Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03217/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03217-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry L. Rogers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L I S H 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court oi Appeals 

Tenth circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

cc:c 1 9 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 89-3217 

LARRY L. ROGERS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Kansas 

(D.C. No. 89-20018- 02) 

J ill M. Wichlens, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. 

Katz, Federal Public Defender and Frances Smylie Brown, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, with her on the brief), Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Julie A. Robinson, Assistant United States Attorney (Benjamin L. 

Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, with her on the brief), 

Kansas City, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and COOK,* 

Judge. 

COOK, District Judge. 

District 

Larry L . Rogers appeals from his conviction on one count of 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 

* The Honorable H. Dale Cook, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation . 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 1 
21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)( 1), one count of using or carrying firearms 

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and one count of using or 

carrying a machine gun during and in relation to a drug 

trafficking offense , in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) . 

I. 

In September, 1988, a special narcotics task force with the 

Johnson County, Kansas Sheriff's Office began investigating Dale 

Willeford for narcotics trafficking. (R. Supp. I, p. 13). In 

making two controlled purchases of cocaine from Willeford, an 

investigator with the task force, Richard Stutzman, learned that 

Willeford's "source" for the cocaine lived "a short distance 

away" and that his "source" could always take care of Willeford's 

cocaine needs. (~ at 18). Surveillance of Willeford led 

officers to an apartment at the Georgetown Apartment complex in 

Merriam, Kansas. (~ at 15). Officers there observed Willeford 

entering Apartment 107 at 7100 Eby Drive, which was leased to 

Rogers' co-defendant, William J. Moore. The officers also 

observed Rogers frequently entering and leaving the apartment. 

On one occasion, the surveillance team photographed Rogers 

carrying a laundry basket of clothes into the apartment. (R . 

Supp. II, p. 168) . Another time, Detective Stutzman stopped 

Roge rs near the apartment to arrange a purchase of cocaine . 

Rogers told Stutzman that the area was "dry", i.e., that he had 

no cocaine to sell, but accepted 

call later. (R. Supp. I, p. 

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a phone number from Stutzman to 

20-21). Rogers never called 

Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 2 
Stutzman, but Willeford thereafter warned Stutzman to stay away 

from his "source" . Willeford stated that Rogers had warned him 

that Stutzman was a "cop". (.l..d...a. at 22) . 

Stutzman executed an affidavit, detailing his contacts with 

Willeford and stating his belief that Willeford 's "source" was to 

be found at Apartment 107, 7100 Eby Drive , Merriam, Kansas . 

Based upon that affidavit, a search warrant for the above address 

was obtained. 

When the officers serving the search warrant knocked on the 

apartment door, Rogers answered and allowed the officers to enter 

the apartment. (R. Supp. II, p . 233) . Rogers apparently had 

been lying on the sofa in the living room. ~at 256-57). The 

apartment was small , with one bedroom. (!d. at 264) . Moore was in 

the hal l way leading into the bedroom when the officers entered. 

(l.d...._ at 234) . 

In their search of the apartment, the officers seized 51.4 

grams of cocaine , packaged in fifteen small Ziploc plastic bags. 

The officers also seized a weighing scale, small and large Ziploc 

plastic bags, snow seals for gram-size packages, dealing records 

and calculator receipts with initials next to amounts owed, all 

of which were alleged at trial to be indicative of distributing 

cocaine. (R. Supp. I, p. 35-36, 50-51). All these items, as well 

as $3,400 in currency , were recovered from the bedroom. From the 

living room, the officers seized a bong pipe and a mirror with 

cocaine residue and a razor blade on it. ( l.d...._ at 53- 54). 

The officers also seized a number of firearms during the 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 3 
execution of the search warrant. A loaded Ruger semi-automatic 

rifle was propped up on the floor of an open linen closet in the 

hallway leading to the bedroom. (~at 65). A loaded Jennings 

.22 handgun was found under the sofa cushions in the living room, 

where Rogers apparently had been lying . (~at 63). A loaded 

Smith and Wesson handgun was found in the bedroom, on the 

nightstand next to the bed. (~ at 66 ) . A loaded, British Sten 

machine gun was in an open closet in the bedroom. (~at 67). 

Ammunition for the machine gun and the other firearms was found 

in that same bedroom closet. (~at 59, 77). 

The sole item in the apartment that was identified as 

belonging to Rogers was a prescription drug bottle with his name 

on it, which was found on the nightstand in the bedroom. (~ at 

41, 104) . 

Several witnesses testified at trial that they had purchased 

cocaine from Moore. (R. Supp. II, p. 119, 217; R. Supp. III, p. 

312). These witnesses testified that they had seen various 

firearms in the apartment while purchasing cocaine there. (R. 

Supp. II, p. 121, 218; R. Supp. III, p. 313). Their testimony 

also indicated that generally Rogers would answer the door for 

cocaine purchasers. (R. Supp. II, p. 123, 199; R. Supp. III, p. 

311). The actual purchases were usually made in the bedroom of 

the apartment, although one witness tes tified that he purchased 

cocaine from Moore in the apartment's living room. (R. Supp. II, 

p. 123, 196; R. Supp. III, p. 312). Three witnesses testified 

that they purchased cocaine from Rogers at the apart ment, when 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 4 
Moore was unavailable . (R. Supp. II, p. 200, 217; R. Supp. III, 

p . 338). One witness testified that on one occasion when he 

purchased cocaine from Rogers at the apartment, Rogers met him at 

the door with a loaded handgun. (R. Supp. II, p. 199 ). Rogers 

did not testify at trial. 

After the jury found Rogers guilty on the three counts with 

which he was charged, Rogers filed a motion for judgment of 

acquittal . The trial court denied that motion, and sentenced 

Rogers to 33 months on the drug trafficking count, to five years 

on the firearms count, and to ten years on the machine gun count . 

The sentences on the firearms and machine gun counts were to run 

consecutive to the drug trafficking sentence ; Rogers' sentence 

thus totalled seventeen years and nine months. 

Rogers filed a timely appeal with this court, raising three 

issues. Rogers contends that the consecutive sentences imposed 

under section 924(c) on the two firearms counts violate the 

double jeopardy clause of the Constitution . Rogers next argues 

that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of 

acquittal, when the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty 

of the crimes charged against him. Finally, Rogers maintains 

that the trial court erred in only partially granting his motion 

to produce witnesses. For the reasons set forth below, we vacate 

the sentences imposed on the two firearms counts and remand for 

resentencing, and affirm as to the other two issues. 

II. 

In United States v . Henning. No. 89-2126 , s l ip op. (10th 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 5 
Cir. June 25, 1990), this court considered the same guestion 

confront i ng us here: whether a conviction for a single drug 

t rafficking offense will support the imposition of consecutive 

sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c ) for multiple firearms carried 

or use d in connection with that single offense. In Henning, the 

defendant was convicted of one count of possession of a 

controlled substanc e with intent t o distribute and of two counts 

of using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

offense. At the time of his arrest. Henning had a semi-automa tic 

pistol under his jacket ; a machine gun , a rifle, a pistol (all of 

which were loaded), ammunition and over twenty grams of 

me thamphetamine were found in Henning's vehic le. ~ at 4. In 

addition to the sentence on the drug offense, Henning was 

sentenced to ten years for the use of the machine gun and five 

years fo r t he use of the other firearms.~ ~ at 6. This court 

vacated the sentences on the two firearm counts against Henning, 

and remanded for resentencing. The court stated that "where a 

~ Henning was convicted under the same version of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) as was Rogers. That statute provides, in pertinent 

part: 

M1oever. during and in relation to any drug 

traffick ing crime, [] including a drug trafficking 

crime, which provides for an enhanced punishment if 

committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or 

device , for which he may be prosecuted in a court of 

the United States, uses or carries a firearm, shall, in 

addition to the punishment provided for such crime .. 

. , be sentenced to i mprisonment for five year, and if 

the firearm is a machinegun, . . . to imprisonment for 

ten years. 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1987 ) . As noted in Henning, the penalties 

under that subsection have increased significantly since 1987 . 

If the firear m is a machine gun, the mandatory consecutive 

sentence for a f irst-time conviction is twenty years . 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 6 
defendant has bee n convicted of a single drug trafficking offense 

and more than one firearm was involved, a single violation of 

§924(c)(l) may not be stacked to account for each f irearm 

seized." l..d....._ at 17. 

Rogers was convicted of only one underlying drug trafficking 

offense . We therefore vacate the sentences imposed for the two 

firearm counts against Rogers, and remand fo r r esentencing. 

III. 

Rogers challenges the trial court"s denial of his motion for 

judgment of acquittal , contending tha t the evidence was 

insufficient to proye him guilty of either actual or constructive 

p ossession of Moore's cocaine , or the use or carrying of any of 

the firearms seized from the apartment . Rogers a rgues that the 

evidence failed to s how t hat he even knew that drugs or drug 

paraphernalia were in the apartment. Rogers also argues that the 

evidence failed to tie him to the firearms located in the hallway 

and bedroom. According to Rogers, the onl y items linking him t o 

the apartment and Moore were Rogers' fortuitous presence in the 

a partment at t he time of the search warrant's execution and the 

prescription drug bottle with his name on it, found on the 

bedroom's nightstand. 

Our standard of review of the sufficiency of the evidence in 

criminal convictions is whether the evidence "both direct and 

circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom - is sufficient i f, when taken in the l ight most 

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 7 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. " United States v . 

McKinnell, 888 F.2d 669, 673 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In United States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 

1985), we stated that "mere proximity to illegal drugs, mere 

presence on the property where they are located or mere 

association with persons who do control them, without more , is 

insufficient to support a finding of possession." ~at 1397. 

We also noted that "such proxi mity, presence, or association is 

sufficient when accompanied ... with testimony connecting the 

defendant with the incriminating surrounding circumstances. "~ 

(quoting United States v. Ratcliffe, 550 F.2d 431, 434 {9th Cir. 

1977). To find that Rogers 

cocaine in the apartment, 

had constructive possession 

the evidence must demonstrate 

of the 

that 

Rogers had the "power and ability to exercise dominion and 

control over the cocaine. United States y, Medina-Ramos, 834 

F.2d 874, 876 (lOth Cir. 1987 ) . 

Here. the testimony and other evidence presented to the 

jury did not show Rogers to be an innocent bystander, caught by 

happenstance at the apartment, but rather that he was knowingly 

in a position to exercise control over the cocaine . Police 

surveillance noted Rogers frequently entering and leaving the 

apartment. Three witnesses testified that they had purchased 

cocaine from Rogers when Moore was absent from the apartment. 

That Rogers knew that drugs were present in the apartment also 

can be inferred from certain evidence. A mirror with cocaine 

residue and a razor blade on it was found on the coffee table in 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 8 
the living room, near the sofa on which Rogers had been lying 

before the execution of the search warrant. The prescription 

bottle with Rogers' name on it was found on the bedroom 

nightstand, near the cocaine, drug paraphernalia and cash 

belonging to Moore. Additionally, when Detective Stutzman 

attempted once to buy cocaine from Rogers, Rogers told Stutzman 

the area was "dry"; Rogers later warned Willeford that Stutzman 

was a "cop" , evidencing some knowledge that a sale to Stutzman 

would be risky . The evidence also demonstrated that Moore 

trusted Rogers to stay at the apartment and to sell his cocaine 

for him in 

could have 

his absence . 

reasonably 

From all of this 

found that Rogers 

evidence, the jury 

not only knew that 

cocaine was present in the apartment, but that he had the power 

and ability to exercise control over the cocaine . 

Likewise , constructive possession and use of the machine gun 

and the other firearms can be imputed to Rogers to sustain his 

convictions under section 924(c). In United States y, McKinnell, 

888 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that the "use" requirement 

in section 924(c) is met when the defendant had "ready access" to 

the firearm, and the firearm "was an integral part of his 

criminal undertaking and its availability increased the 

likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed . " l.d..... at 

675 (quoting United States v. Matra, 841 F.2d 837 , 843 {8th Cir. 

1988). 

Here, the Jennings .22 handgun was easily accessible to 

Rogers from its location under the sofa c u shions in the living 

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Appellate Case: 89-3217 Document: 01019623606 Date Filed: 12/19/1990 Page: 9 
room. The evidence indicated that the other firearms were 

visible and available. Given the evidence of the compactness of 

the apartment, the jury reasonably could have found that the 

other firearms, although located in the hallway closet and the 

bedroom, were nonetheless accessible to Rogers, should the need 

fo r their use arise. From this evidence, and the testimony of 

one witness that Rogers once answered the apartment's door with a 

gun in his hand. the jury could have concluded that the machine 

gun and the other firearms had value to Rogers and Moore for 

purposes of protection and intimidation, and thus were an 

integral part of the cocaine-selling operation. 

We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the 

jury 's conviction of Rogers on all charged counts, and affirm the 

trial court's denial of Rogers' motion for acquittal. 

IV. 

On June 5, 1989, Rogers filed a motion for the production of 

witnesses, pursuant to F.R.Cr.P. 17(b), with the trial court. In 

that motion, Rogers requested subpoenas be i ssued, at the 

government's expense, for the production of five witnesses. The 

trial court granted Rogers' motion as to one of the five 

witnesses, but denied his motion as to the remaining four 

witnesses. 

Rogers contends here that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion to produce one of the requested four witnesses. 

Rogers maintains that that witness, a Sergeant Smith of the 

Merriam, Kansas Police Department could have given testimony 

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contradicting that given by other police officers as to the 

location where the Jennings .22 handgun was found during the 

search of the apartment. According to Rogers, Sergeant Smith 

would have testified that the gun was found under the cushions of 

a nearby loveseat, instead of the couch, where Rogers had been 

lying just before the search. Rogers alleges that the police 

testimony as to the location of the Jennings handgun was the only 

evidence to link Rogers to Moore~s possession of cocaine, and 

that Smith could have controverted that testimony. 

F . R.Cr.P. 17(b) provides that a defendant, in order to 

secure witnesses at government expense, must show that he is 

financially unable to pay the fees of the witness and that the 

presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense. 

However, this rule does not create an absolute right of the 

defendant to have a witness produced at the government~ s expense; 

rather, it is within the court~s discretion whether the requested 

witness is necessary to an adequate defense. United States v. 

Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 374 (lOth Cir. 1972). 

We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying 

Rogers' motion to produce Sergeant Smith . Rogers' motion made 

only the single assertion that all five requested witnesses were 

necessary for an adequate defense and made no particularized 

showing to the trial court as to the need for Sergeant Smith's 

testimony. Rogers therefore did not carry the burden of making a 

satisfactory showing of necessity. United States v. Stoker, 522 

F.2d 576, 578 (lOth Cir. 1975). 

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v. 

In conclusion, we VACATE the sentences imposed on the second 

and fourth counts and REMAND for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. 

§924(c)(l) in accordance with this opinion. We AFFIRM as to all 

other issues. 

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