Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03035/USCOURTS-arwd-3_06-cv-03035-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Ray Brown
Plaintiff
Jason Day
Defendant
Danny Hickman
Defendant
Jason Phifer
Defendant
Jason Silva
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HARRISON DIVISION

DANIEL RAY BROWN PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-3035

 

DANNY HICKMAN, Sheriff, Boone

County, Arkansas; JASON DAY, Jail

Administrator, Boone County Detention

Center; JASON SILVA, Boone County

Detention Center; and JASON PHIFER,

Boone County Detention Center DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He proceeds pro

se and in forma pauperis.

The events at issue in this lawsuit occurred while the plaintiff was incarcerated at the

Boone County Jail. Plaintiff contends his constitutional rights were violated in the following

ways: (1) he was subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement; (2) he was retaliated

against for filing grievances; (3) the grievance procedure was inadequate; (4) he was subjected

to the use of excessive force (pepper spray); and (5) he was denied adequate medical care.

Defendants filed a summary judgment motion (Doc. 23). Plaintiff filed a response to the

motion (Doc. 31). Because the court felt additional information was needed regarding plaintiff’s

claims, a questionnaire was propounded (Doc. 33). 

Plaintiff filed a timely response to the questionnaire (Doc. 34). The summary judgment

motion is before the undersigned for issuance of this report and recommendation. 

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The court will refer to the documents the plaintiff submitted as an exhibit with his original response to 1

defendants’ summary judgment motion (Doc. 31) as Plff’s Ex. 1. The exhibit contains seven pages.

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Background

Brown was booked into the Boone County Jail on March 22, 2006, on the following

charges: fleeing; revocation of a suspended sentence; possession of methamphetamine with

intent to deliver; felon in possession of a firearm; possession of drug paraphernalia; no vehicle

license; and simultaneous possession of drugs and firearms. Plaintiff’s Response (hereinafter

Resp.) at ¶ 1. Brown remained incarcerated at the Boone County Jail until his transfer to the

Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) on November 14, 2006. Id. at ¶ 61.

On April 22nd, Brown submitted a grievance. Resp. at ¶ 2; Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 1.1

Brown stated he understood that the use of the phones in the cells was a privilege and not a right

but that Jailor Phifer seemed to have a problem with giving Brown “a right to this privilege.” 

Brown stated Phifer also had a problem with forgetting the televisions every Saturday and

Sunday. Resp. at ¶ 3; Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 1. Brown stated Phifer sometimes did not turn them

on until lunch. Id. Brown indicated Phifer only did jail checks once or twice on the weekends.

Id. Brown stated these things were becoming frustrating. Id.

In response, Brown was told he was correct the telephones and televisions were

privileges. Resp. at ¶ 4; Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 1. Brown was told the televisions had just been

placed back in the jail after having been pulled for a month. Id. If the televisions became an

issue again, Brown was told they would be removed. Id. As far as jail checks were concerned,

Brown was told that would be looked into. Id.

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On April 26th, Brown stated he had not had an attorney visit and his public defender

would not communicate with him. Resp. at ¶ 5. Jason Day responded that Brown’s legal

concerns were between him and his attorney and that when he went to court he should inform

the judge of his concerns or write the judge a letter. Id.

Brown complained on April 28th that he had placed a call costing $7.40 to Mr. Pasthing’s

office which was accepted by his secretary. Resp. at ¶ 6. Brown then found out that Pasthing’s

secretary was married to an Arkansas State Trooper and Brown felt betrayed and that his civil

rights were violated. Id. Pasthing was Brown’s attorney. Id. at ¶ 7. Brown asked for and was

provided with a form to file a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Resp. at ¶ 8. 

On April 28th, Brown complained that he had been threatened by Drug Task Force

Coordinator Greg Harris. Resp. at ¶ 9(A). Day responded by asking Brown what exactly he

wanted Day to do. Id. 

Brown was asked to explain: how he was threatened; where he was when this occurred;

and who was present when this occurred. Resp. at ¶ 9(B). Brown indicated he was threatened

on March 22nd at the Boone County Jail during a post-Miranda interview conducted by

Detectives Greg Harris and Tom Smith. Id. Harris threatened to go and arrest Brown’s wife.

Id. Brown indicates this is a separate matter but that he was coerced into a confession. Id. 

On April 29th, Brown submitted a grievance indicting that Phifer had a personal grudge

against Brown and was retaliating against him for a prior grievance he submitted about Phifer’s

conduct. Resp. at ¶ 10. Brown indicated that the toilet in cell 7 overflowed at about 11:30 a.m.

that day spilling water, fecal matter, and filthy bacteria on the cell floor. Id. at ¶ 11.

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Brown indicated that during Phifer’s jail check at 1:00 p.m., Brown told Phifer about the

overflow and he left and did nothing about it. Resp. at ¶ 12. At some time after 3:30 p.m.,

Brown indicates concerned inmates sought the attention of the jailor. Id. at ¶ 13(A).

Specifically, Brown states the inmates were yelling in at attempt to get Phifer’s attention. Id. at

¶ 13(B). According to Brown, Phifer came to the cell with a “red face, obviously angry” and

asked Brown if he was yelling. Id. at ¶ 13(A). 

Brown responded no but asked if a trustee could bring a mop. Resp. at ¶ 14. Brown

indicates Phifer said the trustees could not be allowed out until after 4:00 p.m. Id. Brown also

states Phifer refused to bring a mop bucket or a plunger. Id.

Brown complained that he had nothing to do with the clog. Resp. at ¶ 15. Brown

indicated that he had to stick his hand into the toilet to clear the clog. Id. He also stated that he

and the other inmates had to eat lunch with the filthy mess on the floor. Id.

Phifer submitted an incident report on April 29th stating that he had reviewed the video.

Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 4. Phifer noted that at 1017 hours Brown appeared to place an object in the

commode. Id. At 1122, Phifer indicated Brown appeared to remove the object that looked like

a cup from the commode. Id. Phifer reported that Brown then advised Phifer that the commode

had overflowed. Id. See also Resp. at ¶ 18.

According to Phifer, Inmate John Williams stated that someone, who he was not going

to name, stopped up the commode purposefully. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 4. Phifer looked into the

cell and saw only a small amount of water on the floor. Id.

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According to Brown, Williams is the guilty party and was coerced into writing a

grievance on April 30, 2007. Resp. at ¶ 19. Brown maintains Williams is a key witness. Id.

at ¶ 20(A). Brown also asserts there was a large amount of water, fecal matter, filth, and harmful

bacteria in the cell. Id. Brown maintains the video should show that Williams had reached

through the bars and caused the problem. Id. at ¶ 20(B).

As a result of the overflow and having to clear it by hand, Brown indicates he felt sick

to his stomach and suffered stress and anxiety. Resp. at ¶ 20(C). Brown states he sought mental

health services through Ozark Counseling Services by filling out a medical questionnaire. Id.

However, he doesn’t believe they received his questionnaire. Id. Brown maintains Phifer’s

actions were taken in retaliation for Brown having filed a grievance against Phifer. Id. 

Brown states he is not sure what the clog was. Resp. at ¶ 17. He also denies that he was

seen on any video placing anything to clog the toilet. Id. at ¶ 16. He asks that the video be

reviewed. Id. He also contends he cleared the clog at a later time. Id. at ¶ 17. 

When Officer Silva came on duty, Brown, Charles Bailey, and Smokey McDonald were

moved out of cell 7 and into cell 4. Resp. at ¶ 21. All inmates, including Brown, were advised

that if the commode overflowed again due to debris they would be charged. Id. at ¶ 22.

On April 30th,John Williams submitted a grievance stating that Brown wanted to cause

problems because he did not like Phifer because of the telephones. Resp. at ¶ 23. Williams

indicated that Brown had placed a cup in the toilet of cell 7 on April 29th to make it overflow

and took it out an hour later. Id. Williams stated Phifer was always by the book. Id. Williams

indicated that he had no problems with anyone and everyone could get along if Brown would

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shut his loud mouth. Id. Brown agrees that Williams made this statement, however, he states

Williams was called out of his cell, given a cigarette, and coerced by Phifer. Id.

Brown complained on May 2nd that he had not received the § 1983 forms that he had

been requesting regarding his April 29th grievance. Resp. at ¶ 24. Brown stated the damage was

done and he needed compensation for the incident. Id. He stated the flooded cell should not

have been allowed to remain that way for 4 1⁄2 hours and he should not have been required to

unclog it with his bare hands. Id.

Day responded by giving Brown a § 1983 form on May 7th. Resp. at ¶ 25. On May 21st

Brown submitted a grievance complaining that his request for copies of all his grievances was

ignored. Id. at ¶ 26. Further Brown stated he wanted three sets of § 1983 forms. Id. He also

asked that he be removed from his cell to be spoken with concerning lawsuits and/or his

medical/mental appointments. Id. Brown stated personal scolding was not needed. Id.

In response, Brown was told they would be glad to give him copies of all his grievances.

Resp. at ¶ 27. Brown was also told that he would be given a § 1983 form again after he gave

them the other one back. Id. Finally, he was told he would be treated with respect so long as he

was respectful himself which he had not been. Id.

On May 21st Brown submitted a grievance stating that he was pulled out of his cell for

a random search. Resp. at ¶ 28. Brown indicates he voiced displeasure over a strip search and

was taken to the drunk tank by Sgt. Silva. Id. Brown indicated Silva left and Brown yelled

because Silva had forgotten to strip search Brown. Id.

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Brown indicates Silva returned and told Brown angrily that he had been causing the

jailors trouble. Resp. at ¶ 29. Brown asserts Silva left saying that if Brown made noise or yelled

one more time he would be pepper sprayed. Id.

Brown states he saw there was urine on the drain. Resp. at ¶ 30. For this reason, Brown

indicates he yelled to get Silva’s attention. Id. at ¶ 30 & ¶ 32. Brown maintains Silva opened

the door and sprayed him in the face. Id. at ¶ 30. Brown asserts he was sprayed twice in the

face, hair, and body. Id. 

At some point, Brown asserts Daymade an appearance. Resp. at ¶ 30. Day stated Brown

was kicking the door and yelling and had been warned three times. Id. at ¶ 31. Day stated he

was in the hall and the application of pepper spray was necessary and did stop Brown’s violent

nature. Id. 

Brown indicates he suffered burn “blister scars” to his face. Resp. at ¶ 32(C). Brown was

allowed to wash the spray off but he does not know what time but he believes it was longer than

fifteen minutes after he was sprayed. Id. at ¶ 32(D). 

On May 21st Brown submitted a grievance stating that Christopher Helms had staph

infection. Resp. at ¶ 33(A). Brown indicated Helms had been in Brown’s cell, #7, the weekend

before and on May 15th the toilet had broken before Helms could flush it during shower call.

Id. Brown states the problem was not fixed and he remained in the cell until 22 hours later

when he was moved. Id. Brown maintains this was in reprisal. Id.

Brown maintains Silva and Day had it in for him. Resp. at ¶ 33(B). He wonders “why

else would a human being be left in a cell with feces in it for 22 hours.” Id. Brown indicates

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there were cells they could have been moved to or the toilet could have been fixed as defendants

did for the next occupants of the cell within two hours. Id. He indicates four men had to urinate

into the same toilet for twenty-two hours. Id. He asserts the jailers did not like him because he

stood for being treated humanely. Id. He maintains his grievance appeals to the Sheriff were

intercepted. Id.

In response, Brown was told that the plumber had been called and Brown was moved out

of the cell. Resp. at ¶ 33(C). Brown was also asked how he knew Helms had staph infection.

Id. Brown indicates Helms told Brown and others he had staph infection. Id. at ¶ 33(D). Brown

states Helms had an open oozing wound under his nose and was taking two kinds of antibiotics.

Id.

On May 26th, Brown complained that he had not received commissary in three weeks

and that in order to file a lawsuit he needed paper, envelopes, and stamps. Resp. at ¶ 34. Day

responded that Brown was given paper and envelopes. Id. He told Brown to seal the envelope

and then the jail would put the proper postage on the envelope. Id.

On June 11th, Brown complained that his familywas attempting to raise bond money and

he needed to make phone calls. Resp. at ¶ 35. He was allowed to use the phone the following

day. Id. 

On June 13th, Brown complained that he had been lied to about seeing a psychiatrist. 

Resp. at ¶ 34. Brown complained that he was suffering and that jail personnel were aware of his

anxiety disorder. Id. 

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Brown indicated he had no need to see Dr. Mayo. Resp. at ¶ 36(A). Dr. Mayo is a nurse

practitioner that the jail uses. Id. Brown indicates inmates are charged $20 to see Mayo. Id.

In response, Brown was told he was on the waiting list and that he had been scheduled

an appointment for June 15th, but the O.C.S. cancelled the appointment and the jail had no

control over when O.C.S. saw him. Resp. at ¶ 37(A). Brown appealed the grievance and were

again told that O.C.S. had cancelled the appointment and that the jail would take Brown when

O.C.S. called for him. Id. at ¶ 38.

On June 16th, Brown submitted a grievance stating that he believed the grievance

procedure at the jail was ineffective. Resp. at ¶ 39. He stated that his grievances were only

answered part of the time. Id. He indicated he had requested three copies of § 1983 forms, had

been denied medical treatment, and had been lied to. Id. He stated he suffered from paranoia

and anxiety. Id. He asked for six copies of § 1983 forms. Id. 

Day responded that Brown was given six copies of § 1983 forms that day. Resp. at ¶ 40.

They were also going to fax Brown’s medical request to the doctor’s office. Id. Day asked what

Brown had been lied to about and when Brown believed he was denied medical treatment and

by whom. Id.

Day noted that Silva had given Brown copies of all his grievances but said that they

would give him copies once again. Resp. at ¶ 41. Brown states he did not receive copies of

grievances until that day. Id. Brown asserts he did not receive copies of all his grievances and

that his appeals were routinely not answered. Id. at ¶ 42.

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Brown was asked to explain when he was denied medical treatment, for what condition,

and why he had not previously submitted a grievance or request for medical treatment. Resp. at

¶ 43. He responded:

My face was blistered, I believe I did file a grievance that was unanswered. They

did not like me. I let this go out of fear of getting pepper sprayed again. 

I was denied medical attention in respect to mental health at O.C.S. I did file

grievances &appeals but never was given medical attention from 05-12-06 thru

11-14-06 when I left to ADC. (6 months). Boone County Jail was responsible

for my needs, not O.C.S.

Resp. at ¶ 43.

Brown filed this civil rights lawsuit on June 14th. Resp. at ¶ 44. On July 24th, Day

informed Brown that his lawsuit had been received by jail officials and for his benefit and the

benefit of detention center officers the case would not be discussed. Id. Brown then told Day

he was willing to work out a deal if they would have their attorneys contact him. Id. 

On August 3rd, Brown submitted a grievance asking that the mail log be checked for

three letters he mailed to Congressman John Boozman in early May through June of 2006. Resp.

at ¶ 46. In response, Brown was told the mail log would be checked. Id.

On August 16th, Brown submitted a grievance complaining that he had been lied to and

he still had not been to O.C.S. despite having been told his June 15th appointment had been

rescheduled. Resp. at ¶ 47. Brown also stated he had been on medication before and may need

it again. Id.

In response, Day stated that O.C.S. had cancelled the appointment and had rescheduled

Brown. Resp. at ¶ 48. Day also stated that the doctor would not provide Brown with the

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medication that O.C.S. prescribed. Id. Day said they could only take Brown to O.C.S. when

they told them to. Id. He said Brown was not the only one on the waiting list. Id.

According to defendants, on September 21st Brad Tramell and Silva went to do a cell

check on cell 8. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 2. Defendants indicate Brown was taken in the drunk tank

so a physical search could be done. Id. Because Brown was acting in a combative manner,

defendants indicate Brown was taken to an isolation tank. Id. 

Defendants maintain that when they returned to the cell, Brown was yelling, screaming,

and using foul language. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 2. They assert Brown was warned three times to

be quiet. Id. On the fourth occasion, defendants maintain Brown was sprayed with a one second

burst of OC pepper foam. Id. 

Following administration of the spray, Brown was taken to the sally port for

decontamination and then taken to the shower. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 2; Resp. at ¶ 55(A). Tramell

and Silva then returned to finish the cell search. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 2. 

Brown contends defendants’ records are in error. Resp. at ¶ 49. He indicates this

incident occurred on May 20th. Id. He indicates he was taken to an isolated area where the

cameras did not work so that Silva could retaliate against him and pepper spray him. Id. 

Brown maintains he never yelled, screamed, or cursed. Resp. at ¶ 52. He also contends

he was sprayed two times. Id. at ¶ 54. 

Brown indicates he received minor blisters on hisface from the spray and also had some

mental problems. Resp. at ¶ 55(B). Brown asserts he was abused by the system at the jail and

lived in fear. Id. 

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With respect to Sheriff Hickman, Brown contends Sheriff Hickman is supposed to

answer grievance appeals. Resp. at ¶ 57(A). Brown asserts that he filed appeals but they were

never answered and “conveniently disappeared.” Id. Brown maintains Sheriff Hickman is

responsible for the jail and the jail does not follow jail standards and the OC pepper spray policy

was not followed. Id. Brown did not personally speak to, or communicate with, Sheriff

Hickman during his incarceration at the Boone County Jail. Id. at ¶ 57(B). 

With respect to Day, Brown contends Day: failed to protect Brown from cruel and

unusual punishment; failed to properly process grievances; failed to ensure Phifer was not

retaliating against Brown; allowed Silva to sprayBrown; allowed unsanitary conditions to exist;

denied Brown adequate medical care; and failed to ensure the jail was run according to jail

standards and the pepper spray policy was followed. Resp. at ¶ 58.

With respect to Silva, Brown contends Silva sprayed him two times unnecessarily in the

face with OC pepper spray on May 20th. Resp. at ¶ 59. Brown maintains Silva’s actions were

against the jail’s own pepper spray policy and in retaliation for Brown filing grievances. Id.

With respect to Phifer, Brown contends Phifer retaliated against him for filing grievances.

Resp. at ¶ 60. Specifically, Brown maintains Phifer purposefully left Brown and other inmates

in a locked cell with a toilet that had overflowed for 4 1⁄2 hours. Id. Brown also maintains he

was taken by Phifer to the “sexual offender” cell. Id.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986), the record "show[s] that

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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once a party moving for summary

judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth

specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact

exists." National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient

evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." National Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).

"A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary

judgment." Id. (citing Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)).

Discussion

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. We will address each claim

separately. 

Unconstitutional Conditions of Confinement

“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the

Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety

and general well-being.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1719,

140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998)(citation omitted). In Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir.

2006), the Eighth Circuit held that deliberate indifference is the “appropriate standard of

culpability for all claims that prison officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate

food, clothing, shelter, medical care and reasonable safety.” 

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The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit

inhumane ones. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811

(1994). The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment forbids conditions

that involve the “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain,” or are “grossly disproportionate to

the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 69 L. Ed.

2d 59 (1981). 

“A prisoner alleging an Eighth Amendment violation must prove both an objective and

subjective element. Revels v. Vincenz, 382 F.3d 870, 875 (8th Cir. 2004)(citing Wilson v. Seiter,

501 U.S. 294, 298, 111 S. Ct. 2321, 115 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1991)). “The defendant’s conduct must

objectively rise to the level of a constitutional violation by depriving the plaintiff of the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities. The defendants’ conduct must also reflect a subjective

state of mind evincing deliberate indifference to the health or safety of the prisoner” Revels, 382

F.3d at 875 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Deliberate indifference is

established when the plaintiff shows “the defendant was substantially aware of but disregarded

an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Revels, 382 F.3d at 875. The standards against

which a court measures prison conditions are “the evolving standards of decency that mark the

progress of a maturing society.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed.

2d 251 (1976). 

Brown contends he was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement on April

29th when he was required to remain in cell 7 for 4 1⁄2 hours after the cell overflowed allegedly

spilling water, fecal matter, and bacteria on the floor. In Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265 (8th

Cir. 1996) the Eighth Circuit noted that not every “overflowed toilet in a prison amounts to a

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constitutional violation.” Id. at 268. The court noted it had found constitutional violations to

exist when inmates were forced to work without protective gear in “a shower of human

excrement,” and had ordered prisons to provide protective gear and to warn of the dangers of

working in AIDS-contaminated waste. Id. at 269. It had also found a constitutional violation

to exist when “an inmate was forced to endure a cell covered with filth and human waste for two

full years.” Id. The Eighth Circuit noted that “the length of time a prisoner is subjected to harsh

conditions is a critical factor in our analysis.” Id. It noted that “[c]onditions such as a filthy cell

that “may be tolerable for a few days are intolerably cruel for weeks or months.” Id.

In the case before it, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the summary

judgment materials showed the plaintiff was subjected to a “overflowed toilet in his cell for four

days.” Smith, 87 F.3d at 269. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court held the

defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the raw sewage claim. Id.

In this case, Brown maintains the toilet overflowed at 11:30 a.m. on April 29th spilling

water, fecal matter, and bacteria on the floor. Resp. at ¶ 11. At 1:00 p.m., Brown indicates

Phifer was notified about the overflow. Id. at ¶ 12. Brown indicates he had to unclog the toilet

with his hand and felt sick to his stomach as a result. Id. at ¶ 20(C). He also alleges he suffered

mentally as a result. Id. The inmates were moved out of the cell when Silva came on duty. Id.

at ¶ 21. The cell had remained flooded for 4 1⁄2 hours. Id. at ¶ 21. 

According to defendants, Brown placed an object in the commode at 10:17 a.m. causing

the toilet to overflow. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 4. Defendants maintain Brown removed the object

at 11:22 a.m. and then reported the toilet overflow to Phifer. Id. Defendants assert Phifer

checked the cell and saw only a small amount of water on the floor. Defts’ Ex. 2 at page 4. 

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Under the totality of the circumstances, we do not believe Brown’s allegations rise to the

level of constitutional significance. Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, he

was exposed to the overflowed toilet for only a short period of time, 4 1⁄2 hours. We find no

genuine issues of fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of harm

to Brown posed by the overflowed toilet. 

With respect to the broken flush button, Brown alleges that after an inmate who had staph

infection used the toilet on May 15th the flush broken broke. Resp. at ¶ 33(A). For a twenty-two

hour period beginning on May 15th, Brown indicates he remained in the cell with the inmate

who had a staph infection despite the fact the flush button on the toilet was not fixed. Id. There

was no overflow in this case. Rather, the inmates were merely forced to use a toilet that would

not flush. Brown was told a plumber had been called and he was then moved out of the cell. Id.

at ¶ 33(A) & ¶ 33(C).

Brown had limited exposure to the unsanitary condition and does not allege that he

suffered any health consequences as a result. He was moved to a different cell the following day

and a plumber called to fix the problem. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find no

genuine issue of material fact exist as to this claim. 

Retaliation

In general, "[c]onduct that retaliates against the exercise of a constitutionally protected right

is actionable, even if the conduct would have been proper if motivated by a different reason."

Cody v. Weber, 256 F.3d 764, 771 (8th Cir. 2001)(citation omitted); Madewell v. Roberts, 909

F.2d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1990)(same). "Indeed, the retaliatory conduct does not itself need to be

a constitutional violation in order to be actionable." Id. See also Dixon v. Brown, 38 F.3d 379,

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380 (8th Cir. 1994)("[W]hen retaliatory conduct is involved, there is no independent injury

requirement.").

To prevail on his retaliation claim, Brown must demonstrate: (1) that he engaged in

protected activity; (2) that the defendants in response took adverse action; and (3) that his protected

activity was the cause of the retaliation. See Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216, 218 (8th Cir.

1994)(threat of retaliation is sufficient injury if made in retaliation for inmate’s use of prison

grievance procedure). 

Brown filed a grievance about Phifer’s conduct on April 22nd. Resp. at ¶ 2. Following

the filing of this grievance, Brown contends Phifer retaliated against him in the following ways:

(1) Phifer left Brown and other inmates in cell 7 with an overflowed toilet on April 29th, see e.g.,

resp. at ¶ 10; (2) Phifer coerced inmate John Williams into making a statement on April 30th

blaming Brown for the April 29th toilet overflow in retaliation for Brown having submitted a

grievance about Phifer’s conduct, see e.g., resp. at ¶ 23; and (3) on April 30th Phifer placed Brown

in cell 5 with the sexual offenders in order to humiliate him. Brown also contends Silva pepper

sprayed him on May 20th in retaliation for his filing grievances. Resp. at ¶ 59.

“The filing of a prison grievance, like the filing of an inmate lawsuit, is protected First

Amendment activity.” Lewis v. Jacks, 486 F.3d 1025, 1029 (8th Cir. 2007). “To avoid summary

judgment, [Brown] must submit affirmative evidence [of] retaliatory motive.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Because nearly every otherwise routine administrative decision may potentially be

viewed as a retaliatory act, it has been recognized that “[r]etaliation claims by prisoners are prone

to abuse since prisoners can claim retaliation for every decision they dislike.” Graham v.

Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996). Further, the courts have recognized that prison

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officials must have broad administrative authority. Graham, 89 F.3d at 79. For this reason, it

has been said that “courts must approach prisoner claims of retaliation with skepticism and

particular care.” Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001)(not every response to a

prisoner’s exercise of a constitutional right is actionable). See also Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d

1127, 1129 (8th Cir. 1996)(per curiam)(Speculative and conclusory allegations cannot support

a retaliation claim). 

In this case, the grievance Brown submitted regarding Phifer’s conduct was on April 22nd.

The alleged retaliatory conduct taken by Phifer occurred on April 29th and April 30th. The close

time proximity between the protected conduct and the alleged retaliatory conduct could be

suggestive of a causal connection between the two events. See e.g., Kipp v. Mo. Highway &

Transportation Comm’n, 280 F.3d 893, 897 (8th Cir. 2002)(examining temporal connection

between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory activity). We note also that although

defendants maintain Brown was responsible for the overflow on April 29th he does not appear to

have been charged with a disciplinary violation as a result of his alleged actions. We conclude

there are genuine issues of fact that preclude summary judgment in Phifer’s favor on this claim.

There is less evidence to suggest a causal link between the filing of any grievance and

Silva’s use of pepper spray against Brown on May 20th. As discussed below, we believe there are

genuine issues of material fact that preclude entry of summary judgment in Silva’s favor on the

excessive force claim Brown has brought regarding this same incident. Out of an abundance of

caution, we will therefore allow the retaliation claim arising out of the same incident to proceed

against Silva.

However, “[l]iability under section 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility

for, the deprivation of rights. To establish personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [the

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plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a

deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir.

2007)(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no evidence to suggest Jason Day

or Sheriff Hickman were involved in any retaliatory conduct. Accordingly, these defendants will

be granted summary judgment on this claim. 

Denial of Access to an Adequate Grievance Procedure

Brown contends his grievances were not handled properly, he did not always get

responses, he did not get copies, and the appeals were not processed. However, he has not

identified a federal constitutional right that he was deprived of because of the alleged

inadequacies in the grievance procedures. He makes no argument that he was treated differently

from other similarly situated prisoners, or that his grievances were ignored because of his

exercise of his First Amendment rights, or that his ability to exercise any specific constitutional

right was chilled by defendants’ actions. 

"Inmates do not have a constitutionally protected right to a grievance procedure. Because

a . . . grievance procedure does not confer any substantive right upon prison inmates, a prison

official's failure to comply with the . . . grievance procedure is not actionable under § 1983."

Ashann-Ra v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559, 569 (W.D. Va. 2000)(citations

omitted). See also Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994)(inmates have no constitutional

right to grievance procedure); Blagman v. White, 112 F. Supp. 2d 534 (E.D. Va. 2000)(inmate

has no constitutional entitlement to grievance procedure), aff’d, 3 Fed. Appx. 23 (4th Cir. 2001).

"Rather, prison inmates have a constitutional right to petition the government for redress

through a right of access to the courts." Blagman, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (citing Flick v. Alba,

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932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)). A jail's "refusal to entertain such grievances does not

compromise the inmate's constitutional rights, as access to the courts would still be available."

Blagman, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 542 (citing, Scott v. Kelly, 107 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Va. 2000),

aff’d, 6 Fed. Appx. 187 (4th Cir. 2001)). “[A]ny alleged due process violation arising from the

alleged failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless.” Geiger v. Jowers, 404

F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Excessive Force

"In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by

identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of

force." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989).

"[T]he constitutional standard applied may vary depending upon whether the victim is an

arrestee, a pretrial detainee, or a convicted inmate of a penal institution." Andrews v. Neer, 253

F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, Brown was a pretrial detainee. In Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, the Eighth

Circuit court noted that:

[u]nlike convicted prisoners, the state has no right to punish [pretrial detainees].

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1871-72, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447

(1979). Their confinement conditions are analyzed under the due process clause

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Eighth Amendment's

"cruel and unusual punishment" standard which is used for convicted prisoners.

Id. The injuries detainees suffer must be necessarily incident to administrative

interests in safety, security and efficiency. As a pretrial detainee, Freeman's

excessive-force claim is properly analyzed under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 & n. 10

(1989) (due process clause protects pretrial detainee from force amounting to

punishment). 

Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048 (8th Cir. 1989).

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The courts generally analyze excessive force claims of pretrial detainees in the same way

as those of arrestees. Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir. 2001)("The evaluation of

excessive-force claims brought by pre-trial detainees, although grounded in the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Fourth Amendment, also relies on an objective

reasonableness standard."). The use of force must be necessary to some legitimate institutional

interest such as safety, security, or efficiency, and the force used must not be in excess of that

reasonably believed necessary to achieve those goals. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d at 1048. The

relevant inquiry being whether the officials behaved in a reasonable way in light of the facts and

circumstances confronting them. See e.g., Wilson v. Williams, 83 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1996).

According to Brown, OC pepper spray was used against him on only the one occasion

on May 20th. Resp. at ¶ 49. Brown maintains the defendants’ records that indicate pepper spray

was used on him on September 21st are in error and are actually referring to the May 20th

incident. Resp. at ¶ 49. 

On May 20th, Brown concedes he was yelling and kicking the cell door of the drunk tank.

Resp. at ¶ 32(A). Brown maintains he was sprayed twice by Silva and has blister scars on his

face as a result of the application of the spray. Id. at ¶ 30 & ¶ 32(C).

Courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that “a limited application of [nonlethal chemical agent] to control a recalcitrant inmate constitutes a ‘tempered response by prison

officials’ when compared to other forms of force.” Jones v. Shields, 207 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir.

2000)(discussing cases from a number of jurisdictions holding the use of chemical agents did not

constitute cruel and unusual punishment if reasonably necessary to maintain security and order

or subdue a recalcitrant prisoner). But see Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir.

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2006)(“An application of pepper spray when an inmate is being compliant can provide a basis

for an Eighth Amendment claim.”). The Eighth Circuit also noted that when “[u]sed in such

manner and purpose, its application should ‘rarely be a proper basis for judicial oversight.’”

Jones, 207 F.3d at 496.

In this case, Brown states he was voicing “displeasure over [a] strip search” and then

yelled at Silva after he left Brown in the drunk tank without remembering to search him. Plff’s

Ex. 1 at page 4. Brown admits he was warned that if he made any more noise he would be pepper

sprayed. Id. Despite the warning, Brown states he yelled and kicked the cell door to get Silva’s

attention. Resp. at ¶ 32(B). 

In this case, we conclude there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the use

of force was reasonable under the circumstances. Brown asserts that Silva left the area and then

came back. It appears Brown was in a cell and no threat to Silva or the other guards or the

security of the facility at the time the pepper spray was used. 

In Johnson v. Blaukat, 453 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir. 2006), the court considered factors

including whether the actions of the officers were defensive in nature or motivated by anger;

whether the actions were necessary to maintain order or were excessive reactions by frustrated

officers; and whether the amount of force used was commensurate with the situation. Id. The

court noted additional material issues included whether or not the plaintiff failed to comply with

orders given by officers in the cell, whether the plaintiff was actively resisting them, whether

verbal orders or the application of less force would have been sufficient, whether or not a

warning issued before the application of the pepper spray, and whether the plaintiff suffered real

injuries. Id.

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Brown submitted several grievances/medical requests but none mention needing medical

attention as a result of the application of the pepper spray. See e.g., Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 7; Defts’

Ex. 1 at pages 3 & 5. He does contend he submitted a grievance about his face being blistered

but it went unanswered. Resp. at ¶ 43. He asserts he let it go out of fear of getting pepper

sprayed. Id. 

Brown maintains the spray left “blister scars” on his face. Resp. at ¶ 31. We cannot say

as a matter of law this is a de minimis injury. 

With respect to Day, Brown contends he gave Silva the “ok” to spray Brown. Resp. at

¶ 57(A). Brown indicates Day was present and authorized the use of the spray. We therefore

believe it is necessary to deny summary judgment in Day’s favor on this claim also. However,

Brown has alleged no personal involvement of Sheriff Hickman or Phifer or other basis on which

Sheriff Hickman or Phifer can be held liable for the use of the pepper spray. 

Denial of Adequate Medical Care

During his incarceration at the Boone County Jail, Brown was a pretrial detainee.

“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the

Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety

and general well-being.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1719,

140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998)(citation omitted). In Butler v. Fletcher, 465 F.3d 340, 344 (8th Cir.

2006), the Eighth Circuit held that deliberate indifference is the “appropriate standard of

culpability for all claims that prison officials failed to provide pretrial detainees with adequate

food, clothing, shelter, medical care and reasonable safety.” 

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“In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently

harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). The deliberate indifference standard

includes "both an objective and a subjective component: 'The [plaintiff] must demonstrate (1)

that [he] suffered [from] objectively serious medical needs and (2) that the prison officials

actually knew of but deliberately disregarded those needs.'" Jolly v. Knudsen, 205 F.3d 1094,

1096 (8th Cir. 2000)(quoting Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997)).

Additionally, "'[t]he prisoner must show more than negligence, more even than gross negligence,

and mere disagreement with treatment decisions does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.'" Jolly, 205 F.3d at 1096 (quoting Estate of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th

Cir.1995)). See also Gregoire v. Class, 236 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 2000)("To establish a

constitutional violation, it is not enough that a reasonable official should have known of the risk,

a plaintiff must establish that the official in question did in fact know of the risk.").

"Because society does not expect that prisoners will have unqualified access to health

care, deliberate indifference to medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only

if those needs are 'serious.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000, 117 L.

Ed. 2d 156 (1992). "A medical need is serious if it is obvious to the layperson or supported by

medical evidence." Moore v. Jackson, 123 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam)

(internal quotation and citation omitted).

"[T]he failure to treat a medical condition does not constitute punishment within the

meaning of the Eighth Amendment unless prison officials knew that the condition created an

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excessive risk to the inmate's health and then failed to act on that knowledge." Long v. Nix, 86

F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1996). In Dulany v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234 (8th Cir. 1997), the

Eighth Circuit said:

As long as this threshold is not crossed, inmates have no constitutional right to

receive a particular or requested course of treatment, and prison doctors remain

free to exercise their independent medical judgment. Deliberate indifference may

be demonstrated by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to

medical care or intentionally interfere with prescribed treatment, or by prison

doctors who fail to respond to prisoner's serious medical needs. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976). Mere

negligence or medical malpractice, however, are insufficient to rise to a

constitutional violation. Id. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 292.

Dulany, 132 F.3d at 1239. See also Tlamka v. Serrell, 244 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir. 2001). 

In this case, Brown contends he was denied medical care for his face following

application of the pepper spray on May 20th and he was denied mental health care at O.C.S.

Resp. at ¶ 43. With respect to the provision of mental health care, Brown maintains Boone

County Jail was responsible for meeting his needs not O.C.S. Id. 

In connection with the alleged injuries to his face caused by the pepper spray, there is no

indication in the summary judgment record that Brown submitted any requests for medical

treatment. Brown utilized form documents apparently provided by the defendants to submit

grievances, medical requests, and appeals. See e.g., Plff’s Ex. 1; Defts’ Ex. 1. On the forms

provided, the inmate fills in his name, cell number, indicates whether he is submitting a

grievance, medical request, or appeal by placing a check mark in the appropriate area on the

form, describes his problem, and signs and dates the form. See Plff’s Ex. 1; Defts’ Ex. 1. 

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Brown submitted a number of grievances or requests addressing various problems. He

submitted a grievance regarding Silva spraying him with pepper spray but did not mention any

injury to his face or any need for medical attention. Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 4. That same day, he

submitted a second grievance about having been left confined in a cell for twenty-two hours the

weekend before with an inmate who had staph infection and a toilet that did not flush. Id. at

page 5.

With respect to his need for mental health care, Brown indicates he requested care by

filling out a questionnaire on May 12th. Resp. at ¶ 20(A). On June 13th, Brown submitted a

grievance stating he had been told by Silva several weeks ago that he had an appointment at

O.C.S. in a few days. Defts’ Ex. 1 at page 5. In response, Brown was told his appointment had

been scheduled for June 15th but O.C.S. had cancelled it. Id. Brown indicated he suffered from

paranoia and anxiety. Id. at page 3. On August 16th, Brown complained he still hadn’t been to

O.C.S. Plff’s Ex. 1 at page 7. 

In this case, we believe there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether

defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to Brown’s serious medical needs. First, with

respect to the alleged injuries to Brown’s face, there is no indication he sought medical treatment

for the alleged injuries or that defendants ignored an acute or escalating condition with respect

to Brown’s health. See e.g., Beck v. Skon, 253 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 2001)(“Like any other

civil litigant [a pro se litigant is] required to respond to defendants’ motion with specific factual

support for his claims to avoid summary judgment”). Although he filed grievances regarding

the application of the pepper spray, the grievances do not mention any injuries. 

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With respect to his need for mental health treatment, while there is evidence in the record

that Brown requested appointments at O.C.S. over a period beginning sometime in May and

lasting until August 16th, there is nothing in the record to establish Brown was harmed by this

delay or that the delay was attributable to the named defendants. “When the inmate alleges that

a delay in medical treatment rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation, the objective

seriousness of the deprivation should also be measured by reference to the effect of delay in

treatment. To establish this effect, the inmate must place verifying medical evidence in the

record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical treatment ...” Laughlin v. Schriro,

430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Brown

submitted no evidence suggesting any delay in his obtaining treatment had a detrimental effect.

He therefore failed to raise a genuine issue of fact with respect to this claim.

Moreover, there is no evidence the defendants were personally involved in scheduling

appointments at O.C.S. or that they delayed in anyway in referring Brown to O.C.S. or advising

O.C.S. that Brown wanted an appointment. Brown does not dispute the fact that O.C.S.

cancelled Brown’s June 15th appointment or that defendants merely provided transportation for

inmates to O.C.S. appointments. Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir. 1997)(no

evidence that the defendants were doctors or were personally involved in making medical

decisions about treatment); Mark v. Nix, 983 F.2d 138, 139-40 (8th Cir. 1993)(section 1983

liability requires some personal involvement or responsibility). There is simply no basis on

which defendants can be held liable for actions taken by O.C.S. staff. Johnson v. Outboard

Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1999).

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Conclusion

For the reasons stated, I recommend that the defendants’ motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 23) be granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, I recommend as follows:

(1) the motion be granted with respect to the plaintiff’s claims that he was subjected to

unconstitutional conditions of confinement, that the grievance procedure was inadequate, and

that he was denied adequate medical care; 

(2) the motion be granted with respect to all claims asserted against Sheriff Danny

Hickman; and

(3) the motion be denied with respect to his claim that Jason Phifer and Jason Silva

retaliated against him and his claim that Jason Day and Jason Silva used excessive force against

him.

The parties have ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in which

to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 9th day of August 2007.

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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