Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01855/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01855-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Morales-Uribe
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 06-1855

________________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* Southern District of Iowa.

Juan Morales-Uribe, *

*

Appellee. *

________________

Submitted: November 15, 2006 

 Filed: December 18, 2006

________________

Before GRUENDER, JOHN R. GIBSON and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges. 

________________

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

Juan Morales-Uribe pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A). After

determining a total offense level of 31 and an advisory guidelines sentencing range

of 108 to 135 months, the district court sentenced Morales-Uribe to 60 months’

imprisonment, approximately 44 percent below the bottom of the advisory range. For

the reasons stated below, we vacate Morales-Uribe’s sentence and remand for

resentencing.

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I. BACKGROUND

On January 25, 2005, law enforcement officers from the Mid-Iowa Narcotics

Enforcement Task Force received information from a confidential informant that an

individual named Diego was dealing methamphetamine in multi-ounce to pound

quantities in Des Moines, Iowa. The informant reported that Diego had sold him at

least three pounds of methamphetamine between August 2004 and January 2005. Law

enforcement officers subsequently identified Diego as Juan Morales-Uribe. Between

January 25, 2005, and February 24, 2005, the informant and the officers made three

controlled purchases from Morales-Uribe. These methamphetamine purchases, as

well as the purchases made independently by the informant prior to January 25, 2005,

totaled 1.46 kilograms of a substance containing methamphetamine and 57.7 grams

of “actual,” or pure, methamphetamine. 

The task force executed search warrants at Morales-Uribe’s residences on

February 24, 2005. These searches uncovered additional quantities of

methamphetamine, equipment used in methamphetamine production and serialized

currency used by the informant during the controlled purchases. The officers arrested

Morales-Uribe, and he was subsequently charged with one count of conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A),

among other charges. Morales-Uribe pled guilty to the conspiracy count on October

14, 2005, and the other charges were subsequently dismissed.

At Morales-Uribe’s sentencing hearing, the district court and parties accepted

without objection the presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR assigned

Morales-Uribe a base offense level of 34. His offense level was then increased by two

levels for using a minor in connection with the conspiracy. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4.

However, Morales-Uribe received a three-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility and an additional two-level reduction under the sentencing guidelines

safety-valve provision. U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(9), 5C1.2. This resulted in a total

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offense level of 31. With a criminal history category of I, the district court determined

Morales-Uribe’s advisory guidelines range to be 108 to 135 months. The district court

also found Morales-Uribe to be safety-valve eligible under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f),

thereby freeing Morales-Uribe from the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months’

imprisonment. Citing its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district

court varied downward and sentenced Morales-Uribe to 60 months’ imprisonment.

Although the district court recognized that Morales-Uribe was “a sophisticated and

knowledgeable methamphetamine dealer on a significant scale,” it justified the

downward variance by stating that Morales-Uribe was eligible for the § 3553(f)

safety-valve as a first-time offender whose crime did not involve violence, that he was

not a manager or leader of the conspiracy, that a portion of the drugs attributed to him

resulted from “six controlled purchases” by law enforcement authorities, and that the

Government would deport Morales-Uribe following his term of imprisonment.

Additionally, the district court appears to have considered Morales-Uribe’s

underprivileged background and his testimony at sentencing that his motivation for

this crime was to gain money to provide surgery for his son’s cancer. 

II. DISCUSSION

Because there is no dispute concerning the appropriate application of the

guidelines, we need only determine whether the sentence imposed by the district court

is reasonable. United States v. Beal, 463 F.3d 834, 836 (8th Cir. 2006). “We review

the reasonableness of the ultimate sentence under an abuse of discretion standard,

measuring the extent of a district court’s variance from the advisory Guidelines range

against the statutory factors contained in § 3553(a).” United States v. Hodge, Nos. 05-

3633/05-3844, slip op. at 7 (8th Cir. Nov. 22, 2006). A district court abuses its

discretion and applies an unreasonable sentence where it: 

fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant

weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error

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of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range

of choice dictated by the facts of the case. 

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---,

126 S. Ct. 276 (2005). A sentence imposed within the advisory guidelines range is

presumptively reasonable as the guidelines take the § 3553(a) factors into account in

fashioning an advisory sentencing range. United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948,

952-53 (8th Cir. 2006). Thus, “the farther the district court varies from the

presumptively reasonable guidelines range, the more compelling the justification

based on the § 3553(a) factors must be.” United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871,

874 (8th Cir. 2006). 

The district court identified five possible reasons to support its decision to vary

downward to a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment: (1) the presence of the same

factors that made Morales-Uribe eligible for the § 3553(f) safety-valve, including that

this was his first offense, the offense did not involve violence and he was not the

leader of the conspiracy; (2) the amount of drugs used to calculate his base offense

level was substantially the result of law-enforcement-controlled purchases; (3) he

faced deportation upon his release from prison; (4) he had lived an underprivileged

life; and (5) his motivation for his crime was to gain money to provide treatment for

his son’s cancer. The 48-month, or 44 percent, downward variance from the bottom

of the advisory guidelines range is a substantial variance and thus requires compelling

justification. See United States v. Gatewood, 438 F.3d 894, 896 (8th Cir. 2006)

(stating that a 27-month, or 43 percent, variance below the bottom of the advisory

guidelines range is a substantial variance). We find that while the district court

considered appropriate factors in imposing the sentence, the district court committed

a clear error of judgment in weighing these factors.

First, the district court justified its downward variance by considering the same

facts that it considered in finding Morales-Uribe eligible for the § 3553(f) safetyvalve. We have stated that “substantial variances based upon factors already taken

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1

Additionally, because Morales-Uribe was assigned a criminal history category

of I, it is inappropriate to use his lack of criminal history to provide compelling

justification for his substantial variance. United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 418

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into account in a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range seriously undermine

sentencing uniformity.” McDonald, 461 F.3d at 954. Additionally, we have

specifically held that facts taken into account in applying the § 3553(f) safety-valve

cannot serve as compelling justification for a substantial variance. United States v.

Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479, 481 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, --- U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct.

551 (2006). The district court considered Morales-Uribe’s lack of criminal history,

the lack of violence associated with his crime and his non-leadership role in the

conspiracy in its application of § 3553(f), relieving him of the 120-month statutory

mandatory minimum sentence. See id. at 481 (“Claiborne’s lack of criminal history

was taken into account when the safety valve eliminated an otherwise applicable

mandatory minimum sentence.”). Without § 3553(f), Morales-Uribe’s advisory

guidelines range would have effectively been adjusted from 108 to 135 months to 120

to 135 months to reflect the mandatory minimum. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1.

In addition to being relieved from the mandatory minimum, Morales-Uribe’s

safety-valve eligibility provided him the additional benefit of reducing his advisory

sentencing guidelines range. The same factors that allowed him to avoid the

mandatory minimum sentence under § 3553(f) were also taken into account in

determining Morales-Uribe’s total offense level of 31, with an advisory guidelines

range of 108 to 135 months. Because Morales-Uribe qualified for safety-valve relief,

he received a two-level reduction from his base offense level. See 18 U.S.C. §

3553(f); U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(9), 5C1.2. Without this reduction, Morales-Uribe’s

total offense level would have been 33, with a resulting advisory guidelines range of

135 to 168 months. Thus, Morales-Uribe’s lack of criminal history, the fact that no

violence accompanied his offense and the fact that he was not the leader of the

conspiracy already had reduced significantly his advisory guidelines range. These

identified factors therefore cannot support a substantial downward variance.1

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(8th Cir. 2006) (“Inasmuch as a guidelines sentence reflects a defendant’s criminal

history, a wide divergence from the guidelines sentence based solely on this single

criterion would conflict with the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar

conduct.”). 

2

Although the informant made several purchases from Morales-Uribe between

August 2004 and January 2005, there is no evidence that these purchases were made

in conjunction with law enforcement activities.

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Second, the district court clearly erred when it found that law enforcement

officials made six controlled purchases from Morales-Uribe. Although the district

court correctly stated that “some of the drug quantities attributed to the Defendant

were the result of government-controlled drug deals,” it is undisputed by the parties

that only three controlled purchases were made by law enforcement officials.2

Further, to the extent that the district court implied that the law enforcement purchases

increased Morales-Uribe’s advisory guidelines range, the second and third controlled

purchases of methamphetamine had no effect on Morales-Uribe’s advisory guidelines

range. Because Morales-Uribe dealt in both mixtures containing methamphetamine

and actual methamphetamine, all drug quantities sold by Morales-Uribe were

converted to their marijuana equivalents before determining the advisory guidelines

sentencing range. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.10. The earlier independent purchases

made from Morales-Uribe by the informant and the first controlled purchase made by

law enforcement agents using the informant resulted in 3,554 kilograms of marijuana

equivalent. This quantity alone easily placed Morales-Uribe at a base offense level of

34, which is applicable for 3,000 to 10,000 kilograms of marijuana. U.S.S.G. §

2D1.1(c)(3). Thus, the two additional controlled purchases of methamphetamine by

law enforcement officials, which amounted to 519.2 kilograms of marijuana

equivalent and increased the total to 4,073.2 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, had

no effect on the determination of Morales-Uribe’s base offense level. Because the

district court clearly erred in determining the number of controlled purchases and

because the additional controlled purchases did not affect Morales-Uribe’s advisory

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guidelines range, it was clear error for the district court to justify the downward

variance by reasoning that controlled purchases contributed to an increase in MoralesUribe’s advisory sentencing guidelines range.

Third, the district court specifically considered that following Morales-Uribe’s

imprisonment, the Government would deport him to Mexico. In imposing a sentence,

a district court must consider the need for the sentence “to protect the public from

further crimes of the defendant.” § 3553(a)(2)(C). Arguably, the need to protect the

public from a defendant may be reduced in a case where, upon immediate release from

incarceration, the Government will deport the defendant. See, e.g., United States v.

Zapata-Trevino, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1328 (D.N.M. 2005), United States v.

Ramirez-Ramirez, 365 F. Supp. 2d 728, 733 (E.D. Va. 2005). Assuming that MoralesUribe’s impending deportation could provide some justification for a downward

variance in appropriate circumstances, it certainly would not support a substantial

downward variance in this case. The PSR, to which Morales-Uribe did not object,

indicates that he has attempted to enter the United States illegally on three separate

occasions. Two of these attempts, one being successful, occurred even after the

Government deported him on October 27, 1999. This indicates strongly that

deportation will not protect the people of the United States from further crimes by

Morales-Uribe. Under these facts, the impending deportation of Morales-Uribe would

support little, if any, variance. 

Finally, the district court mentioned both Morales-Uribe’s underprivileged

background, which included growing up in a poor family that worked in the fields of

Zacatecas, Mexico, and Morales-Uribe’s motivation for his crime, noting that

Morales-Uribe “dealt in drugs because of [his] son’s condition . . . .” While these are

appropriate considerations in assigning a sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (“The

court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider (1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the

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defendant.”), they cannot by themselves justify a variance of this substantial

magnitude. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Morales-Uribe’s sentence as unreasonable

and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

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