Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03294/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03294-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas M. Coughlin
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-3294

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Thomas M. Coughlin, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: April 12, 2007

Filed: August 28, 2007

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BYE and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Coughlin (Coughlin), a successful and prominent corporate executive,

pled guilty to six felony counts: five counts of aiding and abetting wire fraud, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 2; and one count of filing false tax returns, in

violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). After properly calculating an advisory United States

Sentencing Guidelines range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment, the district court

departed and varied downward eight levels, sentencing Coughlin to no imprisonment,

5 years’ probation under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1) of which 27 months is home

detention, a $50,000 fine, and $411,218 in restitution. The government appeals. We

reverse and remand.

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1

All citations to the Guidelines are to the 2000 version. See generally United

States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). 

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I. BACKGROUND

From January 1997 to October 2001, Coughlin was Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s

(Wal-Mart) Chief Operating Officer and then Wal-Mart’s Executive Vice President

and Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors. During this period, Coughlin defrauded

Wal-Mart by (1) directing that Wal-Mart employees’ travel vouchers be falsely

adjusted to request unwarranted reimbursements, which were then converted into cash

and pocketed by Coughlin; (2) falsifying invoices so Wal-Mart paid Coughlin’s

personal expenses; (3) altering Wal-Mart employees’ expense vouchers to include

fictitious expenses, which were then converted into cash and pocketed by Coughlin;

(4) using large quantities of Wal-Mart gift cards for personal use; and (5) looting

audio equipment and cameras using Wal-Mart’s Merchandise Transfer Report. 

The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report

(PSR). The PSR set Coughlin’s base offense level at 6 and, due to the amount of the

loss, increased Coughlin’s offense level by 9 levels. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a),

(b)(1)(J).1

 The PSR increased Coughlin’s offense level by 2 levels because the

offense involved more than minimal planning, see id. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A), by 2 levels

because Coughlin was the organizer of the criminal activity, see id. § 3B1.1(c), and

by 2 levels because Coughlin abused a position of trust, see id. § 3B1.3. Coughlin’s

adjusted offense level was 21. The PSR reduced Coughlin’s offense level by 3 levels

for acceptance of responsibility. See id. § 3E1.1. Coughlin’s total offense level was

18, and Coughlin had a criminal history category I, resulting in an advisory Guidelines

sentencing range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment. 

At sentencing, the government and Coughlin stipulated the PSR properly

calculated Coughlin’s advisory Guidelines sentencing range, and the court accepted

the PSR’s calculation. The issues at sentencing were a departure based on Coughlin’s

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Dr. Carver relied upon a letter written by Phillip Wise (Wise), which discussed

the conditions within the BOP in general. Dr. Carver did not know Wise’s credentials.

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health pursuant to Guideline § 5H1.4 and a variance based on the factors set forth at

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

Coughlin is in poor health. The record reflects Coughlin is six feet four inches

tall and weighs about 330 pounds. Coughlin survived sudden cardiac death and has

had an implantable cardioverter defibrillator since 2003. Coughlin presently suffers

from cardiac arrhythmia, severe pulmonary hypertension, double vessel coronary

atherosclerosis, type II diabetes, gout, ethmoid sinusitis, obesity, high blood pressure,

severe allergies, and back and knee pain. Couglin also suffers from severe obstructive

sleep apnea, which necessitates the use of a continuous positive airway pressure

machine at night to prevent a dangerous drop in Coughlin’s oxygen levels. Doctors

have ordered Coughlin to control his weight and blood pressure since at least 1980,

yet these warnings have generally gone unheeded. 

Dr. Joel Carver (Dr. Carver), Coughlin’s treating physician, testified with a

reasonable degree of medical certainty (1) sending Coughlin to prison would increase

Coughlin’s stress level and significantly increase the risk of another heart attack;

(2) Coughlin regularly took thirteen different medications, two of which Dr. Carver

understood are not available through the Bureau of Prisons (BOP); and (3) Coughlin’s

medications should not be changed. Dr. Carver has never visited a BOP facility and

conceded he has no knowledge regarding how the BOP operates or treats the inmates

medically, or even what medical capabilities exist within the BOP.2

 Dr. Carver was

asked on direct examination whether Coughlin could survive in the BOP, and Dr.

Carver stated, “[it] honestly would be hard for me to speculate.” According to Dr.

Carver, his medical opinion about Coughlin and the BOP is “[j]ust based on common

sense.”

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Dr. Tecora Ballom (Dr. Ballom), the Clinical Consultant for the South Central

Region and Acting Clinical Director at the Federal Medical Center located at

Carswell, Texas, testified the BOP would review and assess Coughlin’s medical

history and treat him appropriately. The BOP classifies inmates according to their

medical needs. Level one usually includes healthy patients with uncomplicated

diseases who can perform the activities of daily living. Level two includes patients

with chronic diseases who require more frequent monitoring. Level-three patients

may not be able to perform all of the activities of daily living, require even more

frequent monitoring, and are housed in a community with access to medical resources.

Level-four patients have the most difficulty with daily living, require monitoring up

to twenty-four hours a day, and are housed at medical referral centers. 

Dr. Ballom testified Coughlin probably would be classified as a level-three

patient (or possibly as a level-four patient), which would include access to medical

treatment for patients with pacemakers and defibrillators and availability to a

continuous positive airway pressure machine at night. Dr. Ballom discussed the

procedure by which Coughlin could continue to take his current medications that are

not typically available through the BOP. Dr. Ballom testified the BOP could help

Coughlin cope with any increase in stress by using medical monitoring and possibly

psychological or psychiatric consultations. Dr. Ballom noted Dr. Carver’s testimony

concerning an increase in stress appeared to assume Coughlin would be housed at a

level one or two prison from a camp situation to a maximum-security penitentiary

rather than at a dormitory-style facility. Dr. Ballom also testified Coughlin’s health

conditions might improve because Coughlin would be in a controlled environment.

The district court agreed with Dr. Ballom and found “[Coughlin] is at a very

high risk. And [the court is] equating that to an extraordinary physical impairment

and, therefore, under [Guideline §] 5H1.4, [the court finds] that there should be a

downward departure . . . by a level of eight.” This resulted in an adjusted total offense

level of 10 and an advisory Guidelines sentencing range of 6 to 12 months’

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imprisonment. The district court further observed, in addition to a downward

departure under Guideline § 5H1.4, Coughlin could be entitled to a downward

departure under Guideline §§ 5H1.6 (concerning family ties and responsibilities as

well as community ties), 5H1.11 (concerning charitable and employment-related

contributions as well as prior good works), and 5K2.0 (concerning grounds for a

departure not otherwise considered in the Guidelines). The district court declined to

grant a further downward departure on these grounds because “the reduction given

under [Guideline § 5H1.4] is appropriate.” The court sentenced Coughlin to no

imprisonment, 5 years’ probation of which 27 months is home detention, a $50,000

fine, and $411,218 in restitution. In the alternative, if our court ruled on appeal that

the district court abused its discretion in departing downward pursuant to Guideline

§ 5H1.4, the district court imposed an identical sentence as a non-Guidelines sentence,

adopting the previous findings for a § 3553(a) analysis. The district court concluded

“home detention with electronic monitoring is going to be in [Coughlin’s] best

interests.” This appeal followed. 

II. DISCUSSION

After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), the sentencing court first

must calculate the advisory Guidelines sentencing range. See United States v. Ture,

450 F.3d 352, 356 (8th Cir. 2006). Next, the sentencing court must decide whether

a traditional departure from the advisory Guidelines sentencing range is appropriate

based either on Parts H or K of Chapter Five of the Guidelines, policy statements, or

commentary. See United States v. Dalton, 478 F.3d 879, 881 (8th Cir. 2007). The

sentencing court has then arrived at a final advisory Guidelines sentencing range. Id.

Then, the sentencing court must consider the factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

to determine whether to impose a sentence within or without the final advisory

Guidelines sentencing range. See id.; United States v. Rouillard, 474 F.3d 551, 555

(8th Cir. 2007). The sentencing court must impose a sentence tailored to the § 3553(a)

factors. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46. On appeal, we address the reasonableness

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Guideline § 5H1.4, in relevant part, provides:

Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not ordinarily

relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the

applicable guideline range. However, an extraordinary physical

impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable

guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home

detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.

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or unreasonableness of the sentence. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S.

Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007); Booker, 543 U.S. at 261. 

A. Physical Condition Departure

The first issue before the court is the propriety of the district court’s downward

departure pursuant to Guideline § 5H1.4. We review for abuse of discretion

departures from the Guidelines, Rouillard, 474 F.3d at 555, and review for clear error

the district court’s factual finding that Coughlin suffers an extraordinary physical

impairment, see United States v. Robinson, 409 F.3d 979, 981 (8th Cir. 2005). If an

appellate court “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed,” then a factual finding is clearly erroneous even if some evidence supports

the factual finding. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 

Guideline § 5H1.4 permits a downward departure based on a defendant’s

“extraordinary physical impairment.”3

 A departure based on a physical condition is

a discouraged ground on which to depart and should be limited to exceptional

circumstances. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95-96 (1996); United States

v. Johnson, 318 F.3d 821, 823-24 (8th Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 416 F.3d

884 (8th Cir. 2005). A defendant’s physical condition must be “assessed in the light

of the situation the defendant would encounter while imprisoned.” Johnson, 318 F.3d

at 826. To determine if an extraordinary physical impairment exists, we ask three

questions. First, “[i]s the particular defendant’s physical condition such that he or she

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would find imprisonment more than the normal hardship?” United States v. Rabins,

63 F.3d 721, 729 (8th Cir. 1995). Second, “[w]ould imprisonment subject him or her

to more than the normal inconvenience or danger?” Id. Specifically, would

imprisonment worsen his or her condition or does he or she require special care not

provided by the BOP? Id. at 728; accord Robinson, 409 F.3d at 981; Johnson, 318

F.3d at 826. Third, “[d]oes the physical condition have any substantial present effect

on the defendant’s ability to function?” Rabins, 63 F.3d at 729. 

The first and third questions are not in dispute; thus, we will focus on the

second question. Coughlin’s only evidence regarding how imprisonment would affect

Coughlin’s health is Dr. Carver’s testimony that life in prison is more stressful than

life outside of prison and Coughlin should avoid stress. Dr. Carver has never visited

a BOP facility. Dr. Carver conceded he had no personal knowledge of prison

conditions or where Coughlin would be housed within the BOP, nor does Dr. Carver

have specific knowledge regarding the accompanying stress level. “Common sense”

was the basis for Dr. Carver’s opinion. In contrast, Dr. Ballom’s testimony was based

on her considerable personal experiences with the BOP. Dr. Ballom commented that

while life in prison may be stressful, the BOP has the capability to help inmates cope

with stress. Furthermore, Dr. Ballom stated a controlled environment helps many

inmates control and manage their health problems and the BOP will provide Coughlin

with any medication or other necessary medical care. The record, omitting conjecture,

does not show Coughlin’s condition will worsen in a BOP facility or that Coughlin

requires special care the BOP cannot provide, that is, the record does not establish

imprisonment would subject Coughlin to more than the normal inconvenience or

danger. 

Coughlin relies on United States v. Wadena, 470 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 2006),

where this court affirmed a sentence of 5 years’ probation based in part on the

defendant’s poor health. In Wadena, the defendant had a worsening kidney disease,

which required three-hour dialysis treatments three times a week. Id. at 737. Here,

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All of the grounds discussed by the district court in support of a nonGuidelines sentence are “not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence

should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S.S.G. §§ 5H1.6, 5H1.11; see

also id. § 5K2.0 (stating if “an offender characteristic or other circumstances” is “not

ordinarily relevant,” the characteristic or circumstance may be a ground for a

departure “if such characteristic or circumstance is present to an unusual degree and

distinguishes the case from the ‘heartland’ cases covered by the guidelines”). 

-8-

Coughlin’s health ailments were not as severe as Wadena’s ailments. On this record,

the district court clearly erred in finding Coughlin suffers an extraordinary physical

impairment and abused its discretion by departing downward eight levels pursuant to

Guideline § 5H1.4. The no imprisonment sentence is not supported by the record. 

B. Non-Guidelines Sentence

In the event our court concluded the district court abused its discretion in

departing downward pursuant to Guideline § 5H1.4, the district court imposed the

same sentence as a non-Guidelines sentence based on (1) Coughlin’s family ties and

responsibilities, as well as community ties; (2) Coughlin’s charitable and employmentrelated contributions, as well as prior good works; and (3) other factors not otherwise

considered in the Guidelines, such as Coughlin’s “fall from grace.”4

 Although the

district court identified certain factors that could in the abstract support the imposition

of a non-Guidelines sentence, the district court failed to consider these factors in the

context of § 3553(a). Under § 3553(a), in imposing a non-Guidelines sentence, the

district court must also consider the seriousness of the offense, promotion of respect

for the law, just punishment, adequate deterrence, protection of the public from further

crimes, and the avoidance of unwarranted sentencing disparities. Perhaps Coughlin’s

family ties and station in the community, as well as his lofty corporate position of trust

and power, exacerbate the nature of his crimes, especially for Coughlin’s victims:

Wal-Mart, and more generally, American businesses. The record does not reflect the

district court ever weighed both the aggravating and the mitigating nature of

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The district court found Coughlin did not have the ability to pay interest and

waived interest on Coughlin’s fine and restitution. The PSR calculated Coughlin’s net

worth to be in excess of $50 million. The district court plainly erred by concluding

Coughlin did not have the ability to pay interest and on remand should reconsider

Coughlin’s ability to pay interest. See United States v. Carter, 481 F.3d 601, 608 n.5

(8th Cir. 2007). 

-9-

Coughlin’s conduct upon his family and community, Coughlin’s position with

Wal-Mart, and the other relevant factors in § 3553(a). 

Section 3553(c)(2) of Title 18, United States Code, requires the sentencing

court to state with specificity the reasons for the imposition of a non-Guidelines

sentence. See United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 2005).

Section 3553(c)(2) specifically informs “the parties of the reasons for a particular

sentence outside of the guidelines range,” aids the appellate court in reviewing a

Guidelines departure or non-Guidelines sentence, and assists “the Sentencing

Commission in collecting sentencing data and in maintaining a comprehensive

database on all federal sentences.” Id. Here, the district court did not state the

reasons with sufficient specificity for the non-Guidelines sentence, especially

considering the factors relied upon by the district court (1) are ordinarily not relevant

in determining a sentence and are discouraged grounds for the imposition of a nonGuidelines sentence; (2) were not weighed against the negative impact Coughlin’s

crimes had on his family, community, and employer; and (3) were not balanced with

the other considerations in § 3553(a)(1), (2), and (3). 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we must remand for resentencing. Cf. United States

v. Peterson, 455 F.3d 834, 837-38 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court’s eight level

departure or variance, based on this record, does not fall within the range of

reasonableness. We reverse Coughlin’s sentence and remand for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.5

 Both the government and Coughlin should have an

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opportunity to supplement the sentencing record with additional evidence and

argument on these resentencing issues, if either desires to do so. 

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The district court did not err when it found Coughlin suffers from an

extraordinary physical impairment. The district court did not abuse its discretion

when it determined it was appropriate to downward depart, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 5H1.4. Furthermore, a sentence of five years probation with twenty-seven months

of home detention, a $50,000 fine, and $411,218 in restitution is not unreasonable. 

A

Whether Coughlin has an extraordinary physical impairment for the purpose of

a § 5H1.4 departure is a question of fact we review for clear error. United States v.

Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 728-29 (8th Cir. 1995). The district court must ask three

questions when determining whether a defendant has an extraordinary physical

impairment: (1) whether the defendant’s physical condition is such that the defendant

would find imprisonment more than the normal hardship; (2) whether imprisonment

would subject the defendant to more than the normal inconvenience or danger; and (3)

whether the defendant’s physical condition has any substantial present effect on the

defendant’s ability to function. United States v. Johnson, 318 F.3d 821, 825 (8th Cir.

2003) (citing Rabins, 63 F.3d at 729).

As the majority indicates, the first and third questions are not in dispute. Both

the BOP expert, Dr. Ballom, and Coughlin’s expert, Dr. Carver, agree Coughlin is “at

very high risk cardiac and pulmonary wise.” Dr. Ballom testified Coughlin is in the

highest risk category, his condition being more than serious. Both medical experts

agree, Coughlin’s physical condition has a substantial present effect on his ability to

function and will cause Coughlin to find imprisonment more than the normal hardship.

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Dr. Carver relied on the report of Phillip S. Wise, Assistant Director of BOP

(retired), which described in detail the situations listed above as prison realities that

would likely produce stress in older inmates; in her testimony, Dr. Ballom conceded

the same. Despite the majority’s assertion, Dr. Carver did not base his medical

opinion about Coughlin’s health in the BOP only on “common sense.” Dr. Carver

consulted Wise – both through Wise’s written report and through a telephone

conversation – on issues of prison environment, the National Formulary, and

Coughlin’s necessary medical equipment.

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The majority concludes the record does not establish imprisonment would

subject Coughlin to more than the normal inconvenience or danger, and holds the

district court clearly erred when it so found. I disagree. Dr. Carver, a respected

cardiologist whose credentials the government does not dispute, testified

unequivocally Coughlin meets every one of the Rabins factors for an extraordinary

medical impairment.

Coughlin has an unusual heart condition in that he has suffered multiple lifethreatening cardiac episodes as a result of stress. The majority incorrectly concludes,

however, Coughlin’s only evidence regarding how imprisonment would adversely

affect his health is Dr. Carver’s testimony that life in prison is more stressful than life

outside of prison. While the record does detail how strip searches, the risk of physical

assault from younger aggressive inmates, overcrowding, sleep disturbance, unnerving

noise, the threat of disciplinary sanctions, separation from loved ones, and limited

access to health care would likely elevate Coughlin’s stress to dangerous levels,6

 lifeendangering stress is not the only adverse medical consequence that could result from

Coughlin’s incarceration. 

Dr. Carver testified specifically, “incarceration would place [Coughlin] in a

position of danger” and may well cause his death. First, Dr. Carver testified a change

in Coughlin’s prescription regime would be very detrimental to his physical condition.

Dr. Ballom admitted during her testimony she could not guarantee Coughlin would

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Dr. Ballom testified Coughlin would have to seek approval for six of his

medications, because they are not on the National Formulary. She testified each

approval process could take up to a week, and up to thirty percent of patient requests

for such medications are denied.

8

Furthermore, the record shows the district court considered the costs associated

with housing and medicating Coughlin when it asked Dr. Ballom directly about each

of these expenses, which are relevant considerations under the Guidelines (“E.g., in

the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and

less costly than, imprisonment.” (emphasis added)).

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receive his currently prescribed drugs.7

 Second, Dr. Ballom admitted she does not

know whether Coughlin will be assigned to a level-three or level-four detention

facility, and cannot say how far from a hospital Coughlin will be housed. Third, the

record does not show Coughlin will have adequate cardiac monitoring at the BOP

facility to which he is assigned. Dr. Ballom testified she did not know how often a

cardiologist would visit and admitted there was at least one period of a year when

patients at a level-four facility were denied access to a specialist because the detention

facility did not have such a consulting specialist. Fourth, the record shows Coughlin’s

life depends on complicated medical equipment and, in the event of an emergency, Dr.

Ballom conceded Coughlin would be reliant on the ability of ordinary prison staff to

quickly notice and notify a doctor or emergency response team.8

The government argues if we grant Coughlin a downward departure based on

an extraordinary medical impairment, it will open the floodgates for everyone to argue

prison is too stressful. In other words, it asks, who will go to prison if Coughlin does

not? The framing of this argument minimizes the gravity of Coughlin’s medical

condition. The record is replete with evidence of Coughlin’s – in the words of the

government’s own expert – “very high risk” condition. A respected cardiologist

testified, and four to five inches of medical records confirmed, incarceration would

“significantly increase [Coughlin’s] risk of another heart attack or death” and “place

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him in a position of danger.” In light of the overwhelming medical evidence in this

case, a more prescient concern is who will be granted a departure for an extraordinary

physical impairment if not Coughlin? Indeed, the district court wondered, “why even

have a provision in the Guidelines [] that it can be departed from if you can show an

extraordinary physical impairment if the Bureau of Prisons takes the [] stance we can

treat everybody and can and will and provide good care?”

In my judgment, the district court did not clearly err when it concluded

imprisonment would subject Coughlin to more than the normal inconvenience or

danger and ruled Coughlin has an extraordinary physical impairment. Furthermore,

the district court departed downward only to the extent needed to allow it to substitute

home detention for incarceration. The district court’s decision to impose twentyseven months of home detention, instead of the six to twelve months prescribed for

an offense level of ten, further satisfies me that the court did not abuse its discretion

in sentencing Coughlin.

B

Section 3553(a) requires a district court to “impose a sentence no greater than

necessary to account for the nature and seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s

history and characteristics, as well as to provide just punishment, to protect the public,

and to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities.” United States v. Tabor, 439 F.3d 826,

831 (8th Cir. 2006). This court recognizes “[s]entences varying from the guidelines

range . . . are reasonable so long as the judge offers appropriate justification under the

factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Lazenby, 439 F.3d 928,

932 (8th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted).

The variance in this case is substantial in that it resulted in no incarceration

where the Guidelines called for at least twenty-seven months imprisonment.

Nevertheless, I find the sentence was reasonable because the district court offered

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The district court actively participated in the questioning of the experts,

indicating concern for Coughlin’s safety. The court asked Dr. Ballom if she would

be involved in determining in which facility Coughlin would be placed, indicating it

was concerned prisoners may not always be placed in appropriate facilities.

10The majority misinterprets the district court. The district court stated

specifically it was not granting a departure based on §§ 5H1.6 and 5H1.11 factors,

though it noted Coughlin may qualify for the departure under the § 5K2.0(c)

exception. Section 5K2.0(c) allows the consideration of characteristics or other

circumstances, even if not ordinarily relevant to a determination of whether a

departure is warranted, if such characteristics or circumstances are present to a

substantial degree, and if taken together they make the case an exceptional one.

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appropriate justification, taking into account the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors when

deciding to substitute home detention for incarceration.

The district court believed the circumstances of Coughlin’s case were

extraordinary, describing it as “the most unusual case that this Court’s handled or

probably ever will handle,” and felt strongly home detention was the appropriate

sentence for Coughlin.9

 The district court stated, “even if I’m incorrect in what I have

determined about 5H1.4 and my comments concerning 5H1.6, 1.11, and 5K.2, I

restate and adopt all of my findings under 3553 [(a)] and make them my factors in

imposing a reasonable sentence on Coughlin.” The majority claims this statement

shows the district court alternatively relied on factors set forth in §§ 5H1.6 and

5H1.11, which are ordinarily not relevant in determining a departure.10 On the

contrary, the court did not state it would rely on §§ 5H1.6, 5H1.11 and 5K2.0 for a

downward departure, in the event its § 5H1.4 finding was found to be incorrect.

Instead, the court stated it would impose a variance, relying on 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)

and the mandate that its sentence be reasonable.

The majority claims the district court did not state with enough specificity its

reasons for the imposition of a non-guidelines sentence and did not properly balance

the considerations of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I disagree. This court “do[es] not require

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1118 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D).

1218 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).

1318 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).

1418 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).

1518 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).

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district courts to make ‘robotic incantations’ that each § 3553(a) factor has been

considered.” United States v. McMannus, 436 F.3d 871, 874 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing

United States v. Lamoreaux, 422 F.3d 750, 756 (8th Cir. 2005)). Where a matter is

conceptually simple and the record makes clear the sentencing judge considered the

evidence and arguments, the law does not require a judge to write extensively about

the reasons for its imposition of a particular sentence. Rita v. United States, 127 S.

Ct. 2456, 2469 (2006). The law leaves much to the professional judgment of a judge

to decide, under the circumstances, the appropriateness of brevity or length,

conciseness or detail, in delivering its explanation. Id. at 2468.

In this case, the record shows the district court considered: (1) the extraordinary

need to provide the defendant with adequate medical care;11 (2) the exemplary

citizenship of the defendant measured by his history of good civic and charitable

contributions as well as public service;12 (3) the importance of adequate deterrence,

acknowledging the “worldwide exposure and ridicule” the defendant had already

experienced;13 (4) the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,

promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment, taking into account the

defendant has admitted responsibility and faces substantial civil liability and other

financial consequences as a result of his crime;14 and (5) the need to provide

restitution to the victims, by ordering the defendant pay full restitution.15

Appellate Case: 06-3294 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/28/2007 Entry ID: 3345735
1618 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).

-16-

Furthermore, the district court carefully considered the advisory Guidelines

sentencing range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months imprisonment.16 By imposing

a sentence of five years probation, with twenty-seven months of home detention, the

district court imposed the length of sentence prescribed by the Guidelines; the district

court varied only in its substitution of home detention for incarceration.

Sentencing courts have the unique ability to appraise the evidence and

personally assess a defendant. The district court had the discretion to decide it would

be more efficient, effective and less costly for Coughlin to receive treatment from his

current physician and serve his sentence at home. The other § 3553(a) factors do not

weigh strongly against the variance in this case, and some support the variance. Our

court’s obligation is to give the district court’s determination the same amount of

deference whether the resulting sentence is greater than, or less than, the guidelines

range. Given the district court’s careful consideration of the evidence and arguments

contained in this full record, I do not find the court abused its discretion in imposing

a sentence of home detention rather than incarceration. I would therefore affirm.

For the above reasons, I dissent. 

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Appellate Case: 06-3294 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/28/2007 Entry ID: 3345735