Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03256/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03256-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Martin Kendrick
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-3256

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United States of America,

Appellee,

v.

Timothy Martin Kendrick,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Iowa.

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Submitted: March 4, 2005 

 Filed: September 8, 2005

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Before BYE, JOHN R. GIBSON and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Timothy Martin Kendrick of three counts of distributing and

one count of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. He appeals the district

court’s1

 refusal to include a jury instruction on entrapment. He also challenges his

sentence, arguing that the district court erred in finding he was a career offender and

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abused its discretion in denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We

affirm his conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Around March 2001, Kendrick moved from Alabama to Waterloo, Iowa.

Within months of his arrival in Waterloo, Kendrick resumed the abuse of illegal

drugs. As his habit became more regular, Kendrick testified that he began to make

purchases of marijuana and methamphetamine from a drug dealer known as “Jen,” to

whom he was introduced by a mutual acquaintance. Unbeknownst to Kendrick, Jen

was a confidential informant working with local law enforcement.

On July 9, 2001, Jen introduced Kendrick to Kenneth Harms. Over the course

of the next month, Kendrick made approximately five or six purchases of

methamphetamine from Harms. The two also developed a personal relationship,

which included confiding in one another about their drug habits and assisting each

other in obtaining more drugs. For example, Kendrick confided in Harms that he was

an intravenous drug user and that he would sell a portion of each methamphetamine

purchase to people living in his trailer court. In addition, Harms helped Kendrick sell

his Firebird to Bobby Reyes, Harms’s methamphetamine supplier, for approximately

$700 and one-half ounce of methamphetamine. 

Jen also introduced Kendrick to William Herkelman, an undercover officer

with the Black Hawk County Sheriff’s Department. Between this initial introduction

and July 19, 2001, Kendrick sold Jen and Herkelman small quantities of

methamphetamine. On July 19, 2001, Herkelman executed a controlled buy of

methamphetamine from Kendrick. Kendrick sold Herkelman 6.75 grams of

methamphetamine for $450. Jen was not involved in arranging the July 19 controlled

buy and did not accompany Herkelman to Kendrick’s residence for the controlled

buy. 

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On July 24, 2001, Herkelman contacted Kendrick about the possibility of

obtaining more methamphetamine. Over the course of three secretly recorded

telephone conversations, the two discussed various issues involved in the business

of selling methamphetamine, such as price and quantity. Three days later, Herkelman

arrived at Kendrick’s place of employment at the Triple J Mart to consummate

another controlled buy. Kendrick told Herkelman that his supplier would arrive

shortly and was driving a brown, four-door car. While Herkelman waited in his car,

Kendrick’s supplier, who was identified by law enforcement as Harms, arrived in a

brown Ford car. After Harms left, Kendrick approached Herkelman in the parking

lot and sold him 6.69 grams of methamphetamine for $525. The two then discussed

the sale of another ounce of methamphetamine. Again, Jen was not involved in

arranging the July 27 controlled buy and did not accompany Herkelman to the Triple

J Mart for the controlled buy. 

On July 30, 2001, Herkelman and Kendrick met in the parking lot of another

convenience store. Kendrick sold Herkelman 12.7 grams of methamphetamine for

$950. After the transaction was completed, law enforcement surreptitiously followed

Kendrick to Harms’s residence in Cedar Falls, Iowa. Kendrick left Harms’s residence

approximately seven minutes after he arrived.

Kendrick was indicted on October 25, 2002 for one count of conspiring to

distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and three

counts of distributing methamphetamine after having been convicted of a felony drug

offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C) and 851. In the same

indictment, Harms was charged with one count of conspiring to distribute

methamphetamine, seven counts of distributing methamphetamine and one count of

being a drug user in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).

Harms subsequently entered a guilty plea and agreed to cooperate. Kendrick,

however, entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to trial.

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At trial, Kendrick admitted that he was a drug user but denied that he was a

drug dealer. According to Kendrick, his foray into the business of selling

methamphetamine began when Reyes insisted on paying for his Firebird partly with

methamphetamine. Unsure of how to dispose of the methamphetamine, Kendrick

testified that he asked Jen for help in “getting rid of the rest” of the drugs. Jen

apparently encouraged Kendrick to sell some of the methamphetamine to Herkelman,

although Kendrick admitted that he was neither coerced, threatened nor forced into

selling the methamphetamine. He further testified that he did not sell

methamphetamine to anyone but Jen and Herkelman and that he did not share the

drugs with anyone. Finally, Kendrick testified that he was able to discuss prices with

Herkelman because he had dealt with drugs in the past, although he later contradicted

this testimony.

Prior to trial, Kendrick requested an entrapment instruction. After hearing

evidence of the alleged entrapment, the district court denied Kendrick’s request for

the jury instruction and held that Kendrick had failed to produce any evidence that,

prior to contact with Jen, he “did not have any intent or disposition to commit the

crimes charged and was induced or persuaded by Jen, the confidential informant, to

commit the crimes.” Kendrick then filed an Objection to Jury Instructions and

Motion for Entrapment Instruction, which the district court denied after hearing

arguments. After a jury found him guilty on all four counts, Kendrick renewed his

objection to the omission of an entrapment instruction in a Motion for New Trial and

Renewed Rule 29 Motion. The district court denied the motion because Kendrick

“failed to present any evidence he was induced or coerced by Jen to sell the

methamphetamine.”

Kendrick was sentenced on September 2, 2004. The district court found that

he had two prior convictions for crimes of violence for the California offense of first

degree burglary, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 459, and the Oregon offense of

felony fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, in violation of O.R.S. §

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811.540. Accordingly, Kendrick was sentenced under the career offender provision

of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1. Based on an offense level of 34,

a criminal history category of VI and a resulting guidelines range of 262 to 327

months, the district court sentenced Kendrick to 262 months’ imprisonment. The

district court then imposed an alternative sentence of 262 months’ imprisonment

based on its discretion after considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

On appeal, Kendrick argues that the district court abused its discretion by

failing to include an entrapment instruction. Kendrick also challenges his

classification as a career offender, arguing that the district court erroneously held that

the Oregon offense of felony fleeing is a crime of violence as defined by U.S.S.G. §

4B1.2. He also argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment when it

found that his prior conviction for felony fleeing constituted a crime of violence.

Finally, Kendrick argues that the district court clearly erred by failing to grant a twolevel acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Entrapment

“Entrapment exists ‘where the evidence establishes that the government agent

originated the criminal design, the agent implanted in the mind of an innocent person

the disposition to commit the offense, and the defendant then committed the criminal

act at the urging of the government agent.’” United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502,

508 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Hulett, 22 F.3d 779, 781 (8th Cir.

1994)). As an affirmative defense, entrapment is a question of fact generally left to

the jury. United States v. Coleman, 284 F.3d 892, 894 (8th Cir. 2002). A defendant

alleging entrapment, however, is not entitled to an entrapment instruction unless

“sufficient evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.”

United States v. Neal, 990 F.2d 355, 357 (8th Cir. 1993). This requires a defendant

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to show “that the government agents implanted the criminal design in [his] mind[]

and induced [him] to commit the offense.” United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495,

1504 (8th Cir. 1996). If a defendant can produce sufficient evidence of inducement,

then the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. United States v. Berg, 178 F.3d 976,

980 (8th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Eldeeb, 20 F.3d 841, 843 (8th Cir.

1994) (“It is clear that when entrapment is an issue, the government must prove the

absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt.”). “If the defendant exhibits any

predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct, the district court need not instruct

the jury on entrapment.” Id. We review the district court’s decision to deny an

entrapment instruction for an abuse of discretion. Williams, 109 F.3d at 508.

The evidence presented at trial strongly indicates both that the Government did

not induce Kendrick’s criminal activity and that Kendrick had a predisposition to

engage in drug distribution activities. Kendrick admitted that the confidential

informant did not coerce, threaten or otherwise force him to sell methamphetamine.

Further, Jen neither tempted Kendrick with the promise of financial reward nor

attempted to engage him in a personal relationship. Indeed, it was Kendrick who

initially sought the confidential informant’s assistance in selling some of the

methamphetamine he had received from Reyes. At most, the confidential informant

facilitated Kendrick’s criminal plan by introducing him to Herkelman, an apparent

customer. See United States v. Jensen, 69 F.3d 906, 909-10 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting

an entrapment instruction is not warranted where the Government merely facilitated

the defendant’s crime). Otherwise, the confidential informant was not involved in

any of the three controlled buys that resulted in Kendrick’s convictions.

The evidence at trial showed that, even before Jen introduced him to

Herkelman, Kendrick admitted to Harms that he was selling small quantities of

methamphetamine to people in his trailer court. See United States v. Haire, 103 F.3d

697, 699 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Prior distribution of illegal drugs, even as a gift,

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Kendrick admitted at trial that he had sustained a prior controlled substance

conviction only three years before selling drugs to Herkelman. While not enough by

itself to establish predisposition, it is probative of Kendrick’s intent to sell drugs. See

United States v. Brooks, 215 F.3d 842, 846-47 (8th Cir. 2000).

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constitutes predisposition.”). Further, it was Kendrick’s idea, not Jen’s, to distribute

the methamphetamine he had obtained from Reyes. After he had sold the

methamphetamine he had obtained from the sale of his Firebird, Kendrick continued

to sell methamphetamine obtained from Harms. Kendrick’s assertion that he was

merely a drug user2

 and not a drug dealer is belied by his familiarity with the business

of selling methamphetamine. See Jensen, 69 F.3d at 911(denying entrapment as a

matter of law where the defendant made previous sales and gave advice on drug

transactions). The district court properly concluded that Jen’s involvement merely

afforded Kendrick the opportunity to commit an offense for which he was

predisposed. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (“Had the agents

in this case simply offered petitioner the opportunity to [commit the crime], and

petitioner . . . had promptly availed himself of this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely

that his entrapment defense would have warranted a jury instruction.”). For these

reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kendrick a jury

instruction on entrapment.

B. Crime of Violence

“A defendant is a career offender if . . . the instant offense of conviction is a

felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense [and] the

defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a

controlled substance offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (2003). The first predicate crime

of violence relied upon by the district court, first degree burglary in violation of Cal.

Penal Code § 459, is not in dispute. However, Kendrick challenges the district

court’s categorization of the Oregon offense of felony fleeing as a crime of violence.

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A prior conviction may qualify as a crime of violence if it is an “offense under

federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that

. . . involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. The determination of whether an offense is a crime of

violence requires a “categorical approach” that limits the court’s inquiry to such

sources as “the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of

colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was

confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this

information.” Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254, 1263 (2005); Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). We review de novo the district court’s

holding that felony fleeing is a crime of violence. United States v. Griffith, 301 F.3d

880, 884 (8th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Sumlin, 147 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir.

1998) (“We review the question of whether a prior offense constitutes a violent felony

de novo.”).

A person commits the crime of fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer

if, while operating a motor vehicle, he knowingly flees or attempts to elude an

identifiable police officer after the officer has just given a visual or audible signal to

stop. O.R.S. § 811.540. The conduct associated with the commission of felony

fleeing calls to mind the risks associated with escape and automobile theft. In United

States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467 (8th Cir. 2001), we recognized that every escape, even

the most peaceable escape, “‘is a powder keg, which may or may not explode into

violence and result in physical injury to someone at any given time, but which always

has the serious potential to do so.’” Id. at 472 (quoting United States v. Gosling, 39

F.3d 1140, 1142 (10th Cir. 1994)). This is because “an escapee is likely to possess

a ‘variety of super-charged emotions, and in evading those trying to recapture him,

may feel threatened by police officers, ordinary citizens, or even fellow escapees.’”

Id. (quoting Gosling, 39 F.3d at 1142). There is little doubt that felony fleeing

involves, at the very least, the same risks of physical injury to another as a walk-away

escape.

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In reality, the dangerous circumstances surrounding a person’s attempt to flee

from law enforcement are compounded by the person’s operation of a motor vehicle.

The desperate situation that a person fleeing from law enforcement may find himself

in is, in many ways, reminiscent of the serious potential risk of injury surrounding an

automobile theft. As a person is in flight from custody, his vehicle has the potential

to become a deadly or dangerous weapon. United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747,

753 (8th Cir. 2002). Further, “[u]nder the stress and urgency which will naturally

attend his situation, [a person fleeing from law enforcement] will likely drive

recklessly and turn any pursuit into a high-speed chase with the potential for serious

harm to police or innocent bystanders.” Id. Considering the combined risks

associated with felony fleeing, we conclude that the district court properly held that

O.R.S. § 811.540 is a crime of violence as defined by § 4B1.2. See United States v.

Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 334 (7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (“[T]he Wisconsin statute at

issue, fleeing a police officer is categorically a crime of violence.”); United States v.

Martin, 378 F.3d 578, 582 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that third-degree fleeing or

eluding is a crime of violence because of the risk of injury to pedestrians, other

drivers and pursuing officers created by a person fleeing in an automobile); see also

United States v. Albritton, 135 Fed. Appx. 239, 243 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per

curiam) (affirming district court’s holding that aggravated fleeing and eluding is a

crime of violence).

Kendrick also argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment when

it found facts necessary to categorize felony fleeing as a crime of violence. As an

initial matter, Kendrick admitted at trial to prior convictions for first degree burglary

and felony fleeing. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005) (“Any fact

(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the

maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must

be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”

(emphasis added)). Regardless, we have consistently rejected the applicability of

Booker to the fact of a prior conviction, see, e.g., United States v. Paz, 411 F.3d 906,

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At the time of his appeal, Kendrick did not have the benefit of the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Booker nor did he ask for supplemental briefing after Booker. We

now know that the district court’s reliance on mandatory guidelines was error.

However, in Kendrick’s case, the application of mandatory guidelines was harmless

in light of the district court’s alternative discretionary sentence based on the factors

of § 3553(a). United States v. Bassett, 406 F.3d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 2005) (per

curiam).

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909 (8th Cir. 2005), and to the legal determination of whether a prior conviction may

be categorized as a crime of violence, see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 411 F.3d

928, 931-32 (8th Cir. 2005). Indeed, in both Booker and Shepard, the Supreme Court

reaffirmed the authority of the sentencing court to take notice of a defendant’s

criminal history and, as a matter of law, determine whether any prior conviction is

properly categorized as a crime of violence. See United States v. Marcussen, 403

F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the district court properly held that

Kendrick’s prior conviction for felony fleeing constitutes a crime of violence.

C. Acceptance of Responsibility

A defendant who clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his

offense may be entitled to a two-level reduction in his offense level. U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1(a). However, a reduction is not appropriate if the Government goes through

the burden of proving its case at trial, unless the defendant was merely ascertaining

the viability of an issue unrelated to his guilt, such as a constitutional challenge to a

statute. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. A defendant asserting an entrapment defense is

not entitled to a reduction under § 3E1.1 because such a defense “clearly shows that

he did not accept responsibility for the crime of conviction.” United States v. Chevre,

146 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its

discretion by denying Kendrick a two-level reduction for his belated acceptance of

responsibility. See United States v. Water, 413 F.3d 812, 819 (8th Cir. 2005).3

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III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Kendrick’s conviction and sentence.

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