Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04075/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04075-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Brewer
Appellee
Adele Herman
Appellant
John L. Matthews
Appellee
Michael P.W. Stone
Appellee
Utah National Guard
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cirruit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

APR 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

ADELE HERMAN, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

) 

) 

UTAH NATIONAL GUARD; JOHN L. MATTHEWS; ) 

TOM BREWER; MICHAEL P.W. STONE, ) 

Secretary of the Army, in his official ) 

capacity, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellees. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Nos. 90-4075 

& 

90-4101 

(D.C. No. 89-C-626-J) 

(D. Utah) 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Plaintiff-appellant Adele Herman challenges the district 

court's order vacating the default certificate entered against 

defendants and granting defendants' motion to dismiss with 

prejudice pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(S). The 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 1 
district court held that plaintiff's amended complaint naming the 

Secretary of the Army, the only proper party defendant, did not 

relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to the original date of 

filing. We disagree. 1 

"The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law which we 

review de nova. Accordingly, we apply the same scrutiny to the 

complaint as did the trial court." Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 

F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1986)(citations omitted). Also, the 

applicability of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to the undisputed facts in 

this case involves a "purely legal determination." See Slade v. 

United States Postal Serv., 875 F.2d 814, 815 (10th Cir. 1989). 

Plaintiff, after unsuccessfully applying for a civilian 

technical position with the Utah National Guard, filed a formal 

complaint claiming discrimination on the basis of gender. By 

letter dated November 14, 1988, acknowledging receipt of 

plaintiff's discrimination complaint and stating its intention to 

investigate, the Utah National Guard notified her that in the 

event she elected to file a civil action in this matter, she was 

required to "name the Secretary of the Army as the defendant," and 

that "[f]ailure to name the Secretary of the Army may result in 

the loss of any judicial redress to which [she] may be entitled." 

Rec. Vol I, doc. 8, ex. C. Plaintiff received notice of the 

1 The district court dismissed Herman's complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction and insufficiency of service of 

process. We have previously determined that a "dismissal based on 

inability to amend a complaint naming an improper party is failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Johnson v. 

United States Postal Serv., 861 F.2d 1475, 1476 n.1 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 54 (1989). Therefore, we will 

consider the district court's dismissal as a Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 2 
National Guard's final determination of no discrimination on 

June 16, 1989. On July 12, 1989, she filed suit in federal 

district court alleging violations of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. 

§ 2000e. 

Plaintiff's civil action, naming the Utah National Guard, 

John L. Matthews, Tom Brewer, and John Does I through X as 

defendants, was filed within the thirty-day limitations period 

prescribed by 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c). 2 On July 14, 1989, still 

within the limitation period, plaintiff served process on the Utah 

State Attorney General's office. It appears to be an 

uncontroverted fact that on the same day, July 14, 1989, the Utah 

National Guard transmitted, by facsimile, copies of the complaint 

and summons to the United States Attorney's office for the 

District of Utah. The Utah National Guard and the other named 

defendants failed to file a response, and on November 22, 1989, 

plaintiff was awarded a certificate of default. 

On January 9, 1990, the United States Attorney moved to 

vacate the default certificate and to dismiss plaintiff's 

complaint, claiming that by failing to name the Secretary of the 

2 The statute provides: 

(c) Within thirty days of receipt of notice of final 

action taken by a department, agency, or unit referred 

to in subsection (a) of this section or by the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission upon an appeal from a 

decision or order of such department, agency, or unit on 

a complaint of discrimination based on race, color, 

religion, sex or national origin ... an employee or 

applicant for employment ... may file a civil action 

as provided in section 2000e-5 of this title, in which 

civil action the head of the department, agency or unit, 

as appropriate, shall be the defendant. 42 u.s.c. 

§2000e-16(c). 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 3 
Army as the appropriate party defendant, plaintiff had not 

complied with 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-16(c). On February 9, 1990, 

plaintiff amended her complaint, adding the Secretary of the Army 

as a defendant in place of the John Does, and completed service of 

process on that office on February 12, 1990. The issue in this 

case is whether the facsimile copies of the complaint and summons, 

transmitted to the United States Attorney, constituted sufficient 

and timely notice of plaintiff's action to the Secretary of the 

Army, the proper party defendant, thereby triggering the 

relation-back privilege of Fed. R. Civ. P. lS(c). 

The two paragraphs of Rule lS(c) have been referred to as the 

"general notice provision" and the "government notice provision." 

See Allgeier v. United States, 909 F.2d 869, 872 (6th Cir. 1990). 

The general notice provision allows a pleading, amended to name 

the correct party defendant, to relate back to the date of the 

original filing, provided the correct party "(1) has received such 

notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be 

prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew 

or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the 

identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought 

against the party." This must be accomplished within any 

applicable limitations period. Fed. R. Civ. P. lS(c). The 

government notice provision addresses this relation-back privilege 

when the party defendant is the United States government. 

The delivery or mailing of process to the United 

States Attorney, or the United States Attorney's 

designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, 

or an agency or officer who would have been a proper 

defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 4 
(1) and (2) hereof with respect to the United States or 

any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the 

action as a defendant. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(emphasis added). 

Plaintiff relies heavily on a Ninth Circuit decision to 

support her contention that the facsimile copies of the complaint 

and summons to the United States Attorney, prior to the expiration 

of the limitations period, constitute sufficient notice to satisfy 

the government notice provision of Rule 15(c). In Miles v. 

Department of Army, 881 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1989), the court 

allowed relation back of a complaint naming the wrong party 

defendant when the plaintiff named the Department of the Army as 

defendant instead of the Secretary of the Army, the proper party 

defendant. The plaintiff in Miles served the Staff Judge 

Advocate's office in the Presidio who mailed the documents to the 

United States Attorney, all within the prescribed limitations 

period. Id. at 779. Defendant argues that Miles is 

distinguishable in that the notice was actually mailed in direct 

compliance with the literal language of the rule. Considering 

present-day technological advances in the dissemination of 

information, we conclude that notice by facsimile also satisfies 

the notice requirement. 

This court's rationale in Johnson v. United States Postal 

Service, 861 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 

54 (1989), is applicable in this case. In Johnson, a postal 

employee brought a Title VII suit naming the postal service, 

rather than the Postmaster General, the correct party defendant. 

The employee was not allowed to amend his complaint to relate back 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 5 
to his original filing when the correct party defendant had not 

been named or served within the statutory limitations period. Id. 

at 1482. In reaching its decision in Johnson, this court 

acknowledged that Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21 (1986), sets 

forth the factors to be considered when determining whether an 

amended complaint relates back to the original filing under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. lS(c). See Johnson, 861 F.2d at 1479. According 

to Schiavone, relation back is dependent upon the following: 

(1) the basic claim must have arisen out of the conduct 

set forth in the original pleading; (2) the party to be 

brought in must have received such notice that it will 

not be prejudiced in maintaining its defense; (3) that 

party must or should have known that, but for a mistake 

concerning identity, the action would have been brought 

against it; and (4) the second and third requirements 

must have been fulfilled within the prescribed 

limitations period. 

Schiavone, 477 U.S. at 29. 

In Miles, the Ninth Circuit observed that, "whether an 

amendment to a pleading should relate back is not whether a 

particular service procedure is employed to place the government 

on notice, but rather whether the appropriate government official 

is in fact sufficiently notified of the action within the 

statutory period." Miles, 881 F.2d at 783 (emphasis in original). 

In this case, the facsimile copies of the relevant documents 

transmitted to the United States Attorney prior to the expiration 

of the limitations period, placed the government on sufficient 

notice to preclude any prejudice. The Supreme Court's declaration 

that "[t]he linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations 

period," is sufficiently broad to encompass the facts of this 

case. Id. at 31. As the Fifth Circuit has recently stated, 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 6 
In Schiavone, the Supreme Court did not decide the type 

of notice required to satisfy the set out requirements 

but it did decide proof of some notice was necessary. 

. as long as there is 

notice, whether formal 

appropriate period, the 

satisfied. 

evidence of some kind 

or informal, within 

Schiavone factors might 

of 

the 

be 

Honeycutt v. Long, 861 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1988). Although 

deciding a distinguishable issue, this court recently stated, "'it 

is notice and not service that Rule 15(c) requires.'" Gilles v. 

United States, 906 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990)(quoting 

Montgomery v. United States Postal Serv., 867 F.2d 900, 903 (5th 

Cir. 1989)(emphasis in original)(citing Schiavone, 477 U.S. 21, 

106 S. Ct. at 2385)). 

In conclusion, since the United States Attorney received 

actual notice of plaintiff's action within the thirty-day 

limitations period, the district court erred in holding that 

plaintiff's amended complaint could not relate back under Rule 

15(c). The government notice provision was added to Rule 15(c) in 

1966 to alleviate the injustice caused when parties mistakenly 

named the wrong defendant in their actions against the government. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c), advisory committee notes to 1966 

amendment. In order that this intent be given all possible 

deference, and in order to preserve the rights of parties when 

they have difficulty with the often confusing requirements 

surrounding suit against the government, we give a liberal and 

generous interpretation to the notice language of the rule. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-4075 Document: 010110031753 Date Filed: 04/05/1991 Page: 7 
The parties' requests for oral argument are DENIED. The 

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

Utah is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent 

with this order and judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

8 

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