Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03100/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03100-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David W. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 1996 Decided March 5, 1996

No. 92-3220

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DAVID W. SMITH,

APPELLANT

-

Consolidated with

No. 95-3100

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 91cr00527-04)

Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Amy Seidman, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were on the

brief.

June M. Jeffries, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and William E.

Lawler, III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and SILBERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge EDWARDS.

EDWARDS, Chief Judge: Appellant David Smith was found guilty by a jury of distribution of

five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1988). Subsequently, the

District Court sentenced appellant to 360 months in prison.

Appellant now challenges his conviction, claiming that the Government violated its obligation

to disclose certain so-called Brady material, i.e., impeachment evidence relating to one of its

witnesses, Mr. M. As part of a plea agreement with Mr. M, the prosecutor agreed to dismiss two

felony cases pending against Mr. M in D.C. Superior Court. The Government acknowledges that it

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failed to disclose this information to appellant. The Government also admits that it did not disclose

evidence relating to Mr. M's psychiatric history. However, the Government argues that the

undisclosed information was insufficiently material to justify reversal of appellant's conviction. We

disagree.

The Supreme Court has recently made clear that, in the context of a prosecutor's duty to

disclose, materiality is not gauged by a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test. Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S. Ct.

1555, 1566 (1995). Under Kyles, it makes no difference here whether the testimony of other

witnesses might have been sufficient to convict Smith absent Mr. M's testimony. And it makes no

difference that other aspects of Mr. M's plea agreement were disclosed to the defense or that defense

counsel was able to impeach the witness on other grounds. In short, "a showing of materiality does

not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure ofthe suppressed evidence would have

resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." Id. Rather, the question is whether, in light of the

absence ofthe suppressed evidence, the defendant "received a fair trial, understood as a trialresulting

in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id.

During the course of his testimony, Mr. M failed to reveal the full details of his plea bargain

with the Government (omitting any reference to the agreement to dismissthe felony charges pending

in Superior Court). Had defense counsel been armed with full disclosure regarding Mr. M's plea

agreement, the witness could have been subjected to devastating cross-examination regarding his

credibility. Given the likely impact of such cross-examination, it can hardly be doubted that the

undisclosed information wassufficientlymaterial to meet the threshold laid out inKyles. We also find

that the District Court erred by failing to examine Mr. M's medical records in order to determine

whether his psychiatric history constituted a relevant subject for impeachment. Without such an

examination, there simply was no basis for deciding whether the failure to disclose these records

constituted a violation of the Government's discovery obligation. For these reasons, the decision of

the District Court denying Smith's motion to vacate his sentence is reversed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

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On September 10, 1991, a federal grand jury returned a sixteen-count indictment charging

appellant Smith and four co-defendants with various drug offenses. The cases against the

co-defendants were resolved prior to trial, and Smith was tried alone based on a retyped four-count

indictment. This indictment charged Smith with unlawful use of a communication facility and

unlawful distribution offive grams or more of cocaine base in connection with two alleged drug sales.

After a jury trial, Smith was acquitted on three counts, but convicted on one count of unlawful

distribution. On August 26, 1992, the District Court sentenced Smith to 360 months in prison and

eight years of supervised release.

B. The Government's Failure to Disclose

One of the Government witnesses, Mr. M, was originally charged as a co-defendant in the

case. However, prior to trial, Mr. M entered into a plea agreement providing that, in return for Mr.

M's "substantial assistance" and guilty plea to one count of the original indictment, the prosecution

would file a motion recommending a downward departure in sentencing as authorized under section

5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, dismiss all other counts, and agree not to charge

Mr. M with any other known nonviolent offenses committed prior to the execution ofthe agreement.

Appendix of Appellant ("A.A.") 57-65. Although these terms were set forth in a letter that was

provided to the defense (and entered into evidence at trialfor impeachment purposes), the prosecutor

failed to disclose that, as a further part of the plea agreement, the Government agreed to dismisstwo

felony cases pending against Mr. M in D.C. Superior Court. The dismissed cases consisted of a

cocaine distribution charge and a Bail Reform Act violation involving a failure to appear at a

scheduled court date, which together carried a mandatory minimum sentence of six years and a

potential maximum sentence of 35 years. There is no indication, either in the record or in the parties'

briefs, asto why the dismissal of the Superior Court charges was not disclosed to the defense or why

this part of the deal was omitted from the written plea agreement.

In addition, at the time of his guilty plea, which was entered approximately six weeks prior

to appellant's trial, Mr. M informed the court that he had previously been hospitalized for "chronic

depression" for approximately 18 months and that, after he was discharged in November 1989, he

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attended a mental health clinic for an additional four months. A.A. 72-73. It is undisputed that the

prosecution did not provide appellant with any information relating to Mr. M's psychiatric history.

After the trial, appellant filed a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) to vacate, set

aside, or correct his sentence. Appellant argued that the prosecution's failure to disclose the

information concerning Mr. M had deprived defense counsel of material evidence that could have

been used to impeach Mr. M's credibility, and that, as a result, appellant's right to a fair trial had been

violated.

The District Court denied the motion. The court ruled that, although the dismissal of Mr. M's

pending Superior Court cases should have been disclosed to the defense, the nondisclosure did not

prevent Smith from receiving a fair trial. Further, the court held that appellant had failed to establish

that Mr. M's psychiatric history was relevant and that, in any event, such evidence would have been

merely "cumulative" as to his lack of credibility. The court concluded that, notwithstanding the

nondisclosures, the defense had adequately established that Mr. M was a "suspect witness."

Therefore, the court ruled that the suppressed impeachment evidence was not material. United States

v. Smith, Crim. Action No. 91-527,slip op. at 1-6 (D.D.C. June 28, 1995),reprinted in A.A. 145-50.

II. ANALYSIS

The prosecution has an affirmative duty to disclose material evidence favorable to a criminal

defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Further, it is well-settled that this disclosure

obligation includes evidence that could be used to impeach the credibility of a witness. Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972). In this case, it is undisputed that the Government failed

to disclose information that could have been used to impeach Mr. M. Thus, the only remaining issue

is whether the information was sufficiently "material" to establish a Brady violation.

In United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), the Supreme Court held that favorable

evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its suppression by the Government, " "if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.' " Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1565 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682

(opinion of Blackmun, J.)). In Kyles, the Court recently elaborated on the meaning of materiality

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under Bagley, stressing that a reviewing court must focus on the fairness of the trial the defendant

actually received rather than on whether a different result would have occurred had the undisclosed

evidence been revealed:

[A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that

disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the

defendant's acquittal.... Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable

probability" of a different result, and the adjective is important. The question is not

whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict

with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a

trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A "reasonable probability" of a

different result is accordingly shown when the Government's evidentiary suppression

"undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."

Id. at 1566 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678) (citations omitted). Kyles also made it clear that,

"once a reviewing court applying Bagley has found constitutional error there is no need for further

harmless-error review." Id. As the Court pointed out, no Bagley error can ever be harmless because

a reasonable probability of a different result "necessarily entails the conclusion that the suppression

must have had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Id.

(internal quotation omitted). This court's recent decision in United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 408, 411

(D.C. Cir. 1995), adheres to this line of analysis.

Purporting to applythistest, the Government first arguesthat, becauseMr. M'stestimonywas

merely corroborative, the failure to disclose impeachment information could not have been material.

According to the Government, the testimony of other witnesses, as well as the physical evidence

presented at trial, would have been sufficient to convict Smith, even ifthe jury completely discounted

Mr. M's testimony. Therefore, the Government claims that any additional impeachment material

would have been irrelevant to the jury's ultimate verdict. We reject this argument.

As an initial matter, we reject the suggestion that, absent Mr. M'stestimony, the result would

have been the same. There is no way to know this; in fact, the suggestion seems counter-intuitive,

given that this was a close case in which the jury acquitted Smith on three of the four counts. More

importantly, however, the Government's argument completely misconstruesthe relevant inquiry. As

the Court made clear in Kyles, the test for materiality is not a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test. "A

defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the

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1Likewise, when appellate courts consider whether trial error is harmless, the Supreme Court

has instructed us to refrain from analyzing the overall weight of the evidence, and instead look to

the potential affect the error might have had on the jury. See O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct.

992, 994-95 (1995) (The Court ruled that the proper measure of harmlessness is whether the

error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," not

whether the record evidence is sufficient absent the error to warrant a guilty verdict.). 

undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict." Kyles, 115 S. Ct. at 1566.

Indeed, a sufficiency-of-the-evidence test would require appellate courtsto usurp the function of the

jury, for judges would be forced to guess, based on a cold record, how the jury might have weighed

the remaining evidence, standing alone, in a hypothetical error-free trial. Because such an inquiry is

inherently unreliable, Kyles rightly focuses attention instead on the potential impact the undisclosed

evidencemight have had on the fairness ofthe proceedings.1 Thus, the amount of additional evidence

indicating guilt is not dispositive of our inquiry. Instead, we must decide whether the undisclosed

information could have substantially affected the efforts of defense counsel to impeach the witness,

thereby calling into question the fairness of the ultimate verdict.

A. The Dismissed Superior Court Charges

When Mr. M pleaded guilty to one count ofthe indictment against him, ten other counts were

dismissed. These dismissed counts were disclosed to the defense. The Government rightly points

out that defense counsel was therefore able to cross-examine the witness regarding these dismissed

counts and establish a possible motivation for lying. Indeed, the defense attempted to bring out

during cross-examination that Mr. M was testifying in part because he hoped for leniency in

sentencing. Trial Tr. (May 5, 1992, a.m. session) at 74-75. At closing argument, defense counsel

referred to the witness as "a crackhead," "a drug broker," and "a five-time convicted criminal," and

argued that Mr. M was biased because he was "facing a substantialsentence ... for selling almost 60

grams of crack, or 50 grams of crack, whatever it is. And he told you, he faces almost ten years in

jail." Trial Tr. (May 5, 1992, p.m. session) at 20-21.

The Government contends that, given this record, further cross-examination on Mr. M's

credibility and bias based on the dismissal of the two Superior Court convictions would have been

merely cumulative. However, "the fact that other impeachment evidence was available to defense

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2The Government attempts to rely on this court's statement in United States v. Derr, 990 F.2d

1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), that "an incremental amount of impeachment evidence on an already

compromised witness does not create a "reasonable probability' [of a different result]." Id. at

1336. An examination of the discussion preceding this statement, however, reveals that the court

relied on the fact that the undisclosed evidence at issue in that case would have been inadmissible

hearsay and therefore of limited value to the defense. Moreover, Derr was decided prior to the

Supreme Court's decision in Kyles, which explicated Bagley's "reasonable probability" standard. 

counsel does not render additional impeachment evidence immaterial." United States v. O'Conner,

64 F.3d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959)). Thus, we

must look not to the ways defense counsel was able to impeach Mr. M, but to the ways in which the

witness' testimony was allowed to stand unchallenged.2

During cross-examination, Mr. M was asked if he expected "favorsfrom the government" in

exchange for his testimony. Mr. M responded, "No I don'tonly what is in [the plea] letter." Trial

Tr. (May 5, 1992, morning session) at 73. Mr. M went on to say that he had decided to become a

witness in this case "[b]ecause I just want to start fresh and get on with my life." Id. at 74. Defense

counsel then asked again whether Mr. M "expect[ed] any favors at all from [the prosecutor] other

than what is stated in [the plea] letter," to which Mr. M responded, "That is right, just what is stated

in the letter." Id. at 74-75.

TheGovernment deniesthat thewitnesswasintentionallyconcealing the agreement to dismiss

the Superior Court charges, arguing that Mr. M might have mistakenly believed that the written letter

did in fact include these charges in its provisions. However, the witness' good faith does not render

the Brady violation any less material. We must assume that, had the Government disclosed the

information regarding the dismissed Superior Court charges, the witness would still have testified

exactly as he did. Armed with full disclosure, defense counsel could have pursued devastating

cross-examination, challenging Mr. M's assertion that he wastestifying only to "get a fresh start" and

suggesting that the witness might have deliberately concealed the other favorsfrom the Government

that were not in the written plea agreement. The potential impact of such a cross-examination is

sufficient to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict, thereby satisfying the threshold for materiality

laid out in Kyles. Therefore, we find that a new trial is warranted.

B. Prior Medical History

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We also find that the District Court erred in not reviewing Mr. M's medical records before

ruling that such information was immaterial. Federal courts often permit cross- examination

regarding a witness' previous mental history, and may even allow extrinsic evidence such as hospital

records to be used for impeachment purposes. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN'S

EVIDENCE ¶ 607[04], at 66 &n.36. Mental records can be material as impeachment evidence because

they can cast doubt on the accuracy of a witness' testimony. See, e.g., East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996,

1003 (5th Cir. 1995).

Of course, a history of mental illness is not necessarily admissible as impeachment evidence.

For example, the First Circuit has ruled that mental instability is "relevant to credibility only where,

during the time-frame of the events testified to, the witness exhibited a pronounced disposition to lie

or hallucinate, or suffered from a severe illness ... that dramatically impaired her ability to perceive

and tell the truth." United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1992). The test in Butt may

be too narrow a rule of admissibility, so we do not embrace the position of the First Circuit. Rather,

it is enough to say that we agree that evidence regarding mental illness is relevant only when it may

reasonably cast doubt on the ability or willingness of a witnessto tell the truth. The soundest course,

therefore, is for the District Court to consider the medical history of the specific witness in question

so as to render an informed decision regarding the relevance of that history.

In this case, the record indicates that Mr. M was hospitalized for chronic depression for

approximately 18 monthsin 1988-89, and that he attended a mentalhealth clinic for an additionalfour

months thereafter. The length of Mr. M's hospitalization suggests a potentially serious mental

disorder. Thus, it was incumbent on the District Court to review the medical records to determine

whether the witness' prior condition was relevant for impeachment purposes.

The Government argues that a patient suffering from depression would not necessarily be

subject to symptoms that might cast doubt on his testimony as a witness. However, as counsel

acknowledged at oral argument, this is not a medically verifiable rule that can be asserted with

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3

Indeed, a person who suffers from a "Major Depressive Disorder" that is classified as "Severe

With Psychotic Features" could well experience delusions or hallucinations. See AMERICAN

PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed.

1994) 376-77. 

confidence, given the widelyvarying forms of depression and vast array of accompanying symptoms.3

The simple point isthat, without viewing the medicalrecords, there was no way for the District Court

to know the extent of Mr. M's symptoms. The medical records might have indicated a relevant,

ongoing problemand this was not a remote possibility, because the events about which Mr. M

testified took place only two years after his release from the hospital. In any event, we cannot say,

without further evidence, that the undisclosed information was immaterial. Therefore, on remand,

Mr. M's medicalrecordsshould be disclosed to the defense, or at least reviewed by the District Court

in camera to determine their potential relevance.

III. CONCLUSION

The prosecutor's obligation to disclose material information to the defense is a fundamental

component of the guarantee that criminal defendants receive fair trials. Thus, we do not lightly

excuse Brady violations. Because the Government's nondisclosures in this case significantly impaired

defense counsel's ability to impeach the credibility of a principal prosecution witness, we reverse and

remand for a new trial.

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