Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04446/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04446-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ricardo Rusan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Carol E. Jackson, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Missouri. 

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Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-4446

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Ricardo Rusan,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the 

Eastern District of Missouri.

 [PUBLISHED]

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Submitted: May 16, 2006

 Filed: August 22, 2006

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Before BYE, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges. 

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HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Ricardo Rusan appeals his convictions for bank robbery and bank larceny

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (b), contending that the district court1

 erred in

denying his Batson2

 challenge to the Government's use of peremptory strikes during

jury selection and that there was insufficient evidence to establish that the bank

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involved was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). After

careful review, we affirm. 

I.

During the morning hours of November 12, 2004, a man wearing a skull cap

and sunglasses and carrying a backpack entered a branch of the Southern Commercial

Bank in St. Louis. Upon entering the bank the man approached one of the teller

windows and inquired about opening an account. He was directed to the customer

service desk and walked away, but then immediately returned and again approached

the window of teller Dianne Sanborn. When he returned to Ms. Sanborn's window,

he put the backpack on the counter and told her to start filling it with cash. As he

spoke to Ms. Sanborn, the man kept his hand in his pocket, pointing it at Ms.

Sanborn's chest. After she filled the backpack with over two thousand dollars in cash

and a dye pack, the man picked up the backpack and walked out of the bank. While

this was occurring, the bank alarm was activated by another bank employee. The

police arrived shortly after the man left. Witnesses reported seeing the man walking

down the street carrying a backpack from which red smoke was billowing, but the

man could not be identified.

No suspects were arrested in the time immediately after the robbery, and the

police began trying to discern images from the bank security cameras to develop

leads. In early January 2005, the police received a tip from an employee of the

Missouri Department of Corrections who recognized Rusan after seeing images from

the security camera tapes and who identified Rusan as the person who committed the

November 2004 bank robbery. After police received this information, they put out

notice that Rusan was wanted for questioning regarding the bank robbery.

A few days later, the police took Rusan into custody on a different matter, and

then also questioned him about the robbery. Rusan initially denied any involvement

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in the November 2004 robbery and offered an alibi. However, after being told by

police of the mounting evidence pointing toward him as the perpetrator, Rusan

recanted his alibi and confessed to robbing the bank. That same day, Ms. Sanborn

identified Rusan in a multi-person lineup as the man who had approached her teller

window and robbed the bank on November 12.

A grand jury returned a one-count indictment, charging Rusan with bank

robbery. Rusan pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The day trial

began, Rusan waived indictment, and one count of bank larceny was added in order

to allow Rusan to argue for the lesser charge of bank larceny instead of bank robbery.

The district court overruled Rusan's Batson objection to the Government's use of its

peremptory strikes to remove three African-American venirepersons during the jury

selection process. 

After a two-day trial, Rusan was convicted by a jury on both counts. The

district court sentenced Rusan to 240 months of imprisonment on the bank robbery

count and 120 months of imprisonment on the bank larceny count, with the sentences

to run concurrently. Rusan filed this timely appeal, challenging his convictions on

two grounds: (1) that the district court violated the separation of powers doctrine

during its ruling on the Batson challenge, and (2) that the evidence at trial was

insufficient to establish that the Southern Commercial Bank branch was federally

insured. 

II.

A. Batson Challenge 

At the start of trial there was a panel of 39 potential jurors, six of whom were

African-American. The Government removed four African-American venirepersons

in total, striking one for cause and using three of its six peremptory challenges against

the others. Rusan also struck one African-American venireperson, leaving one on the

panel. After the Government exercised its three peremptory challenges against

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African-Americans, Rusan made a Batson objection, claiming the strikes were

improperly motivated by race. The Government responded, first challenging whether

Rusan had even made a prima facie showing of discrimination by the mere fact that

it had used three peremptory strikes against African-Americans and then articulating

several nondiscriminatory reasons for the strikes. 

Rusan did not challenge the adequacy or factual correctness of the

nondiscriminatory explanations offered by the Government except to argue that they

were a pretext for discrimination because the Government had failed to strike Juror

Two, who Rusan maintained was a similarly situated white venireperson. Rather than

requiring the Government to respond to this assertion of pretext, the district court

relied upon the explanations already offered by the Government to note that Juror Two

was not similar in all legitimate factors to the three African-Americans struck by the

Government. (See Trial Tr. at 122-23). The district court then concluded that the

Government's nondiscriminatory reasons for exercising its peremptory strikes were

adequate and overruled Rusan's Batson objection.

On appeal, Rusan argues that a separation of powers concern arises from the

district court's Batson analysis, but because he did not raise this argument before the

district court, we review only for plain error. See United States v. Mohr, 407 F.3d

898, 901 (8th Cir.) (applying plain error review to constitutional arguments not

previously raised), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 670 (2005). We have discretion to reverse

for plain error if there is "an error that is plain," "that affects substantial rights," and

that "seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings." United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (internal marks

omitted). 

There are three steps in a Batson analysis: (1) the district court must determine

whether the challenger has made a prima facie showing that the peremptory strikes

were based upon race; (2) if the court so finds, then the exercising party must provide

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its reasons for dismissing the potential jurors; and (3) the district court must then

determine if the challenger has satisfied the burden of proving purposeful

discrimination. United States v. Thompson, 450 F.3d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 2006). See

also Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. In this case, the district court did not discuss the first

step of whether Rusan had established a prima facie case, but went on to require the

Government to offer race-neutral reasons for the exercise of each peremptory strike

of an African-American venireperson. Rusan then attempted to show pretext by

stating that the Government did not strike a similarly situated white juror. The district

court then overruled the objection.

As we understand Rusan's argument on appeal, he complains that the district

court violated the separation of powers doctrine by, in effect, shouldering the

Government's burden of providing nondiscriminatory reasons when the court did not

require the Government to respond to his assertion of pretext. We see no error, let

alone plain error. The district court did not create its own race-neutral reasons to

satisfy the Government's burden. The Government had provided race-neutral reasons

before Rusan asserted that Juror Two was similarly situated. Because the district

court could determine from the voir dire proceeding it had conducted and the raceneutral reasons already articulated by the Government that Juror Two was in fact not

similarly situated, there was no need for it to delay its ruling to allow further rebuttal

argument by the Government as to pretext. The district court did not err by relying

on the record already made, which demonstrated that Rusan had not met his burden

of proving purposeful discrimination. Rusan's claim of pretext was apparently so

meritless based on the record already made before her that the district judge had no

need to hear further argument from the Government. No separation of powers

concerns arise from the district court's disposition of the Batson challenge. 

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Rusan further argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Southern

Commercial Bank was federally insured at the time of the robbery. "We review

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challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the verdict, resolving any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the

prosecution, and accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict." United

States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 841-42 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

1653 (2006). The verdict will be upheld if "a reasonable jury could have found

[Rusan] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 842.

"Bank robbery [and larceny are] federal crime[s] only if the institution robbed

is a federally chartered financial institution or is insured by a federal deposit insurer."

United States v. Davis, 406 F.3d 505, 511 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

1083 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f) (defining the term "bank"). The

Government relied on the fact that Southern Commercial Bank was insured by the

FDIC to satisfy the statutory requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(f) and presented

evidence of the bank's insured status during its case-in-chief. 

The Government offered a photocopy of a plaque on display at the bank that

notifies customers the bank is insured by the FDIC, and the testimony of Marcia

Ellerbeck, an employee of Southern Commercial Bank for over 31 years. The

photocopy of the plaque that was entered into evidence depicted the plaque displayed

in the bank on the day of the robbery. Ms. Ellerbeck testified that the bank was

insured on the day of the robbery and that her knowledge of that status came through

information disseminated from the bank. She also testified that part of her work

responsibilities included explaining the concept of FDIC insurance to new bank

customers. Rusan contends that this evidence is insufficient, based upon our prior

caselaw, to establish that the bank was FDIC insured. We respectfully disagree. 

 We first question whether we even need to look at the merits of this claim.

While Rusan now contends that there was insufficient evidence presented by the

Government to prove the bank was FDIC insured, at trial Rusan's counsel conceded

that the Government had met its burden on this element. During closing arguments,

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Rusan's counsel argued that the Government had failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt all the elements of bank robbery. (Trial Tr. at 243.) His counsel then went on

to state that "[a]s to bank larceny, . . . I would concede that the government has proved

those elements." (Id.) Because one element of both crimes is the bank's federally

insured status, by conceding that the Government satisfied the elements of bank

larceny, Rusan's counsel conceded that the Government had sufficiently proven that

the bank was FDIC insured as to both counts. While statements made by counsel

during closing arguments are not evidence, United States v. Lowrimore, 923 F.2d 590,

593 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919 (1991), concessions made by counsel as part

of a trial strategy are another matter, see generally Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453,

459 (8th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that trial counsel's decision to concede lesser charge

in closing argument as part of trial strategy was not ineffective assistance), cert.

denied, 529 U.S. 1039 (2000). See also United States v. Bentson, 947 F.2d 1353,

1356 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that defendant was bound by attorney's judicial

admission during closing arguments), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 958 (1992); RodriguezGonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 1981) (stating that attorney's

admission to an element of the offense, done in presence of defendant, was binding);

United States v. Adams, 422 F.2d 515, 518 (10th Cir.) (holding that defendants were

bound by admissions made by counsel during trial when made in defendant's presence

and with permission of defendant), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 913 (1970). Because this

issue can be simply dealt with on its merits we will do so, while acknowledging that

Rusan appears to have conceded this issue at trial.

We have not previously articulated a minimum standard of proof of insured

status in the prior cases that addressed this issue, but the evidence before us may well

be approaching what we would consider the bare minimum. We have stated that a

copy of the insurance certificate issued by the FDIC, proof of payment of the

insurance premium, and the testimony of a bank officer (or other knowledgeable

employee) that the bank's deposits are insured is sufficient to prove that the bank was

insured by the FDIC. See United States v. Mitchell, 136 F.3d 1192, 1193 (8th Cir.

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1998); United States v. Merrill, 484 F.2d 168, 169-70 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.

1077 (1973). While producing the actual certificate and proof of payment may be the

ideal evidence to prove insured status, we have upheld many cases on testimony alone.

See United States v. Lewis, 260 F.3d 855, 855-56 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding insured

status proven by statement of bank manager that deposits are insured by the FDIC),

cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1154 (2002); United States v. Hadamek, 28 F.3d 827, 827-28

(8th Cir. 1994) (stating that testimony from bank president that deposits are insured

was sufficient to allow jury to draw inference that bank was also insured at time of

robbery); United States v. Mays, 822 F.2d 793, 796 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that

testimony of bank manager that bank was insured was enough to satisfy requirement

and noting that testimony of bank manager on this matter should receive the same

evidentiary weight as that of a bank officer). 

The photocopy of the plaque itself is likely not enough to establish Southern

Commercial's insured status, but when admitted in conjunction with the testimony of

Ms. Ellerbeck, an employee (as opposed to a manager or officer) of the bank for over

30 years, it is enough to satisfy us that a jury could have reasonably found that the

bank was insured on the day of the robbery. Ms. Ellerbeck was asked at trial if

through her work she was "familiar with whether or not the deposits of that bank

[were] insured by the federal government." (Trial Tr. at 176.) Ms. Ellerbeck replied

that the deposits were insured and always had been while she had worked there. (Id.)

Not only did she know this through her work in customer service, but she also knew

of the insured status through training and information she received from her superiors.

Ms. Ellerbeck then identified a photocopy of the plaque as one that hangs in the bank

to notify customers that the bank is FDIC insured. Rusan objected to the admission

of the photocopy of the plaque under the best evidence rule, and the district court,

treating the objection as going to the fact that a photocopy and not the original plaque

was being used, overruled Rusan's objection. At no time did Rusan make any further

objections or contend that the court had misconstrued his original objection. 

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The issue of proof of insured status arises more frequently than it should. As

we stated in Hadamek, "we are at a loss to understand why the government did not

introduce more specific evidence regarding the bank's insured status on the date of the

offense, including a copy of the certificate of insurance." 28 F.3d at 828. While the

evidence in this instance was sufficient for the jury to find that the bank was insured

by the FDIC, we respectfully suggest again that the certificate of insurance in effect

at the time of the offense, accompanied by proof of the premium payment for the same

period offered through the testimony of a knowledgeable official from the bank,

would more specifically (and easily) satisfy this element of the offense without being

overly burdensome on the Government. 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

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