Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03162/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03162-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jacqueline Brown
Appellant
Jeremy Brown
Not Party
Cook County, Illinois
Appellee
Thomas J. Dart
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued May 26, 2016

Decided August 02, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3162

JEREMY BROWN,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS J. DART, Sheriff, in his 

official capacity, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of 

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14-cv-00175

John J. Tharp, Jr.,

Judge.

APPEAL OF: Jacqueline Brown,

Third-Party Petitioner.

O R D E R

Plaintiff Jeremy Brown, a correctional officer, filed a civil rights lawsuit against 

his employers, the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois, over adverse 

employment actions that he alleges were based on race. Defendants answered that the 

actions were taken as a result of a domestic battery that Jeremy committed against his 

wife, Jacqueline Brown. Jacqueline appeals the order compelling her deposition 

testimony about the incident. Because Jacqueline is a non-party to Jeremy’s lawsuit and 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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she is appealing an order compelling her testimony, we may consider her appeal under 

the collateral order doctrine. Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1125 (7th 

Cir. 1997). For the following reasons, we affirm the district court’s order denying her 

motion to quash the deposition subpoena.

I. Background

Both Jeremy and Jacqueline are correctional officers employed by the Sheriff of 

Cook County. On March 1, 2012, Jeremy allegedly choked Jacqueline, headbutted her, 

broke her nose, and then fled the scene. Jacqueline reported the incident to Chicago 

police officers, who investigated and filed a report that Jacqueline was the victim of a 

domestic battery by her husband. Jacqueline, however, refused to file a complaint, 

refused a protective order, and refused to acknowledge that she was a victim of 

domestic violence. Jeremy was neither arrested nor charged.

The police reported the incident to the Cook County Sheriff’s Office of 

Professional Review (OPR). The Sheriff’s Office de-deputized Jeremy, placed him on 

leave, ordered him to complete a fitness-for-duty examination, opened an OPR 

investigation, and reassigned him to a different division when he returned to work. 

Jacqueline told the OPR investigators that it had all been a big misunderstanding.

Jeremy filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 against the 

Sheriff and Cook County, claiming that the adverse employment actions were racially 

motivated. During discovery, defendants subpoenaed Jacqueline to testify about the 

alleged domestic violence incident. She moved to quash the subpoena on the grounds 

that her testimony was protected by the adverse spousal testimonial privilege. The 

magistrate judge to whom discovery was referred denied her motion to quash. 

Jacqueline objected to the ruling, and the district court overruled her objection. She 

appeals.

II. Discussion

We review de novo the purely legal question of a privilege’s scope. United States 

v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 492 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2007). We review all findings of fact and 

the application of the law to those facts in connection with a district court’s ruling on a 

claim of privilege for clear error. Id.

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No. 15-3162 Page 3

“There are two distinct marital evidentiary privileges under federal law: [1] the 

marital communications privilege and [2] the adverse spousal testimonial privilege.” 

United States v. Brock, 724 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 2013). The more commonly known 

marital communications privilege is available in civil and criminal cases and either 

spouse can invoke the privilege, but it applies only to communications made in 

confidence. Id. It is akin to the priest-penitent or doctor-patient privilege. This case is 

not about the marital communications privilege. Instead, this case is about the adverse 

spousal testimonial privilege.

The adverse spousal testimonial privilege may be available in criminal cases 

when a spouse’s testimony would be adverse to the non-testifying party spouse. The 

justification for the privilege is that it protects marital harmony, which is a good not 

only for the husband, wife, and children, but for society as well. Hawkins v. United 

States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). It used to be that the privilege could be invoked by either 

spouse, so that the non-testifying spouse could block the voluntary testimony of the 

other. Id. at 78–79. In Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960), the Supreme Court 

announced an exception to the privilege for cases in which one spouse has committed a 

crime against the other. Now, the victim spouse cannot be prevented from testifying, 

and can even be compelled. Id. at 527–30. The Supreme Court further limited the 

privilege in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), so that now only the testifying 

spouse can invoke the privilege. Id. at 53.

The district court declined to extend the privilege to Jacqueline for several 

reasons, the primary reason being that the privilege is limited to criminal cases because 

it applies only “where life or liberty is at stake.” Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 77. Jacqueline 

argues that this was legal error and frames the issue of whether the privilege is limited 

to criminal cases as one of first impression. She argues that the Seventh Circuit has not 

made a “square holding” on the issue. There is some truth to her contention that we 

have yet to hold definitively that the privilege is limited to criminal cases, but it does 

not help her because “it is not necessary to fully defend the civil-criminal distinction in 

order to reject the marital privilege” in a civil case. Ryan v. C.I.R., 568 F.2d 531, 544 (7th 

Cir. 1977). For we have held that even if the privilege were available in civil cases, “the 

privilege should be limited to instances in which it makes the most sense, where a 

spouse who is neither a victim nor a participant observes evidence of the other spouse’s 

crime.” Id. (adhering to United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393, 1397 (7th Cir. 1974)).

Here, Jacqueline is the victim of her husband’s alleged domestic battery, so the 

privilege is unavailable. In fact, the district court relied on this point as an alternative 

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basis for denying Jacqueline the privilege: “according to the officers who responded to 

the March 2012 domestic dispute, it appears that Mrs. Brown was the victim of 

plaintiff’s alleged conduct. Hence, the privilege would likely be unavailable to her in 

any event, notwithstanding the existence of a distinction between civil and criminal 

cases.” Dist. Ct. Order at 4 (Sept. 16, 2015). 

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Jacqueline Brown’s 

Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoena. 

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