Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00084/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melinda Matthews
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

MELINDA MATTHEWS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE No.: 2:14-cv-84-MEF

 ) (WO—Do Not Publish)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

 )

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Melinda Matthews (“Plaintiff” or “Matthews”) brings this action against

Defendant United States of America (“Defendant” or “United States”) alleging medical

malpractice. This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #2) filed by the

United States for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. After reviewing the submissions of the

parties, the Court finds that, for the reasons set forth below, the motion is due to be

GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On August 8, 2011, Matthews underwent foot surgery at the Central Alabama

Veterans Health Care System (“CAVHCS”). (Doc. #1.) Performing the surgery were three

podiatrists: Dan E. Robinson, DPM (“Robinson”), Saadia K. Whatley, DPM (“Whatley”),

and Annell S. Tucker, DPM (“Tucker”). At the time of the surgery, Robinson was a

Department of Veterans Affairs podiatrist practicing at CAVHCS. Whatleyand Tucker were

podiatric residents at CAVCHS. Matthews alleges that problems related to the first surgery

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resulted in the need for two additional surgeries. Matthews further contends that she

continues to suffer from pain and complications resulting from the first surgeries. 

On August 8, 2013, Matthews filed suit against Robinson, Whatley, and Tucker in

the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, pursuant to the Alabama Medical

Liabilities Act, claiming that her doctors negligently diagnosed, treated, and cared for her. 

The same day, Matthews filed Statements of Claim against the Department of Veterans

Affairs. (Doc. #6.) On February 7, 2014, the Department of Veterans Affairs denied

Matthews’s claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). On February 10, 2014, the

United States filed a Notice of Removal and Substitution in this Court. (Doc. #1.) 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(2), the United States Attorney for the Middle District

of Alabama certified that Robinson, Whatley, and Tucker were acting within the scope of

their federal employment at the time of the incident out of which Matthews’s claims arose,

thereby establishing removal jurisdiction in this Court and making substitution of the United

States as party-defendant proper.1(Doc. #1.) The United States also filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack ofsubjectmatter jurisdiction. (Doc. #2.) Specifically, the United States contends that the Court lacks

jurisdiction because Matthews failed to exhaust the FTCA’s administrative remedies before

1

28 U.S.C. § 2679 (d)(1) instructs that “upon certification by the Attorney General that the

defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the

incident out of which the claim arose, any civil action against the United States under the provisions

of this title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be substituted as the party

defendant.” 

2

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filing suit. (Doc. #2.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant can file a motion to dismiss to contest a federal court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). These motions come in two varieties: one

attacking subject-matter jurisdiction on the face of the complaint, the other using extrinsic

evidence to launch a factual attack on jurisdiction. See Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d

920, 925 n.5 (11th Cir. 2003). A court deciding a facial attack to subject-matter jurisdiction

has to accept all well-pled factual allegations as true, viewing them in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. See McElmurray v. Consol. Gov’t of Augusta–Richmond Cnty.,

501 F.3d 1244, 1250 (11th Cir. 2007). In other words, the court merely looks to “see if the

plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject mater jurisdiction.” Lawrence v. Dunbar,

919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). If the court lacks statutory or constitutional power to

hear the claim, it must dismiss it for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Makarova v.

United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).

III. DISCUSSION

The United States, in its Motion to Dismiss, contends that, pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the litigation

because Matthews filed her suit prematurely and in conflict with the FTCA’s administrative

exhaustion requirement. (Doc. #2.) The FTCA provides that “an ‘action shall not be

instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages’ unless the claimant has

3

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first exhausted his administrative remedies.” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107

(1993). These administrative requirements cannot be waived. See Barnett v. Okeechobee

Hosp., 283 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2002). Where a litigant brings suit without first

exhausting available administrative remedies, “the federal court is powerless to act.” 

Johnson v. Hairston, 2007 WL 748479, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2007).

Matthews concedes that she filed this lawsuit on the same day that she filed an

administrative claimwith the Department of Veterans Affairs. (Doc. #6.) Because Matthews

does not dispute the fact that she filed this lawsuit in state court prior to a final denial from

the federal agency, she has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under

the FTCA. However, Matthews makes three distinct arguments as to why her failure to

exhaust administrative remedies should not result in the dismissal of her claims. The Court

will address each argument in turn.

First, Matthews argues that the Court did not obtain jurisdiction over this matter until

the United States removed the case from state court—after the administrative denial. Thus,

it appears that Matthews is attempting to argue that even though she did not exhaust her

administrative remedies at the time suit was commenced in state court, her administrative

remedies were exhausted by the time the case was removed to federal court.2 This argument

is without merit. In McNeil, the Supreme Court held that “Congress intended to require

2 The Department of Veterans Affairs denied Matthews’s claim on February 7, 2014. (Doc.

#6.) On February 10, 2014, the United States removed the action to the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama. (Doc. #1.)

4

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complete exhaustion of Executive remedies before invocation of the judicial process.” 

McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112. The “judicial process” includes “all suits against the United States,

including those originating in state court against defendants yet to be formally replaced by

the United States.” Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Cnt., 403 F.3d 76, 83

(2d Cir. 2005). In light of McNeil, the date of significance here is the date Matthews

instituted her action in state court, not the date the Department of Veterans Affairs denied

her claim, nor the date the action was removed to federal court. Because Matthews’s suit in

state court was instituted prior to formal denial of her administrative claim, her suit was

premature. See Waid v. United States, 2006 WL 1766808, at *4 (M.D. Ala. June 26, 2006).

Next, Matthews argues that she was unaware of the fact that Robinson, Whatley, and

Tucker were acting officially within the scope of their federal office or employment as

doctors of podiatric medicine at the Department of Veterans Affairs at the time of the

surgery. (Doc. #6.) Thus, Matthews alleges that she should not be required to exhaust the

FTCA administrative remedies when she would have no reason to know that her state court

action should have been lodged against the United States. Matthews’s argument ignores the

Westfall Act, which expressly provides that the FTCA’s administrative-exhaustion

requirement applies to all actions, even those removed from state court. Indeed, the Westfall

Act “clarifies that all suits against the United States, including those originating in state court

against defendants yet to be formally replaced by the United States, must be subject to the

administrative-exhaustion requirements specified in 28 U.S.C. § 2675.” Celestine, 403 F.3d

5

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at 84. Therefore, Matthews’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit

in state court requires dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Finally,Matthews contends that dismissal of her claimwill force her to file a duplicate

claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs even though the claim has already been

denied and will result in unjust delays and costs. (Doc. #6.) In McNeil, the Supreme Court

stated that “[t]he interest in orderly administration of this body of litigation is best served by

adherence to the straightforward statutory command.” McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112. And, the

statutory text is not a “trap for the unwary,” primarily because “the risk that a lawyer will be

unable to understand the exhaustion requirement is virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 112–13. 

Therefore, although Matthews may experience some burdens associated with adherence to

the FTCA’s exhaustion requirement, “strict adherence to the procedural requirements

specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.” 

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980). Accordingly, the United States’s Motion

to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant United States’s

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #2) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Melinda Matthews’s claims against

the United States are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Done this the 16th day of April, 2014.

 /s/ Mark E. Fuller 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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