Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05193/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05193-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William J. Clinton
Appellee
Karl T. Hoyle
Appellee
Robert J. Nash
Appellee
Robert H. Swan
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 13, 1996 Decided November 22, 1996

No. 96-5193

ROBERT H. SWAN,

APPELLANT

v.

WILLIAM J. CLINTON, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cv00763)

Richard K. Willard argued the cause for appellant, with whom Brian J. Leske was on the briefs.

Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for

appellees, with whom Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., United

States Attorney, and Stephen W. Preston, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, were on the brief.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

WALD, Circuit Judge: On April 9, 1996, President Clinton removed appellant Robert H.

Swan ("Swan") from his position as a member of the Board of the National Credit Union

Administration ("NCUA") and, using his recess appointment clause powers, appointed Yolanda T.

Wheat ("Wheat") to take Swan's place. Swan seeks to have his removal and Wheat's appointment

declared unlawful and to be reinstated as a Board member. The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of the government, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The NCUA is entrusted with the responsibility of overseeing federally chartered credit unions

and administering the credit union insurance and liquidity funds. 12 U.S.C. § 1752a et seq. (1994).

The task of credit union oversight traveled the agency circuit for many years after the passage of

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federal credit union legislation in 1934. It was first lodged with the Farm Credit Administration,

moved to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") in 1941, then to the Federal Security

Agency in 1948 and was assigned to a bureau within the Department of Health, Education, and

Welfare in 1949 when the Federal Security Agency was absorbed into that department. Finally, in

1970Congress created the NCUAvia amendmentsto the FederalCredit Union Act ("NCUA statute"

or "Act") and made credit union supervision its sole responsibility. See 12 U.S.C. § 1752a (Prior

Provisions); Restructuring the National Credit Union Administration: Hearings Before the

Subcomm. on Financial Insts. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th

Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1976) (statement of the Credit Union National Association, Inc.).

The NCUA was denominated an independent agency in the executive branch, and in itsinitial

form was led by a single Administrator with assistance from an advisory board composed of a

Chairman and one member from each of the federal credit union regions. The Administrator and all

of the advisory board members were to be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and

consent of the Senate. The Administrator and the Chairman of the advisory board were also

described as serving "at the pleasure of the President." Act of March 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-206,

84 Stat. 49, 49-50 (1970) (establishing the NCUA); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d

Sess. 138 (1978) (setting out text of NCUA statute prior to amendment). The term of office for

advisory board members other than the Chairman was six years, and the Act further provided that

"[a]ny member of the board may continue to serve as such after the expiration of his term of office

until his successor has been appointed and has qualified." Id.

In1978,Congress enacted the FinancialInstitutionsRegulatoryand InterestRateControlAct

of 1978 ("FIRIRCA"), Title V of which again amended the NCUA statute and created the NCUA

organizational structure that remains in force today. The 1978 amendments replaced the NCUA

Administrator and advisory board with a new NCUA Board that was given authority to manage the

agency. The NCUA Board consists of three members, each appointed by the President, by and with

the consent ofthe Senate, for a termofsix years. The President designates who shall serve as NCUA

Chairman when he appoints members to the Board. The regional representation requirement of the

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earlier advisory board was dropped; instead NCUA Board members must simply be broadly

representative of the public interest and no more than two members can belong to the same political

party. Congress staggered the terms so that every two years a member's term expires, and only Board

members who were appointed to finish unexpired terms or were initially appointed for lessthan a full

six year term can be reappointed. In addition, a holdover clause provides that Board members can

continue to serve after their terms have expired until their successors have "qualified." 12 U.S.C. §

1752a(c).

At the same time as it restructured the NCUA, Congress also expanded its responsibilities.

In 1970, soon after the NCUA was established, Congress created the National Credit Union Share

Insurance Fund, which insures the accounts of federally chartered credit unions and of many state

chartered credit unions, and made the NCUA responsible for its administration. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1781-

1790(c). In 1978, as Title XVIII of FIRIRCA, Congress established the National Credit Union

CentralLiquidityFacility, which advancesfundsto member credit unionsso that theyare able to meet

their liquidity needs, and again gave the NCUA the responsibility of managing the new facility. 12

U.S.C. §§ 1795-1795k. Overseeing federally chartered credit unions and administering the Insurance

Fund and the Liquidity Facility are currently the three functions of the NCUA.

On April 5, 1990, President Bush appointed and the Senate confirmed Swan to serve as a

Democratic member of the NCUA Board. Swan's term expired in August, 1995 and he continued

to serve as a holdover member. By letter dated April 8, 1996, defendant Robert J. Nash ("Nash"),

an Assistant to the President of the United States, informed Swan that President Clinton had decided

to remove Swan from his position as a member of the NCUA Board, effective at close of business

on April 9, 1996. Swan protested that he intended to remain in office, whereupon defendant Karl T.

Hoyle ("Hoyle"), the Executive Director of the NCUA, ordered Swan to vacate his office. The

Senate was out ofsession from March 29 until April 15, 1996. On April 12, 1996, President Clinton

exercised hisrecess appointment clause power and appointed Wheat to fill Swan'sseat on the NCUA

Board. President Clinton had previously nominated Wheat to replace Swan in November, 1995 but

the Senate had not yet acted on the nomination, nor has the Senate done so since.

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On April 23, Swan sued President Clinton, Nash and Hoyle, seeking to have his removal and

Wheat's appointment declared unlawful and to obtain injunctive relief ordering his reinstatement as

a member of the NCUA Board. Swan argued that the NCUA statute prohibits the President from

removing a Board member without cause, either during the member's term of office or when the

member is serving in a holdover capacity. After Swan's motion for a preliminary injunction was

consolidated with trial on the merits, the government and Swan cross-moved forsummary judgment.

On June 21, 1996, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, holding

that the NCUA statute did not restrict the President's authority to remove members of the NCUA

Board. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo as it was based on a pure

question of law. American Legion v. Derwinski, 54 F.3d 789, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

116 S. Ct. 697 (1996).

II. JURISDICTION

Before turning to an analysis of the NCUA statute to determine whether it restricts the

President's removal powers, we first take up the even more basic and troubling question of whether

this court has jurisdiction to hear Swan's appeal. In order for there to be an Article III case or

controversy over which this court can exercise jurisdiction, Swan must have standing. As the

Supreme Court has stated,

[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First,

the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"an invasion of a legally protected

interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the

injury and the conduct complained of.... Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (footnote, citations, and internal

quotations omitted); see also Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (plurality

opinion) ("To invoke the constitutional power of the federal courts to adjudicate a case or

controversy under Article III, appellees here must allege and prove an injury "fairly traceable to the

[appellants'] allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.' ")

(alterations in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). For the purposes of

determining standing, we "assume the validityof a plaintiff'ssubstantive claim." Catholic Social Serv.

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1Swan seeks declaratory relief based on the declaratory judgment statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-

02, as well as injunctive relief based on the general federal question statute and the mandamus

statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361. Although the following discussion is couched in terms of our

ability to grant injunctive relief against the President, similar considerations regarding a court's

power to issue relief against the President himself apply to Swan's request for a declaratory

judgment. In addition, we note that a request for an injunction based on the general federal

question statute is essentially a request for a writ of mandamus in this context, where the

injunction is sought to compel federal officials to perform a statutorily required ministerial duty,

National Wildlife Fed'n v. United States, 626 F.2d 917, 918 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1980); see also P.

Bator et al., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 998-99 (4th

ed. 1996) (request for mandatory injunction generally judged by same principles as request for

mandamus), and that the declaratory judgment statute does not constitute an independent grant of

jurisdiction, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 772 (1950). The necessary

prerequisites for this court to exercise its mandamus jurisdiction are that "(1) the plaintiff has a

clear right to relief; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) there is no other adequate

remedy available to the plaintiff." American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge, 768 F.2d 426, 433

(D.C. Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean

Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986); Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616-17 (1984); see also Willis v.

Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 395-96 (6th Cir. 1991) (clarifying that these requirements go to court's

jurisdiction under mandamus statute, although often discussed in merits terms as to whether a writ

of mandamus should be issued); Carpet, Linoleum & Resilient Tile Layers v. Brown, 656 F.2d

564, 567-69 (10th Cir. 1981) (same); Cook v. Arentzen, 582 F.2d 870, 876-77 (4th Cir. 1978)

(same). We find that these prerequisites for stating a cause of action under the mandamus statute

are met in this case, and the primary issues before us are whether this court can grant this remedy

against the President or whether injunctive relief against subordinate executive branch officials

sufficiently redresses Swan's injury so as to satisfy the redressability requirement of standing. 

v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1123, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01

(1975).

In this case, it is the third "redressability" element of standing that initially causes some

concern; assuming that Swan is correct and the NCUA statute prohibited his removal, there is no

doubt that this removal caused Swan to suffer a concrete and actual injury. A question exists,

however, as to whether a federal court has the power to grant injunctive relief against the President

of the United States in the exercise of his official duties.1 The Supreme Court has confirmed that a

"grant of injunctive relief against the President himselfis extraordinary, and should ... raise[ ] judicial

eyebrows." Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802. Franklin involved a challenge to the methodology by which

overseas federal employees were allocated to different states in the 1990 census, which in turn

determined how seatsin the House ofRepresentatives would be reapportioned. Under the automatic

reapportionment statute, the Secretary ofCommerce isrequired to performthe census and report the

data to the President, who within nine months is required to transmit a statement to Congress

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2Although Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality opinion that injunctive relief was not

available against the President in the performance of his official duties, he dissented from the

plurality's finding that the redressability requirements of standing were met. Franklin, 505 U.S. at

824-25. 

indicating the number ofRepresentativesto which each state is entitled based on the census data. The

plaintiffs in Franklin sued both the Secretary of Commerce and the President seeking injunctive and

declaratory relief. The plurality opinion of the Court concluded that "in general, "this court has no

jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties,' " and a majority

of the Justices in fact subscribed to this position. Id. at 802-03 (quoting Mississippi v. Johnson, 71

U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866)); see also id. at 826 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment) ("I think it clear that no court has authority to direct the President to take an official

act.").2

Franklin does not, however, directly decide the question of whether this court hasthe power

to grant Swan the injunctive relief he seeks, because the plurality opinion there specifically noted that

the Court had "left open the question whether the President might be subject to a judicial injunction

requiring the performance of a purely "ministerial' duty." Id. at 802 (quoting Mississippi, 71 U.S. (4

Wall.) at 498-99). A ministerial duty is one that admits of no discretion, so that the official in

question has no authority to determine whether to perform the duty. Mississippi, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)

at 498 ("a ministerial duty ... is one in respect to which nothing is left to discretion"); see also Beatty

v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (" "Generally

speaking, a duty is discretionary if it involves judgment, planning, or policy decisions. It is not

discretionary [i.e. ministerial] if it involves enforcement or administration of a mandatory duty at the

operational level' ") (alteration in original and emphasis omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d

735, 737-38 (10th Cir. 1977)). The distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties is also

critical in this case because the courts do not have authority under the mandamusstatute to order any

government official to performa discretionary duty. Heckler, 466 U.S. at 616; 13th Regional Corp.

v. United States Dep't of Interior, 654 F.2d 758, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

Swan allegesthat the President violated a duty to comply with removalrestrictions contained

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in the NCUA statute and not interfere with Swan's holdover status until Swan's successor had

"qualified." This duty, if it exists, is ministerial and not discretionary, for the President is bound to

abide by the requirements of duly enacted and otherwise constitutionalstatutes. See U.S.CONST. art.

II, § 3, cl. 3 (the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"); Kendall v. United

States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) ("To contend that the obligation imposed on the President

to see the laws faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction

ofthe Constitution, and entirely inadmissible"); Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1332

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (denying that the President can "bypass scores of statutory limitations on

governmental activity"); NTEU v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the President may not

refrain from executing laws duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are construed by the

judiciary). The government, on the other hand, argues that since the NCUA statute nowhere

expressly limits the President's removal power, the statute cannot impose a nonremoval duty of

sufficient clarity to create a ministerial duty. We disagree with that part of the government's

argument. As we have stated often in the mandamus context, a ministerial duty can exist even "where

the interpretation of the controlling statute is in doubt," provided that "the statute, once interpreted,

creates a peremptory obligation for the officer to act." 13th Regional Corp., 654 F.2d 758 at 760;

see also American Cetacean Soc'y, 768 F.2d at 433 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (" "If, after studying the statute

and its legislative history, the court determines that the defendant official has failed to discharge a

duty which Congress intended him to perform, the court should compel performance, thus

effectuating the congressional purpose.' ") (quoting Estate of Smith v. Heckler, 747 F.2d 583, 591

(10th Cir. 1984)).

We have, however, never attempted to exercise power to order the President to perform a

ministerial duty. Earlier decisions of this circuit asserted the authority to issue such an order, but

declined to exercise the power so claimed. For example, in NTEU, the court held that it had

jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus directing the President to perform his ministerial duty, asset

out in the Federal Pay Comparability Act, to adjust the pay of federal employees. But the court

decided to issue declaratory relief instead, stating that simply because the court "possesses the

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authority to mandamus the President to perform the ministerial duty involved herein does not mean

that this Court must or should exercise that authority." 492 F.2d at 616; see also National Wildlife

Fed'n, 626 F.2d at 923. It is not entirely clear, of course, whether, and to what extent, these

decisions remain good law after Franklin. For while the Court in Franklin explicitly left open the

question of whether a court may enjoin the President to perform a ministerial duty, it also issued a

stern admonition that injunctive relief against the President personallyis an extraordinarymeasure not

lightly to be undertaken. The reasons why courts should be hesitant to grant such relief are painfully

obvious; the President, like Congress, is a coequal branch of government, and for the President to

"be ordered to performparticular executive ... acts at the behest of the Judiciary," Franklin, 505 U.S.

at 827 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), at best creates an unseemly

appearance of constitutional tension and at worst risks a violation of the constitutionalseparation of

powers.

On the other side of the scale, of course, is the bedrock principle that our system of

government is founded on the rule of law, and it is sometimes a necessary function of the judiciary

to determine if the executive branch is abiding by the terms of legislative enactments. In most cases,

any conflict between the desire to avoid confronting the elected head of a coequal branch of

government and to ensure the rule of law can be successfully bypassed, because the injury at issue

can be rectified by injunctive relief against subordinate officials. See, e.g., Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803

(injury caused by use of allegedly unlawful method for including overseas federal employees in the

1990 census can be redressed by declaratory relief against the Secretary of Commerce); Reich, 74

F.3d at 1328, 1331 n.4 (challenge to an executive order does not raise issue of whether judicial power

can be brought "to bear directly on the President" where challenge targeted Secretary ofCommerce's

regulationsimplementing the executive order and thusrepresented "a claim directed at a subordinate

executive official"); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 811 n.17 (1982) ("Suits against

other officialsincluding Presidential aidesgenerally do not invoke separation-of-powers

considerations to the same extent as suits against the President himself.") If Swan's injury can be

redressed by injunctive relief against subordinate officials, he clearly has standing; moreover, this

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approach would make it unnecessary to determine whether, in light of Franklin, the President can be

enjoined to perform a ministerial duty.

At first glance, it might appear that this case represents one of those rare instances where the

bypass is closed, and only injunctive relief against the President himself will redress Swan's injury,

because only the President has the power to remove or reinstate NCUA Board members. Although

the removal power is nowhere specifically set out in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has

established that the President exercisesthis power as a result of his constitutional appointment power

and obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. See generally Myers v. United

States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). NCUA Board members are entrusted with broad regulatory powers over

the credit union system and given substantial discretion to determine how best to meet their statutory

responsibilities. It thus seems likely that NCUA Board members are principal officers of the United

States, and as such they must be appointed, and removed, by the President. Morrison v. Olson, 487

U.S. 654, 670-73 (1988). In any event, "as a matter of statutory interpretation, ... absent a "specific

provision to the contrary, the power of removalfrom office isincident to the power of appointment.'

" Carlucci v. Doe, 488 U.S. 93, 99 (1988) (quoting Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293

(1900)). Consequently, NCUA Board members can only be removed by the President, even if they

are not principal officers, as the NCUA statute gives the President the power to appoint them and is

silent on removal. Moreover, the President's exercise of his removal power requires no aid of

subordinate officials; in this case, Nash and Hoyle were instrumental in enforcing Swan's removal

from office but their involvement was not necessary for the President to officially remove Swan.

But the criticalquestion in determining redressability is not whethersubordinate officials have

the legal power to remove or reinstate NCUA Board members. It is rather whether injunctive relief

against such officials alone could provide Swan with an adequate remedy, despite the fact that only

the President has the power to officially remove Wheat and reinstate Swan. An examination of the

actions that subordinate officials could perform in Swan's case demonstrates that injunctive relief

against such officials could substantially redress his injury.

Swan has sued not only the President, but also Nash and Hoyle. There is little that Nash

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3This court has authority to amend Swan's complaint in this fashion. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1653,

"[d]efective allegations of jurisdiction may be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate

courts." See Goble v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (in section 1653 "Congress

intended to permit amendment broadly to avoid dismissal of suits on technical grounds"). The

Supreme Court has also added parties on appeal under the authority of Rule 21 of the Federal

could do that would achieve the ends Swan seeks, since Nash, as Assistant to the President, has no

authority to control NCUA operations. But Hoyle is another story. As Executive Director of the

NCUA, he hasresponsibility for coordinating the activities ofthe senior executive staff ofthe NCUA,

and thus could direct the staff to treat Swan as a Board member. 12 C.F.R. § 790.2(b)(7) (1996).

However, Hoyle does not appear to have the authority to order the other Board members to treat

Swan as a Board member; under the NCUA statute, the Board "shall adopt such rules as it sees fit

for the transaction of its business and shall keep ... records of its acts and proceedings." 12 U.S.C.

§ 1752a(d). The NCUA statute also specifies that "[t]he Chairman of the Board shall be the

spokesman for the Board and shall represent the NCUA in its officialrelations with other branches."

Id. § 1752a(e). In addition, the regulation setting forth the organization of the NCUA states that the

Secretary of the Board, who is not listed as a member of the senior executive staff, isresponsible for

preparing and maintaining the minutes of the Board's official actions. 12 C.F.R. §§ 790.2(b)(2),

790.2(b)(7). Although Swan has not included the Chairman, other NCUA Board members or the

Board Secretary as defendants in this action, it seems indisputable that he would have done so had

he thought that suit against the President, Nash, and Hoyle would not be sufficient to provide the

relief he desires. At oral argument Swan's counsel asked that we read Swan's request "for such

additional relief as the court shall deem just and proper" to encompass relief against subordinate

branch officials not named as parties. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that a court has power

under the All Writs Act to issue commands that apply to "persons who, though not parties to the

original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court

order or the proper administration of justice." United States v. NewYork Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174

(1977); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Thus, we think that it would elevate form over substance in

a case of this dimension not to treat Swan's complaint as if it also sought injunctive or declaratory

relief against these individuals in their official capacity.3Injunctive relief against Hoyle and these

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Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "[p]arties may be dropped or added by order of the

court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action on such terms as are

just." Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417 (1952) (noting that "Rule 21 will rarely come

into play at this stage of a litigation" but granting petitioner's motion to add parties on the grounds

that "[t]o dismiss the present petition and require the new plaintiffs to start over in the District

Court would entail needless waste"); see also CP Nat'l Corp. v. Bonneville Power

Administration, 928 F.2d 905, 911-12 (9th Cir. 1991) (on appeal joining power agency as a

necessary party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19). Since the NCUA Chairman, other

Board members and Secretary of the Board are all government officers who, if added, would be

sued in their official capacity and would be represented by the Attorney General and United States

Attorney as are President Clinton, Nash, and Hoyle, we need not be concerned that they might

suffer prejudice by being added as defendants at this point in the proceedings. See, e.g., FED. R.

CIV. P. 15(c) (amendment changing a party relates back to date of the original pleading if party

being added is an officer of the United States and process was timely filed on, among others, the

United States Attorney and the Attorney General); Sims v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety &

Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1460 n.16 (11th Cir. 1989) (no prejudice to state officials from

being added as defendants late in course of lawsuit where state attorney general has represented

state's interest throughout litigation). 

added defendants could on balance substantially redress Swan's injury and is sufficient to satisfy the

redressability requirement of standing. While these officials cannot officially remove Wheat and

reinstate Swan, they can accomplish these deeds de facto by treating Swan as a member ofthe NCUA

Board and allowing him to exercise the privileges of that officei.e., including Swan in Board

meetings, giving him access to his former office, recording his votes as official votes of a Board

member, allowing him to draw the salary of a Board member, etc.and by denying any such

treatment to Wheat.

It istrue that resuming his seat on the Board in this de facto fashion might not be as complete

a remedy for Swan as an official reinstatement by the President. We also acknowledge that the

President, who would not be legally bound by any such decision, might raise obstaclesto meaningful

relief for Swan were he to insist that Wheat and not Swan occupy the position of NCUA Board

member or instruct the Treasury Department not to pay Swan's salary. The plurality opinion in

Franklin addressed this problemofthe President's power to ignore theCourt's decision bystating that

"we may assume it is substantially likely that the President and other executive and congressional

officials would abide by an authoritative interpretation of the census statute and constitutional

provision by the District Court, even though they would not be directly bound by such a

determination." Id. at 803. Justice Scalia, on the other hand, considered the plurality's "speculation

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4We note that the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in section 702 of the Administrative

Procedure Act ("APA") would not apply in this case. Section 702 waives sovereign immunity in

regard to actions seeking nonmonetary relief and claiming "that an agency or an officer or

employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority." 5

U.S.C. § 702. It is not necessary that the suit be brought under the APA for section 702's waiver

to apply. Reich, 74 F.3d at 1328. It might appear that Swan's complaint, as amended, meets the

requirements of section 702, since he seeks injunctive or declaratory relief against officers and

employees of the NCUA, which is an agency under the APA. But the action that Swan complains

of, his removal, was performed by the President, and the President is not an agency within the

meaning of the APA. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 800-01; Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 289

(D.C. Cir. 1991). 

about the probability of such "practical' subservience" to be "disrespectful of a coordinate branch."

Id. at 825. We need not decide between these polar views. Instead, we hold that the partial relief

Swan can obtain against subordinate executive officials is sufficient for redressability, even

recognizing that the President has the power, if he so chose, to undercut this relief. We do not

believe that in so holding we are performing an end run around the redressability requirement of

standing doctrine. Rather, we are simply recognizing that such partial relief is sufficient for standing

purposes when determining whether we can order more complete reliefwould require usto delve into

complicated and exceptionally difficult questions regarding the constitionalrelationship between the

judiciary and the executive branch.

Finally, sovereign immunity does not act as a bar to our exercising jurisdiction over Swan's

claims. Neither the general federal question statute nor the mandamus statute by itself waives

sovereign immunity. Washington Legal Found. v. United States Sentencing Comm'n, 89 F.3d 897,

901 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc. v. Reilly, 889 F.2d 1380, 1385 (5th Cir.

1989). The "Larson-Dugan exception," however, holds that sovereign immunity does not apply as

a bar to suits alleging that an officer's actions were unconstitutional or beyond statutory authority,

on the grounds that "where the officer's powers are limited by statute, his actions beyond those

limitations are considered individual and not sovereign actions." Larson v. Domestic & Foreign

Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949); see also Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-23 (1963);

Washington Legal Found., 89 F.3d at 901. If Swan's removal violated the NCUA statute, the

Larson-Dugan exception would be triggered and hence no waiver ofsovereign immunity is required

here.4

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Having resolved our jurisdiction to hear Swan's appeal, we turn now to a discussion of the

central merits question in the case, namely whether the NCUA statute prevents the President from

removing a holdover member of the NCUA Board, absent good cause.

III. REMOVAL OF A HOLDOVER NCUA BOARD MEMBER

The NCUA statute does not expressly prevent the President from removing NCUA Board

members except for good cause. The lack of an express for cause restriction does not dispose of the

question of whether NCUA Board members are entitled to removal protection, however, for an

examination ofthe NCUA'sfunction,statutorylanguage and legislative historymay demonstrate that

Congress nonetheless intended such removal protection to exist. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S.

349, 353-56 (1958); see also FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(noting that it islikely the President can only remove FEC commissionersfor cause despite statutory

silence on removal), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994). Since a restriction on the President's

ability to remove NCUA Board members would represent a congressional limitation of presidential

action, we can only find such a restriction if there is "affirmative evidence" that Congress intended

it, for "[w]henCongress decides purposefullyto enact legislation restricting or regulating presidential

action, it must make its intent clear." Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 289.

Swan contends that the 1978 amendments to the NCUA statute, which replaced the NCUA

Administrator with the current NCUA Board and established that Board members would be

appointed to nonrecurring six year terms, restricted the President's ability to remove NCUA Board

members except for good cause. Prior law has, of course, established that term limits do not always

provide removal protection, at least when traditional executive branch officials are involved. See,

e.g., Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 338-39 (1897) (President can remove U.S. Attorneys

even during their appointed four year terms). Swan argues, however, that the combination of fixed

terms of office, the NCUA's status as an independent agency, the legislative history of the 1978

amendments and the agency's function as a regulator of financial institutions, together demonstrate

that Congress clearly enacted term limits in this instance as a means of according the NCUA Board

members protection against removal at will.

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Swan does garner support for inferring some removal protection from the 1978 amendments

to the NCUA statute. These amendments replaced the NCUA Administrator, who had explicitly

served at the pleasure ofthe President, with a Board composed of three members, each of whom was

appointed to a six year term, and deleted all reference to the President's removal powers. See H.R.

REP. NO. 1383, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 138 (1978) (setting out text of NCUA statute prior to

amendment and noting changes). The somewhat attenuated legislative history of the 1978

amendments goesfurther in bolstering that inference of removal protection during the term of Board

members. There is little direct legislative history on Title V of FIRIRCA itself; FIRIRCA as a whole

generated significant debate, but the alterations in the NCUA structure were not controversial. See,

e.g., 124 CONG. REC. 33,823 (1978) (no amendments offered to Title V, and no discussion of

provision, during House debate). The provisions that became Title V were initially proposed as a

floor amendment to an early Senate version of FIRIRCA. The sponsor of the floor amendment,

Senator McIntyre, stated that "the principal thrust of this amendment is to transfer management of

the [NCUA] from a single Administrator who serves at the pleasure of the President to a threemember board with fixed terms of office." 123 CONG. REC. 27,396 (1977). The House Report on

FIRIRCA contains a very brief discussion of the NCUA alterations, and primarily notesthat "[o]ther

financial institutions regulatory agencies and other independent agencies operate under the direction

of a board" and cites the Federal Reserve System, the Home Loan Bank System, the FDIC, the

Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") and the FederalTrade Commission ("FTC") as examples.

H.R. REP. NO. 1383 at 26. At the time, the Federal Reserve, FTC, and the ICC authorizing statutes

all had for cause removalrestrictions, while the Home Loan Bank and FDIC statutes were silent. 12

U.S.C. §§ 242, 1437, 1812; 15 U.S.C. § 41; 49 U.S.C. § 11 (repealed).

But the history of a predecessor bill, S. 3312, proposed in the 94th Congress, is revealing.

S. 3312 was identical in all relevant respects to the 1978 amendments to the NCUA statute and it is

apparent fromthe Senate Report on S. 3312 that the Senate Banking Committee believed the six year

terms would protect NCUA Board members from at will removal during their appointed terms:

The Administrator of the [NCUA] is the only Federal financial regulator to

serve at the pleasure of the President without tenure. The lack of tenure tends to

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5For example, the words that Senator MacIntyre used to describe the purpose of the changes

in the NCUA organization he was proposing"the principal thrust of this amendment is to

transfer management of the [NCUA] from a single Administrator who serves at the pleasure of

the President to a three-member board with fixed terms of office"are identical with those

contained in the Senate Report on S. 3312, except that the Senate Report used the word

"legislation" instead of "amendment." S. REP. NO. 751 at 2. In addition, when Senator McIntyre

proposed the amendment containing the NCUA organizational changes, he stated that the changes

were the same as those that were contained in Title II of S. 1665, which in turn incorporated the

provisions of S. 3211. See, e.g., NOW Accounts, Federal Reserve Membership and Related

Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Insts. of the Comm. on Banking, Housing,

Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127, 147 (1977) (Statement of C. Austin Montgomery,

NCUA Administrator). 

politicize the day-to-day decisionmaking process and raises the specter of not

knowing whether taking a particular controversial position on a controversial issue

might cost the Administrator his job.

Ironically, the difficulties encountered by a nontenured Administrator were

dramatically emphasized on the very day the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions

held the hearing on [NCUA] restructuring. At the hearing, the Administrator himself

acknowledged the difficultiesinherent in serving without tenure.... Within hours after

his appearance before the subcommittee, the Administrator was summoned to the

White House and dismissed.

At the very least, therefore, the committee recognizes the need to provide

tenure for the Administrator in order to strengthen the [NCUA]'s status as an

independent agency.

S. REP. NO. 751, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1976). As S. 3312 was proposed in the 94th Congress,

itslegislative history is obviously not determinative of how Title V of FIRIRCA, enacted in the 95th

Congress, should be read. But this legislative history is nonetheless to some degree instructive on

Congress' intent in enacting Title V, given the virtual identity of the two statutes and indications in

the legislative record that the text of Title V was in fact based on the earlier bill.5

We think it useful to trace thislegislative background insofar asit containssupport for NCUA

Board members having protection against removal without cause during their appointed terms, since

if no such protection exists during a member's term, there certainly would be no argument that a

holdover member was so protected. But because the evidence is sufficiently ambiguous as not to

permit us to discount the possibility that Congress did intend at least term protection, we must take

our analysis one step further to determine whether Swan's holdover protection claim has any merit.

Thus we will assume arguendo that Board members have removal protection during their appointed

terms and focus instead on determining whether, even if that is so, holdover members are similarly

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6

It merits noting, however, that the Comptroller of the Currency, who is responsible for

implementing laws relating to the national currency and Federal Reserve notes, is subject to the

general oversight of the Secretary of the Treasury, and, although appointed for a five year term,

can be removed by the President "upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate." 12

U.S.C. §§ 1-2. 

protected. Although Swan argues that it should make little difference that a Board member is serving

in a holdover capacity, we find the contention that holdover members should also be accorded

removal protection to be a far more dubious, and ultimately unpersuasive, proposition.

Asthe foregoing discussion indicates, the strongest reason for according Board members any

removal protection, in the absence of any express provision for it in the NCUA statute, is that

Congress specifically amended the statute to create the Board and give its members fixed terms of

office. It would seem to follow, then, that any such protection would automatically end once the

specified term of office ended, unless there is some additional ground on which removal protection

can be based. In Wiener, the Supreme Court stated that "the most reliable factor for drawing an

inference regarding the President's power of removal ... is the nature of the function that Congress

vested in" the body to which the removed officials belong. 357 U.S. at 353. If this function is one

that "require[s] absolute freedom from Executive interference," id., then a court may infer that

Congress provided the officials with removal protection as a means of "prevent[ing] the President

from exercising "coercive influence' " over them. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 411

(1989) (quoting Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 630 (1935)). The NCUA is

responsible for supervising federal credit unions and administering the insurance and liquidity funds,

and the power to prescribe rules and regulationsto accomplish these tasks and to manage the NCUA

itself is vested in the NCUA Board. Independence from presidential control is arguably important

if agencies charged with regulating financial institutions,such asthe NCUA, are to successfully fulfill

their responsibilities; people will likely have greater confidence in financial institutions if they believe

that the regulation of these institutions is immune from political influence.6 The NCUA's function

may therefore provide further evidence indicating that Board members enjoy removal protection

during their appointed terms. But the function of the NCUA only provides a basis for extending

removal protection to holdover Board members if protection for holdover members is necessary to

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ensure the NCUA's independence. An analysis of the position of holdover Board members

demonstrates that this is not the case. Holdover members can be replaced, whether they have

removal protection or not, by the President nominating and the Senate confirming their successors.

As a result, a removal restriction will not protect holdover members from the aftermath of a

Presidentially unpopular decision, and holdover members know that even if they cannot be removed

directly, an unpopular decision may lead the President to nominate a successor immediately or

encourage the Senate to speed up confirmation hearings. It is true that with removal protection

holdoverBoard members would be less accountable to the President for their actions. But their lesser

accountability to the President does not make them more independent. Rather, given that holdover

members can be replaced whenever a successor is confirmed, all that removal protection achieves is

to make holdover members more dependent on Senate inaction than on the President. The Senate

would have the power to keep a holdover member in office by refusing to act on the President's

nominee for a successor to a NCUA member.

Asthe NCUA'sfunction failsto provide a basisfor inferring removal protection for holdover

Board members, we turn next to an examination of the language of the NCUA holdover clause. This

clause is contained in section 1752a(c), which describes the term of office of Board members:

The term of office of each member of the Board shall be six years, except that

the terms of the two members, other than the Chairman, initially appointed shall

expire one upon the expiration of two years after the date of appointment, and the

other upon the expiration offour years after the date of appointment. Board members

shall not be appointed to succeed themselves except the initialmembers appointed for

less than a six-year term may be reappointed for a full six-year term and future

members appointed to fill unexpired terms may be reappointed for a fullsix year term.

Any Board member may continue to serve afterthe expiration of said member'sterm

until a successor has qualified.

12 U.S.C. § 1752a(c) (emphasis added). The final sentence of section 1752a(c) is the only reference

to holdover Board membersin the NCUA statute. Before the 1978 amendments, the NCUA statute

contained a holdover clause in regard to the now-nonexistent NCUA advisory board. The language

of the pre-amendment holdover clause was very similar to the current final sentence of section

1752a(c); like the current version, it was placed at the end of the subsection that described the terms

of advisory board members. The only difference between the two is that the earlier version provided

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7

It is worth noting that the NCUA holdover clause does not itself contain any term limits; 

rather the only term limit listed in the NCUA statute relates to the length of a Board member's

appointed term. Congress frequently has included term limits that specifically apply to holdover

officials; for example, the holdover clause that applies to members of the SEC provides that a

commissioner can holdover until her successor is appointed and qualified, but cannot holdover

"beyond the expiration of the next session of Congress" subsequent to the expiration of the

commissioner's term. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 1202(b), 1202(c); 7 U.S.C. §

4a(a)(1); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(b)(2); 39 U.S.C. § 202(b); 42 U.S.C. § 7171(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. §

2000e-4(a); 47 U.S.C. § 154(c); 49 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3). As discussed above, to the extent that

Board members have any removal protection, it is because Congress gave them fixed terms of

office. The absence of a term limit for holdovers could be read as evidence that Congress did not

intend any removal protection, because if Congress had so intended, it would have given holdover

members specific terms as it did appointed members. It could also be argued that the inclusion of

a term limit would demonstrate that Congress actually considered the question of a holdover

member's tenure and accepted that holdovers might remain in office for the specified period. But

a term limit on holdovers serves primarily as a means of forcing the President and the Senate to

move quickly on replacements, and thus the absence of such a limit is not a firm basis on which to

conclude that Congress did not intend holdover members to have removal protection. 

that a Board member could holdover until a "successor has been appointed and qualified." Act of

March 10, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-206, 84 Stat. 49, 50 (1970); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1383 at 138

(setting out pre-amendment version of the NCUA statute).7

The statutory text makes clear that NCUA Board members would have to step down at the

end of their terms were it not for the holdover clause. Significantly, the NCUA statute not only

provides that members shall be appointed to six year terms, but also specifies that Board members

cannot be reappointed to succeed themselves if they have served a full term. This suggests that the

primary purpose of the NCUA holdover clause, like the holdover clauses that appear in the statutes

of many independent agencies, is to ensure continuity and avoid the leadership vacancies that

otherwise would exist until successor officials could be appointed. See H.R. 1917, 86th Cong., 2d

Sess. 2 (1960) (recommending that holdover clauses be enacted to apply to the Federal Power

Commission, the SEC, and the FCC because vacancies caused by the expiration of commissioners'

terms cause delays and handicap agencies); see also Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 593

(D.D.C. 1979) (reviewing congressional explanations as to why holdover clauses were included in

the statutes of several independent agencies and concluding that "[t]he thrust of all the comments is

that continuity in office is important and that the disruption caused by prolonged vacancies should

be avoided."). Indeed, Swan does not argue to the contrary.

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8

Indeed, if an intrasession recess is the same as an intersession recess as far as the President's

recess appointments clause powers are concerned, this gap in leadership would be even shorter. 

But see Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess

Appointments Clause?, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2204 (1994) (arguing that intrasession recesses should

not trigger the recess appointments clause). 

It is apparent, however, that removalprotection for holdoverBoard membersis not necessary

to ensure agency continuity. Were holdover Board members freely removable, the President could

replace removed holdover members when the Senate was in recess under the recess appointments

clause, and could do so in regard to holdover members who were removed before the Senate went

into recess as well as those members who were removed during the recess. See U.S. CONST., art. 2,

§ 2, cl. 3 ("The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess

of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End oftheir next Session"); United

States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that recess

appointments clause applies to all vacancies that exist when the Senate is in recess and noting that

the courts and the executive branch have consistently adhered to this view), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1048 (1986); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1962) (interpreting the recess

appointment clause to allow the President to fill only vacanciesthat arise during recess would "create

... a manifestly undesirable situation" and "frustrate the commendable objective sought by the

drafters"), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963). Thus, extending removal protection to holdover

members would be aiming a cannon at a gnat. It would serve only the limited purpose of avoiding

the gap in agency leadership that could potentially result if the President were to remove a holdover

official while the Senate was in session. Even assuming a successor was not quickly appointed via

the usual nomination and confirmation process, such a gap itself would only last until the Senate next

went into recess, a gap of limited duration at most.8

Removal protection for holdover members might be necessary if the purpose of the holdover

clause were not just to prevent gaps in agency leadership generally, but more specifically to prevent

gaps from occurring during the time it takes the Senate to confirm a successorin other words, if

the purpose of the holdover clause was to prevent a successor from being appointed via the recess

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9As an initial matter, we note that removal protection would only preclude recess appointments

if the end of a member's term did not create a vacancy for purposes of the recess appointments

clause, regardless of whether the member assumed holdover status. As the split precedent in the

district courts of this circuit indicates, the meaning of "vacancy" in the recess appointments clause

context is unclear. Compare Wilkinson, 865 F. Supp. at 902 (end of term of member of LSC

Board does not create a vacancy) and Mackie v. Clinton, 827 F. Supp. 56, 57-58 (D.D.C. 1993)

(end of term of member of Post Office's Board of Governors does not create a vacancy), vacated

as moot, 1994 WL 163761 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 1994) with McCalpin v. Dana, No. 82-542,

(D.D.C. Oct. 5, 1982) (end of term of member of LSC Board creates a vacancy), vacated as moot

sub nom. McCalpin v. Durant, 766 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and Staebler, 464 F. Supp. at

589-90 (end of the term of member of the Federal Election Commission creates a vacancy). It is

not necessary for us to determine here whether a vacancy exists when an official's appointed term

of office ends. See Wilkinson, 80 F.3d at 539. 

appointment clause.9 But there is no indication in the language of the NCUA statute or the legislative

history of the 1978 amendments that Congress intended the holdover clause to serve any such

purpose of precluding recess appointments. Cf. Staebler, 464 F. Supp. at 592 (although several

congressional reports describe holdover clauses as allowing the Senate an opportunity to confirm

successor officials, "in none of these reports is there any indication that the Committees considered,

much lessthat they intended to rule out, the constitutionally-prescribed recess appointment option").

And we are unwilling to infer that the NCUA statute precludes the President from exercising a

constitutionally granted power absent clear evidence that this was Congress' intent.

In fact, the textual changes in the holdover clause wrought by the 1978 amendments suggest

the opposite, that Congress sought to make clear that the President could replace holdover officials

using the recess appointment power. As detailed above, the pre-amendment version of the holdover

clause provided that a Board member could holdover until a "successor has been appointed and

qualified," while the current version states that a member can holdover until a "successor has

qualified." There is no explanation in the legislative history as to why Congress so changed the

wording of the holdover clause. It could be argued that "qualified" means confirmed when used in

the phrase "appointed and qualified," since otherwise the words "and qualified" would be surplusage.

See, e.g., Wilkinson, 865 F. Supp. at 893 (reading "appointed and qualified" in the LSC Act as

"appointed and confirmed"). But there is no reason to give "qualified" such a narrow reading when

the word is used alone. Rather, a more natural reading of "qualified" on its own would have it mean

that the requirements for assuming office have been fulfilled, which could be either by nomination

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with Senate confirmation or by recess appointment. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY at 1858 (1976) (defining qualified as meaning primarily either "fitted

... for a given purpose" or "having complied with the specific requirements or precedent conditions

(as for office or employment)"); but see Mackie, 827 F. Supp at 56 (reading "qualified" to mean

"nominated and confirmed"), vacated as moot, 1994 WL 163761 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 1994). Thus,

the current version of the holdover clause is more compatible with the President's being able to

replace holdover Board officials via the recess appointment clause than the pre-amendment version.

It is also worth noting that according holdover Board members removal protection might be

pushing the constitutional envelope to the edge, because this protection could inpractice serve to give

the Senate control over holdover members' tenure in office or to preclude Presidentsfrom being able

to replace holdover membersforsubstantialperiods oftime. If removal protection serves to preclude

replacement of holdover Board members under the recess appointments clause, then the only way to

remove holdover members would be to nominate and confirm successor members, and the Senate

could keep holdover members in office by not acting on the President's nominations for successors.

The Senate's power to keep holdover membersin office in thisfashion might wellraise constitutional

problems,since the Supreme Court has explicitly held that Congress cannot exercise control over the

tenure of executive branch officials:

Congress cannot reserve for itselfthe power ofremoval of an officer charged with the

execution of the laws except by impeachment. To permit the execution of the laws

to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms,

reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws.

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124-35 (1976)

(holding that Federal Election Commission was unconstitutional as constituted because, in part, four

voting members were appointed as well as confirmed by Congress). Nor would the Senate's control

over holdover Board members be a de minimis matter, since the absence of any term limit in the

NCUA holdover clause enables holdover membersto continue in office indefinitely, and in any event

the Court has refused to tolerate any arrangements that could aggrandize the powers of Congress at

the expense of the President, no matter how "innocuous" these arrangements might be in practice.

Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501

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U.S. 252, 276-77 (1991); see also Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730 (likelihood of Congress actually

exercising its removal power over the Comptroller-General is irrelevant to determining whether

Comptroller-General can constitutionally exercise executive powers). In addition, if the President

cannot remove holdover officials and cannot replace themunder the recess appointments clause, then

holdover members could conceivably remain in office for substantial, indeed unlimited, periods of

time. While it is now beyond dispute that Congress generally may place restrictions such as term

limits on the President's removal power, it is not clear that Congress can provide unlimited removal

protection; in its opinions upholding removal restrictions the Court has repeatedly emphasized that

the officials who were protected from removal had only a limited tenure. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672,

691 (upholding restrictions on removal of independent counsel and underscoring that independent

counsel has "limited jurisdiction and tenure"); Wiener, 357 U.S. at 350 (upholding removal

protection for members of the War Crimes Commission and noting commisioners' tenure limited by

three year life ofthe commission); Humphrey'sExecutor, 295 U.S. at 628-32 (upholding restrictions

on removal of FTC commissioners during appointed term); see also Shurtleff v. United States, 189

U.S. 311, 318 (1903) (refusing to infer a restriction on the President's ability to remove a general

appraiser of merchandise, despite a provision stating that the President could remove for cause,

because the result of inferring a removal restriction would be to accord these officials life tenure).

Precluding the President fromremoving an executive branch officialwith potentiallyunlimited tenure

arguably might "impede the President's ability to perform his constitutional duty" under Article II to

take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672, 691.

At oral argument, Swan's counsel contended that limiting the President's authority to remove

holdover Board members is more in keeping with the constitutional plan because the normal

appointment process envisioned by theConstitution is nomination by the President with confirmation

by the Senate. On this view, since holdover members have been approved by both the President and

the Senate at some point, allowing them to continue in office indefinitely is a lesser evil than allowing

the President to deny the Senate any role in the appointment process by removing holdover members

and replacing themwith a succession of recess appointments. This argument rests on the assumption

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10Our colleague, in concurrence, chastises us for unnecessarily discussing the jurisprudential

problems involved when a plaintiff seeks mandamus against the President, problems which lead us

to accept less than complete relief as sufficient for the redressability prong of standing. We do so

in the interests of candor, since we consider it, at the least, an unusual occurrence for an appellate

court, without specific motion, to sua sponte add parties defendant. Additionally, we believe that

our ruling on the removal of holdover Board members in this case requires full discussion of the

many factors that enter into the calculus; unlike our colleague we do not feel comfortable with

ruling that a holdover official can never have tenure until his successor is confirmed under any

circumstances short of an express directive from Congress. Finally, we believe a careful reading

of our opinion will readily disabuse anyone of the notion that we are saying that "a President may

be directed to do, or not to do, anything that any executive branch official can be directed to do

by way of mandamus." Concurring opinion at 4. 

that a recess appointment is somehow a constitutionally inferior procedure, not entirely valid or in

some way suspect, an assumption that the Constitution precludes us from making. The President is

specifically granted the power to make recess appointments in the Constitution, and "the United

States Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "[t]he Constitution ... must be regarded as one

instrument, all of whose provisions are to be deemed of equal validity.' " Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1009-

10 (quoting Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537, 543 (1903)); see also Staebler, 464 F. Supp. at 597

("There is nothing to suggest that the Recess Appointments Clause was designed as some sort of

extraordinary and lesser method of appointment, to be used only in cases of extreme necessity.").

Of course we do not opine on whether according removal protection to holdover NCUA

Board members would be unconstitutional. But the fact that extending removal protection to

holdover Board officials might raise constitutional problems makes us all the more unwilling to infer

such protection absent clear evidence that Congress intended it. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.

Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) ("Courts will not

lightlyopine that Congressintended to impinge on constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power

constitutionally forbidden it."). Removal protection for holdover members is not necessary in light

of the NCUA's basic functions, nor do the language of the holdover clause, the NCUA statute

generally, and the legislative history of the 1978 amendments provide any evidence that Congress

intended holdover members to have such protection.10

We therefore conclude that, even if the NCUA statute were interpreted to grant removal

protection to Board members during their appointed terms (something we do not decide), this

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11Since we hold that Swan's removal was not unlawful, he does not have standing to challenge

the President's appointment of Note 11Continued Wheat during an intrasession recess of the

Senate under the recess appointments clause. Even if Wheat's appointment were illegal, it did not

cause Swan a cognizable injury. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 754 (a party must have suffered a

cognizable injury to have standing and a violation of the "right to have Government act in

accordance with law" is not a cognizable injury). 

protection does not extend to holdover members. As Swan was serving in a holdover capacity when

he was removed from his position as a NCUA Board member by President Clinton, his removal did

not violate the terms ofthe NCUA statute.11 The district court's decision granting summary judgment

in favor of the government is therefore

Affirmed.

SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the judgment but write separately

because there is a good deal in the majority opinion that is problematic and quite unnecessary to our

decision.

I.

We must, of course, at the outset satisfy ourselves that we enjoy jurisdiction over appellant's

claim. That depends on his having standing, which, in turn, depends on our ability to redress his

alleged injury. The government argues that to do so we would have to issue an injunction or a

mandamus or a declaratory judgment (all carrying essentially the same constitutionally troubling

characteristics) directed to the President of the United States. I agree with the majority that after

Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), we must focusfirst on appellant's requested relief.

We are obliged to ask whether Swan'sinjury can be redressed without an order that is directed either

implicitly or explicitly against the President, and if not, are we authorized to issue the order against

the President. One difficulty I have with the majority opinion is that it discusses the troublesome

second question when the answer to the first makes our consideration of the second question

gratuitous. As the Supreme Court said in Franklin, 505 U.S. at 803, "we need not decide whether

injunctive relief against the President was appropriate because we conclude that the injury alleged is

likely to be redressed by declaratory relief against the Secretary alone" (emphasis added). I think we

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1 We might be a good deal less willing to use this authority if it were not for our natural

reluctance to avoid serious constitutional questions. 

could grant appellant all the relief he would ever need in this case, using only a little ingenuity,

without ever attempting to impose judicial power directly on the President of the United States.

Asthe majority recognizes, by amending Swan's complaint, as he wishes, to extend it to more

federal officials (in this instance, without any threat of unfairness), see Maj. Op. at n.3, and relying

on our authority under the All Writs Act to issue our remedial order to "persons who, though not

parties to the original action or engaged in wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the

implementation of a court order or the proper administration of justice," United States v. New York

Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 174 (1977), we can bring all the Board members, all the Board officials, and

the Secretary of Treasury under our orders.1 Cf. Franklin, 505 U.S. at 828 (Scalia, J., concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Review of the legality of Presidential action can ordinarily

be obtained in a suit seeking to enjoin the officers who attempt to enforce the President's directive.").

We could thus compel all officials at the Board to treat Swan as the rightful incumbent and,

consequently, to ignore Wheat, at least officially. Moreover, the Secretary of Treasury could be

directed to pay Swan's salary and not to pay Wheat a nickel in federal funds. If that hypothetical

order would not give Swan complete relief, I would be very surprised indeed.

The majority nevertheless justifies discussing, at length (an exercise in judicial chest

thumping?), our authority to direct the President, because the President might instruct the Secretary

of Treasury not to obey our order or might somehow issue other instructions to executive branch

officials to frustrate our mandate (which isthe only possible meaning to the phrase "were he to insist

that Wheat and not Swan occupy the position of NCUA Board member...." Maj. Op. at 14). But

that is simply another way of saying the President can always create a constitutional crisis of major

proportions by directing subordinate executive branch officials to ignore the federal judiciary. One

can only wonder, if any President would be willing to go that farto encourage bald disobedience

of judicial orderswhat an order directed to the President himself would accomplish. At that point,

we would be headed, in accordance with our temperament, either to the basement or the barricades.

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To give credence to that prospect is a good deal different than Justice Scalia's legitimate protest

against the unseemly judicial arrogance involved in assuming that a President would voluntarily

conform his behavior to a judicial decision when he is under no legal obligation to do so. See

Franklin, 505 U.S. at 825 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

It may well be, as the majority would strongly suggest, Maj. Op. at 8-10, that a federal court

may order the President to reverse an action or desist from action we determine is illegal, but the

issue seems more complicated to me than it is put. The Supreme Court in the venerable case of

Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866), declined to decide whether the President of

the United States could be ordered to perform a purely ministerial act, but held that even if that were

so, he could not be directed to perform or enjoined from performing dutiesthat are purely "executive

and political." Id. at 499 (highlighting "the general principles which forbid judicial interference with

the exercise of Executive discretion"). We have in previous cases, as the majority describes, on

occasion said but never really held that a President could be ordered to perform a ministerial act. See

National Wildlife Fed'n, 626 F.2d 917, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1980); National Treasury Employees Union

v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Particularly after Franklin's admonition that the "grant

of injunctive relief against the President himself is extraordinary and should ... raise[ ] judicial

eyebrows," Franklin, 505 U.S. at 802, I do not think that dicta is worth very much, nor am I

convinced that the ministerial/ discretionary dichotomy which the majority would embrace is

equivalent to the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court in Mississippi v. Johnson between

ministerial on the one hand and "executive and political" on the other. The problem with the

majority's formulation is that any time it is contended that the President has acted or intends to act

illegally, it might be said that the President could not possibly enjoy such "discretion," therefore

employing its ministerial/discretionary distinction leadsinexorably to the proposition that a court can

order the President to not violate or to cease violating a law. But, as the Court implicitly recognized

in Johnson, whether such an order is phrased as an injunctionordering the President not to take an

allegedly illegal actor positivelyto performa legally obliged dutyit trenches on the President's

"executive and political" duties. That is why Justice Scalia's formulation that a President himself

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2 But see Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (holding that a four year term of

appointment for United States Attorneys did not restrict the President's power to remove during

that time). U.S. Attorneys are of course engaged, unlike most members of independent, or

relatively independent regulatory boards or commissions, in a core executive function. 

cannot be directed personally to perform or not perform official duties may be a more appropriate

formulation. See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 826-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment).

In sum, the majority'simplicit conclusion that a President may be directed to do, or not to do,

anything that any executive branch official can be directed to do by way of mandamus, see Maj. Op.

at 6-10, i.e., a nondiscretionary act, which includes complying with the law is a rather far-reaching

and perhaps dubious statement of constitutional law. I am uncertain as to its soundness, but I am

quite sure there is no need to advance it in this case.

II.

I am similarly of the view that the majority's treatment of the merits is unnecessarily

laboredand plows jurisprudential fields that should remain undisturbed. We have never held, and

need not do so in this case, that an appointee to a multi-member regulatory agency with a term

appointment enjoys tenure equivalent to the term appointee who, according to the explicit terms of

the statute, may not be removed except for good cause. It is certainly a logical assumption and we

have assumed it before, see, e.g., Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d

821, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 115 S. Ct. 537 (1994), and I think we should assume it

again here. But that assumption is predicated on the nature of a term appointment. Its most obvious

purpose is to provide the incumbent with some measure of tenure or security against arbitrary

removal.2 Therein lies the difficulty in appellant's argument; after the term expires, the reason for

the assumption expires as well. Unless, then, Congress indicates in the legislation itself that it intends

some measure of job protection during the holdover period, which in this sort of situationwhere

Congress did not explicitly provide a good cause limitation on removal during the actual termis

virtually inconceivable, there is no reason at all to infer a congressional purpose to limit the

President's removal power during the holdover period. Therefore, I think the majority's extended

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exposition on the function of the Board, the "need" vel non, asthe majority seesit, for independence,

the extensive discussion of legislative history, and the emphasis on the lack of a term limit in the

NCUA holdover clause (which it seems to me would serve an entirely different purpose than the

principal term limit) to be unnecessary to decide this case.

I agree that if Congress did try to limit a President's power to remove a member of a

multi-member agency during a holdover period, it would raise serious constitutional problems. See

Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). But in this case, with the text of this holdover clause,

I do not think there is any reason to worry about that hypothetical. There is not the slightest

indication that Congress intended any limitation on the President's authority to remove a Board

member after his or her term has expired.

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