Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01197/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mikhael Charles Dorise
Petitioner
Matevousian
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIKHAEL CHARLES DORISE,

Petitioner,

v.

ANDRE MATEVOUSIAN, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 1:15-cv-01197-DAD-SKO HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING THAT THE COURT 

DISMISS THE PETITION 

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He seeks to have his sentence set aside as excessive following the 

U.S. Supreme Court’s recent holding in Johnson (Samuel) v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 

(2015). Respondent contends that Petitioner should have filed his action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

in the sentencing district and moves to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The 

undersigned has reviewed the parties’ submissions and applicable law and recommends that the 

Court grant Respondent’s motion to dismiss.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

In an unpublished report and recommendation, a magistrate judge in the Western District 

of Louisiana set forth the factual and procedural background of the underlying crime:

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[Petitioner] is currently serving three consecutive sentences, 

totaling 411 months, for robbery, use of a firearm during the 

commission of a crime of violence and possession of a firearm by a 

felon. [3:02-cr-19 S.D. Tex.; Doc. 265] On May 24, 2002, 

[Petitioner], armed with a pistol, forced his way into the Guaranty 

Bank in LaMarque, Texas, just prior to its opening, threatened three 

bank employees at gunpoint, forced them to give him 

approximately $180,000.00, locked them in the bank’s vault, and 

then fled in a truck belonging to one of the employees. [Petitioner] 

was captured shortly after the robbery. [Id.]

[Petitioner] represented himself at trial after rejecting three separate 

court-appointed attorneys. He was convicted by a jury of the three 

crimes alleged against him on May 28, 2004. At sentencing, standby counsel represented him. He was sentenced to 411 months of 

imprisonment, pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act 

(ACCA). On appeal, he accepted the representation of appointed 

counsel. His sole issue on appeal was whether he was competent to 

waive his right to counsel. On January 16, 2006, his convictions 

were affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 

Circuit, which found that the judge did not err in finding that 

[Petitioner] knowingly and willingly waived his right to counsel. 

U.S. v. Dorise, 163 Fed.Appx. 305 (2006).[

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]

More than 2 years later, on November 4, 2008, [Petitioner] filed a 

motion under § 2255 to vacate, set aside or correct [the] sentence. 

[3:02-cr-10, S.D. Tex., Doc. # 265] Petitioner was denied the 

benefit of equitable tolling, and his § 2255 motion was denied as 

time-barred. [3:02-cr-10, S.D. Tex., Doc. # 268, 269] 

Alternatively, the court determined that [Petitioner’s] claims were 

either procedurally barred, not cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding, 

or unavailing. [Id.] Petitioner sought a certificate of appealability, 

which was denied by the district court as well as the Fifth Circuit 

Court of Appeals. [3:02-cr-10, S.D. Tex., Docs. # 277, 291]

Dorise v. Medina, 2011 WL 5024639 at *1 (W.D. La. Sept. 19, 

2011) (No. 11-cv-928).

The District Court adopted the findings and recommendations, and dismissed the case on 

October 20, 2011. See Dorise v. Medina, 2011 WL 5024624 (W.D. La. Oct. 20, 2011) (No. 11-

cv-928).

In a later unpublished opinion, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia 

continued the procedural narrative:

Since filing his § 2255 motion, [Petitioner] has sought permission 

from the Fifth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255 motion 

on three occasions, all of which the Fifth Circuit has denied. In re: 

Mikhail Dorise, No. 10-40605 (5th Cir. 2011 [sic]) (slip op. of Aug. 

 

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“On October 6, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States denied [Petitioner’s] petitioner for writ of certiorari.” 

Dorise v. Zych, 2012 WL 843779 at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 12, 2012) (No. 7:12-cv-00029).

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31, 2010); In re: Mikhael Dorise, No. 10-41020 (5th Cir. 2011[sic]) 

(slip op. of Dec. 14, 2010); In re: Mikhael Dorise, No. 11-40099 

(5th Cir. 2011) (slip op. of Mar. 14, 2011). [Petitioner] has also 

filed two § 2241 petitions in two separate district courts, the Eastern 

District of Kentucky and the Western District of Louisiana, both of 

which were also denied. In his two prior § 2241 petitions, 

[Petitioner] raised substantially the same claim and both district 

courts found that [Petitioner’s] claim was not cognizable in a § 

2241 petition.

In the instant § 2241 petition, [Petitioner] contends that he is 

actually innocent of his career offender status because his 1992 

conviction for a robbery in Galveston, Texas does not qualify as a 

prior “crime of violence” for purposes of a sentencing enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 

decisions in Johnson [(Curtis)] v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1265 

(2010), and Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).2

Dorise v. Zych, 2012 WL 843779 at *1 (W.D. Va. Mar. 12, 2012) 

(No. 7:12-cv-00029).

On March 12, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed 

Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Dorise v. Zych, 2012 

WL 843779 (W.D. Va. Mar. 12, 2012) (No. 7:12-cv-00029). (The Virginia district court applied 

Fourth Circuit precedent holding that the savings clause (28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)) did not apply to 

petitions that only challenge the petitioner’s sentence. Id. at *2.)

On August 3, 2015, Petitioner filed the above-captioned petition for writ of habeas corpus 

in this Court. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition on December 1, 2015.

II. This Court Does Not Have Section 2241 Jurisdiction

A. In General

A federal court may not consider an action over which it has no jurisdiction. Hernandez 

v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000). Respondent contends that because Petitioner 

cannot prove the elements necessary to bring an action challenging his conviction under § 2241, 

the District Court has no jurisdiction over the petition and must dismiss it.

“[T]o determine whether jurisdiction is proper, a court must first determine whether a 

habeas petition is filed pursuant to § 2241 or § 2255 before proceeding to any other issue.” Id. A 

 

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[Petitioner’s] sentence was enhanced under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 because he had committed two prior “crimes of 

violence.” The definition of that term in U.S.S.[G.] § 4B1.2(a) is identical to the term “violent felony” in the ACCA, 

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), the provision at issue in Begay and Johnson [Curtis].

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prisoner must challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution by filing a 

petition pursuant to § 2241 in the “custodial court,” that is, the court of the district in which he is 

incarcerated. Id. at 864. If the prisoner challenges the legality of his conviction or sentence, 

however, he must bring a § 2255 motion in the district of conviction. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 

F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006). The prisoner cannot avoid the restrictions of a § 2255 motion by 

attempting to challenge his conviction or sentence by means of a § 2241 petition in the custodial 

court. Id. If this general rule applies, a petitioner cannot seek modification of his sentence by 

filing a § 2241 petition.

B. The “Escape Hatch”

An exception to the § 2241 limitations, commonly referred to as the “escape hatch” or the 

“savings clause,” “permits a federal prisoner to file a habeas corpus petition pursuant to § 2241 to 

contest the legality of a sentence where his remedy under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to 

test the legality of his detention.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). “[A] prisoner 

may file a § 2241 petition under the escape hatch when the prisoner (1) makes a claim of actual 

innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.” 

Marrero v. Ives, 682 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). “If the 

prisoner’s claims qualify for the escape hatch of § 2255, the prisoner may challenge the legality 

of a sentence through a § 2241 petition in the custodial court.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 

956 (9th Cir. 2008).

C. Unavailability of Adequate or Effective Remedy

The petitioner bears the burden of proving that the remedy available under § 2255 is 

inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). “In 

determining whether a petitioner had an unobstructed procedural shot to pursue his claim, we ask 

whether petitioner’s claim ‘did not become available’ until after a federal court decision.” 

Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 (quoting Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898). To answer this question, a court 

must consider “(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner’s claim ‘did not arise until after he had 

exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion;’ and (2) whether the law changed “in any 

///

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way relevant” to petitioner’s claim after that first § 2255 motion.” Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960 

(quoting Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d at 1060-61).

“An intervening court decision must ‘effect a material change in the application of 

applicable law’ to establish unavailability.’” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960). “[A] decision that simply ‘provides further 

clarification’ of the statute of conviction without ‘materially vary[ing ] from the statutory 

construction set forth’ in previous case law does not effect such a change.” Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 

1048 (quoting Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960).

In Johnson (Samuel), the Supreme Court held that imposing an increased sentence under 

the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)) violated due 

process because it was unconstitutionally vague. Petitioner contends that Johnson (Samuel)

provides him with a previously unavailable argument, rendering his § 2255 remedy inadequate or 

ineffective. 

In this case, before filing this § 2241 petition in the Eastern District of California, where 

he is presently incarcerated, Petitioner has attempted to bring multiple § 2255 motions as well as 

§ 2241 petitions challenging his sentence. When a petitioner seeks authorization to bring a second 

or successive § 2255 petition based on a change in applicable law, “a court of appeals may 

authorize a second or successive § 2255 motion only if the claim relies on a new rule of 

constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 

previously unavailable.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 897. The Fifth Circuit, in which Petitioner was 

convicted and sentenced, has held that Johnson (Samuel) established a new rule of constitutional 

law but that it does not apply retroactively on collateral review. In re Williams, 806 F.3d 322 (5th

Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Petitioner could not successfully pursue relief under Johnson (Samuel)

by filing a motion in the Fifth Circuit seeking authorization to file a second or successive petition.

D. Actual Innocence

Despite the unavailability of an adequate or effective remedy to the alleged violation of 

Petitioner’s due process rights through his sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B ), Petitioner 

///

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cannot rely on the escape clause because he cannot prove that he is actually innocent of the 

charges against him.

 “To establish actual innocence, [a] petitioner must demonstrate that, ‘in light of all the 

evidence,’ ‘it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.’” 

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327-28 

(1995)). See also Alaimalo, 645 F.3d at 1047. Petitioner has the burden of proving this issue by 

a preponderance of the evidence. He must not only show that the evidence against him was weak, 

but that is was so weak that “no reasonable juror” would have convicted him. Lorentsen v. Hood, 

223 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 2000). “[S]uch a claim requires [a] petitioner to support his 

allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory 

scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not 

presented at trial.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324.

The Ninth Circuit has never extended the savings clause to a § 2241 petitioner who 

challenges only the enhancement of his sentence:

We have not yet resolved the question whether a petitioner may 

ever be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence for the purpose of 

qualifying for the escape hatch. It is clear, however, that 

Petitioner’s claim that two of his prior offenses should no longer be 

considered “related,” and that he was incorrectly treated as a career 

offender, is a purely legal claim that has nothing to do with factual 

innocence. Accordingly, it is not a cognizable claim of “actual 

innocence” for the purposes of qualifying to bring a § 2241 petition 

under the escape hatch.

Our sister circuits are in accord that petitioner generally cannot 

assert a cognizable claim of actual innocence of a noncapital 

sentencing enhancement.

Marrero, 682 F.3d at 1193.

Because Petitioner asserts a sentencing claim and because the escape hatch of § 2255 

extends only to petitioners asserting claims of actual innocence regarding their convictions. 

Petitioner has not alleged a cognizable claim of actual innocence. As a result, the Court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider this § 2241 petition under the § 2255 escape hatch.

///

///

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III. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 

2255 before a district judge, the final order shall be subject to 

review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which 

the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a 

proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to another 

district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with a 

criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of 

such person's detention pending removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of 

appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals 

from—

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph 

(1) only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the 

denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall 

indicate which specific issues or issues satisfy the showing required 

by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when the prisoner shows “that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should 

have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal 

quotation omitted). Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he 

must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good 

faith on his . . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

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In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that it lacks jurisdiction to hear the § 2241 petition to be debatable, wrong, or 

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that 

the Court decline to issue a certificate of appealability.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

Because Petitioner cannot establish actual innocence, this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Accordingly, the 

undersigned recommends that the Court dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction and decline to 

issue a certificate of appealability.

These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C ' 636(b)(1). Within thirty 

(30) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendations, either party may file 

written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned AObjections to Magistrate 

Judge=s Findings and Recommendations.@ Replies to the objections, if any, shall be served and 

filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may constitute waiver of the right to appeal the District 

Court's order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 ((9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 27, 2016 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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