Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01697/USCOURTS-ca7-15-01697-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William C. Griesbach
Respondent
NCR Corporation
Petitioner
P.H. Glatfelter Company
Party-in-Interest

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 31, 2015

Decided May 1, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 15-1697

IN RE:

 NCR CORPORATION,

Petitioner.

Petition for Writ of Mandamus.

No. 08-C-16

William C. Griesbach,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

In a pair of cases decided last year, this Court made several determinations 

regarding liability for cleanup in the Fox River Valley Site, which is divided into five 

operable units. See NCR Corp. v. George A. Whiting Paper Co., 768 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(Whiting); United States v. P.H. Glatfelter Co., 768 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2014) (Glatfelter). In

Whiting, a contribution action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 

Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., we rejected P.H. 

Glatfelter Company’s arguments that petitioner NCR Corporation was liable for costs in 

the Site’s Operable Unit 1 (OU1) on the basis of arranger liability or discharges made in 

Portage, Wisconsin. Glatfelter had also argued in the district court that NCR could be 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 15-1697 Document: 5 Filed: 05/01/2015 Pages: 3
No. 15-1697 Page 2

liable on a “single-site” theory, i.e., that if NCR was responsible for costs in any operable 

unit, it was responsible for costs in all operable units. The district court rejected this 

claim, and Glatfelter did not raise it on appeal in Whiting. We remanded Whiting for 

proceedings consistent with the opinion. In Glatfelter, a CERCLA enforcement action, 

we affirmed the imposition of liability on Glatfelter, finding that once the government 

shows that an entity caused “some response costs within the Site, [it] may be held liable 

for all response costs within the Site.” Glatfelter, 768 F.3d at 675. 

On remand, Glatfelter moved the district court to reconsider its decision that 

NCR was not liable for OU1 costs on the basis of the single-site theory, pointing to our 

decision in Glatfelter in support of its argument. The district court decided that it was

appropriate to reconsider its earlier decision with respect to NCR’s liability; it 

ultimately applied the single-site theory and held, contrary to its previous decision, that 

NCR was liable for OU1 costs. Recognizing that procedural rules typically would have 

barred Glatfelter from raising this issue on remand, the court concluded that 

“preventing Glatfelter from making that argument now could work a manifest injustice

because it would mean the parties are not playing on a level playing field.” NCR has 

now petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus vacating the district court’s order, 

arguing that the ruling went beyond the scope of our remand in Whiting. See United 

States v. Whitlow, 740 F.3d 433, 438 (7th Cir. 2014) (issues that could have been, but were 

not, raised on appeal have been waived and thus cannot be within the scope of a 

remand).

We have consistently noted that “mandamus is an extraordinary remedy we do 

not grant lightly.” In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 1998). A petition for a writ of 

mandamus has merit only when the district court’s ruling “so far exceed[s] the proper 

bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered usurpative in character.”

In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1295 (7th Cir. 1995). Generally, the 

petitioner must show both irreparable harm and a clear and indisputable right to the 

relief sought, see In re Sandahl, 980 F.2d 1118, 1119 (7th Cir. 1992), though we have 

sometime relaxed the irreparable harm requirement in petitions seeking to enforce this 

court’s mandates. See, e.g., Lindland v. U.S. Wrestling Ass'n, Inc., 228 F.3d 782, 783 (7th 

Cir. 2000) (per curiam).

NCR has met neither element of this exacting test. The only injury to which it 

points is the cost of further litigation, but these expenses do not qualify as irreparable 

harm. See In re Lewis, 212 F.3d 980, 983 (7th Cir. 2000). More importantly, NCR has not 

demonstrated a clear and indisputable right to the vacatur of the district court’s order. It 

Case: 15-1697 Document: 5 Filed: 05/01/2015 Pages: 3
No. 15-1697 Page 3

is possible that an intervening change in the law may justify an exception to the law of 

the case doctrine, see, e.g., Kathrein v. City of Evanston, Ill., 752 F.3d 680, 685–86 (7th Cir. 

2014), potentially allowing unappealed issues to be addressed following a remand. 

Furthermore, courts may decide CERCLA contribution actions using “equitable 

factors,” see 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), and the district court relied on such factors to justify 

its conclusion here. While these considerations do not show that the district court was 

correct to reopen the issue of NCR’s liability based on the single-site theory, they do 

demonstrate that NCR’s right to have the order vacated is at least somewhat disputable

and that the district court’s actions were not usurpative.

Because NCR has not demonstrated that it has suffered irreparable injury from 

the district court’s order, or that it has a clear and indisputable right to the relief sought,

its petition for a writ of mandamus is DENIED. Nothing in this order should be 

construed as a determination of the propriety of the district court’s actions in reopening 

the issue of NCR’s liability for OU1. NCR may raise any and all issues related to the 

court’s rulings should it eventually appeal from the district court’s final decision.

Case: 15-1697 Document: 5 Filed: 05/01/2015 Pages: 3