Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05047/USCOURTS-caDC-10-05047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denise R. Colbert
Appellant
Robert C. Tapella
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 18, 2011 Decided June 17, 2011 

No. 10-5047 

DENISE R. COLBERT, AN INDIVIDUAL, 

APPELLANT

v. 

ROBERT C. TAPELLA, PUBLIC PRINTER, U.S. GOVERNMENT 

PRINTING OFFICE, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:07-cv-01219) 

 Theodore S. Allison argued the cause and filed the briefs 

for appellant. 

 Alan Burch, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for 

appellee. On the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr., U.S. 

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence and Wyneva Johnson, 

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

USCA Case #10-5047 Document #1313690 Filed: 06/17/2011 Page 1 of 11
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 Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND and BROWN, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

BROWN, Circuit Judge: Denise R. Colbert (“Colbert”), a 

black woman, worked at the Government Printing Office 

(“GPO”) for over thirty years. In December, 2005, she 

applied for two job openings in the Congressional Publishing 

Services, an office within the Customer Service Division of 

the GPO. Without interviewing any candidates, the GPO 

filled the two positions with white men. Colbert sued the 

GPO under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging race and gender 

discrimination. The district court granted the GPO’s motion 

for summary judgment. Because a reasonable jury could find 

in Colbert’s favor, we reverse and remand. 

I 

In December, 2005, the GPO posted two vacancy 

announcements for a Supervisory Printing Services Specialist. 

The two jobs differed in their work schedule (day versus night 

shift) and available salary range (PG 14 pay level versus PG 

13/14 pay level). Each job posting contained a section 

entitled “How You Will Be Evaluated,” which stated: “If you 

meet the qualifications described above, you will be further 

evaluated based on your narrative responses to each 

knowledge, skill, ability and other characteristic (“KSAO”) 

listed below.” Beneath this summary, the job posting 

described the five KSAOs required for the position: (1) ability 

to supervise and direct the work of others, (2) knowledge and 

understanding of the laws and regulations governing the 

USCA Case #10-5047 Document #1313690 Filed: 06/17/2011 Page 2 of 11
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actions of the Government Printing Office, (3) knowledge of 

the legislative process, especially the stages through which a 

bill passes to become law, (4) ability to communicate 

effectively orally, including skill in responding directly to 

inquiries from Senators, Congressmen, and congressional 

staff members, and (5) knowledge of terminology, and 

mechanics of the electronic transmission of data presently 

used by GPO and Congress. 

Jerry Hammond, Director of the Congressional 

Publishing Services, assisted by Lyle Green, the Associate 

Director, selected among the applicants for the two available 

printing specialist positions. Hammond did not interview the 

candidates. Instead, he evaluated each on their written 

application, including the candidate’s stated qualifications and 

narrative responses, as well as any personal knowledge 

Hammond possessed of a candidate’s work. Ultimately, 

Hammond selected Joseph Benjamin and William Milans, 

both white males, for the two positions. 

Colbert sued the GPO, alleging race and gender 

discrimination under Title VII. After discovery, the GPO 

moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted 

the GPO’s motion. Colbert v. Tapella, 677 F. Supp. 2d 289, 

295 (D.D.C. 2010). 

II 

Title VII protects employees from personnel actions that 

discriminate on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or 

national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). Where an 

employer asserts a non-discriminatory reason for the decision 

in question, the court’s inquiry is limited to “one central 

question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted nonUSCA Case #10-5047 Document #1313690 Filed: 06/17/2011 Page 3 of 11
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discriminatory reason was not the actual reason and that the 

employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on 

the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin?” 

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008). In considering this question, the court may look at 

“(1) the [employee’s] prima facie case; (2) any evidence the 

[employee] presents to attack the employer’s proffered 

explanation for its actions; and (3) any further evidence of 

discrimination that may be available to the [employee] . . . or 

any contrary evidence that may be available to the employer.” 

Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1289 (D.C. Cir. 

1998) (en banc). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 

affidavits show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact” and “the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty 

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). In making this 

determination, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Colbert, and draw all reasonable inferences in her 

favor, but we do not make credibility determinations, nor do 

we weigh the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing 

Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). 

A1

The district court erred by requiring Colbert to show not 

only that the GPO’s nondiscriminatory reason was pretext, 

but also that discrimination was the actual reason Colbert was 

not promoted. Colbert, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 295. In so doing, 

 

1

 We do not perceive a material difference between this opinion’s 

description of the legal standard under Title VII and that described 

by our concurring colleague. 

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the district court relied on St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 

U.S. 502, 515 (1993). But we rejected this interpretation of 

Hicks in Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1290 (D.C. 

Cir. 1998) (en banc). There, we stated that “we do not 

endorse a reading of Hicks under which employment 

discrimination plaintiffs are presumptively required to submit 

evidence over and above [evidence of pretext] in order to 

avoid summary judgment.” Id. at 1292. And we further 

noted “[t]he jury can conclude that an employer who 

fabricates a false explanation has something to hide; that 

‘something’ may well be discriminatory intent.” 156 F.3d at 

1293. 

Earlier this term, we affirmed a grant of summary 

judgment in favor of an employer when the only evidence the 

employer fabricated a false explanation was the employee’s 

own personal opinion. See Vatel v. Alliance of Auto. Mfrs., 

627 F.3d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This case is the 

natural corollary: the employer admits to having lied about 

Colbert’s nonselection. In his first meeting with an EEO 

investigator, Hammond said he did not select Colbert, in part, 

because she “wandered.” When later asked whether he 

actually believed Colbert wandered, Hammond said “not 

really.” The GPO argues Hammond’s statement that Colbert 

“wandered” is not a lie because Hammond said it “out of 

anger more than anything else.” Oral Argument Tr. 20–21. 

But this argument is nothing more than a lawyerly effort to 

downplay problematic evidence. Hammond admits part of his 

stated rationale for passing over Colbert was not true. It is 

thus a lie, carrying with it “considerable evidentiary 

significance,” Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292, regardless of 

Hammond’s stated motivation. 

 

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B 

A “plaintiff cannot always avoid summary judgment by 

showing the employer’s explanation to be false . . . .” Id. 

“For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some other, 

nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if 

the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether 

the employer’s reason was untrue and there was abundant and 

uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination 

had occurred.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 

530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). This case does not fit either 

exception. 

The record does not “conclusively reveal[] some other, 

nondiscriminatory reason” for Hammond’s decision to pass 

over Colbert. Id.; see Aka, 156 F.3d at 1291 (discussing 

Rothmeier v. Inv. Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328 (8th Cir. 

1996)). Instead, the record suggests the opposite: GPO’s 

proffered non-discriminatory reason appears to be unfounded. 

According to Hammond, Colbert was not better qualified than 

Benjamin or Milans because her prior work experience was 

“perfunctory” and “limited to routine tasks.” He also said 

Colbert “never worked in procurement,” did not “expand her 

technological capabilities,” and lacked “supervisory 

experience.” Id. But nothing in the record supports these 

statements. Colbert worked for the GPO for over 30 years. 

During that time she received numerous awards and 

commendations, including eight outstanding performance 

awards. In addition, Colbert cites extensive knowledge of 

printing procurement regulations based on work in the 

Customer Service Division and as a liaison between customer 

agencies and the procurement section. Colbert also took two 

courses in “procurement,” an 80-hour college course in offset 

printing, seven courses on electronic publishing, and eleven 

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computer courses related to her work at GPO (including two 

courses in procurement)—all of this, in addition to her formal 

work training and over ten years supervisory experience at 

GPO. 

The record also does not provide “abundant and 

uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination 

had occurred.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. “Where an employer 

has a strong record of equal opportunity employment, any 

inference of discrimination arising from the discrediting of the 

employer’s explanation may be a weak one, and in some 

cases not strong enough to let a reasonable factfinder 

conclude that discrimination has occurred at all.” Aka, 156 

F.3d at 1291. As an example, in Aka, we described “a 

situation in which the hiring officer, as well as 40% of the 

employer’s work force, were members of the same minority 

group as the plaintiff even though the group in question 

comprised only 10% of the relevant labor market.” Id. By 

comparison, the GPO admits that since 1994 white employees 

have exclusively filled the Print Officer and Printing Services 

Specialist positions, save one. And that single minority 

employee received her position through the settlement of her 

own race discrimination complaint. 

The district court, relying on Adeyemi v. District of 

Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2008), found 

“[n]othing Ms. Colbert offers . . . sufficient to show that she 

was ‘significantly better qualified’ than Mr. Benjamin or Mr. 

Milans.” Colbert, 677 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (D.D.C. 2010). 

Adeyemi held, “when an employer says it made a hiring or 

promotion decision based on the relative qualifications of the 

candidates, a plaintiff can directly challenge that 

qualifications-based explanation only if the plaintiff was 

‘significantly better qualified for the job’ than those 

ultimately chosen. . . . The qualifications gap must be great 

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enough to be inherently indicative of discrimination.” 525 

F.3d at 1227. But Adeyemi is not controlling here because 

Colbert is not using her comparative qualifications to prove 

discrimination. Rather, Colbert uses her qualifications to 

show this is not the exceptional case in which the record 

“conclusively revealed some other, nondiscriminatory 

reason.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148. 

III 

Summary judgment is inappropriate if Colbert can 

produce sufficient evidence that the GPO’s nondiscriminatory reason for passing her over—that other 

candidates were more qualified—is pretext for discrimination. 

The district court held Colbert did not do so. But the district 

court erred by requiring Colbert to show not only that the 

GPO’s nondiscriminatory reason was pretext, but also that 

discrimination was the actual reason Colbert was passed over. 

We do not suggest merely showing the employer’s 

explanation to be false would be sufficient. However, given 

Hammond’s lie, his apparent lack of knowledge about 

Colbert’s actual experience or training, and other evidence 

that the hiring and promotion practices of CPS were generally 

inhospitable to minorities, additional evidence of 

discrimination was not necessary for Colbert to defeat 

summary judgment. Aka, 156 F.3d at 1292. 

So ordered. 

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KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

Although I concur, I write separately because I do not agree

with my colleagues’ articulation of the nature of the plaintiff’s

burden at the summary judgment stage of a Title VII

discrimination claim. We all rely on the following language of

Brady:

[I]n considering an employer’s motion for summary

judgment or judgment as a matter of law in those

circumstances, the district court must resolve one

central question: Has the employee produced sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the

employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not

the actual reason and that the employer intentionally

discriminated against the employee on the basis of

race, color, religion, sex, or national origin? 

Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C.

Cir. 2008) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

510, 511 (1993); U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983)) (emphasis added). My colleagues,

however, fault the district court for “requiring Colbert to not

only proffer evidence that the GPO’s nondiscriminatory reason

was pretext, but also additional evidence that discrimination was

the actual reason Colbert was not promoted.” Maj. op. at 4

(citing Colbert v. Tapella, 677 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (D.D.C.

2010) .1

 As Brady makes clear, providing a false reason for the

*

Echoing Supreme Court precedent and our own, the district court

in fact stated: “[A] plaintiff must show ‘both that the reason was false,

and that discrimination was the real reason.’ ” Colbert, 677 F. Supp.

2d at 295 (quoting St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515)

(first emphasis added). The difference in language between the

majority’s and the district court’s phrasing, however, is insignificant

as the usual means to show something for the purpose of summary

judgment is to “proffer evidence” of it. See Hendricks v. Geithner,

568 F.3d 1008, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“To prove her discrimination

claim, [the plaintiff] would . . . have to offer evidence supporting an

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employment decision is not conclusive of pretext or of

discrimination. In the end, the employee bears the burden of

showing not that the employer is dishonest but that it engaged in

unlawful discrimination against the employee. See Hicks, 509

U.S. at 511 (“Court of Appeals’ holding that rejection of the

defendant’s proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff

disregards the fundamental principle of [Fed. R. Evid.] 301 that

a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores

our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times

bears the ultimate burden of persuasion.” (quotation omitted)).

Thus, “ ‘there will be instances where . . . the plaintiff has . . .

set forth sufficient evidence to reject the defendant's

explanation, [yet] no rational factfinder could conclude that the

action was discriminatory.’ ” Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d

944, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000) (alterations in

Mukasey)). This principle is illustrated by our decision in

Hendricks v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1008, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

In Hendricks, we affirmed the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the defendant because the plaintiff, who

had been passed over for promotion, “offered no evidence

sufficient for a jury to conclude that [she] was not selected on

the basis of her sex.” 156 F.3d at 1291. We observed that “a

Title VII discrimination plaintiff cannot prevail by presenting

evidence that tends to show the employer’s proffered reason is

pretextual but also demonstrates that the real explanation for the

employer’s behavior is not discrimination, but some other

motivation.” Id. at 1013-14. We concluded that the employee’s

“attempted rebuttal of the proffered reason” there (that she was

more qualified than the employee selected for promotion) “at

best” fell in the category of “demonstrat[ing] that the real

inference that, absent discrimination, she would have been picked for

the job.”).

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explanation for the employer’s behavior is not discrimination,

but some other motivation.” Her evidence, we explained,

“support[ed] at most favoritism, not sex discrimination,”

“suggest[ing] at worst that [the employer] acted for idiosyncratic

reasons, not discriminatory ones.” Id. at 1014. In other words,

the reason proffered by the employer may have been false—but

the evidence did not demonstrate it shielded a discriminatory

motive. 

In this case, by contrast, Colbert met her burden under both

prongs of the Brady standard. The record, viewed in the light

most favorable to Colbert, could support a finding that the both

reasons proffered for passing her over—that she “wandered” and

that she did not meet the specific requirements for

promotion—were indeed pretextual and that her employer in

fact unlawfully discriminated against her. See maj. op. at 6-7. 

Accordingly, I concur.

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