Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03847/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03847-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mahdi Hakim
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Lawrence L. Piersol, then Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3847

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States 

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Mahdi Hakim, also known as *

Damon Hargrove, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 13, 2007

Filed: June 21, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Mahdi Hakim was convicted of conspiring to possess with the intent to

distribute over 50 grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and

846, and received the statutory minimum sentence of life imprisonment. Hakim

appeals from his conviction, arguing that the district judge1

 erred by denying his

motion for judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.

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The government introduced undisputed documentary evidence and testimony

confirming the date, sender, location of the pick up, and amount of money involved

in this Western Union transaction. According to the undisputed evidence, Hakim

picked up the money in Kansas City.

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I. Background

We state the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. This case

originated in a drug-related investigation and arrest of one of Hakim’s childhood

acquaintances, Ronnie Shaw, who was arrested after attempting to sell crack cocaine

to a police informant. Following his arrest, and to secure a lighter sentence, Shaw

provided information and testimony implicating Hakim in a drug conspiracy.

At Hakim’s trial, in which Shaw was the central government witness, Shaw

testified to the following facts based on his experiences and conversations with

Hakim. Although Hakim was living in Kansas City in early 2004, he had been

“dealing [crack cocaine] with” Shaw’s aunt, Frieda Brown, in Sioux Falls. Hakim’s

supplier was in Kansas City. Brown had recently “crossed” Hakim, however, and so

Hakim needed someone in Sioux Falls who could help him expand his drug business.

Hakim traveled to Sioux Falls in April of 2004 and contacted Shaw with the hope of

recruiting him because Shaw was a twenty-year resident of the city who “knew

people.” The two men did not initially reach an agreement, but on the following day

Hakim fronted Shaw a quarter ounce of cocaine to sell. Within a week, Shaw sold the

quarter ounce and paid Hakim, after which Hakim fronted Shaw an additional ounce

of cocaine, which Shaw also agreed to sell. After selling the crack, Shaw wired

Hakim his agreed upon share of the proceeds ($2,300) via Western Union on May 10,

2004.2

 

On May 16, 2004, Hakim and Shaw were driving together when they were

pulled over for an equipment violation. The officer found marijuana and charged

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Four and one-half ounces equals approximately 125 grams.

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Hakim with a minor marijuana offense that required his presence in court on May 27,

2004. Hakim traveled back to Kansas City during the interim period. After Shaw

wired him additional money, Hakim brought additional crack cocaine with him when

he returned for his court appearance.

Near the end of the conspiracy, the two unsuccessfully attempted to obtain

crack cocaine from a source closer to Sioux Falls. They then traveled together to

Kansas City and purchased four and one-half ounces of powder cocaine, brought it

back to Sioux Falls, and converted it into crack.3

 Shaw received an ounce of crack in

return for a $500 contribution toward the powder cocaine purchase, and Hakim kept

the remainder. Hakim resided in Shaw’s apartment while the pair resumed selling

crack. After two or three days, Hakim returned to Kansas City for a family

emergency, taking with him some of his cocaine and leaving behind the remainder,

which law enforcement found when they arrested Shaw. All told, Hakim fronted

crack cocaine to Shaw approximately six times, usually in one-ounce increments.

The government additionally presented phone records indicating not only that

Shaw had Hakim’s number programmed into his primary cell phone, but also that

there had been 121 telephone contacts between the two men during the dates of the

alleged conspiracy. 

II.

We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, “viewing evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, resolving conflicts in the government’s favor,

and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v.

Washington, 318 F.3d 845, 852 (8th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The standard of

review is strict. We will uphold the verdict “if there is any interpretation of the

evidence that could lead a reasonable-minded jury to find the defendant guilty beyond

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a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Hamilton, 332 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 2003)

(citing United States v. Gillings, 156 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 1998)); see also Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 

Hakim argues that Shaw’s testimony is incredible and should not believed,

especially in light of Shaw’s motivation to give false testimony and Hakim’s own

testimony that provided what he contends to be the real reasons for his visits to Sioux

Falls, his phone conversations with Shaw, and the money transfers. His argument

must fail. “The test for rejecting evidence as incredible is extraordinarily stringent

and is often said to bar reliance only on testimony asserting facts that are physically

impossible.” United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 988 (8th Cir. 2004); see also

United States v. Lanier, 578 F.2d 1246, 1251 (8th Cir. 1978) (“Appellate review of

credibility is prohibited absent extraordinary circumstances.” (citation omitted)).

There is nothing so incredible about Shaw’s testimony to warrant its rejection as a

matter of law. 

Credibility aside, to sustain the verdict in a criminal case there must still be

evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

Crenshaw, 359 F.3d at 987 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 313-20). A conviction for

conspiracy requires the “government [to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there

was an agreement to achieve some illegal purpose, that the defendant knew of the

agreement, and that the defendant knowingly became a part of the conspiracy.”

United States v. Nelson, 165 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States

v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1244 (8th Cir. 1997)). Intentional participation of a

criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence and may be inferred from

the facts and circumstances. United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 634 (8th Cir.

1981) (citing United States v. Harbin, 601 F.2d 773, 781 (5th Cir. 1979)); see also

United States v. Winston, 456 F.3d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Direct evidence of an

explicit agreement is not necessary to prove a conspiracy; instead, a tacit

understanding among co-conspirators may be, and often will be, inferred from

circumstantial evidence.” (internal quotation omitted)). 

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Hakim contends that a single buyer-seller transaction is insufficient to prove

participation in, or knowledge of, a conspiracy. Cf. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d at 634 (noting

that without more, an isolated buyer-seller transaction involving a small amount of

drugs consistent with personal use does not, per se, support an inference of

participation in a conspiracy). Hakim’s reliance on Prieskorn for this legal principle

is misplaced in light of his participation in a number of drug-related dealings and

activities with Shaw and the involvement of a quantity of drugs clearly not intended

for personal use. See id., 658 F.3d at 634-35 (finding the so called buyer-seller

transaction rule inapplicable where a sizeable quantity of drugs was involved). The

evidence indicates that (1) Hakim and Shaw had an ongoing, long-term, mutually

profitable relationship during which Shaw relied on Hakim for obtaining cocaine and

Hakim relied on Shaw for distributing it to his Sioux Falls contacts; (2) Hakim

knowingly sought out Shaw precisely to enter into such a relationship; and (3) the two

repeatedly acted in concert pursuant to this shared purpose and understanding. From

this, a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hakim was part of an illegal

drug conspiracy.

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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