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Parties Involved:
Alexander Serrano
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 3, 2010

Decided March 9, 2010

Before

                     JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐3758

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ALEXANDER SERRANO,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 1:06‐cr‐00521

Blanche M. Manning,

Judge.

O R D E R

Alexander Serrano sold drugs to an informant who approached him wanting to buy

crack cocaine.  He pleaded guilty to a single count of distributing a controlled substance, 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), but reserved the right to argue at sentencing that the substance, although

cocaine, was not crack.  The sentencing court found that it was crack and, because it

weighed at least 50 grams, imposed the 10‐year statutory minimum, see id.

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).

Serrano filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyers have concluded that the

case is frivolous and move to withdraw.  See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

Serrano opposes counsel’s motion.  See CIR. R. 51(b).  We limit our review to the potential

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 08‐3758 Page 2

issues addressed in counsel’s facially adequate brief and in Serrano’s response.  See United

States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

The district court concluded, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the cocaine

Serrano sold was crack, not powder or some other form of cocaine base.  The testimony of

two forensic chemists supports that finding.  The government also called FBI special agent

Michael Culloton, who opined that recordings of conversations Serrano had with the

informant and others established that he “cooked” powder cocaine into crack for the

informant.  Because the district court found that the substance was crack, the guidelines

provided for a base offense level of 30.  U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(5).  After a 3‐level credit for

acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, the imprisonment range would have been 78 to 97

months if not for the statutory minimum.

Serrano has told appellate counsel that he does not want his guilty plea vacated, and

so counsel appropriately refrain from discussing the adequacy of the plea colloquy or the

voluntariness of the plea.  See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670‐72 (7th Cir. 2002).  That

leaves only the sentence.  In their Anders submission, counsel first consider whether Serrano

could argue that the district court erroneously admitted Agent Culloton’s testimony and

whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the substance he distributed was crack.

We agree that these contentions would be frivolous.  We have held that drug type may be

proved through testimony from people familiar with the drug, including law enforcement

officers.  E.g., United States v. Padilla, 520 F.3d 766, 771 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Linton,

235 F.3d 328, 329‐30 (7th Cir. 2000).  And the testimony of two forensic chemists and a

veteran FBI agent are more than enough to support the court’s finding that Serrano

distributed crack to the informant.  See United States v. Wilborn, 576 F.3d 676, 678‐80 (7th Cir.

2009); United States v. Lake, 500 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Buchanan, 362

F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2004); see also United States v. Dumes, 313 F.3d 372, 384 (7th Cir. 2002)

(holding that sentencing court did not commit clear error in finding that substance was

crack in view of recorded conversations referring to “cooking” cocaine).

Counsel also consider arguing that the district court should have concluded that the

different statutory minimums for equal weights of crack and powder cocaine are

unconstitutional given the degree of difference and the perceived disproportionate impact

on black defendants.  But we have rejected this argument repeatedly, see United States v.

Trice, 484 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Blanding, 53 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir.

1995); United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 917, 918‐19 (7th Cir. 1993), and thus counsel are

correct to characterize the argument as frivolous.  And because Serrano’s constitutional

argument would be frivolous, so too would be his contention that the district court should

have imposed a sentence below the statutory minimum.  Even if the court had wanted to

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impose a sentence below the statutory minimum, sentencing courts have no authority to

disregard statutory minimums.  Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108 (2007); United

States v. Douglas, 569 F.3d 635, 636 (7th Cir. 2009).

In his Rule 51(b) response, Serrano echoes the potential argument identified by

counsel and then requests that we hold the appeal in abeyance because a bill has been

introduced in Congress that would amend 18 U.S.C. § 3553 to allow sentencing courts to

disregard statutory minimums as a matter of discretion.  See Ramos‐Compean Justice Act of

2009, H.R. 3327, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009).  We decline to do so.

Accordingly, we GRANT counselʹs motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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