Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10341/USCOURTS-ca9-13-10341-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cristobal Colon-Arreola
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CRISTOBAL COLON-ARREOLA, AKA

Gustavo Colon, AKA Cristobal

Colon-Arreloa,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-10341

D.C. No.

4:12-cr-02541-

DCB-LAB

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

James G. Carr, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

April 9, 2014—San Francisco, California

Filed May 22, 2014

Before: Mary M. Schroeder and Consuelo M. Callahan,

Circuit Judges, and Robert W. Pratt, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Pratt

* The Honorable Robert W. Pratt, Senior United States District Judge for

the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by

designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a sentence for illegal reentry after

deportation in a case in which the defendant challenged the

district court’s application of an enhancement under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) based on his prior conviction for battery

with injury on a peace officer in violation of California Penal

Code § 243(c)(2).

The panel held that a conviction under § 243(c)(2) is a

categorical crime of violence under § 2L1.2 because a person

cannot be convicted under § 243(c)(2) unless he willfully and

unlawfully applies force sufficient to not just inflict a

physical injury on the victim, but to inflict a physical injury

severe enough that it requires professional medical treatment.

COUNSEL

Matthew J. McGuire, Patagonia, Arizona, for DefendantAppellant.

Brian Robert Decker, Assistant United States Attorney,

Office of the United States Attorney, Tucson, Arizona, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA 3

OPINION

PRATT, District Judge:

INTRODUCTION

Cristobal Colon-Arreola (“Colon-Arreola”) appeals his

sentence for illegal reentry into the United States after

deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In particular,

Colon-Arreola challenges the district court’s application of a

sixteen-level enhancement under United States Sentencing

Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)

based on his prior conviction for battery with injury on a

peace officer in violation of California Penal Code

§ 243(c)(2). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. Because we conclude that California Penal Code

§ 243(c)(2) is a categorical crime of violence under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2, we affirm Colon-Arreola’s sentence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s determination that a

prior conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” under

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. United States v. Bolanos-Hernandez,

492 F.3d 1140, 1141 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v.

Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 393 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2005)).

DISCUSSION

Section 2L1.2 of the Guidelines provides that a base

offense level of eight applies to violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. statutory provisions (2012). A

sixteen-level enhancement is applicable if a defendant’s prior

deportation occurred following a felony conviction for a

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4 UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA

crime of violence. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). A “crime

of violence” is defined in the Commentary as:

any of the following offenses under federal,

state, or local law: murder, manslaughter,

kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex

offenses . . . statutory rape, sexual abuse of a

minor, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate

extension of credit, burglary of a dwelling, or

any other offense under federal, state, or local

law that has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another.

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, cmt. n.1(B)(iii).

To determine whether Colon-Arreola’s conviction for

battery on a peace officer qualifies as a crime of violence

under the “catch-all” provision of § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), we

apply the framework established in Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575 (1990). This approach requires that we look

“not to the facts underlying the prior conviction[],” but “only

to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the

prior offense.” Id. at 600, 602. The 2L1.2 sentencing

enhancement will apply categorically only if “the full range

of conduct covered by [the statute] falls within the meaning

of that term.” United States v. Castillo-Marin, 684 F.3d 914,

919 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Grajeda,

581 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009)). “If the statute of

conviction is overbroad—that is, if it punishes some conduct

that qualifies as a crime of violence and some conduct that

does not—it does not categorically constitute a crime of

violence.” Id.

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UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA 5

The Supreme Court has held that the “critical aspect” of

a crime of violence is that it involves the use of physical force

against another person. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9

(2004).1 “Use” requires “active employment” and a “higher

degree of intent than negligent or merely accidental conduct.” 

Id. (explaining that it is not natural to say a person “actively

employs physical force against another person by accident”). 

Thus, a crime may only qualify as a “crime of violence” if the

use of force is intentional. See Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales,

466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (overruling prior cases

that permitted a crime of violence to include offenses

committed through the reckless or grossly negligent use of

force); cf. United States v. Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d 818, 822

n.4 (9th Cir. 2010) (clarifying that Fernandez-Ruiz “did not

hold that ‘crime of violence’ is limited to specific intent

crimes” and that a “general intent crime can satisfy the

generic definition of ‘crime of violence’”). Additionally,

“‘the force necessary to constitute a crime of violence . . .

must actually be violent in nature.’” Ortega-Mendez v.

Gonzales, 450 F.3d 1010, 1016 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Singh

v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 2004)).

A conviction for battery of a peace officer under

§ 243(c)(2) requires proof of the following elements: (1) the

offender committed a battery, defined by California Penal

Code § 242 as “any willful and unlawful use of force or

violence upon the person of another”; 2) the battery was

committed against a peace officer engaged in the performance

of his duties; 3) knowledge by the offender that the victim

1 Leocal was decided using the definition of “crime of violence” in

18 U.S.C. § 16(a), which this Court has found identical to the U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2 definition in all material respects. See United States v. Grajeda,

581 F.3d 1186, 1190 (9th Cir. 2009).

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6 UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA

was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties;

and 4) an injury was inflicted on the victim.2 See Cal. Penal

Code §§ 242, 243(c)(1)–(2).

In Ortega-Mendez, this Court held that misdemeanor

battery under § 242 is not a categorical crime of violence

because the statute does not require the use of violent force. 

450 F.3d at 1016 (“‘[F]orce or violence’ indicates that

nonviolent force suffices; otherwise the ‘or’ has no function.”

(alterations in original)). Ortega-Mendez is plainly

distinguishable, however, because § 243(c)(2) requires proof

of an element that § 242 does not, namely, that an “injury is

inflicted on [a peace officer] victim.”3 The term “injury” is

defined as “any physical injury which requires professional

medical treatment.” Cal. Penal Code § 243(f)(5). Thus, a

person cannot be convicted under § 243(c)(2) unless he

2 A conviction for battery under § 242 is punishable by a fine of $2,000,

six months imprisonment, or both. See Cal. Penal Code § 243(a). Section

243 provides enhanced penalties for battery when certain additional

criteria are satisfied. For instance, section 243(c)(1) provides that the

maximum term of imprisonment is one year when a battery is committed

against certain officials engaged in the performance of their duties, and

when the “person committing the offense knows or reasonably should

know that the victim is [such an official], and an injury is inflicted on that

victim.” Section 243(c)(2) provides for both an increased maximum fine

and an increased term of imprisonment when “the battery specified in

[§ 243(c)](1) is committed against a peace officer engaged in the

performance of his or her duties.”

3

If a battery is committed against a peace officer that does not result in

the infliction of an injury, the crime would fall under a separate provision

of the statute. See Cal. Penal Code §243(b).

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UNITED STATES V. ARREOLA 7

willfully4and unlawfully applies force sufficient to not just

inflict a physical injury on the victim, but to inflict a physical

injury severe enough that it requires professional medical

treatment. Section 243(c)(2), therefore, “fits squarely within

the term [crime of violence] by requiring the deliberate use of

force that injures another.” See Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d at

820–22 (holding that California Penal Code § 273.5, making

it a crime for “[a]ny person [to] willfully inflict[] upon

[certain persons in domestic relationships] corporal injury

resulting in a traumatic condition,”5 was a categorical crime

of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Colon-Arreola’s

conviction under California Penal Code § 243(c)(2) is a

categorical crime of violence within the meaning of § 2L1.2.

AFFIRMED.

4 The term “willfully” is synonymous to the term “intentionally.” See

Laurico-Yeno, 590 F.3d at 821 (citing Cal. Penal Code § 7).

 

5

 California Penal Code § 273.5(d) defines “traumatic condition” as “a

condition of the body, such as a wound, or external or internal injury,

including, but not limited to, injury as a result of strangulation or

suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical

force.”

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