Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02980/USCOURTS-ca3-23-02980-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
LaQuan Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No. 23-2980

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LAQUAN WILLIAMS,

 Appellant

______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Criminal No. 2:21-cr-00384-001)

District Judge: Honorable William S. Stickman, IV

______________

Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)

November 15, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges.

(Opinion filed: January 15, 2025)

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OPINION∗

______________

MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judge.

LaQuan Williams appeals from his judgment of conviction, arguing that the 

District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence. According to 

∗ This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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Williams, the evidence resulted from an illegal seizure in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. We disagree and will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

In July 2020, a Pennsylvania State Police Trooper was on routine patrol alone in 

an area where there had been a high volume of drug and other criminal activity in recent 

weeks. The Trooper pulled into a hotel’s parking lot, checked the back area, and returned 

to the front. As the Trooper was leaving the lot, the Trooper observed a parked car with

the driver’s side door open. The Trooper stopped his patrol vehicle and rolled down the 

driver’s window. The car’s driver, Williams, then began to drive towards the Trooper’s

patrol vehicle. These events happened within seconds of each other. 

As Williams’s car moved forward, the Trooper’s headlights illuminated 

Williams’s windshield, and the Trooper observed a roughly 12-inch-high by 12-inchwide crack on the windshield. The Trooper did not activate his police lights or siren, 

display a badge or weapon, speak to Williams, or direct him to stop. The Trooper’s hand 

was sticking out of his window, but not in a manner directing Williams to stop. The 

Trooper’s patrol vehicle was not blocking Williams’s path. Williams stopped parallel to 

and approximately four feet from the Trooper’s patrol vehicle and rolled down his 

window. The Trooper questioned Williams about the cracked windshield. When 

Williams responded, the Trooper observed Williams’s bloodshot, glassy eyes and 

mumbled response. 

The Trooper got out of his vehicle to hear Williams better and immediately 

detected the smell of marijuana coming from Williams’s car. The Trooper also noticed 

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that Williams’s pupils were dilated, his hands were shaking, and he was taking short, 

slow breaths. The Trooper explained that it was a violation to have a cracked windshield 

within the driver’s eyesight and asked for Williams’s license, registration, and insurance. 

Williams responded by giving the Trooper a bag of marijuana. The Trooper then asked 

Williams to step out of the vehicle. The entire exchange lasted less than 90 seconds. 

Shortly after this exchange, the Trooper called for backup. When backup arrived, 

officers searched Williams’s vehicle and discovered 459 bags of fentanyl. Williams was 

arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute under 

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Williams filed a Motion to Suppress Physical 

Evidence and Statements (the “Motion to Suppress”), seeking to exclude “[a]ll of the 

contraband recovered in [Williams’s] case and all statements made by [Williams because 

they] were the direct result of [an] initial unlawful detention . . . .” App 39. The District 

Court held a suppression hearing and considered post-hearing briefs from the parties. 

The District Court issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Williams’s Motion 

to Suppress because “[the Trooper’s] initial contact with Williams was a mere encounter 

that did not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” App. 16. 

Williams subsequently pleaded guilty, and this appeal followed. 

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II. DISCUSSION1

In this appeal we consider one issue: whether the District Court erred in denying 

Williams’s Motion to Suppress. “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 

suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review 

over questions of law.” United States v. Amos, 88 F.4th 446, 451 (3d Cir. 2023). 

Williams challenges both the District Court’s factual finding that the Trooper did not 

signal Williams to stop and its legal conclusions that the initial interaction was a mere 

encounter and that there was a reasonable suspicion when Williams was eventually 

seized. We address each argument in turn. 

A. The District Court Did Not Err by Finding the Officer Did Not Gesture 

Williams to Stop

First, Williams contends that the District Court incorrectly concluded that the 

Trooper’s hand out the window did not direct Williams to stop his vehicle. Rather, 

Williams argues this was a gesture intended to command him to stop his vehicle and,

thus, he was seized. 

When analyzing factual determinations made after accepting evidence in a motion 

to suppress hearing, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review. United States v. 

Harrison, 689 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir. 2012). A finding is ‘“clearly erroneous” when,

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” United States 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

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v. Pelullo, 173 F.3d 131, 135 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. United States 

Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). “Accordingly, ‘if the district court’s account of 

the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety,’ we will not reverse 

it even if, as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the evidence differently.” United 

States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 277 (3d Cir. 2009) (alteration omitted) (quoting Anderson 

v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985)). “When findings are based on 

determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, [we must give] even greater 

deference to the trial court’s findings; for only the trial judge can be aware of the 

variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on [witness testimony].” 

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575. 

The District Court based its factual finding in part on the hotel’s security camera 

video. The video shows the Trooper placing his hand out the window, but he makes no 

gestures that would indicate Williams should stop. Thus, review of that video evidence 

shows it plausibly supports the District Court’s interpretation that the Trooper placing his 

hand outside the vehicle was not an indication for Williams to stop. The District Court 

also used the Trooper’s witness testimony at the suppression hearing to reach this factual 

finding. The Trooper’s testimony that he made no signal for Williams to stop—which 

the District Court found credible—also plausibly supports the District Court’s factual 

finding that the Trooper was not signaling Williams to stop when he put his hand out the 

vehicle window. 

Because the record plausibly supports the District Court’s factual finding, Price, 

558 F.3d at 277, and we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

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has been committed,” Pelullo, 173 F.3d at 135, we hold that the District Court’s factual 

finding is not clearly erroneous. 

B. Williams’s Initial Interaction with the Trooper Was a “Mere 

Encounter”

Williams next asserts that the District Court erred in holding that his initial 

interaction with the Trooper was a mere encounter. According to Williams, the Trooper 

illegally seized him, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, by putting his hand out of the 

patrol vehicle’s window while Williams was driving toward the Trooper. 

The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S.

CONST. AMEND. IV. “Police encounters with citizens fall into one of three broad 

categories, each with varying degrees of constitutional scrutiny: ‘(1) police-citizen 

exchanges involving no coercion or detention; (2) brief seizures or investigatory 

detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.’” United States v. Brown, 765 F.3d 278, 288 (3d 

Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Perez, 443 F.3d 772, 777 (11th Cir. 2006)). “The 

first type of encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” Id. “The second 

category (i.e., brief seizures or Terry stops) requires a showing that the officer acted with 

reasonable suspicion.” Id. “And the third category (i.e., full-scale arrests) is proper only 

when an officer has probable cause.” Id. 

“Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in 

some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has 

occurred.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). “We apply an objective test when 

evaluating whether an officer’s ‘show of authority’ would have led a reasonable person to 

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believe they were not free to leave.” Brown, 765 F.3d at 289. “Examples of 

circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to 

leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by 

an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or 

tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” 

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Other factors include middle of 

the night interactions, use of police lights or sirens, commands to stop or show hands, or

repeated commands. See United States v. Amos, 88 F.4th 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2023) (using 

police interaction around 2:00 a.m., command to stop and show hands, and use of police 

lights as factors in determining that a show of authority occurred); United States v. Lowe, 

791 F.3d 424, 431 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e held that an objective person would only 

reasonably not have felt free to decline the interaction after the officer repeated his 

motion, and we thus concluded that . . . the repetition of the motion was the ‘show of 

authority.’” (internal citation omitted)). But “[i]n the absence of some such evidence, 

otherwise inoffensive contact between a member of the public and the police cannot, as a 

matter of law, amount to a seizure of that person.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555. 

Here, the Trooper’s actions do not amount to a show of authority. The Trooper 

was the only officer present at the time; he did not display his badge or weapon; he did 

not touch Williams; he did not verbally command Williams to stop, roll down his 

window, or show his hands; he did not use his police lights or sirens; he did not block 

Williams’s path; and the interaction was not late at night. The only fact Williams points 

to in support of a show of authority is that the Trooper “moved his left arm from inside 

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the vehicle, through the window and outside, directly into Mr. Williams’s line of sight.”2 

Opening Br. 17. But a reasonable person, who simply saw a police officer’s arm hanging 

out of a patrol vehicle window without anything more, would have felt free to leave. 

Brown, 765 F.3d at 289; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554. 

Accordingly, we hold that the Trooper did not make a show of authority that 

would have led a reasonable person to believe they were not free to leave, and Williams’s

initial interaction with the Trooper was a mere encounter that did not implicate the Fourth 

Amendment. 

C. The Trooper’s Eventual Seizure of Williams Was Supported by a 

Reasonable Suspicion

Finally, Williams argues that the District Court erred in holding that the Trooper 

had a reasonable suspicion to support the eventual seizure. According to Williams, after 

his initial encounter with the Trooper had ripened into an investigatory seizure, the 

Trooper did not have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity occurring. 

As discussed above, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 

seizures,” U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV, and brief seizures or investigatory detentions must be 

supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Brown, 765 F.3d at 288 (citing

2 Williams cites United States v. Lowe, to bolster his argument, but Lowe is not 

applicable. 791 F.3d 424 (3d Cir. 2015). In Lowe, we held that “when a stationary 

suspect reacts to a show of authority by not fleeing, making no threatening movement or 

gesture, and remaining stationary, he has submitted under the Fourth Amendment and a 

seizure has been effectuated.” Id. at 434. But this holding was made in determining 

“[w]hen [] Lowe actually submit[ted] to the show of authority,” not whether a show of 

authority was made. Id. at 431 (emphasis added). Even if this holding were legally 

applicable, it is factually distinguishable because Williams was moving—not stationary. 

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Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)). In order for a court to find that 

reasonable suspicion existed, “the police officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

reasonably warrant [the seizure or detention].” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. “[W]e must 

consider the totality of the circumstances, including the police officer’s knowledge, 

experience, and common sense judgments about human behavior.” United States v. 

Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002). 

Here, the Trooper points to several “specific and articulable facts” that support a 

reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. The hotel where the Trooper and 

Williams’s interaction took place had a recent history of drug and other criminal activity. 

Williams had bloodshot, glassy eyes. Williams responses to the Trooper’s questions 

were mumbled. As the Trooper approached Williams’s car, he detected the smell of 

marijuana.3

 And the Trooper observed that Williams’s pupils were dilated, his hands 

were shaking, and he was taking short, shallow breaths. Finally, the Trooper had training 

and experience in drug investigations, impaired driving enforcement, and criminal 

3 Under Pennsylvania law, possessing marijuana was prohibited. 35 PA. STAT. AND 

CONS. ANN. § 780-113(31) (West 2014). Additionally, the Trooper did not need 

reasonable suspicion to approach Williams’s vehicle. See United States v. Williams, 413 

F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not implicated by 

police officers simply approaching a vehicle). 

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interdiction. Taken together, these facts are sufficient to show a reasonable suspicion 

necessary for an investigatory seizure. Id. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 

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