Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03058/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03058-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
John Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 18, 2000 Decided May 30, 2000

No. 99-3058

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

John Williams,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00288-01)

Gabriel R. Sanz-Rexach argued the cause for the appellant. John P. Dean was on brief for the appellant.

Sharon A. Sprague, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Assistant United States

Attorney, were on brief for the appellee.

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Before: Silberman, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: John Williams

seeks reversal of his conviction of possession of a firearm and

ammunition by a felon. Williams argues that the district

court made erroneous evidentiary rulings that cannot be

deemed harmless. He challenges the admission of police

officers' testimony regarding the contents of a police radio

call during the events leading to his arrest, the general

danger of traffic stops and the assertion that drug users

commonly carry weapons. It is the admission of the latter,

followed by the trial court's denying Williams an opportunity

to cross-examine the witness and the government's mention

of the testimony in closing argument, which concerns us

here.1

I.

Between 1:30 and 1:45 a.m. on August 1, 1998, Officers

Antonio Duncan and David Reid of the Metropolitan Police

Department, patrolling in the southeast region of the District

of Columbia in a police cruiser, stopped the car in which

Williams was a passenger for failing to stop completely at a

stop sign and then straddling a double-yellow line. As soon

as the officers left their cruiser, Williams got out of the

passenger side of the car "in a crouched position." Transcript (Tr.) 3/3/99 at 39. The officers testified that Williams

immediately reached for his waistband and that he was

holding something "of some girth[,] ... an object of some

weight," id. at 166, which they believed could have been a

concealed weapon. See id. at 158-59, 166-67. Ignoring

commands to remain in the car and, then, to show his hands,

Williams maneuvered around the open door and began run-

__________

1 We have considered Williams's arguments regarding the admissibility of other portions of the officers' testimony and find them

without merit.

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ning. Duncan chased him while Reid detained the driver,

who had stayed in the car.2

Running with his hands at his waistband, Williams began to

cross a footbridge. He collided into the metal railing and

slowed down a bit. The collision caused a metal clanking

noise. Duncan suspected that whatever object Williams appeared to have been carrying caused the clanking noise and

that Williams may have discarded it from the bridge. Continuing his pursuit, Duncan did not hear the sound of an

object striking the concrete "creekbed" below. He made a

radio call requesting backup wherein he described the suspect

and his location and mentioned the "possibility" that the

suspect had a gun.3 Tr. 3/3/99 at 47. Shortly thereafter,

Duncan apprehended and arrested Williams with the help of

an unidentified civilian.

Officer Carter Adams responded to the radio call and, at

Duncan's direction, searched portions of the creekbed.

Williams had told Duncan, when returning to the spot where

he hit the footbridge railing, first, that Duncan had not seen

him throw anything and "had no case" and, then, that he had

thrown his "stash" or his "works," id. at 50, terms commonly

used to refer to drugs and drug paraphernalia, respectively.

Adams found no drugs or drug paraphernalia but did find a

handgun. The creekbed contained "no more than half an

inch" of water. Tr. 3/4/99 at 5. Analysis of the gun revealed

neither fingerprints nor rust. The safety switch on the side

of the gun facing the ground was bent and a piece on the

bottom of the gun was cracked.

Williams's first trial on one count of unlawful possession of

a firearm and ammunition by a felon, a violation of 18 U.S.C.

__________

2 The reasonableness of neither the stop of the car nor the

subsequent pursuit of Williams is in question.

3 While Duncan testified that he had said "possibility" in the

radio call, see Tr. 3/3/99 at 47, Officer Carter Adams, who responded to the call, testified that he remembered the radio call differently, that is, as describing the suspect as a man with a gun. See Tr.

3/3/99, mid-afternoon session, at 5. The tape of the call was not in

evidence.

s 922(g)(1), resulted in a mistrial when the jury failed to

reach a unanimous verdict. After Williams withdrew a guilty

plea to a lesser offense, a second trial commenced. The

officers' testimony at the retrial focused on their suspicion

that Williams had a gun because of his movements when he

got out of the car and his collision with the bridge railing.

The officers conceded, however, that they did not see an

object in Williams's hands nor see him actually throw anything. Defense counsel offered other explanations for the

officers' observations and for the discovery of the gun in the

creekbed. The government had established Williams was a

drug user4 so defense counsel raised the possibility that

Williams could have discarded drugs or drug paraphernalia,

see Tr. 3/3/99 at 109-11, and suggested that the officers did

not conduct an adequate search to rule out the possibility, see

id. at 140-42. Counsel also elicited testimony that violence

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was common in the area and recovery of a gun in the area

was not unprecedented. See id. at 80.

After a lengthy redirect examination of Duncan, the prosecutor ended the questioning with the following exchange:

Q: Now you were asked a lot of questions about violent

crimes in that area [where the chase and subsequent

arrest occurred] and about guns being discarded, is that

right?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. And you know that area pretty well?

A: Yes.

...

Q: In your experience as a patrol officer, is it common

for people who use drugs or sell drugs to carry weapons

for protection?

A: Yes.

Tr. 3/3/99 at 160-61 (emphasis added). The court then excused Duncan from the witness stand and defense counsel

__________

4 See Tr. 3/3/99 at 68-69 (property taken from Williams after

arrest included syringe and needle exchange card).

approached the bench, explaining that she would have objected to the last question but did not have the chance because

"[t]hat answer came out so quickly." Id. at 161. The trial

judge said she would have allowed the exchange in any event

and then denied counsel's request for a "very brief re-cross."

Id. The prosecutor reminded the jury of Duncan's testimony

during her reply closing argument and in the following context:

Counsel also raised an issue about violent crime in the

area to explain, possibly, how this gun--some other way

that this gun could have ended up in that creek....

[C]ounsel ask [sic] a number of questions about violent

crime and about people discarding weapons in the area[,]

and you will recall those type [sic] of questions. Well,

remember that the officer also testified that it is not

uncommon for drug users or drug sellers to carry weapons for protection as well.

Ladies and gentlemen, there is no evidence that this

weapon was tied to any violent crime. And in fact, the

evidence is to the contrary because had this gun been

involved in a violent crime, where somebody wanted to

get rid of it, you would expect that it wouldn't be fully

loaded.... If you recall, this was a fully loaded weapon

with one in the chamber.... In addition, it's an expensive weapon....

Tr. 3/4/99 at 154-55.

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Williams was convicted and sentenced to 180 months in

prison, followed by two years of supervised release. A special assessment of $100 was also imposed.

II.

We review a trial judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1386

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d

629, 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993)). A

"district court's decision to admit evidence ... is entitled to

'much deference' on review," United States v. Ramsey, 165

F.3d 980, 984 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting United States v. Lewis,

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693 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.

223 (1999), but if it is found erroneous, the burden is on the

government to prove the error was harmless. See United

States v. Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert.

denied, 526 U.S. 1140 (1999); Smart, 98 F.3d at 1390 ("At all

times, the burden of proving that an error was not prejudicial

rests on the government.") (citing United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 734 (1993)).

A.

Williams challenges the admission of Duncan's affirmative

reply on redirect examination to the following question: "In

your experience as a patrol officer, is it common for people

who use drugs or sell drugs to carry weapons for protection?"

Tr. 3/3/99 at 160-61. Although the inquiry regarding Duncan's experience with drug dealers commonly carrying weapons for protection raises no eyebrows, see, e.g., United States

v. Conyers, 118 F.3d 755, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting in

appeal of drug trafficking conviction "those who transport

drugs often carry (and all too often use) a firearm"), we

cannot say the same regarding drug users.5 Finding the link

between drug users and guns tenuous, we look to the foundation of Duncan's opinion testimony.

The prosecutor framed the question to Duncan as "in [his]

experience as a patrol officer." Duncan had testified earlier

that he had made gun charge arrests about "six or seven

times." Tr. 3/3/99 at 148. He added that he had "recovered

more than one weapon on a person" and then revised his

previous estimate to "anywhere from ten to eleven, just a

general amount." Id. After hearing defense counsel's late

objection to Duncan's response and commenting that she

would have overruled the objection had it been timely made,

the trial judge denied defense counsel the opportunity to

recross-examine Duncan.

__________

5 As noted, evidence at trial established that Williams was a drug

user. See, e.g., Tr. 3/3/99 at 50, 68-69.

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The foundation of Duncan's opinion linking drug users and

possession of weapons is anything but firm. Fewer than one

dozen arrests involving possession of a firearm is not sufficient grounding to qualify him as an expert under Rule 702 of

the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE), particularly without

evidence establishing that any of those arrests involved a

drug user. If, instead, we view his testimony as having been

admitted under Rule 701,6 FRE, we question whether Dun-

__________

6 Rule 701, FRE, allows lay opinion testimony that "is limited to

those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the

perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of

the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." Fed.

R. Evid. 701. We afford trial judges broad discretion in admitting

opinion testimony of lay witnesses. See, e.g., United States v.

Pierson, 503 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (trial judge should have

broad discretion and "[o]nly a clear abuse of discretion" warrants

reversal); see also United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770, 773 (11th

Cir.) (" 'The ultimate decision as to the admissibility of lay opinion

testimony is committed to the sound discretion of the district court

and will not be overturned on appeal unless there is a clear abuse of

discretion.' ") (quoting United States v. Myers, 972 F.2d 1566, 1576-

77 (11th Cir. 1992)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 974 (1998). The leeway

is due in large part to the opportunity the trial judge ordinarily

affords opposing counsel to expose a weak foundation through

cross-examination of the witness. See, e.g., Pierson, 503 F.2d at 176

(" 'It is hardly ever reversible error to admit such evidence; its

foundation may generally be as conveniently left to crossexamination.' ") (quoting Central R.R. Co. of N. J. v. Monahan, 11

F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926) (Hand, J.)); see also Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ("Vigorous

cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful

instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence."). Nevertheless, to admit lay opinion evidence rationally based on the witness's

perception, a sufficient factual foundation must exist. See, e.g.,

Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (lay

witnesses may testify "only upon the basis of facts known to them").

The Office of Legal Education of the Executive Office for United

States Attorneys provides guidelines to establish a proper foundation for the opinion testimony of a skilled lay observer:

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can's answer was rationally based on his perceptions. He did

not establish a factual basis for credible opinion testimony

regarding the likelihood of drug users being armed.7 Moreover, as noted above, trial judges generally rely on the

structural check of cross-examination in permitting opinion

testimony with a weak foundation and, for that reason, enjoy

broad discretion. But here the trial court refused to grant

defense counsel's request for an opportunity to recrossexamine Duncan which would have allowed counsel to expose

Duncan's lack of experience. We conclude that the district

court's ruling admitting arguably relevant testimony8 over

__________

1. That the witness has, on prior occasions sufficient in number to support a reasonable inference of knowledge of or

familiarity with a subject, observed particular events, conditions, or other matters.

2. That the witness on a certain occasion observed a specific

event, condition, or matter of the same nature as previously

observed.

3. That on the basis of his knowledge or familiarity with the

event, condition or matter, he has an opinion as to the event,

condition or matter involved in the case.

4. That the statement of the opinion will be helpful to a clear

understanding of the testimony of the witness [or] the determination of a fact in issue.

J. Randolph Maney, Jr. & Ruth E. Lucas, Courtroom Evidence 130

(Office of Legal Education, Executive Office for United States

Attorneys (1998) (citing Murl A. Larkin, Federal Evidence Foundations 119-20 (1988)). Here the prosecutor established neither

the first nor the second premise above. She elicited no testimony

from Duncan regarding any "prior occasions," much less occasions

"sufficient in number to support a reasonable inference of knowledge," in which he arrested drug users carrying guns or otherwise

observed drug users carrying guns.

7 The lack of foundation for this testimony is especially clear

when compared to the government's practice of eliciting expert

testimony to establish drug dealers' habits. See, e.g., United States

v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1995), order on reh'g, 77

F.3d 510 (1996).

8 Assuming a proper foundation, the testimony would tend to

make less probable the scenario defense counsel had suggested,

that is, area violence accounted for the gun found in the creekbed.

objection despite the lack of foundation, especially in light of

its subsequent denial of defense counsel's request for "a very

brief re-cross," constitutes error. Cf. United States v. Stock,

948 F.2d 1299, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (error to deny crossexamination of police officer for impeachment). We now

consider if the error was harmless.

B.

In determining whether a non-constitutional trial error is

harmless, we ask whether " 'with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action

from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially

swayed by the error.' " United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d

833, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,

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328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)). In other words, we ask "whether

the error 'had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict.' " Smart, 98 F.3d at 1390

(quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)

(quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776)). If the error had such

an effect, or if we are left in " 'grave doubt' " about the

harmlessness of the error,9 we must reverse the conviction.

Id. (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995)).

On the record below, we can identify only one factor (apart

from the testimony itself) suggesting the testimony may have

affected the jury verdict, that is, the prosecutor's reminding

the jury of Duncan's testimony during her closing argument

in rebuttal. See United States v. Rhodes, 886 F.2d 375, 382

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's closing argument reference to

__________

9 The United States Supreme Court has said: "By 'grave doubt'

we mean that, in the judge's mind, the matter is so evenly balanced

that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of

the error." O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435 (1995). Explaining further, the Court described "grave doubt" as "unusual"

because "[n]ormally a record review will permit a judge to make up

his or her mind about the matter ... [a]nd indeed a judge has an

obligation to do so." Id.

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improperly admitted evidence contributed to conclusion that

error was not harmless). Because the testimony was elicited

during redirect examination and recross-examination was denied, defense counsel could have responded to the testimony

only in her closing argument and could not have responded at

all to the prosecutor's rebuttal reference to Duncan's testimony. Although defense counsel did not, perhaps understandably, request a limiting instruction regarding Duncan's challenged testimony, she did obtain a limiting instruction as to

other portions of Duncan's testimony. See Tr. 3/1/99 4-5, 8-9

and Tr. 3/4/99 at 105 (instruction limiting use of testimony

regarding radio call). The absence of an instruction limiting

the jury's use of the challenged testimony may have reinforced it. Cf. United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 961-62

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (limiting instruction given for some but not

other "bad acts" evidence may enhance latter's influence on

jury). Notwithstanding the prosecutor's statement reminding

the jury of Duncan's testimony linking drug users and guns,

we believe the statement, viewed in the context of the entire

rebuttal closing argument (only one sentence in an argument

covering ten pages in the record, see Tr. 3/4/99 at 150-59) had

minor impact. The prosecutor made the comment in response to the defense explanation for discovery of the gun.

The thrust of her response, however, was the lack of evidence

to support Williams's theory that guns are endemic to a high

crime area.

The most significant factor that negates the error's impact

is the weight and nature of the evidence against Williams.10

See generally Stock, 948 F.2d at 1304 (refusal to allow crossexamination of officer violated confrontation clause but was

__________

10 Our dissenting colleague speculates that because the first trial

resulted in a hung jury, the second trial necessarily presented a

close case. See Dis. Op. at 1-2. We advise caution in assigning

critical significance to the failure of a different jury, which heard

different evidence and argument, to reach agreement. We should

also hesitate to connect the length of deliberations with the strength

of the government's case. But cf. id. (relying on Dallago v. United

States, 427 F.2d 546 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (five-day deliberation after sixweek trial with 37 witnesses and 175 exhibits)).

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harmless because other prosecution evidence "was so much

more credible than the defense testimony that [the court

concluded] without reasonable doubt that the jury would have

found [defendant] guilty"). The government's case was based

on Duncan's and Reid's observations of Williams as he got out

of the car and as he fled. The officers testified that Williams

first disregarded Duncan's order to remain in the car. When

Williams got out, he was "in a crouched position," Tr. 3/3/99

at 39, and "immediately grabbed for his waistband," id. at

166. He "was holding something of some girth," id., and

refused to obey Duncan's command to show his hands, see id.

at 167, instead running away with his hands still at his

waistband. See id. at 44. Recounting his pursuit, Duncan

said that Williams's bumping into the metal railing of the

footbridge caused a clanking noise as Williams slowed down

and appeared to discard something. See, e.g., id. at 45-48.

When Duncan finally apprehended him, Williams first stated

"that [Duncan] didn't see him throw anything, and that

[Duncan] had no case," and then claimed he had thrown his

drug "works" from the bridge. Id. at 50.

As a passenger in a car stopped by the police, Williams's

immediate flight does not weigh in his favor.11 See Illinois v.

Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000) (defendant's unprovoked

flight from officers in area of heavy narcotics trafficking

supported reasonable suspicion defendant was involved in

criminal activity). More significant was the ready discovery

of a handgun (without rust and slightly damaged--both factors consistent with having recently fallen from the bridge

above) where Duncan suspected it would be found and the

fact that Williams did not deny that he threw something from

the bridge or that the police found the gun below the bridge.

Rather, Williams offered an alternative explanation for what

he threw, which was not found, and for why it was not found.

The properly admitted evidence leaves little doubt that the

erroneous admission of the testimony linking drug users and

__________

11 The trial judge instructed the jury that evidence of flight may

be properly considered as a circumstance suggesting guilt but that

it does not raise a presumption of guilt. See Tr. 3/4/99 at 104.

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guns was harmless. See United States v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8

F.3d 202, 211 (5th Cir. 1993) (error in admitting lay opinion

testimony without foundation harmless where evidence aliunde permitted inference establishing element of crime); cf.

United States v. Rhodes, 62 F.3d 1449, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(error in admitting without foundation prior inconsistent

statement of witness admitting he and defendant had been

selling drugs and firearms not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal where prosecution established drugs and weapons seized belonged to defendant); United States v. McConnell, 988 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1993) (admission of coconspirator

statement without foundation constituted reversible error in

conspiracy conviction where hearsay testimony was "crucial

link in the chain" between appellants and conspiracy) (emphasis added).

Moreover, although, as noted earlier, defense counsel requested no limiting instruction, the trial judge gave standard

instructions that the jury is the "sole judge" of the credibility

of the witnesses, Tr. 4/4/99 at 102, a determination that may

be affected by whether a witness had an opportunity to

observe matters about which he testified, see id., and that the

questions, statements and arguments of the lawyers are not

evidence. See id. at 100, 101. We believe these instructions

further mitigated any potential prejudice. See United States

v. Hawkins, 595 F.2d 751, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (similar

instructions "provided at least some mitigation of any prejudice ... which might have arisen from the prosecutor's

closing remarks"); Barkley v. United States, 323 F.2d 804,

808 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (no plain error for failure to give cautionary instruction on lay testimony in absence of request and

where general credibility instruction given). But cf. United

States v. Watson, 171 F.3d 695, 700-02 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(standard jury instructions notwithstanding, prosecutor's misstatement of evidence in closing regarding central issue in

close case not harmless error).

In addition, Duncan's testimony elicited by the prosecution

was only partially objectionable. The reference to drug users

did not stand alone; rather, the prosecution referred to drug

users and drug dealers. The fact that the jury heard unobUSCA Case #99-3058 Document #520063 Filed: 05/30/2000 Page 12 of 15
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jectionable testimony together with objectionable testimony

may have "buried," and therefore minimized, the objectionable portion.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the brief

testimony and argument linking drug users and guns did not

have a "substantial effect" on the verdict nor are we left in

"grave doubt" regarding the harmlessness of the error. Reviewing the evidence against Williams, we are confident the

jury focused on Duncan's and Reid's observations of Williams

during the stop and pursuit and on other inculpatory evidence, including the location and condition of the gun retrieved, not on Duncan's affirmative response to a general

proposition made at the very end of his lengthy testimony.

Accordingly, we find the error harmless and affirm Williams's

conviction.

So ordered.

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Silberman, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I agree with the

majority that the trial judge committed error in this case, but

I disagree that the error was harmless.

This was a close case. Although the officers testified that

appellant was acting as if he had a gun, no one saw appellant

with one, and there were no fingerprints on the gun. See

Maj. Op. at 3. Appellant's flight is neither here nor there

with respect to whether he possessed a firearm; flight is

equally indicative of appellant's possession of the illegal drugs

he claimed to have. See Maj. Op. at 11. There is a vast

difference between using flight as the basis for a reasonable

suspicion of some unknown criminal activity, see Illinois v.

Wardlow, 120 S. Ct. 673, 676 (2000), and using flight here to

link appellant to a gun found in his vicinity. While some

evidence was at least suggestive of appellant's guilt (his

behavior, the condition of the gun), it was hardly overwhelming. I find it difficult to believe a jury found defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority considers the possibility that the jury did not

pay attention to Officer Duncan's statement with respect to

drug users and guns, hypothesizing that the officer's statement with respect to drug dealers overshadowed it. See Maj.

Op. at 12-13. But I find that unlikely. If, as we all agree, a

statement that "drug dealers commonly carry weapons for

protection raises no eyebrows," Maj. Op. at 6, it is probable

the jury focused on the new information that the same is true

of drug users. Since appellant was an admitted drug user--

he argued as much to the jury--the likelihood that the jury

glossed over Officer Duncan's statement is minuscule. And

the prejudicial statement cuts right to the heart of the case:

Was this drug user in possession of a gun?

It is particularly troubling that, as the court's opinion

recounts, the first jury to consider this case could not reach a

decision, resulting in a mistrial. See Maj. Op. at 3-4.1 It

__________

1 The majority does not contend-nor could it-that the first trial's

hung jury is irrelevant. See Maj. Op. at 10 n.10. Combined with

the weakness of the government's case it should trouble the majority as much as it does me.

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was only in the second trial, in which Officer Duncan's

prejudicial statement about drug users and weapons was

introduced, a statement repeated by the prosecutor during

her summation, that appellant was convicted. Since the

inquiry we undertake asks whether "with fair assurance, after

pondering all that happened without stripping away the erroneous action from the whole, ... the [jury's] judgment was

not substantially swayed by the error," the original mistrial is

undoubtedly relevant. United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d

833, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1999). The difficulty the first jury had

with this case amply demonstrates that we are not considering "an error [that] may be more freely disregarded [because]

the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming, since in

such a case the outcome would almost surely have been the

same despite the error." Charles A. Wright, 3A Fed. Prac. &

Proc. Crim.2d s 854 (1982). If we are willing to take into

consideration the length of jury deliberations in our harmless

error review, see Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 559

(D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The jury deliberated for five days, and one

would expect that if the evidence of guilt was overwhelming

the jury would have succumbed much sooner."), surely we

must consider the import of the hung jury.

Under these circumstances, I would remand for a new trial.

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