Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02023/USCOURTS-ca8-05-02023-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Duane Larison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Thomas M. Shanahan, United States District Judge for the

District of Nebraska. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-2023

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Duane Larison,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

District of Nebraska.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: October 11, 2005

 Filed: January 9, 2006

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Before RILEY, HANSEN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

In 1996, Duane Larison pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. His plea exposed him to a

Sentencing Guidelines imprisonment range of 135 to 168 months, but in light of his

substantial assistance to the government, the district court1

 departed from that range

and sentenced him to 82 months of imprisonment followed by a 5-year term of

Appellate Case: 05-2023 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/09/2006 Entry ID: 1994594
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The Honorable Richard G. Kopf, then Chief Judge of the United States District

Court for the District of Nebraska. 

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supervised release. In March 2005, the district court2 revoked Larison's supervised

release based on his voluntary and counseled admissions to numerous violations of

the terms of his supervised release. Among the admitted violations were several

instances (19 in all) of failing to submit to drug testing, the failure to complete a drug

treatment program which included drug testing, and four instances where he tested

positive for three different controlled substances between January 22, 2004, and

March 14, 2004. He also tested positive for methamphetamine on March 15, 2005.

In addition, he had violated the most basic of supervised release conditions, i.e., that

he not commit a crime, when he pleaded guilty to a drunk driving charge in Iowa state

court. The district court imposed a revocation sentence of 60 months of

imprisonment. Larison appeals. 

Larison argues that his sentence is excessive and unwarranted. Specifically, he

first asserts that the district court failed to consider the five to eleven months

sentencing range recommended by the policy statements found in Chapter 7 of the

Sentencing Guidelines. We have long recognized the purely advisory nature of the

Chapter 7 policy statements related to the revocation of supervised release, see United

States v. Jones, 973 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir. 1992), and after United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), we review revocation sentences for

unreasonableness, see United States v. Tyson, 413 F.3d 824, 825 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Despite Larison's arguments to the contrary, the sentencing transcript indicates

that the district court imposed the sentence "after having consulted the [G]uidelines."

(Sent. Tr. at 21.) The district court also noted that Larison had received a substantial

departure at his original sentencing as a reward for his substantial assistance. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4, comment. (n.4) (2004) (noting that an

increased sentence above the recommended revocation range may be warranted where

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the original sentence resulted from a downward departure as a reward for substantial

assistance). Furthermore, even Larison's attorney did not recommend a sentence

within the policy statements' recommended range of five to eleven months. His

attorney stated that a sentence of 24 months would be appropriate. We conclude that

the district court did consider "the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued

by the Sentencing Commission," as required by statute in imposing a sentence for

violation of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)(B). 

Larison argues that the district court gave significant weight to improper and

irrelevant factors. When imposing a sentence for the violation of a term of supervised

release, the district court considers the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United

States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 733, 737 (8th Cir. 2004). "A district court need not

mechanically list every § 3553(a) consideration when sentencing a defendant upon

revocation of supervised release." Id. at 740. There must, however, be evidence that

the district court "considered the relevant matters and that some reason be stated for

its decision." Id. When reviewing for unreasonableness, we consider the following:

A discretionary sentencing ruling . . . may be unreasonable if a

sentencing court fails to consider a relevant factor that should have

received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or

irrelevant factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless

commits a clear error of judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies

outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 276

(2005). 

Specifically, Larison asserts that the sentencing reduction he received at his

original sentencing, the amount of resources that the government invested in his

treatment and supervision, and his need for treatment were irrelevant factors or were

given improper weight. We respectfully disagree. As already noted, the Guidelines

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Larison's oral argument included an assertion that the district court improperly

considered the factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A) (i.e., the need for the sentence to

reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide

for just punishment), because this subsection is not specifically referenced in 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e), which lists the factors the court should consider in making the

discretionary decision of whether to revoke a term of supervised release. We do not

consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument. See United States v.

Mitchell, 31 F.3d 628, 633 n.3 (8th Cir. 1994). Even if we did, however, we would

note that the argument is misplaced. The district court was precluded from making

a discretionary decision to revoke a term of supervised release pursuant to § 3583(e)

in this case because revocation was mandatory given the nature of Larison's admitted

violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (mandating revocation if a defendant possesses

a controlled substance in violation of a condition of supervised release, possesses a

firearm, refuses to comply with drug testing imposed as a condition of supervised

release, or tests positive for illegal controlled substances more than 3 times over the

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specifically permit the court to consider the fact that the original sentence resulted

from a downward departure as a reward for substantial assistance. USSG § 7B1.4,

comment. (n.4). The amount of resources invested by the government and Larison's

own need for treatment appropriately factored into Larison's inability to conform his

conduct to the law after being offered many opportunities to obtain treatment while

on supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring courts to consider the

need to afford adequate deterrence); & (a)(2)(D) (requiring courts to consider the need

to provide the defendant with needed correctional treatment in the most effective

manner). The district court ultimately concluded that Larison's "horrible addiction"

"simply cannot adequately be supervised in a setting less restrictive than prison."

(Sent. Tr. at 19, 22.) The district court recommended "in the strongest possible terms

that the defendant be enrolled in the intensive drug treatment program of the Bureau

of Prisons" to provide the defendant with the needed treatment in a supervised setting.

(Id. at 22.) The fact that the in-prison treatment program could be completed in less

than five years does not render Larison's need for obtaining the treatment in a

restrictive setting an improper or irrelevant factor, nor does it render the five-year

sentence unreasonable in light of all the facts of this case.3

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course of 1 year). Larison met three of the four alternative prerequisites for

mandatory revocation under § 3583(g). Therefore, the district court's decision was not

constrained by the factors specifically enunciated in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), as Larison

contends, but only by the maximum five-year term of imprisonment authorized under

§ 3583(e)(3), as directed in § 3583(g). The district court properly considered all

relevant sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a) in deciding the length of the revocation

sentence.

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Finally, Larison argues that the district court made a clear error in judgment in

balancing the relevant statutory sentencing factors. Larison urges that the length of

his revocation sentence is disproportionately long when compared to others similarly

situated, citing for example, White Face, 383 F.3d at 736-40 (affirming revocation

sentences of 24 months and 48 months for defendants who failed to submit to drug

testing or tested positive for illegal substances); and United States v. Cotton, 399 F.3d

913, 915-17 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming a revocation sentence of 46 months for

continued drug abuse and needed drug treatment). Larison was not entitled to any

particular sentence within the statutory limit, and we cannot conclude that his 60-

month sentence was so disproportionate to the cases cited as to be unreasonable. 

We conclude that the district court appropriately balanced the statutory factors

and imposed a sentence that is within the maximum allowed by statute and not

unreasonable given the facts of this case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (permitting a

five-year revocation sentence where the original offense was a class A felony). The

district court expressed grave concern over Larison's numerous and repeated

violations of the terms of his supervised release and his demonstrated inability to

successfully complete drug treatment programs while on supervised release. Despite

the many chances the probation office had afforded him and the substantial reduction

of his original sentence for substantial assistance, he persisted in his criminal conduct.

See Cotton, 399 F.3d at 916 (citing similar factors). Although Larison received the

maximum sentence available under the statute, the district court justified that decision

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giving excellent supporting reasons for the revocation sentence Larison deserved to

receive.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

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