Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caeb-2_19-mp-00202/USCOURTS-caeb-2_19-mp-00202-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Wayne Bonilla
Petitioning Creditor

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

In re

Named Involuntary Petitioner

STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA

 

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Misc. File No. 19-202

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND DECISION AFTER

REVIEW OF RESPONSIVE PLEADINGS

FILED BY STEVEN WAYNE BONILLA

Steven Wayne Bonilla delivered to the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California

ninety-eight (98) Bankruptcy Form 105s (involuntary bankruptcy petition forms) (Dckt. 3-93, 101-

107), seeking to commence ninety-eight involuntary bankruptcy cases in the Eastern District of

California against various federal and state court judges and justices. Because of facially identified

issues relating to the Form 105s, including whether Mr. Bonilla had standing to commence such

involuntary cases, and no filing fee for the Form 105s presented being paid, the court issued an order

creating this miscellaneous case file, No. 19-202 (“Miscellaneous File”), in Mr. Bonilla’s name so

that all of the Form 105s could be docketed in one place. The Miscellaneous File also affords Mr.

Bonilla the opportunity to present a unified response, rather than ninety-eight separate responses. 

Additionally, to the extent that Mr. Bonilla would disagree with whatever ruling was made by this

court, the creation of the Miscellaneous File and the unified response provides for a single appeal

which Mr. Bonilla would have the option of pursuing, rather than ninety-eight separate appeals.

In the Court’s Order to open the Miscellaneous File (Dckt. 1), it provided for Mr. Bonilla to

file responsive pleadings addressing the various issues in the Court’s Order. Mr. Bonilla has availed

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himself of the opportunity and presented the court with the following pleadings:

A. Response to 6-19-19 Court Order, Dckt. 99 (“Response,” 37 pages).

B. Exhibits from State Court Proceedings, Dckt. 100 (“Exhibits,” 68 pages).

C. Addendum re “Honorary Obligation,” Dckt. 108 (“Addendum,” 15 pages).

D. Additional Grounds Statement, Dckt. 114 (“Additional Statement,” 3 pages).

E. Response re California Judicial Council, Dckt. 115 (“Response to Supplemental

Docketing Order,” 10 pages).

Applications to Proceed in Forma Paupris

Mr. Bonilla has filed five Applications to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. Dckt. 95–98. The

Application filed as Docket Number 95 is a partial document, consisting of only one page. Dckt. 95. 

The other four Applications appear to be complete documents, with three being seven pages in length

and one (Dckt. 98) eight pages in length. In the attachments to these documents, Mr. Bonilla states

that he is not employed and currently has no income. Further, he has no spouse, no assets, and no

monthly expenses.

The eight-page Application has as its cover page one titled for the U.S. District Court or

Bankruptcy Court in the Eastern District of California. Dckt. 98 at 1. The second page of this

document is another “first page” of the Application which is titled as being made to the Bankruptcy

Court for the Central District of California, San Fernando Division. Id. at 2.

The Application filed as Dckt. 96 is titled as requesting the relief from the Bankruptcy Court

in the Central District, Riverside Division.

BANKRUPTCY COURT, BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING,

AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION REGARDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

In beginning this review it is very important to put in context the position of the bankruptcy

court and bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy court and bankruptcy judges have been created by

Congress pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution. While organizationally part of the

United States district court, the bankruptcy court is not an Article III court under the United States

Constitution. The scope of a bankruptcy court proceeding and exercise of a bankruptcy judge’s

judicial authority exists only to the extent as provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (federal court bankruptcy

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jurisdiction) and § 157 (exercise of federal judicial power by a bankruptcy judge). This judicial

power may properly be exercised over bankruptcy cases and civil proceedings arising under the

Bankruptcy Code, as well as those arising in and related to a bankruptcy case.

Mr. Bonilla has provided the court with significant information concerning his state court

criminal proceeding, the asserted defects in the conviction, and various theories and authorities by

which he asserts his rights have been denied. That information is relevant to considering whether

standing exists for Mr. Bonilla asserting the right to commence the involuntary bankruptcy cases. 

However, 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and § 157 limit the scope of an Article I bankruptcy judge’s exercise of

federal judicial power to those bankruptcy issues, and not to the full breadth of the federal judicial

power arising under Article III of the United States Constitution (for which it is the Article III District

Court judges, Court of Appeals judges, and Supreme Court justices whom may exercise that full

power).

The Response indicates that Mr. Bonilla appreciates this distinction and is seeking to present

the “bankruptcy law issues” to this Article I court and not attempting to have this court act outside

its jurisdiction and judicial power granted to it by Congress. To the extent the court has misread

Mr. Bonilla’s statements, this discussion has been included to explain the limitation on this court’s

powers with respect to the broader range of Mr. Bonilla’s issues with the judicial system.

Involuntary Bankruptcy Petition Provisions

Congress has provided a process under the Bankruptcy Code by which creditors of a person

may force that person into bankruptcy with the “mere” filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition

by the creditors. In pertinent part to the matters now before the court, 11 U.S.C. § 303 (discussed in

greater detail infra) provides that three or more creditors of a person may commence an involuntary

bankruptcy case if they collectively hold at least $15,750.00 in liquidated, noncontingent, not subject

to bona fide dispute unsecured debt. If the person for whom the involuntary bankruptcy case is to

be commenced has less than twelve creditors with such claims, then a single creditor who meets the

above criteria may commence the involuntary bankruptcy case.

Here, it is only Mr. Bonilla who is filing the Form 105s as the sole creditor seeking to force

the Form 105 Targets into bankruptcy. Presumably, Mr. Bonilla is asserting that each of the

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Form 105 Targets have less than twelve creditors each. The actual number of creditors holding

unsecured claims is unknown at this time. 

FEE WAIVER/IN FORMA PAUPERIS REQUESTS

With the responsive pleadings Mr. Bonilla has included five fee waiver requests. As

discussed below, Mr. Bonilla is now seeking to pursue only ninety-eight involuntary bankruptcy

cases. Mr. Bonilla directs the court to the provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (which specifies required

filing fees in bankruptcy cases) and asserts that the district court and the bankruptcy court are not

restricted in waiving the filing fees, so long as it is in accordance with Judicial Conference policy. 

Response, pp. 28:23-28, 29:1-15; Dckt. 99. He then directs the court to consider 28 U.S.C. § 1915

which provides for Prisoner’s Application to Proceed in Forma Paupers.

Congress provides in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(1)(A) the required filing fees for bankruptcy cases,

which for a Chapter 7 case is $245.00 (to which is added an administrative fee). In 28 U.S.C.

§ 1930(f)(1) it is provided that the district court or the bankruptcy court may waive the Chapter 7

filing fee for an individual if he or she meets specified economic requirements. Such individual

entitled to seek a Chapter 7 fee waiver is further identified as “such debtors” in subparagraph (f)(2)

of § 1930, with additional waiver relief for “such debtors” who meet the requirements of

subparagraph (f)(1) of § 1930 for “other fees prescribed” under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(b)(additional

Judicial Conference fees) and (c)(notice of appeal fees). Mr. Bonilla in his Response clearly states

he is a “creditor,” and does not assert to be, and is not, a debtor.

 In asserting his status as a creditor, Mr. Bonilla directs the court to 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(3),

which states, “(3) This subsection does not restrict the district court or the bankruptcy court from

waiving, in accordance with Judicial Conference policy, fees prescribed under this section for other

debtors and creditors.” He asserts that pursuant to the statutory enactment in 28 U.S.C. § 1915

providing for a prisoner’s right to proceed in forma paupers, that it is the “Judicial Council Policy”

upon which the district court or the bankruptcy court can waive a Chapter 7 filing fee for a creditor

seeking to file a Form 105. However, the Congressional enactment in 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is not the

Judicial Council Policy, as adopted by that Article III branch of the government, with respect to

bankruptcy fees.

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The Federal Guide to Judiciary Policy § 610.70 and § 610.80 adopted by the Judicial Council

specifically provides for fee waivers of fees in and relating to bankruptcy cases providing:

§ 610.70 Fee Waivers

Other than where expressly allowed in the fee schedules (e.g., Items 4 and 11 of the

Bankruptcy Court Miscellaneous Fee Schedule) or by statute (see: § 610.80 and

Guide, Vol. 4, § 820), fee waivers are generally prohibited. Judicial Conference policy

allows certain types of users to ask courts to exempt them from fees for Public Access

to Court Electronic Records (PACER). See: EPA fee schedule and § 630.20.

§ 610.80 Applications to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

(a) Eligible parties may proceed without prepayment of fees under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 (district courts and courts of appeals).1

(b) The filing fee in a chapter 7 bankruptcy case may be waived in accordance

with 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f). Judicial Conference guidance on fee waivers in

bankruptcy courts is posted on the judiciary’s public website. See: Guide, Vol.

4, § 820 (Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures).

The Judicial Conference guidance referenced in § 610.80 above are summarized as set forth

below, with the entire Guide, Vol. 4, §§ 820 et seq., attached as Addendum “A” to this Order:

§ 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures

The Judicial Conference promulgated these procedures to assist district courts

and bankruptcy courts with implementing the fee waiver provisions set forth in

Section 418 of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of

2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-8, 199 Stat. 23), and codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1)-(3). JCUS-SEP 13, pp. 8-9.

§ 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case

(a) In lieu of paying the prescribed chapter 7 filing fee or filing an installment

application, an individual debtor may, along with the bankruptcy petition,

file an application to waive the filing fee.

(1) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006(c) requires that the

application conform substantially to Official Form 103B.

(2) A defective or otherwise deficient waiver application should be

processed according to the court’s standard operating procedures for

processing deficient pleadings and papers.

(b) When a chapter 7 petition in an individual debtor case is accompanied by

an application to waive the filing fee, the court should initiate and process the

case in the same manner as other individual chapter 7 cases.

1

 This reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is in connection with the district court and the

courts of appeals, not the bankruptcy courts.

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Guide to Judicial Policy, Vol. 4, Ch 8: Bankruptcy Case Policies (emphasis added).

No provision is made in the Judicial Council Policy for the waiving of the Chapter 7 filing

fee for a creditor seeking to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case for another person.

The Supreme Court has enacted Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006 to expressly

address the filing fee in bankruptcy cases and the waiver of such fee. In Rule 1006(c) providing for

the waiving of the Chapter 7 filing fee, such waiver must be requested by the Debtor:

(c) Waiver of filing fee. A voluntary chapter 7 petition filed by an individual shall

be accepted for filing if accompanied by the debtor’s application requesting a

waiver under 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f), prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official

Form.

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(c)(emphasis added).

The filing of an involuntary bankruptcy petition without the payment of the filing fee is

improper. There is no basis for the waiver of such a fee by a creditor seeking to place another person

in bankruptcy.

The failure to pay the filing fee is a basis for the Clerk of the Court not filing each of the

Form 105s as involuntary bankruptcy petitions.

BASIS ASSERTED BY MR. BONILLA FOR HAVING A “CLAIM”

AND

ANALYSIS OF WHETHER THERE IS FACIALLY A BONA FIDE DISPUTE

In considering the original and responsive pleadings/documents, the court first notes that

Mr. Bonilla has been very clear and straightforward is presenting the asserted grounds for having

standing to commence involuntary cases against the now ninety-eight different Form 105 Targets. 

The court appreciates his candor and strives to respond in the same clear manner.

The real basis for Mr. Bonilla wanting to file involuntary bankruptcy petitions against various

federal and state judges and justices appears to rise from his frustration over being unable to

successfully advance such challenges to his state court criminal conviction directly through the state

and federal judicial systems. The vast majority of his detailed legal arguments advanced in the

various response pleadings argue why his criminal conviction is improper, why he asserts that the

state court lacked jurisdiction to determine that he was guilty of a crime arising under state law

(rather than a “mere error” based on the law and evidence), and why the various Form 105 Targets

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should be liable for not issuing judgments or orders that his criminal conviction is void.

Asserted Honorary Obligation

Claim 1

In his Addendum pleading (Dckt. 108) Mr. Bonilla first states that the debt he asserts is an

“honorary obligation debt” owed by each of the Form 105 Targets. Mr. Bonilla then provides the

court with the following definitions as are stated to apply to his Claim 1:

(1) Contract - an agreement between 2 or more persons which creates

an OBLIGATION to do or not to do a particular thing.

(2) Equal Protection of Laws of a state is extended to the enforcement

of contracts under the 14th Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

(2) [sic] Debt - a fixed and certain obligation to pay money or some

other valuable thing or things (such as the Petitioner’s liberty and

freedom), in the present tor in the future. In a broad sense, that which

is due to respond to another in money, labor, or service, it may even

mean a moral or HONORARY OBLIGATION.

(3). Honorary - As applied to public offices and other positions of

responsibility or trust. In other contents or usage, (as here), it means

attached to or growing out of some honor or dignity or HONORABLE

OFFICE, or else it imports an OBLIGATION OR DUTY growing out

of honor or trust only.

(4) Obligation - that which a person is bound to do or forbear; any duty imposed by

law, promise or contract, etc..

Thus, an HONORARY OBLIGATION is a duty imposed by law on a public

official, which creates an OBLIGATION, owe to Petitioner to declare the judgment

null and void. Which is a debt owed to the Petitioner that is enforceable under the

Equal Protection of Law Claus [sic] of the 14th Amendment of the United States

Constitution.

Addendum, pp. 1:21-28, 2:1-24; Dckt. 108 (emphasis in original).

In considering the above, Mr. Bonilla is asserting that he is owed a debt arising from a public

official’s obligation to properly fulfill the duties of his or her office. While stating the contention,

the court is not presented with Mr. Bonilla’s assertion that a monetary obligation is owed by such

public official to Mr. Bonilla because Mr. Bonilla did not prevail in the proceedings or matters before

that official.

Further, while a definition is initially given for a contract, it is clear what Mr. Bonilla asserts

is not based on a bilateral contract with each of the Form 105 Targets, but an inchoate obligation for

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a public official to fulfill the duties of his or her office. On its face, that duty flows to the “public”

and is not an obligation which is owed in a bilateral contract between Mr. Bonilla and each of the

Form 105 Targets.

In substance, Mr. Bonilla asserts a moral obligation to uphold the honor and dignity of that

person’s office. Mr. Bonilla contends that such honor has been violated because he, Mr. Bonilla, has

not been able to prevail in his contentions in his proceedings before those Form 105 Targets.

Claim 2

As grounds for his second claim, Mr. Bonilla asserts that the judgment for his conviction in

the state court criminal proceedings is void on the record in that state court proceeding. Id.. at 2:26-

18. Because Mr. Bonilla concludes that his criminal conviction is void, he then asserts that a duty

exists for the public official to agree with him and declare the conviction void. Id. at 3:1-5. 

Thus, Mr. Bonilla argues that since he disagrees with the various public officials regarding

whether the state court criminal conviction is void, those public officials owe an honorary monetary

obligation to him.

Other than his statement of the above asserted principle, Mr. Bonilla offers no legal authority

showing that his disagreement over the outcome of a judicial or other proceeding births a monetary 

obligation owed to him personally by the judicial officer–as opposed to giving rise to Mr. Bonilla’s

right to appeal the decision.

Claim 3

For a third basis for a claim against the various Form 105 Targets, Mr. Bonilla asserts that

based on the Honorary Obligation owed, for which money damages are owed for a conspiracy,

Mr. Bonilla has a right under the Equal Protection Clause to collect on the debts based on the

Honorary Obligations. 

Mr. Bonilla states that he now seeks to “collect on debts that are owed to him, including ones

born out of an HONORARY OBLIGATION, via this Bankruptcy Court.” Id. at 3:11-14 (emphasis

in original). 

This ties together the first two grounds for his claims, identifying these Form 105s being used

in lieu of the appropriate state court or district court complaints seeking to assert the enforcement of,

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and recover damages from, such honorary obligations.

Relief Sought 

Mr. Bonilla concludes, stating that this Bankruptcy Court has a duty to file the Form 105s and

commence involuntary bankruptcy cases as sought by Mr. Bonilla based on the above asserted

obligations stemming from alleged honorary obligations. Mr. Bonilla argues that the court, after

commencing the involuntary bankruptcy cases against the Form 105 Targets, can issue multiple

orders to show cause and then litigate with each of the Form 105 Targets the issue of proper federal

court jurisdiction.

While politely stated, this last demand is in the same nature of the “Honorary Obligations”

which are asserted to exist, and must be done because Mr. Bonilla so asserts.

SUBSTANCE OF RELIEF REQUESTED

Attached to the Addendum (Dckt. 108) is another pleading titled “Raising Jurisdictional

Question” (“Raising Pleading”). Id. (starting with a new page 1, which is the fourth page of this

pleading). The caption on this Raising Pleading is “In re: to the matter of Alameda County NEVER

ACQUIRED JURISDICTION.” Id. at 1:7-9 (emphasis in original). This does not appear to be a

pleading relating to any of the Form 105s, nor to the Miscellaneous File opened in this court in

Mr. Bonilla’s name.

In the Raising Pleading, Mr. Bonilla states that he seeks to commence an “INDEPENDENT

COLLATERAL SUIT.” Id. at 1:12 (emphasis in original). He argues that the Alameda Superior

Court never acquired jurisdiction over him, or the subject matter of the criminal proceedings in which

he was convicted. He asserts that certain evidence was not admitted, and argues under the California 

Rules of Evidence, such evidence was not admitted in his criminal proceedings. 

Mr. Bonilla then asserts that this is an independent collateral attack on the state court

conviction due to lack of jurisdiction, and not as a habeas corpus petition. He then discusses

extrinsic fraud upon a court and that when such fraud occurs, it may be attacked at any time or place.

Mr. Bonilla then provides extensive citations and legal arguments concerning void judgments,

lack of jurisdiction, and the impropriety of a judge proceeding with the adjudication of the matter. 

This includes detailed factual allegations and legal conclusions drawn therefrom why Mr. Bonilla

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asserts that his criminal conviction is void for the lack of jurisdiction. 

This is consistent with Mr. Bonilla’s Response (Dckt. 99) in which his discussion does not

go in to why the various ninety-eight Form 105 Targets owe him a debt, but instead argues why a

court should declare his criminal conviction void based on Mr. Bonilla’s assertion that the state court

did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the state criminal law conviction.2

 

Mr. Bonilla demonstrates a keen understanding that there are limits to the exercise of judicial

power by a judge. Further, that when the exercise of such power is exceeded, it can result in the

judgment or ruling being void.

It is also clear that these Form 105s are filed as an alternative device to try and have further,

now Article I, judges conduct further review of his assertion that his criminal conviction is void. In

doing so with this court, Mr. Bonilla is asking the court to commit the sin which he accuses other

judges of having made–issuing rulings when the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.

Bankruptcy judges have been created for the unique purpose of presiding over bankruptcy

cases and adjudicating proceedings arising under the Bankruptcy Code, in the bankruptcy case, and

related to the bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 152, 157, 1334. This authority to exercise federal

judicial power is carefully circumscribed to limit the bankruptcy judge, who is appointed as an

Article I judge, in the exercise of that power to only the matters as specified by statute. This

authority is much narrower than those of an Article III District Court Judge, Court of Appeal Judge,

2

 From the detailed and extensive discussion and analysis concerning Mr. Bonilla's

assertions that the California Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an

action brought for violation of California criminal law appears to center on the assertion that the

subpoena for evidence used in the conviction was not admitted into evidence in his state court

criminal trial. Mr. Bonilla also asserts that it was admitted that such subpoena did not exist. 

What Mr. Bonilla does not link is the law which would establish that the California

Superior Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue of California

criminal law. The California Superior Court is the state court of general civil and criminal

subject matter jurisdiction. Thus it may appear that Mr. Bonilla is contending that the conviction

was in error, but the assertion of lack of “subject matter jurisdiction” does not appear.

This court comments the above in a footnote are not purporting to making any ruling on

the state court criminal conviction or applicable law, but only to note the issue stands out in

reviewing the detailed and extensive pleadings and documents filed by Mr. Bonilla. 

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or Supreme Court Justice. While appearing expansive in the exercise of federal court jurisdiction in

the bankruptcy corner of the federal judiciary, it is but a small slice of the federal judicial power

residing in the Article III judges.

Here, Mr. Bonilla seeks to commence an independent action to collaterally attack his criminal

conviction in state court. No legal basis is given for a bankruptcy judge to undertake such a

determination. This appears to be Mr. Bonilla’s dispute with the State of California, not any of his

Form 105 Targets.3

DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR WAIVER OF FILING FEES

AND

DENIAL OF REQUEST FOR FILING OF

 INVOLUNTARY BANKRUPTCY

PETITIONS

As an initial point, the failure to present the court with the required filing fee precludes the

filing of any of the Form 105s. The filing fee is required and no authority exists for a bankruptcy

judge to waive such filing fee. Congress and the Supreme Court have set forth the statutory and

Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure grounds for the limited waiving of filing fees for voluntary

bankruptcy cases filed by the debtors themselves.

Next, based on the original filings, the Response (Dckt. 99), Exhibits (Dckt. 100), Addendum

(Dckt. 108), and Additional Statement (Dckt. 114), the court concludes that Mr. Bonilla does not

qualify as a creditor who has standing to have commenced involuntary against the ninety-eight

Form 105 Targets in this District. As stated previously, the court may, sua sponte, raise the issue of

standing at any time. The court has so raised the issue and afforded Mr. Bonilla the opportunity to

address the issue of whether jurisdiction exists–whether he is a creditor who may commence an

involuntary bankruptcy case.

The court has addressed in detail the requirements for commencing an involuntary bankruptcy

3

 The court acknowledges that the majority of Mr. Bonilla’s pleadings consist of

extensive discussion, arguments, legal citations, conclusions, and assertions as to why his

criminal conviction was void and why judges who have the jurisdiction to do so should declare it

void. This bankruptcy court does not discuss those extensive points and arguments, which,

though read by this court to see what was applicable to the proper exercise of jurisdiction, raise

issues and seek relief that is clearly well outside the jurisdiction of this court.

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case and the significance of commencing such a case, the immediate negative consequences (well

beyond those of a person merely filing a lawsuit in the district or state court) in the prior Order

establishing the Miscellaneous File for Mr. Bonilla and affording Mr. Bonilla the opportunity to

address that Order and issues before this court make its final determination. See Order to Open

Bankruptcy File for Steven Wayne Bonilla, Assignment of Miscellaneous File Number, and

Scheduling of Supplemental Pleadings to be Filed by Mr. Bonilla (“Order to Open Miscellaneous

File”), Dckt. 1. The court does not repeat that determination and the grounds stated therein, but

incorporates it, and that entire ruling, herein by this reference as part of this decision, with a copy of

the Order to Open Miscellaneous File attached hereto as Addendum “B.”

The statutory requirements for a person to qualify as a creditor to commence an involuntary 

bankruptcy case are set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 303(b) and summarized as follows:

An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy

court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title – 

(1) There must be at least three or more entities, each of which is either:

(a) a holder of a claim against such person that is not contingent as to liability

or the subject of a bona fide dispute as to liability or amount, or an indenture

trustee representing such a holder, 

and

(b) if such noncontingent, undisputed claims aggregate at least $ 16,750 more

than the value of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims held

by the holders of such claims;

or

(2) if there are fewer than 12 such holders of claims or, excluding any employee or

insider of such person and any transferee of a transfer that is voidable under section

544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, by one or more of such

holders that hold in the aggregate at least $ 16,750 of such claims; . . . .

The court addresses these elements below. 

Monetary Obligation

For the court to commence an involuntary bankruptcy case against each of the ninety-eight

Form 105 Targets, it must be at least colorable (appearing on its face, but not required to be certain)

that Mr. Bonilla holds a claim for a monetary obligation against each of the ninety-eight Form 105

Targets against whom he wants to commence involuntary bankruptcy case.

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On this point, while Mr. Bonilla makes reference to a contractual obligation in the nature of

an “Honorary Obligation,” which would therefore not appear to be contractual but somehow arising

under the law, he cannot cite the court to any legal authority for such obligation. While Mr. Bonilla

argues that each Form 105 Target has a duty to act for him personally, and when they do not act in

a matter consistent with what he demands that each owes him money, Mr. Bonilla shows no legal

authority for a contention that each of these persons in public office owe him a personal debt for not

acting as he requests. Further, as shown by Mr. Bonilla, there is a bona fide, colorable issue that each

of the persons he complains of may assert judicial immunity with respect to the acts taken or not

taken.

That is not Contingent

It appears that the Honorary Obligations asserted by Mr. Bonilla are not contingent, but are

alleged to be owed as of the time each of the Form 105 Targets failed to declare his state court

conviction void.

That is not Subject to Bona Fide Dispute as to Liability

On this point, Mr. Bonilla asserts that there can be no bona fide dispute because Mr. Bonilla

is correct that the state court judgment for his criminal conviction is void. It asserts that it is “void”

because the California Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate an issue of

California criminal law. As briefly addressed above, the California Superior Court is the court of

general civil and criminal jurisdiction for California law and is the court that adjudicates California

criminal trials. In his various pleadings, Mr. Bonilla argues that this court of general criminal and

civil jurisdiction could not have jurisdiction for his criminal conviction because purported evidence

was improperly admitted. 

 Further, he argues that no judicial immunity can be claimed by any of the Form 105 Targets

failing to declare that the state court conviction is void because judicial immunity cannot be claimed

when a judge does not have jurisdiction. Mr. Bonilla conflates his assertion that the California

Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a California criminal law trial with asserting

that the various Form 105 Targets could not have jurisdiction, and thus could not assert judicial

immunity, in the various judicial proceedings that Mr. Bonilla has commenced or attempted to

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commence in the various state and federal courts.

There was one judge who presided in the state court trial from which Mr. Bonilla’s conviction

arises. It is in that one state court trial that Mr. Bonilla asserts there was no subject matter

jurisdiction. Everyone else who is a Form 105 Target appears to be a member of the state or federal

judiciary that Mr. Bonilla asserts has failed to act and declare the state court conviction determined

void.

In seeking to have the various Form 105 Targets determine that the state court conviction was

void, Mr. Bonilla is necessarily admitting that each of those Form 105 Targets properly had

jurisdiction to make such a determination–even if such determination was to deny Mr. Bonilla the

relief he sought. 

If Mr. Bonilla seeks to assert that the Form 105 Targets cannot assert judicial immunity

because they did not have jurisdiction to act, then he could not properly seek relief from them to

declare the state court conviction void. Thus, if Mr. Bonilla were correct that the various state and

federal judges did not have jurisdiction to act such that they could not raise a judicial immunity

defense, then there is no basis for Mr. Bonilla asserting that he has a claim against someone for

failing to act when they were not authorized to so act.

Clearly, there exists a bona fide dispute obvious on the face of Mr. Bonilla’s pleadings that

judicial immunity (an issue Mr. Bonilla raises in the documents presented to the court) is at issue.

That is not Subject to Bona Fide Dispute as to Amount

Mr. Bonilla has not provided the court with any computation of how he asserts a dollar

amount that is owed to him. There is no contract. There are no statutory damages. The obligation

amount is just an assertion that each of the Form 105 Targets owes Mr. Bonilla more than Three

Hundred Billion Dollars ($300,000,000,000.00).4

 Such an amount is so huge, and there being no

explanation as how such would be computed under applicable law, that it demonstrates there being

a facial bona fide dispute as to amount.

4

 In the seven later filed Form 105s (Dckts. 101-107), the amount asserted to be owed is

lowered to Forty Seven Billion, Four Hundred Ninety One Million, Six Hundred Forty Six

Thousand, Four Hundred Fifty Two Dollars and Thirty-Eight Cents ($47,491,646,452.38). 

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Response to Judicial Council

On August 1, 2019, the court issued a Supplemental Order concerning the docketing of the

Form 105s (“Supplemental Docketing Order,” Dckt. 109). The court previously prepared an order

which included a chart identifying each of the Form 105s delivered to the court by Mr. Bonilla and

identifying each person named as the Form 105 Target in each Form 105. In the Order to Open

Miscellaneous File the court believed that the Clerk’s Office had been sufficiently directed as to how

to label the Form 105s on the Docket so as to not create any false impression that a Form 105 had

been “filed” (i.e. “commenced”).

It was brought to the court’s attention by an attorney appearing in open court who stated that

he was counsel for the California Judicial Council, that the docket entries for the Form 105s appeared

to have been entered in such a manner as to create the potential for confusion. In reviewing the

docket entries that appeared when reviewing the docket through the public Pacer access, as compared

to the internal court access version, the court concluded that some express direction to the Clerk’s

Office was necessary and the Supplemental Docketing Order was entered specifying the

methodology used to clearly identify each Form 105 docketed.

Mr. Bonilla filed a Response to the Supplemental Docketing Order on August 15, 2019. 

Dckt. 115. In it, Mr. Bonilla states that he seeks a proper and fair adjudication of his verified claims. 

Id. at 2:2-5. He states he asserts issues pertaining to “FRAUD, fraudulently/altered and forged

documentation by the prosecution/conspiracy in violation of [Mr. Bonilla’s] Right of Privacy, as a

matter of law...as well as fraud/criminal fraud committed upon the court and [Mr. Bonilla] by State

and Federal actors perpetrating KNOWN unlawful-unconstitutional violations wile acting under the

color of law.” Id. at 2:6-12 (emphasis added).

At this point, it well appears that Mr. Bonilla is seeking to “adjudicate” (i.e. litigate) various

state and federal law claims and rights he asserts to have against the various Form 105 Targets, not

already liquidated, not subject to bona fide dispute claims that are to be paid. 

The Response to Supplemental Docketing Order continues, addressing issues as to why the

state court criminal conviction is void and must be vacated. 

The Response to Supplemental Docket Order then plainly states the relief being sought from

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this bankruptcy court by Mr. Bonilla (both in the response and it appears to be in filing the ninetyeight Form 105s):

Relief Sought

(1). Declare the judgment [State Court criminal conviction] void or issue an order to

show cause.

(2). Seven Wayne Bonilla is entitled to immediate release [from State incarceration

based on the criminal conviction].

Dckt. 115, p. 3:21-23.

RULING 

It has been demonstrated that Mr. Bonilla does not have standing to commence involuntary

bankruptcy cases for the Form 105 Targets, Mr. Bonilla not meeting the requirements to be a

petitioning creditor under 11 U.S.C. § 103.

Alternatively, if the mere assertion that one is a creditor is sufficient for Constitutional

standing, the court concludes that the documents and assertions of Mr. Bonilla do not show that he

has a claim (as defined under the Bankruptcy Code); to the extent he has a claim it is unliquidated

and the $100,000,000,000.00 claim subject to disputes as to the liability, including the defense of

judicial immunity, and the amount.

Further, as demonstrated in the original documents, the Response, Exhibits, Addendum,

Additional Statement, and Response to Supplemental Docketing Order, the actual relief sought

through the ninety-eight Form 105s is well outside of the limited jurisdiction of a bankruptcy judge

and that granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 – the determination that the state court judgment for

Mr. Bonilla’s criminal conviction is void and that Mr. Bonilla be released from his incarceration at

San Quintin Prison.

Therefore, the court determines that each of the Form 105s delivered to the court by

Mr. Bonilla shall be docketed, or continue to be if already docketed, in the Miscellaneous File, and

that involuntary bankruptcy cases not be commenced for each of the Form 105 Targets.

///

///

///

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This one order applies to all of the Form 105s presented to the court, which shall not be filed

as involuntary bankruptcy petitions.

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ADDENDUM “A”

Guide to Judiciary Policy

Vol. 4: Court and Case Management

Ch. 8: Bankruptcy Case Policies

§ 810 Overview

§ 815 Applicability

§ 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures

§ 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case

§ 820.20 Judicial Determination of Filing Fee Waiver Applications

§ 820.30 Developments in the Case

§ 820.40 Waiver of Additional Individual Debtor Fees

§ 830 Guidance for Protection of Tax Information

§ 830.10 Debtor’s Duty to Provide Tax Information

§ 830.20 Restricted Access to Tax Information

§ 830.30 Tax Information Disclosure Requests

§ 830.40 Approved Access to Tax Information

§ 830.50 Required Redaction of Debtor Tax Information

§ 810 Overview

This chapter contains national judiciary policies regarding bankruptcy cases that were adopted

either by the Judicial Conference of the United States or by the Director of the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts (AO). They include:

• Procedures adopted by the Judicial Conference regarding the chapter 7 fee waiver

provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005

(BAPCPA) (see: § 820, below); and

• Director’s Guidance Regarding Tax Information under 11 U.S.C. § 521 (see: § 830).

Note: This guidance is available on uscourts.gov, to which local courts should direct the public

and members of the local bar.

§ 815 Applicability

This chapter applies to the bankruptcy courts.

§ 820 Chapter 7 Fee Waiver Procedures

The Judicial Conference promulgated these procedures to assist district courts and

bankruptcy courts with implementing the fee waiver provisions set forth in Section 418 of the

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-8, 199 Stat.

23), and codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1)-(3). JCUS-SEP 13, pp. 8-9.

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§ 820.10 Filing Fee Waiver Application and Initiation of the Chapter 7 Case

(a) In lieu of paying the prescribed chapter 7 filing fee or filing an installment application,

an individual debtor may, along with the bankruptcy petition, file an application to waive

the filing fee.

(1) Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1006(c) requires that the application

conform substantially to Official Form 103B.

(2) A defective or otherwise deficient waiver application should be processed

according to the court’s standard operating procedures for processing deficient

pleadings and papers.

(b) When a chapter 7 petition in an individual debtor case is accompanied by an

application to waive the filing fee, the court should initiate and process the case in the

same manner as other individual chapter 7 cases.

§ 820.20 Judicial Determination of Filing Fee Waiver Applications

(a) Standard of Eligibility

(1) Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1930(f)(1-3), the district court or bankruptcy court may waive the

chapter 7 filing fee for an individual debtor who:

(A) has income less than 150 percent of the income official poverty line applicable

to a family of the size involved; and

(Note: Since the Office of Management and Budget has never issued

official poverty thresholds, these procedures interpret this statutory

language to refer to the poverty guidelines updated periodically in the

Federal Register by the Department of Health and Human Services

(DHHS) under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2). The Secretary of

Health and Human Services is required to update the poverty guidelines

annually, and defines guidelines separate for the 48 contiguous states and

the District of Columbia, Alaska, and Hawaii. The DHHS does not define

poverty guidelines for Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, American

Samoa, Guam, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of

Micronesia, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and

Palau. For these areas, the guidelines for the 48 contiguous states and the

District of Columbia may be used. See: DHHS guidelines.)

(B) is unable to pay that fee in installments.

(2) The DHHS does not publish a standard definition of income, leaving the determination

of that definition to individual program administrators.

(A) These procedures adopt a definition that is reasonable in the bankruptcy

context.

(B) The income for comparison to the poverty guidelines is the .Total Combined

Monthly Income¡± as reported (or as will be reported) on Schedule I.

(C) Amounts received as non-cash government assistance must be deducted from

the total amount reported on Schedule I for fee waiver consideration.

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(3) “Family size” may be defined as the debtor(s), the debtor’s spouse (unless the spouses

are separated and a joint petition is not being filed), and any dependents listed on

Schedule I.

Note: The DHHS uses the term “family unit” instead of .family size” but does not

publish a standard definition of “family unit.”

(4) The district court or bankruptcy court should consider the totality of the circumstances

in determining whether the debtor is unable to pay the fee in installments as provided in

28 U.S.C. § 1930(f)(1). Official Form 103B elicits information relevant to this

determination.

(5) A debtor may qualify for a waiver of the filing fee even if the debtor has paid or

promised to pay a bankruptcy attorney, bankruptcy petition preparer, or debt relief agency

in connection with the filing.

Note: In 2008, Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1006(b)(1) was amended to delete the sentence

requiring a statement in the installment fee application that the debtor has not paid

an attorney or other person in connection with the case. In the installment fee

application, debtors must certify they will not make additional payment or transfer

any additional property to an attorney or other person for services in connection

with the case until the filing fee is paid in full.

(b) Initial Court Procedures

(1) Filing Fees, Fee Waiver Application, Notice

(A) “Filing fee” as defined at 28 U.S.C. 1930(f)(1), means the filing fee required

by § 1930(a) or any other fee prescribed by the Judicial Conference under §§

1930(b) and (c) that is payable to the clerk upon the commencement of a case

under chapter 7. This includes Items 8 and 9 of the Bankruptcy Miscellaneous Fee

Schedule.

(B) The court should promptly determine whether the fee waiver application

should be granted, denied, or set for early hearing, on notice to the United States

trustee or bankruptcy administrator, the case trustee, the debtor, and, if applicable,

the attorney for the debtor.

(C) The order on the fee waiver should be transmitted to the United States trustee

or bankruptcy administrator, the case trustee, the debtor, and, if applicable, the

attorney for the debtor.

(2) Denial of Fee Waiver

(A) Any order denying a filing fee waiver application may give the debtor a

reasonable time in which to either pay the fee in full or begin making installment

payments.

(B) The order denying the fee waiver application should set forth an installment

payment schedule.

(C) It also should advise the debtor that failure to pay the fee or make timely

installment payments may lead to dismissal of the case.

(D) A standard order is included with the Official Form.

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(3) Conversion to Chapter 7

If a case is converted from another chapter to chapter 7, the court may waive any

unpaid balance on the filing fee if the conditions described in section (a)(1) are

satisfied.

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ADDENDUM “B”

Order to Open Bankruptcy File for Steven Wayne Bonilla,

Assignment of Miscellaneous File Number, and Scheduling of Supplemental Pleadings to be Filed by Mr. Bonilla; Dckt. 1

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Instructions to Clerk of Court

Service List - Not Part of Order/Judgment

The Clerk of Court is instructed to send the Order/Judgment or other court generated document

transmitted herewith to the parties below. The Clerk of Court will send the document via the

BNC or, if checked ____, via the U.S. mail.

Steven Wayne Bonilla

J-48500, 3-EY-13

San Quentin, CA 94974

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