Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01239/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01239-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Miguel Rodriguez-Sanchez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1239

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Northern

* District of Iowa. 

Miguel Rodriguez-Sanchez, also *

known as Oscar Rodriguez, also known * [UNPUBLISHED] 

as Piza, also known as Maro, also *

known as Mado, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 14, 2005

Filed: December 19, 2005

___________

Before MURPHY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

___________

PER CURIAM. 

Miguel Rodriguez-Sanchez, also known as Oscar Rodriguez, Piza, Maro, and

Mado, pled guilty without a plea agreement on the first day of trial to conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine or methamphetamine mixture following a prior felony

drug conviction in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846. He

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The Honorable Mark W. Bennett, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa. 

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was sentenced by the district court1

 to 300 months imprisonment. Rodriguez-Sanchez

appeals, arguing that his enhanced sentence violates his sixth amendment rights and

is unreasonable. We affirm. 

 The presentence report stated that Rodriguez-Sanchez was responsible for

38,801 kilograms of marijuana equivalent and recommended a base offense level of

38 under the federal sentencing guidelines. The amended report recommended a four

level adjustment for role in the offense and a two level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility for a total offense level of 40 with a criminal history category of II. 

Rodriguez-Sanchez responded to the report by challenging the recommended

drug quantity, arguing that the quantities listed in the indictment did not correspond

to those in the statute and that Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), precluded

a court finding that he was responsible for an amount in excess of that which he had

conceded in his plea. He asserted that the appropriate base offense level under the

guidelines would be 32 and that the total offense level should be 30. He

acknowledged that he faced a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years.

At the sentencing hearing on January 7, 2005, the district court stated that it

considered the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional under Blakely and

would sentence him accordingly, but it also said it would fashion an alternative

guideline sentence as well. The court began by calculating the alternative guideline

sentence. It found a base offense level of 36, added a four level enhancement for

aggravated role, made a two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and

noted a criminal history category of II. The court indicated that it would not choose

to depart upward based on underrepresentation of criminal history so the guideline

sentencing range was 262 to 327 months. 

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The court then proceeded to sentencing, noting that Congress had provided a

range between a mandatory minimum of 240 months and life imprisonment for the

offense. The court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors and

expressly pointed to "the magnitude of the defendant's drug involvement, the fact that

he has a prior drug conviction, [and] the fact that he's illegally reentered the United

States on several occasions." The court indicated that 300 months would be the

appropriate nonguideline sentence before it returned to consideration of an alternative

guideline sentence. It decided that the appropriate guideline sentence would be close

to the middle of the 262 - 327 month range and specifically 300 months. The court

then imposed a sentence of 300 months imprisonment, 10 years supervised release,

and a $100 special assessment. Its judgment was filed on January 14, 2005.

Rodriguez-Sanchez argues that his sixth amendment rights were violated

because in his plea he had admitted accountability for only 500 grams of

methamphetamine mixture or 50 grams actual methamphetamine and because the

court rather than a jury was making the finding that he was responsible for more. His

base offense level should therefore have been no more than 32 he argued, and he

should have been sentenced to no more than the mandatory minimum of 240 months.

He also contends that the sentence imposed is unreasonable because the sentencing

range considered by the court was built on a base offense level of 38. The government

responds that the sentence complied with United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 765-

67 (2005), in that the court imposed a reasonable sentence after having treated the

guidelines as not mandatory and having considered the § 3553(a) factors. 

Although Rodriguez-Sanchez 's sentence was enhanced on judge found facts,

he was not sentenced under a mandatory guideline scheme. Under Booker, the

guidelines are no longer mandatory but should be consulted by the sentencing judge

in addition to the § 3553(a) factors, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65, and judge found facts are

permissible in this advisory guideline scheme. Id. at 750. We review his sentence for

harmless error since he preserved a sixth amendment claim. See United States v.

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Meyer, 427 F.3d 558, 560 (8th Cir. 2005). The sentence imposed by the district court

essentially complied with the requirements set in Booker to satisfy the Sixth

Amendment. The court considered the guidelines in forming its alternative sentence

which was identical to its nonguideline sentence. Thus, any sentencing error was

harmless. See United States v. Engler, 422 F.3d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 2005). Since the

sentence imposed was within the applicable guideline range, it is presumptively

reasonable, see United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005), and the

district court considered the § 3553(a) factors in imposing what we conclude was a

reasonable sentence under all the circumstances.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

______________________________

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