Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03063/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rosemary E. Gomez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 2005 Decided December 13, 2005

No. 04-3063

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROSEMARY E. GOMEZ,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr00189-01)

Paul Y. Kiyonaga argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Thomas J. Tourish,

Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

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WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: Rosemary Gomez was

convicted of four counts involving distribution of, or possession

with intent to distribute, cocaine base (in this case, crack

cocaine), plus one count of failure to appear before a court as

required by conditions of release, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146(a)(1)

and 3146(b)(1)(A)(i). Under counts three and four, conviction--

and the substantive issue before us--required involvement with

five or more grams of crack, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1);

841(b)(1)(B)(iii); 860(a), and in practice turned on whether the

government showed Gomez to have been in constructive

possession of a substantial stash of crack located in the closet of

the apartment where she was arrested. 

Here, Gomez argues that there was insufficient evidence for

a rational jury to find that she possessed more than five grams of

crack, and she accordingly asks this court to set aside the

convictions premised on that amount. We reject Gomez’s

argument and affirm those convictions. She also contends that

her sentence constitutes plain error in light of United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). We agree and therefore vacate

the sentence and remand for resentencing. 

* * *

As always with a defendant’s claims of insufficient

evidence, we review de novo, viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the government. We affirm if a rational factfinder could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Wahl, 290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

According to the government’s evidence, Officer Best of

the Metropolitan Police Department (“MPD”), acting

undercover, knocked at the door of a D.C. apartment at about

8:30 on a spring evening in 1990. The door opened, and inside

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Best saw Gomez, as well as two men, Pena and Medina. Best

held out two $20 bills and one $10 bill. He asked for “two

twenties,” meaning, as he later testified, two $20 rocks of crack

cocaine. In response, Pena said, “mira, mira” (look, look), at

which point Gomez walked toward Best and reached into her bra

to pull out a plastic bag. From the bag, Gomez handed Best two

rocks of crack, and Best gave her the two $20 bills. Medina then

asked Best to buy yet another rock. Best handed the $10 bill to

Medina, at which point Gomez reached into her plastic bag

again and gave Best another rock of crack. Best then left the

apartment. 

Five or ten minutes later, several MPD officers announced

themselves at the door of the apartment and, receiving no

answer, forced their way in. Gomez ran out of the front room

and into the bedroom, where she threw down a purse she had

been carrying. The purse contained the three bills, totaling $50,

that Best had used minutes earlier to make his purchase, plus

another $283 in cash. Officer Lawrence searched Gomez and

found that her bra contained a plastic bag, which, in turn,

contained three rocks of crack. 

The crack that Gomez sold to Best, plus the amount

Lawrence recovered from the plastic bag on her person, came to

less than five grams. The government presented no other

evidence of Gomez’s actual possession of crack. But in

searching the apartment the officers discovered, on the floor of

the bedroom closet, a second plastic bag of crack, containing

well over five grams. (Also in the closet were a boot and a film

canister that each contained small amounts of crack.) The key

question is whether the evidence supports the government’s

claim that Gomez was in constructive possession of the stash in

the plastic bag on the closet floor. 

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Conviction on the basis of constructive possession requires

evidence of the defendant’s “ability to exercise knowing

dominion and control over the items in question.” Wahl, 290

F.3d at 376 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Where drugs are found in a place occupied by more than one

person, the evidence must support a belief that “the accused had

a substantial voice vis-à-vis” the drugs, United States v. Staten,

581 F.2d 878, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1978), or, equivalently, “some

appreciable ability to guide [the drugs’] destiny,” id. at 883. Of

special relevance here, a defendant’s “proximity to contraband,

combined with evidence linking the accused to an ongoing

criminal operation of which . . . possession of the contraband is

a part, may support a finding of constructive possession.” In re

Sealed Case, 105 F.3d 1460, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citations,

internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). While some of

our cases hold that constructive possession may be proven by

types of evidence other than Sealed Case’s combination of

proximity to contraband and a link to a criminal operation, e.g.,

United States v. Richardson, 161 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir.

1998), no such case purports to establish an exclusive test. 

Here the evidence showed both features mentioned in

Sealed Case. First, there was close proximity between Gomez

and the closet stash: the apartment was small, consisting of only

a combined living room/kitchen, a bedroom, a hallway, and a

bathroom. Second, there was evidence to link Gomez to the

broader operation. The government presented overwhelming

evidence that Gomez sold the kind of drug of which the stash

consisted, and did so in the very apartment where the stash was

located and in the presence of confederates. It also offered

evidence suggesting reason to believe that what she sold may

have come from the stash itself. The government’s expert

testified that the stash included one large rock and that crack

dealers commonly chip small pieces from such a large rock in

order to make sales. The jury could rationally draw a link

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between this testimony and the small rocks that Gomez kept on

her person. Gomez’s actual possession of $333 further suggests

involvement in a larger enterprise. Finally, besides the natural

inferences from Gomez’s apparently feeling comfortable selling

crack in the apartment in the presence of other occupantconfederates, there was evidence that her link to the apartment

was more than casual. The officers found ten photographs of

Gomez on top of the stereo in the living room (although they

were not framed and there was no evidence that they were taken

in the apartment). 

Gomez draws our attention to the facts of Staten, in which

we upheld a finding that the defendant, whom police discovered

in an apartment, constructively possessed all drugs in the

apartment, even though many of them were tucked away in an

envelope atop a kitchen cabinet, in the pockets of coats hanging

in a closet, and in a plastic bottle on a closet shelf. 581 F.2d at

881. Gomez contends that the evidence in her case is weaker

than in Staten. That may be so in some respects, especially the

defendant’s connection to the apartment: Staten had a key (but

to only one of the two entrance locks) and had left his ID on a

closet shelf (though it was unclear whether this was the shelf on

which drugs were sitting). Id. at 881 & n.27, 885. But the direct

evidence of Staten’s participation in a related drug-dealing

enterprise seems weaker than for Gomez. Staten had on his

person $165 and a distribution quantity of heroin, though heroin

was only one of three types of drugs found in the apartment. Id.

at 881-82, 883. He made no sale in the apartment, much less a

sale in the presence of others. 

Another case upholding conviction, United States v. Thorne,

997 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1993), relates to our facts the same

way (stronger on the defendant’s link to the place, weaker on the

link to a criminal enterprise). There we upheld a finding that

defendant Ian Thorne constructively possessed a stash of crack

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in a bag on the floor of a house’s bedroom closet. Thorne lived

in the room part of the time, though apparently sharing it with

several others. Id. at 1507 n.4, 1510, 1511-12. But Thorne’s

link to crack-dealing was not as tight as Gomez’s. From the

front steps of the house he was seen speaking with one Haynes,

who then walked to a nearby park and sold crack to an

undercover officer; soon afterward Thorne pointed someone in

the direction of that park. Id. at 1507, 1511-12. Thorne owned

a beeper and had on him $190. Id. 

Apart from Staten, Gomez relies particularly on three cases,

each of which is either distinguishable or irrelevant. The first is

United States v. Foster, 783 F.2d 1087 (D.C. Cir. 1986), in

which we invalidated a finding of constructive possession where

the “only evidence . . . to link the appellant to the shotgun was

testimony that the appellant was near the location of the shotgun

[i.e., behind a store counter] just prior to its being discovered,

that he was in that location for an unspecified amount of time

once a week, and that he had another gun on his person.” Id. at

1089. Foster emphasized that the defendant’s possession of the

other gun was not shown to be unlawful and therefore (in

contrast to Gomez’s crack dealing) showed no link to a criminal

enterprise. Id. at 1090-91. 

The second is Sealed Case, in which we rejected a finding

of constructive possession of a gun--a finding that would have

disqualified defendant for the “safety valve” available to drug

offenders of little culpability. 105 F.3d at 1463-65. The

defendant sat in a restaurant for the duration of a drug deal,

while his co-conspirator conducted the actual exchange outside

the restaurant; the gun remained under the driver’s seat of the

co-conspirator’s car the whole time. Id. at 1461. There was no

evidence that the defendant traveled to the restaurant in his coconspirator’s car, id. at 1465, nor apparently that he entered the

car afterward, given that the two men were arrested as soon as

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the sale was over, id. at 1461. The opinion emphasized two

factors distinct from Gomez’s case: (1) there was nothing to

suggest that the defendant was “anywhere near the gun

immediately prior to the sale”; and (2) the government was

trying to use a defendant’s participation in drug distribution to

support constructive possession not of a drug, but of a gun,

which we said it couldn’t do without more evidence. Id. at

1464, 1464-65. 

Finally, Gomez invokes United States v. Jenkins, 981 F.2d

1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992), but mainly to refute the government’s

assertion that Gomez’s flight in the direction of the bedroom

closet indicated her knowledge of the location of the stash—an

assertion on which we don’t rely. 

Accordingly, we find the evidence sufficient to support the

challenged convictions. 

* * *

The district court, sentencing Gomez in April 2004, treated

the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. In January 2005

the Supreme Court held in Booker that under the Sixth

Amendment “[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is

necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum

authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury

verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt.” 125 S. Ct. at 756. As a remedy the

Court effectively nullified the U.S. Code provisions that

rendered the Guidelines mandatory. Id. at 764. 

Gomez now asks us to vacate her sentence as a violation of

Booker and to remand for resentencing. Because she didn’t raise

this issue below, we review her claim for plain error under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Under this rule,

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“there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects

substantial rights”; if “all three conditions are met, an appellate

court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error,

but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,

or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.

Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citations, internal

quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Under Coles, any case

where a district court has sentenced a defendant under the

assumption that the Guidelines are mandatory meets the first and

second conditions automatically and meets the fourth whenever

the third--prejudice to substantial rights--exists. Id. Here, then,

the only question is whether Gomez’s sentence fulfills the third

condition, i.e., whether the error “affects substantial rights.” 

Long before Booker, we held that an appellant seeking to

show that an error in the sentencing context has “affect[ed]

substantial rights” must demonstrate “a reasonable likelihood

that the sentencing court’s obvious errors affected his sentence.”

United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see

also United States v. Williams, 358 F.3d 956, 966 (D.C. Cir.

2004); cf. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333,

2340 (2004) (“a defendant who seeks reversal of his conviction

after a guilty plea, on the ground that the district court

committed plain error under [Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure] 11, must show a reasonable probability that, but for

the error, he would not have entered the plea”). The standard of

“reasonable likelihood” is somewhat more relaxed in the area of

sentencing than it is for trial errors, since “a resentencing is

nowhere near as costly or as chancy an event as a trial.” Saro,

24 F.3d at 288; see also Williams, 358 F.3d at 966. 

In deciding whether the appellant fulfilled the third

condition of the plain-error test, Coles did not discuss the Saro

standard of “reasonable likelihood.” Coles, 403 F.3d at 767-71.

Instead, Coles stated that there would be some cases in which

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the appellate court would be “confident” that the sentence would

not have been lower even if the district judge had known the

Guidelines were advisory, in which case the sentence should be

affirmed. Id. at 769 (citing United States v. Smith, 401 F.3d 497,

499 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). Coles added that there would also be

cases in which the appellate court would be “confident” that the

sentence would have been lower, e.g., if the district judge

“indicated on the record that, but for the Guidelines, she would

have imposed a lower sentence.” 403 F.3d at 769. (The opinion

did not explicitly say what should be done in such cases, but a

full resentencing remand is surely implied.) As to the case

before it, Coles concluded that the record was not “sufficient”

for it to “determine prejudice with any confidence.” Id. It

therefore remanded the record to the district court “for the

limited purpose of allowing it to determine whether it would

have imposed a different sentence, materially more favorable to

the defendant, had it been fully aware of the post-Booker

sentencing regime.” Id. at 771. As to the procedure of this

limited remand, we adopted the Seventh Circuit’s view in

United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005),

that the defendant’s presence was unnecessary but that the

district judge should obtain the views of counsel on both sides.

Coles, 403 F.3d at 770. If the district judge concluded that she

would have given a lower sentence, the appellate court would

then vacate the sentence, id., clearing the way for full

resentencing. 

Nothing Coles said appeared to displace our standard rule

that a defendant is entitled to a sentencing remand on a showing

of a “reasonable likelihood” that the sentence would be lower

absent the trial court’s plain error. A case could be made,

however, that the device Coles created, a purely informational

remand of the record, represents a useful innovation that could

replace a full sentencing remand in those cases where, though

there is a “reasonable likelihood” of a lower sentence with

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correction of the Booker error, the appellate court isn’t

“confident” of such a reduction. 

Even apart from the demands of stare decisis, LaShawn A.

v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1393, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc),

however, we believe that a full resentencing remand continues

to be preferable where there is a “reasonable likelihood” of a

sentence reduction. The alternative approach, using a Coles

remand both in cases where the chance of a reduction is simply

unknown, and in cases where a reduction is “reasonably likely,”

will sometimes, when viewed ex post, prove more speedy and

efficient--namely, in those instances where the district court

ultimately makes clear its intent to keep the sentence unchanged.

In all other instances, viewed ex post, preserving the standard

“reasonable likelihood” remand will be more speedy and

efficient, because the district court will turn straight to lowering

the sentence in one proceeding without any intermediate trip to

the district court, back to the court of appeals, and back to the

district court. Of course we cannot know the ultimate outcomes

ex ante, so we have to apply a rule that seems on balance the

most effective and fair to the parties. We think, in the end, that

enough of the “reasonable likelihood” cases will in fact generate

a sentence reduction to make that approach preferable overall.

A further advantage of adhering to the standard “reasonable

likelihood” remand is that it reduces the risk of a wrongful

extension of a defendant’s prison time where the ultimate

lowered sentence would have been completed before completion

of the process of limited and then full remand. 

We take a moment to consider the practice of the three other

circuits that have adopted a limited-remand procedure for

Booker error. United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078

(9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483-84; United

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1

 The Ninth Circuit remands for full resentencing in a case

where the original district judge is unavailable. United States v.

Sanders, 421 F.3d 1044, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005). See also United States

v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 231-32 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J.,

concurring) (arguing, in a case where the original district judge was

unavailable, that the remand procedure fashioned by the majority was

functionally equivalent to a remand for full resentencing, contrary to

the majority’s assertion). 

States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005). The Ninth

Circuit has said that “reasonable probability” is the standard for

showing prejudice in Booker plain-error cases, Ameline, 409

F.3d at 1078, but its reported Booker-remedy cases seem to

remand for full resentencing only when the appellate court “can

reliably determine from the record that the sentence imposed

would have differed materially.” United States v. LabradaBustamante, No. 04-30082, slip op. at 15274 (9th Cir. Nov. 10,

2005). The Seventh Circuit’s standard for whether to grant such

a remand is clearly higher than “reasonable likelihood”; it says

that the “normal remedy in this circuit for [Booker error] is a

limited remand,” but “[w]e can skip the limited remand if we are

highly confident that the judge would have imposed a different

sentence.” United States v. Pittman, 411 F.3d 813, 817-18 (7th

Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). In only one reported case, where

the district court had been quite explicit in the initial sentencing

about its intent if freed of the Guidelines, has an appellant

passed this test. United States v. Coney, 407 F.3d 871, 876 (7th

Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit sets forth no explicit standard

for showing prejudice in Booker plain-error cases, Crosby; see

also United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2005), and

its reported Booker-remedy cases have never seriously

considered granting an immediate remand for full resentencing,

perhaps because appellants have not pressed the argument.1

 To

the extent that our approach departs from these circuits’, we do

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2

 The district court relied, and so do we, on the Guidelines

manual that became effective Nov. 1, 1989.

so for the reasons of stare decisis and judicial economy

explained above. 

To summarize, in a Booker plain-error case: (1) if the record

establishes a reasonable likelihood that the sentence would have

been lower, we remand for full resentencing; (2) if the record

makes us confident that the sentence would not have been lower,

we affirm; and (3) if neither of the above, we grant a limited

remand. 

In the present case, the record establishes a reasonable

likelihood that the district judge would have given Gomez a

lower sentence had he known that the Guidelines were not

mandatory. 

As is typical under the Guidelines, the sentencing was quite

complex. The amount of crack involved in each of the four drug

offenses yielded an offense level of 26, see U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1(c)(9);2

 for two counts (two and four), the fact that

Gomez’s activities were within 1000 feet of a school, see 21

U.S.C. § 860(a), increased the level by two, U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.2(a)(1), bringing it up to 28. The district court evidently

applied the Guidelines’ grouping provisions and used the level

for the worst offense in the group, i.e., 28, as a combined offense

level. See id. §§ 3D1.1-5. From this, the court subtracted two

on the ground that Gomez was a minor participant in the crime.

Id. § 3B1.2(b). This yielded a level of 26, for which the range,

given Gomez’s criminal history category of I, was 63-78

months. Further, in reliance on United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d

649 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the district judge granted a downward

departure of 10% of the sentence (i.e., six months), on the

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3

 The government did not contest the court’s grant of a Smith

departure below the five-year statutory minimum. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(B). Nor in this appeal has the government raised the issue

of the statutory minimum with respect either to a Smith departure or

to Booker discretion. 

ground that Gomez’s status as a deportable alien would

undeservedly increase the severity of her punishment. This

reduction, he noted, was the “maximum as I read Smith that I

can allow at this time based upon the length of the sentence.”3

This resulted in sentences of 57 months for each drug count, to

be served concurrently, and the judge expressed his intent to

“give the minimum sentence that’s required by the guidelines in

this case.” Finally, the court added one month for the failure to

appear, which by law had to run consecutively with the other

sentences. 

The district judge also considered a motion for a downward

departure under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) for factors not

adequately taken into account by the Guidelines. See Koon v.

United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92-96 (1996). One of several factors

raised by Gomez was her vulnerability to abuse in prison. The

district judge rejected this as a basis of departure, citing United

States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1480-81 (D.C. Cir. 1996),

which held that a departure was warranted only in the case of

“extreme vulnerability,” which the district court found Gomez

had not shown. Gomez raised several other factors, which the

district judge discussed at some length and accepted as true: that

she had a difficult childhood, “no formal education,” a “strong

employment history,” no criminal history before or after the

offenses of which she was convicted, a “fragile . . . emotional

and mental state that has developed since her incarceration,” and

a “physical condition that’s deteriorated” (including surgeries).

He then asserted that the Guidelines barred him from

considering these factors: “While it’s tragic and sad, it does not

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raise to a level that was not adequately considered by the

guidelines.” He explained that the Guidelines took account of

the factors raised, “and I don’t see any individual one or a

combination thereof raising it to a level of taking it outside the

guidelines.” If Booker’s rendering the Guidelines discretionary

means anything, it must give a district judge greater latitude on

these issues than did Koon. 

Throughout the hearing, the district judge focused almost

exclusively on the hardship to Gomez. Despite the prosecutor’s

vigorous condemnation of Gomez’s failure to accept

responsibility, the district judge never mentioned this issue,

except in passing, as a bar to a departure on that basis. Indeed,

the only criticism that he made of Gomez was to note briefly

that “the evidence was strong that you were engaged in a

distribution scheme even though you had children with you in

your home.” The district judge said he would request that

Gomez be sent to a prison where she could be near her family

and receive proper medical care. Most pointedly, he

“recognize[d]” that Gomez was “subject to deportation and

would be separated from her family permanently if this [i.e.,

deportation] happens.” Upon telling Gomez that she would

likely be deported, he added, “I don’t know any way to stop

that.” His concern for Gomez’s hardship appears to have been

his reason for stating that this was “a very difficult sentencing”

and that “sentencings of this type are always very difficult.” 

To counter the inference that the district court’s

discretionary sentence would be lower, the government cites In

re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 488, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1999), where

we observed that a sentencing court’s expressions of a

preference to give a sentence below the Guidelines range should

not be read as demonstrating an unawareness of authority to

depart from the Guidelines. But that, of course, is a quite

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different inquiry from our present one--whether, if subject to the

Guidelines only on a discretionary basis, the court would be

reasonably likely to give a lower sentence. 

The record as a whole--particularly the district judge’s

imposition of minimum sentences (with the minor exception of

the one-month sentence for failure to appear), his references to

the Guidelines’ mandatory constraints (particularly as bars to

downward departures), and his focus on the defendant’s

hardship to the near exclusion of her culpability--establishes a

reasonable likelihood that he would have imposed a lower

sentence had he known the Guidelines were not mandatory. 

* * *

The challenged convictions are affirmed. The sentence is

vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing. 

So ordered. 

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