Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04192/USCOURTS-ca10-93-04192-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Charles Davis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

I FILED 

United States Court or Appeai:J 

Tenth Circuit 

JUL 2 6 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. Nos. 93-4192 & 

94-4147 

ROBERT CHARLES DAVIS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

{D.C. No. 92-CR-211-W) 

G. Fred Metos (Stephen R. McCaughey with him on the brief), Salt 

Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Stanley H. Olsen (Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, 

and Barbara Bearnson, Assistant United States Attorney, with him 

on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Salt Lake City, 

Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before TACHA, BRORBY and HENRY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-Appellant Dr. Robert Charles Davis appeals his 

convictions for filing false claims with the United States and for 

Appellate Case: 93-4192 Document: 01019279186 Date Filed: 07/26/1995 Page: 1 
mail fraud as well as the district court's order of restitution. 

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in 

part and remand in part. 

BACKGROUND 

A federal grand jury for the District of Utah issued a fortyone count indictment against Dr. Davis, a medical doctor, 

charging him with filing false claims and mail fraud in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 287 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341, respectively. The 

government's theory at trial regarding the false claims charges 

related to bills Dr. Davis sent to the Medicaid program for 

reimbursement for work performed after he had been suspended from 

that program. Those bills were submitted under the names of other 

doctors. The mail fraud charges alleged Dr. Davis had engaged in 

a scheme to defraud patients by utilizing unlawful billing 

practices, and that he furthered this scheme with the use of the 

United States mails. 

Dr. Davis was convicted on thirty-three counts, and he was 

thereafter sentenced to fifty-six months imprisonment and three 

years of supervised release, along with a $50,000 fine. Pursuant 

to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-3664, the district court also ordered him to 

pay approximately $158,000.00 in restitution to his various 

victims. 

Dr. Davis then filed a motion for a new trial asserting, 

inter alia, the district court erred in refusing to hold a hearing 

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to determine if any jurors failed to disclose pertinent 

information during voir dire and to determine if any jurors were 

improperly exposed to extraneous prejudicial information during 

the trial. The district court denied the motion, concluding it 

"rest[ed] on wisps of smoke that disappear in the light of 

reason." 

On appeal, Dr. Davis argues the district court erred in 

denying his motion for a new trial, relying primarily on his two 

claims of juror misconduct. He also asserts the district court 

erred in admitting habit evidence pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 406 

and in prohibiting him from offering evidence to rebut the 

government's habit evidence. Finally, he alleges the district 

court erred in using a formula to calculate the amount of 

restitution he should pay. We address each of these claims in 

turn. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

Dr. Davis' first argument relates to two of the jurors' 

alleged failure to provide candid responses to questions posed 

during voir dire. See, e.g., McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. 

Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) ("We hold that to obtain a new 

trial in such a situation [in a civil case] , a party must first 

demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material 

question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct 

response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for 

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cause."}; United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 

243 (lOth Cir.} (applying the two-part McDonough test in a 

criminal case}, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986}. Specifically, 

he contends one juror failed to disclose that the juror's grandson 

was a patient of Dr. Davis and that the grandson owed Dr. Davis 

money for services rendered. He also contends a different juror 

failed to disclose knowledge of accounting and medical billing 

procedures. Deficiencies with the record on appeal, however, 

preclude us from reaching the merits of this claim. 

The appellant, as the party claiming the district court 

erred, bears the "responsibility to order and provide all portions 

of the transcript necessary to give the court of appeals a 

complete and accurate record of the proceedings insofar as such 

proceedings relate to the issues raised on appeal." lOth Cir. R. 

10.1.1; see also United States v. Vasquez, 985 F.2d 491, 495 (lOth 

Cir. 1993} ("The appellant is responsible for insuring that all 

materials on which he seeks to rely are part of the record on 

appeal."}. "When the appellant asserts that his conviction should 

be reversed because of a particular error, and the record does not 

permit us to evaluate the claim, we will generally refuse to 

consider it." Vasquez, 985 F.2d at 495 (citing Tenth Circuit 

cases} . 

In this case, as in Vasquez, relevant portions of the 

transcript of the trial proceedings are not part of the record on 

appeal. "In the absence of a transcript ... the Court of Appeals 

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will not review an issue, even for plain error." Vasquez, 985 

F.2d at 495 This rule is grounded in the impracticalities of 

attempting to conduct meaningful appellate review of factintensive issues in the absence of a trial transcript. Without 

the transcript, we simply cannot substantiate the representations 

in the briefs regarding what questions were posed during voir dire 

and what the jurors' answers were. As a result, we cannot 

determine whether Dr. Davis has in fact made the requisite showing 

required by McDonough. 

Furthermore, the failure to include the appropriate 

transcripts in the record on appeal constitutes a violation of 

lOth Cir. R. 10.1.1, which states "[t]ranscripts should omit the 

examination of the jurors unless specifically drawn into issue on 

appeal." (Emphasis added). Thus, when the examination of jurors 

is an issue on appeal, the portion of the transcript containing 

the examination of the jurors must be included in the record on 

appeal. Due to these deficiencies with the record on appeal, "we 

must defer to·the trial court's decisions." Moore v. Subaru of 

America, 891 F.2d 1445, 1448 (lOth Cir. 1989). Therefore, we 

affirm that portion of the district court's order denying relief 

on the basis of the jurors' alleged failure to disclose 

information during voir dire. 

Similarly, Dr. Davis' second and third claims of error, which 

relate to various evidentiary rulings by the district court, are 

also unreviewable on appeal because of the failure to include the 

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relevant portions of the trial transcript in the record on appeal. 

We have stated "[t]he failure to file a transcript precludes 

review of the trial court's evidentiary rulings. Challenges to 

the admission of evidence will not be considered by the Court of 

Appeals in the absence of a record containing those portions of 

the transcript on which the appellant relies." Vasquez, 985 F.2d 

at 495. 

Moreover, the failure to provide the trial transcript runs 

afoul of lOth Cir. R. 28.2(d). That rule, which applies to any 

"act or ruling for which a party must record an objection to 

preserve the right to appeal," requires "a statement as to where a 

proper objection and the court's ruling thereon may be found in 

the record." lOth Cir. R. 28.2(d). Without the relevant portions 

of the trial transcript, we have no way of knowing whether the 

issue was even preserved for appellate review.l Because we do not 

have the portions of the transcript demonstrating where a proper, 

contemporaneous objection was made, we cannot, and will not, 

address these issues on appeal, and we therefore affirm the 

district court's evidentiary rulings. 

1 The present case provides an illustrative example of the 

rationale behind Rule 28.2(d). The government contends these 

evidentiary issues were not even preserved for appellate review 

while Dr. Davis claims a satisfactory objection was made before 

the district court. In the absence of compliance with Rule 

28.2(d), we cannot verify these contentions one way or the other. 

Because it is the appellant's burden to create an adequate record, 

that party bears the consequences of failing to provide a complete 

record on appeal. 

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II. 

Dr. Davis next asserts several jurors were improperly exposed 

to extraneous prejudicial information during the trial. In 

support of his motion for a new trial on this ground, he submitted 

an affidavit from a "trial research and jury consultant" who 

conducted a post-verdict interview with several of the jurors in 

this case. The relevant portion of the affidavit with respect to 

this claim is a statement by the affiant that one juror told her 

"[t]here was somebody in the courtroom who was drawing. A lot of 

jurors muted the TV to see who was drawn." Because of the 

presence of the sketch artist, several jurors allegedly watched 

television news reports to see who had been drawn, although they 

did so with the sound of the television muted. It is undisputed 

that this behavior directly contravened the district court's 

admonitions to the jurors regarding their duty to avoid any outof-court publicity relative to the trial. 

Dr. Davis asserts the district court erred by refusing to 

order a new trial based on this conduct by the jurors. He further 

contends these broadcasts were prejudicial because of the 

bulletins and statements accompanying the broadcasts, which 

contained information that was not otherwise admissible at trial.2 

2 Some of the bulletins accompanying the broadcasts stated 

"Pleaded No Contest to Medical Fraud," "License Suspended for 

Three Months," "Insurance Fraud," and "Sexual Misconduct." None 

of this evidence was admitted at trial. Cf. United States v. 

Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 380-81 (lOth Cir. 1986) (holding that 

while jurors were improperly exposed to a newspaper article, the 

contents of the article "had already been admitted in evidence"), 

cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908 (1987). 

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"We review the denial of a motion for a new trial based upon 

juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion." United States v. 

Simpson, 950 F.2d 1519, 1521 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citations and 

internal quotations omitted); United States v. Thompson, 908 F.2d 

648, 650 (lOth Cir. 1990). Before reaching the merits of this 

issue, we must first determine whether Dr. Davis was entitled to a 

hearing on this claim. We conclude the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying the request for a hearing. 

A. 

While a juror "may testify on the question whether extraneous 

prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 

attention," a juror "may not testify as to ... the effect of 

anything ... concerning the juror's mental processes in connection 

therewith." Fed. R. Evid. 606 (b). See generally Tanner v. United 

States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-27 (1987) (discussing the common-law 

history of Rule 606(b) and the policies underlying it). As we 

observed in Simpson, the dichotomy established by Rule 606(b) 

permits a juror to testify (either literally or by way of 

affidavit) on the question of "whether any extraneous prejudicial 

information was improperly brought to bear upon a juror ... [but] 

a juror may not testify as to the effect the outside information 

had upon the juror." Simpson, 950 F.2d at 1521 (emphasis in 

original); see also Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 

(1892) (recognizing a distinction between affidavits bearing on 

"the motives and influences" of the jurors, which are inadmissible 

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to impeach the verdict, and affidavits bearing on the "existence 

of any extraneous influence," which are admissible). 

In Simpson, as in this case, the defendant requested a 

hearing on his claim of juror misconduct, but the district court 

denied the request. On appeal, we affirmed this ruling, 

concluding that under Rule 606(b), "it would have been an exercise 

in futility for the trial court to conduct an evidentiary 

hearing." Simpson, 950 F.2d at 1521. Once the fact of potential 

misconduct was brought to the district court's attention, we 

concluded further questioning of the juror at a hearing as to the 

effect of that misconduct was precluded by Rule 606(b). Id.; see 

also United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1045 (lOth Cir. 

1988) (under Rule 606(b), questioning of a juror who has been 

exposed to extraneous information "is limited to the circumstances 

and nature of the improper contact" and questions bearing on the 

"subjective effect of the contact on the juror's decision-making" 

are prohibited), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069 (1989). In 

accordance with Simpson, and for the reasons set forth below, we 

conclude it was not an abuse of discretion to deny the request for 

a hearing in this case. 

We acknowledge our prior statement that the "proper remedy" 

under these circumstances is for the district court to hold a 

hearing. See Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1045. But while a hearing 

might be prudent or otherwise appropriate, we have never held it 

was absolutely mandatory, and we decline to so hold today. Cf. 

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Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1362 (lOth Cir. 1994) 

(" [T]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary hearing in every 

case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."), 

cert. denied, S.Ct. I 1995 WL 251885 (1995). 

In reviewing allegations that a juror was improperly exposed 

to extraneous information, the district judge who presided over 

the trial is "uniquely able" to assess the relative severity of 

the allegations. See Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, 

Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 922 (lOth Cir. 1992). Because the district 

judge is in the best position to determine whether a hearing is 

necessary 

the initial 

to evaluate such claims, the district judge should make 

determination of whether a hearing would be of 

assistance to it in resolving this claim. Furthermore, we see no 

principled reason to treat requests for a hearing concerning this 

type of allegation differently from similar situations where we 

have held that the district judges have the discretion to grant or 

deny a hearing. We therefore conclude the decision whether to 

grant or deny a hearing on a claim that a juror was 

exposed to extraneous information is vested in 

improperly 

the broad 

discretion of the district courts, and we will review the denial 

of a request for such a hearing only for an abuse of discretion. 

See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 47 F.3d 379, 382 (lOth Cir. 

1995) ("'The decision to rely upon affidavits and the record of a 

case rather than conduct an evidentiary hearing on a fee petition 

is ... reviewed for an abuse of discretion.'") (quoting Hamner v. 

Rios, 769 F.2d 1404, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985)); accord United States 

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v. Whalen, 976 F.2d 1346, 1348 (lOth Cir. 1992) (denial of request 

for an evidentiary hearing in a § 2255 proceeding reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion); United States v. Gines, 964 F.2d 972, 977 

(lOth Cir. 1992) ("The standard of review for denial of an 

evidentiary hearing is abuse of discretion."), cert. denied, 113 

S. Ct. 1023 (1993). 

Applying these principles here, we conclude the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Davis' request 

for a hearing. The affidavit attached to the motion for a new 

trial provided the district court with notice of potential juror 

misconduct in this case and the nature of the alleged improper 

contact (i.e., exposure to extraneous information). Notice to the 

court of that concededly improper conduct by the juror or jurors 

was entirely proper under Rule 606(b), and it was sufficient in 

this case to trigger an analysis by the district court of the 

merits vel non of the issue. At that point, however, a hearing to 

examine jurors to determine if they were exposed to such 

information would, as we observed in Simpson, simply be redundant 

and unnecessary. Furthermore, a hearing on this issue could not 

be used to delve into the possible subjective effect any exposure 

might have had on the jurors' deliberations because of the 

prohibition in Rule 606(b). Accordingly, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the district court's decision 

defendant's request for a hearing. 

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B. 

Although the district court did not err in refusing to hold 

an evidentiary hearing, this does not end the analysis. 

Regardless of whether a hearing is held, the district court must 

still determine whether any exposure to the extraneous information 

impermissibly tainted the jurors so as to warrant a new trial.3 

In addressing the possible impact on the jurors of any 

exposure to extraneous material, the district court first noted 

that the foundation for Dr. Davis' motion was "based almost 

entirely on inadmissible hearsay," and, in several instances, 

constituted multiple hearsay. Because of those concerns, the 

court indicated it "seriously considered" denying the motion on 

the ground that it was not supported by "any competent evidence." 

But due to "the seriousness of the rights at issue ... and in an 

abundance of caution," the court declined to rule the affidavit 

was inadmissible. 

As a threshold matter, it cannot be doubted that the district 

court had discretion to refuse to accept the contents of the 

affidavit, which was executed by a hired jury consultant, because 

it contained the hearsay statements by the consultant as to what 

3 We have previously recognized the "special problem" of 

determining the prejudicial impact of a particular extraneous 

influence in light of Rule 606(b} 's prohibition against receiving 

testimony from the jurors as to the subjective effects of such 

influences. See United States v. Scisum, 32 F.3d 1479, 1483 (lOth 

Cir. 1994} (quoting Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 923). While we remain 

sensitive to this problem, it cannot and does not relieve the 

district courts of their obligation to make a determination of 

whether relief is warranted because of the exposure. 

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she was told by the jurors. Unlike cases where a party provides 

the affidavit of the juror directly (after requesting permission 

from the district judge), e.g., Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1043, the 

affidavit here is from a jury consultant, who was hired by the 

defense for the purpose of reaching a result favorable to the 

defendant. Under these circumstances, the district court's 

concerns over the veracity of the contents of this affidavit 

cannot be doubted. If the district court had refused to accept 

this affidavit because of these concerns over its contents, we 

would review that decision for an abuse of discretion. See United 

States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 873 (lOth Cir. 1995). But, while 

the district judge expressed concerns over the reliability of the 

allegations in the affidavit, it never ruled the affidavit was 

inadmissible. Instead, it addressed the merits of this claim 

after expressly "assuming the accuracy of th[e] information 

[contained in the affidavit]." On the basis of that assumption, 

the court concluded the allegations of misconduct were not 

sufficiently prejudicial as compared to other cases,4 and that no 

"further inquiry or a new trial" was warranted. We conclude, 

however, that once the district court assumed the veracity of the 

affidavit, the remainder of its analysis did not comport with our 

existing case law. 

"The law in the Tenth Circuit is clear. A rebuttable 

4 See, e.g., Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 922-26 (jurors improperly 

considered dictionary definitions of certain terms after trial 

court had excluded the dictionary as evidence); Thompson, 908 F.2d 

at 650-53 (jurors seen reading newspaper article containing 

prejudicial information about the defendant). 

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presumption of prejudice arises whenever a jury is exposed to 

external information in contravention of a district court's 

instructions." Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 922 (citing Hornung, 848 F.2d 

at 1044-45). "The presumption of prejudice 'is not conclusive, 

but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, 

after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact 

with the juror was harmless to the defendant.'" Hornung, 848 F.2d 

at 1044 (quoting Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 

(1954)). In order to conclude the exposure was harmless, in the 

context of this direct appeal, "we must ask ourselves whether we 

can 'declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt.'" Thompson, 908 F.2d at 653 (quoting Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). We have recognized that the 

most common means of demonstrating the harmlessness of an 

extraneous contact is to show the existence of "overwhelming 

evidence of [the] defendant's guilt." Hornung, 848 F.2d at 1045; 

see also Thompson, 908 F.2d at 653. 

In this case, the district court concluded Dr. Davis failed 

to demonstrate sufficient prejudice from the jurors' exposure to 

this information to warrant relief. But under Mayhue, Dr. Davis 

was entitled to rely on a presumption of prejudice which, in the 

absence of any countervailing evidence of harmlessness offered by 

the government, would be sufficient to support post-trial relief. 

Because the district court's analysis did not afford Dr. Davis the 

presumption of prejudice recognized by our cases, and because the 

record on appeal does not permit us to make an independent 

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determination of whether the jury's exposure to this material was 

harmless, a remand is necessary to provide the district court with 

an opportunity to make appropriate findings, consistent with the 

framework enunciated above, for analyzing this issue.5 

III. 

Dr. Davis' final claim on appeal relates to the district 

court's restitution order. He phrases the issue on appeal as 

"whether a formula may be used to determine restitution," and he 

limits his argument to the legal issue of the propriety of using a 

formula, while expressly foregoing any challenge to the district 

court's factual findings or the application of the formula to 

those findings of fact.6 Finding no error, we reject this claim. 

"The determination of an appropriate restitution amount is by 

nature an inexact science." United States v. Brewer, 983 F.2d 

181, 185 (lOth Cir.) (citation and internal quotations omitted), 

5 In so ruling, we do not mean to imply the district court must 

hold an evidentiary hearing on remand. To the contrary, we have 

already determined it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse to 

hold a hearing. Of course, we also do not seek to preclude the 

district court from holding a hearing if it believes a hearing 

would facilitate disposition of this matter. The decision of how 

to address this matter on remand is simply left to the district 

court in the first instance. 

6 Because Dr. Davis does not challenge the district court's 

factual findings relative to the restitution order, we find his 

reliance on United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402 (lOth Cir. 1986) 

misplaced. In Hill, we concluded the record was "void of any 

factual determinations" by the district court other than a 

conclusory statement as to the total amount of restitution and on 

that basis, we remanded the case to the district court. Id. at 

407. In this case, however, it is undisputed the district court 

made specific findings of fact as to how much restitution was owed 

to the victims, thereby distinguishing Hill. 

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cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2348 (1993). In cases like this, where 

the "precise amount" of restitution owed is "difficult to 

determine," U.S.S.G. §SEl.l "authorizes the court to reach an 

expeditious, reasonable determination of appropriate restitution 

by resolving uncertainties with a view toward achieving fairness 

to the victim." U.S.S.G. §SEl.l, comment. (backg'd.) This 

commentary to the sentencing guidelines, which must be given 

authoritative weight unless shown to be inconsistent with federal 

law or otherwise plainly erroneous, see Stinson v. United States, 

113 S. Ct. 1913, 1918-19 (1993); United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 

828, 833-34 n.S (lOth Cir. 1995), suggests that where the amount 

of restitution cannot easily be calculated, the touchstone inquiry 

is whether the amount of restitution ordered was "reasonable." 

Dr. Davis does not challenge the amount of restitution 

ordered by the court as unreasonable, nor has he cited any cases 

prohibiting reliance on a formula in calculating an appropriate 

restitution order. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has rejected the 

precise argument advanced here, namely, that reliance on a formula 

in calculating the amount of restitution is per se impermissible. 

See United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 534 n.ll (9th Cir. 

1992) ("[T]he restitution order entered by the district court is 

not unlawful because it used a formula ... to set the amount of 

restitution."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2446 (1993). We agree 

with this statement, and accordingly, find no error in the 

district court's reliance on a formula in fashioning an 

appropriate restitution order. 

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CONCLUSION 

We AFFIRM the district court's order denying the motion for a 

new trial with respect to the voir dire issue and the two 

evidentiary matters, and we AFFIRM the order of restitution. We 

REMAND the case, however, to permit the district court to make 

appropriate findings on the question of whether the jurors' 

exposure to extraneous information was harmless. 

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