Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-10-01827/USCOURTS-ca8-10-01827-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kurt Harrington
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 10-1827

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

Kurt Harrington, *

* [PUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 21, 2010

Filed: August 23, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kurt Harrington was convicted in 2009 of seven drug offenses, including

conspiring to manufacture, distribute, and possess with intent to distribute heroin and

at least 50 grams of cocaine base, resulting in death (Count 1); and distributing heroin,

resulting in death (Count 7). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851, the government

filed notice that Harrington was subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment

by reason of a 2002 felony drug conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (sentence

shall be life imprisonment if death results from use of substance and violation was

Appellate Case: 10-1827 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/23/2010 Entry ID: 3695914
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The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

-2-

committed after prior conviction for felony drug offense). The district court1

sentenced Harrington to concurrent terms of life in prison on Counts 1 and 7, and 360

months on each of the five remaining counts. Harrington appeals, arguing that (1) the

court violated the Sixth Amendment by enhancing his penalty based on his 2002

felony conviction, because the prior-conviction exception in Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), is “founded on bad law” and may soon be overruled; (2) the

enhanced penalty is similar to the enhancement improperly sought by the government

in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), because it required the court to

determine facts about Harrington’s prior offense, and not just the existence of his

conviction; and (3) the mandatory life sentence prescribed by section 841 conflicts

with the sentencing goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and thus it is unreasonable under

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The government moves for summary

affirmance and to stay briefing. For the following reasons, we reject Harrington’s

arguments and affirm. 

First, Apprendi is inapplicable because Harrington faced a statutory maximum

sentence of life in prison regardless of his prior felony conviction. See Apprendi, 530

U.S. at 490 (other than fact of prior conviction, any fact that increases penalty for

crime beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to jury); 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A) (in case of violation involving 50 grams or more of substance

containing cocaine base, sentence is 10 years to life in prison, and if death or serious

bodily injury results from use of such substance, sentence is 20 years to life); see also

United States v. McIntosh, 236 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 2001) (Apprendi was not

implicated where defendant was subject to statutory life term based on quantity of

drug involved, regardless whether death resulted from drug use).

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Second, we see no violation of Shepard here. Although we have previously

discussed the principles of that case in connection with §§ 841 and 851, see United

States v. Ramon-Rodriguez, 492 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 2007), we have not held that

it applies in this context. Cf. United States v. Marsh, 561 F.3d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 2009)

("We have never extended Shepard's holding beyond the realm of the [Armed Career

Criminal Act] or the Career Offender Guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 . . . ."). Even

assuming for the sake of argument that Shepard applied, Harrington's contention

would fail, for he acknowledges in his brief that the sentencing transcript from his

prior conviction, which was admitted at the continued sentencing hearing, showed that

he was convicted of a drug felony. See 544 U.S. at 26 (“enquiry under the [Armed

Career Criminal Act] to determine whether a plea of guilty to burglary defined by a

nongeneric statute necessarily admitted elements of the generic offense is limited to

the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of

colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was

confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this

information”).

Third, because the conviction exposed Harrington to a mandatory sentence of

life imprisonment, his sentence is not unreasonable under Booker. See United States

v. Gregg, 451 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 2006) (district court lacks discretion to impose

non-Guidelines sentence below statutory minimum; Booker does not relate to

statutorily imposed sentences).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We also deny the

government’s motion as moot.

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