Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10260/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Terance Taylor Prigge
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERANCE TAYLOR PRIGGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10260

D.C. No.

2:13-cr-01363-GMS-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

G. Murray Snow, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 21, 2016*

San Francisco, California

Filed July 29, 2016

Before: Susan P. Graber and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit

Judges, and Jed S. Rakoff,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Tallman

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE

SUMMARY***

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction in a case in which the

defendant alleged two errors: (1) the district court’s failure in

advance of trial to preclude the government from impeaching

the defendant with his fourteen-year-old prior conviction if he

testified; and (2) the district court’s refusal to sever three

counts from the five-count indictment.

The panel held that the holding in Luce v. United States,

469 U.S. 38 (1984) (in order to raise and preserve for review

a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, a

defendant must testify), applies to in limine rulings under

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) – that is, in order to appeal a Rule

404(b) pretrial ruling, the evidence subject to that ruling must

be presented at trial. The panel held that because the

defendant did not testify, his first assignment of error is

unreviewable.

The panel held that the district court did not err in

denying the defendant’s motion to sever counts because the

defendant cannot show prejudice from the joinder.

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE 3

COUNSEL

Robert J. McWhirter, ASU Alumni Law Group, Phoenix,

Arizona, for Defendant-Appellant.

Alexander W. Samuels, Assistant United States Attorney;

Krissa M. Lanham, Deputy Appellate Chief; John S.

Leonardo, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, Phoenix, Arizona; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Terance Taylor Prigge appeals his conviction by jury trial

for various drug trafficking and money laundering offenses. 

Prigge asks that we reverse his conviction because of two

alleged errors: (1) the district court’s failure in advance of

trial to preclude the government from impeaching Prigge with

his fourteen-year-old prior conviction if he testified; and

(2) the district court’s refusal to sever three counts from the

five-count indictment. We hold that Prigge’s first assignment

of error is unreviewable on appeal because he did not testify

and that the district court did not err in denying Prigge’s

motion to sever counts because Prigge cannot show prejudice

from joinder. We affirm.

I

The evidence at trial showed that Prigge engaged in a

multi-year effort, involving his co-defendant, Matthew

Gruender, prosecution witness Shane Grafman, and others, to

move large quantities of Central American cocaine to

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4 UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE

Chicago by a common modus operandi—chartering private

planes to land at outlying suburban airports to evade close

law enforcement scrutiny. Although various players entered

and exited the conspiracy during this period, the goals and

methods of the conspiracy remained the same. The operative

indictment charged Prigge with five counts, spanning conduct

from April 2010 to September 2013. While some counts in

the indictment focused on Prigge’s operations in 2013 with

Gruender, other counts focused more on his 2010 conduct

with Grafman. Count One, however, charged Prigge with an

overarching Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute

throughout this time period, including his deals with

Gruender and other individuals such as Grafman. Prigge did

not testify at trial and was ultimately convicted of all five

counts charged in the indictment.

II

Because he did not testify, Prigge did not preserve his

claim that the district court erred in failing to preclude

evidence of his prior conviction. Before trial the government

informed the court that, if Prigge testified, it might seek to

use Prigge’s prior felony conviction1on cross-examination or

rebuttal. Importantly, the government sought to introduce

Prigge’s prior conviction under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b), which allows evidence of prior acts for non-character

purposes.2 Prigge responded by moving in limine to preclude

1 Prigge’s prior conviction was for a state drug-trafficking offense. 

Prigge served approximately seven years for that conviction and was

released in 2001.

2 The government stated, however, that it would use Prigge’s prior

conviction only if Prigge took the stand and denied knowledge or intent.

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UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE 5

the use of his prior conviction for any purpose because of its

age. The district court declined to make the in limine ruling

in a vacuum, and instead reserved the issue for trial, where it

would have more context on which to rely in making an

evidentiary ruling. Below and on appeal, Prigge does not

argue that admission of his prior conviction would be

improper under Rule 404(b), but rather that the timing

requirements and balancing test from Federal Rule of

Evidence 609(b) apply to any conviction introduced under

Rule 404(b) that is more than ten years old. We decline to

reach this argument and instead hold that Prigge’s claim is

barred on appeal by Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38

(1984).3

The Supreme Court held in Luce that, “to raise and

preserve for review the claim of improper impeachment with

a prior conviction, a defendant must testify.” Id. at 43. In

Luce, the defendant sought to preclude the government from

using his prior conviction for impeachment purposes under

Rule 609(a), and the district court held that the government

could introduce the conviction if the defendant testified in a

certain way. Id. at 39–40. The defendant in Luce chose not

to testify. Id. at 40. On appeal, the Supreme Court held it

3 We note that Prigge is confused about the relationship between Rule

404(b) and Rule 609(b). The onerous standards for admission under Rule

609(b) do not apply to convictions admitted for a non-character purpose

under Rule 404(b). See United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067,

1075 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[E]vidence admitted under Rule 404(b) is not

controlled by the ten-year limit specified in Rule 609(b), which applies to

the quite different matter of admitting evidence of prior convictions to

impeach a witness.”); see also United States v. Spillone, 879 F.2d 514, 519

(9th Cir. 1989) (declining to “adopt an inflexible rule excluding evidence

of prior bad acts [under Rule 404(b)] after a certain amount of time

elapses”).

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6 UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE

could not review the impeachment issue. Id. at 43. The Luce

Court gave two primary reasons for its holding. First, trial

courts cannot be expected to rule in a vacuum and often must

have the full context of trial testimony to balance the

prejudice and probative value of the evidence offered. Id. at

41–42. And, second, any harm from the in limine ruling was

“wholly speculative” because the government might have

decided not to use the conviction or the court might have

altered its tentative ruling at trial after hearing the defendant’s

testimony. Id. The Court also explained that harmless error

review is impractical in this situation because, first, there is

no way to know whether the defendant’s decision not to

testify was based on the district court’s in limine ruling and,

second, the reviewing court cannot, in the absence of greater

context, assess the impact of any alleged harm to the

defendant. Id. at 42–43.

A narrow reading of Luce, as urged by Prigge and two

concurring Justices in Luce, suggests that it bars only appeals

based on Rule 609(a). See id. at 43–44 (Brennan, J.,

concurring). But that narrow reading has since been rejected

by our court and others. For example, we have already

extended Luce to in limine rulings under Rule 403. United

States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1990).4

Although we have never explicitly extended Luce to the Rule

4 The facts of Johnson are illustrative. In Johnson, the district court

ruled in limine that, if the defendant testified, the government would be

allowed to ask him to try on some clothing because, under Rule 403, the

probative value of that clothing demonstration outweighed any danger of

unfair prejudice. 903 F.2d at 1221–22. The Johnson defendant chose not

to testify, but then attempted to appeal the district court’s ruling. Id. We

refused to review the issue, citing Luce and holding that we could only

speculate as to the prejudicial effect ofthe clothing demonstration because

the defendant did not actually testify and try on the clothes. Id. at 1222.

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UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE 7

404(b) context, other circuits have uniformly held that Luce

applies to pretrial 404(b) decisions. United States v. Hall,

312 F.3d 1250, 1255–58 (11th Cir. 2002); United States v.

Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 905–06 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.

Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259, 1270 (8th Cir. 1985).

We join our sister circuits in holding explicitly that Luce

applies to in limine rulings under 404(b). That is, in order to

appeal a Rule 404(b) pretrial ruling, the evidence subject to

that ruling must be presented at trial. See Ortiz, 857 F.2d at

906 (“The proper method to preserve a claim of error in

similar circumstances is to take the position that leads to the

admission of the adverse evidence, in order to bring a fully

developed record to this [c]ourt.”). Extending Luce to this

situation makes sense, as the two rationales underlying Luce

apply equally in the 404(b) context. First, the district court

often needs the context of the trial to evaluate the probative

value and prejudice of Rule 404(b) evidence and to ensure it

is being used for a purpose authorized by the rule. Second,

the party seeking to introduce other act evidence under Rule

404(b) may always decide not to do so at trial, or the court

may change its mind, so any harm is speculative unless the

evidence is admitted. Here, Prigge’s prior conviction was

never introduced at trial because he chose not to testify. 

Thus, we hold that Luce bars his claim on appeal.

III

We also affirm the district court’s denial of Prigge’s

motion to sever counts because Prigge has failed to show any

prejudice from joinder. The government charged Prigge with

five counts, spanning conduct from April 2010 to September

2013. Prigge argues that the district court erred under Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure 8(a) and 14 by allowing Counts

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8 UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE

Two, Four, and Five to be joined with Counts One and Three. 

According to Prigge, Counts One and Three involve his

dealings in 2013 with co-defendant Matthew Gruender (what

Prigge terms the “Gruender/Prigge Conspiracy”), while

Counts Two, Four, and Five involve his conduct in 2010 with

other individuals, including prosecution witness Shane

Grafman (which Prigge terms the “Grafman Conspiracy”). 

Assuming that Prigge preserved an objection under both Rule

8(a) and Rule 14,5

 we reject his claims for lack of prejudice.

Counts are properly joined under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 8(a) if they “are of the same or similar

character, or are based on the same act or transaction, or are

connected or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” 

Reversal for improper joinder under Rule 8(a) is appropriate

only if the defendant can show actual prejudice. United

States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 932 (9th Cir. 2001). Even

if counts are correctly joined initially under Rule 8(a), the

district court may still sever the counts under Rule 14 if

joinder is “manifestly prejudicial.” United States v. Johnson,

820 F.2d 1065, 1070 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States

v. Seifert, 648 F.2d 557, 563 (9th Cir. 1980)). Thus, although

claims under Rule 8(a) and Rule 14 present different

questions, it is clear that there is no error under either rule if

joinder was not prejudicial. Joinder is not prejudicial where

5 Defendants must separately preserve Rule 8(a) objections to joinder

and Rule 14 severance motions. See United States v. Smith, 795 F.2d 841,

850 (9th Cir. 1986). Here, Prigge moved to sever Count Four before trial,

and he renewed his motion during trial, asking the district court to sever

Counts Two, Four, and Five. It appears both motions were more focused

on improper joinder under Rule 8(a), but because Prigge also discussed

prejudice (which is relevant to a Rule 14 inquiry), and because the

government has not argued waiver, we address his arguments under both

Rule 8(a) and Rule 14.

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UNITED STATES V. PRIGGE 9

“all of the evidence of the separate count would [still] be

admissible upon severance.” Id. We review misjoinder

under Rule 8(a) de novo and refusal to sever under Rule 14

for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jawara, 474 F.3d

565, 572 (9th Cir. 2007); Smith, 795 F.2d at 850.

We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to

sever Counts Two, Four, and Five because Prigge has failed

to show any prejudice from their inclusion at trial. Prigge

argues that these counts improperly focus on his 2013

conduct, but he failed to argue that Count One should be

severed and Count One covers his conduct in both 2010 and

2013. Although Counts Two and Five have little to do with

co-defendant Matthew Gruender, any evidence relevant to

those counts would also have been admissible under Count

One. In other words, even if the court had granted Prigge’s

motion for severance, the trial would have looked the

same—the allegedly prejudicial testimony of prosecution

witness Shane Grafman would have been admissible to prove

up Count One. Thus, we reject Prigge’s severance and

joinder arguments under Rule 8(a) and Rule 14 because he

cannot show prejudice.

IV

In an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, we join

our sister circuits in holding that Luce extends to in limine

rulings under Rule 404(b), and therefore bars our

consideration of Prigge’s first issue on appeal. We affirm the

district court’s rejection of Prigge’s severance motion

because he cannot show prejudice from the joinder of Counts

Two, Four, and Five. Prigge’s conviction is therefore

AFFIRMED.

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