Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_24-cv-06095/USCOURTS-arwd-6_24-cv-06095-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeff Bailey
Plaintiff
Jennifer E. Corley
Defendant
Derek Scott Finkbeiner
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

JEFF BAILEY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:24-cv-06095 

 

DEREK SCOTT FINKBEINER, et al DEFENDANTS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Jennifer E. Corley (“Corley”), Motion to Dismiss. ECF 

No. 14. Plaintiff has responded to the Motion. ECF No. 19-21. Pursuant to the provisions of 

28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief United States District 

Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making this Report and 

Recommendation. 

I. Background: 

This is an action filed by Plaintiff alleging defamation and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

ECF No. 1. Plaintiff proceeds pro se. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Derek Scott Finkbeiner 

(“Finkbeiner”) and Corley maintained a Facebook page named Hot Spring County Crime Watch.

Id. Finkbeiner, who is Sheriff of Hot Spring County, Arkansas is the administrator of the page 

and Corley, who is a Justice of the Peace in Hot Spring, County, Arkansas serves as moderator. 

Id. Plaintiff alleges this Facebook page is a public forum and, among other things, provides 

updates on accomplishments of the Sheriff’s office and arrest information. Id.

Plaintiff alleges posts he made to this Facebook page were deleted and he was blocked 

from being able to make posts in violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. Plaintiff also

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alleges a defamation claim based on a post which was made to this Facebook page that was false 

and largely inaccurate. Id. Defendant Corley brings this Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) and 

argues there is no mention of any government policy, practice, law, or act that gives rise to "acting 

under color of law" sufficient to support Plaintiff’s claim of civil rights violations under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Id. Further, Corley argues she is a private individual and should not be considered an 

agent acting under color of law. Id. Corley also argues this court should not exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law defamation claim. Id. 

II. Applicable Law: 

A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must 

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twonbly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint’s factual allegations are 

assumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, “even if it strikes a savvy 

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. The Court, 

however, need not “blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts.” 

Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 14486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). 

The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S.). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

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alleged.” Id. “Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976), they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims 

advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004).

III. Discussion: 

 1. First Amendment

Plaintiff alleges posts he made to the Hot Spring County Crime Watch Facebook page were 

deleted and he was blocked from being able to make posts in violation of his First Amendment 

rights. Plaintiff claims Corley acted under color of state law when she participated in blocking 

and deleting posts Plaintiff made on this Facebook page, because the page was a virtual public 

forum. 

At this early stage of the litigation and with only the facts in the Complaint before it, the 

Court knows very little about how this Facebook page in question was operated. If 

the Facebook page is a personal Facebook page which occasionally provided updates on County 

business, then this page would not likely bear enough indicia of an official state-run account to 

satisfy § 1983’s color-of-state-law requirement under clearly established Eighth Circuit law. 

In Campbell v. Reisch, 986 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2021) a Missouri state senator was found not to have 

acted under color of state law when she blocked a constituent from a Twitter page that she had 

created to announce her candidacy for office. The Reisch court observed that a personal social 

media page is not transformed into a public forum simply because the owner of the page holds 

public office. Just being a public official is not enough because “acts that public officials take in 

‘the ambit of their personal pursuits’ do not trigger § 1983 liability.” Id. at 824 (quoting Magee v. 

Trs. of Hamline Univ., 747 F.3d 532, 535 (8th Cir. 2014)). 

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Proving that an official's social media account has been transformed to a public forum will 

require a fact-intensive analysis of the account's history and usage. Some important factors 

considered by the Eighth Circuit include: (1) whether the social media account was started before 

the owner became a public official; (2) the overall “theme” of the owner's postings on the account; 

(3) whether the account was only occasionally used to provide updates on legislation or to explain 

the effect of recently enacted laws; and (4) whether the main purpose of the postings was for the 

official to campaign for office or to “emphasize [the official's] suitability for public office.” Id. at 

827.

At this stage of these proceedings, only the facts in the Complaint may be considered. 

Assuming these facts are true, Plaintiffs has plausibly stated a violation of his First Amendment 

rights. He contends this Facebook page is a public forum and, among other things, provides 

updates on accomplishments of the Sheriff’s office and arrest information. Plaintiff maintains 

Corley and Defendant Finkbeiner deleted and blocked him from participating in because he

expressed unfavorable viewpoints of Defendant Finkbeiner. Given these facts, the Court cannot 

say at this time that Plaintiff did not suffer a violation of his First Amendment rights and that those 

rights were not clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.

2. State Law Defamation Claim

Plaintiff’s Complaint also alleges a defamation claim based on a post which was made to 

this Facebook page that was false and largely inaccurate. Defendant Corley argues in her Motion 

to Dismiss, that because there is no valid federal claim under § 1983, the state law claims cannot 

proceed under the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 

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Once original jurisdiction has been established over one or more claims asserted in an 

action, the federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims which it 

would otherwise lack an independent basis for jurisdiction. Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 

U.S. 343, 349–50 (1988). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), such supplemental jurisdiction is 

proper when the complaint brings state law claims “that are so related to claims in the action within 

such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of 

the United States Constitution.” Claims are considered to be part of the same “case or 

controversy” when they “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact and are such that [a 

plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding.” Kan. Pub. 

Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Koger, Assocs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1063, 1067 (8th Cir. 1996) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

Given that the Court at this time declines to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims 

based on a violation § 1983 and because it appears at this stage that the claim based on defamation 

forms part of the same case or controversy within the court’s original jurisdiction, the Court 

recommends continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s defamation claim. 

IV. Conclusion: 

Accordingly, I recommend Defendant Corley’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14) 

be DENIED. 

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation 

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file 

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties 

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by 

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the district court.

DATED this 21st day of November 2024. 

 /s/ Barry A. Bryant 

 HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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