Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01299/USCOURTS-caDC-10-01299-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Respondent
United States Department of the Air Force
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 2011 Decided May 27, 2011

No. 10-1299

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, 4TH

FIGHTER WING, SEYMOUR JOHNSON AIR FORCE BASE,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS AUTHORITY,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Federal Labor Relations Authority

Robert D. Kamenshine, Attorney, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs

were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, and William

Kanter, Attorney. 

Joyce G. Friedman, Attorney, Federal Labor Relations

Authority, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the

brief was Rosa M. Koppel, Solicitor.

USCA Case #10-1299 Document #1310277 Filed: 05/27/2011 Page 1 of 14
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Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The Air Force petitions for review

of the decision and order of the Federal Labor Relations

Authority (“FLRA”) that a union proposal for uniform cleaning

is a negotiable condition of employment. Reversing its position

before the FLRA, the Air Force contends that the proposal is

non-negotiable because it would require the use of appropriated

funds for a purpose not authorized by law. Section 1593 of title

10 of the U.S. Code authorizes certain appropriated funds to be

used “for uniforms . . . or for allowance for uniforms,” whereby

the Air Force may either “pay an allowance” to employees

required by law “to wear a prescribed uniform” or, “[i]n lieu of

providing an allowance . . . [,] provide a uniform” to employees. 

See also 5 U.S.C. § 5901(a). Based on a recently discovered

Conference Report, the Air Force contends that neither

alternative authorizes the expenditure of funds for the provision

of services related to uniforms and statutory silence does not

leave it discretion to do so. The FLRA, invoking the waiver

provision, 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c), contends the court lacks

jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the Air Force failed

to present its new interpretation of the uniform statutes below.

We hold that the Air Force’s belated discovery of a

constitutional appropriations bar, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.

7, is an “extraordinary circumstance[]” under section 7123(c)

that permits consideration of an argument not presented to the

FLRA. Were the exception not to apply, the FLRA’s order

would, in effect, permit the Air Force, by contract with the

Union, to authorize the expenditure of funds beyond what

Congress has approved. Having jurisdiction, we grant the

petition. Whether because the plain text of the uniform statutes

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does not authorize use of funds for cleaning uniforms, or

because the statutory silence creates ambiguity and the FLRA

must defer to the permissible interpretation of 10 U.S.C. § 1593

by the Department of Defense, which administers the statute, the

Air Force has no duty to bargain over uniform cleaning services.

I.

As of August 2007, the Air Force requires its Air Reserve

Technicians, who are citizen-employees required as a condition

of their employment to maintain membership in a military

reserve unit, to “wear the military uniform while performing

civilian duties.” Air Force Instruction 36-801 § 1.1.1.9 (Apr. 29,

1994) (incorporating change Aug. 6, 2007). The National

Association of Independent Labor, Local 7 (“the Union”),

challenged the “compelling need” for the uniform requirement,

see 5 U.S.C. § 7117; 5 C.F.R. § 2424.50, and alternatively

proposed as a subject for negotiation that the Air Force provide

uniform cleaning services. 

The Air Force claimed it had no duty to bargain over

uniform maintenance because “[t]his matter is specifically

provided for by federal statute and therefore is not a condition

of employment under 5 U.S.C. [§] 7103(a)(14).” Decl. of

Negotiability 2 (Feb. 3, 2010). In its view, “5 U.S.C. § 5901

addresse[d] the payment of a uniform allowance for the

maintenance of the uniform.” Id. When the Union filed a

petition for a review of negotiability issues with the FLRA, see

5 C.F.R. § 2424.22, the Air Force responded to the same effect,

stating that the uniform maintenance proposal was nonnegotiable because under FLRA precedents uniform cleaning

expenses were expressly provided for in 10 U.S.C. § 1593 and

thus fell outside the duty to bargain. Alternatively, it argued that

the proposal was inconsistent with 10 U.S.C. § 1593, which

authorized the Air Force either to furnish a uniform or to

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provide a uniform allowance, but not to “pay a uniform

allowance [and] also to furnish uniforms in the form of cleaning

services to those employees who also receive a uniform

allowance.” Air Force Statement of Position 13–14 (Mar. 23,

2010). The Union responded by pointing to more recent FLRA

precedents as supporting the negotiability of the uniform

cleaning proposal.

The FLRA agreed with the Union, ruling the Air Force had

not established that the uniform statutes left it no discretion to

bargain where the uniform cleaning proposal would not require

it to exceed the dollar amount of the uniform allowance, and

further that the proposal was not inconsistent with the uniform

statutes because providing cleaning services was not the

equivalent of furnishing a uniform. See Nat’l Ass’n of Indep.

Labor Local 7, 64 F.L.R.A. 1194, 1199–1200 (2010). The Air

Force petitions for review.

II.

Under 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c), “[n]o objection that has not been

urged before the Authority . . . shall be considered by the court,

unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused

because of extraordinary circumstances.” The petition for

review by the Air Force presents a new interpretation of the

uniform statutes, 10 U.S.C. § 1593; 5 U.S.C. § 5901, based on

a belatedly discovered Conference Report that, in its view,

precludes payment for cleaning services. Unless the Air Force’s

petition falls within the “extraordinary circumstances” exception

to the waiver provision, then, the court must dismiss the petition

for lack of jurisdiction.

The court, recognizing its jurisdiction normally does not

extend to an “objection that has not been urged before the

Authority,” Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Capital

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Area Council 26 v. FLRA, 395 F.3d 443, 451–52 (D.C. Cir.

2005) (citation and quotation marks omitted), has interpreted the

“extraordinary circumstances” exception narrowly. The

Supreme Court held that the “plain language [of section

7123(c)] evinces an intent that the FLRA shall pass upon issues

arising under [Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,

known as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act,

5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq.1], thereby bringing its expertise to bear

on the resolution of those issues.” EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19,

23 (1986) (per curiam). In that case, the Court concluded it

lacked jurisdiction to decide the question of negotiability

because the principal arguments advanced by the EEOC against

negotiability were not presented to the FLRA, and there was no

extraordinary circumstance to excuse the omission. Id. at

23–24.2

 “[T]he Court so held despite the fact that, had EEOC’s

contentions been correct, the FLRA decision would have

undercut congressional policy.” U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban

Dev. v. FLRA, 964 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Accordingly, this

court concluded that it is not enough that the FLRA’s order

would arguably circumvent this court’s precedent or even a

congressional preference with regard to a class of employees. 

See id. at 3–4. Instead, in an exemplary circumstance, the court

has applied the “extraordinary circumstances” exception to

reach arguments not presented to the FLRA where they “simply

track the objections considered by the [FLRA]” in another case. 

U.S. Dep’t of Interior Minerals Mgmt. Serv. v. FLRA, 969 F.2d

1158, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In other words, a failure to present

1

 See Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Family Support

Admin. v. FLRA, 920 F.2d 45, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

2

 The Court also noted that the EEOC’s failure to present its

objections to the Court of Appeals provided further justification for

dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. See EEOC,

476 U.S. at 24.

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arguments to the FLRA was excused because the court enjoyed

the benefit of the FLRA’s expertise in addressing the same

arguments in another case and “a rehearing petition would have

been futile given that the Authority had just found an identical

proposal negotiable.” Id.

The Air Force suggests that FLRA precedent gave it “ample

reason” to conclude that presenting its new argument to the

FLRA would have been futile. Reply Br. 10. It points to

National Association of Government Employees, SEIU, AFLCIO, 26 F.L.R.A. 515, 526 (1987), where the FLRA, based on

an examination of the uniform statutes and Senate Report No.

83-1992 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3816, 3826,

concluded that 5 U.S.C. chapter 59, subchapter I (where section

5901 is found) “deals comprehensively with the payment of a

uniform allowance by an agency for the maintenance of the

uniform which the agency requires employees to wear.” See

also Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Wisconsin Chapter, 26

F.L.R.A. 682, 684 (1987). Subsequent FLRA decisions

addressing uniform maintenance proposals emphasized and

relied almost exclusively on the Senate Report in ruling that “the

legislative scheme encompassed both the purchase and upkeep

of the uniforms.” See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 46

F.L.R.A. 696, 776–77 (1992). 

The difficulty with the Air Force’s futility argument is twofold. First, the legislative history objections now presented do

not “simply track the objections considered by the Authority” in

another case. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 969 F.2d at 1161. Second,

the Air Force presumes that the FLRA, having relied on

legislative history in the past, would have resisted considering

legislative history not previously addressed in an opinion. The

futility exception does not reach that far. See Ga. State Chapter

Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. FLRA, 184 F.3d 889, 892 (D.C.

Cir. 1999); cf. W & M Props. of Conn., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d

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1341, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Particularly in the instant case, by

the mid-1990s the FLRA had modified its approach to

determining the negotiability of proposals, “clarif[ying] . . . that

the comprehensiveness of a statutory scheme is not, in itself, a

sufficient basis to find a matter outside the duty to bargain” and

focusing instead on “whether the statute at issue provides the

Agency the discretion to agree to the proposal.” Nat’l Fed’n of

Fed. Emps., Local 1669, 55 F.L.R.A. 63, 67 (1999). 

Consequently, the FLRA held the decisions upon which the Air

Force relies in making its futility argument to be “superseded

by, and inconsistent with,” the new methodology insofar as the

decisions “suggest that the comprehensive nature of [the

uniform statute]” – a conclusion previously supported by Senate

Report No. 83-1992, see, e.g., SEIU, 26 F.L.R.A. at 526 – “by

itself . . . foreclose[d] any bargaining on the subject of uniform

allowances.” Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1669, 55

F.L.R.A. at 67.

The belated discovery of a statutory provision, and

presumably no less legislative history, would normally be

insufficient to fall within the waiver exception. See U.S. Dep’t

of the Air Force, Griffiss Air Force Base v. FLRA, 949 F.2d

1169, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also Marine Mammal

Conservancy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric., 134 F.3d 409, 414 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). Nonetheless, we conclude that the Air Force’s

petition presents an “extraordinary circumstance[]” under

section 7123(c) for another reason. The Air Force maintains, in

view of the belated discovery of the Conference Report, that the

uniform statutes it administers do not authorize use of

appropriated funds to clean uniforms. Its new interpretation thus

implicates the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause, which

provides that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but

in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” U.S.CONST.

art. I, § 9, cl. 7; see also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a); Ass’n of Civilian

Technicians, Puerto Rico Army Chapter v. FLRA, 370 F.3d

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1214, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“ACT II”). In Office of Personnel

Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990), the Supreme

Court rejected an estoppel claim for payment of disability

benefits, holding that the Appropriations Clause dictated that

“judicial use of the equitable doctrine of estoppel cannot grant

respondent a money remedy that Congress has not authorized.” 

Id. at 426. The Court pointed to the underlying separation of

powers concerns: “If agents of the Executive were able, by their

unauthorized oral or written statements to citizens, to obligate

the Treasury for the payment of funds, the control over public

funds that the Clause reposes in Congress in effect could be

transferred to the Executive.” Id. at 428; cf. Schism v. United

States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1274–75 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc). 

Similarly, in Department of the Army v. FLRA, 56 F.3d 273, 275

(D.C. Cir. 1995), this court declined to apply section 7123(c)’s

waiver provision where the petition was based on sovereign

immunity, reasoning that if section 7123(c) could bar a belated

claim “a federal official could effectively waive sovereign

immunity and confer jurisdiction upon the court without an

express authorization from the Congress.”

The Air Force’s petition presents the same concerns

identified in Richmond: were the “extraordinary circumstances”

exception not to apply, the FLRA’s order would, in effect,

permit the Air Force, by contract with the Union, to authorize

the expenditure of funds beyond what Congress has approved,

see 496 U.S. at 426, implicating separation of powers concerns,

see id. at 428. This follows because, contrary to the FLRA’s

response to the petition for review, either the plain text of the

uniform statutes dictates this result or the Air Force’s

interpretation of any statutory ambiguity is entitled to deference. 

Cf. Gen. Servs. Admin. v. FLRA, 86 F.3d 1185, 1187 (D.C. Cir.

1996). Although this touches on the merits, doing so is

necessary in order to determine whether the Air Force’s

invocation of a constitutional appropriations bar presents a

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substantial objection to which the waiver exception should

apply. Otherwise the exception Congress provided for

“extraordinary circumstances” would sweep too broadly,

encompassing even frivolous Appropriations Clause challenges. 

This is how the court has previously ensured itself of the merits

of a claim of “extraordinary circumstances.” See Dep’t of the

Army, 56 F.3d at 275. There is no issue of the FLRA’s

expertise. Rather, as the Air Force suggests, “[w]aiver is not a

constitutionally valid basis on which to compel the Air Force to

spend funds for a purpose unauthorized by Congress.” Reply

Br. 7 (capitalization omitted). Section 7123(c), rooted in

concerns of agency autonomy and judicial efficiency, cf.

Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006); NLRB v. SaintGobain Abrasives, Inc., 426 F.3d 455, 458–59 (1st Cir. 2005),

cannot create that authorization. Because the Air Force’s

belated discovery of a constitutional appropriations bar is an

“extraordinary circumstance[]” under section 7123(c), the court

has jurisdiction to consider the Air Force’s petition, to which we

now turn. 

III.

For purposes of identifying our standard of review, the

court has differentiated between the FLRA’s interpretations of

its organic statute and interpretations of a non-organic statute,

where both are at issue. See, e.g., Ass’n of Civilian Technicians,

Tony Kempenich Mem’l Chapter 21 v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1119,

1121 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court has held that it “owe[s] no

deference to the FLRA’s statutory interpretation where it has

endeavored to ‘reconcile its organic statute . . . with a[nother]

statute . . . not within its area of expertise.’” U.S. Dep’t of

Veterans Affairs v. FLRA, 9 F.3d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(second alteration in original) (citation omitted). Here, the Air

Force does not challenge the FLRA’s interpretation of its

organic statute and thus presents no occasion to afford the FLRA

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deference; the Air Force does not contest the FLRA’s

methodology of determining when a bargaining proposal is

“specifically provided for by Federal statute,” 5 U.S.C. §

7103(a)(14), viz., “whether the statute at issue provides the

Agency the discretion to agree to the proposal,” Nat’l Fed’n of

Fed. Emps., Local 1669, 55 F.L.R.A. at 67. Instead, the Air

Force challenges the FLRA’s failure to defer to its interpretation

of 10 U.S.C. § 1593 and 5 U.S.C. § 5901, which are not

administered by the FLRA. The court reviews de novo the

FLRA’s interpretation of a statute it is not charged with

administering. See, e.g., Tony Kempenich Mem’l, 269 F.3d at

1121.

As noted, 10 U.S.C. § 1593 and 5 U.S.C. § 5901 relate to

the provision of uniforms in that they authorize the expenditure

of appropriated funds for either a uniform or “in lieu [there]of”

a uniform allowance.3

 Section 1593 is specific to the Armed

3

 Section 1593 provides, in relevant part:

(a) Allowance authorized. – 

 (1) The Secretary of Defense may pay an allowance

to each civilian employee of the Department of

Defense who is required by law or regulation to wear

a prescribed uniform in the performance of official

duties.

 (2) In lieu of providing an allowance under

paragraph (1), the Secretary may provide a uniform

to a civilian employee . . . .

* * * 

(d) Use of appropriated funds for allowance. – Amounts

appropriated annually to the Department of Defense for the

pay of civilian employees may be used for uniforms, or for

allowance for uniforms, as authorized by this section and

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Forces; section 5901 applies generally to federal government

organizations and employees. Before the FLRA, the Air Force

agreed with the FLRA that uniform cleaning expenses fell

within the scope of these statutes, and therefore the FLRA

decision addressed only whether the statutes leave any discretion

to the Air Force to bargain. The FLRA ultimately concluded,

because the Union proposal did not require an annual

expenditure in excess of the $400 maximum allowance and was

not otherwise inconsistent with the uniform statutes, that the Air

Force had discretion to bargain over the amount of uniform

cleaning expenses. See Nat’l Ass’n of Indep. Labor Local 7, 64

F.L.R.A. at 1199–1200. The Air Force now relies on a recently

discovered Conference Report in contending that the uniform

statutes preclude expenditures for uniform cleaning services. 

We apply the two-step analysis of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.

NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 

The plain text of the two uniform statutes addresses

payment for a uniform or payment “[i]n lieu of,” 10 U.S.C.

§ 1593(a)(2), provision of a uniform. The most natural reading

section 5901 of title 5.

10 U.S.C. § 1593(a), (d). Section 5901 provides, in relevant part:

(a) There is authorized to be appropriated annually . . . on a

showing of necessity or desirability, such sums as may be

necessary to carry out this subchapter. The head of the

agency concerned, out of funds made available by the

appropriation, shall –

 (1) furnish to each of these employees a uniform at

a cost not to exceed $400 a year . . . ; or

 (2) pay to each of these employees an allowance for

a uniform not to exceed $400 a year . . . .

5 U.S.C. § 5901(a).

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of the text allows the expenditure of up to $400 per employee

per year for uniforms, and suggests that Congress cares not

whether the employer or employee is the ultimate purchaser. 

See FCC v. AT&T, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011). Neither

the word “provide,” 10 U.S.C. 1593(a)(2), nor “furnish,” 5

U.S.C. § 5901(a)(1), normally brings to mind cleaning services. 

That Congress did not contemplate uniform maintenance to fall

within the ambit of the statutory authorization appears clear

from the use of the phrase “[i]n lieu of,” contrasting a uniform

allowance and the provision of a uniform. 10 U.S.C.

§ 1593(a)(1) & (2). The legislative history and other traditional

tools of statutory construction reinforce this conclusion. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; Shays v. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 105

(D.C. Cir. 2005). The original Federal Employees Uniform

Allowance Act of 1954, the uncodified precursor to section

5901, stated that funds may be used either to furnish a uniform

or to pay “an allowance for defraying the expenses of

acquisition of such uniform.” Pub. L. No. 83-763, § 402, 68

Stat. 1105, 1114 (emphasis added). Review of the legislative

history further reveals that initial versions of the House and

Senate bills provided for uniform maintenance. See S.REP. NO.

83-1992 (accompanying H.R. 2263 and reprinting comments on

S. 2265 and S. 3507), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3826

(summarizing H.R. 2263, substantially the same as S. 2665 and

S. 3681, as authorizing disbursement “for purchase and upkeep

of uniforms”). The Conference Report upon which the Air

Force relies states, however, that this provision was deleted:

“The conference substitute adopts the language of the Senate

amendment [to Title IV of H.R. 2263], except . . . for deletion of

a provision therein for use of uniform allowances for upkeep of

uniforms.” CONF. REP. NO. 83-2665 (1954), reprinted in 1954

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3861, 3875. 

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Although the Conference Report does not explain why the

provision on upkeep of uniforms was deleted,4

 the FLRA owes

deference to the Department of Defense’s reasonable

interpretation of the second uniform statute, 10 U.S.C. § 1593,

because the Department administers that statute, see Gen. Servs.

Admin., 86 F.3d at 1187, and would exceed its authority by

ruling that, in the absence of a provision specifically addressing

the maintenance of uniforms, the Air Force has discretion to

negotiate with the Union on uniform cleaning services, seeNat’l

Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1669, 55 F.L.R.A. at 67. Here the

Air Force’s interpretation of 10 U.S.C. § 1593 (which is, of

course, the same as the interpretation of the Department of

Defense), assuming there is ambiguity from statutory silence, is

a permissible one that this court “should not disturb” because “it

appears from the statute [and] its legislative history that the

4

 Agency comments reprinted in Senate Report No. 83-1992

indicate that the cost of providing and maintaining uniforms, estimated

to be $20 million, id., reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3818, was a

concern. See Letter from John W. Macy, Jr., For and in Absence of

Philip Young, Chairman, U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, to Senator Frank

Carlson, Chairman, Comm. on Post Office & Civil Serv. (Feb. 19,

1954) (commenting that S. 2265 provides “allowance for the purchase

and maintenance of uniforms,” but noting that “the annual cost of this

bill would be substantial” and, given “the President’s policy of

curtailing expenditures wherever possible, . . . not recommend[ing]

such legislation at this time”); Letter from True D. Morse, Under

Sec’y, Dep’t of Agric., to Chairman Carlson (Mar. 2, 1954)

(commenting that S. 2665 provides allowance for “acquisition and

upkeep of prescribed uniforms,” but noting costs and not

recommending enactment at this time); Letter from Edmund F.

Mansure, Adm’r, Gen. Servs. Admin., to Chairman Carlson (Mar. 5,

1954) (describing GSA’s existing “authority to purchase, repair, and

clean uniforms” and suggesting payment of a uniform allowance be

made optional in S. 2665), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3829,

3836, 3840, 3850.

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accommodation is . . . one that Congress would have

sanctioned.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 (citation and quotation

marks omitted). There consequently is no need to address the

FLRA’s bald assertion that the “necessary expense” doctrine

under decisions of the Comptroller General might allow for such

expenditures. See Resp. Br. 18, 20. See generally ACT II, 370

F.3d at 1218–19, 1221–22; 1 Office of the Gen. Counsel, U.S.

Gen. Accounting Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations

Law 4-19 (3d ed. 2004).

The parties agree that “a collective bargaining proposal is

contrary to law, and hence not subject to bargaining, if it

requires expenditure of appropriated funds for a purpose not

authorized by law.” Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico

Army Chapter v. FLRA, 534 F.3d 772, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(“ACT III”); see also Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Puerto Rico 

Army Chapter v. FLRA, 269 F.3d 1112, 1116–18 (D.C. Cir.

2001) (“ACT I”). The FLRA also recognizes that 31 U.S.C.

§ 1301(a) limits the application of appropriations “only to the

objects for which the appropriations were made except as

otherwise provided by law.” Accordingly, whether as a matter

of the plain text of the two uniform statutes, or the Air Force’s

permissible interpretation of any statutory ambiguity to which

the FLRA must defer, the Air Force correctly maintains that the

Union’s uniform cleaning proposal is non-negotiable because

the statute the Department of Defense administers does not

authorize such payment from appropriated funds, and we grant

the petition for review.

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