Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00750/USCOURTS-azd-2_19-cv-00750-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
DMB Sports Clubs LP
Defendant
Stuart McNicol
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Stuart McNicol,

Plaintiff,

v. 

DMB Sports Clubs LP,

Defendant.

No. CV-19-00750-PHX-MTL

ORDER 

Defendant DMB Sports Clubs LP (“DMB”) has filed a Motion for Summary 

Judgment (Doc. 42). The Motion is fully briefed. (Doc. 42); (Doc. 53); (Doc. 56.) The 

Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

1

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Stuart McNicol began working for DMB on March 24, 2014, as the Head 

Tennis Professional at DMB’s DC Ranch Village Health Club & Spa (“the Village”). 

(Doc. 42 at 2); (Doc. 53 at 1); (Doc. 48-1 at 9.) McNicol’s job responsibilities included 

providing tennis instruction for Village members. (Doc. 1-3 at 7, ¶ 22.) He was also 

permitted to give on-site tennis lessons to non-club members. (Id.) DMB allowed McNicol 

to string racquets from his home, and he was compensated directly by club members for 

1 DMB requested oral argument (part of Doc. 42), which the Court granted before the 

Motion was fully briefed. (Doc. 47.) After reviewing the pleadings, however, the Court 

determined that oral argument would not have aided the Court’s decisional process. See 

e.g., Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998); see also LRCiv 7.2(f); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b). Oral argument was already vacated. (Doc. 57.) DMB’s request for oral 

argument (part of Doc. 42) is denied. 

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those services. (Doc. 1-3 at 20, ¶ 11); (Doc. 53 at 3); (Doc. 48-1 at 18-19.) In 2014 and 

2015 McNicol received favorable year-end employee performance reviews. (Doc. 48-2 at 

83-91.)

McNicol reported directly to the Tennis Director, Nick Heron. (Doc. 42-1 at 97-

99.) On July 5, 2016, Mr. Heron drafted an “Expectations for Success” memorandum to 

McNicol, stating that “[i]n order for our group to succeed, the following expectations of 

each of us must become effective immediately.” (Doc. 42-1 at 127-28.) The memorandum 

listed numerous expectations for the group, including attendance at “member events, 

networking functions and team functions unless prior approval is received from the Tennis 

Director or General Manager to be absent.” (Id.) 

On August 1, 2016, Plaintiff met with Mr. Heron and the Village’s General 

Manager, Jim Krimbill, to discuss the Expectations for Success memorandum. (Doc. 48-1 

at 25-26); (Doc. 53 at 2); (Doc. 42 at 3.) McNicol maintains that the memorandum was 

not given to him as a criticism of his work, but as an outline of expectations moving 

forward. (Doc. 53 at 2-3.) DMB contends that the memorandum identified areas in which 

McNicol’s work needed improvement and reestablished McNicol’s specific job duties. 

(Doc. 42 at 3.) The memorandum was signed by both Mr. Heron and McNicol that day. 

(Doc. 42-1 at 128); (Doc. 48-1 at 25.) 

Sometime in August 2016, McNicol met with Mr. Krimbill and DMB’s Chief 

Human Resources Officer to discuss his compensation.2 (Doc. 42 at 3); (Doc. 53 at 3); 

(Doc. 48-1 at 34.) McNicol alleges that during this meeting the Chief Human Resources 

Officer told him that he could increase his compensation by working overtime. (Doc. 48-

1 at 34); (Doc. 42 at 3); (Doc. 53 at 3.) McNicol responded that he was unaware of his 

eligibility for overtime pay, but that he had been working overtime between March 2014 

and August 2015 without compensation. (Doc. 42 at 3-4); (Doc. 53 at 3.) In September 

2016, after an investigation into McNicol’s unpaid overtime claim, DMB paid McNicol 

2 DMB states (Doc. 42 at 3) that the meeting between McNicol, the General Manager, and 

the Chief Human Resources Officer occurred on August 1, 2016, but the record reflects 

solely that the meeting occurred sometime in August 2016.

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$5,964.33.3(Doc. 53 at 3); (Doc. 42 at 4); (Doc. 48-1 at 37.) 

The Village hired a new Tennis Director, David Critchley, in November 2016. 

(Doc. 53 at 2); (Doc. 42 at 4.) On December 8, 2016, Mr. Critchley and Mr. Krimbill gave 

McNicol an unfavorable year-end employee performance evaluation. (Doc. 42-1 at 130-

34); (Doc. 42 at 4); (Doc. 53 at 4.) The evaluation alleged that McNicol had a negative 

attitude toward the Village’s policies and procedures, that he failed to follow through with 

assigned tasks, and that he poorly managed his time. (Doc. 42-1 at 130-34); (Doc. 42 at 

4); (Doc. 53 at 4.) McNicol’s 2016 year-end review referenced events that purportedly 

occurred in July and October 2016. (Doc. 42-1 at 131-32.) 

In December 2016, DMB purchased equipment that enabled it to offer racquet 

stringing services on-site at the Village. (Doc. 53 at 3.) Thereafter, McNicol was no longer 

permitted to string racquets from his home, and his on-the-job responsibilities were not 

expanded to include on-site racquet stringing services. (Id. at 4.) According to McNicol,

DMB hired teenagers to do this work. (Id.)

McNicol asserts that in January 2017, Mr. Critchley told him that Mr. Krimbill

wanted him fired because he had “cost the company too much money in [his] overtime 

pay.” (Doc. 48-1 at 41-42); (Doc. 53 at 4); (Doc. 1-3 at 20, ¶ 8); (see also Doc. 48-2 at 

176.) DMB denies that any such conversation occurred. (Doc. 9 at 2, ¶ 8.) 

On December 6, 2017, McNicol received a positive year-end employee performance 

review in which Mr. Critchley described him as a “great asset to the club” and the “face of 

[the] tennis program.” (Doc. 42-1 at 139.) McNicol’s 2017 evaluation reflected that 

McNicol had been “very open to the several new responsibilities given to [him] by the 

director,” that he was “quick to help where needed,” and that he had been “a huge asset to 

the director . . . .” (Doc. 53 at 4); (Doc. 42 at 5); (Doc. 42-1 at 139-42.) McNicol did not 

receive a raise in 2017. (Doc. 1-3 at 21, ¶ 20.)

In January 2018, DMB’s Director of Membership told McNicol that non-members 

could no longer receive tennis lessons at the Village. (Doc. 53 at 5.) The next month, 

3 DMB maintains that it paid the $5,964.33 to McNicol even though it could not corroborate 

his overtime claim. (Doc. 42 at 4.) 

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allegedly with DMB’s consent, McNicol began teaching lessons part-time at a non-DMB 

tennis club. (Doc. 42 at 6); (Doc. 53 at 5); (Doc. 48-1 at 50.) McNicol alleges that Mr. 

Critchley continued to personally teach tennis lessons to non-members at the Village, even 

though McNicol was no longer permitted to do so. (Doc. 53 at 5.) McNicol claims, 

moreover, that in mid-April 2018, Mr. Critchley called the other club where McNicol 

provided instruction and inquired about the identities of McNicol’s students there. (Doc. 

1-3 at 22, ¶ 26); (Doc. 53 at 6.)

Sometime between 2017 and 2018, McNicol asserts that he became aware of what 

he believed were unlawful employment practices committed by Mr. Critchley within the 

Juniors Academy at the Village. (Doc. 53 at 5-6); (Doc. 48-1 at 56.) Specifically, McNicol 

believed that cash payments were made to people “under the table,” that an employee’s 

hours were manipulated so that he qualified for insurance benefits, and that DMB was 

employing a foreign citizen without a proper work visa. (Doc. 1-3 at 21, 27, ¶¶ 16-18, 61-

63); (Doc. 53 at 5-6.) 

McNicol discussed these matters, as well as his compensation, job duties and job 

performance with Mr. Critchley in early April, and again on May 3, 2018.

4

 (Doc. 48-2 at 

103, ¶ 12); (Doc. 53 at 6); (Doc. 56 at 5); (Doc. 48-2 at 117-20, 126, 133-35, 145, 160-62.) 

During the May 3, 2018 conversation and in a subsequent email sent to McNicol on May 

14, 2018, Mr. Critchley outlined what he “envision[ed] from the Head Pro Role moving 

forward.” (Doc. 53 at 7); (Doc. 42 at 7); (Doc. 42-1 at 173); (Doc. 48-2 at 132.) Mr. 

Critchley also discussed the possibility of McNicol forgoing his salaried position and its 

accompanying administrative duties in exchange for an hourly and commission-based

position that would only require him to teach tennis lessons. (Doc. 48-2 at 135.) McNicol 

alleges that in the May 14, 2018 email, Mr. Critchley added additional duties to the Head 

Tennis Professional role, including the requirement that McNicol assist with the Juniors 

Academy, where he believed the illegal hiring practices were occurring. (Doc. 53 at 7);

(Doc. 42 at 7.) 

4 McNicol surreptitiously recorded these conversations. Transcripts of the recordings were 

attached to McNicol’s Response. (Doc. 48-2 at 114-192.) 

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On May 7, 2018, Mr. Critchley asked the Village’s human resources department to 

issue a performance improvement plan for McNicol. (Doc. 48-2 at 197-203.) In response 

to Mr. Critchley’s proposal to present McNicol with a “write up,” a human resources 

employee noted that there were not enough documented incidents to make it “a Final” and 

that McNicol could not be written up “for incidents where he notified [Mr. Critchley] 

beforehand . . . .” (Doc. 48-2 at 197.) On May 15, 2018, Mr. Critchley texted McNicol, 

requesting a meeting with Mr. Krimbill to review a disciplinary write-up. (Doc. 1-3 at 24, 

¶ 41.) The performance improvement plan was never given to McNicol. (Doc. 56 at 6.) 

On May 16, 2018, through his attorney, McNicol reported the alleged unlawful

employment practices to the Village’s president. (Doc. 53 at 6.) An internal investigation 

ensued. Mr. Critchley admitted that he had personally paid a non-Village employee to 

assist with tennis lessons, and that he had permitted another employee to do the same. 

(Doc. 48-2 at 12, 54, 55, 57.) Mr. Critchley was disciplined for these infractions. (Doc. 

48-2 at 12-13.) 

Also on May 16, 2018, McNicol’s attorney communicated to Mr. Critchley that 

McNicol considered himself “constructively discharged” from the Head Tennis 

Professional position because he was being “forced” to participate in the Juniors Academy. 

(Doc. 42 at 8); (Doc. 53 at 7-8); (Doc. 42-1 at 176.) McNicol maintains that he thereafter 

“accept[ed] the offer” to work as a commission-based Tennis Professional at the Village. 

(Doc. 53 at 8); (Doc. 42 at 8.) 

DMB terminated McNicol’s managerial access to DMB’s internal system on July 

16, 2018. (Doc. 1-3 at 25, ¶ 48); (Doc. 56 at 7.) Thereafter, when DMB failed to provide 

McNicol with what he considered to be meaningful opportunities to teach lessons, he 

considered himself constructively discharged from the Tennis Professional position, too. 

(Doc. 53 at 8); (Doc. 42-1 at 179.) DMB maintains that McNicol voluntarily resigned from 

his employment with DMB on July 20, 2018. (Doc. 42 at 8.)

In this lawsuit, McNicol raises claims of retaliation under the Fair Labor Standards 

Act (“FLSA”) (Count 1) and wrongful termination under the Arizona Employment 

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Protection Act (“AEPA”) (Count 2). (Doc. 1-3 at 19-40.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party, demonstrates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A 

genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 

for the nonmoving party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law . . . .” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). At the summary judgment stage, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be 

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (internal 

citations omitted); see also Jesinger v. Nevada Fed. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th 

Cir. 1994) (court determines whether there is a genuine issue for trial but does not weigh 

the evidence or determine the truth of matters asserted). 

III. ANALYSIS

A. FLSA Claim

The FLSA makes it unlawful for an employer “to discharge or in any other manner 

discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or 

instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to [the FLSA].” 29 

U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). When evaluating an FLSA retaliation claim in the summary judgment 

context, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: (1) that 

he or she engaged in protected activity; (2) that he or she suffered an adverse employment 

decision; and (3) that there was a causal link between the plaintiff’s activity and the adverse 

employment decision. See Conner v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1394 (10th 

Cir. 1997) (applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)). If a 

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, “the burden shifts to the employer to offer a 

legitimate reason for the [adverse action].” Conner, 121 F.3d at 1394. Once the employer 

offers such a reason, “the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that ‘there is a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for the 

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challenged action is pretextual.’” Id. (internal citations omitted).

1. Prima facie showing

a. Protected activity 

To engage in protected activity, the plaintiff must make a “complaint.” 29 U.S.C. 

§ 215(a)(3). McNicol argues that he engaged in protected activity under the FLSA when 

he filed his overtime claim with DMB in August 2016 and again when he reported the 

illegal “off the book payments” in April and May 2018. (Doc. 53 at 9-10.) For purposes 

of this Motion, DMB agrees that McNicol’s overtime claim in August 2016 constituted 

FLSA-protected activity. (Doc. 42 at 9 n.6.) While DMB challenges the veracity of 

Plaintiff’s theory that “all of the alleged retaliation up to April 2018 was at the behest of 

Mr. Krimbill, while all of the alleged retaliation after April 2018 was by Mr. Critchley,” 

(Doc. 56 at 5), it does not deny that McNicol’s reporting of the “off the book payments” 

constitutes protected activity. See also 29 U.S.C. § 211(c) (FLSA requires employer to 

keep and preserve records of its employees’ wages and hours). 

Because 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) broadly encompasses the filing of “any complaint,” 

(emphasis added), the Court agrees that McNicol engaged in protected activity when he 

made his unpaid overtime claim in August 2016 and again when he reported the unlawful 

payments and hiring practices to Mr. Critchley and the Village president in May 2018. 

Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 9-10 (2011) (holding that 

the phrase “any complaint” suggests a broad interpretation).

b. Adverse Employment Decision

To meet the second prong of the prima facie retaliation test, a court must find that a 

reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse.

McBurnie v. City of Prescott, 511 Fed. App’x. 624, 625 (9th Cir. 2013). An employer’s 

action is materially adverse if it “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 

or supporting” an FLSA complaint. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 

68-69 (2006) (analyzing adverse employment under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision); 

McBurnie, 511 Fed. App’x. at 625 (applying the Burlington standard to FLSA claims). 

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Transfers of job duties away from the plaintiff and undeserved performance ratings can 

constitute adverse employment decisions under the FLSA. Yartzoff v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 

1371, 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1987). Additional adverse actions can include the denial of a pay 

raise, see, e.g., Gillis v. Georgia Dept. of Corrections, 400 F.3d 883, 887 (11th Cir. 2005),

a reduction of hours, Henderson v. City of Grantville, Ga., 37 F. Supp. 3d 1278, 1283 (N.D. 

Ga. 2014), and a termination via a constructive discharge, Ford v. Alfaro, 785 F.2d 835, 

841 (9th Cir. 1986) (constructive discharge constitutes adverse employment decision under 

FLSA where an ordinary employee would feel compelled to resign if confronted with the 

difficult work environment). 

Here, the Court finds that McNicol’s allegations about the unjustified 2016 yearend performance review, the denial of a raise in 2016 and 2017, the reduction of his income 

through the alleged disparate application of internal policies about providing tennis lessons 

to non-members, the alleged constructive discharge from the Head Tennis Professional and 

Tennis Professional positions, the ultimatum to participate in the Juniors Academy and 

assume additional duties or resign, and DMB’s purported failure to provide him new lesson 

opportunities after May 16, 2018, (Doc. 1-3 at 24-26, ¶¶ 38-39, 45, 52)—all, if true, fall 

within the meaning of adverse employment decisions under the FLSA. Each of these 

actions by DMB, taken individually or in the aggregate, might have dissuaded an ordinary 

employee from making an FLSA claim. See Danielson v. Brennan, 764 Fed. App’x. 622, 

623 (9th Cir. 2019) (considering collective actions). Accordingly, McNicol has shown that 

DMB’s actions meet the second prong of the prima facie retaliation test.

c. Causal Link

To show causation at the prima facie stage, McNicol must establish that there is a 

“causal link” between a protected activity and an adverse employment action, which is 

much less stringent than the “but-for” causation that a jury must find. Knickerbocker v. 

City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 910-11 (9th Cir. 1996) (applying “but for” standard for 

causation during trial and on appeal); Starnes v. Wallace, 849 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2017) 

(prima facie inquiry into causation is the “much less stringent” standard); Carmack v. Park 

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Cities Healthcare, LLC, 321 F.Supp.3d 689, 705 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (prima facie burden to 

show causal link is minimal). 

Regarding McNicol’s August 2016 overtime claim and the allegedly unjustified 

2016 year-end performance review—and regarding McNicol’s August 2016 overtime 

claim and the denial of a raise in 2016—the Court finds that McNicol has made a prima 

facie showing of causation. When the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to 

McNicol, the Court agrees that the four-month proximity of McNicol’s overtime complaint

and the 2016 year-end performance evaluation and denial of a raise, combined with the 

alleged retaliatory statement by Mr. Krimbill to Mr. Critchley and the lack of prior 

discipline to McNicol, all reveal an inference of retaliation sufficient to show a causal link

at the prima facie stage. See Knickerbocker, 81 F.3d at 912 (adverse action closely 

following protected activity can support inference of retaliation); (Doc. 48-1 at 41-42); 

(McNicol claiming Mr. Krimbill told Mr. Critchley that he wanted McNicol fired because 

of McNicol’s overtime complaint); (Doc. 48-2 at 176) (Mr. Critchley admitted to McNicol 

during the recorded conversation on April 4, 2018, that Mr. Krimbill wanted McNicol to 

“kind of go away”.) 

While the Court agrees with DMB that McNicol’s favorable year-end performance 

evaluation in 2017 “dispels any inference of retaliation” stemming from the overtime claim 

he made in August 2016, (Doc. 42 at 11); see Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 

802 (9th Cir. 2003) (intervening events, such as pay raises and selection for prestigious 

assignments, break the causal connection), McNicol engaged in additional FLSA-protected 

activities when he reported the unlawful employment practices and “under the table” 

payments in April and May 2018. Because the positive year-end performance evaluation

in 2017 does not dispel any inference of retaliation for the subsequent FLSA-protected 

activities, the Court finds that McNicol made a prima facie showing of causation with 

regard to his allegations that he was constructively discharged from both positions (Doc. 

1-3 at 26, ¶ 52), that he was forced to participate in the Juniors Academy and assume 

additional duties or resign, (Doc. 1-3 at 24, ¶¶ 38-39), and that he was not provided 

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meaningful opportunities for new lessons after May 16, 2018 (Doc. 1-3 at 25, ¶ 45). These

alleged adverse employment actions occurred as little as four days after McNicol engaged 

in the protected activity. (Doc. 48-2 at 200-201.) This temporal proximity alone is 

sufficient to show a causal link at the prima facie stage. See Passantino v. Johnson & 

Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir. 2000).

2. DMB’s proffered reasons 

Because McNicol established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to DMB to 

articulate legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the alleged retaliatory action taken. 

Conner, 121 F.3d at 1394. DMB states that McNicol’s unsatisfactory 2016 evaluation and 

the corresponding denial of a raise were due to McNicol’s “failure to perform the job duties 

outlined in his job description and the ‘Expectations for Success’ memorandum, such as 

organizing and attending events and programs, organizing and developing DMB’s racquetstringing business, and displaying a positive attitude about his job duties . . . .” (Doc. 42 at 

10.) DMB claims that Mr. Critchley added new administrative duties to McNicol’s 

position as Head Tennis Professional in May 2018 because DMB’s tennis program had 

expanded, not because DMB was retaliating against McNicol for reporting the instances of 

unlawful employment practices and payments. (Doc. 42 at 12-13); (Doc. 48-2 at 29-30.) 

Finally, DMB asserts that McNicol was not constructively discharged from either the Head 

Tennis Professional or Tennis Professional position, but that McNicol voluntarily “directed 

his efforts at other employment with more favorable compensation” and “turned down 

numerous lesson opportunities offered to him by DMB.” (Doc. 42 at 13.) The Court finds 

that DMB has stated legitimate reasons for these adverse employment actions. 

3. Genuine disputes of material fact regarding pretext

Because DMB has offered legitimate reasons for the adverse actions, it is McNicol’s 

burden to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether DMB’s

proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions are pretextual. Conner, 121 F.3d at 

1394. McNicol argues that the Expectations for Success memorandum was not a critique 

of his prior job performance, but more of a generalized memorandum. (Doc. 53 at 13.) 

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Though addressed to McNicol, the memorandum emphasizes “the expectations of each of 

us” that are necessary for “our group to succeed.” (See Doc. 42-1 at 127-28.) On its face, 

the memorandum does not purport to identify past alleged instances of poor job 

performance by McNicol. The Court therefore finds that there are genuine disputes of 

material fact about the purpose of the Expectations for Success memorandum and whether 

DMB identified McNicol’s purported job deficiencies prior to his filing of the overtime 

complaint in August 2016. 

Regarding the diminished opportunities for teaching new lessons in June and July 

2018, McNicol has presented evidence that DMB may have offered pretextual reasons for 

its adverse actions. On May 7, 2018, just four days after McNicol reported the “under the 

table” payments to Mr. Critchley, Mr. Critchley initiated the process to put McNicol on a 

performance improvement plan, claiming that he had failed to complete tasks as early as 

January and March of that year. (Doc. 48-2 at 200-201.) Yet in response to Mr. Critchley’s 

plan to present McNicol with a “write up,” the Village’s human resources representative

noted that there were not enough documented incidents to make it “a Final” and that 

McNicol could not be written up “for incidents where he notified [Mr. Critchley] 

beforehand.” (Doc. 48-2 at 197.) Mr. Critchley and Mr. Krimbill ultimately decided not 

to present this to McNicol, and immediately thereafter McNicol’s opportunities for 

teaching lessons declined. The timing of these relevant actions and comments raises a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to “but for” causation. 

Finally, McNicol has raised a genuine disputed fact as to whether the adding of job 

duties to the Head Tennis Professional role in May 2018 was pretextual. DMB claims that 

the additional job duties were added in response to an expanding tennis program; yet 

nobody was hired to replace McNicol as the Head Tennis Professional after he left, and the 

administrative duties were assumed by Mr. Critchley. (Doc. 53 at 15-16); (Doc. 48-2 at 

33.) 

Because there are material disputed facts about whether DMB’s stated reasons for 

the adverse actions are pretextual, the Court denies summary judgment to DMB on Count 

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1. This claim shall proceed to trial. 

B. AEPA Claim

McNicol alleges that he was wrongfully terminated from the Head Tennis 

Professional and Tennis Professional positions. A wrongful termination action under the 

AEPA lies when, in the course of his or her employment, an employee is terminated in 

retaliation for refusing to violate Arizona law or for reporting violations of Arizona law. 

Galati v. America West Airlines, Inc., 205 Ariz. 290, 292 (App. 2003) (citing A.R.S. § 23-

1501(3)(c)(i), (ii)). DMB does not dispute that McNicol reported such violations to DMB’s 

management. (Doc. 42 at 14-18); (Doc. 53 at 16.) The sole argument it advances is that 

McNicol was not terminated from his employment.

5

 (Doc. 42 at 14); (Doc. 56 at 8-11.) 

Termination of the employment relationship is required for a wrongful termination 

claim under the AEPA. A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(c)(i), (ii). Termination may be express or 

constructive. Peterson v. City of Surprise, 244 Ariz. 247, 250 (App. 2018). Constructive 

discharge transforms a resignation into a discharge, which satisfies the termination element 

of a wrongful termination claim under the AEPA. Id. In any action under the statutes of 

Arizona, including the AEPA, constructive discharge may only be established by: (1) 

evidence of an employer’s failure to remedy “objectively difficult or unpleasant working 

conditions to the extent that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign,” A.R.S. 

§ 23-1502(A)(1); or (2) evidence of “outrageous conduct” by the employer, A.R.S. § 23-

1502(A)(2). To preserve the right to bring a constructive discharge claim for “objectively 

difficult or unpleasant working conditions,” the employee must first give the employer “at 

least fifteen days’ notice . . . that the employee intends to resign because of [the] 

conditions.” A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(1). This notice requirement encourages the employee 

to communicate to the employer whenever he or she believes working conditions may 

5 DMB does not challenge causation under McNicol’s AEPA claim. The Court, therefore,

does not decide what framework applies or whether there are material disputed facts as to 

causation on Count 2. Cf. Whitmore v. Wal-Mart Stores Incorporated, 359 F. Supp. 761, 

799-800 n.29 (D. Ariz. 2019) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to 

plaintiff’s AEPA claim); Revit v. First Advantage Tax Consulting Services, LLC, No. 

CV10-1653-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 1230841, at *4-5 (D. Ariz. Apr. 12, 2012) (adopting 

First Amendment retaliation approach to AEPA claims instead of McDonnell Douglas

test).

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become intolerable, and it gives the employer the opportunity to respond to the employee’s 

concerns. A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(1), (E)(2). An employer is deemed to have waived the 

right to notice of an employee’s intent to resign, however, if the employer failed to provide 

prior written notice to its employees of the requirements for bringing a constructive 

discharge claim against the employer. See A.R.S. § 23-1502(E), (E)(2) (providing required 

language and posting requirements for the employers’ notice to employees). An employee 

is not required to give prior notice to the employer if the employee is resigning because of

the employer’s “outrageous conduct.” A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(2), (F). 

McNicol contends that he was expressly terminated and constructively discharged 

from the Head Tennis Professional position, and that he was constructively discharged 

from the Tennis Professional position. (Doc. 53 at 16.) DMB argues that McNicol was 

never expressly terminated, (Doc. 56 at 9), and that he cannot meet the statutory elements 

of constructive discharge because [i] there was no outrageous employer conduct, [ii] he did 

not provide DMB 15 days’ notice of his intent to resign, and [iii] because there were no 

objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions. (Doc. 42 at 16); (Doc. 56 at 9.) 

Neither party identifies whether DMB provided its employees with the statutorily required 

employment notice in A.R.S. § 23-1502(E)(2). 

Preliminarily, the Court agrees with DMB that McNicol was not expressly 

terminated by DMB from either position. McNicol has consistently argued only that he 

was constructively discharged from both positions. (Doc. 1-3 at 28, ¶¶ 66-69.) And the 

evidence he submitted was in furtherance of the same. The Court therefore grants partial 

summary judgment in favor of DMB on Count 2 with respect to McNicol’s claim that he 

was expressly terminated by DMB. 

The Court also agrees with DMB that there is no evidence of outrageous employer 

conduct. While the statute defining outrageous employer conduct does not provide an 

exhaustive list, it names sexual assault, threats of violence, and a continuous pattern of 

discriminatory harassment as examples. A.R.S. § 23-1502(F). Requiring McNicol to 

participate in the Juniors Academy, calling the other club to inquire about McNicol’s 

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students, adding additional duties to the job of Head Tennis Professional, engaging in a 

“systematic and sustained effort to deprive him of almost all lesson income,” and removing 

his managerial access to DMB’s internal system do not rise to the level of “outrageous 

conduct” contemplated by the statute. A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(2); (Doc. 1-3 at 28, ¶ 66); 

(Doc. 53 at 17.) It is therefore ordered granting partial summary judgment in favor of

DMB on Count 2 with respect to McNicol’s claim that he was constructively discharged 

by outrageous employer conduct.

Next, because DMB disregarded § 23-1502(E) in its Motion, the Court assumes that 

DMB did not comply with its own notice obligations. See Cook v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 

CV-110938-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 6089039, at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 2012) (assuming by 

defendant’s disregard of § 23-1502 that they either did not give the employment notice 

required by § 23-1502(E), or they gave the notice and plaintiff complied with the 15-days’ 

notice requirement). Without some showing that DMB complied with § 23-1502(E) by 

giving its employees the required employment notice, the Court cannot find as a matter of 

law that McNicol was required to give DMB 15 days’ notice of the alleged “difficult or 

unpleasant working conditions” prior to resigning. See A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(1), (E) 

(establishing waiver of an employer’s right to notice under subsection A, paragraph 1).

Accordingly, in ruling on summary judgment under § 23-1502(A)(1), the Court will 

consider only whether McNicol presented evidence to show “objectively difficult or 

unpleasant working conditions to the extent that a reasonable employee would feel 

compelled to resign,” and not whether he gave DMB the 15 days’ notice that would 

otherwise be required by statute.

To show difficult or unpleasant working conditions, McNicol focuses on events that 

occurred after he reported the alleged unlawful employment practices to Mr. Critchley in 

April 2018. (Doc. 53 at 17.) He claims that he was compelled to resign from the Head 

Tennis Professional position because: Mr. Critchley called the other club to see which

students McNicol was teaching there, DMB management was intent on giving him a “false 

write up”; DMB added additional duties to his job description; and DMB required him to 

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be part of the Juniors Academy, where McNicol believed the unlawful employment 

practices were occurring. (Id.) He asserts that he was compelled to resign from the Tennis 

Professional position because DMB reduced his income to an unsustainable level by 

depriving him of meaningful opportunities to teach lessons. (Id.) DMB argues that 

McNicol’s claims of constructive discharge are not credible because he agreed to remain 

employed at DMB as a Tennis Professional and because lesson income is generally lower 

in the summer months. (Doc. 42 at 16); (Doc. 56 at 10.) 

Whether working conditions are so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee’s 

decision to resign is generally a fact question for the jury. See West v. Salt River Agr. Imp. 

and Power Dist., 179 Ariz. 619, 625 (App. 1994). The Court construes the inferences in 

favor of McNicol and does not weigh the evidence or assess its credibility at the summary 

judgment stage. Jessinger, 24 F.3d at 1131. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 

requiring McNicol to teach lessons in the Juniors Academy after he reported unlawful 

hiring practices within it, threatening a disciplinary write up that was drafted but never 

substantiated, and adding additional duties to the Head Tennis Professional position 

without an increase in compensation are sufficient to create a question of fact on whether 

McNicol was subjected to “objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions to the 

extent that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign” from the Head Tennis 

Professional position. A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(1). The Court further finds that depriving 

McNicol of opportunities to teach lessons as a commission-based employee creates a 

question of fact on whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign from 

the Tennis Professional position. Partial summary judgment is denied to DMB on Count 2 

with respect to McNicol’s claim that he was constructively discharged by evidence of 

objectively difficult or unpleasant working conditions to the extent that a reasonable 

employee would feel compelled to resign. Count 2 shall proceed to trial. 

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED denying summary judgment (part of Doc. 42) to Defendant on 

Count 1. 

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting partial summary judgment (part of Doc. 

42) to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 that he was expressly terminated (part of 

Count 2). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED granting partial summary judgment (part of Doc. 

42) to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim in Count 2 that he was constructively discharged 

under A.R.S. § 23-1502(A)(2) (part of Count 2). 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying partial summary judgment (part of Doc. 

42) to Defendant on the remaining portions of Count 2. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying DMB’s request for oral argument (part of 

Doc. 42).

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED affirming the Final Pretrial Conference on June 8, 

2020, and the Jury Trial for June 16, 2020 to June 19, 2020. 

Dated this 20th day of March, 2020.

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