Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03199/USCOURTS-caDC-93-03199-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shannon O. Pinnick
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 1, 1994 Decided February 14, 1995

No. 93-3199

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

SHANNON O. PINNICK; A/K/A SCOTT A. BISHOP,

APPELLANT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the District of Columbia

Cr. No. 92-0418-01

Leigh A. Kenny, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the

brief was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Richard L. Chamovitz, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him

on the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman

and Roger L. Kemp, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before BUCKLEY, RANDOLPH and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Appellant Shannon O. Pinnick pled guilty to one count of a four-count

indictment for fraud and received a twenty-one month sentence. He now claims that the district court

erred when it considered the conduct alleged in the other three counts as "relevant conduct" under

section 1B1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines and when it failed to state its reasons for

refusing hisrequest for a downward departure. The district court did not err in treating the first two

counts as relevant conduct and its refusal to depart, under the circumstances of this case, is not

reviewable. But because the conduct underlying count three of the indictment does not qualify as

relevant conduct, we vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

I.

Mr. Pinnick was indicted on four counts of fraud in a single indictment. Count one alleged

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that on October 1, 1992, under the alias Scott Bishop, he presented a counterfeit check for

approximately $19,000 to open an account at a brokerage firm. Count two alleged that on the day

before, using the same alias, he used another counterfeit check drawn on the same fictitious account

to purchase an $18,000 car. Both counts alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a) (1988). Count

three alleged that two months earlieron August 6, 1992appellant violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1029 &

2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) by using the names James Douglas and Scott Bishop to file a fraudulent

application for a credit card account over the Prodigy computer network and by making purchases

of almost $5,000 using that account during the following month. Count four charged that on

December 28 and 29, 1992, appellant, claiming to be a Mr. Agbebaku, cashed five counterfeit checks

totalling $6,000 drawn on Mr. Agbebaku's account at Riggs NationalBank in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1344 (1988).

Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to count four of the indictment and the

government dismissed the first three counts. At his plea colloquy, appellant admitted all of the

allegationsin count four. He also admitted using the aliases "Agbebaku" and "Bishop," but made no

otherstatementsregarding the offenses alleged in the other three counts. The district court accepted

his plea and ordered a presentence investigation.

The presentence report recommended that the court consider counts one, two, and three as

relevant conduct undersection 1B1.3(a)(2) ofthe Sentencing Guidelines because the countsinvolved

the "same course of conduct" as the offense of conviction. See United States Sentencing

Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.3(a)(2) (Nov. 1992) (Guidelines). This recommendation

increased the value of the loss used to determine the appellant's guideline range from $6,000 to

$48,000, increasing his base offense level from level 11 to level 13. In addition, because appellant

was on probation for another offense at the time of the credit card fraud alleged in count three,

treating that count as relevant conduct added two pointsto his criminal history score, placing him in

criminal history category III rather than category II.

Both in a letter to the probation officer who prepared the report and at the sentencing hearing,

defense counsel objected to the use of counts one, two and three as relevant conduct. The

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government submitted no additional evidence. Relying entirely on the presentence report, the

government argued that all four counts involved fraud, were similar in nature, and were part of the

same crime spree.

The district court found that the allegationsin the three dismissed counts qualified asrelevant

conduct, and therefore ruled that appellant's base offense level was 13 and that his criminal history

was categoryIII. Defense counsel asked for a downward departure based upon the abuse and neglect

appellant suffered as a child, noting that the presentence report identified these circumstances as

factors whichmight warrant a departure under the Guidelines. Without commenting on the departure

request, and without objection by defense counsel, the court sentenced appellant to twenty-one

months in prison, the midpoint of the indicated guideline range. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table.

On appeal, Mr. Pinnick argues that the district court should not have treated the three

dismissed counts as relevant conduct. He argues that the government failed to prove that he

committed the actsin the three dismissed counts, and that the court erred in finding that the dismissed

counts were "part of the same course of conduct" as the offense of conviction. He also seeks a

remand so that the district court can explain its reasons for refusing to depart.

II.

In order to treat the dismissed counts as relevant conduct, the district court had to find that

the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that appellant committed those acts. See

United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991). We review the district court's

finding on this issue for clear error. United States v. Foster, 19 F.3d 1452, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Under most circumstances, a sentencing court may rely on undisputed facts in a presentence

report to conclude that the defendant committed any extraneous acts offered as relevant conduct.

See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1994). As the First Circuit has observed, a

defendant's "failure to contest the facts" leaves "little doubt the[ ] acts occurred." See United States

v. Ramirez, 11 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But even

if the defendant does not object, a sentencing court commits "obvious error" by relying on the

presentence report if itsfindings are "internally contradictory, wildly implausible, or in direct conflict

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with evidence that the sentencing court heard at trial." See Saro, 24 F.3d at 291. Because the report

in this case contains no such flaws, it was, if undisputed, sufficient to support a finding that appellant

committed the other offenses. The district court erred, then, only if defense counsel's objections to

the presentence report specifically challenged its factual assertions.

Inherletterto the probation officer and at the sentencing hearing, defense counselstrenuously

objected to the use of the dismissed counts as relevant conduct, arguing that "they are not the same

course of conduct [or] part of a common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction" and that those

counts are "substantially different in a number of respects from what Mr. Pinnick pled guilty to in

count four." Transcript of Sentence, Oct. 27, 1993, Appendix at 35 & 37. She also argued that the

government had not satisfied its burden of proof, stating: 

What is in the presentence report is not enough. There has got to be something to

convince the court that the offenses actually occurred and Mr. Pinnick committed

them. So, again, it is a preponderance of the evidence. He admitted fully the conduct

alleged in the offense of conviction. He made no statement with regard to the

conduct alleged in counts one, two, and three during the guilty plea colloquy.

Id. at 40.

These objections were not enough to place the report's description of the dismissed counts

in dispute. Counsel's argument that the presentence report alone could not meet the government's

burden of proof did not challenge the accuracy or reliability of any factual assertion regarding the first

three counts. She did not contend, for example, that the report misstated the amount of loss

attributable to the other counts, or even that appellant did not commit the acts. Her argument that

the acts described in the report do not qualify as relevant conduct likewise did not dispute a factual

assertion. Objecting to a presentence report's legal conclusion, as counsel did here, does not suffice

to dispute the factual assertions on which that conclusion rests. See, e.g., United States v. Flores,

9 F.3d 54, 56 (8th Cir. 1993).

Checking the box on the acknowledgement form indicating that there were "material factual

inaccuracies" in the report was also not enough to dispute the report's description of the dismissed

counts. SeeReceipt andAcknowledgement ofPresentence InvestigationReport, Oct. 12, 1993, Brief

and Record Material for Appellee, Section B. That form directed appellant to note the "paragraph

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and page" of any alleged inaccuracies. Id. Although the letter accompanying the form objected to

some factual assertionsin the report, none ofthe objectionsrelated to the description ofthe first three

counts. For example, the letter noted that "on page 2 of the aliases portion, Mr. Pinnick admits only

to using the first four names you have listed," and "on page 12 in ¶ 48, Mr. Pinnick notes that after

graduating from high school he obtained an apartment with a roommate in New Jersey." Letter from

Counsel to U.S. Probation Office, Oct. 14, 1993, at 2, Brief and Record Material for Appellee,

Section B. This is precisely the type of clear and specific objection required to place a factual

assertion in dispute. Had the letter made any similarly specific objections to the portion of the report

describing the three dismissed counts, this might be a different case. See, e.g., United States v.

Morton, 957 F.2d 577, 578-79 (8th Cir. 1992).

The record in this case is clear. The presentence report thoroughly described the conduct and

investigations that led to each dismissed count. Appellant had a full opportunity to object, yet failed

to challenge any of these factual assertions. Under these circumstances, the district court did not err

in finding, based solely on the presentence report, that appellant committed the acts in the dismissed

counts by a preponderance of the evidence.

III.

We turn next to appellant's related claim that the district court erred in finding that the

dismissed counts qualify as relevant conduct under section 1B1.3(a)(2) of the Guidelines. A

sentencing court's determination that particular conduct is related to the offense of conviction is a

factual question that we review for clear error. United States v. Jones, 948 F.2d 732, 737 n.11 (D.C.

Cir. 1991).

For most offenses, the Guidelines require the sentencing court to consider only conduct

intrinsic to the offense of conviction in determining the defendant's guideline range. The court may

consider conduct related to other offenses when selecting the specific sentence within that range. See

United States v. Wood, 924 F.2d 399, 403 (1st Cir. 1991). For fraud and certain other offenses,

however, the Guidelines provide a limited exception to this approach. Under section 1B1.3(a)(2),

conduct which is part of a "common scheme or plan" or part of the "same course of conduct" as the

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offense ofconvictionqualifies as "relevant conduct" and is considered when determining the indicated

guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

The presentence report in this case said nothing about a "common scheme or plan," but

concluded that the dismissed counts were part of the "same course of conduct" as appellant's offense

of conviction. Although the district court's views are not entirely clear, we assume from its

statements at the sentencing hearing that it relied on the presentence report and based its relevant

conduct conclusion on a finding that the dismissed counts were part ofthe "same course of conduct."

See Transcript of Sentence, Appendix at 43. Extraneous offenses qualify as part of the same course

of conduct if "they are sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion

that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2),

comment. (n.9(B)). The sentencing court must evaluate and balance several factors, including "the

degree ofsimilarity of the offenses and the time interval between the offenses." Id. Also relevant are

the "nature of the offenses" and whether the offenses can "readily be broken into discrete, identifiable

units that are meaningful for purposes ofsentencing." Id. comment. (n. 9(B)) & backg'd. No single

factor in thisfact-based inquiry is dispositive. The absence of one factor requires a stronger presence

of at least one of the other factors. The inquiry focuses on whether the defendant "repeats the same

type of criminal activity over time" and "engage[s] in an identifiable behavior pattern of specified

criminal activity." United States v. Perdomo, 927 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1991) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).

Where the defendant's offense of conviction and the acts offered as relevant conduct could

be "separately identified" and were of a different "nature," we have found that the conduct was not

part of the same course of conduct. See United States v. Jones, 948 F. 2d 732, 737-38 (D.C. Cir.

1991); accord United States v. Hahn, 960 F.2d 903, 909, 911 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.

White, 888 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1989). In Jones, the defendant was convicted of stealing bank

statements from the mail and using the information to access the accounts. We held that an alleged

embezzlement from his employer that occurred over a year earlier was not part of the same course

of conduct. See Jones, 948 F.2d at 738.

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Applying these principles, we hold that the district court'srelevant conduct finding regarding

the first two countsis not clearly erroneous. In each of the acts associated with counts one, two, and

four, appellant, using an alias, presented a counterfeit check to obtain either cash, or, in count two,

an automobile. The offenses involved similar instrumentscounterfeit checksand a similar

methodusing an aliasalbeit a different aliasin count four (Agbebaku) than in counts one and two

(Bishop). It is true that the conduct in counts one and two preceded that in count four by three

months, and that the acts are separately identifiable. Counts one and two are, however, more similar

in nature and closer in time to appellant's offense of conviction than the embezzlement count was to

the mail fraud conviction in Jones. In this case, the district court could reasonably conclude that

these acts demonstrate that appellant "repeat[ed] the same type of criminal activity over time" and

"engaged in an identifiable behavior pattern of specified criminal activity." See Perdomo, 927 F.2d

at 115 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

We do not agree, however, that the credit card fraud alleged in count three constitutes part

of the same course of conduct as count four, the offense of conviction. Unlike counts one, two, and

four, count three did not involve counterfeit checks. Like the embezzlement count in Jones, count

three is both separately identifiable from count four and of a different nature. That counts three and

four both involved fraud to obtain money is not enough. While substantial similarities exist between

count three and counts one and twothey all involved the same alias and occurred within two

monthsthe government must demonstrate a connection between count three and the offense of

conviction, not between count three and the other offenses offered as relevant conduct. The credit

card fraud in count three is thus not part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction.

The district court committed clear error in treating it as relevant conduct.

Removing count three fromconsideration asrelevant conduct does not affect appellant's base

offense level. It remains at level 13. See U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(1). But because appellant was on

probation at the time of the credit card fraud, excluding count three removes two points from his

criminal history score, placing him in criminal history category II instead of category III. See

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). Eliminating count three as relevant conduct thus reduces appellant's indicated

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guideline range from 18-24 monthsto 15-21 months. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table. Accordingly,

we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.

IV.

In hisfinal claim, appellant challengesthe district court's denial of hisrequest for a downward

departure under policy statement 5H1.3 of the Guidelines based upon the abuse and neglect that he

suffered as a child. Whether the district court's refusal to depart is reviewable here depends upon the

reason for its decision. A sentencing court's refusal is reviewable, we have held, if it rests on a

"misconstruction of its authority to depart." United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir.

1991). A court's discretionary decision that the particular circumstances of a given case do not

warrant a departure, however, is not reviewable. See United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776, 780

(D.C. Cir. 1991). 

We do not know why the district court refused to depart, since it imposed sentence without

commenting on the departure request. Appellant now argues that because the court may have denied

his request under the allegedly mistaken belief that it lacked the authority to depart, we should

remand the case so that the district court can explain itsreasoning. But the appellant, not us, has the

initialresponsibilityto ensure that the district court explainsitsreasoning for the record, and appellant

neglected that responsibility when he failed to object to the district court's ruling. Under these

circumstances, we assume "that the district court kn[ew] and applie[d] the law correctly," see United

States v. Garcia-Garcia, 927 F.2d 489, 491 (9th Cir. 1991), and that, as appellant argues, it had the

authority to depart, but exercised its discretion and decided not to do so here. This issue is thus not

reviewable in this court. We therefore deny appellant's request for a remand without deciding

whether the Guidelines permit a departure for extreme abuse and neglect during the defendant's

childhood.

V.

For the foregoing reasons we affirm the district court's finding that counts one and two are

relevant conduct and do not reach appellant's challenge to the district court's refusal to depart. But

because we find its inclusion of count three as relevant conduct clearly erroneous, we vacate the

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sentence and remand for resentencing.

So ordered.

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