Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03139/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-03139-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Suzan Hubbard
Respondent
James Seegars
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES SEEGARS,

Petitioner,

v.

SUZAN HUBBARD, 

Respondent. ______________________________

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No. C 07-3139 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING

MOTION OBJECTING

TO DISMISSAL

(Docket No. 4)

Petitioner, a California prisoner, filed this pro se habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 1989 conviction and sentence from Santa Clara County Superior

Court. In the petition, petitioner stated that he had a “petition, appeal or other postconviction proceeding . . . now pending” in the California Supreme Court. See Petition at 5. 

Consequently, the petition was dismissed without prejudice to refiling once all state court

post-conviction challenges to petitioner’s conviction and sentence have been completed, and

all claims petitioner wishes to raise in federal court have been presented to the California

Supreme Court. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 716 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983).

Petitioner has filed a motion “objecting” to this dismissal, stating that his pending

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court only seeks production of a transcript, and

does not seek the relief sought herein, namely that his sentence be overturned. As there is no

possibility that petitioner will obtain in state court the relief he seeks in this case, the rule in

Sherwood does not apply. Cf. id. Nevertheless, the Court finds dismissal appropriate for

another reason, namely that the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. 

Case 3:07-cv-03139-MJJ Document 5 Filed 09/12/07 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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In his petition, petitioner claims that his 1989 sentence violates his Sixth Amendment

right to a jury trial because the trial judge imposed the “upper term” following a jury verdict. 

“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime

beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488-90 (2000). The “statutory

maximum” for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge could impose based

solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant; that is, the

relevant “statutory maximum” is not the sentence the judge could impose after finding

additional facts, but rather is the maximum he or she could impose without any additional

findings. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303-04 (2004). See, e.g., Cunningham v.

California,127 S. Ct. 856, 871(2007) (finding the Supreme Court's decisions from Apprendi

to Booker point to the middle term specified in California's statutes, not the upper term, as

the relevant statutory maximum; therefore, California's determinate sentencing law violates

the Sixth Amendment because it authorizes the judge, not the jury, to find the facts

permitting an upper term sentence); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 288-90 (2005)

(holding that Blakely applies to the federal sentencing guidelines).

Apprendi announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure, however, that

does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, such as the instant matter. United

States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 665 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Schardt v. Payne,

414 F.3d 1025, 1038 (9th Cir. 2005) (Blakely announced a new constitutional rule of

criminal procedure that does not apply retroactively on habeas review); United States v.

Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2005) (Booker does not apply retroactively on habeas

review). Petitioner asserts that Cunningham does apply retroactively because it simply

applied the law of Apprendi to California’s sentencing scheme, and the decision did not

announce a new rule of constitutional law. This Court is not aware of any case law deciding

whether or not Cunningham applies retroactively, but that question is not determinative. 

Petitioner’s claim, like the decision in Cunningham, is based on the rule announced in

Apprendi. As Apprendi does not apply retroactively to petitioner’s 1989 sentence, he may

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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G:\PRO-SE\MJJ\HC.07\seegars.osc.wpd 3

not challenge his sentence on the basis of the Apprendi rule in a federal habeas petition. 

Consequently, the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. 

Petitioner’s motion objecting to the dismissal of this matter is DENIED.

This order terminates Docket No. 4. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 9/1/07 MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge 

Case 3:07-cv-03139-MJJ Document 5 Filed 09/12/07 Page 3 of 3