Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14583/USCOURTS-ca11-15-14583-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Elijah Trailer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-14583

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:10-cr-00251-WHA-TFM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

WILLIAM ELIJAH TRAILER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Alabama

________________________

(June 30, 2016)

Before HULL, MARCUS, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 1 of 9
2

Defendant William Trailer appeals his 18-month sentence and life term of 

supervised release, imposed for violating the terms of supervised release that were 

part of his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender. Defendant argues that 

the life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable. After careful 

review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2011, Defendant was sentenced to 37 months’ imprisonment and a life 

term of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of failing to register as 

a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250. As a special condition of his 

supervised release, Defendant was prohibited from having contact with children 

under the age of 18. 

Defendant’s supervised release commenced in August 2014. Just a few 

months later, on February 26, 2015, Defendant’s probation officer filed a petition 

seeking revocation of his supervised release. The petition stated that Defendant 

had violated the conditions of his supervised release by (1) living with his nowwife’s four minor children, (2) failing to follow his probation officer’s instructions

to have no contact with these children, (3) committing another crime by violating 

Alabama’s Community Notification Act, and (4) failing to answer truthfully 

inquiries by his probation officer related to whether he was having contact and 

residing with the children. 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 2 of 9
3

At the revocation hearing, Defendant admitted to the violations set forth in 

the petition, and the district court revoked his supervised release. The district court 

calculated a guideline range of 18 to 24 months’ imprisonment based on a Class B 

violation and a criminal history category of V. Defendant requested a lenient 

sentence because the offense that led to his status as a sex offender had occurred 

decades earlier. He explained that he had violated the conditions of his supervised 

release out of a desire to do what was right for his wife and her children. He 

further asserted that a life term of supervised release was not appropriate given that 

he has to register as a sex offender for the rest of his life. 

Emphasizing that this was not a hearing about the severity of the sex 

offender laws, but was instead a hearing for Defendant’s violations of supervised 

release, the district court stated that Defendant had ignored the terms of his 

supervised release and lied about it to his probation officer. After considering the 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the district court sentenced Defendant to 18 months’ 

imprisonment, to be followed by a life term of supervised release with many of the 

same conditions of supervised release as his original sentence. Defendant objected 

to the life term of supervised release as excessive, and the district court responded 

that it was merely continuing the term of supervised release that was previously 

imposed on Defendant. 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 3 of 9
4

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the district court’s imposition of 

a life term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable because it is greater 

than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing and is not reasonably related 

to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.1

 

Using a two-step process, we review the reasonableness of a district court’s 

sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th 

Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 764 (2014); United States v. Sweeting, 437 F.3d 

1105, 1106–07 (11th Cir. 2006) (reviewing a sentence imposed upon revocation of 

supervised release for reasonableness). We first look to whether the district court 

committed any significant procedural error, such as miscalculating the advisory 

guideline range, treating the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 

consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors,2 selecting a sentence based on clearly 

erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence. Cubero, 754 

 1 To the extent Defendant also attempts to challenge the severity of the sex offender laws and the

restrictions placed upon him for being a sex offender, this argument is not properly before this 

Court. 

2 The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 

and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 

promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for 

deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed 

education or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the 

Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; 

(9) the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution 

to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 4 of 9
5

F.3d at 892. Then, we examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable in 

light of the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. 

The party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is 

unreasonable. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008). We 

will only vacate a defendant’s sentence if we are “left with the definite and firm 

conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing 

the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of 

reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 

F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). 

If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, the district court 

may revoke a defendant’s supervised release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(3). The district court may also impose a new term of supervised release 

which “shall not exceed the term of supervised release authorized by statute for the 

offense that resulted in the original term of supervised release, less any term of 

imprisonment that was imposed upon revocation of supervised release.” Id.

§ 3583(h). 

In the present case, Defendant has not met his burden of showing that the 

district court abused its discretion by imposing a life term of supervised release. 

The statutorily-authorized term of supervised release for failing to register as a sex 

offender under 18 U.S.C. § 2250 is five years to life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Thus, 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 5 of 9
6

Defendant’s life term of supervised release is within the statutory range.3 See 18 

U.S.C. § 3583(h), (k).

The district court’s imposition of a life term of supervised release is also 

supported by the § 3553(a) factors. In particular, the offense that led to 

Defendant’s status as a sex offender involved sexually abusing his then-girlfriend’s 

eight-year-old daughter. With respect to the nature of the present violations, 

Defendant was not only living with four children between the ages of two and nine, 

but he was also going to the children’s elementary school on a regular basis. By 

doing so, he blatantly disregarded the terms of supervised release that were meant 

to protect against the same conduct that was the basis for his original sex-offense 

conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). What’s more, Defendant then repeatedly 

lied to his probation officer about violating the terms of his supervised release. As

emphasized by the district court, a serious term of supervised release was also

necessary to promote respect for the law and to deter the future crimes of other 

defendants because not doing so would send a message that defendants can 

 3 Although not mentioned by the parties, at the time of Defendant’s original sentencing for the 

failure to register offense, the Guidelines recommended the statutory maximum term of

supervised release for a “sex offense,” but were ambiguous as to whether failure to register 

qualified as a sex offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b) & comment. (n.1) (2010). Since then, the 

Guidelines have been amended and now explicitly state that failure to register is not a sex 

offense under U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(b). See id. § 5D1.2(b) & comment. (n.1) (2014); U.S.S.G. App. 

C, Amend. 786 (2014). As such, the Guidelines’ advisory supervised release range for failure to 

register is now five years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a), (c) & comment. (n.6) 

(2014). 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 6 of 9
7

disregard the terms of their supervised release and then lie about it with impunity. 

See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A), (B). 

Defendant asserts that a life term of supervised release ignores the fact that 

he has been a law-abiding citizen for over seven years and that he chose to violate 

the terms of his supervised release in order to live with and take care of his wife’s 

children. Whatever Defendant’s motivation, it does not change the fact that having 

molested his then girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter, he was thereafter prohibited 

from having contact with children under the age of 18. Nor does it change the fact 

that Defendant’s probation officer warned him several times not to have contact 

with his wife’s minor children, and yet he continued to do so, all the while lying to 

the officer about his conduct. 

In support of his argument, Defendant also relies on a state investigation that

did not find any evidence that his wife’s children had been sexually abused. The 

investigation also revealed, however, that the children had been coached on what 

to say. In fact, investigators eventually asked the children’s mother to encourage 

the children to speak truthfully. And without getting into specifics as to what 

investigators learned, the investigation indicated that Defendant was involved in 

the children’s lives in a way, and to a degree, that could give cause for concern. 

We are also not persuaded by Defendant’s argument that because he is 

already required to register as a sex offender for life, a life term of supervised 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 7 of 9
8

release is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of sentencing. Again, a 

life term of supervised release is authorized by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). 

Moreover, Defendant’s argument also completely ignores the fact that he was on 

supervised release in the first place because he had failed to register as a sex 

offender. Defendant then compounded this act of disregard for the law by 

choosing to live with and care for four minor children, in clear and willful violation 

of the terms of supervised release. 

Defendant points to research showing that “sex offenders, as a group, 

reoffend less than other criminal offenders,” as additional support for his argument 

that his life term of supervised release is grossly unreasonable. This research, 

however, does not lend credence to his argument because it does not show that 

Defendant is less likely to re-offend. Nor does it have any bearing on whether a 

life term of supervised release is reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances 

in this particular case. 

As a final matter, we note that Defendant’s life term of supervised release

can be shortened in the future by the district court. Indeed, Defendant can petition 

that court for modification of the conditions of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e)(2). He may also seek early termination of his supervised release after he 

has served at least one year of the term. See id. § 3583(e)(1). The district court 

may shorten the term of supervised release “if it is satisfied that such action is 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 8 of 9
9

warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” Id. 

In fact, the district court acknowledged that if Defendant demonstrated a 

willingness to comply with the terms of supervised release, he could petition the 

court in the future for modification or early termination of his supervised release. 

Further, a defendant is not without recourse if a district court denies a 

motion to terminate early (or shorten) supervised release because a defendant may 

appeal the district court’s denial of such a motion. See United States v. MathisGardner, 783 F.3d 1286, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (entertaining, under an abuse of 

discretion standard, an appeal of the district court’s denial of an offender’s motion 

to shorten his term of supervised release); United States v. Gammarano, 321 F.3d 

311, 315 (2d Cir. 2003) (the same); United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 

(4th Cir. 1999) (the same). 

Thus, given the totality of the circumstances in this case, considered in light 

of the § 3553(a) factors, we are not “left with a definite and firm conviction” that 

Defendant’s life term of supervised release lies outside the range of reasonable 

sentences. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. In short, Defendant has failed to 

demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed a life term 

of supervised release. 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is AFFIRMED. 

USCA11 Case: 15-14583 Date Filed: 06/30/2016 Page: 9 of 9