Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00870/USCOURTS-alsd-1_03-cv-00870-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randall Lucas
Defendant
Carl A. Mitchell
Plaintiff
Albert Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

CARL A. MITCHELL, AIS # 131412,:

Plaintiff, :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 03-00870-CB-B

RANDALL LUCAS, et al., :

Defendants. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an Alabama prison inmate proceeding pro se and

in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

This action was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and is now

before the undersigned on Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment (Docs. 22, 23, 36, and 42). For the reasons stated

below, it is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment be granted and that Plaintiff’s action be dismissed

with prejudice. 

I. SUMMARY OF ALLEGATIONS

Based upon a review of the record, the Court summarizes the

parties’ allegations which are material to the issues addressed

in this Report and Recommendation. While incarcerated at

Fountain Correctional Facility (“Fountain”), Plaintiff, on July

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1 Possession of marijuana is a violation of Department of

Corrections regulations.

2A “safe cell” is a cell containing only a mattress, a

safety tunic and a sack lunch (Doc. 9, pg. 4).

3The doctor advised the nurse on duty, via telephone, to

have Plaintiff placed in the safe cell until he had an

opportunity to observe him.

2

4, 2002, smoked a marijuana cigarette1 (Doc. 9 at 16, Doc. 13

at 6). Plaintiff contends that the effects of the marijuana

caused him to act in an “in sensible [sic] manner” and to say

“loudly things I don’t usually say.” (Id.). According to

Defendants, Plaintiff was “yelling about Jesus while walking

back and forth across the dorm.” (Doc. 9, pg. 3). Correctional

Officer David Black advised Lieutenant Albert Williams, via

radio, of Plaintiff’s bizarre behavior. In response thereto,

Lt. Williams, along with Correctional Officers Randall Lucas and

William Sheets, proceeded to Plaintiff’s cell in order to remove

and transport him to the health care unit. Lt. Williams

instructed Officer Donald Barlow to place Plaintiff in handcuffs

so he could be transported to the health care unit (Id.). At

the health care unit, Plaintiff was placed in the “safe cell”2

until the Doctor could personally observe him3. (Doc. 9, pg. 4).

Plaintiff acknowledges that he was still talking in a loud

manner at this point (Doc. 13, pg. 6). Lt. Williams had the

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3

handcuffs removed from Plaintiff’s wrists, and ordered him to

remove his clothing. Plaintiff questioned why it was necessary

for him to remove his clothing and refused to do so. In his

affidavit, Plaintiff avers that he did not think he should be

forced to undress in front of a female correctional officer.

(Id. at pg. 8). Plaintiff also questioned the correctional

officers about the reason he was being placed in the safe cell

(Id.). After Plaintiff repeatedly refused Lt. Williams’ order

to remove his clothing, Lt. Williams attempted to remove

Plaintiff’s clothing, and Plaintiff began to strike Lt. Williams

in the jaw three or four times with a closed fist. (Doc. 9, pgs.

4, 31, 36, 38-39). Officer Black then entered the cell and

attempted to pull Plaintiff off of Lt. Williams. As he did so,

Plaintiff began to strike out at both officers (Doc. 9 at 4).

Officer Lucas then entered the cell and struck Plaintiff on the

arm with his baton in order to bring him under his control.

Once subdued, the officers handcuffed Plaintiff and left him in

the safe cell fully clothed (Id., Doc. 1, pg. 5). Plaintiff

continued to be combative until Warden Culliver arrived

approximately two hours later and escorted Plaintiff out of the

safe cell to be examined (Doc. 9, pg. 4). During the

examination, it was discovered that Plaintiff’s wrist had been

broken in the struggle. Surgery was required to repair

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4 Plaintiff makes no allegations of inadequate medical

care or treatment.

5 Defendant Randal Lucas is currently deployed in the Iraq

vicinity. Therefore, Defendant Lucas has not been served with

the Complaint (Doc. 9, pg. 10-11, Affidavit of Warden Jerry

Ferrell). However, after taking Plaintiff’s allegations as

true, the Court finds no constitutional violations and

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lucas are DISMISSED. 

4

Plaintiff’s wrist, which was set with two metal pins and six

stitches (Id.)4. 

On December 22, 2003, Plaintiff filed suit against

Correctional Officer Lucas and Lt. Williams (Doc. 1). Plaintiff

alleges that both Defendants violated his 8

th and 14th Amendment

rights. Each defendant is being sued in their official and

individual capacities (Doc. 1, pg. 5). 

In the Special Report and Answer filed on behalf of

Defendants5 on May 24, 2004, Defendants deny Plaintiff’s

allegations of constitutional rights violations and assert the

defenses of sovereign and qualified immunity (Doc. 9).

Furthermore, Defendants respond that they used only the amount

of force necessary to restrain and control Plaintiff, thereby

barring Plaintiff’s Eight Amendment claim (Doc. 9, pgs. 2-3).

On November 29, 2004, the Court ordered that Defendants’

Special Report and Answer be treated as a Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 10). The Court advised Plaintiff that he could

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5

file a response to the motion, and on January 28, 2005,

Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment, as well as several affidavits, reasserting the

claims alleged in his Complaint (Docs. 13, 14, 15).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary

judgment shall be granted:

if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is

entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A factual dispute is “genuine” if the

evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict

for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477

U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is “material” if it “might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing [substantive] law.”

Id.; accord Tipton v. Bergrohr GMBH-Siegen, 965 F.2d 994, 998

(11th Cir. 1992). Moreover, what are considered to be the

“‘facts’ at the summary judgment stage may not turn out to be

the actual facts if the case goes to trial, but those are the

facts at this stage of the proceeding for summary judgment

purposes.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1486 (11th Cir.

1996). 

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The basic issue before the Court on a motion for summary

judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is

so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52. “If reasonable minds could differ

on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then a court

should deny summary judgment.” Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery

Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992). The moving

party has the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue

as to any material fact, and, in deciding whether the movant has

met this burden, the Court must view the movant’s evidence and

all factual inferences arising from it in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970); Tipton, 965 F.2d at 998-99. In

addition to demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of

material fact, the movant must also satisfy the ultimate burden

of persuasion on the claim by showing that it would be entitled

to a directed verdict at trial. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta,

2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993). 

Once the movant satisfies its initial burden under Rule

56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmovant to “come forward with

‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

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7

U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis omitted). “‘[T]he evidence of

the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences

are to be drawn in his favor.’” Tipton, 965 F.2d at 999

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255). However, “[a] mere

‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position

will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the

jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby,

911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990). “Where the record taken

as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for

the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.

Moreover, the non-movant bears “the burden of coming

forward with sufficient evidence on each element that must be

proved.” Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080

(11th Cir. 1990) (emphasis in original). If “a party . . .

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that

party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” Rule 56(c)

mandates that summary judgment be entered against that party.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

III. DISCUSSION

In this action, Plaintiff seeks redress pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional deprivations arising

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6 Despite Plaintiff’s reference to alleged violations of

both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is the Eighth

Amendment that applies here, as Plaintiff is a convicted

prisoner. Further, “the standard for providing basic human

8

from force used to subdue him on July 4, 2002, while he was

incarcerated at Fountain prison. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to

establish any constitutional violation by Defendants; thus, it

is recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED.

In his Complaint, Plaintiff names Lt. Williams and

Correctional Officer Lucas as defendants in this case. He

asserts that they used excessive force against him in trying to

remove his clothing once he was placed in the safe cell. In

order to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in a §

1983 action, a Plaintiff must establish a causal connection

between each defendant’s actions, orders, customs, policies, or

breaches of statutory duty and the alleged deprivation of his

constitutional rights. Boglin v. Weaver, 2001 WL 228172, *14

(S.D. Ala. 2001). 

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Williams and Lucas

violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that they

broke his wrist while attempting to subdue him in the safe

cell.6 Defendants deny Plaintiff’s allegations of excessive

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needs to those incarcerated or in detention is the same under

both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Marsh v. Butler

County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1024 n. 5 (11th Cir. 2001) (en

banc). Therefore, only the Eighth Amendment is addressed

herein. 

 

7 Plaintiff states he is suing defendants in their

official and individual capacities (Doc. 1, at 5). As state

officials, Defendants are absolutely immune from suit for

damages in their official capacities. See Harbert Int’l, Inc.

v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998) (state

officials sued in their official capacities are protected from

suit for damages under the Eleventh Amendment). Moreover,

“[q]ualified immunity protects government officials performing

discretionary functions from suits in their individual

capacities unless their conduct violates ‘clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991,

994 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,

739 (2002)). In determining whether qualified immunity is

appropriate in a given case, “[t]he court must first ask the

threshold question whether the facts alleged, taken in the

light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, show that the

government official’s conduct violated a constitutional

right.” Dalrymple, 334 F.3d at 995 (citing Saucier v. Katz,

533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). Having found herein that

Plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a constitutional

violation, “there is no necessity for further inquiries

concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

9

force and assert the defenses of sovereign and qualified

immunity.7 

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part that: 

Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United

States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall

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be liable to the party injured in an action

at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress. . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 

In addressing an excessive force claim brought under §

1983, the Court begins its analysis “by identifying the specific

constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged

application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394

(1989). Because Plaintiff has been adjudicated guilty of a crime

and is serving a sentence of confinement, the Eighth Amendment,

which attaches “after conviction and sentence,” applies to this

case and protects Plaintiff from punishment that is cruel and

unusual. Graham, 490 U.S. at 392 n.6; see also Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Specifically, the

Eighth Amendment “prohibits the unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain, . . . the infliction of pain totally without

penological justification. . . , [and] the infliction of

punishment grossly disproportionate to the severity of the

offense.” Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 321 (11th Cir. 1987)

(citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981)). 

In order to establish an Eighth Amendment claim, a

Plaintiff must prove both an objective and subjective component.

First, Plaintiff must show that the alleged wrongdoing was

objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional

violation, and, second, Plaintiff must show that “the officials

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act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind,” i.e., that

they acted “maliciously or sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson

v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1992). Analysis of an Eight

Amendment claim of use of excessive force is contextual and

requires that many factors be considered: the need for the

application of force, the relationship between that need and the

amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the

responsible official, any efforts to temper the severity of a

forceful response, and the extent of injury suffered. Only de

minimis uses of force are beyond the constitutional recognition

of the Eight Amendment. Harris v. Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 505

(11th Cir. 1996).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, the question is whether a jury could reasonably

conclude that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights under the

Eighth Amendment. Under the circumstances of this case, the

Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to establish a

constitutional violation. Plaintiff herein admits that he

smoked a marijuana cigarette, and that the effects of such made

him act in a insensible manner, including yelling loudly in his

cell. (Doc. 13, pg. 6). Plaintiff states that he “had

unconsciously began acting loudly vocally [sic], and was doing

so because I was under the drugs (insensible) [sic] influences.”

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(Doc. 15, pg. 2). Once Defendants and other officers arrived

at Plaintiff’s cell to transport him to the health care unit,

he was still talking in a loud manner (Id.). Plaintiff

acknowledges that once at the health care unit, he refused

repeated orders to unclothe (Id. At 7). Instead of obeying the

officers’ directives, Plaintiff questioned why he was being told

to remove his clothing. After refusing to remove his clothes

and continuing to speak in a belligerent manner towards the

officers, Defendant Williams attempted to remove Plaintiff’s

clothing. In his affidavit, Plaintiff does not dispute that a

struggle ensued, or that he struck Defendant Williams several

times (Doc. 15, pg. 7). Plaintiff in essence contends that

Defendant Williams provoked the struggle by attempting to force

him to disrobe in front of a female officer. While Plaintiff

contends that Defendants’ use of force and his resulting wrist

injury amounted to a constitutional violation, the undersigned

disagrees. 

In assessing the factors enumerated above, specifically,

the threat reasonably perceived by Defendants, the need for the

use of force, and Defendants’ motive in using force, it is

evident that Plaintiff’s bizarre behavior in speaking loudly and

yelling justified the Defendants and other officers’ decision

to remove Plaintiff from the general population and place him

in a safe cell. Then, when Plaintiff repeatedly refused to obey

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orders to disrobe, he created a situation which undermined

Defendants’ goal of placing Plaintiff in a safe cell for

evaluation. Likewise, when Plaintiff forcefully struck and

injured Defendant Williams, a real and substantial threat to his

safety arose. As the Supreme Court has stated, “officials

confronted with a prison disturbance must balance the threat

unrest poses to inmates, prison workers, administrators, and

visitors against the harm inmates may suffer if guards use

force. Despite the weight of these competing concerns,

corrections officer must make their decisions ‘in haste, under

pressure, and frequently without the luxury of a second

chance.’” Hudson v. McMillian, et al., 112 S.Ct. 995, 998, 117

L.Ed.2d 156 (1992), quoting Whitley v. Abers, 475 U.S. 312, 320

(1986). Thus, the need for the use of force in order to secure

Defendant Williams’ safety and to handcuff Plaintiff so that no

further damage or injury could occur was present, and there is

no indication that Defendant Lucas’ motives in doing so was

anything other than a good faith effort to maintain security and

restore order when being faced with a situation in which

immediate action was needed. Defendant Lucas did not err in

applying force to defuse the situation. Furthermore, at that

point, Defendant Williams was injured and was unable to use any

force whatsoever against Plaintiff.

With respect to the amount of force used, particularly

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Defendant Lucas’ use of his baton, the Court is mindful that,

while an inmate must be protected from the “unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain by prison officials,” prison officials

must maintain order and discipline “in an often dangerous and

unruly environment.” Ort, 813 F.2d at 321-22 (internal

quotations omitted). Thus, prison officials must be extended

deference in acting to insure the proper administration, safety,

and security of a penal institution. Id. “The infliction of

pain in the course of a prison security measure, therefore, does

not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may

appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or

applied for security purposes was unreasonable, and hence

unnecessary in the strict sense.” Id. at 323. With these

considerations in mind, the Court finds that Defendant Lucas’

use of the baton was applied for the purpose of restoring order

and was not excessive. Indeed, in the face of the grave

possibility of further harm to Defendant Williams, such force

was necessary. Of course, immediately following Plaintiff’s

blows to Defendant Williams’ jaw, Defendant Williams was not

in a position to protect himself, let alone observe Defendant’s

Lucas’ actions to protect him from further harm. Considering

all of the factors enumerated above, Plaintiff’s allegations

simply do not support his claim that he was subjected to

excessive force.

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If a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish

the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and

on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,”

Rule 56(c) mandates that summary judgment be entered against the

nonmovant. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. “No material issues

can be in dispute where the Plaintiff’s evidence fails to

establish a constitutional violation.” Bennett v. Parker, 898

F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1990). Therefore, since no

constitutional violation has been established, Defendants’

Motions for Summary Judgment are due to be granted.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment in their favor on all claims

asserted against them by Plaintiff. Accordingly, it is

recommended that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment be

GRANTED and that the entirety of Plaintiff’s Complaint against

Defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice.

The attached sheet contains important information regarding

objections to the Report and Recommendation.

DONE this 20th day of September 2005.

 /s/ SONJA F. BIVINS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or

anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service of

this document, file specific written objections with the clerk

of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by

the district judge of anything in the recommendation and will

bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual findings of the

magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith,

855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988). The procedure for

challenging the findings and recommendations of the magistrate

judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1,

1997), which provides, in part, that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate

judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by filing a "Statement of Objection to

Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation" within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a different

time is established by order. The statement of objection shall

specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection

is made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time of filing the

objection, a brief setting forth the party’s arguments that the

magistrate judge’s recommendation should be reviewed de novo and

a different disposition made. It is insufficient to submit only

a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or

referred to and incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of the

objection may be deemed an abandonment of the objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or judgment

can be appealed.

2. Opposing party’s response to the objection. Any opposing

party may submit a brief opposing the objection within ten (10)

days of being served with a copy of the statement of objection.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72; SD ALA LR 72.4(b). 

3. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

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this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the

fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial determination

that transcription is necessary is required before the United

States will pay the cost of the transcript.

S/ Sonja F. Bivins 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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