Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02179/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02179-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles De Rosa
Respondent
Victor Pianka
Petitioner

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Victor Pianka, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

Charles De Rosa, 

Respondent.

No. CV-14-02179-PHX-DGC (MHB)

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion for Emergency Injunctive Relief 

(Doc. 16). The Court will deny the motion. 

I. Background. 

Petitioner, a native of Poland and lawful permanent resident, was taken into ICE 

custody on June 7, 2013 and placed in removal proceedings under Section 240 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. 1 at 30.) Petitioner was issued a Notice 

to Appear, alleging that he is deportable because he is a citizen of Poland, not a citizen of 

the United States, and on July 18, 2012, he was convicted of possession of drug 

paraphernalia in Maricopa County Superior Court. (Id.) 

On December 30, 2013, Petitioner appeared for a bond hearing before an 

Immigration Judge (IJ). Petitioner testified that he had obtained United States citizenship 

through his father, Adam Kostewicz, and that the record before the court showing that 

Mr. Kostewicz was neither his biological father nor his adoptive father was based on 

“fraudulent findings.” (Doc. 1 at 38.) 

The IJ found that “based on the evidence of record, [Petitioner] ha[d] not met his 

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burden” of establishing that he had derived citizenship from Mr. Kostewicz or from 

Petitioner’s biological mother, who had naturalized after Petitioner’s 18th birthday. (Id.

at 41.) 

 In his underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner argues that under 

Flores-Torres v. Mukasey, ICE lacks jurisdiction to detain him as an alien. Flores-Torres 

v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2008). In his motion for injunctive relief, Petitioner 

alleges that his detention is unlawful because of the “document fraud” that has occurred 

through “brib[ing] two DHS employees to file false documents” in his immigration file. 

(Doc. 16 at 1.) As a consequence, Petitioner seeks to be released into the FBI’s custody 

or entry into the witness protection program. 

II. Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 

 A. Legal Standard.

 “‘[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that 

should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of 

persuasion.’” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (quoting 

11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2948, pp. 129-

130 (2d ed. 1995)). To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must show 

“that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2009). 

 The Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” version of the sliding-scale test for 

preliminary injunctions remains viable after the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter. 

Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F. 3d 1127, 1134 (9th Cir. 2011). Under 

that test, a preliminary injunction is appropriate when a plaintiff demonstrates that 

“‘serious questions going to the merits were raised and the balance of hardships tips 

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sharply in the plaintiff’s favor.’” Id. at 1134-35 (quoting Lands Council v. McNair, 537 

F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). The movant must also satisfy the other two 

Winter factors—likelihood of irreparable harm and that an injunction is in the public 

interest. Id. With respect to the irreparable harm prong, Winter specifically rejected the 

Ninth Circuit’s “possibility of irreparable injury” standard. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 

586 F.3d 1109, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). Under Winter, a party seeking preliminary relief 

must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. The Court explained that “[i]ssuing a preliminary injunction 

based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with our characterization of 

injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear 

showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id.

 Additionally, because Petitioner seeks a mandatory injunction—an injunction 

altering the status quo—a “heightened standard” applies. Katie A. ex rel. Ludin v. Los 

Angeles County, 481 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2007). A mandatory injunction is 

“‘particularly disfavored’” and a “district court should deny such relief ‘unless the facts 

and law clearly favor the moving party.’” Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1320 

(9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Anderson v. United States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). 

At this stage of the proceedings the facts and law do not clearly favor Petitioner. 

B. Likelihood of Success on the Merits. 

 In his underlying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Petitioner argues that under 

Flores-Torres, ICE lacks jurisdiction to detain him as an alien because he acquired 

derivative citizenship through his stepfather, Adam Dostewicz, whom Plaintiff asserts is 

his birth father. In his motion, Petitioner does not address his underlying citizenship 

claim. Rather, he seeks release to the custody of the FBI or the Witness Protection 

Program. This is not relief that is contemplated in Flores-Torres, which holds only that, 

notwithstanding 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5), district courts retain habeas corpus jurisdiction to 

determine whether a petitioner with a non-frivolous claim to citizenship is in fact a 

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citizen and therefore entitled to release from ICE detention. Flores-Torres, 548 F.3d at 

713. 

 The federal courts of appeals retain exclusive jurisdiction under § 1252(b)(5) to 

review a petitioner’s claim that he may not be removed because he is a citizen of the 

United States. Iasu v. Smith, 511 F.3d 881, 889 (9th Cir. 2007). If the documents 

presented in a petition for review from a final order of removal reveal no material issue of 

fact about the petitioner’s nationality, the court of appeals is authorized to decide the 

petitioner’s nationality claim. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A). If, however, 

the court of appeals finds that a genuine issue of material fact 

about the petitioner’s nationality is presented, the court shall 

transfer the proceeding to the district court of the United 

States for the judicial district in which the petitioner resides 

for a new hearing on the nationality claim and a decision on 

that claim as if an action had been brought in the district court 

under section 2201 of Title 28. 

Id. § 1252(b)(5)(B). Under § 1252(b)(5)(C), the “petitioner may have such nationality 

claim decided only as provided in” § 1252(b)(5). Accordingly, the district courts lack 

jurisdiction to consider a petitioner’s claim to citizenship in connection with an order of 

removal. Iasu, 511 F.3d at 889. 

 In Flores-Torres, after an IJ denied the petitioner’s claim to citizenship, he filed a 

habeas corpus action challenging his immigration detention on the grounds that he was a 

United States citizen. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Torres’s claim 

that he may not be detained by ICE because he is a citizen. On appeal to the Ninth 

Circuit, there was “no dispute that if Torres is a citizen the government has no authority 

under the INA to detain him . . . and that his detention would be unlawful under the 

Constitution and under the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001.” Flores-Torres, 548 

F.3d at 710. The “parties dispute[d] only whether § 1252 of the INA precludes the 

district court from exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction over Torres’s habeas petition.” 

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Id. The court held that § 1252 did not deprive the district court of habeas corpus 

jurisdiction over Torres’s challenge to his detention—as opposed to his removal order—

based on a non-frivolous claim to citizenship. The court also determined that because 

Torres’s “claim is non-frivolous on its face,” the district court had habeas corpus 

jurisdiction to consider it. Id. at 713. But the court denied Torres’s request for 

immediate release and instead “remand[ed] to the district court to hear the merits of his 

habeas petition.” Id. 

 Petitioner’s allegation that he has a non-frivolous claim to citizenship does nothing 

more than establish the Court’s jurisdiction to entertain his claim that his detention is 

unlawful. To succeed on the merits, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that he is a United States citizen because immigration authorities are not prohibited from 

detaining a person born in another country who has nothing more than an arguable claim 

that he is a citizen. But Petitioner makes no effort to establish his entitlement to 

citizenship. And a movant who fails to prove an essential element of his claim has no 

chance of success on the merits. Petitioner may change his position and attempt to prove 

that he is a citizen, but at this stage of the proceedings he has not demonstrated that he is 

likely to succeed on the merits. Indeed, there is also substantial evidence to support the 

government’s claim that he is not a citizen. In addition to his order of removal, he has 

also at least twice failed to prove his citizenship before the CIS or an IJ. (Doc. 14 at 4 

¶ 17; id., Ex. DD.) On the current record, it appears that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed 

on the merits of his claim to citizenship. 

C. Likelihood of Irreparable Injury.

 If Petitioner is not a citizen, his detention during removal proceedings is 

authorized under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 

On the other hand, if Petitioner is a United States citizen, his continued detention by 

immigration authorities is not authorized under the INA and is unlawful under both the 

Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001, and the Constitution. “It is well established that 

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the deprivation of constitutional rights ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” 

Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 

U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). Accordingly, if Petitioner can demonstrate that he is likely to 

succeed on the merits, he will have necessarily demonstrated that he is also likely to 

suffer irreparable injury. As previously explained, however, he has not demonstrated that 

he is likely to succeed on the merits. 

 D. Balance of Hardships and the Public Interest. 

 In Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987), the Court identified the relevant 

interests to be balanced in the context of a habeas corpus action. Unlike this case, 

however, the petitioner had been granted relief by the district court and the government 

sought to maintain the status quo by staying his release pending its appeal. In Hilton, 

Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure “create[d] a presumption of release 

from custody” because the district court had entered an order releasing the petitioner. Id.

at 774. No such presumption applies in this case. But even where the presumption 

applies, “it may be overcome if the traditional stay factors tip the balance against it.” Id.

at 776. The factors that should be considered in determining whether to release a habeas 

corpus petitioner include “the possibility of flight” and “the risk that the prisoner will 

pose a danger to the public if released.” Id. at 777. The interest of the habeas petitioner 

in release will be strongest where those factors are weakest. Id. at 777-78. Ultimately 

the balance of the relative equities “may depend to a large extent upon the determination 

of the [movant’s] prospects of success.” Id. at 778. 

 “Where the [movant] establishes that it has a strong likelihood of success on 

appeal, or where, failing that, it can nonetheless demonstrate a substantial case on the 

merits, [a stay] is permissible if the second and fourth factors in the traditional stay 

analysis militate against release. Where the [movant’s] showing on the merits falls below 

this level, the preference for release should control.” Id. Here, of course, the movant is 

seeking release in the first instance but the preference favors the status quo—detention. 

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 Petitioner, who bears the burden on each element of the preliminary injunction 

standard, has not claimed that he poses no danger to the public or that he is not a flight 

risk. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that the balance of hardships tips sharply in 

his favor. Moreover, as previously explained, his prospects of success on the merits are 

dim at best. Accordingly, on the record currently before the Court, he has not clearly 

demonstrated that the facts and law favor granting him a mandatory preliminary 

injunction. 

III. Motion for Ruling. 

 Petitioner has filed a Motion for Ruling on his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 

(Doc. 36.) The Motion will be denied because Petitioner has not yet even attempted to 

prove that he is a citizen of the United States and an adjudication of his Petition without 

giving him an opportunity to do so would not serve the interests of justice. 

IV. Conclusion. 

 Petitioner fundamentally misunderstands, and has failed to meet, his burden in this 

action. To succeed on the merits of his claim that his detention is unlawful, Petitioner 

must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is a United States citizen. At this 

stage of these proceedings, the record does not support a finding that Petitioner is likely 

to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a 

preliminary injunction, that the balance of hardships tips in his favor, and that his release 

is in the public interest. Accordingly, Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction 

(Doc. 16) is denied. 

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IT IS ORDERED withdrawing the reference to the Magistrate Judge as to 

Petitioner’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 16) and Motion for Ruling (Doc. 36) 

and the motions are denied. 

 Dated this 29th day of February, 2016. 

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