Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02756/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02756-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edwin James
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2756

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Edwin James

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Texarkana

____________

 Submitted: February 13, 2015

 Filed: July 7, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, LOKEN and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

____________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Edwin James appeals his sentence of lifetime supervised release and certain

conditions of supervised release imposed by the district court after James pleaded

guilty to failing to register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250, as is

required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 16901–16991. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
I. Background

In 1979, James pleaded guilty in Washington state to one count of statutory

rape in the first degree for having sexual intercourse with a four-year-old girl. Soon

after his conviction, James was declared to be a sexual psychopath. The court

sentenced him to a suspended sentence of twenty years at a psychiatric hospital

contingent on his completion of a sexual psychopathy program. During his treatment

at the hospital, James admitted to hospital staff that he sexually abused three of his

children and his nephews on several occasions. The treatment also elicited a

confession from James that he sexually abused a six-year-old girl when he was

seventeen years old, and that he sexually abused a 12- or 13-year-old girl when he

was in his twenties. Hospital staff also believed that James's dependence on alcohol

exacerbated his deviance and "aggravate[d] his potential for acting out in a predatory

fashion."

In 1985, James decided to leave the sexual psychopathy program short of

completion because of a domestic dispute with his wife. Hospital staff strongly

warned against James leaving the program because they did not believe James had

overcome his sexual deviance. In a letter to the court, hospital staff called attention

to "[h]is deviousness, attempts to shift accountability and to manipulate others" even

after several years of treatment. After James left the program, the court revoked his

suspended sentence and sentenced Jamesto prison. James was paroled in 1988. Soon

after his release, James began a sexual relationship with Linda Hance, a mentally

handicapped woman. James and Hance share a child together who was born in 1993.

Additionally, James was convicted twice in California for failing to register as a sex

offender in 1995. 

James and his family moved to De Queen, Arkansas in early 2013. James last

registered as a sex offender on May 17, 2012, in Sacramento, California, where he

wasthen living. Coordination between law enforcement in Sacramento and De Queen

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
lead to James's location and arrest in October 2013. James wasindicted on one count

of failing to register under SORNA, to which he pleaded guilty.

The district court sentenced James to 15 months' imprisonment and a lifetime

term ofsupervised release. Upon James's objection to lifetime supervised release, the

court stated the following:

18 United States Code 3[853(k)] states, the authorized term of

supervised release under section 2250 is, any term of years not less than

5 or life. Guidelines [§] 5D1.2[(b)(2)] . . . says, not withstanding or in

spite of [section 5D1.2(a)(1)–(3),] if [the] offense is a sex offense the

term is then five years to life. Now, [James's counsel] explains that

failure to register is not, and it's supported by the law, a sex offense. It's

merely a violation of the law.

* * *

I think circumstances like this and maybe the 8th Circuit or somebody

will be corrected, but administrative violations of law can't trump what

you were originally convicted of. Supervised release, I think under these

conditions should be for life. Although, the defendant's crime initially

was the rape of a four year old child . . . on about November 18, 1979.

And, sexual intercourse with another child, age four, in October or

November of '79. Also, another child, three years old, in November '79.

All of these terrible offenses. As a result you were committed to the

Western State Hospital in Washington state for sexual

psychopath[y] . . . . [You] [u]ltimately pled guilty to being a sexual

psychopath.

* * *

The records of the defendant's hospital stay in the sentence clearly

reflected that you were in need of continuing treatment and evaluation.

In the opinion of [t]he Court this should have been for life. . . . The state

of Washington defines [a] sexual psychopath as any person who is

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
affected in a form of psychoneuroses, or in a form of psychopathic

personality. Which form predisposes such person to the commission of

such sexual offenses in the degree constituting him or her a menace to

the health and safety of others. . . . The defendant [was] also diagnos[ed]

as having a schizoid personality with several deviations. Psychopath[y],

pedophillia and severe alcohol addiction. And, the discharge . . . notes

described you as devious, shift[ing] accountability, and tr[ying] to

manipulate others. It's these things that under the law I am going to find

that you should be placed on supervised release, rather than five years,

but for life. 

The court revisited its rationale when pronouncing its sentence. When

discussing James's sentence, the court stated that "the law says . . . five years, but then

I can impose a term of supervised release more than that five years if I explain the

circumstances, and we've done that." The court continued to explain that it thought

James needed the lifetime supervised release because "he's adjudged a

psychopath. . . . He is also deemed [to have a] schizoid personality, sexual deviation,

[and] severe alcoholism." Additionally, the court noted that hospital staff described

James's post-treatment personality as "devious, shifting accountability[,] and

manipulative."

The court also considered James's objections to many of his special conditions

for supervised release. James objected to the child-proximity restriction that

precluded him from being around children without the consent of the probation

office. James argued that this special condition should be modified to accommodate

visitation with his grandchildren because he has not been convicted of a sex offense

in 35 years. James used the same reasoning to argue that the special condition that he

attend sex-offender counseling was unnecessary because he showed no signs of

recidivism. The district court was not convinced. The court found that the challenged

conditions of supervised release were justified when taking into account James's

history of sexual deviance and his untreated mental health diagnoses. 

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 4 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
When announcing James's sentence, the court orally announced each of the

special conditionsit wasimposing, including a restriction on using computers. James

objected to a special condition restricting his use of computers, to which the court

responded that "[a] lot of times on the computer you can get some things that are

more . . . objectionable than your objection. . . . I'm going to uphold [it]." When the

court issued its written judgment, many of the written special conditions were

materially different from the oral sentence.

II. Discussion

James appeals the district court's lifetime sentence of supervised release and

contends that the district court erred in imposing written special conditions that are

more restrictive than the oral pronouncement. James also renews his challenge to

several conditions of supervised release. The term of supervised release is a part of

a defendant's sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583. "In reviewing a challenge to a sentence, we

'must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.'"

United States v. Dace, 660 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). In review for procedural error, "we review a district

court's factual findings for clear error and its interpretation and application of the

guidelines de novo." Id. (quotation and citation omitted). "If we discover no

procedural error, we then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence

imposed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard." United States v.

Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). 

A. Lifetime Term of Supervised Release

James first challenges the court's imposition of a lifetime term of supervised

release. James claims the district court committed procedural error and alternatively

argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. 

1. Procedural Soundness

-5-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 5 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
Procedurally, James contends that the district court miscalculated the

Guidelines range of the term of supervised release. James first argues that the district

court applied the wrong Guideline section when it stated that "Guidelines [§]

5D1.2[(b)(2)] . . . says . . . if [the] offense is a sex offense the term is then five years

to life." Section 5D1.2(b)(2) was cited in the presentence investigation report ("PSR")

and states that "the term of supervised release . . . may be up to life, if the offense is

. . . . a sex offense." Id. (2013). James argues that failing to register under SORNA is

not a "sex offense." Therefore, to the extent the court adopted the PSR

recommendation and applied § 5D1.2(b)(2) to justify increasing James's term of

supervised release to a lifetime term, the court erred.

1

Complete reading of the district court's disposition, however, reveals that the

court did not base its sentence length on § 5D1.2(b)(2) at all. In fact, the court

explicitly acknowledged that "[James's counsel] explainsthatfailure to register is not,

and it's supported by the law, a sex offense. It's merely a violation of the law." Thus,

the court recognized that § 5D1.2(b)(2) was not applicable to James because it

understood that a failure to register is not itself a sex offense.

In calculating James's sentence, the court stated that "the law says . . . five

years, but then I can impose a term of supervised release more than that five years if

I explain the circumstances, and we've done that." The court acknowledged that the

term of supervised release was five years (as James himself argues), but he varied

upward to extend the term to life based on several factors he enumerated. A court

2

Since James's sentencing on July, 2, 2014, the Guidelines have been updated

1

to clarify this very issue. The Guidelines now explicitly state that "an offense under

18 U.S.C. § 2250 (Failure to Register)" is not a sex offense. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2 cmt. 1

(2014). 

Our holding does not require usto discuss argumentsregarding the Sentencing

2

Commission's amendment 786 to the commentary of § 5D1.2(c) and the status of

United States v. Deans, 590 F.3d 907 (8th Cir. 2010). See U.S.S.G. Supplement to

-6-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 6 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
may take into account factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) "in determining the length of

the termand the conditions ofsupervised release." 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c). See Gall, 552

U.S. at 50 (stating that if a sentencing court "decides that an outside-Guidelines

sentence is warranted, he must . . . ensure that the justification is sufficiently

compelling to support the degree of the variance . . . [and] adequately explain the

chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review"); United States v.

Goodwin, 717 F.3d 511, 521 (7th Cir. 2013) ("Obviously, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) clearly

authorizes any term of years from five to life. . . . [I]f on remand the district court

imposes a supervised release term greater than five years, this term will have to be

explained by something other than the currently available five-year Guidelines

range."). The district court adequately supported its sentence by citing James's mental

health diagnoses, which include sexual psychopathy, schizoid personality, sexual

deviation, and severe alcoholism. The court also noted that hospital staff described

James's post-treatment personality as devious, manipulative, and one that shifts

accountability. Further, the court did not abuse its discretion by taking into account

James's history and the need to protect the public given there was no medical

evidence that James recovered from his psychopathy. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1),

(2)(C). 

2. Substantive Reasonableness

Next, James argues that the upward variance from five years to life is

substantively unreasonable. James essentially challengesthe district court's weighing

of relevant § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121, 1136 (8th

Cir. 2011) ("[S]ubstantive review exists, in substantial part, to correct sentences that

are based on unreasonable weighing decisions." (quotation omitted)). District courts

have broad discretion to "assign some factors greater weight than others in

App'x C, amend. 786 (2014). Given the disposition of the district court, we do not

believe its decision was based on a stale interpretation of § 5D1.2(c), but rather was

an upward variance from the Guidelines range of supervised release of five years.

-7-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 7 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
determining an appropriate sentence." United States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379

(8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Thus, "[j]ust because we 'might reasonably have

concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal

of the district court.'" United States v. Boneshirt, 662 F.3d 509, 517 (8th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Therefore, it is an "unusual case when we reverse a

district court sentence—whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines

range—assubstantively unreasonable." United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464

(8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1090

(D.C. Cir. 2008)). 

We believe the district court reasonably weighed James's history and mental

diagnoses, including any mitigating factors. Considering the "totality of the

circumstances," Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461, the district court justified a lifetime term

of supervised release. While James has only been convicted of one sex offense,

James's inveterate sexual deviance illustrates why criminal history may inadequately

capture the gravity of a defendant's actions. James's sexual psychopathy was not a

passing personality querk that temporarily manifested itself in 1979. Rather, James's

sexual deviance goes back to his teenage years when he sexually abused a young girl.

This deviance continued in his twenties when he abused another young girl; in his

thirties when he abused his own children, nephews, and others; and in his forties

when he engaged in a sexual relationship with a mentally handicapped woman.

Further, the court noted that James's recovery from his mental diagnoses is at best

questionable.James has never completed anymental-health orsex-offender treatment

program. The potential dormancy ofJames's untreated conditions, taken together with

James's past conduct, provide sufficient basis for affirming the district court's exercise

of discretion in varying upward in the term of supervised release. 

B. Imposition of Special Conditions

Next, James argues that the district court erroneously imposed nearly every

special condition of supervised release. As a general matter, district courts enjoy

-8-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 8 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
"wide discretion when imposing terms ofsupervised release." United States v. Smart,

472 F.3d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). This discretion, however, is

not unlimited. Release conditions must "(1) [be] reasonably related to the pertinent

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors, (2) involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than

reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and (3) [be] consistent

with any pertinent policy statements issued by the United States Sentencing

Commission." United States v. Johnson, 773 F.3d 905, 907–08 (8th Cir. 2014)

(alterations in original) (quotation and citation omitted); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). In

order to fulfill these statutory requirements, sentencing courts must make

particularized findings to ensure that special conditions are imposed on an

individualized basis. United States v. Curry, 627 F.3d 312, 315 (8th Cir. 2010) (per

curiam) (citing United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)), vacated

on other grounds, Curry v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). 

First, we address Special Condition 6, which states that "[t]he defendant shall

have no access to the internet, or any device capable of accessing the internet to

include a computer and/or cell phone without the permission ofthe probation officer."

There is no evidence in the PSR or any other source in the record of James ever using

the internet, much less using the internet for unlawful purposes. See United States v.

Springston, 650 F.3d 1153, 1156 (8th Cir. 2011) (vacating a restriction on internet

access because "[t]he record . . . is devoid of evidence that [the defendant] has ever

used a computer for any purpose") vacated on other grounds, Springston v. United

States, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012); United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir.

2005) (vacating a restriction on computer use and internet access because "the record

is devoid of evidence that [the defendant] has ever used his computer for anything

beyond simply possessing child pornography"). The government concedes that this

special condition should be vacated, and we agree.

Second, James challenges Special Condition 1 in its entirety because the court

failed to make an individualized finding justifying this deprivation of liberty. Special

-9-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 9 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
Condition 1 requires James to submit to reasonable searches of his person and his

property upon suspicion that he has violated a condition of supervised release.

Because this argument was not raised before the district court, we review for plain

error. See United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 935 (8th Cir. 2010). "Plain error

occurs if the district court errs, the error is clear under current law, and the error

affects the defendant's substantial rights." United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500,

505 (8th Cir. 2009). Section 3583(d) addresses this very condition when it gives

courts the discretion to impose,

as an explicit condition of supervised release for a person who is a felon

and required to register under [SORNA], that the person submit his

person, and any property, house, residence, [or] vehicle . . . to search at

any time . . . by any law enforcement or probation officer with

reasonable suspicion concerning a violation of a condition ofsupervised

release or unlawful conduct by the person.

Special Condition 1 is expressly allowed by § 3583(d) because Jamesis an individual

required to register under SORNA. Thus, the district court did not commit plain error

by imposing the special condition on James. 

James also challenges Special Condition 2's requirement that he participate in

evaluation, treatment, counseling, or testing for substance abuse. The PSR indicates

that James started drinking at age seven and drank heavily in the past. Also, he was

diagnosed with severe alcohol dependency during his stay at the psychiatric hospital.

The hospital also found a link between James's alcohol consumption and his

predatory personality. Additionally, James regularly used methamphetamine, LSD,

and marijuana. Nevertheless, James contends that he has not used drugs in over 20

years, and as a result, the Special Condition is not reasonably related to § 3553(a).

James also contends that the court failed to make individualized findings to impose

the condition. We disagree. James has admitted that his sexual abuse of children was

related to alcohol abuse. Further, the court made particularized findings when it

-10-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
referenced James's diagnosis of alcohol addiction more than once when considering

James's sentence. Given the district court's findings and the undisputed information

in the PSR, we find that Special Condition 2's requirement to submit to substance

abuse examination and treatment is reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors such as

protecting the public and providing James with needed medical care and correctional

treatment.

Next, James challenges Special Condition 3's requirement that he participate

in a mental-health and/orsex-offender treatment program. Despite his history, James

has never completed a sex offender treatment program and has never otherwise

addressed his mental health diagnoses. "In order to impose a condition of

participation in mental health treatment, the district court must have reason to believe

the defendant needs such treatment." United States v. Wiedower, 634 F.3d 490, 494

(8th Cir. 2011) (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, James argues that this special

condition is not reasonably related to the goals stated in § 3553(a) because he has not

shown indications of recidivism in over 35 years since 1979. James cites United

States v. Scott to illustrate this point. 270 F.3d 632, 635 (8th Cir. 2001). In Scott, the

defendant was convicted of armed bank robbery. Id. at 633. The district court

imposed special conditions tailored to sex offenders "not because of Scott's offense

of conviction . . . , nor because of the conduct that led to revocation of either of his

terms ofsupervised release, but because of an unrelated 1986 sex-offense conviction.

In our view, this was an abuse of discretion." Id. First, the court noted that the special

conditions did not meet the statutory requirements because they "bear no reasonable

relationship to the nature of the convicted offense." Id. at 636. Second, the court

"[a]dditionally" noted that the age of the 15-year-old offense coupled with a lack of

evidence that the defendant "repeated this behavior in any way since his 1986

conviction" was another reason "the special conditions seem unlikely to serve the

goals of deterrence or public safety, since the behavior on which the special

conditions are based . . . has ceased." Id.

-11-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
James's case is readily distinguishable from Scott. First, the facts accepted by

the district court included James's sexual deviancy spanning three decades and over

ten victims. This history suggeststhat recidivismremains a substantial risk for James.

See Smart, 472 F.3d at 599 (the defendant showed a tendency for recidivism because

of a history of sexual deviance). Also, nearly ten years of James's purported 35 years

of good behavior wasspent in prison or in a psychiatric hospital. Given James's battle

with sexual deviance for the majority of his life and his failure to complete any

treatment addressing this issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Thus,

we find the district court's requirement that James complete a mental-health and/or

sex-offender treatment program is reasonably related to § 3553(a) factors such as

protecting the public and providing James with needed medical care and correctional

treatment.

Last, James challenges Special Condition 5 in its entirety. This condition

precludes James from having contact with minors and restricts him from entering

places where minors are known to be present and regularly congregate. James argues

this special condition is unnecessary because he has not shown any signs of

recidivism that would justify restricting his contact with children. At the sentencing

hearing, James asked the district court to amend the special condition to make

allowance for visiting his grandchildren when other adults were in the house, but the

district court denied this request. On this record, James's behavioral history justifies

the district court's imposition of this release condition. This condition is not based

only on James's 35-year-old sex offense and other alleged acts of sexual deviance

committed 20 years ago. See Scott, 270 F.3d at 635 (finding that a 15-year-old sex

offense was too remote). James's mental diagnoses and his failure to address such

diagnoses justify measures such as Special Condition 5 for the protection of minors.

Therefore, the district court did not err in imposing Special Condition 5. 

C. Written Special Conditions Broader Than the Oral Sentence

-12-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
James last argues that the district court's written judgments conflict with the

special conditionsthe court pronounced fromthe bench. "'Where an oralsentence and

the written judgment conflict, the oral sentence controls.'" Durham, 618 F.3d at 934

(quoting United States v. Foster, 514 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir. 2008)). James contends

that several of the written special conditions conflict with the oral sentence. 

In United States v. Brave, we addressed a release condition in which the district

court pronounced that "you shall not reside with any child under the age of 18, that

would include your children" and "[y]ou shall have no correspondence, telephone

contact, or communication with the victim through a third party unless approved in

advance by the probation officer." 642 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 2011). The written

judgment, however, stated "[t]he defendant shall not reside with any child under the

age of 18 or contact her children in any manner unless approved in advance and in

writing by the probation officer." Id. (emphasis added). We found that the written

judgment was broader than the oral sentence because the former precluded any

contact with the defendant's children, whereas the oral sentence only precluded the

defendant from living with her children and having contact with the victim, who was

one of her children. Thus, we vacated the phrase "or contact her children in any

manner" from the written special condition. Id. We also addressed this issue briefly

in Durham when a written special condition added the phrase "internet-connected

computer or other device with internet capabilities" to the oralsentence of an internet

restriction condition of release. 618 F.3d at 945. Originally, the oral sentence only

restricted internet access and did not specify any restrictions on devices. Id.

Accordingly, we vacated the added phrase "because it broadens the restriction." Id.

First, James challenges Special Condition 1, which states in pertinent part that

"[t]he defendant shall submit his person, residence, and/or vehicle(s) to searches

which may be conducted at the request of the United States Probation Officer at a

reasonable time, and in a reasonable manner, based upon reasonable suspicion of a

-13-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 13 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
violation of any conditions of release." (Emphasis added.) The oral pronouncement,

however, stated that James must "[s]ubmit [him]self, [his] residence, [his] vehicle, to

any and all searches by the probation office upon a reasonable suspicion of

contraband." As the government concedes, the emphasized language in the written

condition broadens the deprivation ofliberty because the reasonableness ofthe search

was expanded to include a violation of any condition of release, as opposed to the

more narrow suspicion of contraband. We,therefore, vacate the emphasized language

and remand to the district court to harmonize the written condition with the oral

sentence. 

Second, James challenges Special Condition 2, which states that "[t]he

defendantshall comply with any referral deemed appropriate by the probation officer

for in-patient or out-patient evaluation, treatment, counseling, ortesting for substance

abuse and mental health issues." The oralsentence only stated thatJames would have

to "[s]ubmit to in and out patient counseling for sex abuse, and counseling when and

to the extent necessary." In an earlier explanation, the court stated James would be

required to "[p]articipate in in or out patient counseling for sexual abuse, or any other

health issues." While we caution district courtsfrombeing loose with oralsentences,

3

we find that the oral judgment does not materially contradict Special Condition 2.

From the bench, the court referenced that James would have to participate in and

submit to counseling for health issues. This reasonably includes undergoing ordered

evaluations, treatments, counseling and testing for health issuessuch as mental health

and substance abuse. Special Condition 2 is upheld. 

Third, James challenges Special Condition 3, which states that James shall

"participate in a mental health and/or sex offender treatment program, as directed by

James concedes that the court likely misspoke when requiring him to attend

3

"counseling for sex abuse," which is geared towards victims of sex crimes. It is clear

from the context that the court meant to reference sex-offender treatment. 

-14-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 14 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337 
the probation officer. The defendant shall abide by all program rules, requirements,

and conditions of the sex offender treatment program, including submission to

polygraph testing, to determine if he isin compliance with the conditions of release."

(Emphasis added.) There is some overlap with the oral sentence and explanation

mentioned for Special Condition 2. The oral sentence to "[s]ubmit to in and out

patient counseling for sex abuse, and counseling when and to the extent necessary"

was clearly meant to reference the sex-offender treatment in the written Special

Condition 3. Further, the "health issues" referenced in the court's oral explanation

covers the "mental health" program contemplated in Special Condition 3. Polygraph

testing, however, expands the burden on James and must be vacated from the special

condition. 

Fourth, James challenges Special Condition 5, which states that James will

"have no direct contact with minors (under the age of 18) without the approval of the

probation officer. The defendant shall refrain from entering into any area where

children frequently congregate including, but notlimited to,schools, daycare centers,

theme parks and playgrounds." (Emphasis added.) The oral sentence only states that

James will "[h]ave no contact with underage children, unless [he has] the permission

of the probation office." The emphasized language appears nowhere in the oral

sentence, and substantially broadens the special condition by prohibiting James's

geographical movements. While such a special condition may be appropriate in sexoffender cases, we must vacate the emphasized language and remand to the district

court to harmonize the written condition with the oral pronouncement.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm James's lifetime term of supervised

release and the imposition of Special Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 5. We vacate the district

court's imposition of Special Condition 6, and remand to the district court to amend

the written judgment to harmonize the terms of its oral sentence and the written

conditions.

______________________________

-15-

Appellate Case: 14-2756 Page: 15 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Entry ID: 4292337