Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02284/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02284-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Landon John Plate
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

NON PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2284

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LANDON JOHN PLATE,

 Appellant

 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

District Court No. 2-08-cr-00259-1

District Judge: The Honorable Gustave Diamond

 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

January 15, 2010

Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, BARRY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges

(Filed: January 15, 2010)

 

OPINION

 

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Landon John Plate pleaded guilty to one count of possession of material depicting the

sexual exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1), the District Court calculated a base offense level of 18. After four

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has 1

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 

2

enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 and one downward adjustment, Plate’s total offense

level was 28 and his criminal history score was zero. Based on these calculations, Plate’s

advisory Guidelines range was 78 to 97 months of imprisonment. Plate requested a

downward variance to a sentence of five years of probation without jail time. The District

Court sentenced him to 36 months imprisonment and 15 years of supervised release. Plate

appeals that sentence. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.1

I. 

We review Plate’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). Our

review for abuse of discretion “proceeds in two stages.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. First, we

ensure that “the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to

calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the §

3553(a) factors, . . . or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence[.]” Id. If a district

court’s procedure was correct, we then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness.

Id. Our review for substantive reasonableness is highly deferential. Id. at 568. We will

affirm the sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same

sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” Id. 

Plate’s claims of error draw heavily on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85

(2007). Kimbrough made clear that “sentencing courts may disagree with the Guidelines

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
3

based on policy.” United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 272 n.12 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing

Kimbrough and Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. ----, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843 (2009)). In

Kimbrough, the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court did not abuse its discretion when

it varied downward from the crack cocaine Sentencing Guidelines based on its policy

disagreement with those Guidelines over the sentencing disparities between crack and

powder cocaine. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 110. The Court’s reasoning was based in part on

the fact that the crack cocaine Guidelines were largely the product of mandatory minimum

sentences dictated by Congress, and were not created by the United States Sentencing

Commission on the basis of “empirical data and national experience.” Id. at 109. 

In the District Court, Plate analogized the crack cocaine Guidelines at issue in

Kimbrough to the child pornography Guidelines at issue here. He argued for a downward

variance on the ground that the provisions of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, like the crack cocaine

Guidelines, are the product of statutory directives, not a reasoned analysis of empirical data

and national experience by the Sentencing Commission. On appeal, Plate argues that his

sentence was both procedurally and substantively flawed. First, he contends that the District

Court committed procedural error by failing to “adequately explain [its] chosen sentence.”

Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567. Specifically, he argues that the District Court failed to address his

argument that he was entitled to a downward variance based on his Kimbrough analogy. We

disagree. The District Court granted Plate a sentence that was well below the Guidelines

range. The bottom of Plate’s Guidelines range was six and a half years of prison. After

analyzing the sentencing factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court imposed a

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 3 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
Even if the District Court had wholly ignored Plate’s Kimbrough argument, this 2

would not have been error. The District Court must consider any non-frivolous argument

that is properly presented, has “colorable legal merit,” and has a “factual basis” in the

record. United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, the record

contains no attempt by Plate to substantiate, through a historical analysis or actual record

evidence, his claim that the child pornography Guidelines lack empirical support. Cf.

Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 94-100 (conducting a thorough analysis of the genesis and

evolution of the crack cocaine Guidelines before concluding that they did not reflect

“empirical data and national experience”); United States v. Grober, 595 F. Supp. 2d 382

(D.N.J. 2008), appeal docketed, No. 09-1318 (3d Cir. Feb. 5, 2009) (granting a downward

variance from the prison term prescribed by the child pornography Guidelines, but on the

basis of a voluminous factual record, which included testimony from sentencing experts,

concerning the history of and empirical support for those Guidelines). Therefore, Plate’s

Kimbrough argument lacked a “factual basis” in the record, Ausburn, 502 F.3d at 329,

and the District Court was free to disregard it. 

4

sentence of only three years. This was a downward variance, and a significant one at that.

See United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining that a variance is

a “discretionary change[] to a guidelines sentencing range based on a judge’s review of all

the § 3553(a) factors”). 

To the extent that Plate contends that the District Court failed to address his specific

argument for a variance based on Kimbrough, we are not persuaded. At sentencing, the

Court engaged in an extensive colloquy with counsel for the government concerning the

Guidelines’ “rationale” and “theory” for sentencing individuals such as Plate who possess,

but do not produce, child pornography. The District Court clearly recognized its freedom

under Kimbrough to impose a below-Guidelines sentence based on policy disagreements with

the Guidelines, and in fact exercised that freedom by granting Plate a substantial downward

variance after a thorough analysis of the sentencing factors.2

Plate further argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable under

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 4 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
5

Kimbrough because the District Court employed invalid Guidelines in determining his

sentence. He claims that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 was “flawed at its inception” because it was

“impermissibly” formulated on the basis of statutory directives, not empirical data and

national experience, and that the District Court abused its discretion by using it as a starting

point for his sentence. 

 This argument stretches the Kimbrough decision well past its breaking point.

Kimbrough did not hold that it is “impermissibl[e]” for a Guideline to be formulated based

on statutory directives. It held only that when that Guideline is based on statutory directives,

as opposed to “empirical data and national experience,” a court may choose to give that

Guideline less weight. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. It did not hold that a sentencing court

must vary from the Guidelines under such circumstances; it held only that it is not an abuse

of discretion to do so. Id. at 110. Likewise, Kimbrough did not hold that the District

Court’s use of a Guideline based on statutory directives to fashion a sentence makes that

sentence substantively unreasonable. Where a sentence is otherwise reasonable, “no

justification exists [under Kimbrough] for reversing the District Court [solely] because of its

reliance on a currently valid Guideline.” Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 272 n.12. In short, neither

Kimbrough nor anything in this record persuades us that Plate’s sentence is substantively

unreasonable. Therefore, we will uphold it. See Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.

II. 

Plate’s final argument is that the District Court committed procedural error by failing

to consider his personal history and characteristics in determining his sentence. See 18

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 5 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
6

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Plate contends that his character and positive attributes warranted a

downward variance, and that the District Court erred by failing to explain why it did not

agree. As evidence of his good character and positive attributes, Plate cites a letter to the

Court, written by Plate’s grandmother and attached as an exhibit to his Sentencing

Memorandum. The letter describes Plate as an “attentive grandson” who is “gentle,”

“pleasant,” and “respectful to others.” As further evidence of his good character, Plate also

cites his steady employment, his relationship with his daughter, and his participation in

counseling and other post-offense rehabilitation. 

We conclude that the District Court’s analysis of the sentencing factors, including §

3553(a)(1), was “informed and adequate,” and thus the Court committed no error. See

Thielemann, 575 F.3d at 271. “A sentencing court does not have to discuss and make

findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the

factors into account in sentencing.” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (emphasis in original) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

Here, the record makes clear that the District Court took Plate’s history and

characteristics into account in deciding his sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the Court

explicitly acknowledged its duty to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, including “the

character of the Defendant.” Furthermore, the Court acknowledged reading the letter from

Plate’s grandmother discussing Plate’s positive characteristics. It heard extensive arguments

about Plate’s positive attributes from his lawyer, and a lengthy discussion of Plate’s

“characteristics” as revealed by a pre-sentencing psychological exam conducted by Dr.

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/15/2010
 Plate’s trial counsel’s recognition of that fact may explain why he conspicuously 3

failed to object at sentencing to the District Court’s now-alleged failure to address the

request for a variance. 

7

Robert Coufal. The Court clearly read and considered Dr. Coufal’s report. It explicitly relied

on Dr. Coufal’s conclusions in announcing the sentence, noting that there was “no evidence

that [Plate] is . . . a pedophile or is likely to be a pedophile.” The District Court also

discussed Plate’s psychiatric background, his sexual preferences, and his sexual impulses

during sentencing. He specifically noted that Plate had no “history” of actual sexual contact

with children. All of this demonstrates that the District Court considered Plate’s personal

history and characteristics, and it bears repeating that after considering those characteristics

the District Court did grant Plate a substantial downward variance. 

3

The record “more than adequately demonstrates the Court’s meaningful

consideration” of the § 3553(a) factors, including Plate’s history and characteristics. See

United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 203 (3d Cir. 2007). Ultimately, Plate’s quarrel with

the District Court is not that it failed to consider his personal attributes, but that the Court’s

assessment of those attributes did not result in a downward variance that was as dramatic as

Plate desired. That is no reason to invalidate a sentence. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d

540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that the District Court’s “failure to give mitigating factors

the weight a defendant contends they deserve” does not make a sentence unreasonable);

Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204-05 (same). See also Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568 (noting that we are

“‘highly deferential’ to the sentencing court’s application of the § 3553(a) factors”). 

Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 

Case: 09-2284 Document: 00319984418 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/15/2010