Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01542/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01542-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
2007 Chevrolet Tahoe SUV, VIN: 1GNFC13067J251913, License: 5XLP068
Defendant
Blanca Alvarez
Claimant
Luis Miguel Raigoza
Claimant
United States
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

2007 CHEVROLET TAHOE SUV, 

VIN: 1GNFC13067J251913, 

LICENSE: 5XLP068,

Defendant.

 /

CASE NO. 1:09-cv-01542-LJO-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE

APPLICATION FOR DEFAULT

JUDGMENT

(Doc. 13)

In this civil forfeiture action, Plaintiff United States of America (“Government”) seeks

default judgment against the interests of Blanca Alvarez and Luis Miguel Raigoza in a 2007

Chevrolet Tahoe SUV, VIN: 1GNFC13067J251913, License: 5XLP068 (“Defendant Vehicle”);

and entry of a final forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title and interest in

the Defendant Vehicle. The Government’s motion has been referred to the Magistrate Judge

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72-302(c)(19) and is considered in accordance

with Local Rule A-540(d). This court has reviewed the papers and has determined that this

matter is suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 78-230(h). Having

considered all written materials submitted, the undersigned recommends that the District Court

grant the Government default judgment and enter final forfeiture judgment to vest in the

Government all right, title and interest in the Defendant Vehicle, and order the Government,

within ten (10) days of service of an order adopting these findings and recommendations, to

submit a proposed default and final forfeiture judgment consistent with these findings and

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recommendations.

I. Factual Background1

On January 21, 2009, a confidential informant (“CI”) informed Reedley Police

Department officers that CI could purchase methamphetamine from a male subject named “Luis”

at his current residence, 524 E. Washington Avenue, Reedley, California. CI positively

identified Luis Raigoza from a photograph secured in a previous narcotics investigation. The

officers arranged for CI to make a $50.00 methamphetamine purchase from Raigoza. The

officers observed CI walk to Raigoza’s Washington Avenue residence, enter the front door, and

leave the residence two minutes later. CI handed the officers a plastic bag containing 0.03

ounces of methamphetamine.

On January 22, 2009, officers arranged for CI to purchase $60.00 of methamphetamine

from Raigoza. The officers observed CI walk to a prearranged meet location where Raigoza

arrived as the only occupant of the Defendant Vehicle, complete the transaction with CI, and then

left in the Defendant Vehicle. CI handed the officers a plastic bag containing 0.03 ounces of

methamphetamine.

On January 26, 2009, an officer driving an undercover vehicle followed the Defendant

Vehicle and watched it pull into the driveway at 580 E. Linden Avenue.

On January 29, 2009, Reedley Police officers executed a state search warrant at Raigoza’s

residence, 580 E. Linden Avenue, apt. A, Reedley, California. Raigoza waived his Miranda

rights and stated that the Defendant Vehicle, parked in the driveway, was his vehicle. A consent

search of the Defendant Vehicle revealed two plastic bags containing approximately 2.18 ounces

of methamphetamine and a digital scale covered with methamphetamine.

Raigoza admitted to possession of the methamphetamine found within the Defendant

Vehicle and stated that the methamphetamine was intended for resale. He stated that he had

driven the Defendant Vehicle to a Reedley location the previous evening and purchased the

methamphetamine for $2,400.00. He admitted that he had been selling methamphetamine for the

These facts were derived from the Government’s application and from the Court’s records.

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past year. 

Raigoza told police that the Defendant Vehicle was fully paid for and registered in the

name of his wife, Blanca Alvarez, but that he was its primary driver. When asked why he

appeared to reside at both 580 E. Linden and 524 E. Washington, Raigoza explained that his wife

had kicked him out of the Linden apartment after execution of an earlier search warrant. Alvarez

knew that Raigoza was dealing drugs and did not want police to search her residence again.

Raigoza has a history of criminal drug dealing. In 1991, he was arrested for sales of

methamphetamine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell. In 2003, he was arrested and

convicted of possession of substances used to manufacture controlled substances. In 2007,

Raigoza was arrested for possession and transportation of a controlled substance.

II. Procedural Background

On August 28, 2009, the Government filed its complaint for forfeiture in rem, claiming

(1) that the Defendant Vehicle is subject to forfeiture to the Government under 21 U.S.C. §

881(a)(6) because it constituted moneys or other things of values furnished or intended to be

furnished in exchange for a controlled substance or listed chemical, all proceeds traceable to such

an exchange and/or was used or intended to be used to facilitate one or more violations of 21

U.S.C. § 841, et seq. On September 3, 2009, based on the allegations set forth in the Complaint

(Doc. 1), the Clerk of the Court issued a Warrant for Arrest of Articles In Rem for the Defendant

Vehicle (Doc. 4).

On September 9, 2009, this Court authorized publication of the forfeiture action via the

internet forfeiture website www.forfeiture.gov for at least thirty days (Doc. 5). On September 18,

2009, Raigoza and Alvarez were personally served with notice of this action by the U.S.

Marshals Service (Docs. 6 & 7). According to the Government’s Declaration of Publication

(Doc. 12), a Notice of Civil Forfeiture was published on the official government internet site

(www.forfeiture.gov) for thirty days beginning on September 25, 2009. To date, no claim or

answer has been filed on behalf of Raigoza or Alvarez.

As part of the Government’s Request for Entry of Default (Doc. 10), FSA Paralegal Elisa

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Rodriguez declared under penalty of perjury that on information and belief, neither Raigoza nor

Alvarez was in the military service or was an infant or incapacitated person. Neither potential

claimants Raigoza and Alvarez nor any other potential claimant filed an answer or otherwise

defended the action. The Clerk entered default as to defendants Raigoza and Alvarez on October

23, 2009 (Doc. 11). The Government moved for Default Judgment on December 3, 2009 (Doc.

13).

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Complaint

The Government contends that the allegations set forth in the verified complaint for

Forfeiture In Rem and the cited facts provide ample grounds for forfeiture of the Defendant

Vehicle. A complaint’s sufficiency is one factor for consideration in deciding whether to grant

default judgment. Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9 Cir. 1986). Money or other th

things of value are subject to forfeiture if they (1) are furnished or intended to be furnished by

any person in exchange for a controlled substance, (2) constitute proceeds traceable to such an

exchange, or (3) are used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of the laws governing

controlled substances. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). A vehicle is also subject to forfeiture if it is used

to transport a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).

The Government’s verified complaint alleges that the Defendant Vehicle is subject to

forfeiture since it constitutes a thing of value furnished or intended to be furnished in exchange

for a controlled substance, in which all proceeds were traceable to such an exchange, and/or were

used or intended to be used to facilitate the violation of one or more laws governing controlled

substances (Doc. 1 at ¶ 1). As set forth above and in the verified complaint, the execution of a

state search warrant at Raigoza’s residence at 580 E. Linden Avenue, Reedley, California,

resulted in the seizure of methamphetamine, a digital scale covered with methamphetamine, and

the Defendant Vehicle. Both police surveillance of CI’s second methamphetamine purchase and

the discovery of methamphetamine and the scale in the Defendant Vehicle in the course of police

execution of the state search warrant established that the Defendant Vehicle was used to transport

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methamphetamine.

The complaint meets the requirements of Rule G of the Supplemental Rules for

Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in

that it is verified; states the grounds for subject matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction, and

venue; describes the property seized and the circumstance of its seizure; and identifies the

relevant statutes. In the absence of assertion of interests in the Defendant Vehicle, this Court is

not in a position to question the facts supporting its forfeiture. As alleged, the facts set forth a

sufficient connection between the Defendant Vehicle and illegal drug activity to support a

forfeiture.

The government need not show a relationship between the proceeds of a drug crime and a

specific drug transaction: Circumstantial evidence may support the forfeiture of the proceeds of a

drug crime. See United States v. $30,670.00, 403 F.3d 448, 467-70 (7 Cir. 2005) (concluding th

that totality of circumstances demonstrated that airline passenger’s cash hoard was connected to

drug trafficking and subject to forfeiture); United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1160

(11 Cir. 2004) (applying totality of circumstances to determine that cash carried by airline th

passenger was the proceeds of, or traceable to, an illegal drug transaction).

II. Notice Requirements

The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits the Government from taking

property without due process of law. Individuals whose property interests are at stake are

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The requisite notice was provided to Alvarez

and Raigoza.

A. Notice by Publication

Supplemental Rule G(4) provides that in lieu of newspaper publication, the Government

may publish notice “by posting notice on an official government forfeiture site for at least 30

consecutive days.” Local Admiralty and In Rem rules further provide that the Court shall

designate by order the appropriate vehicle for publication. Local Rules A-530 and 83-171. On

September 9, 2009, this Court authorized publication of the forfeiture action via the internet

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forfeiture website www.forfeiture.gov for at least thirty days (Doc. 5). According to the

Government’s Declaration of Publication (Doc. 12), a Notice of Civil Forfeiture was published

on the official government internet site (www.forfeiture.gov) for thirty days beginning on

September 25, 2009. Accordingly, the Government satisfied the requirements for notice to

Raigoza and Alvarez by publication.

B. Personal Notice

When the Government knows the identity of the property owner, due process requires

“the Government to make a greater effort to give him notice than otherwise would be mandated

by [publication.” United States v. Real Property, 135 F.3d 1312, 1315 (9 Cir. 1998). In such th

cases, the Government must attempt to provide actual notice by means reasonably calculated

under all circumstances to apprise the owner of the pendency of the forfeiture action. Dusenbery

v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (quotations omitted). See also Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (requiring such notice “as one desirous of

actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it”). “Reasonable notice,

however, requires only that the government attempt to provide actual notice; it does not require

that the government demonstrate that it was successful in providing actual notice.” Mesa

Valderrama v. United States, 417 F.3d 1189, 1197 (11 Cir. 2005). th

Supplemental Rule G(4)(b) mirrors this requirement, providing for notice to be sent by

means reasonably calculated to reach the potential claimant. Local Rule A-540 also requires that

a party seeking default judgment in an action in rem demonstrate to the Court’s satisfaction that

due notice of the arrest of the property has been given both by publication and by personal

service of the person having custody of the property, or if the property is in the hands of a law

enforcement officer, by personal service on the person who had custody of the property before its

possession by a law enforcement agency or officer. Notice must also be provided by personal

service or certified mail, return receipt requested, on every other person who has appeared in the

action and is known to have an interest in the property, provided that failure to give actual notice

to such other person may be excused upon a satisfactory showing of diligent efforts to provide

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notice without success. L.R. A-540(a). Notwithstanding the Supplemental Rules and L.R. A540(a), the Government provides sufficient notice when the notice complies with the

requirements of F.R.Civ.P. 4. See F.R.Civ.P. 4(n)(1) (providing that when a federal statute

authorizes forfeiture, “[n]otice to claimants of the property shall then be sent in the manner

provided by statute or by service of a summons under this rule”).

Here, the Government personally served Raigoza and Alvarez with the complaint, arrest

warrant, publication order, and other related documents on September 15, 2009 (Docs. 6 & 7). 

The Defendant Vehicle is registered to Alvarez and was seized from the Linden Avenue

apartment at which she resided. Accordingly, Raigoza and Alvarez, the only claimants requiring

personal service, were personally served.

C. Failure to File Claim or Answer

Supplemental Rule G(5) requires any person who asserts an interest in or right against the

Defendant Vehicle to file a claim with the Court within 35 days after service of the

Government’s complaint or 30 days after the final publication of notice. Supplemental R.

G(4)(b) & (5). Failure to comply with the procedural requirements for opposing the forfeiture

precludes a person from establishing standing as a party to the forfeiture action. Real Property,

135 F.3d at 1317. The Clerk of Court properly entered defaults against Raigoza and Alvarez on

October 23, 2009 (Doc. 11).

D. Default Judgment

The Government seeks judgment against the interests of Raigoza and Alvarez, and final

forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title and interest in the Defendant

Vehicle. The Supplemental Rules do not set forth a procedure to seek default judgment in rem. 

Supplemental Rule A provides, “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also apply to the

foregoing proceedings except to the extent that they are inconsistent with these Supplemental

Rules.”

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, default entry is a prerequisite to default

judgment. “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to

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plead or otherwise defend, and the failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter

the party’s default.” F.R.Civ.P. 55(a). Generally, the default entered by the clerk establishes a

defendant’s liability.

Rule 55 give the court considerable leeway as to what it may require as a

prerequisite to the entry of a default judgment. The general rule of law is that

upon default the factual allegations of the complaint, except those relating to the

amount of damages, will be taken as true.

Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9 Cir. 1987) th

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

As noted above, the Government properly obtained default entries against the interests of

Raigoza and Alvarez. There is no impediment to default judgment sought by the Government

against them. The Government properly seeks judgment against the interests of the entire world,

that is, a final forfeiture judgment to vest in the Government all right, title, and interest in the

Defendant Vehicle. “A judgment in rem affect the interests of all persons in designated property

. . . . [T]he plaintiff is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to

extinguish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons.” Hanson v.

Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n. 12 (1958). Because of Alvarez and Raigoza’s defaults, the

Government is entitled to a final forfeiture judgment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In light of the reasons discussed above, this Court recommends that

1. The District Court grant plaintiff United States of America default

judgment against the interests of Luis Miguel Raigoza and Blanca

Alvarez;

2. The Clerk of Court enter final forfeiture judgment to vest in Plaintiff

United States of America all right, title and interest in the Defendant

Vehicle; and

3. The District Court order Plaintiff United States of America, within ten

(10) days of service of an order adopting these findings and

recommendations, to submit a proposed default and final forfeiture

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judgment consistent with the findings and recommendations and the order

adopting them.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to District Judge Lawrence J. O’Neill

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72-304. Within fifteen (15) court days of

service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these findings and

recommendations with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such document should be

captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district

judge will review these findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 

The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specific time may waive the right

to appeal the district judge’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 5, 2010 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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