Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01736/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01736-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Teresa Anne Palma
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

TERESA ANNE PALMA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security 

Defendant. 

No. 2:15-cv-1736-EFB 

ORDER 

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons that follow, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied and the Commissioner’s 

motion is granted. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI, alleging that she had 

been disabled since March 10, 2010. Administrative Record (“AR”) 180-192. Her applications 

were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 132-136, 142-147. On November 4, 2013, 

a hearing was held before administrative law judge (“ALJ”) David M. Blume. Id. at 58-77. 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 1 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

2

Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the hearing, at which she and a vocational expert testified. 

Id.

On February 13, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled 

under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 20-34. The ALJ made the 

following specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

March 31, 2016. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 10, 2012, the 

alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

///// 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 2 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

3

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: paranoid schizophrenia and bipolar 

disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart 

P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 

416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has 

the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but 

with the following nonexertional limitations: she is limited to non-public simple, 

repetitive, tasks and only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant was born on February 6, 1964 and was 48 years old, which is defined as a 

younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 C.]FR 404.1563 and 

416.963). 

8. The claimant has at least a high school education and is able to communicate in English 

(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964). 

9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using 

the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is “not 

disabled,” whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 

CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2). 

10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional 

capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the 

claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569, 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)). 

* * * 

11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

March 10, 2012, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)). 

Id. at 22-33. 

Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review was denied on June 16, 2015, leaving the 

ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 3 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

4

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by (1) rejecting her treating and examining physicians’ 

opinions without providing legally sufficient reasons, and (2) discounting her subjective 

complaints without providing clear and convincing reasons. ECF No. 10 at 18-34. 

A. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Medical Opinion Evidence 

 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting opinions form her treating and 

examining physicians. ECF No. 10 at 18-29. The weight given to medical opinions depends in 

part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. 

Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, 

who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. 

Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 4 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

5

medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) 

contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ 

may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for 

“clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons 

that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion 

generally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining 

professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may 

resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies 

on the same clinical findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the 

conclusions of the examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 

625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007). 

 In May, 2012, plaintiff began receiving treatment from psychiatrist Dr. Arturo Villamor. 

AR 485. Dr. Villamor diagnosed plaintiff with paranoid schizophrenia, and indicated that 

plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded to poor. Id. The clinical findings supporting the diagnosis 

included poor memory, sleep disturbance, personality change, mood disturbance, delusions or 

hallucinations, anhedonia, paranoia, decreased energy, social withdrawal, and generalized 

persistent anxiety. Id. at 486. Plaintiff’s symptoms included hearing voices, insomnia, command 

hallucinations, anxiety, and paranoia, with auditory hallucinations. Id. at 484. 

 It was Dr. Villamor’s opinion that plaintiff was moderately limited in remembering 

locations and work-like procedures; understanding, remembering, and carrying out one or two 

step instructions; sustaining ordinary routine without supervision; making simple work related 

decisions; completing a normal workday without interruption from psychologically based 

symptoms and performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number of breaks; and 

setting realistic goals and making plans independently. Id. at 488-490. He further opined that 

plaintiff was markedly limited in understanding, remembering and carrying out detailed 

instructions; maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; performing activities 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 5 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

6

within a schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary 

tolerance; interacting appropriately with the general public; getting along with co-workers 

without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; and being aware of normal hazards 

and taking appropriate precautions. Id. It was also Dr. Villamor’s opinion that plaintiff’s 

symptoms would produce good days and bad days; that she was incapable of even low stress 

work; and that her symptoms would cause her to be absent from work about once a month. Id. at 

491-492. He further stated that plaintiff would be able to manage benefits in her own best 

interest. Id. at 492. 

 Plaintiff underwent a psychological evaluation by Dr. Phillip MacFarland, Ph.D. Id. at 

580-592. Dr. MacFarland diagnosed plaintiff with Schizoaffective Disorder. Id. at 582. He 

opined that plaintiff was moderately limited in understanding, remember, and carrying out one or 

two step instructions; making simple work related decisions; and maintaining socially appropriate 

behavior. It was also his opinion that plaintiff was markedly impaired in remembering locations 

and work-like procedures; understanding, remembering, and carryout detailed instructions; 

maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; performing activities within a 

schedule, maintaining regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerance; 

sustaining ordinary routine without supervision; working in coordination with others; completing 

a normal workday without interruption from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a 

consistent pace without an unreasonable number of breaks; interacting appropriately with the 

general public; accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; 

getting along with co-workers without distracting them; responding appropriately to changes in 

the work setting; being aware of normal work hazards and taking appropriate precautions. 

 The record also contains opinions from two non-examining physicians. Based on his 

review of the record, Dr. Preston Davis, Psy.D., opined that plaintiff is moderately limited in 

carrying out detailed instructions; working with or in proximity to others without being distracted; 

interacting appropriately with the general public; and responding appropriately to changes in the 

work setting. Id. at 84-86. He opined that plaintiff could understand, remember, and carry out 

simple work instructions; sustain concentration, pace, and persistence consistently for two hours, 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 6 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

7

with customary breaks; interact with supervisors; perform tasks with little general public and 

coworker contact; and adapt to a work setting that is simple and routine. Id. at 86. Dr. Phaedra 

Caruso-Radin, Psy.D., concurred in Dr. Davis’s opinion. Id. at 112-114. 

 In assessing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ afforded “reduced weight” to Drs. Villamor and 

MacFarland’s opinions, while giving “substantial weight” to Drs. Davis and Caruso-Radin’s 

opinions. Because Dr. Villamor and Dr. MacFarland’s opinions were contradicted by the nonexamining opinions, the ALJ was required to give specific and legitimate reasons supported by 

substantial evidence for giving these opinions reduced weight. See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 

1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 The ALJ acknowledged that Dr. Villamor was a treating physician and had a significant 

treatment history with plaintiff. AR 29. However, the ALJ concluded that his opinion was 

inconsistent with the record as a whole, as well as internally inconsistent. Id. An ALJ may reject 

a treating opinion that is inconsistent with other evidence in the record, including the physician’s 

own assessment and treatment notes. Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216. 

 The ALJ gave numerous examples for his finding that the opinion was unsupported by the 

record and internally inconsistent. First, Dr. Villamor’s opinion is based in part on plaintiff 

experiencing sleep disturbances (AR 486), but treatment records consistently reflected that 

plaintiff reported sleeping well (id. at 340, 363, 416, 419, 422, 469, 475, 478, 505, 508, 545, 548, 

551, 554). Plaintiff contends, however, that treatment records also reference her reports of 

experiencing sleeping disturbances, not just reports of sleeping well. ECF No. 10 at 20. Plaintiff, 

however, identifies only one treatment record reflecting that she reported experiencing sleep 

disturbances. That record is from December 2007, id. at 414, and predates Dr. Villamor’s 

opinion by almost 5 years. Significantly, it is inconsistent with virtually all other treatment 

records. Accordingly, the ALJ permissibly concluded that Dr. Villamor’s statement that plaintiff 

experienced sleep disturbances is inconsistent with the record as whole. Id. at 29. 

 Dr. Villamor also stated that plaintiff’s impairments caused decreased energy. Id. 

However, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff consistently reported that she walked daily. Id. As 

plaintiff concedes, the record reflects that she does walk daily. ECF No. 10 at 20; see, e.g., AR 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 7 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

8

416, 420, 545, 558. However, she argues that “to claim that having the physical energy to walk—

at an unspecified pace or distance—is necessarily inconsistent with a lack of energy or motivation 

to do other tasks is to fail to understand the difference between physical fatigue on the one hand 

and mental exhaustion, lack of motivation, and/or apathy on the other hand.” Id. This argument, 

however, fails to consider that her ability to walk every day demonstrates that she maintains the 

motivation to engage in activities, which the ALJ logically concluded is inconsistent with a 

finding of decreased energy. 

 Dr. Villamor also noted that plaintiff’s impairments caused a pervasive lack of interest. 

AR 486. The ALJ concluded that this finding was not consistent with plaintiff’s reports that she 

enjoyed visiting family and watching television. AR 29. Plaintiff contend that being “able to 

visit with only her sister and father . . . speaks more to the limitations of her social contacts . . . 

than to any positive emotional range.” Plaintiff’s argument merely expresses a different 

interpretation of the evidence. The court, however, cannot find that the ALJ unreasonably 

concluded that Dr. Villamor’s finding that plaintiff had a pervasive lack of interest was 

inconsistent with records showing that he enjoyed visiting with family and watching television. 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s 

conclusion must be upheld.”). 

 Dr. Villamor also concluded that plaintiff’s ability to perform work related activities was 

limited due to command hallucinations. AR 487. However, around the time Dr. Villamor 

rendered his opinion, plaintiff reported that there was a reduction in hearing voices, and she 

denied any command hallucinations. Id. at 446, 449,452, 469, 472, 505, 511, 554. The ALJ 

reasonably determined that these treatment notes undermined Dr. Villamor’s opinions that her 

command hallucinations would significantly impair her ability to work. 

 Further, Dr. Villamor stated that plaintiff required hospitalization or emergency treatment 

one to two times per year for her symptoms. AR 487. As noted by the ALJ, the only records for 

hospitalization after the alleged onset date were for pneumonia and dehydration in September 

2012. Id. at 498, 564. Plaintiff’s treating physician also stated that the limitations he assessed 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 8 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

9

had been present plaintiff’s entire life. Id. at 492. The ALJ logically concluded that this finding, 

coupled with plaintiff’s demonstrated ability to work from 2003 to 2006, significantly 

undermined Dr. Villamor’s opinions that she had impairments that would preclude employment. 

Id. at 29; 272. Similarly, the ALJ also correctly noted that despite assessing severe functional 

limitations, Dr. Villamor actually encouraged plaintiff to engage in more activities, such as 

volunteering or job training. See AR 418. Dr. Villamor’s recommendation can reasonably be 

read as indicating that he did not believe plaintiff was as impaired as his assessment reflected. 

Further, Dr. Villamor also reported that he evaluated plaintiff on a monthly basis (id. at 485), but 

the record indicates that he evaluated plaintiff less frequently (see id. at 469-480, 505-513). 

 These inconsistencies support the ALJ’s rejection of this treating opinion. The court 

acknowledges that the ALJ did identify a few inconsistencies that are less persuasive. The ALJ 

noted that although Dr. Villamor reported that plaintiff’s lowest GAF score in the past year was 

40, but his treatment records show that he gave plaintiff scores ranging between 40 to 50. AR 29. 

There is no inconsistency between the two statements. The ALJ also found that Dr. Villamor’s 

opinion that plaintiff can manage benefits was inconsistent with his opinion that plaintiff had 

moderate to marked limitations in understanding, remembering, and carrying out simple tasks as 

well as detailed tasks. It is questionable to conclude that an individual that would have difficulty 

sustaining simple tasks for an 8-hour workday would also necessarily be precluded from 

managing his own finances 

 Nonetheless, in light of the numerous and legitimate inconsistencies identified by the ALJ, 

any reliance on these latter examples was, at most, harmless. Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that a court may affirm an ALJ’s decision 

“under the rubric of harmless error where the mistake was nonprejudicial to the claimant or 

irrelevant to the ALJ's ultimate disability conclusion.”). Accordingly, the ALJ gave specific and 

legitimate reasons for his rejection of Dr. Villamor’s opinion. 

 Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ failed to give sufficient reasons for rejecting the opinion 

from examining physician Dr. MacFarland. ECF No. 10 at 26-29. The ALJ accorded reduced 

weight to Dr. MacFarland’s opinion because it was based on “one-time examination, and is 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 9 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

10

inconsistent with the record as a whole, which shows the claimant to have improved on 

medications.” AR 31. He found that Dr. MacFarland assessed more restrictive limitations than 

plaintiff’s treating physician, “even though the medical evidence of record indicates that 

[plaintiff] has improved since Dr. Villamor’s opinion.” Id. Lastly, the ALJ noted that Dr. 

MacFarland stated that plaintiff has had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations,” which was not 

supported by the record.2 Id. 

 These reasons constitute a specific and legitimate basis for discounting Dr. MacFarland’s 

opinion. First, while the ALJ observed that Dr. MacFarland’s opinion was based on a single 

examination, a fair reading of the decision indicates that this statement was made to highlight that 

the opinion was inconsistent with extensive treatment records. See Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 359 F.3d. 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2003) (an ALJ may reject a medical opinion that is 

unsupported by the record as a whole or by objective medical evidence). Similar to Dr. Villamor, 

Dr. McFarland found that plaintiff’s impairments caused a number of symptoms, including 

hearing voices, visual hallucinations, sleep disturbance, and pervasive loss of interest. Id. at 586. 

As explained above, these findings are inconsistent with plaintiff’s treatment records, which 

showed that plaintiff experienced improvement in her symptoms. Further, based on his one 

examination, Dr. McFarland assessed extreme limitations that were not only inconsistent with 

plaintiff’s treatment records, but also exceeded the limitations assessed by plaintiff’s treating 

physician. This further inconsistency was a proper consideration in giving reduced weight to Dr. 

MacFarland’s examining opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4) (“the more consistent an 

opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight we will give to that opinion”). Lastly, Dr. 

MacFarland reported that plaintiff had “multiple hospitalizations for full blown psychotic 

episodes and several suicide attempts.” AR 580. However, as noted by the ALJ, plaintiff only 

reported one psychiatric hospitalization in 1994, and there is no evidence that she was 

 2

 The ALJ also observed that he was not was not bound by Dr. MacFarland’s conclusion 

that plaintiff was not able to work a 40-hour workweek, as that opinion went to the ultimate issue 

of disability. AR 31; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d)(1) (“A statement by a 

medical source that you are ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not mean that we will determine 

that you are disabled.”). 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 10 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

11

subsequently hospitalized for any psychological impairment. See, e.g., id. at 416 (treatment note 

reflecting report of one psychiatric hospitalization in 1994). Thus, the ALJ logically concluded 

that Dr. MacFarland’s report overstated the severity of plaintiff’s mental impairment.

 Accordingly, the ALJ also gave legally sufficient reasons for discounting this treating 

opinion. 

B. The ALJ Provided Sufficient Reasons for Discounting Plaintiff’s Credibility 

 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ erred by failing to set forth clear and convincing 

reasons for discrediting her subjective complaints. ECF No. 10 at 29-34. 

In evaluating whether subjective complaints are credible, the ALJ should first consider 

objective medical evidence and then consider other factors. Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 

344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). If there is objective medical evidence of impairment, the ALJ may 

then consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, 

treatment and functional restrictions. See id. at 345-347. The ALJ also may consider: (1) the 

applicant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements or other inconsistent 

testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a 

prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the applicant’s daily activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

Work records, physician and third party testimony about nature, severity and effect of symptoms, 

and inconsistencies between testimony and conduct also may be relevant. Light v. Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). A failure to seek treatment for an allegedly 

debilitating medical problem may be a valid consideration by the ALJ in determining whether the 

alleged associated pain is not a significant nonexertional impairment. See Flaten v. Secretary of 

HHS, 44 F.3d 1453, 1464 (9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ may rely, in part, on his or her own 

observations, see Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989), which cannot 

substitute for medical diagnosis. Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

“Without affirmative evidence showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner’s 

reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear and convincing.” Morgan, 169 F.3d 

at 599. 

///// 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 11 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

12

Plaintiff testified that she suffers from depression and that she hears voices every day. AR 

63. She reported that her depression causes her to sleep all day and to not be in a good mood. Id. 

The voices she hears usually are “murmuring,” but sometimes they are more aggravated and tell 

her things “like your father’s dead.” Id. at 63-64. She usually goes to be around 10 or 11 p.m., 

and will sleep until noon. Id. at 65. On a typical day she sleeps, does homework, checks the 

mail, and, on the weekends, she visits her sister. Id. at 64. She testified that she would be too 

depressed to go to work, and that she would end up sleeping in. Id. Plaintiff stated that she took 

Risperdal for her auditory hallucinations, which “works pretty well” and caused no side effects. 

Id. She also explained that she did not take any depression medication, because her depression is 

caused from hearing voices. Id. at 66. 

 The ALJ found that plaintiff’s allegations of debilitating impairments were not fully 

credible. Id. at 27. He provided multiple reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, the ALJ 

found that plaintiff’s allegations were inconsistent with her reported daily activities. Id. at 27. 

An ALJ may consider activities of daily living in assessing a plaintiff’s credibility. Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). However, a plaintiff’s daily activities have a 

bearing on the plaintiff’s credibility only where the level of activity is inconsistent with the 

alleged limitations. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014). 

 As noted by the ALJ, the record shows that plaintiff walked daily, rode her bicycle, 

provided her own personal care, performed simple household chores, prepared simple meals, 

went out alone, went grocery shopping, and handled money. AR 27, 221-222, 341. These daily 

activities are inconsistent with plaintiff’s allegations that her impairments cause her to sleep all 

day. 

 The ALJ also noted that the record establishes that plaintiff’s alleged disabling 

impairments were present at approximately the same level of severity prior to the alleged onset 

day, and that there is little evidence of worsening of her symptoms. AR 27. The ALJ found that 

“[t]he fact that the impairments did not prevent the claimant from working [prior to the onset 

date] strongly suggest that they would not currently prevent work.” Id. Further, the ALJ also 

noted that there is evidence that plaintiff stopped working due to business being slow, which is 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 12 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

13

unrelated to her impairment. Id. As discussed above, plaintiff’s treating physicians indicated that 

the limitations he assessed in November 2012 existed throughout plaintiff’s life. AR 492. 

However, the record reflects that plaintiff sustained work for several years despite her limitations. 

Id. at 272. Plaintiff’s ability to work despite her limitations was a proper consideration in 

reducing her credibility.3 Light, 119 F.3d at 792 (in assessing credibility, an ALJ may consider 

work records). 

 The ALJ also discounted plaintiff’s credibility based on inconsistent statements. Plaintiff 

testified that she hears voices every day, sleeps all day, and is generally not in a good mood. AR 

63-64. However, treatment records reflected that she reported doing okay, there was a reduction 

in hearing voices, and that she enjoys engaging in several activities, including walking, riding her 

bike, and visiting family. See, e.g., id. at 469-471, 478, 505-507, 542-550). Plaintiff’s testimony 

that she is generally in a poor mood and spent the majority of her day sleeping drastically 

contrasted reports she made to her treating physician. These inconsistencies constitute a clear and 

convincing basis for rejecting plaintiff’s allegations. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (an ALJ may 

discredit testimony that is inconsistent with prior statements or other evidence). 

 Lastly, the ALJ questioned the veracity of plaintiff’s allegations of severe depression. Id. 

at 28. As noted by the ALJ, plaintiff testified that the main reason she is not able to work is 

because of her depression. AR 65-66. She further stated that she did not take any depression 

medication because her depression was caused by hearing voices. However, she also testified 

that she takes Risperdal for her auditory hallucination, which worked pretty well and did not 

cause any side effect. Id. at 64. Moreover, the ALJ observed that the medical records indicate 

///// 

 3

 Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s finding that she left work for reasons unrelated to 

her mental impairments, arguing that the ALJ mischaracterizes her testimony. ECF No. 63. 

Plaintiff testified that she quit working at Burger King after six years because “business was slow 

and that I couldn’t keep up.” AR 63. Given that plaintiff maintained this job for 6 years despite 

her limitations, the court finds the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence reasonable. Thomas v. 

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be 

upheld.”) 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 13 of 14
1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

14

that plaintiff experienced a reduction in hearing voices with her medication. Id. at 28. The ALJ 

concluded that this evidence would suggest that plaintiff’s depression was controlled. Id. 

 The ALJ’s reasoning is sound. Given that plaintiff’s alleged depression was caused from 

auditory hallucinations, which were improved with medication, one would expect improvement in 

depression symptoms. 

 Based on the foregoing, the court finds that the ALJ gave several clear and convincing 

reasons for discounting plaintiff’s credibility. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is granted; and 

 3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the Commissioner’s favor. 

DATED: September 30, 2016. 

Case 2:15-cv-01736-EFB Document 18 Filed 09/30/16 Page 14 of 14