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Parties Involved:
FCI Miami Warden
Appellee
Donald Young
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-13204

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-22661-UU

DONALD YOUNG, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

FCI MIAMI WARDEN, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(March 5, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Donald Young, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s denial of his motion seeking post-judgment relief under Federal Rule of Civil 

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Procedure 60(b) on the basis that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in his 

federal criminal case by coercing him to agree to waive indictment and to plead 

guilty to a crime he did not commit. 

The relevant background is this. Young was convicted and sentenced in 2006 

after pleading guilty to retaliation against a witness, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1513(a)(1)(B).1

 In 2007, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a notice of appeal and to raise

certain errors at sentencing. That motion was dismissed with prejudice in 2009. In 

2017, he filed a § 2241 habeas corpus petition, which was dismissed in part as an 

unauthorized second or successive § 2255 motion. Then, Young twice sought postjudgment relief under Rule 60(b)(6) in the § 2241 case based on ineffective 

assistance by trial counsel. This appeal arises from the summary denial of the second 

Rule 60(b) motion, filed in July 2019.

On appeal, Young argues that he is entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6) 

because of ineffective assistance of trial counsel during his federal criminal case and 

because he was actually innocent of the offense. He requests that we vacate his 

conviction and sentence and acquit him of all charges. 

1 The 78-month federal prison sentence was imposed to run consecutive to an undischarged 

state sentence. 

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Rule 60(b)(6) is a catchall provision that permits reopening of a judgment 

when the movant shows “any . . . reason that justifies relief” other than the more 

specific circumstances set out in Rules 60(b)(1)–(5). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). 

“Relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) . . . requires showing extraordinary 

circumstances justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Arthur v. Thomas, 739 

F.3d 611, 628 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). 

At the outset, we must address whether the district court had jurisdiction to 

consider Young’s Rule 60(b) motion. See Williams v. Chatman, 510 F.3d 1290, 

1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Federal courts are obligated to inquire into subject-matter 

jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

We review jurisdictional issues de novo. Id. We liberally construe pro se filings “to 

discern whether jurisdiction . . . can be founded on a legally justifiable base.” 

Fernandez v. United States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1491 (11th Cir. 1991).

Although Rule 60(b) generally applies in § 2255 cases, the rule cannot be used 

to circumvent restraints on filing second or successive § 2255 motions. Farris v. 

United States, 333 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003). Under the Antiterrorism and 

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a prisoner seeking to file a “second or 

successive” § 2255 motion must “first file an application with the appropriate court 

of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider it.” Id.; 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255(h) (outlining the requirements an applicant must meet to obtain an order 

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authorizing a successive § 2255 motion). Without authorization from a court of 

appeals, the district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive motion. Farris, 

333 F.3d at 1216.

So, we must determine whether permitting a movant to bring a motion under 

Rule 60(b) “would be inconsistent with the restrictions imposed on successive 

petitions by the AEDPA.” Williams, 510 F.3d at 1293. To do so, we must identify 

the type of argument presented in the Rule 60(b) motion. 

Where the Rule 60(b) motion presents a new ground for relief from a 

judgment of conviction or attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim 

on the merits, we will treat the motion as, in substance, a successive § 2255 motion

that must comply with AEDPA’s restraints on successive motions. See Gonzalez v. 

Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005) (addressing a § 2254 habeas petition). But where 

the Rule 60(b) motion “attacks, not the substance of the federal court’s resolution of 

a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas 

proceedings,” the motion is properly brought under Rule 60(b) and is not subject to 

those same restraints.2

 Id.

2 For example, there is no bar to filing a Rule 60(b) motion that alleges a “fraud on the 

federal habeas court” or that “asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination 

was in error—for example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or 

statute-of-limitations bar.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 nn.4 & 5 (2005). 

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Here, we are required to construe Young’s Rule 60(b) motion as a successive 

§ 2255 motion. The motion did not raise any defect in the integrity of the original 

§ 2255 proceeding. See id. Rather, it raised new claims for relief from his conviction 

and sentence. See id. In particular, Young alleged in the motion that trial counsel 

provided ineffective assistance in his federal criminal case by coercing him to waive 

indictment and advising him to plead guilty to a crime he was actually innocent of.

Because Young’s Rule 60(b) motion was, in substance, a successive § 2255 

motion, he was required to comply with AEDPA and obtain this Court’s 

authorization before filing it in the district court. See Farris, 333 F.3d at 1216. 

Without our authorization, the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the 

motion, id., and should have dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction rather than 

summarily denying it, see Franqui v. Florida, 638 F.3d 1368, 1375 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(vacating the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion and remanding with instructions to 

dismiss the motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction as an unauthorized 

successive habeas petition). Accordingly, we vacate and remand with instructions 

to dismiss the motion for lack of jurisdiction. 

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. 

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