Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16292/USCOURTS-ca9-13-16292-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arizona Department of Law

Alice Hancock

Rick Mauldin

State of Arizona

The Geo Group, Inc.
Appellee
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. Thomas

C. Horne, Attorney General;

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF LAW,

Civil Rights Division,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

and

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

ALICE HANCOCK,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

v.

THE GEO GROUP, INC., a Florida

corporation, DBA Arizona State

Prison-Florence West and Central

Arizona Correctional Facility,

Defendants-Appellees,

RICK MAULDIN, an individual,

Defendant.

No. 13-16081

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01995-

SRB

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 1 of 33
2 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

STATE OF ARIZONA, ex rel. Thomas

C. Horne, Attorney General;

ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF LAW,

Civil Rights Division,

Plaintiffs,

ALICE HANCOCK,

Intervenor-Plaintiff,

and

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE GEO GROUP, INC., a Florida

corporation, DBA Arizona State

Prison-Florence West and Central

Arizona Correctional Facility,

Defendant-Appellee.

RICK MAULDIN, an individual,

Defendant.

No. 13-16292

D.C. No.

2:10-cv-01995-

SRB

OPINION

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Susan R. Bolton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 2 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 3

Filed March 14, 2016

Before: Stephen Reinhardt, A. Wallace Tashima,

and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

SUMMARY*

EEOC / Title VII

The panel vacated the district court’s summary judgment,

and remanded with instructions to reinstate the Equal

Employment OpportunityCommission and the Arizona Civil

Rights Division (“the Division”)’s claims brought on behalf

of aggrieved employees of Geo Group, Incorporated, alleging

violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the

Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”).

The panel held that the EEOC and the Division

sufficiently conciliated its class claims against Geo in this

lawsuit in light of Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct.

1645 (2015). The panel assumed that Title VII and ACRA’s

exhaustion requirements applied in this case, and held that the

EEOC and the Division could maintain their claims on behalf

of aggrieved employees provided that the employee alleged

at least one act of misconduct occurred within 300 days prior

to the date the first aggrieved employee, Alice Hancock, filed

a charge against Geo. The panel also held that in an EEOC

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 3 of 33
4 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

class action an aggrieved employee was not required to file a

new charge of discrimination with the EEOC if the claim was

“like or reasonably related” to the initial charge. Finally, the

panel held that aggrieved employee Sofia Hines presented

material issues of fact as to her hostile work environment

claim.

COUNSEL

P. David Lopez, Lorraine C. Davis, Jennifer S. Goldstein, and

Anne Noel Occhialino (argued), Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel,

Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant EEOC.

Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General of Arizona; Rose DalyRooney and Christian B. Carlsen (argued), Assistant

Attorneys General, Civil Rights Division, Tucson, Arizona,

for Plaintiffs-Appellants State of Arizona and Arizona

Department of Law.

Philip L. Ross (argued), Littler Mendelson, P.C., San

Francisco, California; R. Shawn Oller and Kristy L. Peters,

Littler Mendelson, P.C., Phoenix, Arizona, for DefendantAppellee The Geo Group.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 4 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 5

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants the Arizona Civil Rights Division

(“the Division”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) appeal the

district court’s summary judgment rulings against them and

in favor of Defendant-Appellee Geo Group, Incorporated

(“Geo”). A female corrections officer, Alice Hancock, filed

a charge of discrimination with the Division against her

employer, Geo, alleging that she had been subjected to

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of

state and federal employment laws. After an investigation,

the Division and EEOC found reasonable cause to believe

that Geo had violated the employment rights of the

corrections officer and a class of female employees. 

Conciliation attempts failed, and the EEOC and the Division

brought suit on behalf of a class of female employees alleging

that Geo violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

and the Arizona Civil Rights Act (“ACRA”).

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of

Geo dismissing several employees whom neither the EEOC

nor the Division had identified until after filing the complaint. 

The district court also dismissed several employees who had

not alleged acts within 300 days of the Division’s Reasonable

Cause Determination. The district court dismissed the hostile

work environment claim of another aggrieved employee,

Sofia Hines, on the ground that the conduct she alleged was

not sufficiently severe or pervasive.

This appeal raises four issues: (1) the scope of the

requirement that the EEOC and the Division conciliate any

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 5 of 33
6 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

claims with an employer prior to bringing suit, (2) when Title

VII’s 300-day limitations period starts to run in an EEOC

class action; (3) whether, in an EEOC class action, an

aggrieved employee is required to file a new charge of

discrimination for acts that occur after the Reasonable Cause

Determination; and (4) whether aggrieved employee Sophia

Hines has presented material issues of fact as to her hostile

work environment claim.

We vacate the district court’s order. We hold that the

EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated its class

claims against Geo in this lawsuit in light of Mach Mining,

LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645 (2015).1 Assuming that Title

VII and the ACRA’s exhaustion requirements apply in this

case, we hold that the EEOC and the Division may maintain

their claims on behalf of aggrieved employees provided that

the employee has alleged at least one act of misconduct that

occurred within 300 days prior to the date the first aggrieved

employee, Alice Hancock, filed her charge against Geo. We

also hold that in an EEOC class action an aggrieved employee

is not required to file a new charge of discrimination with the

EEOC if her claim is already encompassed within the

Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or

reasonably related” to the initial charge. Finally, we hold that

aggrieved employeeSofia Hines has presented material issues

of fact as to her hostile work environment claim.

I

Alice Hancock was employed by Geo as a correctional

officer at the Arizona State Prison, Florence West Facility. 

1 The district court did not have the benefit of Mach Mining, which was

not decided until after this case was on appeal.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 6 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 7

Geo is a corporation that employs over 13,000 employees and

provides corrections and detention management, health and

mental health services to federal, state, and local government

agencies. Geo contracts with the Arizona Department of

Corrections to maintain and operate two facilities: (1) the

low-to-medium securityreturn-to-custodyand driving-underthe-influence units at Florence West and (2) the mediumsecurity sex-offender unit at Central Arizona Correctional

Facility (“CACF”).

On June 5, 2009, Hancock filed a charge of

discrimination with the Arizona Civil Rights Division and the

EEOC.2 Hancock alleged that while working with Sergeant

Robert Kroen he grabbed her crotch and pinched her vagina. 

Hancock filed an incident report with Geo, but contends that

Geo did not remedy the harassment. After Hancock

complained about Kroen’s conduct, three of her coworkers

complained that Hancock had made an offensive comment. 

Geo placed Hancock on unpaid administrative leave pending

an internal investigation, and later suspended her for 15 days

without pay. Three months after Hancock filed her charge of

discrimination, Geo terminated Hancock’s employment.

The Division investigated the allegations in Hancock’s

charge.3It asked Geo for a position statement and served

discovery on Geo asking for “similar complaints made by

2 A “charge” is a written and verified statement that a person has

engaged or is engaging in an unlawful employment practice. 29 C.F.R.

§§ 1601.7, 1601.9, 1601.11; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1481(A).

3 The Arizona Civil Rights Division has entered into a worksharing

agreement with the EEOC, which states how the investigations of charges

are divided. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(b); 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 7 of 33
8 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

others involving the same issues or individuals as involved in

[Hancock’s] complaint to the [Division].” Geo provided

documentation regarding previous investigations of

complaints of sexual harassment at its Florence West facility

involving individuals other than Hancock. Based on Geo’s

responses, the Division identified five additional female

correctional officers who either witnessed or complained of

sexual harassment. The Division then subpoenaed and

interviewed current and former Geo employees, who

identified additional female employees as potential aggrieved

employees.

On May 19, 2010, the Division concluded its

investigation and issued a Reasonable Cause Determination

substantiating Hancock’s allegations of discrimination and

harassment based on her sex and retaliation. The Division

found that Kroen had sexually harassed her, Kroen and others

created a hostile work environment, and that Geo retaliated

against Hancock after she complained about Kroen. 

Additionally, the Division identified other incidents of

misconduct by Kroen and other male supervisors “that

created an offensive and hostile work environment based on

gender that adversely affected Hancock and a class of female

employees working at the facility.” The Division identified

several egregious acts allegedly committed by three male

correctional officers against subordinate female officers. The

alleged acts included that a male officer grabbed Hancock’s

breast; he made offensive comments and gestures including

that he was “‘fucking” a female correctional officer, told

female officers that he wanted to “bend [them] over the desk”

and “wanted to ram [them] from the back” while making

humping gestures, and told female correctional officers to

“suck his dick” while making gestures towards his penis. 

Another male officer allegedly “rubbed against a subordinate

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 8 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 9

female correctional officer when she bent over to replace a

trash can liner,” and “forcibly lifted her onto a table, shoved

himself between her legs and tried to kiss her.”

The Division also found reasonable cause to believe that

Geo did not take reasonable steps to prevent and correct

harassment in the workplace and subjected female officers to

different terms and conditions of employment. The

Division’s investigation suggested, among other things, that

even after substantiating sexual harassment claims against

two male correctional officers, Geo gave one officer a

positive performance review and made the other officer an

instructor for mandatory training that his victims would be

required to attend. Additionally the Division found that while

Geo had a practice of transferring male supervisors accused

of harassment to other units (which also employed female

correctional officers), female correctional officers were

assigned to less desirable positions after they complained.

Based on its investigation, the Division determined that

“Hancock and the other similarly-situated aggrieved females

were subjected to different terms and conditions of

employment, including harassment and retaliation.” The

Division concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe

Geo had violated Arizona Revised Statutes prohibiting

discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, “against Hancock

and a class of female employees.” The EEOC adopted the

Division’s Reasonable Cause Determination in a separate

letter to Geo.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 9 of 33
10 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

A. The EEOC and the Division’s Conciliation Efforts

with Geo

The EEOC and the Division invited Geo to conciliate the

matter in their Reasonable Cause Determinations. 

Additionally, the EEOC and the Division conveyed a

conciliation letter to Geo that outlined a proposal to settle

Alice Hancock’s charge of discrimination and the claims of

other aggrieved employees of Geo. The letter proposed

damages for Ms. Hancock, a class fund for unidentified class

members, and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs and Geo also

attended a joint conciliation session. During the conciliation

session, Geo made a counteroffer as to Hancock but did not

make a counteroffer to the class demand. Geo asked

Plaintiffs to identify the unidentified class members but they

declined to do so. Geo also proposed a separate settlement

with the EEOC and the Division, which they rejected. 

Ultimately the conciliation was unsuccessful.

B. The EEOC and the Division’s Civil Complaints

The EEOC and the Division filed civil complaints against

Geo alleging that “Geo Group has engaged in unlawful

employment practices at the Florence West and CACF

Facilities” in violation of Title VII and the ACRA. The

complaints alleged that Hancock and similarly situated

employees were subject to “different terms and conditions of

employment, including, but not limited to, sex-based hostile

work environment and sexual harassment,” and “retaliation.”4

4 The Division filed its complaint in the Maricopa County Superior

Court, and Geo removed the Arizona state action to federal court. The

EEOC filed its complaint in the District of Arizona. The cases were

consolidated in district court.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 10 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 11

While litigation was pending, Plaintiffs sent letters entitled

“Notice of Class Litigation” to 144 female correctional

officers and 259 male officers encouraging the officers to

contact them if they ever witnessed any sexual harassment or

retaliation. As a result of these letters, additional female Geo

employees came forward to participate in the lawsuit.

C. The District Court’s Summary Judgment Orders

The district court granted in part Geo’s successive

motions for partial summary judgment. The district court

first dismissed the claims of 15 women who had not been

specifically identified during the course of the investigation

or in the Reasonable Cause Determination. The district court

concluded that the EEOC and the Division were required to

identify these women and attempt to conciliate their claims

prior to bringing suit on their behalf. The court reasoned that

because “Plaintiffs did not identify the fifteen women at issue

until after sending their Notices of Class Litigation,”

Plaintiffs had “wholly failed to satisfy [their] statutory presuit obligations” to conciliate their claims. The district court

stayed the claims of the five aggrieved employees who were

discovered during the investigation into Hancock’s

allegations while the Plaintiffs and Geo attempted

conciliation.

After conciliation failed for the remaining aggrieved

employees, the district court granted Geo’s partial summary

judgment motion finding that Hancock and the other five

remaining aggrieved employees’ claims were untimely in

part. The court found that Title VII and the Arizona Civil

Rights Act required that a party file a charge of

discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory

act. The district court found that Hancock had timely filed

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 11 of 33
12 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

her charge with the EEOC and the Division on June 5, 2009,

but that any discrete acts prior to August 9, 2008—300 days

before Hancock’s June 5, 2009, charge—were untimely. The

court found, however, that any alleged misconduct that

formed Hancock’s hostile work environment claim would not

be barred.

With respect to other aggrieved employees, the court

noted that they were not necessarily required to file their own

charge if their claims arose out of similar discriminatory

treatment as Hancock. However, the district court found the

operative date for other employees was not the date of

Hancock’s charge (June 5, 2009), but rather May 19, 2010,

the date of the Division’s Reasonable Cause Determination

that placed Geo on notice that the Division was expanding its

investigation to include a class of women. Thus, the district

court found that any discrete acts alleged by the other

aggrieved employees prior to July 23, 2009, 300 days

preceding the Division’s Reasonable Cause Determination,

were untimely.

The district court also barred any discrete acts that arose

after the date of the Reasonable Cause Determination, May

19, 2010, as those acts “were not investigated and, therefore,

cannot be considered.” The district court noted that the

EEOC and the Division had failed to respond to Geo’s

argument that post-determination acts should be excluded. 

The court also found that aggrieved employees with claims

arising after the Reasonable Cause Determination were

required to file their own charges. Accordingly, the district

court found that two aggrieved employees, Roach and

Wilcox, had failed to allege any timely acts and granted

summary judgment in Geo’s favor.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 12 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 13

Finally, the district court found that, regardless of whether

Hines’s claims were timely, the conduct that Hines alleged

did not rise to the level of actionable hostile work

environment.

Hancock settled with Geo prior to trial for an undisclosed

amount, and the district court dismissed her claims. The final

two remaining employees entered into a consent decree prior

to trial. The consent decree preserved the EEOC and the

Division’s right to appeal the district court’s summary

judgment orders in an effort to pursue claims and remedies on

behalf for the dismissed employees. The EEOC and the

Division timely appealed.

II

We review summary judgment de novo. Szajer v. City of

L.A., 632 F.3d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 2011). We focus on (1) the

agencies’ obligation to seek conciliation prior to filing suit on

behalf of aggrieved employees, (2) when the 300-day period

begins to run for employees who seek to join an agency class

action, (3) whether, in an EEOC class action, an aggrieved

employee is required to file a new charge of discrimination

for acts that occur after the Reasonable Cause Determination,

and (4) whether Sophia Hines has presented material issues

of fact that precluded summary judgment against her.

III

A. The EEOC and the Division’s pre-suit conciliation

efforts are subject to limited judicial review

“Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., sets out a detailed, multi-step

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 13 of 33
14 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

procedure through which the [EEOC] enforces the statute’s

prohibition on employment discrimination.” Mach Mining,

LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1649 (2015) (unanimous). 

“The process generally starts when ‘a person claiming to be

aggrieved’ files a charge of an unlawful workplace practice

with the EEOC.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). 

“[T]he EEOC notifies the employer of the complaint and

undertakes an investigation.” Id. “If the Commission finds

no ‘reasonable cause’ to think that the allegation has merit, it

dismisses the charge and notifies the parties,” and “the

complainant may then pursue her own lawsuit if she

chooses.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).

“If, on the other hand, the Commission finds reasonable

cause, it must first ‘endeavor to eliminate [the] alleged

unlawful employment practice by informal methods of

conference, conciliation, and persuasion.’” Id. (quoting 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). The statute leaves to the EEOC the

ultimate decision whether to accept a settlement or instead to

bring a lawsuit on its own behalf. Id. “So long as ‘the

Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent

a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission’

itself, the EEOC may sue the employer.” Id. at 1649–50

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). Thus, before suing an

employer for discrimination, the EEOC must try to remedy

unlawful workplace practices through informal methods of

conciliation. The ACRA is “modeled after and is generally

identical” to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Ariz. Civil

Rights Div. v. Hughes Air Corp., 678 P.2d 494, 497 (Ariz. Ct.

App. 1983) (quoting Higdon v. Evergreen Int’l Airlines, Inc.,

673 P.2d 907, 909–10 n.3 (Ariz. 1983)). It contains a similar

condition requiring a conciliation attempt. Ariz. Rev. Stat.

§ 41-1481(B), (D).

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 14 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 15

After principal briefing in this case was completed, the

U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Mach Mining to

determine whether and to what extent may a court enforce the

EEOC’s mandatory duty to conciliate discrimination claims

before filing suit. 135 S. Ct. at 1651. The Court unanimously

held that courts have jurisdiction to review whether the

EEOC has satisfied the pre-suit conciliation requirement. Id.

at 1652–53. However, the review of whether the EEOC has

satisfied its pre-suit conciliation requirements is “limited.” 

Id. at 1653.

[T]he EEOC must inform the employer about

the specific allegation, as the Commission

typically does in a letter announcing its

determination of “reasonable cause.” [42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).] Such notice properly

describes both what the employer has done

and which employees (or what class of

employees) have suffered as a result. And the

EEOC must try to engage the employer in

some form of discussion (whether written or

oral), so as to give the employer an

opportunity to remedy the allegedly

discriminatory practice. Judicial review of

those requirements (and nothing else) ensures

that the Commission complies with the

statute. At the same time, that relatively

barebones review allows the EEOC to

exercise all the expansive discretion Title VII

gives it to decide how to conduct conciliation

efforts and when to end them. And such

review can occur consistent with the statute’s

non-disclosure provision, because a court

looks only to whether the EEOC attempted to

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 15 of 33
16 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

confer about a charge, and not to what

happened (i.e., statements made or positions

taken) during those discussions.

Id. at 1655–56.

Here, it is undisputed that the EEOC and the Division

served Geo with a Reasonable Cause Determination detailing

Hancock’s allegations against Kroen and her complaint to

Geo. Moreover, the Reasonable Cause Determination

referred to a “class” of female employees who had also been

subject to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation at the

low-to-medium securityreturn-to-custodyand driving-underthe-influence unit at Florence West and the medium-security

sex-offender unit, which was located at the CACF. Both

agencies invited Geo to conciliate and all parties participated

in a formal mediation session. The EEOC and the Division

proposed a settlement including damages, injunctive relief,

and a class fund for unnamed class members. Under the

Supreme Court’s guidance in Mach Mining, the agencies’

actions clearly satisfied Title VII and the ACRA’s

conciliatory requirements.

Even if the EEOC and the Division had failed to

conciliate prior to bringing suit, the appropriate remedy

would be a stay of proceedings to permit an attempt at

conciliation, not the dismissal of the aggrieved employees’

claims.

If, however, the employer provides credible

evidence of its own, in the form of an affidavit

or otherwise, indicating that the EEOC did not

provide the requisite information about the

charge or attempt to engage in a discussion

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 16 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 17

about conciliating the claim, a court must

conduct the factfinding necessary to decide

that limited dispute. Cf. id., at –––– – ––––,

134 S.Ct., at 2367–2368. Should the court find

in favor of the employer, the appropriate

remedy is to order the EEOC to undertake the

mandated efforts to obtain voluntary

compliance. See § 2000e-5(f)(1) (authorizing

a stay of a Title VII action for that purpose).

Id. at 1656 (emphasis added).

Although the EEOC, like any party to litigation, may not

negotiate in good faith, these concerns were addressed by a

unanimous Supreme Court in Mach Mining. The Court

explained:

Congress left to the EEOC such strategic

decisions as whether to make a bare-minimum

offer, to lay all its cards on the table, or to

respond to each of an employer’s counteroffers, however far afield. So too Congress

granted the EEOC discretion over the pace

and duration of conciliation efforts, the

plasticity or firmness of its negotiating

positions, and the content of its demands for

relief. For a court to assess any of those

choices—as Mach Mining urges and many

courts have done, is not to enforce the law

Congress wrote, but to impose extra

procedural requirements. Such judicial

review extends too far.

Id. at 1654 (citation omitted).

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 17 of 33
18 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

Thus, the EEOC and the Division sufficiently conciliated

its class claims against the employer, Geo, in this lawsuit

under Title VII and the ACRA. The district court’s grant of

summary judgment for failure to conciliate is vacated.

B. Neither the EEOC nor the Division is required to

conciliate on an individual basis prior to bringing a

lawsuit on behalf of a class of aggrieved individuals

The district court was also concerned that the EEOC and

the Division had used the discovery process to identify

additional aggrieved employees, and accordingly deduced

that they were required to identify and conciliate on behalf of

all class members during the investigation period. But we

reject the district court’s premise that the EEOC and the

Division must identify and conciliate on behalf of each

individual aggrieved employee during the investigation

process prior to filing a lawsuit seeking recovery on behalf of

a class.5 We hold that the EEOC and the Division satisfy

their pre-suit conciliation requirements to bring a class action

if they attempt to conciliate on behalf of an identified class of

individuals prior to bringing suit.

Our determination is based in part on Mach Mining,

which was a lawsuit brought by the EEOC on behalf of a

class of women. The Court held that in order to satisfy its

pre-suit conciliation requirements, the EEOC must identify

“what the employer has done and which employees (or what

class of employees) have suffered as a result.” 135 S. Ct.

1656. The Supreme Court did not articulate any further

5 The district court relied on EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679

F.3d 657 (8th Cir. 2012), but that circuit court decision was decided prior

to Mach Mining.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 18 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 19

requirement of individual conciliation prior to bringing a

lawsuit on behalf of a class of individuals. Accordingly, we

will not impose any additional pre-suit conciliation

requirement.

If the EEOC and the Division were required to pursue

individual conciliation on behalf of every aggrieved

employee, they would be effectively barred from seeking

relief on behalf of any unnamed class members they had yet

to identify when they filed their suit. Civil litigants in private

class actions may discover additional aggrieved employees

who may wish to participate in the class. In light of the broad

enforcement authority of the EEOC and the Division, it

would be illogical to limit their ability to seek classwide relief

to something narrower than the abilities of private litigants.6

Our determination that the EEOC and the Division satisfy

their pre-suit conciliation requirements if they attempt to

conciliate on behalf of a class of individuals prior to bringing

suit is also consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad

interpretation of the EEOC’s enforcement powers. The Court

has held that “[e]very aspect of Title VII’s conciliation

6 We are not called upon to consider whether the EEOC could maintain

a nationwide class action against an employer based on an investigation

of less than a dozen employees or whether such an investigation would be

reasonable. See CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d at 667–69, 673–74. Here,

Hancock’s initial charge prompted an investigation that revealed multiple

potential victims of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation and

harassers who had worked at Geo’s Florence West and CACF facilities. 

Florence West and CACF are both owned and operated by Geo. They are

neighboring facilities on the same road. Florence West houses the returnto-custody and driving-under-the-influence unit and CACF houses the

medium-security sex-offender unit. The facilities’ units were identified

in the Reasonable Cause Determination as part of the class, and the EEOC

and Division attempted conciliation of those class claims.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 19 of 33
20 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

provision smacks of flexibility.” Id. at 1654. Indeed, the

EEOC “may seek specific relief for a group of aggrieved

individuals without first obtaining class certification pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the

Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 333–34 (1980). Additionally,

we have noted, in a different posture, that the EEOC is not

required to provide documentation of individual attempts to

conciliate on behalf of each potential claimant in a class

action. EEOC v. Bruno’s Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 289 (9th

Cir. 1993). In Bruno’s, the defendant restaurant fired its

pregnant waitresses. The EEOC investigated and found

reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had illegally

discriminated against them. Id. at 286–87. The defendant

rejected the EEOC’s efforts to settle and the EEOC brought

suit. The district court dismissed the EEOC’s action and

awarded the defendant its attorney’s fees based on the failure

of the EEOC to conciliate a pattern and practice claim. Id. at

288. We vacated the award of attorney’s fees holding that the

EEOC could have reasonably believed that its efforts to

conciliate were sufficient. Although we clarified that we

were not deciding whether the EEOC in fact conciliated the

claim, we acknowledged case law that had held “in a class

action suit, the EEOC is not required to provide

documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on behalf

of each potential claimant.” Id. at 289 (quoting EEOC v.

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1989)) (alteration

omitted).

Our view is also consistent with the rulings of our sister

circuits. See, e.g., Serrano v.Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 904

(6th Cir. 2012) (holding that EEOC satisfied its pre-suit

requirement to attempt to conciliate class claims by

“provid[ing] notice to Cintas that it was investigating classwide instances of discrimination”); Rhone-Poulenc, Inc., 876

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 20 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 21

F.2d at 17 (per curiam) (holding “the EEOC is not required to

provide documentation of individual attempts to conciliate on

behalf of each potential claimant” (internal quotation marks

omitted)); EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1101

(6th Cir. 1984) (“The record establishes that the EEOC

sought to conciliate the class based claim with Keco.”);

EEOC v. Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185–86 (4th Cir.

1981) (holding that EEOC’s conciliation efforts regarding

discriminatory practices at one branch office were sufficient

to cover claims of similar discrimination at another branch).

We further note that the conciliation requirements do not

change depending on whether the EEOC brings a claim under

§2000e-5 (a § 706 claim) or §2000e-6 (a § 707 pattern-orpractice claim). Title VII indicates that the pre-suit

conciliation procedures for both sections are the same. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (“All such actions shall be conducted

in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 2000e-5

[§ 706] of this title.”). In Mach Mining, the EEOC brought

suit under both § 2000e-5(f)(1) [§ 706] and § 2000e-6 [§ 707]

on behalf of a class of women. The Court held that the EEOC

would fulfill its duty to attempt to conciliate by engaging the

employer to remedy the alleged discriminatory practice

including identifying “both what the employer has done and

which employees (or what class of employees) have suffered

as a result.” 135 S. Ct. at 1656. The Court did not

differentiate between class suits brought under § 706 and

§ 707. In any event, such differences would not apply here

where Mach Mining and this case were both brought under

§ 706.

Thus, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of EEOC

and the Division’s claims on behalf of aggrieved employees.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 21 of 33
22 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

IV

Title VII requires that “[a] charge shall be filed by or on

behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred [(300)]

days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred

. . . .”742 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). For hostile work

environment claims of a continuing nature, the aggrieved

employee must allege “at least one discrete act had occurred

within the 300-day time frame.” Porter v. Cal. Dep’t of

Corr., 419 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Nat’l R.R.

Passenger v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002)). An

individual’s failure to file a charge with the agency within

this time frame will usually operate to bar that person from

bringing a lawsuit for failure to exhaust their administrative

remedies. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

385, 393–94 (1982). However, unnamed class members in a

private class action need not exhaust administrative remedies.

United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 389 n.6

(1977) (“[F]ull relief under Title VII ‘may be awarded on a

class basis . . . without exhaustion of administrative

procedures by the unnamed class members.’” (quoting

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8

(1975)); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771

(1976) (“Th[e]justification [that unnamed class members had

not filed administrative charges] for denying class-based

relief in Title VII suits has been unanimously rejected by the

courts of appeals, and Congress ratified that construction by

the 1972 [Title VII] amendments.”); Albemarle Paper Co.,

7

In states that do not have a fair employment agency or have not agreed

to receive EEOC charges on a deferral basis, the time for filing a charge

of employment discrimination is 180 days of the alleged unlawful

occurrence. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The parties agree that the 300-

day rule applies in Arizona, a deferral state.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 22 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 23

422 U.S. at 414 (“[B]ackpay may be awarded on a class basis

under Title VII without exhaustion of administrative

procedures by the unnamed class members.”).

In addition, an aggrieved employee who fails to file a

timely charge with the EEOC may still be able to pursue a

claim under the piggyback or single-filing rule, in which the

employee “piggyback[s]” onto the timely charge filed by

another plaintiff for purposes of exhausting administrative

remedies. See Harris v. Cty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1136

(9th Cir. 2012) (citing, inter alia, Bean v. Crocker Nat’l

Bank, 600 F.2d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 1979)). The piggyback

rule is a judicially created equitable tolling rule “based on the

observation that it would be duplicative and wasteful for

complainants with similar grievances to have to file identical

notices of intent to sue with a governmental agency.” Id.

(citing Bean, 600 F.2d at 760 n.15).

The district court found that Hancock had timely filed a

charge with the EEOC and the Division within 300 days of

the alleged discriminatory practice. The court further found

that Plaintiffs could assert claims on behalf of a class of

individuals who had suffered an unlawful employment

practice, but held that the filing period for those aggrieved

employees should run from the date of the Reasonable Cause

Determination and not Hancock’s charge.8

8 As an initial matter, we doubt that the EEOC is subject to the same

strict timing requirements with respect to exhaustion of remedies in Title

VII as a private party before bringing a class suit. “Title VII claimants

generally establish federal court jurisdiction by first exhausting their

EEOC administrative remedies.” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456

(9th Cir. 1990). However, it makes little sense for an agency to exhaust

remedies before itself. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279,

288 (2002) (“[T]he EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 23 of 33
24 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

We hold that the district court erred in requiring that

aggrieved employees allege an act that occurred within the

300 days before the Reasonable Cause Determination. The

proper starting date of the EEOC and Divison’s class action

is 300 days prior to Hancock’s charge, not the Reasonable

Cause Determination. This is evident from the plain language

of Title VII that requires a “charge” be filed “within three

hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice

occurred . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Nothing in the

text refers to the agencies’ Reasonable Cause Determination

or indicates that a Reasonable Cause Determination be filed

within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. 

Rather, the statute’s timing requirement refers exclusively to

the “charge.”

Furthermore, we have previously held in a private class

action that the proper “starting date of the class action [is]

300 days prior to the date [the charging party] filed his EEOC

charge.” Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429,

1442 (9th Cir. 1984), as modified, 742 F.2d 520 (1984). As

Domingo holds that the 300-day period starts from the date of

the charge filed by the named plaintiff for all class members

in a private class action, it follows that the limitations period

for class actions brought by the EEOC should be no later.

Thus, the district court erred in limiting the time for

which aggrieved employees may allege unlawful acts to 300

conducting litigation on behalf of private parties.”); EEOC v. Sidley Austin

LLP, 437 F.3d 695, 696 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he Commission is not bound

by the failure of the Sidley ex-partners to exhaust their remedies; the

Commission had no duty to exhaust.”). We need not address whether the

EEOC is subject to the same strict timing requirements as private litigants

because it is undisputed that the aggrieved employees here alleged acts

that occurred within the 300 days prior to Hancock’s charge.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 24 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 25

days preceding the Reasonable Cause Determination in an

EEOC class action. The district court may have been

concerned that Hancock’s initial charge did not provide

sufficient notice to Geo of the existence of class claims by

other aggrieved female employees, particularly those

employed at the CACF, a different facility than where

Hancock worked. See Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins., 252 F.3d

1208, 1226 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“A single charge

cannot be expected to put the EEOC and employer on notice

that general policies as applied to different individuals in

different offices are being challenged indefinitely.”). 

However, this concern fails to distinguish the time frame in

which the employee is required to file their charge of

discrimination (i.e., 300 days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred) from the EEOC’s

responsibility to notify the employer of the results of the

EEOC’s investigation. Nothing in the text of the statute

supports the district court’s imputation of the employee’s

time limit into the EEOC’s duty to notify the employer of the

results of its investigation.

Moreover, we have held that a single charge of

discrimination may be sufficient to put an employer on notice

that additional people may be subject to the same unlawful

employment practices. Paige v. California, 102 F.3d 1035,

1042–43 (9th Cir. 1996). In Paige, we held that the plaintiff

could maintain a class action alleging disparate impact in

promotions even though he had not raised class claims in the

administrative charge. Id. We explained that “even if neither

the EEOC nor the [state] charges on their face explicitly

alleged class discrimination, it is plain that an EEOC

investigation of class discrimination on the basis of race

could reasonably be expected to grow out of the allegations

in the charges.” Id. at 1042 (citing Fellows v. Universal

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 25 of 33
26 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

Rests., Inc., 701 F.2d 447, 451 (9th Cir. 1983)). Similarly, in

Lucky Stores, Inc. v. EEOC, 714 F.2d 911, 913 (9th Cir.

1983), we held that the EEOC could bring claims on behalf

of employees at Sacramento and San Leandro facilities where

the employer had “adequate notice” notice that the EEOC

was investigating those facilities’ successor facility in

Vacaville.9

It follows from Domingo, Paige, and Lucky Stores, that an

employer may be on notice of classwide allegations of

discrimination from a single charge. Here, Hancock’s charge

alleged that she had been subject to discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation. Although Hancock’s alleged

incident with Kroen may have been isolated, she further

elaborated that she complained about the harassment and Geo

did nothing to remedy it. Furthermore, she alleged that after

she complained, Geo initiated an investigation against her

based on false pretenses, and placed her on administrative

leave. Thus, the charge was not limited to an “isolated act”

of discrimination by one individual against another. See

Paige, 102 F.3d at 1042–43, n.9 (“[T]he investigation that

actually results or that can reasonably be expected to result

from a charge filed by an individual is not limited by the

literal terms of the charge.”). The EEOC and the Division

9 We have also rejected the notion that an EEOC lawsuit on behalf of a

class of employees must be confined to the allegations in the original

charge. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580–81 (9thCir. 1976) (per

curiam) (holding EEOC could maintain an action alleging discrimination

against women and minority groups although the original charge alleged

only discrimination against males); EEOC v. Occidental Life Ins., 535

F.2d 533, 540–41 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding EEOC could maintain action

alleging discrimination against male employees in the administration of

the retirement system although original charge was filed by female

alleging discrimination on the basis of her sex).

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 26 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 27

then brought an enforcement action against Geo on the same

grounds articulated in Hancock’s charge: discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation against female correctional

officers.10

Accordingly, the aggrieved employees who alleged acts

of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation—the kind of

discriminatory conduct alleged in Hancock’s charge—within

the 300 days preceding Hancock’s initial charge have made

timely claims.

V

We also hold that in an EEOC class action, an aggrieved

employee is not required to file a new charge of

discrimination if her claim is already encompassed within the

Reasonable Cause Determination or if the claim is “like or

reasonably related” to the initial charge.

We first note that the EEOC failed to argue this point to

the district court below. However, we have discretion to

review an issue of law, that the district court addressed, and

that would result in prejudice if not addressed. See

10 The district court misconstrued EEOC v. General Electric Co., 532

F.2d 359, 372 (4th Cir. 1976), and the cases relying on it. In General

Electric, the Fourth Circuit held that a district court could fashion

equitable relief, such as back pay from the date of the reasonable cause

determination instead of the date that a charge had been filed. Id.

However, General Electric is inapposite. At this stage, we need not

consider the level of redress appropriate for alleged discriminatory

misconduct that occurred in the period prior to Hancock’s charge. We

hold only that in an EEOC class action, the claims of individuals may not

be dismissed ifthey have alleged an act of misconduct within the 300 days

prior to the filing of the initial employee’s charge.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 27 of 33
28 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1260 n.8

(9th Cir. 2010). Whether an aggrieved employee is required

to file a new charge of discrimination in an EEOC class

action is an issue of law, that the district court addressed, and

that otherwise could result in prejudice to those aggrieved

employees if we did not discuss it.

We have held that an EEOC civil suit may allege any

discrimination “stated in the charge itself or discovered in the

course of a reasonable investigation of that charge, provided

such additional discrimination was included in the EEOC

‘reasonable cause’ determination and was followed by

compliance with the conciliation procedures of the Act.” 

EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 553 F.2d 579, 580 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Similarly, in EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899

(9th Cir. 1994), we held that the EEOC could assert an

employee’s discriminatory layoff claim as it was “like and

reasonably related to” her charge which alleged

discriminatory failure to recall and rehire. See also Vasquez

v. Cty. of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding

individual employee mayassert unexhausted retaliation claim

if the later claim is “reasonably related” to the allegations in

the employee’s timely filed charge). We “consider [a]

plaintiff’s civil claims to be reasonably related to allegations

in the charge to the extent that those claims are consistent

with the plaintiff's original theory of the case.” Freeman v.

Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291 F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002)

(quoting B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep’t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100

(9th Cir. 2002)).

The district court refused to consider any aggrieved

employees’ discrimination or retaliation that occurred after

the Reasonable Cause Determination without analyzing

whether the allegations were included in the Reasonable

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 28 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 29

Cause Determination, whether the allegations were “like or

reasonably related to” Hancock’s charge, or whether the

allegations were consistent with Hancock’s original theory of

the case. Pursuant to Hearst and Farmer Bros., the district

court’s outright exclusion of alleged discrimination and

retaliation that occurred after the Reasonable Cause

Determination was misguided.

NationalRailroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan, 536

U.S. 101 (2002), does not compel a different result. Morgan

held that “[e]ach discrete discriminatory act starts a new

clock for filing charges alleging that act,” and “the charge,

therefore, must be filed within the . . . 300–day time period

after the discrete discriminatory act occurred.” Id. at 113. 

That is, “discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable if

time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in

timely filed charges.” Id. Thus, Morgan might be construed

to require that an employee who experiences a discrete act of

discrimination after the initial charge must file an additional,

separate charge. However, the plaintiff in Morgan was

seeking to recover damages for discrete acts that had occurred

more than 300 days prior to the date he filed his charge. Id.

at 106. By contrast, the EEOC and the Division seek to

recover damages on behalf of aggrieved employees who

experience discrete acts of discrimination after the

Reasonable Cause Determination. Additionally, Morgan was

a private action and did not purport to address whether an

aggrieved employee has to file a new charge of

discrimination when a class action is filed by the EEOC.11

11 Accordingly, because this case is an agency action brought by the

EEOC and the Division, we need not weigh in on the existing circuit split

as to whether an employee who experiences a discrete act of

discrimination after the initial charge has been filed must file a new charge

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 29 of 33
30 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

We thus vacate the district court’s per se exclusion of any

discrimination and retaliation that occurred after the date of

the Division’s Reasonable Cause Determination, and remand

to determine whether the aggrieved employees’ claims are

already encompassed within the Reasonable Cause

Determination, or whether the claim is “like or reasonably

related” to the initial charge.

VI

We vacate the district court’s summary judgment

dismissing the claim brought on behalf Sofia Hines and hold

that she has presented material issues of fact as to whether

she was subject to a hostile work environment. “An

employer is liable under Title VII for conduct giving rise to

a hostile environment where the employee proves (1) that he

was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a harassing

nature, (2) that this conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive

working environment.” Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d

1104, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pavon v. Swift Trans.

Co., 192 F.3d 902, 908 (9th Cir. 1999)). “‘Conduct must be

extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of

employment.’ To be actionable under Title VII, ‘a sexually

objectionable environment must be both objectively and

subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would

find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim in fact did

in a private class action. Compare Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208,

1210–11 (10th Cir. 2003) and Richter v. Advance Auto Parts, Inc., 686

F.3d 847, 851 (8thCir. 2012), with Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d

297, 302–03 (4th Cir. 2009); Swearnigen-El v. Cook County Sheriff's

Dep’t, 602 F.3d 852, 864 n.9 (7th Cir. 2010).

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 30 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 31

perceive to be so.’” Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856,

860 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,

524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)). Courts determine whether an

environment is sufficiently hostile or abusive by “‘looking at

all the circumstances,’ including the ‘frequency of the

discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and

whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work

performance.’” Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Faragher,

524 U.S. at 787–88).

We have held that a plaintiff raises a material issue of fact

as to her hostile work environment claim when she alleges

that coworkers made unwanted sexual advances toward her;

coworkers made frequent comments about her breasts; a

coworker grabbed her breasts once; and her manager told her

he wanted to take a trip to the mountains with her and

commented on how “well built” she was. Burrell v. Star

Nursery, Inc., 170 F.3d 951, 953–55 (9th Cir. 1999).

In our case, Hines contends Hilsden made unwanted

physical contact with her by “spank[ing]” her butt in front of

inmates and a cadet. Although Hilsden claimed that his

touching was an accident, Hines disputes this fact. Hines also

alleges that Hilsden was “always talking dirty, always trying

to pick up somebody” including saying that “I have my own

nuts,” and would make gestures while talking dirty. Hines

asserts that other officers harassed her when they bumped

into her, used profanity in front of her, and told her “it’s your

bra” that set off the metal detecting scanner. While each of

these incidents may not in itself be sufficient to support a

hostile work environment claim, their cumulative effect is

sufficient to raise material issues of fact as to whether the

conduct was so severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 31 of 33
32 ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP

the workplace. We express no view on whether Hines was

actually sexually harassed or harassed on the basis of her sex,

but hold that viewing the facts in her favor, the district court

erred in dismissing Hines’s hostile work environment claim.12

The cases cited by Geo, Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1104, and

Surrell v. California Water Service Co., 518 F.3d 1097 (9th

Cir. 2008), are inapposite. In Kortan, a majority of the panel

held that there was no material issue of fact as to harassment

where the plaintiff alleged that a supervisor referred “once or

twice” to another female as a “castrating bitch,” “Madonna,”

and a “regina,” but plaintiff herself did not regard this as

harassing, and the supervisor never directed a sexual insult at

plaintiff. 217 F.3d at 1106–07, 1110–11. Surrell held that

there was no severe or pervasive harassment when the

plaintiff’s supervisor confronted her in front of a customer

about failing to perform an aspect of her job. Surrell, 518

F.3d at 1108–09. Neither Kortan nor Surrell, unlike the case

before us, contained allegations of physical touching of the

plaintiff and repeated comments and gestures directed to her.

* * *

12 The district court also erred insofar as it required that Hines’s

harassment claim be sexual in nature. While sexual harassment must be

sexual in nature, “offensive conduct that is not facially sex-specific

nonetheless may violate Title VII if there is sufficient circumstantial

evidence of qualitative and quantitative differences in the harassment

suffered by female and male employees.” EEOC v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n,

Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 842 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Oncale v. Sundowner

Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (“[H]arassing conduct need

not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination

on the basis of sex.”). Here, the operative complaints allege both “sexbased hostile work environment and sexual harassment.”

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 32 of 33
ARIZONA EX REL. HORNE V. THE GEO GROUP 33

Congress and the Arizona legislature have imbued the

EEOC and the Division with the responsibility to eliminate

unlawful workplace discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(a); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1402. In carrying out this

responsibility, the EEOC and the Division were required to

attempt conciliation with Geo prior to filing their class suit

seeking damages before bringing suit. They did so here by

describing how a class of female prison guards were subject

to discrimination, harassment, and retaliation, and by sending

a conciliation letter to Geo and attending a full day mediation

session. See Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1656. We further

hold that in this lawsuit brought by the EEOC and the

Division on behalf of a class of employees, the starting date

for the class action is 300 days before the filing date of

Hancock’s charge. We vacate the district court’s per se

exclusion of discrete acts that occurred after the Reasonable

Cause Determination. Finally, we hold that Sophia Hines has

presented material issues of fact as to her hostile work

environment claim, and accordingly, the district court’s grant

of summary judgment against her is vacated.

Summary judgment is VACATED and REMANDED to

the district court with instructions to reinstate the EEOC and

Division’s dismissed claims brought on behalf of aggrieved

employees consistent with this opinion.

Costs are awarded to Plaintiffs-Appellants.

 Case: 13-16292, 03/14/2016, ID: 9899906, DktEntry: 51-1, Page 33 of 33