Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03010/USCOURTS-ca10-90-03010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eustaquio C. Deases
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

Ut1ited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 11990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

. EUSTAQUIO C. DEASES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 90-3010 

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No. 90-3010 

(D.C. No. 89-40039-01) 

(District of Kansas) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-40039-01) 

Submitted on the briefs: * 

Lee Thompson, United States Attorney, and Richard L. Hathaway, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Alfredo Parrish of Parrish, Kruidenier & Exline, Des Moines, Iowa, 

Attorney for Defendant-Appellant. 

* This case was initially set for oral argument. However, counsel 

for the appellant filed a motion to postpone oral argument or, in 

the alternative, to submit the case on the briefs. This panel 

denied the motion to postpone oral argument and granted the motion 

to submit the case on the briefs, the government not objecting 

thereto. An order was entered submitting the case without oral 

argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-3010 Document: 01019943051 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 1 
Before LOGAN, ANDERSON, and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

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Deases was charged in the first count of a two-count indictment with the unlawful possession with intent to distribute 500 

grams, or more, of cocaine, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l). 

In the second count he was charged with using or carrying a 

firearm during and in relationship to a drug trafficking crime, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(l). 

Prior to trial Deases filed a motion to suppress the use at 

trial of items taken in a search of his automobile. After hearing, that motion was denied. The defendant later pleaded guilty 

to both counts in the indictment, reserving his right to appeal 

the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He was 

then sentenced to 60 months imprisonment on each count, the two 

sentences to be served consecutively. 

On appeal Deases asserts that the district court erred in 

three particulars: (1) The motion to suppress should have been 

granted because the search of his automobile was unlawful; (2) at 

the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court, over 

objection, allowed inadmissible and prejudicial testimony to be 

introduced into evidence; and (3) in imposing sentence the 

district court erred when it refused to make a downward departure 

based on the "substantial assistance" which Deases claimed he had 

given the government. We shall consider these matters in reverse 

order. 

18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) provides that on motion of the government, if a defendant has given "substantial assistance" to the 

government in the investigation or prosecution of another person 

who has committed an offense, a district court shall have the 

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Appellate Case: 90-3010 Document: 01019943051 Date Filed: 11/01/1990 Page: 3 
authority to impose a sentence below the level established by 

statute as the minimum sentence. Section 5Kl.l of the federal 

sentencing guidelines implements 18 u.s.c. § 3553(e) and reads as 

follows: 

Upon motion of the government stating that the 

defendant has provided substantial assistance 

in the investigation or prosecution of another 

person who has committed an offense, the court 

may depart from the guidelines. 

In this case, the government did not file a 5Kl.l motion. 

However, at his sentencing Deases nonetheless asked for a downward 

departure on the ground that he had, in fact, given "substantial 

assistance" to the government and was therefore entitled to a 

downward reduction, even though the government had not filed the 

5Kl.l motion. In this regard the United States Attorney advised 

the court that Deases had not cooperated nor had he given the 

government "substantial assistance," and that any information 

which he had provided could not be substantiated. In any event, 

the district court refused Deases' request for the downward 

departure and Deases claims that such denial constitutes error. 

His argument is that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) and Guideline §5Kl.l are 

unconstitutional and violate his Fifth Amendment Due Process 

rights. 

Deases' argument in this regard has been considered, and 

rejected, by this Court in two recent cases. In United States v. 

Kuntz, 908 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1990) we upheld §5Kl.l which was 

challenged on about the same grounds as are urged in the instant 

case. In United States v. Sorensen, F.2d _ (10th Cir., 

September 21, 1990) we upheld 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) which also had 

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been challenged on the same constitutional grounds urged here. 

Barring the "egregious" case referred to in Kuntz, which this case 

is not, a district court may not depart downward on the basis that 

a defendant has given the government "substantial assistance" unless the government has first filed a motion under §5Kl.1. In 

Sorensen and Kuntz we held that the requirement that the government must file a motion before a district court has the authority 

to make a downward departure on the ground of substantial assistance to the government is not subject to constitutional challenge. 

At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the government 

called Kirk Simone, a trooper with the Kansas Highway Patrol, who 

testified concerning his stop of a vehicle driven by Deases on 

Interstate 35 and the ensuing search of the vehicle. Deases also 

testified and gave his version of events. On cross-examination, 

the United States Attorney, over objection, was allowed to ask 

Deases whether he was a cocaine user and whether he had previously 

been arrested for cocaine possession. Deases' answer was that he 

had used cocaine before and that he had "turned himself in" on a 

cocaine possession charge in Ames, Iowa. 

lowed this limited inquiry on the grounds 

The district court althat, depending on 

Deases' response, it conceivably had some bearing on Deases' credibility. We agree. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation where, in a hearing on a motion to suppress, the admission of 

inadmissible evidence would justify a reversal on appeal. This 

was not a jury trial but only an evidentiary hearing in connection 

with a pending motion. This situation, i.e., inadmissible 

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testimony in an evidentiary hearing on a pretrial motion, is akin 

to the introduction of inadmissible evidence in a bench trial. In 

this latter connection, the general rule is that the introduction 

of inadmissible evidence in a bench trial is not grounds for 

reversal on appeal. See United States v. Foley, 871 F.2d 235, 

239-40 (1st Cir. 1989), citing Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 

749, 767 (1929). 

The main matter urged on appeal is that the search of Deases' 

vehicle and the seizure of a quantity of cocaine and a loaded 

shotgun from that vehicle was unlawful. At the hearing on Deases' 

motion to suppress, the government called one witness, State 

Trooper Kirk Simone. Officer Simone testified that he stopped the 

driver of a motor vehicle which was going 70 to 71 miles per hour 

in a 65 miles per hour speed zone, and that the only reason he 

stopped the vehicle was because the. vehicle was violating the 

speed limit. He stated that at the time of the stop he had no 

suspicion that there was contraband in the vehicle, not even a 

hunch. Simone stated that he routinely stopped vehicles traveling 

five to six miles over the speed limit for the purpose of giving 

the driver a warning ticket and that the "policy" of the Kansas 

Highway Patrol was to stop all vehicles being driven five to six 

miles over the speed limit and issue the driver a warning ticket. 

After stopping the other vehicle, Trooper Simone testified 

that he approached the stopped vehicle from the driver's side and 

that Deases was the driver. He advised Deases that he had been 

stopped because he was driving 70 to 71 miles per hour in a 65 

miles per hour speed zone. At that point Deases produced his 

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driver's license. Deases was then asked by Simone to exit his 

vehicle and take the right front seat of his marked patrol car. 

While in the patrol car, Simone stated that he issued Deases a 

warning ticket and returned Deases' drivers license. At this 

point Simone testified that Deases was becoming noticeably more 

nervous, even though he had been advised that he was only being 

given a warning ticket. Simone testified that in response to 

inquiry, Deases stated that he was en route from Texas to Ames, 

Iowa where he was a college student. As this nervousness 

increased, Simone asked Deases if he had any drugs or other 

contraband in his automobile, and Deases responded that he did 

not. Thereafter, according to Simone, he asked Deases if he would 

consent to a search of his car, and that Deases' response was, 

"OK." Upon saying "OK," and before Simone could ask Deases to 

sign a written consent, Deases exited the patrol car. Trooper 

Simone then asked Deases to retrieve the keys from the ignition of 

his own car and unlock the trunk. Deases complied without comment 

or hesitation. Simone testified that he and Deases had been in 

the patrol car for about two or three minutes. 

When the trunk was opened, Simone saw a shotgun and some 

suitcases. Simone opened a black travel bag in the trunk and 

espied plastic bags containing what appeared to be cocaine. At 

this point, Deases tried unsuccessfully to grab the bag away from 

Simone. Deases was then placed under arrest. Approximately one 

kilogram of cocaine was recovered from the trunk of Deases' 

vehicle. 

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Deases' testimony differed from Simone's. He testified that 

Simone said that he would not be free to leave until he opened the 

trunk, that he was not issued a warning ticket until after he was 

arrested and placed in jail, and that before he opened the trunk 

Simone "stood by" with "his hand on his gun." 

In his written order denying Deases' motion to suppress, the 

district judge summarized the testimony of Simone and Deases, and 

then found that Deases' testimony was "not credible" and that 

Simone's was credible. The district court also found that the 

stopping of Deases' automobile under the described circumstances 

was reasonable and non-pretextual in its nature. The district 

court further found that when Simone requested permission to 

search his vehicle, Deases granted permission "without any apparent hesitation." It was on this general basis that the district 

court denied Deases' motion to suppress. 

Deases' first argues that Simone's stop of Deases' vehicle 

was pretextual in nature. The district court found that the stop 

of the Deases' vehicle was non-pretextual, and on appeal that 

finding cannot be disturbed unless we conclude it is "clearly erroneous." United States v. Rivera, 867 F.2d 1261, 1262-3 (10th 

Cir. 1989) . 

In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), 

this court held that in determining whether a stop is pretextual 

or non-pretextual an objective test should be used, not a subjective test. In other words, "reasonable practice" and not "subjective purpose" governs. Although the district judge in his order 

denying Deases' motion for summary judgment did not explicitly 

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recognize the rule of Guzman, we conclude that he nonetheless did 

not violate the rule. The fact that he chose to accept the 

trooper's version of events over Deases' does not violate Guzman. 

Further, as mentioned above, the district court did make specific 

mention that under all the circumstances Simone had acted "reasonably." In this connection, we note that Simone testified that it 

was the "policy" of the Kansas Highway Patrol to stop all vehicles 

driving five to six miles over the speed limit and issue warning 

tickets. In this same connection, the district court in its order 

quoted the following language from United States v. Erwin, 875 

F.2d 268, 272 {10th Cir. 1989). 

In our view [the Tenth Circuit's view], under 

the circumstances presented here, a reasonable 

New Mexico patrol officer routinely would have 

stopped a vehicle traveling twelve miles over 

the speed limit even in the absence of illicit 

motive, and nothing in the record is to the 

. .contrary. 

In United States v. Erwin, supra, we were unable to tell 

whether the district court used the "objective reasonableness 

standard" of Guzman or a "subjective standard" based on the 

officer's testimony. In such circumstance, we stated that regardless of the standard, "'overwhelming objective evidence' exists in 

this case to conclude that the stop was reasonable," Erwin, 875 

F.2d at 272, citing Smith v. United States, 799 F.2d 704, 710 

(11th Cir. 1986). Such observation applies to the instant case, 

and we will not disturb the district court's holding that Simone's 

stopping of Deases' vehicle was non-pretextual. 

Deases next contends that the duration of the stop was excessive. We do not agree. Deases and Simone agree that the two of 

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them were in the patrol car for about two to three minutes. What 

happened thereafter is in dispute, but the district court chose to 

believe Simone's testimony that before asking Deases any questions 

about whether he possessed drugs, weapons or contraband, Deases 

had his warning ticket, drivers license and "all of his articles 

back in his hand." The district court also found credible 

Simone's testimony that he then Simone asked, and received permission, to search the vehicle and that Deases himself voluntarily 

opened the trunk for the officer. 1 The scope of the search did 

not exceed the scope of Deases' consent, which was to "search the 

car." Consent to search a car means to search the entire car and 

whatever is in it, unless such consent is otherwise restricted. 

United States v. Espinosa, 782 F.2d 888, 892 (10th Cir. 1986). 

All things considered, the stop of the vehicle, the ensuing search 

of the trunk and the seizure of the contraband therein was lawful. 

The instant case bears considerable resemblance to United 

States v. Werking, F.2d _ (10th Cir. September 26, 1990). 

In Werking, an automobile bearing California license plates was 

stopped by a state highway patrol officer on Interstate 80 in 

Wyoming. The officer stopped the vehicle because he suspected 

that the California car was being driven in violation of Wyoming's 

"one trip" permit law. That law requires all vehicles brought 

into Wyoming for sale to register at a port of entry and affix a 

permit to the vehicle's front windshield. The driver stated that 

1 Having concluded that the initial stop of Deases' car was lawful, the government does not have the "heavier burden" in connection with the consent issue which it would have if the initial 

stop was unlawful. See United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448, 

1457 (10th Cir. 1985). 

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he was driving the vehicle to Ohio to accommodate a friend. The 

driver also, on request, produced registration papers, a valid 

driver's license, and a letter from the owner authorizing him to 

drive the vehicle. Finding no problems with the papers produced 

by the driver, the officer filled out a "contact sheet" stating 

the reason for the detention and indicating that no violation had 

been found. The officer returned the papers to the driver and 

gave him a copy of the contact sheet. The officer then asked the 

driver if he had any contraband in the car, and the driver said he 

did not. The officer next asked whether the driver would mind if 

he took a look in the trunk. The driver said "no," he would not 

mind, and opened the trunk. The ensuing search of the trunk 

disclosed seventy-five pounds of marijuana. 

The driver, Thomas Werking, was charged with the unlawful 

possession of marijuana. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l). Werking filed a 

motion to suppress the use at trial of the marijuana taken from 

the trunk of his automobile. After hearing, the district court 

denied the motion to suppress, whereupon Werking pleaded guilty, 

reserving his right to appeal the district court's order denying 

his motion to suppress. 

On appeal, we affirmed. In so doing, we rejected Werking's 

contention that the initial stop was pretextual. We also rejected 

the further contention that the officer's continued questioning of 

the driver after the driver's license and other papers had been 

returned violated Werking's Fourth Amendment rights. In connection therewith, we stated that "[a]t this point, the encounter 

between Werking [the driver] and Dyer [the officer] became an 

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ordinary consensual encounter between a private citizen and a law 

enforcement official." Finally, we rejected Werking's contention 

that he did not voluntarily consent to the officer's search of the 

trunk of his car. In so doing, we noted that, according to the 

officer, Werking stated he had no objection to a search of his 

vehicle and opened the trunk himself and then made no objection to 

the search as it proceeded. 

In the instant case, according to Trooper Simone, Deases made 

no objection to the search as it proceeded until he tried to 

snatch the black bag containing the cocaine out of the officer's 

hands. At that point only, his prior consent ended, however, the 

cocaine had already been found. 

Judgment affirmed. 

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