Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02515/USCOURTS-ca7-23-02515-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Beckett
Appellee
Steve Bryant
Appellee
Justin Fields
Appellant
Ron Gillette
Appellee
Liberty Healthcare Corporation
Appellee
Josh Shelton
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 7, 2025*

Decided January 21, 2025 

Before

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge 

JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge

No. 23-2515 

JUSTIN FIELDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

LIBERTY HEALTHCARE 

CORPORATION, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois. 

No. 4:22-cv-04050-CSB

Colin S. Bruce, 

Judge. 

O R D E R

Justin Fields and three other civil detainees sued Liberty Healthcare Corporation 

and some of its employees, alleging that their operation of a civil detainee conditional 

release program, including the imposition of burdensome conditions of release, violates

their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district

court screened the initial complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), and dismissed it for failure to 

* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have 

agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts 

and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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state a claim. The district court dismissed the case after giving the plaintiffs two chances 

to amend the complaint, concluding that the allegations still did not state a plausible 

claim for relief. Only one plaintiff, Justin Fields, appeals. Because Fields has stated a 

plausible claim under the First Amendment, we vacate and remand.

In 2009, an Illinois court adjudicated Fields to be a sexually violent person after 

he served a three-year sentence for aggravated criminal sexual abuse. As a sexually 

violent person, Fields was subject to involuntary commitment and indefinite detention 

because the court found that there was a substantial probability that he would engage 

in acts of sexual violence. See 725 ILCS 207/5, /9, /20, /35. Fields was detained at 

Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility.

As a detainee, Fields must be provided with care and treatment designed to 

affect recovery and discharged once it is determined that he no longer presents a 

danger. See id. 207/40. As part of his detention, Fields became eligible for conditional 

release: a program that allows him to live in the community if he meets certain 

requirements. See id. 207/55(a). The conditional release program is operated by Liberty 

Healthcare Corporation, which imposes many conditions and rules on the participants 

and determines when participants violate them.

Fields was discharged on conditional release three times. First, beginning in 

March 2019, he was placed on conditional release in Springfield, Illinois, but was 

returned to Rushville after he attempted suicide in July 2020. He was released again in 

December 2020—this time in Chicago, closer to his family—but his conditional release 

was again revoked in December 2021 when he was caught with a smart phone. In May 

2023, he was released again but has since been detained at Rushville. 

During Fields’s second re-detention in 2022, he and three other civil detainees at 

Rushville filed an initial complaint seeking relief on behalf of themselves and a putative 

class of others and asserting that Liberty Healthcare Corporation discriminated against 

African Americans in their operation of the conditional release program. The district 

court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice because the plaintiffs’ 

allegations were too conclusory to plausibly allege that their Fourteenth Amendment 

rights were violated. The district court also denied class certification because the 

plaintiffs did not have counsel to represent the proposed class and did not meet the 

requirements for class certification. The court allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended 

complaint that provided more factual details. 

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No. 23-2515 Page 3 

The plaintiffs then filed separate proposed amended complaints, which the 

district court dismissed because they were a “patchwork of partial allegations” that did 

not clearly state which allegations related to which parties. The court gave the plaintiffs 

one more chance to amend and to consolidate their allegations and claims for relief. The 

plaintiffs then filed a consolidated, proposed second amended complaint where they 

sought relief for violations of their individual constitutional rights, and no longer 

sought to represent a class. 

The district court dismissed the proposed complaint for failure to state a claim. 

First, the district court observed that the plaintiffs premised their legal claims upon 

violations of Illinois state law and ruled that alleged violations of state law cannot 

support a claim under § 1983. See Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Second, the district court concluded that the plaintiffs made only vague, conclusory 

statements about constitutional violations that were insufficient to state a claim under 

§ 1983. The district court then entered judgment. 

Fields was the only plaintiff to appeal. He argues that the district court

overlooked his claims under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments contained in 

his second proposed amended complaint. We review his challenge to the screening 

dismissal de novo, taking a fresh look at the allegations and construing them liberally. 

See Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015). 

In his second proposed amended complaint, Fields alleged that Liberty 

Healthcare Corporation imposed restrictions on his freedom that violated his rights 

under the Constitution. Fields asserted that he was completely restricted from using the 

internet and communicating with third parties who had not been vetted. Next, he 

maintained that his case managers, Joe Meister and Keir Goatley, compelled him to 

make incriminating statements to his mother and sister about “undiscovered” crimes in 

order to communicate with them. Fields also alleged that after he attempted suicide in 

July 2020, another case manager, Ron Gillette, transferred him from a mental-health 

hold at a hospital to Rushville, where Fields was placed in an isolation cell without 

clothes or a mattress for 15 days. Finally, Fields stated that he filed a motion to expand 

his conditions of release in state court, but Meister and Goatley coerced him into 

dropping the case by threatening to send him back to detention. 

On appeal, Fields argues that the district court overlooked his plausible 

allegations that Liberty Healthcare and his case managers violated his rights under the 

Constitution. We agree in limited part. Fields has sufficiently alleged that Meister and 

Goatley violated his rights under the First Amendment. For the remaining allegations, 

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the district court correctly concluded that Fields failed to state a claim against Liberty 

Healthcare under the First Amendment, against Meister and Goatley under the Fifth 

Amendment, and against Gillette under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Fields first argues that he plausibly alleged that Meister and Goatley violated his 

First Amendment rights when they retaliated against him for challenging his conditions 

of release in state court. We agree. To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, Fields 

must plausibly allege that “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First 

Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment 

activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating 

factor’ in the [d]efendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Whitfield v. Spiller, 

76 F.4th 698, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2023). Here, Fields filed a motion in state court to expand 

his conditions of release to authorize him to make and receive calls from his mother and

to limit Liberty Healthcare and the Illinois Department of Human Services from 

compelling Fields to make incriminating statements to third parties. Fields alleged that 

he withdrew his motion only after Meister and Goatley threatened to return him to 

detention if he did not withdraw his motion. Engaging in legal proceedings is a 

protected activity that supports a First Amendment retaliation claim. Bridges v. Gilbert, 

557 F.3d 541, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2009). And the threat of being returned to a detention 

center is a deprivation that would likely deter Fields from seeking to have his 

conditions of release changed by a state court in the future. Whitfield, 76 F.4th at 708. 

Fields also plausibly alleged that his filing of the motion in state court was the 

motivating factor for his case managers’ threats to send him back to detention.

Although Fields has plausibly alleged that Goatley and Meister violated his First 

Amendment rights, that plausible allegation does not extend to Liberty Healthcare 

Director Steve Bryant, Deputy Director Josh Shelton, and Conditional Release Agent 

William Beckett. Liability under § 1983 requires the personal involvement of each 

defendant in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Est. of Perry v. Wenzel, 872 F.3d 439, 

459 (7th Cir. 2017). And Fields cannot hold these defendants liable without an allegation 

of personal involvement or simply because of their supervisory role over the other 

defendants. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2017). Finally, because Fields did 

not argue that a policy or practice of Liberty Healthcare Corporation was the “moving 

force” behind his case managers’ alleged unconstitutional actions, the corporation is not 

a proper defendant on this claim. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs, 436 U.S. 658, 694–95 

(1978). On remand, the district court can order Fields to file an amended complaint to 

narrow his claim.

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The district court correctly concluded that Fields’s remaining allegations fail to 

state a claim. Fields argues that the district court overlooked his allegations that Liberty 

Healthcare violated his First Amendment rights by prohibiting him from accessing the 

internet in any manner, including in a job-related setting. We disagree. Fields must 

plausibly allege that the regulations on his internet access impinge on his constitutional 

rights and are not rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in rehabilitating 

civil detainees and protecting the public. Lane v. Williams, 689 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 

2012) (applying Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987), to civil detainees); see also Brown 

v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 2015). The conditions of conditional release 

programs must restrict civil detainees from contacting their victims and possessing 

illegal pornography. See 725 ILCS 207/40(5)(O), (T). In Brown, this court held that a ban 

on internet-capable devices at Rushville was rationally related to the state’s interest in 

preventing detainees from contacting their victims and downloading illegal 

pornography. 801 F.3d at 855. Here, the conditions of release that Fields alleged violated 

his First Amendment rights specifically ban internet-capable devices. Because Fields is 

still a civil detainee while he is on conditional release, the state’s interest in protecting 

the public and preventing crime remains the same. And preventing Fields from using 

internet-capable devices that he could use to contact his victims or download illegal 

pornography is rationally related to that interest. 

Fields also argues that the requirement that his visitors be vetted with 

background checks unduly burdened his freedom of speech. We disagree. Fields must 

plausibly allege that the regulations requiring background checks for his visitors 

impinge on his constitutional rights and are not related to the state’s legitimate interest 

in rehabilitating civil detainees and protecting the public. Lane, 689 F.3d at 884; 

see also Brown, 801 F.3d at 853. Here, Fields does not provide enough facts from which 

we could plausibly conclude that the background check is not rationally related to the 

state’s legitimate interest in protecting the public and ensuring that Fields’s 

rehabilitation is not impeded by visitors with criminal histories related to sexual 

violence. 

Next, Fields argues that he plausibly alleged that his right against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment was violated because his case managers 

forced him to disclose “undiscovered” crimes to his mother and sister in order for them 

to visit him and talk to him on the phone. We disagree. To allege a violation under the 

Fifth Amendment, Fields must demonstrate that the disclosures to which he objects are 

testimonial, incriminating, and compelled. Lacy v. Butts, 922 F.3d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 2019) 

(citing Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 189 (2004)). The privilege against 

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self-incrimination protects against disclosures a person “reasonably believes could be 

used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used.” 

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445 (1972). But it only “protects against real 

dangers, not remote and speculative possibilities.” Zicarelli v. N.J. State Comm’n of 

Investigation, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972). Here, Fields alleges generally that the disclosures 

to his mother and sister would result in the information going to the police. Without 

more, Fields’s allegation that disclosure to his close family members would result in 

prosecution is too speculative to state a claim under the Fifth Amendment.

Fields also argues that he plausibly alleged that his case manager, Ron Gillette,

violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by confining him to a cell without clothes 

and a mattress for 15 days after Fields attempted suicide. We disagree. As a civil 

detainee, Fields is protected from cruel and inhumane treatment by the Due Process 

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Echols v. Johnson, 105 F.4th 973, 977 (7th Cir. 

2024). To state a claim, Fields must plausibly allege that his confinement to a cell 

without clothes and a mattress was not rationally related to a legitimate, nonpunitive 

purpose or excessive in relation to that purpose. Davis v. Wessel, 792 F.3d 793, 800 

(7th Cir. 2015) (discussing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561 (1979)). Here, Fields alleged

that after his suicide attempt, he was put on a mental-health hold at St. John’s Hospital 

but was then transferred by Gillette to Rushville where he was put in a cold isolation 

cell without clothes or a mattress for 15 days.

Restricting Fields from having items, like clothes and a mattress, that he could 

use for self-harm is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose in 

preventing Fields from attempting suicide for a second time. And Fields does not

provide further details about when he stopped being at risk of self-harm or when the 

isolation without clothes and a mattress became excessive. Fields implied that the 

isolation was unreasonable the moment he was transferred back to the detention center. 

But Fields also stated that he was put on a 72-hour mental-health hold at St. John’s

Hospital and was transferred before the hold expired. Regardless, Fields does not 

provide enough facts to plausibly allege that his confinement in a cell without clothes 

and a mattress violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Finally, to the extent that Fields argues that the district court erred by denying 

class certification, we disagree. The district court acted well within its discretion when it 

denied class certification because the plaintiffs did not have counsel to represent the 

proposed class, see Howard v. Pollard, 814 F.3d 476, 478–79 (7th Cir. 2015), and did not 

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meet the requirements for class certification, see McFields v. Dart, 982 F.3d 511, 515–519 

(7th Cir. 2020); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 

Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment and REMAND for further proceedings 

consistent with this order. 

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