Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01986/USCOURTS-ca3-24-01986-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent Pisciotta
Appellant
Warden Fort Dix FCI
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 24-1986 

___________ 

VINCENT PISCIOTTA, 

 Appellant 

v. 

WARDEN FORT DIX FCI 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-24-cv-04470) 

District Judge: Honorable Karen M. Williams 

____________________________________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

on December 3, 2024 

Before: BIBAS, FREEMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: December 9, 2024) 

____________________________________ 

Case: 24-1986 Document: 17 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
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___________

OPINION*

___________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Vincent Pisciotta appeals from an order of the United States District 

Court for the District of New Jersey denying his petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241. For the following reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

In 2013, Pisciotta and two other men were convicted of arson and related charges under 

18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 844(h), and 844(i). United States v. Anderson, 783 F.3d 727, 734 (8th 

Cir. 2015). Specifically, Pisciotta was found to have aided the named defendant in that 

case, Anderson, in burning down Anderson’s struggling Kansas City–based restaurant, 

Hereford House. Id. at 736–37. After a jury trial, Pisciotta was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 20 years, and his sentence was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 734.1

In April 2024, Pisciotta, now incarcerated at FCI–Fort Dix in New Jersey, filed a 

habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 which challenged the statutory basis of the Bureau 

of Prison’s determination that he was ineligible for good time credits under the First Step 

Act (“FSA”). He asserted, inter alia, that the exclusion of “ineligible offenses,” including 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

1 Following his conviction and direct appeal, Pisciotta sought relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 

first in the District Court for the Western District of Missouri and then on appeal to the 

Eighth Circuit, but was denied. See generally Pisciotta v. United States, No. 16-3977, 2017 

WL 5157748 (8th Cir. Mar. 1, 2017). Pisciotta then petitioned for relief under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241 in the Northern District of Texas; that petition was dismissed, and the Fifth Circuit 

affirmed. See generally Pisciotta v. Harmon, 748 F. App’x 634 (5th Cir. 2019).

Case: 24-1986 Document: 17 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/09/2024
3 

his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h) & (i) for arson and the use of fire or explosives 

in commission of a felony, amounted to both an ex post facto punishment when applied to 

him particularly, and a violation of similarly situated prisoners’ due process rights generally. 

Pursuant to Habeas Corpus Rule 4, the District Court denied Pisciotta’s petition sua 

sponte after determining it failed to state a basis for relief. In rejecting Pisciotta’s arguments, the District Court noted that the FSA’s good time credit provision did not impose a 

punishment, but rather created a benefit, for an enumerated class of prisoners. The District 

Court further concluded that the list of ineligible offenses satisfied rational basis scrutiny 

based on the risk they create to the public, or their particularly heinous nature. 

We review de novo the District Court’s denial of Pisciotta’s petition under § 2241. 

We will affirm on the District Court’s own reasoning. See Cradle v. United States ex rel. 

Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). 

In relevant part, the FSA provides that a “prisoner is ineligible to receive time credits 

... if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction” of an ineligible offense. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3632(d)(4)(D). The Act then provides a list of offenses that render a prisoner ineligible 

for earned time credits, including convictions under “Subsection (f)(3), (h), or (i) of section 

844, relating to the use of fire or an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xix). Pisciotta 

was convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(h) & (i), and therefore he is ineligible to earn good 

time credits under the plain text of the Act. Id.; see also Anderson, 783 F.3d at 734. 

On appeal, Pisciotta reiterates his claim that his exclusion from the FSA’s Good 

Time Credit provision constitutes an ex post facto punishment and analogizes his situation 

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to that in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981). His argument is misplaced. As Weaver

explains, the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits legislation that works to retroactively disadvantage offenders affected by the law. Id. at 29; see also United States v. Siddons, 660 F.3d 

699, 704 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011). Weaver held that a state law that restricted offenders’ prior 

ability to earn good time credits amounted to an ex post facto punishment, because it left 

the affected offenders in a worse position than they had been prior to the law’s enactment. 

Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33–36. The FSA’s impact on Pisciotta is manifestly different, because 

the FSA did not remove or otherwise restrict an exempt inmate’s previously vested ability 

to earn good time credits, but instead excluded him from a new statutory scheme. See 

Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 258 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 

250–51 (2000)); see also Mickens-Thomas v. Vaughn, 321 F.3d 374, 392 (3d Cir. 2003). 

In other words, while Pisciotta and other similarly excluded offenders did not benefit from 

the passage of the FSA, they were not disadvantaged, as the passage of the FSA left their 

expected sentences and potential good-time credits unchanged; as a result, the Ex Post 

Facto Clause is not implicated. Jones, 529 U.S. at 250–51. 

Next, Pisciotta argues that the FSA’s list of exempt crimes violates his right to equal 

protection of the laws and does not pass rational basis review. To establish an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must at a minimum allege that he was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by the defendant and that there was no rational basis 

for such treatment.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 (3d Cir. 2008).

Disparate treatment of similarly situated, non-suspect classes is permissible so long as it is 

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“grounded on some reasonable policy.” Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 

1981). 

Pisciotta’s brief on appeal asserts that the list of ineligible offenses contained in the 

FSA was added to the bill at the last minute and alleges that the list of offenses exempt 

from the FSA’s Good Time Credit provision is irrational, since many objectively serious 

offenses may nevertheless earn credits under the Act. However, under rational basis review, “courts are compelled ... to accept a legislature’s generalizations even when there is 

an imperfect fit between means and ends.” Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 

(1993). As the District Court correctly noted, a review of the list of ineligible offenses 

indicates that Congress chose to exempt certain serious crimes from the Act’s benefit. Additionally, many of these ineligible offenses are either particularly heinous or create unique 

and unacceptable communal hazards. Even if Congress’s list is arguably imperfect, it cannot be said to lack a rational basis, and as a result, Pisciotta has not shown a violation of 

his right to equal protection. Id.

Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Pisciotta’s petition.

Case: 24-1986 Document: 17 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/09/2024