Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05970/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-05970-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Victor Almager
Respondent
Santiago Soto
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SANTIAGO SOTO,

Petitioner,

 v.

VICTOR ALMAGER, Warden, 

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 07-5970 MMC (PR)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL;

GRANTING LEAVE TO PROCEED

IN FORMA PAUPERIS

(Docket No. 5)

On November 27, 2007, petitioner, a California prisoner proceeding pro se, filed the

above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging

his state court conviction. Petitioner has applied for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

According to the allegations in the petition, in 1996, in the Superior Court of Santa

Clara County (“Superior Court”), petitioner was convicted of second degree murder and was

sentenced to twenty years to life in state prison. Petitioner’s direct appeal was denied, and

the California Supreme Court denied review in 1997. 

In May 2005, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Superior

Court, which petition was denied on the ground petitioner had failed to present a prima facie

case for relief. (Pet. at 2:20-22 & Ex. A.) Petitioner appealed the denial of the petition to the

California Court of Appeal; in May 2006, the Court of Appeal issued an order directing

respondent to show cause before the Superior Court why the petition should not be granted

based on petitioner’s allegations of newly discovered evidence. (Pet. at 2:23-24 & Ex. B.) 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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On July 12, 2007, respondent filed a return to the petition. (Pet. at 6:15-16 & Ex. F.) 

According to petitioner, as of the date he filed the instant federal habeas petition the

Superior Court had not yet ruled on the merits of his state petition. Petitioner claims that the

state court’s “excessive delay” in deciding his petition rises to the level of a due process

violation. Accordingly, he asks this Court to entertain his federal habeas petition even

though the claims have not been exhausted in state court. 

Prisoners in state custody who wish to challenge collaterally in federal habeas

proceedings either the fact or length of their confinement are first required to exhaust state

judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by presenting the

highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each and every

claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c), Rose v. Lundy, 455

U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982). If available state remedies have not been exhausted as to all claims

raised in a federal habeas corpus petition, the district court must dismiss the petition. See id.

at 510. 

The exhaustion requirement applicable to federal habeas petitions is not satisfied if

there is a pending post-conviction proceeding in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)-(c);

Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983). Excessive delay in the state

review process, however, may violate due process and justify federal habeas review before

all state court review of a case is completed. See Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 530 (9th

Cir. 1990). When a petitioner alleges excessive delay in the state review process, “there is no

talismanic number of years or months, after which due process is automatically violated.” Id.

at 531. Instead, to determine when delay becomes excessive and thus a due process

violation, the Ninth Circuit considers four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason

for the delay; (3) whether the petitioner diligently asserted his rights to state court review;

and (4) prejudice to the petitioner. See id. Only delays attributable to the state are

considered when determining whether there has been delay sufficient to excuse exhaustion. 

See Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 1998).

With respect to the first and second Coe factors, petitioner argues that the state court’s

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According to petitioner, seventeen months is the amount of time that elapsed from the

time the Court of Appeal issued its order to show cause in May 2006 until petitioner filed the

instant petition in November 2007. (Petition at 1.)

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delay in deciding his petition is excessive because the petition has been pending for

seventeen months, and the reason for the delay is attributable solely to the state.1

 In

particular, petitioner complains that respondent did not file a return to the petition until

fourteen months after he was ordered to do so, and that the Superior Court has not issued a

decision in the four months since the return was filed. As set forth below, the Court finds the

length of the delay and the reason for the delay do not weigh in petitioner’s favor.

In his state petition, petitioner claims he has newly-discovered evidence that shows he

is factually innocent of the 1995 murder for which he was convicted. (Pet. Ex. F at 2-4.) 

After having been ordered in May 2006 to file a return to the petition, respondent requested

two continuances, both of which were granted by the Superior Court: the first continuance

was granted to afford respondent the opportunity to review the ten-year-old trial record and

further investigate petitioner’s claim; the second continuance was granted, without objection

by petitioner’s counsel, in order that petitioner’s claim of factual innocence could be

investigated by the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office Innocence Project. (Id. at

4:21-5:14.) On July 12, 2007, respondent filed the return to the petition; a little more than

two weeks later, petitioner was appointed new counsel, Keith A. Sugar (“Sugar”). (Pet. at

3:19-20.) On August 15, 2007, Sugar wrote petitioner a letter, explaining he would not be

able to advise petitioner regarding an appropriate course of action concerning his petition

until he had reviewed petitioner’s claims and interviewed pertinent witnesses. (Pet. Ex. D.) 

Petitioner provides no further information in the instant petition concerning Sugar’s

investigation and assessment of petitioner’s claims, or whether Sugar has filed a response to

the return. See Cal. Penal Code § 1484 (allowing filing of response to return before court

hearing on merits of petition). 

In view of the nature of the claims raised in the state petition and the procedural

history that has developed since the petition was filed, the Court finds that seventeen months

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is not an unusual or extreme amount of time for the petition to be pending without a decision,

or that the delay is primarily attributable to the state. See Edelbacher, 160 F.3d at 587

(holding state court delay must be “extreme, unusual or attributable to the ineffectiveness of

the state courts” to excuse exhaustion). In particular, the nature of petitioner’s newlydiscovered evidence claim warranted respondent’s two requests for further time to

investigate petitioner’s allegations; the appointment of new counsel for petitioner required

additional time for counsel to review petitioner’s claims and conduct his own investigation;

and, because petitioner has not shown that counsel has either concluded his investigation of

petitioner’s claims or filed a response to the return, there is no indication that the state

petition is ready for decision on the merits by the Superior Court. 

With respect to the third Coe factor, the Court will assume without deciding, solely for

purposes of this order, that petitioner has diligently asserted his rights to state court review:

petitioner alleges that he filed his first state habeas petition within one year of discovering the

new evidence that establishes his innocence, and that he timely appealed the denial of that

petition, resulting in the Court of Appeal issuing the order to show cause in the pending state

court proceedings.

Finally, with respect to the fourth Coe factor, petitioner makes no showing that he has

been prejudiced by the delay. To determine whether a petitioner has been prejudiced by

post-conviction delay in state court proceedings, the Court looks to the following three

factors: (1) oppressive incarceration while awaiting resolution of the state proceedings; (2)

anxiety and concern of the petitioner awaiting the outcome of the state proceedings; and (3)

impairment of the petitioner’s grounds for relief or viability of the defense in case of retrial. 

See Coe, 922 F.2d at 532. 

Here, whether petitioner’s incarceration is unjustified and thus oppressive cannot be

determined, because such determination depends on the outcome of his state habeas petition,

or subsequent retrial, if any. See United States v. Antoine, 906 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir.

1990). If the conviction was proper, there has been no oppressive confinement, as petitioner

has merely been serving his sentence as mandated by law. See id. Further, while petitioner

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undoubtedly has experienced anxiety and concern during the pendency of his state court

proceedings, he has not alleged any particular anxiety that distinguishes his case from that of

any other prisoner awaiting the outcome of state post-conviction proceedings. See id. at

1382-83. Finally, petitioner does not allege that the delay has impaired his grounds for relief. 

See id. at 1383. In fact, as discussed above, it appears that part of the reason for the delay is

the need for petitioner’s counsel to investigate petitioner’s newly-discovered evidence claim

and to chart an appropriate course of action in response to the return. Accordingly, there is

no basis to support a conclusion that petitioner has been prejudiced by delay in his state court

proceedings. 

In sum, having reviewed the four Coe factors, the Court finds petitioner has not

established excessive delay in the state habeas corpus proceedings amounting to a due

process violation. Consequently, petitioner is required to exhaust his available state remedies

before pursuing federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to

petitioner’s filing a new federal habeas petition once he has exhausted his state remedies. 

See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding dismissal solely

for failure to exhaust does not bar return to federal court after exhaustion of available state

remedies). 

In light of petitioner’s lack of funds, the application to proceed in forma pauperis is

hereby GRANTED.

This order terminates Docket No. 5. 

The Clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 4, 2008

____________________________

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge 

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