Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02197/USCOURTS-ca2-14-02197-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vito Cortesiano

Michael Dolphin

United States of America
Appellee USA
Anthony Vaglica

Bartolomeo Vernace
Appellant
Robert Wehnert

Document Text:

14‐2197‐cr

United States v. Vernace

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

      

August Term 2015  

(Argued:  September 18, 2015    Decided:  February 2, 2016)

Docket No. 14‐2197‐cr

      

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

BARTOLOMEO VERNACE, AKA Pepe, AKA Bobby, AKA Bobby Glasses,

AKA Robert,

Defendant‐Appellant,

ROBERT WEHNERT, AKA Bobby Werner, ANTHONY VAGLICA, AKA Bosch,

MICHAEL DOLPHIN, VITO CORTESIANO, AKA Vito Love,

Defendants.

      

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

      

Before:

SACK, CHIN, and DRONEY, Circuit Judges.

      

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Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York (Townes, J.), convicting defendant of conspiring to

engage in a racketeering enterprise in violation of the Racketeering Influenced

and Corrupt Organizations Act, using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in

relation to a crime of violence, and operating an illegal gambling business.  On

appeal, defendant contends that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to

support his conviction on certain predicate racketeering acts, (2) the district court

applied the wrong version of the firearm statute, and (3) a new trial is required

based on newly discovered evidence about a cooperating witness.    

AFFIRMED.

      

M. KRISTIN MACE, Assistant United States

Attorney (David C. James, Amy Busa, Evan

M. Norris, Amir H. Toossi, Assistant

United States Attorneys, on the brief), for

Robert L. Capers, United States Attorney

for the Eastern District of New York,

Brooklyn, New York, for Appellee.

SETH GINSBERG, Law Office of Seth Ginsberg,

New York, New York, for Defendant‐

Appellant.

      

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CHIN, Circuit Judge:

In 1981, the two owners of the Shamrock Bar in Queens, New York,

were shot to death in their establishment, following an altercation that began

with a spilled drink.  The murders became known as the Shamrock Murders.

More than thirty years later, defendant‐appellant Bartolomeo

Vernace was convicted, following a jury trial, of participating in the Shamrock

Murders.  On May 30, 2014, the district court entered judgment convicting him of

(1) conspiring to engage in a racketeering enterprise in violation of the

Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (ʺRICOʺ), 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(c) and (d), (2) using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in relation to a

crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and (3) operating an illegal

gambling business in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.

Specifically, on the RICO count, the jury found that Vernace

committed nine predicate racketeering acts in support of the conviction,

including the Shamrock Murders and heroin distribution and related

conspiracies.  The district court sentenced him principally to life imprisonment

for the RICO conspiracy, ten yearsʹ imprisonment for the § 924(c) violation to be

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served consecutively, and five yearsʹ imprisonment on the illegal gambling count

to be served concurrently.   

Vernace appeals, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient for

the jury to find that the Shamrock Murders and heroin offenses were related to

the RICO conspiracy, (2) he was convicted under the wrong version of § 924(c),

and (3) newly discovered evidence requires that we grant him a new trial.  For

the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. The Facts

At trial, the Government elicited testimony from 35 witnesses,

including cooperators from the Gambino crime family and another ʺLa Cosa

Nostraʺ crime family, who testified about Vernaceʹs role in the Gambino crime

family.  We recount below that evidence in the light most favorable to the

Government.  See United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012).   

A. Vernaceʹs Involvement in the Gambino Crime Family

When Vernace was arrested on January 17, 2011, he was, by all

accounts, a member of the Gambino crime familyʹs three‐person ruling panel, in

charge of the operations of the organization.  The Gambino crime family is an

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organized operation that generates money for its members through criminal

activities, including drug trafficking, robbery, extortion, illegal gambling, and

loansharking.  It is one of the five organized crime families in New York City that

make up ʺLa Cosa Nostra.ʺ  Gambino members start as ʺassociatesʺ before they

are inducted as ʺsoldiers,ʺ who run their own crews of associates, and then move

up to become ʺcaptains.ʺ  

B. The Shamrock Murders

John DʹAgnese and Richard Godkin, the owners of the Shamrock Bar

in Queens, New York, died on April 11, 1981 ‐‐ DʹAgnese from a single bullet to

the sternum and Godkin from a single bullet to the head.   

The evening before, on April 10, 1981, someone spilled a drink on

the dress of Frank Riccardiʹs girlfriend at the Shamrock Bar.  At the time, Riccardi

was a Gambino associate in Anthony Ruggianoʹs crew.  Riccardi got visibly

upset; this attracted the attention of the bar owners.  When DʹAgnese introduced

himself as owning the Shamrock Bar and attempted to calm Riccardi down,

Riccardi retorted, ʺNo, you donʹt.  I run this place.ʺ  App. at 220.  He grabbed a

bottle of vodka and set it down next to him.  ʺSee?  This is my place.  I do what I

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want in here.ʺ  Id. at 221.  Godkin then intervened, and after a conversation,

Riccardi appeared to have calmed down.  Riccardi then left.

Riccardi, however, went next to Joseph Corozzoʹs social club, a

Gambino gambling operation that members frequented.  The social club was

unmarked:  Only a ʺmembers onlyʺ sign adorned its door.  There, Riccardi found

Vernace and Ronald Barlin.  Vernace had been a Gambino associate since the

early 1970s; though he and Barlin were once part of the same crew as Riccardi,

they were now part of the same crew as Corozzo.  Riccardi, Vernace, and Barlin

together departed for the Shamrock Bar.

They entered through the front door.  Barlin drew his gun.  The

crowd scattered.  Riccardi went for DʹAgnese.  Vernace went for Godkin.  

Vernace had Godkin pinned to the shuffleboard machine.  ʺWhereʹs your gun

now, tough guy?  Go for your gun.  Go ahead.  Go for it,ʺ Vernace taunted,

holding his own gun.  App. at 224.  Two gunshots were fired.  DʹAgnese

collapsed; Godkin stumbled.  Riccardi and Vernace bolted for the front door;

Barlin ran, too, but not before he fired a round into the ceiling, capping their

escape.  DʹAgnese and Godkin had been shot ‐‐ they died the next day.  

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C. Heroin Distribution

Earlier, in January 1981, Special Agent Louis Diaz of the Drug

Enforcement Agency was investigating undercover a heroin trafficking ring.  He

met Bruce Erbacher and Herbert Frank, two heroin dealers.  Diaz told Erbacher

and Frank that he was looking for a new source of supply for his clients in

Philadelphia.  Erbacher revealed that his suppliers were ʺwell organized,ʺ 

meaning ʺorganized crime, Italian Mafia, La Cosa Nostra.ʺ  App. at 316.  Diaz

later asked Frank if this meant ʺconnected[,] [f]amily.ʺ  Id. at 318.  Frank

responded, ʺyou got it.ʺ  Id. at 319.  After several heroin transactions, Erbacher

mentioned during a conversation that his suppliers were ʺRon and Pepe.ʺ  Id. at

321.  Though Vernace sported many nicknames throughout the years, at least one

of them around that time was ʺPepe.ʺ  

At the time, Erbacher and Frank also dealt drugs with George

Gleckler and his girlfriend.  In conversations during these dealings, Glecklerʹs

girlfriend testified that she heard, from time to time, the names ʺPepe and Ron.ʺ  

Id. at 379.  Then, at a dinner party one night at Frankʹs apartment, she saw

Vernace and an associate come by and speak with Gleckler and Frank for fifteen

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or twenty minutes in a bedroom.  Then, Gleckler spoke with Frank.  Afterward,

Gleckler told his girlfriend that they now wanted him to sell heroin, too.

On May 13, 1981, Agent Diaz, after obtaining a warrant, proceeded

to Frankʹs apartment to make an arrest.  There he found and arrested not only

Frank, but also Barlin and Anthony Cuccio, another Gambino member.  From the

premises, he seized heroin, a scale, a sawed‐off shotgun, and $50,000 in cash.  As

he was making these arrests and seizures, the phone rang.  The man on the

phone identified himself as Pepe and asked to speak with Cuccio.  Pepe asked

Cuccio, ʺIs everything okay?ʺ  Id. at 327.  When Cuccio answered, ʺno,ʺ they both

hung up.  Id.  

D. Vernaceʹs Rise and Arrest

Vernace went into hiding following the Shamrock Murders and after

Barlin and the others had been arrested and indicted.  He did not reappear until

the mid‐1980s.  Starting then, Gambino members would see him periodically at

Gambino social clubs or Christmas parties.  By the late 1990s, Vernace was

formally inducted as a soldier.  In 2008, when the members of the Gambino crime

familyʹs ruling panel were arrested, Vernace and two others took over.

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On January 20, 2011, the Government arrested Vernace at a café that

he owned in Queens, New York, which also housed video gambling machines.  

Several thousand dollars in cash were seized.   

II. Proceedings Below

The Government charged Vernace with three counts:  RICO

conspiracy, a § 924(c) violation, and illegal gambling.  On April 17, 2013,

following a month‐long trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts.  On

May 15, 2013, Vernace moved for a judgment of acquittal.   

On February 14, 2014, while the motion was still pending, the

Government informed Vernace that it had learned in November 2013 that one of

the cooperating witnesses had been violating his cooperation agreement since

approximately 2010.  The witness disclosed that he had been engaging in illegal

gambling and collecting illegal gambling debts on behalf of others.  On May 8,

2014, Vernace moved for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33 on the basis of this evidence that the witness had been violating his

cooperation agreement.  

On May 27, 2014, the district court denied both motions and

sentenced Vernace principally to life imprisonment for the RICO conspiracy, ten

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yearsʹ imprisonment for the § 924(c) violation to be served consecutively, and five

yearsʹ imprisonment on the illegal gambling count to be served concurrently.   

This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Vernace contends on appeal that (1) the evidence was insufficient as

to certain predicate racketeering acts, (2) the wrong version of § 924(c) was

applied, and (3) newly discovered evidence requires that he be granted a new

trial.  We address each argument in turn.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

We review de novo challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, but must

uphold the conviction if ʺany rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.ʺ  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979).  In conducting this review, we ʺmust view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could have

been drawn in the governmentʹs favor, and deferring to the juryʹs assessment of

witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of the evidence.ʺ  Coplan, 703

F.3d at 62 (quoting United States v. Chavez, 549 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2008)).   

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Where the Government asks the jury to find an element of the crime

through inference, ʺ[t]he jury may not be permitted to conjecture . . . or to

conclude upon pure speculation or from passion, prejudice or sympathy.ʺ  United

States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 243 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Curley v. United States,

160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947)); see, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 485 F.3d 666,

671 (2d Cir. 2007) (ʺBoth the existence of a conspiracy and a given defendantʹs

participation in it with the requisite knowledge and criminal intent may be

established through circumstantial evidence.ʺ).  Instead, ʺ[w]e must also be

satisfied that the inferences are sufficiently supported to permit a rational juror to

find that the element, like all elements, is established beyond a reasonable

doubt.ʺ  United States v. Martinez, 54 F.3d 1040, 1043 (2d Cir. 1995).

Vernace argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient for the jury

to find that (a) the Shamrock Murders were ʺrelatedʺ to the racketeering

enterprise or (b) he engaged in a heroin conspiracy or that any such conspiracy

was ʺrelatedʺ to the enterprise.  We disagree.

A. Relatedness Under RICO

RICO makes it unlawful for an individual to conduct or conspire to

conduct an enterprise by engaging in ʺa pattern of racketeering activity.ʺ  18

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U.S.C. § 1962(c); see id. § 1962(d).  A pattern of racketeering activity involves, at

minimum, two predicate racketeering activities ‐‐ including, for example,

murder, drug trafficking, and illegal gambling ‐‐ that occur within ten years of

one another.  Id. § 1961(1), (5).

But RICO does not apply to ʺthe perpetrators of ʹisolatedʹ or

ʹsporadicʹ criminal acts.ʺ  United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir.

1989) (en banc) (quoting Sun Savings & Loan Assʹn v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 192

(9th Cir. 1987)).  Criminal conduct only ʺforms a pattern if it embraces criminal

acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or

methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing

characteristics and are not isolated events.ʺ  H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S.

229, 240 (1989) (emphasis added) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982)).  That is,

predicate acts ʺmust be related to each other (ʹhorizontalʹ relatedness), and they

must be related to the enterprise (ʹverticalʹ relatedness).ʺ  United States v.

Minicone, 960 F.2d 1099, 1106 (2d Cir. 1992).   

Vertical relatedness requires ʺthat the defendant was enabled to

commit the offense solely because of his position in the enterprise or his

involvement in or control over the enterpriseʹs affairs, or because the offense

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related to the activities of the enterprise.ʺ  United States v. Burden, 600 F.3d 204,

216 (2d Cir. 2010).  ʺ[I]t is not necessary,ʺ however, ʺthat the offense be in

furtherance of the enterpriseʹs activities for the offense to be related to the

activities of the enterprise.ʺ  United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).  

Further, ʺthe same or similar proof [that] establish[es] vertical relatednessʺ may

also establish horizontal relatedness, because ʺthe requirements of horizontal

relatedness can be established by linking each predicate act to the enterprise.ʺ  

United States v. Daidone, 471 F.3d 371, 375 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); see also

Indelicato, 865 F.2d at 1382 (considering evidence of ʺtemporal proximity, or

common goals, or similarity of methods, or repetitionsʺ).

B. The Shamrock Murders

Vernace argues that the Shamrock Murders were not related to the

activities of the Gambino crime family.  Those murders, he contends, resulted

instead from a mere ʺpersonal dispute over a spilled drink.ʺ  Appellantʹs Br. at

46.  

To begin, Vernaceʹs theory carries with it an air of implausibility.  A

jury need not credit a theory that is not supported ʺby reason and common

sense.ʺ  Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J.,

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dissenting).  Vernace argues that a mere spilled drink somehow cascaded into

two brutal, and very public, murders.  But the jury, seeking to make sense of the

Shamrock Murders, could have reasonably rejected this theory and found instead

that the Shamrock Murders were related to the activities of the Gambino crime

family.

From the evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that

Riccardi enlisted Vernace and Barlin to kill the two bar owners for disrespecting

him as a Gambino associate and to uphold the reputation of the Gambino crime

family.  Riccardi was upset over the spilled drink, but may also have wanted to

demonstrate to DʹAgnese and Godkin that the Gambino crime family ʺr[an] th[e]

place.ʺ  App. at 220.  During his interactions at the Shamrock Bar, Riccardi

suffered an affront (real or perceived) to himself and to his authority as a

Gambino associate, and, by extension, to the family.  Vernace, in turn, helped

him address the affront.  That is, a reasonable jury could have concluded Vernace

went so far as to commit murder in a crowded bar because such a public display

related to preserving (and even enhancing) the reputation of the Gambino crime

family and its members.   

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But the Shamrock Murders link back to the Gambino crime family in

another way.  The jury could also have reasonably concluded that Vernace

participated in the Shamrock Murders to further his own reputation, thereby

enabling him to more effectively carry out the activities of the Gambino crime

family.  The jury heard testimony that one of the goals of the Gambino crime

family was ʺ[t]o make moneyʺ through illicit means.  Id. at 114.  By building their

own reputations, Gambino members gained ʺrespect in the streetʺ that they

could directly leverage in the familyʹs loansharking and extortion activities.  

Govʹt App. at 65‐66 (ʺ[If] people are afraid of you, itʹs easier for you to make

money for the Gambino family.ʺ).  For example, the Government presented a

secretly recorded conversation where one of Vernaceʹs associates used the

Shamrock Murders to collect loansharking debts by telling the victim that

Vernace was ʺthe real thingʺ and after warning that those sorts of homicides

ʺhappen[] every day.ʺ  Id. at 12.  The jury could have reasonably concluded that

Vernace found it valuable to participate in the Shamrock Murders because doing

so would later help him carry out other activities that benefitted the Gambino

crime family.  

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Our case law supports the proposition that Vernaceʹs conduct

therefore lies within the heartland of what RICO targets.  We have noted that

ʺ[t]he question of whether acts form a pattern ʹrarely is a problem with a criminal

enterprise, as distinct from a lawful enterprise that commits occasional criminal

acts.ʹʺ  Minicone, 960 F.2d at 1108 (quoting United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362,

1366 (7th Cir. 1991)); see Daidone, 471 F.3d at 376 (ʺ[S]prawling, complex

enterprises, like the Luchese crime organization, are the prototypical targets of

RICO.ʺ).  This is because the predicate acts will share common goals (such as

increasing or protecting the ʺposition of the enterpriseʺ or its members) and

common victims (such as ʺthose who threaten its goalsʺ) and will draw from ʺthe

same pool of associates . . . of the enterprise.ʺ  Daidone, 471 F.3d at 376; see also

Burden, 600 F.3d at 218‐19 (finding relatedness where ʺviolence enhanced the

level of respectʺ for the racketeering enterprise and ʺgarner[ed] [members]

respectʺ).  In this vein, it would have been reasonable for the jury to conclude

that the Shamrock Murders related to the Gambino crime family because Vernace

set out to promote the Gambino crime familyʹs reputation (and in turn, his own)

when he participated in the murders of DʹAgnese and Godkin .  

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Nonetheless, Vernace contends that his case is indistinguishable

from United States v. Bruno, where we concluded that the evidence was

insufficient to prove that two shootings (which we characterized as ʺsimply

personal mattersʺ) were related to New York Cityʹs Genovese crime family.  383

F.3d at 85.  In Bruno, the defendant, a Genovese associate, recruited two of his

cousins (one of whom recruited another friend) to murder two other Genovese

associates.  We noted that ʺnone of the shooters was a made member of the

Genovese Family[,] nor were the Shootings themselves sanctioned by the family,ʺ 

and that it was ʺentirely reasonableʺ to conclude that the shootings were personal

matters related to the defendant owing the victims tens of thousands of dollars in

loansharking debts, the victimsʹ suspected role in previously setting the

defendant up to be robbed at a poker game, and the defendantʹs personal

animosity toward the victims.  Id. at 74 & n.1, 85.  We therefore concluded in

Bruno that the defendant committed the shootings for personal reasons unrelated

to the Genovese crime family.  Id. at 85.  Vernace asserts that, like the shootings in

Bruno, the Shamrock Murders stemmed from a personal dispute, none of the

participants was an inducted member, the murders were not sanctioned, Riccardi

obtained assistance from friends who were not in his crew, higher ups

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considered killing Riccardi for his involvement, and the participants laid low

after the murders.  

Vernace makes too much of the similarities between his case and

Bruno.  For one, where it was understandable in Bruno that the defendant would

violently retaliate for personal reasons against two individuals ‐‐ who sought to

collect tens of thousands of dollars of loansharking debts from him and who he

suspected had robbed him in the past ‐‐ the personal angle here is far weaker and

not one the jury was obliged to credit.  Further, even if the dispute at the

Shamrock Bar was initially personal, it grew to be much more.  For Vernace and

Barlin, the spilled drink was not entirely personal:  They were uninvolved; they

were not there.  We certainly did not hold in Bruno that a jury must find that all

predicate acts with a personal dimension are unrelated to a charged RICO

conspiracy.   

As to the other factual similarities with Bruno that Vernace draws on,

the jury could have rejected the weight that Vernace now assigns to that

evidence.  The fact that the three participants in the Shamrock Murders were

only Gambino associates and not inducted soldiers was not dispositive.  We look

at the criminal activities in which alleged participants in the racketeering

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enterprise engage, not merely the labels that the enterprise uses to describe them.  

See United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 289‐90 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that

ʺsignificant criminal activity engaged in on behalf of the Family by associatesʺ 

who were not ʺmade membersʺ could support RICO liability).  Likewise, the

evidence that the murders were not sanctioned by the Gambino crime family, the

family sought to discipline Riccardi, and Vernace went into hiding did not

preclude a finding that the murders were related to the familyʹs activities.  See

Bruno, 383 F.3d at 84 (holding that predicate acts need not be ʺin furtherance ofʺ 

the enterprise).  After all, Vernace was not punished for participating in the

Shamrock Murders ‐‐ he was, indeed, ultimately entrusted with ruling authority.

Accordingly, the evidence here was sufficient to support a

reasonable juryʹs conclusion that the Shamrock Murders were related to the

Gambino crime family.

C. Heroin Distribution

Vernace next argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to

find that between January 1981 and May 1981 he distributed or conspired to

distribute heroin or that such drug offenses related to the Gambino crime family.  

At trial, however, multiple witnesses testified that during this period ʺRon and

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Pepeʺ were supplying heroin.  E.g., App. at 321.  Testimony showed that Vernace

went by ʺPepe.ʺ  And a reasonable juror could have concluded that ʺRonʺ was

none other than Ronald Barlin, Vernaceʹs partner from the Shamrock Murders.  

In fact, as Barlin and others were being arrested for possession of heroin, Vernace

telephoned to check that everything was all right.  Vernaceʹs participation was

further shown by testimony that he asked a dealer (Gleckler) to start dealing

heroin.  A reasonable jury could have concluded on this evidence that Vernace

and his associates engaged in a heroin trafficking operation.

Vernace argues alternatively that any such activities were not related

to the Gambino crime family because the family did not sanction, and indeed

had rules against, drug dealing.  He insists that any such activities were merely

personal affairs.  Vernaceʹs challenge fails for much of the same reason that his

challenge to the Shamrock Murders failed.  We have consistently held that

predicate acts need not be ʺin furtherance ofʺ the racketeering enterprise to be

related.  E.g., Bruno, 383 F.3d at 84; Locascio, 6 F.3d at 943.  The Gambino crime

family could have, by its internal rules, discouraged drug dealing, and still, as a

factual matter, been engaged in it as part of its racketeering activities.  Indeed,

the jury heard evidence that this was the case here.  Witnesses testified that the

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Gambino crime family engaged widely in drug trafficking to generate money for

themselves.  The jury further heard that high‐ranking Gambino members

regularly distributed drugs, used other lower‐ranked members to distribute

drugs, or refused to enforce the so‐called rule against drug dealing.  It was

therefore reasonable to conclude that, despite a facial prohibition on drug

dealing, the Gambino crime family profited from it and Gambino members,

including Vernace, regularly participated in it.  Accordingly, a reasonable jury

could have concluded that Vernace distributed and conspired to distribute

heroin in relation to the Gambino crime family.1

II. Section 924 Conviction

Vernace next contends that he was convicted and sentenced under

the wrong version of § 924(c), as a consequence of which, he argues, the

mandatory minimum for his offense was increased and his sentence was

required to be served consecutively.  In 1981, when Vernace committed the

Shamrock Murders, § 924(c) provided that using or unlawfully carrying a

                                               1   We also reject Vernaceʹs two other, related contentions.  He argues that,

because the evidence was insufficient on the Shamrock Murders and heroin distribution

charges (1) there was prejudicial spillover into the additional charges and (2) the

evidence was also insufficient to support a § 924(c) conviction.  As described above,

however, the evidence sufficiently demonstrated Vernaceʹs participation in both the

murders and the drug crimes, and it was likewise sufficient to demonstrate that

Vernace discharged a weapon in the course of those murders.  

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firearm in relation to a felony was subject to imprisonment of not less than one

nor more than ten years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1976).  A sentence was not

required to be imposed consecutively.  See id.; see also United States v. Gaines, 594

F.2d 541, 545‐46 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Sudduth, 457 F.2d 1198, 1202 (10th

Cir. 1972).2

As relevant here, those provisions of § 924(c) were amended first in

1984 to provide for mandatory consecutive sentencing.  See Act of Oct. 12, 1984,

Pub. L. No. 98‐473, § 1005, 98 Stat. 1837, 2138‐39 (codified as amended at 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)).  In 1998, § 924(c) was amended once again to increase the

mandatory minimum from one to ten years.  See An Act to Throttle Criminal Use

of Guns, Pub. L. No. 105‐386, 112 Stat. 3469 (1998) (codified as amended at 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii)) (providing that any person who ʺuses or carries a

firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in

addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug

trafficking crime . . . if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of not less than 10 yearsʺ).   

                                               2   In 1981, § 924(c) provided in relevant part that ʺthe term of imprisonment

imposedʺ shall not ʺrun concurrently with any term of imprisonment imposed for the

commission of such felonyʺ only ʺ[i]n the case of [a] second or subsequent conviction

under [§ 924(c)].ʺ  There was no restriction on concurrent sentences for first convictions.    

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In the proceedings below, the more recently amended version of

§ 924(c) was applied.  Because Vernace never argued below that an earlier

version of § 924(c) should have been utilized, assuming there was error, we

review for plain error.  See United States v. Marcus, 628 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2010).  

We exercise our discretion to overturn a conviction only if (1) there is an error (2)

that is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable debate, (3) that was not

harmless (and thus affected the defendantʹs substantial rights), and (4) that

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.  See United States v. Nouri, 711 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2013).   

Here, even assuming there was error, Vernace does not meet the

criteria under a plain error standard.  First, the error was not clear or obvious.

The district court proceeded entirely based on the post‐1998 amended version of

§ 924(c).  The indictment referenced the newly added subsections; the district

court instructed the jury by reading this statutory language; the verdict sheet

included the newly added element of ʺdischarg[ing]ʺ the firearm, which the jury

then found; the Presentence Report relied on this version; and Vernace was

ultimately convicted under this provision.  Not once, however, did defense

counsel object to using the amended version of the statute.  Second, the error was

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harmless.  Vernace is serving a life sentence independent of his sentence on

Count Two, the § 924(c) count.  His Guidelines range was calculated, and his

term of life imprisonment was imposed, irrespective of which version of § 924(c)

applied.  Finally, we note that in his initial brief on appeal Vernace devotes only

one footnote to the sentencing issue ‐‐ and that footnote consists of only two

conclusory sentences.  Under all these circumstances, the error, assuming there

was error, did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

the proceedings.  Accordingly, we reject Vernaceʹs challenge to his § 924(c)

conviction.   

III. Newly Discovered Evidence   

Vernace finally contends that the Governmentʹs post‐trial revelation

about the cooperating witnessʹs violation of his cooperation agreement for

several years requires that Vernace be granted a new trial, as the newly

discovered evidence would have discredited this witnessʹs testimony.  We

disagree.  

We review a district courtʹs denial of a motion for a new trial based

on newly discovered evidence for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Rivas, 377

F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Persico, 645 F.3d 85, 109 (2d Cir. 2011)

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(commenting that ʺ[t]he motion is not favoredʺ (quoting United States v. Gilbert,

668 F.2d 94, 96 (2d Cir. 1981))).  District courts may grant a new trial if ʺ(1) the

evidence [is] newly discovered after trial; (2) facts are alleged from which the

court can infer due diligence on the part of the movant to obtain the evidence; (3)

the evidence is material; (4) the evidence is not merely cumulative or

impeaching; and (5) the evidence would likely result in an acquittal.ʺ  United

States v. Owen, 500 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2007).

There was no abuse of discretion here.  The trial testimony showed

that the cooperator was a member of New York Cityʹs Bonanno crime family

from the age of twelve until his incarceration decades later.  He testified as to

participating in crimes for the Bonanno crime family and with the Gambino

crime family.  Those crimes, as he acknowledged during direct and cross‐

examination, included illegal gambling, robbery, and dealing drugs.  More

seriously, he planned and committed a murder to ʺlevel[] [his] game upʺ; the

witness lured the victim to a social club and then shot him in the back of the

head.  App. at 644.  

The additional proposed evidence was merely cumulative or

impeachment evidence.  The fact that the witness violated his cooperation

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agreement by engaging in gambling once again could only have been used to

further discredit him.  In any event, the newly discovered evidence was

essentially more of the same, as the witness had testified to a long history of

illegal gambling through his association with the Bonanno crime family.  Further,

in view of his admission to a brutal murder, the new evidence that the witness

was again engaging in illegal gambling could not have added much to Vernaceʹs

attempt to attack the witnessʹs credibility.  We accordingly affirm the district

courtʹs denial of Vernaceʹs motion for a new trial.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.   

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