Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01715/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01715-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jim Hamlet
Respondent
David Rucker
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DAVID RUCKER,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1715 LKK EFB P

vs.

JIM HAMLET, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 1999 judgment of

conviction entered against him in Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of driving

under the influence of alcohol; driving with a blood alcohol level of .08% or greater, with an

enhancement for driving with a blood alcohol level of .20 or higher; and misdemeanor hit-andrun while driving on the wrong side of the road. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) his

sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; (2) his appellate attorney rendered

ineffective assistance; and (3) his right to due process was violated by the giving of a jury

instruction. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned

recommends that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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I. Procedural Background

By information filed September 4, 1998, petitioner was charged with driving under the

influence of an alcoholic beverage or any drug, in violation of California Vehicle Code 

§ 23152(a) (count one); driving with a blood alcohol level of .08 percent, in violation of

California Vehicle Code § 23152(b) (count two); driving with a suspended license, a

misdemeanor violation of California Vehicle Code § 14601.2(a) (count three); and causing an

accident by driving on the wrong side of the highway and failing to stop and report the accident,

a misdemeanor violation of California Vehicle Code § 20002(a) (count four). Clerk’s Transcript

on Appeal (CT) at 7-11. It was also alleged, as to counts one and two, that petitioner had

suffered three prior convictions for driving under the influence; that petitioner had a blood

alcohol level of 0.20 percent or more; and that petitioner had suffered three prior serious felony

convictions. Id. It was alleged as to all counts that petitioner had suffered three prior serious

felony convictions within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law. Id. 

Prior to trial, count three was severed and count four was renumbered as count three. Id.

at 85, 123; Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 588. After a jury trial, petitioner was

convicted of counts one, two, and three. CT at 131-33. The trial court dismissed the severed

count of driving with a suspended license and found the prior conviction allegations to be true. 

CT at 6, 133; RT at 611. On February 26, 1999, petitioner was sentenced to state prison for

twenty-five years to life. CT at 180. 

On January 25, 2000, petitioner filed an appeal of his conviction. Answer, Ex. B. 

Therein, he claimed that the trial court erred by instructing the jurors with CALJIC No. 17.41.1. 

Id. The California Court of Appeal affirmed petitioner’s judgment of conviction in a reasoned

decision dated March 20, 2001. Answer, Ex. E. On May 9, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for

review in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. F. That petition was summarily denied by

order dated June 13, 2001. Answer, Ex. G. On March 20, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for 

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writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. H. That petition was denied

by order dated May 13, 2002. Answer, Ex. I. 

On October 29, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Sacramento County Superior Court. Answer, Ex. J. Therein, he claimed that his sentence

constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Id. That petition was denied as untimely and on the

merits. Answer, Ex. K. On December 2, 2002, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California Court of Appeal, in which he claimed that his sentence constituted cruel

and unusual punishment and that his appellate attorney rendered ineffective assistance. Answer,

Ex. L. That petition was summarily denied by order dated December 5, 2002. Answer, Ex. M. 

On December 17, 2002, petitioner raised the same claims in a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed in the California Supreme Court. Answer, Ex. N. That petition was summarily denied by

order dated July 16, 2003. Answer, Ex. O. 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus on August 14, 2003.

II. Factual Background

On May 25, 1998, Michael Freas lived at 4813 Monet Way in Sacramento County. RT at

83. At approximately 3:55 a.m., Mr. Freas heard a loud crash in front of his house. Id. at 86. 

He jumped out of bed and ran out of the house to see what had happened. Id. He saw that his

three-quarter ton pickup truck was in the middle of the street with a Chevy S-10 Blazer “plowed

into the side of it.” Id. at 87. He approached the Blazer and helped petitioner exit from the

passenger side door. Id. at 90, 93-94. The Blazer smelled of vomit and alcohol. Id. at 95. 

When Mr. Freas first saw petitioner, he was coming across the console between the driver’s seat

and the passenger’s seat. Id. at 93. Petitioner was “incoherent to his surroundings and what had

happened.” Id. at 94. He stood for approximately 30 seconds and then “staggered” down the

street without saying anything to Mr. Freas. Id. at 95-96. Freas yelled at petitioner that he had

just hit his truck. Id. at 95. He then went back into his house and called 911. Id. at 96. Mr.

Freas did not see anyone other than petitioner on the street. Id. at 98.

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Claudia Delchiaro, a neighbor of Mr. Freas, was awakened by a loud crash. Id. at 139. 

She went outside and saw that a vehicle had crashed into Mr. Freas’ truck. Id. at 140. She did

not see anyone in the vicinity. Id. Ms. Delchiaro went back into her house and called 911. Id. at

140-41. She then went back outside to see if anyone was hurt. Id. at 142. She observed that the

driver’s side door of the Blazer couldn’t open because it was too close to the truck. Id. at 144. 

She went around to the passenger’s side door and opened it. Id. She noticed a smell of alcoholic

vomit. Id. There was vomit “all over the driver’s side door on the window, on the steering

wheel and even into the dashboard, and all over the floor of the driver’s side.” Id. at 145. There

was no vomit on the console or the passenger seat. Id. at 159.

Several officers from the highway patrol and the sheriff’s department went to the scene

of the accident. Id. at 165-66, 195, 198, 447-48. Officer Walker testified that there was less than

two inches between the driver’s door of the Blazer and the bed of the pickup truck, and that it

would not have been possible for a person to exit the vehicle from the driver’s side. Id. at 176-

77. 

The registered owner of the Blazer was Kimyette Rucker. Id. at 199. Officers went to

her residence. Id. Petitioner was asleep on the bed. Id. at 199-200. The officers woke

petitioner up and noticed that he smelled of alcohol, had red and glassy eyes, and “slurred and

mumbled and thick tongue speech.” Id. at 200. Petitioner had a blood alcohol level of .22 at

5:43 a.m. and .21 at 5:57 a.m. Id. at 223. Petitioner had an unsatisfactory performance on one

field sobriety test and stated that he could not complete three others. Id. at 202. Petitioner was

then arrested, taken to jail, and placed in a cell with a telephone. Id. at 177-78, 181-82. 

Petitioner informed the officers that he was not the driver of the vehicle. Id. at 209. He stated

that he had been drinking since the night before, and that Allison Ruiz had dropped him off at his

home before the accident occurred. Id. at 209-10. 

Officer Michael Ketterer contacted Allison Ruiz at approximately 6:35 a.m. Id. at 210. 

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He told her that he was investigating an accident involving petitioner. Id. at 211. She stated that

she and petitioner had been together the evening before and that they had each gone home in

separate vehicles. Id. at 211-13. Officer Walker overheard the conversation between Officer

Ketterer and Ms. Ruiz. Id. at 180. He told petitioner that another officer was talking with Ms.

Ruiz on the telephone and that petitioner’s story did not “jibe” with what Ms. Ruiz was saying. 

Id. Subsequently, Ms. Ruiz interrupted her call with Officer Ketterer. Id. at 213-14. When she

came back on the line, she was “uncooperative” and refused to answer questions. Id. at 216. 

Officer Ketterer asked her if she had been talking with petitioner. Id. at 216-17. She did not

respond. Id.

At petitioner’s trial, Ms. Ruiz testified that petitioner was her boyfriend. Id. at 359-60. 

She stated that on the day preceding the accident, she and petitioner were drinking and visiting

various people, including petitioner’s sister. Id. at 366-67, 369-74. Sometime between 3:00 and

4:00 a.m., she and petitioner left in the Blazer to go back to the home of petitioner’s wife. Id. at

374, 376. Ruiz was driving. Id. at 376. While they were driving, petitioner leaned toward Ruiz

and vomited. Id. At that same moment, she hit the truck. Id. at 377, 378-79. Petitioner told her

to leave, so she got out of the car on the driver’s side and ran off. Id. at 382-83, 384-89, 395. 

From a nearby mall, she called her friend FeOrriah Jones, who picked her up and took her home. 

Id. at 396-401.

Ms. Ruiz also testified that during her conversation with Officer Ketterer, she put him on

hold to take a call from petitioner. Id. at 408, 410. A tape of the telephone conversation

between Ms. Ruiz and petitioner was played to petitioner’s jury. Id. at 417. During the

conversation, petitioner told Ruiz several times that she “drove [him] over there.” Id. When

Ruiz asked petitioner why the police were calling her, he responded “Cause I said you – you’re

the one that brought me home.” Id.

FeOrriah Jones testified for the defense. Id. at 290. She stated that she was with

petitioner, Ms. Ruiz, and a group of their friends the evening preceding the accident. Id. at 291. 

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Everyone was drinking. Id. Ms. Jones left sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. Id. At some

point before dawn, Ms. Ruiz paged her and asked for a ride home. Id. at 292. Jones picked up

Ruiz and took her home. Id. at 292-93. Ms. Ruiz was “raggedy” and smelled of vomit. Id. 

Carolyn Howard, petitioner’s sister, also testified for the defense. Id. at 461. She stated

that when Ms. Ruiz and petitioner left her house at 4:00 a.m., Ruiz was driving the Blazer. Id. at

462-63. 

III. Analysis

A. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas

court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

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clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not

enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a

‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court reaches a

decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Cruel and Unusual Punishment

Petitioner contends that his sentence of twenty-five years to life under California’s Three

Strikes law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Petitioner raised this claim for the first

time in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the California Superior Court. The

Superior Court rejected this argument on the merits and on the ground that the petition was

untimely filed pursuant to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 774-75 (1993). With respect to its decision

on the merits of petitioner’s claim, the court reasoned as follows:

Nor do the recent Ninth Circuit decisions remove the Clark bar to

the claim. Neither Andrade nor Brown need be followed at this

time, as they are not binding on this court (People v. Bradley

(1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86; see also Etcheverry v. Tri-Ag Service, Inc.

(2000) 22 Cal.4th 320, 321 [reaffirming Bradley rule]). Indeed,

Andrade has been granted certiorari by the United States Supreme

Court. Until the United States Supreme Court concludes

otherwise, this court is bound under Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455, to reach the opposite

conclusion than that reached in Andrade and Brown, as the Fourth

District Court of Appeal, Division One (People v. Mantanez

(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354) and the Fourth District, Division Two

(People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418) have both

specifically rejected Andrade and Brown and upheld California’s

“Three Strikes” law against just such a cruel and unusual

punishment attack.

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Nor does petitioner, in any event, demonstrate that the facts in his

case are exactly that of the defendants in Andrade or Brown, which

involved current offenses of petty theft with a prior. Petitioner, in

contrast, was convicted of felony driving under the influence,

having been previously convicted three times of driving under the

influence offenses. That is qualitatively different, as human lives

are endangered by drunk drivers on the road, a much more serious

and threatening problem to society than mere petty theft. And, by

the time it has become a fourth violation, it is clearly a significant

recidivism problem.

Nor does petitioner bear any similarity to the defendants in

Andrade and Brown with regard to his past criminal history, which

includes prior convictions of rape, conspiracy, and spousal abuse. 

Andrade and Brown purportedly had no history of violence against

other persons.

Thus, even if Andrade and Brown were to be controlling new law,

which neither is, petitioner would not be entitled to relief under

either, even if the claim were not barred by Clark.

Answer, Ex. K.

In Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003), the United States Supreme Court found that

in addressing an Eighth Amendment challenge to a prison sentence, the “only relevant clearly

established law amenable to the ‘contrary to’ or ‘unreasonable application of’ framework is the

gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear and applicable only

in the ‘exceedingly rare’ and ‘extreme’ case.” Id. at 73 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.

957, 1001 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); and Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S.

263, 272 (1980)). See also Taylor v. Lewis, 460 F.3d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 2006). The Supreme

Court in Andrade concluded that two consecutive twenty-five years to life sentences with the

possibility of parole, imposed under California's Three Strikes law following two petty theft

convictions with priors, did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 538 U.S. at 77; see

also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (holding that a sentence of twenty-five years to life

imposed for felony grand theft under California's Three Strikes law did not violate the Eighth

Amendment). 

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 A “wobbler” is an offense that can be punished as either a misdemeanor or a felony

under applicable law. See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1051 (9th Cir. 2004).

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Following the decision in Andrade, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit held that a third strike sentence of twenty-five years to life in prison for a third

shoplifting offense, a “wobbler” under state law, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. 

Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755 (9th Cir. 2004).1

 In so holding, the court relied upon the

limited and non-violent nature of the petitioner’s prior criminal history and the fact that the

petitioner’s only prior period of incarceration had been a single one-year jail sentence. Id. at

768-69. Thereafter, in Rios v. Garcia, 390 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2004), the court distinguished the

holding in Ramirez from the situation it confronted, finding that the petitioner in Rios had a

“lengthy criminal history,” had “been incarcerated several times,” and that the prior strikes used

to enhance the petitioner’s sentence had “involved the threat of violence.” Id. at 1086.

This court finds that in this case petitioner’s sentence does not fall within the type of

“exceedingly rare” circumstance that would support a finding that his sentence violates the

Eighth Amendment. As noted by the California Superior Court, petitioner’s current offense of

conviction involved a high degree of danger to other persons and was the fourth such conviction. 

Petitioner had also suffered prior convictions for violent crimes, including rape and spousal

abuse. See Reporter’s Transcript of Judgment and Sentence at 13-14. In addition, petitioner

apparently served a prior prison sentence in the California Youth Authority. Answer, Ex. N at 3. 

Under these circumstances, the state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim

was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. This

claim for relief must therefore be denied.

2. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

Petitioner’s next claim is that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 

Petitioner informs the court that he suggested to appellate counsel several claims that should be

raised on appeal, such as a claim that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 

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Pet. at 5, 9. Counsel responded to petitioner’s suggestions in a letter, in which she explained

why she decided not to raise each of petitioner’s suggested issues. Id. at 25. Counsel explained

that, “in [her] professional judgment,” the claim she raised in the opening brief “raises the only

appealable issue present in your case.” Id. 

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United States

Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. See, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption

that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in

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addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

The Strickland standards apply to appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. Smith v.

Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 535-36 (1986); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

However, an indigent defendant “does not have a constitutional right to compel appointed

counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by the client, if counsel, as a matter of

professional judgment, decides not to present those points.” Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751

(1983). Counsel “must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed.” Id. Otherwise, the

ability of counsel to present the client’s case in accord with counsel’s professional evaluation

would be “seriously undermined.” Id. See also Smith v. Stewart, 140 F.3d 1263, 1274 n.4 (9th

Cir. 1998) (Counsel is not required to file “kitchen-sink briefs” because it “is not necessary, and

is not even particularly good appellate advocacy.”) There is, of course, no obligation to raise

meritless arguments on a client’s behalf. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 (requiring a

showing of deficient performance as well as prejudice). Thus, counsel is not deficient for failing

to raise a weak issue. See Miller, 882 F.2d at 1434. In order to establish prejudice in this

context, petitioner must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he probably would have

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 1434 n.9. 

The letter from petitioner’s appellate counsel, described above, makes clear that counsel

reviewed the trial record and concluded that all of the claims suggested by petitioner, including

an Eighth Amendment claim related to the length of his sentence, lacked merit and should not be

raised on appeal. As described above, this court has also concluded that petitioner’s Eighth

Amendment claim lacks merit. Appellate counsel’s decision to press a claim with arguably more

merit than the claims suggested by petitioner was "within the range of competence demanded of

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attorneys in criminal cases." McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). Further, 

petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he would have prevailed if his appellate counsel had

raised any of his other suggested claims. He has therefore failed to establish prejudice.

The state courts’ rejection of petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Strickland. Accordingly, petitioner

is not entitled to relief on this claim.

3. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner’s jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, which provides as follows:

The integrity of a trial requires that jurors, at all times during their

deliberations, conduct themselves as required by these instructions. 

Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or

expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case

based on [penalty or punishment, or] any [other] improper basis, it

is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the

Court of the situation.

CT at 117. Petitioner claims that this jury instruction violated his right to due process because it

“impinged upon Petitioner’s sixth and fourteenth amendment rights to a unanimous jury and to a

jury free to use its power of nullification.” Pet. at 6. Petitioner contends that the instruction may

improperly induce the majority to pressure a holdout minority juror to change his vote or

persuade the trial court to dismiss such a juror. Id. at 9-10. He argues that he “had a right to the

verdict of a unanimous jury without any undue pressures from the court. That right was abridged

in this case because the challenged instruction coerced potential holdout jurors into agreeing

with the majority.” Id. at 9. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected this claim on the basis that it was waived

because petitioner’s counsel failed to object to the instruction. Answer, Ex. E at 3-4. The

appellate court also concluded that the instruction was harmless in any event. The court

explained its reasoning as follows:

In this case, there was no report that a juror had expressed an

intention to disregard the law. Nor is there any suggestion in the

record that any juror was displeased with the law. Nor is there

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anything about the facts of this case – driving under the influence,

which resulted in a Chevrolet Blazer crashing into a parked Ford

ranger pickup – that would give rise to a desire to disregard the

law. We note that the trial court ordered that no mention be made

that defendant could be sentenced in this case pursuant to the

Three Strikes law, and defendant waived his right to have the jury

decide whether he had sustained prior convictions within the

meaning of the Three Strikes law. Accordingly, the jury was not

aware of the Three Strikes issue, and thus it cannot be argued that

a juror might wish to disregard the law on that basis.

In sum, nothing in the record indicates that the verdicts were

affected by the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1, even assuming that

the standard under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17

L.Ed.2d 705], applies. (See People v. Molina, supra, 82

Cal.App.4th at p. 1335.)

Indeed, the verdicts were reached within a day and a half after

deliberations commenced, with no indication of deadlock or

holdout jurors. Specifically, jury deliberations were conducted on

January 12 and 13, 1999. The clerk’s minutes of January 12

reflect that jurors began to deliberate at 8:30 a.m., concluded

deliberations at 4:30 p.m., and at some point, requested the court

reporter to read back the entire testimony of Officer Ketterer, and

to read back “anybody’s testimony re[garding]: distance between

Blazer driver door and Ford. Focus on driver’s door ability to

open or not open.” The clerk’s minutes of January 13 reflect that

the jury began deliberating at 9:00 a.m., and at 1:45 p.m., it

requested to review Vehicle Code section 21650 (driving on the

wrong side of the road). At 2:30 p.m., it announced to the court a

verdict had been reached, finding defendant guilty on all counts.

We reject as speculation defendant’s argument that the instruction

had a chilling effect on the jurors’ deliberations, given defendant’s

failure to point to any evidence that would suggest or support any

such potential chill. Defendant’s argument that the “instruction

coerced potential holdout jurors into agreeing with the majority” is

also speculation in light of the absence of any holdout jurors. And

defendant’s contention that the instruction erroneously directed the

jury “that it must not engage in jury nullification” cannot establish

prejudice where there is no evidence of any interest in engaging in

nullification.

Accordingly, we find that any error in giving the instruction was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California,

supra, 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].)

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 After the state appellate court issued this decision, the California California Supreme

Court held that CALJIC No. 17.41.1 “does not infringe upon defendant's federal or state

constitutional right to trial by jury or his state constitutional right to a unanimous verdict.” 

People v. Engelman, 28 Cal. 4th 436, 439-40 (2002). However, using its supervisory authority

over the lower state courts, the Supreme Court discontinued the use of CALJIC No. 17.41.1

because of its "potential" to intrude on jury deliberations. Id. at 440.

14

Id. at 5-7.2

Petitioner’s claim for relief is foreclosed by the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals in Brewer v. Hall, 378 F.3d 952, 955-57 (9th Cir. 2004). In Brewer, the Ninth Circuit

held that, regardless of the "constitutional merits" of CALJIC No. 17.41.1, habeas corpus relief

was unavailable on the identical claim presented by petitioner here because there is "no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishing" that use of this jury instruction violates a defendant's

constitutional rights. Id. at 955-56. Here, as in Brewer, petitioner "has pointed to no Supreme

Court precedent clearly establishing that CALJIC 17.41.1--either on its face or as applied to the

facts of his case--violated his constitutional rights." Id. at 957. Thus, the state court's rejection

of petitioner's jury instruction claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly

established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Even if the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1, the error

was harmless under the circumstances of this case. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,

623 (1993) (holding that a federal court may not grant habeas relief for trial errors without a

showing of actual prejudice, defined as a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict”). As noted by the California Court of Appeal, the jury in

petitioner’s case quickly reached a verdict without apparent difficulty. There is no evidence that

any juror wished to engage in jury nullification or that any juror was a “holdout” for acquittal. 

There is simply no indication that the giving of CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in this case chilled the

jurors’ exercise of free speech or prevented free and full deliberations. Accordingly, petitioner is

not entitled to relief on this claim.

////

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For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within twenty days

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: April 19, 2007.

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