Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00394/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00394-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Mary Lou Tyler
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY LOU TYLER, No. 2:14-CV-0394-CMK

Plaintiff, 

vs. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

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Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.

Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding

judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending

before the court are plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) and defendant’s crossmotion for summary judgment (Doc. 15). 

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/ / /

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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff applied for social security benefits on August 30, 2011. In the

application, plaintiff claims that disability began on August 11, 2011. Plaintiff’s claim was

initially denied. Following denial of reconsideration, plaintiff requested an administrative

hearing, which was held on November 15, 2012, before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Peter

F. Belli. In a November 29, 2012, decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff is not disabled

based on the following relevant findings:

1. The claimant has the following severe impairment(s): degenerative disc

disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative changes of the thoracic spine,

arthritic changes of the right knee, fibromyalgia, and obesity;

2. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or medically equals an impairment listed in the regulations;

3. The claimant has the following residual functional capacity: the claimant

can perform light work except: she could lift, carry, push, and/or pull 20

pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; she could sit for 8 hours in

an 8-hour workday, with normal breaks, but she requires an option to

alternate sitting and standing such that she could sit for 30 to 40 minutes at

a time when she is not permitted to leave the workstation; she could stand

and walk for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, with no prolonged walking

more than 30 to 40 minutes before she must change positions; she is

unable to climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; she could occasionally

stoop, crouch, crawl, and kneel;

4. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, residual

functional capacity, and vocational expert testimony, the claimant is

capable of performing her past relevant work as an outside deliverer;

additionally, there are other jobs in the national economy the claimant can

perform.

After the Appeals Council declined review on November 12, 2013, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision to determine whether it is: 

(1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a

whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). “Substantial evidence” is

more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521

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(9th Cir. 1996). It is “. . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole,

including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion, must

be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones

v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner’s

decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v.

Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative

findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the

Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of

which supports the Commissioner’s decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal

standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th

Cir. 1988). 

III. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) plaintiff’s residual

functional capacity – as determined by the ALJ – precludes past relevant work; and (2) the ALJ

failed to articulate sufficient reasons for finding her testimony not credible. 

A. Past Relevant Work

As to past relevant work, the ALJ stated:

The claimant has past work as a home attendant (DOT 354.377-014, SVP

3, medium exertion); a medical patients transport (DOT 355.377-014, SVP

2, medium exertion); a fast food worker (DOT 311.472-010, SVP 2, light

exertion); a fast food manager (DOT 185.137-010, SVP 5, light exertion);

a store laborer (DOT 922.786-058, SVP 2, medium exertion); a bartender

(DOT 312.474-010, SVP 3, light exertion); and an outside deliverer (DOT

230.663.010, SVP 2, light exertion). 

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This work constitutes past relevant work because it satisfies three

requirements. 20 C.F.R. 401.1560(b)(1). First, the claimant stated that

she performed this work within the past fifteen years. (Ex. B2E). Second,

the claimant listed dates of employment that show that she performed this

work for a duration long enough to learn the job duties. (Ex. B2E). 

Finally, earnings records show that the claimant performed this work at the

substantial gainful activity level. (Ex. B5D). 

At hearing, the undersigned asked the vocational expert whether the

claimant could perform any past relevant work, given her residual

functional capacity as described in Finding 5. With such limitations, the

vocational expert testified that the claimant could perform past relevant

work as an outside deliverer. 

Plaintiff argues:

In assessing the residual functional capacity the ALJ determined

that Mary Lou Tyler has the residual functional capacity for a reduced

range of light work limited, in relative part, by certain non-exertional

restrictions. AR 22, ¶ 5. The non-exertional restrictions found by the ALJ

do not allow for the performance of the past relevant work and/or the

occupations identified by the vocational expert and relief or by the ALJ. 

They are not performable because the testimony of the vocational expert

conflicts with the DOT. Massachi v. Astrue, 486 F3d 1149 (9th Cir.

2007). In order to deviate from the recognized primacy of the DOT the

ALJ must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict that exists

between the DOT and the vocational expert.

In particular, plaintiff argues that the vocational expert’s testimony deviated from the Dictionary

of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) with respect to the sit/stand limitations identified by the ALJ

because the DOT is silent on such a restriction. According to plaintiff: “[W]here an expert

opines on an issue about which the DOT is silent, a conflict exists.” Plaintiff argues that the ALJ

erred by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony without resolving this conflict.

In support of her argument, plaintiff cites cases from the Northern District of

California. See Valenzuela v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1537876 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that a

vocational expert’s testimony that certain positions would accommodate a sit/stand option was

potentially in conflict with the DOT and warranted further inquiry upon remand) (emphasis

added); Smith v. Astrue, 2010 WL 5776060 (N.D. Cal 2010). Decisions from the Northern

District of California are not binding on this court. The undersigned is persuaded by authority

from this court concluding that a sit/stand option does not necessarily conflict with the DOT and

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noting that the Ninth Circuit has not addressed the issue. See e.g. Gilmour v. Colvin, 2014 WL

3749458 (E.D. Cal. 2014). This holding is consistent with opinions from other courts. See e.g.

Overman v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2008); Sandborn v. Colvin, 2014 WL 3900878 at

(E.D. Pa. 2014).

B. Credibility Finding

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the

court defers to the Commissioner’s discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and

provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit

credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903

F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d

821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible

and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative

evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner’s reasons for rejecting testimony as not

credible must be “clear and convincing.” See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d

1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007),

and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the

Commissioner may not discredit a claimant’s testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely

because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d

341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The claimant need not produce objective medical evidence of the

[symptom] itself, or the severity thereof. Nor must the claimant produce

objective medical evidence of the causal relationship between the

medically determinable impairment and the symptom. By requiring that

the medical impairment “could reasonably be expected to produce” pain or

another symptom, the Cotton test requires only that the causal relationship

be a reasonable inference, not a medically proven phenomenon. 

80 F.3d 1273, 1282 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to the test established in

Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 1403 (9th Cir. 1986)). 

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The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged,

including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell,

947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the

claimant’s reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent

testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a

prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant’s daily activities; (4) work records; and (5)

physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the

claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning

drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the

claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given

impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

As to plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ stated:

The claimant alleges that she stopped working on August 11, 2011, due to

intense back pain and numbness; she has migraines every day that can last

for two to three hours at a time; she continues to take pain medication, the

side effects of which cause drowsiness; she uses a cane; she uses a back

brace for support; she has difficulty dressing herself; she no longer cooks;

she is unable to vacuum; she needs help when she goes grocery shopping;

the pain disturbs her sleep; she has difficulty lifting more than four

pounds; and she is unable to stand and sit for long periods. (Testimony,

Disability Report).

 

The ALJ also considered third-party statements:

The record contains third party statements from the claimant’s sister and

caregiver that state that the claimant is unable to sit and stand for long

periods; she has difficulty lifting; she needs help with house hold cleaning,

personal hygiene, running errands, and cooking; she is generally inactive;

she has difficulty bending to feed her cats; she needs help showering on

occasion she refuses to go on extended car rides; and her pain is

worsening. (Ex. B6E, B12E). 

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In evaluating plaintiff’s credibility, the ALJ stated:

After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that the

claimant’s medically determinable impairments could reasonably be

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, these statements

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these

symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the

above residual functional capacity assessment for the following reasons:

First, these allegations are seriously disproportionate to the mild

radiographic findings. For example, August 29, 2011, radiographs of the

right knee revealed only “[v]ery early” arthritic changes. (Ex. B1F/20). 

August 30, 2011, radiographs of the lumbar spine revealed a “[s]mall” disc

protrusion. (Ex. B4F/20). October 3, 2011, radiographs of the thoracic

spine revealed “[m]inimal” degenerative changes. (Ex. B4F/19). 

Second, these allegations are inconsistent with clinical indications that

show that the claimant’s condition is well controlled. Physical

examinations have revealed intact sensation, intact strength, and no gait

abnormality. (Ex. 4F/9, 13; B5F/3). While the claimant was referred to a

neurosurgeon on September 12, 2011, the record documents no follow

through. (Ex. B14F/3). While obese, the record documents show no

related care other than conservative suggestions that she diet and exercise. 

(Ex. B15F/3, 4). 

Third, these allegations are inconsistent with medical opinions that show

that the claimant has considerable work-related abilities despite her

impairments. Reviewing physician Jerry Reed, M.D., wrote a September

19, 2011, opinion and stated that even with her impairments, the claimant

could perform light exertional work involving occasional postural

activities. (Ex. B2F). Reviewing physician Steven Higgins, M.D., agreed. 

(Ex. B6F). 

* * * 

The claimant’s allegations are partially supported by her use of

prescription medication; her elevated body weight; and some physical

examination findings for muscle tenderness and decreased range of

motion. 

However, the weight of the evidence shows that, while the claimant may

experience some level of pain and fatigue, it is so well controlled such that

she could nonetheless perform a wide range of light exertional work. 

The claimant’s allegations, and the allegations of her sister and caregiver,

are not entirely credible. 

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Plaintiff argues: “The ALJ rejects Ms. Tyler’s testimony based on the belief that

the testimony is not fully credible because that testimony is inconsistent with what the ALJ

believes it should be.” Plaintiff adds: “It also appears that the ALJ is . . . rejecting Ms. Tyler’s

testimony based on a belief that the testimony is not credible because it lacks support in the

objective medical evidence” and “[s]uch rationale is legally insufficient.” Plaintiff also argues

that the ALJ improperly relied on daily activities. 

In addition to the reasons cited by plaintiff, the ALJ also noted that plaintiff’s

conditions are controlled with minimal medications – a reason plaintiff ignores in her brief. The

ALJ properly cited this as a reason to discount her testimony. See Matthews v. Shalala 10 F.3d

678 (9th Cir, 1993). 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner’s final

decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14) is denied;

2. Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is granted; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment and close this file.

DATED: March 16, 2016

______________________________________

CRAIG M. KELLISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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