Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05235/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05235-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Central Intelligence Agency
Appellee
Roger Hall
Appellant
Carol Hrdlicka
Amicus Curiae for Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 8, 2005 Decided February 14, 2006

No. 04-5235

ROGER HALL

APPELLANT

v.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv01319)

James H. Lesar argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Carol Hrdlicka, pro se, filed the brief as amicus curiae in

support of appellant.

Megan L. Rose, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and Michael J. Ryan, Assistant U.S. Attorney. R.

Craig Lawrence and Diane M. Sullivan, Assistant U.S.

Attorneys, entered appearances.

USCA Case #04-5235 Document #949303 Filed: 02/14/2006 Page 1 of 11
Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS.

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Roger Hall, the plaintiffappellant in this case, has made three sets of requests to the

Central Intelligence Agency under the Freedom of Information

Act (“FOIA”), seeking information about prisoners of war and

individuals missing in action in the Vietnam War. The

procedural ins and outs of the resulting litigation have been

disconcertingly complex but for the most part need not be

recited. The key issues between the parties relate to whether

Hall was eligible for complete or partial waiver of fees for

document search, review, and duplication. But the CIA’s

decision to deliver “the documents at issue in this case” to Hall

without seeking payment moots these issues, as we will explain.

Although there appear to be lingering disputes over the

scope of the CIA’s search and the validity of its exemption

claims, the merits of those issues are not before us because of a

procedural twist: Hall failed to file a timely appeal from the

district court’s final order dismissing the case. As a result the

only reviewable order is the court’s denial of Hall’s motion for

reconsideration. With respect to each of Hall’s claims we find

either that they were mooted by the CIA’s release of documents

or that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

them. 

* * * 

In 1994 and 1998 Hall filed FOIA requests seeking

information held by the CIA. Having received what he

considered an inadequate response to the first request and no

response to the later request within twenty business days as

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required by FOIA, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(A)(i), he filed suit

in district court. The CIA thereupon released some documents

to Hall but withheld others in whole or in part.

The CIA moved for summary judgment, arguing that its

searches were adequate and that it had properly invoked various

FOIA exemptions to justify the withholding and redacting of

some documents. The court ruled that the CIA’s affidavits were

insufficient for evaluation of the searches’ adequacy and ordered

submission of additional affidavits; as to the FOIA exemptions,

it ruled largely but not entirely for the agency. Mem. Op. (Aug.

10, 2000).

A battle then ensued on the issue of fees. FOIA allows

agencies to charge different fees for different kinds of requests.

When records are sought for commercial use, an agency may

charge fees for document search, duplication, and review. 5

U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(I). When a representative of the news

media (inter alia) seeks records, the agency may collect only

duplication fees. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(II). When disclosure “is in

the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly

to public understanding of the operations or activities of the

government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of

the requester,” the agency must reduce fees further or eliminate

them altogether. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii). Hall argued initially that

he was entitled to a public-interest waiver. The district court

rejected the argument; it then ordered the parties to “file a joint

report indicating whether or not plaintiff has committed to

paying search and copying fees up to a specific amount. If he

has not, the case will be dismissed.” Mem. Op. (July 22, 2002)

7. The parties then continued to maneuver with respect to fees;

each here seeks to cast blame on the other, but we need not

recount those maneuvers here nor pick sides. 

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Meanwhile, Hall filed a third request to CIA in February

2003, incorporating his prior requests, adding a new group, and

adding an alternative theory to support reduced fees—namely,

his status as a representative of the media. In October 2003 Hall

filed a motion for leave to file an amended and supplemental

complaint that incorporated the February 2003 FOIA request

and the new fee waiver contention. In addition, Hall filed a

separate suit in district court, seeking to enforce the February

2003 request. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Hall v. CIA, No.

04-0814 (D.D.C. filed May 19, 2004). 

On November 13, 2003, the district court hearing the

original case (the present one) issued two memorandum

opinions. In the first it ruled that “[b]ecause plaintiff has

declined to pay the fees for search and copying done by

defendant by offering only $1,000, he has constructively

abandoned his request and is not entitled to receive any

additional documents.” Mem. Op. (Nov. 13, 2003) 4.

Accordingly the court dismissed the case. Id. at 6. The second

opinion denied Hall’s attempts to amend and supplement his

complaint. Mem. Op. & Order (Nov. 13, 2003) (“Nov. 2003

Mem. Op. II”). Two weeks later, Hall mailed two checks

totaling $10,906.33 to the CIA, but the CIA returned the checks

without cashing them. Br. for Appellant 34 n.8. 

Hall then filed a motion for reconsideration of both orders,

purportedly under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, but not within that rule’s 10-day time limit. As the

motion raised grounds cognizable under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 60(b), the district court properly addressed the

motion as one under that rule. See Computer Professionals for

Social Responsibility v. U.S. Secret Service, 72 F.3d 897, 903

(D.C. Cir. 1996) (“An untimely motion under Rule 59(e) may be

considered as a motion under Rule 60(b) if it states grounds for

relief under the latter rule.”). Rule 60(b), so far as relevant here,

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imposes no time limits, but under Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(v) & (vi) of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the filing of a Rule

60(b) motion doesn’t toll the time for filing an appeal when filed

more than 10 days after the judgment. The district court denied

the motion in April 2004. Mem. Op. (April 22, 2004) (“April

2004 Mem. Op.”). By this time, the deadline for filing a notice

of appeal had passed. Hall filed a timely notice of appeal from

the April 2004 order. 

On the eve of oral argument the CIA informed the court that

it “has decided to use its administrative discretion to voluntarily

release the documents at issue in this case without payment from

appellant.” Appellee’s Suggestion of Mootness 2. Hall’s

counsel has since confirmed by letter that he received “a

package containing a release of documents responsive to

Freedom of Information Act requests made by [his] client, Mr.

Roger Hall, in 1994 and 1998.”

We first explain briefly why Hall may not directly appeal

the November 2003 orders. We then turn to Hall’s appeals from

the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration.

Because the fee waiver claims are moot due to the CIA’s release

of documents we vacate the district court orders insofar as they

adjudicate such issues; otherwise we affirm.

I. Direct Appeal

Hall suggests that because of “unique circumstances” the

time for filing a notice of appeal of the November 2003 orders

should be extended. But such a relaxation of the time limits is

permitted only under very narrow circumstances involving

reasonable reliance on a district court’s decisions—not its

silence—in response to motions labeled “Rule 59(e).” See

Webb v. Department of Health & Human Services, 696 F.2d

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101, 104-06 (D.C. Cir. 1982); cf. Center for Nuclear

Responsibility, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 781

F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (rejecting idea that district

court’s merely taking a belated Rule 59(e) motion under

advisement extends the time limits). Hall appears to rest only on

the failure of both court and adversary to object to his

mislabeling of his Rule 59(e) motion. In our adversarial system,

it was not their duty to give him an alert. 

II. Appeal from Denial of Motion for Reconsideration

As noted earlier, the district court properly construed Hall’s

motion for reconsideration as one made under Rule 60(b). Hall

appeals the district court’s rejection of four claims, and we

review them in turn for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Twelve

John Does v. District of Columbia, 117 F.3d 571, 579 (D.C. Cir.

1997). The district court analyzed the first three claims under

Rule 60(b)(1), namely, arguments (1) that Hall’s complaint

should be dismissed, (2) that Hall was not entitled to a publicinterest fee waiver, and (3) that Hall should not be permitted to

amend or supplement his complaint. Rule 60(b)(1) provides:

“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may

relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect . . . .” Relief under Rule 60(b)(1)

motions is rare; such motions allow district courts to correct

only limited types of substantive errors. See, e.g., D.C.

Federation of Civic Ass’ns v. Volpe, 520 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.

1975); see also Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc., 781 F.2d

at 940 (declining to extend the analysis in Volpe). The district

court analyzed Hall’s fourth claim under Rule 60(b)(5), and we

momentarily defer consideration of that issue. 

Dismissal. In the motion practice leading up to the court’s

November 13, 2003 dismissal, Hall naturally offered arguments

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against dismissal. His motion for reconsideration objected to the

dismissal, and the district court denied reconsideration under

Rule 60(b)(1). April 2004 Mem. Op. at 7. Hall’s briefs don’t

contest the reasons the district court offered for denying

reconsideration, so his appeal on this issue fails and we affirm

the district court’s dismissal of the case.

Denial of Public-Interest Waiver. We find that the CIA’s

decision to release documents to Hall without seeking payment

from him moots Hall’s arguments that the district court’s denial

of a fee waiver was substantively incorrect. The rule against

deciding moot cases forbids federal courts from rendering

advisory opinions or “decid[ing] questions that cannot affect the

rights of litigants in the case before them.” See, e.g.,

Pharmachemie B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 276 F.3d 627

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Hall’s position is the same as that of the FOIA

requesters in a previous case who wanted to continue their

challenge to an agency’s initial denial of a fee waiver even after

the agency reversed its position and waived the fees at issue.

Like theirs, Hall’s case is moot because he already has “obtained

everything that [he] could recover . . . by a judgment of this

court in [his] favor.” Better Government Ass’n v. Department

of State, 780 F.2d 86, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (internal citations

omitted, bracketed pronouns ours). 

Hall fails to undermine the government’s mootness claim

with his argument that the media status claim is capable of

repetition, yet evading review. Assuming in Hall’s favor that

the matter is capable of repetition, we fail to see how the issue

has any tendency to evade review. Denials of fee waivers do not

seem inherently of such short duration that they cannot

ordinarily be fully litigated before their cessation. See United

States v. Weston, 194 F.3d 145, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 

USCA Case #04-5235 Document #949303 Filed: 02/14/2006 Page 7 of 11
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There remains the question whether the district court

decisions relating to Hall’s fee-related claims should be vacated;

we believe they should. The normal principle is that “when

mootness results from unilateral action of the party who

prevailed below,” U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall

Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 25 (1994) (citations and footnote

omitted), the moot judgment should be vacated lest the losing

party, denied an opportunity to appeal by its adversary’s

conduct, should later be subject to the judgment’s preclusive

effect. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 40

(1950). We have previously applied this principle in the FOIA

context. See Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97

F.3d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Unlike in Armstrong, neither

party here has requested vacatur, but such a request is

unnecessary. See Columbian Rope Co. v. West, 142 F.3d 1313,

1318 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Here, vacatur appears plainly

appropriate. As noted, Hall has already filed a second lawsuit

regarding his February 2003 FOIA request. The CIA has raised

defenses of issue and claim preclusion. See Br. for Appellant 33

n.8. Moreover, the scope of the CIA’s release of documents

without payment is unclear. Under these circumstances, the

CIA’s unilateral action here should not preclude Hall from

litigating fee waiver questions in that suit. We therefore vacate

each of the district court’s decisions to the extent that they relate

to the payment of fees. See Arizonans for Official English v.

Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 75 (1997) (finding “vacatur down the

line” the equitable solution); see also Columbian Rope Co., 142

F.3d at 1318 n.5.

Amended and Supplemental Complaint. Hall’s proposed

new complaint differed from his original complaint in two ways:

He added a claim based on the set of FOIA requests initially

made in February 2003, and he formally sought fee waivers,

both as a representative of the news media and on public-interest

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grounds. (The original complaint had not claimed a fee waiver,

but the parties litigated his public-interest theory without

objection. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(b).) Hall did not specify

whether these revisions were amendments or supplemental

pleadings. The addition of the new FOIA request is plainly a

supplemental pleading as defined by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15(d), as it “sets forth transactions or occurrences or

events which have happened since the date of the pleading

sought to be supplemented.” See United States v. Hicks, 283

F.3d 380, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Such supplements always require leave of the court.

Id. Insofar as the fee waiver contentions apply to Hall’s first

two sets of FOIA requests they appear to be amendments, as

they “relate to matters that occurred prior to the filing of the

original pleading,” 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,FEDERAL

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1504, at 184 (2d ed. 1990); insofar

as they apply to the third set, they appear to be a supplement. 

Because Hall’s proposed amendments all pertain to the fee

question, they are moot. His proposed supplement, however, is

not. The district court rejected the supplement in the second of

its November 13, 2003, rulings and again in its denial of Hall’s

motion for reconsideration. Hall seeks to appeal both. For the

reasons already given, appeal of the original ruling is

unavailable. 

In denying Hall’s motion for reconsideration, the district

court focused on two factors. First, it noted the absence of

factors that would warrant correction of substantive errors.

April 2004 Mem. Op. at 8. Second, the district court invoked its

analysis in initially denying Hall’s motion, id., where it had

concluded that allowing Hall to supplement his complaint would

both unduly delay resolution of the case and prejudice the

defendant. Nov. 2003 Mem. Op. II at 2-3 (citation omitted).

Delay and prejudice are precisely the matters to be addressed in

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considering whether to grant motions for supplemental

pleadings; such motions are to be “freely granted when doing so

will promote the economic and speedy disposition of the entire

controversy between the parties, will not cause undue delay or

trial inconvenience, and will not prejudice the rights of any of

the other parties to the action.” WRIGHT ET AL.,supra, § 1504,

at 186-87. In analyzing prejudice, the district court referred to

Hall’s ongoing refusal to pay fees, Nov. 2003 Mem. Op. II at 3,

a matter now moot, but it does not appear to have regarded that

conduct as pivotal. Moreover, the suit already filed as to the

February 2003 FOIA request protects Hall from prejudice as to

any claims arising out of that request, as the district court

foresaw. Thus we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s

denial of that aspect of Hall’s motion.

Vacatur Under Rule 60(b)(5). Hall also appeals the district

court’s rejection of his request to vacate its November 2003

dismissal of the case because he had, after the dismissal,

attempted to pay the fees that the CIA had sought. In making

this argument Hall relies on Rule 60(b)(5), which provides in

relevant part that “upon such terms as are just,” the court may

provide relief because “it is no longer equitable that the

judgment should have prospective application.” Hall argues that

his tendering of the entire balance of fees rendered it “no longer

equitable” that he be subject to the judgment of dismissal. The

only “prospective application” of the judgment that Hall appears

to invoke is its potential claim- or issue-preclusive effect. Br.

for Appellant 33. Insofar as the argument relates to the fees

dispute, of course, our order vacating the judgment as moot

removes any possibility of such an effect on those issues. In any

event, preclusive effects do not qualify as “prospective

application[s]” under Rule 60(b)(5), which is addressed to

“executory” decrees or ones involving “the supervision of

changing conditions or circumstances.” Twelve John Does v.

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District of Columbia, 841 F.2d 1133, 1139-40 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

 The district court’s rejection of Hall’s argument was correct. 

* * *

The district court’s orders are vacated to the extent moot

and in all other respects affirmed.

So ordered.

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