Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04243/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04243-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nicole V. Reals
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NICOLE V. REALS,

Plaintiff,

v.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-04243-KAW 

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 18

Plaintiff Nicole V. Reals seeks judicial review, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of the 

Commissioner’s final decision, and the remand of this case for payment of benefits, or, in the 

alternative, for further proceedings. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for summary 

judgment and Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Having considered the papers 

filed by the parties, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, and GRANTS Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND

On September 19, 2011, Plaintiff Nicole V. Reals filed an application for Title II Disability 

Insurance Benefits. Administrative Record (“AR”) 11, 203-205. Plaintiff’s application alleges a 

disability onset date of March 12, 2010. AR 203. Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied on June 20, 

2012. AR 98-102. Plaintiff filed a Request for Reconsideration on June 22, 2012. AR 103. 

Plaintiff’s Request for Reconsideration was denied on December 27, 2012, and Plaintiff filed a 

Request for Hearing on January 7, 2013. AR 106-110, 113. A hearing was held before 

Administrative Law Judge Katherine Loo on May 1, 2013. AR 11-21.

Plaintiff is thirty-eight years old. AR 203. She has one child, and is currently married. AR 

33, 213, 299. Plaintiff graduated from high school. AR 20, 34. From January 2002 until her onset 

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date of March 12, 2010, Plaintiff worked as a medical fee clerk, a patient insurance clerk, a 

laboratory technician, and an admissions clerk. AR 19, 328.

In 2009 and 2010, Plaintiff sought medical treatment from Irina Jasper, M.D. for myalgia, 

weight gain, depressive symptoms, and occasional cough/bronchitis. AR 355-67. Dr. Jasper 

referred Plaintiff to Brian O’Connor, M.D., a rheumatologist, for further examination. AR 375.

On February 25, 2010, Dr. O’Connor examined Plaintiff and noted that she was taking Lyrica and 

Lexapro and found the examination and history “quite significant” for fibromyalgia and noted 

asthma. Id. A sleep disorder study was ordered, but Plaintiff was not found to have sleep apnea or 

other sleep disorder. AR 379. Since testing negative for sleep apnea, Plaintiff was prescribed 

Cymbalta to address her fibromyalgia symptoms in April 2010. Id. Dr. O’Connor indicated that 

he believed that Plaintiff was disabled, but did not offer an assessment of her functional 

limitations. Id. In July 2010, he noted improvement with medication and reported identifying 16 

tender points related to her fibromyalgia. AR 381-82.

In February, March, and July 2011, Plaintiff was treated by Murray Gold, M.D. for 

fibromyalgia and a rash. AR 400-02. In May 2011, Plaintiff underwent a colonoscopy that was 

essentially normal, with a minor polyp removed. AR 422. Other treatment records in 2011 

indicate diagnoses of diverticulitis, gastritis, and irritable bowel syndrome. AR 445. An upper GI 

endoscopy was normal. AR 455. Cannabis use was approved by Andrew Dattila, D.O., in May 

2011. AR 399.

On November 30, 2011, Plaintiff was seen for an initial visit with Douglas D. Zhang, M.D. 

AR 466. Dr. Zhang noted that Plaintiff reported a history of fibromyalgia, and also complained of 

migraine headaches. Id. Dr. Zhang advised that Plaintiff quit smoking. Id. Plaintiffs chest x-ray 

was suggestive of COPD. AR 467. 

On February 7, 2012, Dr. Zhang provided a medical source statement, in which he opined 

that Plaintiff could lift and carry less than 10 pounds, stand and walk for 30 minutes in an eighthour workday, and sit for two hours. AR 514. He opined that she could not climb, crouch, or 

crawl, and could occasionally balance, stoop, and kneel, and that she was limited to occasional 

handling and fingering, and should not work at heights. AR 515. 

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On March 14, 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Zhang for symptoms of bronchitis. AR 525. 

On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff was seen for a follow-up appointment, and she reported that she had 

stopped taking Neurontin for fibromyalgia pain due to a negative side effect (decreased libido), 

and would rather try other medications or go without medications. AR 526. On April 13, 2012, 

she was seen for shortness of breath and treated with a nebulizer. AR 527. On May 18, 2012, 

Plaintiff was treated for stomach pain and diarrhea. AR 529. On July 10, 2012, Plaintiff was seen 

in a follow-up appointment with no negative clinical signs, but, due to complaints about COPD 

symptoms, she was prescribed Spiriva. AR 554-55. Also on July 10, 2012, Dr. Zhang opined that 

Plaintiff was limited to no more than two hours of sitting and two hours of standing in an eighthour workday, with lifting up to 10 pounds, and that she could rarely finger, grasp, and stoop, and 

could never handle or crouch. AR 728. On September 6, 2012, Plaintiff was seen for a checkup, 

and reported that she was eating and sleeping well, her mood was stable, and she had no 

complaints. AR 552. Dr. Zhang noted that Plaintiff was using over-the-counter ibuprofen as 

needed to treat her fibromyalgia symptoms. AR 553.

On February 22, 2012, Farah M. Rana, M.D., conducted a consultative physical 

examination. AR 517-19. At the exam, Plaintiff reported diffuse pain since 2007, exhaustion after 

three to four hours of activity, feeling tired, and worsening pain with cold weather. AR 517. 

Plaintiff also reported a recent diagnosis of COPD, but she continued to smoke cigarettes. AR 518. 

Plaintiff indicated that she was currently using albuterol, Symbicort, Lexapro, 

hydrochlorothiazide, and medical marijuana. Id. On examination, tenderness was noted in the 

cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine, with normal range of motion and a negative straight leg 

raising test. Id. Plaintiff indicated tender points “all over,” complaining of pain with even mild 

pressure despite there being no localized inflammation or swelling. Id. Dr. Rana concluded that 

Plaintiff presented with a history of fibromyalgia and COPD, and that she could stand and walk 

for six hours and sit for an unlimited period. AR 519. Plaintiff could carry 10 pounds frequently 

and 20 points occasionally, and with no other limitations noted. Id.

On March 1, 2012, Aruda Bodepudi, M.D., conducted a consultative psychiatric 

evaluation. AR 521-24. During the examination, Plaintiff denied any psychiatric problems, and 

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denied symptoms of feeling sad or anxious, helplessness, hopelessness, or worthlessness. AR 521. 

Plaintiff reported that she continued to smoke cigarettes and used medical marijuana. AR 522. 

Plaintiff described being able to drive occasionally, dress herself, dust, fix light meals, do laundry, 

shop, visit with family, and watch television. Id. On examination, Plaintiff did not appear to be in 

pain, her mood was euthymic, and her affect was appropriate. AR 523. Dr. Bodepudi made no 

mental impairment diagnosis and assessed no limitations, and noted that Plaintiff appears “well 

adjusted and with very good family support.” Id.

In October 2012, Plaintiff rejoined Kaiser, and was seen by Jonathan Hall, M.D. AR 575. 

On October 3, 2012, Plaintiff reported that she was going to the gym three days a week for 40 

minutes and experienced some shortness of breath at night. AR 575. She reported that she smokes 

one pack of cigarettes per week, and that she did not want narcotics to treat her fibromyalgia. AR 

576. In January 2013, Plaintiff was enrolled in a chronic pain program for fibromyalgia and 

chronic pelvic pain. AR 915. On January 22, 2013, Dr. Hall reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records, 

noting her request for paperwork to support her application for permanent disability benefits. AR 

919. Dr. Hall noted that she reported being unable to sit or stand for prolonged periods or 

complete repetitive activities, and that she has problems gripping things. Id. He noted that she 

goes to the gym and exercises at home. Id. Dr. Hall further noted that Plaintiff continues smoking 

and is using medical marijuana. Id. Dr. Hall indicated that he would “support her in her quest for 

disability” for her fibromyalgia. AR 920. On January 24, 2013, Plaintiff was referred to physical 

therapy with notations that her reported symptoms included abdominal pain, low back pain, and 

fibromyalgia pain with flares about once per month lasting a few hours. AR 923.

Following the hearing, medical interrogatories were propounded to Mark O. Farber, M.D.

AR 1044-47. Dr. Farber identified diagnoses of asthma, fibromyalgia, and hypothyroidism. AR 

1044. Dr. Farber concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the 

requirements of a listing. AR 1045. Dr. Farber also assessed functional limitations and found that 

Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform light work, including lifting and carrying 

10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, sitting for six to eight hours with normal 

breaks, and avoiding significant dust, fumes, and respiratory irritants. AR 1046. 

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In a decision dated July 12, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time 

from March 12, 2010 through the date of the decision. AR 21. On August 21, 2013, Plaintiff 

requested that the Appeals Council review the ALJ’s decision. AR 6. The ALJ’s decision became 

the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review on July 17, 2014. 

AR 1-5. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g).

On August 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment. (Pl.’s Mot., Dkt. 

No. 15.). On September 21, 2015, Defendant filed its opposition and cross-motion for summary 

judgment. (Def.’s Opp’n, Dkt. No. 18.) Plaintiff did not file a reply, so the motions are fully 

briefed.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A court may reverse the Commissioner’s denial of disability benefits only when the 

Commissioner's findings are 1) based on legal error or 2) are not supported by substantial 

evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 

(9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla but less than a 

preponderance”; it is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.” Id. at 1098; Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). In 

determining whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the 

Court must consider the evidence as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the 

evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. “Where evidence is susceptible 

to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ's decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. Comm'r 

of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under Social Security Administration (“SSA”) regulations, disability claims are evaluated 

according to a five-step sequential evaluation. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 

1998). At step one, the Commissioner determines whether a claimant is currently engaged in

substantial gainful activity. Id. If so, the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). At 

step two, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has a “medically severe impairment 

or combination of impairments,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 

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721. If the answer is no, the claimant is not disabled. Id. If the answer is yes, the Commissioner 

proceeds to step three, and determines whether the impairment meets or equals a listed impairment 

under 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If this requirement is 

met, the claimant is disabled. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. 

If a claimant does not have a condition which meets or equals a listed impairment, the 

fourth step in the sequential evaluation process is to determine the claimant's residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) or what work, if any, the claimant is capable of performing on a sustained basis, 

despite the claimant’s impairment or impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can 

perform such work, he is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). RFC is the application of a legal 

standard to the medical facts concerning the claimant's physical capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a). 

If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an inability to perform prior work, the 

Commissioner must show, at step five, that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful 

work that exists in the national economy. Reddick, 157 F.3d 715 at 721. The claimant bears the 

burden of proof in steps one through four. Bustamante v. Massanari, 262 F.3d 949, 953-954 (9th 

Cir. 2001). The burden shifts to the Commissioner in step five. Id. at 954. 

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the 

Social Security Act through December 31, 2015. AR 13. 

The ALJ found at step one that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since her alleged onset date of March 12, 2010. AR 13. 

At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic 

pain syndrome, fibromyalgia, chronic pulmonary disease, marijuana use, migraine headaches, 

hypothyroidism, and diverticulitis. AR 13.

At step three, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1. AR 14.

Before considering step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the residual functional 

capacity to 

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perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)(lift and 

carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; sit for six 

hours, and stand/walk for six hours) except [ ] could sit for six to 

eight hours. She must avoid work environments with significant 

dust, fumes, or other respiratory irritants. 

AR 15. At step four, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was capable of performing past relevant 

work as a medical fee clerk, a patient insurance clerk, a laboratory technician, and an admissions 

clerk. AR 19. Lastly, the ALJ proceeded to step five, and concluded that, while Plaintiff was 

capable of performing past relevant work, there were other jobs that exist in significant numbers in 

the national economy that Plaintiff could perform and so she was not disabled for the purposes of 

the Social Security Act. AR 20-21.

IV. DISCUSSION

In her motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in denying her

application for social security benefits for three reasons: (1) the ALJ erred by improperly affording 

the most weight to non-treating physicians; (2) the ALJ did not have all of Plaintiff’s medical 

evidence before her; and (3) there is no cure for fibromyalgia. (Pl.’s Mot. at 2-5.)1

A. Medical Opinions

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by assigning the most weight to non-treating physicians. 

(Pl.’s Mot. at 2.) 

The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three types of physicians: (1) 

treating physicians; (2) examining physicians; and (3) non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 

81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). The opinions of treating medical sources may be rejected only 

for clear and convincing reasons if not contradicted by another doctor. Id. Where the record 

contains conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ must make a credibility determination and resolve 

the conflict. Chaudhry v. Astrue, 688 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Benton v. Barnhart, 

331 F.3d 1030, 1040 (9th Cir. 2003)). “If a treating or examining doctor’s opinion is contradicted 

by another doctor’s opinion, an ALJ may only reject it by providing specific and legitimate 

reasons that are supported by substantial evidence....” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 

 

1

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, so the Court interprets her motion as raising the following 

arguments, despite the fact that they are not fully developed.

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(9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician, including a treating 

physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by clinical findings.” 

Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1228 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). A 

consulting physician’s opinions may serve as substantial evidence when they are consistent with 

independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 

957 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, the ALJ gave the greatest weight to the opinion Dr. Farber, who reviewed the record 

as a whole and completed medical interrogatories at the ALJ’s request. AR 18, 1044-65. While Dr. 

Farber identified diagnoses of asthma, fibromyalgia (based on pain and tender points), and 

hypothyroidism, he concluded that Plaintiff’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the 

requirements of a listing. AR 1044-45. Dr. Farber concluded Plaintiff was capable of light 

exertional work, including lifting and carrying 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, 

sitting for six to eight hours with normal breaks, but that she should avoid significant dust, fumes, 

and respiratory irritants. AR 1046. Dr. Farber indicated that he agreed with the residual functional 

capacity determined by Dr. Rana. AR 1056. He noted that Plaintiff continued to smoke even after 

being diagnosed with COPD symptoms and that her fibromyalgia symptoms were not very severe. 

AR 1059, 1065. 

The ALJ also gave great weight to the opinion of Dr. Rana, who performed a consultative 

internal medical examination. AR 18, 517-19. An examining physician’s opinion constitutes 

substantial evidence because it rests on a doctor’s own independent examination of the claimant. 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff reported diffuse pain since 

2007, exhaustion after three to four hours of activity, feeling tired, and worsening pain with cold 

weather. AR 517. Plaintiff reported that she obtained some relief from a hot soak. Plaintiff said 

she could do chores around the house but needed to take breaks and rest after a few hours of 

activity. AR 517. Upon examination, tenderness was noted in the cervical, thoracic, and lumbar 

spine, while Plaintiff indicated tender points “all over,” and complained of pain with even mild 

pressure. AR 518. Plaintiff’s shoulder, elbow, wrist, knee, and ankle joints were all mildly tender 

to touch, range of motion was within normal limits, and no localized inflammation or swelling was 

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noted. AR 518. Neurological examination findings revealed full (5/5) motor strength throughout, 

normal (2+) reflexes, and no sensory deficits. AR 519. Dr. Rana concluded that Plaintiff presented 

with a history of fibromyalgia and COPD. Id. Dr. Rana opined that Plaintiff had the RFC to 

perform light exertional work, and could stand and walk for six hours and sit for an unlimited 

period in an eight hour day, carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, and had no 

other limitations. AR 519.

The ALJ assigned the greatest weight to the opinion of Dr. Farber, because he was the only 

qualified medical professional who had the advantage of reviewing the entire record, his opinion 

was consistent with the overall record, and he is familiar with the Social Security program 

requirements. AR 18. “Although the contrary opinion of a non-examining medical expert does not 

alone constitute a specific, legitimate reason for rejecting a treating or examining physician's 

opinion, it may constitute substantial evidence when it is consistent with other independent 

evidence in the record.” Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). The ALJ 

noted that it was consistent with Dr. Rana’s opinion, which was also assigned great weight, 

because Dr. Rana personally examined Plaintiff and her assessment was consistent with the 

record. AR 18. Taken together, the opinions of Drs. Farber and Rana constitute substantial 

evidence.

The ALJ assigned less weight to Dr. Zhang, because his opinion is not well supported by 

his treatment notes. AR 18. An ALJ can reject a treating physician’s assessment of limitations 

when the physician’s clinical notes and other recorded observations regarding the claimant’s 

capabilities contradict the assessment. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005); 

see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002) (treating physician’s opinion 

may be rejected if unsupported by doctor’s examination record). Here, Dr. Zhang initially opined 

that Plaintiff could lift and carry one pound, stand and walk for 30 minutes, and sit for 2 hours in 

an eight-hour workday. AR 514-15. Dr. Zhang later opined that Plaintiff could lift up to 10 

pounds occasionally and sit and stand for 2 hours in an eight-hour workday. AR 728. His 

treatment notes, however, generally reveal unremarkable findings upon physical examination. AR 

466-67, 525-29. Plaintiff’s reported daily activities, including shopping, doing laundry, and caring 

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for her special needs son, suggest that she is not limited to the extent opined by Dr. Zhang. AR 19. 

Thus, as the ALJ indicated, Dr. Zhang appeared to adopt as true all of Plaintiff’s allegations of 

pain without taking into account such factors as her daily activities, her voluntarily stopping 

prescription medications, and that her fibromyalgia pain appeared to be controlled with ibuprofen. 

Id. For example, on March 30, 2012, Plaintiff reported that she had stopped taking Neurontin for 

fibromyalgia pain due to loss of libido, and that she stated that she preferred to stop treating her 

condition with prescription medication. AR 18, 526. The ALJ noted that there is no indication that 

she restarted prescription medication. AR 18. Also, Dr. Hall reported that Plaintiff went to the 

gym three times per week and exercised at home, and did not want to use narcotics to control her 

fibromyalgia pain, but that he would support her application for disability. AR 919-20. 

In light of the foregoing, the ALJ properly made a credibility determination to resolve the 

conflict among the medical opinions regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s condition as they relate to 

her residual functional capacity. Thus, Plaintiff’s argument that the non-treating physicians’

opinions were improperly given more weight is without merit.

B. Absence of prior medical evidence is immaterial

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not have all of Plaintiff’s medical evidence before her

and that the records of her seizure history must be considered. (Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5.)

Defendant contends that the additional evidence has no bearing on whether the ALJ’s July 

12, 2013 decision is supported by substantial evidence. (Def.’s Opp’n at 7.) Specifically, the 

Commissioner argues that the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled from the alleged 

onset date of March 12, 2010 through the date of the decision. Id. Therefore, since the bulk of the 

evidence is from outside the period of consideration, the evidence is immaterial. Id. Indeed, to be 

material, the evidence must relate to the time period that was before the ALJ and be a condition 

“squarely before” the Secretary. Sanchez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 

(9th Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff has failed to explain how evidence of childhood febrile seizures, 

the most recent of which appears to have occurred in 1986, are relevant to the ALJ’s determination 

that she was not disabled from March 10, 2010 through July 12, 2013. Additionally, the 

possibility of a seizure diagnosis was not considered by the ALJ, and, therefore, was not “squarely 

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before” the Secretary.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the additional medical evidence has no bearing on 

whether Plaintiff was disabled between March 12, 2010 and July 12, 2013, and, therefore, remand 

on this issue is inappropriate.

C. The absence of a cure is not dispositive

Plaintiff argues that the absence of a cure for her primary condition of fibromyalgia 

requires that she be considered disabled under the Social Security Act. (Pl.’s Mot. at 3.) To the 

contrary, the existence of a disability alone is not dispositive. Here, Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia was 

determined to be a severe impairment at step two. See discussion supra Part III. But “[t]he mere 

existence of an impairment is insufficient proof of a disability.” Matthews v. Shalala, 10 F.3d 678, 

680 (9th Cir. 1993)(citing Sample v. Schweiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642–43 (9th Cir. 1982)). Indeed, 

“[a] claimant bears the burden of proving that an impairment is disabling.” Miller v. Heckler, 770 

F.2d 845, 849 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, “[t]he applicant must show that he is precluded from 

engaging in not only his ‘previous work,’ but also from performing ‘any other kind of substantial 

gainful work’ due to such impairment.” Matthews, 10 F.3d at 680 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 

423(d)(1)(A)). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff maintains that the incurable nature of her 

fibromyalgia diagnosis renders her automatically disabled and qualifies her for benefits under the 

Social Security Act, she is incorrect. To the contrary, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that 

she is unable to work, which she has not done.

Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff may be arguing that the ALJ erred in the 

determination that she had the RFC to perform light work, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons to 

afford more weight to the opinions of the non-treating physicians. See discussion supra Part IV.A.

Accordingly, the fact that Plaintiff has fibromyalgia, for which there is no cure, does not 

render her disabled under the Social Security Act.

///

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///

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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is DENIED, and 

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 26, 2016

__________________________________

KANDIS A. WESTMORE

United States Magistrate Judge

Case 4:14-cv-04243-KAW Document 19 Filed 09/26/16 Page 12 of 12