Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cr-00144/USCOURTS-ared-4_15-cr-00144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rafael Padilla
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:15-cr-00144 KGB

RAFAEL PADILLA DEFENDANT

ORDER

Before the Court is defendant Rafael Padilla’s motion to suppress evidence (Dkt. No. 13) 

to which the government has responded in opposition (Dkt. No. 14). Mr. Padilla seeks to 

suppress any physical evidence seized from the car Mr. Padilla was driving; any evidence or 

statements obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of any unlawfully seized evidence; and any 

statements that were made while in custody and without the benefit of Miranda warnings. See 

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1996). 

Mr. Padilla argues that he committed no traffic violation; thus, he contends that there was 

no probable cause to stop the vehicle and that all evidence seized as a result of the traffic stop 

should be suppressed (Dkt. No. 14, at 3). The government asserts that there was a traffic 

violation providing probable cause to stop the vehicle and that the search was lawful. The 

government also contends that, even if the traffic stop was unlawful, Mr. Padilla consented to a 

search of his car, which neutralized any taint allegedly stemming from the stop (Dkt. No. 14, at 

1). The government also maintains that there was probable cause to search for a compartment in 

the car.

The Court conducted a hearing on Mr. Padilla’s motion to suppress on June 7, 2016. At 

the hearing, the Court heard oral argument from both parties. Mr. Padilla and the government 

presented witnesses who testified in open court. Mr. Padilla testified on behalf of himself. At 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 1 of 18
2

the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the motion under advisement. For the reasons that 

follow, the Court denies Mr. Padilla’s motion to suppress (Dkt. No. 13).

I. Factual Background

At the hearing on Mr. Padilla’s motion to suppress, the government introduced several 

exhibits, including a video recording of the traffic stop. The government previously filed this 

video as an exhibit to its response in opposition to Mr. Padilla’s motion to suppress (Dkt. No. 14, 

Ex. A). The government also presented testimony at the hearing from Arkansas State Police 

Trooper Brandon Bennett and Arkansas State Police Corporal Rocky Rapert. In support of his 

motion, Mr. Padilla testified on his own behalf. 

Trooper Bennett has 10 years of law enforcement experience. He has attended training 

sessions sponsored by the Arkansas State Police, as well as training regarding drug courier 

profiles and border locations, one of which is McAllen, Texas. The government also presented 

testimony from Corporal Rapert. He has 12 and a half years of law enforcement experience. 

Trooper Bennett testified that, on February 24, 2015, he was on duty and parked on 

Interstate 55 in Mississippi County, Arkansas, near the 60-61 mile marker. He saw a Kia sport 

utility vehicle driven by Mr. Padilla pass his position and immediately apply the brakes. Trooper 

Bennett estimates that Mr. Padilla abruptly slowed from about 70 miles per hour to about 60 

miles per hour. Trooper Bennett then left his parked position and began to follow Mr. Padilla in 

his vehicle. Trooper Bennett asserts that, as he was following Mr. Padilla, Mr. Padilla’s vehicle 

was “at most, one car length behind a tractor-trailer in the right lane.” (Dkt. No. 14, at 1). 

Trooper Bennett then observed Mr. Padilla pass the tractor-trailer in the left lane and testified 

that Mr. Padilla appeared nervous, was sitting perfectly straight, and was holding the steering 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 2 of 18
3

wheel in a two-handed “white knuckle” grip (Id. at 2). During his testimony, Mr. Padilla denied 

being nervous. 

Trooper Bennett testified that, through his training and experience, he has learned that 

these signs indicate potential unlawful action. Trooper Bennett also testified that, when he 

initially observed Mr. Padilla, he decided to conduct a traffic stop because Mr. Padilla was 

following the tractor-trailer too closely. He stated that he has received training by attending 

classes in traffic law and accident investigation. In his classes, he was taught that you should 

have a car length between vehicles for every ten-mile-per-hour increment the vehicles are 

traveling, so in this case that would be six to seven car lengths between vehicles. On cross 

examination by Mr. Padilla’s counsel, Trooper Bennett testified that he is also aware from his 

training that it is permissible to follow a tractor-trailer closely while a person is attempting to 

pass the tractor-trailer. Trooper Bennett explained that he has responded to traffic accidents 

where people were following tractor-trailers too closely and that these accidents have ranged 

from fender-benders to fatalities. He has pulled people over many times for following tractor 

trailers too closely.

At the 63-mile marker, Trooper Bennett radioed in Mr. Padilla’s vehicle tags. Trooper 

Bennett testified that this information is useful because finding out about a driver’s past criminal 

history, about any outstanding warrants, and information of that nature has the potential to save 

his life. Corporal Rapert answered Trooper Bennett’s radio call, ran Mr. Padilla’s vehicle tags, 

and informed Trooper Bennett that the License Plate Reader indicated that the vehicle in which 

Mr. Padilla was traveling had crossed the border from Mexico into the United States at 

approximately 12:30 p.m. on February 23, 2015, the day before. Corporal Rapert testified that 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 3 of 18
4

he relayed this information because the majority of the narcotics in this country come from 

Mexico. 

Trooper Bennett followed Mr. Padilla for what he estimates was three to four miles while 

he received Mr. Padilla’s vehicle tag information. After that, at the 67-mile marker, Trooper 

Bennett activated his blue lights and siren. He pulled Mr. Padilla over. In its response in 

opposition, the government contends that Trooper Bennett conducted the traffic stop of Mr. 

Padilla’s car because Mr. Padilla violated Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-305, which prohibits 

“follow[ing] another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for 

the speed of vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” (Dkt. No. 14, at 6). 

The Court understands that, when the blue lights on a police vehicle are activated, the 

center-mounted dashboard camera in the patrol car activates, begins to film, and, in fact, captures 

approximately one minute of activity prior to the blue lights being activated. In the 

government’s response it represents that: 

Bennett’s car was equipped with a dashcam and a lapel microphone. The camera 

saves video from 60 seconds before the trooper engages [his] police lights. The 

camera begins saving audio when the police lights are activated. When Bennett 

observed Padilla drive too closely to the tractor-trailer, he did not immediately 

activate his police lights and stop Padilla, waiting instead until he had gotten 

information from dispatch about Padilla’s license plate number. Thus, although 

Bennett’s traffic stop was captured on the dashcam, the traffic violation that led 

Bennett to stop Padilla is not captured on the video because Bennett did not turn 

on his blue lights until 3-4 miles (i.e., more than one minute of driving time) after 

he saw Padilla commit the traffic violation.

(Dkt. No. 14, at n.1). 

Trooper Bennett also testified that the traffic violation he witnessed and that prompted 

him to stop Mr. Padilla was not captured on the video. Based upon this representation, the Court 

understands the government to be contending that the alleged traffic violation does not appear on 

the video that is attached as Exhibit A to its response in opposition.

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 4 of 18
5

Trooper Bennett then approached Mr. Padilla’s car and informed him that he had been 

pulled over because he was following a tractor-trailer too closely (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. 1). Trooper 

Bennett then asked Mr. Padilla a series of questions, including where he was going, where he 

had come from, whether he had recently crossed the border, and if he had ever been arrested. 

Mr. Padilla told Trooper Bennett that he was traveling to visit his children in Chicago, Illinois,

and had left his home in McAllen, Texas, at 6:00 a.m. on February 23, 2016. Mr. Padilla also 

told Trooper Bennett that he had crossed the border a week earlier and had never been arrested

(Dkt. No 14, Ex. 1). 

Trooper Bennett then returned to his patrol vehicle to conduct a criminal history check. 

He claims he learned then via radio that Mr. Padilla has been arrested for cocaine and marijuana 

possession but that those charges had been dismissed. Trooper Bennett testified that Corporal 

Rapert came onto the scene to speak with Mr. Padilla soon after Trooper Bennett’s initial 

approach. Both Trooper Bennett and Corporal Rapert testified that, because of the discrepancies 

between Mr. Padilla’s answers about crossing the border and having been arrested and because 

of the information Trooper Bennett received from Corporal Rapert, Corporal Rapert asked Mr. 

Padilla if he would consent to a search of the car. Mr. Padilla consented to the search and stood 

next to Trooper Bennett’s vehicle on the side of the road without being restrained in any way 

while Trooper Bennett and Corporal Rapert searched Mr. Padilla’s vehicle.

The Troopers searched the car for approximately eight minutes and did not find any drugs 

or contraband. The Troopers testified, however, that they saw indications that Mr. Padilla’s rear 

seat had been removed and replaced, including scratches on the plastic molding of the car, paintstained carpet, tool marks, and spray painted bolts (Dkt. No. 14, at 3). Trooper Bennett indicated 

that to him this signified the backseat of Mr. Padilla’s vehicle had been removed. He also 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 5 of 18
6

testified that he had received training that “re-paints and marks” indicate potential hidden 

compartments. Corporal Rapert echoed this testimony. Corporal Rapert testified that he 

received training on detecting hidden compartments and that the markings in Mr. Padilla’s car 

were consistent with what he understood to be a hidden compartment. 

After making these observations, Corporal Rapert asked Mr. Padilla if he had recently 

crossed the border. Mr. Padilla initially denied having crossed the border; then he changed his 

answer to say that he had crossed the border on foot, and he finally explained that he had crossed 

the border in his vehicle. Corporal Rapert then asked Mr. Padilla if anyone had removed the 

backseat of his car, and Mr. Padilla responded that it had been removed at an interior border 

patrol checkpoint. Mr. Padilla then told Corporal Rapert that he had left his home at 1:00 the day 

before, not 6:00 a.m. as Mr. Padilla previously said to Trooper Bennett.

Eventually, Trooper Bennett asked Mr. Padilla if he would follow the Troopers to a 

nearby garage so that they could examine the area underneath his car. Trooper Bennett testified 

that this is his normal practice. Mr. Padilla asked if he had to accompany the Troopers, and 

Trooper Bennett answered no. Mr. Padilla then refused to consent to accompanying the 

Troopers for this purpose and stated that he was tired and had “already let [them] search the car.”

(Dkt. No. 14, at 4, Ex. 1). After Mr. Padilla refused to accompany the Troopers to the garage, 

Corporal Rapert deployed his drug dog. The drug dog was on the scene, in Corporal Rapert’s 

vehicle. Corporal Rapert testified that the dog was trained to detect narcotics, including cocaine, 

and that he has handled the dog for four years. The government contends that the dog indicated 

that it detected contraband in the rear underside of Mr. Padilla’s car by alerting under the vehicle. 

Corporal Rapert testified that the dog alerted when he changed his behavior underneath the car at 

a location corresponding with the marks inside the car. Trooper Bennett then informed Mr. 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 6 of 18
7

Padilla that he could either drive his car to the auto-shop garage for a search, or they could have 

his car towed to the nearby garage. Mr. Padilla chose to drive himself. Trooper Bennett testified 

that, at this time, Mr. Padilla was not restrained in any way. 

The government represents that, at the garage, the backseat was removed from Mr. 

Padilla’s vehicle, and the Troopers found two small compartments that had been cut into the 

metal underneath the rear seat. Inside the compartments, the Troopers located two packages of 

white powder wrapped in electrical tape, which were later identified by laboratory testing as two 

kilograms of cocaine. After the discovery of these packages, Mr. Padilla was arrested for 

possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the 

government introduced photographs of the rear compartments of the vehicle, both of the bundles 

of cocaine while in the compartments, and the bundles after they were removed from the vehicle 

compartments (Gov. Ex. 2-5).

At the request of the parties, the Court takes judicial notice of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-

305, which provides:

(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is 

reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of vehicles and the traffic 

upon and the condition of the highway.

(b) (1) The driver of any motor truck or any motor vehicle drawing another vehicle when 

traveling upon a roadway outside of a business or residence district shall not follow 

within two hundred feet (200’) of another motor vehicle.

(2) The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to prevent overtaking and 

passing.

Mr. Padilla contends that he was following too closely, and thus in violation of Ark. Code

Ann. § 27-51-305(a), so that he could overtake or pass the truck consistent with Ark. Code Ann. 

§ 27-51-305(b). For this reason, Mr. Padilla contends that his actions were permissible and that 

this was an impermissible traffic stop. The government argues that the language in subsection 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 7 of 18
8

(b)(2) states that “[t]he provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to prevent overtaking 

and passing” and, thus, does not explicitly allow a vehicle to get closer than subsection (a) 

provides. 

II. Analysis

The “cardinal principle” in Fourth Amendment search and seizure jurisprudence is that 

“‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, 

are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically 

established and well-delineated exceptions.’” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) 

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); see United States v. Marshall, 986 

F.2d 1171, 1173 (8th Cir. 1993) (quoting same). “When the government seeks to introduce 

evidence that was seized during a warrantless search, it bears the burden of showing the need for 

an exemption from the warrant requirement and that its conduct fell within the bounds of the 

exception.” Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1173 (citing Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390).

At the outset, the Court understands that Mr. Padilla objects to the initial stop. He is not 

disputing his consent to the initial search shortly after he was stopped but suggests this consent 

was not voluntary and that this consent was insufficient to remove the purported taint resulting 

from what he contends was an illegal stop. The Court also believes Mr. Padilla to be arguing 

only that he did not consent to the second request for search because his consent was withdrawn 

when he refused to go to the nearby garage. The Court will examine each issue presented.

A. Initial Traffic Stop

When a law enforcement officer stops a motor vehicle and questions its occupants, the 

stop constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is 

limited and the resulting detention is quite brief. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-56 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 8 of 18
9

(2007); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 

726 (8th Cir. 2001). A traffic stop is legal under the Fourth Amendment if it is supported by 

probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 810 (1996). “Whether probable cause exists depends upon the reasonable conclusion to be 

drawn from the facts known to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. 

Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). In making this assessment, the Court must disregard the 

officer’s subjective intent which plays “no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 

analysis.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. 

It is well-established that a traffic violation, however minor, creates probable cause to 

stop the driver of a vehicle. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1998) 

(citations omitted). Although probable cause requires articulable facts, it does not require that 

the officer making the traffic stop cite a specific rule of law, nor does “[t]he mere fact an incident 

report omits certain details . . . render the officer’s testimony concerning the underlying action 

facially implausible.” United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 828 (8th Cir. 2012). In 

Mendoza, the arresting officer’s report described the justification for probable cause as the driver 

making “random turns and stops” in addition to “not signaling . . . and driving erratically.” Id. at 

827-28. Despite not invoking specific statutory violations of the traffic code, the Eighth Circuit 

determined the officer’s description of the conduct aligned with the alleged statutory violation 

and, therefore, the officer’s observations created probable cause. Id. at 828.

As stated above, the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops does not depend on the 

actual motivations of the individual officers involved. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813. “Once an officer 

has probable cause, the stop is objectively reasonable and any ulterior motivation on the officer’s 

part is irrelevant.” United States v. Frasher, 632 F.3d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 9 of 18
10

States v. Arciniega, 569 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2009)). Nevertheless, as other courts have 

acknowledged, the Court can consider the officer’s motivation in assessing his or her credibility. 

See United States v. Wilkinson, 633 F.3d 938, 943 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We agree that the district 

court could have considered the officers’ motivations in assessing their credibility.”); United 

States v. Gonzalez-Garcia, 781 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (D. Kan. 2011) (citing same).

Here, the Court first examines whether the initial traffic stop was reasonable. Mr. Padilla

disputes whether Trooper Bennett actually witnessed any traffic violation on the part of Mr. 

Padilla. Mr. Padilla specifically contends that “Trooper Bennett was wrong in his assertion that 

Defendant Padilla was following too closely. No objectively reasonable law enforcement officer 

would have stopped Defendant Padilla based on what can be seen on the videotape of the stop.” 

(Dkt. No. 13, at 3). 

The Court finds credible and credits Trooper Bennett’s testimony concerning the traffic 

violation. The Court understands that Trooper Bennett observed the traffic violation before he 

activated the blue lights and before the center-mounted dashboard camera in the patrol car began

to film. His observation of the alleged traffic violation is what prompted him to pull out and 

begin to follow Mr. Padilla. Mr. Padilla admitted under oath at the hearing that he lied to the 

Troopers about crossing the border and his previous arrest record. As a result, the Court 

questions Mr. Padilla’s credibility, including his credibility in describing these events 

surrounding the alleged traffic violation. Further, the Court credits Trooper Bennett’s training 

and experience regarding these types of traffic violations.

The Court also does not accept Mr. Padilla’s arguments regarding Ark. Code Ann. § 27-

51-305(b)(2). This subsection provides an exception to the language of (b)(1), not the language 

of subsection (a). This Court concludes that, under subsection (a), the driver of a motor vehicle 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 10 of 18
11

shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, even when 

overtaking and passing another vehicle. 

To the extent Mr. Padilla suggests that the questions asked of him by the Troopers after 

the traffic stop was initiated were improper or exceeded the scope of the traffic stop, the Court 

rejects his argument. Mr. Padilla was asked questions regarding his travel history, his criminal 

history, and where he was going. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that such 

questioning is within the scope of inquiry allowed by officers making a traffic stop. See United 

States v. Rivera, 570 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2009) (examining and finding permissible these 

types of questions when asked at a traffic stop); United States v. Long, 532 F.3d 791, 795 (8th

Cir. 2008); United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2008).

Even if the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable, this Court determines that Mr. 

Padilla’s later initial consent to a search of his vehicle neutralized any taint stemming from the 

traffic stop. See United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 474 F.3d 1105, 1111 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 

United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 861-862 (8th Cir. 2003)). 

B. Initial Consent To Search

Mr. Padilla contends that his initial consent to search his vehicle was limited to the initial

search on the highway and was later withdrawn when he refused to give the Troopers consent to 

take the car to a nearby garage for further search. Mr. Padilla also argues that his consent was 

withdrawn before the search that led to the discovery of the drugs. Trooper Bennett and 

Corporal Rapert testified that Mr. Padilla consented to a search of his vehicle, and the Court 

finds that Mr. Padilla’s consent to the initial search is audible on the video of the traffic stop 

(Dkt. No. 14, Ex. 1). Mr. Padilla does not dispute this; he testified that he gave his consent for 

the initial search. 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 11 of 18
12

The government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent to search by a 

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Czeck, 105 F.3d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1997). 

Voluntarily-obtained consent obviates the need for government officials to obtain a search 

warrant before conducting a search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). The 

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals examines 11 factors and the totality of the circumstances, as set 

forth in United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1990), to determine whether consent 

given was voluntary. The Chaidez factors include the age, intelligence, and mental state of the 

person giving consent; the nature of the detainment including the number of police officers 

involved, the level of custody, and the place of detainment; and the prior experience of the 

person from whom consent is requested which might establish a more voluntary or knowing 

consent. Id. at 381. 

In general terms, “the scope of a consensual search is measured by what the typical 

reasonable person would have understood by the exchange.” United States v. Brown, 345 F.3d 

574, 580 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Additionally, the scope of a search is 

generally defined by its “expressed object,” which in the instant case would be to search the 

vehicle. United States v. Ferrer-Montoya, 483 F.3d 565, 568 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing Florida v. 

Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)). 

Applying the Chaidez factors and examining the totality of the circumstances, the Court 

concludes the government has proven by a preponderance of the evidence voluntary consent to 

search the vehicle. Mr. Padilla is an adult. There is no indication in the record that he presents 

with anything less than average intelligence or a competent mental state at the time he was asked 

to consent. There were two Troopers on the scene when the request was made. The request was 

made when Mr. Padilla was outside, by the side of the road. He was not physically restrained in 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 12 of 18
13

any way at the time the request was made. The Troopers did not pressure Mr. Padilla, and the 

Troopers did not speak in a rude manner to Mr. Padilla during this exchange. The Troopers

knew he had previously crossed the border and had previously been arrested on a narcotics 

charge. He audibly consented to the search, as evidenced by the videotape exhibit. For these 

reasons, the Court concludes that Mr. Padilla knew that he was consenting voluntarily to a search 

of the car.

To the extent Mr. Padilla argues that the evidence sought to be suppressed is the direct 

result of the allegedly unconstitutional traffic stop and that Mr. Padilla’s intervening consent was 

not an independent, lawful cause of the search and seizure, the Court rejects that argument. “An 

illegal detention is only the start, and not the end, of [the Fourth Amendment] analysis, for the 

evidence seized from [defendants] and their vehicle need not be suppressed if their voluntary 

consent provided an independent basis for the search.” United States v. Esquivel, 507 F.3d 1154, 

1158–59 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). That determination involves asking whether 

“granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 

has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 

distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 

(1965) (citations omitted). 

Subsequent voluntary consent to search may purge the taint of the illegal traffic stop, but 

a voluntary consent to search, “preceded by an illegal police action, does not automatically purge 

the taint of an illegal detention.” United States v. Barnum, 564 F.3d 964, 971 (8th Cir. 2009) 

(citations omitted). To determine whether voluntary consent is “an independent, lawful cause of 

the search,” the Court must consider: “(1) the temporal proximity between Fourth Amendment 

violation and grant of consent to search; (2) the presence of any intervening circumstances; and 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 13 of 18
14

(3) the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s Fourth Amendment violation.” Barnum, 564 F.3d 

at 971 (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975)). 

In considering the first Brown factor, the temporal proximity between any alleged Fourth 

Amendment violation and the grant of consent to search, the Court notes that “the closer this 

period, the more likely the defendant’s consent was influenced by, or the product of, the police 

misconduct.” Id. at 972 (citing United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 495 n. 3 (8th Cir. 

2006)). Here, the record indicates that Mr. Padilla gave his consent to search the vehicle about 

three and a half minutes after the traffic stop was initiated (Dkt. No. 14, Ex. 1). The time period 

between Mr. Padilla’s initial consent and his later refusal to take the vehicle to a nearby garage 

for a more extensive search was about an hour and a half (Id.). The Court considers the 

operative consent here to be Mr. Padilla’s initial consent, not his later refusal to travel to the 

nearby garage. While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a period of about nine 

minutes between stop and consent is enough to purge the taint of any illegality, it has not held 

that a matter of a few minutes would do the same. Thus, considering the first Brown factor, the 

short time between the traffic stop and Mr. Padilla’s consent, slightly favors the government.

Under the second Brown factor, the presence of any intervening circumstances, the Court 

recognizes “that an intervening circumstance between the Fourth Amendment violation and the 

defendant’s consent indicates that the consent was made of the defendant's free will and that the 

officer was not attempting to exploit an illegal situation.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 603–04. The 

government argues that Trooper Bennett had reason to believe that Mr. Padilla lied to him about 

crossing the border and his criminal history, based on the questions asked after the traffic stop 

was initiated. As a result, the government contends these discrepancies led Trooper Bennett to 

suspect criminal activity and constitute the sort of intervening circumstances necessary for Mr. 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 14 of 18
15

Padilla’s consent to override the effect of an alleged illegal stop. The government cites in 

support of its argument United States v. Becker, 333 F.3d 858, 860 (8th Cir. 2003), in which the 

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the officer’s conclusion that the defendant was 

intoxicated constituted sufficient intervening circumstance to purse the taint of an illegal stop. In 

Becker, the court noted that the defendant was not advised of his right to refuse consent to 

search, although the court concluded the defendant was aware of this right. Id. at 862. The 

government also cites United States v. Thomas, 83 F.3d 259, 259 (8th Cir. 1996), in which the 

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that discrepancies in mileage on a car and rental 

agreement that created suspicion of criminal activity, along with the officer making the 

individual aware of his right to refuse consent, constituted intervening circumstances between an 

illegal stop and the driver’s consent to search. Given these controlling authorities as compared to 

the facts of this case, the Court concludes the second Brown factor, the intervening 

circumstances between the traffic stop and Mr. Padilla’s consent, favors the government.

Finally, with respect to the third Brown factor, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer’s 

Fourth Amendment violation, “[a] Fourth Amendment violation may be purposeful or flagrant 

under various circumstances, including where the violation was investigatory in design and 

purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up.” Barnum, 564 F.3d at 973 

(citations omitted). As in Barnum, this Court finds that a reasonable view of Trooper Bennett’s 

testimony supports a finding that he did not act purposefully or flagrantly by initiating an illegal 

traffic stop. See id. According to his testimony, Trooper Bennett testified the traffic stop was 

strictly the result of what he believed was a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-305(a). 

Trooper Bennett testified to his training and experience with this type of traffic stop. Although 

Trooper Bennett’s belief that Mr. Padilla violated Ark. Code Ann. § 27-51-305(a) may have been

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 15 of 18
16

objectively unreasonable, an unreasonable mistake of law or fact is not the type of “blatantly 

unconstitutional or flagrant behavior” condemned in Brown. Barnum, 564 F.3d at 973. 

Courts have found such blatantly unconstitutional and flagrant behavior where: “(1) the 

impropriety of the official’s misconduct was obvious or the official knew, at the time, that his 

conduct was likely unconstitutional but engaged in it nevertheless; and (2) the misconduct was 

investigatory in design and purpose and executed in the hope that something might turn up.” 

United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 605). 

The Court does not find reason in the record to believe that Trooper Bennett initiated the stop 

because of blatantly unconstitutional or flagrant behavior. Thus, the third Brown factor favors 

the government. 

The Court, considering the three Brown factors together, finds that the short time between 

the stop and the voluntary consent given by Mr. Padilla, combined with the intervening 

circumstance, when weighed against the absence of blatantly unconstitutional or flagrant 

behavior, is enough to purge any alleged taint purportedly resulting from the claimed Fourth 

Amendment violation and to make Mr. Padilla’s initial consent an independent, lawful cause of 

the search. 

C. The Search At The Garage

The government contends that Mr. Padilla does not challenge the use of the drug dog or 

the fact that his detection of contraband provided probable cause to search Mr. Padilla’s car at 

the nearby garage (Dkt. No. 14, at n.6). This Court understands that Mr. Padilla argues that he 

did not consent to the second request for search because his consent was withdrawn when he 

refused to go to the nearby garage. The Court rejects any attempt by Mr. Padilla to argue that, 

because the initial traffic stop was impermissible or because he withdrew his consent to search 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 16 of 18
17

when he refused to go to the nearby garage, the search at the nearby garage is tainted and that 

any evidence obtained by the Troopers from the search at the nearby garage should be 

suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree” due to the impermissible traffic stop or the withdrawn 

consent. 

Any arguments on this point fail because Mr. Padilla’s initial consent lead to the search 

of the car on the highway which allowed the Troopers to view evidence of alleged tampering 

and/or the prior removal of the backseat. Once the Troopers saw this evidence, they had 

obtained reasonable suspicion to continue searching. At that point, the Troopers requested to 

change locations from the highway to the nearby garage to conduct a more extensive search. 

That Mr. Padilla withdrew his consent at that point and did not consent to the continuing search 

at the nearby garage does not negate the reasonable suspicion that the Troopers had already 

acquired. 

Further, after Mr. Padilla refused to consent to the search at the nearby garage, Corporal

Rapert deployed his drug dog that alerted to suspected contraband concealed in Mr. Padilla’s 

vehicle on the side of the highway. Corporal Rapert’s drug dog was on the scene, in his police 

cruiser, so there can be no argument that this action in any way delayed the stop or pushed it 

beyond permissible limits. This alert by the drug dog provided the Troopers with further 

reasonable suspicion that made their continued search at the nearby garage constitutional. 

In sum, the Court finds the initial traffic stop was objectively reasonable. Further, even if 

the traffic stop was not objectively reasonable, the Court finds that Mr. Padilla’s consent to the 

intial search was an independent and intervening cause that served to purge any alleged taint of 

illegality involved in the challenged stop. The Court is not persuaded by Mr. Padilla’s argument 

that his consent was withdrawn when he refused to go to the nearby garage or that any search 

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 17 of 18
18

after that withdrawal of consent was unconstitutional. Mr. Padilla likely did withdraw his 

consent by refusing to accompany the Troopers to the nearby garage, but at that time, the 

Troopers already had sufficient probable cause to conduct a more extensive search as a result of 

their personal observations of the alterations in the backseat of the vehicle and the subsequent 

drug dog alert.

***

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Mr. Padilla’s motion to suppress (Dkt. No. 

13).

So ordered this the 23rd day of June, 2016.

________________________________

Kristine G. Baker

United States District Judge

Case 4:15-cr-00144-KGB Document 27 Filed 06/23/16 Page 18 of 18