Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04941/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-04941-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pacific Award Metals, Inc.
Counter-claimant
United States Gypsum Company
Counter-defendant

Document Text:

U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

PACIFIC AWARD METALS INC,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-04941 JSW

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

The Court held a claim construction hearing to construe the disputed claim terms of U.S.

Patent No. 5,131,198 (the “‘198 Patent”) pursuant to Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,

517 U.S. 370 (1996), on November 2, 2005. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers,

heard the parties’ arguments, and considered the relevant legal authority, the Court will now

construe the disputed claim terms within the ‘198 Patent.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff United States Gypsum Company (“USG”) seeks to prevent Defendant Pacific

Award Metals, Inc. (“Award”) from infringing the ‘198 Patent. The ‘198 Patent relates to

corner beads for drywall construction and particularly to corner beads having an outer paper

layer. (‘198 Patent, col. 1, ll. 9-11.)

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 There is a typographical error in claim 1 of the ‘198 Patent referring to a

“protected coating.” (‘198 Patent, col. 4, l. 58.). The parties agree that this reference should

be construed as “protective coating.” (Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement at

2.)

2

The parties dispute two terms: “protective coating”1 and “said protective coating

penetrating some of the fibers of said front paper layer and having a thickness on the front

surface of said front paper layer of about 0.001 to 0.005 inches.” 

ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard.

“It is a bedrock principle of patent law that the claims of a patent define the invention to

which the patentee is entitled the right to exclude.” Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water

Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The interpretation of the scope and

meaning of disputed terms in patent claims is a question of law and exclusively within the

province of a court to decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372

(1996). The inquiry into the meaning of the claim terms is “an objective one.” Innova/Pure

Water, 381 F.3d at 1116. As a result, a court undertaking the construction of disputed terms

“looks to those sources available to the public that show what a person of skill in the art would

have understood the disputed claim language to mean.” Id. In most cases, a court’s analysis

will focus on three sources: the claims, the specification, and the prosecution history. Markman

v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370

(1996). However, on occasion, reliance on extrinsic evidence regarding the relevant scientific

principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art at the time at the time the

patent issued is appropriate.

The starting point of the claim construction analysis is an examination of the specific

claim language. A court’s “claim construction analysis must begin and remain centered on the

claim language itself, for that is the language that the patentee chose to particularly point out and

distinctly claim the subject matter which the patentee regards as his invention.” Innova/Pure

Water, 381 F.3d at 1116 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, in the absence of an

express intent to impart a novel meaning to a term, an inventor’s chosen language is given its

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 2 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

ordinary meaning. York Prods., Inc. v. Cent. Tractor Farm & Family Center, 99 F.3d 1568,

1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Thus, “[c]laim language generally carries the ordinary meaning of the

words in their normal usage in the field of the invention.” Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg.,

L.P., 327 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“Claim language generally carries the ordinary

meaning of the words in their normal usage in the field of invention.”); see also Renishaw v.

Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that “the

claims define the scope of the right to exclude; the claim construction inquiry, therefore, begins

and ends in all cases with the actual words of the claim”). A court’s final construction,

therefore, must accord with the words chosen by the patentee to mete out the boundaries of the

claimed invention.

A court also may look to intrinsic evidence, including the written description, the

drawings, and the prosecution history, if included in the record, to provide context and

clarification regarding the intended meaning of the claim terms because the claims do not stand

alone. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Rather,

“they are part of ‘a fully integrated written instrument.’” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,

1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 978). The specification “may act

as a sort of dictionary, which explains the invention and may define the terms used in the

claims.” Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. The specification also can indicate whether the patentee

intended to limit the scope of a claim, despite the use of seemingly broad claim language. 

SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir.

2001) (recognizing that when the specification “makes clear that the invention does not include

a particular feature, that feature is deemed to be outside the reach of the claims of the patent,

even though the language of the claims, read without reference to the specification, might be

considered broad enough to encompass the feature in question”). 

Intent to limit the claims can be demonstrated in a number of ways. For example, if the

patentee “acted as his own lexicographer,” and clearly and precisely “set forth a definition of the

disputed term in either the specification or the prosecution history,” a court will defer to that

definition. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002). All

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 3 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

that is required to so limit the claims is for the patentee to set out the alternative meaning in the

specification “in a manner sufficient to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change

from ordinary meaning.” Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1117. In addition, a court will adopt

an alternative meaning of a term “if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished

that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject

matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention.” CCS Fitness, 288

F.3d at 1367. Likewise, the specification may be used to resolve ambiguity “where the ordinary

and accustomed meaning of the words used in the claims lack sufficient clarity to permit the

scope of the claim to be ascertained from the words alone.” Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1325.

However, limitations from the specification (such as from the preferred embodiment)

may not be read into the claims, absent the inventor’s express intention to the contrary. Id. at

1326; see also CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1366 (“[A] patentee need not ‘describe in the

specification every conceivable and possible future embodiment of his invention.’”); Virginia

Panel Corp. v. MAC Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well-settled that

device claims are not limited to devices which operate precisely as the embodiments described

in detail in the patent.”). To protect against this result, a court’s focus should remain on

understanding how a person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claim terms. 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1323.

If the analysis of the intrinsic evidence fails to resolve any ambiguity in the claim

language, a court then may turn to extrinsic evidence, such as expert declarations and testimony

from the inventors. Intel Corp. v. VIA Techs., Inc., 319 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003)

(“When an analysis of intrinsic evidence resolves any ambiguity in a disputed claim term, it is

improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to contradict the meaning so ascertained.”) (emphasis in

original). When considering extrinsic evidence, a court should take care not to use it to vary or

contradict the claim terms. Rather, extrinsic evidence is relied upon more appropriately to assist

in determining the meaning or scope of technical terms in the claims. Vitronics Corp. v.

Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 4 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 See note 1, supra.

5

Dictionaries also may play a role in the determination of the ordinary and customary

meaning of a claim term. The Federal Circuit recently reiterated that “[d]ictionaries or

comparable sources are often useful to assist in understanding the commonly understood

meanings of words . . . .” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1322. The Phillips court, however, also

admonished that district courts should be careful not to allow dictionary definitions to supplant

the inventor’s understanding of the claimed subject matter. “The main problem with elevating

the dictionary to ... prominence is that it focuses the inquiry on the abstract meaning of the

words rather than on the meaning of claim terms within in the context of the patent.” Id. at

1321. Accordingly, dictionaries necessarily must play a role subordinate to the intrinsic

evidence.

In addition, a court has the discretion to rely upon prior art, whether or not cited in the

specification or the file history, but only when the meaning of the disputed terms cannot be

ascertained from a careful reading of the public record. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. Referring to

prior art may make it unnecessary to rely upon expert testimony, because prior art may be

indicative of what those skilled in the art generally understood certain terms to mean. Id. 

B. Claim Construction.

1. “Protective coating”

Claim 1 of the ‘198 Patent claims a corner bead for drywall construction comprising,

inter alia, “a thin [protective] coating on said front paper layer.” (‘198 Patent, col. 4, l. 58.)2

USG proposes that the term “protective coating” be construed as: “The material applied to the

front paper layer to reinforce the fibers and provide surface protection against abrasion.” Award

proposes that the term be construed as: “Material that is applied to the outer surface of the front

paper layer and that guards against abrasion.” Each of the parties’ proposed constructions of

this term attempts to describe the purpose or function of the “protective coating.” 

Although the claim language is silent on this point, the specification is not. In the

Detailed Description of the Invention section, the patentee states that “a center band 16 of a

protective coating is applied to the outer face of the cover strip 12, and a pair of bands 17 of a

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 5 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3 The terms “protective coatings” and “protective bands” are used

interchangeably. (See, e.g.,‘198 Patent, col. 4, ll. 42-49.)

6

protective coating is applied to the portions of the outer face of the cover strip 13 ... .” (Id., col.

3, ll. 22-26.) In the Summary of the Invention section, the patentee states that “[t]he portion of

the paper layer covering and adjoining each shoulder is provided with a protective coating

making it far more resistant to scuffing during the sanding operation in preparation for

painting.” (Id., col. 2, ll. 18-23.) 

As further set forth in the specification, “[t]he bands 16, 17 of protective coating

preferably result from treatment of the outer paper layers 12, 13 (12', 13') with a material which

penetrates the fibers of the paper to reinforce the paper and provide surface protection against

abrasion.” (Id., col. 3, ll. 43-47.) The patentee also states that when the corner bead is sanded,

“the protective bands 16, 17 prevent adverse scuffing of the paper 12 covering the corner rib

10a and the paper 13 covering the rounded nose 11a adjacent the shoulders 11b.” (Id., col. 4, ll.

24-28 (describing nail-on corner beads); see also id. at col. 4, ll. 41-43 (“the protective bands

16', 17' prevent adverse scuffing of the outer paper layers 12', 13') (describing tape-on corner

beads).)3 

In light of the fact that the claim language is silent on the purpose of the “protective

coating,” the Court reads the claims “in view of the specification of which they are a part.” 

Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315 (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). It is evident from the

specification that the protective coating is designed to reduce scuffing of the paper layer. 

Award argues that the Court should not construe this term to include the reference to reinforcing

the fibers because that language refers only to a preferred embodiment. USG argues that this

language is not merely a preferred embodiment but is, in fact, a requirement of the invention. 

Award is correct that, in general, the Court should not limit a claim term to the preferred

embodiment. See Teleflex, 299 F.3d at 1326; accord Astrazeneca A.B. v. Mutual

Pharmaceutical Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2004). However, “the patentee’s choice of

preferred embodiments can shed light on the intended scope of the claims.” Astrazeneca, 384

F.3d at 1340. If the specification stated that the material penetrated the fibers of the paper

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 6 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

preferably to reinforce the paper and provide surface protection against abrasion, Award’s

argument on this point would be more persuasive. However, the term “preferably” modifies the

entire phrase that it precedes. (See ‘198 Patent, col. 3, ll. 43-47 (“[t]he bands of protective

coating preferably result from treatment of the outer paper layers with a material that penetrates

the fibers of the paper and provide surface protection against abrasion.”) (emphasis added).) 

Award concedes that in all embodiments the protective coating must penetrate the paper layer. 

In the Court’s view, and considering the context of the overall purpose of the protective

coating, i.e to make the paper layer more resistant to scuffing during sanding, this language

explains the import of the penetration limitation and the scope of the claims. By penetrating the

paper layer, the protective coating both reinforces the paper and provides surface protection

against abrasion. The Court is mindful that it should not read a limitation from the specification

into the claims. However, the Court does not concur with Award’s view that the language

discussed in the preceding paragraph refers only to a preferred embodiment but rather views this

language as evidence that the patentee viewed that particular embodiment as important to the

invention. See CCS Fitness, 288 F.3d at 1367. Therefore, reading the claims “in view of the

specification of which they are a part,” the Court construes the term “protective coating” to

mean: “The material applied to the front paper layer to reinforce said front paper layer

and to provide surface protection against abrasion.”

2. “[S]aid protective coating penetrating some of the fibers of said front paper

layer and having a thickness on the front surface of said front paper layer of

about 0.001 to 0.005 inches.”

This phrase also appears in claim one of the ‘198 Patent and further describes the

protective coating limitation. USG asks the Court to construe it as one phrase that means: “The

protective coating penetrates some of the fibers at the surface of the front paper layer and has a

total thickness of about 0.001 to 0.005 inches, including the penetration depth.” Award asks the

Court to construe the phrase in two parts as follows: “(1) The protective coating enters some of

the spaces between the fibers of the front paper layer;” and (2) “The protective coating has a

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 7 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

layer or film of about 0.001 to 0.005 inches adjoining, and measured from, the outer surface of

the front paper layer.” 

The parties agree that the protective coating penetrates the surface of the front paper

layer. The Court concludes that no further construction of the term “penetrate” is required and

declines Award’s request to parse the phrase to construe it. The true dispute between the parties

rests on the construction of the thickness limitation. 

As set forth above, USG contends that the “thickness” of the protective coating includes

any material that has penetrated into the surface of the paper layer. USG argues that the

thickness must be measured to include material that has penetrated the paper because the patent

contemplates a unitary protective coating. USG acknowledged, however, that at least some of

the protective coating acts as a barrier, i.e. there is some portion of the protective coating that

rests on the surface of the front paper layer. Award contends that the “thickness” limitation

refers only to protective coating that rests above or on top of the surface of the paper layer. 

Award’s proposed construction is supported by the plain language of the claim. The

claim language reads: “said protective coating ... having a thickness on the front surface of said

front paper layer of about 0.001 to 0.005 inches.” (‘198 Patent, col. 4, ll. 61-64 (emphasis

added).) USG argues that the term “on” refers to a location, i.e. the protective coating is located

“on” the front surface of said front paper layer. However, the limitation in question refers to the

thickness of the protective coating and from where that thickness is to be measured. The claim

language suggests that the thickness limitation is to be measured by excluding any of the

material that has penetrated into surface of the front paper layer. 

The Court also reads the claims in light of the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315

(quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 979). The portion of the specification that describes the thickness

limitation reads as follows: “When the coating has dried, the surface of the paper area to which

the coating material has been applied will normally have an acrylic film or layer about 0.001

inches in thickness.” (‘198 Patent, col. 3, ll. 54-57 (emphasis added).) The patentee also stated

that “[t]his surface film or layer can be increased in thickness to about 0.005 inches by using a

suitable primer sealer for the protective coating.” (Id., col. 3, ll. 58-60 (emphasis added).) Thus

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 8 of 9
U

nite

d

States District C

o

u

rt

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

the specification supports a conclusion that once the protective coating penetrates the surface of

the paper layer and dries, it leaves a film or layer that forms a barrier on that surface, which can

vary in thickness depending upon the type of material used. 

Similarly, the drawings depict the bands of protective coating as lying on top of the

paper layers, creating a barrier, and do not contradict the concept of a unitary protective coating

because the drawings also show the penetration of the protective coating into the paper layers. 

(See, e.g., ‘198 Patent, figs. 2, 4, 5, 6.)

Accordingly, the Court construes the term “said protective coating penetrating some of

the fibers of said front paper layer and having a thickness on the front surface of said front paper

layer of about 0.001 to 0.005 inches,” to mean: “The protective coating penetrates some of

the fibers at the surface of the front paper layer and measures about 0.001 to 0.005 inches

in thickness on the front surface of said front paper layer, said thickness excluding

penetration depth of said protective coating.”

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis set forth above, the Court adopts the foregoing constructions of the

disputed terms. The parties are ordered to submit a further joint case management report

pursuant to Patent Standing Order ¶ 13 within 21 days of the filing of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:04-cv-04941-JSW Document 78 Filed 11/08/05 Page 9 of 9