Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02795/USCOURTS-azd-2_16-cv-02795-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert McCoy
Plaintiff
Petwin Hayden LLC
Defendant

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Robert McCoy,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Petwin Hayden LLC, 

Defendant.

No. CV-16-02795-PHX-JAT

ORDER 

Pending before the Court are: (1) Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First 

Amended Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss,” Doc. 19); and (2) Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (“Motion to Amend,” Doc. 20). The parties 

did not request oral argument. The Court now rules on the Motions. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Robert McCoy visited Defendant Petwin Hayden, LLC’s Scottsdale 

office complex (“Defendant’s complex”) on August 14, 2016. (First Amended 

Complaint, (Doc. 6), (“FAC”) at ¶¶ 2, 25). During his visit, Plaintiff contends that he 

encountered access barriers that he believes violate the Americans with Disabilities Act

(the “ADA”) and the Arizonans with Disabilities Act (the “AzDA”).

1

 (Id. at ¶¶ 39–53). 

 

1 Although the Court only discusses the ADA in the body of this Order, the Court’s discussion is equally applicable to the AzDA. See Ariz. Rev. 

Stat. § 41-1492.06(B) (2011) (“Compliance with [T]itles II and III of the Americans with [D]isabilities [A]ct and its implementing regulations shall be deemed in compliance with this article.”); see also George v. AZ Eagle TT Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 971, 974 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2013). 

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Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the parking lots at Defendant’s complex: 

(1) fail to identify van parking spaces by the designation “van 

accessible,” (2) do not contain appropriately identified 

accessible spaces, (3) have signs posted at the incorrect height 

on spaces identified as accessible, (4) have parking spaces, 

sidewalks, landings, and entryways that are not accessible 

because they contain incorrect transitions, grades, slopes, 

rises, surface levels, and lips, and (5) contain other features 

that obstruct the disabled from accessing [Defendant’s 

complex]. 

(Id. at ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges that these barriers deter “disabled individuals” from visiting 

Defendant’s complex. (Id. at ¶ 37). 

II. MOTION TO DISMISS 

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims based on a lack of standing. In 

particular, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege an injury-in-fact and 

sufficient causation between Plaintiff’s injury and Defendant’s conduct in allegedly 

violating the ADA. (Doc. 19 at 3–5). 

 A. Legal Standard 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”) 12(b)(1), a litigant may 

seek dismissal of an action for lack of standing because “Article III standing is a species 

of subject matter jurisdiction.” Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 

643 F.3d 1216, 1227 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). To survive a defendant’s motion 

to dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Tosco v. Cmtys. for a 

Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2000). The “irreducible constitutional 

minimum” required to demonstrate standing requires that a plaintiff has “(1) suffered an 

injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and 

(3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546–47 (2016). 

 “To establish an injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that [he] suffered ‘an invasion 

of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or 

imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of 

Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). Within the context of the ADA, a plaintiff suffers an 

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injury-in-fact “either because discriminatory architectural barriers deter him from 

returning to a facility or because they ‘otherwise interfere with his access to’ the facility.” 

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 950 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 

Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008)). While any such barrier 

need not “completely preclude” but, rather, simply “interfere with the plaintiff’s ‘full and 

equal enjoyment’ of the facility,” such interference must be due to the plaintiff’s 

“particular disability.” Id. at 947. Once a plaintiff has identified such barriers interfering 

with his access to a place of public accommodation, he has not only shown an injury-infact but has also shown that such injury is “traceable to the defendant’s conduct and 

capable of being redressed by the courts,” thus meeting Article III’s standing 

requirement. Doran, 524 F.3d at 1042 n.5. 

B. Analysis 

Here, Plaintiff’s FAC lacks any specificity with which the Court can confirm he 

has standing to sue under the ADA. While Plaintiff states that he is disabled, he never 

states that he was personally unable to access Defendant’s property. Rather, Plaintiff’s 

FAC is filled with allegations about abstract “individuals with disabilities” who were 

injured by Defendant’s alleged statutory violations. (FAC at ¶¶ 26 (“[Plaintiff] found that 

the Premises was not accessible to individuals with disabilities.”), 27 (“[Plaintiff] 

therefore has actual knowledge of at least one barrier preventing disabled individuals 

[from accessing] the parking lots at the Premises[,] and individuals with disabilities are 

currently deterred from visiting [Defendant’s] public accommodation[s].”), 29–31, 33, 

36–37). Overall, it is unclear whether Plaintiff is making an allegation based upon an 

injury he personally suffered or suing on behalf of other “individuals with disabilities” 

who may have suffered injuries. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1 (noting that an 

“injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way”). Thus, Plaintiff’s FAC 

does not properly allege that Plaintiff has standing in this case. 

III. MOTION TO AMEND WITH LEAVE OF COURT 

Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend with the purpose of addressing Defendant’s 

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concerns that Plaintiff lacks standing. (Doc. 20 at 1). Plaintiff’s Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint (“PSAC,” Doc. 20-1) includes additional facts that the Court 

recounts below. 

Plaintiff alleges that his disability is that he “is elderly, has trouble walking, walks 

with a cane, and has a handicap placard in his car identifying himself as a handicapped 

individual.” (PSAC at ¶ 30). On the date Plaintiff visited Defendant’s complex, he 

personally “encountered the barriers to access . . . and some or all of them injured” 

Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶ 36). Plaintiff also makes clear that, as a client of one of the law firms in 

Defendant’s complex, he plans to visit Defendant’s complex again. (Id. at ¶ 33). 

Plaintiff now seeks to amend the FAC pursuant to Federal Rule 15(a)(2) by 

including the above-stated facts related to Plaintiff’s ADA claims. (See Doc. 20). 

A. Legal Standard 

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days after 

serving it or within 21 days of service of, among others, a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). In all other circumstances, a party must seek leave to amend 

from the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice 

so requires.” Id. Additionally, there is a “longstanding rule that ‘[l]eave to amend should 

be granted if it appears at all possible that the plaintiff can correct the defect.’” Lopez v. 

Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 

901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1988)). In determining whether to grant a motion to amend, a 

court should consider five factors: “(1) bad faith; (2) undue delay; (3) prejudice to the 

opposing party; (4) futility of amendment; and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously 

amended his complaint.” Nunes v. Ashcroft, 375 F.3d 805, 808 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Significantly, ‘[t]he party opposing amendments bears the burden of showing prejudice,’ 

futility, or one of the other permissible reasons for denying a motion to amend.” Farina v. 

Compuware Corp., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1060 (D. Ariz. 2003) (quoting DCD Programs, 

Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 187 (9th Cir. 1987)). 

 

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 B. Analysis 

Here, Plaintiff has already amended the Complaint as a matter of right pursuant to 

Federal Rule 15(a)(1) and seeks the Court’s leave to amend his complaint pursuant to 

Federal Rule 15(a)(2). (Doc. 20). Defendant argues that the Court should not grant

Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend because of futility of the amendment (Doc. 22 at 4–6). 

Futility alone is enough to deny a motion for leave to amend. Nunes, 

375 F.3d at 808. It is “futile to allow [leave to amend] an amended complaint that lacks 

subject matter jurisdiction.” Emmanuel Temple v. Abercrombie, 903 F. 

Supp. 2d 1024, 1032 (D. Haw. 2012); see also Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 

300 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming a district court’s denial of leave to amend 

where plaintiffs could not cure a lack of standing in their pleading). The party opposing 

amendment bears the burden of proving futility. Rodriguez v. City of Phoenix, 

No. CV-11-01992-PHX-JAT, 2014 WL 1053602, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 19, 2014). 

Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s PSAC is futile because Plaintiff “fails to allege 

that his disability was impacted by the barriers” Plaintiff describes in the PSAC. (Doc. 22 

at 4–6). To have standing to sue under the ADA, a plaintiff must seek relief for barriers 

that are related to his personal disability. See, e.g., Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947 (“[A] 

‘barrier’ will only amount to such interference [that would cause an injury-in-fact] if it 

affects the plaintiff’s full and equal enjoyment of the facility on account of his particular 

disability.”); Parr v. L & L Drive-Inn Restaurant, 96 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1082–83 

(D. Haw. 2000) (citations omitted) (finding that a plaintiff who suffered from the 

disability of non-mobility lacked standing to sue for barriers unrelated to non-mobility, 

such as braille sign violations). 

Here, the Plaintiff’s PSAC sufficiently alleges that, because of Plaintiff’s 

described disabilities, specific barriers interfered with his access to Defendant’s complex. 

Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that he needs assistance to walk and, when visiting 

Defendant’s complex, must park near the complex’s entrance. (PSAC at ¶¶ 30–36). On 

Plaintiff’s visit, he was “deprived of full or equal access” of Defendant’s complex by 

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specific barriers located within the complex’s parking lot. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 38). Plaintiff 

further alleges that he plans to visit Defendant’s complex. (Id. at ¶ 33). Thus Plaintiff has 

alleged a sufficient nexus between his particular disability and the barriers that allegedly 

violate the ADA.2

IV. CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) is GRANTED. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall file the Proposed Second 

Amended Complaint (Doc. 20-1) within 14 days of the date of this Order. 

 Dated this 27th day of December, 2016. 

 

2 In a footnote, Defendant states that it has remedied some of the barriers Plaintiff 

alleges violate the ADA. (Doc. 22 at 4 n.2). The Court notes that at a later stage of 

litigation, Defendant may file a motion for summary judgment and ask the court to 

declare claims based on such remedied barriers as moot. See Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery 

Co., 654 F.3d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Because a private plaintiff can sue only for injunctive relief (i.e., for removal of the barrier) under the ADA, . . . a 

defendant’s voluntary removal of alleged barriers prior to trial can have the effect of 

mooting a plaintiff’s ADA claim.”). 

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