Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01911/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01911-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Lewis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ROBERTA DRAHEIM and TOM LEWIS,

Defendants‐Appellants.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Western District of Wisconsin.

Nos. 18‐cr‐00058‐1 & 18‐cr‐00058‐6 — William M. Conley, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED APRIL 9, 2020 — DECIDED MAY 7, 2020

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Roberta “Mama Bear” Draheim was

a drug dealerin northern Wisconsin. Draheim’s meth conspir‐

acy was her proverbial cub. Between 2016 and 2018, she over‐

saw the shipment of nearly forty packages of multi‐pound

 We have elected to decide this appeal without oral argument as the

briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
2 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

quantities of methamphetamine from sources in California to

La Crosse, Wisconsin. During this time, Draheim supervised

at least eleven associates in her trafficking organization, in‐

cluding defendant Tom Lewis. Caught up in the conspiracy,

both eventually pleaded guilty to certain narcotics offenses.

At sentencing, Draheim faced a mandatory‐minimum sen‐

tence of ten years. She argued she qualified for “safety‐valve

relief,” which would have authorized the district court to sen‐

tence her below the mandatory minimum. The court over‐

ruled Draheim’s objection because she was the leader of her

enterprise. Lewis contended that the court should only sen‐

tence him based on his conviction, not any other “relevant

conduct.” The court overruled his objection too.

Lewis and Draheim now appeal their sentences, maintain‐

ing that the district court’s safety‐valve and relevant‐conduct

decisions are wrong. We affirm the court’s judgment in

Draheim’s case but vacate its judgment as to Lewis and re‐

mand for resentencing.

I. Background

From October 2016 to February 2018, Roberta Draheim

managed a meth conspiracy in northern Wisconsin. She and

her organization were responsible for at least thirty‐eight

packages of methamphetamine (estimated to total a quantity

in multiple pounds) sent from different locations in California

to La Crosse, Wisconsin.

A. Facts

In Wisconsin, Draheim supervised at least eleven associ‐

ates who trafficked meth for her. Her associates called her

“Mama Bear” and accepted shipments on her behalf, sent

money transfers to California, distributed the meth, rented

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 3

storage lockers, and collected money owed to her. After

Draheim directed an associate to accept a package of meth

from California, for instance, she generally paid that associate

to use his or her home address for future deliveries. In addi‐

tion to her own addresses, Draheim utilized six others in

greater La Crosse.  She provided vehicles for her associates to

drive across the area, and she herself drove two different cars

for purposes of drug distribution.

Draheim put one associate in charge of renting storage

lockers in his name, explaining that it was for herfamily’s pro‐

tection. She used the lockers to stash her meth, and in ex‐

change, receive cash from her customers. On one occasion,

Draheim told an associate that she found a substantial

amount of meth in a locker that she forgot was there. The as‐

sociate laughed, saying that it must be easy to forget when

“you’re dealing with six ‘p’ [pounds] at a time.”

Draheim’s organization did not have one syndicated pay‐

ment method for the meth. Instead, Draheim used multiple

forms, including Walmart‐to‐Walmart wire transfers, FedEx

shipments, and U.S. Postal Service packages. On top of send‐

ing money in her own name, Draheim ordered her associates

to transfer money in their names for her benefit.

At certain times, Draheim’s network of traffickers in‐

cluded her daughter, who along with her two small children

(Draheim’s grandchildren), lived with Draheim. In August

2017, law enforcement officers caught Draheim’s daughter fa‐

cilitating a sale of over fifty‐five grams of meth for her mother.

Draheim reluctantly agreed to cooperate with the agents in

their investigation. During her proffer interview, however,

Draheim lied to the agents about her supplier and did not dis‐

close other details of her operation. Soon thereafter, Draheim

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
4 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

resumed trafficking. As a result, the agents monitored her

closely and placed a wiretap on her phone.

Throughout the conspiracy, the authorities seized several

packages of meth en route to Draheim. In January 2018,

agents seized 323 grams of pure meth from Draheim’s Cali‐

fornia supplier. Subsequently, the supplier got cold feet and

forced Draheim to find a new source. At this time, Draheim

got in touch with Tom Lewis, one of her daughter’s friends

who was recently out of jail but still involved in the “meth

scene.” Draheim needed not only a new distributor for her or‐

ganization, but also a personal dealer she could trust, seeing

that many of her own associates were stealing money from

her. Draheim had done business with Lewis in the past and

knew he had a good relationship with her daughter. She

therefore turned to him for help.

On January 27, a mere five days after his release, Lewis

agreed with Draheim to purchase just under fifty grams of

meth from a new supplier in California. Draheim told Lewis

that if he gave her $400, she would split the meth evenly with

him. Lewis planned to drop off  the money at Draheim’s

house. She texted him, confirming the deal: “thanks for join‐

ing in with me.” Lewis kept in touch with Draheim about the

package’s status. When it did not show up as expected,

Draheim told Lewis that she was “freaking out.” They appar‐

ently did not know that agents had already seized the pack‐

age, which contained a little over half what they ordered: 28.6

grams of nearly pure meth, or “ice.” Draheim and Lewis con‐

tinued to anxiously wait for a package that would never ar‐

rive.

On February 4, while still expecting the package, Lewis

and Draheim made a deal for her to drive him somewhere in

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 5

exchange for a gram of meth from him. Lewis said he would

“hook it up like [he] did last night for [her].” Draheim asked

for more than Lewis gave her the night before, specifically

1.75 grams (colloquially, a “T” or “half‐ball”) for $80. Lewis

promised to stop by Draheim’s place with the “half B” for $80.

Draheim later admitted that she received approximately two

grams of meth from Lewis that day. Lewis, for his part, con‐

ceded he went to Draheim’s house three times.

On February 5, police arrested Draheim after they found

her daughter dead at home from an overdose. Then, on Feb‐

ruary 8, the authorities took Lewis into custody for violating

the terms of his state supervision just two weeks after his re‐

lease from prison.

B. Procedural History

In April 2018, a federal grand jury indicted Draheim,

Lewis, and their codefendants with nine counts of meth dis‐

tribution offenses in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.

Count IX charged that, on or about February 4, 2018, Draheim

and Lewis knowingly attempted to possess with the intent to

distribute a mixture or substance containing meth. Draheim

pleaded guilty in October 2018 to conspiring to distribute and

possess with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of

meth.

Shortly before trial, Lewis and the government agreed to

resolve the case with a plea to a lesser charge. In February

2019, Lewis waived indictment and pleaded guilty to a one‐

count information, stipulating that he used a telephone to fa‐

cilitate a drug crime in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). This of‐

fense carried a maximum penalty of four years in prison, as

opposed to a maximum of twenty years under the crime

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
6 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

charged in the original (now dismissed) indictment. This in‐

formation concerned entirely different conduct from the in‐

dictment. Specifically, it addressed Lewis’s February 4 per‐

sonal delivery of two grams of street meth to Draheim, not the

28.6 grams of ice sent from California. The district court sen‐

tenced Draheim in February 2019 and Lewis in May.

Draheim’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) calcu‐

lated her relevant conduct as involving approximately 783.6

grams of “ice” and 1,954 grams of a mixture of meth, covering

eight transactions. This put her total offense level at 35, which

included a two‐point addition—one she did not object to—

given her role as an organizer, manager, or supervisor in

criminal activity under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Draheim’s crimi‐

nal history score was zero, placing her in category I. The com‐

bination of the two calculations yielded an advisory Guide‐

lines range of 168 to 210 months in prison. Based on the drug

quantity, Draheim’s mandatory‐minimum sentence was 120

months under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).

The PSR stated that Draheim was not eligible for safety‐

valve relief, which would have allowed the district court to

sentence her below the mandatory minimum. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. All agreed that Draheim

satisfied four of the five criteria for the safety valve: she did

not have more than one criminal history point; she did not use

violence or credible threats of violence or possess a firearm;

the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury;

and she provided a truthful interview to the government.

Draheim objected to the PSR’s recommendation against

the safety valve, arguing she also satisfied the fifth and final

requirement for relief: “the defendant was not an organizer,

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 7

leader, manager, or supervisor of others in the offense, as de‐

termined under the sentencing guidelines and was not en‐

gaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, as defined in sec‐

tion 408 of the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(4); see also U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(4) (same). Draheim con‐

tended that she qualified for the safety valve unless she was

both a leader, supervisor, or organizer, and engaged in a con‐

tinuing criminal enterprise to not qualify for the safety valve.

Draheim conceded she was a leader; however, she maintained

her organization was not a continuing criminal enterprise and

thus she remained eligible for relief.

The district court disagreed with Draheim’s statutory in‐

terpretation and overruled her objection. The court explained

that she could not be a leader or part of a continuing criminal

enterprise to qualify for relief. The court relied on our deci‐

sions in United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 2017),

United States v. May, 748 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2014), and United

States v. Doe, 613 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010), to conclude that, be‐

cause Draheim was a leader, the fact that she did not engage

in a criminal enterprise was irrelevant to its analysis.

In any event, the court indicated that the application of the

safety valve would not impact Draheim’s sentence. Her

Guidelines range was above the mandatory‐minimum sen‐

tence of 120 months, and “statutory or not” the court did not

see itself sentencing Draheim to anything less than that. Cit‐

ing the scope and impact of Draheim’s drug operation, with

emphasis on Draheim’s crucial role in it, the court sentenced

her to 130 months in prison.

Turning to Lewis, his PSR calculated his base offense level

as 26 based in part on his relevant conduct. This offense level

accounted for the two grams of street meth that Lewis sold to

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
8 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

Draheim on February 4 (the basis for his conviction), and it

also included the 28.6 grams of ice from the new California

supplier that agents seized on January 31 (the basis of the

original and now‐dismissed indictment). After factoring in

Lewis’s acceptance of responsibility and criminal history cat‐

egory of IV, the Guidelines range was 70 to 87 months.

Lewis objected to the PSR’s inclusion of the attempted im‐

port of California ice as relevant conduct, insisting that it was

not part of the “same course of conduct or common scheme

or plan as the offense of conviction” under U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(2). Lewis thus asserted that his offense level should

be 12 because his conviction was only for the 2 grams that he

delivered to Draheim. His corresponding Guidelines range

would be 15 to 21 months. The PSR signaled that the seized

28.6 grams of California ice constituted uncharged or dis‐

missed conduct, which counts as relevant conduct if it is part

of the same course of conduct or common scheme.

The district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation and

overruled Lewis’s objection. The court acknowledged that

Lewis and Draheim “served different roles through their joint

efforts to use and distribute methamphetamine, as well as

possess it with intent to distribute.” It reasoned that Lewis ar‐

ranged both the 2‐gram personal sale to Draheim and the

seized order of 28.6 grams “through phone contact and texts,

and each involved possession with intent to distribute and

distribution of methamphetamine.” The court therefore de‐

cided that the 28.6 grams fell “within the definition ofrelevant

conduct in that it was a continuation of the defendant’s prac‐

tice of obtaining methamphetamine and repackaging it for

sale.”

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 9

The court sentenced Lewis to 36 months in prison, which

was 34 months below the bottom of the Guidelines range of

70–87 months. That said, 36 months still eclipsed what

Lewis’s Guidelines range would have been, 15–21 months,

had the court determined the 28.6 grams of ice was not rele‐

vant conduct.

These timely appeals followed.

II. Discussion

Draheim and Lewis argue that the district court erred at

sentencing when it overruled their respective safety‐valve

and relevant‐conduct objections. We review the district

court’s interpretation of the safety‐valve statute and Guide‐

lines provision de novo. See United States v. Collins, 924 F.3d

436, 441 (7th Cir. 2019). The district court’s application of the

relevant‐conduct guideline to a dismissed drug quantity is a

factual determination that we review for clear error. See

United States v. Tankson, 836 F.3d 873, 883 (7th Cir. 2016). We

consider each challenge below.

A. Safety Valve

When Congress passed the Mandatory Minimum Sentenc‐

ing Reform Act of 1994, it simultaneously limited the applica‐

tion of mandatory minimums in certain cases in a provision

known as the “safety valve.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Following

the legislature’s lead, the Sentencing Commission added an

analogous provision to the Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. In so

doing, Congress and the Commission recognized that man‐

datory minimums are inappropriate for some defendants, in‐

tending the safety valve “to benefit ‘first‐time, non‐violent

drug offenders who were not organizers of criminal activity

and who have made a good‐faith effort to cooperate with the

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
10 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

government.’” United States v. Syms, 846 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir.

2017) (quoting United States v. Arrington, 73 F.3d 144, 147 (7th

Cir. 1996)).

The safety‐valve statute provides that “the court shall im‐

pose a sentence ... without regard to any statutory minimum

sentence, if the court finds at sentencing, after the Govern‐

ment has been afforded the opportunity to make a recommen‐

dation, that—

(1) the defendant does not have—

(A) more than 4 criminal history points,

excluding any criminal history points re‐

sulting from a 1‐point offense, as deter‐

mined under the sentencing guidelines;

(B) a prior 3‐point offense, as determined

under the sentencing guidelines; and

(C) a prior 2‐point violent offense, as de‐

termined under the sentencing guide‐

lines;

(2) the defendant did not use violence or credi‐

ble threats of violence or possess a firearm or

other dangerous weapon (or induce another

participant to do so) in connection with the of‐

fense;

(3) the offense did not result in death or serious

bodily injury to any person;

(4) the defendant was not an organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor of others in the offense,

as determined under the sentencing guidelines

and was not engaged in a continuing criminal

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 11

enterprise, as defined in section 408 of the Con‐

trolled Substances Act; and

(5) not laterthan the time of the sentencing hear‐

ing, the defendant has truthfully provided to

the Government all information and evidence

the defendant has concerning the offense or of‐

fenses that were part of the same course of con‐

duct or of a common scheme or plan, but the fact

that the defendant has no relevant or useful

otherinformation to provide orthat the Govern‐

ment is already aware of the information shall

not preclude a determination by the court that

the defendant has complied with this require‐

ment.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). Section 5C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines

includes essentially identical language. In this appeal, it is

common ground between the parties that Draheim satisfies

the first, second, third, and fifth criteria. The dispute concerns

the fourth criterion.

As stated previously, Draheim contends that the district

court needed to find that she was both a leader of others in

the offense and engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise

to disqualify her from safety‐valve relief. Draheim depends

heavily on Congress’s choice to use the coordinating conjunc‐

tion “and,” and not the disjunction “or,” to connect the lead‐

ership and criminal enterprise clauses. Generally, the joinder

of two clauses with the word “and,” not “or,” means that the

legislature intended that a potential candidate for statutory

relief fulfill both clauses, not just one. See Loja v. Main St. Ac‐

quisition Corp., 906 F.3d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Antonin

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
12 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Le‐

gal Texts 116 (2012) (“Under the conjunctive/disjunctive

canon, and combines items while or creates alternatives.”)); see

also 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, Sutherland

Statutes and Statutory Construction § 21:14 (7th ed. 2007) (simi‐

lar).

The government disagrees, and the district court adopted

the government’s proposed interpretation, pointing to some

of our safety‐valve jurisprudence. See Syms, 846 F.3d 230;

United States v. May, 748 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2014); United States

v. Doe, 613 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010). We agree with Draheim,

however, that those cases do not resolve the issue because the

parties did not present the specific issue to us for a decision

one way or the other. In this Circuit, then, we are effectively

writing on a blank slate. But this is not a matter of first im‐

pression across the courts of appeals because one of our fel‐

low circuits has ruled on it, albeit several years ago. See United

States v. Bazel, 80 F.3d 1140, 1143 (6th Cir. 1996).

In Bazel, the defendant asserted what Draheim does here:

a defendant otherwise eligible for a sub‐mandatory‐mini‐

mum sentence under the safety valve still qualifies for relief if

the defendant did not engage in a continuing criminal enter‐

prise, even if the government demonstrates that the defend‐

ant was a leader of a criminal operation. 80 F.3d at 1141. The

Sixth Circuit rejected the premise “that the use of the conjunc‐

tive ‘and’ in the statute and Guideline requires the govern‐

ment to prove both that Bazel was not an ‘organizer, leader,

manager, or supervisor’ and that he was not engaged in a

[continuing criminal enterprise].” Id. at 1142. The Bazel de‐

fendant (like Draheim) protested “that to deny the ‘safety

valve’ to him if the court finds only one of these requirements

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 13

to be true is equivalent to judicially substituting the disjunc‐

tive ‘or’ for the conjunctive ‘and.’” Id. at 1142–43.

The Sixth Circuitreasoned that the defendant’s “argument

would be correct if § 3553(f) or § 5C1.2 were phrased in terms

of what the government would have to prove was true of the

defendant, but unfortunately for [the defendant], the statute

is phrased in terms of what the defendant must show was not

true of him.” Id. at 1143; see also Stacey M. Studnicki, Federal

Sentencing Guidelines, 1997 Det. C.L. Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 625,

703 (1997) (“The statute is not phrased in terms of what the

government would have to prove was true of the defendant;

rather, it is phrased in terms of what a defendant must prove

was not true of him.”).

We find our sister circuit’s textual analysis convincing and

adopt its approach as our own for that reason and three oth‐

ers. First and foremost, it is consistent with our caselaw hold‐

ing that a defendant must bear “the burden of establishing el‐

igibility for the safety‐valve exemption from a mandatory

minimum sentence.” Collins, 924 F.3d at 441. Understood ac‐

cordingly, the defendant—not the government—must prove

the defendant’s entitlement to safety‐valve relief by demon‐

strating “the defendant was not an organizer, leader, man‐

ager, or supervisor of others in the offense, ... and was not

engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise ... .” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f)(4).

Second, as noted by both the Sixth Circuit and us, “the leg‐

islative history of the statute and the Guideline[s] is clear. Sec‐

tion 3553(f) was intended to provide a ‘safety valve’ for mere

drug ‘mules’—carriers without significant leadership roles in

a drug operation.” Bazel, 80 F.3d at 1144;see also Syms, 846 F.3d

at 235 (stating that Congress intended the safety valve “to

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
14 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

benefit first‐time, non‐violent drug offenders who were not

organizers of criminal activity and who have made a good‐

faith effort to cooperate with the government.” (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as in Bazel, Draheim

ran her own drug operation. She was not a “mule” or a low‐

level dealer. According to the safety valve’s purpose, then,

Draheim should not benefit from it.

Third, and finally, the Sentencing Commission’s commen‐

tary reinforces the Sixth Circuit’s and now our reading of the

safety‐valve provision. Specifically, Application Note 6 of

§ 5C1.2 states:

“Engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise,”

as used in subsection (a)(4), is defined in 21

U.S.C. § 848(c). As a practical matter, it should

not be necessary to apply this prong of subsec‐

tion (a)(4) because (i) this section does not apply

to a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848, and (ii)

any defendant who “engaged in a continuing

criminal enterprise,” but is convicted of an of‐

fense to which this section applies will be an

“organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of

others in the offense.”

Draheim accepts that the commentary contradicts her stat‐

utory construction. Draheim nevertheless claims that a dis‐

trict court must find that the government showed both prongs

of subsection (a)(4) apply. But that runs right into the Sentenc‐

ing Commission’s contrary interpretation, which observes

that “[a]s a practical matter, it should not be necessary to ap‐

ply [the continuing criminal enterprise] prong of subsection

(a)(4) ... .” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, cmt. n. 6. Construing subsec‐

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 15

tion(a)(4) to require the defendant to establish both prongs har‐

monizes with the Commission’s own comprehension of the

effect (or lack thereof) of the provision.

The district court appropriately denied Draheim safety‐

valve relief from her mandatory‐minimum sentence.

B. Relevant Conduct

Moving on, we next address Lewis’s objection to the dis‐

trict court’s relevant‐conduct determination. To calculate a

defendant’s base offense level under the Guidelines, “the sen‐

tencing court must consider types and quantities of drugs not

specified in the counts of conviction but that were ‘part of the

same course of conduct or common scheme or plan’ as the

convicted offenses.” United States v. Ortiz, 431 F.3d 1035, 1040

(7th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Beler, 20 F.3d 1428,

1431 (7th Cir. 1994)). “‘Common scheme or plan’ and ‘same

course of conduct’ are two closely related concepts.” U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(2), cmt. n. 5(B).

“For two or more offenses to constitute part of a common

scheme or plan, they must be substantially connected to each

other by at least one common factor, such as common victims,

common accomplices, common purpose, or similar modus op‐

erandi.” Id. cmt. n. 5(B)(i). The Sentencing Commission’s com‐

mentary continues:

Offenses that do not qualify as part of a common

scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part

of the same course of conduct if they are suffi‐

ciently connected or related to each other as to

warrant the conclusion that they are part of a

single episode, spree, or ongoing series of of‐

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
16 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

fenses. Factors that are appropriate to the deter‐

mination of whether offenses are sufficiently

connected or related to each other to be consid‐

ered as part of the same course of conduct in‐

clude the degree of similarity of the offenses, the

regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the

time interval between the offenses. When one of

the above factors is absent, a stronger presence

of at least one of the other factors is required.

Id. cmt. n. 5(B)(ii).

To be clear, relevant conduct does not “encompass any of‐

fense that is similar in kind to the offense of conviction but ...

does not bear the required relationship to that offense.” Ortiz,

431 F.3d at 1040 (quoting United States v. Patel, 131 F.3d 1195,

1204 (7th Cir. 1997)). We have emphasized that the “mere fact

that the defendant has engaged in other drug transactions is

not sufficient to justify treating those transactions as ‘relevant

conduct’ for sentencing purposes.” United States v. Purham,

754 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Crock‐

ett, 82 F.3d 722, 730 (7th Cir. 1996)).

In this case, the district court did not expressly find that

the dismissed drug quantity qualified as part of a common

scheme or plan or the same course of conduct. Regardless,

“we may ... affirm without a recitation of magic words that

reference [the Guidelines] if the record supports the district

court’s conclusion.” United States v. Westerfield, 714 F.3d 480,

488 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). The court’s explicit discussion of relevant conduct

highlighted that both transactions involved cell phones and

the possession with intent to distribute and distribution of

meth. It appreciated Lewis and Draheim’s “different roles” in

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 17

their “joint efforts” to dispense meth. The way it saw things,

the California ice order was a “continuation of the defendant’s

practice of obtaining methamphetamine and repackaging it

for sale.”

We do not share the district court’s view. As an initial mat‐

ter, cell phone usage is common, both within the drug trade

and outside of it. On that ground, cell phone use does not

strike us as a very compelling commonality or connection be‐

tween the two transactions. It is also hard for us to understand

how the California ice order was a “continuation” of any prac‐

tice for Lewis when he had just gotten out of prison and this

was the first deal of its kind for Lewis (and the first for

Draheim from this provider).

Importantly, the district court needed to distinguish the

nature of the two transactions. In one transaction, there was

an individual sale of two grams of street meth in a city. In the

other, there was a collaborative bulk order from the other side

of the nation for nearly fifty grams of pure ice. Drug type and

quantity matter when determining the scope of relevant con‐

duct. See United States v. Johnson, 324 F.3d 875, 879 (7th Cir.

2003) (differentiating a large powder cocaine conspiracy from

an individual sale of crack); see also Purham, 754 F.3d at 414

(“The 2008 transactions generally involved much larger

amounts of cocaine than the 2010 transactions.”); Ortiz, 431

F.3d at 1041–42 (finding no relevant conduct where the of‐

fenses were not sufficiently similar because they involved dif‐

ferent drugs, a smaller scale operation, and significantly

smaller drug quantities); but see United States v. White, 519 F.3d

342, 349 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting we do not require a non‐

charged offense to involve a drug identical to that in the of‐

fense of conviction).

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
18 Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911

A one‐time order of a large amount of ice from a national

distributor does not match up with a small sale of street meth

to a local customer. See United States v. McGowan, 478 F.3d 800,

802 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that irregular purchases of sig‐

nificant amounts of cocaine from one person do not align with

a sale of a small amount to another). Lewis’s dismissed con‐

duct was a drug scheme involving, as the district court put it,

joint efforts to acquire a significant amount of ice, while

Lewis’s conviction was for “apparently acting alone to make

an individual drug sale.” Johnson, 324 F.3d at 880. Lewis’s role,

as the court comprehended it, “changed from one of many co‐

conspirators to lone dealer.” Id.

Bearing this in mind, the fact that Draheim partook in both

deals does not pack that great of a punch. Again, Draheim was

Lewis’s accomplice trafficker in the California ice order. She

was, in a manner of speaking, a colleague. Conversely, in the

Wisconsin street‐meth deal, Draheim was Lewis’s customer.

She was effectively a different person given her “different

roles.” Lastly, these key distinctions are not overcome by the

admitted closeness in time between the two transactions.

Granted, only a week and a half separated the two deals.

Lewis concedes, as he must, that such a short time span

strongly favors similarity. Be that as it may, a similarity—such

as the temporal proximity between these two sales—does not

ipso facto make them related. See Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1040. Hence,

the timing is not enough on its own to support a relevant‐con‐

duct finding.

* * *

It is important to underscore that “the relevant conduct or

aggregation rule grants the government a fearsome tool in

drug cases ... .” White, 519 F.3d at 347 (citation and internal

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19
Nos. 19‐1262 & 19‐1911 19

quotation marks omitted). “It permits prosecutors to indict

defendants on relatively minor offenses and then seek en‐

hanced sentences later by asserting that the defendant has

committed other more serious crimes for which, for whatever

reason, the defendant was not prosecuted and has not been

convicted.” Ortiz, 431 F.3d at 1040 (citation and internal quo‐

tation marks omitted).

We have recognized important “limits” in this area of

prosecutorial discretion to avoid abuse. Id. In this case, we

conclude that the district court should not have added

Lewis’s dismissed drug quantities to his base offense level as

relevant conduct, and its calculation to the contrary consti‐

tutes error.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the district

court’s judgment in Draheim’s case and VACATE AND REMAND

its judgment as to Lewis for resentencing without the addi‐

tional offense levels because his dismissed drug quantities are

not relevant conduct under the Guidelines.

Case: 19-1911 Document: 44 Filed: 05/07/2020 Pages: 19