Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02691/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02691-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven P. Gerber
Appellee
State of Wyoming
Appellee
V-1 Oil Company
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

Uoited Statei.; Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cfrcuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

APR 3 0 1990 

!\OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

V-1 OIL COMPANY, A Wyoming 

corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF WYOMING, Department of 

Environment Quality; 

STEVEN P. GERBER, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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Nos. 88-2691 

89-8011 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. NO. C88-0155-J) 

F. M. Andrews, Jr., Andrews and Anderson, P.C., Riverton, Wyoming, 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 

Steve C. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Karen A. 

Byrne, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Joseph B. Meyer, Attorney General with them on the briefs), Cheyenne, Wyoming, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees. 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Plaintiff-appellant V-1 Oil Company ("V-1") appeals an 

adverse summary judgment and an award of attorneys' fees rendered 

by the district court. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 88-2691 Document: 01019583542 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 1 
BACKGROUND 

The district court, V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, 696 F. Supp. 578 

(D. Wyo. 1988), found the following undisputed facts: Defendantappellee Steven P. Gerber is an official of defendant-appellee the 

Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"), an agency of 

defendant-appellee the State of Wyoming. He was aware that 

previous investigations of the V-1 Oil Station in Lander, Wyoming 

revealed that it was a source of groundwater pollution. On April 

28, 1988, he noticed, while driving by, that the concrete above 

the station's underground storage tanks was being removed. Twice 

he tried to find out what was being done, and twice he was refused 

permission to enter the property. Informed of this, a senior 

assistant attorney general tried to obtain a court order allowing 

Gerber to inspect the premises, but no judge was available. The 

attorney then advised Gerber that the Wyoming Environmental 

Quality Act ("the Act") authorized him to conduct a warrantless 

search. That evening, Gerber, accompanied by a policeman and the 

Lander City Attorney, returned to the gas station, visually 

inspected the tanks, and took a soil sample from the exposed area. 

Id. at 579-80. 

On May 27, 1988, V-1 filed suit under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, 

alleging that the search violated V-l's Fourth Amendment rights. 

The district court granted summary judgment for each defendant. 

DEQ and the State were dismissed because of their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Id. at 580. V-1 does 

not appeal this holding. Gerber was deemed entitled to judgment 

because the statute authorizes warrantless searches, id. at 581, 

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such searches are constitutional, id. at 582, and Gerber's conduct 

fell within his qualified immunity because it violated no clearly 

established right, id. at 583. The judgment in favor of Gerber is 

the subject of No. 88-2691. 

The defendants then filed a motion for attorneys' fees under 

42 u.s.c. § 1988. They documented the total time spent on the 

case, but did not state how many hours were spent on each 

particular issue. See R. Vol. I at Tabs 23, 32, 35. In an unpublished order, the court found that V-l's claims against the 

State and DEQ were frivolous and that for a time V-1 had relied 

upon an outdated version of the Act, and decided to award the 

defendants fees for time spent addressing those issues. Order, 

Jan. 19, 1989, R. Vol. I at Tab 37, at 2-3. V-1 does not appeal 

these conclusions. The court then estimated that the defendants 

spent twenty-two hours responding to these claims, and awarded 

fees based upon that estimate. Id. at 2. Whether the court was 

entitled to estimate how much time was spent on the issues upon 

which it awarded attorneys' fees, or instead should have required 

that the movants' records be broken down by issue, is the subject 

of No. 89-8011. 

DISCUSSION 

I. WARRANTLESS SEARCH 

A. Whether The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act Authorizes 

Warrantless Searches 

Gerber claims that section nine of the Act authorizes 

warrantless inspections of suspected sources of pollution. That 

section empowers certain officers, including Gerber, to 

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"enter and inspect any property, premise or place, 

except private residences, on or at which an air, water 

or land pollution source is located or is being 

constructed or installed • . . • Persons so designated 

may •.• inspect any monitoring equipment or method of 

operation required to be maintained pursuant to this act 

• • . for the purpose of investigating actual or 

potential sources of air, water or land pollution and 

for determining compliance or noncompliance with this 

act • " 

Wyo. Stat. § 35-ll-109(a) (vi) (1988). 

V-1 contends that this section did not authorize the search 

which took place, either because it does not authorize warrantless 

searches or because it only authorizes warrantless searches of 

monitoring equipment and methods of operation required by the Act, 

and underground storage tanks do not fall into this category. We 

disagree. 

V-l's first contention seems to be "that a warrant was 

required since the statute nowhere mentions the words 'warrantless 

search.'" V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, 696 F. Supp. at 581. Courts do 

not infer a warrant requirement from statutes which authorize 

inspections but do not discuss the necessity of warrants. 

Instead, a bare authorization for inspections is construed to 

authorize warrantless inspections. See, ~, Exotic Coins, Inc. 

v. Beacom, 699 P.2d 930, 940 (Colo.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 

892 (1985); State v. Williams, 648 P.2d 1156, 1160-61 (Kan. Ct. 

App. 1982); State v. Galio, 587 P.2d 44, 47 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); 

State ex rel. Industrial Comm'n v. Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co., 

594 P.2d 894, 897 (Utah 1979). We see no reason to believe that 

the Wyoming Supreme Court would construe this statute any 

differently. 

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Second, because the Wyoming Environmental Quality Act should 

be construed liberally, People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 

208, 212 (Wyo. 1982); Roberts Constr. Co. v. Vondriska, 547 P.2d 

1171, 1182 (Wyo. 1976), we hold that underground gasoline storage 

tanks are a "method of operation required to be maintained pursuant to th[e] act." The phrase "pursuant to" has a broader meaning 

than the word "by." See Black's Law Dictionary 647 (abr. 5th ed. 

1983). The statute authorizes the inspection, not only of 

facilities which the Act specifically requires, but also of any 

mechanism which is necessary to avoid committing a violation. 

Without proper storage equipment, gasoline could escape and pollute the surrounding land and groundwater. This is prohibited by, 

inter alia, Wyo. Stat. § 35-11-301 (1988). Therefore, the Act 

authorized Gerber to inspect V-l's tanks. 

B. Whether a Warrantless Search Pursuant to the Wyoming 

Environmental Quality Act Is Constitutional 

The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to 

commercial premises. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 

(1967). An exception to this requirement has developed, however, 

for "pervasively regulated business[es]," United States v. 

Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316 (1972), or "'closely regulated' 

industries," Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978} 

(quoting Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 

74 (1970)). To be reasonable, the warrantless inspection of such 

a business must meet the three-part test enunciated in New York v. 

Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987): 

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"First, there must be a 'substantial' government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to which 

the inspection is made •••• 

Second, the warrantless inspections must be 'necessary to further [the] regulatory scheme.' 

Finally, 'the statute's inspection program, in 

terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitutionally adequate 

substitute for a warrant.' In other words, the regulatory statute must perform the two basic functions of a 

warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial 

premises that the search is being made pursuant to the 

law and has a properly defined scope, and it must limit 

the discretion of the inspecting officers. To perform 

this first function, the statute must be 'sufficiently 

comprehensive and defined that the owner of commercial 

property cannot help but be aware that his property will 

be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for 

specific purposes.' In addition, in defining how a 

statute limits the discretion of the inspectors, .•. 

it must be 'carefully limited in time, place, and 

scope.' United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S., at 315." 

Id. at 702-03 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600, 602, 

603 (1981)). The two major questions relevant to the constitutionality of Gerber's search are whether V-1 is pervasively 

regulated and whether the Act provides a constitutionally adequate 

substitute for a search warrant. 1 

1 The other two parts of the Burger test may be discussed 

summarily. 

V-1 concedes, Appellant's Brief at 18, and we agree, that the 

protection of the environment and the public from pollution in 

general, and from leakage from underground gasoline storage tanks 

in particular, is a substantial governmental interest. 

We cannot determine from the record whether warrantless 

inspections are necessary to the regulatory scheme, i.e., whether 

there will be times that DEQ cannot obtain a warrant promptly 

enough for the subsequent search to be effective, see McLaughlin 

v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 996 (6th Cir. 1988); Blackwelder v. 

Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 139 (N.D.N.Y. 1988). Fortunately, 

such a determination is not necessary to our disposition of this 

case. 

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1. Whether V-1 Is Pervasively Regulated 

A pervasively regulated industry is one which has "such a 

history of government oversight that no reasonable expectation of 

privacy could exist • II Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 

at 313 (citation omitted). "[T]he doctrine is essentially defined 

by 'the pervasiveness and regularity of the •.. regulation' and 

the effect of such regulation upon an owner's expectation of 

privacy." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. at 701 (quoting Donovan v. 

Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981)). Pervasively regulated 

industries "represent the 'exception' rather than the rule." 

Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 647 F.2d 96, 99 n.l (10th Cir. 1981) 

(quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 313); see also 

McLaughlin v. Kings Island, 849 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1988). 

Wyoming state law2 requires a license and payment of a fee 

before one may do business as a gasoline dealer. Wyo. Stat. 

§ 39-6-203(b} (1988). Violation of this requirement is a misdemeanor. Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-213(a) (1988). The price of the 

gasoline must be displayed conspicuously, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-205 

(1988), and gasoline tax must be collected, Wyo. Stat. § 39-6-209 

(1988). However, while gasoline wholesalers and refiners must 

submit reports and keep special records, Wyo. Stat. §§ 39-6-204, 

-206, -208 (1989), gasoline dealers face no similar requirement. 

Under federal law, owners of underground gasoline storage tanks 

must furnish substantial and detailed information about the tanks 

2 Gasoline stations also may be regulated by municipal 

authorities, Wyo. Stat. § 15-l-103(a)(xxvii) (1988), but the City 

of Lander has not done so. 

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and must permit certain inspections 3 and monitoring. See 42 

u.s.c. §§ 6991-9li. 

In Burger, the Supreme Court held that New York vehicle 

dismantlers were pervasively regulated because they were subject 

to the following circumscriptions: the requirement of a license 

and payment of a fee; the maintenance and availability for inspection of certain records; the display of the operator's registration number; and the existence of criminal penalties for failure 

to comply with these provisions. Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. at 

704-05. The aggregation of requirements to which Wyoming gas stations are subject is equally intrusive, so we affirm the district 

court's holding that V-1 was pervasively regulated. 

2. Whether the Statute Provides a Constitutionally 

Adequate Substitute for a Warrant 

The district court concluded, with no explanation, that the 

Act provided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant. 

V-1 Oil Co. v. Wyoming, 696 F. Supp. at 582. We disagree. The 

statute is not so '"comprehensive and defined that the owner of 

commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property 

will be subject to periodic inspections undertaken for specific 

purposes.'" Burger v. New York, 482 U.S. at 703 (quoting Donovan 

v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981)). 

First, because the Act applies to every business in Wyoming, 

it provides no notice whatsoever to the owner of any particular 

3 Gerber has not claimed that he was acting pursuant to the 

federal inspection provision, 42 U.S.C. § 699ld(a). Also, the 

constitutionality of that provision is not before us. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2691 Document: 01019583542 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 8 
business that his or her property will be subject to warrantless 

inspections. The only warrantless administrative searches which 

have been upheld are those conducted pursuant to narrow statutes 

which regulate particular industries. Rush v. Obledo, 756 F.2d 

713, 718-19 (9th Cir. 1985); cf. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 

U.S. at 321. Administrative searches conducted pursuant to 

statutes of general applicability require search warrants. See, 

~'Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 313-14 (Occupational 

Safety and Health Act); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 546 

(Seattle Fire Code); Lone Steer, Inc. v. Donovan, 565 F. Supp. 

229, 232 (D.N.D. 1982) (Fair Labor Standards Act), rev'd on other 

grounds, 464 U.S. 408 (1984); Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907, 909-10 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) 

(Colorado Air Pollution Control Act), rev'd on other grounds, 416 

U.S. 861 (1974); New Mexico Envtl. Improvement Div. v. Climax 

Chem. Co., 733 P.2d 1322, 1323 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (New Mexico 

Hazardous Waste Act). 

Second, the Act provides no ''assurance of regularity" of 

inspections. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 599 (1981). In both 

Burger, 482 U.S. at 711, and Dewey, 452 U.S. at 604, the inspections were conducted on a regular basis. The Wyoming Environmental Quality Act leaves inspectors free to inspect any business 

as often or seldom as he or she pleases. A warrant is required if 

searches are "so random, infrequent, or unpredictable that the 

owner, for all practical purposes, has no real expectation that 

his property will from time to time be inspected by government 

officials." Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. at 599; see also Serpas v. 

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Schmidt, 827 F.2d 23, 29 (7th Cir. 1987) ("To satisfy the 

'certainty and regularity' requirement, an 'inspection program 

must define clearly what is to be searched, who can be searched, 

and the frequency of such searches.'" (quoting Bionic Auto Parts & 

Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 721 F.2d 1072, 1078 (7th Cir. 1983)), cert. 

denied, 108 s. Ct. 1075 (1988). 

Because the Act does not provide a constitutionally adequate 

substitute for a warrant, Gerber's warrantless search violated 

V-l's Fourth Amendment rights. 

c. Whether Gerber Was Qualifiedly Immune From Suit 

Government officials performing discretionary functions have 

a qualified immun_i ty f ram suit. 

"[W]hether an official protected by qualified immunity 

may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful 

official action generally turns on the 'objective legal 

reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the 

legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time 

it was taken. 

The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear 

that a reasonable official would understand that what he 

is doing violates that right. This is not to say that 

an official action is protected by qualified immunity 

unless the very action in question has previously been 

held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of 

pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent." 

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 640 (1987) (quoting 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 819 (1982)) (citations 

omitted). "Once a defendant raises the defense of qualified 

immunity as a defense to an action, '[t]he plaintiff carries the 

burden of convincing the court that the law was clearly 

~stablished. '" Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th 

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Appellate Case: 88-2691 Document: 01019583542 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 10 
Cir. 1989) (quoting Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. 

Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 645 (10th Cir. 1988)). 

"If the law was clearly established, the immunity 

defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably 

competent public official should know the law governing 

his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the 

defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove 

that he neither knew nor should have known of the 

relevant legal standard, the defense should be 

sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily 

on objective factors." 

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982). The defendant 

bears the burden of proving such circumstances. See Pleasant v. 

Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1989). 

1. Whether The Right Was Clearly Established 

When the search here at issue took place, the Burger decision 

was almost a year old. The Dewey decision, upon which Burger 

relied heavily, was almost seven years old. The Barlow's decision 

was almost ten years old. At the same time there was no precedent 

for the proposition that a generally applicable statute which 

permitted irregular inspections could constitutionally authorize a 

warrantless search. We hold that V-l's right not to be inspected 

without a search warrant pursuant to a statute such as the Wyoming 

Environmental Quality Act was clearly established. 

2. Whether Extraordinary Circumstances Existed4 

4 The district court did not address this question. We may 

consider it, however, because "we are 'free to affirm a district 

court decision on any grounds for which there is a record 

sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied 

upon by the district court.'" Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 

1047 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 

F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir. 1987)). 

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As its name suggests, the "extraordinary circumstances" 

exception to the rule that a qualified immunity defense fails 

where the defendant violated a clearly established right applies 

only "rarely." Skevofilax v. Quigley, 586 F. Supp. 532, 539 n.6 

(D.N.J. 1984). The circumstances must be such that the defendant 

was so ''prevented," Fernandez v. Leonard, 784 F.2d 1209, 1216 (1st 

Cir. 1986); Student Servs. for Lesbians/Gays & Friends v. Texas 

Tech Univ., 635 F. Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Tex. 1986), from knowing 

that his actions were unconstitutional that "he should not be 

imputed with knowledge of an admittedly clearly established 

right," Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349, 350 (6th Cir. 1988). 

The circumstance most often considered for treatment as 

"extraordinary" is reliance upon the advice of counsel. See 

Carey, Quick Termination of Insubstantial Civil Right Claims: 

Qualified Immunity and Procedural Fairness, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1543, 

1444-55 (1985). Of course, such reliance is not inherently 

extraordinary, for few things in government are more common than 

the receipt of legal advice. Still, "reliance on the advice of 

counsel in certain circumstances rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances." Ortega v. City of Kansas City, Kan.,·659 

F. Supp. 1201, 1211 (D. Kan. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 875 

F.2d 1497 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 325 (1989); cf. 

England v. Hendricks, 880 F.2d 281, 284 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. 

denied, 110 s. Ct. 1130 (1990); Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 

476 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). But cf. 

Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1457~58 (10th Cir. 1989); 

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Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 731 (10th Cir.), 

reh'g en bane granted, 888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1989). 5 

Whether reliance upon legal advice "bars our imputation to 

[the defendant] of constructive knowledge concerning the laws 

allegedly violated by his conduct,'' Polson v. Davis, 635 F. Supp. 

1130, 1144 (D. Kan. 1986), depends upon the circumstances of each 

case. Compare Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 971, 982 (9th 

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1985); Burk v. Unified 

School Dist. No. 329, 646 F. Supp. 1557, 1568 (D. Kan. 1986); 

Wells v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 576 F. Supp. 497, 508 (N.D. 

Tex. 1983); Alexander v. Alexander, 573 F. Supp. 373, 375 n.4 

(M.D. Tenn. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 751 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 

1984) with Watertown Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 

F.2d 1487, 1495-96 (8th Cir. 1987); Ortega v. City of Kansas City, 

Kan., 659 F. Supp. at 1211. Relevant factors include how 

unequivocal, and specifically tailored to the particular facts 

giving rise to the controversy, 6 the advice was, see Watertown 

5 The dissent errs when it reads Melton as a bar to finding 

Gerber qualifiedly immune. That decision does not address the 

extraordinary circumstances exception, so it cannot be considered 

binding authority on the scope of the exception. Melton instructs 

us not to refer to legal advice the defendant received when we 

decide whether or not the governing law was clearly established; 

it gives no guidance in deciding when a defendant should not be 

expected to have known the governing law. 

6 We reject the position of the dissent that the advice must be 

couched in certain precise legal terms before an official is 

entitled to rely upon it. See infra at None of the cases 

cited above makes that suggestion. Such-:a-requirement cannot be 

inferred from the statement in Watertown Equipment that the 

defendants were not qualifiedly immune because the advice "did not 

unequivocally assure [them] of the constitutionality of the South 

Dakota attachment statute," 830 F.2d at 1495, because the problem 

there was not specificity (indeed, just like in this case, the 

[footnote continued ... ] 

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Equip. Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 F.2d at 1496; Ortega v. 

City of Kansas City, Kan., 659 F. Supp. at 1211, whether complete 

information had been provided to the advising attorney(s), see 

Burk v. Unified School Dist. No. 329, 646 F. Supp. at 1560-61; cf. 

Moore v. Marketplace Restaurant, Inc., 754 F.2d 1336, 1348-49 (7th 

Cir. 1985) (separate opinion of Coffey, J.), the prominence and 

competence of the attorney(s), see Alexander v. Alexander, 573 F. 

Supp. at 375 & n.4; cf. Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594, 596 (9th 

Cir. 1988), and how soon after the advice was received the 

disputed action was taken, see Tanner v. Hardy, 764 F.2d 1024, 

1027 (4th Cir. 1984); Green v. Brantley, 719 F. Supp. 1570, 1584 

( N • D • Ga • 19 8 9 ) • 

We hold that a reasonable officer in Gerber's position--that 

is, an officer who conducts a warrantless search on the same day 

he was advised by fully informed, high-ranking government 

attorneys that a particular statute, which had not yet been tested 

in any court, lawfully authorized that particular search--should 

not be expected to have known that the search was unconstitutional. This was not, as the dissent claims, "mere reliance on 

attorney's advice" or "attorney's advice without more." Infra at 

Because Gerber was prevented by extraordinary 

circumstances from knowing the relevant legal standard, he is 

qualifiedly immune. 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

attorney discussed the very statute under which the defendants 

acted), but equivocation: the attorney told the defendants that 

there was "'some risk' that [the plaintiff] could successfully 

attack [the statute's] constitutionality." Id. at 1496. 

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II. ATTORNEYS' FEES 

The amount of an award of attorneys' fees under 42 u.s.c. 

§ 1988 "is particularly within the discretion of the trial court." 

Higgins v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Employment Sec. Comm'n, 642 

F.2d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 1981). "Accordingly, an attorneys' fee 

award ••• will be upset on appeal only if it represents an abuse 

of discretion. Findings on underlying questions of fact are 

subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review." Mares v. 

Credit Bur. of Raton, 801 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 

The district court's finding that twenty-two hours were spent 

on the issues for which fees were awarded is not clearly erroneous! Nor was it an abuse of discretion to reach that finding by 

means of estimation, "so long as there [was] sufficient reason for 

its use." Id. at 1203. That the court was not granting fees for 

the entire litigation, but only for an indiscrete portion thereof, 

is sufficient reason for estimating hours. Other courts have 

approved similar methods. See, ~' Jenkins by Agyei v. 

Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 264 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 

221 (1988); Aubin v. Fudala, 821 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1987); 

Foster v. Board of School Comm'rs, 810 F.2d 1021, 1023-34 (11th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 829 (1987); Evers v. County of 

Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1984). Courts of Appeal 

have even been known on occasion to estimate how much time 

particular claims consumed. See, ~' Raton Gas Transmission Co. 

v. FERC, 891 F.2d 323, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Ustrak v. Fairman, 

851 F.2d 983, 989 (7th Cir. 1988). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2691 Document: 01019583542 Date Filed: 04/30/1990 Page: 15 
We have before us a request from the defendants for atorneys' 

fees for work done on V-l's appeal of the fee award. A party who 

successfully defends a section 1983 action and is awarded 

attorneys' fees, then successfully defends an appeal of that fee 

award, may recover attorney's fees for services rendered on the 

appeal. See Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d 1261, 1266 & n.3 (10th 

Cir. 1988). The standard for awarding fees remains the same as 

below: whether the appeal is "'frivolous, unreasonable, or 

without foundation.'" Coverdell v. Department of Social & Health 

Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 770 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hughes v. Rowe, 

449 U.S. 5, 14-15 (1980) (per curiam)). Because the appeal in No. 

89-8011 meets this standard, we grant the request and "remand to 

the district court for the sole and limited purpose of determining 

a reasonable fee for the time spent def ending on appeal the 

attorney fee award." Glass v. Pfeffer, 849 F.2d at 1268. 

No. 88-2691 is AFFIRMED. No. 89-8011 is AFFIRMED, but 

REMANDED for a determination of an appropriate attorneys' fee 

award. 

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Nos. 88-2691, 89-8011 -- V-1 Oil Company v. Wyoming 

EBELr Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

Although I agree with the majority opinion's conclusion that 

the warrantless search was unconstitutional, I cannot agree with 

its analysis of the "extraordinary circumstances" basis for 

qualified immunity. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the 

majority's holding that Gerber was protected from suit by 

qualified immunity. I have four concerns with the majority 

opinion's reliance on the extraordinary circumstances test in this 

case. 

1. Attorney's advice, without more, is insufficient as a matter 

of law to establish qualified immunity. 

My first concern with the majority's treatment of qualified 

immunity is that it advances nothing beyond receipt of an 

attorney's advice to establish the extraordinary circumstances 

necessary to bestow qualified immunity. As the majority observed, 

few things in government are more common than the receipt of legal 

advice. If the Supreme Court intended legal advice, without more, 

to be sufficient, it surely would have said so in Harlow, or it 

would have used some words other than "extraordinary" 

circumstances. 

Although the Supreme Court has not defined what it meant by 

extraordinary circumstances, the term itself suggests things such 

as (1) extreme urgency, (2) an extraordinarily important public 

interest which justifies precipitous action without careful 

exploration of the legal underpinnings, or (3) actions by the 

plaintiff which somehow mislead the defendant or invited the 

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unconstitutional conduct of the defendant. These extraordinary 

circumstances share a common characteristic, which is not present 

in mere reliance on attorney's advice, in that they are all 

somewhat beyond the control of the defendant and may be 

objectively measured. Reliance upon attorney's advice is solely 

within the control of defendants and, if that is all that were 

required, is vulnerable to manipulation by defendants in order to 

broaden their qualified immunity far beyond the parameters 

anticipated by the Supreme Court. 

This is not to say that attorney's advice is an irrelevant 

consideration. I agree with the proposition, found in many of the 

cases cited by the majority, that attorney's advice is one, but 

only one, factor to be considered. I would consider it in 

evaluating the second prong of the extraordinary circumstances 

test: i.e. whether the defendant can prove that ''he neither knew 

nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." If he 

received erroneous, but good faith, legal advice that his conduct 

was permissible, that would tend to show that he neither knew nor 

should have known that he was violating the clear legal standards, 

provided that there existed extraordinary circumstances which 

enhanced the reasonableness of his reliance upon the erroneous 

legal advice. 

Four of the cases cited in the majority opinion purport to 

discuss receipt of legal advice in the extraordinary circumstances 

framework. Watertown Equipment Co. v. Norwest Bank Watertown, 830 

F.2d 1487, 1495 (8th Cir. 1987), appeal dismissed and cert. 

denied, 486 U.S. 1001 (1988); Green v. Brantley, 719 F. Supp. 

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1570, 1583-84 (N.D. Georgia 1989), appeal dismissed, 895 F.2d 1387 

(11th Cir. 1990); Ortega v. City of Kansas, 659 F. Supp. 1201, 

1211 (D. Kan. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 875 F.2d 1497 (10th 

Cir. 1989); and Burk v. Unified School District, 646 F. Supp. 

1557, 1568 (D. Kan. 1986). Cf. Moore v. Marketplace, 754 F.2d 

1336, 1348 (7th Cir. 1985) (receipt of advice from supervisor 

created extraordinary circumstances). 

Watertown Equipment and Green expressly state that reliance on 

attorney advice is only one of several factors to be considered in 

examining qualified immunity. Similarly, in Ortega, the court, 

while not finding the defendants immune under the facts of that 

case, stated that "reliance on the advice of counsel in certain 

circumstances rises to the level of extraordinary circumstances." 

Ortega, 659 F. Supp. at 1211 (emphasis added). That language 

suggests that the advice of counsel by itself does not create 

extraordinary circumstances but that extraordinary circumstances 

requires reliance on counsel plus something more. This appears 

consistent with the two part nature of the extraordinary 

circumstances test as articulated by Harlow. Only the court in 

Burk states unequivocally that legal advice constitutes 

extraordinary circumstances. However, in Burk, the law was found 

to be unclear and reliance on the extraordinary circumstances test 

merely provided an alternative ground for relief. Thus, at most, 

we are dealing with dicta in that case. 

The other cases cited in the majority opinion that discuss 

reliance on legal advice are not cases involving the extraordinary 

circumstances defense. Rather, the majority of them merely refer 

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to the attorney's advice as evidence going to whether the law was 

unclear or not violated. See Arnsberg v. United States, 757 F.2d 

971 (9th Cir. 1985) (defendant did not violate clearly established 

law), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1086); Wells v. Dallas 

Independent School Dist., 576 F. Supp. 497, 508-09 (N.D. Tex. 

1983) (law unclear); Alexander v. Alexander, 573 F. Supp. 373, 376 

(M.D. Tenn. 1983) (Attorney advice was used by the court to show 

that defendant did not violate clearly established law. However, 

the court notes in footnote 4 that the facts could equally show 

that defendant neither knew nor should have known the law.), 

aff'd, 751 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984). Therefore, those cases 

address the basic Harlow test, which we have agreed was satisfied 

in this case. 

2. The legal advice received here cannot constitute extraordinary 

circumstances. 

Second, even assuming that receipt of attorney's advice 

without more could occasionally rise to the level of extraordinary 

circumstances, I do not believe the facts of this case justify 

invocation of the extraordinary circumstances test. The majority 

opinion makes clear that the plaintiff has satisfied the first 

Harlow test by showing that the defendant has violated a clearly 

established constitutional right of which a reasonable person 

would have known. Notwithstanding that fact, the extraordinary 

circumstance proposed in the opinion that overrides this knowledge 

is nothing more than legal advice that the requested search was 

authorized by Wyoming statute. Neither the appellate briefs nor 

the record suggests that the defendant sought or received legal 

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advice that the search would be constitutional under the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Thus, against the 

acknowledged backdrop that a reasonable person should have known 

that this search was unconstitutional, the defendant should at 

least be required to seek and obtain a specific opinion from 

counsel as to the constitutionality of the search before he can 

rebut the constructive knowledge of unconstitutionality that is 

imputed to him by virtue of the plaintiff's satisfaction of the 

first Harlow test. 

The qualified immunity cases cited in the majority opinion do 

not stand for the proposition that legal advice is a generic term 

and that one size fits all needs. In several of the cases cited 

there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the attorney's 

advice was not directed specifically to the constitutional 

question at issue. See, ~' Arnsberg, 757 F.2d at 981 (whether 

execution of a warrant violated 4th Amendment); Alexander, 573 F. 

Supp. at 378 (whether revocation of commutation of sentence 

deprived plaintiff of liberty interest without due process). 

The Ninth Circuit in Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594 (9th 

Cir. 1988), found that whether legal advice specifically addressed 

the constitutionality of the alleged action is one factor to 

consider in determining whether reliance on that advice gives rise 

to qualified immunity. See 850 F.2d at 596. In Watertown 

Equipment, the Eighth Circuit found that reliance on legal advice 

did not establish qualified immunity, in part, because the advice 

"did not unequivocally assure [defendant] of the constitutionality 

of the [state statute]." Watertown Equipment, 830 F.2d at 1495. 

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The district court in Ortega.similarly found that the 

defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the 

legal advice relied upon was not sufficiently tailored to the 

particular acts at issue. Ortega was a § 1983 suit based on the 

violation of a state extradition statute. In Ortega, the 

defendants failed to ask the attorneys the specific factual 

question of whether mailing notices to out-of-state suspects was 

proper. 

In this case, Gerber failed to ask the specific legal question 

of whether the search was constitutional but rather he sought, and 

received, advice directed only to whether such a search was 

authorized under Wyoming law. Gerber was the Northwest District 

Supervisor for the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, 

Water Quality Division and his duties included investigating 

discharges of pollution into groundwater. As a district 

supervisor with a duty to conduct investigations, he reasonably 

should have known of the constitutional implications of a 

warrantless search and should have made sufficient inquiry to have 

known the clearly established legal test under Burger for 

administrative searches. The record does not establish that 

Gerber made the necessary inquiry. 

3. The majority's holding is contrary to the Tenth Circuit case 

of Melton v. City of Oklahoma City. 

Third, I believe that the majority opinion is contrary to 

Tenth Circuit law. The Tenth Circuit authority contrary to the 

majority's holding is Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 

706, 730-731 (10th Cir.), reh'g en bane granted on other grounds, 

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888 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1989). 1 In Melton, the court held that 

attorney's advice cannot bestow immunity when conduct violates a 

clearly established right (such as we have found to exist in this 

case). The court explained: 

[The defendant] argues that he relied in good faith 

on the advice of municipal counsel in sending his letter 

to [plaintiff], and, therefore, he should be absolved of 

any personal liability for the consequences of his 

actions. While superficially attractive, this argument 

proves too much. Adopting the proffered position would 

immunize officials from liability via the simple 

expedient of consulting counsel. In Harlow, the Supreme 

Court sought to protect officials in the good faith 

exercise of discretion in areas of the law which are not 

clearly charted. However, where the law is clearly 

established, there is no justification for excusing 

individuals from liability for their actions. In sum, 

officials are presumed to know and abide by clearly 

established law. When their actions are otherwise, 

their claims of qualified immunity will fail. 

Melton, 879 F.2d at 730-31. I do not believe that Melton should 

be read so strictly that an individual can never be excused from 

liability if he acts contrary to clearly established law. See 

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19. However, I do not believe that it can 

be read so broadly that it would permit finding Gerber immune from 

suit solely upon reliance on attorney advice. 

4. The extraordinary circumstances defense was not raised below. 

Fourth, I believe that it is inappropriate to affirm on the 

basis of extraordinary circumstances when that theory was not 

1 The other Tenth Circuit cases cited by the majority are 

inapplicable because none of them deal with a situation where a 

defendant is seeking to rely on attorney's advice for immunity 

when his conduct violates clearly established law. See Powell v. 

Mickulecky, 891 F.2d 1454 (10th Cir. 1989); England V:-Hendricks, 

880 F.2d 281, 284 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1130 

(1990), and Lavicky v. Burnett, 758 F.2d 468, 476 (10th Cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1101 (1986). 

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clearly advanced or argued on appeal or, apparently, below. We 

can affirm on a ground not raised below provided the record is 

sufficiently clear to permit us to .do so and provided that both 

parties had an adequate opportunity to develop the record on the 

issue that we choose to rely upon. See Seibert v. University of 

Oklahoma, 867 F.2d 591, 597 (10th Cir. 1989). Here, I do not 

believe that the appellant has had a full and fair opportunity to 

develop in the record the lack of extraordinary circumstances such 

as urgency or compelling state interest. I also do not believe 

that appellant has had an adequate opportunity to establish that 

the legal advice sought and given may have dealt only with the 

procedural compliance with Wyoming law rather than constitutional 

issues. 

As stated in the majority's opinion, one of the factors in 

deciding whether counsel's advice can be relied upon is how 

specific and unequivocal the advice is. Unless we know all of the 

circumstances of what the defendant sought from counsel and what 

the counsel advised, I fear we are deciding this case on an 

incomplete record and in a way that is unfair to the appellant 

since we are springing this defense upon it on appeal. 

For the reasons stated above, I respectfully dissent from the 

majority opinion's holding that Gerber was immune from suit. 

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