Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73469/USCOURTS-ca9-12-73469-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Hector Mancilla-Delafuente
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HECTOR MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 12-73469

Agency No.

A094-397-433

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted 

August 14, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed November 2, 2015

Before: Richard C. Tallman and Consuelo M. Callahan,

Circuit Judges, and Lee H. Rosenthal,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Callahan

 

* The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, District Judge for the U.S. District

Court for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.

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2 MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel dismissed Hector Mancilla-Delafuente’s

petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’

decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal

based on his conviction for conspiracy to possess a credit card

without consent, in violation of Nevada Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480

and 205.690(2).

The panel held that because an intent to defraud applies

to all conduct proscribed by § 205.690(2), a conviction under

the statute is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude. 

The panel also held that Mancilla-Delafuente was not eligible

for the petty offense exception because a conspiracy

conviction under § 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor

potentially punishable by imprisonment up to one year. The

panel deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, which considers the sentence potentially

imposed rather than the sentence actually imposed. 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Ian Silverberg, Esq. (argued) , Reno, Nevada, for Petitioner.

David Schor (argued), Trial Attorney, Stuart F. Delery,

Assistant Attorney General, Erica B. Miles, Senior Litigation

Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division,

United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for

Respondent.

OPINION

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge:

Hector Mancilla-Delafuente (“Mancilla”), a native and

citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without being

admitted in 1997. The Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) found Mancilla removable and determined that

Mancilla was ineligible for cancellation of removal because

he had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude

(“CIMT”) for which a sentence of one year or longer may be

imposed pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). Mancilla petitions

for review, contending that his conviction is not for a

categorical CIMT and that he is eligible for the petty offense

exception under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii). We disagree

and dismiss the petition for review.

I.

Mancilla entered the United States through El Paso,

Texas, in 1997 without inspection by Immigration Officers,

and claimed to be from El Paso in order to obtain

employment authorization. While living in the United States,

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4 MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH

Mancilla was arrested for battery, violating a restraining

order, fraudulent application for a driver’s license, and twice

for domestic battery. Mancilla was also convicted on March

27, 2009, for conspiracy to possess a credit card without

consent, in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480 and

205.690(2). Mancilla pleaded guilty, was charged a fine and

fees of $775.00, and was given credit for two-days time

served. 

On March 18, 2010, the Department of Homeland

Security (“DHS”) initiated removal proceedings in

connection with Mancilla’s March 2009 credit card

conspiracy conviction. The DHS’s Notice to Appear charged

Mancilla with being removable as an alien present in the

United States without being admitted or paroled under

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). On June 21, 2011, the

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found that Mancilla had been

convicted of a CIMT and was thus ineligible for cancellation

of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b). The IJ also found

Mancilla ineligible for the petty offense exception because he

had been convicted of an offense that Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 193.140 made potentially punishable by imprisonment for

up to one year. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s order finding

Mancilla ineligible for cancellation of removal.

Mancilla filed a timely petition for review with this court.

II.

We lack jurisdiction over denials of discretionary relief

but “retain jurisdiction over the BIA’s determination of the

purely legal” questions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B) and

(D); Montero-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 277 F.3d 1137, 1144 (9th

Cir. 2002). Whether an offense is a CIMT is a purely legal

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MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH 5

question. See Mendoza v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1299, 1302 (9th

Cir. 2010). 

There are two steps for determining whether an offense is

a CIMT: first, the BIA interprets the conduct proscribed by

the state statute, and second, the BIA determines whether the

conduct proscribed involves moral turpitude. SeeMarmolejoCampos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 907 (9th Cir. 2009) (en

banc). We review the BIA’s interpretation of the statute de

novo. Id. We review the BIA’s interpretation of ambiguous

terms in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”),

including the definition of moral turpitude, with the deference

required by Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). MarmolejoCampos, 558 F.3d. at 909.

III.

A.

Section 1229b(b)(1) does not allow for cancellation of a

removal order against an inadmissible alien if he has been

convicted of “an offense under section 1182(a)(2),

1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3),” which we have held means that if

an alien has been convicted of an offense described under any

of those sections, he is ineligible for cancellation. GonzalezGonzalez v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The

most logical reading of ‘convicted of an offense under’ is that

reached by the BIA: ‘convicted of an offense described

under’ each of the three sections.”) (emphasis in original). 

Section § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) provides that an alien convicted

of a CIMT for which the potential punishment is one year or

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6 MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH

more is removable.1 Accordingly, we must look to Nevada

law to determine whether Mancilla was convicted of a CIMT

and the maximum penalty possible.

In doing so, we apply the categorical approach articulated

in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598–602 (1990), and

compare the elements of the state offense with those of the

generic definition of a CIMT to determine if there is a

categorical match. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2276, 2283–86 (2013).

There are two types of possible CIMTs: “those involving

fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or

depravity.” See Robles-Urrea v. Holder, 678 F.3d 702, 708

(9th Cir. 2012). Here we are concerned with convictions

involving fraud. See Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 227

(1951) (finding that “a crime in which fraud is an ingredient”

is a CIMT). The BIA has held that an offense is a CIMT if

the statute has as an element the intent to defraud. Matter of

Cortez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 301, 306 (BIA 2010). We review the

BIA’s precedential interpretation of whether conduct involves

moral turpitude with Chevron deference. See Mendoza, 623

F.3d at 1302 (citing Marmolejo-Campos, 558 F.3d at

908–11). We find the BIA’s holding that the intent to defraud

is morally turpitudinous is reasonable in light of Supreme

Court precedent and this Circuit’s precedent. See, e.g.,

Jordan, 341 U.S. at 227; Robles-Urrea, 678 F.3d at 708. 

Moreover we have previously held that conspiracy is a CIMT

if the underlying offense involved moral turpitude. See

McNaughton v. INS, 612 F.2d 457, 458 (9th Cir. 1980). 

 

1 However, § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) creates an exception for an alien

convicted of a CIMT where the maximum penalty possible does not

exceed imprisonment for one year.

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MANCILLA-DELAFUENTE V. LYNCH 7

Nev.Rev. Stat. § 205.690(2) criminalizes “possess[ion of]

a credit card or debit card without the consent of the

cardholder and with the intent to circulate, use, sell or transfer

the credit card or debit card with the intent to defraud.” Thus,

in order to be convicted under the statute, the state must show

a person acted with the intent to defraud. Accordingly, we

affirm the BIA’s finding that a violation of Nev. Rev. Stat.

§ 205.690(2) is a categorical CIMT. 

B.

Mancilla is not entitled to the petty offense exception in

section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii) because the exception is only

available to aliens whose CIMT conviction did not have a

maximum possible penalty of imprisonment for a year or

more. However, a conspiracy conviction under Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 199.480 is a gross misdemeanor potentially punishable

by one year imprisonment, and is covered by

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).2 Although Mancilla was not sentenced

to a year imprisonment, we defer to the BIA’s reasonable

approach of considering the sentence that could have been

imposed, not the actual sentence. See Matter of Cortez,

25 I. & N. Dec. at 307 (explaining that an offense is described 

under § 1227(a)(2) if the alien was convicted of a CIMT “for

which a sentence of a year or longer could have been

imposed”) (emphasis added).

2 Although Nev. Rev. Stat. § 193.140 was amended in 2013 to limit the

sentence to 364 days, this is of no help to Mancilla, who was sentenced in

2009, because the amendment provides that it only applies to individuals

sentenced after October 1, 2013. NV LEGIS 229 (2013), 2013 Nevada

Laws Ch. 229 (S.B. 169), § 30.

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C.

Mancilla’s reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision in

Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005), is

unavailing. Unlike the Virginia statute at issue in Soliman,

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.690(2) does not contain alternative

elements and thus does not allow for the application of the

modified categorical approach. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at

2283–86 (explaining that the modified categorical approach

should only be used “to determine which of a statute’s

alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s prior

conviction”); see also Mendoza, 623 F.3d at 1303 (“If the

statute proscribes only conduct that involves moral turpitude,

we do not proceed to the modified categorical approach”)

(citation omitted). As the element of intent to defraud applies

to all conduct proscribed by Nev. Rev. Stat § 205.690(2), we

do not proceed to the modified categorical approach. See

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–86. 

IV.

Because an intent to defraud applies to all conduct

proscribed by Nev. Rev. Stat. § 205.690(2), a conviction

under the statute is categorically a crime involving moral

turpitude. Additionally, we defer to the BIA’s interpretation

of the INA, which considers the sentence that is potentially

imposed instead of the sentence actually imposed. The

petition for review is DISMISSED.

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