Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03782/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03782-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Allen Gregg
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3782 

___________

United States of America, *

*

Plaintiff - Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * District of South Dakota.

*

James Allen Gregg, *

*

Defendant - Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 24, 2006

Filed: June 29, 2006

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

James Allen Gregg appeals his convictions of second degree murder and

discharge of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence as well as the

sentences imposed by the district court.1

 We affirm.

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I

On the evening of July 3, 2004, and into the morning of July 4, 2004, Gregg,

a twenty-four year old veteran who served in Iraq, was spending time with friends on

the Crow Creek Reservation. Among his friends were James Fallis (James) and Jerrod

Fallis (Jerrod), twin brothers of Indian heritage, whom he had known since the fourth

grade. 

Gregg and others, including the Fallis brothers, had been drinking most of the

evening of July 3, 2004, at a bar, a residential trailer, and then finally, at a mint farm.

While at the mint farm, Gregg expressed interest in a woman who rejected him to

spend time with Jerrod. After receiving this rejection, Gregg and his friend Jacob Big

Eagle (Big Eagle) drove around the reservation. Upon their return, they found the

woman with Jerrod in James’s new car, leaving the mint farm. According to

witnesses, Gregg accelerated, spraying gravel onto James’s new car before returning

to the mint farm to rejoin the drinking party. Gregg testified he did not recall the

incident or spraying dust or gravel onto James’s car. 

When Jerrod returned to the mint farm, he confronted Gregg about the gravel

and informed his brother of the incident. The Fallis brothers, Gregg, and Big Eagle

attempted to ascertain the damage. Gregg said he saw no damage, but offered to pay

for any repairs resulting from sprayed gravel. There was a verbal altercation between

James and Gregg, which escalated when James pushed Gregg. Gregg was then

“sucker-punched” by James’s companion, Francis Red Tomahawk (Chaske). While

Gregg was on the ground, Chaske kicked Gregg in the head until he was stopped by

Brent Sazue. Neither James nor Jerrod kicked Gregg. However, when Gregg stood

up, James hit him one to three times and he fell back down.

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Weeks after Gregg was indicted, his father turned the rifle over to the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) without informing the FBI how he obtained it.

3

Big Eagle was not present at Chaske’s residential trailer the prior evening; he

did not join the group until they were at the mint farm.

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After the fight, the party dispersed. Big Eagle, Sazue, and Jerrod, the only

persons remaining on the mint farm other than Gregg, helped Gregg to his feet.

Gregg, seeing his truck’s domelight lit, went to his truck. He returned from his truck

with a rifle, threatening Sazue and Jerrod. Big Eagle grabbed the rifle from Gregg and

put it into his truck. Sazue and Jerrod then approached Gregg and asked what was

wrong with him because, they claimed, friends do not pull guns on friends. Gregg

apologized and thereafter Jerrod invited Gregg and Big Eagle to celebrate

Independence Day with him and James. Jerrod and Sazue then left the mint farm.

As Gregg was ready to depart, Big Eagle visited with him and noticed Gregg

was crying and upset. Gregg testified he was upset Big Eagle did not stand up for him

during the fight. Gregg testified Big Eagle said “[if] I didn’t stand up for you then,

I will now.” The two then departed the mint farm. Although Big Eagle had put

Gregg’s rifle into his car, at some point Gregg had retrieved the rifle. Gregg testified

he then drove to a bluff overlooking the Missouri River to think about the events

which had transpired when he noticed a rifle in his truck which did not appear to be

his, but appeared to be the type of automatic rifle used in Iraq. Reminded of Iraq, he

threw the rifle, along with the clips, into the river.2

 

Gregg testified he became afraid Big Eagle would confront James and Jerrod

and went to look for him. In his search and approximately forty minutes after the

prior altercation, Gregg arrived at Chaske’s residential trailer where the group was

drinking the night before.3

 Gregg saw James’s car and testified he decided to

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apologize again to James because he was afraid of James and wanted to avoid a family

feud from forming. A witness testified to hearing Gregg ask where Chaske was.

Upon arrival, James came out of the trailer, stating, “You come back for more

. . . You want to fight?” Gregg testified James then tried to pull Gregg out of his

truck. Other witnesses testified James opened the door, but then closed it

immediately. During the altercation, Gregg grabbed a pistol in his car and pointed it

at James, telling him to back away. Gregg testified James responded by saying, “You

want to fuck with guns? I got guns!” and then ran toward his truck. Three other

witnesses testified they heard James say the first sentence, but they did not hear him

say he had guns. As James was running away from the truck, Gregg shot at James

nine times, hitting him five times in the back and wounding him fatally. Gregg then

left the scene and called Big Eagle. Big Eagle informed Gregg that James had died.

Gregg was indicted on charges of first degree murder on an Indian reservation

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1152, and discharge of a firearm during and in

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). A jury found Gregg

not guilty of first degree murder, but found him guilty of second degree murder and

of discharging a firearm during a crime of violence. The district court sentenced

Gregg to 135 months for the second degree murder conviction and to the statutory

minimum of 120 months for the conviction of discharging a firearm during a crime

of violence. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), the sentences were made to run

consecutively. Gregg now appeals his convictions and sentence.

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Because Gregg’s challenges to the firearm charge depend upon the conclusion

the conviction of second degree murder was improper, we only address Gregg’s

conviction for second degree murder.

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II

A

Gregg challenges his convictions arguing he lacked the state of mind necessary

to support a conviction of second degree murder, the requisite crime of violence

supporting the firearm charge.4

 Specifically, Gregg argues the district court erred by

excluding both general opinion and reputation evidence regarding James’s violent

nature as well as specific acts evidence of James’s alleged prior violent conduct.

Gregg argues this evidence goes both to whether James was the aggressor in the

confrontation and to Gregg’s state of mind.

“We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court only for abuses of

discretion, and will reverse only when an improper evidentiary ruling affects the

substantial rights of the defendant or when we believe that the error has had more than

a slight influence on a verdict.” United States v. Ballew, 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir.

1994); see also United States v. Two Eagle, 318 F.3d 785, 794 (8th Cir. 2003) (“A

ruling on admissibility will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear and prejudicial

abuse of discretion.”). If the ruling is purely a legal interpretation of the Federal Rules

of Evidence, the ruling is reviewed de novo. See United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d

700, 706 (8th Cir. 2004).

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1

Gregg argues the district court erred by preventing testimony from Gregg and

other witnesses regarding specific instances of James’s prior violent conduct to prove

James was the aggressor. The government, by motion in limine, sought to prevent

testimony regarding any specific act of violence committed by James. In response,

Gregg’s trial counsel notified the district court he did not intend to introduce such

specific acts evidence, but would only seek to introduce reputation evidence regarding

James’s violent character. The district court granted the motion in limine while

allowing Gregg to elicit reputation evidence regarding James’s violent character.

A defendant can introduce evidence of a victim’s violent character to establish

conformity therewith in homicide cases where self-defense is raised. See Fed. R.

Evid. 404(a)(2) (“Evidence of a person’s character . . . is not admissible for the

purpose of proving action in conformity therewith . . . except: . . . [e]vidence of a

pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused,

or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness

of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence

that the alleged victim was the first aggressor.”); United States v. Emeron Taken

Alive, 262 F.3d 711, 714 (8th Cir. 2001) (“When a defendant raises a self-defense

claim, reputation evidence of the victim’s violent character is relevant to show the

victim as the proposed aggressor.”); see also Smith v. United States, 161 U.S. 85, 88-

89 (1896) (“[E]vidence that the deceased had the general reputation of being a

quarrelsome and dangerous person, was competent [with regard to issue of selfdefense], especially if his character in this respect was known to the defendant . . . .”).

However, a victim’s violent character is not an essential element of the charge

of murder or the defense of self-defense. See United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d

1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992) (“When character evidence is used circumstantially to

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5

Although a line of cases permits defendants to use specific instance evidence

proving victims’ action in conformity therewith as the aggressor, this line of cases is

derived from the holding in United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d 432, 437 (D.C. Cir.

-7-

create an inference that a person acted in conformity with his or her character, Rule

405 allows proof of character only by reputation and opinion.”); Bingham v. Baker,

28 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 267, 272 (8th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“[The victim’s]

violent temper was only relevant as circumstantial evidence of his conduct, that is, as

evidence that [the victim] acted in conformity therewith.”); cf. United States v.

Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding violent character of alleged

coercer is not an essential element to a coercion defense). 

While reputation and opinion evidence of a victim’s character may be used

whenever evidence of a victim’s character is admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 405(a),

evidence of specific instances of a victim’s prior conduct to prove action in

conformity therewith is only admissible “[i]n cases in which character or a trait of

character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense.” Fed. R.

Evid. 405(b). Since a victim’s character is not an essential element of a defense of

self-defense, evidence of a victim’s character used to demonstrate the victim was the

aggressor is circumstantial in nature. Talamante, 981 F.2d at 1156; Fed. R. Evid.

404(a) advisory comm. notes (“Character evidence is susceptible of being used for the

purpose of suggesting an inference that the person acted on the occasion in question

consistently with his character. This use of character is often described as

‘circumstantial.’ Illustrations are: evidence of a violent disposition to prove that the

person was the aggressor in an affray. . . .”); Gibson v. Mayor and Council of City of

Wash., 355 F.3d 215, 232 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Character evidence does not constitute an

essential element of a claim or charge unless it alters the rights and liabilities of the

parties under the substantive law.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Bingham, 28

Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) at 272. “When character is used circumstantially and hence

occupies a lesser status in the case, proof may only be by reputation and opinion.”5

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1972). Burks was decided before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by the

Supreme Court on November 20, 1972, and before they became effective on July 1,

1973. Accordingly, Burks and its progeny are inapposite to our analysis of Rules

404(a) and 405, which limit the use of specific acts evidence to prove the victim acted

in conformity with the victim’s violent character. 

We believe the better rule is that articulated in United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d

847, 855 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding specific acts evidence of a victim’s prior violent

conduct was relevant to prove the victim was the aggressor and therefore the

defendant acted in self-defense, but such evidence would not prove an essential

element of a self-defense claim and therefore should be excluded under Rule 405(b)),

and United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding Rule 404(b)

does not exclude evidence related to specific instances of a victim’s prior violent

conduct when the defendant knew of the victim’s prior conduct at the time of the

alleged offense to show the defendant’s state of mind). We express no opinion

whether extrinsic evidence or additional testimony regarding the victim’s prior acts

may be introduced to corroborate defendant’s subjective fears of imminent injury. 

6

Because Gregg never properly sought to admit specific acts evidence before

the district court, the district court was never presented with the issue for ruling. Had

the district court determined the evidence was proper under Rule 405, it may well

have determined the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403. See United

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Fed. R. Evid. 405 advisory comm. notes. Since James’s violent character is not an

essential element of a claim of self-defense, the district court properly excluded

evidence relating to specific instances of James’s violent conduct to prove James was

the aggressor in the altercation.

2

Gregg also argues the district court erred by not permitting him to elicit

testimony regarding specific acts of James’s violent conduct to establish Gregg’s state

of mind at the time of the shooting. Although specific acts evidence is not admissible

to prove a victim acted in conformity with his character under Rule 405(b),6

 such

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States v. Waloke, 962 F.2d 824, 830 (8th Cir. 1992).

-9-

evidence may be admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove a defendant’s state of mind.

See United States v. Milk, __F.3d__, 2006 WL 1300598, at *5 (8th Cir. May 12,

2006) (recognizing evidence of specific prior bad acts is allowed under Rule 404(b)

in self-defense cases to prove state of mind, but affirming exclusion of such evidence

under Rule 403); United States v. Saenz, 179 F.3d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding

Rule 404(b) does not prohibit a defendant from presenting evidence of his knowledge

of a victim’s prior violent behavior or bad acts which caused defendant to have a

subjective fear of imminent grave injury); Virgin Islands v. Carino, 631 F.2d 226, 230

(3d Cir. 1980) (admitting knowledge of victim’s prior conviction as to state of mind

under Rule 404(b)); cf. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 241 (5th Cir. 1990)

(holding evidence of a defendant’s threat against an adverse witness related to the

validity of his duress defense and therefore was probative of something other than the

defendant’s character, making the evidence admissible under Rule 404(b)). Evidence

of specific instances of a victim’s prior violent conduct for purposes of proving a

defendant’s state of mind, however, is only admissible to the extent a defendant

establishes knowledge of such prior violent conduct at the time of the conduct

underlying the offense charged. See Saenz, 179 F.3d at 688. 

At trial, Gregg sought to make an offer of proof regarding what Gregg’s

testimony would have been, including his subjective fear of imminent grave injury.

The offer of proof stated, “[Gregg] would have testified that he believed that James

Fallis was tougher than he was, that he’s not a person that he would want to have a

fight with, that in his experience James Fallis could have beaten him up, and that he

would not have wanted to have an ongoing feud with James Fallis.” Tr. at 945. Trial

counsel specifically stated the offer of proof would go to Gregg’s state of mind. Id.

at 946. The offer of proof was refused by the district court. 

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Any error in denying the offer of proof regarding reputation or opinion

evidence would, in any event, be harmless because the offer presented no facts not

already before the jury. Cf. United States v. Martinez, 988 F.2d 685, 701-02 (7th Cir.

1993) (finding any error in not admitting defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s

reputation for violence to prove provocation in homicide case to be harmless where

jury had evidence of victim’s violent conduct already before it); United States v.

Cowan, 96 F.3d 1439 (4th Cir. 1996) (unpublished per curiam) (Table) (finding

harmless any error resulting from an exclusion of specific acts evidence where

reputation and opinion evidence of the victim’s violent character was admitted).

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Gregg argues this offer of proof was improperly denied. The offer of proof,

however, identifies no specific instances of James’s prior conduct, let alone any such

instances known by Gregg at the time of the shooting. Accordingly, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying the offer of proof as to specific acts evidence

under Rule 404(b).7

 Two Eagle, 318 F.3d at 794 (“Given the limited proof . . ., the

District Court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proffered evidence.”);

see also United States v. Kirkie, 261 F.3d 761, 767 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We will only

consider an offer of proof that is contained in the record.”) (internal citations omitted).

Gregg also challenges the district court’s exclusion of testimony from other

witnesses regarding the reputation of James’s violent nature. Specifically, Gregg

challenges the district court’s limitation of Gregg’s direct examination of Todd Cowan

and Big Eagle. The district court limited Cowan’s testimony to describe James as

having a reputation in the community for violence and prevented him from testifying

to any specific instances of James’s violent conduct. Similarly, the district court

limited the testimony of Big Eagle to James having a reputation in the community for

hurting people and prevented him from testifying regarding any specific instances of

prior violent conduct.

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Gregg also argues these witnesses should have been allowed to testify to

specific instances when James engaged in violent behavior. As noted above, character

evidence of specific instances of a victim’s violent conduct is inadmissible to prove

action in conformity therewith. While such specific instances, when known by the

defendant at the time of the offense, might be admissible to prove a defendant was

aware of a victim’s violent character, thereby coloring his subjective fears of

imminent grave injury, Gregg provided the district court with no offer of proof

establishing knowledge of any specific instance of violent conduct by James.

Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit

testimony of specific instances when James was violent.

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Gregg argues the district court should have permitted additional opinion and

reputation evidence from these witnesses.8

 At trial, however, Gregg did not properly

seek to introduce additional reputation evidence. The district court sustained the

government’s objections to Gregg’s direct examination of these witnesses when the

responses elicited by the questions strayed from James’s violent character to that of

Jerrod. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objections

because the violent character of Jerrod is not relevant to Gregg’s claim of self-defense

since Jerrod was not present during the altercation. 

Gregg made no offer of proof establishing about what these witnesses would

have testified absent the district court’s intervention. We are therefore left with no

record against which to review the district court’s exclusion of Gregg’s evidence.

Upon review of the transcript, we conclude the district court did not commit an abuse

of discretion or legal error in its evidentiary rulings. 

B

Gregg also challenges the sentence imposed upon him by the district court. We

review the ultimate sentence for reasonableness. United States v. Sharpfish, 408 F.3d

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507, 510 (8th Cir. 2005). We review de novo “whether the district court correctly

applied the guidelines in determining a guidelines sentencing range.” United States

v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016-17 (8th Cir. 2005). If correctly applied, the Court

must “consider whether the sentence chosen by the district court was reasonable in

light of all the § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 1017-18. The “primary point of reference”

in the reasonableness determination is the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005). A sentence is

unreasonable if the district court “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have

received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant

factor, or considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of

judgment by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated

by the facts of the case.” United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005).

Gregg first argues his sentences are unreasonable because the district court did

not grant his motions for downward departure. Gregg sought four downward

departures: (1) aberrant behavior (United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.)

§ 5K2.20); (2) victim’s conduct (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10); (3) diminished mental capacity

(post-traumatic stress disorder) (U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13); and (4) military record, family

obligation, and employment history. For each departure, the district court recognized

it had the authority to depart, but declined to do so. Contrary to Gregg’s assertions,

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), did not change the fact a denial of a

motion for downward departure is not reviewable unless the district court believes it

was without authority to depart. See United States v. Frokjer, 415 F.3d 865, 875 (8th

Cir. 2005). Because we are without authority to review the downward departure

denials, we conclude the district court correctly determined the applicable advisory

Guideline range.

Once the district court determined the applicable advisory Guideline range, it

imposed consecutive sentences of 135 months for the second degree murder

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conviction and 120 months for the firearm conviction. The district court correctly

determined 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) required the application of consecutive

sentences, and correctly applied the mandatory minimum sentence required by statute

for Gregg’s firearm conviction. Gregg argues post-Booker, a district court has

discretion to determine whether the ultimate sentence imposed is reasonable and

therefore may impose a non-Guideline sentence even when a portion of the sentence

is the result of a mandatory minimum sentence. See United States v. Alexander, 381

F. Supp. 2d 884, 889-90 (E.D. Wis. 2005) (Post-Booker, “courts . . . may take into

account the distortions created by mandatory minimums in order to avoid imposing

a total sentence that would, under the circumstances of the particular case, be contrary

to the goals of the [Sentencing Reform Act].”). This argument, however, is

unavailing, because Booker does not relate to statutorily-imposed sentences. See

United States v. Warford, 439 F.3d 836, 845 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. RojasCoria, 401 F.3d 871, 874 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005). 

Finally, Gregg argues his sentence is unreasonable because the district court did

not adequately consider the extenuating “nature and circumstances of the offense”

under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Because the district court was without discretion to

impose concurrent sentences or a sentence for the firearm conviction below the

mandatory minimum, we consider Gregg’s argument as it applies to his sentence for

the second degree murder conviction. Gregg’s advisory Guideline range for the

second degree murder conviction was 135 to 168 months. The district court imposed

a sentence of 135 months. 

Gregg argues the district court erred by not considering the contributing

conduct of James to the confrontation and the ultimate shooting. On this issue, the

district court stated, “I do not place any credence under the facts of this case in any of

the victim misconduct.” The district court considered the victim’s contribution to the

confrontation and concluded, based upon disputed facts in the record, the victim’s

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contribution warranted neither a downward departure from the advisory Guideline

range nor the imposition of a lower, non-Guideline sentence. Based upon the disputed

facts before the court, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in making its

factual findings. 

The district court conducted a very thorough review of the factors of § 3553(a)

and determined the low-end of the advisory Guideline range was an appropriate

sentence under the circumstances. In so concluding, the district court noted various

aggravating and mitigating factors. Specifically, the district court determined under

the facts of the case, Gregg could have been convicted of first degree murder and

noted its concern several of the shots fired by Gregg entered a trailer where people

resided and endangered nearby children. The district court also refused to apply two

sentencing enhancements: (1) obstruction of justice for false testimony to law

enforcement officials, and (2) reckless endangerment of the safety of the arresting

officers by resisting arrest. The district court also acknowledged Gregg may well be

suffering from post-traumatic stress, but concluded Gregg, at the time of the

altercation, was not of a mental state which would warrant the application of a

diminished mental capacity departure. Finally, the district court noted Gregg’s history

and characteristics were favorable to him. 

After considering the district court’s application of the Guidelines and the

§ 3553(a) factors, we agree with the district court a sentence of 135 months is

reasonable for Gregg’s second degree murder conviction. 

We therefore affirm the district court.

______________________________

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