Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00583/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00583-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Will Holly
Plaintiff
John E. Potter
Defendant

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILL HOLLY,

No. 2:07-CV-00583-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster

General of the United States

Postal Service,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Will Holly (“Plaintiff”) brought this wrongful termination

action based upon racial discrimination and retaliation against

John E. Potter, in his capacity as Postmaster General of the

United States Postal Service (“Defendant”). 

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Case 2:07-cv-00583-MCE -EFB Document 33 Filed 11/21/07 Page 1 of 6
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 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, 1

this matter was deemed suitable for decision without oral

argument. E.D. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint. In response, Plaintiff now seeks leave to permit

filing a second amended complaint. Defendant opposes on the

grounds that this would require an amendment to the Pretrial

Scheduling Order (“PTSO”).1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was an employee of the United States Postal

Service until October 17, 2005. In May of 2005, Defendant issued

Plaintiff a Notice of Removal indicating Plaintiff would be

terminated after thirty days. Subsequently, Defendant learned

that Plaintiff is a veteran. Because of Plaintiff’s veteran

status, the original Notice of Removal was defective. The May

2005 Notice was rescinded and expunged from Plaintiff’s record. 

Defendant then issued a new Notice of Removal in July of 2005. 

Plaintiff filed an appeal of the July 2005 Notice of Removal, and

at the hearing in January of 2007, an Administrative Law Judge

upheld Plaintiff’s removal, but found Plaintiff’s suspension was

improper and that Plaintiff was entitled to back-pay for that

period. At a subsequent hearing, Plaintiff was awarded

attorney’s fees based upon the outcome of the January 2007

hearing. The present action is based upon the Administrative Law

Judge’s decision to uphold Plaintiff’s termination.

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3

In the Original Complaint, filed on March 23, 2007,

Plaintiff alleged that he was wrongfully terminated based upon

racial discrimination and retaliation based on the July 2005

Notice of Removal and subsequent termination. Plaintiff’s

attorney then withdrew as counsel.

On June 14, 2007, this Court issued a Pretrial (Status)

Scheduling Order (“PTSO”). The trial is set for March of 2009,

with discovery closing in June 2008. The PTSO provides that

amendments to pleadings require leave of court and a showing of

good cause. 

On June 28, 2007, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

Original Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In

response, Plaintiff filed a substitution of attorney and a First

Amended Complaint (“FAC”). In the FAC, Plaintiff deleted the

causes of action Defendant sought to dismiss and removed the Doe

defendants. In a stipulated order dated August 30, 2007, the FAC

was deemed properly filed and the Motion to Dismiss was

terminated. 

Plaintiff’s allegations in the FAC rely on the May 2005

Notice of Removal, whereas the Original Complaint relied on the

July 2005 Notice of Removal. In the present Motion to Dismiss,

Defendant argues that since the May 2005 Notice was rescinded and

expunged, no harm could arise from it. Plaintiff asserts that

the FAC’s reliance on the May 2005 Notice was a “scrivener’s

error,” and that the proposed Second Amended Complaint bases the

allegations on the July 2005 Notice.

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4

STANDARD

The Court is normally required to enter a pretrial

scheduling order within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The scheduling order "controls the

subsequent course of the action" unless modified by the Court. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Orders entered before the final pretrial

conference may be modified upon a showing of "good cause," but

orders "following a final pretrial conference shall be modified

only to prevent manifest injustice." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e).

Rule 16(b)’s "good cause" standard primarily considers the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). The district

court may modify the pretrial schedule "if it cannot reasonably

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment);

Id. Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of

diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. Id.

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny

a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party's

reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end. Id. at 609.

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5

ANALYSIS

At the outset, the Court notes that amending Plaintiff’s

complaint may not necessarily require an amendment to the PTSO as

the discovery cut-off is more than six months in the future, the

expert disclosure deadline is more than nine months in the

future, and all other deadlines are more than one year in the

future.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has shown good cause in

seeking to amend his complaint and leave to amend shall be

granted. The Court finds that the “scrivener’s error” which

referred to the May 2005 Notice instead of the July 2005 Notice

is harmless in light of the circumstances. First, the error is

such that amendment will not be futile. Second, because the

Original Complaint and the prior adjudicative proceedings

revolved around the July 2005 Notice, Defendant was aware of the

pertinent facts and will not be prejudiced by the Court granting

leave to amend. Finally, after Defendant filed his Motion to

Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a response with a corrected copy of the

complaint. Plaintiff’s attorney acknowledged the error and was

diligent in correcting it. 

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CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff has shown good cause to amend his

complaint and leave to amend is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint (Docket # 28-6) shall be deemed to have been

properly filed. Defendant shall have ten (10) days from the

entry of this Order to file his response to Plaintiff’s Second

Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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