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Parties Involved:
Michael Nash
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 18, 2016

Decided March 18, 2016

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2188

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL NASH,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

Hammond Division.

No. 2:13CR56-001

Philip P. Simon,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Michael Nash pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to defraud the United States, 

18 U.S.C. § 286, and aggravated identity theft, id. §§ 2, 1028A(a)(1), after he used others’ 

personal information to file false tax returns with the IRS and collect the resulting 

refunds. Nash was sentenced to 48 months’ imprisonment for the conspiracy to defraud 

and a consecutive 24 months’ imprisonment for the identity theft. Despite an appeal 

waiver, Nash appealed. His lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to 

withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel has submitted a brief 

that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind 

might be expected to involve; Nash declined to respond to counsel’s motion,

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-2188 Page 2

see CIR. R. 51(b). Because counsel’s analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review 

to the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 

2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).

Counsel informs us that Nash “may wish to challenge his plea,” so counsel first 

considers whether Nash could argue that his plea was not valid. See United States v. 

Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 

(7th Cir. 2002). Before sentencing, Nash had moved to withdraw his guilty plea, 

asserting that it “was not freely and voluntarily given” and that he was innocent. But 

new counsel later was appointed for Nash, and he withdrew the motion. We agree with 

counsel that any challenge to the validity of Nash’s plea would be frivolous. First, Nash 

waived any challenge to the knowingness and voluntariness of his guilty plea when he 

withdrew his motion making that very challenge. See United States v. Tichenor, 683 F.3d 

358, 363 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[W]ithdrawal of an objection generally results in a waiver of 

that argument on appeal.” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. United States, 343 F.3d 

927, 928 (8th Cir. 2003) (claim in defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion waived because it 

replicated claim in his withdrawn plea-withdrawal motion). And even if the argument 

were not waived, the district court ensured that Nash’s plea was knowing and voluntary 

by complying with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in the plea colloquy: the court 

advised Nash that he was under oath and could be separately charged with perjury; 

addressed the nature of the charges against him, the statutory maximum and minimum 

penalties, the trial rights he was forgoing, and the role of the sentencing guidelines; and 

explained the consequences of the appeal waiver. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b); United States 

v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 

(7th Cir. 1997).

It follows, says counsel, that the entire appeal is frivolous. We agree. An appeal 

waiver stands or falls with the guilty plea. See United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 

(7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Sakellarion, 649 F.3d 634, 639 (7th Cir. 2011). Because 

Nash’s guilty plea was valid, we must enforce his waiver. The district court did not rely 

on any impermissible factors in sentencing, and Nash’s sentences do not exceed the 

statutory maximums for his crimes. See Dowell v. United States, 694 F.3d 898, 901–02 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). Moreover, as 

counsel correctly points out, any challenge to Nash’s conditions of supervised release is 

also foreclosed by the waiver. See United States v. Campbell, No. 15-1188, 2016 WL 685119, 

at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). If problems later arise with these conditions, Nash may seek 

modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See Campbell, 2016 WL 685119, at *3; 

United States v. Neal, 810 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 2016).

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Finally, counsel tells us that Nash has voiced “dissatisfaction with his attorney’s 

performance in counseling him to enter into the plea.” But counsel properly recognizes 

that claims of ineffective assistance are best raised in a collateral proceeding where an 

evidentiary foundation can be developed. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 

504–05 (2003); United States v. Flores, 739 F.3d 337, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2014).

We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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