Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cr-00111/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cr-00111-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Schwartz
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAUL SCHWARTZ,

Defendant.

No. 2:17-cr-00111-TLN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Paul Schwartz’s (“Defendant”) Request for 

the Court to Approve the Use of a Monitored Smartphone. (ECF No. 18.) The Government filed 

a response. (ECF No. 19.) Defendant did not file a reply. For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendant’s request is DENIED without prejudice. 

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Case 2:17-cr-00111-TLN Document 21 Filed 06/08/20 Page 1 of 4
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On March 28, 2011, Defendant pleaded guilty before a district court in the Western 

District of Pennsylvania to one count of conspiracy to receive and distribute child pornography in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1). (ECF No. 5 at 5.) The district court sentenced Defendant to

84 months of imprisonment followed by a lifetime of supervised release. (Id. at 6–10.) 

During his imprisonment, Defendant requested to reside in the Eastern District of 

California upon release. (ECF No. 6 at 39.) The United States Probation Office for the Eastern 

District of California requested modified conditions of supervised release as a prerequisite to

Defendant’s relocation. (Id. at 38.) Defendant waived his right to a hearing on the modified

conditions and accepted those conditions. (Id. at 41–42.) Defendant commenced supervised 

release on April 24, 2017. (ECF No. 2 at 1.) 

On May 18, 2020, Defendant filed the instant pro se request for this Court to approve his 

use of a monitored smartphone. (ECF No. 18.) Defendant does not cite any legal authority for 

his request, but the Court construes Defendant’s request as one brought under 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(e)(2). 

II. STANDARD OF LAW 

Courts may modify conditions of supervised release “at any time prior to the expiration or 

termination of the term of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(2). “District courts have 

significant discretion in crafting conditions of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3583(d).” United States v. Quinzon, 643 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2011). However, such 

conditions must: (1) be reasonably related to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), 

(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); (2) involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 

necessary for the purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 

(3) be consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). Id. at 1270–71; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(3). 

“In sum, conditions are permissible if they are reasonably related to . . . deterrence, 

protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender, taking into account the offender’s 

history and personal characteristics, and involve no greater deprivation of liberty than is 

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reasonably necessary for the purposes of supervised release.” United States v. Goddard, 537 F.3d 

1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendant challenges one of the special conditions of his supervised release, which states

in relevant part, “Defendant shall not possess or use a computer or any device that has access to 

any ‘online computer service’ unless approved by the probation officer.” (ECF No. 18 at 3.) 

According to Defendant, his probation officer approved him to have a monitored smartphone or a 

monitored computer, but not both. (Id. at 5.) Defendant argues he needs both a monitored 

smartphone and monitored computer in order to earn a living, access medical care, and be a 

contributing member of society. (Id.) 

In response, the Government argues that after Defendant filed the instant request, the 

probation officer gave Defendant permission to use a smartphone with installation of monitoring 

equipment. (ECF No. 19 at 2.) The Government therefore argues Defendant’s request is moot 

and should be denied without prejudice. (Id.) 

At the outset, it is well-established there is a “strong link between child pornography and 

the internet.” United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 621 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). 

Here, Defendant used a legitimate social networking site to receive child pornography and make 

it available to other members of a private group on the site. Because the internet was central to 

Defendant’s offense, restricting Defendant’s internet access is reasonably related to deterrence, 

public protection, and rehabilitation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(D). Indeed, the Ninth 

Circuit has repeatedly upheld total bans on computer usage when the offense at issue is related to 

child pornography. See, e.g., Rearden, 349 F.3d at 620–22; Goddard, 537 F.3d at 1090; United 

States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 1142 (9th Cir. 2005). As such, the Court finds the condition as 

written does not deprive Defendant of more liberty than is reasonably necessary. 

To the extent Defendant challenges the probation officer’s application of the condition, it 

bears mentioning that courts often give probation officers considerable discretion. See United 

States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Congress has given probation officers 

broad statutory authority to supervise offenders and to enforce a sentencing court’s terms and 

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conditions of supervised release and probation.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3603. Moreover, the only 

evidence Defendant provides to suggest the probation officer denied his request is a single 

sentence from an email between Defendant and the probation officer. (ECF No. 18 at 6.) In the 

email, the probation officer does not expressly reject Defendant’s request. (Id.) Rather, she 

simply asks whether Defendant wants a smartphone in lieu of a laptop. (Id.) Based on the 

information provided by the Government, it appears the probation officer has since granted 

permission for Defendant’s use of a smartphone with installation of monitoring. (ECF No. 19-1.) 

Defendant did not file a reply to the Government’s response. Absent any argument or evidence to 

the contrary, the Court concludes Defendant’s request has been granted by the probation officer 

and thus his instant request is moot. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion without prejudice so that he may file 

another request with the Court if he feels it is necessary in the future. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant’s Request for the Court 

to Approve the Use of a Monitored Smartphone. (ECF No. 18.) 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: June 5, 2020

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