Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00862/USCOURTS-almd-2_06-cv-00862-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Felicia Mulder
Plaintiff
Lisa Wilson
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

FELICIA MULDER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 2:06cv862-MHT

) (WO)

LISA WILSON, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Felicia Mulder intially filed this lawsuit

in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, on

August 7, 2006. Defendant Lisa Wilson filed a notice of

removal to federal court based on federal-question

jurisdiction on September 26, 2006. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1441(b). Mulder has moved to remand. For the reasons

that follow, the court concludes that Mulder’s motion

should be granted and that this lawsuit should be

remanded to the state court from which it was removed.

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I. BACKGROUND

This suit began in state court as an action against

Melissa Rittenour and three fictitious defendants X, Y,

and Z. In addition to numerous state-law claims, the

complaint alleged a violation of the due process clauses

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as enforced

through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Some time later, Mulder

amended her complaint to name Wilson as a defendant.

Subsequently, the court dismissed Rittenour as a

defendant. Wilson, the only remaining named defendant,

removed the case to this federal district court.

Mulder objects to Wilson’s notice of removal and has

moved the court to remand. Mulder notes that, although

the court granted Rittenour’s motion to dismiss and

ordered Rittenour dismissed as a defendant, that

dismissal was not entered as a final judgment as to

Rittenour. Pl. Br. at 3. Thus, Rittenour remained a

party to the action. Mulder further states that, in

cases involving multiple defendants, all defendants must

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consent to removal. Therefore, Mulder argues, Wilson

could not remove the case to federal court without the

consent of Rittenour, whose dismissal from the suit was

not a final judgment, and, because that consent was not

obtained, remand is warranted.

In response, Wilson does not appear to contest

Mulder’s argument that Rittenour remains a party to the

action. Rather, Wilson argues that the unanimity

requirement applies to only cases where federal

jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, 28

U.S.C. § 1332. Def. Br. at 4 (“Had this case been

removed based on grounds of diversity jurisdiction rather

than on grounds of federal question jurisdiction,

Plaintiff would be correct.”) (emphasis added).

Consequently, Wilson appears to concede that, if the

court were to find that the unanimity requirement does

apply in this case, then she was obligated to obtain

Rittenour’s consent for removal and failed to do so.

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1. Section 1446(a) provides:

“A defendant or defendants desiring to

remove any civil action or criminal

prosecution from a State court shall

file in the district court of the United

States for the district and division

within which such action is pending a

notice of removal signed pursuant to

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure and containing a short and

plain statement of the grounds for

removal, together with a copy of all

(continued...)

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II. DISCUSSION

 “[I]n cases involving multiple defendants, all

defendants must consent to removal.” Russell Corp. v.

Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1044 (11th Cir.

2001); see also Lamkin v. Media General, Inc., 302

F.Supp.2d 1293, 1294 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (Thompson, J.).

This requirement, known as the “rule of unanimity,” id.,

flows from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the

federal removal statute in Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v.

Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247-48 (1900). Courts now read the

unanimity requirement into the statutory procedures for

removal codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).1

 Tri-Cities

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(...continued)

process, pleadings, and orders served

upon such defendant or defendants in

such action.”

28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). “This provision has been interpreted

to require that all defendants join in the removal

petition.” Hernandez v. Seminole County, 334 F.3d 1233,

1237 n.3 (11th Cir. 2003).

2. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

close of business on September 30, 1981.

5

Newspapers, Inc. v. Tri-Cities Printing Pressmen &

Assistants’ Local 349, 427 F.2d 325, 326-27 (5th Cir.

1970).2

Wilson argues that she was not required to obtain

Rittenour’s consent because the case was removed based on

federal-question jurisdiction, not diversity

jurisdiction. That is incorrect. As the former Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals has stated, the rule of

unanimity is not limited to diversity jurisdiction, but

applies to federal-question jurisdiction as well:

“Only defendants may remove, either on

the ground of a federal question or by

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reason of diversity of citizenship. ...

In both cases all of the defendants must

join in the petition to remove ....”

Sheets v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp., 115 F.2d 880, 883

(5th Cir. 1940); see also In re Bethesda Mem. Hosp.,

Inc., 123 F.3d 1407, 1410 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997); Hewitt v.

City of Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230, 1232 (9th Cir. 1986);

Orion Refining Corp. v. Fluor Enterprises, Inc., 319 B.R.

480, 485 (E.D. La. 2004) (Vance, J.); Ell v. S.E.T.

Landscape Design, Inc., 34 F.Supp.2d 188, 193 (S.D.N.Y.

1999) (Conner, J.); McShares, Inc. v. Barry, 979 F.Supp.

1338, 1342 (D. Kan. 1997) (Crow, J.); Spillers v.

Tillman, 959 F.Supp. 364, 369 (S.D. Miss. 1997)

(Bramlette, J.); Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 815

F.Supp. 241, 243 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (Parsons, J.); Hess v.

Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 520 F.Supp. 373, 375-76 (N.D.

Ill. 1981) (Grady, J.). Therefore, federal-question

jurisdiction does not relieve Wilson of her obligation to

obtain Rittenour’s consent for removal.

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3. Section 1443 provides:

“Any of the following civil actions

or criminal prosecutions, commenced in

a State court may be removed by the

defendant to the district court of the

United States for the district and

division embracing the place wherein it

is pending:

(1) Against any person who is

denied or cannot enforce in the courts

of such State a right under any law

providing for the equal civil rights of

citizens of the United States, or of all

persons within the jurisdiction thereof;

(2) For any act under color of

authority derived from any law providing

for equal rights, or for refusing to do

any act on the ground that it would be

inconsistent with such law.”

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Wilson also argues that Rittenour’s consent was not

required because the removal was proper under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1443(2).3

 In Brown v. Florida, 208 F.Supp.2d 1344, 1348

(S.D. Fla. 2002) (Jordan, J.), the district court held

that the unanimity requirement did not apply to removal

pursuant to § 1443(2). Here, this court need not decide

whether to adopt the holding of Brown, because § 1443(2)

does not apply to this case.

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4. Section 1441(b) provides:

“Any civil action of which the district

courts have original jurisdiction

founded on a claim or right arising

under the Constitution, treaties or laws

of the United States shall be removable

without regard to the citizenship or

residence of the parties. Any other

such action shall be removable only if

none of the parties in interest properly

joined and served as defendants is a

citizen of the State in which such

action is brought.”

5. The text of § 1446(a) is reprinted at note 1,

supra.

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First, Wilson’s notice of removal stated that removal

was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b);4

 Wilson did not

mention § 1443 until Mulder filed her motion for remand.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), the notice of removal must

contain the grounds therefor.5

 Wilson, by her notice,

sought to ground removal in § 1441(b), not § 1443. 

Second, even if Wilson had originally sought removal

under § 1443, that statute cannot be used for removal of

cases asserting violations of constitutional rights

generally; it applies to only those cases involving

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‘equal rights’ and the statutes protecting it: “[T]he

phrase ‘any law providing for ... equal civil rights’

must be construed to mean any law providing for specific

civil rights stated in terms of racial equality[] ... ‘as

distinguished from laws, of which the due process clause

and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer

equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of

bestowing them upon all.’” Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.

780, 792 (1966) (quoting New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d

255, 271 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also Alabama v. Conley, 245

F.3d 1292, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 2001). For example, § 1443

removal is proper under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792-93. It is not proper under

§ 1983 generally. Conley, 245 F.3d at 1295-96.

Here, Mulder has alleged that Wilson violated her due

process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,

as enforceable through § 1983. As Rachel makes clear,

this claim cannot be removed under § 1443. Therefore,

even if § 1443 does not contain a unanimity requirement,

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and even if Wilson had invoked § 1443 when removal was

sought, she cannot avoid the unanimity requirement on

that basis in the instant case.

Therefore, because this court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, it is ORDERED that plaintiff Felicia

Mulder’s motion to remand to state court (doc. no. 7) is

granted, and that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), this

cause is remanded to the Circuit Court of Montgomery

County, Alabama.

The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take the

appropriate steps to effect the remand.

DONE, this the 20th day of November, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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