Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-84-02422/USCOURTS-ca10-84-02422-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Aspen
Appellant
William A. Goichman
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIAM A. GOICHMAN, on behalf ) 

of himself and ALL OTHERS ) 

SIMILARLY SITUATED, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross- ) 

Appel lee, ) 

) 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

OCT 2 41988 

ROBERT L. H~CKER 

Clerk 

v. ) 

) 

Nos. 84-2341 

84-2422 

CITY OF ASPEN, a Municipal ) 

Corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appel lee/Cross- ) 

Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. Civil Action No. 82-Z-1864) 

Richard B. Rose of Sawaya, Rose & Roads, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

Paul J. Taddune, City Attorney, Taddune & Associates, P.C., Aspen, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Before McKAY, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 84-2422 Document: 010110042890 Date Filed: 10/24/1988 Page: 1 
William A. Goichman appeals from the district court's grant 

of summary judgment dismissing his legal and equitable claims 

brought under 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1982) against the city of Aspen, 

Colorado. Claiming that various sections of Aspen's towing ordinance violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, 

plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, restitution 

and punitive damages, and the certification of a plaintiff class 

under Rule 23(b}(3), Fed. R. Civ. P. Plaintiff also asked for 

attorney's fees under 42 ·u.s.c. § 1988 (1982). 

On summary judgment, 1 the district court held that the 

request for declaratory and injunctive relief had been mooted by 

Aspen's repeal of its prior ordinance and enactment of a revised 

ordinance which the court found to be constitutional. 2 The court 

also declined to certify a plaintiff class because no common questions of law or fact predominated. Finally, the court denied 

plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. We affirm the district 

1 The city of Aspen moved for a judgment on the pleadings under 

R.12(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., or, in the alternative, for dismissal 

under Rule 12(b). The district court converted Aspen's motion to 

one for summary judgment. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rall, 

Barber & Ross, 585 F.2d 454(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 454 

U.S. 895 (1981). 

2 Before filing its Answer, Aspen amended its towing and 

impoundment ordinance to "reaffirm[] and codify[] the City's 

procedures for providing notices of impoundment and hearings 

regarding removal and towing and storage fees of impounded 

vehicles." Record, vol. 2, at 205. After careful review of the 

new ordinance's provisions, the district court held that it adequately addressed due process requirements. We £ind no error in 

the court's conclusion. We note that the constitutionality of 

Aspen's original towing ordinance was never adjudicated by the 

trial court. 

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court's judgment with respect to its disposition of plaintiff's 

claims, albeit on different grounds. With respect to Aspen's 

cross-appeal, we remand for court determination of defendant's 

entitlement to attorney's fees. 

I . 

The incidents prompting Mr. Goichman's complaint were summarized by the district court as follows: 

[Mr. Goichman] was in Aspen as a tourist on 

December 27, 1981, when he parked a leased vehicle on a 

public street. The next day, he discovered that his 

vehicle had been towed from its parking space by 

employees of [Aspen]. [Aspen] states that the vehicle 

was towed and impounded because it was parked in violation of§ 22-26-4 of the Aspen Municipal Code, which 

prohibits parking between the hours of 3:00 a.m. and 

7:00 a.m. at the location in question. 

[Mr. Goichman] asserts ·that when he appeared at 

the offices of the Aspen Police Department on 

December 28, he was informed that he would be required 

to pay a $20.00 parking fine and a $40.00 towing fee 

before the vehicle would be released. Further, Plaintiff states that he was told by an unidentified employee 

that no judicial hearing would be provided to determine 

whether the towing and impoundment was appropriate and 

legal. 

Record, vol. 2, at 205, 

Plaintiff paid the fine and towing fee, choosing not to contest the underlying parking violation. 3 Eleven months later he 

3 In addition to the written notice provided on the traffic 

citation, plaintiff does not contest Aspen's assertion that 

persons claiming their vehicles were advised of their "right to 

appear in Municipal Court to contest the citation ...• If 

exonerated of the citation in Municipal Court, the towing and 

impound fees were waived and reimbursed if already paid." Record, 

vol. 2, at 233 (Memorandum Brief· in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 

for Reconsideration, Exhibit A: Defendant's Answers to 

Interrogatories). 

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brought this section 1983 action alleging that Aspen had deprived 

him of personal property without providing for a "judicial hear-

. ing, prior to payment for the release of the vehicle, to determine 

the legal justification for the . seizure and impoundment of 

the car." Brief of Appellant, at 5. 

II. 

When examining the district court's grant of summary judgment, we apply a de novo standard of review to all legal determinations. Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 260 (10th Cir. 

1987). Moreover, in examining the factual setting in which legal 

questions arise, we construe the pleadings and the evidence on 

record liberally in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. 

Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986). In this 

case, the material facts, i.e., those "that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," are not disputed. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). It is the 

legal conclusions that may properly be drawn from those facts that 

we must decide. Finally, we may affirm the granting of summary 

judgment if any proper ground exists to support the district 

court's ruling. McKibben v. Chubb, 840 F.2d 1525 (10th Cir. 

1988). 

III. 

Due process is a flexible concept, and its procedural protections will vary depending on the particular deprivation involved. 

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). In the context of 

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another challenge to a towing ordinance, this circuit previously 

determined that a city "need not provide a hearing before requiring that the owner of an impounded vehicle pay the fees to recover 

the car." Weinrauch v. Park City, 751 F.2d 357, 360 (10th Cir. 

1984). Requiring an individual to post the equivalent of a bond 4 

(to cover towing charges and parking fees) pending a hearing on 

the underlying violation does not violate due process. The reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit in Cokinos v. District 

of Columbia, 728 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1983), is persuasive: "The 

regulation allows towing of illegally parked vehicles; the validity of the tow, therefore, is dependent on the validity of the 

determination that the car in question was found parked in violation of a traffic regulation." Id. at 503. Thus, as long as 

4 If an individual chooses not to contest the citation, the 

matter is disposed of by payment of the fine and towing charges. 

If, on the other hand, the individual chooses to contest the 

ticket but due to the time of day a Municipal Court hearing is not 

immediately available, he is required to pay a "penalty assessment" equal to the fine, pending a hearing on the underlying violation. Record, vol. 2, at 232-33. In essence, the assessment 

acts as a security bond to ensure the individual's appearance at 

the hearing. 

In much the same way, towing and impoundment charges can be 

viewed as a bond to cover the costs of enforcement if the party 

does not prevail on the merits. The city clearly has a "consinerable interest in imposing the costs of removal upon the vehicle 

owner." Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, 682 F.2d 1320, 1324 (9th Cir. 

1982) (citing Stypmann v. City and County of San Francisco, 557 

F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1977)). The towing charge reflects these 

costs of enforcement, and plaintiff has not alleged that the 

charges are excessive. 

It is uncontested that if an individual wishes to challenge 

his parking ticket and prevails at the hearing, he is reimbursed 

for the fees and charges which he was required to pre-pay. 

Record, vol. 2, at 232, Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiff's 

Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit A: Defendant's Answers to 

Interrogatories. 

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there is an opportunity for a hearing provided to challenge the 

underlying violation, due process is served. 

In this case, Aspen, acting pursuant to a legitimate exercise 

of its police power, enacted parking regulations which it enforced 

through the towing of illegally parked vehicles. At no time has 

the plaintiff challenged the legality of Aspen's authority to 

enact these regulations. Adequate notice of the regulations was 

given through properly posted signs. Record, vol. 2, at 232. 

Thus, Mr. Goichman was on notice that parking his vehicle overnight in a marked zone constituted a violation capable of subjecting him to a fine and/or the towing of his vehicle. When his 

vehicle was, in fact, towed, Mr. Goichman promptly appeared at the 

Aspen Police Department and demanded the vehicle's return. 

Although he had notice that he could challenge the underlying 

parking violation in Municipal Court, 5 Mr. Goichman instead asked 

for a judicial hearing to challenge the impoundment and towing of 

his vehicle. Under these circumstances, Aspen was under no duty 

to afford plaintiff an additional hearing on this matter since an 

adjudication 6f the parking violation would resolve the matter. 

5 See supra note 1. rt is also uncontested that a Municipal 

Court hearing on the underlying traffic violation was available, 

essentially on demand, during normal working hours. Record, 

vol. 2, at 232 (Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 

for Reconsideration, Exhibit A: Defendant's Answers to Interrogatories); see also Cokinos, 728 F.2d at 503. 

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We hold that the reasonable availability of a hearing to 

adjudicate the underlying parking violation satisfies the strictures of due process. 6 As a result, no additional hearing, judicial or otherwise, was necessary to determine the validity of 

Aspen's impoundment and towing procedures. 7 Since Mr. Goichman's 

due process rights were not violated, the section 1983 action cannot lie. Likewise, there is no basis for a class action. 

We are aware that our analysis and conclusion departs from 

the approach employed by a riumber of courts in adjudicating cases 

involving due process challenges to towing ordinances. 8 In our 

6 Under Aspen's original towing ordinance, a hearing on the 

underlying violation was readily available: "During working 

hours, persons who wanted to contest the citation were referred to 

Municipal Court. During non-working hours, the amount of the 

penalty assessment was construed as bond and a bond receipt 

issued." Record, vol. 2, at 232. Memorandum Brief in Support of 

Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit A: Defendant's 

Answers to interrogatories. Where, as here, a hearing on the 

merits is available within normal working hours, due process is 

always satisfied. We leave to another day the question of how 

promptly the hearing on the underlying violation must be held (to 

satisfy due process) when circumstances are otherwise. 

7 Aspen's amended ordinance provides for an administrative 

hearing, within 48 hours, on the validity of the towing. Record, 

vol. 1, at 41. While we have held that this separate hearing is 

not required, it does provide an additional procedural protection 

to individuals whose vehicles are towed. City of Aspen Ordinance 

No. 73 (Series of 1982). 

8 See Stypmann, 557 F.2d 1338; see also Hale v. Tyree, 491 F. 

Supp. 622 (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Hann v. Carson, 462 F. Supp. 854 

(M.D. Fla. 1978); Craig v. Carson, 449 F. Supp. 385 (M.D. Fla. 

1978); Remm v. Landrieu, 418 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. La. 1976); Watters 

v. Parrish, 402 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Va. 1975). Taking as their 

point of departure the Sniadach-Fuentes-Di-Chem line of cases, 

North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); 

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance 

Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), these courts apply roughly the 

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view, the prevailing Sniadach-Fuentes-Di-Chem analysis is inappropriate to situations such as the present one. The factual and 

policy bases of the two types of situations differ sufficiently 

that an uncritical application of that precedent confuses, rather 

than illuminates, the issues before the court. 

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), 

involved a challenge to Wisconsin's garnishment statute which permitted a private party to freeze up to fifty percent of a debtor's 

wages without affording the wage earner immediate notice or a 

hearing to contest the action. The garnisheed wages could be 

unfrozen if the wage earner prevailed at a later trial on the 

underlying obligation. Nevertheless, the absence of a procedure 

to provide adequate notice and hearing led the Supreme Court to 

find that the pre-judgment garnishment constituted a taking of 

property in violation of "fundamental principles of due process." 

395 U.S. at 342. 

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), involved an analogous 

challenge to Florida and Pennsylvania's replevin statutes. Both 

acts permitted a private party to obtain a pre-judgment writ of 

replevin through ex parte summary procedures requiring minimal, if 

following analysis: (1) Sniadach and progeny teach that before 

property interests are negatively affected, due process requires 

notice and a pre-deprivation hearing; (2) an individual's interest 

in his vehicle is a "property interest" within the meaning of the 

fourteenth amendment; therefore, (3) towing a person's vehicle 

without the opportunity for prior (or immediate post-towing) 

notice and hearing results in interference with property interests 

in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 

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any~ showing of entitlement and no opportunity for rebuttal. 

Finally, in North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 

(1975), the Supreme Court revisited the problems associated with 

the issuance of writs of garnishment pending a suit on the merits 

of entitlement,· when the writ issued on the strength of a private 

party's conclusory affidavit and without provision for an early 

hearing to challenge the taking. The Court, relying on Sniadach 

and Fuentes, struck down the statute as violative of due process. 

Stripped of surplusage, all three cases present analytically 

similar fact patterns. In each instance, two private parties 

assert a claim to a res, and one party invokes the state's power 

to seize the res before an adjudication of entitlement. Injecting 

the state, as an intervenor, into what is essentially a private 

dispute alters the balance of power in the parties' relationship. 9 

Achieving that result merely on the basis of conclusory allegations of entitlement clearly harms the.property interests of one 

of the parties. 10 Understandably, under those circumstances the 

9 As the Supreme Court itself stated: 

Sniadach involved the prejudgment garnishment of 

wages--"a specialized type of property presenting 

distinct problems in our economic system." Because 

"[t]he leverage of the creditor on the wage earner is 

enormous" and because ''prejudgment garnishment may as a 

practical matter have a wage-earning family to the 

wall," it was held that the Due Process Clause forbade 

such garnishment absent notice and prior hearing. 

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 614 (1974). 

10 For example, in Fuentes, it was significant to the Court's 

analysis that the statutes permitted seizure of the disputed res 

merely on the basis of general allegations of entitlement. I-n-

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Supr.eme Court has held that due process requires a pre-seizure 

hearing. 

Towing cases present a situation which is clearly distinguishable from the one found in Sniadach, Fuentes, or Di-Chem. In 

towing cases, the state is acting pursuant to a legitimate exercise of its police power. The impoundment and towing of illegally 

parked vehicles is an action taken in order to promote safety and 

public welfare. Contrary to the situation in the replevingarnishment cases, here the state seeks to enforce its own significant interest rather than simply to exercise its power on behalf 

of a private party. 11 Also unlike those cases, the state makes no 

underlying claim to the res. The charges assessed are reasonably 

related to the costs of enforcement, and when satisfied or exonerated, no further claim is made. Finally, and again unlike 

fact, the Pennsylv~nia statute did not require any allegation of 

entitlement whatsoever. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 74-78. 

11 Cf. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 

679 (1974) ("[U]nlike the situation in Puentes, seizure is not 

initiated by self-interested private parITes;rather, [government] 

officials determine whether seizure is appropriate under 

[statutory] provisions" (emphasis added). In Calero-Toledo, the 

Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican 

statute which provided for the forfeiture, without notice or 

hearing, of vessels used for illegal purposes (even when the 

vessel's owners were unaware of the acts leading to forfeiture). 

The Court considered the nature of the government's interest, the 

effect which pre-seizure notice and hearing would have, and the 

nature of the parties involved. The Court concluded that, on 

those facts, due process was not violated by postponement of 

notice and hearing until after seizure. See also Boddie v. 

Connecticut, 401 U.S .. 371, 379 (1971). 

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Sniadach, it is uncontested that there is ready access to a hearing to determine the validity of the underlying violation. Cf. 

Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. at 614 (contrasting the facts 

in Sniadach and Mitchell, the court noted that it was not apparent 

in Sniadach with what speed the debtor could challenge the validity of the garnishment). We believe that the present circumstances implicate much more attenuated property interests than 

were at issue in Sriiadach and its progeny. 

IV. 

We turn now to the actions of the city of Aspen in repealing 

and reenacting its towing and impoundment ordinance. Aspen does 

not dispute that Mr. Goichman's lawsuit was the catalyst in the 

City Administration's reexamination of the towing ordinance. 

Record, vol, 1, at 121. Mr. Goichman relies on this fact as justification for his claim to attorney's fees as a "prevailing 

party" under 42 U.S.C. l 1988. 12 

12 The relevant portion of section 1988, enacted as the Civil 

Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 

provides! 

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 

sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, 

title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may 

allow the prevailing party, other than the United 

States, reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. 

Mr. Goichman argues that "the filing and service of Plaintiff's 

Complaint ..• resulted in the Defendant's repeal of its 

preexisting towing and seizure ordinances and enactment of 

ordinances which, in part, provide constitutional safeguards not 

present in the repealed laws.'' Appellant's Brief at 30. 

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The Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff may "prevail" in the absence of a full litigation of the issues or a judicial determination that plaintiff's rights have been violated. 

Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980). In J & J Anderson, Inc. 

v. Town of Erie, 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985), we adopted the 

test used in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978), for 

determining whether a plaintiff qualifies as a "prevailing party" 

when there has been no judgment on the merits. 13 To satisfy the 

test, plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) his lawsuit is linked 

causally to securing the relief obtained and (2) the defendant's 

conduct in response to the lawsuit was required by law. J & J 

Anderson, Inc., 767 F.2d at 1473. 

Because the facts of this case leave little doubt that the 

first element of the test has been met, we move to an examination 

of the second element. To satisfy it, Mr. Goichman has to establish that Aspen's conduct in response to the lawsuit was required 

by the constitution or federal law. Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 

958 (10th Cir. 1986). In light of our previous discussion and 

holding concerning plaintiff's due process challenge, it is clear 

that Aspen's actions in amending the ordinance constituted gratuitous conduct on its part. The term "gratuitous conduct" has 

13 We recognize that summary judgment operates as an adjudication on the merits. See 10 c. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2712, at 584 (1983). Nevertheless, 

it seems appropriate to apply the Nadeau standard to this case 

because summary judgment was entered against plaintiff on the 

basis that the city's actions, in response to his lawsuit, had 

mooted plaintiff's claim. 

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acquired a definition by our cases as an action not required by 

law. Id. at 964 (Seth, J., concurring). 

Certainly, Aspen's revised ordinance provides additional 

safeguards which further ensure the protection of an individual's 

procedural rights. To the extent that plaintiff, in bringing his 

suit, sought to protect these cherished constitutional values, he 

can ·derive satisfaction from the fruit of his labors. Nevertheless, "[i]f it has been judicially determined that defendants' 

conduct, however beneficial it may be ..• is not required by 

law, then defendants must be held to have acted gratuitously and 

plaintiffs have not prevailed in a legal sense." Supre, 792 F.2d 

at 964 (Seth, J., concurring) (citing Nadeau, 581 F.2d at 281). 

Consequently, the district court correctly denied plaintiff's 

request for attorney's fees. 

v. 

Aspen has cross-appealed the district court's denial of its 

claim for attorney's fees under 42 u.s.c. § 1988. According to 

the Supreme Court, "[a] prevailing defendant may recover an attorney's fee only where the suit was vexatious, frivolous, or brought 

to harass or embarrass the defendant." Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 

U.S. 424, 429 n.2 (1983). See also Prochaska v. Marcoux, 632 F.2d 

848 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984 (1981). We 

recognize that the decision to award or deny attorney's fees lies 

within the sound discretion of the court, and, on appeal, review 

is subject to an abuse of discretion standard. Supre, 792 F.2d at 

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961. Nevertheless, the record is devoid of discussion concerning 

the court's reasoning in arriving at its decision. Given the 

explicit standard which governs this determination, and the 

absence of evidence on the record as to the standard which the 

court applied in considering Aspen's motion for attorney's fees, 

we remand for the district court's reconsideration of the 

motion. 14 

The trial court's summary judgment Order and denial of plaintiff's attorney's fees is AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED for 

consideration of defendant's motion for attorney's fees in light 

of this opinion. 

14 The record indicates that this is the third unsuccessful lawsuit and appeal which Mr. Goichman has brought raising essentially 

similar factual and legal issues. Goichman v. Rheuban Motors, 682 

F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982); Goichman v. W.C. Kelly, Frazier, No. 

75-3321, slip op. (9th Cir. 1978). See also Seidman v. City of 

Beverly Hills, 785 F.2d 1447 (9th Ci~l986) (Mr. Goichman as 

counsel for plaintiff-appellant). 

While intimating no view, the apparent pattern of those cases 

indicates that Aspen's request for attorney's fees was not 

facially frivolous. We therefore believe that the district court 

should re-examine the pertinent facts, and indicate the basis of 

its judgment in accord with the appropriate standard. 

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