Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00527/USCOURTS-alsd-2_06-cv-00527-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bill Bateman
Respondent
Salvatore Candela
Petitioner
Michael Chertoff
Respondent
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent

Document Text:

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Bill Bateman is no longer the Warden of the Perry County

Correctional Center. Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of Rule

25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, David O. Streiff, as

Warden of that facility, is substituted for Bateman as a proper

Respondent in this action.

The Court also notes that Respondents have urged this Court to

dismiss Defendants Gonzales and Chertoff, but have failed to provide

any argument or authority as to why this action should be taken (Doc.

18, p. 1 n.1). To the extent that Respondents’ assertion can be

construed as a motion, it is DENIED. 

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Petitioner maintains that he is a “Stateless individual,” though

he acknowledges that he has been characterized as being from Pakistan

(Doc. 1, pp. 1-2; see also Doc. 11, pp. 2-3). 

3

Petitioner has been in the actual custody of David O. Streiff,

Warden of the Perry County Correctional Center in Uniontown, Alabama. 

“Whenever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present

physical custody with the United States, he should name his warden as

respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.” 

Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004). 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

SALVATORE CANDELA, : 

Petitioner, : 

v. : 

CIVIL ACTION 06-527-KD-M 

ALBERTO GONZALES, : 

MICHAEL CHERTOFF,

WARDEN DAVID O. STREIFF,1 : 

Respondents. : 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This is an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Salvatore

Candela, a citizen and native of Pakistan,2 who has been detained

by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Doc. 1).3 This

action has been referred for report and recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.1(c) and is now

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Court records indicate that Petitioner was actually taken into

custody on December 16, 2002 (see Doc. 11, Exhibit B, p. 3).

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ready for consideration. The record is adequate to determine

Petitioner's claims; no evidentiary hearing is required. It is

recommended that the instant petition be dismissed.

In his petition, Petitioner asserts that he was taken into

custody by agents of the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (hereinafter ICE), on December 10, 2002,4 pursuant to

a finding that he should be removed from this country (see Doc.

1, pp. 3-4). Petitioner maintains that he has been detained for

too long and that such detention is improper (id. at pp. 4-5). 

Candela seeks release from custody (id. at p. 5). Petitioner

filed this action on September 5, 2006 (Doc. 1).

Respondents subsequently filed a Response, stating that

Petitioner is being detained through his own failure to cooperate

with United States authorities (Doc. 11). More specifically,

Respondents assert that Candela has been convicted of

impersonating a federal officer in an extortion scheme, that he

has refused to reveal his true identity or nationality, and that

he has thwarted his repatriation—or, at least, his removal from

this country—throughout all legal proceedings (Doc. 11, pp. 1-3). 

Respondents argue that Petitioner’s confinement is proper, in

light of Candela’s obstruction of the legal process, and that

this action should be dismissed (id. at pp. 4-7). 

The evidence of record demonstrates that Petitioner was

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convicted of extortion, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 872, on May 3,

2002 by the U.S. District Court of Maryland; Candela was

sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment, followed by supervised

release for one year (Doc. 11, Exhibit C). Subsequently, a U.S.

Immigration Judge found that Petitioner was not a U.S. Citizen

and should be deported to Pakistan or India (see Doc. 11, Exhibit

B, p. 4). Two previous rulings by the U.S. District Court of

Maryland have held that Candela has refused to engage in the

process of his repatriation by providing “conflicting,

unsupported, implausible biographical information regarding his

nationality, birth date, religion, family, and residences” (Doc.

11, Exhibit B, p. 5). Those Courts held that Petitioner’s

failure to cooperate prevented his ability to show that his

removal was not likely to occur (Doc. 11, Exhibit A, p. 6;

Exhibit B, p. 6; see also Exhibits D and E (declarations of

Deportation Officers)). As recently as September 29, 2006,

Candela maintained that he was not a Pakistani citizen, a

statement that prevented travel documents being issued on

Petitioner’s behalf (see Doc. 11, Exhibit G).

The United States Supreme Court, in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533

U.S. 678, 687-88 (2001), held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers

jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain actions such as this. 

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The Court notes that 8 U.S.C. § 1231, entitled “Detention and

removal of aliens ordered removed,” states, in pertinent part, as

follows: 

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed

(1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section,

when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney

General shall remove the alien from the United

States within a period of 90 days (in this

section referred to as the "removal period").

(B) Beginning of period

The removal period begins on the latest of the

following:

(i) The date the order of removal becomes

administratively final.

(ii) If the removal order is judicially

reviewed and if a court orders a stay

of the removal of the alien, the date

of the court's final order.

(iii) If the alien is detained or confined

(except under an immigration process),

the date the alien is released from

detention or confinement.

(C) Suspension of period

The removal period shall be extended beyond a

period of 90 days and the alien may remain in

detention during such extended period if the

alien fails or refuses to make timely application

in good faith for travel or other documents

necessary to the alien's departure or conspires

or acts to prevent the alien's removal subject to

an order of removal.

8 U.S.C.A. § 1231. 

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In interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1231,5 the Zadvydas Court held that

the statute “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a

period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal

from the United States. It does not permit indefinite

detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. The Court went on to

hold that “six months [was] a presumptively reasonable period of

time to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation” pursuant

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to § 1231. See Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1051 (11th

Cir. 2002). The Zadvydas Court further stated, however, that “an

alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined

that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. 

This Court notes that statutory language, previously set

out, allows for a petitioner’s detention period to be extended

“if the alien fails or refuses to make timely application in good

faith for travel or other documents necessary to the alien's

departure or conspires or acts to prevent the alien's removal

subject to an order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C). The

Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Pelich v. I.N.S., 329 F.3d

1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003), addressed this issue and held the

following: 

The risk of indefinite detention that

motivated the Supreme Court's statutory

interpretation in Zadvydas does not exist

when an alien is the cause of his own

detention. Unlike the aliens in Zadvydas,

Pelich has the “keys [to his freedom] in his

pocket” and could likely effectuate his

removal by providing the information

requested by the INS. 

Id. (citing Parra v. Perryman, 172 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 1999).

The evidence shows that Candela has obstructed the removal

process and that his actions have led to his continued detention. 

As such, Petitioner cannot prove that “there is no significant

likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” 

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Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Candela’s continued detention is not

improper under 8 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(1)(C).

Therefore, it is recommended that this action be dismissed

and that judgment be entered in favor of Respondents Alberto

Gonzales, Michael Chertoff, and David O. Streiff and against

Petitioner Salvatore Candela. 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk of

court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the

district judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an

attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the magistrate

judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404

(5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging

the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set

out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which

provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing

a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s

Recommendation” within ten days after being served with

a copy of the recommendation, unless a different time

is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made and the basis for the

objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a

brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de

novo and a different disposition made. It is

insufficient to submit only a copy of the original

brief submitted to the magistrate judge, although a

copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred

to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

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objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to a

Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment can

be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 6th day of April, 2007.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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