Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03139/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frederick Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 4, 2013 Decided December 27, 2013

Nos. 07-3135 & 07-3139

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

FREDERICK MILLER,

TIMOTHY R. THOMAS,

APPELLANTS

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 04cr00379-02)

(No. 04cr00379-03)

Dennis M. Hart, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the joint brief for appellant Frederick Miller. 

David B. Smith, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the joint brief for appellant Timothy R. Thomas. 

Nicholas P. Coleman, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne

Grealy Curt, and John K. Han, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Mary

B. McCord, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

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Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and

BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Frederick Miller, Gerald Eiland,

and Timothy R. Thomas appeal their convictions stemming from

a narcotics distribution scheme in Southeast, Washington, D.C.

between 1999 and 2004. They and six others were indicted, and

the district court conducted two trials. Miller and Thomas,

along with Corey Moore, were tried first, and this opinion

addresses Miller’s and Thomas’ challenges to their convictions. 

Miller was also part of the second trial involving Eiland with

respect to the counts on which the jury hung at the first trial. 

Today the court issues simultaneous opinions in these complex

cases addressing all of the challenges to the convictions.

Miller and Thomas challenge their convictions on multiple

grounds, including that the district court erred in denying their

motions to suppress the evidence obtained by the government

through wiretaps placed on Miller’s and Eiland’s cell phones. 

This opinion incorporates the holding in United States v. Eiland,

Nos. 07-3131 & 11-3001, slip op. at 8–15 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 27,

2013), that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the defense motions to suppress the wiretap evidence. 

Miller and Thomas also contend that the district court erred in

permitting “overview” and lay opinion testimony by government

agents, and testimony of a jailhouse confidant about their coconspirators’ statements. Further, they contend the district court

erred in limiting the cross-examination of a key cooperating

government witness, and in denying Thomas’ motion for

judgment because there was insufficient evidence to convict him

of one of the communication facility counts and a corresponding

racketeering act. They contend as well that the district court

erred in allowing unredacted tape recordings and tape recordings

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of their phone calls not played at the trial to go to the jury, and

also impermissibly interfered with the jury’s deliberations by

responding to jury notes in a manner that instructed the jury

about the grand jury’s intent. In their reply brief, they contend

the responses improperly amended the superceding indictment. 

They have withdrawn their Jencks/Brady challenge but contend

the cumulative effect of the district court’s errors requires

reversal of their convictions.

We hold that Miller’s and Thomas’ evidentiary challenges

and their contention regarding the submission of unplayed and

unredacted phone calls fail to demonstrate that reversal of their

convictions is warranted; such errors as occurred were harmless

for lack of substantial prejudice. We further hold that the

district court’s responses to jury notes impermissibly interfered

with the jury’s independent role as the finder of fact, and we

vacate the convictions on the tainted counts. The government

concedes that the district court erred in imposing Thomas’

sentences of life imprisonment in violation of Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and we vacate his life sentences for

narcotics conspiracy and RICO conspiracy. Accordingly, we

remand the case for resentencing and otherwise affirm the

judgments of conviction.

I.

In March 2003, a joint task force of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (“FBI”) and the D.C. Metropolitan Police

Department began an investigation into a suspected narcotics

distribution operation in Southeast, Washington, D.C. As a

result of physical surveillance, use of cooperators, pen registers

and toll records, undercover drug purchases, and execution of

search warrants, the investigators suspected that Miller and

Eiland were partners in drug distribution with at least ten others,

among them Thomas. Upon obtaining judicial authorization of

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wiretaps, the investigators intercepted calls made on the cell

phones used by Miller and Eiland between February and June

2004.

The government’s evidence, as relevant here, showed that

Miller used several individuals as couriers of money and drugs. 

Between October 2003 and January 2004, Miller recruited his

cousin Charles Brown to make five trips to Kansas City,

Missouri to carry money. Miller also recruited Brown to make

a similar trip to Los Angeles, California to carry money to

Robert Bryant, whom investigators suspected of supplying

Miller with PCP. On March 10, 2004, when Brown was

scheduled to go to Los Angeles for Miller, he was stopped at the

airport by Drug Enforcement Administration agents who seized

$30,775 in cash from his person. In April 2004, Miller again

recruited Brown, arranging for a package of heroin to be sent to

Brown’s residence; the package was intercepted by law

enforcement officials who arranged a controlled delivery of the

package to Brown’s residence.

Tyrone Thomas (hereinafter “Tyrone,” and no relation to

Timothy R. Thomas) also acted as a courier for Miller. He was

introduced to Miller by Thomas in 2000. In May or June 2003,

Tyrone drove from Atlanta, Georgia to Los Angeles to meet

with Miller and Bryant, who were planning to purchase PCP. 

After Tyrone returned to Atlanta, Bryant sent him a package of

PCP to take to Miller in the District of Columbia. In March

2004, Tyrone transported a batch of “no good” PCP from the

District of Columbia to Bryant in Kansas City. In March 2004 

Miller also recruited Tyrone to act as a courier in regard to a

purchase of four kilograms of powder cocaine in Phoenix,

Arizona. Tyrone drove from Atlanta to meet with Miller and

Thomas to discuss the new venture. Thomas then drove Tyrone

to Eiland’s apartment in Alexandria, Virginia, where Eiland

instructed Tyrone to take $50,000 to Phoenix where he would

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meet Eiland. In Phoenix, Eiland retrieved the funds and

purchased four kilograms of powder cocaine, and then gave the

drugs to Tyrone to transport to the District of Columbia. Wary

of law enforcement, Tyrone put the drugs in a bag that he

checked onto a Greyhound bus bound for Richmond, Virginia. 

When he arrived in Richmond three days later, Tyrone learned

the bag had not arrived. The bag arrived two days later, on

March 23, 2004, and Tyrone called to let Miller, Eiland, and

Thomas know that he would be arriving shortly in the District of

Columbia. Within thirty minutes of leaving Richmond, law

enforcement officials stopped Tyrone’s car and seized the four

kilograms of cocaine in the trunk. 

Tyrone spoke that day with the FBI and agreed to cooperate

with law enforcement by making recorded phone calls to

Thomas regarding the four kilograms of cocaine. During these

calls, Tyrone communicated a law-enforcement improvised ruse. 

He initially told Thomas that the bag had been delayed and then

lost in the Greyhound baggage system. Thomas expressed his

anger that Tyrone allowed the bag out of his sight, suggested the

bag had been stolen by Greyhound employees or seized by law

enforcement, and warned Tyrone that he would have to pay for

the lost drugs. Tyrone, as instructed by the FBI, also arranged

to send Thomas a facsimile copy of his baggage claim ticket. 

On May 3, 2004, the FBI intercepted a call in which Tyrone told

Thomas that he had located the bag in Spartanburg, South

Carolina but the cocaine was missing. When other intercepted

calls indicated that Miller, Eiland, and Thomas suspected that

Tyrone had stolen the cocaine, the investigators told Tyrone to

confirm his cohorts’ suspicions. In a May 4, 2004 call, Tyrone

admitted to Thomas that he had stolen the cocaine but offered to

return one kilogram in recognition of their past friendship. 

Thomas agreed to have Tyrone leave the cocaine at a hotel room

where he could retrieve it. Investigators set up a reverse sting

on May 19, 2004, planting the kilogram in a hotel room in

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Alexandria. When one of Thomas’ associates, Greta Frank,

came to the room and retrieved the cocaine, she was arrested.

Search warrants were executed between May and July 2004. 

Recovered from Miller’s house and his aunt’s house (which

Miller frequently used) were tools of the drug trade, including

drug packaging materials and two bulletproof vests. Recovered

from Thomas’ apartment were a digital scale, counterweights,

small empty ziploc bags and ziploc bags containing 0.41 grams

of cocaine, a “Cocaine Handbook,” and a telephone “bug”

detector.

On March 20, 2006, the grand jury returned a superceding

71-count indictment against Miller, Eiland, Thomas, and six codefendants. Miller and Thomas were charged with conspiracy

to distribute and possess with intent to distribute narcotics, 21

U.S.C. § 846; conspiracy to violate the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1962(d); distribution, possession, and attempted possession

with intent to distribute (“PWID”) narcotics, 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), 846; unlawfully using a communication

facility, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b); conspiracy to commit murder, D.C.

CODE §§ 22-1805a, 22-2101; and conspiracy to murder in aid of

racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(5). Miller was also

charged with engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise

(“CCE”), 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)–(b). See also Eiland, slip op. at

3–5. The district court denied the defense motions to suppress

the wiretap evidence. United States v. Eiland, 398 F. Supp. 2d

160 (D.D.C. 2005). At the close of all the evidence, the district

court granted the government’s motion to dismiss two PWID

counts and eight communication facility counts against Miller,

as well as both murder conspiracy counts.

The jury found Miller guilty of twenty-one counts of

unlawfully using a communication facility, and not guilty of one

count of possession with intent to distribute PCP and sixteen

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counts of unlawfully using a communication facility. The jury

hung on the remaining charges against Miller, including

narcotics conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, CCE, two counts of

attempted PWID, and seven counts of unlawfully using a

communication facility. Miller was sentenced after the jury in

the second trial returned verdicts on the hung counts. See

Eiland, slip op. at 4–6. The jury found Thomas guilty of

narcotics conspiracy, RICO conspiracy, PWID cocaine, and ten

counts of unlawfully using a communication facility; he was

acquitted of the remaining count of unlawfully using a

communication facility. The district court sentenced Thomas to

life imprisonment for narcotics conspiracy and RICO

conspiracy, twenty years for PWID cocaine, and four years for

each communication facility offense, all to be served

concurrently. The district court denied the defense motions for

a new trial. See United States v. Eiland, 525 F. Supp. 2d 37

(D.D.C 2007), rev’d on other grounds, United States v. Gaskins,

690 F.3d 569 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. (Timothy)

Thomas, 525 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D.D.C 2007). 

II.

Overview Testimony. Miller and Thomas contend that the

trial testimony of FBI Agents Daniel Sparks and Scott Turner

and Detective Steven Hall (a former FBI Agent) ran afoul of this

court’s precedents limiting the permissible use of “overview” or

“summary” witnesses and lay opinion testimony. They point to

the testimony on (1) the procedures for obtaining wiretaps and

search warrants; (2) the methods used to ensure the truthfulness

of cooperating witnesses; (3) the nature of criminal enterprises

and the techniques used to investigate them; and (4) the meaning

and significance of wiretapped phone calls. This testimony,

Miller and Thomas maintain, unfairly allowed the prosecution

to bolster the strength of its case and deprived them of a fair

trial. Properly understood, Miller’s and Thomas’ objections

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concern both overview and lay opinion testimony. Here, we

address the former; we address the latter in Part III, infra.

In United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348–49 (D.C.

Cir. 1983), this court identified three “obvious dangers” posed

by “summary” testimony: (1) “a jury will treat the summary as

additional evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the

underlying testimony,” (2) the testimony will result in “the

subtle introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence,” and

(3) the testimony will “provide an extra summation for the

government that comes from the witness stand rather than the

counsel’s lectern.” A clear illustration of these “obvious

dangers” occurred in United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30,

54–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011), where Agent Sparks’ trial testimony

provided at the outset of the trial “an overview of the

government’s case, setting forth for the jury the script of the

testimony and evidence the jury could expect the government to

present in its case-in-chief” and “expressed his opinion, based

on his training and experience, about the nature of the

investigation conducted in th[e] case.” This court held his

testimony “was improper in offering his non-expert opinions

about the charged conspiracy and [the defendants], vouching for

the reliability of the investigation and of the cooperating coconspirator witnesses the government planned to have testify at

trial, and discussing evidence that had yet to be introduced.” Id.

at 60. More generally, the court “condemn[ed]” the use of

overview witnesses in criminal trials “[b]ecause a witness

presenting an overview of the government’s case-in-chief runs

the serious risk of permitting the government to impermissibly

‘paint a picture of guilt before the evidence has been introduced’

and may never be introduced.” Id. (citation omitted) (quoting

United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 349 (5th Cir. 2003)).

In Moore, the court set forth “clear direction” that “[t]he

government remains free to call as its first witness a law

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enforcement officer who is familiar with the pre-indictment

investigation or was otherwise personally involved,” and such

a witness may “provide relevant background information as to

the investigation’s duration and scope or the methods of

surveillance, based on personal knowledge.” Id. at 60–61. 

Thus, in a narcotics conspiracy prosecution, a government agent

“could properly describe, based on his personal knowledge, how

the gang investigation . . . was initiated, what law enforcement

entities were involved, and what investigative techniques were

used.” Id. at 61. On the other hand, the government agent could

not (1) “present lay opinion testimony about investigative

techniques in general and opine on what generally works and

what does not,” (2) “anticipate evidence that the government

would hope to introduce at trial about the charged offenses,” or

(3) “express an opinion, directly or indirectly, about the strength

of that evidence or the credibility of any of the government’s

potential witnesses, including the cooperating co-conspirators.” 

Id.

Miller and Thomas contend that FBI Agent Sparks’

testimony about procedures for obtaining search warrants and

wiretaps, and similar testimony by FBI Agent Turner, “crossed

the line by advancing the argument that multiple layers of court

and prosecutor review served [as] an independent approval of

the agents’ conclusions of illegality.” Appellants’ Br. 54. In

discussing search warrants, Sparks testified “we have to provide

facts and justify to a judge why we need to get a search warrant”

and described how an application is “reviewed by the U.S.

Attorney’s Office, and then it goes to a Federal Magistrate Judge

who reviews it to decide whether or not they’ll issue a search

warrant.” Mar. 21, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 14. Sparks also

testified that a wiretap is “a court order that allows law

enforcement to listen to and monitor private conversations,” and

that investigators prepare “daily reports that go to the U.S.

Attorney’s Office,” as well as “a ten or fifteen day report to the

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Court,” in order for the court to “monitor the status of the

wiretap.” Id. at 17–18. FBI Agent Turner described how a

wiretap application is approved by the U.S. Attorney’s Office,

the Justice Department, and the FBI’s legal counsel before it is

sent to a judge who “either authorizes or denies it.” Mar. 22,

2006 AM Trial Tr. at 85. Although the “layering” testimony

about multiple levels of approval can be overdone in a manner

that would substantiate Miller’s and Thomas’ concern, see

United States v. Cunningham, 462 F.3d 708, 712–15 (7th Cir.

2006), they raised no objection in the district court. Upon plain

error review, see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34,

736 (1993); United States v. Bailey, 319 F.3d 514, 521 (D.C.

Cir. 2003), we conclude that this testimony by Sparks and

Turner was not so extreme as to suggest, in the absence of a

limiting instruction, that the suspicions of investigators about the

defendants were confirmed because the applications were

subject to multiple layers of review; rather, the agents addressed

the lawfulness of investigative conduct, which was not the same

as evidence of a defendant’s guilt.

Miller and Thomas also contend that FBI Agent Sparks’

testimony about the investigation of criminal enterprises in

general was impermissible. This court has drawn a line between

permissible lay opinion testimony under Federal Rule of

Evidence 701 and expert opinion testimony under Rule 702. In

Moore, 651 F.3d at 61, the court held that a government agent

could not “present lay opinion testimony about investigative

techniques in general.” Thus, “[a]n individual testifying about

the operations of a drug conspiracy because of knowledge of

that drug conspiracy . . . should be admitted as a lay witness; an

individual testifying about the operations of a drug conspiracy

based on previous experiences with other drug conspiracies . . .

should be admitted as an expert.” United States v. (George)

Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court has

“drawn that line because knowledge derived from previous

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professional experience falls squarely ‘within the scope of Rule

702’ and thus by definition outside of 701.” United States v.

Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting FED. R.

EVID. 701(c)). 

FBI Agent Sparks’ testimony about criminal enterprises and

investigative techniques appeared to be premised on his

specialized knowledge as a criminal investigator, rather than his

particularized knowledge of how the Miller/Eiland drug

operation was investigated. As such, its admission was plainly

erroneous. See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61; (George) Wilson, 605

F.3d at 1026. Although this court had not decided Moore or

(George) Wilson at the time of Miller’s and Thomas’ trial, the

Supreme Court held in Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

1121, 1130–31 (2013), that an error need only be “plain” at the

time of appellate consideration. In the district court, Miller and

Thomas objected to Sparks’ testimony with respect to how a

criminal enterprise maintains secrecy, but not to Sparks’

overview of the investigative techniques used to infiltrate

criminal enterprises. Regardless of whether the objection to the

error was preserved as to all of Sparks’ testimony, Miller and

Thomas cannot show substantial prejudice. See Olano, 507 U.S.

at 734; Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 

As the court observed in Moore, Sparks might have qualified as

an expert because he had been an FBI agent for over fifteen

years and had served as the lead agent in five or six criminal

enterprise investigations. See Moore, 651 F.3d at 61; Smith, 640

F.3d at 366.

On the other hand, the government acknowledges that

Miller’s and Thomas’ objection to FBI Agent Sparks’ vouching

testimony is well taken, stating “this Court has since

disapproved of the kind of testimony Sparks gave about the

importance and handling of cooperators.” Appellee’s Br. 53

(citing Moore, 651 F.3d at 59–60). Sparks testified not only that

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cooperating witnesses are used because they are “easily accepted

by the criminals that we’re investigating” and “have access to

the insiders,” Mar. 21, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 13–14, 20, but about

how investigators ensure that cooperating witnesses are truthful,

including checking to determine if what they say is consistent

with other evidence, such as “an autopsy report, or a crime scene

report, or a police report, or airline reservations, or . . . a pen

register, or . . . a wiretap . . . [to] get a sense whether or not

they’re telling the truth.” Id. at 21–22. Moreover, Sparks

testified — in response to a series of questions from the

prosecution impermissibly prompting answers that would invade

the jury’s right to make credibility determinations, see United

States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871–72 (D.C. Cir. 1995) — that any

cooperating witness who would testify at trial or on whom the

government had relied in the instant case was a truth teller.

Vouching testimony of this kind is impermissible because

it manifests the “obvious danger[]” that “a jury will treat [a

summary witness, particularly a government agent] as additional

evidence or as corroborative of the truth of the underlying

testimony.” Lemire, 720 F.3d at 1348. But Miller and Thomas

have not shown the error affected their substantial rights, see

Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776, because any

prejudice from the vouching testimony was adequately

mitigated. See United States v. Brown, 508 F.3d 1066, 1074

(D.C. Cir. 2007). The district court instructed the jurors that

they were “the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses,”

and they “alone [we]re to determine whether to believe any

witness and the extent to which any witness should be believed.” 

May 25, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 15. Testimony from the

government’s primary cooperating witness, Tyrone, was heavily

impeached on cross-examination. See Part V infra. And, on the

counts on which the jury returned guilty verdicts, as in Moore,

651 F.3d at 61, there was overwhelming evidence of Miller’s

and Thomas’ guilt, independent of any cooperator testimony, in

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view of the numerous taped phone conversations and the four

kilograms of cocaine seized from Tyrone that incriminated both

Miller and Thomas.

III.

Lay Opinion Testimony. Miller’s and Thomas’ challenge

to the lay opinion testimony by FBI Agents Sparks and Turner

and Detective Hall focuses on the witnesses’ interpretation of

the recorded phone conversations. The government’s suggestion

that this challenge was not preserved because Miller and

Thomas fail to describe specific instances that “actually led to

the introduction of damaging evidence against them,”

Appellee’s Br. 54 (citing United States v. Hall, 370 F.3d 1204,

1209 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2004)), is not well taken. All of the taped

phone calls were admitted into evidence and incriminating tapes

were played at trial. On appeal, Miller and Thomas renew their

objections in the district court that portions of the interpretative

testimony lacked a foundation or basis. See Appellants’ Br.

49–50, 53.

In United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 981–82 (D.C.

Cir. 2013), the court held that the district court abused its

discretion by admitting lay opinion testimony by a government

agent that did not satisfy the requirements of Rule 701. The

court emphasized that “[e]nforcement of Rule 701’s criteria . . .

ensures that the jury has the information it needs to conduct an

independent assessment of lay opinion testimony.” Id. at 781.

“Judicial scrutiny of a law-enforcement witness’s purported

basis for lay opinion is especially important because of the risk

that the jury will defer to the officer’s superior knowledge of the

case and past experiences with similar crimes.” Id. at 781-82. 

Because the government agent’s testimony was broadly based

on his “‘knowledge of the entire investigation,’” the court

concluded that “the jury had no way of verifying [the agent’s]

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inferences or of independently reaching its own interpretations.” 

Id. at 983 (quoting United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746, 750

(2d Cir. 2004)); accord United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439,

450 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201,

212–13 (2d Cir. 2005); Grinage, 390 F.3d at 750–51.

FBI Agents Sparks and Turner and Detective Hall offered

their lay opinions regarding the meaning and “significance” of

certain wiretapped phone conversations. Turner testified over

several days, often opining based on “the overall state of the

investigation,” his “overall knowledge of the investigation,” his

“perceptions in this case,” and other similarly general bases. 

See, e.g., May 23, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 26. He also testified

about the meaning of coded language in phone conversations, id.

at 51, although “[i]n this case we didn’t really see any consistent

use of any code words indicating any drugs,” id. at 53. Sparks

and Detective Hall likewise interpreted the meaning of recorded

phone conversations based on their “knowledge of the overall

investigation,” or similar generalized bases, such as “knowledge

that [they] received in this investigation,” and “the wiretap in

general.” See, e.g., Apr. 24, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 38–39, 45.

Admission of the government agents’ interpretative lay

opinion testimony was plain error under Hampton. Their

interpretations of non-coded language was erroneously admitted

because they did not set forth the specific bases (events, other

calls, seizures of contraband, etc.) upon which their opinions

rested — other than broad claims about knowledge they had

gained from the investigation. See Hampton, 718 F.3d at

981–82. This gave the jury no effective way to evaluate their

opinions. But, unlike in Hampton, the error was not

substantially prejudicial. See id. at 984 (citing Kotteakos, 328

U.S. at 765). The prejudice in Hampton was apparent from the

absence of other evidence to support the convictions. There, the

government pointed to no “money, drugs, weapons, or other

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evidence seized by law-enforcement personnel that could be tied

to Hampton’s alleged role in the conspiracy.” Id. Here, the

opposite is true: the government points to the seized evidence,

most particularly to the four kilograms of cocaine seized from

Tyrone’s car that were tied to Miller and Thomas not only

through Tyrone’s testimony but also by the consensually

recorded phone conversations between Thomas and Tyrone that

were not interpreted by government agents at trial.

IV.

Co-Conspirator Statements. Miller and Thomas contend

that the district court erred by permitting Melvin Wider to testify

regarding conversations he had with Eiland and Robert Bryant

(neither of whom was a defendant in the first trial) because these

conversations were made neither during nor in furtherance of a

conspiracy, and thus constituted inadmissible hearsay. We

agree. See United States v. Celis, 608 F.3d 818, 843 (D.C. Cir.

2010).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), a statement

is not hearsay if it “is offered against an opposing party and . . .

was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance

of the conspiracy.” FED.R.EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). Statements are

made in furtherance of a conspiracy if they “can reasonably be

interpreted as encouraging a co-conspirator or other person to

advance the conspiracy, or as enhancing a co-conspirator or

other person’s usefulness to the conspiracy.” United States v.

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Such

statements include “those that keep a coconspirator updated on

the status of the business, motivate a coconspirator’s continued

participation, or provide background information on key

conspiracy members.” United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336,

367 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted). On the other hand, “mere narratives of past successes

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and failures” or “a conspirator’s casual comments to people

outside or inside the conspiracy” are not admissible under Rule

801(d)(2)(E). Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1412 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Wider met Eiland and Bryant while they were all

incarcerated in the Montgomery County (Maryland) jail in 2005

after Eiland and Bryant had been arrested and charged in the

Miller/Eiland drug conspiracy. At that time, Wider had pleaded

guilty to a different RICO conspiracy than was charged in the

instant case, and he was cooperating with law enforcement

officials. According to Wider, Eiland and Bryant told him about

Bryant providing PCP to Miller, Thomas’ involvement in the

Phoenix cocaine transaction, and Miller’s involvement in a

private investigative service that Wider claimed was used as a

front for a murder-for-hire operation. The prosecution proffered

that Wider had been enlisted in the conspiracy while

incarcerated by helping Bryant make contact with a woman in

Kansas City named Shantel who had previously obtained cell

phones and stored drugs for Bryant, and by assisting Miller,

Eiland, and Corey Moore in contacting Bryant while

incarcerated, in violation of a separation order. The district

court denied Thomas’ motion to exclude Wider’s testimony,

ruling it was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

The admission of Wider’s testimony was error, not because

of lack of independent evidence of a conspiracy, but because

none of the statements to Wider by Eiland or Bryant can be

construed as in furtherance of the conspiracy, which ended in

September 2004, several months before any of the statements

were made to Wider. There is no evidence that either Eiland or

Bryant did anything after their respective August and October

2004 arrests to carry out the goals of the conspiracy, and their

statements cannot “plausibly be interpreted” as advancing the

conspiracy. United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1111 (D.C.

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17

Cir. 1995). Rather, the co-conspirators’ statements recounted

“past victories and losses” and were “casual comments,”

Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1412, or “idle chatter,” see Carson, 455

F.3d at 366–67. The government’ suggestion that statements

recounted by Wider describing the conspiracy’s drug trafficking

and other illegal activities were made in furtherance of the

conspiracy because they “‘updated’ Wider about the status of

the drug trafficking business, and provided ‘background

information’ on the conspiracy’s members,” Appellee’s Br. 63

(quoting Carson, 455 F.3d at 367), ignores the temporal element

of the conspiracy and the absence of any evidence the speakers

were attempting to induce Wider to join or provide assistance to

the terminated conspiracy, as occurred in United States v.

Shores, 33 F.3d 438, 444 (4thCir. 1994). The other cases cited

by the government involved on-going conspiracies, United

States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 327 (6th Cir. 2005), or

statements by one co-conspirator to another, United States v.

Weaver, 507 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Cir. 2007); Carson, 455 F.3d at

367.

Despite the error, there was no substantial prejudice to

either Miller or Thomas. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. 

Wider’s testimony that inculpated Miller related to counts that

were either dropped by the prosecution before the case was

submitted to the jury or on which the jury did not convict him,

namely Counts 1–7, 68, and 69. Wider’s testimony that

inculpated Thomas related to the four-kilogram Phoenix cocaine

transaction and was cumulative of other evidence.

V.

Cross-Examination of Cooperating Witness. Miller and

Thomas also contend that the district court abused its discretion

by limiting cross-examination of Tyrone and thereby violated

their confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment. We find

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neither an abuse of discretion, see United States v. White, 116

F.3d 903, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1997), nor constitutional error.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the

right to cross-examine the witnesses called against him. 

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 (1986). Although

the Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective

cross-examination, “trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to

impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination.” Id. at

679. “The Confrontation Clause is violated only when the court

bars a legitimate line of inquiry that ‘might’ have given the jury

a ‘significantly different impression of [the witness’s]

credibility.’” United States v. Hayes, 369 F.3d 564, 566 (D.C.

Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

at 680).

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b), a party may inquire

on cross-examination about “specific instances of a witness’s

conduct in order to attack or support the witness’s character for

truthfulness,” so long as the specific instances of conduct “are

probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” 

FED. R. EVID. 608(b). Additionally, “evidence that would

contradict [a witness’s] trial testimony, even on a collateral

subject,” is ordinarily probative because it “would undermine

[the witness’s] credibility as a witness regarding facts of

consequence.” United States v. Fonseca, 435 F.3d 369, 375

(D.C. Cir. 2006). In considering whether a topic is probative of

untruthfulness, the district court “is guided by several factors,

including whether the instances of prior untruthfulness bore

some similarity to the conduct at issue, whether or not they were

remote in time, whether they were cumulative of other evidence,

and whether there was some likelihood they happened.” United

States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2001); accord

United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

It is within the district court’s discretion to balance these factors

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to decide whether the conduct at issue is sufficiently probative

of the witness’s character for untruthfulness to be admitted

under Rule 608. See Morrison, 98 F.3d at 628.

At trial, the defense sought to cross-examine Tyrone

regarding his kidnaping trial in St. Louis in 1975. In that trial,

the district court had ordered a psychological evaluation of

Tyrone. See United States v. (Tyrone) Thomas, 536 F.2d 274,

275 (8th Cir. 1976). After the district court had found Tyrone

was incompetent to stand trial in view of a diagnosis that he

suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, two doctors who

subsequently reexamined him “observed a revealing and sudden

improvement in [Tyrone’s] behavior after the first competency

hearing.” Id. at 276. One psychiatrist concluded that Tyrone

“had simply succeeded in fooling the psychiatrists at the outset,”

and a psychologist testified that Tyrone had admitted to her that

he had feigned his mental illness. Id. Cross-examination about

his 1975 criminal trial was proper, appellants maintain, under

Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) as probative of Tyrone’s

character for untruthfulness, because it would “show that Tyrone

had attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the federal court in St.

Louis.” Appellants’ Br. 67. The district court ruled “[i]t’s so

extraneous, and so beyond anything beyond the pale, I’m not

going to allow it.” Apr. 3, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 51.

The defense also sought to cross-examine Tyrone about his

alleged attempt to shoot someone when he was 13 years old (in

approximately 1961) in order to impeach his testimony on direct

examination that he “started having a lot of problems when [he]

came back from Vietnam,” including drug use, several run-ins

with the law, and the onset of post-traumatic stress disorder

(“PTSD”). Mar. 29, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 40. When the

prosecution objected to the question, counsel for Corey Moore

argued “[t]he government opened the door when [it] elicited

from [Tyrone] that all of this criminal activity was the result of

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[PTSD] in Viet Nam [sic]. We had a basis by his own

admission to say there was conduct that preceded [that].” Apr.

3, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 84. The district court, which treated any

defense objection as an objection by all defendants, sustained

the prosecution’s objection.

We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

prohibiting these two lines of questioning on cross-examination. 

Not only were the events over thirty years old, the suggestion

that Tyrone had attributed all of his criminal behavior to his

experiences in Vietnam is incorrect. The probativeness of the

inquiry into what happened at the 1975 trial was diluted both by

its remoteness in time, see, e.g., United States v. Augustin, 661

F.3d 1105, 1128 (11th Cir. 2011), and by the fact that the crossexamination would have been based on accusations, not a prior

judicial finding Tyrone had lied in 1975 about his mental state. 

Compare United States v. Whitmore, 359 F.3d 609, 620 (D.C.

Cir. 2004), with Morrison, 98 F.3d at 628. See generally

(Tyrone) Thomas, 536 F.2d at 275–77. Similarly, even if

inquiry into Tyrone’s attempt to shoot someone when he was 13

years old would have been impeachment-by-contradiction,

because “[t]he evidence of Tyrone’s violent juvenile conduct

directly contradicted his testimony that his criminal activity was

caused by [PTSD] stemming from his service in Vietnam,”

Appellants’ Br. 71, any contradiction would have been

ambiguous because Tyrone had not testified on direct

examination that he had never engaged in criminal misconduct

prior to serving in Vietnam; on cross-examination he explained

he had claimed only that his “criminal involvement was

principally related to [his] coming back from Viet Nam [sic].” 

Apr. 3, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 82 (emphasis added).

We also hold that the district court’s limitation on Tyrone’s

cross-examination did not violate Miller’s or Thomas’ Sixth

Amendment rights. They maintain “[t]he cross[-examination]

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that was not permitted would have been ‘almost unique in its

detrimental effect on [Tyrone’s] credibility.’” Appellants’ Br.

73 (quoting United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir.

1996)). But at trial defense counsel attacked Tyrone’s

credibility by cross-examining him about numerous other

instances of prior misconduct, including arrests, violating

conditions of release, and lying to law enforcement and a

bankruptcy court. Under the circumstances, there is no basis to

conclude that a reasonable jury would have “received a

significantly different impression of [Tyrone’s] credibility had

[defense] counsel been permitted to pursue [the] proposed

line[s] of cross-examination.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680.

VI.

Sufficiency of Evidence. Thomas contends there was

insufficient evidence to convict him of Count 33 and

Racketeering Act 5(a). Count 33 charged Miller and Thomas

with unlawfully using a communication facility, that is, a

telephone, on or about March 5, 2004 at 12:30 p.m., to facilitate

the conspiracy to unlawfully distribute or possess with intent to

distribute heroin, cocaine, crack cocaine, and PCP. 

Racketeering Act 5(a) charged them with unlawfully using a

communication facility, that is, a telephone, to facilitate the

unlawful distribution of PCP in the RICO conspiracy. This

court “review[s] the evidence of record de novo, considering that

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and

affirm[s] a guilty verdict where ‘any rational trier of fact could

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375

(D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)).

The essential elements of unlawfully using a

communication facility are: (1) knowing or intentional use;

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(2) of a communication facility; (3) in committing or in causing

or facilitating the commission of any act constituting a drugrelated felony. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The evidence showed that

at 12:29 p.m. on March 5, 2004, Miller called Thomas, and

when Thomas answered his phone Miller told him that although

he was “running a little behind” he “wanted to see [Tyrone]

anyway.” Miller asked Thomas whether Miller could “hollar

[sic] at” Tyrone; Thomas replied, “Alright.” The next voice on

the tape is Tyrone’s. Miller proceeded to tell Tyrone: “I want to

see you because I got something, something for you. 

Information.” Miller and Tyrone arranged to meet. Other

recorded phone calls and Tyrone’s trial testimony established

that Tyrone met Miller on March 5, 2004, to arrange for the

transporting of PCP to Kansas City. Although Tyrone testified

at trial that Miller initially contacted him to arrange transport of

PCP “in or around . . . February of 2004” (when Tyrone was still

in Atlanta), Mar. 28, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 42, viewing the

evidence most favorably to the government indicates that the

face-to-face meeting between Miller and Tyrone was arranged

during the recorded phone calls on March 5, 2004. See Wahl,

290 F.3d at 375. Tyrone testified that this meeting took place at

Thomas’ residence in the District of Columbia, that Thomas was

present at the time, and that at the meeting Miller told Tyrone he

was to take a batch of “no good” PCP to Robert Bryant in

Kansas City. Thomas’ presence at the meeting is partially

corroborated by another taped phone call on March 5, 2004 in

which Miller told Thomas that he was “downstairs.”

Thomas maintains that “the fact that [he] was with Tyrone,

answered the phone and then handed the phone to Tyrone, does

not permit a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that [he]

knowingly facilitated the distribution of PCP through the use of

the telephone.” Appellants’ Br. 108. Mere association is not

enough. See id. (citing United States v. Webster, 639 F.2d 174,

188 (4th Cir. 1981)). Although the question is close, we hold

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that the evidence was sufficient when viewed in the context of

Miller’s and Thomas’ activities. The evidence established that

they had used Tyrone as a drug courier prior to March 5th. This

context would permit a reasonable inference that Thomas knew

what Miller had in mind when he asked Thomas to “hollar [sic]

at” Tyrone. Viewed most favorably to the government, the

evidence sufficed to show, given the nature of Miller’s and

Thomas’ drug-related activities, that Thomas knew that the

purpose of the March 5, 2004 meeting was to arrange for the

interstate transport of illegal drugs, and he helped to arrange it

by his use of a phone, even assuming his knowing use of a

phone on March 5, 2004 may have played a comparatively small

part in facilitating the transaction.

VII.

Unredacted and Unplayed Tapes to Jury. Prior to

commencement of the jury deliberations, the district court

addressed which tape recordings should be sent to the jury. All

the tapes had been admitted into evidence, see (Timothy)

Thomas, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 34, but only certain tapes were

played for the jury during the trial and some of those were

played selectively, with the prosecution stopping the tape

recording in accordance with an agreement with defense

counsel. At the conclusion of the presentation of evidence,

defense counsel, who were not in agreement whether all of the

recorded calls should be sent to the jury, requested the district

court to allow them the opportunity to request redaction of any

tapes sent to the jury that had not been played during the trial. 

The district court granted the defense request, ruling that “if a

call that wasn’t played in the courtroom is going to go to the

jury, [the defense must] know[] about it, and if it has something

that should be redacted, [the defense] can get it redacted.” May

22, 2006 AM Trial Tr. at 132–33. The district court also

instructed the jury that it would receive “computer dis[c]s of all

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the calls that were actually played during the trial,” and that if

the jury “want[ed] to listen to additional calls . . . [it should]

[s]end a note to the Court” and “[t]he Court will then discuss the

note and/or request with counsel and make arrangements for the

jury to inspect the specific item of evidence that the jury has

requested.” May 25, 2006 PM Trial Tr. at 77–78.

When the prosecution provided defense counsel with the

two CDs containing recorded calls, however, an accompanying

letter stated that “the audio files were copied as they were

originally intercepted,” the government “could not redact or

copy only a portion of a call,” and, consequently, “any selfcensorship that the prosecution or the defendants employed

during the trial will not occur if the jury chooses to listen to

those calls.” The letter suggested defense counsel confer with

their clients “and if this needs to be addressed with the Court,

we should do so before the Court provides the jury with the 2

CDs.” The record does not indicate that either the prosecution

or defense counsel brought the non-redaction circumstance to

the district court’s attention before the CDs were sent to the jury. 

Miller’s trial counsel’s “recollection is that he objected to the

‘calls played [on the] CD’ going back to the jury without

redaction,” Appellants’ Br. 88 n.59, but this occurred before the

district court’s ruling, when defense counsel were not in

agreement about which calls should go to the jury. In addition

to the unredacted calls played at trial, unplayed calls were also

on the CDs that were sent to the jury. See id. at 87; Appellee’s

Br. 83 n.79.

Miller and Thomas contend the submission of unredacted

and unplayed taped phone calls to the jury was reversible error. 

They suggest the circumstances are similar to those in United

States v. Lampkin, 159 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States

v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1998); and United

States v. Noushfar, 78 F.3d 1442 (9th Cir. 1996). These cases

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involved violations of the Confrontation Clause. Lampkin, 159

F.3d at 613–14; Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1393; see also

Noushfar, 78 F.3d at 1445. Any statements in the unplayed

phone conversations made during and in furtherance of the drug

conspiracy, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), could be admitted

without violating the Confrontation Clause. See Carson, 455

F.3d at 365 (citing Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,

182–84 (1987)); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

56 (2004). None of the eight unplayed phone calls identified by

Miller and Thomas was consensually recorded, and therefore

“cannot be deemed ‘testimonial’ as the speakers certainly did

not make the statements thinking that they ‘would be available

for use at a later trial.’” United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d

173, 181 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). 

The holding in Noushfar, 78 F.3d at 1445, that the “tapes went

to the jury room in violation of [Federal] Rule [of Criminal

Procedure] 43,” is inconsistent with this court’s holding that

“tape replaying [is] not a stage of trial implicating the

confrontation clause or Rule 43(a),” United States v. Sobamowo,

892 F.2d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Sending the unplayed and unredacted played phone calls to

the jury, however, violated the district court’s ruling that only

portions of played calls were to be sent to the jury and, as to

unplayed calls requested by the jury, the defense would have an

opportunity to seek redactions. Cf. Dallago v. United States,

427 F.2d 546, 555 (D.C. Cir. 1969). This error by the

prosecution, avoidable through the exercise of reasonable

diligence, was fundamentally unfair. The defense was deprived

of the benefit of the district court’s ruling that only the played

portions of calls were initially to be sent to the jury and that if

the jury were to request unplayed calls, the defense would have

the opportunity to seek redactions. Also, to the extent the jury

received on the CDs a biased sampling of unplayed calls that the

prosecution had intended to play at trial, the defense was caught

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off guard and no longer had the ability to place the unplayed

calls in context or otherwise try to mitigate their weight for the

jury. 

Although the error was obviously serious because it

involved a violation of the district court’s ruling, Miller and

Thomas fail to demonstrate the error had a “substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” 

Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776. The eight examples of unplayed

calls sent to the jury that Miller and Thomas maintain were

inculpatory include only one (# 8627) that may have warranted

redaction in view of the foul language used by Miller and

Eiland. But given the extensive use of foul language in the

recorded phone calls, this one instance is insufficient to

constitute substantial prejudice. Sending the unredacted tapes

that were only partially played at trial to the jury also caused no

substantial prejudice; the references to Thomas’ time in prison

and what his brief describes as the “shanking” of another

inmate, Appellants’ Br. 86, were brief and too obscure to discern

their meaning.

VIII.

Responses to Jury Notes. After commencement of the

jury’s deliberations, the jury sent a series of notes to the district

court. Miller and Thomas renew the defense objections to the

district court’s responses to six jury notes, contending that by

allowing itself to be enlisted in the fact-finding process, the

district court usurped the jury’s exclusive role and thereby

deprived them of their Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 

They rely principally on United States v. Ayeni, 374 F.3d 1313

(D.C. Cir. 2004), where this court held that the district court had

abused its discretion by permitting counsel for both parties to

make supplemental arguments to the jury in response to its

factual questions after it had begun deliberating. Miller and

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Thomas maintain the situation at their trial was even worse

because the district court placed its imprimatur on the

prosecution’s effort to supply the jury with what the prosecution

deemed to be the correct answers to the jury’s factual inquiries. 

In their view, “the [district] court did not . . . independently

determine that these calls were the ones at issue,” but instead

“simply took the government’s word for [it].” Appellants’ Br.

38.

Jury Note 1. On May 30, 2006, the second day of

deliberations, the jury sent a note stating there was an “error in

the verdict form [and] the indictment.” The note stated that

phone calls for communication facility offenses Counts 19, 20,

and 21 were “listed as” taking place on specific dates and times

in the verdict form and the indictment, but for each count “no

such call exists.” The jury asked the district court whether the

counts were “meant to be” particular recorded phone calls

(which the jury identified for each count by “activation

[numbers]”) that had been entered into evidence at trial. For

example, the jury note stated: “Count 20 — listed as Feb. 20,

2004 9:51 p.m. [N]o such call exists. Is this meant to be

activation # 527 at 9:51 a.m.?” (emphasis added). The jury

asked similar specific questions for Counts 19 and 21. Over

defense objection to the district court’s proposed response as

improperly amending the indictment, the district court

responded “yes” as to each count.

Jury Note 2. On May 31, 2006, the jury asked for

“clarification of the verdict form” and posed two different kinds

of questions in its note to the district court. First, the jury asked

whether the times and dates of phone calls listed in

communication facility offenses Counts 34, 40, and 45 were

“meant to be” particular recorded phone calls entered into

evidence. For example, the jury note stated: “Count 34 — listed

[on the verdict form] as March 5, 2004 10:43 a.m. No such call

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exists. Is this meant to be call # 2877 on March 6, 2004 10:43

a.m. [which date and time is listed in the indictment]?”

(emphasis added). The jury asked similar specific questions

about Counts 40 and 45 regarding a.m./p.m. and 2-minute

differences, respectively. The jury note also stated: “Count 41

— listed [in the indictment and verdict form] as March 10, 2004

11:37 am. We can find no such call. Please advise on the

location or corrected call [number].” Over defense objections

to impermissible variances between the evidence and the

indictment, the district court answered “yes” as to counts 34, 40,

and 45. As to Count 41, the district court stated: “The answer is

that activation # 3594, March 10, 2004, at 11:37 a.m. was

introduced into evidence and played in Court, but was

inadvertently not included in those previously provided to the

jury. It is now provided.”

Jury Notes 3 & 4. At 9:30 a.m. on June 1, 2006, the jury

asked about phone calls listed in communication facility

offenses Counts 57, 59, and 62. The jury note stated: Count 57

was “listed [in the indictment and the verdict form] as April 7,

2004 7:09 p.m.” but “[n]o such call exists.” “Is this meant to be

call # 8459 at April 7, 2004 7:07 p.m.?” As to Counts 59 and

62, the jury note stated that “no . . . call exists” for the date and

time listed in the verdict form and asked the district court:

“Please advise to the intended call.” At 11 a.m., the jury sent a

fourth note asking about phone calls listed in communication

facility offenses in Counts 46, 47, and 63–67. As to the dates

and times listed in the verdict form for Counts 46, 47, and 63,

the jury note stated: “No such call[s] exist[],” and asked: Were

Counts 46, 47, and 63 “meant to be,” respectively, activation

numbers 5659, 5830, and 13554? For Count 64, listed in the

indictment as occurring on or about May 4, 2004 5:24 p.m,

“[t]wo such call[s] exist[]. Is this meant to be call # 13556 May

4, 2004 5:25 p.m. or call # 980 May 4, 2004 at 5:24 p.m.?”

(emphasis added). As to Counts 65, 66 and 67, the fourth note

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stated: “[P]lease provide activation [numbers] for each count as

it is unclear which calls are intended or whether we have not

been provided with these calls.” Over defense objections that

identifying specific calls was “moving into their deliberations”

and “guid[ing] the jury,” the district court responded “yes” for

Counts 46, 47, 57, and 64. As to Counts 59 and 62, the district

court responded: “The answer is that activation # [8806 and

13472] . . . [were] introduced into evidence and played in

Court.” On Counts 63, 65, 66, and 67, the district court stated

for each Count: “The answer is that count [x] refers to

consensual call [# y] on [z date], which was introduced into

evidence and played in Court.” For example, the district court

stated: “The answer is that count 65 refers to consensual call #T47 on May 8, 2004 at 4:40 p.m., which was introduced into

evidence and played in Court.”

Jury Note 5. On June 6, 2006, the jury asked about

Racketeering Act 10(a), which the indictment listed as occurring

“[o]n or about May 4, 2004.” The jury note stated: “Two

activations exist at this period in time (May 4, 2004), please

clarify if this refers to activation # 980 [call at 5:24 p.m.] or T46

[call at 4:42 p.m.]?” (emphasis added) Over defense objection

that answering the question would be improper since neither the

indictment nor the verdict form referred to a specific call in

Racketeering Act 10(a) and would delve into “what members of

the grand jury meant when they indicted this case,” June 6, 2006

AM Trial Tr. at 8, the district court told the jury: “The answer is

activation # T46.”

Jury Note 6. On June 14, 2006, the jury note asked the

district court to “clarify the intended activation numbers” for

Racketeering Acts 6(g) and 6(h), and to “please provide

activation numbers for each call in [Racketeering] Acts 8, 9, &

10 as it is not clear for each of the [twenty-seven] subparts

which call is intended.” Defense counsel renewed their

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objection and moved for a mistrial on the ground the district

court’s specific responses “allow[ed] the government an

additional opportunity to argue their position to th[e] jury, the

likes of which the defense cannot respond to.” June 14, 2006

AM Trial Tr. at 16. Overruling the objection and denying a

mistrial, the district court told the jury that Racketeering Acts

6(g) and 6(h) “are intended to allege activations 3591 for (g) and

3594 for (h)” and listed the “alleged activation numbers” for

Racketeering Act sub-parts 8(a), 8(c)–(e), 8(g)–(o), 9(a)–(d),

9(f), and 10(c). The district court also told the jury that

“activation 9860 in [Racketeering Act] 9(b) . . . was introduced

into evidence but was not played in court, and it is now provided

to the jury,” and that Racketeering Acts 9(e) and 8(f) did “not

involve an activation.”

We observe preliminarily that Miller and Thomas present

no argument in support of their Fifth Amendment due process

claim, which appears only in an argument heading, and

consequently it is not preserved. See United States v. Hall, 370

F.3d 1204, 1209 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Further, we need not

address their contention that some responses to the jury notes

resulted in an improper amendment of the superceding

indictment, see generally United States v. Mangieri, 694 F.2d

1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting Gaither v. United States,

413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969)); see also United States v.

Dickerson, 705 F.3d 683, 694 (7th Cir. 2013), even if untimely

raised in their reply brief, see (George) Wilson, 605 F.3d at

1035, because we are vacating potentially affected counts on

other grounds.

When presented with factual questions from a deliberating

jury, a trial judge must be careful not to “attempt[] to override

or interfere with the jurors’ independent judgment in a manner

contrary to the interests of the accused.” See United States v.

Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 573 (1977). This limit

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on the trial judge’s discretion ensures “independent jury

consideration of whether the facts proved established” the

crimes charged. See Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266

(1989). Both the Supreme Court and this court have elaborated

on why “[t]his privilege of the judge to comment on the facts

has its inherent limitations.” Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S.

466, 470 (1933); see United States v. Thomas, 449 F.2d 1177,

1181 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (en banc); see also Ayeni, 374 F.3d at

1319–20 (Tatel, J., concurring). As in Ayeni, the issue “is not

whether district courts have the discretion [to respond to jury

questions] . . . but whether the court’s action here fell within the

scope of that discretion.” Ayeni, 374 F.3d at 1316. “[A] trial

judge is not a ‘mere moderator,’ but rather is charged with

assisting the inexperienced laypersons who will render a verdict

in understanding the nature and import of the often complex and

always conflicting evidence presented at trial.” United States v.

Duran, 96 F.3d 1495, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1996); accord Quercia,

289 U.S. at 469–70. At the same time, “[t]he influence of the

trial judge on the jury ‘is necessarily and properly of great

weight’ and ‘his [or her] lightest word or intimation is received

with deference, and may prove controlling.’” Quercia, 289 U.S.

at 470 (quoting Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626

(1894)). This court’s analysis in Ayeni is instructive.

In Ayeni, 374 F.3d at 1314, the jury, after announcing it was

deadlocked, responded to the district court’s invitation to

identify areas of disagreement and asked the district court two

factual questions: (1) Why a handwriting expert had been called

to testify, and (2) Whether the parties agreed that Ayeni’s

signatures in the witness voucher record books were authentic. 

Over Ayeni’s objections, the district court allowed both sides to

present supplemental arguments to the jury on these questions,

and instructed before and after the supplemental arguments that

the jury was not to “place undue emphasis on these

supplemental arguments,” but to consider them together with the

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evidence, instructions, and other arguments the jury had heard. 

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On appeal, this court

agreed with the government that the district court has broad

discretion in controlling the jury during deliberations, including

authority to decide what to do when a jury encounters stumbling

blocks in its deliberations, but reversed the conviction, noting

this discretion has limits. Id. at 1316 (citing Brasfield v. United

States, 272 U.S. 448, 449–50 (1926) (trial judge cannot inquire

about the numerical division of the jury) and Thomas, 449 F.2d

at 1186 (trial judge may not give “Allen” charge to a deadlocked

jury)). The court concluded that supplemental arguments were

“an inappropriate response” because the judge could have

answered the first question either by telling the jury that the

handwriting expert was called because the parties disputed the

authenticity of signatures or that the court could not answer the

question because trial strategy was not a proper concern of the

jury, and a complete answer to the second question was “no.” 

Id. “Given these other options,” the court held “it was an abuse

of discretion for the district court to adopt an approach that, in

effect, allowed the lawyers to hear the jury’s concerns and then,

as if they were sitting in the jury room themselves, fashion

responses targeted precisely to those concerns.” Id. The court

noted that the prosecutor’s supplemental argument included a

new argument not made in closing and suggested an explanation

for the expert’s equivocation about the authenticity of the

signatures that the expert had not offered. Id. Reversal of

Ayeni’s conviction was required, the court concluded, because

“there is no way to know whether the supplemental arguments

produced the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 1317.

The district court’s responses to the jury notes in the instant

case fall into two categories: confirming the identification in the

jury note of what was intended by the charge in the indictment,

and directing the jury to evidence previously unidentified by the

jury as supporting the charge in the indictment. The line

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between judicial clarification and impermissible judicial

interference with the jury’s fact-finding may not always be clear,

and we do not doubt that jury questions can present “a difficult

task” for the district court in “proceed[ing] circumspectly,”

United States v. Walker, 575 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1978). We

conclude the first category of response is less problematic than

the second, but both were error.

The first category of response is illustrated by some of the

district court’s responses to Jury Notes 1 and 2 when the district

court confirmed what the jury’s notes had identified as the

specific phone calls that the grand jury had intended to be

associated with the indicted charges. Such confirmation likely

eliminated possible confusion in a case involving thousands of

phone recordings, racketeering counts with subparts, and

differences at times between the date and time listed in the

indictment and in the jury verdict form (e.g., Counts 21, 34, 46,

and 47). Also, in responding about Count 41, the district court

eliminated confusion about a played call inadvertently not sent

to the jury (activation # 3594) that matched the date and time

listed in the indictment. Moreover, although the defense

repeatedly objected to the district court’s proposed responses,

defense counsel did not disagree that the specific calls identified

in the jury notes were properly associated with the questioned

charges.

Still, the district court’s “Yes” responses in effect told the

jury that it need not look beyond the phone calls identified in the

jury notes — which sometimes took place several hours earlier

or later than the time listed in the indictment — in order to

convict the defendants of those charged offenses. For example,

in responding to Jury Note 1, the district court confirmed that

the call in Count 19 was “meant to be” a call that occurred

nearly 12 hours earlier than was listed in the indictment. The

same was true of the responses regarding Counts 20 and 40. At

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other times, the district court confirmed that the calls in Counts

21 and 34 were “meant to be” the specific calls identified by the

jury, which occurred at the date and time listed in the

indictment. Whether a call occurred “on or about” the date and

time listed in the indictment was a factual question for the jury

to resolve. In most instances, the specificity of the jury’s

questions may have minimized the risk that the district court

improperly interfered with the jury’s deliberations because the

specificity indicated that the jury had focused on the identified

call and had tentatively concluded that the grand jury intended

the call to support the questioned count. Cf. United States v.

Harvey, 653 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 2011). Even so, the notes

did not disclose whether there was any disagreement among

jurors about which calls supported which charges. It was error

for the district court to endorse the jury’s preliminary, possibly

non-unanimous, interpretation of the indictment. Cf. Quercia,

289 U.S. at 470.

The second category of response is far more problematic

because the district court directed the jury to evidence

supporting the charges about which the jury inquired. This went

beyond confirmation of the relevant phone call identified in the

jury note. Instead, the district court provided the jury with facts

about a specific call that the jury note had not already identified

as supporting the questioned charge. In Jury Notes 3 through 6,

the jury was asking to be told which calls were intended to

support Counts 59, 62, 65, 66, and 67, and Racketeering Acts 6,

8, 9, and 10. A trial judge has discretion to decide whether and

to what extent the jury may view transcripts of trial testimony,

United States v. (Ralph) Wilson, 160 F.3d 732, 748 (D.C. Cir.

1998), and to provide instructions when a jury encounters

stumbling blocks, see United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 290

(D.C. Cir. 1989); United States v. James, 764 F.2d 885, 890

(D.C. Cir. 1985). But that discretion does not extend to

directing the jury to the evidence that supports a charged count

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or racketeering act. The latter is advocacy, see Blunt v. United

States, 244 F.2d 355, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1957), and “in words,

substance and effect, unwittingly mandate[s] that certain facts

— central to the prosecution’s case — be taken as true,” United

States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 787–88 (1st Cir. 1987).

The district court’s responses to Jury Note 3 are illustrative. 

For Count 59 charging Miller with unlawful use of a

communication facility on or about April 15, 2004, at 6:30 p.m.,

the district court pointed the jury to activation # 8806, a call that

took place six days before, on April 9, 2004, at 6:31 p.m. 

Absent that new fact, the jury reasonably could have found that

a difference of six days between the time listed in the indictment

and the time of activation # 8806 meant that activation # 8806

did not occur “on or about” (or “reasonably near,” as the district

court instructed) the time charged and the prosecution therefore

had failed to meet its burden of proof on Count 59. The district

court’s response foreclosed that independent evaluation of the

evidence by the jury. The same is true for Count 63 charging

Thomas with unlawful use of a communication facility on or

about May 4, 2004 at 5:20 p.m. In responding whether Count 63

was “meant to be [the call identified by activation] # 13554 May

4, 2004 5:18 pm,” the district court directed the jury to call # T46, which took place on May 4, 2004, at 4:42 p.m. Although the

time difference is not as great as in Count 59, it was for the jury

to decide whether call # T-46 supported Count 59 or, instead,

did not occur “on or about” the time listed in the indictment; it

reasonably could have focused instead on other calls that took

place closer to the time listed in the indictment. Other responses

to Jury Notes 3, 4, 5, and 6 also reflect that the district court

directed the jury to the evidence of a call that the jury notes had

not previously identified to support a charge. In response to

Jury Notes 3 and 4 the district court identified the “the intended

call[s]” for Counts 59 and 62 and the calls that Counts 65, 66

and 67 “refer[red] to.” In response to Jury Note 5 about which

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of two calls supported Racketeering Act 10(a), the district court

told the jury which call was intended. The same type of

response occurred for Jury Note 6, with the district court telling

the jury which specific calls were intended for each of several

racketeering act sub-parts.

More troubling still, the record indicates that in both

categories of responses the district court was conveying the

prosecution’s view of what calls the grand jury intended to

support the counts and racketeering acts mentioned in the jury’s

notes. The parties and the district court were bound by the four

corners of the indictment in ascertaining the grand jury’s intent. 

Once deliberations had begun, it was the jury’s exclusive

province to interpret the intended scope of the indictment in

deciding whether the prosecution had met its burden of proof on

each charged offense. Cf. United States v. Evanston, 651 F.3d

1080, 1086–88 (9thCir. 2011); Argentine, 814 F.2d at 787. By

conveying the prosecution’s view of the grand jury’s intent, the

district court improperly permitted the prosecution to make a

supplemental argument to the jury. Cf. Ayeni, 374 F.3d at 1316.

The government maintains that Miller’s and Thomas’

objection to the responses “rests on a misunderstanding of what

the district court actually did.” Appellee’s Br. 96. In

responding to the jury’s questions, the government insists that

the district court “did not ‘assist[] or coach[]’ the jury by

providing the government’s view of what evidence was

generally ‘relevant’ to the jury’s consideration of the charges. 

Instead, the court was ensuring that the jury understood what

the charged conduct actually was, so that the jury could evaluate

that conduct in the light of all of the evidence.” Id. (alterations

in original) (emphasis added) (citations to Appellants’ Brief

omitted). This characterization, however, highlights what was

impermissible about the district court’s responses: In responding

to questions regarding the various counts and racketeering acts,

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the district court was instructing the jury on the specific phone

calls that the grand jury intended to support specific offenses. 

And, to the extent the district court conveyed the prosecution’s

view of “what the charged conduct actually was,” id., the district

court permitted an inappropriate supplemental argument by the

prosecution, see Ayeni, 374 F.3d at 1316. The prosecution’s

opportunity to assist the jury in analyzing the evidence was

during closing argument. Cf. Moore, 651 F.3d at 52–53.

We note that the government has not argued that the district

court’s responses were proper because the superceding

indictment charged specific offenses “on or about” certain dates

and times and the prosecution simply decided to drop alternative

evidence that fit those times in order to ensure jury unanimity. 

During oral argument the government expressly declined to

advance this line of reasoning, and the court therefore has no

occasion to determine its validity. Instead, the government

insisted that the district court’s responses properly instructed the

jury about the grand jury’s intent. But an instruction about the

grand jury’s intent was not proper because there was no

evidence beyond the four corners of the superceding indictment

of what that intent was.

We hold that in responding to the jury’s notes the district

court abused its discretion by instructing the deliberating jury

on the grand jury’s intent on the tainted charges. The first

category of response was in the nature of confirmatory

agreement, while the second category was in the nature of

affirmative advocacy. Although different as a matter of

degree, both types of responses were error and neither was

harmless. Other options were available to the district court, for

instance instructing the jury that the court could not answer

questions seeking confirmation of the grand jury’s intent,

because the jury had to decide for itself whether the

prosecution had met its burden of proof. The government’s

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suggestion of harmlessness, because “the [district] court did no

more than identify properly admitted evidence, and specify

which charge it related to, without further comment,”

Appellee’s Br. 99, does not accurately reflect the dialogue that

occurred. Moreover, a general instruction, such as the district

court gave in responding to Jury Notes 3 and 4, that the jury

may use any evidence it deems relevant in determining

whether the elements of the offense have been proved beyond

a reasonable doubt, is inadequate to cure the harm. Given the

district court’s imprimatur, see Quercia, 289 U.S. at 470,

regarding the phone calls supporting the charges about which

the jury inquired, “there is no way to know whether the

[district court’s responses] produced the jury’s verdict,” Ayeni,

374 F.3d at 1317, on those charges. 

Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s convictions on Counts 19,

20, 34, 40, 46, and 59 and Thomas’ convictions on Counts 46,

47, 63, 64, 65, 66, and 67. We do not vacate Count 41 because

the district court’s response was purely administrative,

providing the jury with the played call identified in the jury

note that inadvertently had not been sent to the jury prior to its

commencement of deliberations. Although the district court’s

responses tainted Racketeering Acts 6, 8, 9, and 10, which

must be vacated, Thomas’ RICO conspiracy conviction is

supported by the guilty verdicts on Racketeering Acts 1 and 5,

see supra Part VI, which show the requisite pattern of

racketeering activity, see United States v. (Gregory) Thomas,

114 F.3d 228, 250–51 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1961(5), 1962).

IX.

Effect of Cumulative Errors. Contrary to their

contention, the errors did not “exert a cumulative effect such

as to warrant reversal” of all of Miller’s and Thomas’

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convictions. See Brown, 508 F.3d at 1076 (quoting United

States v. Jones, 482 F.2d 747, 749 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The

government’s evidence on the charges of which Miller and

Thomas were convicted consisted, among other things, of their

own incriminating words and actions as captured in the tape

recordings of numerous phone calls and further corroborated

by the seized physical evidence. The district court’s errors in

admitting overview, lay opinion, and co-conspirator statement

testimony, combined with the prosecution’s submission of

unplayed and unredacted tapes to the jury contrary to the

district court’s ruling, do not diminish the strength of this

evidence. Limiting cross-examination of the cooperating

witness on two occurrences thirty years ago was not error, and

the errors in responding to the jury’s notes were confined to the

specific charges that we are vacating. Viewed cumulatively,

the errors do not demonstrate that Miller and Thomas were “so

prejudiced,” Egan v. United States, 287 F. 958, 971 (D.C. Cir.

1923), as to deny them a fair trial. See Celis, 608 F.3d at 847

(citing Egan, 287 F. at 971). 

X.

Thomas’ Life Sentences. The jury convicted Thomas of

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute

500 grams or more, but less than five kilograms, of cocaine. 

The maximum statutory term of imprisonment for that quantity

is forty years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). At sentencing, the

district court “credit[ed] Tyrone[’s] testimony that the

conspiracy was for five [kilograms],” Nov. 28, 2007

Sentencing Tr. at 6, and upon applying a sentencing guidelines

range of thirty years to life for narcotics conspiracy, sentenced

Thomas to life terms. Thomas challenges these sentences, and

the government has conceded the error:

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The government agrees that appellant Thomas’s life

sentences for narcotics conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 846)

and RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)) were

entered in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), because the district court imposed a

sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized

by the jury’s findings as to the amount of cocaine for

which Thomas was responsible.

Appellants’ Reply Br. 2 n.1 (stating that government requested

its concession appear in the Reply Brief).

Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s convictions on Counts 19,

20, 34, 40, 46, and 59 and Thomas’ convictions on Counts 46,

47, 63, 64, 65, 66, and 67. In view of the government’s

concession, we also vacate Thomas’ life sentences for

narcotics conspiracy and RICO conspiracy, and we remand for

resentencing of Thomas, see United States v. Coumaris, 399

F.3d 343, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Otherwise we affirm the

judgments of conviction.

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