Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01251/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01251-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Long
Respondent
Andrew Jacob Quintero
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In 2010, Petitioner was convicted of various crimes of violence which resulted in the court 

imposing a term of incarceration for life with other terms running concurrently with this sentence or 

being stayed. Here, Petitioner claims his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s decision 

to preclude the testimony of his expert. Because the Court disagrees, the petition is DENIED.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted in the Fresno County Superior Court in 2010 of inflicting corporal 

injury resulting in a traumatic injury upon the mother of Petitioner’s child, battery with serious bodily 

injury, assault with a deadly weapon, torture, and criminal threats. (Doc. 14, Ex. A, p. 3). The 

Superior Court sentenced him to an indeterminate life term for the torture conviction, while the terms 

for the other convictions and enhancements were either stayed or ordered to run concurrently with the 

indeterminate life term. (Id.). 

ANDREW JACOB QUINTERO,

 Petitioner,

v.

DAVID LONG, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:13-cv-01251-JLT

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 1)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

Case 1:13-cv-01251-JLT Document 17 Filed 11/12/15 Page 1 of 15
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Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the “5th DCA”), 

which affirmed the convictions. (Doc. 14, Ex. A). Likewise, the California Supreme Court denied his 

petition for review. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 21). 

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

On the afternoon of July 28, 2009, appellant went to the house of Cindy Garcia, his former 

girlfriend and mother of two of his children, a boy and baby girl. Garcia testified that she was in 

the bathroom, taking a bath, when she heard a loud bang on her bathroom door and then 

appellant's voice telling her to open the door.

The bathroom door was locked, but appellant was able to open it and walked in. Garcia told 

appellant to leave. Appellant said no and started taking his clothes off. Appellant asked Garcia 

to have sex with him. Although she said no, they started having sex.

Appellant “got off real quick” when he noticed “hickeys” on Garcia's body. He became angry, 

told her to get dressed, and questioned her about the hickeys. While they were still in the 

bathroom, appellant “sock[ed]” Garcia on the side of her face near her eye.

Appellant then grabbed Garcia by her hair and dragged her to her bedroom. Her children were 

asleep on a futon mattress in the corner of the bedroom. Appellant started closing all the 

windows in the bedroom, while telling Garcia “how he should beat [her] ass and calling [her] a 

bitch and a [whore].”

As Garcia was sitting on the bed, appellant came up and “socked” her in the side of the face 

with a closed fist. The blow caused Garcia to fall backwards off the bed. As Garcia was lying on 

her back, appellant “just lost it.” He started hitting her with his fists and said he was going to 

kill her. Appellant hit Garcia's arms when she put her hands up in front of her to try to block 

appellant's blows.

Appellant then lifted Garcia up by one of her arms and hit her “hard” in the side. Garcia heard 

one of her ribs break and began to have trouble breathing. Appellant stopped and asked, “Was 

he worth it? Was he worth it?” Appellant then lifted Garcia up by the arm again and hit her two 

more times in the side. Garcia heard another rib break.

Appellant demanded that Garcia give him her new boyfriend's telephone number. Garcia gave 

him the number and appellant called it. Garcia heard appellant talking to her boyfriend's sister. 

He said something like, “You better tell him to come and get her because she's going to die” and 

“I fucked her up. I beat her ass.”

Garcia asked appellant to call the ambulance. Appellant accused Garcia of “over-exaggerating” 

and told her to get their son's stuff together. Appellant tried to pick Garcia up by her arm, but 

she threw herself back down on a pile of clothes.

While Garcia was lying on the pile of clothes, appellant took “a wizard knife” from off the 

entertainment center. He pulled the blade out and said, “I'm going to cut your pussy.”

Garcia packed their son's bag and appellant left with the boy. After appellant left, Garcia's other 

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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son helped her walk to a neighbor's house. The neighbor called the police.

Around 3:00 p.m., Fresno County Sheriff's Deputy Jose Diaz responded to the call regarding a 

domestic disturbance. When he arrived, emergency personnel were tending to Garcia. Garcia 

was sitting on the ground. She appeared scared. She was crying and having trouble breathing.

Garcia told Deputy Diaz that her boyfriend and father of her children had assaulted her and 

described the assault to him. Garcia said that after appellant brought her into the bedroom, he 

sat her down on the bed and hit her with a full bag of clothing. He then demanded that she tell 

him who gave her the hickeys.

When Garcia told appellant the name of her new boyfriend (i.e., “Andrew”), appellant thought 

she was being sarcastic because this was also appellant's name. Appellant punched Garcia in the 

left side of her face with a closed fist, causing her to fall off the bed onto the ground.

After Garcia fell onto the ground, appellant “picked her up and proceeded to punch her several 

more times on the left side of her body or the left flank of her torso.” After punching her in the 

flank, appellant “proceeded to stomp her upper torso, or chest, approximately eight to ten times” 

and “to kick her on the upper torso numerous times” while she was lying on her back. Finally, 

appellant sat on Garcia's chest and started choking her with his right hand. Appellant only 

stopped when Garcia's youngest son ran into the room.

Garcia also told Deputy Diaz about appellant's threats to kill her and cause injury to her vaginal 

area. Garcia reported that she feared for her life and believed appellant was capable of carrying 

out his threats. Garcia explained that this was not the first time she had been a victim of 

domestic violence. She told Deputy Diaz that appellant had abused her on approximately 10 

prior occasions, but she never reported the abuse because she was afraid of appellant.

Dr. Suneil Agrawal was the emergency room physician who treated Garcia after the incident. 

Garcia told Dr. Agrawal that appellant assaulted her for a period of approximately 30 minutes, 

and said he tried to choke her, pulled her hair, knocked her down, and kicked and punched her. 

Dr. Agrawal opined that Garcia's injuries were consistent with the attack she described.

Dr. Agrawal observed that Garcia had bruising on her arm, chest, and left flank. She also had a 

large area of swelling (hematoma) above her left eye. A computed tomography (CT) scan 

revealed fractures in two ribs, a laceration to the left kidney, and a pneumothorax. Dr. Agrawal 

explained that a pneumothorax involves a penetrating injury to the body cavity, so that air 

escapes inside and the lung deflates. He treated the pneumothorax by inserting a chest tube. Dr. 

Agrawal opined that the pneumothorax was most likely caused by the rib fractures and the 

laceration to the kidney could have been caused by blunt trauma.

On cross-examination, Dr. Agrawal testified that Garcia's injuries were not consistent with a 

single fall against a hard object. He explained:

“One, the hematoma above her left eye was towards her front, while the injuries in her 

thorax area were on her back mostly, which wouldn't be consistent with one fall. 

Number two, she had mentioned that she was choked. And there were several spots on 

her neck that had developed that were consistent with what we had seen with 

fingerprints or hands at least.”

Defense counsel questioned Dr. Agrawal further:

“Q. The rib injury by itself, could you get a rib injury like that from falling into a hard 

object?

“A. Not very easily.

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“Q. Why not?

“A. I don't—it takes quite a bit of force to break a rib or even two ribs. And falling on to 

a hard space just from ground, I don't know that I've ever seen that that I can recall. In a 

patient who is younger and not osteopenic, meaning they have low bone density such as 

an elderly patient.

“Q. You say it takes quite a bit of force to break a rib?

“A. It can.

“Q. Have you known of people to break ribs in relatively low impact sports such as golf 

or rowing a boat?

“A. Yes. I've read about those cases. I don't think I've seen that myself.

“Q. Have you ever known of people to break a rib by coughing?

“A. I've seen that in one or two patients. And they have been cancer patients.”

Defense counsel also presented Dr. Agrawal with a hypothetical: “If someone jumped on my 

back and I threw them off my back and they landed up against a hard object such as a wall 

heater, could that possibly break a rib?” The doctor responded:

“I mean, I don't know the body mass of the person. I don't know their past medical 

history. I don't know what they hit from how far, what force is generated, how strong the 

person is on the ground. I suppose it would be possible, but I would think it's unlikely.”

On redirect examination, Dr. Agrawal testified that he saw nothing in Garcia's records or in 

examining her that would indicate the 28–year–old had any deficiencies in her bone structure 

anatomy.

Laura Woods, a registered nurse and sexual assault forensic examiner, examined Garcia on July 

30, 2009. Woods observed that Garcia had multiple bruises on her arms and legs, her neck, 

around her eyes, and on the left side of her back near the top of her ribs. Woods opined that the 

circular pattern marks she found on Garcia's neck corroborated Garcia's statements that 

appellant choked her.

Woods also observed that Garcia had fractured ribs and a chest tube in place to treat the 

pneumothorax she sustained “from a blunt force injury to the area of her ribs.” On direct 

examination, the prosecutor questioned Woods about the amount of force necessary to cause 

Garcia's injuries:

“Q. Do you know how much force it takes to cause those injuries?

“A. To fracture ribs and cause a pneumothorax takes a pretty good blow.

“Q. What are the kinds of things that in your experience have caused that kind of force?

“A. In my experience with patients—in the emergency department I had a young man 

who was in an ATV accident, all terrain vehicle accident. I had a gentleman that was 

pinned under a car. The car somehow fell from the back and landed on him and he took 

a blow to the ribs.

“Q. Would it be fair to say it takes a lot of force to cause those injuries?

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“A. Yes, that would be fair to say.

“Q. Would those injuries be consistent from a fall from a bed to the floor?

“A. Doubtful unless she landed on an object that made the floor not a flat surface.

“Q. What would be the kind of objects you'd be looking for?

“A. Something hard. Something large that she would have landed on.

“Q. Would there still have to be an application of force involved?

“A. Yes. Yes. Blunt force.”

On cross-examination, Woods acknowledged that rib injuries like Garcia's “could be” sustained 

as a result of the victim jumping on top of someone and then being tossed off and landing on a 

heater in the corner of the room.

The prosecution also called Bob Meade, a licensed marriage and family therapist, as an expert 

on domestic violence. Meade testified generally about common behaviors of domestic violence 

victims. Meade explained that victims often feel guilty after calling law enforcement and recant 

their reports of abuse, even when they have suffered serious injuries like broken bones.

Defense 

Appellant testified that he went to Garcia's house on July 28, 2009, to pick up his son and the 

rest of his belongings and that he had a key to the house. According to appellant, Garcia was the 

one who started the physical altercation. She jumped on his back three times to prevent him 

from leaving and each time he threw her off. One of the times he threw her off, appellant saw 

Garcia hit the wall where the heater was located, so she could have hit the heater.

Appellant denied that he threatened to kill Garcia or that he engaged in the assaultive behaviors 

she described in her trial testimony and to law enforcement and medical personnel at the time of 

the incident. Appellant also denied that he displayed the blade of his knife or threatened to cut 

Garcia with it.

Appellant testified that he had seen Garcia inflict injuries upon herself in the past. Every time he 

would try to leave her, she would hit her face and scratch her arms. When he asked her why, she 

would say, “because I can't beat you up so I'm going to do it to myself.” Appellant also testified 

that Garcia often faked injuries after they would fight.

Mary Ruth Quintero, one of appellant's sisters, testified that, about a week after the incident, 

Garcia asked her to take care of her kids. Garcia told her “she might go to prison because of 

what she said that wasn't true.” On cross-examination, Mary Ruth testified that Garcia told her 

that appellant did not break her ribs, rape her, or anything like that. Garcia told Mary Ruth that, 

when she was telling appellant not to leave, he pushed her and she fell against something, 

possibly the heater or a box of toys that was there.

Miranda Quintero, another sister of appellant, testified that, once in 2007, she walked into the 

bathroom and saw Garcia hitting herself in the face with a brush. When Miranda yelled and 

asked what she was doing, Garcia said she and appellant had been arguing and that she was 

going to blame it on appellant.

Defense investigator Mryl Stebens testified that Garcia contacted the defense in December 

2009, and he arranged to conduct a telephone interview with her, which he recorded with 

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Garcia's consent. A recording of the interview was played for the jury.

In the interview, Garcia told Stebens that she had exaggerated or fabricated a number of the 

details in her previous statements to law enforcement regarding the incident on July 28, 2009. 

Garcia told Stebens that after she and appellant had consensual sex and he saw her hickeys, they 

“started arguing back and forth.” While appellant was gathering up his possessions, Garcia 

grabbed his bag and then grabbed appellant's arms and shoulders to keep him from leaving. 

Appellant threw her off and she hit “the corner of the heater, pretty hard.” Garcia thought this 

was “probably how [she] punctured [her] lung.”

(Doc. 14, Ex. A, pp. 4-11).

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 7 

(2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Fresno County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Lindh, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s enactment). The 

instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

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A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

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507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness).

III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims.

In this action Petitioner alleges that his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial 

were compromised by the trial court’s exclusion of the defense expert witness. (Doc. 1, p. 8). 

A. Exclusion of Defense Expert Witness.

Petitioner contends that the trial court’s exclusion of his defense expert witness denied 

Petitioner his constitutional right to a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This 

contention is without merit.

1. State Court decisions.

a. The Trial Court’s Decision.

As mentioned in the 5th DCA’s Statement of Facts, the defense theory was that the victim 

suffered rib injuries when she landed on a heater after being thrown off Petitioner’s back during an 

argument, and not, as the prosecution maintained, as a result of a blunt force assault by Petitioner on 

the victim. In support of the prosecution’s case, Dr. Agrawal, the treating physician, and Laura Woods, 

a registered nurse and sexual assault forensic examiner, both testified that the most likely scenario for 

the victim’s rib injuries was blunt force trauma caused by Petitioner. However, on cross-examination, 

both experts agreed that the defense theory was at least possible. 

Following Woods’ testimony, the defense sought to present the expert opinions of Myrl Stebens 

as an expert on the amount of force necessary to cause a broken rib. 6 Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) 

1655. A hearing was held outside the presence of the jury pursuant to California Evidence Code § 402. 

6 RT 1656-1669. Stebens testified at the hearing that he received training about the force necessary to 

break ribs as a technician in the military services. Id., p. 1657. He explained that he had attended 

approximately 100 autopsies either as a member of the Sheriff’s Department or during his military 

service and that approximately 50% of the autopsies involved blunt force trauma. Id., pp. 1657-1659. 

He testified that he provided training in personal defense and subduing others at an academy that he 

owned and operated. Id., pp. 1657; 1667. He also testified that he had read studies involving, and had 

conducted his own experiments with, pig parts. Id., pp. 1663-1664; 1667.

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Following Stebens’ testimony, the trial court made the following ruling:

[W]ith all due respect to Mr. Stebens to your very considerable experience in law 

enforcement— and I understand that that relates just not to your own law enforcement 

experience as an officer but in the military, all of that certainly qualifies you to testify about law 

enforcement matters. It does not qualify you, in the court’s view, to testify to what are 

essentially medical matters which are the dynamics by which an injury may be sustained. I 

would agree completely with the defense that it is not in the general knowledge of jurors to the 

degrees of force of methods or dynamics by which injuries are sustained. This is a medical 

subject, in the court’s view, or perhaps once for a medical physicist. It may go beyond that. 

But what’s important here is it’s not a matter about which a person whose [sic] been involved in 

law enforcement, even for many years, can testify. If that were true, then every detective who 

works in the homicide unit who shows up at autopsies could come in here and testify about 

expert opinions about how injuries are caused or how deaths occurred, because they have 

attended those. Every lawyer who had read a book on fingerprints could come in here and 

testify as a fingerprint expert. This is not the law in California as I understand it.

6 RT 1674-1677.

b. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The Fifth DCA rejected Petitioner’s contention as follows:

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion, and denied him his federal 

constitutional right to present a meaningful defense, by precluding Stebens from testifying as 

an expert on the amount of force necessary to break a rib. Appellant claims the court 

erroneously concluded that Stebens was unqualified to render an opinion on the subject 

because he lacked sufficient medical expertise. Appellant asserts that Stebens's testimony at the 

Evidence Code section 402 hearing “disclosed sufficient knowledge of the subject to entitle his 

opinion to go to the jury.” Appellant highlights the defense investigator's testimony confirming 

that, in his extensive military and law enforcement experience, at least “100 times [he had] 

broken a bone or been involved in a situation where a bone has been broken.” Assuming, 

without deciding, the trial court erred in finding Stebens unqualified to render an expert 

opinion on the amount of force necessary to break a rib, and appellant did not waive his 

constitutional claim by failing to raise it below, we conclude reversal is not required because 

the exclusion of Stebens's testimony did not prejudice appellant.

According to appellant, if the trial court had permitted Stebens to testify as an expert, he would 

have testified, as a general matter, “that various factors, not simply the force, contributed to 

broken ribs, such as the person's size, weight, fragility, the hardness of the striking object, its 

nature to apply force per area, the body's position, [and] the trajectory and angle.” Appellant 

argues that such testimony would have “contradicted Nurse Woods'[s] facile testimony that a 

lot of force from a pretty good blow caused the [victim's] injuries.”

Appellant apparently bases his understanding of Stebens's proposed testimony on the witness's 

answers to questions posed by the prosecutor and the trial court during the Evidence Code 

section 402 hearing. The prosecutor questioned Stebens, in relevant part, as follows:

“Q. Have you ever seen anybody have a broken rib from being punched?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And did you know how much force was required from that punch to break the rib?

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“A. There's two answers to that if you would allow me. I have interviewed and seen 

people that have had broken ribs from subsequent contact. And I've inflicted such 

damage.

“Q. Do you know why?

“A. Why what?

“Q. The rib breaks and how much force is applied?

“A. It really depends upon the trajectory, the angle and the force of the—of the 

assailant, which is this case I'm talking about myself as I applied the force. The amount 

of force varies depending upon the position of the body, whether it's the front or the 

back portion of the rib. It breaks in various patterns. Angle has a lot to do with it. If you 

hit it straight on you might have more of a spring effect versus a downward and upward 

thrust could not give that spring or absorbing factor.”

The court questioned Stebens, in relevant part, as follows:

“THE COURT: Okay. I have one question that I need to ask you, Mr. Stebens. As I 

understand it here from [defense counsel] a moment ago he would propose to have you 

testify about the amount of force it might take to break the rib of somebody in the 

position, essentially, of Cindy Garcia in this case, meaning her size and the rest of that. 

What particular experience or training do you have that would allow you to express an 

opinion on that particular subject?

“THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, the only thing I can offer is based upon my 

training and experience and teaching is that force by and in itself is not always the 

necessary—it depends on the soft tissue. It depends on the weight of the individual, the 

hardness of the object they hit or are being hit with i.e., a baseball fast versus a fist—in 

this case maybe a heater, being stomped by the heel of the foot or toe of the foot or 

elbow. That's a contributing factor that has to be taken into consideration when force 

trauma is applied. All the things that have to be taken into consideration are the—well, 

as the individual herself stated, she's fragile; not knowing how big she is as to what the 

strike point was; whether it was a pointed object; PSI, pounds per square inch has 

something to come into it versus—a railing versus a heal of a foot, or the toe of a shoe 

versus a flat railing. Those—they would absorb a lot more force versus a toe coming in 

would have more force applied to it in a focused area. So that's really about all I can 

offer as far as this particular case.”

Assuming, based on the forgoing, that appellant is correct in asserting that Stebens would have 

testified that “various factors, not simply the force, contributed to broken ribs,” there is no 

possibility the trial court's ruling excluding this testimony was prejudicial, whether harmless 

error is judged under the state standard for erroneous evidentiary rulings, which we believe 

applicable here (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998–999; People v. Watson

(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836), or the elevated standard that would be required if the ruling had 

completely prevented appellant from establishing a defense (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 

U.S. 683, 691; Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman)).

Stebens's proposed testimony did not directly refute and would have done little to discredit 

Woods's testimony regarding Garcia's injuries. The nurse's opinion that it would have taken “a 

good blow” or “a lot of force” was elicited in direct response to a question about the amount of 

force it would take to cause the victim's injuries. Contrary to appellant's suggestion, her 

opinion did not necessarily imply that force was the only factor that could have contributed to 

the victim's ribs breaking, or that other factors—such as the victim's size, the hardness of the 

striking object, or the angle at which the victim was struck—were not contributing factors. 

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Indeed, Woods went on to testify that Garcia's injuries could also be consistent with a fall, if 

she landed on a hard or large object. And, during cross-examination, Woods acknowledged 

that it was plausible that Garcia could have sustained the injuries to her ribs if she fell against a 

heater as described by defense counsel.

Moreover, Dr. Agrawal's testimony on cross-examination essentially conveyed that various 

factors—such as “the body mass of the person” and “what they hit from how far”—would need 

to be taken into consideration to render an opinion on whether a victim could sustain rib 

injuries under the scenario presented by the defense. On this record, it is not reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to appellant would have been achieved if the court had 

not excluded Stebens's proposed expert testimony that various factors, not simply the force, 

could contribute to broken ribs. (See People v. Rangel (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 291, 303 [finding 

harmless error under more stringent Chapman standard “where the essence of the stri[c]ken 

testimony” was elicited through other means].)

(Doc. 14, Ex. A, pp. 11-14).

2. Federal Standard.

Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not reviewable in a 

federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. 62, 68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 477 (1991); Middleton v. 

Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1985). Accordingly, incorrect state 

court evidentiary rulings cannot serve as a basis for habeas relief unless federal constitutional rights are 

affected. See Whelchel v. Washington, 232 F.3d 1197, 1211 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). 

Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the 

Compulsory Process or Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees 

criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a defense and to present relevant evidence in 

their own defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) 

(quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984); Chambers 

v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This right is not unlimited, 

but rather, is subject to reasonable restrictions. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 118 S.Ct. 

1261, 140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998).

A state evidentiary rule excluding evidence does not abridge a criminal defendant's right to 

present a defense unless it is “arbitrary or disproportionate” and “infringe[s] upon a weighty interest of 

the accused.” Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308; Crane, 476 U.S. at 689–91 (discussing the tension between the 

discretion of state courts to exclude evidence at trial and the federal constitutional right to “present a 

complete defense”). The Supreme Court has found a violation of the right to present a complete defense 

in cases where a state evidentiary rule, on its face, “significantly undermined fundamental elements of 

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the defendant's defense,” but did little or nothing to promote a legitimate state interest. Scheffer, 523 

U.S. at 315; see also Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324, 126 S.Ct. 1727 (2006).

3. Analysis.

The United States Supreme Court has not “squarely address[ed] whether a court's exercise of 

discretion to exclude expert testimony violates a criminal defendant's right to present relevant 

evidence.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 758 (9th Cir.2009). Likewise, the Supreme Court has not 

squarely addressed the question of whether this discretionary decision violates a defendant's right to 

present a defense. Brown v. Horell, 644 F.3d 969, 983 (9th Cir.2011); Moses, 555 F.3d at 758. 

The Ninth Circuit affirmed of a grant of habeas relief in Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862 (9th 

Cir. 2003), which was based in part on its finding that the petitioner's due process rights were violated 

by the exclusion of expert testimony. However, Alcala applied the pre-AEDPA standard for habeas 

relief. See id. at 868, 877. Moreover, the fact that there may be Ninth Circuit authority to support a 

petitioner's claim of the right to habeas relief when expert testimony was excluded is insufficient to 

meet the AEDPA’s exacting standard of review. Federal law concerning an issue is not “clearly 

established” within the meaning of the AEDPA unless the United States Supreme Court has addressed 

the issue. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Lopez v. Smith, –––U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) 

(AEDPA “prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a 

particular constitutional principle is ‘clearly established’ ”). The Supreme Court has not addressed the 

legal issue here. Thus, in this case, the 5

th DCA’s decision rejecting Petitioner's claim cannot be 

“contrary to clearly established federal law” and there can be no federal habeas relief in this case.

Furthermore, the 5

th DCA’s denial of this claim was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Section 801(a) of the California Evidence Code limits expert testimony to 

opinions “[r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an 

expert would assist the trier of fact.” Also, state law stipulates that, to qualify as an expert witness, the 

witness must possess “special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education sufficient to qualify 

him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates.” Cal. Evid. Code § 720. It was a 

reasonable determination by the trial judge that Steben’s experience in the a military services, as a 

deputy sheriff who attended autopsies, and as the owner of an “academy” teaching self-defense might 

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qualify him as an expert in law enforcement issues, but did not qualify him as an expert in medical 

matters such as the amount of force necessary to break ribs. 

At the § 402 hearing, Stebens testified that his degrees were in criminal law, sociology, and 

criminal justice, that he had never studied anatomy at a university, and that he had no medical training 

beyond first aid. 6 RT 1659-1660. Indeed, Stebens acknowledged that, though he had attended 

numerous autopsies involving blunt force trauma, he had never had any training or formal course of 

study relating to blunt force trauma. 6 RT 1657-1659. In other words, Stebens’ experience regarding 

blunt force rib trauma was entirely anecdotal and involved no formal education, training, or course of 

study. While such experience might be helpful in military or self-defense situations, it did not provide 

Stebens with the “special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to opine on medical 

questions that arose outside of his own personal experiences. As the trial judge correctly noted, if this 

were not the case, then any “armchair expert” who watched documentaries and read books on a 

particular subject would qualify as an expert under California law. Clearly, that is not the case; hence, 

the Court will not second-guess the trial court’s decision to exclude Stebens’ opinions. Marshall v. 

Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n. 6 (1983)([“T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts 

to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules....”). 

Finally, even assuming the experts' testimony was improperly excluded, the error did not have 

“a substantial and injurious effect” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) 

(habeas relief for an erroneous evidentiary ruling would only be available if the error had a “substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict”) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). As mentioned, the two prosecution expert witnesses had already conceded in crossexamination that factors other than simple force could play a role in determining the extent of the 

injuries to the victim’s ribs and that the defense theory that the victim injured herself by falling against 

the heater was at least possible. In that respect, Stebens’ testimony to the same effect was cumulative 

and its exclusion did not deprive Petitioner of the right to present a defense. 

Moreover, as Respondent correctly notes, Petitioner himself testified about the events in a 

manner that markedly differed from that of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., that the victim was the 

aggressor and jumped on Petitioner during an argument, injuring herself when Petitioner threw her off 

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and she fell against a hard object. Based upon the verdict, the jurors clearly believed the victim’s 

version of events over that of Petitioner, and, in the Court’s view, the presentation of Stebens’

cumulative testimony about the force needed to break a rib would not have altered the jurors’ decision 

about whom to believe. In sum, any error in excluding Stebens’ testimony did not have a substantial 

and injurious effect on the outcome of the trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. at 637. Thus, 

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit 

in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged 

with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's 

detention pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not 

be taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made 

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

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Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), is DENIED with prejudice;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file;

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 12, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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