Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06327/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06327-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Antoin Novey
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

( 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

PILED 

United Sit~ C@lfF( @f Appeal, ,, ent~ ei,eult: 

JAN 3 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER. 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-6327 

CHARLES ANTOIN NOVEY, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-89-95-T) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Thomas D. McCormick, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Michael G. Katz, 

Federal Public Defender; and Jill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, on the briefs for DefendantAppellant. 

Timothy D. Leonard, United States Attorney, and Frank Michael 

Ringer, Assistant United States Attorney, Western District of 

Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the briefs for PlaintiffAppellee. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 1 
This appeal arises from a sentence entered by the district 

court following the defendant's guilty plea on two counts of a 

seven-count indictment. The defendant, Charles A. Novey, claims 

the district court erred by (1) classifying him as a career 

offender under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines; (2) increasing 

his punishment as a career offender when the government failed to 

allege both prior offenses in its notice filed pursuant to 21 

u.s.c. § 85l(a)(l) (1988); and (3) requiring restitution for conduct that did not form the basis of the offense of conviction. 

I. 

On May 16, 1989, the government filed a seven-count indictment against the defendant.· Mr. Novey pleaded guilty to count 1, 

which alleged possession with intent to distribute 3837.5 grams of 

marijuana and 68 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 

841(a)(l) (1988). He also pleaded guilty to count 4, which 

charged him with making a false statement to the Postal Service in 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 1702 (1988). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the government agreed to dismiss the remaining counts of the 

indictment. 

On June 12, 1989, ten days prior to the guilty pleas, the 

government filed an information alleging that the defendant had 

been previously convicted of a controlled substance offense. 

Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(l)(C) (1988), the prior conviction raised 

his maximum penalty from twenty to thirty years. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 2 
The presentence investigation report, prepared after the 

defendant pleaded guilty, stated that the defendant had two prior 

convictions involving controlled substances. The first occurred 

on October 17, 1972, from which the defendant was released on 

November 24, 1974. The second conviction, which was included in 

the information, was entered on March 31, 1983. 

Based on his two prior controlled substance offenses, the 

district court determined that the defendant was a career offender 

under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. His offense level and 

criminal history category were raised from a level 16 and category 

V imprisonment range of 41 to 51 months to a level 34 and category 

VI range of 262 to 327 months. The court sentenced him to 

concurrent prison terms of 262 months on count 1 and 40 months on 

count 4. The court also ordered restitution to nine victims which 

totaled $21,752.25. 

II. 

The defendant contends that the trial court's determination 

that he was a career offender was error. He argues that he does 

not have "two prior felony convictions" based on the language in 

section 4Bl.2(3) of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 

The defendant's argument rests on the proper calculation of 

criminal history under the Guidelines. Section 4Al.2(e) of the 

Guidelines sets forth the applicable time period for computing 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 3 
criminal history. 1 It requires that a prior sen~ence of imprisonment of more than thirteen months be counted for purposes of 

computing criminal history if the sentence resulted in the 

defendant's incarceration within fifteen years of the commencement 

of the instant offense. 

Section 4Bl.1 of the Guidelines includes in its definition of 

a career offender a defendant who has at least "two prior felony 

convictions" of a controlled substance offense. 2 Section 4Bl.2(3) 

defines "two prior felony convictions." It states that "[t]he 

date that a defendant sustained a conviction shall be the date the 

judgment of conviction was entered. 113 

1 Section 4Al.2(e)(l) states: 

Any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year 

and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of 

the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is 

counted. Also count any prior sentence of imprisonment 

exceeding one year and one month, whenever imposed, that 

resulted in the defendant being incarcerated during any 

part of such fifteen-year period. 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 

§4Al.2(e) (1) (Nov. 1990). 

2 Section 4Bl.1 provides in pertinent part: 

A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant 

was at least eighteen years old at the time of the 

instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction 

is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 

controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has 

at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime 

of violence or a controlled substance offense ...• 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, §4Bl.l. 

(Nov. 19 9 0) . 

3 Section 4Bl.2(3) states: 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 4 
The defendant contends that there is an ambiguity between 

sections 4Al.2(3) and 4Bl.2(3) and that the rule of lenity applies 

to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the defendant. See Bifulco 

v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980); United States v. 

Connors, 606 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1979). The defendant argues 

that his 1972 conviction should not be counted in the computation 

of his criminal history because it was not entered within fifteen 

years of the commencement of the instant offense. 

We agree with the district court and conclude that the Guidelines pertaining to the career offender provision are not ambiguous. Application Note 4 of section 4Bl.2 clearly states that the 

provisions of section 4Al.2·(3) are applicable to the counting of 

convictions under section 4Bl.1. Therefore, a felony conviction 

is counted as one of two prior convictions for purposes of computing criminal history if the defendant was incarcerated during part 

of the fifteen-year period. See United States v. Marshall, 910 

F.2d 1241, 1245 (5th Cir. 1990). Because section 4Al.2(e) does 

The term "two prior felony convictions" means (A) the 

defendant committed the instant offense subsequent to 

sustaining at least two felony convictions of either a 

crime of violence or a controlled substance offense 

(i.e., two felony convictions of a crime of violence, 

two felony convictions of a controlled substance 

offense, or one felony conviction of a crime of violence 

and one felony conviction of a controlled substance 

offense), and (B) the sentences for at least two of the 

aforementioned felony convictions are counted separately 

under the provisions of Part A of this Chapter. The 

date that a defendant sustained a conviction shall be 

the date the judgment of conviction was entered. 

United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 

§4Bl. 2 ( 3). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 5 
not rely on the date of conviction when calculating criminal history, section 4Bl.2(3) adds no guidance to the calculation of the 

applicable time period. 

The defendant's first prior conviction falls within the 

fifteen-year period set forth in section 4Al.2(3) because he was 

released in November 1974 from his October 1972 controlled substance conviction. The defendant's 1983 conviction is also 

counted. The district court, therefore, correctly concluded that 

the defendant was a career offender under section 4Bl.1 of the 

Guidelines. 

III. 

The defendant claims that the district court erred by 

increasing his punishment as a career offender when the government 

failed to allege both prior offenses in the information it filed 

pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 85l(a)(l) (1988). Although the defendant 

did not raise the government's lack of compliance in the district 

court, the court was without authority to impose an enhanced sentence unless the statutory requirements were met. United States 

v. Noland, 495 F.2d 529, 533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 

966 (1974). Therefore, this court will consider the question on 

its merits. 

The controversy at issue centers upon the different requirements, both substantively and procedurally, for sentence enhancements under the statute and the Guidelines. Title 21, United 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 6 
States Code, section 841(b)(l)(C) states that the defendant's maximum sentence is increased from twenty to thirty years on the 

basis of a single prior conviction. The Sentencing Guidelines 

provide that the defendant's status as a career offender increases 

his sentence from a level 16 range of 41 to 51 months to a level 

34 range of 262 to 327 months. 

The Guidelines do not contain a requirement that the government file an information in order to rely upon prior offenses. 

United States v. Wallace, 895 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir. 1990). However, 21 u.s.c. § 851(a)(l) states: 

No person who stands convicted of an offense 

under this part shall be sentenced to 

increased punishment by reason of one or more 

prior convictions, unless before trial, or 

before entry of a plea of guilty, the United 

States attorney files an information with the 

court (and serves a copy of such information 

on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be 

relied upon. 

(Emphasis supplied.) 

The defendant's sentence in this case was increased to 262 

months because of his two prior convictions which classified him 

as a career offender. The defendant argues that the government 

did not satisfy section 851(a) because it alleged only one of the 

two prior controlled substance offenses in the information, and 

therefore failed to state "the previous convictions to be relied 

upon. 11 

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The government responds that section 851 is satisfied when 

the information alleges only one prior conviction if the defendant's increased sentence under the Guidelines is within the statutory maximum based on that prior conviction. Because the district 

court used the second prior conviction to increase the Guideline 

sentence to only 262 months, a period within the statutory maximum 

of 30 years, the government maintains that the notice requirement 

was satisfied. 

The courts are divided on this issue. See United States v. 

Wallace, 895 F.2d 487, 490 (8th Cir. 1990); Marshall, 910 F.2d at 

1244-45; contra United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 1526, 1529 

(6th Cir. 1990). In Wallace, the court observed that the Guidelines became effective after Congress passed section 851 but say 

nothing that requires the government to file an information in 

order to rely upon prior offenses. Wallace, 895 F.2d at 490. The 

court reasoned, therefore, that section 851 was limited to situations in which a defendant's statutory maximum or minimum is 

enhanced and not to situations where the defendant's increased 

sentence under the Guidelines is within a statutory range. Id. 

After full consideration, we are persuaded that the interpretation 

adopted by the Wallace court is correct. 

The problem presented to this court is to determine what 

interpretation to give to the phrase "increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions" within section 85l(a)(l). 

To correctly interpret this statutory language, we "'must look to 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 8 
the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the 

language and design of the statute as a whole.'" Aulston v. 

United States, 915 F.2d 584, 589 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting 

Sullivan v. Everhart, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 960, 964, 108 

L.Ed.2d 72 (1990)). Applying this canon of statutory construction, we conclude that section 851 is satisfied when the government provides notice of one prior conviction and the defendant's 

Guideline sentence is within the statutory maximum authorized on 

the basis of that prior conviction. 

Section 851 was enacted as part of comprehensive drug legislation in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-

513, 84 Stat. 1242 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 

(1988)). The substantive penalty provisions of section 841 were 

enacted at the same time. Id. These penalty provisions, as 

amended, specifically provide for increasing the maximum and 

minimum statutory penalties on the basis of a defendant's prior 

convictions. See 21 U.S.C. § 84l(b)(l)(A) (raises statutory minimum on the basis of prior conviction from ten to twenty years);§ 

841(b)(l)·(B) (raises statutory minimum from five to ten years and 

statutory maximum from forty years to life);§ 841(b)(l)(C) 

(raises statutory maximum from twenty to thirty years). Thus, 

section 841 establishes additional penalties for recidivists, and 

section 851 provides a measure of protection from their harsh 

effect. 4 

4 In addition, Congress gave defendants the opportunity to show 

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To satisfy the statutory requirements for increased punish-

( ment, the government must file an information stating at least one 

previous conviction. Under section 841(b)(l)(C), the court can 

rely upon a single prior conviction to increase a defendant's punishment above the twenty year ceiling up to the thirty year maximum for recidivists. 

Although the Sentencing Guidelines change the calculus for 

sentencing, increased punishments under the career offender provision remain within the maximums established by statute. See 28 

U.S.C. § 994(h) (1988) (requiring the Sentencing Commission to 

assure that certain career offenders receive a sentence "at or 

near the maximum term authorized"); see also United States 

Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 4Bl.l., comment. 

(backg'd.) (stating that the legislative history of 28 u.s.c. § 

994(h) "suggests that the phrase 'maximum term authorized' should 

be construed as the maximum term authorized by statute"). The 

career offender provision permits the court to sentence at or near 

the top of the statutory range for recidivists. 

Because sentences under the career offender provision are 

within the maximum set forth in the recidivist provision of 

that they were not the persons previously convicted. Section 

851(b) requires that the district court ask the defendant before a 

guilty plea whether he denies the prior convictions and inform him 

that failure to object precludes an objection thereafter to attack 

the sentence. 21 u.s.c. § 851(b) (1988). This provision 

demonstrates the congressional concern that defendants knowingly 

and voluntarily waive their right to challenge the previous 

convictions when deciding whether to plead guilty. See United 

States v. Cevallos, 538 F.2d 1122, 1128 (5th Cir. 1976). 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 10 
section 841(b)(l)(C), a defendant does not lose a~y procedural 

protection when he is sentenced as a career offender after the 

government gives notice of a single prior conviction. A defendant 

can challenge the validity of that conviction before the district 

judge increases the punishment up to the thirty year statutory 

maximum. See 21 u.s.c. § 851(b) (1988); United States v. 

Cevallos, 538 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1976). Given that the 

statutory punishment of thirty years could be imposed with notice 

of one prior conviction, the lesser sentence for a career offender 

may also be imposed with the same notice. On the other hand, the 

district judge could not sentence the defendant to more than 

twenty years without the requisite notice. Cf. United States v. 

Williams, __ F.2d __ (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 1990) (holding that the 

court is not bound to follow a plea agreement sentencing estimate, 

which the defendant acknowledged as nonbinding prior to pleading 

guilty, when the parties considered but excluded from their calculation a prior conviction relied upon by the court). 

In this case, the government provided notice of one prior 

controlled substance conviction before the defendant pleaded 

guilty. By itself, this notice allowed the district court to sentence the defendant to a maximum of thirty years under the recidivist provisions of section 841(b)(l)(C). The defendant's 262 

month sentence as a career offender under the Guidelines is within 

this statutory maximum. The government, therefore, complied with 

section 851. 

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We conclude that 'section 85l(a)(l) applies when a defendant's 

prior convictions have the effect of increasing the minimum or 

maximum statutory sentence for the crime charged. Section 

851(a)·( 1) is satisfied when a defendant's Guideline sentence is 

within the statutory maximum that could be imposed on the basis of 

the government providing notice of a single prior conviction. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's application of the 

career offender provision of the Guidelines. 

IV. 

Defendant's final claim on appeal is that the district court 

erred by imposing restitution for losses resulting from acts other 

than those for which he was· convicted. 

At the time of sentencing this court had interpreted the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act 

(VWPA), 18 u.s.c. §§ 3663, 3664 (1988), to permit a restitution 

order beyond the amount involved in the offenses of conviction 

when there is a significant connection between the defendant's 

other criminal acts and the crime for which a guilty plea was 

entered. United States v. Duncan, 870 F.2d 1532, 1536 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 264, 107 L.Ed.2d 214 

(1989). While this case was pending appeal, however, the Supreme 

Court overruled our decision in Duncan. In Hughey v. United 

States, __ U.S. __ , 110 S. Ct. 1979, 109 L.Ed.2d 408 (1990), the 

Supreme Court held that the VMPA authorizes an award of restitution "only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the 

basis of the offense of conviction." Id., __ U.S. __ , 110 s. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6327 Document: 010110012217 Date Filed: 01/03/1991 Page: 12 
Ct. at 1981. The defendant contends that the district court's 

order of restitution was contrary to the Court's ruling in Hughey. 

The government argues that the defendant should be precluded 

from raising the Hughey decision as grounds for reversal because 

he did not object to the order of restitution. Ordinarily, 

defendant's failure to object would preclude review of the issue 

on appeal. 5 An exception to the rule precluding review exists 

where an intervening Supreme Court decision changes the law while 

an appeal is pending. Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505, 512-13 

(7th Cir. 1989). This exception is a corollary to the principle 

that an appellate court should apply the law in existence at the 

time of appeal. Id. at 513·. We therefore address defendant's 

appeal in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision in 

Hughey. 

The record in this case does not clearly establish whether 

the restitution order was based on losses caused by the conduct 

underlying the offense of conviction. The district court fashioned its restitution order from the presentence investigation 

report. The conduct attributed to count 4 in the report, however, 

appears to include numerous acts other than those for which 

defendant was convicted. Presentence Report at ,1,1 11-14. For 

5 Objections are required so that the district court can correct 

an alleged error. General Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, 

568 F.2d 1147, 1152 (7th Cir. 1978). In this case, however, there 

was no error because Duncan was the applicable law at the time of 

sentencing. Given the established precedent in Duncan, defendant 

cannot be faulted for failing to object. 

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example, the report states that the defendant made sixteen cash 

draws from an account opened with a check stolen "in a separate 

criminal act." Id. at ,r 11. The record is insufficient for us to 

determine whether this loss, and others upon which the restitution 

order was based, was gained through the use of the fraudulently 

opened post office box or was distinct from any loss caused by the 

conduct underlying count 4. Accordingly, we remand this case for 

further fact-finding and resentencing in light of the Supreme 

Court's decision in Hughey v. United States. 6 

The defendant's sentence based on his career offender status 

is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the district court for further fact-finding and resentencing consistent with this opinion. 

6 Because we remand for resentencing, we do not consider 

separately defendant's claim that the district court erred by 

ordering restitution without making a finding as to the amount of 

loss caused by him. In order to satisfy Hughey upon remand, the 

district court is required to make findings in support of an order 

imposing restitution for losses caused by the conduct underlying 

1 the offense of conviction. 

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