Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55625/USCOURTS-ca9-11-55625-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Martel
Appellee
Yow Ming Yeh
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

YOW MING YEH,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MATTHEW MARTEL, Chief Deputy

Warden (A),

Respondent-Appellee.

No. 11-55625

D.C. No.

5:10-cv-00965-

JVS-JCG

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 7, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed May 13, 2014

Before: Myron H. Bright,* Jerome Farris, and

Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Farris;

Dissent by Judge Bright

* The Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 YEH V. MARTEL

SUMMARY**

Habeas Corpus

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an

28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition.

The panel held that petitioner was not entitled to equitable

tolling of the limitations period due to either his limited

English proficiency or his mental impairment, because

neither constituted an “extraordinary circumstance” that

prevented him from timely filing his petition and he did not

diligently pursue his rights.

Judge Bright dissented. He would conclude that the

district court abused its discretion in dismissing the petition

as untimely, because petitioner has sufficiently alleged that a

combination of extraordinary circumstances—each of which

the majorityanalyzed in isolation instead of in combination—

prevented him from filing a timely petition.

COUNSEL

Rose D. Angulo (argued) and Sean Kennedy, Federal Public

Defenders, Santa Ana, California, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Matthew Mulford (argued), Julie Garland, and Kevin Vienna,

California Department of Justice, San Diego, California, for

Respondent-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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YEH V. MARTEL 3

OPINION

FARRIS, Circuit Judge:

I.

On July 18, 2006, Yow Ming Yeh pled guilty to one count

of battery in California state court for biting a correctional

officer while incarcerated at the California Rehabilitation

Center. His state court judgment became final on September

18, 2006, when the time for appealing his conviction expired.

He filed no direct appeal. In the year that followed, Yeh

continued to request assistance for an appeal. On March 28,

2007, Yeh filed an Inmate Appeal Form requesting assistance

from the public defender’s office. He also requested a

translator. On September 12, 2007, Yeh again requested to

meet with his “appeals coordinator.” On September 24, 2007,

Yeh filed another Inmate Appeal Form. Over a year later, on

October 17, 2008, Yeh filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeals, which was denied

on November 19, 2008. Yeh subsequently filed similar

petitions in the California Supreme Court and the Riverside

County Superior Court, which were also denied.

On June 8, 2010, more than two and a half years after the

limitations period had run, Yeh filed the present Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court. The district court

dismissed the petition as untimely because of the one-year

statute of limitations. Yeh appeals the district court’s

judgment, arguing that he is entitled to equitable tolling based

on (1) his limited English proficiency and (2) his mental

impairment. Yeh is a non-English speaker with very limited

English language abilities, who has a history of mental

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4 YEH V. MARTEL

illness, although he does not allege that he is mentally

incompetent.

The dismissal of a habeas petition as barred by the statute

of limitations is reviewed de novo, as is the issue of whether

the petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling (so long as there

are no facts in dispute). Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1096

(9th Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253,

and we AFFIRM.

II.

Equitable tolling is available to a habeas petitioner if

(1) the petitioner pursued his rights diligently, and (2) an

extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. Holland

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). This is a very high bar,

and is reserved for rare cases. See, e.g., Spitsyn v. Moore,

345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (“extraordinary

circumstances beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible

to file a petition on time”) (emphasis in original); Miranda v.

Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002) (requirements

are “very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule”); Miles

v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999) (relief is

“unavailable in most cases”). Yeh fails to meet this bar.

A.

Yeh claims that his limited English proficiency

constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” that made it

impossible for him to meet the deadline. Lack of English

proficiency can constitute an extraordinary circumstance for

equitable tolling purposes, but only when the petitioner is

unable to procure legal materials in his own language or to

obtain translation assistance. Mendoza v. Carey, 449 F.3d

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YEH V. MARTEL 5

1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, Yeh received translation

assistance on numerous occasions during the running of the

one-year limitations period. In his Petition, he admits that

“other inmates assist[ed] him” in many of his internal appeal

filings. Since Yeh received assistance in translation during

the relevant time period, his lack of linguistic understanding

could not have made it “impossible” for him to meet the

deadline.

B.

Yeh next claims that his mentalimpairment constituted an

“extraordinarycircumstance” that prevented him from timely

filing. The standard for equitable tolling based on mental

impairment is delineated by Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092,

1099–100 (9th Cir. 2010):

(1) First, a petitioner must show his mental

impairment was an “extraordinary

circumstance” beyond his control by

demonstrating the impairment was so severe

that either

(a) petitioner was unable rationally or

factually to personally understand the need to

timely file, or

(b) petitioner’s mental state rendered him

unable personally to prepare a habeas petition

and effectuate its filing.

(2) Second, the petitioner must show diligence

in pursuing the claims to the extent he could

understand them, but that the mental

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6 YEH V. MARTEL

impairment made it impossible to meet the

filing deadline under the totality of the

circumstances, including reasonablyavailable

access to assistance.

Id. This reiterates the stringency of the overall equitable

tolling test: the mental impairment must be so debilitating

that it is the but-for cause of the delay, and even in cases of

debilitating impairment the petitioner must still demonstrate

diligence. Id. at 1100.

Yeh’s mental impairment claim fails. First, it cannot be

that his mental impairment was so severe as to be the but-for

cause of his delay. Yeh repeatedly sought administrative and

judicial remedies, and throughout these proceedings showed

an awareness of basic legal concepts: he was able to make

requests for assistance from an appeals coordinator and an

interpreter at his administrative hearings, and also to request

assistance from a public defender after his conviction.

Moreover, he was able to file a state habeas petition in three

different California venues. These facts refute a claim of

impairment so debilitating that one could not “rationally or

factually” understand the meaning of a deadline. See id. at

1099–100.

Our recent decision in Forbess v. Franke, No. 12-35843

(9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2014), illustrates the type of petitioner

entitled to equitable tolling. There, the petitioner “believed

he was working undercover for the FBI, and his trial was a

‘sham’ orchestrated to lure his ex-wife out of hiding and

arrest her for being part of an extensive drug distribution

operation,” and the “magistrate judge explicitly found that

Forbess’s delusions persisted throughout the relevant

[limitations] period.” Id. at 6–7. Yeh’s mental impairment

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YEH V. MARTEL 7

and his allegations regarding that impairment come nowhere

close to those in Forbess.

The record also reflects a lack of diligence. Multiple

periods of delay demonstrate that Yeh failed to pursue relief

diligently. Instead he allowed months and years to go by

without acting. His state court conviction became final on

September 18, 2006, but he did not file his state habeas

petition for nearly two years (October 17, 2008). After his

final state habeas petition was denied by the California

Supreme Court (June 10, 2009), he allowed nearly an entire

year to elapse before he filed his federal habeas petition (June

8, 2010). Even assuming it were true that he was unable to

request relief because he was detained in a special housing

unit (a contention refuted by the fact that three state habeas

petitions were filed during this time), Yeh admits that he was

released from this confinement on October 08, 2009. There

is no explanation for the further nine-month delay. The

record reflects a lack of reasonable diligence. Equitable

tolling is not appropriate.

III.

The district court properly denied the Petitioner’s

equitable tolling claim. The petition for habeas corpus is

barred by the one-year statute of limitations. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(1). AFFIRMED.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent. I would conclude that the district court abused

its discretion in dismissing Yow Ming Yeh’s federal habeas

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8 YEH V. MARTEL

Petition as untimely. Because Yeh has sufficiently alleged

that a combination of extraordinary circumstances prevented

him from filing a timely petition, he is entitled to an

evidentiary hearing to determine whether equitable tolling

applies.

The record reveals several barriers to Yeh’s timely filing. 

At the time Yeh filed his federal Petition in June 2010, he

was serving a six-year sentence for his conviction of battery

upon a correctional officer.1 While incarcerated, Yeh lacked

any proficiency in the English language. Yeh had also been

confined in administrative segregation and did not have legal

representation during the time in which he was required to

file a federal habeas petition. And as if that was not enough,

the record also reflects that Yeh has a history of severe

mental illness—a circumstance that the district court failed to

address in assessing and denying equitable tolling or a

hearing on that matter.

In denying Yeh relief, the majority does consider Yeh’s

allegation that his mental impairment tolled the statute of

limitations for filing his Petition. But in doing so, the

majority misreads the effect of this court’s recent decision in

Forbess v. Franke, No. 12-35843, __ F.3d __, 2014 WL

1509025 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2014), which sheds a new light on

the importance of developing the record with respect to

claims of equitable tolling due to mental impairment. In

1

 At oral argument, Yeh’s counsel represented that Yeh has since been

released from custody. Yeh’s release does not render his Petition moot

because “‘the adverse consequences of[his] criminal conviction remain.’” 

Goldyn v. Hayes, 444 F.3d 1062, 1063 n.2 (9thCir. 2006) (quoting United

States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir.

1988)).

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YEH V. MARTEL 9

Forbess, this court reversed the district court’s denial of relief

and held that the petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling of

the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas

petition because his severe mental delusions prevented him

from filing in a timely manner. Id. at __, 2014 WL 1509025,

at *4. Critically, the district court gave the petitioner in

Forbess the opportunity to present live testimony and submit

supplemental exhibits before the magistrate judge to support

his equitable tolling argument. Forbess v. Mills, No. 3:08-cv01261-AC, 2012 WL 4324912 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2012). The

majority makes no mention of that important aspect of

Forbess. And despite the fact that Yeh alleged that multiple

circumstances prevented him from filing a timely petition, he

received no similar opportunity to develop the record. The

majority’s denial of a remand for an evidentiary hearing for

Yeh cannot be reconciled with Forbess.

In addition, the majority ignores the direct instruction in

Forbessthat a court’s assessment of equitable tolling must be

guided by a “flexible, totality-of-the-circumstances

approach.” __ F.3d at __, 2014 WL 1509025, at *4. Rather

than consider the combination of factors alleged by Yeh, the

majority erroneouslyanalyzes each of Yeh’s justifications for

equitable tolling in isolation. In so doing, the majority

ignores Yeh’s principal argument: that the combination of

lack of English proficiency, solitary confinement, and mental

impairment prevented him from timely filing. See Lott v.

Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923, 924 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

the determination of equitable tolling is “‘highly fact

dependent’” and may “involve the confluence of numerous

factors beyond the prisoner’s control” (quoting Whalem/Hunt

v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

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10 YEH V. MARTEL

The majority also misconstrues Yeh’s burden at this stage

of the proceedings. The majority rejects Yeh’s claim of

equitable tolling due to mental impairment on the ground that

(1) Yeh’s mental impairment was not sufficiently severe and

(2) Yeh did not diligently pursue his federal habeas claims. 

But “we do not require [Yeh] to carry a burden of persuasion

at this stage in order to merit further investigation into the

merits of his argument for tolling.” Laws v. Lamarque,

351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003). Rather, Yeh must simply

make “a non-frivolous showing that he had a severe mental

impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to

an evidentiary hearing.” Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1100

(9th Cir. 2010).

Yeh has made such a showing. The record here is replete

with evidence that Yeh has a history of mental illness and has

been directed to institutions and programming focused on

assisting inmates with mental health issues. This court has

remanded for an evidentiary hearing under similar

circumstances. See Chick v. Chavez, 518 Fed. App’x 567,

569 (9th Cir. 2013) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing

even though “[t]he record reveals no medical evidence from

the time period for which [the petitioner] seeks tolling”

because the record revealed that the petitioner “had some

degree of mental impairment”). Additionally, although a

mental health clinician stated that Yeh would “need to be

stabilized in a treatment setting” if found guilty of battery, the

record does not speak to Yeh’s mental condition after he was

convicted nor whether he received the recommended

treatment. It is necessary to develop the record on these

important questions.

The majority also mistakenly relies on Yeh’s ability to

file internal prison requests and state habeas petitions as

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YEH V. MARTEL 11

evidence that he was not prevented from filing a timely

petition. This is a non-sequitur. That Yeh made certain

filings does not demonstrate his personal awareness of the

timing requirements for filing a federal habeas petition nor

his understanding of how to file a petition. Nor does

assistance from fellow prisoners at various points in time

demonstrate the availability of assistance at any time during

the full period for which Yeh seeks tolling. Yes, the

assistance Yeh received may call into question the degree to

which his circumstances prevented him from filing a petition

for habeas corpus in a timely manner. But that issue should

be assessed after Yeh further develops the record at an

evidentiary hearing with counsel present.

Finally, it’s worth noting that granting an evidentiary

hearing in these circumstances not only gives a petitioner a

fair opportunity to develop the record on important issues, it

also prevents undue delay which inevitably results from an

appellate court remanding for a hearing that should have been

granted in the first place. As a matter of justice and

efficiency, a petitioner should be entitled to an evidentiary

hearing when he or she presents a close case of equitable

tolling, as is the case here. However, I fear the

irreconcilabilityof the majority’s opinion with the unanimous

opinion in Forbess leaves the law of the Ninth Circuit with

respect to equitable tolling unsettled and in conflict. The

majority’s decision today will place district judges in a

quandary when assessing whether to grant or deny an

evidentiary hearing on a claim of equitable tolling,

particularly when the claim includes an allegation of mental

illness.

In closing, the majority, denying any hearing or relief,

would minimize Yeh’s circumstances compared to those

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12 YEH V. MARTEL

suffered by Forbess. The majority states, “Yeh’s mental

impairment and his allegations regarding that impairment

come nowhere close to those in Forbess.” Supra Part II.B. 

But given the skeletal nature of the record, how can the

majority reach such a conclusion? Such statement carries

little relevance or weight when made by a non-medical

person without the benefit of a developed record. As in

Forbess, the district court and this court should decide the

disposition of Yeh’s claim only after the development of the

record through an evidentiary hearing with appropriate

findings of fact by the district court.

In closing, the pro se petitioner in this case alleges a lack

of English proficiency, a history of severe mental

impairment, and confinement in administrative segregation

during the period in which he was required to file a federal

habeas petition. If that person, Yeh, is not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing on equitable tolling, then who is?

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