Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01181/USCOURTS-ca4-07-01181-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chesterfield County Planning Commission
Appellee
Daniel A. Gecker
Appellee
Sherman W. Litton
Appellee
Robert C. Steinburg
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROBERT C. STEINBURG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING  No. 07-1181

COMMISSION; DANIEL A. GECKER, in

his official capacity; SHERMAN W.

LITTON, in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Richmond.

Robert E. Payne, District Judge.

(3:06-cv-00248-REP)

Argued: January 31, 2008

Decided: May 29, 2008

Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges,

and Patrick Michael DUFFY, United States District Judge for the

District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Shedd and Judge Duffy joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: James Broome Thorsen, THORSEN & SCHER, L.L.P.,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Steven Latham Micas, County

Appeal: 07-1181 Doc: 38 Filed: 05/29/2008 Pg: 1 of 22
Attorney, COUNTY ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE COUNTY

OF CHESTERFIELD, Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellees. ON

BRIEF: Jeffrey L. Mincks, Stylian P. Parthemos, COUNTY

ATTORNEY’S OFFICE FOR THE COUNTY OF CHESTERFIELD,

Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellees. 

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge: 

Robert Steinburg, a citizen of Chesterfield County, Virginia, contends that on October 18, 2005, the Chesterfield County Planning

Commission and two of its members violated his First Amendment

rights when the chairman of the Commission had him removed from

a public meeting of the Commission. Steinburg commenced this

action, contending that he was unconstitutionally silenced while

speaking because the commissioners disagreed with the viewpoint he

expressed, which criticized the way in which the Commission was

conducting its business. 

The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that Steinburg was removed from the podium and the

meeting because he refused to address the only topic for which the

public hearing had been opened and because he behaved in a hostile

manner that threatened to disrupt the orderly progress of the meeting.

The court simultaneously denied Steinburg’s motion to amend his

complaint to assert additional claims and add a new defendant

because it found that such amendments were untimely and would be

futile in light of the fully developed record before it. 

We agree with the district court that Steinburg was excluded from

the public meeting because of his refusal to address the topic for

which the meeting was opened and because of his disruptive manner,

and not because of any viewpoint he expressed. Inasmuch as the

Commission was authorized to set its subject matter agenda and to cut

off speech that was reasonably perceived to threaten disruption of the

orderly and fair progress of the meeting, we conclude that the Commission and its members did not violate Steinburg’s First Amendment

2 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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rights in excluding him. We also find that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Steinburg’s motion to amend his complaint. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I

The Chesterfield County Planning Commission, created under Virginia Code § 15.2-2210 "to promote the orderly development of the

locality and its environs," conducts regular public meetings, which are

generally videotaped for local television broadcast, as was the October 18, 2005 meeting, from which this case arose. 

Some time prior to October 18, 2005, Robious Investments LLC,

a developer, had filed an application with the Commission for an

amendment to the zoning ordinance governing its development

known as the Tarrington Subdivision. The application requested that

the Commission change the zoning ordinance to permit development

of homes with front-facing, rather than side-facing, garages. The

application was scheduled to be heard at the October 18 meeting, but

at some point shortly before the meeting, Robious filed a request that

the Commission defer consideration of its application until the Commission’s next meeting in November. 

Acting in accordance with the Commission’s bylaws, Commission

Chairman Sherman Litton invited citizens at the October 18 meeting

to speak only on the limited issue of whether to grant Robious’

request to defer consideration of its application for a zoning change,

and as Nancy Frantel, a county citizen, approached the podium to

speak, Chairman Litton reiterated that the subject of the hearing was

"just on the deferral." Acknowledging the limited subject matter,

Frantel delivered a presentation in which she stated her support for

the deferral request and frequently mentioned the garage-door issue.

Her main point, however, was to express her concern about the presence of a network of abandoned mine shafts below the surface of the

earth where certain sections of the Tarrington Subdivision would be

built. Frantel spoke for approximately six minutes, without interruption from Commission members, speaking calmly and respectfully

throughout. After Frantel concluded her remarks, Commissioner F.

Wayne Bass asked follow-up questions because, as he later explained,

he had not been on the Commission when the Tarrington Subdivision

STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 3

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was originally zoned. Commissioner Bass and Frantel exchanged

comments about the mines for an additional two to three minutes. 

Before the next speaker, Mike Harton, approached the podium,

Chairman Litton asked him whether he was in favor of the deferral,

indicating that "I’d rather not hear the case tonight." Harton replied,

"I will speak to the deferral, sir." Like Frantel before him, Harton

mentioned the deferral of the hearing on Robious’ application to

reorient the garage doors, but then he too turned to the potential hazards of the abandoned mines. When Harton had spoken for about two

minutes about the mines, Commissioner Daniel Gecker asked Harton

whether he was in favor of or opposed to the deferral. Harton replied

that he was in favor of the deferral and then attempted to resume his

presentation on the abandoned mines. Chairman Litton interrupted

him and stated, "Sir, we get to hear this case next month. If you’re,

if you’re opposed to the deferral or for it, then let’s talk to the deferral, but I don’t want to hear the case tonight. The case is going to

come back, and you’ll have a chance to present all your documentations at that time." Harton responded that he wanted to show the

Commission why he thought they should "reconsider this altogether

when the deferral comes up," asserting that the abandoned mines created "a serious safety hazard here, regardless of how the garage doors

are oriented. It makes no difference whether they’re on the front, the

back or the side." Harton concluded his comments by encouraging the

Commission both to defer the case and to "look seriously at the dangers involved of building over a cobweb of mines." Again, Harton’s

presentation was made calmly and respectfully throughout. 

After Harton yielded the floor, Commissioner Gecker called on the

developer’s representative, William Shewmake, to clarify the issue of

the abandoned mines. Commissioner Gecker acknowledged that "this

doesn’t deal with the deferral, Mr. Chair, but since you have let

everybody else speak long past the deferral issue, maybe we can put

this one to bed also." In an exchange that lasted less than a minute,

Shewmake confirmed that the developer had hired a firm to survey

the property to determine the location of any abandoned mine shafts

before development was to begin. 

In response to Chairman Litton’s invitation for further public comment on the deferral request, Robert Steinburg came to the podium.

4 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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But unlike the previous two speakers, he made no effort to relate his

comments to either the developer’s deferral request or the orientation

of the garages. Because it is the subject matter, as well as the tone,

of Steinburg’s speech that is at issue, his presentation is reproduced

in full:

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen, my name is Bob

Steinburg, and I am President of the Old Gun Road Civic

Association, which represents 600 homes in the historic Old

Gun Road corridor. And uh, we have some, we had our

annual picnic here last week, and I can tell you that there is

a great deal of concern about this particular project, and uh,

these are health and safety concerns that are not only environmental in nature, but you’ve heard a great deal tonight

from the speakers who have stepped up to the bar so far. 

Now I, I understand that you’re not making a decision as

it relates to this particular issue this evening, but I think it

is very, very important to apprise you, if you are not already

aware, that uh, this is an issue that people - it’s a very volatile issue. I’ve lived in this corridor for thirty years, and I

can tell you I haven’t seen people this hot about anything

like this, ever. 

This is a very serious issue. One of the things that troubles me when some of these things are being presented this

evening is a lot of bantying [sic] about back and forth by

some of you who don’t seem to be paying attention, or else

are talking about something that perhaps, uh, might not even

be related. And I can tell you that perception is reality in the

eyes of many. What you are talking about, I have no idea.

Mr. Gecker, you in particular, leaning over and saying this,

that, and the other thing, but I can tell you from a perception

standpoint from someone who is concerned, like myself and

the others in this room, it’s not very flattering. Believe me.

After Steinburg had spoken for less than two minutes, Commissioner

Gecker interjected, and the following exchange took place:

STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 5

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COMMISSIONER GECKER: Mr. Steinburg, abusing this

podium is not very flattering — 

STEINBURG: That is not abusing the

podium, sir. That is not

abusing the podium. I am

telling you what I observed.

I am a citizen. I am representing 600 households

here at their bequest [sic]

tonight, and you will listen

to what I am saying. Sir. 

COMMISSIONER GECKER: No, sir, you will not talk to

me that way. I am not going

to listen to what you’ve got

to say on a deferral motion

when you come up and

speak to something other

than the deferral. The Old

Gun Road Association — 

STEINBURG: That is with regard to the

deferral, sir — 

COMMISSIONER GECKER: — that you represent supported the Tarrington

rezoning —

STEINBURG: [shouting] Mr. Gecker,

would you please give me

the right to speak? Who do

you think you are?

CHAIRMAN LITTON: I’m going to cut you off.

I’m Chairman, I can cut —

STEINBURG: Mr. Litton, yes you can,

you can do that. 

6 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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CHAIRMAN LITTON: And I am. This has gone

way past. I’ve given you

the courtesy. This is nothing but a deferral. This has

nothing to do with the case.

So just please sit down. 

STEINBURG: I’m not sitting down. I’m

not done talking yet. Ask

Kirk Turner, he knows me.

I’m not a wild citizen. 

COMMISSIONER GECKER: Is there — Mr. Turner, is

that right? 

STEINBURG: Let me speak! 

CHAIRMAN LITTON: I, you know, I’ve, I’ve

heard enough on this case

tonight. I’m going to cut it

off, okay. 

STEINBURG: Can you tell me why you’re

cutting it off? 

CHAIRMAN LITTON: Because it’s strictly a deferral, and we’re not arguing

the case tonight. The case

will be discussed at some

time, at a later time. If

you’re telling me that

you’re in favor of the deferral, that’s all I need to

know. If you don’t want the

deferral, then that, you can

argue — 

STEINBURG: You don’t want any background information on anySTEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 7

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thing. I, it sounds to me like

you people have already

made up your mind as to

what you’re going to do. 

CHAIRMAN LITTON: I don’t need the information

tonight because I’m going

to hear the case again next

month.

STEINBURG: I understand that, sir. All

I’m asking for is respect

from you. I’ll give you

respect, you give me

respect. That’s all I want. 

CHAIRMAN LITTON: I’m asking you just to sit

down, please.

STEINBURG: I know you are. I understand what you’re doing.

And when I am through

speaking I will sit down. 

CHAIRMAN LITTON: No, I think you’re going to

sit down now. 

STEINBURG: I’m not!

At that point, Chairman Litton directed a request to Police Officer

James Profita, who had entered the meeting room in response to an

electric alarm that had been pressed by Kirk Turner, the Chesterfield

County director of planning who, by virtue of his position, served as

secretary of the Commission.

CHAIRMAN LITTON (to Officer Profita): 

Would you ask him to sit

down, sir? 

8 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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OFFICER PROFITA (to Steinburg): 

Sir, you can sit down right

now, or you can come with

me. It’s come to that

option. 

STEINBURG: And why am I sitting

down? 

OFFICER PROFITA: Disorderly conduct, for one.

STEINBURG: This is disorderly conduct

in a public forum? 

OFFICER PROFITA: Yes, sir, they’ve asked you

to sit down and you’re not

cooperating. 

STEINBURG: Let the record show that

this gentleman has just

asked a citizens [sic] from

Chesterfield County who is

speaking to this issue to sit

down. This is what is wrong

with the County of Chesterfield. This is what you people are doing. 

[Profita approaches Steinburg] 

I’ll go with you! Just hang

on. 

OFFICER PROFITA: You’re done speaking.

You’re done speaking. 

STEINBURG: Show me the way! 

STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 9

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OFFICER PROFITA: You’re done speaking,

please. Let’s go. [Profita

places his hand on Steinburg’s arm. Steinburg

places his hand on Profita’s

side.] Get your hands off of

me. 

STEINBURG: Get your hands off of me! 

OFFICER PROFITA: You’re done. Put your

hands behind your back. 

[Profita and another officer

escort Steinburg from the

podium and out of the

meeting room.] 

After Steinburg was removed from the meeting, the Commission

agreed that the only issue before it was Robious’ deferral request and,

following a motion, voted to grant the request, postponing the hearing

for 30 days on its application for a zoning change. 

In April 2006, Steinburg commenced this action against the Commission, Chairman Litton, and Commissioner Gecker in their official

capacities, seeking an injunction prohibiting the defendants from

restraining his speech and, in particular, prohibiting enforcement of

the Commission’s policy prohibiting "personal attacks" during meetings. He also requested compensatory and punitive damages.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered

judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the incontrovertible evidence showed that Chairman Litton, not Commissioner

Gecker, restricted Steinburg’s speech and that "he did so after repeatedly informing all speakers that the topic to be addressed was the

request for deferral." The court also concluded that because there was

insufficient evidence to prove that Steinburg was silenced because of

the Commission’s policy against personal attacks, it would not reach

the question raised by Steinburg of whether that policy was unconsti10 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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tutional. At the same time that the court decided the summary judgment motions, it also issued an order denying Steinburg’s request to

amend his complaint to sue the individual defendants in their individual capacities, to challenge the Commission’s time, place, and manner

restrictions on speech, and to add Officer Profita as a defendant. The

district court denied that motion because it violated the controlling

scheduling order and because the amendments sought would be futile.

Steinburg appealed, challenging both the district court’s grant of

summary judgment to the defendants and its refusal to allow him to

amend his complaint. 

II

For his principal argument, Steinburg contends that Chairman Litton and Commissioner Gecker unconstitutionally silenced his speech

(1) by enforcing the unconstitutional Commission policy against "personal attacks" and (2) by cutting off his right to speak, based on his

viewpoint. He points to Commissioner Gecker’s accusation that

Steinburg was "‘abusing the podium’ . . . as soon as Steinburg criticized him by name" and to Chairman Litton’s immediate intervention

to "cut off Steinburg after he criticized Gecker and the Commission

for their handling of the deferral debate" and have him removed from

the public meeting. Steinburg argues that the defendants had "no

power to restrict [his] expression because of its message, its ideas, its

subject matter, or its content." 

We address Steinburg’s double-layered argument first by addressing his assertion that the Commission, in cutting off his speech, was

enforcing an unconstitutional policy that prohibited speakers from

engaging in "personal attacks" and then by addressing his claim that

Chairman Litton’s cutting him off and excluding him from the meeting silenced his speech based on his viewpoint. But we begin by recognizing with respect to both layers of Steinburg’s argument that the

standards for determining whether the Commission unconstitutionally

restricted Steinburg’s speech in a public forum depend on the nature

of the forum. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S.

98, 106-07 (2001). 

In the traditional public forum, which includes the streets, sidewalks, parks, and general meeting halls, speakers’ rights are at their

STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 11

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apex. Speakers have a right to speak free of any government-imposed

restrictions on their speech unless the restrictions are reasonable time,

place, and manner restrictions; are content-neutral; and are "narrowly

tailored" to serve a significant governmental interest. See Clark v.

Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 295

(1984). In addition, content-based restrictions may be imposed in a

traditional public forum where there is "a clear and present danger

that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that [government] has a right to prevent," Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47,

52 (1919), and where the restrictions are narrowly drawn to serve that

compelling state interest, see Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md.,

Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 457 F.3d 376, 381 (4th Cir.

2006) (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460

U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 

Distinct from the traditional public forum is the "limited public

forum," which governmental entities may create in a specified location for a limited use, so long as they do not impose those limits in

a manner that discriminates based on the speaker’s viewpoint. Thus,

"[w]hen the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is not

required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of

speech. The State may be justified ‘in reserving [its forum] for certain

groups or for the discussion of certain topics.’" Good News Club, 533

U.S. at 106 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (second alteration in original)). In a limited

public forum, however, the government still "‘must not discriminate

against speech on the basis of viewpoint,’ and any restriction ‘must

be reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.’" Child

Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d

1062, 1067-68 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Good News Club, 533 U.S.

at 106-07). 

In this case the parties agree that the Commission’s public meeting

was a "limited public forum," and we concur in that assessment.

Accordingly, a government entity such as the Commission is justified

in limiting its meeting to discussion of specified agenda items and in

imposing reasonable restrictions to preserve the civility and decorum

necessary to further the forum’s purpose of conducting public business. But any restriction must not discriminate on the basis of a

speaker’s viewpoint. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Col12 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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linson v. Gott, 895 F.2d 994, 1000 (4th Cir. 1990) (Phillips, J., concurring).

In Collinson, through three separate opinions of the three panel

members, we held that the chairman of a board of county commissioners was entitled to immunity against a claim that he had violated

the free speech rights of a man by ruling him out of order while

speaking at a board meeting and having him removed from the meeting by the police. While we do not rely on Collinson’s immunity

holding, we do accept the uncontroversial contours of the government’s ability to restrict speech in a limited public forum, as summarized by Judge Phillips in his concurring opinion:

1. Speech at public meetings called by government officials for discussion of matters of public concern is entitled to normal first amendment protections against

general restrictions or ad hoc parliamentary rulings by

presiding officials. City of Madison[, Joint Sch. Dist.

No. 8 v. Wisc. Employment Relations Comm’n], 429

U.S. [167,] 175-76 [(1976)], 97 S. Ct. at 426-27. 

2. Because of government’s substantial interest in having

such meetings conducted with relative orderliness and

fairness to all, officials presiding over such meetings

must have discretion, under the "reasonable time, place

and manner" constitutional principle, to set subject matter agendas, and to cut off speech which they reasonably perceive to be, or imminently to threaten, a

disruption of the orderly and fair progress of the discussion, whether by virtue of its irrelevance, its duration,

or its very tone and manner.FN3 This obviously contemplates that in this setting the content of speech may

properly be the conscious target of state action (where

it is cut off for irrelevance or manner of delivery), or its

collateral victim (when it is cut off for excessive duration). But this consequence assuredly lies within wellestablished constitutional principles, once it is accepted,

as I think we must, that disruption of the orderly conduct of public meetings is indeed one of the "substanSTEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 13

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tive evils that [government] has a right to prevent."

Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52, 39 S. Ct. at 249. 

FN3. The "disruption" to which this interest

extends — as an "evil" to be avoided — is of

course not confined to raw, physical violence,

but includes any conduct that significantly violates generally or specially established rules of

parliamentary order, and "disrupts" by that

means the orderly conduct of a meeting.

3. As indicated, official discretion here is not limitless.

The limits can be found in the well-established principle

that the primary concern of the no-censorship-ofcontent requirement is with speaker viewpoint rather

than with subject matter per se. See generally Stone,

Restriction of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. Chi. L.

Rev. 81, 83, 108 (1978) (distinction noted). While the

latter will yield fairly readily to time, place and manner

restrictions, the former will but rarely, if ever, do so.

Thus, while a ruling, "We will not listen to your views

on capital punishment at this public hearing on rezoning," certainly must be constitutionally permissible, a

ruling, "We will not listen to yours or any views favoring rezoning at this rezoning hearing," obviously would

not be. See City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 175-76 & n.8,

97 S. Ct. at 426-27 & n.8 (contrasting impermissibility

of viewpoint restrictions with permissibility of general

subject matter restrictions in conduct of public meetings). 

Collinson, 895 F.2d at 1000 (Phillips, J., concurring). 

With these principles applicable to limited public forums in hand,

we now address Steinburg’s arguments, beginning with his challenge

of the Commission’s policy against personal attacks. 

A

On the policy against personal attacks, Steinburg claims that Commissioner Gecker interrupted him for "abusing the podium" and "criti14 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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cizing" Gecker by name, and he argues that Chairman Litton merely

took up Gecker’s cause by excluding Steinburg from the meeting.

Thus, according to Steinburg, the two commissioners were in tandem

and sub silentio enforcing the Commission’s policy against personal

attacks, which he argues was an unconstitutional policy under the

holding of Bach v. School Board of Virginia Beach, 139 F. Supp. 2d

738 (E.D. Va. 2001). In Bach, the court struck down as unconstitutional a school board policy prohibiting speakers from making "attacks or accusations regarding the honesty, character, integrity or

other like personal attributes of any identified individual or group."

Id. at 741. The court found that

[t]he contested provision tests the boundaries of the fine distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulations. First Amendment scholars, judges, and attorneys

could engage in endless debate over whether it discriminates

against speech on the basis of its content by allowing general praise while silencing criticism. Fortunately, the Court

need not engage in such a comprehensive analysis, for a policy that deters individuals from speaking out on an issue of

public importance violates the First Amendment. The contested provision has that effect and for that reason is unconstitutional. 

Id. at 743 (citation omitted). 

The Commission’s policy against "personal attacks" focuses on

two evils that could erode the beneficence of orderly public discussion. First, as an insult directed at a person and not speech directed

at substantive ideas or procedures at issue, a personal attack is surely

irrelevant — unless, of course, the topic legitimately at issue is the

person being attacked, such as his qualifications for an office or his

conduct. Second, as an insult directed at a person and not the issues

at hand, a personal attack leads almost inevitably to a responsive

defense or counter-attack and thus to argumentation that has the real

potential to disrupt the orderly conduct of the meeting. As we

observed in Collinson, this disruption may take the form of speaking

on irrelevant subjects, of speaking too long, or of speaking in a tone

or manner that threatens disruption. 895 F.2d at 1000 (Phillips, J.,

concurring). 

STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM. 15

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The Commission has a significant interest in maintaining civility

and decorum during the public comment sessions of its public meetings, both to ensure the efficient conduct of the people’s business and

to maximize citizen participation in the discussion. See id. To further

these legitimate public interests, therefore, the Commission adopted

a policy against personal attacks.

We conclude that a content-neutral policy against personal attacks

is not facially unconstitutional insofar as it is adopted and employed

to serve the legitimate public interest in a limited forum of decorum

and order. Such a policy is deemed content-neutral when it "serves

purposes unrelated to the content of expression . . . even if it has an

incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others." Ward

v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 

Moreover, denying a speaker at the podium in a Commission hearing the right to launch personal attacks does not interfere with what

that speaker could say without employing such attacks. The same

message could be communicated, indeed probably more persuasively,

as we have witnessed in the videotape of the presentations of other

speakers at the proceedings in this case. In the language of First

Amendment jurisprudence, the Commission’s policy in this case has

left open "‘ample alternative channels for communication of the information.’" Id. at 791 (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 293). 

We therefore reject Steinburg’s facial challenge to the Commission’s policy prohibiting speakers from engaging in personal attacks,

and we find the opinion in Bach, on which Steinburg relies, to be

inconsistent with our jurisprudence on this issue. 

Of course, this holding does not preclude a challenge premised on

misuse of the policy to chill or silence speech in a given circumstance. As for Steinburg’s argument that the Commission’s policy

was in fact used to silence him, it does not appear from the videotape

or the transcript of the hearing in this case that the policy against personal attacks was invoked or applied. Steinburg argues that the policy

was surely what Chairman Litton and Commissioner Gecker had in

mind as they excluded him. But based on the videotape of the meeting, it appears that Chairman Litton excluded Steinburg because of

his refusal to remain on subject and because of Chairman Litton’s

16 STEINBURG v. CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PLANNING COMM.

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observation, as presiding officer of the meeting, that the discussion

was degenerating quickly into a situation which would disrupt the

parliamentary order. As Commissioner Gecker and Steinburg had

their exchange, which undoubtedly raised the temperature in the hearing room, Steinburg told Commissioner Gecker, "[Y]ou will listen to

what I am saying." Gecker responded, "No, sir, you will not talk to

me that way." Steinburg then started talking over Gecker. At that

point, Chairman Litton took control, noting that the discussion had

"gone way past" the deferral issue and instructing Steinburg to "please

sit down." Steinburg refused, stating, "I’m not sitting down. I’m not

done talking yet." When Chairman Litton explained the scope of the

meeting to Steinburg and invited him to continue speaking on the

deferral issue or to speak to the merits later, at the November meeting,

Steinburg insisted on giving background information and demanded

respect. Chairman Litton then repeated his request to Steinburg, "I’m

asking you just to sit down, please." Upon Steinburg’s refusal to obey

his instruction, Chairman Litton excluded Steinburg from the meeting, as described in the following portion of the meeting’s transcript:

CHAIRMAN LITTON: No, I think you’re going to

sit down now. 

STEINBURG: I’m not!

CHAIRMAN LITTON (To Officer Profita): 

Would you ask him to sit

down, sir? 

OFFICER PROFITA (To Steinburg): 

Sir, you can sit down right

now, or you can come with

me. It’s come to that

option.

STEINBURG: And why am I sitting

down? 

OFFICER PROFITA: Disorderly conduct, for one.

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STEINBURG: This is disorderly conduct

in a public forum? 

OFFICER PROFITA: Yes, sir, they’ve asked you

to sit down and you’re not

cooperating. 

Officer Profita then escorted Steinburg from the room. 

It is apparent that the parliamentary order of the proceedings was

put at risk by Steinburg’s refusal to obey the chairman’s ruling that

Steinburg was out of order and the chairman’s instruction to sit down.

All of the evidence in the record is consistent with Chairman Litton’s intent to cut off the irrelevant, off-topic discussion, to restore

order, and to prevent the meeting from spiraling out of control, as was

his right and duty as chair. At no time during the meeting did Litton

cite the "personal attacks" policy, nor did he ever express a view that

he considered Steinburg’s comments during the meeting to constitute

a "personal attack." We agree with the district court’s conclusion that

the "evidence is insufficient to prove that Steinburg was silenced

because of the policy." 

B

Steinburg also contends that he was improperly excluded from the

Commission meeting for expressing his viewpoint, criticizing the way

the Commission was going about its business. Again, however, we

conclude that the record does not support his claim that he was

silenced because he expressed a particular viewpoint.

Beginning with Steinburg’s discussion with Commissioner Gecker,

during which Steinburg was indeed expressing criticism, there is no

evidence to support a claim that Gecker silenced Steinburg’s speech,

nor that Gecker requested the Chairman to do so. Rather, Gecker

observed about Steinburg’s criticism that his "abusing this podium

[was] not very flattering." After Steinburg took issue with the observation that he was abusing the podium, he instructed Gecker, "[Y]ou

will listen to what I am saying." Commissioner Gecker said, "No, sir,

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you will not talk to me that way. I am not going to listen to what

you’ve got to say on a deferral motion when you come up and speak

to something other than the deferral. The Old Gun Road Association

—" At that point, after Steinburg interrupted Commissioner Gecker,

Chairman Litton intervened and told Steinburg that Chairman Litton,

as the presiding officer, was going to cut him off. Thus, Commissioner Gecker was not instrumental in any sense in silencing Steinburg. Gecker simply challenged the premise underlying Steinburg’s

criticism and expressed his intent not to listen. Whether expressing

such an intent was an appropriate response for a commissioner can be

debated, but that response did not amount to a violation of Steinburg’s

First Amendment rights. See Minn. State Bd. for Community Colleges

v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 283 (1984) (noting that there is "no constitutional right to force the government to listen to [one’s] views"). 

As for Chairman Litton, he did attempt to cut Steinburg off and

ultimately he excluded Steinburg from the meeting. But Chairman

Litton’s concern was explicitly focused on having Steinburg stay on

subject and on conforming his manner to the order that was necessary.

Chairman Litton’s first statement after announcing his intent to cut

Steinburg off made clear that his motivation was purely to keep the

meeting from degenerating into an irrelevant argument unrelated to

the item on the agenda: "This has gone way past. I’ve given you the

courtesy. This is nothing but a deferral. This has nothing to do with

the case. So just please sit down." In response to Steinburg’s question

asking why he was being cut off, Chairman Litton stated directly and

clearly, "Because it’s strictly a deferral, and we’re not arguing the

case tonight. The case will be discussed at some time, at a later time."

Litton even tried to afford Steinburg an opportunity to continue

addressing the Commission on the deferral issue: "If you’re telling me

that you’re in favor of the deferral, that’s all I need to know. If you

don’t want the deferral, then that, you can argue — ." But he could

not complete this offer to Steinburg to argue for or against the deferral

because Steinburg interrupted him, accusing the Commission of not

wanting any "background information." Chairman Litton continued to

remind Steinburg that the matter before the Commission was limited

in scope to the deferral of a request to change the orientation of

garages, and had nothing to do with abandoned mines or the overall

zoning case that had been addressed by some previous speakers. 

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Steinburg argues that an inference of viewpoint discrimination can

be drawn from the fact that Chairman Litton permitted Frantel and

Harton to speak off-topic about abandoned mines even though that

subject was irrelevant to the deferral request before the Commission,

whereas Chairman Litton cut off Steinburg as soon as he voiced criticism of the Commission. The record, however, does not support this

argument. While Chairman Litton did permit Frantel to deliver her

presentation without interruption, even though much of it was at best

only tangentially related to the deferral, he also told her that the subject matter was the deferral and he received her position on the deferral. With respect to Harton, Chairman Litton reminded Harton before

he began speaking, perhaps in response to Frantel’s speaking offtopic, that the hearing was limited to the deferral and that he would

"rather not hear the case tonight." Harton promised that he would

"speak to the deferral," but he roamed off-topic and within two minutes he was interrupted twice — first by Commissioner Gecker in an

attempt to determine his position on the deferral since he had not

given it, and a second time by Chairman Litton to remind him once

again that the topic of the public hearing was the deferral, not abandoned mines. Harton then quickly concluded his off-topic discussion.

Steinburg was treated no differently. Again he was reminded of the

topic of the public hearing, but rather than address the deferral, he

became argumentative and disruptive. When it became clear to Chairman Litton that Steinburg had no intention of addressing the deferral

but instead intended to continue discussing irrelevant topics, he intervened to cut off Steinburg’s comments. 

Exercising this type of discretion is precisely what we have

observed that presiding officers may do. "[O]fficials presiding over

such meetings must have discretion . . . to cut off speech which they

reasonably perceive to be, or imminently to threaten, a disruption of

the orderly and fair progress of the discussion, whether by virtue of

its irrelevance, its duration, or its very tone and manner." Collinson,

895 F.2d at 1000 (Phillips, J., concurring) (first emphasis added).

Chairman Litton consistently stated that he was cutting Steinburg off

because his comments were irrelevant and duplicative of what had

come before. It is also plain from the videotape that Steinburg had

raised his voice, had become argumentative, and was refusing to

abide by rulings and directions of the chair. In view of these facts, we

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do not agree with Steinburg’s assertions that Chairman Litton’s treatment of him was inconsistent with Chairman Litton’s treatment of

other speakers and that Chairman Litton discriminated against Steinburg’s viewpoint. 

We conclude that Chairman Litton acted well within his discretion

as chair of the meeting to take the steps he deemed necessary to retain

control, restore order, and resume progress of the meeting, and there

simply is no evidence in the record to support Steinburg’s claim that

he was silenced for expressing his viewpoint. Again, on this issue, we

affirm the summary judgment of the district court. 

III

Finally, Steinburg contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to file an amended complaint to assert

claims against the commissioners in their individual capacities, to

challenge the Commission’s time, place, and manner regulations, and

to add Officer Profita as a defendant. 

The district court denied Steinburg’s motion, noting that Steinburg

had failed to show good cause for modifying the scheduling order

established under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) and that,

in any event, to grant the motion would be an act of futility because

Steinburg’s proposed amended complaint would not survive summary

judgment. The court made this assessment after discovery in the case

had been fully completed and after the court had assessed Steinburg’s

claims on the merits. 

Of course the general rule is that leave to amend a complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) should be freely given, see

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), unless "the amendment

would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith

on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would have been

futile," Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotation marks omitted). A district court’s decision to deny a motion

to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Glaser v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 464 F.3d 474, 476 (4th Cir. 2006). 

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Steinburg has pointed to no material in his proposed amended complaint that would have changed the analysis conducted by the district

court in the context of the developed record, on which the court

entered summary judgment against him. His proposed additional

claims were still based on the events of the meeting on October 18,

2005, in which the defendants cut off his presentation and excluded

him from the Commission meeting. Recognizing that discovery was

fully completed and the district court had an excellent view of the

potential claims, we can find no basis for concluding that the district

court abused its discretion. 

The judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

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