Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02381/USCOURTS-cand-4_10-cv-02381-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Holli Beam-Black
Plaintiff
Gary Black
Plaintiff
Cal Bay Construction
Plaintiff
Castle Roofing
Plaintiff
Google Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY BLACK and HOLLI BEAM-BLACK, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant. /

No. 10-02381 CW

ORDER GRANTING

DEFENDANT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS

AND DENYING AS

MOOT PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION FOR

JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

(Docket Nos. 10

and 15)

Plaintiffs Gary Black and Holli Beam-Black, who are proceeding

pro se, plead several claims against Defendant Google Inc. related

to an anonymous “online comment” on Defendant’s website. Defendant

moves to dismiss their claims. Plaintiffs oppose Defendant’s

motion and move for judgment on the pleadings. The motions were

taken under submission on the papers. Having considered the papers

submitted by the parties, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to

dismiss and DENIES as moot Plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, who are husband and wife, allege that they are

sole proprietors of Cal Bay Construction and Castle Roofing. Both

businesses appear to provide roofing services.

They allege that, on or about October 20, 2009, an anonymous

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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defamatory comment was posted on Defendant’s website about Cal Bay

Construction. They aver that the comment misrepresents their work

and has devastated their businesses. 

According to Plaintiffs, Defendant enables any “member of the

general public or the Defendant, Google, Inc., . . . to post a

businesses name, address, and phone number upon the Defendant’s

website then defame anonymously in review of that business.” 

Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiffs plead that they undertook several efforts

to have Defendant remove the comment. 

Plaintiffs claim that they have been “emotionally disturbed”

by Defendant’s conduct and that their businesses “were suffering

financially on a daily basis from the on line defamation.” Compl.

¶ 28. They plead six causes of action: (1) a “Breach of Authority”

claim for violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a) and 53(a)-(b);

(2) breach of contract; (3) unfair business practices and false

advertising in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1)-(2) and 53(a)-

(b); (4) negligence; (5) misrepresentation; and (6) intentional

infliction of emotional distress. 

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a

claim is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the

defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds

on which it rests. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to

state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. NL

Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). 

However, this principle is inapplicable to legal conclusions. 

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not taken as true. 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009)

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile. 

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether amendment

would be futile, the court examines whether the complaint could be

amended to cure the defect requiring dismissal “without

contradicting any of the allegations of [the] original complaint.” 

Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Leave to amend should be liberally granted, but an amended

complaint cannot allege facts inconsistent with the challenged

pleading. Id. at 296-97.

DISCUSSION

Defendant asserts that, under the Communications Decency Act

of 1996 (CDA), it is immune from Plaintiffs’ action and that, in

the alternative, Plaintiffs fail to state claims upon which relief

can be granted. 

“Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive

computer services against liability arising from content created by

third parties: ‘No provider . . . of an interactive computer

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service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any

information provided by another information content provider.’” 

Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC,

521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c);

alteration in original; footnotes omitted). In enacting § 230,

“Congress wanted to encourage the unfettered and unregulated

development of free speech on the Internet, and to promote the

development of e-commerce.” Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1027

(9th Cir. 2003). As a result, “courts construing § 230 have

recognized as critical in applying the statute the concern that

lawsuits could threaten the ‘freedom of speech in the new and

burgeoning Internet medium.’” Id. (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online,

Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)). 

The statute defines an “interactive computer service” to be

“any information service, system, or access software provider that

provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer

server, including specifically a service or system that provides

access to the Internet and such systems operated or services

offered by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C.

§ 230(f)(2). The immunity applies to such a service “so long as it

does not also function as an ‘information content provider’ for the

portion of the statement or publication at issue.” Carafano v.

Metrosplash.com Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). An

“information content provider” is “any person or entity that is

responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development

of information provided through the Internet or any other

interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 

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1

 Plaintiffs do not dispute that Defendant is an interactive

computer service. Several other courts have recognized Defendant

as such a service. See, e.g., Jurin v. Google Inc., 695 F. Supp.

2d 1117, 1123 (E.D. Cal. 2010); Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F.

Supp. 2d 492, 501 (E.D. Pa. 2006). 

5

Based on the congressional intent discussed above, courts

“have treated § 230(c) immunity as quite robust, adopting a

relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service’

and a relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content

provider.’” Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123. All doubts “must be

resolved in favor of immunity.” Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1174. 

A fair reading of Plaintiffs’ complaint demonstrates that they

seek to impose liability on Defendant for content created by an

anonymous third party. They assert that their lawsuit “arises from

an online comment posted upon the Google web site . . . .”1 Compl.

¶ 1. They aver that the allegedly defamatory comment is

“anonymous,” id. ¶ 21, but they do not allege that Defendant was

its author. Finally, they summarize their action by stating that

Defendant’s “business review ‘courtesy advertisement’ process which

allows for consumer generated content is illegal and inappropriate

as it manifest into allowing parties to seek revenge against

businesses and professionals.” Id. ¶ 34. Based on these

allegations, Defendant is immune from their suit. 

Plaintiffs appear to argue that CDA immunity does not apply

because their claims are based on Defendant’s “programming,” not

the third-party content. Pl.’s Br. of July 19, 2010 at 6. 

Plaintiffs seem to be referring to the source code underlying the

services offered on Defendant’s website. See Compl. ¶ 30

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(asserting that Defendant engaged “in the acts and practices set

forth in this complaint via software programming on their web

site”). In light of Plaintiffs’ complaint, this argument is

unavailing; they aver that their lawsuit arises from the thirdparty content and that their businesses suffered damage therefrom. 

Further, Defendant’s programming does not transform it into the

creator of the offending comment. Indeed, several courts have

considered and rejected theories that an interactive computer

service could be held liable merely because its programming

facilitated the creation of the content at issue. See, e.g.,

Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124-25 (concluding defendant was immune,

even though “the content was formulated in response” to its

questionnaire); Gentry v. eBay, Inc., 99 Cal. App. 4th 816, 833-34

(2002) (holding that plaintiffs could not avoid § 230 by attacking

the structure of defendant’s “safety program”). 

Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant could be held liable

because it sponsored and endorsed the comment. However, Plaintiffs

make no allegations that suggest any sponsorship or endorsement of

the comment by Defendant. Even if they did, Defendant would remain

entitled to immunity. Plaintiffs’ attempt to depict Defendant as a

sponsor or endorser of the comment is, in effect, an end-around the

prohibition on treating it as the publisher or speaker of it. Such

a ploy, if countenanced, would eviscerate the immunity granted

under § 230. Further, even if Defendant were a sponsor or

endorser, the fact remains that Plaintiffs seek to hold it liable

for content generated by a third-party. 

Finally, Plaintiffs contend that their claims rest on

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Defendant’s failure to provide an adequate “dispute resolution”

system to resolve their concerns about the comment. Pl.’s Br. of

July 19, 2010 at 6. Again, this argument fails because the

predicate for liability remains the third-party content. In

addition, several courts have held that immunity is not vitiated

because a defendant fails to take action despite notice of the

problematic content. See, e.g., Universal Commc’ns Sys., Inc. v.

Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 420 (1st Cir. 2007) (“It is, by now,

well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the

information provided is not enough to make it the service

provider's own speech.”); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (“Liability upon

notice would defeat the dual purposes advanced by § 230 of the

CDA.”); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 45 (2006). 

Plaintiffs offer no persuasive argument that their theory presents

an exception.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by § 230. Because

their complaint makes clear that their action “arises from an

online comment posted upon” Defendant’s website, Compl. ¶ 1, any

amendment would be futile and dismissal with prejudice is

warranted. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion

to dismiss. (Docket No. 10.) Plaintiffs’ action is dismissed with

prejudice as barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230. Consequently, their motion

for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED as moot. (Docket No. 15.) 

The case management conference set for September 14, 2010 is

VACATED. 

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. The

parties shall bear their own costs. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 13, 2010 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:10-cv-02381-CW Document 26 Filed 08/13/10 Page 8 of 9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY BLACK and HOLLI BEAM-BLACK, 

Plaintiffs,

 v.

GOOGLE INC.,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV10-02381 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on August 13, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy of the attached, by placing said

copy in a postage paid envelope addressed to the persons hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy into an inter-office delivery receptacle located

in the Clerk's office.

Gary Black

101 Auld Court

Green Valley Falls, CA 94534

Holli Beam-Black

101 Auld Court

Green Valley Falls, CA 94534

Dated: August 13, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: MP, Deputy Clerk

Case 4:10-cv-02381-CW Document 26 Filed 08/13/10 Page 9 of 9