Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03931/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-03931-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Rhondee L. Mullins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RHONDEE L. MULLINS,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-05-3931 JCS

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT, GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S CROSS-MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

AFFIRMING DECISION OF

COMMISSIONER [Docket Nos. 12, 13]

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, Rhondee Mullins, filed a complaint on September 28, 2005, seeking review of the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for

disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. In her summary judgment motion,

Plaintiff asks the Court to reverse the Commissioner’s decision and award benefits, or, in the

alternative, for an order remanding the matter for further administrative proceedings. The

Commissioner, in turn, has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking an order affirming

its final decision. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

For the reasons stated below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion, grants the Commissioner’s

motion, and affirms the decision of the Commissioner.

//

//

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

1. Age, Education and Work Experience

Plaintiff was born November 18, 1962, and was 40 years old on her alleged onset date of

May 24, 2003. Administrative Record (“AR”) at 53. She completed tenth grade in 1979. AR at 67.

Sometime later she obtained a high school equivalency degree (“GED”). AR at 246. Between 1994

and 1997, Plaintiff worked full-time as an office manager in a law office. AR at 63. In 1997 and

1998, she worked full-time as a legal technician. AR at 63. Beginning in 1999, Plaintiff began to

work as a court clerk. AR at 63. In 2001, she had a “physical and mental breakdown” and took

some time off from her job, then returned to work part-time. AR at 251. Plaintiff worked part-time

as a court clerk until May 24, 2003, the alleged onset date of disability. AR at 252, 

On August 21, 2004, and continuing through the date of the hearing, Plaintiff resumed

working part-time for the court. AR 257-259. At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge

(“ALJ”), Plaintiff explained that when her family leave was almost exhausted, her employer called

her to ask what it would take to get her to come back to work. AR at 257. Plaintiff told her

employer that she “just didn’t feel that [she] could work out in the public and down – with all the

stress down at the courthouse but I could possibly do telecommuting.” AR at 257. In response,

Plaintiff’s employer arranged for Plaintiff to pick her work up at the courthouse four days a week

and bring it home. AR at 257. Plaintiff explained that she picked up work one day and brought the

completed work back the next day. AR at 258.

2. Medical Condition and Treatment

Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled on the basis of the following diagnosed conditions:

1) bipolar II disorder; 2) post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”); 3) attention deficit hyperactivity

disorder (“ADHD”); and 4) chronic pain disorder. The evidence in the record relating to these

conditions is summarized below.

a. Dr. Zena Potash (Treating Psychiatrist as of September 2002)

Dr. Potash began treating Plaintiff in September 2002, seeing Plaintiff on a monthly basis for

medication management. AR at 100. In a Mental Disorder Questionnaire Form dated August 27,

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2003, Dr. Potash stated that she had treated Plaintiff as an outpatient for bipolar disorder II for

eleven years. AR at 100. She described Plaintiff as having suffered from “rapidly cycling moods

for years.” AR at 100. In particular, Plaintiff cycles between “hypomanic irritable” moods that “last

weeks” and “depressed moods” that last for months. AR at 100. According to Dr. Potash, Plaintiff

had been seeing the same therapist, Sharlene Speights, for five years. AR at 100. Dr. Potash stated

that during the year that she had been treating Plaintiff, Plaintiff had always been cooperative and

compliant. AR at 100. At the same time, Dr. Potash stated that Plaintiff “always appear[ed] agitated

either by overwhelming depression or irritability and a sense of urgency of needing some mental

relief.” AR at 102. Dr. Potash further stated that Plaintiff “always appeared overwhelmed.” AR at

102.

With respect to Plaintiff’s ability to concentrate and complete tasks, Dr. Potash stated that

Plaintiff was “always hyper and driven wanting to do more than is probably realistic and has

somewhat of a manic quality to her grandiose ambitions.” AR at 103. She continued, “[i]t appears

that she can’t focus on tasks at home or at work.” AR at 103. Dr. Potash prescribed for Plaintiff

Tradazone, Seroquel, Buspar, Klonopin, Strattera and Zyprexa. AR at 104.

b. Dr. Diane Van Arsdale (Treating Psychologist as of August 2003)

As of August 2003, Plaintiff switched to Kaiser health insurance and began receiving mental

health treatment from Dr. Van Arsdale. Dr. Van Arsdale described Plaintiff’s childhood as

“chaotic.” Plaintiff was abandoned by her mother when she was three years old, then returned to

live with her mother when her father died, less than a year later. AR at 203. Plaintiff’s mother gave

her marijuana and Plaintiff used it daily by the time she was five years old. AR at 203. Plaintiff was

molested as a child by her half-brother and witnessed two murders. AR at 203.

Dr. Van Arsdale diagnosed Plaintiff with bipolar disorder I, ADHD, PTSD, depression and

chronic pain. AR at 205. She noted that Plaintiff’s attention and concentration were “poor to fair”

and that Plaintiff had a “poor memory.” AR at 204. Plaintiff’s treatment plan encompassed

individual therapy, ongoing medication evaluation, and group therapy for individuals with bipolar

disorder. AR at 205. Although not all of the dates on the treatment records are legible, it appears

Plaintiff saw Dr. Van Arsdale approximately once a month between August 2003 and September

2004. During this time, Dr. Van Arsdale described Plaintiff’s moods variously as “depressed” (AR

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 The Global Assessment of Functioning Scale “[c]onsider[s] psychological, social, and

occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” On the scale, a score

of 50 indicates “serious symptoms (e.g., suicidal ideation, severe obsessional rituals, frequent

shoplifting”).” A score of 51-60 indicates “moderate symptoms (e.g. flat affect and circumstantial

speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.”

A score of 61-70 is described as “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g. depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR

some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g. occasional truancy, or theft within

household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.”

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th Ed. Text Revision 2000) at 34.

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at 144), “anxious, less depressed,” (AR at 146), “depressed, sad, subdued,” (AR at 150), “subdued,

sad” (AR at 157), and on one visit, “manic euphoria” (AR at 169). 

For each visit, Dr. Van Arsdale assigned Plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning

(“GAF”) score.1

 These scores usually were in the range of 55 to 60, indicating “moderate”

functional limitations. AR at 145, 151, 158, 163, 170, 180. On one visit, on August 5, 2004, Dr.

Van Arsdal assigned a GAF of 61, indicating “mild” symptoms and limitations. AR at 147.

In a form entitled Medical Assessment of Ability to do Work-Related Activities (Mental),

dated October 13, 2004 (“the October 13, 2004 Mental Assessment”), Dr. Van Arsdale indicated that

Plaintiff’s abilities to “[d]eal with work stresses” and to “[m]aintain attention and concentration”

was in the range of “fair” to “poor to none.” AR at 207. She explained, “Ms. Mullins is a highly

emotionally fragile 41 [year old] woman who appears at times to be more stable than she actually is.

[Patient’s] depression, emotional instability, fatigue, poor concentration, poor sleep, [and] extreme

vulnerability to stress make working extremely difficult for her. [Patient] is at high risk for

emotional breakdown.” AR at 207. Later in the form, Dr. Van Arsdale wrote, “[Patient’s] poor

concentration, memory problems, and emotional instability, and fatigue will limit her ability to

adjust to a job.” AR at 208.

c. Sharlene Speights, L.M.F.T. (Psychotherapist as of July 1999)

Plaintiff began weekly sessions with therapist Sharlene Speights in July 1999. In a Mental

Disorder Questionnaire Form dated August 13, 2003, Speights states that Plaintiff uses three

calendars and has someone call her the day before and just prior to her appointments with Speights

because of Plaintiff’s “poor short term memory.” AR at 93 - 97. She describes Plaintiff as “manic,”

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 Because the copies in the Administrative Record of several of Knight’s reports are illegible,

it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s medications were increased or changed during the interim period. 

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with moods ranging from “racing thoughts [and] high energy” to “depression, anxiousness low

energy.” AR at 93. She notes that Plaintiff has “poor short term memory [and] poor concentration.” 

AR at 93. In describing Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning, Speight writes, “short term memory [is]

impaired resulting in forgetting appointments or leaving car keys out at restaurant lot. Concentration

is most difficult at [increased] anxiety times. Judgment can be impaired by mood. No formal

thought disorder.” AR at 94. She wrote that “[o]f late she has experienced a decrease in her

[adaptation] to job stresses and personal changes.” AR at 96. Speights diagnosed Plaintiff with

bipolar disorder II and PTSD. AR at 97. She described Plaintiff’s prognosis as “guarded.” AR at

97.

d. Group therapy

Between February 11, 2004 and July 21, 2004, Plaintiff attended a regular group therapy

session for individuals with bipolar disorder. AR at 148,152, 154, 155, 156159, 160.

e. Medication

When Plaintiff moved to Kaiser, in August 2003, Carolyn Knight, N.P., took on her

medication management. AR at 205. On her first visit, Knight increased Plaintiff’s dose of

Neorontin, started her on Depakote and continued her on Strattera and Ziprexa. AR at 196. On

October 21, 2003, Knight again increased Plaintiff’s dose of Neorontin and also increased her dose

of Depakote from 250 milligrams to 1000 milligrams a day. In March 2004, Knight again increased

Plaintiff’s Depakote dose and started Plaintiff on Abilify.2

 AR at 167.

f. Dr. Sharon Bass (Examining Psychologist – September 4, 2003)

On September 4, 2003, psychologist Sharon R. Bass examined Plaintiff at the request of the

state agency handling the claim, Disability Determination Services (“DDS”). Bass completed a

detailed psychological evaluation of Plaintiff. See AR at 106-109. She described Plaintiff as

follows:

Rhondee Mullins is a 40-year-old married female who presents with

symptoms of depression and anxiety and a history of cycling through

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depressed and elevated mood states. She has a severe trauma history

that includes witness to multiple murders, incest and familial domestic

violence. The claimant is of average intelligence with intact memory

and concentration, though it appears her ability to concentrate and

comprehend directions can be compromised when she is under

significant stress. Pace and persistence on tasks is unimpaired. Her

ability to adhere to a standard work routine may be moderately

diminished by her vulnerability to psychological decompensation

under stress.

AR at 109. 

g. Consulting Physicians

The Administrative Record includes recommendations by DDS physicians who reviewed

Plaintiff’s records but did not examine her. A Dr. Lucila completed a Mental Residual Functional

Capacity Assessment, dated September 17, 2003, in which he or she indicated that Plaintiff had a

“moderately limited” ability “to understand and remember detailed instructions” and to “carry our

detailed instructions.” AR at 110. Dr. Lucila indicated no other limitations, however, concluding

that Plaintiff had no significant limitations with respect to performing within a schedule, sustaining

an ordinary routine and working in coordination and proximity to others. AR at 110. In the section

in which the consulting physician was asked to elaborate on these findings, and in particular, to be

“especially careful to explain conclusions that differ from those of treating medical sources or from

the individual’s allegations” there is no written explanation. AR at 112. Instead, there is a notation

“RW Consult.” AR at 112. 

The Administrative Record also includes an opinion from another DDS physician, apparently

a Dr. Hansell, dated September 18, 2003. In the section entitled “Credibility of Claimant’s

Allegations & Symptoms,” Dr. Hansell writes: “partially credible based on hx, eval & ce/mer.” AR

at 115. The heading entitled “Conflict or Inconsistencies” was left blank, as was the section entitled

“Weighing of Opinion Evidence.” Under the heading “Recommendations, Conclusions and

Subsequent Notes,” Dr. Hansell wrote as follows:

09/18/03 PSYCH MC NOTE: PTSD 3000 CYCLOTHYMIC DO 2960

DXS AS CITED ABOVE. CLAIMANT IS COGNITIVELY INTACT

AND PSYCHOSIS [sic]. ABILITY TO MAINTAIN PACE AND

PERSISTENCE NOTED AS INTACT, AND CLAIMANT CAN

RELATE APPROPRIATELY. SHE SHOULD BE ABLE TO

PERFORM SIMPLE WORK. DVLUCI.

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 The Court presumes that the 9/03 assessment referred to by Dr. Peskin is the report of Sharon

Bass. See AR at 106-109.

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AR at 115. The form is not signed or dated.

Dr. Lucila also completed a form entitled “Psychiatric Review Technique.” AR at 120. That

form concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet any of the listings that would qualify her for

disability and that an assessment of Residual Functional Capacity is necessary. AR at 120. The

form indicated that Plaintiff suffers from “affective disorders,” “anxiety-related disorders” and

“substance addiction disorders.” AR at 120. On the page listing functional limitations, Dr. Lucila

indicated the following limitations: 1) “Restriction of Activities of Daily Living”: Mild; 2)

“Difficulties in Maintaining Social Functioning”: Mild; 3) “Difficulties in Maintaining

Concentration, Persistence or Pace”: Moderate. AR at 129.

In January 2004, another DDS doctor, Dr. Peskin, reviewed the record. AR at 133-134. The

headings entitled “Credibility of Claimant’s Allegations and Symptoms,” “Conflict or

Inconsistencies,” and “Weighing of Opinion Evidence” were left blank. AR at 134. Under the

“Recommendations, Conclusions and Subsequent Notes,” Dr. Peskin wrote as follws:

1/16/04 psych cl assessed on priro [sic] as having “cyclothmia” along

with a DA/A history but assessed in [sic] 9/03 as able to do RRT and

the ADL’s support this on this recon she says she has not seen a Dr

since that 9.03 assessment and there is no new medical evidnece [sic]

to chance the prior assessment which I have affrimed [sic].

AR at 134.3

B. The ALJ’s Five-Step Analysis and Findings of Fact

Disability insurance benefits are available under the Social Security Act when an eligible

claimant is unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a

continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.

§ 423(a)(1). A claimant is only found disabled if his physical or mental impairments are of such

severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but also “cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in

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the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). The claimant bears the burden of proof in

establishing a disability. Gomez v. Chater, 74 F.3d 967, 970 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 881

(1996).

The Commissioner has established a sequential five-part evaluation process to determine

whether a claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). At Step One,

the Commissioner considers whether the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I). If she is, the Commissioner finds that the claimant is not disabled, and

the evaluation stops. If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner

proceeds to Step Two and considers whether the claimant has “a severe medically determinable

physical or mental impairment,” or combination of such impairments, which meets the duration

requirement in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. An impairment is severe if it “significantly limits [the

claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the

claimant does not have a severe impairment, disability benefits are denied at this step. If it is

determined that the impairments are severe, the Commissioner will next perform Step Three of the

analysis, comparing the medical severity of the claimant’s impairments to a compiled listing of

impairments that the Commissioner has ratified as disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If one

or a combination of the claimant’s impairments meet or equal a listed impairment, the claimant is

found to be disabled. Otherwise, the Commissioner proceeds to Step Four and considers whether the

claimant, in light of his impairments and residual functional capacity (“RFC”), can still perform

work she has performed in the past. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant can still

perform previous work, she is found not to be disabled. If the claimant cannot perform past relevant

work, the Commissioner performs the fifth and final step of the analysis. 20 C.F.R. §

404.1520(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant, in

light of her impairments, age, education, and work experience, can adjust to other work in the

national economy. See Distasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d 348, 349 (9th Cir. 1995). A claimant who is

found able to make the adjustment to other work is not considered disabled, and will not receive

disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).

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 In her Motion, Plaintiff does not challenge this determination.

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On October 27, 2004, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Earl J.

Waits. Vocational Expert Gerald Belchik appeared and submitted a Summary of Past Relevant

Work indicating that Plaintiff’s past work was considered “skilled,” with a “sedentary exertional

level.” AR at 91. Belchik did not testify at the hearing. AR at 243-261.

At Step One, the ALJ in this case found that Plaintiff went back to work on August 20, 2004,

and therefore did not satisfy Step One for the period after that date.4

 AR at 19. The ALJ proceeded

to step Two for the period May 24, 2003 (the onset date) through August 19, 2004, during which

Plaintiff did not engage in any substantial gainful activity. AR at 19.

At Step Two, he found that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety and bipolar disorder-depression. 

AR at 19. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s combination of impairments was “severe.” AR at 19.

At Step Three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or equal any listed

impairment which is considered conclusively disabling. AR at 19.

At Step Four, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s RFC. He concluded that for the period May 24,

2003 through August 19, 2004, Plaintiff’s RFC was “at the sedentary exertional level with no other

physical limitations.” AR at 23. He further concluded that Plaintiff’s mental impairments during the

same period resulted in “mild limitations in activities of daily living; mild difficulties in maintaining

social functioning and moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace.” AR

at 23. Based on these limitations, he concluded that Plaintiff was capable of unskilled, entry level

work. AR at 23. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s medical history. He

gave “little weight to the findings of claimant’s treating physicians because their assessments, or

lack of, were conclusory and based primarily on subjective complaints.” AR at 22. He specifically

rejected the October 13, 2004 Mental Assessment of Dr. Van Arsdale on the basis that it was

inconsistent with the fact that Plaintiff had recently returned to work and was, at the time of the

assessment, doing “rather skilled work.” AR at 22. According to the ALJ, the fact that Plaintiff was

able to pick up her work, pace herself and return her work contradicted Van Arsdale’s assesment. 

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AR at 22. On the other hand, the ALJ gave “controlling weight” to the opinions of Dr. Bass and the

DDS medical consultants. AR at 23.

At Step Five, the ALJ relied on Medical-Vocational Rule 201.25, Appendix 2, Subpart P,

Regulation No. 4 (“the Grids”) to conclude that Plaintiff was not disabled. AR at 26.

C. The Motions

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in denying benefits on two grounds. First, she asserts that

at Step Four, the ALJ improperly weighed the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians, especially

Dr. Van Arsdale, choosing to reject the opinions of her treating physicians in favor of the opinion of

examining psychologist Sharon Bass without providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence. Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s reliance on the Grids at Step Five of

the analysis to show that there are jobs in significant number in the national economy that Plaintiff

can perform was incorrect. In particular, Plaintiff asserts that reliance on the Grids in cases

involving exertional and nonexertional impairments is not proper unless the Grids accurately and

completely describe the claimant’s abilities and limitations. Because the Grids do not take into

account Plaintiff’s impairment as to her ability to maintain concentration, persistence and pace,

Plaintiff asserts, the ALJ has not met his burden at Step Five.

In its Opposition/Cross Motion, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Van

Arsdale’s opinion, as well as the opinions of her treating physicians in general, was supported by

substantial evidence. In support of the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Van Arsdale’s opinion, the

Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s offered a legitimate reason for rejecting it, namely, that at the

time Dr. Van Arsdale expressed the opinion that Plaintiff ‘s “ability to deal with work stresses” was

in the range of “fair” to “poor to none,” Plaintiff had already returned to work and was performing

fairly skilled work. The Commissioner also asserts that ALJ properly rejected the opinions of

Plaintiff’s treating physicians generally on the basis that that were conclusory and based only on

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s reliance on the Grids

was proper because Plaintiff’s mental condition only limited her to performing unskilled work. 

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

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When reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, the Court takes as conclusive any findings of

the Commissioner which are free from legal error and “supported by substantial evidence.” 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Substantial

evidence means “more than a mere scintilla” but “less than a preponderance.” Id.; Desrosiers v.

Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Even if the Commissioner’s 

findings are supported by substantial evidence, they should be set aside if proper legal standards

were not applied when using the evidence to reach a decision. Benitez. v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653,

655 (9th Cir. 1978). In reviewing the record, the Court must consider both the evidence that

supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279

(9th Cir. 1996). 

B. Rejection of Treating Physician Opinions

In developing the RFC at Step Four, the ALJ must consider limitations imposed by all of the

claimant’s impairments, even those that are not severe. SSR 96-8p; see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400

F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). Although the ALJ may consider many sources, the opinion of a

treating physician normally is given special weight. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.

1996). If the ALJ decides to disregard the treating physician’s opinions, he “must make findings

setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on substantial evidence in the

record.” Murray v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 1983). The Court concludes that the ALJ

provided specific, legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, in rejecting the opinions of

Dr. Van Arsdale.

Dr. Van Arsdale is a psychiatrist who, at the time she completed the October 13, 2004

Mental Assessment, had been treating Plaintiff on a regular basis for over a year. She expressed the

opinion that Plaintiff’s ability to “[d]eal with work stresses” was somewhere between “fair” and

“poor to none.” AR at 207. She concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to “maintain attention and

concentration” was in the same range. AR at 207. The ALJ rejected these opinions as “inconsistent

and not well supported by the evidence of record.” AR at 22. In support of this position, the ALJ

relied primarily on the fact Plaintiff had returned to work in August 2004 – two months before Dr.

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 Indeed, it is not clear from the record that the other treating physicians’ opinions are

inconsistent with the degree of impairment found by the ALJ.

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Van Arsdale opined that Plaintiff was unable to deal with workplace stresses – and performed

“rather skilled work” for the court. The ALJ also found the opinion’s of Plaintiff’s treating

physicians to be “conclusory.” Id. 

On the other hand, the ALJ gave “controlling weight” to the opinion of Dr. Bass. AR at 23. 

Dr. Bass opined that although Plaintiff’s “ability to concentrate and comprehend directions can be

compromised when she is under significant stress” her “[p]ace and persistence on tasks is

unimpaired.” AR at 109. She concluded that Plaintiff’s “ability to adhere to a standard work

routine” would be only “moderately diminished by her vulnerability to psychological

decompensation under stress.” Id.

The Court finds the reasons given by the ALJ for rejecting Dr. VanArsdale’s opinion to be

specific and legitimate. First, at the time that Dr. Van Arsdale expressed the opinion that Plaintiff

had virtually no ability to handle workplace stress, she was already back at work. It was therefore

reasonable for the ALJ to question whether Plaintiff suffered from the degree of impairment

described by Dr. Van Arsdale. Second, the opinion of Dr. Bass is based on extensive testing,

whereas Dr. Van Arsdale’s opinions are much more conclusory. For the same reasons, the ALJ’s

decision to reject the other treating physicians’ opinions was based on a legitimate reason.5

Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ’s decision to reject the treating physicians’ opinions is

supported by substantial evidence.

C. Use of the Grids at Step Five

Under some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the ALJ to rely on the Grids to

determine at Step Five whether there are “other jobs that exist in substantial numbers in the national

economy” that the claimant can perform. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir.

2001). In particular, the ALJ may rely on the Grids if they “accurately and completely describe a

claimant’s impairments.” Id. 

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Here, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform unskilled work. The mental demands

of unskilled work include:

the abilities (on a sustained basis) to understand, carry out, and

remember simple instructions; to respond appropriately to supervision,

coworkers, and usual work situations; and to deal with changes in a

routine work setting.

SR 85-15. The Court finds that this determination was supported by substantial evidence. 

Accordingly, the ALJ did not err in relying on the Grids to determine that Plaintiff was not disabled.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED. Defendant’s motion is GRANTED. The decision of the

Commissioner is affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 14, 2006

___________________________ JOSEPH C. SPERO

United States Magistrate Judge

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