Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01613/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01613-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
J. Fortune
Defendant
Vance Edward Johnson
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VANCE EDWARD JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

J. FORTUNE,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01613-LJO-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the 

Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is housed at Pleasant Valley State Prison in Coalinga, California, where 

the acts giving rise to this complaint occurred. He names Physician Assistant (“PA”) J. 

Fortune as the sole Defendant. 

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff suffers from chronic pain, arthritis in the neck, and degenerative disc 

disease. Plaintiff was prescribed Tylenol 3 for his pain. 

On July 9, 2014, Plaintiff met with PA Fortune, who wanted to take Plaintiff off of 

Tylenol 3 immediately because he did not think that opiates should be “a front line 

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treatment” for arthritis. When Plaintiff threatened to file a lawsuit, Defendant continued 

the medication and scheduled Plaintiff for a 60-day follow-up.

On September 5, 2014, Plaintiff again met with PA Fortune. At this appointment, 

Defendant went beyond the scope of his duties when he stopped prescribing Tylenol 3 

without a doctor’s approval and knowing that Plaintiff’s pain was worse in cold weather. 

Defendant prescribed medication that worked for inflammation, but not pain, leaving 

Plaintiff to suffer “in excruciating, unbearable pain” for 2.5 months. 

Plaintiff was eventually prescribed a stronger medication, presumably by 

someone other than Defendant. This medication caused an allergic reaction, which 

required a brief hospitalization. Plaintiff was later re-prescribed Tylenol 3 by a doctor.

Plaintiff seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, 

and removal of Defendant from his position as a PA. 

IV. ANALYSIS

Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth 

Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment. See Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1975). “In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate 

indifference consists of two parts. First, the plaintiff must show a serious medical need 

by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further 

significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, the plaintiff 

must show the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent. This 

second prong ... is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett 

v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations, punctuation and 

quotation marks omitted).

In applying this standard, the Ninth Circuit has held that before it can be said that 

a prisoner's civil rights have been abridged, “the indifference to his medical needs must 

be substantial. Mere ‘indifference,’ ‘negligence,’ or ‘medical malpractice’ will not support 

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this cause of action.” Broughton v. Cutter Laboratories, 622 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.

1980) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06). “[A] complaint that a physician has been 

negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 

medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not 

become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 

U.S. at 106; see also Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995); 

McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1050, overruled on other grounds, WMX, 104 F.3d at 1136. Even 

gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical 

needs. See Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1334 (9th Cir. 1990).

As currently pled, Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Section 

1983. A medical professional is not deliberately indifferent to an inmate's serious medical 

need when he prescribes a different method of treatment than that requested by the 

inmate. A difference of opinion between medical professionals concerning the 

appropriate course of treatment generally does not amount to deliberate indifference to 

serious medical needs. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 2004); Sanchez 

v. Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989). Also, “a difference of opinion between a 

prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to 

a [§]1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981). To establish 

that such a difference of opinion amounted to deliberate indifference, the prisoner “must 

show that the course of treatment the doctors chose was medically unacceptable under 

the circumstances” and “that they chose this course in conscious disregard of an 

excessive risk to [the prisoner's] health.” See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th 

Cir. 1996); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1123 (9th Cir. 2012) (awareness 

of need for treatment followed by unnecessary delay in implementing the prescribed 

treatment sufficient to plead deliberate indifference); see also Snow v. McDaniel, 681 

F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2012) (decision of non-treating, non-specialist physicians to 

repeatedly deny recommended surgical treatment may be medically unacceptable under 

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all the circumstances). The allegations in Plaintiff's complaint fail to meet this demanding 

standard.

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court will grant Plaintiff 

an opportunity to file an amended complaint. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 

(9th Cir. 1987). If Plaintiff opts to amend, he must demonstrate that the alleged acts 

resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78. Plaintiff 

must set forth “sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must also demonstrate 

that each named Defendant personally participated in a deprivation of his rights. Jones 

v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

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Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his complaint, filed October 22, 2015; 

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will dismiss this action, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim and 

failure to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 19, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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