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Parties Involved:
Michael Carson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

' 

FI LED 

Unite-d States Court of Appeals 

Tent~1 Cfrroit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 2 5 199 

TENTH CIRCUIT R.OBERT L. HOECKER ----------- Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

vs. 

MICHAEL CARSON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-3142 

(D.C. No. 89-20089-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTENSEN, 

District Judge.** 

Defendant-appellant Michael Carson appeals from a 168-month 

sentence imposed after he plead guilty to knowingly and 

intentionally distributing less than five grams of a mixture 

containing cocaine base. 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

Our jurisdiction arises under 28 u.s.c. § 1291. We affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable A. Sherman Christensen, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-3142 Document: 010110031301 Date Filed: 03/25/1991 Page: 1 
I. 

In December 1989, defendant was charged with two counts of 

illegal distribution of less than five grams of cocaine base. 21 

u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. § 2. Two months later, defendant 

pled guilty to one count of distribution. Defendant's plea 

agreement provided in pertinent part: 

In exchange for defendant's plea of guilty to count IV 

of the indictment the government and defense counsel 

agree the amount of cocaine base to be utilized in 

determining the sentence to be imposed is the amount 

that was in fact distributed in both counts I and IV of 

the indictment, to wit .34 grams. The government will 

move the court to dismiss count I at time of sentencing, 

agrees no additional charges will be filed concerning 

the facts giving rise to the offense charged in the 

indictment and further agrees that whether the defendant 

is to receive credit for acceptance of responsibility is 

to be determined by the probation office. 

I fully understand that the Court is not bound by the 

terms of the plea agreement, and may accept or reject 

said agreement. If the court rejects the agreement, I 

also understand that the Court will NOT give me the 

opportunity to withdraw my plea of guilty .... 

Rec. vol. I, doc. 37 at 4. During the hearing at which his plea 

was entered, defendant acknowledged to the court that he 

understood that the sentence he received might be more severe than 

he expected but that he was nevertheless bound by the plea. Rec. 

vol. IV at 7-8. 

For purposes of making the relevant conduct determination 

under the Sentencing Guidelines, the probation office calculated 

the total amount of cocaine base distributed by defendant to be 

240 grams. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 

Manual 8 1B1.3 (Nov. 1990). The probation office reached this 

determination based on statements made by a codefendant, a witness 

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Appellate Case: 90-3142 Document: 010110031301 Date Filed: 03/25/1991 Page: 2 
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and defendant himself that approximately 0.2 grams of cocaine base 

were sold to approximately twenty customers per day during the 

sixty days in which defendant operated his "crack house." Rec. 

vol. III at 4-5. See United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1462-

63 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991). 

Defendant challenged the findings in the presentence report and 

presented testimony at the sentencing hearing contrasting the 

probation office's computation of drug proceeds. In support of 

the presentence report, the government presented testimony from a 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) agent on the 

content of his interviews with a codefendant and another party 

involved in defendant's "crack house." 

II. 

Defendant argues that the government breached the terms of 

the plea agreement by presenting evidence of uncharged drug 

activity at the sentencing hearing. When the government obtains a 

guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement, such agreement must be 

fulfilled in order to maintain the integrity of the plea. United 

States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1990). A plea 

agreement must be construed in accordance with what the defendant 

"'reasonably understood'" when he entered his plea. Id. (quoting 

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1989)). 

On the other hand, the government is not obliged to "stand mute in 

the face of incorrect or misleading testimony offered before the 

trial court." Id. The government bears the responsibility of 

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apprising the court of information which protects the sentencing 

decision from the taint of incomplete and inaccurate information; 

provision of such information does not violate a plea agreement 

where the prosecutor does not attempt to characterize or argue its 

effect to the sentencing judge. Id. at 856-57. 

In the instant case, defendant's plea agreement explicitly 

stated that the plea was not binding on the sentencing court and 

that he might receive a sentence greater than the one indicated by 

the plea agreement. Moreover, when he tendered his plea, 

defendant acknowledged that he understood that the government's 

sentencing recommendation was not binding on the court. Thus, 

defendant could not reasonably have interpreted the plea agreement 

as requiring the government to stand silent in the face of factual 

challenges to the presentence report. See United States v. 

Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1564-65 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 s. 

Ct. 88 (1990). The government merely fulfilled its ethical 

obligation to prevent the court from being misled by inaccurate 

and incomplete information. See Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856-57. Such 

conduct did not violate the plea agreement. 

Defendant next argues that the government violated his fifth 

amendment right to due process and his sixth amendment right to 

confrontation by presenting the hearsay testimony of a BATF agent 

regarding the amount of cocaine defendant was responsible for 

distributing for purposes of the relevant conduct inquiry under 

u.s.s.G. § lBl.3. 

Plainly, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at 

sentencing ..•. [C)ourts have traditionally been 

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allowed to consider all sources of information in 

formulating an appropriate sentence: "[N)o limitation 

shall be placed on the information concerning the 

background character, and conduct of a person convicted 

of an offense which a court of the United States may 

receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an 

appropriate sentence." 

United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir.) 

(quoting 18 u.s.c. § 3661), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3302 (1990). 

Defendant was sentenced within the statutory range for the crime 

he committed and the hearsay statements admitted at the sentencing 

hearing were sufficiently reliable to protect defendant's due 

process rights. See Reid, 911 F.2d at 1463-64. The district 

court's consideration of the BATF agent's hearsay testimony 

therefore was entirely proper. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-3142 Document: 010110031301 Date Filed: 03/25/1991 Page: 5