Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05013/USCOURTS-caDC-14-05013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Electronic Privacy Information Center
Appellee
United States Department of Homeland Security
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 11, 2014 Decided February 10, 2015

No. 14-5013

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,

APPELLEE

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00260)

Adam C. Jed, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Stuart F.

Delery, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald C. Machen, U.S.

Attorney, and Sharon Swingle, Attorney.

Marc Rotenberg argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee. 

Before: ROGERS, Circuit Judge, and SENTELLE and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to the Freedom of

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Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Electronic

Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) requested release by the

Department of Homeland Security of Standard Operating

Procedure 303 (“SOP 303”), which the Department describes as

a protocol for shutting down wireless networks during critical

emergencies. When the Department released only a heavily

redacted version, EPIC successfully sued to compel disclosure. 

See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 999 F.

Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2013) (“EPIC”). The Department appeals,

invoking FOIA Exemption 7(F) on the ground that production

of SOP 303 could reasonably be expected to endanger many

individuals’ lives or physical safety. Upon de novo review, we

hold that the plain text of Exemption 7(F) protects law

enforcement records the disclosure of which “could reasonably

be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any

individual,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F), during a critical

emergency, without requiring the withholding agency to

specifically identify the individuals who would be endangered,

and that much if not all of SOP 303 is exempt from disclosure. 

Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to

EPIC, and we remand the case for the district court to determine

whether any reasonably segregable portions of SOP 303 can be

disclosed.

I.

SOP 303 is an “Emergency Wireless Protocol” that codifies

a “unified voluntary process for the orderly shut-down and

restoration of wireless services during critical emergencies such

as the threat of radio-activated improvised explosive devices.” 

Decl. James Holzer, I, Senior Dir. FOIA Opns., Privacy Off.,

Dep’t Homeland Sec., ¶ 20, June 28, 2013; see Nat’l Sec.

Telecomm. Advisory Comm., Termination of Cellular Networks

During Emergency Situations, NSTAC Issue Review 2006-07,

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at 139 (2007) (“NSTAC Issue Review”).1

 After the 2005

bombings of the transportation system in London, England, in

which cellular telephones were used to detonate explosives

remotely, the President’s National Security Telecommunications

Advisory Committee identified the need for a “single

governmental process to coordinate determinations of if and

when cellular shutdown activities should be undertaken in light

of the serious impact on access by the public to emergency

communications services during these situations and the need to

preserve the public trust in the integrity of the communications

infrastructure.” Holzer Decl. ¶ 20; see also NSTAC Issue

Review, at 139. The National Coordinating Center for

Communications (“NCC”, formerly known as the NCC for

Telecommunications), part of the Department’s National

Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center,

developed SOP 303, under which the NCC “function[s] as the

focal point for coordinating any actions leading up to and

following the termination of private wireless network

connections.” NSTAC Issue Review, at 139. State Homeland

Security Advisors, or their designees, or representatives of the

Department’s Homeland Security Operations Center make the

decision to suspend cellular service. Id. Once one of these

entities requests a shutdown, the NCC “operate[s] as an

authenticating body, notifying the carriers in the affected area of

the decision.” Id. The NCC also “ask[s] the requestor a series

of questions to determine if the shutdown is a necessary action.” 

Id. “After making the determination that the shutdown is no

longer required, the NCC . . . initiate[s] a similar process to

reestablish service.” Id.

On July 10, 2012, EPIC submitted a FOIA request to the

1 Available at

http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2006-2007%20

NSTAC%20Issue%20Review_0.pdf.

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Department seeking the full text of SOP 303, the series of

questions used to determine whether a shutdown is necessary,

and any related protocols or guidelines. The Department

initially responded that it had conducted a comprehensive

search, but was unable to locate or identify any responsive

records. Following an administrative appeal, however, the

Department conducted another search and located one

responsive record: SOP 303. See Nat’l Coordinating Ctr. for

Telecomm. Standard Operating Procedure 303 (Sept. 25, 2009)

(“SOP 303”). The SOP included the full text of the predetermined series of questions that determines if a shutdown is

necessary, and the executing protocols related to the

implementation of SOP 303. Holzer Decl. ¶ 21.

Pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which protect

certain personal information, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6),

(b)(7)(C), the Department withheld from EPIC the names,

telephone numbers, and email addresses for state homeland

security officials contained in SOP 303. Aside from a sentence

explaining that SOP 303 “provides detailed procedures for the

[NCC] to coordinate requests for the disruption of cellular

service,” certain subsection headings, and the title of Appendix

E (“External Agency Cellular Service Disruption

Implementation Instructions”), essentially all of SOP 303 was

withheld pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 7(F) and 7(E), which

permit non-disclosure of certain law-enforcement information

that, respectively, “could reasonably be expected to endanger the

life or physical safety of any individual,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(F), or “would disclose techniques and procedures

for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions,” id.

§ 552(b)(7)(E).

On February 27, 2013, EPIC filed suit seeking the release

of SOP 303 in its entirety. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The

parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. In support of

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summary judgment, the Department submitted the Holzer

declaration asserting that SOP 303 was exempt from disclosure

under FOIA Exemption 7(F) because “[m]aking SOP 303 public

would, e.g., enable bad actors to insert themselves into the

process of shutting down or reactivating wireless networks by

appropriating verification methods and then impersonating

officials designated for involvement in the verification process.” 

Holzer Decl. ¶ 26. Such bad actors would, Holzer stated, then

“be [able] to disable the protocol [and] freely use wireless

networks to activate . . . improvised explosive devices,” so

“there is a reasonable expectation that disclosure could

reasonably endanger individuals’ lives or physical safety.” Id.

 Exemption 7(E) also applied because, according to Holzer, SOP

303 “contains a homeland security procedure primarily intended

to efficiently and effectively deter the triggering of

radio-activated improvised explosive devices,” and during such

critical emergencies “orderly deactivation of wireless networks

may be the best option for preventing and/or mitigating

explosions that would endanger life and property.” Id. ¶ 25. 

Holzer repeated the “bad actor” explanation for non-disclosure,

adding that SOP 303’s production could “circumvent or interfere

with a law enforcement strategy designed to prevent activation

of improvised explosive devices by providing information about

when shutdown procedures are used and how a shutdown is

executed.” Id.

The district court granted summary judgment for EPIC. 

EPIC, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 27, 29-34. Although concluding the

Department had satisfied Exemptions 7’s threshold requirement,

by showing that SOP 303 was compiled for law enforcement

purposes, id. at 29-30, the district court ruled that Exemption

7(F) was inapplicable because the Department had failed to

“identify the individuals [endangered by disclosure of SOP 303]

with some degree of specificity.” Id. at 32. The district court

acknowledged that an earlier version of Exemption 7(F) only

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protected records from disclosure if their production would

endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement

personnel in particular, see Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(b),

§ 552(b)(7), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974), and that in 1986

Congress had amended the exemption to allow non-disclosure

where production would endanger other persons, too, but

looking to the legislative history concluded Congress intended

only a modest expansion of the exemption. EPIC, 999 F. Supp.

2d at 32-34; see Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1802(a), § 552(b)(7),

100 Stat. 3207, 3255-56 (1986). The district court also ruled

that Exemption 7(E) did not apply because SOP 303 was not a

technique or procedure for law enforcement investigations or

prosecutions. EPIC, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31. 

The Department appeals, and our review of the grant of

summary judgment is de novo, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. Pub. Emps. for Envtl.

Responsibility v. U.S. Section, Int’l Boundary & Water Comm’n,

U.S.-Mexico, 740 F.3d 195, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“PEER”).

II.

The FOIA “mandates that an agency disclose records on

request, unless they fall within one of nine exemptions.” Milner

v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1262 (2011); see 5 U.S.C.

§§ 552(a)(3)(A), (b)(1)-(9). The basic purpose of the FOIA

reflects “a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” John

Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989)

(quotation omitted); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.

Norton, 309 F.3d 26, 32 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The FOIA’s

exemptions “are explicitly made exclusive” and “must be

narrowly construed.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1262 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The burden is on the agency to justify

withholding the requested documents, and the FOIA directs

district courts to determine de novo whether non-disclosure was

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permissible. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for

Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 & n.6 (1989) (citing 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B)). This court’s analysis of the scope of

Exemption 7 in PEER, 740 F.3d at 202-06, is highly instructive,

if not largely dispositive, here.

A.

To fall within FOIA Exemption 7, “documents must first

meet a threshold requirement: that the records were ‘compiled

for law enforcement purposes.’” PEER, 740 F.3d at 202-03

(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)). “[T]he term ‘compiled’ in

Exemption 7 requires that a document be created, gathered, or

used by an agency for law enforcement purposes at some time

before the agency invokes the exemption.” Id. at 203 (citing

John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 155). “Law enforcement entails

more than just investigating and prosecuting individuals after a

violation of the law,” id. (emphasis in original), and “‘includes

. . . proactive steps designed to prevent criminal activity and to

maintain security.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Milner,

131 S. Ct. at 1272 (Alito, J., concurring)).

Applying these principles, the court held in PEER that

emergency action plans and inundation maps created to prevent

attacks on two dams on the U.S.-Mexico border and to maintain

order and ensure dam security during emergencies satisfied

Exemption 7’s gateway requirement. Id. at 204. Here, too, the

Department has shown that it compiled SOP 303 for law

enforcement purposes. SOP 303 was developed after the 2005

bombings of London’s transportation system to address

deficiencies in the United States’ ability to address and respond

to such threats. The Holzer declaration explains that SOP 303

sets forth the steps taken to decide whether and when to disrupt

wireless networks during critical emergencies to, for example,

“efficiently and effectively deter the triggering of

radio-activated improvised explosive devices.” Holzer Decl.

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¶ 25. As so described, SOP 303 was created to prevent crime

and keep people safe, which qualify as law enforcement

purposes. PEER, 740 F.3d at 202-04. SOP 303 meets

Exemption 7’s threshold test.

B. 

Even if a record satisfies Exemption 7’s threshold test, an

agency may only withhold the record pursuant to Exemption

7(F) if the record’s release “could reasonably be expected to

endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(F); see PEER, 740 F.3d at 202. Our consideration

of Exemption 7(F)’s scope begins and ends with its text. 

Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264, 1266-67. 

Exemption 7(F) covers documents that “‘could reasonably

be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any

individual.’” PEER, 740 F.3d at 202 (quoting 5 U.S.C.

§ 552(b)(7)(F)). The scope of the exemption is broadly stated,

see id. at 205, and consequently the government, once it has met

Exemption 7’s threshold test, “will ordinarily be able to satisfy

Exemption 7(F) for documents relating to critical infrastructure,

such as . . . emergency plans.” Id. at 206. Here, the Department

maintains that disclosure of SOP 303, according to the Holzer

declaration, “would enable bad actors to circumvent or interfere

with a law enforcement strategy designed to prevent activation

of improvised explosive devices” and “to insert themselves into

the process of shutting down or reactivating wireless networks

by appropriating verification methods and then impersonating

officials designated for involvement in the verification process.” 

Holzer Decl. ¶¶ 25-26. That explanation shows that SOP 303’s

production could reasonably be expected to place many

individuals at risk and thus, the Department contends, SOP 303

falls within the scope of the plain text of Exemption 7(F).

EPIC maintains, however, that Exemption 7(F) requires the

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Department to identify with some specificity the individuals

who would be endangered by SOP 303’s disclosure. It relies on

American Civil Liberties Union v. Department of Defense, 543

F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008) (“ACLU”), vacated on other grounds,

558 U.S. 1042 (2009). In that case, the Defense Department had

refused to release twenty-one photographs depicting abusive

treatment of detainees by United States soldiers in at least seven

different locations in Afghanistan and Iraq, invoking Exemption

7(F) on the ground that release of the photographs could

reasonably be expected to endanger the life and physical safety

of U.S. and Coalition troops, as well as civilians in Iraq and

Afghanistan. ACLU, 543 F.3d at 64-65. The Second Circuit

observed that “[t]he phrase ‘any individual’ . . . may be flexible,

but is not vacuous,” id. at 67, and concluded, in view of the

FOIA’s structure and the obligation of the court to construe its

exemptions narrowly, that it “cannot [be] read . . . to include

individualsidentified solely as members of a group so large that

risks which are clearly speculative for any particularindividuals

become reasonably foreseeable for the group.” Id. (emphases

added). The court acknowledged that individuals could be

identified in some other way than by name – “such as, for

example, being identified as family members or coworkers of a

named individual, or some similarly small and specific group.” 

Id. at 67-68. But just being a member of a vast group was not

enough, see id., when the group referenced encompassed “a

population the size of two nations and two international

expeditionary forces combined.” Id. at 71. The court rejected

the argument “that the broad scope of the word ‘any’ relieve[d]

the[] [Defense Department] of the burden of identifying, even

roughly, an individual,” id. at 68, noting that the Supreme Court

has rejected wooden, uncritical capitulation to the word “any”

without analysis of surrounding language and relevant

legislative history. See id. at 68-69 (citing Small v. United

States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v.

Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004)). The word “any” did not require

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such a broad interpretation in the FOIA context. Id. at 68. 

“[E]xemption 7(F), by conditioning its application on a

reasonable expectation of dangerto an individual, excludes from

consideration risks that are speculative with respect to any

individual.” Id. at 71 (emphasis in original).

Our decision in PEER does not foreclose this interpretation

of Exemption 7(F), for in PEER the court had no occasion to

decide whether it agreed with it. The court stated that “even if

we agreed with the Second Circuit’s reading of Exemption 7(F),

. . . the [agency] would prevail even under the Second Circuit’s

approach.” PEER, 740 F.3d at 206 (emphasis added). Unlike

in PEER, however, here the Department does not point to a

“particularized threat to a discrete population,” id., but rather

maintains its non-production falls within Exemption 7(F)

because release of SOP 303 would endanger anyone in the

United States who happens to be near an unexploded bomb or

frequents high value targets. In the Department’s view, it would

be anomalous if it could withhold SOP 303 if disclosure poses

a danger to a small group of specifically identifiable people but

not where many or most people would be endangered by

production. Furthermore, the Department contends that, even

under the Second Circuit’s interpretation, it has identified the

individuals most likely to be at risk with the requisite degree of

specificity because “there are identifiable groups who are more

likely to be harmed” from SOP 303’s disclosure, including

“people near unexploded bombs, people who frequent highvalue targets, and bomb squads and other first responders.” 

Appellant’s Br. 19. If viewed without regard to SOP 303’s

requirement that there be a critical emergency for a shutdown to

take place, then the Department’s interpretation may not accord

with the Second Circuit’s approach. See ACLU, 543 F.3d at 71. 

Significantly, however, the context addressed by the Second

Circuit involved “vast” populations and the court disclaimed that

it was confronting a case where there was a showing of a

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reasonable expectation of danger with respect to one or more

individuals, see id., which we conclude there is here.

The court must both narrowly construe the FOIA’s

exemptions and apply the statute’s plain text. See Milner, 131

S. Ct. at 1262, 1264, 1267; see also John Doe Agency, 493 U.S.

at 152-53; FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630-31 (1982). The

Supreme Court has rebuffed lower courts’ attempts to graft

atextual glosses on the FOIA. See Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1267; cf.

CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 169 & n.13 (1985). The FOIA

provides no textual basis for requiring the Department, for

purposes of Exemption 7(F), to identify the specific individuals

at risk from disclosure, and to do so would be to “tak[e] a red

pen” to the words chosen by Congress that are to be understood

to have their ordinary meaning, Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264,

absent indication to the contrary. Congress’ use in Exemption

7(F) of the word “any” is instructive. Generally, “‘the word

‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some

indiscriminately of whatever kind.’’” Ali v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (quoting United States v.

Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 97 (1976))). Although there are

statutory contexts in which “any” does not mean “any,” see

Small, 544 U.S. at 388-89, 391-93; cf. Howard v. Pritzker, —

F.3d — , Nos. 12-5370 & 12-5392, slip op. at 10-11 (D.C. Cir.

Jan. 6, 2015), in the context of Exemption 7(F) the word “any”

demands a broad interpretation. Congress could have, but did

not, enact a limitation on Exemption 7(F), such as “any

specifically identified individual.” See Sims, 471 U.S. at 169

n.13. By contrast, in the Privacy Act Congress afforded special

treatment to certain law enforcement records associated with an

“identifiable individual.” See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(a)(6), (j)(2)(B),

(l)(2); cf. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169 n.13. The language of

Exemption 7(F), which concerns danger to the life or physical

safety of any individual, suggests Congress contemplated

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protection beyond a particular individual who could be

identified before the fact. Exactly who will be passing near an

unexploded bomb when it is triggered somewhere in the United

States may often be unknowable beyond a general group or

method of approach (on foot, by car, etc.), but the critical

emergency itself provides a limit (e.g., a situs on the London

transportation system). To be effective in protecting those

individuals endangered in a critical emergency, the Department

advises, SOP 303 relies on protocols that could be corrupted if

made available to the public.

EPIC maintains that Congress’ choice to condition

Exemption 7(F)’s availability on danger to an individual, rather

than danger in general, indicates a requirement that the subject

of the danger be identified with at least reasonable specificity. 

And according to EPIC, to reject its interpretation would read

“individual” out of the statute, see ACLU, 543 F.3d at 70,

thereby violating the anti-superfluity canon. See Milner, 131 S.

Ct. at 1268; Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir.

1995). But understood in context, the phrase “any individual”

makes clear that Exemption 7(F) now shields the life or physical

safety of any person, not only the law enforcement personnel

protected under the pre-1986 version of the statute. The district

court took note of the 1986 amendment but went beyond the

exemption’s plain text to impose a requirement divorced from

the language Congress enacted. See EPIC, 999 F. Supp. 2d at

32-34. Contrary to EPIC’s suggestion that Congress could have

made explicit that the government need not identify the

individuals at risk with specificity, “the mere possibility of

clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most natural reading of a

statute.” Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132

S. Ct. 1670, 1682 (2012). 

EPIC implies that its interpretation of Exemption 7(F) is

rooted in the exemption’s command that disclosure “could

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reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety

of any individual.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F) (emphasis added). 

But EPIC does not explain why the release of records or

information could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or

physical safety of any individual only where the individual or

individuals at risk can be identified specifically. Release of SOP

303, according to the Department, poses a concrete and

non-speculative danger to numerous albeit unspecified

individuals, see Holzer Decl. ¶¶ 25-26, and the Department

thereby asserted a direct nexus between disclosure and a

reasonable possibility of personal harm. See PEER, 740 F.3d at

206. The attacks in London that triggered the establishment of

SOP 303 illustrate, as noted, that before-the-fact individual

identification is unlikely to be practical. To the extent EPIC is

suggesting that the Department has not satisfied Exemption

7(F)’s risk threshold, that suggestion is met by “[t]he confluence

of Exemption 7(F)’s expansive text and [the court’s] generally

deferential posture when [it] must assess national security

harms.” Id. at 205 (citing Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1272 (Alito, J.,

concurring)).

EPIC suggests that if there is a real danger from disclosure,

then the Department should classify SOP 303, bringing it within

FOIA Exemption 1, which protects materials that are classified

pursuant to certain Executive orders. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). 

The Second Circuit accepted a version of this argument in

ACLU, explaining that

[i]t would be anomalous if an agency that could not

meet the requirements for classification of national

security material could, by characterizing the material

as having been compiled for law enforcement

purposes, evade the strictures and safeguards of

classification and find shelter in [E]xemption 7(F)

simply by asserting that disclosure could reasonably be

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expected to endanger someone unidentified somewhere

in the world. 

543 F.3d at 73. But the possibility of classification and the

concomitant protection from disclosure provided by Exemption

1 do not render Exemption 7(F) superfluous. The Department

has plausibly identified “practical barriers” to classifying SOP

303, including the fact that it “must be shared with federal law

enforcement officials, [S]tate homeland security officials, and

national cellular carriers.” Reply Br. 6. Nor does adhering to

the plain text of Exemption 7(F) eviscerate Exemption 1, which

applies even to records not compiled for law enforcement

purposes. 

The NCC is presumed to be aware of the need to restore

service promptly, particularly in an age in which wireless

communication is a critical component of peoples’ lives. See

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484, 2489 (2014); United

States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring); id. at 963 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 

It remainsfor EPICand otherlitigantsto seek additional judicial

scrutiny by requesting findings on specific matters or in camera

review. At some point, as our precedent indicates, the element

of trust takes over where an agency has filed a sufficiently

specific sworn declaration by a knowledgeable official. See

Juarez v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 518 F.3d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir.

2008); King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.

Cir. 1987). Even if SOP 303’s shutdown protocol is a matter of

significant public interest, balancing when the value of

producing certain categories of documents outweighs the

government’s generic justifications for non-disclosure is what

the Congress has done in enacting and amending the FOIA. See

Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1265 n.5; PEER, 740 F.3d at 198; Pratt v.

Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 416 & n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 

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Finally, to the extent EPIC looks to Exemption 7(F)’s

legislative history, the court’s choice when “presented, on the

one hand, with clear statutory language and, on the other, with

dueling [congressional statements],” is foreordained. See

Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1267. Prior to the 1986 FOIA

amendments, Exemption 7(F) protected records the release of

which would “endanger the life or physical safety of law

enforcement personnel.” See Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(b),

§ 552(b)(7), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563-64 (1974). The exemption did

not cover witnesses, interviewees, victims, informants, or

families of law-enforcement personnel and thus, for example,

undermined law enforcement officers’ ability to enlist

informants. 131 Cong. Rec. 253 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985)

(statement of Hon. Carol E. Dinkins, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen.). 

To remedy this omission, the Executive Branch asked that

Exemption 7(F) be amended. Id. In response, Congress

expanded Exemption 7(F) to protect law-enforcement

documents if their release would endanger “any individual.” 5

U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(F); see Pub. L. No. 99-570, sec. 1802(a),

§ 552(b)(7), 100 Stat. 3207, 3255-56 (1986).

EPIC views Congress’ amendment of Exemption 7(F) in

1986 to bring only witnesses, interviewees, victims, informants,

and families of law-enforcement personnel within the

exemption. There are statements of Members of Congress and

the Executive Branch that reflect concern about those groups’

prior omission. See 130 Cong. Rec. 3,502 (daily ed. Feb. 27,

1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“The bill would . . . extend[]

[E]xemption 7(F) to include such persons as witnesses, potential

witnesses, and family members whose personal safety is of

central importance to the law enforcement process.”); 130 Cong.

Rec. 3,520 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Leahy)

(describing certain changes to the FOIA as “narrowly aimed so

that they will not interfere with the public’s right to know where

law enforcement is not seriously jeopardized”). Other

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16

Members’ statements viewed the amendment to Exemption 7(F)

as relatively broad. For instance, Senator Hatch, the principal

sponsor of the amendment, remarked that the changes to

Exemption 7 were “intended to . . . ease considerably a Federal

law enforcement agency’s burden in invoking” it. 132 Cong.

Rec. 31,424 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). Although General

Dinkins stated that the language of Exemption 7 would be

“modified slightly - not revised wholesale,” 131 Cong. Rec. 248,

she also expressed concern that the prior version of the

exemption did not protect “the life of any other person” besides

law enforcement personnel. Id. at 253. And her explanation

that the 1986 amendments expanded Exemption 7(F) “to include

such persons as witnesses, potential witnesses, and family

members,” id. (emphasis added), is reasonably understood as

illustrative not exclusive. In any event, what Congress enacted

was broad language that was not limited to protection of law

enforcement personnel and related persons. See PEER, 740 F.3d

at 205. “We will not . . . allow[] ambiguous legislative history

to muddy clear statutory language.” Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1266. 

“All we hold today is that Congress has not enacted the FOIA

exemption [EPIC] desires. We leave to Congress, as is

appropriate, the question whether it should do so.” Id. at 1271.

Accordingly, we hold that the Department permissibly

withheld much, if not all of SOP 303, because its release, as

described in the Holzer declaration, could reasonably be

expected to endanger individuals’ lives or physical safety, and

we reverse the grant of summary judgment. As such, we need

not now decide whether Exemption 7(E) applies. See Ctr. for

Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 925

(D.C. Cir. 2003). We will remand the case, however, for the

district court to address, in the first instance, the issue of

segregability, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b); Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp.

Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 734 (D.C. Cir. 2008);

Trans-Pac. Policing Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d

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1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1999), leaving it to determine “whether

more detailed affidavits are appropriate or whether an alternative

such as in camera review would better strike the balance

between protecting [exempted] information and disclosing

nonexempt information as required by the FOIA.” Stolt-Nielsen,

534 F.3d at 734-35 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted);

see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Neill v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice by

Reno, No. 93-5292, 1994 WL 88219, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9,

1994).

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