Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00746/USCOURTS-caed-2_16-cv-00746-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.C.
Plaintiff
Leticia Ceja
Plaintiff
Pablo Ceja
Plaintiff
Arturo Ceja-Gonzalez
Plaintiff
City of Fairfield
Defendant
Joe Griego
Defendant
Daniel Hatzell
Defendant
I.C.
Plaintiff
J.C.
Plaintiff
Clinton Morgan
Defendant
Guadalupe Villa-Vargas
Plaintiff
W.C.
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

A.C., individually and as cosuccessor-in-interest to 

Decedent José Ceja, by and 

through his Guardian-Ad-Litem 

Alicia Villa; I.C., 

individually and as cosuccessor-in-interest to 

Decedent José Ceja, by and 

through his Guardian-Ad-Litem 

Alicia Villa; GUADALUPE 

VILLA-VARGAS; ARTURO CEJAGONZALEZ; W.C., individually, 

by and through his GuardianAd-Litem Pablo Ceja; J.C., 

individually, by and through 

his Guardian-Ad-Litem Pablo 

Ceja; PABLO CEJA, 

individually and as GuardianAd-Litem for W.C. and J.C.; 

and LETICIA CEJA,

Plaintiffs,

v.

JOE GRIEGO; DANIEL HATZELL; 

CLINTON MORGAN (All Officers 

for the Fairfield Police 

Department); and the City of 

Fairfield,

Defendants.

No. 2:16-cv-00746-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS 

///

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Defendants seek to dismiss a suit arising from the fatal 

police shooting of thirty-six-year-old José Ceja. ECF No. 12. 

Plaintiffs oppose dismissal.1 ECF No. 16.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken as true by the Court for 

purposes of this motion. 

In the early morning on January 15, 2015, three officers 

responded to a call for help from José Ceja’s family. First Am. 

Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 22-23. Pablo Ceja, José’s brother, greeted 

Officers Joe Griego, Daniel Hatzell, and Clinton Morgan from 

outside the family home in Fairfield, California. Id. ¶¶ 8, 22-

24. Pablo explained the situation, warned the officers that José

was “extremely intoxicated,” and asked that they turn on their 

body cameras, which they did. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. As they entered the 

house, they noticed José standing on a porch smoking a cigarette. 

Id. ¶ 26. A sliding glass door divided this porch from the 

dining room. One officer ordered José to come into the room. 

Id. ¶¶ 26-27. As José walked through the glass door, his mother 

heard an officer yell at Officer Hatzell “wait, wait, wait,” but 

to no avail: Officer Hatzell shot José twice in the chest. Id.

¶¶ 27, 29. He died on the kitchen floor. Id. ¶ 29.

 All witnesses say José merely walked into the house—at an 

officer’s explicit request—when Officer Hatzell fired his weapon. 

Id. ¶¶ 27-28. They emphasize that José was not posing an 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for August 23, 2016.

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immediate threat to anyone. Id. ¶ 27. But Pablo overheard an 

officer say something about José having a knife. Id. ¶ 30. 

Neither Pablo nor his mother saw anything in José’s hands; though

his father speculated that José might have wielded a butter knife 

from the barbeque. Id. Pablo also heard one officer identify 

Officer Hatzell as the “rookie.” Id. ¶ 33.

Eight relatives (“Plaintiffs”) sued Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, Morgan, and the City of Fairfield (“Defendants”)2 under 

42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several California law claims. Plaintiff’s 

include A.C. and I.C. (José’s children), Guadalupe Villa-Vargas 

(José’s mother), Arturo Ceja-Gonzalez (José’s father), Pablo Ceja 

(José’s brother), Leticia Ceja (José’s sister-in-law), W.C. 

(José’s nephew), and J.C. (José’s niece). Id. ¶¶ 6-13. Except 

for José’s children, all other plaintiffs were present during the 

shooting: José’s brother, mother, and father witnessed the 

shooting; his sister-in-law, niece, and nephew heard the gunshots

from a different room. Id. ¶ 31. 

Plaintiffs seek damages for alleged constitutional 

violations and associated pain and suffering under § 1983; 

damages for wrongful death under C.C.P. §§ 337.60 and 337.61 and 

Probate Code § 6402(b); funeral and burial expenses under those 

same California statutes; damages for loss of financial support;

punitive damages; and attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1983, 1985-86, and 1988. 

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC.

 

2 Plaintiffs also sued other DOE and fictitiously named police 

officers, but this Court dismissed all claims as to those 

unidentified defendants. ECF No. 15.

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II. OPINION

A. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 vindicates federal rights, but does not itself 

constitute a substantive right. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 

U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal citation omitted). To 

successfully bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that “a 

person acting under color of state law committed the conduct at 

issue” and “that the conduct deprived the claimant of some 

right, privilege, or immunity protected by [federal law].” Leer 

v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 632-33 (9th Cir. 1988). Simply put, 

§ 1983 imposes liability for violating constitutional rights, 

but not for violating duties arising from tort law. See Baker 

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979). 

B. Discussion

1. Qualified Immunity

Although § 1983 allows individuals to vindicate their 

federal rights, qualified immunity protects government officials 

from liability for damages in certain situations. “Qualified 

immunity balances two important interests...the need to hold 

public officials accountable when they exercise power 

irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, 

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties 

reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). In 

other words, a person cannot sue a government official for 

damages unless that official’s conduct violated a constitutional 

or statutory right and that right was “clearly established” at 

the time the conduct occurred. See id. 

///

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When deciding this issue, a court considers two criteria: 

(1) whether, under the alleged facts taken in the light most 

favorable to the plaintiff, a constitutional right was violated; 

and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly 

established at the time the violation occurred. See id. at 232. 

The court may address this analysis in either order, especially 

when the second criterion is clearly dispositive. See id. at 

242. Qualified immunity applies no matter if the official’s 

error was “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake 

based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. at 231 (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted).

a. First Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, and Morgan

Plaintiffs bring a § 1983 claim against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, and Morgan, alleging that the officers’ excessive force 

violated José’s Fourth Amendment right. FAC ¶¶ 45-49. 

Defendants move to dismiss this claim as to Officers Griego and 

Morgan. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs neither allege facts 

showing that Officers Griego and Morgan’s conduct violated 

José’s constitutional right nor cite clearly established law 

requiring on-scene officers to prevent or control alleged use of 

force by another officer. Mot. at 7. Yet Plaintiffs say that 

Officers Griego and Morgan are liable because they integrally 

participated in the shooting, and José did not pose a threat to 

anyone. Opp’n at 11.

Here, the dispositive inquiry is whether it would have been 

clear to a reasonable officer in Officers Griego and Morgan’s 

position that their conduct was unlawful in the situation they 

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confronted. See Wood v. Moss, 134 S. Ct. 2056, 2059 (2014). 

Plaintiffs’ “integral participation” theory fails because they 

did not allege supporting facts in their FAC. They, instead, 

alleged those facts in their opposition brief. Opp’n at 8-10. 

A court evaluates a complaint based on its allegations, not new 

facts or claims raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) opposition brief. See

Arres v. City of Fresno, No. CV F 10-1628, 2011 WL 284971, at 

*18 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2011) (emphasizing that allegations in 

opposition papers “are irrelevant for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes”). 

Also, Plaintiffs have not pled facts showing that clearly 

established law requires Officers Griego and Morgan to control 

or prevent another officer’s use of force. Plaintiffs merely 

allege that Officers Griego and Morgan responded to the call for 

help and possibly communicated with José. FAC ¶¶ 23, 27-28. 

Because it would not be clear to reasonable officers that this 

conduct violated any constitutional right, qualified immunity 

protects Officers Griego and Morgan. Based on the allegations 

as currently pled in the FAC, the Court grants Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss the First Cause of Action against Officers

Griego and Morgan. 

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice and without 

leave to amend is appropriate “only if it appears beyond doubt 

that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 

claim which would entitle him to relief.” Navarro v. Block, 250 

F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation 

marks omitted). Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs could 

potentially allege sufficient facts, it dismisses the First 

Cause of Action with leave to amend. 

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b. Second Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, and Morgan

Plaintiffs bring another § 1983 claim against Officers 

Griego, Hatzell, and Morgan, alleging that these officers 

violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to a familial 

relationship and a right to seek redress. FAC ¶ 51. Defendants 

move to dismiss this claim as to Officers Griego and Morgan. 

They again argue that Plaintiffs neither allege facts showing 

that Officers Griego and Morgan’s conduct violated Plaintiffs’ 

rights nor cite clearly established law requiring on-scene 

officers to prevent or control alleged use of force by another 

officer. Mot. at 7.

Plaintiffs’ familial relationship aspect of their § 1983 

claim fails against Officers Griego and Morgan for the same 

reasons the first § 1983 claim failed. The redress aspect of 

this § 1983 claim also fails against all Defendants because 

Plaintiffs have withdrawn it. Opp’n at 11 n.3. 

With respect to Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment right to a 

familial relationship, that part of the claim is dismissed with 

leave to amend against Officers Griego and Morgan. As for 

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to seek redress, that 

part of the claim is dismissed with prejudice against all 

Defendants.

2. Third Cause of Action Against the City of Fairfield

To allege a § 1983 claim against a city, a plaintiff must 

allege facts showing that the city had a custom or policy that 

caused the plaintiff’s constitutional injury. See Monell v. 

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A “policy or 

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custom” under Monell is a “longstanding practice...which 

constitutes the ‘standard operating procedure’ of the local 

government entity.” Ulrich v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 308 

F.3d 968, 984 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted). 

“[T]he complaint must allege the policy, as well as its causal 

relationship to the constitutional injury, in sufficient 

detail.” Hass v. Sacramento Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:13-cv01746, 2014 WL 1616440, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2014).

But a relaxed pleading standard may apply in limited 

circumstances. Allegations based on “information and belief” 

may be sufficient to establish a “causal connection between the 

existing or non-existing policies, procedures and practices and 

the harms [Plaintiffs] experienced” when “the facts that might

demonstrate the causal connection—such as...corrective actions 

taken or not taken—are not available to the pleading party 

[before] discovery.” Phillips v. Cty. of Fresno, No. 1:13-cv0538, 2013 WL 6243278, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). This is particularly 

true when a plaintiff raises failure to discipline or failure to 

train claims. See Estate of Duran v. Chavez, No. 2:14-cv-02048, 

2015 WL 8011685, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2015) (allowing 

plaintiffs’ failure to supervise, investigate, or discipline 

claim survive defendants’ motion to dismiss); Phillips, 2013 WL 

6243278 at *10 (“find[ing] that dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims 

for entity/supervisor liability is inappropriate at this stage 

of the proceeding”).

Plaintiffs bring a Monell claim against the City of 

Fairfield (“City”). FAC ¶¶ 52-57. Defendants argue that 

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Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled facts showing that the 

City had a custom or policy that caused a constitutional injury.

Mot. at 8-9. Plaintiffs respond that given the case’s prediscovery posture, it is no surprise they lack elaborate details 

to support their failure to discipline and inadequate training 

claims. Opp’n at 13. 

Here, a relaxed pleading standard suffices. Plaintiffs’ 

allegations based on “information and belief” parallel those 

found sufficient in Duran and Phillips. Plus, Plaintiffs have 

pled some facts. One officer allegedly yelled for Officer 

Hatzell to “wait wait wait,” and another allegedly called him a 

“rookie.” FAC ¶¶ 27, 33. Both implicate training or the lack 

thereof. Also, most information needed to support inadequate 

training or failure to discipline claims is in Defendants’ 

custody and not available to Plaintiffs before discovery. See

Phillips, 2013 WL 6243278 at *11. Plaintiffs’ FAC contains

information “sufficient to supply notice to Defendants” about 

the kinds of “information they will need to provide to refute, 

if they can, Plaintiffs’ allegations in a subsequent motion for 

summary judgment.” Id. Because Plaintiffs have successfully 

stated a Monell claim, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Cause of Action against the City. 

3. Fourth Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, and Morgan

Plaintiffs bring a Bane Act excessive force claim against 

Officers Griego, Hatzell, and Morgan. FAC ¶¶ 59-62. “The 

essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by [threat, 

intimidation, or coercion] tried to or did prevent the plaintiff 

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from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law 

or to force the plaintiff to do something that he or she was not 

required to do under the law.” Rodriguez v. City of Modesto, 

No. 1:10-cv-01370, 2013 WL 6415620, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 

2013) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 

To state a claim under California Civil Code § 52.1, a 

plaintiff must plead facts showing interference or attempted 

interference by threat, intimidation, or coercion. Cabesuela v. 

Browning-Ferris Indus., 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 111 (1998). 

Generally, a plaintiff must show a coercion independent from the 

coercion inherent in the wrong: where coercion is inherent in 

the alleged constitutional violation, the statutory requirements 

of threats, intimidation, or coercion are not met. See Shoyoye 

v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 203 Cal.App.4th 947, 959 (2012). 

Federal courts, however, have relaxed the pleading standard for 

Bane Act claims when the underlying claim involves excessive 

force: a plaintiff bringing a Bane Act excessive force claim 

need not allege a showing of coercion independent from the 

coercion inherent in the use of force. See Rodriguez, 2013 WL 

6415620 at *13; Dillman v. Tuolumne Cty., No. 1:13-cv-00404, 

2013 WL 1907379, at *21 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013).

Defendants argue that this Court should dismiss Plaintiffs’ 

§ 52.1 claim against all defendants, but for two different 

reasons. First, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not pled 

facts showing violence or threat of violence by Officers Griego 

or Morgan. Mot. at 12. Second, Defendants argue that the 

Shoyoye doctrine bars the claim against Officer Hatzell because 

Plaintiffs have not alleged facts illustrating violence or 

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threat of violence separate from the shooting itself. Id. at 

13.

In response, Plaintiffs maintain that they have stated a 

claim against Officers Griego and Morgan because they

“integrally participated” in Jose’s death and because their 

collective presence was coercive. Opp’n at 13-14. Again, this 

argument fails for the same reasons the integral participation 

argument failed above: the FAC contains no facts supporting

this argument, and the Court will not review new facts stated in 

opposition briefs. Plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled facts 

showing Officers Griego and Morgan committed violence or threats

of violence. The Court grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss 

with leave to amend Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action against 

Officers Griego and Morgan.

Plaintiffs’ Bane Act excessive force claim against Officer 

Hatzell, however, survives. This Court has previously held that 

plaintiffs bringing these claims need not allege a showing of 

coercion independent from coercion inherent in the use of force. 

See Rodriguez, 2013 WL 6415620 at *13 (rejecting defendants’ 

argument that the Bane Act excessive force claim should be 

dismissed because plaintiff failed to show a coercion 

independent from coercion inherent in use of force); Dillman, 

2013 WL 1907379 at 21 (same). Defendants’ argument that 

Plaintiffs must allege facts of violence or intimidation 

separate from the underlying wronged act fails. The Court 

denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action 

against Officer Hatzell.

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4. Fifth Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, Morgan, and the City

Plaintiffs bring a wrongful death claim against Officers 

Griego, Hatzell, and Morgan directly and against the City under 

a respondeat superior theory. FAC ¶¶ 63-68. To state a claim 

for wrongful death under C.C.P. §§ 337.60 and 337.61, a 

plaintiff must plead facts showing a “tort (negligence or other 

wrongful act), the resulting death, and the damages, consisting 

of the pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs. Quiroz v. Seventh 

Ave. Ctr., 140 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1263 (2006) (original 

emphasis). Stating a claim for negligence satisfies the “tort” 

element for wrongful death. Claiming negligence requires 

showing a legal duty to use due care and a breach of that duty 

that proximately causes injury. See Holmes v. Summer, 188 

Cal.App.4th 1510, 1528 (2010). 

Defendants contend that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 

against Officers Griego and Morgan because those officers owed 

no legal duty to otherwise affirmatively act under the facts 

alleged. Mot. at 13. Plaintiffs argue in response that under 

the totality of the circumstances, all the officers violated the 

duty of care owed to José by not planning their approach—

especially given José’s alleged diminished state—and by shooting 

him even after he obeyed their command to enter the home. Opp’n

at 15-16. 

Defendants make the stronger argument. A police officer 

does not assume a greater obligation to others, and his duty is 

limited to that owed to the public at large. See Williams v. 

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California, 34 Cal.3d 18, 24 n.3 (1983) (internal citation 

omitted). “Absent a special relationship creating a special 

duty, the police have no legal duty to control the conduct of 

others.” Adams v. City of Fremont, 68 Cal.App.4th 243, 277 

(1998) (internal citation omitted). Because the FAC lacks 

factual allegations showing that Officers Griego and Morgan owed 

a duty to José or had a special relationship with him, there is 

no negligence liability, which means there can be no liability 

for wrongful death. The Court dismisses with leave to amend the 

Fifth Cause of Action against Officers Griego and Morgan. 

5. Sixth Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, Morgan, and the City

Plaintiffs bring a negligence claim against Officers 

Griego, Hatzell, and Morgan directly and against the City under 

a respondeat superior theory. FAC ¶¶ 70-72. Plaintiffs have 

since withdrawn this claim recognizing that it is duplicative of 

their wrongful death claim. Opp’n at 15 n.4. The Court 

dismisses with prejudice the Sixth Cause of Action against 

Officers Griego, Hatzell, Morgan, and the City. 

6. Seventh Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, Morgan, and the City

Plaintiffs seventh claim alleges assault and battery 

against Officers Griego, Hatzell, and Morgan directly and 

against the City under a respondeat superior theory. FAC ¶¶ 74-

75. To properly state a claim for battery, a plaintiff must 

show that the defendant intentionally performed an act resulting 

in harmful or offensive conduct with her person; that she did 

not consent to that contact; and that the harmful or offensive 

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contact caused injury, damage, loss, or harm to her. See Brown 

v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal.App.4th 516, 526-27 (2009). To 

successfully bring an assault claim, a plaintiff must plead 

facts showing “an unlawful intent to inflict immediate injury on 

the person of another then present.” Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. 

of Cal., 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 6-7 (1944) (internal citation 

omitted).

Defendants argue that the FAC reveals that Officers Griego 

and Morgan used no force against José and contains no facts 

showing their unlawful intent to inflict injury. Mot. at 14. 

Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that, because battery is a state 

law counterpart to § 1983 liability, the Defendants’ argument

fails as to these officers for the same reason. Opp’n at 17.

Plaintiffs have not meaningfully opposed Defendants’ 

argument, and because the FAC lacks facts showing that Officers 

Griego and Morgan used force against José or had an unlawful 

intent to inflict injury, Defendants prevail. The Court 

dismisses with leave to amend the Seventh Cause of Action 

against Officers Griego and Morgan.

7. Eighth Cause of Action Against Officers Griego, 

Hatzell, Morgan, and the City

Plaintiffs bring a negligent infliction of emotional 

distress claim (“NIED”) against Officers Griego, Hatzell, and 

Morgan directly and against the City under a respondeat superior

theory. FAC ¶¶ 77-83. To state a NIED claim, a plaintiff must 

allege facts showing that she “[was] closely related to the 

injur[ed] victim[;] [was] present at the scene of the injuryproducing event at the time it occur[red] and [was] then aware 

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that it was causing injury to the victim[;] and [as a result] 

suffer[ed] serious emotional distress beyond that which would be 

anticipated in a disinterested witness.” Thing v. La Chusa, 48 

Cal.3d 644, 647 (1989).

Defendants contend that because NIED is a theory of 

negligence, for the same reasons as the wrongful death claim, 

the FAC lacks sufficient facts showing that Officers Griego and 

Morgan had a legal duty to José. Mot. at 14. Plaintiffs 

respond that, as bystanders, they were closely related to José 

and either witnessed or heard him gunned down. Opp’n at 16. 

NIED is not an independent tort. When a plaintiff seeks 

damages for NIED, the tort is negligence—regardless of the 

specific name used to describe the tort. See Christensen v. 

Superior Court of Los Angeles Cty., 54 Cal.3d 868, 882 (1991). 

That means the plaintiff must plead a legal duty, a breach of

that duty, causation, and damages. Id. As this Court explained 

in the wrongful death claim discussed above, Plaintiffs have not 

pled facts showing that Officers Griego and Morgan had a legal 

duty to José. Plaintiffs have, therefore, failed to state a 

claim for NIED as to defendants Griego and Morgan. The Court 

dismisses with leave to amend the Eighth Cause of Action against 

these two defendants.

8. Damages Under Sections 1985 and 1986

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs improperly request 

attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. Mot. at 14-

15. To state a claim under § 1985, a plaintiff must allege 

facts showing that the Defendants conspired together. See

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th 

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Cir. 1988). Merely alleging conspiracy without factual 

specificity is insufficient. See id. And a claim under § 1986 

survives dismissal only if “the complaint contains a valid claim 

under section 1985.” Id.

Plaintiffs did not oppose this argument in their brief. 

The Court therefore dismisses this claim with prejudice against 

all Defendants. 

9. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs request punitive damages from all Defendants for 

their alleged section 1983 violations. FAC ¶¶ 42, 60. 

Defendants’ argue that this request fails against the City. Mot.

at 15. 

Municipalities are immune from punitive damages under 

§ 1983. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 

247, 271 (1981). And California law forbids imposing punitive 

damages against public entities. See Arres, 2011 WL 284971 at 

*6. Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for punitive damages 

against the City is granted with prejudice.

III. ORDER

For the reasons discussed above, this Court GRANTS IN PART 

AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss as follows:

1. DISMISSES without prejudice the first cause of action

(§ 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment) against Officers Griego 

and Morgan;

2. DISMISSES without prejudice the second cause of action

(§ 1983 familial relationship claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment) against Officers Griego and Morgan, and DISMISSES with

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prejudice the § 1983 redress claim under the Fourteenth Amendment 

against all Defendants;

3. DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the third cause of 

action (Monell claim) against the City;

4. DISMISSES without prejudice the fourth cause of action

(Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 claim) against Officers Griego and 

Morgan, and DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss this § 52.1 

claim against Officer Hatzell;

5. DISMISSES without prejudice the fifth cause of action

(wrongful death claim) against Officers Griego and Morgan;

6. DISMISSES with prejudice the sixth cause of action

(negligence claim) against all Defendants;

7. DISMISSES without prejudice the seventh cause of action

(assault and battery claim) against Officers Griego and Morgan;

8. DISMISSES without prejudice the eighth cause of action

(NIED claim) against Officers Griego and Morgan;

9. DISMISSES with prejudice the 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 

attorneys’ fees claims against all Defendants; and

10. DISMISSES with prejudice the punitive damages claim

against the City.

The FAC’s surviving claims include:

1. The first cause of action (§ 1983 Fourth Amendment 

excessive force claim) against Officer Hatzell;

2. The second cause of action (§ 1983 Fourteenth Amendment 

familial relationship claim) against Officer Hatzell;

3. The third cause of action (Monell claim) against the 

City;

4. The fourth cause of action (Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 

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claim) against Officer Hatzell; 

5. The fifth cause of action (wrongful death claim)

against Officer Hatzell directly and against the City under a 

respondeat superior theory;

6. The seventh cause of action (assault and battery claim)

against Officer Hatzell directly and against the City under a 

respondeat superior theory; and

7. The eighth cause of action (NIED claim) against Officer 

Hatzell directly and against the City under a respondeat superior

theory.

If Plaintiffs elect to amend any claim dismissed without 

prejudice, they shall file their Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) 

within twenty days of the date of this Order. Defendants shall 

file their responsive pleadings within twenty days thereafter. 

If Plaintiffs elect not to file a SAC, this case shall proceed on 

the remaining claims in the FAC, and Defendants shall file their 

answers to the FAC within thirty days from the date of this 

Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 11, 2016

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