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Parties Involved:
Bernard Edward Analla
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.., FILED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSUoiced States Cou:t: ~f Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SEP 21 1990 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) No. 89-2250 

) (D.C. No. 89-174-JB) 

BERNARD EDWARD ANALLA, ) (D.N.M.) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, TACHA and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant-appellant Bernard Edward Analla (Bernard) was 

convicted by a jury of committing a crime on an Indian 

reservation: assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1153, 113(f) & 2. He appeals claiming 

that the district court erred by 1) admitting the victim's 

statement that "these people" had a reputation for shooting into 

houses, 2) not admitting a sixteen year-old prior felony 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-2250 Document: 010110053421 Date Filed: 09/21/1990 Page: 1 
conviction of an absent codefendant, 3) not granting a two-level 

downward adjustment for a minor role in the offense, and 4) not 

granting a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 

Finding these contentions without merit after a review of the 

record and the applicable law, we affirm. Our jurisdiction over 

this direct criminal appeal arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. 

I. 

Jose Miguel Abeita was shot outside his trailer on the Laguna 

Indian Reservation early Sunday morning, July 10, 1988. The 

preceding Saturday afternoon, Abeita was at a bar near Bibo, New 

Mexico when defendant Bernard, his brother (and absent 

codefendant) Frank Analla, and Leland Stokes called Abeita outside 

the bar and challenged him to a fight. Bernard had numchucks, 

Frank had a rifle and Stokes had a stick or a pipe. Abeita 

declined the invitation and returned to the bar. 

Later that evening, Abeita noticed a car driving slowly by 

his trailer. Abeita testified that he grabbed a rifle and walked 

outside. When queried why he didn't stay inside the trailer, 

Abeita replied that "these people got a reputation of shooting 

through people's windows .... " Rec. vol. III at 51. Abeita 

testified that he confronted Bernard at a distance of 

approximately fifteen feet whereupon Bernard shot him. Bernard 

was arrested the next morning. A shotgun was seized from 

underneath Frank's bed; tests revealed that a shotgun shell found 

at Abeita's residence was ejected from the same shotgun. 

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.. 

In his defense, Bernard argued that his brother Frank was 

responsible for the shooting. He sought to impeach Abeita's 

identification with evidence of intoxication and inconsistent 

physical evidence. The jury was instructed both on the 

substantive offense of assault resulting in serious bodily injury 

and aiding and abetting. The verdict did not distinguish between 

the substantive offense and aiding and abetting. 

II. 

Bernard first argues that Abeita's statement concerning the 

alleged reputation of "these people" for shooting through windows 

was inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts under Fed. R. Evid. 

404(b) and that the trial court committed reversible error by 

overruling Analla's motion to strike such testimony. We disagree. 

Abeita's statement was not admitted "to prove the character of 

[the Anallas, or whoever "these people" are] in order to show 

action in conformity therewith." Fed. R. Evid .. 404(b). Rather, 

the evidence was admitted to show Abeita's state of mind at the 

time he left his trailer. Abeita's fortuitous use of the word 

"reputation" does not automatically place his statement under Fed. 

R. Evid. 404(b) or 608 when character evidence was neither sought 

by the prosecution nor offered by the witness. We cannot say that 

the district court abused its discretion in admitting such 

evidence. See United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th 

Cir. 1989). Obtaining a limiting instruction was the 

responsibility of the defendant, Fed. R. Evict. 105; Huddleston v. 

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United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988), and the defendant should 

have sought clarification of the ruling denying his objection if 

confusion existed. 

III. 

Bernard next complains that the district court made another 

incorrect ruling on Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence, this time by 

excluding a prior conviction of Frank. At the time of trial, 

Frank was a fugitive and unable to testify. Bernard sought to 

introduce Frank's sixteen year-old assault conviction to bolster 

the defense argument that Bernard did not actually shoot Abeita. 

See Appellant's Brief at 15. 

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

Because Frank did not testify at trial, his credibility was not at 

issue and the prior conviction is therefore irrelevant on the 

issue of credibility. Similarly, a sixteen year-old conviction 

has no relevance on the issue of Frank's intent on the morning of 

the assault. Likewise, a sixteen year-old conviction has only the 

most tenuous connection with the issue of identity given the vague 

proffer concerning factual similarity (identifying 

characteristics) between Frank's conviction and the circumstances 

of the instant offense. Rather, the only likely use of Frank's 

assault conviction was to show that he acted in conformity with 

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his criminal record in assaulting Abeita. Such use plainly is 

prohibited by Rule 404(b). The district court in no way abused 

its discretion in excluding the evidence. See Record, 873 F.2d at 

1373. 

IV. 

Bernard next argues that he was entitled to a two-level 

reduction in sentence for a minor role in the offense. The 

Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction in offense 

level "[i]f the defendant _was a minor participant in any criminal 

activity .•.. " United States Sentencing Comm'n, Guidelines 

Manual,§ 3Bl.2(b) (1989). "For purposes of§ 3Bl.2(b), a minor 

participant means any participant who is less culpable than most 

other participants, but whose role could not be described as 

minimal." Id. comment. (n.3). Here, even if Bernard was found 

guilty as an aider and abettor, 18 u.s.c. § 2(a) provides that 

whoever aids and abets an offense against the United States "is 

punishable as a principal." Thus, aider and abettor liability is 

not a legal determination that a person is "less culpable" than if 

he acted as a principal. 

Bernard argues that the district court's factual 

determinations concerning defendant's lack of a mitigating role in 

the offense are clearly erroneous and that the district court 

committed legal error by not recognizing its authority to go 

behind the verdict and consider defense counsel's representations 

concerning a post-verdict poll of six jurors concerning the 

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I 

~ 

defendant's role in the offense. See United States v. Rutter, 897 

F.2d 1558, 1560 (10th Cir. 1990) (under Sentencing Guidelines, 

factual determinations are reviewed under clearly erroneous 

standard; legal questions are reviewed de novo). We don't see it 

that way. The district judge is in command of factual 

determinations when it comes to sentencing and is in no way bound 

by the results of the post-verdict conversations with jurors 

conducted by the defense. This is not a situation in which the 

district court fails to appreciate its discretion in adjusting for 

a defendant's role in the offense. Rather, after trying the case, 

the district court credited the victim's identification of Bernard 

as the perpetrator. Rec. vol. III at 268, 271. This subsidiary 

finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. Moreover, the district 

court's entirely permissible view of the facts, id. at 271-73, 

supports its ultimate finding that no reduction in offense level 

under§ 3Bl.2(b) was appropriate. See United States v. Havens, 

No. 89-2115, slip op. at 7-8 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 1990) [1990 WL 

110271] (applying clearly erroneous standard to role in the 

offense determinations under u.s.s.G. § 3Bl.2). 

v. 

Bernard finally argues that the district court erred in 

refusing his request for a two-level reduction in offense level 

for acceptance of responsibility. The Guidelines provide for such 

a reduction "[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility his criminal 

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conduct[.]" u.s.s.G. § 3El.l(a). "'The sentencing judge is ~n a 

unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of 

responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the 

sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and 

should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation.'" United 

States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

u.s.S.G. § 3El.1, comment. (n.S)). In light of the district 

court's subsidiary factual findings at sentencing which are 

supported by record evidence, we cannot say that the district 

court was clearly erroneous in its determination that Bernard had 

not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct under 

§ 3El.1. See Wach 907 F.2d at 1040. The denial of Bernard's 

request a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility 

therefore must stand. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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