Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00774/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00774-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Demetrous Jackson
Plaintiff
K. Large
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEMETROUS JACKSON,

Plaintiff, CV F 06 0774 LJO WMW PC

vs. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

 WITH LEAVE TO

 FILE AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 

 

(THIRTY DAY DEADLINE)

K. LARGE,

Defendant.

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding prose in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 72-302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

This action proceeds on the complaint. Plaintiff, an inmate in the custody of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation at the California Correctional Institution

at Tehachapi, brings this civil rights action against defendant Captain K. Large, an employee of

the CDCR at CCI Tehachapi.

Plaintiff’s claims in this complaint is that he was denied access to the courts. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he arrived at Tehachapi in February of 2006, and his legal

materials did not arrive until May 31, 2006. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival, he sought “relief from an

order entered by the Superior Court that was unlawful.” The only specific conduct charged to

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Captain Large is that Plaintiff “was denied, and limited to the court by the named defendant.” 

Because states must ensure indigent prisoners meaningful access to the courts, prison

officials are required to provide either (1) adequate law libraries, or (2) adequate assistance from

persons trained in the law. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). Under prior law,

Bounds was treated as establishing "core requirements," such that a prisoner alleging deprivation

of the Bounds minima need not allege actual injury to state a constitutional claim. Sands v.

Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166, 1171 (9th Cir. 1989). Recent Supreme Court precedent abolishes such

approach, however, providing that all inmate claims for interference with access to the court

include "actual injury" as an element. Casey v. Lewis, 518 U.S.343 (1996).

To establish a Bounds violation, a prisoner must show that his prison's law library or legal

assistance program frustrated or impeded his ability to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. Casey,

supra, 518 U.S. 343, 347. The right of access does not require the State to "enable the prisoner to

discover grievances" or to "litigate effectively once in court." The Casey Court further limits the

right of access to the courts, as follows:

Finally, we must observe that the injury requirement is not satisfied

by just any type of frustrated legal claim .... Bounds does not

guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into

litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder

derivative actions to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to

be provided are those that the inmates need in order to attack their

sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the

conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating

capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly

constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.

Casey, supra, 518 U.S. at 346.

The statute under which this action proceeds plainly requires that there be an actual

connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been

suffered by plaintiff. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo

v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to

the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an

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affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is

legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which the complaint is made.” Johnson v.

Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Here, Plaintiff fails to specify the injury that he suffered. Plaintiff refers to a court order,

but does not specifically indicate what type of action he was litigating. Further, Plaintiff has not

charged the named defendant with specific conduct that caused him actual injury as that term is

defined above. Plaintiff simply alleges that the defendant is responsible for the delay in

receiving Plaintiff’s legal property.

The court finds the allegations in plaintiff's complaint vague and conclusory. The court

has determined that the complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint

must give fair notice and state the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.

Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege with at

least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support plaintiff's

claim. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint.

If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See

Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, the complaint must allege in specific terms

how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless

there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed

deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir.

1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 

In addition, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in

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order to make plaintiff's amended complaint complete. Local Rule 15-220 requires that an

amended complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is

because, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux

v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

pleading no longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently

alleged. 

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed; and

2. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file a

first amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned this case and must be labeled "First Amended Complaint." Failure to

file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this

action be dismissed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 17, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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