Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10034/USCOURTS-ca9-15-10034-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jamie Harmon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JAMIE HARMON,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 15-10034

D.C. No.

5:08-cr-00938-LHK-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Lucy H. Koh, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted June 13, 2016

San Francisco, California

Filed August 18, 2016

Before: J. Clifford Wallace, Dorothy W. Nelson,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Owens

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2 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming convictions for money laundering, the panel

held that a prosecutor’s failure to correct false testimony

before a grand jury and failure to disclose impeachment

information about a grand jury witness – even if done

intentionally – do not constitute structural error requiring

automatic reversal, but are harmless as a matter of law after

a petit jury returns a guilty verdict.

The panel explained that United States v. Mechanik, 475

U.S. 66 (1986), makes clear that something other than

dismissal – such as a state bar inquiry or an investigation by

the Office of Professional Responsibility – is the proper

recourse under the facts of this case.

The panel held that the prosecution’s asking the district

court ex parte at trial to decide in camera whether the

witness’s informant activity need be disclosed was not

improper.

COUNSEL

August Gugelmann (argued) and Edward Swanson, Swanson

& McNamara LLP, San Francisco, California, for DefendantAppellant.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 3

Anne M. Voigts (argued), Assistant United States Attorney;

Barbara J. Valliere, Chief, Appellate Division; Brian J.

Stretch, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s

Office, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

OWENS, Circuit Judge:

Defendant-Appellant Jamie Harmon appeals from her

convictions for money laundering. She argues that the

prosecutor’s errors before the grand jury constitute structural

error, requiring reversal. She also contends that the

government’sfailure to disclose impeachment evidence about

a hostile defense witness mandates a new trial. Because the

grand jury errors are not structural, and any impeachment

evidence immaterial, we agree with the district court’s wellreasoned analysis and affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

To make a long and convoluted story short: Christian

Pantages ran a business that resold stolen computer

equipment as legitimate. He was charged in state court with

receiving stolen property, and retained Harmon as his

criminal defense attorney. Fearing that his bank accounts

were frozen, Pantages searched for a way to access the funds

derived from his stolen computer equipment scheme. His

solution was his attorney, Harmon.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

A. The Grand Jury Investigation

Pantages delivered two checks to Harmon totaling

$127,550, and she deposited them into her client-trust

account. Harmon then wrote multiple checks back to

Pantages and his wife totaling around $100,000 within six

weeks of receiving the two checks from Pantages. Harmon

pocketed the remaining funds. The parties agree that the

funds came from a specific unlawful activity, as the money

laundering statute requires. The parties disagree whether

Harmon knew that important fact.

As part of its investigation into Harmon and her

transactions with Pantages, the government called three

witnesses before the grand jury: (1) a federal agent who

traced the checks and provided an overview of the

investigation; (2) a civil attorney who had suspicious

interactions with Harmon; and (3) Yan Ebyam.1 Ebyam, the

former business partner of Pantages, previously had pled

guilty to money laundering charges arising from the stolen

computer scheme. He testified three times about his

interactions with Harmon, including an alleged conversation

where he made it clear that all funds from Pantages came

from illegal activity.

2

1 The astute reader will note that “Yan Ebyam” is a play on “Yes and

No, Maybe.” Cf. Star Trek, All Our Yesterdays (first aired March 14,

1969) (introducing viewers to “Mr. Atoz,” the last resident of planet

Sarpeidon and a shifty librarian).

2 Hollywood could turn this into “Breaking RAM,” with Pantages and

his wife as Walter and Skyler White, Ebyam as Jesse Pinkman, and

Harmon as Saul Goodman.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 5

Ebyam’s plea agreement – which governed his grand jury

testimony – set out his obligation to cooperate with the

government before and after his sentencing. In exchange for

this cooperation, the government agreed to not seek any

additional charges against Ebyam. However, if Ebyam did

not cooperate, the government could seek more charges, as

Ebyam agreed to waive any statute of limitations defenses. 

Ebyam also began working as a paid government informant

in unrelated investigations.

The grand jurorswere curious about Ebyam’s relationship

with the prosecution. At his first grand jury session (and

apparently due to a grand juror’s concern), the prosecutor

asked Ebyam if he had received any promises or benefits in

exchange for his testimony. Ebyam said he had no obligation

to testify, as he had been sentenced and had served his time. 

He explained that he was testifying voluntarily because he

“want[ed] to be a member of society” again. Neither the

prosecutor nor Ebyam mentioned the plea agreement’s

requirement that he cooperate after sentencing or possibly

face additional charges.

At his second session, the prosecutor asked Ebyam if he

was testifying on his own accord. Ebyam stated that he was

under no obligation to cooperate, and again there was no

mention of the plea agreement.

At his third session, a grand juror asked Ebyam: “What

are you doing now?” The prosecutor stepped in before

Ebyam could answer and posed a different question: “Are

you receiving any benefit from your cooperation with the

government, either for your testimony today or any other type

of testimony on this particular case?” Ebyam answered: “I’m

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6 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

not under indictment. I’m not getting any paychecks . . . .

there’s no secret benefit down the line.”

The prosecutor never informed the grand jury that

Ebyam’s plea agreement explicitly required him to testify

before the grand jury, and that if he refused to do so, he

risked facing additional charges. The prosecutor also never

informed the grand jury that Ebyam was a paid informant for

unrelated government investigations. The government

concedes that the prosecutor should have corrected Ebyam to

make clear to the grand jury that the plea agreement obligated

this testimony.

The grand jury returned an indictment against Pantages

and Harmon for money laundering charges. Pantages pled

guilty and agreed to cooperate against Harmon. Harmon

stood tall.

After the indictment, Harmon filed a motion seeking

dismissal of the indictment based on prosecutorial

misconduct related to Ebyam’s testimony. Judge Ware

denied the motion.

B. The Trial

The government’s witnesses included: (1) Pantages, who

had turned against Harmon and revealed numerous damaging

conversations and transactions;3(2) a Deputy District

3 Pantages testified that during one of his meetings with Harmon, he told

her he did not know how to cash the two checks because he thought his

account was frozen. Pantages said Harmon suggested depositing the

checks into her client trust account and returning the proceeds to Pantages.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 7

Attorney who informed Harmon about the illegal nature of

Pantages’s business during the state court prosecution for

receipt of stolen goods; (3) Pantages’s wife, who testified

about some conversations and transactions with Harmon; and

(4) Harmon’s office assistant, who described how Harmon’s

financial transactions with Pantages were not the norm. It

was a strong case for the prosecution.

About a week prior to trial before Judge Ware, the

defense listed Ebyam as an “impeachment” witness. And

shortly before the defense called Ebyam, the government

filed an ex parte application for in camera review of the

additional impeachment information about Ebyam – whether

Ebyam’s ongoing work as a paid informant needed to be

disclosed. The government contended that disclosure:

(1) would endanger Ebyam; (2) was unnecessary because the

impeachment was unrelated to Harmon’s prosecution; and

(3) was barred by privilege under Roviaro v. United States,

353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). The court never ruled on the

application, and defense counsel cross-examined Ebyam

without knowing this additional impeachment information. 

However, defense counsel impeached Ebyam with: (1) his

own criminal conduct; (2) his cooperation agreement (under

which the government could seek additional charges if

Ebyam failed to live up to his side of the deal); (3) his

erroneous testimony before the grand jury about his

obligations under the plea agreement; and (4) a previous

After Pantages signed the checks over to Harmon, she returned almost

$100,000 over the nextsix weeks. Harmon issued checks in the following

amounts to Pantages’s wife: $15,000, $10,000, $10,000, $10,000. 

Harmon also wrote a check to Pantages for $54,000 and suggested he go

to her personal banker and have the check broken into smaller amounts

and issued as cashier’s checks.

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8 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

incident of dishonesty before a court (a state court judge

found that Ebyam had lied about aspects of his personal

finances).

The jury returned guilty verdicts on five counts of money

laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(A)(1)(b)(I)), but hung on the

conspiracy to commit money laundering charge (18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(h)).

C. Post-Trial Motions to Vacate Convictions4

Post-trial, Harmon brought two motions relevant to this

appeal. First, Harmon argued that the prosecutor’s actions

before the grand jury required dismissal of the indictment. 

Harmon contended that the prosecutor’s failure to correct

Ebyam’s false testimony that he was free not to cooperate

with the government was structural error, not subject to

harmless error review. After examining decisions like United

States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986), and Bank of Nova

Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), Judge Koh

(having replaced the since retired Judge Ware) concluded that

the alleged error did not fall into the narrow category of

structural error, and even if it could be reviewed for

harmfulness after a jury verdict, it was harmless in light of

the other evidence presented to the grand jury.

4 Harmon initially argued that an indictment obtained through knowingly

perjured testimony violated due process. Judge Ware rejected that

argument, but then sua sponte granted Harmon a new trial based on an

erroneous jury instruction. Our court reversed that decision and reinstated

the convictions, as any instructional error was harmless. United States v.

Harmon, 537 F. App’x 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2013) (unpublished). Our court

did not decide whether a new trial was warranted due to any prosecutorial

misconduct before the grand jury.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 9

Harmon next argued that the government’s failure to

disclose Ebyam’s status as a paid informant violated Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as defense counsel could have

used that information to attack Ebyam’s motives and

credibility, and therefore call the guilty verdict into doubt. 

Judge Koh rejected that argument, reasoning that: (1) defense

counsel had ample evidence to impeach Ebyam; and

(2) “there was extensive evidence of Harmon’s guilt that was

entirely independent of Ebyam’s testimony.”

Judge Koh sentenced Harmon to 24 months in prison, and

three years of supervised release. Harmon then appealed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

This court reviews de novo a district court’s order

denying a motion to dismiss an indictment based on

prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Fuchs,

218 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2000).5

This court “review[s] de novo a district court’s denial of

a new trial motion based on a Brady violation.” United States

v. Rodriguez, 766 F.3d 970, 980 (9th Cir. 2014).

 

5 The parties frequently discuss prosecutorial misconduct during grand

jury proceedings in the context of the Rule 33 motion for a new trial. 

Because Harmon is asking for us to dismiss the indictment, rather than for

a new trial, we construe this as an appeal of her motion to dismiss the

indictment.

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10 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

B. The Prosecutor’s Actions Before the Grand

Jury

The parties agree that the prosecutor’s actions before the

grand jury – not correcting false testimony – were wrong. 

But errors concerning evidence presented to the grand jury

cannot trigger dismissal of charges or a new trial when a

subsequent petit jury returns a verdict of guilty. See

Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 70 (after a conviction, “any error in the

grand jury proceeding connected with the charging decision

[is deemed] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” as a matter

of law); United States v. Caruto, 663 F.3d 394, 402 (9th Cir.

2010) (“[B]ecause Caruto was subsequently found guilty by

the petit jury based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt[,]

[t]he alleged [grand jury] error was . . . rendered harmless by

Caruto’s subsequent conviction.”).

To bypass Mechanik, Harmon argues thatthe prosecutor’s

errors were so grave that they were structural and required

dismissal of all charges. While we agree that the prosecutor’s

actions were wrong (and may warrant further inquiry by other

bodies),6 we also agree with the district court they were not

structural.

“[M]ost constitutional errors can be harmless . . . Only in

rare cases has [the Supreme Court] held that an error is

structural, and thus requires automatic reversal.” Washington

v. Recuenco, 548 U.S. 212, 218 (2006) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). In the grand jury context, the

only identified structural error to date is discrimination on

6 The now former Assistant United States Attorney who appeared before

the grand jury also was part of the trial team. Our concerns are limited to

him – we do not have concerns about his fellow trial counsel.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 11

account of race or sex in the selection of grand jurors. See

Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 257. This error – which

concerns the composition of the grand jury – is structural, as

it “permeate[s] ‘the entire conduct of the [proceeding] from

beginning to end,’” and cannot be “quantitatively assessed in

the context of other evidence presented in order to determine

whether [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1171–72 (9th Cir. 2005)

(quoting Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307–08,

309–10 (1991)).

Neither the failure to: (1) correct false testimony affecting

a witness’s credibility nor (2) disclose impeachment

information falls into this narrow structural category that

requires automatic reversal. We previously held in United

States v. Sitton, 968 F.2d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated

on other grounds by Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81

(1996), that “[p]resentation of perjured testimony to the grand

jury is not such a structural flaw.” We reasoned that

“[d]ismissal of the indictment is not appropriate when a

witness’ alleged perjury is not material to the defendant’s

indictment and instead affects only the witness’ credibility.” 

Id. at 953 (citation omitted). It was not structural because it

is “an error susceptible of quantitative assessment to

determine its effect, and therefore suitable for harmless error

analysis.” Id. at 954.

The prosecutor’s errors here are also subject to

quantitative assessment. Under Mechanik, presenting false

information to the grand jury affecting a witness’s credibility

and withholding impeachment information – even if done

intentionally, which we assume but do not decide – are

harmless as a matter of law after a petit jury returns a guilty

verdict. Harmon cites no post-Mechanik authority to the

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12 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

contrary. We hold that where the intentional misconduct by

the prosecution goes to a witness’s credibility, it is not

structural error.7 While we share concerns that our holding

could encourage prosecutorial misconduct, Mechanik makes

clear that something other than dismissal – such as a state bar

inquiry or an investigation by the Office of Professional

Responsibility – is the proper recourse under these facts.

C. The Prosecution’s Actions At Trial

The prosecution’s actions at trial – asking the district

court ex parte to decide in camera whether Ebyam’s

informant activity need be disclosed – were not improper. 

We have previously upheld the practice of submitting

impeachment material to the district court for in camera

review. See, e.g., United States v. Dupuy, 760 F.2d 1492,

1501 (9th Cir. 1985) (“By submitting the issue to the judge,

the prosecutor satisfied her duty to disclose exculpatory

material.”); see also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60

7 Harmon leans on decisions of the Second and Tenth Circuits for

support, but the cases are not inconsistent with our decision. In United

States v. Lombardozzi, the Second Circuit recognized that “[d]ismissal of

an indictment following a conviction is an ‘extraordinary’ remedy,” and

is warranted when “the prosecutor’s conduct [must] amount[] to a

knowing or reckless misleading of the grand jury as to an essential fact.” 

491 F.3d 61, 79 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Casamento,

887 F.2d 1141, 1182 (2d Cir. 1989)). Here, the prosecution’s misconduct,

which potentially affected Ebyam’s credibility, did not mislead the jury as

to an essential fact. In United States v. Lopez-Gutierrez, 83 F.3d 1235

(10th Cir. 1996), the Tenth Circuit characterized the government’s failure

to correct false evidence presented to the grand jury as “technical error[s]”

rendered harmless by a guilty verdict and not “flagrant or egregious

misconduct which significantly infringed on the grand jury’s ability to

exercise independent judgment.” Id. at 1245 (quoting United States v.

Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1466 (10th Cir. 1987)). The same is true here.

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UNITED STATES V. HARMON 13

(1987) (explaining that a defendant’s rights “can be protected

fully by requiring that [Brady material] be submitted only to

the trial court for in camera review”). As is reflected under

the facts here, this procedure is “particularly appropriate

when the Government has legitimate reasons for protecting

the confidentiality of the material requested.” Dupuy,

760 F.2d at 1501. While the prosecution should have

reminded the district court about the under seal filing and

asked for a ruling, we cannot fault the initial procedure that

it undertook.

And even assuming that Harmon had a right to

impeachment information about a witness that she called –

something we do not decide here – Harmon was not

prejudiced by the prosecution’s failure to reveal this

information. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. We agree with the

district court that any impeachment value was immaterial for

two reasons.

First, Ebyam was impeached by other evidence. The

defense attorney did a good job showing how Ebyam’s

testimony was bought and paid for through his cooperation

agreement. The additional impeachment evidence – that he

was a paid informant on unrelated matters – would have

added little. Moreover, defense counsel showed that Ebyam

was a convicted money launderer who was found to have

previously lied in court. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 766 F.3d at 989

(rejecting Brady claim where witness’s “credibility was

sufficiently undermined by the defense, given his admitted

cooperation with the prosecution, his extensive criminal

history, and his illicit prison activities”). In sum, this

impeachment evidence was overkill.

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14 UNITED STATES V. HARMON

Second, as Judge Koh correctly held, the evidence against

Harmon was “extremely strong.” The fact that Ebyam, called

by the defense after the prosecution rested its case, was a paid

informant could not have altered the jury’s perception of what

Harmon had done. See, e.g., United States v. Si, 343 F.3d

1116, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting Brady claim based on

impeachment evidence about witness because evidence was

immaterial as witness was extensively cross-examined

regarding his criminal activities and agreement with the

government, and the witness’s testimony was not the linchpin

of the government’s case). If there was any “linchpin” in this

case, it was Pantages and his damning bank account

transactions with Harmon, and not Ebyam. Any information

concerning Ebyam’s informant status was therefore

immaterial.

AFFIRMED.

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