Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00136/USCOURTS-akd-3_15-cv-00136-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Stanton M. Buch
Plaintiff
Sharon A. Stinus
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

STANTON M. BUCH and SHARON A. ) 

STINUS, ) 

)

 Plaintiffs, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) No. 3:15-cv-0136-HRH

 Defendant. ) 

__________________________________________) 

O R D E R

Motion to Dismiss

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.1 This motion is opposed.2 Oral

argument was requested3 but is not deemed necessary. 

Background

Plaintiffs are Stanton M. Buch and Sharon A. Stinus. Defendant is the United States

of America. 

1Docket No. 7. 

2Docket No. 11. 

3Docket No. 13. 

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Case 3:15-cv-00136-HRH Document 14 Filed 03/21/16 Page 1 of 7
In September 2009, Buch “was enlisted with the U.S. Army and stationed at Ft.

Wainright, near Fairbanks,” Alaska.4 Buch was “[d]istraught overdifficulties ina domestic

relationship and under the influence of alcohol and medications” when he “attempted

suicide by slashing his wrists.”5 Buch was “rushed to medical care at Bassett Army

Community Hospital” and “then transferred to the mental health unit at ... Fairbanks

Memorial Hospital[.]”6 Buch was “voluntarily” admitted to Fairbanks Memorial Hospital

on September 24, 2009 and “then discharged into the care of the U.S. Army on September

25, 2009.”7 “That night, after discharge, ... Buch, unwatched and unchallenged, left base,

purchased a handgun and, underthe influence of alcohol, attempted suicide again.”8 Buch

“survived the attempt but injured himself severely in the head.”9 Before Buch “pulled the

trigger[,]” he “contacted his mother, plaintiff Sharon Stinus, by telephone, andapprisedher

of the gun and of his intentions.”10Stinus “desperately tried to dissuade ... Buch from

4Complaint at 2, ¶ 11, Docket No. 1. 

5

Id.

6

Id. at 2-3. 

7

Id. at 3. 

8

Id. at 3, ¶ 14. 

9

Id.

10

Id. at 3, ¶ 15. 

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Case 3:15-cv-00136-HRH Document 14 Filed 03/21/16 Page 2 of 7
harming himself and tried to ascertain his whereabouts so she coulddirect Army personnel

to him in time.”11

 “Stinus was thereby a bystander to the harm which befell ... Buch.”12

On August 13, 2015, plaintiffs commenced this Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)

action. Plaintiffs allege that U.S. Army personnel breached a duty to supervise Buch “by

negligently failing to place himon a suicide prevention watch with adequate safeguards.”13

Plaintiffs allege that Buch “suffered grievous physical wounds, emotionaldistress,painand

suffering and loss of enjoyment of life” as a result of defendant’s negligence.14 And they

allege that Stinus “suffered severe emotional distress and depression from her exposure

to the harm experienced by her son[.]”15 Plaintiffs allege that their injuries “did not arise

out of or flow from any course of activity incident to Stanton Buch’s service with the U.S.

Army.”16

Defendant now moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to the Feres

doctrine. 

11

Id.

12

Id. 

13

Id. at 3, ¶¶ 12-13. 

14

Id. at 4, ¶ 20. 

15

Id. at ¶ 18. 

16

Id. at 4-5, ¶ 23. 

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Case 3:15-cv-00136-HRH Document 14 Filed 03/21/16 Page 3 of 7
Discussion

“A motion to dismiss pursuant to the Feres doctrine is properly treated as a Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss forlack of subject matterjurisdiction[.]” Dreier v. United

States, 106 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1997). “A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial

or factual.” Safe Airfor Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial

attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient

on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. “By contrast, in a factual attack, the

challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise

invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. Here, defendant is making a facial attack. The court

“therefore ‘assume[s] [plaintiffs’] [factual] allegations to be true and draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in [their] favor.’” Doe v. Holy See, 557 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004)). The court does not, “however,

accept the ‘truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual

allegations.’” Id. (quoting Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th

Cir. 2003)). 

“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless it waives such

immunity.” Chadd v. United States., 794 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015). “The FTCA

waives the federal government’s sovereign immunity, rendering the United States liable

‘in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circum-

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stances....’” Ritchie v. United States, 733 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §

2674). “In 1950, however, the Supreme Court carved out a judicial exception to the FTCA,

holding in Feres v. United States that ‘the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort

Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of

activity incident to service.’” Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). 

“It subsequently extended this principle—known informally as the Feres doctrine—in

Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977), to bar third-party

claims which derive directly or indirectly from injuries to service members incident to

military duty.” Id. 

“The Feres doctrine is applicable ‘whenever a legal action would require a civilian

court to examine decisions regarding management, discipline, supervision, and control of

members of the armed forces of the United States.’” Zaputil v. Cowgill, 335 F.3d 885, 887

(9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 710 (9th Cir. 1997)). “‘The test has

been broadly construed to immunize the United States and members of the military from

any suit whichmay intrude in military affairs, second-guess[] military decisions, orimpair[]

military discipline.’” Id. (quoting Jackson v. Brigle, 17 F.3d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

To determine whether a service member’s injuries arise from activity “incident to

service”, the court considers four factors: 

“(1) the place where the negligent act occurred, (2) the duty

status of the plaintiff when the negligent act occurred, (3) the

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Case 3:15-cv-00136-HRH Document 14 Filed 03/21/16 Page 5 of 7
benefits accruing to the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s status

as a service member, and (4) the nature of the plaintiff’s

activities at the time the negligent act occurred.”

McConnell v. United States, 478 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Costo v. United

States, 248 F.3d 863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001)). “[N]one of these factors are dispositive.” Id.

Rather, the court must look at “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Consideration of these factors leads to the conclusion that plaintiffs’ alleged injuries

arose out of activity incident to Buch’s service in the Army. At the time of his second

suicide attempt, Buch was an enlisted soldier serving on active duty. Plaintiffshave alleged

that the cost of almost all of Buch’s medical treatment as a result of his second suicide

attempt “has been borne by defendant[.]”17 And, the alleged negligent act, the failure of

U.S. Army personnel to provide adequate psychiatric care for Buch after his release from

the hospital, presumably took place on base. 

Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is unavailing. Plaintiffs point out that the sole

express military exception in the FTCA is for “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant

activities of the military or naval forces, orthe Coast Guard, during time of war.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2680(j). Thus, because plaintiffs’ claims did not arise out of combatant activities of the

military, plaintiffs argue that their FTCA claims should not be dismissed. 

17Complaint at 4, ¶ 21, Docket No. 1. 

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Case 3:15-cv-00136-HRH Document 14 Filed 03/21/16 Page 6 of 7
Although plaintiffs are correctthatthe onlystatutory military exception in the FTCA

is for combatant activities, that does not mean that the Feres doctrine does not apply here. 

The Feres doctrine is a judicially created exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity in

the FTCA that applies in military cases, such as this one, which do not involve combatant

activities. And, as discussed above, plaintiffs’ alleged injuries arose out of activity incident

to Buch’s service in the Army. Although Buch was off base when he attempted suicide a

second time, plaintiffs’ claims are based on the Army’s failure to supervise one of its

soldiers. Such claims plainly fall within the reach of the Feres doctrine. Thus, plaintiffs’

claims are barred by Feres doctrine, and they must be dismissed. 

Conclusion

Plaintiffs’ request for oral argument18

is denied. Defendant’s motion to dismiss19

is

granted. The clerk of court shall enter judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with

prejudice. 

DATED at Anchorage, Alaska, this 21st day of March, 2016. 

/s/ H. Russel Holland 

United States District Judge

18Docket No. 13. 

19Docket No. 7. 

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