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Parties Involved:
Chris P. Lane
Appellant
Riverview Hospital
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐1118

CHRIS P. LANE,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

RIVERVIEW HOSPITAL,

Defendant‐Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:13‐cv‐01113‐TWP‐TAB — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JUNE 10, 2015 — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2016

____________________

Before MANION, WILLIAMS, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Chris Lane sued River‐

view Hospital, his former employer, for race discrimination in

terminating his employment as a security guard at the hospi‐

tal. The district court granted summary judgment for the de‐

fendant. We affirm.

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2 No. 15‐1118

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, and we

give the non‐moving party the benefit of conflicts in the evi‐

dence and of any inferences in his favor that might reasonably

be drawn from the evidence. See Mintz v. Caterpillar Inc., 788

F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2015). Our account of the facts is filtered

through that summary judgment lens.

Lane is African American and began working as a security

guard at Riverview Hospital in 1999. He had a successful em‐

ployment record at the hospital, without any formal disci‐

pline until the event at the center of this lawsuit.

In August 2012, a 17‐year‐old male autistic patient started

hitting, swinging at, and kicking his caregivers. The situation

had gotten so far out of hand that the health care professionals

were afraid to approach the young man or to enter the room.

A nurse summoned security.

Lane responded and entered the room. He saw the patient

kick one of the staff in the back. Lane then tried to restrain the

patient, who tried to bite him and then spit in Lane’s mouth.

As the patient prepared to spit again, Lane slapped him in the

face with his open palm, making “solid contact.” The patient

settled down and stopped swinging and kicking at Lane and

the health care professionals in the room.

After the incident, Lane completed a written report for the

hospital explaining why he thought the slap was justified un‐

der the circumstances. He also filed a report with the Sheriff’s

Department, where he had status as a special deputy as a con‐

dition of his work for the hospital. The recipients of these re‐

ports concluded he had shown poor judgment and had over‐

reacted without trying less violent steps to gain control of the

situation. The Sheriff’s Department actually sought to file a

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No. 15‐1118 3

criminal assault charge against Lane, but the prosecutor de‐

clined to bring a charge.

At the hospital, the outcome was different. Ann Kuzee, the

hospital’s director of human resources, also investigated the

incident. Kuzee reviews and enforces Riverview’s rules, poli‐

cies, and procedures, and she becomes involved any time a

supervisor proposes to discipline or fire an employee who is

not a physician. Kuzee does not have the final say in whether

to fire an employee. Her recommendations are presented to

the Executive Steering Committee for decision.

After confirming with Lane that he had in fact slapped the

patient, Kuzee recommended that his employment be termi‐

nated. The hospital has a policy on restraints that prohibits

“any form of restraint that is not medically necessary or is

used as a means of coercion, discipline, convenience, or retal‐

iation by staff,” and another policy prohibits acts or threats of

violence. The Executive Steering Committee approved Ku‐

zee’s recommendation on the condition that she consult the

Sheriff’s Department about whether the force used by Lane, a

deputized officer, was appropriate. A major at the Sheriff’s

Department told Kuzee that he thought Lane’s slap was not

an appropriate use of force for the situation.

The hospital told Lane that if he did not resign, he would

be fired. He chose to resign a few days later. The district court

treated the situation as a constructive discharge, and that

point is not at issue in the appeal.

After exhausting administrative remedies through a com‐

plaint to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Lane filed suit for race discrimination in employment in vio‐

lation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

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4 No. 15‐1118

§ 2000e–2(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We analyze Title VII and

§ 1981 claims underthe same framework. E.g., Whitfield v. Intʹl

Truck & Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2014).

If that were the entire story, we would have an employer’s

disciplinary decision that would be well within an employer’s

discretion to make. The question is whether Lane offered

enough additional evidence to permit a reasonable inference

of race discrimination in the decision.

Plaintiff Lane does not rely on the McDonnell Douglas in‐

direct method of proof or any of its variations. See generally

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). He also

does not have evidence directly indicating that Kuzee or any

other decision‐maker was motivated by racial animus. He

tries instead to put together what we have often called a “con‐

vincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence to support an in‐

ference of discrimination. See Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc., 786

F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2015); Hutt v. AbbVie Products LLC, 757

F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2014); Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d

699, 703 (7th Cir. 2013); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d

835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring) (suggesting that

courts avoid unduly formal methods of analyzing discrimina‐

tion and focus instead on whether circumstances could per‐

mit inference of discrimination). The phrase “convincing mo‐

saic” is not a legal test but a metaphor. It describes a case built

on circumstantial evidence, in this case about the reasons for

the hospital’s decision to fire Lane. The core issue is whether

Lane has offered evidence that would allow a reasonable jury

to infer that he would not have been fired if he were not Afri‐

can American and everything else remained the same. See

Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Villages Illinois, Inc., 453 F.3d 900,

Case: 15-1118 Document: 26 Filed: 08/26/2016 Pages: 11
No. 15‐1118 5

903–04 (7th Cir. 2006); Achor v. Riverside Golf Club, 117 F.3d 339,

341 (7th Cir. 1997).

Lane relies on four incidents to support an inference of

race discrimination: an arguably similar incident involving a

white nurse; Kuzee’s factually incorrect response to the EEOC

about her knowledge of that earlier incident; and one com‐

ment and one question by Kuzee about race.  

First, Lane compares his slap of the autistic patient to an‐

other incident involving nurse Matt Rainey, who was not dis‐

ciplined at all, let alone fired. Rainey was assigned to a young

girl brought to the emergency room in February 2011. The

girl’s mother, Jessi Arreola, argued with Rainey about his

treatment of her daughter. As Rainey was leaving the room,

Arreola tried to follow him out. Rainey was closing the door

behind him when Arreola grabbed the handle to keep him

from closing her in the room.

At this point the accounts diverge. According to Arreola,

Rainey then started to slam the door, attempting to trap her

inside the room, after he had “slapped” away her arm in a

“karate style action” as she was grabbing for the handle. Two

onlookers reported, however, that Rainey had tried to remove

Arreola’s hand without using any force.

Rainey’s immediate supervisors investigated the incident.

They credited Rainey and the two onlookers over Arreola and

concluded that Rainey had not slapped her or violated any

hospital rule. The supervisors told Kuzee over the telephone

about the incident, and they later concluded that Rainey

should not be disciplined. Kuzee reviewed and edited the

email the supervisors sent to Rainey informing him he would

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6 No. 15‐1118

not be disciplined. She also was aware that Arreola had filed

a police report complaining about Rainey.  

Under any mode of analysis for a discrimination case, ev‐

idence that the employer treated better a similarly situated

employee outside the plaintiff’s protected class can provide

some circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Whether em‐

ployees are similarly situated is a flexible inquiry. See Cole‐

man, 667 F.3d at 841; Humphries v. CBOCS West, Inc., 474 F.3d

387, 405 (7th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 442 (2008). The basic

question is whether the situations are similar enough, apart

from the employees’ races, to provide support for a reasona‐

ble inference of discrimination. Arguments about the close‐

ness of the “fit” between comparisons will often present ques‐

tions for trial rather than for summary judgment. See, e.g.,

Coleman, 667 F.3d at 846–47 (reversing summary judgment);

Humphries, 474 F.3d at 405 (same); Graham v. Long Island R.R.,

230 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).

Lane and Rainey had different jobs and responsibilities,

but as the district court recognized, both were subject to the

same hospital policies against violence and use of restraints

to coerce patients. See Coleman, 667 F.3d at 847–48 (reversing

summary judgment; allowing comparison of employees with

different jobs and supervisors where same senior manager

was responsible for deciding how to enforce same policy on

violence against all employees).

The district court concluded that the Rainey incident does

not offer a probative comparison because different people

made the decisions, first not to discipline Rainey and then to

fire Lane. For purposes of summary judgment, though, this

difference is disputed as a matter of fact. It is true that Kuzee

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No. 15‐1118 7

did not investigate the Rainey matter herself or make the ini‐

tial call on discipline, but she was at least informed about the

decision/recommendation not to discipline him. If she had

disagreed, she had the authority to step in and push for a dif‐

ferent response. A reasonable jury could treat her as involved

sufficiently in both cases to allow a fair comparison. See Or‐

ton‐Bell v. Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 2014) (concluding

that employees with different immediate supervisors and in

different “chains of command” were similarly situated when

same person fired both); Perez, 731 F.3d at 707–08 (rejecting

argument that employees were not comparators because they

had different “nominal” supervisors when both supervisors

were involved in reviewing employees’ incidents and acted in

concert).

The problem for Lane is a more fundamental and undis‐

puted difference between the two incidents from the perspec‐

tive of the common decision‐maker, Kuzee, which is the rele‐

vant perspective. Lane admitted that he slapped the patient.

Rainey denied striking Arreola, and the hospital supervisors

who investigated the incident credited his account, as backed

up by other witnesses. The accusation against Rainey was sim‐

ilar to that against Lane, but from Kuzee’s perspective, the un‐

disputed facts show, she thought that Rainey actually did

nothing wrong. Lane admitted to conduct—the slap in the

face—that Kuzee viewed as a serious violation of important

hospital policies to protect vulnerable patients. The Rainey in‐

cident is not similar enough to support an inference of dis‐

crimination.

Lane’s next point stems from the EEOC proceedings after

Lane filed a charge of discrimination in which he compared

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8 No. 15‐1118

his treatment to Rainey’s. The hospital’s response, which Ku‐

zee reviewed and approved, asserted that Kuzee had not

known about the accusation against Rainey until after she re‐

ceived Lane’s charge of discrimination. Lane has offered evi‐

dence that Kuzee in fact had known about the Rainey incident

when she acted to fire Lane. Kuzee had received a telephone

call from Rainey’s supervisors who investigated the incident,

and she helped edit an email about the Rainey incident. She

was also aware that a police report had been filed.

Lane argues that Kuzee lied to the EEOC about a material

fact and that the lie supports an inference of illegal discrimi‐

nation. Kuzee and the hospital argue that her involvement in

the Rainey incident was so minimal that the response to the

EEOC was just honestly mistaken on this point. The district

judge concluded that Kuzee’s misrepresentation was an un‐

derstandable error and that Lane had presented no other evi‐

dence to show the misrepresentation was deliberate.

It has long been established that an employer’s dishonesty

in defending or explaining an employment decision can sup‐

port an inference of illegal discrimination. See St. Mary’s

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993). When an em‐

ployer’s response is factually wrong in a self‐serving way on

a material fact, the choice between treating it as an honest mis‐

take or a deliberate falsehood is ordinarily a choice for a jury

at trial, not for summary judgment. See Castro, 786 F.3d at 574;

Testerman v. EDS Technical Products Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 303 (7th

Cir. 1996). And an assertion that a decision‐maker was not

aware of the comparator identified by a complaining party

can be important, even decisive. If the supposedly common

decision‐maker was not even aware of the comparator, then a

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No. 15‐1118 9

court cannot infer intentional discrimination from the differ‐

ent treatment.

If there were more substance to the Rainey comparison

here, we would find a jury issue here, as well. But the two in‐

ferential steps go too far here. To go from this factual discrep‐

ancy to an inference of racial bias, a jury would have to con‐

clude first that the discrepancy was the result of a deliberate

decision to mislead the EEOC and second that the motive of

the deliberate decision to mislead was to conceal unlawful

race discrimination. Without further circumstantial evidence

of unlawful discrimination, a reasonable jury could not take

that step. (The issue here is familiar as the pretext element of

the McDonnell Douglas framework for circumstantial evi‐

dence. See Castro, 786 F.3d at 574; McInnis v. Alamo Community

College Dist., 207 F.3d 276, 283 (5th Cir. 2000). Even under that

framework, such evidence of pretext is not enough by itself to

prove discrimination; it becomes a factor only after the plain‐

tiff has shown other circumstances corroborating unlawful in‐

tent, including evidence that a similarly situated employee

outside the plaintiff’s protected class was treated better. That

additional evidence is missing here.) Even if we assume that

Kuzee and the hospital deliberately misled the EEOC about

her role in the Rainey incident, that would not by itself sup‐

port the further inference of unlawful intent. And the rest of

the support here is just too weak to allow a reasonable infer‐

ence of discrimination.

Lane also relies on evidence of one comment and one

question by Kuzee relating to race to support an inference that

she discriminated against him based on race. Kuzee made the

first of the remarks after the February 2011 incident involving

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10 No. 15‐1118

Rainey and before the August 2012 incident with Lane. In Jan‐

uary 2012 a white security guard at the hospital had accused

an African American guard of theft. The white guard recalled

later that Kuzee reacted to the accusation by saying that she

“did not want any trouble” because the other guard “was

black.”

Kuzee’s second remark came in her meeting with Lane

about the incident with the autistic patient. Lane mentioned a

previous encounter when the same patient had yelled a

highly offensive racial slur at him. Later during that same con‐

versation, in explaining his reaction to being spat upon, Lane

told Kuzee how his brother had reacted when a person had

spit on him when he was younger. Kuzee asked Lane about

the race of the boy who had spit on his brother.

Neither of these comments reflects racial animus. The dis‐

trict judge found that neither remark could support a reason‐

able inference of discrimination. The first comment came

about eight months before Lane’s firing and did not refer to or

involve him in any way. If that comment by a decision‐maker

had shown racial animus, it would be difficult to hold unrea‐

sonable an inference of racial animus eight months later. See

Perez v. Thorntons Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 710 (7th Cir. 2013) (com‐

paring logic of “stray remarks” cases to logic of “same actor

inference”). But a human resources manager’s non‐hostile re‐

mark that merely acknowledged the potential for race to be‐

come an issue in an unrelated incident simply does not sup‐

port that inference.

The second remark, Kuzee’s question, was tied directly to

this decision and came from a key decision‐maker. It does not,

however, support an inference of intentional race discrimina‐

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No. 15‐1118 11

tion. Kuzee’s job was to find out what happened. As the dis‐

trict judge pointed out, Kuzee asked the question only after

Lane himself told her about the patient’s use of a vile racial

epithet against him on an earlier occasion and about his own

brother’s experience. Kuzee did not exhibit racial bias by ask‐

ing a question about why Lane had brought up the story

about his brother.

Finally, viewing all of the evidence together, we still find

no error in the grant of summary judgment. The undisputed

facts show that Lane intentionally struck a patient. Reasona‐

ble managers could disagree about the proper response for

the hospital, but termination was certainly one reasonable re‐

sponse. Lane’s effort to put together a mosaic of circumstan‐

tial evidence of race discrimination simply does not hold to‐

gether sufficiently to present a genuine issue of material fact,

even when we give him the benefit of conflicts in the evidence

and reasonable inference in his favor. A jury could not reason‐

ably find that Riverview discriminated on the basis of race

when it decided to fire Lane. The judgment of the district

court is  

             AFFIRMED.

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