Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10543/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10543-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher James
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHRISTOPHER JAMES,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-10543

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-08206-NVW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Neil V. Wake, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 11, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed January 14, 2016

Before: Alex Kozinski and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges and Lawrence L. Piersol,* Senior District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tallman;

Dissent by Judge Kozinski

* The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, Senior United States District

Judge for the District of South Dakota, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel reversed the district court’s decision granting

a motion for acquittal after a jury rendered a verdict against

the defendant on two counts of sexual abuse of a severely

disabled woman under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B), vacated the

judgment of acquittal, and remanded for reinstatement of the

jury verdict.

The panel held that “physically incapable” under

§ 2242(2)(B)—which punishes a sexual act with a person

physically incapable of declining participation in, or

communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act—

should be defined broadly and not confused with the more

narrow “physically helpless” standard employed by the

district court. The panel held that the government proffered

sufficient evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable

to it—to allow a rational juror to conclude beyond a

reasonable doubt that the woman was physically incapable

of declining participation in, or communicating her

unwillingness to engage in, a sexual act with the defendant. 

The panel held that—to the extent a defendant raises a

factual dispute regarding consent as a defense under

§ 2242(2)(B)—the jury is the appropriate fact-finder to weigh

the question when evaluating the victim’s physical incapacity

to decline participation or communicate her unwillingness to

engage in the alleged sexual abuse.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 3

Dissenting, JudgeKozinski wrote that, as the district court

recognized, the government simply did not introduce the type

of evidence that would allow “any rational trier of fact” to

conclude that the woman’s physical limitations rendered

her incapable of declining participation or communicating

unwillingness.

COUNSEL

Dimitra H. Sampson (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney; John S. Leonardo, United States Attorney; Mark S.

Kokanovich, Deputy Appellate Chief, Phoenix, Arizona, for

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Keith J. Hilzendeger (argued), Assistant Federal Public

Defender; Jon M. Sands, Federal Public Defender, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Federal law lacks a generic statute addressing nonconsensual rape, as every state has. Instead, 18 U.S.C.

§ 2241 prohibits aggravated forcible sexual assault. 

18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) covers the less frequent scenario where

an assailant sexually assaults a victim who is (A) mentally

incapable of understanding what is happening, or

(B) physically incapable of resisting the assault. Under

§ 2242(2)(A), sexually assaulting a person whose mental

capacity is such that one cannot form the necessary consent

in many ways mirrors state statutory rape laws. The other

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4 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

subsection, § 2242(2)(B), however, covers the even more

infrequent scenario where the victim who is sexually

assaulted may have mental capacity to consent but is

incapable of communicating a refusal of unwanted

intercourse. We review the latter in greater depth today on a

record of heart-wrenching facts.

The district court granted a motion for acquittal after the

jury rendered a guilty verdict against Christopher James on

two counts of sexual abuse of a severely disabled woman

under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B). The court found insufficient

evidence that the victim was “physically incapable” of

resisting or declining to participate in the sexual assault by

James. We hold that the district court erred in granting that

acquittal, although we acknowledge that determining what

constitutes physical incapacity under § 2242(2)(B) is a

difficult issue of first impression in our circuit. Applying the

familiar standard under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

320 (1979), we hold, contrary to the district court’s decision,

that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s

determination by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that James

violated the statute under which he was found guilty.

I

T.C.1is severely disabled by cerebral palsy. Although

T.C. was twenty-eight years old at the time of the sexual

assault, she cannot care for herself and needs assistance from

others with all of the major activities of daily living,

1

In order to protect the victim’s privacy, we refer to her solely by her

initials throughout this opinion. We summarize the facts in the light most

favorable to the prosecution in support of the jury’s verdict. See United

States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 2007).

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 5

including eating, grooming, and using the bathroom. She

cannot walk without assistance. She must be lifted in and out

of her wheelchair, into which she is fastened with a seatbelt

in order to keep her from falling out when her limbs spasm

uncontrollably. When T.C. is in the wheelchair, she can only

use her feet to move around. When not in the wheelchair, she

“can scoot herself kind of Army style on the floor, or she sits

with her legs outward and she’ll hop.” She has no use of her

hands and is incapable of lifting heavy objects.

It is difficult even for those who know T.C. to

communicate with her or to understand her attempts at

speech. T.C.’s tongue is enlarged and her voice box is thicker

than normal, thus making her largely non-verbal. She

communicates primarily through nodding her head yes or no

in response to questions and grunting. Her full time caretaker

of eight and one-half years testified that her responses are

frequently inappropriate or nonsensical to the questions or

situation. Her uncle testified that T.C. sometimes “gets mad”

and “kind of like growls and give[s] you the mean look” if he

changes a channel away from a program she prefers watching

on television. T.C.’s caretaker testified she “kn[ew] about”

an instance where T.C. bit a person she did not like, and that

T.C. can cry and express anger. When T.C. finishes using the

toilet, she will moan or grunt to indicate she is done. These

examples are reflective of the extent of T.C.’s

communicability.

On August 3, 2011, a family member caught James

having sex with T.C. on the porch of her grandparents’ home,

covered with only a blanket. The incident occurred inside the

boundaries of the Fort Apache Reservation within Indian

Country. Because James was adopted by the victim’s

grandparents—who also raised T.C. following the death of

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6 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

her mother during childbirth—T.C. is legally James’ niece. 

The aunt who discovered James lying on top of T.C. called

for an ambulance, which rushed T.C. to the nearest clinic for

a medical examination. A sexual assault nurse examiner

conducted a vaginal examination and observed that T.C. had

torn tissue and was bleeding from a laceration. The nurse

testified that T.C. was unresponsive to her efforts at the clinic

to obtain a medical or event history.

James admitted to investigators that he had sex with T.C. 

During interviews with an agent from the Bureau of Indian

Affairs (“BIA”), James confessed to removing T.C. from her

wheelchair and lifting her onto a bed, after which he took off

her pants and underpants, pulled down his pants, and

penetrated her vaginally with his digit and penis. James also

said he had been drinking, he was “ashamed,” and it was not

the victim’s fault. In a written statement—introduced at

trial—James wrote: “I’m ashamed and confusted [sic]. I

don’t know what made me do what I did. . . . I will not

forgive me [sic] but I do ask God for forgiveness. [T.C.] is

not to bleame [sic] either. She was incent [sic] of all things.” 

When a BIA agent questioned James about the statement,

James responded: “It was intercourse, but it wasn’t like sex,

you know? . . . [W]ith her, she’s just laying there but, I mean,

you are inside her and you are moving up and down.” James

also informed the BIA agent that T.C. cannot talk, only

“ma[ke] noises.”

Because the sexual assault took place on the Fort Apache

Indian Reservation, James could be indicted only by the

federal government since the state of Arizona has no

jurisdiction there. See United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d

931, 946 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that enacted statutes have

given the federal government limited jurisdiction over certain

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 7

major crimes committed on Native American land); cf.

18 U.S.C. § 1162 (noting Arizona is not one of the six

enumerated states that have “jurisdiction over offenses

committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian

country”). On November 1, 2011, a federal grand jury

returned an indictment charging James with two counts of

sexual abuse in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B). For

reasons unknown, the Government did not charge James in

the indictment under § 2242(2)(A), nor did it offer an expert

at trial to establish her cognitive impairments, relying instead

on lay testimony from family members, caregivers, the nurse,

and the BIA agent.

A three-day jury trial began on July 30, 2013. The

investigating BIA agent testified that he was unable to ask

T.C. about the event because he could not communicate with

her, but he videotaped his contact with her and that was

shown to the jury during the trial.2 The jury returned a guilty

verdict on both counts of sexual abuse. Though James moved

for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29(a) both at the close of the Government’s case

and again at the close of trial, the district court reserved its

ruling on both occasions to await the jury’s verdict. The jury

2 The Government submitted two videos that were admitted into

evidence at trial: (1) clips of T.C. at her school taken near the time of the

incident with James; and (2) the attempted “interview” between the BIA

agent and T.C. filmed after the incident. Both ofthese videos, particularly

the latter, demonstrate examples of T.C.’s extreme physical limitations

and her inability to provide a narrative as to what happened. This was

powerful corroborative evidence for the jury’s consideration of the

testimony offered by those who knew her best as to whether she was

physically incapable of declining participation in, or communicating her

unwillingness to engage in, sexual acts with James. She was not called as

a witness at trial for the same reasons.

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8 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

convicted. After post-trial briefing and oral argument, the

district court granted James’ Rule 29 motion and entered its

Judgment of Acquittal on September 26, 2013. The

Government timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.

II

We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion

for acquittal. United States v. Sanchez, 639 F.3d 1201, 1203

(9th Cir. 2011). We review evidence presented against the

defendant in the light most favorable to the Government to

determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.” United States v. Mincoff, 574 F.3d 1186, 1192 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation omitted).

III

Congress promulgated 18 U.S.C. § 2242 in 1986 as part

of its effort to “modernize and reform Federal rape statutes.” 

H. Rep. No. 99-594, at 6 (1986). It states in relevant part:

Whoever, in the special maritime and

territorial jurisdiction of the United States3. . .

knowingly—

(1) causes another person to engage in a

sexual act by threatening or placing that other

person in fear (other than by threatening or

3 The “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States”

includes Indian Country. United States v. Begay, 42 F.3d 486, 498 (9th

Cir. 1994).

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 9

placing that other person in fear that any

person will be subjected to death, serious

bodily injury, or kidnapping); or

(2) engages in a sexual act with another

person if that other person is—

(A) incapable of appraising the nature of

the conduct; or

(B) physically incapable of declining

participation in, or communicating

unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act;

or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this

title and imprisoned for any term of years or

for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2242 (emphasis added).4 Because the

Government indicted James under only subsection (2)(B)—

physical incapacity—rather than subsection (2)(A)—mental

incapacity—the jury could convict James only if it deemed

T.C. physically incapable of resisting or communicating her

lack of consent.

This case turns on the breadth of the “physically

incapable” standard in § 2242(2)(B) for punishing a sexual

act with an individual with the physical incapacity to decline

participation in or communicate unwillingness to engage in

4

18 U.S.C. § 2241 proscribes aggravated sexual abuse, which includes

causing another person to engage in a sexual act (a) by force or threat,

(b) by rendering the victim unconscious (e.g., by a drug), or (c) when the

victim is a child.

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10 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

the act.5 The statutory definitions provided in 18 U.S.C.

§ 2246 do not define “physically incapable,” nor did

Congress provide context for this term in the legislative

history. While no federal court has definitively addressed the

issue, we hold that “physically incapable” under § 2242(2)(B)

should be defined broadly and not confused with the more

narrow “physically helpless” standard employed by the

district court. As so interpreted, we think the Government

provided sufficient evidence to permit the question to proceed

to the jury. The resulting guilty verdict meets the standard of

Jackson. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320.

Due to the lack of congressional direction and germane

federal precedent, the district court opted to draw a parallel

between the federal statute’s “physically incapable” language

and the “physically helpless” language employed by some

states in their rape schemes—holding essentially that T.C.

would need to be totally physically helpless in order for the

jury to convict James under § 2242(2)(B). See, e.g., Conn.

Gen. Stat. § 53a-71(a)(3); N.Y. Penal Law § 130.35(2). The

district court may have relied on this parallel because some

states’ definitions of “physically helpless” similarly discuss

an inability to communicate. For example, both Oregon and

New York define the term “physically helpless” as “a person

[who] is unconscious or for any other reason is physically

unable to communicate unwillingness to [engage in a sexual]

5 The dissent appears to suggest we should apply the rule of lenity in

interpreting this statute. See Dissent at 20. However neither we or the

dissent find the statute ambiguous. Id. (“What this means is perfectly

clear.”). Therefore, the rule of lenity does not apply. See United States

v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 17 (1994) (“The rule of lenity, however, applies

only when, after consulting traditional canons of statutory construction,

we are left with an ambiguous statute.”). The question is whether the

evidence was sufficient to convict James under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B).

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 11

act.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.305; N.Y. Penal Law § 130.00(7);

see also Tenn. Code § 39-13-501(5).

But relying on state law as the district court did is

problematic. First, the Supreme Court has held that “in the

absence of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate

diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning

of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law.” 

United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957); see also

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 591 (1990). We find

this guidance particularly applicable here. State law statutory

schemes are very different from federal law because state law

punishes the broad category of non-consensual rape—but

federal law has no such counterpart. Noticeably absent from

18 U.S.C. § 2242 is a provision punishing non-consensual

sexual intercourse. The scope of conduct punished by federal

law is therefore narrower than the scope of conduct punished

by state law. See United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez,

756 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Nonconsensual

intercourse with a mentally and physically capable individual

not involving a threat or the use of fear might violate Or. Rev.

Stat. § 163.425, but it would not violate 18 U.S.C. § 2242.”).

Second, the district court followed the line of state case

law that construes the term “physically helpless” very

narrowly. See State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674 (2012); People

v. Huurre, 603 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). 

Although both cases involved victims who suffer from

cerebral palsy as T.C. does, the district court ignored the

differences between the legal terms “physically incapable”

and “physically helpless.” In Fourtin, a 4–3 decision, the

majority held a woman who could not walk or talk

nonetheless failed to meet the physically helpless standard

because she could nonverbally communicate her

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12 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

unwillingness to engage in the sexual act by biting, kicking,

and screaming. 52 A.3d at 689. Rather than apply a common

sense interpretation of the term, Fourtin explained that

“‘physically helpless’ has a particular statutory meaning that

requires more than a showing that a victim is totally

physically incapacitated.” Id. (emphasis added); see also id.

at 682 (“[N]o one would dispute that the victim is physically

helpless in the ordinary sense of that term.”). In Huurre, the

state appellate court held that the victim was able to

nonverbally communicate her unwillingness to do something

by making guttural noises. 603 N.Y.S.2d at 306–07. 

Although the state had not sustained its burden in presenting

evidence sufficient to demonstrate the victim was physically

helpless, Huurre noted that the state had sustained its burden

of showing an inability to consent “by reason of a mental

defect.” Id. at 310.6

6 Critically, states like Connecticut and New York can afford to be

narrow in their interpretation of “physically helpless” because they have

other statutes that address conduct where a physically restrained or

disabled victim verbally or non-verbally indicates lack of consent. See,

e.g., People v. Morales, 528 N.Y.S.2d 286, 286–87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988)

(dismissing one count because the victim, who “suffers from muscular

dystrophy rendering her paralyzed from the neck down and wheelchair

bound,” was not physically helpless, butsustaining indictmentfor forcible

rape); State v. Hufford, 533 A.2d 866, 869–72, 873–74 (Conn. 1987)

(setting aside guilty verdict for sexual contact with a woman restrained on

a stretcher due to insufficient evidence she was “physically helpless” and

of use of force to compel the sexual contact, but remanding for new trial

to determine guilt under non-consensual sexual assault statute); see also

State v. Bucknell, 183 P.3d 1078, 1081–82 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008)

(reversing rape conviction because victim, who suffered from ALS and

“was bedridden and unable to move from her chest down,” was not

physically helpless, but remanding for entry of judgment on a lesser

charge of non-consensual sexual intercourse).

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 13

However, the term “physically helpless” has various

interpretations in other states. See, e.g., Dabney v. State,

930 S.W.2d 360 (Ark. 1996) (rejected by the majority in

Fourtin). Dabney found evidence sufficient to find the victim

physically helpless where she was “blind, mentally impaired,

partially handicapped, and unable to speak,” and “could only

grunt, raise her hand, and shake her head from side to side.” 

Id. at 361–62. “Granted, the victim was not completely

physically incapacitated, but this is not what the statute

requires; it only requires physical helplessness, not total

incapacity.” Id. at 362. As another example, Iowa punishes

sex with an individual who is “mentally incapacitated,

physically incapacitated, or physically helpless.” Iowa Code

§ 709.4(d). The state defines these terms separately: 

“Physically helpless” means a person who “is unable to

communicate an unwillingness to act because the person is

unconscious, asleep, or is otherwise physically limited,” and

“[p]hysically incapacitated” means a person who “has a

bodily impairment or handicap that substantially limits the

person’s ability to resist or flee.” Id. § 709.1A. These

statutes demonstrate that the concept of being “physically

helpless” need not be as narrow as defined by Connecticut or

New York and that “physically incapable” is a separate,

broader standard.

Nothing compels us to adopt Connecticut and New

York’s narrow formulation of “physically helpless” over the

broader approach taken by other states. The federal statute

itself does not use the term “physically helpless” and the

district court erred in defining “physically incapable” so

narrowly. “Physically helpless” and “physically incapable”

are two separate standards. “Physically helpless” suggests a

lack of physical ability to do anything while “physically

incapable” is a term that is more susceptible to application to

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14 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

various factual situations that can come before a jury. A

victim could have a physical incapacity to decline

participation or be incapable of communicating unwillingness

to engage in a sexual act and still not be physically helpless.

We find our support in differentiating the broader

“physically incapable” standard from the more narrow

“physically helpless” standard relied upon by the district

court when we look to federal applications of § 2242(2)(B). 

For example, we have held in the context of sentencing that

a defendant had committed an act in violation of § 2242

where the victim “repeatedly gained and lost consciousness”

and “was unconscious or nearly so” when the defendant

engaged in intercourse with her. United States v. Morgan,

164 F.3d 1235, 1237–38 (9th Cir. 1999). The Eighth Circuit

has similarly held that sufficient evidence supported finding

the victim physically incapable where “the lingering effects

of the marijuana may have hindered her ability to object

straightaway to the abuse,” even though the victim was

conscious at the time of the sexual assault. United States v.

Carter, 410 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United

States v. Barrett, 937 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1991)

(upholding conviction where the victim, though not fully

awake until penetration, “vaguely remember[ed] someone

pulling off her jeans and underwear”).

These federal cases support our conclusion by indicating

that a defendant may be convicted under § 2242(2)(B) where

the victim had some awareness of the situation and—while

not completely physically helpless—was physically

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 15

hampered due to sleep, intoxication, or drug use and thereby

rendered physically incapable.7

Most compellingly, “whether a victim is physically

helpless at any given moment is largely a question of fact for

the jury to decide.” Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 695 (Norcott,

Eveleigh, & Harper, JJ., dissenting) (quoting State v. Stevens,

53 P.3d 356, 361 (Mont. 2002)); see also State v. Tapia,

751 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa Ct. App. 2008) (same); State v.

Rush, 650 A.2d 373, 374 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (“It

is thus for the jury and not the judge to determine whether, as

a matter of fact, a victim’s condition meets the physically

helpless standard.”). The district court wisely deferred

making a final decision until after the jury had spoken. It

erred on this record by not abiding by its verdict.

After surveying the dearth of case law, we find the cases

more persuasive which punish conduct under the broader

“physically incapable” standard rather than the narrower

“physically helpless” standard because it will allow more

cases to be submitted to the good judgment of a jury. A jury

could properly convict under § 2242(2)(B) for sexual acts

committed against a victim who cannot verballyarticulate her

lack of consent—“physically incapable of communicating

unwillingness”—as well as a victim who cannot physically

resist the sexual act—“physically incapable of declining

7

In contrast to our situation involving a developmentally disabled

woman, the law is well established that a sexual act with one who is

physically incapable due to sleep, intoxication, or drug use is punishable

under § 2242(2)(B). See United States v. Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 1184

(9th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Wilcox, 487 F.3d 1163, 1169 (8th

Cir. 2007)) (affirming conviction even where the victimwoke up while the

sexual act was ongoing); Carter, 410 F.3d at 1027–28. Contra United

States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2002).

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16 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

participation.” We hold that the district court erred by, in

essence, requiring the Government to prove T.C. was

physically helpless in order to allow the jury’s verdict to

stand.

IV

Now that we have settled the proper legal standard,

applying the facts of this case is straightforward. We hold

that the Government proffered sufficient evidence—when

viewed in the light most favorable to it—to allow a rational

juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that T.C. was

physically incapable of declining participation in, or

communicating her unwillingness to engage in, a sexual act

with James. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320.

The Government presented evidence that witnesses—

even those who knew her well—could not always understand

T.C. Cf. Fourtin, 52 A.3d at 680 (reasoning that “all the . . .

witnesses testified that, sometimes with the aid of a

communication board and at other times, with appropriate

gestures, the [victim] was able to make herself understood.”

(alterations in original)). Although James was T.C.’s uncle

by adoption, he had never resided with her, and the evidence

demonstrated they never spent any appreciable time together

before James sexually assaulted her. Nothing indicates he

knew her well enough to understand her or could otherwise

understand her attempts at communication.

Furthermore, while T.C. had some minimal means of

communicating, the evidence demonstrated that she had

difficulty communicating even with her longtime caregivers,

close family members, the emergency room nurse, and

investigators. During the physical examination after the

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 17

attack, T.C. could not communicate with the treating

nurse—even through yes or no questions—nor did she seem

to understand the nurse’s inquiries or directives. James

himself admitted that she was like a limp doll who “just lay[]

there” during his assault. Thus, the facts presented at trial are

sufficient to permit a juror to find that T.C.’s cerebral palsy

was sufficiently severe that it rendered her incapable of being

understood by others, and thereby incapable of

communicating to James her unwillingness to participate in

the sexual act.

The evidence also suffices to show that T.C. was

physically incapable of declining participation in a sexual act

with James. T.C. does not have use of her arms, cannot lift

heavy objects, and would not be capable of pushing someone

off who was lying on top of her. She is unable to feed or

groom herself. She cannot walk nor get into or out of her

wheelchair without assistance. James had to physically lift

her from the wheelchair to the bed, and then he had to disrobe

the victim before penetration. The facts presented at trial

would permit a rational juror to find that T.C.’s cerebral palsy

rendered her physically incapable of declining participation

in this unwanted sexual act.8

8 The dissent highlights evidence that could support an acquittal. 

Dissent at 22–25. While that evidence might support a conclusion that

T.C. was capable of communicating her unwillingness to participate in the

sexual act, the jury heard this evidence and did not credit it. We must

presume “that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the

prosecution, and must defer to that resolution.” United States v. Nevils,

598 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979)). “[A] court of appeals may not usurp

the role of the finder offact by considering how it would have resolved the

conflicts, made the inferences, or considered the evidence at trial.” Id.

The evidence is sufficient under Jackson to support the jury’s conclusion.

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18 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

V

We emphasize that our holding does not preclude

someone suffering from a physical disability from ever

having consensual sexual intercourse. Someone may suffer

from a physical disability and retain sufficient mental

functional capacity to consent. It is one thing to impose per

se legal violations with respect to minors and those who

cannot comprehend the nature of the act under § 2242(2)(A);

it is quite another to say the law is designed in this manner for

individuals who suffer solely from a physical disability.

The legislative history of § 2242(2) is clear that “[l]ack of

consent by the victim is not an element of the offense, and the

prosecution need not introduce evidence of lack of consent or

of victim resistance.” H. Rep. No. 99-594, at 16 (emphasis

added). This makes sense, as it would be very difficult to

prove a sleeping or intoxicated person—who could not

provide any verbal or non-verbal cues—did not consent to the

sexual act. But we do not think this means that in the case of

a severe physical disability the jury cannot consider the

presence of consent when determining physical incapacity.

We hold that—to the extent a defendant raises a factual

dispute regarding consent as a defense under § 2242(2)(B)—

the jury is the appropriate fact-finder to weigh the question

when evaluating the victim’s physical incapacity to decline

participation or communicate her unwillingness to engage in

the alleged sexual abuse. See, e.g., United States v.

Fasthorse, 639 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Although

Fasthorse testified that the victim ‘wasn’t asleep’ and

consented to the sexual act, the jury rejected his version of

events.”). Here, James never raised consent as a defense and,

in fact, conceded “it wasn’t like sex” because “she’s just

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 19

laying there [while] you are inside her and you are moving up

and down.” The district court erred by taking the question

out of the jury’s domain after it had rendered a guilty verdict

against James, and we now vacate that ruling and remand to

reinstate the verdict.

VI

The law in its majesty protects from assault those who are

too weak and feeble to protect themselves. No society

worthy of being called civilized may do any less. We

reverse, vacate the judgment of acquittal, order reinstatement

of the jury verdict, and direct the district court to proceed to

sentencing.

REVERSED, VACATED, and REMANDED with

instructions.

KOZINSKI, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I am puzzled and confused by Part III of the opinion. My

colleagues work hard to prove that the district court read

18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) too narrowly, but I’m not sure how

the majority’s reading is any different from that of the district

court—or mine, for that matter. The whole enterprise seems

misguided because the statute is clear and thus not reasonably

susceptible to conflicting interpretations.

Here’s what the statute says:

Whoever . . . knowingly . . . engages in a

sexual act with another person if that other

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20 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

person is . . . physically incapable of declining

participation in, or communicating

unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act . . .

shall be fined under this title and imprisoned

for any term of years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2242. What this means is perfectly clear: The

government must prove that the alleged victim had a physical

impairment and that this impairment made it impossible for

her to say no to (“communicat[e] unwillingness to engage

in”) or otherwise indicate nonconsent to (“declin[e]

participation in”) sexual acts. There must be enough

evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

the victim could not indicate, by word or deed, her lack of

assent to a proposed sexual contact. Insofar as the majority

tries to squeeze any more meaning out of these words—such

as the possibility that the government could prove a violation

by showing the victim could not actually fight off her

assailant, see maj. at 10, 17—I must respectfully disagree. 

The statute is simply not susceptible to any such

interpretation.

I also disagree with the methodology employed by the

majority in seeking to pump up the statute beyond its ordinary

meaning. The majority purports to find the statute crystal

clear, maj. at 10 n.5, but then decides it must pick between

broader and narrower interpretations of the statutory

language. It opts for the broader one because “it will allow

more cases to be submitted to the good judgment of a jury.” 

Id. at 15. This rule of acerbity, i.e., the rule of lenity stood on

its head, is not how the criminal law is supposed to work. 

People must have fair notice of what is legal and what is

illegal, which is why we apply the rule of lenity when

confronted with an ambiguous criminal statute. See Liparota

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 21

v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985). The function of

the jury is to find facts and determine guilt by applying

known legal standards, not to make up the law as it goes

along. The majority’s “let the jury decide what’s illegal”

approach is unwise and, most likely, unconstitutional. I

emphatically disapprove of it.

The majority finds yet another reason for giving section

2242(2)(B) a capacious interpretation: According to the

majority, we must read section 2242(2)(B) more broadly than

analogous state laws because “state law punishes the broad

categoryof non-consensual rape—but federal law has no such

counterpart.” Maj. at 11. This is a legislative choice

Congress was free to make; it gives us no license to stretch

other provisions of federal law beyond their natural meaning. 

The question “is not what Congress would have wanted but

what Congress enacted.” Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,

Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 618 (1992) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Our task is to construe the language as written, not

to fill in what we perceive to be gaps in the statute.

In any event, all of these interpretive calisthenics are

beside the point. As Isaid at the outset, the statute speaks for

itself: A jury can convict only if it has proof that the victim

could not physically express her lack of consent to the

defendant’s sexual advances. Because the government chose

to prosecute James under subsection (2)(B) (dealing with

physical incapacity) rather than subsection (2)(A) (dealing

with mental incapacity), we must assume that T.C. was

capable of understanding and consenting to sexual intercourse

with James. The only question is whether she was able to

communicate lack of consent if she chose not to participate.

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22 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

It’s quite clear that the district judge understood and

applied this standard. I can do no better than to quote the

district judge’s own review of the evidence:

In her opening statement, the

government’s counsel said, “[The victim]

communicates primarily nonverbally with

gestures and sounds. She can say yes or no.” 

The government’s witnesses included Special

[Agent] Adrian Jim, Patricia Shands, Mark

Quay, and Jodie Quay.

Special Agent Adrian Jim testified that

when he first met with the victim, she was

crying and “[i]t didn’t seem like she wanted to

talk to us.” He testified that he interviewed

the victim on a second visit, and the video

recording of the second interview was played

for the jury. The video showed the victim

nodding her head in agreement and shaking

her head for disagreement. Special Agent Jim

testified that during the second interview the

victim responded to his questions by nodding

her head for yes and shaking her head for no.

Patricia Shands, the victim’s direct

caregiver, testified that part of the victim’s

school program involv[ed] practicing

language skills, such as “sounding out our

ABCs and her vowels,” working on the

alphabet, and using flash cards with pictures

to practice the sounds of letters. Ms. Shands

testified that when the victim gets out of her

wheelchair, she chooses where she wants to

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 23

sit. Ms. Shands also testified that the victim

requires assistance to use the toilet, but “she’ll

moan when she’s done” so that a caregiver

can help her get back to her wheelchair. Ms.

Shands testified that the victim can talk, but

sometimes she has difficulty understanding

the victim, and it is easier for the victim to

show you something than to tell you. She also

testified that the victim has many friends at

school, and she can express anger and dislike

for someone. Ms. Shands testified that the

victim communicates by nodding or shaking

her head and making grunting sounds. She

further testified that the victim can

communicate her needs and desires, such as

when she needs to go to the bathroom, when

she is finished using the toilet, when she

wants to go play on the computer, when she

wants to play games, when she wants to do

something, and when she does not want to do

something.

Mark Quay, the victim’s uncle, testified

that the victim understands both English and

Apache and responds to questions by nodding

her head for yes and shaking her head for no.

He testified that she does not talk much, but

she can talk. Mr. Quay testified that

sometimes she expresses that she loves him

by hugging him. He said that when he comes

to her house, she always points at him and

says “Mark” or “uncle.” He also testified that

if you change the television channel when the

victim does not want you to, she gets mad,

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24 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

growls, and gives you a mean look. Mr. Quay

further explained that when the victim gives

you a mean look it looks like the mean look

that others give.

Jodi Quay, the victim’s aunt, testified that

on August 3, 2011, she saw the Defendant and

the victim talking and laughing together,

communicating. Ms. Quay also testified that

she can communicate with the victim, and the

victim nods her head for yes and shakes her

head for no.

At the time the Court reserved ruling on

Defendant’s Rule 29 motion, the evidence

showed that the victim was physically able to

communicate her unwillingness to engage in

a sexual act and physically able to decline

participation in a sexual act by head

movements and vocalizations such as

growling. As in [State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d

674 (Conn. 2012)] and [People v. Huure,

603 N.Y.S.2d 779 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)], the

government may have been able to present

evidence that the victim was “incapable of

appraising the nature of the conduct”—such

as evidence of mental limitations,

developmental delay, and lack of knowledge

about sex—sufficient to support a conviction

under § 2242(2)(A). But the government did

not charge Defendant under § 2242(2)(A). 

The victim’s mental limitations likelyaffected

her ability to know what she should and

should not be unwilling to do, but

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 25

§ 2242(2)(B) requires evidence that the victim

is physically incapable of expressing

unwillingness or declining participation. The

evidence presented by the government at trial

was not sufficient for a jury to reasonably find

that the victim was “physically incapable of

declining participation in, or communicating

unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act.”

United States v. James, No. CR-11-08206-PCT-NVW, 2013

WL 5423979, at *5–*6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 26, 2013) (emphasis

added) (citations omitted).

As the district court recognized, the government simply

did not introduce the type of evidence that would allow “any

rational trier of fact” to conclude that T.C.’s physical

limitations rendered her incapable of declining participation

or communicating unwillingness. Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Significantly, the government

never elicited testimony from a witness who knew T.C. that

she was physically incapable of expressing her refusal or

disagreement. The fact that T.C. was nonresponsive during

her medical examination, see maj. at 16–17, is wholly

irrelevant. See State v. Fourtin, 52 A.3d 674, 689–90

(concluding that a victim’s failure to communicate with

physicians “simply is not probative of whether the victim was

unable to communicate to the defendant that his sexual

advances were unwelcome”). The nurse’s testimony that

T.C. “could not say yes or no” to simple questions tells us

nothing about whether T.C. was physically incapable of

communicating. All the nurse observed was that T.C. did not

respond.

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26 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

It’s possible that T.C. didn’t comprehend the situation,

either when she was with James or with the nurse. See maj.

at 16–17. But because the government didn’t charge James

under section 2242(2)(A), T.C.’s mental capacity to

“apprais[e] the nature of the conduct” was never at issue

before the jury and is not at issue now. We therefore must

presume her limitations were purely physical, and that her

comprehension of the situation was no different from that of

any other adult woman. The majority’s periodic references

to T.C.’s mental capacity betray its effort to justify James’s

conviction under a provision he was not charged with

violating.

The majority ultimately lists a number of facts that are

pretty much beside the point and thus cannot overcome the

solid wall of evidence that T.C. was capable of

communicating her lack of consent when she was so inclined. 

For example, the majority’s reliance on the fact that T.C.’s

caretaker and guardians can’t always understand her specific

needs, maj. at 5, 16, is not the least bit helpful. Evidence that

it’s hard to understand T.C.’s “wants or needs” doesn’t

demonstrate that she is incapable of expressing her

unhappiness with a situation. Witnesses familiar with T.C.

agreed that she can express disapproval with head nods,

grunts, moans, growls, tears and mean looks similar to those

given by able-bodied people. The majority is right that the

video introduced into evidence “was powerful corroborative

evidence for the jury’s consideration of the testimony offered

by those who knew her best,” maj. at 7 n.2: The video

confirms that T.C. could express a simple concept like “no”

by physically verbalizing that word. While those who knew

T.C. testified that people less familiar with her might not be

able to understand the exact message she is trying to convey

with her growls or grunts, none of them said that she was

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UNITED STATES V. JAMES 27

unable to communicate a simple concept like “no” by means

of head shaking, mean looks, crying or kicking. This

testimony, along with the video showing T.C. saying the

word “no,” gives rise to only one conclusion: T.C. had

multiple ways to “communicat[e] unwillingness” that a

reasonable person unfamiliar with her could understand.

The majority also notes that “James had to physically lift

[T.C.] from the wheelchair to the bed, and then he had to

disrobe [her].” Maj. at 17. But this only proves that T.C. was

unable to get out of her wheelchair or disrobe herself—which

everyone agrees was the case. It has nothing to do with her

ability to communicate, verbally or nonverbally. Even if T.C.

had affirmatively consented, James would still have had to

lift and disrobe her in order to consummate the act.

Finally, the fact that James said T.C. was “just laying

there” during intercourse, see id., doesn’t show that she

couldn’t say “no.” By characterizing the sexual act as

“unwanted,” id., the majority engages in circular logic: If

T.C. was physically capable of declining participation, she

would have done so; therefore her failure to resist must mean

she couldn’t. This begs the question because we don’t know

that the sexual act was “unwanted.” The fact that the

government doesn’t have to prove nonconsent under section

2242(2)(B) doesn’t make lack of evidence of affirmative

consent dispositive.

The majority claims that its holding “does not preclude

someone suffering from a physical disability from ever

having consensual sexual intercourse.” Maj. at 18. I’m not

so sure. James will go to prison, likely for many years,

because he had sex with someone whose physical handicap

impaired her ability to communicate, even though those who

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28 UNITED STATES V. JAMES

knew her testified that she could physically convey the idea

of “no” when she wanted to. Today’s opinion will make

others more reticent about engaging in sex with people who

are physically impaired. Their already difficult task of

seeking out a partner for sexual gratification will become

even more daunting.

Adopting a reading of the statute “that allow[s] more

cases to be submitted to the good judgment of a jury” will

deter all those who do not wish to submit their lives to the

judgment of a jury, which I’m guessing includes most people. 

T.C. herself, for example, will never have sex again; who’d

be foolish enough to risk it? If we’re going to let juries

impose lifetime sex bans on disabled individuals, it should

only be by Congress speaking in far clearer terms. Cf. City of

Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442–43

(1985) (noting that how mentally disabled persons “[are] to

be treated under the law is . . . verymuch a task for legislators

. . . and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the

judiciary”).

In the end, the majority faults James for not trying to

prove consent as a defense. Maj. at 18–19. But the absence

of an affirmative defense does not lower the government’s

burden to prove the elements of the crime. Because the

government didn’t (and couldn’t) prove one such element

beyond a reasonable doubt, I would affirm the sound

judgment of the district court.

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