Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01644/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01644-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
International Custom Products, Inc.
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1644

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:08-cv-00189-GWC, Judge Gregory W. 

Carman.

______________________ 

Decided: June 30, 2015

______________________ 

 GREGORY HUGH TEUFEL, OGC Law, LLC, Pittsburgh, 

PA, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

JEREMY L. SAMEK, Eckert, Seamans, Cherin, & Mellott

LLC, Pittsburgh, PA.

REGINALD THOMAS BLADES, JR., Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. 

Also represented by JOYCE R. BRANDA, JEANNE E.

DAVIDSON, MARTIN M. TOMLINSON; EDWARD FRANCIS 

KENNY, AMY RUBIN, International Trade Field Office, New 

York, NY. 

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2 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

JOHN MICHAEL PETERSON, Neville Peterson LLP, New 

York, NY, for amicus curiae The American Association of 

Exporters and Importers. Also represented by RICHARD F.

O'NEILL, RUSSELL ANDREW SEMMEL. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

International Custom Products, Inc. (“ICP”) appeals 

from the United States Court of International Trade (“the 

Trade Court”) decisions (1) dismissing Counts 1–9 of ICP’s

complaint, Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 931 

F. Supp. 2d 1338 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2013) (“Decision I”), and 

(2) denying ICP’s motion to reconsider, alter, or amend 

the judgment and/or to amend the complaint, Int’l Custom 

Prods., Inc. v. United States, 991 F. Supp. 2d 1335 (Ct. 

Int’l Trade 2014) (“Decision II”). Because the Trade Court 

did not err, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

I 

“It is a ‘well-established principle that federal courts 

. . . are courts of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress,’” Norcal/Crosetti Foods, Inc. v. United States, 963 

F.2d 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)), and Congress has delineated 

the specific boundaries of the Trade Court’s jurisdiction in 

28 U.S.C. § 1581 (2000). Subsections (a)–(h) grant the 

Trade Court exclusive jurisdiction over specific actions. 

Subsection (i), on the other hand, offers a residual jurisdiction provision, which we have repeatedly held “may not 

be invoked when jurisdiction under another subsection of 

§ 1581 is or could have been available, unless the remedy 

provided under that other subsection would be manifestly 

inadequate.” Miller & Co. v. United States, 824 F.2d 961, 

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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS v. US 3

963 (Fed. Cir. 1987); accord Am. Air Parcel Forwarding 

Co. v. United States, 718 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 

(“[W]here a litigant has access to [the Trade Court] under 

traditional means, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a), it must 

avail itself of this avenue of approach complying with all 

the relevant prerequisites thereto.”). 

To invoke the Trade Court’s jurisdiction under subsection (a), an aggrieved importer must first file a protest 

under 19 U.S.C. § 1514, which the United States Customs 

and Border Protection (“Customs”) then denies. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1581(a) (stating that the Trade Court “shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced to contest 

the denial of a protest” under 19 U.S.C. § 1515); 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1515; id. § 1514(a) (identifying the decisions subject to a 

protest, such as “classification and rate” and “liquidation 

or reliquidation of an entry”). Once Customs denies that

protest, the importer must then pay “all liquidated duties, 

charges, or exactions” owed before commencing suit in the 

Trade Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2637. ICP contests the constitutionality of that pre-payment requirement on appeal. 

II

This case has an extensive history, but we recount below only the facts most relevant to this appeal. ICP is an 

importer and distributor of products sold to processed food 

manufacturers, including the “white sauce” at issue here. 

In late 1998, ICP sought a tariff classification ruling from 

Customs for “white sauce” under the Harmonized Tariff 

Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”). Consequently, 

Customs issued NYRL D86228 (“Ruling Letter”), classifying “white sauce” under HTSUS 2103.90.9060 (1999) as 

“sauces and preparations therefor.” 

In 2004, Customs notified ICP that it was initiating a 

new investigation into the classification of “white sauce.”

Based on the results of that investigation, Customs issued 

a Notice of Action (“2005 Notice”), without providing the 

requisite notice and comment, reclassifying “white sauce” 

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4 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

under HTSUS 0405.20.3000 (2005) as “[d]airy spreads.” 

Customs informed ICP that the reclassification would 

impact all pending and future entries of “white sauce.” 

Ultimately, the reclassification effected a tariff increase of 

almost 2400%, and several waves of litigation followed. 

The first began in 2005 after Customs liquidated sixty 

of ICP’s then-pending entries under the 2005 Notice. ICP 

did not protest the liquidation of those sixty entries as is 

required to establish jurisdiction under § 1581(a), but it 

nonetheless filed a complaint in the Trade Court challenging the validity of the 2005 Notice. That court exercised

its residual jurisdiction under § 1581(i), finding that 

§ 1581(a) proved “manifestly inadequate” because its

requisite protest procedure would put ICP, a company on 

the “brink of bankruptcy,” out of business. Int’l Custom 

Prods., Inc. v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1321–

22 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2005). It then found the 2005 Notice 

void because Customs did not comply with the notice and 

comment procedures of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c). Id. at 1326. 

On appeal, we reversed and vacated, instead holding 

that the Trade Court lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i). 

Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 467 F.3d 1324 

(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“ICP I”). We reasoned that § 1581(a) was 

not “manifestly inadequate” because “mere allegations of 

financial harm . . . do not make the remedy established by

Congress manifestly inadequate,” and thus ICP could not

try to “circumvent the prerequisites of 1581(a) by invoking jurisdiction under 1581(i).” Id. at 1327. ICP had to 

protest the liquidation and then pay the duty owed before 

it could commence such a lawsuit in the Trade Court.

Another wave began in 2007 after Customs liquidated 

several additional “white sauce” entries at the duty rate 

prescribed in the 2005 Notice. Customs first liquidated 

eleven entries ICP made into its warehouse in 2005. ICP 

protested the liquidation of one of those entries, and that 

protest was deemed denied thirty days later pursuant to 

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19 U.S.C. § 1515(b). ICP paid the duty owed on that entry

and commenced suit in the Trade Court under § 1581(a). 

Customs then liquidated eighty-four similar entries made 

between 2003 and 2005. ICP protested those liquidations, 

but Customs voluntarily suspended those protests pending the outcome of ICP’s suit. 

Before the Trade Court, ICP argued that Customs’ 

failure to comply with the notice and comment procedures 

of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) rendered the 2005 Notice void. The 

Trade Court agreed, and ordered Customs to reliquidate 

the entry pursuant to the Ruling Letter. See Int’l Custom 

Prods., Inc. v. United States, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1350 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2012). On the government’s appeal, we 

affirmed. Int’l Custom Prods., Inc. v. United States, 748 

F.3d 1182, 1189 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“ICP IV”). We held that 

the 2005 Notice was an interpretive ruling that effectively 

revoked the Ruling Letter, and was thus subject to the 

strict requirements set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c). Id. at 

1186. Customs’ failure to abide by those requirements 

rendered the 2005 Notice void. Id. at 1189. In light of our 

holding, the entry in ICP IV and the entries subject to the 

suspended protests are being reliquidated pursuant to the 

Ruling Letter. 

III

In 2007, Customs also liquidated thirteen entries from

between October 2003 and October 2004 under the 2005 

Notice. ICP protested the liquidation of those entries in a 

single protest, which Customs denied. ICP then asked 

Customs for relief under 19 U.S.C. § 1520(c), but Customs 

denied that request as “beyond the scope of the authority 

provided by the statute.” Joint Appendix 45 ¶ 19. ICP 

did not ask Customs, however, to voluntarily reliquidate 

those entries under 19 U.S.C. § 1501. Nor did it timely 

seek administrative review of the protest denial as “contrary to proper instructions” under 19 U.S.C. § 1515(d). 

As a result, Customs’ denial became final. Because of its 

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6 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

administratively final status, that protest could not be 

suspended pending our resolution of ICP IV. Thus, unlike 

the entries subject to the suspended protests discussed 

supra, the thirteen entries from between October 2003 

and October 2004 are not being reliquidated; they are 

instead at issue here. 

In 2008, ICP commenced this suit in the Trade Court. 

Because liquidation of the thirteen entries under the 2005 

Notice imposed a duty liability of roughly $28 million, and 

ICP remained on the “brink of bankruptcy,” ICP filed its 

complaint in the Trade Court without first paying the $28 

million owed. In Counts 1–8, ICP alleged, inter alia, that

Customs effectively revoked the Ruling Letter without 

first complying with the notice and comment requirements set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c); violated its own 

regulation when it classified the entries as a dairy spread, 

rather than as a sauce preparation; and violated the 

Administrative Procedure Act and due process when it 

revoked the Ruling Letter. In Count 9, ICP alleged that 

the pre-payment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) is 

unconstitutional as applied to ICP.

The Trade Court first dismissed Counts 1–8 pursuant 

to USCIT Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Decision I, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 1341. It noted that 

the pre-payment requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a) is “a 

condition upon the waiver of sovereign immunity” that

“must be strictly construed in favor of the government.” 

Id. The court thus reasoned that ICP’s failure to pay the 

duties owed foreclosed any attempt to invoke jurisdiction 

under § 1581(a). Id. at 1342. The court then held that it 

also lacked jurisdiction under § 1581(i), noting that “[ICP] 

may not do indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly.” 

Id. (citing American Air Parcel and ICP I for the proposition that ICP could not invoke § 1581(i) because § 1581(a) 

remained available and was not manifestly inadequate). 

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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS v. US 7

The Trade Court next found that it had jurisdiction 

over Count 9 under § 1581(i) because Count 9 questioned 

the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a), “a provision 

over which Customs has no authority or discretion,” and 

“advance[d] a claim against the United States arising out 

of a [federal law] providing for revenue from imports . . . .” 

Id. at 1343. But the court nevertheless dismissed Count 9 

pursuant to USCIT Rule 12(b)(5) for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 1345. In so 

doing, the court noted that the pre-payment requirement 

“has been a fixture of the customs laws” since 1845, id. at 

1343, and “has consistently been upheld as a valid condition attached to the government’s waiver of sovereign 

immunity” in § 1581(a), id. at 1344. The court recognized 

that the pre-payment requirement “seem[ed] both harsh 

and unfair” when applied here, id., yet stated that such 

unfairness did not present a constitutional defect. 

ICP timely moved to reconsider, alter, or amend the 

judgment, or, in the alternative, to amend the complaint, 

Decision II, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1336, and the Trade Court 

denied that motion, id. at 1339. The court reasoned that 

reconsidering the judgment would be improper because 

ICP only “reiterate[d] arguments already made in its brief 

opposing the motion to dismiss and fully considered at 

that time.” Id. at 1337. The court empathized with ICP’s 

situation, id. at 1338 (“[ICP] is unable to obtain relief 

because it cannot prepay the very duties that the courts 

have declared invalid.”) (emphasis in original), but again 

noted that the pre-payment requirement places a permissible condition on the government’s waiver of sovereign 

immunity, id. The court further reasoned that allowing 

amendment “here would be futile and unduly delay resolution of this case.” Id. at 1339. 

ICP timely appealed to this court; we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5). 

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8 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

DISCUSSION

I 

The constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 2637(a), i.e., the

pre-payment requirement, permeates every aspect of this

appeal; we therefore address the issue at the outset. In so 

doing, we start with the Trade Court’s dismissal of Count 

9 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. See Decision I, 457 F.3d at 1345.

We review de novo the Trade Court’s dismissal for 

failure to state a claim. Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford 

Fire Ins. Co., 672 F.3d 1041, 1049 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper only when it is 

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts 

that would entitle it to relief.” Amoco Oil Co. v. United 

States, 234 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000). We also 

review de novo any issues of constitutional interpretation. 

Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc. v. United States, 734 F.3d 

1306, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Shoe Corp. v. 

United States, 196 F.3d 1378, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

ICP argues that we should reinstate Count 9 because 

the pre-payment requirement, as applied to ICP, deprives 

ICP of its property without due process of law by creating 

“an insurmountable financial barrier to judicial review.” 

Appellant’s Br. 20. Requiring pre-payment of duties owed 

undoubtedly burdens an importer, and we appreciate the 

harsh reality that requirement imposes here, as ICP must

pay almost $28 million before it can commence suit in the 

Trade Court. But we nonetheless hold that the prepayment requirement does not deny ICP the fundamental

processes of fairness required by the Fifth Amendment. 

A 

The pre-payment requirement at issue simply conditions the government’s waiver of sovereign immunity in 

suits over the denial of a protest. It is “elementary” that 

“[t]he United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit 

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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS v. US 9

save as it consents to be sued.” United States v. Mitchell, 

445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). In the event the government consents to suit, that waiver “cannot be implied 

but must be unequivocally expressed.” Id. (citation omitted). In the trade context, the government “unequivocally” consented to suit for certain actions, such as when an 

importer contests the denial of a protest. Humane Soc. of 

United States v. Clinton, 236 F.3d 1320, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 

2001) (“[We] conclude that § 1581 not only states the 

jurisdictional grant to the [Trade Court], but also provides 

a waiver of sovereign immunity over the specified classes 

of cases.”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (entitled “[c]ivil actions 

against the United States”); id. § 1581(a). 

Yet, even when the government waives its immunity, 

a plaintiff lacks carte blanche to file suit. Any waiver is 

subject to “the terms and conditions under which [the 

government] consents to be sued,” NEC Corp. v. United 

States, 806 F.2d 247, 248 (Fed. Cir. 1986), and “must be 

strictly observed,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 

(1981) (citing Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270, 276 

(1957)). Courts have repeatedly recognized, for example,

a statute of limitations as such a valid condition. Block v. 

N. Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 

287 (1983) (“When waiver legislation contains a statute of 

limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.”); see also Hart 

v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 817 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The 

statute of limitations is an express limit[] on the Tucker

Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity.”). Any claim brought 

outside the limitations period is accordingly barred.

The Supreme Court has also held that pre-payment of 

monies owed similarly conditions the government’s waiver 

of immunity. In Cheatham v. United States, the Court 

reiterated that “the government has the right to prescribe 

the conditions on which it will subject itself to the judgment of the courts.” 92 U.S. 85, 89 (1875). It then noted 

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10 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

that “the general government has wisely made the payment of the tax claimed, whether of customs or of internal 

revenue, a condition precedent to a resort to the courts

. . . . We regard this as a condition on which alone the 

government consents to litigate.” Id. The Court has yet 

to question the validity of such a condition. United States 

v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 11 (2008) 

(noting that a taxpayer must pay her taxes before initiating a refund action, and “see[ing] no constitutional problem at all” with that requirement); Flora v. United States, 

362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960) (stating that the tax scheme

“requires full payment . . . before an income tax refund 

suit can be maintained”). We find no differently here. 

As in the tax context, the pre-payment requirement 

here has been “a fixture of the customs laws” since the 

founding of the republic. Decision I, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 

1343. The first tariff statutes lacked any mechanism for 

importers to directly challenge a duty rate. See, e.g., Act 

of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24; Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 

5, 1 Stat. 29. Thus, an importer wanting to challenge a

rate had to pay the duty and then sue the customs collector for a refund in a common law court. United States v. 

Cherry Hill Textiles, Inc., 112 F.3d 1550, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (recounting the genesis of the pre-payment requirement). That pre-payment requirement was subsequently codified in 1845, and now resides in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2637(a): “A civil action contesting the denial of a protest 

. . . may be commenced in the Court of International 

Trade only if all liquidated duties, charges, or exactions 

have been paid at the time the action is commenced.” It 

undoubtedly conditions the government’s consent to suit: 

If . . . the appellant desires to litigate the matter 

here by protest . . . it must first meet the demands 

of the Government, pay the money claimed to be 

due, and then proceed by way of protest . . . . Section 514 contemplates in cases of this character 

that the money shall be in the hands of the GovCase: 14-1644 Document: 55-2 Page: 10 Filed: 06/30/2015
INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS v. US 11

ernment at the time the protest is filed. Suitors in 

these matters must constantly have in mind that 

they sue the Government only by the Government’s 

grace. 

Champion Coated Paper Co. v. United States, 24 CCPA

83, 89–90 (1936) (emphases added). Absent any genuine 

authority contesting the validity of such a condition, we 

decline the invitation to disturb the otherwise well-settled 

understanding that the government may condition its 

involvement in a litigation on the pre-payment of, in this 

case, duties owed. 

B 

We further conclude that ICP cannot allege a genuine 

due process claim, for it lacks a constitutionally protected 

property interest. “The first inquiry in every due process 

challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a 

protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. 

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). 

ICP contends that it has a property interest “in having Customs classify its entries of white sauce under the 

sauces heading.” Appellant’s Br. 22. We disagree. 

The Constitution’s “procedural protection of property 

is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person 

has already acquired in specific benefits.” Bd. of Regents 

of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972). Those 

benefits “may take many forms,” id., and are not simply

limited to “real estate, chattels, or money,” id. at 572. But 

for a benefit to warrant the procedural protections of due 

process, “a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. . . . He must, instead, have a 

legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Id. at 577. For that 

reason, welfare benefits, Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 

(1970), and the right to continued receipt of Social Security disability benefits, Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319 

(1976), are constitutionally protected property interests. 

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In contrast, ICP does not have a “legitimate claim of 

entitlement” to a specific classification and its associated

duty rate, much less the maintenance of that duty rate. 

As we noted, “the Constitution does not provide a right to 

import merchandise under a particular classification or 

rate of duty,” A Classic Time v. United States, 123 F.3d 

1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997), or even afford “a protectable 

interest to engage in international trade,” Am. Ass’n of 

Exporters & Importers-Textile & Apparel Grp. v. United 

States, 751 F.2d 1239, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1985); accord NEC 

Corp. v. United States, 151 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 

1998) (“[E]ngaging in foreign commerce is not a fundamental right protected by notions of substantive due 

process.”). Nor does the Constitution recognize a right to 

rely on the maintenance of a duty rate. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 318 (1933) 

(“No one has a legal right to the maintenance of an existing rate or duty.”); GPX Int’l Tire Corp. v. United States, 

780 F.3d 1136, 1144 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (same); Gilda Indus., 

Inc. v. United States, 446 F.3d 1271, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(“[E]xecutive actions involving foreign trade, such as the 

imposition of tariffs, do not constitute the taking of property without due process of law.”). Absent a right to a 

duty rate and its sustained existence, ICP cannot contest 

the adequacy of the process provided, which here includes 

the pre-payment requirement. 

Moreover, to the extent process is due, Congress has 

delineated a notice and comment regime that Customs 

must follow in order to alter or revoke a ruling letter. 

When Customs fails to abide by that process, an importer 

has access to judicial review. The statutory pre-payment 

requirement does not completely foreclose such access, 

even for a financially struggling importer. An importer 

can pay the duties on a single entry and request that 

liquidation of the remaining entries be suspended, if it 

does so on a timely basis. See, e.g., ICP IV, 748 F.3d 1182. 

Moreover, in circumstances such as this, additional proCase: 14-1644 Document: 55-2 Page: 12 Filed: 06/30/2015
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tections exist. See 19 U.S.C. § 1515(d). The statutory 

scheme and pre-payment requirement are not unconstitutional simply because ICP failed to timely avail itself of 

the provided procedures. 

Because the pre-payment requirement is a valid condition attached to the government’s waiver of immunity, 

and because ICP lacks a constitutionally protected property interest, the Trade Court correctly dismissed Count 9 

for failure to state a claim.

II

We similarly review de novo the Trade Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Heartland 

By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 424 F.3d 1244, 1250 (Fed. 

Cir. 2005). 

ICP has twice before argued that the Trade Court had 

jurisdiction to hear its claims under § 1581(i), ICP I, 467 

F.3d 1324; Int’l Custom Prods. v. United States, 214 F. 

App’x 993 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and we have twice rejected its 

arguments. In ICP I, we reiterated that “mere allegations 

of financial harm . . . do not make the remedy established 

by Congress manifestly inadequate,” and thus ICP had to 

proceed via § 1581(a). ICP I, 467 F.3d at 1327. ICP now 

suggests that § 1581(a) cannot confer jurisdiction at all

because the protest procedures of 19 U.S.C. § 1514 do not 

apply to a claim “centered on the patent ultra vires nature 

of Customs’ actions.” Appellant’s Br. 37. We yet again 

find ICP’s attempt to circumvent § 1581(a) unpersuasive. 

“[W]here Congress has prescribed in great detail a 

particular track for a claimant to follow, in administrative 

or judicial proceedings, and particularly where the claim 

is against the United States . . . , the remedy will be . . . 

exclusive.” Nat’l Corn Growers Ass’n v. Baker, 840 F.2d 

1547, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Here, Congress “prescribed 

in great detail a particular track for a claimant” to challenge a classification decision or duty assessment: 

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[A]ny clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence, . . . adverse to the importer, in any entry, liquidation, or reliquidation, and, decision of 

the Customs Service, including the legality of all 

orders and findings entering into the same, as to . . 

. (2) the classification and rate and amount of duties chargeable; . . . [and] (5) the liquidation or reliquidation of an entry . . . shall be final and 

conclusive . . . unless a protest is filed . . . .

19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (emphasis added). That is an express

statement requiring an importer to challenge the legality 

of Customs’ classification or liquidation decisions via the 

protest procedures in §§ 1514 and 1515. See Omni U.S.A., 

Inc. v. United States, 840 F.2d 912, 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 

(noting the perceived “pervasive requirement throughout 

the statute to channel all nonexcepted protests through 

§ 1514 even when those protests go to the legality of a 

custom official’s action”). And the Trade Court has jurisdiction over such a challenge exclusively via § 1581(a). Id.

(refusing to grant jurisdiction under § 1581(i) for the “void 

liquidation” challenge simply because the importer failed 

to comply with the requirements of the proper jurisdiction 

provision). 

ICP’s self-proclaimed “ultra vires” claim, which simply

questions “the legality of all orders and findings entering 

into the same,” is just such a challenge. ICP must thus 

proceed via the protest procedures of §§ 1514 and 1515, 

and thus must also comply with the jurisdictional prerequisites of § 1581(a) to pursue a suit in the Trade Court. 

To allow ICP to ignore the heart of its claim and assign an 

arbitrary classification to it would exacerbate our earlier

noted concern that “[b]y artful pleading alone a litigant 

would be able to change the entire statutory scheme 

Congress has established.” Am. Air Parcel, 718 F.2d at 

1550. Congress “prescribed in great detail” a mechanism 

by which importers challenge classification and liquidation decisions. ICP cannot now ignore that scheme. 

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Section 1581(a) thus remains the proper vehicle for 

ICP to challenge the legality of the 2005 Notice in the 

Trade Court. Yet, as the Trade Court held, ICP’s failure 

to pay the duties owed foreclosed any attempt to enter the 

Trade Court under § 1581(a). ICP cannot now reclassify 

its claim to excuse itself from § 1581(a)’s associated prepayment requirement. See Decision I, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 

1342 (“[ICP] may not do indirectly what it is prohibited to 

do directly.”). The Trade Court therefore correctly dismissed Counts 1–8 for lack of jurisdiction. 

III

We review the dismissal of a motion to amend and the 

dismissal of a motion for reconsideration for an abuse of 

discretion. Renda Marine, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 

1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (motion for reconsideration);

Saarstahl AG v. United States, 177 F.3d 1314, 1320 (Fed. 

Cir. 1999) (motion to amend). 

ICP argues that the Trade Court abused its discretion 

by denying ICP an opportunity to amend its complaint to 

incorporate a “deemed liquidated jurisdictional basis for 

its claims.” Reply Br. 12. According to ICP, an importer 

need not file a protest, and thus need not comply with the 

earlier described protest procedures, when it challenges 

an entry “Customs purported to liquidate . . . after it had 

already been liquidated by operation of law.” Appellant’s 

Br. 29. Moreover, ICP contends that any purported delay 

in raising a deemed liquidated argument did not prejudice 

the government, and that allowing amendment to incorporate such an argument would not have been futile. 

We disagree. As the government contends, the Trade 

Court did not abuse its discretion in denying ICP’s motion 

for reconsideration and/or to amend. With respect to the 

motion for reconsideration, the Trade Court did not abuse 

its discretion by rejecting an “attempt[] to re-litigate the 

case.” Decision II, 991 F. Supp. 2d at 1338. Reconsideration is granted in limited circumstances, and as the court 

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16 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS, INC. v. US

noted, ICP failed to satisfy those circumstances. No 

meaningful argument disputing that has been raised now 

on appeal. 

With respect to the motion to amend, the Trade Court 

did not abuse its discretion by noting that accepting ICP’s 

deemed liquidated argument would “be futile and unduly 

delay resolution of this case.” Id. at 1339. As the government notes, ICP waited five years to raise its deemed 

liquidated argument, only first raising the argument after 

the Trade Court dismissed the case. It was not an abuse 

of discretion for the court to find that hearing such an 

argument would unduly delay resolution of the case. See 

Ultimax Cement Mfg. Corp. v. CTS Cement Mfg. Corp., 

587 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that “the 

district court was clearly within its discretion to deny the 

motion to amend based on undue delay and a similarly 

burdensome need to reopen summary judgment motions”). 

 Moreover, the Trade Court did not abuse its discretion 

in finding the deemed liquidated argument futile here. As 

we have held, an importer may use a deemed liquidated 

claim as a shield in an enforcement action. Cherry Hill, 

112 F.3d at 1560. An importer can thus defend against a 

purported untimely liquidation in an enforcement action 

without first having to protest. Id. at 1561 (“We therefore 

hold that because Cherry Hill’s entry was liquidated by 

operation of law . . . , IC&S was not required to protest 

the October 28 liquidation in order to . . . defend against 

liability on the ground of the deemed liquidation.”). Such 

a claim, however, cannot be further used “as a sword” in 

an action against the government simply to avoid protest 

procedures. Fujitsu Gen. Am., Inc. v. United States, 283 

F.3d 1364, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2002). ICP’s claim against 

the government did not present the proper posture for 

raising a deemed liquidated claim, and it was therefore 

not an abuse of discretion for the Trade Court to dismiss 

the requested amendment to include that argument here. 

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INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM PRODUCTS v. US 17

We therefore hold that the Trade Court correctly denied ICP’s motion for reconsideration and/or to amend the 

complaint. We have considered all remaining arguments, 

but find them unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decisions of the Trade 

Court (1) dismissing Counts 1–9 of ICP’s complaint and 

(2) denying ICP’s motion to reconsider, alter, or amend 

the judgment and/or to amend the complaint are affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1644 Document: 55-2 Page: 17 Filed: 06/30/2015