Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07079/USCOURTS-caDC-14-07079-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Advanta Medical Solutions, LLC
Appellant
Maria Caschetta
Appellee
Carmen Cunningham
Appellee
Lifecare Management Partners
Appellant
Kathy Radtke
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 23, 2015 Decided July 28, 2015

No. 14-7079

KATHY RADTKE AND CARMEN CUNNINGHAM,

APPELLEES

v.

LIFECARE MANAGEMENT PARTNERS AND ADVANTA MEDICAL 

SOLUTIONS, LLC,

APPELLANTS

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cv-02031)

Alan Lescht argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellants.

S. Micah Salb argued the cause for appellees. With him 

on the brief was Dennis Chong.

Before: MILLETT and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellees, medical 

records coders employed by appellants, brought this action 

against their employers for unlawfully failing to pay overtime 

pay. Appellees prevailed in a jury verdict that found they

were not exempt from overtime pay. The district court denied 

defendant-appellants’ motions for judgment as a matter of 

law, for a new trial, and to alter or amend the judgment. 

Appellants brought the present appeal, contending that no 

reasonable jury could have found appellees not to be exempt, 

and that errors by the court require a new trial. Finding no

merit in appellants’ arguments, we affirm the judgment of the 

district court for the reasons more fully set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-appellees Kathy Radtke and Carmen 

Cunningham were employed as medical records coders by 

defendant-appellants. Appellees brought the present action 

against their former employers. Although the complaint and a 

subsequent amended complaint asserted multiple theories of 

relief, as relevant to the present appeal, plaintiffs asserted that 

defendants had failed to pay them compensation at the rate of 

one and a half times their normal pay for work in excess of 

forty hours per week, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards 

Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) et seq.

1

 Defendants 

contended that plaintiffs were exempt from the requirement to 

 1 We note that our review of the complaint and amended complaint 

would have been expedited had either party seen fit to include 

either document in the Joint Appendix or Supplemental Appendix 

filed with this court.

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pay overtime pay under the administrative and professional 

exemptions defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 and § 541.300. 

This case came on for trial before a judge and jury. 

Plaintiffs offered testimonial and documentary evidence to 

support the proposition that they had worked beyond forty 

hours per week and not been paid at time and a half. 

Defendants offered evidence and arguments to the effect that 

plaintiffs were exempt from the statutory enhancement and 

offered descriptions of the employees’ duties, which 

defendants contended were consistent with administrative and 

professional employment as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 541.200 

and § 541.300, so that they would be exempt from the 

statutory requirement for payment of the enhanced wages.

The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., 

“ordinarily requires employers to pay employees time-andone-half for hours worked beyond forty per week unless the 

employees are exempt.” Robinson-Smith v. GEICO, 590 F.3d 

886, 888 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 213. 

Relevant to this case, an employer is not required to pay 

overtime to exempt “administrative” and “professional” 

employees. An employee falls under the administrative 

exemption if her compensation is high enough (not in dispute 

in this case), her “primary duty is the performance of office or 

non-manual work directly related to the management or 

general business operations of the employer or the employer’s 

customers,” and her “primary duty includes the exercise of 

discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters 

of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). An employee falls 

under the professional exemption if her compensation is high 

enough (not in dispute in this case), and her “primary duty is 

the performance of work...[r]equiring knowledge of an 

advanced type in a field of science or learning customarily 

acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual 

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instruction; or...[r]equiring invention, imagination, originality 

or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative endeavor.” 

29 C.F.R. § 541.300(a). The employer bears the burden of 

establishing that its employee falls within a recognized 

overtime exemption. See Robinson-Smith, 590 F.3d at 891.

DISCUSSION

Appellants’ main line of argument is that they were

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, notwithstanding the 

verdict. Appellants rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

50(a), which provides that, “[i]f a party has been fully heard 

on an issue during a jury trial and the court finds that a 

reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient evidentiary 

basis to find for the party on that issue,” the trial court may 

grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that 

party on that issue. While we review the district court’s 

denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, 

Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305, 311 

(D.C. Cir. 2009), “[w]e do not...lightly disturb a jury verdict. 

Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

therefrom are so one-sided that reasonable men and women 

could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff’s favor,” 

Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This 

court must resolve all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ 

favor and “cannot substitute its view for that of the jury, and 

can assess neither the credibility nor weight of the evidence.” 

Scott v. District of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 753 (D.C. Cir. 

1996).

As to appellants’ alternate argument that the district court 

erred in denying their motion for a new trial, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59(a)(1) provides in relevant part that “[t]he 

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court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the 

issues...after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial 

has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal 

court.” “We review the district court’s denial of [a] motion 

for a new trial ‘only for an abuse of discretion.’” Muldrow, 

493 F.3d at 166 (quoting Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 

227 F.3d 433, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2000)). “When the district court 

denies a motion for new trial, our scope of review is 

particularly narrow because the trial court’s decision accords 

with the jury’s.” Hutchinson v. Stuckey, 952 F.2d 1418, 1420

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). “In reviewing for an 

abuse of discretion, the Court considers ‘whether the decision 

maker failed to consider a relevant factor, whether [the 

decision maker] relied on an improper factor, and whether the 

reasons given reasonably support the conclusion.’” Peyton v. 

DiMaro, 287 F.3d 1121, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).

A. Defendant–Appellants’ Argument for Judgment as 

a Matter of Law

Appellants argue that they are entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law, as no reasonable jury could have come to the 

conclusion that Radtke and Cunningham were non-exempt 

based on the evidence adduced at trial. Appellants contend 

that “Ms. Radtke’s and Ms. Cunningham’s statements in their 

resumes, job applications and emails demonstrate that their 

jobs fell within the administrative exemption and that they 

were not simply looking up codes in a book.” Appellants’ Br. 

23. Appellants argue that Cunningham was exempt under the 

administrative exemption because Cunningham “supervised 

between 9 and 22 coders,...provided training as well as 

feedback to physicians regarding documentation and coding,” 

id. at 24, and worked independently to evaluate and revamp 

the coding procedures of Walter Reed Medical Center, id. at 

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25–26. Appellants similarly argue that Radtke fell under the 

administrative exemption because “she was responsible for 

educating physicians and other clinicians and proper coding 

of visits, procedures and diagnoses,” id. at 27, and worked 

independently on projects such as creating a “new super bill 

for the doctors,” a document that “codifies the most typical 

diagnoses and procedures that a group of practitioners is 

handling so the provider can easily find the code,” id. at 28.

 

Appellees respond that the majority of their work, their 

“primary duties,” entailed simply medical records coding. 

Coding does not require independent judgment; the relevant 

codes and descriptions are all specified in manuals. 

Informing physicians and other professionals how to code 

properly does not require the exercise of discretion and 

independent judgment in matters of significance. See

Appellees’ Br. 23. And even if some of Radtke and 

Cunningham’s time was spent on matters involving the 

exercise of discretion and independent judgment, appellants 

have not shown that these tasks constituted their “primary 

duties.” Id. at 24.

Appellees introduced time cards showing that they spent 

most of their time coding. Cunningham spent 75% of her 

time coding medical records, Radtke 92% of her time. Id. at

21. The time spent by an employee on various tasks is a 

useful guide in determining an employee’s “primary duty.” 

Maestas v. Day & Zimmerman, LLC, 664 F.3d 822, 827 (10th 

Cir. 2012). A relevant regulation provides, “employees who 

spend more than 50 percent of their time performing exempt 

work will generally satisfy the primary duty requirement.” 29

C.F.R. § 541.700(b). 

Appellants contend that these time records do not support 

the jury’s verdict because “‘a number of different 

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functions...were characterized under the rubric of coding.’” 

Appellants’ Br. 30 (quoting testimony of defendant Maria 

Caschetta). Further, appellants point to Robinson-Smith, 590 

F.3d at 894, for the proposition that an employee may still fall 

within the administrative exemption even if the employee 

spent the majority of her time engaged in non-exempt work. 

Appellants maintain that the time cards do not undermine the 

other evidence (adduced by appellees’ testimony, resumes, 

internal communications, etc.), which overwhelmingly shows 

that the appellees fall under the administrative exemption.

Appellants further argue that Radtke and Cunningham 

fall under the professional exemption, as “their jobs required 

independent judgment and discretion” and “[t]hey were hired 

because they were seasoned professionals with the 

educational background and experience to work 

independently.” Appellants’ Br. 33. Appellants point out that 

both Radtke and Cunningham possess certifications and 

college degrees relevant to medical coding. Id. at 33–37. 

Appellees respond that Radtke and Cunningham’s credentials 

are not controlling; “it is the educational requirements of the 

job, not the education of the individual, that matter for the 

professional exemption.” Appellees’ Br. 17 (emphasis in 

original) (citing Young v. Cooper Cameron Corp., 586 F.3d 

201, 206 (2d Cir. 2009)). Appellees contend that appellants 

failed to prove that their jobs required sufficient professional 

training to be exempt.

It is clear to us that the appellants are not entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law. Appellants have shown at most 

that there was a conflict in the evidence before the jury. It is 

the function of the jury and not this court to weigh evidence 

and make findings. It is true that we recently held that 

“[w]hether an employee comes within the FLSA 

administrative employee exemption from overtime benefits is 

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a question of law.” Robinson-Smith, 590 F.3d at 891. In the 

Robinson-Smith case, however, the facts material to this legal 

determination were “largely undisputed.” Id. at 891 n.5. 

When the underlying facts are in dispute, “[t]he exemption 

question under the FLSA is a mixed question of law and fact.” 

Ramos v. Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc., 687 F.3d 554, 558 (2d 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As 

the Supreme Court explained, “The question of how the 

[employees] spent their working time...is a question of fact. 

The question whether their particular activities excluded them 

from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law.” 

Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 

(1986). 

Each side offered its evidence. The matter went to the 

jury. The jury resolved the factual disputes, regarding the 

type of work primarily performed by Radtke and 

Cunningham, in appellees’ favor. We agree with the district 

court that “this case presented a pristine example of how a 

genuine issue of material fact emerges from all the evidence, 

requiring its resolution by the jury.” Mem. Op. & Order 5, 

Radtke v. Caschetta, No. 06-cv-02031 (D.D.C. May 14, 

2014), ECF No. 182. As noted above, the parties introduced 

conflicting evidence regarding the appellees’ primary duties. 

Appellants have not shown, as they must to prevail, that the 

evidence is “so one-sided that reasonable men and women 

could not have reached a verdict in plaintiff’s favor.” 

Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 165.

At trial, appellants bore the burden of showing that 

Radtke and Cunningham were exempt. See, e.g., Kinney v. 

District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6, 10 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The 

[employer], of course, had the burden of showing that its 

employees are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime 

provisions.”). Appellants bear a heavier burden in convincing 

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this court to override the jury’s verdict. As stated by the 

Third Circuit:

It is rarely appropriate to grant a directed verdict or 

judgment n.o.v. in favor of the party having the burden 

of proof; such action is reserved for those extreme 

circumstances where the effect of the evidence is not 

only sufficient to meet his burden of proof, but is 

overwhelming, leaving no room for the jury to draw 

significant inferences in favor of the other party.

Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1990). In this 

case, the evidence is far from overwhelmingly in favor of 

appellants. Appellants phrase the issue on appeal as 

“[w]hether there is substantial evidence to support the jury 

verdict that [a]ppellees...were non-exempt from the 

requirement to pay overtime under the administrative and 

professional exemptions.” Appellants’ Br. 1. Appellants 

argue that “Ms. Radtke and Ms. Cunningham did not produce 

significantly probative evidence supporting the jury verdict 

that [p]laintiffs were non-exempt.” Id. at 23. Since 

appellants bore the burden of proof on the exemption issue, 

however, the appellees were under no obligation to introduce 

such evidence that they were non-exempt. A more accurate 

way to frame the issue would be: whether the evidence was so 

one-sided that reasonable men and women must find that 

appellants sufficiently proved that Radtke and Cunningham 

were exempt. See Muldrow, 493 F.3d at 165. The evidence 

does not compel such a conclusion, and we affirm the district 

court’s denial of appellants’ motion for judgment as a matter 

of law.

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B. Defendant–Appellants’ Argument for a New 

Trial

Appellants further argue that even if they are not entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law, we should nonetheless vacate 

the judgment and remand the case for a new trial. Appellants 

argue that a new trial is warranted for three reasons. First, 

they contend that Radtke gave “improper testimony” that 

clearly influenced the jury’s verdict. Appellants’ Br. 39. 

Appellants contend that “Radtke blurted out that she was not 

treated as exempt under FLSA in a job she held subsequent to 

her job with Advanta after the [c]ourt sustained [a]ppellants’ 

objection to that question.” Id. Despite the trial court’s 

instructions to disregard, appellants maintain that this 

statement “was not a bell that could be unrung” and a new 

trial was warranted. Id. at 40. 

We disagree. The trial court judge instructed the jury 

multiple times to disregard that statement. He did so twice 

after Radtke gave her answer, once directly after Radtke gave 

her response and again after a sidebar conference. Trial Tr., 

Jan. 15, 2014, 10:13–20, 21:7–13. And he reminded the jury, 

in his instructions to them, to disregard any stricken 

testimony. Trial Tr., Jan. 15, 2014, 76:20–24. “We assume 

juries follow their instructions,” and the appellants here have 

“raise[d] no argument nor proffered evidence that would 

suggest to us that the jury did not heed the court’s 

admonition.” United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 846 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010). Or, as the Supreme Court put it, “We normally 

presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard 

inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless 

there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be 

unable to follow the court’s instructions and a strong 

likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating 

to the defendant.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 767 n.8 

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(1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We 

thus hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 

not ordering a new trial.

Second, appellants argue that a new trial is warranted 

because “[t]he [c]ourt should not have allowed Ms. 

Cunningham to repeatedly contradict herself without giving 

the jury a perjury instruction.” Appellants’ Br. 40. 

Appellants contend that Cunningham contradicted her prior 

statements and her resume when she testified that she was not 

a supervisor when she worked for Lifecare. According to 

appellants, the court should have issued “an instruction that 

Ms. Cunningham put forth false evidence with the intent to 

deceive the jury into believing facts that are not true.” Id. at 

41. We disagree. 

Simply put, credibility judgments are the sole province of 

the jury. Cunningham testified that she was not a supervisor, 

and appellants had the opportunity to impeach her testimony 

by her prior statements and the job description on her resume. 

Cunningham did her best to explain those apparent 

discrepancies, and the jury ultimately decided whom to 

believe, and how important this issue was to its verdict. The 

judge was not required to himself weigh the evidence, assess 

Cunningham’s credibility, and then instruct the jury as to his 

view of the evidence. We hold that the trial judge did not 

abuse his discretion in denying appellants a new trial for this 

reason. 

We further note that we are not compelled to consider 

this argument at all. Appellants provide us no indication that 

they raised the issue before the district court, and even when 

directly asked at oral argument whether they had tendered any 

such instructions to the court, they could provide no 

reference. See Coleman-Lee v. District of Columbia, __ F.3d 

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__, 2015 WL 2365709, *1 (D.C. Cir. May 19, 2015) (per 

curiam) (when an objection to the jury instruction is “never 

raised and preserved” by party, “we review only for plain 

error”). Appellants have cited no case in which this circuit 

has ever reversed a judgment of the district court for failure to 

give a “perjury instruction,” with or without an objection in 

the district court. Indeed, a Westlaw search reveals no 

opinion of this court in which we have ever used the 

expression “perjury instruction.” Appellants have not shown 

plain error.

Appellants finally argue that a new trial is required 

because plaintiff–appellees’ attorney stated, in his opening 

statement, that appellants needed to prove that Radtke and 

Cunningham were exempt by clear and convincing evidence. 

See Appellants’ Br. 21, 41; Trial Tr., Jan. 13, 2014, 84:2–7. 

This statement was erroneous, appellants contend, as the 

judge later instructed the jury that the defendant–appellants 

“must prove every element of their defenses that the 

[plaintiff–appellees] are exempt from the overtime 

requirement of the Fair Labor Standards Act by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” Trial Tr., Jan. 15, 2014, 

78:24–79:1 (emphasis added). Appellants thus argue that,

“[b]ecause there is a direct link between the errors and the 

jury’s determination that Ms. Radtke and Ms. Cunningham 

were non-exempt, Appellants are entitled to a partial new 

trial.” Appellants’ Br. 41. This is the entirety of the 

appellants’ argument.

We might reject appellants’ discussion as so scant and 

conclusory as to constitute a waiver of that argument. In any 

event, appellants are not entitled to a new trial. It may be an 

overstatement to characterize the attorney’s remarks as 

“inappropriate,” id., as this circuit has never stated what the 

proper burden of proof is in this context, Robinson-Smith, 590 

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F.3d 891 n.5, and some of our sister circuits have required 

employers to prove exemption by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” see, e.g., Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town 

Gaming, L.L.C., 564 F.3d 688, 692 n.3 (4th Cir. 2009). We 

need not decide the appropriate standard of proof in this case, 

because the jury instructions and verdict form enforced the 

standard of proof most favorable to the appellants of the 

available options. The judge gave the jury detailed and clear 

instructions that appellants needed to prove exemption only 

by “a preponderance of the evidence,” Trial Tr., Jan. 15, 

2014, 79:1, which appellants argue is the proper standard. 

As we noted above, we presume that juries follow the 

instructions of the district judge. See, e.g., Celis, 608 F.3d at 

846. In the present case, the presumption is particularly 

compelling, as appellants neither objected to the statement by 

plaintiffs’ counsel nor submitted any other proposed 

instruction to the district court on the subject. As we further 

stated above, such an objection is normally forfeited, and if 

we were to review it at all, it would be solely for plain error. 

See, e.g., Coleman-Lee, __ F.3d. __, 2015 WL 2365709, at 

*1. Appellants are not close to meeting that standard. 

Appellants would have us conclude that the jury must have 

ignored the judge’s instructions and been unduly influenced 

by appellees’ opening statement, based on the mere fact that 

the jury found for the appellees. We reject their argument. In 

short, appellants give us no reason to think that the judge 

abused his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial; 

we thus affirm the district court.

As further evidence of the frailty of this allegation of 

error, the verdict forms submitted to the jury2 expressly 

 2 We note that the verdict forms, like the complaints, were not 

included in the Appendices or other filings of the parties.

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asked: “Did the defendants establish by a preponderance of 

the evidence that plaintiff . . . was exempted from the 

overtime requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 

because of the” administrative or professional exemption. 

Verdict Form for Plaintiff Radtke, Radtke v. Caschetta, No. 

06-cv-02031 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014), ECF No. 141 (emphasis 

added); Verdict Form for Plaintiff Cunningham, Radtke v. 

Caschetta, No. 06-cv-02031 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2014), ECF No. 

142 (same).

CONCLUSION

In sum, the jury fulfilled its function. It considered 

conflicting evidence, resolved factual disputes, and returned a 

verdict. There is no reason for us to upset that verdict or 

order a new trial. We thus affirm the judgment of the district 

court.

So ordered.

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