Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01906/USCOURTS-caed-2_23-cv-01906-11/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BlendJet, Inc.
Defendant
Linda Gage
Plaintiff
Gregory Rittenhouse
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

GREGORY RITTENHOUSE, and LINDA 

GAGE, individually and on behalf 

of all others similarly 

situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

BLENDJET, INC., and RYAN 

PAMPLIN,

Defendants.

No. 2:23-cv-01906 WBS DB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANT BLENDJET, INC.’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiffs Gregory Rittenhouse (“Rittenhouse”) and 

Linda Gage (“Gage”) brought this action against BlendJet, Inc., 

(“defendant” or “BlendJet”) and its CEO Ryan Pamplin (“Pamplin”)

seeking legal and equitable relief for breach of contract, 

violations of New York General Business Law sections 349-50, 

violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 

Practices Act, violations of various other state consumer 

protection statutes, breach of the implied warranty of 

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merchantability, fraudulent omission, negligent omission, and 

quasi-contract. (First Amended Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 99-186 (Docket 

No. 25).) 

BlendJet now moves to dismiss all Claims brought 

against it in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) under Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 9(b). (Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (Docket No. 28).)1

I. Factual and Procedural Background

BlendJet is a Delaware corporation with its principal 

place of business in Benicia, CA. (FAC ¶ 14.) BlendJet sells 

portable blenders of varying designs and colors for consumer use. 

(Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) The product at issue here is “[t]he BlendJet 2, 

[which] is a battery-powered personal portable blender made, 

distributed, sold, and marketed since 2020.” (Id. ¶ 1.) Towards 

the end of the calendar year of 2023, BlendJet recalled “4.8 

million BlendJet 2 [p]roducts” and offered customers “a free 

replacement base and matching lid.” (Id. ¶¶ 59-60, 64.)

Plaintiff Gregory Rittenhouse lives in New York, where 

he purchased two of defendant’s blenders as presents for his wife 

“in or around December 2022.” (Id. ¶¶ 11, 67-70.) He observed 

that one of his blenders “overheated” while charging. 

(Id. ¶ 71.) Rittenhouse “also noticed the BlendJet 2 blending 

blade assembly became wobbly and loose within approximately one 

1 Because counsel on both sides were affected by the wild 

fires existing in and around Los Angeles, where they either 

reside or have their offices, the court has vacated the hearing 

which was scheduled for January 21, 2025, and takes the motion 

under submission. Pursuant to Local Rule 230(g), the court finds 

the motion suitable for decision on the briefs without the need 

for oral argument. 

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month of his purchase.” (Id. ¶ 72.)

Plaintiff Linda Gage lives in Illinois, where she 

“purchased two BlendJet 2 [p]roducts in early 2023.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 12, 75.) One of the blenders “was a red chrome color,” 

which “was more expensive.” (Id. ¶ 75.) Unlike Rittenhouse, 

Gage participated in BlendJet’s voluntary recall by sending 

defendant both of her blenders. (Id. ¶ 79.) In return, Gage 

received “two original model bases, not one original and one 

chrome [p]roduct as she had purchased. She paid a premium for the 

chrome [p]roduct and received a less expensive model in return 

during the recall.” (Id.)

II. Justiciability

Plaintiff must first show constitutional standing for 

the court to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim, 

or the claim will be subject to dismissal under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Shulman v. Kaplan, 58 F.4th 404, 

407-08 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2023). “To establish Article III 

standing, [plaintiffs] must show (1) that they ‘suffered an 

injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or 

imminent’; (2) ‘that the injury was likely caused by the 

defendants;’ and (3) ‘that the injury would likely be redressed 

by judicial relief.’” Id. at 408 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. 

Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021)).

BlendJet moves to dismiss the claims of both plaintiffs 

on mootness and standing (collectively, “justiciability”)

grounds. In particular, it argues that neither plaintiff has 

shown an injury in fact. “To establish an injury in fact, a 

plaintiff must show that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a 

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legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and 

particularized.’” McGee v. S-L Snacks Nat’l, 982 F.3d 700, 705 

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Davis v. Facebook, Inc. (In re Facebook, 

Inc. Internet Tracking Litig.), 956 F.3d 589, 597 (9th Cir. 

2020)).

A. Rittenhouse

Here, Rittenhouse’s Claims against BlendJet, which are 

alleged in Counts 1-3 and Counts 5-9 of the FAC, are not 

justiciable because the FAC does not allege that he suffered an 

injury in fact. At best, it contains assertions that 

“Rittenhouse suffered an economic injury because he purchased 

blenders that are worthless for their intended purpose,” as they 

“overheated” or had components that “became wobbly and loose 

within approximately one month of his purchase.” (FAC ¶¶ 71-73.)

But neither of Rittenhouse’s grievances rise to the 

level of an economic injury recognized by the Ninth Circuit. 

See McGee, 982 F.3d at 705-08 & nn.4-6 (recognizing three 

theories of economic injury in a putative class action against a 

popcorn merchant: benefit of the bargain, overpayment, and 

diminution of value). In particular, he does not allege that the 

blender stopped working. Indeed, the FAC even states that 

Rittenhouse was able to solve the issues on his own. (See FAC ¶¶

8, 72.) Accordingly, the court will dismiss Rittenhouse’s Claims 

of breach of contract, deceptive trade practices, false 

advertising, violations of other states’ consumer protection 

statutes, fraudulent omission, negligent omission, and quasicontract against BlendJet.

B. Gage

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In contrast, Gage has alleged an injury in fact in 

Counts 1 and 4-9. As plaintiffs allege, she participated in 

BlendJet’s voluntary recall and “received a less expensive model 

in return” after paying “a premium for” the chrome model she sent 

back. (See FAC ¶¶ 75, 79.) In that sense, she did not receive 

“the benefit of the bargain” she made with BlendJet. See McGee, 

982 F.3d at 705-06. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 

Gage’s current Claims on justiciability grounds. 

Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. 

BlendJet asserts that Gage suffered no injury in fact because its

voluntary recall addressed any injury which she may have 

sustained. See Sharp v. FCA US LLC, 637 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468-69 

(E.D. Mich. 2022) (“conclud[ing] that dismissal is appropriate on 

prudential mootness grounds” after assessing adequacy of recall). 

A court may dismiss a complaint on “prudential mootness” grounds 

when it determines that a “coordinate branch[] of government” 

will provide the relief sought by plaintiffs. Id. at 463-64 

(quoting Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 

1208, 1210-11 (10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.)). 

At first glance, the doctrine of prudential mootness 

seems to support defendant’s suggestion. However, the Ninth 

Circuit has upheld applications of “prudential mootness only in 

the bankruptcy context.” Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 

1161 n.5 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Bowen v. Energizer Holdings, 

Inc., 118 F.4th 1134, 1139-40 (9th Cir. 2024) (reversing 

dismissal of a products liability complaint alleging that 

sunscreen contained a carcinogen on justiciability grounds 

despite defendants’ recall efforts). In effect, BlendJet asks 

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the court to find that a voluntary recall cures any legal 

violation defendant may have committed in furnishing the product 

or recalling it. The court cannot do so under the applicable 

Ninth Circuit precedent. Accordingly, the court will not dismiss 

Gage’s Claims based on failure to allege injury in fact.

III. Plausibility and Rule 9(b)

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 

dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to state “a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Moreover, Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “a party [alleging claims that 

sound in fraud] must state with particularity the circumstances 

constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Pursuant to that 

requirement, the Ninth Circuit has held that a fraud plaintiff’s 

complaint “must include an account of the time, place, and 

specific content of the false representations as well as the 

identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Depot,

Inc. v. Caring for Montanans, Inc., 915 F.3d 643, 667-68 (9th 

Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). It clarified that “the pleading ‘must 

‘identify the who, what, when, where, and how of the misconduct 

charged, as well as what is false or misleading about the 

purportedly fraudulent statement, and why it is false.’’” Id.

(quoting Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 

2013)).

A. Counts 1 and 6

Both Rittenhouse and Gage plausibly allege that a 

contract exists between themselves and BlendJet as well as that

defendant may have breached it. As alleged in the FAC, 

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Rittenhouse and Gage each paid money for defendant’s products.

These exchanges give rise to contracts which may contain implied 

warranties of merchantability under either New York or Illinois 

state law. See Cosgrove v. Oregon Chai, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 3d 

562, 586 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (positing that a New York contract could

have an implied warranty of merchantability); Van Zeeland v. Rand 

McNally, 532 F. Supp. 3d 557, 565-66 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (finding 

that an Illinois contract may contain an implied warranty of 

merchantability). To the extent BlendJet alleges that 

affirmative defenses such as waiver defeat plaintiffs’ 

contractual Claims, the court declines to address them at the 

motion to dismiss stage. See CFTC v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 

966, 972 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 8 

does not require plaintiffs to plead around affirmative 

defenses.”). For this reason, the court will deny BlendJet’s 

motion to dismiss as to its Claims of breach of contract and 

breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.

B. Counts 2-4

In Count 2, Rittenhouse alleges that BlendJet violated 

New York General Business Law section 349, which prohibits 

“[d]eceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, 

trade[,] or commerce or in the furnishing of any service.” In 

Count 3, he alleges that BlendJet violated New York General 

Business Law section 350, which prohibits “false advertising” in 

the same scope. For either Claim, “a plaintiff must allege that 

a defendant has engaged in (1) consumer-oriented conduct, that is 

(2) materially misleading, and that (3) the plaintiff suffered 

injury as a result of the allegedly deceptive act or practice.” 

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See Plavin v. Grp. Health Inc., 146 N.E.3d 1164, 1168 (N.Y. 

2020). New York law requires plaintiffs bringing claims under 

either General Business Law section to specify a particular act 

or practice defendant committed. See Shaw v. Club Managers Ass’n 

of Am., Inc., 923 N.Y.S.2d 127, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).

In Count 4, Gage alleges that BlendJet violated the 

Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Such a claim (1) requires “a 

deceptive act or practice by the defendant, (2) the defendant’s 

intent that the plaintiff rely on the deception, (3) the 

occurrence of the deception in a course of conduct involving 

trade or commerce, and (4) actual damage to the plaintiff that is 

(5) a result of the deception.” De Bouse v. Bayer, 922 N.E.2d 

309, 313 (Ill. 2009). In particular, a plaintiff bringing a 

claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business 

Practices Act “must actually be deceived by a [specific] 

statement or omission that is made by the defendant.” Id. at 

315-16.

In Counts 2-4 of the FAC, neither plaintiff specifies a 

particular deceptive trade practice or act (including false 

advertising) by BlendJet which he or she perceived before 

purchasing its blenders. Because plaintiffs’ Claims in Counts 2-

4 sound in fraud, the result is the same under federal law, which 

requires particularity or specificity as well. See Depot, 915 

F.3d at 667-69 & n.17 (applying the particularity requirement of 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) to claims arising under 

California’s consumer protection statutes). Accordingly, the 

court must dismiss the FAC’s state law Claims for deceptive trade 

practices and false advertising.

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C. Count 5

In Count 5 of the FAC, plaintiffs, who reside in 

Illinois and New York, allege that BlendJet has violated the laws 

of other states, such as California, Connecticut, Maryland, and 

Missouri. (FAC ¶¶ 138-44.) In contrast to the FAC’s

constitutional standing issues, Count 5 raises the question of 

whether plaintiffs have statutory standing to bring claims under 

the laws of states where they do not reside or are otherwise 

connected. See Shulman, 58 F.4th at 407 n.1.

Named “[p]laintiffs must show they have standing for 

each claim they raise, and plaintiffs do not have standing to 

bring claims under the laws of states where they have alleged no 

injury, residence, or other pertinent connection.” Jones v. 

Micron Tech. Inc., 400 F. Supp. 3d 897, 908-09 (N.D. Cal. 2019); 

see Corcoran v. CVS Health Corp., 169 F. Supp. 3d 970 (N.D. Cal. 

2016) (collecting cases reaching the same result). Here, 

however, the FAC does not specify where Gage bought the blenders 

except for reciting her domicile, and thus it is devoid of any 

“pertinent connection[s]” between Gage and “sister states” 

besides Illinois. Jones, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 908-09. 

The same applies to Rittenhouse and the state of New 

York. See id. Because of the lack of any pertinent connection 

between Rittenhouse or Gage and sister states, the court will 

dismiss the FAC’s Claims for violations of those states’ 

deceptive trade practices laws. To the extent such Claims in 

Count 5 are duplicative of the Illinois and New York state law 

Claims in Counts 2-4 of the FAC, they are dismissed as redundant. 

Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

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D. Counts 7-9

Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority in support 

of their fraudulent omission Claim in Count 7 of the FAC. Cf.

Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 

2003) (“[J]udges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried 

in briefs.”). Even if they did, plaintiffs neglect to specify 

what representations or omissions BlendJet made to them before 

selling the products at issue to plaintiffs, which is fatal to 

their Claims of actionable omissions. See Depot, 915 F.3d at 

667-68 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)). Therefore, the court will 

dismiss the FAC’s Claims of fraudulent omission.

Plaintiffs concede that Count 8 of the FAC for 

negligent omission fails to state a claim. (See Opp. to Mot. at 

28-30 & n.3 (Docket No. 37).) The court will therefore also

dismiss the FAC’s Claims for negligent omission.

As for the FAC’s last Claim for quasi-contract or 

unjust enrichment, plaintiffs “request leave to amend to remove” 

Count 9 alleging such Claims. (Opp. to Mot. at 30.) Because the 

court concludes that the FAC plausibly alleges that contracts 

exist between each plaintiff and BlendJet, the court accepts

plaintiffs’ offer. See Crowley v. VisionMaker, LLC, 512 F. Supp. 

2d 144, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Accordingly, the court will dismiss 

the FAC’s Claims for quasi-contract.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that BlendJet’s motion to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ Claims against it (Docket No. 28), be, and 

the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART. Count 5 and Counts 7-9 are 

DISMISSED without prejudice as to both plaintiffs. Counts 1-3

and 6 are DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff 

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Rittenhouse. (Docket No. 25.) Count 4 and Counts 6-9 are 

DISMISSED without prejudice as to plaintiff Gage. (Id.) 

BlendJet’s motion to dismiss is DENIED in all other respects. 

Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date of this Order to file 

an amended complaint if they can do so consistent with this 

Order.

Dated: January 16, 2025

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