Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05007/USCOURTS-caDC-13-05007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffry Schmidt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 18, 2014 Decided April 25, 2014

No. 13-5007

JEFFRY SCHMIDT, ALSO KNOWN AS JEFF SCHMIDT,

APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00570)

Michael D.J. Eisenberg argued the cause and filed the 

briefs for appellant. 

Benton G. Peterson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant 

U.S. Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and 

SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

USCA Case #13-5007 Document #1489949 Filed: 04/25/2014 Page 1 of 12
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WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Jeffry Schmidt, a 

Marine Corps veteran, was honorably discharged from the 

military in 1989 by reason of physical disability. In 1990, he

filed an application with the Board for Correction of Naval 

Records (BCNR) seeking an increase in his disability rating. 

His request was denied. In 2008, he asked the BCNR to 

reconsider its earlier decision based, at least in part, on his 

having been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and 

depression by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 

After the BCNR’s Acting Executive Director denied his 

application, Schmidt filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, 

which later transferred one aspect of Schmidt’s case to the 

U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia: his claim that 

the BCNR’s procedure allowing for the Acting Executive 

Director (rather than the Board) to render a decision on his 

application was improper. Following transfer, the parties 

agreed to a remand to the BCNR, whereupon the Board itself 

considered Schmidt’s claim anew. It was denied. Schmidt

then sought to challenge, before the District Court, the merits 

of the BCNR’s denial, filing an amended complaint without 

leave of court or the other side’s consent. After disallowing 

the amended complaint, the District Court dismissed the case 

as moot, reasoning that Schmidt’s only claim for relief had 

been fully resolved. Alternatively, the District Court ruled 

that Schmidt’s challenge to the BCNR’s 2011 decision would 

be time-barred and that, because he sought money damages, 

jurisdiction over the claim would lie with the Court of Federal 

Claims. Schmidt now appeals. Agreeing that the only claim 

ever properly placed at issue before the District Court was 

rendered moot by the stipulated remand to the BCNR, we 

affirm the District Court’s dismissal on this basis and do not 

reach the other issues briefed on appeal. 

USCA Case #13-5007 Document #1489949 Filed: 04/25/2014 Page 2 of 12
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– I –

Jeffry Schmidt served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 

February 1983 until March 1989, when he was honorably 

discharged by reason of physical disability due to a lower 

back condition. Schmidt was given a 10% disability rating, 

entitling him to a one-time severance payment of about

$13,000. Almost immediately after his discharge, Schmidt 

filed for disability benefits with the Department of Veterans 

Affairs, and the VA initially awarded Schmidt a 30% 

combined disability rating (accounting for his lower back 

issues and a few other medical conditions). Armed with this 

higher disability rating, Schmidt filed a request for correction 

of his records with the BCNR, arguing that he was given an 

unjust rating at the time of discharge.1 The Board denied 

Schmidt’s request in March 1992, explaining that his new 

disability ratings were not dispositive “because the VA, 

unlike the military departments, may assign disability ratings 

without regard to the issue of fitness for military service.” 

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 74.

Sixteen years later, in March 2008, Schmidt sought 

reconsideration of the BCNR’s decision, raising what he 

believed to be new and material evidence. Specifically, he

pointed to the fact that the VA had since diagnosed him with 

post-traumatic stress disorder and depression, and that his 

overall disability rating from the VA had increased even more

since the Board’s original decision, totaling 100% (full 

disability) by that time. J.A. 68–74. In May 2008, the Acting 

Executive Director of the BCNR denied Schmidt’s 

 1

 Because the U.S. Marine Corps is a component of the 

Department of the Navy, see 50 U.S.C. § 3004(b), the BCNR 

handles records-correction requests from current and former 

members of the Marine Corps, see 32 C.F.R. § 723.2(b). 

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application; according to the letter of decision, though some 

of Schmidt’s evidence was seen as “new,” it was not 

considered “material.” J.A. 65.

 

Schmidt then filed suit in the U.S. Court of Federal 

Claims, alleging that he was discharged from the Marine 

Corps with an incorrect disability percentage rating. He 

sought back pay and benefits in excess of $10,000, along with 

an order deeming him medically retired from the military at 

the disability rating assigned by the VA or, alternatively, a 

new medical examination board. In addition, Schmidt 

challenged the BCNR’s denial of his reconsideration 

application, arguing that the decision was not only wrong on 

the merits, but also procedurally infirm under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA) insofar as the Acting 

Executive Director—and not members of the Board—acted 

on his request. J.A. 11–14. The Court of Federal Claims, 

ruling on cross-motions for summary judgment, dismissed the 

near entirety of Schmidt’s claims as time-barred under 28 

U.S.C. § 2501. With respect to Schmidt’s procedurallyfocused APA challenge, though, the Court of Federal Claims 

transferred that claim—and only that claim—to the U.S. 

District Court for the District of Columbia. See Schmidt v. 

United States, 89 Fed. Cl. 111 (Ct. Cl. 2009) (transferring 

Schmidt’s APA claim attacking “the promulgation of a Naval 

regulation that allows a staff member of the BCNR and not 

the BCNR itself to deny a petition for reconsideration”).

2

 

 2

 The applicable regulation provides, in relevant part:

All requests for further consideration will be initially 

screened by the Executive Director of the Board to 

determine whether new and material evidence or other 

matter (including, but not limited to, any factual allegations 

or arguments why the relief should be granted) has been 

submitted by the applicant . . . . If no such evidence or 

other matter has been submitted, the applicant will be 

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Following transfer, the parties jointly agreed to remand to 

the BCNR Schmidt’s remaining claim, which the parties 

described as “his claim that the Navy’s regulation allowing 

denial of a request for reconsideration by the BCNR Acting 

Executive Director and not BCNR board members violated 

the APA.” J.A. 34–35. The Government agreed to set aside 

the earlier decision and to have members of the Board (and 

not the Acting Executive Director) consider Schmidt’s request 

for reconsideration anew. Schmidt’s application was no more 

successful before the Board, however. The BCNR denied his 

reconsideration request via letter dated March 17, 2011. In 

the Board’s view, Schmidt failed to present any new 

arguments warranting correction of his records. Despite his

subsequent diagnoses and heightened disability ratings from 

the VA, the Board concluded that Schmidt failed to show he 

was suffering from these conditions at the time of his 

discharge in 1989, or that they would have rendered him unfit 

for duty at the disability ratings he claimed. J.A. 45–47. 

After the Board’s ruling, Schmidt filed a “Status Report 

and Proposed Briefing Schedule” in the District Court,

followed by an “Amended Complaint.” The amended 

complaint—filed without the Government’s consent and 

without leave of court—purported to “challenge[] the March 

17, 2011, BCNR decision as arbitrary, capricious, 

unsupported by substantial evidence, and contrary to law.”

J.A. 37–41. The Government objected to Schmidt’s 

amendment, noting, among other things, his failure to comply 

with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2). J.A. 42 n.1.

At that point, in the Government’s eyes, “[t]he only APA 

 

informed that his/her request was not considered by the 

Board because it did not contain new and material evidence 

or other matter.

32 C.F.R. § 723.9 (2013).

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issue before [the] [c]ourt (the alleged improper participation 

by the Executive Director of the BCNR in Plaintiff’s request 

for reconsideration before the BCNR) ha[d] been rectified.” 

J.A. 44. The District Court agreed and issued an order 

disallowing the amended complaint and adopting the 

Government’s description of Schmidt’s sole pending claim. 

J.A. 48–49.

Schmidt proceeded to file a “Motion to be Heard on the 

APA Issue,” arguing that the District Court had “APA 

jurisdiction” to hear his substantive appeal from the BCNR’s 

reconsideration decision. Therein, Schmidt “agree[d] with the 

Government that the issue of the procedural APA violation 

[was] now moot”; he argued, however, that the Board’s 

decision after remand “[was] itself subject to judicial review,” 

and he asked the District Court “to find that it has jurisdiction 

to hear [his] challenge to the March 17, 2011, final decision 

by the BCNR.” J.A. 50–55. Meanwhile, the Government 

moved to dismiss the case as moot, contending that the 

Board’s decision on Schmidt’s reconsideration application

afforded him all the relief sought through his only remaining 

claim. The Government also argued, seemingly in the 

alternative, that any claim challenging the substance of the 

BCNR’s 2011 decision would be time-barred and subject to 

the Court of Federal Claims’ exclusive Tucker-Act 

jurisdiction in any event. 

The District Court granted the Government’s motion and 

dismissed Schmidt’s case for lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that 

“[t]he Board’s review on remand totally remedied and 

disposed of Plaintiff’s sole argument that the Navy’s 

regulation . . . permitting the Executive Director to make such 

a decision” was improper. Finding that Schmidt had secured 

“the only remedy he sought in the remand,” the District Court 

thus dismissed the case as moot. Alternatively, the District 

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Court also found that Schmidt’s proposed “substantive” 

challenge to the merits of the 2011 BCNR decision would be 

barred by the statute of limitations and, as a claim seeking 

money damages, would be subject to the exclusive 

jurisdiction vested in the Court of Federal Claims. J.A. 56–

61. 

The District Court entered judgment on December 21, 

2012, and Schmidt timely appealed. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the District 

Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 

including on mootness grounds. Del Monte Fresh Produce 

Co. v. United States, 570 F.3d 316, 321 (D.C. Cir. 2009).

– II –

“Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented 

are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable 

interest in the outcome.” Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 525 F.3d 1, 3–

4 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 

440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)). “This occurs when, among other 

things, the court can provide no effective remedy because a 

party has already ‘obtained all the relief that [it has] sought.’”

Conservation Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 

(D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Monzillo v. Biller, 735 F.2d 1456, 

1459 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). If a case becomes moot, federal 

courts are divested of jurisdiction over the action. See Iron 

Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). 

In this case, all agree that the only claim transferred to 

the District Court from the Court of Federal Claims was 

Schmidt’s procedurally-focused attack on the BCNR’s 2008 

denial of his reconsideration request—i.e., his claim that it 

was wrong for the Acting Executive Director to make that

decision, rather than the Board. All also agree that this claim 

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was rendered moot when, after remand, the BCNR itself 

evaluated and made a determination on Schmidt’s application.

Consequently, unless Schmidt properly amended his 

complaint to assert another live claim before the District 

Court, the court was right to conclude that the controversy 

was moot and that it thus lacked jurisdiction over the case. 

In our view, then, this appeal turns on well-settled,

procedural principles governing the amendment of pleadings. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that, 

once the time for amendment as a matter of right has lapsed, 

“a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing 

party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(2). We have long observed that leave to amend under 

Rule 15 shall be granted “freely,” Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, 

Inc. v. Hines, 995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993), but we 

have also made clear that “Rule 15(a)—even as liberally 

construed—applies only when the plaintiff actually has 

moved for leave to amend the complaint; absent a motion, 

there is nothing to be freely given,” Belizan v. Hershon, 434 

F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Our prior cases have 

repeatedly stressed the importance of navigating the 

procedural requirements for amending under Rule 15. Rollins 

v. Wackenhut Servs., Inc., 703 F.3d 122, 130–31 (D.C. Cir. 

2012); Belizan, 434 F.3d at 582–83; Hines, 995 F.2d at 299. 

And this is where Schmidt’s appeal runs aground. Whatever 

the merit of Schmidt’s attack on the BCNR’s 2011 decision, 

this claim was never properly placed before the District Court 

through a course that complied with Rule 15.

To be sure, Schmidt attempted to file an amended

complaint after the BCNR rendered its decision on remand, 

but that attempt failed to comply with Rule 15(a)(2) because 

Schmidt did not have the Government’s consent, nor did he 

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seek leave of court. As a result, the District Court rightly 

disallowed his amended complaint, which, absent consent or 

leave of court, was without legal effect. United States ex rel. 

Mathews v. HealthSouth Corp., 332 F.3d 293, 296 (5th Cir. 

2003); Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 

1998); see also CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 6

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1484, at 685 (3d 

ed. 2010).

Thereafter, Schmidt—who has been represented by 

counsel throughout these proceedings—never followed the 

proper course for amending his complaint to add the claim he 

now seeks to press. He did file a “Motion to be Heard on the 

APA Issue,” but we are far from convinced that this 

submission can be fairly treated as a motion seeking leave to 

amend.3 Nowhere within that filing did Schmidt so much as 

reference Federal Rule 15, nor did he otherwise attempt to 

explain how he satisfied the legal standards for amendment. 

Instead, that submission was directed at whether the District 

Court had jurisdiction to hear his new APA challenge—an 

issue distinct from whether he could properly amend the 

scope of his lawsuit to include such a claim in this case. 

Even construing his “Motion to be Heard” as a motion 

for leave to amend, though, Schmidt fares no better. First, his 

filing was still procedurally deficient because he failed to 

attach a copy of his proposed amended pleading, as required 

by D.C. District Court Local Civil Rules 7(i) and 15.1. We 

have faulted litigants for this shortcoming in the past. See 

 3

 This is particularly so given the response of Schmidt’s 

counsel to these issues during oral argument. Counsel conceded

that no proper motion for leave to amend was filed in the District 

Court, even going so far as to recognize that he “may have erred” in 

not filing a motion for leave to amend. (Oral Arg. Recording at 

8:05–9:26).

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Rollins, 703 F.3d at 130-31. Second, and perhaps more 

problematic, Schmidt’s opening brief fails to meaningfully 

argue that the District Court was wrong in refusing to allow 

him to amend his complaint, certainly not using the Rule 15 

rubric we regularly apply in reviewing these issues on appeal. 

In this sense, the argument is debatably forfeited. See, e.g., 

World Wide Minerals, Ltd. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 296 

F.3d 1154, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As we have said many 

times before, a party waives its right to challenge a ruling of 

the district court if it fails to make that challenge in its 

opening brief.”). And third, our review of the District Court’s 

denial of leave to amend is for abuse of discretion in any 

event, see Elkins v. District of Columbia, 690 F.3d 554, 565

(D.C. Cir. 2012), and Schmidt can point to none here. During 

argument, counsel’s only real response to this last point was 

that Congress’s “solicitude” for veterans should have trumped 

Rule 15’s procedural requirements for amendment. (Oral Arg. 

Recording at 10:45–11:20). We disagree. While we certainly 

have tremendous respect for the men and women of our 

military, their estimable service for our country does not 

exempt them from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, for “[t]hese rules govern the procedure in all civil 

actions and proceedings in the United States district courts,” 

FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (emphasis added), other than in certain 

exceptional circumstances not present here. 

In sum, because Schmidt never properly amended his 

complaint before the District Court to assert a claim 

contesting the merits of the BCNR’s 2011 decision, and 

because there is no dispute that Schmidt’s original, 

procedurally-focused claim was rendered moot by the Board’s 

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action upon remand, we conclude that the District Court 

properly dismissed this action on mootness grounds.4

Given this holding, we have no occasion to reach the 

District Court’s other grounds for dismissal, nor any of the 

other arguments raised on appeal. We thus express no view

as to whether Schmidt’s merits-based, APA challenge to the

BCNR’s 2011 decision (1) was timely brought under 28 

U.S.C. § 2401(a); (2) was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction 

of the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act; or (3) 

 4

 We feel constrained to briefly flag our frustration that 

neither side’s briefing seemed to fully grasp Rule 15’s importance 

to the resolution of this case. Schmidt’s opening and reply briefs 

failed to cite Rule 15 at all, and nowhere in his briefing did he

assert that the trial court’s striking of his amended complaint was in 

error. In addition, though the Government’s brief did refer to 

Schmidt’s ham-handed efforts to amend his complaint below, and 

his failure to squarely raise that issue on appeal, (see Gov’t Br. at 

11), the Government could have spelled out, in clearer fashion, the 

interplay between Schmidt’s noncompliance with Rule 15 and the 

resultant mootness of this case. 

That being said, we do not perceive any waiver of these Rule 

15 arguments on the Government’s part here, and we have no 

compunction about our resolving this case on these grounds. For 

one thing, we generally employ waiver principles with a greater 

“degree of leniency” as applied to appellees. Cf. Crocker v. 

Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(“[F]orcing appellees to put forth every conceivable alternative 

ground for affirmance might increase the complexity and scope of 

litigation more than it would streamline the progress of litigation.”). 

Additionally, this point was explored at some length with the 

parties during oral argument, and at no point did Schmidt suggest 

that the Government waived the issue. We thus treat any potential 

waiver argument that Schmidt might have raised as itself waived. 

See Catholic Health Initiatives Iowa Corp. v. Sebelius, 718 F.3d 

914, 922 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 

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was barred by res judicata, law-of-the-case, or any other

doctrine of preclusion. Indeed, because Schmidt’s case 

became moot, the District Court was without power to decide 

these issues in the first place, and, to the extent that it did so, 

those portions of its opinion are vacated. These matters can 

be resolved, if at all, should Schmidt choose to file a new 

lawsuit properly asserting such a claim with the District Court 

or the Court of Federal Claims. 

– III –

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 

judgment dismissing this case on mootness grounds.

So ordered.

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