Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03239/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03239-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard J. Asten
Appellant
City of Kansas City, Kansas
Not Party
Aaron Elmore Jr.
Not Party
Carolyn Elmore
Appellee
The Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department
Not Party

Document Text:

,. . 

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Uoited States Court of .Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 2 4 1990 

&OBERT L. l-IOECKER 

CAROLYN ELMORE and AARON ) Clerk 

ELMORE, JR., ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

RICHARD J. ASTEN, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant, ) 

) 

& ) 

) 

CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, ) 

and THE KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, ) 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, ) 

) 

Defendants. ) 

No. 89-3239 

(D.C. No. 88-2605-0) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.** 

Defendant-appellant, Richard Asten, is a police officer with 

the Kansas City, Kansas, police department. Plaintiffs-appellees, 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 1 
Aaron and Carolyn Elmore, instituted suit in the Kansas federal 

district court against Asten under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, 

among other things, his use of excessive force in connection with 

their arrest on November 1, 1987. The district court denied 

Asten's motion for summary judgment holding that factual disputes 

between the parties as to what really happened on that date made 

the issue of Asten's purportedly excessive force one for the jury. 

Asten appeals. 

We have reviewed the district court record as well as the 

parties briefs, and conclude that the district court properly 

denied Asten's motion for summary judgment due to the presence of 

factual issues. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 

judgment substantially for the reasons set forth in its memorandum 

and order, a copy of which is attached hereto. 1 

AFFIRMED and REMANDED. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

1 At pages twelve through fifteen of its order, the district 

court analyzed the excessive force claims under a substantive due 

process standard in accordance with our decision in Hewitt v. City 

of Truth or Consequences, 758 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 

474 U.S. 844 (1985). In Graham v. Connor, 109 s. Ct. 1865 (1989), 

however, the Supreme Court held that excessive force claims are to 

be analyzed under the objective reasonableness standard of the 

fourth amendment. Although we do not believe this change in the 

law affects the presence of triable factual issues in this case, 

the district court should be aware of this development in 

instructing the jury. 

-2-

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 2 
. ~ 

om .. ·--"'-

FILED 

U.S. DISTRICT COU T 

Dier!'.\• .. .. • '-'• , ·, : . i : I~ t' ~ ' I (" • s . . .. ,, ~v,· 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Aue O 2 3o f 11 , 8 

CAROLYN ELMORE and 

AARON ELMORE, JR. , -

v. 

CITY OF KANSAS CITY, 

KANSAS, et al., 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

) 

) 

Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

) CIVIL ACTION 

) 

) NO. 88-2605-0 

-------------------------> 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the summary judgment 

motion1 of the defendants the City of Kansas City, Kansas (City) , the 

Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department (Department), and Richard J. 

Asten (Asten). The plaintiffs Carolyn Elmore (Carolyn) and Aaron 

Elmore Jr. (Aaron) brought this action in connection with their 

arrests, alleging causes of action under 42 u.s.c. §§ 1981, 1983, 

and 1985, and common law claims of assault and false arrest. 

When considering a motion for summary judgment, we must 

examine all evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing 

party. Prochaska v, Marcoux, 632 F.2d 848, 850 (10th cir. 19ao), 

The defendants filed their motion, the plaintiffs 

responded, and the defendants replied. Later, the defendants filed 

a motion to amend their reply to include discussion of a case 

published in 1977. The plaintiffs then responded to the initial 

reply, and the defendants moved to strike this second response. The 

plaintiffs then responded to the defendants• motion to strike the 

plaintiffs' second response to the swnmary judgment motion. Based 

on D.Kan. Rule 206, we decline to consider either the defendants• 

amended reply or the plaintiffs' second response. Therefore, we 

will deny the d,tendanta• motion to amend their reply, and we will 

grant the defendants' motion to strike the plaintiffs' response to 

the defendants• initial reply. 

S1 

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 3 
... '"' . 

..____,. 

0~--

..\ 

I 

cert, denied, 451 u.s. 984 (1981). If the moving party bears the 

burden of proof at trial, he must show, through pleadings, 

depositions, answers to interrogatories, admission~ on file, and 

I 

affidavits, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 

he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ~ Fed. R. civ. P. 

56(c). If the moving party does not bear the burden of proof, he 

must show "that there is an absence of evidence to support the 

nonmoving party's case." Celotex corp, y, Catrett, 477 u.s. 317, 

325 (1986). This burden is met when the moving party identifies 

those portions of the record demonstrating an absence of a genuine 

issue of material fact. l.d.&. at 323. 

If the moving party meets his requirement, the burden 

shifts to the nonmoving party, who "must set .forth specifj,c facts 

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. " Anderson y, 

Liberty Lobby. Inc,, 477 u.s. 242, 256 (1986) (emphasis added). The 

trial judge then determines whether a trial is needed -- "whether, 

in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly 

can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably 

be resolved in favor of either party." l9.a. 

- 2 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 4 
AOnA 

·--·· .......... 

-, 

i 

I 

The pertinent facts are as follows:• In the early morning 

on November 1, 1987, the Elmores had an argument. Carolyn drove 

into an underground parking lot under the Kansas City, Kansas City 

Hall in an attempt to avoid Aaron. He followed her, parked and 

exited his automobile, and resumed arguing. Officer Sophia Barajas 

(Barajas) approached the Elmores and asked if there was a problem. 

Carolyn said she did not want to talk to or be followed by her 

husband, and Officer Barajas ordered Aaron away from the vehicle. 

Carolyn drove from the underground lot to another parking 

lot, and Aaron followed her and parked his vehicle so that Carolyn 

could not drive away. Officer Barajas called for a back-up unit, 

and she followed the Elmores to the second parking lot; she and 

Officer Richard Asten arrived at the lot at about the same time. 

Aaron was outside Carolyn's car. In his statement during a police 

internal affairs . investigation, Aaron stated that "we were just 

arguing and I was getting kind of loud, you know." In his 

statement, Officer Asten said that he could hear a man screaming and 

a woman crying as he approached the lot. Officer Barajas said in 

her statement that Aaron was shouting and Carolyn "was crying really 

I The defendants have moved to strike portions of the 

affidavit of Carolyn Elmore, contending that the affidavit attempts 

to create a shaa factual issue. ~ Franks y, Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 

1237 (10th Cir. 1986), Based on the factors enumerated in Franks, 

we are unconvinced that the affidavit attempts to create a sham 

issue. Thus, we will deny the defendants I motion to strike. 

However, we note that portions of the affidavit directly contradict 

various witnesses' statements, including Aaron's statement, made 

during the internal affairs investigation which took place shortly after this incident. 

- 3 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 5 
\ 

'----· bad. 11 In an affidavit dated .June 26, 1989, the day before the 

plaintiffs filed their response to the defendants• summary judgment 

motion, Carolyn stated that "[d]uring the time Aaron was outside my 

vehicle he was merely talking to me. He was not arguing loudly." 

Officers Barajas and Asten ordered Aaron to back away from 

his wife's vehicle, and he complied. Officer Asten approached 

Aaron, who said to his wife, "For every time he hits me with that 

stick, I •m going to hit you twice." Carolyn then asked the officers 

not to harm her husband. Officer Asten advised Aaron that he was 

under arrest for disorderly conduct, and he continued to approach 

Aaron. The events that followed are disputed. Officer Asten's 

statement indicates that Aaron raised his hand, and that Officer 

Asten then slapped him twice. Aaron's statement and Carolyn's 

affidavit indicate that Aaron's hands remained at his sides, and 

that Officer Asten nonetheless struck Aaron with his fist four 

times. Aaron's statement also indicates that after striking him, 

Officer Asten said, "You don't like that, do you?" Aaron required 

no medical or dental treatment for his jaw, but he did take Tylenol 

to relieve the pain. 

Officer Asten placed Aaron in his (Officer Asten's) 

vehicle and began questioning him. Officer Barajas told Carolyn 

that she could leave; however, Aaron's automobile was blocking her 

exit. Officer Barajas asked Carolyn to move Aaron's vehicle, but 

because she was upset and inexperienced with a manual transmission, 

- 4 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 6 
, . ~ 

. J 

..... 

' ' 

Carolyn failed. Officer Asten then allowed Aaron to move the 

vehicle, after which Aaron returned to the squad car. 

Officer Barajas then asked Carolyn whether she wished to 

press charges against her husband, and Carolyn declined. Pursuant 

to Department policy, and because the officers suspected domestic 

.violence, ·Officer Barajas asked Carolyn to identify herself. 

Carolyn refused. Officer Barajas informed Officer Asten, who 

approached Carolyn's vehicle and asked her for her driver's license. 

The subsequent events are disputed. The statements of Officers 

Asten and Barajas indicate that because Aaron was calmly sitting in 

the squad car, Officer Asten began to question whether Carolyn was 

the instigator of the disturbance. Further, Officers Asten and 

Barajas could smell alcohol on Carolyn's breath. When Officer Asten 

asked for her license, Carolyn asked him why he needed it. Officer 

Asten replied that she was operating a motor vehicle, and he needed 

to see her license. Carolyn replied, "Get the fuck away." After 

she continued to refuse to provide her license, Officer Asten 

advised Carolyn that she was under-arrest for disorderly conduct and 

obstructing an officer. Officer Asten attempted to open the door, 

but it was locked; he and Officer Barajas reached inside and 

unlocked the door while Carolyn attempted to roll up the window and 

scratched the officers. Officer As ten then opened the door. 

Carolyn's vehicle was slowly rolling backwards toward a squad car 

as Officer Asten attempted to coax her out. Fearing an accident, 

Officer Asten pulled Carolyn from the vehicle, jumped inside, and 

- 5 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 7 
' • 

)72A 

..... ~ 

'. 

stopped it. During this activity, Carolyn fell to the ground. She 

was then taken into custody. 

Aaron's statement and Carolyn's statement and affidavit 

tell a different story. Carolyn had not been drinking that night. 

After Carolyn said that she did not want to press charges, Officer 

Asten approached Carolyn's vehicle and asked for her driver's 

license. She said that she had rights and she wanted to know why 

he wanted her license. Officer Asten replied, "I don't have to give 

you a God-damned reason, just give me the license • ." He and Officer 

Barajas then reached into the car and struggled with Carolyn in an 

attempt to unlock and open the door. During this struggle, the 

window, lock system, and electric seat control received damages 

totalling $100. Eventually, the door was opened, and Officer Asten 

grabbed Carolyn and "body-slammed" her to the ground. Carolyn's 

automobile then began to roll backwards, and Officer Asten jumped 

in and stopped it. Carolyn got up and was crying when Officer Asten 

grabbed her, threw her against the vehicle, and handcuffed her. 

Officer Mike Vega then took charge of Carolyn. In his 

statement, Officer Vega said that Carolyn was not thrown to the 

ground, and that although he could not smell alcohol on her breath, 

he believed that she was intoxicated. 

Carolyn was charged with resisting arrest, disorderly 

conduct, and obstructing an officer. Aaron was charged with 

resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. Because of Officer Asten' s 

beliefs that (1) Carolyn was intoxicated and could not drive safely, 

- 6 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 8 
--------===================================================================== 

, . . 

• 

om 

a.ia,\ 

' : 

! " l 

and (2) domestic abuse may have played a part in the disturbance, 

Carolyn and Aaron were both placed in four-hour holds. They were 

booked at 3:00 a.m. and released to the custody of a relative at 

4:00 a.m. At a trial, Carolyn was found guilty of obstructing an 

officer and not guilty of disorderly conduct and resisting arrest; 

Aaron was found guilty of disorderly conduct and not guilty of 

resisting arrest. 

The Elmores made a complaint to the Department's internal 

affairs division. Pursuant to the ensuing investigation, the 

Elmores and Officers Asten, Barajas, and Vega made and signed 

statements. Following the investigation, the division determined 

that no Department rules or regulations had been violated by the 

officers. 

The Elmores filed this action against the city, the 

department, and Officer Asten, seeking a total of $8,500,000 in 

damages. Count 1, which deals with Carolyn, mentions 42 u.s.c. §§ 

1981, 1983, and 1985, and seeks $500,000 in actual damages and 

$1,000,000 in punitive damages. Count 2 alleges assault against 

Carolyn and seeks $1,500,000. Count 3 claims a violation of Aaron I s 

rights under section 1983 and seeks $500,000 in actual damages and 

$1, ooo, 000 in punitive damages. Count 4 claims that Aaron was 

arrested without probable cause and that unreasonable and excessive 

force were used, thereby violating the fourth and fourteenth 

amendments; this count seeks $500,000 in actual damages and 

$1,000,000 in punitive damages. Count 5 alleges assault against 

- 7 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 9 
·' 

.. 

Aaron and seeks $1,500,000. Count 6 alleges that Aaron was falsely 

arrested and imprisoned, and seeks $1,000,000. · The defendants seek 

summary judgment on all counts. 

I. The section 19a3 claims, 

The Elmores each make claims against Officer Asten, the 

department, and the city under 42 u.s.c. § 1983, which provides as 

follows: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 

of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunitie~ secured by the 

Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to 

the party injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

• • • 

A. Officer Asten, 

The defendant Officer Asten seeks summary judgment as to 

the Elmore's section 1983 claims regarding the officer's decision 

to arrest, asserting that he is entitled to qualified immunity. 1 We 

have previously set forth the standards for qualified immunity: 

The doctrine of qualified immunity was 

described in Harlow y, Fitzgerald, 457 u.s. 800, 

102 s.ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), where the 

Supreme Court stated "that government officials 

performing discretionary functions, generally 

are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 

I Frankly, the court has had difficulty determining the 

exact nature of the Elmores' claims and both sides' arguments 

regarding the summary judgment motion, as neither the plaintiffs nor 

the defendants have stated their positions with any real clarity. 

- 8 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 10 
-,. : 

\ 

; 

• j ' I 

' 

clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have 

known.• 1Q... at 818, 102 s.ct. at 2738. 

Formerly, the qualified immunity test had both 

an objective aspect and a subjective aspect. 

~, LS.a., wood v, Strickland, 420 u.s. 308, 

3 2 2 , 9 5 S • Ct. 9 9 2 , 10 0 0 , 4 3 L. Ed. 2 d 214 , uh.a_ 

denied, 421 u.s. 921, 95 s.ct. 1589, 43 L.Ed.2d 

790 (1975). An official was entitled to 

qualified immunity unless he knew or reasonably should have known his actions violated a 

plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights, 

or he acted with malicious intention to deprive 

a plaintiff of his rights. .IsL. Harlow 

eliminated the subjective aspect of the 

qualified immunity test so that more claims 

could be resolved on summary judgment motions. ~ Mcsurely v, Mcclellan, 697 F.2d 309, 316 

(D.C. Cir. 1982). Thus, the qualified immunity 

test became compatible with the Court's goal of 

dispensing with insubstantial claims prior to 

trial. Harlow, 457 u.s. at 816-18, 102 s.ct. 

at 2737-38; TM Alfil2 Butz v, Economou, 438 u.s. 

478, 98 s.ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). 

The functional details of qualified immunity are as follows: Qualified immunity is 

an affirmative defense which must be pleaded by 

the defendant. Harlow, 457 u.s. at 815, 102 

s.ct. at 2736. The burden then shifts to the 

plaintiff, who must convince the court that the 

law proscribing the defendant's conduct was 

clearly established at the time the defendant 

allegedly deprived the plaintiff of his 

constitutional or statutory rights. Lutz y. weld county school District No,§, 784 F.2d 340, 

342-43 (10th Cir. 1986). Whether the law was 

clearly established is a matter of law to be 

resolved by the court. ~ at 343. "[T]he 

court must focus on the specific nature of the 

conduct complained ot and the state of the law 

with respect to the identified conduct at the 

time the official acted." Myers y. Morris, 810 

F.2d 1437, 1459 n. 16 (8th Cir. 1987); ~ Al..§..2 

Anderson Y, Creighton, -- u.s. --, --, 101 s.ct. 

3034~ 3040, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 532 (1987). 

If the plaintiff fails to convince the 

court that the law was clearly established, the 

defendant is entitled to qualified immunity and 

judgment must be entered in his favor. Burk y, 

- 9 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 11 
'. \ 

unified school District No, 329, 646 F.supp. 1557 (D. Kan. 1986). However, if the .plaintiff convinces the court that the law was clearly established, the court then determines whether 

the defendant has raised a factual issue as to 

whether there existed "exceptional circumstances" such that a reasonable person in 

the defendant's position would be unaware of the 

relevant legal standard. 14....; .&ill lil.Q l.!.lll. at 

343. If the defendant has raised a ·factual 

issue as to exceptional circumstances, the factfinder determines whether a reasonable person 

would be unaware of the legal standard. If so, 

the defendant is qualifiedly immune and the 

fact-finder does not reach the issue of whether 

the defendant's acts were a constitutional 

violation. If not, or if no factual issue as 

to exceptional circumstances is raised by the 

defendant, the fact-finder deliberates as to 

whether the defendant's acts violated the 

plaintiff's constitutional or statutory rights. 

staneart v, Board of Trustees of Ransom Memorial Hospital, 684 

F.Supp. 1573, 1575-76. 

The defendant Officer Asten has asserted the defense of 

qualified immunity; thus, the burden shifts to the Elmores, who must 

convince the court that clearly established law proscribed Officer 

Asten•s conduct. 

First, the Elmore Is assert that "the duty to arrest is 

ministerial and not discretionary. 11 The . court assumes that this 

assertion is an attempt on the Elmores• part to demonstrate that 

clearly established law prohibited Officer Asten•s conduct. As 

such, it fails. We decline to accept the blanket assertion that all 

arrests are non-discretionary and therefore carried out under 

clearly established law. 

- 10 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 12 
. ~. 

. . ' 

72A 

. . 

\ . ) 

Second, the Elmores assert that under clearly established 

law, th.ere was no probable cause for their arrests. "Probable cause 

exists if the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's 

knowledge ••• are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of 

reasonable caution. to believe than an offense has been or is being 

committed." state y, Abu-Isba, 235 Kan. 851, , 685 P.2d 856, --

(1~84). 

As to Carolyn, we note that under K.S.A. 8-244, an 

operator of a motor vehicle "shall display [her driver's license] 

upon demand ••• of any police officer." Further, K.S.A. 21-3808 

is violated when "an identified officer was discharging his duty, 

and defendant knowingly and willfully obstructed 'that officer in 

the performance of that duty. 111 state y. Lee. 242 Kan. 38, 42, 

P.2d --, -- (1987) (quoting state y. Parker, 236 Kan. 353, 365, 690 

P.2d 1353, -- (1984)). Under the uncontroverted facts, Carolyn (1) 

did not provide Officer Asten with her driver's license upon demand, 

(2) refused to exit her car, and (3) attempted to keep the officers 

from opening her car door. In light of these actions and the law 

discussed above, we find that the law was not clearly established 

that Officer Asten had no probable cause to arrest Carolyn; thus, 

he is entitled to qualified immunity on Carloyn•s section 1983 claim 

as it pertains to Officer Asten•s decision to arrest. 

As to Aaron, the City's ordinances and K.S.A. 21-4101 

proscribe disorderly conduct: 

Disorderly conduct is, with knowledge or 

probable cause to believe that such acts will 

- 11 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 13 
' • 

'-- "· 

072A 

lev. 8182) 

. 

.. \ 

alarm, anger or disturb others or provoke an 

assault or other breach of the peace: 

* * * 

(c) Using offensive, obscene, or abusive 

language or engaging in noisy conduct tending reasonably to arouse alarm, anger or resentment 

in others. 

K.S.A. 21-4101. Moreover, the City's ordinances and K.S.A. 21-3408 

proscribe assault, which "is an intentional threat or attempt to do 

bodily harm to another coupled with apparent ability and resulting 

in immediate apprehension of bodily harm." The facts are 

uncontested that Aaron and Carolyn were arguing in the parking lots. 

All of the _witnesses except Carolyn in her late-dated affidavit 

state that the argument was loud. Further, it is uncontroverted 

that Aaron threatened to hit Carolyn twice for each time he was hit. 

Given these facts and the law, it was not clearly established that 

Officer Asten had no probable cause to arrest Aaron; thus, we will 

grant Officer Asten•s motion as to the portion of Aaron's section 

1983 claim dealing with his arrest. 

Officer Asten also seeks summary judgment on the Elmores' 

section 1983 claims of excessive force.' Although his supporting 

memorandum makes some reference to Anderson y. Creighton and 

qualified immunity, we believe that Officer Asten•s basic argument 

' The exact nature of the Elmores• section 1983 claims is 

not clearly delineated. We assume that the Elmores are claiming 

that Officer Asten•s use of allegedly excessive force infringed on 

the substantive aspects of their rights to liberty. ~ Hewitt y, 

city of Truth or consequences, 758 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 c1oth cir. 

1985), cert. denied, 474 u.s. 844; TM .AlJiQ Damm v, sparklnan. 609 

F.Supp. 749, 752-54 (D. Kan. 1985). 

- 12 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 14 
) 

\ •.· 

regarding the excessive force claims is that his conduct does not 

rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 

The Tenth Circuit has addressed the issue of a section 

1983 claim arising from use of force by the police: 

Not ai1· force used by the police rises to a 

constitutional violation. But the use of 

excessive force on a pretrial detainee deprives the victim of life or liberty without due 

process in violation of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Factors relevant to whether the use 

of force is excessive are the relationship 

between the amount of force used and the need 

presented, the extent of the injury inflicted, 

and the motives of the state officer. Force 

inspired by unwise, excessive zeal amounting to 

an abuse of official power that shocks the 

conscience, or by malice rather than mere 

carelessness, may be redressed under section 

1983. 

Hewitt Y, city of Truth or consequences. 758 F.2d 1375, 1379 c1oth 

Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 474 u.s. 844. The 

Hewitt court went on to state that it need not determine "how 

egregious" police conduct must be to amount to a denial of 

substantive due process, as Hewitt merely involved police 

negligence. ~ .i9.,_ 

However, other Tenth Circuit cases shed light on whether 

the alleged conduct in the instant action rises to the level of a 

section 1983 violation. In Trujillo y, Goodman~ 825 F. 2d 1453 ( 10th 

Cir. 1987), the court restated the relevant factors as set forth in 

Hewitt, and added that the inquiry· as to whether force is excessive 

such that it may be redressed under section 1983 ."is a factual one, 

depending for its resolution on the totality of the circumstances 

- 13 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 15 
.. ) 

72A 

v. 8l82l 

'\ 

j 

presented, and is one properly reserved, in most instances, for the 

jury." Trujillo, 825 F.2d at 1458-59. In · Lusby Y, T,G, & Y, 

stores. Inc,, 749 F.2d 1423 (10th cir. 1984), the circuit court 

stated as follows: 

We have no problems with Alvin Lusby' s 

claims against Wertz and Dunegan based on Wertz ' 

conduct while transporting Alvin to jail. A 

police officer's use of excessive force is 

actionable under § 1983 as a constitutional 

violation. Garrick y. city of Denyer, 652 F.2d 

969, 972 ( 10th Cir. 1981) ; Jill Al.§,Q, 

Shillingford v, Holmes, 634 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1981) • The plaintiffs presented ample evidence that Wertz struck Alvin on the face 

without cause while he was handcuffed outside 

the Lawton police station and then shoved Alvin 

head first into a wall on the way into the 

station. From this evidence the jury could have 

concluded that Wertz used excessive force 

against Alvin. 

Lusby. 749 F.2d at 1433. similarly, in Meade v, Grubbs. 841 F.2d 

1512 (10th Cir. 1988), the Tenth Circuit held that the plaintiff's 

section 1983 claim of excessive force should not be dismissed where 

the plaintiff alleged that the defendants hit, kicked, and choked 

him. ~ isL. at 1527. 

Based on these cases, we are of the opinion that summary 

judgment is unwarranted on the Elmores' claims of excessive force 

in violation of section 1983. When the facts are viewed in the 

light most favorable to the Elmores, Officer Asten hit Aaron in the 

face four times with a -closed fist despite the fact that Aaron did 

not provoke or resist Officer As ten in any manner. Further, Officer 

Asten violently threw Carolyn to the pavement and then slammed her 

against a vehicle and handcuffed her. Based on the circumstances, 

- 14 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 16 
... . . \ 

'--· 

A072A __ _ 

. 

i 

Officer Asten•s actions may have constituted excessive force, which 

is actionable under section 1983. ~ Lusby, 749 F.2d at 1433; 12.Y.t 

TM Damm y. Sparkman, 609 F.Supp. 749, 751, 754-55 (D. Kan. 1985) 

(where the district court held that a plainti~f who was hit in the 

face six to eight. times by a police officer who had stated, "We'll 

have to show you •••• ," did not have a cause of action under 

section 1983 because the "conduct [was] not an abuse of power that 

shocks the conscience of th[e] Court" and "was not so egregious as 

to constitute an abuse of power condemned by the Constitution"). 

In sum, whether excessive force was used in violation of section 

1983 is a question of fact for a jury to resolve. 

B. The Department and the city. 

Next, we address the liability of the Department and the 

City for the Elmores' sect,ion 1983 claims. Under the holding of 

Monell v, New York city Department of social services, 436 u.s. 658 

(1978), .a municipality cannot be held liable for violations of 

section 1983 under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 1£.a. at 694. 

Rather, a municipality incurs liability only when "the action that 

is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy 

statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 

promulgated by that body's off ice rs," 14.a. at 690, or when the 

constitutional deprivations are the result of a "governmental 

•custom• even th~ugh such a custom has not received formal approval 

through the body's official decisionmaking channels." l!L. at 690-

- 15 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 17 
' I 

,072A 

~ \I. 8182\ 

'· 

91. Additionally, proof of a single incident of unconstitutional 

activity is insufficient to establish liability under Monell. ~ 

of Oklahoma city y, Tuttle, 471 u.s. 808, 824 (1985). According to 

the Supreme Court, "considerably more proof than the single incident 

will be necessary in . every case to establish both the requisite 

fault on the part of the municipality, and the causal connection 

between the •policy• and the constitutional deprivation." 1£L. 

(footnotes omitted). 

The Elmores contend that the Department and the City have 

a policy of destroying records of complaints against police 

officers, and .that this policy interferes with the ability of 

citizens to seek redress. They further contend that the Department 

and the City have wrongly failed to implement a policy giving 

citizens a role in reviewing complaints against police officers. 

Additionally, they contend that the Department and the City have an 

informal policy not to discipline police officers. For support, 

they allude to two cases in which officers were not disciplined 

after reports were filed by citizens. 

Initially, we note that the Elmores have fallen short of 

the requirements of Anderson y, Liberty Lobby. Inc,, 477 u.s. 242, 

256 (1986). Other than the vague and unsupported mention of two 

cases where officers were not disciplined, the Elmores have set 

forth no evidence showing a Department or City policy of arresting 

persons without probable cause and through the use of excessive 

force. Further, nothing indicates that the practice of destroying 

- 16 -

•'Y 

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 18 
.. · ~. 

,._ A072A .... 

,· 

records after a certain period of years is for wrongful motives; 

rather, it seems likely that the practice is implemented for 

practical reasons (such as simplification of record-keeping tasks 

and elimination of out-dated files) • In any event, the Elmores have 

failed to meet their burden of producing specific evidence showing 

a practice actionable under section 1983. Additionally, the Elmores 

have provided no legal support for their theory that the absence of 

citizen review of complaints against police officers is actionable 

under section 1983. In short, nothing indicates a Department or 

City policy or practice of arresting persons without probable cause 

and through the use of excessive force, or even a policy or practice 

of failing to discipline officers who arrest without probable cause 

or use excessive force. · Thus, we will enter summary judgment for 

the City and the Department on the Elmore's section 1983 claims. 

II. · The Fifth and sixth Amendment claims, 

The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the 

Elmores' fifth and sixth amendment claims. The defendants• motion 

is somewhat perplexing because the Elmores' complaint does not 

specifically refer to the fifth or the sixth amendments. In fact, 

the proper manner in which to assert such claims would be under 

section 1983, but the Elmores do not refer to either amendment in 

their section 1983 claims. In any event, we will briefly address 

the parties• arguments on the fifth and sixth amendments. 

- 17 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 19 
. .. . ' 

·.i 

The defendants assert that they are entitled to summary 

judgment if the arrests were based on probable cause. The Elmores• 

response is rather puzzling. As to the fifth amendment claims, they 

state: 

The Supreme Court of the United States has 

held that the right of privacy is a fundamental 

right guaranteed by the United States 

constitution. Griswold y. Connecticut, 381, 

U.S. 479, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 85 s.ct. 1678. The 

court [sic] found the right to privacy in the 

penumbras and enamations [sic] of the First, 

Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth 

amendments. The right of personal privacy has 

been held to be the "right to be let alone." 

Katz Y, U.S. [sic], 389 U.S. 347, 19 L.Ed.2d 

576, 88 s.ct. 507. The plaintiffs (sic] right 

[sic] under the Fifth Amendment were violated 

when the defendant unlawfully arrested, 

assaulted and prosecuted them. The plaintiffs 

clearly had a right to be left alone. 

As to the sixth amendment claims, the Elmores state as follows: 

Plaintiff (sic] rights under the 6th Amendment 

were violated when the officers charged 

plaintiff Carolyn Elmore with resisting arrest, 

obstruction and disorderly conduct and charged plaintiff Aaron Elmore with disorderly conduct 

and resisting arrest. The facts show that 

plaintiffs were charged with the offenses as a 

pretext to the interference of their 

constitutional rights. There was no probable 

cause to arrest. The plaintiffs were not 

informed of the true nature and cause of the 

accusations. 

The Elmore&' complaint seeks no redress under the 

Constitution apart from the claims under Title 42. However, to be 

certain that the parties are not confused as to the scope of the 

issues which will . be addressed at trial, we will grant the 

defendants• summary judgment motion as to the Elmores• fifth and 

- 18 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 20 
,. . .. ' I 

' 

sixth amendment claims. The fifth amendment claim, as characterized 

in the Elmores• memorandum opposing summary judgment, is nothing 

short of absurd. Further, no evidence indicates that the Elmores 

were not informed of the charges against them. 

III. The section 19a1 claims, 

The complaint mentions section 1981 only in count 1, which 

concerns Carolyn. However, in their memoranda regarding the summary 

judgment motion, the parties appear to assume that both Aaron and 

Carolyn have made claims under section 1981. For purposes of this 

motion, we will assume that to be the case. 

Section 1981 states as follows: 

All persons within the jurisdiction of the 

United States shall have the same right in every 

State and Territory to make and enforce 

contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 

and to the full and equal benefit of all laws 

and proceedings for the security of persons and 

property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and 

shall be subject to like punishment, pains, 

penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of 

every kind, and to no other. 

42 u.s.c. § 1981. 

To succeed on their section 1981 claims, the Elmores must 

prove that the defendants• actions were motivated by intentional 

discrimination. ~ Washington y. Simpson, 806 F.2d 192, 197 (8th 

cir. 1986) (citing General Building contractors Association v, 

Pennsylvania, 458 u.S.375, 391 (1982)). The Elmores assert that 

there was intentional discrimination because (1) the Elmores are 

black, whereas the officers are not, (2) Officer Asten swore at 

- 19 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 21 
' 

-----

\.__ , 

. . 

Carolyn and used excessive force, and (3) after striking Aaron, 

Officer Asten stated, "You don't like that, do you?" The Elmores 

conclude with the statement that "[a]lthough plaintiff has no direct 

evidence of racial ane_mus [sic], it can be inferred from defendant 

Asten•s conduct that the unlawful arrest and attack of plaintiffs 

was done for a discriminatory reason." Again, the Elmores have 

fallen short of the requirements of Anderson y, Liberty Lobby, Inc, 

They may not simply assert that there was purposeful discrimination; 

they must set forth specific facts indicating discrimination. The 

facts that the Elmores and the officers were o~ different races, 

excessive force was allegedly used, and Officer Asten' s alleged 

statement to Aaron do not indicate racial motivation. Therefore, 

we will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the 

Elmores• section 1981 claims. 

IV. The common Law Assault claims, 

The Elmores' seek damages against Officer Asten for 

assault under Kansas common law. Officer Asten asserts that he is 

entitled to qualified immunity, arguing that "if the court finds 

that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity under the 

plaintiffs' allegations under 1983, then they should be entitled to 

the same immunity on the plaintiffs' state law claims alleging 

excessive force." As discussed above, qualified immunity does not 

shelter Officer Asten from possible liability as to the Elmores' 

- 20 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 22 
. . I .. . 

'---..,· 

claims of excessive force. Thus, Officer Asten•s motion for summary 

judgment on the Elmores• assault claims is denied. 

v. The section 1985 claims, 

As with. the section 1981 claims, the Elmores I complaint 

refers to section 1985 only in count 1, which pertains to Carolyn; 

however, in their memoranda regarding summary judgment both sides 

assume that Aaron and Carolyn each make section 1985 claims. In 

this order, we will make the same assumption. 

Section 1985 states as follows: 

(3) If two or more persons in any State or 

Territory conspire • • • for the purpose of 

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 

person or class of persons of the equal 

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws .•. , [and] if 

one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause 

to be done, any act in furtherance of the object 

of such conspiracy, whereby anpther is injured 

in his person or property, or deprived of having 

and exercising any right or privilege of a 

citizen of the United States, the party so 

injured or deprived may have an action for the 

recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury 

or deprivation, against any one or more of the 

conspirators. 

42 u.s.c. § 1985. In essence, section 1985 prohibits racially based 

conspiracies to deny an individual his civil rights. In the instant 

action, as discussed above, the Elmores• have failed to sufficiently 

establish that the defendants (particularly Officer Asten) were 

motivated by racial animus. Thus, their section 1985 claim fails. 

VI. summary, 

- 21 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 23 
.. -, --\ . 

In summary, we will grant the defendants I motion for 

summary judgment on (1) the Elmores I section 19.83 claims pertaining 

to their arrest, (2) the Elmores• fifth and sixth amendment claims 

(other than any claims of excessive force under section 1983, which 

may incorporate notions of the fifth amendment), (3) the Elmores' 

section 1981 claims, and (4) the Elmores• section 1985 claims. We 

will deny the defendants• motion as to (1) the Elmores• section 1983 

claims pertaining to the use of excessive force, and (2) the 

Elmores• assault claims. Thus, the only matter remaining is the 

issue of whether Officer Asten used excessive force. Accordingly, 

Aaron and Carolyn each may maintain claims against officer Asten 

under section 1983 and state common law regarding the amount of 

force used. From this date forward, the parties should focus solely 

on that issue. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the summary judgment motion 

of the defendant City is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment motion of 

the defendant Department is granted. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the summary judgment motion of 

the defendant Officer Asten is granted in part. Summary judgment 

shall be entered for Officer Asten on the Elmores• (1) section 1983 

claims based on wrongful arrest, (2) fifth and sixth amendment 

claims, (3) section 1981 claims, and (4) section 1985 claims. 

- 22 -

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 24 
• . • . .... .. , 

' \ 

• '· 

d.. 

Dated this /~~-· day of August, 1989, at Kansas City, 

- Kansas. 

~E. O'CONNOR, Chief Judge 

- 23 - . 

072A 

Appellate Case: 89-3239 Document: 01019972045 Date Filed: 04/24/1990 Page: 25