Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01154/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01154-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Wayne Carson
Petitioner
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DAVID WAYNE CARSON,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1154

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-11-0062-B-2.

______________________ 

Decided: April 11, 2016 

______________________ 

DAVID WAYNE CARSON, Pleasant View, TN, pro se.

DANIEL S. HERZFELD, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

ELIZABETH M. HOSFORD. 

______________________ 

Before MOORE, BRYSON, and REYNA, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-1154 Document: 19-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/11/2016
2 CARSON v. DVA

PER CURIAM. 

David Wayne Carson appeals from an order of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board denying his request for 

corrective action under the Whistleblower Protection Act 

(“WPA”). We affirm. 

I 

At the time of his retirement, Mr. Carson was a criminal investigator in the Office of the Inspector General of 

the Department of Veterans Affairs (“DVA”). Mr. Carson 

retired in 2009 after more than 20 years of service. He 

completed a “Notice of Retirement” form, in which he 

stated that the reason he was retiring was “Desire to 

Retire.” 

In 2010, Mr. Carson submitted a whistleblower complaint to the Office of Special Counsel alleging that the 

DVA had retaliated against him for two protected disclosures: a phone call in 2006 to the legal office of the Inspector General concerning legal advice he received from his 

supervisor, and a phone call questioning the legality of 

seizing a computer during a 2008 operation at the offices 

of the Kentucky Disabled American Veterans (“DAV”). 

He alleged that in retaliation for his disclosures, he had 

been coerced into retiring. On September 27, 2010, the 

Office of Special Counsel closed its investigation of Mr. 

Carson’s whistleblower allegations and informed him that 

he could file an individual-right-of-action request for 

corrective action with the Board.

Mr. Carson filed an individual-right-of-action appeal 

on October, 12, 2010. In her initial decision, the administrative judge who was assigned to the case found that the 

2006 disclosure was not a protected disclosure because 

Mr. Carson’s “disclosure concerned possibly erroneous 

instructions or rules provided by his supervisor, rather 

than any conduct that was violative of any law, rule, or 

regulation.” Accordingly, the administrative judge found 

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CARSON v. DVA 3

that the Board did not have jurisdiction over Mr. Carson’s 

appeal.

The full Board agreed that the Board had no jurisdiction over Mr. Carson’s 2006 disclosure, but it found that 

the administrative judge had not addressed his claim 

regarding the 2008 disclosure. The Board ruled that Mr. 

Carson’s second disclosure raised a non-frivolous claim of 

protected disclosure and remanded the case for further 

development. 

On remand, the administrative judge first analyzed 

whether Mr. Carson’s disclosures during the 2008 search 

and seizure operation at the offices of the DAV were 

protected. During the operation, Mr. Carson had concerns 

that the seizure of a particular computer violated the 

Fourth Amendment. His concern was based on his belief 

that only an employee of the organization had authorized 

the seizure, and that the employee was unable to give 

effective consent to seize the computer. He expressed his 

concerns to two superiors. In fact, it turns out that the 

DAV was cooperating with investigators and had authorized the search. Mr. Carson argued that the disclosure 

was a protected disclosure under the WPA.

After taking the testimony of Mr. Carson and the Assistant U.S. Attorney who was involved in the 2008 

investigation, the administrative judge determined that, 

at the time Mr. Carson raised his concerns, he was unaware that DAV was cooperating with investigators and 

believed that the agency had only the consent of the 

employee. Under the circumstances, the administrative 

judge found that Mr. Carson had a reasonable belief that 

the agency did not have consent to search or seize the 

computer, and therefore his disclosure regarding the 

legality of the search was protected by the WPA.

The administrative judge also found, however, that 

Mr. Carson had failed to establish that his retirement was 

involuntary and therefore did not show that he suffered a 

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4 CARSON v. DVA

“personnel action” within the scope of the WPA. Mr. 

Carson’s retirement was voluntary, the administrative 

judge found, because the adverse circumstances that he 

identified were not “so intolerable that a reasonable 

person in his position would have felt compelled to retire.”

In support of his claim that he was mistreated, Mr. 

Carson pointed to a number of incidents. First, he alleged 

that after the 2008 disclosure, his supervisor, Mike Keen,

threatened to fire him. However, Mr. Keen testified that 

he never threatened to fire Mr. Carson and that he had no 

authority to fire anyone. Mr. Keen’s testimony about his 

lacking of firing authority was confirmed by Mr. Keen’s 

supervisor, Quentin Aucoin. 

Next, Mr. Carson alleged that after the 2008 disclosure, Mr. Keen subjected him to long and abusive case 

reviews and required him to re-present cases to prosecutors that they had previously declined to prosecute. He 

also alleged that Mr. Keen had treated him poorly by

micro-managing his work, talking down to him, raising 

his voice, and interrupting him. Mr. Keen denied subjecting Mr. Carson to longer case reviews than were needed 

based on the complexity of the case and the progress of 

the investigation.

Mr. Carson complained that Mr. Keen allowed another employee to stop preparing Mr. Carson’s travel documents, even though she provided that service for other 

agents in the office. The employee testified that she 

stopped preparing Mr. Carson’s documents after he spoke 

to her in a demeaning manner and that after he apologized to her she began preparing his documents again.

Mr. Carson also alleged that after his 2008 disclosure, 

the agency disapproved his requests for supervisor training. Mr. Aucoin testified that he did not approve Mr. 

Carson’s requests for supervisory training, either before 

the disclosure or afterwards, because he thought Mr. 

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CARSON v. DVA 5

Carson was “abrasive, abusive, and put his own selfinterests above others.”

On other occasions, as claimed by Mr. Carson and 

confirmed by Mr. Keen, the two engaged in heated conversations, and on one occasion Mr. Keen ordered Mr. 

Carson out of his office.

Finally, Mr. Carson pointed to an incident in 2009. 

After Mr. Carson suffered a hand injury, the agency 

stripped him of his badge, his weapon, his law enforcement duties, and his government-owned vehicle. Mr. 

Carson stated that the reason given by the agency—that 

Mr. Carson’s medical restrictions prevented him from 

performing law enforcement duties—was pretextual, as 

another employee had continued with his law enforcement duties after suffering a hand injury. Mr. Keen 

testified that the difference in the agency’s response to the 

two situations was that the other employee did not request any accommodation or indicate that he was unable 

to perform any of his normal duties, while Mr. Carson 

presented a doctor’s note restricting him from using his 

right hand. When the doctor’s restrictions on the use of 

his hand were removed, the agency immediately restored 

his privileges.

Mr. Keen testified that he never asked Mr. Carson to 

retire, and that when the subject came up in conversation, 

it was always raised by Mr. Carson. Mr. Aucoin testified 

that he informed Mr. Carson that he was welcome to stay 

as long as he did the work.

After reviewing the record, the administrative judge

found that Mr. Carson failed to meet his burden to show

that his retirement was involuntary. The administrative 

judge accepted as true Mr. Carson’s allegations that Mr. 

Keen treated him poorly on occasion, but she did not find 

that those circumstances were so difficult as to compel a 

reasonable person to resign. The administrative judge did 

not consider the denial of training requests or the withCase: 16-1154 Document: 19-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/11/2016
6 CARSON v. DVA

drawal of Mr. Carson’s badge, weapon, law enforcement 

duties, and vehicle to be ill-treatment, because the agency 

established that it had legitimate reasons for those 

measures. In sum, the administrative judge found that

Mr. Carson “described no more than difficult and unpleasant working conditions,” which were insufficient to 

satisfy his burden to show that his retirement was involuntary. The administrative judge therefore concluded 

that Mr. Carson had failed to establish that he suffered a 

“personnel action” within the scope of the WPA and 

denied his request for corrective action.

The full Board denied Mr. Carson’s petition for review

and affirmed the administrative judge’s decision.

II

 “A decision to resign or retire is presumed to be voluntary.” Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric., 260 F.3d 1336, 1340-41 

(Fed. Cir. 2001). An employee can overcome that presumption if he proves by a preponderance of the evidence 

that his retirement was involuntary and thus tantamount 

to a forced removal. Id. at 1341. A retirement is involuntary if the agency creates “working conditions so intolerable for the employee that he or she is driven to 

involuntarily resign or retire.” Garcia v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 437 F.3d 1322, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). 

To determine whether a reasonable person would have 

been driven to resign, the Board considers the totality of 

the circumstances, including “events not immediately 

preceding the leave of employ.” Shoaf, 260 F.3d at 1342.

Mr. Carson first argues that the administrative judge

failed to consider the totality of the circumstances. He 

argues that the administrative judge’s error lay in excluding the actions as to which the agency was justified—such 

as the denial of Mr. Carson’s training requests—from the 

totality of the circumstances analysis. 

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CARSON v. DVA 7

The administrative judge did not fail to consider that 

evidence; she simply explained that she did not consider 

those incidents to represent be “ill-treatment” on the part 

of Mr. Keen. The administrative judge meticulously 

analyzed the record, considering both the details of individual events and Mr. Carson’s experience as a whole 

before reaching the determination that his retirement 

was voluntary. We hold that there was substantial evidence for the Board’s finding that Mr. Carson voluntarily 

retired.

Mr. Carson also contends that the Board failed to determine whether the whistleblowing disclosure was a 

“contributing factor” to an adverse personnel action, and 

failed to require the agency to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have had taken the same 

personnel action absent the disclosure. In order to make 

out a prima facie case, however, the claimant must prove: 

(1) that he made a protected disclosure, (2) that he was 

subject to an adverse personnel action, and (3) that the 

protected disclosure was a contributing factor in the 

adverse personnel action. Johnston v. Merit Sys. Prot. 

Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Because the 

Board determined that Mr. Carson voluntarily retired, his 

claim fails because he was not subject to an adverse 

personnel action. Therefore, there was no reason for the 

Board to consider the contributing factor element or the 

agency’s possible affirmative defense.

We have considered Mr. Carson’s remaining arguments but find them unpersuasive.

No costs.

AFFIRMED

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