Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03002/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cindy Sheehan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2007 Decided January 11, 2008

No. 07-3002

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CINDY SHEEHAN,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 05mj00649-17)

Catherine M.A. Carroll argued the cause for appellant.

With her on the briefs were David S. Cohen and Jennifer M.

O’Connor.

Florence Y. Pan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III and Michael Truscott,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant Cindy Sheehan

was arrested in September 2005 for demonstrating without a

permit on the White House sidewalk during an antiwar protest.

She was charged with violating 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2), a

National Park Service (“NPS”) regulation promulgated pursuant

to the authority granted by 16 U.S.C. § 3. The regulation

governs demonstrations in all park areas in the National Capital

Region, including the White House sidewalk, and provides that

demonstrations involving more than 25 people may be held only

pursuant to a permit. Following a bench trial before a

Magistrate Judge, appellant was convicted and assessed a $50

fine and a $25 administrative fee.

 Appellant appealed her conviction to the District Court

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (“an appeal of right shall lie from

the judgment of the magistrate to a judge of the district court of

the district in which the offense was committed”) and Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2). The District Court

rejected appellant’s arguments that the NPS regulations were

unconstitutional and that the evidence was insufficient to

support a conviction, and affirmed the judgment of the

Magistrate Judge:

[T]he National Park Service regulation at issue – 36 C.F.R.

§ 7.96 – does not impose strict liability and may be

interpreted to require that an accused “knowingly”

demonstrate without a permit. Moreover, even if the

regulation were deemed to lack a mens rea element, the

appellants waived their right to challenge the

constitutionality of the regulation on that ground by failing

to raise the argument below. The Court also concludes that

the evidence was sufficient for a fair-minded and

reasonable trier of fact to find the appellants guilty beyond

a reasonable doubt of demonstrating without a permit in

violation of 36 C.F.R. § 7.96.

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Sheehan v. United States, No. 05-MJ-00649, 2006 WL 3756349,

at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2006).

 On appeal to this court, appellant contests the District

Court’s judgment on five principal grounds. She asserts the

following: (1) the First Amendment challenge to the NPS

regulations was properly preserved at trial; (2) the NPS permit

requirement is facially unconstitutional under the First

Amendment, because it imposes strict liability on protected

expressive conduct; (3) there is no evidence of appellant’s mens

rea, because the Government prosecuted the case on the premise

that strict liability applied and the Magistrate Judge excluded

evidence that addressed appellant’s mens rea; (4) the evidence

does not show that appellant was “demonstrating” within the

meaning of the NPS regulations; and (5) the evidence does not

show that appellant knowingly demonstrated without a permit.

We hold that appellant’s facial challenge to the

constitutionality of the regulations is properly before the court,

but that it fails. We agree with the District Court that the NPS

regulations should be construed to contain a mens rea

requirement. We also reject appellant’s claim that a valid permit

existed for demonstrations on the White House sidewalk on the

day of her arrest. We reverse and remand for a new trial,

however, because appellant was convicted of a crime that does

not exist and prevented from offering a viable defense. There is

no strict liability under 36 C.F.R. § 7.96. Yet, the Magistrate

Judge allowed the Government to prosecute the case against Ms.

Sheehan on the erroneous premise that the disputed regulations

imposed strict liability for her alleged expressive activity, and

sustained the prosecutor’s objections when appellant sought to

advance a defense based on her knowledge and intent. As a

result, appellant’s conviction is based on errors of law that

eliminated the prosecutor’s burden to prove mens rea and barred

the appellant from presenting a defense on that issue. We are

therefore obliged to reverse and remand for a new trial.

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BACKGROUND

On July 20, 2005, individuals from a group called the Iraq

Pledge of Resistance (“IPR”) submitted an application to the

NPS for a permit to hold a demonstration near the White House

on September 26, 2005. The stated purpose of the

demonstration was to “peaceful[ly] protest against the Iraq War

and [memorialize] those killed in it.” Appendix to Brief of

Appellant (“App.”) A22. This first permit request indicated that

the location of the proposed activity was “[t]he Ellipse,

Constitution Avenue between 14th and 16th Streets N.W., The

Ellipse Drive (behind the White House).” Id.

On July 28, 2005, IPR submitted a revised application, this

time designating the demonstration location as “Lafayette

Square, sidewalk surrounding the park” and “White House

sidewalk.” Id. at A25. NPS took no action on the amended

application. The NPS regulations governing the National

Capital Region state that “[a]ll demonstration applications . . .

are deemed granted, subject to all limitations and restrictions

applicable to said park area, unless denied within 24 hours of

receipt.” 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(3). Therefore, by the end of July

2005, IPR had a “deemed granted” permit to demonstrate on the

White House sidewalk.

On September 22 and 23, 2005, an individual affiliated with

IPR corresponded by email with NPS officials regarding details

of the upcoming event. App. A28-33. In an email sent on

September 23, the IPR representative indicated that the group no

longer sought to include the White House sidewalk as a

designated location in the demonstration permit:

I want to communicate that we do NOT wish our permit to

include the White House sidewalk. We would like to

include the Ellipse and Lafayette Park, of course, as we

have discussed previously, but to repeat we do not want the

permit to include the White House sidewalk.

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Id. at A31. A written permit was faxed by NPS to IPR

coordinators later that day. The permit specified that the

approved location of the public gathering was “The Ellipse – SE

quadrant, Lafayette Park east-side.” Id. at A15. The White

House sidewalk was not listed on the written permit.

On September 26, 2005, appellant and four other members

of an organization called Gold Star Families for Peace

approached the northwest gate of the White House and

requested a meeting with the President of the United States to

discuss the Iraq War. When the guard at the gate informed them

that no one would meet with them, the five walked a short

distance away from the gate and sat down on the White House

sidewalk. Appellant remained there for approximately one hour.

Meanwhile, more than 200 other people assembled on the White

House sidewalk to protest the Iraq War. By all accounts, these

participants engaged in nonviolent conduct that included

singing, chanting, and carrying signs, and their activities drew

a crowd of spectators. Around 1:30 p.m., an officer of the

United States Park Police (“USPP”) announced that the

demonstrators were in violation of NPS regulations and

instructed them to leave the area or risk arrest. Using a

megaphone amplified by the loudspeaker system on two police

cars, the officer repeated the warning three times, with two to

five minutes between warnings. After the final warning, the

police officers cordoned off the sidewalk and then arrested the

people remaining on the sidewalk within the enclosure.

Appellant was among those arrested. 

Appellant and the persons with whom she was arrested were

charged with demonstrating without a permit on the White

House sidewalk in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2). On

November 16 and 17, 2005, appellant and 28 other defendants

were tried together before a Magistrate Judge pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3401. The only evidence offered against appellant was

that she was sitting on the White House sidewalk when the area

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was cordoned off by USPP officers. Both the Magistrate Judge

and the Government proceeded with the trial of the case on the

premise that there was no mens rea requirement under the NPS

regulations. And the Magistrate Judge prevented appellant and

her co-defendants from offering evidence of their intent and

knowledge. When Ms. Sheehan and the other codefendants

attempted to proffer testimony about what they knew during the

day of the demonstration, the prosecutor objected, arguing that

intent was irrelevant, and the Magistrate Judge sustained the

objection and expressly stated that intent was irrelevant. See,

e.g., Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 60-62 (Testimony of Defendant

Manijeh Saba); id. at 103 (Testimony of Defendant Cindy

Sheehan). Although police officers testified about the bullhorn

warnings they had given the demonstrators, appellant and other

defendants were prevented from providing testimony to the

contrary and were therefore prevented from advancing a defense

on a principal element of the charged offense.

On November 17, 2005, the Magistrate Judge found

appellant and all of her codefendants guilty of demonstrating

without a permit. The Magistrate Judge subsequently filed a

written decision and judgment. United States v. Allen, Mag.

Crim. No. 05-00649 (D.D.C. Dec. 7, 2005). Appellant was

assessed a $50 fine and a $25 administrative fee. Appellant then

appealed her conviction to the District Court pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 3402 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(g)(2),

but her appeal was denied. Sheehan, 2006 WL 3756349. 

The District Court rejected appellant’s argument that her

conviction for violating the NPS regulations could not stand

because the regulations impose strict criminal liability for

conduct that is protected by the First Amendment. On this

point, the District Court concluded that “inferring a requirement

that an individual ‘knowingly’ demonstrate without a permit

appears appropriate to remedy any question about the mental

state required to convict someone for violating the National Park

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Service regulation, and such a result is in harmony with the case

law.” Id. at *5. In the alternative, the District Court ruled that,

even if the NPS regulations did impose strict liability, appellant

waived any argument that the regulations lack a mens rea

requirement by failing to raise the issue before or during her

trial. Id. at *5-*6. The District Court also rejected appellant’s

claim that, because there were no facts showing that she was

“demonstrating” as defined by the NPS regulations, the evidence

against her was insufficient to prove the alleged offense. The

court found that prior to her arrest, appellant was sitting on the

White House sidewalk near a mass of other people, all of whom

were expressing their opposition to the war in Iraq. The court

concluded that, given this setting, appellant’s act of sitting

constituted “demonstrat[ing]” within the meaning of the

regulations. Id. at *7-*8. Finally, the trial court rejected

appellant’s contention that a valid permit had been granted to

IPR to demonstrate at the White House sidewalk on the day in

question. The court held:

The appellant is correct that the National Park Service

regulation states that a permit application shall be deemed

granted unless denied in writing within 24 hours of receipt

and permits the Service to revoke a permit only in writing

for the reasons enumerated in the regulation. 36 C.F.R.

§§ 7.96(g)(3) & (g)(6). The regulation does not, however,

cover situations in which an applicant voluntarily

withdraws or cancels their request for a permit, as occurred

here. To suggest that a cancelled request also be subject to

the revocation procedures is not compelling, or even

practical, given that the regulation allows revocation only

in specified circumstances that are not applicable or

relevant when an applicant voluntarily cancels his or her

application. 

Id. at *8.

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Appellant filed a timely appeal with this court challenging

the District Court’s judgment.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPELLANT’S FACIAL

CHALLENGE TO THE NPS REGULATIONS

As a threshold matter, the parties disagree over the

applicable standard of review covering appellant’s claim that the

NPS regulations are facially unconstitutional. The Government

argues that the plain error standard under Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 52(b) applies, because appellant forfeited

her claim by not raising it with sufficient specificity at trial.

Appellant contends that the issue is subject to de novo review by

this court, because it was raised and preserved below.

“No procedural principle is more familiar . . . than that a . . .

right may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the

failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal

having jurisdiction to determine it.” Yakus v. United States, 321

U.S. 414, 444 (1944). When an appellant fails to clearly raise

an issue at trial, the District Court Judge is deprived of the

opportunity to consider it. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas,

896 F.2d 589, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

[Objections] should be timely, specific, and renewed, when

the court’s initial ruling, correct when made, is proved

erroneous in the light of subsequent evidence. The

rationale for these requirements includes importantly the

need for a record, developed by adversary processes, on

which appellate consideration and resolution can safely

proceed.

United States v. Lewis, 433 F.2d 1146, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

(internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also

Graham v. Davis, 880 F.2d 1414, 1419-20 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

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 Whether an issue has been properly raised and preserved is

a matter of judgment, however, and it may require the exercise

of discretion by the appellate court. For example, as the

Supreme Court noted in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.

112 (1988), when an appellant’s “legal position in the District

Court . . . was consistent with the legal standard that it . . .

advocates” on appeal, the reviewing court may consider the

issue even though appellant’s “arguments in the District Court

were much less detailed than the arguments” advanced on

appeal. Id. at 120. 

During the trial in this case, in answer to a question raised

by the Magistrate Judge, defense counsel indicated that

appellant meant to raise a facial challenge to the NPS

regulations:

Mr. Norris [trial counsel for Ms. Sheehan]: It’s clear, Your

Honor, first off, there’s a constitutional First Amendment

right both to freedom of speech, to assemble, and to be able

to address the government for grievances. So there is a

First Amendment constitutional right to protest, to speak

out, to speak out at the White House. It’s a public area.

The Court: So you’re challenging the constitutionality of

the Code of Federal Regulation.

Mr. Norris: Yes.

Trial Tr. (11/16/05 PM) at 29. The Magistrate Judge then

suggested that the facial validity of the regulations had already

been decided by the court of appeals. The Judge indicated,

however, that appellant could raise the issue on appeal:

The Court: As I read [United States v. Cinca, 56 F.3d 1409

(D.C. Cir. 1995)], certainly our circuit appears to have not

found that particular section of the [NPS regulation]

wanting in terms of constitutionality, but on the other hand,

you will certainly be able to make your record on that and

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state the record and the Court will rule on it. And if the

Court were to rule against you and it seems to me I have no

choice in view of the circuit decision, that you can then take

it up to the Court of Appeals.

Id. at 30. 

The foregoing record excerpts indicate that the Magistrate

Judge understood that appellant meant to raise a facial challenge

to the NPS regulations. Although appellant’s counsel said

nothing more on the matter following his exchange with the

Magistrate Judge, he also did nothing to suggest that he meant

to abandon or waive appellant’s facial challenge to the NPS

regulations. And, more importantly, the matter was fully briefed

by both parties in appellant’s appeal to the District Court. In

these circumstances, there is no good reason why this court

should not address the issue.

In Grace v. Burger, 665 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1981), aff’d

in part and vacated in part, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.

171 (1983), this court was faced with a challenge to the

constitutionality of a statute that made it unlawful to parade,

stand, or move in processions or assemblages in the Supreme

Court building or grounds. The District Court dismissed the

complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. We

rejected the District Court’s dismissal of the case on grounds of

exhaustion and then addressed the constitutional issue even

though the District Court had not ruled on it. We noted that:

Both parties have addressed fully the constitutionality of

[the statute], both in this court and in the District Court.

This is not a case, therefore, where resolution of an issue for

the first time on appeal would cause undue surprise or

prejudice. In addition, since appellants challenge the

constitutionality of [the statute] on its face, the resolution of

this issue is purely one of law, appropriate for appellate

review. For these reasons, we believe that a remand to the

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District Court, which inevitably would result in a future

appeal to this court, would be a waste of judicial resources.

665 F.2d at 1197 n.9 (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted), aff’d in part and vacated in part, United States v.

Grace, 461 U.S. at 175 n.4 (assuming without deciding that the

court of appeals acted properly in deciding the constitutional

issue). 

As we noted in Grace v. Burger, “‘[t]he matter of what

questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on

appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of

appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases.’” 665

F.2d at 1197 n.9 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121

(1976)). It follows, a fortiori, that if this court has the discretion

to resolve an issue that was not addressed by the trial court, we

surely may address an issue that was raised by appellant before

the Magistrate Judge, briefed and argued by the parties during

the course of appellant’s appeal to the District Court, and

decided by the District Court in an extensive written opinion.

We do so here. In the end, for the reasons discussed below, we

affirm the District Court’s decision that the NPS regulations do

not impermissibly impose strict liability for protected First

Amendment activities. 

II. APPELLANT’S FACIAL CHALLENGE TO THE NPS PERMIT

REQUIREMENT

Appellant was convicted of violating 36 C.F.R.

§ 7.96(g)(2), which states that “[d]emonstrations and special

events may be held only pursuant to a permit issued in

accordance with the provisions of this section.” Permits are not

required for some demonstrations involving fewer than 25

people, nor are they required for demonstrations taking place in

certain park areas that are not at issue in this case. 36 C.F.R.

§ 7.96(g)(2)(i) and (ii). 

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Under the regulations, the term “demonstrations”

includes demonstrations, picketing, speechmaking,

marching, holding vigils or religious services and all other

like forms of conduct which involve the communication or

expression of views or grievances, engaged in by one or

more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent or

propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers. This term does

not include casual park use by visitors or tourists which

does not have an intent or propensity to attract a crowd or

onlookers.

36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(1)(i). And the penalty provision applicable

to appellant’s alleged violation states that

[a] person convicted of violating a provision of the

regulations contained in [Part 7] of this chapter . . . shall be

punished by a fine as provided by law, or by imprisonment

not exceeding 6 months, or both, and shall be adjudged to

pay all costs of the proceedings.

36 C.F.R. § 1.3(a). 

Appellant argues that because none of the applicable

provisions in the regulations contains a mens rea element, “a

person may be found guilty even when he has no knowledge as

to the lack of a permit and, indeed, even where he holds a

reasonable, good faith – but mistaken – belief that a permit in

fact exists.” Br. for Appellant at 18. According to appellant,

these provisions establish a “strict liability regime” that imposes

“an unconstitutional burden on free expression.” Id. Appellant

thus contends that the District Court erred in holding to the

contrary. In addressing this claim, we apply a de novo standard

of review. See United States v. West, 393 F.3d 1302, 1310 (D.C.

Cir. 2005) (appellate court reviews de novo the trial court’s

construction of a criminal statute); United States v.

Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(“As an issue of statutory construction, our review is de novo.”).

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Strict liability is generally disfavored in criminal law,

particularly with respect to cases that implicate the First

Amendment. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-

54 (1959). It is well understood, however, that the “mere

omission . . . of any mention of intent will not be construed as

eliminating that element from the crimes denounced.”

Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978).

This point was reiterated in Staples v. United States, 511 U.S.

600 (1994), where the Supreme Court held that a statute’s

“silence” on the mens rea element “does not necessarily suggest

that Congress intended to dispense with a conventional mens rea

element.” 511 U.S. at 605. The Staples Court importantly

added that “some indication of congressional intent, express or

implied, is required to dispense with mens rea as an element of

a crime.” Id. at 606.

 We agree with the District Court that we must “presum[e]

that criminal statutes and regulations contain a mens rea element

unless otherwise clearly intimated in the language or legislative

history.” Sheehan, 2006 WL 3756349 at *4. In this case,

nothing significant in the language or legislative history of the

NPS regulations indicates a congressional intent to adopt a strict

liability regime. The language of the regulations is at worst

ambiguous, and the legislative history is silent. Furthermore, it

is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has implied a mental state

requirement where the legislative history of a disputed statute

has provided much more evidence of congressional intent to

create a strict liability regime than is evident in this case. See

United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 73-78

(1994); see also id. at 80-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting). It is also

significant that, unlike the situation in American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600

(6th Cir. 2005), the Government here ostensibly concedes that

the NPS regulations would be unconstitutional if they imposed

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strict liability. Br. for Appellee at 31-40; see also Sheehan,

2006 WL 3756349 at *4. 

In light of the well-established precedent covering this

matter, we hold that 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(2) survives appellant’s

facial constitutional challenge. We therefore affirm the decision

of the District Court on this point:

Although the National Park Service regulation contains

no express language indicating that demonstrators must

know that there is no permit before being subjected to

criminal sanctions, there likewise is no language clearly

evincing an intent to dispense with such a mental state, and

the appellant proffered no evidence of such an intent by

citing to the history of the regulation, or to any other source

for that matter. Thus, following the reasoning applied in

Morissette and its progeny, it is clear that the presumption

in favor of a [mens rea] requirement should apply to each

of the statutory elements that criminalize otherwise

innocent conduct.

Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and

footnotes omitted). In short, the disputed NPS regulations must

be read to contain a mens rea element. This means that

individuals cannot be convicted of demonstrating without a

permit unless the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt

that they had the requisite knowledge and intent to do so.

III. THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF APPELLANT’S MENS REA

A. The Critical Errors During Appellant’s Trial

Although the NPS regulations are not facially

unconstitutional for want of a mens rea requirement, the

Government proceeded with the prosecution of appellant on the

erroneous premise that the regulations imposed strict liability.

As noted above, the Magistrate Judge, in response to the

prosecutor’s objections, prevented appellant and her

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co-defendants from offering evidence of their intent and

knowledge. In addition, when appellant’s trial counsel moved

for acquittal at the end of the Government’s case, the prosecutor

stated that “[t]he issue of whether or not the Defendants were

notified of the existence or nonexistence of a permit is not

apposite.” Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 50. And in her closing

rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that “notice about the

existence of the permit or lack of a permit is not an element and

not a defense of this violation.” Id. at 130; see also id. at 122.

These arguments by the prosecutor were erroneous. Although

a mistake of law on appellant’s part may not have been a worthy

defense, this did not relieve the prosecution of its burden to

prove her mens rea, i.e., what appellant knew, heard, and

intended on the day in question. The Government incorrectly

proceeded on the basis that mens rea was not an element of the

offense, and successfully objected to appellant’s attempts to

offer evidence of her knowledge and intent.

It is also clear that the findings of the Magistrate Judge were

premised on the erroneous view that the NPS regulations

imposed strict liability. In his written opinion, the Magistrate

Judge failed to mention any mens rea element when discussing

the Government’s burden of proof, stating instead that “[i]n

order to sustain a charge of protesting without a permit, the

Government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the

Defendants did not, in fact, have a permit to demonstrate on the

sidewalk directly in front of the White House.” Allen, Mag.

Crim. No. 05-00649 at 4. 

The Magistrate Judge committed two legal errors. First, in

allowing the Government to prosecute the case against Ms.

Sheehan on the erroneous premise that the disputed regulations

imposed strict liability, the Magistrate Judge eliminated the

prosecutor’s burden of proving mens rea. This was a serious

constitutional error: The prosecution’s “burden of proving all

elements of the offense charged” and obligation to “persuade the

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factfinder beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts necessary to

establish each of those elements” arise from the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S.

275, 277-78 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Second, in preventing appellant from presenting a defense

on the mens rea issue, the Magistrate Judge denied her the right

to procedural fairness. The Supreme Court has made it clear

that 

[w]hether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process

or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the

Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense. . . . [A]n

essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity

to be heard. 

Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). 

Given these well-established constitutional protections, it

cannot be doubted that the Magistrate Judge’s rulings in this

case were erroneous. During oral argument before this court,

Government counsel did not contest that error was committed.

Rather, the Government argued that the Magistrate Judge’s

errors should be excused as harmless. We disagree. The

Government was allowed to prosecute appellant for a crime that

does not exist, and appellant was denied “a meaningful

opportunity to present a complete defense.” For the reasons set

forth below, we cannot hold these errors harmless. 

B. The Harmless Error Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) states that “[a]ny

error . . . that does not affect substantial rights must be

disregarded.” Because the errors in this case involved

infringements of constitutional rights, we can ignore the errors

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as harmless only if it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that

the error[s] complained of did not contribute to the verdict

obtained.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); see

also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (evaluating trial

judge’s failure to submit an element of the crime to the jury

under the Chapman standard for constitutional error). “At all

times, the burden of proving that an error was not prejudicial

rests on the government.” United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379,

1390 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

C. Application of the Harmless Error Standard to the

Facts of this Case

As has already been indicated, the Magistrate was of the

view that the NPS regulations imposed strict liability and

proceeded on the basis that mens rea was not an element of the

offense. Pursuant to this erroneous view of the law, the

Magistrate Judge barred appellant from advancing a defense

based on her lack of knowledge and intent. When Ms. Sheehan

and other defendants attempted to proffer testimony about what

they knew during the day of the demonstration, the prosecutor

objected, arguing that intent was irrelevant, and the Magistrate

Judge sustained the objections and expressly stated that intent

was irrelevant. See, e.g., Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 103 (Testimony

of Defendant Cindy Sheehan); Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 60-62

(Testimony of Defendant Manijeh Saba). Thus, as the record

makes clear, the Magistrate Judge incorrectly ruled that the NPS

regulations did not contain a mens rea requirement and then

prevented appellant from advancing a defense on this element of

the charged offense. 

In determining whether the Government has met its burden

of demonstrating “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error[s]

complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,”

Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, a reviewing court invariably considers

whether “(1) the case is not close, (2) the issue not central, or

(3) effective steps were taken to mitigate the effects of the

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error.” In re Sealed Case, 99 F.3d 1175, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, for example, an error

will be found harmless under Chapman “where a reviewing

court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that [an] omitted

element [of the charged offense] was uncontested and supported

by overwhelming evidence, such that the . . . verdict would have

been the same absent the error.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. None

of these caveats provides relief from the legal errors in the

instant case. First, it surely cannot be said that the case is “not

close.” Indeed, it is impossible to assess the “weight” of the

evidence in this case, because appellant was prevented from

advancing a defense on her knowledge and intent. The

Magistrate Judge’s erroneous legal premise might not have

resulted in reversible error if appellant had been allowed to

present a defense on her mens rea and the Government had been

able to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the

Magistrate Judge’s failure to consider an element of the charged

offense “did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” No such

showing can be made here, because the Magistrate Judge would

not allow appellant to testify on her knowledge and intent.

Second, appellant’s intent is undoubtedly a central issue in this

case, because, as the Government now concedes, mens rea is an

element of the charged offense. And, finally, no steps were

taken to mitigate the effects of the Magistrate Judge’s error. The

verdict was not rendered by a jury, so no jury instructions or

other steps were readily available to lessen the gravity of the

erroneous legal conclusion drawn by the Magistrate Judge. The

Magistrate Judge was of a clear mind that mens rea was not an

element of the offense and he conducted the trial and reached his

judgment accordingly. At the conclusion of the Government’s

case, appellant’s counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on

the ground that the Government had failed to prove that

appellant or her codefendants “had notice that they were

violating the law.” Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 47; see also id. at 44-

47. The motion was denied, undoubtedly because the

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Magistrate Judge viewed the NPS regulations as imposing strict

liability. 

In its arguments to this court, the Government attempted to

minimize the effect of the trial errors by noting that appellant

was asked at one point by the prosecutor whether she had a

permit, and she responded that she “didn’t know that [she]

needed a permit.” Trial Tr. (11/17/05) at 110. It is unclear

whether this statement by appellant was intended as sarcasm, but

it does not matter because the statement does not give evidence

of appellant’s intent or knowledge. Because of the Magistrate

Judge’s ruling, appellant was never allowed to testify about her

intent and knowledge on the day in question. Thus, there is no

evidence in the record indicating, inter alia, (1) whether

appellant heard the police officer’s bullhorn announcements and,

if she did hear them, what she reasonably understood from them;

(2) whether she knew that the original permit would have

allowed the protestors to demonstrate on the White House

sidewalk; and (3) whether she knew that the demonstration

leaders had changed the permit just a few days before September

26, 2005, such that the permit no longer included the White

House sidewalk as an acceptable place for demonstrating. The

Magistrate Judge’s written opinion occasionally refers to “the

intent of the demonstrators to engage in civil disobedience.”

See, e.g., Allen, Mag. Crim. No. 05-00649 at 10. But these

references are merely rhetorical, at least insofar as they relate to

appellant, because she was not allowed to offer any testimony

about her knowledge and intent regarding the charge of

demonstrating without a permit. 

When, as happened in this case, a defendant is prevented

from offering crucial evidence in her own defense, it can hardly

be concluded that the trial errors are harmless. “Error cannot be

harmless where it prevents the defendant from providing an

evidentiary basis for his defense.” United States v. Saenz, 179

F.3d 686, 689 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that where a trial court

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mistakenly ruled as a matter of law that certain evidence relating

to the defendant’s self-defense claim was inadmissible, the error

was not harmless); United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 69 (2d

Cir. 1995) (holding that erroneously excluding testimony that

supported appellant’s defense was not harmless error because

the defense “went to the core of the prosecution’s case”); cf.

United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 653-55 (D.C. Cir. 1994)

(finding reversible error where the trial judge had erroneously

excluded testimony critical to the appellant’s defense). 

During oral argument, Government counsel argued that the

Supreme Court’s holding in Neder supports a finding of

harmless error in this case. We disagree, because the

circumstances in Neder are quite different from appellant’s case.

In Neder, the defendant was convicted of filing false federal

income tax returns and of federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and

bank fraud. The trial court determined, inter alia, that the

element of materiality with regard to the tax and bank fraud

charges was a question for the judge, not the jury, and found that

the evidence established that element. The Eleventh Circuit

held that the trial court’s failure to submit the materiality

element of the tax offense to the jury was error, but that the error

was harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed on these points.

However, Neder is distinguishable from the case before us. In

Neder, the district court did not prevent the defendant from

adducing evidence on the disputed issue of materiality. The

defendant was “heard” on the issue. The trial judge’s error was

in deciding the issue, rather than presenting it to the jury. 527

U.S. at 6-7. Moreover, the defendant in Neder did not contest

the issue of materiality. Id. at 15. On this record, the Neder

Court concluded that it was “beyond a reasonable doubt that the

omitted element was uncontested and supported by

overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have

been the same absent the error.” Id. at 17. 

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It is clear that, despite the Court’s holding that a trial error

concerning the omission of an element of a charged offense can

be subject to harmless error review, Neder does not control this

case. Unlike the defendant in Neder, Ms. Sheehan sought to

present evidence on the critical element of the charged offense,

but the Magistrate Judge barred the introduction of the evidence

when the prosecutor objected to its admission. The trial judge

in Neder misperceived the law, but he did not eliminate the

prosecutor’s burden of proving an element of the charged

offense or bar the defendant from presenting a defense on that

issue. Given these differences between Neder and the instant

case, and in consideration of the record here, we cannot hold

that the Government has met its burden of proving “beyond a

reasonable doubt” that the Magistrate Judge’s failure to consider

an element of the charged offense “did not contribute to the

verdict obtained.” 

In light of our holding that appellant was denied an

opportunity to present a defense to an element of the offense, we

are unable to determine whether appellant was in fact

“demonstrating” on the day in question. Nor can we determine

whether the police officer’s bullhorn announcements gave

appellant notice that she was demonstrating on the White House

sidewalk without a valid permit. These matters can be

addressed if and when appellant is retried for the alleged offense

that gave rise to her prosecution in this case.

IV. THE VALIDITY OF THE FIRST PERMIT

Finally, appellant argues that her conviction should simply

be reversed, with no possibility of a new trial, because, even if

she was demonstrating on the day in question, a valid permit

existed for demonstrations on the White House sidewalk.

Appellant contends that, no later than August 1, 2005, IPR had

a “deemed granted” permit to demonstrate on the White House

sidewalk which was never properly revoked, so any persons who

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demonstrated on the White House sidewalk on September 26 did

so lawfully. This argument fails. 

In circumstances such as these, where the holder of a permit

voluntarily withdraws an existing permit and applies for a new

one, there is nothing to indicate that the Government is obliged

to follow the revocation procedures codified in 36 C.F.R.

§ 7.96(g)(6). The Government’s failure to give any notification

that the scope of IPR’s demonstration permit was narrowed

between the end of July and September 23, 2005, when a new

written permit was issued to IPR, may be relevant to an

assessment of appellant’s knowledge and intent during the

demonstration. It does not, however, indicate that a valid permit

to demonstrate on the White House sidewalk existed on

September 26, 2005.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons indicated in the foregoing opinion, the

judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed

in part. The case is hereby remanded for a new trial.

So ordered.

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