Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07036/USCOURTS-caDC-19-07036-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aaron Ball
Appellant
George Washington University
Appellee

Document Text:

1

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-7036 September Term, 2019

FILED ON: February 3, 2020

AARON BALL,

APPELLANT 

v.

GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:17-cv-00507)

______

Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia and the briefs filed by the parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 

34(j). The Court has accorded the issues full consideration and determined that they do not warrant 

a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). For the reasons stated below, it is 

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the District Court order be affirmed.

From 2008 until 2015, Aaron Ball was a plumber at George Washington University (GW). 

Starting in 2013, Ball frequently asked for, and was granted, leave under the Family Medical Leave 

Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq., the District of Columbia Family Medical Leave Act 

(DCFMLA), D.C. Code §§ 32-501 et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. After returning to work following one leave period, Ball’s supervisors 

confronted him with evidence that he was “loafing” during work hours and had falsified work 

records to cover it up. The evidence of misconduct allegedly included video footage showing that 

Ball was not working when and where he claimed to have been doing so. Ball was subsequently 

suspended and then discharged. He filed suit, asserting ADA claims of discrimination and 

retaliation, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), discrimination and retaliation claims under the District of 

Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA), see D.C. Code § 2-1402.11(a), and retaliation and 

wrongful-interference-with-leave claims under the FMLA, see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a). In addition, 

because, during discovery, GW failed to produce some of the video footage on which it relied,

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Ball moved for sanctions under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. 

CIV. P. 37(e). In two thorough and well-reasoned orders, the district court denied Ball’s sanctions 

motion and granted GW’s summary judgment motion. Ball now appeals.

Under Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court may sanction 

a party “[i]f electronically stored information that should have been preserved in the anticipation 

or conduct of litigation is lost because a party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve it, and it 

cannot be restored or replaced through additional discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). Ball had the 

burden to establish that GW lost or destroyed the video footage at issue once a duty to preserve it 

attached. See Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995). We review the 

district court’s factual findings underlying its denial for clear error. Id. at 1475–76. The district 

court reviewed the evidence and concluded that the footage was automatically deleted before Ball 

filed his EEOC complaint, the only event Ball suggested created a duty to preserve the footage. 

Ball has not demonstrated that the district court clearly erred in making this finding. Nor was the 

district court obliged to wait until it decided the already fully briefed summary judgment motion 

to rule on the sanctions motion, as Ball now suggests. Consequently, we find no error in the district 

court’s denial of Ball’s sanctions motion. 

Ball next argues that the district court erred in granting GW’s summary judgment motion. 

If a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of employer discrimination or retaliation in the context of ADA, 

DCHRA or FMLA claims, as Ball lacks, the claims are evaluated under the burden-shifting 

framework established by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Giles v. 

Transit Emps. Fed. Credit Union, 794 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (ADA and DCHRA); Gordon v. 

U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 161 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (FMLA). If the employer proffers a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, “the central question at summary judgment is 

whether [the plaintiff] produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that [the 

employer’s] asserted reason for [the challenged action] was not the true reason.” Miles v. Howard 

Univ., 653 F. App’x. 3, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted) (quoting

Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015)). Evaluating an employer’s asserted reason for 

a discharge, we ask not whether the employer was objectively correct in discharging the employee 

but instead whether “the employer honestly believes in the reasons it offers.” Fischbach v. D.C.

Dep’t of Corrections, 86 F.3d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996). GW proffered a legitimate reason for 

Ball’s termination: his workplace misconduct. Ball claims that he presented sufficient evidence 

for a reasonable jury to conclude that GW’s reason was pretextual. We disagree.

Ball first claims that flaws in the investigation of his alleged misconduct undermine GW’s 

reliance on it. But, for a jury to conclude that an employer lacked an honest belief that the employee 

engaged in misconduct, the employer’s investigation into the misconduct must have been “not just 

flawed but inexplicably unfair.” See Burly v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290, 299 (D.C. 

Cir. 2015) (quoting Mastro v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 447 F.3d 843, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Ball

points to what are, at worst, minor procedural flaws in the investigation, including, for example,

the involvement of a non-supervisory employee. But he identifies no flaw sufficient to establish 

that the investigation was “inexplicably unfair.”

Second, Ball argues that a letter drafted by a second-level supervisor, acting on behalf of 

GW’s plumbing division, asserting that Ball’s February 2015 leave request would impose an 

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“undue hardship”1 on the plumbing division “demonstrate[s] a bias towards [him] due to his 

disability and the leave accommodation required” because Ball’s direct supervisor testified in his 

deposition that he was unaware of the second-level supervisor’s undue hardship letter and that the 

division was able to keep up with its work despite Ball’s absence. The second-level supervisor’s

letter appears, on its face, to have been reasonable—a substantial number of GW’s plumbers were 

out on leave and Ball’s direct supervisor testified that, although they were able to keep up with the 

plumbing division’s work, the absence of several employees put a significant burden on the 

remaining employees. Consequently, the letter does not support an inference that GW’s proffered 

basis for Ball’s discharge was pretextual. 

Ball also argues that GW’s alleged failure to ensure that he had a usable iPod (used by GW 

plumbers to record their work assignments) when he returned from leave “is highly probative of 

his argument that [GW’s] proffered reasons for suspension and termination were pretextual” 

because his lack of an iPod led to the investigation of his work and his ultimate termination.

Accepting as true Ball’s testimony that the supervisor told Ball that he would secure an iPod for 

Ball, the fact that Ball’s misconduct was discovered because of the supervisor’s failure to follow 

through does nothing to undermine GW’s honest belief that Ball engaged in misconduct. Even if 

a jury could infer from Ball’s deposition testimony that the supervisor lied about Ball’s having a 

usable iPod, the supervisor was not the final decisionmaker, the final decisionmaker did not rely 

on Ball’s lack of an iPod in terminating Ball and there was substantial objective evidence, 

including key card records showing that Ball could not have been working in the buildings he 

claimed to have been working in when he claimed to have been doing so, to support the ground 

for termination—misconduct—the final decisionmaker did rely on. 

Ball argues that the temporal proximity of various events establishes that GW’s explanation 

for his discharge was pretextual. We have held that temporal proximity is insufficient by itself to 

rebut an employer’s legitimate explanation for an adverse action. See Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 

521, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (less than one-month gap between employee filing EEOC complaint 

and employee’s deposition and supervisor’s reduction of employee’s privileges and authority 

insufficient to rebut employer’s legitimate explanation for adverse actions). The several temporal 

proximities that Ball points to are insufficient to rebut GW’s proffered reason for his discharge in 

light of the supervisor’s evidence that he engaged in misconduct—notably the key card records 

earlier discussed.2

Finally, Ball asserts an FMLA interference claim. “To state an FMLA interference claim, 

a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show, among other things, that (1) he was entitled to take 

leave because he had a serious health condition, (2) he gave his employer adequate notice of his 

intention to take leave, and (3) his employer denied or otherwise interfered with his right to take 

1 Under the ADA, an employer need not grant an accommodation such as medical leave if the requested 

accommodation “would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer’s] business.” See 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).

2 On appeal, Ball presses a mixed-motive theory to support his ADA, FMLA and DCHRA claims. Ball has 

made no argument to this court demonstrating that the district court erred in concluding that a mixed-motive 

theory was not supported by the summary judgment record. Accordingly, Ball has forfeited his challenge 

to the district court’s rejection of his mixed motive claim. 

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leave.” Thomas v. District of Columbia, 227 F.Supp.3d 88, 110 (D.D.C. 2016) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted) (quoting Hodges v. District of Columbia, 959 F.Supp.2d 148, 155 

(D.D.C. 2013)). Ball does not dispute that he was not entitled to take FMLA leave at the time of 

his final request. Accordingly, this claim, too, fails. 

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. Pursuant to D.C. 

Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance 

of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or 

rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

PER CURIAM

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Daniel J. Reidy

Deputy Clerk

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