Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00580/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00580-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keiki Kay Mitsu Fujita
Plaintiff
Harris & Zide
Defendant
Hunt & Henriques
Defendant
The Best Service Company
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

OAKLAND DIVISION 

KEIKI KAY MITSU FUJITA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 vs. 

THE BEST SERVICE COMPANY, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No: C 19-00580 SBA 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT BY 

DEFENDANT HARRIS & ZIDE 

Dkt. 36 

Plaintiff Keiki Kay Mitsu Fujita (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant pro se action alleging 

claims, inter alia, under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), id. § 1681 et seq., and the 

Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. As partydefendants, Plaintiff has named The Best Service Company (“Best”); Hunt & Henriques 

(“Hunt”); and Harris & Zide (“Harris”). Only Harris and Hunt remain as party-defendants 

in the action. 

The parties are presently before the Court on the Harris’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment. Dkt. 36. Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with this 

matter and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS the motion for the reasons set 

forth below. The Court, in its discretion, finds this matter suitable for resolution without 

oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b).

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I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an individual residing in Kensington, California. Compl. at 1, Dkt. 1.

Defendant Harris is a law firm engaged in the business of debt collection. Id. ¶ 16. On 

December 12, 2018, Harris received a file from its client, Bank of America, N.A. (“Bank of 

America”), for a delinquent credit account in the amount of $2,521.18 belonging to 

Plaintiff. Zide Decl. ¶ 4, Dkt. 36-1. The next day, Harris sent a letter to Plaintiff 

demanding payment of her outstanding debt. Id. ¶ 5 & Ex. A. On December 24, 2018, 

Harris received a letter from Plaintiff requesting validation of her debt. Id. ¶ 6 & Ex. B.

Harris provided the requested validation by letter on January 2, 2019. Id. & Ex. C. On 

January 22, 2019, Harris received a second letter requesting validation from Plaintiff. Id. 

¶ 7 & Ex. D. Harris responded to Plaintiff’s request on January 23, 2019. Id. & Ex. E. 

On February 1, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant action in this Court. The Complaint 

alleges five claims, which are brought against all Defendants, except as noted: (1) violation 

of the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b); (2) violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(8); 

(3) violation of the FDCPA, id. § 1692d(5); (4) violation of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692f; 

and (5) violation of the Telephone Communication Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (as to Best only).1

On February 19, 2019, Harris, on behalf of Bank of America, filed a collection 

lawsuit against Plaintiff in Contra Costa County Superior Court (“Superior Court”). Zide 

Decl. ¶ 9. On September 16, 2019, the Superior Court conducted a trial in the collection 

action and entered judgment in favor of Bank of America. Id. ¶ 24. The judgment is in the 

amount of $2,521.08, representing Plaintiff’s delinquent debt, plus an additional $354.50 in 

court costs, for a total of $2,875.58. Id. 

In the instant action, Harris served Plaintiff with discovery requests, including 

requests for admission (“RFAs”) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36. Zide 

Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. O. Harris served the discovery requests on July 9, 2019, see id., meaning 

1 Pursuant to a stipulation between Plaintiff and Best, all claims against Best were 

dismissed with prejudice. Dkt. 35.

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that responses were due by August 8, 2019, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Plaintiff refused 

to respond to the discovery requests, claiming that she was dissatisfied with Harris’ 

responses to discovery in the state court collection action. Zide Decl. ¶ 21. As a result of 

Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the RFA, the matters set forth in the RFA are deemed 

admitted and are “conclusively established” for purposes of this action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(a)(3), (b)(3).2

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate when it 

is demonstrated that there “is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The burden of establishing 

the nonexistence of a ‘genuine issue’ is on the party moving for summary judgment.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). “[A] party seeking summary judgment 

always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its 

motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it 

believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 323; see Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

Where the moving party meets its burden on summary judgment, the burden then 

shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “This burden is not a light one. 

The non-moving party must show more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.”

In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). An issue is “genuine” only if there is 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact finder to find for the non-moving party. See 

2 Plaintiff attaches responses to Harris’ RFAs to her opposition to the instant motion. 

Under Rule 6(b), a party may seek an extension of time after a deadline has expired upon a 

showing of excusable neglect. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b). Plaintiff has not made a motion 

under Rule 6(b), nor has she presented any explanation for her late responses.

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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 322-23. All reasonable inferences are to be drawn in favor of the 

party against whom summary judgment is sought. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

III. DISCUSSION

A. FCRA 

The purpose of the FCRA is to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, protect 

consumer privacy, and promote efficiency in the banking system. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. 

v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007); 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The FCRA imposes duties on both 

consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) as well as “furnishers” that provide credit 

information to CRAs. Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th 

Cir. 2009).

To ensure the accuracy of credit reports, the FCRA imposes two sets of 

responsibilities on entities which furnish information to CRA. Id. at 1154. The first set of 

duties requires furnishers “to provide accurate information,” including the duty to provide 

notice that the consumer is disputing the debt. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(3). The provisions 

of § 1681s-2(a) may be enforced only by federal agencies and certain state officials, not 

private persons. Nelson v. Chase Manhattan Mort. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 

2002).

The second category of responsibilities is triggered when a furnisher is notified by a 

CRA that a consumer disputes any reported information. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).3 The 

duty is triggered only when the information concerning the dispute is provided by the CRA; 

“notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger the furnisher’s 

duties under subsection (b).” Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. Unlike subsection (a), the FCRA 

3 Subsection (b) requires the furnisher to conduct an investigation; review all 

relevant information provided by the CRA; report the results of its investigation to the 

CRA; if its investigation reveals incomplete or inaccurate information, it must notify all 

other CRAs to whom it furnished the information; and if the incomplete or inaccurate 

information cannot be verified, it must modify, delete, or block the information 

permanently. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(1). 

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creates a private right of action for willful or negligent noncompliance with subsection (b).

Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n & o). 

Plaintiff’s first claim alleges that Harris violated § 1681s-2(b) by failing “to conduct 

an investigation and report the result of that investigation to the CRAs” after “the CRA’s 

investigation request to Defendants.” Compl. ¶ 52. However, there is no evidence that any 

CRA made such a request to Harris. To the contrary, it is uncontroverted that Harris had no 

communication with any CRA regarding Plaintiff. Zide Decl. ¶ 26. Moreover, Plaintiff 

admitted that Harris had no communication with any CRA. Harris’s RFA to Plaintiff asked 

her to admit that Harris never communicated with any CRA and that Harris, at all times, 

comported itself legally in its dealings with her. Id. ¶ 19 & Ex. P. Plaintiff did not respond 

to the RFAs within the requisite 30-day window. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). As a result 

of her failure to respond, it has been “conclusively established” that Harris received no 

investigation request from any CRA or otherwise violated the FCRA. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 

36(b) (“A matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court, on 

motion, permits the admission to be withdrawn or amended.”). 

The Court finds that Harris has sufficiently demonstrated that Plaintiff lacks any 

factual or legal basis for her FCRA claim. Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED in 

favor of Harris on this claim. 

B. FDCPA 

The FDCPA prohibits “debt collectors” from engaging in various unlawful debt 

collection practices, including the making of “false, deceptive or misleading 

representations.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a & 1692e. “There are four elements to an FDCPA 

cause of action: (1) the plaintiff is a ‘consumer’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3); (2) the debt 

arises out of a transaction entered into for personal purposes; (3) the defendant is a ‘debt 

collector’ under 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6); and (4) the defendant violated one of the provisions 

contained in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692a-1692o.” Wheeler v. Premiere Credit of N. Am., LLC, 80 

F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1112 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 

(9th Cir. 2004)).

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The Complaint alleges that Harris violated the FDCPA by failing to validate the 

Bank of America debt, reporting false information to CRAs and harassing her by telephone. 

Compl. ¶¶ 56, 59, 60, 63. In support of its summary judgment motion, Harris presents 

documentation establishing that it timely responded to both of Plaintiff’s demands for 

validation. Zide Decl. ¶¶ 6, 7 & Exs. C, E. Harris likewise confirms that it did not provide 

any information to any CRA and made no telephone calls to Plaintiff. Zide Decl. ¶¶ 26, 27.

Plaintiff offers no evidence to controvert Harris’ evidentiary showing. Moreover, as 

discussed, Plaintiff admitted these facts by failing to respond to Harris’ RFAs. Zide Decl. 

¶ 19 & Ex. P (RFA Nos. 3, 4, 6, 8). 

The Court finds that Harris has sufficiently demonstrated that Plaintiff lacks any 

factual or legal basis for her FDCPA claims. Summary judgment is therefore GRANTED 

in favor of Harris on these claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Harris’ Motion for Summary Judgment is 

GRANTED. Harris shall be terminated as a party-defendant in this action. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: 1/29/20 ______________________________

SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG 

Senior United States District Judge 

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