Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01079/USCOURTS-caed-2_10-cv-01079-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sean McEndree
Plaintiff
Rash Curtis & Associates
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN MCENDREE,

No. 2:10-cv-01079-MCE-JFM

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RASH CURTIS & ASSOCIATES,

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiff Sean McEndree

(“McEndree” or “Plaintiff”) alleges that Defendant Rash Curtis &

Associates, a debt collection agency, violated state and federal

law by its actions in attempting to collect a $450.00 unpaid

medical bill allegedly owed by Plaintiff. Plaintiff also asserts

a common law cause of action for invasion of privacy. Defendant

Rash Curtis & Associates (“Rash Curtis” or “Defendant”) now

moves, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, for

summary adjudication as to certain claims submitted by Plaintiff

on grounds that said claims are either legally deficient,

factually lacking, or both. 

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As set forth below, Defendant’s Motion will be granted in part

and denied in part. 

BACKGROUND

According to Rash Curtis, on or about September 6, 2009, it

received a referral from the Midtown Primary Care Association for

collection of a $450.00 bill owed by Plaintiff. Defendant claims

it sent an initial letter to Defendant on or about September 8,

2009, as required by the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”). That letter would have

included information about the debt and how to satisfy the

obligation short of litigation.

In addition to notifying Plaintiff by mail, Rash Curtis also

attempted to call him by using a cell phone number and other

telephone numbers that Rash Curtis believed were associated with

Plaintiff. Decl. of Bob Keith, ¶¶ 1-12. One of those numbers

turned out to be a work number for Plaintiff’s girlfriend (and

now wife), Jherica Hartwell.

Rash Curtis maintains an electronic record of its debt

collection contacts for all accounts. In this particular case,

those logs indicate that on September 18, 2009, a Rash Curtis

employee spoke to Ms. Hartwell using what it later learned was

her work number. According to Rash Curtis, Hartwell identified

herself as Plaintiff’s wife, explained that insurance was

supposed to have paid the bill, and told Rash Curtis she had set

up a payment plan to make small payments on the account. Id. at

¶ 12.

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Rash Curtis also states that it obtained an Experian Online

Credit Report on September 18, 2009, the same day it spoke to

Ms. Hartwell. The Experian report confirmed that Ms. Hartwell

was indeed Plaintiff’s wife. A copy of Experian’s report is

attached as Exhibit C to Bob Keith’s Declaration.

Jherica Hartwell, for her part, denies ever telling Rash

Curtis that she was McEndree’s wife during her September 18,

2009, conversation with Rash Curtis. Hartwell Dep., 37:18-38:3.

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and Hartwell were not married at

the time of the events underlying this lawsuit (although living

together as a couple, together with their child, they did not

marry until 2011). Hartwell does, however, recall that she

discussed the potential of a payment plan. She confirmed that

the Rash Curtis employee did not release any specific debt

information to her at that time. Id. at 39:17-19.

Rash Curtis’ electronic records show that just minutes after

speaking to Hartwell on September 18, 2009, Plaintiff himself

called to complain that Hartwell “had nothing to do with the

debt.” Rash Curtis claims Plaintiff started cursing and hung up

when its employee told Plaintiff that Hartwell had identified

herself as his wife. Keith Decl., ¶ 13. Rash Curtis denies that

Plaintiff informed its employee that he and Hartwell were not

married at the time of this conversation. Id.

 At deposition, Plaintiff states he “believes” he told Rash

Curtis to stop calling Jherica Hartwell. 

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Pl.’s Dep., 34:5-7. The declaration submitted by Plaintiff in

opposition to the present motion is more emphatic in stating that

he told Rash Curtis “not to call [Hartwell] because she had

nothing to do with this debt and that she was not [his] wife.” 

Pl.’s Decl., ¶ 5. 

It appears that Jherica Hartwell had a second conversation

with Rash Curtis personnel on March 17, 2010. Hartwell claims

that during that conversation the employee did disclose specific

information concerning Plaintiff’s debt. See Hartwell Dep.,

39:17-40:4. During that conversation Ms. Hartwell informed Rash

Curtis that she was not Plaintiff’s spouse, but only his

girlfriend. Keith Decl., ¶ 15. According to Rash Curtis, after

receiving that information it removed Ms. Hartwell’s number from

its computer system to ensure that she was not called again. 

There is no evidence that any calls were placed to her

thereafter.

It is undisputed that the Rash Curtis calls placed to

Plaintiff himself were only to his cell phone. Pl.’s Undisputed

Fact (“UF”) No. 5 While some of those calls did come while

Plaintiff was at work, Plaintiff admitted that Rash Curtis did

not know his work schedule, which varied. Although Plaintiff

claims that Rash Curtis called him repeatedly (as many as ten

times during the course of one day, March 17, 2010 (see Compl.,

¶ 5), Plaintiff conceded that with caller identification, he was

able to see that Rash Curtis was calling and could ignore the

calls if he chose to do so. Pl.’s Dep., 34:12-20.

///

///

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With respect to the substance of the calls he received,

Plaintiff testified at deposition that he was told that they

would “take him to court” if he failed to pay. Id. at 28:11-13. 

Plaintiff’s deposition also alludes to alleged statements made by

Rash Curtis to the effect that it was already in litigation with

Plaintiff’s employer, Metro PCS, about the debt he owed. Id. at

27:5-14. Rash Curtis allegedly told Plaintiff that they would

take him to court as well in order to collect the unpaid

obligation. Id. at 28:1-5. Plaintiff also claims that Rash

Curtis threatened to garnish his wages. Pl.’s Decl., ¶ 7.

Plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on May 2, 2010. In

addition to alleging federal statutory claims under the FDCPA,

Plaintiff asserts corresponding state law claims under the

Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, California Civil

Code section 1788 et seq., as well as a common law claim for

invasion of privacy.

On June 15, 2010, about six weeks after the present lawsuit

was commenced, Rash Curtis instituted its own lawsuit against

Plaintiff to collect the debt Plaintiff owed to the Midtown

Primary Care Association. Rash Curtis ultimately prevailed in

that lawsuit and a judgment was entered against Plaintiff on

June 17, 2011. Keith Decl., ¶ 17. 

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STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). One of the

principal purposes of Rule 56 is to dispose of factually

unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant partial summary

judgment, or summary adjudication on the part of a claim or

defense. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party seeking to recover

upon a claim... may... move... for a summary judgment in the

party’s favor upon all or any part thereof.”); see also Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995);

France Stone Co., Inc. v. Charter Township of Monroe,

790 F. Supp. 707, 710 (E.D. Mich. 1992).

The standard that applies to a motion for summary

adjudication is the same as that which applies to a motion for

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), 56(c); Mora v.

ChemTronics, 16 F. Supp. 2d. 1192, 1200 (S.D. Cal. 1998).

Under summary judgment practice, the moving party

always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion, and

identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.

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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 323 (quoting Rule 56(c)).

If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the

burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a

genuine issue as to any material fact actually does exist. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

585-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S.

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence of this factual

dispute, the opposing party must tender evidence of specific

facts in the form of affidavits, and/or admissible discovery

material, in support of its contention that the dispute exists. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The opposing party must demonstrate that

the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might

affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that

the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52

(1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of Western Pulp and Paper

Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). Stated another way,

“before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary

question for the judge, not whether there is literally no

evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury could

properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it,

upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

251 (quoting Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, 448,

20 L. Ed. 867 (1872)). 

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As the Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has

carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more

that simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not

lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,

there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at

586-87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the

opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences

that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be

drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. 

Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is

the opposing party’s obligation to produce a factual predicate

from which the inference may be drawn. Richards v. Nielsen

Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985),

aff’d, 810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Claims.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff identifies thirteen different

violations of either the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act, then

incorporates those allegations into Count I, for violation of the

FDCPA, and Count II, which alleges that Defendant ran afoul of

the provisions of the Rosenthal Act. The present motion seeks

summary adjudication as to six of those claims, which will now be

addressed.

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1. Impermissibly Seeking Location Information about

Plaintiff from a Third Party.

The FDCPA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692b, places parameters on the

contacts a debt collector can have with a third party for

purposes of obtaining location information about the debtor

himself. Location information is defined as meaning “a 1

consumer’s place of abode and his telephone number at such place,

or his place of employment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(7). The debt

collector for example, in asking how to locate the debtor cannot

say that any debt is owed, cannot communicate with the same party

more than once under normal circumstances, and cannot disclose in

correspondence that the communication relates to the collection

of a debt.

Here, Plaintiff makes it clear that the only third party

contacted by Rash Curtis was his girlfriend, Jherica Hartwell. 

Pl.’s Dep., 18:19-23. With respect to Hartwell, there is no

evidence that Rash Curtis contacted her in order to obtain

location information as to Plaintiff. To the contrary, Rash

Curtis alleges it believed Hartwell to be Plaintiff’s spouse, and

Hartwell herself does not suggest either by way of her deposition

testimony or opposing declaration that there were any queries

about Plaintiff’s location whatsoever other than a request that

Rash Curtis speak with Plaintiff. 

///

///

 The FDCPA uses the term “consumer” in referring to the 1

debtor, and defines “consumer” as “any natural person obligated

or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).

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The contents of both phone conversations identified by Hartwell

with Rash Curtis pertained not to how Plaintiff could be reached,

but rather about the debt itself, with Hartwell talking about a

debt repayment plan during the first conversation, and with Rash

Curtis allegedly disclosing information about the debt in the

second telephone contact in March of 2010. Consequently, § 1692b

is inapplicable on its face to the circumstances of this matter,

and summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claim under that

statute must be granted.

2. Impermissibly Disclosing Information about a Debt

to a Third Party.

Again, because it is undisputed that Jherica Hartwell was

the only third party with whom Rash Curtis had any contact about

Plaintiff’s debt, it is the contents of the communications Rash

Curtis had with her that must be analyzed in order to determine

whether Rash Curtis can be liable under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) of

the FDCPA. That section prohibits communications with a third

party for purposes of collecting a debt, without prior consent of

the debtor or absent judicial authorization, except for purposes

of obtaining location information pursuant to § 1692b as

discussed above.

As used in § 1692c, the term “third party” does not include

the debtor’s spouse. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d) (“[f]or the

purpose of this section, the term consumer (i.e. debtor) includes

the consumer’s spouse....”). Contact with a debtor’s spouse is

consequently not prohibited by the FDCPA.

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Rash Curtis argues that it reasonably believed that Jherica

Hartwell was married to Plaintiff because she admitted as much at

the time of her initial telephone conversation with Rash Curtis

on September 18, 2009. Rash Curtis argues that Hartwell’s status

in that regard was further reinforced by a credit report obtained

that same day which also listed Jherica as Plaintiff’s spouse. 

Defendant argues that it consequently had a good faith belief

that Hartwell and Plaintiff were indeed married when it contacted

Hartwell. According to Rash Curtis, when it did find out that

Plaintiff and Hartwell were not husband and wife at the time of

its second March 17, 2010 conversation with Hartwell, it never

called Hartwell again and removed her name and number from its

contact list for Plaintiff’s file. 

Although Plaintiff argues that a debt collector’s mistaken

belief as to the propriety of its actions is not sufficient to

preclude FDCPA liability, essentially making the FDCPA a strict

liability statute (citing Spencer v. Hendersen-Webb, Inc.,

81 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D. Md. 1999)), the FDCPA does contain a

provision insulating a collector from liability if “the violation

was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error

notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted

to avoid any such error.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(D). Rash Curtis

argues that this safe harbor provision protects it from liability

given the information it obtained both from Hartwell and from

Plaintiff’s credit report, as well as the fact that no additional

procedures could have protected against error given those

representations.

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The problem with the position of both parties is that

factual disputes abound as to what in fact occurred. Rash Curtis

claims that Jherica Hartwell told its employee on September 18,

2009 that she was married to Plaintiff; Hartwell herself denies,

both by way of deposition and through her declaration, that she

made any such statement. Hartwell Dep., 37:18-38:3; Hartwell

Decl., ¶¶ 3, 7. Obviously, whether or not Hartwell made a

representation as to her marital status is critical in

determining whether Rash Curtis had a good faith belief as to

whether she was Plaintiff’s wife. 

Plaintiff’s own version of events presents similar

conflicts. In his declaration, he states that he specifically

told Rash Curtis that Hartwell “had nothing to do with his debt

... and was not my wife.” Pl.’s Decl., ¶ 4. He goes on to state

that despite requesting that Rash Curtis “never call her since

she was not my wife” the company continued to call and harass her

at work. Id. at ¶¶ 4,5.2

In sum, then, triable issues of fact preclude summary 

adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claims of impermissible third

party contacts in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).

///

 The Court notes that Rash Curtis has requested that the 2

Court disregard the declarations of both Plaintiff and Jherica

Hartwell on grounds that they impermissibly diverge from the

sworn version of events they provided in their deposition. 

Although certain discrepancies do exist, they are not sufficient

to preclude consideration of the declarations in their entirety

as Rash Curtis requests. The declarations, for example, appear

to conflate certain contacts, and other issues were not

definitely established at the time of the depositions to make the

declarations plainly contradictory. Moreover, and in any event,

triable issues of fact preclude summary adjudication here even

were the declarations to be disregarded.

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3. Impermissibly Calling Plaintiff at His Place of

Employment or at Another Place or Time Known to Be

Inconvenient.

15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1) prohibits a debt collector from

contacting the debtor at an “unusual time or place or a time or

place known or which should be known to be inconvenient.” In

arguing for liability under this provision of the FDCPA,

Plaintiff argues that while all calls were made to his cell

phone, “some calls were made when he was at work” and that Rash

Curtis continued to call Plaintiff despite the fact that he had

asked them to stop doing so. Pl.’s Opp’n, 8:4-19.

Although Plaintiff claims that he made Defendant aware “on

multiple occasions not to call him at certain times,” the portion

of his deposition cited to support that claim states only that he

“told them to quit calling me.” Pl.’s Dep., 21:14-15. 

Additionally, the fact that Plaintiff may have been at work when

some calls were placed to his cell phone does not give rise to

liability under § 1692c(a)(1) on grounds that Rash Curtis should

have known that the calls were inconvenient. First, as indicated

above, Plaintiff concedes that Rash Curtis never used a work

number and only called his cell phone. Id. at 20:22-23. 

Secondly, Plaintiff further admits that he never told Rash Curtis

his work schedule, which varied depending on the day and week,

and, consequently, it would have not known whether Plaintiff was

at work or not. Id. at 25:16-26:13. No evidence whatsoever has

been presented to suggest that Rash Curtis knew or should have

known it was calling Plaintiff on his cell phone at inconvenient

times or places. 

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Therefore, summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s claim in that

regard must be granted.

4. Impermissibly Making False Threats in Attempting

to Collect on a Debt. 

The FDCPA prohibits a “threat to take any legal action that

cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken”, and

deems such threat to constitute a “false, deceptive, or

misleading representation” in violation of the statute. 

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5). Similarly, subdivision (e)(4) of the

statute prohibits “the representation or implication that

nonpayment of any debt will result in the arrest or imprisonment

of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment or sale of

any property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful

and the debt collector or creditor intends to take such action.” 

California’s Rosenthal Act tracks the above enumerated federal

provisions at California Civil Code § 1788.13(j) (prohibiting

false representations as to the institution of legal proceedings)

and § 1788.10(e) (threatening garnishment of wages prohibited

where such action is not contemplated or permitted by law).

Defendant argues that it made no false threats actionable

under either the FDCPA or the Rosenthal Act. It appears

undisputed that Rash Curtis did not threaten to have Plaintiff

arrested or take his property. Rash Curtis also correctly points

out that it did take legal action against Plaintiff as a result

of the debt and in fact obtained a judgment against him. That

judgment could permit garnishment proceedings against Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a viable claim against

either the FDCPA, at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4) or the Rosenthal Act,

at California Civil Code § 1788(10)(e).

Plaintiff also contends, however, the claim that Rash Curtis

stated it had sued his employer, Metro PCS, concerning

Plaintiff’s own debt. Pl.’s Dep. 27:5-14; Pl.’s Compl.,

¶ 5(i)-(j). Plaintiff alleges that representation was false, and

there is no evidence that Rash Curtis took any action against

Metro PCS or had the ability to do so. Consequently, taking

Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must do for

purposes of summary judgment (Anderson, supra, 477 U.S. at 255),

Plaintiff may be able to state a viable claim against Rash Curtis

for false representations under the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act at

15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5) and California Civil Code § 1788.13(j). 

Summary adjudication as to those false representation claims

consequently cannot be had.

5. Failure to Send Written Notice of Debt as Required

by the Fdcpa.

The FDCPA requires debt collectors to provide consumers with

a so-called “validation notice” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g

informing consumers that their alleged debt will be assumed to be

valid unless the consumer disputes the validity of the debt

within 30 days. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3). While Plaintiff

argued in his complaint that he did not receive the required

validation notice (see Compl., ¶ 5(m)), Plaintiff’s opposition

indicates that he concedes the § 1692g claim “because Plaintiff

did receive a letter from Defendant.” Pl.’s Opp’n, 10:9-10. 

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Plaintiff consequently offers no opposition to Defendant’s

summary adjudication request and that request will be granted. 

B. Invasion of Privacy.

In addition to the statutory claims discussed above,

Plaintiff also asserts a common law claim for invasion of privacy

in Count III of his Complaint. Plaintiff argues that the FDCPA

and Rosenthal Act claims he identifies “constitute an intentional

intrusion into Plaintiff’s private places and into private

matters of Plaintiff’s life, conducted in a manner highly

offensive to a reasonable person.” Pl.’s Compl., ¶ 6. According

to Plaintiff, his subjective expectation of privacy under the

circumstances was objectively reasonable. Id. Plaintiff further

contends that Defendant’s disclosure of the debt to third parties

amounted to a “public disclosure of a private fact not of

legitimate public concern,” and was “highly offensive to a

reasonable person.” Id. at ¶ 7.

Plaintiff’s allegations track the prerequisites of a viable

invasion of privacy claim, which requires an intentional

intrusion into private affairs in a manner highly offensive to a

reasonable person. Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc.,

18 Cal. 4th 200, 231 (1998). Defendant nonetheless argues, in

this instance, that collection calls to Plaintiff’s cell phone,

where he had caller identification and was able to (and did)

ignore the calls if he chose to do so, were not a highly

offensive intrusion into Plaintiff’s private affairs sufficient

to support an invasion of privacy claim. 

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Defendant also points out that it was assigned a debt owed by

Plaintiff for collection and that debt collection, and calls made

in an attempt to collect a debt, are not illegal.

In opposition, Plaintiff does little more than argue that

whether or not Defendant’s debt collection activities were

sufficiently offensive is a determination that must be left to

the trier of fact. The Court disagrees. In order to survive

summary judgment, Plaintiff must identify a genuine issue of

material fact, as well as some evidence upon which a jury could

find in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra,

477 U.S. at 248, 251-52. Here, the facts as alleged by Plaintiff

simply do not meet that fundamental minimum. For all intents and

purposes, Plaintiff has shown little more in this matter other

than that Rash Curtis called him, albeit on numerous occasions,

in attempting to collect a debt, under circumstances where

Plaintiff was free to disregard the calls and not even answer

since he was able to ascertain that it was Rash Curtis attempting

to contact him. That is plainly insufficient to state an

actionable invasion of privacy claim.

With respect to public disclosures to third parties as

supporting an invasion of privacy claim, as indicated above

Plaintiff concedes that the only third party at issue is his

girlfriend, Jherica Hartwell. Plaintiff’s allegations with

respect to disclosures made to Jherica Hartwell, even if

sufficient for purposes of potential liability under FDCPA, are

insufficient to establish viable invasion of privacy claim. 

///

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The Court does not believe that any reasonable jury could find

that disclosure to Hartwell alone, an individual with whom

Plaintiff resided at the time of the alleged disclosures (the

couple had a child together) and later married, constituted a

“public disclosure” upon which in invasion of privacy could be

predicated. Moreover, the gravamen of the “public disclosure”

component of the invasion of privacy tort is that disclosure must

be to the public in general or to a large group of people, not to

a single individual like Hartwell. See, e.g., Porten v.

University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 828 (1976). 

Either way, Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim fails as a

public disclosure. Defendant is entitled to summary adjudication

as to Plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s Motion for

Summary Adjudication (Docket No. 14) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. The Motion is GRANTED with respect to 3

Plaintiff’s claims under the FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b,

1692c(a)(1), 1692e(4) and 1692g, but DENIED as to §§ 1692c(b) and

1692e(5). Defendant’s request for summary adjudication as to

Plaintiff’s claims under the Rosenthal Act is GRANTED as to

California Civil Code § 1788.10(e) but DENIED as to § 1788.13(j).

///

 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 3

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 230(g).

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Defendant’s request for summary adjudication as to Plaintiff’s

invasion of privacy claim is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 9, 2012

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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