Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00164/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00164-60/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Georgina Carrillo Ayala
Defendant
Enrique Buenavida
Defendant
Jose Francisco Buenavida
Defendant
Canas
Defendant
Jose Antonio Pantoja Estrada
Defendant
Jerry Curtis Foster
Defendant
Luis Armando Rios Garcia
Defendant
Hector Gomez-Garcia
Defendant
Kelly Duane Hughes
Defendant
Bart Richard Hughes
Defendant
Francisco Loya-Solarzano
Defendant
Filiberto Madrigal
Defendant
Manny
Defendant
Roberto Mercado-Rangel
Defendant
Pancho
Defendant
Pistola
Defendant
Jose Manuel Rodriguez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Uncle
Defendant
Elias Hernandez Valencia
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

LNU (aka FRANCISCO LOYA-SOLARZANO, aka 

“Uncle,” aka “Pancho”)

ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA (aka “Pistola”)

FILIBERTO MADRIGAL (aka “Fily”)

LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA (aka “Pee Wee”)

GEORGINA CARRILLO AYALA

HECTOR GOMEZ-GARCIA

JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA (aka “Canas”)

ENRIQUE BUENAVIDA

JOSE ANTONIO PANTOJA ESTRADA

KELLY DUANE HUGHES

JERRY CURTIS FOSTER

BART RICHARD HUGHES

JOSE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ (aka “Manny”)

ROBERTO MERCADO-RANGEL,

 Defendants. 

CASE NO. 2:18-CR-164-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING 

EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER 

SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER

DATE: July 15, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case was set for status conference on July 15, 2021. The undersigned parties now request to 

move the status conferences to October 7, 2021, and to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act, 

pursuant to the Court’s General Orders, in the interest of public health and safety, and pursuant to Local

Code T4 as well, for the reasons set forth below.

On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, suspending jury trials in the Eastern 

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District of California “until further notice.” Under this order, a judge “may exercise his or her authority 

to continue matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior 

General Order 611 issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the 

Judge’s discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may 

order case-by-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or 

upon the request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such 

an order will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This 

and previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

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following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id.

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United 

States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”).

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STIPULATION

1. By this stipulation, the following defendants now move to continue the status conference

in this matter to October 7, 2021, and to exclude time between July 15, 2021, and October 7, 2021, 

under Local Code T4, as well as under the Court’s General Orders:

a) ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA (aka “Pistola”)

b) FILIBERTO MADRIGAL (aka “Fily”)

c) JOSE ANTONIO PANTOJA ESTRADA

d) JOSE MANUEL RODRIGUEZ (aka “Manny”)

2. These parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes seven compact discs, containing over 400 pages of investigative reports, surveillance 

photographs, surveillance video, and T-III wiretap transcripts. All of this discovery has been 

either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to continue to review discovery, 

conduct investigation, communicate with the government and their respective clients, discuss 

possible resolutions, and prepare for trial. The continuance is necessary to ensure continuity of 

counsel and for defense preparation.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) As to both cases, for the purpose of computing time for these defendants under 

the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time 

period of July 15, 2021 to October 7, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to the 

Court’s General Orders, in the interest of public health and safety, and 18 U.S.C.

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§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the 

Court at defendants’ request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by 

taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

3. Regarding defendant JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA (aka “Canas”), his counsel and 

the government agree and stipulate, and ask that the Court find, that the defendant’s whereabouts remain

unknown, despite the exercise of due diligence. The parties ask that the Court find for the purposes of 

computing time for this defendant under the Speedy Trial Act, within which trial must commence, the 

time period of July 15, 2021 to October 7, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 

3161(h)(3)(A) & (B) [Local Code M]. 

4. Defendants KELLY DUANE HUGHES, JERRY CURTIS FOSTER, and BART 

RICHARD HUGHES have entered guilty pleas in this matter and been sentenced. ROBERTO 

MERCADO-RANGEL, LUIS ARMANDO RIOS GARCIA (aka “Pee Wee”), and GEORGINA 

CARRILLO AYALA have entered guilty pleas in this matter and are awaiting sentencing. 

5. The defendants not mentioned in this stipulation have not yet appeared in this matter. 

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6. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: July 13, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: July 13, 2021 /s/ HAYES GABLE III

HAYES GABLE III

Counsel for Defendant 

ELIAS HERNANDEZ VALENCIA

Dated: July 13, 2021 /s/ TONI WHITE

TONI WHITE

Counsel for Defendant 

FILIBERTO MADRIGAL

Dated: July 13, 2021 /s/ OLAF HEDBERG

OLAF HEDBERG

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE FRANCISCO BUENAVIDA

Dated: July 13, 2021 /s/ DINA SANTOS

DINA SANTOS

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE PANTOJA ESTRADA

Dated: July 13, 2021 /s/ DAVID D. FISCHER

DAVID D. FISCHER

Counsel for Defendant 

JOSE RODRIGUEZ

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 21, 2021

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