Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02306/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-02306-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elbert Jeffery
Plaintiff
Yellow Freight
Defendant
Yellow Transportation, Inc.
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ELBERT JEFFERY, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. DBA

YELLOW FREIGHT and DOES 1 

through 20, inclusive, 

 Defendants. /

No. Civ. S-05-2306 RRB EFB 

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

Elbert Jeffery (“Jeffery”) brought an action against his 

former employer Yellow Transportation, Inc. (“Yellow”) alleging 

racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Yellow now moves for summary judgment on 

the grounds that Jeffery’s claims are time-barred by the 

relevant statute of limitations and/or laches. Alternatively, 

Yellow moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Jeffery 

cannot establish a prima facie case for racial discrimination, 

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harassment, or retaliation under § 1981. For the reasons stated 

below, Yellow’s motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.1

I. BACKGROUND 

In 1985, Jeffery, an African-American, was hired as a 

dockworker for Yellow.2

 Pl.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (“UMF”) # 2. In 1992, he was transferred to 

Yellow’s loading dock in Tracy where he worked until he was 

terminated in January 2002. Pl.’s UMF #3; Def.’s UMF # 28. 

During his employment with Yellow, Jeffery was a member of the 

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 439 

(“Union”). Pl.’s UMF # 1. The terms and conditions of 

Jeffery’s employment were governed by the Collective Bargaining 

Agreement (“CBA”) entered into between the Union and Yellow. 

Def.’s UMF # 7. The CBA contains a non-discrimination policy 

prohibiting unlawful discrimination as well as the procedures to 

be followed in the event that an employee is terminated, 

 

1

 Inasmuch as the Court concludes the parties have submitted 

memoranda thoroughly discussing the law and evidence in support 

of their positions, it further concludes oral argument is 

neither necessary nor warranted with regard to the instant 

matter. See Mahon v. Credit Bureau of Placer County, Inc., 171 

F.3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1999)(explaining that if the parties 

provided the district court with complete memoranda of the law 

and evidence in support of their positions, ordinarily oral 

argument would not be required). As a result, the oral argument 

presently scheduled for July 25, 2007, at 10:00 a.m., see Minute 

Order dated May 14, 2007, is hereby VACATED. 

2

 Yellow is a provider of motor carrier services throughout North 

America and abroad. (Def.’s Separate Statement of Undisputed 

Material Facts (”UMF”) # 1.)

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including the right of an employee to challenge his termination 

before a grievance panel.3 Id. ## 10, 12-13. 

 On or about March 22, 2000, Jeffery was terminated from 

Yellow for his role in a physical altercation with a co-worker. 

Def.’s UMF ## 14-18. Pursuant to the CBA, an automatic 

grievance was filed and Jeffery was subsequently reinstated. 

Id. # 21. On or about January 15, 2002, Jeffery was terminated 

for a second time for his involvement in a physical altercation 

with a co-worker. Def.’s UMF ## 22-28. Again, an automatic 

grievance was filed pursuant to the CBA. Id. # 35. On or about 

March 18, 2002, Jeffery submitted a letter of resignation before 

the grievance panel made a final determination regarding his 

employment status. Id. # 37. 

 In the instant action, Jeffery alleges that he resigned 

from Yellow in March 2002, rather than challenge his 

termination, because he could no longer handle the severe and 

continuous racial and retaliatory harassment he suffered at the 

hands of a group of predominantly white co-workers, led by Chuck 

Tyron and Daniel Drake. Pl.’s UMF ## 6, 109 & 111; Def.’s UMF 

## 13, 28-29 & 37. Jeffery alleges that such harassment 

occurred on a daily basis throughout his 10 years of employment 

at the Tracy facility. Pl.’s UMF # 6. Jeffery further alleges 

 

3

 The grievance panel is ultimately responsible for determining 

whether to uphold an employee’s termination. Id. # 13.

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that the harassment occurred in the presence of supervisors and 

managers who acknowledged it but failed to take any action to 

prevent it. Id. In fact, Jeffery contends that his complaints 

of harassment to management resulted in more severe and 

retaliatory harassment. Id. 

On November 15, 2005, Jeffery filed the instant action 

alleging that Yellow violated his civil rights under § 1981. 

Compl. at 1. In this action, Jeffery seeks damages against 

Yellow for its failure to provide a workplace free from unlawful 

harassment, discrimination and retaliation, and for its failure 

to take reasonable action to prevent and correct such 

harassment. Id. 1-6. 

Conversely, Yellow contends that it is not liable for the 

discrimination, harassment and retaliation alleged by Jeffery 

because it was unaware of such conduct. Def.’s UMF ## 74-77. 

More particularly, Yellow alleges that it was unaware of the 

alleged harassment because Jeffery never: (1) filed a grievance 

with the Union alleging harassment in violation of the CBA; (2) 

reported any incident of harassment to Yellow’s human resource 

department; (3) reported any incident of harassment or 

retaliation to management; or (4) filed a formal complaint with 

any state or federal agency, including the Equal Opportunity 

Commission or the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing. Def.’s UMF ## 11, 61-62 & 74-76. 

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II. DISCUSSION 

Jeffery alleges that his former employer Yellow engaged in 

racial discrimination, harassment and retaliation in violation 

of § 1981. These claims are addressed individually below. 

 A. Legal Standard 

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary 

judgment when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. § 56(c). 

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 

the absence of a “genuine issue of material fact for trial.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). A 

fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit 

under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248. A material 

fact is “genuine,” if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The 

burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond 

the pleadings, and by his or her own affidavits, or by the 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

 “[W]hen the non-moving party bears the burden of proving 

the claim or defense, the moving party can meet its burden by 

pointing out the absence of evidence from the non-moving party. 

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The moving party need not disprove the other party’s case.” 

Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th 

Cir. 2006) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). Hence, summary 

judgment is properly granted in favor of a defendant where the 

plaintiff has failed to sufficiently establish the existence of 

an element essential to his or her case, and on which he or she 

will bear the burden of proof at trial. Miller, 454 F.3d at 987 

(citing Cleveland v. Policy Management Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 

805-806 (1999)). 

When the moving party meets its burden, the “adverse party 

may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse 

party’s pleading, but the adverse party’s response, by 

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth 

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 

If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 

appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse party.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). 

“[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the 

nonmoving party’s evidence is to be believed, and all 

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party’s] favor.” 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (internal quotation marks omitted) 

(citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999)). “But the 

non-moving party must come forward with more than ‘the mere 

existence of a scintilla of evidence.’” Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 

(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). Thus, “‘[w]here the record 

taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find 

for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’” 

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Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 

Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 

Where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn 

from the undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. 

Miller, 454 F.3d at 988. 

B. Statute of Limitations 

 Yellow argues that Jeffery’s § 1981 claims are time-barred 

because he failed to demonstrate that an act of racial 

harassment, discrimination, or retaliation occurred within the 

statutory period. 

 The statute of limitations for a cause of action brought 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as amended by the Civil Rights Act 

of 1991, is governed by the four-year statute of limitations set 

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), not the personal injury statute of 

limitations of the forum state. See Thinket Ink Information 

Resources, Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc., 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 

(9th Cir. 2004) (citing Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 

U.S. 369). 

In 1991, Congress amended § 1981 “by adding a new 

subsection to § 1981 defining the term “‘make and enforce 

contracts’” to include the “termination of contracts, and the 

enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of 

the contractual relationship.” Jones, 541 U.S. at 373.4

 The 

 

4 Section 1981(a) generally provides: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United 

States shall have the same right in every State and 

Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be 

parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal 

benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security 

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United States Supreme Court concluded that a cause of action 

arising under the amendments to § 1981 is governed by 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1658’s “catch-all” four-year statute of limitations because 

such a “construction best serves Congress’ interest in 

alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of 

borrowing state statutes of limitations while at the same time 

protecting settled interests.” Jones, 541 U.S. at 382. The 

Court reasoned that such a rule is proper because it “spares 

federal judges and litigants the need to identify the 

appropriate state statute of limitations to apply to new claims 

but leaves in place the ‘borrowed’ limitations periods for preexisting causes of action, with respect to which the difficult 

work already has been done.” Id.

 In the instant action, Jeffery alleges that Yellow deprived 

him of the right to be free from discrimination, harassment and 

retaliation on the basis of race, in violation of his right to 

make and enforce contracts, including the “making, performance, 

modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of 

all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the 

contractual relationship.” Compl. at 5. In short, Jeffery 

alleges that the racial harassment and retaliation he endured at 

the Tracy facility amounted to a hostile work environment 

substantially altering the terms and conditions of his 

employment and impairing his ability to work. Id. The Court 

concludes that such allegations are sufficient to bring 

 

of persons and property as is enjoyed by white 

citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 

pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 

every kind, and to no other. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).

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Jeffery’s claim within the amended language of § 1981. See

Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 302 (1994) 

(observing that the 1991 amendments to § 1981 made it clear that 

racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts 

applied “to all phases and incidents of the contractual 

relationship, including discriminatory contract terminations.”); 

Manatt v. Bank of America, NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(holding that “the congressional amendment to § 1981 evinced 

congressional intent to permit hostile work environment claims 

under § 1981. A hostile work environment interferes with the 

‘enjoyment of all benefits . . . and conditions of the 

contractual relationship’ of employment and is therefore 

actionable under § 1981.”) 

Accordingly, because Jeffery’s claims were brought pursuant 

to the 1991 amendment to § 1981, they fall within the four-year 

statutory period proscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658. See Jones, 541 

U.S. at 383 (finding that petitioners’ hostile work environment, 

wrongful termination, and failure to transfer claims arose under 

the 1991 Act because they were made possible by that Act). 

Next, the Court turns to whether Jeffery’s § 1981 claims 

arose during the four-year period. In this regard, Yellow 

argues that Jeffery’s claims are time-barred because he failed 

to proffer evidence demonstrating that an act of racial 

discrimination, harassment or retaliation occurred within the 

four years prior to the filing of the complaint on November 15, 

2005. The Court disagrees. 

Hostile environment claims are different from discrete acts 

of discrimination or retaliation because they involve repeated 

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conduct. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 

115 (2002).5

 “The ‘unlawful employment practice’ therefore 

cannot be said to occur on any particular day. It occurs over a 

series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to 

discrete acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable 

on its own.” Id.

“In determining whether an actionable hostile work 

environment claim exists, we look to ‘all the circumstances,’ 

including ‘the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its 

severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, 

or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 

interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Morgan, 536 

U.S. at 116. “A hostile work environment claim is composed of a 

series of separate acts that collectively constitute one 

‘unlawful employment practice.’” Id. at 117. Thus, so long as 

an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing 

period, a court may consider the entire time period of the 

hostile environment claim for purposes of determining liability, 

even if some of the acts of the claim fall outside the statutory 

time period. Id. In this context, “[a] court’s task is to 

determine whether the acts about which an employee complains are 

part of the same actionable hostile work environment practice, 

and if so, whether any act falls within the statutory time 

period.” Id. at 120.

 

5

 While Morgan involved a Title VII hostile work environment 

claim, the court recognizes that those legal principles guiding 

a court in a Title VII dispute apply with equal force in a § 1981 

action. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 797. 

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In the case at bar, Jeffery alleges that he was subjected 

to a continuous and pervasive pattern of racial harassment, 

discrimination and retaliation from 1992 until his termination 

in 2002. Compl. at 4-5; Pl.’s Supp. Resp. to Def.’s First Set 

of Interrogatories, Response # 2. Importantly, while Jeffery 

has provided an extensive accounting of the harassment and 

retaliation he allegedly experienced over the course of his 

employment with Yellow, he only identified one specific act of 

harassment occurring within the four-year statutory period, 

i.e., one act of harassment occurring after November 15, 2001. 

This act allegedly took place “sometime after Thanksgiving, 

2001” and involved a derogatory remark written next to Jeffery’s 

name on a bulletin board in the break room containing the word 

“nigger.” Id.6 

Under Morgan, this evidence is sufficient to trigger the 

continuing violation doctrine and permit the consideration of 

earlier, otherwise time-barred acts. See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 

122 (a charge alleging a hostile work environment claim is not 

time-barred so long as all acts which constitute the claim are 

part of the same unlawful employment practice and at least one 

act falls within the time period).7

 Accordingly, in viewing the 

 

6

 See McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1116 (9th 

Cir. 2004)(“It is beyond question that the use of the word 

‘nigger’ is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a history of 

racial violence, brutality, and subordination. This word is 

‘perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in 

English,. . . a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry.’”) 

7

 Yellow argues that the averments contained in Jeffery’s 

supplemental responses to its First Set of Interrogatories 

should be disregarded as sham facts designed to evade the 

statute of limitations because neither his declaration in an 

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evidence in the light most favorable to Jeffery, his § 1981 

claims are not time-barred because a discriminatory act occurred 

within the statutory period and that act was part of the same 

unlawful employment practice giving rise to a single hostile 

work environment claim relating back to 1992. 

C. Laches 

 Yellow argues that the equitable doctrine of laches 

operates to bar Jeffery’s § 1981 claims because he unreasonably 

delayed in bringing such claims when he had ample basis to bring 

them as earlier as 1992. Mot. at 8. 

 Laches operates to bar a plaintiff from maintaining a 

action if he or she has unreasonably delayed in filing such 

action and defendant has suffered harm as a result. Morgan, 536 

U.S. at 121. The defense of laches requires a defendant to 

prove (1) lack of diligence by the plaintiff, and (2) prejudice 

to defendant. Id. at 121-122. If the elements of latches are 

established, the trial court has “the discretionary power to 

locate a just result in the circumstances peculiar to the case.” 

 

earlier related case, nor his deposition testimony, specifically 

mentions any incidents of harassment during his last two months 

on the job. See Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 

419, n.2 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A party cannot create a genuine issue 

of material fact to survive summary judgment by contradicting 

his earlier version of the fact.”) (citation omitted). This 

argument is unpersuasive. Jeffery’s later averments simply 

elaborate on, rather than contradict, his earlier statements. 

See Scamihorn v. General Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1085, n.7 

(9th Cir. 2002) (In response to a motion for summary judgment 

“‘the non-moving party is not precluded from elaborating upon, 

explaining or clarifying prior testimony elicited by opposing 

counsel on deposition; minor inconsistencies that result from an 

honest discrepancy, a mistake, or newly discovered evidence 

afford no basis for excluding an opposition affidavit.’”). 

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Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted).8 In other words, 

the establishment of a laches defense does not necessarily mean 

that a plaintiff’s entire action fails. See Pruitt v City of 

Chicago, 472 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2006) (observing that “[a] 

less severe consequence would be to carve off the aspects of 

plaintiffs’ claim that are no longer subject to meaningful 

adversarial testing.”) 

In the case at bar, Jeffery alleges that he suffered severe 

and pervasive harassment from 1992 until his termination in 

2002. Pl.’s UMF #6. This means that, assuming Jeffery is 

telling the truth, a basis existed for a claim approximately 13 

years before the filing of this action. Jeffery has proffered 

no legitimate excuse for this delay. As such, the Court finds 

Jeffery’s delay unreasonable and inexcusable. See Miller v. 

Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 997 (9th Cir. 

2006) (“In considering whether a plaintiff's delay was 

unreasonable, courts consider: (1) the length of the delay, 

measured from the time the plaintiff knew or should have known 

about his potential cause of action, and (2) whether the 

plaintiff’s delay was reasonable, including whether the 

plaintiff has proffered a legitimate excuse for his delay.”) 

Accordingly, this factor militates in favor of establishing the 

defense of laches. 

 With respect to prejudice, Yellow argues that it has been 

prejudiced by Jeffery’s delay in the form of fading witness 

 

8

 In Morgan, the Supreme Court expressly stated that it would not 

address questions such as “how-and how much-prejudice must be 

shown” or “what consequences follow if laches is established.”

Id. at 121. 

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memory, the death of one harasser and one witness, and the 

departure of one harasser and one witness from Yellow’s employ. 

Mot. at 8-9. While the Court recognizes that Yellow will indeed 

suffer some prejudice from Jeffery’s delay, it does not, 

however, find as a matter of law that such delay warrants 

dismissal of the entire action. 

Based on the widespread allegations of harassment, the 

Court finds that the unavailability of two deceased witnesses 

(one of whom died in 1992) is relatively insignificant, 

especially since the deceased harasser was allegedly responsible 

for a single act of harassment and the deceased witness only 

observed that act of harassment. Likewise, the Court finds that 

the departure of two witnesses from Yellow’s employ is also 

relatively insignificant given that there is no evidence to 

suggest that either witness is unavailable to testify at trial. 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that equity is not 

served by dismissing the entire action under the doctrine of 

laches.9

 Dismissal is not appropriate because Yellow has failed 

to demonstrate that there is no genuine dispute as to whether it 

has suffered material prejudice from Jeffery’s delay. 

 

9

 See Pruitt, 472 F.3d at 929 (observing that the result of 

dismissing an entire suit “because it is no longer feasible to 

litigate about the most ancient of the asserted wrongs could be 

functionally equivalent to giving the employer an easement 

across Title VII. [Essentially,] [b]y violating the statute for 

long enough, the employer would acquire a right to continue 

indefinitely.”) The Court is persuaded that equity does not 

favor such a result. Yellow should not be able to escape 

liability for continuous acts simply because those acts have 

been ongoing for a substantial period of time.

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Nevertheless, due to Jeffery’s delay in filing this action, 

the Court, upon proper briefing, does not foreclose the 

possibility of carving off the aspects of plaintiff’s claims 

that are no longer subject to meaningful adversarial testing. 

See Pruitt, 472 F.3d at 929 (suggesting that a less severe 

approach to outright dismissal of a case following a finding of 

laches is “to carve off the aspects of the plaintiffs’ claim 

that are no longer subject to meaningful adversarial testing.”) 

 D. Hostile Work Environment 

 Yellow argues that Jeffery cannot establish a hostile work 

environment claim because he did not subjectively perceive his 

workplace to be abusive since he engaged in the same behavior he 

complains of, i.e., Jeffery regularly used profanity and uttered 

derogatory remarks. The Court disagrees. 

 “In evaluating motions for summary judgment in the context 

of employment discrimination, we have emphasized the importance 

of zealously guarding an employee’s right to a full trial, since 

discrimination claims are frequently difficult to prove without 

a full airing of the evidence and an opportunity to evaluate the 

credibility of the witnesses.” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112. 

Moreover, because “‘[t]he real social impact of workplace 

behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding 

circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not 

fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the 

physical acts performed,’” a court runs the risk of providing a 

protective shield for discriminatory behavior that our society 

has determined must be extirpated when it too readily grants 

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summary judgment. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Oncale v. 

Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998)). 

To establish a prima facie case of hostile work environment 

under § 1981, plaintiff must raise a triable issue of fact as to 

whether: (1) he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct 

because of his race; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) the 

conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 

conditions of plaintiffs employment and create an abusive 

working environment. Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798 (quoting Kang v.

U. Lim Am., Inc., 296 F.3d 810, 817 (9th Cir. 2002)). Like 

Title VII, § 1981 is not a general civility code. Manatt, 339 

F.3d at 798 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 

775, 788 (1998)). “‘Simple teasing,’ offhand comments, and 

isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to 

discriminatory changes in the ‘terms of conditions of 

employment.’” Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (citation omitted). 

In determining if an environment is so hostile to violate § 

1981, “[i]t is enough ‘if such hostile conduct pollutes the 

victim’s workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her 

job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay on in her 

position.’” McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113. A plaintiff must show 

that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively 

offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or 

abusive, and one that the victim in fact did perceive to be so. 

Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 

871-872 (9th Cir. 2001).

In determining whether a work environment is objectively 

hostile a court considers the following factors: (1) frequency 

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of discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether it is 

physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive 

utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an 

employee’s work performance. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113 (citing 

Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872). The required severity of the conduct 

varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the 

conduct. McGinest, 360 F.3d at 1113. Finally, the objective 

hostility of a racially hostile work environment must be 

assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging 

to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff. Id. at 1115. 

In this case, viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Jeffery, the Court concludes that the acts 

described by Jeffery, in his virtually un-rebutted declaration 

and discovery responses, are sufficient to survive a motion for 

summary judgment. 

Jeffery alleges that he suffered severe and pervasive 

harassment at the hands of co-workers and that his complaints to 

management of such harassment were to no avail. For instance, 

Jeffery alleges that, among others, co-worker Tyron regularly 

used the words “nigger” and “Uncle Tom” as well as called him a 

“monkey” and “gorilla.” Pl.’s Supp. Response to Yellow’s First 

Set of Interrogatories ¶¶ 79 & 106.10 Jeffery also alleges that 

he repeatedly discovered derogatory remarks scrawled on the 

bathroom wall, including, but not limited to, “nigger,” “Uncle 

 

10 Jeffery also alleges that co-worker Drake would call him, among 

other things, “nigger” and “token nigger.” See Decl. of Elbert 

Jeffery ¶¶ 57-63 (submitted in a previous action and 

incorporated into this action), attached as Exh. 7 to Decl. of 

Steven W. Moore In Support of Def.’s Mot. for Summary Judgment. 

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Tom,” “Junior that fat ass nigger,” “Junior suck ass nigger,” 

“Nigger should die,” “nigger snitch,” and “Junior’s bringing 

back legalized slavery.” Id. at ¶¶ 84-85.11 

In addition, Jeffery avers that after he complained about 

such harassment, various co-workers referred to him as a 

“suckass, “snitch,” “nigger snitch,” “Uncle Tom,” “Company boy,” 

and accused him of “sucking the [manager’s] dick.” Pl.’s Supp. 

Response to Yellow’s First Set of Interrogatories at ¶¶ 79, 88, 

104 & 106. Finally, Jeffery avers that his co-workers engaged 

in other harassment, including filling his shoes with soda, 

placing wood blocks under his forklift (to get it stuck), 

stealing his freight bills and tampering with his food. Id. at 

¶¶ 88-91 & 100. 

While the foregoing is not an exhaustive list of the 

harassment alleged by Jeffery, it is sufficient to create a 

triable issue as to whether he was subjected to unwelcome, 

ongoing and continuous race based harassment and retaliatory 

harassment.12 The Court finds that the alleged harassment would 

 

11 Jeffery further alleges that he discovered a stick figure 

drawing in the bathroom of a person hanging from a gallows with 

the words, “Junior, Ha, Ha,” written next to it. See Decl. of 

Elbert Jeffery ¶ 27. 

12 See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding 

that a hostile work environment may be the basis for a 

retaliation claim under Title VII). In Ray, the court held that 

a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether a plaintiff was 

subject to a hostile work environment (based on retaliation) 

where he was subject to regular verbal abuse from his 

supervisors after complaining about the treatment of women. Id. 

at 1245-1246. Here, as in Ray, Jeffery’s allegations of 

retaliatory harassment by co-workers following his complaints to 

management are sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as 

to whether Jeffery was subject to a hostile work environment. 

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be sufficient to alter the terms and conditions of Jeffery’s 

employment. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Jeffery has 

proffered sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact 

regarding whether the Tracy facility was a hostile work 

environment. 

However, notwithstanding the finding of a hostile work 

environment, Jeffery cannot survive summary judgment unless he 

establishes a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Yellow 

knew of the harassment but failed to take remedial measures 

reasonably calculated to end it. See McGinest, 360 F.3d at 

1119-1120 (while employers are liable for failing to remedy or 

prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which 

management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of 

reasonable care should have known, they may avoid liability for 

known harassment “by undertaking remedial measures ‘reasonably 

calculated to end the harassment.’”) 

In the instant case, Jeffery avers that he repeatedly went 

to manager Scott Birch’s office and complained about racial and 

retaliatory harassment that he was subjected to at the hands of 

his fellow co-workers. Pl.’s Supp. Response to Yellow’s First 

Set of Interrogatories ¶ 79. Jeffery further avers that not 

only did Birch refuse to take any remedial action but that he 

encouraged such harassment by making a joke about it. Id. at ¶ 

80. Finally, Jeffery avers that, on numerous occasions, he 

informed various managers, and showed at least one, the 

derogatory and retaliatory remarks written on the bathroom 

walls. Id. at ¶¶ 84-85 & 87. 

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Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that Jeffery 

has proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue 

of fact regarding whether Yellow had actual knowledge of the 

harassment of which Jeffery informed various supervisors and/or 

managers, including the derogatory comments by co-workers Drake 

and Tyron. Additionally, the Court concludes that Jeffery has 

proffered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of 

fact as to whether Yellow had actual or imputed knowledge of the 

incidents of racist graffiti because Jeffery not only allegedly 

informed various managers of the graffiti but the managers used 

the restrooms where the graffiti was prevalent. 

Accordingly, because Yellow failed to proffer any evidence 

of remedial measures taken to end the harassment (i.e., warnings 

or discipline), except for painting over the graffiti in the 

bathrooms, Jeffery has established a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether Yellow’s remedial measures were adequate given the 

reoccurrence of the graffiti and the alleged pervasiveness of 

the harassment. 

For these reasons, the Court concludes that summary 

judgment is not appropriate with respect to Jeffery’s hostile 

work environment claim. 

E. Disparate Treatment & Retaliation 

Yellow argues that Jeffery cannot recover under § 1981 on 

either a disparate treatment theory or a retaliation theory 

arising out of its decision to terminate him. The Court 

concludes that to the extent the complaint seeks to assert such 

claims, they are not viable because, even assuming that Jeffery 

could make a prima facie showing that he is entitled to relief 

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under either theory, Yellow has articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Jeffery’s termination. See Hardage v. 

CBS Broad. Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2006) (if an 

employee meets the elements of a prima facie case of 

retaliation, the burden then shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the 

adverse action);13 see also Yartzof v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 

1377 (9th Cir. 1987) (if the defendant satisfactorily 

articulates a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for an adverse 

employment action, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 

show that the alleged explanation is a pretext for impermissible 

retaliation. The plaintiff can meet its burden “‘either 

directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason 

more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that 

the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.’”) 

Accordingly, because Yellow proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Jeffery; and because 

Jeffery failed to create a genuine issue of fact by asserting 

that Yellow’s reasons for terminating him were pretextual (i.e., 

Jeffery failed to show that a discriminatory reason more likely 

motivated Yellow’s decision to terminate him, or that Yellow’s 

explanation for Jeffery’s termination is unworthy of credence) 

Jeffery cannot state a viable disparate treatment or retaliation 

claim with respect to his termination. Indeed, it is undisputed 

 

13 See Aragon v. Republic Silver State Disposal Inc., 292 F.3d 

654, 658-659 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that the familiar 

burden-shifting scheme that applies in a retaliation claim also 

applies in a racial discrimination claim).

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that Jeffery was terminated for physically assaulting a coworker. 

F. Constructive Termination 

Yellow argues that Jeffery’s constructive termination claim 

cannot survive summary judgment because Jeffery has failed to 

cite any authority supporting the proposition that a claim for 

constructive termination is viable when an employee resigns 

following his termination. The Court disagrees. 

“[C]onstructive discharge occurs when the working 

conditions deteriorate, as a result of discrimination, to the 

point that they become ‘sufficiently extraordinary and egregious 

to overcome the normal motivation of a competent, diligent, and 

reasonable employee to remain on the job to earn a livelihood 

and to serve his or her employer.’” Brooks v. City of San 

Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 930 (9th Cir. 2000). “A constructive 

discharge occurs when, looking at the totality of circumstances, 

‘a reasonable person in [the employee’s] position would have 

felt that he was forced to quit because of intolerable and 

discriminatory working conditions.’” Watson v. Nationwide Ins. 

Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987). The determination as to 

whether conditions were so intolerable and discriminatory as to 

justify a reasonable employee’s decision to resign is normally a 

factual question left to the trier of fact. Id. 

 In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Jeffery was 

terminated on January 18, 2002 for physically assaulting a coworker. It is further undisputed that his termination triggered 

the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA. Finally, it is 

undisputed that Jeffery submitted a letter of resignation 

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(because he could no longer tolerate the harassment) on March 

18, 2002, halting the grievance procedures before a final 

determination was rendered. Therefore, because the grievance 

procedure had not run its course prior to Jeffery’s resignation, 

it cannot be considered meaningless since it was possible that 

Jeffery could be reinstated by the grievance panel. 

 Viewing the evidence most favorably to Jeffery, the Court 

concludes that Jeffery has sufficiently alleged a continuous 

pattern of discriminatory treatment to constitute the necessary 

aggravating factors such that a trier of fact could (but not 

necessarily would) conclude that a reasonable person would find 

the conditions so intolerable and discriminatory as to justify 

resigning. See Watson, 823 F.2d at 361-362. Put another way, 

Jeffery’s allegations create a genuine issue of fact as to 

whether he was constructively terminated to preclude dismissal 

of this claim at the summary judgment stage. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 For the above stated reasons, the Court DENIES the motion 

for summary judgment/adjudication in all respects, except that 

it GRANTS the motion as to Jeffery’s claims of disparate 

treatment and/or retaliation arising out of Yellow’s decision to 

terminate him. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 30th day of July, 2007. 

 s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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