Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-17-73308/USCOURTS-ca9-17-73308-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohammed Mostafa Altayar
Petitioner
William P. Barr
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MOHAMMED MOSTAFA ALTAYAR, 

AKA Mohammed Mastafa Majid,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

Nos. 17-73308

 18-71754

Agency No.

A212-377-363

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted October 24, 2019

San Francisco, California

Filed January 14, 2020

Before: J. Clifford Wallace and Daniel A. Bress, Circuit 

Judges, and Robert S. Lasnik,

* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Bress

* The Honorable Robert S. Lasnik, United States District Judge for 

the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

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2 ALTAYAR V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

Denying Mohammed Mostafa Altayar’s petition for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals, 

the panel held that his aggravated assault conviction under 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 

13-1204(A)(2) qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude 

that made him removable. 

Aggravated assault in Arizona arises from the interplay 

of two separate provisions, A.R.S. § 13-1203(A), which 

describes basic assault, and A.R.S. § 13-1204(A), which 

describes aggravated assault. The panel agreed that the 

parties’ approach of treating both statutes as divisible 

comported with this court’s case law and Arizona precedent. 

Reviewing the judicially noticeable documents in the 

record, the panel concluded that Altayar had been convicted 

of aggravated assault under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2), which 

contemplates intentionally placing another person in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury, and 

§ 13-1204(A)(2), which provides that a person commits 

aggravated assault if the person uses a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument. The panel rejected Altayar’s 

contention that the plea colloquy, in which his counsel used 

the word “reckless” in describing Altayar’s misconduct, 

created ambiguity whether he was convicted under § 13-

1203(A)(2), which has a means rea of “intentionally.” 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 3

Considering the charging the document, the plea agreement, 

and plea colloquy together, the panel concluded it that it was 

clear that Altayar had been convicted under A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2).

Next, the panel turned to the question whether an 

aggravated assault conviction under A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) is a crime involving moral 

turpitude. The panel noted that, under this court’s cases, a 

crime involving moral turpitude is a crime that (1) is vile, 

base, or depraved and (2) violates accepted moral standards. 

The panel also observed that, under this court’s precedents, 

the assault statutes that have been held to be crimes 

involving moral turpitude are those that include as an 

element some aggravating dimension sufficient to increase 

the culpability of an assault or battery and so to transform 

the offense into one categorically a crime involving moral 

turpitude.

The panel concluded that, consistent with this court’s 

precedents and the BIA’s longstanding decisions, the BIA 

could properly regard an aggravated assault with a deadly 

weapon or dangerous instrument as substantially more 

turpitudinous than a mere simple assault. The panel further 

explained that the intent element of A.R.S. § 13-

1203(A)(2)—which requires intentionally placing another 

person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical 

injury—is another factor supporting the BIA’s 

categorization of Altayar’s offense as a crime involving 

moral turpitude. Finally, the panel concluded that 

aggravated assault under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-

1204(A)(2) involves serious contemplated harm, another 

factor that supports characterizing it as a crime involving 

moral turpitude. In this respect, the panel explained that the 

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury is not 

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4 ALTAYAR V. BARR

merely of any injury, but a serious physical injury or even 

death. Accordingly, the panel held that aggravated assault 

under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) is a 

crime involving moral turpitude.

In a separate unpublished memorandum disposition, the 

panel denied Altayar’s petitions for review as to the agency’s 

determinations that he was ineligible for asylum and related 

relief, as well as the denial of his motion to reopen.

COUNSEL

Benjamin T. Wiesinger (argued), Pope & Associates, PC, 

Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner.

Sabatino F. Leo (argued), Senior Litigation Counsel; 

Anthony P. Nicastro, Assistant Director; Joseph H. Hunt, 

Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of 

Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, 

Washington, D.C.; for Respondent.

OPINION

BRESS, Circuit Judge:

The question in this case is whether an Arizona 

aggravated assault conviction for “[i]ntentionally placing 

another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury” while “us[ing] a deadly weapon or 

dangerous instrument,” A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-

1204(A)(2), qualifies as “a crime involving moral 

turpitude,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), thus rendering an 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 5

alien deportable. Consistent with our precedents, we hold 

that such a conviction so qualifies.

I.

Petitioner Mohammed Mostafa Altayar is an Iraqi citizen 

who was admitted to the United States as a refugee in 2011 

and became a lawful permanent resident in 2012. On April 

13, 2014, Altayar was working at Sandy’s Smoke Shop in 

the Phoenix area and standing out front with his friend and 

customer, Tracie Gomez. Erick Villasenor walked by them 

and allegedly touched Gomez’s buttocks.

Things quickly got out of hand. Altayar called 

Villasenor a “faggot,” and Villasenor then punched Altayar 

in the face. Altayar drew a firearm and Villasenor fled. 

Altayar and his brother Mohannad chased Villasenor and 

caught him at a nearby Shell Gas station. Video surveillance 

footage (which is no longer available) reportedly showed 

Altayar pointing his gun at Villasenor after Villasenor had 

been detained. Villasenor also confirmed this to the police. 

Villasenor’s brother and an acquaintance, who were both 

standing nearby, saw the commotion and ran to intervene, 

but Altayar waved his gun at both men, who then backed 

away with their hands up. Before long, the smoke shop’s 

security guard arrived at the parking lot and placed 

Villasenor in handcuffs, believing Villasenor had robbed the 

store. Once Villasenor was restrained, Altayar holstered his 

firearm and kicked Villasenor in the head. Police responded 

to the scene, questioned witnesses, reviewed footage from 

the gas station’s security cameras, and placed Altayar under 

arrest.

Altayar was charged in Arizona state court with four 

counts of aggravated assault and one count of disorderly 

conduct. “Count 1” charged Altayar with “Aggravated 

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Assault, A Class 3 Dangerous Felony.” Count 1 alleged that 

Altayar, “on or about the 13th day of April, 2014, using a 

handgun, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, 

intentionally placed ERICK VILLASENOR in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury, in violation of 

A.R.S. §§ 13-1203, 13-1204, 13-3105, 13-701, 13-702, and 

13-801.”

Altayar pleaded guilty to Count 1. In exchange, the 

prosecution agreed to dismiss “Counts 2–5, and the 

allegation that Count 1 was a dangerous offense for sentence 

enhancement purposes.” At the plea colloquy, Altayar 

through counsel confirmed that Altayar had drawn his gun 

“after there was no further issue as to danger for himself,” 

and that “there was no issue in terms of self-defense because 

the danger had ceased to exist the moment he withdrew the 

weapon.”

Altayar’s plea and sentence were formally entered on 

March 6, 2015. As a first-time offender, he faced a 

sentencing range of 2 – 8.75 years in prison and a 

presumptive sentence of 3.5 years. See A.R.S. § 13-702(D). 

Altayar’s presentence investigation report concluded that 

Altayar “escalated matters when he pulled out a handgun” 

and “waved and pointed the gun” at Villasenor. While this 

was Altayar’s first criminal conviction, the presentence 

report found the conviction was “quite serious in nature as it 

involved a weapon and a victim.” The court sentenced 

Altayar to 48 hours in jail along with five years of probation 

and ordered payment of restitution, a fine, and fees.

Shortly after Altayar pleaded guilty, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings 

against him. Citing his aggravated assault conviction, DHS 

alleged that Altayar was removable under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) for being convicted of a crime involving 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 7

moral turpitude punishable by a sentence of one year or more 

that was committed within five years after admission. 

Altayar admitted his conviction but denied removability. 

Altayar also applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and 

protection from removal under the Convention Against 

Torture. 

As relevant here, the Immigration Judge (IJ) determined 

that Altayar’s conviction qualified as a crime involving 

moral turpitude (sometimes referred to as a “CIMT”). The 

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed Altayar’s 

appeal. The BIA concluded that the charging documents and 

plea agreement confirmed that Altayar was convicted of 

“[i]ntentionally placing another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury” while “us[ing] a 

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument,” in violation of 

A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2). In the BIA’s 

view, such a conviction qualified as a crime involving moral 

turpitude because it “require[d] both proof of an aggravating 

factor (here, the use of a deadly weapon) and a culpable state 

of mind.” In the alternative, the BIA held that Altayar’s 

crime would involve moral turpitude even if the statute of 

conviction had only required a mens rea of recklessness. 

Altayar now petitions for review.1

1 The IJ further found that Altayar had committed a “particularly 

serious crime,” thereby rendering him ineligible for asylum and 

withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 

1231(b)(3)(B)(ii). The IJ also denied deferral of removal under the 

Convention Against Torture. The BIA agreed as to both issues. Altayar 

later filed a motion to reopen in the BIA, which the BIA denied. We 

address these issues in a separate unpublished memorandum disposition, 

where we deny the petitions for review as to those issues.

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II.

A.

An alien is deportable if he (1) “is convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude committed within five years . . . 

after the date of admission” and (2) “is convicted of a crime 

for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed.” 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i). The only requirement that 

Altayar challenges is whether his Arizona aggravated assault 

conviction is a “crime involving moral turpitude.” We have 

jurisdiction to address this purely legal question. See 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Leal v. Holder, 771 F.3d 1140, 

1144 (9th Cir. 2014).

To answer it, we apply the so-called “categorical” and 

“modified categorical approaches,” which require 

determining whether the elements of the offense of 

conviction (as opposed to the facts underlying the 

conviction) constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. 

See, e.g., Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th Cir. 

2010); Marmolejo–Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 912 

(9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). Under the categorical approach, 

“we ask whether the full range of conduct encompassed by 

the criminal statute constitutes a crime of moral turpitude.” 

Lozano-Arredondo v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th 

Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted). The modified categorical 

approach, by comparison, requires examination of those 

elements encompassed within the specific statutory 

provision that formed the basis for the conviction. Id. We 

apply the modified categorical approach “only if the statute 

is divisible,” id., which is to say that the statute contains 

multiple, alternative sets of elements that define multiple, 

distinct crimes. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 

2248–49 (2016). At that point, we “consult a limited class 

of documents . . . to determine which alternative formed the 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 9

basis of the [petitioner’s] prior conviction.” Descamps v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2010). When, as here, the 

conviction is based on a guilty plea, we may examine the 

“charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of 

plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial 

judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United 

States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); United States v. CabreraPerez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1005 n.4 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).2

B.

Aggravated assault in Arizona arises from the interplay 

of two separate provisions, A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A) and 13-

1204(A). Under A.R.S. § 13-1203(A), Arizona’s basic 

assault provision, “[a] person commits assault by”:

1. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly 

causing any physical injury to another 

person; or

2. Intentionally placing another person in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury; or

3. Knowingly touching another person with 

the intent to injure, insult or provoke such 

person.

A.R.S. § 13-1203(A). Under § 13-1204(A), “[a] person 

commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as 

2 We must reject Altayar’s request that we abandon the categorical 

and modified approaches altogether and consider the underlying facts 

giving rise to his conviction. Circuit precedent forecloses that argument. 

See, e.g., Mendoza, 623 F.3d at 1302.

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prescribed by § 13-1203 under” eleven separately numbered 

circumstances. One of these, which is relevant here, is “[i]f 

the person uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” 

A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2).

The parties have treated both the basic and aggravated 

assault provisions as divisible. That approach comports with 

our case law and Arizona precedent. See United States v. 

Sahagun-Gallegos, 782 F.3d 1094, 1098 & n.3 (9th Cir. 

2015) (treating A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) as divisible in 

determining if conviction constituted a “crime of violence” 

under the Sentencing Guidelines, and noting that “Arizona 

treats the subsections of A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) as three 

different crimes, each comprised of different elements”); 

Cabrera-Perez, 751 F.3d at 1004–05 (same for purposes of 

“crime of violence” provision in Immigration and 

Nationality Act). Because each subsection of § 13-1203(A) 

carries different punishments, see A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(B), 

13-707(A), “then under Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466 (2000)] they must be elements,” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 

2256. The same is true for § 13-1204(A), which contains 

eleven subsections that trigger differing punishments 

depending upon the aggravating circumstance. A.R.S. § 13-

1204(E)–(G); A.R.S. § 13-702. 

The judicially noticeable documents in the record 

establish beyond question that Altayar was convicted of 

aggravated assault under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-

1204(A)(2). Altayar concedes the latter, but disputes the 

former. He is mistaken. As we explained above, Altayar’s 

charging document in Count 1 used language that directly 

tracked the language of A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2), and Altayar 

pleaded guilty to Count 1. We have applied the modified 

categorical approach in like circumstances to hold that 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 11

A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) formed the 

statute of conviction. See Cabrera-Perez, 751 F.3d at 1006.

Altayar tries to inject uncertainty into this analysis by 

seizing upon two instances in the plea colloquy during which 

his counsel used the word “reckless” or “recklessly” in 

describing Altayar’s misconduct. According to Altayar, this 

creates ambiguity whether Altayar was convicted under 

§ 13-1203(A)(2), which has a mens rea of “intentionally.” 

That argument fails. Like the charging document, Altayar’s 

counsel at various points in the colloquy described Altayar’s 

offense in language that mirrors the statutory language of 

§ 13-1203(A)(2). In light of the factual basis confirmed 

during the plea hearing, Altayar’s plea under the statute 

shows that he “necessarily admitted” the elements therein, 

Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26, including that the offense was done 

“intentionally.” Considering the charging document, plea 

agreement, and plea colloquy together, it is clear Altayar was 

convicted under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-

1204(A)(2).

C.

1.

We now turn to the question whether an aggravated 

assault conviction under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-

1204(A)(2) is a crime involving moral turpitude, examining 

the statute of conviction and not Altayar’s underlying 

conduct. See Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 1094, 

1110 (9th Cir. 2011). 

To begin, we determine de novo the elements of the 

statute of conviction. See, e.g., Leal, 771 F.3d at 1144. We 

then compare those elements “to the generic definition of a 

crime of moral turpitude and decide whether the conviction 

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meets that definition.” Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 778 

(9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quotations omitted). The 

objective is to determine “whether the conduct proscribed in 

the statute is broader than, and so does not categorically fall 

within,” the definition of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Leal, 771 F.3d at 1145 (quotations omitted).

Under our cases, “‘a crime involving moral turpitude is 

generally a crime that (1) is vile, base, or depraved and 

(2) violates accepted moral standards.’” Ceron, 747 F.3d at 

779 (quoting Latter-Singh v. Holder, 668 F.3d 1156, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2012)). The BIA can receive deference in its 

determination that an offense qualifies as a crime involving 

moral turpitude. See, e.g., id. at 785. Where, as here, the 

BIA’s decision “is unpublished (and not directly controlled 

by any published decision interpreting the same statute),” 

Uppal v. Holder, 605 F.3d 712, 714 (9th Cir. 2010), we 

apply the Skidmore framework, under which “the measure 

of deference afforded to the agency varies ‘depend[ing] upon 

the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of 

its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 

pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power 

to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Marmolejo–

Campos, 558 F.3d at 909 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). In this 

case, the BIA’s decision, though unpublished, is a reasoned 

one that derives its conclusion from our prior decisions and 

prior BIA decisions. It is therefore entitled to some measure 

of deference. See, e.g., Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1160.

2.

The starting point for evaluating the BIA’s decision is 

our own decision in Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 

1159, 1164–68 (9th Cir. 2006), in which we held that A.R.S. 

§ 13-1203(A)—Arizona’s base assault provision—did not 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 13

categorically qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Our holding there reflected the well-accepted proposition 

that “a conviction for simple assault does not involve moral 

turpitude.” Id. at 1165; see also Uppal, 605 F.3d at 716 

(same); In re Wu, 27 I. & N. Dec. 8, 10–11 (BIA 2017) (“It 

is well established that a simple assault or battery that only 

requires offensive touching or threatened offensive touching 

of another committed with general intent that does not result 

in serious bodily harm is not considered to involve moral 

turpitude.”). 

Fernandez-Ruiz did not involve an aggravated assault 

under A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2), or any other aggravating 

circumstance. See 468 F.3d at 1167 n.8. Nor did FernandezRuiz involve a conviction under § 13-1203(A)(2) in 

particular: the administrative record there did not allow us to 

apply the modified categorical approach because it was 

unclear which subsection of § 13-1203(A) supported the 

conviction. Id. at 1164–68. Fernandez-Ruiz therefore did 

not consider the question presented here, namely, whether 

an aggravated assault under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 

13-1204(A)(2) is a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Under our precedents in this area, an aggravated assault 

presents a very different situation than mere simple assault. 

As we have explained, “[s]ome assault statutes . . . have been 

held to be CIMTs. Those statutes include as an element 

‘some aggravating dimension’ sufficient to increase the 

culpability of an assault or battery and so to transform the 

offense into one categorically a CIMT.” Uppal, 605 F.3d at 

717 (citing various BIA decisions); see also Leal, 771 F.3d 

at 1148; Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1161. As a result, “to rise 

to the level of moral turpitude, an assault crime must involve 

a particular type of aggravating factor, one that says 

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something about the turpitude or blameworthiness inherent 

in the action.” Uppal, 605 F.3d at 717.

The BIA here relied on the fact that Altayar’s conviction 

involved the aggravating circumstance that he “use[d] a 

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” A.R.S. § 13-

1204(A)(2). Arizona law defines “[d]eadly weapon” as 

“anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm.” 

A.R.S. § 13-105(15). A “[d]angerous instrument,” 

meanwhile, is “anything that under the circumstances in 

which it is used, attempted to be used or threatened to be 

used is readily capable of causing death or serious physical 

injury.” A.R.S. § 13-105(12). These definitions underscore 

that the aggravating circumstance in A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2) 

is a quite serious one involving a weapon or instrument 

capable of producing serious harm or even mortal injury.

The BIA determined that the aggravating circumstance 

of using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument supported 

categorizing Altayar’s offense as one involving moral 

turpitude. That determination finds ample support in the 

BIA’s own longstanding decisions, see, e.g., Wu, 27 I. & N. 

Dec. at 11–12; In re Sanudo, 23 I. & N. Dec. 968, 971 (BIA 

2006); In re Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. 611, 614 (BIA 1976), 

as well as our own. Indeed, in Uppal, we specifically noted 

that an “‘aggravating dimension[]’” that has been 

“recognized as sufficiently increasing the culpability of an 

assault to turn an assault into a CIMT ha[s] been the use of 

a deadly weapon.” 605 F.3d at 717 (emphasis added) (citing 

Medina, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 614). In Ceron, our en banc Court 

similarly explained that “[t]he presence of an aggravating 

factor, such as . . . the use of a deadly weapon, can be 

important in determining whether a particular assault 

amounts to a crime involving moral turpitude.” 747 F.3d at 

783 (quotations omitted).

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These observations are readily understandable: the use in 

an assault of a “deadly weapon” (or a “dangerous 

instrument” that “is readily capable of causing death or 

serious physical injury,” A.R.S. § 13-105(12)) necessarily 

makes the offense more serious, more dangerous, and 

therefore more blameworthy than a simple assault. See 

Uppal, 605 F.3d at 717. Such an aggravating circumstance 

is directly reflective of “‘the character, gravity, and moral 

significance of the conduct.’” Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 

1159 (quoting Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at 910); see 

also Wu, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 11 (BIA concluding that the 

aggravating factor of use of a deadly or dangerous weapon 

or instrument “magnifies the danger posed by the perpetrator 

and demonstrates his or her heightened propensity for 

violence and indifference to human life”). Consistent with 

our own precedents, see Ceron, 747 F.3d at 783; Uppal, 605 

F.3d at 717, the BIA could properly regard an aggravated 

assault with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument as 

substantially more turpitudinous than a mere simple assault. 

The intent element of A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2)—which 

requires “[i]ntentionally placing another person in 

reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury” 

(emphasis added)—is another factor supporting the BIA’s 

categorization of Altayar’s offense as a crime involving 

moral turpitude. The BIA relied upon this factor, and its 

reliance was well-placed. We have explained that “intent is 

a crucial element in determining whether a crime involves 

moral turpitude.” Ceron, 747 F.3d at 781 (quotations 

omitted). And citing the BIA’s “previous opinions in which 

it found that intentionally threatening behavior indicated a 

crime involving moral turpitude,” we have held that “[t]he 

BIA is entitled to place great weight on the presence or 

absence of a mens rea element when determining whether a 

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crime involves moral turpitude.” Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 

1162.

In this case, “intentionally” is defined as “with respect to 

a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an 

offense, that a person’s objective is to cause that result or to 

engage in that conduct.” A.R.S. § 13-105(10)(a). Arizona 

law requires that this heightened mens rea applies to each 

element of the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-202(A) (“If a statute 

defining an offense prescribes a culpable mental state that is 

sufficient for commission of the offense without 

distinguishing among the elements of such offense, the 

prescribed mental state shall apply to each such element 

unless a contrary legislative purpose plainly appears.”). In 

the context of an aggravated assault conviction under A.R.S. 

§§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2), a defendant must 

therefore intend to use the deadly weapon or dangerous 

instrument and must, through the use of that weapon or 

instrument, “intend[] to place another person in reasonable 

apprehension of imminent physical injury.” State v. Salman, 

897 P.2d 661, 664 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (citing In re Pima 

Cty. Juvenile Action, 693 P.2d 909, 911 (Ariz. 1984)). The 

heightened mens rea of “intentional[]” wrongdoing in 

A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) adds to the moral blameworthiness 

of Altayar’s offense and supports the BIA’s determination 

that Altayar’s conviction is a crime involving moral 

turpitude.3

3 Because it is clear under the modified categorical approach that 

Altayar was convicted under a subsection requiring intentional 

misconduct and not reckless misconduct, we have no occasion to 

consider the BIA’s alternative holding that a reckless aggravated assault 

with a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument would also qualify as a 

crime involving moral turpitude. Our opinion should not be read to 

suggest that an aggravated assault offense must necessarily contain a 

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ALTAYAR V. BARR 17

Finally, aggravated assault under A.R.S. §§ 13-

1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) involves serious 

contemplated harm, another factor that supports 

characterizing it as a crime involving moral turpitude. In 

Fernandez-Ruiz, we relied on the fact that A.R.S. § 13-

1203(A)(2), standing alone, “contains absolutely no element 

of injury whatsoever, as it prohibits conduct that merely 

places another person ‘in reasonable apprehension of’ 

physical injury.” 468 F.3d at 1167. But as stated above, 

Fernandez-Ruiz did not consider an aggravated assault with 

a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. And later cases 

have clarified that in some circumstances, offenses that do 

not result in physical harm can still qualify as crimes 

involving moral turpitude.

For example, in Latter-Singh, we held that a conviction 

under California Penal Code § 422 qualified as a crime 

involving moral turpitude, where the statute criminalized 

“‘willfully threaten[ing] to commit a crime which will result 

in death or great bodily injury to another person, with the 

specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a 

threat.’” 668 F.3d at 1156 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Cal. 

Penal Code § 422). We explained that “the underlying 

conduct threatened”—“death or great bodily injury”—“is 

itself a crime of moral turpitude.” Id. at 1161. That, we held, 

“was not true of the statute in Fernandez-Ruiz, which 

involved a simple assault.” Id.; see also Coquico v. Lynch, 

789 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he threat in LatterSingh had to be of ‘death or great bodily injury,’ which was 

not the case in Fernandez-Ruiz . . . .”) (quotations omitted).

mens rea requirement greater than recklessness in order to qualify as a 

crime involving moral turpitude. We do not reach that issue.

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18 ALTAYAR V. BARR

Several years later in Leal, we similarly held that 

Arizona’s felony endangerment statute, A.R.S. § 13-1201, 

qualified as a crime involving moral turpitude because it 

“require[d] the perpetrator to endanger another person 

recklessly with a substantial risk of imminent death.” 771 

F.3d at 1145–46. In Leal, we therefore “agree[d] with the 

BIA’s determination that the creation of a substantial, actual 

risk of imminent death is sufficiently reprehensible, or in 

terms of our case law, ‘base, vile, and depraved,’ to establish 

a CIMT, even though no actual harm need occur.” Id. at 

1146.

More recently, in Fugow, we held that first-degree 

imprisonment under Hawaii law was a crime involving 

moral turpitude. Fugow v. Barr, 943 F.3d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 

2019) (per curiam). The statute at issue there criminalized 

“knowingly restrain[ing] another person under 

circumstances which expose the person to the risk of serious 

bodily injury.” Id. at 458 (alteration in original) (quoting 

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-721(1)). Relying on Leal, we 

reiterated that actual injury was not invariably a requirement 

for crimes involving moral turpitude, and that it was 

sufficient, in combination with the Hawaii statute’s 

heightened mens rea, that the misconduct “expose[s] the 

[victim] to a risk of serious bodily injury.” Id. at 459.

The contemplated bodily harm associated with conduct 

punishable under A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and § 13-

1204(A)(2) fits comfortably within these above-described 

precedents. While A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) standing alone 

requires only “reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury,” without more, the aggravating 

circumstance in § 13-1204(A)(2) requires the use of “a 

deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” And as we 

explained above, Arizona law defines “[d]eadly weapon” as 

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“anything designed for lethal use, including a firearm,” 

A.R.S. § 13-105(15), and a “[d]angerous instrument” as 

“anything that under the circumstances in which it is used, 

attempted to be used or threatened to be used is readily 

capable of causing death or serious physical injury,” A.R.S. 

§ 13-105(12). The “reasonable apprehension of imminent 

physical injury,” A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2), is thus not merely 

of any injury, but a serious physical injury or even death. 

See A.R.S. §§ 13-1204(A)(2), 13-105(12) & (15). In that 

situation, “the underlying conduct threatened is itself a crime 

of moral turpitude.” Latter-Singh, 668 F.3d at 1161. 

There are, to be sure, some differences between the 

Arizona offense at issue here and the offenses at issue in 

these other cases. For example, the contemplated harm in 

Leal was death, 771 F.3d at 1144, whereas the contemplated 

harm here is death or serious physical injury. But that was 

true in Fugow as well. See Fugow, 943 F.3d at 459 (holding 

that “the lesser harm contemplated by the Hawaii statute . . . 

is less severe than the harm contemplated by the Arizona 

statute” in Leal, but that “the harm required by the Hawaii 

statute is still severe”). It was also the case in Latter-Singh. 

See 668 F.3d at 1161. Another difference is that LatterSingh involved the “requirement that the person threatened 

be in sustained fear of immediate danger to his or his 

family’s safety,” id. at 1162, whereas the Arizona aggravated 

assault offense in this case does not require such a 

“sustained” fear component. 

But there are other differences among the statutes 

indicating that, in certain respects, the Arizona offense at 

issue here reflects greater moral turpitude. Leal, for 

example, proscribed only reckless conduct, see 771 F.3d at 

1146, whereas the statute of conviction here proscribes 

intentional conduct. See also Fugow, 943 F.3d at 459 

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(making a similar point). In Latter-Singh, the offense did 

not even involve conduct, but rather speech. See 668 F.3d at 

1162. And none of the other cases involved the most 

turpitudinous feature of this case, which is the required use 

of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. See, e.g., 

Uppal, 605 F.3d at 717.

That statutes with such differences all qualify under our 

precedents as crimes involving moral turpitude speaks to the 

basic point that in order to so qualify, a greater required 

showing in one aspect of the criminal offense can 

accommodate a lesser required showing in another. As we 

have held, “‘as the level of conscious behavior decreases, 

i.e., from intentional to reckless conduct, more serious 

resulting harm is required in order to find that the crime 

involves moral turpitude.’” Leal, 771 F.3d at 1146 (quoting 

Ceron, 747 F.3d at 783). By that logic, “[i]t follows that a 

crime committed knowingly or intentionally needs less 

serious harm to qualify as a CIMT than a crime committed 

recklessly.” Fugow, 943 F.3d at 458. We are satisfied that 

under our cases, an aggravated assault conviction under 

A.R.S. §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and 13-1204(A)(2) involving the 

use of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument qualifies as 

a crime involving moral turpitude.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons and those set forth in our 

accompanying memorandum disposition, Altayar’s petitions 

for review are DENIED.

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