Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02185/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02185-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher M. Rachell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 3, 2016 

Decided February 3, 2016 

Before 

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge 

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-2185 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

CHRISTOPHER M. RACHELL, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:12CR00185-003 

Sarah Evans Barker, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Christopher Rachell pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess and distribute 

marijuana, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a), and he was sentenced to 120 months’ 

imprisonment. Rachell’s plea agreement includes an appeal waiver, but he filed a notice 

of appeal anyway. His appointed counsel represents that the appeal is frivolous and 

seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We invited Rachell to 

respond to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), but he has not. Counsel’s supporting brief 

explains the nature of the case and discusses points that could be expected to arise on 

appeal, and because his analysis appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the 

subjects he discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United 

States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

Case: 15-2185 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2016 Pages: 2
No. 15-2185 Page 2 

Counsel says that Rachell has given conflicting answers about whether he wants 

to challenge his guilty plea, so counsel first considers whether Rachell could claim on 

appeal that the district judge did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

11(b) before accepting the plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th 

Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel points out 

that the plea agreement, which provided for a prison sentence of 100 to 120 months, was 

binding on the district court once the judge accepted it. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C), 

(c)(3)(A); United States v. Sanford, 806 F.3d 954, 960 (7th Cir. 2015). Counsel also 

represents, and we agree, that the transcript of the plea colloquy shows that the district 

court substantially complied with Rule 11. The court advised Rachell of the trial rights he 

was waiving by pleading guilty, the charges against him including a dismissed firearm 

count that would have required a consecutive prison sentence, and the judge’s limited 

discretion to impose a sentence from 100 to 120 months’ imprisonment, based on the 

plea agreement. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); United States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688–89 

(7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Akinsola, 105 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1997). The court also 

ensured that Rachell’s guilty plea was supported by an adequate factual basis and made 

voluntarily. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3). Thus, as counsel recognizes, an appellate 

claim contesting Rachell’s guilty plea would be frivolous. 

It follows, says counsel, that the entire appeal is frivolous because Rachell’s plea 

agreement includes an appeal waiver. We agree, since an appeal waiver stands if the 

underlying guilty plea stands. United States v. Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013); 

United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746, 752 (7th Cir. 2010). In any event Rachell’s appeal 

would be frivolous despite the waiver because he bargained for, and received, a specific 

sentence. He cannot appeal that sentence because it does not exceed what he bargained 

for, and neither has counsel identified any reason to conclude that the sentence was 

imposed in violation of law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1), (c)(1); Sanford, 806 F.3d at 960–61;

United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 363 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gibson, 356 

F.3d 761, 766–67 (7th Cir. 2004). 

 We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. 

Case: 15-2185 Document: 18 Filed: 02/03/2016 Pages: 2