Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03859/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-03859-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
S. Adamik
Defendant
M. W. Barker
Defendant
Jill L. Brown
Defendant
G. Fuller
Defendant
Gary D. Hines
Plaintiff
S. Petrakis
Defendant
J. R. Ward
Defendant
Jeanne S. Woodford
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY D. HINES, 

Plaintiff,

 v.

S. ADAMIK, prison guard; J. R. WARD,

prison guard; G. FULLER, Lieutenant;

M. W. BARKER, Lieutenant; S.

PETRAKIS, Associate Warden; JILL L.

BROWN, Acting Warden; and JEANNE

S. WOODFORD, previous warden, 

Defendants. /

No. C 04-3859 PJH (PR)

ORDER DENYING

PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS AND

GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. The only remaining

defendants, Brown, Fuller and Petrakis, have moved for summary judgment. Plaintiff has

opposed the motion, and defendants have replied. Plaintiff has also filed several motions. 

For the reasons set out below, plaintiff’s motions will be denied and defendants’ motion will

be granted. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally presented four claims, all of which were allowed to proceed in the

court’s screening order. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was, however, granted in large

part, and denied only as to plaintiff’s claim that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated

by the service of cold food. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Motions

Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel. There is no constitutional right to

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counsel in a civil case, Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981), and

although district courts may "request" that counsel represent a litigant who is proceeding in

forma pauperis, as plaintiff is here, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), that does not give the

courts the power to make "coercive appointments of counsel." Mallard v. United States

Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989). 

The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may ask counsel to represent an

indigent litigant only in "exceptional circumstances," the determination of which requires an

evaluation of both (1) the likelihood of success on the merits and (2) the ability of the

plaintiff to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved. 

Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff appears able to present his claims adequately, and the remaining issue is

very simple. The motion for appointment of counsel will be denied.

Plaintiff has filed a motion to recuse the undersigned judge. The court has

determined not to recuse because the allegations of bias are grounded on earlier rulings in

this case, which is not a proper basis for recusal. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S.

540, 555-56 (1994) (judicial rulings alone may constitute grounds for appeal, but almost

never constitute a valid basis for a bias or impartiality motion). The motion to recuse is

therefore frivolous and will be denied. See Civil L.R. 3-15. 

Plaintiff is a member of the class in a class action brought by prisoners on San

Quentin’s death row, the subject of which is conditions on death row. See Lancaster v.

Tilton, No. 79-1630 WHA. Defendants’ request to take judicial notice of documents in the

Lancaster file and documents showing the offenses for which plaintiff is incarcerated, all of

which meet the standard for judicial notice, is granted. 

Because plaintiff is a member of the Lancaster class, his motion for a preliminary

injunction cannot be considered in this case. See McNeil v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165

(10th Cir. 1991) (individual suits for injunctive and equitable relief from alleged

unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought where there is a pending class action

suit involving the same subject matter); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir.

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1988) (en banc). 

Plaintiff’s motion to compel and for sanctions, filed more than seven days after the

discovery cut-off, will be denied. See Civ. L.R. 26-2.

B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

1. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

2. Analysis

The remaining claim in the case is plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim regarding cold

food. The defendants on that claim are Brown in her official capacity, Petrakis, and Fuller. 

Those defendants have moved for summary judgment.

a. Objections to Summary Judgment Materials

Both the plaintiff and the defendants have filed objections to some of the evidentiary

materials relied upon by the other side. The objections will be considered below to the

extent the court relies on objected-to materials.

///

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b. Injunctive Relief

As to defendant Brown, only plaintiff’s injunctive relief claim remains. The claims

against the other two defendants, Fuller and Petrakis, are for both injunctive relief and

damages. As discussed above, the injunctive relief claims cannot be pursued here

because plaintiff is a member of the class in Lancaster v. Tilton, where his claim not only

could be raised, but in fact was raised and rejected. 

In Lancaster a consent decree was entered in 1980 which included a provision

apparently requiring the use of hot carts. Lancaster, “Order Granting In Part and Denying

in Part Motion to Terminate Consent Decree... ” (Dec. 21, 2007) at 11. On December 21,

2007, the Lancaster court entered an order ruling on those parts of the State’s motion to

terminate the consent decree that did not require an evidentiary hearing. The court

terminated the “hot cart” provision, concluding that as to the hots carts the consent decree

goes “well beyond what the Eighth Amendment requires,” that there is no constitutional

right to hot food, and that room temperature food is sufficient for health. Id. The State has

filed a notice of appeal in Lancaster from a February 15, 2008, order granting in part and

denying in part the rest of the motion to terminate the consent decree. No final judgment

has been entered in the case. The rule therefore remains applicable that separate claims

for injunctive relief cannot be maintained when there is a class action pending which

involves the same subject matter.

The injunctive relief claims against the movants will be dismissed. See McNeil, 945

F.2d at 1165; Gillespie, 858 F.2d at 1103. 

c. Damages Claim 

Plaintiff contends that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated by adoption and

implementation of a new procedure for feeding death row inmates. He asserts that as a

result of the new procedure the food was not as hot as it should have been and that it was

unhealthy.

The Eighth Amendment imposes the duty upon prison officials to provide all

prisoners with the basic necessities of life such as food, clothing, shelter, sanitation,

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1 Plaintiff objects to this declaration, as he does the others, but provides no specifics

saying what it is about the Williams declaration which he finds objectionable. The objections

therefore are overruled. 

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medical care and personal safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). A prison

official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met: (1) the deprivation

alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious, id. at 834 (citing), and (2) the prison official

possesses a sufficiently culpable state of mind, id. at 834 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.

294 at 297- 98 (1991)).

As to the first prong of the Farmer test, there is no genuine issue of material fact as

to whether the alleged deprivation was sufficiently serious – under the undisputed facts, it

was not. 

First, it is not an Eighth Amendment violation for food not to be served hot. “Extreme

deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim. Because routine

discomfort is part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against

society, only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities

are sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.” Hudson v.

McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 1000 (1992) (interal quotation marks and citations omitted). The

Eighth Amendment requires only that prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain

health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing. LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444,

1456 (9th Cir. 1993). “‘The fact that the food occasionally contains foreign objects or

sometimes is served cold, while unpleasant, does not amount to a constitutional

deprivation.’” Id. (quoting Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1096 (1986)). In sum, even if the food was not served hot, that was

not a constitutional violation. 

Second, defendants have met their burden of pointing to materials showing that

there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the food was unhealthy, for

instance by providing a doctor’s declaration that plaintiff’s medical records reveal no foodrelated health issues, and that he weighs the same as he did when he entered the prison. 

Decl. Williams at ¶ ¶ 3-7.1

 Although plaintiff contends in response that he has had a

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number of illnesses, decl. Hines, ex. J at 15, he has not provided any competent evidence

linking his episodes of nausea and vomiting to the food. There thus is no genuine issue of

material fact on this point. Given that the alleged deprivation, if there was one, was not

sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth Amendment, the motion for summary judgment

will be granted.

CONCLUSION

1. Plaintiff’s motions for counsel (document number 56 on the docket), for a

preliminary injunction (document 55), for sanctions (document 64), and to recuse

(document 80) are DENIED.

2. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (document 69) is GRANTED. This

case is DISMISSED with prejudice. The clerk shall close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 26, 2008. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.04\HINES859.MSJ2.wpd 

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