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Parties Involved:
Aaron F. Broussard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-30876

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff−Appellee,

versus

AARON F. BROUSSARD, 

Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:14-CV-432

Before SMITH, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Aaron Broussard appeals the denial of his motion for collateral relief 

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court issued a certificate of appealability 

on one issue—the only one Broussard was permitted to bring under his plea 

agreement—ineffective assistance of counsel affecting the validity of his guilty 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 4, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

Case: 14-30876 Document: 00512957740 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/04/2015
No. 14-30876

plea. He contends that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with his counsel’s 

ability to give competent advice and rendered his lawyer constructively ineffective, such that prejudice should be presumed under United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648 (1984).1

Broussard fails to articulate a claim under the narrow category of cases 

involving “affirmative government interference in the representation process.” 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 682 (1984). That category encompasses only those government actions that impose affirmative bars or obstacles on 

counsel’s ability effectively to conduct a defense, such as restricting a lawyer 

from conferring with his client overnight during trial or limiting how counsel 

may examine the defendant at trial. See id. at 686 (citing cases). “We read 

these cases as pointing to a constructive denial of counsel only where a government rule affirmatively forces counsel to make a choice he or she might not 

otherwise make in the context of a particular case.” May v. Collins, 948 F.2d 

162, 167 (5th Cir. 1991).

Nothing alleged here rises to the degree of interference that Cronic

requires. Having considered the briefs, the facts, and applicable law, and having heard the arguments of counsel, and assuming, without deciding, that the 

issues urged on appeal were properly preserved, we find no reversible error. 

The order denying relief is AFFIRMED.

1 The district court analyzed Broussard’s claim under the Washington standard

because that is how Broussard presented it in his initial memorandum in support of the 

§ 2255 motion. He raised a Cronic claim for the first time only in response to the government’s opposition. On appeal, he now asserts that the claim was under Cronic all along and 

relies solely on that theory. We need not consider whether Broussard abandoned this claim 

by inadequately presenting it to the district court because we can, and do, straightforwardly 

resolve the merits. See United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1109 (5th Cir. 1998).

2

 

Case: 14-30876 Document: 00512957740 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/04/2015