Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01677/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-01677-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JoAnne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Dana Collins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 It is not clear from the record whether plaintiff was acting pro se when she applied for disability

benefits in 1995. She was represented by counselwith respect to the appealofher 1998 application, and the

record contains an Appointment of Representative dated October 1998.

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DANA COLLINS,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JOANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-01677 SI

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,

DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

REMANDING CASE

On April 29, 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint with this Court seeking judicial review of the

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision not to reopen a 1995 Social Security disability insurance benefits

(DIB) application. Plaintiff has filed a motion for summary judgment, and defendant has filed a cross motion

for summary judgment. After reviewing the parties’ original summary judgment briefs, the Court ordered

supplemental briefing on several issues. Having carefully considered the papers submitted, the Court hereby

GRANTS plaintiff’s motion, DENIES defendant’s motion, and REMANDS forfurther proceedings consistent

with this order.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff allegesthatshe filed a DIB application 1995, claiming that she had been disabled since 1991,

but the applicationwas denied. Administrative Transcript (“Tr.”) at 7, 11. Plaintiff did not seek reconsideration

or otherwise appeal that denial. Plaintiff states she did notseek review ofthe 1995 decision because she was

suffering from psychological problems at the time. Tr. 11.1

Case 3:04-cv-01677-SI Document 17 Filed 11/08/05 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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OnFebruary 12, 1998, plaintifffiled another DIB application, again claiming thatshe had beendisabled

since 1991. Tr. 78-81. Plaintiff has been diagnosed with depression caused by anxiety disorders as well as

borderline personality traits. Tr. 201-03, 224. On May 14, 1998, her application was initially denied. Tr. 33.

Plaintiff then petitioned the ALJ for a hearing on her disability status. Tr. 56. The ALJ dismissed her request

for a lack of jurisdiction because plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative procedures by not filing for a

reconsideration determination, and remanded to the districtofficeofthe SocialSecurityAdministration(“SSA”)

for reconsideration. Tr. 57-60. Thereafter, on January 13, 2000, the SSA issued a determination, after

undertaking reconsideration, that plaintiff has been disabled since December 31, 1992. Tr. 61-62. 

On March 13, 2000, plaintiffrequested a hearing to reopen the 1995 DIB application. Tr. 63. Plaintiff

made multiple requests to the SSA to locate the 1995 DIB application. Tr. 14-15. In a decision dated

September 5, 2003, ALJ Parks dismissed plaintiff’s request for a hearing on her request to reopen the 1995

application. Tr. 18. The ALJ stated:

The claimant was awarded benefits based on an application filed on February 12, 1998 with

an onset date of December 31, 1992. The claimant alleges a prior 1995 claim should have

been reopened. Although, there is no record of reconsideration on the 1995 [application], it

appears it could have been reopened. The problem is that new and material evidence of the

1995 Application is insufficient. No existing record reflects a claim was processed on

February 22, 1995. . . . 

After reviewing the case, I order a dismissal because no greater relief can be granted by

reopening [the] 1995 Application. Therefore, the request for reopening is hereby denied and

dismissed without the necessity of a hearing since no new and material [evidence] could be

presented at any hearing.

Id. The Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, see Tr. 5-6, and now plaintiff seeks judicial

review. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in concluding that “no greater relief can be granted” by reopening

the 1995 application because ifthat applicationwere reopened, she would be entitled to approximately 3 more

years ofdisability benefits. Plaintiff also contends that the SSA never responded to any of her multiple letters

requesting the SSA to look for her 1995 application, and that SSA denied her due process by failing and

refusing to look for the application.

Case 3:04-cv-01677-SI Document 17 Filed 11/08/05 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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 Section 404.621(a) provides, “If you file an application for disability benefits . . . you may receive

benefits for up to 12 months immediately before the month in which your application is filed.”

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DISCUSSION

1. Jurisdiction

The parties dispute whether this Court has jurisdictionover plaintiff’s appeal. In Evans v.Chater, 110

F.3d 1480 (9th Cir. 1997), the Ninth Circuit held that a district court has jurisdictionto review a decision not

to reopen a prior, final benefits decision ifthe claimant raises a colorable constitutional claim that (1) relates to

the manner or means by which the SSA decided not to reopen a prior decision, or (2)implicates a due process

right either to a meaningful opportunity to be heard or to seek reconsideration of an adverse benefits

determination in connection with the application that the claimant seeks to reopen. Id. at 1483. 

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s decision not to reopen the 1995

application. Plaintiff has asserted a colorable due process violation because she alleges that the ALJ made an

error of law by denying her request on the ground that she would be entitled to the same amount of benefits

under the 1995 application as she was receiving under the 1998 application. See Panages v. Bowen, 871

F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1989). The Court also notes that plaintiff states that she did not appeal the denial of her

1995 application because she was suffering from psychologicalproblems at the time, and the record is unclear

whether plaintiff was proceeding pro se at the time. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that these factors are also

sufficient to assert a colorable constitutional claim. See Evans, 110 F.3d at 1483. 

2. Merits

The Court notes that in the initial round of summary judgment briefing, defendant contended that the

ALJ was correct and that plaintiff would receive no greater benefits under the 1995 application than under the

1998 application. Although plaintiff contended in her briefs that she would be entitled to additional benefits

under the 1995 application, she did not provide authority for this contention. After the Court located a

regulationwhich appeared to support plaintiff’s position (20 C.F.R. § 404.621(a))2, the Court directed further

briefing on the benefit onset date under the 1998 application, and whether 20 C.F.R. § 404.621(a) limited the

retroactivity of disability insurance benefits to 12 months prior to the date of application.

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In making a determination whether good cause exists to reopen the 1995 application, the SSA will

necessarily be required to search for documentation that the 1995 applicationwas actually filed. Accordingly,

the Court need notreach plaintiff’s contention that SSA’s failure to search for the 1995 application constituted

a due process violation. 

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In its supplemental brief, defendant now acknowledges that Section 404.621(a) applies and that the

benefit onset date under the 1998 application is February 1997. Thus, if the SSA had reopened plaintiff’s

application, she would have received approximately 3 more years of additionalretroactive benefits. See Rolen

v. Barnhart, 273 F.3d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The Court concludes that the ALJ committed an error of law in dismissing plaintiff’srequest to reopen

the 1995 application because the dismissalwas based on an incorrect application ofSection 404.621(a). See

Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 1987). Because the SSA may reopen the 1995

application “for good cause,” the Court REMANDS for a determination whether such good cause exists. 20

C.F.R. § 404.988(b). The Court notes that it appears such good cause would exist given that SSA has already

concluded that plaintiff was disabled as ofDecember 1992, and in light of plaintiff’s statement that she did not

seek review of the 1995 application because of her psychological problems.3 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiff’s motion

for summary judgment, DENIES defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and REMANDS for a

determination on whether plaintiff’s 1995 application should be reopened.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November ___, 2005

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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