Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02144/USCOURTS-ca10-94-02144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Grace Tsosie
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

.. 

Patrick J. Fisher, Jr. 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

Tenth Circuit 

Byron White United States Courthouse 

1823 Stout Street 

Denver, Colorado 80294 

(303) 844-3157 

August 16, 1996 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: 94-2144 USA v. Tsosie 

August 9, 1996 by The Honorable Stephanie K. Seymour 

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Please be advised of the following correction to the captioned decision: 

Mr. Mariano's name, appearing on page 14 in the second paragraph, is misspelled. 

The correct spelling in Mariano. 

Please make the appropriate correction to you copy. 

Very truly yours, 

Patrick Fisher, Clerk 

Beth Morris 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 94-2144 Document: 01019279720 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 1 
' 

PUBLISH 

FILED 

llnited States Court or Appeals Tenth Circuit 

AUG -91996 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALsPATRICKFISHER 

TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, on 

its own behalf and on behalf of 

Reuben Mariano, a/k/a Na tithl hi ya, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Counter-ClaimDefendant-Appellant, 

GRACE TSOSIE, 

Defendant-Counter-ClaimantAppellee, 

No. 94-2144 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CIV-92-1234-LH) 

Jacques B. Gelin, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C. 

(Lois J. Schiffer, Asst. Attorney General, Washington, D.C., John J. Kelly, U.S. 

Attorney, and Raymond Hamilton, Asst. U.S. Attorney, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, David C. Shilton, Attorney, Environment & Nat. Res. Division, 

Washington, D.C., Edwin G. Winstead, Of Counsel, Asst. Regional Solicitor, 

Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-Counter-ClaimDefendant-Appellant. 

Paul E. Frye, ofNordhaus, Haltom, Taylor, Taradash & Frye, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. 

Appellate Case: 94-2144 Document: 01019279720 Date Filed: 08/09/1996 Page: 2 
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BRORBY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge. 

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The United States brought this trespass and ejectment action, on its own 

behalf and as trustee for Mr. Reuben Mariano, against Ms. Grace Tsosie. The 

United States sought on behalf of Mr. Mariano the possession of land, known as 

Allotment No. 868, located in Crownpoint, New Mexico. Ms. Tsosie 

counterclaimed seeking a declaratory judgment that she has an unextinguished 

aboriginal occupancy right in the land. Both Mr. Mariano and Ms. Tsosie are 

members of the Navajo Tribe and the property at issue is located in Indian 

country. 1 The district court dismissed the action sua sponte under the tribal court 

exhaustion doctrine. See United States v. Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768 (D.N.M. 

1994 ). The United States appeals, and we affirm. 

I. 

The pleadings evince the following facts. 2 Prior to 1864, members of the 

Navajo Tribe occupied the land surrounding and including what would become 

Allotment No. 868. From 1864 through 1868, the United States removed Navajo 

Indians from the land and incarcerated them at Bosque Redondo. In 1868, the 

1 Indian country is defined as "all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to 

which have not been extinguished." 18 U.S.C. § 1151(c); see Oklahoma Tax 

Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993); see also United States v. 

Tsosie, 849 F. Supp. 768, 772 n.3 (D.N.M. 1994 ). 

2 The factual and procedural history is complicated and disputed. 

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United States and the Navajo Tribe entered into a treaty which recognized the 

Navajo Reservation and allowed Navajo Indians to return to their homeland. The 

events shortly after the 1868 treaty are the genesis of the rights claimed by both 

Mr. Mariano and Ms. Tsosie. 

In 1908, the United States accepted applications for allotments outside the 

Treaty Reservation. That same year an application was approved for Allotment 

No. 868 in the name of Na tithl hi ya a/k/a Mr. Mariano; however, a patent was 

not issued to him until 1964 and he has never occupied the land. He asserts that 

he has to title to Allotment No. 868 based on the approved application and 

subsequently issued patent. He further asserts that he has the right to possess the 

land because Ms. Tsosie breached a homesite lease which allowed her to occupy 

it. 

In 1868, Ms. Tsosie 's ancestors returned from Bosque Redondo and 

resettled on Allotment No. 868. In 1901, her mother was born on or near 

Allotment No. 868 and her mother's umbilical cord is buried there, which has 

profound significance in Navajo custom and religion. In 1928, Ms. Tsosie's 

parents were married and continued living on the land. Shortly thereafter, 

according to Ms. Tsosie, the United States characterized Allotment No. 868 as 

"government land" and affirmatively allowed, encouraged and supported the 

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continued occupancy and improvement of the land3 by her parents. In 1928, Ms. 

Tsosie was born on the land and has lived there to the present time. 

Ms. Tsosie contends that the United States has taken several actions which 

contradict Mr. Mariano's asserted rights to the land. She asserts that in 1908, 

allotting agents violated the instructions of the Acting Commissioner of Indian 

Affairs when they approved Allotment No. 868 because the railroad claimed the 

land. She further asserts that in 1917, 1931, 1939 and 1960, the United States 

withdrew land containing Allotment No. 868 to address Indian settlement matters; 

and in 1945, the United States granted her a grazing permit for Allotment No. 

In 1968, four years after the United States patented Allotment No. 868 to 

Mr. Mariano, the legal disputes surrounding the land began. That year Mr. 

Mariano signed as lessor and the parents of Ms. Tsosie signed as lessees a 

homesite lease approved by the United States covering one acre of land on 

Allotment No. 868. Lease payments were not made after 1969. In 1970, Mr. 

Mariano informed the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) that he wished to terminate 

the lease and he began fencing the allotment. In 1975, Ms. Tsosie and her parents 

3 Over the years, Ms. Tsosie's parents erected several buildings on the 

land. 

4 There are other patents, land orders, executive orders, policies and 

conditions which have been imposed on this land since the 1800's. 

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obtained a temporary restraining order from the Navajo Tribal Court which 

restrained Mr. Mariano from fencing the allotment and from harassing them or 

harming their property pending the settlement of the case; however, the case was 

never settled. 

In 1981, Mr. Mariano filed suit against Ms. Tsosie 's mother and two BIA 

officials seeking to eject Ms. Tsosie and her mother and to cancel the homesite 

lease. The United States defended the BIA officials and removed the action to 

federal district court. The district court dismissed the BIA officials and remanded 

the case to tribal court after the BIA declared that the homesite lease was null and 

void. 5 On remand, Mr. Mariano consented to dismissal without prejudice of the 

ejectment claim against Ms. Tsosie's mother. 

In 1992, the United States filed this trespass and ejectment action on behalf 

of Mr. Mariano in district court. In a carefully reasoned opinion, the district 

court dismissed the action sua sponte under the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. 

On appeal, the United States contends the exhaustion of tribal remedies is 

inappropriate because (1) the United States as plaintiff enjoys a special right of 

access to its own courts; (2) the United States has not waived its sovereign 

5 In 1988, the BIA notified Ms. Tsosie that she had to move off the land 

within 90 days; she appealed administratively and the decision was affirmed in 

1991. She was again notified that she had to move but she did not respond and 

continues to occupy the land. 

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immunity; and (3) the policy behind tribal court exhaustion does not apply where 

tribal law and custom are irrelevant and are, in any event, preempted by Congress 

with respect to ownership of an Indian allotment. 

II. 

While concerns of comity do not present a jurisdictional bar, we have held 

that a court has discretion to raise comity issues sua sponte. Smith v. Moffett, 

94 7 F .2d 442, 445 (1Oth Cir. 1991 ). "We review a dismissal on exhaustion 

grounds for an abuse of discretion." Texaco. Inc. v. Zah, 5 F.3d 1374, 1376 (lOth 

Cir. 1993)(citing United States v. Plainbull, 957 F.2d 724, 725 (9th Cir. 1992)), 

aff' d after remand, Texaco. Inc. v. Hale, 81 F .3d 934 (1Oth Cir. 1996). Under this 

standard the district court abuses its discretion " if it does not apply the correct 

law or if it rests its decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact." 

Plain bull, 957 F .2d at 725. "The proper scope of the tribal exhaustion rule, 

however, is a matter of law which we review de novo." Zah, 5 F.3d at 1376. 

The tribal court exhaustion rule "provides that 'as a matter of comity, a 

federal court should not exercise jurisdiction over cases arising under its federal 

question or diversity jurisdiction, if those cases are also subject to tribal 

jurisdiction, until the parties have exhausted their tribal remedies."' I d. (quoting 

Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636,640 (lOth Cir. 1991)). The rule was created 

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"because of Congress's 'strong interest in promoting tribal sovereignty."' Id. 

(citing Moffett, 94 7 F .2d at 444 ). Where comity concerns are present, 

"[j]urisdiction presumptively lies in the tribal court ... unless Congress has 

expressly limited that jurisdiction." Moffett, 94 7 F .2d at 444. Moreover, the 

exhaustion rule does not require an action to be pending in tribal court. ld.; cf. 

United States v. Bank ofNew York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 480 (1936) ("Even 

where the District Court has acquired jurisdiction prior to state proceedings, the 

character and adequacy of the latter proceedings ... may require in the proper 

exercise of the discretion of the federal court that jurisdiction should be 

relinquished in favor of state administration."). Guided by these principles we 

now turn to the United States' contentions on appeal. 

A. 

The United States first contends tribal court exhaustion is inappropriate 

because the federal government enjoys a special right of access to its own courts 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1345. Section 1345 provides that "the district courts shall have 

original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the 

United States." Our assessment of this argument requires addressing three issues: 

1) does the government enjoy special status; 2) does the Tribal court have 

concurrent jurisdiction; 3) does exhaustion meet the policy concerns set out in 

National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 4 71 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985). 

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"[T]he grant of jurisdiction to the District Court in suits brought by the 

United States does not purport to confer exclusive jurisdiction," Bank of New 

York , 296 U.S. at 4 79, and "leaves open the question of the propriety of its 

exercise in particular circumstances," id. at 480; see also Gulf Offshore Co. v. 

Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 479 (1981)("[T]he mere grant of jurisdiction to a 

federal court does not operate to oust a state court from concurrent jurisdiction 

over the cause of action."). In Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), the United States brought suit under section 

1345 on its own behalf and as trustee for certain Indian tribes for determination of 

reserved water rights. The Supreme Court admonished that "' [a]bdication of the 

obligation to decide cases can be justified under [the abstention] doctrine only in 

the exceptional circumstances where the order to the parties to repair to the state 

court would clearly serve an important countervailing interest."' I d. at 813 

(quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188-89 

( 1959)). The Court in Colorado River determined that none of the three general 

categories of abstention applied, 6 but held nevertheless that "there are principles 

6 The three general categories of abstention doctrine include: ( 1) cases 

where federal constitutional issues might be mooted or presented in a different 

posture by a state court determination of state law, Railroad Comm 'n v. Pullman 

Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); (2) cases where there have been presented difficult 

questions of state law regarding policy issues of substantial public import, 

Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); and (3) 

cases where federal jurisdiction has been invoked in order to restrain state 

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unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication and regard for 

federal-state relations which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous 

exercise of concurrent jurisdictions .... These principles rest on considerations 

of' [ w ]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial 

resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."' I d. at 817 (quoting 

Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-0-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 

( 1952))(alteration in original). The Court reasoned that "[t]here is no 

irreconcilability in the existence of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction," id. 

at 809, and held that the "factors here ... justify the District Court's dismissal," 

id. at 820. It is thus apparent that the district courts do not possess exclusive 

jurisdiction merely because the United States commences an action under section 

1345. 

We now turn to whether the tribal court has concurrent jurisdiction under 

the facts of this case. "Indian tribes retain 'attributes of sovereignty over both 

their members and their territory,' to the extent that sovereignty has not been 

withdrawn by federal statute or treaty." Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 

9, 14 (1987)(citing United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975)). The 

Supreme Court has "repeatedly recognized the Federal Government's 

criminal proceedings, Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Colorado 

River, 424 U.S. at 814-16. 

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• 

longstanding policy of encouraging tribal self-government," id., and has 

"assiduously advocated federal abstention in favor of tribal courts," Moffett, 94 7 

F.2d at 445 (citing LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9; National Farmers, 471 U.S. 845). In 

determining whether the tribal court has concurrent jurisdiction, we consider the 

Navajo Nation's statutes. See Zah, 5 F.3d at 1377. 

In Zah we held that 

[g]enerally, the Navajo Tribal Code defines Navajo court civil 

jurisdiction to reach "[a ]ll civil actions in which the defendant is a 

resident of Navajo Indian Country, or has caused an action to occur 

within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation." Navajo 

Trib. Code tit. 7, § 253(2) (1986). The territorial jurisdiction of the 

Navajo Nation is defined to be coextensive with Navajo Indian 

Country. Id. § 254. 

Zah, 5 F.3d at 1377 n.4 (alternation in original). The present case clearly falls 

within the jurisdiction of the tribal court--it is essentially a dispute between two 

Navajo Indians 7 over land located in Indian country. 8 

The Supreme Court suggested three federal policy concerns behind the 

tribal court exhaustion rule. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856-57. In Zah, 

we paraphrased those concerns as: "(I) to further the congressional policy of 

7 Indeed, Ms. Tsosie alleges facts that suggest she and Mr. Mariano may be 

related. Joint App. at 87, 145. 

8 The United States conceded below that "[s]ince this allotment is 'Indian 

country' the Navajo tribal court may, in fact, have jurisdiction for some 

purposes." Joint App. at 70 (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 

508 U.S. 114 (1993)). 

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supporting tribal self government; (2) to promote the orderly administration of 

justice; and (3) to obtain the benefits of tribal expertise." Zah, 5 F.3d at 1377-78. 

We agree with the district court's conclusion that abstention is appropriate under 

the National Farmers factors. Because the dispute here is between two Navajo 

Indians and involves land located in Navajo Indian country, we believe this case 

is essentially "a reservation affair" in which exhaustion of a tribal court remedy is 

almost always required. See id. at 13 78. 

The United States' decision to bring this suit on behalf of Mr. Mariano does 

not alter the fact that this is essentially a dispute between Indians over certain 

rights to land in Indian country. 9 Cf. United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 846 

& n.9 (1986)(holding that suits involving an Indian's interests and rights in a 

previously issued allotment or patent do not require the United States to be a 

party). The present case is analogous to Plainbull, where the court said: "The fact 

that the Government is attempting to enforce federal law is immaterial. The 

alleged trespass was to tribal land and ... the tribal courts get the first 

opportunity to resolve this case." Plainbull, 957 F.2d at 728. 10 Here the alleged 

9 The United States "did not bring this action under federal statute, but 

rather, under common law theories of trespass and ejectment." Tsosie, 849 F. 

Supp. at 773. 

10 The United States argues that Plainbull is factually distinguishable 

because that case involved a substantial tribal interest and this case does not. We 

disagree. The Tribal courts here have a significant interest in adjudicating a 

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trespass is to Mr. Mariano's allotment; in other words, the alleged trespass is to 

land in Indian country held by a Navajo. We therefore hold that "[t]he fact that 

the complainant in [this case] is the United States does not justify a departure 

from the rule," Bank of New York, 296 U.S. at 479, which requires tribal court 

exhaustion. 

B. 

The United States next contends tribal court exhaustion is inappropriate 

because it has not waived its sovereign immunity. '" [W]hen the United States 

institutes a suit, it thereby consents by implication to the full and complete 

adjudication of all matters and issues which are reasonably incident thereto."' 

United States v. Taunah, 730 F.2d 1360, 1362 (lOth Cir. 1984) (quoting United 

States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764, 769 (1959)). In Taunah, the United States brought 

a quiet title action on behalf of certain Indians against other Indians within the 

same family. The defendant Indians counterclaimed for equitable relief and the 

United States asserted the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We reasoned that 

"[t]he real plaintiff is not the United States," and held that an exception to 

sovereign immunity applied because the counterclaim did not "venture outside the 

subject of the original cause of action." I d. at 1362; see also 6 Charles A. Wright. 

dispute between Tribal members over Indian land involving Tribal laws and 

customs. 

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Arthur R. Miller. & Mary K. Kane. Federal Practice and Procedure § 1427, at 197 

(2d ed. 1990)("[W]hen the United States institutes an action, defendant may assert 

by way of recoupment any claim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence 

as the original claim in order to reduce or defeat the government's recovery."); cf. 

FDIC v. Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472, 1486-87 (lOth Cir. 1994)(holding that a defendant 

may assert by way of recoupment any claim against the United States ( 1) arising 

from the same transaction or occurrence, (2) seeking relief of the same kind or 

nature, and (3) not in excess of the recovery sought by the United States). 

The United States put at issue whether Ms. Tsosie rightfully occupied the 

land when it brought this action for ejectment and trespass. Moreover, Ms. Tsosie 

simply asserts occupancy rights against Mr. Marino. The United States does not 

contend that Ms. Tsosie's counterclaim is unrelated to, or does not arise out of, 

the claims in its original complaint. Because Ms. Tsosie's counterclaim asserts 

claims and seeks relief based on issues asserted by the United States in its 

complaint, sovereign immunity has been waived with respect thereto. 

c. 

Finally, the United States argues that the policy behind tribal court 

exhaustion does not apply because tribal law and custom are irrelevant in this 

case and, in any event, have been preempted by Congress. We are not persuaded. 

The United States misconstrues Ms. Tsosie's counterclaim, asserting that 

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she has not "allege[ d] any issue of Navajo tribal law," Brief of Aplt. at 21. To 

the contrary, Ms. Tsosie asserts that she has an aboriginal occupancy right which 

implicates "Navajo custom, tradition, history, culture and common law," Tsosie, 

849 F. Supp. at 774, 11 notwithstanding the validity of Mr. Marino's patent. The 

United States concedes that if the district court exercises jurisdiction, "where 

tribal custom may be implicated, the district court could in an appropriate case 

consult the tribal court." Brief of Aplt. at 6-7. "Adjudication of such matters by 

any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal 

courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law." LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 

16. 

The United States further argues it is "critical" that the dispute over the 

validity of the patent and allotment application be determined based on federal 

law in federal court. The Supreme Court has rejected the argument that tribal 

courts cannot address issues that arise under and "must be answered by reference 

to federallaw." 12 National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852. The Court held that 

11 In 1943, the Department of the Interior, relying on Cramer v. United 

States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), determined that there existed a need to examine the 

aboriginal occupancy rights of individual Indians. Aplee. Supp. App. at 15-16. 

In 194 7, the government stated that Navajo "Indian use and occupancy are to be 

determined with reference ... to the habits and modes of Indian life." Joint App. 

at 136. 

12 The Navajo code recognizes the need to determine issues of federal law 

and states "[i]n all cases the Courts of the Navajo Nation shall apply any laws of 

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the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require a 

careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that 

sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a 

detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch Policy as 

embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial 

decisions. 

We believe that examination should be conducted in the first 

instance in the Tribal Court itself .. . . The risks of the kind of 

"procedural nightmare" that has allegedly developed in this case will 

be minimized if the federal court stays its hand until after the Tribal 

Court has had full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction ... 

Id. at 855-57 (footnotes omitted). 

Accordingly, where the United States commences an ejectment and trespass 

action on behalf of an Indian against another Indian involving land located in 

Indian country, it is required to exhaust remedies in tribal court prior to initiating 

an action in district court. 13 The district court correctly so held in this case. 

We AFFIRM the decision of the district court. 

the United States that may be applicable and any laws or customs of the Navajo 

Nation not prohibited by applicable federal laws." Navajo Trib. Code tit. 7, § 204 

(a) (1985). 

13 "Although [appellant] must exhaust available tribal remedies before 

instituting suit in federal court, the [tribal court's] determination of tribal 

jurisdiction is ultimately subject to review." LaPlante, 480 U.S. at 19. 

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