Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05443/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-05443-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
Defendant
David J. Manfre
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID J. MANFRE

Plaintiff,

 v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,

Commissioner of Social Security Administration,

Defendant. /

No. C-06-05443 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Cross Motions for

Summary Judgment and/or

Remand

Plaintiff David J. Manfre seeks judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s finding that plaintiff is not due benefits for

his alleged incapacity to work. Now before the court is plaintiff’s appeal of that decision and the

parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and/or remand. Having considered the arguments

presented and for the reasons set forth below, the court enters the following memorandum and order.

BACKGROUND1

I. Factual History

Plaintiff is a fifty-four year-old man with a tenth grade education. He worked as an

equipment operator for approximately the last thirty-three years but has not been engaged in any

substantial gainful activity since he was laid off in January 2003. Plaintiff had a heart attack in

2001, broke his collarbone in December 2003, and thereafter ran out of health insurance. Plaintiff

has suffered various difficulties including being left by his wife, the loss of his career, and the death

of a friend killed while operating a crane. Although a medical professional advised plaintiff to see a

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psychiatrist, he has not done so. Currently, plaintiff stays at an outbuilding on a farm in Petaluma. 

He claims that he cannot keep things in order, and that his daily activities include eating at his

friend’s house, cooking, watching television, shopping with his friend, hanging out, talking,

listening to the stereo, reading magazines, and sleeping. Plaintiff’s friend, John Lindt, describes

plaintiff’s daily activities as taking care of his dog, microwaving his own meals, driving a car,

shopping, watching television, sleeping, and getting along with others. The onset date of plaintiff’s

alleged disability was December 29, 2003. Plaintiff filed for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”)

and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)(collectively, “benefits”) on July 30, 2004 alleging

disability due to a broken collarbone, a bad heart, depression, and a swollen and arthritic right

thumb. Plaintiff claims that he is unable to work because of his physical and mental disabilities.

Dr. Margaret Marquez performed an internal medicine consultative examination on plaintiff

on October 21, 2005. She found that plaintiff has a history of coronary artery disease post

myocardial infarction, a left collarbone fracture, and a bilateral hand burning sensation which was

treated successfully with Neurontin. Plaintiff was taking no medication at the time of the

examination but had previously used sublingual Nitroglycerin, Prozac, Lisinopril, Tenormin,

Lovastatin, Celebrex, and Neurontin. Dr. Marquez assessed that plaintiff could lift or carry twenty

pounds frequently, stand or walk for six hours, and sit without limitations in an eight-hour workday.2

On December 18, 2004 plaintiff was evaluated by psychiatric consultative examiner William

L. Schwimmer, Ph.D. Dr. Schwimmer found that plaintiff could understand, carry out and

remember simple instructions as well as respond to coworkers, supervisors, the public, and work

situations. He diagnosed plaintiff with an adjustment disorder, depressed mood and a global

assessment of functioning (“GAF”) score of sixty-five—indicating that plaintiff may experience

some difficulty in social and occupational functioning.3 Def.’s Mot. n.6 at 4. State agency medical

consultants found on four different occasions that plaintiff could do light work and would be

moderately limited to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions. Michael L.

Venard, Ph.D., an examining psychologist, evaluated plaintiff on June 6, 2005. Dr. Venard

diagnosed plaintiff with a major depressive episode and a GAF score of fifty—indicating that

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plaintiff may have serious impairment in social and occupational functioning. Pl.’s Mot. at 4. He

found that plaintiff could understand, remember and carry out simple instructions, and would be

moderately limited in his ability to remember detailed instructions. Dr. Venard’s diagnosis

additionally contained findings that were more severe than those of Dr. Schwimmer or the state

medical consultants: he found that plaintiff would be severely limited in his ability to respond to a

work routine by depression-related fatigue, lack of drive and limited motivation, would be

moderately limited in his ability to maintain concentration and work pace, and would be severely

limited in his social interactions by depression.

At a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”) on August 4, 2005, vocational

expert Malcom Borzinsky testified that plaintiff could not return to his past relevant work.4

However, Borzinsky additionally testified that an individual of the plaintiff’s age, education, past

relevant work and functional limitations as described by the ALJ could perform light, unskilled jobs

such as small parts assembler or housekeeper. On January 24, 2006, the ALJ found that plaintiff

retained a residual functioning capacity (“RFC”) for work activity at the light exertional level with

no forceful gripping, routine, repetitive tasks, and limited public contact. He concluded that plaintiff

has an affective disorder with depression imposing mild restrictions on his daily activities, moderate

difficulties in social functioning, and moderate difficulties in concentration. The ALJ also found

that plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not fully credible given the evidence in the record from

the examining physicians and the testimony of plaintiff and Mr. Lindt. In accordance with these

findings and Borzinsky’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is capable of performing other

work in the economy, and therefore, that plaintiff is not disabled and not entitled to DIB or SSI.5

II. Procedural History

Plaintiff’s original application for benefits in July 2004 was denied by the Social Security

Administration (“SSA”). Following initial and reconsideration denials of this application, claimant

filed a timely hearing request on April 29, 2005. Evidence was then taken at a hearing on August 4,

2005 before the ALJ, in which plaintiff and Bordzinsky testified. The ALJ again denied plaintiff’s

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application for benefits on January 24, 2006. That decision became final when the Appeals Council

declined to review the ALJ’s denial on June 30, 2006. Plaintiff timely filed for review of the SSA’s

proceedings with this court.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there is

“no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the

case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is

genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving

party. Id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions

of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). On an issue for which the opposing party

will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Mere allegations or denials do not defeat a moving

party’s allegations. Id.; Gasaway v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 26 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir.

1994). The court may not make credibility determinations, and inferences to be drawn from the

facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New

Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

The moving party may “move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment

in the party’s favor upon all [claims] or any part thereof.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Supporting and

opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be

admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the

matters stated therein.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

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DISCUSSION

Claimant argues that the final decision of the Commissioner was not based upon substantial

evidence and therefore should be overturned. A federal district court may not disturb the final

decision of the Commissioner unless it is based on legal error or the fact findings are not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir.

1987). “Substantial evidence, considering the entire record, is relevant evidence which a reasonable

person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 679

(9th Cir. 1993). The court’s review “must consider the record as a whole,” including evidence that

supports the Commissioner’s decision and evidence that detracts from it. Desrosiers v. Sec. of

Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988). Nonetheless, where evidence is

susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner’s

decision, the court must defer to the Commissioner’s decision and may not substitute its judgment

for that of the Commissioner. See Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720–21 (9th Cir. 1998). The

Commissioner’s determinations of law, however, are reviewed de novo. See McNatt v. Apfel, 201

F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus even if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s

fact findings, “the decision should be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied in

weighing the evidence and making the decision.” Benitez v. Califano, 573 F.2d 653, 655 (9th Cir.

1978) (quoting Flake v. Gardner, 399 F.2d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 1968)). The Social Security Act

defines disability as “the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42

U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The claimant has the burden of establishing a disability under the Act. See,

e.g., Webb v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 683, 686 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 To determine whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the ALJ engages in a five-step

sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At each step, if the ALJ can determine that the claimant

is disabled or not disabled, the ALJ need not advance to the next step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the

first step, if the ALJ determines that the claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the

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claimant will not be found disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ considers the

medical severity of the claimant’s impairments. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant’s medically

determinable physical or mental impairment is not severe, the claimant will not be found disabled. 

Id. At step three, the ALJ will determine whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments are equivalent to a listed impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii); 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1. At step four, the ALJ must consider the functional limitations imposed by the

claimant’s impairments and determine the claimant’s RFC. The claimant will not be found disabled

if he or she retains the ability to perform past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). Past relevant

work is work that a claimant has performed within the past fifteen years, that was a substantial

gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn the necessary skills to perform

the work. Id. § 404.1560(b). If the ALJ determines that claimant cannot perform past relevant

work, the ALJ must consider at step five whether the claimant’s impairment or combination of

impairments prevent the claimant from performing other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the

national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

Plaintiff asks the court to enter a judgment that he is medically disabled and thus eligible for

benefits, or alternatively, that the case should be remanded for further administrative proceedings on

the issue of plaintiff’s alleged disability. Specifically, plaintiff claims that the ALJ improperly (1)

evaluated plaintiff’s RFC with respect to his mental impairments, (2) discounted plaintiff’s selfreporting of symptoms, and (3) determined that plaintiff can perform “other work” in the economy. 

Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

I. Plaintiff’s RFC

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC at step four was improper

because it was not based on the evidence in the entire record. Specifically, plaintiff argues that

defendant improperly disregarded Dr. Venard’s diagnosis of plaintiff’s condition. In assessing a

plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ “must consider the record as a whole.” Desrosiers, 846 F.2d at 576. The

ALJ’s assessment of plaintiff’s RFC involved determinations of fact, and therefore is given a

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deferential review; the court must defer to the ALJ’s decision where one of various rational

interpretations of the evidence supports that decision. Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720–21. 

While defendant insists that the ALJ’s conclusion with respect to plaintiff’s RFC was

consistent with “much of Dr. Venard’s assessment,” defendant does concede that the ALJ “rejected

the more extreme portions of Dr. Venard’s assessment.” The ALJ, however, is not bound by the

diagnoses of physicians in making a determination of disability and is justified in disregarding a

physician’s opinion in various circumstances. See Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 359

F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ALJ need not give controlling weight to the opinion of a

treating physician”); see also Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (a

physician’s opinion is “not binding on an ALJ with respect to . . . the ultimate determination of

disability”). Defendant argues that the circumstances justified the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. Venard’s

diagnosis for the following reasons.

First, defendant argues that the ALJ properly rejected the part of Dr. Venard’s diagnosis that

characterized plaintiff’s social interactions as “dramatically” and “severely” limited because Dr.

Venard did not explain the basis for these findings. This argument is unpersuasive. Dr. Venard

thoroughly explained the basis for his entire diagnosis. An ALJ may discount a physician’s opinion

where it “lack[s] substantial medical findings to support [his] conclusion.” Batson, 359 F.3d at

1195. In Batson, the court gave “minimal weight” to the opinions of two physicians because their

evaluations were conclusory, written in the form of a checklist, and were not supported by objective

evidence. Id. In the instant case, Dr. Venard has provided a seven-page report which is significantly

more comprehensive than the checklists in Batson. Dr. Venard gives a number of explanations in

support of his finding that plaintiff’s social interactions are “severely limited,” including that

plaintiff suffers from “withdrawal, irritability and probable confusion due to severe levels of

depression.” TR at 166. The causes of plaintiff’s severe depression are chronicled throughout the

report as well. TR at 163–66. The ALJ’s partial rejection of Dr. Venard’s diagnosis is therefore not

justified by an argument that Dr. Venard failed to provide substantive medical findings. 

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Defendant next argues that the ALJ’s decision was proper because it was consistent with the

opinions of Dr. Schwimmer and two state agency medical consultants. The ALJ is responsible for

resolving conflicting or ambiguous medical opinions. See Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th

Cir. 1984); Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). Where a

doctor’s opinion is uncontroverted, the Commissioner must provide “clear and convincing” reasons

for rejecting the doctor’s opinion. Pitzer v. Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 (9th Cir. 1990). Where two

or more doctors’ opinions conflict, the weight given to the opinion of an individual doctor varies

depending on the nature of the doctor-patient relationship. More weight is given to a treating

physician’s opinion than to that of a non-treating physician, and likewise, the opinion of an

examining physician is preferred over that of a non-examining physician. See Magallanes v. Bowen,

88 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989); Pitzer, 908 F.2d at 506 n.4. However, the contradicted opinion of

a treating physician or an examining physician may be rejected so long as the ALJ makes findings

supported by specific and legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. Morgan v.

Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin, 169 F.3d 595, 603–04 (9th Cir. 1998). The ALJ can satisfy

this standard by providing a “detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical

evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403,

1408 (9th Cir. 1986). Furthermore, where one physician’s opinion rests on independent clinical

findings, the ALJ need not articulate specific and legitimate reasons for discounting another

physician’s opinion, as the independent clinical findings of the prior physician constitute substantial

evidence. See Miller v. Heckler, 770 F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985). 

The conflict in the instant case exists between two examining physicians, Drs. Venard and

Schwimmer. Therefore, the decision of the Commissioner to partially reject Dr. Venard’s opinion 

was proper if specific, legitimate reasons existed that were supported by substantial evidence in the

record or if the ALJ based his decision on conclusions that Dr. Schwimmer drew from independent

clinical findings.

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ did not articulate any specific, legitimate reasons for partially

rejecting the opinion of Dr. Venard and that the Commissioner’s decision was therefore improper. 

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The Ninth Circuit has highlighted the flexibility of this requirement, noting that the court may draw

its own specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ’s opinion to satisfy the standard. 

Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 755. In Magallanes, the court found that the ALJ had given sufficiently

specific and legitimate explanations where the ALJ “summarized the facts and conflicting clinical

evidence in detailed and thorough fashion, stat[ed] his interpretation and [made] findings.” Id. 

In the instant case, the ALJ’s explanations and findings were substantially similar to those presented

in Magallanes. The ALJ summarized the facts and clinical findings of Drs. Venard and Schwimmer

in detail, stated his interpretation, and found that plaintiff is able to do work activity at a light

exertional level. TR at 18–21. Specifically, the ALJ explained that he based his conclusions

regarding plaintiff’s RFC on the report of Dr. Schwimmer, who found that plaintiff could

understand, carry out and remember simple instructions, respond to coworkers, supervisors, and the

public. TR at 19, 132. Moreover, the diagnoses of the state agency medical consultants support the

diagnosis of Dr. Schwimmer and the ALJ’s finding. TR at 151. The Ninth Circuit held in Andrews

that an examining physician’s opinion may be rejected in favor of nonexamining physician’s opinion

where the latter’s opinion is “supported by other evidence in the record and is consistent with it.” 53

F.3d at 1041. Here, the opinion of Dr. Schwimmer—an examining physician—is supported by the

opinions of two state agency physicians and in part by the diagnosis of Dr. Venard. Courts have

upheld the decision of the Commissioner denying disability status on much less. See, e.g., Morgan

169 F.3d at 602–04 (rejecting the opinions of a treating psychiatrist and an examining psychologist

where ALJ gave specific reasons consistent with the opinion of a nontreating, nonmedical advisor). 

Because the opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than those of nonexamining

physicians, the Commissioner’s argument is made even stronger in the instant action by the fact that

the physician’s opinion upon which the ALJ relied was that of an examining physician. The court is

satisfied that the ALJ had specific, legitimate reasons for partially rejecting Dr. Venard’s diagnosis

because the decision was supported by substantial evidence in the record, namely, the opinions of an

examining physician and two state agency physicians.

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The decision of the ALJ was further justified by the fact that Dr. Schwimmer’s diagnosis was

based on independent clinical findings. Independent clinical findings constitute substantial evidence

and justify the discounting of conflicting medical testimony because it is “solely the province of the

ALJ to resolve the conflict.” Andrews, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly

emphasized the importance of avoiding the imposition of “‘burdensome procedural requirements

that facilitate . . . second-guessing [the ALJ’s resolution of conflicting medical testimony].’” Id.

(quoting Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 580 (9th Cir. 1984) (brackets in original). Dr.

Schwimmer’s diagnosis was based upon an independent medical status evaluation performed on

December 18, 2004. The ALJ relied on Dr. Schwimmer’s independent clinical findings in arriving

at his decision to deny disability status. The decision was therefore proper.6

The court is sensitive to the fact that plaintiff’s alleged difficulties in the instant case are the

result of a mental disability. In his dissenting opinion in Morgan, Judge Noonan of the Ninth Circuit

observed that where “[a claim] revolves primarily around allegations of mental disabilities which are

by their nature difficult to diagnose, it is important to give adequate weight to the personal

impressions formed by the experts who have interacted with the claimant.” Morgan, 169 F.3d at 605

(Noonan, J., dissenting). After a thorough review of the record, the court is satisfied that the ALJ’s

final determination of plaintiff’s RFC was proper because specific, legitimate reasons and

independent clinical findings supported his decision.

II. The ALJ’s Rejection of Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptoms

Plaintiff alleges that if his statements about pain, depression and limited daily activities had

been credited, plaintiff would have been found disabled due to an inability to sustain performance in

any occupation in the competitive workplace. In the absence of evidence showing that the claimant

is malingering, “the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting the claimant’s testimony must be clear

and convincing.”7

 Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599; see also Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir.

1995); Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989). Social Security Ruling 88-13

provides factors for the adjudicator to consider when evaluating the credibility of testimony

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regarding pain, limitations and other subjective symptoms. These factors include (1) the nature,

location, onset, duration, frequency, radiation, and intensity of any pain; (2) precipitating and

aggravating factors, such as movement or environmental conditions; (3) type, dosage, effectiveness,

and adverse side-effects of any pain medication; (4) treatment, other than medication, for relief of

pain; (5) functional restrictions; and (6) the claimant’s daily activities. SSR 88–13 (1988). “The

SSR 88–13 factors ensure that the determination of disability is not a wholly subjective process,

turning solely on the identity of the adjudicator.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 346 (9th Cir.

1991). In addition,

[t]he ALJ may consider . . . : (1) ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation, such as

the claimant’s reputation for lying, prior inconsistent statements concerning the

symptoms, and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid; (2)

unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed

course of treatment; and (3) the claimant’s daily activities.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

The ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting claimant’s subjective

testimony. Morgan is instructive on this point. The Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ’s rejection of

Morgan’s subjective symptoms from depression was proper where the ALJ based his decision on

reports from physicians and inconsistencies between Morgan’s claims, the diagnoses of physicians,

and Morgan’s own account of his daily activities. Morgan, 169 F.3d at 599–600. Specifically, the

ALJ found Morgan’s alleged disability inconsistent with his stated ability to fix meals, do laundry,

work in the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child. Id. at 600. The court noted, “[i]f a

claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance

of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this fact may be

sufficient to discredit a claimant’s allegations.” Id.; see also Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th

Cir. 1989). In the instant case, the ALJ pointed to substantial evidence in the record that supported

his finding that plaintiff’s subjective testimony was not credible. For example, the ALJ cited to

plaintiff’s good prior work record, observations from “a preponderance of the physicians” that

plaintiff can still do work, the testimony of Mr. Lindt regarding plaintiff’s daily activities, and

plaintiff’s own description of his daily activities. TR at 20. The ALJ noted that the testimony of

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plaintiff and Mr. Lindt collectively show that plaintiff is able to take care of his person, wash dishes,

vacuum, do laundry, visit with his neighbor, walk, talk with others, follow instructions, take care of

his dog, microwave his own meals, drive a car, shop, and watch television. Id. Here, the ALJ

pointed to even more evidence in support of his decision than did the ALJ in Morgan. Therefore, the

ALJ provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s subjective symptom complaints.

III. Vocational Expert Hypothetical

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the decision of the Commissioner was improper because the

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not adequately include the limitations

imposed on plaintiff by his condition. After a claimant has shown that he cannot return to his

previous job, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant can do other types of

substantial, gainful work in the economy. Embry v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988);

Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 644 (9th Cir. 1982). Vocational experts are used to determine

whether a claimant can perform other work in the economy. Embry, 849 F.2d at 422. “Hypothetical

questions posed to the vocational expert must set out all the limitations and restrictions of the

particular claimant . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). Limitations and abilities assumed in a

hypothetical question must be supported by the record. Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 757. However,

supposed limitations and abilities need not be supported by the entire record and are permissible if

supported by substantial evidence. Martinez v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). The

ALJ need not include limitations from properly rejected physician opinions. Batson, 359 F.3d at

1197. Limitations that the ALJ finds not credible also need not be included. Bayliss v. Barnhart,

427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). For reasons the court has already explained, the ALJ’s

decision to partially reject Dr. Venard’s diagnosis and discount plaintiff’s subjective complaints was

proper. In finding that the plaintiff was able to perform light work such as a housekeeper or small

parts assembler, the vocational expert took into account the plaintiff’s age, education, past relevant

work, and functional limitations as described by the ALJ. TR at 20. Because the ALJ’s finding of

plaintiff’s functional limitations was properly reached, the vocational expert’s testimony satisfied the

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Commissioner’s burden of proving that plaintiff could perform other types of gainful employment in

the national economy. Plaintiff’s argument that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational

expert was improper is therefore unavailing. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and/or remand is DENIED, and

defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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1. All facts in this section are taken from the Social Security Administration’s January 24, 2006

decision, Certified Administrative Transcript (“TR”) at 17–21, unless otherwise indicated. 

2. Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s finding that his physical impairments considered singly or in

combination with his mental impairments do not entitle him to benefits because they do not meet or

equal the requirements of the Listing of Impairments in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4 (SSR

96–6p).

3. A GAF score represents a clinical evaluation of an individual’s overall level of functioning. Def.’s

Mot. n.6 at 4.

4. Past relevant work is work that a claimant has performed within the past fifteen years, that was a

substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for the claimant to learn the necessary skills to

perform the work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)

5. A claimant will not be found disabled if the ALJ determines that the claimant’s impairment or

combination of impairments do not prevent him from performing other jobs that exist in significant

numbers in the national economy. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v).

6. Plaintiff argues that relying on Dr. Schwimmer’s report was improper because the report of Dr.

Venard was more detailed and because “almost any scientist would choose the report with more

evidence.” Pl.’s Mot. at 5. This, however, is not the relevant standard. As the final arbiter of

conflicting medical testimony, the ALJ’s decision to rely on one physician’s report rather than another

is proper so long as the former “is not contradicted by all other evidence in the record.” Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 752 (emphasis in original).

7. Parties do not claim that any evidence of malingering is present in the record. 

ENDNOTES

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