Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00658/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00658-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clifton Jerome Rogers
Plaintiff
Verizon Wireless Corp.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Clifton Rogers initiated this action by filing a complaint on May 11, 2016, asserting that 

Verizon Wireless company unlawfully had him arrested, confiscated his cell phone and retaliated 

against him for complaining about the defendant’s improper billing scheme. (Doc. 1)

As discussed below, because Verizon Wireless is not a state actor within the meaning of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, the Court finds Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and 

leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, it is recommended that Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 

forma pauperis be DENIED and the matter be DISMISSED without prejudice.

I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

As a general rule, all parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a United States 

District Court must pay a filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the Court may authorize the 

commencement of an action “without prepayment of fees and costs of security therefor, by a person 

who submits an affidavit that . . . the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor.” 28 

CLIFTON JEROME ROGERS,

 Plaintiff,

v.

VERIZON WIRELESS CORP,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:16-cv-00658 DAD JLT 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO PROCEED 

IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND DISMISSING THE 

MATTER WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Therefore, an action may proceed despite a failure to prepay the filing fee only if 

leave to proceed in forma pauperis is granted by the Court. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1178, 

1177 (9th Cir. 1999). 

The Ninth Circuit has held “permission to proceed in forma pauperis is itself a matter of 

privilege and not a right; denial of an informa pauperis status does not violate the applicant’s right to 

due process.” Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1231 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Weller v. Dickson, 314 

F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963)). In addition, the Court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion to 

proceed IFP. O’Loughlin v. Doe, 920 F.2d 614, 616 (9th Cir. 1990); Weller, 314 F.2d at 600-01. In 

making a determination, the court “must be careful to avoid construing the statute so narrowly that a 

litigant is presented with a Hobson’s choice between eschewing a potentially meritorious claim or 

foregoing life’s plain necessities.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F.Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984).

Here, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis be DENIED

because, as discussed below, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

II. Screening Requirement

When a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the Court is required to review the complaint, and 

shall dismiss the case at any time if the Court determines that the allegation of poverty is untrue, or the 

action or appeal is “frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . 

seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). A 

claim is frivolous “when the facts alleged arise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 

whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton v. Hernandez, 

504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

III. Pleading Standards

General rules for pleading complaints are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A 

pleading stating a claim for relief must include a statement affirming the court’s jurisdiction, “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief; and . . . a demand for the relief 

sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

The Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, and pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent 

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standards” than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521-21 (1972).

A complaint must give fair notice and state the elements of the plaintiff’s claim in a plain and 

succinct manner. Jones v. Cmty Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Further, a 

plaintiff must identify the grounds upon which the complaint stands. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 

U.S. 506, 512 (2002). The Supreme Court noted,

Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers 

labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will 

not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 

factual enhancement.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Conclusory and vague allegations do not support a cause of action. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 

266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). The Court clarified further,

[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” [Citation]. A claim has facial plausibility when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. [Citation]. The plausibility 

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. [Citation]. Where a complaint pleads 

facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line 

between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). When factual allegations are well plead, a court should 

assume their truth and determine whether the facts would make the plaintiff entitled to relief; legal 

conclusions in the pleading are not entitled to the same assumption of truth. Id. 

The Court has a duty to dismiss a case at any time it determines an action fails to state a claim, 

“notwithstanding any filing fee that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915e(2). Accordingly, a court 

“may act on its own initiative to note the inadequacy of a complaint and dismiss it for failure to state a 

claim.” See Wong v. Bell, 642 F.2d 359, 361 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure, § 1357 at 593 (1963)). However, leave to amend a complaint may be granted 

to the extent deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by an amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

IV. Discussion and Analysis

Plaintiff asserts his right against cruel and unusual punishment was violated by Verizon 

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Wireless who, on April 10, 2016 “had [him] falsely imprisoned” by “blatantly lieing to Bakersfield 

Police officers in their citizen’s arrest report” and for refusing to call an ambulance after Plaintiff 

report to store staff that his blood pressure was elevated. (Doc. 1 at 3) Plaintiff also claims that 

Verizon has been deprived him of “free and ready access to the courts system” because defendant 

confiscated his cell phone. Id. at 5. Plaintiff claims that this precludes him from making telephonic 

court appearances in Monterey County. Id. Finally, Plaintiff claims Verizon “severly denigrated” his 

due process rights by retaliating against him for complaining that Verizon attempting to “charge him 

double for his phone bill.” Id. at 6. For these claims, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $4.5 

million.

Title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code “is a method for vindicating federal rights 

elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). Thus, an individual may bring an 

action for the deprivation of civil rights pursuant to section 1983, which states in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 

any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the 

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 

proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff must allege facts from which it may be inferred (1) he was deprived of a 

federal right, and (2) a person or entity who committed the alleged violation acted under color of state 

law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Williams v. Gorton, 529 F.2d 668, 670 (9th Cir. 1976). 

Plaintiff’s complaint concern actions taken by Verizon Wireless. This company is not a state 

actor for purposes of Section 1983. Thus, though Plaintiff may be able to state claims against this 

defendant, he may not do so under the United States Constitution nor may he bring these claims in 

federal court.

V. Findings and Recommendations

Because Verizon Wireless did not act under color of state law as to the claims raised by 

Plaintiff, he is unable to state a claim for a violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. 

Consequently, leave to amend to amend would be futile. Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (dismissal of a pro 

se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper where it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on 

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the facts alleged). 

Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED:

1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be DENIED;

2. The matter be DISMISSED without prejudice; 

3. The remaining motion be terminated as moot; and

4. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close the action.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned 

to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local Rules of 

Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with the 

Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 

Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2016 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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