Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-05831/USCOURTS-ca6-14-05831-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gayle Ray

Henry Steward
Appellant
Maurice Darnell Tyler
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0304n.06

Case No. 14-5831

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MAURICE DARNELL TYLER,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v.

GAYLE RAY, Commissioner of Corrections 

and HENRY STEWARD, Warden,

Respondents-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF 

TENNESSEE

BEFORE: SILER, BATCHELDER, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Representatives of the State of Tennessee (“the warden”) appeal 

a district court’s decision to grant habeas relief to a prisoner on the basis of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel. A jury convicted Maurice Tyler of the premeditated murder of two people at a 

Nashville nightclub in 2002, even though his accomplice, who had previously pleaded guilty to 

being the getaway driver, testified at trial that he was the shooter and that Tyler was not 

involved. In his habeas petition, Tyler argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

call one of the getaway driver’s attorneys as a witness to bolster the getaway driver’s confession. 

The district court agreed and granted the writ. On appeal, the warden argues that the district 

court erred in finding that (1) Tyler’s claim was not barred by the statute of limitations and 

(2) the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals acted unreasonably when it denied Tyler’s post-

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conviction petition. Because the Tennessee courts’ resolution of Tyler’s Sixth Amendment 

claim was not unreasonable, we VACATE the writ of habeas corpus and REMAND the case to 

the district court. 

I.

Tyler and Christopher Schultz were close friends. They were both living in Tyler’s 

mother’s house when they were victims of a home invasion. Tyler is African-American and 

Schultz is Caucasian.

One of the people who robbed Tyler’s house was Monty Campbell. Tyler testified 

against Campbell at Campbell’s preliminary hearing. An officer would later testify he overheard 

Tyler muttering to himself after the hearing that he would kill Campbell when Campbell got out 

of jail. In August 2002, several years later, Campbell was released on parole. 

Before dawn on November 25, 2002, Tyler and Schultz were at the Outer Limits night 

club in Nashville, Tennessee. Campbell was there, too. As Campbell and his girlfriend Cayra 

Carruth got into a car to leave the club, they were shot. A club employee, Jared Johnson, 

watched it happen. The gunman reloaded twice, firing a total of twenty-eight bullets into the car, 

killing both occupants. 

After the gunman left in a dark-colored Saturn, Johnson gave chase for several miles in 

his own car. During the pursuit, Johnson spoke to a 911 operator and filmed the fleeing Saturn 

with a video camera. Police obtained the video and interviewed other witnesses at the scene. 

Although the witnesses’ descriptions of the gunman were not entirely consistent—including their 

opinions on whether the gunman was white, black, or Hispanic—Schultz and Tyler soon became 

suspects. A key piece of evidence was that the Saturn was registered to Tyler’s mother and 

belonged to Schultz. 

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Schultz initially told police he was not the shooter. But he soon changed his story and 

began telling investigators and his attorneys that he was the trigger man. He insisted that his 

friend Earl Shannon, who was deceased by that time, was the getaway driver, and that Tyler was 

not involved at all. 

Schultz pleaded guilty about two weeks before Tyler’s trial. At the plea colloquy, 

Schultz, under oath, agreed with the government’s theory that he was the getaway driver and 

Tyler was the shooter.

Tyler’s trial strategy was to convince the jury that Schultz’s version of events was true. 

Schultz testified at Tyler’s trial that he shot Campbell and Carruth, and that Tyler was not 

involved. On cross examination, Schultz admitted that he first told police he was the driver, and 

that, in pleading guilty, he admitted under oath to the government’s theory of events. 

Nevertheless, he insisted that he lied in his first statements to police and that he felt he had to 

agree to the government’s version of events at his plea hearing. 

To bolster Schultz’s credibility, Tyler’s counsel played to the jury a videotape of 

Schultz’s earlier confession to police that he was the killer. Tyler’s counsel would later testify 

that he believed Schultz’s testimony and videotaped confession were “pretty moving” and 

“pretty convincing,” and that he was surprised when the jury convicted Tyler of two counts of 

premeditated murder and one count of felony murder. Tyler was sentenced to life without the 

possibility of parole. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals upheld his convictions. State v. 

Tyler, No. M2005-00500-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 264631 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 1, 2006), 

appeal denied (Tenn. June 26, 2006).

Tyler then petitioned for state post-conviction relief. Among his grounds for relief, he 

faulted his trial counsel for failing to call Schultz’s attorneys and other witnesses who had heard 

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Schultz confess that he was the shooter. Jonathan Wing represented Schultz during his guilty 

plea. At the post-conviction hearing, Wing 

testified that Schultz never wavered from his insistence that he was the shooter 

and that [Tyler] was not involved in the murders. However, Wing stated that he 

was more inclined to believe the State’s theory of the case than the version of 

events expounded by Schultz, noting that the proof was not consistent with 

Schultz’s claims.

Tyler v. State, No. M2008-02199-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 2025459, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 

21, 2010), appeal denied (Tenn. Aug. 26, 2010). The post-conviction court denied Tyler’s 

petition, and the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Id. at *8. Regarding the 

question of whether Tyler’s trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 

U.S. 668 (1984), for failing to call corroborating witnesses, including Wing, to testify, the 

appellate court explained:

The post-conviction court noted that Schultz’s credibility was a major issue at 

trial and that his credibility was “severely damaged by the self-serving facts 

adopted into his plea testimony and by his statements to police—all suggesting 

that he was not the shooter.” The court found that introducing evidence of prior

consistent statements would not have negated the presence of the inconsistent 

statements. Therefore, the court found that [Tyler] was not prejudiced by 

counsel’s failure to call witnesses to testify regarding Schultz’s prior consistent 

statements. The record does not preponderate against this finding.

Tyler, 2010 WL 2025459, at *7.

 Tyler then petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

Tyler’s amended petition asserted nine grounds for relief, including the theory that trial counsel 

was ineffective for failing to call witnesses to bolster Schultz’s confessions. The district court 

noted that (1) the federal habeas limitations period expired on December 3, 2010; (2) Tyler 

placed his petition in the prison mail room on December 9, 2010; and (3) Tyler amended his 

petition on April 25, 2013. The district court determined that all but two claims were time-

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barred. Regarding the claim related to Wing, the district court concluded that Tyler “made a 

sufficient showing of actual innocence to overcome his six-day delay.” Tyler v. Steward, No. 

3:10-1187, 2014 WL 3644072, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. July 21, 2014). 

Ultimately, the district court granted the writ solely on the claim that trial counsel failed 

to call Wing as a witness. Id. at *23. The court reasoned: 

Upon consideration of the State courts’ findings of fact on this claim, the Court is 

unable to conclude that the Tennessee courts’ decision on this claim was 

reasonable. Here, the State courts found that “Schultz’s credibility was a major 

issue at trial.” [Tyler, 2010 WL 2025459, at *7]. [Tyler’s] counsel interviewed 

Wing and also had proof of his testimony. Wing’s testimony would clearly have 

negated the effect of Schultz’s prior inconsistent statements by demonstrating 

Schultz’s consistent statements to his counsel that he was the shooter. According

to Wing, Schultz “never wavered” in his statements that he was the shooter. Id. at 

*2. Where the critical issue is whether [Tyler] or Schultz shot the victim and 

Schultz’s credibility is the major issue at trial, then any proof that was consistent 

with [Tyler’s] innocence would be [Tyler’s] counsel’s obligation to present and 

let the jury assess the credibility of the witnesses. Without Wing’s testimony, the 

jury did not have the benefit of proof that Schultz was truthful in his testimony, as 

reflected by his consistent statements to his counsel. Without this proof, the 

Court cannot be assured as to what the jury’s verdict may have been.

Id. at *22.

The warden moved to alter or amend the district court’s judgment. While the warden 

argued that Tyler’s attorney’s decision not to call Wing was “strategic,” the district court noted 

that Tyler’s counsel testified that, in hindsight, he wished he had called Wing as a witness. The 

district court denied the motion and reaffirmed its position that failing to call Wing was not only

not “strategic,” it was objectively unreasonable under Strickland. 

As we will explain, the Tennessee courts’ decision was not an unreasonable application 

of Strickland, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Accordingly, we need not determine whether 

Tyler’s petition was barred by the statute of limitations.

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II.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution grants criminal defendants the 

right to effective assistance of counsel to ensure a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686, 689. 

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel present “mixed questions of law and fact” subject to 

de novo review. Id. at 698. To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must prove both that 

counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 

Id. at 687. 

Federal habeas corpus relief for state prisoners is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, section 

(d) of which states:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 

claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the 

adjudication of the claim--

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination 

of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

For habeas petitions alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, “[t]he pivotal question is 

whether the state court’s application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Harrington 

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). Section 2254(d) requires that the state courts be granted 

more “deference and latitude” than would be available under a pure Strickland review. Id.

Congress designed this standard to be “difficult to meet.” Id. at 102. The state court’s 

decision must be more than simply wrong: “[E]ven a strong case for relief [under Strickland] 

does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. Although section 

2254(d) does not completely bar federal review of previously-litigated state prisoner Strickland 

claims, it only allows for the writ to issue “in cases where there is no possibility fairminded 

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jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s 

precedents.” Id.

In this case, the district court failed to apply the appropriate degree of deference to the 

state courts’ decision. The question under Strickland is not what the reviewing judge would have 

done in hindsight, or even what the attorney himself would have done in hindsight. The question 

is whether the attorney’s behavior at trial was so objectively unreasonable that it overcomes the 

“strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 

professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Under these standards, the analysis of the 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals was not unreasonable. 

Here, the defense’s best strategy was to argue that Schultz’s version of events (in which 

Tyler was not involved in the shooting) was true. The most compelling evidence for this version 

of events was Schultz’s own live first-person account of how he killed the victims. Although

Schultz clearly had credibility problems, Tyler’s counsel attempted to rehabilitate Schultz’s 

credibility by playing for the jury a video of Schultz’s prior consistent confession to the police. 

Schultz’s video confession was so compelling that a relative of one of the victims shouted, 

“You’ve killed my daughter,” and had to be removed from the courtroom. See Tyler, 2014 WL 

3644072, at *14.

In reviewing the state trial court’s denial of Tyler’s post-conviction petition, the 

Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals accurately stated the Strickland standard as the governing 

law. Tyler, 2010 WL 2025459, at *6. That court then reasonably determined that introducing 

more “evidence of prior consistent statements” through Wing would not have significantly 

improved Schultz’s credibility. Id. at *7.

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The district court found this analysis unreasonable. We disagree. Adding Wing’s 

testimony on top of Schultz’s trial testimony and videotaped confession would not have so 

effectively bolstered Schultz’s credibility as to overcome the state’s other evidence.

When Tyler’s trial attorney testified at the post-conviction hearing, he initially opined

there was nothing more he could have done to establish that Schultz, not Tyler, was the shooter. 

Counsel explained that the videotape of Schultz’s confession was “pretty moving” and “pretty 

convincing,” especially when 

in the middle of that tape one of the family members of one of the victims got up 

and made a comment . . ., you’ve killed my daughter, or something to that effect. 

And I think he was removed from the courtroom. My point being, not only did I 

have Schultz there who I thought was pretty convincing that he was the shooter 

and then the videotape comes in, kind of reaffirming that. I just thought that we 

had convinced [the jury] that [Schultz] was the shooter at that point.

Tyler’s counsel also said he 

had a lot of [pre-trial] conversations with [Schultz’s attorneys] because they kept 

telling me that [Schultz] wants to get up on the stand and testify for you that he’s 

the shooter. And they could not figure out why he wanted to do that, but I knew 

that he would do that.

Tyler’s counsel also responded to a question about whether he considered calling Wing 

as a witness to bolster Schultz’s testimony:

I know there was an issue about whether or not to call Jon Wing. I’ll tell you—I 

really thought once [Schultz] testified and that videotape was played, and we got 

the reaction out of the person in the audience, I thought, if that person in the 

audience believes that Schultz killed these people, I felt that we had shown that.

Counsel did admit at the post-conviction hearing that “[k]nowing what I know now,” he would 

have called Schultz’s attorneys to rehabilitate Schultz’s testimony. But the rest of counsel’s 

testimony suggests he made a conscious decision at trial not to call Wing.

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Nor would Wing’s testimony necessarily have been the sockdolager that rehabilitated 

Schultz’s credibility. At Tyler’s post-conviction hearing, Wing explained, “My position even at 

[the] time [of Schultz’s plea deal and Tyler’s trial] was that I was more inclined to believe the 

state’s theory than Mr. Schultz’s theory.” Wing said he “didn’t quite understand why” Schultz 

was claiming to be the shooter. Wing testified he believed that the state’s theory “was more sort 

of inclined to be with the facts” than Schultz’s story. “[I]n all of the proof we looked at,” Wing 

said, “the dynamic was, essentially, me trying to say, I don’t understand why you want to be the 

shooter here.” 

Although we are not certain that Wing’s opinions on the evidence would have been 

admissible at Tyler’s trial, this testimony does suggest that Wing might not have been the most 

effective witness to bolster Schultz’s credibility. This observation weighs against any finding 

that Tyler’s counsel was objectively unreasonable for failing to call Wing as a witness.

Accordingly, the state post-conviction court and Court of Criminal Appeals were not 

unreasonable in finding that Tyler’s trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance. By no 

means was the Tennessee courts’ decision “so lacking in justification that there was an error well 

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded 

disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

For this reason we VACATE the writ of habeas corpus and REMAND this case to the 

district court.

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ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the result. I agree 

completely with the majority’s analysis of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim and would 

similarly find that the district court erred by granting a writ of habeas corpus—if reaching the 

merits were appropriate. It is not appropriate, however, because Tyler’s petition is time-barred.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides a one-year 

statute of limitations for federal applications for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 

pursuant to a judgment of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Although the statute of 

limitations is “not jurisdictional,” when it has been timely asserted by the warden it “effectively 

bars relief absent a showing that the petition’s untimeliness should be excused based on equitable 

tolling and actual innocence.” Akrawi v. Booker, 572 F.3d 252, 260 (6th Cir. 2009). The district 

court at least followed the correct procedure; it excused the statute of limitations based on a 

showing of actual innocence, even if that determination was incorrect. The majority, however, 

notes simply that the court “need not determine” whether the petition is time-barred because of 

its holding that Tyler loses on the merits. But AEDPA does not allow us to ignore a time bar to 

rule on the merits, regardless of whether the case has any merit.

This court is thus barred from deciding this case on the merits if Tyler’s petition was 

untimely. And it was.1Tyler’s limitations period began to run on “the date on which the 

judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). If a petitioner does not seek certiorari before

the Supreme Court, the judgment becomes final for AEDPA purposes—and the limitations 

 

1Tyler contends that the warden waived this issue because she failed to include it in her “Statement of the Issue.” 

The warden did, however, include the time-bar issue in her table of contents and in the argument section of her brief. 

Further, Tyler responded to the time-bar issue in his brief, and the issue was fully argued at oral argument. Under 

similar circumstances, we have held that the issue is not waived. See Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 F.3d 

532, 540 (6th Cir. 2014); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Prof’l Realty Invs., Inc., 72 F.3d 130, 1995 WL 717021, at *11 n.4 

(6th Cir. 1995) (table decision).

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period begins—after the ninety-day period in which he could have petitioned for certiorari. 

Bronaugh v. Ohio, 235 F.3d 280, 283 (6th Cir. 2000). Here, the Tennessee Supreme Court 

denied review of the case on June 26, 2006, concluding Tyler’s direct review. The ninety-day 

certiorari period expired on September 26, 2006. Thus, the limitations period began to run on 

September 27, 2006.

AEDPA further provides that “[t]he time during which a properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is 

pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). On June 

18, 2007, Tyler filed a state post-conviction petition. By this date, 266 days had run from the 

one-year statute of limitations. Upon filing the state post-conviction petition, however, the 

statute began to toll. It did not begin to run again until state post-conviction review was no 

longer “pending.” 

The warden and Tyler each point to a different date for when state post-conviction review 

was no longer pending. The warden argues that the relevant date is August 26, 2010, which is 

when the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its order denying Tyler’s application for permission 

to appeal. Under this timeline, the statute of limitations expired on December 3, 2010, and 

Tyler’s petition—which was filed on December 9, 2010—would have been untimely. Tyler, on 

the other hand, contends that the relevant date is September 14, 2010, which is when the 

Tennessee Supreme Court issued its mandate for the case. Under this timeline, the statute of 

limitations expired on December 22, 2010, and Tyler’s petition would have been timely.

The timeliness of Tyler’s petition thus hinges on when state post-conviction relief was no 

longer pending: either when the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its order or when it issued its 

mandate. Pointing to Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), and Lawrence v. Florida, 549 

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U.S. 327 (2007), Tyler argues that the Supreme Court has suggested that, as a blanket rule, the 

mandate is the relevant date. The Court has created no such blanket rule, however. Rather, the 

Court has noted that “until the application has achieved final resolution through the State’s postconviction procedures, by definition it remains ‘pending.’” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 

(2002). Latching on to this language, the Lawrence Court, while noting that the relevant date in 

that case was the mandate, stated that an application for state post-conviction relief is finally 

resolved “[a]fter the State’s highest court has issued its mandate or denied review.” Lawrence, 

549 U.S. at 332 (emphasis added). The Court thus has specifically contemplated either a denial 

of review or a mandate as “finally resolving” a state post-conviction petition.

So how do we determine when a state has “finally resolved” a post-conviction petition? 

The Court counsels us to look to the relevant state’s practices. See Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 

198, 203–05 (2006) (noting AEDPA’s tolling provision is calculated from the issuance of the 

mandate by the Florida appellate court because “under Florida law, appellate order ‘is pending’ 

until the mandate issues”). Fortunately for us, Tennessee law is clear: the date of the decision, 

and not the date of the mandate, is the relevant date. See Pinchon v. State, No. M2003-00816-

CCA-R3-PC, 2004 WL 193055, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2004) (“This court has 

consistently held that the final action of the supreme court is the date of the filing of either the 

court’s opinion or denial of application for permission to appeal.”).

This means that, when the Tennessee Supreme Court issued its order denying Tyler’s 

application for permission to appeal on August 26, 2010, Tyler’s state post-conviction petition 

was no longer “pending,” and the AEDPA statute of limitations began to run again. The statute 

thus expired on December 3, 2010. Because Tyler did not file his petition until December 9, 

2010, his petition was untimely. 

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The district court recognized that the petition was untimely, but held that Tyler had made 

a sufficient showing of actual innocence to excuse the time bar. We have indeed allowed 

equitable tolling of AEDPA’s statute of limitations based upon a credible claim of actual 

innocence. See Souter v. Jones, 395 F.3d 577, 588–90 (6th Cir. 2005). We have also warned, 

however, that equitable tolling “should only be granted sparingly.” Id. at 588. The Supreme 

Court agrees; the actual innocence exception should “remain rare,” being applied only in the 

“extraordinary case.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 321 (1995) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). A credible showing of actual innocence requires “new reliable evidence—whether it 

be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical 

evidence—that was not presented at trial.” House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). This new evidence must lead us to a conclusion that “it is more likely 

than not that no reasonable juror would have found [Tyler] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

McCray v. Vasbinder, 499 F.3d 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

We do not have such an extraordinary case here. The district court did not elaborate on 

what evidence it believed comprised the “sufficient showing of actual innocence.” Tyler has 

certainly shown no scientific or physical evidence, so his evidence must be “trustworthy 

eyewitness accounts” in order to apply. Wing’s testimony does not qualify, as he was not an 

eyewitness to the crime. Schultz’s testimony—through the supposed bolstering of Wing’s 

testimony—does not qualify either, because although he was an eyewitness to the crime, he is far 

from trustworthy given the fact that he gave throughout the course of the investigation and trial 

four different accounts of the night in question. Without any new reliable evidence, Tyler is not 

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eligible for the actual innocence exception, and the time bar still applies. Because it applies, 

relief is inappropriate on that ground and that ground alone.

We have on occasion ruled on the merits in the alternative, while also recognizing that 

the time bar precludes relief in and of itself. See Akrawi, 572 F.3d at 261 (“Yet, for the reasons 

that follow, we conclude . . . that even if the merits of the petition were considered, the result 

would be the same: Akrawi is not entitled to habeas relief.”). But that is not what the lead 

opinion has done here. For this reason, while I believe the majority is exactly correct in its 

analysis of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, I cannot join its opinion, because the 

merits should not have been reached. I concur only in the result of reversing the district court’s 

grant of the writ.

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