Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00281/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-00281-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Halliburton Company
Defendant
Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
Defendant
Harrison Y. Harris
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HARRISON Y. HARRIS,

Plaintiff,

v.

HALLIBURTON COMPANY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:16 -cv-00281-LJO-JLT

ORDER ADOPTING FINDINGS AND 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO COMPEL 

ARBITRATION

(ECF No. 20)

Plaintiff Harrison Y. Harris (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against defendants 

Halliburton Company and Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.1(collectively, “Defendants”), 

bringing nine claims for race and gender discrimination, harassment and retaliation under Title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the California Fair Employment and Housing 

Act, and various California labor statutes arising from events that occurred while he was 

employed by defendant Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. ECF No. 1. 

Defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration on the basis that Plaintiff’s obligation to 

arbitrate his claims is governed by and enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act. ECF No. 

10. This matter is now before the Court upon consideration of the Amended Findings and 

Recommendations (“F&Rs”) issued by Magistrate Judge Thurston, in which she recommends 

that Defendants’ motion be granted. ECF No. 20. Plaintiff filed Objections, ECF No. 21, and 

 

1 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc., is a subsidiary of Halliburton Company. ECF No. 10-2 at 1. 

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Defendants filed a Response, ECF No. 22. 

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court has conducted 

a de novo review of this case. Having carefully reviewed the entire file, the Court finds the F&Rs

to be supported by the record and by proper analysis, and that Plaintiff’s Objections either repeat 

arguments that the F&Rs have correctly rejected or reflect a misunderstanding both of the 

relevant facts of this case and the reasoning set forth in the F&Rs. 

First, Plaintiff takes issue with the Magistrate Judge’s finding that he knowingly waived 

his right to a judicial forum for his claims. ECF No. 21 at 4-5. Specifically, he reiterates his 

claim that he was unaware that he had agreed to submit disputes arising out of his employment to 

binding arbitration pursuant to Defendants’ Dispute Resolution Program (“DRP”), stating that 

Defendants never provided him with a copy of the DRP and arguing that this omission renders 

the DRP procedurally unconscionable. Id. 

Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. The Magistrate Judge’s determination as to 

Plaintiff’s waiver of his claims is supported by a recent Ninth Circuit decision, Ashbey v. 

Archstone Property Management, Inc., 785 F.3d 1320, 1325-26 (9th Cir. 2015). In Ashbey, the 

Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff had knowingly waived his right to a judicial forum for his Title 

VII and equivalent state-law claims where he signed an acknowledgment form that stated “I 

understand that it is my responsibility to understand the Archstone Company Policy Manual, 

including the Dispute Resolution Policy, and to adhere to all of the policies contained herein.” Id.

The Ninth Circuit further noted “[t]hat the acknowledgment did not list the terms of the Policy is 

not fatal to the Policy’s enforcement,” because “[t]he full text of the Policy was at [the 

plaintiff]’s fingertips; he acknowledged he had received directions on how to access both the 

Manual and the Dispute Resolution Policy contained in the Manual.” Id. Similarly, in this case, 

Plaintiff acknowledged that he “[could] obtain a copy of the DRP from the Human Resources 

Department,” (ECF No. 10-2 at 9 & 28), and the full text of the DRP was accessible to Plaintiff, 

as the sworn affidavit of Halliburton’s Senior Human Resources Manager Stanley Wells, 

indicates that “[a]s a Halliburton employee, Plaintiff had access to the Halliburton DRP website 

via the company intranet. This site includes the DRP materials and documents describing the 

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DRP process, including the obligation to submit disputes over asserted legal rights to binding 

arbitration. This website also serves as a portal for assessing DRP staff with any questions an 

employee may have about the DRP.” ECF No. 10-2 at 2. Ashbey therefore confirms the F&Rs’ 

conclusion that Plaintiff made a knowing waiver of his right to a judicial forum for his claims.

Next, Plaintiff argues that the Magistrate Judge did not properly analyze the substantive 

unconscionability of the DRP provisions on attorney’s fees and injunctions. ECF No. 21 at 5-7. 

With regard to the DRP’s provision on attorney’s fees, Plaintiff argues that the F&Rs failed to 

account for the possibility that the DRP could permit Defendants to recover costs that it could 

not recover under California law. Id. at 5-6. However, a plain reading of the relevant provision in 

the DRP indicates that the recovery of attorney’s fees and cost is restricted to only the employee 

or applicant—in other words, the DRP does not permit Defendants to recover costs. ECF No. 10-

2 at 57 (Paragraph 8.D, “Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding subsection, in an 

proceeding before an arbitrator, the arbitrator, in the arbitrator’s ‘discretion, may allow a 

prevailing Employee or Applicant reasonable attorney’s fees, expert witness’ fees, and other 

costs which may be allowable under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as part of the award.”). 

As for the DRP’s provision on injunctions, Plaintiff makes the unsupported assertion that 

“the DRP does not apply to requests for injunctive orders, e.g., to protect confidentiality of 

company information or protect trade secrets, which are the claims Halliburton is likely to bring 

against its employees.” ECF No. 21 at 7. Again, Plaintiff misinterprets the plain text of the DRP, 

which clearly permits either party to seek an injunction in court. ECF No. 10-2 at 54 (“any court 

with jurisdiction over the parties may issue any injunctive orders (including preliminary 

injunctions) if the necessary and equitable requirements under applicable law are met.”). While 

acknowledging that “courts generally do reject contractual provisions that would have the 

practical effect of being invoked only, or far more often than the employer,” see Davis v. 

Gazillion, No. C 10-743 RS, 2010 WL 2740002, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2010), the Court sees 

no basis for Plaintiff’s assertion that the DRP’s injunction provision is more likely to be used by 

Defendants. Furthermore, as Defendants note in their Response, the provision is completely 

irrelevant here, as neither Defendants nor Plaintiff seek an injunction in this matter. ECF No. 22 

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at 6. 

Based on these two erroneous assertions, Plaintiff then contends that the DRP is so 

“permeated with unconscionability” that it cannot be saved by severing the unconscionable 

provisions. ECF No. 21 at 7-9. However, as the F&Rs correctly find, only two provisions in the 

DRP can be deemed unconscionable: the provision barring representative claims and the 

provision regarding Defendants’ unilateral termination and amendment of the DRP. ECF No. 20

at 17, 21. Moreover, both provisions are irrelevant to this case, as Plaintiff has not brought any 

representative claims (see ECF No. 1), and it is impossible for the unilateral termination and 

amendment provision to apply, because the plain text of this provision indicates that any 

amendment or termination of the DRP would not apply to disputes that arose prior to amendment 

or termination (see ECF No. 10-2 at 56). As the F&Rs note, these provisions can be severed from 

the DRP. See, e.g., Davis, 2010 WL 2740002, at *3 (granting a motion to compel providing that 

“[t]he final sentence of Paragraph C and Paragraph D are stricken from the arbitration agreement 

between the parties.”); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 1599 (“Where a contract has several distinct 

objects, of which is one at least is lawful, and one at least is unlawful, in whole or in part, the 

contract is void as to the latter and valid as to the rest.” Because the vast majority of the DRP is 

not unconscionable, the F&Rs are correct in finding that the two unconscionable provisions may 

be severed and that the DRP is enforceable. 

Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Franken Amendment 

and Executive Order 13673 do not apply in this case. ECF No. 21 at 9-10. The Franken 

Amendment precludes the Department of Defense from entering a contract in excess of 

$1,000,000 unless the contractor agrees not to

“take any action to enforce any provision of an existing agreement with an employee or 

independent contractor that mandates that the employee or independent contractor resolve 

through arbitration any claim under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort 

related to or arising out of sexual assault or harassment, including battery, [and] 

intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

Pub.L. No. 111–118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409, 3454–3455 (2010). Similarly, Executive Order 

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13673, which President Obama signed on July 31, 2014, provides in relevant part, that

[All Federal] [a]gencies shall ensure that for all contracts where the estimated value of 

the supplies acquired and services required exceeds $1 million, provisions in solicitations 

and clauses in contracts shall provide that contractors agree that the decision to arbitrate 

claims arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or any tort related to or 

arising out of sexual assault or harassment may only be made with the voluntary consent 

of employees or independent contractors after such disputes arise.

Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 FR 45309, Sec. 6(a). 

Claiming that Halliburton is a “large oil services company with operations throughout the 

world,” Plaintiff argues that it is “highly likely” that Defendants have a contract with the federal 

government or the Department of Defense valued at over $1,000,000, and requests that the Court 

permit him to conduct discovery as to whether Defendants have such a contract. ECF No. 21 at 

10. 

Plaintiff’s contentions are without merit. Plaintiff’s Objections misunderstand the F&Rs, 

as he seems to believe that the Magistrate Judge’s finding was premised upon him not personally 

working under a government contract while employed by Halliburton Energy Services. Id. at 9-

10. However, Defendants, citing the sworn affidavit of Halliburton Energy Services’ Human 

Resources Manager Stanley Wells, point out in their Response, “[u]ndisputed evidence shows 

that Halliburton Energy Services is not a government/Department of Defense contractor. It 

provides services to private national and international resource production companies, such as 

Chevron.” ECF No.22 at 8. Consequently, Plaintiff’s request that the Court permit him to 

conduct discovery on this matter is futile. Because there is no evidence that Defendants have a 

contract with either the Department of Defense or any federal agency, even assuming the 

Franken Amendment and Executive Order 13673 impose substantive prohibitions2on the 

arbitration of Title VII claims, they do not apply to this case. The Court therefore finds no error 

in the F&Rs’ determination that neither the Franken Amendment nor Executive Order 13673 

 

2 Case law does not support this assumption. See, e.g., Abbiati v. Lockheed Martin Information Tech., 84 Mass. App. 

Ct. 1129, 1129 (2014) (Franken Amendment “does not create any rights or establish procedures that inure to the 

benefit of civil rights plaintiffs”); Fellows v. Career Systems Dev. Corp., 2-16-cv-00718, 2016 WL 4010964, at *5-6 

(W.D. Penn. July 27, 2016) (Executive Order 13673 has yet to come into effect, as its implementing regulations are 

still pending, and it therefore cannot invalidate an otherwise enforceable arbitration agreement).

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apply in this case. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Amended F&Rs (ECF No. 20), filed June 13, 2016, are ADOPTED IN 

FULL;

2. The clauses pertaining to representative actions (Rule 4.B(i)) and unilateral 

amendment and termination (Rule 6) are SEVERED from the DRP; 

3. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (ECF No. 10) is GRANTED;

4. This matter is STAYED to allow for the completion of arbitration;

5. Within 120 days and every 120 days thereafter, counsel shall FILE a joint status 

report. Additionally, within 10 days of the determination by the arbitrator, counsel 

shall FILE a joint status report;

6. The Court shall RETAIN jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award and enter 

judgment for purposes of enforcement. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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