Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01642/USCOURTS-ca7-19-01642-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Baez-Sanchez
Petitioner
William P. Barr
Respondent

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 19-1642

JORGE BAEZ-SANCHEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A206 017 181.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 15, 2020 — DECIDED JANUARY 23, 2020

____________________

Before BAUER, EASTERBROOK, and HAMILTON, Circuit 

Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge. Jorge Baez-Sanchez, a citizen 

of Mexico, is removable as a criminal alien. His conviction 

for aggravated ba]ery of a police officer renders him inadmissible. 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). He applied to the Department of Homeland Security for a U visa, which would 

allow him to remain in the United States. The U visa is available to some admissible aliens who have been victims of 

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crime in this country. Baez-Sanchez asked the immigration 

judge assigned to his case to grant him a waiver of inadmissibility, which would allow the Department of Homeland 

Security to rule favorably on his visa application. A statute, 8 

U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii), permits the A]orney General to 

waive an alien’s inadmissibility. Exercising that authority, an

immigration judge twice granted the request for waiver. After the initial grant, the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded with instructions to consider an additional issue. 

The immigration judge did so and reaffirmed her decision.

On appeal to the Board, the Department of Homeland 

Security contended that the immigration judge erred in finding that Baez-Sanchez had shown the extraordinary circumstances needed to justify a waiver and had abused her discretion in light of Baez-Sanchez’s criminal history and other 

negative equities. The Board did not address either contention. Instead, relying on Ma6er of Khan, 26 I&N Dec. 797 (BIA 

2016), the Board concluded that the power to waive inadmissibility belongs to the A]orney General alone and may not 

be exercised by immigration judges.

On petition for review, we held that 8 C.F.R. §1003.10(a) 

permits immigration judges to exercise all of the A]orney 

General’s powers, except those expressly reserved by some 

other regulation. Baez-Sanchez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 854 (7th 

Cir. 2017). No other regulation withdraws from immigration 

judges the power under §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii), which means that 

the BIA erred. See also L.D.G. v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1022 (7th 

Cir. 2014).

Because the Board had not addressed any other question, 

principles of administrative law meant that we could not do 

so either. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87–88 (1943).

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No. 19-1642 3

We remanded with instructions to consider two possibilities 

that the A]orney General had raised in defense of the 

Board’s decision: first, that some statute, regulation, or reorganization plan transferred to the Secretary the A]orney 

General’s power to waive inadmissibility; second, that the 

power to waive inadmissibility may be exercised only in favor of aliens who apply from outside the United States. 872 

F.3d at 856–57. We added that the Board also (or perhaps instead) could “decide whether to exercise in favor of, or 

against, Baez-Sanchez whatever discretion the A]orney 

General possesses.” Id. at 857.

What happened next beggars belief. The Board of Immigration Appeals wrote, on the basis of a footnote in a le]er

the A]orney General issued after our opinion, that our decision is incorrect. Instead of addressing the issues we specified, the Board repeated a theme of its prior decision that the 

Secretary has the sole power to issue U visas and therefore 

should have the sole power to decide whether to waive inadmissibility. The Board did not rely on any statute, regulation, or reorganization plan transferring the waiver power 

under §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) from the A]orney General to the 

Secretary. Nor did the Board discuss whether only aliens 

outside the United States may apply for relief under 

§1182(d)(3)(A)(ii). Likewise the Board did not consider 

whether Baez-Sanchez is entitled to a favorable exercise of 

whatever discretion the A]orney General retains. In sum, 

the Board flatly refused to implement our decision. BaezSanchez has filed a second petition for review.

We have never before encountered defiance of a remand 

order, and we hope never to see it again. Members of the 

Board must count themselves lucky that Baez-Sanchez has 

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not asked us to hold them in contempt, with all the consequences that possibility entails.

The Board seemed to think that we had issued an advisory opinion, and that faced with a conflict between our views 

and those of the A]orney General it should follow the la]er. 

Yet it should not be necessary to remind the Board, all of 

whose members are lawyers, that the “judicial Power” under 

Article III of the Constitution is one to make conclusive decisions, not subject to disapproval or revision by another 

branch of government. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 

Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). We acted under a statutory grant of 

authority to review the Board’s decisions. 8 U.S.C. 

§1252(a)(1). Once we reached a conclusion, both the Constitution and the statute required the Board to implement it.

A judicial decision does not require the Executive Branch 

to abandon its views about what the law provides, for the 

doctrine of offensive non-mutual issue preclusion does not 

apply to the United States. United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 

154 (1984). The A]orney General, the Secretary, and the 

Board are free to maintain, in some other case, that our decision is mistaken—though it has been followed elsewhere, see 

Meridor v. A6orney General, 891 F.3d 1302, 1307 & n.8 (11th 

Cir. 2018). But they are not free to disregard our mandate in 

the very case making the decision. That much, at least, is 

well established, not only in Plaut but also in many other 

cases. See, e.g., United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 

165 (1984). The Solicitor General did not ask the Supreme 

Court to review our decision, and the Department of Justice 

is bound by it.

The A]orney General’s brief in this court does not defend the Board’s decision—but neither does it confess error. 

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Instead it asks us to remand so that the Board may “address 

in an authoritative decision whether an immigration judge 

may adjudicate an application for a nonimmigrant waiver 

under 8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(3)(A)(ii) in removal proceedings.” 

The request is bizarre. We have already held that immigration judges do possess this power, if the A]orney General 

himself retains it. We directed the Board to consider whether 

the power has been transferred by statute, regulation, or reorganization plan to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

The Board chose not to address that question, and we are 

hardly going to remand so that the Board can write another 

opinion about whether we erred in construing 8 C.F.R. 

§1003.10(a). That’s water under the bridge. The A]orney 

General contends that a new decision by the Board could be 

entitled to deference under Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 

(2019), but we held that the regulation is unambiguous. An 

agency is entitled to reinterpret an ambiguous regulation, 

see National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X 

Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), but cannot rewrite an 

unambiguous one through the guise of interpretation. 

Change requires rulemaking.

The only remaining question is what should happen 

next. After concluding that an administrative decision is 

flawed, a court of appeals normally must remand to the 

agency. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511 (2009); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183 (2006); INS v. Orlando Ventura, 

537 U.S. 12 (2002). Yet we have already remanded, only to be 

met by obduracy. The remand rule is designed to afford the 

agency an opportunity to have its say on an issue, a say that 

may reflect expertise and could be entitled to judicial deference. The Board had that opportunity and disdained it. Another remand would do li]le beside give the Board a free 

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pass for its effrontery, while delaying the alien’s entitlement 

to a final decision. That’s not the goal of the remand rule.

Baez-Sanchez has waited long enough.

We deem all of the legal questions se]led. For the purpose of this proceeding, at least, the A]orney General retains 

his power to grant waivers of inadmissibility, and immigration judges may exercise that power on the A]orney General’s behalf. An immigration judge has ruled in favor of Baez-Sanchez. If the Department of Justice were contending 

that the immigration judge had abused her discretion, then 

we would remand to the Board to address that subject. But 

the A]orney General’s brief in this court does not ask for a 

remand on the propriety of granting a waiver to BaezSanchez, in particular. The brief the Department of Homeland Security submi]ed to the Board on remand similarly 

does not contend that the immigration judge erred, if immigration judges possess the waiver power. All of the issues in 

this proceeding therefore have been finally resolved, and 

there is nothing more for the Board to do.

The petition for review is granted, and the Board’s decision is vacated. This leaves the immigration judge’s decision 

in force. The Executive Branch must honor that decision, 

which grants Baez-Sanchez a waiver of inadmissibility so 

that he may seek a U visa from the Department of Homeland 

Security.

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