Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03102/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03102-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Army
Intervenor
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
Jose E. Rosario-Fabregas
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOSE E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2015-3102

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. NY-0752-13-0167-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 16, 2016

______________________ 

ROBERT J. GAJARSA, Latham & Watkins LLP, Washington, DC, argued for petitioner. Also represented by 

BRETT MATTHEW SANDFORD, Menlo Park, CA.

STEPHEN FUNG, Office of the General Counsel, Merit 

Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, argued for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

KRISTIN MCGRORY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

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2 ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB

Washington, DC, argued for intervenor. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD; JOHN KASBAR, U.S. Army Corps 

of Engineers, Jacksonville, FL. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, WALLACH, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HUGHES. 

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge DYK. 

HUGHES, Circuit Judge. 

Mr. Jose Rosario-Fabregas seeks review of a final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board dismissing 

his appeal for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that 

Mr. Rosario was not constructively suspended during his

four month absence from work. Because the Board’s

decision applied the correct legal standard to determine 

whether an employee has been constructively suspended 

and is supported by substantial evidence, we affirm. 

I 

Mr. Rosario served as a biologist and project manager 

for the Regulatory Division of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) until he was fired in February 2010. In 

November 2011, the Board determined that the termination violated Mr. Rosario’s due process rights and ordered 

his prompt restoration. This improper removal caused 

Mr. Rosario to suffer from depression, thus he voluntarily 

took sick leave to recover before resuming his duties. 

On May 7, 2012, Mr. Rosario submitted a letter from 

his physician, Dr. Juan Rodriguez-Velez, to his supervisor, Mr. Sindulfo Castillo, stating that his symptoms, 

which included severe anxiety, paranoia, chronic insomnia, marked irritability, frequent panic attacks, and 

aggressive episodes, were not improving. Dr. RodriguezVelez recommended either: (1) referring Mr. Rosario for 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 3

partial hospitalization; (2) relocating Mr. Rosario’s working area; or (3) providing reasonable accommodation for 

three months to evaluate whether Mr. Rosario was emotionally stable to continue working. 

One month later, Mr. Rosario submitted another letter to Mr. Castillo from Dr. Rodriguez-Velez, which recommended that Mr. Rosario return to work on July 2, 

2012, for 20–30 hours per week, because he had “started 

to advance emotionally.” J.A. 1279. The Corps viewed 

this letter as a request for reasonable accommodation of 

Mr. Rosario’s medical condition. Therefore, on June 14, 

2012, Mr. Castillo requested further information to clarify 

Mr. Rosario’s proposed accommodation, including the 

number of hours he wanted to work per week, his proposed schedule, and if he was requesting leave for the 

hours he was not working each week or if he was requesting to be switched to a part-time schedule. 

On June 25, 2012, Mr. Castillo reminded Mr. Rosario

to submit the information so that the Corps could continue processing his request for accommodation. Mr. Rosario 

replied that he would not be submitting the forms because 

he was going to return to work full time. 

The next day, Mr. Castillo informed Mr. Rosario that 

due to his symptomatology and the possibility of aggressive episodes, the Corps had a reasonable belief that he 

could not perform an essential job function and/or that he 

represented a direct safety threat to himself or his coworkers. Therefore, to return to duty on July 2, 2012, 

Mr. Rosario needed to provide a medical release from his 

physician addressing the history of his medical condition, 

his prognosis, including an estimated date of recovery,

and an explanation of the condition’s impact, including

any resultant medical restrictions and the reasons for 

them. Mr. Castillo also informed Mr. Rosario that he 

needed to request approved leave or risk being placed in 

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AWOL status until he provided the requested medical 

documentation. 

Mr. Rosario requested leave under protest. On July 

23, 2012, Mr. Rosario submitted a letter from 

Dr. Rodriguez-Velez, which recommended that 

Mr. Rosario apply for disability because his depression 

had returned. Mr. Rosario did not provide any other 

medical documentation and continued to request leave

under protest. On September 25, 2012, Mr. Castillo 

informed Mr. Rosario that he had not yet provided adequate medical documentation that would allow the agency 

to evaluate his request to return to work. 

On November 14, 2012, Mr. Rosario forwarded a report from Dr. Rodriguez-Velez which outlined his treatment regimen, and explained that Mr. Rosario could 

exercise necessary impulse control and perform his duties 

at an intermediate capacity, if in a structured and predictable environment. Dr. Rodriguez-Velez recommended 

that Mr. Rosario return to work beginning on November 

19, 2012 for 20–30 hours per week. 

On November 15, 2012, the Corps issued a “Revised 

Notice of Proposed Removal” based on the same charges 

that led to the first removal action in February 2010. 

Mr. Rosario was informed that he would be placed on 

administrative leave, beginning November 18, 2012,

pending a decision from the deciding official regarding the 

proposal. 

Mr. Rosario appealed, arguing that he was constructively suspended from July 2, 2012 until November 18, 

2012, when he was placed on administrative leave. The

Board, however, concluded that he was not constructively 

suspended and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 5

Mr. Rosario appeals. We have jurisdiction under 5 

U.S.C. §§ 7703(b)(1)(A), 7702(a)(1)(A), and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9). 

II

We may set aside a Board decision if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(c). Whether the Board had jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal is a question of law, which we review de

novo. Herman v. Dep’t of Justice, 193 F.3d 1375, 1378 

(Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Middleton v. Dep’t of Def., 185 F.3d 

1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)); Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995). This court is bound by 

the Board’s jurisdictional factual findings “unless those 

findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” 

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed.

Cir. 1998).

A 

The Board’s appellate jurisdiction is limited to agency 

actions over which it has been granted jurisdiction by law, 

rule, or regulation. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a). Appealable agency actions include removals and suspensions for more 

than 14 days. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7512, 7513(d). Additionally, 

this court has recognized that “seemingly voluntary 

actions in some circumstances may be considered adverse 

actions” over which the Board has jurisdiction. Garcia v. 

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 

2006) (en banc). Specifically, the Board has jurisdiction 

“if the employee proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his or her action] was involuntary and thus 

tantamount to [a forced enumerated adverse action].” Id.

at 1329 (alterations in original) (citing Shoaf v. Dep’t of 

Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 

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One such involuntary action that the Board has jurisdiction over is an appeal based on a “constructive suspension”—an involuntary absence from an agency for more 

than 14 days. Halloway v. U.S. Postal Serv., 993 F.2d 

219, 220–21 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (the dispositive inquiry for 

whether there has been a suspension for jurisdictional 

purposes is “whether the employee’s absence from the 

agency was voluntary or involuntary”). 

In the context of constructive resignations and retirements, the decision to retire or resign is presumed 

voluntary “and this presumption will prevail unless 

plaintiff comes forward with sufficient evidence to establish that the resignation [or retirement] was involuntarily 

extracted.” Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329. Claimants generally allege involuntariness by establishing that the resignation or retirement was the product of (1) misinformation 

or deception by the agency or (2) coercion by the agency. 

Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 1111, 1121 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013). This court has determined that the Board has 

jurisdiction over involuntary coercion claims if the employee first establishes that: “(1) the agency effectively 

imposed the terms of the employee’s resignation or retirement; (2) the employee had no realistic alternative but 

to resign or retire; and (3) the employee’s resignation or 

retirement was the result of improper acts by the agency.” 

Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (quoting Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 

1341). 

Here, Mr. Rosario alleges that his decision to take 

leave was involuntary due to coercion by the Corps. See

Pet. Br. 21 (“On behalf of the Corps, Mr. Castillo decided 

that [Mr. Rosario] could not perform the duties of his 

position because of his medical disabilities and forced him 

to use leave indefinitely . . . .”). Therefore, the Board 

required Mr. Rosario to demonstrate that his absence 

from work was involuntary by proving that: (1) he lacked 

a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it was the 

Corps’ wrongful actions that deprived him of that choice. 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 7

See Romero v. U.S. Postal Serv., 121 M.S.P.R. 606, 610 

(2014). Ultimately, the Board concluded that 

“[c]onsidering the appellant’s failure to engage in the 

interactive process with respect to his request for parttime work and his failure to provide documentation from 

his psychiatrist releasing him for full-time work . . . the 

agency did not act improperly in refusing to place the 

appellant back in a duty status.” J.A. 12. 

Mr. Rosario argues, however, that the Board’s requirements for establishing involuntariness erroneously 

conflated the merits determination (whether the Corps’ 

action was wrongful) with the jurisdictional question 

(whether Mr. Rosario’s absence was involuntary). See

Pet. Br. 21–23. We disagree. In the context of constructive action cases, whether an agency acted wrongfully is 

fundamental to determining jurisdiction because “[a]n 

action is not voluntary if it is produced by government 

conduct which is wrongful.” Roskos v. United States, 549 

F.2d 1386, 1389–90 (Ct. Cl. 1977). Moreover, the Board’s 

requirements for establishing jurisdiction in constructive 

suspension cases are directly in line with this court’s 

requirements for establishing jurisdiction in constructive 

retirement and resignation cases. Compare Romero, 121 

M.S.P.R. at 610 (requiring an employee to establish 

involuntariness by proving that the agency’s wrongful 

actions deprived him of a meaningful choice in the matter), with Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1329 (requiring an employee to establish involuntariness by proving, among other 

things, that the resignation or retirement was the result 

of improper acts by the agency). Therefore, the standard 

used by the Board to determine if Mr. Rosario’s absence 

from work was involuntary was appropriate. 

B 

Because we find the Board’s jurisdictional inquiry appropriate, Mr. Rosario’s petition for review must be denied if the Board’s decision is supported by substantial 

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8 ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB

evidence. J.A. 12; see Bolton, 154 F.3d at 1316; Hogan v. 

Dep’t of Navy, 218 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 

(“[T]his court will not overturn an agency decision if it is 

supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 

Mr. Rosario asserts that his absence from work from 

July 2, 2012 until November 18, 2012, was involuntary—

i.e., he lacked a meaningful choice in the matter. Even 

assuming that assertion is correct, for Mr. Rosario to 

prevail, he must also show that his absence was involuntary because it was caused by improper agency action. 

See Romero, 121 M.S.P.R. at 610. 

When an employee voluntarily takes leave, an agency 

may properly refuse to allow the employee to resume 

working if the employee does not satisfy the agency’s 

conditions for returning to work. Id. at 610 n.2 (“[W]hile 

the agency’s refusal to allow the appellant to return to 

work is the immediate cause of his absence, the proximate 

cause is arguably his failure to meet the conditions of the 

agency’s ‘clearance to return to work’ policy.”). In those 

circumstances, the agency’s refusal to allow the employee 

to return to work does not amount to a constructive 

suspension. 

Here, Mr. Rosario took voluntary leave to recover 

from depression. When Mr. Rosario was able to resume

working, the Corps conditioned his return on the provision of a medical release in which his physician addressed 

the history of his medical condition, his prognosis, including estimated date of recovery, and an explanation of the 

impact of the medical condition, including any resultant 

medical restrictions and the reasons for them.1 J.A. 1291. 

1 We offer no conclusion as to whether the Corps’ 

conditions for returning to work violate the Americans 

 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 9

Mr. Rosario did not provide the Corps with the requested 

medical release and thus failed to comply with the Corps’ 

conditions for returning to work. Accordingly, substantial 

evidence supports the Board’s finding that the Corps did 

not act improperly by refusing to allow Mr. Rosario to 

return to work. Because the Corps did not act improperly 

in refusing to allow Mr. Rosario to return to work, his 

absence was not involuntary and thus he was not constructively suspended. 

III

Because the Board applied the correct standard for

determining whether an employee has been constructively 

suspended and substantial evidence supports the finding 

that the Corps did not act improperly in refusing to allow 

Mr. Rosario to return to work, Mr. Rosario was not constructively suspended. Therefore, we affirm the Board’s 

decision dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED

No costs. 

with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, as jurisdiction for 

those claims lie with the Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission, 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1), or the appropriate 

United States District Court, 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2). 

 

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United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

JOSE E. ROSARIO-FABREGAS,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,

Intervenor

______________________ 

2015-3102

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. NY-0752-13-0167-I-1.

______________________ 

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The majority in this case affirms the Board’s dismissal of Mr. Rosario’s case for lack of jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the panel majority, the Board, the agency, and the 

petitioner himself view the case as involving an alleged

constructive suspension—that is, a purportedly voluntary 

act that is, in fact, involuntary. In my view this is not a 

true constructive suspension case in which an employee’s 

facially voluntary leave is, in fact, coerced and involuntary. Instead, under our court’s precedent, Mr. Rosario’s 

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2 ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB

absence is properly viewed as a facially involuntary

suspension over which the Board has jurisdiction. 

It is undisputed that in June of 2012, Mr. Rosario contacted his supervisor at the Corps, Mr. Castillo, asking to 

return from sick leave on July 2, 2012. Mr. Castillo 

refused to permit him to return to work absent medical 

documentation establishing that Mr. Rosario was able to 

perform his job safely and capably. As the majority 

opinion describes, “[w]hen Mr. Rosario was able to resume 

working, the Corps conditioned his return on the provision of a medical release in which his physician addressed 

the history of his medical condition, his prognosis, including estimated date of recovery, and an explanation of the 

impact of the medical condition, including any resultant 

medical restrictions and the reasons for them.” Maj. Op. 

at 8. Between July 2 and November 18, 2012, the employee asked to work, and the agency prevented him.1 

This case is governed by Pittman v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 832 F.2d 598 (Fed. Cir. 1987). There, 

we reviewed the Army’s decision to place an employee “on 

enforced leave after determining that it could no longer 

retain him on a light-duty position and that it had no 

other position which he was physically capable of performing within his medical restrictions.” Id. at 599. We 

held that this enforced leave constituted an appealable 

suspension of more than 14 days.2 Id. at 600. 

1 After the agency refused to let him return, Mr. 

Rosario chose to use leave rather than risk being placed 

in AWOL status. But that does not transform his facially 

involuntary suspension into a voluntary one. 

2 Although the statute defines a “suspension” as 

“the placing of an employee, for disciplinary reasons, in a 

temporary status without duties and pay,” 5 U.S.C. 

 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 3

“[I]ndefinite enforced leave is tantamount to depriving the 

worker of his job—without any review other than by the 

agency—until the agency itself changes its mind and 

decides that he can perform his job.” Id. 

As in Pittman, Mr. Rosario’s leave was “a suspension 

for more than 14 days.” 5 U.S.C. § 7512(2). Under 

§ 7513(d), “[a]n employee against whom an action is taken 

under this section is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems Protection Board under section 7701 of this title.” 5 

U.S.C. § 7513(d). We held in Garcia that “jurisdiction 

under § 7512 is established if and when a claimant shows 

that he or she is, in fact, a covered employee as required 

by the statute and that the agency took one of the enumerated actions in § 7512 against the claimant.” Garcia 

v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (Fed. 

Cir. 2006) (en banc). Mr. Rosario has met this burden. 

A constructive suspension, by contrast, exists when 

an employee’s facially voluntary leave is, in fact, coerced 

and involuntary. “A constructive adverse action arises 

when an agency’s conduct leaves an employee no alternative but for the employee, involuntarily, to impose the 

adverse action on himself or herself.” Id. at 1324. The 

MSPB has previously distinguished an enforced leave 

from a true constructive suspension. In Abbott v. United 

States Postal Service, the Board reviewed Pittman and 

noted that “an agency’s placement of an employee on 

§ 7501(2) (emphasis added), Pittman held that enforced 

leaves qualify, because such suspensions “are ‘disciplinary’ in the broader sense of maintaining the orderly 

working of the Government against possible disruption by 

the suspended employee,” 832 F.2d at 599 (quoting 

Thomas v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 756 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 

1985)). 

 

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enforced leave for more than 14 days constitutes an 

appealable suspension within the Board’s jurisdiction.” 

121 M.S.P.R. 294, 298 (M.S.P.B. 2014) (citing Pittman, 

832 F.2d at 599–600). Abbott held that “suspensions 

under these circumstances are not ‘constructive,’ and the 

case law concerning constructive suspensions is inapplicable.” Id. This is a meaningful distinction, as the petitioner in a non-constructive suspension case does not need 

to clear the additional jurisdictional hurdle of proving the 

involuntariness of his absence from work. Mr. Rosario’s 

claim is not a constructive suspension claim because he 

was barred from returning to work by the agency. 

The Board’s decision does not mention Pittman, and 

its appeal brief dismisses the decision in passing, noting 

that “what the petitioner has alleged in this matter” is a 

constructive suspension, not an enforced leave suspension. Resp’t’s Br. at 24 n.3. While Mr. Rosario framed his 

petition and now frames his appeal in terms of constructive suspension, we cannot, because of that error, apply 

an incorrect jurisdictional framework. Indeed, it is well 

established that we are obliged to decide jurisdictional 

questions without regard to a petitioner’s erroneous 

positions on jurisdictional issues. “[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only 

of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in 

a cause under review . . . .” Bender v. Williamsport Area 

Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). “When a requirement goes to 

subject-matter jurisdiction, courts are obligated to consider sua sponte issues that the parties have disclaimed or 

have not presented. Subject-matter jurisdiction can never 

be waived or forfeited.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 

641, 648 (2012) (internal citation omitted); see also 14D 

Charles Alan Wright et al., Fed. Practice & Procedure

§ 3801 (4th ed. 2013) (“Subject matter jurisdiction . . . 

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ROSARIO-FABREGAS v. MSPB 5

cannot be waived by the parties.”). “The Board has jurisdiction to determine whether a resignation was voluntary 

or involuntary because it has jurisdiction to determine its 

jurisdiction, as do its AJ’s.” Cruz v. Dep’t of the Navy, 934 

F.2d 1240, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (en banc). 

To be sure, the agency may have been justified in refusing to permit Mr. Rosario to return to work. An agency 

with reasonable concerns should have the authority to 

require a long-absent employee to submit documentation

of fitness to work as a condition of return. But the propriety of an agency’s decision to bar an employee from work 

for failure to submit medical documentation is a merits 

question, not a jurisdictional one. I would reverse the 

MSPB’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and remand with 

instructions to consider the merits of Mr. Rosario’s claim. 

I respectfully dissent. 

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