Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00098/USCOURTS-ared-5_16-cv-00098-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnathan Johnston
Plaintiff
Wendy Kelley
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

PINE BLUFF DIVISION

JOHNATHAN JOHNSTON,

ADC #154144 PETITIONER

v. 5:16CV00098-BSM-JJV

WENDY KELLEY, Director,

Arkansas Department of Correction RESPONDENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS

The following recommended disposition has been sent to Chief United States District

Judge Brian S. Miller. Any party may serve and file written objections to this

recommendation. Objections should be specific and should include the factual or legal basis

for the objection. If the objection is to a factual finding, specifically identify that finding and

the evidence that supports your objection. An original and one copy of your objections must

be received in the office of the United States District Court Clerk no later than fourteen days

from the date of the findings and recommendations. The copy will be furnished to the

opposing party. Failure to file timely objections may result in a waiver of the right to appeal

questions of fact.

If you are objecting to the recommendation and also desire to submit new, different,

or additional evidence, and to have a new hearing for this purpose before either the District

Judge or Magistrate Judge, you must, at the time you file your written objections, include the

following:

1. Why the record made before the Magistrate Judge is inadequate.

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2. Why the evidence to be proffered at the new hearing (if such a hearing is

granted) was not offered at the hearing before the Magistrate Judge.

3. The details of any testimony desired to be introduced at the new hearing in the

form of an offer of proof, and a copy, or the original, of any documentary or other nontestimonial evidence desired to be introduced at the new hearing.

From this submission, the District Judge will determine the necessity for an additional

evidentiary hearing. Mail your objections and “Statement of Necessity” to:

Clerk, United States District Court

Eastern District of Arkansas

600 West Capitol Avenue, Suite A149

Little Rock, AR 72201-3325

DISPOSITION

I. BACKGROUND

A Pulaski County Circuit Court jury found Petitioner Johnathan Johnston guilty of

three counts of rape. (Doc. No. 1.) They sentenced him to forty-years’ imprisonment on

each count to run concurrently. (Doc. No. 6 at 1182-85.) Mr. Johnston appealed, and the

Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, holding the circuit court’s admission of pornographic

images retrieved from Mr. Johnston’s computer was harmless error, and reciting the

underlying facts: 

On November 4, 2011, Johnston was charged with three counts of rape of his

then nine-year-old daughter, C.J. The rapes were alleged to have occurred

between December 21, 2006, and September 5, 2011. At trial, C.J. testified

that Johnston had been raping her since she was four or five years old during

her weekly visitation with her father, which was established following her

parents' divorce. She stated that the rapes occurred several times during each

weekend visit and that Johnston raped her vaginally, orally, and anally. C.J.

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testified that Johnston had occasionally used a condom but that he typically

ejaculated on her, and she described the smell of his semen. She further

testified that Johnston had filmed her “sucking on his penis” and that he had

taken photographs of her in suggestive poses. C.J. stated that the rapes were

painful and that Johnston would anally rape her when he was “really mad”

because he knew that hurt her the most.

According to C.J., she did not tell anyone about the abuse because her father

threatened that “demons would kill me and him.” C.J. stated that Johnston

would tell her that he saw demons or vampires in the mirror and try to scare

her. She testified that she finally decided to tell her grandmother about the

abuse after a visit with her father over Labor Day weekend in 2011, when she

asked him when he would stop raping her, and he replied that he did not know.

C.J. stated that he made a “pinkie promise” to stop but that he then raped her

again on that Monday. While Johnston would normally make C.J. change her

clothes and shower after the rapes, she decided not to change her underwear

before she went home that weekend because she had a feeling that she was

going to disclose the rapes. C.J. told her grandmother after school on Tuesday,

and she was taken to Arkansas Children's Hospital, where she underwent a

sexual-assault exam. A swab taken fromC.J.'s vagina tested positive for sperm

cells, although the cells were unable to be DNA typed. The underwear that 

C.J. had worn home that weekend was also examined, and Johnston's semen

was found in the crotch area. His semen was also found on four1other pairs of

C.J.'s underwear seized from Johnston's home. A forensic sexual-assault

examination conducted two weeks later revealed that C.J. had a major tear in

her hymen that indicated sexual abuse involving penetrating trauma.

Johnston v. State, 2014 Ark. 110, *1-3, 431 S.W.3d 895, 896-97 (2014). 

On June 16, 2014, Mr. Johnston filed a pro se Rule 37 Petition arguing his trial

counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to “procure an expert witnesses in petitioner’s

defense;” (2) failing “to present expert testimony of a psychiatrist or psychologist licensed

in psychosexual behavior and/or sex therapy;” and (3) failing “to procure expert testimony

1Petitioner correctly asserts this statement is factually inaccurate. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) The

Arkansas State Crime Lab tested six pairs of the victim’s panties. Semen and/or sperm cells were

found in the inside crotch area of five pairs. (Doc. No. 6 at 778-83.) Mr. Johnston’s DNA was

found in the inside crotch area of two pairs; in three pairs the secondaryDNA source from the semen

and/or sperm cells could not be identified. (Id. at 812.)

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relating to the human papilloma virus (sic).” (Doc. No. 5-8 at 19-23.) The Pulaski County

Circuit Court found the petition without merit. (Id. at 39-40.) Mr. Johnston filed a notice

of appeal (Id. at 43) and a request for extension of time to file appeal. (Doc. No. 5-9.) 

However, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied the extension “because it [was] clear from the

record that [Mr. Johnston] could not prevail if the appeal were permitted to go forward . . .”

Johnston v. State, 2015 Ark. 162 *1, 459 S.W. 3d 782, 784 (2015). 

Mr. Johnston filed the current Petition on March 31, 2016. (Doc. No. 1.) In it he

alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for various reasons, some of which were raised in his

Rule 37 petition, the trial court violated his due process rights when it allowed the admittance

of pornographic material found on his laptop, and the cumulative errors render his

convictions unfair. Some of these claims are raised for the first time in this Petition.

Respondent argues that the state’s ruling should be given deference, and Mr. Johnston’s

remaining claims are either procedurally defaulted or meritless. For the following reasons,

I agree. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. State Deference

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),

federal habeas courts, are restricted to a “limited and deferential review of underlying state

court decisions.” Sera v. Norris, 400 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005). Under the AEDPA,

federal review of underlying state court decisions is limited because federal courts may only

grant habeas relief if the claim was adjudicated on the merits in the state court proceeding

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and the state court’s decision:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380 (2005). 

Under subsection (d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” federal law if the state

court arrived “at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the United States Supreme] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13

(2000); see also Collier v. Norris, 485 F.3d 415, 421 (8th Cir. 2007). A decision involves

an unreasonable application of federal law when the state court “identifies the correct

governing legal principle from[the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonablyapplies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. Under subsection

(d)(2), a state court decision will be based on an “unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented . . . only if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that

the state court’s presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record.” 

Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2003). Such is not the case here.

Mr. Johnston argues his counsel was ineffective for, inter alia: (1) failing to prepare

a defense based on his sexually transmitted disease, human papilloma virus (“HPV”); and

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(2) failing to prepare a defense based on the size and appearance of his penis.2

In its opinion

denying Mr. Johnston’s extension of time to file an appellate brief, the Arkansas Supreme

Court addressed these two claims. It found trial counsel was not ineffective because: 

The decision to call or not to call a particular witness is generally a matter of

professional judgment and trial strategy that is outside the purview of Rule

37.1. Feuget v. State, 2015 Ark. 43, 454 S.W.3d 734 (citing Nelson v. State,

344 Ark. 407, 39 S.W.3d 791 (2001) (per curiam)). The fact that there was a

witness, or witnesses, who could have offered beneficial testimony is not, in

itself, proof of counsel's ineffectiveness. Feuget, 2015 Ark. 43, 454 S.W.3d

734. 

Johnston v. State, 2015 Ark. 162 *6, 459 S.W.3d 782, 786 (2015). Furthermore, the 

Arkansas Supreme Court said:

When a petitioner pursuant to [Rule 37] claims ineffective assistance of

counsel based on the failure of counsel to call an expert witness, the petitioner

bears the heavy burden ofsupporting his allegations with facts that established

that the defense suffered actual prejudices arising from counsel’s conduct. See

Feuget, 2015 Ark. 43, 454 S.W.3d 734. As stated, there is a strong

presumption that trial counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance. Anderson, 2015 Ark. 18, 454 S.W.3d 212.

The claimant must provide facts that affirmatively support his or her claims of

prejudice; neither conclusory statements nor allegations without factual

substantiation are sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was

effective, and such statements and allegations will not warrant granting a Rule

37.1 petition. Green [v. State], 2014 Ark. 284, 2014 WL 2814866; Dixon v.

State, 2014 Ark. 97, 2014 WL 805350 (per curiam) (citing Abernathy [v.

State], 2012 Ark. 59, 386 S.W.3d 477). [Petitioner] did not show that there is

a reasonable probabilitythat, but for counsel's error, the fact-finder would have

had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt and the outcome of the proceeding

would have been different. See Feuget, 2015 Ark. 43, 454 S.W.3d 734. 

Johnston, 2015 Ark. 162 * 7, 459 S.W.3d 782, 787 (2015).

2These claims include allegations that trial counsel was ineffective for both failingto question

witnesses about Mr. Johnston’s HPV and penis size, and also failing to call medical experts

regarding those claims. The claims regarding the expert testimony were addressed by the Arkansas

Supreme Court, and the claims that trial counsel should have questioned witnesses regarding HPV

and penis size are procedurally defaulted and will be addressed infra. 

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To find Mr. Johnston’s trial counsel ineffective, I must find the Arkansas Supreme

Court’s finding is contrary to clearly established federal law or is based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. I cannot. Therefore, I must give deference to the Arkansas

Supreme Court and dismiss each of these claims. 

Mr. Johnston also argues that he was denied due process when the trial court

introduced “irrelevant and grossly prejudicial incestuous pornographyfound on [Johnston’s]

laptop computer.”3(Doc. No 1 at 24.) Mr. Johnston argues the introduction of this evidence

was so prejudicial that the remainder of the trial was “clouded” and denied Mr. Johnston a

fair trial. (Id. at 28.) However, this was argued on direct appeal. The Arkansas Supreme

Court found the harmless-error doctrine applied and affirmed the conviction. The Arkansas

Supreme Court stated:

Even assuming that the admission of the photos was error, there was

overwhelming evidence of Johnston's guilt. In addition to C.J.'s detailed

testimony recounting the many years of rapes by her father, there was also

corroborating medical and forensic testimony. Johnston's semen4 was found on

the crotch area of five pairs of C.J.'s underwear, including the pair that she had

worn home following her Labor Day visitation, during which, she testified, 

Johnston had raped her three times. Further, a vaginal swab from the sexualassault exam performed the next day tested positive for sperm cells, and a

major tear in C.J.'s hymen, which was consistent with sexual abuse involving

penetration, was also found. Thus, there was overwhelming evidence of

Johnston's guilt in this case.

Johnston v. State, 2014 Ark. 110 *7,8, 431 S.W.3d 895, 899 (2014). I cannot find that this

ruling is contrary to clearly established federal law, and this claim must be dismissed.

3Alternatively, Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to federalize the

objection to the introduction of evidence. This claim is procedurally defaulted and must be

dismissed. 

4As stated above, semen was found in five pairs of panties. DNA could be typed in only two.

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B. Procedural Default

Mr. Johnston’s remaining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are procedurally

defaulted. He claims trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to question Dr. Sarah

Covey, Jacqueline Johnston, and Jennifer MacMillan about HPV; (2) failing to question the

victim, Ms. Johnston, and Ms. MacMillian about the size and appearance of Mr. Johnston’s

penis; (3) failing to move the trial court to merge the rapes into one count; and (4) failing to

point out “inconsistencies, improbabilities, and gaping holes in the State’s case.”5 Each of

these claims are raised in the federal Habeas Corpus Petition for the first time. 

However, before seeking federal habeas review, a state prisoner must first fairly

present the substance of each claim to each appropriate state court. Baldwin v. Reese, 541

U.S. 27, 29 (2004); See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (stating a state prisoner must exhaust available

state court remedies before raising a claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding). As a

matter of comity and federalism, the state courts should have a proper opportunity to address

a petitioner’s claims of constitutional error before those claims are presented to the federal

court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). This requirement is in place to

afford the state the opportunity to correct any constitutional errors before the federal courts

intervene. Lenza v. Wyrick, 665 F.2d 804, 807-8 (8th Cir. 1981); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.

270, 275 (1971) (“We have consistently adhered to this federal policy for it would be

unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court

conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation.”)

5This claim includes seven sub-claims, all of which are procedurally defaulted and, even if

they were not, do not rise to the Strickland standard. 

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(citations omitted). Failure to do so will result in a procedural default. Kennedy v. Delo, 959

F.2d 112, 115 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. 722 at 749-50). 

Mr. Johnston makes no excuse for his procedural default. Therefore, I conclude

Martinez would not apply in this case. However, assuming Martinez applied, I would

perform a merits review of the defaulted claims if (1) the claim of ineffective assistance was

substantial, (2) the “cause” was that Mr. Johnston had no counsel6in the postconviction

proceeding, (3) the Rule 37 proceeding was the initial review proceeding with respect to the

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and (4) it was highly unlikely that Mr. Johnston had

a “meaningful opportunity” to raise his ineffective assistance claims on direct appeal. 

Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911 (2013). Here, Mr. Johnston’s claim fails on the first prong

of the analysis. His many claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are based on

disagreements with strategic decisions during trial, conclusory, or meritless. I have carefully

reviewed the trial transcript in this case and conclude that Mr. Johnston’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel are far from reaching the level of “substantial.” 

Where procedural default has occurred, federal habeas review is permitted only if the

petitioner can demonstrate (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the

alleged violation of federal law, or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a

fundamental miscarriage of justice, that is, that a constitutional violation has resulted in the

conviction and continued incarceration of one who is actually innocent. Coleman v.

Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). Neither is applicable here, although the Petition states

6

It is noted that although Mr. Johnston filed his Rule 37 pro se, he is now represented by

counsel. 

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that “[Johnston] may be actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted.” (Doc.

No. 1 at 31, emphasis added.) To prove actual innocence, Mr. Johnston would have to

establish (1) new and reliable evidence that was not presented to the state courts, and (2) that

in light of the new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have

convicted him. See Weeks v. Bowersox, 119 F3d. 1342, 1351 (8th Cir. 1997). No new

evidence has been presented, and the claim that he “may” be actually innocent is insufficient. 

Therefore, the remaining ineffective assistance of counsel claims are procedurally defaulted

and must be dismissed. 

C. Meritless 

The final claim of Mr. Johnston is based upon overturned law. He argues “the

cumulative effect of the errors committed in this case” violates his right to due process based

on the ruling in Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982). However, in

Wainwright v. Lockhart, 80 F.3d 1226, 1233 (8th Cir. 1996), the Eighth Circuit Court of

Appeals found that “Harrisis no longer good law.” The Eighth Circuit said, “Errors that are

not unconstitutional individually cannot be added together to create a constitutional

violation.” Id. Therefore, this claim is meritless and must be dismissed. 

III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States

District Courts, a district court “must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it

enters a final order adverse to the applicant.” A court may only issue a certificate of

appealability “ifthe applicant has made a substantial showing ofthe denial of a constitutional

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Mr. Johnston’s claims do not rise to a substantial showing

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of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, a certificate of appealability should not be

entered. 

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

(Doc. No. 1) be DISMISSED, and the requested relief be DENIED. A certificate of

appealability be DENIED.

DATED this 15th day of July, 2016. 

__________________________

JOE J. VOLPE 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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