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Parties Involved:
Warren D. Turner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 7, 1997 Decided July 25, 1997 

No. 96-3096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WARREN D. TURNER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00005-01)

David B. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Theodore C. Marcus, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant 

U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

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Before: SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: After losing a motion to suppress 

evidence found in the trunk of his car, appellant Warren 

Turner entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of 

possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of 

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 

841(b)(1)(A)(iii). As part of his plea agreement, Turner preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his 

motion to suppress. The issue presented on this appeal is 

whether United States Park Police officers lawfully searched 

the trunk in which the evidence was found. We conclude that 

they did and affirm the district court's denial of appellant's 

motion to suppress.

I

On December 6, 1995, United States Park Police Officer 

William Sepeck stopped Mr. Turner's car because it did not 

have a license plate on its front bumper. As Officer Sepeck 

approached the car, Turner rolled down the window, and the 

officer noticed a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating 

from inside. Officer Sepeck asked Turner to produce his 

driver's license and registration. Turner produced a temporary registration, but could not produce his license.

Looking through Turner's open window, Officer Sepeck 

saw torn pieces of cigar tobacco in Turner's lap, on the seat 

between Turner's legs, and on the floor at Turner's feet. In 

the officer's experience, these observations were consistent 

with marijuana use. He believed they indicated that a hollowed out cigar "blunt" had been used as a receptacle for 

smoking marijuana. Through another window, Sepeck also 

observed on the floor directly behind Turner's seat a clear 

plastic bag of green, weed-like material, which he believed to 

be marijuana itself.

Based on these observations, Officer Sepeck asked Turner 

for his car keys. After obtaining the keys, Sepeck tossed 

them to a second officer who had arrived on the scene, and 

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asked that officer to search the car's trunk for more marijuana. When the second officer discovered there was no trunk 

key on the ring, Officer Sepeck asked Turner to take off his 

shoes. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer 

Sepeck testified that in his experience, when a trunk key is 

missing, it often is concealed on the person's body, including 

in his shoes. Tr. at 12. As Officer Sepeck predicted, the 

trunk key was in the sole of Turner's left shoe. The second 

officer then searched the trunk, finding $825 in small bills and 

a 62-gram chunk of cocaine base ("crack").

Appellant moved to suppress the evidence found in the 

trunk. He argued that the traffic stop leading to the search 

had been pretextual, and that the search had been made 

without a warrant. At the close of the suppression hearing, 

Turner largely abandoned the pretext argument, and asserted instead that the shoe search that produced the trunk key 

had been conducted without probable cause. The government argued that the car had not been stopped on pretext; 

that the key was found as part of a lawful search incident to 

arrest; and that the trunk search came within the scope of 

warrantless automobile searches authorized by the Supreme 

Court in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). Tr. at 

45. The district court agreed, and denied Turner's motion to 

suppress. Id. at 46. Thereafter, Turner entered a conditional plea of guilty, preserving the right to appeal the denial of 

his motion to suppress.

II

On appeal, Turner does not renew the arguments he made 

below. Instead, he argues that the search of his trunk 

exceeded the scope of warrantless searches authorized in 

Ross, because the officers lacked probable cause to believe 

there would be contraband in the trunk.1 The government 

__________

1 Turner also challenges what he believes to be the district 

court's holding that the search of his trunk was authorized by 

another exception to the warrant requirement, the "search incident 

to arrest" doctrine, an exception which is limited to a car's passenger compartment. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.4 

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argues that, because Turner failed to raise this particular 

Fourth Amendment challenge in the district court, the court's 

ruling should be affirmed unless it was "plain error"that is, 

an error "so obvious and substantial" or so "serious and 

manifest that it affects the very integrity of the trial process." 

See In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

While conceding that he did not make this particular challenge below, Turner argues it was sufficient that he moved 

for suppression of the evidence based on the absence of a 

warrant. Once he did so, Turner contends, it was the government's burden to show the search came within the scope of 

warrantless searches authorized by Ross, not his burden to 

show it did not. Appellant's Reply Br. at 1 (citing United 

States v. Hough, 944 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 1996)). Moreover, he notes, the government did in fact argue that the 

search came within the scope of Ross and the district court so 

held. Id. at 2 (citing Tr. at 45). Under these circumstances, 

Turner contends, this Court should determine de novo whether the search of the trunk was lawful. See generally United 

States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551, 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

This dispute over the appropriate standard of review need 

not detain us, however, as we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the district court's determination.

III

In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), the 

Supreme Court established an exception to the Fourth 

Amendment's warrant requirement, holding that a warrantless search of an automobile, stopped by police officers who 

had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband, was not unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 

Amendment. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), 

__________

(1981). We, however, do not read the district court's decision as 

relying on the search incident to arrest doctrine to support the 

trunk search. Rather, the court relied on that doctrine to authorize 

seizure of the key from Turner's shoe, while relying on Ross to 

support the "search of every part of the vehicle and its contents, 

including the trunk." Tr. at 46.

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the Court considered the breadth of that exception, holding 

that the "scope of a warrantless search of an automobile ... 

is defined by the object of the search and the places in which 

there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." 

Ross, 456 U.S. at 824. "If probable cause justifies the search 

of a lawfully stopped vehicle," the Court stated, "it justifies 

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that 

may conceal the object of the search." Id. at 825. See also 

California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 570, 579-80 (1991). 

Thus, the question for consideration here is whether the 

police had probable cause to believe that contraband may 

have been in the trunk of Mr. Turner's car or, as the Ross

Court put it, whether the trunk was one of several parts of 

the vehicle that "might contain the object of the search." 456 

U.S. at 821.

On appeal, the government relies on three pieces of evidence to establish probable cause: the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the car, the pieces of torn cigar paper 

arrayed around Turner, and the ziplock bag of green weed 

material found on the floor behind his seat. Government's 

Br. at 11-12.2 The government argues that these three 

pieces of evidence, together with Officer Sepeck's experience 

and training in traffic and narcotics enforcement, formed a 

"totality of circumstances" sufficient to meet the requirements of probable cause: that is, "a fair probability that 

contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found," Illinois 

__________

2 Before actually opening the car's trunk, Officer Sepeck also 

learned a fourth factthat Mr. Turner had hidden the trunk key in 

his shoe. If we were to consider that fact here, it would greatly 

simplify the probable cause determination, as it points suspicion 

directly at the trunk. But the government does not rely on the 

trunk key's location as part of the probable cause for the search, 

apparently because it thinks it fatal that the key was not discovered 

until after the officer had formulated an intent to search the trunk 

and after he had been thwarted by the key's absence. Because this 

issue was not presented, we do not decide whether the government 

was correct in concluding that it could not rely on the key, and 

instead limit ourselves to considering only the three pieces of 

evidence proffered to us.

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v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), elsewhere in the car, 

including in its trunk.

Turner does not dispute the legality of the manner in which 

any of these pieces of evidence came to the officer's attention. 

Nor does he dispute that these facts established probable 

cause to believe additional marijuana might be found elsewhere in the passenger compartment of the car, or that if 

another kind of evidence (for example, a larger quantity of 

narcotics) had been found in the passenger compartment, it 

could have constituted probable cause to believe additional 

contraband might be found in the trunk. Appellant's Br. at 6. 

Turner argues, however, that the observations made by Officer Sepeck constituted evidence of nothing more than personal use of marijuana, and that a person who uses rather than 

distributes drugs would keep them within his control, either 

on his person or in his immediate vicinity, and not in his 

trunk. Id. at 6-7. Hence, he contends, in this case there was 

no probable cause to believe additional drugs would be found 

in the trunk.

The line appellant seeks to draw is too fine. While it may 

be true that evidence of narcotics distribution would constitute even stronger cause to believe additional contraband had 

been secreted in the trunk, the evidence in this case was 

sufficient to establish a "fair probability" that Turner might 

have hidden additional drugs not necessary for his current 

consumption in areas out of plain sight, including the trunk of 

the car. The testimony of Officer Sepeck at the suppression 

hearing, based on his experience in narcotics and traffic 

enforcement, supports that conclusion. Tr. at 11, 24-25.

Those federal courts that have considered the "personal 

use" argument have rejected it, and have upheld trunk 

searches on evidence similar to that found here. See United 

States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208, 210-11 (10th Cir. 1986) (smell 

of still-burning marijuana cigarette butts and a small bag of 

marijuana supported trunk search); United States v. Burnett,

791 F.2d 64, 67 (6th Cir. 1986) (small amount of marijuana on 

floorboard of passenger compartment provided probable 

cause to search trunk). See also United States v. Reed, 882 

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F.2d 147, 149 (5th Cir. 1989) (odor of burnt marijuana justified search of entire vehicle, including locked compartment in 

rear of station wagon); United States v. Hough, 944 F. Supp. 

20, 23 & n.2 (D.D.C. 1996) (smell of marijuana and discarded 

marijuana cigarettes on floor of car provided probable cause 

to search entire car including trunk).

Although the Supreme Court has not considered this question directly, it did consider a similar set of facts in Robbins v. 

California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981). In Robbins, California 

Highway Patrol officers stopped a station wagon that had 

been operating erratically. When the driver opened the door, 

the officers smelled marijuana smoke. A pat-down of the 

driver produced a vial of liquid, and a search of the passenger 

compartment yielded marijuana "as well as equipment for 

using it." Id. at 422. With nothing more than this evidence 

of marijuana use, the officers opened the tailgate of the 

station wagon, lifted the cover of a recessed luggage compartment set flush in the deck, and discovered two packages 

wrapped in opaque plastic. They unwrapped the packages 

and found that each contained fifteen pounds of marijuana. 

Id.

In Robbins, the Supreme Court held that the opaque 

plastic packages should not have been opened without a 

warrant, 453 U.S. at 428a holding later disavowed in Ross, 

456 U.S. at 824. The Robbins Court, however, did not 

question the officers' authority to open the station wagon's 

luggage compartment in the first place. To the contrary, 

although it was not a focus of the case, the Court stated that 

the two bricks of marijuana had been discovered "during a 

lawful search of the petitioner's car." Robbins, 453 U.S. at 

428. And, while Ross later disapproved the disposition in 

Robbins insofar as it required a warrant for opening the 

packages, it reaffirmed that the search for and discovery of 

the packages inside the luggage compartment had been legitimate. Ross, 456 U.S. at 817, 824. Although there are 

distinctions between a station wagon's luggage compartment 

and a car's trunk, they both are sufficiently outside the 

control of the vehicle's occupants for us to read Robbins and 

Ross as authorizing the trunk search at issue here.

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IV

Turner acknowledges that there are "no federal cases 

supporting [his] position that have the same facts." Appellant's Br. at 11. He contends, however, that two cases are 

"close." Id. at 11-12 (citing United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 

1487 (10th Cir. 1993), and United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 

1102, 1107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 

155 (1993)). He also contends that language in United States 

v. Ross, 456 U.S. at 824, and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 

at 580, is consistent with his position. None of Turner's 

citations, however, supports overturning the decision of the 

district court here.

In United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 

1993), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 

Circuit held that an officer's testimony that he smelled burnt 

marijuana in the passenger compartment of the defendant's 

car, without physical corroboration, provided insufficient 

probable cause to search the trunk. In Nielsen, however, the 

court's principal concern was with the credibility of such an 

uncorroborated observation by an untrained "human sniffer." 

Id. At the same time, the Tenth Circuit confirmed its 

previous rejection of the " 'personal use' argument," id. at 

1490, and distinguished Nielsen from the earlier case of 

United States v. Loucks, 806 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1986), where 

it had upheld a trunk search after the officer both smelled 

and found corroborating evidence of small amounts of marijuana in the passenger compartmentthe same kind of evidence the government proffers here. In a subsequent case, 

the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the position taken in Loucks,

holding that a police officer had probable cause to search the 

trunk of a car "when he smelled burned marijuana in the car 

and found corroborating evidence of contraband [a rolled-up 

dollar bill with a white powder residue, and a marijuana 

cigarette] on defendant." United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 

1444, 1450 (10th Cir. 1995).

In the second case cited by appellant, United States v. 

Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 

___, 114 S. Ct. 155 (1993), the Fifth Circuit upheld a trunk 

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search based on evidence of drug usea glass pipe with 

cocaine residueas well as apparent modification of a rear 

seat to allow trunk access. The pipe had been found after a 

drug detection dog alerted to the presence of narcotics in the 

passenger compartment. The court held that the pipe provided probable cause to search the trunk, Seals, 987 F.2d at 

1107, but suggested in dictum that if the sole evidence 

providing probable cause had been the dog's alerting to the 

passenger compartment, only a search of that compartment 

would have been justified. Id. at 1107 n.8. The distinction, 

the court said, was "between probable cause to believe that 

drugs are in a particular section of the car, and probable 

cause to believe that drugs are generally within the car." Id.

In the former circumstance, the court suggested, only that 

particular section could be searched; in the latter, any part of 

the car that could conceal the drugs would be subject to 

search.

This same distinction is at the heart of the language in 

Ross to which appellant draws our attention. Although in 

Ross the Court found that the police "had probable cause to 

search respondent's entire vehicle," 456 U.S. at 817, it noted a 

circumstance in which that would not have been true: "Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a 

taxi contains contraband or evidence," the Supreme Court 

said, "does not justify a search of the entire cab." Id. at 824. 

The Court's example was not hypothetical, but rather a 

reference to the container placed in the taxi in the case of 

Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), the facts of which 

were described earlier in Ross. In Sanders, the police had 

been advised by a reliable informant that Sanders would 

arrive at the airport carrying a green suitcase containing 

marijuana. He did in fact arrive with a green suitcase, and 

the police observed him placing it in the trunk of a taxi. The 

relationship between the suitcase and the taxi was "coincidental," the Ross Court noted, and "no danger existed that its 

contents could have been secreted elsewhere in the vehicle." 

456 U.S. at 813 & n.17. Under those circumstances, the Ross

Court said, the police in Sanders did not have "probable 

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cause to search the vehicle or anything within it except the 

... green suitcase...." Id. at 814.3

In California v. Acevedo, the Supreme Court returned once 

again to this distinction between probable cause to believe 

contraband is in a specific location, and probable cause to 

believe that it may be in some unknown location within a 

vehicle. While upholding the warrantless seizure of a bag in 

a trunk, the Acevedo Court stated that the "facts in the 

record reveal that the police did not have probable cause to 

believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the 

automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been 

without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment." 500 U.S. at 580. In Acevedo, as in Sanders,

the police had been following a particular parcel of drugs

one the police actually had intercepted, examined, and resealedand had watched as the suspect bag was placed in the 

trunk. The government did not argue that it had reason to 

suspect additional drugs were anywhere else in the car, and 

indeed did not search anywhere else in the car. Under those 

circumstances, the Court said, probable cause to search extended to the bag alone. Id.

Unfortunately for Turner, his case is not comparable to the 

dicta of Seals, Ross or Acevedo. Here, "suspicion was not 

directed at a specific container," Ross, 456 U.S. at 814, 

whether by drug dog, informant, or police surveillance.4

__________

3

In Sanders, the Court also noted that, although there was 

probable cause to search the suitcase, that probable cause existed 

before the suitcase was placed inside the automobile. Hence, the 

Court said, the automobile exception did not apply and a warrant 

was required. Subsequently, in California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 

(1991), the Court disapproved this aspect of Sanders, holding that 

the police may search any container found in an automobile without 

a warrant "if their search is supported by probable cause." Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 579.

4 This case is different from the circumstances discussed in 

Ross for another reason as well. Here, the question is not just 

whether probable cause to believe there are drugs in one part of a 

car can provide probable cause to believe they may be in another, 

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Rather, as was true in Ross itself, in this case the police had 

probable cause to search "every part of the vehicle and its 

contents that may conceal the object of the search." Id. at 

825. Neither logic nor case law excludes Mr. Turner's trunk 

from the list of such locations. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment of the district court.

__________

but whether an actual finding of drugs in one location supplies 

probable cause to believe there may be additional drugs in another.

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