Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03033/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kevin Mangum
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 31, 1996 Decided November 22, 1996

No. 95-3033

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KEVIN MANGUM,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00411-01)

Howard B. Katzoff, appointed by the court, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for appellant.

William D. Weinreb, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee, with whom Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States

Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman and Peter R.

Zeidenberg, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Kevin D. Mangum appeals from a judgment

entered by the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia convicting him after a jury trial of unlawful possession

of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1) and sentencing him to 37 months of incarceration. We

reject his appeal and affirm his conviction.

On October 18, 1994, Mangum was indicted on five counts: (1)

unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (18 U.S.C. §

922(g)(1)) (Count One); (2) possession of a firearm with an

obliterated, removed, changed or altered serial number (18 U.S.C.

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1Count One, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon, is the only count at issue here. After the prosecution

succeeded in obtaining a conviction on Count One, it dismissed

the other charges against Mangum. 

§ 922(k)) (Count Two); (3) carrying a pistol without a license

(D.C. Code § 22-3204(a)) (Count Three); (4) possession of an

unregistered firearm (D.C. Code § 6-2311(a)) (Count Four); and (5)

unlawful possession of ammunition (D.C. Code § 6-2361(3)) (Count

Five).1 Appellant filed three pretrial motions: (1) a motion to

suppress evidence; (2) a motion for disclosure of confidential

informant and exculpatory information; and (3) a motion to

bifurcate trial, or, in the alternative, for severance of counts.

Following a hearing, the district court denied the first two

motions and disposed of the third by severing Count One of the

indictment from the remaining counts. The judge then held a jury

trial on Count One, and the jury found Mangum guilty. Appellant

was sentenced to 37 months of incarceration and the government

voluntarily dismissed the four remaining counts of the indictment.

All five charges against Mangum arose out of an incident on

September 3, 1994, when police, acting on an informant's tip,

stopped appellant and removed a gun from a knapsack that was in the

trunk of the car in which he was a passenger. In late August 1994,

Detective Andre Williams, a six-year veteran of the Metropolitan

Police Department ("MPD"), received a detailed tip from a

confidential informant that appellant carried a gun each day to his

place of employment, a barbershop in the 700 block of H Street,

N.E., and kept the gun in his knapsack while he worked. The

informant stated that appellant normally left work with the gun at

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2On one prior occasion, the police had waited outside the

barbershop for Mangum, but he never emerged. Apparently, he had

left the shop that day without the police seeing him. 

the end of the day and was picked up by friends in a black Nissan

automobile bearing Virginia license plates numbered NOL-113.

Detective Williams conveyed this information to several other

police officers (including Officer Leon Johnson, also of the MPD),

telling them that appellant was a six-foot-tall, light-skinned,

stockily-built man named Kevin Mangum, and he subsequently provided

the officers with appellant's picture.

On September 3, 1994, Officer Johnson received word from

Detective Williams that appellant was in the barbershop with the

gun and would probably emerge from the shop fifteen minutes before

it closed.2 Johnson and two other officers parked their car a

block away from the barbershop and watched as a black Nissan

automobile fitting the earlier description drove up and Mangum

emerged from the barbershop carrying a brownish knapsack. The

driver of the automobile got out and opened the trunk, and

appellant placed the knapsack in the trunk. At that point, the

driver returned to his seat, and Mangum got into the car on the

other side. The car then pulled away from the shop.

Shortly thereafter, the officers stopped the car, asked its

occupants to get out, patted them down for weapons and, finding

none, asked the driver to open the car's trunk. The driver opened

the trunk, and Officer Johnson removed the knapsack. He asked the

driver and Mangum in turn whether the knapsack belonged to them.

Both of them disclaimed ownership. Mangum stated: "it's not my

bag, it's the driver's." Transcript ("Tr.") I, at 26-27, 37.

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Officer Johnson then searched the knapsack, finding inside a pair

of shorts containing Mangum's driver's license and a loaded

handgun.

The confidential informant who gave the tip to Detective

Williams had been arrested about three years earlier and had agreed

to provide information to the police in exchange for a favorable

disposition of his case. Since that time, the informant had

provided information on approximately 30-35 occasions. Id. at 41-

42. This information had proved reliable every time, and on at

least six occasions, it had resulted in criminal convictions.

On appeal, appellant claims that the district court erred in

denying each of his three pretrial motions. Additionally,

appellant contends that he was prejudiced by the trial judge's

allegedly erroneous questioning of a government witness. We find

that none of appellant's contentions has merit. Accordingly, we

affirm the conviction.

I. DISCUSSION

A. Suppression of Evidence Under Fourth Amendment

Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence, which

the district court denied. The court found that the police had

probable cause to stop the car and search the knapsack on the basis

of the reliable informant's detailed tip and the officers'

corroboration of this tip. Appendix of Appellant ("A.A.") 14-18.

The court also held that the appellant lacked standing to challenge

the search of the knapsack because he had disclaimed ownership of

and therefore had no privacy interest in the bag. A.A. 20-21. The

court found that the officers could not and need not have obtained

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3The court had no occasion to reach the issue whether, if

appellant had been found to be unlawfully arrested prior to the

search of the knapsack, suppression of the evidence would have

been required. 

a search warrant prior to stopping the car, since they did not have

probable cause to search appellant until they had corroborated the

details of the tip by observing Mangum. Finally, the court held

that the police did not arrest appellant prior to finding the gun,

but had only conducted a lawful "investigative detention and

weapons search" pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A.A.

14-16.3

On appeal, Mangum argues that the district court erred in

refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop and

search of the car in which Mangum was a passenger. Appellant

concedes that the police officers' corroboration of the informant's

tip provided reasonable articulable suspicion for an investigative

Terry stop of the vehicle and pat-down of its occupants. Brief of

Appellant, at 12. However, he claims that, because "the detention,

seizure, and search exceeded the scope of a legitimate

investigative stop," the stop crossed the line into a warrantless

"arrest" that was unjustified by probable cause and the evidence

thereby seized must be suppressed. Id. at 16. Appellant advances

four reasons why the stop crossed the line into an arrest: (1)

three police cars and seven or eight officers were involved in the

stop; (2) appellant "was not free to leave or refuse to answer the

officers' questions; (3) the officers did not conduct "further

investigation" before they opened the trunk and searched

appellant's bag; and (4) the officers had already intended to

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4Because we base our decision on these grounds, we need not

reach the issues of (1) whether seizing the gun from appellant's

knapsack was the "fruit" of his detention under the Fourth

Amendment; or (2) whether the police had probable cause to

arrest Mangum. 

arrest him when they removed him from the automobile. Id. at 14-

15.

The government counters that the trial court did not err when

it refused to suppress the evidence. Its response proceeds on a

number of theories: (1) seizing the gun and other items from

appellant's backpack was not the "fruit" of his detention under the

Fourth Amendment; (2) the investigatory stop never crossed the

line to being an arrest; (3) even if appellant was arrested, the

arrest was justified by probable cause; and (4) appellant lacked

standing to challenge the seizure of the knapsack since he had

disclaimed ownership of it. Brief for Appellee, at 7.

We agree with the government that the trial judge did not err

in refusing to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop and

search of the car in which Mangum was a passenger because the

legitimate investigatory stop never turned into an arrest and

because Mangum lacked standing to challenge the search of his

knapsack.4 It is true that the "[t]emporary detention of

individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if

only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a

"seizure' of "persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth

Amendment]" and therefore is subject to the limitation that it be

"reasonable" under the circumstances. Whren v. United States, 116

S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). A legitimate investigatory stop may

cross the line into an arrest "if the duration of the stop or the

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amount of force used is "unreasonable' under the circumstances."

United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 285 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The

government carries the burden of showing that the measures employed

during the stop were justified.

We conclude that the scope and duration of the investigatory

stop at issue here were reasonable under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968), and its progeny. Based on their corroboration of the

innocent details of the tip, the officers clearly had a reasonable,

articulable suspicion sufficient to stop the car in which Mangum

was a passenger, to complete a protective weapons search of its

occupants, and to conduct reasonable further investigation. In

Adams v. Williams, the Supreme Court held that "[a] brief stop of

a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to

maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more

information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to

the officer at the time." 407 U.S. 143, 146 (emphasis added).

Moreover, it is well-recognized that "officers' orders to the

occupants to get out of the car for questioning [are] compatible

with an investigatory stop." United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29,

36-37 (D.C. Cir.). Here, the officers did no more than was

permissible under these precedents. After stopping the car and

ordering its occupants to step outside, the officers conducted an

expeditious pat-down for weapons and then promptly asked the driver

to open the trunk. The driver consented to the request. Removing

the knapsack, one officer then asked whether it belonged to the

driver or to Mangum. When both denied ownership, the officer

opened the bag and found the gun, along with appellant's shorts

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5In addition to Mangum and the driver, two passengers were

seated in the back seat of the car. 

with identification in the pocket. Throughout this process, the

officers were diligent in pursuing their investigation. United

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) ("In assessing whether

a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an

investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether

the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was

likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which

time it was necessary to detain the defendant."). The entire

investigatory stop lasted only a few minutes, until the officers

found the gun and officially arrested Mangum. Additionally, as the

district court properly found, there was no evidence in the record

of any threat or use of force that would have converted the stop

into an arrest. A.A. 16.

Finally, none of appellant's specific objections to the

investigatory stop demonstrate that it was not reasonable or that

it crossed the line into an illegal arrest. First, we know of no

case that has held it unreasonable for seven or eight officers to

aid in the stop of a car carrying four passengers when there is no

showing of any threat or exertion of unlawful force by those

officers.5 Second, although the government concedes that appellant

was not free to leave the scene during the stop, that fact alone

does not convert the stop into an arrest. See, e.g., United States

v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

965 (1987) (holding that "[t]he perception ... that one is not free

to leave is insufficient to convert a Terry stop into an arrest"

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6Moreover, as explained below, appellant lacks standing to

challenge the search of the knapsack itself. 

7On the contrary, there does not appear to be any such

evidence in the record. Indeed, if the police officers had not

found a gun in the knapsack, it seems clear that the appellant

would have been released. 

and that "[a] brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid

under Terry"). Third, it is not clear what appellant is objecting

to in claiming that the police failed to complete "further

investigation" prior to opening the trunk of the car and searching

appellant's knapsack. Indeed, the officers were pursuing further

investigation by asking the driver if he would open the trunk and

by attempting to ascertain the proper ownership of the knapsack.6

Finally, even if appellant had produced evidence showing that the

officers intended to arrest appellant prior to stopping him and

finding the gun,7 such evidence would be irrelevant. In

determining whether a stop or search is reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment, courts look to objective evidence, not subjective

intentions. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996)

(rejecting the proposition that "the constitutional reasonableness

of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the

individual officers involved"); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (adopting

objective standard for determining reasonableness of searches or

seizures under the Fourth Amendment). We therefore find that none

of appellant's four objections have merit.

In addition to finding the Terry stop reasonable, we also

conclude that appellant lacks standing to challenge the search of

his knapsack. In the course of the investigatory stop, as duly

explained above, the officers asked the driver of the car to open

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8Appellant questions whether the driver's opening of the

trunk was truly voluntary. Brief of Appellant, at 14 n.9. The

district court found that, "[a]fter patting down the car's

occupants, the officers asked the driver to open the vehicle's

trunk." A.A. 12 (emphasis added). We may not overturn a

district court's finding of fact unless it is clearly erroneous,

and appellant has produced no evidence to demonstrate that there

was clear error here.

But even if the driver had not consented to the search of

the trunk, Mangum has no standing to challenge the search because

he was not the owner of the car. It is well-established that

passengers traveling in a car in which they have no possessory

interest have no legitimate expectation of privacy vis-a-vis a

search of the car itself. See, e.g., United States v. Zabalaga,

834 F.2d 1062, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Rakas v. Illinois, 439

U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). 

the trunk, which he did.8 Officer Johnson removed the knapsack

from the car. When Mangum was asked whether the bag was his, he

denied ownership. On these facts, we need not reach the issue of

whether the police officers had probable cause to search

appellant's knapsack. Because Mangum disclaimed ownership of the

bag, he "abandoned" his property and waived any legitimate privacy

interest in it. Courts have long held that, when a person

voluntarily denies ownership of property in response to a police

officer's question, "he forfeits any reasonable expectation of

privacy in [the property]; consequently, police may search it

without a warrant." United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1302

(D.C. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, Mangum has no standing to challenge

the search of his bag on Fourth Amendment grounds.

We conclude that the officers' investigatory stop of appellant

was not an arrest and that appellant lacked standing to contest the

officers' search of his knapsack since he disclaimed ownership of

it. Thus, we find that the district court did not err in denying

appellant's motion to suppress evidence gleaned from the stop and

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9Another approach deemed acceptable by the appellant was for

the district court to sever Count One from Counts Two through

Four and try the latter counts first. It is unclear to us how

this would have aided the appellant in any way. The purpose of

his motions to sever was to prevent the jury's knowledge of

Mangum's prior felony conviction for receiving stolen property

from prejudicially affecting the jury's finding as to whether or

not Mangum possessed the firearm in the first instance. Trying

Count One to a new jury after Counts Two through Four had been

tried by the first jury would in no way prevent any alleged

prejudice to the defendant. 

search.

B. Severance of Count One

In its memorandum opinion, the district court stated that,

"without objection [it] bifurcated the trial such that count one,

unlawful possession of a firearm by a Convicted Felon, would be

tried alone, while the other four counts would be tried together at

a later date." A.A. 28. Appellant argues that the district court

erred in failing to sever the ex-felon element from the possession

element for the trial on Count One.9 The government disputes

whether appellant properly raised this issue in the proceedings

below. But even assuming, arguendo, that he did raise it, we find

that the district court did not abuse its discretion by severing

Count One from the other counts and trying Count One first, nor did

it abuse its discretion by deciding not to bifurcate the ex-felon

element and the other elements of Count One.

Appellant relies on United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50

(D.C. Cir. 1992), in which this court held that it was an abuse of

discretion for a trial court to join an ex-felon firearms count

with three drug counts in light of "defense motions to sever, to

introduce the defendant's prior conviction by stipulation or to try

the count to the judge," as well as numerous references by the

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prosecution at trial to the defendant's prior conviction. Id. at

50. The Dockery court concluded that the trial court had not shown

"sufficient scrupulous regard for the defendant's rights" when it

refused to sever the ex-felon count from the separate drug

distribution counts. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). Appellant argues that his situation is

sufficiently like Dockery to make the trial court's decision an

abuse of discretion. Although the trial court here did agree to

sever the ex-felon count from the other counts for trial, appellant

claims that "the prejudicial spillover from the "ex-felon' evidence

was not cured because the jury was allowed to consider it with

respect to the felon-in-possession charge itself." Brief of

Appellant, at 21.

We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

by not severing the prior felony element from the other elements of

the crime. This case is sharply distinguishable from Dockery,

where the trial court refused to sever the ex-felon count from the

other counts against the defendant. In this case, the trial court

only refused to sever the ex-felon element from the element of

appellant's possession of a gun that had traveled in interstate

commerce; both were elements of the same count. This court's

decisions in Dockery and United States v. Daniels guard against the

joinder of a felon-in-possession count with other counts because of

the "high risk of undue prejudice" insofar as such joinder allows

evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction "to be introduced

in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would

otherwise be inadmissible." Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C.

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10In contrast, this evidence is obviously admissible here

because showing that Mangum was a convicted felon was a necessary

element of the government's case. 

11A number of our sister circuits have reached the same

conclusion on this issue. In United States v. Collamore, the

First Circuit reversed a district court's decision to bifurcate

the prior felony conviction issue from the possession issue on a

felon-in-possession charge. The court reasoned in part that

when a jury is neither read the statute setting forth

the crime nor told of all the elements of the crime, it

may, justifiably, question whether what the accused did

was a crime. The present case is a stark example. 

Possession of a firearm by most people is not a crime. 

A juror who owns or who has friends and relatives who

own firearms may wonder why [the defendant's]

possession was illegal. Doubt as to the criminality of

[the defendant's] conduct may influence the jury when

it considers the possession element.

868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1993). Accord United States v.

Gilliam, 994 F.2d 97, 101-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

927 (1993); United States v. Jacobs, 44 F.3d 1219, 1222 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1835 (1995); United States v.

Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 310 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.

946 (1980); United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.

1993), modified, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434

U.S. 1047 (1978); United States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 482

(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 980 (1993). 

Cir. 1985).10 When faced with the risk posed by joinder of separate

charges, trial courts should consider other measures that assure a

fair trial, such as holding "a bench trial or a separate trial on

the ex-felon count," or withholding evidence of a prior felony

conviction until after the jury has reached a verdict with regard

to the possession element. Dockery, 955 F.2d at 55 n.4. Since the

trial court here complied with this mandate by severing the

ex-felon count from the other countswhich were later dismissed by

the government anywayappellant's claim is without merit.11

C. Nondisclosure of Identity of Informant

Appellant claims that the district court erred by denying

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12Mangum never cited any specific facts supporting his

motion to disclose the identity of the informant. He merely

asserted that it was necessary to his case that he interview the

informant because the informant might possess information that

could exculpate Mangum. 

appellant's motion to compel disclosure of the confidential

government informant's identity. Mangum argued that the informant

was a relevant and necessary witness for the defense, that the

informant might have been motivated by his desire to curry favor

with the government, and that the informant might have had physical

access to Mangum's knapsack, in which the gun was found. Tr. I, at

5-7, 9, 12, 14, 16-18.12 At the hearing, Mangum argued that he

needed to interview the informant in order to determine whether the

informant might have planted the gun in the knapsack in order to

help secure an arrest and curry favor with the government. Id. at

6-7, 53-54.

The district court rejected Mangum's motion. After explaining

the relevant legal standards, the court found that the defendant

was not entitled to know the informant's identity "[b]ecause there

is no evidence in the record supporting the Defendant's speculation

that the informant actively participated in the offense." A.A. 25.

Thus, the defendant had failed to meet his burden by "showing that

the informant's testimony is necessary to his defense so as to

justify placing the informant's safety in jeopardy." Id.

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by rejecting Mangum's motion to disclose the identity of

the informant. In general, defendants seeking disclosure of an

informant's identity bear a "heavy burden" in establishing that

disclosure is warranted. United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 654

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(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066,

1071 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). This court has held that "[m]ere

speculation that the informer might possibly be of some assistance

is not sufficient to" meet this burden. United States v. Skeens,

449 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (internal quotation marks

omitted). In order "to overcome the public interest in the

protection of the informer," the defendant is obligated to show

that the informer was "an actual participant in or a witness to the

offense charged," whose identity is "necessary to [the] defense."

Id. at 1070, 1071.

Appellant has failed to meet this burden here. The district

court was correct in finding that appellant's assertion that the

informant was a participant or witness whose testimony was

necessary to the defense was purely speculative. Appellant offered

no evidence in support of that assertion other than to point to the

tip itself, which, in his view, suggested that the informant had

access to the knapsack on the day of the offense. Yet, as the

government convincingly argues, the substance of the informant's

tipthat Mangum generally carried a gun in his knapsack as he went

to and from workdid not indicate that the informant had any access

to the knapsack. See Brief for Appellee, at 37-38. For example,

the informant might have learned this information from something

appellant said. Moreover, the tip was given to police

approximately one week prior to appellant's arrest, and there

appears to be no way that the informant would have known precisely

when the police were going to stake out the barbershop and arrest

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13The court also denied appellant's "Motion Requesting an

Evidentiary Hearing on Identity of Informant and Reconsideration

of Disclosure" in light of the evidence adduced at the first day

of the trial. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 

Taking additional testimony or making findings concerning the

informant's "proximity and opportunity of access" to the knapsack

would have tended to reveal the identity of the informant. Tr.

I, at 21, 51. Since appellant had failed to meet his heavy

burden of showing a need for the informant's identity in the

first instance, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying

appellant's request for findings as well. 

the appellant. Id. at 38.13 Finally, the government proffered that

the informant was not a participant in or witness to the crime.

A.A. 38-39. On these facts, the trial judge's factual finding that

"nothing in this record establishes that the informant was a

participant, an eyewitness, or a person who was otherwise in a

position to give direct testimony concerning the crime" was not

clearly erroneous. A.A. 23 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding that

appellant did not meet his burden of showing that the informant was

an actual participant in or witness to the crime charged.

D. Trial Judge's Questioning of Witness

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in asking two

questions of Officer Johnson, a government witness, during

Johnson's direct testimony at trial about the events that occurred

on the date of appellant's arrest. The following interchange is at

issue:

THE COURT: Had you observed this barbershop 

before the incident you're now describing?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.

* * *

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THE COURT: And if so, for how long?

THE WITNESS: Yes, on a prior date, we were there 

watching the barbershop, observing 

Mr. Mangum, and we were waiting 

for him to come out of the barbershop, but the barbershop closed and 

we never saw him come out. So, 

evidently, he had got out of the barbershop without us seeing him.

Tr. II, at 43. Appellant objected to both questions, but these

objections were denied. Appellant argues that he is entitled to a

new trial on the basis of prejudice caused by the two questions.

He contends that the testimony elicited by the court's queries

"unnecessarily highlighted the fact that appellant was the target

of the tipster's information and that they have been observing him

on more than one occasion." Brief of Appellant, at 26. He also

claims that the testimony "inaccurately suggested that [appellant]

somehow eluded law enforcement on the prior occasion, perhaps

intentionally." Id. at 27.

We reject appellant's claim that the district court erred in

this regard. It is well-established that trial judges may question

witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 25 F.3d 1105, 1109

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing FED. R. EVID. 614(b)). This authority is

subject only to the limitations that the judge "remain a

disinterested and objective participant in the proceedings," that

he "hold to a minimum his questioning of witnesses in a jury

trial," and that he avoid questions that extend to advocacy.

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United States v. Norris, 873 F.2d 1519, 1526 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(collecting cases) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where

objection is made to the trial court's questions, any error in

those questions shall be disregarded so long as it is harmless

under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 52(a).

On the facts at issue here, we find that the trial judge was

well within the bounds of his authority to question a witness,

since his participation was minimal and he clearly limited his

inquiries to those that "a disinterested and objective participant"

would ask. Indeed, the record indicates that the judge was merely

seeking clarification of testimony that he perceived to be

ambiguous. As the government aptly points out, "Judge Richey could

reasonably have been concerned that Officer Johnson might ... be

failing to distinguish rigorously between the events of the two

[separate] dates" on which the police observed appellant based on

the information given in the tip. Brief for Appellee, at 48. This

is a perfectly plausible explanation for the court's questions and

puts the questions well within the court's discretion. In any

event, even assuming arguendo that the court's questions were

erroneous, the error was harmless. The questions neither affected

a fundamental right of the appellant, nor did they affect the

outcome of a close case. The questions addressed an issue (how

many times the police had set up an observation post outside the

barbershop) that was peripheral to the main issues in the case, and

any impact the questions might have had on the jury was

insignificant in relation to the overwhelming evidence against

Mangum.

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II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reject all of appellant Mangum's

challenges to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Affirmed.

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