Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-09511/USCOURTS-ca10-89-09511-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
United States Postal Service
Respondent

Document Text:

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PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Petitioner, 

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Uoi«:J St-'1~~ ~ri: fJf Ap~s 

'femh Circuit 

JUN l 9 ·J9QO 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

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) 

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) 

) 

) 

No. 89-9511 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Respondent. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 

(No. 17-CA-12451 (P)) 

Howard E. Perlstein (David Seddelmeyer with him on the brief), 

Supervisory Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, 

D.C., for Petitioner. 1 

Lynn D. Poole (Stephen E. Alpern, Associate General Counsel; Jesse 

L. Butler, Assistant General Counsel, with him on the briefs}, 

United States Postal Service, Office of Labor Law, Washington, 

D.C., Respondent. 

Before SEYMOUR, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

This matter comes before the court on application of the 

National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board"), pursuant 

to § l0(e) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or ''the 

Appellate Case: 89-9511 Document: 01019867885 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 1 
Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), for enforcement of the Board's decision 

and order in United States Postal Service and Charles B. 

Richardson, 290 NLRB No. 20, 1988-89 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,081. 

The Board affirmed the findings and conclusions of the 

administrative law judge ("the ALJ") that respondent United States 

Postal Service ("USPS") violated§ 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act by 

refusing to reassign and promote Charles Richardson because he had 

engaged in protected concerted activity and that respondent 

violated§ 8(a)(l) by threatening to harass and retaliate against 

Richardson because he had engaged in protected concerted activity. 

I 

Charles B. Richardson was hired by respondent on April 9, 

1977, as a part-time clerk at respondent's Joplin, Missouri, 

facility. In the fall of 1979, Richardson contacted the Galena, 

Kansas, postmaster Clarence Bounds concerning a possible transfer 

to the Galena facility and, in November 1979, Bounds offered 

Richardson a position as a "part-time clerk-carrier." Richardson 

accepted the offer and transferred to Galena effective December 1, 

1979, at least in part because of the possibility he would be able 

to transfer to a full-time carrier position in Galena within a few 

years. At the time of Richardson's transfer, the Galena facility 

work force consisted of two full-time rural catriers, two fulltime city route carriers and three part-time clerks. 1 

1 Pursuant to the collective-bargaining agreement, 

in the clerical craft and 

combined in a single job 

Agreement ("CBA"), Art. 7.2. 

time position, the agreement 

in the carrier craft are 

position. Collective 

When the USPS wishes to 

mandates that the most 

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Postmaster 

postal work 

not normally 

Bargaining 

fill a fullsenior partAppellate Case: 89-9511 Document: 01019867885 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 2 
Bounds held the only supervisory position. 

In February 1983, Richardson was assigned to work holidays 

and days off for Lester Clarkson, a full-time city route carrier. 

Thereafter, during the summer of 1984, a part-time carrier 

position was created in Galena in anticipation of Clarkson's 

retirement. Both Richardson and Timothy Weston, a part-time 

clerk, applied for reassignment to the new position. In early 

July, Bounds asked carriers Clarkson and Teddy Watkins to 

recommend an employee to fill the new position. Clarkson and 

Watkins then wrote a letter recommending Weston for the vacancy. 

In September 1984, after Bounds formally recommended Weston for 

reassignment to the new carrier position, USPS management in 

Wichita approved Weston's reassignment effective October 13, 1984, 

and notified Richardson that his reassignment request had been 

denied. After Clarkson retired in January 1985, Weston, Galena's 

only part-time carrier, was promoted to fill Clarkson's full-time 

letter carrier position. 

Between 1981 and the time the new carrier position opened in 

1984, Richardson filed several successful grievances against 

Bounds pursuant to the grievance machinery of the collectivebargaining agreement. 2 Richardson filed his first grievance in 

-

time employee in the same craft as the vacancy shall, under most 

circumstances, receive the job. When there are no eligible 

employees within the same craft, the USPS is free to select an 

outside applicant or choose an employee from another craft. CBA, 

Art. 33.2. 

2 Under the grievance procedure established by the collective-

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Spring 1981 when Bounds insisted that Richardson work as a 

temporary supervisor in Bounds' absence. The grievance was 

withdrawn at the first step when a union steward informed Bounds 

that the collective-bargaining agreement expressly prevented the 

postmaster from requiring an employee to work as a supervisor. 

On September 21, 1981, Richardson filed a grievance over a 

warning Bounds issued to him. Bounds denied the grievance at the 

first step and Richardson appealed the denial of his grievance to 

the second step, where Bounds was overruled and the warning 

withdrawn. On October 13, 1981, Richardson filed a grievance when 

Bounds suspended Richardson for fourteen days. Bounds' first step. 

decision was again overturned at the second level and Richardson 

received forty hours back pay (Richardson also received forty 

hours of back pay through a separate Equal Employment Opportunity 

("EEO") complaint). 

On February 24, 1984, Bounds disciplined Richardson for 

misdelivery of the mail and discourtesy to customers by issuing a 

letter of warning. In March 1984, Richardson filed a grievance 

concerning the ~etter and at the second stage of the grievance 

procedure the warning was reduced to a nondisciplinary "job 

discussion." Also in March 1984, Bounds denied Richardson a 

regular pay increase and Richardson filed a grievance in protest 

bargaining agreement, grievances arising at the Galena facility 

are heard at the first level by the local postmaster and at the 

second level by USPS management in Wichita, Kansas. CBA, Art. 

15.2. 

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on March 28. (About March 26, Bounds also relieved Richardson of 

his substitute carrier duties, ostensibly because of customer 

complaints related to Richardson's performance and Richardson's 

inefficient work.) On April 6, the grievance concerning the pay 

increase was decided in Richardson's favor at the second level. 

The General Counsel of the Board issued a complaint April 1, 

1985, against respondent based upon charges filed by Richardson on 

January 9, 1985. The complaint alleged that respondent, through 

postmaster Bounds, violated § 8(a)(l) and (3) of the NLRA by 

threatening, harassing and refusing to reassign and promote 

Richardson because he had engaged in protected concerted activity. 

by utilizing the grievance procedures of the collective-bargaining 

agreement. 

A hearing was held before the ALJ July 10-12, 1985, and in a 

decision dated February 19, 1986, the ALJ held: ( 1) "By 

threatening to harass, retaliate against and prevent the 

advancement of Charles B. Richardson because he filed grievances, 

Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of 

Section 8(a)(l) of the Act," and (2) "By refusing to reassign and 

promote Charles B. Richardson because he filed grievances, 

Respondent has engaged and is engaging in unfair labor practices 

in violation of Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act." 

Accordingly, the ALJ ordered respondent to cease and desist 

engaging in the unfair labor practices and ordered respondent to 

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perform certain affirmative actions designed to further the 

purposes of the Act. Specifical~y, respondent was ordered to 

offer Charles B. Richardson a full-time regular carrier position 

at the Galena facility, "displacing if necessary any employee 

assigned to such a position since 31 December 1984," and to make 

Richardson whole for any loss he may have suffered as a result of 

respondent's discriminatory activities. 

Respondent filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision with the 

NLRB, which, in a decision and order dated July 29, 1988, 

"affirm[ed] the [ALJ]'s rulings, findings, and conclusions as 

modified'' and modified the interest rate to be used in calculating. 

the ordered remedy. 1988-89 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 15,082 at 28,296 

(footnote omitted). Respondent subsequently refused to comply 

with the Board's decision and order, necessitating the Board's 

instant application to this court for enforcement. 

II 

Respondent first contends the Board erred in concluding that 

the USPS had violated § 8(a)(l) and (3) of the Act. 

Section 8(a)(l) and (3) of the NLRA, 29 u.s.c. § 158(a)(l) and (3) 

provides: 

3 

(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 

employer--

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 

employees in the exercise of the f~~hts 

guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 

Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 u.s.c. § 157, provides in part: 

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(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or 

tenure of employment or any term or condition 

of employment to encourage or discourage 

membership in any labor organization .... 

A violation of § 8(a)(3) is established where General Counsel 

demonstrates that an employer's opposition to protected union 

activity was a motivating factor in a decision to take adverse 

action against an employee and the employer is unable to 

demonstrate that the adverse action would have been taken even 

absent the protected activity. NLRB v. Transportation Management 

Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983), aff'g Wright Line, 251 NLRB No. 

150, 1980 NLRB Dec. (CCH) I 17,356. 

In conducting our review, we must uphold the Board's factual 

findings if they are supported by substantial evidence on the 

record considered as a whole. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 

U.S. 474 (1951); Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 586, 590 

(10th Cir. 1984). "The substantiality of evidence must take into 

account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight." 

Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488. However, the substantiality 

calculus does not mean that ''a court may displace the Board's· 

choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court 

would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been 

Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to 

form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 

collectively through representatives of their own 

choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities 

for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual 

aid or protection, and shall also have the right to 

refrain from any or all of such activities .... 

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before it de novo." Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488. " [This] 

court certainly does not retry the case. It [ does not] 

undertake[] to weigh the credibility of witnesses"--the 

credibility determinations of an ALJ will not be upset absent 

extraordinary circumstances. Artra Group, 730 F.2d at 590, 592. 

In our opinion, substantial evidence in the record supports 

the ALJ's conclusions that Bounds threatened to harass and 

retaliate against Richardson and prevented Richardson's 

advancement because Richardson had repeatedly filed grievances 

challenging Bounds' conduct. 4 

Richardson testified that on July 11, 1984, Bounds told him 

that he would not be reassigned to the new carrier position "due 

to EEO complaints and union grievances [Richardson] filed against 

[Bounds]" and because Clarkson and Watkins had objected to 

Richardson's reassignment. According to Richardson, when 

Richardson reminded Bounds that he had originally transferred to 

Galena because Bounds had indicated that a regular letter carrier 

position might later become available, Bounds replied that he did 

"remember, but due to past actions on [Richardson's] part, it 

would not be to the Postal Service's advantage to reassign 

[Richardson] at this time." 

4 Filing grievances pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement constitutes protected concerted union activity within the 

meaning of§ 7. NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 836 

(1984). 

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In recommending Weston for reassignment to the new carrier 

position, Bounds supplied Wichita management with employment 

histories he had prepared concerning Weston and Richardson. The 

history about Richardson noted that Richardson had "filed several 

EEO Complaints and several Grievances since his transfer to the 

Galena office" and that he did not "perform as a team member." 

Richardson also testified that on September 29, 1984, when 

Bounds informed Richardson that the new carrier position had been 

given to Weston, Bounds again said that Richardson did not get the 

position "due to EEO complaints and Union grievances" filed by 

Richardson against Bounds. According to Richardson, Bounds also. 

told Richardson that "if [Richardson] didn't like his decision, 

[Richardson] had several ways of filing complaints available to 

[him]." The content of this conversation was confirmed in the 

testimony of Earl Williams, an employee in the Galena facility who 

overheard the conversation. Williams testified that, when 

Richardson asked Bounds why Bounds wouldn't transfer Richardson to 

the carrier position, Bounds replied: "Due to the EEO Complaints 

and Union Grievances you have filed against me." (Williams was 

the only employee to overhear the conversation.) Not 

surprisingly, Bounds testified that he made no such statement. 

Richardson also testified that around November 23, 1984, 

Bounds rejected a request by Richardson for additional working 

hours, adding that "if [Richardson] didn't like the hours in the 

Post Office, [Richardson] could quit and find a job elsewhere" and 

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that "[Bounds] was going to make things as hard on [Richardson] as 

he could." Also on November 23, Richardson complained that Bounds 

had scheduled Weston to work across craft lines as a clerk when 

Richardson, a clerk, was available. Bounds again replied that 

Richardson could file a grievance or find another job. Richardson 

subsequently filed a grievance and was awarded back pay at the 

second grievance step for the time Weston was assigned to work as 

a clerk. 

Finally, on January 21, 1985, Bounds reduced Richardson's pay 

by six minutes over a time-clock dispute. At the time of the 

incident, Richardson told Bounds he would file a grievance, to. 

which Bounds responded, "Chuck, you just keep filing grievances 

and I'll keep finding ways of getting back at you." 

Respondent's challenge to this portion of the ALJ's findings 

focuses on the credibility determinations made by the ALJ. In 

arriving at his findings, the ALJ made specific reference to 

conflicts in the testimony of the parties' respective witnesses 

and determined to credit the testimony of Richardson and Williams 

over that of Bounds. Specifically, the ALJ commented that Bounds 

demonstrated a lack of candor, evasiveness and nervousness during 

his testimony, which reflected adversely on his credibility. 

Respondent disagrees with the ALJ's findings as to 

credibility, especially as to the testimony of Williams, a man 

admittedly on unfriendly terms with Bounds. However, the ALJ was 

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in a unique position to observe the demeanor of the testifying 

witnesses, and we find no cause to overturn his credibility 

determinations. As such, we affirm his findings that Bounds 

threatened to harass and retaliate against Richardson for 

Richardson's grievance-filing activity and that 

Richardson's advancement and reassignment 

impermissible reason. 

Bounds 

for 

prevented 

the same 

Having affirmed the finding that Bounds' opposition to 

Richardson's protected union activity was a motivating factor in 

his actions against Richardson, we now examine, consistent with 

Wright Line's allocation of the burdens of proof, whether. 

respondent demonstrated that the adverse action would have been 

taken even in the absence of the protected activity. To that end, 

the USPS contends that, notwithsta~ding his history of filing 

grievances, "overwhelming evidence" demonstrates that Richardson 

was not reassigned to the open carrier position because he was a 

singularly dreadful mail carrier. 

In support of its position, respondent directs our attention 

to evidence in the record of a series of documented customer 

complaints 

documented 

logged against Richardson. (Twelve of the nineteen 

complaints concerned reported incidents of mail 

misdelivered by Richardson.) Additionally, respondent's witnesses 

testified that postal customers repeatedly approached Bounds, 

Clarkson and Watkins on the street to complain about Richardson's 

performance as a carrier. Clarkson testified that these 

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Appellate Case: 89-9511 Document: 01019867885 Date Filed: 06/19/1990 Page: 11 
complaints formed the basis for Clarkson's and Watkins' written 

opposition to Richardson's reassignment as a carrier. Bounds and 

Weston also testified that Richardson was a difficult employee to 

supervise, that he was prone to make mistakes, and that he 

resented authority. Clarkson further testified that he found 

Richardson extremely difficult to train. 

In evaluating the above evidence of Richardson's purported 

incompetence, the ALJ noted that most of the customer complaints 

formally documented against Richardson were documented by Bounds 

and that Bounds only bothered to formally document complaints 

against Richardson, not his other carriers. The ALJ noted that. 

although most of the complaints documented against Richardson 

concerned misdeliveries of mail, Bounds admitted that he did not 

consider identical reports of carrier Weston's misdeliveries to be 

"complaints" and did not formally document them as such. The ALJ 

found no evidence that any other carrier had ever had a customer 

complaint of misdelivered mail formally documented against him by 

Bounds, even though the city route carriers who testified admitted 

that they also had made misdeliveries. Accordingly, the ALJ 

concluded that he could not sufficiently weigh the significance of 

the documented complaints against Richardson for purposes of 

evaluating Richardson's level of performance. He also concluded 

that Bounds appeared to have singled Richardson out for disparate 

treatment by documenting his misdeliveries: 

Respondent contends that Bounds made the 

reassignment decision based on the superiority of 

Weston's performance, the "customer complaints" against 

Richardson and the Clarkson/Watkins' letter recommending 

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Weston. The significance of the superiority of Weston's 

performance as a carrier is rendered suspect by the fact 

that Bounds made his decision no later than 11 Julr--

over two months before Weston began carrying mail. 5 1 

Similarly, the timing and manner of collection and the 

disparate nature of the "complaints" documented by 

Bounds against Richardson rob them of any probative 

value. Even if it were concluded that Bounds had not 

been ''papering a case" against Richardson, the absence 

of any probative evidence concerning the number and 

nature of complaints received about other carriers makes 

it impossible to evaluate the significance of the 

"complaints" relating to Richardson ...• Accordingly, I 

conclude that the justifications advanced by Respondent 

were wholly pretextual. The real reason for refusing to 

reassign Richardson was the one repeatedly iterated by 

Bounds: Richardson filed too many grievances, almost 

all of which resulted in Bounds' decisions being 

reversed by his superiors. 

In light of the evidence chronicled above, and based on our 

review of the record as a whole, we conclude that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Bounds' proffered 

justification for not reassigning Richardson was pretextual and 

thus that the adverse actions would not have been taken absent 

Richardson's history of filing grievances against Bounds. 

III 

In an alternate challenge to the NLRB order, the USPS asserts 

the Board erred in refusing to defer the charge to the parties' 

collective-bargaining procedures. 6 

5 Weston began carrying the mail on September 13, 1984. 

6 Article 15 of the collective-bargaining agreement ("the 

agreement") between the USPS and the American Postal Workers Union 

and the National Association of Letter Carriers (collectively 

referred to hereinafter as "the Unions") establishes a grievance 

arbitration procedure and defines a grievance as: 

a dispute, difference, disagreement or complaint between 

the parties related to wages, hours, and conditions of 

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The NLRB is empowered with the exclusive statutory authority 

to prevent unfair labor practices: 

The Board is empowered ••• to prevent any person from 

engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 

158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall 

not be affected by any other means of adjustment or 

prevention that has been or may be established by 

agreement, law, or otherwise .••• 

NLRA § l0(a), 29 u.s.c. § 160(a). Notwithstanding this exclusive 

grant of jurisdiction, the Board also has wide discretion to 

decline to exercise its authority and to defer to the method of 

dispute resolution mandated by a collective-bargaining agreement 

if deferral will serve the fundamental national labor policy 

objectives established by Congress in the NLRA. Carey v. 

Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 264-66 (1964); NLRB v. 

Northeast Oklahoma City Mfg. Co., 631 F.2d 669, 673 (10th Cir. 

1980). However, "[o]nce the Board has exercised its discretionary 

authority to establish a deferral policy, its original discretion 

is displaced. The Board must thereafter follow the policy it has 

adopted 'unless and until it explicitly changes that policy."' 

631 F.2d at 673-74 (quoting NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 

employment. A grievance shall include, but is not 

limited to, the complaint of an employee or of the 

Unions which involves the interpretation, application 

of, or compliance with the provisions of this Agreement 

or any local Memorandum of Understanding not in conflict 

with this Agreement. 

Additionally, Article 3 of the agreement provides that the USPS 

may transfer and assign employees and determine the personnel by 

which its operations are to be conducted, but only consistent with 

applicable laws. Based upon these two provisions, the USPS 

contends the instant "grievance'' is arbitrable under the 

collective bargaining agreement. 

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620 F.2d 367, 380 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J., concurring)). 7 

The Board's present pre-arbitration deferral policy was first 

announced in Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150, 1971 NLRB 

Dec. (CCH) ~ 23,385, and later reaffirmed in United Technologies 

Corp., 268 NLRB No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,027 (1984): 

The Collyer majority articulated several factors 

favoring deferral [to the parties' grievance-arbitration 

7 Unfortunately, with respect to claims such as the claim in 

the instant case--where the charge alleges unfair labor practices 

under§ 8 of the NLRA and does not require interpretation of the 

collective-bargaining agreement--the Board has explicitly and 

dramatically changed its policy twice in the past thirteen years. 

Six years after Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 NLRB No. 150, 1971 

NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 23,385 (1971), the Board held that it would notdefer cases alleging violations of § 8(a)(l) and (3) and 

8(b)(l)(A) and (2). General American Transp. Corp., 228 NLRB No. 

102, 1976-77 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 17,961 (1977). Seven years after 

General American Transp., in United Technologies Corp., 268 NLRB 

No. 83, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~ 16,027 (1984), the Board 

expressly overturned General American Transp. and held that 

deferral would thereafter be allowed even in cases alleging unfair 

labor practices, so long as deferral was consistent with the 

principles of Collyer. (One commentator has suggested that the 

NLRB's shifting deferral policy is a "meandering marked by 

advances as well as major retreats, followed by uncertain returns 

to previously abandoned _principles." Peck, A Proposal to End NLRB 

Deferral to the Arbitration Process, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 355, 387 

(1985).) 

Recently, in Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 

1990), the D.C. Circuit held that the Board's pre-arbitration 

deferral policy as expressed in United Technologies contravenes 

the plain meaning of§ l0(a) of the NLRA. The Hammontree court 

concluded that the Board cannot, consistent with the Board's 

exclusive power to remedy unfair labor practices under§ l0(a), 

defer unfair labor practice claims that do not involve the 

interpretation or application of provisions of the collectivebargaining agreement. 

Here, the parties have not argued the related issues. of 

whether United Technologies is consistent with the NLRA and thus 

whether the NLRB could ever properly defer unfair labor practice 

charges such as those alleged in the instant case. Accordingly, 

and because we have affirmed the Board's decision not to defer on 

alternate grounds, we leave these issues for anotherday. 

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machinery]: The dispute arose within the confines of a 

long and productive collective-bargaining relationship; 

there was no claim of employer animosity to the 

employees' exercise of protected rights; the parties' 

contract provided for arbitration in a very broad range 

of disputes; the arbitration clause clearly encompassed 

the dispute at issue; the employer had asserted its 

willingness to utilize arbitration to resolve the 

dispute; and the dispute was eminently well suited to 

resolution by arbitration. 

United Technologies, 1983-84 NLRB Dec. 16,027, at 27,310-11; 

Collyer, 1971 NLRB Dec. ~ 23,385, at 30,226. 

The USPS first moved for deferral to the grievance 

arbitration procedures before the ALJ. The ALJ denied the motion 

because: 

First, it is not altogether clear that the issues 

presented in the grievance process and the issues 

presented here are of sufficient similarity [to warrant 

deferral]. Clearly, if the prima facie case presented 

by General Counsel were to be believed, deferral aside 

as a legal issue, there's no question that the Act would 

have been violated. 

Apparently there is significant difficulty in the 

Union's mind as to whether the contract would have been 

violated by the identical content. 

Secondly, and more significantly, the Charging 

Party in this case is Mr. Richardson, not the Union. 

Mr. Richardson, as you pointed out in your argument, 

sought to use the grievance process and the utilization 

of that process was denied him by the Union. Mr. 

Richardson's rights are the ones at stake, not the 

Union's. 

Consequently, it would be totally inappropriate to 

deny him the protection of the National Labor Relations 

Act, based upon the actions of the Union. 

In his written order, the ALJ reaffirmed without further 

discussion his denial of respondent's motion to defer. 

On review, the Board agreed that deferral was inappropriate, 

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but noted that "in doing so we rely on the fact that this 

grievance-arbitration procedure has been totally ineffective in 

curbing the Respondent's proclivity to retaliate against the 

Charging Party for filing grievances." 1988-89 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 11 

15,081, at 28,297. The Board continued: 

We find that the record evidence establishes that 

the Respondent has engaged in a series of reprisals 

against Richardson for his grievance-filing activity. 

This pattern of hostile conduct is fundamentally at odds 

with the Act and the policy behind deferral. The facts 

of the case at bar show a continuation of the earlier 

coercive conduct, and the Respondent's recent statements 

reveal an intent to retaliate against Richardson in the 

future. In these circumstances, the grievancearbitration machinery we are being asked to defer to has 

become meaningless in the extended campaign of reprisals 

against Richardson. Accordingly, we will not require 

Richardson to perform what has clearly become a futile 

act. The Respondent's own words have established the 

futility of future grievance-filing by Richardson. 

Here, we hold that the Board's focus on the futility of 

Richardson's further use of the grievance machinery amounts to a 

finding, consistent with the second Collyer factor set forth 

above, "of enmity by Respondent to employees' exercise of 

protected rights." Collyer, 1971 NLRB Dec. (CCH) ~23,385, at 

30,226. We have already recited the record evidence demonstrating 

that Bounds had retaliated against Richardson and had threatened 

further retaliation because of Richardson's grievance-filing 

activities. (See section I.) At a minimum, that evidence ably 

demonstrates that Bounds was not planning on altering his conduct 

towards Richardson as a result of the grievance process. To 

repeat, Richardson testified that Bounds told him, "Chuck, you 

just keep filing grievances and I'll keep finding ways of getting 

back at you." 

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We therefore conclude that, because the Board's decision is 

consistent with its pre-arbitration deferral policy as expressed 

in Collyer and United Technologies, the Board did not abuse its 

discretion in declining to defer its jurisdiction over this case. 

IV 

In conclusion, we hold that the findings of the NLRB and the 

ALJ are supported by substantial evidence based on the record 

considered as a whole. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the NLRB's 

determination that respondent's challenged activities violated 

§ 8(a)(l) and (3) of the NLRA. Additionally, we hold that the_ 

Board did not abuse its discretion in refusing to defer this case 

to the grievance arbitration machinery of· the collectivebargaining agreement. The order of the NLRB shall be enforced. 

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