Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-00035/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-00035-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aurora Lopez-Avila
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, 

vs.

AURORA LOPEZ-AVILA,

Defendant. 

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No. CR 10-035-TUC-CKJ

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw from Plea [Doc. #

14]. The government has filed a response. Evidence and argument were presented to the

Court on April 12, 2010.

Procedural Background

On January 6, 2010, Defendant Aurora Lopez-Avila (“Lopez-Avila”) was indicted

on one count of Possession with Intent to Distribute Cocaine. On February 24, 2010,

Lopez-Avila pleaded guilty to the indictment. Lopez-Avila stated, under oath, that (1)

she was voluntarily pleading guilty because she was guilty, (2) she understood that once

her guilty plea was accepted she would not be permitted to withdraw her guilty plea, and

(3) knowing her rights and the consequences of her plea, she wanted to enter a guilty plea.

Lopez-Avila further stated that, on December 8, 2009, she was driving a 2000 Dodge

Stratus in Nogales, Arizona, she knew there were drugs in the vehicle, she intended to be

paid to deliver those drugs to someone else, and the government could prove that the

drugs in the vehicle consisted of 10.3 kg of cocaine.

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Throughout her testimony, Lopez-Avila testified regarding “the man” and “he.” The

Court will simply refer to him as Garcia.

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On March 28, 2010, Lopez-Avila filed a Motion to Withdraw from Plea. The

Court scheduled the matter for an April 12, 2010, hearing. During the hearing, the Court

advised counsel that she had listened to the recording of the change of plea hearing.

United States Probation Officer Erlinda Galindo (“Galindo”) testified that, during

an interview with Lopez-Avila, Lopez-Avila informed her that she was continuously

employed and that she received approximately $3,000 per month in income. When

counsel asked Galindo if Lopez-Avila had told her that she was forced to commit the

crime and that she had not committed the crime for the money, Galindo agreed that

Lopez-Avila had made such comments.

Counsel agreed that the Court could consider the contents of paragraph 12 of the

draft pre-sentence report. The Court reviewed paragraph 12 during the hearing. The

Court also reviewed the factual basis included in the proposed plea agreement.

Defense counsel informed the Court that Lopez-Avila informed him that she

believed defense counsel, who was appointed and was not being paid for by Lopez-Avila,

was an agent of the government. Defense counsel further stated that it was only after the

interview with the probation officer had been stopped, that Lopez-Avila provided duress

information to defense counsel. Counsel discussed with the Court defense counsel’s

failure to discuss with Lopez-Avila any perceived conflicts and his role as her appointed

attorney.

Lopez-Avila testified that she originally did not discuss with defense counsel that

she had been forced to transport the drugs because she was afraid of Luis Alfonso Garcia

(“Garcia”) and that she did not believe defense counsel could help her.1

 Lopez-Avila

further testified that she first had contact with Garcia regarding running drugs

approximately three months before Lopez-Avila’s arrest. Lopez-Avila further testified

that Garcia offered her money to run drugs. Lopez-Avila testified that Garcia was

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repeatedly threatening her during the three month period between the first contact and

her arrest, telling Lopez-Avila that, if she did not transport the drugs, he would have hit

men after her; Lopez-Avila repeatedly told him no. 

Lopez-Avila further testified that she told a law enforcement officer when arrested

that she had been threatened, but did not remember if she had told the agents that she had

been repeatedly threatened. Lopez-Avila testified that she told an agent that she had been

pressured that morning by telephone, that she was told that she had to transport the drugs,

that she told Garcia on the telephone that she would not transport the drugs, and that

Garcia asked her if she wanted him to send hit men for her. 

Lopez-Avila also testified that she was not aware that duress was a defense, but

during the interview with the probation officer, she could not hold it in anymore. LopezAvila also testified that she had been told that Garcia would find out about whatever she

said. Lopez-Avila testified that she did not discuss these issues with defense counsel

sooner because she was always afraid.

Lopez-Avila also testified that she has not received any direct threats since the date

of the incident, but that, since the incident, Garcia has asked her business clients what has

happened with her.

Counsel for the government informed the Court that the report of ICE Special

Agent Jesus Lozania included details of Lopez-Avila’s statement, but did not include any

reference to any threats or coercion.

Motion to Withdraw from Plea Agreement

The necessary showing for withdrawal of a guilty plea differs depending upon the

point in the proceedings at which the motion is made. A defendant may withdraw a plea

of guilty before the Court accepts the plea for "any reason or no reason" or after the Court

accepts the plea, but prior to sentencing, for a "fair and just reason." Fed.R.Crim.P.

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Other circuits have set forth factors or tests that are used in determining whether a

motion to withdraw a plea should be granted. In United States v. Garcia, 401 F.3d 1008 (9th

Cir. 2005), the court noted that the district court had borrowed a four-part test from out of

circuit that examined "the plausibility of the reasons for the withdrawal, the timing of the

motion, whether Garcia had asserted his innocence, and whether the original plea was

involuntary in violation of the standards set forth in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11."

401 F.3d at 1010. The court stated that the district court improperly considered those factors

– the Ninth Circuit found that new evidence warranted setting aside the plea. The Court,

therefore, does not consider those out-of-circuit tests.

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11(d)(1) and (2)(B).2

 The decision to allow withdrawal of a plea under 11(d)(2)(B) is

solely within the discretion of the district court. United States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d

1206, 1208 (9th Cir.2003). The defendant has the burden of showing a fair and just

reason for withdrawal. Id. The standard is applied liberally. United States v. Jones, 472

F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) (where defendant only offered his own inaccurate interpretation

of the law, court did not abuse discretion in denying motion to withdraw plea). Fair and

just reasons include an inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquy, newly discovered evidence,

intervening circumstances, or other reasons that did not exist when the plea was entered.

United States v. Davis, 428 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2005), citing United States v.

Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir.2004). A defendant's good faith change of

heart or unsupported protestations of innocence is not an adequate "fair and just reason."

See e.g., United States v. Rios-Ortiz, 830 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In this case, Lopez-Avila’s request is not based simply on a change of heart or a

protestation of innocence. Unlike the situation presented in Rios-Ortiz, 830 F.2d at 1069-

70, where the defendant knew of the availability of a defense at the time the plea was

entered and sought to withdraw his plea based on a change of heart, Lopez-Avila asserts

that she was unaware of the possible availability of the affirmative defense when the plea

was entered. See generally Davis, 428 F.3d at 805 (reason asserted to withdraw guilty

plea was defendant’s belief at time of guilty plea, based on attorney’s advice, that

defendant would receive probation); see also United States v. Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587

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See Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions 6.5 and 6.6. The Court notes that

the government asserts that any immediate threat dissipated when Lopez-Avila came into

contact with law enforcement officials. The Court notes that the unrebutted testimony is that

there was an apparent continuous threat of a hit man being sent after Lopez-Avila if she did

not transport the drugs. Moreover, there is insufficient information before the Court to

determine whether Lopez-Avila had a reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.

See e.g., United States v. Contento-Pachon, 113 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1997) (duress defense

asserted where defendant, who had been told that he would be constantly watched, assisted

law enforcement officers at first opportunity to do so without alerting observer). LopezAvila asserts that she did inform law enforcement officials of the threats. Although

Lozania’s report does not include such information and counsel for the government informed

the Court that it is his experience that such information would have been included in the

report, there is no testimony before the Court that Lopez-Avila did not provide the

information to Lozania or another agent. 

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(9th Cir. 2009) (where defendant made informed choice to forego an available strategy,

defendant’s change of heart did not warrant withdrawal of plea). Moreover, defense

counsel was not aware of the potential affirmative defense prior to the change of plea. 

In this case, the unrebutted evidence presented and proffered at the hearing on the Motion

to Withdraw from Plea may constitute a valid duress defense.3

 See generally United

States v. Groll, 992 F.2d 755, 759-60 (7th Cir. 1993) (court abused its discretion in

denying motion to withdraw plea without addressing why unrebutted evidence in the

presentence report did not support entrapment defense). Further, the unrebutted evidence

presented and proffered did not contradict the testimony presented during the change of

plea hearing. The evidence presented and proffered establishes that Lopez-Avila did not

make an informed decision, at the time of the change of plea, to forego an available

strategy.

The Court also considers that Lopez-Avila did not delay in seeking to withdraw

her guilty plea once she learned of the possible availability of a duress defense. See

Ortega-Ascanio, 376 F.3d at 886, citing United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 222

(D.C.Cir.) (where withdrawal motion is delayed, the reasons to support withdrawal must

have considerably more force), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1013 (1975).

The government argues that “an interpretation which require[s] the District Court

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See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(I) (“If trial did not commence within the time limitation

specified in section 3161 because the defendant had entered a plea of guilty or nolo

contendere subsequently withdrawn to any or all charges in an indictment or information, the

defendant shall be deemed indicted with respect to all charges therein contained within the

meaning of section 3161, on the day the order permitting withdrawal of the plea becomes

final.”). The Court notes that Lopez-Avila, in her Motion to Withdraw from Plea, has waived

any speedy trial rights.

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to grant a motion in the absence of prejudice would interfere with the District Court’s

ability to exercise discretion inherent in Rule 11.” Response, p. 3. However, the Ninth

Circuit has determined that a defendant need not show prejudice or show that the plea was

invalid to establish a fair and just reason for withdrawing a plea. See Davis, 428 F.3d at

806 (“To require a defendant satisfy the prejudice prong of [Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.

52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985)] in order to withdraw a plea based on counsel’s

erroneous advice eviscerates the distinction between a motion to withdraw a plea made

pre-sentence and a post-sentence challenge to a plea.”).

Applying the fair and just standard liberally, Jones, 472 F.3d at 1141, the Court

finds that fair and just reasons exist to permit Lopez-Avila to withdraw her plea. The

Court will set this matter for trial.4

Review of Pre-Sentence Report

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that, even in the absence of a

showing of personal bias, in unusual circumstances, a case should be assigned to a new

judge. In re Ellis, 356 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. 2004). Where those circumstances involve a

judge's review of a presentence report prior to a trial, the Ninth Circuit has stated:

The district judge has read the presentence report and has expressed strong views

on its contents. Whether or not he would reasonably be expected to put out of his

mind the information previously disclosed or the conclusions previously drawn,

and without ourselves reaching any determination as to his ability to proceed

impartially, to preserve the appearance of justice, and consistent with the purposes

of Rule 32, we conclude reassignment is appropriate. See Gregg v. United States, 394 U.S. 489, 492, 89 S.Ct. 1134, 22 L.Ed.2d 442 (1969) (noting that to allow

submission of a presentence report "to the judge who will ... preside over a jury

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trial would seriously contravene ... [Rule 32's] purpose of preventing possible

prejudice from premature submission of the presentence report"). Given the

preliminary nature of the plea proceedings, the minimal potential for waste or

duplication of judicial resources is outweighed by the need to proceed in a manner

that preserves the appearance of justice. 

Ellis, 356 F.3d at 1211. 

More recently, the Ninth Circuit found that a district court's review of a

presentence report prior to accepting a guilty plea was error. In re Gallaher, 548 F.3d

713 (9th Cir. 2008). However, a district court judge in Hawaii has determined that

Gallaher did not require reassignment where the presentence report review did not take

place prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. The district court stated:

Gallaher is inapposite. In that case, the district court reviewed the PSR before

accepting a guilty plea. In contrast, this judge accepted [Defendant's] guilty plea

before reviewing [Defendant's] PSR. This judge's review of [Defendant's] PSR

was in full compliance with Rule 32. [Defendant's] later withdrawal of his guilty

plea did not convert that entirely proper review into a violation of Rule 32. To rule

otherwise would be to require recusal whenever a defendant withdraws his guilty

plea after he and the court have reviewed a PSR. As motions to withdraw guilty

pleas are often triggered by reviews of sentencing guideline calculations in PSRs,

it is likely that many guilty plea withdrawals would require recusal if [Defendant's]

position were adopted.

Similarly, if a conviction were reversed on appeal and a new trial ordered,

[Defendant's] position would require reassignment to a new district judge, as the

original judge would have reviewed the PSR in connection with sentencing the

defendant. Yet, reassignment is the exception, not the rule, following reversal.

As the Supreme Court notes, "It has long been regarded as normal and proper for

a judge to sit in the same case upon its remand, and to sit in successive trials

involving the same defendant." [Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994)].

United States v. Joseph, No. 06-00080 SOM, 2008 WL 5423194 (D.Haw. 2008). The

Joseph court also determined that neither Gregg nor Ellis stood for the broad proposition

that any review of a PSR before trial requires disqualification.

This case has proceeded beyond preliminary plea proceedings and judicial

resources have been devoted to this case. See Ellis, 356 F.3d at 1211. Further, the

Court’s review of part of the pre-sentence report was appropriate. However, the Court

notes that the Advisory Committee Note to the 1974 amendment of Rule 32(c)(1)

recognizes that, because the rule “provides for disclosure of the presentence report to the

defendant, [] this will enable counsel to know whether the information thus made

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available to the judge is likely to be prejudicial.” The Court will provide the parties an

opportunity to advise the Court that reasons or an appearance of impropriety exists such

that reassignment is appropriate.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED:

1. Lopez-Avila’s Motion to Withdraw from Plea [Doc. # 14] is GRANTED.

2. Lopez-Avila’s plea of guilty to the Indictment is VACATED.

3. The parties shall file any brief asserting reassignment of this case is

appropriate on or before May 3, 2010. Should Lopez-Avila choose not to assert that

reassignment is appropriate, Lopez-Avila shall file a waiver of the right to subsequently

assert this matter should have been reassigned on or before May 3, 2010. 

4. The deadline for a plea in this case is May 14, 2010. The only plea that the

Court will accept after said date will be a plea to the entire Indictment. Counsel will not

be reminded by the Court of this plea deadline and the deadline will be strictly enforced.

THE PLEA MUST BE TAKEN BEFORE THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE ON OR

BEFORE THE PLEA DEADLINE.

5. This matter is RESET for trial on June 2, 2010, at 9:30 a.m. Counsel are to

be present at 9:00 a.m.

6. Any motion or stipulation to continue the scheduled trial date and change

of plea hearing deadline shall be submitted in writing and filed with the Clerk of Court

no later than 5:00 p.m., Monday, May 24, 2010.

DATED this 23rd day of April, 2010.

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