Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08143/USCOURTS-azd-3_15-cv-08143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jestin Dale Rogers
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Jestin Dale Rogers, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States of America , 

Defendant.

No. CV-15-08143-PCT-JZB

 Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. 6.) For the reasons below, the Court will grant Defendant’s 

Motion. 

I. Background 

 Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asserts that on August 17, 2014, Defendant’s 

employee, Sergeant Terry Michael Orazi, returned to his home in Clarksville, Tennessee. 

(Doc. 1 ¶ 14.) At that time, Sergeant Orazi’s home was occupied by two other Army 

soldiers, Rachel L. Rogers and Sergeant Joshua Gaither, as well as Plaintiff’s two young 

sons. (Id. ¶ 15.) Sergeant Orazi had been at the firing range prior to returning home, and 

he brought a duffle bag filled with firearms into the home. (Id. ¶ 17.) At that time, Ms. 

Rogers and Sergeant Gaither were in the bedroom together in the second level of the 

home, and Eldin J. Rogers, the son of Plaintiff and Ms. Rogers, was in his bedroom. (Id.

¶¶ 18-19.) 

 Plaintiff alleges that after Sergeant Orazi returned to the home, he and Eldin 

Rogers interacted for 20-30 minutes, during which Sergeant Orazi allowed Eldin Rogers 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 1 of 11
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

to “help him load bullets into firearm magazines.” (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff claims that 

Sergeant Orazi then placed a loaded 9mm Glock on the coffee table near where Eldin 

Rogers was standing. (Id. ¶ 24.) Sergeant Orazi turned his back and the gun fired, 

shooting Eldin Rogers in the chest and destroying his “liver and a kidney.” (Id. ¶¶ 26-

27.) Emergency units were dispatched and Eldin Rogers was taken to Vanderbilt 

Hospital in Nashville, Tennessee. (Id. ¶ 29.) Eldin Rogers was pronounced dead at 7:35 

PM on that same day. (Id. ¶ 30.) 

 Plaintiff asserts that Sergeant Orazi was acting within the course and scope of his 

employment with Defendant at the time of the incident because “he was in direct 

violation of military regulations living with other military members off base, which 

constitutes a form of fraternization.” (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff further alleges that Sergeant 

Orazi was held in confinement at Fort Campbell immediately after the incident, and 

Defendant punished Sergeant Orazi, Ms. Rogers, and Sergeant Gaither “at the military 

level.” (Id. ¶¶ 31-32.) 

 On August 12, 2015, Plaintiff, an Arizona resident, filed his Complaint in the 

District of Arizona asserting claims for negligence and wrongful death against the United 

States pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. (FTCA). (Id.) 

On October 16, 2015, Defendant filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Motion to 

Transfer Venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. 6.) Plaintiff filed a Response in 

opposition to the Motion on October 23, 2015. (Doc. 10.) On October 27, 2015, 

Defendant filed a Reply. (Doc. 11.) 

II. Legal Standard 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to any 

other district or division where the action might have been brought “[f]or the convenience 

of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice[.]” The change of venue statute was 

enacted to “prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect litigants, 

witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van Dusen v. 

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 2 of 11
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

“When determining whether a transfer is proper, a court must employ a two-step 

analysis. A court must first consider the threshold question of whether the case could 

have been brought in the forum to which the moving party seeks to transfer the case.” 

Park v. Dole Fresh Vegetables, Inc., 964 F.Supp.2d 1088, 1093 (N.D. Cal. 2013). “In 

order that the case ‘might have been brought’ in the proposed transferee district, the court 

there must have subject matter jurisdiction and proper venue, and the defendant must be 

amenable to service of process issued by that court.” Kachal, Inc. v. Menzie, 738 F. 

Supp. 371, 372–73 (D. Nev. 1990). An FTCA action “may be prosecuted only in the 

judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of 

occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b). 

Here, there is no dispute that the complained of conduct occurred in or near 

Montgomery County, in Clarksville, Tennessee. (Doc. 1 ¶ 2; Doc. 6 at 1-2.) 

Accordingly, the Middle District of Tennessee is a district where the action might have 

been brought.1

 

Second, the Court must consider “whether the transferee district is a more suitable 

choice of venue based upon the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interests 

of justice.” Airbus DS Optronics v. Nivisys LLC, No. CV–14–02399–PHX–JAT, 2015 

WL 3439143, *2 (D. Ariz. May 28, 2015); Park, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. The Ninth 

Circuit Court has identified the following factors, in addition to the convenience of the 

parties and witnesses, that district courts may consider in determining whether a transfer 

is appropriate: 

(1) the location where the relevant agreements were negotiated and 

executed, (2) the state that is most familiar with the governing law, (3) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (4) the respective parties’ contacts with the forum, (5) the contacts relating to the plaintiff’s cause of action in the chosen forum, (6) the differences in the costs of litigation in the two 

forums, (7) the availability of compulsory process to compel attendance of 

1

 The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville 

Division, “is comprised of the counties of Cannon, Cheatham, Davidson, Dickson, 

Houston, Humphreys, Montgomery, Robertson, Rutherford, Stewart, Sumner, Trousdale, 

Williamson, and Wilson.” United States District Court for the Middle District of 

Tennessee, Divisions of Court, http://www.tnmd.uscourts.gov/divisions_of_court (last 

visited Dec. 4, 2015). 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 3 of 11
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unwilling non-party witnesses, and (8) the ease of access to sources of 

proof. 

Jones v. GNC Franchising, Inc., 211 F.3d 495, 498–99 (9th Cir. 2000). No single factor 

is dispositive, and a district court has broad discretion to adjudicate motions for transfer 

on a case-by-case basis. Stewart Org, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (“A 

motion to transfer under § 1404(a) thus calls on the district court to weigh in the balance 

a number of case-specific factors.”); Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 

639 (9th Cir. 1988). The party seeking a change of venue bears the burden of 

establishing such action is proper. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Savage, 611 

F. 2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). 

III. Discussion 

Defendant argues that transferring this case to the United States District Court for 

the Middle District of Tennessee is appropriate because the action could have been 

brought there, and based on several different factors, it is the better venue for this case. 

(Doc. 6.) Plaintiff does not dispute that this action could have been brought in the Middle 

District of Tennessee. Rather, Plaintiff contends that transfer of this matter will cause 

him hardship and give Defendant an unfair advantage. (Doc. 10.) Below, the Court 

addresses the relevant factors and the parties’ arguments. 

a. Convenience of the Parties 

This factor weighs slightly against transferring this case. If this case is transferred 

to the Middle District of Tennessee, Plaintiff will need to travel there for any trial in this 

matter. Defendant contends that if Plaintiff chooses to conduct depositions of witnesses 

in person, he will likely need to travel to Tennessee for those depositions regardless of 

whether the case is transferred because most, if not all, of the witnesses, other than 

Plaintiff, reside in or near Tennessee. The Court finds that it would be more convenient 

for Plaintiff if this case were tried in Arizona because he currently resides here. 

Defendant has counsel available in both Arizona and Tennessee, so it would not be 

inconvenient for Defendant if the case is tried here or in the Middle District of Tennessee. 

Plaintiff argues in his Response that transferring this case would cause him “undue 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 4 of 11
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

hardship.” (Doc. 10.) However, Plaintiff fails to provide any basis for this contention. 

The Court notes that although it will be less convenient for Plaintiff to travel to 

Tennessee, the possibility of taking telephonic or video depositions of witnesses may 

ease the burden on Plaintiff. And, as Defendant notes, even if Plaintiff were to take 

depositions in person, he would likely have to travel to Tennessee to do so regardless of 

whether the case is transferred because non-party witnesses in or near Tennessee cannot 

be forced to travel to Arizona. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1) (“A subpoena may command 

a person to attend a trial, hearing, or deposition only . . . within 100 miles of where the 

person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person; or . . . within the 

state where the person resides, is employed, or regularly transacts business in person, if 

the person . . . is commanded to attend a trial and would not incur substantial expense.”)2

b. Convenience of Witnesses 

This factor weighs heavily in favor of transferring this case. “‘In determining the 

convenience of the witnesses, a court should consider not only the number of witnesses 

located in the respective venues, but also the nature and quality of their testimony.’” 

Federal Trade Commission v. Wyndham World Wide Corp., No. CV-12–1365–PHX–

PGR, 2013 WL 1222491, at *4 (D. Ariz. March 25, 2013) (quoting Sloan v. Pfizer, Inc., 

Case No. C-08-1849-SBA, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78785, 2008 WL 4167083, at *5 

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008)). 

There appears to be no dispute that all of the witnesses to the incident reside 

within 100 miles of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee 

in Nashville, Tennessee. Defendant has provided Declarations to support its claim that 

 

2

 Plaintiff also argues that transferring this case to the Middle District of 

Tennessee will give Defendant an unfair advantage in the litigation. (Doc. 10.) In support of this argument, Plaintiff cites to a November 2010 “United States Attorneys’ Bulletin” regarding litigating the venue in federal tort claim cases, which Plaintiff claims 

provides that “requesting a change in venue is a tactical move and US Attorneys are advised to request change of venue if it could significantly affect the outcome of the case 

in favor of Defendant.” (Id.) The Court does not find this argument supported or persuasive. Plaintiff fails to provide any basis for his contention that transferring this specific case to another United States District Court will result in an unfair advantage to Defendant, particularly because, as detailed below, regardless of the venue, the parties agree that Tennessee law applies to Plaintiff’s claims. 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 5 of 11
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

witnesses in this case reside and/or work in Tennessee or just across its border at Fort 

Campbell in Kentucky, including Ms. Rogers, Mr. Gaither, Detectives Eric Ewing and 

Tyler Barrett of the Clarksville, Tennessee Police Department, who investigated the 

incident, medical professionals who treated Eldin Rogers, and other members of the 

United States Army stationed at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. (Doc. 6 at 4-5; Doc. 6-1; 

Doc. 6-2; Doc. 6-3.) Plaintiff contends in his Response that “Defendant admits the 

factual aspects of the incident,” “[n]egating the need for witness testimony in that 

regard.” (Doc. 10 at 1.) Although Defendant admits that Eldin Rogers was injured at the 

time and location identified in the Complaint, Defendant disputes at least some of the 

factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint regarding the events that occurred, including 

whether Sergeant Orazi was acting within the course and scope of his employment. 

(Doc. 7 at 4-5.) The witnesses who can testify to the factual allegations in this case all 

reside in or near the Middle District of Tennessee. And, as Defendant points out, at least 

some of the witnesses who can testify to matters related to alleged damages, including 

medical personnel and Ms. Rogers, are located in or near Tennessee. Plaintiff fails to 

identify any witness who is located in Arizona, other than himself. 

Because the non-party witnesses residing in Tennessee and Kentucky are outside 

the compulsory power of this District Court, if the case were to stay in Arizona, all of 

these witnesses, assuming they would appear at trial, would need to voluntarily travel 

across the country to testify. Defendant also contends that all of the relevant documents 

in the case are located in or near Clarksville, Tennessee. Plaintiff does not dispute this 

contention. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of transfer. See Gomez v. 

Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. CV-09-00181-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1936790, at *2 (D. 

Ariz. July 2, 2009) (“The convenience of witnesses is said to be the most important factor 

in passing on a transfer motion.”) (quoting Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Com’n v. Nat’l 

Football League, 89 F.R.D. 497, 501 (C.D. Cal. 1981)). Further, this factor outweighs 

the convenience of the parties. See Lax v. Toyota Motor Corp., 65 F. Supp. 3d 772, 780 

(N.D. Cal. 2014) (“The convenience of non-party witnesses is the most important 

convenience factor; more important than the convenience of party witnesses”); Shalaby v. 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 6 of 11
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Newell Rubbermaid, Inc., No. C06-07026 MJJ, 2007 WL 3144357, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 

24, 2007) (quoting Saleh v. Titan Corp., 361 F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1160 (S.D. Cal. 2005)) 

(“[W]hile the convenience of party witnesses is a factor to be considered, the 

convenience of non-party witnesses is the more important factor.”). 

c. Location of Relevant Agreements 

The parties have not identified any agreements at issue in or relevant to this case. 

Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of or against transferring this case. 

d. The State That is Most Familiar With the Governing Law 

Both parties assert that Tennessee law applies to this case. (Doc. 1 ¶ 3; Doc. 6 at 

6.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges tort claims against the United States pursuant to 

the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., for injuries caused within a government employee’s 

scope of employment. “The law applicable to determine whether a government 

employee was acting within the scope of employment is ‘the law of the place where the 

act or omission occurred.’” Kasin v. Kent, 457 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2006). Further, 

Tennessee law will govern Defendant’s liability for the tort claims alleged in this action. 

Tekle v. United States, 511 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 2006); (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 34, 43). The United 

States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee would be more familiar with 

Tennessee law, which governs Plaintiff’s claims here, than this Court. Accordingly, this 

factor weighs in favor of transferring this case. 

e. Plaintiff’s Choice of Forum 

This factor weighs slightly against transferring this case. Generally, a plaintiff’s 

choice of forum is entitled to substantial consideration. “However, ‘the degree to which 

courts defer to the plaintiff’s chosen venue is substantially reduced when the plaintiff’s 

choice is not its residence or where the forum lacks a significant connection to the 

activities alleged in the complaint.’” Inherent.com v. Martindale-Hubbell, 420 F. Supp. 

2d 1093, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Carolina Cas. Co. v. Data Broadcasting Corp., 

158 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (emphasis added)); see also Park, 964 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1094. Here, the only connection to Arizona is that it is the state where 

Plaintiff resides. None of the acts complained of in Plaintiff’s Complaint took place in 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 7 of 11
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Arizona. Therefore, this factor weighs only slightly against transfer of this case. 

f. The Parties’ Contacts With the Forum 

This factor weighs slightly in favor of transferring this case. Defendant has 

contacts with the District of Arizona, and Plaintiff resides in Arizona. However, the 

specific military personnel related to this action are located in or near Tennessee. 

Defendant further contends that Plaintiff previously lived in Tennessee with his wife and 

child and has traveled to Tennessee on at least one occasion subsequent to the events at 

issue in this case. Plaintiff does not dispute these contentions in his Response, and 

asserts in his prayer for relief that he has traveled to Tennessee since the incident 

occurred. (Doc. 1 ¶ 50; Doc. 6 at 7-8, Doc. 10.) Therefore, this factor weighs slightly in 

favor of transferring this case. 

g. The Contacts Relating to Plaintiff’s Cause of Action In the Chosen 

Forum 

This factor weighs in favor of transferring this case. There is no dispute that all of 

the incidents giving rise to this litigation occurred in or near the Middle District of 

Tennessee. (Doc. 1 at 2-5; Doc. 6 at 8.) 

h. The Costs of Litigation 

This factor does not weigh in favor of or against transferring this case. 

“Generally, litigation costs are reduced when venue is located near most of the witnesses 

expected to testify or give depositions,” and “[a]lthough developments in electronic 

conveyance have reduced the cost of document transfer somewhat, the cost of litigation 

will be substantially lessened if the action is venued in the same district where most of 

the documentary evidence is found.” See Gomez, 2009 WL 1936790, at *3. Courts also 

consider the financial impact of transfer on the parties in analyzing this factor. See Koval 

v. United States, No. 2:13–cv–1630–HRH, 2013 WL 6385595, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec. 6, 

2013); Airbus DS Optronics GmbH, 2015 WL 3439143, at *5. 

The Defendant argues that it would be more costly to litigate this matter in 

Arizona because all of the witnesses, other than Plaintiff, and the documents reside in the 

Middle District of Tennessee or within 100 miles of the courthouse. (Doc. 6 at 8.) 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 8 of 11
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

Defendant further argues that even if the case remains in Arizona, Plaintiff would need to 

travel to the Middle District of Tennessee to take depositions and, therefore, the costs for 

him would be about the same regardless. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the evidence in 

this case will come from documents and written reports, and “it is common place to 

conduct depositions telephonically.” (Doc. 10 at 1.) If this case were tried in the Middle 

District of Tennessee, Plaintiff would presumably need to incur additional costs to travel 

there for trial. Defendant is likely in a better position to bear any additional financial 

costs of litigating this case in Arizona, than Plaintiff is to bear additional travel costs if 

this case were tried in the Middle District of Tennessee. Balancing the costs associated 

with travel for witnesses and Plaintiff, the Court finds this factor is neutral, and does not 

weigh in favor of or against transfer of this case. 

i. The Availability of Compulsory Process 

This factor weighs in favor of transferring this case. If the case were to remain in 

this District, several of the witnesses located in or near the Middle District of Tennessee 

would be beyond the subpoena power of this Court. See Koval, WL 6385595, at *4 

(noting non-party witnesses were outside of the court’s 100-mile limit for compelling 

attendance of witnesses) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1)(A)). Defendant contends that 

although it can generally compel attendance at trial by its employees, Ms. Rogers, a 

witness to the events, is scheduled to be discharged from the Army and will no longer be 

within Defendant’s control. (Doc. 6 at 9.) As stated above, Defendant also contends that 

other witnesses who will testify are located within the subpoena power of the Middle 

District of Tennessee, including health care professionals who treated Eldin and members 

of the local law enforcement who investigated in the incident. Plaintiff does not dispute 

these contentions. Witnesses may testify through the use of deposition or video 

testimony; however, here, it appears that several likely witnesses are outside the 

subpoena power of this Court. See F.T.C. v. Wright, No. 2:13-CV-2215-HRH, 2014 WL 

1385111, at *4 (D. Ariz. Apr. 9, 2014) (“there are several likely witnesses who reside in 

Utah. These individuals are outside the subpoena power of this court and thus this factor 

‘weigh[s] strongly in favor of transfer.’”) (quoting U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Hire A Helper, 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 9 of 11
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

LLC, No. CV-08-1271-PHX-DGC, 2008 WL 4368663, at *3) (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2008); 

see also Leyvas v. Bezy, Case No. CV 07–1032–PHX–SMM, 2008 WL 2026276, at *4 

(D. Ariz. May 9, 2008)) (“the inability of the Court to compel the attendance of certain 

witnesses would certainly favor transferring the case”)). Accordingly, this factor weighs 

in favor of transferring this case. 

j. The Ease of Access to Sources of Proof 

This factor weighs in favor of transfer. There is no dispute that the almost all of 

the witnesses and documents relevant to this case are all located in or near the Middle 

District of Tennessee, and all of the complained of conduct took place there. See Patent

Mgmt. Found., LLC v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. C 10-03630 SBA, 2011 WL 197831, at 

*4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2011) (transferring case where virtually all of the third-party 

witnesses and documents are located in the transferee district); Hunter v. Mozil, No. C 

08-4213 PJH, 2008 WL 5130453, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2008) (transferring case to 

Texas where other than plaintiff and possibly one other witness, “any witnesses [were] 

likely to be located in Texas, as [was] the physical and documentary evidence.”). 

k. Localized Interest 

Finally, Defendant contends that transfer of this case is also appropriate because 

Tennessee has a localized interest in having this case decided in the Middle District of 

Tennessee. Plaintiff does not address this argument. (Doc. 6 at 10-11.) At least some 

courts have also considered localized interests in ruling on a motion to transfer. See 

Koval, 2013 WL 6385595, at *2 (citing Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 

805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Court finds that Tennessee has some local 

interest in litigation involving local law enforcement and employees at a military base 

near Tennessee. However, the military base in question is a federal military base. 

Therefore, the Court finds this factor weighs only slightly in favor of transfer. 

l. Conclusion 

Balancing the above factors, the Court concludes that transferring this case to the 

Middle District of Tennessee is appropriate. There is no dispute that all of the 

complained of conduct occurred in or near that District. Likewise, most, if not all, of the 

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 10 of 11
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

witnesses, other than Plaintiff, and the documentation relevant to the incidents alleged in 

the Complaint are located in or near the same location. Although Plaintiff’s choice of 

forum should be given deference, in light of the location of the witnesses and relevant 

documents, the applicability of Tennessee law to Plaintiff’s claims, the limits on the 

compulsory power of this Court, and the local interest in litigating this case in Tennessee, 

the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion to Transfer this case to the United States District 

Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in Nashville, Tennessee. 

Accordingly, 

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Transfer (Doc. 6) is granted. 

 Dated this 10th day of December, 2015. 

Honorable John Z. Boyle

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 3:15-cv-08143-JZB Document 12 Filed 12/10/15 Page 11 of 11