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Parties Involved:
Executive Committee of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
Appellee
Leo D. Stoller
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 18, 2020*

Decided February 25, 2020 

Before 

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

No. 20-1055 

IN RE: LEO D. STOLLER, 

Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division. 

No. 07 C 1435 

Rebecca Pallmeyer, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

In 2007, the Executive Committee of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois imposed a filing restriction against appellant Leo Stoller, 

prohibiting him from instituting any new civil action in the Northern District of Illinois 

without leave from the Committee. In December 2019, Stoller requested that the 

Committee vacate the order so he could take over litigation on behalf of his brother. The 

Committee denied Stoller’s request, and he appealed. 

*

 We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is 

frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 20-1055 Document: 6 Filed: 02/25/2020 Pages: 2
No. 20-1055 Page 2 

On appeal, Stoller requests summary disposition of the appeal in his favor. He 

relies on a 2012 order from this court, in which we lifted a 2009 filing bar against Stoller. 

See In re Stoller, No. 08-4240 (7th Cir. Oct. 29, 2012). He asserts that the district court’s 

filing bar is unlawful because our 2012 order is controlling. He further argues that the 

bar is unconstitutional because (1) he did not have the opportunity to defend himself, 

(2) the order is perpetual and does not provide a process for rescinding the order, and 

(3) a sanction should be tailored to the abuse. 

We have carefully reviewed the orders of the Executive Committee and the 

record on appeal. Based on this review, we have determined that any issues which 

could be raised are insubstantial and that further briefing would not be helpful to our 

consideration of the issues. See Taylor v. City of New Albany, 979 F.2d 87 (7th Cir. 1992); 

Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 869 F.2d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 1989) (court can decide case on 

motions papers and record where briefing would not assist the court and no member of 

the panel desires briefing or argument). “Summary disposition is appropriate ‘when the 

position of one party is so clearly correct as a matter of law that no substantial question 

regarding the outcome of the appeal exists.’” Williams v. Chrans, 42 F.3d 1137, 1139 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 

In the first place, the challenged order imposes a screen rather than a bar, and we 

have upheld very similar Executive Committee orders restricting an overzealous 

litigant’s ability to file new actions. See In re Chapman, 328 F.3d 903, 905–06 (7th Cir. 

2003). And the original order is well-tailored to Stoller’s pattern of frivolous litigation—

the Committee imposed the bar because Stoller had filed at least 49 lawsuits in its 

district. Nor is any time limit necessary. As evidenced by this appeal, Stoller is capable 

at any time to petition the Executive Committee for a lift of or change to the screening 

order. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186 (7th Cir. 1995) (setting time 

limit on filing bar so restricted filer could petition for lift of bar). 

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Executive Committee is 

summarily AFFIRMED. Any pending motions are DENIED as moot. 

Case: 20-1055 Document: 6 Filed: 02/25/2020 Pages: 2