Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-02-02990/USCOURTS-ca8-02-02990-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Russell Rhines
Appellee
Douglas Weber
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 02-2990

___________

Charles Russell Rhines, *

*

Petitioner - Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Douglas Weber, Warden, South Dakota *

State Penitentiary, * [TO BE PUBLISHED]

*

Respondent - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 10, 2005

Filed: June 6, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

South Dakota inmate Charles Russell Rhines petitioned for a federal writ of

habeas corpus. The district court determined that the “mixed” petition included eight

unexhausted claims and that non-futile state court remedies may be available. To

avoid federal claims becoming time-barred while Rhines exhausted his state court

remedies, the court stayed all claims pending exhaustion provided Rhines commenced

state court exhaustion proceedings within sixty days and returned to federal court

within sixty days of completing exhaustion. Respondent appealed, and we reversed,

concluding that our decision in Akins v. Kenney, 341 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2003),

Appellate Case: 02-2990 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/06/2005 Entry ID: 1911642
-2-

“precludes the district court from staying Rhines’s exhausted claims while he seeks

state post-conviction relief on other claims that may be unexhausted.” Rhines v.

Weber, 346 F.3d 799, 800 (8th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court granted Rhines’s

petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits. The Court has

vacated our judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its

opinion in Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005). For the following reasons, we

remand to the district court.

In Rhines, the Court held that the stay and abeyance procedure adopted by the

district court was within the court’s authority but should be available “only in limited

circumstances.” 125 S. Ct. at 1535. The Court remanded, instructing us “to

determine, consistent with this opinion, whether the District Court’s grant of a stay

in this case constituted an abuse discretion.” Id. at 1535-36. The Court’s opinion

provided the following guidance:

[S]tay and abeyance is only appropriate when the district court

determines there was good cause for the petitioner’s failure to exhaust

his claims first in state court. Moreover, even if a petitioner had good

cause for that failure, the district court would abuse its discretion if it

were to grant him a stay when his unexhausted claims are plainly

meritless.

* * * * *

Even where stay and abeyance is appropriate . . . [a] mixed

petition should not be stayed indefinitely. . . . Thus, district courts

should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner’s trip to state court

and back. . . . And if a petitioner engages in abusive litigation tactics or

intentional delay, the district court should not grant him a stay at all.

Id. at 1535. 

Appellate Case: 02-2990 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/06/2005 Entry ID: 1911642
-3-

In this case, the district court granted a stay without the benefit of this

controlling Supreme Court guidance. Thus, the court did not (i) analyze each

unexhausted claim to determine whether Rhines had good cause for failing to exhaust

the claim and whether it is potentially meritorious, and (ii) consider whether Rhines

has engaged in “abusive litigation tactics or intentional delay.” In addition, the

district court gave Rhines sixty days to commence state court proceedings and sixty

days to return to federal court after completing exhaustion, whereas the Supreme

Court in discussing this issue quoted from a Second Circuit opinion noting that an

appropriate interval is “normally 30 days.” 125 S. Ct. at 1535, quoting Zarvela v.

Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 381 (2d Cir. 2001).

In these circumstances, we conclude that we should not review the stay order

for abuse of discretion until the district court has considered these issues in the first

instance. Accordingly, the district court’s order of July 3, 2002, is vacated and the

case is remanded for further consideration in light of the Supreme Court’s decision

in Rhines v. Weber, 125 S. Ct. 1528 (2005).

______________________________ 

Appellate Case: 02-2990 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/06/2005 Entry ID: 1911642