Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-08024/USCOURTS-alnd-5_16-cv-08024-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eddie Pressley
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

EDDIE PRESSLEY )

)

vs. ) Case No. 5:16-cv-08024-VEH

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner, Eddie Pressley, has filed a counseled Motion To Vacate, Set Aside

or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. His motion is entirely premised

upon the (accepted astrue for purposes ofthis analysis)failure of priorretained counsel

to file a timely (or indeed, any) Motion To Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He also asksthis court to find that his motion is not timebarred because the same failure of prior retained counsel equitably tolled the statute of

limitations. For the reasonsset out below, this court findsthat the motion is time-barred

and therefore procedurally defaulted. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling.

Further, he has not set out any claims that are cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

Accordingly, the Petition will be dismissed with prejudice.

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

On March 2, 2011, Defendant Eddie Pressley (“Pressley”) was found guilty by

a jury verdict of the following: one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371

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FILED

 2017 Jan-31 PM 03:52

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 5:16-cv-08024-VEH Document 7 Filed 01/31/17 Page 1 of 10
(Count One); one count of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2) (Count Two);

seven counts of depriving the public of its right to the honest services of a public

official or employee through the use of the wiresin violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and

1346 (Counts Three through Ten); one count of conspiracy to commit money

laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count Eleven); and ten counts of

engaging in monetary transactions with criminal proceeds in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1957 (Counts Twelve through Twenty-Two). On January 5, 2012, after ruling on

various post-trial motions, this court sentenced Petitioner to a termof one hundred and

forty-four months’ imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release, and

ordered forfeiture of $21 million. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on

May 2, 2013.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The Petition Is Procedurally Defaulted Because It Is Untimely

Section 2255 enables a federal prisoner to challenge his conviction or sentence;

however, there are procedural limitations on a § 2255 motion. Procedural default is one

of those limitations. Generally, if a defendant does not raise an argument regarding his

sentence on direct appeal, then he may not seek collateral review of his sentence by

way of a § 2555 challenge. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500,

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504 (2003). “The procedural-default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional

requirement, but it is a doctrine adhered to by the courts to conserve judicial resources

and to respect the law’s important interest in the finality of judgments.” (Id.).

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) was

enacted on April 24, 1996, and, pertinent to this case, added a new subdivision to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 providing for a one-year period of limitations within which federal

prisoners must file their motions to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Akins v.

United States, 204 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 971

(2000).

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section.

The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; 

(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by

governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws ofthe United States

is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such

governmental action; 

(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme

Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could

have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

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Petitioner makes no argument, and presents no facts, in favor of the court’s

application of subsections (2), (3), or (4) of § 2255(f). Thus, the timeliness of the

pending motion is calculated under § 2255(f)(1) based upon the date on which

Petitioner’s judgment of conviction became final. In this case, the Judgment of

Convictionwas entered on January 5, 2012. Petitioner appealed to the EleventhCircuit,

and on May 2, 2013, that court affirmed his conviction. He did not appeal to the United

States Supreme Court. His conviction became final ninety days later, on July 31, 2013,

when the time in which he could have filed a petition for certiorari expired. See U.S.

Sup. Ct. R. 13.1. See also, Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003) (“For the

purpose of starting the clock on § 2255's one-year limitation period, we hold, a

judgment of conviction becomes final when the time expires for filing a petition for

certiorari contesting the appellate court's affirmation of the conviction.”). See also,

Chavers v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006)

(per curiam) (recognizing that, under Rule 13.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court,

“‘[t]he time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari runs from the date of entry of the

judgment or ordersought to be reviewed, and not fromthe issuance date ofthe mandate

(or its equivalent under local practice)’”). Thus, the one-year statute of limitations ran

on July 31, 2013, and that was the deadline for Petitioner to file a petition under §

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2255.1 He did not file his petition until April 13, 2016. It is untimely and, thus,

procedurally defaulted.

B. Petitioner Is Not Entitled To Equitable Tolling

Petitionerrecognizesthat his petition is untimely, but requeststhat it be accepted

under the doctrine of equitable tolling. He asserts that, after his sentence was affirmed

on appeal, specifically in March of 2014, he retained an attorney to file a § 2255

petition. Notably, he does not state what grounds would have been asserted in that

petition, and the only grounds he asserts in the present motion is the failure of his prior

§ 2255 counsel to file a § 2255 petition.

Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. The doctrine of equitable tolling

applies “when a movant untimely files because of extraordinary circumstances that are

both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.” Knight v. Schofield, 292

F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). “Equitable tolling is an

1 The court is aware that the Government has argued that Clay “[held] that, for defendants

who do not file a petition for certiorari, the one-year time limitation for filing a § 2255 motion begins

69 days after issuance of the Court of Appeals’ mandate affirming the conviction.” (Doc. 4 at 3).

However, Clay resolved a Circuit split and held that the one-year time period within which to file a

§ 2255 petition “runs from the date of entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, and not

fromthe issuance date of the mandate (or its equivalent under local practice).” Clay v. U.S., 537 U.S.

at 527 (emphasis supplied).

The Government also citesto Kaufmann v. United States, 282 F.3d 1336, 1337-39 (11th Cir.

2002) to support its erroneous calculation. However, in Kaufmann, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a

district court that had calculated 2255(f) by reference to the date on which the appellate mandate was

issued, rather than by reference to the expiration of the 90 day period within which a petition for

certiorari could have been filed.

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extraordinary remedy which is typically applied sparingly.” Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d

1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). An inmate bears the difficult burden of showing specific

facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence. See Akins,

204 F.3d at 1089-90.

First, Petitioner has not alleged that his prior counsel misrepresented the filing

deadline (which, asstated previously, wasJuly 31, 2014). Second, even if prior counsel

did so (and Petitioner relied on that misrepresentation) mere error, excusable neglect,

or mistake, whether by counsel or by movant, does not warrant equitable tolling. See

Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2003)(mistakes of counsel

as to the calculation oftime remaining in limitation period or when the limitation period

begins to run alone does not justify equitable tolling); United States v. McIntosh, 332

F.3d 550, 551 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[E]quitable tolling based on [movant’s] mistake about

the deadline is not warranted”); United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir.

2002)(“‘[M]ere attorney error or neglect is not an extraordinary circumstance such that

equitable tolling isjustified.’ ... Likewise, a petitioner’s own ignorance or mistake does

not warrrant equitable tolling.” (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted); United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7thCir. 2000) (no equitable

tolling where counsel’s miscalculation resulted inmotion being filed one day late: “The

deadline simply was missed. That is not grounds for equitable tolling.”).

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A prisoner has no right to counsel during post-conviction proceedings. Coleman

v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991). Accordingly, “equitable tolling cases do not

laboriously apply the familiar test of Strickland v. Washington ... : Ineffective

assistance of counsel is irrelevant to the tolling decision. Likewise, a petitioner's own

ignorance or mistake does not warrant equitable tolling, and it would be rather peculiar

to treat a trained attorney's error more leniently than we treat a pro se litigant's error.”

Riggs, 314 F.3d at 798 (emphasis in original).

Nor has Petitioner shown diligence on his part even after he learned of his prior

counsel’s failure to file. Using Petitioner’s allegations, he knew, in August 2014, that

his counsel had not yet filed a § 2255 petition. He states that he learned, on September

17, 2014, that his former counsel would not file a § 2255 petition. He had current

counsel representing him as of March 25, 2015 – when that counsel filed a motion

seeking permission to file an untimely § 2255 petition, which this court denied without

prejudice, noting that no cognizable grounds for relief under § 2255 had even been

alleged. Current counsel sought to have that order reconsidered, and this court denied

that motion as well. Yet the current motion was not filed until April 12, 2016. At that

point, not only did Petitioner know that no § 2255 petition had been filed and that the

deadline to do so had expired, he had new counsel representing him for more than a

year who also had that knowledge but failed to file a § 2255 petition. Petitioner has not

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shown that he was duly diligent. See Dodd v. United States, 365 F.3d 1273, 1283 (11th

Cir. 2004), aff'd, 545 U.S. 353 (2005) (discussing lack of diligence during periods

when no impediment existed).

C. The Petition Sets Out No Cognizable Claims

Section 2255 of Title 28 allows a district court to vacate, set aside, or correct a

federalsentence that was imposed in violation ofthe Constitution orlaws ofthe United

States or was imposed by a court without jurisdiction, exceeds the maximum sentence

authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.2 This is called collateral

relief, because it is relief collateral to that available on direct appeal. Collateral relief,

however, is limited, and “[o]nce [a] defendant's chance to appeal has been waived or

exhausted, ... [a court is] entitled to presume he standsfairly and finally convicted” and

“a collateral challenge may not do service for an appeal.” United States v. Frady, 456

U.S. 152, 164–65 (1982). Section 2255 relief “is reserved for transgressions of

constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have

been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage

2

28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provides:

(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of

Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was

imposed in violation ofthe Constitution or laws ofthe United States, or that the court

was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess

of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may

move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the

sentence.

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of justice.” Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (2004) (quoting Richards v.

United States, 837 F.2d 965, 966 (11thCir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Massaro, 538 U.S. at 505–09 (holding that a constitutional claimofineffective

assistance of counsel generally is properly raised on collateral review in order to allow

for adequate development and presentation of relevant facts). On collateral review, it

is the movant's burden to establish hisright to relief. Mackey v. United States, 221 Fed.

Appx. 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2007).

Here, the only matters of which Petitioner complains are matters that occurred

(or rather, failed to occur) entirely post-conviction. He does not complain of any error

at his trial, during his sentencing, or on direct appeal. Rather, at best, he argues that he

received ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel in that such counselfailed to

file a timely (or any) § 2255 petition. However, a defendant has no Constitutional right

to counsel on a collateral attack on his conviction or sentence. Coleman, 501 U.S. at

752. Thus, he has failed to set out any cognizable claim for relief.

III. CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

For the reasons set out above, the undersigned finds that the Motion is timebarred and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling. Further,

Petitioner has failed to assert any cognizable claims. The Court specifically finds there

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is no need for an evidentiary hearing. Any of Petitioner’s allegations not specifically

addressed herein have been found to be without merit.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. The motion to vacate, set aside, or correct an illegal sentence pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Eddie Pressley (Doc. 1) is DENIED.

2. This case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

3. The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly and is directed to

close this case.

4. A certified copy of this Order and the judgment shall also be filed in criminal

case number 5:09-cr-00154-VEH-SGC-2.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the § 2255 motion (Criminal

Case Doc. 257) filed in criminal case number 5:09-cr-00154-VEH-SGC-2.

DONE and ORDERED this the 31st day of January, 2017.

 

 VIRGINIA EMERSON HOPKINS

United States District Judge

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