Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00108/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sherman Antwan Broadhead
Plaintiff
Larry Woods
Defendant

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHERMAN ANTWAN BROADHEAD,

AIS #246842

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-0108-KD-M

:

OFFICER LARRY WOODS,

Defendant.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by an 

Alabama prison inmate, Sherman Broadhead, proceeding pro se 

and in forma pauperis, was referred to the undersigned 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 

72, and is now before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint 

(Doc. 1), Defendant, Larry Wood’s, Answer, Special Report, 

(Docs. 13, 16), and Plaintiff’s Response (Doc. 24). The 

Court has converted Defendant’s Special Report into a 

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 17), and, after 

consideration of such, and for the reasons set out below, 

it is recommended that Defendant’s Motion for Summary 

Judgment be granted and Plaintiff’s action be dismissed 

with prejudice.

Case 1:16-cv-00108-KD-M Document 27 Filed 09/09/16 Page 1 of 18
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FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, Sherman Broadhead, is an Alabama Department 

of Corrections (“ADOC”) inmate, serving a twenty year 

sentence for First Degree Rape at Holman Correctional 

Facility. (Doc. 1 at 5). Larry Woods is a Corporal 

employed by the Baldwin County Corrections Center. (Doc. 

13-2 at 2). 

This action arises out of an incident on August 29, 

2015, wherein Plaintiff was sprayed with OC Spray1 and hit 

with two shots from a pepper ball gun by Defendant. (Doc.

1). According to Plaintiff, on the day of the incident, he 

was confined in a “suicide cell” in the Baldwin County Jail

when he was told to “get down on the floor and put my 

hand[s] behind my back.” (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 1-1). 

Plaintiff asserts he “did everything he was told”, but that 

he was still sprayed in the face with mace. (Id.) After 

being sprayed, Plaintiff jumped up and started swinging at 

the officers in “self defense”. (Doc. 24 at 8-9). He was 

then shot twice with a pepper ball gun by Defendant Woods, 

taken to the floor by other officers, and ultimately placed 

in a restraint chair. (Id. at 9-11). 

As a result of the above-described incident, Plaintiff 

filed a Complaint against Defendant for criminal 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 The record contains a factual discrepancy as to whether Plaintiff was 

sprayed pepper spray, OC spray, or mace. However, the exact type of 

spray used is immaterial to this Court’s analysis. 

Case 1:16-cv-00108-KD-M Document 27 Filed 09/09/16 Page 2 of 18
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negligence, excessive force, and assault. (Id. at 4). For 

relief, Plaintiff requests “$350,000 for my damages and 

what was did to me and to make sure this officer can’t do 

this again to me or others again.” (Id. at 6). 

Defendant Wood filed his Answer and Special Report, 

denying Plaintiff’s allegations and pleading multiple 

defenses. (Docs. 13, 16). The relevant documents filed 

with the Special Report were: Plaintiff’s booking report 

(Doc. 13-1); the affidavit of Larry Woods (Doc. 13-2); the 

jail incident report (Doc. 13-3); the video of the incident 

(filed conventionally as Doc. 14); the statements of 

Officer Steven Drinkard and Staff Sergeant Klos (Docs. 13-5 

and 13-6, respectively); the Use of Force report (Doc. 13-

7); the Confinement Watch log (Doc. 13-8); all incident 

reports involving Plaintiff (Docs. 13-10 and 13-11); all 

disciplinary reports involving Plaintiff (Doc. 13-12); and 

all grievances completed by Plaintiff (Doc. 13-3). 

According to Defendant’s Special Report, Plaintiff was 

booked into the Baldwin County Detention Center on July 9, 

2015. (Doc. 13 at 2; Doc. 13-1). On August 29, 2015, the 

date of the subject incident, Defendant Woods was working 

in the “G” pod unit, when he was asked to assist with a 

situation involving Plaintiff. (Doc. 13 at 2; Doc. 13-2 at 

¶¶ 5-6; Doc. 13-3). Defendant Woods was relieved from GCase 1:16-cv-00108-KD-M Document 27 Filed 09/09/16 Page 3 of 18
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Pod to assist with Plaintiff whom he understood was 

continuously kicking his cell door and acting in an 

aggressive manner towards staff members. (Doc. 13 at 2-3; 

Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 7; Doc. 13-3). When Defendant arrived to

Plaintiff’s cell unit, Plaintiff was kicking his cell unit 

door and was not complying with the officers who were

already present (Staff Sergeant Klos, Private First Class 

Drinkard, and Private First Class Green,) all of whom were 

at Plaintiff’s cell with the intention of putting Plaintiff 

in a restraint chair. (Doc. 13 at 3; Doc. 13-2 at ¶¶ 8-9;

Doc. 13-3; Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-6.) 

Upon arrival to Plaintiff’s cell, Defendant ordered 

Plaintiff to lie down and place his hands behind his back, 

but Plaintiff did not comply. (Doc. 13 at 3; Doc. 13-2 at

¶¶ 10 and 11; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 14; Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-6). 

According to Defendant, Plaintiff was additionally in a 

push-up position that could have allowed him to quickly 

jump up and potentially fight any of the officers that were 

present. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 12.). Due to Plaintiff’s failure

to lie flat on the ground and place his hands behind his 

back, Defendant sprayed Plaintiff with a one second burst 

of pepper spray. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 13; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 14;

Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-6; Doc. 13-7). Once pepper sprayed,

Plaintiff immediately jumped up and started swinging his 

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fists at Defendant. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 14; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 

14; Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-6). Defendant was scratched by 

Plaintiff after which Defendant shot Plaintiff with two 

pepper balls from his pepper ball gun. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶¶ 

15-17; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 13-5; Doc. 14; Doc. 13-6).

After being shot, Plaintiff complied with the 

officers’ commands by lying flat on the floor and placing

his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. (Doc. 13-2 at

¶ 18; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 14; Doc. 13-5; Doc. 13-6). Plaintiff 

was then placed in a restraining chair and taken by the 

correctional officers to be decontaminated. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 

19; Doc. 13-3; Doc. 14; Docs. 13-5, 13-6, and 13-7). Video 

of the incident does not show the entirety of the scene 

leading up to Defendant arriving to Plaintiff’s cell, but 

does show Plaintiff lying on the floor before being sprayed 

with pepper spray by Defendant. (Doc. 14). Video also 

shows Plaintiff jumping up and swinging at Defendant before 

being shot with pepper balls and ultimately being placed in

a restraint chair by several officers. (Id.)

Prior to the subject incident, Plaintiff had informed 

some of the correctional officers that he was going to send 

one of them to the hospital. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 25). 

Additionally, in the weeks leading up to the subject 

incident, Plaintiff verbally threatened Defendant on 

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numerous occasions and had at least fifteen incident 

reports written on his behalf due to his attitude and

behavior, one of which resulted in Plaintiff being informed 

that any further confrontations would result in him being 

sprayed with OC spray. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 26; Doc. 13-11; 

Doc. 13-6 at 3; Doc. 13-12). Plaintiff did not file any 

inmate request slips or grievance forms regarding the 

August 29, 2015 incident. (Doc. 13-2 at ¶ 27; Doc. 13-13).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure grant this Court 

authority under Rule 56 to render “judgment as a matter of 

law” to the party who moves for summary judgment. 

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper “if the 

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 

fact. . . .” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 

(1986). The Court must view the evidence produced by “the 

nonmoving party, and all factual inferences arising from 

it, in the light most favorable to” that party. Barfield 

v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 934 (11th Cir. 1989). However, 

Rule 56(e) states that:

If a party fails to properly support an 

assertion of fact or fails to properly 

address another party’s assertion of 

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fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may:

(1) give an opportunity to properly 

support or address the fact;

(2) consider the fact undisputed for 

purposes of the motion; 

(3) grant summary judgment if the 

motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered 

undisputed—show that the movant is 

entitled to it; or

(4) issue any other appropriate order.

FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). “[T]here is no issue for trial unless 

there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party. . . . If the 

evidence is merely colorable, . . . or is not significantly 

probative, . . . summary judgment may be granted.” 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986) (internal citations omitted). “Summary judgment is 

mandated where a party fails to make a showing sufficient 

to establish the existence of an element essential to that 

party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden 

of proof at trial.” Custom Mfg. and Eng’g, Inc. v. Midway 

Servs., Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).

Also, it is well settled that a conclusion cannot be 

taken as true, and the Court will not accept conclusory 

allegations as facts in consideration of a motion for 

summary judgment. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 

(2009); see also Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 

1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000)(“[t]his court has consistently 

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held that conclusory allegations without specific 

supporting facts have no probative value”); Fullman v. 

Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 1984)(a 

plaintiff’s mere verification of conclusory allegations is 

not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment). 

DISCUSSION

A. Excessive Force

Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims for excessive 

force in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, criminal 

negligence, and assault. (Doc. 1 at 4). According to 

Plaintiff, the excessive force claim is supported by the 

fact that Plaintiff did as he was told prior to being 

pepper sprayed by Defendant, and, yet, was still sprayed

maliciously and without cause. (Doc. 1, 1-1; Doc. 24, 

generally).

Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, ... subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United 

States ... to the deprivation of any 

rights ... secured by the Constitution 

and laws, shall be liable to the party 

injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for 

redress . . . . 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). 

The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and 

unusual punishment governs the amount of force that prison 

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officials are entitled to use against inmates. Campbell v. 

Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999). An excessive 

force claim has two requisite parts: an objective and a 

subjective component. Sims v. Mashburn, 25 F.3d 980, 983 

(11th Cir. 1994). In order to satisfy the objective 

component, the inmate must show that the prison official's 

conduct was “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 

294, 298 (1991)). The subjective component requires a 

showing that the force used was “maliciously and 

sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm” rather 

than “a good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21 

(1986). In order to determine whether the force was used 

for the malicious and sadistic purpose of causing harm or 

whether the force was applied in good faith, courts 

consider the following factors: the need for the exercise 

of force, the relationship between the need for force and 

the force applied, the extent of injury that the inmate 

suffered, the extent of the threat to the safety of staff 

and other inmates, and any efforts taken to temper the 

severity of a forceful response. Skelly v. Okaloosa Cty. 

Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 456 Fed.Appx. 845, 848 (11th Cir. 

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2012) (quoting Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1217 

(11th Cir. 2009)).

In the present action, there is no dispute that on the 

day of the subject altercation, prior to Plaintiff being 

sprayed with pepper spray, he was kicking his cell door. 

(Doc. 24 at 3, 21). The only factual dispute is whether 

Plaintiff’s behavior and refusal to follow the commands of 

officers caused him to be pepper sprayed or, as Plaintiff 

contends, he was sprayed despite doing everything he was 

told. Assuming, as Plaintiff asserts, that Plaintiff was 

sprayed while lying on the floor and following the commands 

of officers, there was still no violation of the Eighth 

Amendment. 

Regardless of whether Plaintiff was complying with the 

oficers’ commands at the precise moment that he was pepper 

sprayed, the subject incident was not an isolated event. 

Instead, the number of incidents involving Plaintiff 

leading up to the incident which is the subject of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint must be considered. In that regard 

and in addition to the fact that Plaintiff was admittedly 

kicking his cell door, the record reflects that prior to 

the subject altercation, Plaintiff was involved in 

approximately fifteen disciplinary incidents for his 

behavior. (Doc. 13-11 at 1-32, generally; Doc. 13-12). 

Case 1:16-cv-00108-KD-M Document 27 Filed 09/09/16 Page 10 of 18
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The record additionally shows that at least four of these 

previous incidents included verbal threats of physical

violence to officers and involved Plaintiff kicking his 

cell door and refusing to follow the commands of officers. 

(Id.) The record further shows that Plaintiff had 

previously made verbal and written threats towards 

officers, including Defendant. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff

had been forewarned that, due to his behavior, any future 

altercations would result in him being pepper sprayed. 

(Doc. 13-6 at 3; Doc. 13-11 at 27). 

Under these circumstances, Defendant Woods could have 

reasonably perceived Plaintiff’s conduct to be a threat to 

prison order and discipline and could have reasonably 

believed it necessary to use some measure of force to take 

physical control of Plaintiff and remove him from his cell;

a belief which was proven correct by Plaintiff’s resulting 

attack upon Defendant. Moreover, there is no evidence that 

the force applied, a one second burst of pepper spray, was

used “maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm rather 

than in a “good faith effort to maintain or restore 

discipline”, given Plaintiff’s propensity to become hostile

and to refuse to follow the commands of officers, including 

Defendant. Whitley, 475 U.S. 312, 320–21.2 Further, there 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 2 See also Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 762-63 (4th Cir. 1996) 

(finding that the spraying of mace in the face and chest of a 

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is a lack of evidence that Plaintiff’s injury, described by 

Plaintiff as a hurting and bleeding left side (Doc. 24 at 

11), was anything other than minimal and it is undisputed 

that Plaintiff was provided with medical treatment, 

including a decontamination, immediately after the subject 

altercation took place. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to 

establish a violation of his Eighth Amendment right as a 

result of being pepper sprayed.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim 

is based on him being shot with two pepper balls by 

Defendant, Plaintiff’s claim is equally unavailing as it is 

clear that Plaintiff was shot after attacking Defendant and 

in an effort to de-escalate the subject altercation. As a 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! recalcitrant prisoner while in his cell did not constitute cruel and 

unusual punishment because he had been throwing water and refused to 

remove his arm from a food service slot); Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 

1260, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding the use of mace in a 

prisoner's cell because he refused to be handcuffed), cert. denied, 470 

U.S. 1085, 105 S. Ct. 1846, 85 L. Ed. 2d 144 (1985); Clemmons v. 

Greggs, 509 F.2d 1338, 1340 (5th Cir. 1975) (ruling that there was no 

constitutional violation when mace was used during a disturbance 

because there was no intent to punish), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946, 96 

S. Ct. 360, 46 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975); Geas v. DuBois, 868 F. Supp. 19, 

24 (D. Mass. 1994) (ruling that “'the use of non-dangerous quantities 

of [a chemical agent] in order to prevent a perceived future danger 

does not' generally overstep constitutional parameters.”); Blair-El v. 

Tinsman, 666 F. Supp. 1218, 1222 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (finding that 

officers acted reasonably when they sprayed a chemical spray into an 

inmate's cell to quell a disturbance); cf. Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318, 

324 (11th Cir. 1987) (relying on the decision in Soto v. Dickey in 

which chemical agents were used, to determine that the denial of water 

was an immediate, coercive measure, and not punishment). It is only a 

“violation of the Eighth Amendment [Fourteenth Amendment] for prison 

officials to use mace or other chemical agents in quantities greater 

than necessary or for the sole purpose of punishment or the infliction 

of pain.” Soto, 744 F.2d at 1270. “A limited application of mace may be 

'much more humane and effective than a flesh to flesh confrontation 

with an inmate.'” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 763 (quoting Soto, 

744 F.2d at 1262).

Case 1:16-cv-00108-KD-M Document 27 Filed 09/09/16 Page 12 of 18
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result, there is no evidence that Defendant’s action of 

shooting Plaintiff with pepper balls was for a malicious or 

sadistic purpose, that the use of force was not 

proportional to the need to restore order, or that 

Plaintiff’s injury3 was more than minimal. Therefore, 

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for excessive force under 

the Eighth Amendment and summary judgment is due to be 

granted as a matter of law.4

B. Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)

Even assuming that Plaintiff could establish a 

violation of constitutional right, his claim is still due 

to be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative 

remedies. 

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, provides that “[n]o 

action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 

under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 

by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 

correctional facility until such administrative remedies as 

are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 3 Plaintiff does not distinguish whether his injury of a “hurting and 

bleeding” left side was a result of being pepper sprayed, being hit 

with pepper balls, or some other cause. However, there is no 

indication that Plaintiff suffered any injury beyond those relating to 

his left side. 

4 Because this Court has determined that Plaintiff failed to establish a 

violation of a constitutional right, it is unnecessary to address 

whether the Defendant has qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 

U.S. 194, 201 (2001)(“If no constitutional right would have been 

violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for 

further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”)

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“Therefore, when a state provides a grievance procedure for 

its prisoners, ... an inmate alleging harm suffered from 

prison conditions must file a grievance and exhaust the 

remedies available under that procedure before pursuing a § 

1983 lawsuit.” Porter v. Sightler, 457 Fed.Appx. 880, 881-

82 (11th Cir.2012) (quoting Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368, 

1372 (11th Cir.2008) (quotation marks omitted). The PLRA's 

exhaustion requirement “applies to all inmate suits about 

prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or 

particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive 

force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 

516, 532, 122 S.Ct. 983, 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 12 (2002). 

In the present action, it is evident that Baldwin 

County Jail has a grievance procedure and that Plaintiff is 

familiar with the grievance process. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 

13-13). There is also no dispute that Plaintiff failed to 

file a grievance relating to the incident which is the 

subject of this litigation. (Doc. 1 at 3; Doc. 24 at 13). 

Rather, Plaintiff only contends that he did not file a 

grievance because he was not given paper and then because 

he was moved to another jail a few days after the subject 

incident. (Id.) This Court understands Plaintiff’s 

contentions to assert that the grievance process was 

unavailable to him. “To demonstrate that administrative 

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remedies were unavailable, Plaintiff must provide specific 

facts which indicate that jail staff inhibited him from 

utilizing the grievance process. “ Milner v. Jennings, 

2008 WL 5381826 at *6 (December 23, 2008) (citing to Boyd 

v. Corr. Corp. Of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 998 (6th Cir.2004) 

(“nonspecific allegations of fear” and “subjective 

feeling[s] of futility” no excuse for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies).

In the instant action, Plaintiff does not provide any 

details as to the circumstances surrounding his inability 

to complete a grievance for lack of paper, i.e., whether 

and when he asked for paper, who he asked, what response he 

was given, an explanation for a refusal, etc., and his 

allegation without any supporting evidence is insufficient.

It is also apparent that Plaintiff was not moved to a 

different facility, according to Plaintiff, “for a few 

days”, so there is no indication that Plaintiff did not 

have time to complete a grievance. (Doc. 1 at 3.) As 

such, Plaintiff has not shown that he exhausted his 

administrative remedies or that the administrative remedies 

were unavailable to him following the incident that is the 

subject of this action. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims 

are due to be dismissed for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies.

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C. Criminal Negligence and Assault Claims

In addition to Plaintiff’s excessive force claim, 

Plaintiff has also asserted a claim for criminal negligence 

and assault. However, both of these claims are additionally 

due to be dismissed. 

Negligence is not a cognizable claim under § 1983. 

See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 

115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991). Further, to the extent Plaintiff is 

seeking to initiate a criminal prosecution against 

Defendant, no such remedy is available to Plaintiff. See 

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137, 106 S.Ct. 2440, 91 

L.Ed.2d 110 (1986); see also Otero v. United States 

Attorney General, 832 F.2d 141, 141 (11th Cir.1987) (“[A] 

private citizen has no judicially cognizable interest in 

the prosecution or non-prosecution of another.”). As a 

result, Plaintiff’s claim for criminal negligence is due to 

be dismissed.

Further, Plaintiff’s claim for assault is a state law 

cause of action and it is within the discretion of this 

Court to exercise pendant jurisdiction over such a claim. 

See Rainey v. Allstate, 370 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (11th 

Cir.2004) (citing to Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 

1119 (11th Cir.1999). However, the Eleventh Circuit has 

“encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state 

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claims when, as here, the federal claims have been 

dismissed prior to trial.” Rainey, 370 F.3d at 1089. In 

the present action, because Plaintiff’s federal law claim 

is due to be dismissed for the reasons stated hereinabove, 

Plaintiff’s state law claim of assault is, likewise, due to 

be dismissed.

Conclusion

In conclusion, and for the reasons set out above, 

there is no question of material fact from which a jury 

could reasonably find that Plaintiff was subjected to the 

use of excessive force or that Defendant’s conduct caused 

the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 

Further, there is no cognizable claim for negligence under 

§ 1983 and, lastly, this Court is not inclined to exercise 

pendant jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claim for 

assault. As a result, it is recommended that Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment be granted and this action be 

dismissed with prejudice. 

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS 

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

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Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED.R.CIV.P. 

72(b); S.D. ALA. GenLR 72(c)(2). The parties should note 

that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party failing to 

object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations 

contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with 

the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to 

challenge on appeal the district court's order based on 

unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party 

was informed of the time period for objecting and the 

consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the 

absence of a proper objection, however, the court may 

review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the 

interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to be 

specific, an objection must identify the specific finding 

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the 

basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

DONE this 9th day of September, 2016.

s/ BERT W. MILLING, JR 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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