Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03056/USCOURTS-caDC-95-03056-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio M. Smart
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 25, 1996 Decided November 1, 1996

No. 95-3056

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTONIO M. SMART,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00390-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, and Valencia R. Rainey, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were on the

briefs.

Steven E. Rindner, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher and Thomas J. Tourish, Jr., Assistant United

States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD, Circuit Judge and BUCKLEY, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WALD.

WALD, Circuit Judge: In 1995, appellant Antonio M. Smart was convicted by a jury on four

different counts of violating federal law: (1) possession with intent to distribute five grams or more

of crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)); (2) using or carrying a firearm during

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1); (3) carrying a pistol

without a license in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204(a); and (4) possession of an unregistered

firearm (D.C. CODE § 6-2311(a)). On appeal, Smart challenges the validity of these convictions on

three grounds. First, he claims that the police stop-and-frisk to which he was subjected in conjunction

with his arrest was unsupported by reasonable and articulable suspicion, and therefore the district

court erred by denying his motion to suppress the evidence gleaned from this search. Second, he

argues that the trial court allowed the government's drug expert to answer a hypothetical question

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in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). Third, appellant contends that his conviction for

using or carrying a gun under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) should be reversed due to an erroneous jury

instruction. Appellant also challenges the sentence imposed on the grounds that the district court

failed to recognize its authority to depart downward in his sentence under federal sentencing

guidelines and policies.

Although we find that the expert witness' answer to a hypothetical question posed by the

prosecution constituted improper expert testimony in violation ofRule 704(b), we also conclude that

this error was harmless. In light of the overwhelming amount of properly admitted evidence

indicating that Smart possessed a large quantity of crack cocaine with the requisite intent to distribute

that cocaine and the virtual absence of any exculpatory evidence, it is not plausible that the district

court's error under Rule 704(b) had a "substantial influence" on the jury. Similarly, we find that,

although the district court'sinstruction to the jury on the meaning of "use" under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

was clearly erroneous, this error was not prejudicial. Smart's other claims are without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm all four convictions and reject appellant's challenge to his sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Scenario

On September 21, 1994, Officer Michael Tuz ("Officer Tuz") of the Metropolitan Police

Department set up an observation post on the ground behind a small tree outside of the building

located at 1503 Howard Road, S.E., Washington, D.C. At 9:30 p.m. on that day, Officer Tuz looked

through his binoculars and observed appellant Antonio Smart walk over to a grassy strip near some

trees and a building, where Smart reached down and picked up a plastic bag from the ground

alongside the building. The plastic bag contained a "chunk of whitea white substance." Although

Officer Tuz was approximately 30 feet away from appellant, the binoculars made it appear asthough

appellant were right next to him.

After picking up the plastic bag, appellant walked around the building and into a nearby

parking lot, where he was out of Officer Tuz's line of sight. Officer Tuz radioed to a nearby arrest

team that the suspect was a black man, wearing a black jacket, black shirt, and a black pair of pants

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1At various points in the testimony, the amount of crack cocaine found was said to be

approximately 27 grams, or 25.5 grams, but the official amount, as testified to by the

government's expert witness Detective Tyrone Thomas, was 25.55 grams. Transcript ("Tr.") II,

at 50. 

and would be in the first parking lot near the street. Twenty-five to thirty seconds later, Officer Chris

Huxoll ("Officer Huxoll") spotted appellant standing "midway" in the parking lot. Although there

were a few other people standing further "back in the parking lot," Officer Huxoll did not notice them

until after arresting appellant. According to the prosecution, appellant was the only person in the

parking lot who matched Officer Tuz's radioed description.

Officer Huxoll drove up to appellant in an unmarked patrol car, identified himself as a police

officer and asked appellant to put up his hands. Officer Huxoll then walked appellant over to the

police car. Before Officer Huxoll could pat him down, appellant put his hands on his waistband.

Officer Huxoll again asked him to put up his hands. Although appellant complied with this request

at first, he immediately put his hands back on his waistband. While appellant's hand rested on his

waistband, Officer Huxoll placed his hand on top of appellant's hand. Officer Huxoll felt a hard object

and knew it was a gun.

A scuffle ensued, and two other officers assisted in securing appellant. The officers recovered

a loaded 9-millimeter semiautomatic handgun fromappellant. At this time, appellant told the officers

that he carried the gun for protection because he had been shot recently. To prove his claim, he

showed the officers his wound. In addition, the officers searched appellant and found a bag

containing 25.55 grams of crack cocaine and 56 small ziplock bags in the pockets of his coat,1a

pager, and $580 in small denomination bills. Officer Tuz, having left his original observation post,

went around the back of the buildingsto the parking lot and identified appellant asthe individual who

had retrieved a plastic bag with a white substance from the ground.

The defense called to the witnessstand Theodore Clash ("Clash"), a self-employed mechanic

with a criminalrecord for possession with intent to distribute PCP. Clash, an acquaintance of Smart,

testified that on the night in question, Clash saw appellant walking across a playground on the

sidewalk toward his car. He said he never saw appellant go towards any trees near the playground,

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as Officer Tuz had testified. Clash said that Smart approached him and asked him to get transmission

fluid for Smart's car. Clash went to his apartment to check for the transmission fluid. When he

returned to the parking lot, the police were searching Smart. Clash stated that, at that time, Clash

was wearing a blue sweater, jeans and tennis shoes and that the police also stopped Clash, searched

him and then let him go.

Appellant testified that, as he was driving home with his friend Richard after buying some

cassette tapes, his station wagon was making a ticking noise, so he pulled into a parking lot near

Richard's house. Richard got out and went into his house. Smart also went into the house and

claimed to have gotten transmission fluid. After that, Smart claimed that he went into the house of

a friend who lived next door to retrieve Smart's Polo sweater, but could not find his sweater, so he

went back next door to Richard's house to get a jacket. He went into the bedroom where Richard

was, asked for a jacket, was told to grab the one by the door, and did so, zipping it up and walking

back out past the playground along the sidewalk in between his car and another car and put the

transmission fluid in the car. Appellant noted that there were other people in the parking lot. The

only time he talked to Clash, he said, was when he was putting the one bottle of transmission fluid

in the car and yelled to Clash to get another bottle of fluid upstairs.

Smart claims that he was fiddling around with the transmission cap on his engine, when a

couple of unmarked police cars drove into the parking lot. The officers grabbed two other persons

who were standing outside. An officer in a white Chevrolet pulled up to Smart, got out of the car,

and grabbed him. The officer started frisking appellant and stopped upon feeling a pager. Smart

claims that the police officer, who hadn't identified himself as such, began to choke Smart. Other

officersthen came over to assist. Appellant testified that he did not have a gun on his person and that

he did not see narcotics removed from his jacket. Smart also denied telling the police that he carried

the gun for protection.

B. Procedural History

On October 6, 1994, a grand juryindicted appellant for (1) possession with intent to distribute

five grams or more of 

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crack cocaine (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(B)(iii)); (2) using and carrying a firearm

during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)); (3) carrying a pistol

without a license (D.C. CODE § 22-3204(a)); (4) possession of an unregistered firearm (D.C. CODE

§ 6-2311(a)); (5) possession of unregistered ammunition (D.C. CODE § 6-2361(3)).

On February 1, 1995, the district court held an evidentiary hearing on appellant's motion to

suppress. The trial judge denied Smart's motion. On February 3, 1995, a jury found Smart guilty on

all counts except Count 5, possession of unregistered ammunition. The trial judge dismissed Count

5 at the close of all evidence. On May 12, 1995, Smart was sentenced to (1) 121 months of

incarceration to be followed by four years of supervised probation and a $50 special assessment on

Count 1; (2) a consecutive term of 60 months of incarceration and a $50 special assessment on

Count 2; (3) a concurrent term of one year of incarceration on Count 3; and (4) a concurrent term

of one year of incarceration on Count 4. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 16, 1995.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal appellant claims that (1) the trial judge erred in denying appellant's motion to

suppressthe evidence, pursuant to the FourthAmendment, because the police stop-and-frisk to which

he was subjected in the parking lot was not supported by reasonable and articulable suspicion as

required under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968); (2) the trial court violated Federal Rule of

Evidence 704(b) by allowing the government's narcotics expert to answer a hypothetical question

which mirrored the facts of the case and encompassed an element of the crime charged; (3)

appellant's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) must be reversed because of an incorrect jury

instruction; and (4) this case should be remanded for resentencing because the record indicates that

the district court did not recognize its authority to depart downward pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0

and the SentencingCommission's SpecialReport to Congress onCocaine and the Federal Sentencing

Policy. We find appellant's objection to the expert witness's answer to the government's hypothetical

question to have merit. Nonetheless, we conclude that any error was harmless and therefore affirm

his conviction for possession with intent to distribute. In addition, although the jury instruction on

"use" of a firearm was erroneous, we find that this error was also harmless and thus affirm the

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2Appellant cites to United States v. Board, 744 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1990), for support. In

Board, the court held that officers who stopped the defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that he

was engaged in or had engaged in criminal activity, and thus seizure of defendant violated his

Fourth Amendment rights. In addition, such seizure tainted his alleged consent to search of his

automobile, where officers were acting on the ground that defendant fit a very general description

of a juvenile wanted in a custody dispute and was parked across the street from the apartment

building where police had looked for the juvenile the previous day. The present case is

distinguishable because the police officers radioed a description of the appellant and gave the

exact time and place where he could be located. Within twenty-five to thirty seconds of the

broadcast, Officer Huxoll spotted appellant. Moreover, despite Smart's claim to the contrary,

there were no other persons in that area at that time matching the suspect's description. 

conviction for carrying a gun in relation to a drug offense. Appellant's other claims are without merit.

A. District Court's Denial of Appellant's Motion to Suppress

Appellant argued to the trial court that the police did not have enough information under the

Fourth Amendment to support a Terry stop of appellant on the night of September 21, 1994. Under

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), a police officer may, even without probable cause, stop and briefly

detain a suspect if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by specific, articulable facts that

the suspect is involved in some sort of criminal activity. Further, an officer may frisk such a suspect

if the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the suspect in question may be armed and

dangerous. Applying this standard, the trial judge found that:

While the testimony of Officer Tuz was not a model of clarity, I think it was a

sufficient broadcast on his part from his observations of the defendant to justify a

Terry stop by Officer Huxoll at the other end of the wire. And once [Officer] Huxoll

had the right and articulable suspicion to conduct a Terry frisk, he had the right to

search and come across the gun, he had the justhe had a reason to arrest the

defendant, and the pager and the money and the cocaine are all properly incident to

a lawful arrest.

Tr. II, at 75-76.

Appellant claims that the district court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress. It is

appellant's contention that Officer Huxoll's "Terry stop" and "Terry frisk" of Smart was unlawful.2

The legality of a stop or frisk is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, United States v.

Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989), and this court will "look to the record as a whole to determine what

facts were known to the officer and then consider whether a reasonable officer in those circumstances

would have been suspicious." United States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

According to appellant, the "Terry stop" was unlawful because the radio broadcast was too

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vague in its physical description of the suspect. There were other people matching the suspect's

description nearby, and at least two other individuals in the area were stopped by the police. In

addition, the "Terry frisk" wasillegal because the radio broadcast gave no facts providing a basis for

a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect was armed and dangerous or that the officer's

safety was in danger. The broadcast failed to disclose the nature of the illegal activity and failed to

give any reference to a gun, knife, or any other weapon. Thus, Smart argues, a reasonably prudent

officer would not have believed appellant to be "armed and dangerous."

The government contends that the "Terry stop" was justified because it was based on a

reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that appellant was involved in criminal drug

activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The reason Officer Tuz set up the observation post

at that location was to investigate illegal narcotic activity. Prior to observing appellant pick up the

plastic bag, Officer Tuz had observed an apparent narcotic transaction in the building across the

street. Furthermore, Officer Huxoll's subsequent stop of appellant was also justified. Appellant was

the only person in the area that matched the description of a black man wearing all black in the exact

location specified byOfficer Tuz. The inclusion of a specific time and specific location is what makes

the government's contention persuasive.

Under Terry, officers may also frisk persons that they stop, if they can articulate facts

supporting a reasonable belief that "criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom

[they are] dealing may be armed and presently dangerous." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. In the

circumstances here, where Officer Tuz had just observed what he believed to be a suspect engaged

in a drug transaction, it was reasonable for the officersto suspect that appellant had a gun to protect

himself and his drugs. Moreover, when Officer Huxoll repeatedly asked appellant to raise his hands,

appellant moved his hands to his waistband leading the officer to suspect appellant was armed. As

the SupremeCourt noted in Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972), Terry authorizes "[a] brief

stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo

momentarily while obtaining more information," and permits a "limited search ... not to discover

evidence of crime, but to allow the officerto pursue hisinvestigation without fear of violence." Thus,

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3Rule 704(b) provides that:

No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a

defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the

defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element

of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for

the trier of fact alone.

FED. R. EVID. 704(b). 

the trial court was entirely justified in denying appellant's motion to suppress.

B. Expert Opinion Testimony

Appellant claimsthat the government violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b)3because the

government's drug expert gave opinion testimony to hypothetical facts identical to the facts of the

case and testified that the elements ofthe offense, includinginferentiallyintent, were present. The

testimony of Detective Thomas, the government's drug expert, went as follows:

Prosecutor: Now, Detective, I'm going to ask you a hypothetical question and I'm

going to ask you to tell us with whatwhat you think about the activities in the

hypothetical question as an expert. A person is observed walking directly to a spot

located next to a building. That person picks up a large white, rock-like substance

wrapped in plastic. Within minutes that same person is stopped and that person has

a large, white, rock-like substance on him in plastic. In fact, it's 25.5 grams that turns

out to be cocaine base. He also has a pager, $580 in small denomination bills, 56

empty Ziploc bags, and a 9 millimeter handgun. With what activity are thesethis

person's actions consistent, in your opinion?

Defense Attorney: Objection, Your Honor. Object to the form of the question. It's

not a hypothetical.

The Court: I'll permit it. Go ahead. Can you answer that, Sergeant?

Detective Thomas: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court: Do you have an opinion? Now, what is your opinion?

Detective Thomas: My opinion from listening to the hypothetical that was given to

me, that individual isinvolved in a drug operation. He met the elements: He went to

a stash area, a place that he controlled and removed an item. Later it was determined

that he had 25.55 grams of crack cocaine; and as you mentioned, some Ziploc

envelopes. Money that's consistent with what a drug userI'm sorry, drug dealer

would have on the streets of Washington, D.C. And also a weapon that would be

used to protect the drug operation. It would sound to me that someone was in the

business of making drugsmaking money by selling drugs on the streets of

Washington, D.C.

Defense Attorney: Your Honor, I'm going to object to that testimony and move to

strike it. The witness just testified to the elements of the defense. He's not a lawyer.

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He can't give testimony to that effect.

The Court: I'll permit it. Do you have any questions of this witness?

Tr. II, at 58-59.

Appellant relies on United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995), a case in which this

court held that an expert's assertion at trialthat "hypothetical" facts exactly mirroring alleged facts

of defendant's arrestshowed "possessionwithintent to distribute," ratherthanpossessionfor personal

useviolated Rule 704(b)'s prohibition on expert witnesses stating an opinion as to whether the

defendant had the necessary mental state constituting an element of the crime charged. Appellant

claims here that the trial court allowed Detective Thomas to testify in the manner forbidden in Boyd.

Thomastold the jury that the hypothetical individual "met the elements" of being "involved in a drug

operation," "in the business of making drugsmaking money by selling drugs on the streets of

Washington, D.C.," and his possession of drugs, drug paraphernalia and moneywere "consistent with

what a ... drug dealer would have on the streets of Washington, D.C." Appellant claims that, since

"involve[ment] in a drug operation" and possession "of articles consistent with what a ... drug dealer

would have," necessarily encompasses an intent to distribute narcotics, Thomas did in fact testify to

an ultimate issue in the case in violation of Rule 704(b). Moreover, appellant argues that Detective

Thomas'sstatement that the defendant "met the elements" of being involved in drug dealing implicitly

referred to the statutory element of intent required to convict a defendant of possession with intent

to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii).

The government, on the other hand, contends that Detective Thomas did not testify to the

intent or mental state of appellant, but only to the modus operandi of a participant in a drug

operation. The government contends that Thomas's use of the word "elements" was only a reference

to the elements of a "drug operation," not a reference to the formal elements of the charged offense.

The government attemptsto distinguish this case fromBoyd by noting that neither the prosecutor nor

the expert testifying in this case actuallyused the word "intent" or its equivalent when explaining what

activity could be inferred on the part of the "hypothetical" defendant. In Boyd, the prosecutor

hypothesized the existence of a person identicalin everyrelevant respect to the defendant in that case,

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4

Id. at 422. The prosecutor asked what "the packaging of that crack cocaine into nine

individual ziplocks tell[s] you about the intent of the person that was carrying those ziplocks," and

the expert responded that such evidence indicated that "[i]t was intent to distribute." Id.

then asked the expert whether "that person's possession" was "possession for personal use" or

"possession with intent to distribute." Boyd, 55 F.3d at 670. Thus, the prosecutor there was not just

explaining what kind of drug activity might be inferred from the hypothetical presented, but went one

step further to tell the jury that the person at issue had the intent to distribute drugs.

The government also points out (in a footnote) that, following the questionable expert

testimony at Smart'strial, defendant's counsel asked the police expert on cross-examination whether

the expert possessed any "information with respect to the facts of this particular case," to which the

officer replied that he did not. The government noted that, in United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d

1463 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the court upheld a conviction despite testimony that appeared to constitute

a violation of Rule 704(b), reasoning that the expert'stestimony would have been "troubling" but for

the fact that the district court had emphasized to the jury that the expert had no first-hand knowledge

about the case. See id. at 1466.

This court reviews a trial judge's admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.,

United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928 (1993).

Applying thisstandard of review, we are of the opinion that this case presents a close question under

Rule 704(b). On the one hand, the vast majority of cases in this and other circuits finding a Rule

704(b) violation involve situations in which the prosecutor, the expert, or both used the actual word

"intent" in describing the conduct of the individual posed in a hypothetical. In Boyd, the prosecutor

asked whether the facts given (which mirrored the actual case before the jury) were consistent with

"possession [of drugs] for personal use or ... possession with intent to distribute." 55 F.3d at 670

(emphasis added). The expert, in turn, opined that the facts suggested "[p]ossession with intent to

distribute." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in United States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir.

1993), the court found the expert testimony to "crossthe line" in violation of Rule 704(b) when both

the prosecutor and the expert used the word "intent" when asking about and evaluating a hypothetical

person's actionsthat mirrored the alleged actions of the actual defendant.4 Although use of the word

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5The Williams court found the statements about "intent" problematic, even though they were

directed at the purpose for which the bags were designed, rather than the intent of the defendant

per se.

6

See also United States v. Speer, 30 F.3d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1994) (interpreting United States

v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in pertinent part on reh'g, 821 F.2d 1034 (1987),

to stand for the proposition that "Rule 704(b) is not strictly construed and prohibits only a direct

statement of the defendant's intent") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 768 (1995); 

United States v. Hunter, 95 F.3d 14, 16, 17 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding expert testimony that a

14.76 gram quantity of cocaine base " "would definitely be involved in distribution versus

personal use' " and concluding that "[e]xpert testimony that a certain quantity of drugs suggests

distribution is admissible"); United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1239 (7th Cir. 1994)

("[Courts] have found it significant whether the expert actually referred to the intent of the

defendant or, instead, simply described in general terms the common practices of those who

clearly do possess the requisite intent, leaving unstated the inference that the defendant, having

been caught engaging in more or less the same practices, also possessed the requisite intent."); 

United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 653 n.2 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[I]f [the expert] had responded that

the circumstances suggested that this cocaine probably would be distributed, there would be no

Rule 704(b) issue. It is only the expert's use of the world "intended' that implicates the rule."). 

"intent" clearly violated the rule, the Mitchell court made clear that "Rule 704(b) allows an expert

to state that certain conduct fits a specific role in a criminal enterpriseeven though the conduct

described exactly parallels conduct that other evidence explicitly links to a defendant." Id. And in

United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1992), the court found that, in the absence of

an admonition to the jury by the trial judge that the expert possessed no actual knowledge of the case

before it, it would be "troubling" for the prosecutor to ask about "the intentions of the person who

possessed those [ziplock] bags," and to have the expert reply that possession of the bags indicated

that the drugs "were meant to be distributed at street level." Id. at 1465 (emphasis added by district

court).5In all of these cases, however, the actual word "intent" was used by the prosecutor and/or

the expert to describe conduct mirroring that ascribed to the defendant.6

On the other hand, some courts have warned that the Rule 704(b) inquiry should not be

allowed to degenerate into formalism and that the actual use of the word "intent" should not be the

dispositive factor in finding a Rule 704(b) violation. As the Seventh Circuit explained in United

States v. Lipscomb, "though officers did not in fact say "intent' or "intended' [in the case before the

court,] they might as well have, for the effect would have been exactly the same." 14 F.3d at 1240.

The court reasoned that,

[i]f the drugs found on Lipscomb "were for street-level distribution," as each of the

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officers testified, then Lipscomb possessed them for that purpose; he intended to

distribute them. Further, it would seem to make little difference that the officers'

opinions were based on an analysis of the external circumstances of the arrest, for the

officersstill would have "state[d] an opinion or inference asto whether the defendant

did or did not have the mentalstate or condition constituting an element of the crime

charged," and this is what the rule forbids.

Id. at 1240-41. Similarly, in the present case, where the jury heard the officer's testimony that

"hypothetical" behavior exactly mirroring Smart's alleged behavior was consistent with having "met

the elements" of "making money by selling drugs," it is more than plausible to posit that the officer

might as well have stated that such a person (clearly meaning Smart himself) intended to distribute

drugs for a profit in violation of the statute. The use of the word "elements," in particular, carries

legal connotations that could have misled the jury into thinking that Detective Thomas was

speculating on the ultimate legal issue of whether Smart had the requisite intent to distribute drugs.

Troubled by the difficulty of discerning a coherent principle from the potpourri of cases,

several courts have looked to the underlying purposes of Rule 704(b), and we do likewise here.

Although the Rule was originally enacted to place a limitation on psychiatric testimony when a

criminal defendant relies upon the insanitydefense,see S.REP. No. 225, 98thCong., 1st Sess. 230-31

(1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3412-13, it is now well-established that Rule 704(b)

applies to all cases in which an expert testifies as to a mental state or condition constituting an

element of the crime charged or defense thereto. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671

(D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994). The legislative

history of the Rule suggests that it was aimed at ameliorating "the danger associated with mental

health testimony ... that the expert, who is qualified only to explain medical concepts, will be called

upon to interpret legal ones." Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242. The Seventh Circuit opined that "[n]o

similar danger arises from the testimony of law enforcement experts because, by definition, they are

qualified to identify illegal behavior and to distinguish among its various forms." Id. Nevertheless,

that court recognized that the Rule also serves an important purpose with regard to the so-called

modus operandi testimony of law enforcement officers, where "[t]he central danger" isthat "the jury

may attach "undue weight' to the officer's testimony, either by mistaking an expert opinion for what

is really only an eyewitness observation, or by inferring that the officer's "opinion about the criminal

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7

In Boyd, the government lawyer asked the officer whether the hypothetical facts posed were

"consistent with" possession or possession with intent to distribute," whereas, in this case, the

prosecutor merely asked "with what activity" it was consistent. In Boyd, the predictable answer

nature ofthe defendant's activity is based on knowledge ofthe defendant beyond the evidence at trial.'

" Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11thCir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1026

(1988) (other citations omitted)).

To avert the danger that jurors will rely unduly on a law enforcement officer's expert

testimony, the Seventh Circuit articulated the following standard to be applied in Rule 704(b) cases

in which a police officer's expert testimony is at issue:

[S]uch testimony should not be excluded under Rule 704(b) as long as it is made

clear, either by the court expressly or in the nature of the examination, that the

opinion is based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on

some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes. Relevant in this regard,

though not determinative, is the degree to which the expert refers specifically to the

intent of the defendant, for this may indeed suggest, improperly, that the opinion is

based on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes.

Id. at 1242-43 (citation omitted). Under this standard, a court should assess two key elements in

deciding whether expert testimony violates Rule 704(b): (1) the language used by the questioner

and/or the expert, including use of the actual word "intent"; and (2) whether the context of the

testimony makes clear to the jury that the opinion is based on knowledge of general criminal

practices, rather than "some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes."

We find that the Seventh Circuit standard accurately encapsulates the law up to this point in

this circuit as well. It avoids any talismanic reliance on whether or not the prosecutor or expert used

the word "intent" in order to determine whether a violation of Rule 704(b) has occurred, and it also

recognizesthe importance of ensuring that the jury does not place undue weight on expert testimony

pertaining, expressly or impliedly, to the intent of the defendant. Applying this standard to the

present case, we conclude that Rule 704(b) was violated when the expert used the phrase "met the

elements" in analyzing a hypothetical that was a "carbon copy" ofthe alleged factualscenario. Unlike

most cases finding a violation of Rule 704(b), including Boyd, the prosecutor here did not actually

use the word "intent" in questioning the officer, nor did the officer use the word "intent" in his

answer.7 But this fact alone cannot be dispositive. Although Detective Thomas was not testifying

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was possession with intent, and in this case, the "activity" was described as "the business of

making drugsmaking money by selling drugs." 

8We were comforted to learn from government counsel at argument that the government no

longer engages in posing such mirroring hypothetical questions to its experts at trial. We are thus

confident this case represents the end of the line on this problematic practice. We note also that

this case was tried before our opinion in Boyd highlighted the danger of such questioning. 

9

See, e.g., United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d 1065, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (explaining, in dictum,

that it would be problematic for an expert to testify that a certain quantity of drugs "was intended

to be sold on the streets of Washington for a profit for a drug dealer" in part because "the district

court made no corrective interjection to ensure that the jury did not think that the prosecution's

expert was testifying that [the defendant] in particular intended to distribute the cocaine base"); 

United States v. Williams, 980 F.2d at 1466 (noting that a question by the prosecutor about a

hypothetical person's intent would be problematic absent "intervention" by the trial court to make

clear that the officer testifying had no actual knowledge of the case before the court). 

10It is true that the defendant's attorney, in cross-examining the detective, asked whether he

had any "information with respect to the facts of this particular case," to which the detective

replied that he did not. Tr. II, at 60. However, it may not have been clear at all to the jury that

this statement referred back to the mirroring hypothetical put forth by the prosecutor. 

explicitly as to the legal "elements"including the mens rea elementof the crime of possessing

drugs with the intent to distribute those drugs, the word "elements" must almost certainly have been

associated in the jury's mind with the statutory "elements" of the alleged crime, including the

"element" of intent. Thus, despite the fact that neither the prosecutor nor the expert explicitly used

the word "intent," the context of the interchange and the use of other words connoting intent added

up to a Rule 704(b) violation.8

Because the word "intent" was not used by the prosecutor or the expert, however, a Rule

704(b) violation could have been avoided under the Lipscomb standard if the court or the prosecutor

had made clear to the jury that the expert was not qualified to testify as to the ultimate issue of

intent.9 But the jury that convicted Antonio Smart was not notified adequately that Detective Thomas

was not testifying with regard to the actual facts of this case. The district court failed to intervene

when the detective explained that the individual in the hypothetical mirroring Smart's case "met the

elements" of involvement in drug dealing. The district court or the prosecutor should have made

clear to the jury that the detective was not allowed to draw any ultimate conclusions on statutory

elements of a crime since "ultimate issues" were reserved for the jury alone.10 However, this fact was

not explained by the district court or by the prosecutor at the time that Detective Thomas actually

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11In contrast, in United States v. Williams, the district court intervened almost immediately

after the prosecutor and police officer referred to the intentions of the hypothetical individual,

explicitly asking the officer: "You aren't referring and you have no knowledge, I take it, about

this particular case?"to which the officer replied: "That's correct." 980 F.2d at 1465. 

12In contrast, in cases where the defendant failed to object to the question or answer at trial,

any error is reviewed under the "plain error" standard. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 996

F.2d 419, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (explaining plain error standard); United States v. Askew, 88 F.3d

1065, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (error in allowing expert opinion as to intent held not plain error). 

13Indeed, structural errors, such as complete deprivation of the right to counsel or trial by a

biased judge, are per se prejudicial and lead to automatic reversal of a conviction. See, e.g.,

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-310 (1991); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275

(1993) (jury instruction on meaning of reasonable doubt that violates Constitution may never be

harmless error). But most errors, such as the one at issue in this case, are classified as "trial-type

drew his conclusions about the hypotheticalfacts; in fact, the district court overruled the defendant's

objections to the testimony.11 Consequently, it was never "made clear, either by the court expressly

or in the nature of the examination," that the detective's implicit reference to the hypothetical

individual's intent to distribute drugs "[was] based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal

practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes." United States

v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1242 (7th Cir. 1994). In the absence of such safeguards, we find that the

expert's testimony violated Rule 704(b).

Since the detective's answer to the prosecutor's mirroring hypotheticalwas objected to below

by defendant's counsel, the final issue is whether the error in allowing it into evidence was harmless.12

FederalRule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) providesthat: "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance

which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. RULE. CRIM. P. 52(a). When a

court is engaging in direct review of a nonconstitutional trial error, it must determine "whether the

error "had a substantial or injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Brecht v.

Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776

(1946)); see also United States v. Smith, 77 F.3d 511, 515 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (proper measure of

harmlessnessis whether error had "substantial and injurious effect" on verdict). In deciding whether

the error had such an effect, the court must consider both the severity ofthe error and the trialrecord

as a whole. In cases where the error is fundamental, or where the other, admissible evidence against

the defendant is ambiguous, a court will almost always conclude that the error affected the verdict.13

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errors" and are subject to harmless error review. 

14In another context, we have stated that "juries may infer an intent to distribute not only from

possession of drug packaging paraphernalia, but also from the presence of firearms," because

these items are tools of the drug trade just as surely as the drugs themselves. United States v.

Dunn, 846 F.2d 761, 763 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 

15Indeed, prior to answering the prosecution's hypothetical with the forbidden reference to the

"elements" of drug distribution, Detective Thomas had already produced abundant and lawful

testimony as to the parts played by "stashes," ziplock bags, pagers, weapons, large amounts of

cash in small-denomination bills, and large quantities of crack cocaine in the drug distribution

underworld. Detective Thomas explained the $20 dose-by-dose habit of the typical crack user. 

He noted that the amount of cocaine found on Smart would have generated about 178 individual

dose bags of crack, with a street value of approximately $3,560. He told of the implausibility of

any crack "user" possessing 178 doses for personal use. At the closing argument, the prosecutor

repeated all of this evidence againabout the large amounts of cash and drugs, the ziplock bags,

the pager, the gun, the practice of "stashing" drugs. 

If the judge is in "grave doubt" about the harmlessness of the error, he or she must reverse the

conviction. O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995). At all times, the burden of proving that an

error was not prejudicial rests on the government. See, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

734 (1993) (government bears the burden ofshowing that an error was not prejudicial and therefore

harmless).

Applying this standard here, we find that the government has met its burden in showing that

the Rule 704(b) violation committed at trial was harmless error. The totality of properly admitted

evidencedemonstrating both Smart's possession of the drugs and his intent to distribute those

drugswas weighty and not at all ambiguous. Although Smart was not observed in any

communication or transaction with anyone else, there was substantial evidence linking him to drug

dealing, including police observations at the scene, as well as his possession of money, 25.5 grams

of crack cocaine, ziplock bags, a pager, and a gunall the classic accessories of a drug dealer.14 In

addition, the direct evidence was supplemented by the entirely proper portion of the expert's

testimony addressing the modus operandi of drug dealers.15

Moreover, there was a virtual absence of exculpatory evidence. Appellant's defense was that

the drugs found on his person did not belong to him at all, that he had been wearing someone else's

jacket and was unaware of the contents of its pockets. He claimed that he was not the person the

police officer saw pick up drugs shortly before his apprehension. He also contended at trial that the

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16At trial, Smart conceded that he had never gone back to the neighborhood to look for

Richard. Smart claimed he had "called and tried to get in touch with [Richard]" but had been

unable to reach him. Tr. III, at 15. He also claimed that he had told an investigator about

Richard, but that the investigator was not able to locate him to issue a subpoena. Tr. III, at 16. 

police were lying about finding a gun in his waistband when they searched him. However, appellant

failed to present any evidence directly supporting these contentions, whereas there was ample

evidence that contradicted his assertions. Several different police officers testified that, at the time

of the arrest, they found a gun in his waistband. They testified that the appellant told them he carried

the gun for "protection" since he had been shot recently and that he showed the officers his gunshot

wound in order to prove his point. Additionally, although Smart testified that the reason for his

presence in the parking lot was that he was picking up transmission fluid from an adjacent house

where his friend Richard lived, he did not call this friend to the stand at trial as a witness to

corroborate his story about the transmission fluid or about the purportedly "borrowed" jacket.16

Most importantly, it is excruciatingly clear that the jury did not believe Smart's story. As

previously explained, his only defense was that the drugs were not his and that the police had lied

about finding the gun on his person. But if the jury had believed his tale, they would surely have had

to find himinnocent, and the expert testimonywhich simplycharacterized behavior he denied outright

as consistent with "the elements" of drug distribution would have been totally discounted or found

irrelevant. Once we assume that the jury believed the evidence linking Smart to the drugs, the gun,

and the other paraphernalia, the violation of Rule 704(b) represented by the expert testimony could

hardly have been crucial to the jury's secondary inference that Smart's possession of cocaine was

accompanied by the requisite intent to distribute the drugs. Smart himself never produced any

evidence or even suggested that his intent was not to distribute the cocaine found in his possession.

His principal contentions that the drugs were not his and that there was no gun in no way related to

any separate defense that he did not have the requisite intent to distribute drugs. In light of the

totality of the properly admitted evidence, as well as the fact that the violation of Rule 704(b) here

was not such a fundamental or pervasive error so as to taint the overall fairness of the trial, we

conclude that the erroneous inclusion of expert testimony in violation of Rule 704(b) did not have "a

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17See also Everette v. Roth, 37 F.3d 257, 262 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Insofar as possible the habeas

or appellate court shuns resolving credibility and weighing the evidence. Nevertheless, the

Brecht-Kotteakos test for harmless error requires the habeas court to evaluate to some extent the

probability of the outcome if the case were tried under proper instructions."), cert. denied, 115 S.

Ct. 2620 (1995). 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict," and therefore was

harmless.

We emphasize, however, that the harmless error test we apply here is not a mere

sufficiency-of-the-evidence inquiry. An appellate court may not usurp the jury's role as the arbiter

of guilt or innocence. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946) ("The [harmless error]

inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough [evidence] to support the result, apart from the

phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence.");

see generally Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal

Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995). Of course, in deciding whether an error has

had substantial influence on the jury, a reviewing court cannot help but look at the totality of lawful

evidence presented at trial. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 763-64.17 And if, as here, the lawful evidence

against the defendant is overwhelming and the trial error is not a fundamental one, the error should

be deemed harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Shyllon, 10 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(Confrontation Clause violation harmless in light of the "overwhelming direct evidence supporting

[defendant's] conviction") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1206 (1994).

On the other hand, if the evidence presented at trial is ambiguous, even a relatively minor

error requiresreversal. In O'Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992 (1995), the Supreme Court held that

in cases "where the record isso evenly balanced that a conscientiousjudge isin grave doubt as to the

harmlessness of an error," the judge cannot find a trial error to be harmless. Id. at 995. Indeed, in

a case where the evidence at trial is conflicting or ambiguous, the danger that an error will affect the

jury's verdict is almost always substantial. As we stated in United States v. Boyd, "where the facts

offered at trial are at best ambiguous as to the defendant's role in alleged criminal activity, expert

testimony on the ultimate issue of fact is likely to have a powerful effect on the result." 55 F.3d at

672 (emphasis in original). We further explained that, if a jury is already uncertain about a

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18See also United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 384, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[T]here is often an

inherent danger with expert testimony unduly biasing the jury "because of its aura of special

reliability and trust.' ") (quoting United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973)),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1012 (1989). 

19Section 924(c)(1) provides in relevant part:

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime

... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such

crime ..., be sentenced to imprisonment for five years....

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994). 

defendant's guilt or innocence, but hears testimony from an expert witness "who claims to know the

defendant's state of mind," then "the jurors may rely on the purported expertise of the Government

witnessto cure the ambiguity that they face." Id.18 Thus, if the other evidence presented in this case

had been even slightly ambiguous, we would be required to reverse Smart's conviction. It is only

because we find thatespecially in light of the absence of any convincing exculpatory evidence or

theory of the defensethe overall evidence supporting Smart's conviction is overwhelming and not

at all ambiguous, that we find this troublesome violation of Rule 704(b) to be harmless.

C. Jury Instruction on "Use" of a Gun

Count 2 of the indictment charges appellant with using and carrying a firearm during and in

relation to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).19 Appellant accurately notes

that the court incorrectly gave the jury an overbroad definition of the essential elements of using or

carrying a weapon in relation to a drug trafficking offense, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The

court's instructions to the jury were:

The second count of the indictment, charges the defendant with the knowing use and

carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking offense, that is, the

offense set forth in count 2 of the indictment.

The essential elements of this offense, namely, count 2, which the government must

prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are that the defendant used or carried a firearm;

that he did so knowingly and intentionally; that he did so during and in relation to a

drug-trafficking crime.

You are instructed that the word "use" can mean any use, such as the maintenance of

a firearmforsecurity or protection purposes. The government need not show that the

defendant actually employed the firearm or that the firearm was fired. It is sufficient

to show that the defendant actually or constructively possessed the firearm in order

to prove that he used it.

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20This Supreme Court decision reversed our in banc decision in United States v. Bailey, 36

F.3d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (in banc). 

Since these instructions were consistent with the case law at the time, the defense counsel did not

object, and any objection he raised would have been futile.

During jury deliberations, the jury forwarded a note to the court. The note asked two

questions: (1) "Is possession with intent to distribute cocaine base a drug-trafficking crime?" and "if

not, what is a drug-trafficking crime?"; and (2) "What is meant by knowingly used a firearm?" The

court responded by saying, "You've answered the question. Of course possession with intent to

distribute cocaine is a drug-trafficking crime." With respect to the jury's second question, the court

said:

I have previously instructed you that the word "use" can mean any use such as the

maintenance of a firearm for security or protection purposes. And I've previously

instructed you that an act is done knowingly if it is done voluntarily and purposely,

and not because of mistake, inadvertence or excuse. In other words, the act of using

a firearm meansincludes the maintenance of a firearm for security or protection

purposes, not because of mistake, accident, inadvertence or accident. It means to be

done voluntarily, intentionally and purposely.

Clearly, the trial judge's jury instruction on the "use" prong of the weapons possession in

relation to a drug trafficking charge was erroneous in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent

decision in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995),20 which held that for a conviction under

the "use" prong of § 924(c), the government must prove that the defendant "actively employed" the

firearm during and in relation to the predicate crime, since Congress intended to "require more than

possession to trigger the statute's application." Id. at 509. Under the supervening-decision doctrine,

we apply Bailey retroactively to vacate any prior conviction in which such an instruction was given

where it might have caused the jury to conclude that the defendant's awareness of and proximity to

a gun nearby in a drug transaction constituted a forbidden "use" of the gun. See, e.g., United States

v. Washington, 12 F.3d 1128, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (court will consider issue not raised at trial

"where a supervening decision has changed the law in appellant's favor and the law was so

well-settled at the time of trial that any attempt to challenge it would have appeared pointless");

United States v. McKie, 73 F.3d 1149, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (judicial construction of a statute is

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21This provision provides in pertinent part that:

No person shall carry within the District of Columbia either openly or concealed

on or about their person, a pistol, without a license issued pursuant to District of

Columbia law, or any deadly or dangerous weapon capable of being so

concealed.... 

D.C. Code § 22-3204. 

22At oral argument, defendant's counsel suggested a scenario in which the jury might have

concluded that the defendant "carried" a gun in violation of D.C. Code § 22-3204, while at the

same time concluding that he did not "carry" a gun in violation of § 924(c)(1). Counsel posited

that there could have been two different packages of drugs at issue, one that defendant allegedly

retroactive and relates back to the time of the statute's enactment).

The government, however, contendsthat in this case the error was harmless, because the jury

found the appellant guilty of a separate count of carrying a pistol without a license, in violation of

D.C. Code § 22-3204(a) (Count 3), a charge which necessarily had to include the finding that the

appellant "carried the pistolopenlyor concealed on or about his person [and] that he carried the pistol

knowinglyand intentionallythat means consciously, voluntarilyand on purpose, and not bymistake

or accident." Brief for Appellee, at 28 (quoting trial court's instructions to the jury). The

government's evidence showed conclusivelythat the firearmwasfound onhis person in his waistband.

Thus, the government argues, when the jury found that appellant "carried" a firearm within the

meaning of D.C. Code § 23-3204(a),21 the jury must necessarily have found the appellant "carried"

a firearm within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). For this reason, the error in the "use"

instruction was harmless.

We agree. All of the police officers involved in Smart's arrest testified consistently at trial that

they found a semiautomatic handgun in his possession when they patted him down during the Terry

stop-and-frisk. Clearly, the jury found this testimony credible and therefore found Smart guilty on

the charge of violating D.C. Code § 23-3204(a). Concomitantly, it is clear that the jury did not find

credible Smart's contention that he did not have a weapon on his person at the time of his arrest. The

only other possible scenario suggested by appellant's counsel in which he could have been properly

convicted under the D.C. Code while simultaneously improperly convicted under the federal "use"

or "carry" provision was quite implausible.22 Under § 924(c), Smart's knowing possession of the

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picked up by the trees, and one that was allegedly found inside the defendant's jacket in the

parking lot. The jury could have believed the evidence about the drugs by the trees, while at the

same time disbelieving the evidence that defendant had drugs on him in the parking lot. Since the

only evidence presented as to defendant's possessing a firearm was in the parking lot, not by the

trees, the jury could only have legitimately found a "carrying" firearm offense vis-a-vis the parking

lot evidence. If the drug offense found by the jury were confined to the tree drugs, then the

firearm offense might not relate to a drug offense, as required by § 924(c)(1). Necessary to

counsel's hypothetical scenario is the notion that, under the broad definition of "use" under § 924

offered to the jury, they could have found "use" of a firearm constructively (e.g., based on it being

in his car while he was near the trees), even though the gun was not found at the same time that

the drugs were seen in the defendant's possession. The elaborate scenario proposed by

defendant's counsel seems too farfetched a possibility for any rational jury to base its verdict on in

light of the evidence offered at trial. 

23Under this provision, a sentencing court may impose a sentence outside the range provided

for by the sentencing guidelines if the court determines

that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a

degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in

formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that

described.

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 

handgun at the time of his arrest, and his subsequent conviction for possessing more than five grams

of cocaine with intent to distribute, are sufficient to support a conviction for "carrying" a firearm

"during and in relation to ... [a] drug trafficking crime." Accordingly, we conclude that the improper

jury instruction asto the meaning of "use" under § 924(c) was harmless, and Smart's conviction under

that provision is affirmed.

D. Departures From Sentencing Guidelines

Finally, before sentencing, the defense counsel filed a sentencing memorandum asking the

court to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines in light of the Sentencing Commission's

Special Report to Congress on Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy ("Commission's Special

Report"), addressing the sentencing disparity between powder cocaine and crack cocaine. At

appellant's sentencing hearing on May 12, 1995, the defense counsel urged the court to depart from

the Sentencing Guidelines, and attempted to persuade the court that it had the discretion and legal

authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)23 and pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, to depart downward from

the guideline range based on the Commission's Special Report. The court, however, rejected the

argument,stating, "suspicion [that the circuits will change their position ifCongressshould adopt the

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Commission'srecommendations] is not good enough when we've got a flat statement of what the law

is." Tr. V, at 5.

This court's decision in United States v. Anderson, 82 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1996), is directly

on point. In Anderson, this court held that "Congress's and the Commission's actions gave [the

district judge] no power to depart [from the Sentencing Guidelines]." Id. at 442. This decision is

dispositive, for the present at least, and the district court did not err in refusing to depart.

Affirmed.

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