Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-3_09-cv-01500/USCOURTS-alnd-3_09-cv-01500-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy Clemmons
Counter Defendant
Jim Bishop Chevrolet Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.
Counter Claimant

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHWESTERN DIVISION

JIMMY CLEMMONS,

Plaintiff,

v. CV 09-J-1500-IPJ

JIM BISHOP CHEVROLET BUICK

PONTIAC GMC, INC.,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Jimmy Clemmons has filed suit against defendant Jim Bishop

Chevrolet Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. (“Jim Bishop Chevrolet” or “dealership”) for

alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 29

U.S.C. § 621 et seq. and the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act

(“AADEA”) Ala. Code § 25-1-20, et seq. Defendant Jim Bishop Chevrolet filed a

motion for summary judgment (doc. 21), and a brief and evidentiary materials in

support (docs. 22-23). Plaintiff has submitted a brief in opposition to summary

judgment (doc. 33), evidentiary materials (doc. 34), and a “Response to

Defendant’s Statement of Facts” (doc. 35).

Factual Background

FILED

 2010 May-10 AM 09:59

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 1 of 16
Roden’s date of birth is September 8, 1961; Wright’s date of birth is April 1

10, 1954; and Clemmons’ date of birth is September 9, 1942. Hallmark is over the

age of forty. Ex. G to Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Submission (doc. 34-7); Ex.H to

Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Submission (doc. 34-7).

2

Jim Bishop (“Bishop”), the chief executive officer of Jim Bishop Chevrolet,

hired Jimmy Clemmons as a sales manager at the dealership in 1991. Jimmy

Clemmons Dep., at 6-8 (doc. 23-1); Jim Bishop Dep., at 12 (doc. 23-2). Bishop

was the majority owner of the dealership until April of 2008 when Brad Bishop,

Jim Bishop’s son and until that point a minority shareholder, purchased the

dealership. Bishop Dep. at 9, 27-28.

In December of 2007 Jim Bishop Chevrolet employed four sales managers: 

David Hallmark, Johnny Wright, Donnie Roden, and Jimmy Clemmons. 

1

Clemmons Dep. at 16-18. All of the sales managers “closed deals,” worked with

salespeople, and were responsible for sales, Bishop Dep. at 14 (doc. 23-2), but

each also had specific duties at the dealership. Bishop Dep. at 28. Johnny

Wright, who had the longest tenure at the dealership, was Bishop’s “right arm” for

25 years. Clemmons Dep. at 29, 128; Bishop Dep. at 12. Wright could sign

checks and mainly focused on appraising and purchasing used cars, but if Bishop

was not present at the dealership, Wright was the final decision-maker. Bishop

Dep. at 14-15. Hallmark was trained in customer retention management (“CRM”);

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 2 of 16
The dealership’s taxable income in 2005 was -$481,859.00; in 2006 was 

2

-$841,777.00; in 2007 was -$622,729.00; in 2008 was -$1,516,169.00. James

Brad Bishop Aff. at 1. During his deposition, the plaintiff noted that there was

“less traffic” in the dealership during 2007 and admitted that his diminished

earnings in 2007 indicate that the dealership did not close as many deals. 

Clemmons Dep., at 27-28. 

3

Roden “ran the Buick-GMC-Pontiac operation” and had responsibilities related to

finance and insurance for the dealership; and Clemmons dealt with customer

satisfaction. Bishop Dep., at 32-33.

Beginning in 2005 and continuing at least until 2008, Jim Bishop Chevrolet

was operating at a loss, making no net profit. James Brad Bishop Aff. at 1 (doc. 2

23-4). For the dealership, personnel was the biggest expense, followed by floor

plan and then advertising. Bishop Dep., at 43. The floor plan was cut by lowering

inventory, and Bishop also cut advertising and other expenses. Bishop Dep., at

40, 43, 98. Bishop “tried to eliminate any excess expense that we had before we

got into personnel,” Bishop Dep., at 98, and “tried to maintain a good course of

frugalness and [keep] things down to a bare minimum.” Bishop Dep., at 153-154. 

Bishop was also able to control costs by moving Ronnie Garner from general

manager to sales and Wright to used car manager in 2005. Johnny Wright Dep., at

18-19 (doc. 23-3). 

 Bishop waited until December of 2007 to further restructure his

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 3 of 16
Bishop explained that he knew Clemmons could make a “substantial 3

living” because he had a “good following” of customers. Bishop Dep., at 39. 

Plaintiff did not return to work after December 7, 2007, but he was paid his 4

full salary and commission as though he worked for the entire month of December. 

Clemmons Dep., at 40. In January of 2008 Clemmons retained employment as a

sales manager with a dealership, “Lyons,” in Lewisburg, Tennessee for about two

weeks. He was then unemployed for several weeks before taking a job as a

salesperson at Bentley Chevrolet, his current place of employment. Clemmons

4

management team because the managers had “been with [him] a long time, and [he

was] just trying to hang on as long as [he] could.” Bishop Dep., at 153. On

December 7, 2007, a Friday, Wright told Clemmons that Bishop wanted to see him

in Bishop’s office. The parties agree that Bishop began the meeting by stating, “I

don’t have to do this very often, but I’m losing my ass.” Bishop Dep., at 87-88;

Clemmons Dep., at 31-32. Bishop then explained that he had to remove

Clemmons from his position as a sales manager and offered him a position as a

salaried salesperson. If Clemmons were to accept the position, he would have

been paid his then-salary of $1,700.00 per month plus thirty percent commission

on any cars he personally sold. Clemmons Dep., at 31-32. In addition, the 3

plaintiff would be given bonuses and commission as though he had retained his

position as sales manager through December of 2007. Clemmons Dep., at 40. 

Clemmons stated that he wanted to have the weekend to make a decision, and on

Monday, he informed Wright that he did not want the position. Clemmons Dep.,

4

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 4 of 16
Dep., at 5-6, 36-37.

At the summary judgment stage, the court is required to consider the 5

evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and may not make credibility

determinations nor weigh the parties’ evidence. Frederick v. Spring/United

Management Co. 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11 Cir. 2001); Stewart v. Booker T. th

Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11 Cir. 2000). th

5

at 40.

The parties dispute whether Bishop terminated Clemmons and then made a 5

new offer of employment. The plaintiff contends that Bishop stated, “‘I’m going

to have to let you go,’” and after a five minute pause of “dead silence,” Bishop

offered to rehire Clemmons as a salesperson. Clemmons Dep., at 31-32. Bishop

and Wright testified that there was no discussion whatsoever of laying off

Clemmons, Wright Dep., at 24; Bishop Dep., at 87-88, and the silence after Bishop

offered Clemmons the salesperson job lasted only a few seconds. Bishop Dep., at

137. Age was not mentioned whatsoever during the meeting. 

Plaintiff claims that his removal from his position as a sales manager was

due to age-based discrimination and bases this claim on a conversation that

occurred two weeks before December 7, 2007. The plaintiff testified:

I don’t remember the conversation, but, I mean, Johnny and Mr.

Bishop asked me how old I was, and, of course, I never do talk about

age. You know when you get up past 40, you quit talking about age. 

But I didn’t tell them at first and then Johnny asked me two or three

times, and, I mean, I finally told them. Of course, they had personnel

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 5 of 16
The plaintiff stated six times during his deposition that he did not 6

remember the context of the conversation. Clemmons Dep., at 62-63, 67-68.

6

records there. They could have looked it up. . . . I don’t recall what

we were talking about at the time.

A: But y’all weren’t just talking about age. You were talking about

getting older, weren’t you?

Q: I don’t think that was the conversation, but, you know, like I told

you, I don’t recall what the conversation was.

Clemmons Dep., at 62-63. Plaintiff also testified that neither Wright nor Bishop 6

asked each other their ages, nor did either one offer their age. Clemmons Dep., at

63-64.

Both Wright and Bishop claim the conversation took place months before

the meeting on December 7, 2007, and describe it as a “break in business BS

session.” Bishop Dep., at 83; Wright Dep., at 83-84. Bishop explains that he

walked into Clemmons’ office in the middle of a conversation about how difficult

it is to get out of bed as one ages and how one’s anatomy begins to change. 

Bishop testified that Clemmons asked him how old he was, and Bishop “returned

the favor.” Bishop was surprised when Clemmons said he was sixty-five, and

asked, “You’re 65?” because Clemmons looks and moves as though he is younger. 

Bishop Dep., at 82-83. 

Wright added that they were talking about some of the employees getting

Bishop a birthday cake at the time. Wright Dep., at 66. Wright testified,

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 6 of 16
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And I asked – I said – I said, “Jim, how old are you?” And he looked

at me and said, “I’ll be 58.” And then he said, “How old are you?” 

And I said, “I’m about 53" or something like that, and he said,

“Jimmy?” And I know Jimmy said, “Well, boss, I’m turning 65, or

65.” And he said, “Dang I tell you what, these birthdays come up on

us quick, don’t they,” or something like that. It was just a casual

conversation.

Wright Dep., at 66.

The only evidence Clemmons presents to show the December 7th

employment actions were motivated by discriminatory animus is this conversation. 

Clemmons Dep., at 70, 76, 80. Clemmons testified, “Well, in my mind, I think

that’s the only reason because Mr. Bishop told me [the night I was fired] . . . it was

not because of anything that I had done wrong or anything I’d done right. He said

it was just economics.” Clemmons Dep., at 70. Clemmons continued, stating that

the only information he had “is what Mr. Bishop told me,” and he acknowledged

that Bishop told him that Bishop “was losing his ass, business was bad, and da, da,

da, and all that.” Clemmons Dep., at 71. Clemmons did not mention age during

the December 7, 2007, meeting nor did he bring it up on the following Monday

when he resigned. Wright Dep., at 85.

Bishop testified that his decision to move Clemmons to a salesperson

position was based purely on the harsh financial situation facing his dealership. 

Clemmons had been a good employee, but by removing a manager, the dealership

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 7 of 16
Clemmons was paid a salary of $1,700 each month plus a commission of 7

1.75 percent of gross profit. Clemmons Dep., at 23, 32; Bishop Dep., at 47. In

2006, Clemmons made $100,475.38, and in 2007, he made $93,702.65. Exs. 1-2

to Clemmons Dep.

Donnie Roden’s duties included handling finance and insurance. 8

Clemmons Dep., at 25-26; Bishop Dep., at 54. To handle finance and insurance,

Wright testified that one must be licensed to sell insurance in the state of Alabama

and be computer-oriented. Wright Dep., at 73. Further, Bishop testified that

because of new regulations, Clemmons would have needed extensive training to

be able to perform finance and insurance duties. Bishop Dep., at 54. 

David Hallmark was trained in customer retention management (“CRM”). 

Bishop Dep., at 32-33. Hallmark dealt with the CRM computer program more

than any other manager, and was the only manager that kept the system updated

and trained new salespeople on how to use the program. Wright Dep., at 42;

Bishop Dep., at 131-132.

Johnny Wright was Bishop’s “right arm” for 25 years, and was the

dealership’s former general manager. He was the final decision-maker when

Bishop was absent. Bishop Dep., at 14-15, 51.

8

could avoid paying the manager’s commission, an expense of 1.75 percent of

7

gross profit. Bishop Dep., at 45, 78. Further, Clemmons was the only sales

manager whose duties could be taken over by the remaining sales managers

without training them. Bishop Dep., at 76-77. 

Mr. Clemmons, I would have had to have trained him. If Mr.

Hallmark left, I’d had [sic] to train him on [customer retention

management]. If Mr. Roden would have left, I would have had to get

him in [finance and insurance] school so he can do F&I, and Mr

Wright is the - - was the general and in charge of operations when I

wasn’t there.

Bishop Dep., at 51. However, Roden was able to absorb Clemmons’ sales

8

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 8 of 16
9

training and customer satisfaction duties, and each of the sales managers took on

larger sales responsibilities. Bishop Dep., at 100-101. 

Clemmons testified he had the same qualifications and experience to do the

job that Roden did, that he did “the same thing” as Hallmark, and that he could

“probably” perform Wright’s duties, but noted Wright was “unique. He’s good.”

Clemmons Dep., at 106-107.

Legal Standard

A moving party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue

of material fact, leaving final judgment to be decided as a matter of law. See FED.

R. CIV. P. 56; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986). An issue is material if it is a legal element

of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome

of the case. It is genuine if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier

of fact to find for the nonmoving party. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642,

646 (11 Cir. 1997). th

The facts, and any reasonable inference therefrom, are to be viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, with any doubt resolved in the

nonmovant’s favor. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158, 90 S.Ct.

1598, 1609 (1970). Once met by the moving party, however, the burden shifts to

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 9 of 16
10

the nonmovant to come forward with evidence to establish each element essential

to that party’s case sufficient to sustain a jury verdict. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Earley v. Champion Int’l

Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11 Cir. 1990). th

A party opposing a properly submitted motion for summary judgment may

not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Eberhardt v. Waters,

901 F.2d 1578, 1580 (11 Cir. 1990). In addition, the non-moving party’s

th

evidence on rebuttal must be significantly probative and not based on mere

assertion or merely be colorable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). Speculation does

not create a genuine issue of fact. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181

(11 Cir. 2005). th

Analysis

The ADEA applies to any individual over forty years of age and makes it

unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with respect to

his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 10 of 16
The analysis for the AADEA is identical to that for the ADEA. Robinson v. 9

Alabama Central Credit Union, 964 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 2007) (“[T]he federal

courts have applied to AADEA claims the same evidentiary framework applied to

federal age-discrimination claims. We agree that this framework . . . is the proper

means by which to review an AADEA claim.”). 

Although the plaintiff argues that the conversation regarding age that took 10

place before the December 7, 2007, meeting constitutes direct evidence, this court

disagrees. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, (11th

Cir. 1999) (employer’s comment that he wanted “‘aggressive, young men’ like

himself to be promoted” constitutes circumstantial evidence); Alphin v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1499-1501 (11 Cir. 1991) (supervisor’s comment

th

that employee had “been around too long and [was] too old and [was] making too

much money” constitutes circumstantial evidence). Likewise, viewing the facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the only evidence Clemmons believes

supports his age discrimination claim is when he was asked his age during a “BS

session” at work, during which other employees were talking about getting the

CEO a birthday cake. Such an inquiry does not constitute direct evidence of age

discrimination. See Van Vorhis v. Hillsborough County Bd. Of County Comm’rs,

512 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11 Cir. 2008) (“[O]nly the most blatant remarks, whose th

intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the basis of age, . . .

constitute direct evidence of discrimination.”) (citations omitted).

11

individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2). A plaintiff may prove his claim 9

through circumstantial evidence by invoking the three-step framework 10

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817

(1973). See Cofield v. Goldkist, Inc., 267 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11 Cir. 2001). th

Under the McDonnell Douglas standard, if the plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case, the employer must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

the employment decision. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 11 of 16
12

133, 142, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (2000). The plaintiff then “has the opportunity to come

forward with evidence . . . sufficient to permit a reasonable fact-finder to conclude

that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse

employment decision,” but instead were a pretext for discrimination. Chapman v.

AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Combs v. Plantation

Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1528 (11 Cir. 1997)). th

Until the Supreme Court’s decision in Gross v. FLB Financial Services,

Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009), courts had contemplated mixed-motive cases under

the ADEA. However, Gross clearly sets out that Congress’s use of “because of”

in the statutory language of 29 U.S.C. § 623 indicates that the ADEA prohibits

discrimination when “age [is] the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.” 

Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held

that a successful plaintiff in an ADEA case “must prove that age was the ‘but-for’

cause of the employer’s adverse decision.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus, it is

insufficient to show that age was simply a motivating factor in the employer’s

decision, and the burden of persuasion to show but-for causation rests with the

plaintiff. Id. at 2351.

1. Prima Facie Case

Applying the facts of this case, it is clear to the court that Jim Bishop

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 12 of 16
The plaintiff repeatedly stated that he simply cannot remember the conversation. 11

Clemmons Dep., at 62-63, 67-68.

13

Chevrolet’s motion for summary judgment is due to be granted. When a position

is eliminated in its entirety, a plaintiff proves his prima facie case of age

discrimination by demonstrating:

(1) that [he] was in a protected age group and was adversely affected

by an employment decision, (2) that [he] was qualified for [his]

current position or to assume another position at the time of

discharge, and (3) evidence by which a fact finder could reasonably

conclude that the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of

age in reaching that decision.

Smith v. J. Smith Lanier & Co., 352 F.3d 1342, 1344 (11 Cir. 2003). In this case, th

Clemmons is 65 years of age and Bishop admits that Clemmons had always been a

good employee. Thus, the first two elements are met. However, looking at the

facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the plaintiff’s belief that he was

the victim of age-based discrimination is a conversation that took place two weeks

before December 7, 2007. The plaintiff does not dispute that the conversation 11

was a “BS session” unrelated to work during which he and his two superiors were

discussing a birthday cake some of the employees were getting for Bishop. The

plaintiff admits that his superiors could have determined his age by looking at his

personnel file, but insists his employer manifested discriminatory animus by

asking his age several times during the“BS session” during which Bishop’s

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 13 of 16
14

birthday was being discussed. The surprise Bishop expressed upon hearing the

plaintiff’s age was explained in his undisputed testimony: “[Clemmons] don’t look

like he’s 65. He gets around good.” Thus, the court considers this very scant

evidence of age-based discriminatory animus and will assume for purposes of the

motion for summary judgment that the plaintiff has met his burden to prove a

prima facie case.

2. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reasons

Therefore, assuming arguendo, that plaintiff can establish a prima facie

case, the defendant has presented ample evidence of legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for removing the plaintiff from his management position. 

Jim Bishop Chevrolet has shown that the dealership was not operating at profit

from 2005 through 2008; it implemented cost-containment measures as early as

2005 by changing its floor plan, allocating less money to advertising, and

maintaining a general posture of frugality at the dealership; and finally by

lowering its largest expense, personnel, by offering the plaintiff employment as a

salesperson, thereby eliminating the expense of a manager’s commission, which

comes from gross profit. At this stage, the defendant need only produce evidence

sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that petitioner suffered an adverse

employment action for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, Reeves, 530 U.S.

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 14 of 16
Plaintiff makes two additional arguments that are unavailing. First, 12

plaintiff critiques Bishop for not conducting a cost-saving analysis to determine if

he could cut expenses elsewhere. However, Bishop was the CEO of the dealership

and had no legal duty to perform such an analysis. “It is by now axiomatic that we

cannot second-guess the business decisions of an employer.” Rowell v. Bellsouth

Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 798 (11 Cir. 2005) (quoting Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc.,

th

376 F.3d 1079, 1092 (11 Cir. 2004)). th

15

at 142, and the defendant has met this burden.

3. Pretext

Thus, the plaintiff has the onerous task of showing that the defendant’s

proffered reason is pretext and that but-for the plaintiff’s age, he would have

retained his position as sales manager. See Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2350. This the

plaintiff simply cannot do. The evening that the plaintiff was removed from his

position as a sales manager, Bishop told him that it “was just economics,” which is

supported by testimony from Wright and the tax returns of the dealership for 2005,

2006, 2007, and 2008. Even the plaintiff admitted that his diminished pay in 2007

was a result of the dealership closing fewer deals. Admittedly, the plaintiff’s only

evidence that Bishop acted with age-based discriminatory animus is his testimony

concerning the “BS session” during which Bishop’s birthday cake and Clemmons’

age were discussed. Taking this evidence in the light most favorable to

Clemmons, the plaintiff cannot prove as a matter of law that he would have

retained his position as sales manager but for his age.12

Case 3:09-cv-01500-IPJ Document 38 Filed 05/10/10 Page 15 of 16
Second, plaintiff argues that four younger managers were hired after

Clemmons’ refused to take the salesperson position, allegedly to replace

Clemmons. However, the undisputed evidence is that these changes took place

after Bishop sold the dealership and accordingly cannot be used to prove that

Bishop intended to replace Clemmons with younger employees. Bishop Dep., at

61-62.

16

Conclusion

Having considered the foregoing, and finding that plaintiff has failed to

establish any genuine issue of material fact sufficient to allow this case to proceed

to trial on his claims against defendant, and that defendant Jim Bishop Chevrolet

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it is ORDERED that defendant’s

motion for summary judgment be GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims shall be

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE by separate order.

DONE and ORDERED this the 10 of May 2010. th

 

INGE PRYTZ JOHNSON

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE 

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