Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04198/USCOURTS-cand-4_03-cv-04198-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Linda E. Diaz
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINDA E. DIAZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-4198 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

DENYING PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR TO REMAND. 

Plaintiff Linda Diaz moves for summary judgment or for

remand. Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart in her capacity as

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration opposes

Plaintiff's motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. Having

considered all the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or to remand, and GRANTS

the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment. 

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On May 4, 2000, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance

benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, alleging

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1 Residual functional capacity is the most strenuous

activity an individual can do despite his or her limitations. 

20 C.F.R. § 416.945.

2

that she injured her back on February 10, 1998, when she

attempted to lift a thirty-pound box at work. She later argued

that she was unable to work until May 25, 2002, a closed period

of over four years. (Administrative Record (AR) 502). 

Plaintiff's application was denied initially and on

reconsideration. (AR 31-34, 36-39). On April 3, 2003, a

hearing was held before an administrative law judge at which

Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared as a

witness. (AR 500-532). On April 24, 2003, the ALJ issued his

ruling that there was no twelve-month period, beginning on or

prior to Plaintiff's date last insured (DLI), when Plaintiff did

not retain the residual functional capacity (RFC)1 to perform

light work similar to the work Plaintiff previously had done as

a claims analyst and a legal assistant. (AR 9-21). On this

basis, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled at the

fourth sequential step. (AR 20). 

Plaintiff filed a request for review with the Social

Security Appeals Council, challenging the ALJ's decision. (AR

8). On July 25, 2003, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's

decision. (AR 5-7). On June 16, 2004, Plaintiff filed the

instant action, claiming that (1) the ALJ improperly rejected

the opinion of her treating doctor; (2) the ALJ's determination

of her RFC was not supported by substantial evidence; and (3)

the ALJ improperly found her not to be credible. 

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2Although these dates appear on Plaintiff's work history

report (AR 92) and on the Summary of Past Relevant Work (AR

110), in 1981 Plaintiff would have been approximately nine years

old.

3

II. Factual History

Plaintiff was twenty-six years old at the time of the

injury and twenty-eight years old at the time she filed her

application for Social Security benefits. (AR 13). Plaintiff

received sixteen years of education including a bachelor of

science degree in holistic nutrition which she completed through

a correspondence course. (AR 503). The record indicates that

from June, 1981 to June, 1997, Plaintiff worked as a legal

assistant for her parents who are "paralegals." (AR 92, 110).2

From June, 1997 to February, 1998, Plaintiff was employed as a

claims analyst for Fort James, Inc., a manufacturer of consumer

paper products, where she made collection calls and processed

accounts receivable. (AR 523). Both Plaintiff's legal

assistant position and her claims analyst position are

classified as skilled occupations performed at the light

exertional level. (AR 159). In addition, from 1995 to 1996

Plaintiff played golf professionally. (AR 92, 512). 

Because of her injury, Plaintiff filed for workers'

compensation benefits and received temporary disability benefits

through March 7, 2000, when treating physician Clement K. Jones,

M.D., issued his final report declaring Plaintiff restricted to

"sedentary work." He said that she had a fifteen minute sitting

tolerance, thirty minute walking tolerance, could occasionally

bend or lift with a ten pound lifting capacity, and must avoid

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3 Radiculopathy is a disorder of the spinal nerve roots. 

Stedman's Medical Dictionary, 1503 (27th ed. 2000).

4

squatting, kneeling, crawling, climbing, stooping, and driving. 

(AR 283-284). 

A. Medical Evidence

After her February 10, 1998 injury, Plaintiff was admitted

to the hospital where she stayed for eight days and was treated

with traction and medication. (AR 15). At that time, Plaintiff

was treated by Dr. John A. Carr who diagnosed her with a

herniated lumbar disk at L4-5, on the left, with left L5

radiculopathy3 and who recommended continued conservative

treatment. (AR 112-113). 

On March 10, 1998, Dr. San S. Yuan examined Plaintiff

before he administered a lumbar epidural steroid injection. (AR

271). Dr. Yuan's pre-injection examination showed limited back

motion and a positive straight-leg raising test on the left at

thirty degrees. (AR 271). Dr. Yuan noted that sensory

examination of the lower extremities was "normal." (AR 271). 

After the injection, Plaintiff continued to experience left

buttock and leg pain with numbness in the left foot along the

dorsum of the foot on the medial side of the first toe, and left

knee pain which coincided with the onset of her back and leg

symptoms. (AR 122). After the epidural, there are no medical

records for a period of almost six months. On September 3,

1998, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Kenneth I. Light, a

neurosurgeon, complaining of an inability to sit, stand, bend,

walk or work. (AR 299). Dr. Light recommended back surgery

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4 A diskectomy, also spelled discectomy, is an excision, in

part or whole, of an intervertebral disk. Stedman's Medical

Dictionary, 508 (27th ed. 2000).

5 A laminotomy is an excision of a portion of a vertebral

lamina in which the intervertebral foramen is enlarged by

removal of a portion of the lamina. Stedman's Medical

Dictionary, 964 (27th ed. 2000).

5

which he described as an anterior diskectomy4 and fusion at the

L4-5 level. (AR 299).

In November, 1998, Plaintiff saw Dr. Jones for a second

opinion. Dr. Jones concurred with Dr. Light as to the need for

back surgery, but disagreed as to the type of surgery; Dr. Jones

recommended that Plaintiff undergo a left L4-5 laminotomy5 and

diskectomy, a more conservative surgery than the disk fusion

proposed by Dr. Light. (AR 296-298). On December 7, 1998,

Plaintiff underwent a diskectomy performed by Dr. Jones. (AR

121-125). Dr. Jones' February 16, 1999 post-operative report

indicates that Plaintiff did very well until two months after

the surgery when she noticed worsening numbness and pain in her

left leg and foot. (AR 294). At that time, Plaintiff

complained to Dr. Jones of decreased sensation in the left L5

dermatome, weakness in her left EHL tendon, and severe leg pain. 

(AR 294). During Dr. Jones' February 16, 1999 examination, he

found Plaintiff had a positive tripod sign with left straight

leg raise while sitting and that all passive ankle dorsiflexion

or straight leg raise tension tests produced severe leg pain

which was only relieved when the knee and hip were

simultaneously flexed. (AR 294). Dr. Jones recommended that

Plaintiff undergo a gadolinium enhancer lumbar spine MRI. (AR

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6 Sciatica is pain in the lower back and hip radiating down

the back of the thigh into the leg, initially attributed to

sciatic nerve dysfunction, but now known usually to be due to a

herniated lumbar disk compromising a nerve root, most commonly

the L5 or S1 root. Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1602 (27th ed.

2000).

6

294).

In April, 1999, Dr. Jones noted that Plaintiff continued to

have left lower back, buttock, and left leg symptoms but they

"are not as severe as those preoperatively." (AR 292). There

were no sciatic tension signs, and Plaintiff was able to perform

straight-leg raising while supine without any back or leg pain

but she still complained of leg numbness. (AR 292). 

From May 24, 1999 through July 19, 1999, Plaintiff attended

a program at Guardian Rehabilitation Hospital where she received 

comprehensive pain management including occupational therapy,

biofeedback, physical therapy and psychosocial intervention. 

(AR 143). During this period, she also received occupational

therapy at Golden State Rehabilitation Hospital. (AR 130-141).

In June, 1999, Dr. Jones noted that Plaintiff was taking no

medications for pain, and was doing well in the pain management

program. (AR 290). Dr. Jones noted that Plaintiff was able to

stand and walk on her heels and toes. (AR 290). In October,

1999, Dr. Jones reported that Plaintiff had only mild weakness

in her left foot and ankle. (AR 287). In December, 1999, one

year after surgery, Dr. Jones reported that Plaintiff was able

to walk on her heels and toes, but seemed to "lack endurance." 

(AR 285). At that time, Plaintiff reported chronic intermittent

left leg sciatica,6 and stated that she had only a ten minute

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sitting tolerance. (AR 285). In his March 7, 2000 report for

Plaintiff's workers' compensation claim, as noted previously,

Dr. Jones reported pervasive evidence of muscle weakness and

that Plaintiff was limited to "sedentary" work. (AR 283-84). 

In his last report of record, dated September 25, 2001, Dr.

Jones noted that Plaintiff's straight-leg raising test was

negative and Plaintiff was able to walk normally on her heels

and toes despite evidence of motor weakness and decreased

sensation in the left L5 and S1 dermatome. (AR 460).

In June, 2000, State Disability Determination Services

(DDS) Medical Consultant John Vaillancourt, and State agency

physician Samuel McFadden, M.D., reviewed the evidence in the

record and determined Plaintiff's RFC to be that she could lift

ten pounds frequently, twenty pounds occasionally, and stand,

walk and sit for six hours, with some postural restrictions. 

(AR 367-374). 

B. Hearing and Determination

At her April 3, 2003 hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff told

him that she was currently working part-time at Starbucks and

was claiming a closed period of disability from February 19,

1998, the date of her injury, to May 25, 2002. (AR 501). The

ALJ determined that Plaintiff met the disability insured status

requirements of the Act on the alleged onset of disability date

of February 10, 1998. (AR 13). However, he noted that

Plaintiff's disability insured status expired on September 30,

1999 which meant that Plaintiff would qualify for benefits only

if her disability had begun on or prior to September 30, 1999,

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7 In order to determine whether a plaintiff is disabled, the

SSA regulations provide a five-step sequential process. The

five steps of the inquiry are (1) Is the plaintiff presently

working in a substantially gainful activity? If so, then the

plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Social

Security Act. If not, proceed to step two. (2) Is the

plaintiff’s impairment severe? If so, proceed to step three. 

If not, then the plaintiff is not disabled. (3) Does the

impairment “meet or equal” one of a list of specific impairments

described in 20 C.F.R. Part 220, Appendix 1? If so, then the

plaintiff is disabled. If not, proceed to step four. (4) Is

the plaintiff able to do any work that he or she has done in the

past? If so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. If not,

proceed to step five. (5) Is the plaintiff able to do any other

work? If so, then the plaintiff is not disabled. If not, then

the plaintiff is disabled. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d

949, 953 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,

416.920).

The plaintiff maintains the burden of proof for steps one

through four. However, should an inquiry proceed to step five,

the burden then shifts to the Commissioner.

8

the date last insured (DLI) and continued for twelve consecutive

months thereafter. (Id.)

In his written decision, the ALJ employed the five-step

sequential process to evaluate Plaintiff's Social Security

Administration (SSA) claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. 

§§ 404.1520(b)-(f).7 At the first step the ALJ found that

Plaintiff had not performed any "substantially gainful activity"

(SGA) during the closed period at issue. 

At step two, the ALJ found that there was sufficient

evidence to establish that Plaintiff suffered from a "severe"

medically determinable impairment which could reasonably be

expected to produce some degree of low back and left leg pain. 

(AR 14) 

At step three, the ALJ looked at the severity of the

Plaintiff's musculoskeletal impairment from February 19, 1998 to

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May 25, 2002 and found that the medical evidence failed to show

that all of the relevant listing criteria were present for

twelve continuous months beginning on or prior to the DLI of

September 30, 1999. (AR 18). 

The ALJ then proceeded to consider step four of the SSA

sequential evaluation which involved an assessment of the

claimant's RFC during the period at issue. It was at this

fourth step of sequential evaluation that the ALJ reached his

determinative finding that Plaintiff was "not under a

'disability' as defined in the Act, at any time on or prior to

the expiration of her insured status on September 30, 1999" (AR

21), and therefore "not entitled to a period of disability or

disability insurance benefits under . . . the Social Security

Act." AR 21. 

The ALJ considered Dr. Jones' March 7, 2000 report in which

he indicated that Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work and

restricted to fifteen minutes of sitting, thirty minutes of

walking, ten pounds of lifting, and no squatting, kneeling,

crawling, climbing, stooping, or driving. (AR 283-284). The

ALJ rejected Dr. Jones' opinion based on the fact that the

opinion was given in the workers' compensation context which,

according to the ALJ, is inapplicable to a Social Security

determination and because Dr. Jones relied significantly on

Plaintiff's own statements rather than on any objective

diagnostic findings. 

The ALJ also considered that during the closed period at

issue Plaintiff (1) continued to play golf on a regular basis

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8 "Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to

10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a

job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking

or standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with

some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be

considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light

work, you must have the ability to do substantially all of these

activities. If someone can do light work, we determine that he

or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional

limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to

sit for long periods of time." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567 (1987). 

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(noting that Plaintiff testified she got "tired after nine

holes"); (2) vacationed in Hawaii three times; (3) visited

her parents in Los Angeles multiple times; (4) drove a car on a

frequent basis; and (5) went out to dinner in various

restaurants. (AR 18). The ALJ noted that, on a number of

occasions, Plaintiff cancelled her therapy sessions to go to

weddings, baseball games, and a San Francisco art fair (AR 18-

19) and at the time Plaintiff filed her request for a hearing in

January, 2001, she reported that she had begun attending classes

at Diablo Valley College. (AR 18). 

The ALJ relied primarily upon the assessment of Plaintiff's

RFC provided by DDS Specialist John Vaillancourt, and State

agency physician Samuel McFadden, M.D., dated June, 2000, which

stated that Plaintiff could lift ten pounds frequently, twenty

pounds occasionally, and stand, walk and sit for six hours, with

some postural restrictions. (AR 367-374). The ALJ determined

that this RFC allowed Plaintiff to perform light work8 as she had

done in the past as a claims analyst and a legal assistant. The

ALJ also considered the fact that Plaintiff took no medications

for pain and that her testimony at the hearing was "vague and

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unresponsive; she always seemed to be shading the truth." (AR

20). The ALJ reasoned that, to the extent Plaintiff alleged

that her symptoms precluded her from doing the range of light

work that she had previously performed, given her "myriad [of]

social activities during the period at issue, a limitation to

sedentary work [as suggested by treating doctor Jones] seems

much too restrictive." (AR 18). The ALJ, therefore, found

Plaintiff not disabled at step four of the sequential process. 

(AR 20).

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the

Commissioner's findings are based upon legal error or are not

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th

Cir. 1989); Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir.

1986); Taylor v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1985). 

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Orteza v.

Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir. 1995). It is more than a

scintilla but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not

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just the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a

specific quantum of supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879

F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). In short, a court must weigh the

evidence that supports the Commissioner's conclusions and that

which does not. Martinez, 807 F.2d at 772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld

even when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v.

Secretary, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th

Cir. 1984). If supported by substantial evidence, the findings

of the Commissioner as to any fact will be conclusive. 42

U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris, 637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir.

1981). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act

Under the Social Security Act, “disability” is defined as

the: 

inability to engage in any substantial gainful

activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be

expected to result in death or which has lasted or

can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than twelve months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so severe

that the claimant “is not only unable to do his previous work

but cannot . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful

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work.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the impairment

must result “from anatomical, physiological, or psychological

abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory techniques.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 

A request for benefits for a closed period requires the

decision maker to determine that a new applicant for disability

benefits was disabled, that is the applicant was unable to

engage in any substantial gainful employment for a continuous

period of not less than twelve months, for a finite period of

time which started and stopped prior to the date of decision,

or, as the case may be, started on or before the DLI and stopped

prior to the date of decision. Mendoza v. Apfel, 88 F. Supp. 2d

1108, 1112 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196,

1199 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). Thus, in a closed period case, the

disability decision and the cessation decision are made in the

same document. Id. As noted above, a determination of

disability requires the claimant to be unable to engage in any

substantial gainful employment, including even light and

sedentary work, for a continuous period of not less than twelve

months. Once the claimant is found to be disabled, a

presumption of continuing disability arises, and the

Commissioner bears the burden of producing evidence sufficient

to rebut this presumption under the medical improvement standard

as defined in the Social Security Regulations. Mendoza, 88 F.

Supp. 2d at 1113.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff contends that (1) her testimony should not be

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discredited in light of her social activities because her

activities were sporadic and not indicative of an ability to do

sustained work; (2) the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of

Dr. Jones, her treating doctor; and (3) the ALJ improperly found

that she could perform light work during the entire four-year

closed period at issue.

For the reasons stated below, the Court affirms the

Commissioner's decision.

I. Credibility

A. Legal Standard

In Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir. 1986), the Ninth

Circuit developed a threshold test to determine the credibility

of a claimant's subjective symptom testimony. Under Cotton, a

claimant "must produce objective medical evidence of an

underlying impairment 'which could reasonably be expected to

produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.'" Bunnell v.

Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (quoting

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407-08); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d

1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996). Cotton requires "only that the

causal relationship be a reasonable inference, not a medically

proven phenomenon." Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1282. Therefore, a

claimant is not required to produce objective medical evidence

of the pain itself or its severity. Id. (citing Bunnell, 947

F.2d at 347-48). "It is improper as a matter of law for an ALJ

to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it

is not fully corroborated by objective medical findings." 

Cotton, 799 F.2d at 1407; Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 601 (9th

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Cir. 1989). 

Once a claimant meets the Cotton test, "the

Commissioner may not discredit the claimant's testimony as to

subjective symptoms merely because they are unsupportable by

objective evidence. Unless there is affirmative evidence

showing that the claimant is malingering, the Commissioner's

reason for rejecting the claimant's testimony must be 'clear and

convincing.'" Lester, 81 F.3d at 834 (quoting Swenson v.

Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)); Smolen, 80 F.3d at

1281. In determining whether a plaintiff's testimony concerning

the severity of his symptoms is credible, the ALJ may properly

consider: (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation,

such as the plaintiff's reputation for lying, prior inconsistent

statements concerning the symptoms, and other testimony by the

plaintiff that appears less than candid; (2) unexplained

or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow

a prescribed course of treatment; and (3) the plaintiff's daily

activities. Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1273.

When outlining the findings supporting a conclusion that a

plaintiff's testimony is not credible, the ALJ must consider

"all of the available evidence" in analyzing the severity of the

claimed pain. SSR 88-13. Factors to be analyzed include: (1)

the nature, location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and

intensity of any pain; (2) precipitating and aggravating

factors; (3) type, dosage, effectiveness and adverse side

effects of any pain medications; (4) treatment, other than

medication, for relief of pain; (5) functional restrictions; and

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(6) the plaintiff's daily activities. Id.; see Fair, 885 F.2d

at 603 (types of activities ALJ may rely on to find pain

allegations credible include the daily activities performed by

plaintiff and whether plaintiff sought or followed treatment);

Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding

rejection of plaintiff's pain testimony justified where

plaintiff had little evidence of spinal abnormalities, had not

used strong pain medication, had not participated in pain

management or physical therapy, and limited daily activities by

choice not necessity). However, medical evidence is still

relevant in determining the severity of a plaintiff's alleged

pain and its disabling effects. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2);

Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). 

B. Analysis 

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had, among

others, the following disabling symptoms: chronic low back pain

radiating into the left buttock and left leg; constant numbness

in the left leg with a pins-and-needles sensation; left leg

weakness and instability; and disturbed sleep due to pain. She

also described her tolerance for physical activity as follows:

sitting fifteen minutes, standing in one place for ten to

fifteen minutes, and walking for thirty minutes without a break. 

Although the ALJ did not discuss whether Plaintiff met the

Cotton threshold test, assuming that Plaintiff was able to meet

that test, the ALJ has produced clear and convincing reasons for

rejecting Plaintiff's testimony. Although the ALJ did not

explicitly discuss the credibility factors under Smolen, the

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ALJ's discussion of Plaintiff's testimony suggests that he

rejected her subjective symptom testimony for two reasons: (1)

medical records did not corroborate her testimony; and (2) her

numerous social activities during the time she claimed to be

disabled belied her complaints of pain. 

Regarding the medical records, the ALJ noted that they did

not corroborate Plaintiff's testimony of chronic pain. For

instance, on March 10, 1998, Dr. Yuan opined that sensory

examination of Plaintiff's lower extremities was normal. Also,

Dr. Jones' physical examination in November, 1998 revealed that

Plaintiff's deep tendon reflexes at the knees and ankles were

normal bilaterally. The ALJ pointed out that Plaintiff's postoperative reports from Dr. Jones showed that Plaintiff did very

well after her December 7, 1998 surgery. In June, 1999, Dr.

Jones observed that Plaintiff was able to stand and walk on her

heels and toes and, although there was some residual mild

weakness in her left leg, "she had 60% normal sensation in the

left L5 dermatome compared to the right." (AR 16). In a report

dated October, 1999, Dr. Jones concluded that Plaintiff had only

mild weakness in her left foot and ankle and normal sensation in

all dermatomes bilaterally. Furthermore, an EMG study performed

in July, 2000 was within normal limits, and Dr. Jones' last

report dated September 25, 2001 noted that Plaintiff was able to

walk on her heels and toes normally. For these reasons, the ALJ

concluded that the medical records did not corroborate

Plaintiff's testimony.

Moreover, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff's "allegations of

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chronic pain and dysfunction are undermined by her admissions

concerning her social activities." (AR 19). At the hearing,

Plaintiff admitted that during the closed period she frequently

engaged in such activities as playing golf, vacationing in

Hawaii, and driving a car. At one point, the ALJ noted,

Plaintiff cancelled a therapy session to attend an art exhibit

in San Francisco. The ALJ also observed that the file

demonstrated that Plaintiff was active despite her alleged pain. 

For instance, Plaintiff began to take a class at Diablo Valley

College. The ALJ pointed out, as did the DDS consulting

doctors, that Plaintiff's admitted ability to attend college

classes and engage in other activities such as traveling to

Hawaii, was inconsistent with her allegation that pain prevents

her from sitting longer than ten minutes. (AR 18). Examining

Plaintiff's social activities, the ALJ concluded: 

While it is true that claimant typically reported increased

pain after doing these activities, she continued doing the

activities anyway, which leads me to conclude that her

allegations of pain were exaggerated and were perhaps voiced

for the benefit of her workers' compensation claim. In

finding her symptom allegations not credible for the period

at issue, I also rely upon the fact that she took no

medications for pain.

(AR 19). In addition, the ALJ noted that, during the hearing,

Plaintiff's testimony was vague and unresponsive and she always

seemed to be shading the truth. 

The Court finds that ALJ has provided clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff's testimony and that the ALJ's

conclusion that Plaintiff's testimony is not credible is

supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

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II. Treating Physician 

A. Legal Standard

The medical opinion of a treating physician is entitled to

special weight. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 604 (9th Cir.

1989). As a general rule, "more weight should be given to the

opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who

do not treat the claimant." Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830

(9th Cir. 1996). As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "treating

physicians are employed to cure and thus have a greater

opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual." 

Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Where the treating physician's opinion is not contradicted

by an examining physician, that opinion may be rejected only for

"clear and convincing reasons." Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d

1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830. 

The opinion of a non-examining physician alone will not

constitute substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of

the opinion of a treating physician. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908

F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d

1450, 1456 (9th Cir. 1984). However, the opinion of a nonexamining physician in conjunction with medical evidence and

contradictory reports from examining physicians may constitute

substantial evidence for rejecting a treating physician’s

opinion. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751-52; Andrews v. Shalala, 53

F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 1995).

B. Analysis

Because Dr. Jones' opinion was not contradicted by the

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opinion of an examining physician, the ALJ had to provide clear

and convincing reasons for rejecting it. The ALJ's decision to

discredit Dr. Jones' report is supported by clear and convincing

reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. The ALJ

noted that (1) Dr. Jones' reports seem internally inconsistent;

(2) they were contradicted by the opinions of DDS Specialist

Vaillancourt and Dr. McFadden, who found Plaintiff could perform

light work; 

(3) Dr. Jones' designation of "sedentary" to describe

Plaintiff's condition is a specialized workers' compensation

rating which is inapplicable to a Social Security disability

determination; and 

(4) Dr. Jones' statement regarding Plaintiff's abilities relied

significantly on Plaintiff's own statements, rather than

objective medical measures. 

The ALJ pointed out the following internal inconsistencies

in Dr. Jones' reports. Although Dr. Jones maintained that

Plaintiff's condition was permanent and stationary, he also

observed, in April, 1999, that "there were no sciatic tension

signs, and the claimant was able to perform straight-leg raising

while supine without any back or leg pain." In June, 1999, Dr.

Jones also noted that Plaintiff was taking no medications for

pain, was doing well in the pain management program, and was

able to walk on her heels and toes. Furthermore, in Dr. Jones'

March 7, 2000 report to the workers' compensation unit, he

opined that Plaintiff could perform only sedentary work but at

the same time he indicated that she only had a fifteen minute

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sitting tolerance. In another report dated September 25, 2001,

Dr. Jones concluded that Plaintiff was able to walk on her heels

and toes normally. 

In contrast to Dr. Jones' conclusion that Plaintiff's

condition was permanent and stationary, Drs. Vaillancourt and

McFadden reviewed the record and concluded that Plaintiff could

lift ten pounds frequently, and walk and sit for six hours. The

ALJ concluded that, in light of Plaintiff's social activities

such as playing golf, taking long-plane rides for vacation, and

driving, the consulting DDS Specialists' opinions more

accurately reflected Plaintiff's physical limitations. 

The ALJ was correct that he was not required to accept the

conclusion in Dr. Jones' March, 2000 report that Plaintiff was

restricted to "sedentary" work because that conclusion was made

in a workers' compensation context. See DesRosiers v. Sec'y of

Health & Human Serv., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)

(explaining that categories of work under Social Security

disability scheme are measured differently than those under

California workers' compensation system). 

Finally, the ALJ noted that Dr. Jones' conclusions regarding

Plaintiff's abilities relied significantly on Plaintiff's own

statements, rather than any objective measure. See Saelee v.

Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 523 (9th Cir. 1996) (a treating or

examining physician's opinion may properly be disregarded when

it is based to a large extent on a claimant's discredited

subjective complaints).

For the above reasons, this Court concludes that the ALJ

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provided clear and convincing reasons supported by substantial

evidence in the record for rejecting Dr. Jones' opinion. 

III. Closed Period

Plaintiff argues that her condition changed during the

closed period and that the ALJ improperly determined her

condition for the entire period based on the DDS medical

consultants' report dated June 26, 2000, that reflected her

condition "well after the injury-to-surgery period."

As noted above, although Plaintiff seeks SSA disability

benefits for a closed period from February 10, 1998 to May 25,

2002, Plaintiff's DLI was September 30, 1999. Therefore, in

order to qualify for benefits, the ALJ would have to find that

Plaintiff was not able to engage in substantial gainful

employment for a continuous twelve-month period beginning on or

before September 30, 1999. At step four of the five-step

process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she was not

capable of engaging in her past relevant work for such a

continuous twelve-month period. 

The ALJ's conclusion that Plaintiff was not disabled during

the closed period is supported by substantial evidence and the

record shows that Plaintiff has not met her burden of proof. 

One month after her injury, in March, 1998, Dr. Yuan treated

Plaintiff with a lumbar epidural steroid injection. Dr. Yuan's

March 10, 1998 pre-injection examination indicated that

Plaintiff had limited back motion but that "sensory examination

of the lower extremities was normal." Although the injection

did not provide Plaintiff any lasting relief from pain, after

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the injection there are no medical records for a period of

almost six months, nor any medical evidence that she was

disabled during this period. On September 3, 1998, Plaintiff's

medical records continue with an examination by Dr. Light who

recommended back surgery. On December 7, 1998, Dr. Jones

performed the back surgery. Dr. Jones' February 17, 1999 postoperative report indicates that Plaintiff was doing fairly well

for two months after the surgery. 

However, on or about February 10, 1999, Plaintiff began

experiencing numbness and pain in her left leg. Dr. Jones'

April 13, 1999 examination revealed that Plaintiff did not have

any sciatic tension signs and was "able to perform straight-leg

raising while supine without any back or leg pain." Dr. Jones

reported in June, 1999, that Plaintiff was taking no medications

for pain and in October, 1999, that Plaintiff had only mild

weakness in her left foot and ankle and she had normal sensation

in all dermatomes bilaterally. Additionally, Plaintiff's social

activities since May, 1999 belied her testimony of subjective

pain and physical limitations. As noted, her DLI occurred on

September 30, 1999.

Because after Plaintiff's injury there is a six month period

in which she apparently did not seek medical treatment and

because, in the two months following her December, 1998 surgery,

Plaintiff was doing fairly well, she has not established that

she was disabled for the continuous twelve month period

following her injury. Moreover, although she experienced

numbness and pain beginning about two months after her December

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7, 1998 surgery, these symptoms diminished by June, 1999 when

Dr. Jones reported that although Plaintiff had some residual

mild weakness in her left leg tendons, she was taking no pain

medication, was able to stand and walk on her heels and toes and

the sciatic tension tests were negative bilaterally. 

Plaintiff's improvement continued as indicated in Dr. Jones'

October, 1999 examination. Plaintiff's recovery is supported by

the list in the ALJ's report of Plaintiff social activities

which began in approximately May, 1999. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the record supports the

ALJ's finding that Plaintiff was not disabled for any continuous

twelve-month period beginning on or prior to September 30, 1999. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's motions for summary

judgment and to remand (Docket No. 5) are DENIED and the

Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 8) is

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/18/05 /s/ CLAUDIA WILKEN 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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