Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05955/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-05955-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BNSF Railway Company
Defendant
Neil A. Jensen
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NEIL A. JENSEN,

Plaintiff,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-05955-HSG 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 

RENEWED MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 

AS A MATTER OF LAW 

Re: Dkt. No. 203

A seven-day jury trial in this action brought under the Federal Railway Safety Act 

(“FRSA”) began on October 26, 2015. Dkt. No. 169. On November 3, 2015, the jury returned a 

verdict in favor of Defendant BNSF Railway Co., finding that Plaintiff Neil Jensen failed to prove 

a violation of the FRSA. Dkt. No. 210.

Plaintiff filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 50, as well as a motion to strike affirmative defenses, on November 3, 2015. Dkt. No. 

203. The Court did not grant the motions.1 Plaintiff renewed his motion for judgment as a matter 

of law following publication of the jury’s verdict. Tr. at 1228:21-25. Defendant filed an 

opposition, Dkt. No. 218, and Plaintiff filed a reply, Dkt. No. 220. For the reasons articulated 

below, the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

In considering a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a court must uphold the 

jury’s verdict if “substantial evidence” supports the jury’s conclusion. Johnson v. Paradise Valley 

Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence is evidence 

 

1 Under Rule 50(b), the Court thereby “submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later 

deciding the legal questions raised by the motion.” 

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adequate to support the jury’s conclusion, even if it is also possible to draw a contrary conclusion 

from the same evidence.” Id. The Court must “view all the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, draw all reasonable inferences in the favor of the nonmover, and disregard 

all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Castro v. Cnty. 

of Los Angeles, 797 F.3d 654, 662-63 (9th Cir. 2015). Judgment as a matter of law “is appropriate 

when the jury could have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict.” Lakeside-Scott v. 

Multnomah Cnty., 556 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir. 2009).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleged a single cause of action for violation of § 20109(c)(2) of the FRSA. Dkt. 

No. 1. To prevail, Plaintiff had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he engaged in 

protected activity; (2) his employer knew that he engaged in the protected activity; (3) he suffered 

an adverse personnel action; and (4) the protected activity was a contributing factor to the adverse 

action. Araujo v. N.J. Transit Rail Operations, 708 F.3d 152, 157 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Dkt. 

No. 139-1 at 29 (Plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction agreeing in substance with this 

characterization of the elements of his FRSA claim). If Plaintiff satisfied this burden, Defendant

could avoid liability if it proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have terminated 

Plaintiff even if he had not engaged in protected activity. Araujo, 708 F.3d at 157. Plaintiff 

sought compensatory damages—including back pay, front pay, lost benefits, and damages for 

emotional distress—and punitive damages.

The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Plaintiff failed 

to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant violated the FRSA. Most notably, the 

record contained ample evidence adequate to support the conclusion that Plaintiff did not engage 

in protected activity—i.e., that his absences from work during the relevant time period were not 

occasioned by him “following orders or a treatment plan of a treating physician.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 20109(c)(2). As Plaintiff notes, “Dr. Galli testified at trial . . . that the 3-8 intermittent days off 

per month were required to rest Jensen’s injured wrist.” Dkt. No. 220 (“Reply”) at 1. But 

Defendant presented substantial evidence showing that Defendant provided at least eight rest days 

per month to Plaintiff that were not counted as unexcused absences. See, e.g., Tr. at 452:23-

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453:17. Moreover, Defendant presented substantial evidence from which the jury could conclude

that the December 20, 2011 letter signed by Dr. Galli indicating that Plaintiff should be provided 

3-8 days off per month in addition to his regularly scheduled rest days was in fact written by 

Plaintiff’s counsel for purposes of litigation, and thus did not amount to “orders or a treatment 

plan of a treating physician.” See, e.g., Tr. at 811:19-813:4. The Court therefore finds that the 

record contains more than adequate support for the jury’s conclusion that Plaintiff did not prove 

each element of his case by the required preponderance of the evidence. The totality of the record 

clearly demonstrates that the jury need not “have relied only on speculation to reach its verdict.” 

Lakeside-Scott, 556 F.3d at 803. 

III. CONCLUSION

The standard for granting a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is high, and 

the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff

has not offered a sufficient basis to disturb that verdict. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED.2 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 2, 2015

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

 

2 Because the jury did not need to reach Defendant’s affirmative defenses, Plaintiff’s arguments 

regarding those issues are moot. Additionally, given its finding that substantial evidence supports 

the jury’s conclusion that Defendant is not liable under the FRSA, the Court does not reach 

Plaintiff’s argument regarding punitive damages.

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