Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02519/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02519-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Edward DuBois
Appellant

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-2519

___________

Edward DuBois, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, *

Commissioner of Social Security * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 17, 2005

Filed: June 14, 2005

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit

Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Edward DuBois appeals an order of the district court1

 affirming the

Commissioner of Social Security's decision to deny his application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i),

423. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) denied benefits to

Mr. DuBois, and, when the Appeals Council denied review, the ALJ's decision

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became the final decision of the Commissioner. Mr. DuBois argues that the ALJ

erred by not properly evaluating his credibility regarding his claim that he suffers

from, inter alia, post-traumatic stress disorder stemming from his experiences in

Vietnam, and he asserts that the record requires a finding that he is disabled. He also

maintains that the ALJ failed to give due weight to a Veterans Administration (VA)

determination that he is one-hundred percent disabled. In short, Mr. DuBois asserts

that the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See 42

U.S.C. § 405(g). We affirm.

"Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a

reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion." Johnson v. Apfel,

240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001). Provided that substantial evidence supports the

Commissioner's decision, this court may not reverse even if the record also provides

substantial evidence to support a contrary outcome. See Haley v. Massanari, 258

F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). 

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision.

When evaluating Mr. DuBois's subjective complaints, the ALJ properly considered

the totality of the evidence, see Burns v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d 1218, 1219-20 (8th Cir.

1989) (per curiam), including the considerations set out in Polaski v. Heckler, 739

F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). Because much of the evidence in the record

militated against taking his complaints at face value, the ALJ discounted

Mr. DuBois's credibility. During his hearing, Mr. DuBois repeatedly stated that he

did not intend to return to work because his VA benefits would end if he did. For this

reason, the ALJ concluded that "[s]econdary gain is a theme throughout this record."

Cf. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004); Gaddis v. Chater,

76 F.3d 893, 896 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, although Mr. DuBois claims that his

disability began in September of 1996, he successfully pursued a sales and marketing

degree from the fall of 1997 until he graduated in the spring of 2001. (We note that

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Mr. DuBois was insured for disability benefits through December 31, 2001, and

therefore he must establish his disability by that date.) The ALJ also evaluated

Mr. DuBois's daily, social, and recreational activities and found them inconsistent

with the type and severity of symptoms that Mr. DuBois described. The ALJ

considered but ultimately rejected Mr. DuBois's subjective complaints, and we will

not disturb this decision when, as here, the ALJ's conclusion is supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Haggard v. Apfel, 175 F.3d 591,

594-95 (8th Cir. 1999).

Mr. DuBois also argues that the ALJ failed to give due weight to a

determination by the VA that he is one-hundred percent disabled. But a disability

decision by the VA is based on its rules and not those of the Social Security

Administration. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504. Therefore, a determination by the VA

that Mr. DuBois is disabled was not binding on the ALJ. Id. Although not binding,

a "VA finding [is] important enough to deserve explicit attention" and must be

considered by the ALJ. Morrison v. Apfel, 146 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1998). The

ALJ's actions in the instant case are consistent with this admonition. The ALJ,

moreover, evaluated the conflicting medical and lay opinions regarding Mr. DuBois's

ability to work differently from the way the VA did, as was the ALJ's prerogative.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________

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