Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01336/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01336-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deputy Sheriff David Yarbrough
Appellant
Deputy Sheriff Donald Richer
Appellant
Hyon Dixon
Appellee
Willie Dixon
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

WILLIE DIXON, HYON DIXON, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

FI LED 

United State1> Cou,:t of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN -7 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 89-1336 

DEPUTY SHERIFF DONALD RICHER, 

DEPUTY SHERIFF DAVID YARBROUGH, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. NO. 88-C-804) 

Phillip A. Vaglica, (Ann A. Maenpaa, Assistant County Attorney, 

Office of the County Attorney of El Paso County, Colorado, with 

him on the briefs), Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for 

Defendants-Appellants. 

Edward J. LaBarre, (Mark J. Rue, with him on the briefs), Colorado 

Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Sheriff's Deputies Donald Richer and David Yarbrough appeal a 

district court order denying their motion for summary judgment on 

qualified immunity and collateral estoppel grounds, in a 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1983 action brought against them by Willie and Hyon Dixon. We 

affirm. 

Appellate Case: 89-1336 Document: 010110012930 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

Willie and Hyon Dixon are married. On November 28, 1987, 

they went to the Oriental King Restaurant and Lounge (the Oriental 

King) in El Paso County, Colorado, with Hyon's brother, Kwan Choe, 

and a family friend, Pyonz Ober. While they were there, Choe 

became angry because Hyon Dixon danced with a man other than her 

husband. Choe threw a chair into some mirrors, causing damage. 

After being subdued, Choe left the restaurant with Ober. 

The Dixons remained at the Oriental King long enough to 

discuss the resulting property damage with a security guard and 

the Oriental King's owner, both of whom the Dixons already knew. 

The Dixons assured them that Choe would pay for any property damage he had caused. The Dixons then left in their blue van. 

The security guard had called the El Paso County's Sheriff's 

office when the disturbance took place. Shortly after the Dixons 

left, Sheriff Deputy Doris Flanigan arrived at the scene and 

questioned the security guard. Flanigan was informed that the 

"Korean male" (Choe) who had caused the damage had left, and that 

the people he had been sitting with were driving a blue van and 

had just left. 

Assuming that Choe had left with the Dixons, Flanigan radioed 

to Deputy Richer, who had just pulled into the Oriental King's 

parking lot. She said "the blue van," and pointed in the direction the van had gone. Richer proceeded after the blue van in his 

police cruiser and stopped it a short distance from the Oriental 

( King. 

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There is considerable dispute over what happened next. For 

purposes of reviewing the denial of summary judgment, we consider 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 

As a result, the Dixons' account, as presented in affidavits, 

depositions .and prior testimony, follows. 

After pulling over, the Dixons both exited the van and began 

to walk back to Richer's car. Over the P.A. system, Richer told 

the Dixons to stop where they were. They complied. Richer then 

got out of his car, drew his handgun, and pointed it at the 

Dixons. Mr. Dixon informed Richer that he was a Department of 

Corrections Officer, and Richer lowered and reholstered his 

weapon. Mr. Dixon went back to the van to obtain his Department 

of Corrections identification, handed it to Richer, and asked 

"Now, could you kindly tell me why we are being stopped?" Instead 

of responding to Mr. Dixon's question, Richer stated "I can care 

less who you work for. Get up against the van." 

Mr. Dixon complied and put his hands up against the van. 

Richer then informed him to spread out from the van. Mr. Dixon 

moved his legs backward. At that point, Richer began to frisk 

him, and, while patting him down, told him to "move them back 

further." Mr. Dixon scooted his legs back even further. Richer 

then kicked Mr. Dixon in the instep, causing him intense pain. 

Dismayed, Mr. Dixon turned toward Richer and asked, "Is that 

f __ ing necessary?" Richer said, "You stay right here," returned 

to his police car, and radioed for a backup. 

Several minutes later, Deputy Yarbrough arrived. The two 

deputies conversed briefly and then walked over to the Dixons. As 

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they did so, Richer again pulled his gun and told Mr. Dixon to get 

back up against the van, and Yarbrough had his nightstick out and 

tapped it menacingly in his hand. Mr. Dixon put his hands up 

against the van. 

The officers. began .. to. pat him. down. again ... Without warning, 

one of them kicked Mr. Dixon again, so forcefully that he started 

to fall. As Mr. Dixon fell, Richer hit him in the stomach with a 

metal flashlight. Once on the ground, the deputies got on top of 

him and began to beat and choke him. 

At this point, Hyon Dixon became hysterical and screamed, 

"Don't hurt my husband. He didn't do anything wrong.'' She saw 

Yarbrough use his nightstick to twist her husband's leg. She 

screamed into Yarbrough's ear, and he pushed her to the ground, 

stepped on one of her legs, and twisted one arm and hand behind 

her back and up to her neck. Terrified, Mrs. Dixon resisted 

Yarbrough's attempts to handcuff her. 

At this point, Flanigan arrived on the scene and assisted 

Yarbrough in handcuffing Mrs. Dixon. Mrs. Dixon screamed at 

Flanigan that Richer and Yarbrough had treated them like animals 

and that they had done nothing wrong. Flanigan assured Mrs. Dixon 

that if she had done nothing wrong, everything would be all right. 

Mrs. Dixon calmed down and allowed herself to be handcuffed. 

Richer and Yarbrough then handcuffed Willie Dixon as well. 

The Dixons were jailed and charged with "Second Degree 

Assault on a Police Officer," a felony, and various misdemeanors. 

They were tried by a jury in state court and acquitted of all 

charges. Subsequent to their acquittal, the Dixons filed this 

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action against Richer and Yarbrough. Their§ 1983 claim alleges 

that the deputies deprived them of various constitutional rights, 

including due process, equal protection, and the right to be free 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Dixons also asserted 

pendent state.claims-of libel,-slander, assault, battery, false 

arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. At the 

close of discovery, Richer and Yarbrough moved for summary judgment. The district court dismissed any§ 1983 claim grounded on 

the Eighth Amendment, but otherwise denied the motion for summary 

judgment. 

II. 

Richer and Yarbrough assert that summary judgment should have 

been granted on the basis of collateral estoppel. They base their 

assertion on the fact that the Colorado court that conducted the 

Dixons' criminal trial ruled, in a pretrial suppression hearing, 

that Richer and Yarbrough had reasonable suspicion to stop and 

probable cause to arrest the Dixons. 

"Under proper circumstances, federal courts accord preclusive 

effect to issues decided by state courts." O'Connor v. City and 

County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 1990). In fact, 

"Congress has specifically required all federal courts to give 

preclusive effect to state-court judgments whenever the courts of 

the State from which the judgments emerged would do so •.•. " 

Allen v. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980) (citing to 28 u.s.c. 

§ 1738). This practice "promote[s] the comity between state and 

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federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the 

federal system." Id. 

Colorado law precludes litigation of an issue if (1) the 

issue was actually litigated and necessarily adjudicated in a 

prior proc.eeding; (2-). the party against-.whom preclusion is sought 

was a party to or was in privity with a party in the prior proceeding; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior 

proceeding; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is sought 

had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 

proceeding. People v. Allee, 740 P.2d 1, 5 (Colo. 1987). 

These requirements have not been met. First, the issues in 

this case were not decided in the prior proceeding. The first 

issue supposedly precluded,· whether Richer and Yarbrough had 

reasonable suspicion to stop the Dixons, is not even in dispute. 

Even if the second issue--whether Richer and Yarbrough had probable cause to arrest the Dixons--were decided in the prior proceeding, it would not preclude litigation of the critical issue 

whether Richer and Yarbrough used unreasonably excessive force in 

arresting the Dixons. 

Second, the Dixons did not have a full and fair opportunity 

in the prior proceeding to litigate the issue of probable cause to 

arrest. They did not have an opportunity to appeal the court's 

ruling on their motion to suppress. Before a final judgment, such 

an interlocutory appeal would have been improper, and after the 

judgment (the Dixons were acquitted), an appeal was rendered moot. 

The district court correctly denied the motion for summary 

judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. 

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.. 

III. 

Richer's and Yarbrough's chief argument on appeal is that the 

district court should have granted their motion for summary judgment on the .. basis of. qualified immunity. "The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that government officials 'generally are 

shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Rozek v. 

Topolnicki, 865 F.2d 1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting Harlow v 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 

The framework for analyzing a claim of qualified immunity on 

summary judgment is as follows. "Once a defendant raises the 

defense of qualified immunity. '[t]he plaintiff carries the 

burden of convincing the court that the law was clearly established.'" Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th Cir. 

1989) (quoting Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988)). The plaintiff must 

"come forward with facts or allegations sufficient to show both 

that the defendant's alleged conduct violated the law and that the 

law was clearly established when the alleged violation occurred." 

Id. (quoting Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 

847 F.2d at 646). The "contours of the right must be sufficiently 

clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is 

doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 

640 (1987). Officials can "not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal developments ••• [or] fairly be said to 

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'know' that the law forbade conduct not previously identified as 

unlawful." Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d at 1456 (quoting Harlow 

v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818). If the plaintiff does not meet 

this initial burden, "the government official is properly spared 

the burden .. and .. expense of proceeding any. .further,11 .. id. at 1457, 

and should be granted summary judgment. On the other hand, if the 

plaintiff demonstrates to the court that the defendant's alleged 

conduct violated a clearly established right, then the "defendant 

assume[s] the normal burden of a movant for summary judgment of 

establishing that no material facts remain in dispute that would 

defeat her or his claim of qualified immunity." Id. 

The claim of qualified immunity presents a question of law; 

"the court cannot avoid the question by framing it as a factual 

issue." Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 

at 646. Moreover, "[t]he court's decision should identify the law 

upon which it relied and state the basis for its conclusion." Id. 

We review de novo the district court's denial to determine whether 

it correctly applied these principles. Osgood v. State Farm 

Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). 

IV. 

Richer and Yarbrough assert their alleged conduct was 

improperly judged by a legal standard that was not clearly 

established at the time of the challenged incident. 

After the incident, but before the district court denied 

defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court issued 

its decision in Graham v. Connor, 109 s.ct. 1865 (1989). The 

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Graham Court held that "all claims that law enforcement officers 

have used excessive force--deadly or not--in the course of an 

arrest, investigatory stop, or other 'seizure' of a free citizen 

should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 'reasonableness' standard, rather than under a 'substantive due process' 

approach." Id. at 1871. 

The Dixons' complaint bases its§ 1983 claim on the alleged 

violation of various constitutional rights, including both the 

Fourteenth and the .Fourth Amendment. However, their response to 

defendants' summary judgment motion focuses solely on the Fourth 

Amendment. R. Vol. I, Tab 4 at 9. The district court analyzed 

the Dixons' claim under the objective reasonableness standard of 

the Fourth Amendment. 

Richer and Yarbrough argue that because Graham was decided 

after the challenged incident, it was not clearly established at 

the time of the incident that the Dixons' excessive force claim 

should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. They argue that at 

the time of the challenged incident the clearly established law in 

the Tenth Circuit was to analyze such allegations of excessive 

force under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; 

therefore, in determining qualified immunity, the district court 

should have applied a substantive due process analysis. 1 In 

1 The substantive due process approach considers the following 

factors: 

1) the relationship between the amount of force used and the 

need presented; 

2) the extent of the injury inflicted; and 

3) the motives of the state officer. 

[footnote continued] 

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support of this argument, they cite our recent decision in Hannula 

v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Their argument misunderstands our pre-Graham approach to 

§ 1983 claims alleging police use of unconstitutionally excessive 

force. Prior.to.Graham, we considered such claims under the 

Fourteenth Amendment when the plaintiff solely alleged "excessive 

force" instead of citing to a specific constitutional provision 

violated. Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d 1453, 1457 (10th Cir. 

1987) ("the constitutional provision on which most courts . 

ground a§ 1983 claim solely alleging excessive use of force by 

state officials is the Fourteenth Amendment") (quoting Gumz v. 

Morrissette, 772 F.2d 1395, 1399 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 

475 U.S. 1123 (1986)) (emphasis added); Hewitt v. City of Truth or 

Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1378 (10th Cir.) (when the plaintiff 

did not articulate a specific constitutional provision violated by 

excessive use of force, the court applied substantive due process 

analysis), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). 

We did not, however, "exclude[] other grounds for relief." 

Trujillo v. Goodman, 825 F.2d at 1457 (applying due process 

analysis since it was the only claim the plaintiff pressed on 

appeal); McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367, 1373 (10th Cir. 1984) 

(en bane) (stating the relevant inquiry should focus on the 

particular constitutional provision at issue). Indeed, nothing in 

the law of this circuit barred a plaintiff from specifically 

[footnote continued] 

See Hewitt v. City of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1379 

(10th Cir. 1985). 

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alleging infringement of her Fourth Amendment right to be free 

from unreasonable searches and seizures. 

Nor does Hannula v. City of Lakewood support such a bar. In 

Hannula, we stated the proposition that prior to Graham we "generally examined.claims of excessive use of force .under a substantive 

due process standard." 907 F.2d at 131. But in neither Hannula 

nor the cases we cited in Hannula for that proposition (Trujillo 

and Hewitt, cited above) did the plaintiff plead and pursue the 

specific allegation that her Fourth Amendment rights had been 

violated. Confronted with a general claim of excessive force that 

predated the Supreme Court's clarification in Graham, ·we held in 

Hannula that the circuit's established law required a substantive 

due process analysis. 

In this case, however, while the incident occurred before 

Graham, the Dixons did not solely allege "excessive force" or 

violation of substantive due process. In fact, in their response 

to Richer's and Yarbrough's motion for summary judgment on the 

basis of qualified immunity, the Dixons specifically argued that 

they had been illegally searched and seized, in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment. 

Our holding in Hannula would govern this case if a wellestablished and well-defined body of Fourth Amendment law did not 

predate Graham, i.e., if, at the time deputies Richer and 

Yarbrough stopped the Dixons, there was no clearly established set 

of rules and norms governing the propriety, under the Fourth 

Amendment, of stopping, searching, and seizing private citizens. 

Obviously, such was not the case. Long before Graham, the Supreme 

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Court set forth the salient standard for governing the situation 

that developed that night in Colorado: law enforcement officers 

must be "objectively reasonable" in their searches and seizures. 

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968) (investigative stop); 

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7.,..9 (1985) (§ 1983 action for 

excessive force evaluated under the Fourth Amendment: "reasonableness depends on not only when a seizure is made, but also how it 

is carried out"). That Graham directed lower courts to apply 

Fourth Amendment analysis to§ 1983 claims of excessive force 

during arrest is not evidence that such claims were previously 

foreclosed. 

Since the plaintiffs pled and pursued their claim under the 

Fourth Amendment, the district court properly applied the Fourth 

Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard to the officers' 

alleged conduct. That standard was clearly established at the 

time the challenged incident took place. 

v. 

Richer and Yarbrough next assert that, even if the Fourth 

Amendment standard was clearly established, the district court 

should have held that their alleged conduct was objectively 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

The relevant inquiry is summarized in Graham: 

Determining whether force used to effect a 

particular seizure is "reasonable" under the Fourth 

Amendment requires a careful balancing of "'the nature 

and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth 

Amendment interests'" against the countervailing 

governmental interests at stake. Tennessee v. Garner 

471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (quoting United States v. Place, 

462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Our Fourth Amendment 

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jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make 

an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with 

it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or 

threat thereof to effect it. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 22-27 (1968). Because "[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of 

precise definition or mechanical application," Bell v. 

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), however, its proper 

application requires careful .. attention. to . the. facts and 

circumstances of each particular case, including the 

severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect 

poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers 

or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest 

or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee 

v. Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9 (the question is "whether the 

totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular 

sort of ••. seizure"). 

The "reasonableness" of a particular use of force 

must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of 

hindsight. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-22. 

* * * 

The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for 

the fact that police officers are often forced to make 

split-second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, 

uncertain, and rapidly evolving--about the amount of 

force that is necessary in a particular situation. 

Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. at 1871-72 (citations altered for 

clarification). In applying this standard, we are to consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the Dixons. 

Although Richer had a reasonable basis for stopping the 

Dixons, they were not suspected of committing any crime. The 

investigative stop was justified to ascertain whether the Dixons 

could provide information concerning the whereabouts of Kwan Choe 

(who himself was only guilty of a misdemeanor). Yet neither 

Richer not Yarbrough asked the Dixons about Choe. When Willie 

Dixon identified himself, and asked why they had been stopped, 

Richer refused to inform him of the reason he was being detained. 

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Willie Dixon did not resist being frisked. Showing due 

deference to Richer's judgment in an uncertain, and potentially 

dangerous circumstance, it is certainly possible that what Dixon 

perceived as a malicious kick was actually a reasonable act 

designed to position Dixon's legs for.a .pat down. Moreover, 

Dixon's response to being kicked the first time (turning around 

and swearing at Richer) could reasonably have been interpreted as 

an act of resistance. Richer's initial response, calling for a 

backup (Yarbrough), was both reasonable and prudent. But when 

Willie Dixon was kicked (the second time), struck with a flashlight, and then choked and beaten, he had already been frisked, 

had his hands up against the van with his back to the officers, 

and was not making any aggressive moves or threats. While it is 

reasonable to frisk a detainee suspected of carrying a weapon, 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 24, it is not reasonable to hit him in 

the stomach with a flashlight, or choke and beat him, solely on 

the basis of that suspicion. 

As for resisting arrest, it bears reminding that the Dixons 

were not under arrest. They were ostensibly stopped in order to 

be asked some questions. That Willie Dixon resisted being choked 

and beaten does not retroactively justify it. Neither does Hyon 

Dixon's resistance retroactively justify the alleged treatment of 

her or her husband. 

For purposes of summary judgment, viewing the totality of the 

circumstances judged solely under the Dixons' version of the 

facts, we agree with the district court that the alleged conduct 

is not objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

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VI. 

Under the qualified immunity inquiry, we must next determine 

whether a reasonable officer could have believed that the conduct 

in question did not violate clearly established law. In general, 

even though conduct is "unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, 

because of "the difficulty of determining whether particular 

searches or seizures comport with the Fourth Amendment," Anderson 

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644 (1987), such conduct may nevertheless be objectively reasonable for purposes of qualified immun1. ·t y. 2 In insufficient warrant claims, for example, the Fourth 

Amendment inquiry asks whether probable cause existed for the 

magistrate to issue the warrant. But even if a court decides that 

there was no probable cause, in a close case it may have been 

objectively reasonable for a police officer to rely on the judgment of the magistrate and believe that probable cause existed. 

See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986). 

However, in excessive force claims asserted under the Fourth 

Amendment, the qualified immunity question is usually answered in 

the Fourth Amendment inquiry. 3 This is because, in the excessive 

force context, the Fourth Amendment inquiry asks directly whether 

the police officer reasonably could have believed that the force 

2 This is but another way of phrasing the requirement that the 

right the official is alleged to have violated was clearly 

established at a meaningful level of specificity. See Anderson v. 

Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639-40. 

3 See Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: 

Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for a Police Officer's 

Use of Excessive Force, 62 Temp. L. Rev. 61, 97-114 (1989). 

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was necessary under the circumstances. 4 Since we have already 

held that, under the Dixons' version of the facts, a reasonable 

police officer would not have believed that the force used was 

necessary under the circumstances, the qualified immunity question 

has already been .answered on the state of the record before us. 

We hold that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. That, of course, 

does not mean that the officers cannot reassert their qualified 

immunity claims at and after trial when the factual disputes have 

been resolved. At this juncture, however, material facts remain 

in dispute, 5 and the deputies are not entitled to summary judgment 

on the basis of qualified immunity. 

VII. 

This still does not end our inquiry. The district court 

identified the Fourth Amendment and its objective reasonableness 

test as the relevant legal standard in the disposition of the 

motion for summary judgment. But the district court failed to 

follow our directive in Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d at 646, and "state the basis for its conclusion" 

that, under the evidence presented by the Dixons, Richer's and 

4 This is not a circumstance where the officer is relying on 

the probable cause determination of a magistrate. The police 

officer is the sole actor whose objective reasonableness is at 

issue. 

5 Richer and Yarbrough vigorously dispute the Dixons' version 

of the stop and ensuing altercation, and submit affidavits 

directly contradicting the Dixons' account. 

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Yarbrough's seizure was objectively unreasonable. R. Vol. I, Tab 

5 at 7. 

However, remanding this case to the district court in order 

for it to set out the same analysis that we have just presented 

would not affect the outcome of the district court's decision, and 

would waste judicial resources. This court is "free to affirm a 

district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record 

sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied 

upon by the district court." Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 

1047 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 

F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)). For the reasons stated above, we 

agree that a police officer could not have reasonably engaged in 

the conduct that the Dixons describe without violating the Fourth 

Amendment, and that an officer could not reasonably believe that 

such conduct did not clearly violate the Fourth Amendment. 

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court. 

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