Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01217/USCOURTS-caDC-15-01217-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Petitioner
Tito Contractors, Inc.
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 11, 2016 Decided February 3, 2017 

No. 15-1217 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

PETITIONER

v. 

TITO CONTRACTORS, INC., 

RESPONDENT

Consolidated with 15-1226 

On Application for Enforcement and Petition 

for Review of an Order of the 

National Labor Relations Board 

Jonathan W. Greenbaum argued the cause and was on 

brief for Tito Contractors, Inc. 

Michael Ellement, Attorney, National Labor Relations 

Board, argued the cause for the National Labor Relations 

Board. Richard Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Jennifer 

Abruzzo, Deputy General Counsel, John H. Ferguson, 

Associate General Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, and Jill A. Griffin, Supervisory Attorney, 

were with him on brief. 

USCA Case #15-1217 Document #1659251 Filed: 02/03/2017 Page 1 of 21
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Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON. 

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Tito 

Contractors, Inc. (Tito) is a Washington, D.C.-based general 

contracting company. As it turns out, that label covers a 

diverse set of services, ranging from masonry to snow removal 

and recycling services. This case involves the question of 

what bargaining unit is appropriate when so varied a workforce 

seeks union representation. The National Labor Relations 

Board (NLRB or Board) concluded that Tito’s employees 

should be included in a “wall-to-wall” bargaining unit. We 

believe that the Board failed to consider evidence pointing to 

the absence of the required “community of interest” among 

them. We therefore grant Tito’s petition for review, deny the 

NLRB’s application for enforcement and remand to the Board 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

I. BACKGROUND 

In November 2013, the International Union of Painters 

and Allied Trades, District Council 51, AFL-CIO (Union) filed 

a representation petition with the NLRB. The Union sought to 

represent “[a]ll employees employed by [Tito], excluding all 

project managers, recycling supervisors, clerical employees, 

managerial employees, professional employees, guards, and 

supervisors as defined by the [National Labor Relations] Act” 

(Act). Joint Appendix (JA) 116. The following month, an 

NLRB hearing officer (HO) held a hearing on the Union’s 

petition. Tito raised two objections: first, that the proposed 

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bargaining unit was inappropriate because its members did not 

share a sufficient “community of interest” and, second, certain 

employees should be excluded from the bargaining unit 

because they were supervisors within the meaning of the Act. 

We focus on the first of the challenges. Considering that 

challenge, the HO advised Tito that a “wall-to-wall unit of all 

employees employed by the [e]mployer involves a 

presumption . . . of appropriateness under Board law[.]” Id. at 

15. She informed Tito that it was therefore “required to 

present an offer of proof that the unit sought is inappropriate.” 

Id. Tito objected to the offer-of-proof procedure, arguing that 

it instead had the right to present testimony and other evidence 

on the issue of unit appropriateness. 

Notwithstanding its objection, Tito made an offer of proof, 

describing its business at some length. It divided Tito’s 

operations into two halves: the “labor or contract side of the 

business” and the recycling side. Id. at 23. Tito further 

divided the labor side into three groups of employees: two 

mechanics, one warehouse employee and multiple laborers.1

 

Regarding the first, Tito explained that it employed two 

mechanics who worked full-time in its Georgia Avenue office 

in the District of Columbia (District). The two performed 

routine maintenance on Tito vehicles but performed no work 

for Tito customers. Both mechanics “receive[d] benefits and 

vacation.” Id. at 20. Second, Tito explained that its one 

warehouse employee worked full-time in Kensington, MD. 

There, he coordinated and received deliveries and organized 

 1

 Tito used “laborers” to refer to employees on the labor side of 

its business. JA 21. It referred to its recycling employees simply 

as “employees.” Id. at 23–29. Tito did not identify how many 

laborers it employed; instead, it noted that it had approximately 57 

employees providing recycling services and approximately 100 

employees in toto, excluding managerial and clerical employees. 

See id. at 19, 23. 

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the Tito warehouse. He was the only employee there and 

performed no contracting services. Third, Tito laborers 

worked in crews, performing a variety of tasks for its 

customers. Some laborers worked as painters, others as 

skilled masons and others as tile installers and carpenters. 

Some crews were assigned to “more permanent contracts[,]” 

id. at 22, of which Tito provided a few examples. For 

example, four employees worked under Tito’s contract with 

Arlington County, VA. The four reported to Arlington 

County’s maintenance office each morning and complied with 

the “task orders” they received there. The tasks ranged from 

repairs to construction to snow removal. Arlington County 

controlled the Tito laborers’ working hours and could request 

that they be removed from or remain on the job site. In 

addition, Tito had contracts with Baltimore, MD, and Fairfax 

County, VA, which contracts set forth specific work hours and 

standards for how Tito laborers were to complete their work. 

Tito also offered proof of the recycling side of its business. 

It had three separate recycling contracts with Maryland 

Environmental Services (MES) under which nearly sixty Tito 

employees worked at several recycling facilities in Maryland. 

The first contract covered two locations in Montgomery 

County, MD: a compost facility in Dickerson and a transfer 

station in Derwood. Tito employees at the Dickerson location 

performed such tasks as bagging compost, stacking bags, 

wrapping pallets, monitoring temperatures and 

groundskeeping. 2 The Derwood employees’ duties, in 

contrast, included traffic control, equipment cleaning, 

groundskeeping and temperature monitoring. Under this 

contract, MES exercised considerable control of the Tito 

employees. For example, MES determined the number of 

 2

 The groundskeeping duties included, among other things, 

“mowing, weed eating, . . . leaf blower usage, litter control, 

housekeeping[] [and] painting.” JA 25. 

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employees needed and their hours, established their minimum 

pay rate, approved or denied overtime and “provide[d] that 

employees at these two facilities . . . be offered . . . [,] 

if . . . eligible . . . [,] medical and dental insurance.” Id. at 25–

26. 

The second contract covered a different Derwood facility. 

At this facility, twenty-five Tito employees and one Tito 

supervisor sorted recyclables on a conveyor belt. They also 

performed minor custodial duties. Like the first, their contract 

included a minimum pay rate and provision for medical and 

dental insurance. In addition, Tito employees generally 

worked a ten-hour shift each day Monday through Thursday, 

with a half-hour unpaid lunch break and relief breaks as 

approved by an MES supervisor. 

The third MES contract covered a recycling facility in 

Cockeysville, MD. The contract required both skilled and 

unskilled labor, including provision of recycling services. 

Like the other MES contracts, the Cockeysville contract set a 

minimum pay rate. Tito employees working in Cockeysville 

were paid less than their counterparts in Dickerson and 

Derwood and they were not eligible for benefits. 

After Tito completed its offer of proof, the HO went off 

the record for seven minutes. Once back on the record, she 

announced that “[a]fter consulting with the [r]egional 

management, [she] receive[d] [Tito’s] officer of proof” but 

declared that “the evidence proffered [was] rejected” and that 

she did not intend to “permit testimony on [the 

bargaining-unit] issue.” Id. at 29. Tito objected, arguing that 

section 9 of the Act affords an employer a “hearing on issues 

subject to the petition.” Id. The HO noted Tito’s objection 

but instructed it to present its first witness on the supervisor 

issue only. 

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During the hearing, two Tito witnesses testified—a Tito 

general manager and a Tito supervisor—on the supervisor 

issue. After their testimony concluded, Tito renewed its 

objection to the offer-of-proof procedure. It argued, in part: 

Section 9(c)(1) of the Act affords the 

[e]mployer the opportunity to present evidence 

and witnesses for a full hearing on the 

representation petition. In this case, the 

Regional Director[ 3

] took an offer of proof. 

Within a couple of minutes of providing that 

offer of proof, the Regional Director made a 

decision without a transcript and literally within 

a couple of minutes [made] a determination that 

the Employer would have to rest on the record 

on that issue with an offer of proof without the 

availability of presenting witnesses and 

evidence. 

Id. at 108. 

 Eleven days after the hearing, and after only Tito filed a 

post-hearing brief, the Board’s Acting Regional Director 

issued a Decision and Direction of Election. In it, he 

concluded that the HO properly exercised her discretion in 

following the offer-of-proof procedure. Importantly, he 

acknowledged that “[t]here [was] no evidence of any 

interchange between the recycling employees, or between the 

recycling employees and any other classification of 

employee.” Id. at 120. But he also noted that Tito had not 

proposed an alternative bargaining unit. He then concluded 

Tito had not overcome the “presumption” that an 

employer-wide unit was appropriate. Tito thereafter sought 

 3 The HO clarified that she—not the Regional 

Director—decided that Tito’s offer of proof was insufficient. 

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Board review. In the meantime, a mail-ballot election was 

held between February 28, 2014 and March 14, 2014. 

 On November 17, 2014, the Board rejected Tito’s 

unit-appropriateness petition, stating that “[t]he Employer’s 

Request for Review of the Acting Regional Director’s 

Decision and Direction of Election is denied as it raises no 

substantial issues warranting review” and that “[t]he 

Employer’s request to reopen the record is denied.” Id. at 

162. The Board also included the following footnote: 

In denying review, we agree with the Acting 

Regional Director that the Employer has not 

overcome the presumptive appropriateness of 

the unit sought by the Petitioner. The 

petitioned-for employees work for the same 

employer in facilities located in a common 

geographical region and perform skilled and 

unskilled physical work. There is some 

evidence that the warehouse employee 

sometimes assists with other Employer projects 

besides the warehouse and coordinates 

shipments and deliveries with other employees. 

Further, there is no evidence of collective 

bargaining in smaller units and no party seeks to 

represent any of the employees in a smaller 

unit. Finally, the Employer has not proposed 

any alternative units. Member Miscimarra 

would grant review and evaluate the record 

evidence regarding the appropriateness of the 

petitioned-for unit. 

Id.

 Shortly thereafter, the ballots were counted and the Union 

prevailed. Tito lodged three objections to the election, 

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including a challenge to the balloting by mail. The Board 

eventually rejected the objections and certified the Union. 

Tito refused to bargain with the Union and the Union then filed 

an unfair labor practice complaint. The Board General 

Counsel moved to transfer proceedings from the applicable 

regional director to the Board and also moved for summary 

judgment. Tito did not respond and the Board granted 

summary judgment, ordering Tito to bargain with the Union. 

Tito thereafter filed a petition for review in this Court and the 

Board cross-applied for enforcement of its order. 

II. ANALYSIS 

Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that a 

representative selected “by the majority of the employees in a 

unit appropriate for [collective-bargaining] purposes” is to be 

the employees’ exclusive collective-bargaining representative. 

29 U.S.C. § 159(a). The Board “shall decide in each case 

whether . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 

bargaining [is] the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or 

subdivision thereof . . . .” Id. § 159(b). Although the 

Board’s discretion to pick a bargaining unit is “broad,” NLRB 

v. Action Auto., Inc., 469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985), it is not 

unlimited; for example, the Board may not give controlling 

weight to the extent to which the employees have organized, 29 

U.S.C. § 159(c)(5). In deciding what bargaining unit is 

appropriate, the Board has long presumed that an 

employer-wide bargaining unit is appropriate, absent a 

sufficient showing to the contrary. See, e.g., Greenhorne & 

O’Mara, Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 514, 516 (1998); Montgomery 

Cty. Opportunity Bd., 249 N.L.R.B. 880, 881 (1980). 

When a labor union files a petition for a representation 

election, section 9(c) of the Act requires the Board to 

investigate. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1). If the Board has 

“reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation 

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affecting commerce exists,” it is to “provide for an appropriate 

hearing upon due notice.” Id. At the time of the hearing in 

this case, regulations provided that all parties must be 

“afforded full opportunity to present their respective positions 

and to produce the significant facts in support of their 

contentions.” 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (2014).4 Additionally, 

the regulations also make it “the duty of the hearing officer to 

inquire fully into all matters and issues necessary to obtain a 

full and complete record upon which the Board or the regional 

director may discharge their duties under section 9(c) of the 

Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.64(b) (2013).5

 

In its petition to this Court, Tito challenges the 

offer-of-proof procedure used by the HO and endorsed by the 

Board. It also challenges the Board’s ultimate conclusion that 

an employer-wide bargaining unit is appropriate for Tito’s 

multi-faceted business. 

A. PROCEDURAL OBJECTION

 The core of Tito’s regulation-based argument is that, by 

rejecting its offer of proof and approving an employer-wide 

unit based on a presumption, the HO failed to “inquire fully 

into all matters and issues necessary to obtain a full and 

 4

 The NLRB eliminated this regulation, effective April 14, 

2015. Representation—Case Procedures, 79 Fed. Reg. 74,308, 

74,308, 74,384 (Dec. 15, 2014). The revised regulations clarify that 

many issues, including employees’ eligibility to vote, can be 

deferred until after the election. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. 

§§ 102.64(a)–(b), 102.66(a). 

5

 This provision is now qualified by the phrase “[s]ubject to the 

provisions of § 102.66[.]” Among other things, § 102.66 authorizes 

an HO to solicit an offer of proof and a regional director to reject the 

evidence described therein if insufficient to sustain the offeror’s 

position. 29 C.F.R. § 102.66(c). 

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complete record” and to “afford[] [Tito] full opportunity to 

present [its] position[] and to produce the significant facts in 

support” thereof. 29 C.F.R. § 101.20(c) (2014); 29 C.F.R. 

§ 102.64(b) (2013). Nevertheless, both the Board 

Casehandling Manual and Board precedent confirm that the 

Board has historically regarded the offer-of-proof approach as 

sound and “we give controlling weight to the Board’s 

interpretation of its own rule unless it is plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation itself.” Rush Univ. Med. Ctr. 

v. NLRB, 833 F.3d 202, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

First, the Casehandling Manual provides in pertinent part: 

When the hearing officer rejects proffered 

testimony or refuses to allow a line of 

testimony, it may be appropriate to suggest that 

the party adversely affected make an offer of 

proof. If after reviewing the offer of proof, the 

hearing officer continues to reject the testimony 

or line of inquiry, a brief record of the rejected 

material is present in the record for later review. 

The offer, in essence, is a statement that, if the 

named witness were permitted to testify on the 

matters excluded, he/she would testify to 

specified facts. The facts should be set forth in 

detail; an offer in summary form or consisting 

of conclusions is insufficient. 

An offer of proof may take the form of an oral 

statement on the record, a written statement to 

be included in the record (copies and service as 

with motions, Sec. 11225) or in the unusual 

situation, with permission of the hearing 

officer, specific questions of and answers by the 

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witness. The latter often lengthens the record 

unnecessarily and should be avoided. 

Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Casehandling Manual, Pt. 2, 

Representation Proceedings, § 11226 (Aug. 2007). This 

provision plainly supports the procedure the HO used here. 

Elsewhere, the Casehandling Manual provides that, if “the unit 

sought . . . is presumptively appropriate, then only limited 

evidence may be allowed where a party takes a position as to 

alternative units.” Id. § 11217 (emphasis in original). But 

“such evidence may be precluded in certain circumstances.” 

Id. If an employer which, unlike Tito, proposes an alternative 

unit can present only “limited” evidence, then Tito—which did 

not “take[] a position” on an alternative unit—should not be 

heard to complain that it is entitled to more under Board 

regulations. 

 The offer-of-proof procedure is also consistent with Board 

precedent. In In re Laurel Associates, Inc. d/b/a Jersey Shore 

Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, the union sought to 

represent a presumptively appropriate unit comprising, in 

effect, all eligible service and maintenance employees. 325 

N.L.R.B. 603, 603 (1998). At the hearing, the employer 

argued that three smaller units were more appropriate and the 

HO then directed it to make an offer of proof. Id. The offer 

of proof showed that each proposed unit differed in terms of 

supervision, job functions, wage rates and training 

requirements. Id. It also showed that no interchange existed 

among the three proposed units. Id. The HO rejected the 

offer of proof and precluded further evidence on the issue, 

noting that the proposed wall-to-wall unit was presumptively 

appropriate. Id. The regional director and, ultimately, the 

Board upheld the decision. Id. Laurel Associates, then, is 

direct precedent supporting the use of an offer of proof in lieu 

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of oral testimony if the petitioned-for unit is presumptively 

appropriate.6

 Nor are we persuaded by Tito’s claim that “[f]ederal 

courts have . . . held that the Board’s refusal to allow an 

employer to litigate the appropriateness of a bargaining unit 

constitutes reversible error.” Pet’r’s Br. 20. Tito’s argument 

rests on three cases—NLRB v. Indianapolis Mack Sales & 

Service, Inc., 802 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1986), NLRB v. St. Francis 

Hospital of Lynwood, 601 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1979) and Ozark 

Automotive Distributors, Inc. v. NLRB, 779 F.3d 576 (D.C. Cir. 

2015)—each of which is distinguishable. 

In Ozark, the only one decided by this Court, the employer 

challenged a union representation election, alleging that union 

agents interfered with the election. 779 F.3d at 577–78. 

Before the HO’s hearing, the employer served subpoenas 

duces tecum on the union and on an employee who allegedly 

 6

 Tito does not discuss Laurel Associates; it instead relies on 

the NLRB’s earlier decision in Barre-National, Inc., 316 N.L.R.B. 

877 (1995), which has since been overruled. 79 Fed. Reg. at 

74,386; see NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, 416 U.S. 

267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he choice between rulemaking and 

adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s 

discretion . . . .”). In Barre-National, the union sought to represent 

a unit of all warehouse and distribution, production and maintenance 

employees. 316 N.L.R.B. at 877. The employer argued that 24 

individuals within the group were supervisors and thus ineligible for 

inclusion. Id. The HO allowed the employer to make only an offer 

of proof as to the supervisors’ status. Id. at 878. The Board on 

review concluded that the hearing had been improperly curtailed, id., 

stressing that its conclusion was “based on the facts of this case.” Id.

at 878 n.9. The Board order, however, did not explain which facts it 

regarded as critical to its decision. At a minimum, its focus on 

supervisory status rather than unit-appropriateness distinguishes it 

from this case. 

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acted as its agent. Id. at 578. The union and the employee 

objected, including on attorney-client privilege and 

work-product grounds. Id. The HO did not rule on the 

subpoenas until the end of the hearing in case the employer 

could elicit “some of the evidence through testimony[.]” Id.

(internal quotation marks omitted). At the close of testimony 

and without conducting an in camera review, the HO quashed 

the subpoenas. Id. at 578–79, 581. The employer appealed 

to the Board; however, the Board adopted her findings and 

recommendations and certified the union. Id. at 579. One 

Board member dissented because, in his view, the HO 

improperly focused on the employees’ privacy interest to the 

exclusion of the employer’s interests. Id. The employer 

persisted in its refusal to negotiate with the union and the 

Board upheld the union’s subsequent unfair labor practice 

charge. Id. at 579–80. We granted the employer’s petition 

for review, id. at 586, concluding that both the HO and the 

Board failed to balance the employees’ interests against the 

employer’s need for the documents, id. at 581. We noted that 

the NLRB Guide for Hearing Officers instructs an HO, if faced 

with a confidentiality objection, to consider reviewing the 

subpoenaed documents in camera to determine whether the 

objection can be met by redacting the documents or limiting 

the subpoena’s scope. Id. at 582. The HO had done neither. 

Id. Nor was the error harmless because it could have affected 

the employer’s presentation at the hearing. Id. at 582, 585–

86. Ozark is thus easily distinguished: it did not treat the 

offer-of-proof procedure. 

Tito’s out-of-circuit caselaw is likewise distinguishable. 

In Indianapolis Mack, the employer contracted with a 

nationwide business to acquire the latter’s subsidiary’s 

Indianapolis factory. 802 F.2d at 282. The employer 

subsequently refused to negotiate with the union that 

represented employees in the factory’s service and parts 

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departments and the union’s unfair labor practice charge 

followed. Id. At the hearing, the employer challenged the 

bargaining unit’s appropriateness but the administrative law 

judge (ALJ) declared that the issue was not properly before 

her. Id. In her subsequent decision, however, she concluded 

that the bargaining unit composed of service department 

employees only was, as a matter of law, appropriate. Id. at 

282–83. The Board agreed but the Seventh Circuit denied its 

enforcement application. Id. at 283, 286. The court reasoned 

that the Board’s bargaining-unit determination was improper, 

in part because the Board made the determination on the basis 

of the record before the ALJ, who had not permitted 

unit-appropriateness evidence because she wrongly believed 

the issue was not before her. Id. at 283–84. In our view, 

Tito’s reliance on Indianapolis Mack Sales & Service might be 

well-placed but for one critical difference—Tito’s offer of 

proof. The employer in Indianapolis Mack made no offer of 

proof. Id. at 286 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Because Tito’s 

offer of proof did address—however summarily—the 

appropriateness of the wall-to-wall unit, Indianapolis Mack is 

of scant support to Tito. 

In St. Francis Hospital, the union petitioned to represent 

the hospital’s registered nurses. 601 F.2d at 407. The 

hospital argued that the bargaining unit should include all

professional employees and sought to present supporting 

testimony and other evidence. Id. The HO did not admit the 

evidence, relying on NLRB precedent holding that registered 

nurses, if they desired, were entitled to their own bargaining 

unit. Id. Although the hospital made an offer of proof before 

the HO, the reviewing regional director subsequently 

concluded that registered nurses comprised an appropriate unit 

and the Board agreed. Id. The Ninth Circuit, however, 

concluded that the Board improperly relied on a per se rule of 

bargaining-unit appropriateness. Id. at 413–16. Unlike in St. 

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Francis Hospital, the HO here (presumably) evaluated Tito’s 

offer of proof when she went off the record for seven minutes. 

Tito’s final argument is that the offer-of-proof procedure 

runs afoul of the text of two statutory provisions. Tito first 

argues the Act requires the Board to “decide in each 

case . . . the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective 

bargaining,” 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (emphasis added). The HO, 

regional director and Board did consider case-specific facts in 

deciding—rightly or wrongly—that the wall-to-wall 

bargaining unit was appropriate. 

Tito’s second statutory argument posits that the decision 

does not comply with section 9(c)(5)’s command that, “[i]n 

determining whether a unit is appropriate . . . [,] the extent to 

which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.” 

Id. § 159(c)(5). As we have explained, the Board’s 

unit-appropriateness presumptions give “the [u]nion an initial 

advantage” but “[t]his modest benefit . . . hardly grants 

‘controlling’ weight to the extent the [u]nion ha[d] organized 

the employees.” Sundor Brands, Inc. v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 515, 

519 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Similarly, presuming a wall-to-wall 

bargaining unit’s appropriateness is not synonymous with 

granting controlling weight to a union’s organizing effort. 

B. APPROPRIATENESS OF WALL-TO-WALL 

BARGAINING UNIT

 Tito’s substantive challenge to the appropriateness of the 

wall-to-ball bargaining unit has more “substance.” In our 

view, the Board did not adequately consider the ample 

evidence manifesting that Tito’s employees lacked a 

community of interest. 

We start with the principle that the Board’s decision as to 

the appropriate bargaining unit “is entitled to wide deference.” 

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United Food & Commercial Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 519 

F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “In determining whether a unit is appropriate, the 

Board focuses on whether the employees share a community of 

interest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The 

Board considers ‘a variety of factors, including the employees’ 

wages, hours and other working conditions; commonality of 

supervision; degree of skill and common functions; frequency 

of contact and interchange with other employees; and 

functional integration.’” Id. (quoting Sundor Brands, 168 

F.3d at 518). Nevertheless, we have granted a petition for 

review if the NLRB’s “bargaining unit determination . . . is 

arbitrary or not supported by substantial evidence in the 

record.” Blue Man Vegas, LLC v. NLRB, 529 F.3d 417, 420 

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e 

may not find substantial evidence ‘merely on the basis of 

evidence which in and of itself justified [the Board’s decision], 

without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence 

from which conflicting inferences could be drawn.’” 

Lakeland Bus Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 955, 962 (D.C. 

Cir. 2003) (second alteration in original) (quoting Universal 

Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). “[T]he 

substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in 

the record fairly detracts from its weight.” Id. at 961–62 

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Universal Camera 

Corp., 340 U.S. at 488). 

 In our view, the Board order is not supported by 

substantial evidence. The Board does not discuss the portions 

of Tito’s offer of proof which plainly showed no community of 

interest. Tito’s offer of proof contains at least three types of 

evidence contradicting the Board’s conclusion. First, the 

Board fails to recognize the unchallenged assertion that Tito’s 

business comprised two discrete halves—a labor side and a 

recycling services side. As Tito explained, its laborers’ tasks 

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included such varied duties as painting, tile installation and 

snow removal. Most of its employees on the labor side of the 

business performed work exclusively for Tito. In contrast, all 

of Tito’s recycling employees worked on site at Maryland 

recycling facilities where they did not “perform labor work,” 

JA 24, but instead bagged compost and sorted recyclables. 

These employees worked in different locations several miles 

apart and the recycler, MES, exercised considerable control 

over their working conditions. The Board minimizes these 

plain—and specific—differences with its generic observation 

that “[t]he petitioned-for employees work for the same 

employer in facilities located in a common geographical region 

and perform skilled and unskilled physical work.” Id. at 162 

n.1. But how does the Board’s hyper-generalized description 

of Tito’s employees’ responsibilities reflect a community of 

interest? The Board offers only silence. 

Second, the Board also fails to consider the lack of 

interchange among the different types of Tito employees. 

Significantly, the Acting Regional Director himself noted that 

“[t]here [was] no evidence of any interchange between the 

recycling employees, or between the recycling employees and 

any other classification of employee.” Id. at 120 (emphasis 

added). For example, on Tito’s recycling side, the 

Cockeysville facility is approximately sixty miles from the 

Derwood facility, meaning that its employees could not easily 

move between the two if one facility was short-staffed. This 

distance alone belies the existence of meaningful interchange 

between the recycling employees and Tito’s labor-side 

employees. Indeed, the distances among Tito’s various 

worksites were cited as a reason to conduct a mail-ballot 

election. Id. at 170. And yet, the Board ignored that 

employee interchange was lacking. Instead, it summarily 

concluded that the employees worked “in facilities located in a 

common geographical region” and that there was “some 

USCA Case #15-1217 Document #1659251 Filed: 02/03/2017 Page 17 of 21
18 

evidence that the warehouse employee sometimes assists with 

other [e]mployer projects . . . and coordinates shipments and 

deliveries with other employees.” Id. at 162 n.1. The Board 

did not explain how these isolated facts, even if true, supersede 

the lack of evidence that interchange exists among Tito’s two 

mechanics, one warehouseman and its many laborers (who 

themselves are separated). 

 Third, the Board overlooks the significant differences 

among Tito’s employees’ “wages, hours and other working 

conditions.” United Food & Commercial Workers, 519 F.3d 

at 494. Tito’s Cockeysville employees receive no fringe 

benefits and are paid less than the Dickerson and Derwood 

employees to whom both medical and dental insurance is 

available. Moreover, the three MES contracts set minimum 

pay rates for Tito’s recycling employees. These important 

differences tend to undermine the conclusion that Tito’s 

employees share a community of interest. Because the Board 

failed to take this evidence into account, its conclusion is not 

supported by substantial evidence. Lakeland Bus Lines, 347 

F.3d at 961–62. 

For the foregoing reasons, we grant Tito’s petition for 

review, deny the Board’s application for enforcement and 

remand to the Board for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #15-1217 Document #1659251 Filed: 02/03/2017 Page 18 of 21
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I write separately to give a word to the wise: although the 

Board’s order, composed of two sentences of text and a 

footnote analysis of the unit-appropriateness issue (which 

analysis also acknowledges its dissenting colleague’s view) is 

apparently standard operating procedure at this stage, the 

Board will continue to run the risk of a court-imposed re-do if 

it persists—especially when, en route to the Board’s review, 

the HO, inter alia, likewise fails to consider adequately the 

offered proof. It might be better served by rethinking its 

drumhead procedure. 

USCA Case #15-1217 Document #1659251 Filed: 02/03/2017 Page 19 of 21
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in granting

the petition for review, and denying the Board’s crossapplication for enforcement of its Order. With respect to the

challenge to the Board’s finding of the appropriateness of the

company-wide bargaining unit, Op. Part II.B, I concur for the

following reasons. The Board’s decision failed to come to grips

with record evidence offered by the petitioner that potentially

detracts from the conclusion that the company-wide bargaining

unit sought by the Union was appropriate. See Tito Contractors,

Inc. v. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades, Dist. Council 51

(AFL-CIO), NLRB Case 05-RC-117169 at 1 n.1 (Nov. 17, 2014)

(“2014 Decision”). As the court recounts, the evidence

suggested that the petitioner’s business was divided into two

halves, where working conditions varied between and within the

two halves. See Op. 16-18. The Board’s finding is therefore

unsupported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 

See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491

(1951); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e). 

Of course, in determining whether employees share a

“community of interests” making a bargaining unit appropriate,

RC Aluminum Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 326 F.3d 235, 239 (D.C.

Cir. 2003), the Board considers a “host of factors” and “no

particular factor controls,” id. at 240. But the challenged

decision makes it difficult to discern the Board’s rationale for

concluding that the petitioner failed to overcome the

presumptive appropriateness of the company-wide bargaining

unit. See NBCUniversal Media, LLC v. NLRB, 815 F.3d 821,

829 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The Board makes conclusory findings,

such as that employees work in a “common geographical region

and perform skilled and unskilled physical work.” 2014

Decision at 1 n.1. It also fails to explain why the few facts on

which it relies, such as “some evidence” that a single employee

“sometimes assists” others, id., should take precedence over

other record evidence that appears to detract from the Board’s

conclusion, see Op. 16-18.

USCA Case #15-1217 Document #1659251 Filed: 02/03/2017 Page 20 of 21
2

 On remand, the Board will have the opportunity to address

fully the evidence offered by the petitioner regarding the

structure and operation of its business that potentially detracts

from the Board’s broadly stated conclusion on appropriateness.

See Sundor Brands, Inc. v. NLRB, 168 F.3d 515, 519 (D.C. Cir.

1999); Op. at 16-18. Accordingly, I “express no opinion upon

the question whether the factors for which there is support in the

record could suffice by themselves to support the Board’s

present unit determination.” Sundor Brands, Inc., 168 F.3d at

520. But see Op. at 16. It remains open to the Board to reach

the same conclusion about the appropriateness of a companywide bargaining unit upon providing a reasoned explanation that

“take[s] into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from

its weight.” Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488; see

NLRB v. Sw. Reg’l Council of Carpenters, 826 F.3d 460, 465-66

(D.C. Cir. 2016). There is no occasion to comment further, as

“clarity” in explication of its opinion, not particular formatting,

is what is asked of the Board. Shepard v. NLRB, 459 U.S. 344,

350 (1983) (quoting Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S.

177, 197 (1941)). But see Concurring Op. (Henderson, J.).

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