Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00816/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00816-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Bureau of Prisons
Respondent
Ignacio Medrano-Sanchez
Petitioner
Dennis Smith
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IGNACIO MEDRANO-SANCHEZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

vs. )

)

)

DENNIS SMITH, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

)

)

___________________________________ )

1:07-CV-0816 OWW WMW HC

FINDINGS AND

RECOMMENDATIONS RE

MOTION TO DISMISS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS

[Doc. 4]

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se on a petition for writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 2241. Pending before the court is Respondent’s motion

to dismiss. Petitioner has not opposed the motion.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) at Atwater,

California pursuant to a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of California. On June 4, 2007, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas

corpus in this Court. Petitioner claims the BOP is unlawfully denying him consideration for

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placement into a Residential Re-entry Center (“RRC”). 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Writ of habeas corpus relief extends to a person in custody under the authority of the

United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Writ of habeas corpus relief is available if a federal

prisoner can show he is “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the

United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Petitioner’s claims are proper under 28 U.S.C. §

2241 and not 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because they concern the manner, location, or conditions of

the execution of petitioner’s sentence and not the fact of petitioner’s conviction or sentence.

Tucker v. Carlson, 925 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir.1990) (stating that a challenge to the execution

of a sentence is "maintainable only in a petition for habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2241"); Montano-Figueroa v. Crabtree, 162 F.3d 548, 549 (9th Cir.1998) (per curiam)

(allowing a federal prisoner to use § 2241 to challenge the BOP's restitution policies).

Further, Petitioner is challenging the execution of his sentence at Atwater which is

within the Fresno Division of the Eastern District of California; therefore, the Court has

jurisdiction over this petition. See Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990).

B. BOP Regulations Contradict United States Code Statutes

As previously stated, Petitioner contends that BOP regulations which prevent him

from being considering for release to RRC until after he has served nine-tenths of his

sentence violate Title 18, Section 3621(b), of the United States Code. See Petition at 1-2. 

Title 18, of the United States Code, Section 3621(b) states:

(b) Place of imprisonment - - The Bureau of Prisons shall designate the place

of the 

prisoner’s imprisonment. The Bureau may designate any available penal or

correctional facility that meets minimum standards of health and habitability

established by the Bureau, whether maintained by the Federal Government or

otherwise and whether within or without the judicial district in which the person was

convicted, that the Bureau determines to be appropriate and suitable, considering -- 

(1) the resources of the facility contemplated;

(2) the nature and circumstances of the offense;

(3) the history and characteristics of the prisoner;

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(4) any statement by the court that imposed the sentence - -

 (A) concerning the purposes for which the sentence to imprisonment was

determined to be warranted; or

 (B) recommending a type of penal or correctional facility as appropriate;

and

(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 28.

In designating the place of imprisonment or making transfers under this

subsection, 

there shall be no favoritism given to prisoners of high social or economic status. The

Bureau may at any time, having regard for the same matters, direct the transfer of a

prisoner from one penal or correctional facility to another. The Bureau shall make

available appropriate substance abuse treatment for each prisoner the Bureau

determines has a treatable condition of substance addiction or abuse. 

Section 3624(c) states:

(c) Pre-release custody - - the Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent

practicable, assure 

that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed

six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that

will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the

prisoner’s re-entry into the community. The authority provided by this subsection

may be used to place a prisoner in home confinement. The United States Probation

System shall, to the extent practicable, offer assistance to a prisoner during such

pre-release custody.

The relevant BOP regulations state the following:

(a) This subpart provides the Bureau of Prisons’ (Bureau) categorical exercise

of 

discretion for designating inmates to community confinement. The Bureau designates

inmates to community confinement only as part of pre-release custody and

programming which will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and

prepare for re-entry into the community.

See 28 C.F.R. § 570.20(a). 

Section 570.21 states:

(a) The Bureau will designate inmates to community confinement only as part

of 

pre-release custody and programming, during the last ten percent of the prison

sentence being served, not to exceed six months.

(b) We may exceed these time-frames only when specific Bureau programs

allow

greater periods of community confinement, as provided by separate statutory authority

(for example, residential substance abuse treatment program (18 U.S.C.

3621(e)(2)(A)), or shock incarceration program (18 U.S.C. 4046(c)).

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The Court hereby takes judicial notice of Arcediano v. Wrigley, Case No. 1:06-CV-00780 AWI DLB HC. 1

This Court “may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if

those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.” U.S. ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v.

Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244 (9 Cir.1992); see also MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500, 505 (9 Cir. 1986); th th

United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9 cir. 1980) Arcediano is factually congruent with the instant case. th

Therefore, the Court’s opinion in this case will be derived from the record developed in Arcediano.

4

Prior to December 13, 2002, the BOP would occasionally allow prisoners to serve all

or part of their imprisonment in an RRC. Then, on December 13, 2002, the Office of Legal 1

Counsel of the Department of Justice (“OLC”) issued a legal opinion interpreting the

interplay between §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c) of Title 18. The opinion held that § 3621(b) did

not authorize the BOP to place an inmate in an RRC for the entire term of his sentence

because community confinement did not constitute imprisonment. Id. The BOP consequently

changed its procedure and limited RRC placements for prisoners to the final 10% of their

sentences or six months, whichever was shorter. 

However, in 2004, two Circuit Court of Appeals held that the 2002 BOP policy

change was unlawful given that the plain language of § 3621(b) gave the BOP discretion to

transfer an inmate to an RRC at any time. Elwood v. Jeter, 386 F.3d 842 (8 Cir. 2004); th

Goldings v. Winn, 383 F.3d 17 (1 Cir. 2004). In light of the opinions of Elwood and st

Goldings, on August 18, 2004, the BOP proposed new regulations “announcing its

categorical exercise of discretion for designating inmates to community confinement when

serving terms of imprisonment.” 69 Fed. Reg. 51, 213 (Aug. 18, 2004). Although the 2005

regulations acknowledged the BOP’s general discretion to place an inmate at an RRC at any

time, it limited such placement to the lesser of 10% of a prisoner’s total sentence or six

months, absent application of special statutory circumstances. 28 C.F.R. §§ 570.20, 570.21.

The final rules were published on January 10, 2005, and became effective on February 14,

2005. 

The question to be resolved here is whether the BOP’s 2005 regulations are contrary

to, or a permissible construction of, Section 3621(b). 

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Three Circuit Court of Appeals and several District Courts, including this Court, have

found the 2005 regulations to be contrary to Section 3621(b). Woodall v. Federal Bureau of

Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, (3 Cir. 2005); Fults v. Sanders, 442 F.3d 1088 (8 Cir. 2006); Levine rd th

v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2006); Horn v. Ellis, No. 06 CV-F-0006 OWW TAG HC;

2006 WL 1071959 (E.D. Cal. April 21, 2006); Baker v. Willingham, No. 3:04cv1923, 2005

WL 2276040 (D.Conn. Sept. 16, 2005); Wiederhorn v. Gonzales, No. 05-360-TC, 2005 WL

1113833 (D.Or. May 9, 2005); United States v. Paige, 369 F.Supp.2d 1257 (D. Mont. 2005);

Drew v. Menifee, No. 04 Civ. 9944, 2005 WL 525449 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2005); Pimentel v.

Gonzales, 367 F.Supp.2d 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Cook v. Gonzales, No. 05-09-AS, 2005 WL

773956 (D.Or. Apr. 5, 2005); Crowley v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 312 F.Supp.2d 453

(S.D.N.Y. 2004). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the issue.

In reviewing an agency’s construction of a statute, courts apply the test set forth in

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The

Court looks first to the text of the statute to determine whether Congress has spoken directly

on the issue. Contract Management, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 434 F.3d 1145, 1146-47 & n.2 (9 Cir. th

2006). If the intent of Congress is clear from the text of the statute, that is the end of the

inquiry, the Court must follow the expressed intent of Congress. Id. at 1146-47, citing

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct.

2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). If, however, the statute is silent or ambiguous on the specific

issue, the Court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a permissible

construction of the statute. Id. at 1147. If so, the Court defers to the agency’s determination.

Id.

As found by the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, this Court finds

that the plain text of the statute, as well as the legislative history do not support the BOP’s

regulations to limit RRC placement to only those inmates serving the last 10% of their

sentence. As stated in § 3624(c), Congress’s intent to release prisoners to an RRC is to

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facilitate their re-entry into the community. Congress has unambiguously set forth five

factors for the BOP to consider when making its determination to release a prisoner. 18

U.S.C. § 3621(b). Specifically, Section 3621(b) distinguishes between the BOP’s duty to

designate a place of imprisonment (“shall designate”) and its broad discretion in determining

the specific place of imprisonment (“may designate any available penal or correctional

facility”). Levine, 455 F.3d at 80. The statute not only provides discretion to the BOP for

placement, but provides a specific list of five factors the BOP must consider prior to

placement. Id. Given the clear text of the statute and Congress’s unequivocal intent for the

BOP to consider all five factors, the current BOP regulation is invalid because “these factors

cannot be fully considered because the amount of time an inmate may spend in a CCC is

categorically limited to the lesser of six months or ten percent of a sentence without regard to

individualized circumstances.” Woodall, 432 F.3d 235, 245; Levine, 455 F.3d at 80-82;

Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091. Further, the legislative history supports the finding that

consideration of the five factors are mandatory, although non-exclusive. As set forth in

Levine v. Apker, 455 F.3d 71, the Second Circuit stated:

Accompanying § 3621(b), the Senate Judiciary Committee issued a report

speaking directly to the nature of the statutory factors. . . . The report stated

that ‘[i]n determining the availability or suitability of the facility selected, the

Bureau [is] specifically required to consider such factors as [those listed in §

3621(b)],’ and that ‘[a]fter considering these factors,’ the BOP may designate

a place of imprisonment or enact an inmate transfer. S.Rep. No. 98-225

(1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3324-25; see also Woodall, 432

F.3d at 245-46 (quoting same). The report disavows any restriction on the

BOP’s exercise of discretion, but rather states that it ‘intends simply to set

forth the appropriate factors that the Bureau should consider in making the

designations.’ Id. By ‘specifically requir[ing]’ the BOP to consider the listed

factors before it makes placements and expressing intent to ‘set forth the

appropriate factors’ to be considered, the report underscores what the textual

language itself makes clear: that the enumerated factors are mandatory.

(footnote omitted).

Levine, at 82. 

Thus, although the BOP has discretion to refuse to place an inmate in a correctional

facility, the exercise of discretion must be based at least in part on the specific factors

outlined in § 3621(b), and the BOP regulations set forth in §§ 570.20 and 570.21 simply

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ignore those factors. As such, the regulations contradict, rather than interpret, § 3621(b), and

no deference is owed. 

In Arcediano, Respondent argued that the language of § 3624(c) states

“unambiguously that prisoners have no right to be considered for an RRC placement until

they have finished 90% of their sentence.” See Arcediano v. Wrigley, Case No. 1:06-CV00780 AWI DLB HC. However, Respondent fails to recognize that by creating a blanket rule

against transfer until the inmate has served 10% of his sentence, the BOP has failed to

consider the mandatory factors set forth in § 3621(b). Woodall, 432 F.3d at 250. As stated in

Woodall, “§ 3624 does not determine when the BOP should consider CCC placement, but

when it must provide it.” Id. (Emphasis in original.) “The statute requires the BOP not just

to consider, but to actually place an inmate in a CCC or like facility, during the last ten

percent or six months of the sentence, when that is possible.” Id. (Emphasis in original.)

Three of the five factors set forth in § 3621(b)- the nature and circumstances of a prisoner’s

offense, the history and characteristics of the prisoner, and any statement by the court that

imposed the sentence, require specific analysis to each individual prisoner. Levine, 455 F.3d

at 86; Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247; Fults, 442 F.3d at 1091. Yet, under the 2005 regulations,

these considerations cannot be fully considered. As illustrated by the Court in Woodall,

which stated:

Worthy of special mention is the recommendation of the sentencing judge. United

States District Judges take their sentencing responsibilities very seriously and are

familiar with the various BOP institutions and programs. Their recommendations as

to the execution of sentences are carefully thought out and are important to them. The

significance of this aspect of the sentencing process is highlighted by the

acknowledgment of the regional counsel of the BOP at oral argument that the BOP

follows judicial recommendations in approximately 85-90 percent of all cases. Here,

however, the requirement that the BOP consider a sentencing judge’s

recommendation cannot be satisfied without an individualized, case-by-case inquiry

that is impossible under the regulations.

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Woodall, 432 F.3d at 247. In Woodall, the Court recognized that the sentencing court had

recommended the petitioner spend six months at a halfway house placement, but under the

current regulations, that recommendation could not be fully considered. Id. at 248. “In fact,

no recommendation of a CCC placement exceeding six months or ten percent of a sentence

can be considered.” Id. Although the BOP can consider the amount of time the prisoner has

actually served in making placements, that factor cannot be the single consideration, which is

precisely what the 2005 regulations have done. 

In Arcediano, Respondent alleged his view is supported by the Ninth Circuit’s

decision in United States v. Latimer, 991 F.2d 1509, 1514-15 (9 Cir. 1993). In Latimer, the th

Ninth Circuit held that the language of the Sentencing Guidelines, specifically section

4A1.2(e)(1), did not define incarceration to include detention solely in a community

treatment center or halfway house. Latimer, 991 F.2d at 1514. Respondent argued that the

Office of Legal Counsel’s December 13, 2002, opinion used similar reasoning in determining

that the guidelines did not permit the BOP to substitute confinement in an RRC for a term of

imprisonment. In Arcediano, this Court did not find Respondent’s argument persuasive. As

Respondent acknowledged, the case does not involve a prisoner who was directly placed into

an RRC at the outset of his sentence. Thus, this Court determined it need not reach

Respondent’s argument. 

Respondent further argued that the case is similar to Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230

(2001), which addressed § 3621(e)(2)(B), a different subsection. In Lopez, the Supreme

Court analyzed and upheld a BOP regulation that categorically denied early release to certain

inmates after completion of a drug rehabilitation program, who would have otherwise been

released under the terms of the statute. Lopez, 531 U.S. at 238. The statute at issue there, 18

U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B), stated that the BOP may reduce the prison term of an inmate who

was convicted of a “nonviolent offense” and had successfully completed a substance abuse

program. Id. at 232. The BOP’s regulation interpreting that statute categorically denied early

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release to prisoners who had been convicted of a felony involving “the carrying, possession,

or use of a firearm.” Id., quoting 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B)). The Supreme Court held

that the BOP had properly exercised its discretion by furthering Congress’s intent to exclude

certain violent inmates from consideration for pre-release. Id. Respondent reasoned that

“[j]ust as § 3621(e)(2)(B) vests broad discretion in the BOP to determine which individuals

are candidates for early release, so too § 3621(b) gives the BOP broad discretion in deciding

where to designate inmates. The BOP’s decision to restrict RRC placements to prisoners

serving the last 10% of their sentences is a categorical expression of the BOP’s discretion that

does not differ fundamentally from the BOP’s exercise of the same discretion under

§ 3621(e)(2)(B).” See Arcediano, 1:06-CV-00780 AWI DLB HC. The BOP undoubtedly

may exercise discretion under § 3621(b), however, it is not free to disregard the specific

factors set forth by Congress when doing so. Although Respondent argued that “the

categorical exercise of discretion in Lopez used factors such as sentencing enhancements

which were not determinative of being ‘violent’ under some circuits” and therefore

broadened the definition, this argument overlooks the fact that the statute at issue there did

not specifically include a set of factors to be considered by the BOP in making its

determination of whether an offense could be classified as “violent.” In Lopez, the BOP had

simply filled in a statutory gap, whereas here, no such claim can be made because the BOP

has specifically excluded from consideration the very factors that Congress outlined for

consideration. 

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the BOP regulations contradict, rather

than interpret, Congress’s intent in enacting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621(b) and 3624(c).

In his motion to dismiss, Respondent acknowledges this court’s many prior rulings on

this issue, but argues that in this case, the petition is premature. Respondent explains that

Petitioner is not due to be released until May 2, 2012, even if he is given credit for all

possible good time. Respondent argues that this petition is therefore premature, and should

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be dismissed without prejudice to renewal at a time closer to Petitioner’s release date.

The petition in this case also challenges another Bureau of Prisons regulation about

RRC placements, Program Statement 7310.04, Community Correction Center (CCC)

Utilization and Transfer Procedure. The Program Statement sets forth procedures for

placement of prisoners in RRC's by the BOP. ( Id.). That document provides that, “Normally

11 to 13 months before each inmate's probable release date, the unit team shall decide

whether to refer an inmate to a Community Corrections program.” Respondent argues that

under the Program Statement the BOP is not legally required to evaluate Petitioner for

placement in an RRC until eleven to thirteen months before his release date. Thus,

Respondent concludes that this issue is not ripe.

The ripeness doctrine serves “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature

adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative

policies, and also to protect the agencies from judicial interference until an administrative

decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681

(1967). The Supreme Court has stated that to meet the ripeness standard, plaintiffs must show

either a specific present objective harm or the threat of specific future harm. Laird v. Tatum,

408 U.S. 1, 14, 92 S.Ct. 2318, 33 L.Ed.2d 154 (1972). “A claim is not ripe for adjudication if

it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not

occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300, 118 S.Ct. 1257, 140 L.Ed.2d 406

(1998) (internal citations omitted).

This court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner's claim is not ripe and that,

therefore, he presently lacks standing under Article III. Even assuming, arguendo, that the

petition properly challenged the validity of the Program Statement, that regulation does not,

as Petitioner has suggested, improperly limit the discretion of BOP to make an RRC

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placement in any individual case. Rather, the regulation only requires that BOP make an RRC

placement assessment at least eleven to thirteen months prior to the inmate's release date.

Nothing in the Program Statement prevents the BOP, in the exercise of its statutory

discretion, from making an earlier determination, although the Court is not aware of any

statute or regulation that requires such expedited action by the BOP. In other words, the

Program Statement simply insures that inmates will receive an RRC assessment sufficiently

in advance of their release date to permit them to make appropriate plans prior to their

transfer. Because the Program Statement does not limit or otherwise intrude on the BOP's

exercise of discretion in making its RRC assessment, the Program Statement, contrary to

Petitioner's assertions, is not in any way analogous to the 2002 and 2005 regulations that

many courts, including this one, have found to be an illegal limitation on the discretion

vested in the BOP by § 3621(b).

Because Petitioner's release date is May 2, 2012, the Program Statement does not

require that the assessment team meet to consider Petitioner's RRC placement until June

2011, approximately three years from now. Because Petitioner is not presently entitled to an

RRC assessment under the applicable BOP regulation, he cannot show either a specific

present objective harm or the threat of specific future harm. Moreover, even Petitioner's

release date is only tentative at this point; events could transpire between now and May 2,

2012, that would result in the postponement of Petitioner's release date to a more distant

point in time. For this reason, Petitioner's claim of a right to an immediate assessment rests

“upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. at 300. Thus, the claim is not ripe, and Petitioner lacks

standing to pursue the claim at this time.

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED as follows:

1) that Respondent’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED;

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2) that this petition for writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without prejudice;

3) that the Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment for Respondent and to close this

case. 

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the assigned District Judge,

pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty days after being

served with the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the

Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to

Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall be

served and filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

Court's order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 30, 2008 /s/ William M. Wunderlich 

mmkd34 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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