Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01951/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01951-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chico Lodging, LLC
Defendant
Lary Feezor
Plaintiff
Marriott
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LARY FEEZOR,

NO. CIV. S-05-1951 LKK/CMK

Plaintiff,

v. O R D E R

CHICO LODGING, LLC, dba

MARRIOTT,

Defendant.

 /

Pending before the court is defendant Chico Lodging’s motion

to dismiss contending that plaintiff has not demonstrated that he

has standing to bring the claims and that the complaint is not

alleged with sufficient specificity. For the reasons explained

below, the motion is denied.

I.

THE COMPLAINT 

Feezor alleges that he is a paraplegic who requires the use

of a wheelchair and a mobility-equipped van to ambulate. The

Marriott in Chico, California, is a place of lodging with more than

five rooms for rent, open to the public, and intended for nonCase 2:05-cv-01951-LKK -CMK Document 20 Filed 02/28/06 Page 1 of 9
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residential use. Feezor visited the Marriott and “encountered

barriers (both physical and intangible) that interfered with - if

not outright denied - his ability to use and enjoy the goods,

services, privileges, and accommodations offered at the facility.”

Compl. at 3. Attached to the complaint is a list of different

specific violations, some of which, the complaint explains, are

unrelated to Feezor’s disability but which were provided as a

courtesy notice. 

II.

STANDARDS

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint must

be accepted as true. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972).

The court is bound to give the plaintiff the benefit of every

reasonable inference to be drawn from the "well-pleaded"

allegations of the complaint. See Retail Clerks Intern. Ass'n,

Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963).

Thus, the plaintiff need not necessarily plead a particular fact

if that fact is a reasonable inference from facts properly alleged.

See id.; see also Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 648 (1963)

(inferring fact from allegations of complaint).

In general, the complaint is construed favorably to the

pleader. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). So

construed, the court may not dismiss the complaint for failure to

state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of the claim which would entitle

him or her to relief. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

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73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).

In spite of the deference the court is bound to pay to the

plaintiff's allegations, however, it is not proper for the court

to assume that "the [plaintiff] can prove facts which [he or she]

has not alleged, or that the defendants have violated the . . .

laws in ways that have not been alleged." Associated General

Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

III.

ANALYSIS

The defendant makes two claims in the present motion. First,

it challenges whether the plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to

demonstrate standing, arguing that plaintiff has not alleged an

imminent injury. Secondly, it claims that the alleged violations

are “conclusory and not sufficiently plead.” Each issue will be

addressed in turn.

A. STANDING

Defendant’s contention concerning standing is frivolous. The

complaint alleges the following:

Feezor was also deterred from visiting the Hotel because

he knew that the Hotel’s goods, services, facilities,

privileges, advantages and accommodations at the hotel

were unavailable to physically disabled patrons (such as

himself). He still refuses to visit the Hotel because

of the future threats of injury created by these

barriers.

Compl. at 3. 

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Defendant argues that since plaintiff “refuses to visit the

Hotel” he has not shown that he intends to return, but rather that

he will not. Clearly, however, Feezor is claiming that he is

deterred from visiting the hotel again until the alleged

accessibility violations are remedied for fear that he will be

injured again. The Ninth Circuit, in Pickern v. Holiday Quality

Foods Inc. held that:

a disabled individual who is currently deterred from

patronizing a public accommodation due to a defendant's

failure to comply with the ADA has suffered “actual

injury.” Similarly, a plaintiff who is threatened with

harm in the future because of existing or imminently

threatened non-compliance with the ADA suffers “imminent

injury.”

293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002). It is unnecessary for

plaintiff to frequently return to a facility and suffer repeated

abuse in order to obtain standing. See 42 U.S.C. § 12187(a)(1)

(“[n]othing in this section shall require a person with disability

to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that

a person or organization covered by this subchapter [Title III]

does not intend to comply with its provisions.”); Pickern, 293 F.3d

at 1135; Steger v. Franco, 228 F.3d 889 (8th Cir. 2000). 

Defendant’s reply brief cites to Molski v. Mandarin Touch

Restaurant to support the argument that a serial plaintiff must

show more than simply a professed intent to return to a location

to be persuasive. 385 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045-46 (C.D. Cal. 2005).

According to defendant plaintiff has filed 44 ADA cases in this

District.

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I begin by noting that Molski is not biding and hardly

persuasive. Moreover, the rule for motions to dismiss is that the

court must treat plaintiff’s colorable allegations as true.

Nothing before the court suggests that plaintiff’s allegations are

to be doubted. The fact that plaintiff is fulfilling the

Congressional purpose when it provided for private enforcement of

the ADA is hardly evidence of bad faith. See Wilson v. Pier 1

Imports (US), Inc., -- F.Supp.2d --, 2006 WL 213823, *1 (E.D. Cal.

2006).

Defendant also complains about Feezor’s decision to notify

Chico Lodging of barriers that do not affect Feezor’s disability.

Plaintiff conceded in the complaint that he does not have standing

to bring these claims. The complaint does not identify which of

the barriers in the attachment are associated with Feezor’s

disability and which are not. Defendant claims that this renders

the complaint impossible to answer. The court fails to see why

this is the case. Chico Lodging may answer the complaint as to the

existence of the barriers, and deny liability by virtue of a lack

of standing where appropriate.

B. SPECIFICITY OF PLEADING 

Defendant’s second claim is in two parts. First, defendant

argues that the complaint is not specific enough in that it does

not mention which portions of the property Mr. Feezor actually

visited or how the barriers he allegedly encountered interfered

with his use and enjoyment. This contention is equally frivolous.

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The pleading puts Chico Lodging on notice that plaintiff visited

the Marriott and encountered barriers. Attached to the complaint

is a list of 75 alleged specific violations, including a citation

to the ADAAG standard (and, in some cases, other standards as well)

with photographs attached. This is clearly more than what is

required under federal notice pleading. As long as the plaintiff

alleges that he encountered one barrier on his visit he has the

right to bring suit for any other barriers which exist at the

facility which might hinder his access in the future, even if he

only became aware of those barriers as a result of his expert’s

subsequent review of the facility. Pickern v. Holiday Quality

Foods Inc. 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2002); Wilson v. Pier 1

Imports (US), Inc., –- F. Supp.2d -–, 2006 WL 280953, *4 (E.D.

Cal. 2006). 

Defendant next argues that some of the statements in the

complaint are not specific enough. For example, the complaint

states that the “tow away sign [is] posted at wrong height” and

defendant claims that this is not specific enough because it does

not provide what height the sign is or why that height is in

violation of the law. Those details, however, go beyond what is

required for notice pleading. 

Defendant also claims that there are allegations in the

complaint that have been rejected by this court on previous

occasions and thus are “disingenuous” for Mr. Feezor to plead.

They cite to no doctrine of estoppel or res judicata which

prohibits pleading of violations which were rejected in a different

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1 Moreover, it is not clear that this affects the character

of the facility as a public accommodation. In any event, defendant

has not demonstrated why plaintiff’s failure to register, if such

is the fact, bears upon the sufficiency of the complaint. 

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case with different plaintiffs and different defendants. If such

a doctrine exists the court is unaware of it. 

Defendant argues that some of Mr. Feezor’s alleged violations

are “bogus on their face.” As the court understands defendant’s

motion, however, it is not moving to specifically dismiss those

claims, but the entire complaint. A similar problem exists with

the argument that some of the violations are “non-existent” since

the complaint does not specifically set out evidence of what is

required, and what exists at the facility. The example given is

that there is no lift in the pool, defendant states that this is

not required, but provide a cite to a portion of the DSA’s

California Access Compliance Reference Manual (which plaintiff

referenced in the attachment to the complaint) which requires that

“public and common rooms and similar areas shall be made accessible

to people with disabilities.” Defendant does not show, however,

how the pool is accessible. 

The single most persuasive argument defendant makes is that

Mr. Feezor has not alleged that he was a registered guest, and

therefore that he was entitled to access the pool, workout room,

and guest rooms. However, this, again, is beyond what is required

by the pleading standard.1 

Feezor’s complaint is clearly a cookie cutter model which

includes allegations that the hotel was both designed or

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2 The date after which the ADAAG standards are triggered as

plain violations of the ADA. 

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constructed after January 26, 19922 and that it was altered after

that date. Defendant states that the complaint “is so generic that

it entirely fails to take into consideration that the Property is

newly built.” Def.’s Br. at 7. However, the complaint clearly

alleges that the facility was constructed after the relevant date,

there does not appear to be anything more required at this stage

of the proceedings. Throughout the brief, the defendant puts much

emphasis on the fact that the building is brand new, somehow

suggesting that because it is brand new that the court should

assume that it has no violations of the ADA. Obviously, the one

fact, assuming it is true, hardly mandates the suggested

conclusion.

Finally, while it may seem inconvenient to the defendant that

they need to respond to all the allegations set out in the

complaint - that is what the law requires. The liberal pleading

standard of Rule 8 only requires the “short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” that

appears to have been accomplished here. Plaintiff has alleged that

he visited the hotel, encountered barriers, and was deterred from

visiting in the future. He alleges that the hotel was built and/or

modified after 1992 and sets out the four statutes under which he

seeks recovery. Plaintiff also includes a very lengthy list of

alleged violations, including citations to exact code provisions,

it is not even clear that the list would have been required at all.

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The rule does not require more.

The court has considered whether it is appropriate to sanction

defendant for a frivolous motion unduly multiplying these

proceedings. The court has decided not to, given that certain

recent District Court cases have, in effect, encouraged this

motion. The court, however, cautions counsel that future similar

conduct will not be viewed with equal sanguinity. 

Defendant’s motion to dismiss is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: February 27, 2006.

/s/Lawrence K. Karlton 

LAWRENCE K. KARLTON

SENIOR JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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