Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02926/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02926-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sharon Robbins
Plaintiff
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SHARON ROBBINS, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 

INSURANCE COMPANY, 

 Defendant. 

______________________________/

No. Civ. S-06-2926 RRB DAD

Memorandum of Opinion

and Order

 Before the court is Plaintiff Sharon Robbins’ (“Robbins”) 

Ex Parte Application (“Application”) for an order to modify the 

pretrial scheduling order (“Scheduling Order”) filed on March 2, 

2007 (“Rule 16 Order”).1 Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile 

Insurance Company (“State Farm”) opposes the Application. 

 To prevail on her Application, Robbins must make a “good 

cause” showing as to why the Scheduling Order should be 

 

1

 Robbins failed to address Rule 16’s “good cause” 

requirement in her Application to modify the Scheduling Order. 

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modified. Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 

608 (9th Cir. 1992). “Rule 16(b)’s ‘good cause’ standard 

primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the 

amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial schedule 

‘if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the 

party seeking the extension.’” Id. at 609 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 16 advisory committee’s note (1983 amendment)). The focus of 

the inquiry is on the moving party’s reasons for seeking 

modification, not the prejudice caused to the party opposing the 

modification. Id. If the moving party is not diligent, the 

inquiry ends. Id. 

To demonstrate diligence, the moving party may be required 

to show: (1) that it was diligent in assisting the Court in 

creating a workable Rule 16 scheduling order; (2) that its 

noncompliance with the scheduling order’s deadline occurred or 

will occur notwithstanding diligent efforts to comply because of 

“the development of matters which could not have been reasonably 

foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling 

conference;” and (3) that it was diligent in seeking amendment 

of the scheduling order once it became apparent it could not 

comply with the order. Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 

605, 608 (E.D. Cal. 1999). Finally, the Ninth Circuit has 

stated that “carelessness is not compatible with a finding of 

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diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief.” Johnson,

975 F.2d at 609.

 In the instant case, Robbins states that her Application 

was necessitated by State Farm’s unjustifiable delay in 

responding to discovery requests, including State Farm’s refusal 

to timely produce documents and special interrogatory responses. 

Robbins further states that she attempted to obtain a 

stipulation from State Farm’s counsel to modify the Scheduling 

Order on November 5 and November 8, 2007, in light of her 

inability to meet the upcoming November 30, 2007, expert 

disclosure date and the February 15, 2008, discovery cut-off 

date. Robbins’ Application however is devoid of any showing of 

“good cause” to support her request to modify the Scheduling 

Order, i.e., Robbins’ Application does not explain how she 

diligently sought to modify the Scheduling Order once it became 

apparent that she could not comply with the order. Instead, 

Robbins simply argues that modification of the Scheduling Order 

is appropriate because State Farm unjustifiably delayed in 

responding to discovery requests. The court finds this 

explanation inadequate to satisfy the diligence requirement of 

Rule 16.2

 

 

2

 According to Robbins, she did not seek to amend the 

Scheduling Order until November 9, 2007 (three weeks before the 

expert disclosure date), despite the fact that State Farm had 

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Accordingly, because Robbins failed to sufficiently explain 

why in the exercise of diligence she did not seek the requested 

amendment sooner, the court concludes that she failed to meet 

her burden to show “good cause” to modify the Scheduling Order. 

See Byrd v. Guess, 137 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 1998) (it is 

the moving party’s burden to demonstrate that modification of 

the pretrial order is necessary) abrogation on other grounds 

recognized by Moreland v. Las Vegas Metro. Police, 159 F.3d 365, 

369-70 (9th Cir. 1998).3

 

purportedly been unresponsive to her July 31, 2007, discovery 

requests until October 25, 2007. Therefore, because it should 

have been apparent to Robbins’ prior to November 9, 2007, that 

she would not be able to comply with the November 30, 2007, 

expert disclosure deadline, she did not satisfy her burden to 

act diligently in seeking to modify the Scheduling Order. See

Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608 (to satisfy the requirement to act 

diligently in seeking an amendment of the Rule 16 Order a party 

must seek amendment once it becomes apparent that it cannot 

comply with the Order). Additionally, to the extent that 

Robbins argues that she cannot meet the February 15, 2008, 

discovery cut-off date due to State Farm’s delay in responding 

to discovery requests, the court finds this argument 

unpersuasive since the discovery deadline is approximately three 

months away. As such, the court declines to modify the 

discovery cut-off date because Robbins has not demonstrated that 

this deadline cannot reasonably be met. 

 

3

 The purpose of the pretrial order is “to guide the course 

of the litigation,” and “once formulated, [it] should not be 

changed lightly.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e), Advisory Committee 

Note (citing Clark v. Pa. R.R. Co., 328 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 

1964)). 

 

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 Notwithstanding, the expert witness disclosure deadline is 

hereby extended by 60 days with all other deadlines, including 

the trial date, remaining as previously set. 

 For the reasons stated above, Robbins’ Application is 

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2007. 

s/RALPH R. BEISTLINE 

 United States District Judge 

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