Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01618/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01618-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cesar Castro-Higuero
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1618

___________

United States of America, * 

* 

Appellee, * 

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Minnesota.

Cesar Castro-Higuero, * 

* 

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2006

Filed: January 16, 2007

___________

Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Cesar Castro-Higuero was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to distribute and

possession with intent to distribute in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana and aiding

and abetting possession with intent to distribute approximately 250 kilograms of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), 846 and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2. The district court1

 sentenced Castro-Higuero to 60 months' imprisonment, the

mandatory minimum sentence for the offenses. Castro-Higuero appeals, challenging

the admission of his post-arrest statements and the sufficiency of the evidence.

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The record contains an audio recording of the interrogation as well as a

transcript of the interrogation. The recording was transcribed by a federally certified

Spanish interpreter. The transcript contains both a verbatim transcript of everything

said on the tape and the English translation of every Spanish-language utterance. The

excerpts contained in this opinion only recite the English translations.

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Alternatively, he seeks reversal of the denial of his motion for new trial due to an

alleged prejudicial statement by the court in the presence of the jury. Finally, CastroHiguero contests the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences. For the

reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I. Background

Castro-Higuero and six codefendants were arrested in a warehouse in

Minnesota as they unloaded approximately 500 pounds of marijuana from a secret

compartment in a tractor-trailer. Law enforcement surveillance cameras recorded

Castro-Higuero helping others unload the marijuana from the truck. An undercover

agent and a confidential informant present at the scene witnessed Castro-Higuero

unloading the drugs, and a body wire worn by the undercover agent recorded the

audio events in the warehouse. Castro-Higuero was arrested and taken to the county

detention center for questioning. 

Special Agent Robert Nance of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal

Apprehension, the undercover agent that witnessed Castro-Higuero unloading the

marijuana, interrogated him around 3:15 a.m., approximately one hour after CastroHiguero's arrest. Because Castro-Higuero spoke limited English, Agent Nance

obtained a Spanish interpreter to translate the interrogation. Nance advised CastroHiguero of his Miranda rights as follows:2

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"AN" represents Agent Nance, "I" represents the interpreter, and "C-H"

represents Castro-Higuero.

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AN3

: So, maybe if you could just tell him that I'm gonna go ahead and

read the Miranda Warning, and if you could translate. He has a

hard time, uh, understanding, uh, English.

I: Sure.

AN: Okay. Uh, Cesar, you have the right to remain silent.

I: Sir, um, we're going to read you you're rights, it's the Miranda

Warning, warning you Miranda. Sir, you have the right to remain

silent.

C-H: Okay.

AN: Anything you say can and will be used against you in court.

I: Anything you say can be used against you.

AN: You have the right to talk to a lawr—lawyer now, and have the

lawyer present now, or at any time, uh, during questioning.

I: You can have, um, a lawyer present during your questioning.

AN: Okay. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you

without cost.

I: If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be assigned to you.

AN: Cesar, do you understand each of these rights as I have explained

them to you?

I: Uh—oh, um, sir, do you understand the—each of the rights as

they have been explained to you?

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C-H: Yes.

. . . .

After this exchange, Castro-Higuero was asked if he wanted to talk to Agent

Nance or at least listen to what Agent Nance had to say. The interpretation of this

question confused Castro-Higuero, who then asked, "[Y]ou mean, I can talk? Or, or

should I keep quiet till [sic] another time?" Agent Nance then reiterated the Miranda

rights, which the interpreter relayed to Castro-Higuero as follows:

AN: [I]f you could just tell him again what the Miranda Warning

entailed, uh he does have the right to remain silent. Um, anything

he says can and will be used against him in court. Um, he does

have the right to talk to a lawyer now, and have the lawyer present

at any time, um, certainly those rights, or he can just listen to what

I um, have to offer him maybe, if he doesn't have to answer any

questions, if he wants to just listen, I can explain to him where

we're gonna go from now.

I: [W]hat was just read to you regarding your rights is that it was

explained to you that you can and have every right to remain silent

if you wish. It was also explained to you that if you wish, um, you

can simply request that a lawyer be with you for any type of

information or for any conversation you want to establish. In the

event that you can pay for one you can request one your own or if

not then one will be assigned to you, but the officer wants to know

if you, that you'd like to discuss with him his opinion, what he and

what he has to, you know, talk to you about, and discuss, you

know, options. It's up to you to talk or not talk to him, to share or

not share with him whatever it is that you're thinking, I mean that's

your right, wanting to talk to him or not wanting to talk to him and

just listening and in the end it's up to you.

C-H: Okay.

I: That's why he's asking if you're, um, willing to talk to him.

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C-H: Okay, yes, I do want to say some things.

. . .

Castro-Higuero subsequently made incriminating statements to Agent Nance

about his involvement in the delivery of the marijuana. During the interrogation,

Agent Nance was unarmed and dressed in plain clothes. Castro-Higuero was not

handcuffed. Agent Nance testified that Castro-Higuero cooperated fully, spoke freely

throughout the questioning, and answered every question asked. Castro-Higuero never

requested an attorney or asked that the questioning cease.

During the interrogation, Castro-Higuero explained his involvement in the drug

delivery. According to Castro-Higuero, he initially agreed to help one of his

codefendants drive a tractor-trailer from California to Wisconsin, believing the tractortrailer contained only powdered milk. However, several hundred miles into the trip,

the codefendant informed Castro-Higuero that the trailer contained a hidden cache of

marijuana to be delivered to Minnesota. Castro-Higuero admitted that he could have

chosen not to participate in the drug delivery. He agreed to do so, however, because

he was promised extra money if he helped deliver the drugs.

Before trial, Castro-Higuero moved to suppress his incriminating statements.

The district court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and denied

Castro-Higuero's motion to suppress. Accordingly, the post-arrest statements were

admitted into evidence. At trial, Castro-Higuero testified at length, admitting that he

helped deliver and unload the marijuana but also asserting that he did not know the

tractor-trailer contained marijuana until well into the trip. Castro-Higuero's trial

testimony was consistent with his post-arrest statements to Agent Nance.

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At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:

Nothing that I have said or done during the course of this trial is intended

in any way to somehow suggest to you what I think your verdict should

be. Nothing said in these instructions and nothing in any form of verdict

prepared for your convenience is to suggest or convey to you in any way

or manner any intimation as to what verdict I think you should return.

What the verdict shall be is the exclusive duty and responsibility of the

jury. 

The court then attempted to dismiss the alternate juror, stating:

[Juror], you're the alternate; sorry about that. All of you have been

paying such close attention that I feel terrible having to let you go. Do

you have somebody's name or somebody that could call you about the

verdict and you could discuss whether you would have agreed with it or

not? If you want to do that, or eventually we'll tell you what the verdict

was; that will take a while. Whatever you want to do is fine. You can go

now; you're excused. Remember all of the cautions I've been giving you

until such time you know what the verdict is.

The court then realized that it had accidentally attempted to dismiss the wrong

juror. The court instructed the first juror to remain for deliberations and dismissed the

actual alternate juror, stating:

[Alternate], remember what I just said, make sure you keep things to

yourself. Thank you very much; appreciate you're [sic] being here. We'll

let you know exactly what's happened. Frankly, I send a little letter out

with a sentence. You'll get a note from me if you don't get some other

indication. (Emphasis added).

Castro-Higuero did not object or otherwise bring to the court's attention the

allegedly prejudicial nature of this comment. The jury subsequently found CastroAppellate Case: 06-1618 Page: 6 Date Filed: 01/16/2007 Entry ID: 3267701
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Higuero guilty on both counts. The court then sentenced Castro-Higuero to the

mandatory minimum of 60 months' imprisonment.

II. Discussion

On appeal, Castro-Higuero contends that his post-arrest statements should have

been suppressed because the translated Miranda warnings he was given were

ambiguous and confusing. He also argues that insufficient evidence supports the jury's

guilty verdict and alleges that an improper, prejudicial statement by the court in the

presence of the jury caused a miscarriage of justice. Finally, Castro-Higuero contests

the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences.

A. Motion to Suppress

Castro-Higuero argues that the translated Miranda warnings he was given were

ambiguous and confusing and thus his Miranda waiver was not knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary. Accordingly, he contends that the court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the statements.

When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we reverse the

court's factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Jones, 275

F.3d 673, 678 (8th Cir. 2001). But, the ultimate determination of whether waiver

occurred is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Caldwell, 954

F.2d 496, 504 (8th Cir. 1992). "We will affirm the district court's denial of a motion

to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based on an

erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is clear

that a mistake was made." Jones, 275 F.3d at 678–79.

For a defendant to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,

his waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436, 444 (1966). A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is "made with a full

awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the

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decision to abandon it." United States v. Syslo, 303 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir. 2002). It

is voluntary if it is "the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than

intimidation, coercion, or deception." Id. "To determine whether a waiver or a

confession was voluntary, a court looks at the totality of the circumstances and must

determine whether the individual's will was overborne." Id. at 866. "A court must

examine both 'the conduct of the law enforcement officials and the capacity of the

suspect to resist pressure to confess.'" Id. (quoting United States v. McClinton, 982

F.2d 278, 282 (8th Cir. 1992)).

Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Castro-Higuero validly

waived his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Castro-Higuero was informed of

his rights through an interpreter and answered that he understood his rights. CastroHiguero understood the interpretation well enough to seek clarification of one of

Agent Nance's questions. Agent Nance asked the interpreter to clarify and reiterate the

rights to Castro-Higuero and proceeded only after receiving assurance from CastroHiguero that he understood. Castro-Higuero then stated that he "want[ed] to say some

things." Also, Agent Nance, unarmed and in plain clothes throughout the interview,

questioned Castro-Higuero without handcuffs and without loud or intimidating

speech. Castro-Higuero's will was not overborne, nor was he intimidated, coerced, or

deceived into waiving his rights.

Castro-Higuero's argument that he did not know the full extent of his rights

because the interpreter only informed him that anything he said could be used against

him, instead of informing him that anything he said could be used against him in

court, is also without merit. See Evans v. Swenson, 455 F.2d 291, 295 (8th Cir. 1972)

(holding that warnings complied with Miranda requirements where the defendant was

informed of his rights, including warning that "any statement you do make can be

used against you").

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Appellant also argues that his waiver was insufficient because of deceptive

tactics used by Agent Nance during the interview. These alleged deceptive tactics

were the time—3:15 a.m., the use of an over-the-phone interpreter, and the ambiguous

choice given appellant of speaking or listening. This argument is without merit. We

have previously held that early morning/late night interrogations are not in themselves

coercive. See United States v. Jordan, 150 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that

the fact that the police approached the defendant at 3:00 a.m. did not render

confession involuntary); United States v. Pierce, 152 F.3d 808, 813 (8th Cir. 1998)

(finding that interrogation beginning at 4:26 a.m., following 2:57 a.m. arrest, was not

coercive). Additionally, the mere fact that the interpreter translated over the phone had

no effect on the sufficiency of the waiver, as Castro-Higuero could communicate

effectively through the interpreter and adequately understand what was being said. See

United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 1506, 1510 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[W]hen a

defendant is advised of his rights in his native tongue and claims to understand such

rights, a valid waiver may be effectuated.").

Finally, the allegedly confusing and ambiguous instruction to Castro-Higuero

did not invalidate his waiver. Castro-Higuero was informed of his right to remain

silent, and he clearly affirmed that he understood this right. Castro-Higuero then stated

that he "want[ed] to say some things." As the district court noted, there was no

"indication that he intended to remain silent or that such intentions were ignored." The

totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Castro-Higuero was aware of his rights

and knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived them. Thus, the district court did

not err in denying Castro-Higuero's motion to suppress.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Castro-Higuero contends that the evidence against him was insufficient to

convict him. In reviewing a jury verdict for sufficient evidence, we view the evidence

in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept all reasonable inferences drawn

from the evidence that support the jury's verdict. United States v. Frauendorfer, 428

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F.3d 1115, 1118 (8th Cir. 2005). We will reverse on the basis of insufficient evidence

only if no reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id.

Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we hold

that substantial evidence supports the jury's verdict. Castro-Higuero admitted, both in

statements to Agent Nance and in his testimony at trial, that he continued to drive the

tractor-trailer with knowledge that drugs were hidden inside and willingly participated

in the delivery and unloading of the drugs. Furthermore, Castro-Higuero

acknowledged that he had opportunities to withdraw from involvement in the drug

deal but agreed to participate on the promise of more money. Additionally, the

government produced video-surveillance footage of Castro-Higuero unloading drugs

from the truck. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the government,

a reasonable jury could have found Castro-Higuero guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 768–69 (8th Cir. 2006).

C. Motion for New Trial

Castro-Higuero also asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion

for new trial. He contends that the court's statement to an excused alternate juror using

the term "a sentence" rather than "a verdict," as it had in its prior statement, was

prejudicial and amounted to a miscarriage of justice. The court made the statement just

before the jury began its deliberations. However, Castro-Higuero did not

contemporaneously object or otherwise call the court's attention to the allegedly

prejudicial nature of its comment. Castro-Higuero argues that this statement implied

bias on behalf of the court towards conviction. Following the jury's verdict, CastroHiguero moved the court for a new trial based on this allegedly prejudicial statement.

The court denied the motion for new trial, finding that the statement did not result in

a miscarriage of justice because any prejudicial effect of the statement had been

mitigated by the court's other statements to the jury and because the court had

maintained an otherwise neutral role throughout the trial.

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We will reverse a district court's denial of a motion for new trial only if the

district court abused its discretion. Rottlund Co. v. Pinnacle Corp., 452 F.3d 726, 731

(8th Cir. 2006). "We have always been reluctant to disturb a judgment of conviction

'by reason of a few isolated, allegedly prejudicial comments of a trial judge.'" United

States v. Lueth, 807 F.2d 719, 727 (8th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States v. Bland,

697 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir.1983)). In determining whether the comments of a trial

judge require reversal, "[o]ur task is to balance and weigh the comments of the judge

against the overall fairness of the trial." Lueth, 807 F.2d at 727 (citing United States

v. Singer, 710 F.2d 431, 436 (8th Cir.1983); Bland, 697 F.2d at 265).

In this case, the court's comment about "a sentence" made to the alternate juror

in dismissing the alternate was the only alleged prejudicial statement made by the

court during the three-day trial. Although this statement was a mistake and should

have been clarified, weighing the single comment against an otherwise fair and

impartial adjudication, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the motion for new trial.

The potential prejudice of the statement is sufficiently mitigated when placed

in the context of the court's other statements to the jury. Prior to addressing the actual

alternate juror, the court accurately told the person that it believed to be the alternate

juror "we'll tell you what the verdict was." Likewise, in another instruction, the court

told the jury as a whole:

Nothing that I have said or done during the course of this trial is intended

in any way to somehow suggest to you what I think your verdict should

be. . . . What the verdict shall be is the exclusive duty and responsibility

of the jury. 

In light of the overall neutrality displayed by the court, the one improper

statement—not objected to—did not result in a miscarriage of justice, and the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion.

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D. Mandatory Minimum Sentences

Lastly, Castro-Higuero argues that United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

(2005) made mandatory minimum sentences unconstitutional. Our court has rejected

this argument. United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 846 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding

that Booker does not render statutory minimum sentences unconstitutional). We,

therefore, need not address it.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court.

______________________________

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