Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05324/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-05324-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cecilio Lara Romero
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re CECILIO LARA ROMERO,

Petitioner,

 /

No. C 15-5324 MEJ (PR)

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE

DISMISSED; GRANTING LEAVE TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Dkt. No. 6

Petitioner, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the Taft Modified Community

Correctional Facility, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenging a conviction from Contra Costa County Superior Court. He also seeks to

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

BACKGROUND

According to the petition, Petitioner was found guilty of unspecified crimes, and, on

or about August 31, 2012, Petitioner was sentenced to jail. Docket No. 5 (“Pet.”) at 2–3. 

Petitioner does not specify the length of his sentence. Id. at 2. Petitioner appealed his

conviction and sentence, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction and

sentence in 2013. Id. at 3. On November 20, 2015, Petitioner filed a letter with this Court. 

Docket No. 1. That same day, the Clerk of the Court informed Petitioner that he should

submit his petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the proper form. Docket No. 2. On

February 10, 2105, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. Docket No. 5.

DISCUSSION

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a);

Case 3:15-cv-05324-MEJ Document 9 Filed 04/12/16 Page 1 of 5
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). A district court shall “award the writ or issue an

order directing the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it

appears from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28

U.S.C. § 2243. 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c); see Rose v. Lundy,

455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding every claim raised in federal habeas petition must be

exhausted). The state’s highest court must be given an opportunity to rule on the claims even

if review is discretionary. See O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (petitioner

must invoke “one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.”); see

also Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (exhaustion requires that prisoner fairly

present his claim in each appropriate state court, including a state supreme court with powers

of discretionary review). If available state remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims,

the district court must dismiss the petition. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1981). 

Petitioner lists numerous grounds for federal habeas relief. Pet. at 5–7. However,

according to the petition, Petitioner has not presented any of these claims to the California

Supreme Court. In other words, he has not invoked a complete round of California’s

established appellate review process. See Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.

1999) (holding that California law requires presentation of claims to the California Supreme

Court through petition for discretionary review in order to exhaust state court remedies)

(relying on Cal. R. Ct. 28(b) (1999), which was renumbered Rule 8.500 and amended in

2007, but still provides that the California Supreme Court has the discretion to review

decisions issued by the California Court of Appeal). The instant petition is therefore subject

to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Rose, 455 U.S. at 522 (requiring that all

claims in a federal habeas petition be exhausted).

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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Petitioner may avoid dismissal if he can show that he is entitled to a stay of the action. 

Prisoners who may run the risk of having the federal statute of limitations expire while they

are exhausting their state remedies may avoid this predicament “by filing a ‘protective’

petition in federal court and asking the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas

proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416

(2005) (citing Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269, 277–78 (2005)). A federal court may stay a

petition that raises only unexhausted claims. Mena v. Long, No. 14-55102, 2016 WL

62540516, *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 17, 2016). A stay and abeyance “is only appropriate when the

district court determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust his

claims first in state court;” the claims are not meritless; and there were no intentionally

dilatory litigation tactics by the petitioner. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 277–78. Any stay must be

limited in time to avoid indefinite delay. Id. Reasonable time limits would be 30 days to get

to state court, as long as reasonably necessary in state court, and 30 days to get back to

federal court after the final rejection of the claims by the state court. See id. at 278. If

Petitioner moves for a stay, he must show that he satisfies the Rhines criteria. The Rhines

Court cautioned district courts against being too liberal in allowing a stay because a stay

works against several of the purposes of the AEDPA in that it “frustrates AEDPA’s objective

of encouraging finality by allowing a petitioner to delay the resolution of the federal

proceeding” and “undermines AEDPA’s goal of streamlining federal habeas proceedings by

decreasing a petitioner’s incentive to exhaust all his claims in state court prior to filing his

federal petition.” Id. at 277. 

In addition, it appears that the instant petition may be untimely. The Antiterrorism

and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which became law on April 24, 1996,

imposed for the first time a statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus filed

by state prisoners. Petitions filed by prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or

sentences must be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (A) the judgment

became final after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct

review; (B) an impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 The exceptions to the statute of limitations set forth in Section 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D) require

claim-by-claim consideration and allow for delayed commencement of the limitations period

where the delay in presenting the claim was due to governmental interference, § 2244(d)(1)(B);

where the claim was based on a constitutional right newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactive, § 2244(d)(1)(C); or where the factual predicate of the claim could not have

been discovered earlier, § 2244(d)(1)(D).

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was removed, if such action prevented petitioner from filing; (C) the constitutional right

asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on collateral review; or (D) the factual

predicate of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Time during which a properly filed application for state

post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the one-year time

limit. Id. § 2244(d)(2). The one-year period generally will run from “the date on which the

judgment became final by conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). In the instant action, Petitioner reports

that the California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence in 2013. Pet. at 3. 

Petitioner could seek review of the California Court of Appeal decision by serving and filing

a petition for review within ten days after the California Court of Appeal’s decision became

final, Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(e)(1), but did not do so. At the latest, Petitioner’s judgment became

final in early 2014. The instant action was commenced on November 20, 2015, and is

possibly untimely, unless Petitioner is entitled to either delayed commencement of the

limitations period pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B)-(D),1

 or equitable tolling of the

limitations period, Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“[A] ‘petitioner’ is ‘entitled

to equitable tolling’ only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and

(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented timely filing.”)

(quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418)). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, Petitioner must show cause

why this federal habeas action should not be dismissed either for failing to exhaust his claims

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before filing suit, or for being untimely. If Petitioner seeks to stay and abey this action, he

must, within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, file a motion for a stay in which he

explains why he failed to exhaust his claims in state court before presenting them to this

court, that his claims are not meritless, and that he is not intentionally delaying resolution of

his constitutional claims. If Petitioner fails to respond in accordance with this order, the

action will be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 

2. The application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 6) is GRANTED. 

This order terminates Docket No. 6.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 

Maria-Elena James

United States Magistrate Judge

April 12, 2016

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