Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01214/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01214-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dynamic Drinkware, LLC
Appellant
National Graphics, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC,

Appellant

v.

NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1214

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00131.

______________________ 

Decided: September 4, 2015

______________________ 

MATTHEW R. MCCLEAN ̧ Davis & Kuelthau, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, argued for appellant. Also represented by 

PATRICK M. BERGIN, JOSEPH S. HEINO. 

MICHAEL T. GRIGGS, Boyle Fredrickson, S.C., Milwaukee, WI, argued for appellee. Also represented by JOHN 

PAUL FREDRICKSON, SARAH M. WONG. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, BRYSON, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/04/2015
2 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Dynamic Drinkware, LLC (“Dynamic”) appeals from 

the decision of the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office (“PTO”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in 

an inter partes review not to reject claims 1 and 12 of 

National Graphics, Inc.’s (“National Graphics”) U.S. 

Patent 6,635,196 (the “’196 patent”) as anticipated under 

35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (2006).1 See Dynamic Drinkware, LLC 

v. Nat’l Graphics, Inc., No. 2013-00131, 2014 WL 4628897

(P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2014) (“Board Decision”). Because 

Dynamic failed to carry its burden of proving unpatentability, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

National Graphics owns the ’196 patent, which is directed to making molded plastic articles bearing a “lenticular” image. The ’196 patent issued on October 21, 2003, 

from an application filed on November 22, 2000. The ’196 

patent claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional Application

60/211,112, filed on June 12, 2000.

Dynamic petitioned the PTO for inter partes review of 

the ’196 patent. In its petition, Dynamic argued that 

claims 1, 8, 12, and 14 of the ’196 patent were anticipated 

by U.S. Patent 7,153,555 (“Raymond”). The application 

for Raymond was filed on May 5, 2000, claiming the 

benefit of U.S. Provisional Application 60/182,490 (the 

“provisional application” or “Raymond provisional appli1 The relevant provision of § 102(e)(2) was reorganized into newly designated § 102(d)(2) when certain 

aspects of the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”),

Pub. L. No. 112-29, took effect on March 16, 2013. Because the application for the patent at issue in this case 

was filed before that date, we refer to the pre-AIA version 

of § 102. 

 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 2 Filed: 09/04/2015
DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 3

cation”), filed on February 15, 2000. The PTO granted the 

petition in part, and instituted trial on claims 1 and 12.

The Board concluded that Dynamic failed to prove by 

a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 and 12 

were anticipated under § 102(e)(2) by Raymond. Board 

Decision at 13. The Board first found that Dynamic failed 

to prove that the Raymond patent was entitled to the 

benefit of its earlier February 15, 2000 provisional filing 

date, and hence that it was a § 102(e) reference as of its 

provisional date. Id. at 3. According to the Board, “[t]o be 

entitled to rely on the February 15, 2000 provisional filing 

date, [Dynamic] had to establish that it relies on subject 

matter from Raymond that is present in and supported by 

its provisional.” Id. (citing In re Giacomini, 612 F.3d 

1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Ex parte Yamaguchi, 88 

U.S.P.Q.2d 1606 (B.P.A.I. 2008)). The Board found that, 

rather than comparing “the portions of [Raymond] relied 

on by [Dynamic] to the Raymond provisional,” Dynamic 

only compared claim 1 of the ’196 patent to the Raymond 

provisional application. Id. at 4. As a result, the Board 

found that Dynamic “failed to carry its burden of proof 

that Raymond’s effective date is earlier than May 5, 

2000.” Id. It is worth emphasizing that the relevance of 

the Raymond provisional application date here is not to 

give the Raymond patent any earlier priority over a 

competing application or patent, but to serve third party 

Dynamic’s goal of creating earlier prior art against the 

’196 patent.

The Board then found that National Graphics reduced 

to practice its invention by March 28, 2000, before the 

May 5, 2000 filing date of the Raymond patent. Id. at 12. 

Thus, the Board concluded that Dynamic failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that claims 1 

and 12 of the ’196 patent were anticipated by Raymond 

under § 102(e). Id. at 13. 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 3 Filed: 09/04/2015
4 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

Dynamic timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A).

DISCUSSION

We review the Board’s legal determinations de novo, 

In re Elsner, 381 F.3d 1125, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 2004), and the 

Board’s factual findings underlying those determinations 

for substantial evidence, In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 

1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the evidence to support the finding. Consol. Edison Co. v. 

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

For a patent to claim priority from the filing date of 

its provisional application, it must satisfy 35 U.S.C. 

§ 119(e)(1) (2006), which provides that: 

An application for patent filed under section 

111(a) or section 363 of this title for an invention 

disclosed in the manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of this title in a provisional 

application filed under section 111(b) of this title, 

by an inventor or inventors named in the provisional application, shall have the same effect, as to 

such invention, as though filed on the date of the 

provisional application filed under section 111(b)

of this title . . . .

(emphases added). “In other words, the specification of 

the provisional must ‘contain a written description of the 

invention and the manner and process of making and 

using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms,’ 35 

U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, to enable an ordinarily skilled artisan to 

practice the invention claimed in the non-provisional

application.” New Railhead Mfg., L.L.C. v. Vermeer Mfg. 

Co., 298 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (emphases in 

original).

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 4 Filed: 09/04/2015
DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 5

I 

Dynamic argues that the Board erred in shifting the 

burden to Dynamic to prove that the Raymond patent was 

entitled to the filing date of its provisional application. 

According to Dynamic, as a presumptively valid prior art 

patent, Raymond’s presumed effective date is its February 

15, 2000 provisional application filing date. Dynamic 

contends that it made a prima facie showing that Raymond was thus prior art to the ’196 patent under § 102(e)

as of its provisional date, and, under Giacomini, the 

burden should have shifted to National Graphics to prove 

that Raymond was not entitled to the filing date of its 

provisional application. 

In response, National Graphics argues that the Board 

properly placed the burden of proof on Dynamic to support its contention that the Raymond provisional application provided written description support for the claims of 

the Raymond patent. According to National Graphics,

priority claims are not examined by the PTO as a matter 

of course, and consequently are not entitled to a presumption of adequate written description support in the provisional application.

We agree with National Graphics that the Board did 

not err in placing the burden on Dynamic, the petitioner 

in the inter partes review, to prove that the prior art 

Raymond patent was entitled to the filing date of its 

provisional application. As an initial matter, and to 

clarify the relative burdens, we begin with the established 

concept that there are two distinct burdens of proof: a 

burden of persuasion and a burden of production. See 

Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 

1326–27 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The burden of persuasion “is 

the ultimate burden assigned to a party who must prove 

something to a specified degree of certainty,” such as by a 

preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing 

evidence. Id. (citations omitted). In an inter partes 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 5 Filed: 09/04/2015
6 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

review, the burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to 

prove “unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence,” 35 U.S.C. § 316(e), and that burden never shifts to 

the patentee. “Failure to prove the matter as required by 

the applicable standard means that the party with the 

burden of persuasion loses on that point—thus, if the fact 

trier of the issue is left uncertain, the party with the 

burden loses.” Tech. Licensing, 545 F.3d at 1327.

A second and distinct burden, the burden of production, or the burden of going forward with evidence, is a 

shifting burden, “the allocation of which depends on 

where in the process of trial the issue arises.” Id. (citations omitted). The burden of production may entail 

“producing additional evidence and presenting persuasive 

argument based on new evidence or evidence already of 

record.” Id.

These burdens are illustrated in Technology Licensing, where the patentee, TLC, sued Gennum for infringement, and Gennum argued that TLC’s patent was 

anticipated by certain prior art. Id. At issue was whether 

the asserted patent was entitled to the benefit of the 

priority date of a related nonprovisional application. Id. 

TLC argued that the asserted claim was entitled under 35 

U.S.C. § 120 to the benefit of the earlier filing date of its 

parent nonprovisional application. Id. Section 120, which 

has language similar to that found in § 119(e)(1), provides 

that a patent application for an “invention disclosed in the 

manner provided by the first paragraph of section 112 of 

this title in an application previously filed in the United 

States . . . shall have the same effect, as to such invention, 

as though filed on the date of the prior application . . . .” 

(emphasis added).

Gennum, having the ultimate burden of proving its 

defense of invalidity based on anticipating prior art, also 

had the initial “burden of going forward with evidence 

that there is such anticipating prior art.” Tech. Licensing,

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 6 Filed: 09/04/2015
DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 7

545 F.3d at 1327. In response, TLC then had “the burden

of going forward with evidence either that the prior art 

does not actually anticipate, or, as [TLC] attempted in 

this case, that it is not prior art because the asserted 

claim is entitled to the benefit of a filing date prior to the

alleged prior art.” Id. We noted that “[t]his requires TLC 

to show not only the existence of the earlier application, 

but why the written description in the earlier application 

supports the claim.” Id. We concluded that once “TLC’s 

evidence and argument in support of the earlier filing 

date is . . . before the court, the burden of going forward 

again shifts to the proponent of the invalidity defense, 

Gennum, to convince the court that TLC is not entitled to 

the benefit of the earlier filing date.” Id. at 1328.

The aforementioned shifting burdens and related priority claims under § 120 in district court litigation parallel the shifting burdens and related priority claims under 

§ 119(e)(1) in inter partes reviews. Although, as Dynamic 

notes, the patent in Technology Licensing was entitled to 

the presumption of validity under 35 U.S.C. § 282, the 

different evidentiary standard in an inter partes review 

does not alter the shifting burdens between the parties

because § 316(e) also places the burden of persuasion on 

the petitioner to prove unpatentability. Compare § 282 

(“The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any 

claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”), with § 316(e) (“In an inter partes review . . . , the 

petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition 

of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”).

In this case, Dynamic, as the petitioner, had the burden of persuasion to prove unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence, and this burden never shifted. 

Dynamic also had the initial burden of production, and it 

satisfied that burden by arguing that Raymond anticipated the asserted claims of the ’196 patent under 

§ 102(e)(2).

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 7 Filed: 09/04/2015
8 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

The burden of production then shifted to National 

Graphics to argue or produce evidence that either Raymond does not actually anticipate, or, as was argued in 

this case, that Raymond is not prior art because the 

asserted claims in the ’196 patent are entitled to the 

benefit of a filing date (constructive or otherwise) prior to 

the filing date of Raymond. National Graphics produced 

evidence that the invention claimed in the ’196 patent

was reduced to practice prior to the filing date of Raymond, and thus contended that the asserted claims were 

entitled to a date of invention prior to that of the Raymond patent. 

As a result, the burden of production returned to Dynamic to prove that either the invention was not actually 

reduced to practice as argued, or that the Raymond prior 

art was entitled to the benefit of a filing date prior to the

date of National Graphics’ reduction to practice. As the 

Board found, however, Dynamic failed to carry its burden 

of proving that Raymond’s effective date was earlier than 

the date that the invention claimed in the ’196 patent was 

reduced to practice. The burden of production was on 

Dynamic to prove that, under § 119(e)(1), Raymond was 

entitled to the benefit of the filing date of its provisional 

application, and it failed to do that. 

In contrast, Dynamic’s proffered approach would create a presumption that a patent is entitled to the benefit 

of the filing date of its provisional precursor, but that

would be unsound because the PTO does not examine 

provisional applications as a matter of course; such a 

presumption is therefore not justified. The PTO’s Manual 

of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”), which is

“commonly relied upon as a guide to patent attorneys and 

patent examiners on procedural matters,” Litton Sys., Inc. 

v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1439 (Fed. Cir. 1984), 

explains this: 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 8 Filed: 09/04/2015
DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 9

If the filing date of the earlier provisional application is necessary, for example, in the case of an interference or to overcome a reference, care must be 

taken to ensure that the disclosure filed as the 

provisional application adequately provides (1) a 

written description of the subject matter of the 

claim(s) at issue in the later filed nonprovisional 

application, and (2) an enabling disclosure to 

permit one of ordinary skill in the art to make and

use the claimed invention in the later filed 

nonprovisional application without undue experimentation.

MPEP § 211.05(I)(A) (2014) (emphasis added). Thus, 

because the PTO does not examine priority claims unless 

necessary, the Board has no basis to presume that a 

reference patent is necessarily entitled to the filing date of 

its provisional application. See, e.g., PowerOasis, Inc. v. 

T-Mobile USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 

(“When neither the PTO nor the Board has previously

considered priority, there is simply no reason to presume 

that claims in a [continuation-in-part] application are 

entitled to the effective filing date of an earlier filed 

application. Since the PTO did not make a determination 

regarding priority, there is no finding for the district court 

to defer to.”). 

Indeed, Dynamic’s reliance on Giacomini to argue for 

a presumption is misplaced. In Giacomini, the Board 

rejected certain claims of Giacomini’s application as 

anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) by the Tran patent. 

Giacomini, 612 F.3d at 1382. The Tran patent’s filing 

date was exactly a month after Giacomini filed his application, but the Tran patent claimed priority from a provisional application that antedated Giacomini’s filing date. 

Id. As relevant here, we found that “[b]ecause Giacomini 

never argued before the Board that the Tran provisional 

failed to provide written description support for the 

claimed subject matter in accordance with section 119(e), 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 9 Filed: 09/04/2015
10 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

Giacomini waived the argument by failing to raise it 

below.” Id. at 1383 (citation omitted). We ultimately 

concluded that the Tran patent had the same “patentdefeating effect” as though it was filed on the date of the 

Tran provisional. Id. at 1385. Because Giacomini waived 

the argument that the Tran provisional application did 

not support the Tran patent, we did not reach the question whether the Tran patent was presumptively entitled 

to the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application.

 Thus, the Board did not err in concluding that, in 

view of National Graphics’ evidence of the actual reduction to practice of the invention of the ’196 patent, Dynamic had the further burden to prove that Raymond was 

entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional application.

II

Asserting that it carried that burden, Dynamic argues 

that it provided sufficient evidence to prove that the 

Raymond provisional application provided written description support for the claims of the Raymond prior art 

patent. Dynamic contends that, as part of its petition, it 

compared the claims of the ’196 patent to the disclosure in 

the Raymond patent. According to Dynamic, it then 

provided a claim chart in its reply brief to the Board 

establishing anticipation of claim 1 of the ’196 patent by 

the Raymond provisional application. Dynamic argues 

that the combination of the two charts demonstrates that 

the Raymond provisional application provides written 

description support for the claims of the Raymond patent. 

National Graphics responds that Dynamic only made 

a conclusory assertion in its petition that Raymond was 

entitled to an earlier effective date, and the argument is 

therefore waived. National Graphics also argues that, 

even absent a determination of waiver, the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence because DynamCase: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 10 Filed: 09/04/2015
DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 11

ic never compared the claims of the Raymond patent to 

the disclosure in the provisional application. 

First, we find that Dynamic did not waive its argument that Raymond was entitled to an earlier effective 

date. As discussed supra, Dynamic did not have the 

burden of producing evidence relating to the Raymond 

provisional application until after National Graphics 

made its argument regarding reduction to practice. As a 

result, it was not necessary for Dynamic to prove in its 

petition that Raymond was entitled to the filing date of its 

provisional application. Thus, there was no waiver.

We ultimately agree with National Graphics, however, that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial 

evidence because Dynamic failed to compare the claims of 

the Raymond patent to the disclosure in the Raymond 

provisional application. A reference patent is only entitled to claim the benefit of the filing date of its provisional 

application if the disclosure of the provisional application 

provides support for the claims in the reference patent in 

compliance with § 112, ¶ 1. In re Wertheim, 646 F.2d 527, 

537 (CCPA 1981).2 As Dynamic acknowledges, it provided 

charts to the Board comparing the claims of the ’196 

patent to the disclosure of the Raymond patent and claim 

1 of the ’196 patent to the disclosure of the Raymond 

provisional application. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. at 22. 

Nowhere, however, does Dynamic demonstrate support in 

the Raymond provisional application for the claims of the 

Raymond patent. That was Dynamic’s burden. A provisional application’s effectiveness as prior art depends on 

its written description support for the claims of the issued 

patent of which it was a provisional. Dynamic did not 

make that showing.

2 Because we refer to the pre-AIA version of § 102, 

we do not interpret here the AIA’s impact on Wertheim in 

newly designated § 102(d).

 

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 11 Filed: 09/04/2015
12 DYNAMIC DRINKWARE, LLC v. NATIONAL GRAPHICS, INC. 

We thus conclude that the Board’s finding that Dynamic failed to prove that the Raymond patent was

entitled to the filing date of its provisional application is 

supported by substantial evidence. We have considered 

Dynamic’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. 

CONCLUSION

Because the Board properly concluded that Dynamic 

failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence 

that claims 1 and 12 of the ’196 patent are anticipated by 

Raymond under § 102(e), we affirm. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 15-1214 Document: 31-2 Page: 12 Filed: 09/04/2015