Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03012/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03012-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrew Modjewski
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3012

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANDREW MODJEWSKI,

Defendant-Appellant.

___________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 10-cr-654 — Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 19, 2014 — DECIDED APRIL 13, 2015

____________________

Before ROVNER, WILLIAMS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Andrew Modjewski presented the testimony of a psychiatric expert during his sentencing hearing in 

hopes that it would reduce his sentence for possession and 

delivery of an extremely large amount of child pornography. 

At the sentencing hearing, after the defense conducted its 

direct examination and the government cross-examined the 

expert, the district court judge engaged in lengthy and direct 

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questioning of the expert, much of it regarding whether 

Modjewski could be classified as having a pedophilic identification. Though the expert said Modjewski could not, the 

judge came to her own contrary conclusion based on her 

knowledge of the field. Modjewski now argues the judge 

should have sua sponte recused herself. We reject Modjewski’s argument that the judge’s questioning rose to the level 

of personal bias since she was testing the reliability of the 

expert’s opinion. We also find neither the judge’s general 

knowledge of the relevant field nor her determination that 

Modjewski was more accurately classified having a pedophilic identification constituted personal knowledge of a 

disputed evidentiary fact, since neither was a fact. Further, 

we find that Modjewski waived his right to challenge the 

district court’s purported failure to address the arguments in

mitigation raised in the appeal. We therefore affirm 

Modjewski’s sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

Modjewski pled guilty to three counts of possession and 

transportation of electronic child pornography. His collection was massive, consisting of over 12,500 images and 700 

videos. One analyst from the National Center for Missing & 

Exploited Children called it the “most complete collection” 

of child pornography she had investigated. 

At sentencing, Modjewski presented the expert testimony 

of Dr. Lisa Rone, an Assistant Professor of Clinical Psychiatry at Northwestern University, Feinberg School of Medicine. 

Dr. Rone reiterated the findings in her report that Modjewski 

suffered from post-traumatic stress and bipolar disorders. 

She testified that he had minimal risk factors for reoffending since he did not have a personality or impulse 

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No. 13-3012 3

control disorder and was being adequately treated. She also 

opined that he was not a pedophile, based on her “experience with people who have had post-traumatic stress disorder from childhood sexual abuse and treating them” and her 

discussion with Modjewski. The government elicited testimony that Dr. Rone’s opinions were based on only one meeting with Modjewski and she did not conduct any tests on 

him, relying on tests conducted by others, and she did not 

review any of the images he downloaded or traded. 

After the government rested, the district court judge 

asked questions of Dr. Rone. Those questions spanned eleven minutes and eleven pages of transcript, and primarily related to Dr. Rone’s diagnosis that Modjewski was not a pedophile. For example: 

Court: So in reaching your conclusion that he’s 

not a pedophile, the type of images that he has 

possessed or collected would be relevant, 

wouldn’t it?

Dr. Rone: They absolutely would be relevant.

Court: And there would be a difference, in 

your opinion, if, for example, he had pornography in the area of—child pornography of 16-

to 18-year-old only. That would make a difference in your assessment of whether he was a 

pedophile, right?

Dr. Rone: Well, again, your Honor, I was making the assessment about his proclivity to being 

a pedophile not on the basis of just the images, 

but also on the basis of his psychiatric history 

and his own experiences.

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Court: Right, but that’s not my question. My 

question is: It would make a difference in making an assessment of pedophilia if these images 

were solely those between 16- and 18-yearolds, right?

Dr. Rone: Certainly it would make a difference. 

I don’t think we would be talking about pedophilia —

Court: You wouldn’t be able to diagnose him 

with pedophilia.

Dr. Rone: That’s correct.

Court: Okay. So when you say aroused by prepubertal images, if an individual has those in a 

collection and you didn’t view them, how do 

you know that he’s not a pedophile? You never 

looked at them, right?

Dr. Rone: Your honor, I don’t think I needed to 

look at them based on the descriptions I read.

Defense counsel did not object to the court’s questions 

(aside from an occasional relevance objection) or the fact that 

the court was questioning the expert. When the judge finished, defense counsel asked Dr. Rone further questions on 

redirect. 

At the hearing’s conclusion, the judge noted: “I am not 

going to make any finding today, nor do I need to make any 

finding today, that this defendant will act out on any behaviors and will be a contact offender. I don’t think that is necessary under the guideline calculations or the Sentencing 

Commission’s report. I don’t think that this psychiatrist who 

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No. 13-3012 5

testified had enough experience in the field to opine on that 

conclusion, nor will I.” The court continued: 

The Court does not credit [Dr. Rone’s] finding 

that [Modjewski is] not a pedophile. And I 

don’t think it matters if I make a determination 

of the term, because the term is really not necessary for my findings. But I don’t think that 

one can come to a conclusion under the DSM-5 

[Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 

Disorders, Fifth Edition] that an individual is 

not a pedophile if she hasn’t taken into account 

the actual images, viewing the actual images, 

looking at the types of images, the time period 

that they were stored, the amount of time that 

they were accessed, and the period of time 

over which he accessed the materials. That’s 

critical to understanding whether someone has 

a preference and a motivation and a determination to obtain these images under her own 

definition. ...

The Court doesn’t come to this study blindly. 

As the parties know, I’ve—I have continually 

read on the subject and stay up on the literature in this area and have written a treatise on 

the issue of child exploitation. And so for the

appellate record, I have referenced some of the 

materials from “Child Exploitation and Trafficking: Examining the Global Challenges and 

U.S. Responses,” many of which do support 

some of the things that the doctor said, but not 

all of the things.

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I’m not, again, making a conclusion that he’s 

acted out, nor that he will act out. That’s not a 

conclusion I think that I need to make. So with 

that in mind, the Court does find that the 

number of images, the type of images, the long 

period of time that the images were distributed, and the exacerbating fantasy and/or direct 

languages contained in the chats show a very 

aggravating circumstance and an individual 

who is obsessed with sexual activity with prepubescent individuals, and that that prepubescent activity also includes harm. And, therefore, with that in mind, a pedophilic identification, in the Court’s opinion, is much more accurate.

The court found three mitigating factors and sentenced 

Modjewski to a 15-year sentence, which was 30 months below the 210-262 month advisory guideline range. After the 

sentence was imposed, the government asked, “if the defendant has other issues he felt should have been addressed 

by the [sentencing judge] in [her] statement [explaining the 

sentence], that he raise them now at this time.” Thereafter, 

the sentencing judge, addressing Modjewski’s counsel, stated, “I have read all of the filings, but if you feel that there 

was something that I needed to address specifically, ... I 

would be happy to do so.” In response, counsel only raised 

two issues related to treatment programs for Modjewski.

Modjewski appeals his sentence.

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No. 13-3012 7

II. ANALYSIS

A. Recusal Was Not Required

Modjewski argues the district court judge should have 

sua sponte recused herself because she was biased or because 

a reasonable person would question her impartiality. He argues both 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and § 455(b)(1) required recusal. 

Under § 455(a), a judge shall recuse herself “in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Under § 455(b)(1), a judge should recuse herself 

where she “has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 

party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 

concerning the proceeding.” Modjewski must present “compelling evidence” of bias so that a reasonable person would 

be convinced the judge is biased. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. 

John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir. 2002). 

First, we reject the government’s argument that Modjewski’s motion was untimely. He appealed to this court when 

the relevant acts—the judge’s questions and statements—

came to light. See United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 351 

(7th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have permitted a judicial bias concern 

to be raised after trial when the bias did not become known 

until the trial’s cessation.”). However, he did so without filing a motion to disqualify with the district court or a writ of 

mandamus with this court. We cannot review a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) without such filings. Id. at 352. Recusal 

under § 455(a) is of little use to Modjewski anyway since “it’s 

too late for us to order the judge removed from the case, because she’s through with it.” In re Bergeron, 636 F.3d 882, 884 

(7th Cir. 2011); see also Diekemper, 604 F.3d at 352. Our ability 

to review a recusal argument under § 455(b) without the 

writ and what standard of review we use are “less clear.” 

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Diekemper, 604 F.3d at 351. As the government points out, we 

have reviewed recusal arguments under § 455(b) for the first 

time on appeal without a writ or motion filed with the district court, and have done so under both the clear and plain 

error standards. Id. (clear error); United States v. Smith, 210 

F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2000) (same). But see United States v. 

Lara-Unzueta, 735 F.3d 954, 958 (7th Cir. 2013) (plain error); 

United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688, 695 (7th Cir. 2001) 

(same). Ultimately the argument fails under either, so we assume without deciding that we can review the matter. 

Modjewski argues the judge, “in essence, stepped into 

the role of the prosecution” when she asked numerous direct 

questions of the expert “for the purpose of countering [her] 

conclusions.” He argues this demonstrates the judge’s “personal bias or prejudice.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). A judge may 

examine a witness. Fed. R. Evid. 614(b). However, she abuses 

that authority when she “abandons [her] proper role and assumes that of an advocate.” Fed. R. Evid. 614 advisory committee’s notes; cf. United States v. Alfaro, 336 F.3d 876, 883 (9th 

Cir. 2003) (applying Rule 614 at sentencing). One of the main 

reasons that such questioning can be prejudicial is that it can 

influence the jury. See United States v. Barnhart, 599 F.3d 737, 

744–46 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding judge in jury trial erred by 

asking questions that “read like a cross-examination”). Here, 

there was no jury, and “in non-jury proceedings, questioning 

by the judge will rarely be prejudicial to the defendant.” 

United States v. Webb, 83 F.3d 913, 917 (7th Cir. 1996). Moreover, many of the formalities that come with a criminal trial 

are relaxed in sentencing. At sentencing, a court “may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information [she] may consider, or the source from which it may come.” United States v. 

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Johnson, 489 F.3d 794, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quote 

omitted).

While the tone and content of the judge’s questions read 

somewhat like a cross-examination, it is the judge’s role to 

fashion a sentence based on information with a sufficient indicia of reliability. See id. The judge also plays the role of the 

“gatekeep[er]” when it comes to expert evidence, ensuring 

that it “both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to 

the task at hand.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 

U.S. 579, 597 (1993). At times a determination of reliability 

will call for lengthy questioning and, at others, for direct 

questions (if for no other reason than efficiency). See Webb, 83 

F.3d at 917 (finding no abuse of discretion in judge’s questioning, which was “intended to speed the suppression hearing along”). Here, there were eleven minutes of mostly tothe-point questions. Yet the sheer volume of questions cannot per se show the questioning is improper since there is no 

principled way to determine how many questions are sufficient or excessive, whether the judge was required to ask 

more as a result of an uncooperative witness, and so forth. 

See, e.g., United States v. Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1314 (7th Cir. 

1977) (holding no error in judge asking fifty-six questions 

over twelve pages of transcript during bench trial). The 

judge did not cut off the witness, demean her or impeach 

her. Rather, the judge posed various pointed inquiries to 

“question and even challenge” the reliability of Dr. Rone’s 

testimony. United States v. Vallone, 698 F.3d 416, 468 (7th Cir. 

2012), reinstated by United States v. Vallone, 752 F.3d 690 (7th 

Cir. 2014). Moreover, to meet his burden that a judge should 

be disqualified based on “judicial remarks during the course 

of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile 

to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,” Modjewski must 

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show “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to 

make fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States, 510 

U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Modjewski has not presented compelling evidence that the judge reached that level by asking a 

large number of direct questions while determining which 

evidence was reliable. 

Modjewski next contends that the judge’s general 

knowledge about child exploitation was a “disputed evidentiary fact[] concerning the proceeding” that was used to contradict the expert and therefore required her recusal. 28 

U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). But, the judge’s broad extrajudicial 

knowledge was not a “fact[] concerning the proceeding.” She 

has written a treatise on the subject, as she stated on the record, but there is no evidence she knew any extrajudicial facts 

about Modjewski. Moreover, all of the information she knew 

was available to the general public. Therefore, she did not 

need to recuse herself. See, e.g., In re Hatcher, 150 F.3d 631, 

635 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding no recusal necessary under 

§ 455(b)(1) since the judge “learned nothing ... that any 

member of the public could not also have learned”); United 

States v. Bonds, 18 F.3d 1327, 1331 (6th Cir. 1994) (Boggs, J., in 

chambers) (holding recusal not necessary in criminal case 

involving DNA matches despite judge’s attendance at DNA 

conference); United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1476 (9th 

Cir. 1991) (finding “expertise on and exposure to a subject ... 

does not necessitate recusal” in sexual abuse case where 

judge had been on Attorney General’s Commission on Pornography). 

Nor does the fact that the judge discounted the expert’s 

opinion that Modjewski was a pedophile mandate recusal 

since Dr. Rone’s own testimony—not any “personal 

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No. 13-3012 11

knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts” allegedly held by 

the judge—provided the reasons to reject the diagnosis. The 

first reason the judge gave for dismissing Dr. Rone’s opinion 

was because “I don’t think that one can come to a conclusion 

under the DSM-5 that an individual is not a pedophile if she 

hasn’t taken into account the actual images.” Dr. Rone testified to that exact point, stating it would “absolutely be relevant” under the DSM-5 to consider the type of images that 

Modjewski has possessed or collected. Dr. Rone also admitted she did not view those images. The judge then discredited the conclusion because Dr. Rone did not determine the 

age group of individuals in the images, which Dr. Rone admitted would “certainly ... make a difference” in assessing 

pedophilia. Dr. Rone acknowledged she did not make such a 

determination. So, based on Dr. Rone’s own testimony, the 

judge rejected the conclusion as unreliable. See United States 

v. Garthus, 652 F.3d 715, 720 (7th Cir. 2011) (affirming sentence in child pornography case when the “judge was unpersuaded [by an expert’s testimony] that the defendant 

would forgo criminal activity after release from prison”); 

United States v. Coopman, 602 F.3d 814, 818 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming sentencing judge who rejected expert’s testimony 

because judge “harbored serious concerns about the doctor’s 

specific experience, methods, and analysis” in the child pornography case).

The judge’s more problematic action, from Modjewski’s 

perspective, is not that she knew facts from outside of the 

proceeding, but that she knew enough to ask informed questions. Yet, to hold that a judge may not ask such questions 

would be to ignore that “she sits to see that justice is done in 

the cases.” Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1998) 

(internal quotation omitted). The judge credited that testiCase: 13-3012 Document: 59 Filed: 04/13/2015 Pages: 17
12 No. 13-3012

mony which she found to be reliable and discredited that 

which she did not, while giving reasons for both. That is the 

role of the judge at sentencing, and Modjewski does not 

challenge those determinations. To find recusal necessary 

here, we would punish the judge for being well-informed. 

Yet, we have previously noted that judges are not subject to 

“eternal[] disqualif[ication]” in cases where they know the 

subject matter well. See Schurz Commc’ns., Inc. v. FCC, 982 

F.2d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J., in chambers); see 

also United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir. 

1987) (per curiam) (“All judges come to the bench with a 

background of experiences, associations, and viewpoints. ... 

A judge is not required to recuse himself merely because he 

holds and has expressed certain views on a general subject.” 

(internal citations omitted)). Any other ruling would result 

in, for example, judges being forced to sit idly by if one party 

presented uncontradicted, but known to the judge as wrong, 

evidence. 

Finally, Modjewski points to the court’s affirmative finding of his pedophilic identification as cause for recusal. But, 

again, the judge’s opinion was not a “fact” and therefore no 

recusal was necessary. Cf. Fed. R. Evid. 702 (noting expert

“opinion[s]” based on “facts”). The court acknowledged as 

much by defining Dr. Rone’s pedophilic identification as a 

“conclusion” and the court’s own classification as her “opinion” on the matter. By comparison, the facts in the case were 

Modjewski’s actions and his collection, and there is nothing 

in the record showing the court had any extrajudicial 

knowledge of those facts. 

However, the judge’s own diagnosis was not reliable evidence upon which she could base a sentence. We have preCase: 13-3012 Document: 59 Filed: 04/13/2015 Pages: 17
No. 13-3012 13

viously held that sentencing based on “speculation or unfounded allegations” constitutes plain error. See United States 

v. Halliday, 672 F.3d 462, 475 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing because district court focused on defendant’s purported belief 

in the lawfulness of his offenses without any evidence defendant held that belief); cf. United States v. Bradley, 628 F.3d 

394, 400 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Sentencing judges 

necessarily have ‘discretion to draw conclusions about the 

testimony given and evidence introduced at sentencing,’ but 

‘due process requires that sentencing determinations be 

based on reliable evidence, not speculation or unfounded 

allegations.’” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. 

England, 555 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[D]ue process requires that sentencing determinations be based on reliable 

evidence, not speculation or unfounded allegations.”). This 

plain error was not raised by either party, but that does not 

prohibit our review. “In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, 

may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Atkinson, 297 

U.S. 157, 160 (1936); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (noting 

plain error “may be considered even though it was not 

brought to the court's attention”). 

The judge’s opinion that Modjewski exhibited a pedophilic identification cannot be based on Dr. Rone’s expert 

opinion, since Dr. Rone testified to the contrary. Therefore, 

the only basis for this opinion came from the judge herself, 

but such a conclusion cannot be a reliable expert opinion 

here. Expert opinions are based on specialized knowledge 

and result from reliable principles and methods being apCase: 13-3012 Document: 59 Filed: 04/13/2015 Pages: 17
14 No. 13-3012

plied to the facts of this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 702. Whether 

someone should be diagnosed as a pedophile or having a 

pedophilic identification is a conclusion for experts to make. 

See, e.g., United States v. Boroczk, 705 F.3d 616, 620 (7th Cir. 

2013) (noting conflicting expert testimony on pedophilic 

identification); Garthus, 652 F.3d at 719 (noting expert testified as to pedophilic fantasies); United States v. Mantanes, 632 

F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2011) (same). But the judge was not 

admitted as an expert. She was not subject to a Daubert hearing, and it is unclear who would even conduct such a hearing. She did not disclose her methods for classifying 

Modjewski, nor was she subject to cross-examination on her 

opinions. Before a purported expert opinion is found reliable, it is “crucial that a Daubert analysis of some form in fact 

be performed.” Naeem v. McKesson Drug Co., 444 F.3d 593, 

608 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). That was not 

done here. Since there was no other evidence in the record 

upon which the judge could support her conclusion, her 

finding of a pedophilic identification was speculative and an 

error. Cf. United States v. Miller, 601 F.3d 734, 739-40 (7th Cir.

2010) (reversing where judge based sentence on belief that 

sex offenders have higher than normal recidivism rates, but 

there was an “absence of support in the record for the court’s 

views”); United States v. Dorvee, 604 F.3d 84, 94 (2d Cir. 2010) 

(finding sentence substantively unreasonable when district 

court made the “assumption” defendant “was a ‘pedophile’ 

likely to engage in sexual conduct with a minor” despite 

“expert record evidence to the contrary”). 

We must now ask whether the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights by evaluating whether the district 

court’s error was not only plain “but also likely to ‘have resulted in a different sentence.’” United States v. CoronaCase: 13-3012 Document: 59 Filed: 04/13/2015 Pages: 17
No. 13-3012 15

Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 2010). Modjewski bears 

the burden of persuasion as to this question. See United States 

v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993); Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d at

341. Modjewski fails to establish that the sentencing judge’s 

pedophilic identification finding was likely to have resulted 

in a different sentence. While it is problematic that she made 

such a statement, in context of the whole hearing, we find 

that she did not rely upon it. The record shows that the sentencing judge repeatedly stated that she did not need to 

make a finding of pedophilic tendencies to support the sentence. See, e.g., Sent’g Hr’g Tr. 118, Dist. Ct. Dkt., ECF No. 

156 (“I [do not] need to make any finding today, that this defendant will act out on any [sexual] behaviors [toward children] and will be a contact offender.”); id. at 119 (“I don’t 

think that the psychiatrist who testified had enough experience in the field to opine on [whether Modjewski will engage in sexual activity with a child] nor will I.”); id. (“[I]t will 

not be a part of my conclusion that he will or will not act out 

on his urges.”); id. at 127 (“The [c]ourt does not credit [Dr. 

Rone’s] finding that [Modjewski] is not a pedophile. And I 

don’t think it matters if I make a determination of the term, 

because the term is really not necessary for my findings.”); 

id. at 129 (“I’m not, again, making a conclusion that he’s acted out [sexually against children], nor that he will act out. 

That’s not a conclusion I think that I need to make.”); see also 

id. at 132 (“I am going to go below the guideline range, but I 

can’t go to a level that would probably make everyone feel 

comfortable in your family because of the seriousness of the 

offense.). The sentencing judge explicitly and repeatedly denounced reliance on Modjewski’s pedophilic tendencies, and 

under the circumstances here, we conclude that the finding 

was not likely to have resulted in a different sentence. Cf. 

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16 No. 13-3012

McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243, 246 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding the error likely impacted the sentence “absent some explicit indication to the contrary by the trial judge at the time 

of sentencing”). Therefore, while the error is plain, we cannot vacate the sentence because the plain error did not affect 

Modjewski’s substantial rights.

B. Mitigation Arguments Were Addressed or Waived

“A sentencing court must address a defendant’s principal 

arguments in mitigation unless they are too weak to merit 

discussion.” United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 569 

(7th Cir. 2013). Modjewski argues that the district court never addressed all the arguments in mitigation put forth in the 

eight motions and exhibits that he filed requesting variances 

or contesting the government’s or the probation officer’s positions. However, the district court directly addressed many 

of Modjewski’s arguments in mitigation including the U.S. 

Sentencing Commission’s report to Congress about child 

pornography offenses under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 (the guideline 

used in this case), Modjewski’s risk of recidivism, Modjewski’s cooperation with law enforcement, the circumstances 

and nature of the offense, and offender characteristics, including Modjewski’s own victimization. 

Modjewski also argues that the district court did not specifically address his arguments regarding the continued risk 

of being assaulted in prison and the sentencing disparity 

among circuits in child pornography cases. Modjewski 

waived these issues for appeal. After imposing the sentence, 

the district court explicitly asked Modjewski’s counsel 

whether he wished to raise any arguments. See Sent’g Hr’g 

Tr. at 137 (“I have read all of the filings, but if you feel that 

there was something that I needed to address specifically ... 

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No. 13-3012 17

I would be happy to do so.”). Modjewski did not raise the

arguments he makes now, and instead, raised only two issues related to treatment programs. As a result, Modjewski 

waived the arguments in his appellate brief that the sentencing judge should have explicitly addressed his risk for assault in prison and the sentencing disparities among circuits 

in child pornography cases. See Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d at 569 

(encouraging sentencing courts after imposing the sentence 

“to inquire of defense counsel whether they are satisfied that 

the court has addressed their main arguments in mitigation” 

and finding that if the argument was not raised, a later challenge for failure to address the argument would be considered waived); see also United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 

940–41 (7th Cir. 2014) (finding waiver of defendant’s argument that the district court failed to address a principal argument in mitigation where at the sentencing hearing the 

judge asked defendant’s counsel if he “required ‘any further 

elaboration’ of the reasons for the sentence,” and defendant’s 

counsel did not raise the argument raised on appeal).

III. CONCLUSION

We therefore AFFIRM Modjewski’s sentence. 

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