Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00551/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00551-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Porterville
Defendant
Anthony Luckey
Plaintiff
Bruce Sokoloff
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANTHONY LUCKEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF PORTERVILLE, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 1:23-cv-00551-BAM

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 21)

Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to racial discrimination while employed by the 

Porterville Police Department. (Doc. 20.) He asserts violations of California’s Fair Employment 

and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the United States and 

California Constitutions against the City of Porterville and Bruce Sokoloff (“Sokoloff”) 

(collectively “Defendants”). (Id.)

Defendants move to dismiss all claims in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint pursuant 

to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 21 at 1-2.) Plaintiff opposes 

dismissal, asserting the Second Amended Complaint states facts sufficient to survive a motion to 

dismiss for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 32.) The matter was not calendared for hearing, and the 

Court finds the motion suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 

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230(g).1 For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. Summary of Second Amended Complaint

Causes of Action

Plaintiff forwards the following causes of action: (1) race discrimination in violation of 

Title VII against Defendant City of Porterville; (2) deprivation of civil rights in violation of 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of Porterville and Sokoloff; (3) race discrimination in 

violation of the California Constitution against Defendant City of Porterville; and (4) race 

discrimination in violation of FEHA against Defendant City of Porterville. 

Allegations

Plaintiff accepted a position as a patrol officer with the Porterville Police Department in 

the fall of 2020. (Doc. 20, Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶ 14.) For the next few months, 

Plaintiff was repeatedly told he was doing a great job, and the Porterville Police Department was 

glad he joined the team. (Id.) After Sokoloff, an employee of the Porterville Police Department, 

“learned that Plaintiff was dating Porterville Police Officer Ana Moreno, a White female officer, 

he made clear he did not approve of her dating Plaintiff, a Black officer. On multiple occasions, 

Sokoloff asked Ms. Moreno inappropriate questions concerning her relationship with Plaintiff and 

expressed his disapproval. When Ms. Moreno refused to terminate her relationship with Plaintiff, 

Sokoloff retaliate[ed] against her.” (Id., ¶ 16.)

Sokoloff “used his position” as a Porterville Police Department Sergeant and his influence 

with the Porterville Police Department administration “to conduct a discriminatory campaign to 

create a pretext to fire Plaintiff. That campaign included a number of unfounded criticisms and 

warnings concerning Plaintiff’s performance. After Plaintiff began dating a white, female coworker, he was written up on at least six occasions.” (SAC ¶ 17.) Sokoloff ultimately conducted 

a bogus “investigation” that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination. (Id.)

II. Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, and 

1 The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction over this action for all purposes, including 

trial and entry of final judgment, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Docs. 27, 28, 30.)

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dismissal is proper if there is a lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts 

alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Conservation Force v. Salazar, 646 F.3d 1240, 1241–42 

(9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A court may only consider the 

complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Evidence 201. See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); 

Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (quotation marks 

omitted); Conservation Force, 646 F.3d at 1242; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 

(9th Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability 

requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. 

In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

the court must accept as true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 

U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins 

v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 

1999). However, the court need not credit “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of 

the elements of a cause of action.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 

amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 

could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 

1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

///

///

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III. Discussion and Analysis

A. First and Fourth Claims (Race Discrimination)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s first and fourth claims alleging race discrimination under 

Title VII and FEHA, respectively, must be dismissed because Plaintiff fails to plead a prima facie 

case based on a disparate treatment theory. (Doc. 21 at 8-9.) 

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate 

against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 

employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2000e-2(a)(1); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).2 “A plaintiff may show 

discrimination in violation of Title VII by proving disparate treatment or impact, or by 

establishing the existence of a hostile work environment.” Kurdi v. California Dep’t of 

Transportation, No. 1:22-cv-00729 JLT EPG, 2023 WL 267538, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2023).

Plaintiff appears to assert a discrimination claim based on disparate treatment. (Doc. 32 at 3-4.) 

To articulate a prima facie case of disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is 

a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) he experienced an adverse 

employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated 

more favorably, or other circumstances surrounding the adverse employment action give rise to 

an inference of discrimination. Lee v. Foothill-De Anza Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. 23-CV-03418-

PCP, 2024 WL 2013611, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 7, 2024) (quoting Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard 

Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also Davis v. Advance Servs., Inc., No. 2:22-cv00343-MCE-JDP, 2023 WL 4670104, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 2023) (quotation and citation 

omitted), (“To state a prima facie case of discrimination under the FEHA, a plaintiff must allege 

and ultimately show that: (i) [he] was a member of a protected class; (ii) [he] was qualified for the 

position [he] sought or was performing competently in the position [he] held; (iii) [he] suffered an 

2

“FEHA uses largely the same language and promotes the same objective as Title VII,” and “the Title VII 

framework is applied to claims brought under . . . FEHA, including discrimination claims brought under a 

disparate treatment theory.” Freeling v. PCX, Inc., No. 8:23-cv-00173-DOC-KES, 2023 WL 6194259, at 

*4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2023. The Court will therefore assess Plaintiff’s Title VII and FEHA claims under 

the Title VII framework and federal law.

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adverse employment action; and (iv) the employer acted with a discriminatory motive.”). 

“[A]lthough a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination is not required to allege a 

prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss, the prima facie elements are nonetheless valuable 

in determining whether plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible and 

not merely speculative.” Albro v. Spencer, No. 1:18-cv-01156-DAD-JLT, 2019 WL 2641667, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. June 27, 2019) (acknowledging that the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas

is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement); see also Kurdi, 2023 WL 267538, at *5 

(“Although a prima facie case need not be established at the pleading stage, Swierkiewicz v. 

Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002), a complaint still must state a plausible claim sufficient to put 

the defendant on notice of the claim and the grounds it rests upon.”); Lee v. Hertz Corp., 330 

F.R.D. 557, 561 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Plaintiffs need not prove the prima facie elements to survive a 

motion to dismiss, but must plead the general elements to make a claim facially plausible.”).

The parties dispute whether Plaintiff adequately pleads the fourth element of a

discrimination claim, with Plaintiff contending that the SAC alleges “other circumstances 

surrounding the adverse employment action” that give rise to an inference of discrimination. 

(Doc. 32 at 4.) Namely, Plaintiff asserts that the SAC alleges that “(1) Plaintiff received universal 

praise for his performance prior to it becoming known he was dating a white female co-worker, 

(2) the white woman he was dating was told by Defendant Sokoloff that it was inappropriate for 

her to be dating Plaintiff and threatened to get her fired, although the Porterville Police 

Department did not have any rule prohibiting officers from dating each other, and (3) it was 

Defendant Sokoloff who conducted the bogus investigation that resulted in Plaintiff’s 

termination.” (Id.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the fourth element of a

disparate treatment claim. First, Plaintiff fails to include any allegations that similarly situated 

individuals outside of Plaintiff’s protected class received more favorable treatment. Second,

Plaintiff fails to adequately allege “other circumstances” giving rise to an inference of 

discrimination. Plaintiff appears to rely on allegations that Sokoloff asked Ms. Moreno 

“inappropriate questions concerning her relationship with Plaintiff” and “made clear he did not 

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approve of her dating Plaintiff.” (SAC ¶ 16.) There are no allegations in the SAC that the 

“inappropriate questions” mentioned race or that Sokoloff “expressed his disapproval” because of 

the interracial dating relationship. 

Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations are generally conclusory in nature. For instance, the

SAC summarily concludes that Sokoloff “used his position” to “conduct a discriminatory 

campaign” against Plaintiff. (SAC ¶ 17.) However, there are no allegations articulating what 

Sokoloff did that reportedly subjected Plaintiff to a “discriminatory campaign.” While the SAC 

describes the “campaign” to include “a number of unfounded criticisms and warnings concerning 

Plaintiff’s performance” and that Plaintiff “was written up on at least six occasions,” there are no 

factual allegations indicating that Sokoloff was directly involved in the criticisms, warnings, or 

write ups, or linking Sokoloff to those actions. (SAC ¶ 17.) The SAC also summarily concludes 

that Sokoloff conducted a “bogus ‘investigation’” that resulted in Plaintiff’s termination. (SAC ¶ 

17) Again, however, there are no factual allegations relevant to the “investigation.” The Court 

need not credit “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The Court therefore concludes that the SAC fails to 

allege sufficient factual matter to state a claim for discrimination under Title VII or FEHA that is 

plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

Plaintiff’s discrimination claims premised on theory of disparate treatment is GRANTED. This 

dismissal will be with leave to amend. 

B. Second Claim (Monell)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

against the City of Porterville because Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled Monell liability. 

(Doc.21 at 9-10.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that he adequately alleges the grounds for the 

City of Porterville’s liability based on ratification of Sokoloff’s conduct. (Doc. 32 at 4-5.) 

Municipalities “cannot be held liable [for the actions of their employees] under § 1983 on 

a respondeat superior theory.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 591 

(1978). Instead, the constitutional injury must occur during the execution of an official “policy or 

custom.” Id. at 694. “A plaintiff may assert Monell liability based on: (1) an official policy; (2) a 

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‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local 

government entity’; (3) the act of an ‘official whose acts fairly represent official policy such that 

the challenged action constituted official policy’; or (4) where “an official with final policymaking authority ‘delegated that authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.’” 

Bustamante v. County of Shasta, No. 2:23-cv-01552-TLN-DMC, 2024 WL 3673529, at *2 (E.D. 

Cal. Aug. 6, 2024) (quoting Price v. Sery, 513 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 2008)). 

Only ratification appears to be at issue. (See Doc. 32 at 4-5.) A municipality may be 

liable under this theory if “an official with final policy-making authority ratified a subordinate’s 

unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 

1346–1347 (9th Cir. 1992). “Ratification requires that the policymaker engage in a ‘conscious, 

affirmative choice’ to endorse a subordinate’s conduct.” Bustamante, 2024 WL 3673529 at *3, 

quoting Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. 

In the SAC, Plaintiff alleges Sokoloff acted “with the full knowledge and support of the 

highest levels of the Porterville Police Department, who as the authorized policymakers for the 

Porterville Police Department had knowledge of Defendant Sokoloff’s unconstitutional conduct 

that led to Plaintiff’s officially approved termination.” (SAC ¶ 25.) This allegation alone is 

conclusory and is insufficient to state a Monell claim against the City of Porterville based upon 

ratification. Bustamante, 2024 WL 3673529, at *3 (concluding that allegations certain officials 

with final policy-making authority had “direct knowledge of the facts of this incident” and “made 

a deliberate choice to endorse the decisions of [probation department employees] and the basis for 

those decisions” were “unclear, conclusory, and insufficient to state a Monell claim . . . based 

upon ratification”); Thurston v. City of Vallejo, No. 2:19-CV-1902-KJM-CKD, 2021 WL 

1839717, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2021) (finding that “simply listing a number of high-ranking 

individuals is not sufficient to allege a specific final policymaker” and “allegations that the 

policymakers ‘ratified’ or ‘knew and/or reasonably should have known about’ the alleged 

constitutional violations are conclusory”).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible Monell 

claim. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claim against the City of Porterville is 

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GRANTED. The Monell claim will be dismissed with leave to amend.

C. Second Claim (Qualified Immunity)

Defendants argue that Sokoloff is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s second 

claim for relief alleging violation of his right of intimate association secured to him by the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 (Doc. 21 at 11-12.) 

“Government officials enjoy qualified immunity from civil damages unless their conduct 

violates ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 

have known.’” Jeffers v. Gomez, 267 F.3d 895, 910 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When presented with a qualified immunity defense, the 

central questions for the court are: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable 

to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the defendants conduct violated a statutory or constitutional 

right; and (2) whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time it is alleged to have 

been violated. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), overruled in part on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).

A right is “clearly established” when its bounds are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable 

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The 

Supreme Court does “not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed 

the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 

(2011). Indeed, “in an obvious case, [highly generalized] standards can ‘clearly establish’ the 

answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 

(2004).

The Supreme Court “has concluded that choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate 

human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of 

such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional 

scheme.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984). This freedom of intimate 

3 Plaintiff’s second claim alleges unlawful conduct by “intentionally discriminating against him on the 

basis of his race and interfering with his intimate relationship with a white, Hispanic, female co-worker.” 

(SAC ¶ 25.) By this order, the Court grants leave to amend as to the claims based on race discrimination. 

Therefore, the issue of qualified immunity is focused on the alleged right to intimate association.

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association “receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty.” Id. at 618; see 

also Bd. of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte (“Rotary Club”), 481 U.S. 537, 545 

(1987) (identifying that the Supreme Court “has recognized that the freedom to enter into and 

carry on certain intimate or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by 

the Bill of Rights.”). Further, the Supreme Court has “emphasized that the First Amendment

protects those relationships...that presuppose ‘deep attachments and commitments to the 

necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of 

thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.’” Rotary 

Club, 481 U.S. at 545 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619–20). Although the Supreme Court has 

“not attempted to mark the precise boundaries of this type of constitutional protection,” the 

intimate relationships that have been “accorded constitutional protection include marriage; the 

begetting and bearing of children; child rearing and education; and cohabitation with relatives.” 

Id. at 545 (internal citations omitted). However, the constitutional protection is not restricted to 

relationships among family members. Id. The Supreme Court has explained that qualifying 

relationships “are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of 

selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical 

aspects of the relationship.” Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see also Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 545

(determining whether a particular association is sufficiently personal or private to warrant 

constitutional protection requires consideration of “factors such as size, purpose, selectivity, and 

whether others are excluded from critical aspects of the relationship”); see Mann v. City of 

Sacramento, No. 21-15440, 2022 WL 2128906, at *1 (9th Cir. June 14, 2022) (“Neither Rotary 

Club nor its progeny extended the First Amendment to cover [intimate-association claims brought 

by adult siblings].”).

Relevant here, Plaintiff’s SAC alleges that Plaintiff was “dating” Ms. Moreno. (SAC ¶

25.) Defendants contend that applying the relevant Roberts factors, there are no allegations that 

Plaintiff’s dating of Ms. Moreno maintained “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin 

and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.” 

(Doc. 21 at 12.) Defendants therefore characterize Plaintiff’s relationship as akin to a close 

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friendship, and assert that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit has recognized 

“dating” or a friendship, however close, as sufficiently intimate to warrant constitutional 

protection. (Id., citing Hittle v. City of Stockton, 2018 WL 1367451 (E.D. Cal 2018).) 

Defendants conclude that in the absence of such authority, Plaintiff’s alleged right to intimate 

association was not clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, and Sokoloff is 

entitled to qualified immunity.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ assertion that the SAC fails to 

allege that Plaintiff’s dating relationship maintained “a high degree of selectivity in decisions to 

begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the 

relationship.” Plaintiff also does not challenge Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff’s 

relationship as a close friendship. Plaintiff instead argues that Sokoloff is not protected by 

qualified immunity because “Defendants ignore the fact that as early as 1983 the Supreme Court 

condemned a university’s rule that prohibited interracial dating,” citing Maini v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 

1167, 1175 (9th Cir. 2000) and Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580 (1983). 

(Doc. 32 at 5.) Plaintiff asserts that in “this day and age, Defendants’ claim that Sokoloff is 

protected by qualified immunity because he would not have known that penalizing an interracial 

couple for dating is unconstitutional cannot be given any credence.” (Id.)

Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the constitutional violation was clearly established 

by defining the law at issue in a concrete, particularized manner. Shafer v. County of Santa 

Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117-18 (9th Cir. 2017) (stating that the plaintiff bears the burden of 

showing that the rights allegedly violated were clearly established); Gordon v. County of Orange, 

6 F.4th 961, 969 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the right 

allegedly violated was clearly established” at the time of the violation). A case directly on point is 

not necessary to defeat qualified immunity, but existing case law must have put “every reasonable 

official” on notice that the conduct was unconstitutional. Martinez v. High, 91 F.4th 1022, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2024).

Plaintiff has not identified any authority that has applied the relevant Roberts factors 

discussed above and held that “dating” or a close friendship is sufficiently intimate to warrant 

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constitutional protection. See Hittle v. City of Stockton, No. 2:12-cv-00766-TLN-KJN, 2018 WL 

1367451, at *15 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2018) (identifying that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the 

Supreme Court has recognized a friendship, however close, as sufficiently intimate to warrant 

constitutional protection). Here, Plaintiff’s broad identification of a clearly established right is 

insufficient. Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5-6 (2021) (“Although this Court’s 

caselaw does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing 

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate. This inquiry 

must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 

proposition.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In the absence of any such 

authority, Plaintiff’s alleged right to intimate association was not clearly established at the time of 

the challenged conduct, and Sokoloff is entitled to qualified immunity. Consequently, Plaintiff's

second claim for relief is dismissed with prejudice insofar as it seeks money damages from 

Sokoloff in his individual capacity for allegedly infringing upon Plaintiff's right to intimate 

association.

D. Third Claim (Race Discrimination in violation of California Constitution)

Plaintiff’s third claim alleges race discrimination in violation of “Section 1 of the

California Constitution.” (SAC ¶ 29.) 

Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution states:

All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. 

Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, 

and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and 

privacy.

Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 1. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim, asserting that Section 1 does not support a race 

discrimination claim. Plaintiff has not cited case law suggesting Article 1, Section 1 provides for 

a claim based on race discrimination. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the amended complaint 

“clearly puts Defendants on notice that his Third Cause of Action is based upon the California 

Constitution’s prohibition against race discrimination.” (Doc. 32 at 5.) Plaintiff acknowledges 

that the amended complaint “cites the wrong section of the California Constitution,” but argues 

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that this “is immaterial and could be corrected in response to a motion for a more definite 

statement.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff suggests that Defendants had sufficient notice because defense 

counsel had actual knowledge that Plaintiff’s cause of action was based upon Article 1, sections 

8 and 31. (Id. at 6.)

Given Plaintiff’s concession that the amended complaint cites the incorrect section of the 

California Constitution, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim for race

discrimination in violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution is GRANTED. 

As Plaintiff plausibly contends that the pleading deficiency can be cured by further amendment, 

this claim will be dismissed with leave to amend. 

IV. Leave to Amend

Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend should be

freely given “when justice so requires,” and courts are guided by “the underlying purpose of 

Rule 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” 

Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has 

repeatedly held that “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the 

pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the 

allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, except 

where noted above, Plaintiff will be granted a final opportunity to amend to cure the identified 

pleading deficiencies. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 21) is GRANTED as follows:

a. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII and FEHA discrimination 

claims premised on a theory of disparate treatment is GRANTED. These 

claims are DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

b. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Monell claim against the City of Porterville 

is GRANTED. The Monell claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

c. Plaintiff's second claim for relief is DISMISSED with prejudice insofar as it 

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seeks money damages from Sokoloff in his individual capacity for allegedly 

infringing upon Plaintiff's right to intimate association.

d. Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s third claim for race discrimination in 

violation of Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution is GRANTED. 

This claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 

2. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date 

of service of this order. Defendants shall file any responsive pleading within 

fourteen (14) days from service of Plaintiff’s amended complaint. 

3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint, then the action may be dismissed 

without prejudice for failure to prosecute and failure to obey the Court’s order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2024 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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