Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_17-cv-00077/USCOURTS-ared-5_17-cv-00077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wendy Kelley
Defendant
Michael McCaslin
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

MICHAEL MCCASLIN PETITIONER 

ADC # 154226 

VS. CASE NO. 5:17-CV-0077-KGB-JTK 

WENDY KELLEY, Director 

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT 

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

INSTRUCTIONS 

The following recommended disposition has been sent to United States District Court 

Judge Kristine G. Baker. Any party may serve and file written objections to this recommendation. 

Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis for the objection. If the 

objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and the evidence that supports 

your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must be received in the office of the 

United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen (14) days from the date of the findings 

and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the opposing party. Failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different, or 

additional evidence, and to have a hearing for this purpose before the District Judge, you must, at 

the same time that you file your written objections, include the following:

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1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate. 

2. Why the evidence proffered at the hearing before the District Judge (if such 

a hearing is granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate 

Judge. 

3. The detail of any testimony desired to be introduced at the hearing before 

the District Judge in the form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, 

of any documentary or other non-testimonial evidence desired to be 

introduced at the hearing before the District Judge. 

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional evidentiary 

hearing, either before the Magistrate Judge or before the District Judge. 

 Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to: 

Clerk, United States District Court 

Eastern District of Arkansas 

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149 

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325 

DISPOSITION 

 For the reasons explained below, it is recommended Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of 

Habeas Corpus (DE # 1) be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Procedural History 

 In November of 2013, Petitioner pled guilty to the rape of his six-year old daughter in 

exchange for a sentence of twenty-five (25) years of imprisonment. (DE # 11-2) In the plea 

agreement, the Petitioner acknowledged that he understood the rights he was giving up by entering 

a guilty plea. Furthermore, he acknowledged within his statement that he had fully discussed all 

matters with his counsel, and he “did in fact commit the crime(s) with which he is charged and is 

guilty thereof beyond every reasonable doubt.” Id. at 3. The sentencing order was filed on 

November 15, 2013. (DE # 11-4) On November 16, 2013, the Petitioner wrote a letter to the 

circuit clerk stating that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea and asserted that his public defender 

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was ineffective because he “could have done my case better.” (DE # 11-5) The letter was received 

and filed in Garland County Circuit Court on November 20, 2013. Id. 

On October 27, 2014, Petitioner filed a “Pro Se Motion for a State Post-Conviction 

Petition” in the form of a letter—and docketed by the clerk as a “letter,”—in which he contended 

that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and requested for his guilty plea to be reversed. 

(DE # 11-7) The State of Arkansas filed a response to the motion on November 3, 2014, stating 

that “[a]lthough not captioned properly, the Defendant’s Petition appears to be a petition pursuant 

to Rule 37 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.” (DE # 11-8) The State argued, however, 

that the petition should be dismissed as untimely because it wasn’t filed within ninety (90) days of 

the entry of the judgment. Id. The online docket reflects that there was no further action taken in 

the case regarding Petitioner’s motion. (DE # 11-9) 

 On March 23, 2017, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus (DE # 1), pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that (1) he is actually innocent of the crime and (2) that his guilty 

plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently entered and was based on ineffective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Respondent 

filed her response on June 23, 2017, and admits Petitioner is in her custody and there currently are 

no non-futile state remedies available to him. (DE # 11) She denies, however, that Petitioner is 

entitled to habeas corpus relief because the petition is procedurally defaulted and time barred. 

Discussion 

I. Statute of Limitations 

There exists a one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) for filing an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a 

person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28 U.S.C.A. 2244(d)(1). The statute starts 

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running from the date on which the judgment became final. Id. In this case, the Petitioner’s 

Sentencing Order was entered on November 15, 2013. Therefore, the Petitioner had through 

December, 15, 2014, to timely file his application. See Camacho v. Hobbs, 774 F.3d 931, 934-35 

(8th Cir. 2015) (holding the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period begins to run from the date on 

which the thirty-day period in which to file an appeal expires, even for a criminal defendant who 

enters an unconditional guilty plea and generally has no right to appeal such plea). Petitioner, 

however, did not file this petition until March 23, 2017, and therefore, the petition is untimely. 

II. Actual Innocence – Equitable Exception to AEDPA 

Petitioner acknowledges that his petition was filed after the statute of limitations had 

expired. He argues, however, that he is entitled to the equitable exception of actual innocence set 

out in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013). In Perkins, the United States Supreme Court 

held that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass” 

to have his otherwise untimely petition considered. Id. at 386. The Court, however, cautioned 

“that tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare: ‘[A] petitioner does not meet the threshold 

requirement unless he persuades the district court, that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, 

acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citing 

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). Furthermore, the Court held that a petitioner’s 

diligence in proffering new evidence as well as the “likely credibility of [a petitioner’s] affiants 

bear on the probable reliability of . . . evidence [for actual innocence].” Id. at 399 (citing Schlup, 

513 U.S. at 332). In conclusion, the Supreme Court held in Perkins that “[t]he gateway should 

only open when a petition presents ‘evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have 

confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332.) 

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The Petitioner argues that he is entitled to the actual innocence exception set forth in 

Perkins because his daughter, who he confessed to raping, signed an affidavit wherein she recanted 

her prior incriminating statements to the police. (DE # 1) Petitioner’s daughter, now ten (10) 

years old, entered an affidavit on August 2, 2016, stating that “my father did make me touch his 

penis with my hand 1 time back when I was 6 years old. He also kissed me with an open mouth 

(like grown-ups do). But, my father never did anything else sexually to me.” Id. at 34. Petitioner 

argues that the affidavit serves as his daughter’s recantation, and that no juror would have found 

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt without his daughter’s statement. The Court disagrees. The 

proffered affidavit is hardly adequate to satisfy the standard set forth in Perkins. Considering the 

evidence that would have been set forth at trial, especially the fact that the Petitioner admitted in 

his state court plea that he raped his daughter, there is no “new evidence” of actual innocence 

sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of his petition. 

Petitioner appears to be arguing that his daughter’s 2016 recantation completely negates 

her initial statement and disclosures to the police. This Court disagrees. Hypothetically, if the 

Petitioner were granted a new trial, his daughter’s prior allegations that he raped her would be 

heard by the jury. Rather, credibility of the child’s recantation versus the credibility of the prior 

statement would be determined by a jury. This Court’s responsibility is to “consider ‘all of the 

evidence,’ old and new, incriminating and exculpatory, without regard to whether it would 

necessarily be admitted under ‘rules of admissibility that would govern at trial.’” House v. Bell, 

547 U.S. 518, 538 (2006) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327-328. This requires the Court to make 

some credibility assessments. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has consistently held that 

“[c]ourts look upon recantations with suspicion.” United States v. Miner, 131 F.3d 1271, 1273 

(8th Cir. 1997). This is “especially applicable of cases of child sexual abuse where recantation is 

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a recurring phenomenon.” United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir. 1992). 

Furthermore, the court stated that [r]ecantation is particularly common when family members are 

involved, and the child has feelings of guilt or the family members seek to influence the child to 

change her story. Id. It is reasonable and likely, therefore, that a juror in this case would be 

inclined to believe the child’s prior statements to the police, rather than the later recantation. The 

Court does not have a trial record to review in this case due to the Petitioner’s confession and his 

acceptance of a plea agreement. However, the facts are not nearly enough to convince this Court 

that no juror, acting reasonably, would have found the Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 

even with the child’s recantation. 

The Petitioner voluntarily entered into a Plea Agreement on November 7, 2013, in which 

he affirmatively admitted that he was guilty of the crime of rape and that he had previously been 

convicted of sexual assault in the fourth degree. (DE # 11-2) The Agreement stated that “[u]pon 

the voluntary plea of guilty of Defendant to the charges herein and Defendant’s complete and 

truthful disclosure of all facts relevant to the crime charged and his/her participation therein,” the 

State of Arkansas recommends the Defendant be sentenced to twenty-five (25) years in the 

Arkansas Department of Correction, to run concurrently with the five-year sentence he was already 

serving for the sexual assault.1

 Id. In the Plea and Waiver, Petitioner agrees that “he is not innocent 

of said charge(s) against him, did in fact commit the crime(s) with which he is charged and is 

guilty thereof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 3. Furthermore, during the plea hearing the 

Petitioner swore under oath to the following: 

                                                            

1

 If Petitioner was granted a new trial, and he chose to take the stand in his defense, it is inevitable that the felony 

conviction for sexual assault in the fourth-degree would be admissible for impeachment purposes. While the Court 

acknowledges that it is unlikely the Petitioner would choose to testify on his own behalf for this very reason, it cannot 

be certain what the Petitioner would choose to do at trial. Therefore, when weighing the impact of “all of the 

evidence,” the Court does take into consideration the effect the prior felony conviction could have on potential jurors. 

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The Court: To the charge of rape, a class Y felony carrying a 

 potential penalty of twenty-five to forty years, or life in prison, how 

 do you plead? 

Defendant McCaslin: Guilty. 

The Court: State’s proof? 

Mr. Jones: Your honor, State’s proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 

 that on September 25, 2012, the Defendant, Michael Shane McCaslin 

 did within Garland County, Arkansas engage in sexual intercourse or 

 deviate sexual activity with his six year old daughter. 

The Court: Were you able to hear the statement of the Prosecuting 

 Attorney? 

Defendant McCaslin: Yes, sir. 

The Court: Was that statement substantially correct? 

Defendant McCaslin: Yes, sir. 

The Court: And you are guilty as charged? 

Defendant McCaslin: Yes, sir. 

(DE # 11-3, pgs. 4-5). In addition to Petitioner’s confession to the rape, the child made these 

allegations of inappropriate sexual contact with her father to more than one individual. The 

Petitioner acknowledges that his daughter made allegations that he touched her inappropriately to 

fellow students at a bus stop on her way to school, as well, as her grandmother. (DE # 1 at pgs. 1-

2) The Respondent also notes that the child disclosed the allegation of rape to her school counselor. 

(DE # 11 at pg. 10) Lastly, there is the audio and videotaped interview conducted by Forensic 

Interviewer, Tracey Childress, on September 25, 2012, wherein the child described sexual acts 

with the Petitioner. The Petitioner argues that his daughter’s statements “were simply not true and 

were made during a period of time in her life when she needed attention that she was not receiving.” 

(DE # 1 at pg. 19) Given the evidence before the Court, as well as the child’s age at the time of 

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the initial statement, and the sheer number of individuals that she confessed to in 2012, the Court 

does not find this argument convincing. The Petitioner has not set forth new evidence of actual 

innocence sufficient to excuse the untimeliness of his petition, and therefore, it should be 

dismissed. 

III. Equitable Tolling 

 Alternatively, the Petitioner argues that “this Court should grant equitable tolling based on 

the fact that McCaslin was subjected to an outright denial of his right to counsel for purposes of 

state post-conviction review.” (DE # 1) This argument has no merit. 

 In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the United States Supreme Court held that a petitioner is entitled 

to equitable tolling only if he can prove: (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently and (2) 

that some extraordinary circumstance prevented timely filing. 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005). The 

Petitioner cannot show that he has been pursuing his rights diligently or that any extraordinary 

circumstance prevented a timely filing. There is no argument that the Petitioner’s post-conviction 

petition was untimely, because it was filed more than ninety (90) days after entry of the sentencing 

order. In fact, his Rule 37 petition was filed nearly a year after the sentencing order was filed. 

Furthermore, his federal habeas petition was filed more than seven months after the date of his 

daughter’s recantation and several years after the statute of limitations expired. Petitioner has not 

pursued his rights diligently. See Nelson v. Norris, 618 F. 3d 886 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding that 

petitioner was not diligent in pursuing his rights when he waited until nine months after the 

Arkansas Supreme Court denied rehearing to file his federal habeas petition) and Pace, 544 U.S. 

at 419 (finding that petitioner’s lack of diligence precludes equity’s operation where he waited five 

months after post-conviction proceedings became final before seeking relief in federal court). The 

Petitioner also has not presented any extraordinary circumstances beyond his control that made it 

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impossible to file his petition on time. Even if we were to assume that Petitioner’s lack of postconviction counsel is what caused the untimely filing, the Eighth Circuit has held that “ineffective 

assistance of counsel generally does not warrant equitable tolling.” Walker v. Norris, 436 F. 3d 

1026, 1033 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Beery v. Ault, 312 F. 3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2002)). Therefore, 

it logically follows that if ineffective assistance of counsel does not warrant equitable tolling, 

neither does lack of counsel. See Kreutzer v. Bowersox, 231 F. 3d 460, 463 (stating that even in 

a case of an unrepresented prisoner alleging lack of legal knowledge or legal resources, equitable 

tolling has not been warranted). See also, Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 2004) 

(holding that a Petitioner’s misunderstanding of the Arkansas rules, statutes, and the time period 

set forth therein do not justify equitable tolling). Accordingly, the Court finds that equitable tolling 

does not apply. Because the petition is untimely, the Court need not address the procedural default 

of Petitioner’s claims or the merits of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel surrounding 

his guilty plea. 

Certificate of Appealability 

 When entering a final order adverse to the Petitioner, the Court must issue or deny a 

certificate of appealability. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United 

States District Court. The Court can issue a certificate of appealability only if Petitioner has made 

a substantial showing that he was denied a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)-(2). In this 

case, Petitioner has not provided a basis for issuing a certificate of appealability. 

Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the instant habeas petition (DE #1) be 

denied and dismissed with prejudice and that a certificate of appealability be denied. 

 

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 SO ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 2019. 

____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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