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Parties Involved:
Tyrone E. Brawner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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*Our holding limiting the scope of Copelin has been circulated to and approved by the entire

court and thus constitutes the law of the circuit. See Irons v. Diamond, 670 F.2d 265, 268 n.11

(D.C. Cir. 1981). 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 15, 1994 Decided August 26, 1994

No. 91-3332

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

TYRONE E. BRAWNER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(91cr00050-01)

Enid Hinkes (appointed by the court) argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Cynthia D. Walicki-Chan, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her

on the brief were J. Ramsey Johnson, United States Attorney at the time the brief wasfiled, and John

R. Fisher, Assistant United States Attorney.

Before SILBERMAN, WILLIAMS, and GINSBURG, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Circuit Judge: Tyrone Brawner challenges his conviction on a single count of

possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Based upon United States v. Copelin, 996 F.2d 379

(D.C. Cir. 1993), he argues that it was plain error for the district judge not to have issued a limiting

instruction sua sponte after his prior convictions for robbery and possession with intent to distribute

heroinwere introduced into evidence. We hold that the presumption of plain error created in Copelin

does not arise where, as in this case, evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts is introduced not by

the Government but as part of the defense attorney's strategy.

* We therefore affirm Brawner's

conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

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In January 1991 officers of the Metropolitan Police Department executed a search warrant

at a house in the southwest quadrant of the city. At the time, three people were in the house:

appellant Brawner, who was sitting in a bedroom, naked; Carolyn Willis, who was standing in the

bathroom, also naked; and a young child who was sleeping on a sofa elsewhere in the house.

Brawner's blue jeans, with $300 in the pocket, were on a chair in the bedroom. When the officers

moved the jeansthey found, partially hidden under the cushion of the chair, a black pouch containing

30 ziplock packets of cocaine. The police then advised Brawner and Willis of their rights and asked

them whether they lived in the house. Willis said she did not; according to the trial testimony of one

detective, Brawner said that he did live in the house. The police also found Brawner's identification

card and other personal items in the bedroom in which he was sitting when arrested.

At trial Brawner testified in his own behalf and presented five other witnesses. Brawner's

testimony focused on establishing that he did not live in the house in which he was arrested, that the

black pouch was not his, and that he did not have control over it. On direct examination, Brawner

denied telling police officers that he lived in the house and denied that he had brought the pouch of

drugsto the house. He testified that he had gone to the house, as he did "three or four times a week,"

to be injected with a combination of heroin and cocaine. He said that he was admitted to the house

by one Gary Stanley, a friend of his, who injected him with drugs and departed, and that he met

Carolyn Willis that day at the house. Brawner also testified about the search, about what he was

asked during the search, and about where his items of clothing and the black pouch containing the

drugs were located.

Prior to putting Brawner on the stand, his attorney had learned that the Government intended

to impeach Brawner with his convictions in 1976 for robbery and in 1980 for possession with the

intent to distribute heroin. Having tried but failed to convince the district judge to exclude questions

about his prior convictions because of their potential for prejudice, she apparently decided that

Brawnershould bring the facts out himself, i.e., under her direct examination, rather than wait for the

prosecutor to ask him about his prior convictions. Therefore, after asking Brawner a series of

questions about whether he either owned or had ever seen the black pouch in which the drugs were

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found, Brawner's attorney questioned him as follows:

Attorney: All right. Now, Mr. Brawner, you were convicted of robbery in 1976, isn't that correct?

Brawner: Yes.

Attorney: And you were convicted of possession with intent to distribute heroin, isn't that correct?

Brawner: Yes.

Attorney: What year was that?

Brawner: '79, '80.

Attorney: Do you recall if you went to trial or you plead in that case?

Brawner: I pleaded guilty to both.

Attorney: Why is that?

Brawner: Because I was guilty.

Without further comment Brawner's attorney then turned to questioning him about whether he lived

in the house in which he was arrested and what he knew about who lived there.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor's first three questions asked Brawner to confirm the

details of his conviction for possession with the intent to distribute heroin. The prosecutor then

questioned Brawner briefly about what had occurred on the day of his arrest. At no point did

Brawner's attorney ask for a limiting instruction; nor did the district judge offer one sua sponte.

The trial judge did give a limiting instruction with respect to the prior acts evidence as part

of hisfinal charge to the jury. The judge's final instructions were not transcribed, but the parties agree

that he told the jury that it was to consider Brawner's past convictions only for their bearing, if any,

upon his credibility as a witness, and not with respect to any of the substantive questions at issue in

the case. The jury convicted and the district judge sentenced Brawner to 27 years of imprisonment,

to be followed by four years of supervised release.

II. ANALYSIS

Brawner's only substantial challenge to his conviction is based upon the trial court's failure

to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte after Brawner testified concerning histwo prior convictions.

As a general matter, "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the

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character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith." FED. R. EVID. 404(b). In

other words, a jury may not infer (and evidence may not be introduced in order to encourage them

to infer) that because a defendant has committed a crime in the past he is a bad person and therefore

likely to have committed the crime for which he is on trial. Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.

469, 475-76 (1948) (noting that "[t]he inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the

contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one

with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge").

Nonetheless, Rule 404(b) permits evidence of prior bad acts to be introduced for other

purposes. For example, such evidence may be used in "an attempt to impeach the accused as a

witness." United States v. Bell, 506 F.2d 207, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1974). As Justice Holmes said some

time ago in a civil case:

[W]hen it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime, the only ground for

disbelieving himwhich such proof affordsisthe generalreadinessto do evil which the

conviction may be supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the

jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and thence that he has

lied in fact.

Gertz v. Fitchburg Railroad Co., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884). The same rationale applies as well in a

criminal case. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) ("The reason

for exposing the defendant's prior record isto attack his character, to call into question hisreliability

for truth-telling by showing his prior, relevant antisocial conduct") (emphasis in original).

The use of prior acts evidence therefore depends upon a distinction that although subtle has

nonetheless long been recognized in our law: the jury may infer from such evidence that the

defendant has a "bad character" and istherefore not a credible witness, but not that the defendant has

a "bad character" and therefore committed the crime with which he is charged. In order to bring this

distinction home to the jury, a defendant who isimpeached by evidence of a past conviction is entitled

to a limiting instructionthat is, an instruction to the jury that it may use the evidence of his prior

conviction only to assess his credibility, and not to infer that he is guilty of the crime for which he is

on trial. See FED. R. EVID. 105.

As we have seen, Brawner's attorneydid not ask for a limiting instruction either when she first

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brought out his prior convictions on direct examination or when the prosecution returned to the

subject on cross-examination; nor did she later object to the district judge's failure to offer one.

Nonetheless, Brawner now arguesthat the failure ofthe district judge to offersuch an instruction sua

sponte requires reversal of his conviction.

We begin our analysis ofBrawner's argument with the general principle stated in FederalRule

of Evidence 105:

When evidence which is admissible ... for one purpose but not admissible ... for

another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its

proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.

(Emphasis added). Rule 105 clearly places upon defense counsel the burden of requesting an

instruction limiting the use to which the jury may put evidence of the defendant's prior crime. As the

Supreme Court has noted, defense counsel's right to request such an instruction is a primary

sourcealong with the requirementsthat the evidence be relevant, offered for a proper purpose, and

probativefrom which "the protection against ... unfair prejudice emanates." Huddleston v. United

States, 485 U.S. 681, 691 (1988).

We have nonetheless held that the failure of a district judge to offer a limiting instruction to

the defendant sua sponte may constitute reversible error. Most notably, in United States v. Lewis,

693 F.2d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (footnotes omitted), we held that: "The court must give such

an instruction sua sponte only if the evidence has the potential for substantially prejudicing the

defendant." Hence, the appropriate focus of our inquiry is whether the admission of testimony

concerning Brawner's prior convictions substantially prejudiced hima form of plain error analysis.

See United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777-78 (1993) (holding that defendant who failstimely

to object during trial, "bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice"); see also United

States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (holding that a "per se approach to plain-error review is

flawed").

We most recently discussed the framework for determining whether a defendant has been

substantially prejudiced by the admission of evidence of a prior bad act in United States v. Copelin,

996 F.2d 379 (D.C. Cir. 1993). There "[we did] not hold that it is per se plain error for a district

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judge to neglect to offer an immediate limiting instruction whenever evidence is admitted only for

purposes of impeachment" but we did say that "there is a huge presumption of plain error" if he fails

to do so. Id. at 384. We anticipated that only in "rare situations" would a limiting instruction not be

necessary because the surrounding circumstances so clearly indicate that the defendant was not

substantially prejudiced by the evidence. Id. at 385.

In Copelin itself there was a distinct possibility that the defendant would be prejudiced by the

lack of a limiting instruction. At his trial for unlawful distribution of cocaine, the defendant testified

that he had never seen cocaine except perhaps on television. Id. at 381. In order to impeach that

testimony, the Government produced evidence that he had tested positive for cocaine three times

during his pretrial release. This account of the defendant's conduct while awaiting trial might have

inflamed the jury and led it to conclude (somewhat illogically) that Copelin was guilty of the crime

charged. In particular, the connection between Copelin's bad acts and the crime for which he was on

trial might have unduly influenced the jury absent an instruction to ignore it. Hence, in that case, the

court held that it was plain error for the trial judge not to offerif not immediately then at least in

his final chargeto instruct the jury to consider the evidence only for the purpose of impeachment.

In contrast, it is by no means obviousthat the defendant in this cocaine case wassubstantially

prejudiced by the evidence of his prior bad acts. For one, Brawner's convictions were more than ten

years behind him at the time of his trial, thus diminishing the chance that the present jury would view

Brawner as a "bad man," and perhaps even making him seem to be that rara avis, the former drug

distributor who has gone straight for a long time.

The important difference between this case and Copelin, however, is the way in which the

evidence of the defendant's past crimes was put before the jury. Brawner's own attorney asked him

about his prior convictions on direct examination, and she did so for a reason. She obviously believed

that ifshe brought out his past convictions herself, then their impact would be less than ifshe let the

prosecutor highlight themduring his cross-examination ofthe defendant. Had the trial judge stepped

in at this point in her direct examination, or for that matter when the prosecutor returned to the

subject, and offered a limiting instruction to defense counsel, the judge would only have defeated the

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defense attorney's strategy: Brawner's testimony about his previous convictions would have hung

over the silent courtroom like a black cloud for the jury to dwell upon while counsel and court

conferred at sidebar. As the Kentucky Supreme Court recently explained:

Defense counsel should be free to make as little of the admission by defendant of a

prior felony conviction as possible. As a matter of trial strategy, it may be decided

that [a limiting instruction] would only serve to emphasize the conviction, and hence

no admonition may be requested. If, on the other hand, a limiting admonition is

desired, it need only be requested.

Hall v. Commonwealth, 817 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Ky. 1991); see also United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d

169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that "[i]t is well known that, even when a limiting instruction is

likely to aid the accused's cause, astute defense counsel may prefer tactically to forego it in the

interest of avoiding itsinevitable focus ofthe jury's attention on unfavorable evidence"); 22CHARLES

A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5249, at 539

(1978) ("Critics have been skepticalregarding the utilityofinstructions and attorneys often prefer not

to have the evidence emphasized by such futile exhortations.").

Nonetheless, read literally Copelin would seem to require reversal in this case, for we cannot

say that thisrather ordinary case presentsthe "rare situation" in which the surrounding circumstances

clearly indicate that the defendant was not prejudiced by the introduction of his prior bad acts. By

unanimous agreement of the court, however, we hold that Copelin is inapplicable to cases in which

the defendant's prior bad acts are introduced into evidence by the defense rather than by the

prosecution. Our decision to narrow Copelin in this manner is based upon the strategic concerns

discussed above. If we are truly to leave "[d]efense counsel ... free to make as little of the admission

by a defendant of a prior felony conviction as possible," Hall, 817 S.W.2d at 229, then the scope of

the Copelin decision must be limited in order to leave defense counsel room to maneuver. Absent

some independent basisfor thinking counsel incompetent, therefore, we presume that where, as here,

defense counsel brings out the defendant's prior bad acts, the defense is pursuing a strategy for

minimizing the impact of that evidence, which is sure to be offered by the prosecution if the defense

does not act preemptively. Once we see that defense counsel is acting strategically, we can be

confident that the defendant is not substantially prejudiced for want of an immediate limiting

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instruction. Thus, it was not plain error for the district judge to fail sua sponte to offer Brawner a

limiting instruction.

III. CONCLUSION

To summarize, theCopelin decisioncontinuesto governcasesinwhich the prosecution brings

out evidence of the defendant's prior bad acts. If such evidence is brought out by the defense,

however, then the trial judge need not offer a limiting instruction unlessspecifically asked by defense

counselin which case the judge must immediately provide one; that is, waiting until charging the

jury at the conclusion of trial will not suffice. Defense counsel may ask for a limiting instruction, and

hence the judge must immediately provide one: (1) after the defense brings out the evidence of prior

bad acts and (2) after the prosecution returns, if it does, to the subject on cross-examination.

In this case the evidence of Brawner's prior conviction came in as part of his defense and we

therefore decline to reverse his conviction because the district court failed to offer him a limiting

instruction sua sponte. Brawner raises a number of other issues regarding the conduct of his trial,

none of which merits attention in a published opinion. For the reasons given above, the judgment of

the district court is

Affirmed.

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