Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03105/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Michael Angelo Vargas
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2004 Decided December 21, 2004

No. 03-3105

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL ANGELO VARGAS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(97CR00020-01)

Cheryl D. Stein, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the brief for appellant Michael Angelo Vargas.

Lisa H. Schertler, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, Barbara J. Valliere and John R. Fisher,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S.

Attorney, entered an appearance for appellee.

Before: EDWARDS and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

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RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Michael A. Vargas is serving a

lengthy sentence for committing federal crimes. Invoking 28

U.S.C. § 2255, he filed an action to have his conviction set

aside. The district court ruled against him in 2001 and this court

affirmed in an unpublished opinion. In 2003, Vargas filed a

motion seeking relief under FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) from the

district court’s denial of his § 2255 petition. The rule permits a

district court to relieve a party from a judgment on several

grounds, only two of which – “(4) the judgment is void” and

“(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the

judgment” – are relevant here because Vargas sought relief more

than a year after judgment. After the district court denied his

Rule 60(b) motion, Vargas sought a certificate of appealability

– a “COA” – under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) in order to raise the

following issue on appeal: “Whether this Court erred in treating

the Petitioner’s properly filed Rule 60(b) Motion as a ‘second or

successive’ motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” The district court

refused to issue a COA because it had not denied the Rule 60(b)

motion on that ground. Vargas then moved in this court for a

COA to raise the question whether “the District Court erred in

declining to issue a COA on the mistaken belief that appellant

had one year to file his Civil Rule 60(b)(6) motion for relief

from judgment.”

Rather than grant or deny a COA, we referred the matter to

a merits panel. Our order stated that “[w]hile not otherwise

limited, the parties are directed to address in their briefs” the

following questions: whether Vargas’s Rule 60(b) motion “was

in fact a second or successive § 2255 motion requiring this

court’s authorization; whether the motion for a certificate of

appealability filed in this court should be construed as a motion

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for leave to file a second or

successive” § 2255 petition; and “if so, whether it should be

denied because the motion alleges neither newly discovered

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evidence nor a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive

by the Supreme Court.”

Prompting the order was a disagreement among the circuits

about when a Rule 60(b) motion should be considered a “second

or successive” § 2255 petition requiring a certification from a

court of appeals. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(1) & 2255; Felker

v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 662 (1996). The positions of the

circuits are fairly summarized in In re Abu-Ali Abdur’Rahman,

No. 02-6547, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 25609, at *9-11 (6th Cir.

Dec. 13, 2004) (en banc). Despite our order, Vargas does not

want us to treat his application for a COA as a request to have

us retroactively certify his Rule 60(b) motion. Even if we could

do this – and we express no opinion on the subject – our

appellate jurisdiction depends initially on whether a prisoner

needs a COA to appeal the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion in a

§ 2255 (or habeas) proceeding. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 336 (2003). In many of the decisions about when

Rule 60(b) motions should be viewed as successive § 2255

petitions, the opinion makes clear that the court of appeals had

first issued a COA to establish its appellate jurisdiction. See

Rodwell v. Pepe, 324 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2003); Harris v.

United States, 367 F.3d 74, 77 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v.

Winestock , 340 F.3d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 2003); Thompson v.

Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1998); Gonzalez v. Sec’y

for Dep’t of Corr., 366 F.3d 1253, 1267-68 (11thCir. 2004) (en

banc). Vargas himself recognized that he needed a COA in

order to get appellate review. At last count, seven courts of

appeals have interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to require a

COA in cases such as his. Kellogg v. Strack, 269 F.3d 100, 103

(2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 336

(3d Cir. 1999); Reid v. Angelone, 369 F.3d 363, 369 (4th Cir.

2004); Rutledge v. United States, 230 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (7th

Cir. 2000); Zeitvogel v. Bowersox, 103 F.3d 56, 57 (8th Cir.

1996) (per curiamorder); Langford v. Day, 134 F.3d 1381, 1383

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(9th Cir. 1998); Gonzalez, 366 F.3d at 1262-67 (11thCir. 2004).

We now make it eight.

Section 2253(c)(1)(B) states: 

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a

certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to

the court of appeals from – 

* * *

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section

2255.

This was a § 2255 proceeding and the denial of Vargas’s Rule

60(b) motion was a final order, although his appeal – if

permitted – would not bring up the underlying judgment. See,

e.g., Browder v. Director, Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257,

263 n.7 (1978); Derrington-Bey v. District of Columbia Dep’t of

Corr., 39 F.3d 1224, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The only possible

doubt stems from the word “the” in subsection (B), which might

signify that only one final order per § 2255 proceeding requires

a COA, the most likely candidate being the judgment denying

the § 2255 petition. As against this, the Dictionary Act provides

that in “determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless

the context indicates otherwise, words importing the singular

include and apply to several persons, parties, or things.” 1

U.S.C. § 1. Here the context hardly indicates otherwise. A

statute’s structure is part of its context, and so is its purpose.

See Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

The purpose of § 2253(c)(1)(B) is to prevent frivolous cases

from clogging appellate dockets and to promote finality. See

Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 892 (1983) (predecessor

statute). As several courts have reasoned, it would make no

sense for Congress to require the screening of appeals from

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judgments denying § 2255 petitions yet allow appeals from

denials of Rule 60(b) motions seeking to reopen those

judgments. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 366 F.3d at 1264; Kellogg, 269

F.3d at 103.

Vargas therefore must satisfy us that he has, in the words of

§ 2253(c)(2), “made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right.” It is quite obvious that he can make no

such showing. The issue he seeks to raise deals not with a

constitutional right, but with the district court’s application of

Rule 60(b). The court did not deny his motion on procedural

grounds. Compare Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478

(2000). The court denied it on the ground that the judgment was

not void and that Vargas had presented nothing to warrant

exercise of the court’s discretion under Rule 60(b)(6). We

therefore refuse to issue a COA. 

Appeal dismissed.

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