Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03022/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03022-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Bigley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 13, 2015 May 15, 2015

No. 12-3022

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOHN BIGLEY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cr-00282-1)

Jonathan S. Jeffress, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs was 

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman and David 

B. Kent, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, BROWN, Circuit Judge, 

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion filed for the Court PER CURIAM. Concurring 

Opinion filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

PER CURIAM: Before United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 

220 (2005), rendered the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 

advisory, we forbade district courts from relying on 

sentencing manipulation as a basis for mitigation. See United 

States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 1323, 1329–30 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But 

Booker and its offspring fundamentally changed the 

sentencing calculus, requiring courts to now consider any 

mitigation argument related to the sentencing factors

contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when imposing a sentence 

within the statutory range of punishment. See Pepper v. 

United States, 562 U.S. 476, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1241–48 

(2011); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101–02 

(2007); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007). A 

sentencing court, post-Booker, must consider nonfrivolous 

arguments for mitigation, even if those arguments were 

previously prohibited under the mandatory guidelines regime. 

Because the district court failed to consider a nonfrivolous 

claim of sentencing manipulation when it pronounced its 

sentence, we vacate the sentence and remand. 

I

A Metropolitan Police undercover operative, Detective 

Timothy Palchak, engaged in a private online chat with John 

Bigley, in an Internet chat room frequented by individuals 

with a sexual interest in prepubescent children. Bigley’s 

profile stated he was 75 years old and living in New Castle, 

Pennsylvania. 

Their conversations were sordid and graphic; and the 

prurient details need not be repeated here. Palchak pretended 

to have a sexual relationship with his girlfriend’s 12-year-old 

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daughter, “Christi.” Bigley was “very interested” in traveling 

to Washington D.C. to get sexual access to Christi and

expressed interest when Palchak said he had nude

photographs of Christi. Palchak raised the idea of Bigley 

taking photographs of Christi during his visit and, in a later 

conversation, Palchak advised Bigley to bring a digital 

camera on his trip. 

When Bigley arrived in Washington D.C., the police 

arrested him. Officers discovered a camera in his car, but after 

conducting a search of his residence, they found no child 

pornography. 

Bigley was charged with one count of interstate travel 

with intent to engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor.

See 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b). He pled guilty. When the probation 

office calculated his advisory sentencing guideline range, it 

employed the Section 2G1.3(c)(1) cross-reference guideline 

provision, which requires the application of Section 2G2.1

when an offense involves “causing, transporting, permitting, 

or offering . . . a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct 

for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such 

conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(c)(1). By applying Section

2G2.1, Bigley’s base offense level increased from 24 to 32, 

which, when the other guideline calculations were made, 

boosted his sentence guideline range from 46 to 57 months to 

135 to 168 months of imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A 

(sentencing table). 

At sentencing, Bigley argued for a variance from the 

advisory guideline range. Bigley claimed Palchak purposely 

introduced the camera into their conversations to manipulate 

and increase Bigley’s sentence. Because a much lower 

offense level would have applied without the application of 

Section 2G2.1, Bigley argued the sentencing factors contained 

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in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) supported a sentence of either 24 or 36 

months imprisonment.

The district court imposed a sentence of 84 months, 

stating:

The Court imposes this sentence which is a departure 

from the guidelines, having considered all of the factors 

under 3553(A), but in light of the seriousness of the 

offense, the Court believes that this sentence is the 

appropriate one under the guidelines, taking into 

account your age and the lack of any prior criminal 

record, but nonetheless this is a very serious offense 

that the Court has to take as seriously as Congress has 

mandated.

Sentencing Transcripts at 15–16, United States v. Bigley, No. 

11-00282 (D.D.C. July 18, 2012) (“Sent. Tr.”). The court did 

not address Bigley’s sentencing manipulation argument. Nor 

did Bigley object to the court’s statement of reasons.

II

Bigley now claims the district court committed 

procedural error by failing to address his nonfrivolous 

sentencing manipulation argument when imposing the 

sentence.

When a defendant fails to timely raise a procedural 

reasonableness objection at sentencing, this Court reviews for 

plain error. See United States v. Ransom, 756 F.3d 770, 773 

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (“Ransom acknowledges that at sentencing 

he did not object to his sentence[ ] . . . we review the district 

court’s sentencing procedures for plain error.”); United States 

v. Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“Because 

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Locke did not challenge the adequacy of the district court’s 

statement of reasons below, we review her claim for plain 

error.”).

Bigley nonetheless contends de novo review, rather than 

the more demanding plain error standard, applies because 

there was no opportunity to object to the district court’s 

procedural error. We need not decide whether Bigley had the 

requisite opportunity to object because, as we explain below, 

the plain error standard is met in any event. 

III

The crux of Bigley’s sentencing claim is that even if the

more punitive guideline provision for child pornography 

applied, the court should have imposed a “non-guideline 

sentence” and issued a downward variance from the guideline 

range. App. 34. Bigley claims the government purposely 

manipulated his sentence by inserting a camera into the 

discussion. To bolster his claim that the real offense conduct 

did not involve child pornography, Bigley noted the 

exhaustive search of his residence and camera revealed no 

images of child pornography—providing the inference that he 

was not predisposed to committing a child pornography 

offense had Palchak not introduced the topic into their 

discussion. This argument went to the nature of the offense, a 

relevant sentencing factor, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and was 

nonfrivolous.

When a district court confronts a nonfrivolous argument

for a sentence below the relevant guideline range, it must 

consider it. See Locke, 664 F.3d at 357 (holding Section

3553(c) “requires that the court provide a ‘reasoned basis’ for 

its decision and consider all ‘nonfrivolous reasons’ asserted 

for an alternative sentence”) (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–57).

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“In fact, so long as the judge provides a ‘reasoned basis for 

exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,’ we 

generally presume that he adequately considered the 

arguments and will uphold the sentence if it is otherwise 

reasonable.” Locke, 664 F.3d at 358. But, here, the

presumption is rebutted by the district court’s silence in the 

face of a sentencing manipulation argument for mitigation, 

along with the government’s concession that the court may 

have thought—consistent with the government’s

assumption—it could not reduce Bigley’s sentence based on

sentencing manipulation. Oral Arg. Recording 19:30-21:15. 

Thus, the court’s failure to consider Bigley’s nonfrivolous 

sentencing argument was error. 

The government contends United States v. Walls, 70 F.3d 

1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and its progeny stand for the 

proposition that a sentencing manipulation argument may 

never “be a basis for a reduced sentence in this jurisdiction.” 

Br. of Appellee at 24, United States v. Bigley, No. 12-3022 

(D.C. Cir. July 9, 2014). As an initial matter, Walls and its ilk

are inapposite. The two defendants in Walls brought a due 

process sentencing entrapment claim after receiving 

mandatory life sentences pursuant to statute, not the 

sentencing guidelines. 70 F.3d at 1325. And the district court

in United States v. Shepherd sentenced the defendant below 

the applicable statutory mandatory minimum based on 

sentencing manipulation. 102 F.3d 558, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

In both cases, the Court held defendants could bring due 

process sentencing manipulation claims to challenge only 

their conviction, not their sentence. Walls, 70 F.3d at 1329;

Shepherd, 102 F.3d at 566–67. But bringing a constitutional 

challenge seeking imposition of a sentence outside the 

statutory range is far different than a request for a judge to 

consider varying the sentence within the appropriate statutory 

range. The former requires a defendant to prove a 

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constitutional violation; the latter merely requires a defendant 

to request mitigation of his sentence based on sentencing 

factors contained within Section 3553(a). See Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 63–64 (2007).

Our decisions in United States v. Hinds, 329 F.3d 184 

(D.C. Cir. 2003), and United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749 

(D.C. Cir. 1998), are also distinguishable. In Hinds, the 

defendant claimed the sentencing court erred in failing to 

reduce his base offense level under the guidelines due to 

government sentencing manipulation, and we concluded such 

arguments were not a proper legal basis to challenge a 

sentence. 329 F.3d at 190. But here, by contrast, Bigley 

requested a downward variance after acknowledging the 

correctly calculated guideline range. In Glover, the Court 

again rejected a claim of sentencing entrapment. But unlike 

Walls and Shepherd, the Court simply rejected the claim on 

the merits, finding no evidence the government “orchestrated” 

a crime carrying a stiffer penalty. 153 F.3d at 756–57. 

United States v. Webb, 134 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 1998), is 

closer to the mark. The district court there departed downward 

from the guideline range due to an undercover police officer 

making multiple drug buys from the defendant before finally 

arresting him. We noted—despite the district court’s 

reluctance to use the label—that the departure was based on

sentencing manipulation, and we reaffirmed the guidelines 

provide no basis for such a departure. Id. at 409.

As to the government’s larger point—sentencing 

manipulation can never be a basis for a reduced sentence in 

this jurisdiction—the Walls line of decisions is incompatible 

with the Supreme Court’s post-Booker precedents. See 

Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241–48 (holding that forbidden preBooker departure for post-conviction rehabilitation could be 

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considered as a factor justifying a variance); United States v. 

Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019 (10th Cir. 2009) (“However, 

after Booker, a claim of sentencing factor manipulation may 

also be raised as a request for a variance based on § 3553(a)’s 

requirement that a district court consider the nature and 

circumstances of the offense.”). Sentencing courts, postBooker, can issue a variance from the advisory guidelines 

range without the need for a pre-Booker departure, and can 

issue a variance on the same grounds that were previously 

forbidden for departures. See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1241–42 

(holding there is no “basis for the courts to invent a blanket 

prohibition against considering certain types of evidence at 

sentencing”). If the district court relied on the Walls line of 

cases in denying Bigley’s sentencing manipulation argument, 

as the government agrees the court “probably” did, Oral Arg. 

Recording 19:30-21:15, that too was error. 

By failing to consider the defendant’s nonfrivolous 

mitigation argument, the district court committed plain error. 

The Supreme Court’s post-Booker decisions required 

sentencing courts to consider nonfrivolous mitigation 

arguments at sentencing; Walls does not seem to apply to 

Bigley’s request for a variance from the guideline range based 

on sentencing manipulation; and even if the Walls line of 

decisions is deemed applicable, they are incompatible with 

the post-Booker advisory guideline regime. See In re Sealed 

Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (error is plain “if it 

contradicts . . . Supreme Court precedent”).

In the sentencing context, the plain error standard further 

requires only that the defendant “show a reasonable 

likelihood” that the sentencing court’s plain error “affected 

his sentence.” In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d at 852 (quoting 

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see 

id. at 853. Here, that burden is met by the government’s own 

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concession. At oral argument, government counsel conceded 

the judge “probably” thought—just as the prosecutor did—the 

court lacked authority to vary downward from the Guidelines 

based on Bigley’s sentencing entrapment argument. See Oral 

Arg. Recording 19:30-21:00. The government, moreover, 

agreed the entire case came down to a question of whether a 

judge can consider sentencing entrapment post-Booker, id. at 

21:00-21:20, and if this Court concluded the government’s 

view on that question was wrong, then the defendant had been 

prejudiced, id. at 1930-21:00, 33:00-33:50. We have so 

concluded.

In order to meet plain error review, a defendant must also 

show the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or 

public reputation of judicial proceedings,” United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993). We said, in In re Sealed 

Case, “[a] district judge must adequately explain the chosen 

sentence to promote the perception of fair sentencing,” which 

“is important not only for the defendant but also for the public 

to learn why the defendant received a particular sentence.” 

527 F.3d at 193. When a judge fails to address a defendant’s 

nonfrivolous mitigation claim based on a 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) 

sentencing factor, a reviewing court and the public cannot

adequately evaluate the judge’s sentence selection. Moreover, 

where, as here, a district court may have thought it was 

prohibited, as a matter of law, from considering a claim for 

mitigation, the error seriously affects the public reputation of 

judicial proceedings. See United States v. Terrell, 696 F.3d 

1257, 1263–64 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (reversing for plain error a 

district court’s mistake on the scope of its sentencing 

discretion).

Because this case meets the standard for plain error, we 

vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. In doing so, we 

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emphasize that this disposition in no way requires the district 

court to shorten the sentence on remand. Rather, the district 

court remains free to resentence the defendant appropriately.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Bigley’s sentence 

and remand for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

So ordered.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge, concurring: After the Supreme 

Court declared the Sentencing Guidelines advisory in United 

States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), and required a very 

deferential form of reasonableness review, see Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51–53 (2007), there is very little left for 

an appellate court to do in reviewing federal sentences. That 

said, we must still ensure a sentencing judge considered all of 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including 

defendants’ nonfrivolous arguments for mitigation directed at

those factors. As a practical matter, effective review depends 

on the trial judge’s transparency in addressing his 

considerations—however lightly—on the record or in written 

orders.

A majority of circuits require judges to address a 

defendant’s nonfrivolous arguments for a sentence below the 

advisory Sentencing Guideline range. E.g., United States v. 

Poulin, 745 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding the 

sentencing judge must “consider” a nonfrivolous sentencing 

argument and “provide reasons explaining his acceptance or 

rejection of it”); United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 376–

77 (2d Cir. 2013) (reversing for, inter alia, the district court’s 

failure to address defendant’s nonfrivolous argument); United 

States v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(“Trujillo presented nonfrivolous arguments, and the district 

court did not at all explain the reasons for rejecting them; this 

was legal error.”); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 

(4th Cir. 2010) (holding the district court failed to address the 

defendant’s “nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different 

sentence”); United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 

357, 362 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding the district court 

inadequately addressed defendant’s argument for a downward 

departure from the Guideline range); United States v. Sevilla, 

541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds

by United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(“[A] rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not 

suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution 

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properly raises a ground of recognized legal merit . . . and the 

court fails to address it”); United States v. Peters, 512 F.3d 

787, 788 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing because “the District 

Court did not address the defendant’s ‘time-served’ 

argument”). 

“Sentencing is a responsibility heavy enough without our 

adding formulaic or ritualized burdens.” United States v. 

Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 193 (2d Cir. 2008). I am not indifferent 

to concerns about saddling busy district courts with more 

procedural loads and I appreciate this court’s reluctance. But 

the burden of providing a brief explanation is small and the 

advantages great. “Most obviously, [an explanation] 

requirement helps to ensure that district courts actually 

consider the statutory factors and reach reasoned decisions.” 

Id. at 193; see also In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 188, 192 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (“The requirements that a sentencing judge 

provide a specific reason for a departure and that he commit 

that reason to writing work together to ensure a sentence is 

well-considered.”). It also promotes the “perception of fair 

sentencing,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50, and “helps the sentencing 

process evolve by informing the ongoing work of the 

Sentencing Commission,” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193. When a 

sentencing court responds to a defendant’s arguments, it 

“communicates a message of respect for defendants, 

strengthening what social psychologists call ‘procedural 

justice effects,’ thereby advancing fundamental purposes of 

the Sentencing Reform Act.” See Michael M. O’Hear, 

Explaining Sentences, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 459, 472 (2009).

The requirement also assures an adequate record with which 

we can conduct “meaningful appellate review.” Gall, 552 

U.S. at 50.

1 Consequently, I would join the majority of 

 1 Requiring a sentencing court to both consider and address a 

defendant’s argument for mitigation also can affect outcomes. See

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circuits in holding district courts should address a defendant’s 

nonfrivolous argument for a variance from the Guideline 

range. 

The court relies on the government’s concession that the 

district court “probably” believed it was prohibited by our 

case law from considering sentencing manipulation as a basis 

for a variance from the advisory Guideline range. Maj. Op. at 

6 (citing Oral Arg. Recording 19:30-21:15). But we are 

required to “conduct an independent review” of a legal issue, 

despite the government’s concession on appeal. United States 

v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 636 (D.C. Cir. 2010). More 

importantly, although the government claimed the district 

court probably believed it was prohibited by United States v. 

Walls, 70 F.3d 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1995), and its progeny, from 

considering Bigley’s sentencing manipulation argument, the 

government never presented the Walls argument to the district 

court—either in its sentencing memorandum or during the 

sentencing hearing. Thus, it seems odd to find, as the court 

did, that the district court erred in failing to consider Bigley’s 

sentencing manipulation claim based on an argument the 

government never presented. I would rather have the district 

court’s explanation than the government’s dubious 

concession.

I concur in the judgment.

 

Jennifer Niles Coffin, Where Procedure Meets Substance: Making 

the Most of the Need for Adequate Explanation in Federal 

Sentencing, CHAMPION, Mar. 2012, at 36 (“When courts of appeals 

insist that the district courts fully address the evidence and 

arguments presented by the parties regarding the appropriate 

sentence, and then explain their decision to accept or reject those 

arguments, actual outcomes are different on remand, sometimes 

significantly so.”).

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