Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01648/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01648-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Madeleine K. Albright
Respondent
People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran
Petitioner
United States Department of State
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 5, 1999 Decided June 25, 1999

No. 97-1648

People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran,

Petitioner

v.

United States Department of State and

Madeleine K. Albright, Secretary of State,

Respondents

No. 97-1670

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,

Petitioner

v.

United States Department of State,

Respondent

On Petitions for Review of Orders of the

United States Secretary of State

---------

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Jacob A. Stein argued the cause for petitioner in 97-1648.

With him on the briefs were George A. Fisher and Ronald G.

Precup.

Ramsey Clark argued the cause for petitioner 97-1670.

With him on the briefs was Lawrence W. Schilling.

Douglas N. Letter, Litigation Counsel, U.S. Department of

Justice, argued the cause for respondents in 97-1648. With

him on the brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney

General, Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John P. Schnitker

and H. Thomas Byron, III, Attorneys, U.S. Department of

Justice.

John P. Schnitker, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent in 97-1670. With him on the

brief were Frank W. Hunger, Assistant Attorney General,

Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, Douglas N. Letter, Litigation

Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, and H. Thomas Byron,

III, Attorney.

Before: Williams and Randolph, Circuit Judges, and

Buckley, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: The Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act conferred upon the Secretary of State the

power to designate "foreign terrorist organizations." 8

U.S.C. s 1189. By order effective October 8, 1997, Secretary

of State Madeline K. Albright so designated the People's

Mojahedin Organization of Iran and the Liberation Tigers of

Tamil Eelam. See Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 62 Fed. Reg. 52,650 (1997). Both groups have

brought petitions for judicial review of their designations

pursuant to 8 U.S.C. s 1189(b)(1).1

__________

1 Because these separate petitions involve the same statute and

similar claims, we decide both in a single opinion.

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I

The statute before us is unique, procedurally and substantively. On the basis of an "administrative record," the Secretary of State is to make "findings" that an entity is a foreign

organization engaging in terrorist activities that threaten the

national security of the United States. See 8 U.S.C.

s 1189(a)(2)(A)(i), (3)(A). This language--"findings" on an

"administrative record"--is commonplace. We encounter it

day in and day out in cases coming from federal agencies.

But unlike the run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding, here

there is no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts

and agencies think of as evidence, no advance notice to the

entity affected by the Secretary's internal deliberations.

When the Secretary announces the designation, through publication in the Federal Register, the organization's bank

accounts in the United States become subject to seizure and

anyone who knowingly contributes financial support to the

named entity becomes subject to criminal prosecution. See 8

U.S.C. ss 1189(a)(2)(C), 2339B(a)(1). Any classified information on which the Secretary relied in bringing about these

consequences may continue to remain secret, except from

certain members of Congress and this court. See 8 U.S.C.

s 1189(a)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2). There is a provision for "judicial

review" confined to the material the Secretary assembled

before publishing the designation. See 8 U.S.C. s 1189(b)(2).

Because nothing in the legislation restricts the Secretary

from acting on the basis of third hand accounts, press stories,

material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the

organization's activities, the "administrative record" may consist of little else.

We will give the details of the governing provisions in a

moment. At this point in a judicial opinion, appellate courts

often lay out the "facts." We will not, cannot, do so in these

cases. What follows in the next two subsections may or may

not be facts. The information recited is certainly not evidence of the sort that would normally be received in court. It

is instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a

record, from sources named and unnamed, the accuracy of

which we have no way of evaluating.

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A

"The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam was founded in

1976 for the purpose of creating a separate Tamil state in Sri

Lanka. The group began its war against the Government of

Sri Lanka in 1983 and has employed violent means, including

bombings and political assassination, to achieve the goal of a

separate entity in the North and East of the country. Some

50,000 people are estimated to have died in fourteen years of

fighting."2 "Sri Lankan military and intelligence sources that

have reported reliably in the past have identified the Ellalan

Force as another alias for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam," which "will hereafter be referred to as the 'LTTE'."

"Headquartered in the Jaffna Peninsula [of Sri Lanka], ...

Velupillai Prabhakaran," "the founder and leader of Sri Lanka's LTTE ... organized the insurgency group to pursue an

independent homeland for Tamils in Sri Lanka's northern and

eastern regions out of frustration over the ethnic discrimination of the Sri Lankan government, according to press reports." "Tamils ... are the mainstay of his organization,

according to US military officials."

A February 1995 news story from Hong Kong stated: "Sri

Lanka's Tamil Tiger rebels denied plans to assassinate President Chandrika Kumaratunga but tacitly admitted having

killed former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi, press reports

here said Tuesday.... Tigers have also been accused of

killing Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in May

1993 and opposition leader Gamini Dissanayake in October

last year. However, Tigers have denied all these killings."

"[T]he LTTE tried to assassinate leaders of the Tamil Eelam

Liberation Organization (TELO)--a Tamil political party--on

August 26 [1996]. The President of the party escaped, but a

district leader was killed." A report dated July 1996 stated:

"A suicide bomb attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil

Eelam ... narrowly missed killing a key [cabinet minister]

and left 25 dead...." A State Department report on terrorist activity in 1996 reported that: "The LTTE has refrained

__________

2 All quotations in this part A are from the public version of the

administrative record.

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from targeting Western tourists, but a front group--the

Ellalan Force--continued to send threatening letters to Western missions and the press."

"The LTTE ... uses its international contacts to procure

weapons, communications, and bomb-making equipment.

The LTTE exploits large Tamil communities in North America, Europe, and Asia to obtain funds and supplies for its

fighters in Sri Lanka."

B

A CIA Intelligence Research Paper, dated July 1993, reports that the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran--the

MEK, for short--"is the largest and most active Iranian

dissident group. Its primary goal is the overthrow of the

Iranian Government, after which it would seek to establish a

nontheocratic republic.... The MEK's history, marked by

violence and terrorism, belies its claim to uphold democratic

ideals. Formed in the early 1960s, its origins reflect both

Marxist and Islamic influences, and its history is studded with

anti-Western activity." 3

The MEK "collaborated with Ayatollah Khomeini to overthrow the former Shah of Iran. As part of that struggle,

they assassinated at least six American citizens, supported

the takeover of the U.S. embassy, and opposed the release of

American hostages." "[In 1972] the MEK exploded time

bombs at more than a dozen sites throughout Tehran, including the Iran-American Society, ... and the offices of Pepsi

Cola and General Motors. From 1972-75 ... the Mojahedin

continued their campaign of bombings, damaging such targets

as the offices of Pan-American Airlines, Shell Oil Company,

and British organizations." "The MEK has been unable since

the mid-1980s to mount terrorist operations inside Iran on

the same scale as its earlier activities because of government

repression and the group's lack of popular support." "In

__________

3 According to 62 Fed. Reg. at 52,650, the People's Mojahedin

Organization of Iran is also known as the Mujahedin-e Khalq, the

MEK, the MKO, the PMOI, the Organization of the People's Holy

Warriors of Iran and the Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran.

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June 1987 the MEK formed a military wing, the National

Liberation Army of Iran (NLA), which is located in eastern

Iraq along the central Iran-Iraq border area." "In April

1992, the MEK used its sympathizers in the United States,

Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland,

the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Australia to

launch virtually simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies

and installations." In March 1994 Reuters and the BBC

reported that the MEK "said its fighters attacked and disabled 14 oil pipelines in the north of Khuzistan province

during military operations" and took credit for "25 other ...

attacks it said took place in Iran between March 8 and March

18."

"The MEK looks to expatriate Iranians who are not members of the organization for financial support and manpower."

"Baghdad is the MEK's primary supporter and closest ally."

"The MEK has offices and members throughout Europe,

North America, the Middle East and in Australia. These

offices are responsible for collecting donations from private

citizens--especially Iranian expatriates--for the MEK and

for organizing activities such as demonstrations to show

support for the MEK."

C

Section 1189(a)(1), as added by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104-132,

s 302, 110 Stat. 1214, 1248, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,

Pub. L. No. 104-208, s 356, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-644, empowers the Secretary of State to designate a "foreign terrorist

organization" if the Secretary finds three things: "(A) the

organization is a foreign organization"; "(B) the organization

engages in terrorist activity" as defined in the provisions set

forth in the margin;4 and "(C) the terrorist activity of the

__________

4 Terrorist activity is defined as any activity which is:

unlawful ... where it is committed (or which, if committed in

the United States, would be unlawful under [state or federal

law]), and which involves any of the following:

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organization threatens the security of United States nationals

or the national security of the United States." Such activities

threaten the "national security" when they threaten the "national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the

United States." See 8 U.S.C. s 1189(c)(2).5 Upon notification that the Secretary plans to designate an organization, the

Secretary of the Treasury may require U.S. financial institutions that possess or control assets of that organization to

block all financial transactions involving those assets until

further directive from him, by Act of Congress or order of a

court. See 8 U.S.C. s 1189(a)(2)(C).

The knowing provision of material support or resources to

a designated organization is a crime punishable by a fine or

up to ten years imprisonment, or both. See 18 U.S.C.

__________

(I) The hijacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including

an aircraft, vessel, or vehicle).

(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill,

injure, or continue to detain, another individual in order to

compel a third person (including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or

implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or

detained.

(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected

person ... or upon the liberty of such a person.

(IV) An assassination.

(V) The use of any--

(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon

or device, or

(b) explosive or firearm (other than for mere personal

monetary gain),

with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one

or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to property.

(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the

foregoing.

8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).

5 The statute requires the Secretary to notify certain members of

the House and Senate before making a designation, but she need

not notify the organizations being considered for designation, nor

give them an opportunity to be heard. See 8 U.S.C.

s 1189(a)(2)(A).

s 2339B(a)(1). Alien members or representatives of designated organizations may not be admitted to the United

States. See 8 U.S.C. s 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V).

Also, 8 U.S.C. s 1189(a)(8) states that "[i]f a designation

under this subsection has become effective under paragraph

(1)(B), a defendant in a criminal action shall not be permitted

to raise any question concerning the validity of the issuance

of such designation as a defense or an objection at any trial or

hearing." (This last provision seems to contain a miscitation.

Paragraph (1)(B) does not deal with a designation's becoming

effective; (1)(B) is the paragraph requiring a finding of

terrorist activity. It appears that s 1189(a)(8) meant to refer

to paragraph (2)(B).)

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The judicial review provision states that a designated organization may, within 30 days of publication in the Federal

Register, file a petition for judicial review in the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

8 U.S.C. s 1189(b)(1). The court is to look only at the

"administrative record" the Secretary has assembled, although "the Government may submit, for ex parte and in

camera review, classified information used in making the

designation." See 8 U.S.C. s 1189(b)(2).

In APA-like language, s 1189(b)(3) provides that the court

shall "hold unlawful and set aside a designation the court

finds to be" "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,"

"contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity," "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitation," "lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to

the court" or a designation that was not made "in accord[ance] with the procedures required by law." 8 U.S.C.

s 1189(b)(3).

II

These cases bear some resemblance to Joint Anti-Fascist

Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), in which

the Attorney General, purportedly acting pursuant to an

Executive Order, designated certain organizations as CommuUSCA Case #97-1648 Document #445050 Filed: 06/25/1999 Page 8 of 14
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nist on a list furnished to the Civil Service Commission. No

majority opinion emerged, but in separate opinions Justices

Black (id. at 143), Frankfurter (id. at 173), Douglas (id. at

176) and Jackson (id. at 186-87) stated that the Fifth Amendment's due process clause barred the government from so

condemning organizations without giving them notice and

opportunity to be heard. In view of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, and other authorities, the LTTE and the

MEK suppose that s 1189 deprived them of due process of

law, particularly since the Secretary's designations had the

effect of making it a crime to donate money to them. Compare Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 704-05 (1976).

We put to one side situations in which an organization's

bank deposits were seized as a result of the Secretary's

designation. Neither the LTTE or the MEK suffered that

fate, presumably because no United States financial institutions held any of their property. From all that appears, the

LTTE and the MEK have no presence in the United States.

Their status as foreign is uncontested. This serves to distinguish them from the organizations named as Communist in

the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee case. Those were domestic

entities. A foreign entity without property or presence in

this country has no constitutional rights, under the due

process clause or otherwise. "[A]liens receive constitutional

protections [only] when they have come within the territory of

the United States and developed substantial connections with

this country." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.

259, 271 (1990).6 No one would suppose that a foreign nation

had a due process right to notice and a hearing before the

Executive imposed an embargo on it for the purpose of

coercing a change in policy. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222

(1984).

Whatever rights the LTTE and the MEK enjoy in regard

to these cases are therefore statutory rights only. Because

__________

6 Because the issue is not before us, we do not decide whether

s 1189 deprives those in the United States of some constitutional

right if they are members of, or wish to donate money to, an

organization designated by the Secretary.

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Congress so allowed, the LTTE and the MEK are entitled to

contest their designations on the grounds set forth in

s 1189(b)(3). Under the statute, they may for instance seek

our judgment about whether the Secretary followed statutory

procedures, or whether she made the requisite findings, or

whether the record she assembled substantially supports her

findings.

But even this puts the matter too broadly, the government

tells us. Of the three findings mandated by s 1189(a)(1), the

third--"(C) the terrorist activity of the organization threatens

the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States"--is nonjusticiable. Chicago &

Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333

U.S. 103 (1948), holds that it is beyond the judicial function

for a court to review foreign policy decisions of the Executive

Branch. These are political judgments, "decisions of a kind

for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor

responsibilities and have long been held to belong in the

domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or

inquiry." 333 U.S. at 111. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S.

280, 292 (1981).

May we nevertheless conduct judicial review limited to

determining whether the Secretary complied with the remaining portions of s 1189(a)? The question arises because it is

the Secretary's designation that we are supposed to review

according to 8 U.S.C. s 1189(b)(1): "Not later than 30 days

after publication of the designation in the Federal Register,

an organization designated as a foreign terrorist organization

may seek judicial review of the designation in the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit."

If we are not competent to pass upon the Secretary's national

security finding under s 1189(a)(1)(C), and we interpret

Waterman to hold that we are not, how can we perform the

function Congress assigned to us, which is to pass upon the

validity of the designation?7 For all we know, the designa-

__________

7 In cases on appeal from the district court, we are to review

"judgments, not opinions." Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). Orders issued by

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tion may be improper because the Secretary's judgment that

the organization threatens our national security is completely

irrational, and devoid of any support. Or her finding about

national security may be exactly correct. We are forbidden

from saying. That we cannot pronounce on the question does

not mean that we must assume the Secretary was right. It

means we cannot make any assumption, one way or the other.

So the question remains: may we perform the checking

function of judicial review by ignoring (C) and just pronouncing on (A) and (B)? Waterman has some bearing on the

issue. There the Civil Aeronautics Board issued a proposed

order disposing of 29 applications from 15 United States

carriers to engage in overseas operations. See Waterman,

333 U.S. at 116 n.5. Pursuant to statute, such CAB orders

(regardless whether the order granted or denied the application) had to be approved by the President before becoming

final. In Waterman the President approved the CAB's consolidated order. This had the effect of granting Chicago &

Southern's application and denying Waterman's. See id. at

104-05. The statute contained a provision allowing for judicial review of such CAB orders (although not orders granting

or denying routes to foreign carriers). The court of appeals

believed that it "could not review such provisions of the order

as resulted from Presidential direction," see id. at 111, and as

we have said, the Supreme Court majority (and the dissenters

too) agreed. But the Court disagreed with the court of

appeals that it could nevertheless review whatever portion of

the CAB's order had not resulted from the President's foreign policy judgment. (On this point the Court divided 5-4.)

The Court viewed the CAB orders as merely advisory until

the President acted. After the President acted, even if he

changed nothing the CAB had decided, "the final orders

embody Presidential discretion as to political matters beyond

the competence of the courts to adjudicate." See id. at 114.

__________

agencies are treated differently. In administrative law, we do not

sustain a "right-result, wrong-reason" decision of an agency. We

send the case back to the agency so that it may fix its reasoning or

change its result. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1942),

explains the difference.

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One might suppose that, by analogy, the Secretary's designations also "embody ... discretion as to political matters

beyond the competence of the courts to adjudicate." See id.

But there is a difference between the statutory system in

Waterman and the statutory system we have before us.

Apart from the fact that the President did not need to make

any particular findings to approve, modify or reject a proposed CAB order, the order could not be effective without

Presidential action. The President's action was not limited to

a "mere right of veto." See id. at 109. The President could,

for instance, set aside CAB orders refusing to authorize air

transportation. See id. Judicial review of the CAB's action,

then, would have amounted to rendering an advisory opinion.

333 U.S. at 113-14. Not so here. If we were to determine

that the Secretary failed to comply, or did comply, with

s 1189(a)(1)(A) and (B), there would be nothing advisory

about our opinion. We would uphold, or set aside, the

Secretary's determination on that ground. Judicial review, as

thus limited, performs the role Congress intended without

thrusting the judiciary into the political realm.

With subsection (C) out of the picture, all that remains to

be examined--in view of the arguments the LTTE and the

MEK present--is the Secretary's findings that these organizations are "foreign" and that they "engage[ ] in terrorist

activity" (8 U.S.C. s 1189(a)(1)(A) & (B)). The LTTE, but

not the MEK, contests whether it is a "foreign organization"

within the meaning of the statute. According to the LTTE, it

is instead a government. The LTTE assumes a difference

between a foreign organization and a foreign government.

Only in the definition of terrorist activities is there a hint that

Congress meant to draw such a distinction. See 8 U.S.C.

s 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II). In any event, the United States replies that a court cannot make the determination the LTTE

wants because recognizing foreign states is solely entrusted

to the political branches, and the United States has not

recognized the LTTE. "Who is the sovereign, de jure or de

facto, of a territory, is not a judicial, but a political question,

the determination of which by the legislative and executive

departments of any government conclusively binds the

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judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of

that government." Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212-

13 (1890). Here, the Secretary determined that the LTTE

was a foreign organization and, in the words of the statute,

there is "substantial support" for her finding in the materials

she has furnished us as an "administrative record." 8 U.S.C.

s 1189(b)(3)(D).8

We also believe that the record, as the Secretary has

compiled it, not surprisingly contains "substantial support"

for her findings that the LTTE and the MEK engage in

"terrorist activities" within the meaning of 8 U.S.C.

s 1182(a)(3)(B). We have already recounted, above, enough

of the record to show that the Secretary had before her

information that each of the organizations engaged in bombing and killing in order to further their political agendas.

Any one of the incidents attributed to the LTTE and to the

MEK would have sufficed under the statute.

We therefore refuse to set aside either designation. In so

deciding we are not--in the words of Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989)--allowing the reputation of

the Judicial Branch to be "borrowed by the political Branches

to cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action."

We reach no judgment whatsoever regarding whether the

material before the Secretary is or is not true. As we wrote

earlier, the record consists entirely of hearsay, none of it was

ever subjected to adversary testing, and there was no opportunity for counter-evidence by the organizations affected. As

we see it, our only function is to decide if the Secretary, on

the face of things, had enough information before her to come

__________

8 Section 1189(b)(3), although generally parroting the language of

the Administrative Procedure Act, modified the "substantial evidence" standard of 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(E) to say instead "substantial

support." Perhaps this was in recognition of the decision of this

court that whenever a statute requires the agency action to be

supported by "substantial evidence"--a term of art in administrative law--there must be "some sort of adversary, adjudicative-type

procedures" before the agency. Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d

1238, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

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to the conclusion that the organizations were foreign and

engaged in terrorism. Her conclusion might be mistaken, but

that depends on the quality of the information in the reports

she received--something we have no way of judging.

We have considered and rejected the other arguments

petitioners have raised and see no need to burden this opinion

with a discussion of them.

The petitions for review are denied.

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