Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00282/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00282-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
GS Holistic, LLC
Plaintiff
Mr Vape Smoke Shop
Defendant
Mr Vapes Smoke Shop
Defendant
Mustasem Yusef Sarama
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

GS HOLISTIC, LLC, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

MR VAPE SMOKE SHOP, et al., 

Defendants. 

No. 1:23-cv-0282 DJC SCR 

AMENDED FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

Presently pending before the undersigned are Plaintiff GS Holistic, LLC’s motions for 

default judgment against Defendants Mr Vape Smoke Shop d/b/a Mr Vapes Smoke Shop and 

Mustasem Yusef Sarama. ECF No. 24, 29.1

 To date, Defendants have not opposed Plaintiff’s 

motions or otherwise appeared in this action. 

Because Plaintiff has failed to establish the second and third factors for default judgment 

under Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1986), the undersigned recommends Plaintiff’s 

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 Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment on September 8, 2023, and a motion hearing was 

set for October 25, 2023, before Magistrate Judge Boone. ECF No. 24. On September 13, 2023, 

this case was reassigned to District Judge Calabretta and Magistrate Judge Deborah Barnes. ECF 

26. On October 31, 2023, Magistrate Judge Barnes issued a minute order instructing Plaintiff to 

re-notice the motion considering the case reassignment. ECF No. 28. On November 1, 2023, 

Plaintiff re-filed and re-noticed the motion for default judgment. ECF No. 29. Because the two 

motions for default judgment appear to be identical, compare ECF No. 24 with ECF No. 29, this 

order will refer to and cite to the motion for default judgment filed as ECF No. 29. 

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motions be denied without prejudice, and the First Amended Complaint (FAC) be dismissed with 

leave to amend. 

I. Background Facts and Procedural Posture 

Plaintiff is a company incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in 

California. ECF No. 14 at ¶ 5. Plaintiff makes and sells smoking products and is the registered 

owner of three “Stündenglass” trademarks: 

1. U.S. Trademark Registration Number 6,633,884 for the standard character mark 

“Stündenglass” in association with goods further identified in registration in 

international class 011. 

2. U.S. Trademark Registration Number 6,174,291 for the standard character mark 

“Stündenglass” in association with goods further identified in registration in 

international class 034. 

3. U.S. Trademark Registration Number 6,174,292 for the design plus words mark 

“S” and its logo in association with goods further identified in the registration in 

international class 034. 

Id. at ¶¶ 8, 11 (collectively Plaintiff’s Marks or Stündenglass Marks). 

 Defendant Mr Vapes Smoke Shop is a business incorporated in California and has its 

principal place of business in Modesto. Id. at ¶ 6. Defendant Mustasem Yusef Sarama is or was 

the owner, manager, and/or operator of Mr Vapes Smoke Shop. Id. at ¶ 7. 

Plaintiff alleges that on October 18, 2022, Defendant Mr Vapes Smoke Shop sold a glass 

infuser affixed with a Stündenglass Mark to Plaintiff’s investigator. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. “[I]mages 

and/or the physical unit of the product purchased from [Mr Vapes Smoke Shop] were inspected 

by [Plaintiff’s] agent to determine authenticity.” Id. at ¶ 31. Upon inspection, Plaintiff 

“confirmed that the Glass Infuser” sold by Defendant Mr Vapes Smoke Shop to Plaintiff’s agent 

“was a Counterfeit Good with an Infringing Mark affixed to it.” Id. The FAC alleges that the 

“marks are identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, the Stündenglass Trademarks.” 

Id. at ¶ 28. The FAC does not state which of the three Stündenglass Marks was affixed to the 

glass infuser. Nor does the FAC allege facts explaining how Plaintiff’s agent confirmed the 

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infuser purchased was counterfeit. 

Plaintiff asserts claims for “Federal Trademark Counterfeiting and Infringement, 15 

U.S.C. § 1114” and “Federal False Designation of Origin and Unfair Competition, 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1125(a)” against Defendants. ECF No. 14 at 13-17. Defendants were served but failed to 

appear or respond, after which the clerk entered default. ECF Nos. 15-20. Plaintiff moved for 

default judgment on September 11, 2023, and again on November 1, 2023, seeking an award of 

$150,000.00 in statutory damages, an injunction, costs of $1,131.53, and other relief. ECF No. 29 

at 1. Defendants have still not appeared in this matter. See generally, Civil Docket 1:23-cv-0282 

DJC SCR. 

II. Legal Standard 

Default may be entered against a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is 

sought who fails to plead or otherwise defend against the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). “A 

defendant’s default does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a court-ordered judgment.” 

PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Draper v. 

Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the decision to grant or deny an 

application for default judgment lies within the district court’s sound discretion. See NewGen, 

LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 660, 616 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Seven factors—known as the Eitel factors—govern a request for default judgment: (1) the 

possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the merits of plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the 

sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the possibility of a 

dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and (7) 

the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the 

merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). 

Generally, once default is entered, well-pleaded factual allegations in the operative 

complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. NewGen, 840 F.3d 

at 617 (citing Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). 

However, “necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally 

insufficient, are not established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 

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1267 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th 

Cir. 2007) (“[A] defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit 

conclusions of law”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

III. Discussion 

A. Jurisdiction 

“[A] district court has an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject 

matter and the parties” before entering default. In Re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1999). 

Subject matter jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because this action arises under 

federal trademark law, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, et seq. The Court has personal jurisdiction over 

Defendant Mr Vapes Smoke Shop because it is incorporated in and has its principal place of 

business in California. ECF 14 at ¶ 6; ECF No. 29 at 8. Even though the FAC does not allege 

where Defendant Mustasem resides or generally does business, it alleges that he owns, operates, 

and manages Mr Vapes Smoke Shop. Defendant Mustasem was also served in this district. ECF 

No. 15. These facts are sufficient to establish the Court’s personal jurisdiction over Defendant 

Mustasem under the minimum contacts and voluntary presence doctrines. See Martinez v. Aero 

Caribbean, 764 F3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2014). 

B. Service of Complaint 

“In reviewing a motion for default judgment, the Court must determine whether 

Defendant was properly served with the summons and complaint.” GS Holistic, LLC v. Shinwar, 

No. 2:23-cv-0355 CSK, 2024 WL 3890082, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2024) (citing Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 4(c)). Under California law, “a summons may be served on a corporation by delivering a copy 

of the summons and the complaint” on an authorized agent, Cal. Civ. P. 416.10, and by personal 

delivery to the person to be served. Cal. Civ. P. 415.10. On July 3, 2023, at 6:08 p.m., a thirdparty process server properly served Defendants with the FAC. See ECF Nos. 15-17. 

C. Stündenglass Marks Suits in Federal Courts 

Before evaluating the Eitel factors, the undersigned notes that Plaintiff has brought many 

similar, if not identical, claims concerning the Stündenglass Marks against other defendants. See

GS Holistic, LLC v. Shinwar, No. 2:23-cv-0355-CSK, 2024 WL 3890082, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

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20, 2024) (collecting cases). Some judges have granted Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment. 

See GS Holistic, LLC v. Cloud City Discount Cigarettes, No. 2:23-cv-0350 DAD JDP, 2024 WL 

3441441, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2024) (granting default judgment in part and limiting damages 

to $5,000), findings and recommendations adopted 2024 WL 3637485 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2024); 

GS Holistic, LLC v. AA 110, No. 2:22-cv-20377 WBS CKD, 2024 WL 2848455, at *7 (E.D. Cal. 

June 5, 2024) (same), findings and recommendations adopted 2024 WL 3396380 (E.D. Cal. July 

12, 2024); GS Holistic, LLC v. Nasher, No. 1:23-cv-0285 KJM JDP, 2024 WL 1994707, at *1 

(E.D. Cal. May 6, 2024) (same); GS Holistic, LLC v. Habib’s Disc., No. 1:23-cv-0288 DAD AC, 

2023 WL 8644103, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2023) (granting motion for default judgment and 

awarding $75,000 in damages), report and recommendation adopted 2024 WL 495139 (E.D. Cal. 

Feb. 8, 2024). But most judges have found Plaintiff’s allegations vague and conclusory, and 

therefore insufficient to satisfy the standard for default judgment. See Shinwar, 2024 WL 

3890082, at *8 (denying motion for default judgment without prejudice because plaintiffs 

allegations were vague and conclusory and did not satisfy the second and third Eitel factors); GS 

Holistic, LLC v. J’s Smoke Shop, et al., No. 1:23-cv-0286 KJM KJN, 2024 WL 1054899, at *2 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2024) (same); GS Holistic, LLC v. Kings Smokeshop, No. 1:23-cv-0292 TLN 

KJN, 2024 WL 150217, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2024) (same); GS Holistic, LLC v. Ravens 

Smoke Shop, Inc., No. 22-cv-7199 MWF, 2023 WL 5504964, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 10, 2023) 

(same); GS Holistic, LLC v. Ashes Plus Nine, No. 22-cv-7101 LJC, 2023 WL 5993055, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2023) (same); GS Holistic, LLC v. Puff+ LLC, No. 2:22-cv-2035 DAD DB, 

2024 WL 659362, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 16, 2024) (collecting cases where motion for default 

judgment was denied due to GS Holistic’s insufficient pleadings and motion); GS Holistic LLC, v. 

Puff N Go Gift Shop LLC, et al., No. 22-cv-7634 VKD, 2023 WL 4146232, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 

22, 2023) (“While GS [Holistic] addresses the Eitel factors in its motion for default judgment, its 

analysis is cursory and lacks specific analysis of how [GS Holistic’s] factual allegations support 

its conclusions”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 22-cv-07634 EJD (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 

2023); GS Holistic, LLC v. Alien Smoke Shop, No. 2:22-cv-5622 JLS DFM, 2023 WL 3402589, 

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (“Particularly where, as here, a plaintiff seeks substantial 

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damages for alleged infringement, the Court is reluctant to enter default judgment based only on 

allegations that are lacking in detail.”). 

For the reasons stated below, the undersigned agrees with the cases finding Plaintiff’s 

allegations to be vague and conclusory and that default judgment is not appropriate under the 

second and third Eitel factors. 

D. Application of Eitel Factors2 

“The second and third Eitel factors both examine the merits and sufficiency of a plaintiff’s 

complaint, and accordingly, are often analyzed together.” Johnson v. Qolor, LLC, No. 21-cv8475 RS, 2022 WL 3348589, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2022) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted); see also Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1055 

(E.D. Cal. 2010). As noted above, Plaintiff asserts claims for “Federal Trademark Counterfeiting 

and Infringement, 15 U.S.C. § 1114” and “Federal False Designation of Origin and Unfair 

Competition, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).” ECF No. 14 at 12-17. To prevail on a claim for relief under 

either statute, Plaintiffs would have to prove that (1) “it has a protectible ownership interest in the 

mark,” (2) the Defendant used of the mark, and (3) the Defendant’s use of the mark “is likely to 

cause consumer confusion.” Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for Cal. v. Bazaar Del Mundo Inc., 448 

F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).3

1. Valid Trademark 

Registration of a mark “on the Principal Register in the Patent and Trademark Office 

constitutes prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered mark and of [the registrant’s] 

exclusive right to use the mark on the goods and services specified in the registration.” Applied 

2

 Because Plaintiff fails to establish two important factors for determining whether default 

judgment should be granted, like other courts before it, the undersigned does not analyze all the 

factors at this time. Plaintiff, however, is informed that any subsequent motion for default 

judgment should address all seven Eitel factors. 

3

 The “ultimate test” for false designation of origin under § 1125(a), as a type of unfair 

competition claim, is similar to infringement claims under § 1114: the public’s likelihood of 

confusion. See Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th Cir. 2008) (using the same 

likelihood of confusion test to analyze trademark infringement and false designation of origin 

claims); Shinwar, 2024 WL 3890082 (noting that analysis of both types of claims turns on 

likelihood of confusion). 

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Info. Sciences Corp. v. eBAY, Inc., 511 F.3d 966, 970 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citation omitted). 

Here, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he has three valid, protectable trademarks. See ECF 

No. 14 at ¶ 11(a)-(c). Because the FAC sufficiently alleges that three trademarks are federally 

registered to Plaintiff, the first prong of trademark infringement is adequately plead. 

2. Defendants’ Use of the Mark 

The FAC lacks sufficient factual allegations to plausibly conclude Defendant used 

Plaintiff’s Marks. The FAC states that on October 18, 2022, Plaintiff’s investigator “purchased a 

Glass Infuser with a Stündenglass Mark affixed to it, from Mr Vapes Smoke Shop, for a cost of 

$404.53[.]” ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 29-30. The FAC references three registered marks, id. at ¶ 11(a)-

(c), and the motion for default judgment alleges Defendants used “three of the Plaintiff’s 

trademarks with the Registration Numbers 6,633,884, 6,174,292 and 6,174,291[.]” ECF No. 29 

at 16. However, the FAC uses only the singular “a Stündenglass Mark” when describing the 

infuser purchased by Plaintiff’s investigator. ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 29-30. There is thus a lack of 

clarity in the FAC and the motion for default as to the number of infringed marks and, regardless 

of number, which ones were infringed.4

 See J's Smoke Shop, 2024 WL 1054899, at *2 (denying 

motion for default judgment where, among other things, plaintiff failed to specify which of its 

three trademarks was used); Shinwar, 2024 WL 3890082, at *5 (same); Pudasaini, 2024 WL 

710890, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2024) (same); Bubbles Smoke Shop, 2023 WL 6787773, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2023) 

The FAC also makes conclusory allegations as to the counterfeit nature of the infuser. 

“[I]mages and/or the physical unit of the product purchased from [Mr Vapes Smoke Shop] were 

inspected by [Plaintiff’s] agent to determine authenticity.” Id. at ¶ 31. This inspection 

“confirmed that the Glass Infuser ... was a Counterfeit Good with an Infringing Mark affixed to 

it.” Id. These “statement[s] provides no detail as to the process the agent used to confirm the 

similarities of the trademarks.” Shinwar, 2024 WL 3890082, at *5. Plaintiff knows whether its 

4

 Moreover, if more than one mark was applied to the infuser, Plaintiff has not explained how 

one product can bear trademarks associated with two different international classes of goods. 

ECF No. 14 at ¶ 11(a) (Mark associated with international class 011); ECF No. 14 at ¶ 11(b)-(c) 

(Marks associated with international class 034). 

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agent inspected the infuser through “images” or “the physical unit itself” (or through both 

methods).5 Plaintiff’s failure to explain what its agent did to inspect the infuser, including how 

that inspection could differentiate a counterfeit Stündenglass infuser from a bona fide 

Stündenglass infuser, combined with a boilerplate “confirm[ation]” of the infuser’s counterfeit 

status, falls short of showing that its mark was infringed. “If, as other courts have noted, 

Defendant is merely reselling Plaintiff[] [GS Holistic’s] products, this would not be 

infringement.” Shinwar, 2024 WL 3890082, at *5. 

The FAC is accordingly deficient for lack of necessary detail concerning Defendants’ use 

of one of Plaintiff’s marks. 

3. Likelihood of Confusion 

Under the test for likelihood of confusion, courts ask “whether a ‘reasonably prudent 

consumer’ in the marketplace is likely to be confused as to the origin of the good or service 

bearing one of the marks.” Dreamwerks Prod. Grp. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir. 

1998) (citation omitted). To make this determination, courts look to the eight Sleekcraft factors: 

“(1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of 

actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to 

be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of 

expansion of the product lines.” Punchbowl, Inc. v. AJ Press, LLC, 90 F.4th 1022, 1027 (9th Cir. 

2024) (quoting AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogated on other 

grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prod., 353 F.3d792 (9th Cir. 2003)). There is a 

presumption of confusion, and courts need not engage in the Sleekcraft analysis if the plaintiff 

adequately alleges the use of a counterfeit mark. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc 

Sols., Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The late comer who deliberately copies the dress 

of his competitors already in the field . . . raises a presumption that customers will be deceived.” 

(citation omitted)). 

5

 While parties are generally entitled to plead in the alternative, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d), a 

Plaintiff must still go beyond “naked assertions devoid of further factual development.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted). 

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As explained above, the FAC fails to adequately plead Defendants’ use of one of 

Plaintiff’s Marks. The FAC states “images and/or the physical unit of the product purchased 

from [Mr Vapes Smoke Shop] were inspected by [Plaintiff’s] agent to determine authenticity.” 

Id. at ¶ 31. Upon inspection, Plaintiff “confirmed that the Glass Infuser” sold by Mr Vapes 

Smoke Shop to Plaintiff’s agent “was a Counterfeit Good with an Infringing Mark affixed to it.” 

Id. And that the “marks are identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, the 

Stündenglass Trademarks.” Id. at ¶ 28. But Plaintiff fails to identify the specific genuine mark 

used by Mr Vapes Smoke Shop, provides no photographs of the identical marks, nor any details 

regarding the process used by their agent to confirm the similarities of the trademarks. Mere 

assertions that the infuser sold at Mr Vapes Smoke Shop is a “counterfeit good with an infringing 

mark” are conclusory statements, which are not taken as true. See Paulsen v. CNF Inc., 559 F.3d 

1061, 1071 (9th Cir. 2009) (the court is not required to accept as true legal conclusions in a 

complaint “merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations”); Shinwar, 2024 WL 

3890082, at *5-6 (denying GS Holistic’s motion for default judgment in part because of the 

FAC’s reliance on conclusory statements that the Defendant’s agent confirmed the product sold 

by defendant was a counterfeit good with an infringing mark). 

The FAC also fails to allege other facts from which the undersigned can infer a likelihood 

of confusion under the Sleekcraft factors. For example, the FAC contains no photographs or 

product descriptions demonstrating the similarities between the marks, no allegations of actual 

confusion, no description of the marketing channels used, and no description of the degree of care 

consumers are likely to exercise in purchasing the goods. Instead, Plaintiff makes only 

conclusory statements, such as: “[Mr Vapes Smoke Shop] used images and names identical to or 

confusingly similar to the Stündenglass Marks, to confuse customers,” ECF No. 14 at ¶ 37; the 

“[I]nfringing Mark affixed to [Mr Vape Spoke Shop’s] Counterfeit Goods . . . is confusingly 

identical or similar to the Stündenglass Marks that GS affixes to its glass infusers,” id. at ¶ 38; 

Defendants’ infringing acts “have caused and are likely to cause confusion, mistake, and 

deception,” id. at ¶ 42; “[t]he spurious marks or designations used by [Mr Vapes Smoke Shop] in 

interstate commerce are identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, the Stündenglass 

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Marks on goods covered by the Stündenglass Marks,” id. at ¶ 49; and “[t]he Defendants’ 

unauthorized use of counterfeit marks of the registered Stündenglass Marks . . . is likely to cause 

confusion or mistake in the minds of the public,” id. at ¶ 56. As stated above, such conclusory 

allegations lacking in factual support are insufficient for purposes of default judgment. Paulsen, 

559 F.3d at 1071. 

Because the FAC fails to sufficiently plead facts supporting trademark infringement and 

counterfeiting, or false designation of origin claims, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second and 

third Eitel factors and the undersigned recommends denial of Plaintiff’s motion for default 

judgment. 

E. Allegations of Personal Liability 

The undersigned shares the concerns regarding personal liability expressed by another 

judge of this Court in Shinwar, 2024 WL 3890082, at *7. To impute personal liability on a 

corporate officer, like Defendant Mustasem, or any other unnamed officer or director, Plaintiff 

must allege sufficient facts to support that Defendant Mustasem, or any other unnamed officer or 

director, “was the ‘guiding spirit’ behind the wrongful conduct” or “the ‘central figure’ in the 

challenged corporate activity.” Id. (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff’s allegations against 

Mustasem, or any other unnamed officer or director, for personal liability are defective because 

they are entirely conclusory. Id.; ECF No. 14 at ¶ 7 (Mustasem “owned, managed, and/or 

operated Mr Vapes Smoke Shop, and regularly exercised the authority to purchase products for 

resale, decide which products Mr Vapes Smoke Shop offered for sale, to hire and fire employees, 

and controlled the finances and operations of Mr Vapes Smoke Shop”); ¶ 32 (Mustasem 

“authorized, directed, and/or participated in Mr Vapes Smoke Shop’s offer for sale, in commerce, 

of the Counterfeit Goods,” and that his acts “were the moving, active, and/or conscious force 

behind Mr Vapes Smoke Shop’s infringement”); ¶¶ 43-47 (alleging Mustasem’s “willful” acts 

caused damages); see also id. at 15-16 (requesting damages “jointly and severally for 

[Mustasem], and other officers, and directors, for the knowing participation in the [alleged] 

counterfeiting activities of Mr Vapes Smoke Shop”). This is an alternative reason to deny default 

judgment as to Defendant Mustasem. 

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F. Leave to Amend 

Given the deficiencies in the FAC identified above, the Plaintiff should be granted leave 

to amend. See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A district court should 

grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleadings was made, unless it determines 

that the pleadings could not possibly be cured by the allegations of other facts.” (brackets and 

citations omitted)). Should Plaintiff elect not to amend the FAC—which, as explained above, 

fails to adequately plead a claim for relief—the Court should sua sponte dismiss the complaint for 

failure to state a claim. See Turan Petroleum, Inc. v. Ministry of Oil and Gas of Kazakhstan, 406 

F.Supp.3d 1, 4 n.1 (D.D.C. 2019) (“[A] court can sua sponte dismiss a complaint for failure to 

state a claim if taking all the material allegations of the complaint as admitted and construing 

them in the plaintiff[s’] favor, the court determines that the plaintiff[s'] complaint could not 

possibly entitle [them] to relief[.]”) (cleaned up); Akrura Pte. Ltd. v. Apero Tech. Group, No. 

2:23-cv-00102-JLS-KS, 2024 WL 2982971, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2024) (“Plaintiff's failure to 

file a renewed motion for default judgment or to timely amend its Complaint will result in 

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute and to state a claim.”). 

IV. Conclusion 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s motions for default judgment (ECF No. 24, 29) be denied; and 

2. Plaintiff be granted leave to amend the FAC (ECF No. 14). 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen (14) 

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written 

objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

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objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 

DATED: October 22, 2024 

 

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