Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00401/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00401-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kia C. Chevalier
Plaintiff
Oakland Sutter Hotel, L.P.
Defendant
Sutter Hotel
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIA C. CHEVALIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND SUTTER HOTEL, L.P. dba

Sutter Hotel,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-0401 MMC (EMC)

ORDER CONDITIONALLY GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL

(Docket No. 38)

Currently pending before the Court is Defendant’s motion to compel. Having reviewed the

parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby conditionally GRANTS

Defendant’s motion and RECOMMENDS to the presiding judge that the appeal taken by Plaintiff

be certified as frivolous.

I. DISCUSSION

The parties do not dispute that the discovery sought by Defendant is relevant. Plaintiff’s

main claim is that Defendant’s motion to compel is unnecessary because she has already expressed

to Defendant her willingness to produce documents, to supplement her interrogatory responses, and

to appear for a deposition. 

Although Plaintiff may be willing to provide the discovery sought, the fact remains that it

has been almost a month since her opposition and still no documents have been produced, no

supplemental responses have been served, and no deposition has taken place. Accordingly, the

Court does not find the motion to compel unnecessary. Furthermore, contrary to Plaintiff’s

Case 3:07-cv-00401-MMC Document 55 Filed 04/16/08 Page 1 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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contention, an order compelling her to provide the discovery requested will impose no burden on her

as she has already agreed to provide it and the Court shall give her adequate time to provide it.

The Court, however, may only conditionally grant Defendant’s motion to compel because

Plaintiff has appealed one of the interlocutory orders issued by Judge Chesney. The general rule is

that a notice of appeal divests the lower court of jurisdiction over all but tangential matters. See

Marks v. Clarke, 102 F.3d 1012 , 1018 n.8 (9th Cir. 1996). While there is an exception to this rule --

i.e., when the district court certifies that the interlocutory appeal is frivolous or forfeited, see id. --

Judge Chesney has not made such a certification in the instant case. 

That being said, in the interest of efficiency, the Court recommends that such a certification

be issued. Plaintiff does not have an appeal as of right of Judge Chesney’s order denying Plaintiff’s

motion to strike Defendant’s answer. See 19-201 Moore’s Fed. Prac. -- Civ. § 201.30 (noting that

“[a] party may appeal as of right interlocutory orders concerning the following types of proceedings:

injunction, receivership, arbitration, admiralty, and patent infringement”); see also 28 U.S.C. §

1292(a), (c). Nor does she have permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 1292(b). 

Under this provision,

[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not

otherwise appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that

such order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate

appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination

of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court

of Appeals which would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action

may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from

such order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry

of the order . . . .

Id. § 1292(b). In the instant case, Judge Chesney has not certified the order at issue for an

interlocutory appeal. Moreover, the Court sees no basis for certifying an interlocutory appeal under

§ 1292(b) because Judge Chesney’s order did not involve a controlling question of law as to which

there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. In her order, Judge Chesney simply held that

the motion to strike was untimely under the clear terms of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) and

that a default judgment, to the extent one was sought, was not appropriate because Plaintiff failed to

seek entry of default first, as required by Rule 55, and because Defendant was only a week or so late

Case 3:07-cv-00401-MMC Document 55 Filed 04/16/08 Page 2 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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in filing an answer. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (listing factors for

a court to consider in ruling on a motion for default judgment, two of which are the strong policy

underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits and the possibility

of a dispute concerning material facts).

II. RECOMMENDATION & CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court conditionally grants Defendant’s motion to compel and

recommends that the presiding judge certify that the interlocutory appeal taken by Plaintiff is

frivolous. If such certification should issue, then within thirty (30) days of the certification, Plaintiff

shall respond to the document requests served by Defendant, produce responsive documents, and

provide supplemental responses to the interrogatories. The production of documents and further

responses to interrogatories shall not be conditioned as an agreement on the dates for deposition. 

Plaintiff has an independent duty to respond to Defendant’s written discovery requests. 

Furthermore, upon certification, the parties shall meet and confer to determine a date and time for

Plaintiff’s deposition. More specifically, Defendant shall provide to Plaintiff four different proposed

dates for the deposition; Plaintiff shall accept one of the four dates.

This order disposes of Docket No. 38.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2008

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00401-MMC Document 55 Filed 04/16/08 Page 3 of 4
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

KIA C. CHEVALIER,

Plaintiff,

v.

OAKLAND SUTTER HOTEL, L.P. dba

Sutter Hotel,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-07-0401 MMC (EMC)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the U.S. District Court, Northern

District of California. On the below date, I served a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing

said copy/copies in a postage-paid envelope addressed to the person(s) listed below, by depositing

said envelope in the U.S. Mail; or by placing said copy/copies into an inter-office delivery

receptacle located in the Office of the Clerk.

KIA C. CHEVALIER

P.O. Box 55641 

Hayward, CA 94545 

510/467-3538 

ALL OTHER COUNSEL SERVED VIA

ELECTRONIC FILING (“E-FILING”)

Dated: April 16, 2008 RICHARD W. WIEKING, CLERK

By: /s/ 

Leni Doyle

Deputy Clerk

Case 3:07-cv-00401-MMC Document 55 Filed 04/16/08 Page 4 of 4