Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01775/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-01775-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Greenly
Plaintiff
Sara Lee
Defendant
Gordon Mayberry
Defendant

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1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN GREENLY,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-06-1775 WBS EFB 

vs.

SARA LEE, et al., 

ORDER

Defendants.

__________________________________/

This case was before the undersigned on January 16, 2008, for hearing on plaintiff’s

motion to compel further production of documents, and to have plaintiff’s requests for

admissions deemed admitted. Nathaniel Potratz appeared as plaintiff’s counsel and Danielle

Ochs Tillotson and David J. Cardiff appeared as defense counsel. 

Plaintiff’s motion was filed after the discovery cut-off date, but because the district

judge’s pretrial scheduling order gives this court discretion to modify all dates other than those

set for the pretrial conference and trial, the court considered plaintiff’s application to extend the

deadline for purposes of his motion. In the interest of reaching the merits of this litigation, and

based on plaintiff’s allegations of misconduct by defendants, the court agreed to hear the motion. 

For the reasons stated at the hearing and discussed below, the court denies the majority of

plaintiff’s motion. As to plaintiff’s request for an order compelling production of defendant

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1

 L.R. 5-135(g) provides:

Completion of the registration form will permit electronic filing of documents

and, unless an attorney opts out, will authorize acceptance of service by electronic

means. . . .

(1) Consent to Service. Unless an attorney opts out by designating

such on the registration form, registration as a filing user

constitutes: (1) consent to receive service electronically and

waiver of the right to receive service by first class mail pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) . . . .(2) consent to making electronic

service and waiver of the right to make service by personal service

or first class mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) (emphasis

added). 

2

Gordon Mayberry’s personnel file, that portion of the motion is mooted by the parties’

agreement at the hearing to submit a stipulated proposed protective order governing production

of that and other documents. The court has reviewed that stipulation, and publishes its

endorsement (with some modifications) in a separately issued order.

The discovery deadline in this case was previously extended from September 28, 2007, to

October 31, 2007. Despite that extension, plaintiff did not file his present motion until

December 1, 2007. Plaintiff’s motion is based on defendants’ alleged failure to provide

responses to requests for production of documents and requests for admissions propounded on

April 17, 2007. Defendants aver and provide evidence showing that they timely served the

responses to those discovery requests via electronic mail on May 21, 2007, after plaintiff refused

an agreement for a brief extension of time to respond. In essence, plaintiff accuses defense

counsel of lying about having timely e-mailed the responses, and argues that service of discovery

via e-mail is not authorized and therefore invalid. For these reasons, plaintiff asks the court to

deem admitted his various requests for admission. That request is denied. 

Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b)(E) states that service by electronic means

is valid only if the person consents in writing, Local Rule 5-135(g) requires attorneys practicing

in the Eastern District to accept service by electronic means, unless they expressly opt out.1

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L.R. 1-101 provides: 

“Consent to Service” is the authorization by an attorney or party to

accept service during the course of an action by electronic means

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(E) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 49. See

L.R. 5-135(g).

2

 Under the Local Rules and this court’s order, the parties were to file a joint statement

briefing the discovery dispute five court days prior to the noticed hearing. L.R. 37-251(c). 

Defense counsel avers that plaintiff’s counsel did not contact her about the joint statement until

midnight on January 9, 2008, the day the statement was due. Decl. of Danielle Ochs Tillotson, 

¶ 12; Exh. M. In light of the impending filing deadline, and because the e-mailed version of

plaintiff’s statement was not in compliance with the local rules, defense counsel filed a separate

statement. Plaintiff’s counsel also filed a separate statement, which did not comply with the

local rules. See L.R. 37-251(c). 

3

Plaintiff’s counsel has not expressly opted out of this requirement. Under Local Rule 5-135(g)

he must accept service by electronic means. Although plaintiff argues that this rule applies only

to service of documents that are filed with the court and not to discovery responses, plaintiff’s

own service of discovery responses by electronic means undermines this argument. See Decl. of

Danielle Ochs Tillotson, ¶ 3; Exhs. B, C (document no. 64). Further, the court finds that a

reasonable reading of Local Rule 5-135(g) contemplates service of discovery responses via

electronic means, although the more prudent approach would be to also serve responses via U.S.

mail. Accordingly, the court finds that defendants’ responses were timely and therefore denies

plaintiff’s requests to deem the requests for admissions admitted and the objections to the

requests for production of documents waived.

The court is further unmoved by plaintiff’s counsel’s allegation that he never received

defendants’ responses. In their separate statement regarding the discovery dispute, defendants

provide evidence showing service of their discovery responses via e-mail on May 21, 2007. See

Decl. of Danielle Ochs Tillotson, ¶ 5; Exh. E. Contrarily, plaintiff’s counsel provides no

declaration to support his claims of non-receipt in the separate statement filed regarding the

dispute. It was not until the hearing that he pointed to a declaration attached to his original

motion, filed December 1, 2007, to support his claim that he never received the responses.2

 

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3

 Per the Local Rules and this court’s order, the parties were to file a joint statement

briefing the discovery dispute five court days prior to the noticed hearing. L.R. 37-251(c);

Minute Order, Dec. 14, 2007. Defense counsel avers that plaintiff did not contact her about the

joint statement until midnight on January 9, 2008, the day the statement was due. See Decl. of

Danielle Ochs Tillotson, ¶ 12; Exh. M. In light of the impending filing deadline, and because the

e-mailed version of plaintiff’s statement was not in compliance with the local rules, defense

counsel filed a separate statement. Plaintiff’s counsel also filed a separate statement, which did

not comply with the local rules, and which failed adequately to address the disputed discovery

items, his arguments as to why defendants’ responses were deficient, and what relief was

requested. See L.R. 37-251(c). 

4

In any event, the record shows that it was a lack of diligence on the part of plaintiff’s

counsel that led to his need for an extension of the discovery deadline. It is noteworthy that

plaintiff’s counsel was so impatient to receive the responses that he was unwilling to extend

defendants the courtesy of additional time for them to serve their responses. Yet, incredibly, he

did not notify them until early October of his alleged non-receipt of any response. His motion to

compel was not filed until October 31, 2007, after the deadline for filing discovery motions. 

At the hearing, when questioned about his more than four-month delay in following up with

defendants about the discovery responses, plaintiff’s counsel could provide no explanation

besides citing the demands of his heavy caseload. Defendants argue that plaintiff’s delay in this

regard, especially in light of the then impending discovery deadline, amounts to a waiver of any

right to bring the current motion

While courts have had occasion to find waivers in such circumstances, see, e.g., Gault v.

Nabisco Biscuit Co., 184 F.R.D. 620, 622 (D. Nev. 1999) (motion to compel further responses

denied as untimely when filed 136 days after receipt of the allegedly deficient responses and 76

days after the close of discovery where there was no showing that the delay was caused by

matters outside moving party’s control), the court declines to take that approach here. Plaintiff,

however, has made deciding the merits of his motion difficult by failing to follow the local rules

governing the briefing of discovery disputes.3

 In his statement regarding the dispute, plaintiff

does not address the specific discovery items in dispute, fails to set forth his arguments as to how

and why defendants’ responses are purportedly deficient, and does not provide much

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4

 Request no. 4 asks for all documents “including statements that you have obtained in

any form, of persons. . . who witnessed, or claim to have witnessed the incident.” Request no. 5

asks for “all documents sent to, or received from, any person . . . evidencing this incident and the

attending circumstances.” Plaintiff defines “incident” as “the chain of events that occurred

leading to the instant civil action wherein all named defendants in this action allegedly

participated in the tortious conduct as alleged in responding party’s complaint. Incident also

refers to, where appropriate, subsequent events occurring after the date the instant action was

filed.” 

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clarification as to the relief he seeks. L.R. 37-251(c). 

Based on defendants’ paperwork, the court surmised and confirmed at the hearing that

plaintiff sought additional responses to requests for production nos. 4 through 6 and 10 through

11. See Defs.’ Stmt., at 7:16-12:5; Exh. E. As discussed at the hearing, defendants initially filed

objections to several of these requests, expecting, in part, that plaintiff would meet and confer to

clarify some of the vague and ambiguous language. However, defendants did not hear from

plaintiff until early October regarding their responses served in May 2007. 

The defendants’ objections on the basis of vagueness and ambiguity with respect to

requests for production nos. 4 and 5 are well taken.4

 As to request no. 11, which seeks plaintiff’s

personnel file, defendants represented at the hearing that they already provided that file to

plaintiff. The court denies the balance of plaintiff’s motion based on his failure to follow the

Local Rules and provide adequate briefing regarding the specific discovery requests.

Moreover, the court notes that the parties have stipulated to a proposed protective order

governing the production of sensitive information including defendant Gordon Mayberry’s

personnel file, which is the subject of request for production no. 10. The court has reviewed and

endorsed the stipulation (with some modifications) and will separately publish the approved

order. Because defendants have agreed to produce Mr. Mayberry’s personnel file subject to that

order, plaintiff’s motion as to request for production no. 10 is moot. 

As discussed at the hearing, defendants are ordered to provide a certification verifying

their previous responses that there are no documents responsive to plaintiff’s request for

“harassment complaints by another employee, Chris Mikaelson, against Gordon Mayberry.” See

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Defs.’ Stmt., Exh. O. Defendants shall provide such certification within five days from the date

of service of this order. 

Finally, in light of the court’s willingness to hear plaintiff’s untimely discovery motion,

the court will allow defendants additional time to seek discovery that is allegedly owed by

plaintiff. In their opposition to plaintiff’s motion, defendants requested an order compelling

supplemental responses from plaintiff as to those document requests to which he objected on the

basis that the documents were “equally available” to defendants. See Suppl. Decl. of Danielle

Ochs Tillotson, Exh. Q. This court, in a previous discovery order in this case, found plaintiff’s

“equally available” objections to be inappropriate to the extent he had responsive documents in

his possession, custody or control. See July 31, 2007, Order (document no. 47) (citing St. Paul

Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 514 (N.D. Iowa 2000) (“courts have

unambiguously stated that this exact objection is insufficient to resist a discovery request”)). 

Defendants are entitled to such discovery in plaintiff’s possession, even though the prudent

course would be to also subpoena those documents from third parties who maintain them in their

usual course of business. 

Plaintiff is ordered to provide supplemental responses to the requests to which he

previously objected on the basis that the responsive documents were “equally available” to

defendants. Plaintiff is also ordered to provide supplemental responses to those requests seeking

medical records, to which plaintiff responded that he would produce responsive documents once

he received them. See Suppl. Decl. of Danielle Ochs Tillotson, Exh. Q (Request nos. 1-3). To

the extent no such responsive documents exist, plaintiff shall provide a certification to that

effect, within five days from the date of service of this order. Both parties are admonished of

their continuing duty to supplement their discovery disclosures and responses. Fed. R. Civ. P.

26(e). 

Finally, the court addresses both parties’ requests for sanctions in connection with this

motion. Because the court’s order as outlined above does not wholly grant or deny the relief

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sought by plaintiff, an award of sanctions is within the court’s discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a)(5)(C). After reviewing the submitted paperwork, and considering the arguments made

during the hearing, the court finds that an award of expenses for either side is not warranted in

connection with this motion. Both parties delayed, and then raced to the court seeking discovery

orders, well after the discovery deadline has passed. Such conduct does not merit an award of

fees. 

SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 1, 2008.

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