Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00164/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00164-58/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Georgina Carrillo Ayala
Defendant
Enrique Buenavida
Defendant
Jose Francisco Buenavida
Defendant
Canas
Defendant
Jose Antonio Pantoja Estrada
Defendant
Jerry Curtis Foster
Defendant
Luis Armando Rios Garcia
Defendant
Hector Gomez-Garcia
Defendant
Kelly Duane Hughes
Defendant
Bart Richard Hughes
Defendant
Francisco Loya-Solarzano
Defendant
Filiberto Madrigal
Defendant
Manny
Defendant
Roberto Mercado-Rangel
Defendant
Pancho
Defendant
Pistola
Defendant
Jose Manuel Rodriguez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Uncle
Defendant
Elias Hernandez Valencia
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

LNU (aka FRANCISCO LOYA-SOLARZANO, aka 

“Uncle,” aka “Pancho”)

ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA (aka “Pistola”)

FILIBERTO MADRIGAL (aka “Fily”)

LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA (aka “Pee Wee”)

GEORGINA CARRILLO AYALA

HECTOR GOMEZ-GARCIA

JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA (aka “Canas”)

ENRIQUE BUENAVIDA

JOSE ANTONIO PANTOJA ESTRADA

KELLY DUANE HUGHES

JERRY CURTIS FOSTER

BART RICHARD HUGHES

JOSE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ (aka “Manny”)

ROBERTO MERCADO-RANGEL,

 Defendants. 

CASE NO. 2:18-CR-164-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING 

EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER 

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

DATE: May 13, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA

 Defendant. 

CASE NO. 1:19-CR-100-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING 

EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER 

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

DATE: May 13, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

Case 2:18-cr-00164-KJM Document 342 Filed 05/19/21 Page 1 of 5
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These related cases were set for status conferences on May 13, 2021, then moved on the Court’s 

own motions to May 27, 2021. The undersigned parties now jointly request to move the status 

conferences for both matters to July 15, 2021, and to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant 

to the Court’s General Orders, issued in the interest of public health and safety in response to the 

COVID-19 pandemic, and pursuant to Local Code T4 as well, for the reasons set forth below.

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to 

continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to 

address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

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circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 The parties note that, by signing the proposed order 

below, the Court will have designated a new date for the status conferences. United States v. Lewis, 611 

F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

1. By this stipulation, the following defendants now move to continue the status conferences 

in the related matters to July 15, 2021, and to exclude time between May 13, 2021, and July 15, 2021, 

under Local Code T4, as well as under the Court’s General Orders:

a) ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA (aka “Pistola”)

b) FILIBERTO MADRIGAL (aka “Fily”)

c) LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA (aka “Pee Wee”)

d) GEORGINA CARRILLO AYALA

e) JOSE ANTONIO PANTOJA ESTRADA

f) JOSE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ (aka “Manny”)

2. These parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes seven compact discs, containing over 400 pages of investigative reports, surveillance 

photographs, surveillance video, and T-III wiretap transcripts. All of this discovery has been 

either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to continue to review discovery, 

conduct investigation, communicate with the government and their respective clients, discuss 

possible resolutions, and prepare for trial. The continuance is necessary to ensure continuity of 

counsel and for defense preparation.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) As to both cases, for the purpose of computing time for these defendants under 

the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time 

period of May 13, 2021 to July 15, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to the Court’s 

General Orders, in the interest of public health and safety, and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) 

[Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants’

request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

3. In regard to the defendant JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA (aka “Canas”), the 

government and counsel for this defendant agree and stipulate, and ask that the Court find, that the 

defendant’s whereabouts are currently unknown, despite the exercise of due diligence. The parties 

therefore ask that the Court find that for the purposes of computing time for this defendant under the 

Speedy Trial Act, within which trial must commence, the time period of May 13, 2021 to July 15, 2021, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(3)(A) & (B) [Local Code M]. 

4. Defendants KELLY DUANE HUGHES, JERRY CURTIS FOSTER, and BART 

RICHARD HUGHES have entered guilty pleas in this matter and been sentenced. ROBERTO 

MERCADO-RANGEL has entered a guilty plea in this matter and is awaiting sentencing. 

5. The defendants not mentioned in this stipulation have not yet appeared in this matter. 

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6. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: May 12, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: May 13, 2021 /s/ HAYES GABLE III

HAYES GABLE III

Counsel for Defendant 

ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA

Dated: May 12, 2021 /s/ TONI WHITE

TONI WHITE

Counsel for Defendant 

FILIBERTO MADRIGAL

Dated: May 12, 2021 /s/ PETER KMETO

PETER KMETO

Counsel for Defendant 

LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA

Dated: May 12, 2021 /s/ TASHA PARIS CHALFANT

TASHA PARIS CHALFANT

Counsel for Defendant 

GEORGINA CARRILLO AYALA

Dated: May 13, 2021 /s/ OLAF HEDBERG

OLAF HEDBERG

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA

Dated: May 13, 2021 /s/ DINA SANTOS

DINA SANTOS

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE PANTOJA ESTRADA

Dated: May 12, 2021 /s/ DAVID D. FISCHER

DAVID D. FISCHER

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE RODRIGUEZ

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: May 19, 2021

Case 2:18-cr-00164-KJM Document 342 Filed 05/19/21 Page 5 of 5