Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00175/USCOURTS-almd-1_08-cv-00175-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Anderson
Plaintiff
City of Dothan
Defendant
Officer Jackson
Defendant

Document Text:

1. Anderson also charged Jackson with a federal

false-arrest claim, and state false-arrest and illegalimprisonment claims, but Anderson explicitly withdrew

these claims at summary judgment. See Plaintiff’s

Opposition to Summary Judgment at 10. In addition, he

brought a state negligent-training-supervision-andretention claim against the city, but he did not defend

(continued...)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY ANDERSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CIVIL ACTION NO.

) 1:08cv175-MHT

GOVERNOR JACKSON and the ) (WO)

CITY OF DOTHAN, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Anthony Anderson has sued defendant City of

Dothan, and one its police officers, defendant Governor

Jackson, for violations of federal and state law.

Anderson charges Jackson, in his individual capacity,

with a federal excessive-force claim and a state assaultand-battery claim. He also brings a federal inadequatetraining-and-supervision claim against the city.1

 The

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1. (...continued)

this claim in his opposition to summary judgment, see id.

at 27-33, and clarified in the pretrial conference that

his sole claim against the city was a federal claim for

inadequate training and supervision. Thus, this state

claim is abandoned. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v.

Stryker Sales Corp., 182 F.38 888, 892 (11th Cir. 1999)

(trial court need not consider assertions made in

pleadings but not in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment).

2

court’s jurisdiction over these claims is proper pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. 

This lawsuit is before the court on the defendants’

motion for summary judgment. The motion will be granted

in part and denied in part.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court's role

at the summary-judgment stage is to view the evidence in

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the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of that party.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475

U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

On the evening of March 23, 2006, at around 10:00

p.m., Anderson pulled into a gas station in Dothan,

Alabama. He had loud music playing. Officer Jackson

approached the car, tapped on the driver’s side window,

and asked Anderson to turn down his music. Anderson

recognized Jackson as a police officer and turned down

his music. Jackson collected Anderson’s driver’s license

and proof of insurance and walked away. 

Another officer on the scene, Chad Kinney, told

Anderson that he might receive a ticket or go to jail for

violating the City of Dothan’s noise ordinance. Officer

Kinney ordered Anderson out of the car, handcuffed and

arrested him, and then walked him over to a patrol car.

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Jackson and several other officers were standing by the

car. Anderson objected loudly to his arrest, directing

his objections to Jackson. Jackson walked over, and the

two men got into a heated argument. At that point,

Jackson struck Anderson, who was still handcuffed, twice

in the jaw. Anderson was then taken to the city jail.

After his release, Anderson was treated for a fractured

jaw.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Anderson’s claims against Officer Jackson

1. Excessive force

In response to Anderson’s federal excessive-force

claim, Officer Jackson asserts the defense of qualified

immunity.

 The qualified-immunity doctrine insulates government

employees from the burden of litigation against them in

their individual capacities stemming from actions taken

pursuant to their discretionary authority. Harlow v.

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Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982). Determining whether

a government employee is entitled to qualified immunity

involves two steps. Sims v. Metro. Dade County, 972 F.2d

1230, 1236 (11th Cir. 1992). First, the employee must

establish that he acted within the scope of his

discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful act

occurred. This point is not disputed here, as the

parties agree that Jackson was acting in his

discretionary authority when Anderson was arrested.

Once it is shown that the government employee was

acting within his discretionary authority, the burden

shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employee's

action violated clearly established law. Sims, 972 F.2d

at 1236. Courts follow a two-part inquiry when deciding

whether a clearly established right has been violated.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The court should

ask first whether a right has been violated; if so, the

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2. In Pearson v. Callahan, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 129

S. Ct. 808, 818-21 (2009), the Court determined that the

two-step inquiry established in Saucier was no longer

mandatory; courts could move immediately to inquiring

whether the right was clearly established at the time of

violation. Adherence to the two-step procedure is

appropriate in this case, as the court finds that a right

was violated and that the right was clearly established

at the time of violation. 

6

court then asks whether that right was clearly

established at the time it was violated. Id. at 201.2

Whether the force Officer Jackson used against

Anderson violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free

from excessive force depends on context. The court should

consider “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the

suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he [was] actively

resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by

flight.” Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445 F.3d 1323, 1333

& n. 10 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490

U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). “[G]ratuitous use of force when

a criminal suspect is not resisting arrest constitutes

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3. Jackson further argues that he did not strike

Anderson and that Anderson spit in his face, forcing

Jackson to use his open palm to move Anderson’s head

away. But these factual assertions are contradicted by

Anderson’s testimony, and any dispute about the facts

must be resolved by a jury, not by the court at summary

judgment.

7

excessive force.” Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324,

1330 (11th Cir. 2008).

The facts described by Anderson establish an

excessive-force violation, because at the time that he was

struck by Jackson, Anderson posed no threat to Jackson or

any other officer; he was in handcuffs, not resisting, and

outnumbered by police officers. Moreover, the crime at

issue was anything but severe: an excessive-noise

violation for playing music too loudly in his car. On

these facts, the force sufficient to fracture Anderson’s

jaw was unnecessary.3

The only remaining question is whether this right was

clearly established at the time of the violation.

Anderson’s right to be free from excessive force, and the

particular force described in this case, was clearly

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established at the time of his arrest. See Hadley v.

Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[A]

handcuffed, non-resisting defendant's right to be free

from excessive force was clearly established in February

2002.”). It is a core Fourth Amendment principle that

law-enforcement officers may not unnecessarily harm an

individual during arrest. See, e.g., Hadley, 526 F.3d at

1330 (officer used excessive force by punching a nonresisting suspect once in the stomach); Lee v. Ferraro,

284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (denying qualified

immunity based on clearly excessive force where officer

slammed suspect into car after she had been handcuffed);

Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926-27

(11th Cir. 2000) (denying qualified immunity in light of

clearly excessive force where officer allowed police dog

to attack arrestee who had already followed officer's

order to lie down on ground); Slicker v. Jackson, 215 F.3d

1225, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000) (officers used excessive force

by kicking and beating a handcuffed and non-resisting

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defendant); Smith v. Mattox, 127 F.3d 1416, 1419 (11th

Cir. 1997) (denying qualified immunity based on clearly

excessive force where officer broke arm of suspect who

"docilely submitted" to officer's order to "get down"). 

A reasonable police officer would have known that

striking a cuffed, compliant individual with sufficient

force to fracture his jaw serves no legitimate

law-enforcement purpose and amounts to a violation of the

constitutional right to be free from excessive force.

Officer Jackson is not entitled to qualified immunity on

Anderson’s excessive-force claim. Summary judgment will

be denied on this claim.

2. Assault and battery 

Anderson has also stated a claim against Officer

Jackson for assault and battery under Alabama law.

Jackson denies that his actions constituted assault and

battery, and contends that, regardless, he is protected

against suit because of immunity available to Alabama

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police officers for torts committed in the course of their

discretionary duties. Jackson’s contentions are without

merit.

In order to make out his assault-and-battery claim,

Anderson must show that (1) Jackson touched him; (2)

Jackson intended to touch him; and (3) “the touching was

conducted in a harmful or offensive manner.” Ex Parte

Atmore Community Hosp., 719 So.2d 1190 (Ala. 1998); see

also Harper v. Winston County, 892 So.2d 346, 354 (Ala.

2004); Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So.2d 1097, 1104 (Ala.

1986). Jackson concedes that he touched Anderson and that

he intended to touch him; he denies that the touching was

harmful or offensive. However, according to the evidence

read in Anderson’s favor, Jackson struck Anderson on the

jaw twice, with sufficient force to fracture Anderson’s

jaw. The touching was therefore harmful. Anderson has

satisfied the elements of his assault-and-battery claim.

Jackson responds that Alabama law immunizes him

against any such claim. He relies on the doctrine of

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discretionary-function immunity. 1975 Ala. Code §

6-5-338(a) grants statutory immunity from tort liability

to a police officer for “conduct in performance of any

discretionary function within the line and scope of his or

her law enforcement duties.” The immunity, however, does

not protect conduct that is “so egregious as to amount to

willful or malicious conduct or conduct engaged in bad

faith.” Couch v. City of Sheffield, 708 So. 2d 144, 153

(Ala. 1998).

To apply discretionary-function immunity, the court

must first determine whether the police officer was

performing a discretionary function when the alleged wrong

occurred. If so, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to

demonstrate that the defendant acted in bad faith, with

malice or willfulness in order to deny [him] immunity.”

Scarbrough v. Myles, 245 F.3d 1299, 1303 n.9 (11th Cir.

2001) (alteration in original) (applying Alabama law and

quoting Sheth v. Webster, 145 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir.

1998) (per curiam)).

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Anderson concedes that Jackson was performing a

discretionary function within the meaning of the

statute--arresting Anderson--at the time of the incident.

See Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 204 (Ala.

2003) (“Simply stated, the statute shields every defendant

who (1) is a ‘peace officer,’ (2) is performing ‘law

enforcement duties,’ and (3) is exercising judgment or

discretion.”).

Thus, the burden is Anderson’s to show that Jackson

acted in bad faith with malice or willfulness. Again, the

evidence viewed in Anderson’s favor showed Jackson twice

struck a restrained individual in the jaw without cause.

This evidence is sufficient to support a finding that the

action taken was in bad faith and was malicious and

willful. See Wright v. Wynn, 682 So. 2d 1, 3 (Ala. 1996)

(finding plaintiff had put forth sufficient evidence of

bad faith to go to jury where evidence showed trooper

cursed and used excessive force in handling a handcuffed

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arrestee). Summary judgment will denied as to Anderson’s

assault-and-battery claim against Jackson.

B. Anderson’s claim against City of Dothan for 

failure to train and failure to supervise 

Anderson brings a federal claim that the City of

Dothan failed to train and supervise its officers

adequately, causing the excessive-force violation

committed by Officer Jackson. 

It is well-established that a municipality cannot be

held vicariously liable for the constitutional torts of

its employees based solely on a theory of respondeat

superior. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,

691-94 (1978). Rather, a plaintiff seeking to hold a

municipality accountable must show that it adopted a

custom or policy that caused the constitutional violation.

Id. at 694-95. 

When arguing failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise

as a basis for liability, a plaintiff must show that (1)

the city failed to train or failed to supervise its

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employees, (2) this failure was part of a policy or custom

of failure to train or supervise, and (3) the failure

caused employees to violate a person’s constitutional

rights. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-91

(1989); Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th

Cir. 1998). “Since a municipality rarely will have an

express written or oral policy of inadequately training or

supervising its employees, ... a plaintiff may prove a

city policy by showing that the municipality's failure to

train evidenced a ‘deliberate indifference’ to the rights

of its inhabitants.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350 (quoting City

of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388-89). A plaintiff seeking to

make such a showing “must present some evidence that the

municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in

a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate

choice not to take any action.” Gold, 151 F.3d at 1350.

Anderson contends that the city was put on notice of

the need for training in the use of excessive force

because 79 excessive-force complaints were filed against

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it between 1988 and 2008; seven lawsuits alleging

excessive force, including Anderson’s, were filed against

it between 2004 and 2009; five other lawsuits involving

“similar civil rights violations” were filed previously,

two of which settled; and five individuals have been

killed in the course of arrests by Dothan police (four in

motor-vehicle collisions while police gave chase, and one

who asphyxiated on a baggie he swallowed while trying to

run from police). 

Anderson offers no information about the merit of the

complaints and lawsuits that were filed, nor any

information about what was inadequate about the city’s

action in response to any claims that were actually

meritorious. Because some complaints are likely without

merit, simply showing the total number of complaints filed,

without more, does not provide meaningful information about

the extent of the use of excessive force or about the

city’s actions in response to those complaints. See Brooks

v. Scheib, 813 F.2d 1191, 1193 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding

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that, despite ten prior complaints, city did not have any

notice of past police misconduct because the plaintiff

“never demonstrated that past complaints of police

misconduct had any merit”). It is entirely plausible that

the city investigated each complaint, and took disciplinary

action in some complaints but not others; Anderson simply

has not provided the court with that information. Nor has

Anderson provided any testimony, expert or otherwise,

regarding whether an average of four complaints per year

over the course of 20 years is excessive for a police

department the size of that in Dothan. Finally, although

troubling, the five incidents of arrestee deaths--four

involving motor vehicles--during the course of police

chases are not necessarily related to allegations that

Dothan officers regularly used excessive force. In sum,

Anderson’s evidence is not sufficient to show how Dothan

should have been on notice that its police department

suffered from a policy or widespread practice of excessive

force. 

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Furthermore, Anderson has provided no evidence of any

similar prior complaints specifically against Officer

Jackson. In fact, the city has shown that there were only

three complaints against Jackson, all of which dated back

to 1994 or earlier. More than a decade passed between

those complaints and Anderson’s complaint in this case. 

Finally, Anderson has not shown how the city was

deliberately indifferent to any such notice that might have

existed about problems with the use of excessive force

generally or with respect to Jackson specifically. Indeed,

Anderson fails to explain how the City of Dothan’s Internal

Affairs Division was inadequate in its investigation of

complaints; how the city was inadequate in its discipline

of officers; how the city’s guidelines for the use of force

by police officers were insufficient; or how the city’s

mandatory 12-hour annual training was insufficient. 

At summary judgment, the burden is Anderson’s to

provide evidentiary support for his claim that the city

failed to train and supervise its police officers

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adequately; mere assertions that existing policies for

training and supervision are inadequate simply are not

enough. Summary judgment will be granted in favor of the

city on the federal claim against it. 

***

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED as follows:

(1) Defendants Governor Jackson and City of Dothan’s

motion for summary judgment (doc. no. 56) is denied as to

plaintiff Anthony Anderson’s claims for excessive force and

assault and battery against defendant Jackson. Only these

claims will go to trial.

(2) Said motion is granted as to plaintiff Anderson’s

claim that defendant City of Dothan failed to train and

supervise its officers adequately, with judgment entered

in favor of defendant City of Dothan and against plaintiff

Anderson on this claim and with Anderson taking nothing on

this claim.

DONE, this the 21st day of August, 2009.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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