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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Antonio Valdez
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 11, 2013 Decided July 16, 2013

No. 11-3086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTONIO VALDEZ, ALSO KNOWN AS TONY,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:09-cr-00281-10)

Dennis M. Hart, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. Machen Jr.,

U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. Kolb, and

John K. Han, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: GARLAND, Chief Judge, ROGERS, Circuit Judge,

and SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SENTELLE.

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SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Antonio

Valdez appeals his conviction for drug conspiracy and his 240-

month sentence, claiming errors by the district court, improper

closing argument by the government, and unresolved sentencing

issues. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of

the district court.

Background

In 2009 law-enforcement authorities received information

that Mouloukou Toure was dealing heroin in the Washington,

D.C. area. The authorities wiretapped Toure’s phone and

conducted surveillance of his movements, noticing that Toure

interacted with appellant Antonio Valdez (known as “Tony”)

and an acquaintance of Valdez, David Diaz Garcia. 

Subsequently, Valdez and several others, including Toure and

Diaz Garcia, were arrested and charged with, inter alia,

conspiracy to distribute heroin. After being arrested, Valdez and

Diaz Garcia were incarcerated in the same jail cell, at which

time Valdez allegedly threatened Diaz Garcia in an attempt to

prevent him from cooperating with authorities. Valdez was

subsequently indicted on counts of narcotics conspiracy and

witness tampering. Before trial, Valdez moved to sever the drug

conspiracy charge from the witness tampering charge. The

district court denied the motion. 

During trial, Toure and Diaz Garcia, both of whom had

pleaded guilty and cooperated with the government, testified

against Valdez. Intercepted phone calls between the

conspirators were played for the jury, including one between

Valdez and Toure in which Toure called Valdez “Montana.” 

Also introduced during trial was an arrest record of Valdez in

2004 in Maryland for distribution of cocaine. During closing

arguments the prosecutor, after reminding the jury that Toure

had called Valdez “Montana” in one of the intercepted phone

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calls, made reference, over defense counsel’s objection, to: the

movie “Scar Face;” the character played by Al Pacino, Tony

Montana; and Tony Montana’s role in the drug business. 

Valdez was found guilty by the jury of narcotics conspiracy but

acquitted of the witness tampering charge. At sentencing,

discussions were held concerning Valdez’s eligibility for a

safety valve exemption and/or a Smith departure as a deportable

alien. In the end, the district court sentenced Valdez to the

statutory mandatory-minimum of 240 months.

Valdez appeals, arguing that the district court committed

two reversible errors; that the government made improper

remarks during its closing argument; and that two sentencing

issues were left unresolved.

Discussion

Alleged Errors by the District Court

Valdez asserts that the district court committed two errors,

each of which requires that his conviction be reversed. The first

error alleged by Valdez is that the district court should not have

permitted the government to introduce evidence, pursuant to

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), of prior drug activity by Valdez unrelated

to the charges in this case. The prior drug activity concerned a

2004 conviction in Maryland for distributing cocaine. The

district court allowed the conviction to be introduced as relevant

to issues of Valdez’s knowledge and intent in the drug charge. 

Valdez argues that knowledge and intent were not disputed, and

that the true use of the prior drug charge was to suggest that

Valdez was inclined to deal drugs, in violation of the

requirements of Rules 404(b) and 403.

The second alleged error committed by the district court

was the denial of Valdez’s motion requesting that the drug

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conspiracy charge and the witness tampering charge be severed

for purposes of trial. In denying the motion, the district court

determined that if there were separate trials, evidence of each

charge would be allowed in each trial for the purpose of proving

Valdez’s guilt on each charge. Consequently the court ruled that

severance was not required. Valdez argues that the drug

conspiracy verdict was impermissibly tainted by the jury’s

knowledge of the witness tampering allegation.

Our review of both of these claims of error is for abuse of

discretion. See United States v. Pettiford, 517 F.3d 584, 588

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (a claim that a district court improperly

admitted evidence under Rule 404(b) reviewed for abuse of

discretion); United States v. Gooch, 665 F.3d 1318, 1326 (D.C.

Cir. 2012) (a district court’s denial of a motion to sever counts

reviewed for abuse of discretion). In both instances the district

court gave reasoned explanations for its decisions. In both

instances limiting instructions were given to the jury on use of

the evidence introduced. We conclude that the district court did

not abuse its discretion on either claim of error.

Government’s Arguments to the Jury

In the government’s initial closing argument, the prosecutor

played an intercepted call between Valdez and Toure in which

Toure addressed Valdez as “Montana.” The prosecutor then

argued, “Why Montana? Here’s the hint. What character did Al

Pacino play in the drug movie Scar Face.” Defense counsel

objected, and the district court overruled the objection. The

prosecutor continued:

Out of all the Tonies to call Mr. Valdez, [Toure] calls

him Tony Montana, the character in Scar Face who

was leading the drug business there . . . [I]n this case,

because of the association and relationship between

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Toure and Mr. Valdez, which is one of a drug nature,

he makes a drug reference and calls him Tony

Montana.

Valdez argues that this comparison made by the prosecutor

was an assumption based on no evidence that was produced at

trial. Toure was never asked during his testimony about this

reference, and there was no evidence linking Toure’s calling

Valdez “Montana,” or Valdez himself, to the movie character. 

Citing United States v. Maddox, 156 F.3d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

Valdez argues that it is well established that counsel in closing

argument may not refer to, or rely upon, evidence unless the trial

court has admitted it. Valdez contends that these improper

remarks by the prosecutor were especially prejudicial in that the

only direct evidence of Valdez’s membership in the conspiracy

was the testimony of Toure and Diaz Garcia, who were

contradictory to each other on their own roles and were

attempting to work off their own liabilities and sentences by

testifying for the government. Taking all of this into

consideration, Valdez argues, his guilty verdict should be set

aside and a new trial ordered.

As we noted some time ago in United States v. Small, 74

F.3d 1276, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1996), our decision in “Gaither [v.

United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1969)] has long

made clear that the prosecutor may not refer in the opening or

closing statement to evidence not admitted at trial.” Here, we

agree with Valdez that no factual basis for the prosecutor’s

comments was made during trial and that these remarks by the

prosecutor were improper.

We review improper prosecutorial argument for substantial

prejudice. United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 50 (D.C. Cir.

2011). Our task is to “‘carefully examine the error committed

to determine whether it sufficiently prejudiced [the defendant]

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to call for reversal.’” Small, 74 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Gaither,

413 F.2d at 1079). In Small we identified three factors in

assessing prejudice: “‘the closeness of the case, the centrality of

the issue affected by the error, and the steps taken to mitigate the

effects of the error.’” 74 F.3d at 1280 (quoting Gaither, 413

F.2d at 1079). In this instance, the case against Valdez was

strong. The government’s evidence included the testimony of

Valdez’s co-conspirators that Valdez was a lower-level heroin

dealer. This testimony was corroborated by intercepted phone

calls and police surveillance. For the same reasons, the

prosecutor’s reference to “Tony Montana . . . who was leading

the drug business there” was not central to the government’s

proof of guilt. See Small, 74 F.3d at 1284. Furthermore, the

“Montana” reference was brief, made in passing by the

prosecutor during his closing argument. Finally, steps were

taken by both the prosecutor and the district court to mitigate the

effects of the prosecutor’s comments. During the government’s

rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reminded the jury that:

Tony Montana is not my words; it’s the words of

[Valdez’s] partner, Toure. He called him Tony

Montana, not me . . . In the grand scheme of things,

[Valdez is] not the big player. We never said he was.

Additionally, the district court instructed the jury at the

beginning of trial and in its final instructions that the jury could

only consider evidence admitted into evidence at trial and that

the arguments of counsel were not evidence. We conclude that

the prosecutor’s improper remarks did not substantially

prejudice Valdez.

But although we find no substantial prejudice in the

prosecutor’s remarks, we remind the United States Attorney of

the Supreme Court’s admonition that “[the United States

Attorney] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he

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should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at

liberty to strike foul ones . . . [I]mproper suggestions [and]

insinuations . . . are apt to carry much weight against the

accused when they should properly carry none.” Berger v.

United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

Sentencing

Valdez argues that his case should be remanded to the

district court for a rehearing on sentencing. He claims that he is

entitled to a rehearing because two sentencing issues went

unresolved. The first alleged unresolved issue was whether he

was entitled to safety-valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(f), which permits the sentencing court to impose a

sentence below the statutory mandatory-minimum term when a

defendant, inter alia, “has truthfully provided to the Government

all information and evidence the defendant has concerning the

offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct

or of a common scheme or plan.” We need not consider this

issue long, since at Valdez’s sentencing hearing it was clear that

Valdez “did not successfully debrief with the government” and

“may want to debrief later on.” Sentencing Transcript, Sept. 12,

2011, at 10. Consequently, Valdez has not fulfilled all the

requirements of § 3553(f), and therefore is not entitled to safetyvalve relief. Alternatively, Valdez suggests that his trial counsel

failed to argue the safety-valve issue with appropriate vigor, and

consequently his counsel was ineffective. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). But Valdez was not

entitled to safety-valve relief, and consequently his trial counsel

was not ineffective in not arguing the issue with more vigor. 

See United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(citation omitted) (“[A] lawyer is not ‘ineffective’ when he fails

to file a meritless motion.”).

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The second alleged unresolved issue was whether, as a

deportable alien, Valdez was entitled to a sentencing departure

under United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In

Smith we held permissible a “depart[ure] below the range

indicated by the Sentencing Guidelines where the defendant,

solely because he is a deportable alien, faces the prospect of

objectively more severe prison conditions than he would

otherwise.” Smith, 27 F.3d at 649. Smith, then, concerned a

sentencing departure from the Sentencing Guidelines, whereas

here Valdez requested a departure from a sentence that was a

statutory mandatory-minimum. The district court correctly

opined that it did not have the discretion to award a Smith

departure of any length beneath the statutory minimum. A

district court is authorized to impose a sentence below the

statutory mandatory-minimum only when a defendant offers

substantial assistance to the government, see United States v.

Motley, 587 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing 18

U.S.C. § 3553(e)), or is eligible for safety-valve relief, see

United States v. Gales, 603 F.3d 49, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing

18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)). As is evident from our discussion of the

first issue, Valdez does not meet those criteria. The district

court properly followed the statute by not imposing a sentence

reflecting the Smith departure.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district

court is affirmed.

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