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Parties Involved:
Luca Pizzingrilli
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 16-10984

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:15-cr-60142-DTKH-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

LUCA PIZZINGRILLI, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 11, 2017)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Luca Pizzingrilli appeals his 70-month sentence after pleading guilty to 

conspiracy to commit access device fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2) 

(Count 2) and to aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) 

(Count 3). Mr. Pizzingrilli argues that the district court imposed a substantively 

unreasonable sentence as to Count 2 because it ignored his argument that the loss 

for which he was held responsible overstated the amount of loss directly 

attributable to him. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ 

briefs, we affirm. 

I

Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the 

underlying record and recite only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.

Mr. Pizzingrilli engaged in a scheme to commit a practice commonly known 

as “ATM skimming” with five other individuals. The scheme involved placing a 

device over or inside an ATM card slot to read and store the card numbers of ATM 

customers. The conspirators also mounted a concealed camera on the ATM to 

obtain the personal identification number corresponding to the customer’s card. 

Using this information, the conspirators electronically re-coded the card numbers 

onto blank plastic cards or gift cards and used the cards to make withdrawals from 

the customers’ bank accounts. 

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The PSI held Mr. Pizzingrilli responsible for all of the bank accounts 

involved in the scheme, totaling 1,275 skimmed accounts. The conspirators used 

326 of those accounts, resulting in an actual loss of $233,802. The remaining 942 

accounts that were skimmed, but not used, resulted in an intended loss calculation 

of $474,500.1 Taking into account the actual and intended loss, the PSI assigned a 

total loss of $708,302.

As to Count 2, the PSI recommended a total offense level of 23 and a 

criminal history category of I, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 46 to 57 

months’ imprisonment. This guideline range included a 14-level enhancement 

under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H) for a total loss amount of more than $550,000 but 

not more than $1,500,000. Count 3 carried a mandatory consecutive 24-month 

term of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A.

Mr. Pizzingrilli requested a downward variance from the advisory guideline 

range as to Count 2. The district court denied this request and sentenced 

Mr. Pizzingrilli to 46 months’ imprisonment on Count 2, followed by the 

mandatory 24-month consecutive term of imprisonment on Count 3.

II

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Mr. Pizzingrilli, as 

 1 The PSI assigned a $500 intended loss per unused account pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1.

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the party challenging the sentence, has the burden of demonstrating that it is 

unreasonable in light of the record and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). See United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). “A

district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to 

relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an 

improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in 

considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (en banc). Under our deferential standard of review, “we are to vacate 

the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors 

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” Id. at 1190 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 

totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The district court must 

impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 

purposes” listed in § 3553(a)(2), including the need to reflect the seriousness of the 

offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, deter 

criminal conduct, and protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal 

conduct. The court must also consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing 

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disparities. See § 3553(a)(6). The fact that a sentence is within the advisory 

guideline range and well below the statutory maximum are both factors indicative 

of reasonableness. See United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 898 (11th Cir. 

2014). 

III

The sentence on Count 2 falls at the low end of the advisory guideline range 

and is well below the statutory 60-month maximum. See Cubero, 754 F.3d at 898. 

Mr. Pizzingrilli has failed to demonstrate that this sentence was substantively 

unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. During sentencing, 

the district court weighed the nature and circumstances of the crime, including the 

sophisticated nature of the scheme to steal credit card information from ATMs. 

The court considered Mr. Pizzingrilli’s background and history, including his 

expression of remorse, his upbringing, and his mother’s testimony. The court 

weighed the need to deter Mr. Pizzingrilli and others from such criminal activity

and to promote respect for the law.

As for Mr. Pizzingrilli’s claim that the district court failed to consider that 

the actual loss was far less than the intended loss, we are not persuaded. The 

district court need not state that it “considered the evidence and argument or why 

[it] rejected the arguments for a variance”—it is “enough that the ‘context and 

record’ indicated the reasoning behind [its] conclusion.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1195 

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(citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007)). Indeed, we have never 

required that a sentencing court “articulate [its] findings and reasoning with great 

detail or in any detail for that matter.” Id. (citations omitted). 

At sentencing, the district court engaged in extensive dialogue regarding 

actual and intended loss. Mr. Pizzingrilli’s counsel argued that, because 

Mr. Pizzingrilli was being held responsible for the conduct of his co-conspirators, 

the total amount of loss overstated the loss directly attributable to him.

Specifically, he argued that, as stated in the factual proffer, the amount of loss 

directly attributable to him was $145,620. Yet he was being held accountable for a 

loss of $708,302, resulting in a six-level increase in his guidelines score. See D.E. 

33 at 10–11. He conceded that, legally, he “ha[d] to be [held] responsible” and that 

he knew “what was going on[,]” but maintained that the amount of loss was 

exaggerated and asked the court to consider a lower guideline range more 

reflective of his conduct. Id. at 13. 

In response, the district court cited the multiple skimming events Mr. 

Pizzingrilli participated in across several states and noted that he seemed 

“thoroughly involved in the conspiracy.” Id. After announcing its sentence, the 

district court specifically recognized that conspiracy “is a really dangerous crime” 

because a conspirator like Mr. Pizzingrilli can be held liable not only for his own 

conduct but also for the conduct of others. Id. at 33. 

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The district court did not, as Mr. Pizzingrilli argues, ignore his argument. 

Indeed, the record reflects that it considered all relevant factors as to the 

conspiracy and the effects of the intended loss calculation.

IV

Mr. Pizzingrilli has not demonstrated that his 70-month sentence was 

substantively unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. 

AFFIRMED.

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