Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00752/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00752-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bennge
Defendant
Cantu
Defendant
Donald Jeffery
Plaintiff
Knight
Defendant
Wright
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD JEFFERY,

Plaintiff,

v.

M. T. A. BENNGE, et al.,

Defendants.

 /

CASE NO. 1:06-cv-00752-OWW-SMS PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

OR NOTIFY THE COURT OF HIS

WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED ONLY

AGAINST DEFENDANTS CATU AND

KNIGHT ON HIS EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIM

(Doc. 17)

I. Screening Order

A. Screening Requirement 

Plaintiff Donald Jeffery (“plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed this action on June

15, 2006. On February 23, 2007, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend, for

failure to state any claims upon which relief may be granted under section 1983. Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint on April 2, 2007. 

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

“Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall

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28 Identified as Cantu in the original complaint. 1

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dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. A court may dismiss a complaint only

if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with

the allegations. Id. at 514. “‘The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether

the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of

the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but that is not the test.’” Jackson v. Carey,

353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also

Austin v. Terhune, 367 F.3d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir. 2004) (“‘Pleadings need suffice only to put the

opposing party on notice of the claim . . . .’” (quoting Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 977 (9th Cir.

2001))). However, “the liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.”

Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights

complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l

Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at Salinas Valley State Prison in Soledad. The events at issue

in this action allegedly occurred at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State

Prison in Corcoran. The defendants named in this action are Medical Technical Assistants Bennge

and M. Shaw, Sergeant J. Martinez, and Correctional Officers R. Catu, S. Knight, and Coffee. 1

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Plaintiff is seeking money damages. The claims in this action arise from the alleged denial of mental

health care services and the alleged use of excessive force physical force.

1. Denial of Mental Health Care

Plaintiff alleges that defendants Bennge, Shaw, and Martinez intentionally denied him

emergency mental health care services on December 4, 2003, when he was having suicidal thoughts.

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 . . . creates a cause of action for violations of the federal

Constitution and laws.” Sweaney v. Ada County, Idaho, 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

(internal quotations omitted.) “To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the

deprivation of a state-created interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution,

Section 1983 offers no redress.” Id. 

Section 1983 plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions

of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v.

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “‘A

person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of [§] 1983,

if [that person] does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform

an act which [that person] is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint

is made.’” Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 676, 689 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “[T]he ‘requisite causal connection can be established not only by

some kind of direct, personal participation in the deprivation, but also be setting in motion a series

of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the

constitutional injury.’” Id. (quoting Johnson at 743-44). 

Plaintiff’s claim involves his mental health care and therefore falls within the purview of the

Eighth Amendment. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, prison conditions must involve “the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.”

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Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). A prisoner’s claim of inadequate medical care does

not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the

prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” and (2) “the prison official ‘acted

with deliberate indifference in doing so.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)

(quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). A prison official

does not act in a deliberately indifferent manner unless the official “knows of and disregards an

excessive risk to inmate health orsafety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate

indifference may be manifested “when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with

medical treatment,” or in the manner “in which prison physicians provide medical care.” McGuckin

v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX Techs., Inc. v.

Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). Where a prisoner is alleging a delay in

receiving medical treatment, the delay must have led to further harm in order for the prisoner to

make a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060

(citing Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

In order to proceed under section 1983 against defendants for acting with deliberate

indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, plaintiff’s factual allegations must be sufficient

to support a claim that defendants “[knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to [plaintiff’s]

health . . . .” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Further, in a situation such as that alleged by plaintiff, there

must be some allegation that further harm resulted from the denial of mental health care services on

December 4, 2003. Shapely v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir.

1985). The failure to provide treatment to a suicidal inmate may be sufficient to support a claim for

violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he placed defendants

Bennge, Shaw, and Martinez on notice that he was suicidal and they refused to provide him with any

assistance. However, plaintiff has not alleged any facts supporting a claim that as a result on

defendants’ failure to act, he suffered any further harm. As a result, plaintiff fails to state a claim

for violation of the Eighth Amendment. 

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2. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges that on December 4, 2003, defendants Catu and Knight used excessive force

against him while he was restrained, and he suffered injuries as a result. “What is necessary to show

sufficient harm for purposes of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause [of the Eighth

Amendment] depends upon the claim at issue . . . .” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).

“The objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is . . . contextual and responsive to

contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

malicious and sadistic use of force to cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency,

regardless of whether or not significant injury is evident. Id. at 9; see also Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d

623, 628 (9th Cir. 2002) (Eighth Amendment excessive force standard examines de minimis uses

of force, not de minimis injuries)). However, not “every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives

rise to a federal cause of action.” Id. at 9. “The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and

unusual punishments necessarily excludes from constitutional recognition de minimis uses of

physical force, provided that the use of force is not of a sort repugnant to the conscience of

mankind.” Id. at 9-10 (internal quotations marks and citations omitted). 

“[W]henever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force in violation of

the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied

in a good-faith effort to maintain orrestore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”

Id. at 7. “In determining whether the use of force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also be proper

to evaluate the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of

force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“The absence of serious injury is . . . relevant to the Eighth Amendment inquiry, but does not end

it.” Id. 

Plaintiff’s allegation that defendants slammed him face first into the ground without

provocation, and one tooth was knocked loose and another tooth was chipped as a result is sufficient

to give rise to an excessive force claim against defendants Catu and Knight. However, defendant

Coffee’s involvement was limited to confiscating plaintiff’s bloody clothes after the incident.

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Defendant Catu was identified as defendant Cantu in the original complaint. Plaintiff is responsible 2

for properly identifying this defendant in the summons and USM-285 form so that service of process may be

effected by the Marshal.

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Neitherthe allegation that defendant Coffee took plaintiff’s clothes nor the allegation that defendant

Coffee obtained the clothes only by threatening to bring other officers and take them by force if

plaintiff did not turn them over gives rise to a claim for relief under section 1983. Gaut v. Sunn, 810

F.2d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1987). Defendant Coffee’s actions simply do not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. 

C. Conclusion

Plaintiff’s amended complaintstates a cognizable claim for relief under section 1983 against

defendants Catu and Wright for use of excessive physical force, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. However, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any claims under section 1983 against

defendants Bennge, Shaw, Martinez, or Coffee. The court will provide plaintiff with one final

opportunity to file a second amended complaint, if plaintiff wishes to do so.

If plaintiff does not wish to file a second amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding

only against defendants Catu and Wright for use of excessive physical force, plaintiff may so notify

the court in writing, and the court will issue a Findings and Recommendations recommending that

the remaining defendants and claims be dismissed from this action, and will forward plaintiff two

summonses and two USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the 2

court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

In the event that plaintiff does wish to file a second amended complaint, plaintiff is advised

that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d

1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987), and must be

“complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” Local Rule 15-220.

Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original complaint which are not alleged

in an amended complaint are waived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing to London v. Coopers &

Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at 1474.

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If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy,

625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how each named

defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some

affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy,

588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the court in

this order, or

b. Notify the court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended complaint

and wishes to proceed only against defendants Catu andWright on his Eighth

Amendment excessive force claim; and

3. If plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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