Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01108/USCOURTS-ca10-92-01108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Moresco
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F l ~-_; \ of.JAppeah · States ~\~ n; United ~renth Circuit 

JOHN MORESCO, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEC 1 O 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-1108 

(D. Colo., No. 92-F-308) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, Circuit Judge, BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

EBEL, Circuit Judge.** 

In this prose appeal, the appellant is challenging the 

district court's order denying his motion to modify his sentence. 

In 1988, the appellant pled guilty to two counts of racketeering 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952. The appellant was sentenced to 

two years imprisonment on the first count and five years 

imprisonment on the second count, with the terms to run 

consecutively. The appellant was also sentenced to two years of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 92-1108 Document: 010110151604 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 1 
supervised release on each count. The appellant was paroled from 

his first sentence after serving eight months, at which time he 

started serving his sentence on the second count. While serving 

his second sentence, the appellant was informed by the prison 

authorities that he could expect placement in a halfway house for 

the last six months of his sentence. The appellant is scheduled 

to enter the halfway house on October 28, 1992 and to be released 

on April 28, 1993. 

On February 18, 1992, the appellant filed a motion for 

modification of his sentence in the District Court of Colorado. 

The appellant requested the court to send him to a halfway house 

six months earlier than originally scheduled, and to place him in 

an electronic home confinement program for the last six months of 

his sentence. The basis for the appellant's request was the 

desire to take advantage of an employment offer to manage a 

restaurant. The district court dismissed the appellant's motion 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies. We agree that the appellant has failed 

to allege proper subject matter jurisdiction and thus affirm. 1 

The appellant has asserted two bases for the district court's 

exercise of subject matter jurisdiction. First, the appellant 

alleges that the district court has authority to modify his 

sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255. However, a habeas petition under 

§2255 may only challenge the validity of a sentence, not the 

1 This court reviews de novo issues pertaining to its subject 

matter jurisdiction. Weiss v. United States, 889 F.2d 937, 938 

(10th Cir. 1989). 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 92-1108 Document: 010110151604 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 2 
, 

• manner in which the sentence is being executed. United States v. 

Hutchings, 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir. 1987); Brown v. United 

States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Thompson v. United 

States, 536 F.2d 459, 460 (1978). Thus, this section does not 

give the federal district courts authority to determine a 

prisoner's place of confinement. United States v. Jalili, 925 

F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991); Duval v. Willingham, 390 F.2d 203, 

204 (10th Cir. 1968) .

2 

Alternatively, the appellant asserts that the district court 

has authority to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c). 

However, §3582(c) only authorizes the federal district courts to 

modify a sentence 1) upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of 

Prisons, 2) when expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35 of 

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, or 3) when a defendant 

has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing 

guideline range that has subsequently been lowered. 18 U.S.C. 

§3582(c). None of these circumstances is present in the instant 

case. 

Our conclusion that 28 U.S.C. §2255 and 18 U.S.C. §3582(c) do 

not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court is 

2 A prisoner may attack the execution of his sentence by means of 

a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. §2241(a). Jalili, 925 F.2d at 

893; Brown, 610 F.2d at 677. Even under this section, however, a 

petition must allege that the sentence is being executed in 

violation of the Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. 

§2241(c); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Since the 

appellant's motion to modify his sentence does not allege any such 

violation, even if we were to broadly construe the appellant's pro 

se petition under §2255 as a petition under §2241(a), see 

Hutchings, 835 F.2d at 187, it would not confer subject matter 

jurisdiction on the district court. 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 92-1108 Document: 010110151604 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 3 
supported by the grant of authority to the Bureau of Prisons in 18 

U.S.C. §3621(b). This section authorizes the Bureau of Prisons 

"to designate the place of a prisoner's imprisonment." 18 U.S.C. 

§3621(b). The term "imprisonment" refers to any type of custody, 

including custody in a correctional facility or home confinement 

program. See 18 U.S.C. §3624(c); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 893-94. 

Consequently, §3621(b) gives primary authority to the executive 

branch over any petition pertaining to a prisoner's place of 

f ' 3 con inement. See Johnson v. Moore, 926 F.2d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 

1991); Jalili, 925 F.2d at 892; Dragna, 746 F.2d at 458; Duval, 

390 F.2d at 204. Accordingly, we find that the district court was 

without authority to entertain the appellant's motion to modify 

4 his sentence. 

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

3 The federal courts do have authority, in some instances, to 

specify a defendant's place of confinement as part of a sentence 

of supervised release. See Sentencing Guidelines 5Cl.l(d), 5Fl.1, 

5Fl.2; Jalili, 925 F.2d at 892-93. This authority is not at issue 

in this case, however, because the appellant is seeking to 

restructure his term of imprisonment, not his term of supervised 

release. 

4 Because we find that the appellant failed to allege proper 

subject matter jurisdiction, we do not decide whether the 

appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 92-1108 Document: 010110151604 Date Filed: 12/10/1992 Page: 4