Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03352/USCOURTS-ca10-93-03352-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Capstan, Inc.
Appellee
William E. Elmore
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILEDUnited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 1 a 1995 

WILLIAM E. ELMORE, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. No. 93-3352 

CAPSTAN, INC. , 

Defendant-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 92-4004-DES) 

Victor A. Bolden (Eric Schnapper, Elaine R. Jones, Charles stephen 

Ralston and Theodore M. Shaw, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational 

Fund, Inc., and Pantaleon Florez, Jr., Florez & Frost, P.A., 

Topeka, Kansas, on the brief), New York, New York, for PlaintiffAppellant ) 

Michael W. Merriam, Goodell, Stratton, Edmonds & Palmer, L.L.P., 

Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee. 

SEYMOUR, Chie\ Judge, SETH, Circuit Judge, and KANE, Senior 

District Judge • 

KANE, Senior District Judge. 

Plaintiff employee, an African-American, initiated this Title 

VII action against his employer claiming his discharge for 

violating a work rule was the result of intentional discrimination 

based on race. The employee alleged disparate treatment, 

* Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for 

the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-3352 Document: 01019279505 Date Filed: 06/19/1995 Page: 1 
based on race. The employee alleged disparate treatment, 

contending defendant disciplined non-minority employees more· 

leniently for similar conduct. After a two-day bench trial, the 

district court found that while the employee had established a 

prima facie case of disparate treatment, he had not established 

this treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based 

on race. The district court entered judgment in favor of the 

employer, and the employee appealed. 

on appeal, the employee argues reversal is required because 

the district court's judgment was premised on the erroneous finding 

that "no" evidence of discriminatory animus had been adduced at 

trial. The employee points to the district court's finding that 

non-minorities were treated more leniently for similar infractions 

on the job, as well as its determination that certain of the 

explanations for the employee's discharge given by the employer 

were not credible. While we agree such evidence can be the basis 

from which a trier of fact may infer discriminatory intent, such an 

inference is not compelled as a matter of law. The ultimate 

question of whether intentional discrimination occurred is one for 

the trier of fact -- in this case the district court -- to decide. 

The determination is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of 

review. After reviewing the district court's findings in light of 

the record before us, we find no clear error. 

affirm. 

II. Facts 

Accordingly, we 

William E. Elmore is an African-American machinist who was 

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hired as a laborer in the sheet metal department of Seymour Foods, 

Inc. ( 11Seymour11 ) in November of 1986. Elmore was considered by his 

immediate supervisor to be an average employee who never refused to 

perform tasks assigned to him and never received a written 

reprimand about either his performance or his attendance at 

Seymour. Elmore v. Capstan, No. 92-4004-DES, 1993 WL 290259, at *2 

(D. Kan. July a, 1993). Nevertheless, Seymour fired Elmore on 

December 19, 1990, purportedly for failing timely to notify his 

supervisor of an extended absence due to illness, as well as for 

falsifying his return-to-work slip. Elmore filed his complaint in 

this action on January, 6, 1992, naming Seymour as defendant. 

Seymour, in conjunction with a sale of assets in October 1992, 

later changed its name to Capstan, Inc. ( 11Capstan11 ) and Capstan was 

substituted as the party defendant in this action. 

The dispute between Elmore and Capstan began on Saturday, 

December a, 1990, when Elmore became sick with what was eventually 

diagnosed as an upper respiratory infection. His last day at work 

was Friday, December 7, 1990. The following day, Saturday, 

December 8th, Elmore fell ill and elected not to work an overtime 

shift. He was not scheduled to work Sunday, December 9th. 

Elmore was still ill on Monday, December lOth, and made an 

appointment to see his physician Dr. Cohen on Tuesday, December 

11th. Dr. Cohen diagnosed Elmore's illness as a respiratory 

infection and prescribed a five-day supply of cough medicine and an 

antibiotic. He also gave Elmore a slip authorizing him to return 

to work on Friday, December 14, 1990. Elmore's first contact with 

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Capstan regarding his illness and absence from work was on 

Wednesday, December 12, when his wife called supervisor Gary 

Thompson to advise him her husband was ill. At that time, Elmore' .s 

wife indicated Elmore would probably be back to work on Friday, 

December 14th. 1 

Elmore did not return to work on Friday. Instead, Elmore's 

wife went to Dr. Cohen's office to request an extension of time for 

Elmore to be off work because Elmore still was not feeling well. 

Dr. Cohen wrote out a new return-to-work slip, permitting Elmore to 

return to work on December 17, 1990, the following Monday. Elmore 

did not return to work until Wednesday, December 19. On that day, 

Elmore submitted the return-to-work slip signed by Dr. Cohen. The 

date on the slip had been altered from December 17 to December 19 

·by changing the number 11 711 to a 11 9. 11 

Elmore was not permitted to work on December 19th. Instead, 

supervisor Thompson told him the new operations manager, Don 

Appleby, would have to be consulted. 2 Appleby told Elmore he had 

violated company policy by failing to call in and by altering the 

date on the return-to-work slip. Elmore was asked to go home and 

await the company's investigation and decision with regard to his 

absence. After a telephone conversation with Dr. Cohen, in which 

1 The only other contact with Capstan made by Elmore or his wife during 

Elmore's illness was on Thursday, December 13. Elmore called Larry Ledom, a nonsupervisory employee at Capstan responsible for the company's payroll, and asked 

to be paid earlier than the regular Friday payday. Elmore was told at that time 

that he would have to produce a doctor's slip in order to return to work. On 

that same day, Elmore's wife picked up his paycheck. 

2 Don Appleby began working for Capstan as its operations manager on 

December 11, 1990. 

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Dr. Cohen stated he had only authorized Elmore to be off work until 

December 17th and had not altered the return-to-work date on the 

slip to December 19th, 3 Appleby consulted with Elmore's 

supervisors and made the decision to terminate Elmore's employment. 

At 2:00 p.m. on December 19th, Elmore was notified that his 

employment was terminated for failure to comply with company policy 

regarding his absence and for falsifying the date on the return-towork slip issued by Dr. Cohen. 4 

Elmore asserts Capstan fired him because of his race in 

violation of Title VII of the civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. 

sec. 2000e-2(a) (1). 5 Citing other incidents at Capstan involving 

serious violations of company policy, Elmore argued that nonminority employees were subject to more lenient discipline for 

comparably classified offenses. He referenced incidents at Capstan 

where non-minority employees were disciplined for falsifying 

3 Dr. Cohen testified that when he changes a return-to-work date, his 

practice is to issue a new form with the new date rather than alter the date on 

the original slip. 

4 Seymour's policy on absenteeism provided that employees would be 

considered to have voluntarily terminated their employment if they failed to call 

in for three successive days to report an absence and to request that the absence 

be recorded as "excused." An employee's failure to notify his supervisor after 

the second day of absence was classified as a serious offense to be disciplined 

with termination. An absence was excused under Seymour's policy if it was 

documented by a doctor. An absence was recorded "unexcused" unless the employee 

requested approval in advance, or, if the absence was due to family or personal 

illness, jury duty, or other acceptable reason, the employee called in to report 

such absence between 7:00 and 8:30 a.m. on the date of the absence. Unexcused 

absences would result in disciplinary action depending upon the number of 

unexcused absences occurring within a 12-month period. It was permissible at 

Seymour for a sick employee to have his spouse call in on his behalf. 

5 Section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e2(a)(1), provides: "It shall be an unlawful employmentpractice for an employer 

••• to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, 

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin •••• " 

5 

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company records and for excessive absenteeism who, instead of being 

fired, were given written warnings about the possibility of 

termination if the unacceptable conduct occurred again. Elmore 

presented no evidence, however, that such employees had been absent 

without prior notice or company approval for seven consecutive work 

days, or that they had altered a doctor's return-to-work slip. 

Applying the three-pronged framework established in McDonnell 

Douglas v. Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973), the district court 

determined first that Elmore had established a prima facie case of 

disparate treatment at trial by showing (1) he was a member of a 

protected class; (2) he was discharged for violating a work rule; 

and ( 3) non-minority employees were subjected to more lenient 

discipline for infractions classified as comparable in 

seriousness. 6 Elmore v. Capstan, 1993 WL 290259 at *4 (D. Kan. 

July a, 1993). Second, the district court determined Capstan had 

met its burden of producing evidence of facially legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reasons for Elmore's discharge in that Elmore 

failed to comply with company policy regarding absences from work 

and appeared to have altered his return-to-work slip. Id. 

Finally, the district court found Capstan's non-discriminatory 

reasons for discharging Elmore were not a pretext for racial 

discrimination, and concluded Elmore had failed to carry his 

ultimate burden of establishing his discharge was the result of 

6 Elmore asserts a disparate treatment, as opposed to a disparate 

impact, claim. A disparate impact claim alleges that an ostensibly neutral 

policy or practice has a disparate impact or effect on a protected class. See 

Teamsters v. United States, 431 u.s. 324, 335-36 n. 15 (1977) for a discussion 

of the differences between the two theories. 

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intentional discrimination based on his race. Id. at *5. 

III. Analytical Framework 

To prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge based on race 

under Title VII, plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving, 

either directly or indirectly, that his discharge was motivated by 

racial bias. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 u.s. 

248, 253 (1981). Where there is inadequate direct evidence of 

discrimination (e.g., oral or written statements on the part of a 

defendant showing a discriminatory motivation), the United states 

Supreme Court has established a three-step burden-shifting format 

whereby plaintiff may prove his case through indirect, i.e. , 

circumstantial, evidence. McDonnell Douglas, 411 u.s. at 801-05; 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-56. It is well settled in this circuit 

that the McDonnell Douglas format is applicable to the analysis of 

Title VII claims of disparate treatment. Sanchez v. Philip Morris, 

Inc., 992 F.2d 244 (lOth Cir. 1993); EEOC v. Flasher, 986 F.2d 

1312, 1316 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, plaintiff has the 

initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of intentional 

discrimination. The standard in this circuit for doing so on a 

disparate treatment claim based upon discharge for violation of a 

work rule is set out in detail in Flasher. There we held a 

plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment 

by showing (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he was 

discharged for violating a work rule; and (3) similarly situated 

non-minority employees were treated differently. Flasher, 986 F. 2d 

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at 1316 (citing McAlester v. United Air Lines, 851 F.2d 1249, 1260 

(lOth Cir. 1988)). When comparing the relative treatment of 

similarly situated minority and non-minority employees, the 

comparison need not be based on identical violations of identical 

work rules; the violations need only be of "comparable 

seriousness." Id. (citing McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1261). 

Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 

production shifts to defendant to articulate a facially 

nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. McDonnell 

Douglas, 411 u.s. at 802-03, modified by Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316, 

n.4 (emphasizing that defendant's proffered reason need be only 

"facially" nondiscriminatory because no examination of whether the 

reason given is pretextual or unequally applied is made at this 

stage of the analysis). The proffered reason for the employer's 

action, however, must be reasonably specific and clear. Burdine, 

450 u.s. at 258. 

Once defendant has met its burden of production by 

articulating a facially nondiscriminatory reason for its employment 

action, plaintiff then assumes the normal burden of any plaintiff 

to prove his or her case at trial. Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1316. 

Plaintiff can prevail 

"either directly by proving the employer acted 

with a discriminatory motive or indirectly by 

showing the stated reason for the discharge 

was a 'pretext for the sort of discrimination 

prohibited by (Title VII]' --that is, that 

the facially nondiscriminatory reason was 'a 

cover-up for a racially discriminatory 

decision. 111 

Id. To do so the employee need neither prove his employer 1 s 

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proffered reasons were false, nor that a discriminatory factor was 

the "sole motivating factor in the employment decision." See James 

v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc., 21 F. 3d 989, 992 (lOth Cir. 

1994) (citations omitted) (applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis in 

a constructive discharge action brought under the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 u.s.c. § 621). Instead, the 

employee must prove only that a discriminatory factor was "also a 

reason for the employer's decision" and that it was "the factor 

that made a difference." Id. Finally, in a disparate treatment 

case, pretext may be shown by reference to other similarly situated 

non-minority employees receiving disparate discipline. See 

McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1261. In the final analysis, "the court is 

required to weigh all the evidence and to assess the credibility of 

the witnesses in order to determine whether the plaintiff was the 

victim of intentional discrimination based upon protected class 

characteristics." Flasher, 986 F.2d at 1317. 

The ultimate factual determination of whether the employer's 

decision was motivated by intentional discrimination based upon 

protected class characteristics is for the trier of fact. Id., 

(citing Pullman-standard v. Swint, 456 u.s. 273, 287-88 (1982)). 

Consequently, with respect to the Title VII liability dispute 

raised on appeal, we are left with the "single overarching issue 

whether plaintiff adduced sufficient evidence to warrant (the trier 

of fact's] determination that adverse employment action was taken 

against him on the basis of [race]." Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 

944 F.2d 743, 744 (lOth Cir. 1991), applied in Sanchez 992 F.2d at 

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246. 7 

We review the district court 1 s findings under the clearly 

erroneous standard. Id. (citing Anderson v. city of Bessemer City, 

470 u.s. 564, 573 (1985) and Pitre v. Western Electric Co., 843 

F.2d 1262, 1266 (lOth Cir. 1988)). Under this standard, we may 

uphold any determination falling within a "broad range of 

permissible conclusions." Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp., 496 u.s. 

384, 400 (1990). 11Where there are two permissible views of the 

evidence, the factfinder•s choice between them cannot be clearly 

erroneous." Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574. 11A finding of fact is 

clearly erroneous if it is without factual support in the record or 

if, after reviewing all the evidence, [the court] is left with the 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 11 Cowles 

v. Dow Keith Oil & Gas, Inc., 752 F.2d 508, 511 (lOth Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 479 u.s. 816 (1986). 

IV. Legal Analysis 

We find the district court correctly applied the three-part 

analysis applicable to Title VII disparate treatment claims 

articulated in McDonnell Douglas and Flasher. The district court 

first determined Elmore had established a prima facie case of 

disparate treatment, finding non-minority employees were subjected 

7 This is so because the purpose of the sequential burden-shifting 

analysis adopted from McDonnell Douglas is to provide a basic "order of 

presentation of proof" so the controversy can be brought into focus." Carey v. 

United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 621, 623 (lOth Cir. 1987). It was not 

intended to provide a ritualistic formula for what ultimately is a 

straightforward trial about motive. Thus, after a full trial on the merits, the 

sequential burden-shifting analysis adopted from McDonnell Douglas "drops out" 

of consideration. See sanchez, 992 F.2d at 246. 

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to more lenient discipline, such as verbal and written warnings, 

for infractions that were comparable in seriousness under Capstan's 

rules of conduct. Elmore v. Capstan, 1993 WL 290259 at *4. Next, 

the district court found Capstan had articulated a facially 

nondiscriminatory reason for Elmore's discharge by presenting 

evidence that Elmore failed to call in sick until the third day of 

his absence and submitted a falsified return-to-work slip a week 

later when he finally did return to work. 

on the ultimate question of whether Elmore had proven his 

discharge was motivated by intentional discrimination based on 

race, the district court found that he had not, concluding Elmore 

had "submitted no evidence whatsoever that his discharge was 

motivated by racial discrimination." Id. at *5. The court allowed 

that Elmore's termination may have been unfair in light of the 

lenient treatment afforded other employees who violated similar 

work rules; it concluded, however, that evidence of disparate 

treatment alone does not establish a claim of racial 

discrimination. Id. 

On appeal, Elmore contends the conclusion that he had 

presented "no evidence whatsoever" of discriminatory intent is 

erroneous given the district court's simultaneous finding -- made 

in the context of considering whether Elmore had established his 

prima facie case -- that non-minority Capstan employees were 

disciplined less harshly than comparable infractions of work rules 

than he. Elmore argues the district court erroneously held that 

evidence of disparate treatment could not constitute evidence of 

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intentional discrimination. This is a mischaracterization. The 

district court clearly stated that Elmore had not met his burden of 

•persuasion•, not production. Id. at *5 (emphasis added). Thus, 

the court's subsequent statement that there was "no evidence" 

Elmore's discharge was "motivated" by racial discrimination was not 

a determination by the court that there was no evidence from which 

a trier of fact could infer racial discrimination. Rather, it was 

a determination that the evidence failed to persuade the district 

court, sitting as trier of fact, that such an inference was 

warranted. 

The record shows the district court considered the evidence of 

dissimilar treatment presented by Elmore throughout its analysis. 

It first considered this evidence when it found Elmore had 

established his prima facie case. Id. at *4. It considered this 

evidence again, along with the other evidence presented, when it 

made the ultimate factual determination that Elmore had failed to 

prove intentional discrimination. Id. at *5. 

Elmore argues unexplained differences in treatment should 

compel a finding of intentional discrimination or pretext. It is 

error, however, "to assume that differential treatment 

between a minority employee and a non-minority employee that is not 

explained by the employer in terms of a rational, predetermined 

business policy must be based on illegal discrimination because of 

an employee's protected class characteristics." Flasher, 986 F.2d 

at 1319-20. Irrational differential treatment may in some 

instances support an inference of racial discrimination, upon an 

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appropriate record. Id. at 1320. "However, such a conclusion is 

not compelled as a matter of law". In Sanchez v. Philip 

Morris. Inc., we explained that 

"because the prima facie case orily creates an 

inference of unlawful discrimination, some 

evidence that the articulated legitimate 

business reason for the decision was 

pretextual does not compel the conclusion that 

the employer intentionally discriminated. 

[citing Flasher. ] If a plaintiff successfully 

proves that the defendant's reasons are not 

worthy of credence, the plaintiff must still 

prove that the true motive for the employment 

decision violates Title VII." 

992 F.2d at 247 (emphasis added). In this case, the district court 

found Elmore had failed to prove unlawful discrimination was the 

"true motive" for his discharge. 

In Flasher, we noted that differences in treatment may be 

attributed to the fact discipline was administered by different 

supervisors. 986 F. 2d at 1320. The district court alluded to this 

observation in its Memorandum and Order. Elmore, 1993 WL 290259 

at *6 n. 8. Appleby became the new operations manager on December 

11, 1990, the second day of Elmore's absence. Appleby stated at 

trial that other employees had been treated differently by other 

supervisors, and that an employee under his supervision who 

violated company rules would be terminated regardless of the 

8 employee's race. 

8 Elmore argues that the district court erred in prohibiting him from 

questioning Appleby concerning an incident which occurred two years after Elmore 

was fired, involving a non-minority employee. Elmore sought to elicit 

information as to how Appleby disciplined a white employee who had thrown a pipe 

at another employee. This was classified as a serious offense under the 

company's Rules of Conduct, as was falsifying company records. Apparently Elmore 

sought to challenge the credibility of Appleby's assertion that he would fire any 

employee who violated company rules, regardless of the employee's race. The 

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Elmore has never disputed that Appleby, as his direct 

supervisor, had the authority to fire him. That Appleby, a manager 

new to his position, wished to achieve a more disciplined operation 

than other supervisors had established does not compel an inference 

that the disparities in the treatment of Elmore and others were 

racially motivated, irrational or lacking in credibility. Based on 

all the evidence, the district court found Elmore had neither 

established that Appleby's actions were motivated by racial animus, 

nor persuaded the court that Capstan's proffered reasons for those 

actions were pretextual or a cover-up for such a motive. 9 We have 

district court sustained Capstan's objection to the questioning on the basis of 

relevance. Following the district court's initial opinion of July 12, 1993, 

Elmore filed a motion, treated by the district court as a motion for a new trial. 

Elmore asserted the court improperly excluded evidence of disciplinary actions 

taken by Appleby in the post-1990 time frame. In denying the motion, the 

district court stated such evidence was irrelevant because the court had already 

found sufficient evidence of unequal punishment to establish a prima facie case 

of disparate treatment, and because some of the post-1990 discipline evidence 

concerned violations of work rules clearly distinguishable from Elmore's 

violations. 

Evidentiary rulings of a trial court are reviewed under the abuse of 

discretion standard. Faulkner v. Super Valu stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1433 

(lOth Cir. 1993). Under this deferential standard of review, the trial court 

will be reversed only if there is a firm and definite belief that the trial court 

made a clear error in judgment. Id. The district court's determination that the 

post-1990 incident was cumulative and distinguishable was within its discretion, 

and does not indicate a clear error in judgment. 

9 Elmore argues that the district court only considered the motive and 

conduct of Appleby, the operations manager who fired him, and failed to consider 

the motives or intent of other supervisors who consulted with Appleby. We 

disagree. 

The district court's finding that Elmore had failed to meet his ultimate 

burden of persuasion with respect to the existence of a discriminatory motive was 

not limited to Appleby. The trial court based its findings on the evidence 

presented at trial, which included the testimony of Elmore's other supervisors. 

Nothing in the record suggests racial animus by persons other than Appleby that 

the district court did not consider. 

Moreover, Appleby was directly involved in the events which culminated in 

the decision to terminate Elmore's employment and did not blindly rely on the 

advice of others. To the contrary, he met with Elmore himself, and consulted 

directly with Dr. Cohen regarding the falsified return~to-work slip. The mere 

fact that he also consulted with other supervisors does not prove he acted as a 

conduit for others' intentional discrimination. Finally, the district court 

found no evidence of racial animus with respect to Thompson or any other Elmore 

supervisor. It therefore was unnecessary for the district court to consider 

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reviewed the record before us and conclude these findings were not 

clearly erroneous. 

Accordingly, the district court's Memorandum and Order finding 

in favor of Capstan and entering judgment against Elmore is 

AFFIRMED. 

whether Appleby was a conduit for any of the other supervisor's racial bias 

because the court did not find any evidence that they had any. 

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