Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cr-01468/USCOURTS-azd-4_19-cr-01468-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sergio Guerrero
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

v. 

Sergio Guerrero,

Defendant.

No. CR-19-01468-001-TUC-CKJ (MSA)

REPORT AND 

RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant Sergio Guerrero’s motion to suppress 

evidence obtained during an unlawful detention. (Doc. 21.) The Government has filed a 

response, and an evidentiary hearing was held on February 4, 2020. (Docs. 23, 29.) For 

the reasons that follow, the Court will recommend that the motion be granted.

Background1

On April 17, 2019, at 3:22 p.m., State Trooper Christopher Amick initiated a traffic 

stop of a vehicle traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 through Marana, Arizona. (Tr. 6–8.) 

Defendant was the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle, a Dodge Journey (a sport utility 

vehicle) bearing Arizona state license plates. (Id. at 9–10; Pl.’s Ex. 3.) Trooper Amick 

approached the front passenger window of Defendant’s vehicle and observed two 1,000-

round boxes of ammunition in the rear cargo area. (Tr. 10–11.)

Trooper Amick informed Defendant that he had been stopped for illegal window 

tint and requested Defendant’s driver’s license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance. 

1 The following statement of facts is taken from testimony and documents presented 

at the evidentiary hearing.

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(Id. at 13.) In addition to the registration, Defendant provided his Arizona driver’s license, 

which listed his home address in Tucson, Arizona.

2

 (Id. at 13, 34.) At Trooper Amick’s 

request, Defendant waited near the passenger side of the patrol car while Trooper Amick 

ran checks and completed the paperwork for the stop. (Id. at 14–15.) While completing 

the paperwork, Trooper Amick inquired about Defendant’s travels. (Id. at 17.) Defendant 

responded that he was returning to Tucson after visiting his mother in Phoenix for a few 

hours. (Id. at 17, 39–40.)

Trooper Amick returned Defendant’s documents and issued Defendant a warning 

citation, which Defendant signed. (Id. at 18.) At that point, according to Trooper Amick, 

Defendant was free to leave. (Id. at 19.) Trooper Amick did not tell Defendant he was free 

to leave or say anything else that might imply that state of events (e.g., “have a good day”). 

(Id. at 37.) Trooper Amick waited until Defendant started moving away, then asked if 

Defendant was willing to answer some additional questions. (Id. at 19, 53.) Defendant 

agreed. (Id. at 19.) In response to Trooper Amick’s questions, Defendant stated that he 

was transporting approximately 20,000 rounds of ammunition. (Id. at 20.) Trooper Amick 

then obtained Defendant’s verbal and written consent to a search of the vehicle. (Id. at 20–

21; Pl.’s Ex. 2.) During the search, Trooper Amick found 20,000 rounds of rifle and 

handgun ammunition. (Tr. 25.)

Based on the large amount of ammunition, Trooper Amick believed he had 

reasonable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in the smuggling of ammunition into 

Mexico. (Id. at 26.) Trooper Amick handcuffed Defendant and notified him that he was 

being detained. (Id. at 25–26.) Trooper Amick then called Special Agent Jacob Boisselle 

of Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) and notified Agent Boisselle of the search 

results. (Id. at 28.) The phone call was made at approximately 3:40 p.m. (Id. at 42.)

Accompanied by another agent, Agent Boisselle left his office in Tucson and 

traveled to the scene, arriving between 4:10 p.m. and 4:20 p.m. (Id. at 58, 61.) There, he 

2 Defendant initially told Trooper Amick that the vehicle belonged to his sister, 

“Jacqueline.” (Tr. 14.) Defendant quickly corrected himself, stating that his sister’s name 

is “Martha.” (Id.) Trooper Amick did not find the misstatement unusual or suspicious. 

(Id. at 51–52.)

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obtained a Mirandized confession from Defendant that the ammunition was being 

transported to Nogales, Arizona, to then be smuggled into Mexico. (Id. at 64; see Doc. 1.) 

During the 30- to 40-minute wait for Agent Boisselle, Defendant stood handcuffed on the 

roadside. (Tr. 43–45.) Trooper Amick did not question Defendant about the ammunition

during this period. (Id. at 30.)

Discussion

These facts implicate three issues: (1) whether Trooper Amick prolonged the traffic 

stop unlawfully; (2) if the prolonged stop was lawful, whether Trooper Amick had 

reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant after the vehicle search; and (3) if Trooper Amick 

had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant, whether that detention transformed into a de 

facto arrest for which probable cause was required.

I. Prolongation of the Traffic Stop

Defendant contends that that Trooper Amick unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop. 

He argues that, at the conclusion of the traffic stop, no reasonable person would have felt 

free to leave after Trooper Amick requested consent to questioning. The Government 

argues that Defendant was in fact free to leave, and that the prolonged encounter was 

consensual. The Court agrees with the Government.

“A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation.” 

Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). However,

traffic stops can last only as long as is reasonably necessary to carry out the 

“mission” of the stop, unless police have an independent reason to detain the 

motorist longer. The “mission” of a stop includes “determining whether to 

issue a traffic ticket” and “checking the driver’s license, determining whether 

there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the 

automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” A stop that is 

unreasonably prolonged beyond the time needed to perform these tasks 

ordinarily violates the Constitution.

United States v. Gorman, 859 F.3d 706, 714 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 

at 355).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that “a traffic stop may be extended 

to conduct an investigation into matters other than the original traffic violation only if the 

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officers have reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.” United States v. Landeros, 

913 F.3d 862, 867 (9th Cir. 2019) (emphasis added) (citing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357–

58). Other courts have held that a traffic stop may alternatively be prolonged based on 

voluntary consent. See, e.g., United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 805 (4th Cir. 2019) 

(“A police officer can extend the duration of a routine traffic stop only if the driver gives 

consent or if there is reasonable suspicion that an illegal activity is occurring.”). The Court 

agrees that consent is an independent basis for extending a traffic stop. See Florida v. 

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (stating that consensual encounters do not violate the 

Fourth Amendment).

Here, there is no question that Trooper Amick lacked reasonable suspicion to 

prolong the traffic stop. “Reasonable suspicion ‘exists when an officer is aware of specific, 

articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a 

basis for particularized suspicion.’” Landeros, 913 F.3d at 868 (emphasis in original) 

(quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en 

banc)). At the conclusion of the traffic stop, Trooper Amick had observed only two 1,000-

round boxes of ammunition, which are legal to possess. Although Trooper Amick’s 

observation aroused his suspicions, the two boxes of ammunition by themselves do not 

support a particularized inference that Defendant was engaged in illegal activity.

The Government contends, however, that Defendant voluntarily consented to 

further interaction with Trooper Amick. “No Fourth Amendment seizure occurs when a 

law enforcement officer merely identifies himself and poses questions to a person if the 

person is willing to listen.” United States v. Washington, 490 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 2007). 

However, “the police [must] not convey a message that compliance with their requests is 

required.” Id. (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435). Whether a consent was voluntary or the 

product of coercion “is to be determined by the totality of all the circumstances and is a 

matter which the Government has the burden of proving.” United States v. Mendenhall, 

446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 227 

(1973)).

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The Government has met its burden in this case. Trooper Amick testified that he 

asks for consent only after there is a clear ending to the traffic stop, usually when the 

motorist starts to leave. (Tr. 53–54.) In this case, although he could not recall specifically 

what action Defendant took to leave, he was sure that Defendant either backed away or 

turned and started walking away. (Id. at 54–55.) The Court agrees with Defendant that 

the circumstances were fairly coercive—Defendant was removed from his vehicle for a 

minor window-tint violation and made to stand next to the patrol car, and Trooper Amick 

said nothing indicating that Defendant was free to leave—but the evidence indicates that 

Defendant attempted to leave despite these circumstances. Therefore, the traffic stop was 

not unlawfully prolonged, but rather became a consensual encounter.

II. Reasonable Suspicion for the Detention

The Government concedes that Trooper Amick seized Defendant by handcuffing 

him after the vehicle search. Defendant contends that this detention was unlawful, as it 

was not supported by reasonable suspicion. The Government disagrees, arguing that the 

ammunition alone gave Trooper Amick reasonable suspicion. The Court agrees with 

Defendant.

As noted above, “[r]easonable suspicion ‘exists when an officer is aware of specific, 

articulable facts which, when considered with objective and reasonable inferences, form a 

basis for particularized suspicion.’” Landeros, 913 F.3d at 868 (emphasis in original) 

(quoting Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1129). This determination turns on “the totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the stop, including ‘both the content of information 

possessed by police and its degree of reliability.’” United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150, 

1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 308 (9th Cir. 2016)).

Although relevant, the fact that Defendant was traveling eastbound on Interstate 10 

is of only minimal significance. Interstate 10 is undoubtedly utilized by smugglers. 

Nevertheless, it cannot be overlooked that Interstate 10 connects Phoenix and Tucson,

Arizona’s two largest cities. Presumably, most of the traffic between these two cities is 

lawful. See United States v. Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir. 2002)

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(presuming that most of the traffic on Highway 86 is lawful, despite its reputation as an 

alien-smuggling route, because it connects various cities to Interstate 10). The significance 

of the route and direction of travel is further lowered by the fact that Defendant was stopped 

passing through Marana, which is just north of Tucson. Given that Defendant’s driver’s 

license listed an address in Tucson, Defendant’s assertion that he was traveling home was 

more than plausible.

The Government rightly treats the amount of ammunition as the strongest evidence 

of criminal activity. Trooper Amick stated that he rarely encounters large amounts of 

ammunition, and that large amounts are indicative of smuggling activities. (Tr. 46, 48.) 

However, the significance of the ammunition is diminished by two circumstances. First, 

ammunition is a legal commodity and it is lawful to carry 20,000 rounds of ammunition in 

Arizona. (Id. at 39); see Brown, 925 F.3d at 1153 (observing that it was “presumptively 

lawful in Washington” to carry a gun). Second, prior to the search, Defendant freely told 

Trooper Amick that he was carrying that amount of ammunition. Trooper Amick did not 

say that Defendant reacted nervously to the question, or that Defendant tried to avoid

answering it in any way. (Tr. 20.) Defendant’s demeanor was perfectly consistent with 

lawful behavior.

The Court finds that Trooper Amick did not have reasonable suspicion. The only 

factor holding more than minimal weight is the ammunition. However, in view of its 

legality and the fact that Defendant readily reported it, the ammunition did not give rise to 

an objective and reasonable inference that crime was afoot. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 

27 (1968) (explaining that a mere hunch is insufficient). This remains true when the 

ammunition is considered with the other factors, none of which particularly bolster the

level of suspicion. The detention was consequently unlawful.

III. De Facto Arrest3

Defendant contends that the duration and character of his detention transformed the 

detention into a de facto arrest for which probable cause was lacking. The Government 

3 To reach this issue, the Court assumes that Trooper Amick had reasonable suspicion 

to detain Defendant.

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responds that Trooper Amick and Agent Boisselle diligently pursued the investigation at 

all times and that the overall length of the detention was reasonable. However, because 

the evidence presented shows that Defendant was detained for an extended period of time 

during which Trooper Amick made no attempt to “confirm or dispel” his suspicions, United 

States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985), the Court finds that the seizure exceeded the 

bounds of a lawful investigatory stop and became an arrest. The Court also finds that the 

arrest was not supported by probable cause.

There is no bright-line rule for determining whether and when an investigatory stop 

turns into a de facto arrest. Id. at 685. This is a case-specific determination that turns on

the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Edwards, 761 F.3d 977, 981 (9th Cir. 

2014). In considering the circumstances, courts “evaluat[e] not only how intrusive the stop 

was, but also whether the methods used were reasonable given the specific 

circumstances.’” United States v. Rousseau, 257 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis 

in original) (quoting Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996)). “[A]n 

investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 

the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least 

intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short 

period of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).

Following the search, Trooper Amick detained Defendant for further investigation 

of a possible ammunitions-smuggling offense. (Tr. 26, 44.) The Government contends 

this detention was reasonable. It emphasizes that Trooper Amick was quick to call Agent 

Boisselle, and that Agent Boisselle immediately left for the scene of the traffic stop. 

However, the threshold inquiry is not whether Trooper Amick and Agent Boisselle were 

diligent in performing these activities. It is whether, in calling and waiting for Agent 

Boisselle, Trooper Amick used the “least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or 

dispel” his suspicions of ammunitions smuggling. Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

The answer is no. The testimony reflects that Trooper Amick made no attempt to 

verify or dispel his suspicions. In fact, he stated that his failure to investigate was 

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intentional:

Q: So what happened during the approximately 40 minutes that you were 

waiting for Special Agent Boisselle to arrive, where are you, where is Mr. 

Guerrero?

A: Yes ma’am. He’s standing by the front passenger’s side tire of my car 

and I’d note again nothing but courteous young man. I’m not asking 

questions about any sort of investigation because I understand he’s been 

detained and we’re just standing there waiting.

(Tr. 29–30 (emphasis added).)

There was another obvious, less-intrusive means of investigation reasonably

available to Trooper Amick: He could have questioned Defendant himself. Trooper Amick 

did not lack the experience necessary to question Defendant about ammunitions 

smuggling—a straightforward offense which Trooper Amick accurately described. (Tr. 

26.) He testified that his “mission” is to interdict contraband (illegal drugs, weapons, and 

ammunition) being transported on interstate highways, and he knows from experience that 

large amounts of ammunition are indicative of ammunitions smuggling. (Id. at 20, 26.) 

He has confirmed in the past that seized ammunition was being smuggled into Mexico. 

(Id. at 46–47.) Additionally, Defendant was not combative or otherwise uncooperative, 

such that a one-on-one interview would have been difficult or unreasonable. To the 

contrary, Trooper Amick emphasized that Defendant was “100 percent cooperative and 

very courteous the entire time.” (Id. at 20, 26.)

The Court is cognizant that it must refrain from “unrealistic second-guessing” of

police conduct. Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. However, these circumstances show that Trooper 

Amick had the experience and means to investigate Defendant in a more expeditious way. 

Instead, Trooper Amick suspended the investigation and forced Defendant to stand on the 

roadside, in handcuffs, for 30 to 40 minutes. Given the reasonableness of the alternative, 

this was far more intrusive than necessary. See id. at 687 (“The question is not simply 

whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably 

in failing to recognize or to pursue it.”). Consequently, the Court finds that the detention 

became a de facto arrest for which probable cause was required.

It must be observed that Trooper Amick was simply following his training. (Tr. 27.)

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Pursuant to an informal understanding between HSI and the Department of Public Safety, 

state troopers who find weapons or ammunition are trained to contact HSI’s smuggling 

task force. (Id. at 57.) However, although cooperation between law enforcement agencies 

is desirable, such informal understandings have no effect on the limits the Constitution sets 

for investigatory detentions. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 632 (2003) (per curiam)

(sheriff’s department’s routine practice of transporting suspects in handcuffs was irrelevant 

to the objective determination whether transportation of defendant in handcuffs constituted 

an arrest). Here, the detention of Defendant was not made reasonable merely because it 

was a result of Trooper Amick following his training. Trooper Amick had a constitutional 

duty to investigate diligently. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500; Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. As 

explained above, he did not do so.

This finding should not be construed as a broader statement that officers can never 

wait for assistance. There are undoubtedly situations where an officer will need to detain 

a suspect until help arrives. See, e.g., Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 679, 687 n.5 (holding that an

officer reasonably detained a motorist while awaiting the arrival of a federal agent, where 

reasonable suspicion for the stop was based on the agent’s, not the officer’s, observations);

Rousseau, 257 F.3d at 927–30 (holding that an officer reasonably detained two suspects at 

gunpoint until other officers arrived, where one suspect was known to be armed and 

dangerous). These situations involve circumstances that make delay necessary. See 

Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (stating courts “should take care to consider whether the police are 

acting in a swiftly developing situation”). There were no such circumstances in this case.

The delay was not necessitated by a “swiftly developing situation,” but rather by HSI’s 

preference that it be called into certain traffic stops. By the time of the phone call, Trooper 

Amick had initiated the stop, obtained consent to questioning and a search, and found a 

large amount of ammunition, all with the complete cooperation of Defendant. There was 

no reason to discontinue what had been a successful investigation up to that point.

Having found that Defendant was arrested, the question becomes whether the arrest 

was supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists if “under the totality of 

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circumstances known to the arresting officers, a prudent person would have concluded that 

there was a fair probability that the defendant had committed a crime.” United States v. 

Price, 921 F.3d 777, 790 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Beier v. City of Lewiston, 354 F.3d 1058, 

1065 (9th Cir. 2004)). “The analysis involves both facts and law. The facts are those that 

were known to the officer at the time of the arrest. The law is the criminal statute to which 

those facts apply.” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting 

Rosenbaum v. Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam)).

The facts are that, at approximately 3:30 p.m., Defendant was traveling eastbound 

on Interstate 10 with 20,000 rounds of ammunition in his vehicle. Defendant was stopped 

north of Tucson, where he lives, and he stated that he was returning to Tucson from 

Phoenix, where he had visited his mother for a few hours. Taking all relevant facts into 

account, the Court finds that no reasonable officer could believe there was a fair probability 

that Defendant was committing, or had committed, a criminal offense.

As noted above, the direction of travel and notoriety of the route are only minimally 

probative. There are hundreds (if not thousands) of motorists each day who travel the same 

direction on the same road; most of that traffic is lawful. See Sigmond-Ballesteros, 285 

F.3d at 1124. Moreover, Defendant had a plausible explanation for his travels—he was 

heading home after spending a few hours in Phoenix. See District of Columbia v. Wesby, 

138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) (requiring courts to consider the plausibility of explanations for 

suspicious conduct). The 20,000 rounds of ammunition are more probative. However,

ammunition is a legal commodity. And although it may be suspicious to travel with 20,000 

rounds of ammunition, that activity by itself is presumptively legal. (Tr. 39); see Harper 

v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “even strong reason 

to suspect” criminal activity is not enough to establish probable cause). Conspicuously 

absent here is any information suggesting that Defendant was doing something besides

lawfully transporting the ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 554(a) (criminalizing the 

transportation of merchandise with knowledge that such merchandise will be illegally 

exported from the United States).

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The Court cannot agree that the police may arrest any person who carries 20,000 

rounds of ammunition on Interstate 10 towards Tucson. Therefore, the Court finds that 

Trooper Amick lacked probable cause for the arrest.

IV. Remedy

Soon after Agent Boisselle’s arrival, Defendant confessed that he was transporting 

the ammunition to Nogales, Arizona so that another individual could smuggle it into 

Mexico. (Tr. 64.) The confession must be suppressed unless it was “an act of free will 

[sufficient] to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.” Wong Sun v. United 

States, 371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). Factors relevant to determining whether a confession 

was an act of free will include the giving of Miranda warnings, “[t]he temporal proximity 

of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, 

particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Brown v. Illinois, 422 

U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975) (internal citations and footnotes omitted). Miranda warnings 

alone, however, are insufficient to break the causal connection between an illegal arrest 

and a confession. Id. at 602–03. The Government bears the burden of showing the 

admissibility of a confession that was preceded by an illegal arrest. Id. at 604.

The Government has not met its burden, as it has offered no analysis of the foregoing 

factors. Moreover, the factors weigh in favor of suppression. Defendant gave his 

confession within two hours of his illegal arrest. See id. (finding temporal proximity 

favored defendant where statements were given less than two hours after the illegal arrest). 

There were no intervening circumstances; he was not released from custody, nor did he 

appear before a judge or consult with an attorney. See United States v. Washington, 387 

F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that these circumstances tend “to distance the 

suspect from the coercive effects of temporally proximate constitutional violations”). 

Finally, the detention had a quality of purposefulness about it, in that there was no reason 

why Trooper Amick could not himself have questioned Defendant. See United States v. 

Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1290–91 (9th Cir. 1979) (reaching the same conclusion on 

similar facts).

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Agent Boisselle did advise Defendant of his Miranda rights. (Tr. 67.) However, 

this factor alone does not outweigh the remaining factors. Brown, 422 U.S. at 602–03. 

Therefore, the Court concludes that Defendant’s confession must be suppressed.

Conclusion

The Court finds that although Trooper Amick obtained voluntary consent to prolong 

the encounter, he lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant. Alternatively, if 

Trooper Amick had reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant, the Court finds that the 

detention of Defendant transformed into a de facto arrest for which probable cause was 

lacking. Therefore,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the motion to suppress (Doc. 21) be granted and 

that any statements made to law enforcement after the illegal detention be suppressed.

The parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of this recommendation 

to file specific written objections with the District Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 6, 72. The parties shall have fourteen days to respond to any objections.

Dated this 19th day of February, 2020.

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