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Parties Involved:
Ron Gillis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FI LED 

Uoited States Court of AppeaJ,s 

PUBLISH Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS A LJ G 1 2 1991 

TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

v. 

RON 

) 

Plaintiff - Appellee, ) 

) No. 90-8064 

) 

) 

GILLIS, ) 

) 

Defendant - Appellant. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CR-89-0106-01-B) 

Scott H. Robinson of Gerash, Robinson & Miranda, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John R. Barksdale, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard A. 

Stacy, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), District of 

Wyoming, Casper, Wyoming, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SETH, and LOGAN, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Ron Gillis was convicted of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988). He 

was also convicted of possessing a firearm during a drug traf f icking offense under 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l) (1988). Defendant's main 

contention on appeal is that he was deprived of his constitutional 

Appellate Case: 90-8064 Document: 01019731391 Date Filed: 08/12/1991 Page: 1 
right to a fair trial because members of the venire panel also sat 

on a panel for an earlier case in which defendant was tried for 

another methamphetamine distribution conspiracy. 

I. 

In early 1988, the Wyoming Division of Criminal Investigation 

and the Sheriff's Office of Campbell County, Wyoming, investigated 

a methamphetamine distribution scheme in the vicinity of Gillette, 

Wyoming. The investigation focused on defendant as the source in 

the distribution chain and on Marvin Aeschbacher as a mid-level 

seller. 

Through the use of an undercover informant, the officials 

initially purchased one-eighth of an ounce of methamphetamine from 

a street-level seller. The informant then bought one ounce of 

methamphetamine from the same individual after the seller obtained 

approval from his source, Marvin Aeschbacher. 

The officials proceeded to buy larger quantities of methamphetamine in an attempt to identify those individuals higher up 

the distribution chain. The undercover informant went to Mr. 

Aeschbacher's trailer home to negotiate a two-ounce purchase. 

During the meeting, the informant noticed a pistol hanging on the 

wall and asked about buying it. Mr. Aeschbacher told him that the 

gun was stolen and that he had other firearms. The informant 

bought the pistol. Later that evening, the informant purchased 

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from Mr. Aeschbacher two ounces of methamphetamine, another pistol, and a shotgun. 

Mr. Aeschbacher testified that he travelled to defendant's 

residence in Glenrock, Wyoming, to obtain methamphetamine from his 

source, defendant Gillis. Record, vol. B, at 131-32. Police surveillance followed Mr. Aeschbacher as he travelled from Gillette 

to Glenrock and observed his activities at defendant's residence. 

Testimony was also presented that defendant would supply Mr. 

Aeschbacher with methamphetamine on credit and that he would be 

paid after Mr. Aeschbacher made sales in Gillette. 

Approximately one month before trial, defendant was tried on 

identical charges arising out of a methamphetamine distribution 

scheme involving different coconspirators. Of the thirty-two prospective jurors on the venire panel at defendant's second trial, 

at least fifteen were present at the selection of the first jury. 

Three individuals present on both panels sat as trial jurors in 

the present case. These three persons had been excused during the 

voir dire examination in the first trial. 

Prior to the voir dire examination, defendant challenged the 

entire venire panel for cause. He also specifically challenged 

for cause the venire members who were on the previous panel. 

Defendant argued that these individuals had heard voir dire concerning the first trial, knew about his previous indictment and 

trial, and were therefore unable to be fair and impartial. The 

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record does not indicate, however, whether they were aware of the 

disposition of the charges. Defendant was also concerned about 

asking specific questions during voir dire for fear of notifying 

the other venire members about the first trial. 

The district judge denied defendant's challenge for cause. 

He reasoned that the prior panel service did not necessarily demonstrate prejudice, and that juror prejudice, if any, would be 

brought out during the voir dire examination. Record, vol. 6, at 

6. Moreover, in response to defendant's concern about asking 

questions regarding the first trial, the judge stated that defendant would not "have the opportunity to do the asking. I'll do 

the asking, and what I ask will be whether or not they have any 

grounds of prejudice about which we haven't inquired, and we'll 

see what their answers are." Id. at 7. 

During the voir dire examination, the district judge did not 

specifically inquire about possible juror bias stemming from service on the first venire panel and from knowledge that defendant 

had been tried on identical charges. Instead, the judge asked: 

"Do any of you know of any reason whatsoever about which I may not 

have asked which directly or indirectly could impair your impartiality today?" Id. at 39. In addition, defendant did not ask 

questions concerning possible prejudice due to service on the 

first venire panel. Nor did defendant exhaust five of his peremptory challenges. 

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On appeal, defendant argues that he was denied his sixth 

amendment right to an impartial jury. He also contends that there 

was insufficient evidence presented at trial to demonstrate that 

he had any involvement in Mr. Aeschbacher's sale of firearms to 

the undercover informant. 

II. 

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution states: 

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 

to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . " It is 

the responsibility of the district court to guarantee that the 

jury is fair and impartial. Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 

497, 511 (1948). Further, the procedures used at voir dire are 

committed to the discretion of the district court. Fed. R. Crim. 

P. 24(a). A district judge abuses that discretion if the scope of 

voir dire is so limited that it does not create any reasonable 

assurances that prejudice would be discovered if present. Id. at 

1298. United States v. Hurley, 746 F.2d 725, 727 (11th Cir. 

1984); United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 

1981). Reversal is required if the specific circumstances suggest 

a significant risk of prejudice and if examination or admonition 

of jurors fails to negate that inference. United States v. Wylie, 

919 F.2d 969, 979 (5th Cir. 1990); Patterson, 648 F.2d at 629. 

To guarantee an impartial jury, it is often necessary for the 

voir dire examination to include specific questions concerning 

particular sources of possible juror bias. For example, in Casias 

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v. United States, 315 F.2d 614 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 

845 (1963), the defendant argued that he was deprived of his right 

to an impartial jury due to prior jury service by panel members on 

similar cases in which prosecution witnesses scheduled to appear 

in his case had testified. The district judge, however, had carefully probed the venire panel for prejudice and asked each prospective juror questions suggested by defendant, including whether 

they would give more weight to the testimony of those prosecution 

witnesses than to others. We concluded that the voir dire examination was adequate and declined to hold that the jurors were 

disqualified as a matter of law. Id. at 618. 

In United States v. Franklin, 700 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1983), 

juries for several criminal trials, including the defendant's, 

were selected on the same day. Before his trial, the defendant 

objected to the jury because of possible bias arising from jury 

service on similar cases by some members in the interim between 

selection and trial. We held that the district court erred by 

failing to grant a supplemental voir dire to determine if there 

had been such interim service. Moreover, we noted the importance 

of a searching inquiry during the supplemental voir dire; jurors 

can be dismissed for cause if questioning reveals that they had 

served on cases involving similar legal or factual issues between 

the date of their selection and the commencement of trial. Id., 

700 F.2d at 1242. See also, United States v. Jefferson, 569 F.2d 

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260 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court should inquire about jury service between time of selection for defendants' trial and date 

trial began). 

Finally, in United States v. Patterson the defendant argued 

that he was denied an impartial jury because six members of the 

venire panel in his first trial were jurors in his later trial. 

The charged offenses were similar and the trials occurred only one 

day apart. Although the district judge asked general questions 

about possible prejudice, the voir dire did not specifically target potential prejudice from the earlier voir dire. The Court of 

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rev~rsed the defendant's conviction 

after concluding that these circumstances created a significant 

risk of prejudice and that the voir dire examination failed to 

negate that risk. Patterson, 648 F.2d at 630. 

In defendant Gillis' case, the risk of a biased jury was significant. The two trials involved methamphetamine distribution 

conspiracies. Both indictments charged the use of firearms during 

a drug trafficking offense. The trials occurred approximately one 

month apart. Potential jurors present at both voir dire examinations could easily have been influenced by the prior questioning 

such that they would not be "willing to decide the case solely on 

the evidence before" them. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 

(1982); see also Marrero v. Florida, 343 So.2d 883 (Fla. 1977) 

(concluding that overlapping venire members were bound to be 

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unfairly prejudiced due to their knowledge of the defendant's 

arrest on different charges). 

Moreover, the district court erred by failing to ascertain 

whether information in the previous voir dire prejudiced the panel 

members in the case about to be presented. The judge made no 

specific inquiry about such potential prejudice. His catch-all 

question about whether panel members knew of any reason why their 

impartiality would be impaired was insufficient to ensure an unbiased jury. The questioning did not bring to the attention of the 

overlapping panel members the possibility that they might prejudge defendant's guilt based on their knowledge of his previous 

arrest, indictment, and trial. See Beard v. Mitchell, 604 F.2d 

485, 501 (7th Cir. 1979). Without an adequate examination to 

negate the risk of prejudice, we conclude that the procedures used 

by the district judge failed to create a reasonable assurance that 

any actual prejudice was discovered. 

Regardless of the adequacy of the voir dire, the government 

contends that defendant waived his sixth amendment argument 

because (1) he failed to question the venire members about prejudice from the prior voir dire, and (2) he did not exhaust his 

peremptory challenges. 

Defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to submit voir 

dire questions to the district court regarding prejudice from the 

overlapping venire panels. When defense counsel moved to dismiss 

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the entire panel for cause, the district judge informed her that 

she would be unable to ask specific questions concerning prior 

panel service. We will not penalize defendant for counsel's compliance with the judge's directive. Cf. United States v. 

Carranza, 583 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1978) (defendant not deprived of 

right to exercise challenges where counsel was free to submit special voir dire questions and failed to do so, where counsel failed 

to request challenges for cause, and where members of panel who 

served on prior case were eliminated from jury by exhaustion of 

peremptory challenges). 

In addition, defendant did not waive his right to challenge 

for cause the overlapping panel members by virtue of his failure 

to exhaust his peremptory challenges. Defendant and his codefendant were given twelve peremptory challenges collectively. 

They were free to allocate the challenges between themselves as 

they wished. The co-defendants declined to exercise five of the 

twelve challenges. Exhausting the peremptory challenges, however, 

would have been a futile effort because they were insufficient to 

remove both the tainted venire members already called to the jury 

box and those similarly tainted members who would have replaced 

them. Due to the futility of exhausting his peremptory strikes, 

we conclude that defendant did not waive his right to challenge 

the overlapping venire members for cause. See United States v. 

Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 

1120 (1969). Cf. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1987) (defendant 

not denied right to impartial jury where jurors who ultimately sat 

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were impartial, despite defendant having to use peremptory strikes 

to correct trial court's failure to strike jurors for cause). 

III. 

Defendant also argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

convict him for the use of a firearm during the methamphetamine 

distribution conspiracy. Defendant was convicted of this substantive count based on the co-conspirator theory of liability of 

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). * 

A panel of this court has previously held that exactly the 

same evidence used against co-conspirator Brad Parkinson was suff icient to support a conviction for use of a firearm during this 

methamphetamine conspiracy. United States v. Parkinson, No. 90-

8034, slip op. (10th Cir. June 13, 1991). That decision is stare 

decisis on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support 

this conviction. 

Because we remand this case for a new trial, we need not 

reach defendant's last argument that the district court erred by 

allowing the government to present testimony concerning the use of 

firearms during drug transactions. 

* Under the Pinkerton theory, a conspirator "can be held 

responsible for the substantive crimes committed by his coconspirators to the extent those offenses were reasonably 

foreseeable consequences of acts furthering the unlawful agreement, even if he did not himself participate in the substantive 

crimes." Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946). 

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( 

This case is REVERSED and REMANDED to the district court for 

a new trial. 

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