Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03153/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03153-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Talib D. Watson
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 1998 Decided April 9, 1999

No. 97-3153

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Talib D. Watson,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00276-01)

Peter K. Levitt argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Peter M. Brody, appointed by the court.

Karen Melnik, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Wilma A. Lewis,

U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Rogers and Garland,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: The critical issue at Talib Watson's

second trial on narcotics-related charges was whether Watson

had a connection to a large stash of cocaine base and heroin

found inside a burgundy Subaru automobile.1 Watson did not

own the Subaru, nor did any witness or fingerprint evidence

place him in the vehicle. To prove his connection to the car,

the government relied on a key to the Subaru that the police

found on Watson when he was arrested, a Shaw's jewelry bag

containing nearly 100 grams of cocaine base that the police

found in the car, and a receipt from a Shaw's store that the

police found in Watson's home. Defense witnesses, however,

placed Watson in church for part of the evening in question

and disputed a police officer's testimony that Watson had the

car key at the time of his arrest. Instead, defense witnesses

connected Everett Hawkins to the Subaru and the car key on

the day and evening in question. To strengthen the evidence

of Watson's connection to the Subaru, the government attempted to prove that the owner of the car was his girlfriend.

The attempt was fumbled, however, when the prosecutor

asked a defense witness a compound question assuming a fact

not otherwise in evidence, namely that the registered owner

of the car was Watson's girlfriend, and then eliminated the

ambiguity in the witness' response by purporting to quote the

witness' testimony during closing argument to the jury. Because credibility was hotly disputed and the evidence connect-

__________

1 Watson's first trial ended in a mistrial. At this second trial,

he was convicted of possessing 50 or more grams of cocaine base

with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. ss 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(1994)),

and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. s 2); possession with intent to

distribute cocaine base within 1000 feet of a school (21 U.S.C.

s 860(a)), and aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. s 2); possession with

intent to distribute heroin (21 U.S.C. s 841(a)(1)), and aiding and

abetting (18 U.S.C. s 2); and assault on a police officer (D.C. Code

Ann. s 22-505(a)(1981)). He was acquitted of firearms charges.

ing Watson to the car was not weighty, we conclude that the

standard jury instructions that the arguments of counsel and

counsel's questions are not evidence were insufficient to mitigate the substantial prejudice arising from the prosecutor's

misstatement of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.

I.

Between 5:30 and 6 p.m. on September 27, 1995, the police

received an anonymous telephone call advising that an unidentified person wearing a black baseball cap, blue jeans,

and a blue jean jacket had been selling drugs all day near 18th

and D Streets, N.E, operating out of a burgundy Subaru with

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temporary Maryland tags. Around 9 p.m., five plainclothes

police officers arrived at the scene. According to three

officers, Watson handed a "dark object" to Theodore Ford,

who dropped the object, later determined to be a gun, into a

trash can. When the police attempted to arrest Watson, two

officers testified that he dropped five ziplock bags to the

ground that contained about one gram of cocaine base. A

third officer testified that he removed from Watson's person a

key, a pager, and $57 in United States currency. The key

opened the burgundy Subaru.

Upon searching the Subaru, the police found in the glove

compartment a Shaw's jewelry bag that contained nearly 100

grams of cocaine base, about a half gram of heroin, as well as

a gray sponge, a scale, and empty ziplock bags. According to

the police, when Watson saw that the police had found the

jewelry bag, he attempted to run. The police grabbed him;

Watson hit one of the officers with a police flashlight; and

then as other officers held Watson to the ground he yelled to

the crowd for help. Gun shots erupted from the crowd.

When the area was secure, the police transported Watson and

Ford for processing. Upon executing a search warrant of

Watson's home, the police found an August 8, 1995, receipt

for a purchase at a Shaw's jewelry store.

Watson's defense was part alibi and part mistaken identification. The president and a minister of God's Healing TemUSCA Case #97-3153 Document #428390 Filed: 04/09/1999 Page 3 of 25
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ple both testified that Watson arrived at church for a recital

between 6 and 7 p.m., around the time the police received the

anonymous tip, and he did not leave until 8 p.m. Other

defense witnesses testified that another man had been selling

drugs out of the Subaru all day and ran, discarding various

items, when the police arrived in response to the anonymous

tip. Leonard Butler, a bystander at the scene, testified that

he saw Everett Hawkins standing in the alley near the trash

can where the gun was found, and that upon seeing the police,

Hawkins ran down the alley discarding objects. Raymond

Thomas testified that he saw Hawkins in the area that day

wearing a jeans outfit and a hat and that Hawkins left the

area when the police arrived. Three other defense witnesses

testified that the police initiated the brawl with Watson,

beating him with the butt of a gun, their fists, and flashlights.

Defense witnesses also disputed the government's evidence

regarding the Subaru. Anthony Shank, another bystander,

testified that he saw an officer remove Watson's shoe laces

and belt, but not the Subaru key, from his person. Raymond

Thomas put Everett Hawkins in the Subaru on the night in

question. A sixteen-year-old high school student testified

that the Subaru belonged to Hawkins, that Hawkins was in

the car on the day in question (and on other occasions), and

that the key introduced into evidence by the government was

the key Hawkins used to open the Subaru. To corroborate

his version of events, the student testified that on the afternoon of the day in question he left his school books in the

Subaru; the government stipulated that the police found his

books inside the Subaru.

II.

On appeal Watson contends that he is entitled to a new

trial on three grounds: first, the district court abused its

discretion under Rule 403 in admitting his 1988 conviction for

drug trafficking inasmuch as possession was the only contested issue and there was ample other evidence to show knowledge and intent; second, the district court plainly erred in

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allowing expert witness testimony in the form of mirroring

hypotheticals suggesting personal knowledge of Watson's intent to distribute; and third, the district court erred in

denying his motion in limine to restrict the prosecutor from

misstating evidence during closing argument and the prosecutor's subsequent misstatement of the evidence during closing

argument substantially prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

Because we conclude that Watson's third ground requires

reversal of his conviction, we limit our comments on his first

two grounds to matters that are likely to arise upon retrial.

A.

During closing argument to the jury the prosecutor misstated a defense witness' testimony on a critical point and did

so while purporting to quote the witness' testimony. The

unfortunate sequence of events arose when the prosecutor

cross-examined defense witness Raymond Thomas about

whether Tyra Jackson, the registered owner of the Subaru

where the drugs and contraband were found, was Watson's

girlfriend. In asking the question, however, the prosecutor

presented the witness with a compound question assuming a

key fact not in evidence--namely, that Jackson was Watson's

girlfriend--with the result that the witness' response was

ambiguous on the critical point the prosecutor sought to

establish. Yet in closing argument the prosecutor, purporting to quote the defense witness, told the jury that Jackson

was Watson's girlfriend, thereby establishing a stronger connection of Watson to the Subaru than the disputed evidence

regarding the Subaru key and the seven week old sales

receipt from Shaw's jewelry store. Otherwise the Subaru

had been connected only to Jackson as the owner and to

Hawkins as the user of her car. We review the record to

emphasize both the significance of the evidence at issue and

the context in which the prosecutor's error occurred.

On cross examination during the defense case, the prosecutor asked Raymond Thomas about his knowledge of Tyra

Jackson. The prosecutor asked, "Mr. Thomas, you believe

that you know Watson's girlfriend, Tyra Jackson, right?"

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Thomas replied: "I never testified I knew her or not." The

prosecutor then asked, "You believe that you may have met

her once or twice, right?" Thomas's response: "Maybe."

Thus, the witness' reference to "her" might have been simply

to Tyra Jackson as an individual rather than as Watson's

girlfriend; the form of the question rendered the response

ambiguous.

Prior to closing argument, Watson's counsel moved in

limine to exclude from the prosecutor's closing argument any

reference to Tyra Jackson being Watson's girlfriend. Defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's question had assumed a fact not in evidence, namely that Tyra Jackson was

Watson's girlfriend. As defense counsel recalled, somewhat

inaccurately, the prosecutor had asked Thomas "Have you

ever met Mr. Watson's girlfriend, Tyra Jackson?," and Thomas responded "I think I have." The district court stated that

it thought that the witness had answered "Yes," and that any

ambiguity about whether she was Watson's girlfriend should

have been taken care of on redirect; the court ruled that the

witness' answer placed the fact in evidence and denied the

defense motion.

In his initial closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:

We have the registration to the car, the Subaru. I[t] is

in the name of Tyra Jackson. It's not in the name of ...

Everett Hawkins. It's in the name of Tyra Jackson.

The only evidence we have about Tyra Jackson is Thomas's answer, one of the defense witnesses, "Do you think

you met Tyra Jackson?" "Well, I think I met her once

or twice. I think I've met Watson's girlfriend, Tyra

Jackson once or twice." Tyra Jackson's car, the registration to the Subaru.

In rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor reiterated the

point: "We've got the evidence from [Watson's] witness that

he thinks he knows Tyra Jackson, his [Watson's] girlfriend,

and the title to the car, the registration to the car." After

closing arguments, the district court gave the standard instructions that counsel's questions, statements, and arguUSCA Case #97-3153 Document #428390 Filed: 04/09/1999 Page 6 of 25
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ments are not evidence. See Criminal Jury Instructions for

the District of Columbia, Instr. 1.07, 2.05.

Although a prosecutor's statements in closing argument

will rarely warrant a new trial, see United States v. Young,

470 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1985), United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d

1238, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1993), Watson's is such a case. It is

error for counsel to make statements in closing argument

unsupported by evidence, to misstate admitted evidence, or to

misquote a witness' testimony. In the instant case the prosecutor's remarks were error to the extent that they misstated

and misquoted Raymond Thomas's testimony. See United

State v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015, 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We

do not decide whether the district court erred in denying

Watson's motion in limine, but focus solely on the prosecutor's misquotation and misrepresentation of the witness' testimony during closing arguments to the jury.2

A misstatement of evidence is error when it amounts to a

statement of fact to the jury not supported by proper evidence introduced during trial, regardless of whether counsel's

remarks were deliberate or made in good faith. See Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1025; United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426,

432-33 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Small, 74 F.3d

1276, 1280-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Perholtz, 842

F.2d 343, 360-61 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Gaither v. United States,

413 F.2d 1061, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1969). The misstatement

constituting error is demonstrated here by comparing the

witness' testimony with the statements made by the prosecutor in closing arguments. See Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1025;

Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 360; Gaither, 413 F.2d at 1078. The

government does not dispute that the prosecutor purported to

__________

2 Although Watson lists as an issue on appeal that the district

court erred in denying his motion in limine, he never argues the

point in his brief. Accordingly, we decline to address his "asserted

but unanalyzed" argument. Carducci v. Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177

(D.C. Cir. 1983); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6); see also Washington

Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 31, 39 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

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quote Thomas's testimony. Yet the quote was inaccurate;

the error is apparent on the face of the record.

That Watson is entitled to a new trial by reason of the

error is demonstrated by application of this circuit's test

designed to determine whether a defendant has suffered

sufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial. See Gartmon, 146

F.3d at 1026. The test consists of three factors:

"the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue

affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the

effects of the error." We have also framed the test for

prejudice in terms of the severity of the prosecutor's

misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct, and the certainty of conviction absent the improper

remarks.

Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1026 (quoting United States v. North,

910 F.2d 843, 895, superseded in part on other grounds, 920

F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). This test applies regardless of

whether our review is for harmless error or plain error.3 Id.

The court determines how the prosecutor's misstatements

prejudiced Watson in light of the evidence presented, asking

not whether evidence was sufficient to convict notwithstanding the error, but rather whether the court can say that the

error did not affect the jury's verdict; if in "grave doubt," the

court cannot affirm Watson's conviction. Kotteakos v. United

States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946), cited in Lane v. United

States, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986); United States v. Smart, 98

F.3d 1379, 1391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

__________

3 Compare United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 737

(D.C. Cir. 1998) (plain error review) with Donato, 99 F.3d at 432-33

(harmless error review). Because Watson sought, by a motion in

limine, to prevent the prosecutor from arguing to the jury that

Jackson was Watson's girlfriend and his motion was denied, any

contemporaneous objection during closing argument would have

been superfluous. See United States v. Mediola, 42 F.3d 259, 260

n.2 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilson, 26 F.3d 142, 158-60

(D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Meija-Alarcon, 995 F.2d 982,

985-88 (10th Cir. 1993).

Each of the relevant factors points to substantial prejudice

in Watson's case. First, the case was close, and credibility

was key. A parade of eyewitnesses for the government and

the defense recounted different versions of what occurred at

critical points, from Watson's whereabouts at the time the tip

was received, to what he was doing when the police apprehended him, to where Everett Hawkins fit into the picture,

and most importantly to Watson's connection to the Subaru.

Even though three police officers testified that Watson handed co-defendant Thomas something that turned out to be a

gun, the jury discredited that testimony. See supra n. 1.

Only one officer claimed he took the car key off Watson's

person and although another officer testified that he may

have seen the key taken off Watson, the testimony about the

key was disputed by defense witnesses. Police testimony

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otherwise linking Watson to the Subaru was disputed by

defense witnesses who placed Everett Hawkins in a jeans

outfit in the Subaru at relevant times and otherwise connected him to the car and the key. There was no fingerprint

evidence linking Watson to either the key or the Subaru.

Aside from Raymond Thomas's ambiguous testimony, the

government's evidence connecting Watson to the Subaru consisted of the disputed testimony that the key was recovered

from Watson's person and a Shaw's jewelry bag found in the

car that the government sought to link to Watson through a

seven week old receipt, which at best showed that he had

purchased something from a Shaw's store.

Second, Raymond Thomas's testimony concerned a central

issue in the case, namely Watson's connection to the Subaru.

Although the police found five ziplock bags near Watson, the

bags contained a relatively small amount of cocaine base, and

the drugs in those bags were of a different concentration than

the drugs recovered from the Subaru. Only the 100 grams of

cocaine base, heroin, and drug paraphernalia found in the

glove compartment of the Subaru permitted a reasonable

inference of knowledge and intent to distribute, see, e.g.,

United States v. Stephens, 23 F.3d 553, 555-58 (D.C. Cir.

1994), and triggered heightened penalties under 21 U.S.C.

s 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)(1994). Yet Watson was not found in the

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car, nor did any witness or fingerprint evidence place him

there. Connecting Watson to the Subaru was essential to the

government's distribution case and its evidence in that regard

was disputed. These circumstances highlight the prejudicial

nature of the prosecutor's error.

Moreover, the prosecutor's question reflects his understanding that connecting Watson to the drugs in the Subaru

was critical to the government's distribution case. Yet at the

time he cross-examined Raymond Thomas, the prosecutor

had yet to establish that the owner of the Subaru was

Watson's girlfriend. The lack of clarity in Raymond Thomas's testimony stemmed directly from the prosecutor's use of

a compound question and his assumption of a key fact not in

evidence. The defense, of course, had no obligation to object

to the prosecutor's question, much less to perfect the government's case by clarifying the witness' response on reexamination, but could rest satisfied with the response, which did not

produce damaging testimony. Instead, defense counsel could

properly move in limine to restrict the prosecutor's closing

arguments, thus avoiding highlighting before the jury whether Jackson was Watson's girlfriend. Of course, once the

district court denied defense counsel's in limine motion,

assuming for purposes of this appeal no error in the district

court's ruling, the prosecutor could properly use the witness'

testimony in closing argument to show that Jackson was

Watson's girlfriend. But the prosecutor was not thereby

relieved of the obligation to ascertain the testimony with

accuracy, much less the obligation to quote it accurately. The

in limine motion placed the prosecutor on notice that at least

defense counsel thought the prosecutor had not elicited a true

admission from the witness that he knew Tyra Jackson was

Watson's girlfriend. The prosecutor also knew that his compound question made a clear response doubtful. Nevertheless, rather than simply shrewdly characterizing or merely

paraphrasing the witness' testimony, the prosecutor presented an inaccurate direct quotation of Thomas's testimony to

the jury, eliminating the ambiguity on a central point. So far

as the record reveals, no effort was made, either during

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ments, to check the court reporter's notes on Raymond

Thomas's testimony; the absence of a transcript was irrelevant in this regard and cannot excuse prosecutorial carelessness.

Finally, the government can point to nothing by way of

mitigation of the prejudice beyond the standard instructions

that the opening statements and closing arguments of counsel

are not evidence and that a lawyer's question is not evidence.

See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia,

Instr. 1.07, 2.05. Although the ameliorative effects of jury

instructions are not to be underestimated, see Greer v. Miller,

483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S.

200, 211 (1987), there are limits when, as here, the instructions did not address the prosecutor's error in closing argument, and the error affected a central issue. Consequently,

the instructions given could neither undo the error nor mitigate its prejudicial effects under these egregious circumstances. See United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.6

(D.C. Cir. 1993); see also Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S.

497, 512-13 (1978); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d

490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1996); cf. Small, 74 F.3d at 1284.

In sum, the error was not harmless. "This circuit has long

made clear that the government must take care to ensure

that statements made in opening and closing arguments to

the jury are supported by evidence introduced at trial."

Small, 74 F.3d at 1280. Faced with only minimal evidence on

a key element in its case--Watson's connection to the Subaru--the prosecutor sought to make the critical link by purporting to quote a defense witness to state that Tyra Jackson,

the owner of the car, was Watson's girlfriend. The government does not dispute that the prosecutor purported to quote

this testimony, nor that a check of the court reporter's notes

could have avoided the error. Moreover, the quote was

completely wrong. Particularly where a defendant has filed

an anticipatory motion in limine, the prosecutor was alerted

to the fact that the existence of any evidence supporting this

alleged relationship was disputed. The prosecutor's closing

argument, then, cannot be absolved as no more than a shrewd

characterization of testimony; it was wrong and based on no

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evidence in the trial record. Moreover, the prosecutor repeated his misstatement: once in his initial closing argument

by direct quotation and again on rebuttal by reference.

There can be no doubt that the error was significant, for it

went to the heart of the government's case on a matter with

respect to which the government had no other weighty evidence. Given the centrality of the government's misstatements to the jury and the hotly contested other evidence of

Watson's connection to the car, Watson has demonstrated

substantial prejudice warranting a new trial.

B.

Insofar as Watson's evidentiary contentions are likely to

arise upon retrial, we offer two observations.

First, the admission of Watson's 1988 drug trafficking

conviction under Rule 403 undoubtedly presents a close question. As Watson points out, in Old Chief v. United States,

117 S. Ct. 644 (1997), the Supreme Court emphasized the

appropriateness of the contextual approach in considering the

probative value of prejudicial evidence under Rule 403. See

117 S. Ct. at 652. While Old Chief reinforces the prosecutor's

right to tell the story with "descriptive richness," id. at 653,

Watson's 1988 conviction seems, at best, remotely probative

of non-contested issues. Even assuming, as in United States

v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1204-05 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (in banc),

Watson's prior drug involvement was of a similar type or

conducted in a similar place,4 its relevance to intent and

knowledge is limited to establishing that Watson knows how

to sell drugs. Cf. United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1324

(D.C. Cir. 1998). The prior conviction is inadmissible to

prove the contested issue, namely, possession. Yet the prejudicial effect of the evidence is strong because it invites the

jury to infer that Watson has a propensity for drug offenses

__________

4 Watson's prior conviction, seven years old at the time of his

arrest, was for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, not

cocaine base, that was discovered during a police search of a

residence. While the residence was on the same block as the

Subaru, there was no transaction at all.

and therefore the drugs and paraphernalia found in the

Subaru must be his. It is this inference that Rule 404(b)

intends to preclude, and the danger has been recognized by

this and other courts. See, e.g., United States v. (Dennis)

Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 776-77 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United State

v. (Timothy) Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1994);

United States v. (Michael) Johnson, 970 F.2d 907, 912-14

(D.C. Cir. 1992). At a new trial, the district court can

consider anew its Rule 403 balancing, considering as well

whether a limiting instruction like those in the prior trials,

distinguishing between "act" and "intent," is sufficient to

overcome the prejudicial effect of the prior conviction. See

Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1210.

Second, there is no basis in the record before the court on

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which to conclude that there was error, much less plain error

by the district court in admitting the expert's testimony

because, contrary to Watson's contention, there were no

proscribed "mirroring hypotheticals" that in tandem with the

form of the prosecutor's questions and the expert's responses

impermissibly gave an opinion on Watson's state of mind.

See, e.g., United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1385-89 (D.C.

Cir. 1996); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 670-72 (D.C.

Cir. 1995); United States v. (Keith) Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419,

421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If some questions may have come

close to the line of questioning that the court has found

objectionable, see, e g., Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, expert testimony

regarding the modus operandi of drug dealers, even if elicited

through mirroring hypotheticals, does not violate Federal

Rule of Evidence 704(b).5 See United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d

176, 184-86 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Rather, what is proscribed is

__________

5 Federal Rule of Evidence 704 provides that "testimony in the

form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the

trier of fact," see Fed R. Evid. 704(a), except "[n]o expert witness

testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to

whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or

condition constituting an element of the crime charged," see Fed. R.

Evid. 704(b).

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questioning that produces responses suggesting some special

knowledge of the defendant's mental processes. See Toms,

136 F.3d at 185. Examples of what is proscribed include

expert testimony that the hypothetical person's conduct "met

the elements" of the charged offense, Smart, 98 F.3d at 1385,

that the hypothetical individual's possession was "consistent

with intent to distribute," Boyd, 55 F.3d at 672, and that the

hypothetical person's intent "was intent to distribute," Mitchell, 996 F.2d at 422. Here, by contrast, the prosecutor asked

the expert about drug trafficking generally in the District of

Columbia. He also asked how many "dosage units" would be

contained in 100 grams of cocaine base, to which the witness

responded "700," and concluded that "[m]y experience easily

tells me that if any one individual possesses what's equivalent

to 700 bags of crack cocaine [sic] is in the business of making

money selling drugs in the streets of Washington, D.C. or

whatever." Although the prosecutor did ask the expert

whether he was familiar with the case, risking that the jury

might be led to think that the expert had first-hand information about Watson, this reference did not indicate any familiarity with Watson's mental processes. See United States v.

Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242-43 (7th Cir. 1994).

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and

remand the case for a new trial.

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Garland, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In the vast majority of criminal cases tried in this circuit,

transcripts of witness testimony are not available at the time

of closing arguments. This means that prosecutors and

defense counsel must rely on their recollections in making

those arguments, and that judges must rely on theirs in

ruling on objections. Innocent mistakes of recollection are

inevitable and hardly uncommon. For protection from prejudice, our adversary system relies on the opportunity each side

has to challenge the other's misstatements before the jury,

and upon the court's standard admonition that it is the jury's

recollection that controls. In the end, the jury's memory of

what a witness actually said provides the corrective for errors

made by the parties.

In light of this reality, it is not surprising that although "it

is error for a prosecutor to mischaracterize evidence in a

summation[,] [i]t is also clear ... that an error in a prosecutor's summation will only rarely warrant reversal of a conviction." United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 432 (D.C. Cir.

1996); see also United States v. Edelin, 996 F.2d 1238, 1243

(D.C. Cir. 1993) ("[W]e have generally been 'chary of reversing convictions solely on the grounds of a misstatement in a

closing argument.' ") (citation omitted). Indeed, it is so rare

that my colleagues are unable to cite a single case in which

we have reversed a conviction solely for a prosecutor's misquotation of testimony that the jury itself heard.

It is "the law of this circuit that, even where challenges to a

prosecutor's closing argument have been preserved through

timely objection, we will reverse a conviction and require a

new trial only if we determine that the defendant has suffered

'substantial prejudice.' " United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d

693, 715 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. North, 910

F.2d 843, 897-98 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). We have "framed the test

for prejudice in terms of the severity of the prosecutor's

misconduct, the measures adopted to cure the misconduct,

and the certainty of conviction absent the improper remarks."

Id. at 715; see also United States v. Gartmon, 146 F.3d 1015,

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1026 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting variety of similar formulations).

It is only in the most egregious of cases that we will consider

reversal, see North, 910 F.2d at 897 n.33, and an examination

of the applicable factors makes clear that this is not such a

case.

A

As the court recognizes, the first step in determining the

severity of a prosecutor's misstatement is to compare it with

the witness' actual testimony. A misstatement is error, but

only "to the extent that [it] overstate[s]" the testimony.

Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1025 (quoting United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). In this case there

clearly was an overstatement, but the difference between the

witness' testimony and the prosecutor's characterization is

not as substantial as the court's opinion suggests.

The problem in this case began with a classic error in trial

technique. See Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial

Techniques 385 (1980). The prosecutor asked what was in

essence a compound question: "Mr. Thomas, you believe that

you know Watson's girlfriend, Tyra Jackson, right?" In so

doing, he effectively asked both whether the witness knew

Ms. Jackson, and whether the witness knew her to be the

defendant's girlfriend. At that point, the equally-classic "objection as to form" would have been in order. Defense

counsel, however, did not make it. Instead, the crossexamination unfolded as follows:

Prosecutor: Mr. Thomas, you believe that you know

Watson's girlfriend, Tyra Jackson, right?

Thomas: I never testified I knew her or not.

Prosecutor: You believe that you may have met her

once or twice, right?

Thomas: Maybe.

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The court may be correct in stating that the defense had no

obligation to object to the prosecutor's question. But my

colleagues are wrong in suggesting that the defense could

"rest satisfied" with the witness' response because it "did not

produce damaging testimony." Op. at 10. In fact it did. As

the court notes, the compound question yielded an ambiguous

response--the classic consequence of asking such a question.

But ambiguity is not the same as the absence of evidence. A

reasonable jury could have concluded that Thomas would

have disputed the implication that Jackson was Watson's

girlfriend if it were untrue or if he did not know it to be

true--particularly since he had already exhibited a willingness to resist the prosecutor's assumptions. See 5/1/96 Tr. at

50. ("I never testified I knew her or not."). Accordingly, a

reasonable jury could well have interpreted Thomas' answers

as assent to the implied question--do you know Tyra Jackson

to be Watson's girlfriend? Although the defendant did not

have to risk "perfect[ing] the government's case by clarifying

the witness' response," Op. at 10, by not doing so he accepted

the risk that the jury would reasonably read the ambiguity

against him.1

It is true that when the prosecutor recounted the exchange

in closing argument, he erred by "eliminating the ambiguity"

in Thomas' testimony. Op. at 10. The prosecutor told the

jury that Thomas had said: "I think I've met Watson's

girlfriend, Tyra Jackson once or twice." This was a stronger

version of the witness' testimony and hence was error. But

since it was an inference that a reasonable jury could have

derived on its own, the measure of the difference is one of

degree. The prosecutor did no more than make express what

a juror could reasonably have found implicit in the witness'

answers. This was error, but not egregious error.

Nor was the prosecutor's misstatement an intentional one.

Recalling the precise contours of a witness' testimony is a

__________

1 On the other hand, as the district court pointed out, if Jackson

were not defendant's girlfriend or if Thomas did not know, defense

counsel could easily have covered the point during his redirect

examination of Thomas. See 5/2/96 Tr. at 24.

difficult task in the best of circumstances, made all the more

difficult here by the witness' ambiguous answer to the prosecutor's compound question. When defense counsel made his

motion in limine concerning the statement, he did so orally,

without notice, and without obtaining a transcript to support

his motion. In the absence of that transcript, all of the

participants were forced to rely on their recollections--and all

of those recollections were erroneous to some degree. See

Revised Appendix ("App.") 161. Although the prosecutor's

memory was worse than that of defense counsel, it did not

vary significantly from that of the judge.2 Thus, it can hardly

be said that the defense's uncorroborated allegation put the

prosecutor on notice that he had not obtained the admission

he thought he had.

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Finally, in measuring the severity of the prosecutor's error,

it is also important to note that it involved just one sentence

in each of the prosecutor's two closing arguments.3 Those

arguments spanned more than twenty pages of transcript.

As we have said many times before, such isolated misstatements rarely amount to severe misconduct. See, e.g., Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1026; North, 910 F.2d at 897; Perholtz, 842

F.2d at 361.

B

The next factor to consider in measuring the substantiality

of prejudice is whether measures were available to mitigate

its impact. The error at issue here was the inaccurate

recitation of testimony that the jury itself heard. Hence, if

__________

2 In response to defense counsel's contention that "there's no

evidence that Tyra Jackson was the girlfriend," the court responded: "I thought the witness answered 'yes.' " 5/2/96 Tr. at 23.

3 Indeed, while the sentence in the initial closing argument was

erroneous because the prosecutor presented it as if it were a direct

quotation of the witness' testimony, the sentence employed in the

rebuttal appears more as characterization than quotation, and hence

may not have been error at all. See Donato, 99 F.3d at 432

(holding that "fair, if disputed, characterization" of testimony does

not constitute error).

the jury relied on its own recollection, rather than on that of

the prosecutor, the error would be without effect. The judge

gave two separate instructions designed to ensure precisely

that result:

If any reference by the court or the attorneys to

evidence does not coincide with your own recollection of

the evidence, it is your recollection which should control

during your deliberations.

The statements and arguments of the lawyers are not

evidence. They are only intended to assist you in understanding the evidence.

The court also gave an additional instruction aimed directly at

the kind of problem engendered by a compound question:

Sometimes a lawyer's question suggests that something is a fact. Whether or not something is a fact

depends on the witness's answer, not the lawyer's question. A lawyer's question is not evidence.

Both the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly

held such instructions sufficient to mitigate prejudice caused

by prosecutors' misstatements in closing arguments.4 More-

__________

4 See, e.g., Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 541 (1993)

("[T]he District Court admonished the jury that opening and closing

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arguments are not evidence.... These instructions sufficed to

cure any possibility of prejudice."); Gartmon, 146 F.3d at 1026

("[T]he judge gave the standard limiting instruction that lawyers'

arguments are not evidence and that the jury's recollection of the

evidence controls. We have repeatedly said this kind of instruction

can mitigate the impact of erroneous jury argument."); North, 910

F.2d at 897 ("Our unwillingness to reverse a conviction has been

particularly pronounced when the trial judge issues curative instructions.... Here [the judge] ... explicitly reminded the jurors

that 'the statements, opinion and arguments of counsel are not

evidence'.... [and that] the jurors' 'recollection alone' is controlling as to 'all aspects of the evidence.' The District Judge could not

have more directly communicated to the jury the limited evidentiary

value of closing arguments.").

over, it bears emphasizing that this is not a case in which the

prosecutor asserted knowledge of evidence neither seen nor

heard by the jury, nor subject to cross-examination by the

defense.5 In such a case, it might be argued that an instruction that the jury's recollection controls is of questionable

value since the jury has no recollection on which to rely.

Here, by contrast, the dispute was solely about evidence the

jury did hear, and as long as the jury followed the court's

instructions the prosecutor's error would be mitigated. See

Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987) ("[J]uries are

presumed to follow their instructions.").

We also cannot ignore defense counsel's failure to use his

closing argument to tell the jury that the prosecutor had

misstated the evidence. Pointing out such a misstatement

can have a powerful, even devastating effect on an opponent's

case. Had defense counsel used his closing argument in that

fashion, we doubtless would have found it sufficient to mitigate the impact of the misstatement. See, e.g., United States

v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(holding that although government's opening statement

blamed defendants for two murders as to which it never

introduced evidence, defense counsel was able "to use the

variance between the government's opening and its proof to

sow doubt of the prosecution among the jurors"); North, 910

F.2d at 895; Cross v. United States, 353 F.2d 454, 455 (D.C.

Cir. 1965). The defense's failure to take advantage of this

curative opportunity cannot put it in a better position than if

it had--at least not without creating a powerful incentive to

let misstatements pass without comment in the hope of

obtaining a second bite at the apple if the jury's verdict

should be unfavorable.

__________

5 United States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cited

by the court, is an example of such a case. There, we reversed a

conviction because the evidence was insufficient to convict. See 985

F.2d at 1089. We indicated in dicta, however, that we would also

have reversed based on the prosecutor's repeated references in

closing argument to alleged "eye contact" between the two codefendants--which we characterized as "phantom evidence" that

was not "adduced at trial." Id. at 1089 n.6.

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C

Finally, we must consider the weight of the government's

evidence. As my colleagues correctly note, the government's

case against Watson cannot be characterized as overwhelming. But the evidence against the defendant was certainly

"weighty," and that is sufficient to uphold his conviction in

light of the other factors discussed above. See Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 639 (1993) (holding Kotteakos

harmless error standard satisfied where "evidence of guilt

was, if not overwhelming, certainly weighty"); Childress, 58

F.3d at 716 (indicating that the various factors must be

weighed against each other in determining whether prosecutorial remarks caused substantial prejudice). The evidence

tying Watson to $14,000 worth of crack cocaine was as

follows.

First, a search of Watson's person produced a key to a car

that was parked fifteen feet from the spot at which Watson

was arrested. Although the court describes the searching

officer's testimony as "disputed," Op. at 4, that description is

overstated. Only one defense witness, Anthony Shank, testified about the search of Watson, and he merely said that "the

only thing I saw them remove from him was his shoe strings

and belt." App. 152. Shank did not affirmatively testify that

there was no key; he was not even asked whether he saw a

key. Nor is Shank's testimony inconsistent with the officer

finding the key when Shank was not looking; there was no

testimony that anyone saw the officer find the key elsewhere.

Indeed, although the court may regard Shank's testimony as

a powerful attack on the officer's credibility, apparently defense counsel did not appraise it the same way: he did not

even mention Shank's testimony in his closing argument.6

__________

6 A second defense witness, a high school student, testified that

the key the government introduced into evidence "look[ed] like" a

key he saw in the possession of a different individual (Everett

Hawkins) five hours earlier on the day of Watson's arrest. See

App. 131. Like Shank's, that testimony was not inconsistent with

Watson having the key when he was arrested.

Second, inside the car's glove compartment the police found

large rocks of crack cocaine wrapped in a Shaw's Jewelry

bag. The officers testified that when Watson saw they had

found the bag, he began struggling violently to escape. Inside the Shaw's bag, along with the crack, were five black

ziplock bags matching five other bags that fell from Watson's

hand when he was arrested. See 4/25/96 Tr. at 19-20, 224.7

And inside Watson's house was a receipt for a purchase at

Shaw's Jewelry just seven weeks before--a purchase made

using the same alias Watson gave police when he was arrested on the instant charge. It would be surprising if the jury

regarded that purchase as nothing more than an unfortunate

coincidence.

Third, the district court properly admitted, under Federal

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Rules of Criminal Procedure 403 and 404(b), evidence that

Watson previously had been convicted of committing the

same crime--possession with intent to distribute cocaine--on

the same city block. See 4/26/96 Tr. at 13-14. Although this

cannot alone prove that Watson possessed the drugs on the

instant occasion, it can be used to prove he intended to

distribute the cocaine in the Shaw's bag, and "may be a 'brick

__________

The court also suggests that the jury disbelieved the police

witnesses, because it acquitted Watson of a firearms charge despite

their testimony that they thought they saw Watson pass a gun to a

codefendant. By the same logic, we could say that the jury

disbelieved Shank, because it found defendant guilty of assaulting a

police officer despite Shank's testimony that the assault was actually perpetrated by the police. In fact, the better view is simply that

propounded by the Supreme Court in United States v. Watts: "[I]t

is impossible to know why a jury found a defendant not guilty on a

certain charge. An acquittal is not a finding of any fact....

Without specific jury findings, no one can logically or realistically

draw any factual finding inferences." 117 S. Ct. 633, 637 (1997).

7 The court notes that the drugs in the latter five bags were of

a different concentration than the drugs recovered from the car.

That difference was quite small (39% vs. 42%), and not at all

inconsistent with all of the crack cocaine coming from the same

batch. See United States v. Robinson, 59 F.3d 1318, 1320 (D.C. Cir.

1995) (citing testimony of DEA chemist).

in the wall of evidence' proving possession." United States v.

Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202, 1208 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

My colleagues suggest that upon retrial, the district court

may wish to reconsider the admissibility of Watson's prior

conviction. Although the district court is certainly free to

reconsider anything it likes, there is no reason to reconsider

its decision to admit this prior crimes evidence. We have

repeatedly upheld the admission of such evidence in similar

circumstances,8 and the reason the court gives for regarding

admissibility as a close question in this case is unpersuasive.

The court suggests that the evidence of Watson's prior

crime can go only to prove "non-contested issues." Op. at 12.

The court apparently adopts defendant's argument that the

element of intent was uncontested in this case, because his

defense was mistaken identification rather than the absence

of an intent to distribute cocaine.9 But that is precisely the

argument we rejected, en banc, in Crowder, where we held

prior crimes evidence relevant notwithstanding a defense of

mistaken identification and notwithstanding defendant's offer

to stipulate that whoever did possess the drugs in question

had the necessary intent. See Crowder, 141 F.3d at 1206; see

__________

8 See, e.g., United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1324 (D.C.

Cir. 1998); United States v. Mitchell, 49 F.3d 769, 776 (D.C. Cir.

1995); United States v. Johnson, 40 F.3d 436, 441 n.3 (D.C. Cir.

1994). The court notes that Watson's prior conviction was for

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possession with intent to distribute cocaine rather than cocaine

base, and that it occurred seven years before his arrest in this case.

Neither circumstance bars admission of Watson's prior conviction.

See, e.g., United States v. Tomberlin, 130 F.3d 1318, 1319-21 (8th

Cir. 1997); United States v. Hernandez, 84 F.3d 931, 935 (7th Cir.

1996); United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1040 (5th Cir.

1996); Mitchell, 49 F.3d at 775-77.

9 I assume that the court is not arguing that the prior crimes

evidence here is "remotely probative" merely because it is inadmissible to prove the issue of possession directly, since prior crimes

evidence is never admissible for that purpose. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

404(b).

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also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69-70 (1991) ("[T]he

prosecution's burden to prove every element of the crime is

not relieved by a defendant's tactical decision not to contest

an essential element of the offense.... [The prosecution is

not required] to refrain from introducing relevant evidence

simply because the defense chooses not to contest the

point.").

In short, the district court properly admitted the evidence

of Watson's prior drug crime to prove Watson's intent with

respect to the cocaine at issue in this case. Moreover, as we

noted in Crowder, "[p]roof of an individual's intent to commit

an act may itself serve as proof that the individual committed

the act," and hence "other-offense evidence of intent would

have probative value not just on the intent element, but also

on the possession element of the offense." 141 F.3d at 1208.

When this is taken together with the other evidence connecting Watson to the bag of crack cocaine, the government's

evidence is sufficiently weighty to bar a conclusion that

Watson was substantially prejudiced by the limited (and

mitigated) error the prosecutor committed in closing argument.

D

It may well be that in the not-too-distant future even

routine criminal trials will have the benefit of real-time

transcripts of witness testimony. See Toni Locy, Law Meets

Technology in Courtroom No. 9, Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1997, at

J1. When that day comes, disputes over testimony will be

resolved by reference to transcripts rather than memories.

In the meantime, however, it is inevitable that trial lawyers

will suffer from innocent misrecollections. We have always

relied on the self-corrective nature of the adversary system,

combined with instructions from the court, to police all but

the most egregious of these kinds of errors. Because I am

unable to conclude that the defendant suffered substantial

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prejudice as a consequence of the error that occurred in this

case, I respectfully dissent from the reversal of his conviction.

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