Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-07-05116/USCOURTS-ca6-07-05116-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Express
Appellee
Deborah Thornton
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0217p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

DEBORAH THORNTON,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION d/b/a FEDEX

EXPRESS,

 Defendant-Appellee.

X

-

-

-

-

>

,

-

-

-

-

N

No. 07-5116

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.

No. 05-02247—J. Daniel Breen, District Judge.

Submitted: June 6, 2008

Decided and Filed: June 24, 2008 

Before: DAUGHTREY, CLAY, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Karen Vaughan McManus, FEDEX CORPORATION, Memphis, Tennessee, for

Appellee. Deborah Thornton, Moscow, Tennessee, pro se. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Deborah Thornton is a former employee of

Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx”). She was discharged on August 24, 2004, when, after a 16-

month leave of absence, she did not return to work, despite being notified of return-to-work

opportunities. Plaintiff had taken the leave of absence due to stress stemming from sexual

harassment by her immediate supervisor, David Bragorgos. Plaintiff did not pursue the return-towork opportunities because she continued to receive treatment for panic disorder and fibromyalgia

from health care providers who she says had not released her to return to work. 

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Western District of Tennessee on April 1, 2005,

charging FedEx with sex discrimination and retaliation, in violation of federal and state civil rights

laws, and with discrimination based on her disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities

Act. Defendant FedEx’s motion for summary judgment was granted by the district court in a 19-

1

 Case: 07-5116 Document: 00611502978 Filed: 06/24/2008 Page: 1
No. 07-5116 Thornton v. Federal Express Corp. Page 2

1

The district court awarded summary judgment to FedEx on plaintiff’s claims under federal law and then,

declining to exercise continuing supplemental jurisdiction, dismissed the state law claims without prejudice. 

page opinion and order dated January 22, 2007.1 Proceeding pro se, plaintiff appeals from the

district court’s judgment, contending the court failed to view the record evidence in the light most

favorable to her. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I

Having duly considered the record in light of the parties’ appellate arguments, we find the

district court’s opinion to be clear and well-reasoned in most respects. First, we find no error in the

holding that plaintiff’s quid pro quo sexual harassment claim under Title VII fails for lack of

evidence that plaintiff suffered a tangible job detriment due to her rejection of Bragorgos’s sexual

advances. As the district court explained, the courier route change that precipitated plaintiff’s

request for a leave of absence, though personally inconvenient one day of the week, clearly did not

entail an increase in responsibilities or a demotion or loss of pay or benefits that would satisfy the

“materially adverse change” element of such a claim. Moreover, the courier route change was

hardly a fait accompli, but was a change in-progress, subject to continuing negotiation between

plaintiff and management at the time she took her leave of absence. 

Second, the district court correctly awarded summary judgment to FedEx on plaintiff’s claim

under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for lack of adequate showing that she suffers

from a “disability,” i.e., an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. Despite

plaintiff’s protestations, a disability determination by the Social Security Administration, even if

substantiated, would not be controlling. Plaintiff has failed to identify evidence demonstrating that

she suffers from an impairment that substantially limits her in a major life activity or that FedEx

discharged or otherwise discriminated against her because of such an impairment.

Third, plaintiff’s Title VII claim that FedEx retaliated against her because she complained

about Bragorgos’s harassment also lacks evidentiary support. The mere fact that she was eventually

terminated after having filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does

not justify an inference that there is a causal connection between the two events. We therefore find

no error in the award of summary judgment to FedEx on plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim.

II

As to plaintiff’s Title VII sexual harassment claim based on hostile work environment,

however, we find the district court’s analysis incomplete. The district court fairly considered the

evidence of Bragorgos’s harassing conduct, but concluded that it was not sufficiently severe and

pervasive to create an actionable hostile work environment. Citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998), the court characterized Bragorgos’s conduct as more akin to “simple

teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents,” rather than “discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult” sufficiently serious to have altered the conditions of plaintiff’s employment.

In order to establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on sexual

harassment, plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that she was a member of

a protected class; (2) that she was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the

harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work

performance by creating a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment; and (5) that there

is a basis for employer liability. Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir. 1999).

There is no question that the first three elements of this standard are met on the present

record. To assess the fourth element, the court must consider “‘all of the circumstances,’ including

 Case: 07-5116 Document: 00611502978 Filed: 06/24/2008 Page: 2
No. 07-5116 Thornton v. Federal Express Corp. Page 3

2

The district court did not address this fifth element of the prima facie case because it erroneously concluded

that plaintiff had not satisfied the fourth element. Because we review the grant of summary judgment de novo, we may

affirm the judgment on grounds other than those employed by the lower court, as long as the party opposing summary

judgment is not denied the opportunity to respond. Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 849 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, the

factual record has been adequately developed on the fifth element and both parties have asserted appellate arguments

under the governing standards. We therefore proceed to address the question whether there is a genuine issue of material

fact on FedEx’s affirmative defense. 

‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an

employee’s performance.’” Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647, 658 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting

Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). The “conduct in question must be judged by both

an objective and a subjective standard: the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an

environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively

regard that environment as abusive.” Id. at 658 (quoting Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc., 104 F.3d 822,

826 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

The district court minimized the offensive nature of Bragorgos’s comments and behavior.

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to plaintiff, however, we are satisfied that it

establishes a genuine fact issue on the fourth element of her prima facie case. Although there is

little evidence that Bragorgos was physically intimidating, his continuous preoccupation with sex

talk and persistent unwelcome advances, often targeted at plaintiff, were degrading, offensive,

increasingly intimidating and inexcusable. A reasonable jury could conclude that a reasonable

person, directly subordinate to Bragorgos, would find the work environment offensive. 

There is support for FedEx’s position that, for much of the two years plaintiff was subject

to Bragorgos’s supervision, she endeavored not to take him too seriously and patiently tolerated his

misbehavior. Yet, the impression is inescapable that during the months of February to April 2003,

Bragorgos put increasing pressure on plaintiff “to consummate their relationship” before his

upcoming wedding. As this pressure coincided with tensions resultant from courier route

adjustments being made in the Spring of 2003, tensions that Bragorgos seemed to exploit rather than

alleviate, plaintiff clearly began to view the work environment as hostile and abusive. Judging

Bragorgos’s alleged conduct objectively and subjectively, we find that the facts adduced create a

genuine question as to whether the work environment was hostile. 

The hostile work environment claim is not brought against Bragorgos, however, but against

plaintiff’s employer, FedEx. As to the fifth element of plaintiff’s prima facie case, FedEx is

vicariously liable for sexual harassment by Bragorgos, her supervisor, unless FedEx establishes its

affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. FedEx does this by demonstrating (a) that

it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior; and

(b) that plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities

provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; Burlington

Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); Jackson, 191 F.3d at 659.2

 

Generally, an employer satisfies the first part of this two-part standard when it has

promulgated and enforced a sexual harassment policy. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S.

at 807. “[A]n effective harassment policy should at least: (1) require supervisors to report incidents

of sexual harassment; (2) permit both informal and formal complaints of harassment to be made;

(3) provide a mechanism for bypassing a harassing supervisor when making a complaint; and

(4) provide for training regarding the policy.” Clark v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 400 F.3d at 341,

349-50 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). 

 Case: 07-5116 Document: 00611502978 Filed: 06/24/2008 Page: 3
No. 07-5116 Thornton v. Federal Express Corp. Page 4

There is no dispute that FedEx had promulgated and disseminated a facially effective sexual

harassment policy. Plaintiff acknowledges having received more than one copy of the Employee

Handbook, which contained a summary of the policy. Plaintiff became so familiar with the

handbook, she referred to it as her “Bible,” although she did not become familiar with the sexual

harassment policy until after her leave of absence commenced. Plaintiff was also aware that the

People Manual, containing a more detailed description of personnel policies, was accessible to

employees in the office. 

The closer question, in connection with FedEx’s affirmative defense, is whether plaintiff has

been shown to have been unreasonable in failing to use available preventive and corrective

measures to avoid harm. Plaintiff did not report the sexual harassment until June 2003, two months

after her leave of absence had begun, as she requested an extension of her leave. While plaintiff

remained on leave, an internal investigation was promptly undertaken by FedEx. Bragorgos denied

wrongdoing; other employees were unable to corroborate plaintiff’s allegations; and the complaint

of misconduct was deemed not to have been confirmed by the investigation. Yet, plaintiff was

offered the opportunity to return to work under supervision of a different manager involving courier

routes within her schedule preferences. In other words, plaintiff’s eventual use of the harassment

policy complaint procedure yielded the offer of a remedy that would have potentially cured both

stress-producing conditions, i.e., her subordinate relationship to Bragorgos and her schedule

difficulties. Plaintiff declined, for the reason that a psychologist and a psychiatrist with whom she

consulted in July 2003 indicated she was experiencing work-related stress and was unable to return

to work. Plaintiff was granted a one-year workers’ compensation medical leave of absence, during

which time she continued to refuse to return to work. Finally, in August 2004, after notice, plaintiff

was terminated in accordance with FedEx policy. 

Plaintiff attempts to justify her failure to earlier report Bragorgos’s misconduct by explaining

that she feared retaliation. When she did report the harassment, she contends, FedEx responded by

conducting only a superficial investigation. She contends she did not accept FedEx’s

accommodating return-to-work offers because she was physically unable to. Under these

circumstances, she maintains her failure to take advantage of available preventive and corrective

measures was reasonable. 

First, “an employee’s subjective fears of confrontation, unpleasantness or retaliation do not

alleviate the employee’s duty under Ellerth to alert the employer to the allegedly hostile

environment.” Williams v. Missouri Dep’t of Mental Health, 407 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Shaw v. AutoZone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806, 813 (7th Cir. 1999)). See also Barrett v. Applied

Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has not adduced evidence

demonstrating that she was under a “credible threat of retaliation.” Walton v. Johnson & Johnson

Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1290-91 (11th Cir. 2003). Second, plaintiff’s dissatisfaction with the

investigation does not justify her rejection of the corrective action taken by FedEx, which was

reasonably designed to eliminate the complained-of stressors in plaintiff’s work. See Weger v. City

of Ladue, 500 F.3d 710, 723 (8th Cir. 2007); Walton, 347 F.3d at 1288. Finally, the record does not

substantiate plaintiff’s contention that she was unable to return to work prior to August 2004 and

falls far short of demonstrating that any continuing difficulties were caused by any inadequacy in

FedEx’s preventive or corrective measures.

We therefore conclude that the record clearly supports the finding by a preponderance of the

evidence that plaintiff’s failure to take advantage of FedEx’s preventive and corrective measures was

unreasonable. It follows that FedEx has established its Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to

employer liability. The award of summary judgment to FedEx on plaintiff’s hostile work

environment claim is also properly affirmed, albeit on grounds other than those relied on by the

district court. 

 Case: 07-5116 Document: 00611502978 Filed: 06/24/2008 Page: 4
No. 07-5116 Thornton v. Federal Express Corp. Page 5

 III 

Accordingly, for the reasons stated by the district court in its opinion, as augmented by this

opinion, the district court’s judgment in favor of FedEx is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 07-5116 Document: 00611502978 Filed: 06/24/2008 Page: 5