Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-02355/USCOURTS-ca8-16-02355-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Daniel Morris Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

______________________________

No. 16-2355

______________________________

United States of America

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Daniel Morris Johnson

Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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Submitted: November 18, 2016

Filed: February 17, 2017

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Before BENTON and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges, and EBINGER, District Judge. 1

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EBINGER, District Judge.

The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for

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the Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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Daniel Johnson was charged with production of child pornography in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and 2251(e). Johnson filed a motion to suppress evidence

obtained during a search of his residence, alleging the affidavit supporting the

warrant lacked probable cause because the information was stale and lacked a nexus

to his residence. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and

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recommendation denying Johnson’s motion to suppress. Johnson was found guilty

after a bench trial.

At sentencing, Johnson argued his prior conviction—criminal sexual conduct

in the fifth degree in violation of Minnesota law—should not be considered a

predicate offense used to enhance his sentence. The district court applied the

enhancement and sentenced Johnson to 354 months’ imprisonment. On appeal,

Johnson argues the district court erred in denying his suppression motion and in

applying the sentencing enhancement based on his prior Minnesota conviction. We

affirm.

I. Background

Between 2009 and August 2010, Johnson was involved in a romantic

relationship with K.J., an adult female. During that time, three children lived with

K.J. in her home in Montevideo, Chippewa County, Minnesota, including her fifteenyear-old daughter, identified here as Jane Doe. In September 2010, Jane Doe wrote

a letter to her mother disclosing Johnson sexually abused her on multiple occasions.

K.J. delivered the letter to the Chippewa County Sheriff’s Office.

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the

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District of Minnesota, adopting the report and recommendation of the Honorable

Tony N. Leung, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of Minnesota.

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On November 4, 2010, Chippewa County Sheriff’s Deputy Brian Hanson and

two victim advocates interviewed Jane Doe. Jane Doe disclosed repeated sexual

abuse by Johnson, including at least four instances of sexual intercourse and one

incident when Johnson took pictures of her during a sexual assault. After the

interview, Deputy Hanson prepared an application for a search warrant for Johnson’s

residence in Woodbury, Washington County, Minnesota, where Johnson was living

with his mother. The warrant sought evidence of sexual abuse, including “explicit

pictures or any pictures of” Jane Doe on “[c]omputers, [c]omputer [d]isks, thumb

drives,[ ]computer hardware[, c]ameras, [or c]ell [p]hones.”

As recounted in the affidavit supporting the search warrant, Jane Doe told

Deputy Hanson that Johnson first sexually assaulted her approximately two weeks

before Christmas in 2009. Jane Doe came home from school and Johnson was the

only other person home. Johnson told Jane Doe “a friend had bought her a cell phone

and that she could not see it or have it[ ]unless [Johnson] got to see her naked.” Jane

Doe eventually acquiesced. She reported during the first assault Johnson “put his

fingers in her vagina.” She also stated Johnson took pictures of her naked and

“downloaded themon to his computer . . . at [Johnson’s]mom’s house in Woodbury.”

Jane Doe said Johnson “always downloaded all of his pictures on the computers at his

mom’s house in Woodbury” and “he would go there at least once a week.” Jane Doe

also disclosed Johnson had sexual intercourse with her on at least four occasions. The

affidavit states Jane Doe said the sexual abuse stopped after Johnson’s arrest in

February.3

On November 10, 2010, a Minnesota state court judge signed the search

warrant for the Woodbury residence Johnson shared with his mother. Deputy Hanson

executed the warrant with the assistance of the Washington County Sheriff’s Office.

At trial, the evidence indicated Johnson was arrested in February 2010 for

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failure to register as a sex offender in Chippewa County and pleaded guilty.

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During the search, officers found Johnson in a locked room in the basement and

arrested him. Officers seized sixteen computer towers and hard drives in addition to

USB storage devices and two digital cameras. On one of the hard drives officers

located a webcam video showing Johnson sexually assaulting Jane Doe.

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Johnson was charged with one count of production of child pornography in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and 2251(e). Johnson moved to suppress the webcam

video. After a hearing on the motion to suppress, the magistrate judge recommended

Johnson’s suppression motion be denied. The district court adopted the magistrate

judge’s report and recommendation.

On April 14, 2015, Johnson proceeded to a bench trial. He stipulated that Jane

Doe was under 18 years old at the time the video was made and that the computer

equipment traveled in interstate commerce. Johnson did not stipulate to knowingly

producing the video of the sexual assault, asserting he did not know the webcam was

on or recording because the webcam was motion-activated. The district court found

Johnson guilty of production of child pornography.

At sentencing, Johnson objected to the use of his prior conviction to enhance

the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum penalties applicable to his offense.

Johnson argued his conviction for criminal sexual conduct in the fifth degree in

violation of Minnesota Statute section 609.3451 is not a predicate offense under 18

U.S.C. § 2251(e). Johnson argued the statute is overinclusive because the offense is

not necessarily committed for sexual gratification. The district court overruled

Johnson’s objection, resulting in a 25-year mandatory minimum and a 50-year

statutory maximum. The Government sought the 50-year maximum sentence. The

court sentenced Johnson to 354 months’ imprisonment. The district court remarked

A second search warrant, not at issue here, was obtained prior to the search of 4

the computer equipment.

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he “would be imposing under . . . these 3553(a) factors, exactly the same sentence”

regardless of the predicate offense enhancement.

II. Discussion

A. Motion to Suppress

On appeal, Johnson argues the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress the evidence obtained during the search of his Woodbury residence. Johnson

argues there was not probable cause supporting the search warrant application

because: 1) it set forth stale evidence; and 2) it lacked a nexus with his Woodbury

residence.

“We review the district court’s factual determinations in support of its denial

of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United

States v. Johnson, 601 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.

Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 643 (8th Cir. 2006)). Reversal of a decision to deny a motion

to suppress is warranted “only if the district court’s decision ‘is unsupported by

substantial evidence, based on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based

on the entire record, it is clear a mistake was made.’” Id. (quoting Harper, 466 F.3d

at 643).

The role of a reviewing court is to ensure the magistrate issuing the warrant

“had a ‘substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.’” United States

v. Colbert, 828 F.3d 718, 726 (8th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v.

Garcia–Hernandez, 682 F.3d 767, 771 (8th Cir. 2012)); accord Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983). “Probable cause exists, if under the totality of the

circumstances, a showing of facts can be made ‘sufficient to create a fair probability

that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.’” United States v.

Wallace, 550 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting United States v.

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Underwood, 364 F.3d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom.

Carpenter v. United States, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005)); accord Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.

The issuing court’s probable cause determination “should be paid great deference by

reviewing courts.” United States v. Brewer, 588 F.3d 1165, 1170 (8th Cir. 2009)

(quoting United States v. Hansel, 524 F.3d 841, 845 (8th Cir. 2008)).

1. Staleness

We first examine Johnson’s contention that the warrant was obtained based on

stale information. “A warrant becomesstale if the information supporting the warrant

is not ‘sufficiently close in time to the issuance of the warrant and the subsequent

search conducted so that probable cause can be said to exist as of the time of the

search.’” Colbert, 828 F.3d at 727 (quoting Brewer, 588 F.3d at 1173). The specific

context and nature of the warrant must be examined for each case; “[t]here is no

bright-line test for determining when information in a warrant isstale.” United States

v. Lemon, 590 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Pruneda, 518

F.3d 597, 604 (8th Cir. 2008)). “Important factors to consider in determining whether

probable cause has dissipated . . . include the lapse of time since the warrant was

issued, the nature of the criminal activity, and the kind of property subject to the

search.” Colbert, 828 F.3d at 727 (omission in original) (quoting Brewer, 588 F.3d

at 1173). A “lapse of time is least important when the suspected criminal activity is

continuing in nature and when the property is not likely to be destroyed or

dissipated.” Lemon, 590 F.3d at 614 (quoting United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781,

786 (8th Cir. 1999)).

We conclude the information used to establish probable cause was not stale.

As the district court noted in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress, “[t]he affidavit

alleges a number of very detailed occurrences of sexual assault against a minor over

a period of time” with “specific details regarding photographs.” The search warrant

wasissued approximately elevenmonths after Johnson took the pictures, ninemonths

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after the last sexual assault, and at most three months after Jane Doe told her mother

about the sexual assaults. Given the nature of the crime and type of evidence sought,

the execution of the warrant in November 2010 did not render the warrant deficient

based on stale information. See id. at 615 (holding the evidence demonstrated

probable cause for a search warrant despite the eighteen-month gap between the

defendant’s last exchange of child pornography and the application for the warrant);

United States v. Morales–Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 119 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding the

warrant’s information was not stale where there was a three-year lapse between the

defendant’s purchase of child pornography and the warrant application).

Johnson urges this Court to rely upon the Third Circuit’s reasoning in United

States v. Zimmerman to reach a contrary conclusion. 277 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2002). At

issue in Zimmerman was a search warrant for the home of a high school teacher and

coach. Id. at 429–30. The affidavit supporting the warrant “recounted various

incidents in which [the defendant] allegedly sexually accosted students at the high

school or on athletic road trips, with only brief mention made of [adult]

pornography.” Id. at 431. The Zimmerman court found the warrant lacked probable

cause to search the defendant’s home for child pornography because the affidavit did

“not even allege much less demonstrate that [the defendant] was engaged in a

‘continuing offense’ of acquiring pornography and keeping it in his home.” Id. at 434.

The court emphasized the warrant did not indicate the defendant “ever possessed

child pornography” and the information about adult pornography was stale because

the pornography was viewed six months prior via the Internet. Id. at 434–35.

Zimmerman is inapposite. In Zimmerman there was no evidence the defendant

possessed child pornography, and there was no connection between the victim and

the pornography or the evidence sought. In contrast, this search warrant sought

evidence of sexual abuse, including naked photographs Johnson took of Jane Doe

during a sexual assault. The affidavit stated Johnson downloaded the photographs of

Jane Doe onto a computer at his mother’s residence in Woodbury—the location ofthe

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intended search. Cf. id. at 434–36. The affidavit supporting the search warrant also

detailed Johnson’s sexual assaults ofJane Doe over several months, including sexual

intercourse. These facts established a link between Johnson and Jane Doe, and the

photographs sought. Unlike in Zimmerman, where there was no evidence the issuing

court could rely upon to presume the defendant retained any relevant images (let

alone any child pornography), here the issuing court could reasonably rely upon the

presumption that Johnson would retain images of evidentiary value (including child

pornography) in finding probable cause supported the warrant. See United States v.

Summage, 481 F.3d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 2007) (presuming the defendant “would

maintain in his possession the video and photographs that he made of the sexual

encounter”); see also Lemon, 590 F.3d at 614 (“Possession of child pornography is

a crime that is continuing in nature . . . .”). Thus, the warrant, issued eleven months

after Johnson took the naked photographs of Jane Doe, was not based upon stale

information.

2. Nexus

We next turn to the issue of the nexus between the sexual assaults in

Montevideo and the search of Johnson’s residence in Woodbury. In order to support

an application for a search warrant, “[t]here must be evidence of a nexus between the

contraband and the place to be searched.” Colbert, 828 F.3d at 726 (quoting United

States v. Tellez, 217 F.3d 547, 550 (8th Cir. 2000)). Factors to consider in

determining if a nexus exists include “the nature of the crime and the reasonable,

logical likelihood offinding useful evidence.” Id.(quotingUnited States v. Etheridge,

165 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1999)). Johnson contends the affidavit lacked reliable

information to sufficiently bolster or corroborate Jane Doe’s knowledge about

Johnson’s Woodbury residence.

We conclude the information in the affidavit established a search ofJohnson’s

Woodbury residence would likely result in discovery of evidence of sexual assault.

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The affidavit supporting the search warrant included information specifically tying

the sexual assault with evidence at the Woodbury residence Johnson shared with his

mother. Jane Doe said Johnson took nude pictures of her during the first sexual

assault. She said Johnson “downloaded the pictures [of her naked] on his computer

that he has at his mom’s house in Woodbury.” The affidavit states Johnson “always

downloaded all his pictures on the computers at his mom’s house in Woodbury” and

returned to Woodbury “at least once a week.” These facts provided a substantial basis

for the issuing court’s conclusion there was a reasonable likelihood evidence of

Johnson’s sexual assault of Jane Doe would be found in Johnson’s Woodbury

residence. Therefore, we hold the district court did not err in denying Johnson’s

motion to suppress.

Even if the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause, the Leon

good-faith exception prevents suppression of the seized evidence. See United States

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The evidence is admissible alternatively under the Leon

good-faith exception because “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing

a search warrant to have relied in good faith on the judge’s determination that there

was probable cause to issue the warrant.” United States v. Hudspeth, 525 F.3d 667,

676 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Grant, 490 F.3d 627, 632 (8th Cir.

2007)). “In assessing whether the officer relied in good faith on the validity of a

warrant, we consider the totality of the circumstances, including any information

known to the officer but not included in the affidavit . . . .” Grant, 490 F.3d at 632.

“It is the magistrate, and not the affiant, that is responsible for” determining whether

probable cause exists. Summage, 481 F.3d at 1077–78.

At the time he requested the warrant, Deputy Hanson was aware Johnson was

a registered sex offender. Deputy Hanson knew Johnson was required to register as

a sex offender for the underlying offense of criminal sexual conduct in the fifth

degree. He knew Johnson was arrested in February 2010 for failure to register as a

sex offender. Deputy Hanson knew Johnson lived with K.J., Jane Does’s mother,

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during the time Jane Doe alleged Johnson sexually abused her. Deputy Hanson also

knew Johnson occasionally resided with his mother in Woodbury, Minnesota. Based

on these additional facts, along with those contained in the warrant affidavit, it was

reasonable for Deputy Hanson to have relied in good faith on the judge’s

determination there was probable cause to issue the warrant. See Hudspeth, 525 F.3d

at 676. Moreover, there is no reason not to apply the good-faith exception. See United

States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2015) (listing “four situations when

the good-faith exception would not apply”). Therefore, even if probable cause was

lacking, the district court’s order denying Johnson’s motion to suppress would be

affirmed.

B. Predicate Offense Enhancement

Johnson’s presentence investigation report recommended his sentence be

enhanced pursuant to § 2251(e) based on his prior conviction for criminal sexual

conduct in the fifth degree. The district court agreed and applied the enhancement

despite Johnson’s objection. The court sentenced Johnson to 354 months’

imprisonment.

“We review de novo the district court’s use of prior convictions for sentencing

enhancement purposes.” United States v. Lockwood, 446 F.3d 825, 827 (8th Cir.

2006). Section 2251 criminalizesthe production of child pornography. It providesfor

a minimum sentence of 15 years (180 months) and a maximum sentence of 30 years

(360 months). 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). The minimum and maximum penalties are

enhanced when the defendant has one prior state conviction “relating to aggravated

sexual abuse, sexual abuse, abusive sexual contact involving a minor or ward.” Id.

The minimum sentence becomes 25 years (300 months) and the maximum sentence

becomes 50 years(600 months). Id.Johnson argues § 2251(e) isinapplicable because

his prior conviction does not relate to the sexual abuse of a minor.

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We need not reach the issue of whether the district court properly enhanced

Johnson’s sentence based on his prior Minnesota conviction because any error in

applying the enhancement was harmless. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

52(a), “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial

rights must be disregarded.” The burden is on the government to prove an error was

harmless. See United States v. Bah, 439 F.3d 423, 430 (8th Cir. 2006). The

government may meet its burden by showing the district court “specifically

contemplated the possible error” and itself engaged in contemplation about “the

potential impact of the specific error involved.” United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d

739, 741–42 (8th Cir. 2008) (considering a procedural error).

In this case, we conclude the Government met its burden to show any error by

the district court in applying the sentencing enhancement was harmless. The district

court’s 354-month sentence is less than the unenhanced statutory maximum (360

months) and within the enhanced statutory sentencing range (300 to 600 months). See

18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). The sentencing-hearing transcript demonstratesthe district court

“specifically contemplated” an error in applying the enhancement. Henson, 550 F.3d

at 742. The district court stated it would have imposed the same sentence regardless

of whether Johnson’s prior Minnesota conviction qualified as a predicate offense

under § 2251(e). The district court said “anything less than [the sentence the Court

imposed] would not promote sufficient respect for the law.” The district court

determined the consequences of an error, if any, would not impact the sentence

imposed; any purported error was harmless. We affirm the district court’s imposition

of a 354-month sentence.

III. Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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