Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30208/USCOURTS-ca9-14-30208-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Paul Edward Parnell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

PAUL EDWARD PARNELL,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-30208

D.C. No.

1:13-cr-00030-BLW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Idaho

B. Lynn Winmill, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 10, 2016—Portland, Oregon

Filed April 12, 2016

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Marsha S. Berzon

and Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher;

Concurrence by Judge Watford

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2 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Vacating a sentence and remanding for resentencing, the

panel held that armed robbery under Massachusetts law does

not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against the person of another,” and

therefore, under the categorical approach, does not qualify as

a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal

Act’s force clause.

The panel affirmed the defendant’s conviction in a

concurrently filed memorandum disposition.

Concurring, Judge Watford wrote that the court’s

conclusion is compelled by two oddities of Massachusetts

law: that Massachusetts has abandoned the traditional

common-law definition of robbery requiring use of violence

or intimidation; and that for armed robbery, the weapon need

not play any role in the offense and the victim need not be

aware of the weapon’s existence.

COUNSEL

Robert K. Schwarz (argued) and Melissa Winberg, Federal

Defender Services of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, for DefendantAppellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 3

Wendy J. Olson, United States Attorney, Christian S.

Nafzger, Assistant United States Attorney, and Joshua D.

Hurwit (argued), District of Idaho, Boise, Idaho, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

Paul Edward Parnell was found guilty of unlawful

possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).1

The government sought an enhanced penalty under the

Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e),

which provides that a person who violates § 922(g) and who

“has three previous convictions” for a “violent felony” shall

be imprisoned for a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of

life. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). A “violent felony” is defined as

“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year” that “(i) has as an element the use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id.

§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i),

known as the force clause, “the phrase ‘physical force’ means

violent force – that is, force capable of causing physical pain

1

See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . .

who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in

interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any

firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has

been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”).

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4 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010).

The district court concluded Parnell qualifies as an armed

career criminal based in part on his 1990 conviction for

armed robbery. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 17. 

Parnell argues this offense does not have “as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person of another.” We agree.

DISCUSSION

We review de novo a district court’s conclusion that a

prior conviction is a predicate offense under ACCA. See

United States v. Snyder, 643 F.3d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 2011). 

“To determine whether a prior conviction qualifies as a

violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), we apply the

‘categorical approach’ outlined by the Supreme Court in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).” United States

v. Jennings, 515 F.3d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). “Under that

approach, we initially evaluate whether a defendant’s prior

conviction corresponds to an offense enumerated as a violent

felony in § 924(e)(2) by examining only ‘the fact of

conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’” 

Id. (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). “Where the statute of

conviction is overinclusive, criminalizing some conduct that

would qualify as a predicate offense and other conduct that

would not, Taylor authorizes courts to ‘go beyond the mere

fact of conviction in a narrow range of cases where a jury was

actually required to find all the elements of the enumerated

offense.’” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S.

at 602). “In such cases, we employ the ‘modified categorical

approach’ and examine the charging paper and jury

instructions to determine whether the defendant was

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 5

necessarily convicted of an offense corresponding to one

listed in § 924(e)(2).” Id. Only in the case of a divisible

statute, however, does the modified categorical approach

apply. See Ramirez v. Lynch, 810 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.

2016) (citing Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276,

2283–85 (2013)). Here, we hold Parnell’s conviction for

armed robbery does not qualify as a violent felony under the

categorical approach.

For an individual to be convicted of armed robbery under

Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 17, the

jury must find the defendant (1) committed a robbery

(2) while in possession of a weapon. See King v.

MacEachern, 665 F.3d 247, 253 (1st Cir. 2011) (citing

Commonwealth v. Tevlin, 741 N.E.2d 827, 833 (Mass.

2001)).2

To satisfy the first element, a robbery can be committed

in one of two ways: (1) “by force and violence” (i.e., the

actual force prong) or (2) “by assault and putting in fear” (i.e.,

the constructive force prong). Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.

265, § 19(b).3 Under either prong, “the degree of force is

2

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 17 (“Whoever, being armed with

a dangerous weapon, assaults another and robs, steals or takes from his

person money or other property which may be the subject of larceny shall

be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of

years . . . .”).

3

See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 19(b) (“Whoever, not being

armed with a dangerous weapon, by force and violence, or by assault and

putting in fear, robs, steals or takes from the person of another, or from his

immediate control, money or other property which may be the subject of

larceny, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or

for any term of years.”).

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6 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

immaterial so long as it is sufficient to obtain the victim’s

property ‘against his will.’” Commonwealth v. Jones,

283 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Mass. 1972) (quoting Mass. Gen. Laws

Ann. ch. 277, § 39). “[S]o long as the victim is aware of the

application of force which relieves him of his property . . . ,

the requisite degree of force is present to make the crime

robbery.” Id. at 844–45. The offense need not involve

resistance by the victim. See id. at 844 (recognizing but

declining to follow the majority rule, under which “snatching

does not involve sufficient force to constitute robbery, unless

the victim resists the taking or sustains physical injury, or

unless the article taken is so attached to the victim’s clothing

as to afford resistance”). Under the actual force prong,

moreover, it is not necessary that the victim be placed in fear. 

See id. at 843; Commonwealth v. Brown, 318 N.E.2d 486, 487

(Mass. App. Ct. 1974).

To satisfy the second element of armed robbery, the

defendant must possess a dangerous weapon during the

commission of the offense. The weapon, however, need not

be “fired, employed to effectuate the robbery, used in a

threatening manner, or even generally or openly displayed.” 

King, 665 F.3d at 253. Nor need the victim be aware of the

weapon’s presence. See Commonwealth v. Goldman,

367 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977).

We agree with Parnell that the force required by the actual

force prong of robbery under Massachusetts law does not

satisfy the requirement of physical force under

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) – “force capable of causing physical pain or

injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. 

Because the “degree of force is immaterial,” Jones,

283 N.E.2d at 843 (emphasis added), accord Commonwealth

v. Joyner, 4 N.E.3d 282, 293 (Mass. 2014), any force,

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 7

however slight, will satisfy this prong so long as the victim is

aware of it. Such force is insufficient under Johnson.

Purse snatching cases upon which Parnell relies

demonstrate the Massachusetts statute does apply to minimal,

nonviolent force. In Jones, 283 N.E.2d at 842, for example,

the defendant simply grabbed the victim’s pocketbook from

her arm. The victim explained: “I really couldn’t tell you

what he did. All I knew he was standing there. Next thing I

knew, I felt something off my arm. I realized my bag was

gone.” Id. The court held this testimony proved sufficient

force to satisfy the statute, because “[s]natching necessarily

involves the exercise of some actual force.” Id. at 845

(emphasis added). The court held “where, as here, the actual

force used is sufficient to produce awareness, although the

action may be so swift as to leave the victim momentarily in

a dazed condition, the requisite degree of force is present to

make the crime robbery.” Id. (emphasis added). Similarly,

in Brown, 318 N.E.2d at 487, the defendant was convicted of

robbery where he merely snatched a small purse the victim

was holding in her hand, touching neither her hand nor her

body. The court held “the pulling of a purse from a victim’s

hand constituted sufficient force to satisfy the ‘by force and

violence’ alternative of the statutory definition” of robbery. 

Id.4

Under our case law applying Johnson, this level of force

– the snatching of a purse from a victim’s hand – does not

4

Jones and Brown also show there exists a realistic probability, not

merely a theoretical possibility, that Massachusetts would apply its

robbery and armed robbery statutes to conduct falling outside ACCA’s

violent felony definition. See Ramirez, 810 F.3d at 1131 (citing Gonzales

v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).

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8 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

constitute force “capable of causing physical pain or injury to

another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140. In United States

v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2014),

for example, we held the crime of assaulting a federal officer

was not a crime of violence under Johnson because it reached

conduct such as chasing a prosecutor down the street and

bumping into him, walking up to a prosecutor and jolting her

arm and shoulder, grabbing a wildlife agent’s jacket or

spitting in a mail carrier’s face. Similarly, in United States v.

Flores-Cordero, 723 F.3d 1085, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2013) (as

amended), we held Arizona’s crime of resisting arrest was not

a crime of violence under Johnson because it reached conduct

such as a “minor scuffle” in which a defendant kicked at

officers who were attempting to place her in handcuffs. If the

level of force in Dominguez-Maroyoqui and Flores-Cordero

was not capable of causing physical pain or injury, then

neither is the snatching of a purse from a victim’s hand.

At oral argument, the government contended the armed

robbery offense nonetheless satisfies the force clause because

it encompasses a willingness to inflict bodily injury on a

resisting victim if necessary. See Jones, 283 N.E. 2d at 844. 

The Massachusetts cases do not require proof of a willingness

to use such force. But even if they did, the force clause

requires the actual, attempted or threatened use of physical

force, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), not a mere

uncommunicated willingness or readiness to use such force. 

A willingness to use violent force is not the same as a threat

to do so. The latter requires some outward expression or

indication of an intention to inflict pain, harm or punishment. 

See Threat and Threaten, Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 2382 (2002); Threat and Threaten, Am. Heritage

Dictionary of the English Language 1813 (5th ed. 2011);

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 9

Threat, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). The former

does not.

For similar reasons, we are not persuaded a simple

snatching necessarily entails an implied threat to use violent

force to overcome a victim’s potential resistance. Although

some snatchers are prepared to use violent force to overcome

resistance, others are not. Notably, a defendant can be

convicted of robbery in Massachusetts even if the victim is

not placed in fear. See Jones, 283 N.E.2d at 843; Brown,

318 N.E.2d at 487; 14A Mass. Prac., Summary of Basic Law

§ 7:217 (5th ed. 2015). If every robbery involved an implied

threat of violent force, every victim would be placed in fear. 

This, obviously, is not the case under Massachusetts law.

By its very nature, of course, armed robbery is a serious

and dangerous crime. The possession of a dangerous weapon

may indicate a robber’s willingness to use that weapon if

necessary to accomplish the criminal undertaking. See

Goldman, 367 N.E.2d at 1182. The mere fact an individual

is armed, however, does not mean he or she has used the

weapon, or threatened to use it, in any way. See United

States v. Werle, No. 14-30189, 2016 WL 828132, at *5 (9th

Cir. Mar. 3, 2016). As noted, the Massachusetts statute does

not require a weapon be used or displayed, or even that the

victim be aware of it. See King, 665 F.3d at 253; Goldman,

367 N.E.2d at1182. There is a material difference between

the presence of a weapon, which produces a risk of violent

force, and the actual or threatened use of such force. Only the

latter falls within ACCA’s force clause. Offenses presenting

only a risk of violence fall within ACCA’s residual clause,

see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (defining a violent felony to

include an offense that “otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

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10 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

another”), which, as the government concedes, does not apply

here. See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563

(2015) (holding the residual clause is unconstitutionally

vague and, hence, imposing an increased sentence under the

residual clause violates the Constitution’s guarantee of due

process). Nor can we presume an implied threat to use a

weapon from a defendant’s mere possession of it. As we

explained in Werle, 2016 WL 828132, at *5, “a defendant

could be convicted of felony riot if there was a knife in his

pocket or a gun within his reach but he did not use or threaten

to use physical force. This would not qualify as a crime of

violence under the ACCA.” The mere possession of a

weapon, therefore, does not bring Massachusetts’ armed

robbery statute within ACCA’s force clause.

We acknowledge the First Circuit’s holding in United

States v. Luna, 649 F.3d 91 (1st Cir. 2011). Addressing the

same Massachusetts armed robberystatute at issue here, Luna

held the statute satisfied the force clause because the

defendant had “provided no reason for us to conclude that the

type of force involved in armed robbery is not ‘violent force

– that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury,’

and we see no reason to do so.” Id. at 108–09 (citation

omitted) (quoting Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140). Luna, however,

does not carry significant persuasive weight. The court’s

discussion of the Johnson issue consists of only a single

sentence, provides no reasoning and makes no mention of the

Massachusetts case law deeming the degree of force

immaterial to a conviction for armed robbery.

We are instead persuaded by the First Circuit’s more

thorough and well-reasoned analysis in United States v.

Castro-Vazquez, 802 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2015). The defendant

there had a prior conviction under Puerto Rico’s robbery

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 11

statute, which criminalizes a person’s “unlawfully taking

personal property belonging to another in the immediate

presence of said person and against his/her will by means of

violence or intimidation.” Id. at 37 (alteration omitted)

(quoting P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 33, § 4826) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Assuming “violence is defined under Puerto

Rico law to include the slightest use of force,” the First

Circuit held “the prior offense would fall short of the . . .

requirement that the offense include an element of ‘physical

force,’ which is defined as ‘violent force – that is, force

capable of causing physical pain or injury to another

person.’” Id. Castro-Vazquez is analogous to this case and

persuasive. See also United States v. Dunlap, No. 1:14-CR00406-AA, 2016 WL591757, at *5, ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, ___

(D. Or. Feb. 12, 2016) (holding a conviction for robbery

under Oregon Revised Statutes § 164.395(1), which “requires

onlyminimal force,” does not satisfy Johnson, 559 U.S. 133).

In sum, because the degree of force required to commit

armed robbery in Massachusetts is immaterial so long as the

victim is aware of it, Massachusetts’ armed robbery statute

does not have “as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person of

another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Under the categorical

approach, therefore, a conviction under the Massachusetts

statute does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s

force clause. The government does not argue Parnell’s

conviction falls under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) or that the modified

categorical approach applies. Accordingly, we hold Parnell’s

1990 armed robbery conviction does not qualify as a

predicate conviction for purposes of a sentencing

enhancement under ACCA.

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12 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

Given that neither this conviction nor Parnell’s 1989

conviction for assault and battery by dangerous weapon

qualifies as a violent felony, the district court erred by

sentencing Parnell as an armed career offender under

§ 924(e).5 We therefore vacate Parnell’s sentence and

remand for resentencing. Because we vacate Parnell’s

sentence on this ground, we need not address his contention

regarding the government’s improper argument at sentencing.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in a concurrently filed

memorandum disposition, we affirm Parnell’s conviction. 

For the reasons stated here, we vacate Parnell’s sentence and

remand for resentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART;

REMANDED.

5 Parnell argues, and the government does not dispute, that his 1989

conviction for assault and battery by dangerous weapon (ABDW), see

Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 15A, does not qualify as a violent

felony. Under Massachusetts law, an ABDW conviction may be

predicated on a reckless act causing physical or bodily injury to another. 

See Commonwealth v. Burno, 487 N.E.2d 1366, 1368–69 (Mass. 1986);

see also United States v. Fish, 758 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2014); United

States v. Hart, 674 F.3d 33, 41–43 & nn.7–8 (1st Cir. 2012). We have

held, however, that the ACCA’s force clause reaches only offenses

requiring the intentional use of force. See United States v. Dixon,

805 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Lawrence, 627 F.3d

1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2010). The district court therefore erred by relying

on Parnell’s ABDW conviction as an ACCA predicate.

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UNITED STATES V. PARNELL 13

WATFORD, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join the court’s opinion in full, although I confess I was

initially inclined to affirm the sentence. The notion that

robbery is not a “violent felony,” as that term is defined in the

Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), strikes me as

counterintuitive to say the least. Holding that armed robbery

doesn’t qualify as a violent felony seems even more absurd. 

But, as the court’s opinion persuasively explains, that

conclusion is compelled by two oddities of Massachusetts

law.

The first is that Massachusetts has abandoned the

traditional common-law definition of robbery. To distinguish

robbery from larceny, the common law required more than

just stealing property from the person of another. To commit

robbery, the defendant also had to use violence or

intimidation to coerce the victim into parting with his

property. See 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law

§ 20.3, at 173, 181–89 (2d ed. 2003). In Massachusetts,

however, a defendant may be convicted of robbery without

using violence or intimidation of any sort. See

Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 N.E.2d 840, 843–45 (Mass.

1972). It’s enough, for example, if the defendant sneaks up

behind the victim and snatches a purse from her hand without

so much as touching the victim or doing anything to put her

in fear beforehand. Commonwealth v. Brown, 318 N.E.2d

486, 487 (Mass. App. Ct. 1974).

The second oddity is this: In Massachusetts, armed

robbery consists of robbery (as defined above) while in

possession of a dangerous weapon. The weapon need not

play any role in the offense, as is often required in other

States, and the victim need not even be aware of the weapon’s

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14 UNITED STATES V. PARNELL

existence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rogers, 945 N.E.2d

295, 301 n.6 (Mass. 2011); Commonwealth v. Goldman,

367 N.E.2d 1181, 1182 (Mass. App. Ct. 1977). Thus, the

same purse-snatcher described above is guilty of armed

robbery under Massachusetts law so long as he has a gun

concealed on his person—even if the victim never learns of

the gun’s presence, and even if the gun plays no role in

facilitating the crime. So again, strange as it may seem, in

Massachusetts a defendant can be found guilty of armed

robbery without using or threatening to use any violence

whatsoever.

The conduct encompassed by Massachusetts’ armed

robbery statute surely falls within the scope of the ACCA’s

so-called residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). But

that clause is no longer valid. Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). To qualify now as a violent felony,

armed robbery must have as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of violent physical force. 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). That is not the case under Massachusetts

law, so Parnell’s prior armed robbery conviction cannot serve

as the basis for an enhanced sentence under the ACCA.

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