Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00535/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cr-00535-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Napoleon Flores-Arvizu
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

Napoleon Flores-Arvizu, 

Defendant. 

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CR-05-0535-PHX-NVW

ORDER

I. Background

On April 12, 2006, Defendant Flores-Arvizu pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). After being sentenced to thirty

months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release on July 7, 2006,

Defendant appealed. On July 20, 2007, while his appeal was pending, Defendant was

released from prison and deported from the United States. Apparently neither counsel

informed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that the Defendant had been released and

deported. On March 27, 2008, the Ninth Circuit entered judgment vacating the sentence

and remanding for re-sentencing because the government had not satisfied its burden of

establishing the basis for a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). (Doc.

# 59). The formal mandate accompanying the judgment was filed by the clerk at the

Ninth Circuit on April 21, 2008. The mandate was received by the government on April

22, 2008, and by defense counsel on April 24, 2008. It is unknown whether the Clerk of

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Re-sentencing following vacation and remand is to be distinguished from resentencing following remand to correct or reduce the sentence under Rule 35 of the Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the former requires the defendant’s presence, the latter

does not. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b)(4); United States v. Arrous, 320 F.3d 355, 359-60 (2d Cir.

2003); United States v. Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1991). In this case, because

the sentence was vacated, Defendant’s presence at re-sentencing is required.

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this Court did not receive the mandate or received it and somehow failed to file it. In any

event, there is no record of the mandate being received and it was not filed. Neither

counsel contacted this Court concerning re-sentencing pursuant to the mandate they had

received. The Clerk of this Court discovered the missing mandate in the course of a

general audit of cases on appeal in July 2009. Another copy of the mandate was then

obtained and entered on the district court docket July 28, 2009. Before then, this Court

was not aware of it. 

Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a defendant to be

present at sentencing, but attempts to contact Defendant for re-sentencing have been

unsuccessful. The government and defense counsel propose different resolutions of this

case in light of Defendant’s absence. In its Memorandum Regarding Affirmation of

Sentence (doc. # 61), the government proposes affirming the original sentence without

prejudice to Defendant’s motion to vacate the sentence if and when he returns to the

United States. In Defendant’s Memorandum Regarding Re-Sentencing (doc. # 63),

defense counsel suggest either that the government dismiss the case outright or that the

case be continued indefinitely until Defendant returns to the United States. For the

reasons set forth below, all this Court can do is advise the parties to seek an amendment

of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. 

II. Analysis

A. Presence Required

A defendant must be present at sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a)(3). This

requirement extends to re-sentencing proceedings following vacation and remand.1

 See

United States v. Plancarte-Alvarez, 366 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.

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Moree, 928 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. McClintic, 606 F.2d 827, 828

(8th Cir. 1979). In a noncapital case, a defendant’s voluntary absence waives his right to

be present at sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(c)(B). However, where a defendant has

been deported, his absence is involuntary. See United States v. Arrous, 320 F.3d 355, 360

(2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Suleiman, 208 F.3d 32, 40 (2d Cir. 2000). Here, because

the sentence was vacated and remanded, Defendant’s presence is required at resentencing. Defendant has not waived his right to be present, because his absence due to

deportation is involuntary. Therefore, Defendant’s presence is required at the resentencing proceeding.

B. Resolution

This case presents conflicting obligations. On the one hand, the Ninth Circuit has

vacated the sentence and remanded the case for re-sentencing, a mandate this Court is

obligated to follow. On the other hand, re-sentencing cannot proceed without

Defendant’s presence. Both the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit have previously

anticipated this dilemma and ruled accordingly in two cases where the defendant had

already been deported at the time of the appellate ruling. See Plancarte-Alvarez, 366

F.3d at 1065; Suleiman, 208 F.3d at 40. In Suleiman, the Second Circuit decided that the

district court had erroneously refused to enhance the defendant’s sentence, but noted that

the defendant’s absence due to deportation would impede the re-sentencing. 208 F.3d at

34. The Second Circuit’s solution was to affirm the judgment of the district court without

prejudice to an application by the government to the district court to vacate the judgment

and re-sentence the defendant if and when he returns to the United States. Id. at 41. The

Second Circuit decided that this solution would best avoided “undesirable and

mischievous results,” including leaving the case on the district court’s calendar for an

indefinite period during which the defendant could argue that his sentence had been

vacated. Id. 

In Plancarte-Alvarez, with facts very similar to Suleiman, the Ninth Circuit

expressly adopted the Second Circuit’s solution. Ordinarily, the court would have

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vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. 366 F.3d at 1065. However,

because the court was aware that defendant was absent due to deportation and could not

be re-sentenced, the court affirmed the sentence without prejudice to an application by the

government to the district court to vacate the sentence and re-sentence the defendant if

and when he returns to the United States. Id. 

In this case, however, the Ninth Circuit has vacated the sentence and remanded for

re-sentencing, presumably because the court was not informed that Defendant had already

been deported. Therefore, this Court squarely faces the very conflict that was avoided in

Suleiman and Plancarte-Alvarez. The district courts in United States v. Arrous, 320 F.3d

355 (2d Cir. 2003), and United States v. Londono, 100 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1996), faced the

same conflict, but resolved it in different ways. In Arrous, the Second Circuit had

previously vacated the sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. 320 F.3d at 357. By the

time the case was remanded, however, the defendant had served his full sentence and had

been deported. Id. at 357-58. After attempts to contact the defendant proved

unsuccessful, the district court re-sentenced the defendant despite his absence, prompting

defense counsel to appeal. Id. at 358. On appeal, the Second Circuit held that the district

court erred in re-sentencing the defendant in his absence, but nevertheless upheld the new

sentence because the error was harmless. Id. at 361. The court’s decision was based on

the fact that the new sentence was less onerous than the original sentence and that the

defendant’s presence at re-sentencing would have made no difference to the sentence. Id. 

In Londono, the Second Circuit had previously vacated the sentence and remanded

for re-sentencing, but was unaware of the defendant’s deportation at the time the sentence

was vacated. 100 F.3d at 237. Rather than re-sentencing the defendant in his absence,

the district court issued an opinion explaining that the Second Circuit’s mandate could not

be enforced due to the defendant’s absence and deciding that, by vacating the sentence,

the Second Circuit had nullified the conviction. Id. The district court’s “final

disposition” involved placing the case on the fugitive calendar pending the defendant’s

return to the United States. Id. at 240. The Second Circuit recalled its mandate,

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reinstated the district court’s erroneous sentence, remanded for correction of the sentence

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35, and vacated the portion of the district court’s opinion directing

the clerk to remove the case from the active calendar. Id. at 242. Although the district

court’s opinion ultimately led to a resolution of the case, the Second Circuit took issue

with the fact that the district court’s failure to suggest that the parties seek an amendment

of the mandate and with the parties’ failure to inform the Second Circuit of the

defendant’s deportation prior to issuance of the district court’s opinion. Id. at 242. 

In this case, although re-sentencing Defendant in his absence will likely be

harmless error in light of the fact that the new sentence will not be more onerous than the

original sentence, the Court should not knowingly err. Therefore, the district court’s

solution in Arrous is rejected. The government’s solution, which is to affirm the sentence

without prejudice to an application by Defendant to vacate the sentence, is also flawed,

because the sentence has been vacated. More importantly, affirming the sentence would

be contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s mandate. Defense counsel’s suggestion that the case be

continued indefinitely pending Defendant’s return to the United States is not sensible

because there is no reason to think the Defendant will return to the United States or

surrender himself for resentencing if he does. This Court’s hands are tied. All it can do is

follow the guidance of the Second Circuit in Londono and advise the parties to seek an

amendment of the Ninth Circuit’s mandate in light of the fact that Defendant cannot be

re-sentenced in his absence. A possible solution would be for the Ninth Circuit to affirm

the sentence without prejudice to an application by Defendant to this Court to vacate the

sentence and impose a new sentence should he ever return to the United States, as was

done in Plancarte-Alvarez. 

/ / /

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the parties consider seeking an amendment to

the Ninth Circuit’s mandate in light of the fact that this Court cannot re-sentence

Defendant in his absence.

DATED this 11th day of December, 2009.

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