Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03525/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03525-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Thou Lim
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

THOU LIM,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendants. /

No. C 06-03525 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR REMAND AND DENYING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Now before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment seeking reversal

of the decision of the Social Security Commissioner (the “Commissioner”) denying benefits,

or in the alternative seeking remand for further administrative proceedings, and Defendant’s

Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment seeking affirmation of the Commissioner’s decision. 

For reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for reversal and remand,

and DENIES Defendant’s cross-motion. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff Thou Lim (“Plaintiff”) filed an application for Supplemental Security Income

(“SSI”) under title XVI of the Social Security Act, on May 27, 2003. (Administrative

Record “A.R.” at 260-66.) Plaintiff’s application was denied by the Commissioner on

November 17, 2003. (A.R. at 29, 31-34, 268-72.) Plaintiff timely filed a request for

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reconsideration on December 22, 2003, (A.R. at 35), which was denied on May 11, 2004. 

(A.R. at 30, 36, 273-77.) Plaintiff then filed a request for hearing, which was held on April

12, 2005. (A.R. at 288-312.) In a decision dated August 22, 2005, an Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) for the Social Security Administration ruled against Plaintiff. (A.R. at 11-27.) 

Following the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff filed a request for review of hearing decision. (A.R.

at 10.) On April 21, 2006, a Notice of Appeals Council Action was issued indicating that no

reason was found to review the ALJ’s decision. (A.R. at 6-8.) Plaintiff now brings this

action for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. sections 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). 

B. Factual Background

1. Plaintiff’s Disability Claim

Plaintiff Thou Lim was born on January 2, 1966, in Cambodia. (A.R. at 263.) 

Plaintiff has no education and her work experiences consist of employment as an office

cleaner, assembly line worker, and janitor. (A.R. at 15.) 

Plaintiff alleges disability due to depression and anxiety. Id. She has not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset date of May 27, 2003. Id. However,

according to the record, plaintiff began seeking medical help for her symptoms as early as

February 2003. (A.R. at 208-09.) 

2. Medical Evidence

a. Primary Care Provider

On April 7, 2003, Plaintiff visited the Alameda County Medical Center where she was

seen by William Wallin, M.D. (A.R. at 166-68.) Noting that her eyes were teary and hands

sweaty, Dr. Wallin diagnosed Plaintiff with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”). Id.

Dr. Wallin saw Plaintiff again on June 9, 2003, where, while noting that Plaintiff appeared

“less nervous,” he again diagnosed her with PTSD. Id. The PTSD diagnosis was carried

forward to August 20, 2003, when an examining physician at the Alameda County Medical

Center apparently queried whether Plaintiff suffered from PTSD or depression. (A.R. at 183-

85.) As part of the physician’s clinical impression, Plaintiff was referred to Asian Mental

Health Services. Id.

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According to the record, Plaintiff visited the Alameda County Medical Center an

additional five times between October 2003 and June 2004. (A.R. at 182, 252-53.) The

examining physicians from both the March and June 2004 visits noted depression in their

respective progress records. (A.R. at 252-53.)

Following her June 2004 visit, Plaintiff apparently made no further visits to the

Alameda County Medical Center despite making appointments for September and November

2004. (A.R. at 250-51.) 

b. The Treating Therapist

On February 11, 2003, Plaintiff visited a community mental health clinic where she

was referred to Mona Afary, Ph.D., a licensed marriage and family therapist. (A.R. at 208-

09, 258-59.) On March 7, 2003, Dr. Afary diagnosed Plaintiff with PTSD. (A.R. at 204-07.) 

This diagnosis was carried forward to June 30, 2003, when Dr. Afary added depression to her

diagnosis and indicated that Plaintiff had a “poor” prognosis. (A.R. at 199-203.) In addition,

Dr. Afary noted that Plaintiff had poor memory, difficulty with concentration, poor

judgment, and could not follow simple instructions. Id. Dr. Afary also opined that Plaintiff

would not be able to interact with supervisors or coworkers, or be able to maintain schedules. 

Id.

On September 9, 2003, Dr. Afary noted that Plaintiff suffered from a depressed affect

and appeared withdrawn. (A.R. at 194-98.) Dr. Afary also noted that Plaintiff’s memory and

concentration were markedly impaired and that her prognosis for recovery sufficient to

sustain regular gainful employment was very poor. Id. A similar report was made on April

16, 2004, when Dr. Afary opined that Plaintiff could not sustain employment due to her

inability to keep attendance, schedules, or deal with stresses common to the work

environment. (A.R. at 189-93.)

c. The Psychiatric Evaluation 

On October 27, 2003, Plaintiff underwent a psychiatric evaluation conducted by

Michael Zizmor, M.D., who was hired by the state agency. (A.R. at 177-80, 232.) Among

the results of Dr. Zizmor’s mental status examination were that Plaintiff was alert but not

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oriented; that her long-term memory appeared intact but she could recall only one of three

items after five minutes; that she was unable to follow a three-step command; that her mood

was depressed and anxious; and that her affect appeared depressed. (A.R. at 177-80, 232.) 

Dr. Zizmor further opined that Plaintiff would have severe difficulties understanding and

carrying out simple one or two-step job instructions, moderate to severe problems

understanding supervisor’s instructions, and significant problems negotiating an eight-hour

work day or 40-hour work week because of her PTSD and major depressive disorder. Id. 

3. Plaintiff’s Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she lives with her four children and receives

AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children) support. (A.R. at 293.) Plaintiff further

testified that on a typical day, she would see her children off to school, clean up around the

house and prepare some meals. Id. Afterward, she would spend time playing with her

youngest child until the others returned from school, at which point she would prepare meals

for them. Id. Plaintiff also testified that, on occasion, one of her friends would pick her up

and take her places. (A.R. at 294-95.)

As to her health limitations, Plaintiff testified that she sees a doctor for depression,

that she fears falling asleep, that she has difficulty breathing and that she has difficulty

recalling things. (A.R. at 296-99.)

4. Vocational Expert Testimony

A vocational expert at the hearing testified that a claimant with severe problems

following a supervisor’s instructions would be eliminated from “all jobs,” while moderate

problems following instructions might have considerably less effect on a claimant. (A.R. at

311-12.) The vocational expert also testified that a claimant with significant problems

negotiating an eight-hour work day or 40-hour work week “should not be competitive

enough to make money.” Id. 

//

//

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II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the Social Security

Administration’s denial of benefits is supported by substantial evidence in the administrative

record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). A district court may overturn a decision to deny benefits only if

it is not supported by substantial evidence or if the decision is based on legal error. Andrews

v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995); Magallenes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit defines substantial evidence as “more than a mere scintilla but

less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039. Determinations of credibility,

resolution of conflicts in medical testimony and all other ambiguities are to be resolved by

the ALJ. Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1039; Magallenes, 881 F.2d at 750. The decision of the ALJ

will be upheld if the evidence is “susceptible to more than one rational interpretation.” 

Andrews, 53 F.3d at 1040.

B. The ALJ’s Decision

In considering whether a claimant is entitled to benefits, an ALJ conducts a five-step

sequential inquiry. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ considers if the claimant

is engaged in substantial gainful activity; if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful

activity, the second step asks if the claimant has a severe impairment (i.e. an impairment that

has a significant effect on the claimant’s ability to function); if the claimant has a severe

impairment, the third step asks if the claimant has a condition which meets or equals the

conditions outlined in the Listings of Impairments in Appendix 1 of the Regulations (the

“Listings”); if the claimant does not have such a condition, the fourth step asks if the

claimant is capable of performing his past relevant work; if the claimant is not capable of

performing his past relevant work, the fifth step asks if the claimant is capable of performing

other work which exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520(b)-404.1520(f)(1).

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The ALJ in this case found Plaintiff not “disabled” within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. (A.R. at 24.) The ALJ based his conclusion on his determination that Plaintiff

has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform simple repetitive tasks. (A.R. at 17-

23.) In making his RFC determination, the ALJ disregarded all of the medical opinions from

examining sources contained in the record, all of which concluded that Plaintiff would have

significant problems engaging in substantial gainful employment because of her mental

condition. Id. The ALJ also disregarded Plaintiff’s own testimony as to the severity of her

limitations. Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff essentially makes three separate yet related claims. First, Plaintiff claims that

the ALJ’s rejection of the medical opinions contained in the record was not supported by

substantial evidence. Next, Plaintiff claims the ALJ improperly discredited Plaintiff’s

testimony by failing to consider the record as a whole and by failing to provide clear and

convincing reasons. Finally, Plaintiff claims the ALJ’s RFC determination was not

supported by substantial evidence. 

The Court agrees with Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not

supported by substantial evidence. It should be noted, however, that the Court’s discussion

of Plaintiff’s third claim will also involve discussion of the other two claims. 

A. The ALJ’s Determination of Plaintiff’s RFC

All of the evidence contained in the record consistently establishes that Plaintiff

suffers from PTSD and/or depression. Indeed, the ALJ does not dispute that Plaintiff suffers

from depression at all; despite ultimately determining that Plaintiff is not “disabled” within

the meaning of Title VII, the ALJ did find that Plaintiff’s depression constitutes a “severe”

impairment within the meaning of the Social Security regulations. (A.R. at 16.) Therefore,

the only evidence at issue is that relating to the severity of Plaintiff’s depression. Yet here,

too, all of the evidence contained in the record–the medical opinion evidence and Plaintiff’s

testimony–is consistent. (A.R. at 17-19.) The ALJ did not point to any affirmative, let alone

substantial, evidence to support his RFC determination that Plaintiff can perform simple

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repetitive tasks; instead, the ALJ only discredited the uniform evidence that Plaintiff would

have significant problems engaging in substantial gainful employment. As discussed further

below, the ALJ’s decision to discredit the uncontradicted medical evidence and Plaintiff’s

testimony was improper. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the ALJ did not based his

RFC determination on substantial evidence in the record. 

1. The Medical Evidence

 In making his RFC determination, the ALJ gave little weight to the conclusions of Dr.

Zizmor, the evaluating psychiatrist, and Dr. Afary, the treating therapist, who both opined

that Plaintiff would have significant problems engaging in substantial gainful employment

because of her mental condition. While the ALJ is not obliged to adopt any medical opinions

on Plaintiff’s limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the ALJ may reject uncontroverted

medical opinions only for clear and convincing reasons. Shalala, 53 F.3d at 1041 (noting

that the uncontroverted opinions of either examining or treating physicians may be rejected

only for clear and convincing reasons). The Court finds that the ALJ did not state clear and

convincing reasons for rejecting the medical opinions of Dr. Zizmor and Dr. Afary. 

a. Dr. Zizmor’s Opinion

Dr. Zizmor, the psychiatrist retained by the state agency, opined that Plaintiff would

have significant problems negotiating an eight-hour work day and 40-hour work week

because of her PTSD and depression. (A.R. at 180.) The ALJ rejected this conclusion for

several reasons. First, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Zizmor’s opinion that Plaintiff’s lack of

education, illiteracy, and inability to understand English would cause her severe difficulties

understanding and carrying out simple one or two-step job instructions. (A.R. at 20.) The

ALJ concluded that this opinion was not necessarily true because Plaintiff admitted and

demonstrated at the hearing that she understands some English. Id. On this basis, the ALJ

questioned the premise underlying Dr. Zizmor’s opinion that Plaintiff is severely functionally

impaired. Id. Looking more closely at Dr. Zizmor’s report, however, it becomes apparent

that the ALJ misconstrued Dr. Zizmor’s conclusion; Dr. Zizmor actually concluded that

Plaintiff’s difficulties following instructions were “because of her depression and PTSD,” not

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The ALJ actually wrote that “[Dr. Zizmor] noted no behavioral oddities,” which might

imply that Dr. Zizmor affirmatively wrote in his report that Plaintiff exhibited no behavioral

oddities. The report, however, reveals that Dr. Zizmor made no mention of behavioral oddities

one way or the other. (A.R. at 177-80.)

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because of her limited ability to speak English. (A.R. at 180.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s ability

to speak some English does not undermine Dr. Zizmor’s opinion. 

Next, the ALJ determined that Dr. Zizmor’s opinion that Plaintiff is severely

functionally impaired is undercut by Plaintiff’s modest work history and the fact that she has

never left a job due to any impairment. (A.R. at 20-21.) Yet the ALJ elsewhere in his

opinion stated that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged

onset date. (A.R. at 15.) Accordingly, this is not a clear and convincing reason.

The ALJ also discredited Dr. Zizmor’s medical opinions about Plaintiff because Dr.

Zizmor apparently did not observe any behavioral oddities,1

 included no discussion of PTSD

criteria, and noted that there was no loosening of association. (A.R. at 21.) The lack of such

discussions in Dr. Zizmor’s report may go to the weight of his medical opinion, but is not a

clear and convincing reason for wholly disregarding the opinion, especially where it is

consistent with all other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(1), (3); see also

Robbins v. SSA, 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that an ALJ may not disregard

claimant’s testimony solely because it is not substantiated affirmatively by objective medical

evidence). 

Finally, the ALJ rejected Dr. Zizmor’s opinions because they were based on

Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms, and the ALJ did not find the Plaintiff credible. (A.R. at

21.) While such credibility determinations are within the province of the ALJ, Magallanes,

881 F.2d at 750, and a plaintiff’s statements alone are not sufficient to establish that there is a

mental impairment, 20 C.F.R. § 404.12528(a), self-reported symptoms may be incorporated

into a medical source opinion reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a given

impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.12527(a)(2). 

In any event, Dr. Zizmor did not rely solely on Plaintiff’s self-reported symptoms. In

conducting his mental status examination, Dr. Zizmor made various observations and

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Plaintiff notes in her Reply brief that the only conflicting medical opinion in the entire

record is the non-examining state agency opinion finding that Plaintiff has no medically

determinable impairment. (A.R. at 241-48.) The ALJ, however, did not rely on this opinion as

a basis for determining Plaintiff’s RFC. In addition, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that such an

opinion does not constitute substantial evidence in light of the overwhelmingly consistent

treating and examining medical opinions. See Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506, n.4 (9th Cir.

1990) (“The nonexamining physician’s conclusion, with nothing more, does not constitute

substantial evidence, particularly in view of the conflicting observations, opinions, and

conclusions of an examining physician.”).

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judgments about Plaintiff, such as that Plaintiff was alert but not oriented; that she could

recall only one of three items after five minutes; and that her affect appeared depressed. 

(A.R. at 179.) That the ALJ did not find Plaintiff credible may affect the weight of Dr.

Zizmor’s medical opinion evidence, but it does not nullify the evidence. Dr. Zizmor’s

medical opinion is evidence just the same. What is more, it is evidence consistent with the

rest of the record, and the ALJ did not provide any clear and convincing reasons for

disregarding it.2

 

b. Dr. Afary’s Opinion

Dr. Afary opined that Plaintiff’s memory and concentration were markedly impaired,

and that her prognosis for recovery sufficient to sustain regular gainful employment was very

poor. (A.R. at 194-98.) As with Dr. Zizmor, the ALJ cited various reasons for giving Dr.

Afary’s reports “very little weight.” First, the ALJ discounted Dr. Afary’s opinion because

her findings were “suspect.” (A.R. at 20.) The only evidence the ALJ cited in support of this

proposition was Dr. Afary’s September 9, 2003 report in which she first noted that Plaintiff’s

memory and concentration were “markedly impaired,” and then, two pages later, noted that

Plaintiff’s memory and concentration were “impaired.” (A.R. at 195, 197.) This alleged

discrepancy is not a clear and convincing reason for rejecting Dr. Afary’s opinion. 

The ALJ was also troubled by Dr. Afary’s findings because they were accompanied

by little to no objective clinical evidence. (A.R. at 19.) As an example, he noted that while

Dr. Afary’s diagnosis of PTSD was due to Plaintiff’s traumatic experiences in Cambodia, the

only evidence of PTSD symptoms were Plaintiff’s statements that she longed to hear from

her family and wished they were still alive. Id. The ALJ was also troubled that Dr. Afary’s

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conclusion that Plaintiff is unable to follow and understand simple written or oral instructions

was not accompanied by test results. (A.R. at 20.)

The ALJ gave several other examples of conclusions made by Dr. Afary that were not

accompanied by test results. (A.R. at 19-20.) However, it is not necessary to analyze each

one individually. The mere lack of objective medical evidence is not a clear and convincing

reason for disregarding an uncontradicted medical opinion. See Robbins, 466 F.3d at 883

(noting that an ALJ may not disregard claimant’s testimony solely because it is not

substantiated affirmatively by objective medical evidence). In any event, the ALJ overlooks

that while Dr. Afary did not provide any objective medical evidence, such as a mental status

examination, Dr. Zizmor did. The ALJ was required to consider all of the medical opinions

together along with other relevant evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b). 

Because the ALJ did state any clear and convincing reasons for disregarding the

uncontradicted opinions of Dr. Afary and Dr. Zizmor, the Court finds that the ALJ

improperly discredited their medical opinions in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.

2. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

 In making his RFC determination, the ALJ also discounted portions of Plaintiff’s

testimony as not credible due to various alleged inconsistencies. An ALJ has the authority to

determine whether a claimant’s testimony is credible. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341,

345-46 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). However, unless an ALJ makes a finding of malingering

based on affirmative evidence thereof, the ALJ may only find an applicant not credible by

making specific findings as to credibility and stating clear and convincing reasons for each. 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1283-84 (9th Cir. 1996). 

The first inconsistency the ALJ noted was Plaintiff’s failure to mention all symptoms

to every examining and treating medical source; stated differently, the ALJ was apparently

troubled by Plaintiff’s failure to document every symptom equally in every portion of her

medical record. (A.R. at 21.) As an example, the ALJ points to Plaintiff’s failure to tell

investigators from the Cooperative Disability Investigations Unit about her auditory

hallucinations, traumatic history or other symptoms she mentioned to Dr. Afary and Dr.

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Zizmor. (A.R. at 21.) Given that there is no affirmative evidence in the record that Plaintiff

was malingering, the Court is unconvinced by the ALJ’s stated reasons that such an

inconsistency is proper grounds for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony.

Next, the ALJ took issue with Plaintiff’s inability to pinpoint the date that her illness

became disabling. Id. For example, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff, on one occasion, alleged

first becoming ill 20 years prior, and then, on a different occasion, said 1993. Id. The only

relevant date, however, is the alleged disability onset date, which the ALJ accepted as May

27, 2003. (A.R. at 15.) Keeping in mind that there is no affirmative evidence of

malingering, the Court is unconvinced by the ALJ’s reasoning. Statements that Plaintiff

became ill at any point prior to May 27, 2003, do not show that the disability onset date was

any different as that reported. 

Finally, the ALJ found Plaintiff not credible because he believed there are

inconsistencies between her daily activities and her alleged limitations. For example, the

ALJ found that Plaintiff’s testimony about her daily activities–cleaning the house, cooking

for herself and her children–were inconsistent with her statements to Dr. Afary that she did

minimal cooking, shopping, and maintaining her residence. (A.R. at 22.) The ALJ had a

similar problem with Plaintiff’s claim that she spends most of her day in isolation, yet has no

problems meeting with her friend, talking on the phone almost every day, or seeing her

children off to school. Id. The ALJ’s reasons are unconvincing. The mere fact that Plaintiff

has carried on certain daily activities, such as grocery shopping, cooking, or limited walking

does not detract from her credibility as to her overall disability. See Vertigan v. Halter, 260

F.3d 1044, 1050 (9th Cir. 1989) (explaining mere fact that plaintiff shopped for groceries,

drove a car, or did limited walking for exercise did not detract from credibility as to overall

disability because such activities did not consume a substantial part of plaintiff’s day). 

Plaintiff “does not need to be ‘utterly incapacitated’ in order to be disabled.” Id. The ALJ

does not provide clear and convincing reasons as to how Plaintiff’s daily activities

demonstrate a lack of credibility or are inconsistent with plaintiff’s claimed inability to work.

As with the medical opinion evidence, the ALJ did not state clear and convincing

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reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony as he did. More importantly, the ALJ did not

point to any other evidence in the record to support his RFC determination, but only

discredited the evidence that was inconsistent with his determination that Plaintiff has the

RFC to perform simple repetitive tasks. 

B. Remedy

Having determined that the ALJ’s RFC determination was not supported by

substantial evidence, the Court must now determine whether to remand the case for further

administrative proceedings or instead award benefits. The decision whether to remand or to

award benefits is within the discretion of the court. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 635

(9th Cir. 1981). If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original administrative

proceedings, the case should be remanded. Id. On the other hand, where a rehearing would

only delay receipt of benefits, the court should award benefits. Id. 

This case presents a full record that supports the conclusion that Plaintiff is disabled. 

The uncontroverted medical evidence establishes that Plaintiff would have severe problems

following one or two-step job instructions, moderate to severe problems understanding a

supervisor’s instructions, and significant problems negotiating an eight-hour work day or 40-

hour work week. In addition, the vocational expert testimony establishes that, given such

limitations, a claimant “should not be competitive enough to make money.” (A.R. at 311-

12.) Remanding the case for further administrative proceedings would only delay Plaintiff’s

receipt of benefits. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff is disabled and is entitled

to benefits. See, e.g., Erickson v. Shalala, 9 F.3d 813, 819 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering

judgment for plaintiff where all medical evidence and vocational expert testimony

established that plaintiff could not perform light work); Penny v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 953, 958-

59 (9th Cir. 1993) (ordering judgment for plaintiff where record wholly supported plaintiff’s

claim of non-exertional pain and the Administration used medical-vocational guidelines

instead of vocational expert testimony, thereby failing to satisfy burden of showing that

plaintiff could perform other work).

// 

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G:\CRBALL\2006\3525\Lim order.wpd 13

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. In

addition, the Court finds that the record is fully-developed and establishes that Plaintiff is

disabled and is entitled to benefits. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgement is DENIED. The decision of the Commissioner

denying benefits is REVERSED, and the Court REMANDS the case for an award of

benefits.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 3, 2007 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

Case 3:06-cv-03525-CRB Document 19 Filed 04/03/07 Page 13 of 13