Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-01088/USCOURTS-almd-1_04-cv-01088-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Willie Mae Hammonds
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE MAE HAMMONDS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) 1:04-CV-01088-DRB

) [WO]

JO ANNE B. BARNHART )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Willie Mae Hammonds (“Hammonds”) appeals from a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”) denying her application for supplemental

security income under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. Considered examination of the record,

briefs, and the relevant law inform the court’s conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision should

be affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

Hammonds’ application on December17, 2002, alleged the onset of disability on August 1,

2002. Denied administratively and represented by counsel, Hammonds received a requested hearing

before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Upon receipt of additional evidence, the ALJ rendered

an unfavorable decision.

Hammonds, age 51 at the time of the hearing, testified that she has a sixth grade education

and is able to read and write. Because she has no past relevant work experience, the ALJ found that

Hammonds has not engaged in substantial gainful work since the alleged onset date of disability. The

ALJ determined that Hammonds has diabetes, hypertension, degenerative disc disease, osteoarthritis

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 1 of 14
R. 21, 24-28. The ALJ’s disability analysis followed the five-step sequential evaluation 1

process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 and summarized in Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232

(11 Cir. 2004). th

R. 223. 2

2

and leg and back pain. Although he described all of these conditions as “severe” impairments, after

considering them individually and in combination, he concluded that they did not meet or equal in

severity any impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Appendix 1 to Subpart P. Hammonds’

allegations of pain and functional limitations were deemed “not credible.” Acknowledging the

absence of any “past relevant work experience”, the ALJ proceeded to step five of the five-step

sequential evaluation process. After considering Hammonds’ age, education, and work experience,

in reliance on the Medical Vocational Guidelines, the ALJ found her able to perform a full range of

light work and, consequently, not disabled under the Social Security Act.1

In response to the ALJ’s adverse decision on March 9, 2004, Hammonds presented to the

Appeals Council purportedly “new and material” evidence from her treating physician, Dr. Riley, who

rendered opinions to the ALJ regarding Hammonds’ residualfunctionalcapacity; Dr. Riley continued

to opine that Hammonds is disabled and unable to perform any type of employment. In reliance on

these opinions, Hammonds argued, inter alia:

In his decision, the ALJ noted that prior to rendering his decision, the ALJ contacted

the claimant’s representative regarding his concerns over Dr. Riley’s

questionnaire...The ALJ was informed that appropriate steps were taken to obtain

information from Dr. Riley regarding the ALJ’s concerns. Enclosed...are the

statements obtained from Dr. Riley regarding the authenticity of all documents in

question and the consistency of Dr. Riley’s statements...The claimant respectfully

submits that these enclosed documentssupport Dr. Riley’s original questionnaire and

therefore the ALJ committed reversible error in failing to give Dr. Riley’s

questionnaire controlling weight.2

The Appeals Council did consider this information but disagreed with Hammonds’ assessment

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 2 of 14
3

that it provided a basis for changing the ALJ’s decision. Finding no reason to review the ALJ’s

decision, the Appeals Council denied Hammonds’ request. Consequently, the Appeals Council’s

order denying review is a “finaldecision” of the Commissioner under 42 U.S.C. §405(g). This appeal

to the United States District Court is timely and proceeds pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and 28

U.S.C. §636(c).

 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefitsislimited. The court cannot

conduct a de novo review or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Walden v.

Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835 (11 Cir. 1982). This court must find the Commissioner’s decision th

conclusive “if it is supported by substantial evidence and the correct legal standards were applied.”

Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F. 3d 1211, 1213 (11 Cir. 1999), citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F. 3d 1420, 1422 th

(11 Cir. 1997). th

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely

create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable

person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560

(11th Cir. 1995), citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson

v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).

If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will

affirm, even if the court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the court

findsthat the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937

F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into

account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord,

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 3 of 14
4

Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177 (11th Cir.

1986). 

 The district court will reverse a Commissioner’s decision on plenary review if the decision

applies incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide the district court with sufficient reasoning to

determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Department of Health and

Human Services, 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). The case may be remanded to the

Commissioner for a rehearing under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g); under sentence six of 42

U.S.C. § 405 (g); or under both sentences. Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1089 - 92, 1095, 1098

(11th Cir. 1996). 

In deciding whether the Commissioner erred in denying review of the ALJ’s decision, the

court also must consider additional evidence considered and made a part of the record by the

Appeals Council in denying requested review. The Appeals Council will review a case if there

appears to be an abuse of discretion by the ALJ, if there is an error of law, or if the ALJ’s action,

findings, or conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1470; see also,

Parker v. Bowen, 788 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The Appeals Council’s denial of

review is subject to judicial review to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. Parker, 788

F. 2d at 1520.

III. ISSUES

Hammonds specifies four issues for review:

1. Whether the ALJ’s finding that [she] retains the residual functional capacity to

perform light work is based on substantial evidence;

2. Whether the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider the side effects of [her]

medications; 

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 4 of 14
Pl.’s Br. at 3-7. 3

5

3. Whether the ALJ erred by relying solely on the Medical Vocational Guidelines, in the

presence of non-exertional impairments; and

4. Whether the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council warrants remand.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Assessment of RFC for Full Range of Light Work 

Assessment of RFC falls squarely within the ALJ’s province, but it must be based upon all 

relevant evidence of the claimant’s ability to work despite impairments. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.

3d 1436, 1440 (11 Cir. 1997); SSR 96-5p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 2, *5-*7 (“If the case record contains th

an opinion from a medical source on an issue reserved to the Commissioner, the adjudicator must

evaluate all the evidence in the case record to determine the extent to which the opinion is supported

by the record.”); SSR 96-6p (Although ALJ responsible for assessing RFC, the ALJ “must consider

and evaluate any assessment of the individual’s RFC by a State agency medical or psychological

consultant and by other program physicians...RFC assessments by State agency medical...consultants

or other program physicians...are to be considered and addressed in the decision as medical opinions

from nonexamining sources...”).

Hammond argues that no substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s assessment of her RFC

for a fullrange of light work because the ALJ “rejected the only RFC assessment of record completed

by a treating physician”, Dr. Clark Riley, and also “failed to mention [her] spinal stenosis with

possible neuro-claudication....” . Analysis of the record readily buttresses the court’s rejection of 3

this argument. 

 The ALJ “afforded no weight” to Dr. Riley’s opinions in the Physical Residual Functional

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 5 of 14
Hammonds makes the meritless contention – for the first time in her reply brief – that the 4

ALJ “also failed to accord weight to Dr. Mockler, a treating physician, or Dr. Roberts.” Pl.’s Reply

Br. at 2. Neither Dr. Mockler nor Glen Roberts, D.O. rendered any opinions on Hammonds’

functional limitations. The ALJ summarized both Dr. Mockler’s treatment notes for Hammonds’

(continued...)

6

Capacity Questionnaire dated October 8, 2003 (“Questionnaire”) for reasons which are clearly

articulated, substantiated, and adequate:

The questionnaire was not fully completed. Approximately one-third (1/3) of the

questions were ignored and left blank. The undersigned finds the omitted questions

represent some of the most important questions in the questionnaire, as they relate

to the assessment of the claimant’s physical residual functional capacity. Dr. Riley

failed to describe the nature, frequency and length of contact (question #1), list a

prognosis (question #3), identify clinical findings and objective signs (question #6),

describe the claimant’s treatment and response to same (question #7), describe the

degree that the claimant is able to tolerate work stress (question #14), or describe the

claimant’s limitations in use of hands/fingers/arms for repetitive tasks (question

#15(m)). Also, of those questions answered, many of the responses were nonsensensical [sic] and not logically responding to the question asked. For example,

question #15(h) asks what percentage of time during an eight (8) hour workday

should the legs be elevated. Dr. Riley responded, “at least”. Finally, the undersigned

finds that Dr. Riley’s responses on the questionnaire are inconsistent with his own

treatment records and the record as a whole. In question #11, Dr. Riley identifies the

psychological condition of depression as affecting the claimant’s physical condition.

Dr. Riley’s medical treatment records, however, do not contain a single reference to

the claimant being diagnosed with or suffering from depression. Also, on the PRFC

form Dr. Riley identifiessevere restrictions on the claimant’s performance of activity,

i.e., the claimant is only able to sit for thirty (30) minutes at a time and cannot walk

a single city block without rest or severe pain. His medical treatment records, and the

record as a whole, fail to place any restrictions on the claimant’s performance of

activity. In fact, the record contradicts such an assessment. As previously stated, the

claimant expressed that her legs hurt if she does a lot of walking. Further, she

testified that she is able to sit for two (2) to (3) hours at a time, “alright”. 

(R. 26). (emphasis added)

 Hammonds does not challenge any of these explicit reasons but merely questions the ALJ’s

rejection of Dr. Riley’s opinions in the absence of an RFC assessment from another treating

physician or an examining physician. As this court has instructed previously, the ALJ is not duty 4

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 6 of 14
(...continued) 4

alleged neuropathy of both upper extremities and Dr. Roberts’ report for his treatment on October

28, 2002.(R.22). 

See Mitchell v. Barnhart, No. 2:04-cv-0081-DRB , Mem. Op. at 6 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 28, 5

2005) (“Mitchell also claims reversible error in the ALJ’s failure to obtain an assessment of her RFC

by a treating or examining doctor, ... The court deems it necessary to address this contention only

to correct Mitchell’s erroneous assertion that a treating or examining doctor’s statement is a

necessary requirement for the ALJ’sformulation of her RFC.”), citing Lewis v. Callahan; 20 C.F.R.

404.1545; SSR 96-5p, SSR No. 96-8p. 

Spinal stenosis is a narrowing of the vertebral canal, nerve root canals, or intervertebral 6

foramina of the lumbar spine caused by encroachment of bone upon the space; symptoms include

pain, paresthesias, and neurogenic claudication (i.e., limping or lameness accompanied by pain and

parethesias in the back, buttocks, and legs that is relieved by stooping. Dorlands Medical Dictionary

339, 1576 (28 ed 1994). th

Pl.’s Br. at 6. 7

R. 185. 8

R. 21-24. 9

7

bound to adopt an assessment of a claimant’s RFC from any source.5

Regarding her spinal stenosis and possible neuro-claudication, Hammond deems the ALJ’s

6

omitted reference significant because the condition “would preclude her basic ability to stand or walk

for the ‘six hours in an eight hour day’ as required by the RFC found by the ALJ.” Based on his 7

consultative examination on March 26, 2003, Dr. Vyas listed among six diagnostic impressions:

“osteoarthritis with degenerative disc disease causing spinal stenosis of lumbar spine and possible

neuro-claudation while she stands up. There is no evidence of neurological impairment clinically.”8

The ALJ did include the diagnosed osteoarthritis and degenerative disc disease as severe

impairments along with back and leg pain. Hammonds did not provide any probative testimony or 9

other evidentiary basis, however, for the ALJ’s consideration of her “spinal stenosis with possible

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 7 of 14
See 20 C.F.R. §404.1512(a)(“In general, you have to prove to us that you are ... disabled. 10

Therefore, you must bring to our attention everything that shows that you are... disabled.”); McCray

v. Massanari, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2001)(substantial evidence supports ALJ’s

finding of no disability despite ALJ’s failure “to discuss[claimant’s] complaints of chronic back pain,

[where] there is scant medical evidence to support the complaint...[and the claimant] did not indicate

at the hearing that his claims of disability were premised on back pain or that he had functional

limitations therefrom.”); Street v. Barnhart, No. 04-15077, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 8938, **15-**18

(11 Cir. May 18, 2005)(finding no error in ALJ’s failure to discuss severity of diagnosed mental th

impairment where claimant, represented by counsel, failed to list any mental impairment in his

application for benefits, nor did he testify at the hearing that he suffered fromany mental impairments

that would prevent him from working).

Pl.’s Br. at 7-8, citing R. 118-120, 126, 158, 174, 181. 11

Def.’s Br. at 12, citing R. 158, 174, 181. 12

Two years prior to Hammonds’ onset date, Dr. Karen Mockler reported on a progress note 13

dated June 20, 2000: “With the hormonal therapy she sometimes feels a little dizziness.” (R.

(continued...)

8

neuro-claudication” as a functionally restrictive impairment separate and distinct from the diagnosis

stated by Dr. Vyas. In sum, the court finds that substantial evidence sufficiently undergirds the 10

ALJ’s RFC formulation for Hammonds. 

B. Consideration of Side Effects of Medications

Citing to seven referenced “complain[ts] of ‘dizziness’ to her physicians on numerous

occasions,” Hammonds claims reversible error for the ALJ’s alleged failure to find that this

medication side effect “could render [her] disabled or at least contribute to her disability.” The 11

Commissioner responds that “only three of those reports occurred near or after her alleged onset

date” and the “record does not support a finding that [Hammonds] experienced significant side 12

effects from her medications.” 

 Scrutiny of the specified reports discloses no basis for the claimed error: no correlation

is shown between any of Hammond’s “dizziness” complaints and her prescribed medications;13

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 8 of 14
(...continued) 13

119)(emphasis added). This single reference is insufficient. Similarly inadequate is Dr. Riley’s posthearing opinion in a “Physical Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire dated March 29, 2004,

and submitted to the Appeals Council. See Falge v. Apfel, 150 F. 3d 1320, 1323 (11 Cir. th

1998)(When the Appeals Council denies review, the court will only look to evidence actually

presented to the ALJ in determining whether theALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence).

On the Questionnaire actually reviewed by the ALJ ( R. 215), Dr. Riley did not respond to the

inquiry for medication side effects. 

On a Disability Report completed on August 12, 2002, Hammonds does reference her 14

complaint of dizziness as a side effect of a prescribed decongestant, Atuss ( R 85), but this

prescription is not included on the current medication list submitted at the hearing. See R. 41-42

(Hammonds’ relevant testimony).

See e.g., French v. Massanari, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1337-38(M.D. Fla. 2001)(finding ALJ 15

did not have a duty to develop record on whether side effects of claimant’s medication contributed

to his disability where only evidence in record is claimant’s testimony that his pain medication makes

him “groggy”); cf. Epps v. Harris, 624 F. 2d 1267, 1272-73 (5 Cir. 1980)(remand warranted th

because incumbent upon ALJto ascertain whether claimant’s prescribed treatment precluded gainful

work activity on a regular and continuing basis where his medical records substantiated the necessary

treatment regimen as at-home traction treatment for two to three times per day for ten to twenty

minutes). 

9

pharmacological descriptions of dizziness as a potential side effect of certain medicines is alone

insufficient; and Hammonds’ testimony did not refer at all to dizziness as a side effect of prescribed

medicines. Consequently, remand is not dictated for the claimed error. 14 15

C. Exclusive Reliance on Medical Vocational Guidelines

The ALJ relied solely on the Medical Vocational Guidelines (“the Grids”) for his nondisability determination grounded on Hammonds’ RFC to perform a full range of light work; age,

sixth grade education, and literacy; and lack of past relevant work and transferable skills. The ALJ

erred in not securing testimony from a vocational expert, Hammonds contends, since she suffers

dizziness, diabetes, hypertension and leg/back pain, as non-exertional impairments. Because the

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 9 of 14
Exclusive reliance on the Gridsis not appropriate if the claimant either is unable to perform 16

a full range of work at a given residual functional level or has non-exertional impairments that

significantly limit basic work skills. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F. 3d 1232, 1242 (11 Cir. 2004). th

Such a non-exertionalimpairment must evidence “limitationsthat prohibit a claimant from performing

‘a wide range’ of work at a given work level,”, in which case the ALJ must consult a vocational

expert. Id.,at 1243; Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11 Cir. 1999); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d th

1553 (11 Cir. 1995). th

Pl.’s Br. at 9, citing Gray v. Massanari, No. CA 00-0739-CB-C, 2001 WL 530704 (S.D. 17

Ala. May 1, 2001) and Ezell v. Massanari, 180 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (S.D. Ala. 2001). After diligent

research, this court cannot identify any Eleventh Circuit caselaw that supports this proposition. See

e.g., Phillips, 357 F. 3d at 1232 (explaining that while ALJ found claimant’s Sjogren’s syndrome and

fibromyalgia to be severe impairments, it is possible claimant suffered exertional limitations that

rendered her unable to perform unlimited types of sedentary work and it is also possible these two

severe impairments did not affect her exertional capabilities at the sedentary level). The district court

caselaw from the Southern District of Alabama, on which Hammonds relies exclusively, is not binding

on this court.

A non-exertional impairment is one which is medically determinable and causes a non- 18

exertional limitation of function. SSR No. 85-15. A limitation is classified as exertional if it affects

the ability to meet the seven strength demands of jobs, i.e. sitting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying,

pushing, and pulling. Non-exertional limitations include difficulty functioning due to nervousness or

anxiety, difficulty maintaining attention and concentration; difficulty seeing or hearing; difficulty

(continued...)

10

ALJ found that Hammonds “could perform a full range of light work activity and had no nonexertional impairments,” the Commissioner argues, he relied properly on the Grids. Undisputed is

the controlling law.16

Because the ALJ found her diabetes, hypertension, and leg/back pain to be severe

impairments, Hammonds argues that he “implicitly found that these nonexertional impairments

significantly limit [her] ability to do basic work skills.” The ALJ never described these severe 17

impairments as non-exertional impairments, and his decision provides no basisfor an implied finding.

Though he did not adopt the “exertional” and “non-exertional” phraseology, the ALJ made specific

findings on Hammond’s functional limitations in each category. After discussing limitations in the 18

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 10 of 14
(...continued) 18

tolerating certain environmental settings such as fumes, or difficulty performing manipulative or

postural functions such as reaching, handling, stooping, and climbing. 20 C.F.R. §404.1569a. They

also include pain limitations. See Phillips, 357 F. 3d at n.11.

R. 25-26; see discussion, supra, on the evidentiaryrecord relating to Hammonds complaints 19

of dizziness. Additionally, in a November 10, 2002 treatment note, Dr. Riley assessed her

hypertension – noted by Dr. Mockler as a possible cause of her dizziness – as controlled. ( R. 127),

and in December 2002, he reported that hypoglycemic symptoms, including dizziness, ceased once

Hammonds began eating her bedtime snack “like she was supposed to” ( R. 174).

11

seven indicators of strength demands which are classified as exertional, he evaluated the evidence

for any non-exertional limitations, which include mental limitations, pain limitations and physical

limitations not encompassed by these strength demands. The ALJ found no disabling mental

limitations or pain limitations, and his consideration of non-exertional physical limitations is apparent

from his conclusion that “the record simply fails to support [Hammonds’] assertions of severe

functional limitations resulting from any of her diagnosed conditions.”19

In sum, the court concludes that substantial evidence support the ALJ’s step five analysis of

Hammonds’ functional limitations, both exertional and non-exertional. Because the ALJ found that

Hammonds can perform a full range of light work and suffers no non-exertional impairment

precluding her ability to engage in a wide range of light work, he did not commit reversible error in

relying exclusively on the Grids.

D. Consideration of New and Material Evidence

The Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision on March 9, 2004, after reviewing

and making a part of the record a March 29, 2004 Physical Residual Functional Capacity

Questionnaire and a one-page letter dated May 20, 2004, both completed by Hammonds’ treating

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 11 of 14
R. 6-9. 20

Pl.’s Br. at 10-13. For a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the claimant 21

must establish that (1) there is new, non-cumulative evidence; (2) the evidence is material because

it is relevant and probative so there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative

result; and (3) there is good cause for failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level. Vega

v. Commissioner of Social Security, 265 F. 3d 1214 (11 Cir. 2001); Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, th

1323 (11 Cir. 1998). Failure to establish any of these elements means that remand is not th

appropriate. Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763, 766 (11th Cir. 1987).

Def.’s Br. at 13-14. Materiality of the evidence requires "a reasonable possibility that the 22

new evidence would change the administrative outcome." Hyde v. Bowen, 823 F.2d at 459. An

additional implicit requirement of materiality is that the new evidence “relates to the period on or

before the date of the administrative law judge hearing decision.” 20 C.F.R. §416.1470(b). 

Def.’s Br. at 13. 23

12

physician, Dr. Clark Riley. Hammonds contends that these post-hearing submissions satisfy the 20

requirements of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and the applicable caselaw. Noting that the Appeals Council 21

did, in fact, consider these two pieces of evidence, the Commissioner argues principally that the

evidence fails to satisfy the non-cumulative prong and the materiality prong of the three-pronged

standard for remand articulated by the Eleventh Circuit.22

Regarding the non-cumulative nature of the records which were indisputably not before the

ALJ, the Commissioner contends that the post-hearing submission “is essentially the same as the first

[Questionnaire completed byDr. Riley] with onlya few minor changes.” The record before the ALJ 23

did contain opinions by Dr. Riley set forth on an identicalQuestionnaire form, dated October 8, 2003.

The ALJ discredited the initial Questionnaire, in part, because it did include complete responses and

the “omitted questions represent some of the most important questions in the questionnaire, as they

relate to the assessment of the claimant’s physical residual functional capacity”, including notation

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 12 of 14
R. 26. 24

Def.’s Br. at 13; Pl.’s Br. at 12; Pl.’s Reply Br. at 11. 25

Def.’s Br. at 14. 26

R. 27. 27

13

of the clinical and objective findings that support the physician’s opinions. Scrutiny of the March 24

29, 2004 Questionnaire reflects the same deficiency.

With respect to the materiality prong, the Commissioner contends that Dr. Riley’s second

Questionnaire “was still incomplete and did not include supporting evidence for the conclusions

contained within it” and thus, “it would not have changed the result at the administrative level”. 

Hammonds responds that the Questionnaire is material “because it demonstrates the severity of [her]

impairments and provides a medicalsource opinion that she is not able to perform work on a regular

continuing basis” and thus, “would likely change the administrative outcome.” Regarding Dr. 25

Riley’s post-hearing letter, the Commissioner concedes that the letter “authenticated the two

[Questionnaires]” but argues that it “did not provide supporting evidence and was conclusory.” 

26

After summarizing his efforts to ascertain the authenticityofthe initialQuestionnaire, the ALJ

concluded: “...although not completely convinced of the veracity of these statements, [ I have] chosen

to ignore these stated inconsistencies, overlook [my] concerns regarding the authenticity of the

document and instead focus on the inconsistencies contained in the document itself.” Thus, 

27

because the ALJ did not rest hisrejection of Dr. Riley’s assessment on authenticity grounds, the court

finds no reasonable possibility for a change in the administrative outcome fromthe post-hearing letter

from Dr. Riley designed to authenticate his initial assessment. Similarly unpersuasive to modify the

administrative outcome would be this doctor’s additional opinions in the same letter; absent any

Case 1:04-cv-01088-DRB Document 18 Filed 02/02/06 Page 13 of 14
14

newly offered “objective” support – the same deficiency which led the ALJ to ignore previously

expressed opinions – Dr. Riley opines that “Hammondssuffers medically determinable impairments”,

“ is disabled” and “is unable to perform any type of employment.”

Because Hammonds simply has not established the materiality of the post-hearing

submissions, the requested remand for consideration of new evidence is not warranted.

V. CONCLUSION

Based on the findings and conclusions detailed in this Memorandum Opinion, the court finds

the decision of the ALJ supported by substantial evidence and a proper application of the law.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

A separate judgment is entered herewith.

Done this 2 day of February, 2006. nd

/s/ Delores R. Boyd

DELORES R. BOYD

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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