Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07484/USCOURTS-cand-4_06-cv-07484-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel King
Petitioner
James E. Tilton
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

OAKLAND DIVISION

DARREL KING,

Petitioner,

 v.

JAMES E. TILTON, Secretary of the

California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation,

Respondent. 

No. C 06-7484 SBA

ORDER

[Docket No. 13]

Before the Court is Darrel King’s petition for a certificate of appealability [Docket No. 13].

Petitioner King, a California state inmate, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus [Docket No. 1]

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On August 13, 2007, the Court granted respondent James Tilton’s

(Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation) motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petition is barred by the statute of limitations. See Docket No. 11. King filed a notice

of appeal of the order denying his habeas petition on September 12, 2007, along with the present petition

for a certificate of appealability (COA). See Docket Nos. 13, 14. For the reasons that follow, the

petition for a COA is DENIED. 

1. The Order Dismissing the Habeas Petition

The following is the Court’s analysis and reasoning in the August 13, 2007 order dismissing

King’s habeas petition:

BACKGROUND

In 1981, King was convicted of first degree murder and was sentenced to a total

prison term of 29 years to life. See Docket No. 1, at 2. On April 23, 2002, the Board of

Prison Terms (Board) found King unsuitable for parole and denied further consideration

for parole for another two years. Id. King then submitted an administrative appeal of

the parole denial to the Board, but the appeal was denied on July 8, 2003. Id. King filed

a state habeas petition in San Francisco Superior Court on May 24, 2004, which was

denied on July 29, 2004. Id. King then appealed. Id. at 3. After his initial appeal was

denied, King appealed to the California Supreme Court which denied his appeal on

September 7, 2005. Id. King filed the present federal habeas petition on December 6, 2006, alleging that

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the Board’s failure to set a parole date violated due process of law, and that by not giving

individualized consideration to the relevant factors in determining a parole date, the

Board’s decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Docket No. 1, at 3. In response, the

Secretary has filed a motion to dismiss contending that King’s petition is barred by the

one-year statute of limitations. See Docket No. 6, at 2. King concedes his petition is

untimely, but claims his counsel’s negligence in timely submitting the petition is an

extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See

Docket No. 7, at 1-2. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires

a state prisoner petitioning for federal habeas corpus relief to do so within one year after:

(a) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review, or

the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (b) the date on which the impediment

to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such

action prevented the petitioner from filing; (c) the date on which the constitutional right

asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly

recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or

(d) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise

of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). The one-year statute of limitations is

tolled, however, while a “properly filed application for State post-conviction or other

collateral review . . . is pending.” Id. § 2244(d)(2); Summers v. Schriro, 481 F.3d 710,

711 (9th Cir. 2007); Biggs v. Duncan, 339 F.3d 1045, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 2003). 

ANALYSIS

1. Timeliness 

In this case, the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period began when King’s parole

appeal was denied by the Board on July 8, 2003. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1084 (9th Cir. 2003). When a prisoner challenges a Board decision denying parole, the

date on which the prisoner could have discovered the factual basis of his claim is the

date on which the Board’s decision became final. See id. The one-year statute of

limitations was tolled from the time King filed his first state habeas petition until the

California Supreme Court rejected his final collateral challenge. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219-20 (2002); Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F.3d 817, 819-20 (9th Cir.

2003) (per curiam). King filed his first state habeas petition in May 24, 2004, and the

California Supreme Court denied his request for review on September 7, 2005; the

statute of limitations was thus tolled by 471 days, the pendency period of his state habeas

proceedings. Accordingly, the one-year statute of limitations began on July 8, 2003, and

ran through May 24, 2004, when it was then tolled by the pendency of the state

proceedings. It was then triggered again on September 7, 2005, and ran until December

6, 2006, when King filed this petition in federal court. Thus, a total of 776 days elapsed

making King’s habeas petition untimely under the one-year period of limitations set by

AEDPA.

2. Equitable Tolling

King acknowledges that his petition is untimely, but invokes equitable tolling as

necessary due to extraordinary circumstances. According to King, the extraordinary

circumstance is that his attorney mistakenly believed the one-year limitations period

would not begin to run unless and until the California Supreme Court denied a petition

for writ of habeas corpus. See Docket No. 7 (Babcock Decl.). 

The statute of limitations may be subject to equitable tolling, but only “if

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extraordinary circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file a

petition on time.” Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127

S. Ct. 1880 (2007) (citation omitted). The prisoner must show that the “extraordinary

circumstances” caused the untimeliness. Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir.

2003). The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under the AEDPA is very

high, “lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066

(9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has declared the equitable

tolling is “unavailable in most cases.” Id. (citation omitted). Attorney negligence and miscalculation of limitations deadlines does not

constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling. See Lawrence v.

Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (“[a]ttorney miscalculation is simply not sufficient

to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction context where prisoners

have no constitutional right to counsel”); Miranda, 292 F.3d at 1067 (attorney’s

miscalculation of limitations period did not constitute extraordinary circumstances); Frye

v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an attorney’s general

negligence and miscalculation of the limitations deadline did not constitute extraordinary

circumstances that warranted equitable tolling in a non-capital habeas case); Hernandez

v. Tilton, 2007 WL 1430094, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (mere attorney miscalculation is not

a basis for equitable tolling). 

King relies primarily on Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003), to

substantiate his argument for equitable tolling. In Spitsyn, the petitioner’s attorney failed

to file and prepare a habeas petition, although he had been hired and paid nearly a year

in advance of the filing deadline to do so. Id. at 801. The attorney failed to take action

despite repeated requests by the petitioner and the petitioner’s mother. Id. Also, despite

a request that he return the petitioner’s file, the attorney retained the file during the

limitations period and more than two months after the deadline. Id. The court found that

the attorney’s conduct was “sufficiently egregious” to justify equitable tolling of the

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. Id.

While King’s attorney’s miscalculation may be deemed negligent at worst, it

cannot be considered “sufficiently egregious.” The Spitsyn court itself stated that

equitable tolling has not been applied in non-capital cases where attorney negligence

caused the filing of a petition to be untimely. Id. at 800. And while the attorney in

Spitsyn showed complete disregard for the promise he made to his client and essentially

defrauded him, King’s attorney made a good faith effort to file King’s habeas petition

but simply miscalculated the filing deadline. 

King’s situation is more accurately compared to Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144,

1146 (9th Cir. 2001), a case in which the petitioner’s counsel also miscalculated the

filing deadline for his client’s federal habeas petition. The Frye court found that the

attorney’s miscalculation of the limitations period and his negligence in general did not

constitute the extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Id.

King’s attorney’s error virtually mirrors the Frye attorney’s negligent miscalculation;

even though he was aware of the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period, he miscalculated

the deadline because he used a later starting point than the date dictated by the statute.

Thus, there does not exist extraordinary circumstances required for equitable tolling of

the AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. The one-year statute of limitations therefore

applies, thereby barring King’s habeas petition. 

2. Legal Requirements for a Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding without first

obtaining a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A court shall

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grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial

of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating

that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive

procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.

322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The certificate must indicate which

issues satisfy this standard and the Court of Appeals is limited to considering only those claims. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3); Hivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). 

In this case, King’s petition was denied on procedural grounds---failure to comply with the

statute of limitations. “Determining whether a COA should issue where the petition was dismissed on

procedural grounds has two components, one directed at the underlying constitutional claims and one

directed at the district court’s procedural holding.” Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. “When the district court

denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the [petitioner’s] underlying

constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the [petitioner] shows, at least, that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right

and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural

ruling.” Id. at 484. Supreme Court jurisprudence “allows and encourages” federal courts to first resolve

the procedural issue, as was done here. See id. at 485.

3. Analysis

In denying King’s habeas petition, this Court found that the statute of limitations was not subject

to equitable tolling for “extraordinary circumstances,” because under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit

precedent, attorney negligence and miscalculation of limitations deadlines does not constitute

extraordinary circumstances. See Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1085 (2007) (“[a]ttorney

miscalculation is simply not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling, particularly in the postconviction

context where prisoners have no constitutional right to counsel”); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063,

1067 (9th Cir. 2002) (attorney’s miscalculation of limitations period did not constitute extraordinary

circumstances); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that an attorney’s

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general negligence and miscalculation of the limitations deadline did not constitute extraordinary

circumstances that warranted equitable tolling in a non-capital habeas case). These holdings are clear,

leaving their application not subject to debate among reasonable jurists. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the application for a COA is DENIED. King has not demonstrated that reasonable

jurists would find this Court’s procedural ruling debatable. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484

(2000). The Clerk of the Court shall forward to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals the case file with

this Order. See United States v. Asrar, 116 F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 7, 2007 _________________________________

Saundra Brown Armstrong 

United States District Judge

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