Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00969/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-00969-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elk Grove Unified School District
Defendant
Cristina Ravanera
Plaintiff

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 Plaintiff is suing Defendant for: (1) discrimination under 1

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000(e); (2) discrimination, harassment, and

retaliation under California Code section 12940 et. seq.; (3)

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of

public policy; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CRISTINA R. RAVANERA,

2:06-CV-0969-MCE-PAN

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT, and DOES 1 through

100,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through this present motion, Elk Grove Unified School

District (“Defendant”) moves to dismiss all five causes of

action brought by Cristina Ravanera (“Plaintiff”) pursuant to 1

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and largely bases its

motion on the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

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Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 78-230(h). 

2

For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s motion is denied in

part and granted in part.2

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a woman of Filipino/Asian ancestry and national

origin, began working for Defendant as a Payroll Technician I on

or about March 12, 2002. Plaintiff alleges that from

approximately March 2002 through June 2004, her interim manager

Debby Smith (“Smith”) harassed Plaintiff by regularly mimicking

and mocking Plaintiff’s accent, and criticizing Plaintiff’s

English communication skills. Plaintiff further alleges that in

approximately December 2003, a supervisor for Defendant told

Plaintiff not to speak her native language, Tagalog, with other

Filipino co-workers, explaining that Defendant had an “Englishonly” policy.

According to the Complaint, in approximately June 2004,

Plaintiff applied for a promotion for which she was qualified. 

The promotion would have elevated Plaintiff to a Payroll

Technician II position. Plaintiff interviewed with Smith and was

told that she did not receive the job due to a lack of

communication skills. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff overheard

another interviewer, an employee of Defendant, comment that

Defendant should not hire people who don’t speak English. 

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3

Plaintiff alleges the promotion was given to a non-Filipino,

less-qualified individual.

In September 2004, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Plaintiff

alleges that Smith thereafter mounted a campaign of retaliation

against Plaintiff. According to Plaintiff, Smith began to appear

regularly at Plaintiff’s desk, scrutinized Plaintiff’s work, and

intimidated Plaintiff by following her around the work place. 

Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Smith began to assign menial

tasks to Plaintiff instead of her normal duties.

On December 10, 2004, Plaintiff was asked to leave work

immediately in plain view of several of Plaintiff’s co-workers. 

Thereafter, Defendant announced to Plaintiff’s co-workers that

Plaintiff had been placed on “disability” status, and would not

be returning to work. 

Plaintiff alleges on or about February 7, 2006, the EEOC

sent her a Right to Sue Letter, setting forth a ninety day (90)

window for Plaintiff to file suit. Plaintiff filed the current

action in this Court on May 5, 2006, in accordance with the

EEOC’s instructions. 

STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss a complaint

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 

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4

A court should not dismiss a complaint, however, for a party’s

failure to state a claim “unless it appears beyond doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim

which would entitle [it] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.

41, 45-46, (1957); see also Yamaguchi v. United States Dep’t of

the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1997). 

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court should take all

factual allegations set forth in the complaint “as true and

construed in the light most favorable to [p]laintiffs.” Epstein

v. Washington Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Dismissal is appropriate “only if it is clear that no relief

could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467

U.S. 69, 73, 104 S. Ct. 2229, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1984); see also

McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1988). 

However, the Court need not “assume that the [plaintiff] can

prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have

violated . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged. 

Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council

of Contractors, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

"Generally, a district court may not consider any material

beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." Hal

Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555

n.19 (9th Cir.1990); see also Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.

Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). However, the court

may “consider material which has been properly submitted as part

of the complaint” when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hal

Roach Studios, 896 F.2d at 1555 n.19.

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5

ANALYSIS

A. Eleventh Amendment

The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides in pertinent part as follows:

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.

Although the Eleventh Amendment does not address suits by

citizens against their own States, the United States Supreme

Court has extended the Amendment’s applicability to such suits. 

Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363

(2001) (“The ultimate guarantee of the Eleventh Amendment is that

nonconsenting States may not be sued by private individuals in

federal court.”); see Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid

Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 669-670 (1999). 

The Eleventh Amendment bar also extends to suits against

state agencies and departments. Austin v. State Indus. Ins.

Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 677 (9th Cir. 1991). Thus, the Eleventh

Amendment prevents private individuals from suing State and State

entities in federal court for either money damages, Atascadero

State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 235, 241 (1985), or

equitable relief, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781, 782 (1978).

This guarantee extends to both federal and state claims asserted

by citizens against their own States. Gilbreath v. Cutter

Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1327 (9th Cir. 1991)(citing

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)).

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 Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendant’s motion appears to 3

concede that the Eleventh Amendment bars her from bringing a

(continued...)

6

Eleventh Amendment immunity is not absolute, however. The

Supreme Court has recognized two circumstances in which a private

individual may sue a State or state entities. Coll. Sav. Bank,

527 U.S. at 670. First, Congress may authorize such a suit

against a State pursuant to a valid exercise of its power. Id.

Second, a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to

suit. Id. A State’s consent to a suit in federal court,

however, must be unequivocal. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465

U.S. at 99.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized school districts as state

entities. Belanger v. Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248,

254 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, the question becomes whether

Plaintiff’s claims asserted herein come under an exception

preventing Defendant’s general immunity under the Eleventh

Amendment from applying. Plaintiff’s claims will be analyzed in

that regard below.

1. Federal Law Claim

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is based on Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by, 42 U.S.C. 2000, et.

seq. In its motion to dismiss, Defendant argues this Court lacks

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal law claim

because Eleventh Amendment immunity shields Defendant from

individuals seeking money damages against state entities in

federal courts. 

3

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(...continued) 3

Title VII action against Defendant. That interpretation of the

law is just as misguided as Defendant’s argument in bringing the

instant Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII claim on Eleventh

Amendment grounds in the first place.

 Plaintiff claims (2) discrimination, harassment, and 4

retaliation under California Code section 12940 et. seq.; (3)

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of

public policy; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress;

and (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress.

7

In setting forth this argument, Defendant failed to consider

whether Congress abrogated this immunity in Title VII actions.

In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Supreme Court found that in

the 1972 Amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

Congress, acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,

authorized federal courts to award money damages in favor of a

private individual against a state government found to have

subjected that person to employment discrimination on the basis

of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 427 U.S. 445,

447-448 (1976). The Eleventh Amendment does not invalidate the

1972 amendments. Id. at 449. Plaintiff’s Title VII cause of

action is consequently not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

2. State Law Claims

Plaintiff contends this Court has supplemental jurisdiction

over her remaining four state law causes of action pursuant to 4

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 

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 Regarding Plaintiff’s state law claims, Defendant further 5

argues in its motion to dismiss that Plaintiff failed to exhaust

her administrative remedies, failed to allege compliance with

California’s Tort Claim Act, and failed to allege statutory

violations. However, since the Eleventh Amendment completely

insulates Defendant from Plaintiff’s state law claims, we do not

discuss Defendant’s other arguments. 

8

In its motion, Defendant requests, inter alia, that this Court 5

dismiss these four state law claims due to Defendant’s Eleventh

Amendment immunity. The Court agrees. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent

state law claims against nonconsenting state defendants in

federal court. Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S.

533, 540-541 (2002); see also Stanley v. Trs. of the Cal. State

Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, California has

not unequivocally waived its sovereign immunity. Thus, the

Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiff’s state law claims in their

entirety against Defendant. As the Ninth Circuit explained, 

“It is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state

sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials

on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result

conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that

underlie the Eleventh Amendment.” Stanley v. Trs. of the Cal.

State Univ., 433 F.3d at 1134 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &

Hosp., 465 U.S. at 106).

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CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s claim for relief under Title VII is not barred

by the Eleventh Amendment, and Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s first cause of action is therefore denied. 

Plaintiff’s remaining four state law claims however, are barred

on Eleventh Amendment grounds. Because the deficiencies of

Plaintiff’s Complaint as to her state law claims cannot be cured

through amendment, granting Plaintiff further leave to amend

those claims would be futile. Broughton v. Cutter Labs., 622

F.2d at 460. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is accordingly

granted without leave to amend, as to the Second, Third, Fourth

and Fifth causes of action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: August 8, 2006

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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