Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01827/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01827-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John J. Lincoln
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1827

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa.

John J. Lincoln, *

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: December 14, 2004

Filed: May 26, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BEAM, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

John J. Lincoln (Lincoln) pled guilty to distributing 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). The

district court1

 sentenced Lincoln to 168 months’ imprisonment and five years

supervised release. Lincoln appeals, arguing (1) a prior marijuana offense should not

have been scored in calculating his criminal history points because the prior offense

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was expunged, and (2) he should not have received a two-level enhancement for

obstruction of justice. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In December 2002, Lincoln made at least four methamphetamine sales to

confidential informants and to undercover narcotics agents. On June 27, 2003,

Lincoln was indicted on two counts of distribution of 50 grams or more of

methamphetamine. On June 30, law enforcement executed a federal arrest warrant

on Lincoln at his home. At the time of arrest, Lincoln possessed marijuana and some

firearms. Lincoln was released the same day on pretrial supervision. On September

4, the Pretrial Services Office (Pretrial Services) submitted a Non-Compliance

Memorandum to the district court, alleging Lincoln failed to appear for random

urinalysis testing during the entire month of August. On September 8, Pretrial

Services submitted a second Non-Compliance Memorandum to the district court,

restating the violations set forth in the September 4 memorandum, and also alleging

Lincoln was arrested on September 7 by the Jackson County, Iowa, Sheriff’s

Department for operating while intoxicated (OWI) and failure to maintain control.

On September 11, Lincoln failed to appear in the district court for jury selection in

his trial for the drug offenses. The district court issued a warrant for Lincoln’s arrest,

and Lincoln was arrested on September 16. Trial was rescheduled to commence on

September 24. On September 23, Lincoln pled guilty to one count of distributing 50

grams or more of methamphetamine.

Three years earlier, on July 26, 2000, Lincoln was arrested for marijuana

possession. He later pled guilty to the offense in Iowa state court. Upon review of

Lincoln’s plea agreement, in which Lincoln admitted guilt, the Iowa district court

ordered a deferred judgment. In its order, the court stated that, if by December 7,

2002, Lincoln “ha[d] not violated the terms of his probation, this case shall be

expunged from his record.” On March 12, 2004, twelve days before sentencing in the

instant federal case, the state court “expunged from public access” the court’s file of

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the marijuana charge, “pursuant to Iowa Code section 907.4,” but conditioned

expunction on Lincoln’s payment of $57.41 in costs. On March 22, 2004, Lincoln

paid the costs owed, which triggered the expunction authorized on March 12.

At the March 24, 2004 sentencing in federal court, the district court found the

Iowa deferred judgment did not result from a finding of either Lincoln’s innocence

or a mistake of law. Thus, the district court ruled the deferred judgment should be

“scored” to calculate Lincoln’s criminal history, resulting in a criminal history

category of II. 

The district court also assessed a two-level enhancement for obstruction of

justice for Lincoln’s failure to appear for jury selection and denied a two-level

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. In applying the obstruction-of-justice

enhancement, the district court found Lincoln’s failure to appear for jury selection

was willful. The court sentenced Lincoln to 168 months’ imprisonment, the bottom

of the sentencing range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Expunged Iowa Conviction

Lincoln argues the plain language of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j) requires a holding

that his marijuana offense was “expunged” under Iowa law and may not be counted

in assessing his criminal history. “We review de novo the district court’s construction

and interpretation of Chapter Four of the Guidelines, and we review for clear error

the district court’s application of Chapter Four to the facts.” United States v.

Holland, 195 F.3d 415, 416 (8th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

We recently decided this precise issue in United States v. Townsend, No. 04-

3110, 2005 WL 1083467 (8th Cir. May 10, 2005). In Townsend, we concluded the

defendant’s prior third-degree burglary conviction, though expunged under Iowa law,

“was not expunged due to constitutional invalidity, innocence, or a mistake of law,

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as required under the Guidelines.” Id. at *4. Thus, we held the district court properly

counted the burglary conviction in calculating the defendant’s criminal history. Id.

Because the relevant facts of this case and Townsend are indistinguishable,

Townsend controls this issue. Therefore, we conclude Lincoln’s prior marijuana

conviction was not expunged for purposes of the Guidelines.

We also reject Lincoln’s argument he was not convicted because the state court

never entered judgment against him. “A plea of guilty is more than a confession

which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction[.]” Boykin v.

Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); see Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855, 859 (8th

Cir. 1969) (same). “[A] diversionary disposition resulting from a finding or

admission of guilt in a judicial proceeding is counted as a sentence under Guidelines

§ 4A1.1(c), even if a conviction is not formally entered.” United States v. Frank, 932

F.2d 700, 701 (8th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Bagheri, 999 F.2d 80, 82-83 (4th

Cir. 1993) (ruling defendant’s diversionary sentences would be counted even though

the state court never entered a formal judgment of conviction); see also United States

v. Tankersley, 374 F.3d 721, 722 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that, although prior

judgment was not entered, the court “fail[ed] to see how [defendant] could have been

placed on probation and subject to its restrictions without an underlying conviction”).

The district court did not err in counting Lincoln’s previous marijuana conviction. 

B. Obstruction of Justice Enhancement

Lincoln claims the district court erred by misapplying the Guidelines and

assessing a two-level enhancement, arguing his failure to appear for jury selection

and his failure to notify officials of his whereabouts were not willful. Lincoln also

contends he was sentenced in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial,

as announced in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Lincoln argues the

district court erred in assessing a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice

based upon its factual findings rather than those of a jury. 

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During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court, in United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749-57 (2005), applied the holding of Blakely to the

Guidelines. The Court in Booker excised two provisions of the Sentencing Reform

Act of 1984, making the Guidelines “effectively advisory.” Id. at 756-57. Under the

advisory Guidelines system, the district court must “consider Guidelines ranges,”

though the court is permitted “to tailor the sentence in light of other statutory

concerns as well.” Id. at 757 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). Courts of appeals now

review sentences for unreasonableness. Id. at 765.

Lincoln first claims the district court erroneously applied the Guidelines. Even

after Booker, we continue to review the district court’s factual findings for clear error

and review its interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. United States

v. Mathijssen, No. 04-1995, 2005 WL 1005003, at *1 (8th Cir. May 2, 2005). The

unreasonableness standard applies only to the ultimate sentence the district court

imposes. Id. As to the propriety of the obstruction enhancement itself, we conclude

the district court properly applied the Guidelines. Section 3C1.1(A) provides a twolevel enhancement if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded . . . justice during

the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense.” The

enhancement applies when the defendant “willfully fail[s] to appear, as ordered, for

a judicial proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(e). “Willful” means the

“misconduct occurs with knowledge of an investigation, or at least with a correct

belief that an investigation is probably underway.” United States v. Oppedahl, 998

F.2d 584, 586 (8th Cir. 1993). The district court has “broad discretion to apply

section 3C1.1 to a wide range of conduct.” United States v. Duke, 935 F.2d 161, 162

(8th Cir. 1991). 

Lincoln did not argue he was unaware of the scheduled court appearance for

jury selection. Lincoln did, however, offer several excuses for failing to appear.

Lincoln claimed he lived sixty-five miles from the courthouse, he did not have access

to a telephone, he did not have a driver’s license, and the woman who was to drive

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him to the courthouse had an unexpected medical emergency and was unable to drive

him there on September 11. Lincoln called three witnesses to support his claims.

Julie Reuter testified she had to take her daughter to Mercy Hospital in Dubuque after

the pregnant daughter’s water broke on the day Lincoln was scheduled to appear for

jury selection. Lincoln’s brother, Richard Lincoln (Richard), explained Lincoln did

not have a car because Lincoln had wrecked his car in an OWI accident a few days

earlier. Richard claimed he could not drive Lincoln sixty-five miles to the courthouse

in Cedar Rapids due to Richard’s blurred vision. However, Richard drove Lincoln

to Dubuque, twenty miles from their home town, so Lincoln could check into Mercy

Hospital on September 16. Lincoln’s stepson, Timothy Balfe, testified he did not

have his own transportation and only had local telephone service at his home. Upon

arriving at the hospital on September 16, Lincoln still did not notify court personnel

of his whereabouts. Richard believed Lincoln was depressed. Lincoln did not

discontinue his obstructive conduct of his own volition; rather, the conduct ceased

only when he was arrested five days after he failed to appear in court. 

The district court found Lincoln “consciously act[ed] with the purpose of

obstructing justice,” a factual finding we conclude was not clearly erroneous. The

district court found Lincoln offered no valid excuse for failing to appear, observing

that, even if the witnesses’ testimony were correct, Lincoln still could have walked

five miles to a gas station to use a telephone to make a collect call to the United States

Marshal Service, his attorney, or the United States Probation Office, to tell them

about his transportation problem. The district court noted Richard was well enough

to drive Lincoln twenty miles to Dubuque, so he could have driven Lincoln the five

miles to a gas station to use a telephone. Based on the circumstances, the district

court properly inferred Lincoln intended to obstruct justice. See United States v.

Watts, 940 F.2d 332, 333 (8th Cir. 1991). We therefore conclude the district court

did not err in applying the obstruction of justice enhancement to Lincoln.

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In addition to the propriety of the enhancement itself, we must address the

Blakely (now Booker) error Lincoln alleges. As we recently acknowledged, “[t]he

standard of review will be critically important in most appeals involving Booker

issues.” United States v. Rodriguez-Ceballos, No. 04-3390, 2005 WL 1131672, at

*3 (8th Cir. May 16, 2005). This pronouncement rings true in this case. Lincoln

acknowledges he did not assert a Sixth Amendment objection at his sentencing

hearing. Accordingly, we review Lincoln’s sentence for plain error, United States v.

Pirani, No. 03-2871, 2005 WL 1039976, at *3 (8th Cir. Apr. 29, 2005) (en banc), a

demanding standard not easily met, Rodriguez-Ceballos, No. 04-3390, 2005 WL

1131672, at *3 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340

(2004)). Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which mandates plainerror review, “a court of appeals [has] a limited power to correct errors that were

forfeited because not timely raised in district court.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731 (1993). To establish plain error, Lincoln must show “(1) error, (2) that is

plain, and (3) that affect[s] substantial rights.” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 467 (1997) (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). If these three

conditions are met, the court has discretion to remand the case for resentencing “if (4)

the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original). Plain-error

review is to be exercised “sparingly.” Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389

(1999).

From Pirani, we can assume that the district court committed a Booker error

when it applied “the Guidelines as mandatory, and [that] the error is plain, that is,

clear or obvious, at this time.” Pirani, No. 03-2871, 2005 WL 1039976, at *4. Thus,

we must determine whether the error affected Lincoln’s substantial rights. In order

to show such an effect, Lincoln must establish a “reasonable probability that he would

have received a more favorable sentence with the Booker error eliminated by making

the Guidelines advisory.” Id. at *5.

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Nothing in the record indicates the district court would have given Lincoln a

more lenient sentence absent Booker error. While the district court sentenced Lincoln

at the bottom of the applicable Guidelines range, we note “the parties stipulated to

recommend the sentence at the bottom of the range.” However, sentencing at the

bottom of the range “is insufficient, without more, to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that the court would have imposed a lesser sentence absent the Booker

error.” Id. at *7. “Where the effect of an alleged error is so uncertain, a defendant

cannot meet his burden of showing that the error actually affected his substantial

rights.” Jones, 527 U.S. at 394-95. Because Lincoln has not shown a reasonable

probability the district court would have imposed a more lenient sentence under an

advisory Guidelines system, we find no plain error in Lincoln’s sentence.

Finally, we are required to “‘take account of the Guidelines together with [the]

other sentencing goals’ enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Pirani, No. 03-2871,

2005 WL 1039976, at *4 (quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764) (alteration in original).

In light of the Guidelines and the factors listed in section 3553(a), we conclude the

sentence the district court ultimately imposed was not unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lincoln’s sentence.

______________________________

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