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Parties Involved:
Ernest Tepper
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Submitted January 15, 2010 Decided August 6, 2010

No. 08-3115

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ERNEST TEPPER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:93-cr-00073)

A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, and Mary Manning

Petras, Assistant Federal Public Defender, were on the briefs for

appellant.

Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was

filed, and Roy W. McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, were on

the brief for appellee. 

Before: ROGERS, GARLAND, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

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GARLAND, Circuit Judge: In 1993, Ernest Tepper pled

guilty to possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more

of crack cocaine and was sentenced as a career offender to 262

months’ imprisonment. In 2007 and 2008, the Sentencing

Commission amended the sentencing guidelines that generate

offense levels for crimes involving crack, but did not amend the

provisions relating to career offenders. Tepper seeks a

sentencing reduction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which

authorizes a reduction if the original sentence was “based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the

Sentencing Commission.” We conclude that Tepper cannot

proceed under § 3582(c)(2) because the Commission’s

amendments did not lower the sentencing range on which his

sentence was based.

I

On April 20, 1993, Tepper pled guilty to one count of

unlawful possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, also

known as “crack,” in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)

prepared by the United States Probation Office used the 1992

edition of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)

to calculate Tepper’s guideline range. Because Tepper admitted

possessing 108.8 grams of crack and 20.445 grams of heroin, the

Guidelines’ drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6) (1992),

gave him a base offense level of 32. PSR at 5. The PSR then

applied a three-level downward adjustment from the base

offense level for Tepper’s acceptance of responsibility and

guilty plea, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which yielded a total offense

level of 29. PSR at 6. The PSR also determined that Tepper’s

prior convictions put him in criminal history category IV. Id. at

9; see U.S.S.G. ch. 4, pt. A; id. ch. 5, pt. A.

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As the PSR noted, however, Tepper qualified as a career

offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because he was older than

eighteen, pled guilty to a controlled substance offense, and had

two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence or controlled

substance offenses. PSR at 6. This status altered both his total

offense level and his criminal history category. Under the career

offender guideline, Tepper’s offense level rose to 37, which,

after the adjustment for accepting responsibility and pleading

guilty, yielded a total offense level of 34. PSR at 6. The career

offender guideline also fixed his criminal history category at VI. 

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; see PSR at 6, 9. In combination, that offense

level and criminal history yielded a sentencing range of 262 to

327 months. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table); see PSR

at 16. At Tepper’s July 13, 1993 sentencing, the district court

agreed that Tepper was a career offender, adopted the PSR’s

guidelines calculations, and sentenced him to 262 months’

imprisonment -- the bottom of the guidelines sentencing range. 

Sentencing Tr. 20-21.

In November 2007, the United States Sentencing

Commission amended the drug quantity table’s crack cocaine

guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, lowering by two levels the base

offense levels for most crimes involving crack cocaine. See

U.S.S.G. Supp. App. C, amend. 706, 711 (2007); see also id.

amend. 715 (2008). In 2008, the Commission gave those

amendments retroactive effect. See id. amend. 713, 716 (2008). 

In light of the amendments, Tepper filed a motion to modify his

term of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which

authorizes a court to reduce a term of imprisonment “in the case

of a defendant who has been sentenced . . . based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the

Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district

court denied the motion, holding that § 3582(c)(2) did not apply

to Tepper’s sentence because his sentencing range was based on

the career offender provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, not on the

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recently-amended U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. United States v. Tepper,

Mem. Order at 1 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). This appeal followed.

II

Section 3582(c) provides: 

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment

once it has been imposed except that . . . 

(2) in the case of a defendant who has been

sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered

by the Sentencing Commission[,] . . . the court may

reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if such a

reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As the text indicates, the district court may

not reduce Tepper’s sentence unless it was “based on a

sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the

Sentencing Commission.” Because Tepper’s appeal turns solely

on the meaning of that statutory phrase, we review the question

de novo. See United States v. Cook, 594 F.3d 883, 886 (D.C.

Cir. 2010).

1. Tepper acknowledges that his “ultimate sentence was

imposed pursuant to the § 4B1.1 career offender provision[,]”

which has not been amended by the Commission. Appellant’s

Br. 6-7. Nonetheless, he argues that he falls within the ambit of

§ 3582(c)(2) because “his guideline sentencing calculation

included the § 2D1.1 crack cocaine guideline which has been

reduced.” Id. at 7. 

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The problem with this argument is that, by its terms,

§ 3582(c)(2) applies only when a “sentencing range” -- not a

“guideline” -- has been lowered. And nothing the Sentencing

Commission did in 2007 or 2008 lowered the sentencing range

upon which Tepper’s original sentence was based. The

amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 did lower his drug-quantitybased offense level by two levels, and therefore lowered the

total offense level that would have been applicable to Tepper

were he not a career offender. But the career offender provision

instructs the court to apply its offense level when it is greater

than the otherwise applicable level. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). 

Because Tepper’s career offender offense level (34) was greater

than the level calculated using U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (32), the

reduction in the latter did not even lower Tepper’s offense level

-- let alone his sentencing range. Because both his total offense

level (34) and criminal history category (VI) remain the same,

Tepper’s sentencing range remains unchanged at 262 to 327

months.

2. Tepper protests that this analysis reflects too narrow a

construction of the words “based on” in the phrase, “a term of

imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently

been lowered.” Those words, he argues, should not be limited

to the final steps in the calculation of the sentence. Rather, they

“must be understood to encompass each guideline the sentencing

judge calculated and considered” along the way. Appellant’s

Br. 10. This construction is appropriate, he contends, because

the “Guidelines provide a specific sequence to follow in arriving

at an ultimate sentence.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1). 

Tepper is certainly correct that the Guidelines instruct

courts to follow a specific sequence. As is relevant here, this

includes first determining the base offense level pursuant to the

appropriate offense guideline section; then applying the

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility; then determining

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the defendant’s criminal history as specified in part A of Chapter

4; and then applying the career offender provision in part B of

Chapter 4. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1. Following this path, the PSR

(and the district court, which adopted it) first determined that the

applicable base offense level under the drug quantity table,

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6), was 32. It then applied a 3-level

downward adjustment for Tepper’s acceptance of responsibility

under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, yielding a total offense level of 29. 

Only thereafter did the PSR turn to the career offender provision

of § 4B1.1, which yielded a total offense level (after adjustment)

of 34, and a criminal history category of VI. Those, in turn,

generated a guideline sentencing range of 262 to 327 months.

See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A. 

Tepper maintains that the Guidelines’ sequencing provision

means that his “sentence was based on more than simply the

career offender range.” Appellant’s Br. 16. Rather, it “began

with the § 2D1.1 provisions and, therefore, [was] based at least

in part on [a] guideline that has now been reduced.” Id. at 8. 

Tepper’s argument faces two insurmountable obstacles. 

First, we agree that a sentence “based on a sentencing

range” is also based on the guideline calculations on which that

sentencing range was itself founded in whole or in part. But as

we held in United States v. Cook, the guideline calculation at

issue must have actually played a role in determining that range. 

594 F.3d at 888. It is not enough that a guideline was merely

calculated or considered along the way. Id. at 888-89; see

United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2008)

(rejecting the argument that a career offender’s sentence was

“based on” the crack guideline because it was “a way station

along the road that the district court traveled in arriving at the

appropriate sentencing range”). For that reason, Cook held that

a defendant who was sentenced to a statutory mandatory

minimum above the applicable guidelines range did not come

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within the ambit of § 3582(c)(2), notwithstanding the

amendment to the crack guidelines. 594 F.3d at 891. Although

the sequencing provision of the Guidelines does require the

court to calculate a sentencing range based on the crack

guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(g), Guideline § 5G1.1(b) then

instructs the court to ignore the result of that calculation if the

statutory mandatory minimum exceeds the guidelines range. 

The defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence was not “based

on” a guidelines sentencing range, we said, because “that

sentence was determined independent of and rendered irrelevant

[the] otherwise applicable guideline range.” Cook, 594 F.3d at

888.

Similarly, there is no sense in which Tepper’s sentencing

range was determined -- either solely or partially -- by the crack

guideline. After the court follows the steps that begin with that

guideline, the career offender provision instructs it to disregard

those steps and instead adopt the offense level for a career

offender (if it is greater) and a criminal history category of VI. 

See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Only after the court completes that

step does the sequencing provision instruct it to “[d]etermine the

guideline [sentencing] range . . . that corresponds to the offense

level and criminal history category.” Id. § 1B1.1(g).1

Second, for essentially the same reason, Tepper’s argument

again founders on the point discussed in Part II.1 above. Section

3582(c)(2) only authorizes a reduction for a term of

imprisonment that was based on a sentencing range that “has

subsequently been lowered.” Because the crack guideline

1

Hence, unlike the case of a mandatory minimum, where the court

first calculates an otherwise applicable sentencing range that it

discards if the mandatory minimum sentence is higher, see U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.1(b), in the case of a career offender the court never calculates

an otherwise applicable sentencing range at all.

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played no role in determining Tepper’s original sentencing

range, the Commission’s decision to lower that guideline did not

lead to a lowering of his sentencing range.

3. Tepper raises two further arguments in support of the

proposition that the amendment to the crack guidelines will

lower his “ultimate sentence.” Appellant’s Reply Br. 5. First,

he argues that in considering whether to depart from the

sentencing range generated by the career offender guideline, as

authorized under limited circumstances by U.S.S.G § 4A1.3, a

sentencing court may consider the disparity between the higher

range dictated by that guideline and the lower range that would

otherwise apply. Noting that the reduction in the crack

guideline creates an even greater disparity between those two

ranges, he maintains that this increases the chance that the court

will depart from the career offender range in a § 3582(c)(2)

proceeding. Second, Tepper argues that the prospect that his

sentence will ultimately be lowered has been further improved

by the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v Booker, 543

U.S. 220, 245 (2005), which made the guidelines ranges

advisory rather than mandatory, and Kimbrough v. United

States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007), which held that courts may

consider the disparity between the Guidelines’ treatment of

crack and powder cocaine offenses in determining whether to

vary from a guidelines range.

Both of these arguments ignore the statutory text. Again,

§ 3582(c)(2) authorizes a court to modify a sentence only for a

defendant who was sentenced based on a “sentencing range” that

has subsequently been lowered. Even if Tepper were correct

that the reduction in the crack guideline would lead to lowering

his ultimate sentence, that would not be because his original

sentencing range was lowered. Rather, under his first argument

it would be because the district court decided to depart from that

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range, and under the second it would be because the court

decided, post-Booker, to vary from that now advisory range.

But the bigger problem for both arguments is yet another

Supreme Court decision, Dillon v. United States, which the

Court handed down after Tepper submitted his briefs in this

case. 130 S. Ct. 2683 (2010). In Dillon, the Court held that

“[c]ourts generally may ‘not reduce the defendant’s term of

imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) . . . to a term that is

less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.’” Id. at

2691 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)).2

 That is, in

§ 3582(c)(2) proceedings, courts generally may neither “depart

from the amended Guidelines range,” id. at 2693, nor “vary

from” that range on the basis of Booker or Kimbrough, id. at

2690; see id. at 2691-93.

4. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 3582(c)(2)

does not authorize a district court to reduce a career offender’s

term of imprisonment based on the Sentencing Commission’s

amendments to the crack cocaine guidelines. In so holding, we

join every court of appeals that has addressed the question. See

Caraballo, 552 F.3d at 11 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v.

Martinez, 572 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v.

Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 153 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Tyler,

301 F. App’x 265, 266 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v.

Anderson, 591 F.3d 789, 791 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Perdue, 572 F.3d 288, 293 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Knox, 573 F.3d 441, 450 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Tingle,

2

They may do so “[o]nly if the sentencing court originally

imposed a term of imprisonment below the Guidelines range,” in

which case they may “impose a term ‘comparably’ below the amended

range.” Dillon, 130 S. Ct. at 2691-92 (quoting U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.10(b)(2)(B)). Tepper’s sentencing court did not originally

impose a sentence below the guidelines range.

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524 F.3d 839, 840 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tupuola, 587

F.3d 1025, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sharkey, 543

F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Moore, 541

F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008). 

III

The judgment of the district court, denying the appellant’s

motion for modification of his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2), is

Affirmed.

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