Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01383/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01383-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Florence
Plaintiff
S. Frauenheim
Defendant
R. Reser
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID FLORENCE,

Plaintiff,

v.

S. FRAUENHEIM, et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-MJS (PC)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO 

DISMISS ACTION FOR FAILURE TO 

STATE A CLAIM

(ECF NO. 9)

FOURTEEN (14) DAY OBJECTION 

DEADLINE

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

On November 24, 2015, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to 

state a claim but gave leave to amend. (ECF No. 8.) His first amended complaint is 

before the Court for screening.

I. Screening Requirement

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 1 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. Pleading Standard

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated at Kern Valley State prison but complains of acts that 

occurred at Pleasant Valley State Prison (“PVSP”) in Coalinga, California. Plaintiff 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 2 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

names as Defendants PVSP Correctional Officer (“CO”) R. Reser in his individual 

capacity, and PVSP Warden Scott Frauenheim in his individual and official capacities.

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff transferred to PVSP on December 5, 2012, with nine boxes of personal 

property. Upon Plaintiff’s arrival, CO Reser told Plaintiff that he was only allowed four 

boxes. Plaintiff countered that he had a permissible amount of property – according to 

Plaintiff, six cubic feet of property and one cubic foot of legal material – because his nine

boxes were only half full. Plaintiff threatened to file a grievance. Reser became angry.

Reser confiscated six CDs containing explicit lyrics, telling Plaintiff that explicit 

lyrics were not allowed pursuant to prison policy. Plaintiff stated that he was filing an 

appeal and asked Reser to hold the CDs. Reser refused, telling Plaintiff to send the CDs 

home or donate them. 

Reser removed Plaintiff’s civil rights complaint in another case and the related 

inmate appeals, stating, “You sure don’t have a problem with filing 602s.” He then 

stated, I’m going to give you something to file an appeal about,” and confiscated 

Plaintiff’s hot pot, orthopedic shoes, extension cord, and other items

On December 6, 2012, Plaintiff sent a CDCR Form-22 to the Warden1regarding 

the policy of prohibiting CDs with explicit lyrics and the confiscation of Plaintiff’s CDs.

Plaintiff received a memorandum back stating that the items were contraband.

In January or February 2013, Plaintiff suffered a nervous breakdown. He was 

placed in a crisis room and then transferred to California Medical Facility for treatment. 

He then was transferred to California State Prison – Corcoran (“CSP-COR”) for ninety 

days pending transfer to Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”), where he is 

presently housed. Since his personal property remained at PVSP following his nervous 

breakdown, he sent a letter on June 26, 2013, to Defendant Warden Frauenheim 

 

1

Presumably Defendant Warden Frauenheim, although this is not expressly stated.

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 3 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

requesting that the property be forwarded to him at RJD because of upcoming court 

deadlines. 

On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff was called to pick up his personal property at RJD. 

He was given four boxes of property that were in his cell at the time he was placed in the 

crisis room. This property had been “transpacked” by non-party correctional officers on 

December 10, 2012. Some of the property was damaged. Plaintiff’s legal documents 

were missing.

Plaintiff directly sent Defendant Warden Frauenheim several appeals and a letter 

regarding his missing legal documents, damaged personal property, and the abovedescribed incident with Defendant Reser. The letter was forwarded to Lieutenant K.D. 

Geringer, who advised Plaintiff on October 7 2013, to submit a Form-22 to the “R-R”2

sergeant regarding his issues. Plaintiff thereafter filed many appeals regarding his 

personal property. He now alleges, in essence, that his appeals were improperly 

processed, rejected, cancelled and/or otherwise inappropriately evaluated. He contends 

that Defendant Frauenheim falsely stated he did not receive Plaintiff’s appeals, impeding 

Plaintiff’s access to the courts.

In December 2013 or January 2014, Plaintiff received a response from PVSP 

stating that four boxes of property had been located and would be sent to Plaintiff. 

Plaintiff eventually received three boxes of property.

Plaintiff brings retaliation and denial of court access claims against the 

Defendants, as well as claims for various provisions of title 15 of the California Code of 

Regulations and CDCR internal policies and manuals. He seeks damages and 

declaratory relief.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff previously was advised of the legal standards applicable to his claim and 

was afforded the opportunity to cure noted defects in his pleading. Nonetheless, the 

 

2

Presumably “Receiving and Release.”

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 4 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint differ only marginally from the original, 

defective pleading. Accordingly, the Court will recommended that the action be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court again sets forth the legal standards 

applicable to Plaintiff’s claims, although the analysis remains largely the same.

A. First Amendment Retaliation

“Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails 

five basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against 

an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) 

chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not 

reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal .” Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 

567-68 (9th Cir. 2005) (footnote and citations omitted).

Under the first element, plaintiff need not prove that the alleged retaliatory action, 

in itself, violated a constitutional right. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (1995) (to 

prevail on a retaliation claim, plaintiff need not “establish an independent constitutional 

interest” was violated); see also Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(“[P]risoners may still base retaliation claims on harms that would not raise due process 

concerns.”); Rizzo v. Dawson, 778 F.2d 527, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) (transfer of prisoner to a 

different prison constituted adverse action for purposes of retaliation claim). The interest 

cognizable in a retaliation claim is the right to be free of conditions that would not have 

been imposed but for the alleged retaliatory motive. However, not every allegedly 

adverse action is sufficient to support a claim for retaliation under § 1983. Watison v. 

Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012) (harm must be “more than minimal” (quoting 

Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568, n.11)); see also Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 

2002) (“[S]ome adverse actions are so de minimis that they do not give rise to 

constitutionally cognizable injuries.” (citing Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 396 (6th 

Cir. 1999))).

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 5 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

To prove the second element, retaliatory motive, plaintiff must show that his 

protected activities were a “substantial” or “motivating” factor behind the defendant's 

challenged conduct. Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1271 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 

Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1989)). Plaintiff must 

provide direct or circumstantial evidence of defendant's alleged retaliatory motive; mere 

speculation is not sufficient. See McCollum v. CDCR, 647 F.3d 870, 882-83 (9th Cir.

2011); accord, Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014). In addition to 

demonstrating defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's protected conduct, circumstantial 

evidence of motive may include: (1) proximity in time between the protected conduct and 

the alleged retaliation; (2) defendant's expressed opposition to the protected conduct; 

and (3) other evidence showing that defendant's reasons for the challenged action were 

false or pretextual. McCollum, 647 F.3d at 882 (quoting Allen v. Iranon, 283 F.3d 1070, 

1077 (9th Cir. 2002)).

The third element includes prisoners' First Amendment right to access to the 

courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996). While prisoners have no freestanding 

right to a prison grievance process, see Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.

2003), “a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts hinges on his ability to 

access the prison grievance system,” Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1279 (9th Cir.

1995), overruled on other grounds by Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 230 n.2 (2001). 

Because filing administrative grievances and initiating civil litigation are protected 

activities, it is impermissible for prison officials to retaliate against prisoners for engaging 

in these activities. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 567.

Under the fourth element, plaintiff need not demonstrate a “total chilling of his 

First Amendment rights,” only that defendant's challenged conduct “would chill or silence 

a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities.” Rhodes, 408 F.3d 

at 568-69 (emphasis in original, citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, 

direct and tangible harm will support a retaliation claim even without demonstration of a 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 6 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

chilling effect on the further exercise of a prisoner's First Amendment rights. Id. at 568 n. 

1. “[A] plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he 

suffered some other harm” as a retaliatory adverse action. Brodheim, 584 F.3d at 1269 

(citing Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n.11).

Regarding the fifth element, the Ninth Circuit has held that preserving institutional 

order, discipline, and security are legitimate penological goals that, if they provide the 

motivation for an official act taken, will defeat a claim of retaliation. Barnett v. Centoni, 31 

F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir. 1994); Rizzo, 778 F.2d at 532. When considering this final factor, 

courts should “‘afford appropriate deference and flexibility’ to prison officials in the 

evaluation of proffered legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be 

retaliatory.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). 

Plaintiff bears the burden of pleading and proving the absence of legitimate correctional 

goals for defendant's challenged conduct. Pratt, 65 F.3d at 806.

Plaintiff claims that Reser saw that he had filed a civil rights complaint and 

numerous grievances at his prior institution, and thus retaliated against him by 

confiscating his CDs. This argument fails. Plaintiff plainly states that Reser confiscated 

the CDs pursuant to an institutional policy prohibiting explicit lyrics. Thus, Plaintiff fails to 

allege an absence of legitimate penological interest in light of the institution’s 

determination that the CDs were contraband.

Plaintiff next claims that Reser confiscated other personal items, including a hot 

pot, shoes, and an extension cord, in retaliation for Plaintiff having threated Reser with a 

grievance. However, Plaintiff also states that these items were confiscated pursuant to 

the Department Operations Manual, or DOM. (ECF No. 9 at 25.) Again, Plaintiff’s 

argument fails because he has shown that departmental policy, rather than a retaliatory 

motive, was the moving force behind Reser’s action. 

Plaintiff then claims that Reser retaliated against him by keeping or stealing some 

of Plaintiff’s items that remained at PVSP following his transfer. This allegation appears 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 7 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

to be based entirely on speculation. Reser allegedly assumed control of Plaintiff’s excess 

property when the property arrived at the institution. There is nothing to indicate he was 

responsible for locating or transferring Plaintiff’s property after Plaintiff left PVSP.

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Frauenheim retaliated against Plaintiff by stating 

that he never received some of Plaintiff’s appeals. Plaintiff does not provide any facts to 

suggest that Frauenheim retaliated against him for engaging in protected conduct. This 

allegation fails to state a claim. 

B. Access to Courts

Prisoners have a constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts. Silva v. 

DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2011). The right of access to the courts 

protects prisoners' right to file civil actions that have “a reasonable basis in law or fact” 

without “active interference” by the government. Id. at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks 

and emphasis omitted). The right of access to the courts “does not require prison 

officials to provide affirmative assistance in the preparation of legal papers,” but does 

prohibit states from “erecting barriers that impede the right of access of incarcerated 

persons,” such as by depriving prisoners of the “tools necessary to challenge their 

sentences or conditions of confinement.” Id. at 1102-03 (internal brackets and quotation 

marks omitted).

The Supreme Court distinguishes between “forward-looking” access to the courts 

claims, in which the plaintiff alleges that official action is frustrating plaintiff's ability to 

prepare and file a suit at the present time, and “backward-looking” claims, in which 

plaintiff alleges that due to official action, a specific case cannot now be tried, or be tried 

with all material evidence. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). To state 

a claim for denial of access to the courts, prisoners must allege an actual injury, i.e., that 

some official action has frustrated or is impeding plaintiff's attempt to bring a nonfrivolous 

legal claim. Nevada Dept. of Corrections v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 8 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

Plaintiff here claims that the Defendants denied him access to the courts.

However, he alleges no injury with respect to any ongoing or intended litigation, nor has 

he alleged facts to suggest that his ongoing or intended legal actions are nonfrivolous. 

Instead, Plaintiff alleges only that his many attempts to pursue grievances were 

thwarted. However, absent some impact on Plaintiff’s ability to pursue a nonfrivolous 

claim in court, this allegation fails to state a claim. As Plaintiff fails to establish that he 

suffered any prejudice in connection with any contemplated or pending litigation, this 

claim must be dismissed.

C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

1. Property Seizure

A prisoner may not be deprived of a protected property interest without due 

process. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). However, “the Due Process 

Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss 

of or injury to ... property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986). Similarly, “an 

unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute 

a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Hudson v. 

Palmer, 468 U.S. at 533. In California, a meaningful postdeprivation remedy is available 

in the form of a tort claim against public officials pursuant to California Government Code 

§ 900, et seq. See City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999). Because 

the State of California provides a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for any property 

deprivation that was either negligent or intentional but unauthorized, the allegation of 

such a deprivation fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in the federal 

courts. Only an authorized, intentional deprivation of property by a public official may 

constitute an actionable violation of the Due Process Clause. Logan v. Zimmerman 

Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435-36 (1982).

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 9 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint can be construed as asserting a Due Process 

violation relating to the box of property that apparently was lost, it fails since it is based 

on a negligent or unauthorized deprivation, which is not actionable under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Plaintiff’s allegation that his personal property was wrongfully lost, 

misplaced, damaged, or stolen reflects a random and unauthorized deprivation of 

property not cognizable under Section 1983. His property claim may be cognizable 

under state law, but such a claim must be brought in state court rather than in federal 

court.

2. Grievance Process

Plaintiff does not a have protected liberty interest in the processing his appeals, 

and therefore, he cannot pursue a claim for denial of due process with respect to the 

handling or resolution of his appeals. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 

2003) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Although prison officials cannot willfully turn a blind eye to constitutional violations 

being committed by subordinates, Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1098 (9th Cir. 2006),

there is no indication in this case that a constitutional violation occurred, let alone that 

Defendant Frauenheim was aware of but disregarded a constitutional violation.

D. California Code of Regulations and CDCR Policies

Plaintiff alleges various violations of title 15 of the California Code of Regulations 

and the Department Operations Manual. However, Plaintiff fails to provide authority for 

the existence of a private right of action under either authority. See Gonzaga University 

v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-86 (2002) (basing a claim on an implied private right of action 

requires a showing that the statute both contains explicit rights-creating terms and 

manifests an intent to create a private remedy); Davis v. Powell, 901 F.Supp.2d 1196, 

1211 (S.D.Cal. 2012) (no implied private right of action for violation of Title 15 prison 

regulations). Furthermore, any such claims arise under state law and are not properly 

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 10 of 11
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

before this Court absent a cognizable federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family 

Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001).

V. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint does not state a cognizable claim for relief. He 

previously was advised of pleading deficiencies and afforded the opportunity to correct 

them. He failed to do so. Any further leave to amend reasonably appears futile and 

should be denied. 

The undersigned recommends that the action be dismissed with prejudice, that 

dismissal count as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and that the Clerk of the 

Court terminate any and all pending motions and close the case. 

The findings and recommendation will be submitted to the United States District 

Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

Within fourteen (14) days after being served with the findings and recommendation, the 

parties may file written objections with the Court. The document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” A party may respond 

to another party’s objections by filing a response within fourteen (14) days after being 

served with a copy of that party’s objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 

Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 

F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 25, 2016 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:15-cv-01383-AWI-JDP Document 10 Filed 07/26/16 Page 11 of 11