Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03155/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03155-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Chicago
Appellee
Billy Gonzalez
Appellee
Robert A. Kero
Appellee
Christian E. Ramirez
Appellee
Mark Rosado
Appellant

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐3155

MARK ROSADO,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

BILLY GONZALEZ, CHRISTIAN E. RAMIREZ, ROBERT A. KERO,

and CITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 1:15‐cv‐03733 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 24, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 10, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and KANNE,

Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge. On September 7, 2012, two Chicago

Police Department (“CPD”) officers, Defendants Billy Gon‐

zalez and Christian Ramirez, pulled over a car driven by

Plaintiff Mark Rosado for failing to use a turn signal. After

stopping the car, the officers “claimed to have seen” a badge

and handcuffs, as well as a handgun in plain view “between

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
2 No. 15‐3155

the brake lever and center console.” The officers arrested Ro‐

sado for unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon and for

violating the armed habitual criminal statute. Defendant Of‐

ficer Robert Kero approved the officers’ report as establish‐

ing probable cause. Rosado was bound over for trial on Sep‐

tember 8, 2012, after a probable cause hearing.  

Rosado spent the next year and a half in jail fighting the

criminal charges. In February 2014, Rosado received a copy

of the dash cam video taken the evening he was arrested,

which, contrary to the officers’ accounts, showed that Ro‐

sado had used his turn signal, and it was operable. The state

court, relying on the video, found that the officers could not

have seen the traffic infraction. Accordingly, it granted Ro‐

sado’s motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. In

light of the grant of the motion, the state dismissed the case

nolle prosequi on April 14, 2014.

Rosado filed this § 1983 lawsuit against Defendants on

April 28, 2015, alleging false arrest, conspiracy to violate

constitutional rights, failure to intervene, violation of due

process, and a state‐law respondeat superior claim.1

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Rosado’s false‐

arrest claim as barred by the two‐year statute of limitations.

The district court granted the motion to dismiss because Ro‐

sado’s claim accrued when he was bound over for trial on

September 8, 2012, and he did not file his complaint until

April 28, 2015—outside the two‐year statute of limitations.

Because his claims of conspiracy and failure to intervene

                                                 

1 Rosado did not allege a state‐law malicious‐prosecution claim despite

the fact that he alleged that the officers “agree[d] to putatively and false‐

ly charge” him. (Compl. ¶ 21d (emphasis added).)

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
No. 15‐3155 3

arose from the underlying false‐arrest claim, those were also

dismissed. The district court dismissed Rosado’s due‐process

and respondeat‐superior claims on the merits.

I. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Rosado only challenges the district court’s

dismissal of three of his claims—false arrest, conspiracy, and

failure to intervene—as time‐barred.

A district court’s dismissal on statute‐of‐limitations

grounds constitutes a dismissal for failure to state a claim

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the

claim is “indisputably time‐barred.” Small v. Chao, 398 F.3d

894, 898 (7th Cir. 2005). We therefore review the district

court’s dismissal of Rosado’s claims de novo, taking the factu‐

al allegations from Rosado’s complaint as true and drawing

all reasonable inferences in his favor. Vesely v. Armslist LLC,

762 F.3d 661, 664–65 (7th Cir. 2014).

The statute of limitations on Rosado’s claims is governed

by Illinois’s personal‐injury statute of limitations, which is

two years. 735 ILCS 5/13‐202; Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

387 (2007). The statute of limitations for a false‐arrest claim

“begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained

pursuant to legal process,” meaning when the claimant is

“bound over for trial.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391, 397.

Rosado was bound over for trial on September 8, 2012.

He concedes that his two‐year statute of limitations began to

run at that point and therefore expired on September 8, 2014.

Because he did not file his claim until April 28, 2015, he was

out of time. But, Rosado attempts to salvage his time‐barred

claim by arguing that he is entitled to equitable estoppel or

equitable tolling.

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
4 No. 15‐3155

A. Equitable Estoppel

Rosado cannot satisfy the requirements for application of

equitable estoppel. Equitable estoppel, which is a doctrine of

federal law, “comes into play if the defendant takes active

steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, as by prom‐

ising not to plead the statute of limitations.” Shropshear v.

Corp. Counsel of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir. 2001). Eq‐

uitable estoppel presupposes “efforts by the defendant,

above and beyond the wrongdoing upon which the plain‐

tiffʹs claim is founded, to prevent, by fraud or deception, the

plaintiff from suing in time.” Id.

The heart of Rosado’s claim for equitable estoppel is that

after the police officers unlawfully detained him, they inten‐

tionally withheld the dash cam video to prevent him from

bringing suit. Even if we were to accept that Defendants’ al‐

leged intentional withholding of the dash cam video is the

type of active step that could give rise to equitable estoppel,2

Rosado has not shown that any affirmative misconduct

“prevent[ed him] from suing in time.” Shropshear, 275 F.3d at

595. In other words, he cannot show causation. See Flight At‐

tendants Against UAL Offset v. Comm’r Internal Revenue., 165

F.3d 572, 577 (7th Cir. 1999) (“It is implicit in the doctrine

that the conduct alleged as the basis for the estoppel have

                                                 

2 Although Rosado admits that he “knew he used his turn signal toggle”

on the night of his arrest, he argues that he “had no way of knowing

whether or not the rear turn signal light was operable and visible to the

Officers.” (Appellant Br. 8.) Thus, the Defendants’ alleged concealment

of evidence showing that the arrest was a result of their wrongdoing (ra‐

ther than the signal’s malfunction) could constitute the type of “hiding

evidence” that justifies equitable estoppel. See Thelen v. Marc’s Big Boy

Corp., 64 F.3d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1995). We need not decide that question.

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
No. 15‐3155 5

been the cause of the plaintiff’s not suing in time.” (emphasis

added)); see also Smith v. City of Chicago Heights, 951 F.2d 834,

840 (7th Cir. 1992) (“To prove estoppel successfully, the

plaintiff must show that the defendant’s conduct was im‐

proper, and that the plaintiff was harmed by such conduct.”

(emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Rosado has not alleged that any wrongdoing by Defend‐

ants actually caused him to file outside the statute of limita‐

tions. At most, Defendants’ conduct delayed filing. But by

February 2014, Rosado had the dash cam video and knew

that the officers lacked probable cause to stop his vehicle. At

that point, he still had seven months remaining before the

statute of limitations expired. In the absence of some allega‐

tion that Defendants continued to obstruct his ability to file

his suit, or that seven months was insufficient time to file a

complaint, Rosado cannot demonstrate that Defendants “ac‐

tually prevent[ed Rosado] from suing in time.” Flight Attend‐

ants, 165 F.3d at 577. Accordingly, he is not entitled to equi‐

table estoppel.

B. Equitable Tolling

Rosado is also not entitled to equitable tolling. Equitable

tolling, which is governed by Illinois law, may apply “if the

defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff

has been prevented from asserting his or her rights in some

extraordinary way.” Clay v. Kuhl, 727 N.E.2d 217, 223 (Ill.

2000). Illinois law also requires that the plaintiff act diligent‐

ly to file his suit: “[E]quitable tolling does not reset the stat‐

ute of limitations; instead, the doctrine requires that the

plaintiff get the litigation under way promptly after the cir‐

cumstance justifying delay is no longer present.” Ashafa v.

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
6 No. 15‐3155

City of Chicago, 146 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal quo‐

tation marks omitted).

Rosado did not promptly file. There cannot be any dis‐

pute that Rosado knew the officers had fabricated probable

cause by February 2014, when he received the dash cam vid‐

eo that showed his turn‐signal light blinking. At that point,

he still had seven months to timely file suit. Rosado’s unex‐

plained failure to file suit within the seven months remain‐

ing on the statute of limitations precludes the applicability of

equitable tolling.3 See Cada, 920 F.2d at 453 (no equitable toll‐

ing where claimant had eight months remaining on statute

of limitations).

C. Remaining Claims

We briefly address the remaining claims in Rosado’s

complaint. Rosado’s claim of conspiracy to commit constitu‐

tional violations is a recast of his false‐arrest claim, which, as

we have said, is time‐barred. Because a plaintiff cannot use a

theory of a continuing civil conspiracy to recover for indi‐

vidual overt acts that would themselves be time‐barred, Ro‐

sado’s claim of conspiracy to commit false arrest is also time‐

barred. See Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1992)

                                                 

3 Although we have described the delay in filing as “unexplained,” we

are not convinced that the delay is as unexplained as it may seem. Ro‐

sado at some point had a lawyer representing him in connection with his

potential civil lawsuit (albeit not counsel who ultimately filed Rosado’s

lawsuit and appeal). (Hr’g Tr. 5, Aug. 19, 2015 (“[T]his case came to me

within days ... before filing this case. Another lawyer had it.”).) Alt‐

hough a lawyer’s error in allowing a statute of limitations to run is not

the type of extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling, see

Modrowski v. Mote, 322 F.3d 965, 967–68 (7th Cir. 2003), the error may

give rise to liability for malpractice.

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7
No. 15‐3155 7

(explaining that “[a] rule allowing plaintiffs in civil conspir‐

acy actions to recover only for overt acts alleged to have oc‐

curred within the applicable limitations period” prevents

plaintiffs from defeating the purpose of a statute of limita‐

tions “simply by asserting that a series of separate wrongs

were committed pursuant to a conspiracy” (internal quota‐

tion marks omitted)).

The same fate befalls Rosado’s claim of failure to inter‐

vene. “In order for there to be a failure to intervene, it logi‐

cally follows that there must exist an underlying constitu‐

tional violation ... .” Harper v. Albert, 400 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th

Cir. 2005). The underlying constitutional violation here is a

time‐barred false‐arrest claim. Because the claim of false ar‐

rest is time‐barred, the derivative claim of a failure to inter‐

vene during the false arrest is also time‐barred.

Finally, because Rosado has not argued on appeal that

the district court improperly dismissed his due‐process and

respondeat‐superior claims on the merits, we do not address

them here.  

II. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

dismissal of Rosado’s suit.

Case: 15-3155 Document: 29 Filed: 08/10/2016 Pages: 7