Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00244/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-00244-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rodrigo Alberto Lozano-Valadez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff, 

vs.

RODRIGO ALBERTO LOZANOVALADEZ, 

Defendant. 

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No. CR 04-00244-PHX-SRB

 CIV-05-1901-PHX-SRB (BPV)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

On June 23, 2005, Rodrigo Alberto Lozano-Valadez, ("Movant”), presently

confined in the Federal Correctional Institute in Milan, Michigan, filed a pro se Motion

to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence By a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Motion") (Doc. #17). The Magistrate Judge recommends that the

District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter an order dismissing the

Motion.

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files

and records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief ...."

28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively

establish that Movant is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156,

1159 (9th Cir. 1989). Hence, no hearing is required to rule on the present Motion. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND.

Rodrigo Alberto Lozano-Valadez, ("Movant"), was arrested on February 13,

2004, (Doc. # 1) and indicted on March 10, 2004, for Reentry After Deportation in

violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and enhanced by (b)(2). (Doc. #7) 

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Movant entered a plea of guilty to the indictment on April 12, 2004. (Doc. # 11)

On June 28, 2004, Movant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 30 months, three

years supervised release and a special assessment of $100.00. (Doc. # 13) Movant did

not appeal. 

On June 23, 2005, Movant filed a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. (Doc. # 17) Movant also

filed a Memorandum in support of his motion. (Doc. # 18) He raises two grounds for

relief: (1) That he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, and (2) That a sixteen

level enhancement decision by the judge was in violation of his right to trial by jury.

On June 28, 2005, the District Court called for an answer from the United States

Attorney. (Doc. # 19) The order also referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Bernardo

P. Velasco pursuant to LRCiv 72.1 and 72.2 for further proceedings and a report and

recommendation. Respondents filed a Response in Opposition on October 6, 2005.

(Doc. # 26) No reply was filed. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a one

year period of limitations from the date on which the judgement of conviction becomes

final has been imposed on the filing of motions for collateral relief by prisoners in

federal custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondents do not contest the timeliness of this

motion, and a review of the record suggests that the motion was timely filed. 

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Movant asserts that he "feels that his counsel did NOT make an attempt to make

sure the [Movant] understood his charges and possible length of his sentence." 

(Motion to Vacate, p. 3.) 

The established law governing the merits of an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is expressed in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The general

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standard for attorney performance is that of “reasonably effective assistance.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To have a valid ineffective assistance

of counsel claim Petitioner must meet the requirements set forth in Strickland. The

Strickland test requires Petitioner establish deficient performance by counsel and

prejudice resulting from that performance to obtain relief. See Luna v. Cambra, 306

F.3d 954, 961 (9th Cir. 2002), amended, 311 F.3d 928. First, deficient performance

requires that counsel’s errors “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 694. Second, Defendant must show prejudice resulting from deficient

performance by counsel. To show prejudice Defendant must demonstrate a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceedings

would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Luna, 306 F.3d at 961.

Movant contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to make sure

Movant understood his charges and possible length of his sentence and that his attorney

advised him to plead guilty resulting in the imposition of a harsher sentence. This

contention lacks merit because Movant has failed to demonstrate either deficient

performance or prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

The plea agreement demonstrates that Movant's attorney, in court, informed

Movant that he was in the highest offense level, level 24, because of a prior conviction

for attempted importation of marijuana. (Response, Ex. 1, p. 13) The Court informed

Movant that, under the plea agreement, signed by Movant, (Doc. # 15), the government

would move for a six level downward departure, resulting in Movant being sentenced

at offense level 18. (Response, Ex. 1, p.13) Both the Court, and the plea agreement

signed by Movant indicated that this offense level carries a sentence between 27 and

71 months. (Id. and Doc. # 15, p. 3) The Movant indicated that he understood this

arrangement.

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Movant acknowledged that his attorney had read the plea agreement to him and

that his attorney had answered all of his questions relating to the plea agreement, had

reviewed the charge pending against him, and that he was "absolutely" satisfied with

his representation. (Response, Ex.1, p. 5, 8)

Moreover, Movant has failed to state any prejudice as a result of the alleged

ineffectiveness.

Accordingly, having failed to demonstrate either the first or second prong of

Strickland, Movant's first claim fails. 

C. Right to a Jury Trial

Movant asserts that he was sentenced to 30 months, an increase above the

statutory maximum of 24 months in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to

trial by jury, because the Court erroneously believed the United States Sentencing

Guidelines were mandatory. (Motion to Vacate, p. 3) Movant argues that Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), requires that sentencing above the statutory

maximum be proven to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Motion to

Vacate, p.3) 

Respondent asserts that the Court should deny Movant's Sixth Amendment claim

because Movant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to

collaterally attack his sentence. 

The right to petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is statutory. United States

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing See Abney v. United States, 431

U.S. 651, 656 (1977) ("The right of appeal, as we presently know it in criminal cases,

is purely a creature of statute....")). A knowing and voluntary waiver of statutory rights

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is enforceable, id. (citing United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912

F.2d 318, 321(9th Cir.1990)), as long as the plea agreement expressly makes the

waiver, United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956, 959 (9th Cir. 2000);United States v.

Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1994). Neither concerns of public policy nor due

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process invalidate a valid waiver of statutory rights, such as the statutory right of

appeal. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321.

"'Generally, courts will enforce a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal if 1)

the language of the waiver encompasses the defendant's right to appeal on the grounds

claimed on appeal, and 2) the waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made."' United

States v. Martinez, 143 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation

omitted). Although waiver of the right to appeal would not prevent an appeal where the

sentence imposed is not in accordance with the negotiated agreement, a waiver is valid

even if a defendant does not know the exact nature of what appellate issues might later

arise at the time the defendant enters the waiver. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d at 321. 

Here, the Movant does not challenge the validity of his waiver, and the record

reflects that it was knowingly entered into and it was voluntary. The sentence imposed

was consistent with the negotiated agreement. The Plea Agreement expressly waived

the Movant's right to collaterally attack the sentence. (Doc. # 15, p. 4-5) The Plea

Agreement states that the defendant waives "any right to collaterally attack defendant's

conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other

collateral attack." (Doc. # 15, p. 5) The Plea Agreement further stated that the Movant

agreed that his attorney had fully advised him of the nature of the charges to which he

was entering a plea, that the guilty plea was not the result of force, threats, assurances

or promises, that his acceptance of the plea was voluntary, and that he agreed to be

bound by its provisions. (Doc. # 15, p. 6) The District Judge, at the time of sentencing,

noted that the Defendant was advised of his right to appeal and acknowledged his

waiver of his appeal rights. (Response, Ex. 1, p.8) 

The Plea Agreement signed by the Movant demonstrates that Movant entered a

knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right to appeal or collaterally attack

any matter pertaining to the prosecution or sentence. The District Court acknowledged

this waiver at the time of sentencing. The Movant does not challenge the validity of

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this waiver. Pursuant to his waiver, the Movant is barred from proceeding under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, and the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court dismiss

the Motion accordingly. 

Recommendation 

It is the recommendation of this Court that the Movant's Motion to Vacate/Set

Aside Sentence (Document # 17) be DENIED. 

Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written

objections within 10 days of being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation. If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CR 04-00244-

PHX-SRB and CV 05-1901-PHX-SRB. 

 DATED this 24th day of May, 2006.

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