Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03141/USCOURTS-caDC-99-03141-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dennis Hall
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2000 Decided June 2, 2000

No. 99-3141

United States of America,

Appellant

v.

Dennis Hall,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00435-01)

Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Wilma

A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Anne

Pings, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Sara E. Kopecki argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Henderson and Rogers,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: Appellant, the United States, raises

only one question on this appeal: Did the District Court have

jurisdiction to grant a motion for a new trial nunc pro tunc

(which literally means "now for then") in order to circumvent

the time limitations of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

33? Rule 33 provides that a motion for a new trial must be

filed "within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty or

within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-

day period" (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the

District Court did not actually grant Mr. Dennis Hall's motion for an extension of time within 7 days after a jury found

appellee Hall guilty of possessing a firearm and ammunition

after a felony conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)

(1994) and of possessing marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C.

s 844(a) (1994) on May 5, 1999. Mr. Hall filed his motion for

an extension of time on May 14, 1999, within 7 days after the

verdict; but the trial court did not respond to that motion

until after the 7 days had passed. Mr. Hall subsequently

filed a motion for a new trial on June 10, 1999; this filing was

within the time limit set by the District Court when it

eventually granted Mr. Hall's motion for an extension of time.

The sole controversy in this case is whether the District

Court had the authority to avoid Rule 33's time limit--that is,

whether the court was authorized to wait until June 3, 1999,

almost one month after the jury verdict, before granting Mr.

Hall's motion for an extension and then back-date its decision

nunc pro tunc to May 14, 1999 to satisfy Rule 33's time

requirements.

We agree with the Government that the District Court

erred. The District Court's nunc pro tunc order was a

nullity. We also reject any suggestion that Mr. Hall was at

the mercy of the District Court, for there was no reason that

Mr. Hall could not have filed a motion for a new trial within

Rule 33's 7-day time period. Counsel could not provide such

a reason at oral argument, and we can discern none. Finally,

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we reject as specious Mr. Hall's claim that the District

Court's pre-verdict ruling, deferring consideration of the defendant's objection to the prosecutor's closing argument, necessarily transformed the defendant's pre-verdict motion to

one for a new trial or mistrial. We therefore reverse the

District Court's judgment.

I. FACTS

Mr. Hall's jury trial commenced on May 3, 1999. On May

5, 1999, the jury found Mr. Hall guilty on one count of

possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon

and one count of possession of marijuana. Seven business days

after the jury's verdict, on May 14, 1999, Mr. Hall filed a

timely motion for an extension of time alleging that the

prosecution had continually and impermissibly emphasized

Mr. Hall's status as a convicted felon during its rebuttal

argument.

Despite Rule 33's clear prescription that a court may only

grant an extension "within such further time as the court may

fix during the 7-day period" after the verdict or finding of

guilty, the District Court chose to hold Mr. Hall's motion in

abeyance to allow the Government to respond. On June 3,

1999, after it became clear that the Government did not

intend to respond, the District Court granted Mr. Hall's

motion nunc pro tunc to May 14, 1999 and authorized Mr.

Hall to file a motion for a new trial on or before June 10,

1999. Mr. Hall met the new deadline.

On July 9, 1999, the Government filed an opposition, arguing that the District Court lacked jurisdiction under Rule 33

to consider the motion for a new trial. In particular, the

Government challenged the District Court's attempt to circumvent Rule 33's time requirement by resorting to nunc pro

tunc relief. On October 1, 1999, the District Court granted

Mr. Hall's motion for a new trial, finding that "[t]o penalize

the defendant for the Court's delay in granting the motion,

which delay resulted from an effort of the Court, sua sponte,

to protect the government's right to respond, would be manifestly unjust, if not an unconstitutional violation of the due

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process clause." United States v. Hall, No. 98-435-LFO,

Mem. Op. at 4 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 1999) ("Mem. Op."). This

appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

Motions for new trials that implicate jurisdictional issues

are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d

1033, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("Although we typically review

denials of new trial motions for abuse of discretion, because

the district court dismissed Torres's motion on jurisdictional

grounds, our review is de novo." (internal citations omitted)).

B. Jurisdiction

The District Court's actions are clearly proscribed by the

Supreme Court's decision in Carlisle v. United States, 517

U.S. 416 (1996), a case that the District Court's opinion fails

to mention. In Carlisle, the Court considered whether a

district court had authority to grant a post-verdict motion for

judgment of acquittal filed just one day outside of the time

limit prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c).

Rule 29(c) provides, in relevant part, that "[i]f the jury

returns a verdict of guilty ..., a motion for judgment of

acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the

jury is discharged or within such further time as the court

may fix during the 7-day period." Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). It

is true that the petitioner in Carlisle, unlike Mr. Hall, filed an

untimely motion. This factual distinction is not cause for

much concern, however, because like Mr. Hall, the petitioner

in Carlisle argued that district courts should have the discretion to step outside of the Rules' strict time limits, and it is

this latter assertion upon which the Carlisle Court ultimately

focused. In particular, the Court read Rule 29(c) in conjunction with Rule 45(b), which provides that,

"the court may not extend the time for

taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to the

extent and under the conditions stated in them." Fed. R.

Crim. P. 45(b). This language convinced the Court that,

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because "[t]hese rules are plain and unambiguous ...

[, t]here is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b)

for the granting of an untimely postverdict motion of acquittal...." Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 421. The Court therefore

concluded that the text of the relevant Rules did not authorize district courts to circumvent Rule 29's time limits.

The Court also considered and rejected petitioner's argument that, in the absence of textual support from the Rules

themselves, courts retain limited "inherent supervisory authority" to depart from the Rules' strict time limits. In

advancing this argument, the petitioner in Carlisle relied on

United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), where the

Court held that courts "may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the

Congress." Id. at 505. The Carlisle Court read the decision

in Hasting very narrowly, however, holding that "[w]hatever

the scope of this 'inherent power,' ... it does not include the

power to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Carlisle, 517 U.S. at

426. In other words, as a general principle, when the text of

a rule is clear, it must be enforced as written. The Court

allowed that a failure to meet a prescribed time limit might

be excused in "the 'unique circumstances' that the cause of

the failure to meet the Rule's deadline was an erroneous

ruling or assurance by the District Court itself." Id. at 428.

At bottom, however, Carlisle says that "[t]he case law of [the]

Court ... does not establish any 'inherent power' to act in

contravention of applicable Rules." Id.

In the present case, Rule 33 is unambiguous. The Rule

means what it says: A court can only extend the time in

which to grant a motion for a new trial if a court fixes such a

time within 7 days of the verdict or finding of guilty. Rule

45(b) resolves any possible ambiguity by noting that a district

court's authority to extend time is limited "to the extent and

under the conditions stated" in Rule 33. Fed. R. Crim. P.

45(b).

We recognize that a trial court may exercise "long ...

unquestioned" "inherent power" in the enforcement of Rules,

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but such a power may only be exercised when it does not run

afoul of an express and unambiguous Rule to the contrary.

Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426. The "long ... unquestioned" power

caveat therefore has no application in this case, because Rule

33 is absolutely clear in its terms.

The District Court in this case sought to justify its disputed

action by suggesting that it would be fundamentally unfair to

reject Mr. Hall's untimely motion:

To penalize the defendant for the Court's delay in granting the motion, which delay resulted from an effort of the

Court, sua sponte, to protect the government's right to

respond, would be manifestly unjust, if not an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause.

Mem. Op. at 4. We disagree. Indeed, the defendant does

not even contend that the District Court somehow erred in

failing to respond to the motion for extension of time within

the 7-day period. This is not surprising, because nothing in

Rule 33 compels a district court to respond to a motion for an

extension of time within the 7-day time limit; the Rule

merely provides that after the 7-day window has closed, a

district court is without jurisdiction to grant an extension of

time. Thus, although the trial court's decision to delay its

decision did not violate any law, its decision to grant an

extension of time after the 7-day window had closed necessarily abrogated Rule 33 and was thus impermissible.

Furthermore, there was no reason why Mr. Hall could not

have filed a motion for a new trial within Rule 33's 7-day time

limit. At oral argument, counsel offered no explanation for

this oversight, and we can discern none.

Finally, Mr. Hall argues that the District Court effectively

converted a defense objection into a motion for a new trial

when the trial judge addressed the parties before the case

was submitted to the jury. Following closing argument by

Mr. Hall's attorney, the prosecutor, in rebuttal, warned the

jury not to allow Mr. Hall's attorney to get away with playing

a "race card." Mem. Op. at 7. Mr. Hall's attorney objected

and requested the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard

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the prosecutor's rebuttal. The judge, however, said that he

was "not going to get into this. The jury will sort this out

and I'll consider it after we have a verdict." Id. at 8. Mr.

Hall argues that this statement by the judge necessarily

converted the defendant's motion to one for a new trial or

mistrial. This is a specious claim. The District Court never

suggested this ground as a basis for the relief afforded Mr.

Hall; rather, the court granted Mr. Hall's motion for an

extension of time nunc pro tunc. Furthermore, Mr. Hall's

own actions demonstrate the baselessness of his reading of

the District Court's statements; if Mr. Hall were so certain

that his pre-verdict motion had been converted to a motion

for a new trial or mistrial, there would have been no need for

him to file a motion for an extension of time in which to file a

motion for a new trial. The simple truth is that the District

Court acted on an untimely motion for a new trial, something

that it had no authority to do under Rule 33.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the District Court was without

jurisdiction to grant Mr. Hall's motion for an extension of

time nunc pro tunc. We therefore reverse the judgment of

the District Court.

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