Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03091/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03091-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of the Air Force
Respondent
Kathleen Mary Kaplan
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

KATHLEEN MARY KAPLAN,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3091

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. DC-0752-14-0708-I-1.

______________________ 

Decided: January 7, 2016 

______________________ 

 KATHLEEN MARY KAPLAN, Arlington, VA, pro se.

 KATRINA LEDERER, Office of the General Counsel, 

Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC, for 

respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G. POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, O’MALLEY, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

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2 KAPLAN v. MSPB

Kathleen Kaplan (“Kaplan”) seeks review of the Merit 

Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) decision dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Kaplan v. Dep’t of 

the Air Force, No. DC-0752-14-0708-I-1, 2014 MSPB

LEXIS 8955 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 29, 2014) (“Final Decision”). 

For the reasons explained below, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Kaplan is currently employed as a Principal Computer Scientist, DR-1550-IV, with the Department of the Air 

Force (“the agency”) Office of Scientific Research in Arlington, Virginia. Kaplan v. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 

DC-0752-14-0708-I-1, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 4826, at *1

(M.S.P.B. July 18, 2014) (“Initial Decision”). Kaplan was 

subsequently selected to participate in the agency’s Civilian Developmental Education (“CDE”) RAND Fellowship 

program (“RAND Fellowship”). Id. 

By letter dated April 30, 2014, the agency removed 

Kaplan’s designation to attend the RAND Fellowship. Id. 

That letter explained that Kaplan’s prior misconduct and 

reprimand “constitute[d] just cause for removing you from 

such CDE.” Respondent’s Appendix (“RA”) 33.

Kaplan timely appealed to the Board, arguing that 

the agency took a personnel action against her in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A) when it removed her “from 

all CDE for all time and forevermore.” Final Decision, 

2014 MSPB LEXIS 8955, at *3. Specifically, Kaplan 

alleged that the agency removed her “in retaliation for her 

submission of pleadings to the U.S. District Court for the 

Eastern District of Virginia and the U.S. Court of Federal 

Claims.” Id. 

On June 11, 2014, the agency moved to dismiss 

Kaplan’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that it did 

not take an action against her that is appealable to the 

Board. Initial Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 4826, at *2. 

In its motion, the agency explained that: (1) Kaplan has 

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KAPLAN v. MSPB 3

been in the competitive service since 2005, and remains 

employed as a Principal Computer Scientist with the 

agency; (2) Kaplan’s previously granted RAND Fellowship 

was canceled due to misconduct; and (3) an agency decision “to grant or not to grant an educational opportunity 

is not reviewable by the Board.” Id. To the extent 

Kaplan’s claims could be construed to allege whistleblowing or other protected activity, the agency argued that the 

Board lacked jurisdiction over “any potential individual 

right of action (IRA) appeal, because she has not sought 

corrective action from the Special Counsel.” Id. at *3. 

Kaplan timely responded, arguing that the Board had 

jurisdiction over her appeal because the agency removed 

her from the RAND Fellowship program. Final Decision, 

2014 MSPB LEXIS 8955, at *3. According to Kaplan, her 

removal was appealable as an adverse action under 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1), and as a suitability action under 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(9). Id. Kaplan also reiterated that the 

agency took a personnel action against her when it removed her from the CDE program in retaliation for protected activity, but clarified that she was not alleging 

whistleblower retaliation or retaliation for equal employment opportunity activity. Id. at *3-4, & n.2. 

On July 18, 2014, the administrative judge (“AJ”) 

issued an initial decision dismissing Kaplan’s appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. The AJ found it “uncontroverted” that 

the agency removed Kaplan’s designation to attend the 

RAND Fellowship, but did not terminate her employment 

or remove her from her Principal Computer Scientist 

position. Initial Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 4826, at *8. 

Because the agency merely terminated an educational 

opportunity for Kaplan, the AJ concluded that the Board 

lacked jurisdiction. Id. The AJ also considered and 

rejected Kaplan’s argument that the agency’s action was a 

“suitability action” within the Board’s jurisdiction. Id. at 

*9. Specifically, the AJ found no negative suitability 

determination to appeal because neither the agency nor 

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4 KAPLAN v. MSPB

the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) “took any 

action that canceled her eligibility for a particular position, removed her, canceled her reinstatement or debarred 

her from a Federal position.” Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.3(a)(9)). Finally, the AJ explained that, to the 

extent Kaplan is attempting to file an IRA claim of retaliation for engaging in protected activity, she must first 

seek corrective action from the Office of Special Counsel, 

and exhaust her administrative remedies. Id. at *9-10. 

Because Kaplan failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation 

of Board jurisdiction, the AJ dismissed her appeal without 

a hearing. Id. at *10. 

Kaplan filed a petition for review, requesting that the 

Board reconsider the AJ’s initial decision. Specifically, 

Kaplan argued that: (1) the AJ erred in finding that the 

agency terminated an “educational opportunity” rather 

than a “particular position”; and (2) the Board has jurisdiction over the agency’s removal of her designation to 

attend the RAND Fellowship program as a “determination of non-suitability.” Final Decision, 2014 MSPB 

LEXIS 8955, at *8. 

On December 29, 2014, the Board issued a final decision denying Kaplan’s petition for review. In its decision, 

the Board first explained that it has jurisdiction over 

adverse action appeals, which includes, in relevant part, 

removals or terminations of employment after completion 

of probationary or other initial service period. Id. at *8. 

Next, the Board found it undisputed that the agency 

removed Kaplan from the RAND Fellowship program, 

which is one of several educational programs the agency 

offers for civilians. Id. at *9. Because the agency did not 

remove Kaplan from her position or terminate her employment, the Board found that Kaplan alleged no facts

which, if proven, include an adverse action within the 

Board’s jurisdiction. Id. 

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KAPLAN v. MSPB 5

The Board further found that Kaplan failed to allege 

facts that could support a finding of jurisdiction over the 

agency’s action as a “negative suitability determination.” 

Id. The Board explained that a suitability determination 

involves a decision by OPM or an agency with delegated 

authority that a person is suitable or not suitable for a 

covered position in the federal government or federal 

agency. Id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 731.202(b)). The Board 

concluded that Kaplan’s allegation that the agency removed her from the RAND Fellowship program and 

“deemed her permanently ineligible for all future CDE 

programs, even if proven, does not establish jurisdiction 

over her appeal as a negative suitability determination or 

an appealable adverse action.” Id. at *10. Accordingly, 

the Board denied Kaplan’s petition for review.1

Kaplan timely appealed to this court, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

1 Kaplan submitted, for the first time on appeal to 

the Board, an internal agency memorandum dated August 11, 2011, showing that “‘outplacement from centralized [CDE]’ was exempt from the implementation of a 

hiring freeze because of its funding source.” Final Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 8955, at *10. According to 

Kaplan, this document showed that the agency’s decision 

to revoke her designation to participate in the RAND 

Fellowship program and all other CDEs was within the 

Board’s jurisdiction. Id. Because Kaplan failed to show 

that the information contained in the memorandum was 

previously unavailable despite due diligence before the 

record closed, the Board concluded that it need not consider it. Id. at *10-11 (citing Grassell v. Dep’t of Transp., 

40 M.S.P.R. 554, 564 (1989)). Even considering the submission, however, the Board found no basis for concluding 

that Kaplan made a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction. Id. at *11. 

 

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6 KAPLAN v. MSPB

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a decision 

of the Board is limited. We must affirm the Board’s 

decision unless it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; 

(2) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); Fields v. Dep’t 

of Justice, 452 F.3d 1297, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Whether 

the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate an appeal is a 

question of law, which we review de novo. Parrott v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 519 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the 

Board’s jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 

C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i) (2015).2 To be entitled to a 

jurisdictional hearing, a claimant must make a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction over her 

appeal. Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 

1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). “Nonfrivolous allegations 

of Board jurisdiction are allegations of fact which, if 

proven, could establish a prima facie case that the Board 

has jurisdiction over the matter in issue.” Ferdon v. 

United States Postal Serv., 60 M.S.P.R. 325, 329 (1994) 

(citation omitted). 

The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is limited 

to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction 

by law, rule, or regulation. Johnston v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). As noted, Kaplan 

argued before the Board that her removal from the RAND 

Fellowship program was appealable both as an “adverse 

action” under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1), and as a “suitability 

2 Prior to March 30, 2015, the applicable regulation 

was set forth at 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(a)(2)(i). 

 

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KAPLAN v. MSPB 7

action” under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(9). We address each 

potential basis for Board jurisdiction in turn.

By statute, the Board has jurisdiction over appeals of 

adverse actions, including: (1) removals; (2) suspensions 

for more than fourteen days; (3) reductions in grade; 

(4) reductions in pay; and (5) furloughs of thirty days or 

less. 5 U.S.C. § 7512(1)-(5). The applicable regulations 

likewise indicate, in relevant part, that the Board is 

authorized to hear an adverse action appeal involving 

removals, which are “terminations of employment after 

completion of probationary or other initial service period.” 

5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1). 

Here, Kaplan has not made a nonfrivolous allegation 

that the agency engaged in an adverse action that falls 

within the Board’s jurisdiction. Indeed, the Board found 

it undisputed that the agency did not remove Kaplan from 

her position as a Principal Computer Scientist or terminate her employment. Final Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 

8955, at *9. There are no allegations that Kaplan was 

suspended, furloughed, or suffered a reduction in grade or 

pay. Instead, the agency merely removed Kaplan’s eligibility to participate in the RAND Fellowship program, 

which is an educational program. Id. We agree with the 

Board that the agency’s termination of Kaplan’s ability to 

participate in an educational program does not fall within

the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction over adverse actions. 

Id.; see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(1). 

Kaplan’s briefing to this court focuses solely on her 

belief that the Board had jurisdiction over her appeal as a 

suitability action pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.3(a)(9). We 

disagree. A “suitability action” is an “[a]ction based on 

suitability determinations, which relate to an individual’s 

character or conduct that may have an impact on the 

integrity or efficiency of the service.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.3(a)(9). “Suitability actions include the cancellaCase: 15-3091 Document: 38-2 Page: 7 Filed: 01/07/2016
8 KAPLAN v. MSPB

tion of eligibility, removal, cancellation or reinstatement 

eligibility, and debarment.” Id. 

As the Board explained, a “[s]uitability determination 

means a decision by OPM [the Office of Personnel Management] or an agency with delegated authority that a 

person is suitable or is not suitable for employment in 

covered positions in the Federal Government or a specific 

Federal agency.” Final Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 

8955, at *9 (quoting 5 C.F.R. § 731.101). A “covered 

position” is “a position in the competitive service, a position in the excepted service where the incumbent can be 

noncompetitively converted to the competitive service, 

and a career appointment to a position in the Senior 

Executive Service.” 5 C.F.R. § 731.101(b). 

Kaplan’s primary argument on appeal is that the 

Board admitted that it had jurisdiction when it used the 

word “position” to describe the RAND Fellowship. She 

then asserts that the RAND Fellowship program is a 

“covered position” because it required a Top Secret security clearance, and because the agency vetted her personnel 

records before selecting her to participate in the program. 

Each of these arguments is without merit.

First, although the Board used the term “position,” 

the record is clear that the RAND Fellowship is an educational program, not a position separate and apart from 

Kaplan’s career position as a Principal Computer Scientist. Indeed, when read in context, the sentence in the 

Board’s decision upon which Kaplan relies actually contradicts her argument. That sentence states, in its entirety: “[i]t is undisputed that the agency effectively removed 

the appellant from the RAND Fellowship position, which 

is one of the educational programs offered for civilians by 

the agency.” Final Decision, 2014 MSPB LEXIS 8955, at 

*9. The next sentence states that it is also “undisputed 

that the agency did not remove the appellant from her 

Principal Computer Scientist position or terminate her 

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KAPLAN v. MSPB 9

employment.” Id. Accordingly, the mere fact that the 

Board used the word “position” is insufficient to give rise 

to Board jurisdiction. 

Second, as noted, a suitability determination involves 

a finding that an individual is suitable or not suitable for 

employment in a “covered position.” 5 C.F.R. 

§ 731.101(b). Because the RAND Fellowship is an educational program—not a “covered position” as that term is 

defined in 5 C.F.R. § 731.101(b)—the agency did not make 

a suitability determination when it removed Kaplan from 

it. That the Fellowship required a Top Secret security 

clearance and the agency reviewed Kaplan’s personnel 

record prior to selecting her to participate has no bearing 

on whether the program qualifies as a “covered position.” 

Nor is there any evidence that the agency or OPM took 

any action that cancelled Kaplan’s eligibility for a particular position, removed her, cancelled her reinstatement, or 

debarred her from a federal position. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 1201.3(a)(9). Indeed, the record reveals that Kaplan 

occupied the position of Principal Computer Scientist 

before, during, and after her designation to attend the 

RAND Fellowship. We therefore agree with the Board 

that Kaplan’s removal from the RAND Fellowship program was not appealable to the Board as either an adverse action or as a suitability determination. 

CONCLUSION 

Kaplan failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of 

Board jurisdiction over the agency’s decision to terminate 

her participation in the RAND Fellowship program. 

Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s decision dismissing her

appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

AFFIRMED

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