Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01206/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01206-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin R. Imes
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

IN RE KEVIN R. IMES

______________________ 

2014-1206

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Application No. 

09/874,423. 

______________________ 

Decided: January 29, 2015 

______________________ 

JOHN S. ARTZ, Dickinson Wright PLLC, of Troy, Michigan, for appellant. Of counsel were BRYAN JOSEPH 

SCHOMER and FRANK MICHAEL SMITH. 

NATHAN K. KELLEY, Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor, 

United States Patent and Trademark Office, of Alexandria, Virginia, for appellee. With him on the brief were

THOMAS W. KRAUSE, Deputy Solicitor, JOSEPH G. PICCOLO 

and JOSEPH MATAL, Associate Solicitors. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, MOORE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

Kevin Imes’s U.S. patent application no. 09/874,423 is 

directed to a device for communicating digital camera 

image and video information over a network. The Patent 

Case: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/29/2015
2 IN RE IMES

Trial and Appeal Board affirmed the examiner’s rejections 

of all pending claims 1-14 and 16-47 as either anticipated 

by or obvious over various references. On appeal, Mr. 

Imes challenges only the rejections of independent claims 

1, 34, and 43 and of their dependent claims 2-5, 35-42, 

and 44-47, by virtue of their dependence from the independent claims. He does not challenge the rejections of 

claims 6-14 and 16-33. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4). For the reasons discussed below, we 

reverse and remand. 

I. Rejection of Claims 1-5 

Independent claim 1 recites an electronic device including a memory for storing digital images, a display for 

displaying the images, and an input device for receiving a 

request for communication. The device includes a housing 

that stores first and second wireless communication 

modules. The first wireless communication module is a 

cellular communication module, and the second wireless 

communication module is a “low power high-speed” communication module. 

The examiner rejected claim 1 and dependent claims 

2-5 as obvious over the combination of U.S. Patent Nos. 

6,762,791 (Schuetzle), 6,223,190 (Aihara), and 7,173,651 

(Knowles). The central dispute is whether Schuetzle 

discloses a second wireless communication module. 

Schuetzle discloses a system where a camera 30 can send 

image information to a computer system 20 via a wireless 

communication interface, via a tethered interface, and/or 

by inserting a removable memory card 35 into system 20. 

Schuetzle col. 1 ll. 20-30, col. 4 ll. 16-25, Fig. 1 (below). 

Case: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 2 Filed: 01/29/2015
IN RE IMES 3

The examiner found that Schuetzle’s wireless communication interface in Figure 1 discloses the first wireless communications module and that Schuetzle’s 

removable memory card 35 discloses the second wireless 

communications module. The examiner concluded that 

removable memory card 35 was “wireless” because to 

communicate information to computer system 20, it “must 

be removed from [camera] 30 and inserted into the computer system 20. In other words, no wire is utilized.” J.A. 

175 (emphasis added). The examiner thus construed 

“wireless” as including communication along the metal 

contacts of the removable memory card and the computer 

system when the memory card is inserted into the computer. According to the examiner, the metal contacts are 

not a wire. The Board affirmed the rejection, noting that 

Schuetzle’s “wireless data communication transfer from a 

removable media card” discloses a “wireless communication module.” 

We review the Board’s factual findings for substantial 

evidence and its legal conclusions de novo. In re Kotzab, 

Case: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/29/2015
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217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In this case, we 

review the Board’s claim construction de novo.1 

We hold that the Board erred in concluding that 

Schuetzle’s removable memory card 35 discloses the 

claimed second wireless communication module. Whether 

removable memory card 35 is a wireless communication 

module turns on the construction of the term “wireless.” 

The Patent Office’s construction of “wireless” to include

communications along metal contacts of the removable 

memory card and the computer system is inconsistent 

with the broadest reasonable interpretation in view of the 

specification. The construction of “wireless” is straightforward. The ’423 application expressly and unambiguously defines wireless: “[w]ireless refers to a 

communications, monitoring, or control system[] in which 

electromagnetic or acoustic waves carry a signal through 

atmospheric space rather than along a wire.” ’423 application p. 46 l. 26 - p. 47 l. 1. The ’423 application consistently uses the term “wireless” to refer to methods and 

devices that carry waves through atmospheric space, such 

as Bluetooth and various cellular protocols. E.g., id. p. 15 

l. 20 - p. 16 l. 29, 46 ll. 20-25. The metal contacts of a 

removable memory card do not carry a signal through 

atmospheric space using electromagnetic or acoustic 

waves, and thus removable memory card 35 is not a 

wireless communication module under the broadest 

reasonable interpretation of that term in view of the 

specification. 

For the first time on appeal, the Patent Office advances an additional theory for why removable card 35 

1 Nothing in this case implicates the deference to 

fact findings contemplated by the recent decision in Teva 

Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 

841-42 (2015). 

 

Case: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 4 Filed: 01/29/2015
IN RE IMES 5

discloses the second wireless communications module. 

Under this new theory, the Patent Office argues that 

memory 34 and removable card 35 can each communicate 

their data wirelessly through camera 30’s wireless communication interface, such that memory 34 coupled with 

the wireless communication interface forms a first wireless communication module and removable card 35 coupled with the same wireless communication interface 

forms a second wireless communication module. This 

rationale was not articulated by the examiner or the 

Board, and we will not consider it for the first time on 

appeal. Even if the Board had used this reasoning below, 

it would have constituted a new ground of rejection because it relies on “new facts and rationales not previously 

raised to the applicant by the examiner.” In re Leithem, 

661 F.3d 1316, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011). We therefore reverse the rejection of claims 1-5 without considering the 

Patent Office’s new rationale articulated for the first time 

on appeal. 

II. Rejections of Claims 34-42 and Claims 43-47

Independent claims 34 and 43 each recite a communications device comprising, among other features, a “communications module . . . operable to wirelessly 

communicate streaming video to a destination.” The 

examiner rejected claim 34 as anticipated by Knowles and 

claim 43 as obvious over Knowles in view of U.S. Patent 

No. 7,372,485 (Bodnar). The examiner found that 

Knowles discloses the recited communications module 

operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a 

destination. Knowles discloses a wireless digital camera 

system that transmits images over the Internet. Knowles

col. 6 ll. 23-29. Knowles’s camera system allows a user to 

take multiple consecutive still images and queues the 

images so that they can be serially transmitted to a server

while allowing the user to take subsequent pictures 

without waiting for the previous picture to be transmitCase: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/29/2015
6 IN RE IMES

ted. Id. Figs. 12, 18, col. 10 ll. 6-48, col. 12 l. 36 - col. 13 l. 

29. The server then transmits the images via e-mail. Id. 

col. 13 ll. 48-60. Noting that Figure 12 of Knowles shows 

a repetitive loop where images are transmitted so long as 

they are in the queue, the examiner concluded that 

Knowles discloses “streaming video.” The examiner 

explained that “[a] continuous process of sending images 

is the equivalent of streaming video.” J.A. 154-55. The 

examiner also noted that Knowles discloses that its 

invention can be implemented on a Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook that incorporates a digital camera. The examiner 

then cited a press release explaining that the Sony Vaio 

C1 Picturebook can send both still images and digital 

video clips over the Internet as e-mail attachments. 

The Board affirmed. It construed “operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a destination” as 

“capable of wirelessly communicating continuous video 

transmission.” Like the examiner, it determined that the 

Figure 12 embodiment of Knowles and the implementation on a Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook disclose this limitation. 

We see no error in the Board’s construction of the 

streaming video limitation as “capable of wirelessly 

communicating continuous video transmission.” There is, 

however, no substantial evidence supporting its determination that Knowles discloses streaming video. Knowles 

discloses a system that sends a series of individual still 

images as e-mail attachments. Sending a series of e-mails 

with attached still images is not the same as streaming 

video. Such a construction is unreasonable as it comports 

with neither the plain meaning of the term nor the specification. Streaming video is the continuous transmission 

of video. A series of e-mails with attachments does not 

meet the definition of “streaming” and still images do not 

meet the definition of “video.” 

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The ’423 application consistently distinguishes image 

transmission from video transmission, as does the prior 

art cited by the Patent Office. The ’423 application repeatedly describes embodiments where an “image,” “digital image,” or “image information” is communicated over 

the Internet. See, e.g., ’423 application p. 10 l. 12 - p. 16 l. 

11, p. 19 l. 7 - p. 20 l. 12, p. 24 l. 13 - p. 25 l. 5. It also 

repeatedly associates these “images” with still pictures 

such as “photos” or “photographs.” E.g., id. p. 7 ll. 10-12, 

p. 26 ll. 6-13, p. 28 ll. 8-18, p. 30 ll. 2-15, p. 31 ll. 7-23, p. 

37 ll. 2-12, p. 41 l. 26 - p. 42 l. 16. The embodiments 

disclosing transmission of images do not in any way 

disclose transmission of video. In contrast, only two 

embodiments in the ’423 application (one of which is the 

claimed streaming embodiment) disclose transmitting 

“streaming video,” “video files,” or “video information.” 

Id. p. 21 l. 6 - p. 22 l. 15, p. 32 ll. 7-13. The video embodiments describe sending video of a wedding so that a user 

can attend “the event in a ‘virtual’ manner,” id. p. 22 ll. 4-

12, or communicating video of a baseball game captured 

with a digital video recorder, id. p. 32 ll. 7-13. The Sony 

Vaio press release cited by the Patent Office similarly 

distinguishes between images and video, disclosing a 

camera “that can capture digital still images as well as 

video clips.” J.A. 239. These distinctions in the specification and prior art support the common-sense conclusion 

that image transmission is not the same as video transmission. Thus, Knowles’s disclosure of sending a series of 

e-mails with images attached does not disclose streaming 

video. 

We also hold that substantial evidence does not support the Patent Office’s finding that Knowles’s reference 

to a Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook discloses the streaming 

video limitation. Knowles itself indicates that its invention may be implemented on a number of different devices, including the Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook. Knowles col. 

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6 l. 61 - col. 7 l. 13. Knowles does not mention any specific 

features of the Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook other than that 

it incorporates a digital camera. Id. col. 7 ll. 10-12. 

Instead, the examiner relied on a press release in which 

Sony announced its new Vaio notebook computer to show 

the inherent characteristics of the Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook. In particular, this press release indicates that the 

digital camera is capable of capturing digital still images 

and video clips and sending them as attachments to email messages. J.A. 239-40. A second reference may be 

used to show that a feature is inherent in a first reference 

if the first reference is silent with regard to the inherent 

feature. See Continental Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto 

Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268-69 (Fed. Cir. 1991). However, 

the evidence must make clear that the missing characteristic is “necessarily present” in the first reference. Id. 

Here, the Sony Vaio press release does not disclose that

the Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook is capable of “streaming 

video” or “continuous video transmission.” The press 

release only discloses that the Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook 

can send out “digital video clips and still pictures . . . 

attached to e-mail messages.” Sending out an e-mail 

message with a video file attached does not disclose 

streaming video or, as construed, continuous video transmission. In fact, the ’423 application distinguishes between streaming video and sending a video file: “a user 

may want to wirelessly communicate streaming video or a 

video file.” ’423 application p. 21 ll. 22-23 (emphasis 

added). The Sony Vaio press release does not discuss 

streaming or continuous transmission of anything—it 

merely discloses sending a video file as an attachment to 

an e-mail. 

Nowhere in the record did the examiner or the Board 

explain how implementing Knowles’s disclosed image 

transmission method on a Sony Vaio C1 Picturebook 

discloses streaming video or continuous video transmisCase: 14-1206 Document: 64-2 Page: 8 Filed: 01/29/2015
IN RE IMES 9

sion. Instead, both the Board and the examiner found 

that Knowles discloses continuous image transmission 

and that Knowles can be implemented on the Sony Vaio 

C1 Picturebook, which is capable of sending video files via 

email. J.A. 6, 9-10, 154-55. These two findings do not 

provide substantial evidence that Knowles discloses, 

expressly, inherently, or even implicitly, streaming video 

capabilities. For these reasons, we hold that the Board 

erred in concluding that Knowles discloses the claimed 

“communications module . . . operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a destination.” 

CONCLUSION

Because the Board incorrectly construed “wireless” 

and its rejection of claims 1-5 is not supported under the 

correct construction, and because the Board’s conclusion 

that Knowles discloses a communications module operable to wirelessly communicate streaming video to a destination is not supported by substantial evidence, we 

reverse the rejections of claims 1-5 and 34-47 and remand. 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

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