Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02183/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02183-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Abidemi Ajayi
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14‐2183

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

ABIDEMI AJAYI,

Defendant‐Appellant.

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 190 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 21, 2015 — DECIDED DECEMBER 11, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.  

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Abidemi Ajayi deposited a

$344,657.84 fraudulent check, which had originally been

written to another company, into his bank account. Ajayi

spent about half of the money before the bank froze his ac‐

count. He was indicted and convicted after a jury trial of five

counts of bank fraud and one count of money laundering.

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He now appeals his conviction arguing that the evidence

was insufficient to establish that he knew the check was al‐

tered. However, we find that the evidence of his guilt, which

includes all the facts and circumstances surrounding the

check, was compelling and sufficient to support the convic‐

tion. He also challenges the district court’s decision to ex‐

clude certain emails related to his business plan to secure

MRI machines because they were not related to the case. We

agree with the district court and find that the emails were

irrelevant because the emails had nothing to do with the

fraudulent check or the person Ajayi claims sent him the

check. Next, Ajayi contends that the district court erred by

only submitting to the jury a portion of the pattern jury in‐

struction that defines scheme, which would permit the jury

to find him guilty without proof of misrepresentation. But,

we find no error in the jury instructions because the instruc‐

tions, reviewed as a whole, did not permit the jury to find

him guilty without finding proof of misrepresentation. He

also contends that the five bank fraud counts were multiplic‐

itous. Since the four counts of bank fraud arose from Ajayi’s

acts of withdrawing funds after he deposited the fraudulent

check and were merely in furtherance of the bank fraud, we

conclude that four bank fraud counts were multiplicitous.

Therefore, we vacate four of the bank fraud convictions. Fi‐

nally, he asserts that there was a variance or a constructive

amendment between the indictment and the proof offered at

trial, but this contention is without merit.  

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts were introduced at Ajayi’s trial. Aja‐

yi, a U.S. citizen of Nigerian descent, was an electrical engi‐

neer, with a specific background related to magnetic reso‐

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No. 14‐2183 3

nance imaging (“MRI”) machines. Ajayi wanted to start a

business selling MRI products in Africa. So, he incorporated

GR Icon (“GRI”) in Illinois and another company in Africa.

To fund the business he sought money from private inves‐

tors and African governments.

While traveling to Cameroon in 2009, he struck up a con‐

versation with Charles Brown, a man on the plane who was

reading an issue of Scientific American that had an MRI ma‐

chine on the cover. Ajayi introduced himself, explained he

worked with MRI machines, and eventually told Brown

about his business and showed him his business materials.

They talked for six hours. Brown indicated that he was a

venture capitalist and by the end of the conversation, he

stated that he would be interested in investing $45,000.

After returning home, Ajayi received an envelope from

Brown with a $344,657.84 check. He called Brown to ask

about the check amount. Brown explained that the account‐

ing department had made an error, told Ajayi to deposit the

check right away, and stated that they would work out a

way for Ajayi to refund the difference.

On November 27, 2009, Ajayi deposited the check

through an automatic teller machine (“ATM”) into his GRI

account. Before this deposit, the account balance was $90.08.

(And during 2009, it never had an ending balance over

$332.) The bank held the check for about two weeks before

releasing the funds around December 8, 2009. Ajayi called

Brown and told him that the check had cleared. Thereafter,

Brown flew to Chicago unannounced and told Ajayi to meet

him downtown. They met, and Brown demanded the differ‐

ence between the check and the $45,000 promised.  

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Pursuant to Brown’s instructions, between December 9

and December 12, 2009, Ajayi wrote at least five checks to

himself from the GRI account and cashed them. As charged

in the indictment, on December 9, 2009, he wrote a $9,600

check to himself and cashed it at a Chase branch in Evans‐

ton. The next day, he wrote a $16,500 check to himself and

cashed it at a Chase branch in downtown Chicago. On De‐

cember 11, 2009, he wrote a $17,000 check to himself and

cashed it at a Chase branch just north of downtown Chicago.

During that bank visit, he also made a $53,000 wire transfer

from the account. On December 12, 2009, he wrote a $9,650

check to himself and cashed it at a Chase branch on the

north side of Chicago. That day, he also wrote a $9,800 check

to himself and cashed it at a different Chase branch on the

north side of Chicago. At some point during this period,

Ajayi also made retail purchases at Gap and the Apple Store.

There were additional checks cashed in a similar manner

that were not charged in the indictment.

In total, he was able to withdraw more than $171,000 be‐

fore the bank froze his account. The bank learned from

ABM, the Texas company that issued the check, that ABM

believed the check’s payee had been changed because the

intended payee, Pollock, another Texas company, had con‐

tacted ABM asking for payment. After investigating, ABM

learned that the payee’s name on the check had been altered.

There are no facts as to who altered the check and how it got

from Texas to Illinois.  

Ajayi attempted to offer into evidence emails between

him and individuals who would help facilitate his purchase

of MRI equipment. These emails were exchanged around

July 20–21, 2009, December 9–30, 2009, and January 16, 2010.

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No. 14‐2183 5

In response to the government’s argument that Ajayi’s busi‐

ness was not legitimate, Ajayi offered these emails to show

that he was legitimately trying to enter the MRI business.

The district court deemed the emails not relevant because

they did not relate to the fraudulent check, the charges, or

Brown.

During a hearing held at the close of evidence, the gov‐

ernment proposed pattern jury instructions, and stated that

any exceptions were noted. As to the jury instruction defin‐

ing “scheme,” the government did not use all the wording of

the pattern jury instruction, and it did not contain a state‐

ment indicating any alteration. The government did not in‐

form Ajayi or the court that it was not a pattern instruction,

and Ajayi’s counsel assumed that it was a pattern instruction

and stated “no objection.”

The government charged Ajayi with five counts of bank

fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(1) and (2), one count of money

laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a), and one count of

knowingly making and possessing an altered check under 18

U.S.C. § 513(a). The jury convicted Ajayi of the bank fraud

and money laundering counts. The district court sentenced

Ajayi to 44 months’ imprisonment. Ajayi appeals his convic‐

tion.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Ajayi raises five challenges to his conviction.

Specifically, he challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence

underlying his convictions for bank fraud and money laun‐

dering, (2) the district court’s decision to exclude Ajayi’s

business emails on the ground of relevance, (3) the district

court’s failure to give the pattern jury instruction defining

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scheme, (4) the five bank fraud counts as multiplicitous, and

(5) whether there was a variance or a constructive amend‐

ment between the indictment and the proof offered at trial.

We address each argument in turn.

A. Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain Ajayi’s Convic‐

tions.

Ajayi challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in sup‐

port of the convictions for bank fraud and money launder‐

ing. He argues that an essential fact to each count was that

he knew the check he deposited was altered and that the

government failed to prove this fact. We disagree.

To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

used to convict him, Ajayi must show that, “based on the ev‐

idence presented at trial, no rational juror could find guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Morris, 576 F.3d

661, 666 (7th Cir. 2009). We often describe this as a nearly in‐

surmountable hurdle. See, e.g., id. at 665–66 (quoting United

States v. Pulido, 69 F.3d 192, 205 (7th Cir. 1995)). This descrip‐

tion is apt because we will only find the evidence insufficient

“when the record contains no evidence, regardless of how it

is weighed, from which the trier of fact could find guilt be‐

yond a reasonable doubt” as to each element of the crime.

United States v. Domnenko, 763 F.3d 768, 772 (7th Cir. 2014)

(quoting United States v. Torres‐Chavez, 744 F.3d 988, 993 (7th

Cir. 2014)). And, we must “view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government.” Morris, 576 F.3d at 666.

In order to convict Ajayi for bank fraud under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1344(1), the government must prove: “(1) there was a

scheme to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant

knowingly executed or attempted to execute the scheme; (3)

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No. 14‐2183 7

the defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and (4) the

deposits of the financial institution were insured by the

FDIC at the time of the charged offense.” United States v. Par‐

ker, 716 F.3d 999, 1008 (7th Cir. 2013). Bank fraud under

§ 1344(2) requires the government to prove that there was a

scheme to obtain money from the bank and that the scheme

involved a materially false or fraudulent pretense, represen‐

tation, or promise, in addition to elements two through four

necessary under § 1344(1). See United States v. Higgins, 270

F.3d 1070, 1073–74 (7th Cir. 2001). Money laundering under

18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) requires the government to prove the de‐

fendant knew the transaction involved criminally derived

property that was derived from an unlawful activity, here,

bank fraud. See United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 791–92

(7th Cir. 2006). Because Ajayi contends that essential to each

count was proof that he knew the check was altered and the

government failed to prove that fact, we will only address

that aspect of the crimes.

The government introduced evidence establishing that

the fraudulent alterations of the check were readily appar‐

ent, that Ajayi had control of the business account, with a

$90.08 balance, that carried a balance of less than $332 the

year before the deposit. The government also proved that

Ajayi deposited the check through an ATM as opposed to a

teller and that within five days of the check’s clearance, Aja‐

yi withdrew approximately $171,000. He wrote checks to

himself that he cashed at different branches, sent a wire

transfer to a third‐party in Florida, and made purchases at

retailers such as Gap and the Apple Store.

While there was no direct evidence that Ajayi deposited

the check knowing it had been altered, the government

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could also establish this fact by circumstantial evidence and

by inferences drawn from the scheme itself. See United States

v. Howard, 30 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 1994); see also United

States v. Jackson, 540 F.3d 578, 594 (7th Cir. 2008). Based on

the government’s circumstantial evidence regarding the ac‐

count balances and the way that Ajayi withdrew funds, a ra‐

tional juror could have found that Ajayi knowingly deposit‐

ed a fraudulent check. Additionally, there was evidence that

the alterations on the check were obvious. Given these facts,

Ajayi’s story that he was expecting a $45,000 check—but re‐

ceived one for almost $350,000, and cashed it—is highly sus‐

pect. Finally, this evidence was sufficient not only to estab‐

lish that Ajayi deposited the check knowing of the alterna‐

tion, but it also supports the money laundering conviction.

Relying on United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886 (7th

Cir. 1999), Ajayi finally argues that as to the bank fraud

counts, the fraud scheme ended when Ajayi deposited the

check, so evidence of his activities after cashing the check

cannot establish that he knew the check was fraudulent.

“[T]he crime of bank fraud is complete when the defendant

places the bank at risk of financial loss, and not necessarily

when the loss itself occurs.” Anderson, 188 F.3d at 888. The

“bank fraud statute is meant to punish each ‘execution’ of

the scheme to defraud, and not each act in furtherance of the

scheme to defraud.” Id. at 889. Although the crime is com‐

plete when the bank is put at risk of financial loss, a defend‐

ant could still engage in subsequent acts in furtherance of

the scheme that are not indictable, but are still part of the

scheme. See United States v. Longfellow, 43 F.3d 318, 323 (7th

Cir. 1994). Ajayi overstates the holding in Anderson. Even if

the withdrawal of funds were acts in furtherance of the

crime, as opposed to separate crimes as charged, the un‐

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charged acts could be evidence that supports the conviction.

See Anderson, 188 F.3d at 889; Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 323.

B. No Abuse of Discretion to Refuse Admission of

Emails.

Ajayi argues that the central issue at trial was “whether

he knowingly executed the bank fraud, i.e., whether he

knew the check was altered.” He contends that the district

court erred by excluding emails exchanged between him and

individuals who were helping him buy or attempting to sell

him MRI machines because the emails would have support‐

ed his defense that the check was intended to help his fledg‐

ling MRI business. These emails were sent around July 20–

21, 2009, December 9–30, 2009, and January 16, 2010. He

maintains that the jury could have reasonably inferred from

the text and timing of the emails that he had been contem‐

plating the purchase of MRI machines to start his business

for at least four months before he received the check in No‐

vember 2009, and that after he received the check, he in‐

creased the seriousness of his inquiries about the MRI ma‐

chines. He also argues that the emails would have discredit‐

ed the government’s argument that his business was not le‐

gitimate and the check had no legitimate purpose.  

We review the district court’s decision to exclude evi‐

dence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Holt, 460 F.3d

934, 936 (7th Cir. 2006). Even if the district court erred, “[w]e

will reverse and order a new trial only if any evidentiary er‐

rors are not harmless.” United States v. Simon, 727 F.3d 682,

696 (7th Cir. 2013). We evaluate challenges to the admissibil‐

ity of evidence in light of all the evidence before the jury.

Holt, 460 F.3d at 936.

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Relevant evidence is evidence that has a tendency to

make a fact more or less probable than it would be without

the evidence and involves a fact of consequence in determin‐

ing the action. Fed. R. Evid. 401. Although the district court

was not required to exclude this evidence, it was acting

within its discretion when it did. District courts have “broad

discretion to control the admission of evidence.” United

States v. Ozuna, 561 F.3d 728, 738 (7th Cir. 2009). Evidentiary

rulings are “subject to reversal only if ‘no reasonable person

could take the view adopted by the trial court.’” United

States v. Blitch, 773 F.3d 837, 847 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Unit‐

ed States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2008)). While the

emails may have shown that Ajayi had a legitimate business,

a reasonable person could have taken the view that they

were not germane because they had no connection to the

crime—the forged check, Brown, or Ajayi’s intent to engage

in the scheme. Therefore, the exclusion of the emails was not

an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d

814, 825 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that the district court did not

abuse its discretion by excluding evidence because the evi‐

dence did not have any bearing on the elements of the

crime).

C. No Error in Failure to Give Pattern Scheme Jury In‐

struction.

Ajayi argues that the district court’s failure to include

certain language from the pattern jury instruction that de‐

fines “scheme” constituted plain error and prejudiced him.

The government responds that the issue is not reviewable

because Ajayi waived his objection to the jury instruction

when he affirmatively agreed to it as proposed by the gov‐

ernment, and if the issue were not waived, there was no er‐

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No. 14‐2183 11

ror. We agree. Even if we were to find that Ajayi did not

waive his right to challenge the “scheme” jury instruction,

he fails to establish that there was plain error.

Ordinarily, we treat an affirmatively stated “no objec‐

tion” to a jury instruction as a waiver. See, e.g., United States

v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 729–30 (7th Cir. 2013). “But in Natale,

we recognized the harshness of the waiver rule where de‐

fense counsel’s statements likely resulted from negligently

bypassing a valid argument rather than a knowing inten‐

tional decision.” United States v. Pust, 798 F.3d 597, 602 (7th

Cir. 2015). When a simple “no objection” was given during a

rote call‐and‐response colloquy with the district court judge

during a charging conference, we suggested that it may be

that waiver is not presumed and the court may examine

whether the objection was forfeited rather than waived. Na‐

tale, 719 F.3d at 730–31. We further suggested that reviewing

these issues may be proper when the alleged erroneous in‐

struction “inaccurately state[d] the law by minimizing or

omitting elements required for conviction.” Id. at 731. Here,

Ajayi’s counsel stated “no objection” during a rote colloquy

with the district court. Also, the government represented

that the instruction was a pattern one and did not disclose

that the instruction omitted language that was relevant to

the case. (In other instances, the government noted altera‐

tions to the pattern instruction or when the instruction was

not a pattern one.)

However, even if we were to conclude that the deletion

of this language was an error, he has not shown that it was

plain. We may only find plain error if he establishes that

there is: (1) an error or defect; (2) that is clear or obvious; and

(3) that affected his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States,

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556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If the defendant can establish “the

above three prongs ..., the court of appeals has the discretion

to remedy the error,” if it seriously affects the fairness, integ‐

rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.  

The Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions

defines “scheme” for charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The

pattern instruction, in full, states:

A scheme is a plan or course of action formed with

the intent to accomplish some purpose.  

[In considering whether the government has proven

a scheme to obtain moneys, funds, credits, assets, securi‐

ties, or other property from a [bank] [financial institu‐

tion] by means of false pretenses, representations or

promises, the government must prove at least one of the

[false pretenses, representations, promises, or] acts

charged in the portion of the indictment describing the

scheme. However, the government is not required to

prove all of them.]  

[A scheme to defraud a [bank] [financial institution]

means a plan or course of action intended to deceive or

cheat that [bank] [financial institution] or [to obtain

money or property or to cause the [potential] loss of

money or property by the [bank] [financial institution].

[A scheme to defraud need not involve any false state‐

ment or misrepresentation of fact.]]

Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit 413

(2012). The commentary explains when to use the bracketed

language.

The first bracketed paragraph should be given in a

case in which a scheme to obtain money from a bank by

means of false pretenses, representations or promises is

charged under § 1344(2). The second bracketed para‐

graph should be given in a case in which a scheme to de‐

fraud a bank is charged. Where both methods of violat‐

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No. 14‐2183 13

ing the statute are charged, both paragraphs should be

given.

Id. The government’s proposed instruction, which was

adopted by the court, only included the first sentence and

the second bracketed paragraph of the pattern instruction.1

Ajayi argues that the district court erred. Because its jury

instruction did not include the language from the pattern

instruction clarifying what constitutes a scheme, the jury did

not know that it had to find proof of a misrepresentation to

convict him.

The district court’s failure to include the language of the

first bracketed paragraph of the pattern instruction defining

“scheme” did not permit the jury to find Ajayi guilty with‐

out proof of a misrepresentation. The indictment charged

Ajayi under § 1344(2). So, the instruction arguably should

have included this paragraph. But we must keep in mind

that the instruction given immediately before the scheme in‐

struction informed the jury that it must find proof of a mis‐

representation beyond a reasonable doubt. It stated that the

government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

the “defendant knowingly executed the scheme” and that

the “scheme involved a materially false or fraudulent pre‐

tense, representation, or promise.” This language informed

                                                  1 The jury instruction used by the court stated:

A scheme is a plan or course of action formed with

the intent to accomplish some purpose.  

A scheme to defraud a bank means a plan or course

of action intended to deceive or cheat that bank or to ob‐

tain money or property or to cause the potential loss of

money or property by the bank.  

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the jury that proof of a misrepresentation was required. We

assume the jury follows the instructions given. United States

v. Keskes, 703 F.3d 1078, 1086 (7th Cir. 2013). Ajayi did not

point to anything in the record to overcome that presump‐

tion. The omitted language defining scheme would merely

have informed the jury that regardless of how many misrep‐

resentations are alleged in the indictment, the government

must prove at least one. There was no plain error and the

absence of the language did not permit the jury to find Ajayi

guilty without the evidence necessary for conviction.  

D. Bank Fraud Counts Are Multiplicitous.

Ajayi contends that the five counts of bank fraud in the

indictment are multiplicitous. The government contends that

the bank fraud counts are not multiplicitous because each

check Ajayi wrote to himself and cashed was a separate exe‐

cution of the fraud scheme. Because Ajayi failed to challenge

the indictment on multiplicity grounds before trial, the claim

is forfeited and subject to plain error review. United States v.

Parker, 508 F.3d 434, 440 n.5 (7th Cir. 2007).

Counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of the indictment charged Ajayi

with bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344(1) and (2). The in‐

dictment alleged a fraud scheme where Ajayi, knowing the

check had been altered, deposited the check into his business

account to create an inflated balance. The balance was inflat‐

ed, the government alleged, to deceive JP Morgan Chase into

honoring checks and paying debits drawn on the account.

Count 1 described this general scheme and the first check

drawn on the business account that Ajayi wrote to himself

and cashed. Of the remaining bank fraud counts, each count

was for one of the four other checks drawn on the business

account that Ajayi wrote to himself and cashed.  

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No. 14‐2183 15

A multiplicitous indictment charges a single offense as

separate counts. United States v. Starks, 472 F.3d 466, 468–69

(7th Cir. 2006). It exposes the “defendant to the threat of re‐

ceiving multiple punishments for the same offense in viola‐

tion of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amend‐

ment.” Id. at 469. To “determine whether a given indictment

contains multiplicitous counts, we look to the applicable

criminal statute to see what the allowable ‘unit’ of prosecu‐

tion is—the minimum amount of activity for which criminal

liability attaches.” United States v. Allender, 62 F.3d 909, 912

(7th Cir. 1995).

The bank fraud statute criminalizes a knowing execution

of a scheme to defraud a financial institution or a scheme to

obtain money under the custody or control of a financial in‐

stitution by means of fraudulent representations. 18 U.S.C.

§ 1344. “This and other circuits have consistently held that

each ‘execution’ of a scheme, rather than a mere ‘act in fur‐

therance of such a scheme,’ constitutes a separate violation

of § 1344.” Allender, 62 F.3d at 912 (quoting Longfellow, 43

F.3d at 323); see also Anderson, 188 F.3d at 889. A single crim‐

inal scheme may have more than one execution. Anderson,

188 F.3d at 889. Furthermore, “the crime of bank fraud is

complete when the defendant places the bank at risk of fi‐

nancial loss, and not necessarily when the loss itself occurs.”

Id. at 888.  

An act is an indictable “execution” rather than a non‐

indictable “act in furtherance” when the act puts the bank at

an additional financial risk. See Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 323

(collecting cases). Additionally, an execution is “chronologi‐

cally and substantively independent,” where no act “de‐

pended on others for its existence, and each [act] had its own

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function and purpose—they were interrelated only because

they involved the same overall scheme.” Id. (citing United

States v. Molinaro, 11 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 1993)) (alterations

omitted).

Here, each withdrawal was not a “chronologically and

substantively independent” act. The withdrawal of funds,

the basis for counts 2, 3, 5, and 6, was entirely dependent on

the initial deposit of the fraudulent check. Additionally, the

acts were not chronologically separate, as each act charged

occurred within days of the other.

Also, the withdrawal of funds did not put the bank at

any additional risk. When it released the funds from the

check to the account, the bank put itself at risk for losing the

entire amount of the check, and the subsequent withdrawals

did not create an additional risk. So, they are not executions.

Rather, they are acts in furtherance of the crime. As a result,

we hold that withdrawals of money credited to an account

that is the proceeds of a fraudulent check are not indictable

separate executions. See United States v. Hord, 6 F.3d 276,

281–82 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that under the bank fraud

statute the deposits of fraudulently obtained funds consti‐

tute the execution of the fraud scheme, not the attempts to

withdraw funds); see also Longfellow, 43 F.3d at 324 (discuss‐

ing Hord). Therefore, counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 are multiplicitous

of count 1, and Ajayi was exposed to double jeopardy. See

Starks, 472 F.3d at 468–69. So his convictions and sentence

were illegal and a miscarriage of justice. See United States v.

Podell, 869 F.2d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1989). We vacate his convic‐

tions on counts 2, 3, 5, and 6 and remand for resentencing

because the district court committed plain error by permit‐

ting his convictions.

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The government argues that even if there were an error,

it need not be corrected because the sentence was significant‐

ly below the statutory maximum, and the guideline range

for one conviction would be the same as for five. However,

we do not agree and conclude that these counts must be va‐

cated. Parker, 508 F.3d at 441 (citing United States v. Ball, 470

U.S. 856, 864–65 (1985)). At the very least, the district court

must vacate the $100 special assessment for each multipli‐

citous conviction. Also, the district court sentenced Ajayi to

eight months for each multiplicitous conviction, to run con‐

secutively. Since there is simply no way to ascertain whether

the district court would have imposed the same sentence if

Ajayi had been convicted of only one bank fraud count in‐

stead of five, we must remand the case for resentencing.

E. There Was No Variance.

Finally, Ajayi argues that there was a fatal variance be‐

tween the indictment and proof at trial because the scheme

presented at trial was categorically different and broader

than the scheme alleged in the indictment. Specifically, Ajayi

contends that the indictment alleges that Ajayi was respon‐

sible for diverting the check from ABM to his business; while

at trial, the government did not attempt to prove this fact.

Instead, it showed that Ajayi deposited a check that he knew

was altered (because it was obvious on the face of the check)

into his business account and made withdrawals from the

account. Ajayi maintains that this varied the proof because

based on the indictment, he believed that the government

had to link him to the check in some way before its forgery.

He further maintains that he was unable to anticipate that

the government would present evidence that the diversion

of the check and its forgery were not committed by Ajayi

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and that he knew the check was altered because the altera‐

tions were facially obvious. And as a result, he was left un‐

prepared to defend himself. Because Ajayi failed to raise this

challenge below, the claim is subject to plain error review.

United States v. Duran, 407 F.3d 828, 843 (7th Cir. 2005).

Although Ajayi references a constructive amendment, we

find none. A constructive amendment occurs when the evi‐

dence presented at trial supports a crime other than the one

charged. See United States v. Ratliff‐White, 493 F.3d 812, 820

(7th Cir. 2007). Neither Ajayi’s arguments nor the evidence

support the conclusion that the evidence at trial established

a crime different from the one charged. So, we will examine

whether there was a variance.

“A variance between indictment and proof exists ‘when

the terms of the indictment are unaltered, but the evidence

offered at trial proves facts materially different from those

alleged in the indictment.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Galif‐

fa, 734 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A variance is fatal only

when the defendant is prejudiced in his defense because he

cannot anticipate from the indictment what evidence will be

presented against him ... .” Id. (quoting Hunter v. State of

N.M., 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1990)) (alteration omitted).

“When ... the indictment gives a defendant particular notice

of the events charged, and the proof at trial centers on those

events, minor differences in the details of the facts charged,

as contrasted to those proved, are unlikely to be either mate‐

rial or prejudicial.” United States v. Reeder, 170 F.3d 93, 105

(1st Cir. 1999).

The facts at trial did not substantially vary from the fac‐

tual allegations in the indictment. The indictment asserted,

and the evidence at trial showed, that: (1) Ajayi had a busi‐

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No. 14‐2183 19

ness bank account; (2) he obtained the fraudulent check; (3)

the fraudulent check was altered by someone; (4) Ajayi,

knowing that the check had been altered, deposited the

check; and (5) Ajayi made several withdrawals from the ac‐

count in the form of checks payable to himself.

The only fact presented not included in the indictment

was that the alteration to the check was obvious from the

face of the check. “The proof at trial is necessarily more de‐

tailed than the facts alleged in the indictment, which is simp‐

ly a ‘plain, concise and definite written statement of the es‐

sential facts constituting the offense charged.’” Id. (quoting

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c)(1)). As previously stated, the indictment

charged a scheme to defraud the bank by Ajayi submitting a

check he knew was altered. Proof at trial was the same. Con‐

trary to Ajayi’s contention, the indictment does not allege

how Ajayi knew the check was altered. This information is

part of the “more detailed” facts that were proof at trial but

not part of the indictment. In our view, there was no materi‐

al variance.

Even if there were a variance, we find that Ajayi was not

prejudiced by it. Ajayi argues that had he known that the

government was going to argue that he knew the check was

altered because the alterations were obvious from the face of

the check, he would have moved for a bill of particulars or to

dismiss the indictment, or added expert testimony to estab‐

lish that a layperson would not have known the check was

altered. However, Ajayi knew the material elements of the

crime and that the government was going to try to establish

that he knew the check was altered. It was up to Ajayi and

his attorney to come up with ways to show that he did not

have the requisite knowledge. He could have filed motions

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20 No. 14‐2183

and retained an expert to defend against the knowledge el‐

ement based on the indictment as written. Also, because one

of the charges was that he made and possessed an altered

check, he could have anticipated that the government was

going to submit evidence about the alteration. Therefore, we

conclude that he was not prejudiced because he could antic‐

ipate from the indictment what evidence was going to be

presented against him.

III. CONCLUSION

Therefore, we VACATE the convictions for counts 2, 3, 5,

and 6 because they are multiplicitous and REMAND this case

to the district court for resentencing. We AFFIRM all other is‐

sues raised on appeal.

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