Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cr-05287/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cr-05287-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Wayne Arnett
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1Because defendant has not previously raised this issue, he

concedes that he is not entitled to dismissal of those counts which

charged him with armed bank robbery because defendant’s conviction

of those counts has been affirmed on appeal and are final. 

Oral argument of this motion was heard on March 21, 2005

before Judge Coyle and taken under submission. Subsequently, this

action was assigned from the docket of Judge Coyle to the docket of

Judge Wanger. All of the pleadings relevant to this motion and a

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

TIMOTHY WAYNE ARNETT, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-95-5287 OWW

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS INDICTMENT

ON GROUND OF VIOLATION OF

FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

Defendant moves to dismiss those counts of the Indictment in

this action alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on the

ground that he did not receive a probable cause determination by

a judicial officer within 48 hours of his warrantless arrest by

Medford police on September 21, 1995.1

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transcript of oral argument have been reviewed. 

2Defendant submits no document substantiating that the state

charges were dismissed on September 22, 1995 “pending further

[federal] proceedings.”

2

The record establishes that defendant was arrested without

an arrest warrant for armed bank robbery in Oregon by officers of

the Medford Police Department on September 21, 1995. Defendant

asserts that the state charges were dismissed on September 22,

1995, “pending further [federal] proceedings.”2 Attached to

defendant’s motion is a document captioned “PROSPECTIVE STATUS”,

represented by defendant to be a report of FBI Special Agent

Jeffrey Grey, which states:

On September 22, 1995, Assistant United

States Attorney FRANK R. PAPAGNI, JR.,

Eugene, Oregon was advised of the facts of

this matter. AUSA PAPAGNI authorized Armed

Bank Robbery and Use of a Firearm During a

Federal Crime of Violence charges.

Defendant also submits page 7 of a Medford Police Department

Narrative, in which it is stated in pertinent part:

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

On 092295 in the early morning hours, I and

FBI Agent Grey will contact suspect Arnett

who is lodged at the Jackson County Jail. 

Additional statements will be asked of Arnett

concerning details of robberies in

California, to included burglaries, stolen

vehicles, and kidnappings.

On September 29, 1995, defendant was arrested pursuant to a

federal arrest warrant based on a federal criminal complaint

issued by Magistrate Judge Cooney in the District of Oregon and

taken into federal custody. On October 6, 1995, Magistrate Judge

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3

Cooney conducted a preliminary hearing, finding probable cause to

bind defendant over for the federal grand jury. On October 19,

1995, an Indictment in the District of Oregon was filed. The

Indictment for different bank robberies in the Eastern District

of California was filed on October 26, 1995 and a federal arrest

warrant issued for defendant’s arrest on the same date. 

Defendant has offered no evidence of improper cooperation or

collusion between state and federal authorities in the detention,

arrest, and charging of defendant in the Oregon and California

cases.

In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975), the Supreme

Court held that “the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial

determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended

restraint of liberty following arrest.” When an arrest has been

made subject to a warrant, a judicial determination of probable

cause has already been made as a prerequisite to obtaining the

arrest warrant. In the case of warrantless arrests, however,

there has been no pre-arrest probable cause determination by a

judicial officer. In such cases, the Supreme Court has held that

to detain the suspect pending further proceedings, the government

must obtain - within 48 hours of the arrest - a probable cause

determination by a judicial officer. County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). If the arrested person does

not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, “the

burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a

bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance”

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318 U.S.C. § 3501 pertains to the admissibility of

confessions. Section 3501(c) provides in pertinent part:

In any criminal prosecution by the United

States ..., a confession made or given by a

person who is a defendant therein, while such

person was under arrest or other detention in

the custody of any law-enforcement officer or

law enforcement agency, shall not be

inadmissible solely because of delay in

4

justifying the delay. Id. at 57. 

In opposing defendant’s motion, the United States measures

the 48 hour period from the date of defendant’s arrest on the

federal arrest warrant, contending:

[D]efendant’s federal arrest in the District

of Oregon was pursuant to an arrest warrant

issued upon a complaint and his federal

arrest in the Eastern District of California

was pursuant to an arrest warrant issued upon

a grand jury indictment - i.e., no further

‘Gerstein’ probable cause hearing was

required.

The defendant was also taken before the

federal magistrate judge in the District of

Oregon for his initial appearance on the same

day that he was arrested on the federal

arrest warrant, so there was no delay in

taking him before the federal magistrate

judge for his initial appearance, much less

any unreasonable delay.

In arguing that the 48-hour period runs from the issuance of

the federal arrest warrant, the United States refers to United

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 358 (1994). 

In Alvarez-Sanchez the Supreme Court held that a duty to

bring an individual before a federal magistrate for purposes of

18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) does not arise until the individual has been

arrested for a federal offense.3 Even if the arresting law

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bringing such person before a magistrate judge

or other officer empowered to commit persons

charged with offenses against the laws of the

United States ... if such confession is found

by the trial judge to have been made

voluntarily and if the weight to be given the

confession is left to the jury and if such

confession was made or given by such person

within six hours immediately following his

arrest or detention; Provided, That the time

limitation contained in this subsection shall

not apply in any case in which the delay in

bringing such person before such magistrate

judge or other officer beyond such six-hour

period is found by the trial judge to be

reasonable considering the means of

transportation and the distance to be traveled

to the nearest available such magistrate judge

or other officer.

5

enforcement officer believes federal offenses may have been

committed, when a subject is arrested and held only on state

charges, the provisions of § 3501(c) are not triggered. Id., at

358. It is unclear that this holding applies to a claim that the

right under the Fourth Amendment to a probable cause

determination within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest articulated

by the Supreme Court in McLaughlin. The Supreme Court in

Alvarez-Sanchez refused to address the claim that a confession

obtained during an ongoing violation of his Fourth Amendment

right to a prompt determination of probable cause set forth in

Gerstein and McLaughlin had been violated because the issue had

not been raised below. 511 U.S. at 360 n.5. In United States v.

Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S.

1127 (2000), the Sixth Circuit addressed a situation in which a

defendant was in state custody following a warrantless arrest for

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72 hours before being transferred to federal custody. The Sixth

Circuit stated in pertinent part:

In his motion to clarify his statement during

oral argument, the Assistant United States

Attorney attempted to distinguish this case

from McLaughlin by stating that Fullerton was

held on local charges until September 26,

then transferred into federal custody and

afforded an initial appearance within twentyfour hours. Therefore, he argues, there was

no deficiency in the arrest or the timing of

the initial appearance on federal charges. 

We find the Assistant United States

Attorney’s argument to be disingenuous ...

[H]is argument appears to be based on United

States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, which held that 18

U.S.C. § 3501(c), governing the admissibility

of custodial confessions in federal trials

despite delay in presentment, does not apply

if the suspect is arrested initially on local

charges and held in local custody before

federal charges are filed ... We can easily

distinguish Alvarez-Sanchez from the case at

hand because Alvarez-Sanchez discusses §

3501(c), not McLaughlin. Furthermore, §

3501(c) applies only to people arrested for

violating federal laws ..., whereas

McLaughlin sets forth a Fourth Amendment

violation ... which through the Fourteenth

Amendment would apply equally to people

arrested on state or local charges.

187 F.3d at 590 n.

2.

Rule 5(a)(1)(A), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

provides in pertinent part that “[a] person making an arrest ...

must take the defendant without unnecessary delay before a

magistrate judge ....” In United States v. Michaud, 268 F.3d

728 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 867 (2002), the Ninth

Circuit addressed whether a confession should be suppressed

because of a claim that state law enforcement officials colluded

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4It is noted that the First Circuit in United States v.

Encarnacion, 239 F.3d 395, 398 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001), rejected the

argument that Rule 5(a) incorporates the Fourth Amendment’s

requirement of prompt determination of probable cause. 

7

with federal agents to delay bringing her before a federal

magistrate, thereby violating Section 3501 and Rule 5(a). In a

footnote, the Ninth Circuit, citing McLaughlin, stated:

... Although the state police did not comply

with their constitutional duty to bring

Michaud before a magistrate with 48 hours of

her arrest, see County of Riverside v.

McLaughlin ..., this delay cannot be

attributed to the federal agents and

considered for purposes of § 3501(c) absent

evidence of collusion ....

268 F.3d at 734 n.2. This statement suggests that McLaughlin is

not considered by the Ninth Circuit to be separate from the

requirements of Rule 5(a) and Section 3501 in the absence of

admissible and material evidence of collusion between the state

and federal law enforcement officials. The 48 hour period set

forth in McLaughlin runs from the date of defendant’s federal

arrest, not while he was in state custody before any federal

charges were filed.4 Defendant does not assert nor offer

evidence that there was collusion between the state and federal

officers.

Defendant’s assertion that the state bank robbery charges

for which he was arrested were dismissed the day after that

arrest, implying that he was detained in the Medford jail for

seven days in the absence of an arrest warrant, state or federal,

is unsupported by any evidence in the record. 

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8

The Government further argues that any delay in obtaining a

probable cause determination with regard to the federal charges

brought in the District of Oregon has no bearing on the federal

charges in the Eastern District of California. Defendant was not

arrested or detained by state or federal authorities in Oregon

because of crimes allegedly committed by defendant in the Eastern

District of California. He was arrested and detained in Oregon

because he had committed a bank robbery in Oregon. He was

eventually arrested on federal charges and tried and convicted in

the Oregon District Court of those charges. Defendant cannot

contest his conviction in the Oregon District Court on the ground

that his Fourth Amendment rights under McLaughlin were violated

in this case.

Defendant was arrested on the charges brought in the Eastern

District of California following the issuance of an arrest

warrant upon indictment in the Eastern District of California.

Defendant argues that, because the FBI questioned him on

approximately September 22, 1995 about details of robberies in

California to which he had confessed, he was being detained in

Oregon on both the Oregon and the California federal charges and,

therefore, a probable cause determination had to be made within

48 hours of his detention with respect to the crimes committed in

the Eastern District of California. 

There is authority that a prolonged detention without a

probable cause determination attempted to be justified because of

investigation into other crimes that the person arrested without

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a warrant may have committed is not considered “an emergency or

other extraordinary circumstance” under McLaughlin. Anderson v.

Calderon, supra, 232 F.3d at 1070. However, defendant’s claim of

a McLaughlin violation had to be made in the District of Oregon. 

Defendant cannot base a McLaughlin violation in the criminal

action in the Eastern District of California on the fact that

federal law enforcement officials also had information that

defendant had committed other crimes in the Eastern District of

California and were investigating that information while he was

detained in Oregon. 

Consequently, defendant has not established that his Fourth

Amendment right under McLaughlin was violated in this criminal

action. 

Finally, even if arguendo, defendant’s Fourth Amendment

right was violated with respect to the charges brought in the

Eastern District of California, defendant is not entitled to

dismissal of the counts alleging violation of Section 924(c). In

Gerstein, the Supreme Court held:

In holding that the prosecutor’s assessment

of probable cause is not sufficient alone to

justify restraint of liberty pending trial,

we do not imply that the accused is entitled

to judicial oversight or review of the

decision to prosecute. Instead, we adhere to

the Court’s prior holding that a judicial

hearing is not prerequisite to prosecution by

information ... Nor do we retreat from the

established rule that illegal arrest or

detention does not void a subsequent

conviction ... [A]lthough a suspect who is

presently detained may challenge the probable

cause for that confinement, a conviction will

not be vacated on the ground that the

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5Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Bueno-Vargas, 383

F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct.

1098 (2005) is unavailing. Nowhere in that decision does the Ninth

Circuit even discuss whether dismissal of an indictment is an

appropriate remedy for a violation of the Fourth Amendment right

recognized in McLaughlin; it addresses the weekend fax procedures

used for the issuance of complaints in the Southern District of

California which utilizes a declaration under penalty of perjury to

attest probable cause. 

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defendant was detained pending trial without

a determination of probable cause.

420 U.S. at 118-119. See also United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d

311, 314-315 (9th Cir. 1995). In Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d

1053, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1036 (2001),

the Ninth Circuit held that the appropriate remedy for a

violation of McLaughlin “is the exclusion of the evidence in

question - if it was ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” However, a

delay in obtaining a probable cause determination under the

Fourth Amendment does not automatically require suppression. Id. 

See also United States v. Garcia-Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 452

n. 17 (6th Cir. 2004)(addressing a Rule 5(c) violation,

expressing uncertainty as to the extent to which McLaughlin and a

Rule 5(c) violation overlap, and observing that dismissal is not

required, citing United States v. Fullerton, 187 F.3d 587, 590-92

(6th Cir. 1999)).5

For all these reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss the

Section 924(c) counts alleged in the Indictment is DENIED.

 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 10, 2005 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

emm0d6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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