Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00275/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00275-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A. Scribner
Respondent
Theodore Floyd Stankewitz
Petitioner

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THEODORE FLOYD STANKEWITZ,

Petitioner,

v.

A. SCRIBNER,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0275 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 1, 5]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 13, 2006. On May

3, 2006, the Court issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for

failure to exhaust the state court remedies. (Court Doc. 4.)

Petitioner filed a response to the order to show cause on May 18, 2006. (Court Doc. 5.)

In his response, Petitioner concedes that only Ground One has been exhausted. Petitioner

states that as to Grounds Two through Seven, he will be filing a state habeas corpus. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." 

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B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d

1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). th

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court.

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971);

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest th

state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis);

Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States th

Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus 

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to 

that court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 

223 F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in 

Duncan, this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the 

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28 The Court assumes this to be true based only on Petitioner’s assertion and makes no express regarding the 1

exhaustion of Ground One.

3

claim explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even

if the federal basis is “self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 

(9th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the

underlying claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations

that would control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F3d 1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 

(9th Cir. 1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added). 

Because Petitioner has conceded that only Ground One was exhausted in the state court,

1

the instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims. The Court

must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to exhaust the

claims if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760. However,

Petitioner must be provided with an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted claims and go

forward with the exhausted claims. Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013 (9 Cir.2005); Anthony v. th

Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“district courts must provide habeas litigants with the

opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an alternative to

suffering dismissal”). 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DISMISSED, without prejudice. This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. 

Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claims within thirty (30)

days of the date of service of this Recommendation and proceed with only the exhausted claim.

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988). If petitioner fails to withdraw the th

unexhausted claims within the thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed,

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without prejudice, so Petitioner can return to state court to exhaust the remainder of his claims

before filing a new federal petition. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d at 372. 

This dismissal will not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting available

state remedies. See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, th

this does not mean that Petitioner will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations

imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed

request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for

the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S.

991 (2001). 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days

(plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. Provided Petitioner does not

move to withdraw the unexhausted claims, the Finding and Recommendation will be submitted

to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9

th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: May 23, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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