Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01625/USCOURTS-ca2-14-01625-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William R. Cosme
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

14‐1625‐cr

United States v. Cosme  

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit

________

AUGUST TERM, 2014

ARGUED: OCTOBER 24, 2014

DECIDED: AUGUST 10, 2015

No. 14‐1625‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

   

v.

WILLIAM R. COSME, also known as William R. Cosmo,

Defendant‐Appellant.

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York.

No. 13‐cr‐43 – Harold Baer, Jr., Judge.

________

Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and CARNEY, Circuit Judges.

________

William R. Cosme challenges the government’s restraint of his

property during his prosecution on charges of wire fraud. Upon

Cosme’s arrest in 2012, the government seized several of his assets,

including his cars and two bank accounts. In August 2013, the

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district court issued an order allowing the government to hold the

seized property until the conclusion of its criminal case. Cosme then

unsuccessfully moved to vacate the order on the basis that it

violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the government

seized his assets without seeking a warrant. In addition, Cosme

argues on appeal that there has been no judicial finding as to

whether probable cause supports the forfeitability of the seized

assets. We find merit in both arguments and hereby hold that

exigent circumstances do not support the government’s indefinite

seizure in the absence of a warrant.  We remand for the district court

to determine whether probable cause supports the forfeitability of

Cosme’s assets. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s denial

of Cosme’s motion to vacate the August 6, 2013 order and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

________

JEFFREY E. ALBERTS, Pryor Cashman LLP, New

York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.

MARTIN S. BELL (Sarah E. Paul and Brian A.

Jacobs, on the brief), Assistant United States

Attorneys, for Preet Bharara, United States

Attorney for the Southern District of New York,

New York, NY, for Appellee.

________

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JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

William R. Cosme challenges the government’s restraint of his

property during his prosecution on charges of wire fraud. Upon

arresting Cosme in 2012, the government seized several of his assets,

including his cars and two bank accounts. In August 2013, the

district court issued an order allowing the government to hold the

seized property until the conclusion of its criminal case. Cosme then

unsuccessfully moved to vacate the order on the basis that it

violated his Fourth Amendment rights because the government

seized his assets without seeking a warrant. In addition, Cosme

argues on appeal that there has been no judicial finding as to

whether probable cause supports the forfeitability of the seized

assets. We find merit in both arguments and hereby hold that

exigent circumstances do not support the government’s indefinite

seizure in the absence of a warrant.  We remand for the district court

to determine whether probable cause supports the forfeitability of

Cosme’s assets. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court’s denial

of Cosme’s motion to vacate the August 6, 2013 order and

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  

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BACKGROUND

Cosme’s Arrest

Cosme was arrested on December 19, 2012 on charges of wire

fraud. According to the criminal complaint supporting the arrest,

Cosme defrauded an international school in Korea of approximately

$5.5 million. The complaint alleges that Cosme represented that he

would invest the school’s money but instead used the money to

enrich himself.

On the day of Cosme’s arrest, the government seized several

of his assets, including a Cadillac that was parked in plain view in

his driveway, and a Lamborghini and a Ferrari in his garage that

were discovered during a protective sweep. During an inventory

search of the cars, officers found and seized a bag containing

$634,894 in currency.

That same day, the government delivered letters to Scottrade

and Sterling National Bank requesting that they freeze Cosme’s

accounts (the “bank accounts”), believed to contain proceeds of

unlawful activity, pursuant to civil forfeiture provisions 18 U.S.C.

§§ 981(a)(1)(A), 981(a)(1)(C), and 981(b)(2)(B)(ii). In its letters to the

financial institutions, the government stated that it had “probable

cause to believe that the . . . property is subject to seizure and

forfeiture.” App’x 161. The letters also stated that the government

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was “in the process of obtaining a seizure warrant” from the court

for the accounts but that “exigent circumstances require that the

Subject Property be frozen immediately to prevent it from being

dissipated.” App’x 161. The government cited United States v.

Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1993), and 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B)(ii) in

support of this last statement and noted that, upon the warrant’s

issuance, a copy of the warrant would be provided to the letters’

recipients. The government never sought a warrant for the seized

property.   

On January 17, 2013, Cosme was indicted in the District Court

for the Southern District of New York. The indictment alleged that

the international school had transferred $5.5 million to Cosme upon

his promise to invest it. Instead, the indictment alleged, Cosme spent

the money on himself and otherwise misappropriated it. The

indictment listed a series of purchases made by Cosme using the

money, including a Cadillac Escalade, a Lamborghini Gallardo, a

Nissan Juke, and a Ferrari 458. In a section entitled “Forfeiture

Allegation,” the indictment stated that Cosme “shall forfeit” the

listed property, which included, in addition to the four automobiles,

funds held by Scottrade, Inc., Sterling National Bank, Chase

Investment Services, and JP Morgan Chase banks, as well as the

seized $634,894 in currency. App’x 34‐35. In its brief on appeal, the

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government acknowledges for the first time that the indictment’s

forfeiture allegations were “merely notice provisions that were not

subject to a grand jury vote.” Appellee Br. 39. On July 5, 2013, the

government filed a Bill of Particulars that listed the same property as

subject to forfeiture.

The August 6, 2013 Order and the Stipulations

In July 2013, the government moved ex parte for a pretrial

restraining order applicable to the seized assets. At a conference on

August 6, 2013 before the district court (Harold Baer, Jr., Judge), the

parties discussed the proposed order, which Cosme and his attorney

had not seen prior to the conference. The district court reviewed the

property seized and attempted to determine its value. After

describing it on the record, the district court signed the pretrial

restraining order and provided a copy to Cosme, who offered no

objections to its entry. By its terms, the August 6, 2013 restraining

order permitted the government to “maintain custody” of the seized

assets “through the conclusion of the pending criminal case.” App’x

165‐66. As the government was by then seeking only criminal

forfeiture, the order relied on 21 U.S.C. § 853, a criminal forfeiture

statute, for its authority and stated that the property was “already in

the lawful custody of the Government.” App’x 72. The order also

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cited 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(B)(ii)(II) to preserve the government’s

ability to later pursue civil forfeiture.

At the same conference, Cosme’s attorney asked to be relieved

because of the conflict between his position as a court‐appointed

lawyer and Cosme’s potential Monsanto hearing, the purpose of

which would be to obtain the release of seized funds in order to hire

a replacement lawyer.  

On September 18, 2013, the parties appeared again before the

district court to discuss a stipulation (the “First Stipulation”), in

which the government agreed to release the seized currency in the

amount of $634,894 to enable Cosme to fund his defense. In

exchange, Cosme promised that “he [would] have access to

sufficient unrestrained assets to fund his defense throughout the

course of the [criminal] case, and that, as a result, he [would] not

seek a Monsanto hearing in this case with respect to any restrained

accounts, currency, or property, including but not limited to the

Accounts, Currency, and Property listed in the Bill of Particulars.”

App’x 92. He further agreed “not to raise on appeal any denial by

the Court of a Monsanto hearing.” Id. At the conference, the district

judge confirmed that Cosme understood the terms of the stipulation.

He told Cosme that he was waiving the right to “come back and ask

for more money,” App’x 79, and Cosme acknowledged that “the

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stipulation does waive some due process” and includes “other

waivers which [he] accepted,” App’x 77‐78. The district court

signed the First Stipulation on September 25, 2013, and the following

day, Cosme’s sixth lawyer, Maurice Sercarz, entered an appearance.

On January 8, 2014, Cosme entered into another stipulation

(the “Second Stipulation”), in which the government agreed that

$407,000 held in an escrow account by attorney Sercarz could be

released to a new attorney, David Touger, who, with the court’s

approval, relieved attorney Sercarz. Cosme confirmed with

reference to these funds that he had “access to sufficient

unrestrained assets to fund his defense,” and he again agreed “not to

raise on appeal any denial by the Court of a Monsanto hearing in this

case.” App’x 97.

A few weeks later, on January 23, 2014, attorney Steven

Kessler (Cosme’s eighth lawyer) filed a notice of appearance.  

Cosme’s Motion to Vacate the August 6, 2013 Order

On February 14, 2014, Cosme moved to vacate or modify the

district court’s August 6, 2013 order. Cosme argued, inter alia: (1)

that the seizure of his assets was unlawful pursuant to the Fourth

Amendment because the government had not obtained a warrant

and exigent circumstances did not justify the seizure; (2) that the

order violated his Fifth Amendment rights to due process because

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the government’s application was ex parte; and (3) that the order

violated his Sixth Amendment rights because he did not have

enough money to retain his counsel of choice.

On March 27, 2014, the district judge informed the parties at a

conference that he intended to deny Cosme’s motion but that he

would “permit a Monsanto hearing” in the “interest of justice” if

Cosme requested one. App’x 213. The next day, the district court

denied Cosme’s motion to vacate the order with respect to all of the

seized assets except the bank accounts, which might be subject to a

Monsanto hearing. On March 31, 2014, Cosme informed the district

court that he “intends to seek a Monsanto hearing.” App’x 242.

On April 21, 2014, the district court issued an opinion denying

without a hearing Cosme’s motion to vacate the August 6, 2013

order of seizure. The district court stated that “[t]he Government

made a sufficient showing of probable cause by virtue of the

Indictment, which included the forfeiture allegation,” citing Kaley v.

United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1098 (2014), in support. App’x 250. The

district court’s opinion also denied Cosme’s request for a Monsanto

hearing on the basis that Cosme waived that right “both in writing

and orally,” App’x 253, and that Cosme failed to show that he did

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not have sufficient alternative assets to fund his defense as required

by United States v. Bonventre, 720 F.3d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 2013).

Cosme filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

I.   Waiver

As a threshold matter, the government argues that Cosme

waived his right to appeal the restraints on his property by failing to

object during the August 6, 2013 conference and by entering into the

two stipulations.  

A waiver requires the “intentional relinquishment or

abandonment of a known right.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

733 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).  As a

corollary, if a “party consciously refrains from objecting as a tactical

matter, then that action constitutes a true ‘waiver,’ which will negate

even plain error review.” United States v. Yu‐Leung, 51 F.3d 1116,

1122 (2d Cir. 1995).

Cosme’s conduct at the August 6, 2013 conference does not

reveal intentional waiver of all rights to appeal the pretrial

restraining order. In that conference, Cosme challenged the

restraints on his property by raising objections to the seizures. He

protested, for example, that the seized assets “far exceed” the theft

amount alleged, App’x 56, and argued that the “[t]he burden is on

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[the Government], right, of proving the money is tainted,” App’x 62.

He also timely sought to vacate the order before the district court.

Cf. Olano, 507 U.S. at 731 (noting that a right is forfeited through the

failure to timely object in the district court).  

The stipulations present a closer question. However, we do

not read them as waiving the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims

that Cosme brings here. In the First Stipulation, Cosme agreed that

“he will not seek a Monsanto hearing in this case with respect to any

restrained accounts, currency, or property, including but not limited

to the Accounts, Currency, and Property listed in the Bill of

Particulars.” App’x 92. He also agreed “not to raise on appeal any

denial by the Court of a Monsanto hearing in this case.” Id. The

relevant language of the Second Stipulation exactly mirrored that of

the First. App’x 97.

Both stipulations were narrowly phrased and specifically

addressed only Cosme’s right to a Monsanto hearing. Both

stipulations were intended, by their terms, to cover only Cosme’s

Sixth Amendment‐protected “access to sufficient unrestrained assets

to fund his defense.” App’x 92, 97. Neither stipulation referenced

Cosme’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights. Thus we conclude that

these stipulations did not effect a waiver of the Fourth and Fifth

Amendment claims that Cosme now asserts.  

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A Monsanto hearing vindicates a defendant’s Sixth

Amendment right to counsel by testing in an adversary hearing

whether seized assets are properly forfeitable in circumstances

where the defendant has insufficient assets from which to fund his

defense. United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1203 (2d Cir. 1991)

(en banc) (defining the required process as “an adversary, post‐

restraint, pretrial hearing as to probable cause that . . . the properties

specified as forfeitable in the indictment are properly forfeitable, to

continue a restraint of assets”), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090 (2014). Monsanto, however,

dealt specifically with the Sixth Amendment and, as incident to that,

the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to a hearing on that

question. Id. at 1191 (holding that “a pre‐trial adversary hearing is

required where the question of attorney’s fees is implicated”

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Monsanto did not mention, let

alone discuss, a defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment

and it referenced the Fifth Amendment only as “taken in

combination” with the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1192.

Because Cosme’s stipulations waived only his right to a

Monsanto hearing, they do not reach his Fourth Amendment claim or

his Fifth Amendment due process claim relating to the government’s

ex parte application for the order that was entered on August 6, 2013.

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The government could have sought a broader waiver but did not do

so. Consequently, although Cosme waived the ability to contest the

seizure of his property based on the Sixth Amendment, he did not

waive his right to contest it under the Fourth and Fifth

Amendments.  

Cosme is, however, limited in how he may challenge the

Fourth and Fifth Amendment implications of the seizure. This court

has instructed that Monsanto hearings are required only to protect a

defendant’s “constitutional right to use his or her own funds to

retain counsel of choice”—a right that is, however, “not implicated

unless the restraint actually affects the defendantʹs right to choose

counsel and present a defense.” Bonventre, 720 F.3d at 131. Indeed,

before a court will grant a Monsanto hearing, it demands a

“threshold showing” of insufficient assets to fund counsel of choice,

id., such that the hearing arises exclusively to vindicate Sixth

Amendment rights.1 Having explicitly confirmed his sufficient

access to funds for his defense and having expressly waived his

right to a Monsanto hearing and the related Sixth Amendment

challenges in the two stipulations, Cosme has no independent

 

1 Even if Cosme had not properly effected waiver of his right to a Monsanto

hearing, we see no reason, as a factual matter, to disturb the District Court’s

alternative rationale that Cosme “has not come close to making an adequate

showing of indigence” as required by Bonventre.  App’x 254.

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constitutional entitlement to an adversarial hearing on his Fourth

and Fifth Amendment challenges.2

Cosme’s Fifth Amendment claim, moreover, is easily rejected

and need not concern us further.3 With these principles in mind, we

now turn to Cosme’s Fourth Amendment claim.

II.   Probable Cause Determination

Cosme argues that the restraining order issued on August 6,

2013 violates the Fourth Amendment because there was never a

judicial finding of probable cause. We review this question of law de

novo. See Bonventre, 720 F.3d at 128. After examining the record, we

 

2 We note also that several sister circuits have indicated that a pretrial, post‐

deprivation adversarial hearing is not required absent Sixth Amendment

concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 647 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If a

defendant fails to persuade the court [that he lacks unrestrained funds sufficient

to hire counsel of his choice], then the private interest of the Mathews [v. Eldridge,

424 U.S. 319 (1976),] calculus drops out of the picture, tipping the balance of

interests against a post‐restraint hearing”); United States v. Farmer, 274 F.3d 800,

804 (4th Cir. 2001) (“In sum, a defendant must show a bona fide need to utilize

seized assets to conduct his defense in order to be entitled to a hearing”

(alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  

3 We find without merit Cosme’s argument that the government’s ex parte

application for the August 6, 2013 order violated his Fifth Amendment right to

due process. The motion may have been made ex parte, but the order was not

issued ex parte. Before it was signed, both parties discussed the order extensively

at the conference before the district judge on August 6, 2013. At the conference,

Cosme gave no indication that he wanted to review the order further, nor did he

object when the district judge signed it. Because Cosme had notice and an

opportunity to be heard before the order was issued, we find no due process

violation. See United States v. Premises & Real Prop. at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., Livonia,

N.Y., 889 F.2d 1258, 1263 (2d Cir. 1989) (“As a general rule, due process has been

held to require notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation of

a property interest . . . .”).

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agree that no proper finding of probable cause has occurred in this

case and, thus, we must remand the case to the district court to

determine whether probable cause supports the forfeitability of the

restrained property.  

Government seizures of property in criminal cases must

comply with the Fourth Amendment. While “the government need

not obtain a judicial determination of probable cause prior to

seizure,” it must establish probable cause if a defendant protests

restraints on his property. Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 50 (stating that “the

fourth amendment mandates the existence of probable cause at the

time of seizure”).

The government’s switch from civil forfeiture to criminal

forfeiture in this case does not immunize it from having to

demonstrate probable cause. When it first seized Cosme’s property

in 2012, the government cited civil forfeiture provision 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(b)(2)(B)(ii).4 That provision allows the government to seize

 

4 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B) states:  

2) Seizures pursuant to this section shall be made pursuant to a

warrant obtained in the same manner as provided for a search

warrant under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, except

that a seizure may be made without a warrant if‐‐ . . . (B) there is

probable cause to believe that the property is subject to forfeiture

and‐‐ (i) the seizure is made pursuant to a lawful arrest or search;

or (ii) another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant

requirement would apply . . . .  

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property without a warrant if “there is probable cause to believe that

the property is subject to forfeiture” and an “exception to the Fourth

Amendment warrant requirement would apply.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(b)(2)(B)(ii). At the August 6, 2013 hearing, the government, at

that point seeking only criminal forfeiture, relied on 21 U.S.C.

§ 853(e),5 which enables a court to “enter a restraining order or

injunction . . . or take any other action to preserve the availability of

property . . . upon the filing of an indictment or information

charging a violation . . . for which criminal forfeiture may be ordered

. . . .” See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(C) (“If criminal forfeiture is the only

forfeiture proceeding commenced by the Government, the

Government’s right to continued possession of the property shall be

governed by the applicable criminal forfeiture statute.”). We identify

no inherent problem with the government’s pursuit of criminal

 

5 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) states:  

(e) Protective orders (1) Upon application of the United States, the

court may enter a restraining order or injunction, require the

execution of a satisfactory performance bond, or take any other

action to preserve the availability of property described in

subsection (a) of this section for forfeiture under this section‐‐ 

(A) upon the filing of an indictment or information charging a

violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter for

which criminal forfeiture may be ordered under this section and

alleging that the property with respect to which the order is

sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture

under this section . . . .

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forfeiture after first initiating civil forfeiture proceedings,6 but this

tactic cannot serve as a tool for the government to seize assets

without ever showing probable cause.  It is evident from the district

court’s April 21, 2014 opinion that, when making its probable cause

finding, the district court relied on a mistaken understanding of

what the grand jury voted on in the indictment. In particular, the

district court cited to Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1098

(2014), which suggests to us that it believed that the grand jury had

voted on the forfeiture allegations. In Kaley, the Supreme Court held

that a judge could not “second‐guess[]” a grand jury’s finding of

probable cause. Id. (“If judicial review of the grand jury’s probable

cause determination is not warranted (as we have so often held) to

put a defendant on trial or place her in custody, then neither is it

needed to freeze her property.”). Here, however, as the government

concedes in its brief on appeal, the grand jury did not vote on the

forfeiture allegations, which were simply notice provisions not

subject to a grand jury vote. Accordingly, Kaley does not apply, and

the district court was required to make its own probable cause

finding where none had yet been made in the case.  

 

6 See United States v. Candelaria‐Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 43 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is

perfectly proper to begin a forfeiture action with a civil seizure, and then to

convert the action to a criminal forfeiture once an indictment is returned.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

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The government argues that this error is harmless, but we

disagree. Although the substantive allegations in the indictment

mention the assets in connection with the criminal conduct, at no

point in this case has the government had to demonstrate that it had

probable cause to restrain Cosme’s assets as required by the Fourth

Amendment.7 See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 50. Cosme is thus entitled to a

proper judicial determination of whether probable cause existed at

the time of the seizure to support the forfeitability of his property—

although not necessarily to the adversarial hearing that often

precedes such a determination.

III.   The Warrantless Seizure of Cosme’s Bank Accounts

Cosme also argues that the government’s seizure and

continued possession of his bank accounts violates the Fourth

Amendment. We agree.  

18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B)(ii) allows the government to seize

property without a warrant where an “exception to the Fourth

Amendment warrant requirement would apply.” We have held that

the forfeiture statute does not “create a new exception to the fourth

amendment’s warrant requirement.” United States v. Lasanta, 978

 

7 The Government’s application for the August 6, 2013 order stated, without

justification or explanation, that Cosme’s property was “already in the lawful

custody of the Government.” App’x 72.   

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F.2d 1300, 1304 (2d Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by Florida v.

White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999). “To be valid, therefore, this

warrantless seizure must meet one of the recognized exceptions to

the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement.” Id. at 1305.

The government defends the warrantless seizure of Cosme’s

bank accounts by arguing that it was justified by the exigent

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement under Daccarett.

In Daccarett, we held that exigent circumstances existed where the

government sought to freeze bank accounts used to move drug

trafficking funds. 6 F.3d at 49.    We stated that “[b]ecause the

property at issue was fungible and capable of rapid motion due to

modern technology, we are satisfied that exigent circumstances were

present [in that case].” Id.

Daccarett permitted the initial freezing of electronic accounts

because of their virtually instantaneous transfer capabilities—akin to

the police securing or restricting access to premises while a warrant

is obtained—but we do not read it to allow the perpetual restraint of

a defendant’s property without a warrant. Rather, the exigent

circumstances exception only permits a seizure to continue for as

long as reasonably necessary to secure a warrant, as the government

promised but then failed to do here. We are troubled that, in the

absence of a warrant, the government has retained custody of

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Cosme’s bank accounts for over two years.  See Lasanta, 978 F.2d at

1305 (noting that a warrant was necessary where it was not

“impractical” for agents to obtain one); cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.

385, 393 (1978) (“[A] warrantless search must be strictly

circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

Accordingly, the exigent circumstances exception does not

immunize the lengthy, warrantless seizure here.    Because the

government has never set forth, either here or before the district

court, any alternative theory by which another exception to the

warrant requirement would apply, we conclude that the continued

seizure of Cosme’s accounts violated the Fourth Amendment.

Nevertheless, it is settled law that “even when the initial seizure is

found to be illegal, the seized property can still be forfeited.”  

Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 46).   Cosme is thus not entitled to the relief he

requests—i.e., the immediate return of his restrained assets.    We

express no view as to whether he may be entitled to other relief in

the future, perhaps including suppression of certain evidence—an

issue that is not germane to this appeal.  

However, for the reasons described above in Section II, Cosme

is entitled to a judicial determination of probable cause.    If the

district court determines that probable cause existed at the time of

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seizure to support forfeitability, Cosme’s request for the return of his

property must be denied even though the continuing seizure was

illegal, because “the illegal seizure of property . . . will not immunize

that property from forfeiture.”8 Premises & Real Prop. at 4492 S.

Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d at 1265. If, on the other hand, the district court

determines that no such probable cause existed, then and only then

would Cosme be able to seek a vacatur of the restraining order and

the return of his restrained assets.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the April 21, 2014

district court order and REMAND for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.  

 

8 Our ruling is not intended to foreclose the government from presenting

evidence that there presently exists probable cause to believe the restrained

assets are subject to forfeiture, even if that evidence was not in the government’s

possession at the time of the initial seizure. See United States v. $37,780 In U.S.

Currency, 920 F.2d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce a forfeiture proceeding is

brought, if further evidence is legally obtained to justify the governmentʹs belief,

there is no persuasive reason to bar its use.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Case 14-1625, Document 69-1, 08/10/2015, 1572054, Page21 of 21