Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00177/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00177-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Louis Boyd
Respondent
Brandon Marquis Pugh
Petitioner

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BRANDON MARQUIS PUGH, :

 :

Petitioner, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION NO. 16-00177-WS-B

 :

LOUIS BOYD, :

 :

Respondent. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Brandon Marquis Pugh, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding 

pro se, brought this action seeking federal habeas corpus relief 

in the Western District of New York (Doc. 1). The New York

Court transferred this action after determining that the 

Southern District of Alabama would be a more convenient 

forum because Pugh seeks to challenge a conviction entered by 

an Alabama state court, and because all of the records 

relating to his conviction, as well as his previous application 

for relief, are located in the Southern District of Alabama 

(Doc. 5). The case is now before the undersigned Magistrate 

Judge for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B), S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R), and Rule 8 of the 

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Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.1 Upon careful consideration, 

it is recommended that this action be dismissed as a successive 

petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 

I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

According to Pugh’s petition, and other records 

electronically maintained by this Court, see Pugh v. Scoungers, 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20140 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 2014)(“Pugh I”);

Pugh v. Boyd, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148427 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 

2014)(“Pugh II”), Pugh was charged with second-degree rape in 

the Circuit Court of Mobile County (CC-07-0808), and on August 

15, 2007, he entered a guilty plea. (See Pugh II). On the same 

date, Pugh was sentenced to twenty years in the State 

penitentiary, split with five years to be served, followed by

five years probation. He did not appeal his conviction and 

sentence. (Id.)

Pugh was released from prison to probation on January 1, 

2012. (Id.) Six weeks later, he was arrested for second-degree 

rape and second-degree sexual abuse. His probation in CC-0700808 

was revoked on September 26, 2012, and he was ordered to serve 

the remainder of his 2007 sentence. (Id.)

 

1

 The record is adequate to determine Petitioner’s claim; thus, 

no federal evidentiary hearing is required. Kelley v. Sec’y for 

Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. 

denied, 545 U.S. 1149 (2005).

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In 2013, Pugh filed three habeas petitions with this Court. 

See Pugh, I, Pugh II, and Pugh v. Boyd, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

183533 (S.D. Ala. Dec. 19, 2013) (“Pugh III”). In Pugh I, Pugh 

challenged the revocation of his probation, and in Pugh II and 

III, he challenged his 2007 conviction and sentence. In a report 

and recommendation issued in Pugh II, the Court determined that 

Pugh’s petition challenging his 2007 conviction and sentence was 

time-barred. See Pugh II. The report and recommendation was 

adopted by the District Court, and Pugh’s petition was dismissed 

as time-barred on October 20, 2014. Pugh v. Boyd, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 148437 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 20, 2014)2. 

Subsequent thereto, Pugh commenced the instant habeas 

action in the Western District of New York. (Doc. 1). In his 

habeas petition, Pugh seeks once again to attack his 2007 

conviction and sentence.

II. ANALYSIS

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“ADEPA”) provides that before a state inmate can file a second 

or successive § 2254 petition, he must seek and obtain an order 

from the court of appeals authorizing the district court to 

consider the second or successive petition 28 U.S.C. 

 2 Pugh III was consolidated with Pugh I, which was 

subsequently dismissed for failure to exhaust.

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§2244(b)(3)(A); Morris v. Fla. Dep’t. of Corr., 519 Fed. Appx. 

990 (llth Cir. 2013). 28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A) expressly 

provides that:

Before a second or successive application 

permitted by this section is filed in the district 

court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate 

court of appeals for an order authorizing the district 

court to consider the application.

28 U.S.C. §2244(b)(3)(A). Without prior approval from the 

courts of appeals, the district court simply lacks authority to 

consider a “second or successive” application. Farris v. United 

States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003)(“Without 

authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider 

a second or successive petition.”). 

In this action, Pugh does not allege and there is nothing 

in the record to suggest that he has requested and has received 

authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals to 

bring this successive petition before this Court. Thus, this 

Court is without subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Pugh’s 

petition, and as a result, this action is due to be dismissed. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, 

“[t]he district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant.” Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing 2254 Cases 

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(December 1, 2009). A certificate of appealability may issue 

only where “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 

When a habeas petition is dismissed on procedural grounds, 

such as in the instant case, without reaching the merits of any 

underlying constitutional claim, “a COA should issue [only] when 

the prisoner shows ... that jurists of reason would find it 

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason 

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct 

in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 

120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d 542 (2000); see Miller-EL v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1039, 154 L.Ed. 2d 

931 (2003)(“Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must 

‘show that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that 

matter, agree that) the petition should have resolved in a 

different manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to 

deserve encouragement to proceed further.’”).

In the instant action, Pugh has not demonstrated that he 

has applied to and received permission from the Eleventh Circuit 

to file this successive federal habeas petition; thus, this 

Court is without jurisdiction to consider the instant petition. 

Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216. Under the facts of this case, a 

reasonable jurist could not conclude either that this Court is 

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in error for dismissing the instant petition or that Pugh should 

be allowed to proceed further. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 

S. Ct. at 1604 (“Where a plain procedural bar is present and the 

district court is correct to invoke it to dispose of the case, a 

reasonable jurist could not conclude either that the district 

court erred in dismissing the petition or that the petitioner 

should be allowed to proceed further.”). Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that the Court conclude that no 

reasonable jurist could find it debatable whether Pugh’s 

petition should be dismissed. As a result, he is not entitled to 

a certificate of appealability.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends 

that the Court dismiss Pugh’s petition as an improper successive 

petition, and find that he is not entitled to a certificate of 

appealability, and is further not entitled to proceed in forma 

pauperis on appeal.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on 

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects 

to this recommendation or anything in it must, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of service of this document, file specific 

written objections with the Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA GenLR 72(c). The parties 

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should note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge’s findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives 

the right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order 

based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the 

party was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of 

a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for 

plain error if necessary in the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. 

R. 3-1. In order to be specific, an objection must identify the 

specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, 

state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed 

determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by 

reference or refers to the briefing done by the Magistrate Judge 

is not specific. 

DONE this the 3rd day of June, 2016.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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