Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cr-00674/USCOURTS-azd-2_13-cr-00674-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Primativo Escobar-Benitez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Primativo Escobar-Benitez, 

Defendant.

No. CR13-00674-PHX-DGC

ORDER 

 Defendant Primativo Escobar-Benitez has filed a motion to suppress. Doc. 27. 

The motion is briefed, and the Court held an evidentiary hearing on November 27, 2013. 

This order includes facts agreed to by the parties and factual findings from the testimony 

and exhibits presented during the hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will 

deny the motion to suppress. 

I. RELEVANT FACTS. 

 On April 2, 2013, investigators with Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) 

executed a federal search warrant on apartment 192 of the complex located at 3838 East 

Camelback Road in Phoenix, Arizona. The apartment was being used as a “stash house” 

for illegal aliens being smuggled into the country, and a total of 16 undocumented 

persons were apprehended. The person responsible for operating the stash house, Lucio 

Castillo-Castillo, subsequently advised investigators that another apartment in the same 

complex was used as a stash house. Castillo-Castillo identified two adjacent apartments 

as possibilities, including apartment 98. After speaking with management at the 

apartment complex, HSI investigators decided to inquire at apartment 98. 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 1 of 8
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

 On April 18, 2013, at approximately 6:15 a.m., agents conducted a “knock and 

talk” at apartment 98. Two agents approached the front door and knocked. A male 

voice, speaking Spanish, asked “who is it?” The agents responded in Spanish that they 

were police officers and would like to speak with the persons inside. Two minutes 

passed with no further communication and no visual contact with any occupants. 

 Multiple HSI agents had stationed themselves behind the apartment before the 

knock and talk was initiated. These agents stood outside a block wall that enclosed a rear 

patio. The agents who knocked on the front door notified the agents in back as they were 

about to initiate the knock and talk. 

 The agents in back saw the back door of the apartment open quietly. Two males 

emerged and began running across the patio toward a partially-open gate in the block 

wall. Agents standing just outside the gate and wall pointed their guns at the two men 

and commanded them to stop. One of the men, later identified as Defendant, stopped just 

short of the gate. The other ran back into the apartment, leaving the back door ajar. 

 Agents directed Defendant to walk through the gate, where they placed him in 

handcuffs. Agents then gave loud commands to the other individual to exit the 

apartment. When the individual did not do so, agents entered the patio, surrounded the 

back door, and again gave commands for the individual and anyone else in the apartment 

to exit. When nobody exited, agents entered through the open back door and proceeded 

room-by-room to clear the premises. They found the individual who had run back into 

the apartment hiding in a bathroom, and another 11 adults hiding in two closets. All 

occupants eventually admitted that they were illegal aliens. 

 Agents secured the apartment and applied for a search warrant. Upon receiving 

the warrant at approximately 4:30 p.m., agents searched the apartment and found various 

items of evidence relevant to this case. 

 Defendant contends that the agents seized him unlawfully when they commanded 

him to stop, directed him to walk through the gate, and then placed him in handcuffs. 

Defendant also contends that agents violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 2 of 8
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the apartment without a search warrant and discovered the persons hiding inside. 

II. STOP OF DEFENDANT.

 Defendant asserts that he was within the curtilage of the apartment when he was 

stopped by HSI agents, that he therefore was within his home for purposes of the Fourth 

Amendment, and that agents cannot execute an investigative stop inside a home. 

Because the agents did not have probable cause to arrest him, Defendant contends, his 

detention in the patio area violated the Fourth Amendment. 

 The government argues that the stop and detention were lawful. The government 

also argues that Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment, and 

that his Fourth Amendment rights therefore could not have been violated by the actions 

of the HSI agents. The Court will address this argument first. 

A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy.

 When Defendant was detained, he was in possession of keys to the apartment. No 

other person was found with keys. Defendant advised agents that he had been entrusted 

with the apartment by an individual named Sedamo-Ortega, and that Sedamo-Ortega left 

for New York approximately five days earlier. Defendant asserted that he had been 

maintaining the apartment and had possessed food and drinks within the apartment that 

he sold to the illegal aliens who were present. Defendant stated that a man wearing a 

mask would come to the apartment at night, provide him with additional food, and pay 

him $25 to keep the apartment clean. Sedamo-Ortega had advised Defendant that illegal 

aliens would be brought to and taken from the apartment at night. In addition, neighbors 

reported that someone who looked like Defendant had been seen driving a vehicle that 

was parked behind the apartment. Agents later determined that Defendant did not own 

the vehicle. 

 Defendant argues that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment 

because he qualified as an “overnight guest.” See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 

(1998). The Supreme Court has held that “an overnight guest in a home may claim the 

protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 3 of 8
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

the householder may not.” Id. at 90. Courts applying Carter to similar cases have held 

that a person qualifies as an overnight guest only if the individual is an invited guest, 

authorized to be in the house by someone with lawful control of the premises. See United 

States v. Gonzales-Barrera, 288 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2003); see also United 

States v. Vasquez, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1023 (C.D. Cal. 2010); United States v. 

Rodriguez-Alejandro, 664 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1341-42 (N.D. Ga. 2009). 

 The government presented evidence at the hearing that apartment 98 was leased by 

Jose Ramirez-Perez, Mario Estrada, and Mecanica Estrada. Ex. 10. The application 

submitted by these individuals also included references from Antonio Lopez and Jose 

Romero. The application was signed by Jose Ramirez. Id. Defendant presented no 

evidence that Sedamo-Ortega was lawfully in possession or control of apartment 98, nor 

that any of the individuals named in the rental application authorized him to stay at the 

apartment. Thus, Defendant has presented no evidence that he was an invited guest at the 

apartment by someone who had lawful authority over it. As the court concluded in 

Gonzales-Berrera, “defendant’s concession that no one had given him permission to stay 

in the house is an important factor that takes this case outside the ambit of [the overnight 

guest rule]. Absent a showing that he was an invited guest, defendant has not borne his 

burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house.” 

Gonzales-Berrera, 288 F. Supp. 2d at 1050. 

 The Court will not recount the full analysis set forth in Gonzales-Berrera, nor the 

additional authorities cited in Vasquez and Rodriguez-Alejandro. Suffice it to say that the 

Court agrees with the analysis in these cases, and that Defendant has presented no 

evidence to suggest that he was a legitimate occupant of apartment 98 when the HSI 

agents arrived on April 18, 2013. Because Defendant had no legitimate expectation of 

privacy in apartment 98, he also lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 

curtilage. Thus, a valid investigative stop of Defendant while located in the curtilage 

could not be deemed a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. 

/ / / 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 4 of 8
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. The Investigative Stop Was Valid.

 The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the curtilage of a home is entitled to the 

same Fourth Amendment protection as the home itself, and that law enforcement officers 

may lawfully enter the curtilage on the same terms as they may lawfully enter the home. 

United States v. Perea-Ray, 680 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2012). The Ninth Circuit has 

also held that the investigative or Terry stop exception to the warrant requirement “does 

not apply to in-home searches and seizures.” United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 

738 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). As a result, Defendant 

argues that no valid Terry stop could have been made when he was still located within the 

curtilage of the apartment, that HSI agents did not have probable cause to arrest him at 

that time, and that his seizure was therefore unlawful. The Court does not agree. 

 As noted above, Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

apartment and patio. His stop while physically located within the curtilage therefore did 

not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. Moreover, even if Defendant had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in the premises, the Court concludes that the Terry stop was valid. 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that a Terry stop may be made at the threshold of a 

home: “we now hold that when a suspect voluntarily opens the door of his residence in 

response to a non-coercive ‘knock and talk’ request, the police may temporarily seize the 

suspect outside the home (or at the threshold) provided that they have reasonable 

suspicion of criminal activity. If an arrest in the doorway is allowed, certainly the lesser 

intrusion of a Terry stop . . . is also permissible.” United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 

1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007). In Perea-Ray, one of the principal cases relied on by 

Defendant, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the correctness of the holding in Crapser. The 

Court of Appeals explained that the suspects in Crapser and similar cases “knowingly 

and voluntarily exposed themselves to police officers,” making a Terry stop lawful. 

Perea-Ray, 680 F.3d at 1188 n.5. The Ninth Circuit further explained that, “[u]nlike a 

private yard or carport, tenants in an apartment building or motel have no justified 

expectation of privacy as to a portion of the home which all residents and visitors must 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 5 of 8
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

use to enter, the common yard open to the public or the parking lot open to all users of 

the apartment building.” Id. (citation omitted). 

 In this case, Defendant exited the back door of the apartment and began running 

across the patio toward the gate that led to the common parking lot of the apartment 

complex. Agents commanded Defendant to stop, and he came to a halt two feet or less 

before he reached the partially-open gate. This fact is captured in photographs taken at 

the time; indeed, it appears Defendant was stopped as he reached out to push open the 

gate and enter the parking lot. See Exs. 5, 6. Defendant, who admits that he was the 

person who spoke to officers through the front door when they announced the knock and 

talk, voluntarily chose to exit the apartment and run toward the parking lot, an area the 

Ninth Circuit has identified as lacking any reasonable expectation of privacy. Perea-Ray, 

680 F.3d at 1188 n.5. By this action, Defendant knowingly and voluntarily exposed 

himself to police officers. The fact that officers commanded Defendant to stop as he was 

running out of the patio, and that he came to a halt just short of the gate, does not have 

constitutional significance. Defendant clearly was exiting the apartment and the 

curtilage, was fleeing from the officers he knew were at the front door, and was stopped 

only upon command of the officers waiting in the parking lot. Given Defendant’s clear 

intention and efforts to flee the premises, the Court concludes that he had no greater 

constitutional protection than he would have had if he had opened the front door. If he 

could be detained under Terry at the front door as Crapser holds, 472 F.3d at 1148, he 

certainly could be detained under Terry as he fled out the back door and patio.1

 

 The HSI agents clearly had sufficient grounds for a Terry stop. Law enforcement 

officers may stop and detain an individual if they have reasonable suspicion to believe 

that criminal activity is occurring, based on the totality of the circumstances. United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In this case, agents had 

reason to believe from their interview of Castillo-Castillo and their discussions with the 

 

1

 In contrast, the suspect in Perea-Ray made no effort to leave the curtilage. 680 F.3d at 1186-88. 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 6 of 8
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

apartment’s management that apartment 98 may be involved in alien smuggling. The 

agents knocked on the front door and asked to speak with the occupants. Shortly 

thereafter, Defendant quietly stepped out of the back door and began running to the 

parking lot. The individual running with Defendant, after seeing law enforcement 

officers, turned and ran back in to the apartment. Based on these facts, the officers had a 

reasonable basis to suspect that Defendant may be involved in alien smuggling. A Terry

stop was entirely warranted. 

 In summary, the Court concludes that the stop of Defendant did not violate his 

constitutional rights even if he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

apartment and patio.2

 

III. SEARCH OF THE APARTMENT.

 Because Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

apartment, he cannot complaint about its search. Even if he did have a reasonable 

expectation, however, the Court finds that the limited search was justified by exigent 

circumstances. 

 The parties agree that the relevant test is set forth in United States v. Snipe, 515 

F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2009). The Court must consider two factors: “whether (1) considering 

the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable basis for 

concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or themselves from serious 

harm; and (2) the search’s scope and manner were reasonable to meet the need.” Id. at 

952. 

 The test is easily satisfied in this case. As noted above, agents learned that 

apartment 98 or the apartment next to it was being used as an alien stash house. When 

agents knocked on the door, announced their presence, and asked to speak to the 

occupants, Defendant and another fled out the back. The second individual saw the 

officers, did not stop, and ran back into the apartment. HSI Special Agent Timothy 

 

2

 The fact that agents placed Defendant in handcuffs during the investigatory stop did not transform it into an arrest. United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th 

Cir. 1982). 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 7 of 8
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Hemker testified at the hearing that he immediately became concerned for the safety of 

individuals in the apartment. He noted that agents believed this was a stash house, a fact 

corroborated by the occupants’ refusal to open the front door and the attempt of 

Defendant and another male to flee. Agent Hemker knew that smuggled aliens were 

often held in stash houses against their will and under armed guard. Agent Hemker also 

knew there was a school nearby and that individuals fleeing from the apartment could 

potentially pose a risk to the school. In light of these circumstances, Agent Hemker and 

others entered the apartment to secure any persons inside. Clearly, the agents had 

objectively reasonable grounds for concluding that there was a need to enter the 

apartment and protect any individuals who may be held against their wills, and to 

apprehend anyone who might pose a threat to the surrounding area, including the nearby 

school. The Ninth Circuit reached the same conclusion in a similar case. See United 

States v. Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2010).

 The Court also concludes that the scope and manner of the entry were reasonable. 

Officers entered the apartment with guns drawn, moved slowly through each room to 

clear the apartment, found the individual who had returned to the apartment hiding in the 

bathroom, and found 11 other adults hiding in two closets. Agents took these individuals 

into custody, secured the apartment, and obtained a search warrant before conducting 

further searches of the premises. The agents did only as much as was necessary to secure 

the occupants of the apartment and ensure their safety and the safety of others. 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s motion to suppress (Doc. 27) is denied. 

Excludable delay pursuant to U.S.C. § 18:3161(h)(1)(D) is found to run from 9/9/2013. 

 Dated this 3rd day of December, 2013. 

Case 2:13-cr-00674-DGC Document 41 Filed 12/03/13 Page 8 of 8