Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-16-04070/USCOURTS-ca4-16-04070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Saundra Lucille White
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4070

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

SAUNDRA LUCILLE WHITE, a/k/a Lucille Parrish-White, a/k/a L. Saundra 

White, a/k/a L. Saundra Parrish White, a/k/a Lucille S. White, a/k/a Lucille P. 

White, a/k/a Lucille Parrish, a/k/a Saundra L. Parrish,

Defendant – Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt. 

Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:13-cr-00436-PWG-1)

Argued: January 25, 2017 Decided: March 9, 2017

Before DUNCAN and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Duncan wrote the opinion, in which Judge 

Keenan and Senior Judge Davis joined.

ARGUED: Alex Christian Gesch, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellant. James I. Pearce, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, 

Baltimore, Maryland, Meghan S. Skelton, Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland; Mark A. Perry, GIBSON, 

DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Leslie R. Caldwell, 

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Assistant Attorney General, Sung-Hee Suh, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 

Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, Sujit Raman, Chief of Appeals, 

Thomas P. Windom, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED 

STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.

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DUNCAN, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Saundra Lucille White (“White”) appeals her convictions for 

mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and aggravated identity theft. White contends 

that she should have received a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),

to challenge the veracity of the affidavit supporting a search warrant authorizing a search 

of her residence. White also appeals the reasonableness of her sentence. For the reasons 

that follow, we affirm.

I.

A.

On December 26, 2009, Christal Millner suffered a severe stroke leaving her 

unable to walk, talk, or drive for the remainder of her life. Pamela Hiler, Millner’s 

cousin, took responsibility for Millner’s care. In March 2010, hospital staff advised Hiler 

to seek guardianship of Millner in order to make health care and other decisions on 

Millner’s behalf. Hiler, a counselor, reached out to White for assistance. White and 

Hiler had attended the same church for many years and Hiler recalled that White was an 

attorney. White graduated from Texas Southern University School of Law in 1983 and 

obtained a Master of Law in Taxation from Georgetown University in 1989. Hiler 

retained White on March 24, 2010 and received temporary and then permanent 

guardianship over Millner. 

As part of the guardianship process, Hiler and White inventoried Millner’s assets. 

These included Millner’s condominium in Silver Spring, Maryland, a 1993 Volvo, and 

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three Bank of America accounts totaling over $130,000. Millner also had access to her 

deceased mother’s assets, including bank accounts totaling $352,000, approximately 

$400,000 in savings bonds, and a house. Hiler set about trying to organize Millner’s 

personal affairs and gave White a key to Millner’s condo. 

Almost immediately after Hiler retained White, White began a scheme to defraud 

Hiler and Millner. In April 2010, White impersonated Millner to apply for a duplicate 

license in Millner’s name at a Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (“MVA”)

location. White used Millner’s birth certificate and forged Millner’s signature on the 

application. Because White did not look like the prior photographs of Millner in the 

MVA database, the MVA confiscated the license. Undeterred, White obtained a 

counterfeit university identification with White’s picture and Millner’s name. 

In June 2010, White created a Maryland entity called Intel Realty Financial 

Services (“IRFS”). White opened a bank account for IRFS at Wachovia Bank, listing 

Millner as IRFS’s CEO, owner, and president. The registered address of the bank 

account was a P.O. Box that White had previously opened. Using the fake university 

identification and Millner’s vehicle registration, White then rented another P.O. Box in 

Millner’s name from UPS. White authorized Millner and IRFS to receive mail from the 

UPS box. 

Shortly thereafter, Millner received the first of many tax deficiency notices. 

Because Millner was bedridden in a medical facility, Hiler routinely went to Millner’s 

condo to retrieve the mail. In June 2010, Hiler opened a letter addressed to Millner and 

Millner’s mother purportedly from the “IRS, Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue 

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Service.” J.A. 1163. The letter referred to an “Offer Compromised Agreement” between 

Millner and the IRS and requested remittance of $158,500 to IRFS. J.A. 1165. It warned 

that the office would “file an immediate lien on any and all of” Millner’s assets unless the 

agency received “full and complete payment” by June 19, 2010. J.A. 1165. Hiler asked 

White, her attorney, to call the number on the notice to ascertain whether it was

legitimate and to confirm that Millner actually owed the money. After assuring Hiler that 

she had looked into the matter and Millner did owe the money, White told Hiler to send 

the checks on Millner’s behalf. Hiler purchased cashier’s checks drawn on Millner’s 

account and sent them to IRFS. From June 2010 until early 2013, Millner continued to 

receive similar tax notices and Hiler continued to send IRFS money from Millner’s 

accounts. Even after Millner died in January 2011, the tax notices continued. 

By the end of 2012, the IRFS payments had depleted Millner’s assets. Hiler then 

received a notice addressed to her stating that she, as Millner’s personal representative, 

was responsible for paying the taxes. In addition, Hiler received a voicemail from an 

unidentified caller purporting to be “an official collector for” the IRS and the “State of 

Maryland Department of Revenue.”1

 J.A. 2354. The caller instructed Hiler or her 

attorney to contact the office that day and left a return number. When Hiler consulted 

White as to these notices, White confirmed that Hiler was responsible for paying the 

taxes and advised that she borrow money to do so. Having sent IRFS approximately

 1 Maryland’s tax authority is the Office of the Comptroller of Maryland, not the 

Department of Revenue.

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$800,000 at this point, Hiler became suspicious. She consulted another attorney, Craig 

Ellis, who told Hiler that the notices were “absolutely crazy” because an estate 

representative generally is not liable for the debts of the estate. J.A. 1360. Ellis, now

also suspicious, did a quick internet search of White. He found out that, unbeknown to 

Hiler, White had been disbarred in Washington, D.C. and Maryland since 2011 and was 

not currently licensed to practice law. 

B.

Ellis contacted the Fraud Section of the Anne Arundel County, Maryland Police 

Department, which sparked a state and federal investigation of White’s conduct. Law 

enforcement learned that after Hiler wrote checks to IRFS, White deposited the checks 

into the IRFS bank account. White then forged Millner’s names on checks out of the 

IRFS account to herself, her daughter, trust fund accounts, to purchase vehicles, and to 

renovate property White owned. 

On May 15, 2013, John Davids, Special Agent with the United States Treasury 

Inspector General for Tax Administration, submitted a sworn affidavit in support of an 

application for a search and seizure warrant for White’s office and residence. The 

affidavit described White’s scheme, including the fraudulent tax notices, the IRFS 

P.O. Box and bank account opened by someone claiming to be Millner, ATM 

photographs of White making deposits and withdrawals into the IRFS bank account, and 

the forged checks from the IRFS account. As to probable cause, Davids relied on his 

interview with Hiler and his twenty-five years of experience as a Special Agent. 

According to Davids, Hiler met White at White’s office “for meetings that were directly 

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related to this scheme.” J.A. 32. Davids also attested that Hiler told him she “has been 

present at White’s home and had discussions related to this scheme there.” J.A. 32. A 

magistrate judge issued the search warrant, which agents executed on May 17, 2013.

The search uncovered a bevy of incriminating evidence, including debit cards for 

the IRFS bank account, an envelope on which White had been practicing Millner’s 

signature, draft notices to Millner with the IRS seal cut and pasted onto them, mail from 

the IRFS P.O. Box, the counterfeit university identification card, and several of the 

cashier’s checks Hiler had sent to IRFS. Agents also found carbon copies of forged 

checks from the IRFS account to White, White’s daughter, White’s family trust, car 

dealerships for cars White purchased, and a contractor for construction work on White’s 

property.

C.

On September 15, 2014, a superseding indictment charged White with three 

counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341; one count of wire fraud in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; two counts of money laundering in violation of 

18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a), 1957; and one count of aggravated identity theft in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 1028A. White pleaded not guilty, and the district court released her pending 

trial. On October 14, 2014, the government filed a motion seeking White’s pretrial 

detention, alleging that White violated the terms of her pretrial release by defrauding 

another victim and opening another bank account without prior approval. Accordingly, 

the court ordered White detained pending trial, which began in July 2015. 

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 Hiler was the government’s first witness. On cross-examination, Hiler testified 

that she did not have “any formal business meetings” at White’s home and only went to 

White’s home on “social occasions.” J.A. 1315. White immediately requested a Franks

hearing, arguing that the primary bases for the warrant were Hiler’s statements to Davids 

that she had been to White’s home and discussed business--specifically Millner--with 

White at White’s home. On redirect, Hiler clarified that she did not recall “having a full 

detailed conversation” with White about Millner at White’s home but that she may have 

communicated with White “in passing” about Millner’s health. J.A. 1341. Hiler also 

reiterated that she knew White had a home office but had never been inside of it. After 

excusing Hiler and the jury, the district court heard arguments and determined that White 

was not entitled to a Franks hearing. 

 The jury convicted White on all seven counts. At sentencing, the district court 

applied several sentencing enhancements, two of which are at issue here. Over White’s 

objection, the district court added a two-level enhancement for misrepresentation of a 

government agency pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) and an additional two-level 

enhancement for sophisticated means under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C). The district court also 

denied White’s request for a downward departure based on her psychologist Dr. Michael 

Hendricks’s diagnosis of . Upon the 

government’s motion, the district court ordered Dr. Neil Blumberg to conduct a 

psychiatric examination of White. Dr. Blumberg’s report contradicted Dr. Hendricks’s 

conclusion, finding that the diagnosis was “questionable at best” because the 

examination was self-reported and had no built-in validity scales. J.A. 2607. Further, 

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Dr. Blumberg’s own examination revealed “

.” J.A. 2608. 

At sentencing, the district court weighed the competing expert reports and found 

Dr. Blumberg’s analysis more compelling. The district court calculated White’s 

Guidelines range for Counts 1 to 6 as 87 to 108 months and sentenced White to 108 

months. Count 7 carried a mandatory consecutive 24-month sentence, making White’s 

total sentence 132 months. White timely appealed the district court’s denial of a Franks

hearing and her sentence. 

II. 

White argues that she was entitled to a Franks hearing because Hiler’s testimony 

called into question the validity of the warrant. The government argues that White 

waived this argument by not making the request before trial and, even if the argument is 

not waived, White does not meet the standard for a Franks hearing. “We assess de novo 

the legal determinations underlying a district court’s suppression rulings, including the 

denial of a Franks hearing, and we review the court’s factual findings relating to such 

rulings for clear error.” United States v. Allen, 631 F.3d 164, 171 (4th Cir. 2011). 

A. 

 In Franks v. Delaware, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the 

general rule prohibiting a defendant from attacking a facially valid affidavit. 438 U.S. 

at 171. Although we typically describe the Franks test as two-pronged, it actually has 

three parts. To obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a “substantial 

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preliminary showing” that the affiant made (1) a false statement (2) “knowingly and 

intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” that was (3) “necessary to the 

finding of probable cause.” Id. at 155–56. 

Before turning to the substance of White’s claim, we must first address the 

government’s threshold argument that White failed to preserve her Franks hearing 

challenge because she did not make the request prior to trial. Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 12(b) requires defendants to make suppression requests, like a Franks hearing, 

before trial “if the basis for the motion is then reasonably available.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3). The basis for White’s Franks hearing request was Hiler’s 

testimony, which White believes contradicted statements in the affidavit. Because that

information was not “reasonably available” before trial, id., White did not waive her right 

to request a Franks hearing.

Nevertheless, White’s Franks claim fails on the merits because she did not make a 

substantial showing that Agent Davids knowingly, intentionally or with reckless 

disregard made a false statement in the affidavit. The affidavit stated that Hiler had been 

to White’s home, “discussed this case with her there and knows her to maintain a home 

office at that location.” J.A. 31. At trial, White’s counsel asked Hiler a series of 

questions on cross-examination regarding her interactions at White’s home.

Q: We were talking about the times when you’ve been to her house. 

They were social occasions?

A: Yes.

Q: Or holiday occasions, right? These weren’t times where you 

talked business?

A: No.

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Q: You didn’t have any formal business meetings at Ms. White’s 

house?

A: No.

Q: So you never claimed to Agent Davids that you discussed 

business at Ms. White’s house?

A: No.

J.A. 1314–15. Based on those answers, White immediately requested a Franks hearing. 

The district court first allowed Hiler to finish her testimony. On redirect, Hiler clarified 

that she had seen White’s home office before, though she had never been inside of the 

room. The government also asked Hiler whether she had ever discussed Millner with 

White at her home. Hiler responded that she did not “recall . . . having a full detailed 

conversation” with White about Millner but they may have discussed Millner’s 

healthcare “in passing” at White’s home. J.A. 1341. 

Outside of the presence of the witness and the jury, the district court heard 

arguments and found that Hiler’s statements did not satisfy the requisite showing for a 

Franks hearing because “at best” Hiler’s testimony evinced “inconsistent versions with 

varying degrees of certainty . . . about communications that occurred” over two years 

prior. J.A. 1517. Moreover, the affidavit also cited Agent Davids’s “training and 

experience that persons operating fraudulent schemes . . . often transport[] and store[] 

evidence, fruits and instrumentalities of the crime from the office to the home and vice 

versa.” J.A. 31–32. Agent Davids attested to his knowledge “from training and 

experience that in this modern technological environment, many times the line between 

office, home and vehicle is often blurred because of technology that allows persons to be 

mobile in their endeavors.” J.A. 32. Therefore, even without Hiler’s statements, the 

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district court concluded that probable cause existed for the search warrant of White’s 

home.

B.

The district court did not err in finding that White failed to make the requisite 

showing for a Franks hearing. First, White cannot point to a false statement. Hiler’s trial 

testimony did not contradict Agent Davids’s assertions that (1) Hiler discussed Millner

with White at her home and (2) Hiler knew White had a home office from which she 

conducted business. Hiler’s acknowledgment on redirect that she had conversations 

regarding Millner with White at White’s home--no matter how fleeting--comport with 

Agent Davids’s statements in the affidavit. 

Second, White cannot establish the requisite scienter under Franks. Because the 

Franks test is from the perspective of the affiant, White must show that Agent Davids 

“knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth” included those 

statements in his affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155. White asserts Agent Davids 

attributed statements to Hiler that she did not make, which is unlikely to have been an 

innocent mistake. However, a defendant’s showing for a Franks hearing “must be more 

than conclusory.” Id. at 171. White did not offer any proof showing that Agent Davids 

intentionally or recklessly included a false statement in the affidavit.2

 Therefore, the 

district court did not err in denying White a Franks hearing.

 2 Because we conclude that White did not show that Agent Davids recklessly 

included a false statement in the affidavit, we need not address whether the challenged 

statements were necessary for the magistrate judge to find probable cause.

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III. 

We now turn to White’s challenges to the reasonableness of her sentence. White 

argues that the district court erred in applying (1) a two-level enhancement for 

misrepresenting a government agency and (2) a two-level enhancement for sophisticated 

means. White also contends that the district court should have reduced her sentence 

based on her diagnosis. We discuss each argument in turn. 

A. 

When reviewing a criminal sentence, we first ensure that the district court did not 

commit significant procedural error, such as incorrectly calculating the Guidelines range. 

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We review the district court’s factual 

findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Strieper, 

666 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). If there is no procedural error, we review the 

substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. A 

within-Guidelines range sentence is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Susi, 

674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). 

B. 

1. 

The Sentencing Guidelines allow a district court to enhance a sentence by two 

levels when a fraud “involved a misrepresentation that the defendant was acting on behalf 

of . . . a government agency.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) (2014). The district court 

applied this enhancement to White based on two pieces of evidence: (1) the fraudulent 

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tax statements White created that induced Hiler to remit money and (2) the voicemail in 

which an unidentified person claimed to be an official tax collector for the 

U.S. Department of Treasury and the State of Maryland. The voicemail demanded 

payment for taxes and left a number that was later associated with White. White 

challenges both pieces of evidence. 

White argues that the notices cannot trigger the enhancement because White did 

not sign her name to them or otherwise directly state that she was acting on behalf of a 

government taxing authority. For support, White points to the application notes for 

§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), which provide three examples of when the enhancement should apply. 

Id. § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B). White argues that these examples show that the Sentencing 

Commission intended the enhancement to apply only when a defendant directly and 

verbally misrepresents that she is acting on behalf of a government agency. 

White’s claim lacks merit for two reasons. First, while commentary to the 

Sentencing Guidelines is authoritative, we only turn to the commentary when the 

implicated Guideline is ambiguous. United States v. Ashford, 718 F.3d 377, 382 

(4th Cir. 2013). Here, the Sentencing Commission was clear--the enhancement 

encompasses any fraud that “involved a misrepresentation.” § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A). The 

Commission’s use of the passive voice forecloses White’s argument that the defendant 

must make a direct misrepresentation. Second, even if we consider the application note’s

illustrations, they do not explicitly require a direct misrepresentation. The first example

involves a “defendant who solicited contributions for a non-existent famine relief 

organization.” § 2B1.1 cmt. 8(B)(i). This example does not specify how the defendant 

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solicited money and White’s behavior here is analogous: she solicited tax payments 

through the fraudulent IRS notices and thereby misrepresented a government agency.

White’s challenge to the voicemail is equally unavailing. White argues that the 

voicemail cannot be attributed to her because the caller is unidentified. However, 

whether White is the actual person on the phone is irrelevant because the Guidelines 

apply to all conduct “commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the 

defendant.” § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). The return phone number for the voicemail was a number 

White activated shortly after beginning the scheme, appeared on the fraudulent tax 

notices, and was connected to numerous documents in White’s home. The district court 

did not commit clear error in finding that either White (in a disguised voice) or someone 

at White’s direction made the phone call. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s 

application of a two-level enhancement for misrepresentation of a government agency.

2.

The Guidelines also provide for a two-level sophisticated-means enhancement 

when a fraud involves “especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct 

pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.” § 2B1.1 cmt. 9(B). “Conduct 

such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities . . . also 

ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.” Id. Whether a defendant’s conduct involved 

sophisticated means is a factual inquiry that we review for clear error. United States v. 

Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014). The sophisticated-means enhancement 

“applies where the entirety of a scheme constitutes sophisticated means, even if every 

individual action is not sophisticated.” Id. at 257.

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The elaborate elements of White’s scheme belie her attempt to downplay her 

conduct as common-place fraud. White took advantage of her relationship with a church 

member, Hiler, to scam approximately $800,000 from Hiler and Hiler’s incapacitated and 

deceased family members. The calculated scheme involved several levels of fraud and 

spanned almost three years. To effectuate her fraud White impersonated Millner to 

obtain a duplicate license and counterfeit university ID. She created the fictitious entity 

IRFS and opened bank accounts and a P.O. Box for the entity in Millner’s name. She 

created fraudulent IRS notices directing Hilner to pay taxes on behalf of her bedridden 

cousin to IRFS. White then advised Hiler, her client, to pay IRFS. White forged 

Millner’s signature on IRFS checks to use the money in the IRFS account for herself and 

her daughter. Looking at the totality of the case, the district court found the evidence 

“sufficiently great to take this out of the mindrun [sic] of a wire fraud . . . and mail fraud 

case.” J.A. 2373. We agree.3

 On appeal, White contends that the sophisticated-means 

 3 White argues that we rejected the sophisticated-means enhancement based on 

similar facts in Adepoju, 756 F.3d at 250. In Adepoju, the defendant created counterfeit 

identification documents and used them to open bank accounts and deposit fraudulent 

checks. Contrary to White’s contention, we did not hold in Adepoju that the scheme did 

not warrant a sophisticated-means enhancement. Rather, we held that the facts did not 

“affirmatively demonstrate” sophisticated-means evidence and the district court clearly 

erred by shifting to the defendant the burden to “disprove sophistication.” Id. at 257 

(emphasis added). The government in Adepoju had only carried its burden of proof as to 

the defendant’s use of forged checks and a stolen identity to attempt bank fraud, which 

was not enough to place the scheme beyond the “forgeries, misrepresentation, and 

concealment inherent in bank fraud.” Id. The facts here show more than simple 

“unauthorized acquisition and use of another’s information.” Id. In addition to 

impersonating Millner, White also created a fictitious entity, opened multiple bank 

accounts and P.O. Boxes, and created the fraudulent tax notices. The district court did 

not clearly err in finding that those facts, which the government proved beyond a 

(Continued)

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enhancement is inappropriate “because of the clumsy execution of several aspects” of the 

scheme. Appellant’s Br. at 58. But “sophisticated” under the Guidelines refers to the 

“especially complex or especially intricate” planning involved in a fraud, § 2B1.1 cmt. 

9(B), not the skill with which a scheme is executed. The district court did not clearly err 

in applying a two-level enhancement for sophisticated means. 

C. 

Finally, turning to the substantive reasonableness of White’s sentence, we must 

consider whether, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the district court abused its 

discretion in sentencing White to 108 months for Counts 1 to 6, which was the top end of 

the Guidelines range.4

 A district court is not required to “robotically tick through” every 

§ 3553(a) factor but it must make an individualized assessment of the § 3553(a) factors 

tailored to the defendant. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). 

White alleges that the district court failed to properly consider “the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” as 

required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Specifically, White believes her sentence should 

have been reduced based on her diagnosis. 

 

preponderance of the evidence, separated White’s offense “from the ordinary or generic.” 

United States v. Jinwright, 683 F.3d 471, 486 (4th Cir. 2012). 

4 Because Count 7 carried a mandatory 24-month consecutive sentence, the district 

court only had discretion as to the sentence for Counts 1 to 6. 

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court amply explained its reasons for crediting Dr. Blumberg’s report and did not abuse 

its discretion in so doing. Therefore, White has failed to rebut her presumptively 

reasonable sentence. 

IV.

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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