Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03137/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lelyn J. Braun
Appellee
Laverne Reich
Appellant

Document Text:

LAVERNE 

v. 

LELYN J. 

REICH, 

FIL; .. J 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Co~rt,of Appea\F- Tenth· Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

FEB 1 1. 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

) 

) 

BRAUN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

No. 92-3137 

(D.C. No. 90-CV-1006) 

(D. Kan . ) 

Before ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,** District 

Judge . 

**Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, 

District Court for the District 

designation. 

District Judge, United States 

of Wyoming, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially 

assist the determination of this appeal . See Fed. R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34 . 1 . 9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument, and plaintiff' s request for oral 

argument is denied. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

t he case, r 8S judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36 . 3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3137 Document: 010110170344 Date Filed: 02/11/1993 Page: 1 
Plaintiff appeals the district court's entry of summary 

judgment in defendant's favor on the ground that the statute of 

limitations had expired before this legal malpractice diversity 

case was filed. Plaintiff claims the district court erred in its 

determination of when the statute of limitations began to run, and 

in denying plaintiff's motion to recuse the district court. We 

exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. 

Defendant represented plaintiff in a divorce action beginning 

in 1981 and concluding in late 1982. According to plaintiff, 

defendant was negligent when he failed to solicit and obtain a 

property settlement to include a release of plaintiff's obligation 

on a debt and deed of trust to the Federal Land Bank of Wichita 

(bank). According to plaintiff, she had requested defendant 

procure such a settlement, but he refused to explore settlement. 

The divorce proceeded to a hearing . The state court judge divided 

the marital property, granting the subject real estate and its 

debt to the husband. Plaintiff was not released from the debt on 

the real estate. 

In 1986, plaintiff's former husband failed to pay the debt, 

and on December 11, 1986, the bank filed suit against plaintiff 

and her former husband. Defendant represented plaintiff for some 

time in the suit brought by the bank. On July 7, 1987, the state 

court filed its j ournal entry of foreclosure, ordering "the 

plaintiff, Federal Land Bank of Wichita, recover a judgment in 

personnam [sic] and in rem herein for the sum of $328,052.46 

together with interest thereon at the rate of 14.5% per 

annum . .. against the defendants Martin Vann and Laverne Vann, 

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jointly and severally . .. II Aplt. App . Doc . N, journal entry 

of foreclosure, at 2. Following a foreclosure sale conducted on 

April 25, 1989, the state court denied confirmation of the sale, 

finding that no deficiency had been adjudicated . Id., order 

denying confirmation of sale, at 2 . Thereafter, on June 7, 1989, 

a deficiency judgment was entered against plaintiff and her former 

husband. Plaintiff ultimately paid off the debt to the bank. 

Plaintiff filed this case on January 5, 1990, alleging legal 

malpractice. The district court determined the two-year statute 

of limitations provided in Kan. Stat . Ann. § 60-513(a) (4) began to 

run on July 7, 1987, the date of the journal entry of foreclosure. 

Accordingly, the district court held that the l imitations period 

had expired prior to filing suit, and granted defendant's motion 

for summary judgment. 

I. RECUSAL 

Plaintiff moved to recuse the district court, pursuant to 28 

U.S . C. § 144, alleging a close relationship between the judge and 

the defendant that necessarily would color the court's judgment in 

thi s case. According to plaintiff, the district court's bias in 

favor of defendant was demonstrated by the court's expression of 

concern for defendant in view of very serious problems faced by 

defendant's family. The district court de nied the motion . 

"Because the decision to recuse is within the sound 

discretion of the district judge, this court reviews the denial of 

a motion to recuse only for abuse of discretion." Weatherhead v. 

Globe Int'l. Inc., 832 F. 2d 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1987) . The 

party reque sting recusal bears a substantial burden to d emonstr ate 

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the judge is not impartial. Id. Here, "[t]here is no 

indication .. . that the judge had formed an opinion on the 

merits on some basis other than what he had learned from his 

participation in the case." Hinman v . Rogers, 831 F.2d 937, 939 

(10th Cir. 1987); see also State v. Griffen, 734 P.2d 1089, 1093 

(Kan. 1987) (in criminal case, recusal based on lack of 

impartiality required where facts create a reasonable doubt about 

judge's impartiality, not in judge's mind or even in litigant's 

mind, but rather in the mind of a reasonable person with knowledge 

of all circumstances). The judge's "ordinary and natural 

reaction" to an unfortunate situation involving a party in a case 

before him does not create grounds for disqualification for bias. 

See Griffen, 734 P.2d at 1093 (judge not to be disqualified 

because he reacted as would anyone else to evidence of accused's 

actions causing natural disgust). 

We conclude the district court's expression of concern f or 

defendant and his family was a natural reaction to defendant's 

circumstances. Plaintiff failed to carry her burden of 

demonstrating the district court was not impartial . Accordingly, 

we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of 

the recusal motion . 

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

We review de novo the grant or denial of summary judgment, 

applying the same legal standard used by the district court under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First 

Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990 ) . 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the material facts are not 

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genuinely disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law. Russillo v. Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 

(10th Cir. 1991). We will examine the record in the light most 

favorable to the party opposing the motion . DBLKM Inc. v. 

Resolution Trust Corp . , 969 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1992). We 

conduct a de novo review of the district court's determination of 

state law. Mares v . ConAgra Poultry Co . , 971 F . 2d 492, 495 (10th 

Cir. 1992 ). 

It is undisputed that plaintiff's malpractice action, based 

on defendant's negligence in failing to secure a property 

settlement in the divorce, is governed by the two - year statute of 

limitations provided in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a) (4) & (b) . We 

have reviewed the record and considered plaintiff's arguments. 

For substantially the reasons stat ed in the district court's 

memorandum and order dated March 12, 1992, a copy of which is 

attached, we affirm the summary judgment granted to defendant. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas is AFFIRMED . 

Entered for the Court 

Clarence A. Brimmer 

District Judge 

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82) 

LAVERNE REICH, 

vs. 

LELYN J. BRAUN, 

f!L"ED 

·U.S. DISTRICT COURT 

D!STRICT OF K' HSAS IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT ~ ' 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS HAR 12 9 47 Ml '92 

Plaintiff, 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-1006-K 

_______________ ) 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This is a legal malpractice action brought by the plaintiff, 

Laverne Reich, against her former at~orney, Lelyn Braun. Reich 

alleges that Braun negligently failed to negotiate a property 

settlement in her divorce action which would have relieved her of 

liability on mortgaged property awarded to her husband. Reiqh also 

claims Braun was negligent in failing to obtain a release of 

liability from the guarantor of a promissory note executed by Reich 

and her ex-husband as security for the mortgage. As a result of 

Braun's negligence, Reich claims she was forced to sell mineral 

interest rights to pay the balance of the promissory note, and as 

a result, suffered substantial monetary damagt. In his defense, 

Braun asserts that Reich's action is barred by the statute of 

limitations and therefore is subject to summary judgment • . Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 

affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any 

material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as 

Appellate Case: 92-3137 Document: 010110170344 Date Filed: 02/11/1993 Page: 7 
B2) 

a matter of law. Fed.R. Civ.P. 56(c). In considering a motion for 

summary j"udgment, the court must resolve all «:Iisputed facts in 

favor of the party resisting summary judgment. White v. General 

Motors corp., Inc., 908 F.2d 669, 670 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. 

denied, 59 u.s.L.W. 3441 (1991). Summary judgment shall be denied 

if the moving party fails to demonstrate its entitlement beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Norton v. Liddel, 620 F.2d 1375, 1381 {10th Cir. 

1980). 

The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law 

when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an 

essential element of the case to which the nonmovi~g party has the 

burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). In resisting a ~otion 

for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rely upon mere 

allegations, or denials, contained in its pleadings or briefs. 

Rather, the party must come forward with specific facts showing the 

presence of a genuine issue for trial. Abercrombie v • . city of 

Catoosa, 896 F.2d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990). One of the 

principal purposes of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of 

factually unsupported claims or defenses, and the rule should be 

interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. 

A hearing on the issue was held on March 9, 1992. The court 

now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

As more fully explained below, the defendant's motion for summary 

judgment is hereby granted. 

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182) 

Findings of Fact 

The facts of this case are somewhat confusing and require a 

detailed sequence of events. 

on May 26, 1976, the plaintiff and her husband, Martin Vann 

(Vann), executed a promissory note for the sum of $339 1 000.00, 

payable to the Federal Land Bank of Wichita (FLB). As security for 

the note, the Vanns executed a mortgage on 640 acres of real 

property in Kearny county, Kansas, located at Section 1, Township 

25 south, Range 36 West of the Sixth Principal Meridian (1-25-36), 

together with certain irrigation equipment. The appraised value of 

the mortgaged real estate was $452,800.00. 

on June 17, 1981, plaintiff, a resident of Kansas, entered an 

oral contract with Lelyn Braun, an attorney in Garden City, Kansas, 

to represent her in a divorce action. 1 The Vanns attempted to 

reconcile their relationship but ultimately failed, and a final 

trial was held on October 19, 1982. Plaintiff contends that during 

this period she repeatedly requested that Braun negotiate· a 

property settlement to the effect that Vann would receive all the 

marital real estate and accompanying deb~s, and in return she would 

accept a cash settlement for her inchoate rights in the marital 

property. Braun, however, refused or failed to initiate any such 

settlement, but instead advised plaintiff to seek a court-ordered 

division of the marital real estate • . 

1 As this court has previously determined, Braun was a 

resident of Colorado on January s, 1990, when plaintiff's legal 

malpractice action was instituted against Braun. Subject matter 

jurisdiction, therefore, is conferred upon this court pursuant to 

2 8 U.S.C. §1332. (0kt. No. 6). 

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82) 

At the time of the Vanns' divorce and division of property, 

the mortgaged property, without minerals, had an appraised market 

value of $528,000.00. Plaintiff has produced evidence to show that 

if Braun had requested a release from obligation for plaintiff as 

co-obliger on the promissory note made to the FLB and release from 

the FLB' s mortgage, the FLB more probably than not would have 

allowed the request as part of a settlement proposal. Braun did 

not make the request, however, and consequently the court awarded, 

in part, one-half the mineral interest rights in 1-25-36 ,to the 

plaintiff, subject to any indebtedness. Vann was awarded the 

surface rights to 1-25-36, also subject to any indebtedness. 

Plaintiff contends that since the division of marital property she 

believed she was no longer liable on the promissory note held by 

the FLB. 

Thereafter, several lawsuits were filed against the plaintiff 

to recover outstanding debts. Eventually, Braun filed a motion to 

reopen the divorce and property settlement action to dispose of 

previously unassessed marital debts. The motion was denied, 

however, as an improper collateral attack on the evidence presented 

at trial. 

on July 1, 1986, Vann failed to make the annual installment 

payment due on the promissory note executed by himself and the 

plaintiff in 1976. on October 23, 1986, the FLB exercised its 

option to accelerate all unmatured portions of the indebtedness and 

declared all the indebtedness due and payable. The FLB filed an 

action against Vann and plaintiff Laverne Reich on December 11, 

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,i. 

A 

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1986, seeking a judgment of $303,900.99 together with interest at 

the annual rate of 14.5 percent. 

As plaintiff's attorney, Braun filed an answer and cross-claim 

in the FLB action. Plaintiff denied that she was in default on the 

mortgaged real estate because it had been awarded to Vann in the 

divorce action. In her cross-claim, plaintiff sought judgment 

against Vann in the event a deficiency judgment was entered against 

her in favor of the FLB. Plaintiff contends that at the time of 

preparing the answer in the FLB action, Braun represented to her 

that she would have no personal liability arising out of the 

proceedings unless a deficiency judgment was entered against her 

and a foreclosure sale occurred. 

A journal entry of foreclosure was entered by the district 

court on July 7, 1987. Judgment was granted in favor of the FLB 

and against plaintiff and Vann, jointly and severally, in the 

amount of $328,052.46 together with interest at 14.5 percent. The 

mortgaged real estate, excluding plaintiff's undivided one-half 

mineral interest, was sold to the FLB for $250,000.00. Thereafter, 

several writs of execution were issued to attach Vann's property. 

There is no record of Braun's formal withdrawal as plaintiff's 

counsel in the FLB case. Nor is there any record of entry of 

appearance by any other counsel. However, from the records 

provided to-this court it appears that Robert Frederick was acting 

. as plaintiff's counsel by June 16, 1988. 

On May 3, 1989, the district court denied a confirmation of 

sale of Vann•s property. The court determined that no defici ency 

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:-... ~ .. ,..-. 

.• ' .. , ·•.· .•. ··=-

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82) 

judgment had been entered prior to any of the execution sales and 

that no deficiency judgment had ever been judicially determined. 

on June 7, 1989, a deficiency judgment was entered in favor of the 

FLB for $67,387.34 with interest at 14.5 percent. 

In the meantime, the FLB entered a partial release of the 

judgment lien on plaintiff's one-half mineral interest, although 

plaintiff was not discharged from personal liability. Thereafter, 

plaintiff sold her one-half interest in the mineral rights of the 

mortgaged property and applied the proceeds of the sale to the FLB 

debt on May 10, 1989. Plaintiff made several more payments to the 

FLB and eventually paid the balance due on March 19, 1991. 

Conclusions of Law 

Plaintiff filed this legal malpractice action against her 

former attorney, Lelyn Braun, on January 5, 1990. Plaintiff 

alleges that she has suffered substantial monetary damage due to 

Braun's failure to negotiate a property settlement in her divorce 

action which would have released her as co-obliger on the 

promissory note to the FLB and released her undivided one-half 

minera+ interest from the mortgage. She claims that Braun 

negligently failed to explain the true nature of her legal 

relationship with the FLB and did not advise her that she would 

remain liable on the underlying promissory note if the FLB ever 

sought a deficiency jud~ent after a foreclosure of the secured 

real property. Plaintiff alleges that Braun's negligence continued 

after the divorce action because he continued to represent to her 

that she would not be held personally liable on the promissory 

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!!2) 

note. Finally, plaintiff claims she did not suffer substantial 

injury until May 10, 1989, when she was forced to sell mineral 

interest rights and apply the proceeds to the balance due on the 

promissory note. 

Braun contends this action is barred by the statute of 

limitations. He argues the statute of limitations commenced 

running when the alleged negligent act occurred, sometime between 

June 17, 1981 and October 19, 1982. Thus, the alleged act of 

negligence did not occur within two years of plaintiff's 

malpractice suit and is barred by the statute of limitations. 

Plaintiff's malpractice action, based upon the alleged 

negligence of Braun in failing to obtain a release of liability for 

her as co-obligor on a promissory note to the FLB, is governed by 

the two-year statute of limitations provided in K.S.A. 1990 Supp . 

60-513(a) (4). K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-513(b) provides that a cause of 

action based upon a tort accrues when: 

"[T]he act giving rise to the cause of action first 

causes substantial injury, or, if the fact of injury is 

not reasonably ascertainable until some time after the 

initial act, then the period of limitation shall not 

commence until the fact of injury becomes reasonably 

ascertainable to the injured party, ••• " 

The language of K.S.A. 1990 Supp. 60-513(b) establishes that 

the statute of limitations in a tort liability cause of action 

accrues when substantial. injury occurs or when substantial injury 

is reasonably ascertainable after the negligent act. General 

principles have evolved, however, to aid in the application of the 

statute to particular facts and circumstances. In general, a cause 

of action accrues, so as to start the running of the statute of 

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__, 

,,-,.:., --::. 

~,. ....... , ... , ., .. .. ...... ,.•: 

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limitations, as soon as the right t _o maintain a legal action 

arises. The true test to determine when an action accrues is that 

point in time at which the plaintiff could first have filed and 

prosecuted his action to a successful conclusion. Johnston v. 

Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 218 Kan. 543, 548, 545 P.2d 312 

(1976); Yeager v . National Cooperative Refinery Ass'n, 205 Kan. 

504, 470 P.2d 797 (1970). 

In Pancake House. Inc. v. Redmond, 239 Kan. 83, 716 P.2d 83 

(1986), the Kansas Supreme Court set out four theories which could 

apply to attorney malpractice suits and the commencement of the 

statute of limitations. 

(1) The occurrence rule--the statute begins to run 

at the occurrence of the lawyer's negligent act or 

omission. 

(2) The damage rule--the client does not accrue a 

cause of action for malpractice until he suffers 

appreciable harm or actual damage as a consequence of his 

lawyer's conduct. 

(3) The discovery rule--the statute does not begin 

to run until the client discovers, or reasonably should 

have discovered, the material facts essential to his 

cause of action against the attorney. 

(4) The continuous representation rule--the 

client's cause of action does not accrue until the 

attorney-client relationship is terminated. 

Pancake House, 239 Kan. at 87. 

In the present action, Braun asserts the statute of 

limitations began to run when the alleged acts of negligence 

occurred, that is, no later than December 7, 1982, when the 

property settlement between plaintiff and her husband was 

journalized. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that she did not 

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. ... . .. .. .... ~ ..... ' ! ' 

32) 

actually incur damages until May 10, 1989, when she was forced to 

sell mineral interest rights to pay the balance due on the 

promissory note to the FLB. In any event, plaintiff argues she 

could not have legally maintained an action against Braun and have 

been successful until June 7, 1989, when a deficiency judgment was 

granted to the FLB. 

Braun's alleged negligent acts occurred sometime between June 

17, 1981, and December 7, 1982. At that time plaintiff suffered 

some injury because she did not get the requested property 

settlement which would have granted Vann the marital real estate 

along with its accompanying debts. Nor did she acquire a release 

from liability on the promissory note, although Vann was awarded 

the surface rights of mortgaged property and plaintiff retained 

only a one-half interest in the mineral rights. Plaintiff's action 

against Braun did not accrue at the time of the alleged negligent 

acts, however, because she did not sustain an actionable injury at 

that time. If Vann had satisfied the obligations under the 

promissory note to the FLB, plaintiff would not have suffered any 

injury even though Braun negligently allowed plaintiff to remain a . 

co-obligor on the promissory note. Thus, since plaintiff did not 

suffer substantial injury when the alleged negligent act occurred, 

the statute of limitations did not commence at that time. 

The issue then is w~en plaintiff knew or should have known 

that she sustained an injury as the result of Braun's malpractice. 

In a legal malpractice action, the statute of limitations does not 

necessarily begin to run with the plaintiff's knowledge of an 

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.......... ... I ·,:-· 

'82) 

injury; rather, the action accrues when the plaintiff reasonably 

ascertains that the fact of the injury is the result of the 

attorney's past negligence. Dearborn Animal Clinic, P.A. v. 

Wilson, 248 Kan. 257, 270, 806 P.2d 997 (1991). 

In Dearborn, the plaintiff suffered injury when it incurred 

legal expenses and was forced to bring suit against a party it had 

contracted with. When Dearborn sued in the underlying action to 

enforce its contract, it believed it had a contract with the 

defendant which contained a mandatory stock purchase provision. 

Id. at 266. Therefore, Dearborn's legal malpractice cause of 

action did not commence at that time because it did not know that 

its injury was the result of its attorney's neglig~nt preparation 

of the contract. The legal malpractice cause of action 

accrued at a later date, when it was evident to the plaintiff that 

its attorney had negligently prepared an option contract rather 

than a mandatory purchase contract, but before the underlying 

action was finally determined. Id. at 271. 

The facts in this case are distinguishable from Dearborn. In 

the instant action, it was reasonably ascertainable on December 11, 

1986, when the FLB filed suit and sought judgment against the 

plaintiff and Vann, that plaintiff's injury was the result of 

Braun's negligence. At that time, plaintiff should have taken 

notice that her potenti~l liability was the result of Braun ' s 

negligence. Nevertheless, that statute of limitations did not 

begin to run at that date due to Braun's continued representations 

to the plaintiff that she was not personally liable on the 

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promissory note issued to the FLB. Braun's acts of answering the 

FLB petition and denying liability, along with the filing of a 

cross-claim against Vann, lulled the plaintiff into believing she 

would not suffer damage as a result of the foreclosure action. 

There is no doubt, however, that on July 7, 1987, when a journal 

entry of foreclosure was entered against the plaintiff and Vann, 

jointly and severally, that plaintiff had notice she was liable for 

the debt. At no time following the journal entry of foreclosure 

was plaintiff's liability an issue of serious dispute. Therefore, 

plaintiff should have known that her injury was the result of 

Braun's failure to obtain a release of liability during the divorce 

proceeding. In any event, the foreclosure judgment, entered on July 

7, 1987 gave plaintiff notice to investigate the cause of her 

liability on the promissory note. Thus, the fact and cause of 

injury was reasonably ascertainable on July 7, 1987, at which time 

plaintiff• s legal malpractice cause of action accrued and the 

statute of limitations began to run. 

Plaintiff argues that the only property foreclosed upon in the 

underlying action belonged to her former husband, and therefore 

did not provide notice of her liability. In addition, she argues· 

that no deficiency judgment was entered against her until June 7, 

1989, a?d it was not until_this time that she had knowledge of the 

actual damage sustained. 

As a general rule, the statute of limitations does not begin 

to run until the underlying litigation is finally determined. 

Pizel v. Zuspann, 247 Kan. 54, 77, · 795 P.2d 42 (1990). However, if 

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~,,, 

it is clear that the plaintiff in a potential legal malpractice 

action has incurred an injury, and if it is reasonably 

ascertainable that such injury was the result of the attorney's 

negligence, then the statute of limitations begins to run at the 

time that it was reasonably ascertainable that the injury was 

caused by the attorney's malpractice even though the underlying 

action may not have been finally determined. Dearborn, 248 Kan. at 

270. 

As the court explained above, plaintiff had notice of 

substantial injury attributable to Braun's negligence when a 

judgment of foreclosure was entered against her i~ the underlying 

action by the FLB. At that time, it was clear the only reason for 

plaintiff's liability was Braun's negligence in failing to obtain 

a release for her on the promissory note previously issued to the 

FLB. Therefore, on July 7, 1987, plaintiff could legally have 

filed s~i t against Braun and prosecuted her legal malpractice 

action to a successful conclusion. Thus, her cause of action 

against Braun accrued on that date and the statute of limitations 

began to run. Plaintiff's suit was filed January 5, 1990, more 

than two years after the cause of action accrued and, therefore, is 

barred by the statute of limitations. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this /"2--day of March, 1992, that 

defendant Lelyn Braun's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 17) 

is hereby granted. 

PATRICK ~~ F. KELLY, ~EF JUDGE 

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