Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05358/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05358-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Combat Veterans for Congress Political Action Committee
Appellant
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
David H. Wiggs
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 5, 2015 Decided July 28, 2015 

No. 13-5358 

COMBAT VETERANS FOR CONGRESS POLITICAL ACTION 

COMMITTEE AND DAVID H. WIGGS, TREASURER, 

APPELLANTS

v. 

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 1:11-cv-02168) 

Paul D. Kamenar argued the cause for appellants. With 

him on the briefs was Dan Backer. 

 

Harry J. Summers, Assistant General Counsel, Federal 

Election Commission, argued the cause for appellee. With 

him on the brief were Kevin A. Deeley, Acting Associate 

General Counsel, and Robert W. Bonham III, Senior Attorney. 

Before: HENDERSON, PILLARD and WILKINS, Circuit 

Judges. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge PILLARD. 

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PILLARD, Circuit Judge: The basic facts are few and not 

in dispute. The Federal Election Commission in October of 

2011 imposed an $8,690 fine on the Combat Veterans for 

Congress Political Action Committee and its treasurer, David 

Wiggs, in his official capacity. Combat Veterans incurred the 

fine for failing to meet three required reporting deadlines 

under the Federal Election Campaign Act. Combat Veterans 

sued the Commission, contesting the fine and charging that 

the Commission’s procedural errors deprived it of the power 

to act. 

Only one of Combat Veterans’ claims gives us pause. It 

emerged during litigation that the Commission’s voting 

procedures may contravene the Campaign Act. The 

Commission must secure “an affirmative vote of” four of its 

six Commissioners to initiate an enforcement action against a 

person who misses a filing deadline under the Act. 52 U.S.C. 

§ 30109(a)(2). In polling its Commissioners to learn how 

they vote on an enforcement action, the Commission currently 

uses a voting procedure that counts as “affirmative votes” 

ballots that it distributes to the Commissioners but that 

Commissioners do not mark and return. There is a question 

whether it is lawful for the Commission to treat unmarked, 

unreturned ballots as affirmative votes. 

Disposition of this case does not, however, require that 

we resolve the precise meaning of “affirmative votes” under 

the statute, and, in particular, whether the Commissioners’ 

silent acquiescence may be treated as such votes. Combat 

Veterans has failed to show that the Commission’s use of its 

allegedly flawed voting procedure caused it any prejudice. 

The challenged votes did not result in an investigation of 

Combat Veterans because the filings’ lateness was readily 

apparent from information already in the Commission’s 

possession. Moreover, the Commission’s ultimate liability 

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determinations on the late filing charges were made by 

unanimous tally votes on marked ballots. Because we 

conclude that the Commission’s use of its voting procedure 

was harmless even if it was in error, we affirm the decision of 

the district court. 

I. 

A. 

The Federal Election Commission administers the 

Federal Election Campaign Act, the statute that regulates 

campaign fundraising and financing for federal elections. See 

52 U.S.C. §§ 30101 et seq.1

 The Campaign Act requires that 

political committees file periodic reports detailing their 

receipts and disbursements. Id. § 30104(a)-(b). The Federal 

Election Commission is authorized to fine political 

committees that fail to meet the Act’s reporting deadlines. Id.

§ 30109(a)(5)(A)-(B). 

Deadlines are not all that the Commission superintends, 

however. The Commission’s mandate is broad and its 

authority considerable. See id. § 30107. Substantively, the 

Act charges the Commission to enforce laws governing 

required public disclosures of campaign finance information, 

as well as limits on contributions to, and public funding of, 

federal election campaigns. As a procedural matter, the Act 

authorizes the Commission to conduct investigations, 

authorize subpoenas, administer oaths, receive evidence, and 

initiate civil actions. See id. Such an independent 

 

1

 Until recently, the Federal Election Campaign Act was codified 

at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-457. The Act has since been recodified and 

renumbered. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-46. In this opinion, we cite 

to the current codification. 

USCA Case #13-5358 Document #1564829 Filed: 07/28/2015 Page 3 of 16
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Commission holds potentially enormous power. It must 

decide “issues charged with the dynamics of party politics, 

often under the pressure of an impending election.” FEC v. 

Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 

(1981). 

Congress sought to limit the Commission’s powers 

through two safeguards. First, Congress tempered the 

Commission’s powers through structure. See H.R. Rep. No. 

94-917, at 3 (1976); see also Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. 

Bowman, Obstacles to Effective Enforcement of the Federal 

Election Campaign Act, 52 Admin. L. Rev. 575, 590-93 

(2000). Congress designed the Commission to ensure that 

every important action it takes is bipartisan. See Democratic 

Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. at 37; Common Cause 

v. FEC, 842 F.2d 436, 449 n.32 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The 

Commission is comprised of six Commissioners. 52 U.S.C. § 

30106(a)(1); see FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 

821, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding unconstitutional 

statutory provision permitting two congressional officers to 

serve as ex-officio members). Of the six Commissioners, 

“[n]o more than [three] . . . may be affiliated with the same 

political party.” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(a)(1) Many Commission 

actions require “the affirmative vote of 4 members of the 

Commission.” See id. § 30106(c) (cross-citing 52 U.S.C. §§ 

30107(a)(6), (7), (8), (9)). No Commissioner may “delegate 

to any person his or her vote or any decisionmaking authority 

or duty.” Id. The Commission cannot sub-delegate its central 

powers to committees of its members. See id. The fouraffirmative-vote, non-delegation, and bipartisanship 

requirements reduce the risk that the Commission will abuse 

its powers. As the Committee Report accompanying the 

creation of the four-vote language explains: “[t]he four-vote 

requirement serves to assure that enforcement actions, as to 

which Congress has no continuing voice, will be the product 

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of a mature and considered judgment.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-

917, at 3 (1976). 

Congress further tempered the Commission’s power by 

requiring a series of steps before the Commission takes 

enforcement action. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a); see also 11 

C.F.R. § 111.3-111.24 (enforcement process regulations); 

Thomas & Bowman, supra at 584-90. Before it may act, the 

Commission must find “reason to believe” that a violation of 

the Act has occurred. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). Following 

such a determination, the Commission’s General Counsel may 

then conduct an investigation. Id. If the outcome of the 

investigation warrants it, the Commission may then proceed 

to the next stage of the enforcement process by finding 

“probable cause to believe” a violation has occurred. Id. § 

30109(a)(1)-(4). Following a finding of probable cause, the 

Commission “shall attempt” to resolve a matter by “informal 

methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion, and . . . 

enter into a conciliation agreement” with the respondent 

involved. Id. § 30109(a)(4)(A)(i). If informal measures are 

ineffective, the Commission may vote to file a de novo civil 

suit in federal district court to enforce the Campaign Act. Id.

§ 30109(a)(6). Notably, each of those three procedural 

stages—(1) a reason to believe determination, (2) a probable 

cause determination, and (3) the filing of a civil suit—requires 

“an affirmative vote of 4 of [the Commission’s] members” 

before the Commission may proceed. Id. §§ 30109(a)(2), 

30109(a)(4)(A)(i), 30109(a)(6). 

B. 

In 1999, Congress amended the Campaign Act to create a 

special, streamlined set of procedures for efficiently imposing 

fines on covered persons for routine filing and record-keeping 

violations, such as the late filings at issue here. See id. § 

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30109(a)(4)(C); 145 Cong. Rec. 16,260 (July 15, 1999) 

(statement of Rep. Maloney) (noting that the bill “contains 

several provisions that will help the agency operate more 

efficiently,” by mandating some electronic filing and creating 

“a system of ‘administrative fines’—much like traffic tickets, 

which will let the agency deal with minor violations of the 

law in an expeditious manner”); 145 Cong. Rec. 21,725 (Sept. 

15, 1999) (statement of Rep. Maloney). With those 

amendments, Congress sought to make it easier for the 

Commission to enforce the Campaign Act’s deadlines. As the 

Committee Report accompanying the amendments to the Act 

explains, the Administrative Fines Program “create[d] a 

simplified procedure for the FEC to administratively handle 

reporting violations.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-295, at 11 (1999). 

An administrative fines proceeding under the amended 

Act thus involves fewer hurdles than other Commission 

enforcement proceedings. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(4)(C). 

To impose an administrative fine, the Commission makes a 

reason-to-believe determination just as it would in any 

potential enforcement proceeding. See id. § 30109(a)(2). The 

Commission then furnishes a person with “written notice and 

an opportunity to be heard before the Commission.” Id. § 

30109(a)(4)(C)(ii). Once that notice and opportunity has been 

afforded, however, the streamlined administrative fines 

authority permits the Commission to find—without making a 

probable cause determination and without filing an action in 

district court—that the person violated the Act and require 

that she or he “pay a civil money penalty.” Id. §§ 

30109(a)(4)(C)(i)(I), (II). In administrative fines proceedings, 

Congress shifted the burden of seeking judicial review in 

federal district court to the party against whom the 

Commission makes an adverse determination. Id.

§ 30109(a)(4)(C)(iii). 

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C. 

The Commission uses a twenty-four-hour, no-objection 

procedure to make reason-to-believe determinations in 

administrative fines cases. The no-objection vote is one of 

two “circulation vote” procedures that the Commission set 

forth in Directive 52, FEC Directive 52 (Sept. 10, 2008), 

http://www.fec.gov/directives/directive_52.pdf, pursuant to its 

statutory authority to promulgate “rules for the conduct of its 

activities,” 52 U.S.C. § 30106(e). The other procedure is a 

tally vote. FEC Directive 52, supra at 2. The no-objection 

and tally vote procedures enable the Commission to conduct 

votes when the six Commissioners are not physically present 

together at a meeting. 

A twenty-four-hour “no objection” vote refers to the 

practice of circulating paper ballots to each Commissioner’s 

office, receiving and counting marked ballots, and counting as 

“yes” votes any ballots not marked and returned within 

twenty-four hours. Id. at 3. A tally vote, by contrast, refers to 

the practice of circulating paper ballots, receiving and 

counting marked ballots, and deeming ballots not returned by 

the deadline (within a week) to be abstentions, i.e., to not

count as “yes” or “affirmative” votes. Id. at 2. In both cases, 

the Commission Secretary certifies the results of balloting 

promptly after the voting deadline has passed. Any single 

Commissioner’s objection to making a particular decision by 

no-objection vote, however, has the effect of placing the 

matter on the agenda for an in-person vote at a 

Commissioners’ meeting. Id. at 3. If, in an administrative 

fines proceeding, a respondent challenges a reason-to-believe 

determination, the Commission will use a tally vote to make 

the final determination as to whether to impose a fine. Id. 

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D. 

In late 2010, the Combat Veterans for Congress PAC 

missed three deadlines for filing election reports under the 

Campaign Act. Over the next four months, pursuant to staff 

recommendations, the Commission used its no-objection 

procedure to make three separate determinations that there 

was “reason to believe” that Combat Veterans had missed a 

reporting deadline. In the vote regarding the first late-filed 

report, only three Commissioners marked and returned their 

ballots; in the second, only two; and in the third, again, only 

three Commissioners returned marked ballots. In each 

instance, the Commission Secretary certified that the 

Commission had “[d]ecided by a vote of 6-0.” J.A. 105, 238, 

344. The Secretary further certified that, in each case, all six 

Commissioners “voted affirmatively for the decision.” J.A. 

105, 238, 344. 

Combat Veterans challenged each of the Commission’s 

reason-to-believe determinations. It admitted that the reports 

were filed late, but disclaimed liability because it believed 

that Combat Veterans’ former treasurer, Michael Curry, was 

solely responsible for missing the deadlines. In October of 

2011, the Commission unanimously found that Combat 

Veterans and its current treasurer (in his official capacity) 

were liable for $8,690 in civil penalties. The Commission 

made that unanimous finding by a tally vote of the 

Commissioners, after Combat Veterans and its treasurer had 

been provided written notice and had taken advantage of their 

opportunity to respond.

Combat Veterans petitioned the Commission for 

reconsideration, a hearing, and mitigation of the fine, all of 

which the Commission denied. Combat Veterans and its 

current treasurer filed a timely petition for review in the 

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district court. Combat Veterans for Cong. Political Action 

Comm. v. FEC, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2013). On 

cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court 

rejected all of Combat Veterans’ claims and granted judgment 

to the Commission. Id. at 5, 11-21. This appeal followed. 

II. 

A. 

The Commission’s twenty-four-hour, no-objection voting 

procedure must comport with the statutory requirement that 

the Commission, when it takes action to investigate reports of 

suspected violations, do so only “by an affirmative vote of 4 

of its members.” 52 U.S.C. § 30109(a)(2). That requirement 

is a cornerstone of the Commission’s governance structure. 

See id. §§ 30106(c), 30109(a)(2), 30109(a)(4)(A)(i), 

30109(a)(6). The four-affirmative-vote requirement prevents 

partisan misuse of the Commission’s powers and safeguards 

individuals from erroneous deprivations of rights. 

This matter, which the Commission pursued through its 

streamlined Administrative Fines Program, involved a 

straightforward determination that Combat Veterans’ filings 

were late. The Commission did not exercise here any of the 

important powers—including the powers to make “field 

investigation[s] or audit[s],” issue interrogatories, conduct 

depositions, and issue subpoenas—that it may bring to bear in 

more complex cases once it has found a reason to believe a 

statutory violation has occurred. See id. §§ 30106(c), 

30109(a)(2); see also id. § 30107(a)(1)-(4). The statutory 

provision that governs voting in the streamlined 

Administrative Fines Program, however, equally applies to 

other, more serious and sensitive Commission enforcement 

actions. See id. § 30109(a)(2). At least in theory, then, the 

Commission’s interpretation of section 30109(a)(2) to permit 

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it to use no-objection voting might equally authorize the 

Commission to initiate investigations in complex, sensitive, or 

major cases by no-objection voting. In those cases, any 

voting inadequacy could have significant effects because the 

reason-to-believe determination opens the door to the 

Commission’s use of powerful and intrusive investigative 

techniques. 

Petitioners contend that, even in this simple case, noobjection voting violates the statutory command that reasonto-believe determinations be decided by an “affirmative vote” 

of four Commissioners. They read the statutory reference to 

“affirmative” voting to mean voting by positively taking 

action, i.e., doing more than acquiescing by doing nothing. 

Yet, they observe, the no-objection voting the Commission 

uses in its Administrative Fines Program fails to require that 

the Commissioners mark ballots, nor even that 

Commissioners’ offices keep any record of Commissioners’ 

votes on such matters. 

Petitioners claim that no-objection voting creates the 

unacceptable risks (a) that a Commissioner’s view might be 

recorded mistakenly, or (b) that the Commissioner might not 

even develop a view before the deadline. A Commissioner 

could be on vacation, out of the country, in a hospital bed, or 

her email could be malfunctioning, or simply ignored and 

unopened. If a Commissioner failed to learn of a ballot, her 

silence could inadvertently cast “yes” votes even on issues 

she opposes. Petitioners note that Congress’s purpose of 

requiring four affirmative votes was to “assure that 

enforcement actions, as to which Congress has no continuing 

voice, will be the product of a mature and considered 

judgment.” H.R. Rep. No. 94-917, at 3 (1976). The noobjection procedure, however, arguably makes it easier for 

Commissioners to give their blanket assent despite Congress’s 

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intention that each matter receive individualized 

consideration. 

The question whether no-objection voting complies with 

the statutory requirement to act by “four affirmative votes” 

may be a substantial one but, for the reasons that follow, we 

need not decide it in this case. 

B. 

Even assuming the Commission’s use of its no-objection 

procedure was in error, Combat Veterans has failed to show 

any likelihood that any material Commission action or 

decision would have been different had a tally voting 

procedure been used for the reason-to-believe decisions. We 

therefore hold that any error was harmless. 

“In administrative law, as in federal civil and criminal 

litigation, there is a harmless error rule.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home 

Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659-60 

(2007) (quoting PDK Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 

(D.C. Cir. 2004)). That rule “requires the party asserting 

error to demonstrate prejudice from the error.” First Am. 

Disc. Corp. v. CFTC, 222 F.3d 1008, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). The party claiming injury 

bears the burden of demonstrating harm; the agency need not 

prove its absence. Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S. Dep’t of 

Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see Shinseki 

v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009). In discussing 

harmless error in the context of the Administrative Procedure 

Act, the Supreme Court has counseled: 

[T]he factors that inform a reviewing court’s 

“harmless-error” determination are various, 

potentially involving, among other case-specific 

factors, an estimation of the likelihood that the result 

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would have been different, an awareness of what 

body (jury, lower court, administrative agency) has 

the authority to reach that result, a consideration of 

the error’s likely effects on the perceived fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, 

and a hesitancy to generalize too broadly about 

particular kinds of errors when the specific factual 

circumstances in which the error arises may well 

make all the difference. 

Shinseki, 556 U.S. at 411-12. 

The Commission’s use of its twenty-four-hour, noobjection voting procedure was harmless for three reasons. 

First, even if a reason-to-believe determination had been 

erroneously made, Combat Veterans has not explained how it 

was prejudiced. A reason-to-believe determination, without 

more, is a mere allegation of wrongdoing. All the 

Commission did as a result of that step was, in each case, to 

notify Combat Veterans of the allegations against it and give 

it an opportunity to respond. The Commission did not use 

any of its reason-to-believe determinations as grounds to 

subpoena, depose, or otherwise investigate Combat Veterans. 

Combat Veterans responded to the Commission’s allegations 

by admitting that the reports were filed late, advancing 

arguments as to why it nonetheless should not be held liable, 

and requesting reductions in the proposed fine. Combat 

Veterans has failed to carry its burden to show how an 

erroneous reason-to-believe determination in this case, if 

indeed an error occurred, caused it any prejudice. 

Second, there is no hint of any suggestion that the 

Commission would have made any different determination 

even if it had used a tally voting procedure at the reason-tobelieve stage. The Commission staff recommended that the 

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Commissioners find reason to believe the deadlines had been 

missed, and the dates on the reports showed they had in fact 

been filed late. No evidence has been introduced to show that 

there was any irregularity in the votes undertaken by the 

Commission in this case. Combat Veterans’ sole assignment 

of error is the Commission’s use of the no-objection 

procedure itself. 

Third, under our precedent, the Commission’s ratification 

of a defect in a reason-to-believe finding by a subsequent, 

valid tally vote is sufficient to remedy the earlier error. In 

Federal Election Commission v. Legi-Tech, Inc., we 

considered a case involving three separate votes—to find 

reason to believe, to find probable cause, and to institute an 

enforcement action against a party—that the Commission 

took while it was unconstitutionally composed. 75 F.3d 704, 

705-06 (D.C. Cir. 1996). After the Commission voted but 

before the Legi-Tech litigation was over, the decision of 

another case in our court held unconstitutional that portion of 

the Campaign Act that included on the Commission two exofficio congressional officers not appointed by the President, 

and accordingly voided enforcement actions the Commission 

had initiated while it was unlawfully constituted. See NRA 

Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d at 828. 

During the pendency of Legi-Tech, the Commission 

responded to NRA Political Victory Fund by voting to 

reconstitute itself as a six-member body and exclude the exofficio, non-voting members from all proceedings, thus 

correcting the constitutional defect in its composition. See 

Legi-Tech, Inc., 75 F.3d at 706. The recomposed 

Commission then voted, inter alia, to ratify the prior votes 

Legi-Tech had challenged. Id. We held that the 

Commission’s ratification remedied the constitutional 

infirmity in the prior votes—even though we were willing to 

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assume that the Commission’s unconstitutional structure had 

prejudiced Legi-Tech. Id. at 708-09. 

This case is far easier than Legi-Tech. The purported 

infirmity in the Commission’s procedure here was statutory 

rather than constitutional. And, as noted above, there was no 

prejudice to Combat Veterans. The Commission was 

preparing a civil suit for damages against Legi-Tech, whereas 

it merely assessed an administrative fine against Combat 

Veterans. None of the potentially intrusive investigative 

powers that a reason-to-believe determination generally 

authorizes were deployed against Combat Veterans, where 

prima facie liability for the fines followed from the fact that 

the reports were filed later than they were due. 

We are confident both that the reason-to-believe 

determinations in this case caused Combat Veterans no 

prejudice and that the same determinations would have been 

made even if the Commission had taken a tally vote. In any 

event, any prejudice Combat Veterans might have suffered 

was rendered harmless by the Commission’s subsequent 

ratification of its reason-to-believe finding with a concededly 

valid tally vote. We therefore conclude that the 

Commission’s use of its allegedly flawed procedure was 

harmless. 

C. 

Finally, because a dispositive number of the ballots the 

individual Commissioners submitted to ratify the 

Commission’s ultimate determination to fine Combat 

Veterans were signed by a staff member acting on the 

Commissioner’s instructions, we must address whether such a 

ballot is validly cast. We hold that it is. The practice is 

reasonable, not proscribed by statute, and rooted in 

longstanding principles of agency. See, e.g., Nisi prius coram 

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Holt, 12 Mod. Rep. 564, 564 (1701) (Holt, C.J.) (“[I]f a Man 

has a Bill of Exchange, he may authorize another to indorse 

his Name upon it by Parol; and when that is done, it is the 

same as if he had done it himself.”); Joseph 

Story, Commentaries on the Law of Agency § 50, 56-57 (4th 

ed. 1851) (explaining that agents may be verbally authorized 

to sign unsealed documents on behalf of principals).2

III. 

Combat Veterans’ other challenges to the Commission’s 

fines require little discussion. In addition to its voting 

procedure claims, Combat Veterans argued to the 

Commission, the district court, and this court that its former 

treasurer, Michael Curry, made it impossible for Combat 

Veterans to file its reports on time. In the days immediately 

preceding mandatory deadlines for several filings under the 

Campaign Act, Curry suddenly, and for reasons never 

clarified, left his post as Combat Veterans’ treasurer. With 

Curry went all of the Committee’s institutional knowledge: 

passwords, awareness of the contents of its records, bank 

deposit slips, bank statements, donor lists, and the expertise to 

submit reports to the Commission electronically. Combat 

 

2

 Combat Veterans makes additional, technical objections to the 

Commission’s voting procedures, including (1) that Directive 52 is 

void because, Combat Veterans assert, it was promulgated in secret 

in violation of the Sunshine Act, and that many of the 

Commissioners’ votes are invalid because (2) the ballots were not 

tendered in strict compliance with Directive 52, or (3) were 

received after a ballot deadline but counted anyway. The Court’s 

resolution of this case on harmless error grounds, coupled with the 

fact that—even accepting Combat Veterans’ technical objections—

at least four of the Commission’s ballots in its final tally vote were 

valid, means that those claims need not be addressed. 

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Veterans’ view is that Curry’s “reckless and willful 

misconduct”—his “malfeasance”—was akin to a natural 

disaster, impossible for the organization to have anticipated, 

and impossible to rectify in time to meet the relevant statutory 

deadlines. Appellant Br. 48-55. Combat Veterans maintains 

that both law and reason dictate that the Commission should 

have held Curry, and only Curry, liable for the missed 

deadlines and, short of that, should have mitigated the fine in 

light of Combat Veterans’ alleged use of its best efforts to 

overcome Curry’s obstruction. 

Denial of Combat Veteran’s claims requires no 

explanation beyond what the district court provided. See 

Combat Veterans, 983 F. Supp. 2d at 11-18. We affirm for 

the reasons given by that court. The district court held, and 

we agree, that: (1) the Commission reasonably interpreted the 

Campaign Act to permit it to fine both Combat Veterans and 

its treasurer in his official capacity for missing filing 

deadlines, id., at 11-14; (2) disagreement with a Commission 

decision not to take action against someone else is not 

grounds for a petition seeking reversal of an administrative 

fine against oneself, id. at 14-15; (3) the Commission’s 

decision not to mitigate penalties against Combat Veterans 

because of Curry’s misconduct was not arbitrary and 

capricious, id. at 16-17; and (4) the Commission’s regulation 

setting forth the circumstances in which it will mitigate 

damages is not arbitrary or capricious or inconsistent with the 

Campaign Act, id. at 17-18. 

* * * 

 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the 

district court. 

So ordered. 

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