Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02092/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02092-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cherokee Nation
Appellant
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH u·FILED 

Nited States Court of A 

T.:.nth c· . PPeals -· ·lrt~lilt 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 2 81989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 

COMMISSION, 

Applicant-Appellee, 

v. 

THE CHEROKEE NATION, 

Respondent-Appellant. 

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No. 88-2092 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 321-M) 

James G. Wilcoxen, Wilcoxen & Wilcoxen, Muskogee, Oklahoma, for 

Respondent-Appellant. 

John F. Suhre, Attorney (Charles A. Shanor, General Counsel, 

Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate General Counsel, Vella M. Fink, 

Assistant General Counsel, with him on the brief), Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, Washington, D.C., for 

Applicant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, LOGAN, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 1 
I. 

At issue in this case is the jurisdictional authority of the 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) over the Cherokee 

Nation pursuant to the ADEA, as amended, 29 u.s.c. S 621-34 

(1982). The dispute was precipitated by EEOC's attempt judicially 

to enforce an administrative subpoena duces tecum directing the 

Cherokee Nation to produce documents of several former tribal 

employees. The subpoena was issued as part of an EEOC 

investigation of an age discrimination charge filed by 

complainant, Mrs. Louise Gossett, against the Cherokee Nation's 

Director of Health and Human Services. 

The Cherokee Nation resisted the EEOC's assertion of 

authority, maintaining that tribal sovereign immunity precluded 

EEOC jurisdiction absent specific congressional intent to bring 

tribes under ADEA coverage. The district court examined the ADEA 

and its prototype--Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 

amended, 42 u.s.c. S 2000e-(b) (1982)--and concluded that 

principles of statutory construction led to the conclusion that 

Congress intended the ADEA to apply to Indian tribes. 1 Therefore 

the EEOC was entitled to have its administrative subpoena 

enforced. 

II. 

In Navajo Forest Products we held that OSHA, a statute of 

general applicability, was nevertheless not applicable to a tribal 

l The district court's determination is a question of law, 

which we review de novo. Matter of Tri-State Equip., Inc., 792 

F.2d 967, 970 (lOth Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 2 
business enterprise operating in the reservation for two reasons: 

First, because its enforcement would violate treaty provisions 

which recognized the tribe's right to exclude non-Indians from 

tribal lands. 692 F.2d at 712. Second, because enforcement 

"would dilute the principles of tribal sovereignty and selfgovernment recognized in the treaty." Id. 

This second basis for our holding in Navajo Forest 

Products--the treaty-protected right of self-government--is 

likewise at issue in the case before us. 2 The treaty's language 

clearly and unequivocally recognizes tribal self-government with 

only two express exceptions, neither of which is at issue in this 

case. We believe that the reasoning in Navajo Forest Products is 

equally applicable to the case at bar. Consequently, we hold that 

ADEA is not applicable because its enforcement would directly 

2 Article V of the Treaty of New Echota, December 29, 

Stat. 478, provides in pertinent part: 

1835, 

The United States hereby covenant and agree . [to] 

secure to the Cherokee Nation the right by their 

national councils to make and carry into effect all such 

laws as they may deem necessary for the government and 

protection of the persons and property within their own 

country belonging to their people or such persons as 

have connected themselves with them; provided always 

that they shall not be inconsistent with the 

constitution of the United States and such acts of 

Congress as have been or may be passed regulating trade 

intercourse with the Indians •••• 

(emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 3 
interfere with the Cherokee Nation's treaty-protected right of 

self-government.3 

III. 

Like the Supreme Court, we have been "extremely reluctant to 

find congressional abrogation of treaty rights" absent explicit 

statutory language. See United States v. Dion, 476 u.s. 734, 739 

(1986). We are also mindful that we should not "construe statutes 

as abrogating treaty rights in a 'backhanded way'; in the absence 

of explicit statement, 'the intention to abrogate or modify a 

treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress.' Indian 

treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside." Id. 

(citations omitted). 

In its carefully reasoned opinion, the district court 

attempted to determine congressional intent by comparing the 

statute on which ADEA was modeled, Title VII, which provides an 

express exclusion of tribes from the statute's coverage, with the 

3 The EEOC relies on the broad dictum in Federal Power Comm'n 

v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 u.s. 99, 116 (1960), to support 

its claim that the ADEA, as a statute of general applicability, 

applies to all persons including Indians. This argument is 

inapposite since it is well established that the so-called 

Tuscarora rule is not applicable to treaty cases such as this one. 

See, ~' Phillips Petroleum Co. v. United States Environmental 

Protection Agency, 803 F.2d 545. 556 (lOth Cir. 1986) (The 

Tuscarora "rule of construction can be rescinded where a tribe ra~ses a specific right under a treaty • • . which is in conflict 

with the general law to be applied •••• "); Donovan v. Coeur 

d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 1985) (Although 

Tuscarora represents the general rule, there is an exception when 

"the application of the law to the tribe would 'abrogate rights 

guaranteed by Indian treaties.'"). In fact, in Navajo Forest 

Products we questioned the continuing vitality of the Tuscarora 

d~ctum ~n light of the Supreme Court's decision in Merr~on v. 

Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 u.s. 130 (1982). 692 F.2d at 712-13. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 4 
ADEA, which is completely silent on the subject. 4 The court then 

applied normal rules of construction to reach its holding. 

While normal rules of construction would suggest the outcome 

which the district court adopted, the court overlooked the fact 

that normal rules of construction do not apply when Indian treaty 

rights, or even nontreaty matters involving Indians, are at issue. 

See, ~, Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 u.s. 759, 766 (1985) 

("[S]tatutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the 

Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their 

benefit."); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 u.s. 

226, 247 (1985) ("[T]he canons of construction applicable in 

Indian law are rooted in the unique trust relationship between the 

United States and the Indians. Thus, it is well established that 

treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, 

with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit. . The 

Court has applied similar canons of construction in nontreaty 

matters."); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 u.s. 130, 152 

{1982) ("[I]f there [is] ambiguity ••• the doubt would benefit 

the tribe, for 'ambiguities in federal law have been construed 

generously in order to comport with ••• traditional notions of 

sovereignty and with the federal policy of encouraging tribal 

4 The language of the ADEA neither expressly includes nor 

excludes Indian tribes from coverage. In contrast, Congress has 

shown that it knows how to extend the ADEA's coverage when it 

chooses to do so. The original version of the ADEA expressly 

excluded states from the Act's definition of "employer". Age D~scr~m~nation in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 

S ll(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605. However, in 1974 Congress amended the 

Act, this time explicitly including states in the Act's coverage. 

See 29 u.s.c. S 630{b). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 5 
independence.'") (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 

448 u.s. 136, 143-44 (1980)). 

We believe that unequivocal Supreme Court precedent dictates 

that in cases where ambiguity exists (such as that posed by the 

ADEA's silence with respect to Indians), and there is no clear 

indication of congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty 

rights (as manifested, ~, by the legislative history, or the 

existence of a comprehensive statutory plan), the court is to 

apply the special canons of construction to the benefit of Indian 

interests. Cf. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148-49 n.ll ("Because the 

Tribe retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not 

been divested by the Federal Government, the proper inference from 

silence [in the Tribe's Constitution] is that the sovereign power 

to tax remains intact."). We conclude that, in this case, the 

bases for inferring congressional intent were not so clear as to 

overcome the burden which the EEOC was required to carry. 

REVERSED. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 6 
No. 88-2092, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. The 

Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma 

TACHA, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Because I believe that there is clear indication of 

congressional intent to apply the Age Discrimination in Employment 

Act of 1967 (ADEA) to Indian tribes, I respectfully dissent. 

Indian tribes possess inherent powers of sovereignty that 

predate the coming of the Europeans to this continent. See United 

States~ Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978). Their 

incorporation within the territory of the United States, and their 

acceptance of its protection, however, "necessarily divested them 

of some aspects of [that] sovereignty." Id. at 323. In addition 

to the implicit divestment of sovereign powers by virtue of tribal 

dependence upon the United States, other sovereign powers were 

explicitly yielded by treaties or removed by Congress. Id. at 

322-23. "The Indian tribes [however] retain all aspects of tribal 

sovereignty not specifically withdrawn." Donov~n v. Navajo Forest 

Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 712 (lOth Cir. 1982). 

The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a 

unique and limited character. It exists only at the 

sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance. But until Congress acts, the tribes retain 

their existing sovereign powers. In sum, Indian tribes 

still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn 

by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary 

result of their dependent status. 

Wheeler, 435 u.s. at 323. 

The laws of the united States recognize both sovereign 

immunity from suit and tribal self-government as aspects of the 

inherent sovereignty retained by Indian tribes. See Santa Clara 

Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 u.s. 49, 58-60 (1978); see also White 

Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 7 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 u.s. 136, 142-43 (1980). 

Both of these aspects of tribal sovereignty, however, whether or 

not established by treaty, are "subject to the superior and 

plenary control of Congress." Martinez, 436 u.s. at 58: ~also 

Bracker, 448 u.s. at 143. "The United States retains legislative 

plenary power to divest Indian tribes of any attributes of 

sovereignty." Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d at 714. The issue 

in this case is whether, by enacting the ADEA, Congress has 

exercised its power to divest the Cherokee Nation of the aspects 

of tribal sovereignty here claimed. 

In determining whether Congress has exercised such power, "a 

proper respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the 

plenary authority of Congress ••• cautions that we tread lightly 

in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent." 

Martinez, 436 u.s. at 60. The majority notes that the courts have 

been "'extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of 

treaty rights' absent explicit statutory language." Majority 

opinion at 4 (quoting United States ~ Dion, 476 u.s. 734, 739 

(1986)). The Supreme Court, moreover, has stated that "Congress' 

intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights [must] be clear and 

plain." United States~ Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986). 

The majority apparently interprets the "clear intent" 

language of Dion to require explicit language applying the statute 

to Indian tribes either on the face of the statute or in its 

legislative history. 1 In my view Dion cannot be read as 

1 Although the majority parenthetically notes that 

congressional intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights could be 

manifested with the requisite clarity through the enactment of a 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 8 
restrictively as the majority suggests. 

In Dion, the Supreme Court stated that it has "enunciated 

• different standards over the years for determining how such 

a clear and plain intent must be demonstrated." Id. at 739. 

Although an "[e]xplicit statement by Congress is preferable for 

the purpose of ensuring legislative accountability," the Court has 

not "rigidly interpreted that preference ••. as a~ se rule." 

Id. (emphasis added). 

[W]here the evidence of congressional intent to abrogate 

is sufficiently compelling, "the weight of authority 

indicates that such intent can also be found by a 

reviewing court from clear and reliable evidence in the 

legislative history of a statute." What is essential is 

clear evidence that Congress actually considered the 

conflict between its intended action on the one hand and 

the Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to 

resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty. 

Id. at 739-40 (citation omitted) (quoting F. Cohen, Handbook of 

Federal Indian Law 223 (1982)); see Martinez, 436 U.S. at 61 

("structure of statutory scheme" and "legislative history" did not 

support "intrusion into tribal ·sovereignty"). 

The majority finds that the ADEA provisions are ambiguous 

because they neither expressly include nor exclude Indian tribes 

from coverage. Majority opinion at 5 n.4. The majority dismisses 

any analysis of Title VII in its review of the ADEA and therefore 

holds that the ambiguous provisions of the ADEA must be construed 

to the benefit of the Indians since there is no indication of 

contrary congressional intent. Majority opinion at 4-5. I am 

"comprehensive statutory plan," majority op1n1on at 6, it fails to 

show why the ADEA, either alone or in conjunction with other civil 

rights legislation s~ch as Title VII, is not such a comprehensive 

plan. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 9 
convinced, however, that discerning the legislative intent behind 

the relevant provisions of the ADEA here requires a comparison 

with the corresponding provisions of Title VII, in light of the 

fact that Congress was clearly aware of and relied upon Title 

VII's provisions when promulgating the ADEA. 2 In making such a 

comparison it becomes clear that any impingement upon tribal 

sovereignty by enforcement of the ADEA was intended by Congress. 

I begin by examining the ADEA's definition of "employer" for 

purposes of the Act: 

The term "employer" means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more 

employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 

year: Provided, That prior to June 30, 1968, employers 

having fewer than fifty employees shall not be 

2 There is much evidence to indicate that Congress had 

awareness of Title VII's provisions when promulgating the 

an acute 

ADEA. 

During consideration of Title VII there were unsuccessful efforts 

to include age as one of the protected categories in that 

legislation. 110 Cong. Rec. 2596-99 (1964) {amendment to include 

age as protected category under Title VII offered by Rep. Dowdy; 

amendment rejected by vote of 94 to 123); 110 Cong. Rec. 9911-16, 

13,490-92 (amendment to include age as protected category under 

Title VII offered by Sen. Smathers; amendment rejected by vote of 

28 to 63); see also EEOC~ Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) 

{noting that amendments to include age in Title VII were 

rejected). Title VII instead included a provision directing the 

Secretary of Labor to study potential age discrimination in the 

workplace and to make recommendations for combating the problem if 

it existed. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 

78 Stat. 241, 265 (superseded by Equal Employment Opportunity Act 

of 1972, § 10, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103, 111). The 

Secretary's report led to the enactment of the ADEA. See J. 

Kalet, Age Discrimination in Employment Law 1-2 (1986)-.--

Commentators have noted that the ADEA is effectively a hybrid of 

Title VII's general scheme and the Fair Labor Standards Act's 

remedial devices. J. Kalet,,Age Discrimination in Employment Law 

1-3. See generally 2 H. Egl1t, Age D1scr1m1nation § 16.01 (1988). 

"Because Title VII had already established a framework within 

which the ban on employment discrimination could be enforced, the 

Title VII enforcement scheme and proof considerations were 

followed extensively in the drafting of the AOEA." J. Kalet, Age 

Discrimination in Employment Law 2. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 10 
considered employers. The term also means (1) any agent 

of such a person, and (2) a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality 

of a State or a political subdivision of a State, and 

any interstate agency, but such term does not include 

the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the 

Government of the United States. 

29 u.s.c. § 630(b). Congress utilized a similar definition in 

Title VII, which was enacted prior to the ADEA, except that 

definition expressly excludes "an Indian tribe" from qualifying as 

an employer for purposes of Title VII. See 42 u.s.c. § 2000e{b}. 

When interpreting a statute, Congress' intent as expressed in 

that statute is determinative. In discerning that intent, "we 

must presume that Congress acts with deliberation, rather than by 

inadvertence, when it drafts a statute." United States v. 

Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985). Because Title VII 

and the ADEA are devoted to the common purpose of proscribing 

employment discrimination, and the ADEA's definition of employer 

is patterned after the definition in Title VII, those definitional 

provisions should be construed in pari materia. Cf. Kennedy ~ 

Whitehurst, 690 F.2d 951, 956-57 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (pointing to 

indications that the ADEA's enforcement provision for federal 

employment discrimination should be read in pari materia with 

Title VII}. Further, when Congress explicitly enumerates certain 

exceptions to a statutory scheme, we may not imply additional 

exceptions without evidence of legislative intent to do so. See 

Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980). 

Finally, we must be mindful that the ADEA is a remedial statute 

and therefore should be liberally construed in favor of its 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 11 
beneficiaries. See Oscar Mayer ! Co. v. Evans, 441 u.s. 750, 765 

(1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 

The definition of employer in the ADEA was patterned after 

the definition of employer in Title VII, with the important 

exception that Title VII explicitly excludes Indian tribes from 

the definition.3 The omission of the Indian tribe exclusion in 

the ADEA, in light of the clear congressional reliance on Title 

VII's provisions, ~supra note 2, evidences congressional intent 

on the face of the statute to include Indian tribes in the 

definition of employer for the purposes of the ADEA. Congress has 

3 The definition of employer in the ADEA as enacted is taken 

almost verbatim from the original definition in Title VII. The 

relevant language from § 70l(b) of Title VII as originally enacted 

reads: 

The term "employer" means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more 

employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 

year, and any agent of such a person, but such term does 

not include i!l the United States, ! corporation-whQIIy 

owned ~ the Government of the un~ted States, an Indian 

tribe, o-r--a State or--pOIIt~cal subd~vision thereof 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 70l(b), 78 Stat. 

241, 253 (emphasis added). 

The relevant language from S ll(b) of the ADEA as originally enacted reads: 

The term "employer" means a person engaged in an 

industry affecting commerce who has twenty-five or more 

employees for each working day in each of twenty or more 

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year 

••• but such term does not include the United States, 

a corporatiOn -wEOlry--owned ~ the Government of the 

United States, or a State or pOIItical subdiVIsiOn 

thereof. 

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 

§ ll(b), 81 Stat. 602, 605 (emphasis added). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 12 
carefully enumerated the exceptions to ADEA coverage, and I find 

no basis to imply a further exception for Indian tribes. 

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that there is 

some purpose for the exclusion of Indian tribes from the 

definition of employer under Title VII -- to enable Indian tribes 

to be free to give preference to Indians in tribal government 

employment. Morton~ Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 548 (1974); ~ 110 

Cong. Rec. 13,701-03 (1964) (comments by Sen. Mundt regarding 

amendment to exclude Indian tribes from compliance with Title 

VII}. I find no comparable reason for Congress to carve out an 

exception for Indian tribes under ADEA. 

The majority bases its decision, in part, on Navajo Forest 

Prods., 692 F.2d 709, in which we held that the Occupational 

Safety and Health Act (OSHA) did not apply to an Indian tribal 

business owned and operated by the Navajo tribe on the Navajo 

Reservation because its application would be in derogation of 

·Navajo treaty rights. Majority opinion at 2-4. That case is not 

apposite. The definition of employer utilized in OSHA is not 

patterned after the Title VII definition, and in Navajo Forest 

Products we found nothing in OSHA's legislative history to 

conclude that Congress intended to abrogate tribal sovereignty. 

Navajo Forest Prods., 692 F.2d at 712. 

My review of the legislative history supports the conclusion 

that any limitations on the Cherokees' right to self-government 

here were intended by Congress when promulgating the ADEA. I 

would hold that the EEOC has jurisdiction over Indian tribes for 

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Appellate Case: 88-2092 Document: 01019300946 Date Filed: 03/28/1989 Page: 13 
purposes of enforcing the ADEA and that the subpoena issued in 

this case is enforceable. I, therefore, respectfully dissent. 

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