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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ty West
Appellant

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-12900

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-20894-JLK-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

TY WEST, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(January 12, 2017)

Before HULL, WILSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

Ty West appeals his convictions and total 384-month sentence after pleading 

guilty to three counts of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119(a); two counts of 

brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. §§ 

924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and (c)(1)(C)(i); and one count of possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). No reversible error has been shown; we 

affirm. 

I.

West first challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his 

guilty plea. Briefly stated, West contends that his lawyer failed to advise him 

adequately before the plea and that the plea was not knowing and voluntary.

We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuseof-discretion standard. United States v. Brehm, 442 F.3d 1291, 1298 (11th Cir. 

2006). No abuse of discretion occurs “unless the denial is ‘arbitrary or 

unreasonable.’” Id. 

A defendant -- like West -- who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after the 

court has accepted the plea but before sentencing must demonstrate “a fair and just 

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reason” for doing so. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). We construe liberally 

whether a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to withdraw is supported by “a fair and 

just reason.” United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988). A 

defendant, however, has “no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Instead, 

whether a defendant will be allowed to withdraw his plea is a decision “left to the 

sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. 

In determining whether a defendant has satisfied his burden of showing a 

“fair and just reason” for withdrawal, the district court must “consider the totality 

of the circumstances surrounding the plea.” Id. at 472. In pertinent part, the 

district court considers (1) whether the defendant received close assistance of 

counsel, and (2) whether the plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. Id. 

The district court abused no discretion in denying West’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. About the assistance received from his lawyer, West 

testified at his plea hearing that he had discussed the charges and possible 

sentences with his lawyer, that he understood them, and that he was satisfied with 

his lawyer’s representation. Statements made under oath by a defendant during a 

plea colloquy receive a strong presumption of truthfulness. United States v. 

Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994). A defendant “bears a heavy burden” 

to show that his statements under oath were false. United States v. Rogers, 848 

F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988). 

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At the hearing on his motion to withdraw, West testified only that he 

believed that his lawyer did not “fight enough” for him. But West also confirmed 

that, before the plea hearing, he had discussed the charges with his lawyer, 

understood the charges against him, and that his lawyer’s representation was “not 

bad.” In the light of this testimony, West failed to satisfy his “heavy burden” of 

showing that the earlier statements made about his lawyer’s representation were 

false. Moreover, the record supports the district court’s determination that West’s 

lawyer not only acted professionally and provided every assistance required of a 

defense counsel under the circumstances, but that West’s lawyer rendered services 

that exceeded expectations. 

About the voluntariness of West’s plea, West also contended that he was 

confused at the plea hearing and did not understand the factual proffer that he 

signed.*

 But West also testified that he in fact entered his plea voluntarily, 

understood what he was doing at the time, and that the main reason he sought to 

withdraw his plea was because of the length of the sentence he faced. 

On this record, West has failed to demonstrate both that he received less 

than the close assistance of counsel before his plea and that his plea was not 

entered knowingly and voluntarily: two failures of proof. The district court thus 

 * Because West entered an open plea, he signed no factual proffer. During his testimony, West 

confirmed that the factual proffer was, instead, read aloud during the plea hearing and that he 

raised no objections to it.

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abused no discretion in denying West’s motion to withdraw his plea. See United 

States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 801 (noting that close assistance of 

counsel and a knowing and voluntary plea are strong evidence in support of a 

district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea). 

II.

West next challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for new 

counsel. 

We review the denial of a motion for new counsel for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1343 (11th Cir. 1997). In doing so, we 

consider “(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court’s inquiry 

into the merits of the motion; and (3) whether the conflict was so great that it 

resulted in a total lack of communication between the defendant and his counsel 

thereby preventing an adequate defense.” Id. 

About the first factor, we cannot say that West’s motion -- made in open 

court on the morning of his sentencing hearing -- was timely made. Nevertheless, 

the district court postponed the sentencing hearing and conducted a detailed 

inquiry into the basis for West’s motion for new counsel, including permitting 

West (with his lawyer’s useful questioning) to testify about his concerns. Thus, 

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both the first and second factors weigh against West. About the third factor, West 

also failed to demonstrate a total lack of communication between himself and his 

lawyer. To the contrary, West confirmed that he had discussed the charges with 

his lawyer, that he had “received satisfactory assistance” from his lawyer, and that 

his lawyer’s representation was “not bad.” In the light of this evidence, the district 

court abused no discretion in denying West’s motion for new counsel. 

Moreover, West has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the district 

court’s ruling. Nothing evidences that West’s lawyer provided less than adequate 

and professional counsel, and West’s sentence represented the statutory mandatory 

minimum sentence for the offenses to which he pleaded guilty. See Calderon, 127 

F.3d at 1343 (to demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that his lawyer’s 

“performance was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases and that ‘but for’ counsel’s continued representation at the 

sentencing hearing, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

(quotations omitted)). Thus, even if the district court had abused its discretion --

which we reject -- that error would be deemed harmless. See id. 

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III.

West next contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because 

the district court failed to explain adequately the chosen sentence. Because West 

raised no objection to the reasonableness of his sentence at his sentencing hearing, 

we review this issue only for plain error. See United States v. Vandergrift, 754 

F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). 

We stress that nothing “requires the district court to state on the record that it 

has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 

3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005) (the 

district court’s explicit acknowledgement that it considered the parties’ arguments 

and the section 3553(a) factors is sufficient). 

In imposing West’s sentence, the district court said expressly that it had 

considered the arguments made by the parties, the pre-sentence investigation 

report, the advisory guideline range, and the section 3553(a) factors. The district 

court then determined that a sentence of 32 years’ imprisonment -- which both 

parties had requested and which was at the low end of the guidelines range --

provided sufficient punishment. The district court’s explanation for the chosen 

sentence was adequate; West has demonstrated no plain error. See id. 

AFFIRMED.

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