Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-19-02114/USCOURTS-ca10-19-02114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Serna
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

WILLIAM SERNA, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 19-2114 

(D.C. No. 1:18-CR-03321-JB-1) 

(D.N.M.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before PHILLIPS, McKAY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.**

_________________________________ 

In this case, Serna conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession 

of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He now appeals 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. He argues that the police sergeant 

 * This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines 

of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for 

its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. ** While the late Honorable Monroe G. McKay was assigned to, and 

participated in the disposition of, this matter before his death on March 28, 2020, his 

vote was not counted. Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019) (federal court may 

not count the vote of a judge who dies before a decision is issued). “The practice of 

this Court permits the remaining two panel judges if in agreement to act as a quorum 

in resolving the appeal.” United States v. Wiles, 106 F.3d 1516, 1516 n. * (10th 

Cir.1997); see also 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (noting circuit court may adopt procedures 

permitting disposition of an appeal where remaining quorum of panel agrees on the 

disposition). The remaining panel members have acted as a quorum with respect to 

this Order and Judgment. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 30, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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lacked reasonable suspicion to seize him. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

 Sergeant Peter Silva is a fifteen-year veteran of the Albuquerque Police 

Department (APD). On September 3, 2018, Sergeant Silva and three other police 

officers were on bicycle patrol in downtown Albuquerque. During this patrol, 

Sergeant Silva rode on a street alongside Robinson Park—an area known for frequent 

drug-related activity. From his bicycle, Sergeant Silva saw two men standing by each 

other, apparently in “a hand-to-hand exchange.” R. vol. 2 at 15. As Sergeant Silva 

neared the men, he saw one man hand the other cash. Sergeant Silva recognized one 

of the men, Serna, from earlier drug-related offenses. Sergeant Silva got off his 

bicycle and asked the two men what they were doing. Before either man responded, 

Sergeant Silva ordered them to keep their hands where he could see them, and both 

men “immediately put their hands up in the air.” Id. at 19–20. One of the men, 

Fuentes, told Sergeant Silva that he was buying a lighter from Serna and showed 

Sergeant Silva the lighter in his hand. Sergeant Silva questioned whether Fuentes was 

buying a lighter for “[w]hat[,] ten dollars?”1

 Fuentes responded that he “didn’t wanna 

 1

 In Sergeant Silva’s body-camera recording of the encounter, he speaks of ten 

dollars, but testifying at the suppression hearing, he testified that he had seen “20 

bucks.” R. vol. 2 at 23. Serna raises Sergeant Silva’s conflicting statements over 

whether he saw Serna and Fuentes exchange a ten-dollar or a twenty-dollar bill. But 

the district court “discount[ed] Silva’s testimony regarding what bill he observed [the 

men exchange,]” and found that regardless of what denomination of bill Sergeant 

Silva saw being exchanged, he “trust[ed] Silva’s ability to identify suspicious 

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walk [to the gas station].” Body-Camera Video at 00:30–00:40. Unpersuaded by this 

story, Sergeant Silva told both men to put their hands on their heads and approached 

Serna, who was nearer to him. As a safety measure, Sergeant Silva asked Serna if he 

had any weapons on him, and Serna replied that he did have a gun in his front pocket. 

Sergeant Silva located and removed a loaded semi-automatic firearm from 

Serna’s pocket. Sergeant Silva read Serna his Miranda rights and placed him under 

arrest. After handcuffing Serna and while awaiting a police car, Sergeant Silva said to 

Serna: “Will, I know you got prior felonies, man, you’re not supposed to have a gun 

on you.” Id. at 03:30–03:47. As part of a search incident to arrest, Sergeant Silva 

seized from Serna’s backpack a second loaded firearm, 100 rounds of ammunition, 

and a distribution amount of methamphetamine. A federal grand jury charged Serna 

with one count of being a felon in possession, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).2

On January 6, 2019, Serna filed a motion to suppress evidence of the firearms, 

ammunition, and methamphetamine, as fruit of an illegal seizure. The district court 

ruled that Silva had reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and denied the motion to 

dismiss. United States v. Serna, 406 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 1099 (D.N.M. 2019). The 

district court concluded that Sergeant Silva had seized Serna when Serna placed his 

hands on top of his head after being told to keep his hands in sight. Id. at 1124. And 

 

activity[.]” United States v. Serna, 406 F. Supp. 1084, 1126–27 (D.N.M. 2019) 

(citation omitted).

2

 Serna initially faced state-court charges for “being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, narcotics trafficking, and narcotics possession[,]” Appellee’s Resp. Br. 5, but 

these charges were later dismissed after Serna’s federal indictment. 

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in a thorough opinion, the district court concluded “that Silva had reasonable 

suspicion that justified seizing Serna[.]” Id. at 1123–24. 

Serna pleaded guilty but reserved his right to appeal the district court’s order 

denying his suppression motion. On July 16, 2019, the district court sentenced Serna 

to seventy-months’ imprisonment. Serna has timely appealed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal 

conclusions de novo, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government. United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1255 (10th Cir. 2011). We 

review de novo the district court’s ultimate determination of reasonableness. Id. 

(citing United States v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1126, 1132 (10th Cir. 2008)). 

DISCUSSION 

 The sole issue on appeal is whether Sergeant Silva’s seizure of Serna was 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects persons 

from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. But the Fourth 

Amendment also permits police officers to “stop and briefly detain a person for 

investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by 

articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot[.]” United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 

1134, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Unlike probable cause, reasonable suspicion 

requires only that the officer articulate specific facts “and rational inferences drawn 

from those facts” supporting that a person has committed or is committing a crime. 

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McHugh, 639 F.3d at 1255 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Latorre, 893 

F.3d 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2018). Though not a heavy burden, reasonable suspicion still 

requires more than a mere “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” 

Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1188 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). 

An investigative detention—commonly known as a “Terry stop”—occurs when 

a police officer stops and detains a person “to determine his identity or to maintain 

the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 

F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Terry stops are considered 

seizures under the Fourth Amendment.3 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 

(1981) (“In assessing the validity of respondent’s initial detention, we note first that 

it constituted a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”); see also 

United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1461 (10th Cir. 1993).

 Serna was “seized” under the Fourth Amendment through a Terry stop when 

Sergeant Silva told Serna to keep his hands where he could see them, and Serna 

placed his hands on top of his head. See United States v. Salazar, 609 F.3d 1059, 

1064 (10th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that a seizure occurs when (1) an officer shows his 

authority and (2) the citizen submits). The district court ruled that Serna’s seizure 

was justified because Sergeant Silva “(i) observed an individual [Serna] known to 

 3

 An initial detention “seizure” is different than an “official seizure of the 

person [which] must be supported by probable cause, even if no formal arrest is 

made.” Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 696 (1981) (citing Dunaway v. New 

York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)). 

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engage in drug trafficking; (ii) engag[ing] in a hand to hand exchange of cash; (iii) in 

a park known as a site for drug trafficking.” Serna, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 1124. We agree 

with the district court that the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, establish that Serna’s seizure was reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. 

In evaluating whether Sergeant Silva had reasonable suspicion to seize Serna, 

we look at the totality of the circumstances, judging “the officer’s conduct in light of 

common sense and ordinary human experience,” United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 

1426, 1431 (10th Cir. 1997), and we defer to an officer’s ability to distinguish 

between innocent and suspicious actions, United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 

1146–47 (10th Cir. 2010). Reasonable suspicion does not require us to “rule out the 

possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002). 

But it does require that the facts relied on by Sergeant Silva for the Terry stop were 

“facts [that were] available to the officer at the moment of the seizure.” Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). 

Serna argues “that there was no evidence that an exchange of drugs ever 

occurred.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 8. By this, Serna implies that an officer’s 

suspicions are reasonable only if proved correct. In fact, reasonable suspicion does 

not require proof that a crime actually or even probably occurred. See United States 

v. Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[An officer] may initiate an 

investigatory detention even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not

involved in any illegality.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States 

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v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1194 (10th Cir. 2004))). Here, Sergeant Silva saw two 

men engaging in activity consistent with a drug transaction, one of whom he knew 

had previous drug-related arrests. Serna, 406 F. Supp. 3d at 1128. The district court 

found that Sergeant Silva had observed one “half of a purported drug transaction.” Id. 

Serna also disputes reasonable suspicion on grounds that “looking ‘suspicious’ 

in a ‘high crime area’ is not a sufficient basis for a seizure.” Appellant’s Opening 

Br. 9 (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)). Without analysis, Serna 

characterizes what Sergeant Silva had as mere inchoate suspicion. 

The district court considered Sergeant Silva’s testimony that Serna was in a 

high-crime area, in which police officers had “regularly arrest[ed] individuals” for 

drug-related offenses. Serna, 406 F. Supp. 3d. at 1125. Indeed, this fact alone would 

not establish reasonable suspicion. McHugh, 639 F.3d at 1257 (“[T]he fact that a stop 

occurred in a high-crime area cannot alone justify a Terry stop[.]”). But “this circuit 

. . . continues to consider an area’s disposition toward criminal activity as a factor 

that contributes to an officer’s reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Guardado, 699 

F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 

It matters too that Sergeant Silva recognized Serna from previous drug-related 

arrests.4

 “Standing alone, a criminal record—let alone arrests or suspected gang 

affiliation—is not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of anything[.]” United 

 4

 The district court credited Sergeant Silva’s testimony that he recognized 

Serna from previous arrests, noting that “Silva stated in court and under oath that he 

recognized Serna once he entered Robinson Park.” Serna, 406 F. Supp. 3d 

at 1126-27. 

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States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 906–07 (10th Cir. 2018) (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But when “the circumstances of the 

stop itself interact with an individual’s criminal history to trigger an officer’s 

suspicions, that criminal history becomes critically relevant for Terry-purposes.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

Sergeant Silva’s experience and training are also relevant considerations. 

“Officers must be permitted to draw on their own experience and specialized training 

to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available 

to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. QuintanaGarcia, 343 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). Based on the above facts, Sergeant Silva had reasonable suspicion to 

investigate as he did. As such, the district court did not err in denying Serna’s motion 

to suppress. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the reasons given, we affirm. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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