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Parties Involved:
National Organization of Veterans Advocates, Inc.
Petitioner
Secretary of Veterans Affairs
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

 

NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF VETERANS 

ADVOCATES, INC.,

Petitioner

v.

SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-7024

______________________ 

Petition for review pursuant to 38 U.S.C. Section 502.

______________________ 

Decided: January 13, 2016 

______________________ 

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Law Offices of Carpenter 

Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for petitioner. 

ELIZABETH MARIE HOSFORD, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E.

KIRSCHMAN, JR.; Y. KEN LEE, AMANDA R. BLACKMON, 

Office of General Counsel, United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

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BRYSON, Circuit Judge. 

The National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, 

Inc. (“NOVA”) petitions this court for review of certain 

regulations promulgated by the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“DVA”). The challenged regulations, which are 

codified at 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.1010, 20.900(a)(2), and 20.1302

(2015), were intended to implement the Veterans’ Benefits Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-389, 122 

Stat. 4145 (2008). The regulations relate to the process 

by which an eligible survivor may be substituted for a 

veteran who dies while the veteran’s claim for benefits is 

pending before the DVA or on appeal to the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals. 

I 

Prior to the enactment of the Veterans’ Benefits 

Improvement Act, if a veteran seeking DVA benefits died

while his claim was pending, the veteran’s survivor could 

not take the place of the veteran and continue to prosecute the claim. Instead, the survivor would have to file a 

claim for accrued benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121. As the 

accrued benefits claim was treated as separate from the 

veteran’s claim, the survivor would have to proceed from 

the beginning of the adjudication process, regardless of 

how far the veteran’s claim had progressed. See 

Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

The 2008 Act sought to remedy that situation. Section 212 of the Act, codified as 38 U.S.C. § 5121A, authorizes eligible survivors to be “substituted as the claimant 

for the purposes of processing the claim to completion.” 

Those eligible to substitute for the deceased claimant are 

the same individuals who would be eligible to pursue an 

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accrued benefits claim.1 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5121A, 

5121(a)(2).

In 2011, the DVA proposed regulations to implement 

section 5121A. Substitution in Case of Death of Claimant

(“Proposed Rule”), 76 Fed. Reg. 8,666 (Feb. 15, 2011). 

After notice and an opportunity for comment, the DVA 

published the final version of the regulations. Substitution in Case of Death of Claimant (“Final Rule”), 79 Fed. 

Reg. 52,977 (Sept. 5, 2014). 

The regulations require a request to substitute to be 

filed with the agency of original jurisdiction (such as one 

of the DVA’s regional offices) within one year of the 

claimant’s death; the prospective substitute is required to 

submit evidence of his eligibility to substitute. 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.1010; see DVA Form 21-0847. The regulations further 

provide that if the claimant died while his appeal was 

pending before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the Board 

must dismiss the appeal without prejudice so that the 

agency of original jurisdiction can address the substitution request. If the agency of original jurisdiction grants 

the request to substitute, then the case returns to the 

same place on the Board’s docket that it held at the time 

of the veteran’s death. 38 C.F.R. §§ 20.1302, 20.900. 

NOVA filed an original proceeding in this court under 

38 U.S.C. § 502 to review the new DVA regulations. 

Although NOVA argues that the regulations are unlawful

in two respects, we reject NOVA’s contentions and deny 

the petition for review.

1 In most cases the claimant is a veteran seeking 

benefits for a service-connected disability. However, the 

claimant may also be a non-veteran seeking benefits 

directly. See, e.g. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1310, 1313, 1314, and 

1315. In the context of section 5121A, we use veteran and 

claimant interchangeably.

 

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II

NOVA first challenges the requirement that prospective substitutes provide evidence of their eligibility in all 

cases. In some cases a veteran receiving disability benefits is entitled to receive additional benefits because of his 

dependents. Those same dependents may also be eligible 

to substitute for that veteran after his death. Compare 38 

U.S.C. § 1115 with id. § 5121(a). 

NOVA argues that when a claimant before the Board 

has been receiving additional benefits because of a 

spouse, child, or dependent parents, the Board should 

allow the prospective substitutes to move to be substituted and have the Board determine eligibility based on the 

material the DVA already has in the deceased claimant’s 

file. According to NOVA, the aspect of the regulation 

requiring the claimant’s relatives to provide evidence of 

their eligibility to substitute when the DVA already has 

evidence of their status in its files is arbitrary and capricious. 

The DVA responds that the pertinent provision of the 

2008 Act, 38 U.S.C. § 5121A, requires all prospective

substitutes to submit evidence of their eligibility, and that 

the regulation, which embodies the same requirement, is 

therefore entirely lawful.

The relevant portion of section 5121A states:

(1) If a claimant dies while a claim for any 

benefit under a law administered by the Secretary, or an appeal of a decision with respect to 

such a claim, is pending, a living person who 

would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to 

the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title 

may, not later than one year after the date of the 

death of such claimant, file a request to be substituted as the claimant for the purposes of processing the claim to completion. 

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(2) Any person seeking to be substituted for 

the claimant shall present evidence of the right to 

claim such status within such time as prescribed 

by the Secretary in regulations.

The DVA interprets section 5121A to require the prospective substitute to put forward evidence of eligibility to 

substitute. Eligibility to substitute under section 5121A 

is governed by subsection 5121(a), which determines 

eligibility based on the person’s relationship to the veteran at the time of death. It provides that the persons 

eligible to substitute are, in order of preference, the 

claimant’s spouse, his children, and his dependent parents. 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2).

Under the statutory scheme, eligibility to substitute 

has three requirements: the claimant must have died

during the pendency of his claim, the prospective substitute must be alive at the time of the claimant’s death, and 

the prospective substitute must be first in priority (for 

example, a spouse would have priority in substitution 

over a child). Because the status of a potential substitute 

is not static, eligibility to substitute can be conclusively 

determined only at the time of the claimant’s death.

While it is possible that the individuals the claimant 

certifies as his spouse, children, or dependent parents at 

some point during his lifetime will still occupy that status 

at the time of the claimant’s death, it is not certain that 

will be the case. Due to divorce, death, or a change in 

dependency status, the person who appears to be eligible 

to substitute based on the DVA’s records may not in fact

be eligible. 

 Both the statute and the regulation explicitly put the 

burden on the prospective substitute to prove eligibility to 

substitute, and in similar language. By its terms, the 

statute requires the prospective substitute to “present 

evidence of the right to claim such status.” 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5121A(a)(2). In that respect, the statute appears to be 

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unambiguous; the requirement to “present evidence” 

would appear to apply in every case. The regulations use 

language that closely tracks that of the statute. It provides that “[a] person filing a request to substitute must 

provide evidence of eligibility to substitute.” 38 C.F.R. 

§ 3.1010(d). The regulation thus cannot be faulted for 

being inconsistent with the statutory directive.

Even assuming the statute is not deemed to be entirely unambiguous in requiring a prospective substitute to 

provide evidence of eligibility, we must defer to the DVA’s 

interpretation of the statutory provision if we find it to be 

reasonable. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Defense 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); Guerra v. 

Shinseki, 642 F.3d 1046, 1049 (Fed Cir. 2011). As the 

DVA pointed out in the comments that accompanied the 

issuance of the regulations, various events, such as divorce, remarriage, or the birth of a child could make the 

information in the veteran’s file at time of his death 

inaccurate. See Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 52,980. 

 For example, suppose a veteran has a dependent 

mother and receives additional benefits on her account. 

See 38 U.S.C. § 1115. If the veteran fathered a child, but 

has not yet informed the DVA about the child so that he 

could receive additional benefits, then the DVA’s records 

would reflect that the veteran’s mother was eligible to 

substitute in the event of the veteran’s death. Under 

subsection 5121A, however, it would be the veteran’s 

newborn child who would be eligible to substitute and not 

the veteran’s mother, because a child has a higher priority 

than a dependent parent. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2). 

Requiring the prospective substitute to provide evidence 

of eligibility to substitute is thus a reasonable measure to 

ensure that the DVA has the current and accurate information it needs to promptly process substitution requests. 

NOVA argues that it is inappropriate for this court to 

accord Chevron deference to the DVA’s interpretation of 

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section 5121A because “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.” Brown v. Gardner, 513 

U.S. 115, 118 (1994). However, this court has held that 

“where the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, 

we must take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable 

regulations simply because they do not provide for a proclaimant outcome in every imaginable case.” Sears v. 

Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

We have applied Chevron deference to the DVA’s reasonable interpretation of the statutes that it administers 

in numerous other cases. See, e.g., Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ 

Advocates v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 669 F.3d 1340, 

1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Because Congress has not 

spoken directly to the issue raised in the rule, we must 

determine whether the regulation is otherwise permissible.”); Guerra v. Shinseki, 642 F.3d at 1051-52 (“By regulation, the DVA has interpreted subsection 1114(s) to 

provide that in order to qualify for benefits under that 

statute, the veteran must have a single disability rated at 

100%. That interpretation is entitled to deference under 

the principles of [Chevron].”); Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 

1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Thus, although Mr. Haas 

argues that the Brown [v. Gardner] doctrine effectively 

means that the DVA is not entitled to deference if its 

rulemaking resolves a statutory ambiguity, this court’s 

precedent is to the contrary.”). There is no force to 

NOVA’s suggestion that the DVA’s interpretations are not 

entitled to Chevron deference because of Gardner. 

III

NOVA also challenges the regulatory provisions that 

apply when the claimant dies while his case is pending 

before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. The regulations 

provide as follows:

An appeal pending before the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals when the appellant dies will be dismissed 

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tion under § 3.1010 of this chapter may file with 

the agency of original jurisdiction a request to 

substitute for the deceased appellant. If the agency of original jurisdiction grants the request to 

substitute, the case will assume its original place 

on the docket pursuant to Rule 900 

(§ 20.900(a)(2)).

38 C.F.R. § 20.1302(a). Rule 900 states in relevant portion:

A case returned to the Board following the grant 

of a substitution request or pursuant to an appeal 

of a denial of a substitution request assumes the 

same place on the docket held by the deceased appellant at the time of his or her death. Pursuant 

to paragraph (c) of this section, if the deceased 

appellant’s case was advanced on the docket prior 

to his or her death, the substitute will receive the 

benefit of the advanced placement.

38 C.F.R. § 20.900(a)(2). NOVA argues that the requirement of a remand to the agency of original jurisdiction is 

also unlawful. When information about the claimant’s 

relatives is on file at the time of the claimant’s death, 

NOVA argues that the Board should decide the request to 

substitute in the first instance, rather than dismiss the 

appeal and remit the matter to the agency of original 

jurisdiction to decide the substitution issue. 

Importantly, section 5121A provides that substitution 

under the new statute “shall be in accordance with such 

regulations as the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] may 

prescribe.” 38 U.S.C. § 5121A(a)(3). That delegation of 

rulemaking authority gives the Secretary broad power to 

fill the gap explicitly left by Congress for the agency to 

fill. In such cases, where there has been an “express 

delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation,” the ensuing 

legislative rules “are given controlling weight unless they 

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are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the 

statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Hacker v. 

United States, 613 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 

Lofton v. West, 198 F.3d 846, 850 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 

The regulations governing the disposition of appeals 

pending before the Board at the time of the claimant’s 

death easily satisfy that standard.

In the course of promulgating the regulation, the DVA 

addressed the argument that the Board should decide 

substitution issues that arise when a claimant dies while 

the case is pending before the Board. Noting that the 

Board’s jurisdiction limits it to deciding appeals, the DVA 

explained in the remarks accompanying the proposed 

rules that the Board “cannot entertain requests to substitute in the first instance.” Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

8,668. Moreover, the DVA explained that “allowing the 

Board to decide a substitution request would deprive the 

survivor of the right to the ‘one review on appeal’ mandated by 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a).” Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 

52,979. The Board’s jurisdictional statute states: 

All questions in a matter which under section 

511(a) of this title is subject to decision by the 

Secretary shall be subject to one review on appeal 

to the Secretary. Final decisions on such appeals 

shall be made by the Board.

38 U.S.C. § 7104(a). The DVA concluded that, consistent 

with the “one review on appeal” principle, the agency of 

original jurisdiction should first decide whether to allow 

substitution, which would enable a dissatisfied prospective substitute to obtain Board review of the substitution

issue on appeal. If the Board were to decide the substitution issue in the first instance, there would be no appellate recourse for the claimant within the DVA.

Finally, the Board is an appellate tribunal and is not 

well equipped to conduct the fact-gathering that may be 

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necessary to determine eligibility for substitution. It was 

reasonable for the DVA to conclude that the agencies of 

original jurisdiction are better suited to perform that 

task. 

In sum, in light of the broad authority Congress gave 

to the Secretary to promulgate regulations administering 

section 5121A, the Secretary’s decision to commit the 

eligibility decision to the agencies of original jurisdiction 

in the first instance is not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. We therefore reject NOVA’s 

challenges to the regulations. 

No costs.

PETITION DENIED

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