Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02558/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02558-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Meisner
Appellee
Micah D. Stern
Appellant

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 15‐2558

MICAH D. STERN,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL MEISNER, Warden,

Respondent‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:13‐cv‐01376‐NJ — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.

ARGUED JANUARY 4, 2016 — DECIDED FEBRUARY 9, 2016

Before BAUER, ROVNER, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge. Petitioner‐appellant, Micah D. Stern

(“Stern”), appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for

writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A

jury convicted Stern of one count of using a computer to

facilitate a sex crime against a child, in violation of Wis. Stat.

§ 948.075(1r) (2011‐12) (the “Statute”). As a result, Stern is

currently incarcerated in Wisconsin on a 25‐year sentence, 10

years being served in custody and the remaining 15 years on

Case: 15-2558 Document: 22 Filed: 02/09/2016 Pages: 11
2 No. 15‐2558

extended supervision. Stern argues that his conviction is

unconstitutional because the Wisconsin appellate court’s

unforeseeable interpretation of the belief and intent elements

of the Statute violated his due process rights by depriving him

of fair notice of such elements. Both the Wisconsin appellate

court and the district court rejected Stern’s argument. For the

following reasons, we likewise reject Stern’s argument and

affirm the denial of the petition and the dismissal of the case.

I.  BACKGROUND

In December 2009, Stern posted an ad entitled “Coach

Seeking Boy” in the “Men Seeking Men” section of Craigslist.

A police investigator working undercover posed as a 14‐year‐

old boy named “Peter” in responding to Stern’s ad. Stern and

Peter continued to communicate via e‐mail and Myspace,

during which Peter repeatedly told Stern that he was 14 years

old. Ultimately, they agreed to meet in the restroom of a

McDonald’s. When Stern appeared at the McDonald’s at the

agreed upon date and time, the police arrested him. Police

searched Stern’s car and found a box of unopened condoms

and personal lubricant.

Stern was charged with one count of using a computer to

facilitate a sex crime against a child, in violation of the Statute.

The Statute states:

Whoever uses a computerized communication

system to communicate with an individual who the

actor believes or has reason to believe has not

attained the age of 16 years with intent to have

sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the indi‐

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No. 15‐2558 3

vidual in violation of § 948.02(1) or (2) is guilty of a

Class C felony.

Wis. Stat. § 948.02 is Wisconsin’s statutory rape law. Subsec‐

tions (1) and (2) of § 948.02 delineate the classes of felonies for

sexual assault of a child based upon the child’s age. There is no

intent element within these child sexual assault crimes; they

are strict liability crimes. See, e.g., State v. Badzinski, 352 Wis. 2d

329, 337, 342 (2014) (the elements of a violation of Wis. Stat.

§ 948.02(1)(e) are:(1)defendant had sexual contact with victim;

and (2) victim was under 13 years old at time of sexual

contact).

At trial, Stern’s defense was that he knew Peter was really

an adult based upon the language Peter used during their

online communications and the “dated” photographs Peter

provided. A defense expert witness testified that Stern’s

ad headline of “Coach Seeking Boy” reflected a dominant/

submissive relationship assumed by many homosexual

couples. The jury rejected Stern’s defense and found him

guilty.

Stern made the same arguments in the state circuit and

appellate courts1 and the federal district court as he makes here

regarding the constitutionality of the Statute. Stern argues that

to be found guilty of a violation of the Statute, one must intend

to have sexual contact with a minor, as the Statute provides a

person uses the computer “... with intent to have sexual

contact ... in violation of § 948.02(1) or (2),” which are strict

liability crimes. Stern further argues that given the specific

1

   Stern’s petition for review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court was denied.

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4 No. 15‐2558

intent element (specific intent to commit statutory rape), the

“reason to believe” language of the Statute can result in an

unconstitutional conviction. Simply put, Stern argues that the

only constitutional way a defendant may be found guilty of a

violation of the Statute is if he actually believes the victim is a

minor. For the Wisconsin appellate court to hold otherwise

constitutes an unconstitutional “redaction of the intent

requirement from the [S]tatute, depriving Stern of notice and

due process.” In other words, Stern argues that the Statute

impermissibly allows for a conviction based only on the

defendant’s “reason to believe” that the victim is a minor. To

Stern, this is unconstitutional because the defendant must also

have the specific intent to commit statutory rape.

Thedistrict courtdeniedStern’s habeas corpuspetition and

dismissed the case, finding the Wisconsin appellate court’s

interpretation of the Statute was not unreasonable and did not

violate Stern’s federal constitutionalrights to due process. The

district court found that the Wisconsin appellate court reason‐

ably interpreted the plain language of the Statute, that such

interpretation was not unforeseeable, and therefore, Stern’s

due process right to fair notice had not been violated.

II.  DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When reviewing adistrict court’s ruling on a habeas corpus

petition, we review the district court’s factualfindings for clear

error and rulings on issues of law de novo. Lechner v. Frank, 341

F.3d 635, 638 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Stern’s petition

was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which limits the

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to only those claims that

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No. 15‐2558 5

“(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly establishedFederal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Given the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), our task is to

determine whether the Wisconsin appellate court’s decision

“resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011) (citations omitted).

We review “the decision of the last state court to rule on the

merits of [Stern’s] claim.” Charlton v. Davis, 439 F.3d 369, 374

(7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). This review is highly deferen‐

tial; we review the Wisconsin appellate court’s decision “for

reasonableness only.” Badelle v. Correll, 452 F.3d 648, 654 (7th

Cir. 2006) (quotation and citation omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has made clear that

“habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in

the state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary

error correctionthrough appeal.”Harrington, 562U.S. at 102–03

(quotation and citation omitted). Thus, Stern’s burden is

“difficult to meet.” Id. at 102. He has to “show that the state

court’s ruling on the claim beingpresentedin federal court was

so lacking in justification that there was an error well under‐

stood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibil‐

ity for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at 103. In other words,

Stern must show a complete absence of reasonableness in the

Wisconsin appellate court’s decision. Id. at 98.

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Our inquiry is an objective one. “[A]n ‘unreasonable

application’ of clearly established federal law is not synony‐

mous with an erroneous decision.” Badelle, 452 F.3d at 654

(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000), and Woodford

v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per curiam)). As such, we are

charged with determining whether the Wisconsin appellate

court’s decision is so clearly erroneous so “as to be ‘objectively

unreasonable.’” Badelle, 452 F.3d at 654 (citations omitted). If

“‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the

state court’sdecision,” then habeas reliefis precluded.Harring‐

ton, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652,

664 (2004)). A state court decision is only unreasonable when

it “l[ies] well outside the boundaries of permissible differences

of opinion,” thereby allowing the writ to issue. Hardaway v.

Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

B. Application

In Stern’s case, because the Wisconsin appellate court’s

decision is not objectively unreasonable, habeas corpus relief

is precluded. 28U.S.C. § 2254(d).As is reasonable and required

in interpreting the construction of a statute, the Wisconsin

appellate court began by looking to the Statute’s plain lan‐

guage. See State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court, 271 Wis. 2d 633,

663 (2004)(citations omitted).The courtfoundthe Statute plain

and unambiguous, stating: “[The Statute] is violated when the

actor either believes or has reason to believe the individual is

underage. Stern’s proffered construction is not reasonable

because it would require reading ‘has reason to believe’ out of

the [S]tatute.” The court further found that the jury was

properly instructed on the elements of the crime, as the jury

instruction mirrored the Statute, and the jury found beyond a

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No. 15‐2558 7

reasonable doubt that Stern had reason to believe Peter was 14

years old when they were communicating via computer.

The appellate court’s reasoning and construction of the

Statute is not objectively unreasonable. A person violates the

Statute when he communicates, via computer, with someone

he either actually (subjectively) believes or has reason to

(objectively) believe is a child, intending to have sexual contact

with that child. A person can violate the Statute by communi‐

cating with a child via computer, in order to have sexual

contact with that child, when the person actually believes or

knows that the child is in fact a child. For instance, this

violation occurs when an adult, who has met the child face‐to‐

face and believes subjectively that the child is underage, then

communicates with the child via computer in order to have

sexual contact with the child.

However, the Statute does not stop at actual belief. One

who “has reason to believe” the child is underage may also

violate the Statute. For instance, this violation occurs when an

adult “meets” a child online only (rather than in person), and

based upon the circumstantial evidence, such as the represen‐

tations made by the child or the online interactions between

the adult and child, the adult objectively “has reason to

believe” that the person on the other end of the online commu‐

nications is a child.

Stern raises three arguments, none of which have merit.

Stern first argues that a guilty verdict based upon the objective

“reason to believe” element is constitutionally impermissible

given the specific intent elementto violateWis. Stat. § 948.02(1)

or (2). Stern argues a guilty verdict is only permissible when

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the defendant actually, subjectively believes that the child is

underage. At its core, Stern’s argument is one seeking codifica‐

tion of his trial defense. At trial, Stern argued he actually,

subjectively believed that Peter was an adult. The jury chose to

reject this argument.

If Stern’s interpretation of the Statute were to be adopted,

then every defendant charged with violation of the Statute

would argue that he or she actually believed the victim was an

adult, and a jury would be required to find him or her not

guilty, provided the jury found the defendant’s defense

credible. The Statute is written to preclude such an effect. A

defendant may make the same argument as Stern, but the jury

may reject his argument because, despite the defense, it finds

that objectively the defendant “had reason to believe” the

victim was a child. Stern’s argument is not one of legal

construction. Rather, it is one based on evidence and credibil‐

ity, which is the jury’s charge. And, in Stern’s case, the jury

chose to reject his defense.

The district court properly found that Stern’s argument,

and not the reasoning of the state appellate court, is unforesee‐

able and unreasonable. Stern’s argument would render the

“reason to believe” element ofthe Statute superfluous. Such an

interpretation is unreasonable and is to be avoided. See, e.g.,

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (“one of the most basic

interpretive canons” is that “a statute should be construed so

that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be

inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant”) (citations,

quotations, and brackets omitted); United States v. Ranum, 96

F.3d 1020, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996) (defendant’s argument rejected

“because it would render some of the statutory language

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No. 15‐2558 9

... superfluous, and it is well‐established that ‘courts should

disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language

superfluous’”) (quoting Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253

(1992)).

Because the state appellate court’s decision was not

unreasonable and not unforeseeable, Stern’s constitutional

right to fair notice of the Statute’s elements was not violated.

The state appellate court’s decision was not so far afield to be

objectively unreasonable, constituting such an “extreme

malfunction” justifying habeas corpus relief.

Second, Stern argues that the jury instruction pertaining to

the charged crime allowed the jury to find him guilty without

finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he actually believed

Peter was underage. His argument proceeds as follows: given

the specific intent element to have sexual contact with a minor,

the perpetrator must have actual belief that the child is in fact

underage; ergo, because the jury instruction mirrors the Statute

and allows the jury to find guilt on “reason to believe” alone,

it violates Stern’s due process right to have guilt proven

beyond a reasonable doubt on all elements (actual belief, but

not reason to believe).

Given that the state appellate court’s interpretation of the

Statute was reasonable, Stern’s argument regarding the

constitutionality of the jury instruction is moot. The jury

instruction correctly informed the jury of the elements of the

crime: the prosecution was required to prove (1) Stern used a

computerizedcommunicationsystemto communicate with an

individual; (2) he believed or had reason to believe that the

individual with whom he communicated was underthe age of

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10 No. 15‐2558

16; (3) he used a computerized communication system to

communicate with the individual with the intent to have

sexual contact or intercourse with the individual; and (4) he

performed an act, in addition tousing a computerizedcommu‐

nication system, to carry out the intent to have sexual contact

orintercourse with the individual.Wis. Stat. § 948.075(1r);Wis.

Stat. § 948.075(3); Wis. JI—Criminal 2135. This instruction

mirrors the elements of the Statute, which we have found to be

reasonably interpreted by theWisconsin appellate court.Thus,

Stern’s argument regarding the instruction is meritless.

Finally, Stern argues that the state appellate court’s inter‐

pretation of the Statute violates his Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendmentrights by criminalizing his ability to have consen‐

sual sex with adults, in violation of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.

558, 578 (2003). Stern argues that the state appellate court’s

construction of the Statute, which includes the “reason to

believe” language, allows a conviction in the case of an adult

communicating with an adult whom he actually believes is an

adult. Stern further argues that an impermissible conviction

occurred in his case because he actually believed the under‐

cover officer was an adult and the undercover officer was in

fact an adult.

But Stern misses one crucial detail that distinguishes his

case from the theoretical adult communicating with an adult

case. In Stern’s case, the undercover officer posing as Peter

unequivocally held himself out as being 14 years old by

repeatedly telling Stern during their online communications

that he was 14 years old. The two had conversations in which

theydiscussedPeter’s age. Forinstance,PetertoldStern that he

was in the ninth grade, lived with his mom, and that he was

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No. 15‐2558 11

“jailbait.” Stern asked Peter, “You are 18, right?” followed by

a “smiley face” emoticon. Peter replied: “If you want me to lie

about being 18 I’m down with that. I just don’t want you to

freak out when you see me, okay? I can’t even get into

R movies. I look my age.” The jury determined, based on the

evidence presented and despite Stern’s defense, Stern had an

objective reason to believe Peter was 14.

Stern argues thatthe statutory framework requires a jury to

stillfind an adult who believed he was communicating with an

adult guilty. But, as the district court noted, this result would

never happen. If the jury is convinced of the defendant’s

credibility and believes the adult defendant was communicat‐

ing with a consenting adult, then the jury would be precluded

from finding the defendant guilty. But, such a scenario is not

Stern’s. The undercover officer posed as a 14‐year‐old boy.

Stern had reason to believe Peter was 14 years old based upon

all of the information provided to Stern by Peter. Based on the

evidence, the jury found Stern had the intent to have sexual

contact with someone he objectively had reason to believe was

14 years old.

Because the state appellate court’s decision was not

objectively unreasonable nor unforeseeable, habeas corpus

relief is precluded.

III.  CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court

is AFFIRMED.  

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