Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-08-01533/USCOURTS-ca3-08-01533-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lionheart Holding Group
Appellant
Philadelphia Contributionship Insurance Co
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 08-1533

_____________

LIONHEART HOLDING GRP

v.

PHILA CONTRIBUTIONSHIP INS CO,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 06-cv-05254)

District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

_______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

February 26, 2010

Before: CHAGARES, STAPLETON, and LOURIE*, Circuit Judges

(Filed: March 4, 2010)

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OPINION OF THE COURT

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*Honorable Alan D. Lourie, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Federal Circuit sitting by designation.

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LOURIE, Circuit Judge.

Lionheart Holding Group, LLC (“Lionheart”) appeals from the decision of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissing as

untimely Lionheart’s breach of contract claim against Philadelphia Contributionship

Insurance Company (“PCIC”). Lionheart Holding Group, LLC v. Phil. Contributionship

Ins. Co., 534 F. Supp. 2d 543 (E.D. Pa. 2008). We will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Lionheart owns property at 37 Byram Road in Point Pleasant, Pennsylvania. PCIC

insured that property under a National Flood Insurance Program Standard Flood Insurance

Policy (“SFI Policy”) issued pursuant to the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42

U.S.C. § 4001 et seq. Both the SFI Policy, codified at 44 C.F.R. Pt 61, App. A(2), and the

federal statute include a one-year statute of limitations on recovery once a claim for

benefits under the Policy has been denied or partially denied. 

On April 3, 2005, Lionheart’s Byram Road property flooded. The flood caused

serious damage to two buildings present on the property–a restaurant and a house. In June,

Lionheart submitted a Proof of Loss to PCIC pursuant to its SFI Policy for the damages to

both buildings.

On June 15, 2005, PCIC responded to Lionheart’s insurance claim by letter. The

letter stated that Lionheart’s SFI Policy did not cover the house, which would require a

separate policy, and that PCIC would be sending a check for $30,230.46 to cover the flood

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damage to the restaurant. The letter also informed Lionheart that because “a portion of

your claim has been denied, you will have one year from the date of this letter to file suit

in the US District Court for the district in which the property was located at the time of the

loss.” On November 27, 2006, over seventeen months after PCIC’s June 2005 letter,

Lionheart brought suit against PCIC in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking

additional compensation under its SFI Policy for the damages to the restaurant. After the

commencement of the lawsuit, on April 2, 2007, PCIC’s counsel sent Lionheart a letter

suggesting that Lionheart’s claim had not been denied and that the statute of limitations

had not yet begun to run. 

PCIC filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that Lionheart’s suit was

barred by the SFI Policy’s statute of limitations, which it argued had been triggered by the

June 15, 2005, letter. On February 13, 2008, the District Court granted PCIC’s motion. 

Lionheart, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 543. The Court concluded that because PCIC’s June 15,

2005, letter explicitly denied coverage of the house in response to a claim for both

buildings under a single insurance policy, no reasonable jury could find that the letter did

not constitute a denial or partial denial of Lionheart’s claim. Id. at 545. Accordingly, the

Court held that the letter triggered the SFI Policy’s one-year statute of limitations, making

Lionheart’s suit, filed on November 30, 2006, untimely. Id. In so holding, the District

Court found the April 2, 2007, letter sent by PCIC’s counsel allegedly disclaiming the

commencement of the statute of limitations irrelevant because the letter was sent after the

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statute of limitations had run and did not contravene the contents of the June 15, 2005,

letter. Id. at 545 n.1. 

Lionheart timely appealed the District Court’s summary judgment order. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II. DISCUSSION

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo, applying the same

standard as used by the District Court. Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000)

(en banc). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact so that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). All facts must be

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences

drawn in favor of the non-movant. Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806.

On appeal, Lionheart argues that the District Court erred in finding its suit timebarred by the SFI Policy’s statute of limitations. Specifically, Lionheart contends that it

submitted two claims under the Policy, one for each building, and that the June 15, 2005,

letter denied Lionheart’s claim for damage to the house, which was never covered, but did

not deny any portion of its claim for the restaurant and thus did not trigger the statute of

limitations with regard to the latter. This was confirmed, according to Lionheart, by

PCIC’s lengthy post-June 15, 2005, investigation and adjustment process for its restaurant

claim and by the April 2, 2007, letter from PCIC’s counsel, which indicated that the statute

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of limitations had not begun to run. 

PCIC responds that there is no genuine issue of material fact that its June 15, 2005,

letter constituted a partial denial of Lionheart’s claim under the SFI Policy because the

letter denied coverage of the house and expressly stated that a portion of the claim had

been denied. Furthermore, according to PCIC, the April 2, 2007, letter sent by its counsel

is irrelevant because, inter alia, it was sent after the statute of limitations had run and

defense counsel cannot waive a statute of limitations mandated by federal law. 

We agree with PCIC that the June 15, 2005, letter constituted a partial denial of

Lionheart’s claim for benefits under the SFI Policy as a matter of law. PCIC sent the June

15, 2005, letter in response to Lionheart’s insurance claim regarding damages sustained by

the buildings on its Byram Road property. That letter denied Lionheart’s claim with

respect to the house, which the letter indicated was not covered by the SFI Policy, but

confirmed that a check would be sent to cover the damages to the restaurant. The letter

further explicitly informed Lionheart that because PCIC had denied a portion of

Lionheart’s claim, Lionheart had a year within which to file suit. It is therefore irrelevant

whether Lionheart filed a single claim or separate claims for each building. Each claim

sought benefits for damages arising from a single flooding event under a single SFI Policy. 

The letter thus triggered the SFI Policy’s one-year statute of limitations, making

Lionheart’s suit, filed on November 30, 2006, untimely.

We also agree that the April 2, 2007, letter sent to Lionheart by PCIC’s counsel

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fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the consequences of the June 15,

2005, letter. The SFI Policy’s statute of limitations is governed by federal law and cannot

be altered or waived by defense counsel. See 44 C.F.R. § 61.13(d) (stating that no

provision of the SFI Policy shall be altered, varied, or waived other than by the express

written consent of the Federal Insurance Administrator); see also Van Holt v. Liberty Mut.

Fire Ins. Co., 163 F.3d 161, 165-66 (3d Cir. 1998). As such, the letter, even if it could be

read as an attempt to alter or waive the statute of limitations, could not have had that

effect.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s summary judgment

holding that Lionheart’s suit is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

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