Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00028/USCOURTS-caed-1_24-cv-00028-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Arellano-Moya
Defendant
Five Diamond Cold Storage, Inc.
Defendant
Jorge Esteban Fuentes
Defendant
Grow Smart Labor, Inc.
Defendant
Sara Reyes
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SARA REYES,

Plaintiff,

v.

FIVE DIAMOND COLD STORAGE, INC., 

et al.

Defendants.

Case No. 1:24-cv-00028-JLT-SAB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

RECOMMENDING GRANTING

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

(ECF No. 12, 13, 14, 22, 23, 24)

OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN 

DAYS

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 9, 2024, Defendants Five Diamond Cold Storage, Inc., Grow Smart Labor, Inc., 

Pedro Arellano-Moya, and Jorge Esteban Fuentes filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Sara Reyes’ 

first amended complaint pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. The Court finds this matter suitable for decision without oral argument. See Local 

Rule 230(g). Based on the moving, opposition, and reply papers, and the Court’s record, the 

Court recommends granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend.

/ / /

/ / /

/ / /

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II.

BACKGROUND

Sara Reyes (“Plaintiff”) alleges she has been employed directly or jointly by Defendants 

Grow Smart Labor, Inc. (“Grow Smart”), Five Diamond Cold Storage, Inc. (“Five Diamond”), 

Pedro Arellano-Moya, and Jorge Esteban Fuentes (collectively “Defendants”) as a non-exempt 

employee on land owned, leased, and/or operated by Defendants in and around Tulare County, 

California. (First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), ECF No. 7, ¶ 10.) Plaintiff alleges that “during 

the relevant time period,” she worked for Defendants performing services covered by an 

applicable Wage Order. (Id.)

Five Diamond and Grow Smart are California corporations that conduct business in

Tulare County. (FAC ¶¶ 13, 14.) They have hundreds of employees, and each provide

employees to the agricultural industry. (Id.) Defendant Arellano-Moya is the Chief Executive 

Officer of Grow Smart and was in charge of making major corporate decisions and managing 

operations. (FAC ¶ 15.) Defendant Fuentes is the Chief Financial Officer of Grow Smart and 

oversaw making major corporate decisions and managing operations. (FAC ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff filed this class action on January 5, 2024, bringing claims for (1) violations of

the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”); (2) failure to record 

and pay non-productive time separate from piece-rate compensation; (3) failure to provide meal 

periods; (4) failure to pay minimum wages; (5) failure to pay overtime premium wages; (6) 

waiting time penalties; (7) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements; (8) violations 

of the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”); and (9) PAGA penalties. (ECF No. 1.)

On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative FAC which brought the same causes of 

action but attached two exhibits establishing that she provided notice of her intent to seek PAGA 

penalties to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency. (See FAC.)

On April 9, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss the FAC in its entirety. 

(Defs.’ Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF No. 13.) Defendants filed a 

declaration by counsel in support of the motion. (Declaration of Landon Schwob Supp. Defs.’ 

Mot. (“Schwob Decl.”), ECF No. 12.) Defendants also filed a request for judicial notice in 

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support of the motion. (Defs.’ Req. Jud. Not. (“RJN”), ECF No. 14.) Following a stipulation to 

modify the briefing schedule (ECF Nos. 20, 21), Plaintiff filed her opposition on April 30, 2024. 

(Pl’s Opp’n Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 22.) On May 17, 2024, Defendants filed their reply 

(Defs.’ Reply Opp’n (“Reply”), ECF No. 23), and a request for judicial notice in support of the 

reply (Defs.’ Req. Jud. Not. Supp. Reply (“Reply RJN”), ECF No. 24).

III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on 

the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A 

motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro 

v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). In deciding a motion to dismiss, “[a]ll allegations 

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). The pleading 

standard under Rule 8 does not require “ ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than 

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In 

assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as 

true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. To avoid a 

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, the Ninth Circuit has found that two 

principles apply. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth the allegations in the complaint 

“may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action but must contain sufficient allegations 

of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself 

effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, so that it is not unfair 

to require the defendant to be subjected to the expenses associated with discovery and continued 

litigation, the factual allegations of the complaint, which are taken as true, must plausibly 

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suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. “Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal 

theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 

250 F.3d at 732 (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

IV.

DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Notice

In conjunction with the motion, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of 

three complaints filed by counsel for Plaintiff on behalf of different plaintiffs against different 

defendants in separate actions in this district.

1

 (RJN 2; Schwob Decl. 97-203). Plaintiff does not 

oppose the request.

In conjunction with its reply brief, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice 

of (1) Industrial Welfare Commission wage order 14-2001 (Reply RJN 2, 4-15), and (2) a first 

amended complaint filed by different plaintiffs against different defendants in a separate action 

in another district, McKeen v. Franklin American Mortgage Company, No. 4:10-cv-05243-SBA 

(N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2011) (Reply RJN 16-35). Plaintiff does not oppose the requests. 

Further, Defendants filed a declaration by counsel in support of their motion which 

proffers (1) the parties’ meet and confer efforts; (2) a redline version of the original complaint in 

this matter showing the changes made by Plaintiff to the FAC; and (3) “true and correct copies of 

redlines” showing changes of the three other complaints filed by counsel for Plaintiff in separate 

actions with separate parties. (See ECF No. 12-1 at 5-96; 204-460.) Plaintiff does not object to 

Defendants’ proffered declaration or attached exhibits. 

“As a general rule, ‘a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in 

ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.’ ” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 

2001) (quoting Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994)). Doing so would convert a 

motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). However, a court 

1 Ortiz v. Lucero AG Services, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-01319-JLT-EPG (E.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2023), ECF No. 1; 

Nataren v. Central Valley Farming, Inc., No. 2:24-cv-00747-DAD-DB (E.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2024); Gonzalez 

Mondragon v. R T Farm Labor, Inc., No. 1:22- cv-01259-JLT-BAM (E.D. Cal. Oc. 3, 2022), ECF No. 1.

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may take judicial notice of a fact not subject to reasonable dispute, either because the fact is 

generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or because the fact is capable 

of accurate and ready determination from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned. Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may also take judicial notice of undisputed matters of 

public record, Lee, 250 F.3d at 689, including documents filed in federal or state courts. Harris

v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012).

Defendants argue the complaint in the instant action recites legal conclusions that were 

copied and pasted from three other complaints filed by Plaintiff’s law firm. (Mot. 7.)2 

Defendants further argue the McKeen complaint is an example of a plaintiff alleging “specific 

examples where she worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive overtime 

compensation.” (Reply 6.) While the Court may take judicial notice of the four complaints filed 

in federal court, the Court finds they have no bearing on the determination of the instant motion. 

It is of no consequence for purposes of deciding the instant motion that Plaintiff’s counsel has 

filed similar complaints in separate actions or that another plaintiff has alleged factual content to 

support her individual claims. Because the four complaints are not relevant to the instant

motion, the Court recommends denying Defendants’ request for judicial notice.3

The Court recommends granting judicial notice of California Industrial Welfare 

Commission Wage Order 14–2001, which is available on the State of California Department of 

Industrial Relations website. See Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 978 n.2 (9th Cir. 

2007) (taking judicial notice of government-published documents).

B. Violations of AWPA

Plaintiff’s first cause of action arises out of Grow Smart and Five Diamond’s alleged 

violations of AWPA. (FAC ¶¶ 46-50.) The purpose of the AWPA is “to remove the restraints 

2 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners 

via the CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

3 To the extent Defendants request judicial notice of the “true and correct copies of redlines showing the 

changes from the Complaint in this action against the Ortiz, Nataren, and Mondragon complaints” (Schwob Decl. ¶ 

7, Exs. 7-9) or the redlined version of the complaint filed in this action on January 5, 2024 and the FAC at issue 

(Schwob Decl. ¶ 4, Ex. 2), the Court recommends denying such requests. It does not appear the redlined documents 

are matters of public record nor otherwise judicially noticeable in accordance with Rule 201. The Court did not—

and cannot pursuant to Rule 12(d)—rely on the declaration or redlined documents in issuing these findings and 

recommendations.

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on commerce caused by activities detrimental to migrant and seasonal agricultural workers ... 

and to assure necessary protections for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers, agricultural 

associations, and agricultural employers.” 29 U.S.C. § 1801. “AWPA allows seasonal and 

migrant agricultural employees to bring suit in federal court if employers fail to pay them wages 

owed or violate a working arrangement.” Valenzuela v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp., 614 F. Supp. 

2d 1089, 1092 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 

The FAC alleges that at “all relevant times,” Plaintiff has been “employed directly or 

jointly by Defendants, as an employee on land owned, leased, and/or operated in and around 

Tulare County.” (FAC ¶ 10.) Defendants note—and Plaintiff does not dispute—the FAC fails to 

plead any facts about Plaintiff’s employment, including her job title, job duties, or that she even 

engaged in agricultural work. (Mot. 10-11.) Plaintiff also fails to allege whether she was a 

seasonal or migrant agricultural worker. While the FAC alleges the corporate Defendants 

allegedly have “hundreds of employees and provide[] employees in the agricultural industry,” it

fails to allege Plaintiff was an agricultural worker for one or both corporate Defendants and 

whether she was a migrant or agricultural worker. Compare FAC generally, with Guerrero v. TY Nursery, Inc., No. 13CV3126 JM BGS, 2014 WL 5480705, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) 

(finding allegations that plaintiffs were “seasonal agricultural worker(s) within the meaning of 29 

U.S.C. § 1802(1), and/or individuals entitled to the AWPA's protections”; defendants operated 

and supplied labor to agricultural nurseries; and “plaintiffs cultivated plants, shrubs and trees” 

were “minimally sufficient” to establish that plaintiffs were seasonal agricultural workers for 

purposes of AWPA). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege even the most basic facts regarding her 

employment that would allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that she can state a claim 

for protection under the AWPA. The Court therefore recommends Plaintiff’s claim for violation 

of the AWPA be dismissed with leave to amend.4

4 Defendants also argue that the remaining allegations in the FAC regarding violations of the AWPA are 

conclusory regurgitations of AWPA legal standards and are insufficiently plead for the same reasons the California 

wage and hour claims are insufficiently pled. This argument is well-taken, should Plaintiff choose to amend her 

complaint. 

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C. Labor Code Violations

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s six causes of action alleging violations of the California Labor 

Code fail to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. The Court addresses each claim in turn. 

1. Failure to Pay Non-Productive Time 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor Code § 

226.2. (FAC ¶¶ 51-61.) California law requires that employers compensate their piece-rate 

employees for rest and recovery periods and other nonproductive time “separate from any piecerate compensation.” Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a)(1). This separate compensation for rest and 

recovery time must be at an hourly rate that is no less than the applicable minimum wage, and in 

some circumstances must be greater than the minimum wage. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a)(3)(A), 

(B). Similarly, the separate compensation for employees’ other nonproductive time must be no 

less than the applicable minimum wage. Cal. Lab. Code § 226.2(a)(4).

The FAC alleges Plaintiff and the Class “were not compensated for rest and recovery 

periods and other nonproductive time separate from any piece-rate compensation.” (FAC ¶ 53; 

see also FAC ¶ 3 (same).) The FAC further alleges that Defendants failed to include on itemized 

statements, the total hours of compensable rest and recovery periods or other nonproductive time, 

the rate of compensation, and gross wages paid for those periods during the pay period in violation 

of California Labor Code § 226.2(a)(2)(A). (FAC ¶¶ 54-55.) 

Plaintiff contends the crux of the FAC is Defendants’ failure to separately pay its 

employees for rest breaks under its piece rate system of compensation. 5 (Opp’n 14.) Defendants 

argue the FAC fails to allege anything more than the legal conclusion that she was not 

compensated properly because of a piece-rate system. (Mot. 11-12.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s 

claim for failure to pay non-productive time is a recitation of the language used in section 226.2, 

without support of any allegations of fact that would plausibly indicate any Defendant operates an 

unlawful compensation system that fails to compensate rest periods or other unspecified non5 Plaintiff also argues Defendants’ unlawful compensation system fails to pay non-exempt employees for rest 

breaks and other nonproductive time separate from any piece-rate compensation. (Id. (citing FAC ¶ 3).) If Plaintiff 

intends to plead failure to separately pay for “other nonproductive time,” Plaintiff fails to provide any facts alleging 

what constitutes such non-productive time.

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productive time. 

Courts are not required to accept as true allegations that are “merely conclusory, 

unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 

266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). Courts are also not required to “assume the truth of legal 

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Marceau v. Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 540 F.3d 

916, 919 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing 

Plaintiff’s second cause of action with leave to amend. 

2. Failure to Pay Non-Productive Time Provide Meal Periods or Premiums

Plaintiff’s third cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor Code §§ 

226.7, 512, and the “applicable IWC Wage Order.” (FAC ¶¶ 62-72.) California law requires an 

employer to provide its non-exempt employees with a thirty-minute meal period for every five 

hours of work. See Cal. Labor Code §§ 226.7, 512. A compliant meal break under California law

requires the employer to “relieve the employee of all duty for the designated period but need not 

ensure that the employee does no work.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.4th 1004, 

1034 (2012). To successfully state a meal or rest break claim, the plaintiff must allege sufficient 

facts identifying an instance where they were deprived of a meal or rest break. Perez v. DNC 

Parks & Resorts at Sequoia, No. 1:19-CV-00484-DAD-SAB, 2020 WL 4344911, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 

July 29, 2020) (citing Landers v. Quality Commc'ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) and 

Boyack v. Regis Corp., 812 F. App'x 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020)6(affirming that a rest break claim 

fell short of the Landers’ requirements by not “demonstrating at least one workweek in which [the 

plaintiffs] were personally deprived of rest breaks”)). 

The FAC alleges Plaintiff and the Class were not afforded timely meal periods as required 

by California law, since they were routinely required to work five hours or more without a timely, 

thirty minute, uninterrupted meal period, and they were not compensated for missed meal periods. 

(FAC ¶ 63.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ meal period policies failed to provide employees: “(a) at 

least one (1) meal period prior to the fifth hour and/or two (2) meal periods for shifts greater than 

6 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3(b).

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ten hours, (b) net thirty-minute meal periods, and/or (c) timely meal periods.” (FAC ¶ 29.)

Plaintiff further alleges she and the class did not voluntarily or willfully waive meal periods. 

(FAC ¶ 68.) 

Defendants argue the claim should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient 

facts to set forth a plausible claim. (Mot. 13.) Defendants note Plaintiff’s complaint is bereft of 

any facts alleging employees could not take their unpaid meal breaks in between completing 

various piece-rate tasks and that Plaintiff does not allege how she was unable to take meal 

breaks. (Id.) 

In opposition, Plaintiff argues the FAC “could not be clearer about the nature of 

Defendants’ meal break violations.” (Opp’n 14.) The Court disagrees. Couched in formulaic 

recitations of statutory language, the FAC alleges that Plaintiff and the Class were “routinely 

required to work” without a meal break. (FAC ¶ 63.) The FAC otherwise fails to provide any 

supporting factual allegations, “such as when, how, and which individuals were denied meal

periods [] that would plausibly indicate defendants are liable.” Tavares v. Cargill Inc., No. 1:18-

CV-00792-DAD-SKO, 2019 WL 2918061, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2019) (citing Luna v. 

Universal City Studios Prods. LLLP, No. 12-CV-9286 PSG (SSX), 2013 WL 12308201, at *4

(C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2013) (dismissing a complaint where plaintiff “fail[ed] to state who denied 

[him] meal periods, when they were denied, and what policies and practices resulted in a 

deprivation of meal periods”); see also Wyland v. Berry Petroleum Co., LLC, No. 1:18-CV01414-DAD-JLT, 2019 WL 1047493, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2019) (dismissing a meal period 

claim where the plaintiff alleged he was “prohibited by his supervisors from taking [ ] meal 

breaks” without factual support). 

Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit only requires that she merely allege she was 

deprived of a meal break to successfully state a meal break violation. (Opp’n 14 (citing Landers, 

771 F.3d at 646).) The Court disagrees. While the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly set a rule for 

pleading requirements for meal break violations, it concluded that allegations that merely alleged 

that a plaintiff was not paid for overtime hours “fail[ed] to state a plausible claim under Rule 8” 

because “a possibility is not the same as plausibility.” Id. (quoting Nakahata v. New YorkCase 1:24-cv-00028-JLT-SAB Document 28 Filed 06/11/24 Page 9 of 22
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Presbyterian Healthcare Sys., Inc., 723 F.3d 192, 201 (2d Cir. 2013)). Applying this framework, 

Plaintiff’s admittedly mere allegation she was routinely deprived of meal breaks states a 

possibility that Defendants violated section 226.7, but, without any supporting factual 

allegations, Plaintiff has not plausibly stated a claim for a meal break violation. Accordingly, the 

Court recommends granting Defendants’ motion with leave to amend. 

3. Failure to Pay Minimum and Overtime Wages

Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor Code §§ 

1194, 1194.2, 1197(A) and the “applicable IWC Wage Order” by failing to pay minimum wages. 

(FAC ¶¶ 73-82.) Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor 

Code §§ 510, 1194, 1194.2, and the “applicable IWC Wage Order” by failing to pay overtime 

wages. (FAC ¶¶ 83-91.) California law requires employers to pay employees the minimum 

wage for all hours worked, see California Labor Code § 1197, and overtime pay for any work in 

excess of eight hours in one workday and forty hours in any workweek, see California Labor 

Code § 510(a).

With regard to her unpaid minimum wage claim, Plaintiff alleges that “Defendants have 

failed to pay minimum wages for all hours worked. In particular, Defendants failed to record 

and compensate piecework workers for nonproductive time separate from piece-rate units and 

failed to accurately calculate compensation for rest and recovery periods.” (FAC ¶ 75.) In 

support of her unpaid overtime wage claim, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “employ[ed] Plaintiff 

and the class in excess of eight (8) hours in one day and forty (40) hours in a workweek without 

paying the required overtime rate.” (FAC ¶ 86.) Further, Plaintiff alleges that she and the class 

“were routinely working hours in excess of eight (8) hours per day without receiving overtime 

compensation.” (Id.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s allegations are legal conclusions without requisite factual 

support. Defendants rely on Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc., wherein the Ninth Circuit 

held that post-Iqbal, “detailed factual allegations regarding the number of overtime hours worked 

are not required to state a plausible claim,” but conclusory allegations that merely recite the 

statutory language are inadequate. Landers, 771 F.3d at 644. Thus, to successfully state an 

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hourly or overtime wage claim under the FLSA, a plaintiff must identify “at least one workweek 

when he worked in excess of forty hours and was not paid for the excess hours in that workweek, 

or was not paid minimum wages.” Id. at 646. Although Landers addressed FLSA claims, 

federal courts have held that its reasoning applies to California Labor Code claims as well. Cook 

v. Land O'lakes, Inc., No. 1:20-CV-00553-NONE-SAB, 2020 WL 5633045, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 

Sept. 21, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:20-CV-00553-NONE-SAB, 2020 

WL 5983346 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2020); see also Perez v. DNC Parks & Resorts at Asilomar, Inc., 

No. 1:19-CV-00484-DAD-SAB, 2022 WL 411422, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2022) (“This FLSA 

pleading requirement applies to minimum and overtime wage claims under state law as well.”).

Plaintiff argues that her allegations that Defendants used a piece-rate compensation 

system under which they failed to provide separate compensation for rest and recovery periods 

and other non-productive time is sufficient to state a claim for failure to pay minimum wage. 

(Opp’n 15 (citing FAC ¶ 3).) Plaintiff further contends that a plaintiff asserting an overtime 

wage claim merely needs to allege the Defendant was her employer and that she worked more 

than forty hours per week or more than eight hours in a day without receiving overtime 

compensation. (Opp’n 16 (citing McKeen-Chaplin v. Franklin Am. Mortg. Co., No. C 10-5243 

SBA, 2011 WL 4082543 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2011)).)7 Thus, Plaintiff argues the allegation that 

Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Class “routinely” in excess of eight hours in one day and 

forty hours in a workweek without overtime compensation is sufficient to state a claim for failure 

to pay premium overtime wages. (Id.)

The Court finds the FAC falls short of stating plausible claims for failure to pay 

minimum and overtime wages. Despite conceding Landers requires a Plaintiff to “plead facts

demonstrating at least one workweek when she was not paid minimum wage” (Opp’n 15 (citing 

Landers, 771 F.3d at 647)), Plaintiff fails to identify any workweek where she worked in excess 

7

In McKeen-Chaplin, the court denied a motion to dismiss because it found the plaintiff adequately alleged 

that the “[d]efendant was her employer, that she worked in its Concord, California office from February 2009 

through October 2010, and specific examples where she worked more than forty hours per week but did not receive 

overtime compensation.” McKeen-Chaplin, 2011 WL 4082543, at *3. The FAC here fails to adequately allege 

comparable factual support. Rather, Plaintiff fails to adequately identify her employer, any date of employment, or 

any specific example of a workweek wherein she worked more than forty hours per week without overtime pay. 

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of forty hours and was not paid for the excess hours in that workweek or was not paid minimum 

wages. In fact, Plaintiff fails to allege any factual content—including the hours she typically 

worked during a workweek, her wage, or an estimate of the amount of minimum and overtime 

wages she believes she is owed—to permit the Court to find that Plaintiff states a plausible claim 

for failure to pay minimum or overtime wages. See id. at 645 (“A plaintiff may establish a 

plausible claim by estimating the length of her average workweek during the applicable period 

and the average rate at which she was paid, the amount of overtime wages she believes she is 

owed, or any other facts that will permit the court to find plausibility.”) 

Further, while Plaintiff alleges she and the class were “routinely” working in excess of 

eight hours per day without overtime compensation, she fails to identify what constitutes 

“routine[]” and whether it represents the average workweek during the applicable period. See

Perez, 2020 WL 4344911, at *8 (dismissing minimum wage and overtime pay claims where, 

although the plaintiff alleged she “often works 8 hours per week over 6 days, but ... is only paid 

for 43 to 45 hours for those weeks,” she failed to indicate what constitutes “often” and whether it 

represents the average workweek during the relevant period); Bush v. Vaco Tech. Servs., LLC,

No. 17-cv-05605-BLF, 2018 WL 2047807, at *9 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2018) (concluding plaintiff's 

“bare assertion that she ‘regularly’ worked more than the statutory requirement is conclusory and 

insufficient under the standard set forth in Landers”); Boyack v. Salon Mgmt. Corp., No. 8:18-

cv-01233-AG-DFM, 2019 WL 1744855, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2019) (dismissing plaintiffs' 

hourly wage claims despite “somewhat fact specific” allegations including pleading three 

occasions when plaintiffs pay rate was incorrect and two other occasions when they were paid 

purely commission instead of minimum wage), aff’d, 812 F. App'x 428 (9th Cir. 2020). 

The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations of unpaid overtime and minimum wage claims in 

the FAC “provide nothing beyond ‘an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me 

accusation.’ ” Perez, 2020 WL 4344911, at *4 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Courts find that 

conclusory allegations such as those included in the FAC are insufficient to state a plausible 

claim. Avalos v. Amazon.com LLC, No. 1:18-CV-00567-DAD-BAM, 2018 WL 3917970, at *3 

(E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2018) (collecting cases). Although plaintiffs are not expected to allege “with 

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mathematical precision” the amount of overtime owed by Defendants, they should at the very 

least “be able to allege facts demonstrating there was at least one workweek in which they 

worked in excess of forty hours and were not paid overtime wages.” Landers, 771 F.3d at 646 

(quoting Dejesus v. HF Management Services, LLC, 726 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 2013)) (emphasis 

added).

The FAC fails to plausibly allege that Plaintiff was entitled to but was denied overtime or 

minimum wages. Accordingly, the Court recommends granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action with leave to amend. 

4. Waiting Time Penalties

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor Code §§

201-203, which regulate the timely payment of final wages upon an employee’s separation. 

Section 201 covers employees who are terminated by their employer and section 202 covers 

employees who resigned from employment. Section 203 imposes penalties on employers that 

“willfully” fail to pay final wages in accordance with sections 201 and 202. 

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay minimum, overtime, meal period wages, 

and rest and recovery periods and other nonproductive time separate from any piece-rate

compensation. (FAC ¶ 94.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to liquidate those unpaid wages 

upon separation from employment, whether through voluntary resignation or involuntary 

resignation. (Id.) Plaintiff thus alleges Defendants violated “California Labor Code §§ 201 

and/or 202” by failing to pay wages owed to Plaintiff and the class when they “left their 

employment with Defendants.” (FAC ¶ 95.)

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s claim fails because she alleges only legal conclusions, does 

not allege facts regarding termination or resignation, and fails to sufficiently plead a willful 

violation. (Mot. 17.) The Court agrees. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants failed to pay 

minimum, overtime, meal period, and rest period wages are factually deficient, and are therefore 

merely legal conclusions for the reasons previously discussed. 

Further, while Plaintiff alleges she and the Class “left their employment with 

Defendants” (FAC ¶ 95), Plaintiff fails to allege whether she resigned or was terminated. See

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Boyack v. Salon Mgmt. Corp., 2019 WL 1744855, at *5 (dismissing a claim where “Plaintiffs 

don't even allege whether Plaintiffs were discharged or whether they resigned...Instead, 

Plaintiff’s parrot the statutory language underlying their claims and conclude Defendants failed 

to abide by that language.”); Perez, 2020 WL 4344911, at *6 (same). 

Plaintiff also offers no facts supporting her allegation that Defendants “willfully” failed 

to pay wages upon her unspecified termination or resignation. Instead, she alleges “Defendants 

willfully failed to pay all wages due as the failure to pay was not inadvertent or accidental” and 

despite leaving Defendants’ employment, Plaintiff nor the class have received payment. (FAC ¶ 

97, 99.) These factually deficient allegations are insufficient to state a waiting time penalty 

claim. See Porch v. Masterfoods, USA, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2008) 

(explaining the willfulness element under section 203.), aff’d, 364 F. App’x 365 (9th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s waiting time penalties claim be dismissed 

with leave to amend. 

5. Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements

Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action alleges Defendants violated California Labor Code §§ 

226, 226.2 and the IWC Wage Order. (FAC ¶¶ 102-112.) An employer is required semimonthly 

or at the time of each payment of wages to supply the employee with an accurate itemized 

statement that shows nine specific items. Cal. Lab. Code § 226(a). To recover damages for a 

violation of section 226(a), “an employee ‘must suffer injury as a result of a knowing and 

intentional failure by an employer to comply with the statute.’ ” Dawson v. HITCO Carbon 

Composites, Inc., No. CV16-7337 PSG FFMX, 2017 WL 7806618, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 

2017) (quoting Price v. Starbucks, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1136, 1142 (2011)). However, this 

injury requirement “ ‘cannot be satisfied simply because one of the nine itemized requirements ... 

is missing from a wage statement.’ The deprivation of information is not itself sufficient to 

establish a cognizable injury.” Id. (quoting Price, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1143). 

Plaintiff alleges Defendants failed to provide accurate itemized wage statements that 

include each of the nine itemized requirements, in violation of section 226(a). (FAC ¶ 104.) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants “knowingly and intentionally fail[ed] to provide Plaintiff 

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and Class Members itemized wage statements in conformance with Labor Code § 226” and have 

willfully refused to pay and accurately state wages” with intent to “annoy harass, oppress, 

hinder, delay, or defraud Plaintiff and the class, in violation of California Labor Code § 226.6.” 

(FAC ¶¶ 107-109.)

The Court first finds Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff’s claim should fail because she 

fails to plausibly allege a knowing or intentional violation is without merit. (Mot. 19.) “Malice, 

intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 9(b); Reinhardt v. Gemini Motor Transp., 879 F.Supp.2d 1138, 1142 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 

Here, Plaintiff alleges, albeit in a roundabout manner, that Defendants “knowingly and 

intentionally fail[ed] to provide Plaintiff and Class Members itemized wage statements in 

conformance with Labor Code § 226....” (FAC ¶ 107.) The Court finds the FAC sufficiently 

makes a general allegation that Defendants engaged in knowing and intentional conduct.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s wage statement claim merely recites legal standards

and does not comply with federal pleading standards. (Mot. 18-19.) The Court agrees. The 

FAC parrots the language of section 226 when alleging Defendants’ wage statements omitted or 

inaccurately reflected each of nine itemizations without providing any factual matter. For 

example, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “fail[ed] to separately state the total hours of compensable 

rest and recovery periods, the rate of compensation and the gross wages paid for those periods 

during the pay period, and the total hours of other nonproductive time, the rate of compensation, 

and the gross wages paid for that time during the pay period.” (FAC ¶¶ 105-06.) However, this 

allegation is merely a summarized recitation of section 226.2(a)(2)(A)-(B).

The most specific allegation in relation to Plaintiff’s wage statement claim is reiterating 

the first and fifth items listed in section 226 with a catch all: Defendants “inaccurately stat[ed] 

gross and net wages and other issues as described above.” (FAC ¶ 105.) However, the FAC 

does not contain any facts alleging an estimated accurate gross or net wage, nonetheless a factual

allegation or example of an inaccurate gross or net wage reflected on any wage statement. See 

Boyak, 2019 WL 1744855, at *5 (dismissing a claim where the plaintiff generally alleged 

“Defendants’ wage statements fail to correctly list gross wages earned, net wages earned, all 

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applicable hourly rates of pay, total hours worked, and the hours worked at each pay rate in 

violation of California Labor Code Sections 226 and 1174.”).

While sufficiently pleading a possible violation, the FAC fails to state a plausible claim 

for failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements. The Court therefore recommends 

dismissing Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action with leave to amend. 

D Violations of the UCL

Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action alleges Defendants violated the UCL, which prohibits 

“any unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

The UCL “borrows violations from other laws by making them independently actionable as 

unfair competitive practices.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134, 

1143 (2003). “A business act or practice may violate the UCL if it is either ‘unlawful,’ ‘unfair,’ 

or ‘fraudulent,’” as “[e]ach of these three adjectives captures ‘a separate and distinct theory of 

liability.’” Rubio v. Cap. One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Kearns v. Ford 

Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2009). With respect to the unlawful prong, “the UCL 

permits violations of other laws to be treated as unfair competition that is independently 

actionable.” Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 Cal.4th 939, 949 (2002). However, “[w]here a plaintiff 

cannot state a claim under the ‘borrowed’ law, they cannot state a UCL claim either.” Tavares, 

2019 WL 2918061, at *8 (holding that where plaintiff inadequately pled a wage and hour claim, 

her derivative UCL claim must also fail). 

The FAC conclusorily alleges Defendants’ actions constitute unlawful, unfair, and 

fraudulent business practices. (See FAC ¶¶ 115, 117-21.) However, Plaintiff appears to only 

defend the unlawful theory of liability in her opposition. (See Opp’n 20 (“[the FAC] identifies 

myriad [sic] statutes and wage orders Defendants violated through their unlawful employment 

policies and practices”).) Because Plaintiff’s UCL claim is entirely derivative of her second 

through seventh causes of action which the Court finds are insufficiently plead, the Court

recommends also dismissing Plaintiff’s UCL claim with leave to amend.

E. PAGA Penalties

Under PAGA, an “aggrieved employee” may bring an action for civil penalties for Labor 

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Code violations on behalf of themselves and other current or former employees. Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 2699(a). An employee plaintiff suing under PAGA “does so as the proxy or agent of the 

state’s labor law enforcement agencies.” Arias v. Superior Ct., 46 Cal. 4th 969, 986 (2009). In 

such action, “the employee plaintiff represents the same legal right and interest as state labor law 

enforcement agencies—namely, recovery of civil penalties that otherwise would have been 

assessed and collected by the Labor Workforce Development Agency.” Id. (citing Cal. Lab. 

Code § 2699(a), (f)).

The parties agree Plaintiff’s PAGA claim is derivative of her second through seventh 

causes of action alleging Labor Code violations. (Mot. 20; Opp’n 22.) The Court notes 

Plaintiff’s PAGA claim does not add any factual allegations. (See FAC ¶¶ 123-135.) “[L]ike the 

UCL, a PAGA claim ‘rises or falls’ with its underlying causes of action.” Perez, 2020 WL 

4344911, at *11 (quoting Price, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1147). The Court therefore recommends 

dismissing Plaintiff’s derivative PAGA claim with leave to amend for the reasons discussed 

herein regarding the underlying Labor Code violations. 

F. Joint Employer Liability

Plaintiff alleges that she was “employed directly or jointly by Defendants....” (FAC ¶ 

10.) Defendants argue this legal conclusion fails to plausibly allege a joint employer theory of 

liability for the four Defendants. (Mot. 20-21.) Plaintiff does not respond to nor dispute this 

argument. (See generally Opp’n.)

To be held liable for any violations under the California Labor Code, the defendant must 

be Plaintiff’s employer. To be liable as a joint employer, an entity must have had the ability to 

“(1) to exercise control over . . . wages, hours or working conditions, (2) to suffer or permit to 

work, or (3) to engage, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” Ochoa v. 

McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (citing Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 64 (2010)). However, in certain 

circumstances, “a person can be a joint employer without exercising direct control over the 

employee.” Medina v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC, 68 Cal. App. 5th 868, 879 (2021). “While 

plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish that defendants were her joint employers at the 

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pleading stage, plaintiff must at least allege some facts in support of this legal conclusion.” 

Hibbs-Rines v. Seagate Techs., LLC., No. C 08-05430 SI, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 2, 2009) (emphasis in original).

To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a theory of joint employer liability, Plaintiff's single 

allegation that she “has been employed directly or jointly by Defendants” is far from sufficient. 

The FAC is otherwise devoid of any factual allegations that support her disjunctive allegation 

that the Defendants were her joint employers. Merely stating a legal conclusion that Defendants 

are joint employers is insufficient to allege joint employer liability. See, e.g., U.S. E.E.O.C. v. 

Am. Laser Centers LLC, No. 1:09-cv-2247-AWI-DLB, 2010 WL 3220316, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 

13, 2010) (dismissing joint employer claims because the plaintiff failed to plead any specific 

allegations that explained how the defendant companies were related to each other); HibbsRines, 2009 WL 513496, at *5 (dismissing joint employer liability where the plaintiff merely 

alleged defendants were joint employers); Perez, 2020 WL 4344911, at *4 (same). 

Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegation of joint employer liability is

insufficiently plead and therefore recommends dismissal of the complaint with leave to amend. 

G. Individual Defendants

Plaintiff’s second through seventh claims alleging violations of the Labor Code are also 

brought against Arellano-Moya and Fuentes individually in their capacities as CEO and CFO, 

respectively, of Grow Smart. Plaintiff describes each individual Defendant’s respective job title 

and then alleges each individual: 

was in charge of making major corporate decisions and managing 

the operations of the corporation during the relevant time period. 

As such, he was on notice, whether actual or constructive, of all of 

the violations described above, and failed to prevent or address 

them. On information and belief, Defendant...is an owner,

director, officer, or managing agent of Defendant Grow Smart 

Labor, Inc. who controlled and caused the violations at issue here 

either by making illegal policies, implementing illegal policies, or 

failing to correct illegal policies. Defendant... is therefore liable as 

a person acting on behalf of Defendant Grow Smart Labor, Inc. 

under California Labor Code § 558.1.

(FAC ¶¶ 15-16.)

California Labor Code § 558.1 extends liability to an “owner, director, officer, or 

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managing agent of the employer” who “violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 

226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802” of the Labor Code. Cal. Lab. Code § 558.1(a),(b). Defendants do 

not dispute any substantive application of section 558.1. (See Mot 22.) Instead, Defendants 

argue Arellano-Moya and Fuentes should be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead sufficient 

facts to show either individual Defendant caused violations of the Labor Code. (Mot. 22.) In 

opposition, Plaintiff argues the language above sufficiently extends liability for the alleged Labor 

Code violations against Arellano-Moya and Fuentas as individuals. 

Section 558.1 “does not enable courts to, in effect, pierce the corporate veil to hold 

corporate owners, shareholders, or other officers liable for wrongdoing committed by the 

employer corporation.” Roush v. MSI Inventory Serv. Corp., No. 2:17-CV-1010-JAM-KJN, 

2018 WL 3637066, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 30, 2018). Rather, section 558.1 makes individual 

owners, directors, officers or managing agents liable “if they themselves acted to violate or cause 

the violation of California’s labor laws.” Id. A plaintiff must therefore “allege specific facts to 

establish that [the individual Defendant] was personally involved in the alleged violations.” 

Carter v. Rasier-CA, LLC, No. 17-CV-00003-HSG, 2017 WL 4098858, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 

15, 2017), aff'd, 724 F. App'x 586 (9th Cir. 2018). Courts in this Circuit have dismissed claims 

that contain no specific allegation of individual wrongdoing as failing to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. See id.; Roush, 2018 WL 3637066, at *3; Rios v. Linn Star Transfer, 

Inc., No. 19-CV-07009-JSC, 2020 WL 1677338, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2020); Plaskin v.

NewSight Reality, Inc., No. 19-cv-00458, 2019 WL 4316255, at *4 (C.D. Cal. 2019).

Here, the FAC vaguely alleges both Defendants are individually liable because, as CEO 

and CFO, each “controlled and caused the violations at issue here either by making illegal 

policies, implementing illegal policies, or failing to correct illegal policies.” (FAC ¶¶ 15-16.) 

The FAC is otherwise devoid of any facts alleging what actions Defendants Arellano-Moya and 

Fuentas took in their individual capacity to violate Plaintiff’s rights or cause violation of 

California labor law. While plaintiff is not required to conclusively establish Defendants 

Arellano-Moya and Fuentas were personally involved in the alleged hour and wage violations at 

the pleading stage, plaintiff must allege some facts to substantiate her conclusory allegations. 

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The Court therefore recommends dismissing the complaint and granting leave to amend the 

allegations against Defendants Arellano-Moya and Fuentas.

H. Leave to Amend

Courts freely grant leave to amend a complaint which has been dismissed. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(2) (“The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.”); Schreiber 

Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986) (“If a complaint is 

dismissed for failure to state a claim, leave to amend should be granted unless the court 

determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not 

possibly cure the deficiency.”); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (same). 

Leave to amend generally shall be denied only if amendment would unduly prejudice the 

opposing party, cause undue delay, be futile, or if the moving party has acted in bad faith. 

Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008). “These factors, 

however, are not given equal weight. Futility of amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of ... 

leave to amend.” U.S. ex rel. Insoon Lee v. SmithKline Beecham, Inc., 245 F.3d 1048, 1052 

(9th Cir. 2001).

Plaintiff proffers her claims can be cured by amendment and therefore requests leave to 

amend the FAC. (ECF No. 24.) Defendants argue the Court would be justified in denying leave 

to amend because Plaintiff has already amended her complaint and still fails to allege any facts. 

(Mot. 6; Reply 11.) 

The Court must briefly address Plaintiff’s assertion that she is entitled to leave to amend 

because there is “no reason to expect Reyes has exhausted her efforts to provide what would 

otherwise be ‘free discovery’ to Defendants.” (Opp’n 24.) This argument is not well-taken. The 

purpose of federal pleading standards is not to provide “free discovery” to a defendant. Rather,

the well-established requirement that a complaint “contain sufficient allegations of underlying 

fact [is] to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr, 

652 F.3d at 1216. As discussed, Plaintiff’s thirty-five page FAC merely parrots the language of 

the applicable statutory provisions without providing any supporting factual allegations. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (noting “the pleading standard Rule 8 

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announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an 

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation.”). Plaintiff acknowledges the spirit 

of Iqbal and Twombly “is obvious: plead what is sufficient to draw out the ‘who, what, where, 

why, and how’ of the factual predicate such that a defendant may respond, put the matter at 

issue, and get on with litigation.” (Opp’n 11.) However, the FAC is wholly devoid of even the 

most basic factual context regarding Plaintiff, including her job title, job description or duties, 

dates of employment, the Defendant for which she worked, a workweek where she did not 

receive minimum or overtime wages, whether she resigned or was terminated, whether she was a 

seasonal or migrant agricultural worker, or whether she was even an agricultural worker at all. 

Alleging such basic facts—which are known to Plaintiff at the time of filing—does not, as 

Plaintiff argues, “impose unnecessary barriers...by compelling guesswork or pleading facts 

normally developed through discovery.” (Id.) The absence of factual allegations compels this 

Court to find the FAC fails to meet a threshold standard of plausibility. 

Setting aside Plaintiff’s misguided characterization of federal pleading standards and the 

venerated principle of fair notice, the Court finds Plaintiff has not acted in bad faith or with 

dilatory motive, and it would not prejudice Defendants or be futile to grant an opportunity to 

amend the FAC to allege factual allegations. The Court therefore recommends granting Plaintiff

leave to amend to cure the deficiencies identified in these findings and recommendations. 

V.

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendants’ requests for judicial notice be GRANTED in part and DENIED in 

part; and

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s first amended complaint be GRANTED 

with leave to amend. 

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this 

action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen 

(14) days of service of these recommendations, the parties may file written objections to the

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findings and recommendations with the Court. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The District Judge will 

review the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 11, 2024 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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