Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04186/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-04186-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gail Lewis
Respondent
Donald Eugene Radonich
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD EUGENE RADONICH,

Petitioner,

 vs.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent.

 

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No. C 02-4186 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING

CERTIFICATE OF

APPEALABILITY AND

GRANTING REQUEST

FOR EXTENSION OF

TIME

(Docket nos. 22, 24)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus challenging the validity of his State conviction. On September 20, 2005, this

Court entered an order denying the petition on the merits. Petitioner has filed a motion

for extension of time to file a notice of appeal, which is GRANTED (docket no. 22). 

Petitioner has timely filed a notice of appeal (docket no. 23), and a request for a

certificate of appealability pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) and Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 22(b) (docket no. 24). 

BACKGROUND

On August 20, 1998, Petitioner was convicted by a jury in Marin County Superior

Court of possession of ephedrine with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and

receiving stolen property. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court also found that
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Petitioner suffered a prior assault conviction alleged as a “strike” under California Penal

Code section 1170.12, and a prior conviction for possession of drugs for sale alleged as a

three-year enhancement under California Penal Code section 11370.2(b). On December

21, 1998, Petitioner was sentenced to sixteen years and four months in state prison. 

DISCUSSION

A petitioner may not appeal a final order in a federal habeas corpus proceeding

without first obtaining a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). A judge

shall grant a certificate of appealability "only if the applicant has made a substantial

showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "Where a

district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to

satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable

jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

I. Evidence of Acquaintance’s Arrest

First, Petitioner contends that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of

evidence of the methamphetamine drug laboratory arrest of Petitioner's friend, Kelly

Moriarty. In its order denying the petition, this Court found that "[t]he Court of Appeal

upheld the trial court’s ruling of admissibility, finding that the evidence of a

methamphetamine operation at Moriarty’s home was not admitted to show Petitioner’s

guilt by association, but to prove his knowing possession and intent." (September 20,

2005 Order at 6.) This Court further found that the state Court of Appeal noted that the

trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction that the evidence “‘has collateral relevance

here. Nobody is accusing the defendant of maintaining a lab at that location. This

evidence has some possible relevance, depending upon what you think of it ultimately,

on the subjects such as knowledge or intent.’” Id. at 7 (citing April 12, 2002 slip op. at

5-6.) 
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Under clearly established federal law, in order to obtain habeas relief on the basis

of an evidentiary error, Petitioner must show that the error was one of constitutional

dimension and that it had “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993). Petitioner argues that

the evidence of other crimes was inflammatory and that he was “silently convicted,

without being charged and silently sentenced” for the crime of operating a

methamphetamine laboratory, in violation of his due process rights. (Mot. for Cert. of

Appealability at 5.) The record below clearly indicates, however, that the evidence was

admitted only to show knowledge and intent and that the trial court gave limiting

instructions to avoid the possibility of confusion. Accordingly, "reasonable jurists"

would not find debatable the Court's assessment that the admission of this evidence did

not amount to prejudicial error.

II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Petitioner also argues that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to

request a jury trial or to verify whether Petitioner had waived his right to a jury trial on

the sentencing enhancement allegation of his prior conviction for possession of

methamphetamine for sale. The record indicates that Petitioner agreed to waive a jury

trial on the strike enhancement allegation of his prior conviction for assault with a

firearm, but that Petitioner’s waiver did not cover the prior drug conviction allegation,

which was alleged as a three-year enhancement. See Rep. Tr. 514-22. 

In his motion for a certificate of appealability, Petitioner contends that he was

entitled to a jury trial on his prior drug conviction under the holding in Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that the defendant

was entitled to a jury trial in the finding of those facts that increased his maximum

punishment. Id. at 490. Petitioner argues that this right extends to a sentencing

enhancement for prior convictions. The Supreme Court, however, expressly made an
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exception for prior convictions. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 US at 490 (emphasis added). There is no right under the Sixth Amendment to have a

jury hear and rule on a sentencing enhancement allegation based on a prior conviction. 

Rather, Petitioner’s right to a jury trial on the sentencing enhancement is provided by

state statute. California law provides a criminal defendant with a statutory right to have a

jury determine “whether or not the defendant has suffered the prior conviction.” Cal.

Penal Code § 1025(b) (2001); Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 769 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2001).

Although the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee the right to have a jury hear

and rule on a sentencing enhancement allegations based on a prior conviction, see

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76, the deprivation of a statutory entitlement to a jury trial

implicates the federal Due Process Clause. See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346

(1980). Where a state has provided for the imposition of criminal punishment in the

discretion of the trial jury, the defendant in such a case has a substantial and legitimate

expectation that he will be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the

jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion, and that liberty interest is one that the

Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the state. See Hicks,

447 U.S. at 346. Such violations are subject to harmless error review under Brecht. See

Dillard, 244 F.3d at 770. 

On the present habeas petition, the Court denied Petitioner’s claim for ineffective

assistance of counsel on the ground that Petitioner had not established prejudice under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984). Because the Strickland prejudice

analysis is complete in itself, a further harmless error analysis under Brecht is

unnecessary. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002). The Court of

Appeal found that “the People submitted certified documents of a 1996 felony conviction
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for possession of methamphetamine for sale, which were sufficient to support the trial

court’s finding that Radonich had a prior felony drug conviction.” (April 12, 2002 slip

op. at 7.) See Clerk Tr. 178-236. Petitioner does not contend that those documents were

not authentic, or that the documents were insufficient to establish that the prior

conviction was the same one alleged in the sentencing enhancement, although Petitioner

vaguely suggests that his drug conviction was “illegally obtained,” without further

explanation (Mot. for Cert. of Appealability at 6). Furthermore, Petitioner does not

explain why he would agree to waive his statutory right to a jury trial on the “strike”

allegation for his prior serious felony conviction, but not on his prior drug conviction

allegation. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court was presented with documentary

evidence of Petitioner’s prior convictions and found beyond a reasonable doubt that both

the prior strike allegation and the prior drug conviction allegation were true. (Rep. Tr.

522.) Petitioner fails to demonstrate how a jury trial on the prior drug conviction

allegation would have resulted in a different outcome, given the documentary evidence

of his prior conviction and the trial court’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Petitioner has not shown that it is reasonably probable that, but for his trial

attorney’s failure to request a jury trial on the sentencing enhancement, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. On his motion

for a certificate of appealability, Petitioner has not demonstrated “that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the request for a

certificate of appealability is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

Petitioner’s request for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal is

GRANTED (docket no. 22). Petitioner’s motion for a certificate of appealability is

DENIED (docket no. 24). The Clerk of Court shall forward this order, along with the
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case file, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit from which

Petitioner may also seek a certificate of appealability. See United States v. Asrar, 116

F.3d 1268, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997).

DATED: November 28, 2005

 

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

United States District Judge