Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03140/USCOURTS-caDC-07-03140-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allen G. Love
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2009 Decided January 22, 2010 

No. 07-3140 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

APPELLEE

v. 

ALLEN G. LOVE, 

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 07cr00027-01) 

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. 

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance. 

Courtney D. Spivey, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. 

Taylor, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy 

W. McLeese III, Assistant U.S. Attorney. 

Before: GINSBURG and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. 

USCA Case #07-3140 Document #1226874 Filed: 01/22/2010 Page 1 of 24
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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH. 

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Allen G. Love pled guilty to 

transporting or shipping material involving child pornography 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and 2256 (2006). On 

appeal, he challenges the district court’s application of a 

sentencing enhancement, as well as some of the conditions of 

his supervised release. We affirm Love’s sentence, save one 

condition of supervised release. 

I. 

On October 19, 2006, two men using the screen names 

“James” and “Al” met in an incest chat room on the Internet. 

James mentioned he had a ten-year-old daughter, and Al 

asked to see a picture of her. James soon replied with a 

photograph of a young girl. “Al” was the defendant, Allen 

Love. “James” was undercover Metropolitan Police Detective 

Timothy Palchak, an investigator of Internet crimes against 

children.1

Love and Palchak chatted online many times over the 

next several months. Love wrote that he wanted to have sex 

with Palchak’s daughter and asked for nude pictures of her. 

Love also suggested that Palchak bring his daughter to 

Chicago, where Love could have sex with her at a local hotel. 

In addition, Love sent Palchak four photographs and two 

video clips of prepubescent children engaging in sexually 

explicit conduct, including one clip in which a child is 

forcibly raped. 

 

1

 Our recitation of the facts draws from the proffer signed by Love 

in support of his guilty plea and from the district court’s findings 

with respect to two disputed paragraphs of the Presentence 

Investigation Report. 

USCA Case #07-3140 Document #1226874 Filed: 01/22/2010 Page 2 of 24
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During an online chat on October 26, 2006, Palchak 

asked Love for pictures he could show his daughter. Love 

sent him a photograph of an adult male’s genitals. On 

December 7, 2006, the men chatted again about Love’s 

having sex with Palchak’s daughter. Palchak said that he told 

his daughter Love wanted to have sex with her and that she 

was excited to meet him. Palchak said he was going to show 

her the child pornography Love had sent and asked for more. 

Love responded, “ok,” and repeated that he wished Palchak 

and his daughter were in Chicago so that Love could have sex 

with her. Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 21. In a 

chat on January 23, 2007, Palchak asked Love if he had any 

more pictures he could show his daughter or “just the same 

stuff” he had sent previously. Love replied, “[J]ust the same 

ones.” Id. ¶ 22. 

On January 25, 2007, agents from the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation executed a search warrant at Love’s home. A 

search of his computers discovered over 600 images of child 

pornography. Love confessed to the FBI that he regularly 

traded child pornography with people he met online. Love 

was subsequently indicted for one count of transporting or 

shipping material involving child pornography and one count 

of possessing such material. Love pled guilty on September 4, 

2007, to the distribution count in exchange for the 

government’s dismissing the possession count and 

recommending a sentence at the low end of the guideline 

range. 

Under section 2G2.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines, the 

base offense level for Love’s conduct is 22. U.S. SENTENCING 

GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2G2.2(a) (2007) [hereinafter 

U.S.S.G.]. As part of the plea agreement, Love stipulated to 

several enhancements to his offense level: a two-level 

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increase because he possessed or transmitted illicit material 

involving a prepubescent minor, id. § 2G2.2(b)(2); a twolevel increase because he distributed child pornography, id.

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(F); a four-level increase because the material 

portrayed violent, sadistic, or masochistic conduct, id.

§ 2G2.2(b)(4); a two-level increase because he used a 

computer to facilitate his offense, id. § 2G2.2(b)(6); and a 

five-level increase because he possessed 600 or more illicit 

images, id. § 2G2.2(b)(7)(D). In return, the government 

agreed the offense level should be decreased by three levels 

under section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines for Love’s acceptance 

of responsibility. According to the stipulations, Love’s total 

offense level was 34. 

Following Love’s guilty plea, the United States Probation 

Office issued a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that 

agreed with those stipulations, with one exception. In lieu of 

section 2G2.2(b)(3)(F)’s two-level enhancement for any 

distribution of child pornography, the Probation Office 

applied section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E)’s seven-level enhancement for 

“[d]istribution [of child pornography] to a minor that was 

intended to persuade, induce, entice, or facilitate the travel of, 

the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” PSR ¶ 31. 

This difference resulted in a total offense level of 39, see id.

¶ 41, five levels higher than that to which the parties had 

agreed. 

A defendant’s sentence may not exceed the statutory 

maximum regardless of the guideline range that results from 

his criminal history category and total offense level. See 

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a) (“Where the statutorily authorized 

maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable 

guideline range, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence 

shall be the guideline sentence.”). Love’s fairly clean criminal 

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record placed him in Criminal History Category I. See PSR 

¶¶ 42–49. His total offense level was either 34 or 39, 

depending on whether section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) applied. Given 

Love’s criminal history category, a total offense level of 39 

would translate to a sentencing range of 262 to 327 months’ 

imprisonment, and a total offense level of 34 would mean a 

sentencing range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment. See

U.S.S.G. pt. 5A. But the statutory maximum for Love’s 

offense is 240 months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252A(b)(1). 

At Love’s sentencing hearing, the district court applied 

the seven-level enhancement recommended by the Probation 

Office, Tr. 24–25, but imposed a sentence of 188 months’ 

imprisonment, followed by supervised release for life. 

Judgment in a Criminal Case at 2–3 [hereinafter Judgment]. 

Love’s term of supervised release is subject to several 

standard and special conditions of supervision. Love timely 

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.2

 

 

2

 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) authorizes appeals of sentences “imposed 

as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.” 

In Love’s case, the district court imposed a sentence (188 months) 

below the guideline sentence that results from applying the sevenlevel enhancement (240 months). One passage in In re Sealed Case, 

449 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2006), arguably suggests we lack 

jurisdiction under § 3742(a)(2) when the district court grants such a 

downward departure. See id. at 121–22 & n.1 (“Subsection (2) does 

not allow jurisdiction here because Appellant’s sentence was not 

the ‘result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines.’ 

Rather, his sentence was the result of the District Court’s decision 

to grant a departure from the Sentencing Guidelines . . . . The 

[departure] did not involve an application of the Guidelines. It 

involved a decision not to apply the Guidelines at all.”). In re 

Sealed Case, however, held only that § 3742(a)(2) is inapplicable 

USCA Case #07-3140 Document #1226874 Filed: 01/22/2010 Page 5 of 24
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Love argues the district court erred in three ways: 

(1) applying the seven-level enhancement from section 

2G2.2(b)(3)(E); (2) entering a written judgment that 

conflicted with the orally pronounced sentence; and 

(3) imposing unreasonable conditions of supervised release.

 

II. 

We review sentences for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. 

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). In applying this 

standard, the court “ensure[s] that the district court committed 

no significant procedural error.” Id. at 51. Procedural errors 

include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the 

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, 

failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence 

based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately 

explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for 

any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id. 

Love argues the district court committed procedural error 

by applying section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E)’s seven-level 

enhancement. He alleges error with respect to each element of 

the enhancement: (1) distribution of child pornography; (2) to 

 

when the defendant challenges the degree of a section 5K1.1 

departure from the guideline range. See id. at 121–22 (citing United 

States v. Hazel, 928 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). Love’s 

argument is different. Because Love challenges the district court’s 

initial calculation of the guideline range, rather than the degree of 

its subsequent downward departure, we have jurisdiction under 

§ 3742(a)(2). A sentence that results from a miscalculation of the 

guideline range is “imposed as a result of an incorrect application 

of the sentencing guidelines,” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2), regardless of 

whether the district court also departed from the guideline range. 

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a minor; and (3) intended to persuade, induce, entice, or 

facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited 

sexual conduct. We address each of his arguments in turn. We 

find none persuasive. 

A. 

Love argues the district court erroneously based the 

enhancement on his transmittal of one image of an adult 

male’s genitals, rather than his admitted distribution of 

pictures and videos of child pornography. Appellant’s Br. at 

14; Reply Br. at 6–10. To address this argument, we must 

examine the entire sentencing transcript to understand why 

the district court applied the enhancement. See United States 

v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 740–41 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 

(discussing the need to avoid “reading the district court’s 

explanation [of a sentencing adjustment] in a parsed manner 

that overlooks its meaning in context”). If Love’s 

understanding of the district court’s decision were correct, we 

would reverse. The enhancement applies only to distribution 

of “material involving the sexual exploitation of a minor.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt.1. A photograph of an adult’s genitals 

does not qualify. A careful reading of the entire sentencing 

transcript, however, shows that the district court relied on the 

exchange of adult pornography only for its value as 

circumstantial evidence that Love distributed child 

pornography to a minor with the requisite intent. We therefore 

find no error. 

In his pre-hearing objections to the PSR, Love raised two 

objections to the seven-level enhancement. First, Love 

distributed child pornography to Palchak, not “to a minor.” 

Second, Love did not intend to facilitate a sexual encounter 

with Palchak’s daughter. At the sentencing hearing, the court 

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questioned defense counsel about these objections. In doing 

so, the court referred to all the material Love had sent 

Palchak: 

All of that, at least circumstantially, shows that . . . the 

defendant believed that it was being sent, albeit at the 

request of the officer, to the officer for the purpose of it 

being shown to the child . . . . I think it is reasonable to 

infer from all of that, that he sent it with the anticipation 

it would be shown to the child, so that it would factor into 

the child ultimately having sex with him. 

Tr. 24–25 (emphases added). 

Love argues the court’s use of the word “it” shows the 

court was speaking of a single photograph. Appellant’s Br. at 

14; Reply Br. at 7–8. Though plausible, that is not the only 

permissible reading of the court’s conclusion. “It” could just 

as easily refer to the child pornography Love sent or, more 

likely, all the pornography he sent, taken together. 

Read in isolation the court’s statement is at most 

ambiguous. Read in context, it shows the district court applied 

the enhancement because of Love’s distribution of material 

that included child pornography. In response to defense 

counsel’s argument that Love would not have distributed 

child pornography to a minor had Palchak not induced him, 

the court stated even more plainly its conclusion that Love 

distributed child pornography to Palchak’s daughter with the 

intent to facilitate a sexual encounter with her: 

[T]he dissemination of material, not only showing young 

children in nude situations, but very suggestive situations, 

and also showing children actually being raped—I think 

it would be very difficult to show that when you send 

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photographs to someone with the intent of having those 

photographs shown to a child and you have already 

expressed your intent or desire to have sex with that 

child, I think it is very difficult to show that there wasn’t 

a predisposition to engage in the act. 

Tr. 18. 

Nevertheless, Love contends the court based the 

enhancement on the chat in which he sent Palchak adult—but 

not child—pornography because the court repeatedly 

mentioned that chat. Appellant’s Br. at 14; Reply Br. at 6–7. 

But Love’s reading is too crabbed and fails to take into 

account that these comments were made in the context of 

Love’s having already conceded that he distributed child 

pornography. The court easily found that Love distributed 

adult pornography to Palchak’s daughter to facilitate 

prohibited sexual conduct. It then reasonably inferred that 

when Love sent Palchak child pornography, he did so for the 

same reason and expected Palchak’s daughter to see it. 

Because the district court based its application of the 

enhancement on Love’s distribution of child pornography, it 

committed no error. 

B. 

Love next argues his distribution of child pornography 

was not “to a minor.” Appellant’s Br. at 14–15; Reply Br. at 

10–12. He gives three reasons: (1) the evidence does not 

support a finding that Palchak’s fictitious daughter was a 

“minor” as defined in the commentary to the guideline; (2) the 

evidence was insufficient to support a finding that Love had 

the requisite intent or knowledge that Palchak would show his 

daughter the child pornography; and (3) the enhancement is 

limited to “direct” distribution of child pornography to a 

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minor and therefore does not apply here. Because its findings 

were not clearly erroneous and its interpretation of the 

guideline was correct, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion. See United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 

1345 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 

The commentary to section 2G2.2 defines “minor” to 

include “an individual, whether fictitious or not, who a law 

enforcement officer represented to a participant (i) had not 

attained the age of 18 years, and (ii) could be provided for the 

purposes of engaging in sexually explicit conduct.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 2G2.2 cmt.1. Love argues there was insufficient evidence to 

find that Palchak “represented” that his young daughter 

“could be provided for the purposes of engaging in sexually 

explicit conduct.” The record contains ample evidence to 

support that finding. Palchak wrote that he told his daughter 

Love wanted to have sex with her and she was excited to meet 

him, PSR ¶ 21, from which one could reasonably infer that he 

was offering his daughter for sex. Moreover, Palchak made 

that statement during several months of chats in which Love 

made repeated entreaties to have sex with his daughter. 

Love also argues the enhancement applies only if the 

government shows he intended for Palchak to display the 

child pornography to his daughter. But Love provides no 

authority that the government must prove specific intent. 

Knowing the child pornography he distributed would reach a 

minor is sufficient, see U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 cmt.1 (defining 

“distribution to a minor” as “the knowing distribution to an 

individual who is a minor at the time of the offense” 

(emphasis added)), and the district court did not clearly err in 

concluding Love acted with such knowledge. During their 

chats, Palchak repeatedly asked for photographs or movies 

that he could show his daughter. On January 23, 2007, 

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Palchak again asked if there were pictures he could show the 

young girl, and Love responded: “[J]ust the same ones” he 

had already sent. PSR ¶ 22. By that time, Love had given 

Palchak numerous photographs and movie clips containing 

child pornography. 

Finally, nothing in the Guidelines supports Love’s 

argument that section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) applies only to 

distribution of child pornography “directly” to a minor. Love 

suggests that, if the Sentencing Commission intended the 

enhancement to apply to distribution through an intermediary, 

it would have made the guideline explicit on that point. 

Appellant’s Br. at 15. But the Commission could just as easily 

have limited the guideline in the manner Love suggests by 

inserting the word “directly” before “to a minor.” We will not, 

without good reason, read into the guideline a requirement not 

included in its text. Cf. Jama v. Immigration & Customs 

Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335, 341 (2005) (“We do not lightly 

assume that Congress has omitted from its adopted text 

requirements that it nonetheless intends to apply . . . .”). 

Rather, we understand section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E) to apply when, 

acting with the requisite purpose, the defendant engages in an 

act related to the transfer of child pornography with the 

knowledge it will be received or viewed by a minor. 

C. 

Love also asserts, as he did below, that the record does 

not support a finding that his distribution of child 

pornography was “intended to persuade, induce, entice, 

coerce, or facilitate the travel of” Palchak’s daughter to 

engage in prohibited sexual conduct. We review the district 

court’s factual finding about Love’s intent for clear error. See 

United States v. Leonzo, 50 F.3d 1086, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

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The district court did not clearly err in concluding Love 

intended his distribution of child pornography to “factor into 

the child ultimately having sex with him.” Tr. 25. During their 

first conversation, Love asked Palchak for a picture of his 

daughter. After Palchak sent a photograph of a young girl, 

Love said he wanted to have sex with her and asked Palchak 

to bring her to Chicago for that purpose. When Palchak told 

Love he was going to show his daughter the videos he had 

sent, Love replied, “ok,” and that he wished Palchak and his 

daughter were in Chicago so Love could have sex with her. 

PSR ¶ 21. The district court inferred from these exchanges 

that Love’s purpose in conversing with Palchak and sending 

him child pornography was to facilitate a sexual encounter 

with Palchak’s ten-year-old daughter. This was not clearly 

erroneous. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s application of 

section 2G2.2(b)(3)(E)’s seven-level enhancement. 

III. 

Next, Love challenges seven conditions of his supervised 

release, some on the ground that they differ from the sentence 

announced from the bench and all on the ground that they are 

unreasonable. 

A. 

 Because “[t]he pronouncement of the sentence constitutes 

the judgment of the court,” Kennedy v. Reid, 249 F.2d 492, 

495 (D.C. Cir. 1957), “the written judgment form is a nullity 

to the extent it conflicts with the previously pronounced 

sentence,” United States v. Booker, 436 F.3d 238, 245 (D.C. 

Cir. 2006). This rule rests on two foundational principles: 

(1) the defendant has a right to be present at sentencing, 

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Borum v. United States, 409 F.2d 433, 440 n.28 (D.C. Cir. 

1967), and (2) “when a final judgment has once been entered, 

no second or different judgment may be rendered . . . until the 

first shall be vacated and set aside or reversed on appeal or 

error.” Booker, 436 F.3d at 245 (quoting 49 C.J.S.

JUDGMENTS § 76, at 150–51 (2005)). When the two are in 

conflict, we will order the judgment corrected to conform to 

the sentence imposed from the bench, see, e.g., United States 

v. Lewis, 626 F.2d 940, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980), but we will not 

remand when the judgment is consistent with the sentence, 

see Borum, 409 F.2d at 440. 

This circuit has not squarely addressed whether the 

district court may use the written judgment to clarify an 

ambiguous oral pronouncement of the sentence. Today we 

join the vast majority of our sister circuits in holding that it 

may. See United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 334–35 (6th 

Cir. 2008); United States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 

(9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Vega-Ortiz, 425 F.3d 20, 23 

(1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Osborne, 345 F.3d 281, 283 

n.1 (4th Cir. 2003); Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 133–35 

(3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Thomas, 299 F.3d 150, 152–

53 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Warden, 291 F.3d 363, 365 

(5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bull, 214 F.3d 1275, 1279 

(11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 

511–12 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 

1448, 1451 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (“This is the purpose of 

the written order: to help clarify an ambiguous oral sentence 

by providing evidence of what was said from the bench.”). 

But cf. Holloway v. United States, 960 F.2d 1348, 1358 (8th 

Cir. 1992) (“[A]mbiguities in the sentence pronouncement are 

to be construed in favor of the defendant.”). Therefore, we 

will not remand for the district court to correct a written 

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judgment that clarifies—rather than contradicts—the oral 

pronouncement of the sentence. 

Love contends that the descriptions of several special 

conditions of supervised release in the written judgment 

impermissibly conflict with the conditions imposed orally at 

sentencing. Most of the alleged discrepancies simply clarify 

or define terms included in the oral pronouncement. Not every 

difference Love finds between the sentence and judgment 

warrants discussion, but some do, and with respect to one 

condition he is correct. 

First, Love argues that the judgment’s description of the 

condition regarding mental health treatment impermissibly 

differs from the sentence. At the sentencing hearing, the 

district court required that, while in prison, Love receive “any 

mental-health treatment that needs to be provided.” Tr. 63. 

The court further required that when Love is “on supervised 

release, if it’s felt further treatment is needed, either in the 

sex-offender area or in the mental-health area, [Love] also 

participate in that.” Tr. 64. The written judgment provides: 

The defendant shall participate in a mental health 

program specifically related to sexual offender 

therapy, as approved by the Probation Office. The 

defendant shall abide by all program rules, 

requirements and conditions, which may include, but 

[are] not limited to, submission to periodic and 

random polygraph testing, plethysmograph 

examinations, and ABEL Assessment, as directed by 

the Probation Office. 

Judgment at 4. 

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Love maintains the oral pronouncement of the sentence 

made treatment conditional, rather than mandatory, by 

requiring mental health or sex offender treatment only “if it’s 

felt further treatment is needed.” Tr. 64. Love also challenges 

the reasonableness of the oral pronouncement as 

impermissibly vague because it fails to identify who will 

decide if treatment is necessary and when such a 

determination will be made. Appellant’s Br. at 20–21; Reply 

Br. at 15. 

Oral pronouncements of supervised release conditions are 

often worded imprecisely. Cf. United States v. Daugherty, 269 

U.S. 360, 363 (1926) (“Sentences in criminal cases should 

reveal with fair certainty the intent of the court . . . . [But] 

elimination of every possible doubt cannot be demanded.”). 

With that in mind, we do not think the district court intended 

to make Love’s mental health treatment conditional on a 

subsequent determination of its necessity. Once again, we 

look to the context of the district court’s statements. See 

Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d at 740–41. The district court had 

before it the Sentencing Guidelines, which recommend 

mandatory mental health treatment, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 5D1.3(d)(7), and the government’s sentencing 

memorandum, which recommended the same. Love lodged no 

objection to the court’s reliance upon either. Tr. 47, 66. As 

such, we think the court intended the condition to be 

mandatory, regardless of the phrasing used at sentencing. The 

written judgment is consistent with that understanding. Our 

conclusion moots Love’s concerns about the condition’s 

vagueness. Because the district court made treatment 

mandatory, there is no need to ask who decides whether 

treatment is necessary and when that decision is to be made. 

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 Second, Love contends the written judgment is more 

restrictive than the oral sentence because it limits his ability, 

absent permission, to reside or volunteer with minors. We find 

no error because both restrictions are encompassed in a third 

one: The oral pronouncement barring all contact with 

children. Tr. 64. Moreover, to the extent the oral 

pronouncement and written judgment differ, the judgment is 

more lenient because it permits Love to reside or volunteer 

with children as long as he receives permission. The oral 

pronouncement could be read to prohibit even that.3

 Finally, Love argues the district court impermissibly 

expanded a condition restricting possession of pornography 

by adding in the written judgment that he “shall not patronize 

any place where pornography or erotica can be accessed, 

obtained, or viewed, including establishments where sexual 

entertainment is available.” Judgment at 4. The government 

suggests this prohibition may be “reasonably viewed as a 

clarification” of the restriction on Love’s possession of 

pornographic materials. Appellee’s Br. at 39 n.17. The oral 

pronouncement, however, unambiguously limits the 

restriction to possession of pornography. The written 

judgment is not so limited. It prohibits visiting certain 

establishments—including, presumably, many bookstores and 

newsstands—regardless of whether Love possesses 

pornography while he is there. This cannot be understood as a 

mere clarification of the pornography restriction pronounced 

orally. We therefore remand to the district court for the sole 

purpose of deleting from the written judgment the provision 

that “[h]e shall not patronize any place where pornography or 

erotica can be accessed, obtained, or viewed, including 

 

3

 The government does not challenge the judgment as insufficiently 

restrictive. 

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establishments where sexual entertainment is available.” See, 

e.g., United States v. Braxtonbrown-Smith, 278 F.3d 1348, 

1356 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remanding for the district court to 

strike from the judgment a special condition of supervised 

release).

B. 

Love also challenges seven of the special conditions of 

his supervised release as unreasonable or inconsistent with the 

Guidelines. At sentencing, he specifically objected only to the 

conditions related to Internet usage, associations with known 

sex offenders, and contact with children through employment. 

Tr. 47–52. We review the imposition of these conditions for 

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 

884, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The statutory factors guiding the 

district court’s exercise of its discretion are outlined in United 

States v. Stanfield, 360 F.3d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 2004): 

[T]he court may order any condition of supervised 

release “it considers to be appropriate,” to the extent 

the condition is “reasonably related” to the nature and 

circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant, and to the need to 

deter crime, to protect the public from further crimes 

of the defendant, and to provide needed training, 

medical care, or other correctional treatment to the 

defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). The condition also 

must entail “no greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary” to provide adequate deterrence, 

to protect the public, and to meet the defendant’s 

vocational and medical needs. Id. § 3583(d)(2). 

360 F.3d at 1352–53. Love’s general objection to the other 

conditions, see Tr. 66 (objecting “to any condition of 

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supervised release beyond that which I indicated in my 

proffer”), was insufficient to preserve his arguments for 

appeal. See United States v. Breedlove, 204 F.3d 267, 270 

(D.C. Cir. 2000) (“An objection is not properly raised if it is 

couched in terms too general to have alerted the trial court to 

the substance of the petitioner’s point.”). We therefore review 

those conditions for plain error, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b), 

and find none. 

1. Restriction on Internet Access 

Love challenges a condition that will require him to 

obtain prior written approval from the Probation Office for 

Internet access. The condition states, “The defendant shall not 

possess or use a computer that has access to any ‘on-line 

computer service’ at any location, including his place of 

employment, without the prior written approval of the 

Probation Office.” Judgment at 4. The condition is overbroad, 

Love argues, in light of the near ubiquity of the Internet in 

everyday life. He suggests a more tailored condition that 

would ban only electronic communication involving 

prohibited sexual material, or, alternatively, would require 

that his Internet use be monitored remotely by the Probation 

Office. Appellant’s Br. at 22–25. 

The Internet prohibition will, no doubt, substantially 

affect Love’s day-to-day activities. It will deprive him of the 

easiest way to pay his bills, check the weather, stay on top of 

world events, and keep in touch with friends. It will also 

prevent him from using the Internet to trade child 

pornography. These are all factors district courts should 

weigh in considering restrictions on Internet access as 

conditions of supervised release. Given the alternatives of 

remote monitoring of an individual’s Internet usage and 

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unannounced examinations of his computers, an Internet ban 

subject to Probation Office approval may in some cases 

impose a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 

necessary” to deter illegal conduct and protect the public. 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); see, e.g., United States v. PerazzaMercado, 553 F.3d 65, 69–74 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 

Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877–79 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. 

Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. 

White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205–07 (10th Cir. 2001). But not 

here. In Love’s case, this restriction is eminently reasonable. 

On this record, the condition is properly tailored to the 

circumstances of the offense and Love’s background, and it is 

reasonably necessary to deter future misconduct and to protect 

children. Consensus is emerging among our sister circuits that 

Internet bans, while perhaps unreasonably broad for 

defendants who possess or distribute child pornography, may 

be appropriate for those who use the Internet to “initiate or 

facilitate the victimization of children.” Holm, 326 F.3d at 

878; see United States v. Thielemann, 575 F.3d 265, 278 (3d 

Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 446 F.3d 272, 283 (2d 

Cir. 2006); United States v. Boston, 494 F.3d 660, 668 (8th 

Cir. 2007); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169 (5th Cir. 

2001). The distinction is grounded in the simple proposition 

that when a defendant has used the Internet to solicit sex with 

minors, “the hazard presented by recidivism” is greater than 

when the defendant has traded child pornography. Johnson, 

446 F.3d at 283. 

The district court found that Love not only distributed 

child pornography but that he also solicited sex with 

Palchak’s fictitious daughter. The court concluded that Love 

would have had sex with her if given the opportunity, Tr. 18, 

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59, 60, and he would likely repeat this conduct upon release if 

he thought he would not be caught, Tr. 62. In sum, the hazard 

presented by Love’s potential recidivism is substantial, and 

his inclination towards reoffending is great. Making Love’s 

Internet use subject to Probation Office approval is therefore 

appropriately tailored to the harm that may result should he 

resume his previous course of conduct after release from 

prison. 

Moreover, the continuing development of the Internet 

makes it reasonable for the district court to give the Probation 

Office broad authority to determine the scope of Love’s 

permissible Internet use. Love’s term of supervised release 

will not begin any time soon. Sentencing courts can predict 

neither the new ways in which child pornography will then be 

available nor the new technologies the government may use to 

police its availability. An Internet restriction that today 

imposes “no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 

necessary” to deter illegal conduct may, by the time Love is 

released, be either wholly inadequate or entirely too 

burdensome. A broad Internet prohibition, which the 

Probation Office will tailor to the technology in use at the 

time of Love’s release, is an appropriate way to deal with that 

uncertainty. We assume the Probation Office will reasonably 

exercise its discretion by permitting Love to use the Internet 

when, and to the extent, the prohibition no longer serves the 

purposes of his supervised release. The Internet restriction 

therefore imposes no greater deprivation of liberty than is 

reasonably necessary to serve the purposes of supervised 

release. 

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2. Restriction on Contact with Known Sex Offenders 

The district court required that Love “not associate with 

known sex offenders or groups of individuals engaged in such 

activity.” Tr. 64. Love argues compliance with this condition 

would be unduly burdensome because it could preclude his 

residence with other sex offenders in shared housing and 

prevent his rehabilitation through group therapy with other 

sex offenders. He also argues the condition is overbroad 

because distribution of child pornography is not ordinarily 

committed in groups. 

In addition to the contact-with-sex-offenders condition, 

Love’s supervised release is subject to the standard condition 

prohibiting him from associating “with any persons engaged 

in criminal activity” or “with any person convicted of a 

felony, unless granted permission to do so by the probation 

officer.” Judgment at 3. The Guidelines recommend this 

condition be attached to any term of supervised release, see

U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)(9), and Love does not challenge its 

imposition here. The special condition prohibiting contact 

with known sex offenders is merely one particular application 

of the standard condition. The only difference between the 

two is that the sex-offender condition contains no explicit 

exception for contact with the permission of the Probation 

Office. We do not agree with Love, however, that the absence 

of such an exception will require the Probation Office to 

enforce the condition at the expense of other postincarceration objectives like supervision and treatment. There 

is no conflict in principle between these conditions. Should 

the Probation Office find the conditions to be inconsistent in 

practice, it may reasonably reconcile them through nonenforcement of the contact-with-sex-offenders condition. 

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Moreover, we find entirely meritless Love’s contention 

that the condition is overbroad because distribution of child 

pornography is not usually a group offense. Distribution is 

inherently interpersonal. Preventing Love from interacting 

with others who share his predilections is reasonably related 

to the specific-deterrence objectives of supervised release. 

3. Restriction on Employment 

Love also challenges as inconsistent with section 5F1.5 

of the Sentencing Guidelines the requirement that he obtain 

approval for employment involving contact with minors.4

That condition is impermissible, Love argues, because there 

was no “reasonably direct relationship” between his 

“occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant 

to the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(1). 

Because, as we discuss below, we uphold a broader 

condition that prohibits Love from having any contact with 

minors, we need not decide whether the lesser included 

condition banning employment involving contact with minors 

is inconsistent with the Guidelines. Nothing we might say 

about this narrower condition would relieve Love of his 

obligation to avoid such employment. 

4. Remaining Restrictions

We review for plain error the conditions relating to 

Love’s possession of pornographic materials, possession of 

 

4

 As reflected in the written judgment, the condition provides: “The 

defendant shall not be employed in any capacity or participate in 

any volunteer activity that involves contact with minors under the 

age of 18, except under circumstances approved in advance and in 

writing by the Court.” Judgment at 4. 

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camera or video recording equipment, contact with children, 

and post-incarceration mental health treatment. 

The first three of these conditions are nearly identical to 

those upheld under plain error review in United States v. 

Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006).5

 We found 

Sullivan’s challenges “meritless” because the conditions were 

not “even arguably inconsistent” with any D.C. Circuit 

authority. 451 F.3d at 896. Love cites no case decided in the 

three years since Sullivan that makes any error by the district 

court more plain than it would have been then. Although Love 

will be on supervised release from the time he leaves prison 

until the time he dies, whereas Sullivan served only a twoyear term of supervised release, compare Sullivan, 451 F.3d at 

887, with Judgment at 2–3, we do not think this difference 

 

5

 The conditions read: 

The defendant shall have no direct, or indirect, contact with 

children under the age of 18, and shall refrain from loitering in 

any place where children congregate, including but not limited 

to residences, arcades, parks, playgrounds, and schools. He 

shall not reside with a child or children under the age of 18 

without the expressed and written approval of the minor’s 

legal guardian and the written permission of the Court. . . . 

The defendant shall not possess any pornographic, sexually 

oriented, or sexually stimulating materials, including visual, 

auditory, telephonic, or electronic media, and/or computer 

programs or services that are relevant to the offender’s deviant 

behavior pattern. . . . 

The defendant shall not own or possess any type of camera or 

video recording device without the approval of the Probation 

Office. 

Judgment at 4. 

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makes any error committed by the district court an obvious 

one. 

The only remaining condition at issue is the requirement 

that Love obtain mental health treatment. As discussed above, 

our holding that the condition is mandatory resolves Love’s 

substantive concerns. 

IV. 

We remand the case to the district court with instructions 

to conform the condition in the written judgment relating to 

possession of sexual materials to the corresponding condition 

imposed orally at the sentencing hearing. Otherwise, we 

affirm. 

So ordered. 

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