Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00173/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00173-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Plaintiff
Eduardo Valenzuela
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

USA,

Plaintiff,

v.

EDUARDO VALENZUELA,

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-00173-TEH-1 

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 

DISMISS INDICTMENT

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss based on failure to indict in a 

timely manner pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act. Having carefully considered the parties’ 

written and oral arguments and for the reasons set forth below, the Court now DENIES 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND 

 Defendant Eduardo Valenzuela was arrested on February 6, 2015, and a criminal 

complaint was filed against him on February 9, 2015. On February 13, 2015, Magistrate 

Judge Joseph C. Spero granted a stipulated order, which stated: 

For the reasons stated by the parties on the record on Feb. 13, 

2015, the Court excludes time under the Speedy Trial Act from 

Feb. 13, 2015 to Mar. 2, 2015 and finds that the ends of justice 

served by the continuance outweigh the best interest of the 

public and the defendant in a speedy trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(A). The Court makes this finding and bases this 

continuance on the following factor(s): [...] Failure to grant a 

continuance would unreasonably deny the defendant the 

reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). 

Feb. 13 Order (Docket No. 8). The dates in the above text were handwritten, and at the 

bottom of the order, a handwritten sentence stated: “Time is also extended under Rule 

5.1.” Id.

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

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On March 2, 2015, Judge Spero filed another stipulation and proposed order. 

Docket No. 9. The proposed order, which Judge Spero had granted, stated in pertinent 

part: 

For the reasons stated above [in the parties’ stipulation], the 

Court continues the hearing . . . from March 2, 2015 to March 

23, 2015 . . . The Court further finds that a speedy trial 

exclusion from March 2, 2015 to March 23, 2015 is warranted 

and that the ends of justice served by the continuance outweigh 

the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy 

trial. Denying the requested exclusion of time would deprive 

the defendant effective preparation of counsel, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7)(B)(iv). The Court further finds that an extension of 

time under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1 from March 

2, 2015, to March 23, 2015, is appropriate for the stated 

reasons.

Id. 

Defendant was indicted by a grand jury on four counts relating to drug offenses. 

The Government filed the indictment on March 19, 2015. Docket No. 1. Defendant now 

moves to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the two aforementioned stipulated orders 

were insufficient to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act, and therefore the indictment 

was untimely. Docket No. 66. The Government timely opposed the motion. Docket No. 

67. Defendant replied.1 Docket No. 68. 

DISCUSSION 

The Speedy Trial Act provides in relevant part: “Any information or indictment 

charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days 

from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in 

connection with such charges.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b). The filing of the criminal complaint 

– in the instant case, on February 9, 2015 – triggers the thirty-day timeline. United States 

v. Candelaria, 704 F.2d 1129, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 1983). 

 

1

The Court notes that Defendant’s Reply was filed one day late.

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Enumerated “periods of delay” are excluded from the computation of the indictment 

filing deadline, including the following: 

Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by 

any judge on his own motion or at the request of the defendant 

or his counsel or at the request of the attorney for the 

Government, if the judge granted such continuance on the basis 

of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay resulting 

from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with 

this paragraph shall be excludable under this subsection unless 

the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in 

writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served 

by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

18 U.S.C § 3161(h)(7)(A). Defendant’s argument is centered on the concept that time 

cannot be excluded “unless the court makes reasonably explicit findings that demonstrate 

that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance do, in fact, outweigh the best 

interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” United States v. Perez-Reveles, 

715 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Defendant argues that the factual findings in both stipulated orders reproduced in 

part above – in addition to oral representations made at the hearings on which the 

stipulations were based – only applied to continuing the date for the preliminary hearing; 

therefore the stipulated orders were not intended to extend the Government’s deadline to 

file the indictment. To support this contention, Defendant notes that the parties did not 

specifically discuss delaying the filing of the indictment, either on the record at the 

hearings or in the aforementioned stipulations. Mot. at 9. Defendant correctly states that 

“[c]ontinuing a preliminary hearing is not the same as obtaining more time to seek an 

indictment.” Id. at 10 (citing United States v. Siembida, No. 05-CR-366-PKC, 2007 WL 

4267192 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2007) (unpublished decision)).

 Defendant cites a Fourth Circuit case, United States v. Keita, 742 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 

2014), as an example of what, in Defendant’s opinion, the parties should have done. Mot. 

at 10. In Keita, the parties agreed to, and the Government so moved, “for a continuance of 

the thirty-day time period to file an indictment under the Speedy Trial Act.” 742 F.3d at 

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187. Defendant also cites a Seventh Circuit case, United States v. Jean, 25 F.3d 588 (7th 

Cir. 1994), to argue that Judge Spero should have offered more specific evidence in his 

factual findings. Mot. at 12. In Jean, the Government offered many convincing factual 

reasons for excluding time, based on the complexity of the investigation and evidence, and 

specifically asked for more time to file the indictment. 25 F.3d at 592-93. 

The Court is unpersuaded by Defendant’s arguments. Keita and Jean certainly 

provide examples of what parties may offer to the Court in order to sufficiently exclude 

time to file an indictment, but Defendant has not offered any authority stating that any of 

those cases are requirements for such exclusion. The Court finds that by citing the 

appropriate provisions of the Speedy Trial Act – which provides the deadline for filing an 

indictment, not for holding a preliminary hearing – the parties sufficiently requested an 

extension of the Government’s time to file an indictment. Defendant’s argument that using 

the terms “speedy trial exclusion” and citing specific provisions of the Speedy Trial Act 

could somehow refer only to continuing the preliminary hearing date and not the 

indictment deadline is unfounded, and the Court notes that if that argument were true, it 

would be superfluous for Judge Spero to then find as a separate matter that the preliminary 

hearing was continued, as both stipulated orders found. 

Furthermore, the Court notes that the requests for time exclusions came before the 

Court as stipulations. Defendant argues that Judge Spero “did not make the required 

independent findings; instead it simply credited vague statements by one party’s lawyer 

about the general desire for a continuance.” Mot. at 13. Defendant seemingly ignores the 

fact that the requests did not come before the Court from one party’s lawyer, but rather 

were stipulated by both parties. Similarly, when Defendant faults Judge Spero for not 

“conduct[ing] an appropriate inquiry to determine how long a delay was actually required, 

if one was required at all,” Defendant suggests that the request was contested, which it was 

not. Mot. at 13. A court may “fulfill [its] Speedy Trial Act responsibilities by adopting 

stipulated factual findings,” United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1157 n.9 (9th 

Cir. 2000), and Defendant may not, after the fact, argue against the previously stipulated 

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findings. See United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1456, 1462 (9th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, 

in cases such as this, it is not the Court’s responsibility to question the parties’ stipulations 

by requesting additional facts, where the facts may be protected by attorney-client 

privilege or other safeguards afforded to the defendant. 

For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendant stipulated to the February 13, 

2015 through March 2, 2015, and the March 2, 2015 through March 23, 2015 exclusions of 

time under the Speedy Trial Act, and that considering the wording of the stipulated orders 

and citations therein, it would be unreasonable to believe that Defendant did not anticipate 

that the exclusion applied to the indictment filing deadline. The Court further finds that 

the February 13, 2015 and March 2, 2015 stipulated orders sufficiently found that the ends 

of justice served by granting the continuance outweighed the best interests of the public 

and Defendant in a speedy trial, based on the facts before Judge Spero at that time. 

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the two stipulated orders signed by Judge Spero were sufficient 

to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act, thus affording the Government additional time 

to file the indictment. Accordingly, there was no violation of the Speedy Trial Act, and 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 06/02/16 _____________________________________ 

THELTON E. HENDERSON 

United States District Judge

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