Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02108/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02108-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Corey Lea
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

COREY LEA,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2016-2108

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00292-MBH, Judge Marian Blank 

Horn.

______________________ 

Decided: October 6, 2016

______________________ 

COREY LEA, Arrington, TN, pro se.

JESSICA COLE, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and CLEVENGER, Circuit Judges.

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 1 Filed: 10/06/2016
2 LEA v. US

PER CURIAM.

Corey Lea (“Lea”) appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Federal Claims (the “Claims 

Court”) dismissing his complaint for lack of jurisdiction

and denying his motion for reconsideration. See Lea v. 

United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 203 (2016) (“Order”); Lea v. 

United States, No. 15-292C, 2016 WL 2854257 (Fed. Cl. 

May 10, 2016). Because the Claims Court did not err in 

dismissing the complaint, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

Lea was a farmer in Kentucky. Appellant’s Informal 

Br. 1. Acting through his company, Corey Lea, Inc., he 

applied for a loan from Farmers National Bank, guaranteed by the Farm Service Agency of the United States 

Department of Agriculture. Id. at 1. The loan guarantee 

agreement lists the borrower’s name as Corey Lea, Inc. 

and is signed by a Farm Service Agency official. Appellee’s App. 58. Farmers National Bank held the first 

mortgage, and the Farm Service Agency held the second 

mortgage. After Lea defaulted by failing to make payments, the bank foreclosed on the farm property. Appellant’s Informal Br. 2.

Lea first filed multiple complaints against the government and Farmers National Bank in the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Kentucky, 

alleging discrimination and seeking an injunction against 

the foreclosure. The district court dismissed the claims in 

favor of the defendants, and on appeal from one of the 

dismissals, this court issued an order holding that we 

lacked jurisdiction and transferring that appeal to the 

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Lea 

v. Dep’t of Agric., 562 F. App’x 969 (Fed. Cir. 2014).

Lea next filed a complaint against the government in 

the Claims Court in January 2014, alleging fraud, breach

of contract, conspiracy to commit fraud and breach of 

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 2 Filed: 10/06/2016
LEA v. US 3

contract, and tortious interference. The Claims Court 

dismissed his appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that it lacked jurisdiction (1) over any claims 

against defendants other than the United States, (2) to 

grant any requested injunctive or declaratory relief, and 

(3) to hear his tort claims. Lea v. United States, No. 14-

44C, 2014 WL 2101367, at *2 (Fed. Cl. May 19, 2014) (Lea 

I). The Claims Court also dismissed his claims for breach 

of contract for failure to state a claim because Lea failed 

to show that he was either a party or a third-party beneficiary to the contracts involving the government. Id. at *3.

Lea appealed from that decision to this court, and we 

vacated and remanded the dismissal of his contract 

claims, but affirmed the dismissal of all other claims. See

Lea v. United States, 592 F. App’x 930 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(Lea II). We held that Lea lacked standing unless he were

a third-party beneficiary, and we vacated and remanded 

for the Claims Court to determine whether to grant 

discovery on that issue. Id. at 933–34. 

However, before our opinion issued, Lea filed another 

complaint against the government in the Claims Court, 

again asserting the breach of contract claims, along with 

various claims of constitutional violations such as takings. 

See Lea v. United States, 120 Fed. Cl. 440, 443 (2015) (Lea 

III); Order, 126 Fed. Cl. at 209–10 (summarizing the 

procedural posture of Lea III). Because Lea was pursuing 

the same breach of contract claims in Lea I on remand, 

the contract claims in Lea III were dismissed as duplicative and the noncontractual claims were dismissed for 

lack of jurisdiction. 

Shortly afterwards, Lea filed another complaint

against the government in the Claims Court in March 

2015, which became the instant case (Lea IV), and he 

voluntarily dismissed Lea I without prejudice. Order, 126 

Fed. Cl. at 209. In this complaint, he alleged, inter alia, a 

taking, unjust enrichment, breach of an implied-in-fact 

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 3 Filed: 10/06/2016
4 LEA v. US

contract by violating federal foreclosure regulations, 

breach of the loan guarantee agreement, and breach of 

the second mortgage agreement. Id. at 209–10. The 

Claims Court observed that Lea had filed at least eleven 

separate actions in federal courts based on the same set of 

facts. Id. at 207.

The Claims Court first found that Lea failed to cure 

the jurisdictional defects that led to the dismissal of the 

same claims of a taking, unjust enrichment, and breach of 

an implied-in-fact contract in Lea III, and thus was precluded from reasserting those claims. Order, 126 Fed. Cl. 

at 214–15. The court then analyzed the remaining breach 

of contract claims. Id. at 215–18. The court noted that 

the borrower identified in the loan guarantee agreement 

and the mortgagor identified in the second mortgage 

agreement were both the corporate entity, not the individual. The court concluded that Corey Lea, Inc. was the 

only entity eligible to pursue contractual claims against 

the United States based on third-party beneficiary status. 

Id. at 217. Because a corporation must be represented by 

an attorney, the court dismissed the remaining contract 

claims. Id. at 217–18.

Lea moved for reconsideration, which was denied by 

the Claims Court. Lea timely appealed to this court from 

the Claims Court’s decisions. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).

DISCUSSION

We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction de novo. FloorPro, Inc. v. United States, 680 

F.3d 1377, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The Tucker Act provides the Claims Court with jurisdiction to “render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded

. . . upon any express or implied contract with the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). However, in contract 

cases “[t]he government consents to be sued only by those 

with whom it has privity of contract.” Erickson Air Crane 

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 4 Filed: 10/06/2016
LEA v. US 5

Co. of Wash. v. United States, 731 F.2d 810, 813 (Fed. Cir. 

1984); see also id. (holding that subcontractors lack privity with the government and thus lack standing to bring a 

direct suit for breach of contract against the government).

Lea argues that the Claims Court did not consider 

that Corey Lea, Inc. is a dissolved corporation with Lea as 

a sole shareholder winding up its affairs. Lea asserts that 

the court also incorrectly cited case law applying Texas 

law rather than Kentucky law with regard to a corporation’s ability to continue litigation after it has been dissolved. Lea also insists that the government waived the 

argument of standing to sue on behalf of the corporation. 

Lea further asserts that as a debtor listed on the first 

mortgage, he has standing as an individual to sue for 

breach of contract. Moreover, Lea contends, the courts in 

Lea I and Lea II found that he had standing, and therefore under the law of the case doctrine and the mandate 

rule, the Claims Court erred in finding that it lacked 

jurisdiction over his contract claims. Lea also disputes 

that collateral estoppel applies, particularly as to the

takings claim, which he denies was previously addressed 

in Lea III.

The government responds that the Claims Court considered all of the facts alleged in the complaint and 

acknowledged that Lea was winding up Corey Lea, Inc.’s 

affairs. However, the government maintains, Lea was not 

a party to the contracts with the government, and any 

injury to him was not separate and distinct from the 

corporation’s injury. The government asserts that Lea’s

claims were therefore derivative of the corporation’s, and 

emphasizes that shareholder-derivative actions require 

counsel. Additionally, the government responds, the court 

may sua sponte challenge its own subject matter jurisdiction at any time, whether the defendant raises the issue 

or not. As for the other claims, the government contends 

that the court correctly applied collateral estoppel because 

the claims were “almost verbatim” identical to the claims 

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 5 Filed: 10/06/2016
6 LEA v. US

in Lea III that were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and 

Lea failed to cure the jurisdictional defects. 

We agree with the government that the Claims Court

did not err in dismissing Lea’s complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction. We understand Lea’s desire to pursue claims 

relating to the company that he was the sole shareholder 

of and that bears his name. Lea’s role in managing the 

affairs of the dissolved corporation, however, is insufficient to vest the Claims Court with jurisdiction to adjudicate his claims.

Lea focuses on the fact that Corey Lea, Inc. has been 

dissolved and that he is the sole shareholder winding up 

the affairs of the corporation. Appellant’s Informal Br. 

5–9. Although Kentucky law provides that dissolution of 

a corporation does not bar or exempt the corporation from 

litigation in its own name, the law does not create privity 

between Lea and the government merely because of such 

dissolution, such that he as an individual may sue for 

breach of contract. As Lea is not an attorney, and a 

corporation may not be represented by a non-attorney, the 

Claims Court correctly concluded that he may not pursue 

the claims on behalf of Corey Lea, Inc.

The only way Lea could have had standing to sue the 

government for breach of contract with regard to the loan 

guarantee agreement and the second mortgage agreement 

would have been, as we noted previously, if he were a 

third-party beneficiary to the contracts. See Lea II, 592 F. 

App’x at 933. But Lea did not expressly argue that he 

was a third-party beneficiary until he made an oblique 

reference to such in his reply. Appellant’s Reply Br. 6. 

Nonetheless, the government addressed that point in its 

response brief by asserting that the Claims Court properly determined that Lea was not a party to the contracts 

and that Corey Lea, Inc. was the intended beneficiary 

instead. Appellee’s Br. 10. We will accordingly address it 

briefly.

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 6 Filed: 10/06/2016
LEA v. US 7

To prove third-party beneficiary status, a plaintiff 

must show “that the contract not only reflects the express 

or implied intention to benefit the party, but that it 

reflects an intention to benefit the party directly.” Glass

v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 

And we have previously held that shareholders are not 

necessarily third-party beneficiaries eligible to enforce a 

contract between a corporation and the government. Id. 

at 1354–55; First Hartford Corp. Pension Plan & Tr. v. 

United States, 194 F.3d 1279, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that “one of the principal motivations behind utilizing 

the corporate form is often the desire to limit the risk of 

ownership to the amount of capital invested and thus 

avoid the obligations, contractual or otherwise, of the 

corporation” and finding the shareholders in that case 

were not third-party beneficiaries and thus could not 

bring breach of contract claims on their own behalf).

Although a third-party beneficiary need not be explicitly identified in a contract, here the contracts were 

clearly not intended to benefit Lea as an individual. The 

loan guarantee and second mortgage agreements were 

clearly intended to assist Corey Lea, Inc. in obtaining a 

loan to purchase and operate farm property. Even though 

Lea was the president and sole shareholder of Corey Lea, 

Inc., the company was and is still a separate legal entity. 

More is required to confer intended third-party beneficiary status than knowledge that he as an individual 

would indirectly benefit from the agreements. Lea made 

the conscious choice to apply for the loan in his company’s 

name rather than his own. Whatever his reasons might 

have been, he cannot now claim that the contract was 

intended to directly benefit him as an individual. Moreover, whether he was listed as an individual on the first 

mortgage, a contract with a private bank, is irrelevant to 

privity with the government. Because Lea has not alleged 

facts sufficient to establish his status as a third-party 

beneficiary, the Claims Court correctly found that it 

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 7 Filed: 10/06/2016
8 LEA v. US

lacked jurisdiction over the breach of contract claims filed 

in his name.

Accordingly, Lea did not provide the Claims Court

with evidence supporting his alleged status as a thirdparty beneficiary of the loan guarantee and second mortgage agreements. The court therefore did not err in 

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Lea’s

breach of contract claims. 

Lea furthermore did not present any new, previously 

unavailable facts that would support the Claims Court’s 

jurisdiction over claims previously found to be not within 

the purview of the Tucker Act. The court therefore did 

not err in finding that Lea did not cure the original jurisdictional defects and thus did not justify a new analysis of

jurisdiction over those claims.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Lea’s remaining arguments and 

conclude that they are without merit. For the foregoing 

reasons, the decision of the Claims Court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

Case: 16-2108 Document: 29-2 Page: 8 Filed: 10/06/2016