Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01170/USCOURTS-ca13-12-01170-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cross Match Technologies, Inc.
Intervenor
International Trade Commission
Appellee
Mentalix Incorporated
Appellant
Suprema, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SUPREMA, INC., 

MENTALIX INCORPORATED,

Appellants 

v. 

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee

CROSS MATCH TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2012-1170

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-720.

______________________ 

Decided: September 14, 2015

______________________ 

DARRYL MICHAEL WOO, Vinson & Elkins LLP, San

Francisco, CA, argued for appellants. Also represented by

ILANA RUBEL, BRYAN ALEXANDER KOHM, DAVID MICHAEL

LACY KUSTERS, HEATHER N. MEWES, ERIN SIMON, Fenwick

& West, LLP, San Francisco, CA; JAE WON SONG, Mountain View, CA; BRADLEY THOMAS MEISSNER, Seattle, WA.

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/14/2015
2 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

CLARK S. CHENEY, Office of the General Counsel,

United States International Trade Commission, Washington, DC, argued for appellee. Also represented by DOMINIC

L. BIANCHI, ANDREA C. CASSON, CLINT A. GERDINE, 

WAYNE W. HERRINGTON. 

MAXIMILIAN A. GRANT, Latham & Watkins LLP,

Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented

by CLEMENT J. NAPLES, New York, NY; GABRIEL BELL, 

BERT C. REISER, JENNIFER HALBLEIB, Washington, DC. 

MARK R. FREEMAN, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC,

argued for amicus curiae United States. Also represented

by JOYCE R. BRANDA, SCOTT R. MCINTOSH. 

JAMES ALTMAN, Foster, Murphy, Altman & Nickel,

PC, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae American Intellectual Property Law Association. Also represented by F.

DAVID FOSTER. 

J. MICHAEL JAKES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington DC, for amicus

curiae Intellectual Property Owners Association. Also

represented by HERBERT CLARE WAMSLEY, JR., Intellectual Property Owners Association, Washington, DC; PHILIP

STATON JOHNSON, Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick,

NJ; KEVIN H. RHODES, 3M Innovative Properties Company, St. Paul, MN.

CONSTANTINE L. TRELA, JR., Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, IL, for amicus curiae Microsoft Corporation. Also

represented by RICHARD ALAN CEDEROTH, DAVID T.

PRITIKIN, Chicago, IL; BRIAN R. NESTER, RYAN C. MORRIS, 

Washington, DC; THOMAS ANDREW CULBERT, DAVID E.

KILLOUGH, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.

JOHN THORNE, Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans

& Figel, PLLC, Washington, DC, for amici curiae Dell

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 3 

Inc., Adobe Systems, Inc., Ford Motor Co., Hewlett Packard Co., LG Display Co., Ltd., LG Electronics, Inc., Netflix, Inc., Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., SAP America,

Inc. Also represented by AARON M. PANNER, MELANIE L. 

BOSTWICK. 

DARYL JOSEFFER, King & Spalding LLP, Washington,

DC, for amicus curiae Google Inc. Also represented by

ADAM CONRAD, Charlotte, NC; SUZANNE MICHEL, Google

Inc., Washington, DC. 

ERIC JAY FUES, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, Washington, DC, for amicus curiae

International Trade Commission Trial Lawyers Association. Also represented by T. CY WALKER, Kenyon & Kenyon LLP, Washington, DC.

JOHN D. HAYNES, Alston & Bird LLP, Atlanta, GA, for

amici curiae Nokia Corporation, Nokia USA, Inc. Also

represented by ADAM DAVID SWAIN, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, O’MALLEY and REYNA,

Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

This appeal, which arises from rulings of the International Trade Commission (“the Commission”), returns to 

this panel after en banc consideration. We reinstate in its 

entirety the panel’s rulings, dated December 13, 2013, as 

to U.S. Patent Nos. 7,277,562 (“the ’562 patent”) and 

5,900,993 (“the ’993 patent”). See Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 

742 F.3d 1350, 1363-71 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“Suprema I”)

(Parts III.A, III.B, and V). The en banc Court neither 

considered nor questioned either the conclusions the 

panel reached as to those patents, nor the rationale for 

those conclusions. As to U.S. Patent No. 7,203,344 (“the 

’344 patent”), we affirm the Commission’s finding of a 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 3 Filed: 09/14/2015
4 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

violation of 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (“section 337”) and the 

exclusion order predicated thereon. 

BACKGROUND

This Court previously set forth at length the factual 

background of the present controversy. See generally 

Suprema I, 742 F.3d at 1352-56; Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 

2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13929, *4-13 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10,

2015) (en banc) (“Suprema II”). Briefly, Appellee Cross 

Match Technologies, Inc. (“Cross Match”) asserted that 

Appellants Suprema, Inc. and Mentalix, Inc. violated 

section 337 by infringing the ’344 patent, the ’562 patent, 

and the ’993 patent. The Commission found claim 19 of 

the ’344 patent infringed by the combination of certain of 

Suprema’s scanners (RealScan-10, RealScan-D, RealScan10F, and RealScan-DF (collectively, the “accused products”)) and Software Development Kit (“SDK”) with the 

“segmentation” feature of Mentalix Inc.’s FedSubmit 

software. The Commission concluded that Mentalix 

directly infringed claim 19 of the ’344 patent and that 

Suprema had induced that infringement. The Commission determined that the asserted claims of the ’562 

patent were not infringed, however. The Commission 

further found that Suprema’s RealScan-10 and RealScan10F scanners directly infringe claims 10, 12, and 15 of the 

’993 patent, and that Appellants failed to prove the asserted claims of the ’993 patent invalid as obvious. Suprema I, 742 F.3d at 1353. Based on these findings, on 

October 24, 2011, the Commission issued a limited exclusion order directed to certain scanning devices imported 

“by or on behalf of Suprema or Mentalix” and issued a 

cease and desist order directed to Mentalix only.1 See

Certain Biometric Scanning Devices, Components Thereof,

Associated Software, and Products Containing Same, 

1 The cease and desist order is not at issue on appeal; we address only the propriety of the exclusion order.

 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 4 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 5 

USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-720, Pub. No. 4366, Limited 

Exclusion Order ¶ 1 (Feb. 2013). 

On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed the Commission’s non-infringement ruling regarding the ’562 

patent. Suprema I, 742 F.3d at 1353. The panel also 

affirmed the Commission’s finding of infringement with 

regard to the ’993 patent, and affirmed the Commission’s 

conclusion that Appellants failed to prove the asserted 

’993 patent claims were invalid as obvious. Id. The panel 

vacated the Commission’s infringement finding on the 

’344 patent, however, holding that “an exclusion order 

based on a violation of § 1337(a)(1)(B)(i) may not be 

predicated on a theory of induced infringement where no 

direct infringement occurs until post-importation.” Id. 

Accordingly, the original panel did not reach the merits of 

the Commission’s willful blindness or direct infringement 

findings on the ’344 patent. Id. 

After reaching these conclusions, this Court granted 

en banc rehearing and vacated the panel decision. Suprema, Inc. v. ITC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 10124, at *1-2. 

The en banc Court reversed the panel’s holding as it 

relates to the ’344 patent, and upheld the Commission’s 

interpretation that 19 U.S.C. § 1337 covers “importation 

of goods that, after importation, are used by the importer 

to directly infringe at the inducement of the goods’ seller.” 

Suprema II, at *3-4 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 10, 2015). The en 

banc Court then remanded “for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.” Id. at *34-35.

The en banc Court’s holding did not relate to the panel’s judgments with respect to the ’562 and ’993 patents. 

Because all aspects of the panel opinion were vacated 

when en banc review was granted, however, having now 

received the appeal on remand, we must address the 

Commission’s findings with respect to all three patents at 

issue. For the reasons explained in the original panel

opinion, we reinstate the original panel’s holdings with 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 5 Filed: 09/14/2015
6 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

respect to the ’562 and ’993 patents. To be clear, we 

affirm the Commission’s finding of no infringement of the 

’562 patent. See Suprema I, 742 F.3d at 1368-71(Part V of 

the panel opinion). We further affirm the Commission’s 

conclusions that Suprema infringes the ’993 patent, and 

that Appellants failed to prove invalidity of the ’993 

patent. Id. at 1363-68 (Parts III.A and III.B of the panel 

opinion). 

DISCUSSION

We now reach the merits of the Commission’s direct 

infringement and willful blindness findings on the ’344 

patent. As noted, the Commission found that Mentalix 

directly infringes claim 19 of the ’344 patent, and that 

Suprema was liable for induced infringement of that 

claim due to Suprema’s willful blindness toward Mentalix’s infringement. The Commission found that Suprema performed market research on its competitors’ 

patents and products, then actively encouraged Mentalix’s 

activities while willfully blinding itself to the infringing 

nature of those activities. Suprema argues that the 

Commission erred in two ways. First, Suprema argued 

that Mentalix does not directly infringe the ’344 patent. 

Second, Suprema argues that the Commission’s findings 

regarding willful blindness were erroneous. As set forth 

below, because there is substantial evidence in the record 

to support the Commission’s findings on both points, we 

affirm the Commission’s conclusions.

A. Standard of Review

“[T]he ultimate issue of the proper construction of a 

claim should be treated as a question of law.” Teva 

Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 838 

(U.S. 2015). We review any factual determinations made 

in support of a claim construction with deference. Id. at 

838-39.

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 6 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 7 

Patent infringement, whether direct or indirect, is a 

question of fact. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 

F.3d 831, 850 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. 

Otis Elevator Co., 593 F.3d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 

On appeal, we review the Commission’s factual findings 

for substantial evidence, and the Commission’s legal 

determinations de novo. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c); 5 U.S.C. § 

706(2)(E); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 946 

F.2d 821,832 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 

B. Background on Claim 19 of the ’344 Patent

The ’344 patent contains claims drawn to methods 

used by an optical scanning system to detect fingerprint 

images based on shape and area, and to determine fingerprint quality based on the detected shape and area. ’344 

patent col. 19 ll. 24-38. Claim 19 (the only claim of 

the ’344 patent found infringed) recites such a process:

A method for capturing and processing a fingerprint image, the method comprising:

(a) scanning one or more fingers;

(b) capturing data representing a corresponding 

fingerprint area;

(c) filtering the fingerprint image;

(d) binarizing the filtered fingerprint image;

(e) detecting a fingerprint area based on a concentration of black pixels in the binarized fingerprint 

image; 

(f) detecting a fingerprint shape based on an arrangement of the concentrated black pixels in an 

oval-like shape in the binarized fingerprint image; 

and

(g) determining whether the detected fingerprint 

area and shape are of acceptable quality.

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 7 Filed: 09/14/2015
8 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

Id. col. 19 ll. 24-37.

The operation of the accused products is undisputed. 

The accused products allow for scanning of a fingerprint. 

Then, the accused products perform a pixel-level analysis 

to determine height and width of a fingerprint to draw a 

bounding box. Suprema’s expert admitted that the 

bounding box determines how fat, thin or short the fingerprint is. 

The parties also do not dispute that Mentalix provided training and demonstrations to the U.S. Census Bureau regarding how to use the accused products. 

C. Whether Mentalix Directly Infringes Claim 19 of the 

’344 Patent

Appellants contend that the Commission’s findings 

regarding direct infringement of steps (e) and (f) of claim 

19 of the ’344 patent were erroneous. For the reasons 

below, we agree with the Commission’s claim construction

with respect to claim 19. We further find that the Commission’s rulings as to direct and induced infringement 

are supported by substantial evidence.

The Commission found step (e) infringed because the 

accused products detect a fingerprint area by identifying 

the fingerprint image in a bounding box. The Commission 

further found step (f) infringed because the accused 

products identify the height and width of the finger print, 

which constitutes detection of characteristics of fingerprint shape. 

Notably, neither Appellant asked that the Commission construe steps (e) and (f). Despite their failure to 

request claim construction, Appellants argue that the 

Commission’s non-infringement finding effectively construed the claims in a way that ignores any distinction 

between steps (e) and (f) of claim 19 of the ’344 patent. 

With respect to step (e), Appellants argue that the Commission’s claim construction required no actual detection 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 8 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 9 

of “a fingerprint area.” Appellants argue that drawing a 

box around the fingerprint does not detect its area, and 

that therefore the Commission’s interpretation reads out 

“finger print area” from the claim.

Regarding step (f), Appellants argue that the Commission conflated it with step (e) and thus required no 

detection of “a fingerprint shape” under step (f). Appellants argue that the Commission’s interpretation fails to 

give effect to all the terms in the claim. Drawing a box 

around the fingerprint area does not detect the fingerprint’s shape, Suprema argues, since any shape can be 

contained inside the rectangular bounding box. Suprema 

argues that, to practice step (f), the contours of the image 

must be identified to be an “oval-like shape,” according to 

the claim’s terms. The shape of the pixel arrangement, 

Appellants argue, must play a role in detecting the shape, 

since step (f) specifies that the oval-like shape exists while 

step (e) does not. 

Step (e) requires “detecting a fingerprint area based 

on a concentration of black pixels in the binarized fingerprint image.” The Commission found that this limitation 

was practiced based on the accused products’ source code, 

and based on expert testimony regarding the accused 

products. The evidence demonstrates that the functions 

find concentrations of black pixels in a fingerprint image, 

and then put a ‘bounding box’ around it. By drawing a 

box around the fingerprints, the Commission concluded 

that the accused functions detect a fingerprint area. The 

Commission’s conclusions were consistent with the teachings of the ’344 patent, which instruct that a common 

method of detecting fingerprint area is by drawing a 

bounding box around the fingerprints. See ’344 patent 

col.15 ll.43-46 (“In step 708, a fingerprint area is detected. 

Usually, the black areas of the image are concentrated 

around the fingerprints. Thus, the detection step detects 

the areas concentrated by black pixels.”). We thus conCase: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 9 Filed: 09/14/2015
10 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

clude that the Commission’s findings with respect to step 

(e) are supported by substantial evidence.

We also agree with the Commission’s finding that 

Mentalix directly infringes step (f) of claim 19. Step (f) 

requires “detecting a fingerprint shape based on an arrangement of the concentrated black pixels in an oval-like

shape in the binarized fingerprint image.” The Commission construed step (f) to mean “identifying concentrations 

of black pixels, which have oval-like shapes, to determine 

individual fingerprint areas and shapes.” The Commission found that claim 19 covers products that detect 

fingerprint shape through detecting concentrations of 

black pixels within the identified bounded area. We find 

that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s 

finding that step (f) is infringed by the accused products’ 

detection of concentrations of black pixels, whether or not 

the system defines the outlines of an oval. This reading 

finds support in the patent specification, which states 

that “[i]n step 710, fingerprint shapes are detected. The 

fingerprint shapes can be oval-like shapes. The fingerprint shape detection step detects the areas concentrated 

by black pixels that are comprised of oval-like shapes.” 

’344 patent col.15 ll.46-49 (emphases added). Thus, by 

drawing a box around a fingerprint and detecting concentrations of black pixels, the accused products detect the 

fingerprint’s shape. The shape of the bounding box is 

dictated by the shape of the fingerprint; i.e., it corresponds to the height and width of the fingerprint. The 

teachings of the patent do not require a calculation or 

determination of whether anything is oval-like. Given 

inherent limitations in the process of fingerprint capture, 

fingerprints are rarely in the form of a perfect oval. While 

the fingerprint shapes can be “oval-like,” the patent 

specification notes that they need not be oval-shaped. 

’344 patent col.15 ll.46-49. The Commission thus had 

sufficient support for its conclusion that step (f) can be 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 10 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 11

satisfied by detecting the concentrations of black pixels 

using a box bounding the black pixels. 

Appellants’ argument that Cross Match limited the 

scope of step (f) during prosecution to specifically require 

detection of “oval-like shapes,” is also without merit. “A 

disclaimer must be ‘clear and unmistakable,’ and unclear 

prosecution history cannot be used to limit claims.” 

Cordis Corp. v. Boston Sci. Corp., 561 F.3d 1319, 1329

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Here, nothing in the 

prosecution history limits the claimed invention to detection of only fingerprints that are of oval-like shape or 

mandates calculation of an oval. The patentee never 

mentioned “oval-like shape” in its remarks to the examiner. The additional calculation and precision that Appellants advocate is simply not required by the patent. The 

specification places no limits on steps (e) or (f) beyond the 

bounding box used in the accused products. And the 

specification indicates that the concentration of black 

pixels can be used to determine both characteristics of 

fingerprint area and fingerprint shape. Therefore, we 

reject Appellants’ argument regarding prosecution disclaimer. 

In sum, we hold that the Commissioner’s findings that 

the accused products directly infringe claim 19 are supported by substantial evidence. 

D. Whether Suprema was Willfully Blind to Mentalix’s 

Infringement

Appellants next dispute the Commission’s finding

that Suprema is liable for induced infringement because 

Suprema was willfully blind to the fact that Mentalix 

would infringe of claim 19 of the ’344 patent when it 

received and employed Suprema’s scanners. 

A party who “actively induces infringement of a patent” under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) is liable for patent infringement if the party knows that the induced acts 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 11 Filed: 09/14/2015
12 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

constitute patent infringement. Global-Tech Appliances, 

Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2063 (2011). A defendant can be found liable for induced infringement if it has 

actual knowledge of the infringement, or if it is willfully 

blind to the infringement. Id. The doctrine of willful 

blindness requires that “(1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact 

exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate actions 

to avoid learning of that fact.” Id. at 2070. 

“The requisite intent to induce infringement may be 

inferred from all of the circumstances,” and may be established through circumstantial evidence.” Broadcom Corp.

v. Qualcomm, Inc., 543 F.3d 683, 699 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

The question of whether Suprema was willfully blind to 

Mentalix’s infringement is a question of fact. National

Presto Indus. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed.

Cir. 1996). The Commission’s findings of fact should be 

set aside only if they are not supported by substantial 

evidence. Intel Corp., 946 F.2d at 832. 

The Commission found Suprema liable for induced infringement based on the totality of the facts the Commission believed evidenced Suprema’s willful blindness. See

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) A221-25. From the entirety of the 

record before us, we hold that the Commission’s conclusion regarding induced infringement is supported by 

substantial evidence.

The Commission observed that, when Suprema developed the accused products, it admitted to engaging in 

extensive market research on its competitors. Suprema 

also admitted to researching and identifying Cross 

Match’s patents, including the ’993 and ’562 patents. 

Suprema specifically studied the ’562 patent, which 

incorporates by reference in four portions of its specification the patent application (U.S. Patent Ser. No. 

10/345,420) that led to the ’344 patent. ’562 patent col 

1:11-14 (“The present application is related to . . . U.S. 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 12 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 13

patent application Ser. No. 10/345,366 . . . which [is] 

incorporated by reference in [its] entiret[y].”); id. col. 5:30-

34, 39-42, 65-67. Following its extensive research, Suprema successfully developed its scanners into the autocapture, image quality checking, and automatic 

segmentation processes that are covered by claim 19 of 

the ’344 patent. The Commission noted that, because the 

’562 and ’344 patents have overlapping inventors and 

share the same assignee, Cross Match, “a word search 

likely would have identified both patents.” J.A. A223. 

The Commission also found that, in developing the accused products, Suprema was well-aware of competitor 

products, of Cross Match’s prominence in the fingerprint 

scanner market, and of Cross Match’s relevant ’562 

patent. The Commission found that Suprema’s market 

analysis was similar in scope to that performed by the 

accused infringer in Global-Tech, who was found liable for 

induced infringement based on a theory of willful blindness. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2071-72 (noting that 

the accused infringer performed “market research” and 

“gather[ed] information as much as possible.”). Suprema 

asserts that during its extensive market research it failed 

to check to see if the related patent application referenced 

in the ’562 patent proceeded to mature into an issued 

patent. The Commission discounted this testimony. The 

Commission found it notable that the ’344 patent issued 

in April 2007, six months prior to the October 2007 issue 

date of the ’562 patent. Thus, had Suprema checked for 

the issuance of the ’344 patent at the time it was reviewing the ’562 patent, Suprema would have undoubtedly 

discovered that the ’344 patent had issued.

Suprema and amicus Google, Inc. (“Google”) argue 

that a requirement to seek out every reference referred to

in a competitor’s patent would place too high a burden on 

manufacturers to avoid a finding of willful blindness. We 

do not hold that such an exhaustive patent search is 

required in every instance. Nor do we find that the ComCase: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 13 Filed: 09/14/2015
14 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

mission predicated its willful blindness finding only upon 

such an obligation. Rather, given the similarities in 

content, inventorship, and ownership between the ’344 

and ’562 patents, and the facts that Suprema studied the 

’562 patent during its extensive market analysis, was 

aware of Cross Match’s activities in the scanner field, and 

specifically targeted the market Cross Match serviced 

when developing its own products, we find, based on the 

totality of the circumstances, that the Commission had 

adequate evidence upon which to conclude that Suprema’s 

actions constituted willful blindness. 

Notably, the Commission found that “the record is replete” with evidence of Suprema’s efforts in aiding and 

abetting Mentalix to adapt Mentalix’s FedSubmit software to work with Suprema’s imported scanners and SDK 

to practice claim 19 of the ’344 patent. The Commission 

then concluded that the totality of Suprema’s actions 

evidenced its subjective belief of the high probability that 

Cross Match’s scanner technology was patented, and 

further evidenced its deliberate actions to avoid learning 

of that fact. The Commission also found that Suprema 

deliberately avoided learning of the fact that Suprema’s 

own accused products would likely infringe Cross Match’s 

patents. The Commission’s findings are supported by 

substantial record evidence, and the Commission correctly 

concluded that those factual findings are sufficient to 

support a finding of willful blindness. See Global-Tech, 

131 S. Ct. at 2070-71. 

The Commission also found that Suprema’s failure to 

obtain an opinion of counsel constituted an additional fact 

evidencing Suprema’s willful blindness. The Commission 

noted that, had an opinion of counsel been sought, it 

would have “undoubtedly uncovered the ’344 patent, the 

fact that both the ’344 and ’562 patents are assigned to 

Cross Match, and would have analyzed whether Suprema 

infringed any of the Cross Match patents.” J.A. 224. 

Thus, the Commission found that Suprema was willfully 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 14 Filed: 09/14/2015
SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC 15

blind to the existence of the ’344 patent and the nature of 

the infringing activities it actively encouraged Mentalix to 

perform. We do not find these findings to be without 

adequate support, as Suprema claims. 

The failure to obtain counsel opinion goes to the “state 

of mind” inducement requirement, and “such evidence 

remains relevant to the . . . intent analysis” for inducement.2 Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 699. Thus, it was not error 

for the Commission to consider Suprema’s failure to 

obtain an opinion of counsel as a factor in their analysis of 

inducement. We do not hold that an opinion of counsel is 

required to avoid a finding of induced infringement. The 

failure to obtain an opinion of counsel is merely one fact of 

many that may be considered in the assessment of willful 

blindness. Broadcom, 543 F.3d at 698-701. Like the 

Commission, we do not place dispositive weight on Suprema’s failure to obtain an opinion of counsel. While

Global-Tech changed the standard of intent for establishing induced infringement, Global-Tech did not displace 

this Court’s holding in Broadcom that failure to obtain an 

opinion of counsel can be considered in determining 

whether the intent standard for induced infringement has 

been met. See Global-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2069-70. We 

thus reject Suprema’s argument that its failure to seek 

the opinion of counsel could not be considered as part of 

2 The America Invents Act (AIA) provides that 

“[t]he failure of an infringer to obtain the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent, or the 

failure of the infringer to present such advice to the court 

or jury, may not be used to prove that the accused infringer willfully infringed the patent or that the infringer 

intended to induce infringement of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. 

§ 298. Because the AIA only applies to patents issued on 

or after September 16, 2012, and the ’344 and ’562 patents issued in 2007, this provision does not control here. 

 

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 15 Filed: 09/14/2015
16 SUPREMA, INC. v. ITC

the totality of circumstances indicating its willful blindness to Mentalix’s infringement. 

In its amicus brief, Google argues that the Commission’s willful blindness ruling imposes too onerous a duty 

on innovators to ensure that its customers will not potentially infringe a patent. Google asserts that the Commission’s ruling upsets the balance struck in Global-Tech. It 

is nearly impossible, Google argues, for a technology 

company to identify “all patents that are potentially 

implicated” by customers’ potential infringement of patents. While we are not unmindful of these concerns, we 

do not find them sufficiently implicated in this present 

controversy to warrant a different outcome. We note, 

moreover, our deferential standard of review, which 

requires us to defer to the Commission’s factual findings if 

supported by substantial evidence. Our holding is limited 

to the facts in the case before us. None of the facts upon 

which the Commission relied, in isolation, would support 

a finding of willful blindness. Yet, while no single factor 

is dispositive here, we are satisfied that there is substantial evidence on this record to support the Commission’s 

findings. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission’s 

findings with respect to the ’344 patent. We further 

reinstate the original panel’s opinion with respect to the 

’562 and ’993 patents (Parts III.A, III.B, and V of the 

panel opinion). See Suprema I, 742 F.3d at 1363-71. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED

Case: 12-1170 Document: 223-2 Page: 16 Filed: 09/14/2015