Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07004/USCOURTS-ca10-92-07004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
Appellee
Lavonna Radford
Appellant

Document Text:

FILLO 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAlli\ted sr~~~~ Apl)e&h 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT APR 2 0 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

LAVONNA RADFORD, Personal Representative) Clerk 

of the Estate of EDDIE R. RADFORD, ) 

Deceased, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CHEVRON, U.S.A., INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 92-7004 

(D.C. No. CIV-91-353-S) 

( E . D. Okla. ) 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and RUSSELL,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable David L. Russell, District 

District Court for the Western District of 

designation. 

Judge, United States 

Oklahoma, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument . 

The case is therefore ordered 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-7004 Document: 010110212801 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff, the mother and personal representative of 

decedent, commenced a wrongful death action against defendant for 

damages for decedent's death, which was caused by an explosion and 

fire at defendant's oil storage tank battery. Plaintiff alleged 

that defendant negligently maintained the oil storage battery and 

failed to warn the public of the dangers of the site . After three 

days of trial before a jury, the district court entered judgment 

for defendant as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

50(a) (1). Plaintiff appealed, raising three grounds for reversal: 

(1) based on the evidence presented, the district court erred in 

ruling for defendant as a matter of law; (2) the district court 

erred in ruling the decedent was a trespasser on defendant's 

leasehold; and (3) even if the decedent was a trespasser, the 

district court erred in ruling defendant had not breached its duty 

of care to the decedent. We affirm. 

Rule 50(a) (1) permits a district court to grant a motion for 

judgment as a matter of law" [i]f during a trial by jury a party 

has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no 

legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have 

found for that party with respect to that issue .. Although 

this version of Rule 50 (a), which became effective on December 1, 

1991, abandons the directed verdict terminology previously used in 

the rule, it does not change the existing standard expressed in 

case law. Rule 50 advisory committee's note. 

1 The sufficiency of evidence to go to the jury is a matter of 

federal law in diversity cases. FDIC v. Palermo, 815 F.2d 1329, 

1335 (10th Cir. 1987). 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-7004 Document: 010110212801 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 2 
Thus, in reviewing the judgment as a matter of law, we apply 

the same standard applied by the district court, see Clark v . 

R.E . L. Prods., Inc . , 972 F . 2d 317, 317 (10th Cir. 1992 ) , and 

review de novo, see Pytlik v. Professional Resources, Ltd., 887 

F.2d 1371, 1380 (10th Cir. 1989) . In doing so, we determine 

whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

nonrnovant, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the 

evidence are so clear a reasonable mind could not differ on the 

conclusion. See id. A motion for judgment as a matter of law may 

be entered only when the evidence is so in favor of the moving 

party that a jury verdict in favor of the party opposing the 

motion would be improper. See id. 

Plaintiff argues the district court erred in ruling for the 

defendant as a matter of law based on the evidence presented. 

Plaintiff submits that there were genuine issues of fact 

concerning defendant's creation of a dangerous condition of 

improper venting that should have been submitted to the jury. 

Furthermore, plaintiff maintains that defendant was aware of a 

potential danger to the public, yet failed to warn the public of 

the danger. Defendant counters that plaintiff must initially 

establish a duty owed by defendant to the decedent before the jury 

can be instructed on negligence. We agree. 

The district court determined the decedent was a trespasser. 

Plaintiff argues this determination was in error. Nothing in the 

appendices indicates the decedent had permission of the land owne r 

or de f endant, the lease holder, to be on the property. Rather, 

the evidence showed that the decedent was on the property without 

3 

Appellate Case: 92-7004 Document: 010110212801 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 3 
an invitation and against defendant's wishes. See Lohrenz v. 

Lane, 787 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Okla. 1990). Based on the evidence 

before us, we conclude that the district court correctly 

determined that plaintiff was a trespasser. Cf. Hollinghead v. 

Carter Oil Co., 221 F.2d 920, 922 (5th Cir. 1955) (fifteen-year-old 

boy who climbed on oil storage tank, forcibly opened hatch, and 

peered in with open light was a trespasser). 

Plaintiff maintains this court should abandon the status 

distinctions of trespasser, licensee, and invitee and adopt a 

standard of reasonableness under the circumstances. In a 

diversity case, this court follows the applicable state law. 

Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1218 (1991). 

The Oklahoma Supreme Court has refused to depart from the common 

law classification scheme. Lohrenz, 787 P.2d at 1275-76; Woodis 

v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 704 P.2d 483, 485 (Okla. 1985 ). 

Accordingly, we refuse to depart from the classifications in this 

case. 

Citing Woodis, 704 P.2d 483, plaintiff suggests that because 

there was testimony that the venting system did not meet 

recommended standards, the jury could have determined that 

defendant was per se negligent. In Woodis, the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court held that when an electric company fails to comply with a 

police power statute or regulation, the traditional rules 

regarding trespasser status do not apply and the issue becomes 

whether violation of the police power statute or the regulation 

was the proximate cause of the injuries. Id. at 487. The case, 

however, recognizes a distinction between a negligence claim of a 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-7004 Document: 010110212801 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 4 
trespasser against an ordinary land possessor and a negligence 

claim by a trespasser against a land owner and operator who 

violates a police power safety statute or regulation. See id.; 

cf. Daniel v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 329 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Okla . 

1958) (care and duty demanded of property owner commensurate with 

danger). Because, in this case, there is no actual safety statute 

or regulation at issue and plaintiff describes the venting 

standards as recommended, the traditional classification rules 

apply. 

Plaintiff argues that even if the decedent was a trespasser, 

the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that 

defendant did not breach its duty of care to the decedent. A 

landowner owes a trespasser a duty not to injure the trespasser 

willfully, wantonly, or intentionally. Lohrenz, 787 P . 2d at 1278. 

There is an exception to this duty when the presence of the 

trespasser is known or should reasonably have been anticipated. 

Oklahoma Biltmore, Inc. v . Williams, 79 P.2d 202, 205 (Okla . 

1938). There is, however, no legal obligation on the defendant to 

anticipate that a trespasser will assume a position of peril . Id. 

at 206 . 

Wanton acts and grossly negligent acts are synonymous . 

Lohrenz, 787 P.2d at 1278 . Acts or omissions involving reckless 

indifference to the safety of reasonably anticipated trespassers, 

although wi thout intent to injure, may be wanton . Id. "The 

existence of a high degree of likelihood that substantial harm 

will result is an essential ingredient of wanton and reckless 

conduct . " Foste r v. Emery, 495 P. 2d 390, 393 (Okla. 1.972 ) . 

5 

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The evidence in this case failed to establish that defendant 

wantonly failed to protect decedent who disregarded his own safety 

and who placed himself in unexpected and sudden peril. See 

Hollinghead, 221 F.2d at 922; Kaw City v. Johnson, 209 P.2d 699, 

702 (Okla. 1949). No evidence indicated defendant should 

reasonably have anticipated a trespasser on the property. Rather, 

the evidence indicated that no one other than employees had been 

on the property. Defendant's no smoking sign should have been 

sufficient to alert decedent of any danger. 

Plaintiff complains that the district court improperly 

prevented her from presenting evidence that defendant's acts and 

omissions rose to a level of wantonness causing decedent's death. 

The district court refused to permit plaintiff's expert witness to 

testify that defendant's acts and omissions rose to the level of 

gross negligence and a reckless disregard for the public safety. 

The district court permitted only a question concerning whether 

the expert thought defendant was negligent. 

11 [T]he district court has broad discretion in determining 

whether or not to admit expert testimony, and we review a decision 

to admit or deny such testimony only for abuse of discretion." 

Orth v. Emerson Elec . Co., White-Rodgers Div., 980 F . 2d 632, 637 

(10th Cir. 1992 ). Federal Rule of Evidence 704 (a) permits an 

expert to present his opinion as to the ultimate issue to be 

decided by the trier of fact . A.E. ex rel. Evans v . Independent 

Sch. Dist. No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, 476 (10th Cir. 1991) ; Karns V. 

Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987). All 

opinions, however, are not admissible. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-7004 Document: 010110212801 Date Filed: 04/20/1993 Page: 6 
805, 807 (10th Cir. 1988 ) (citing Rule 704 advisory notes) , cert. 

denied, 488 U. S. 1008 (1989 ) . An expert may not state legal 

conclusions drawn by applying law to the facts. 

Evans, 936 F .2d at 476. 

A. E. ex rel. 

Plaintiff's expert witness would have testified to an 

impermissible legal conclusion. The district court, therefore, 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony. 

Because the district court correctly concluded that defendant 

did not breach its duty of care, the court correctly entered 

judgment for defendant as a matter of law. The judgment of the 

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma 

is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

7 

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