Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_90-cr-00003/USCOURTS-azd-2_90-cr-00003-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denard Darnell Neal
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Denard Darnell Neal, )

)

Petitioner, ) 2:90-CR-00003-PHX-RCB

)

vs. ) O R D E R

)

United States of America, )

)

Respondent. ) )

Currently pending before the court are four motions by

petitioner pro se, Denard Darnell Neal. Chronologically,

based upon filing date, the first is a “Request for Immediate

Change of Venue[.]” Mot. (doc. #215) (emphasis omitted). 

Second is petitioner’s motion “to vacate void [sic] judgment

pursuant to Rule 60(b)(3)[.]” Mot. (doc. #216). Third,

petitioner has filed a “Request for Status of Filed

Documents[.]” Mot. (doc. #217). Fourth, petitioner Neal also

“Request[s] [a] Waiver of Costs, Fees, and Fines[]” (doc.

221) associated with his Notice of Appeal filed in the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals on March 18, 2010 (doc. 218). 

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1 Indeed, petitioner has gone so far as to seek habeas corpus relief in

the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The court dismissed

that action as an impermissible successive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 because

again Neal had not obtained certification from the Ninth Circuit. Neal v.

Gonzales, 2007 WL 1322113, at *2 (D.D.C. May 4, 2007), aff’d without pub’d opinion,

258 Fed.Appx. 339 (D.C Cir. 2007). 

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Petitioner’s affidavit “to proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis[] [(“IFP”)}” accompanies that last request. See

Aff. (doc. 222) at 1 (emphasis added). For the reasons set

forth below, the court DENIES all four motions in their

entirety. 

Background

Petitioner Neal is an habitual filer of motions of

various kinds all attacking, in one way or another, his 1990

conviction and subsequent sentence in 1991 of 55 years

imprisonment for bank robbery and use of a firearm during a

crime of violence. On direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s convictions and sentence. 

United States v. Neal, 976 F.2d 601 (9th Cir. 1992); United

States v. Neal, 977 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1992). Several years

later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

district court’s denial of petitioner’s first 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 petition. U.S. v. Neal, 129 F.3d 128 (9th Cir.

1997)(unpublished opinion). 

In the intervening years, petitioner has filed a number

of other unsuccessful challenges to his sentence and attacks

on his conviction.1 Of particular significance here is that

on two separate occasions the Ninth Circuit has denied

petitioner’s application for authorization to file in this

court a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

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The Ninth Circuit uniformly denied those applications because

plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing under that

statute. See Docs. 133 (No. 01-70790); and 135 (No. 01-

71845). 

Construing petitioner’s motion to set aside judgment for

fraud upon the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Civ. P.

60(b) as an application to file a second or successive

section 2255 petition, the Ninth Circuit likewise denied that

motion. The Ninth Circuit did so because petitioner did not

make a prima facie showing under that statute. Doc. 147 (No.

04-72347). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit denied another

application by petitioner for authorization to file in this

district court a second or successive section 2255 motion. 

The Court denied that application without prejudice to

petitioner “filing a new application which complies with the

requirements of the rules[.]” Doc. 134 (No. 01-71367). 

Further, construing another of petitioner’s section 2255

motions as a writ of mandamus, the Ninth Circuit denied it. 

See Doc. 131 (No. 01-70650). The Ninth Circuit also

summarily affirmed an order of this court denying

petitioner’s post-judgment motion for release. U.S. v. Neal,

263 Fed.Appx. 572 (9th Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion). 

In 2006, petitioner filed an “Ex parte Motion to Vacate

Void Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)(5)” (doc. 158). 

Despite how petitioner styled that motion, the court

construed it to be a second or successive section 2255

petition. Neal v. U.S., 2006 WL 2481126, at *1 (D.Ariz. Aug.

24, 2006) (“Neal I”). The court denied that petition because

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Neal did not show that he had requested or received

authorization from the Ninth Circuit to file a second or

successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id. Petitioner

did appeal that denial, but eventually he voluntarily

withdrew it. Doc. 213 (No. 09-10181). 

On March 15, 2010, while the foregoing motions were

pending, petitioner filed a “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal

to the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.” 

Doc. #218. In that Notice, petitioner is appealing an

undocketed March 2, 2010, memorandum from the Clerk of the

Court, wherein the Clerk allegedly “refus[ed] to file

documents in the Public Record.” Id.

Discussion

I. Jurisdiction

 The first issue which the court must address is the

impact on the pending motions of petitioner’s most recent

filing of a Notice of Appeal. Generally, the filing of a

notice of appeal divests a district court of jurisdiction

over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal. See

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58,

103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (per curiam) (“The

filing of a notice of appeal ... confers jurisdiction on the

court of appeals and divests the district court of its

control over those aspects of the case involved in the

appeal.”). However, “[w]hen a Notice of Appeal is defective

in that it refers to a non-appealable interlocutory order, it

does not transfer jurisdiction to the appellate court, and so

the ordinary rule that the district court cannot act until

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the mandate has issued on the appeal does not apply.” 

Nascimento v. Dummer, 508 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted). Hence, “[w]here the deficiency in a

notice of appeal, by reason of untimeliness, lack of

essential recitals, or reference to a non-appealable order,

is clear to the district court, it may disregard the

purported notice of appeal and proceed with the case, knowing

that it has not been deprived of jurisdiction.” Ruby v.

Secretary of the Navy, 365 F.2d 385, 388-89 (9th Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). Simply put, “[f]iling an appeal from an

unappealable decision does not divest the district court of

jurisdiction.” U.S. v. Hickey, 580 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.

2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, No. 09-1093, ___ U.S.

___, ___ S.Ct. ___, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, 78 U.S.L.W. 3549 (April

19, 2010). 

Here, it is plain on the face of petitioner’s Notice of

Appeal that it is improper. Not only is it interlocutory,

but petitioner is not appealing an order or judgment of this

court, but rather a “memorandum” by the Clerk of the Court. 

As an aside, the court observes that because that memorandum

is undocketed, the court has no idea as to its content. In

any event, clearly, petitioner’s filing of a Notice of Appeal

after the filing of the pending motions did not divest this

court of jurisdiction to entertain those motions. Having

found that it has jurisdiction, the court will now address

petitioner’s motions. 

II. Motion to “Vacate Void Judgment”

The rambling and oft-times incoherent nature of

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petitioner’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion made it exceedingly

difficult for the court to ascertain exactly what he is

claiming. What is clear though is the nature of the relief

which petitioner Neal is seeking. Petitioner seeks “total

dismissal of all [criminal] charges [against him] along with

an order to vacate the judgment & commitment order and [his]

immediate release from custody[.]” Mot. (doc. 216) at 10-11,

¶ 22.); see also id. at 14, ¶ 2.) (same).

Petitioner styles this motion as one to vacate or void

judgment brought pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). Id.

at 1. That Rule allows, inter alia, a court to “relieve a

party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 

. . . fraud[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). However, given

that petitioner is effectively seeking to vacate or set aside

his sentence, the court construes this a motion brought

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. When it does that, the court

finds that once again, Neal’s “petition was not properly

filed.” Neal I, 2006 WL 2481126, at *1. “Section 2255

provides that a second or successive motion made pursuant to

that section must be certified by a panel of the appropriate

court of appeals to contain newly discovered evidence or a

new rule of constitutional law.” Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255). “Until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals certifies

that a second or successive petition may be filed, this Court

is without jurisdiction to consider Neal's claims.” Id.

(citing United States v. Allen, 157 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir.

1998)). 

As before, petitioner “Neal has made no showing that a

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request for certification was made or that authorization was

granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.” Id.

Therefore, the court denies petitioner’s “Commercial Notice

and Pleadings to Vacate Void Judgment Pursuant to Rule

60(b)(3)[]” based upon lack of jurisdiction. Mot. (doc. 216)

at 1. 

Even if the court were to treat petitioner’s motion as

based upon Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), it would still deny that

motion. Among others, motions brought pursuant to subsection

(b)(3) “must be made . . . no more than a year after the

entry of the judgment or order or the date of the

proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Here, petitioner was

convicted in 1990 and sentenced in 1991. Obviously, this

motion made nearly 20 years after the fact is not timely. 

The court is well aware that Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3)

“does not limit a court’s power . . . to set aside a judgment

for fraud on the court.” The court is equally well aware

that because “‘[f]raud on the court’ is a claim that exists

to protect the integrity of the judicial process,” such a

claim, in contrast to other fraud-based Rule 60(b)(3)

motions, “cannot be time barred.” Bowie v. Maddox, 677

F.Supp.2d 276, 278 (D.C.D. 2010) (citing, inter alia, 12

James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, 

§ 60.21[4][g] & n. 52 (3d ed. 2009)). Thus, insofar as

petitioner Neal’s Rule 60(b)(3) motion can be read as

asserting a fraud upon the court, that aspect of his motion

would not be time barred. 

Nonetheless, that aspect of petitioner’s motion fails on

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2 In Neal I, petitioner asserted that “Denard Darnell Neal is a

‘fictitious-corporate entity,’ thus requiring that all dealings with such entity

[must] comply with the [U.C.C.].” Neal I, 2006 WL 2481126, at *1 (citation

omitted). 

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the merits. The Ninth Circuit “narrowly” construes “the term

‘fraud on the court[.]’” Appling v. State Farm Mut. Auto.

Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 780 (9th Cir. 2003). It “embrace[s]

only that species of fraud which does or attempts to, defile

the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of

the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in

the usual manner its impartial task of adjudicating cases

that are presented for adjudication.” Id. (citation

omitted). Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has so narrowly defined

“fraud on the court” that it does not encompass “[n]ondisclosure, or perjury by a party or witness . . . , by

itself[.]” Id. (citation omitted). “Fraud on the court

requires a ‘grave miscarriage of justice,’ . . . and a fraud

that is aimed at the court.” Id. (quoting United States v.

Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32

(1998)). 

In the present case, petitioner Neal has not provided any

evidence of fraudulent conduct, much less any evidence that

rises to the level of fraud on the court amounting to a

“grave miscarriage of justice.” The bulk of petitioner’s

motion consists largely of nonsensical rambling, with

absolutely no evidentiary basis for support. 

To illustrate, as he has previously, petitioner invokes

the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) for no logical reason.2

This time petitioner repeatedly refers to himself as a

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“Secured Party” in one form or another, and also as a

“Holder-In-Due-Course[.]” See, e.g., Mot. (doc. 216) at 3, 

¶¶ II (4.)); (5.)); (7.)). In a similar and equally

incongruous manner plaintiff further alleges that he was

“arrested . . . and imprisoned without due process . . . for

the sole purpose of being held as surety for an ILLEGAL BOND

AND SECURITIES BEING MARKETED IN THE IDENTITY OF THE

COLLATERAL/DEBTOR DENARD DARNELL NEAL©, the register[ed]

property of the Secured Party-Plaintiff.” Id. at 7, ¶ 12.). 

As is readily apparent, even if the court were to deem

petitioner’s motion as having been brought pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) for fraud on the court, still, the court

would find this motion to be wholly without merit. 

Accordingly, regardless of the type of fraud alleged,

assuming arguendo that petitioner has brought a Rule 60(b)(3)

motion, the court denies that motion altogether. 

III. Change of Venue

In addition to seeking to vacate the judgment against

him, petitioner is seeking an “immediate change of venue to

the Federal District Court” in Anchorage, Alaska. Mot. (doc.

215) at 3, ¶ 2.). Apparently petitioner is basing this

motion upon what he perceives as a “conflict of interest.” 

Mot. (doc. 215). This alleged conflict arises from

petitioner’s wholly unsubstantiated and distorted theory that

“the UNITED STATES ATTORNEY OFFICE IN PHOENIX . . . AND THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT[,] DISTRICT OF ARIZONA[,]

PHOENIX DIVISION IS [sic] PARTIES IN A[N] ON-GOING CRIMINAL

SCHEME . . . [TO] CREATE[] AND MARKET BONDS AND SECURITIES IN

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THE IDENTITY OF SECURED PARTY Denard-Darnell: Neal[.]” Mot.

(doc. 215) (emphasis in original). 

Petitioner cites no statutory or other legal basis for

his motion to change venue, however. Presumably he is

relying upon 28 U.S.C. § 1404, stating in relevant part that

“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the

interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil

action to any other district court . . . where it might have

been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (emphasis added). “The

purpose of § 1404(a) is to prevent the waste of time, energy,

and money and to protect litigants, witnesses and the public

against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Metz v. U.S.

Life Ins. Co. in City of New York, 674 F.Supp.2d 1141, 1145

(C.D.Cal. 2009) (quotations omitted) (citing, inter alia, Van

Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 84 S.Ct. 805, 11 L.Ed.2d 945

(1964)).

“Analysis under § 1404 is two-fold.” Id. “First, the

defendant must establish that the matter ‘might have been

brought’ in the district to which transfer is sought.” Id.

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). “This includes demonstrating

that subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and

venue would have been proper if the plaintiff had filed the

action in the district to which transfer is sought.” Id.

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Second,

courts must consider the following three factors: (1) the

convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the

witnesses; and (3) the interests of justice.” Id. (citing,

inter alia, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)). 

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In the present case, petitioner Neal has not even

attempted to meet the first prong of section 1404(a), i.e.,

that this matter “might have been brought” in the United

States District Court for the District of Alaska. So, there

is no need for the court to proceed to the second prong of

the analysis under section 1404(a). Instead, the court

easily finds that petitioner has not met his burden of

establishing that a change of venue is warranted. 

IV. Status 

The court’s ruling herein denying petitioner Neal’s Rule

60(b)(3) motion renders moot his petitioner’s “request for

the Status and/or adjudication of [his] Rule 60(b)(3)”

motion. Mot. (doc. 217) at 1. Accordingly, the court denies

that request as moot. 

V. IFP Request

Evidently petitioner’s IFP request as to his most recent

Ninth Circuit Appeal was precipitated by an April 19, 2010,

order of that Court noting his failure to pay the required

filing and docketing fees. See United States v. Neal, No.

10-10117 (9th Cir. Apr. 19, 2010) (doc. 4-1). The Ninth

Circuit required petitioner Neal “[w]ithin 21 days after the

date of th[at] order” to pay “the fees to the district court

and provide written proof to th[at] court of having done so

o[r] move for In Forma Pauperis.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Petitioner opted to seek IFP status in this court. 

Given that petitioner Neal was “determined to be

financially unable to obtain an adequate defense in [his]

criminal case,” under certain circumstances, he may “proceed

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on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization[.]”

Fed. R. App. Pro. 24(3)(A). Petitioner’s “Notice of

Interlocutory Appeal” of an undocketed memorandum from the

Clerk of the Court supposedly “refus[ing] to file documents

in the Public Record[,]” (doc. 218), is not taken in “good

faith” as Rule 24(3)(A) requires, however. That appeal is

not taken in good faith because, as already explained,

petitioner is not appealing an order or judgment of this

court, but rather a “memorandum” by the Clerk of the Court. 

Moreover, because that “memorandum” is not docketed and not

otherwise been provided to the court, on the merits, it is

impossible for this court to determine whether this appeal is

taken in good faith. Accordingly, the court certifies that

any appeal of the memorandum from the Clerk of the Court

dated March 2, 2010 would not be taken in good faith. The

court, therefore, denies petitioner’s request for IFP status

with respect to his Notice of Interlocutory Appeal filed on

March 18, 2010. 

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:

(1) Petitioner’s “Request for Immediate Change of Venue”

(doc. 215) is DENIED; 

(2) Petitioner’s “Commercial Notice and Pleadings to

Vacate Void Judgment Pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(3)[]” (doc. 216)

is DENIED; 

(3) Petitioner’s “Request For Status Of Filed

Documents[]” (doc. 217) is DENIED as moot; and

(4) Petitioner’s “Request For Waiver of Costs, Fees, and

Fines[]” (doc. 221) associated with his Notice of Appeal

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filed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 18, 2010

(doc. 218) is DENIED.

DATED this 28th day of April, 2010.

Copies to counsel of record and petitioner pro se

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