Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07156/USCOURTS-caDC-13-07156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy Brown
Appellant
Anthony F. Shelley
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Appellant
Whole Foods Market Group, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 15, 2015 Decided June 12, 2015

No. 13-7156

RANDY BROWN,

APPELLANT

v.

WHOLE FOODS MARKET GROUP, INC.,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cv-00175)

Andrew D. Herman argued the cause for the amicus curiae 

in support of the appellant. Anthony F. Shelley, appointed by 

the court, was with him on briefs.

Christopher E. Humber argued the cause and filed brief 

for the appellee. 

Before: HENDERSON and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 1 of 15
2

PER CURIAM: Pro se plaintiff Randy Brown suffers from 

a cognitive disability due to traumatic brain injury. His 

impairment causes twitching, abnormal or “quirky” facial 

expressions, “social awkwardness” and “idiosyncratic 

mannerisms.” Compl. 1; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 

¶ 4. It also renders him susceptible to confusion and, when he 

experiences stress, it can incapacitate him with little warning. 

Brown enjoys imported food and wine and often shops at the 

Whole Foods supermarket in Washington, D.C.’s Foggy 

Bottom area. Brown alleges, however, that Whole Foods 

employees repeatedly mistreated him and eventually 

orchestrated his false arrest for theft and trespassing. He sued 

Whole Foods, claiming that its mistreatment amounted to 

discrimination based on his disability and his race. The 

district court dismissed his suit and, for the reasons set forth 

below, we reverse and remand.

I.

Whole Foods’s alleged mistreatment of Brown first began 

in late summer 2011 when a cashier asked Brown: “Wouldn’t 

your food stamps buy more at a less expensive store?” 

Amend. to Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 1.1

 Brown insisted that he did not 

use food stamps but the cashier responded (loud enough for 

others to hear) that she had seen him use food stamps and then 

mocked him for doing so. Brown claims she mistook him for 

a different black male, thus profiling him because of his race. 

He reported the incident to Whole Foods management and the 

cashier was reassigned to stocking shelves. Nevertheless, the 

 1

 Because we review the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s 

claims, we recount the facts as laid out in his pleadings, viewing 

them in the light most favorable to Brown. See Klay v. Panetta, 758 

F.3d 369, 371 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 2 of 15
3

cashier-turned-shelf-stocker continued to display “open 

resentment and hostility” toward him. Id. ¶ 2.

In January 2012, while in the Whole Foods deli section, 

Brown asked to sample an expensive salami. The Whole 

Foods employee refused, allegedly assuming that Brown could 

not afford to buy it and informing him that samples were only 

for customers intending to make a purchase. Brown insisted 

and, rather than offering him the salami on a napkin (as she did 

with other customers), she allegedly removed her gloves, 

grabbed a discarded slice with her bare hands and shoved it 

towards Brown. When Brown refused the sample, she 

accused Brown of “thinking that he was too good to eat 

something from her bare hands” and left the deli section to 

speak with a Whole Foods wine-department employee. Id. 

¶ 6. Brown overheard the two employees referring to him as 

“simple looking” and “trifling” and remarking that he “should 

be grateful for anything he received.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 6.2

The day after the deli incident, Brown returned to Whole 

Foods. The wine-department employee who had earlier 

mocked him accused him of stealing olives and shouted:

“You’re not to eat anything in this store!” Id. ¶ 7. Brown 

indicated that he was not eating anything, which prompted an 

apology and, according to Brown, a false explanation that the 

employee was merely concerned because “toxic dust” could 

make him sick. Id. Brown continued shopping, eventually 

asking a wine-department supervisor for a recommendation. 

 2

 Brown also alleges, however, that another Whole Foods 

employee “put on gloves and provided the sample that [he] had, 

originally, requested[,] served on a napkin.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 6.

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 3 of 15
4

According to Brown, the supervisor stared at him and “was 

reluctant to speak to [him] about wines.” Id. ¶ 9.

Frustrated, Brown met with “Ashley,” the supervisor of 

the deli and wine departments. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. He explained 

his disability and that Whole Foods employees’ harassment 

aggravated his confusion and disorientation. Ashley 

apologized and assured him that the store’s employees would 

be reprimanded for violating Whole Foods’s 

non-discrimination policy. Brown then asked whether Whole 

Foods “would accommodate him by allowing him to speak 

with management if a problem arose in the future.” Id. ¶ 14. 

Ashley assured him that he could speak with a manager if he 

felt mistreated or harassed and promised to document their 

conversation. Subsequently, Brown asked Ashley to make 

Whole Foods management “understand” his disability and 

“discourage employees from profiling and targeting him.” Id. 

¶ 15. According to Brown, Ashley “took notes and promised 

that WholeFoods [sic] would take the matter seriously.” Id. 

¶ 16. 

On February 4, 2012, Brown, wearing a foot cast and 

using a cane due to a bicycle accident, was walking through 

Whole Foods with an armful of groceries when he noticed a 

Whole Foods employee named “Khalil” taking photos of him. 

Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. Khalil confronted Brown, accused him of 

stealing a cookie, advised him to “flee the store” before the 

police arrived and suggested that he “never return.” Amend. 

to Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 9. Brown told Khalil that he wanted to speak 

with a manager; Khalil responded, “I am the manager.” Pl.’s 

Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 21. Brown panicked and 

was unable to respond. When the police arrived, Khalil 

allegedly said, “We don’t want this guy in our store. He stole 

a package of cookies and walked through the entire store eating 

them. He has been here over an hour.” Id. ¶ 22. 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 4 of 15
5

Brown was arrested for theft and trespassing but 

ultimately charged with trespassing only. He retained a 

lawyer and the trespassing charge was eventually dismissed 

when Whole Foods failed to appear for trial. Brown’s lawyer 

then suggested that he sue Whole Foods but told Brown to take 

no legal action on his own. His lawyer filed a one-page 

complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that Brown had been 

falsely arrested. According to Brown, his lawyer declined to 

allege race or disability discrimination, advising Brown that 

Whole Foods was not subject to civil-rights statutes, that he

had in fact trespassed by not leaving Whole Foods when asked 

and that Whole Foods could file a retaliatory suit against both 

Brown and the lawyer for “impugning” its reputation if a 

civil-rights complaint were brought. Add. to Pl.’s Resp. to 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 2. 

Dissatisfied, Brown filed a pro se complaint in district 

court under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., “pertaining to [Whole Foods’s] 

refusal to accommodate” him. Compl. 1. His complaint 

recounted his experiences with Whole Foods employees and 

alleged that he had “asked that management be aware that [he] 

was susceptible to confusion in complicated situations 

involving the type of harassment that [he] had already 

experienced at WholeFoods [sic].” Id. at 2. It further alleged 

that Brown had “asked for an accommodation that would allow 

[him] to receive help from a man[a]ger in order to prevent 

future problems.” Id. Whole Foods moved to dismiss 

Brown’s complaint, acknowledging Brown’s allegation that he 

had requested access to a manager but also noting that he did 

not allege that he had been “denied such a request.” Mem. in 

Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 4. 

In his opposition to Whole Foods’s motion, Brown alleged 

that he had requested Whole Foods management to 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 5 of 15
6

“understand his disability and discourage employees from 

profiling and targeting him.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to 

Dismiss ¶ 15. According to Brown, he “felt bewildered” 

because “Ashley had assured [him] that WholeFoods [sic] 

would accommodate him by allowing him to speak with a 

manager” but “Khalil’s actions contradicted what Ashley had 

promised.” Id. ¶ 21. 

Brown also filed an “Amendment” to his original 

complaint that, for the first time, alleged that Whole Foods 

violated Title II3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA), 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. In support, Brown recounted the 

food-stamp accusation and noted that he had been subject to 

“similar remarks indicating a pattern of [racial] profiling.” 

Amend. to Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 7. Whole Foods 

responded with a second motion to dismiss, arguing that 

Brown’s failure to comply with the CRA notice requirement4

ousted the court of jurisdiction. Whole Foods further argued 

that the jurisdictional deficiency could not be cured because 

the statute of limitations for filing a discrimination complaint 

with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights 

(DCOHR) had long since expired. 

Brown moved for an extension of time to respond, 

attaching a copy of an email from the DCOHR General 

Counsel. The email responded to Brown’s earlier email that 

appeared to be a post-complaint attempt to comply with the 

CRA notice provision. A few weeks later, Brown responded 

to Whole Foods’s second motion to dismiss, conceding his 

 3 Brown’s complaint mistakenly alleged a violation of Title III 

of the CRA but the district court assumed that he meant Title II, 

which bars racial discrimination by “any place of public 

accommodation.” See Mem. Op. 7 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)). 

4

 See infra p. 12.

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 6 of 15
7

noncompliance with the CRA notice requirement and the 

one-year statute of limitations but arguing for an equitable 

exception because his former lawyer had “misadvis[ed]” him. 

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s 2d Mot. to Dismiss 7. 

On September 4, 2013, the district court 

dismissed—without prejudice—both of Brown’s claims. On 

his ADA claim, the court first assumed that Brown intended to 

allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii), which 

prohibits a place of “public accommodation” from failing “to 

make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 

procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford” 

the ADA-covered entity’s “goods, services, facilities, . . . or 

accommodations to individuals with disabilities.” See Mem. 

Op. 6. The court then found that “Brown’s only requested 

accommodation was that he ‘receive help from a manager in 

order to prevent future problems.’ ” Id. (quoting Compl. 2). 

According to the court, Brown “never claim[ed] that he ever 

sought to make good on this request or that Whole Foods ever 

denied it.” Id. Without addressing Brown’s 

allegations—asserted in his opposition to Whole Foods’s 

motion to dismiss—that he did in fact request managerial 

assistance on the day of his arrest and asked that Whole Foods 

management understand his disability and discourage its 

employees from harassing him, the district court dismissed his 

ADA claim.

On his CRA claim, the district court first held that Whole 

Foods fit the statutory definition of a “place of public 

accommodation,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1)–(3), but, 

concluding that “[t]he notice provision in Title II is a 

mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite,” Mem. Op. 8 (quotation 

marks omitted), it decided that Brown’s admitted failure to 

comply divested it of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 9. It 

further observed that it was “too late for Brown to cure the 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 7 of 15
8

deficiency in his claim by filing such a notice” because race 

discrimination “[c]omplaints must be filed with DCOHR 

‘within 1 year of the occurrence of the unlawful discriminatory 

practice, or the discovery thereof,’ ” id. at 9–10 (quoting D.C. 

Code § 2-1403.04(a)), and “Brown allege[d] that the last 

incident of discrimination occurred on February 4, 2012, well 

over one year” earlier, id. at 10. Without addressing Brown’s 

post-complaint attempt to comply with the notice provision, 

the district court also dismissed his CRA claim. 

Brown timely appealed; we subsequently appointed 

amicus curiae to “present arguments in favor of [Brown’s] 

position.” Order Appointing Amicus Curiae 2 (Apr. 23, 

2014). We also notified Brown to “file a brief or file a notice 

stating that he is joining in the brief of amicus curiae” or his 

appeal would be dismissed for lack of prosecution. Id. 

Before amicus filed its brief, Brown filed a notice indicating 

that he “intend[ed] to join in the brief of Amicus Curiae” and 

would “not file a brief” of his own. Appellant’s Notice 

Regarding Intent to Join Br. of Amicus Curiae 2. 

II.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of 

Brown’s complaint for failure to state a claim (his ADA claim) 

and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (his CRA claim). 

Atherton v. Dist. of Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 

672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (failure to state a claim); Oakey v. 

U.S. Airways Pilots Disability Income Plan, 723 F.3d 227, 231 

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (subject-matter jurisdiction). In so doing, we 

treat “the complaint’s factual allegations as true” and we grant 

Brown “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from 

the facts alleged.” Atherton, 567 F.3d at 677. Although we 

hold Brown’s pro se pleadings to “less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 8 of 15
9

U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), Brown must nonetheless plead 

“factual matter that permits [us] to infer more than the mere 

possibility of misconduct,” Atherton, 567 F.3d at 681–82 

(quotation marks omitted). 

A.

Brown first alleges a violation of Title II of the ADA, 

specifically section 12182(a). To state a claim under the 

ADA, Brown must plausibly allege that he is disabled within 

the meaning of the ADA; that Whole Foods is a place of public 

accommodation; and that Whole Foods discriminated against 

him by denying him a full and equal opportunity to enjoy the 

goods and services it provides. See Camarillo v. Carrols 

Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008). The district court 

assumed5 that Brown satisfied the first and second elements 

but concluded that he failed to show discrimination. 

ADA-prohibited discrimination can take many forms, 

some of which are enumerated in the statute. The district 

court presumed that Brown’s claim fit under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 6 After noting that “Brown’s only 

requested accommodation was that he ‘receive help from a 

 5

 The court declared: “Even assuming that Brown is disabled 

and that Whole Foods is a public accommodation within the 

meaning of the ADA, . . . his Complaint still fails to state a cause of 

action for which relief can be granted.” Mem. Op. 6 (citation 

omitted). 

6

 Again, it declared: “[T]he Court will presume that Brown 

intends to allege discrimination consisting of ‘a failure to make 

reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when 

such modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, 

facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to individuals 

with disabilities.’ ” Mem. Op. 6 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)). 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 9 of 15
10

manager in order to prevent future problems,’ ” Mem. Op. 6 

(quoting Compl. 2), the court dismissed Brown’s ADA claim 

because “Brown never claims that he ever sought to make good 

on this request or that Whole Foods ever denied it.” Id. 

On appeal, amicus argues that Brown did in fact plausibly 

so allege. Amicus Br. 16; see also id. at 20. Amicus insists 

that Brown “made two, specific requests for reasonable 

modification[s], neither of which were granted by Whole 

Foods,” Amicus Reply Br. 8; specifically, that Whole Foods 

management instruct its employees to “cease harassing 

Brown” and that Whole Foods “provide him with access to a 

supervisor capable of addressing his needs.” Amicus Br. 25; 

see also Amicus Reply Br. 8–9, 11–12. Whole Foods 

responds that Brown was never denied an opportunity to speak 

with a manager and that his pleadings do not indicate that he 

asked Whole Foods to modify its policies to account for his 

disability. Whole Foods argues that, “[i]f anything, Brown is 

simply attempting to shoehorn a disparate treatment claim into 

the framework of a reasonable accommodation claim” but that 

the district court “did not construe Brown’s pleadings to 

include a disparate treatment claim . . . and Brown does not 

argue on appeal that it should have done so.” Appellee’s 

Br. 11. 

We conclude that Brown’s pleadings—considered in 

toto—set out allegations sufficient to survive dismissal. 

Specifically, Brown allegedly asked that management be made 

aware of his disability, see Compl. 2; Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. 

to Dismiss ¶¶ 14–15; that he be allowed to receive help and 

speak to a manager to prevent future problems, see Compl. 2; 

Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 14; and that 

management discourage employees from profiling and 

targeting him, Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 15. 

Brown was then allegedly denied these accommodations when 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 10 of 15
11

he asked for a manager on the day of his arrest. See id. ¶ 21. 

Although Khalil responded that he was the manager, Brown 

was “bewildered” because “Khalil’s actions contradicted what 

Ashley had promised,” id., that is, “that management [would] 

be aware that [he] was susceptible to confusion” and would 

provide “help . . . in order to prevent future problems.” 

Compl. 2. It appears that the district court did not consider 

these allegations. Brown also alleged that he requested 

Whole Foods management more generally to “understand his 

disability and discourage employees from profiling and 

targeting him.” Pl.’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss ¶ 15. 

The district court did not expressly rule on this request. 

We conclude that Brown, as a pro se plaintiff, successfully 

“nudged [his] claim[] across the line from conceivable to 

plausible,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007), and, because the district court did not appear to 

consider all of his allegations—including those in Brown’s 

opposition to Whole Foods’s motion to dismiss—in 

concluding otherwise, we reverse and remand the dismissal of 

Brown’s ADA claim. We have previously held that a district 

court errs in failing to consider a pro se litigant’s complaint “in 

light of” all filings, including filings responsive to a motion to 

dismiss. See Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 

(D.C. Cir. 1999). Whole Foods will suffer no prejudice by 

allowing Brown to, in effect, supplement his complaint with 

the allegations included in his opposition. See id. at 549. 

Indeed, when Brown filed his opposition, he also filed a 

separate amendment to his complaint, which amendment the 

district court allowed. In reversing the district court’s 

dismissal order, we hold that the district court should have 

considered the facts alleged in all of Brown’s pleadings and, 

once considered, should have concluded that Brown 

sufficiently stated his ADA claim to avoid 12(b)(6) dismissal.

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 11 of 15
12

B.

Brown also alleged that Whole Foods violated Title II of 

the CRA, which ensures that “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to 

the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of 

public accommodation . . . without discrimination or 

segregation on the ground of race, color, religion or national 

origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a). The CRA provides that, if an 

“alleged act or practice prohibited by this subchapter . . . 

occurs in a State” with a “State or local law prohibiting such 

act or practice and establishing or authorizing a State or local 

authority to grant or seek relief from such practice;” 

[N]o civil action may be brought . . . before the 

expiration of thirty days after written notice of such 

alleged act or practice has been given to the 

appropriate State or local authority by registered mail 

or in person, provided that the court may stay 

proceedings in such civil action pending the 

termination of State or local enforcement 

proceedings. 

Id. § 2000a–3(c) (emphasis added). The CRA notice 

provision applies to claims arising in the District of Columbia7

and Brown did not first seek relief from DCOHR. 8

 

 7

 See D.C. Code § 2-1402.31(a)(1) (unlawful “[t]o deny [on 

the basis of race], directly or indirectly, any person the full and equal 

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, 

and accommodations of any place of public accommodations”); id. 

§§ 2-1403.01–.17 (DCOHR has authority to seek relief for violations 

of D.C. Code § 2-1402.31).

8

 Amicus raised the possibility that Brown gave verbal notice 

to the D.C. Office of Disability Rights—not DCOHR—before he 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 12 of 15
13

Construing the CRA notice provision as a “mandatory 

jurisdictional prerequisite,” Mem. Op. 8 (quotation marks 

omitted), the district court held that it was without 

subject-matter jurisdiction and that it was too late for Brown to 

meet the CRA notice requirement, id. at 9.

Amicus argues that the CRA notice provision is not a 

jurisdictional prerequisite under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 

decision in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), and 

its progeny and that Brown sent a post-complaint email to 

DCOHR; accordingly, amicus argues, Brown’s failure to 

comply strictly with the CRA notice provision should be 

excused on equitable grounds. Whole Foods defends the 

district court’s decision in toto, noting that several of our sister 

circuits—all pre-Arbaugh—have construed the CRA notice 

requirement as jurisdictional. Whole Foods is wrong. Under 

Supreme Court cases like Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 500, Gonzalez 

v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641 (2012), Sebelius v. Auburn Regional 

Medical Center, 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013), and United States v. 

Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625 (2015), jurisdiction means a court’s

“statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case,” Steel 

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)

(emphasis in original), and statutory limitations like the CRA 

notice provision are jurisdictional only when the Congress has 

“clearly stated as much,” Wong, 135 S. Ct. at 1632 (notice 

requirement and time limits in Federal Tort Claims Act are not 

jurisdictional) (alterations and quotation marks omitted). The 

Congress has not so treated the CRA notice requirement and 

we take this opportunity to make clear that section 2000a–3(c) 

of the CRA does not constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite. 

 

filed his complaint. Amicus concedes, however, that there is no 

record support therefor. 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 13 of 15
14

Brown’s attempt to comply with the notice provision, the 

district court concluded, came “too late.” Mem. Op. 9. We 

disagree. In Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750 

(1979), the Supreme Court construed a materially similar 

notice provision contained in the Age Discrimination in 

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. 

Section 14(b) of the ADEA provides, in relevant part, that:

In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring 

in a State which has a law prohibiting discrimination 

in employment because of age and establishing or 

authorizing a State authority to grant or seek relief 

from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be 

brought . . . before the expiration of sixty days after 

proceedings have been commenced under the State 

law.

29 U.S.C. § 633(b). After holding that exhaustion of state 

administrative remedies is “mandatory, not optional,” Oscar 

Mayer, 441 U.S. at 758, the Supreme Court nonetheless 

rejected the argument that, because the state statute of 

limitations at issue had expired, it was “too late . . . to remedy 

[the] procedural omission” and the “federal action [was] 

therefore jurisdictionally barred.” Id. at 759. The argument 

failed because the state statute of limitations could not divest 

the federal court of jurisdiction “unless Congress mandated 

that resort to state proceedings must be within time limits 

specified by the State,” id., and “[b]y its terms,” section 14(b) 

“requires only that state proceedings be commenced 60 days 

before federal litigation is instituted,” id. (emphasis added). 

Indeed, “besides commencement[,] no other obligation is 

placed upon the ADEA grievant,” particularly no obligation 

that “the grievant must file with the State within whatever time 

limits are specified by state law.” Id. For this reason, the 

Court held that the plaintiff in Oscar Mayer “may yet comply 

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 14 of 15
15

with” the ADEA’s notice provision “by simply filing a signed 

complaint” with the appropriate state agency. Id. at 764. If 

that state agency dismissed the complaint as untimely, then, the

Court held, he “may . . . return to federal court.” Id. at 764–

65. To give the Oscar Mayer plaintiff the opportunity to 

satisfy the ADEA’s notice requirement, the Supreme Court 

ordered his suit held in abeyance. Id. at 764.

The same reasoning applies to Brown’s CRA claim. The 

CRA notice requirement, by its terms, does not incorporate any 

state statute of limitations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a–3(c). For 

this reason, Brown may still comply with it by providing 

written notice of his race discrimination allegations to DCOHR 

and waiting thirty days. If DCOHR denies his administrative 

complaint as time-barred, he, like the Oscar Mayer plaintiff, 

can return to federal court at that time. Accordingly, we 

reverse the district court’s dismissal and instruct it to hold 

Brown’s CRA claim in abeyance until he complies with the 

CRA notice provision.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s 

dismissal of Brown’s ADA and CRA claims and remand for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

So ordered.

USCA Case #13-7156 Document #1557154 Filed: 06/12/2015 Page 15 of 15