Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04006/USCOURTS-ca10-94-04006-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carlos Botero-Ospina
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH u FILED 

nlted States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 0 5 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff- Appellee, 

v. 

CARLOS BOTERO-OSPINA, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-4006 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-48) 

R. Steven Chambers, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellant. 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney (David J. Schwendiman, First Assistant 

U.S. Attorney, and Bruce C. Lubeck, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with him on the briefs), 

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MOORE, ANDERSON, TACHA, BALDOCK, 

BRORBY, EBEL, KELLY, HENRY, BRISCOE~ and LUCERO, Circuit Judges. • 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

*Judge Murphy did not participate in this decision. 

Appellate Case: 94-4006 Document: 01019280236 Date Filed: 12/14/1995 Page: 1 
On our own motion we granted in bane review in this case to review that portion of 

the panel opinion in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1988), holding 

that the proper standard for determining whether a traffic stop is unconstitutionally 

pretextual is whether "under the same circumstances, a reasonable officer would have 

made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose." I d. at 1517 (quoting United States 

v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)). For the reasons set forth below, we hold 

that the Guzman standard should be overruled and we adopt a new test in this circuit for 

determining when an initial stop of an automobile violates the Fourth Amendment. 

BACKGROUND 

On March 9, 1993, Carlos Botero-Ospina was traveling eastbound on Interstate 70 

just east of Salina, Utah. Deputy Phil Barney, ofthe Sevier County Sheriffs Department, 

was traveling westbound in his patrol car when he observed Mr. Botero-Ospina's vehicle 

swerve from the outside lane, straddle the center line, and swerve back to the outside lane. 

Deputy Barney testified at the suppression hearing that along this particular stretch of 

highway, midway between Los Angeles and Denver, drivers frequently experience 

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fatigue. R. Vol. IV at 10-12. Thus, he decided to stop the vehicle to ensure that the 

driver was not falling asleep or driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 1 

Deputy Barney approached the vehicle and asked Mr. Botero-Ospina for his 

driver's licence and registration. The driver's license was that of Mr. Botero-Ospina, but 

the vehicle was registered in New Jersey to another man, Jamie Higuera. Mr. BoteroOspina explained that he had recently purchased the vehicle from a woman in California 

and that she had told him he could obtain the title from a bank in New Jersey. l.d... at 17-

19. Mr. Botero-Ospina, however, was unable to identify the woman or to explain her 

connection to the registered owner of the vehicle, Mr. Higuera. 

In response to the deputy's question regarding where he had been, Mr. BoteroOspina indicated that he had just come from "Garfield." Deputy Barney, however, knew 

from his experience that there was no such town along Mr. Botero-Ospina's route. Given 

the unusual nature of the encounter, Deputy Barney then asked Mr. Botero-Ospina if he 

had any weapons or drugs. Mr. Botero-Ospina answered that he did not. The deputy 

asked if he could search the vehicle, to which Mr. Botero-Ospina responded "sure." Id. at 

19-21. 

1

Deputy Barney's patrol car was equipped with a video camera which began 

recording when the deputy activated his emergency equipment. The video tape of the 

stop and ensuing search was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. R. Vol. 

IV at 13-15 (Ex. 1). 

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The search resulted in the seizure of 7 4 kilograms of cocaine from a secret 

compartment in the vehicle. Mr. Botero-Ospina moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing, 

inter alia, that the initial stop of his vehicle was pretextual, in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. Following a suppression hearing, the district court adopted the 

recommendation of the magistrate judge and denied the motion. Following his conviction 

and sentencing, Mr. Botero-Ospina filed this appeal. 

DISCUSSION 

I. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the factual findings of 

the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. McSwain, 29 F.3d 

558, 560 (lOth Cir. 1994). The ultimate determination of reasonableness under the Fourth 

Amendment, however, is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. 

Hom, 970 F.2d 728, 730 (lOth Cir. 1992). We view the evidence on appeal in the light 

most favorable to the government. United States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1513 (lOth Cir. 

1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207 (1991). 

A traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even 

though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." 

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). An ordinary traffic stop is, however, 

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more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial arrest. United States v. 

Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 871 (lOth Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 815 

(lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1093 (1992). We therefore analyze such stops 

under the principles pertaining to investigative detentions set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968). See Walker, 933 F.2d at 815. To determine the reasonableness of an 

investigative detention, we make a dual inquiry, asking first "whether the officer's action 

was justified at its inception," and second "whether it was reasonably related in scope to 

the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." ~. 392 U.S. at 

20; see McSwain, 29 F.3d at 561; United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1501 (lOth Cir. 

1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1118 (1992). 

In United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1988), we defined a 

pretextual traffic stop as one in which "the police use a legal justification to make the stop 

in order to search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious 

crime for which they do not have the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop." 

I d. at 1515. We identified as the "classic example" of an unconstitutional pretext stop the 

case of an officer stopping a motorist for a minor traffic violation in order to investigate 

the officer's "hunch" that the individual is engaged in other illegal activity. Such a stop, 

we concluded, is not justified at its inception, and therefore violates the Fourth 

Amendment. 

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In Guzman, we adopted the following test to determine whether a stop is 

pretextual: '"whether under the same circumstances a reasonable officer would have 

made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose.'" Id. (quoting United States v. 

Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)). This has become known as the "would" or 

the "usual police practices" standard. Time has proven the Guzman standard 

unworkable. 

In our own circuit, its application has been inconsistent and sporadic. For 

example, while in Guzman we defined usual police practices in terms of the entire New 

Mexico police force, see Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1518, in United States v. Fernandez, 18 

F .3d 87 4 (1Oth Cir. 1994 ), we focused on the common practices of a particular unit of the 

Utah Highway Patrol. I d. at 877. In some cases we have specifically rejected an analysis 

which would consider the practices of an individual officer, id.; see Guzman, 864 F.2d at 

1518, while in other cases we have focused exclusively on the practices of the individual 

officers. See United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 1004, 1006 (lOth Cir. 1993); see also 

United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (lOth Cir. 1990). Additionally, since 

Guzman, we have only once, in United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973, 975 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

relied on the "would" standard to reverse an order denying 

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suppression.2 In every other case, we have either implicitly or explicitly concluded that 

the stop was not pretextual based upon the officer's having observed a traffic violation or 

having had reasonable suspicion that a violation was occurring. See. e.g., United States v. 

Dirden, 38 F.3d 1131, 1140 (lOth Cir. 1994); United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 77 

(lOth Cir. 1994); Harris, 995 F.2d at 1005-06; United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 

1554 (lOth Cir. 1993); Hom, 970 F.2d at 731; United States v. Deases, 918 F.2d 118, 121 

(lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233 (1991); Werking, 915 F.2d at 1408; United 

States v. Corral, 899 F.2d 991, 994 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d 

268, 272 (lOth Cir. 1989). 

Moreover, the clear majority of other circuits considering the issue, as well as 

many state courts, including most within our circuit, have rejected the Guzman standard, 

either explicitly or implicitly. See United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 

1995); United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375-76 (D.C. Cir. 1995), petition for cert. 

filed, (U.S. Aug. 31, 1995) (No. 955841); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 

782-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 207 (1994); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 

385, 388-92 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 97 (1994); United States v. Hassan 

El, 5 F.3d 726,729-31 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1374 (1994); United States 

2

Furthermore, in Lyons, the officer's inability to articulate any specific reason for 

pulling the defendant over--other than the officer's own "sixth sense"--made the stop 

unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional, under any standard. Id. at 976. 

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v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2427 (1993); United 

States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 962 

(1991); United States v. Hope, 906 F.2d 254, 257-58 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 

U.S. 983 (1991); State v. Corpany, 859 P.2d 865, 870 (Colo. 1993) (en bane); Skelly v. 

State, 880 P.2d 401, 404 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1136-

37 & n.4 (Utah 1994); Vrooman y. State, 642 P.2d 782, 784 (Wyo. 1982); cf. United 

States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 993 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 (1991). 

But see United States v. Hernandez, 55 F.3d 443, 445 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. 

Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (11th Cir. 1991V 

3

The Ninth Circuit's Hernandez opinion articulates the standard as follows: "[w]e 

focus on the objective facts and ask whether a reasonable officer, given the 

circumstances, would have made the stop absent a desire to investigate an umelated 

serious offense. In making this inquiry, we often find it helpful to determine whether the 

stop conformed to regular police practices." Hernandez, 55 F.3d at 445 (citations 

omitted). 

Of the six states within our circuit, it appears that New Mexico has not decided 

whether to adopt the Guzman standard. See State v. Apodaca, 814 P.2d 1030, 1032 

(N.M. Ct. App.1991) ("As in State v. Benjamin C., 109 N.M. 67, 781 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 

1989), we need not decide whether to follow Guzman .... "). There is some confusion, 

however, because in State v. Wilson, 867 P.2d 1175 (N.M. 1994), in addressing whether a 

stop was pretextual, the New Mexico Supreme Court observed that "[t]he evidence was 

that [the] Deputy ... stopped six to eight vehicles a month for seat belt violations, and 

that he would not have stopped the car ifthere had been no seat belt violation." Id. at 

1179. That appears to be an application of the Guzman standard. We are aware of no 

Kansas cases addressing this issue. 

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Because the Guzman standard is unworkable, we now adopt a new standard in this 

circuit for examining the constitutionality of a traffic stop: a traffic stop is valid under the 

Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic violation or if the police 

officer has reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic or equipment violation has 

occurred or is occurring.4 It is irrelevant, for purposes of Fourth Amendment review, 

"whether the stop in question is sufficiently ordinary or routine according to the general 

practice of the police department or the particular officer making the stop." Ferguson, 8 

F .3d at 391. It is also irrelevant that the officer may have had other subjective motives 

for stopping the vehicle. Our sole inquiry is whether this particular officer had reasonable 

suspicion that this particular motorist violated "any one of the multitude of applicable 

traffic and equipment regulations" of the jurisdiction. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 

661 (1979). To the extent that our decision in United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 

(lOth Cir. 1988), is inconsistent with this holding, it is overruled. 

We adopt this new standard for several reasons, many of which have been 

discussed in other circuit court opinions rejecting our Guzman standard. See Johnson, 63 

F.3d at 246-47; Whren, 53 F.3d at 375-76; Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 391-92. This new 

standard more effectively promotes an objective assessment of police officers' actions, as 

4

W e do not address in this standard an officer performing a community caretaking 

function. 

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required by the Supreme Court. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985); 

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978). It eliminates the confusion and 

inconsistencies inherent in the application of the Guzman standard, and ensures that the 

validity of traffic stops "is not subject to the vagaries of police departments' policies and 

procedures concerning the kinds of traffic offenses of which they ordinarily do or do not 

take note." Ferguson, 8 F.3d at 392. Finally, and significantly, by abandoning the 

Guzman standard for pretext, we rightly leave to the state legislatures the task of 

determining what the traffic laws ought to be, and how those laws ought to be enforced. 

II. 

It goes without saying that, by adopting the standard we do today, we do not 

abandon the traveling public to "the arbitrary exercise of discretionary police power." 

Johnson, 63 F.3d at 247. Our holding in this case properly focuses on the very narrow 

question of whether the initial stop of the vehicle is objectively justified. We leave intact 

the vast body of law which addresses the second prong of the~ analysis--whether the 

police officer's actions are reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified 

the interference in the first place. Our well-developed case law clearly circumscribes the 

permissible scope of an investigative detention. See United States v. Jones, 44 F .3d 860, 

871-72 (lOth Cir. 1995); United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (lOth Cir. 1993); 

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United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 (lOth Cir. 1991); Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519; 

see also Johnson, 63 FJd at 247. Therefore, if an officer's initial traffic stop, though 

objectively justified by the officer's observation of a minor traffic violation, is motivated 

by a desire to engage in an investigation of more serious criminal activity, his 

investigation nevertheless will be circumscribed by Thn:x's scope requirement. 

III. 

Applying the standard set forth in Part I of this opinion to the facts of this case, we 

cannot conclude that the district court erred in denying Mr. Botero-Ospina's suppression 

motion. 

At the suppression hearing, Deputy Barney testified--and the magistrate judge's 

findings of fact reflect--that Mr. Botero-Ospina's vehicle was traveling well below the 

posted speed limit and straddling the lane as it traveled eastbound on Interstate 70. R. 

Vol. IV at 10. Additionally, Deputy Barney testified that, based upon his observation of 

the vehicle and his experience with motorists traveling down that stretch of road, he 

believed the driver may have been impaired or falling asleep. Id. at 12; R. Vol. II at 7. 

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The magistrate judge found that Mr. Botero-Ospina's vehicle was generally being 

operated in violation ofUtah law. R. Vol. I, Doc. 32 at 12.5 

Under the standard adopted today, Deputy Barney's stop of Mr. Botero-Ospina's 

vehicle was proper. He observed a violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-61 relating to lane 

straddling. Furthermore, he was able to articulate specific facts which, in light of his 

training and experience, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Botero-Ospina may 

have been driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-

44. For either or both of these reasons, Deputy Barney was fully warranted in stopping 

Mr. Botero-Ospina. It is irrelevant whether a reasonable officer would have stopped Mr. 

Botero-Ospina under these circumstances. It is likewise irrelevant that Deputy Barney 

may have harbored a secret hope of finding evidence of drug trafficking. Because the 

deputy had reasonable articulable suspicion that a traffic violation had occurred or was 

occurring, the stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment and we need inquire no further 

into the circumstances surrounding the stop. 

The other issues raised by Mr. Botero-Ospina in his appeal are not before the in 

bane court. We therefore return the case to the panel to address the remaining issues. 

5

Straddling the lane is a violation ofUtah law, see Utah Code Ann.§ 41-6-61, as is 

driving under the influence of alcohol. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. 

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No. 94-4006, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CARLOS BOTERO-OSPINA 

SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, with whom HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, 

join, dissenting. 

The majority today upholds the validity of objectively 

unreasonable stops, and in so doing simply closes its eyes to 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. To bolster its decision, the 

majority relies on reasons so logically or legally flawed as to be 

little more than self-serving rationalizations. Because I can 

accept neither the holding nor its support, I must respectfully 

dissent. 

I. 

The majority concludes that 11 a traffic stop is valid under 

the Fourth Amendment if the stop is based on an observed traffic 

violation. 11 Maj. op. at 8. Under this standard it is irrelevant 

that a stop is rarely made, if ever, based on the particular 

violation. It is also irrelevant that the stop was motivated by 

racial animus, an inarticulable hunch, or any of the other 

improper reasons repeatedly condemned by the Supreme Court in the 

Fourth Amendment context. Although recognizing that the legality 

of a traffic stop must be analyzed under the balancing test set 

out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the majority does not 

evaluate its standard under that test. When the majority's 

standard is assessed under Terry, it falls far short of satisfying 

11 the central inquiry under the Fourth Amendment--the 

reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular 

Appellate Case: 94-4006 Document: 01019280236 Date Filed: 12/14/1995 Page: 13 
governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security ... Id. at 

19. 

11 The essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth 

Amendment is to impose a standard of 'reasonableness' upon the 

exercise of discretion by government officials, including law 

enforcement agents, in order ' 11 to safeguard the privacy and 

security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. 11 ' 11 Delaware 

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (footnote omitted) (quoting 

Marshall v. Barlow's. Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)). To assess 

the reasonableness of governmental conduct, the Court in Terry 

established a balancing test under which the need to stop or 

search must be weighed against the resulting intrusion upon 

constitutionally protected interests. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-

21. The Court mandated examination of three factors, 11 the nature 

and extent of the governmental interests involved, 11 id. at 22, 

11 the nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights,n 

id. at 24, and 11 the reasonableness of [the] particular search or 

seizure in light of the particular circumstances .. , id. at 21. 

I turn first to the nature of the governmental interests that 

the majority asserts are of sufficient significance to outweigh 

the resulting intrusion. We are here concerned with traffic laws 

that have resulted in a traffic stop on a particular occasion even 

though they otherwise would rarely, if ever, be enforced, 

especially on an interstate highway. A traffic ordinance so low 

in priority that it is not routinely enforced is not a 

particularly weighty governmental interest in the Terry balance. 

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The majority points out that state legislatures should determine 

11 what the traffic laws ought to be, and how those laws ought to be 

enforced. 11 Maj. op. at 9. While I agree with that statement, it 

begs the question here. Although it is the legislature's 

prerogative to make the traffic laws, it is the police who enforce 

them and the police undeniably cannot and do not enforce all the 

laws all the time. We do not impinge upon the state's ability to 

articulate and enforce traffic laws by scrutinizing the 

inconsistent and arbitrary enforcement of those laws. Indeed, we 

routinely examine the enforcement of state laws implementing vital 

state interests when that enforcement is challenged as 

unconstitutional. 

The second factor to be weighed in the Terry balance is the 

nature and quality of the intrusion on individual rights. The 

Supreme Court has made clear that although a traffic stop may be 

limited in purpose and brief in duration, it is nonetheless a 

11 physical and psychological intrusion11 of significance. Delaware 

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 657. A traffic stop 11 generally entail[s] 

law enforcement officers signaling a moving automobile to pull 

over to the side of the roadway, by means of a possibly unsettling 

show of authority. [It] interfere[s] with freedom of movement, 

[is] inconvenient, and consume[s] time. [It] may create 

substantial anxiety. 11 Id. 

"An individual operating or traveling in an 

automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of 

privacy simply because the automobile and its use are 

subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is 

a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of 

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transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and 

leisure activities. Many people spend more hours each 

day traveling in cars than walking on the streets. 

Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense of security and 

privacy in traveling in an automobile than they do in 

exposing themselves by pedestrian or other modes of 

travel. Were the individual subject to unfettered 

governmental intrusion every time he entered an 

automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth 

Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. As Terry v. 

Ohio, supra, recognized, people are not shorn of all 

Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their 

homes onto the public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of 

those interests when they step from the sidewalks into 

their automobiles." 

Id. at 662-63 (footnote omitted). 

In addition to producing the intrusion any individual 

experiences when subjected to a traffic stop, the majority's 

standard frees a police officer to target members of minority 

communities for the selective enforcement of otherwise unenforced 

statutes. The Supreme Court recognized in Terry that the 

harassment of minority groups by certain elements of the police 

population does occur, and that "the degree of community 

resentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to 

an assessment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable 

expectations of personal security caused by those practices." 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 n.14. By refusing to examine either the 

arbitrariness with which a particular statute is enforced or the 

motivation underlying its enforcement in a particular case, the 

majority standard does nothing to curb the ugly reality that 

minority groups are sometimes targeted for selective enforcement. 

As a result, the majority standard adds the onus of discrimination 

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and resentment to the already significant burden imposed by 

traffic stops generally. 

The third element in the Terry balance is the justification 

for the particular intrusion. In United States v. Guzman, 864 

F.2d 1512, 1517 (lOth Cir. 1988), this court held the relevant 

inquiry to be "whether under the same circumstances a reasonable 

officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid 

purpose." The majority now rejects this standard and instead asks 

only whether the officer could have made the stop on the basis of 

an observed violation, even if a reasonable officer would not have 

done so under the circumstances absent an invalid purpose. In so 

doing, the majority simply ignores the plain language of binding 

Supreme Court authority. 

The Supreme Court held in Terry that to justify a particular 

intrusion, a "police officer must be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (emphasis added). It is difficult to 

justify a stop as reasonable, even if supported by an observed 

violation, if the undisputed facts indicate that the violation 

does not ordinarily result in a stop. Moreover, the Court in 

Terry described in detail the appropriate reasonableness inquiry 

in language that is utterly irreconcilable with the majority 

standard. The Court stated that in assessing the reasonableness 

of a particular stop "it is imperative that the facts be judged 

against an objective standard: would the facts available to the 

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officer at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man 

of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 

appropriate?" Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added). It would hardly 

seem necessary to point out that the Court's mandate to determine 

what a reasonable officer would do in the circumstances cannot be 

fulfilled by merely ascertaining in a vacuum what a particular 

officer could do under state law. 

Given the "multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 

regulations" in any jurisdiction, maj. op. at 8, upholding a stop 

on the basis of a regulation seldom enforced opens the door to the 

arbitrary exercise of police discretion condemned in Terry and its 

progeny. "Anything less [than the reasonable officer standard] 

would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights 

based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a 

result this Court has consistently refused to sanction." Terry, 

392 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added). "This kind of standardless and 

unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when 

in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the 

official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent." 

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661. The majority standard, which 

allows virtually unfettered discretion by upholding a stop even if 

the underlying regulation is rarely enforced and even if motivated 

by an illegal purpose, simply cannot pass muster under Supreme 

Court authority. The Guzman standard, on the other hand, tracks 

the reasonable man standard set out in Terry virtually verbatim. 

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For this reason, one noted commentator is harshly critical of 

those courts that have adopted the majority standard, describing 

the cases as "poorly reasoned decisions" which "cannot be squared 

with the fundamental point that arbitrary action is unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment, as has been recognized by the Supreme 

Court in a variety of circumstances." 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & 

Seizure§ 1.4(e), at 94 (2d ed. 1987 & 1995 pocket part). As Mr. 

LaFave points out, "[i]t is the fact of the departure from the 

accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's 

conduct arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which in this 

context constitutes the Fourth Amendment violation." Id. 

"[G]iven the pervasiveness of ... minor offenses 

and the ease with which law enforcement agents may 

uncover them in the conduct of virtually everyone . 

. . there exists 'a power that places the liberty 

of every man in the hands of every petty officer,' 

precisely the kind of arbitrary authority which 

gave rise to the Fourth Amendment." 

Id. at 95 (footnote omitted) . 

Application of the majority's "could" standard will promote 

cases as outrageous as United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088 (5th 

Cir. 1993). The facts there were as follows: 

"Shortly after midnight on Monday, October 14, 

1991, Roberson, Keeper, and Whitlock were passengers in 

a minivan driven northbound by Darlene Linda McCleod on 

state highway 59 in Panola County, Texas. State Trooper 

Barry Washington, while pursuing a speeder, passed the 

van and observed its out-of-state license plates and 

four black occupants. Shortly thereafter Trooper 

Washington crested a hill, pulled onto the shoulder of 

the highway, doused his lights, and trained his radar 

gun on northbound traffic. 

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As the van approached, the radar gun registered 58 

miles per hour, three miles per hour above the speed 

limit. The van. apparently the only moving vehicle on 

that stretch of road, changed lanes to distance itself 

as it passed the vehicle on the right shoulder. Trooper 

Washington noted that the lane change was unaccompanied 

by a signal and obviously regarded this as a serious 

traffic offense when committed by an out-of-state driver 

in Panola County. He immediately gave chase and pulled 

the van over." 

Id. at 1089 (emphasis added). The panel noted that "this court 

has become familiar with Trooper Washington's propensity for 

patrolling the fourth amendment's outer frontier," id. at 1092, 

but held that it was bound by Fifth Circuit precedent to uphold 

the stop.l Our court is now saying that all traffic stops meet 

the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth Amendment and Terry 

regardless of how insignificant the traffic violation and how 

ludicrous the notion that any reasonable officer would stop a 

vehicle on an interstate highway for that traffic violation. Our 

court is now saying that any archaic and unenforced traffic 

regulation justifies a stop regardless of how racially motivated 

and pretextual the stop is. 

The majority standard not only abandons any meaningful effort 

to limit police discretion or to control pretext, it fails to even 

address the Supreme Court's concern with these problems. The Court 

has not directly evaluated pretextual stops under the Fourth 

Amendment, presumably because no case has asserted the argument 

1 Our own Officer Barney has now patrolled far outside the 

outer boundaries of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. 

Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 324, 326 (lOth Cir. 1995) (when driver of car 

drove off after illegal search, Officer Barney shot at the tires 

and then gave chase at speeds up to 100 miles per hour) . 

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that such stops are constitutional. Nonetheless, the Court has 

consistently suggested that the pretextual use of police power is 

constitutionally suspect. See, ~, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 

691, 716 n.27 (1987) (in upholding administrative search, Court 

noted that neither statute nor search it authorized were pretext 

for obtaining evidence of penal violations); Texas v. Brown 460 

U.S. 730, 743-44 (1983) (in upholding seizure of evidence in plain 

view at roadblock stop, Court observed that roadblock was not 

pretext for invoking plain view doctrine); Steagald v. United 

States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981) (in holding that arrest warrant 

does not justify search of home, Court pointed out that arrest 

warrant may serve as pretext for entering home to search without 

probable cause); Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 n.4 

(1980) (in upholding traffic stop, traffic citation, and subsequent 

arrest for theft, Court noted that issuing citation was not 

pretext for confirming suspicion of theft); South Dakota v. 

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976) (in upholding validity of 

inventory search pursuant to standard police procedures, Court 

observed that search was not pretext concealing investigatory 

motive) . 

The Court's care in noting the absence of pretext clearly 

indicates that pretext is significant and that its presence would 

affect the legality of an otherwise valid stop or a search. The 

majority standard, to the contrary, looks only at the ostensible 

justification for the intrusion and holds irrelevant factors that 

would indicate the presence of pretext. Under the majority 

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standard, no stop can ever be pretextual by definition, while 

stops that are pretextual in fact are deemed lawful. 

In sum, the majority standard promotes a government interest 

of very limited magnitude and permits intrusions upon Fourth 

Amendment interests that are not only significant but are 

additionally aggravated by the real possibility of discriminatory 

application. The majority validates these intrusions under a 

standard so devoid of meaningful content as to invest the police 

with the unbridled discretion condemned by the Supreme Court. The 

majority justifies this result by asserting that the reasonable 

officer standard is unworkable. The majority also contends that 

its standard more effectively promotes the objective assessment of 

police conduct and ensures that the validity of traffic stops does 

not vary on the basis of the violations particular police 

departments decide to emphasize. These reasons do not withstand 

even a cursory review. 

Perhaps no concept is more firmly embedded in American 

jurisprudence than the reasonable person standard. Given its 

routine application by judges and juries in a myriad of contexts, 

I believe the majority is presumptuous in pronouncing it 

unworkable. In any event, we are not at liberty to reject the 

reasonable officer standard in view of the Supreme Court's clear 

directive that it be applied in this situation. The majority 

bolsters its conclusion by observing that we have rarely 

invalidated a stop as pretextual under the Guzman standard. 

However, the majority's observation equally supports the 

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conclusion that Guzman does indeed work, that prosecutors have 

read and taken heed of that opinion, and that they have not 

pursued cases involving stops condemned by that case.2 

In contending that its standard more effectively promotes an 

objective assessment of police conduct, the majority continues to 

turn a blind eye to the Supreme Court's directive in Terry that 

use of the reasonable officer standard is "imperative" in order to 

give meaning to the Fourth Amendment. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22. 

Indeed the cases which the majority cites rely themselves upon the 

reasonable officer standard set out in Terry. See Scott v. United 

States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-

22); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985) (quoting Scott). 

Finally, the majority contends its standard ensures that the 

validity of traffic stops will not vary with the implementation 

policies of particular police departments. In virtually the same 

breath, however, the m~jority rightly points out that determining 

how traffic laws are to be enforced is a task for the states and 

not for the federal courts. We simply misperceive our 

responsibility when we mold our analysis to further state policy 

rather than to guarantee constitutional objectives. The validity 

of the enforcement of traffic stops must be measured not by the 

promotion of state interests but by the requirements of the Fourth 

Amendment as construed by the Supreme Court. 

2 To the extent our prior opinions have inconsistently applied 

the Guzman standard, we should clarify the standard rather than 

abandon it altogether. 

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The Supreme Court did exactly that in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 

U.S. 648, holding a stop unconstitutional even while recognizing 

that the stop promoted a valid state interest. There the Court 

considered the constitutional validity of random traffic stops to 

check driver's licenses and car registrations. Significantly, the 

Court agreed that enforcing licensing and registration 

requirements is a vital state interest and assumed that the 

resulting detention would be both related to that interest and 

limited in nature. Nonetheless, the Court ruled such stops 

unconstitutional, concluding that "[t]he marginal contribution to 

roadway safety possibly resulting from a system of spot checks 

cannot justify subjecting every occupant of every vehicle on the 

roads to a seizure--limited in magnitude compared to other 

intrusions but nonetheless constitutionally cognizable--at the 

unbridled discretion of law enforcement officials." Id. at 661. 

The facts at issue in Delaware v. Prouse are not 

significantly different from the scenario proposed by the majority 

here. In both cases the ostensible state purpose for the original 

stop is valid, although in both cases the stop promotes that 

interest only marginally. In both cases the resulting detention 

would be brief and circumscribed by that legitimate interest. In 

both cases the police possess virtually unchecked discretion in 

selecting motorists to stop. The Court's ruling in Delaware that 

the "'grave danger' of abuse of discretion" outweighed the other 

factors and rendered such stops unconstitutional would seem 

equally applicable here. Id. at 662. 

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Our mandate is clear. 

"The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 

meaningful only when it is assured that at some point 

the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can 

be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a 

judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a 

particular search or seizure in light of the particular 

circumstances. And in making that assessment it is 

imperative that the facts be judged against an objective 

standard: would the facts available to the officer at 

the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man 

of reasonable caution in the belief" that the action 

taken was appropriate?" 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In 

refusing·to apply the reasonable officer standard required by 

Terry, the majority rejects binding Supreme Court authority that 

we are not at liberty to disregard. 

II. 

If the majority standard is to be the law in this circuit, it 

is imperative that we narrowly circumscribe and clearly define the 

scope of the detention that is permissible following a stop. I 

therefore take this opportunity to augment the majority's summary 

citation to our caselaw and to suggest limiting the breadth of 

some of our prior cases. 

First, an officer conducting a traffic stop may detain the 

driver only so long as is necessary to request a driver's license 

and vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a 

citation. See, ~, United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 

(lOth Cir. 1995); United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 816 (lOth 

Cir. 1991). Questions unrelated to the driver's traffic violation 

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or to his right to operate the vehicle during this legitimate 

period of detention are only justified when the officer can 

support those questions by an objectively reasonable suspicion of 

other illegal activity. Jones, 44 F.3d at 872. In addition, 

detaining the driver beyond the time necessary to issue the 

citation, and/or questioning him during that extended detention 

likewise violates the Fourth Amendment absent reasonable 

suspicion. Walker, 933 F.2d at 816. 

Second, our cases make clear that "[u]nless the officer has 

returned the driver's documentation, the driver is not free to go, 

and the encounter is not consensual." United States v. Soto, 988 

F.2d 1548, 1557 (lOth Cir. 1993). So long as the officer retains 

the driver's license and registration, therefore, the officer 

cannot justify questions unrelated to the traffic stop as a 

consensual encounter. Such questions must be supported by an 

objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity. See Walker, 

933 F.2d at 817. 

We have permitted intrusive questioning absent reasonable 

suspicion once the driver's license and registration have been 

returned on the theory that because the driver is then "free to 

leave," the encounter is consensual. See, ~, United States v. 

Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (lOth Cir. 1990). As we recognized 

in Werking, however, the line between a detention and a consensual 

encounter is not an easy one to draw. Id. at 1409. While a 

driver is as a matter of law free to leave once the officer has 

returned his documents, I am not persuaded that most drivers in 

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reality understand that this act marks the end of their detention 

and the beginning of their right to go about their business, 

particularly when the return is immediately followed by questions 

about guns or drugs. Consequently, giving undue weight to the 

return of a driver's documents in ascertaining whether a 

subsequent encounter is consensual both ignores the real world and 

creates the substantial possibility that traffic stops will be 

used as fishing expeditions. Given this court's determination to 

permit pretextual stops of automobile travelers, it is especially 

important that we be vigilant at this second stage. 

The Ohio Supreme Court has recently dealt with this problem 

by adopting a bright-line rule with respect to consensual 

encounters following traffic stops. See State v. Robinette, 653 

N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995). As the court recognized in Robinette, 

"[m]ost people believe that they are validly in a 

police officer's custody as long as the officer 

continues to interrogate them. The police officer 

retains the upper hand and the accouterments of 

authority. That the officer lacks legal license to 

continue to detain them is unknown to most citizens, and 

a reasonable person would not feel free to walk away as 

the officer continues to address him." 

Id. at 698. The Ohio Supreme Court was concerned that the blurred 

line between a legal detention and an attempted consensual 

encounter may be used to circumvent the clear rules courts have 

established to secure the protections of the Fourth Amendment. 

"The transition between detention and a consensual 

exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may 

not notice that it has occurred. The undetectability of 

that transition may be used by police officers to coerce 

citizens into answering questions that they need not 

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answer, or to allow a search of a vehicle that they are 

not legally obligated to allow." 

Id. While recognizing that consensual encounters are an important 

and constitutional law enforcement tool, the court concluded that 

11 [w]ithout a clear break from the detention, the succeeding 

encounter is not consensual at all." Id. at 699. The court 

accordingly held that the required clear break does not occur 

until the detaining officer informs the driver that he is free to 

leave. 

"[W]e are convinced that the right, guaranteed by 

the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure in 

one's person and property requires that citizens stopped 

for traffic offenses be clearly informed by the 

detaining officer when they are free to go after a valid 

detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a 

consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual 

interrogation must be preceded by the phrase "At this 

time you legally are free to go" or by words of similar 

import. 

While the legality of consensual encounters between 

police and citizens should be preserved, we do not 

believe that this legality should be used by police 

officers to turn a routine traffic stop into a fishing 

expedition for unrelated criminal activity. The Fourth 

Amendment to the federal Constitution and Section 14, 

Article I of the Ohio Constitution exist to protect 

citizens against such an unreasonable interference with 

their liberty." 

Id. at 699. 

Under federal constitutional jurisprudence, the voluntariness 

of consent "is to be determined by the totality of all the 

circumstances, and is a matter which the Government has the burden 

of proving." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 u.s. 544, 557 

(1980) (citation omitted). While I do not propose that we adopt 

the bright-line test in Robinette, the Supreme Court has made 

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clear that knowledge of the right to refuse is "highly relevant" 

to the consent determination. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 559. I do 

not believe the Government can meet its burden under Mendenhall 

merely by showing that the officer returned the documents because, 

as Robinette discusses, we cannot infer from this act alone the 

critical fact that the driver understood its legal significance. 

To the extent that our cases can be read to hold that the return 

of documents is dispositive on the issue of a consensual 

encounter, see, ~, United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1451 

(lOth Cir. 1993). I believe we should disapprove them. 

III. 

In closing, I must state that I am certain my learned 

colleagues do not lightly disregard controlling authority which in 

my view so clearly precludes the majority holding today. 

Nonetheless, the magnitude of the majority's deviation from 

Supreme Court precedent and the poverty of its reasons for doing 

so prompt me to observe that it is not for this court to provide 

law enforcement with a weapon in the war on drugs at the expense 

of the Fourth Amendment. A conviction won by eroding every 

individual's right to personal security is dearly bought indeed. 

In my judgment, we are perilously close to selling our birthright 

for bread and pottage. See Genesis 25:33-34. Accordingly, I 

respectfully dissent. 

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No. 94-4006, United States of America v. Carlos Botero-Ospina 

LUCERO, Circuit Judge, with whom SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and HENRY, 

Ciruit Judge, join, dissenting: 

I join in the dissent of Chief Judge Seymour. 

I take this opportunity to author these published 

remarks, my first since joining the court, to express my 

strong opposition to the rule which my colleagues in the 

majority announce today. I suggest an alternative approach. 

The majority holds that in cases involving Fourth 

Amendment stops, federal trial courts may not inquire whether 

the initial traffic stop was a pretext. The pretext doctrine 

is expressly abandoned. Instead, the sole inquiry will be 

whether a traffic or equipment violation had occurred or 

there was a reasonable suspicion that one was occurring at 

the time of the stop. Further inquiry as to the 

reasonableness of the stop is deemed irrelevant. The message 

to law enforcement officers is clear: "You may stop 

motorists on a subterfuge; we don't care and we won't ask."1 

I do not question the depth of the frustration which 

drives my colleagues in the majority to abandon the 

reasonable officer standard; nor do I doubt their sincerity 

1 The consequence of such a message is also clear. An 

example of how innocent ordinary highway travellers have been 

stopped by profiling is described in Whitfield v. Board of 

County Commissioners, 837 F. Supp. 338, 340, 344 (D. Colo. 

1993). Under today's standard one driver--out of a string of 

hundreds of commuters hurrying horne, each travelling three 

miles over the speed limit--could be stopped on the basis of 

constitutionally impermissible subjective motives. Inquiry 

about such subjective motives is branded irrelevant. 

Appellate Case: 94-4006 Document: 01019280236 Date Filed: 12/14/1995 Page: 30 
in articulating the alternative path which they select. 

Nevertheless, their action will not stand the test of time, 

and it does not pass constitutional scrutiny today. 

The right of the people to be free from unreasonable 

governmental intrusion into their lives has always been an 

aspirational goal of a free society. In America, freedom is 

not an allegory, it is a right. The Framers enacted the 

Fourth Amendment to protect against two particular devices by 

which the British crown had perpetrated widespread 

infringement on individual liberty. These devices--general 

warrants and writs of assistance--gave government officials 

power to find and shut down 11 libelous printers 11 and search 

colonists' homes for smuggled goods. See Wayne R. LaFave, 

Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 

1.1 (a) (2d. ed. 1987). They embodied 11 'a power that places 

the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty 

officer.' 11 Id. § 1.4(e), at 95 (citation omitted). The 

Fourth Amendment was framed in response to this unacceptable 

governmental intrusion. 

The Amendment does not prevent all searches and 

seizures; it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 

It is intended to protect the innocent from unreasonable 

police 

of the 

conduct. We, the independent judiciary--as guardians 

Constitution--determine whether a seizure is 

reasonable. 

Amendment. 

Reason is the conscience of the Fourth 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-4006 Document: 01019280236 Date Filed: 12/14/1995 Page: 31 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) controls the judicial 

reasonableness inquiry. The language adopted by the Court 

today presents an express conflict with the language of 

Terry. What are the trial courts to do when faced with such 

an irreconcilable conflict? 

I understand the desire of the majority to correct the 

perceived difficulties which require it to modify the Guzman 

standard, but that presents no basis for insulating the first 

step of Terry from any reasonableness inquiry whatsoever, 

save for asking whether an officer had a reasonable 

11 articulable suspicion11 that a traffic violation may be 

occurring. The policy arguments which are advanced in 

support of the majority's action are not an acceptable 

substitute for the clear language of the Fourth Amendment or 

of Terry. 

I do not understand why the majority appears to have 

more confidence in the police than in the trial courts to 

make a comprehensive reasonableness analysis. If it is the 

use of the term 11 reasonable officer 11 that genuinely troubles 

the majority, then we should clarify the Guzman standard 

rather than abandon it altogether. We could align Guzman 

even more closely with Terry by adopting the Terry standard 

almost verbatim. 

Under such an approach, the appropriate inquiry would 

be: Under the totality of the circumstances of any given 

stop, 11 Would the facts available to the officer at the moment 

of the seizure or the search 'warrant a [person] of 

3 

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reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was 

appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22 (emphasis added); see 

also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) ( 11 the 

totality of the circumstances--the whole picture must be 

taken into account 11 ) (emphasis added). 

I have every confidence in the ability of the trial 

courts to determine whether Fourth Amendment-related traffic 

stops are reasonable under a totality of the circumstances 

test. I do not agree that merely asking whether an officer 

could have made a stop is an objective standard for 

reasonableness; rather I see it as a warrant for arbitrary 

exercise of police power. 

Using the Constitution as our navigational chart, our 

duty as a court is to steer an independent course, staying 

clear of any pressures of the day. Because I perceive that 

my colleagues in the majority are pushing the tiller and 

steering us far away from our historical mission, I 

respectfully dissent. The rights of the people of this 

country as assured in the Bill of Rights have been achieved 

and maintained at a high cost. I would not dilute those 

rights by judicial fiat. 

4 

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