Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05245/USCOURTS-caDC-98-05245-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellee
Lutheran Social Services
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 30, 1999 Decided August 24, 1999

No. 98-5245

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Appellee/Cross-Appellant

v.

Lutheran Social Services,

Appellant/Cross-Appellee

---------

Consolidated with

98-5401

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98ms00133)

Jonathan P. Graham argued the cause for appellant/crossappellee. With him on the briefs was Dan S. Sokolov.

John F. Suhre, Attorney, Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission, argued the cause for appellee/cross-appellant.

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With him on the briefs was Philip B. Sklover, Associate

General Counsel.

Before: Silberman, Williams and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: In this proceeding to enforce an

administrative subpoena, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission seeks access to a report prepared by attorneys

for appellant Lutheran Social Services summarizing the results of an investigation into alleged violations of Title VII.

The EEOC argues that Lutheran waived its claim that the

report is protected by the attorney-client and work product

privileges by failing to comply with a regulation requiring

subpoena recipients to present any objections to the Commission within five days. We conclude that under the particular

circumstances of this case Lutheran's failure to present its

objections pursuant to the regulation cannot be viewed as a

waiver of its attorney-client and work product privileges. In

addition, because Lutheran's lawyers conducted their investigation "in anticipation of litigation," we conclude that the

entire report is fully protected by the work product privilege.

I

In July 1996, the board of Lutheran Social Services became

aware of two anonymous memoranda accusing its president of

creating a hostile work environment for female employees.

Responding to these accusations, Lutheran placed the president on administrative leave and hired the law firm of

Williams & Connolly to investigate the accusations and advise

Lutheran as to its potential liability. Williams & Connolly

interviewed sixteen employees, two former employees, and

two former board members, advising each interviewee that

Lutheran had retained the firm to investigate certain charges

and asking each to keep the content of the interview confidential. Based on these interviews, Williams & Connolly prepared a report for Lutheran's board that summarized and

categorized the interviews (without revealing who made which

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statements) and assessed Lutheran's potential Title VII liability. Only one copy of the report was made. Board members

were permitted to read the report only in the presence of

Lutheran's permanent outside counsel, Matthew Watson, and

were required to return the copy to him. Shortly after

receiving the report, the board requested the president's

resignation.

Almost ten months later, the EEOC began investigating

sex discrimination charges filed by two former Lutheran

employees. The Commission's investigator asked Lutheran

to produce several documents, including the Williams & Connolly report. Lutheran turned over everything the Commission requested except the law firm's report, claiming it to be

protected by the attorney-client privilege. Following an exchange of letters between the investigator and Watson, in

which Watson reiterated Lutheran's claim of privilege, the

EEOC issued a subpoena demanding production of the report

by February 13, 1998. Addressed to Lutheran's Human

Resources Director, the subpoena was dated January 30 and

sent on that date by certified mail.

On about February 9, Lutheran retained Williams & Connolly to represent it in connection with the subpoena. In a

February 13 letter advising the EEOC investigator that

Lutheran had retained the firm, a Williams & Connolly

associate stated that "the subpoena is improper and our

client, therefore, does not intend to comply with it." Letter

from Oliver Garcia, Williams & Connolly, to Aaron C. Blight,

EEOC (Feb. 13, 1998). The letter concluded: "I would be

happy to discuss this matter with you further." Id. According to the associate, the investigator later responded by

telephone, informing him that he was referring the matter to

EEOC trial counsel but promising to contact the associate

before taking further action. See Garcia Decl. p p 2, 5. The

investigator neither recalls nor denies making such a promise.

See Blight Decl. p 3.

Shortly thereafter, the EEOC filed this enforcement action

in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Commission alleged that Lutheran had waived its

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attorney-client privilege by failing to comply with EEOC

procedures for challenging subpoenas. Codified at 29 C.F.R.

s 1601.16(b)(1) (1998), those procedures provide that "[a]ny

person served with a subpoena who intends not to comply

shall petition the issuing Director ... to seek its revocation

or modification. Petitions must be mailed ... within five

days ... after service of the subpoena." The EEOC promulgated this regulation pursuant to section 710 of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, s 7, 86 Stat.

103, 109 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-9 (1994)), which

grants the Commission all investigative powers possessed by

the National Labor Relations Board under section 11 of the

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. s 161 (1994). Section 11 of the NLRA in turn provides that a party receiving

an NLRB subpoena may within five days file a petition with

the Board seeking revocation or modification of the subpoena

on the grounds that it either "does not relate to any matter

under investigation" or "does not describe with sufficient

particularity the evidence whose production is required." 29

U.S.C. s 161(1). On the merits, the EEOC argued that the

attorney-client privilege does not protect statements made by

employees with interests adverse to their employer. The

Commission also argued that the work product privilege,

which protects only documents prepared "in anticipation of

litigation," Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), was equally inapplicable

because at the time Williams & Connolly prepared the report,

the prospect of Title VII litigation was "too speculative."

In defense, Lutheran challenged the legality of the EEOC's

section 1601.16(b)(1) procedures, arguing that the statute's

use of the word "may" prohibited the Commission from

adopting mandatory procedures. In the alternative, Lutheran argued that under the particular circumstances of this

case--the Commission knew of Lutheran's objections and

those objections were based on the attorney-client and work

product privileges--its failure to follow the Commission's

regulations should not be considered a waiver. Responding

to the Commission's claim that the report was not privileged,

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cations between the law firm and Lutheran, that it reflected

the attorneys' "mental processes," and that the attorneys had

prepared it in anticipation of litigation by Lutheran's president and employees.

Without explanation and without reviewing the report, the

district court directed Lutheran to produce the report, but

allowed it to "redact any portion ... that constitutes legal

advice or conclusions." EEOC v. Lutheran Soc. Servs., No.

98ms133 (D.D.C. June 11, 1998). Both sides appeal.

II

Lutheran first argues that the section 1601.16(b)(1) procedures violate Title VII. Title VII confers on the EEOC the

same subpoena authority the National Labor Relations Act

gives to the National Labor Relations Board. See 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-9. Section 11 of the NLRA provides in full:

Within five days after the service of a subpena [sic] on

any person requiring the production of any evidence in

his possession or under his control, such person may

petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke,

such subpena [sic] if in its opinion the evidence whose

production is required does not relate to any matter

under investigation, or any matter in question in such

proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpena [sic] does

not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence

whose production is required.

29 U.S.C. s 161(1). According to Lutheran, by making the

subpoena review process mandatory (i.e., requiring that a

party objecting to the subpoena "shall petition" and that

petitions "must be mailed ...within five days," see 29 C.F.R.

s 160.16(b)(1)), the regulation violates the statute's plain language, which uses optional terms (i.e., "such person may

petition the Board to revoke"). Lutheran also points out that

unlike section 11 of the NLRA, the regulation covers any

objection, not just those based on relevance or particularity.

Given that "Congress has directly spoken to the precise

question at issue," argues Lutheran, "that is the end of the

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matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect

to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467

U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). We need not resolve Lutheran's

Chevron argument, however, because whatever authority the

EEOC has under the statute, we conclude that it has no

power to strip federal courts of authority to determine whether the subpoena the agency seeks to enforce is lawful.

At the outset, we note that the EEOC conceded at oral

argument that compliance with its section 1601.16(b)(1) procedures is not jurisdictional, and for good reason: "[E]xhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite," we have held, "[o]nly

when Congress states in clear, unequivocal terms that the

judiciary is barred from hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to a decision." I.A.M. Nat'l Pension

Fund Benefit Plan C v. Stockton Tri Indus., 727 F.2d 1204,

1208 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also id. at 1209 ("Congress knows

how to withdraw jurisdiction expressly when that is its purpose.") (internal quotation and citation omitted). An example

of just such a clear and unequivocal statement appears in

section 313 of the Federal Power Act:

No proceeding to review any order of the Commission

shall be brought by any person unless such person shall

have made application to the Commission for a rehearing

thereon....

.... No objection to the order of the Commission

shall be considered by the court unless such objection

shall have been urged before the Commission in the

application for rehearing unless there is reasonable

ground for failure so to do.

16 U.S.C. s 825l (1994); see Platte River Whooping Crane

Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust v. FERC, 876 F.2d 109,

112-13 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[T]he requirements imposed by the

[Federal Power Act] are strict and go well beyond judiciallyimposed standards requiring the exhaustion of administrative

remedies prior to the exercise of federal court jurisdiction.... Neither FERC nor this court has authority to

waive these statutory requirements."). In contrast, section

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11 of the NLRA provides only that parties "may petition the

[Commission] to revoke" a subpoena on the basis of relevance

and particularity; nowhere does section 11 even imply, much

less expressly state, that courts lack jurisdiction to hear

objections not presented to the Commission.

Agreeing that section 1601.16(b)(1) does not deprive this

court of jurisdiction to consider Lutheran's privilege arguments and arguing that his position "does not implicate the

court's basic authority," our dissenting colleague (but not the

EEOC) nonetheless asserts that section 1601.16(b)(1) prohibits us from considering Lutheran's arguments because the

regulation is "mandatory." Dissenting Op. at 4, 2. If "mandatory" means prohibiting courts from hearing issues not

presented to the agency, however, we fail to understand how

a regulation can be "mandatory" without being jurisdictional--or at least the functional equivalent. Indeed, the import

of the cases cited by the dissent is that mandatory language

prohibits courts from considering arguments precisely when

the language is jurisdictional. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422

U.S. 749, 766 (1975) (distinguishing between "statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite[s]" and "the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion"); I.A.M. Nat'l Pension Fund,

727 F.2d at 1209 ("Congress knows how to withdraw jurisdiction expressly when that is its purpose") (internal quotation

and citation omitted); cf. Glisson v. United States Forest

Serv., 55 F.3d 1325, 1327 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the

"inflexible command of [the] statute" required exhaustion

without deciding whether the command was jurisdictional).

And in the absence of a statute clearly depriving courts of

jurisdiction to hear issues not first presented to the agency,

we know of no principle of administrative law--Chevron or

otherwise--that would permit an agency to do so on its own.

Contrary to our dissenting colleague's suggestion, nothing

in Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), supports the novel

proposition that an agency may, without clear statutory authority, prevent Article III courts from hearing issues not

first presented to the agency. See Dissenting Op. at 4-5. In

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ered agencies to require exhaustion. Here, in contrast, the

APA is inapplicable, and the governing statute (section 11 of

the NLRA) delegates no such authority to the EEOC. And

Darby's holding--that courts may not impose exhaustion

requirements in addition to those contemplated by an agency

exercising its statutory authority under section 10(c) of the

APA--hardly supports our dissenting colleague's theory that

an agency may, without congressional authorization, prevent

Article III courts from considering issues not first presented

to the agency. As Darby itself put it: "Of course, the

exhaustion doctrine continues to apply as a matter of judicial

discretion in cases not governed by the APA," 509 U.S. at

153-54 (emphasis added)--meaning that courts may exercise

their traditional authority to hear issues not presented to the

agency if the circumstances surrounding noncompliance with

agency procedures are sufficiently compelling. In McCarthy

v. Madigan, moreover, the Supreme Court said quite clearly:

"Where Congress specifically mandates, exhaustion is required. But where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs." 503 U.S. 140, 144

(1992) (citations omitted); see also id. ("[E]xhaustion is 'a rule

of judicial administration,' ... and unless Congress directs

otherwise, rightfully subject to crafting by judges") (quoting

Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 518 (1982)

(White, J., concurring in part)). Indeed, notwithstanding our

dissenting colleague's characterization of section 1601.16(b)(1)

as "non-jurisdictional but mandatory," he stops short of insisting that there are no situations in which we may excuse

non-compliance, recognizing that courts still enjoy authority

"to consider certain traditional limited exceptions such as

futility or agency bias." Dissenting Op. at 4.

Nor is there any basis for the proposition that our authority to excuse non-compliance means that section 1601.16(b)(1)

has "no legal bite," that we have "no obligation to respect

agency rules," or that "an employer [under] subpoena ...

could simply ignore the agency." Dissenting Op. at 4, 3. To

the contrary, section 1601.16(b)(1)'s mandatory language creates a strong presumption that issues parties fail to present

to the agency will not be heard in court. See United States v.

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L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) ("Simple fairness ... requires as a general rule that courts should

not topple over administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its practice.").

Hardly a "distressing ... misuse of judicial power," Dissenting Op. at 4, our holding is simply that no categorical bar

prevents us from considering whether the facts surrounding

Lutheran's failure to file a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition constitute circumstances sufficiently extraordinary to defeat this

presumption, a task to which we now turn.

III

We think the circumstances of this case, when considered

in combination, excuse Lutheran's failure to present its

attorney-client and work product objections to the Commission. To begin with, instead of stating that a subpoena

recipient has five days to object or even pointing the recipient

to section 1601.16(b)(1), the subpoena (attached as an appendix to this opinion) says only that it "is issued pursuant [to]

(Title VII) 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-9." Had Lutheran's Human

Resources Director, the subpoena's addressee, looked up

section 2000e-9, it would have referred her to section 161 of

Title 29 (section 11 of the National Labor Relations Act).

Had she then looked up section 161, she would have learned

that Lutheran "may" petition the EEOC if it objects to the

subpoena on the basis of either relevance or particularity.

Nothing on the face of the subpoena or in the statutes to

which it referred would have led her to believe that Lutheran

must petition the EEOC within five days, particularly given

that Lutheran's objection rested not on relevance or particularity, but on the attorney-client and work product privileges.

Cf. Randolph-Sheppard Vendors of America v. Weinberger,

795 F.2d 90, 108 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (exhaustion required, in

part, because there was "no evidence ... of neglect on the

part of the agency").

To be sure, had Lutheran's permanent counsel, with whom

the EEOC investigator had been dealing, learned of the

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subpoena within the five-day period (the record is silent on

this issue) and had he shepardized section 2000e-9, he would

have unearthed 29 C.F.R. s 1601.16(b)(1). But because the

subpoena itself did nothing to alert the recipient to the

Commission's procedures--indeed, by referring the recipient

to section 11 of the NLRA, the subpoena may well have

misled her into believing that Lutheran had no obligation to

file a petition with respect to objections not based on relevance or particularity--Lutheran's failure to file a petition

was hardly unreasonable.

Even the EEOC investigator seems to have been unaware

of Lutheran's section 1601.16(b)(1) obligation. In response to

Williams & Connolly's February 13 letter claiming the subpoena to be "improper," the EEOC investigator never said,

"Sorry, you're too late. 29 C.F.R. s 1601.16(b)(1) requires

your client to have filed a petition with the District Director

within five days of receiving the subpoena." Instead, according to the Williams & Connolly lawyer's affidavit, the investigator agreed to "keep [the lawyer] posted on the EEOC's

decision and to contact [the lawyer] before taking further

action." Garcia Decl. p 5. True, the investigator does not

remember making such a statement, but neither does he deny

it, much less claim that he told the Williams and Connolly

lawyer about the section 1601.16(b)(1) procedures. Not until

the EEOC filed this enforcement action did it mention section

1601.16(b)(1).

Moreover, this is not a case where a subpoena recipient

raises an issue for the first time in court. To the contrary,

beginning with the very conversation in which the EEOC

investigator first requested the report, Lutheran repeatedly

claimed the document to be privileged. See Letter from

Aaron Blight, EEOC, to Matthew Watson, June 26, 1997.

Moreover, the EEOC official with whom the regulation required Lutheran to file its petition, the District Director, was

aware of the nature of Lutheran's objections. Signed and

issued by that very District Director, the subpoena expressly

states that the Commission seeks a copy of the report "referenced in previous correspondence." It was in that "previous

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correspondence" that Lutheran's permanent counsel detailed

his client's view that the report was privileged.

For all of these reasons, we think it would be inappropriate

to view Lutheran's failure to file a section 1601.16(b)(1)

petition as a waiver of its privilege claim. So concluding,

moreover, would do little if any damage to the integrity of the

Commission's section 1601.16(b)(1) procedures. As the Supreme Court has held, "The basic purpose of the exhaustion

doctrine is to allow an administrative agency to perform

functions within its special competence." Parisi v. Davidson,

405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (citing McKart v. United States, 395

U.S. 185, 194 (1969)). No such benefit would flow from

requiring exhaustion in this case, for the EEOC has no

expertise with respect to the attorney-client and work product privileges. Indeed, expertise as to those privileges resides in the federal courts. See Fed. R. Evid. 501 (The

question of privilege is to be "governed by the principles of

the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of

the United States in the light of reason and experience.").

Therefore, even if Lutheran had filed a section 1601.16(b)(1)

petition, we would not defer to the EEOC's disposition of

Lutheran's privilege claims. See Director, Office of Thrift

Supervision v. Vinson & Elkins, LLP, 124 F.3d 1304, 1307

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (according no deference to agency's views on

issues related to work product privilege). This case is thus

quite different from the more typical situation where a subpoena recipient's objections rest on relevance or particularity,

the two factors listed in 29 U.S.C. s 161. In such cases,

exhaustion is important because the EEOC possesses considerable expertise with respect to relevance and particularity,

expertise to which we would comfortably defer. See id.

(agency's interpretation of relevance of subpoena deserves

deference because "[t]he scope of the investigation ... is very

much dependent on the agency's interpretation and administration of its authorizing substantive legislation").

Conceding that it lacks relevant expertise in this case, the

Commission argues that requiring exhaustion is nevertheless

appropriate because it gives the commissioners an opportunity to revoke or modify subpoenas, thus conserving judicial

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resources. This is a worthy goal, but in this case the

Commission's General Counsel, charged by Title VII with

conducting litigation on the agency's behalf, see 42 U.S.C.

s 2000e-4(b) (1994), could have sought Commission clearance

before filing this action. Indeed, if the Commission wishes to

ensure (regardless of the actions of its General Counsel) that

it has an opportunity to review all subpoena enforcement

issues before they get to court, it can easily do so by adding

to the face of the subpoena, which already contains a "Notice

to Person Subpoenaed," something like the following:

If you have any objections to this subpoena, you must

include them in a petition filed with the issuing official

pursuant to 29 C.F.R. s 1601.16(b)(1). Petitions must be

mailed within five days of receiving this subpoena. Failure to follow these regulations may result in loss of any

ability to raise such objections in court.

Cf., e.g., Federal Trade Commission, Form 68-B, Subpoena

Duces Tecum (Sept. 1992) (notifying recipients that they have

twenty days to petition Commission Counsel to limit or quash

the subpoena).

Our conclusion that Lutheran has not waived its privilege

claims is reinforced by two additional considerations. First,

the attorney-client and work product privileges play an important role in Title VII's enforcement scheme. As the

Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, "[c]ooperation

and voluntary compliance were selected [by Congress] as the

preferred means for achieving th[e] goal [of eliminating those

practices and devices that discriminate on the basis of race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin]." Alexander v.

Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); see also Ford

Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1982). The EEOC

has likewise pointed to the importance of voluntary compliance. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. s 1601.24(a) ("Where the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that

an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate such practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. [42 U.S.C. s 2000e-5] In conciliating a case in which

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a determination of reasonable cause has been made, the

Commission shall attempt to achieve a just resolution of all

violations found and to obtain agreement that the respondent

will eliminate the unlawful employment practice and provide

appropriate affirmative relief."). Voluntary compliance with

the law often depends on sound legal advice; sound legal

advice in turn often depends on the attorney-client and work

product privileges. See In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 881, 884

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Here, Lutheran did precisely what Congress contemplated: It undertook an investigation to assess

its compliance with Title VII. What we said in In re Sealed

Case applies here as well:

[L]acking resources to pursue every suspected violation

of federal law, the government must depend on effective,

conscientious private lawyers to help clients comply voluntarily. The government might gain some short term

benefit by obtaining documents in this case, but the longrange consequences could be quite damaging. Weakening the ability of lawyers to represent clients at the preclaim stage of anticipated litigation would inevitably reduce voluntary compliance with the law, produce more

litigation, and increase the workload of government lawenforcement agencies.

In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d at 887.

Second, rejecting the Commission's waiver claim will not

deny it access to any sources of possible evidence of discrimination. The Commission can easily obtain whatever evidence

of discrimination appears in the lawyers' witness summaries

by interviewing the witnesses itself. The only information

that the Commission would be unable to obtain from other

sources is Williams & Connolly's legal advice. As we have

just said, however, allowing access to such advice is inconsistent with Title VII's enforcement scheme.

In sum, under the combined circumstances of this case, we

think it both unfair and unwise to penalize Lutheran for

failing to file a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition. Nothing in the

cases cited by the dissent from other circuits requires a

different result. See Dissenting Op. at 7-8. In Maurice v.

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NLRB, for example, the Fourth Circuit did not hold--as the

EEOC urges us to hold here--that a subpoena recipient had

waived her objections by raising them for the first time in

federal court. See 691 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1982). Rather, the

court instructed the recipient to return to the agency--relief

neither sought by the EEOC in this case nor appropriate in

view of the fact that the Commission's brief makes it quite

clear that it considers Lutheran's privilege claims meritless.

See id. at 183; Athlone Indus., Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety

Comm'n, 707 F.2d 1485, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The desirability of avoiding ... unfairness, the purely legal nature of the

issue presented, and the likely futility of further resort to the

Commission, all operate to convince us that it would be

unwise to adhere to the general rule of exhaustion in this

case.").

The dissent also cites Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, where

counsel promised an administrative law judge that he would

produce the subpoena recipient but then failed to do so at the

hearing arranged for that purpose. See 643 F.2d 32, 34 (1st

Cir. 1981). Far from erecting the jurisdictional barrier our

dissenting colleague reads into the case, the court held that

the company, by playing "a game of hare and hounds" with

the agency, id. (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,

331 (1950)), had failed to show "at least a modicum of candor

and good faith" and thus had no excuse for failing to exhaust.

Id.

In NLRB v. Frederick Cowan & Co., the court likewise

found that the company's actions exhibited "an utter abandonment ... of normal agency procedures." 522 F.2d 26, 28 (2d

Cir. 1975). No abandonment occurred in this case. To the

contrary, Lutheran presented its objections to the investigator, and its counsel told us at oral argument that his client

would have preferred to present its objections to the Commission rather than endure lengthy and costly litigation in federal court.

Finally, in EEOC v. Cuzzens, Inc., the subpoena recipient

ignored administrative remedies and argued for the first time

in district court that Title VII did not apply to it. See 608

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F.2d 1062, 1063 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). Although the

Fifth Circuit held that the recipient's failure to present the

objection to the Commission barred it from raising the objection as a defense to the enforcement action, id. at 1064, the

court made clear not only that this exhaustion requirement

was not absolute--it was inapplicable to "objections based on

constitutional grounds," id.--but also that nothing in its decision prevented Cuzzens from making the identical objection

in district court once the case ripened from an EEOC investigation into an actual dispute on the merits. Not so here. If

the EEOC obtains access to the report, Lutheran's attorneyclient and work product privileges will be lost forever.*

IV

This brings us to the merits of Lutheran's privilege claim.

Without examining the report in camera and apparently

limiting itself to determining whether the report was protected by the attorney-client privilege, the district court ordered

disclosure of the document with legal advice and conclusions

redacted. Lutheran argues, as it did in the district court,

that the entire report is protected because, in addition to

containing legal advice, it summarizes confidential client-tolawyer communications. Describing the report as also revealing the questions the lawyers asked, the answers the witnesses gave, and the lawyers' summary and categorization of

the information received, Lutheran argues that the entire

report is also protected by the work product privilege because

it reveals Williams & Connolly's "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

The EEOC disagrees, claiming with respect to the attorneyclient privilege that statements made by employees with

__________

* We fail to see the relevance of Swidler & Berlin v. United

States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). See Dissenting Op. at 8 n.3. Rejecting

a balancing test, Swidler & Berlin held that the attorney-client

privilege survives the death of the client. That has nothing to do

with the issue in this case, i.e., whether a subpoena recipient's

failure to file a section 1601.16(b)(1) petition prevents it from raising

its objections in court--objections which in this case happen to rest

on the attorney-client privilege.

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adverse interests to their employer are unprotected, and with

respect to the work product privilege that the report was not

prepared in anticipation of litigation. Because we find the

work product privilege dispositive, we begin with it.

To resolve the parties' competing work product claims, we

ask " 'whether, in light of the nature of the document and the

factual situation in the particular case, the document can

fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of

the prospect of litigation.' " Senate of Puerto Rico v. United

States Dep't of Justice, 823 F.2d 574, 586 n.42 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure s 2024 (1970)). In In re Sealed

Case, we held that for a document to meet this standard, "the

lawyer must at least have had a subjective belief that litigation was a real possibility, and that belief must have been

objectively reasonable." 146 F.3d at 884. Applying that test

to the facts of that case, we found that documents prepared

by counsel for the Republican National Committee in response to news reports questioning the legality of its relationship with another organization, the National Policy Forum,

had been prepared in anticipation of litigation even though

the Federal Election Commission had yet to file a formal

complaint. We relied on an affidavit from an RNC lawyer

that stated, "I was ... aware that the chairman of the FEC

had announced that the FEC was investigating cases involving allegations of illegal contributions in U.S. elections.... I

was further aware that the [National Policy Forum] had been

criticized in the press as an organization used by the RNC to

evade federal campaign finance laws, and thus I had a

significant concern that litigation over this issue was probable." Id. at 886. Another RNC lawyer stated, "[F]rom the

time the NPF was formed, I and the RNC were concerned

about the substantial likelihood of potential litigation...."

Id. at 886.

Lutheran faced a virtually identical situation. Like the

RNC, it had not been sued at the time it hired outside

counsel. Also like the RNC, Lutheran hired counsel because

it feared litigation. In her affidavit, a Lutheran board member stated, "To prepare for the possibility of a lawsuit by the

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president, the Board wanted a careful investigation and legal

analysis of the allegations against him...." LePard Decl.

p 4. She further "agreed" with Williams & Connolly that the

investigation "should also be conducted in anticipation of a

suit being brought on grounds of a hostile work environment

for women." Id. p 5. The Williams & Connolly lawyer to

whom the Board first spoke said he advised the Board that

"the investigation [into hostile work environment] should also

be conducted in preparation for a discrimination suit brought

by a disgruntled current or former employee." Graham Decl.

p 2. In terms of demonstrating a genuine fear of litigation,

we see no significant difference between these affidavits and

the affidavits in In re Sealed Case.

Offering no evidence to counter Lutheran's affidavits, the

EEOC hypothesizes that Lutheran undertook its investigation in the "ordinary course of business," which, the Commission says, includes looking into whether the organization was

complying with the relevant laws regarding discrimination in

the workplace. See EEOC Br. at 27. Even if accurate, the

Commission's recharacterization of Lutheran's motivation

does nothing to undermine Lutheran's contention that it

genuinely feared litigation. Indeed, fear of EEOC or

employee-initiated litigation may well be the very reason why

an employer hires outside counsel to determine whether it is

complying with Title VII.

Turning to the objective prong of the work product test,

the EEOC argues that Williams & Connolly could not have

prepared its report "in anticipation of litigation" because the

litigation Lutheran feared was "too remote and speculative."

EEOC Br. at 24. But the prospect of litigation in this case

was no less speculative than in In re Sealed Case. There, we

found that news reports hinting at illegal behavior coupled

with the RNC's fear of litigation provided sufficient objective

support for the lawyer's assertion that they had prepared the

documents "in anticipation of litigation." See 146 F.3d at

885-86, 888. Here too evidence suggests that litigation lay

just over the horizon. Lutheran had documents in which its

own employees (perhaps future plaintiffs) directly accused the

president of creating a hostile work environment. That those

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documents were anonymous and the charges nonspecific does

nothing to undermine the objective reasonableness of Lutheran's fear of litigation. And just as in In re Sealed Case,

where the RNC's fear of litigation was eventually confirmed

when the FEC filed suit, Lutheran's fear was confirmed when

two of its employees filed EEOC charges based on allegations

contained in the anonymous memoranda.

Finally, no compelling need requires disclosure of the

Williams & Connolly report. As we have noted, the Commission can obtain all of the factual information it seeks by

conducting its own interviews. Although it would certainly be

easier for the Commission to see the law firm's report, the

work product privilege's very purpose is to prevent a party

from "perform[ing] its functions ... on wits borrowed from

the adversary." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947)

(Jackson, J., concurring).

Because the EEOC does not challenge Lutheran's claim

that the report reveals its lawyer's mental impressions, we

find the entire report protected by the work product privilege. We therefore have no need to consider whether the

attorney-client privilege also protects the report. This case is

remanded to the district court to dismiss the Commission's

enforcement action.

So ordered.

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APPENDIX

[Appendix not available electronically.]

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, dissenting: The majority extends its magic wand over the parties and waives appellant's

obligation to exhaust its administrative remedies. I believe

that the court lacks the unbridled discretion it asserts and, in

any event, that appellant is not entitled to such favored

treatment.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, passed 35 years ago, was

amended in 1972 to give the EEOC the exact investigative

powers previously conferred 52 years ago on the NLRB.

Accordingly, 29 U.S.C. s 161(1) applies to subpoenas issued

as part of the investigative process by both the NLRB and

the EEOC. Although it is set forth in the majority opinion, I

quote it again:

Within five days after the service of a subpena [sic] on

any person requiring the production of any evidence in

his possession or under his control, such person may

petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke,

such subpena [sic] if in its opinion the evidence whose

production is required does not relate to any matter

under investigation, or any matter in question in such

proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpena [sic] does

not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence

whose production is required.

The NLRB issued a regulation interpreting or implementing that statutory provision in 1947. See 12 Fed. Reg. 5657,

5660 (1947). The current version of the regulation provides

that "[a]ny person served with a subpoena ..., if he or she

does not intend to comply with the subpoena, shall, within 5

days after the date of service of the subpoena, petition [the

regional director, or if during the hearing, the administrative

law judge] in writing to revoke the subpoena." 29 C.F.R.

s 102.31(b) (1999).

Not surprisingly in 1972, the same year Title VII was

amended to give the EEOC the investigatory powers of the

NLRB, the EEOC issued a virtually identical regulation, see

37 Fed. Reg. 9218 (1972), the current version of which

provides that "[a]ny person served with a subpoena who

intends not to comply shall petition the issuing Director or

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petition the General Counsel, if the subpoena is issued by a

Commissioner, to seek its revocation or modification. Petitions must be mailed to the Director or General Counsel, as

appropriate, within five days ... after service of the subpoena." 29 C.F.R. s 1601.16(b)(1) (1999).

The appellant makes much of the distinction between the

statute's "may" and the regulation's "shall," but I think that

is a tempest in a teapot. The statute could not have used

"shall" because it does not include the qualifying phrase

"person ... who intends not to comply"; it speaks to everyone served with a subpoena. Obviously, it would make no

sense for Congress to tell someone who is served and has no

objection to producing information that he or she shall petition to revoke. The most reasonable interpretation of the

statute, accordingly, is that it is equivalent to the regulation--

that the process is obligatory if one wishes to object to a

subpoena. There can be no other reason why Congress

imposed a five-day limitation.1 It certainly would have been

senseless for Congress to provide that a party may petition

within five days, but that nothing is to stop the party from

petitioning after the five days. The permissive "may" was

used, not to create a five-day period that any party can

disregard at will, but merely to make clear--quite sensibly--

that objections are optional. And if a party who objects to a

subpoena must petition the agency to revoke within five days,

it follows that the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. The

majority would do well to bear in mind that the provision in

question is part of the NLRB's (and the EEOC's) investigative powers, and it is certainly understandable that Congress

__________

1 Lutheran suggests that the five-day limitation means instead

that the agency is prohibited from seeking enforcement of the

subpoena until the revocation period expires. But setting a time

limit within which objections are to be filed by recipients would be a

positively bizarre way of limiting the agency's power. The argument also assumes that the agency might actually attempt to

enforce the subpoena within the five-day period, which strikes me

as ridiculous since subpoena recipients typically are given more

than five days within which to produce the requested material

(Lutheran was given nearly two weeks).

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should wish such agencies to be armed against efforts to

frustrate and delay their investigation. If an employer

against whom such a subpoena is issued could simply ignore

the agency or say, "I'll see you in court," the investigative

process would be significantly impaired.

If the statute is to be honored, the district court should not

entertain, in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, a respondent's objection that should have been raised first before the

agency.2 That is simply another way of saying the exhaustion

requirement is mandatory. See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503

U.S. 140, 144 (1992) ("Where Congress specifically mandates,

exhaustion is required.") (emphasis added). To be sure, the

EEOC did not argue that the statute created a jurisdictional

bar to the district court's consideration of appellant's claim,

unquestionably because s 161(1) is not phrased in terms of

jurisdiction. Cf. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 756 (construing a statutory exhaustion requirement that operates by

divesting district courts of jurisdiction except in cases of final

agency decisions). And we have said that exhaustion is a

jurisdictional prerequisite "[o]nly when Congress states in

clear, unequivocal terms that the judiciary is barred from

hearing an action until the administrative agency has come to

a decision," I.A.M. National Pension Fund Benefit Plan C v.

Stockton Tri Indus., 727 F.2d 1204, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1984)--a

requirement that s 161(1) may well not meet (despite its

obvious implication). But although it does not speak to our

jurisdiction, the statute seems to me to impose a mandatory

obligation on targets of subpoenas.

The majority not only conflates a statutory provision limiting our jurisdiction with a statute or regulation governing

parties' behavior, it also ignores the distinction between a

mandatory exhaustion requirement created by statute or

regulation, and the judicially-created common law doctrine of

exhaustion. See Weinberger, 422 U.S. at 765-66 (distinguish-

__________

2 It is rather misleading to ask as the majority does whether

the appellant has "waived" its attorney-client privilege; the question is better phrased as whether the appellant forfeited its claim by

not raising it in a timely fashion before the agency.

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ing between "statutorily specified jurisdictional prerequisite[s]" and "the judicially developed doctrine of exhaustion").

The latter is a judge-made rule that admits of various prudential exceptions; the former is not. See I.A.M. National

Pension Fund, 727 F.2d at 1208; Glisson v United States

Forest Service, 55 F.3d 1325, 1327 (7th Cir. 1995) ("But to the

extent that [exhaustion] is a doctrine of federal common law

rather than the inflexible command of a statute, it is to be

applied with due regard for its underlying purpose and for

considerations that may in particular cases counsel for a

waiver."). It is relatively open to us to relax the rigors of

exhaustion doctrines we ourselves have created, but a statutory or authorized regulatory command is entitled to more

respect--even if not phrased in judicial jurisdictional terms.

It may well be (there are really no cases in point) that a nonjurisdictional but mandatory exhaustion requirement allows a

court to consider certain traditional limited exceptions such as

futility or agency bias. But to call the exhaustion requirement non-jurisdictional--the majority's extensive argument to

that effect is really a red herring--is not to allow a court to

treat it as if it had no legal bite. The majority seems to be

under the impression that it has no obligation to respect

agency rules unless we are told by Congress that we lack

jurisdiction to do otherwise. In my view, this case does not

implicate the court's basic authority, still less its jurisdiction,

but rather illustrates the more familiar, but nevertheless

distressing, misuse of judicial power to override rather than

defer to a reasonable agency rule. We are "prohibited," as

the majority puts it, from hearing appellant's argument not

because we lack power to do so but because we are a court of

law.

Even if the statute itself were thought ambiguous as applied to this case, the NLRB-EEOC regulations--interpretations of s 161(1) that deserve deference, see Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984)--unquestionably make exhaustion obligatory and clearly cover all potential defenses such as attorney-client privilege. The Supreme Court has recognized that agencies may

promulgate regulations mandating exhaustion which are to be

enforced by courts, see Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 154

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(1993), and surely a reasonable regulatory interpretation or

elaboration of a statutory exhaustion requirement qualifies as

such. I do not see how the majority justifies ignoring this

regulation's obligatory nature. That is equivalent to holding

the mandatory exhaustion regulation unenforceable and replacing it with a judge-made, equity-inspired, permissive doctrine. As this court asked once before: "If an agency rule

requires, without exception, that a party must take an administrative appeal before petitioning for judicial review, on what

basis may a court excuse non-compliance?" Marine Mammal Conservancy, Inc. v. Department of Agric., 134 F.3d 409,

411 (D.C. Cir. 1998). My answer is: certainly not the basis

made up to fit this case.

The majority sideslips Darby's recognition that agencies

may impose regulatory exhaustion requirements by limiting

Darby to situations where the agency's regulatory exhaustion

requirements are authorized by statutes that speak in jurisdictional terms. But Darby expressed no such limitation; the

Darby Court was not even concerned with limiting the power

of agencies to create exhaustion requirements; it was concerned with limiting the power of courts to do so. Nor does

Darby confuse (as does the majority) the concept of mandatory exhaustion requirements imposed on parties with statutory

provisions that strip courts of jurisdiction. Thus the Court

concluded that s 10(c) of the APA "has limited the availability

of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to

that which the statute or rule clearly mandates." 509 U.S. at

146 (emphasis added).

Rather inconsistently the majority insists that it shows no

disrespect for the agency's rule. Instead, it is simply correcting the agency's "error." See Maj. Op. at 8-9, quoting

United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33,

37 (1952) ("[C]ourts should not topple over administrative

decisions unless the administrative body ... has erred.").

But the majority never identifies the error it is targeting, and

it should be obvious that it simply does not like the rule.

Even assuming the exhaustion requirement were not mandatory, in which case we could freely "balance the interest of

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the individual in retaining prompt access to a federal judicial

forum against countervailing institutional interests favoring

exhaustion," McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 146, I do not think it

would be appropriate to excuse Lutheran's default. Since

Lutheran has not claimed one of the recognized exceptions to

the exhaustion requirement, see id. at 146-49--the majority

takes a different tack. It reasons instead that, since the issue

of the existence or scope of attorney-client and work product

privilege is not one that is committed to agency "expertise,"

there is no basis for enforcing the exhaustion requirement

here. That conclusion rests on the erroneous premise that

the only real purpose of an exhaustion requirement is "to

allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its

special competence." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37

(1972). But the leading exhaustion case cited by Parisi,

quoted by the majority, is McKart v. United States, 395 U.S.

185 (1969), and McKart spoke of exhaustion as having various

purposes, including enabling the agency to create a factual

record, to apply its expertise, and to exercise its discretion.

See id. at 194 (observing that the exhaustion doctrine's furtherance of executive and administrative autonomy is "particularly pertinent where the function of the agency and the

particular decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of

discretionary powers" or application of special expertise).

More recently in McCarthy, the Court again said that "[e]xhaustion concerns apply with particular force when the action

under review involves exercise of the agency's discretionary

power or when the agency proceedings in question allow the

agency to apply its special expertise." McCarthy, 503 U.S. at

145 (emphasis added).

When a target of an NLRB or EEOC subpoena formally

asserts an attorney-client or work product privilege pursuant

to the regulation, we should expect, and EEOC's counsel

confirmed at oral argument, that the matter is escalated

above the litigation attorney to a more senior official of the

agency--perhaps the general counsel himself. And, as we

should also expect, that might well lead to a modification (or

even abandonment) of the agency's subpoena. It is hard to

imagine any agency decisions more laced with discretion than

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such investigative and prosecutorial determinations. Cf.

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830-35 (1985) (discussing

discretionary nature of agency decisions not to undertake

enforcement action). That we would not defer to such a

decision, once made, does not detract at all from the importance of permitting the agency to resolve the question in the

first instance. I cannot understand the majority's disposition

to dismiss this sort of agency discretion as beneath our notice,

let alone respect.

Understandably reluctant to be specific about the precise

nature of the sweeping discretionary power it arrogates to

itself, the majority does not make reference to doctrines of

equity. Yet the judicial posture the majority assumes goes

far beyond even the balancing of institutional and individual

interests that traditionally accompanies non-mandatory common law exhaustion. Its judgment seems ultimately to rest

on little more than its determination that the "combined

circumstances of this case" make it "unfair" to hold that

Lutheran has forfeited its privilege claim, which I suppose

translates into a new doctrine of judicial will, i.e., it pleases us

not to support the EEOC's exhaustion rule.

But since the provision of Title VII and the EEOC regulation at issue in this case simply followed the NLRA and

Labor Board regulation, s 1601.16(b)(1) perforce must be

interpreted and applied just as we would treat the NLRB's

counterpart regulation (and vice versa). And the Board's

exhaustion requirement has long been enforced by the federal

courts, without any reference to the majority's broad notions

of "equity." See, e.g., Maurice v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 182, 183

(4th Cir. 1982); Hedison Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 643 F.2d 32, 34

(1st Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Frederick Cowan & Co., 522 F.2d

26, 28 (2d Cir. 1975). In the only circuit case on point, the

counterpart EEOC exhaustion requirement was similarly enforced. See EEOC v. Cuzzens of Georgia, Inc., 608 F.2d

1062, 1063-64 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also EEOC v.

County of Hennepin, 623 F. Supp. 29, 31-32 (D. Minn. 1985);

EEOC v. Roadway Express, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1526, 1528-29

(N.D. Ind. 1983). The majority would distinguish these cases,

pointing out that Cowan and Hedison, for example, involved a

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level of party misconduct not found here. Yet in all of the

cases, courts refused to entertain objections to subpoenas

that had not been presented to the issuing agency; in none of

them was there a suggestion that open-ended equitable balancing was appropriate or even permissible. This case then

is the first serious challenge to important Labor Board and

EEOC regulations that go back several decades. The majority's superficially narrow holding--forgiving Lutheran's failure

to exhaust given the "combined circumstances of this case,"

Maj. Op. at 13--should not obscure the far-reaching consequences of its decision. Every case, after all, has its circumstances, and every chancellor's foot a different length. See

generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,

56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1989).3

Finally, even assuming we had the extraordinarily broad

equitable discretion the majority claims, I believe there is no

reason for invoking it in this case. Traditional equitable

doctrines do not help Lutheran here. The EEOC has not

waived its exhaustion argument, nor would tolling be of much

use since Lutheran never made its privilege objection in

writing at any time4 (as opposed to objecting after the five

days passed), see Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1400 n.1

(10th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing the requirement of a timely

EEOC filing from the requirement of an EEOC filing). And

__________

3 Judge Tatel, dissenting in In Re Sealed Case, 124 F.3d 230,

239-40 (D.C. Cir. 1997), powerfully argued that a loosey-goosey

balancing test as applied to attorney-client privilege issues was

inappropriate. The Supreme Court agreed. See Swidler & Berlin

v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998). In that case, the clear rule

favored private lawyers, whereas here the loosey-goosey approach

adopted by the majority apparently bails out some private lawyers.

4 As the majority indicates, Lutheran did inform the EEOC by

letter that it thought the subpoena "improper" and that it did not

intend to comply. But as I read the regulation, that letter, in

addition to being untimely, was fatally deficient not only because it

was not sent to the Director who issued the subpoena, but more

importantly because the regulation requires the complaining party

to state specifically the grounds of non-compliance, see 29 C.F.R.

s 1601.16(b)(2).

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although the majority suggests that agency officials misled

Lutheran into thinking that it was not obligated to comply

with the regulation--which I take to be an estoppel notion

though the majority does not say so--the majority bases this

suggestion on Lutheran's lawyer's assertion that an EEOC

investigator told him that Lutheran would be notified before

the agency took any action. It does not seem to matter that

this conversation took place well after the five-day period had

elapsed, or that the EEOC investigator does not recall making the statement.

A careful parsing of the majority's opinion reveals that the

only real ground upon which my colleagues rely to tilt the

equities in favor of appellant is the one they "begin" and end

with. See Maj. Op. at 9-10.5 That is, the subpoena stated,

that "it is issued pursuant [to] 42 U.S.C. s 2000e-9," but did

not explicitly alert appellant's Human Resources Director, to

whom the subpoena was sent, that under EEOC's regulation

(and for that matter the statutory provision that s 2000e-9

incorporates), appellant had five days to object formally.

But it is well settled that inaccurate or ineffective notice

from a government agency is an excuse for non-compliance

with an EEOC time limit only when the agency is "required

to provide notice of the limitations period." Bowden v.

United States, 106 F.3d 433, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Like the

regulation at issue in Bowden, 29 C.F.R. s 1601.16(b)(1) does

not require that the agency provide notice of the limitations

period for objections. As we held in Bowden, even if we

thought it would be "sensible and simple" for the EEOC to

list the regulation on the face of the subpoena, "the agency

__________

5 The majority thinks it also significant that Lutheran orally

informed an EEOC investigator (not the District Director) of its

objections and that the District Director was (the majority infers)

aware of Lutheran's objections. Apparently my colleagues are

willing to excuse a party's non-compliance with agency regulations

when the party comes "close enough"--in this case, informal conversations with the wrong person that took place before the subpoena ever issued. That is, to say the least, a rule of administrative

law of which I am not aware.

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had no duty to do so" and thus Lutheran's failure to comply

with the regulations cannot be excused on that ground. Id.

As for the supposed unfairness to Lutheran in not receiving

notice of a federal regulation, I do not know whether to laugh

or cry. Any lawyer experienced in the employment law field,

of course, would be familiar with the regulation, but I think

we should assume that any competent lawyer receiving such

a subpoena would spend the ten minutes necessary to determine the applicable law. (The majority is willing to assume

that Lutheran's Human Resources Director could locate

s 161(1) of the Labor Act from the cross-reference in Title

VII, but thinks it requires some great feat of legal ingenuity

to locate the applicable regulation.) Even if the Human

Resources Director had not sent the subpoena to Lutheran's

counsel in time (as the majority observes, the record is silent

on this issue), that would be no excuse. In today's world, any

person in such a job who did not consult counsel immediately

would be guilty of gross negligence. Perhaps the import of

the majority's opinion is that the NLRB and the EEOC, if

they wish their exhaustion regulations honored, will have to

give the recipients the administrative law equivalent of a

Miranda warning, including a list of counsel who have shown

competence in employment law.

The majority's last point is that we should excuse Lutheran's failure to exhaust because voluntary compliance with

Title VII is an important value, and because that value

depends on safeguarding the attorney-client and work product privilege. That conflates the merits of Lutheran's privilege claim with the need for an exhaustion requirement. The

Congress and the EEOC, which administers this investigatory regime, believes that a mandatory exhaustion requirement

is a necessary and useful component of it. Though voluntary

compliance is an important value, and overzealous agency

investigation without regard to claims of privilege could undercut that value, it is for the agency, not for this court, to

strike the balance. Why the majority cannot see (thinking ex

ante rather than ex post) that its holding will actually undermine voluntary compliance--by encouraging subpoena recipients to flout agency regulations and to gamble on garnering

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equitable relief from a court--is beyond me. See generally

Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10-12 (1984). In any

event, I can accept the majority's policy preference no more

than I can subscribe to its assertion of discretionary power.

I dissent.

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