Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04335/USCOURTS-ca4-23-04335-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathan Marcus McCall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4335

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JONATHAN MARCUS MCCALL,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at 

Spartanburg. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (7:18-cr-00039-BHH-1)

Submitted: November 30, 2023 Decided: January 17, 2024

Before KING and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. Leesa Washington, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF 

THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Jonathan Marcus McCall pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to 

distribute and to distribute cocaine base, cocaine, and heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 846, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime and aiding and 

abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c)(1)(A). The district court sentenced McCall 

to 157 months’ imprisonment, followed by a five-year term of supervised release, and he 

now appeals. 

On appeal, McCall asserts that the district court erred by including in the written 

judgment conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced at sentencing. 

The Government moves to dismiss the appeal as barred by the appellate waiver contained 

in McCall’s plea agreement. Rather than contesting the validity of the waiver, McCall 

contends that his argument on appeal falls outside the waiver’s scope. For the following 

reasons, we deny the Government’s motion but affirm the criminal judgment. 

“[I]n order to sentence a defendant to a non-mandatory condition of supervised 

release, the sentencing court must include that condition in its oral pronouncement of a 

defendant’s sentence in open court.” United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345 

(4th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 296 (4th Cir. 2020)). A valid 

appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from asserting a Rogers claim. See Singletary, 

984 F.3d at 345. Thus, the waiver in McCall’s plea agreement does not bar review of the 

issue he raises on appeal, and we therefore deny the Government’s motion to dismiss the 

appeal.

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Turning to the merits, we review McCall’s claim of Rogers error de novo. See 

United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022). As is relevant here, a district 

court may “satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary conditions through 

incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all [Sentencing] Guidelines ‘standard’ 

conditions when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those 

conditions in the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299. 

McCall contends that the district court failed to orally announce or incorporate the 

13 standard conditions of supervised release listed in the criminal judgment. Our holding 

in Cisson forecloses this claim. In Cisson, the district court stated at sentencing “that it 

would impose the ‘mandatory and standard conditions’ of supervised release.” 33 F.4th at 

194 (emphasis omitted). We observed that the District of South Carolina has no standing 

order listing supervised release conditions that differ from the standard conditions in the 

Guidelines. Id.; see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5D1.3(c), p.s. (2023). “Thus, 

there [wa]s no other set of ‘standard’ conditions to which the court could have been 

referring other than the Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions.” Cisson, 33 F.4th at 194. 

Because there were no other standard conditions of supervision to which the district court 

could have been referring in this case, and McCall’s judgment does not impose any 

additional discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not incorporated in the 

court’s oral pronouncement, we conclude that the district court sufficiently pronounced the 

standard conditions of supervision. See id. 

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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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