Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-02722/USCOURTS-ca3-16-02722-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Wilmington
Appellee
Rashad El
Appellant
Gregory Griffin
Appellant
Keith Medley
Appellant
Antoine Murrey
Appellant
Jayvon Wright
Appellant

Document Text:

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 16-2722

___________

JAYVON WRIGHT; ANTOINE MURREY; KEITH MEDLEY; GREGORY GRIFFIN; 

RASHAD EL, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF A CLASS OF OTHERS 

SIMILARLY SITUATED,

 Appellants 

v.

CITY OF WILMINGTON

___________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:13-cv-01966)

District Judge: Honorable Sue L. Robinson

____________________________________

Argued: January 25, 2017

Before: KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: February 17, 2017)

Stephen P. Norman (ARGUED)

30838 Vines Creek Road

Dagsboro, DE 19939 

Counsel for Appellants Jayvon Wright, Antoine Murrey, Keith Medley, Gregory Griffin, 

and Rashad El 

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C. Malcolm Cochran, IV (ARGUED)

Kelly E. Farnan 

Christine D. Haynes 

Travis S. Hunter 

Richards Layton & Finger

920 North King Street 

Wilmington, DE 19801 

Counsels for Appellee City of Wilmington 

OPINION*

KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

Appellants Jayvon Wright, Antoine Murrey, Keith Medley, Gregory Griffin, and 

Rashad El were granted leave to file this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 23(f) challenging the District Court’s denial of their motion for class 

certification pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). We now dismiss Appellants’

appeal as improvidently granted.

We find this unfortunate step necessary because, as became apparent at oral 

argument,1the District Court’s order that is purportedly under review—denying class 

certification for failure of the proposed class to satisfy our “ascertainability” requirement, 

see Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2012)—pertains to a 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.

1 Oral Arg. (argued Jan. 25, 2017), available at http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/

oralargument/audio/16-2722WrightetvCityofWilmington.mp3. 

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class definition that was superseded in Appellants’ amended complaint. That is, the 

District Court here granted Appellants’ motion for leave to file the amended complaint 

with a different class definition than previously proposed.

2

 Yet, rather than properly 

dismissing Appellants’ then-pending motion for class certification as moot in light of the 

change to the class definition in the amended complaint and waiting for Appellants to 

move to certify the new class, the District Court erroneously proceeded to address the 

merits of the pending motion, holding that the original class was not ascertainable and 

declining to address other objections to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on class 

certification.3 Compounding the error, Appellants opted not to file a motion to certify the 

new class, but instead to petition this Court pursuant to Rule 23(f) to review the District 

Court’s ruling on the superseded class. In sum, Appellants have not yet filed—and thus, 

a fortiorari, the District Court has not yet ruled upon—any motion to certify the newlydefined class.

 

2 Compare App. 49 (defining class as “[a]ll persons who have been handcuffed, 

transported, searched, and imprisoned by Wilmington Police Department based only 

upon reasonable suspicion of a crime during [the applicable time frame]”), with App. 85 

(defining class as “[a]ll persons taken into custody pursuant to the Investigatory 

Detention Policy of Wilmington Police Department, which authorizes officers of the 

police department to handcuff, transport, search, and imprison persons for a period of up 

to two hours based only upon reasonable suspicion of a crime during [the applicable time 

frame]”). 

3 The amended complaint also identified two additional named plaintiffs, 

presented additional factual allegations regarding the operation of the challenged policies, 

and attached two new exhibits in support of the Appellants’ allegations. These additions, 

which may be relevant to the ascertainability analysis, were also not properly before the 

District Court for consideration in connection with Appellants’ motion to certify the 

original class. 

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Appellants suggested at argument that the District Court’s opinion, adopting the 

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, could be read as ruling on the new class 

definition. The record does not support that reading. The District Court states that

“[Appellants’] motion to certify class is denied,” a motion pertaining only to the original 

class, and at no point acknowledges or addresses the new class definition. App. 6. 

Moreover, while the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation adopted by the 

District Court makes reference at various points to Appellants’ amended complaint, the 

Magistrate Judge quotes in full the original class definition, and likewise states

unambiguously that she is recommending Appellants’ motion to certify that class—the 

only motion to certify Appellants have filed—be denied. Thus, we agree with Appellee 

that this case is “not ready” for our review. Oral Arg. at 27:06. Instead, the parties 

should have the opportunity to raise arguments relevant to certification of the newlydefined class before the District Court, and the District Court should consider those 

arguments in the first instance. 

In addition, we note that the District Court declined to address Appellants’

proposed Rule 23(b)(2) class on the ground that it had already determined the class was 

not ascertainable. This too was in error: Ascertainability is not a requirement for 

certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 

2015). Thus, should Appellants file a motion for class certification in connection with 

their amended complaint, the District Court should address the viability of such class or 

classes under the relevant criteria, as well as threshold issues including Appellants’ 

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standing to seek injunctive and declaratory relief in view of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 

461 U.S. 95 (1983). 

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that leave to appeal was improvidently

granted, the Court’s Order entered on May 31, 2016, in Wright, et al. v. City of 

Wilmington, C.A. No. 16-8032, will be vacated, and Appellants’ appeal will be

dismissed. 

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