Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_08-cv-01969/USCOURTS-alnd-2_08-cv-01969-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Rents, Inc.
Defendant
Tom Kunstmann
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

TOM KUNTSMANN et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

AARON RENTS, INC., d/b/a,

AARON’S SALES AND LEASE

OWNERSHIP.

Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.

08-AR-1969-S

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This case comes before the court on the motion of the named

plaintiff, Tom Kuntsmann, and nineteen other opt-in plaintiffs,

who sue on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated

employees (collectively “plaintiffs”), to facilitate notice

pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§

201, et seq., to all individuals holding the position of “general

manager” within the last three years at employer-defendant, Aaron

Rents, Inc., d/b/a, Aaron’s Sales and Lease Ownership (“Aaron

Rents”). Also before the court are cross-motions for sanctions and

protective orders. On April 10, 2009, the court heard oral argument

on all pending motions.

Pertinent Procedural Facts

Aaron Rents specializes in sales and lease ownership and has

stores in forty-nine states. Def.’s Mot. to Facilitate Notice Resp.

11 (citation omitted). Aaron Rents has 109 “regions” in the United

FILED

 2009 Apr-20 PM 03:15

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 1 of 12
States. Id. Each region is overseen by a regional manager who

supervises approximately twelve stores. Id. (citation omitted).

The original named plaintiff, Tom Kuntsmann, filed his

complaint on October 22, 2008. Since then, nineteen persons have

filed consent forms opting into the action. The named plaintiff 1

and the putative class are current and former general managers of

Aaron Rents (collectively “plaintiffs”). This action is brought to

recover unpaid overtime compensation. Most of the plaintiffs have

filed at least one declaration with the court. Inter alia,

2

plaintiffs declarations reflect the following: (1) plaintiffs

contend that they and other similarly situated general managers

were required to perform both managerial and non-managerial duties

without receiving overtime compensation; (2) Aaron Rents had a

uniform policy and practice of consistently requiring its general

managers to work over 40 hours per week, generally 50-60 hours per

The following is a list of the twenty plaintiffs, the respective state

1

where they worked as a general manager, and whether or not they are “former”

general managers or “current” general managers: Tom Kuntsmann (Alabama-former),

Garry Smith (Alabama-former), John Day (Alabama-former), Susan Rogers (Alabamaformer), Daniel Guedes (Illinois-former), Eric Keith (Alabama-former), Latanya

Safford (Michigan-former), Brian Patton, Jr. (Alabama-current), Raymond Edward

Dalzell (Alabama-former), Anthony Dudley (Alabama-former), James Hicks (Alabamaformer), Teddy R. Wilson (Alabama-current), Jr., Anthony Riggans (Alabamaformer), Michael W. Matthews (Georgia-former), Brian Thrash (Alabama-current),

Frantonia Wesley (Alabama-current), Michael Jason Morrow (Mississippi-former),

Chad Moody (Mississippi-former), Ray Brantley (Alabama-current), and Gordon E.

McGlocklin, Jr. (Alabama-current). See Docs. 2,3,12,26,30,33,35.

Tom Kunstmann, John Day, Garry Smith, Daniel Guedes, Eric Keith, Latanya

2

Safford, Brian Patton, Jr., Raymond Edward Dalzell, Anthony Dudley, James Hicks,

Michael W. Matthews, Teddy R. Wilson, Jr., Brian Thrash, Anthony Riggans,

Frantonia Wesley, Ray Brantley, and Gordon McGlocklin have all filed at least one

declaration. The court notes that these declarations are obviously form

declarations. The declarations show minimal (if any) divergence from one another.

2

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 2 of 12
week, without overtime compensation; (3) the regional manager

performed all important managerial job duties for each store,

including approving any overtime hours and setting store hours; (4)

general managers did not have any input in setting their store’s

payroll budget; (5) plaintiffs allege that “all, or nearly all” of

their time was spent performing non-managerial functions; (6) all

stores were basically the same in size and in layout; (7) the nonmanagerial manual tasks performed consist of (a) unloading and

loading the trucks and placing stock on the floor, (b) placing

stock on the floor according to a pre-determined plan, (c) making

phone calls for collections according to a pre-determined plan, and

(d) making visits to customers who were more than thirty days

behind on their account to collect on the account; (8) there was

only one “store policy and procedure manual” which all stores were

to follow; (9) the inventory of store merchandise within each store

was determined by corporate headquarters; and (10) there was only

one general manager job description applicable to all general

managers. See Pl.s’ Compl., Pls.’ Mot. to Facilitate Notice Attach.

A, and Pls.’ Mot. to Facilitate Notice Reply Ex. 1-12 (collectively

“plaintiffs’ allegations”). Only five plaintiffs declared, “I was

[(or “am”)] paid on a salary basis. I have spoken with other

General Managers who have told me that they are also paid on a

salary basis.” Michael W. Matthews, Decl. ¶ 21, Apr. 2, 2009; Brian

Thrash Decl. ¶ 21, Apr. 2, 2009; Frantonia Wesley Decl. ¶ 21, Apr.

3

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 3 of 12
3, 2009; Ray Brantley Decl. ¶ 21 Apr. 9, 2009; Gordon E.

McGlocklin, Jr. Decl. ¶ 21 Apr. 9, 2009 (emphasis added). 

Aaron Rents agrees with plaintiffs assertions (7(d)), (8),

(9), and (10). Def.’s Mot. to Facilitate Notice Resp. 8. Aaron

Rents also filed a copy of (10) the “standard general manager job

description.” Id. at Ex. A(1). Aaron Rents defends on several

grounds, including the ultimate defense that all general managers

are exempt employees under § 213(a) of the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. §

213(a).

On February 9, 2009, plaintiffs filed their motion to

facilitate nationwide notice. On February 24, 2009, Aaron Rents,

through its regional managers, solicited approximately 856 form

declarations from its approximately 1026 current general managers.

Def.’s Mot. to Strike Resp. 4. On March 9, 2009, Aaron Rents

responded with a memorandum of law containing voluminous exhibits,

including the approximately 856 declarations. Of the 856

declarations, only 8 general managers indicated they spent less

than 50% of their time on managerial duties. D. Chad Strickland,

Decl. ¶ 16, Mar. 9, 2009. Aaron Rents also stresses that the

declaration gathering process was “voluntary.” Inter alia, Aaron

Rents argues that the fact that the approximately 170 general

managers, who were contacted on February 24, 2009, chose not to

fill out the declaration indicates “voluntariness.” See id.

Plaintiffs dispute the voluntariness of the declaration gathering

4

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 4 of 12
process. Aaron Rents complains that the contact between plaintiffs’

counsel and current general managers, particularly a letter dated

March 13, 2009, from plaintiffs’ counsel to current general

managers, is a violation of a rule of professional conduct. See

Def.’s Mot. to Strike Ex. H.

Three of the opt-in plaintiffs, Daniel Guedes, Frantonia

Wesley, and Gordon E. McGlocklin, are among the approximately 856

general managers who filled out the February 24, 2009, declaration.

Another opt-in plaintiff, Ray Brantley, is among the approximately

170 general managers who refused to sign the February 24, 2009,

declaration. Fifteen of the nineteen plaintiffs worked at Aaron

Rents stores in Alabama. See supra note 1. The other five worked at

Aaron Rents stores in four states, namely Georgia, Illinois,

Michigan, and Mississippi. Id. No other discovery has been

conducted.

Discussion

A. Motion to Facilitate Notice

Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of

the FLSA. The court has the “discretion, in appropriate cases, to

implement 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) . . . by facilitating notice to

potential class members.” Hoffman-LA Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 3

Section 216(b) provides in pertinent part:

3

Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section

207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees

affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their

5

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 5 of 12
U.S. 165, 169 (1989). Before facilitating notice on the putative

collective class, “the district court should satisfy itself that

there are other employees . . . who desire to 'opt-in' and who are

'similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and

with regard to their pay provisions.” Dybach v. Fla. Dep’t of

Corr., 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991)(internal quotation

marks in original; emphasis added). These are the general

requirements recognized by the Eleventh Circuit. See Hipp v. Nat’l

Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2001), and Cameron-Grant v.

Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2003).

Collective actions proceed in two stages. The first stage is the

“notice stage,” where, under a “fairly lenient standard,” courts

typically grant notice usually based on only the pleadings and any

affidavits. Id. at 1243 n.2. The Eleventh Circuit recently observed

that granting notice is synonymous with conditionally certifying

the class. Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233,

unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an

additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who

violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be

liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to

effectuate the purposes of section 215(a)(3) of this title,

including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion,

and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as

liquidated damages. An action to recover the liability prescribed in

either of the preceding sentences may be maintained against any

employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court

of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees for and in

behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly

situated. No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action

unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and

such consent is filed with the court in which such action is

brought. . . .

6

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 6 of 12
1261 n.40 (11th Cir. 2008). A putative plaintiff must affirmatively

“opt-in” to an action via written consent in order to toll the

statute of limitations. See, e.g., Longcrier v. HL-A Co., Inc., 595

F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1244 (S.D. Ala. 2008). The second determination

is typically precipitated by a motion for “decertification” by the

defendant usually filed after discovery is largely complete and the

matter is ready for trial. Id. at 1261. Additionally, it is the

plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate a “reasonable basis for his claim

that there are other similarly situated employees.” Id. at 1260

(internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted).

1. Desire to Opt-In

At the notice stage, the court looks only to what the parties 

have filed. Aaron Rents filed 856 declarations from its current

general managers in support of its response to the motion. The

court does not pass on the relevance and/or admissibility, if any,

of these affidavits going forward. However, to the extent they help

to shape the scope of the putative class of current general

managers, they are relevant here. The mere fact that 170, or

roughly 16.5%, of Aaron Rents’s current store managers did not sign

the February 24 declaration is perhaps some evidence of a desire to

opt-in by current general managers. Additionally, the fact that

nineteen opt-in plaintiffs have filed consents to sue and most have

filed at least one declaration indicates that there is some desire

to opt-in. See, e.g., Holt v. Rite Aid Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1265,

7

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 7 of 12
1269-70 (M.D. Ala. 2004). However, only six of the twenty

plaintiffs who have opted-in are current general managers. All six

of these opt-in current general managers are from Alabama. In other

words, the class of current general managers in the other fortyeight states is unrepresented by the plaintiffs. 

Of the former general managers who have opted-in, nine are

from stores in Alabama, one from a store in Illinois, one from a

store in Georgia, one from a store in Michigan, and two from stores

in Mississippi. In other words, fourteen of an unknown class of

former general mangers who worked at Aaron Rents within the last

three years have opted in. Forty-four states are unrepresented. 

A snapshot of these numbers reveals merely that fifteen Aaron

Rents general managers in Alabama and a handful of general managers

from four other states have an FLSA grievance. The court seriously

doubts that this evidence should constitute a “reasonable basis”

for facilitating nationwide notice. With great trepidation, the

court will assume arguendo that this suffices as a demonstration of

a desire to opt-in and will turn to the dispositive question,

whether the general managers are similarly situated. 

2. Similarly Situated

The parties dispute the legal standard for determining whether

or not a putative collective action class is similarly situated.

Aaron Rents argues: 

8

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 8 of 12
[A] plaintiff must either: (1) identify a “single

decision, policy or plan” that allegedly resulted in the

proposed class’ improper treatment under the FLSA; or (2)

“make some rudimentary showing of the commonality between

the basis for his claims and that of the potential claims

of the proposed class, beyond the mere facts of job

duties and pay provisions.” See Saxton v. Title Max of

Ala., 431 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (N.D. Ala. 2006); Holt,

333 F. Supp. 2d at 1270; Tyler v. Payless Shoe Source,

Inc., 2:05-cv-33, 2005 WL 3133763, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov.

23, 2005).

Def.’s Mot. to Facilitate Notice Resp. 7 (emphasis added). Here, on

the evidence presented thus far, there is no express single

decision, policy or plan by Aaron Rents. Thus, only the second

portion of the test is at issue here. Plaintiffs argue that “the

issue as to whether the actual job duties performed by a General

Manger qualify the position to be an exempt position is not an

issue currently before the Court and should only be addressed at

the decertification stage and not at the pre-certification (notice)

stage.” Pls.’ Mot. to Facilitate Notice 8 (emphasis added). 

a. Job Duties & Pay Provisions

In two recent opinions by the Eleventh Circuit, the court

placed the “beyond the mere facts and job duties” section of the

opinion in the “decertification stage” section of the analysis. See

Morgan, 551 F.3d at 1261-62, and Anderson v. Cagle’s, Inc., 488

F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007)(citing White v. Osmose, 204 F. Supp.

2d 1309, 1314 (M.D. Ala. 2002)). In Osmose, in ruling on a motion

to facilitate notice, the court stated: 

9

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 9 of 12
[T]his court concludes that a plaintiff must make some

rudimentary showing of commonality between the basis for

his claims and that of the potential claims of the

proposed class, beyond the mere facts of job duties and

pay provisions. 

Id. at 1314. Further muddying the waters is the fact that the

above-quoted legal conclusion of the Osmose court was implicitly

drawn from the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Dybach. In Dybach, at

the notice stage, the court remanded the case to the district court

with the instruction: “[T]he district court should satisfy itself

that there are other employees of the defendant-employer who desire

to ‘opt-in’ and are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to their job

requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.” Osmose, 204

F. Supp. 2d at 1312 (quoting Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1567-68)(internal

quotation marks in original; emphasis added). Both Holt, 333 F.

Supp. 2d at 1270, and Tyler, 2005 WL 3133763 at *3, quoted by Aaron

Rents, cite directly to Osmose’s “beyond the mere facts of job

duties and pay provisions” language.4

It is understandable why the parties have a temporal

disagreement regarding the proper inquiry at the notice stage. It

is somewhat clear that the phrase “beyond the mere facts of job

duties and pay provisions” sets the “floor” of a plaintiff’s burden

in a putative collective action. It is unclear, however, whether or

In Saxton, also cited by Aaron Rents, the court stated that the test was

4

“whether these employees are ‘similarly situated’ with respect to both their job

duties and their pay.” 431 F. Supp. 2d at 1187-88 (emphasis added).

10

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 10 of 12
not the burden should be imposed at the notice stage, or at the

decertification stage, or at both stages. If it is, in fact, a

requirement at both stages, as this court will hold, the question

then becomes what is the varying degree, if any, of the plaintiffs’

burden at each stage? Put another way, the spectrum of a

plaintiff’s (or plaintiffs’) burden at the notice stage is arguably

defined as: “At the notice stage, it is plaintiffs’ burden to

demonstrate more than mere similarity as to both job requirements

and pay provisions, however, it is not necessary for plaintiffs to 

demonstrate similarity as to actual job duties performed and dollar

amounts/benefits paid.” Plaintiffs have colorably demonstrated some

similarity regarding “job requirements.” See supra plaintiffs’

allegations. However, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate

similarity as to “pay” or “pay provisions” because the only

evidence offered is that of the five opt-in plaintiffs who

declared, “I was paid on a salary basis. I have spoken with other

General Managers who have told me that they are also paid on a

salary basis.” Generously assuming that this evidence is

admissible, that these five general managers were paid a similar

salary amount, and that the salary/benefit structure is similar,

there is nothing in the record to reflect how the other fifteen

plaintiffs were paid, nor the other 1026 current general managers,

nor the unknown class of former general managers. There must be

some demonstration of similarity of pay provisions before the court

11

Case 2:08-cv-01969-KOB-JEO Document 37 Filed 04/20/09 Page 11 of 12
can grant the facilitation of notice. In light of evidence

gathering in Morgan, the lack of evidence present here, and the

reasons given above, it is appropriate for the parties to engage in

some discovery to determine whether or not there is a desire to

opt-in and whether the putative class members are similarly

situated. 

B. Motions to Strike & Sanctions

Aaron Rents’s motion for a protective order will be granted,

however, only to the extent that it precludes plaintiffs’ counsel

from soliciting Aaron Rents’s current general managers. In all

other respects, Aaron Rents’s motion for a protective order will be

denied. Because the court, for now, finds nothing expressly

unlawful or coercive about any counsel’s action, and for the

reasons given in open court, the court will deny all other motions.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to facilitate

notice and for a conditional nationwide collective action will be

denied without prejudice by separate order.

DONE this 20th day of April, 2009.

_____________________________

WILLIAM M. ACKER, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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