Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00512/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00512-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ben Curry
Respondent
Rudy Elias Martinez
Petitioner

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUDY ELIAS MARTINEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

BEN CURRY, )

)

Respondent. )

)

)

___________________________________ )

1:07-cv-0512-OWW WMW HC

ORDER REQUIRING

PETITIONER TO INFORM

COURT AS TO HOW HE

WISHES TO PROCEED WITH

CASE

Response due in 30 days

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). 

th

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with

a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Picard v.

Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th

Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity

to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal

basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal basis); Kenney v.

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis). Additionally, the

petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th

Cir.1998). 

In 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Pub.L. No

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. Under the AEDPA, exhaustion can be waived by respondent. 28

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(C). The Court can also excuse exhaustion if “(I) there is an absence of available

State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such a process ineffective to protect

the rights of the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B). In this case, respondent has not waived

exhaustion. In addition, California provides avenues for Petitioner to pursue state claims. For

example, these claims may be presented in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 1473 - 14758. There are not sufficient circumstances in this case for the Court to ignore

the United States Supreme Court’s admonishment that comity demands exhaustion and find that

California’s corrective processes are ineffective to protect Petitioner’s rights. 

In his petition, Petitioner raises the following four contentions: 1) insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdict as to count one; 2) the trial judge, rather than the jury, made findings as to

an element of the charged crime; 3) Petitioner was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel;

and 4) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s true finding as to special allegation. 

According to the information provided in his petition, it appears that Petitioner has exhausted his

first and third claims, but not his second or fourth claims. That is, there is no indication in the

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petition that Petitioner’s second or fourth claim

have ever been presented to the California Supreme Court. The claims therefore appear to be

unexhausted. The Court must dismiss a petition that contains unexhausted claims, even if it also

contains exhausted claims. Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22, 102 S.Ct. at 1205; Calderon v. United

States Dist. Court (Gordon), 107 F.3d 756, 760 (9 Cir. 1997) th

Pursuant to Ninth Circuit holdings, a Petitioner should be given the option of withdrawing

his unexhausted claims and proceeding in federal court with those claims that are exhausted. Guizar

v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988), citing, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 510, 520 (1982). 

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However, should Petitioner abandon his unexhausted claims, any later attempt to amend the petition

to include newly exhausted claims may be subject to an abuse of the writ challenge. See

McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S.Ct. 1454 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 455 U.S. 510, 520-521

(1982); see also, Rule 9(b), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (failure to

allege all available grounds for relief in a single petition may be abuse of the writ). Should the

Petitioner fail to withdraw the unexhausted claims or withdraw the Petition, the petition will be

dismissed. Rose, 455 U.S. at 519; Guizar, 843 F.2d at 372. This dismissal will not bar Petitioner

from returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. See, Trimble v. City of

Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, Petitioner should bear in mind that 28 th

U.S.C. § 2244(d) sets out a critical one-year limitations period within which a federal habeas

petition may be filed. In most cases, the one year period starts to run on the date the California

Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s direct review. See, id. Although the limitations period tolls

while a properly filed request for collateral review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d)(2), is does not toll for the time an application is pending in federal court. Duncan v.

Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

The Court HEREBY ORDERS:

1. Petitioner is GRANTED thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order to

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inform the Court whether he seeks to withdraw the unexhausted claims and

proceed with those that are exhausted or withdraw the entire Petition and return to

state court to exhaust those claims that are unexhausted. If Petitioner has

additional information regarding the exhaustion of his second or fourth claims, he

should provide it to the court. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 25, 2007 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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