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Parties Involved:
Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees
Appellee
Valerie T. Filar
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Argued January 21, 2010

Decided May 10, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK,  Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY,  Circuit Judge

DANIEL A. MANION,  Circuit Judge

No. 09‐2489

VALERIE T. FILAR,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM BOARD

OF TRUSTEES, a/k/a BOARD OF

EDUCATION OF THE CITY OF

CHICAGO,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 04 cv 4679

Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

O R D E R

Valerie Filar worked as a full‐time substitute teacher in the Polish bilingual program

at Foreman High School in Chicago.  In 1999,  the principal of the school re‐classified her as

a roving substitute.  Believing that decision was because of her age, she sued the Chicago

School Reform Board of Trustees under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.  The

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐2489 Page 2

case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict for the Board.  Filar appeals, claiming she

is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in ruling on three evidentiary

matters.  We affirm.

I.

In the fall of 1992, there was an acute need for Polish bilingual teachers at Foreman

High School in Chicago.  Dr. John Garvey, the principal at Foreman High, hired 62‐year‐old

Valerie Filar to teach computer in the school’s Polish bilingual education program.  Filar

was classified as a “full‐time basis substitute” (FTB), a non‐tenure‐track instructor who

teaches in a particular school for an entire school year.  FTBs have less seniority than tenure‐

track “appointed” teachers, meaning that when teaching positions lose funding or are no

longer needed, FTBs are “displaced” first.  (“Displacement” means that a teacher is re‐

categorized as a roving “cadre substitute” who fills temporary vacancies in city schools as

they arise.).  And among FTBs with similar credentials, the least senior is the first to go.  

One year later, Garvey displaced Filar.   She grieved that decision to the Chicago

Board of Education.  While her grievance was under review, Garvey hired two FTB teachers

for the Polish bilingual program—Piotr Monaco and Kornelia Rydberg—both of whom

were younger than Filar.  The Board eventually reinstated Filar in August 1994 after

concluding that her displacement was improper.

Over the next several years, Filar taught in a traditional classroom setting and

received either “satisfactory” or “excellent” overall reviews from Garvey.  Then, from 1997

to 1999, she supervised students in a computer lab where the instruction was computer‐

based; she received highest possible “superior” overall ratings for those two years.  In

contrast, Rydberg received all “superior” reviews and Monaco received all “superior” and

one “satisfactory” from 1994 to 1999 while teaching in traditional classroom settings.

In the summer of 1999, Garvey appointed Rydberg and Monaco to tenure‐track

positions.  Then, in September 1999, Garvey displaced Filar.  She filed a grievance with the

Board, alleging the displacement was improper because she was not the least senior FTB.

The Board held a hearing concerning the grievance with Filar, two union representatives,

and a hearing officer present.  The Board eventually upheld the displacement after

concluding that Filar was the least senior FTB in the Polish bilingual program.

In 2004, Filar sued the Board for violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (ADEA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  The district court granted

summary judgment for the Board on both claims.  Filar appealed; we affirmed on the ADA

claim but reversed on the ADEA claim.  Filar v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 526 F.3d

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No. 09‐2489 Page 3

1054 (7th Cir. 2008).  The district court then held a trial on the age discrimination claim.

Filar attempted to prove that claim, at least in part, by showing that Garvey had appointed

the younger comparators (Monaco and Rydberg) to tenure‐track positions in the summer of

1999, leaving the older Filar as the only FTB in the Polish bilingual program and thus an

easy target for displacement.  During the trial, the district court excluded evidence of Filar’s

1993 displacement and grievance under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 after concluding the

probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and

potential confusion of the issues—or in its own words, because delving into such events

would necessitate a “mini trial.”  The court also excluded evidence of the 1999 displacement

hearing as hearsay and because the evidence would require a separate trial concerning that

hearing.  It did, however, permit Filar to introduce a document in which the Board, before

officially denying her grievance, briefly mentioned the hearing.  And over Filar’s objection,

the district court allowed the Board to introduce evidence of the comparators’ and her

performance evaluations dating back to 1992 and forbade Filar from discussing the gap in

the evaluations that occurred due to her displacement in 1993–94.  After the close of the

evidence, the jury returned a verdict for the Board.  Filar appeals, arguing she is entitled to a

new trial based on the district court’s allegedly improper rulings on the three

aforementioned evidentiary issues.

II.

We first address Filar’s contention that the district court wrongly excluded evidence

of her 1993 displacement based upon Federal Rule of Evidence 403.  Specifically, Filar

claims that ruling permitted the Board to argue unhindered in its closing statement that

because Garvey had hired her when she was 62‐years‐old in 1992, he was not discriminating

against her because of her age when he displaced her in 1999.  As with all of the district

court’s evidentiary rulings, our review is for an abuse of discretion, and we give special

deference to the court’s assessment of the balance between probative value and potential for

unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues under Rule 403.  Thompson v. City of Chicago, 472

F.3d 444, 453 (7th Cir. 2006).  We will reverse only if no reasonable person would agree with

the trial court’s decisions.  Maher v. City of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 823 (7th Cir. 2008).

According to Filar’s offer of proof, she would have presented evidence that Garvey

only hired her because Foreman High School was in a pinch for Polish bilingual teachers

and that he displaced her a year later because the school’s acute need for teachers had

abated.  She also would have shown that Garvey hired two younger FTB teachers while she

pursued her grievance.  In addition, Filar claims she would have shown that the Board

eventually found her displacement to be improper and ordered her reinstated.  As the

district court fairly perceived, exploring and resolving all of these points from over fifteen

years earlier essentially would have required a trial‐within‐a‐trial, which could have

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blurred the distinction between the key issues concerning the 1999 displacement and the

collateral ones surrounding the 1993 displacement.  The court concluded that the probative

value—if any—of delving into the circumstances surrounding the 1993 displacement was

substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing matters for the jury.  This was a

reasonable decision entitled to special deference on appeal.

Next, Filar contends that the district court abused its discretion in permitting the

Board on the one hand to introduce evidence of her performance evaluations dating back to

1992 but at the same time precluding her from explaining that the absence of an evaluation

for 1993 was due to the first displacement.  She concedes that the last two evaluations before

the 1999 displacement are relevant but argues that her earlier evaluations are irrelevant

concerning whether Garvey discriminated against her on the basis of age.  Her position is

inconsistent, but not surprising:  Filar received “superior” ratings the two years

immediately preceding her 1999 displacement for her performance in a computer lab.

However, she received lower marks in previous years when she was teaching in a

traditional classroom setting.  By comparison, Monaco and Rydberg, who regularly taught

in traditional classrooms, received higher marks than Filar did when she was teaching in a

similar traditional classroom.  The Board understandably wished to use this evidence to

show that Garvey had legitimate, non‐discriminatory reasons for promoting Monaco and

Rydberg to tenure‐track positions and passing over Filar.  Thus, the evidence was probative

of a determining fact in the case.  Moreover, the district court’s refusal to let Filar probe the

gap in her ratings was consistent with its earlier ruling that evidence of the 1993

displacement should not be admitted.  And there is no merit to Filar’s argument that the

gap was somehow prejudicial to her:  the mere absence of an evaluation for one year would

not create any unfavorable inference against her.  The district court did not abuse its

discretion on this issue.     

Finally, Filar contends that the district court’s exclusion of evidence concerning the

1999 grievance hearing was improper.  Even assuming arguendo that is true, to obtain

reversal Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 and Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) require

Filar to show that her substantial rights were affected.  Peals v. Terre Haute Police Dep’t, 535

F.3d 621, 630 (7th Cir. 2008); Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F.3d 579, 589 (7th Cir. 2001).  She

cannot do this because the substance and significance of the excluded evidence is not

reflected in the record.

After a district court has made a ruling excluding evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence

103(a)(2) requires that the substance of the evidence be made known by an offer of proof

unless it is apparent from the context.  That did not happen here.  Instead, after the district

court sustained the Board’s objection to the line of questioning concerning the 1999

grievance hearing, Filar’s counsel moved on, introducing the letter from the Board denying

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Filar’s grievance.  Her counsel did not make an offer of proof regarding what the evidence

of the hearing would have shown or how it was material.  Nor is it apparent from the

context.  Before the Board objected, Filar had just begun testifying about the 1999 grievance

hearing and the persons present.  The district court could not discern from that snippet of

testimony what transpired at the grievance hearing and what significance those events may

have had; neither can we.  Because we have no basis for concluding that Filar was

prejudiced by any error the district court may have made in excluding the evidence, her

argument on this issue fails.  United States v. Rettenberger, 344 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2003);

Israel Travel Advisory Serv., Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., 61 F.3d 1250, 1260 (7th Cir. 1995).

On appeal, Filar claims that the evidence would have shown the Board failed to follow its

internal procedures at the hearing, which she says is indicative of pretext.  But she forfeited

the point by failing to comply with Rule 103(a)(2).  United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 135 (1st

Cir. 1995); see Germano v. Int’l Profit Ass’n, Inc., 544 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2008).  To review

the issue now would rive the Rule.

III.

Because we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings Filar

challenges, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

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