Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01205/USCOURTS-ca10-90-01205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Anderson
Not Party
John Bradshaw
Not Party
City of Fort Collins, Colorado
Not Party
Joseph Clingan
Not Party
Sandra Gibson
Not Party
Terence Gilmore
Appellant
Bruce Glasscock
Not Party
Francis Gonzales
Not Party
Barry Hughes
Appellee
Paul Landolt
Not Party
Ray Martinez
Not Party
Robert McKibben
Not Party
Jerry Roselle
Appellant
Frank Russell
Not Party
Ruth Shanahan
Not Party
Stuart VanMeveren
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TBli'l'H CIRCUIT 

BARRY HUGHES, individually and as the 

parent and natural guardian of NICOLE 

ANN HUGHES and CALE JOSEPH HUGHES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CITY OF FORT COLLINS, COLORADO, a ) 

municipal corporation; BRUCE GLASSCOCK; ) 

ROBERT MCKIBBEN; PAUL LANDOLT; FRANCIS ) 

GONZALES; RAY MARTINEZ; JOSEPH CLINGAN; ) 

FRANK RUSSELL; JOHN BRADSHAW; SANDRA ) 

GIBSON; RUTH SHANAHAN; JAMES ANDERSON, ) 

Defendants, 

and 

STUART VANMEVEREN; TERENCE GILMORE; 

and JERRY ROSELLE, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

} 

) 

) 

) 

} 

___________________________________ ) ) 

BARRY HUGHES, individually and as the 

parent and natural guardian of NICOLE 

ANN HUGHES and CALE JOSEPH HUGHES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

CITY OF FORT COLLINS, COLORADO, a 

municipal corporation; BRUCE GLASSCOCK; 

ROBERT MCKIBBEN; PAUL LANDOLT; FRANCIS 

GONZALES; RAY MARTINEZ; FRANK RUSSELL; 

JOHN BRADSHAW; SANDRA GIBSON; RUTH 

SHANAHAN i JAMES ANDERSON I 

Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

} 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

United Sta~ (Ann oi Appeals 

"r1'!?'1tl. ,;.,.,..u.it, 

FEB 2 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1205 

No. 90-1209 

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 1 
JOSEPH CLINGAN; STUART VANMEVEREN; 

TERENCE GILMORE; JERRY ROSELLE, 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

---------------------------------> 

BARRY HUGHES, individually and as the 

parent and natural guardian of NICOLE 

ANN HUGHES and CALE JOSEPH HUGHES, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CITY OF FORT COLLINS, COLORADO, a ) 

municipal corporation; BRUCE GLASSCOCK; ) 

ROBERT MCKIBBEN; PAUL LANDOLT; FRANCIS ) 

GONZALES; RAY MARTINEZ; FRANK RUSSELL; ) 

JOHN BRADSHAW; SANDRA GIBSON; RUTH ) 

SHANAHAN; JAMES ANDERSON; STUART ) 

VANMEVEREN; TERENCE GILMORE; JERRY ) 

ROSELLE, ) 

Defendants, 

and 

JOSEPH CLINGAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-1213 

APPEAL FROM THE URI'l'ED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 

(D.C. No. 88-Z-812) 

William F. Eggert, Malcolm s. Mead, Hall & Evans, Denver, 

Colorado, Attorneys for City of Fort Collins, Colorado, Bruce 

Glasscock, Robert McKibben, Paul Landolt, Francis Gonzales, Ray 

Martinez, Frank Russell, John Bradshaw, Sandra Gibson, Ruth 

Shanahan, and James Anderson; George H. Haas, Hardin, Schmidt, 

Hass & Zier, Fort Collins, Colorado, Attorneys for Stuart 

VanMeveren, Terence Gilmore and Jerry Rosselle; Louise B. Bruno, 

Bruno, Bruno & Colin, P.C., Denver, Colorado, Attorney for Joseph 

Clingan, on a consol idated brief for Defendants-Appellants. 

No brief was filed on behalf of the Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before ANDERSON, TACBA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 2 
This is an appeal from a district court order denying defendants' motions for sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. We affirm. 1 

Plaintiffs Barry Hughes and his two children brought a civil 

rights action under 42 u.s.c. S 1983 against the city of Fort 

Collins, some of its police officers, and certain district 

attorneys, alleging deprivation of constitutional rights in the 

murder of Barry Hughes's spouse and the children's mother, Mona 

Hughes. They asserted that defendants' failure to solve a previous murder and apprehend the perpetrator before he murdered Mona 

Hughes deprived them of rights guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. 

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, 

they all requested that the court impose sanctions pursuant to 

Rule 11 of the Federal Rules. After a hearing on September 14, 

1988, the district court dismissed the complaint for lack of 

constitutional protection for members of the public against 

criminal attacks by third parties and for lack of state action. 

The court denied defendants' motions for sanctions, stating that a 

good faith argument might be made for a modification of existing 

law. 

1 After exam~n~ng the brief and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 3 
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint, and 

defendants cross-appealed the denial of their motions for sanctions. On July 13, 1989, this court affirmed the dismissal of the 

complaint, reversed the trial court for "summarily refusing to 

consider the award of sanctions, " and remanded for "further 

proceedings on the defendants' motion[s] for sanctions." On 

remand, in an order dated June 26, 1990, the district court again 

denied defendants' motions for sanctions, citing the reason it had 

already articulated at the September 14th hearing, a reason that 

"[t]he Tenth Circuit apparently overlooked" in reviewing the 

record. Defendants once again appeal, arguing that the district 

court applied the wrong legal standard to its denial of sanctions 

under Rule 11. 

In reviewing all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination, this court applies an abuse of discretion standard. 

Under this standard, reversal would be appropriate only if a 

district court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law 

or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence." Cooter & 

Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). 

A deferential standard for reviewing matters of both fact and 

law has been adopted for several reasons. First, the factspecific nature of the inquiry demands it. Analogizing to its 

reasoning in Pierce v. Underwood, 2 the Supreme Court in Cooter & 

2 In Pierce, the Supreme Court held that, under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act, an abuse of discretion standard should be 

used to review a district court's determination that the United 

States' position was "substantially justified. " A position is 

"substantiall y justified" if it "has a reasonable basis in law or 

fact." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 566 n.2 (1988). 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 4 
Gell observed: 

Because a determination whether a legal position is 

"substantially justified" depends greatly on factual 

determinations, the Court [in Pierce] reasoned that the 

district court was "better positioned" to make such 

factual determinations. A district court's ruling that 

a litigant's position is factually well grounded and 

legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes is similarly factspecific. Pierce also concluded that district court's 

rulings on legal issues should be reviewed 

deferentially. 

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 2460 (citations 

omitted) (emphasis added). 

Second, the deferential abuse of discretion standard enhances 

the goal of judicial economy and serves to maintain the integrity 

of the trial and appellate courts. As to the appellate court 

function, the Supreme Court has concluded that a more stringent de 

novo standard of review for legal determinations would distort the 

appellate process and, at the same time, fail to advance the 

development of the law: 

[A]n appellate court reviewing legal issues in the Rule 

11 context would be required to determine whether, at 

the time the attorney filed the pleading or other paper, 

his legal argument would have appeared plausible. Such 

determinations "will either fail to produce the normal 

law-clarifying benefits that come from an appellate 

decision on a question of law, or else will strangely 

distort the appellate process" by establishing circuit 

law in "a most peculiar, second-handed fashion." 

Id. (citations omitted). 

The Supreme Court also noted that the deferential standard of 

review enhances the trial court's integrity: 

The district court is best acquainted with the local 

bar's litigation practices and thus best situated to 

determine when a sanction is warranted to serve Rule 

ll's goal of specific and general deterrence. Deference 

to the determination of courts on the front lines of 

litigation will enhance these courts' ability to control 

the litigants before them. Such deference will 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 5 
streamline the litigation process by freeing appellate 

courts from the duty of reweighing evidence and 

reconsidering facts already weighed and considered by 

the district court; it will also discourage litigants 

from pursuing marginal appeals, thus reducing the amount 

of satellite litigation. 

The Supreme Court's message is clear. It is not the role of 

the circuit court to second-guess the district court's Rule 11 

determinations. While we are sympathetic with the burdens this 

litigation has imposed on the City, we are not the district court, 

and we cannot reverse that court simply because, had we been the 

triers of fact, we might have decided the case differently. 

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985). 

The essence of defendants' appeal is that the trial court 

based its denial of sanctions on an improper hybridization of the 

old and new standards mandated by Rule 11. By confusing the old 

subjective standard with the new objective standard, defendants 

argue, the court "based its ruling on an erroneous view of the 

law," Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 2461, thus 

mandating reversal. 

We agree that, prior to 1983, Rule 11 spoke in "plainly 

subjective terms." Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d 

Cir. 1980); Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d 588, 589 (lOth Cir. 

1986). If a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of an 

attorney could be shown, fees and costs could be assessed against 

that attorney. Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 

177, 181 (7th Cir. 1985). In contrast, the 1983 amendment added 

language that "in effect changed the standard for finding a 

violation of the rule from a subjective to an objective standard." 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 6 
Id. The revised standard is characterized by an objective 

assessment of ''reasonableness under t he circumstances. 11 Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes. See also White v. General 

Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 680 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In pertinent part, Rule 11 now provides that the signature of 

an attorney on a pleading or motion c e rtifies "that to the best of 

the signer's knowledge, informat ion, and belief formed after 

reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 

existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law 11 In this amended version of the rule, we should note, the term "good faith" modifies 

the phrase that directly follows it and nothing else. Burkhart v. 

Kinsley Bank, 804 F.2d at 589. If a pleading is signed in violation of the objective standard enunciated in the rule, "the court 

• shall impose .•• an appropriate sanction." 

Defendants assert and we agree that the district court's oral 

ruling at the September 14th hearing confuses the two standards. 

Initially, the court describes the current Rule 11 standard quite 

plainly and accurately. In an attempt at further clarification, 

however, the court elaborates on the standard, interjecting the 

subjective phrase "good faith belief" before the objective phrase 

"formed after reasonable inquiry." This juxtaposition confuses 

the current standard with the pre-1983 standard. To determine 

whether the court's denial of sanctions constitutes an abuse of 

discretion, therefore, we must omit the subjective refe rences and 

measure the decision solely against the objective standard of the 

current Rule 11. 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 7 
The Supreme Court has recently described the process for 

determining whether an attorney has violated Rule 11. Three types 

of issues must be considered. First, "[t]he court must consider 

factual questions regarding the nature of the attorney's prefiling 

inquiry and the factual basis of the pleading or other paper." 

Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S.Ct. at 2457. Second, 

"[l]egal issues are raised in considering whether a pleading is 

'warranted by existing law o~ a good faith argument' for changing 

the law and whether the attorney's conduct violated Rule 11 . 

Finally, the trial court must exercise its discretion to tailor an 

'appropriate sanction.'" Id. 

In this case, we have no indication that the trial court, in 

its oral ruling, considered either the attorney's prefiling 

inquiry or the factual basis for the pleadings. We presume, 

however, that absent these considerations, the court would never 

have reached the legal issues. Plainly, the court did respond to 

plaintiffs' legal arguments, orally implying that plaintiffs had 

made a good faith argument for a modification of existing law: 

I think there is no such constitutional claim; but I 

think probably there is room, if one reads Martinez, for 

inquiring whether these various progeny of Martinez 

which have been decided in all these circuits really 

flow from the words of Martinez or whether there is a 

possible challenge there which needs to be further 

clarified ultimately by the Supreme Court. Certainly 

it' s established law, I think, in the Tenth, Eleventh, 

Ninth, Seventh, Sixth circuits; but whether there is an 

argument which may ultimately be resolved by the Supreme 

Court in carving out an exception to Martinez, I don't 

know. 

R. Vol. II at 17-18. Based on this statement, the court declined 

to impose sanctions. 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 8 
Prior to determining whether a pleading which requires a 

change in existing law is warranted, it would be logical for a 

district court in this circuit to carefully examine the controlling law (i.e. decisions of the Supreme Court, this court, the 

state courts in diversity cases, and statutes) in terms of its 

pervasiveness {number of decisions in the circuits and presence or 

absence of any split in the circuits, as well as possible multiple 

opinions in this circuit), its recency, its clarity, and its 

specific rele vance to the issues confronting the court, among 

other things. Then the court would do well to determine whether 

the proponent of the position has articulated a reasoned and 

principled basis for the proposed extension, modification, or 

reversal of the controlling law. 

A mere assertion that the control ling law is wrong should, at 

the very least, be viewed critically by the district court. 3 An 

unadorned and forlorn hope that a court may change settled law at 

some future time ought not to be enough. This case comes dangerously close to that category. 

Nonetheless, the district court plainly stated in its oral 

ruling that it believed an argument could be made for an exception 

to or clarification of the controlling law. And, while we believe 

the case is a close one, under the clear standard so recently 

3 As an example of plaintiffs' attorney's response to 

controlling law, we note that when informed of the decision in 

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S.Ct. 998 

(1989), and its direct applicability to this case, plaintiffs' 

attorney responded that the decision was "horrendous" and that he 

would distinguish it "in a number of particulars with regard to 

the facts of our case • • .• in [our) reply brief." A reply 

brief was not filed, nor was the case ever distinguished. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 9 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 

Corp., we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion 

in refusing to impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11. The decision 

of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED. 

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Appellate Case: 90-1205 Document: 01019728158 Date Filed: 02/25/1991 Page: 10