Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00113/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00113-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Veronica Garza
Plaintiff
Mike Johanns
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VERONICA GARZA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

MIKE JOHANNS, Secretary, )

United States Department of )

Agriculture, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CV-F-06-113 OWW/LJO

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Doc. 15) AND DIRECTING

CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER

JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT

On February 2, 2006, plaintiff Veronica Garza, proceeding in

pro per, filed a Petition for Review, naming Mike Johanns,

Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture as

defendant. Ms. Garza alleges that she is a Resource Assistant

with the U.S. Forest Service, Mammoth Ranger District, Division

of Recreational Services, Inyo National Forest. Ms. Garza

requests that the Final Order of the Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) of the Equal Opportunity Commission dismissing Ms. Garza’s

complaint of discrimination based on national origin

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The record establishes that plaintiff was served with 1

defendant’s motion. 

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discrimination and reprisal for prior EEO activity when she was

issued a Letter of Reprimand on October 24, 2004 and when she was

denied work details from April 2004 through October 2004 be

vacated and that her case be remanded to the EEOC for

adjudication. The Petition for Review alleges in pertinent part:

By order of the Administrative Judge (AJ) of

the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

pursuant to 29 CFR 1614.109(g)(3), a Decision

(AJ’s Decision) was ordered in which

Complainant’s case was dismissed on the 14th

day of September, 2005. Complainant’s

representative received the Final Order of

the US Department of Agriculture (‘The

Agency’) on November 4, 2005.

Defendant moves for dismissal or for summary judgment of

this action on the ground that it is time-barred and this court

lacks jurisdiction. 

 Plaintiff did not file a written opposition to the motion

nor did she appear at the hearing on October 2, 2006. 

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Defendant submits the Declaration of Rhonda Buckman, Equal

Opportunity Assistant, United States Department of Agriculture,

since July 2004, who avers she is “responsible for mailing out

the Final Agency Decisions to the Complainants and all other

parties involved.” Ms. Buckman further avers:

2. In the case of Veronica Garza v. Johanns,

Agency No. 050311, I sent a copy of the Final

Agency Decision to Plaintiff’s

Representative, Mr. Robert Donnelly, via

certified mail, on October 18, 2005.

3. I copied the certified mail tracking

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number (7003 3110 0001 5607 7973) used to

track the delivery of the Final Agency

Decision to Mr. Donnelly onto the top portion

of the Decision. I did so in the normal

course of business and as I customarily do

whenever I certify service of Final Agency

Decisions via certified mail. By copying

tracking numbers directly onto Final Agency

Decisions, the Employee Complaints Division

can easily identify assigned tracking numbers

within the office.

Attached to Ms. Buckman’s declaration is a copy of a letter from

Sadhna G. True, Director, Office of Civil Rights, dated October

14, 2005 and addressed to Mr. Donnelly, Donnelly & Donnelly, 1450

Springfield Drive, #56, Chico, California. The letter encloses a

copy of the Final Agency Decision and a description of further

appeal rights, including the following information:

You also have the right to file a civil

action in an appropriate United States

District Court. If you choose to file a

civil action, you may do so:

! Within ninety (90) days of

receipt of the final action if no

appeal has been filed.

...

Unless an appeal is filed with the EEOC,

failure to file a civil action within ninety

(90) calendar days may result in the

dismissal of your civil action. ....

Handwritten at the top of the letter are what appears to be the

following numbers: “100331100003520 2026" and “3110 0001 5607

7973". The proof of service attached to this letter also states

that the letter and the enclosure were mailed to Ms. Garza, P.O.

Box 8524, Mammoth Lakes, California, on October 18, 2005. 

Defendant also submits the Declaration of Sara B. Cohen, an

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attorney with the Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of

Agriculture, in San Francisco. Ms. Cohen avers in pertinent

part:

2. On or around July 26, 2006, I contacted

Rhonda Buckman ... to request the delivery

records of the October 14, 2005, Final Order

in Garza v. Johanns, EEOC No. 370-05-00483. 

Ms. Buckman gave me the certified tracking

number used to track the delivery of the

Final Order in that case: 7003 3110 0001 5607

7973. 

3. On July 28, 2006, I contacted the United

States Postal Service Office in Chico,

California to request the delivery record for

certified item number 7003 3110 0001 5607

7973. Following my request, the Postal

Service sent via fax a copy of its archived

delivery records for that certified item

number.

Attached to Ms. Cohen’s declaration is a copy of a fax

transmission from the United States Postal Service to Ms. Cohen,

which states in pertinent part:

The following is in response to your

07/28/2006 request for delivery information

on your Certified item number 7003 3110 001

5607 7973. The delivery record shows that

this item was delivered on 10/31/2005 at 1:57

PM in CHICO, CA 95928. The scanned image of

the recipient information is provided below.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) provides that “[w]ithin 90 days of

receipt of notice of final action taken by a department, agency,

or unit ... an employee ..., if aggrieved by the final

disposition of his complaint ... may file a civil action as

provided in section 2000e-5 ... of this title.” If the

complainant is represented by counsel, the 90 day period

commences to run from the date of counsel’s receipt of the final

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In calculating the 90 day period, the first day is omitted 2

and the last day is counted. See Prophet v. Armco Steel, Inc., 575

F.2d 579, 580 n.1 (5 Cir.1978), citing Geronymo v. Joseph Horne th

Co., 440 F.Supp. 1157, 1159 (W.D.Pa.1977). 

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decision. See Irwin v. Dept. of Veteran’s Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,

93 (1990). 

According to defendant’s unrebutted exhibits, the 90 day

period commenced on November 1, 2005. To be timely plaintiff’s 2

complaint should have been filed on January 30, 2006. As noted,

the complaint was not filed until February 2, 2006.

The 90 day period is subject to equitable tolling, id. at

95-96. As the Supreme Court explained, however, 

Federal courts have typically extended

equitable relief only sparingly. We have

allowed equitable tolling in situations where

the claimant has actively pursued his

judicial remedies by filing a defective

pleading within the statutory period, or

where the complainant has been induced or

tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into

allowing the filing deadline to pass. We

have generally been much less forgiving in

receiving late filings where the claimant

failed to exercise due diligence in

preserving his legal rights ....

Petitioner urges that his failure to file in

a timely manner should be excused because his

lawyer was absent from his office at the time

that the EEOC notice was received, and that

he thereafter filed within 30 days of the day

on which he personally received notice. But

the principles of equitable tolling described

above do not extend to what is at best a

garden variety claim of excusable neglect.

Id. at 96.

Rule 12(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that

if, in a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “matters outside the

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pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the

motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed

of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given

reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to

such a motion by Rule 56.” In Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449,

454 (9 Cir.1994), the Ninth Circuit held that “documents whose th

contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no

party questions, but which are not physically attached to a

pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

to dismiss.” In Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th

Cir.1998), the Ninth Circuit further held “that a district court

ruling on a motion to dismiss may consider a document the

authenticity of which is not contested, and upon which the

plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies.” 

Under these standards, the October 14, 2005 letter attached

to Ms. Buckman’s declaration advising Mr. Donnelly of the final

decision and of plaintiff’s appeal rights may be considered in

resolving the motion to dismiss. However, Ms. Cohen’s

declaration refers to a document upon which plaintiff’s complaint

does not necessarily rely and which is not alleged in the

complaint, i.e., the fax transmission from the U.S. Postal

Service. Therefore, the motion is resolved as one for summary

judgment.

“Where the moving party does not have the burden of proof on

the relevant issues, ... the district court must determine that

the deficiencies in the opponent’s evidence designated in or in

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connection with the motion entitle the moving party to judgment

as a matter of law.” Anchorage Associates v. V.I. Bd. of Tax

Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (9 Cir.1990). However, as explained th

in Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9 Cir.2001): th

[T]he district court may determine whether

there is a genuine issue of fact, on summary

judgment, based on the papers submitted on

the motion and such other papers as may be on

file and specifically referred to and facts

therein set forth in the motion papers. 

Though the court has discretion in

appropriate circumstances to consider other

materials, it need not do so. The district

court need not examine the entire file for

evidence establishing a genuine issue of

fact, where the evidence is not set forth in

the opposing papers with adequate references

so that it could conveniently be found.

Under these standards, the evidence submitted by defendant

establishes as a matter of law that the Petition for Review was

not filed within 90 days of Mr. Donnelly’s receipt of the final

decision and information concerning further appeal rights. 

Plaintiff makes no allegation and presents no evidence from which

it may be inferred that she is entitled to equitable tolling.

ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter JUDGMENT for

defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 6, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

668554 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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