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Parties Involved:
Shawyne Tallisce Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

Unit.ed StatP.s Court of Appcab 'fe,th Circuit 

MAR 1 f 1992 

ROBF.RT L. HOECKER 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

SHAWYNE TALLISCE ANDERSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 91-6052 

(D.C. No. CR 90-184-T) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, SETH, Circuit Judge, and FINESILVER, 

District Judge**· 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

In this appeal we revisit the Oklahoma City bus depot and the 

drug interdiction program run by two detectives, Gary Eastridge 

and Glenn Ring, of the Oklahoma City Police Department. In 

United States v. Evans, 937 F.2d 1534 (10th Cir.), we held that 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable Sherman G. Finesilver, Chief United States District 

Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

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the same detectives' initial questioning of an individual matching 

their drug courier profile did not constitute a seizure 

implicating the Fourth Amendment. Here, we must determine whether 

a similar encounter between the two detectives and DefendantAppellant Shawyne Anderson was more than a police-citizen 

encounter. In addition, as is usual in these cases, we are asked 

to review the district court's application of problems in the 

Sentencing Guidelines. 

Appellant is a 33-year-old African-American female with some 

college education. She has no prior criminal record and was 

steadily employed until her arrest at the Oklahoma City bus depot. 

Appellant had gotten off a bus from California carrying a 

suitcase . The officers saw her make a phone call and thought this 

and her demeanor was suspicious. They confronted her, asked for 

identification, and whether she was carrying guns or drugs. She 

asked to go into the terminal. There she was questioned further. 

She denied the suitcase was hers, and from her movements and 

general appearance the officers decided that she consented to 

their search of the suitcase. It was searched and was found to 

contain drugs and no money . Appellant throughout all the 

subsequent proceedings and hearings maintained that she thought 

the suitcase contained only money. 

Appellant was initially indicted for possession with intent 

to distribute approximately eight kilograms o f a mixture or 

substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C . § 84l(a)(l) . Against the advice of counsel, she 

attempted to plead guilty. After a conference, the district court 

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rejected the plea apparently because the Appellant lacked the 

scienter to plead guilty to knowingly possessing the cocaine. 

Appellant had maintained throughout that she believed she was 

carrying only money in the suitcase. The judge before whom the 

plea was heard, Judge Russell, apparently believed and relied on 

these assertions. 

The government thereafter filed a superseding information 

alleging that Appellant unlawfully traveled in interstate commerce 

to facilitate the distribution of cocaine in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 1952(a)(3). Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea 

reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to 

suppress. 

The relevant facts are taken from the two suppression 

hearings held by the district court. During the first hearing on 

October 4, 1990, Appellant was represented by court-appointed 

counsel. The hearing consisted solely of the testimony of 

Detective Ring. Her then attorney decided not to have Appellant 

testify. On October 9, 1990 the court issued an order denying 

Appellant's motion to suppress. 

Approximately one month later, Appellant returned to the 

district court with new counsel and asked the court to reopen the 

hearing on the motion to suppress to supplement the record. The 

new counsel stated that Appellant had not felt comfortable with 

her court-appointed counsel and had not testified in large part 

because she was not familiar with the court system. The new 

counsel also stated that Appellant had not told her first counsel 

the truth about what happened because she did not trust him. 

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On November 6, 1990, a second hearing was held where both 

Appellant and Detective Ring testified. Although there were 

inconsistencies in the testimony of Appellant and Detective Ring, 

the court reaffirmed an earlier order denying the motion to 

suppress. 

The encounter leading to Appellant's arrest began when 

Appellant arrived in Oklahoma City on a bus originating in 

Los Angeles, as mentioned above. Some additional details about 

the encounter are necessary. The bus was under surveillance on 

its arrival by the two detectives because Los Angeles was a known 

source city of illicit drugs. Both detectives were dressed in 

civilian clothes with no external police identification. 

THE FIRST SUPPRESSION HEARING 

At the first suppression hearing which was before Judge 

Russell on October 4, Detective Ring testified that he observed 

Appellant leave the bus carrying a "soft sided-type suitcase." 

Ring stated that he saw her briefly speak to a man who was also 

traveling on the bus but had not gotten off with her. She then 

went to a telephone outside the bus terminal where she dialed a 

set of numbers and then hung up. Ring testified that based on his 

observations he believed she was calling a telephone pager. He 

did not state any reason why he so concluded, but he knew from his 

experience pagers were used by drug dealers. Appellant testified 

that she was calling her family. During this time, Ring stated 

that Appellant was "looking around" and that "she paid a lot of 

attention to me." He also testified that it appeared that 

Appellant nodded to another person. 

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After consulting with Detective Eastridge, who also observed 

that Appellant was looking around and protecting her bag, the two 

officers approached Appellant at the phone. They identified 

themselves, showed their credentials and explained to Appellant 

that they were police officers trying to intercept loads of 

narcotics originating in the Los Angeles area. Appellant was 

asked for identification and her bus ticket. She handed the 

detectives a California driver's license issued in her name. 

Detective Ring testified, as is typical in these 

circumstances, that at this point in the encounter, Appellant 

appeared very nervous. The bus station was not in the best part 

of town and Appellant said the officer came close to her and he 

was dressed like a "cowboy." He stated that her hand was "visibly 

shaking" while she produced her identification. Ring then asked 

her whether she was carrying weapons or narcotics. When Appellant 

did not reply, Ring asked if he could look in her bag. Instead of 

directly responding, Appellant asked if they could go someplace 

else. She and the two detectives proceeded into the bus terminal 

to an unoccupied area in the snack bar. Ring testified that 

neither he nor Detective Eastridge touched Appellant or guided her 

to the snack bar. 

Once in the snack bar, Ring again asked if he could look in 

the bag. Appellant picked up the bag, placed it on a table in the 

snack bar and stepped back. She then denied that the bag was 

hers. Before opening the bag Ring again asked if the bag was hers 

and she said no . Ring stated that he interpreted Appellant's 

statement that the bag was not hers and her body language in 

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stepping back from the bag to mean she was giving permission to 

look into the bag. Detective Ring opened the bag and discovered 

approximately eight kilograms of cocaine under a sheet or 

pillowcase. Appellant was then placed under arrest. 

Ring testified that throughout his conversation with 

Appellant he was extremely friendly and did not raise his voice. 

He stated on cross-examination that he never told Appellant that 

she was free to leave. 

THE SECOND SUPPRESSION HEARING 

During the second suppression hearing on November 6, 1990 

before Judge Russell, Appellant denied that she ever gave 

Detective Ring permission to search her luggage. She stated that 

when she asked, "What's this all about?", Ring responded that 

"[a]s soon as you cooperate with me, then you won't be detained 

anymore." She testified that before Ring opened the luggage she 

asked him whether he had a search warrant and was told that he did 

not need one. 

Detective Ring denied Appellant's statements. The court, 

describing the issue as one of credibility, chose to believe the 

testimony of Detective Ring. It held that the statements of 

Detective Ring were consistent with his earlier testimony. The 

court found that Appellant's credibility was questionable because 

she had told several different stories regarding the case. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

The applicable standard of review is well established. "On 

appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, 'our standard of 

review is to accept the trial court's findings of fact, unless 

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clearly erroneous, and to consider the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the government.'" United States v. Donnes, 947 F.2d 

1430, 1432 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. McAlpine, 919 

F.2d 1461, 1463 (10th Cir.)). Determinations of reasonableness 

concerning Fourth Amendment issues and other questions of law are 

reviewed de nova. United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482 (10th 

Cir.). 

Appellant argues that the district court erred by finding 

that no seizure implicating the Fourth Amendment occurred. Citing 

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, Appellant contends that the detectives 

were required, at a minimum, to be able to point to specific and 

articulable facts which justified the stop and warranted the 

intrusion. The district court disagreed and held that the 

detectives' actions never exceeded a typical police-citizen 

encounter. 

The three categories of encounters between police and 

citizens are well established. See United States v. Morgan, 936 

F.2d 1561, 1566 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Santillanes, 

848 F.2d 1103, 1106 (10th Cir.)). Here, we must determine whether 

the detectives' actions can meet a Fourth Amendment challenge. 

Our task is simplified by our recent decision in Evans and the 

Supreme Court's decision in Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct . 2382, 

2386. 

In Evans we held that questioning by Detectives Ring and 

Eastridge at the Oklahoma City bus depot did not implicate Fourth 

Amendment concerns. The encounter in Evans was described as 

cooperative, the conversations were friendly and there were no 

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threats or promises made to the de fendant . Evans, 937 F.2d at 

1537. We there found that nothing in the record exceeded the 

proper scope of a typical police/citizen encounter as articulated 

in Florida v. Bostick. 

The facts in the present case parallel Evans. In its initial 

order denying Appellant's motion to suppress (October 9, 1990), 

the district court found: 

"In this case, the Defendant voluntarily 

cooperated with the officers' questioning. 

Nothing in the officers' conduct would have 

caused a reasonable person to believe that she 

was not free to leave. The officers exerted 

no physical force, and engaged in no show of 

authority beyond showing their badges and 

identifying themselves as police officers. 

When the Defendant asked the officers to move 

the questioning to another area, the officers 

complied. She was not detained by physical 

force or show of authority. " 

Although the Appellant presented evidence in the second 

suppression hearing conflicting with the officers' statements, the 

then district court did not alter the findings theretofore made. 

The court there stated that "it's unquestionable that the officers 

in question were polite, were not overbearing with the Defendant. 

And I'm satisfied that she was under no inhibitions as far as her 

ability to leave the scene based on anything that these officers 

did on the occasion in question." Viewing the evidence in the 

record in the light most favorable to the government, there is 

nothing to indicate that the district court's findings are clearly 

erroneous. 

Appellant also challenges the consent to search the bag. 

From her brief, it appears that Appellant is arguing that the 

coercive nature of the officers' conduct prior to the search made 

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the consent involuntary rather than arguing that the consent 

itself was not given. 

Our holding on the seizure issue disposes of the first part 

of Appellant's argument. Appellant cannot contend that the search 

was invalidated by her unlawful detention. See United States v. 

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558. The question remains, however, 

whether the consent was invalidated for any other reason. 

The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be 

determined from the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. 

Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218. The government had the burden of 

showing that the consent was freely and intelligently given 

without duress or coercion . United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 

1448, 1453 (10th Cir. ). In our evaluation of the facts we start 

with the presumption that Appellant did not waive her 

constitutional rights. Id . 

After reviewing the record and the findings of the district 

court, we find nothing to suggest that the district court was 

clearly erroneous. In its initial order, the district court 

found that "[t]he search of the bag in the Defendant's possession 

was clearly consensual . . .. " After the second hearing, the 

court stated that Appellant "conceded to have her purse and 

ultimately the packages in question searched. " 

THE GUIDELINES 

Appellant's second point on appeal is that the district court 

misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines. She contends that the 

district court erred when it based her sentence on the eight 

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kilograms of cocaine found in the suitcase she was carrying. We 

agree. 

As mentioned, Appellant was initially charged with possession 

with intent to distribute cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S . C. § 841 

(a)(l). Appellant ' s brief states that, against the advice of 

counsel, Appellant attempted to plead guilty under this statute. 

The brief further states that the district court rejected her plea 

because she did not knowingly possess the drugs. There was a 

conference with the trial judge who was then handling the case, 

but there is no record of these proceedings. Although there is 

nothing in the record on appeal to expressly support this 

statement, it is apparent that an agreement for a change was 

reached, a change which eliminated the possession with intent. We 

can infer from the superseding information filed by the government 

that Appellant's position is correct. As mentioned, Appellant 

maintained throughout that she thought that there was only money 

in the suitcase, and that the suitcase was to be delivered in 

Washington to its owner, the person who had given it into her 

care . 

Unlike the indictment under§ 841(a)(l), the superseding 

information charging Appellant under§ 1952 did not require that 

she knowingly "possess" the drugs. The specific language of the 

superseding information states that Appellant, 

"did knowingly and unlawfully travel in 

interstate commerce from the Los Angeles, 

California, area, to the Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, area, with the intent to promote, 

manage, establish, carry on, or fac i litate the 

promotion, management, establishment, and 

carrying on of an unlawful activity, i . e . , 

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distribution of cocaine, a Schedule II 

controlled substance, in violation of Title 

21, United States Code, Section 84l(a)(l), and 

thereafter did perform and attempt to perform 

acts to promote, manage, establish, carry on, 

and facilitate the promotion, management, 

establishment, and carrying on of said 

unlawful activity. 

"All in violation of Title 18, 

United States Code, Section 1952 (a)(3) and 

( 2) • II 

Appellant pleaded guilty to the superseding information. 

Appellant was sentenced to a 60-rnonth term of imprisonment. 

The sentence was computed under Guideline§ 2El.2 "Interstate or 

Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of a Racketeering 

Enterprise." Under this Guideline, the base offense level is the 

greater of 6 or "the offense level applicable to the underlying 

crime of violence or other unlawful activity in respect to which 

the travel or transportation was undertaken." u.s.s.G. 

§ 2El.2(a). The district court further computed her sentence 

using distribution of cocaine as the underlying unlawful activity. 

Under§ 2D1.l(c}(6) the offense level for an offense involving at 

least 5 kilograms but less than 15 kilograms of cocaine is 32. 

The district court granted no adjustments to the base offense 

level. Thus, the court held that Appellant's base offense level 

was 32. 

Our position on this appeal of the sentencing issues is 

difficult as usual because of the structure of the Guidelines, but 

more so because of the first trial judge's determination that 

Appellant could not plead guilty to the indictment charging under 

21 u.s.c. § 841. This, in our view of the circumstances before 

us, was by reason of the judge's acceptance of Appellant's 

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assertions that she did not know what was in the suitcase she had 

been given to take to Washington to return to the person who had 

given it to her. She thought it contained money. She had a 

suspicion that it may have been "drug money." This position as to 

possession with intent was apparently also accepted by the 

prosecutor by the filing of a superseding information which sought 

to charge under§ 1952, and the plea. 

There is nothing whatever to indicate that the second j udge, 

who sentenced Appellant, was aware of the circumstances leading to 

the first judge's refusal to accept a guilty plea to§ 841. 

However, we feel compelled to accept the determination made by the 

first trial judge, and hold that there was no basis for the 

sentence by the second trial judge using§ 841. 

There is a second problem with the application of the 

Guidelines as made by the sentencing judge. The information, 

reciting a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952, as quote d more fully 

above, alleges that the Defendant 

"did knowingly and unlawfully travel in 

interstate commerce . .. with the intent to 

promote, manage, establish, carry on, or 

facilitate the promotion, management, 

establishment, and carrying on of an unlawful 

activity, i.e . , distribution of cocaine It 

The "unlawful activity" alle ged to be inte nded to be carried on is 

the "distribution of cocaine." However, that is not an offense 

under the statute. The statute is a racketeering statute and 

"unlawful activity" is not defined for all subsections as the 

distribution of narcotics but instead is state d or de fined in 

§ 1952(b) as follows: 

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"(b) As used in this section (i) 

'unlawful activity' means (1) any business 

enterprise involving gambling ... , narcotics 

or controlled substances ...• " 

Thus the "unlawful activity" must be a business enterprise, 

something continuing, and not an isolated incident. United States 

v. Fox, 902 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir.); United States v. Kendall, 766 

F.2d 1426 (10th Cir.). 

There was no such allegation. Thus the information as 

written did not allege an offense under§ 1952 and a plea of 

guilty to such an information was a nullity. 

We cannot agree with the trial court's application of the 

Guidelines to Appellant's case. We must hold that the application 

made was clearly erroneous. Further, if the wrong Guideline is 

applied, the sentencing constitutes plain error. United States v. 

Smith, 919 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.). 

The judgment of the trial court on the sentencing is REVERSED 

and REMANDED for further consideration. The judgment on the 

merits is REVERSED and REMANDED for a determination as to what 

crime was charged, if any, and for such other and further 

proceedings as the trial court may deem necessary. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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