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Parties Involved:
Dwayne Antonio Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 11, 1994 Decided November 22, 1994

No. 92-3276

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL D. JOHNSON,

APPELLANT

No. 92-3289

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KEVIN LAMONT THOMAS,

APPELLANT

No. 93-3153

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DWAYNE ANTONIO THOMAS,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(92cr0156-01, 92cr0156-02 & 92cr0081)

Jensen E. Barber (appointed by the court) argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant Michael

D. Johnson. A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, filed the briefs for appellant Kevin Lamont Thomas.

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A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Dwayne Antonio Thomas.

With him on the briefs was Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal Public Defender.

Barbara A. Grewe, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese, III, and

William R. Cowden, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge: These cases involve a constitutional challenge to the Anti-Drug

AbuseAct of1986 ("1986 Act"), which punishes crimesinvolving "crack" cocainemore severelythan

those involving an equivalent amount of cocaine powder. Appellants were convicted of possession

and distribution of crack cocaine,sentenced under the federalSentencing Guidelines, and now appeal

theirsentences under the equal protection component ofthe Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.

We affirm the convictions and sentences.

I.

This opinion responds to the common contentions of appellants Dwayne Antonio Thomas,

KevinLamont Thomas, and MichaelD.Johnson, raised in three separate appeals. Each appellant was

convicted of an offense or offenses involving crack cocaine, and sentenced accordingly under the

federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Dwayne Antonio Thomas was apprehended within 1000 feet of a school in possession of

16.26 grams of cocaine base, 0.429 grams of marijuana, $190 in cash and a beeper. He was

subsequently indicted for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within

1000 feet of a school in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 860(a), and unlawful possession of marijuana in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). He pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine

base within 1000 feet of a school, and the other counts were dismissed. Applying the federal

Sentencing Guidelines, the trial court arrived at a sentence of 87 months' imprisonment, the bottom

of the applicable guideline range.

Michael D. Johnson was apprehended on March 12, 1992, while the passenger in a car driven

by appellant Kevin Lamont Thomas. Officers observed Johnson placing something under his seat

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during the traffic stop; that something was ultimately determined to be a plastic bag containing 52.98

grams of crack cocaine. Both appellants were charged with possession with intent to distribute 50

grams or more of cocaine base and possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine

base within 1000 feet of a school. Thomas pleaded guilty to the latter charge and was sentenced to

121 months' imprisonment followed by 10 years' supervised release.

Johnson proceeded to trial on both counts. Evidence was introduced at trial relevant to

Johnson's possession with intent to distribute that on March 10, 1992, two days prior to Johnson's

ultimate arrest, police apprehended Johnsonwhile he wasshowing an object to two females, an object

which he discarded upon arrival of the police and which turned out to be a 3.5 gram "rock" of crack

cocaine. Johnson was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, though he was

acquitted of intent to distribute within 1000 feet of a school. He was sentenced to 121 months'

imprisonment to be followed by five years' supervised release.

All three appellants, African-Americans, raise identical constitutional challenges to the 1986

Act and the federal Sentencing Guidelines, alleging that the sentencing scheme violates the equal

protectioncomponent oftheFifthAmendment bydisproportionatelyand invidiouslyimpacting blacks

through meting out of harsher penalties for offenses involving crack cocaineas opposed to

sentences received by offenders possessing identical amounts of powder cocaine. "Crack" cocaine

is also known as cocaine base, and is trafficked and sold in a hard, rock-like form. Cocaine powder

or cocaine hydrochloride issold in a loose granularform. Cocaine powder may be reduced to cocaine

base through a baking or distillation process. In fiscal year 1992, 91.57 of defendants convicted

nationwide in federal crack cocaine prosecutions were black, 5.37 were hispanic, and 37 were white.

In the same time period, slightly more than 257 of defendants convicted of federal cocaine powder

offenses were black, while over 307 were white.

Under the penalty structure of the 1986 Act, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b), one gram of crack cocaine

is equivalent to 100 grams of cocaine powder. This ratio translates into disparate penalties. For

example, an offense involving five grams or more of crack cocaine triggers a mandatory minimum

five-year prison term, while an offense involving a similar amount of powder cocaine does not. 21

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1Strict scrutiny is also applied where a statute burdens the exercise of a "fundamental" right,

which cannot be properly asserted here, though appellants allude to that rubric of equal protection

analysis as their alternativeand misguidedbasis for requesting heightened scrutiny. See, e.g.,

San Antonio Independent Sch. District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34, reh'g denied, 411 U.S.

959 (1973). Appellants' asserted "liberty interests" bear no relation to the fundamental "rights" at

stake in cases such as Rodriguez (education) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)

(marriage and procreation), interests which represented more than just the manufactured "right"

to be free from the very punishment at issue in the core equal protection challenge. 

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii). Appellants argue that Congress (and the Sentencing Commission) acted

with a discriminatory motive in choosing to punish crack offenders more severely than criminals

trafficking in cocaine powder.

II.

We have only recently rebuffed a challenge to the same statute challenged by appellant here

on Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection grounds. Thompson v. United States, 27 F.3d

671 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But in Thompson the appellant had asserted only that the statutory scheme

failed the rational basis testthe lowest level of judicial review of government action challenged on

equalprotection grounds. In the present cases the appellants alternatively argued that the appropriate

scope ofjudicial inquiry is greater than the deferentialrationalbasisreview; it is claimed that we must

exercise "strict scrutiny." If that standard governed, we would be obliged to ask, in accordance with

reigning constitutional doctrine, whether the statute is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state

interest.

In order to trigger strict scrutiny, however, appellants must show more than that the

sentencing scheme has a disproportionate impact on those African-Americans who are convicted of

cocaine-related offenses.

1 The Supreme Court has required that a "decisionmaker ... selected or

reaffirmed a course of action at least in part "because of,' not merely "in spite of,' its adverse effect

upon an identifiable group." Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279

(1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 901 (1980). Discriminatory purpose thus implies even more than an

"awareness of consequences." Id.

Disparate racial impact, to be sure, can be probative ofsuch purpose, but it is not dispositive

without more. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). It is not enough that a law

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impacts members of different races differently in effectit must have been passed at least in part with

that purpose. When determining whether such invidious discriminatory purpose exists, courts may

look to "the totality of the relevant facts," including the disparate impact. See id. at 242.

Circumstantial evidence of racially discriminatory legislative purpose may also include the historical

background of the legislative scheme, the specific sequence of events leading up to the enactment,

a departure from the normal procedural sequence, a substantive departure from a routine decision

or rule, contemporary legislators' statements, and the "inevitability or foreseeability of the

consequence ofthe law." See United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 711 (8thCir. 1994),reh'g en banc

denied, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 29,370 (8th Cir. Oct. 20, 1994) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978)).

Appellants urge usto ascribe a discriminatory intent to Congress based on rathersketchy and

unpersuasive bits of information. They point first to the undeniable racism that animated legislative

debate leading to the passage of a 1914 statute criminalizing cocaine trafficking generally, long before

the crack/powder distinction was contemplated. We think this information is of no relevance to our

inquiry into the motives ofthe Congressthat passed the 1986 Act. McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,

298 n.20 (1987) ("unless historical evidence is reasonably contemporaneous with the challenged

decision, it has little probative value."). In light of the changes in American society since 1914,

changesincluding the impact ofthe Voting Rights Act on the nature ofCongressitselfin no small

way effected by successive Congresses, it would be anomalousto attempt to tar the present Congress

with the racist brush of a pre-World War I debate.

Turning to the 1986 Congress, which passed the legislation appellants challenge, appellants'

claim of a discriminatory motive is based only on indications that the statute was passed hastily,

without full committee hearings addressing all aspects ofthe statute, and on the alleged racial imagery

contained in a few documents introduced into the Congressional Record and contemporaneous

utterances ofsome legislators. The climate in Congress was allegedly "frenzied," as legislators moved

to respond to the burgeoning crack epidemic. See United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24, 29

(D.D.C. 1994). The 100-1 ratio of severity of treatment of crack versus cocaine powder received

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attention in one Senate Committee hearing for "only" 3 1/2 hours. Media accounts introduced into

the Congressional Record indicated that crack dealers were either African-American or from

Caribbean islands, one senator described the dealers as drawn from "the ghetto's legion of

unemployed teenagers," and otherstatements entered into the record characterized the crack problem

as "spreading well beyond the inner city" and becoming a "white" problem. See Walls, 841 F. Supp.

at 28-29.

Whether one believes the disparity between crack sentences and cocaine sentences is "fair"

or not, see Walls, 841 F. Supp. at 29, we think these scattered pieces of legislative history are quite

inadequate to serve to attribute a discriminatorypurpose to theCongress. Congress' undeniable haste

in passing the 1986 Act is more naturally attributed to a very real public concern over the generic

elements of the crack phenomenonan expanding market, the proliferation of violence among

dealers and in the larger community, and the untold suffering and degradation of addicts.

After all, the Congress of 1986 was composed of many congressmen, including a number of

African-Americans, who could have been expected to attack promptlyanylegislation thought to stem

from discriminatory purposelet alone legislation accompanied by racist remarks. That media

accounts introduced into the Congressional Record reflected awareness that certain racial or

nationality groups might be represented among the lawless is not probative of a discriminatory

congressional motive; intent, as noted above, requires more than knowledge of consequences. See

Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279. Certainly the actual statements of legislators cited by the appellants reflect

only an attempt to comprehend and respond decisively to a perceived national crisis. To do so

necessarily requires an understanding of the demographics and economics of the drug trade sought

to be curtailed. As the Eighth Circuit determined in United States v. Clary, there is no circumstantial

evidence of discriminatory congressional purpose, and the 1986 Act is readily explainable as a

reaction to "a unique and unprecedented problem for American narcotics enforcement." See Clary,

34 F.3d at 714. See also, e.g., United States v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 917, 918 (7thCir. 1993); United

States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5thCir. 1992). We therefore reject appellants' argument that

a racially discriminatory purpose can be attributed to Congress here.

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2One should bear in mind, as we said in Thompson, that the legislation may actually

disproportionately benefit African- Americans who live in areas plagued with crack distribution

and use. See Thompson, 27 F.3d at 678 n.3. 

3Appellant Johnson also challenges his conviction on the grounds of sufficiency of the evidence

and admission of evidence of a past drug transaction as probative of intent to possess and

distribute cocaine in the charged offense. The sufficiency of the evidence here cannot be seriously

challenged. See United States v. Rogers, 918 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Appellant's

prejudice arguments are similarly unavailing in light of our past precedents, which clearly establish

Lacking persuasive evidence of discriminatory congressional purpose beyond the bare

statistical impact of the guidelines, appellants argue alternatively that under Gomillion v. Lightfoot,

364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the racially disparate impact of

a legislative enactmentwhere particularly dramaticcan be used without more to infer

discriminatory intent on the part of the decisionmaker.2 Those cases are not controlling, however,

because here the legislative scheme and resulting disparate impact can be readily and logically

explained on grounds other than discriminatory purpose. Gomillion and Yick Wo stand for the

proposition that disparate racial impact may be thought dispositive or highly probative of

discriminatory purpose without other evidence only where there exists a clear pattern of starkly

disparate impact "unexplainable on grounds other than race." Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266

(emphasis added). Here, one need only look to the congressional findings as to the seriousness of

the crack cocaine problem to find such a race-neutral explanation. As evident from our analysis in

United States v. Cyrus and Thompson, Congress acted in light of the distributional efficiencies,

heightened potency and acute violence associated with crack cocaine. The crack/powder distinction

in the statute is thus readily explained on grounds other than race. See United States v. Cyrus, 890

F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Thompson, 27 F.3d at 678-79. And, as noted above, appellants

have not even demonstrated that impermissible considerations accompanied these race-neutral

motivations.

* * * *

Accordingly, we reject appellants' constitutional argumentsthat the 1986 Act and the federal

Sentencing Guidelinesimpermissibly distinguish between criminal actsinvolving powder cocaine and

those involving crack cocaine.3 The convictions and sentences below are

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the probative value of evidence of past acts to establish present intent or other elements of a

crime, probative value outweighing any possible prejudice. See, e.g., United States v.

Washington, 969 F.2d 1073, 1080-81 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, Washington v. United

States, 113 S. Ct. 1287 (1993).

That Johnson had conceded the element of intent to distribute and chose only to dispute

the possession element of the charged offense does not render the past bad act evidence

prejudicial. Not only was the evidence probative of intent to possess (as distinct from intent to

distribute), but also the government may still introduce evidence to establish each of the elements

of an offense, even those elements tactically ceded by a defendant. See Estelle v. McGuire, 112

S. Ct. 475, 480 (1991). 

Affirmed.

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