Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02252/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02252-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Burgess Steel
Appellant
Trinity Products
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2252

No. 06-2365

___________

Trinity Products, Inc., *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee/ *

Cross Appellant, *

* Appeals from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri

Burgess Steel, L.L.C., *

*

Defendant - Appellant/ *

Cross Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: December 11, 2006

Filed: May 7, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, MURPHY and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

LOKEN, Chief Judge.

Burgess Steel, L.L.C. (Burgess), hired Trinity Products, Inc. (Trinity), to

fabricate two steel towers. After the first tower was erected, the owner rejected it

because the base plate was warped. Burgess directed Trinity to fabricate and deliver

a replacement. At the end of the project, Trinity sued for the balance of the contract

price and for extra work not covered by the contract, primarily the value of the

replacement tower. Burgess counterclaimed for breach of contract. The dispute is

governed by the Missouri Uniform Commercial Code. The district court granted

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The Burgess inspectors satisfied a requirement that representatives of the New

York sign erectors union be present during fabrication to ensure that the towers could

be safely erected in New York City.

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Trinity summary judgment of $102,958 on its contract claim and dismissed Burgess’s

counterclaims. After trial, the jury awarded Trinity $60,660 for extra work. The court

awarded Trinity $114,649.73 in attorneys’ fees but denied prejudgment interest and

an additur. Burgess appeals the adverse judgment, and Trinity cross appeals the denial

of an additur and prejudgment interest. We reverse the grant of summary judgment,

vacate the award of attorneys’ fees, affirm the jury verdict, and remand.

I. Background

The general contractor hired Burgess to erect two 75-foot, 125-ton steel towers

on top of a two-story building in midtown Manhattan. Burgess hired Trinity to

fabricate the towers in St. Louis and deliver them to the New York City job site. The

contract price as amended by three change orders was $601,896. Trinity’s two-page

sale agreement was accepted by Burgess, with significant hand-written modifications,

on March 5, 2003.

To fabricate each tower, Trinity welded a seven-foot square base plate, two

inches thick, to the foot of the tower column. The towers when erected would be

bolted to the building’s girder connections through holes in the steel base plates.

While welding the base plate to the first tower (referred to by the parties as the north

tower), Trinity’s welders and welding inspectors present at Trinity’s St. Louis

workplace on behalf of Burgess1

 noticed that the base plate was warping. Efforts to

eliminate the warping during the final welding were unsuccessful. After further

discussions with the Burgess inspectors, Trinity shipped the completed north tower

to a storage facility in Pennsylvania on April 16 and requested early payment, a

variance from the applicable letter of credit that required inspection and approval by

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Burgess. A Burgess field superintendent inspected the tower in Pennsylvania and

reported the warped base plate. As requested by Burgess, Trinity’s Vice President and

Sales Manager sent Burgess a letter stating, “The warpage will not affect the base

plate to girder connection in any way.” Burgess then paid for the tower. 

Burgess erected the tower when it arrived at the Manhattan job site on May 23.

The warped base plate caused gaps between the base plate and the girder of 3/4 to 1-

1/16 inches. Burgess promptly advised Trinity, “it appears that base plates have not

been fabricated in accordance with . . . fabrication tolerances,” and advised the

project’s engineer of record of the issue. Though Trinity and Burgess proposed

procedures to flatten the base plate, on June 5 the engineer of record, acting on behalf

of the owner and the general contractor, declared that these procedures were not

acceptable and concluded: “We are loosing [sic] valuable time. We should proceed

with the replacement of the column.” 

Burgess removed the north tower and it was shipped back to St. Louis at

Trinity’s expense. Burgess directed Trinity to fabricate a second north tower as well

as the south tower called for by the contract. For these two towers, Trinity developed

a more thorough sequence of base plate welding procedures and reduced the size of

the “fillet welds” from 5/8 inch to 5/16 inch, which reduced distortion-causing heat

during the welding process. The second north tower and the south tower were

delivered and successfully erected. Both Trinity and Burgess incurred significant

unanticipated expenses in completing their parts of the project. 

Trinity commenced this action in Missouri state court, asserting a breach of

contract claim for the unpaid balance of the contract price (Count I), and a quantum

meruit claim for the fair value of “extra work” requested and accepted by Burgess,

primarily the second north tower (Count IV). After removing, Burgess asserted

breaches of contract by Trinity -- primarily the faulty first north tower -- both as

damage counterclaims and as defenses to Trinity’s claims.

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The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the counterclaims on

the ground that Burgess did not assert these claims in the time period specified in the

contract. For the same reason, the court granted Trinity summary judgment on Count

I, awarding $102,958 as the unpaid contract balance. The case then proceeded to trial

on Count IV, the extra work claims. The jury returned a verdict in Trinity’s favor on

four of the five extra work claims, awarding $60,660 in damages. The district court

awarded Trinity $114,649.73 in attorneys fees on Count I but denied prejudgment

interest on both counts and an additur on Count IV. Burgess appeals the summary

judgment rulings, the jury verdict, and the award of attorneys fees. Trinity cross

appeals the denial of prejudgment interest and additur. We conclude: (i) summary

judgment was improperly granted on Count I and the counterclaims; (ii) the jury

verdict on Count IV is not tainted by the erroneous summary judgment ruling or by

other errors alleged by Burgess on appeal; (iii) the district court properly denied

Trinity an additur on Count IV; and (iv) the denial of prejudgment interest must be

affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. Accordingly, we vacate

portions of the final judgment and the fee award and remand for further proceedings

on Count I and the Burgess counterclaims consistent with the jury verdict. 

II. The Summary Judgment Ruling

A. The principal focus of the parties’ claims and counterclaims in this case was

the first north tower that was delivered to the Manhattan job site, erected, and then

rejected by the engineer of record as unacceptably defective. The district court

granted summary judgment dismissing Burgess’s counterclaims and defenses solely

on the ground that its notice of these claims was untimely. We review the grant of

summary judgment de novo. See Baum v. Helget Gas Products, Inc., 440 F.3d 1019,

1022 (8th Cir. 2006) (standard of review). The parties agree that the substantive law

of Missouri governs this diversity case. 

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A provision on the first page of the Trinity/Burgess sales contract stated: “Any

claim(s) for damaged or incorrect material must be made in writing within five (5)

days of receipt of material to be considered valid.” The second page, entitled TERMS

AND CONDITIONS OF SALE GOODS, included a different provision:

If the goods which are being sold hereunder are defective, the Seller, at

its sole option, will either repair the goods, replace the goods, or will

take back the goods and refund to the Purchaser any purchase price that

the Purchaser may have paid for the goods. If the Purchaser fails to

notify Seller of any defects in the goods upon the arrival of the goods at

Purchaser’s business location, Purchaser will be deemed to have

unequivocally accepted the goods. 

In granting summary judgment for Trinity, the district court concluded that the fiveday provision applied to Burgess’s claims regarding the first north tower because the

warped base plate made the tower “incorrect material,” not “defective goods,” and

Burgess “did not make a claim with [Trinity] for the incorrect materials within five

days of their receipt.” We disagree.

Missouri has enacted the Uniform Commercial Code. The Code provides that,

whenever it “requires any action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which

is not manifestly unreasonable may be fixed by agreement.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.1-

204(1). The Code further provides that a buyer may reject tendered goods “within a

reasonable time after their delivery or tender.” § 400.2-602(1). The five-day

provision “fixed” the reasonable time for rejection of damaged or incorrect goods.

That provision would clearly be reasonable in many situations, for example, if the

seller had obviously shipped the wrong product, such as a green car instead of a red

car, or if the product was obviously damaged in shipment.

But that is not what happened in this case. The parties first noticed a potential

defect -- the warped base plate -- at Trinity’s St. Louis shop. The tower was

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nonetheless shipped and Trinity requested early payment. When a Burgess field

inspector again noted the possible defect, Trinity assured Burgess it would not affect

the tower’s performance “in any way.” The tower arrived at the job site on May 23.

Burgess elected to accept it. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 400.2-601, 2-606(1)(a). When the

tower was erected, serious gaps caused by the warped base plate appeared. Burgess

notified Trinity of the apparent contract nonconformity in writing four days later, and

the parties attempted to cure the problem. The engineer of record concluded that these

efforts were unsuccessful and rejected the tower on behalf of the general contractor

and the owner on June 5. 

The UCC has remedial provisions that expressly govern this situation. Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 400.2-607 provides in relevant part:

(2) Acceptance of goods by the buyer precludes rejection . . . and

if made with knowledge of a nonconformity cannot be revoked because

of it unless the acceptance was on the reasonable assumption that the

nonconformity would be seasonably cured but acceptance does not of

itself impair any other remedy provided by this article for

nonconformity.

(3) Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer must within a

reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach

notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy . . . . 

Likewise, Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 400.2-608(1) provides:

The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a . . . commercial unit

whose nonconformity substantially impairs its value to him if he has

accepted it

(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconformity would be

cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or 

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(b) without discovery of such nonconformity if his acceptance was

reasonably induced . . . by the seller’s assurances.

These statutes demonstrate that the defective goods provision of the written

contract governs this situation. Moreover, the reference to “irrevocable” acceptance

in that provision may not reasonably be construed to eliminate the buyer’s rights

under the UCC to revoke an acceptance or to preserve other remedies in the case of

a nonconformity that was unknown or could not be cured, or when acceptance was

reasonably induced by the seller’s assurances. Here, with timely notice of an apparent

nonconformity, Trinity gave assurances that induced Burgess to accept the tower. See

No. States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405, 408-09 & n.3 (8th Cir.

1985); R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266, 273 (8th Cir.

1985); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-607 (UCC cmt. 4). The nonconformity could not be

cured to the engineer’s satisfaction, and he rejected the tower. This substantially

impaired, indeed destroyed the value of the tower to subcontractor Burgess. All this

happened within a reasonable period, from erection of the tower on May 23 to its

rejection on June 5. Thus, neither Burgess’s counterclaims nor its defenses to

Trinity’s claim for the unpaid balance of the contract price are barred by the five-day

notice provision. See Neville Chem. Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 422 F.2d 1205,

1217 (3rd Cir. 1970). Of course, this does not mean that Trinity breached the contract

or a warranty, only that Burgess’s claims and defenses are not precluded as untimely.

B. Trinity argues that the district court’s summary judgment rulings may be

upheld on an alternative ground -- that all of Burgess’s counterclaims and defenses are

barred by another clause in the defective goods provision that limited Trinity’s

contractual liability: 

Purchaser shall not be entitled to recovery from the Seller for any

consequential damages, incidental damages, property damage, or

damages for loss of use, loss of time, shut down time, loss of profits,

inconvenience, or loss of income.

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Disclaimers of consequential and incidental damages in commercial contracts

are generally enforceable under Missouri law. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v.

Rauch, 970 S.W.2d 348, 358 (Mo. App. 1998). But it is not always easy to determine

whether a claim is for direct or consequential damages. See Shatterproof, 758 F.2d

at 273. Here, for example, Burgess claims damages for on-site repairs to correct

nonconformities in the second north tower and the south tower, repairs that Trinity

allegedly approved because it lacked union relationships needed to do the work itself.

Moreover, the Missouri UCC bars damage disclaimers where “circumstances cause

an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose,” or where the exclusion

of consequential damages “is unconscionable.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-719(2), (3).

These are fact intensive inquiries that should be decided on a full evidentiary record.

See Bracey v. Monsanto Co., 823 S.W.2d 946, 949 (Mo. banc 1992); Zimmerman v.

Gen. Mills, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D. Mo. 1971). Thus, these issues must

be initially addressed and resolved by the district court on remand.

For these reasons, we reverse the grant of summary judgment dismissing

Burgess’s counterclaims and awarding Trinity damages on its claim for the unpaid

balance of the contract price. We vacate the district court’s grant of attorneys’ fees,

which was based entirely on a contract provision allowing Trinity to recover its costs

of collection. The district court may of course revisit the attorneys fee question when

Trinity’s breach of contract claim is finally resolved. 

III. The Jury Verdict

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Trinity on four of its five Count IV

quantum meruit claims for the value of extra work. Burgess argues that the district

court’s improper grant of summary judgment, plus jury instruction and evidentiary

errors, require a new trial of these claims. To resolve these issues, we must focus

more closely on the nature of those four claims and their submission to the jury. Two

of the claims relate to the ill-fated first north tower; the jury awarded damages of

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$49,360 on those claims. The other two are for extra work performed later in the

project; the jury awarded $11,300 on those claims.

To recover on a quantum meruit claim under Missouri law, “plaintiff must plead

and prove that it provided to defendant materials or services at the request or with the

acquiescence of defendant, that those materials or services had a certain reasonable

value, and that defendant despite demands of plaintiff, has failed and refused to pay

the reasonable value of those materials and labor.” Berra v. Papin Builders, Inc., 706

S.W.2d 70, 73 (Mo. App. 1986). In addition, a quantum meruit claim for “extra

work” performed when plaintiff and defendant were parties to a construction contract

requires proof that the work was “[1] not contemplated by the parties and [2] not

controlled by the contract.” Uhle v. Tarlton Corp., 938 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Mo. App.

1997); see Air Cooling & Energy, Inc. v. Midwestern Constr. Co. of Mo., 602 S.W.2d

926, 930 (Mo. App. 1980). Whether services qualify as “extra work” is an issue for

the jury. See Kaiser v. Lyon Metal Prods., Inc., 461 S.W.2d 893, 899 (Mo. App.

1970). 

In this case, the district court separately instructed the jury on the four quantum

meruit claims. For each claim, the court instructed:

Your verdict must be for defendant Burgess if you believe that

such goods or services provided by Plaintiff Trinity was not “Extra

Work”. “Extra Work” is work of a nature not contemplated by the

parties and not controlled by the original contract and written change

orders between Plaintiff Trinity and Defendant Burgess.

Thus, the jury was specifically instructed on the additional proof required for a

quantum meruit claim for extra work. Burgess complains that this instruction

improperly shifted the burden of proof to the defendant on an element of the quantum

meruit plaintiff’s case. “A district court exercising its diversity jurisdiction need not

‘give the precise instruction set out’ in the Missouri Approved Instructions. . . . [T]he

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district court ‘has broad discretion to instruct the jury in the form and language it

considers a fair and adequate presentation of substantive law.’” H.H. Robertson Co.

v. V.S. DiCarlo Gen’l Contractors, Inc., 950 F.2d 572, 576 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations

omitted). Although this instruction was derived from an affirmative defenses chapter

of the Missouri Approved Jury Instructions manual, we do not believe the jury was

likely to construe it as shifting the burden of proof. We conclude that the district court

did not abuse its broad discretion in formulating this “Extra Work” instruction, nor in

declining to give a change-order instruction proposed by Burgess that was inconsistent

with the parties’ course of dealing as established at trial. 

The district court faced an additional issue in instructing the jury on the two

quantum meruit claims for expenses incurred in replacing the first north tower.

Trinity contracted to furnish Burgess two towers for a set contract price. After the

first north tower was rejected by the engineer of record, Trinity furnished a third

tower (the second north tower) at the request or insistence of Burgess and incurred

shipping expenses in returning the first north tower to St. Louis. That appears to be

extra work not anticipated by the parties or controlled by the contract unless Trinity

materially breached the contract in fabricating the first north tower, in which case

replacing that tower was the performance of Trinity’s repair-or-replace remedial

obligation under the contract. If that issue was not submitted to the jury because of

the court’s prior summary judgment rulings, then we must order a new trial on these

quantum meruit claims. However, on each of these claims, the jury was instructed:

Your verdict must be for Defendant Burgess if you believe:

First, that the original north tower did not comply with the requirements

of the contract; and 

Second, as a result, a second north tower was required under the

contract.

Therefore, Burgess’s core defense -- that it was Trinity’s breach of contract that

caused the replacement of the first north tower -- was submitted to and decided by the

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The engineer of record’s drawings called for full penetration welds with

reinforcement and specified that all welds comply with AWS (American Welding

Society) specifications. The applicable AWS standard allowed for reinforcing fillet

welds that “need not exceed” 3/8 of an inch. Trinity then prepared shop drawings that

the engineer of record approved. The size of the fillet welds was not specified in

either the engineer’s drawings or the shop drawings. While fabricating the first tower,

Trinity contacted the engineer of record, who specified a 5/8 inch fillet weld. Trinity

then complied with that instruction. 

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jury in Trinity’s favor. Burgess again complains that this instruction improperly

shifted the burden of proof from Trinity to Burgess. When applied to this instruction,

the contention is without merit. “The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach

with respect to the goods accepted.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-607(4).

Burgess further argues that the district court “committed reversible error” in

permitting a late-disclosed Trinity witness to testify at trial, and in excluding letters

from Trinity to Burgess that did not assert extra work claims as irrelevant and as

“related to attempts to settle and settlement discussions.” After careful review of the

record, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its substantial discretion in

admitting and excluding evidence, nor did these rulings affect Burgess’s substantial

rights. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Aon Risk Serv., Inc. of Minn., 356 F.3d

850, 857 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of review). 

Finally, Burgess argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for

judgment as a matter of law because the alleged “extra work” in replacing the first

north tower “was caused by Trinity’s own failure to properly fabricate the column.”

As we have explained, the jury was instructed on this issue and resolved it in Trinity’s

favor. In our view, the evidence was sufficient to support that verdict. The breach of

contract issue turned on whether the warped base plate was caused by Trinity’s faulty

welding, or by the engineer of record unreasonably specifying a 5/8” fillet weld.2

 If

the engineer was at fault, then Trinity fabricated the first tower in accordance with the

contract requirements and was not in breach. Another issue was whether the engineer

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of record was unreasonable in rejecting the first tower when Burgess and Trinity

proposed less radical on-site remedies. Again, if the engineer of record was at fault,

Trinity performed “extra work” in implementing his unreasonable demand. It matters

not that the engineer of record represented the general contractor and the owner, not

Burgess. The issues were whether the original north tower did not comply with the

contract and, if so, whether replacing the first north tower was required to remedy this

breach of contract. If Trinity prevailed on either issue, it was entitled to a quantum

meruit recovery for furnishing the second north tower. 

For these reasons, we affirm the jury verdict on the quantum meruit claims and

the judgment entered on that verdict. In all proceedings on remand, the parties will

be bound by the jury findings that the first north tower complied with the contract and

that a second north tower was not required under the contract.

IV. Trinity’s Cross Appeal 

A. Trinity cross appeals the denial of its motion for an additur of $30,240 to

its judgment on the jury verdict for extra work. Trinity argues that it is entitled to this

additional amount so that its quantum meruit recovery equals the full value of the

second north tower it furnished. We review the denial of an additur for abuse of

discretion, bearing in mind that if the amount of damages was disputed, a grant of

additur violates the losing party’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See Novak

v. Gramm, 469 F.2d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1972). Here, the amount of Trinity’s damages

for furnishing the second north tower was disputed. A Trinity witness testified that

the value of the second north tower was $75,600. But Burgess presented evidence that

Trinity was able to reuse a great deal of the first north tower in constructing the south

tower. The jury obviously found that Trinity’s actual damages were less than the

market value of a completely new tower. Thus, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying the motion for additur.

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B. Trinity cross appeals the district court’s denial of prejudgment interest on

its claims for the contract price and for extra work. In a diversity case, the question

of prejudgment interest is controlled by state law. Emmenegger v. Bull Moose Tube

Co., 324 F.3d 616, 623-24 (8th Cir. 2003). A Missouri statute provides that creditors

shall be allowed interest at the rate of nine percent per annum, “when no other rate is

agreed upon, for all moneys after they become due and payable, on written contracts,

and on accounts after they become due and demand of payment is made.” Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 408.020. When the damages for a claim of breach of contract are fixed or

readily ascertainable and a sufficient demand is made, the statute compels the award

of prejudgment interest. See Watters v. Travel Guard Int’l, 136 S.W.3d 100, 112

(Mo.App. 2004). However, the statute does not apply if the parties have explicitly

agreed upon another rate of interest, or no interest. See Manfield v. Auditorium Bar

& Grill, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 262, 269-70 (Mo. App. 1998). 

In this case, Trinity’s pre-printed contract form provided for 1.5% interest per

month on amounts past due, but that provision was crossed out and replaced with a

handwritten notation: “as per L/C (Letter of Credit).” The district court concluded

that this substitution reflected an intent that no interest would be owed on amounts

past due, including amounts due for extra work. Therefore, the court ruled, § 408.020

did not apply, and no prejudgment interest was owing. A letter of credit ensures that

the buyer’s bank will promptly pay contract demands that conform to the letter of

credit’s requirements. See Waidmann v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat. Assn., 711 S.W.2d

907, 911 (Mo. App. 1986). Thus, we agree with the district court that replacing a

contractual rate of interest for amounts past due with a provision that payment will be

made under a letter of credit reflects an agreement that no interest will be owing on

amounts past due, since any amounts not promptly paid would not have been

demanded in accordance with the letter of credit. 

Trinity does not challenge this conclusion, but it does argue that the letter of

credit was for the initial contract price, $480,000, not the contract price as increased

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by subsequent change orders to which Burgess agreed. Therefore, prejudgment

interest should be awarded on claims for the contract price above $480,000, which

would include the $102,958 awarded Trinity on Count I. This argument has some

force, but the issue is controlled by the contract documents, most particularly, the

terms of the letter of credit that Trinity failed to put into evidence. Therefore, on this

record, we would affirm the denial of prejudgment interest on Count I. But we have

reversed the grant of summary judgment on Count I and are remanding for further

proceedings on that claim, so we will leave to the district court’s discretion whether

to revisit this aspect of its order denying prejudgment interest.

Trinity also argues that it should be awarded prejudgment interest on the jury’s

quantum meruit award for extra work. A plaintiff may recover interest on a quantum

meruit claim under § 408.020. See Gen’l Aggregate Corp. v. LaBrayere, 666 S.W.2d

901, 909-910 (Mo. App. 1984). Because the jury specifically found that Trinity’s

claims for extra work were not controlled by the contract, we do not agree with the

district court that the notation in the contract, “as per L/C,” reflected an unambiguous

intent that no interest would be paid for past due extra work claims. The case cited

by the district court, Classic Kitchens & Interiors v. Johnson, 110 S.W.3d 412 (Mo.

App. 2003), is not to the contrary. 

However, Missouri law denies prejudgment interest when a claim is

unliquidated because “where the person liable does not know the amount he owes he

should not be considered in default because of failure to pay.” United States ex rel.

Conner Universal Co. v. Dimarco Corp., 985 F.2d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 1993) (quotation

omitted). A claim is liquidated for this purpose if it is fixed or readily determinable,

that is, “ascertainable by computation.” Jerry Bennett Masonry v. Crossland Const.

Co., 171 S.W.3d 81, 90 (Mo. App. 2005) (quotation omitted). A quantum meruit

claim for commercial services is liquidated if the reasonable value of those services

can be objectively determined, because the defendant was under a duty to liquidate

and pay that amount. See Lucent Tech., Inc. v Mid-West Elec., Inc., 49 S.W.3d 236,

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247 (Mo. App. 2001). Here, Trinity’s Count IV claims for additional stub outs

($3,300), for providing additional transportation services ($8,000), and for shipping

the first north tower from the project site ($4,000), were readily ascertainable.

Accordingly, we reverse the denial of prejudgment interest on those claims. However,

for the same reason that Trinity’s motion for additur was denied, its quantum meruit

claim for furnishing the second north tower was unliquidated. Therefore, the district

court properly denied prejudgment interest on the jury verdict on that claim ($43,360).

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Amended Judgment of the district court dated

May 9, 2006, is affirmed in part (the first and fifth operative paragraphs), reversed in

part (the second and third operative paragraphs), and vacated in part (the fourth

operative paragraph). The case is remanded for entry of an amended judgment

awarding such amounts of prejudgment interest on jury verdicts A, B, and E as the

district court concludes are appropriate, and for other further proceedings not

inconsistent with this opinion. Trinity’s motion to strike portions of Burgess’s reply

brief is denied because it is frivolous.

______________________________

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