Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03009/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmie Lee Kennedy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 20, 1997 Decided January 16, 1998 

No. 97-3009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JIMMIE LEE KENNEDY, A/K/A JAMES KORNEGAY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cr00198-01)

Neal Goldfarb, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on 

the brief.

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Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, HENDERSON and ROGERS, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Jimmie Lee Kennedy 

appeals from his conviction by a jury of robbery and weapons 

offenses on the grounds that the district court erred in 

imposing five life sentences. He contends that the robbery 

convictions under the Hobbs Act could not constitute the 

basis for life imprisonment, that the jury was incorrectly 

instructed as to the firearm possession count, that the government failed to comply with the statutory requirement that 

he be served prior to trial with a copy of the information filed 

in court that the government would seek a term of life 

imprisonment, and that his sentence for violating the felon-inpossession law was incorrectly assessed in light of the life 

sentences he received for one of the robberies. We conclude 

that the Hobbs Act contention is unpersuasive, and hold that 

the instructional error was harmless and that the district 

court did not clearly err in ruling that the government had 

met its burden to show service of the information, albeit just 

barely. However, we agree with appellant's contention regarding his sentence for being a felon in possession of a 

firearm and, accordingly, remand that count to the district 

court for resentencing; in all other respects we affirm the 

judgment of conviction.

I.

Appellant and a man named Harrington robbed a Roy 

Rogers restaurant at 6514 Georgia Avenue, N.W., in Washington, D.C., on the evening of May 17, 1995, and again on the 

morning of June 25, 1995. United States v. Harrington, 108 

F.3d 1460, 1463-64 (D.C. Cir. 1997). On both occasions 

appellant produced a handgun and ordered store employees 

to give him the money from the restaurant safe. During the 

second robbery, two uniformed police officers happened to be 

waiting in a marked Metropolitan Police Department car to 

place an order at the restaurant's drive-through window. 

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rant, but not before he drew his gun and fired several shots 

at them, slightly wounding one officer. Appellant also pointed his gun at another police officer who arrived on the scene 

to arrest him.

The government indicted appellant for two violations of the 

Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, two counts of using a firearm to 

commit a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and one count 

of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g). He was also charged with two counts of assault on 

a police officer pursuant to D.C. Code 22-505(a) and (b). A 

jury found him guilty as charged and the district court 

sentenced him to five concurrent life terms of imprisonment 

for the federal charges, and 20 months to five years imprisonment on the assault charges.

II.

Individuals who use or carry a firearm "during and in 

relation to any crime of violence" must be sentenced to a five 

year prison term in addition to any sentence warranted by 

their conviction for the underlying crime. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 924(c)(1). The term "crime of violence" is defined as a 

felony that

(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property 

of another, or

(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 

physical force against the person or property of another 

may be used in the course of committing the offense.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Additionally, the federal three-strikes 

law provides that individuals who have been convicted of two 

prior serious violent felonies "shall be sentenced to life imprisonment." 1

18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). Under the statute,

the term "serious violent felony" means

__________

1 Appellant had been convicted of armed robbery and assault 

with a deadly weapon in 1970 and of armed bank robbery and 

robbery in 1981.

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(i) a Federal or State offense, by whatever designation 

and wherever committed, consisting of ... robbery (as 

described in section 2111, 2113, or 2118); ... extortion; 

... firearms use; ... and

(ii) any other offense punishable by a maximum term 

of imprisonment of 10 years or more that has as an 

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force against the person of another or that, by 

its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force 

against the person of another may be used in the course 

of committing the offense.

Id. § 3559(c)(2)(F).2

A "crime of violence" and a "serious violent felony" are 

ordinarily designated as such by looking to the statutory 

definition of the crime, rather than the evidence presented to 

prove it. See, e.g., United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 

1342-43 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Amparo, 68 F.3d 

1222, 1225-26 (9th Cir. 1995). Although appellant's armed 

robberies contained all the indicia of violent acts, he correctly 

observes that what he did is not at issue. Instead, the 

question is whether the crime with which he was charged 

constituted a serious violent felony or a crime of violence. As 

the Supreme Court explained in Taylor v. United States, 495 

U.S. 575, 601 (1990), "Congress generally took a categorical 

approach to predicate offenses" because "the practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a factual approach are 

daunting." Id. Appellant contends that his § 924(c) and 

third-strike conviction must be vacated because the Hobbs 

__________

2 The analyses of appellant's contentions under § 924(c) and 

§ 3559(c) do not differ in any significant respect. Appellant did not 

raise his three-strikes claim in the district court. Accordingly, the 

error made by the district court on that issue would have to be 

"obvious" to entitle him to relief. United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 

283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But because we conclude that the district 

court made no error of any kind in sentencing appellant under 

§ 924(c) or the three-strikes law, the different standard of review 

does not require a different analysis.

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Act charges cannot constitute predicate crimes of violence or 

serious violent felonies, as required by both statutes.

The Hobbs Act provides in pertinent part:

(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or 

affects commerce ... by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens 

physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of 

this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 

imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.

(b) As used in this section

(1) The term "robbery" means the unlawful taking or 

obtaining of personal property from the person or in the 

presence of another, against his will, by means of actual 

or threatened force, or violence....

(2) The term "extortion" means the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful 

use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or 

under color of official right.

18 U.S.C. § 1951.

The Hobbs Act thus prohibits interference with interstate 

commerce through either robbery or extortion. Because 

extortion under color of official right need not be effected 

through violence, not all crimes under the Hobbs Act need be 

violent crimes. Appellant would accordingly have this court 

interpret Taylor to mean that if one possible way to violate a 

criminal statute could be nonviolent, all statutory violations 

would be immunized from the three-strikes law and § 924(c). 

Yet doing so would ignore an exception provided in Taylor 

that has been interpreted by this court and others to cover 

statutes that enjoin both violent and nonviolent forms of 

conduct. In Taylor, the Supreme Court explained that its 

"categorical approach ... may permit the sentencing court to 

go beyond the mere fact of conviction" in cases where the 

crime is "generic." See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. Because the 

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ent crime, the Hobbs Act is one of the "generic" crimes that 

requires further assessment by the district court. See United 

States v. Mendez, 992 F.2d 1488, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993). In the 

instant case, therefore, the district court was entitled to look 

at the indictment or jury instructions to determine whether 

the charged crime was "by its nature" a crime of violence 

pursuant to § 924(c)(3)(B) or a serious violent felony pursuant 

to § 3559(c)(1)(B)(ii).3See United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 

52, 55-56 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 

18 (1st Cir. 1994). As the Ninth Circuit has concluded where 

"the indictment expressly states which of the various permutations of § 1951 is the source of the conviction ... [w]e may 

consider [the] indictment in determining the nature of an 

offense using the categorical approach." Mendez, 992 F.2d at 

1491; cf. also United States v. Elder, 88 F.3d 127, 128-29 (2d 

Cir. 1996) (per curiam); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 

836, 842 (8th Cir. 1996).

Our conclusion comports with this court's prior application 

of the Taylor exception. In United States v. Mathis, 963 

F.2d 399 (D.C. Cir. 1992), this court remanded a three-strikes 

case to the district court to determine whether "the indictment and/or jury instructions" for a prior conviction "demonstrate that the jury necessarily found that appellant used or 

threatened to use physical force" in committing his crime. 

Id. at 409. The approach adopted here and in Mathis avoids 

the factual inquiry that concerned the Supreme Court in 

Taylor, but permits courts to treat violent crimes as Congress 

__________

3 Appellant contends that Taylor's exception should apply only 

where the predicate crimes at issue are prior convictions. Thus, in 

his view, the exception would only apply to the three-strikes law 

and not to § 924(c). But other circuits have held that a robbery 

charged as a violation of the Hobbs Act can serve as a predicate 

crime of violence under § 924(c). See, e.g., Mendez, 992 F.2d at 

1491; Elder, 88 F.3d at 128-29. There is no difference, for the 

purpose of sentencing enhancement statutes, between predicate 

crimes committed in the past or the present. Either way, appellant 

was on notice that his violent conduct was both violative of the 

Hobbs Act and constituted a "crime of violence" and "serious violent 

felony" susceptible to an enhanced sentence.

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intended they be treated. Furthermore, the exception provided to the general rule in Taylor is narrow; a district court 

may only undertake this inquiry when a statute provides for 

both violent and nonviolent means of violation.

The indictment charged appellant with two counts of 

"Hobbs Act Robbery, in violation of Title 18, United States 

Code, Sections 1951(a) and 2)." Because robbery that affects 

interstate commerce is a violent felony prohibited by the 

Hobbs Act, and because the indictment establishes that appellant was being charged with such a crime, appellant's contention that his crimes did not constitute "crimes of violence" 

and "serious violent felonies" for the purposes of the sentencing enhancement statutes fails.

III.

Section 924(c)(1) applies only to those who "use[ ] or 

carr[y]" a firearm "during and in relation to any crime of 

violence." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). In Bailey v. United States,

116 S.Ct. 501 (1995), the Supreme Court limited the scope of 

the term "use." The Court held that § 924(c)(1) "requires 

evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the 

firearm by the appellant, a use that makes the firearm an 

operative factor in relation to the predicate offense." Id. at 

505. "Active employment", the Court specified, "certainly 

includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and 

most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a firearm." Id. at 

508. The government concedes that the district court instructed the jury in accordance with the pre-Bailey law of 

§ 924(c) that conflated the terms "use" and "carry" and 

defined both broadly; appellant accordingly seeks reversal of 

his § 924(c) convictions.

We review the district court's instructions mindful that 

errors may be harmless. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 

1379, 1393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Price, 76 

F.3d 526, 529 (3d Cir. 1996). Non-constitutional error such as 

is asserted by appellant is harmless when it is highly probable 

that the error did not contribute to the conviction. United 

States v. Cicero, 22 F.3d 1156, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

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The jury found appellant guilty of two counts of assault, 

based only on his firing and pointing of his gun at police 

officers. The indictment charged appellant with "assault [of] 

Brian Gibson, an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, by use of a deadly and dangerous 

weapon, namely, a Colt .38 caliber revolver" and "assault [of] 

Anthony Paci, an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, by use of a deadly and dangerous 

weapon, namely, a Colt .38 caliber revolver." Because appellant was followed by the police from the moment he left the 

Roy Rogers to the moment he fired his gun at them and was 

apprehended, his conviction on the assault charges establishes 

that the jury concluded that appellant carried a gun while he 

robbed the Roy Rogers in violation of § 924(c). Furthermore, restaurant employees testified that appellant jumped 

over the counter brandishing a gun. Given the overwhelming 

evidence of appellant's guilt, we hold that the error in the 

jury instruction was harmless.

IV.

The district court sentenced appellant to two concurrent 

terms of life in prison for the robberies pursuant to the threestrikes law. 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). Under § 3559(c)(4), the 

government must comply with the provision of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 851(a) if it wishes to invoke the three-strike law against a 

defendant in a violent felony or drug case. Appellant contends that the government failed to comply with the statute. 

Although prior to trial the government filed with the district 

court a three-strikes information that included a certificate of 

service to the effect that a copy had been mailed to appellant's trial counsel, counsel claimed that she had never received it.

Section 851(a) provides that:

No person who stands convicted of an offense under this 

part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by 

reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before 

trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United 

States attorney files an information with the court (and 

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serves a copy of such information on the person or 

counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous 

convictions to be relied upon....

21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). Section 851(a) is a firm and strict rule 

for which actual notice cannot be substituted for compliance 

with the rule; nor does actual notice render failure to comply 

strictly with the service requirements harmless. As this 

court has explained, "Section 851 gives defendants a chance 

to contest the accuracy of the government's recital of their 

prior convictions." See Vanness, 85 F.3d 661, 663 & n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996). Furthermore, "[s]ection 851(a) ... inform[s] the 

defendant that [ ]he faces severe consequences if convicted." 

United States v. Kelly, 29 F.3d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir. 1994). 

Put succinctly, "[a] prosecutor's compliance with § 851(a)(1) is 

simply a necessary condition to a judge's imposing an enhanced sentence on the basis of a defendant's prior convictions." Vanness, 85 F.3d at 663 n.2. Because service is a 

necessary condition of compliance with the statute, "the doctrine of harmless error does not apply with respect to failures 

to follow the statutory scheme of § 851." United States v. 

Weaver, 905 F.2d 1466, 1481 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation 

marks, citation omitted); Kelly, 29 F.3d 1109-10.

Therefore, the government had to comply with the rules 

regarding service by mail when it chose that method of 

notifying appellant under § 851(a). The Federal Rules of 

Criminal Procedure direct that service be made in accordance 

with the rules "provided in civil actions." Fed. R. Crim. P. 

49(b). Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

provides that

[s]ervice upon the attorney or upon a party shall be made 

by delivering a copy to the attorney or party or by 

mailing it to the attorney or party at the attorney's or 

party's last known address or, if no address is known, by 

leaving it with the clerk of the court....Service by mail 

is complete upon mailing.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b). Under Rule 5(b), then, the government 

was obligated to show only that it mailed the information to 

appellant's counsel, and not that defense counsel actually 

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received the letter, to comply with the service requirements 

set forth in § 851(a). "Service is deemed complete at the 

instant the documents are placed into the hands of the United 

States Post Office or a Post Office Box." 3D Moore's Federal 

Practice § 5.04[2][a] (citing cases); see also 4A Wright & 

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1148 (citing cases). 

The evidence before the district court on the issue of 

mailing consisted of the testimony of an Assistant United 

States Attorney that he had either placed the information 

addressed to appellant's trial counsel in the out-box in his 

office or given it to his secretary with written instructions to 

mail it, and that the mail was picked up twice a day from his 

immediate office. Although he had no independent recollection of giving the information at issue to his secretary, the 

Assistant described his normal procedure and noted the file 

stamp as indicating that the original copy had in fact been 

filed in the district court. Further, there was no indication 

from the Assistant's secretary or otherwise that there had 

been any problems with mail pick up in his office during that 

period. Appellant contends that this evidencethat the prosecutor either put the information in his out-box or gave it to 

his secretary to mailsupports an inference that the letter 

was lost as easily as it supports an inference that the letter 

was mailed.

The district court found that the government had satisfied 

its statutory obligations, as evidenced by the certificate of 

service attached to the court-filed information and the testimony of the Assistant about his usual mailing practices.4

__________

4 The Assistant also testified, and was corroborated by a second 

Assistant, that the three-strikes nature of the case had been discussed with appellant's counsel. The district court had also stated 

during a pretrial conference that this was "a section 3559 case" and 

"a third strike case." The court accordingly found that appellant 

had actual notice of the government's intentions. Because review 

for harmless error review is inapplicable in evaluating the government's compliance with § 851(a), the finding of actual knowledge of 

the government's intentions is of no moment. Weaver, 905 F.2d at 

1481.

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Although we find no clear error in this finding, see United 

States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 911 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cf. 

Clayton Brokerage Co. of St. Louis, Inc. v. Bunzel, 820 F.2d 

1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1987); General Electric Co. v. Brown 

Transport Corp., 597 F. Supp. 1258, 1260 (E.D. Va. 1984), the 

government's evidence is just barely sufficient to meet its 

burden of proof. The mailbox rule defining permissible service by mail cannot be converted in to an out-box rule. 

Missing from the government's evidence is any testimony 

regarding what the secretary might have done with the 

information addressed to appellant's counsel and evidence 

regarding the standard operating procedures within the United States Attorney's Office for the handling of out-box mail. 

Somewhat similar to the point appellant makes, on this record 

another factfinder might have concluded that the evidence of 

mailing was in equipoise. In light of the important purposes 

underlying the statutory requirement, there is good reason 

for the government to avoid that possibility, and it can easily 

do so by viewing its statutory obligation to encompass establishing a chain of "custody": the government must present 

evidence on the role of each person who handles a document, 

from the point of its creation to its entrustment to the United 

States Postal Service, thereby establishing that the document 

was, in fact, served on the defendant or his counsel. Then, 

"as a matter of reasonable probability," the possibilities of 

misplacing or failing to send the document have been eliminated, and the government has met its burden of establishing 

an adequate chain of service. United States v. Robinson, 447 

F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc) (quoting Gass v. 

United States, 416 F.2d 767, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); see also 

United States v. Stewart, 104 F.3d 1377, 1383 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

When hand-to-hand evidence cannot be produced, the government can fill the gap by offering evidence of the usual and 

normal practices at each stage. See, e.g., United States v. 

Luna, 585 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1978). Other than the Assistant's testimony, the government failed to offer evidence of 

this sort. However, the record indicates that the information 

was actually filed in the district court with a statement of 

service on appellant's trial counsel. The timely filing of this 

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information supports an inference of regularity as to the 

other aspects of the Assistant's conduct. Thus, the district 

court's finding that service by mail occurred was not clearly 

erroneous. Nonetheless, government counsel will be well 

advised in the future not to rely on such a weak inference to 

fill evidentiary gaps, in place of more substantial evidence of 

the usual practice of routing mail.

V.

Appellant was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment for 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which provides, in pertinent 

part,

It shall be unlawful for any person

(1) who has been convicted in any court of a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one 

year

...

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or 

possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which 

has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign 

commerce.

This "felon-in-possession" count was based on the gun found 

in appellant's possession when he was apprehended after the 

second robbery. Though appellant's possession of the weapon violated the statute, appellant contends that his life sentence for the crime represented a misapplication of the Guidelines, and we agree.

Under the Guidelines the sentencing court is required to 

"determin[e] a single offense level that encompasses all of the 

counts of which the defendant is convicted." U.S.S.G. Ch. 3, 

Pt. D, introductory commentary. The Guidelines also require 

the sentencing court to "group" counts related to the same 

acts. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). The district court appropriately 

grouped appellant's second robbery of the Roy Rogers with 

his felon-in-possession count, but acted in contravention to 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 in imposing a life sentence for robbery.

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Under the Guidelines, the determination of a single offense 

level for each of the grouped counts is assessed at the 

sentence required by the highest offense level for any of the 

counts in the group. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.3(a). All grouped 

counts are then sentenced at that level. Id. The combined 

adjusted offense level for the robbery count was 34, which 

translated to a Guidelines range of 262-327 months. This 

sentence should have been imposed on appellant for his felonin-possession count. But the district court did not impose the 

Guidelines range for either the robbery or the felon-inpossession count. It correctly did not impose the Guidelines 

range on appellant's robbery count because that count constituted appellant's third strike, and therefore required the 

imposition of a mandatory minimum life sentence. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). However, the court also imposed life 

imprisonment on appellant for the grouped felon-inpossession count. Yet U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 provides that for 

multiple-count sentences:

[e]xcept as otherwise required by law (see 5G1.1(a), (b)), 

the sentence imposed on each ... count shall be the total 

punishment as determined in accordance with Part D of 

Chapter Three and Part C of this Chapter.

Under Part D of Chapter 3 and Part C of Chapter 5, the 

determination of the appropriate sentence is generally made 

without regard to any applicable statutory minimums or 

maximums.5 The Commentary to § 5G1.2 indicates that the 

term "total punishment" refers only to the punishment based 

on the combined offense level, without regard to any applicable mandatory sentence. "The combined length of the sentences ('total punishment') is determined by the adjusted 

offense level." U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1 commentary. In appellant's 

case, the Guidelines range for the felon-in-possession count 

__________

5 There are only two references in Part D of Chapter 3 or Part 

C of Chapter 5 to statutorily mandated punishments: § 3D1.1(b) 

provides that counts subject to a mandatory consecutive sentence 

are excluded from the grouping rules, and § 5C1.2 provides for 

downward departures from a statutory minimum under the safety 

valve.

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and the second Hobbs Act count was 34, or 262-327 months. 

That range, and not the mandatory life imprisonment term is 

the "total punishment" referred to in § 5G1.2(b). Hence, the 

fact that appellant failed to object in the district court to his 

life sentence on the felon-in-possession count does not foreclose our determination that plain error has occurred. See 

Saro, 24 F.3d at 286.

The ramifications of this error are reflected the opening 

clause of § 5G1.2(b), which reads "[e]xcept as otherwise required by law...." A mandatory sentence exceeding the 

guidelines range is a sentence "otherwise required by law." 

But if mandatory minimum sentences were factored into the 

determination of the "total punishment," the total punishment 

would always be consistent with the punishment "required by 

law." To give the opening clause meaning total punishment 

must be determined in accordance with the adjusted combined offense level.6

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction in all 

respects except we vacate the sentence on count five and 

remand the case so that the district court can impose a new 

sentence on that count.

__________

6 Appellant's Commerce Clause contention is foreclosed by the 

court's rejection of the same contention by Harrington, the codefendant, who maintained that the Hobbs Act prohibition against 

"obstructing, delaying, or affecting commerce or the movement of 

any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion," 18 

U.S.C. § 1951(a), did not extend to the robberies of the Roy Rogers 

on Georgia Avenue. See Harrington, 108 F.3d at 1464-70 (D.C. 

Cir. 1997). The court concluded that "[w]ithout relying on disputed 

facts or dubious or speculative rationales, the jury could securely 

conclude that ... this missing [stolen] money would [be used in] a 

series of interstate transactions." Id. at 1469.

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