Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02591/USCOURTS-ca8-07-02591-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Stanford Johnson
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2591

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Robert Stanford Johnson *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 11, 2008

Filed: June 12, 2008

___________

Before RILEY, GRUENDER, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Robert Stanford Johnson is before us for a second time, this time to challenge

the denial of his motion to suppress evidence and convictions for possession of

cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possession

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). For the

reasons given below, we affirm the decisions of the district court.1

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-2-

I.

On October 4, 2004, a citizen complained to the Des Moines, Iowa police

department about suspected narcotics activity at an apartment on Ninth Street. The

citizen reported a high volume of short-term traffic to the apartment and identified the

occupants as Desseray Wright and Robert Johnson. Officers confirmed with the

electric company that the utilities for the apartment were in Wright’s name. Through

a computerized search of law enforcement records, the police found a man named

Robert Johnson who had an association with Wright. The program relied on data the

department compiled from sources such as witness statements, arrested persons’

contact information, and pawn shops. Using Johnson’s birth date and Social Security

number as given by the program, the officers learned that he had been convicted of a

felony in 2001.

Knowing that heavy short-term traffic is consistent with narcotics sales, officers

arranged for a confidential informant to purchase cocaine base (“crack”) from the

apartment. The informant purchased crack there, but from someone other than Wright

or Johnson. Days later, an informant bought more crack from the apartment, this time

identifying Wright as the seller and providing a physical description. As the officers

conducted surveillance, they observed a man matching Johnson’s description at the

apartment. 

Based on their investigation, the police obtained a warrant to search the Ninth

Street apartment for drugs, money, weapons, and drug paraphernalia. Wright and

Johnson’s names were hand-written at the top of the warrant, to the left of the case

number and above the document caption. The warrant did not otherwise refer to any

individual. The police executed the warrant on October 21, 2004.

Johnson was asleep in the northeast corner bedroom when the police entered.

Upon finding him, uniformed officers immediately detained Johnson and restrained

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-3-

his hands in plastic zipper cuffs. The uniformed officers then left, and plain clothes

officers came into the apartment. One of the plain clothes officers picked Johnson up

off of the bed and put him up against the wall. The officer frisked him, then went into

Johnson’s pocket, pulling out a package and wallet. In the wallet was over $1,500 in

cash; inside the package was 5.33 grams of crack. After Johnson was taken out of the

room, the officers found a shoe box containing a loaded Taurus .38 caliber handgun

on top of a dresser next to the bed and within reach of any person who was laying on

the bed. 

The officers questioned Johnson, then arrested him. A grand jury indicted him

on four counts: (1) conspiracy to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii), 846; (2) possession with intent to distribute more

than five grams of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(iii); (3) possession

of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and (4) being

a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

II.

Johnson moved to suppress the drugs and cash found in his pocket. The district

court held a hearing on the motion in which Officer Chad Nicolino and Johnson

testified. Nicolino recounted the investigation and the execution of the search

warrant. He explained that the occupants of the home were detained before the

officers began their search, both for safety reasons and to prevent evidence from being

destroyed. He testified that because officers knew of Johnson’s prior felony

conviction, Johnson was subject to arrest based on the discovery of the gun next to the

bed and could be searched as part of the booking procedures. Nicolino confirmed that

the search warrant did not include a request to search Johnson, but listed him as a

suspect.

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-4-

Johnson described his detention, search, questioning, and arrest. The court

found no meaningful conflict between Nicolino’s and Johnson’s versions of the

events. The court orally denied the motion to suppress, first finding that the search

warrant was supported by probable cause and that the officers could detain Johnson

as an occupant of the residence under Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).

The court also found that the officers had knowledge of Johnson’s prior felony

conviction, and that there was probable cause to believe that he possessed the gun.

Therefore, the court reasoned that the discovery of the drugs and cash was inevitable

because they would have been found either during the initial frisk or after Johnson

was arrested for possession of the gun. 

The Government dismissed the conspiracy charge, and the case went to trial on

the remaining three counts. Four police officers, a crime lab criminalist, and

cooperating witness Desseray Wright testified on the Government’s behalf. Officer

Brian Mathis identified the crack and cash that he had removed from Johnson’s

pocket. Based on their training and experience, two officers testified that five grams

of crack is not an amount that is normally intended for personal use, but rather

connotes a distribution quantity. They said that the standard user amount is .2 to .5

grams, but allowed that a heavy user might take three to four grams per day. The

criminalist confirmed that the substance found in Johnson’s pocket was crack, that it

weighed 5.33 grams, but that he did not test it for purity. The Government also

introduced several small baggies and Johnson’s identification card, which were found

in the closet of the northeast bedroom. The officers also described the drugs, guns,

and paraphernalia that were found elsewhere in the apartment. 

Wright testified that she consumed five to ten grams of crack with Johnson

nearly every other day. She acknowledged that the apartment was a drug distribution

center, but said that Johnson did not sell drugs. In his defense, Johnson called an exgirlfriend to testify that she suspected Johnson to be a drug user. Johnson’s younger

brother testified, claiming ownership of the handgun and stating that he (the brother)

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-5-

placed the gun in the shoe box in the northeast bedroom. Johnson also testified on his

own behalf. He said that he used 3.5 to 4 grams of crack on a daily basis, that he

earned the cash from his work, that he never sold crack, and that he had never seen the

gun found in the bedroom until after he was arrested.

The jury convicted Johnson on all three counts, but found that the Government

did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson intended to distribute at least

five grams of cocaine base. Hence it convicted him of the lesser-included offense of

possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. Johnson moved for a judgment

of acquittal and a new trial. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal as to the

two firearm counts, and conditionally granted a new trial as to those counts in the

event the acquittal was vacated or reversed. It denied the motion as to the possession

with intent to distribute count, finding “abundant evidence” to support the jury’s

verdict. The Government appealed the district court’s decision on the firearm counts.

We reversed with instructions to reinstate the jury’s verdicts on both firearm counts.

United States v. Johnson, 474 F.3d 1044 (8th Cir. 2007). 

On remand, the district court sentenced Johnson to a total 240 months of

imprisonment. He now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his

convictions for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute and possession of

a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime. 

III.

We review for clear error the factual findings underlying a district court’s denial

of a motion to suppress. United States v. Tyler, 238 F.3d 1036, 1038 (8th Cir. 2001).

We review de novo its ultimate application of the law to those facts. Id. Johnson’s

challenge to the district court’s decision has two parts. First, he argues that there was

no probable cause to support the warrant to search the apartment. Second, he argues

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-6-

that he should not have been detained or arrested when the police executed the search

warrant. We affirm the district court’s decision.

Probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant if, based on the

totality of the circumstances set forth in the application and affidavits, “there is a fair

probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). Here, the warrant application described

two controlled buys of crack at the apartment, and one of the buyers identified

Desseray Wright as the seller. Information from the electric company corroborated

Wright’s occupancy of the apartment. In addition, there was a great deal of short-term

traffic to the apartment, consistent with narcotics trafficking. See United States v.

Sumpter, 669 F.2d 1215, 1222 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding probable cause based on shortterm traffic and allegations of two informants). Considering the circumstances, there

was probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 

Johnson disputes that there was probable cause to connect him to the alleged

illegal activities at the residence. We do not understand the district court’s ruling to

be based on the assumption that the search warrant encompassed Johnson’s person.

Rather, the court ruled that the police were within their power to restrain Johnson

while they executed the search and would have eventually discovered the crack in

Johnson’s pocket. This brings us to Johnson’s second argument.

Michigan v. Summers recognizes that, consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1 (1968), a limited intrusion on a person’s security is sometimes justified by

substantial law enforcement interests such that it may be made on less than probable

cause. Summers, 452 U.S. at 698-700. For example, the resident of a home subject

to a search warrant may be detained so as to prevent flight, minimize the risk of harm

to the officers, and allow the officers to conduct an orderly search. United States v.

Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1111 (8th Cir. 2003). Because a neutral magistrate has

already found probable cause to search the home, there is naturally an articulable and

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-7-

individualized suspicion of criminal activity that justifies the detention of the home’s

occupants. Summers, 452 U.S. at 703-04. In contrast, an articulable and

individualized suspicion does not exist to search the patron of a public business during

the execution of a search warrant. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1979).

Not only was Johnson an occupant of the apartment when the warrant was

executed, he was individually identified in the search warrant application, known to

be a felon, and had been seen at the apartment during a period of short-term traffic.

Regardless of whether he was a temporary or permanent occupant of the apartment,

the police had a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he was involved in criminal

activity. As a result of this suspicion, the police had a right to employ the least

intrusive means to detain him and investigate crime. See United States v. NavarreteBarron, 192 F.3d 786, 790 (8th Cir. 1999) (applying Terry standard to a vehicle stop).

In light of the dangerousness of the suspected drug trafficking, and the likelihood that

Johnson had access to a weapon, it was reasonable for the police to restrain Johnson’s

hands. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100 (2005) (the “safety risk inherent in

executing a search warrant for weapons was sufficient to justify the use of

handcuffs”); Navarrete-Barron, 192 F.3d at 791.

As the district court found, even if the search of Johnson’s pocket was not

otherwise proper, the contents of his pocket would have inevitably been discovered.

Because the police knew Johnson was a felon and saw a firearm within his reach, they

had information sufficient to support the reasonable belief that Johnson was a felon

in possession of a firearm. Thus, there was probable cause to arrest Johnson without

a warrant. See United States v. Hartje, 251 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2001). As Officer

Nicolino testified, Johnson would have been searched incident to that arrest. 

It follows that it was more probable than not that the evidence would have

ultimately been discovered by lawful means in the absence of any alleged police

misconduct. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); see also United States

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-8-

v. Thomas, No. 06-2452, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9632, *11-*18 (8th Cir. May 5,

2008) (Colloton, J., concurring). By virtue of the execution of the search warrant, the

police were pursuing a substantial alternative line of investigation that would have led

to Johnson’s arrest and incidental search. See Thomas, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 9632,

at *6 (opinion of the court). Due to the inevitable discovery exception to the

exclusionary rule, the district court correctly denied Johnson’s motion to suppress the

crack and cash that was found in his pocket.

IV.

We agree with the district court that there was abundant evidence to support

Johnson’s conviction for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. We

observe a strict standard of review on questions of whether evidence is sufficient to

support a conviction. United States v. Savatdy, 452 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 2006).

We resolve all evidentiary conflicts in the Government’s favor and accept all

reasonable inferences from the evidence that support the jury’s verdict. United States

v. Spencer, 439 F.3d 905, 913 (8th Cir. 2006). Only if no reasonable jury could have

found Johnson guilty will we overturn the verdict. United States v. Bell, 477 F.3d

607, 613 (8th Cir. 2007). 

The crack from Johnson’s pocket was admitted into evidence, supported by

expert confirmation that the substance was 5.33 grams of cocaine base. Experienced

officers testified that five grams is far greater than what one would maintain for

personal use. Combined with the cash in Johnson’s pocket, the presence of a firearm,

and the evidence of other drug dealing in the house, the jury had sufficient grounds

to convict Johnson. Cf. Bell, 477 F.3d at 613 (affirming a conviction based on a

similar quantity of evidence). The jury was free to disbelieve the testimony of

Johnson’s witnesses. See United States v. Evans, 220 F.3d 950, 953 (8th Cir. 2000).

We affirm the conviction for possession with intent to distribute. We reaffirm

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694
-9-

Johnson’s conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking

offense. See Johnson, 474 F.3d at 1050. 

V.

We affirm the decisions of the district court in all respects.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 07-2591 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/12/2008 Entry ID: 3442694