Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00996/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00996-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melinda Avila
Plaintiff
County of Madera
Defendant
Richard Gonzales
Defendant
Alfredo Lorenzo
Plaintiff
Gretel Lorenzo
Plaintiff
Jose Lorenzo
Plaintiff
Guy Rich
Defendant
State of California
Defendant
Paul Varner
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELINDA AVILA; GRETEL 

LORENZO; ALFREDO LORENZO; and 

JOSE LORENZO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA; COUNTY 

OF MADERA; RICHARD GONZALES; 

PAUL VARNER, and DOES 3 

through 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 1:15-cv-00996-JAM-EPG

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT MADERA 

COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The County of Madera (“the County”), one of the four 

remaining defendants in this case, moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

fourth and fifth causes of action (Doc. #24). Plaintiffs Melinda 

Avila (“Melinda”), Gretel Lorenzo (“Gretel”), Alfredo Lorenzo 

(“Alfredo”), and Jose Lorenzo (“Jose”) (collectively 

“Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion (Doc. #25). For the reasons set 

forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the 

County’s motion to dismiss. 

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts, alleged by Plaintiffs, are assumed to 

be true for purposes of this motion. The conduct underlying 

Case 1:15-cv-00996-DAD-EPG Document 28 Filed 02/23/16 Page 1 of 9
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Plaintiffs’ claims occurred on the night of June 1, 2013, and 

carried on into the next morning. TAC ¶¶ 19-23. During this 

time period, an altercation occurred within the Chukchansi Gold 

Resort and Casino (“the Casino”), which led to Plaintiffs 

deciding to leave the Casino. Id. ¶ 20-21. While Plaintiffs 

were waiting outside the Casino, defendants Deputy Sheriff 

Richard Gonzales (“Gonzales”), Sergeant Guy Rich (“Rich”), CHP 

Officer Paul Varner (“Varner”) and other law enforcement officers

arrived and approached the Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 22. The officers 

were questioning the Plaintiffs when, “in a concerted action,” 

Rich arrested Jose, and Gonzales and Varner grabbed Alfredo, 

forced him to the ground, and handcuffed him. Id. Gretel 

protested to the officers that Alfredo had done nothing wrong,

and Gonzales “forcefully shoved” her backwards. Id. The force 

caused Gretel to collide with Melinda, which then caused Melinda

to fall to the ground. Id. Melinda struck her head on the 

ground and shattered her hip. Id. One of the officers then 

pinned Melinda down. Id. Melinda went to the hospital via 

ambulance. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. The County’s sheriffs handcuffed Jose, 

Gretel, and Alfredo and took them to the County jail. Id. ¶ 23. 

The County filed charges against Jose, Gretel, and Alfredo, but 

later dropped the charges. Id.

Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint in Madera County 

Superior Court (Doc. #1-1). Defendants removed the case to 

federal court (Doc. #1) after Plaintiffs stated federal causes of 

action in their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”). Multiple 

defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ SAC (Doc. #11). The 

Court dismissed all claims against Rich with prejudice, so Rich

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is no longer a defendant in this case. 10/14/15 Order at 21. 

The Court granted Plaintiffs leave to amend their fourth and 

fifth causes of action. Id. at 14, 23. Plaintiffs filed a TAC

(Doc. #22) which states five causes of action: (1) violation of 

California Civil Code § 52.1; (2) false arrest/imprisonment; 

(3) reckless infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligent 

training and supervision; and (5) violation of federal 

constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. TAC at 6-18. 

II. OPINION

A. Fourth Cause of Action 

Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is for negligent 

training and supervision. TAC at 13. Plaintiffs plead two 

theories of how Anderson breached his duty to properly supervise 

and train his officers. First, Plaintiffs allege that the 

County had a policy of “isolating and immobilizing the person . 

. . who was . . . the greatest threat without regard to whether 

that person” behaved threateningly and that Anderson approved of 

the policy. Compl. ¶ 53. Alternatively, Plaintiffs allege that 

Anderson knew that his subordinate officers’ were immobilizing 

the most physically threatening person and “did nothing to train 

[them] not to assault individuals who had provided no legal 

basis for their arrest.” Id. As discussed in greater detail 

below, the County addresses only Plaintiffs’ first theory in its 

motion to dismiss and wholly ignores Plaintiffs’ alternate 

theory.

To state a claim for negligent training and supervision 

under California law, “a plaintiff must [plead] the traditional 

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elements of actionable negligence, including duty, breach, and 

causation.” Corser v. Cty. of Merced, 2009 WL 174144, at *25 

(E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2009) (citing Thompson v. Sacramento City 

Unified Sch. Dist., 107 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1372 (2003)). As 

discussed in the Court’s 10/14/15 order, public entities cannot 

be held directly liable for negligence claims. See 10/14/15 

Order at 12. Public entities can, however, be held vicariously 

liable for the conduct of an employee when such conduct occurs 

within the scope of employment and the employee is not immune 

from liability. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.2. 

1. Liability Under Plaintiffs’ First Theory: Anderson 

Approved the Policy

The County argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claim should 

be dismissed because Anderson’s decision to approve the policy

is immune from liability under California Government Code 

sections 815.2(b) and 820.2. Mot. at 5. Section 815.2(b) 

states that “a public entity is not liable for an injury 

resulting from an act or omission of an employee of the public 

entity where the employee is immune from liability.” Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 815.2(b). Section 820.2 states that “a public employee 

is not liable for an injury resulting from his act or omission 

where the act or omission was the result of the exercise vested 

in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 820.2. Immunity under § 820.2—often called 

“discretionary act immunity”—extends to “basic governmental 

policy decisions entrusted to broad official judgment.” 

Harmston v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 2007 WL 2814596, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Caldwell v. Montoya, 10 Cal. 4th 972, 

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976 (1995)). “To determine which acts are discretionary, 

California courts do not look at the literal meaning of 

‘discretionary,’ because almost all acts involve some choice 

between alternatives.” Olvera v. Cty. of Sacramento, 932 F. 

Supp. 2d 1123, 1175 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (quoting Martinez v. City 

of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1379 (9th Cir. 1998)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Rather, immunity protects basic 

policy decisions, but does not protect operational or 

ministerial decisions that merely implement a basic policy 

decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs respond to the County’s contention of immunity 

with two arguments, both of which fail. First, Plaintiffs argue 

that section 820.4, not section 820.2, applies to Anderson. 

Opp. at 7. Section 820.4 states that a law enforcement officer 

is not entitled to immunity for “false arrest or false 

imprisonment.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 820.4. As the County 

correctly notes in its reply, section 820.4 does not apply to 

Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. Section 820.4 applies only to the 

false imprisonment and false arrest claims, which the County has 

not moved to dismiss.

Secondly, Plaintiffs argue that the County had a “mandatory 

duty” to supervise and train police officers. Opp. at 6-7. 

This argument is irrelevant because the County does not argue 

that it had no duty. Instead, the County argues that Anderson’s 

alleged breach was immune from liability.

Thus, the issue under Plaintiffs’ first theory is whether 

Anderson’s alleged knowledge and approval of the policy is a 

“basic governmental policy decision” or an “operational or 

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ministerial decision[] that merely implement[s] a basic policy 

decision.” See Olvera, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Plaintiffs 

allege that Anderson “is responsible for the operations of the 

Madera County Sheriff’s Department, including the . . . training 

of . . . law enforcement.” Compl. ¶ 51. The County contends

that Anderson’s alleged approval of a policy is a “basic policy 

decision” and is therefore immune. Mot. at 5. 

Taking everything in Plaintiffs’ complaint as true, as the 

person in charge of the County sheriff department’s operations, 

Anderson had the discretion to decide whether to approve of the 

alleged policy. According to the complaint, Anderson did more 

than “merely implement” a policy decision, rather, Anderson 

approved the alleged policy. TAC ¶ 53. Thus, Anderson’s alleged 

approval of training consistent with the policy is entitled to 

immunity under section 820.2. Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action 

is dismissed to the extent that it relies on the theory that 

Sheriff Anderson knew of the policy and approved of it.

2. Liability Under Plaintiffs’ Second Theory: Anderson 

Knew of His Subordinates’ Actions and Did Nothing to 

Change Such Actions

The County does not address Plaintiffs’ second theory of 

liability in its motion to dismiss or in its reply. Since the

County does not challenge Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action 

based on Plaintiffs’ alternative theory of liability, Plaintiffs

can proceed on this claim to the extent that it relies on the 

theory that Anderson failed to do anything to ensure that his 

subordinates engaged in proper practices when arresting 

individuals.

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B. Fifth Cause of Action

In their fifth cause of action, Plaintiffs bring § 1983 

claims against the County. TAC at 16. A county may be liable 

under § 1983 when (1) a plaintiff was deprived of a 

constitutional right, (2) the county had a policy, (3) the 

policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to the 

constitutional right, and (4) the policy was the “moving force” 

behind the constitutional violation. Mann v. Cty. of San Diego, 

2015 WL 7458613, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2015). Under the 

“moving force” prong, a court should determine whether there is 

“direct causal link” between the alleged policy and the 

constitutional deprivation. Id. at *15. The plaintiff must 

“show both causation-in-fact and proximate causation.” 

Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 

2013). “[I]n a § 1983 action, a superseding intervening cause 

that is reasonably foreseeable will not relieve a defendant of 

liability, but an unforeseen and abnormal intervention will 

break the chain of proximate causation.” Estate of Lopez ex 

rel. Lopez v. Torres, 105 F. Supp. 3d 1148, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The County moves to dismiss the fifth cause of action as 

brought by plaintiffs Jose, Gretel, and Melinda because none of 

those plaintiffs “are alleged to have been subjected to the 

alleged policy” of neutralizing the most physically threatening 

person in a group. Mot. at 7. The County argues that the

alleged policy was not the “moving force” behind Jose’s arrest

and Gretel’s and Melinda’s alleged injuries. Mot. at 7. 

Plaintiffs argue that without the policy, “there would have been 

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no assault on Alfredo, Gretel would not have been shoved into 

Melinda . . ., and Jose would not have been arrested.” Opp. at 

10. 

According to the complaint, Rich arrested Jose at the same 

time Gonzalez and Varner forced Alfredo to the ground. Compl. 

¶ 22. Plaintiffs do not provide any allegations to establish 

that Gonzalez and Varner’s taking Alfredo to the ground caused 

Rich to arrest Jose. Plaintiffs have failed to show that the 

alleged policy was the “moving force” behind Jose’s arrest. 

Plaintiffs have already been given multiple opportunities to 

properly plead this claim and any further attempts would be 

futile. As such, Jose’s § 1983 claim is dismissed with 

prejudice.

As to Gretel and Melinda, the County argues in its reply 

that “Gretel’s own act of ‘protesting’ . . . the arrest of 

Alfredo was an intervening cause” of both Gretel’s and Melinda’s 

injuries. Reply at 5. Taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, 

it is plausible that Gretel’s act of protesting her family 

member’s arrest was foreseeable, and therefore not a superseding 

cause that cuts off the County’s liability. As such, the 

County’s motion to dismiss Melinda and Gretel’s § 1983 claims is

denied. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of 

action is dismissed to the extent that it relies on the theory 

that Anderson knew of and approved the alleged policy. The Court 

DENIES the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action 

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to the extent that Plaintiffs rely on the theory that Sheriff 

Anderson knew that officers were making illegal arrests but did 

nothing change the practice. The Court grants the County’s 

motion to dismiss Jose’s § 1983 claim without leave to amend. 

The Court denies the County’s motion to dismiss Gretel and 

Melinda’s § 1983 claims. The County’s answer to the TAC must be 

filed within twenty days of the date of this order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 22, 2016

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