody by officers Krean and James. 

In Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held

that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statement

made during custodial interrogation may be admitted in evidence. 

Miranda protections are triggered where there is both custody and

interrogation. 384 US at 467. "In custody" means, "'formal arrest

or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a

formal arrest." California v Beheler, 463 US 1121, 1125 (1983)

(quoting Oregon v Mathiason, 429 US 492, 495 (1977)). It requires

that "a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to

terminate the interrogation and leave," as judged by the totality of

the circumstances. Thompson v Keohane, 516 US 99, 112 (1995). 

"[I]nterrogation means questioning or 'its functional equivalent,'

including 'words or actions on the part of the police (other than

those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police

should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating

response from the suspect.'" Pope v Zenon, 69 F3d 1018, 1023 (9th

Cir 1995) (quoting Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301 (1980)). 

Respondents argue that petitioner did not exhaust his

Miranda claim in the state courts. Even if he did not, it may be

dismissed because it is not colorable. See Cassett, 406 F3d at 624. 

Petitioner was arguably in custody once he was placed in the back

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seat of officers James and Krean’s patrol car. A reasonable person

in those circumstances would have felt not able to leave. See

Thompson, 516 US at 112. But, petitioner’s subsequent recorded

conversation with Smith was not interrogation, because Smith is not

a police officer. See Pope, 69 F3d at 1023. Because petitioner’s

Miranda rights were not triggered by an interrogation, officers

James and Krean were not required to read petitioner Miranda

warnings. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on

his Miranda claim. 

J

Petitioner claims that the use of felonies committed by

him prior to the enactment of California’s Three Strikes law to

enhance his sentence violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

Constitution.

The United States Constitution prohibits the federal

government and the states from passing any "ex post facto Law." US 

Const Art I, § 9, cl 3 (federal government); Art I § 10, cl 1

(states). A law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause only if it: (1)

punishes as criminal an act which was innocent when committed; (2)

makes a crime's punishment greater than when the crime was

committed; or (3) deprives a person of a defense available at the

time the crime was committed. See Collins v Youngblood, 497 US 37,

42 (1990). The application of an enhancement due to a prior

conviction is not a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the

United States Constitution. See McDonald v Mass, 180 US 311, 312-13

(1901) (“The statute, imposing a punishment on none but future

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crimes, is not ex post facto."). The enhancement is not a penalty

for the prior offense; it is the recidivist nature of the present

offense that the enhancement punishes. See McDonald at 312-13. 

California courts have consistently held that sentencing

enhancement for prior serious felony convictions does not violate

the prohibition against ex post facto laws. See People v Williams,

140 Cal App 3d 445, 448-50 (1983) (citing Ex Parte Gutierrez, 45 Cal

429, 432 (1873)). The enhancement is attributable to the

petitioner's status as a repeat offender and arises as an incident

of the present offense, rather than constituting a penalty for the

prior offense. See People v Jackson, 37 Cal 3d 826, 833 (1985) (“No

constitutional bar prevents the application of [California Penal

Code] section 667 to the later offense solely because the prior

conviction which serves as a basis for enhancement was committed

before the initiative passed.”). 

To be sure, enhancement statutes may not be applied to

enhance sentences for crimes which occurred prior to their

enactment. See People v McCary, 166 Cal App 3d 1, 7 (1985). But,

if the present crime occurred after the enactment of the statute,

priors which occurred before the enactment of the statute may be

used to enhance the sentence for the present crime. See Fong v

United States, 287 F2d 525, 526 (9th Cir 1961) (affirming

petitioner’s enhanced sentence for a current conviction based on

prior convictions committed before the enactment of a recidivist

sentencing scheme). 

Contrary to respondent’s suggestion, petitioner properly

raised his ex post facto claim in a supplemental petition for writ

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of habeas corpus to the California Supreme Court. But,

unfortunately for petitioner, the state high court’s denial of the

claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 USC §

2254(d). The use of pre-Three Strikes law prior convictions to

enhance a sentence for a post-Three Strikes law current conviction

does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause. See McDonald, 180 US

at 312-13; Fong, 287 F2d at 526. Petitioner is not entitled to

federal habeas relief on his ex post facto claim.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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