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Parties Involved:
Juan Frias
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued March 2, 2016

Decided March 23, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐1568

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JUAN FRIAS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 11 CR 881‐1

Rebecca R. Pallmeyer,

Judge.

O R D E R

Juan Frias appeals his 120‐month sentence for possessing with intent to distribute

over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district court determined that his

relevant conduct included distributing much higher quantities—several kilograms of

heroin and cocaine—than the 382 grams of heroin specified in the indictment, U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(2). The court also refused an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility

because Frias denied distributing the additional quantities of heroin and cocaine,

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). Frias challenges the district court’s relevant‐conduct and

acceptance‐of‐responsibility determinations. We affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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The investigation into Frias began as part of the Drug Enforcement

Administration’s investigation into a cocaine‐distribution ring in Michigan. One of the

suspects, Miguel Reyes, told agents that he had been receiving kilogram‐quantities of

cocaine from Frias in Chicago for approximately one year. Reyes’s partner, Samuel

Lopez, did not know and had never met Frias, but he corroborated that he traveled with

Reyes to Chicago to pick up the cocaine. Based on this information, agents obtained and

executed a search warrant for Frias’s house in December 2011. The search did not turn

up any cocaine; however, after receiving a Miranda warning and signing a waiver of

rights, Frias led agents to his garage and revealed the 382 grams of heroin, a digital

scale, and a PVC pipe that he used to transport drugs.

According to two DEA agents, Frias spoke to them about the extent of his drug

trafficking. Frias stated that the 382 grams of heroin was the remainder of a 500‐gram

supply he had received a month earlier. He told the agents that he had been receiving

300 to 500 grams of heroin every month since 2008. Additionally, on two to four

occasions he had received kilogram‐quantities of heroin. He had two suppliers, one of

whom was Alfredo Soberanis,1 and a single customer whom agents never identified.   

Frias told the agents that he also had trafficked kilogram‐quantities of cocaine

over the past year. He specified that he sold 15 to 20 kilograms of cocaine within the

past half‐year, as well as multiple additional shipments of 2 or 3 to 5 kilograms.

Soberanis was also his cocaine supplier, and Reyes was his only customer.

Frias entered a blind plea of guilty and admitted possessing the heroin found in

his garage. But he disputed that additional drug quantities should be included as

relevant conduct. Based on the agents’ report of their interview with Frias, a probation

officer recommended that, under § 1B1.3, the additional heroin and cocaine were part of

a “common scheme or plan” as the charged offense, and gave a “conservative estimate”

that Frias was responsible for distributing 13 kilograms of heroin and 20 kilograms of

cocaine. The probation officer also recommended denying a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility because Frias refused to be held accountable for the additional drugs.

In his sentencing memorandum Frias made both legal and factual challenges to

the quantity of drugs listed in the PSR. Frias asserted that he could only be held

accountable for the quantity of heroin charged in the indictment and to which he

pleaded guilty. And he flatly denied “any role as a supplier of narcotics to Mr. Reyes or

                                                 

1 Soberanis’s first name is variously stated in the record as Alfredo and Alberto.

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his co‐conspirators” in Michigan. He argued that the evidence of the additional drug

dealing—based on the agents’ accounts of his interview and partially corroborated by

Reyes and Lopez—was unreliable.

At sentencing, the district court heard testimony from the two DEA agents who

interviewed Frias. The agents testified consistently that Frias had admitted distributing

the amount of heroin and cocaine listed in the PSR during the time frame identified in

the PSR, to receiving both drugs from Soberanis, and to selling cocaine to Reyes. The

only difference in the agents’ testimony was the location where they first encountered

Frias—one agent said Frias was first encountered in the garage, and the other said it

was in the house. Defense counsel extensively cross‐examined the agents about their

investigation of Reyes and Lopez, Frias’s fluency in English, and the circumstances of

the interview with Frias—including that Frias did not initial the individual rights listed

on the waiver form; he was not asked to give a handwritten statement; he did not sign

the agents’ interview report; and, after the interview, he spoke with his attorney and

subsequently refused to cooperate.

Defense counsel argued that Frias had not made the statements to the agents.

Frias did not testify or otherwise offer evidence that he did not make the statements or

that the drug quantities the agents testified about were wrong. Frias did apologize “for

all the bad actions,” but stated that he “[didn’t] agree with the agents about the

statements.” Defense counsel also argued that Frias should receive a reduction for

acceptance of responsibility because he admitted responsibility for the heroin found in

the garage.

The government countered that the agents credibly testified about their

interview with Frias and that the additional drug quantities qualified as relevant

conduct because they were part of the same course of conduct—Frias supplied

kilogram‐quantities of both drugs from his home in Chicago during the same time

period and received the drugs from the same supplier. And given Frias’s unsupported

and “blatant[]” denial of his post‐arrest interview with agents, the government urged

the court to refuse a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

The district court found it “not terribly plausible” that Frias was responsible for

only the 382 grams of heroin found in the garage. Noting that Frias had not offered

anything to rebut the government’s evidence, the court adopted the heroin and cocaine

quantities listed in the PSR and described by the agents. The court explained that the

additional drugs were relevant conduct under the guidelines because the offenses

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involved “the same type of conduct”—“the sale of narcotics”—and “the same people or

persons,” in particular the same customer. Because Frias refused to acknowledge this

relevant conduct, the district court denied a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.

Based on these determinations, the court calculated a total offense level of 34 and a

criminal‐history category of I (zero points), resulting in a guidelines range of 151 to 188

months. The court sentenced Frias to a below‐guidelines sentence of 120 months’

imprisonment followed by 4 years’ supervised release.

On appeal Frias makes four challenges to the district court’s relevant‐conduct

determination. First he argues that the district court clearly erred by basing its drug‐

quantity determination on unreliable agent testimony. He points to the agents’

inconsistent testimony about where they first encountered Frias (in the garage or in the

house), the agents’ reliance on Reyes’s and Lopez’s information during their

investigation, the agents’ failure to corroborate Frias’s alleged statements, and the

“troubling” circumstances of the post‐arrest interview—the lack of Frias’s initials next

to each right listed in the waiver form, the lack of a handwritten statement, and the lack

of an opportunity for Frias to review and sign the agents’ interview notes.

Although a drug‐quantity determination must be supported by information that

bears sufficient indicia of reliability, see United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir.

2010), minor inconsistencies and a lack of corroborating evidence do not as a matter of

law make a witness’ testimony unreliable or incredible, see United States v. Isom, 635 F.3d

904, 907–08 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Hernandez, 544 F.3d 743, 746–47 (7th Cir.

2008). Here, the district court heard unrebutted, consistent testimony from two agents

that Frias admitted distributing at least 13 kilograms of heroin and 20 kilograms of

cocaine. Counsel vigorously cross‐examined the agents on their investigation into Frias,

Reyes’s and Lopez’s roles in their investigation, and the circumstances of the post‐arrest

interview. And Frias offered no evidence either that the agents fabricated his statements

or that the content of his statements differed from that reported by the agents. The

district court was thus entitled to credit the agents’ testimony, which fully supported its

conservative drug‐quantity finding.

Next Frias argues that the government did not establish relevant conduct

because it failed to show temporal proximity or regularity of drug sales. But under the

“common scheme or plan” provision of the guidelines—as opposed to the “same course

of conduct” provision—temporal proximity and regularity are not required.

See § 1B1.3(a)(2), cmt. n.5(B); United States v. Baines, 777 F.3d 959, 963 (7th Cir. 2015);

United States v. Zehm, 217 F.3d 506, 511 (7th Cir. 2000) (comparing the “distinct

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concepts” of the “common scheme or plan” and “same course of conduct”

formulations). Rather, the charged and uncharged conduct must be “substantially

connected to each other by at least one common factor, such as common victims,

common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus operandi.” Baines, 777 F.3d at

963 (quoting § 1B1.3(a)(2), cmt. n.5(B)). Here, the same principal (Frias) received

multiple kilogram shipments of both heroin and cocaine from the same supplier

(Soberanis) and distributed the drugs from the same location (Frias’s home) regularly

(monthly heroin deals and multiple cocaine deals) during the same time period (within

a year of his arrest). This is sufficient to show that the additional heroin and cocaine

were part of a common scheme or plan and thus relevant conduct for sentencing

purposes. See § 1B1.3 cmt. n.5(B)(i); United States v. Burnett, 805 F.3d 787, 792 (7th Cir.

2015) (drug sales were relevant conduct where they “involved the same supplier, the

same drug, the same purchasers, and the same continuous period of time as the conduct

of conviction”); Baines, 777 F.3d at 964 (drug sales were relevant conduct where they

shared a common principal, “drug courier/accomplice,” location, “stash houses,

delivery points, delivery vehicles,” and “supplier”).

Third, Frias argues that the district court’s explanation for finding relevant

conduct—that both the charged and uncharged conduct involved narcotics and the

same people, specifically the same customer—was insufficient. It is true that these

statements by the district court, taken alone, would be problematic. The mere fact that

Frias’s conduct involved “the sale of narcotics” is insufficient to find that conduct

relevant for sentencing. See United States v. Purham, 754 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040–41 (7th Cir. 2005). And there was no evidence

that Frias sold heroin and cocaine to the same customer. But these two statements do

not show clear error because the district court is not required to explicitly describe the

factors supporting its relevant‐conduct determination as long as its consideration of

witness testimony, the government’s arguments at sentencing, and the PSR, is

“sufficient to show it made the relevant factual findings” and “[n]othing more is

required to understand the basis for the district court’s [decision].” Baines, 777 F.3d

at 965; see United States v. Singleton, 548 F.3d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 2008). Here the court

considered detailed witness testimony, the government’s argument, and the PSR—all

describing multiple commonalities between Frias’s heroin and cocaine distribution, as

detailed above.

Frias also complains that this was a case of “the tail wagging the dog”—Frias

was indicted for trafficking a relatively small amount of heroin but was sentenced based

on a significantly larger quantity of heroin and cocaine. Frias is correct that the relevant‐

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conduct provision gives prosecutors a “fearsome tool” in drug cases; but as long as the

drug quantity is based on reliable evidence, as it was here, we will uphold a relevant‐

conduct determination—even when it creates a large discrepancy between charged and

uncharged drug quantities. See United States v. White, 519 F.3d 342, 347–48 (7th Cir.

2008).

Frias further challenges the denial of an acceptance‐of‐responsibility reduction.

He argues that his “legitimate” challenge to the drug quantity should not have robbed

him of a reduction for his “genuine[]” acceptance of responsibility, as shown by his

early guilty plea and his expression of remorse. To receive a reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, defendants are not required to “affirmatively admit relevant conduct

beyond the offense of conviction,” United States v. Ghiassi, 729 F.3d 690, 698 (7th Cir.

2013), and they may make good‐faith challenges to relevant‐conduct determinations;

but they may not “attempt falsely to deny past activities,” Etchin, 614 F.3d at 739. See

§ 3E1.1 cmt. n.1(A). Here, Frias, through counsel, denied distributing cocaine to Reyes,

refused to acknowledge making a statement to agents, and contested the agents’

testimony. Frias himself stated that he disagreed with the agents “about the

statements,” but he offered no evidence to support his position. Given his unsupported

denials, the district court was justified in finding his arguments “not terribly plausible”

and refusing to credit him for accepting responsibility. See United States v. Gordon,

495 F.3d 427, 431 (7th Cir. 2007) (no reduction for “frivolous,” “non‐specific objections

to the loss amount in the face of overwhelming evidence”); Zehm, 217 F.3d at 516 (no

reduction after “bare denials to counter the largely consistent stories of several

witnesses”).

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision.

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