Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01932/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-01932-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Fairman
Defendant
Rite Aid Corporation
Defendant
Ronald J. Robb
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD J. ROBB,

Plaintiff,

v.

RITE AID CORPORATION, JOSEPH FAIRMAN,

and DOES ONE through TWENTY,

inclusive,

Defendants.

 

No. C 05-1932 CW

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR REMAND

AND DENYING IN

PART AND GRANTING

IN PART

DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendants move for dismissal of this action pursuant to

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff opposes

the motion. Plaintiff moves for remand and for fees and costs

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendants oppose the motion. 

The matter was heard on July 15, 2005. Having considered the

parties' papers, the evidence cited therein and oral argument on

the motion, the Court DENIES in part Defendants' motion to dismiss

and GRANTS it in part and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to remand.

BACKGROUND

The following information is taken from Plaintiff's Complaint

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1

Defendants note that Mr. Fairman was erroneously sued as

Joseph Fairman; his name is Joe Fairman.

2

The Notice of Removal lists Plaintiff as a resident of

Washington. Plaintiff does not dispute this.

2

except where otherwise indicated. Defendant Rite Aid Corporation

is a retailer incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in

Pennsylvania. Defendant Joe Fairman1 is a regional vice-president

for Rite Aid and resides in Sacramento County, California.

Plaintiff is a former employee of Rite Aid now residing in

Washington State.2

Plaintiff worked for Rite Aid and its predecessors Thrifty

PayLess, Inc. and PayLess for thirty-five years. On or about

February 25, 2004, Plaintiff was forced to resign his position as a

district manager in charge of monitoring nineteen stores for Rite

Aid's Region 42, North Bay District. Throughout the time

surrounding his resignation and for some time before, Plaintiff was

under stress because his wife and her mother were experiencing many

medical difficulties, and his wife spent half her time caring for

her sick mother who lived in Washington State. 

Plaintiff's resignation resulted from preparation for an

inventory in the Vacaville store. The Vacaville store manager

asked Plaintiff for guidance on what to do with some marked-down

and "deleted" merchandise (unsold merchandise no longer a part of

regular Rite Aid inventory). Because there was no written policy

on transferring already marked-down goods to a close-out store,

Plaintiff contacted his supervisor, Fairman, for guidance. Fairman

instructed Plaintiff to email him the list of the type of goods and

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their approximate value. An email with that information was sent

to Fairman and Fairman's supervisor. Plaintiff learned that the

email had been forwarded up the supervisory chain for final

approval, at which point Plaintiff communicated the approval to the

Vacaville store manager. The store manager then asked if, in the

same transfer, he could include additional deleted goods not

previously shown to Plaintiff. The first set of goods had been

marked down to half price, but Plaintiff did not think to ask if

the additional goods had also been marked down. Plaintiff approved

the transfer of the additional goods because the original valuation

was only an approximation. Final approval for the transfer was

received. The store manager emailed Plaintiff to verify the value

at which all the goods should be transferred. Plaintiff authorized

the store manager to transfer the goods at retail. The approximate

difference in value between the goods priced at retail and the

goods marked down was $900. The valuation could be corrected

electronically without financial loss to Rite Aid. Plaintiff did

not financially gain from the incorrect valuation. 

On February 20, 2004, personnel from Rite Aid's Asset

Protection and Labor Relations Divisions questioned Plaintiff, who

admitted his error, calling it a "lapse in judgment" under time

pressure, not intentional inventory fraud. Plaintiff was

immediately suspended. He was informed that his offense could

result in termination. Fairman recommended that Plaintiff contact

Rite Aid Executive Senior Vice President Mark Panzer to see if

Panzer would intervene. Panzer did not intervene and, on

February 25, 2004, Fairman and Rite Aid human resources personnel

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3Plaintiff refers to the document, but does not attach it to

his complaint. Defendants request judicial notice of the document

which is GRANTED. A court may consider documents "whose contents

are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party

questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading." 

Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on

other grounds in Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119,

1127 (9th Cir. 2002).

4

forced Plaintiff to resign under threat of termination. Plaintiff

alleges that Panzer at one point called him "the old man of the

district," and that Panzer was heard to ask, "Can't we find someone

younger?" with regard to hiring back another district manager over

age fifty. 

Based on long-time observation of company practice, Plaintiff

did not believe his offense was one for which the company normally

considered termination appropriate. For example, a $35,000

inventory error by Plaintiff had been overlooked in the past. 

Also, Plaintiff, on recommendation from Fairman, gave a store

manager only a written warning for the disappearance of inventory. 

Plaintiff received very positive work evaluations throughout

his employment with Rite Aid. In fact, his resignation form dated

February 27, 2004, listed him as a "very good" employee. In 2001,

the regional vice president had recommended that Plaintiff train

new district managers based on Plaintiff's experience. Plaintiff

had received regular promotions and wage increases throughout his

thirty-five year work history. In 2002, Plaintiff signed an

acknowledgment of receipt of Rite Aid's "An Associate Atlas," an

employee handbook, which included various statements to the effect

that employment was at-will and that at-will status could only be

changed by a written agreement signed by an officer of Rite Aid.3

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The handbook also included an ethics section and a section on

standards of conduct which included factors to be considered in

imposing discipline, such as length of employment and the

circumstances under which misconduct occurred. 

Plaintiff and Fairman had a close relationship, traveling

together frequently and discussing personal matters. Fairman knew

of Plaintiff's family's health issues. Plaintiff asked Fairman on

more than one occasion for a transfer to Washington State, the

residence of his sick mother-in-law. Fairman made statements to

Plaintiff that Plaintiff's plan to continue working at Rite Aid

until his retirement at age sixty-two was a "good plan." Fairman

discussed the performance of other district managers with Plaintiff

and led Plaintiff to understand that he had a unique status at Rite

Aid based on his many years as a district manager. 

Plaintiff filed a complaint on February 24, 2005, in the

California Superior Court of Sonoma County alleging 1) breach of

employment contract, 2) breach of the covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, 3) age discrimination in violation of California

Government Code section 12941 and 4) negligent infliction of

emotional distress. On May 10, 2005, Defendants removed the case

to this Court. 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Remand to State Court

A defendant may remove a civil action filed in State court to

federal district court so long as the district court could have

exercised original jurisdiction over the matter. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a). However, a defendant may not remove based on diversity

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a civil action filed in State court if one "of the parties in

interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of

the State in which such action is brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). 

Title 28 U.S.C. section 1447 provides that if at any time before

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction over a case previously removed from State court, the

case must be remanded. § 1447(c). On a motion to remand, the

scope of the removal statute must be strictly construed. Gaus v.

Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). "The 'strong

presumption' against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant

always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper." Id.

Courts should resolve doubts as to removability in favor of

remanding the case to State court. Id.

A. Federal Question Jurisdiction

Ordinarily, federal question jurisdiction is determined by

examining the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. 

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). When a

plaintiff has suffered an injury that could give rise to both

federal and State causes of action, the plaintiff "is free to

ignore the federal cause of action and rest the claim solely on a

state cause of action." Garibaldi v. Lucky Food Stores, Inc., 726

F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff may not, however,

artfully plead a complaint to avoid federal jurisdiction by

"omitting from the complaint federal law essential to his claim, or

by casting in state law terms a claim that can be made only under

federal law." Olguin v. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co., 740 F.2d

1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1984). "Once an area of state law has been

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completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal

claim, and therefore arises under federal law." Caterpillar, 482

U.S. at 392.

B. Diversity Jurisdiction

District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil

actions "where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value

of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . 

citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When federal

subject matter jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of

citizenship, complete diversity must exist between the opposing

parties. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-

74 (1978). 

A defendant may remove a case with a diversity-destroying

defendant on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and seek to

persuade the district court that this defendant was fraudulently

joined. McCabe v. General Foods Corp., 811 F.2d 1336, 1339 (9th

Cir. 1987). "If the plaintiff fails to state a cause of action

against a resident defendant, and the failure is obvious according

to the settled rules of the state, the joinder of the resident

defendant is fraudulent." Id. at 1339. The defendant need not

show that the joinder of the diversity-destroying party was for the

purpose of preventing removal. Instead, the defendant must

demonstrate that there is no possibility that the plaintiff would

be able to establish a cause of action under State law against the

alleged sham defendant. Id.; see also Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,

139 F.3d 1313, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The defendant seeking removal

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is entitled to present facts showing that the joinder is

fraudulent. McCabe, 811 F.2d at 1339.

II. Failure to State a Claim

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim will be

denied unless it is “clear that no relief could be granted under

any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Falkowski v. Imation Corp., 309 F.3d 1123, 1132 (9th

Cir. 2002), citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506

(2002). All material allegations in the complaint will be taken as

true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 

NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). A

complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a). “Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and

direct. No technical forms of pleading or motions are required.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). These rules “do not require a claimant to

set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the

contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of

the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).

When granting a motion to dismiss, a court is generally

required to grant a plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request to

amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, a court examines whether the complaint could be

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4Defendants also removed on the grounds that Plaintiff's claim

for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing raises a

federal question on its face pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 1331,

1441 and 1446 under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. section 1001, et seq. Because the Court

finds diversity jurisdiction, it does not address ERISA in regard

to remand. ERISA preemption is discussed in the context of the

motion to dismiss.

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amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97. 

DISCUSSION

I. Remand

Defendants removed this case to this Court on the grounds that

Fairman was joined fraudulently, and thus federal diversity

jurisdiction exists.4 Plaintiff argues that 28 U.S.C. section

1441(b) prevents removal because Fairman is a properly joined

defendant and is a citizen of the State in which this civil action

was brought. Defendants assert Plaintiff cannot maintain against

Fairman a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress

(NIED), the only claim alleged against him, and that therefore he

is fraudulently joined.

The traditional test for a claim of NIED in California is one

of reasonable forseeability. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27

Cal. 3d 916, 923 (1980). However, the law of NIED is evolving in

California, and it is seen now not as an independent tort, but

"simply as the tort of negligence." Klein v. Children's Hosp. Med.

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Ctr., 46 Cal. App. 4th 889, 894 (1996). A plaintiff must

demonstrate a duty, breach, causation and damages. Id. A

negligent act must be part of the claim. See Miller v. Fairchild

Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding under

California tort law an intentional discharge could not also be

negligent). 

A plaintiff cannot recover for emotional distress suffered in

the normal course of an employment relationship, including distress

due to termination, because all such harm is covered by worker's

compensation. Phillips v. Gemini Moving Specialists, 63 Cal. App.

4th 563, 577 (1998). Work environments that are discriminatory are

not part of the normal course of employment, and California courts

have allowed claims of both intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress to proceed against employers in cases where

discrimination has been alleged. See Accardi v. Superior Court, 17

Cal. App. 4th 341, 352-53 (1993) (denying dismissal of a female

police officer's claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress based on harassment and discrimination); Fretland v.

County of Humboldt, 69 Cal. App. 4th 1478, 1492 (1999) (allowing

disabled plaintiff's claims for intentional and negligent

infliction of emotional distress based on harassment, assault and

discrimination). But, a supervisor or co-employee cannot be sued

for tortious conduct undertaken in the course of job-related

functions. Sheppard v. Freeman, 67 Cal. App. 4th 339, 343 (1998)

(holding that a former employee cannot sue a former co-employee for

conduct related to personnel issues, unless mandated by statute,

regardless of whether the co-employee was acting within the scope

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of his or her employment); Graw v. Los Angeles County Metro.

Transp. Auth., 52 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding

that the California Supreme Court would find Sheppard too broad,

but would allow an exemption from tort suit for actions by managers

towards employees that were at least partially beneficial to the

company). Further, an employee cannot maintain a NIED claim

arising from a violation of the California Fair Employment and

Housing Act against another employee because a discrimination claim

can only be made against an employer. Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th

640, 643 (1998).

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants should

have foreseen that Plaintiff would suffer emotional shock when

forced to retire after thirty-five years of positive service to

Rite Aid. He alleges that Fairman forced him to resign in spite of

knowing his stressful family situation.

In his motion to remand, Plaintiff asks the Court's permission

to amend his complaint to clarify that the claim against Fairman

does not arise out of discriminatory conduct, but rather is based

on a unique personal relationship between Plaintiff and Fairman. 

In his reply, Plaintiff indicates that his claim is based on the

fact that Fairman asked him to conduct the inventory quickly and

that Fairman did not take responsibility for his role in

Plaintiff's mistake although he knew Plaintiff was emotionally

vulnerable because of his family situation. 

Even if Plaintiff were to amend his complaint to make such

allegations, it would not change the fact that Fairman was acting

in his role as Plaintiff's supervisor throughout the time leading

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to Plaintiff's resignation. Fairman may have gained knowledge of

Plaintiff's family situation outside of work, but the acts that

Plaintiff alleges caused him emotional distress, forcing Plaintiff

to resign (as alleged in his complaint) and failing to intervene

(as argued in his reply), occurred within the context of Fairman's

role as Plaintiff's supervisor. Because Fairman was acting within

the scope of his managerial position at Rite Aid, pursuant to

Sheppard and Graw, he cannot be sued for NIED. Plaintiff does not

allege any negligent or intentional act by Fairman outside of his

supervisory role. Therefore, Defendants' motion to dismiss the

claim against Fairman is GRANTED with leave to amend. Should

Plaintiff choose to amend his complaint to state a claim for NIED

against Fairman, he must allege a specific negligent action that

occurred outside the scope of Fairman's employment at Rite Aid. 

Without Fairman, no resident of the State in which the civil

action was brought remains a party to this action. Therefore,

removal on the basis of diversity jurisdiction is not barred by 28

U.S.C. section 1441(b). The motion for remand is DENIED.

II. Failure to State a Claim 

A. Preemption by ERISA

Defendants move to dismiss all causes of action for failure to

state a claim on the grounds of ERISA preemption. Defendants

allege that the first two causes of action based on Plaintiff's

alleged employment contract are directly preempted and that the

third and fourth causes of action are preempted because the

allegations in the previous causes of action are re-alleged

therein. Plaintiff argues that ERISA does not preempt any of his

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claims because his allegations regarding a retirement plan were

meant to be an example of the consequences of Plaintiff's forced

retirement, not the reason for the forced resignation. He asks

that, if the complaint is not clear on this point, he be allowed

leave to amend. 

Section 510 of ERISA states: "It shall be unlawful for any

person to discharge . . . or discriminate against a participant or

beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with the

attainment of any right to which such participant may become

entitled under the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1140. The purpose of ERISA

is to "provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit

plans." Aetna Health, Inc., v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2495

(2004). Section 1132(a)(1)(B) creates a federal cause of action to

recover benefits due or enforce rights under ERISA plans and

section 1144(a) provides that ERISA "shall supercede any and all

State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any

employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title." 

Where a plaintiff alleges that the employer terminated him or

her to avoid paying benefits or to prevent him or her from

obtaining benefits from an ERISA plan, the claim relates to the

plan and is preempted by ERISA. Campbell v. Aerospace Corp., 123

F.3d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1997); Tingey v. Pixley-Richards West,

Inc., 953 F.2d 1124, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). However, where the

plaintiff’s complaint does not plead an ERISA cause of action, even

though it could have, and ERISA is not the only basis for the

complaint, it is not preempted. Karambelas v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

992 F.2d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 1993). When "the existence of a

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pension plan is a critical factor in establishing liability under

the State's wrongful discharge law" and an employer's "principal"

motivation in terminating an employee is a "pension-defeating

motive," ERISA completely preempts the State law claims based on

termination. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 140,

146 (1990). However, if a plaintiff's loss of benefits from a

pension plan is a "mere consequence of, but not a motivating factor

behind, the termination of benefits," the claim is not preempted by

ERISA. Ethridge v Harbor House Restaurant, 861 F.2d 1389, 1405

(9th Cir. 1988)(internal quotations omitted). 

Citing Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants argue that Plaintiff

alleges that Defendants forced Plaintiff's resignation to deprive

him of his pension benefits. There are two allegations in

Plaintiff's complaint that refer to retirement benefits. Paragraph

39 states that Rite Aid breached the alleged employment contract

"for the purpose of frustrating Plaintiff's enjoyment of benefits

of the contract. Plaintiff is informed and believes that Defendant

unfairly frustrated Plaintiff's right to receive one or more

agreements the parties actually made prior to the forced

resignation, specifically Plaintiff's retirement benefits." Compl.

¶ 39. Plaintiff also alleges that he was "terminated in bad faith

so as to deprive Plaintiff of an independent benefit in terms of

his eventual retirement." Compl. ¶ 38. 

Paragraph 39 can be read to allege that the loss of retirement

benefits was a consequence of his resignation. Plaintiff alleges

that Rite Aid "frustrated" his right to receive retirement benefits

when Defendant fired him. Paragraph 38 is also arguably ambiguous. 

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Plaintiff's age discrimination claim is not ERISA-preempted

for the further reason that “ERISA does not preempt FEHA provisions

that merely prohibit employers from discriminating against

employees on the basis of age, race, sex, or religion.” Sorosky v.

Burroughs Corp., 826 F.2d 794, 800 (9th Cir. 1987); Lane v. Goren

743 F.2d 1337, 1340 (9th Cir. 1984). 

15

Plaintiff states in his opposition that Rite Aid's

contribution to his plan was so minimal that it could not have been

a significant factor in its decision to force Plaintiff to resign

and that he intends in his complaint merely to mention the loss of

the plan benefits as a consequence of his forced retirement. 

Plaintiff asks for leave to amend his complaint, if this is not

clear. The complaint, although ambiguous, allows for that

interpretation. The Court will strike the offending phrases, which

will clarify that none of the claims is preempted by ERISA.5

However, if Plaintiff decides to amend his complaint, he must omit

these phrases. Because Defendants have not filed a responsive

pleading, Plaintiff may amend without permission of the Court. See

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) (providing that “[a] party

may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course at any

time before a responsive pleading is served”); Fed. R. Civ. P.

7(a). The motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

B. Contract Claims

In the alternative, Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's

claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing because Plaintiff was an "at-will" employee

and thus had no employment contract on which he can sue. Plaintiff

opposes, arguing that he had an implied-in-fact employment

contract. 

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California Labor Code § 2922 provides that "an employment,

having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either

party on notice to the other." However, the "at-will" presumption

provided in section 2922 may be overcome by an implied agreement

not to terminate without good cause. Foley v. Interactive Data

Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 680 (1988). The Foley court cited several

factors that may be considered in determining whether such an

implied agreement exists, including "'the personnel policies or

practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service,

actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of

continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which

the employee is engaged.'" Id. (quoting Pugh v. See's Candies, 116

Cal. App. 3d 311, 326-27 (1981)). An important consideration is

what the parties actually and mutually understood, based not only

on express words but on conduct. Guz v. Bechtel Nat., Inc., 24

Cal. 4th 317, 337 (2000). Although a statement in a written

personnel policy that employment is at-will creates a presumption

that employment is at-will, it does not by itself preclude a

plaintiff from rebutting that presumption. But if there is an

express, written at-will employment contract signed by the

employee, that presumption cannot be overcome. Id. at 339-40. If

an implied-in-fact contract is found, a breach of the implied

employment contract claim requires a finding that the employer

terminated the employee without good cause. Cotran v. Rollins

Hudig Hall Int'l, 17 Cal. 4th 93, 100-07 (1998).

Defendants point to several excerpts from Rite Aid's Associate

Atlas which state that employment is at-will and that an employee's

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status can only be changed by means of a written agreement signed

by a Rite Aid officer. Plaintiff signed an acknowledgment and

receipt form for that handbook in 2002. Defendants assert that

because he signed the form acknowledging his at-will status,

Plaintiff cannot contend that his employment was anything but atwill. 

The acknowledgment and receipt form is not an employment

contract. Nonetheless, the written policies in the handbook do

present strong evidence of at-will employment. Plaintiff attempts

to overcome this presumption with several allegations. First,

Plaintiff argues that sections in the handbook indicate that

termination of a Rite Aid employee follows a certain pattern: "In

arriving at a decision for proper action, the following will be

considered: The seriousness of the infraction. The associate's

past record. The circumstances surrounding the matter." Compl.

¶29. Plaintiff alleges that he was not disciplined for an earlier

$35,000 inventory error and that he did not fire a store manager

after consulting with Fairman when it appeared the manager had been

responsible for the disappearance of merchandise. Plaintiff

alleges various instances when he discussed his future at Rite Aid

with Fairman and was told that his intent to work at Rite Aid until

retirement was "a good plan." Plaintiff also cites his thirty-five

years with Rite Aid, very positive evaluations of his work,

including positive comments on his resignation form, and frequent

promotions and pay raises. Plaintiff also alleges that his former

supervisor recommended that he train other district managers and

that he discussed the possible future careers of other district

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managers with Fairman and came to understand that he had a unique

position as a longstanding district manager. 

A plaintiff does not have to allege in complete detail all the

facts upon which he bases his claim. Here, Plaintiff's allegations

are sufficient to create a question as to whether he can overcome

the presumption of at-will employment. Therefore, Defendants'

motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract and

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing must be

DENIED.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES in part

Defendants’ motion to dismiss and GRANTS it in part and DENIES

Plaintiff's motion for remand (Docket Nos. 9 and 14) without

prejudice. The motion to dismiss the claims against Defendant

Fairman is GRANTED with leave to amend. Should Plaintiff amend his

complaint he must omit the phrases referring to retirement benefits

and state a claim against Fairman for NIED that does not arise from

Fairman's actions as an employee of Rite Aid. Plaintiff must file

that amended complaint by July 29, 2005. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/21/05

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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