Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01778/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01778-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Wilhelmina Trimble
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

WILHELMINA TRIMBLE, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:13-cv-1778-EFB 

ORDER 

 

 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her applications for a period of disability and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) and for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Titles II and XVI of the 

Social Security Act. The parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. For the 

reasons discussed below, the court grants plaintiff’s motion, denies defendant’s motion, and 

remands the matter for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on March 24, 2011, 

2011, alleging that she had been disabled since December 15, 2010. Administrative Record 

(“AR”) 172-185. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Id. at 

87-91, 94-99. On February 14, 2012, and July 2, 2012, hearings were held before administrative 

law judge (“ALJ”) Trevor Skarda. Id. at 29-67. Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the 

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hearings, at which she and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified. Id. 

 On July 19, 2012, the ALJ issued a decision finding that plaintiff was not disabled under 

sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act.1 Id. at 12-24. The ALJ made the following 

specific findings: 

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through June 30, 2012. 

2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 15, 

2010, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.). 

3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: plantar fasciitis, Achilles 

contractures, obesity, and hypertension (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)). 

 1

 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) is paid 

to disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Under both provisions, 

disability is defined, in part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to 

“a medically determinable physical or mental impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 

1382c(a)(3)(A). A five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits. See 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 423(d)(1)(a), 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The 

following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

 Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

 Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

 Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

 Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

 Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled. 

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

 

 The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5. The Commissioner bears the burden if the sequential 

evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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* * * 

4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 

416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926). 

* * * 

5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned find that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). The claimant may occasionally climb, balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme 

cold. She must avoid moderate exposure to wetness and humidity. She requires a 

handheld assistive device for ambulation for any distance that exceeds 100 feet. 

* * * 

6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a customer service 

supervisor. This work does not require the performance of work-related activities 

precluded by the claimant’s residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 

416.965). 

* * * 

7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, 

from December 15, 2010, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) 

and 416.920(f)). 

Id. at 14-23. 

 Plaintiff’s request for Appeals Council review, id. at 8, was denied on July 18, 2013, 

leaving the ALJ’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security. Id. at 

1-5. 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS 

 The Commissioner’s decision that a claimant is not disabled will be upheld if the findings 

of fact are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the proper legal standards were 

applied. Schneider v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 223 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2000); 

Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999); Tackett v. Apfel, 

180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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 The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are 

conclusive. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 847 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantial evidence is 

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th 

Cir. 1996). “‘It means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. 

N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

 “The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 

testimony, and resolving ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 

2001) (citations omitted). “Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational 

interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” 

Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). 

III. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in (1) rejecting her treating and examining physicians’ 

opinions that she has standing and walking limitations; (2) failing to consider whether plaintiff 

meets or equals Listing 1.02A; and (3) failing to consider the side effects of plaintiff’s 

medications. 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the medical opinions of treating physician 

Dr. Tanson and examining physician Dr. Van Kirk without providing legally sufficient reasons. 

ECF No. 14-1 at 12-14. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they 

are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1996). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating 

professional, who has a greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1295 (9th Cir. 1996). To evaluate whether an ALJ properly 

rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) 

contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ 

may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for 

“clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining professional may be rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons that are 

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supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally 

is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion 

(e.g., supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. 

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 

747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). However, “[w]hen an examining physician relies on the same clinical 

findings as a treating physician, but differs only in his or her conclusions, the conclusions of the 

examining physician are not ‘substantial evidence.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 

2007). 

 On October 24, 2011, plaintiff’s treating physician Dr. Gabriel Tanson completed a 

medical report of work-related impairments. AR 311-315. He indicated that he had been treating 

plaintiff since February 2011. Id. at 311. He diagnosed plaintiff with plantar fasciitis, Achilles 

contractures, metatarsalgia, and Morton’s neuroma, which he treated with pain medication, 

podiatry care, a right foot boot, and Achilles stretching. Id. Dr. Tanson opined that plaintiff 

could occasionally lift up to 10 pounds, but never carry any weight; could sit, stand, and walk for 

one hour in an eight-hour workday; occasionally perform simple grasping with her right hand; 

occasionally push and pull; and occasionally stoop, but never climb, crouch, kneel, or crawl. Id. 

at 12-13. He further opined that plaintiff should avoid all exposure to heights and moving 

machinery, and avoid concentrated exposure to vibrations, noise, dust, fumes, odors, and smoke. 

Id. at 314. 

 Plaintiff underwent a comprehensive orthopedic evaluation on March 6, 2012, by Dr. Dale 

Van Kirk. Id. at 370. Dr. Van Kirk diagnosed plaintiff with Achilles tendonitis in her right ankle, 

and chronic lumbosacral musculoligamentous strain/sprain. Id. at 373. On examination, plaintiff 

displayed satisfactory tandem walking and toe and heel walking, but could only squat one-third of 

the way due to pain. Id. at 372. She had full range of motion on her left side, but reduced range 

of motion in her right ankle. Id. at 372-373. Her motor strength, sensation, and reflexes were 

normal; however, Dr. Kirk did not test the right ankle because of pain. Id. at 373. In his narrative 

report, Dr. Kirk opined that plaintiff could stand and/or walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; 

sit without limitations; lift 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, and occasionally 

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bend, stoop, crouch, climb, kneel, balance, crawl, and push or pull. Id. at 373-374. He further 

opined that plaintiff should use her fracture boot to help decrease pain when walking on uneven 

terrain, use her cane for ambulation, and avoid extreme cold and/or damp environments. Id. at 

373. 

 Dr. Kirk also completed a check-box form statement. Id. at 636-638. He indicated that 

plaintiff could only sit, stand, and walk for one hour at a time without interruption, walk only 100 

feet without the use of a cane, and would not be able to walk a block at a reasonable pace on 

rough or uneven surfaces due to right ankle pain. Id. at 368. 

 In assessing plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ accorded “very little weight” to Dr. Tanson’s 

opinion, while giving significant weight to Dr. Kirk’s narrative opinion. Id. at 21-22. However, 

the ALJ gave reduced weight to Dr. Kirk’s opinion that plaintiff could only walk, stand, or sit for 

one hour at a time. Id. at 21. 

 Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by ignoring Dr. Kirk’s opinion that plaintiff could 

not walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces. ECF No. 14-1 at 14. Plaintiff 

contends that by ignoring this opinion, the ALJ failed to meet his burden of providing specific 

and legitimate reasons for his implicit rejection of the finding. Id. 

 The Commissioner does not dispute that the ALJ failed to address Dr. Kirk’s opinion that 

plaintiff lacked the ability to walk one block on rough or uneven terrain. The Commissioner, 

however, attempts to side-step the problem by contending that the “ALJ properly distinguished 

Dr. Van Kirk’s narrative opinion from the check-box form, and where they diverged [the ALJ] 

logically gave more weight to the narrative opinion and reduced weight to the form.” ECF No. 15 

at 6. The ALJ, however, did not state that he was according superior weight to Dr. Kirk’s 

narrative opinion. Nor did he identify or acknowledge any conflict between Dr. Kirk’s narrative 

opinion and the check the box opinion. Instead, the ALJ singled out an opinion from the checkbox form—the opinion that plaintiff could only sit, stand, and walk for one hour at a time—and 

explained that the opinion was given reduced weight because it was not supported by plaintiff’s 

normal gait findings, minimal radiological findings, and conservative treatment. AR 21. 

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 Furthermore, Dr. Kirk’s opinion that plaintiff lacked the ability to walk a block at a 

reasonable pace on rough or uneven surfaces does not appear to be inconsistent with any of the 

limitations discussed in his narrative opinion. In his narrative opinion, Dr. Kirk stated that 

plaintiff should use her fracture boot and cane “mainly when she is out and about for even and 

uneven terrain” to reduce pain in her right ankle. Id. at 374. Dr. Kirk’s finding that plaintiff 

would need assistive devices for walking on both even and uneven surfaces is not inconsistent 

with his opinion that plaintiff cannot walk a block at a reasonable pace on rough or uneven 

surfaces. Furthermore, while the ALJ found that plaintiff should use a handheld assistive device 

when walking more than 100 feet, his RFC does not include the need to use an assistive boot for 

ambulation.2 Therefore, inconsistency in the opinion cannot serve as a “clear and convincing,” or 

even “specific and legitimate” explanation for rejecting Dr. Kirk’s opinion. 

The ALJ failed to provide reasons for implicitly rejecting portions of Dr. Kirk’s opinion 

regarding plaintiff’s limitations in ambulation. Accordingly, the matter must remanded for 

further consideration of the medical evidence.3 

IV. CONCLUSION 

 The ALJ erred by not providing legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Dr. Kirk’s 

opinion. Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that: 

 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is granted; 

 2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment is denied; 

 3. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this order; and 

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 2

 In his decision, the ALJ states that his opinion accounted for Dr. Kirk and Dr. Tanson’s 

finding that plaintiff needed a cane and Cam boot. AR 22-23. However, the ALJ’s RFC 

determination only states that plaintiff needs a handheld assistive devise for ambulation greater 

than 100 feet. The RFC makes no mention of the need for a Cam boot. 

3

 As the matter must be remanded for further consideration of the medical record, the 

court declines to address plaintiff’s remaining argument. 

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 4. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in the plaintiff’s favor. 

DATED: March 19, 2015. 

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