Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01021/USCOURTS-caDC-95-01021-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Anthony Crane Rental, Inc.
Petitioner
Robert B. Reich
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 2, 1995 Decided December 1, 1995

No. 95-1021

ANTHONY CRANE RENTAL, INC.,

PETITIONER

v.

ROBERT B. REICH, SECRETARY OF LABOR,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Richard R. Nelson, II, argued the cause for petitioner, with whom Wayne C. Holcombe was on the

brief.

Bruce Justh, Counsel, United States Department of Labor, argued the cause for respondent, with

whom Thomas F. Williamson, Solicitor, Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Barbara U.

Werthmann, Counsel, were on the brief. Charles F. James, Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: This is a case about a craneand about whether the company that

leased the crane can be held accountable for the crane's failure to meet safety standards promulgated

under the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSH Act"). In this case, Anthony Crane Rental

("ACR"), a companywhich leases and services cranes, appeals a decision of the Occupational Safety

and Health Review Commission ("Commission"), penalizing it for violations of the safety standards

for cranes used in construction. ACR argues that because it merely leased the crane to another

company and was not engaged in construction work, it should not be held liable under the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") construction safety standards. The

Secretary of Labor argues, and the Commission ruled, that because ACR leased the crane, created

or had control over the hazards at issue, serviced the crane, and performed work "integral" to the

construction project, it can be held accountable under the OSH Act.

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We agree, but only in part, and affirm those citations for which there was a specific finding

that ACR'srepairman was exposed to the hazard. With respect to those hazards for which there was

no specific finding that an ACR employee was exposed, we decline at this juncture to accede to the

Secretary's urging that we adopt the "multi-employer" doctrine, under which an employer can be

penalized for exposing employees of other employers to a hazard. Rather than applying this broad

doctrine for the first time in this circuit on the basis of the record before us, we vacate the citations

in this second category and remand so that the Commission may clarify whether in these ambiguous

situations ACR's repairman was in fact exposed to the hazards. We also vacate another citation,

where it is unclear that anyone was exposed to the hazard, and similarly remand for clarification.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the matter to the Commission.

I. BACKGROUND

AnthonyCraneRentaloperates a facilityinWest Mifflin, Pennsylvania, whichleases,services,

and maintains cranes. In 1990, ACR leased a number of cranes to subcontractors engaged in

construction at the Greater PittsburghInternationalAirport constructionproject; among these cranes

was the equipment at issue here, a conventional truck crane leased to Mid-West Conveyor

Construction Services ("Mid-West").

ACR leased most of the cranes under an "owner operated" lease, where it supplied the crane,

the crane operator and oiler, and all fuel, maintenance services, and insurance for the crane.

However, the crane here was leased pursuant to what ACR calls a "bare rental" lease, the terms of

which called for the lessee, Mid-West, to provide the operator and oiler, and arrange for any

maintenance or repairs. Though free to hire any company it wished to perform repairs, Mid-West

chose ACR to do the servicing on the crane.

The crane was delivered to Mid-West on October 8, 1990. The following day, Jeff Paisley,

one of ACR's field mechanics, visited the worksite in response to a complaint about the lowering

capability of the crane. He diagnosed the problem, and returned on October 11 to repair it. On

October 26, Paisley responded to a request by a Mid-West employee to check the crane because it

was not swinging properly. Paisley fixed the problem that day.

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Later that day, the boom of the crane collapsed, killing the crane's oiler. After the accident,

OSHA investigated the worksite and cited ACR for numerous violations of the construction safety

standards for cranes, though none of the alleged violations was related to the fatal accident. OSHA

proposed that ACR be fined $82,200 for its violations of § 5(a)(2) of the OSH Act, 29 U.S.C. §

654(a)(2), and its construction industry regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12.

At the hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), ACR disputed the factual

existence of many of the violations, and argued that because it had leased the crane pursuant to a

bare-rental lease, it could not be held liable for OSH Act violations. The ALJ agreed that some of

the violations had not been established, but found ACR responsible for others. In addition, the ALJ

determined that ACR's activities were sufficiently "integral" to the construction project to justify a

finding that ACR was engaged in "construction" within the OSHA regulations. See Secretary of

Labor v. Anthony Crane Rental, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 91-0556 (Mar. 12, 1993) ("ALJ

Decision").

The specific violations found by the ALJ were:

(1) Exhaust Pipe Insulation: The exhaust pipe and muffler of the crane, which get hot

during operation, were not insulated or otherwise protected from contact. 29 C.F.R. §

1926.550(a)(10). (Citation No. 1, item 1).

(2) Fire Extinguisher: There was no fire extinguisher in the cab of the crane. Id. §

1926.550(a)(14)(i). (Citation No. 1, item 2).

(3)Inspection Records: Although the crane was inspected within a year of its rental to MidWest, ACR did not maintain written records of the inspection. Id. § 1926.550(a)(6).

(Citation No. 2, item 2(e)).

(4) Improperly Adjusted Components: There were four separate violations of 29 C.F.R.

§ 1926.550(b)(2):

(a) Boom hoist rachet pawlsThese devices are intended to prevent the crane's boom from

falling if the brake should slip. They were bent and not functioning properly. (Citation No.

2, item 3(c), instance 1).

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(b) Hoist drum power downThis mechanism can help prevent a load from falling, and was

not functioning properly. (Citation No. 2, item 3(c), instance 2).

(c) Boom cable shroud coverThe rain cover for the cable was not properly adjusted, and

might eventually have caused the cable to spool improperly, leading to the boom snapping.

(Citation No. 2, item 3(c), instance 3).

(d) Tail shaft governorThis device prevents excessive wear on the machinery. The crane

was delivered with the device disconnected. (Citation No. 2, item 3(c), instance 4).

(5) Modifications & Use of Unapproved Replacement Parts: ACR added several parts

to the ratchet pawl assemblies without the crane manufacturer's approval, which could result

in part of the boom assembly tearing out of the machine. Id. § 1926.550(a)(16), (b)(2).

(Citation No. 2, items 5(a) and 5(b)).

(6) Failure to Make Prompt Repairs: Mid-West complained about the power down

mechanismimmediately after the crane was delivered on October 8, and Paisley observed the

problem on October 9. However, Paisley did not repair the mechanism until October 11. Id.

§ 1926.550(b)(2). (Citation No. 2, item 6(a)).

(7) Preventative Maintenance Program: ACR had an unorganized maintenance program

and poor record-keeping. Id. (Citation No. 2, item 7).

The ALJfound, however, that the violations were not willful, and thusreduced the penalty to $3,150.

The Commission affirmed the ALJ's findings and penalties, Secretary of Labor v. Anthony Crane

Rental, Inc., 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2107 (1994) ("Comm'n Decision"), and this appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

We will uphold the Commission's factual conclusions if they are "supported by substantial

evidence on the record considered as a whole," 29 U.S.C. § 660(a), and will uphold other findings

and conclusions of the Commission so long as they are not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of

discretion, or contrary to law, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). We defer to the Secretary's interpretation of

the Act and regulations, upholding such interpretations so long as they are consistent with the

statutory language and otherwise reasonable. See Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 150-51 (1991);

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1The general safety standard for cranes can be found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.180. 

2Section 1910.12 in turn refers to § 1926, which contains the precise technical standards for

cranes and derricks which ACR is alleged to have violated. 

S.G. Loewendick & Sons v. Reich, No. 94-1662, 1995 WL 686057 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 1995)

(deference is owed only to the Secretary and not the Commission on questions of statutory or

regulatory interpretation).

A. Construction Regulations

The OSH Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish safety and health standards,

which are binding on employers. 29 U.S.C. § 655. Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary has

promulgated the Occupational Safety and Health Standards, also known as the "general industry

standards." 29 C.F.R. Part 1910.1In addition, the Secretary has adopted several industry-specific

standards, including the construction safety standards under which ACR was cited:

The standards prescribed in part 1926 of this chapter are adopted as occupational

safety and health standards under section 6 of the Act and shall apply, according to

the provisions thereof, to every employment and place of employment of every

employee engaged in construction work. Each employer shall protect the

employment and places of employment of each of his employees engaged in

construction work by complying with the appropriate standards prescribed in this

paragraph.

Id. § 1910.12(a). Under this regulatory scheme, the general industry standards apply unless they are

preempted by specific industry standards.2See generally Brock v. Cardinal Indus., 828 F.2d 373,

376 (6th Cir. 1987).

If the construction industry standards are to applyas the Commission found hereACR

must have been "engaged in construction work." The starting point for determining whether ACR

met this requirement is 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(b), which provides, "For purposes of this section,

Construction work means work for construction, alteration, and/or repair, including painting and

decorating."

ACR argues that its activities at the Mid-West site were "merely ancillary" to the bare-rental

lease, and thus did not constitute construction work. See Brief for ACR at 33. This might be a

stronger argument if ACR had merely sold or leased the crane, without providing repair services, or

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if the repair services had been de minimis. Clearly, there are circumstances under which a provider

of equipment has such a tenuous connection to the ongoing construction work in a project that it

cannot reasonably be held to be engaged in "work for construction." But here, the Commission

specifically found that by "providing mechanic services on an ongoing and regular basis, ACR

engaged in activities whichwere inextricablylinked to the construction project in question." OSHRC

Decision at 4. In so finding, the Commission located ACR's activities squarely within a line of cases

which have found similar activitiesto fallwithin the definition of construction work. See, e.g., Beatty

Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 577 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1978) (leasing and erecting

scaffolding on construction site); Heede International, Inc., 2 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1466 (OSHRC

1975) (dismantling of crane on construction site); West Allis Lime & Cement Co., 2 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) 1453 (OSHRC 1974) (delivery of material to construction site). We find, therefore, that the

Commission's conclusion that ACR was engaged in constructionwork was not an abuse of discretion.

The second question is whetherthe Mid-West worksite was ACR's "place[ ] of employment."

29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a). ACR points to Reich v. Simpson, Gumpertz & Heger, Inc., 3 F.3d 1 (1st

Cir. 1993), a case in which the court found that an engineering firm which had given faulty advice

which led to the collapse of part of a building under construction could not be held liable under the

construction industry regulations of § 1910.12. The court in Simpson said:

[W]e do not think that the WPI construction site is a "place[ ] of employment" which

[the firm] had a duty under OSHA to protect. In our opinion, adoption of the

Secretary's interpretation would expand the meaning of the phrase "places of

employment" beyond any reasonable boundaries.

Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).

However, the Simpson decisionwas based principallyon the fact that the engineering firmhad

no "employees at the actual construction site." Id. Therefore, Simpson does not suggest to us any

cause to depart from the plain language of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12(a)namely, that the place where an

employee works is a "place of employment." The fact that Mid-West's employees also worked (or

even predominated) at the construction site makes it no less a place of employment for ACR's

repairman, Paisley. See Baroid Division of NL Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC, 660 F.2d 439, 445-46 (10th

Cir. 1981) (independent company could be penalized for exposing its employee to hazards at a

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worksite controlled by another employer).

In sum, because ACR was engaged in construction work, and because the worksite was a

place of employment for ACR, the Commission properly applied the construction industry standards

of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12.

B. Exposure to the Hazards

The more difficult problemin this case implicatesthe question ofjust who was exposed to the

hazards posed by the crane. With respect to some of the hazards, the ALJ specifically found that

Paisley was exposed. With respect to other hazards, the ALJ found that Mid-West employees were

exposed, but did not specifically say whether Paisley was exposed. And with respect to one of the

violationsthe failure to maintain inspection recordsthe ALJ did not find that any employee was

exposed. ACR does not dispute these findings, but does dispute their legal consequences. Each

category requires a separate analysis.

1. Hazards to Which Paisley Was Exposed

TheALJspecificallyfound that Paisleywas exposed to (1) non-insulated exhaustsystem, ALJ

Decision at 12 ("Respondent's field mechanic ... had access to the areas with the heated pipes and

could have been burned."); (2) lack of a fire extinguisher, id. at 13 ("mechanic [was exposed] when

he was in the cab or actually working on the crane"); (3) improperly adjusted boom hoist ratchet

pawls, id. at 31 ("Respondent's employee was at risk when he was near the crane."); (4)

modificationsto boom down ratchet pawl, id. at 41 ("Respondent'sfield mechanic ... could have been

injured in the event of partsfailure."); (5) lack of preventative maintenance program, id. at 46 ("All

of Anthony's own employees ... were exposed to the hazard of cranes which had not been subject to

an appropriate preventative maintenance program."). On the basis of the record before us, we affirm

the Commission's finding of liability with respect to each of these violations.

ACR offers several arguments why, despite the exposure of its repairman, it should not be

held accountable. First, ACR argues that it should not be penalized because it is basically like a seller

of equipment. See Brief for ACR at 23. Although it is true that sellers are generally not held liable

under the OSH Act for supplying equipment that does not meet OSHA standards, see, e.g., Johnson

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3The ALJ properly vacated other citations arising out of hazards over which ACR had no

control. For example, the ALJ vacated a citation for failure to check lubricating systemsa duty

clearly falling to the lessee. ALJ Decision at 25. The ALJ also vacated a citation based on the

failure of the crane's operator and oiler to make adequate inspections. Id. Again, this decision

was appropriate because ACR had no control over the operator and oiler, who were Mid-West's

employees. In addition, the ALJ vacated a citation for failure to post a chart stating the crane's

load capacities in the crane of the cab. Id. at 15-18. This decision was also appropriate, because

the evidence showed that ACR supplied the chart to Mid-West, but Mid-West failed to post it in

the cab. 

v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182, 1189 (N.D. Ohio 1981), app. dismissed, 705 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.

1982), ACR was not a mere seller of equipment. To the contrary, it maintained a repair facility for

cranes and serviced cranes both in the field and in its own facility. After each rental, the crane was

returned to ACR for inspection and necessary repairs. Thus, unlike a typical seller, ACR was in a

favored position to learn of defects and to take actions to correct them. See Central of Ga. R.R. v.

OSHRC, 576 F.2d 620, 623 (5th Cir. 1978) (OSH Act "focuses liability where the harm in fact can

be prevented").

Second, ACR argues that it would be unfair to penalize it for the mere act of sending an

employee to repair a problem with the crane. Under the Secretary's theory of liability, ACR argues,

any repair company could be cited for an OSHA violation by sending an employee into a situation

where a hazard exists, even though repairing the problemwillmake the worksite safer for all the other

employees. Here, however, ACR was found to have created the very hazards to which Paisley was

exposed. Paisley did not go to the worksite merely to repair defects that arose out of the operation

ofthe crane, but rather, defectsthat ACR should have identified and corrected before renting out the

crane.3 Our narrow holding today in no way addresses the general issue of whether an employer

which exposes its repair workers to hazards created by others can be held liable under the Act.

Finally, ACR argues that holding it liable for OSH Act violations under the circumstances of

this case would be contrary to public policy and would frustrate the Act's purpose of promoting

worker safety, because liability would dissuade lessors from performing repairs. We fail to see,

however, how holding the party in the best position to know of any work hazards responsible for

exposing its employees to those hazards runs contrary to public policy. At any rate, our review of

Commission decisions does not extend to choosing among competing policy options. To the

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contrary,so long asthe path chosen by the Commission isreasonable and consistent with the lawas

it was herewe will uphold it.

Therefore, we affirmthe Commission'sfindings and penalties with respect to the above-listed

citations.

2. Hazards as to Which Paisley's Exposure is Unclear

There is a second group of violations, with respect to which the ALJ did not specify whether

Paisley was exposed, but did find that employees of Mid-West were exposed. These violations were

(1) hoist drum power down, ALJ Decision at 33 ("crane operator, oiler and others working around

the crane were exposed"); (2) boom cable shroud cover, id. at 35 ("employees, particularly the

ironworkers handling the crane'sloads, were exposed"); (3) tail shaft governor, id. at 37 ("[a]s with

similar hazardous conditions, the operator, oiler and those working near the crane at the site were

exposed"); and (4) failure to make prompt repairs, id. at 43 ("[t]here was exposure of the operator,

oiler and other construction workers working in the vicinity").

It would not be altogether unreasonable to infer that Paisley, as well as other on-site

employees, was exposed to some of these hazards. For example, both the boom hoist ratchet pawls

and the hoist drum mechanism prevent the boom or the loads it is carrying from falling, and since the

ALJ explicitly found that Paisley was exposed to the former, it would not take any great leap of logic

to suppose he was exposed to the latter as well. But on review, we do not feel free to choose

between competing inferences that can be drawn from essentially factual matters. It is up to the

Commission, not us, to determine whether Paisley was exposed to any or all of this second group of

hazards. See Dole v. Williams Enters., 876 F.2d 186, 190 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing SEC v.

Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943)).

The Secretary argues, however, that even if Paisley was not exposed to certain hazards, ACR

can still be held accountable under what is called the "multi-employer doctrine." As the Commission

explained it, "an employer at a multi-employer construction worksite is responsible ... in the absence

of exposure of its own employees, for any hazardous conditions which it creates or controls."

OSHRC Decision at 6.

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4

§ 654. Duties of Employers and Employees

(a) Each employer

(1) shall furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of

employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are

likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees;

(2) shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated

under this chapter. 

This doctrine, first enunciated in Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975), has

developed over the past 20 years as a means of apportioning liability at multi-employer worksites

where one employer has created a hazard, and some employees, but not necessarily its own, are

exposed to it. See Teal v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 728 F.2d 799, 804-05 (6th Cir. 1984)

("Once an employer is deemed responsible for complying with OSHA regulations, it is obligated to

protect every employee who works at its workplace."). See generally MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,

OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH LAW §§ 161-169 (3d ed. 1990). The basic theory underlying

the multi-employer doctrine isthat while the language of 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)4isspecifically limited

to situations where an employer's own employees are exposed to hazards, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2)

creates liability for violations of specific industry standards (such as the construction industry

standards here) where any employees are exposed, even if they are not employees of the employer

responsible for the violation.

Before Brennan v. OSHRC, several courts and the Commission had taken the position that

the language in § 654(a)(1), which says that an employer's duty runs to "his employees," precluded

liability in those situations where employees of another company were exposed. See, e.g., Brennan

v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974) (affirming OSHRC decision that general

contractor was notresponsible forsafetyofsubcontractor's employees). At the Secretary's invitation,

the Second Circuit rejected this position:

But to draw from [the language of § 654(a)(1) ] a general rule that standards under

the Act can be violated only when a cited employer's own employees are shown to be

directly exposed to a violation of a standard seems to us to be wholly unwarranted.

It also fails to give effect to the clause under which [the subcontractor] was cited,

subparagraph (2) of § 654(a). That subparagraph requires employers to "comply with

occupational safety and health standards promulgated under the Act." This specific

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duty to comply with the Secretary'sstandardsisin no way limited to situations where

a violation of a standard is linked to exposure of his employees to the hazard. It is a

duty over and above his general duty to his own employees under § 654(a)(1).

Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d at 1037-38 (footnotes omitted). In Teal, the Sixth Circuit attempted

to further dissipate the confusion that had arisen due to the different duties imposed by subsections

(a)(1) and (a)(2):

The difficulty which courts have experienced in attempting to define a particular

employer's responsibilities under the Act is due primarily to the varying nature of the

separate duty provisions. The general duty clause was intended by Congress to cover

unanticipated hazards; Congress recognized that it could not anticipate all of the

potential hazards that might affect adversely the safety of workers. Accordingly it

enacted the general duty clause [654(a)(1)] to cover serious hazards that were not

otherwise covered by specific regulations.... In contrast, Sec. 654(a)(2) is the specific

duty provision. The class of employers who owe a duty to comply with the OSHA

regulations is defined with reference to control of the workplace and opportunity to

comply with the OSHA regulations. Accordingly, an employers' [sic] responsibilities

under the Act depend upon which duty provision the employer is accused of

breaching.

728 F.2d at 804.

Thus, if an employer is accused of breaching a specific dutysuch as the construction

industry standards herethe Secretary brings the charge under § 654(a)(2), and urges the

Commission and reviewing courtsto apply the multi-employer doctrine. Although some of our sister

circuits have applied this doctrine in circumstances similar to those here, see, e.g., Beatty Equip.

Leasing, 577 F.2d at 536-37 (subcontractor who supplied and erected a scaffolding liable, evenwhere

his own employees not exposed); Marshall v. Knutson Constr. Co., 566 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977)

(general contractor has duty to protect all employees at worksite), the Fifth Circuit has declined to

adopt it, e.g., Melerine v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 659 F.2d 706, 712 (5th Cir. 1981) ("In this

circuit, therefore, the class protected by OSHA regulations comprises only employers' own

employees."). And indeed, in the peculiar circumstances of "duty to warn" cases, we have upheld

OSH Act violations where the employees "exposed" were not those of the violating employer. See

Durez Div. of Occidental Chem. Corp. v. OSHA, 906 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (rejecting petition for

review by chemical manufacturer charged with not adequately warning downstream employees of

hazards, but not addressing applicability of multi-employer doctrine); General Carbon Co. v.

OSHRC, 860 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (same). But as the Secretary candidly admits in his brief,

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5

29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200. 

this court has not yet explicitly considered whether the duty to comply with the standards imposed

by § 654(a)(2) requires an employer to protect employees other than its own.

There are two concerns which militate against making that decision on the basis ofthe present

record in this case. First, it is not clear to us that the multi-employer doctrine is consistent with the

Secretary's own construction industry regulation, 29C.F.R. § 1910.12(a). That regulation, discussed

in supra Section II.A. ofthis opinion, requires employersto complywith the "occupationalsafetyand

health standards" of 29 C.F.R. Part 1926. In other words, § 1910.12 requires compliance with the

specific industry standards referred to in § 654(a)(2). However, the language of § 1910.12, which

says that "[e]ach employer shall protect the employment and places of employment of each of his

employees" (emphasis added), is in marked tension with the multi-employer doctrine we are asked

to apply here. In contrast, the Hazard Communication Standards at issue in Durez and General

Carbon5specifically required chemical manufacturers to "furnish information to "downstream'

employers," General Carbon, 860 F.2d at 481, thus making it entirely consistent with application of

the multi-employer doctrine. Here, the relevant regulation by its terms only applies to an employer's

own employees, seemingly leaving little room for invocation of the doctrine. At any rate, the parties

have not briefed this issue, nor has any court that has adopted the multi-employer doctrine explicitly

considered it. Consequently, we leave to a later date the critical decision of whether to apply the

multi-employer doctrinewhere anemployer has been cited under the construction industry regulations

of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.12.

Moreover, as we pointed out, it is possible that Paisley was in fact exposed to some of the

hazards in question here, and that the ALJ merely failed to make a sufficiently explicit finding to that

effect. It is certainly not beyond the pale to believe that if the improperly adjusted boom hoist ratchet

pawls exposed Paisley to the risk of the boom falling, other violations, such as the improperly

adjusted boom cable shroud cover, which risked causing the boom to snap, produced a comparable

exposure for Paisley. We hesitate to plunge into the thicket of the multi-employer doctrine if there

is a narrower ground on which liability may be imposed.

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Accordingly, the findings ofliabilityfor the above-listed violations are vacated, and the matter

is remanded to the Commission, which may conduct further inquiries or make further findings as to

the exposure of ACR's own employees to this category of risks.

3. Hazards as to Which Exposure of Any Employee is Unclear

The ALJ and Commission did not specifywhether any employees were exposed to the hazard

arising from failure to maintain written inspection records. See ALJ Decision at 20-24. Although

there may well be some OSH Act violations for which exposure is not required, see generally

ROTHSTEIN, supra, § 169, the Secretary has not argued here that this violation is among them.

Accordingly, this citation is vacated, and on remand, the Commission may make more detailed

findings as to exposure.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Commission's finding of liability with respect to the

citations discussed in subsection II.B.1 of this opinion (Citation No. 1, item 1; Citation No. 1, item

2; Citation No. 2, item 3(c), instance 1; Citation No. 2, items 5(a) and 5(b); and Citation No. 2,

item 7). Because the four instances of violation of Citation No. 2, item 3(c) were all grouped

together for purposes of assessing the fine, that penalty is set aside, and the Commission must

re-determine the proper fine for the one instance we affirm. With respect to the remaining citations

discussed in subsections II.B.2 and II.B.3 of this opinion (Citation No. 2, item 2(e); Citation No. 2,

item 3(c), instances 2, 3, and 4; Citation No. 2, item 6(a); Citation No. 2, item 7) we vacate the

Commission'sfindings ofliability,set aside the fines, and remand for further consideration consistent

with this opinion.

So ordered.

USCA Case #95-1021 Document #165450 Filed: 12/01/1995 Page 13 of 13