Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30240/USCOURTS-ca9-13-30240-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tiffany Kim Hymas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AARON MICHAEL HYMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30239

D.C. No.

1:12-cr-00045-

EJL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TIFFANY KIM HYMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-30240

D.C. No.

1:12-cr-00045-

EJL-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

Edward J. Lodge, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 19, 2014—Portland, Oregon

Filed March 25, 2015

Before: Richard R. Clifton, Milan D. Smith, Jr.,

and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Clifton

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2 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated Aaron Hymas’s sentence, and affirmed

the district court’s restitution order as to Aaron and Tiffany

Hymas, in a case in which Aaron and Tiffany each pled guilty

to one count of wire fraud in connection with making false

statements in a mortgage loan application.

The panel held that there were no serious due process

concerns that required application of a clear and convincing

evidence standard, rather than a preponderance of the

evidence standard, to determine the extent of loss attributable

to the loan that was the subject of Aaron’s conviction, where

Aaron admitted the facts of the fraud that caused the loan to

be made and knew the size of the loan, which defined the

potential extent of the loss.

The panel held that before applying an 8-level increase

that more than doubled the Sentencing Guidelines range of

imprisonment, the district court should have applied the clear

and convincing standard to determine the amount of the

losses from loans that were not the subject of Aaron’s

conviction, where Aaron was not charged with a conspiracy,

pled guilty only to one count of fraud regarding a specific

loan transaction, and had neither need nor opportunity to

contest the alleged conspiracy. The panel could not say that

the error was harmless.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 3

The panel rejected Aaron’s arguments regarding

calculation of losses from the loans. The panel held that the

district court correctly calculated the losses by taking the

principal amount of the loan and subtracting any credits from

the subsequent sale of the property, and did not err by

considering the losses submitted by successor lenders who

had purchased the loans.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

calculating Aaron’s and Tiffany’s respective restitution

amounts. The panel held that the record supports (1) holding

Aaron responsible for losses resulting from loan applications

submitted under the names of Tiffany and his brother-in-law

in addition to the loans in his name, and (2) determinations

that the lenders listed in the presentence report suffered losses

that were directly and proximately caused by the Hymases’

conduct. The panel rejected as foreclosed by Robers v.

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1854 (2014), the Hymases’

argument that the amount of restitution is too high because

the drop in the market, not the fraud on the loan applications,

was responsible for the lenders’ losses.

The panel remanded for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Marcus R. Mumford (argued), Mumford PC, Salt Lake City,

Utah , for Defendants-Appellants.

Syrena C. Hargrove (argued) and Wendy J. Olson, Assistant

United States Attorneys, Boise, Idaho, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Aaron and Tiffany Hymas were each convicted, pursuant

to plea agreements, of one count of wire fraud under

18 U.S.C. § 1343. Aaron1

appeals his sentence of 24 months’

imprisonment, contending that facts found by the district

court in sentencing should have been subject to the clear and

convincing standard of proof rather than the preponderance

of the evidence standard that the district court applied,

because of the disproportionate impact of those facts on the

sentence that was imposed. We agree, in part, vacate that

sentence, and remand to the district court for further

proceedings. Both defendants also appeal the district court’s

orders requiring restitution. We affirm those orders.

I. Background

Aaron and Tiffany Hymas are a married couple. They

partially owned and ran two businesses in the housing

industry, Crestwood Construction and OPM Enterprises. In

order to acquire financing, the Hymases and their business

partner developed a plan to borrow money to construct

houses, sell them, and use the proceeds to pay off the loans,

ideally leaving a profit.

It was alleged, however, that many of the mortgage loan

applications submitted by the defendants from 2005 to 2007

were fraudulent. Indictments alleged that the Hymases made

false statements related to their employment, employment

1 To avoid confusion we refer to the defendants individually by their first

names.

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 5

income, and rental income in the applications for twenty

loans. Five of the loan applications listed Aaron as the

borrower, thirteen listed Tiffany, and two listed Allen

Bollschweiler, the husband of Aaron’s sister.

Both defendants pled guilty to one count of wire fraud

pursuant to plea agreements that provided that the other

counts would be dismissed. Specifically, each defendant pled

guilty to a charge of wire fraud regarding a March 28, 2007

loan to Tiffany in the amount of $295,600, identified as

Count Four in both indictments. In the plea agreements, the

defendants admitted that identified statements “were false and

material to the loan application, and that [he or she] knew that

they were false at the time [he or she] made them or caused

them to be made.” Each plea agreement specified certain

statements that were made in the loan application though

known to be false. Aaron’s agreement, for instance, specified

the following misrepresentations:

1) Tiffany Hymas was employed by OPM

Enterprises with 2.6 years on the job.

2) Tiffany Hymas had base employment

income of $42,500/month, plus commissions

of $30,000/month for a total of

$72,500/month.

3) Tiffany Hymas had gross rental income, as

follows: $4,350/month on 6097 Moose Creek,

Meridian, Idaho; $4,100/month on 5035 N.

Spangle in Meridian, Idaho; $2,150/month on

7243 E. Hampshire Lane, in Nampa, Idaho;

$4,000/month on 11 632 W. Hollandale in

Boise, Idaho.

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6 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

It was further agreed that the loan was funded based on the

above misrepresentations.

A presentence report (“PSR”) was prepared for each

defendant. For Aaron, the PSR calculated the total loss as

$3,689,953.73. The loss attributed to the Count Four loan was

$162,758.79. The rest represented losses allegedly suffered

by lenders on other loans, including loans that were the

subject of counts that were dismissed. Losses from these

loans were included because other “relevant conduct,”

separate from the specific activity that is the subject of the

criminal conviction, may be considered in imposing a

sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3.

Adding the losses from other loans substantiallyincreased

the proposed Guidelines sentencing range calculated in the

PSR. The base offense level for Aaron’s conviction under the

Sentencing Guidelines was 7, but the loss amount as

determined in the PSR increased that level by 18, to a total of

25. Following a reduction of 3 levels for acceptance of

responsibility, the PSR determined that Aaron’s total offense

level was 22. With a criminal history category of I, Aaron’s

Guidelines imprisonment range was 41 to 51 months.

Aaron filed objections to the PSR loss calculation. He

contested the relevant conduct, the proper burden of proof,

the number and identification of victims, and the loss amount

for sentencing. He also contested the loss amount and the

proper victims for restitution. The district court held a threeday evidentiary hearing to resolve the factual issues.

Following the hearing, the district court issued a written

order. Although Aaron argued that the clear and convincing

evidence standard applied, the court explicitly held that the

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 7

burden of proof that applied was preponderance of the

evidence. The court applied that standard to determine the

total loss amount for the purpose of calculating Aaron’s

sentence, including losses from other loans as relevant

conduct. The court found that Aaron Hymas had committed

fraud in the nineteen other loan applications and that the total

loss amount was $3,416,337.97, slightly less than the amount

calculated in the PSR. The district court agreed with the

PSR’s calculation of the Guidelines imprisonment range as 41

to 51 months. The district court subsequently sentenced

Aaron to 24 months in prison.

The amount of restitution proposed by the PSRs for each

defendant was $2,891,866.34. Aaron’s attorney specifically

objected to that calculation, but Tiffany’s did not. The

district court ultimately ordered restitution in the amounts of

$1,520,296.77 for Aaron and $667,505.42 for Tiffany.

II. Aaron’s Sentence

As described above, the district court applied the

preponderance of the evidence standard to calculate the total

loss amount resulting from Aaron’s relevant conduct. Aaron

contests the district court’s use of that standard, arguing that

the clear and convincing standard should have been applied

because the loss enhancements had a disproportionate impact

on the length of his sentence.

District courts generally use the “preponderance of the

evidence standard of proof when finding facts at sentencing,

such as the amount of loss caused by a fraud.” United States

v. Treadwell, 593 F.3d 990, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). The higher

clear and convincing standard may apply, however, “when a

sentencing factor has an extremely disproportionate effect on

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8 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

the sentence relative to the offense of conviction.” United

States v. Mezas de Jesus, 217 F.3d 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2000)

(citing United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 659 (9th Cir.

1991) (en banc)); see also Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1000. 

Particularly “where a severe sentencing enhancement is

imposed on the basis of uncharged or acquitted conduct, due

process may require clear and convincing evidence of that

conduct.” Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1000.

Our precedents “have not been a model of clarity in

deciding what analytical framework to employ when

determining whether a disproportionate effect on sentencing

may require the application of a heightened standard of

proof.” United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1048 (9th Cir.

2009). We have indicated that, “where the sentencing

enhancements are based on . . . the offense of conviction,” the

preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient. Id.

(citing United States v. Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d 1520,

1524 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

have also held that “there is no bright-line rule for the

disproportionate impact test;” instead, the court examines the

“totality of the circumstances” using six factors first

articulated in United States v. Valensia, 222 F.3d 1173 (9th

Cir. 2000) (“Valensia factors”).2 Berger, 587 F.3d at 1048

(citing United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.

2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the Valensia totality of the circumstances test, six

factors, none of which is dispositive, guide the determination

2 Our opinion in Valensia was vacated and remanded by the Supreme

Court, see United States v. Valensia, 532 U.S. 901 (2001), but we have

continued to use the factors articulated in the decision.

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 9

of whether a sentencing factor has a disproportionate impact

on the sentence:

(1) whether the enhanced sentence falls within

the maximum sentence for the crime alleged

in the indictment; (2) whether the enhanced

sentence negates the presumption of

innocence or the prosecution's burden of proof

for the crime alleged in the indictment;

(3) whether the facts offered in support of the

enhancement create new offenses requiring

separate punishment; (4) whether the increase

in sentence is based on the extent of a

conspiracy; (5) whether an increase in the

number of offense levels is less than or equal

to four; and (6) whether the length of the

enhanced sentence more than doubles the

length of the sentence authorized by the initial

sentencing guideline range in a case where the

defendant would otherwise have received a

relatively short sentence.

Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1000.

We separate our consideration of the loss enhancement

here into two parts: (1) losses attributed to the loan that was

the subject of Count Four of the indictment, to which Aaron

pled guilty, and (2) losses attributed to the other loans.

1. Count Four Losses

Aaron pled guilty to Count Four of the indictment, which

involved a loan in the amount of $295,600. Applying the

preponderance of the evidence standard, the district court

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10 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

determined the loss to the lender on that loan to be

$162,758.79. That loss, by itself, enhanced Aaron’s total

offense calculation under the Sentencing Guidelines by 10

levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (providing for a 10-level

increase for losses over $120,000 but no more than

$200,000).

Notwithstanding the increase in the sentence, the loss

from Count Four stemmed from conduct for which Aaron

was convicted, alleviating the due process concerns discussed

above. The preponderance of the evidence standard was

sufficient for determining the actual extent of that loss. See

Harrison-Philpot, 978 F.2d at 1524.

We would reach the same conclusion applying the

Valensia factors. The maximum sentence authorized for wire

fraud was 20 years, and the sentence imposed was well below

that. The loss enhancement did not negate the presumption

of innocence or alter the burden of proof for wire fraud. See

Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1001. The facts offered in support of

the loss enhancement did not create a new offense that would

require separate punishment. See id. The fourth factor did

not apply because Aaron was not convicted for conspiracy.

The fifth and sixth factors arguably favor use of the clear

and convincing standard. The number of offense levels added

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 for a loss of more than $120,000 but

not more than $200,000 was 10. In pleading guilty, Aaron

did not acknowledge any particular loss amount, and that loss

enhancement was over 4 levels. Similarly, the length of the

Guidelines sentencing range based on that loss amount more

than doubled the length of sentence authorized by the initial

Guidelines range if no loss had been attributed to the

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 11

transaction. Aaron argues that these two factors alone were

sufficient to require the use of the heightened standard.

But the size of a loss enhancement, standing alone, does

not compel the use of the clear and convincing standard. 

Treadwell, 593 F.3d at 1001–02. In this instance, we

conclude that there were no serious due process concerns that

required application of a heightened standard, even

considering the Valensia factors, to the extent that the

sentence was based on the loan that was the subject of the

conviction. Aaron admitted the facts of the fraud that caused

the loan to be made. He also knew the size of the loan, and

that defined the potential extent of the loss. In that situation

it was not necessary to apply a heightened standard to protect

against a violation of due process.

2. Losses from Other Loans

The sentence imposed by the district court was not

entirely based on the loan that was the subject of the

conviction, however. The district court also used losses from

other loans to calculate Aaron’s total offense level, increasing

the total offense figure by an additional 8 levels. Based on

the principles articulated above, the clear and convincing

standard of proof should have been applied to determine the

amount of the losses from the other loans.

Aaron did not plead guilty to fraud for the other loans. 

He was not charged with a conspiracy, nor did he admit in his

plea agreement that he had participated in a scheme to

defraud involving multiple transactions. Losses from these

loans were based on conduct for which he was not convicted. 

Aaron did not have a guilt-phase trial where the government

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12 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

committed fraud on the other loan applications.

Similar to the analysis of Count Four, the fifth and sixth

Valensia factors support the use of the heightened standard

for the other loans, even though the first four factors may not

require that result. Inclusion of the losses from the other

loans ultimately resulted in an increase of 8 offense levels,

from 10 (based on the loss from the Count Four loan by itself)

to 18. This additional 8-level increase more than doubled the

Guidelines imprisonment range. Under our precedents, we

conclude that the district court should have employed a

heightened clear and convincing standard of proof with

regard to the losses from those other loans.

In United States v. Munoz, for example, we held that the

district court was required to use the clear and convincing

evidence standard when calculating losses from uncharged

conduct. 233 F.3d 1117, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000), superseded on

other grounds by statute as stated in United States v. Van

Alstyne, 584 F.3d 803, 817–18 (9th Cir. 2009). Two

defendants were indicted on ten counts but convicted of only

two counts of fraud in connection with specific sales of bus

shelters as part of a Ponzi scheme. Id. at 1123. The district

court, applying a preponderance of evidence standard,

included within the loss calculation the losses from hundreds

of sales made to other investors not included in the two

counts of conviction. Id. at 1124. We vacated the sentence

and remanded for resentencing, holding that, while the sales

to the other investors were relevant conduct, the heightened

standard of proof should have been used because the

enhancement had a “disproportionate effect on the sentence.” 

Id. at 1127. The same is true here.

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 13

The district court in this case concluded that the

appropriate standard of proof was preponderance of evidence

based upon a line of cases that applied that lower standard

when determining the extent of losses from a conspiracy. 

The decisions cited by the district court – Treadwell, 593 F.3d

at 1001; Berger, 587 F.3d at 1048–49; and United States v.

Armstead, 552 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2008) – hold that

where losses are based on the extent of a criminal conspiracy,

those losses need not be proven by clear and convincing

evidence because the defendants had the opportunity at trial

to challenge evidence of the extent of the fraud conspiracy.

In this case, however, the government did not charge

Aaron with a conspiracy to defraud that included the other

acts of fraud alleged in the indictment. He only pled guilty to

one count of fraud regarding a specific loan transaction. He

had neither need nor opportunity to contest the alleged

conspiracy, and he cannot be sentenced using the lower

standard as if he had challenged a conspiracy charge.

To be sure, the allegations against the Hymases bore

similarities to a conspiracy, and the multiple counts

resembled each other by alleging similar misrepresentations

in similar loan applications. But the representations were not

identical in all applications. Most of the losses included in

the district court’s calculation were based on loans that did

not contain the specific false representations in Count Four

acknowledged in the Plea Agreement. Even as to the loan

applications that included the same statements, Aaron argues

with justification that his admission that the statements were

false in 2007 did not mean he admitted that those same

statements were false in earlier years, before the family’s

financial circumstances deteriorated.

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14 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

The government argues that, even if the district court

applied the wrong standard, its decision to impose a 24-month

sentence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the

sentence varied significantly below the guidelines range. We

decline to engage in such guesswork. It is true that the

district court might have made the same loss calculation

applying the clear and convincing standard, but it might not

have, either. The court made a point of stating that it was

applying the preponderance standard, and the court’s

emphasis on the standard could imply that a higher standard

would have resulted in a different loss calculation. 

Sometimes a district court says in finding a loss amount that

it would reach the same result under either standard, but the

court in this instance did not.

Similarly, the district court might have imposed the same

sentence even if it had calculated a lower loss figure under

the clear and convincing standard and, as a result, a lower

sentencing Guidelines range, but that possible outcome is too

uncertain for us to rely upon it. It is also inconsistent with

our normal approach to sentencing. “[T]he district court must

correctlycalculate the recommended Guidelines sentence and

use that recommendation as the ‘starting point and initial

benchmark.’” United States v. Munoz-Camarena, 631 F.3d

1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (quoting Kimbrough

v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). We cannot say on this record that the failure

to calculate the correct recommended Guidelines sentence

was harmless error because the district court’s analysis for the

extent of the variance was not based on the correct range. Id.

at 1030–31. Accordingly, we vacate Aaron Hymas’s

sentence and remand the matter to the district court. On

remand, the court should apply the clear and convincing

standard in calculating losses attributable to the other loans.

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 15

3. Calculation of Losses from Loans

Aaron also argues that the district court erred by using the

amount realized from deficiency sales to calculate the losses

from the loans. We conclude that the district court correctly

calculated the losses by taking the principal amount of the

loan and subtracting any credits from the subsequent sale of

the property. See United States v. Morris, 744 F.3d 1373 (9th

Cir. 2014). Similarly, the district court did not err by

considering the losses submitted by successor lenders who

had purchased the loans. The losses to those lenders are

considered reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm because

the lenders purchased the loans “without an awareness of

[their] true value due to . . . fraud.” United States v. Yeung,

672 F.3d 594, 603 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other

grounds by Robers v. United States, 572 U.S. –, 134 S. Ct.

1854 (2014)). Although Yeung examined proximate cause in

the context of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act,

18 U.S.C. § 3663A, we see no reason why its reasoning

would not apply to determine losses in the sentencing context.

III. Restitution Order

The court reviews de novo the legality of a restitution

order, including the district court’s valuation method. Yeung,

672 F.3d at 600. Factual findings supporting an order of

restitution are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Chao

Fan Xu, 706 F.3d 965, 993 (9th Cir. 2013).3

3 Tiffany did not file objections to the PSR. The failure to object might

otherwise call for review under the “plain error” standard. We need not

consider that possibility, however, because we conclude that the district

court did not err at all. For a similar reason, we reject Tiffany’s argument

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, discussed below at 17–18.

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16 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires that

defendants be ordered to pay restitution to any victim

“directly and proximately harmed as a result of the

commission of an offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).4 The

district court properly determined that Aaron owed

$1,520,296.77 and Tiffany owed $667,505.42 in restitution.

While the district court limited the restitution Tiffany

owed to the amount in the loan applications submitted in her

name, the court held Aaron responsible for losses resulting

from loan applications submitted under the names of Tiffany

and his brother-in-law in addition to the loans in his name

because he orchestrated all the loans. The testimony in the

record supports the district court’s findings that Aaron was

responsible for making the fraudulent statements on the loan

applications even if he himself did not sign them. 

Additionally, Aaron’s guilty plea conviction concerned a loan

in Tiffany’s name.

The record also supports the district court’s

determinations that the lenders listed in the PSR suffered

losses that were directly and proximately caused by the

Hymases’ conduct. The Hymases argue that successor

lenders were not victims entitled to restitution. This court has

already considered and rejected the argument that the sale of

loans to successive lenders breaks the chain of causation

between fraud on a loan application and the resulting loss. 

The Hymases’ fraud on the original loan application

proximately harmed each successor lender because that

4 The standard of proof for restitution proceedings is preponderance of

the evidence, as opposed to the standard of clear and convincing evidence

required for a sentencing enhancement with a disproportionate impact. 

18 U.S.C. § 3664(e).

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UNITED STATES V. HYMAS 17

lender purchased the loan “without an awareness of its true

value due to [the] fraud.” See Yeung, 672 F.3d at 603.

The Hymases also argue that the loan servicers listed in

the PSR did not themselves suffer losses. This argument was

not presented to the trial court, and it cannot be raised for the

first time on appeal. See United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d

1040, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2006). Although we may consider

newly-raised issues that are “purely legal,” this argument is

not purely legal because it requires fact-finding as to the

terms between the servicing entities and the successor holders

of the loan.5

The Hymases further argue that the amount of restitution

is too high because the drop in the market, not the fraud on

the loan applications, was responsible for the lenders’ losses. 

The Supreme Court has squarely rejected this argument,

concluding that fluctuations in propertyvalues are “common”

and “foreseeable,” and that a drop in the market does not

sever the link between the fraud and the lenders’ losses. 

Robers, 134 S. Ct. at 1859.

In connection with her challenge to the restitution order,

Tiffany argues that her appointed counsel in the proceedings

below was ineffective by failing to object to the loss and

restitution amount presented in the PSR. Although it seems

doubtful that trial counsel’s performance could have been

deficient because the district court substantially decreased her

 

5

 The servicing entities, even if they do not own the loan outright, may

be considered to be the entity “designated by the owner” to receive the

restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b)(1)(A) (The court may order a defendant

to “return the property to the owner ofthe property or someone designated

by the owner.”)

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18 UNITED STATES V. HYMAS

restitution amount from the figure proposed in the PSR, we

need not address that question because we have already

concluded that the district court did not err with respect to

calculating Tiffany’s restitution amount. Trial counsel’s

objection would not have produced a different result. See

Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 942 (9th Cir. 2013).

IV. Conclusion

We vacate Aaron Hymas’s sentence and remand to the

district court for further proceedings. We affirm the district

court’s restitution order as to both defendants.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND

REMANDED IN PART.

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