Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01911/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01911-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Busby
Respondent
Armenio Huerra
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1), the parties have 

consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge 

to conduct all further proceedings in the case, including the entry 

of final judgment, by manifesting their consent in writings signed 

by the parties or their representatives and filed by Petitioner on 

December 5, 2011, and on behalf of Respondent on December 16, 2011.

Pending before the Court is the petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

which was filed on November 17, 2011. Respondent filed an answer on 

February 28, 2012, and Petitioner filed a traverse on April 23, 

ARMENIO HUERRA,

 Petitioner,

v.

TIMOTHY BUSBY, Warden,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:11-cv-001911-SKO-HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (DOC. 1), DIRECTING 

THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT FOR 

RESPONDENT, AND DECLINING TO ISSUE 

A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

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2012.

I. Jurisdiction

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the 

effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies in this proceeding. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327 (1997); Furman v. Wood, 190 F.3d 1002, 

1004 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The challenged judgment was rendered by the Superior Court of 

the State of California, County of Tulare (TCSC), which is located 

within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. 28 U.S.C. 

§§ 84(b), 2254(a), 2241(a), (d). Further, Petitioner claims that in 

the course of the proceedings resulting in his conviction, he 

suffered violations of his constitutional rights. 

Accordingly, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) and 2241(c)(3), which authorize a district 

court to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus by a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on 

the ground that the custody is in violation of the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States. Williams v. Taylor, 529 

U.S. 362, 375 n.7 (2000); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. -, -, 131 

S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010) (per curiam). 

An answer was filed on behalf of Respondent Timothy Busby, who, 

pursuant to the judgment, had custody of Petitioner at the Ironwood 

State Prison (ISP), his institution of confinement at the time the 

petition and answer were filed. (Doc. 16.) Petitioner thus named 

as a respondent a person who had custody of Petitioner within the 

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2242 and Rule 2(a) of the Rules Governing 

Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts (Habeas 

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Rules). See Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 

(9th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, the Court concludes it has jurisdiction over the 

person of the Respondent.

II. Background

A. Procedural Summary

Petitioner was found by a jury to have committed attempted

wilful, deliberate, and premeditated murder in violation of Cal. 

Pen. Code §§ 187(a) and 664 and assault with a deadly weapon in 

violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 245(a)(1). The jury further found 

that Petitioner personally used a deadly weapon within the meaning 

of Cal. Pen. Code § 12022(b)(1), but it found not true the special 

allegation that Petitioner had personally inflicted great bodily 

injury within the meaning of Cal. Pen. Code § 12022.7(a). The trial 

court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison with the possibility of 

parole, plus one year for the deadly weapon enhancement. (LD 4, 1-

5.)

Respondent concedes that the petition before the Court was 

timely filed and that Petitioner exhausted state court remedies as 

to his claims, which concern instructional error and the sufficiency 

of the evidence to support the conviction. (Doc. 14, 6.)

B. Factual Summary

In a habeas proceeding brought by a person in custody pursuant 

to a judgment of a state court, a determination of a factual issue 

made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct; the 

petitioner has the burden of producing clear and convincing evidence 

to rebut the presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); 

Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2004). This 

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presumption applies to a statement of facts drawn from a state 

appellate court’s decision. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 746 n.1 

(9th Cir. 2009). The following statement of facts is taken from 

the opinion of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth 

Appellate District (CCA) in People v. Armenio Huerra, case number 

F059689, filed on April 20, 2011:

Prosecution case

The victim, Pedro Ruiz Huerta, testified that he was 

attending a birthday party for his three-year-old nephew 

on the day of assault. Huerra arrived at the party shortly 

after Huerta. Huerra and Huerta shared a rented room in a 

house; Huerta thought the two were friends.

Huerra arrived at the party very drunk. At the party he 

drank more beer and was misbehaving. He had a difficult 

time walking because of his intoxication. Eventually, some 

of the parents asked Huerta to tell Huerra to leave. 

Huerta asked Huerra to leave the party because he was 

acting inappropriately. Huerra said he would be back and 

walked to his vehicle.

Approximately 10 minutes later, Huerta was holding a beer 

and talking with his sister when Huerra approached and hit 

him. Huerra had a knife in his hand. Huerta had seen the 

knife in Huerra's van the previous day. Huerra swung at 

Huerta two times, stabbing him once in the abdomen and 

once in the right arm. The right arm injury occurred when 

Huerta used his arm to block the second stab attempt, 

which was aimed at his chest. Huerra then ran from the 

scene.

Huerta received three stitches on his arm and two on his 

abdomen as a result of the injuries inflicted by Huerra. 

Huerta denied trying to strike Huerra. Huerta also denied 

making any rude comments to Huerra.

Octaviano Alejandro, Jr., a security guard at a nearby 

bar, testified that Huerra came by the bar later that 

night. He had blood on his shirt and Alejandro would not 

allow him to enter until after he cleaned up. Huerra left 

and returned a short while later with a washed face and 

clean shirt. Alejandro spotted a steak knife in Huerra's 

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waist band and told Huerra he could not bring the knife 

into the bar. Huerra gave Alejandro the knife and entered 

the bar. When asked about the knife, Huerra told Alejandro 

that “they” would not mess with him anymore. Alejandro 

spotted some blood on the knife and threw it away. About 

15 minutes later, Huerra got into an argument with another 

customer and Alejandro forced Huerra to leave. Alejandro 

eventually retrieved the knife and gave it to a police 

officer.

After Huerra was forced to leave the bar, he called for 

emergency assistance to regain entrance into the bar. 

Deputy Sheriff Francisco Perez responded to Huerra's call. 

Huerra obviously had been drinking, but was able to 

communicate. Huerra had red, watery eyes, smelled of 

alcohol, and had poor balance. Perez noticed that Huerra 

was dressed similarly to the assailant from three hours 

earlier, so he detained him.

Deputy Sheriff Todd Bruce responded to the scene of the 

assault, arriving at 9:20 p.m. He was later dispatched to 

the bar where Huerra had been detained, arriving at 12:15 

a.m. Bruce described the knife recovered from Huerra as a 

paring knife with a blade of approximately three inches.

Huerra was transported to the local sheriff's substation 

where he was interviewed. The interview began at 

approximately 1:00 a.m. At that time, Huerra was 

intoxicated, but able to walk normally. He had red, watery 

eyes and smelled of alcohol. He was able to communicate, 

appeared to understand the questions posed to him, and 

responded in an appropriate manner. The interview was not 

recorded because the sheriff's substation did not have any 

recording equipment.

Perez interpreted for Bruce while Bruce interviewed 

Huerra. Perez testified that Huerra appeared coherent 

during the interview and gave appropriate responses to the 

questions asked.

Huerra explained that the ladies at the party gave him a 

lot of attention when he arrived. This attention 

apparently made Huerta jealous. Huerta made disparaging 

remarks about Huerra, claiming Huerra had no money and was 

nothing. This made Huerra angry, so he confronted Huerta 

and asked Huerta if he had a problem with him. Huerta said 

that he did have a problem with him, so Huerra challenged 

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Huerta to a fight. Huerta agreed to fight. Huerra asked 

Huerta if he wanted to be killed, and Huerta responded 

affirmatively. Huerra said he went to his van to get the 

knife so he could kill Huerta. After retrieving the knife, 

Huerra returned to the party and confronted Huerta. Huerra 

asked Huerta if he had a problem with him. When Huerta 

responded affirmatively, Huerra asked Huerta if he wanted 

to be killed. Huerta then lunged at Huerra. Huerra 

responded by stabbing Huerta.

Huerra told Perez that he retrieved the knife because he 

wanted to kill Huerta by stabbing him in the heart. Huerra 

stated he stabbed Huerta twice and then the two rolled on 

the ground. Huerra ran from the scene when he saw several 

people approaching him. Huerra stated he felt bad for what 

he had done, but at the time he wanted to kill Huerta.

Defense case

Jennifer Kearney testified that blood was drawn from 

Huerra at 3:25 a.m. and was tested. His blood-alcohol 

content from the sample was 0.18 percent. Based on that 

information, and assuming Huerra stopped all alcohol 

intake at 9:30 p.m., Kearney concluded that Huerra's 

blood-alcohol content at 10:00 p.m. would have been in the 

range of 0.26 to 0.28 percent.

(LD 4, 2-4.)

III. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Intent to Kill

Petitioner argues that the evidence was insufficient to support 

a conviction of attempted murder requiring intent to kill because 

there was no evidence of a specific intent to kill at the time of 

commission of the overt act that manifested the attempt. Instead, 

Petitioner intended at most a wounding, an assault, or a small 

fight, as shown by his stabbing the victim, inflicting a wound that 

took only two stitches, and desisting after two ineffectual 

attempts. The jury rejected a great bodily injury finding. 

Petitioner contends that the evidence supports at most an inference 

that he was reckless. Petitioner’s admission to law enforcement 

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that he had wanted to kill the victim was unreliable evidence 

because it was made when Petitioner was intoxicated, and it was not 

recorded. 

A. Standard of Decision and Scope of Review

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254 provides in pertinent part:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on

behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 

 judgment of a State court shall not be granted

with respect to any claim that was adjudicated

on the merits in State court proceedings unless

the adjudication of the claim–

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.

Clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as 

opposed to the dicta, of the decisions of the Supreme Court as of 

the time of the relevant state court decision. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, - U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1399 (2011); Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 

412 (2000).

A state court’s decision contravenes clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it reaches a legal conclusion opposite 

to, or substantially different from, the Supreme Court's or 

concludes differently on a materially indistinguishable set of 

facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405-06. The state court 

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need not have cited Supreme Court precedent or have been aware of 

it, "so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the statecourt decision contradicts [it]." Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 

(2002). A state court unreasonably applies clearly established 

federal law if it either 1) correctly identifies the governing rule 

but then applies it to a new set of facts in an objectively 

unreasonable manner, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly 

established legal principle to a new context in an objectively 

unreasonable manner. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th 

Cir. 2002); see, Williams, 529 U.S. at 407. An application of 

clearly established federal law is unreasonable only if it is 

objectively unreasonable; an incorrect or inaccurate application is 

not necessarily unreasonable. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. A state 

court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal 

habeas relief as long as it is possible that fairminded jurists 

could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision. 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 (2011). Even 

a strong case for relief does not render the state court’s 

conclusions unreasonable. Id. 

To obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show 

that the state court’s ruling on a claim was “so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and 

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Id. at 786-87. The § 2254(d) standards are “highly 

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deferential standard[s] for evaluating state-court rulings” which 

require that state court decisions be given the benefit of the 

doubt, and the Petitioner bear the burden of proof. Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Habeas relief is not appropriate 

unless each ground supporting the state court decision is examined 

and found to be unreasonable under the AEDPA. Wetzel v. Lambert, -–

U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012).

In assessing under section 2254(d)(1) whether the state court’s 

legal conclusion was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

federal law, “review... is limited to the record that was before the 

state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.” Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1398. Evidence introduced in federal court 

has no bearing on review pursuant to § 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1400. 

Further, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides that in a habeas proceeding 

brought by a person in custody pursuant to a judgment of a state 

court, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court 

shall be presumed to be correct; the petitioner has the burden of 

producing clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of 

correctness. A state court decision on the merits based on a 

factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 

unless it was objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state proceedings. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 

322, 340 (2003).

With respect to each claim, the last reasoned decision must be 

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identified in order to analyze the state court decision pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1092 n.3 

(9th Cir. 2005); Bailey v. Rae, 339 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 

2003).

B. The State Court Decision

Here, the CCA issued an unpublished, reasoned opinion affirming 

the judgment. (LD 4.) Petitioner then raised the issue in a 

petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court (CSC), 

which summarily denied review without a statement of reasoning or 

authority on June 29, 2011. (LD 5, LD 6.) 

Here, the CCA’s opinion on appeal was the last reasoned 

decision in which the state court adjudicated Petitioner’s claims on 

the merits. Where there has been one reasoned state judgment 

rejecting a federal claim, later unexplained orders upholding that 

judgment or rejecting the same claim are presumed to rest upon the 

same ground. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). This 

Court will thus “look through” the unexplained decision of the CSC 

to the CCA’s last reasoned decision as the relevant state court 

determination. Id. at 803-04; Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 998 

n.5 (9th Cir. 2004).

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s opinion is as follows:

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Huerra challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in two 

respects. First, he argues there was insufficient evidence 

that he intended to kill Huerta. Second, he argues there 

was insufficient evidence that the assault was committed 

willfully and with premeditation and deliberation.

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 Standard of review

Challenges to a judgment based on insufficient evidence

are reviewed under well-established rules. We review the 

whole record to determine whether any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 

or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. (People 

v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.) The record must 

disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict, 

i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value, such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 

396.) In applying this test, we review the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in 

support of the judgment the existence of every fact the 

jury reasonably could have deduced from the evidence. 

(People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 480.) “Conflicts 

and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable 

suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for 

it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to 

determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or 

falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. 

[Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor 

evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. 

[Citation.]” (Maury, at p. 403.) A reversal for 

insufficient evidence “is unwarranted unless it appears 

‘that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient 

substantial evidence to support’” the jury's verdict. 

(People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 (Bolin).)

The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution 

relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. (Maury, 

supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 396.) We “must accept logical 

inferences that the jury might have drawn from the 

circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “Although it 

is the jury's duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the 

circumstantial evidence susceptible of two reasonable 

interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other 

innocence, it is the jury, not the appellate court that 

must be convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a 

reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 

Cal.4th 978, 1053–1054.) Where the circumstances 

reasonably justify the trier of fact's findings, a 

reviewing court's conclusion that the circumstances also 

might be reconciled reasonably with a contrary finding is 

not grounds for reversing the judgment. (Id. at p. 1054.)

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 Intent to kill

Huerra claims there was insufficient evidence that he 

intended to kill Huerta. To sustain a conviction for 

attempted murder, the prosecution was required to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Huerra intended to kill 

Huerta, and that he committed a direct but ineffectual act 

toward accomplishing that goal. (People v. Stone (2009) 46 

Cal.4th 131, 136.) “The jury may infer a defendant's 

specific intent to commit a crime from all of the facts 

and circumstances shown by the evidence. (See People v. 

Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208 [‘Evidence of a 

defendant's state of mind is almost inevitably 

circumstantial, but circumstantial evidence is as 

sufficient as direct evidence to support a 

conviction .’].)” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 

27.)

The circumstantial evidence suggesting Huerra intended to 

kill Huerta was strong. After being asked to leave the 

party, Huerra retrieved a knife from his vehicle. He 

returned to the party and stabbed Huerta in the abdomen. 

He then attempted to stab Huerta in the chest, but was 

prevented from doing so when Huerta blocked the attempt 

with his arm. These acts logically lead to the inference 

that Huerra intended to kill Huerta.

Huerra argues that these acts do not suggest an intent to 

kill because he stabbed at Huerta only two times. He 

suggests that if he had intended to kill Huerta, he would 

have stabbed him repeatedly. This argument, however, 

simply asks us to draw a different inference from these 

facts than that which supports the judgment. The standard 

of review, however, requires that we draw every logical 

inference that the jury may have drawn from the evidence. 

This evidence amply supports the logical inference that 

Huerra intended to kill Huerta.

Not only was the jury provided with strong circumstantial 

evidence to support the inference that Huerra intended to 

kill Huerta, there was direct evidence of Huerra's intent. 

In his statements to the police, Huerra stated several 

times that he intended to kill Huerta when he returned to 

the party with the knife.

Huerra asks us to ignore his statements for two reasons, 

neither of which are persuasive. First, Huerra argues his 

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statements were unreliable because he was intoxicated when 

he was interviewed. This argument is not supported by 

logic or the record. While it is undisputed that Huerra 

was intoxicated when he was interviewed, both officers 

testified that Huerra appeared coherent and responded 

appropriately to the questions asked of him. Simply 

because he was intoxicated does not mean that he would be 

unable to tell the truth. Significantly, the only 

testimony in the record on the issue of the effect of 

intoxication on an individual suggested that intoxication 

lowered an individual's inhibitions.FN2

FN2. Huerra's expert witness, Kearney, testified 

that intoxication generally will lower a 

person's inhibitions, exaggerate emotions, and 

may cause a person to do things he or she 

normally would not do.

Thus, intoxication may have lowered Huerra's inhibitions 

and may have led him to overreact when Huerta asked him to 

leave the party. These lowered inhibitions, however, also 

may have led Huerra to provide truthful and incriminating 

statements to the police that he may not have made if he 

had not been intoxicated. Nothing in the record suggests 

that simply because Huerra was intoxicated, his statements 

were untruthful or unreliable.

Second, Huerra asks us to ignore his statements because 

they were not recorded. The jury was instructed that 

incriminating statements made by Huerra that were not 

recorded or written should be viewed with caution. 

(CALCRIM No. 358.) Presumably, the jury followed this 

instruction. (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 

559.) We review the record, however, in the light most 

favorable to the judgment. Under this standard, we must 

presume the jury viewed Huerra's statements with caution, 

but nonetheless found them to be credible. The combination 

of circumstantial evidence and direct evidence provided 

overwhelming evidence that Huerra intended to kill Huerta.

(LD 4, 5-8.)

C. Analysis

To determine whether a conviction violates the constitutional 

guarantee of due process of law because of insufficient evidence, a 

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federal court ruling on a petition for writ of habeas corpus must 

determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson 

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 20-21 (1979); Windham v. Merkle, 163 

F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998); Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1008 

(9th Cir. 1997). 

All evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. 

It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to resolve conflicting 

testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the 

facts; thus, it must be assumed that the trier resolved all 

conflicts in a manner that supports the verdict. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones, 114 F.3d at 1008. The relevant 

inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except 

guilt, but rather whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its 

verdict. United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). 

Circumstantial evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn 

therefrom can be sufficient to prove any fact and to sustain a 

conviction, although mere suspicion or speculation does not rise to 

the level of sufficient evidence. United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 

814, 820 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stauffer, 922 F.2d 508, 

514 (9th Cir. 1990); see Jones v. Wood, 207 F.3d at 563. The court 

must base its determination of the sufficiency of the evidence from 

a review of the record. Jackson at 324. 

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The Jackson standard must be applied with reference to the 

substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state 

law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16; Windham, 163 F.3d at 1101. 

However, the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause 

requires to prove an offense is purely a matter of federal law. 

Coleman v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (per 

curiam). For example, under Jackson, juries have broad discretion 

to decide what inferences to draw and are required only to draw 

reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Id. 

Further, under the AEDPA, federal courts must apply the 

standards of Jackson with an additional layer of deference. Coleman 

v. Johnson, - U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2062 (2012); Juan H. v. Allen, 

408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). This Court thus asks whether 

the state court decision being reviewed reflected an objectively 

unreasonable application of the Jackson standard to the facts of the 

case. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2062; Juan H. v. Allen, 408 

F.3d at 1275. The determination of the state court of last review 

on a question of the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to 

considerable deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Coleman v. 

Johnson, 132 S.Ct. at 2065.

Here, the CCA articulated legal standards for reviewing the 

sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction that are consistent 

with the Jackson standard. Further, the CCA reasonably applied the 

Jackson standard in determining that although other inferences could 

conceivably have been drawn from the evidence, it would be presumed 

that the jury drew inferences that supported the judgment, and those 

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inferences were rational in light of the evidence in the record. 

State law required proof of intent to kill, which the CCA reasonably 

found to have been inferred from fact that Petitioner left the 

party, retrieved a knife from his vehicle, returned to the party 

after a substantial interval of time, stabbed the victim in the 

abdomen, attempted to stab him in the chest, and retreated when the 

attempt at the chest was blocked by the victim’s arm. The nature of 

the weapon chosen and the fact that serious bodily injury was 

ultimately not inflicted might warrant an inference of intent to 

inflict some lesser injury, but the CCA reasonably applied Jackson

in concluding that the jury reasonably found to the contrary. 

The state court reasonably relied on Petitioner’s statement

that he had intended to kill the victim when he returned to the 

party with the knife because although he exhibited some signs of 

intoxication when he was questioned, Petitioner appeared to be 

coherent and responded appropriately during the questioning. The 

failure to record the statement was due to a lack of recording 

equipment, and the jury was instructed to view the unrecorded 

statement with caution. Under the circumstances, a rational finder 

of fact could have found that the Petitioner admitted that he 

harbored the intent to kill at the time of the overt act of the 

attempt.

In sum, the state court’s decision on the sufficiency of the 

evidence of intent to kill was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, 

Petitioner’s claim that the evidence of intent to kill was 

insufficient will be denied.

///

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IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Attempted Wilful,

 Deliberate, and Premeditated Murder

Petitioner contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support a conviction of attempted wilful, deliberate, and 

premeditated murder, a form of first degree murder. Petitioner 

relies on People v. Anderson, 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27 (1968), in which 

it was held that three categories of evidence are relevant to 

resolving the issue of premeditation and deliberation: planning 

activity, manner of killing, and motive. Using the Anderson test, 

Petitioner argues he picked a small paring knife which was an 

ineffective weapon; there was no evidence of planning because the 

incident came in reaction to an argument among friends, and the fact 

that Petitioner left for his car and returned in ten to twenty 

minutes to attack the victim is consistent with Petitioner’s 

position that the victim invited him to fight and thus does not 

constitute planning; and the random nature of the attack precludes a 

finding of motive. Thus, Petitioner contends that sufficient 

evidence of deliberation and premeditation is lacking.

A. The State Court Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows:

Willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder

The information alleged that the assault was committed 

willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, thus 

making the crime attempted murder in the first degree. The 

jury found this allegation true. Huerra argues this 

finding was not supported by substantial evidence.

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When reviewing a finding that a defendant's actions were 

done willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation, we 

apply well-established standards. “In People v. Anderson

[(1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26–27], we identified three 

categories of evidence relevant to resolving the issue of 

premeditation and deliberation: planning activity, motive, 

and manner of killing. However, as later explained in 

People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247: ‘Anderson does 

not require that these factors be present in some special 

combination or that they be accorded a particular weight, 

nor is the list exhaustive. Anderson was simply intended 

to guide an appellate court's assessment whether the 

evidence supports an inference that the killing occurred 

as the result of preexisting reflection rather than 

unconsidered or rash impulse. [Citation.]’ Thus, while 

premeditation and deliberation must result from ‘ “careful 

thought and weighing of considerations”’ [citation], we 

continue to apply the principle that ‘[t]he process of 

premeditation and deliberation does not require any 

extended period of time. “The true test is not the 

duration of time as much as it is the extent of the 

reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great 

rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at 

quickly....” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Bolin, supra, 18 

Cal.4th at pp. 331–332.)

Huerra argues that none of the Anderson factors was 

present in this case. His argument, however, ignores the

standard of review. We repeat, we review the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the judgment, drawing all 

inferences the jury reasonably could have drawn from the 

evidence.

Applying the correct standard of review, it is clear that 

the finding was supported by substantial evidence. While 

true that Huerra did not plan for days how he would 

assault Huerta, there was ample evidence that he planned 

the assault. Huerta testified that he asked Huerra to 

leave the party because Huerra was acting inappropriately. 

Huerra left and returned about 10 minutes later. Without 

warning, Huerra stabbed Huerta twice, and then ran from 

the scene.

Huerra's statement to the police was more incriminating. 

He told officers that he became upset with Huerta because 

Huerta was denigrating him and told him to leave the 

party. Huerra challenged Huerta to a fight and even asked 

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Huerta if he wanted to die. Huerra then left the party, 

went to his van, obtained the knife (which he remembered 

was in the van), and approached Huerta. Huerta lunged at 

Huerra, and Huerra stabbed him.

The jury also heard the testimony of Alejandro, the 

security guard. Alejandro testified that when questioned 

about the knife, Huerra said that “they” would not mess 

with him anymore. Huerra also told officers that he wanted 

to kill Huerta.

From this testimony, the jury logically could have 

concluded that Huerra became angry when Huerta asked him 

to leave the party. Huerra decided to attack Huerta and 

went to his van to obtain a weapon. He knew he had a knife 

in the van and he retrieved it with the express intent of 

killing Huerta. Huerra then returned to the party and 

carried out his plan to kill Huerta. This evidence was 

more than adequate to establish planning and premeditation 

by Huerra.

Huerra also claims there was no evidence of motive. We 

disagree. Huerra stated several times during his interview 

with police officers that he was from Guatemala and that 

men from Guatemala knew how to kill. Alejandro also 

testified to Huerra's statement that Huerta would know not 

to mess with Huerra anymore. The jury logically could have 

inferred from this evidence that Huerra's pride was 

offended when Huerta made disparaging remarks to him and 

asked him to leave the party and that he, Huerra, had to 

defend his honor as a matter of national pride.

(LD 4, 8-10.)

B. Analysis

The CCA determined that under state law, the Anderson

categories of evidence are not exclusive. Pre-existing reflection, 

careful thought, and weighing of considerations are required for 

premeditation and deliberation, but the process does not require an 

extended period of time due to the ability of a person to think and 

exercise a calculated judgment rapidly; rather, the test is the 

extent of the reflection. (LD 4, 9.) 

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This Court accepts a state court's interpretation of state law. 

Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1180, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996). In a habeas 

corpus proceeding, this Court is bound by the California Supreme 

Court=s interpretation of California law unless the interpretation is 

deemed untenable or a veiled attempt to avoid review of federal 

questions. Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 964 (9th Cir. 

2001). Here, there is no indication that the state court’s 

interpretation of state law was associated with an attempt to avoid 

review of federal questions. Thus, this Court is bound by the state 

court’s interpretation and application of state law.

The CCA reasonably applied the Jackson standard in concluding

that the finding of attempted wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 

murder was supported by evidence that Petitioner left the party, 

returned ten minutes later with a knife he obtained from his 

vehicle, stabbed the victim twice without warning, and then fled --

all of which showed planning. Further, the state court reasonably 

concluded that the motive was defense of his honor after suffering 

an offense to his pride from the victim’s disparaging remarks. A 

rational finder of fact could conclude that although Petitioner was 

intoxicated, his behavior showed the necessary deliberation and 

premeditation. The state court’s decision was not contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that the evidence was 

insufficient to show attempted wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 

murder will be denied.

V. Jury Instruction on Intoxication

Petitioner argues he was deprived of a defense because there 

was evidence that Petitioner was interviewed by the police while he 

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was highly intoxicated, yet the trial court instructed the jury not 

to consider Petitioner’s intoxication except with respect to the 

elements of intent to kill, deliberation, and premeditation. 

Petitioner contends that the evidence should have been considered by 

the jury in assessing the viability of Petitioner’s statement to 

police because under state law, restrictions on the consideration of 

intoxication imposed by Cal. Pen. Code § 22 do not apply to the 

evaluation of the credibility of a witness’s statement. Petitioner 

contends that the trial court erred in failing to give an 

instruction on the defense theory, which was that Petitioner was 

intoxicated when he spoke to police and was bragging. Further, 

although Petitioner’s statement may not have been involuntary, it 

was unreliable. Finally, the instruction relieved prosecution of 

the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It was fundamentally 

unfair and constituted a violation of due process of law. 

A. The State Court Decision

The pertinent portion of the CCA’s decision is as follows:

II. Jury Instruction on Intoxication

Huerra undisputedly was intoxicated at the time of the 

assault and when he was interviewed by officers. 

Accordingly, the trial court instructed the jury with 

CALCRIM No. 625 as follows:

“You may consider evidence, if any, of the 

defendant's voluntary intoxication only in a 

limited way. You may consider that evidence only 

in deciding whether the defendant acted with an 

intent to kill or that the defendant acted with 

deliberation and premeditation.

“A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or 

she becomes intoxicated by willingly using any 

intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance, 

knowing that it could produce an intoxicating 

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effect or willingly assuming the risk of the 

effect.

“You may not consider evidence of voluntary 

intoxication for any other purpose.”

Huerra contends the trial court erroneously limited the 

consideration of his voluntary intoxication to the mental 

state required for attempted murder. He argues the jury 

should have been allowed to consider his intoxication when 

evaluating the reliability of the statements he gave to 

officers.

Huerra's argument can be summarized as follows. His 

intoxication was relevant to the statements he made during 

the interview with officers because it could have impacted 

the credibility and trustworthiness of the statements. 

Since all relevant evidence is admissible (Evid.Code, § 

350), the jury should have been allowed to consider the 

evidence for that purpose. The instruction limiting the 

use of his intoxication, however, precluded the jury from 

considering his intoxication when evaluating his 

statements to the officers.

There are several flaws in Huerra's argument. First, both 

officers testified that Huerra was coherent and responded 

appropriately to the questions posed.

Second, there is nothing in the record to suggest that 

simply because Huerra was intoxicated he was unable to 

tell the truth. The only witness to testify on the subject 

said the intoxication reduces inhibitions, a 

characteristic that in this case made it more likely that 

Huerra would have been truthful than deceitful.

Third, the only case on point cited by Huerra does not 

support his position. Huerra cites to pages 1136 and 1137 

of People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114. These pages 

are part of the concurring opinion of Justice Mosk and are 

not part of the majority opinion. Justice Mosk did cite 

four cases, but those cases each stand for a different 

proposition than that advanced by Huerra.

In People v. Barnett (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1046 and People 

v. Haydon (1912) 18 Cal.App. 543, the issue was the 

intoxication of a witness during trial. Barnett held that 

the trial court erred in refusing the defendant's 

requested instruction that informed the jury it could 

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consider a witness's intoxication at the time of trial 

when assessing the testimony. (Barnett, at p. 1052.) 

Haydon addressed the propriety of questions propounded to 

a witness about whether he was intoxicated while 

testifying.

In People v. Singh (1937) 19 Cal.App.2d 128 and People v. 

Salladay (1913) 22 Cal.App. 552, the issue addressed was 

the intoxication of the witness at the time of the events 

to which he was testifying. Singh held that the trial 

court erred in precluding questions about whether a 

witness was intoxicated at the time of the events because 

such testimony is relevant to the credibility of the 

witness. (Singh, at p. 129.) In Salladay the issue was 

whether the trial court improperly sustained objections to 

questions about whether a witness was intoxicated at the 

time of the event in question. The court acknowledged that 

intoxication of a witness is relevant because intoxication 

can interfere with a person's “power of perception, the 

accuracy of his deductions and the integrity of his 

memory.” (Salladay, at p. 555.) These cases do not suggest 

that the truthfulness of a witness is suspect simply 

because he was intoxicated at the time of the event.

Fourth, Huerra did not object to the instruction as given, 

thus resulting in a forfeiture of the argument.

Finally, even if there is merit to the argument, Huerra 

cannot establish that the error was prejudicial. His 

statements to police, while incriminating, also provided 

the only exculpatory evidence offered in his defense. 

Huerra told officers that he stabbed at Huerta after 

Huerta lunged at him. Huerra also told officers that 

Huerta agreed to fight and provoked him.

Moreover, Huerra's statements generally were consistent 

with that of Huerta, indicating that Huerra's memory of 

the events was not influenced by his intoxication. Huerra 

admitted arriving at the party intoxicated, being asked to 

leave by Huerta, going to his vehicle to retrieve the 

knife, and then returning to confront Huerta. Huerra's 

statement is incriminating because he admitted to the 

officers he intended to kill Huerta. It is incongruous to 

suggest that Huerra would correctly recall the sequence of 

events but lie about his intent.

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Also, there was no evidence that Huerra's actions were 

motivated by anything other than an alcohol-fueled need to 

seek revenge for his wounded pride. According to Huerra, 

Huerta spoke to him in an offensive manner, and Huerra 

needed, as a Guatemalan, to take action for the slight. It 

also was undisputed that Huerra left the party and 

returned at least 10 minutes later with a knife and 

assaulted Huerta.

These facts can lead to only one logical conclusion: 

Huerra decided he had to prove his manhood by seriously 

harming Huerta. The decision to return with a knife 

established that merely inflicting physical harm was 

insufficient in Huerra's mind. If physical harm was his 

only intent, then he merely could have fought him. 

Obtaining the knife suggests that Huerra wanted to cause 

deadly harm. These facts and inferences strongly suggest 

an intent to kill after deliberation and premeditation.

Finally, the jury was well aware of Huerra's intoxication, 

as virtually every witness testified that Huerra was 

intoxicated. The jury's verdict establishes that it 

concluded Huerra's intoxication did not preclude him from 

forming the mental states of deliberation, premeditation, 

and intent to kill. It is unlikely that the jury would 

have rejected Huerra's admissions when he was less 

intoxicated at the time he spoke with the officers, 

especially since both officers testified to his coherence 

at the time of the interview. Under any standard of 

review, the failure to instruct the jury that it could 

consider Huerra's intoxication when evaluating his 

statements to the officers did not cause Huerra any 

prejudice.

 

(LD 4, 10-13.)

B. Analysis

 The only basis for federal collateral relief for instructional 

error is that the infirm instruction or the lack of instruction by 

itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction 

violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72

(1991); Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); see Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974) (noting that it must be 

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established not merely that the instruction is undesirable, 

erroneous or even “universally condemned,” but that it violated some 

right guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment). 

The instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but 

must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and 

the trial record. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. In reviewing an 

ambiguous instruction, it must be determined whether there is a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged 

instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. Estelle, 502 

U.S. at 72-73 (reaffirming the standard as stated in Boyde v. 

California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). The Court in Estelle

emphasized that the Court had very narrowly defined the category of 

infractions that violate fundamental fairness, and that beyond the 

specific guarantees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due 

Process Clause has limited operation. Id. at 72-73.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 

Compulsory Process Clause and Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 

Amendment require that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful 

opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 

U.S. 683, 690 (1986); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 

(1984). The Supreme Court has characterized its cases as not 

recognizing a generalized constitutional right to have a jury 

instructed on a defense available under the evidence under state 

law. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 108 U.S. 333, 343 (1993). When habeas 

is sought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a failure to instruct on the 

defense theory of the case constitutes error if the theory is 

legally sound and evidence in the case makes it applicable. Clark 

v. Brown, 450 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2006); see Mathews v. United 

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States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988) (reversing a conviction and holding 

that even if a defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, 

he is entitled to an entrapment instruction when there is sufficient 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment, and the 

defendant requests such an instruction).

The harmless error analysis applies to instructional errors so

long as the error at issue does not categorically vitiate all the 

jury's findings. Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 61 (2008) (citing 

Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 11 (1999) (quoting in turn 

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993) concerning erroneous 

reasonable doubt instructions as constituting structural error)). 

In Hedgpeth v. Pulido, the Supreme Court cited to its previous 

decisions that various forms of instructional error were trial 

errors subject to harmless error analysis, including errors of 

omitting or misstating an element of the offense or erroneously 

shifting the burden of proof as to an element. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. 

60-61. To determine whether a petitioner proceeding pursuant to § 

2254 suffered prejudice from such an instructional error, a federal 

court must determine whether the petitioner suffered actual 

prejudice by assessing whether, in light of the record as a whole, 

the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict. Hedgpeth, 555 U.S. at 62; Brecht v. 

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993).

Thus, a habeas petitioner must show that the alleged 

instructional error had a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993); Clark v. Brown, 450 F.3d at 905. A 

failure to instruct on a defense theory has been held harmless under 

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the Brecht standard where other instructions permitted consideration 

of the pertinent defensive matter. Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 

560, 576 (9th Cir. 2004) (failure to instruct on manslaughter was 

not error, but if it were error, it was harmless because it had no 

substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict where numerous instructions allowed the jury to 

consider the effect of threats upon the accused’s mental state, both 

as an absolute defense to all charges and as a factor in choosing 

between first and second degree murder; the jury had been given more 

than the simple all or nothing choice at issue in Beck v. Alabama, 

447 U.S. 625, 638-46 (1980); and the jury's decision to reject 

second degree murder meant that they would not have accepted the 

lesser charge of manslaughter).

Here, this Court is bound by the state court’s conclusion that 

the instruction concerning intoxication was generally correct under 

state law that limits the jury’s consideration of intoxication to 

the issues of specific intent, wilfulness, deliberation, and 

premeditation. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d at 1180. However, 

Petitioner’s pretrial statement to law enforcement officers 

constituted direct evidence of his state of mind at the time of the 

offense and thus was admissible and relevant with respect to state 

of mind. It is logically possible that the intoxication instruction

in some manner circumscribed the jury’s consideration of 

Petitioner’s intoxication as a factor bearing upon the weight to 

assign to the evidence of Petitioner’s pretrial statement. However, 

it is not reasonably probable that a rational juror would understand 

the intoxication instruction to limit consideration of intoxication 

with respect to the pretrial statement. This is because 

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Petitioner’s statement itself related directly to Petitioner’s 

specific intent, wilfulness, deliberation, and premeditation at the 

time of the offense -- all matters within the scope of proper 

consideration of intoxication as set forth in the instruction given. 

The closing arguments are consistent with this understanding.

During argument, the prosecutor relied on Petitioner’s statement 

that he wanted to kill the victim and thus aimed at the heart as 

showing intent to kill. (LD 10, 3 RT 212-13, 222-24.) 

The prosecutor detailed the evidence regarding Petitioner’s 

intoxication throughout the night in question. The prosecutor 

acknowledged that toxicological testimony put Petitioner’s blood 

alcohol at a .22 to .28 at 9:30 p.m., the time of the party, which 

was two to three times the legal limit for driving. Further, 

Petitioner was observed at the party acting in an intoxicated 

fashion by forcing a twelve-year-old to dance with him while he was 

falling down. Much later upon encountering Petitioner at about 

12:15 a.m., officers observed red and watery eyes, slurred speech, 

and swaying.

However, the prosecutor also emphasized all the evidence that 

was inconsistent with the defense that Petitioner’s intoxication

precluded a finding of intent to kill, wilfulness, deliberation, and 

premeditation. The prosecutor argued that throughout that time,

Petitioner’s performance of a series of willed, complex acts 

reflected that although intoxicated, Petitioner nevertheless 

intended to kill and acted with wilfulness, deliberation, and 

premeditation. The conduct relied on by the prosecutor included 

Petitioner’s driving to the party, dancing, walking to the cooler 

and retrieving eight beers from it during the party, communicating 

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as he was being escorted out of the party, forming the intent as he 

was being ejected, going to his vehicle, opening it up, finding the 

knife, returning to the party after about a ten-minute interval,

striking the victim twice suddenly and directly upon finding him, 

and injuring the victim twice. (LD 10, 3 RT 212-21.) 

The prosecutor argued that Petitioner continued to engage in 

complex, willed behaviors for a substantial time after the offense, 

including getting up from the floor after the scuffle, running off, 

managing to reach a bar a couple of blocks away, cleaning himself up 

after being told he was too bloody to enter the bar, returning to 

the bar, and calling police when he was not allowed back into the 

bar. (Id. at 221-24, 244-47.) 

The defense argued that voluntary intoxication was a defense to 

the attempted murder charge, and that the evidence thus showed an 

assault. The defense argued that at 3:20 a.m., Petitioner’s blood 

alcohol was .18; there was no evidence he drank after the party, so 

he must have had a blood alcohol level of .26 or .28 at the time of 

the stabbing. The defense contended that one strong basis for 

discrediting Petitioner’s statement was that he was still very 

intoxicated at the time of the statement. (Id. at 234-43.)

Thus, the matter of Petitioner’s intoxication was the subject 

of considerable evidence at the trial and was fully argued to the 

jury. There was never any objection from either side to the scope 

of the closing argument concerning intoxication and Petitioner’s 

statement.

There was also nothing in the jury deliberations that suggested 

the jury experienced any confusion concerning the two instructions. 

(LD 10, 3RT 252-55.) The jury was instructed to decide if the 

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Petitioner made the pretrial statement and how much importance to 

give to it in light of the other evidence. The jury was also 

instructed to view the statement with caution unless recorded or

written. (Id. at 195-96.)

There is no indication that the instruction lessened the 

prosecution’s burden of proof. The instruction concerning 

evaluation of Petitioner’s statement expressly reminded the jury 

that the prosecution had the burden of proving each element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 196.) The jury was 

correctly instructed on the presumption of innocence and the burden 

of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at 187, 190, 198-200, 

206.)

In light of the record as a whole, the state court’s decision 

that Petitioner did not suffer prejudice from the instructions was 

not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law. The evidence did not require an inference 

that Petitioner’s statement was likely to be untrue simply because 

he was still intoxicated to some extent at the time he made the 

statement. Instead, there was testimony that intoxication might 

reduce inhibitions and thereby encourage admissions. Further, the

interrogating officers testified that during the interrogation,

Petitioner was coherent and responded to the questions posed. 

The narrative in Petitioner’s statement was substantially 

consistent with the victim’s account of the events at the party, 

which tends strongly to show that Petitioner was perceiving and 

recollecting rationally at the time of the offense. The statement

was incriminating, but it also contained the only evidence of selfdefense because Petitioner told the officers that the victim had 

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lunged at him before Petitioner stabbed at the victim, had provoked 

Petitioner, and had agreed to fight him. There was no apparent 

motive for the crime other than to respond to an insult to the 

Petitioner’s manhood. Petitioner’s leaving the party to obtain a 

deadly weapon before physically confronting the victim supports an 

inference that Petitioner intended to kill the victim and acted 

wilfully and with deliberation and premeditation. 

The jury considered Petitioner’s intoxication when it 

determined that at the time of the stabbing, Petitioner harbored the 

intent to kill as well as the special mental state or states of 

premeditation and deliberation. The jury necessarily determined 

that at that time, when the evidence reflected a much higher blood 

alcohol content, Petitioner’s intoxication did not constitute a 

defense to criminal liability or otherwise excuse or mitigate his 

wrongful intent. It is therefore unlikely that the jury would have 

concluded that hours later, when the blood alcohol content would 

have been much lower, Petitioner was too impaired even to recall and 

relate the events of the evening. 

In sum, there is no showing that the instructions had any 

substantial effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict. 

No instructional error rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim of a violation of due process of law 

from the instructions on intoxication will be denied. 

VI. Failure to Instruct on Attempted Voluntary Manslaughter

Petitioner argues that the trial court had the duty to instruct 

on its own motion on attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a 

killing on a sudden quarrel or in the sudden heat of passion or 

provocation. Although the trial court instructed on voluntary 

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manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense, Petitioner contends 

that the court was further required to instruct on the defense 

theory of the lesser included offense of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter based on a killing on a sudden quarrel or in the sudden 

heat of passion or provocation because such an instruction was 

supported by sufficient evidence for a jury to find in Petitioner’s 

favor. Petitioner contends that the absence of the proper 

instruction deprived him of his right to due process of law 

protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to have the 

jury determine all factual issues relating to a charged offense.

A. The State Court Decision

The pertinent portion of the last reasoned decision on the 

issue, which was the CCA’s unpublished decision on direct appeal, is 

as follows:

III. Voluntary Manslaughter as a Lesser Included Offense

In addition to instructing the jury on attempted murder, 

the trial court instructed the jury on attempted voluntary 

manslaughter based on Huerra acting in imperfect selfdefense. Huerra argues the trial court erred because it 

also should have instructed the jury that he would be 

guilty of attempted voluntary manslaughter if he acted in 

the heat of passion.

 Standard of Review

“‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the 

absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the 

general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by 

the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law 

governing the case are those principles closely and openly 

connected with the facts before the court, and which are 

necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 

overruled on other grounds in People v. Breverman (1998) 

19 Cal.4th 142, 149 (Breverman).)

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The general principles of law include instructions on 

lesser included offenses if there is a question about 

whether the evidence is sufficient to permit the jury to 

find all the elements of the charged offense. (Breverman, 

supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 154–155.) There is no obligation 

to instruct the jury on theories that do not have 

substantial evidentiary support. (Id. at p. 162.) “[T]he 

existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will not 

justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but 

such instructions are required whenever evidence that the 

defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is 

‘substantial enough to merit consideration’ by the jury. 

[Citations.]” (Ibid.) Evidence is substantial if it would 

permit the jury to conclude the lesser offense was 

committed, but the greater offense was not. (Ibid.)

 Analysis

We begin with the question of whether there was sufficient 

evidence to require the trial court to instruct the jury 

on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. “An 

intentional, unlawful homicide is ‘upon a sudden quarrel 

or heat of passion’ (§ 192[, subd.] (a)), and is thus 

voluntary manslaughter (ibid.), if the killer's reason was 

actually obscured as the result of a strong passion 

aroused by a ‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an 

‘“ordinary [person] of average disposition ... to act 

rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and 

from this passion rather than from judgment.”’

[Citations.] ‘ “[N]o specific type of provocation [is] 

required....”’ [Citations]. Moreover, the passion aroused 

need not be anger or rage, but can be any ‘ “ ‘[v]iolent, 

intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion’” ’

[citations] other than revenge [citation]. ‘However, if 

sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and 

the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to 

return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter....’ 

[Citation.]” (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 163.)

Huerra asserts that he was angry and upset when Huerta 

made fun of him and then asked him to leave the party. He 

argues that these factors were sufficient to require a 

heat of passion instruction. We disagree. While we accept, 

for the purposes of argument, that these factors caused 

Huerra to become upset, this was not the type of 

provocation that would be sufficient to cause an ordinary 

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person of average disposition to act rashly. Moreover, if 

these factors did cause Huerra to act impulsively, his 

actions would have been motivated by revenge for his 

injured pride, which is not a sufficient ground to support 

the heat of passion theory.

Also, Huerra's argument is not supported by the facts. 

Huerra did not lash out at Huerta when Huerta denigrated 

him and asked him to leave the party. Instead, Huerra left 

the party for at least 10 minutes to obtain a weapon. 

Huerra told officers that during this time he formed the 

intent to kill Huerta. These facts demonstrate that Huerta 

was not acting under a heat of passion. The voluntary 

manslaughter instruction based on actions committed while 

acting under a heat of passion was not supported by the 

evidence.

Even if we were to assume that the trial court should have 

instructed the jury on this theory, we would not reverse 

the judgment because Huerra cannot demonstrate any 

prejudice.

“In a noncapital case, the error in failing to instruct on 

a lesser included offense is reviewed for prejudice under 

People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 which requires 

reversal of the conviction for the greater offense ‘if, 

“after an examination of the entire cause, including the 

evidence” [citation], it appears “reasonably probable” the 

defendant would have obtained a more favorable outcome had 

the error not occurred.’ [Citation.] Probability under 

Watson ‘does not mean more likely than not, but merely a 

reasonable chance, more than an abstract possibility.’ 

[Citation.]” (People v. Racy (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1327, 

1335.)

We conclude there is no possibility that Huerra would have 

obtained a better result had the jury been instructed on 

the heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter. 

First, trial counsel did not argue that Huerra acted under 

a heat of passion, but instead argued that the crime 

committed was assault with a deadly weapon and not 

attempted murder.

Second, the jury not only found Huerra guilty of attempted 

murder but also found true the special circumstance that 

his actions were willful, deliberate, and premeditated. 

This finding precludes any possibility that the jury would 

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have found Huerra was acting under a heat of passion 

because the two mental states are diametrically opposed. 

Also, the jury had two lesser options to convict Huerra—

attempted murder without premeditation and deliberation 

and voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect selfdefense. The jury rejected both of these theories. Logic 

compels the conclusion that the jury also would have 

rejected voluntary manslaughter based on actions committed 

during a heat of passion. 

(LD 4, 14-16.)

B. Analysis

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under 

state law does not state a claim cognizable in federal habeas corpus 

proceedings. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 71-72. A claim that 

an instruction was deficient in comparison to a state model or that 

a trial judge incorrectly interpreted or applied state law governing 

jury instructions does not entitle one to relief under § 2254, which 

requires violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a), 2241(c)(3).

This basic, limiting principle is applicable in the present

case, where the object of Petitioner’s claim of unfairness is the 

state court’s decision upholding the trial court’s failure to 

instruct on its own motion on a lesser included offense. This court 

is bound by the state court’s conclusion that the evidence was not 

substantial enough to warrant giving such an instruction under state 

law principles because any provocation shown by the evidence was 

legally insufficient, and a vengeful motive precluded a finding of 

heat of passion. (LD 4, 14-15.) 

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Although the Supreme Court has held that the failure to 

instruct on lesser included offenses can constitute constitutional 

error in capital cases, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. at 625, it has 

reserved decision on whether such an omission in non-capital cases 

constitutes constitutional error, id. at 638 n.7. When the Supreme 

Court has expressly reserved consideration of an issue, there is no 

Supreme Court precedent creating clearly established federal law 

relating to a petitioner’s habeas claim. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 

F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 2006). In such a situation, a petitioner 

cannot rely on circuit authority, and there is no basis for relief 

pursuant to § 2254(d)(1) for an unreasonable application of clearly 

established federal law. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d at 864;

Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004).

Accordingly, there is no clearly established federal law within 

the meaning of § 2254(d) concerning a state court’s rejection of a 

claim that Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in a non-capital 

case were violated by a failure to instruct on a lesser included 

offense. Thus, such a claim is not cognizable in a proceeding 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and is subject to dismissal. Windham 

v. Merkle, 163 F.3d at 1092.

Further, the absence of the instruction did not result in any 

fundamental unfairness. From the standpoint of a claim that the 

failure to instruct violated the right to instruction on the defense 

theory of the case, the record before the state court supports the 

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state court’s conclusion that the defense did not mount a heat of 

passion or sudden quarrel defense. The defense instead argued that 

intoxication rendered the attack a simple assault. The evidence 

showed no sudden confrontation or quarrel; instead, Petitioner was 

escorted out of the party and then reappeared ten minutes later to 

stab the victim. 

Finally, the state court’s decision that Petitioner was not 

prejudiced was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. There was strong direct and 

circumstantial evidence that Petitioner intended to kill the victim. 

The jury accepted this evidence and declined to conclude that 

Petitioner’s clearly demonstrated intoxication negated the specific 

intent to kill or bolstered a defense of unreasonable or “imperfect” 

self-defense. The jury concluded that Petitioner’s offense of

attempted murder was of the wilful, deliberate, and premeditated 

variety, which involved a state of mind inconsistent with the heat 

of passion under state law. It thus was not possible that a trier 

of fact could have concluded that Petitioner acted in the heat of 

passion and thus was at most culpable of attempted voluntary 

manslaughter. 

In sum, Petitioner has not shown that he suffered any 

fundamental unfairness or that the omission had any substantial or 

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Petitioner’s claim concerning the 

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failure to instruct on attempted voluntary manslaughter based on a 

sudden quarrel or the heat of passion. 

VII. Certificate of Appealability

Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the Court of Appeals 

from the final order in a habeas proceeding in which the detention 

complained of arises out of process issued by a state court. 28 

U.S.C. ' 2253(c)(1)(A); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 

(2003). A district court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. 

Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant 

makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 

' 2253(c)(2). Under this standard, a petitioner must show that 

reasonable jurists could debate whether the petition should have 

been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented 

were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. MillerEl v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 336 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000)). A certificate should issue if the Petitioner 

shows that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether: (1) 

the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional 

right, and (2) the district court was correct in any procedural 

ruling. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000). 

In determining this issue, a court conducts an overview of the 

claims in the habeas petition, generally assesses their merits, and 

determines whether the resolution was debatable among jurists of 

reason or wrong. Id. An applicant must show more than an absence 

of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith; however, the 

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applicant need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. at 338.

Here, it does not appear that reasonable jurists could debate 

whether the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner. Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial 

of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court will decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability. 

VIII. Disposition

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

1) The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED; and

2) The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment for Respondent; and 

3) The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 27, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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