Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00099/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00099-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darryl Adams
Respondent
Steven Lindsey Thomas
Petitioner

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 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to 1

dismiss. 

 All further statutory references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN LINDSEY THOMAS,

Petitioner,

v.

DARRYL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0099 OWW DLB HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND1

On March 14, 2003, following a jury trial in the Kern County Superior Court, Petitioner

was convicted of conspiracy (Cal. Penal Code § 182(a)(1)), transportation of methamphetamine 2

(Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11379), possession of methamphetamine for sale (Cal. Health & Saf.

Code § 11378), and possession of a destructive device (§ 12303). The weight enhancement (Cal.

Health & Saf. Code § 11370.4(b)(1)) and arming enhancement (§§ 12022(a)(1) & 12022(c) 

allegations were found true. On May 6, 2003, Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of eight

years in state prison. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. No. 1.)

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 Respondent states that he has confirmed the absence of any state habeas filing by consulting the Kern 3

County Superior Court via telephone, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court via

http://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov. As this factual representation is not contradicted or contested, the Court

assumes it to be true. 

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Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

Appellate District. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. No. 2.)

After briefing was complete, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in its entirety on

November 30, 2004. (Respondent’s Lodged Doc. No. 5.)

Petitioner did not file any state habeas petitions in state court.

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On January 31, 2006, Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

On February 15, 2006, the Court directed Respondent to submit a response to the petition.

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on April 17, 2006. 

Petitioner did not file an opposition.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it "plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that "an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground." The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

///

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B. Exhaustion of State Remedies

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge her conviction by

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501

U.S. 722, 731, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2554-55 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518, 102 S.Ct.

1198, 1203 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9 Cir. 1988). 

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A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828,

829 (9 Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair th

opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's

factual and legal basis. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 888 (1995) (legal

basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 112 S.Ct. 1715, 1719 (1992) (factual basis).

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66, 115 S.Ct. at 888; Keating v. Hood, 133

F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). For example, if a petitioner wishes to claim that the trial court th

violated her due process rights "he must say so, not only in federal court but in state court." 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 366, 115 S.Ct. at 888. A general appeal to a constitutional guarantee is 

insufficient to present the "substance" of such a federal claim to a state court. See Anderson v.

Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7, 103 S.Ct. 276 (1982) (Exhaustion requirement not satisfied circumstance

that the "due process ramifications" of an argument might be "self-evident."); Gray v.

Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63, 116 S.Ct. 1074 (1996) ("a claim for relief in habeas corpus

must include reference to a specific federal constitutional guarantee, as well as a statement of the

facts which entitle the petitioner to relief.").

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising

a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666,

669 (9th Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th

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Cir.1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9 Cir.1998). In Duncan, the United States

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Supreme Court reiterated the rule as follows: 

In Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 . . . (1971), we said that exhaustion 

of state remedies requires that petitioners "fairly presen[t]" federal claims to the 

state courts in order to give the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct 

alleged violations of the prisoners' federal rights" (some internal quotation marks

omitted). If state courts are to be given the opportunity to correct alleged violations

of prisoners' federal rights, they must surely be alerted to the fact that the prisoners

are asserting claims under the United States Constitution. If a habeas petitioner 

wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state court trial denied him the due 

process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, he must say so, not only 

in federal court, but in state court. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-366. The Ninth Circuit examined the rule further, stating:

Our rule is that a state prisoner has not "fairly presented" (and thus

exhausted) his federal claims in state court unless he specifically indicated to that

court that those claims were based on federal law. See Shumway v. Payne, 223

F.3d 982, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2000). Since the Supreme Court's decision in Duncan,

this court has held that the petitioner must make the federal basis of the claim

explicit either by citing federal law or the decisions of federal courts, even if the

federal basis is "self-evident," Gatlin v. Madding, 189 F.3d 882, 889 (9th Cir.

1999) (citing Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 . . . (1982), or the underlying

claim would be decided under state law on the same considerations that would

control resolution of the claim on federal grounds. Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F3d

1098, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 830-31 (9th Cir.

1996); . . . .

In Johnson, we explained that the petitioner must alert the state court to 

the fact that the relevant claim is a federal one without regard to how similar the 

state and federal standards for reviewing the claim may be or how obvious the 

violation of federal law is. 

Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 668-669 (9th Cir. 2000) (italics added).

In the instant petition, Petitioner raises seven grounds for relief. Respondent argues that

Grounds One and Two of the petition are exhausted, however, Grounds Three through Seven are

unexhausted, resulting in a mixed petition. The Court will address each claim separately.

1. Ground One

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions beyond a

reasonable doubt under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution. (Petition, at 5.)

As Respondent concedes, this claim is exhausted as it was presented to the California

Supreme Court in the petition for review. (Lodged Doc. No. 6, at 3-9.)

///

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2. Ground Two

Petitioner claims that the trial court erred when it permitted the admission of twenty-yearold “‘uncharged’ hearsay offenses” in violation of his Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. (Petition, at 5.)

As Respondent concedes, this claim is exhausted as it was presented to the California

Supreme Court in the petition for review. (Lodged Doc. No. 6, at 10-17.)

3. Grounds Three Through Seven

In Ground Three, Petitioner contends that “the trial was marred by prosecutorial

misconduct which violated Petitioner’s right to the due process of law and rendered the trial

outcome unreliable in violation of the 14 Amendment.” th

In Ground Four, Petitioner contends that there was an abuse of judicial discretion when

the trial court denied Petitioner’s right to testify at the section 1538.5 hearing.

In Ground Five, Petitioner contends that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in

several respects. 

In Ground Six, Petitioner contends that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance

in several respects.

In Ground Seven, Petitioner contends that his “trial was marred by judicial misconduct by

the trial judge sleeping during the trial proceeding in front of the jury.” (Petition, at (6a).)

As Respondent correctly submits, Petitioner did not present Grounds Three through

Seven to the state’s highest court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 518. The petition for review, the

only filing to the California Supreme Court, reveals that only the first two grounds for relief were

presented to that Court for review. 

The instant petition is a mixed petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims.

The Court must dismiss a mixed petition without prejudice to give Petitioner an opportunity to

exhaust the claims if he can do so. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22; Gordon, 107 F.3d at 760. 

However, Petitioner must be provided with an opportunity to withdraw the unexhausted claims

and go forward with the exhausted claims. Jefferson v. Budge, 419 F.3d 1013 (9 Cir.2005); th

Anthony v. Cambra, 236 F.3d 568, 574 (9th Cir.2000) (“district courts must provide habeas

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litigants with the opportunity to amend their mixed petitions by striking unexhausted claims as an

alternative to suffering dismissal”). 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be

DISMISSED. This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District

Court Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 72-304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District

of California. 

Petitioner may, at his option, move to withdraw the unexhausted claims within thirty (30)

days of the date of service of this Recommendation and proceed with only the exhausted claims.

Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d 371, 372 (9 Cir. 1988). If petitioner fails to withdraw the th

unexhausted claims within the thirty (30) day time frame, the entire petition will be dismissed so

Petitioner can return to state court to exhaust the remainder of his claims before filing a new

federal petition. Rose, 455 U.S. at 520; Guizar v. Estelle, 843 F.2d at 372. This dismissal will

not bar Petitioner from returning to federal court after exhausting available state remedies. See

Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9 Cir.1995). However, this does not mean

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that Petitioner will not be subject to the one year statute of limitations imposed by 28 U.S.C. §

2244(d). Although the limitations period is tolled while a properly filed request for collateral

review is pending in state court, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), it does not toll for the time an

application is pending in federal court. Duncan v. Walker, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 531 U.S. 991 (2001). 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and

Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all

parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendation.” Replies to the Objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days

(plus three days if served by mail) after service of the Objections. Provided Petitioner does not

move to withdraw the unexhausted claims, the Finding and Recommendation will be submitted

to the District Court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may

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waive the right to appeal the Order of the District Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9

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Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 9, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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