Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50647/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50647-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Jefferson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

GEORGE JEFFERSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50647

D.C. No.

3:13-cr-01378-LAB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 8, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed June 26, 2015

Before: Alex Kozinski, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Concurrence by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a sentence for knowingly and intentionally

importing a controlled substance into the United States in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960, the panel rejected the

defendant’s argument that recent Supreme Court authority

requires the government to prove that the defendant knew the

specific type and quantity of the drugs he imported in order

to trigger the ten-year mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C.

§ 960(b)(1)(H).

Judge W. Fletcher concurred because this court is bound

by United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2002),

but wrote to explain why Carranza should be overruled.

COUNSEL

Kara Hartzler (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division, and Benjamin J. Katz (argued), Special

Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 3

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

George Jefferson appeals his ten-year mandatory

minimum sentence for knowinglyand intentionallyimporting

a controlled substance into the United States in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 960. We reject Jefferson’s argument

that recent Supreme Court authority requires the government

to prove that the defendant knew the specific type and

quantity of the drugs he imported in order to trigger the tenyear mandatory minimum under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(H). 

Accordingly, we affirm.

I.

Jefferson entered a guilty plea to one count of knowingly

and intentionally importing 4.65 kilograms of a mixture

containing methamphetamine into the United States. 

Jefferson claims that, at the time he crossed the border, he

thought the substance he was transporting was marijuana, not

methamphetamine, and that he did not know how much of the

illegal substance was in his truck. At sentencing he

contended, among other things,1that under the Supreme

Court’s decisions in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151

(2013) and Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646

(2009), knowledge of drug type and quantity were elements

1

Jefferson also objected to the presentence report’s classification of him

as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)

§ 4B1.1, and to the Probation Office’s decision against recommending a

minor role reduction in his Guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The

district court rejected these objections, and Jefferson does not appeal these

rulings.

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4 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

of the offense, and that, therefore, the government had to

prove he knew the exact drug type and quantity he was

transporting for the 10-year mandatory minimum under

21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(H) to apply. The district court

concluded that Alleyne and Flores-Figueroa did not abrogate

long-established Ninth Circuit precedent that the government

is not required to prove that a defendant knew the type or

quantity of the controlled substance he imported to be found

guilty under § 960. The district court imposed a sentence of

144 months of incarceration, followed by 10 years of

supervised release.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review the district court’s interpretation of a statute de novo

and its application of a statute to the facts for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Yazzie, 743 F.3d 1278, 1288 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 227 (2014).

III.

It is “unlawful . . . to import into the United States from

any place outside thereof, any controlled substance in

schedule I or II of subchapter I” of the Controlled Substances

Act. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). Methamphetamine is a schedule II

controlled substance. 21 C.F.R. § 1308.12(a), (d)(2). “Any

person who . . . knowingly or intentionally imports or exports

a controlled substance . . . shall be punished as provided in

[21 U.S.C. § 960(b)].” 21 U.S.C. § 960(a) (citing 21 U.S.C.

§ 952).

21 U.S.C. § 960(b), entitled “Penalties,” prescribes

varying minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment and

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 5

fines depending on the type and quantity of controlled

substance a person imports. For example, a person convicted

of importing 500 grams or more of a mixture containing

methamphetamine shall be sentenced to a minimum of 10

years imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment. 

Id. § 960(b)(1)(H). A person convicted of importing less than

50 kilograms of marijuana faces no mandatoryminimum, and

shall be sentenced to a maximum of 5 years imprisonment, a

fine not exceeding $250,000, or both. Id. § 960(b)(4).

We have consistently held that a defendant can be

convicted under § 960 if he believed he imported or exported

some controlled substance. See United States v. Carranza,

289 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. RamirezRamirez, 875 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.

Rea, 532 F.2d 147, 149 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam). The

government is not required to prove that the defendant knew

the type or quantity of the controlled substance he imported

to obtain a conviction under § 960(a), Carranza, 289 F.3d at

644, or for the penalties under § 960(b) to apply, see United

States v. Salazar, 5 F.3d 445, 446 (9th Cir. 1993); United

States v. Lopez-Martinez, 725 F.2d 471, 474–75 (9th Cir.

1984). Section 960(a) requires a person to “knowingly or

intentionally” import a controlled substance; § 960(b) refers

to different types and amounts of controlled substances for

sentencing purposes.

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6 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

A.

Jefferson first argues that this long established precedent

was abrogated2by the Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v.

United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), which held that any

fact that increases the mandatory minimum sentence is an

“element” of the offense that must be submitted to the jury

and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 2155. The

decision extended the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), in which the Court established that,

“[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed

statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt.” The AlleyneCourt reasoned that

“there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that

raise the maximum from those that increase the minimum.” 

133 S. Ct. at 2163.

Jefferson correctly notes that Alleyne renders the type and

quantity of a controlled substance “elements” of a § 960

offense. Both drug type and quantity can trigger, or increase,

a mandatoryminimum sentence under § 960(b), and therefore

both facts must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable

doubt—or, as here, admitted by the defendant. See Blakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding that facts

may be admitted by the defendant “for Apprendi purposes”);

United States v. Guerrero-Jasso, 752 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th

2 We may overrule our precedent only if it is clearly irreconcilable with

an intervening higher authority. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893

(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Absent such an intervening higher authority, “a

later three-judge panel . . . has no choice but to apply the earlier-adopted

rule.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1171 (9th Cir. 2001).

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 7

Cir. 2014) (holding that admissions by the defendant satisfy

Apprendi).

3

This does not mean, however, as Jefferson urges, that the

“knowingly or intentionally” mens rea standard found in

§ 960(a) applies to the elements found in § 960(b). Alleyne

provides no guidance as to which facts increase mandatory

minimum sentences under a given statute. It addressed only

who must determine such facts, and which burden of proof

applies. See United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1061

(9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“Apprendi affects

only the identity of the decisionmaker and the burden of proof

. . . .”); United States v. Brough, 243 F.3d 1078, 1079 (7th

Cir. 2001) (“Apprendi . . . make[s] the jury the right

decisionmaker (unless the defendant elects a bench trial), and

the reasonable-doubt standard the proper burden, when a fact

raises the maximum lawful punishment.”). Determining

which facts increase the mandatory minimum sentence is

instead a statute specific inquiry—and Alleyne does not alter

our precedent that a defendant’s knowledge of the type and

quantity of the controlled substance he imports is not such a

fact, and, therefore, not an element of the offense.

Nor do two decisions that postdate the district court’s

ruling—Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881 (2014), and

Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014)—require

§ 960(a)’s “knowingly or intentionally” standard to be

applied to drug type and quantity. The Burrage Court

examined a twenty-year mandatory minimum that applies

when a defendant “knowingly or intentionally . . .

3 A defendant who enters a guilty plea waives his right to a trial by jury,

see Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187 (2004), and therefore also waives

Alleyne and Apprendi’s protections of that right.

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8 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

distribute[s] . . . a controlled substance,” 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),

and its use results in “death or serious bodily injury,” id.

§ 841(b)(1)(C).4See 134 S. Ct. at 885. In summarizing the

charged offense, the Court stated that an element was the

“knowing or intentional distribution of heroin.” Id. at 887. 

The Court’s use of the word “heroin” instead of “controlled

substance” does not clearlysignal that a defendant must know

the type of drug he imports or distributes. The statute’s mens

rea standard was not at issue, and the Court’s analysis was

devoted entirely to the question of causation: whether

§ 841(b)(1)(C) “applies when use of a covered drug supplied

by the defendant contributes to, but is not a but-for cause of,

the victim’s death or injury.” Id. at 885; see also 887–92. “It

is unlikely in the extreme that the Supreme Court intended by

[a]single sentence to overrule sub silentio years of decisional

law . . . .” United States v. Fonseca-Caro, 114 F.3d 906, 907

(9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).

In Rosemond, the Court concluded that a defendant

charged with aiding and abetting an armed drug sale under

18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 924(c) must have had “advance

knowledge” that one of his confederates would use or carry

a gun as part of the crime’s commission, because “a state of

mind extending to the entire crime” is necessary for

conviction. 134 S. Ct. at 1245, 1248–49. The federal aiding

and abetting statute, unlike § 960, derives from common law

standards of accomplice liability, a fact which was critical to

the Court’s decision. See id. at 1245. Rosemond says nothing

4

21 U.S.C. § 841 is “structurally identical” to § 960. United States v.

Mendoza-Paz, 286 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2002). In addition to the

“death results” enhancement, § 841(b) also provides different minimum

and maximum terms of imprisonment and fines based on the type and

quantity of controlled substance distributed. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)–(b).

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 9

about the mens rea required for the crime of importing a

controlled substance, or about mens rea requirements

generally.

Our conclusion that Alleyne did not change the mens rea

requirement for § 960 is further supported by the Sixth

Circuit’s decision in United States v. Dado, 759 F.3d 550,

570 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 510 (2014). 

Addressing § 841, the Sixth Circuit rejected Dado’s argument

that Alleyne effectively overruled its precedent that “the

government need not prove mens rea as to the type and

quantity of the drugs in order to establish a violation of

§ 841(b).” Dado, 759 F.3d at 569 (quoting United States v.

Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2003)). We agree with

the Sixth Circuit that this contention confuses the requisite

burden of proof with the mens rea standard, and that Alleyne

did not—and could not—change the statutory text. See id. at

570.

B.

Nor does the Supreme Court’s decision in FloresFigueroa, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), alter the statutory landscape

or override our decision in Carranza. In Flores-Figueroa,

the Supreme Court examined the crime of aggravated identity

theft as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A—a statute which

penalizes a person, who in the commission of other specified

crimes, “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without

lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The Court applied ordinary

grammatical rules to the text of the statute, reasoning that

“where a transitive verb has an object, listeners in most

contexts assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that

modifies the transitive verb tells the listener how the subject

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10 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

performed the entire action, including the object as set forth

in the sentence.” Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 650. The

Court concluded that the statute required the government to

prove that a defendant knew the identification belonged to

another person. Id. This conclusion was also fully consistent

with the way “courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes,”

which is to “read a phrase in a criminal statute that introduces

the elements of a crime with the word ‘knowingly’ as

applying that word to each element.” Id. at 652.

The text of § 960(a) and (b) is not structured like that of

18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The mens rea standard in § 960(a)

is separate and distinct from the penalty ranges set forth in

§ 960(b). Because § 960’s statutory text and structure are not

parallel to that of § 1028A(a)(1), the ordinary grammatical

interpretive rules articulated in Flores-Figueroa do not apply

here. See United States v. Castagana, 604 F.3d 1160,

1162–63, 1165–66 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that FloresFigueroa did not require a particular construction of a statute

because the statute at issue was not parallel to the statute in

Flores-Figueroa).

Relying on United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

513 U.S. 64 (1994), a case cited in Flores-Figueroa,

Jefferson further contends that the presumption that scienter

is generally implied in a criminal statute, even when it is not

expressed, requires us to read a mens rea element into

§ 960(b). In X-Citement Video, the Court interpreted a child

pornography statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (1988 ed. and Supp.

V), that once again had different textual and structural

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 11

features than § 960,5and that, if interpreted in its most natural

manner would criminalize a significant amount of innocent

behavior. See 513 U.S. at 68–69, 73. The Court there held

that the “knowingly” mens rea in § 2252(a)(1) applied to the

terms “use of a minor” and “sexually explicit conduct” in

§ 2252(a)(1)(A). Id. at 78. The Court’s imputation of

knowledge to the use of a minor, i.e., requiring the

government to prove that the defendant knew that the person

depicted in the sexually explicit material was in fact

underage, also avoided a potential First Amendment problem. 

See id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764–65

(1982)).

Here, there is no potential for the penalization of innocent

conduct nor do we face constitutional avoidance concerns. If

the government must prove that the defendant knew he was

importing some amount of a controlled substance, that is

sufficient to ensure the statute penalizes only culpable

conduct. See United States v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119,

1121–22 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Provided the defendant recognizes

he is doing something culpable, however, he need not be

aware of the particular circumstances that result in greater

punishment.”); X–Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 72 n.3

(“Criminal intent serves to separate those who understand the

wrongful nature of their act from those who do not, but does

5 Section 2252 penalizes any person who: “(1) knowingly transports or

ships . . . in . . . interstate or foreign commerce . . . any visual depiction,

if— (A) the producing ofsuch visual depiction involves the use of a minor

engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) such visual depiction is of

such conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1).

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12 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

not require knowledge of the precise consequences that may

flow from that act once aware that the act is wrongful.”).6

IV.

Our precedent holding that the government need not

prove that the defendant knew the precise type or quantity of

the drug he imported is not clearly irreconcilable with any of

the Supreme Court decisions cited by Jefferson. Because

Jefferson knew that he imported a controlled substance into

the United States, and because he in fact imported 4.65

kilograms of a mixture containing methamphetamine, the

6

Jefferson also relies upon other principles of statutory construction to

support his reading of § 960. He cites Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.

600, 616 (1994), for the proposition that courts should construe offenses

that carry particularly harsh penalties (such as a ten-year mandatory

minimum sentence) as requiring a stricter mens rea. He also notes that

applying a mens rea of “knowingly” to drug type and quantity is

consistent with the principle that any ambiguity in the reach of a criminal

statute should be resolved in favor of lenity. Finally, he contends that

reading “knowingly or intentionally” into the elements of drug type and

quantity is consistent with congressional intent.

We need not consider the strength of these arguments, as we cannot

reconsider our precedent or depart from its reasoning unless there is

“intervening higher authority” that is “clearly irreconcilable” with the

prior decision. Miller, 335 F.3d at 893; see also Hart, 266 F.3d at 1171. 

Jefferson has not cited to any “intervening higher authority” in support of

these positions.

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 13

district court did not err in concluding that § 960(b)(1)(H)’s

ten-year mandatoryminimum term of imprisonment applied.7

AFFIRMED.

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in Judge Wardlaw’s careful opinion, which

faithfully applies our circuit’s law regarding the mens rea

required to sentence a defendant convicted of illegally

importing drugs. But I do so only because we are bound by

United States v. Carranza, 289 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Under the rule of Carranza and its predecessors, a defendant

who reasonably believes that he is importing a relatively

small quantity of marijuana into the country must be

sentenced to the ten-year mandatory minimum prison term

that applies to a defendant who knowingly imports the same

quantity of methamphetamine. I do not believe that Congress

intended this result. I write to explain why, in my view,

Carranza should be overruled.

I

Jefferson was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and

960, which together criminalize the importation of narcotic

drugs into the United States. Section 960, under which

7

In Jefferson’s reply brief, he also argues that the Information violated

due process by not providing him with fair notice of the Government’s

burden and the charges against him. Jefferson has waived this argument

by not raising it in his opening brief. United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d

990, 997 (9th Cir. 2006).

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14 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

Jefferson’s penalty was determined, is an omnibus narcotics

statute that prescribes penalties for a variety of trafficking

crimes. Section 960(a) sets out “[u]nlawful acts.” 21 U.S.C.

§ 960(a). As relevant here, it provides that “[a]ny person who

. . . knowingly or intentionally imports . . . a controlled

substance . . . shall be punished as provided in subsection (b)

of this section.” Id. (citing id. § 952).

Section 960(b) sets out separate and increasingly severe

penalties corresponding to different types and quantities of

drugs. Defendants who import up to 50 kilograms of

marijuana, for example, are not subject to a mandatory

minimum sentence; instead, they face a maximum prison

sentence of five years. Id. § 960(b)(4) (citing id.

§ 841(b)(1)(D)). By contrast, defendants who import as little

as 500 grams of cocaine are subject to a five-year mandatory

minimum sentence. Id. § 960(b)(2)(B). Defendants who

import as little as 50 grams of methamphetamine are subject

to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id.

§ 960(b)(1)(H).

These escalating penalties, which depend on the particular

drug a defendant imported, were established bythe Anti-Drug

Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207. See

U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to Congress:

Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy 116 (1995). Under

the Act, a defendant who manufactures, distributes, or

imports certain quantities of dangerous illegal drugs faces

significantlymore severe sentences than a person who traffics

in the same quantities of less dangerous drugs. The

increasingly severe penalties correspond to the culpability of

the defendant, as well as the danger to the public posed by the

importation of the particular drugs.

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 15

The question presented in this appeal is whether a

defendant who reasonablybelieved he was illegallyimporting

several kilograms of marijuana, but in fact illegally imported

several kilograms of methamphetamine, must be sentenced

to the ten-year minimum term that corresponds to

methamphetamine. As Judge Wardlaw’s opinion explains,

we have confronted this question on several occasions. See,

e.g., Carranza, 289 F.3d 634; United States v. Salazar, 5 F.3d

445 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Ramirez-Ramirez,

875 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. LopezMartinez, 725 F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1984). Each time, we have

concluded that “the government need not prove that the

defendant knew the type and amount of a controlled

substance that he imported or possessed; the government need

only show that the defendant knew that he imported or

possessed some controlled substance.” Carranza, 289 F.3d

at 644 (emphasis in original); see also Op. at 5.

The Carranza rule has devastating consequences for a

defendant who reasonably believes that he is carrying a

controlled substance but is mistaken about what that

substance is. This case makes those consequences clear. The

government does not dispute Jefferson’s claim that he

believed he was importing marijuana into the United States. 

If Jefferson had in fact been carrying only the four kilograms

of marijuana that he believed he was carrying, he would have

faced a maximum sentence of five years, with no mandatory

minimum. Under Carranza, however, he must be sentenced

to a minimum of ten years in prison because he was, in fact,

carrying methamphetamine.

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16 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

II

If I were writing on a clean slate, I would hold that

Jefferson, who reasonably believed he was importing

marijuana, may not be punished by the mandatory minimum

that attaches to the importation of methamphetamine. I reach

this conclusion for three reasons.

First, it is a cardinal rule of the interpretation of criminal

statutes that “the existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather

than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American

criminal jurisprudence.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,

438 U.S. 422, 436 (1978) (alteration and internal quotation

marks omitted). That is, we generally interpret criminal

statutes to require the government to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that “the defendant kn[e]w the facts that

ma[d]e his conduct illegal.” Staples v. United States,

511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994). Absent this background rule, the

terms of many federal statutes “would sweep out . . . , except

when expressly preserved, the ancient requirement of a

culpable state of mind” — a result “inconsistent with our

philosophy of criminal law.” Morissette v. United States,

342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952). Subjecting a defendant to a decade

in prison based on a fact that he did not know — indeed, in

this case, a fact that Jefferson reasonably believed not to be

true — is inconsistent with “fundamental and far-reaching”

principles of criminal liability. Id. at 247.

Second, I find nothing in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act that

overcomes the presumption of a mens rea. See Staples,

511 U.S. at 605–06. An important purpose of the escalating

mandatoryminimums established by the Act, as noted above,

is to approximate the culpability of the defendant and the

dangerousness of his act. Whether or not these mandatory

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 17

minimums are reliable approximations, see Kimbrough v.

United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97–99 (2007) (canvassing

criticisms of the sentencing disparity between crack and

powder cocaine), they reflect the basic insight that someone

who imports a kilogram of methamphetamine is more

culpable than someone who imports a kilogram of marijuana.

The Supreme Court has recognized an exception to the

presumption of a mens rea for so-called “public welfare”

offenses. See Staples, 511 U.S. at 506–07; U.S. Gypsum Co.,

438 U.S. at 437–38; cf. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250

(1922). This exception originated in Balint, which considered

whether a predecessor to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the

Narcotic Act of 1914, required the government to prove only

that a defendant knew that the items he sold were “narcotics”

criminalized by the statute. See id. at 254. But the

sentencing scheme established by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act

looks nothing like the scheme considered in Balint. Under

the 1914 Act, a convicted defendant faced only the imposition

of a discretionary fine or a short term in prison. See Pub. L.

No. 63-223, ch. 1, § 9, 38 Stat. 785, 789 (1914). The purpose

of the “criminal penalty,” as the Court explained, was simply

“to secure recorded evidence” of transactions in narcotics,

and thereby to promote compliance. Balint, 258 U.S. at 254;

see also Staples, 511 U.S. at 616 (noting that public welfare

offenses, as a historical matter, “almost uniformly . . .

provided for only light penalties such as fines or short jail

sentences”).

By contrast, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act sets up a

sentencing scheme that — at least as applied absent a mens

rea requirement — is indiscriminately punitive in nature. It

is considerably more punitive than the statutes considered in

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18 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

Staples, U.S. Gypsum, and Morissette. As Judge Kavanaugh

has pointed out:

The “harsh penalties” in Staples and

[United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,

513 U.S. 64 (1994)] were statutorymaximums

of 10 years’ imprisonment. The “sever[e]”

sanction in U.S. Gypsum was a statutory

maximum of 3 years’ imprisonment. And the

“high” penalty in Morissette was a statutory

maximum of one year in prison. The Supreme

Court deemed those penalties sufficiently

stringent to support a requirement of mens

rea.

United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 548 (D.C. Cir. 2012)

(en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)(citations omitted). The

penalties considered in these cases were “harsh.” The

mandatory minimum sentences imposed under § 960(b) are

even more so. Anyone convinced that he is importing

marijuana but convicted of importing methamphetamine

faces a mandatory minimum of ten years. The presumption

of a mens rea is designed to avoid precisely this injustice.

Third, my conclusion is underscored by the Supreme

Court’s increasing attention to the Sixth Amendment

consequences of statutory sentencing schemes. See Alleyne

v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013); Harris v. United

States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), overruled by Alleyne, 133 S. Ct.

at 2155; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 

Although I agree with Judge Wardlaw that Alleyne, the most

recent in this line of cases, is not “clearly irreconcilable” with

Carranza, see Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir.

2003) (en banc), Alleyne reflects a broader concern with the

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 19

unfairness of sentencing schemes in which the facts that are

“‘legallyessential to the punishment to be inflicted’” need not

be found beyond a reasonable doubt. See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct.

at 2160 (quoting 1 Joel Prentiss Bishop, Criminal Procedure

51 (2d ed. 1872)).

Alleyne held that any “facts that increase mandatory

minimum sentences must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at

2163. The government agrees that in a case brought under

21 U.S.C. § 960, such facts include the type and quantity of

drug. After Alleyne, “the core crime and the fact triggering

the mandatoryminimum sentence” — here, the drug type and

quantity — “together constitute a new, aggravated crime,

each element of which must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at

2161. There is no reason, in light of Alleyne, why it should

be enough for the government to prove that a defendant knew

that he was carrying a controlled substance, irrespective of

what that substance was, in order to subject him to the

mandatory minimum sentences set out at § 960(b). If the

government must prove that Jefferson “knowingly” imported

four kilograms of methamphetamine into the United States —

that is, if both the fact of importation and the type of drug are

“elements” of the crime — it should be required to prove not

only that Jefferson knew he was importing an illegal drug, but

also that he knew what that drug was.

III

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McFadden v.

United States, No. 14-378, 2015 WL 2473377 (U.S. June 18,

2015), does not change my reading of the statute in the case

now before us. In McFadden, the Supreme Court considered

the mens rea required to convict a defendant of violating the

Controlled Substance Analogue Enforcement Act of 1986

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20 UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON

(“Analogue Act”). See 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(32)(A), 813. The

Court held that in order to convict a defendant of violating the

Analogue Act, the government must prove that the defendant

knew “that the substance he is dealing with is some

unspecified substance listed on the federal drug schedules.” 

2015 WL 2473377, at *4. It further held that, when trying to

convict a defendant of violating the narcotics statutes using

an analogue, the government must show that he “knew the

specific analogue he was dealing with, even if he did not

know its legal status as an analogue.” Id. at *5.

But the Court did not address whether a defendant could

be subject to the mandatory minimums set out at § 960(b)(1)

and (2) if all the defendant knew was that he had dealt with

“some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug

schedules . . . regardless of whether he knew the particular

identity of the substance.” Id. at *4–5. A defendant

convicted of violating the Analogue Act is not subject to the

mandatory minimums set out at § 960(b)(1) and (2); he is

instead subject only to the maximum sentence set out at

§ 960(b)(3) that applies to all defendants whose crime

“involve[s] a controlled substance in schedule I.” See

21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(3); see also id. § 813 (“A controlled

substance analogue shall . . . be treated . . . as a controlled

substance in schedule I.”). Thus the Court had no reason in

McFadden to consider whether the government must prove

that a defendant knew “the particular identity” of the

controlled substance he dealt with in order to subject him to

the escalating mandatory minimums set out in the Anti-Drug

Abuse Act for particular illegal drugs. For the reasons above,

I would hold that the government must prove such

knowledge.

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UNITED STATES V. JEFFERSON 21

I have no quarrel with the proposition that the government

can prove a violation of § 960(a) by proving only that a

defendant knew he violated the narcotics laws by importing

“some unspecified substance listed on the federal drug

schedules.” McFadden, 2015 WL 2473377, at *4. But I do

not believe the government can subject that defendant to the

escalatingmandatoryminimums set out at § 960(b)(1) and (2)

without proving that he knew which illegal drug he was

importing. Our longstanding presumption of a mens rea

requirement, the history and purpose of the Anti-Drug Abuse

Act, and the lessons of Alleyne and Apprendi teach us

otherwise.

IV

Imposing ten years of mandatory imprisonment on this

defendant is fundamentally“inconsistent with our philosophy

of criminal law.” Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250. While I join

Judge Wardlaw’s careful opinion, I do so only because we are

bound by Carranza. The government does not dispute that

Jefferson reasonably believed that he was illegally importing

marijuana. In the absence of Carranza, I would hold that

Jefferson is not subject to the ten-year mandatory minimum

applicable to the illegal importation of methamphetamine.

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