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Parties Involved:
Jess P. Bingman
Appellee
Natkin & Company
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JESS P. BINGMAN, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

and Cross-Appellant, 

NATKIN & COMPANY, a Missouri corporation, 

Defendant-Appellant 

and Cross-Appellee. 

FILED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 2 8 1991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Nos. 89-1114 

89-1122 

(D.C. No. 87-C-127) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 87-C-127) 

Curtis V. Smith, Leo Gemma, Jr. & Associates, P.C., Littleton, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff/Appellant. 

Donald B. Gentry, Grant, McHendrie, Haines & Crouse, P.C., Denver, Colorado, 

attorneys for Defendant/Appellee. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, District 

Judge*. 

BROWN, District Judge 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, United States District Senior Judge for the 

District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 1 
At age 60, plaintiff-aAppellant Jess Bingman was terminated 

from a job by his employer, appellee Natkin & Company. He filed 

this action to recover back pay, front pay, lost benefits, 

liquidated damages and injunctive relief for deprivation of rights 

under the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 

1967, as amended, 29 u.s.c. 621 et seq. Following trial, a jury 

found that Bingman's age was a determinative factor in the defendant's decision to discharge him, and that Bingman sustained 

damages in the sum of $78,302.76 as a consequence of that action. 

In addition to these findings, the jury found that the defendant 

acted willfully in terminating Bingman's employment. Judgment was 

entered for plaintiff in the sum of $156,605.50, double the amount 

of the verdict, under the provisions of the Age Discrimination Act. 

Defendant moved for a new trial contending that the verdict 

was against the weight of the evidence as to both the claim of age 

discrimination, and the willful violation, that defendant was 

denied a fair trial by admission of evidence concerning subsequent 

acts by defendant, and by admission of evidence contrary to stipulations, and that the damages assessed for a willful violation were 

excessive. Record Vol. I, Item 7. 

The motion for new trial was denied March 24, 1989. Record 

Vol. I, Item 13. 

No jury instruction was given on the issue of future damages 

in lieu of reinstatement, because the parties had stipulated that 

"after the jury verdict the Court would then decide whether it's 

appropriate to have the remedy (of) reinstatement or some remedy of 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 2 
money damages in lieu of reinstatement." 1 on April 19, 1989, 

following an evidentiary hearing on this issue, the trial court 

denied "front pay," and ordered that plaintiff be reinstated to his 

former position. 

Defendant Natkin & Company has appealed upon the assertion 

that the jury verdict for plaintiff was against the weight of the 

evidence and was unsupported by the evidence, and that the trial 

court erred in admitting evidence of other acts by defendant, which 

occurred after Bingman had been terminated. Defendant also 

contends that the motion for future damages and relief should have 

been denied. 

Plaintiff has filed a cross-appeal, contending that the 

district court erred in ordering reinstatement instead of awarding 

him future damages. In this respect, plaintiff alleges that the 

court erred in failing to consider factors other than "work place 

hostility" in determining whether front pay or reinstatement would 

be the appropriate remedy. 

1 During a third conference on jury instructions, the court 

inquired into a stipulation concerning future damages: 

•••. it's my understanding that counsel now wish to stipulate that 

in lieu of giving the jury any instructions regarding a monetary 

amount, which would be present value of any wages and benefits the 

plaintiff would have earned had he not been terminated for the 

future period beyond the verdict until age 71, in lieu of any reinstatement the Court might order in an equitable remedy, that 

counsel would prefer to simply have the Court handle all those 

matters separately after the jury verdict. That is, after the jury 

verdict the Court then would decide whether it's appropriate to 

have the remedy reinstatement or some remedy of money damages in 

lieu of reinstatement and that counsel wish to brief that issue and 

argue it. Is that the stipulation as you understand it? (Vol IV, 

P· 2) 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 3 
"A motion for a new trial made on the ground that the verdict 

of the jury is against the weight of the evidence normally presents 

a question of fact and not of law and is addressed to the 

discretion of the trial court ..• On review, the trial court's 

decision to deny a motion for new trial will stand absent a showing 

of a manifest abuse of discretion • • Our inquiry focuses on 

whether the verdict is 'clearly, decidedly, or overwhelmingly' 

against the weight of the evidence. . • " Richardson v. City of 

Albuquerque, 887 F.2d 727, at 730 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

Our review of the record establishes that the verdict of the 

jury was, and is, supported by substantial evidence, and is not 

against the weight of the evidence. Viewing the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the plaintiff, 2 the testimony and exhibits 

established the following factual situation: 

The defendant Natkin and Company is a mechanical contractor 

engaged in new construction in Colorado, employing a large number 

of personnel engaged in various skilled crafts such as plumbers, 

pipe fitters and sheet metal workers who install the equipment 

necessary to heat and cool large commercial structures. Natkin is 

a union employer and has contracts with Plumbers Local No. 3, 

Pipefitters Local No. 208, and Sheet Metal Local No. 9. In 

addition to these men, Natkin also employed support personnel who 

worked in the "pipe shop", or warehouse, handling material, maintaining equipment and inventory, and delivering equipment and 

supplies to the various job sites. The pipe shop had four general 

2 Jackson v. City of Albuquerque, 890 F. 2d 225, 226, 231 (10 

Cir. 1989). 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 4 
areas of work--warehousing, driving, yard or forklift operations, 

and hydro crane operations. These support people were represented 

by Teamsters Local No. 13. 

During WWII, plaintiff served in the Navy Seabees, a construction battalion, and thereafter worked as an "over the road" long 

haul truck driver for 20 years. In 1972, at age 47, he was hired 

as a truck driver by Natkin and worked for defendant until he was 

terminated at age 60 in January, 1986. After driving a truck for 

defendant for several years, plaintiff switched to operating a 

hydro crane, which was mounted on a truck, with a lifting capacity 

of about 4,000 pounds. With this unit, he went around job sites 

delivering and unloading equipment and supplies for 3 or 4 years. 

He then transferred to work as a forklift operator inside the pipe 

shop, where he also checked supplies and parts in and out and 

otherwise did whatever there was to be done in the way of yard 

maintenance, or warehousing at the shop. During the 7 years 

preceding his termination, plaintiff's primary job was that of 

forklift operator. At the time he was terminated, he worked with 

the forklift about 50% of the time, and worked the remaining time 

in yard maintenance, or as needed around the area. From the 

evidence, the jury was entitled to find that despite "titles," all 

employees in plaintiff's unit performed whatever needed to be done 

in the operation. 

As a result of a decline in construction projects, Natkin laid 

off 350 field workers during 1985. It was also determined that 

three men would have to be laid off in the support operation--two 

of them from the "mechanical side" of the warehouse where plaintiff 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 5 
worked, and one from the "sheet metal side". It was determined 

that plaintiff and Melvin Mitchell, a truck driver, would be 

terminated on the mechanical side, and that Oswat, a forklift 

operator, would be the one to go on the sheet metal side. 

It was stipulated by the parties that Natkin had an economic 

need to reduce its support force on January 9, 1986, by three 

people. It was also stipulated that two of the three employees 

terminated were in the protected age group, and that no employees 

under the age of 40 years were terminated in the reduction in force 

which affected plaintiff. 

Although there was no formal seniority clause in the contract 

with the Teamsters, there was evidence from which the jury could 

find that employment decisions took seniority into account, and 

plaintiff testified that he was told, prior to termination, that 

the proposed layoffs were to be based upon seniority. With the 

exception of the supervisor, Parsons, all those remaining on the 

job after plaintiff was terminated had less seniority than he did 

and, from the evidence, the jury could find that those who kept 

their jobs had less experience in driving trucks and operating a 

crane or forklift. 3 

This evidence was disputed. Defendant's witnesses testified 

that there was no seniority policy clause in the union contract: 

3 The people left in the unit after plaintiff's layoff were 

Lopez, a driver, age 60, with less seniority than plaintiff: Smith, 

a driver, age 32, with 10 years less seniority, Olsen, the second 

in command who did tool repair, age 34, with 4 years less 

seniority, and Sundine, age 3 4, , with 9 years less seniority, 

listed as a truck driver, forklift, and warehouse man who, 

according to defendant, was an "inside" and not an "outside" yard 

man. 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 6 
that a "best-qualified" policy was used only when making choices 

between persons performing the same duties, that this policy was 

not used because plaintiff's job was being eliminated, and that 

others in the work force simply took over the few "forklift" duties 

that came up after plaintiff was terminated. Defendant's witnesses 

testified that forklift work within the warehouse was minimal, that 

most of plaintiff's work was "yard maintenance," and that his job 

was in fact eliminated but, under all of the evidence, the jury 

could find that in fact it was not, and that plaintiff's job had 

been taken over and assumed by younger men with less seniority, 

thereby justifying the inferential finding that plaintiff lost his 

job because of prohibited age discrimination. 

Defendant objected to the admission of evidence that the two 

60-year-old employees who were kept on when plaintiff was terminated, were laid off by defendant about a year later. Defendant 

suggests that this evidence was irrelevant and, even if relevant, 

the evidence should have been excluded under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 403 as prejudicial. Defendant further complains that the 

parties had stipulated that 60-year-old employees remained in the 

unit after plaintiff was laid off, and the admission of the 

evidence denied defendant a fair trial because defendant relied 

upon the stipulation. 

Gary Parsons, who was Bingman's foreman, was called as a 

witness for plaintiff, and questioned about shop personnel after 

plaintiff was terminated. In this examination, Parsons testified 

that employees Sundine, Smith and Olson, ages 34, 32, and 34, were 

still employed, but that Lopez, age 60, lost his job at the next 

7 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 7 
reduction in force which occurred about one year after Bingman lost 

his job. This evidence was received over defendant's objection 

that circumstances were different at that later time. The court 

ruled that the Lopez termination was close enough in time to be 

evidence of defendant's practice in terminating older employees. 

Record, Volume III, pp. 161-162. There was also evidence that 

another employee, Welch, age 60, was also terminated in a reduction 

in force. Vol. III, pp. 191-192. 

In this action, plaintiff claimed that defendant terminated 

him because of his age, under the guise of a reduction in force, 

and in opposition to defendant's usual policy which recognized 

seniority as an element of termination decisions. In order to 

establish his claim, he was required to prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that his position was filled by a younger employee or 

that his job continued to exist in its various parts. Record Vol. 

V, pp. 298-299. See Spulak v. K Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1153-

1154 (10 Cir. 1990). In this respect, evidence concerning the 

make-up of the employment force and events which occurred after 

plaintiff's termination were entirely relevant to the question of 

whether or not age was one of the determinative reasons for 

plaintiff's termination; and, as the trial court found, evidence 

not too remote in time that defendant terminated others in the GOyear-old age group would be entirely relevant to the question of 

defendant's policies and practices. 

Defendant claims that the admission of such evidence was 

unduly prejudicial and that it was subjected to unfair "surprise" 

because of the prior stipulation that employees age 60 were 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 8 
retained in the work force at the time plaintiff was terminated. 4 

Plaintiff's evidence of the subsequent terminations in no way 

contradicted the terms of this stipulation. Defendant had an 

opportunity to present evidence and explain the later terminations 

and did present testimony that Welch, an assistant mechanic, did 

not have the same qualifications as Cole, the head mechanic, who 

was retained. In addition, defense counsel in his jury argument, 

relied on plaintiff's own evidence that Lopez was really not a 

highly qualified worker' arguing that "you already have in front at 

you from that source of the evidence the fact certainly there were 

good reasons why Mr. Lopez is the person who is next laid off." 

Record, Vol. 5, p. 334. 

There was no abuse of discretion in the admission of evidence 

of defendant's subsequent termination of two employees, age 60. 5 

The jury was entitled to judge the credibility of the witnesses, 

to resolve conflicts of evidence in plaintiff's favor, and to find 

that plaintiff's age was a determinative factor in defendant's 

decision to terminate his employment. 

Judgment was entered on the jury verdict on January 13, 1989, 

and on February 3, plaintiff filed a motion for assessment of 

future damages in the amount of $273,139.00, representing future 

4 As noted, the Stipulation, as presented to the jury was 

that of the three employees terminated on January 9, 1986, all were 

between the ages of 40 and 70, that no employee under the age of 40 

was terminated, and that following that, "only two employees in 

Bingman's unit were aged 60 or older." Record Vol.V, p. 294. 

5 There was also evidence that a Rick Hughes, age 35 to 40, 

transferred over to the pipe shop from the "sheet metal side", 

sometime after Bingman was terminated. Record Vol. v, p. 353. 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 9 
pay losses. 6 Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court 

found that plaintiff should be reinstated to his former position in 

lieu of the money damages which he claimed. 

In this appeal, defendant alleges that the motion for 

aAssessment of future damages should have been denied as being 

untimely and that plaintiff should have been denied additional 

relief by way of reinstatement since the post-trial motion was not 

filed within the 10 days provided by Rule 59, Federal Rules of 

civil Procedure. 7 The trial court rejected defendant's contention 

that the claim for future damages was untimely upon the basis that 

the parties had stipulated that the trial "would, in effect, be 

bifurcated, and that the liability aspects (of the case) would be 

tried first, with the general damages. • . and that other matters 

(would) be tried later. 11 Record Vol. VI, p. 7. In this respect, 

the district court found that the issue of reinstatement/future 

damages was simply a continuation of the trial on liability: 

In essence, what we did is subject to, 

pursuant to the stipulation of counsel on both 

sides, bifurcated, or, you might say, 

trifurcated this trial if you count attorney's 

fees as a separate segments (sic), with the 

understanding we were going to finish the 

trial at a later time, that later time was set 

in February, I believe, which was a short time 

after the trial, and was continued to this 

6 Plaintiff requested that this figure be doubled, thereby 

yielding $702,883.52, for a total judgment of $702,883.52, plus 

costs and attorney fees. Record, Vol. I, Item 8. 

7 Rule 59 (b) and 59 (e) provide that motions for new trial, 

or motions to alter or amend a judgment, must be served not later 

than 10 days after the entry of judgment. Defendant contends that 

plaintiff's motion for assessment of future damages sought to 

increase the jury verdict or to add a remedy, thereby challenging 

the correctness of the Judgment entered January 12, 1989. 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 10 
date, and that's where we are now, and, as far 

as I'm concerned, we are just finishing the 

trial today. (Record, Vol. VI, p. 9). 

Defendant contends that its stipulation did not waive the 

application of procedural rules applicable to post-judgment 

motions, and that it was error to accept additional evidence 

concerning future losses. we find such argument without merit--the 

issue of future losses was always a part of plaintiff's case--and 

it was agreed by the parties that this was a matter to be resolved 

by the court after the jury had determined liability. 

Plaintiff has appealed from the court's finding that reinstatement would be the remedy in this case, claiming that front pay 

would be a more appropriate award. In choosing reinstatement, the 

trial court reviewed the testimony and exhibits of plaintiff and 

his experts, Dr. James Evenson and Robert M. Woodard. Plaintiff 

testified that he was physically able to return to work and that he 

wanted to work to at least age 70, but he had misgivings about how 

he would be received if he returned to work, particularly expressing some concern that if he returned someone else would lose his 

job. All of the evidence established that plaintiff had good 

relations with his supervisors and fellow workers at the pipe shop 

and had in fact returned for visits after he was terminated. The 

trial court also considered that defendant was well established in 

the construction industry, with a large number of employees, and 

was then involved in projects requiring the need for employees in 

the pipe shop. The evidence during trial also established that 

defendant had been flexible in employee relations in the past, 

retaining employees when work was slow by reducing their hours or 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 11 
shifting their jobs about, and that the union contracts contained 

no provisions which would inhibit defendant from returning 

plaintiff to his former job. The trial court specifically found 

that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that defendant 

could not or would not take appropriate measures to reinstate 

plaintiff, or to find that the work place would be unduly hostile 

to his return, for the court observed that at trial all persons 

involved in plaintiff's termination testified, and none showed 

animosity toward him because of this lawsuit. 

The award of equitable relief by way of reinstatement rests in 

the discretion of the trial court and this determination will not 

be set aside unless we are satisfied that it is clearly erroneous. 

See E.E.o.c. v. General Lines. Inc. 865 F.2d 1555 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

This circuit has frequently held that reinstatement is the 

preferred remedy for discrimination in employment matters in all 

but special instances of unusual work place hostility or other 

aggravating circumstances which may make reinstatement impossible. 

Such situations were discussed at length in Anderson v. Phillips 

Petroleum, 861 F. 2d 631 ( 10 Cir. 1988) and, more recently, in 

Jackson v. city of Albuquerque, 890 F.2d 225 (lOth cir. 1989). 

In Anderson. where reinstatement was found to be the appropriate 

remedy, this court noted some few instances where reinstatement 

would not be beneficial--such as the existence of "extreme 

hostility" in the work place, instances where no comparable job was 

available, or when the time period for an award of front pay was 

very short. In Jackson, a case involving racial discrimination in 

city employment, the trial court awarded front pay instead of 

12 

Appellate Case: 89-1114 Document: 01019297077 Date Filed: 06/28/1991 Page: 12 
reinstatement upon a finding that general hostility in the work 

place remained "impossibly high. " That decision was reversed 

because all of the hostility was one-sided and evidenced by the 

individual defendants and their supporters in the city government 

who, "were determined to run plaintiff Carl Jackson off the job." 

As we observed in that case, if reinstatement were denied, then the 

defendants would have accomplished their purpose. 8 

In this appeal, plaintiff Bingman alleges that the trial court 

erred in "not considering" factors other than work place hostility, 

but the findings and conclusions of the court, as discussed above, 

clearly reflect that this was not the case. The order of reinstatement is supported by the evidence, and not clearly erroneous. 

There being no error, the judgment and reinstatement order are 

AFFIRMED. 

8 In Marshall v. TRW. Inc .• Reda Pump Div •. 900 F. 2d 1517 

(10 Cir. 1990), involving a claim for retaliatory discharge under 

state law, a jury awarded future damages due to hostility in the 

workplace. This judgment was reversed upon a finding that state 

law provided for reinstatement, and that, as in Jackson, supra, 

there was insufficient evidence of hostility to support such an 

award. 

13 

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