Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01323/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01323-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mandy Martinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 05-1323

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Mandy Martinson,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the

Northern District of Iowa.

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Submitted: June 22, 2005

 Filed: August 18, 2005(Corrected: 08/22/05)

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Before MELLOY, HEANEY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury found Mandy Martinson (“Martinson”) guilty of conspiracy to distribute

500 grams or more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine

and conspiracy to distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A), 841(b)(1)(D) and 846; possession with intent to distribute 5 grams or

more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A); and possession of a firearm in furtherance

of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). 

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The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa, sitting by designation.

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At the close of the Government’s evidence, Martinson made an oral motion for

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, which the

district court1

 denied. Martinson timely filed a renewed, written motion for judgment

of acquittal after the jury verdict, which the district court also denied. Martinson

based both motions for judgment of acquittal on the Government’s alleged failure to

establish sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. At no point did Martinson move

for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.

The district court sentenced Martinson to a 120-month mandatory-minimum

sentence for her conspiracy conviction, a concurrent 120-month sentence for her

possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction, and a consecutive 60-month

mandatory-minimum sentence for her firearm conviction. Martinson’s resulting 180-

month sentence was the statutory minimum available to the district court. See 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). 

On appeal, Martinson, who is represented by different counsel than at her trial,

argues that the district court should have granted her a new trial on the basis of

insufficient evidence to sustain her convictions despite her failure to move for a new

trial before the district court. Martinson also argues that she is entitled to a new trial

because the district court used two erroneous verdict forms. We affirm.

I. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

Martinson admits that while she did file a motion for judgment of acquittal, she

did not file a motion for a new trial with the district court. Motions for judgment of

acquittal are different motions with different substantive standards than motions for

a new trial, and we will not construe the filing of one to preserve for our review

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claims of error relating to the other. See United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 8-10

(1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to construe a motion for judgment of acquittal as a motion

for a new trial). For that reason, we review Martinson’s contention that the district

court erred in failing to grant her a new trial based on the sufficiency of the evidence

for plain error. Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects substantial rights

may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s attention”). 

To establish plain error, Martinson bears the burden of establishing that the

district court’s failure to grant her a new trial sua sponte was “(1) ‘error,’ (2) that is

‘plain,’ and (3) that ‘affects substantial rights.’” Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S.

461, 467 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). Even

if Martinson establishes all three plain-error factors, we may exercise our discretion

to notice the forfeited error “only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness,

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

We need not reach the third and fourth prongs of the plain-error analysis

because we hold that the district court committed no error, plain or otherwise, in not

granting Martinson a new trial. Regardless of the merits of her claims of insufficient

evidence, the district court did not err because it does not have the power under Rule

33 to order a new trial sua sponte. United States v. Bordeaux, 92 F.3d 606, 607 (8th

Cir. 1996); see also Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 431-32 (1996); United

States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 474-75 (1947) (noting that the ability to grant a new

trial sua sponte would raise double jeopardy concerns). 

Rule 33 provides that “[u]pon the defendant’s motion, the court may vacate any

judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P.

33; see also Fed. R. Crim P. 33 advisory committee notes (“The [1966] amendments

to the first two sentences make it clear that a judge has no power to order a new trial

on his own motion, that he can act only in response to a motion timely made by a

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We note our decision in United States v. Gutierrez, 130 F.3d 330, 332 (8th Cir.

1997), which held that we need not consider an objection to the district court’s sua

sponte order of a new trial where a defendant waived his right to challenge the district

court’s action. The Gutierrez Court, however, states in dicta that the district court

does have the “power” to grant a new trial sua sponte. Id. at 332. To the extent that

the Gutierrez decision can be read to conflict with our holding that the district court

lacks the power to grant a new trial sua sponte, we believe our holding in this case is

the correct statement of law as it follows the plain language of Rule 33, Supreme

Court precedent, and our prior decision in Bordeaux. Our holding in this case also

conforms with the express holdings of other circuits. See, e.g., United States v.

Viayra, 365 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wright, 363 F.3d 237, 248

(3d Cr. 2004); Moran, 393 F.3d at 9. 

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defendant.”). Martinson does not allege newly discovered evidence and admits that

she did not file a timely motion for a new trial. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(2) (“Any

motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence

must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty . . . .”). Thus, under

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court lacked the power to grant

Martinson a new trial because she failed to move for one. Consequently, the district

court did not err in not granting Martinson a new trial sua sponte.2

In her reply brief, Martinson changes her request for a new trial into a claim of

ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Martinson contends that her trial counsel’s

failure to raise a motion for a new trial was not objectively reasonable and there is a

reasonable probability that, but for that error, the district court would have granted

her motion for a new trial. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,

691(1984) (stating the constitutional standard for claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel); United States v. Staples, 410 F.3d 484, 488 (8th Cir. 2005). In particular,

Martinson argues that her trial counsel’s failure to move for a new trial denied her the

opportunity to have the district court independently weigh the evidence because a

district court must grant all reasonable inferences to the Government when

considering a motion for a judgment of acquittal. See United States v. Vesey, 395

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Martinson raises this argument in the context of the Supreme Court’s decision

in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The Booker decision, however, is

inapposite because the district court sentenced Martinson to the mandatory-minimum

sentence for her convictions. See United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir.

2005). 

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F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that when reviewing a motion for a new trial

based on the sufficiency of the evidence, a district court may weigh the evidence and

evaluate for itself the credibility of witnesses); United States v. Bennett, 956 F.2d

1476, 1481 (8th Cir. 1992) (contrasting the district court’s discretion in ruling upon

motions for a new trial with the district court’s obligation to deny a motion for

judgment of acquittal unless “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as

to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime charged”). 

Martinson’s ineffective assistance claim was raised for the first time in her

reply brief. We generally “do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a

reply brief.” United States v. Griggs, 71 F.3d 276, 281 (8th Cir. 1995). In addition,

we generally do not consider a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct

appeal “unless a miscarriage of justice would result or a full record on the issues in

controversy has already been developed.” United States v. Halter, 411 F.3d 949, 951

(8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). We see no reasons to deviate from these rules in this

case. Therefore, we decline to consider Martinson’s ineffective assistance claim.

II. VERDICT FORMS

Next, Martinson argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the district

court provided the jury erroneous verdict forms for both her conspiracy conviction

and her possession-with-intent-to-distribute conviction.3

 We disagree with both of

Martinson’s claims of error.

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We normally review the district court’s choice of verdict forms for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Moore, 149 F.3d 773, 779 (8th Cir. 1998); United

HealthCare Corp. v. Am. Trade Ins. Co., 88 F.3d 563, 574 (8th Cir. 1996).

Martinson, however, failed to timely object to the verdict forms used at trial, and, for

that reason, we review for plain error. United States v. Davis, 237 F.3d 942, 944 (8th

Cir. 2001). If we find that the district court’s use of either verdict form constituted

error that was plain, we reach the third prong of plain error review: whether the

verdict forms affected Martinson’s substantial rights. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734; United

States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005). To hold that an erroneous verdict

form affected Martinson’s substantial rights, we must conclude that the verdict form

was prejudicial; that is, we must determine that the error affected the outcome of the

district court proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.

With regard to the verdict form for Martinson’s conspiracy conviction, we find

no error. Martinson contends that the verdict form contained special interrogatories

for quantities of methamphetamine but erroneously failed to contain similar

interrogatories for quantities of marijuana. Martinson fails to acknowledge, however,

that the form allowed the jury to return a verdict of guilty without any findings of

drug quantities as to either marijuana or methamphetamine. Such a verdict could

have accurately reflected a jury’s conclusion that Martinson was guilty of conspiracy

to distribute marijuana but not methamphetamine. In addition, the jury found that

Martinson conspired to distribute more than 500 grams of methamphetamine, which

compelled Martinson’s 120-month statutory mandatory-minimum sentence for the

conspiracy charge. Given the jury’s verdict, Martinson would not have received a

lesser sentence even if the district court had allowed the jury to find a specific

quantity of marijuana. Finding no error, we hold Martinson is not entitled to a new

trial.

With regard to the verdict form for Martinson’s possession-ofmethamphetamine charge, she contends that the verdict form was erroneous because

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it referenced a charge of “possession of methamphetamine and/or marijuana” but the

corresponding count of the indictment only involved methamphetamine. Assuming

without deciding that the form contained error that was plain, any error did not affect

the outcome of the district court proceeding because the verdict form allowed for, and

the jury made, a special finding only with regard to methamphetamine quantity. In

doing so, the jury clearly indicated its judgment that Martinson was guilty of

possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, the offense for which she was

charged. For that reason, any error on the verdict form does not entitle Martinson to

a new trial.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm Martinson’s convictions.

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