Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00606/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-00606-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Guy Cadwell
Plaintiff
Snapple Beverage Corporation
Defendant
Frances Von Koenig
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

FRANCIS VON KOENIG, GUY

CADWELL, individually and on

behalf of all others similarly

situated,

2:09-cv-00606 FCD EFB

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SNAPPLE BEVERAGE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________/

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendant Snapple

Beverage Corporation’s (“Snapple” or “defendant”) motion to

dismiss claims in their First Amended Consolidated Class Action

Complaint (“FAC”) relating to all advertising and promotions

other than product labeling, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). Plaintiffs Frances Von Koenig (“Von

Koenig”) and Gay Cadwell’s (“Cadwell”) (collectively

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“plaintiffs”) oppose the motion. For the reasons set forth

below,1 defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of plaintiffs’ allegations that

defendant “engaged in the unfair, unlawful, deceptive and

fraudulent practice of marketing, promoting, and advertising its

drink products as ‘All Natural’ when these drink products contain

one or more non-natural or artificial ingredients, such as High

Fructose Corn Syrup (“HFCS”).” (Pl.’s First Am. Consolidated

Class Action Compl. (“FAC”) [Docket #84], filed May 25, 2010, at

2.) Specifically, plaintiffs allege defendants marketed its

drink products as “All Natural” even though they contained HFCS. 

(Id.) 

On May 10, 2010, the court issued its Memorandum & Order,

granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion to

dismiss plaintiffs’ Corrected Consolidated Class Action

Complaint. (Mem. & Order [Docket #83], filed May 10, 2010.) 

With respect to plaintiffs’ claims sounding in fraud, the court

concluded that plaintiffs had satisfied heightened pleading

standards with respect to its claims arising out of defendants’

labeling though their allegations and submission of the labels at

issue. (Id. at 17-18.) However, the court also concluded that

plaintiffs did not sufficiently plead claims “based upon other

advertisements and marketing or based upon other labels not

submitted to the court.” (Id. at 18.) 

1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders the matter submitted on the briefs. 

E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g)

2

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On May 25, 2010, plaintiffs filed their First Amended

Consolidated Class Action Complaint, alleging that sixty

different drink products of defendant were labeled as “All

Natural” while containing HFCS. (Id.) Plaintiffs have submitted

examples of the relevant labels on each of these drink products.2

(Pls.’ Requests for Judicial Notice [Docket ## 112-18], filed

Dec. 1, 2010.) 

ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that in the FAC, plaintiffs re-pled “vague

and highly generalized allegations” arising out of defendant’s

“‘commercial advertisements’ and ‘other promotional materials’

identical to those alleged in plaintiffs’ dismissed CAC.” 

(Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss [Docket #91], filed July 6, 2010, at 3.) 

Accordingly, defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims to the

extent they arise out of advertising and marketing allegations

separate and apart from the drink product labels. Plaintiffs do

not substantively respond to the crux of defendant’s motion, but

rather assert that their claims arising from the labels on the

sixty drink products set forth in the complaint meet the

requisite heightened pleading standard. 

A court may dismiss a claim grounded in fraud when its

allegations fail to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading

requirements. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1107

2 Because these labels form the basis of the relevant

causes of action, the court considers them for the purpose of

defendant’s motion to dismiss. United States v. Ritchie, 342

F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a document is not

attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into

a complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document

or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 

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(9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, plaintiff “must state with

particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 9(b). In other words, the plaintiff must include “the

who, what, when, where, and how” of the fraud. Id. at 1106

(citations omitted). A plaintiff must therefore “state the time,

place, and specific content of the false representations as well

as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” 

Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393,

1401 (9th Cir. 1986). The plaintiff must also “set forth what is

false or misleading about a statement, and why it is false.” 

Decker v. Glenfed, Inc., 42 F.3d 1541, 1548 (9th Cir. 1994). 

A central purpose of Rule 9(b) is to ensure that defendants

accused of the conduct specified have adequate notice of what

they are alleged to have done, so that they may defend against

the accusations. Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1124-

25 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that Rule 9(b) also serves to protect

the reputation of those charged with fraud and to prohibit

plaintiffs from unilaterally imposing enormous social and

economic costs on the court, the parties, and society without a

factual basis); Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1502 (9th Cir.

1995). “Without such specificity, defendants in these cases

would be put to an unfair advantage, since at the early stages of

the proceedings they could do no more than generally deny any

wrongdoing.” Concha, 62 F.3d at 1502 (citing Semegen v. Weidner,

780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985)).

As set forth in the court’s prior order, plaintiffs’

allegations arising out of the labels on defendant’s drink

products satisfy the heightened pleading standard of Rule 9(b). 

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(See Mem. & Order [Docket # 83] at 16-18.) Specifically,

plaintiffs allege that between March 4, 2005 and March 4, 2009,

defendant used terms such as “All Natural” and other similar

terms in labeling its drink products. (FAC ¶¶ 41, 43.) 

Plaintiffs have submitted examples of the labels from a bottle of

each of the sixty drink products set forth in the FAC, all of

which contain the term “All Natural” or “100% Natural.” 

Plaintiffs allege that this labeling deceived consumers because

the drink products contained HFCS, which they assert is not a

natural product. (Id. ¶ 31-32.) Plaintiffs further allege that

if they had not been deceived by the labels on the products, they

would not have purchased defendant’s product, but would have

purchased alternative drink products. (Id. ¶ 36.) These

allegation are sufficient to establish the “time, place, and

specific content” requirements of Rule 9(b). See Pom Wonderful

LLC v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1124

(C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that the plaintiff adequately pled

false advertising claims with particularity where the complaint

alleged when the defendant introduced the drink product, how it

was labeled, and what was misleading about the label); see also

Germain v. J.C. Penney Co., No. CV 09-2847, 2009 WL 1971336 (C.D.

Cal. July 6, 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs pled false

advertising claims with particularity where the complaint

identified who was responsible for the conduct alleged and the

defendants could “prepare an adequate answer from the

allegations”); cf. Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126 (holding that

plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity where he

failed to specify what advertisements he was exposed to, what

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those advertisements specifically stated, and when or by whom he

was told that the product at issue was the best available and

most rigorously tested).

However, defendant’s motion to dismiss is directed not at

plaintiffs’ claims arising out of the specified drink product

labels, but at plaintiffs’ broader allegations regarding

unspecified “commercial advertisements” and “other promotional

materials.” Except for the allegations relating to drink product

labels, plaintiffs’ FAC fails to (1) identify any specific

advertisements or promotional materials; (2) allege when

plaintiffs were exposed to each advertisements or materials; or

(3) explain how such advertisements or materials were false or

misleading. Accordingly, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ claims arising out of advertisements and marketing,

separate and apart from the labels identified in the complaint

and submitted to the court, is GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 6, 2011 

 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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