Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00174/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cr-00174-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Enrique Calderon-Montes
Defendant
Martha Amelia Gomez
Defendant
Deborah Ann Martinez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

JAMES R. CONOLLY 

Assistant United States Attorney 

501 I Street, Suite 10-100 

Sacramento, CA 95814 

Telephone: (916) 554-2700 

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900 

Attorneys for Plaintiff 

United States of America 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JESUS ENRIQUE CALDERON-MONTES, 

MARTHA AMELIA GOMEZ, 

DEBORAH ANN MARTINEZ, 

 Defendants. 

CASE NO. 2:20-CR-174-TLN 

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

DATE: November 12, 2020 

TIME: 9:30 a.m. 

COURT: Hon. Troy L. Nunley 

This case was set for a status conference on November 12, 2020. By this stipulation, the parties 

request that the Court continue the status conference to January 14, 2021, and to exclude time under 

Local Code T4, as well under the Court’s General Orders, for the reasons set forth below. 

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, suspending all jury trials in the Eastern 

District of California “until further notice.” Pursuant to General Order 611, this Court’s declaration of 

judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council’s Order of April 16, 

2020, continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed district judges to continue all 

criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.1

 This and previous General Orders, as well as the 

declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

1

 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

Case 2:20-cr-00174-TLN Document 28 Filed 11/10/20 Page 1 of 4
 

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Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”). 

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 2:20-cr-00174-TLN Document 28 Filed 11/10/20 Page 2 of 4
 

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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”). 

STIPULATION 

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through defendants’ counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 

14, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between November 12, 2020, and January 14, 2021, under 18 

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4], as well as under the Court’s general orders. 

2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports and related documents, including approximately 170 pages of 

documents. There is also physical evidence associated with this case, including narcotics seized 

during the course of the investigation and arrest. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel or made available for inspection. The government also anticipates producing 

additional discovery in the form of electronic surveillance, including audio and video recordings. 

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review this discovery, as well as 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research applicable law, to consult with their 

clients and to discuss with them potential resolution of their respective cases, to file pretrial 

motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. 

c) Counsel for defendants believe that the failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence. 

d) The government does not object to the continuance. 

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

2

 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020). 

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original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of November 12, 2020 to January 14, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence. 

IT IS SO STIPULATED. 

Dated: November 10, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT 

United States Attorney 

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY 

 JAMES R. CONOLLY 

Assistant United States Attorney 

Dated: November 10, 2020 /s/ CHRISTINA SINHA 

CHRISTINA SINHA 

Assistant Federal Defender 

Counsel for Defendant 

JESUS ENRIQUE CALDERON-MONTES 

Dated: November 10, 2020 /s/ CHRIS COSCA 

CHRIS COSCA 

Counsel for Defendant 

MARTHA AMELIA GOMEZ 

Dated: November 10, 2020 /s/ CLEMENTE JIMÉNEZ 

CLEMENTE JIMÉNEZ 

Counsel for Defendant 

DEBORAH ANN MARTINEZ 

FINDINGS AND ORDER 

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 10th day of November, 2020. 

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