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Parties Involved:
Donald Freeman Owens
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

P U B L· l S H ... 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

--·FOR, THE .TENTH CIRCUIT 

l' .,. ., .. 

. If ILE D . ·· ,.·. Vmc~;~tattt,.; Cwrt o{Appeals· 

APPEALS r'emh Cirn1)~ 

AUG. l a 1989 . i'. . 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. .. 

DONALD FREEMAN OWENS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

.t .. ,.:. 

ON APPEAL "FROM THE' .UNITED STATES DIS',l.'RICT COURT 

·Fo1f· ·'¥IiE- 1DI-STRICT OF NEW MEX I co 

(D.C. No. CIV ff6-487 JB) 

.,-.,·· 

Alan F. Zvolanek, Albuquer'c1u.e·;. New Mexico, rf.6:;.pef~;Aa~:R.·t-,-Appeilant .. :::. .... . '.' , ~ 

• ~ • 0.; 0 ,• • I 

Mark Jarmie, Assistartt Uni ti4~-·states Attorx:i:g·y..,''t Al~uque,.r-qtie-, New· 

Mexico (William L. Lutz,'/United States At-t·orn.ey a:,nd Jennifer A. 

Salisbury, Assistant United· States Attor~ey, ~lbuqμ~rque, New 

Mexico, were on the brief) for Plaintiff-Appellee .~· 

Before.HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, SETH an.a ANDERSON_., Circ;::uit Judges 

HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge 

Defendant Donald -Freeman~': ?Wens ~:-r-towens_L~;fll,.i.~ed a motion for .... 

relief under 28 u.s.c. § 2255.;.(i.1982), c~_aiming, that he was denied 

effective assistance of counsel. The di1;J;.tr ic.t.:,"t·court,. adopt.ing. J:he:· -.~ . , 

magistrate's proposed f inding·s+· of ~i'i. 'fact · and recommended .. ,. 

disposition, denied the motion and dismissed. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 1 
I 

Factual Background and Procedural Posture 

Owens was convicted on ten counts of making false statements 

in the acquisition of firearms, a violation of 18 u.s.c. § 

922(a)(6) (1982) and 18 u.s.c. § 924(a) (1982). He was also 

convicted on four counts of receiving firearms as a felon, a 

violation of 18 u.s.c. § 922(h) (1) (1982) and 18 u.s.c; § 924(a) 

(1982). The jury found him not guilty, on one count (Count 15) 

charging him ~ith possession of -a firearm as a felon. ·•.We affirmed 

\ 

his convictions on direct appeal in United States v. Owens, No. 

84-1856 (May 20, 1985). Owens then filed a Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 

motion, which was de·nied., This motion for relief under § 2255 1 

followed. That motion was denied and this appeal was taken. 

A. 

Evidence Seized Pursuant to the Search 

Warrant and Admitted at Trial 

_Owens' conviction was supported by documents and photographs· 

seized at his residence during a warrant search. 1 Police officers 

Nester and Harpster executed an affidavit in support of the 

warrant. IR. 8, Ex. A. The affidavit contains a detailed 

description of the e·xter ior of Owens' home. It describes the 

property to be searched for, including methamphetamine, a 

I 

methamphetamine laboratory, methamphetamine paraphernalia, records 

showing the source and the prices for methamphetamine, writings 

showing the 

1 

identity .,,,.-· -~ . ... j ... ,... of Donald Freeman Owens o'r Jimmy or.Jim 

A number of weapons were also found during the search. II R. 

22. However, the only one that was introduced against Owens at 

trial was a .38 caliber pist~l found in his girlfriend's purse. 

The jury found him not guilty of the charge {possession of a 

firearm by a felon) relating to that weapon. Owens, Sli-p op. at 

2. 

2 

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Owens, and "ALL FIREARMS & AMMUNITION in the residence, vehicles. 

or curtilage of the property .... " IR. 8, Ex. A. The affidavit 

was based substantially on information obtained from a 

confidential informant. II R. 67. 

The day before trial, Owens' attorney filed a motion to 

suppress evidence, arguing that the "warrant was obtained by 

false, inaccurate, misleading and perjured" statements in the 

affidavit. Mr. Farrah asked the court to grant a hearing on the 

motion and to suppress the evidence obtained during the search. I 

R. 8. The trial court denied the motion to suppress without an 

evidentiary hearing. I R. 11. The evidence was introduced and 

Owens was convicted on all but one count. No challenge to the 

trial court's denial of the motion to suppress and denial of the 

hearing was raised on direct appeal. 

B. 

Testimony for Owens in Support 

of the S 2255 Motion 

Before ruling on Owens' motion for§ 2255 relief, the United 

States Magistrate held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 8 

of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings in the United 

States District Courts. 2 At the hearing, Owens' attorney on 

appeal, Mr. Zvolanek, informed the court that he had spoken to a 

2 

Rule 8(b)(l) and (2) provide that: 

(1) When designated to do so in accordance with 28 

u.s.c. § 636(b), a magistrate may conduct hearings, 

including evidentiary hearings, on the motion, and 

submit to a judge of the court proposed findings and 

recommendations for disposition. 

(2) The magistrate shall file proposed 

recommendations with the court and a 

forthwith be mailed to all parties. 

3 

findings and 

copy shall 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 3 
Mr. Thompson. Thompson is the person referred to in the affidavit 

who allegedly took the confidential informant to Owens' home. 3 

Zvolanek said that Thompson would testify, if he were available, 

that he had never been to Owens' home. This testimony would 

contradict the information related by the confidential informant 

in the warrant affidavit. See footnote 3. zvolanek requested an 

opportunity to depose Thompson. II R. 6, 9. The court indicated 

that it would consider allowing Owens' attorney the opportunity to 

depose Thomson, but counsel's request was never granted. II R. 

96. 

The first witness at the evidentiary hearing was Owens' 

attorney at trial and on direct appeal, Mr. Farrah. He said that 

he and Owens had gone to Thompson's house. Thompson indicated 

that he had seen Owens but did not know him and had not been in 

his house or dealt with him. II R. 12. Thompson also told Farrah 

that he had never purchased drugs from Owens. II R. 13. Farrah 

attempted to subpoena Thompson to testify at the hearing on the 

motion to suppress, but his process server was unable to locate 

him. II R. 16. 

Shelly Watkins, who was living at Owens' residence when it 

was searched, testified that although she had seen Thompson down 

the street, she did not know him and had never seen him at Owens' 

house. II R. 20-21. Owens also testified that he did not know 

Robert Thompson and that Thompson had never been to his house. II 

3 

The affidavit states that "[i]nformant advised us that within 

the past month, Robert [Thompson] took informant to 2230 Henry 

Rd., described above, and there the informant met the male house 

occupant and a woman living there." The affidavit also relates a 

description of Owens' home given to the affiants by the informant. 

IR. 8 Ex. A. 

4 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 4 
R. 28. He also said that when he and Farrah went to talk with 

Thompson, Thompson said that he had never told anyone that Owens 

was manufacturing methamphetamine. 4 II R. 28, 30. Owens said 

that he told Farrah that the search warrant was false and asked 

him to file a motion to suppress. II R. 32. 

c. 

Testimony for the Government in Opposition 

to the S 2255 Motion 

Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms agent Fuller, who participated 

in the search of Owens' home, testified that before the warrant 

was executed, he had investigated Owens. He had seen Owens with :a 

known chemical supply person and had checked with the DEA to find 

out if they knew anything about Owens. Fuller also checked Owens' 

name with Albuquerque gun dealers and discovered that someone 

named "Jimmy Owens" had been purchasing paramilitary weapons. II 

R. 50. Fuller found fifteen to twenty different gun dealers that 

had records of having sold guns to Owens. II R. 50. He took down 

information from these various dealers. II R. 52. Fuller knew 

that Donald Freeman Owens had been purchasing guns as a feloh 

under a false name (his brother's name was Jimmy Owens) prior to 

the execution of the search warrant. II R. 54, 56-58. 

Fuller said that he had received information relating to all 

of the counts charging Owens with receiving firearms as a felon 

(counts IV, VI, VIII, and X) prior to the search. II R. 55-56. 

Fuller also said that all of the counts charging Owens with false 

4 

The affidavit states that the informant 

to Owens' home and describes Owens as 

methamphetamine. IR. 8, Ex. A. 

5 

was taken by Thompson 

Thompson's source for 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 5 
statements in the acquisition of firearms were supported by 

records of which he had knowledge prior to the search. II R. 57-

58. The only receipts found during the search were from Ron 

Peterson's guns and the Golden West in Bosque Farms. Fuller had 

already obtained the information from Ron Peterson's guns. II R. 

65. And the receipt relating to the purchase of a weapon from the 

Golden West did not involve a weapon listed in the indictment. II 

R. 65. 

Officers Harper and Nestor, co-affiants on the affidavit, 

admitted that most of the information in the affidavit was 

obtained from the confidential informant. II R. 67. They said, 

however, both in the hearing and in the affidavit, that they 

corroborated the information received from the confidential 

informant. Harper confirmed that Owens' residence matched the 

description given by the informant. II R. 68. He con(irmed with 

postal authorities that Thompson ·received mail at the address 

given. II R. 69. He checked the registration on a vehicle at 

Owens' residence and performed a records check on Owens as well. 

II R. 71-72. Harper also had the confidential informant purchase 

a quantity of methamphetamine from Owens and confirmed that it was 

methamphetamine. II R. 75. 

Harper said that after he had checked the information given 

by the confidential informant, he believed that he was telling the 

truth, although he admitted that the informant could not identify 

Owens at the line up. II R 76, 79. Like Harper, Nestor testified 

that he corroborated the information received from the informant; 

that he had been in contact with the informant three weeks prior 

to the search. II R. 90, 94-95. He advised the informant that if 

6 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 6 
the information given was false, criminal charges possibly would 

be brought against him. II R. 91. 

D. 

The Rulings Below 

The magistrate proposed a finding that Owens' convictions for 

making false statements in the acquistion of firearms and for 

receiving firearms as a felon were supported by evidence not 

obtained pursuant to the contested search warrant. IR. 62, p.2. 

His proposed finding also was that defendant had failed to show 

both that his counsel was ineffective and that there was a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome 

would have been different. IR. 62. The district court adopted 

the magistrate's proposed findings after a de novo review and 

denied the motion. A timely notice of appeal was filed. 

II 

Analysis 

The defendant argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment 

right to effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The claim is based on Mr. 

Farrah's alleged failure to provide the trial court with proper 

information to obtain an evidentiary hearing of the kind referred 

to in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 (1978), to 

challenge statements made in the search warrant affidavit. 5 Since 

5 

The restrictions on federal habeas review of Fourth Amendment 

claims announced in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) do not 

extend to Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel Where the principal error of counsel was incompetent 

representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue. 

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379, 382-383 (1986). 

7 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 7 
the principal allegation of -the Sixth Amendment claim-is Farrah's 

handling of the Fourth Amendment claim, the Franks claim, Owens 

must prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that 

there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been 

different, absent the excludable evidence, to demonstrate actual 

prejudice. 6 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986). The 

defendant's Fourth Amendment claim "is one element of proof of his 

Sixth Amendment claim ••. 

the Fourth Amendment claim. 

II Id. Accordingly, we turn first to 

A. 

The Merit of Owens' Fourth Amendment Claim 

Owens argues that if the motion to suppress had been pursued 

more effectively, the trial court would have granted an 

evidentiary hearing at which he could have challenged the accuracy 

of the factual statements made in the warrant affidavit. 7 In 

6 

Owens' brief states that his trial counsel did not "raise the 

denial of his suppression motion on [direct] appeal because he 

felt that an investigation of Owens had been begun earlier by 

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and that since evidence had been 

obtained from gun dealers with regard to Owens purchasing guns, it 

wasn't the fruits of the search." Brief of Appellant, p. 5. The 

government does not contest this statement, nor does it argue that 

Owen's collateral attack here is barred by procedural default. 

Because the issue was not contested by the government or ruled on 

in the trial court, we do not address the issue, but go on to the 

merits of Owen's claim. 

7 

Mr. Farrah, Owens' lawyer at trial, filed the motion to 

suppress evidence the day before trial. IR. 8. The motion 

alleges that the warrant was obtained by false, misleading and 

perjured testimony, but was not supported by affidavits or sworn 

statements. No offer of proof was made in support of the motion. 

On appeal, Owens' argues that the "denial [of the suppression 

motion without a hearing] occurred because counsel did not provide 

the Court with the proper information necessary to justify such a 

hearing." Brief of Appellant, p. 10. 

8 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 8 
-Franks, the Court enunciated a two-pronged test, which if 

satisfied, entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing: 

There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood 

or of reckless dis~egard for the truth, and those 

allegations must be accompanied by an offer of proof. 

They should point out specifically the portion of the 

warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they 

should be accompanied by a statement of supporting 

reasons. Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable 

statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their 

absence satisfactorily explained. Allegations of 

negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient. The 

deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose 

impeachment is permitted today is only that of the 

affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. Finally, 

if these requirements are met, and if, when material 

that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless 

disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient 

content in the warrant affidaiit to ~upport a finding of 

probable cause, no hearing is required. 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-172. While clear proof of deliberate or 

reckless omission is not required at the stage where entitlement 

to an evidentiary hearing is being demonstrated, see United States 

v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 769 F.2d 

1410 (9th Cir. 1985), Owens had to make a "substantial preliminary 

showing." Franks, 438 U.S. at 170. 

We ·conclude that Owens did not make a substantial preliminary 

showing that the warrant affidavits contained deliberate 

falsehoods, or false statements or omissions made with reckless 

disregard for the truth. 8 Owens made, in effect, an offer of 

proof at the hearing which was designed to show that Mr. Thompson 

would testify, if called, that he had never been to Owens' home 

8 

While the magistrate's findings and recommended disposition 

do not specifically address the Franks issue, we have carefully 

reviewed the transcript of the Rule 8 hearing. An analysis of the 

Franks issue is important since the Sixth Amendment claim 

necessarily fails without a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim. 

See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. 

9 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 9 
and had never taken anyone to Owens' home. II R. 5-9. Thompson 

was the person referred to in the affidavit supporting the search 

warrant. The affidavit_ states that Thompson took the informant to 

Owens' home to get methamphetamine. 9 But even if Thompson would 

testify that he had never been to Owens' home, that would only 

establish that the confidential informant gave false information 

to the affiants (as noted, the affidavit specifically states that 

the information was obtained from the informant). It would not 

show that the affiants knowingly falsified the affidavit or 

recklessly disregarded the truth. 

9 

The affidavit states that the "informant admitted involvement 

in criminal conduct, including acquiring illegal drugs and 

methamphetamine from 'ROBERT' (Thompson) and from Robert's 

methamphetamine source at 2230 Henry Road SW,. Albuquerque, 

Bernalillo County, New Mexico." IR. 8 Ex. A. Thompson lived at 

2218 and Owens lived at 2230 and is the "source" referred to in 

the affidavit. The affiants go on to state that: 

The informant advised the Affiants that on several 

occassions in 1983, it [sic] had personally been inside 

the premises at 2218·Henry Road SW, Albuquerque,· New 

Mexico and on several of those occasions obtained 

methamphetamine at that premises. The informant advised 

that the person from whom - it is getting the 

methamphetamine is a man named 'Robert' (last name is 

not known to the informant). 

* * * 

The informant indicated that 'Robert' has an 

ongoing methamphetamine-selling business from his 

(Robert's) house because of informant's numerous 

observations and several acquisitions of methamphetamine 

from Robert at 2218 Henry Road SW, in 1983, including 

observations of methamphetamine there in the fall of 

1983. Informant advised us that within the past month, 

Robert took informant to 2230 Henry Rd., described 

above, and there the informant met the male house 

occupant and a woman living there. 

See IR. 8, Ex. A (Emphasis added). 

10 

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"The deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose 

impeachment is permitted today is only that of the affiant, not of 

any nongovernmental informant." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. It is 

not enough to show that the informant lied to an unsuspecting 

affiant, or that an affiant's negligence or innocent mistake 

resulted in false statements in the affidavit. United States v. 

Orr, 864 F.2d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir. 1988); United States v. 

Bloomgren, 814 F.2d 580, 584 (10th Cir. 1987). Thus to qualify 

for a Franks hearing, Owens must make a substantial showing that 

Harper and Nestor knew of, or recklessly disregarded the truth. 

Bloomgren, 814 F.2d at 584 (citing United States v. Schauble, 647 

F.2d 113, 117 (10th Cir. 1981)). The offer of proof failed to 

meet this standard. 

The other testimony at the hearing was similarly deficient. 

Farrah testified that Owens told him that although he had seen 

Thompson, he did not know him and had never been in his house. II 

R. 12. Shelly Watkins, who lived with Owens when the search 

warrant was executed, testified that she did not know Thompson and 

had not seen him at Owens' house. II R. 20-21. Owens said that 

Thompson had never been to his house. II R. 30. But this 

testimony only shows that the information given to the affiants by 

the confidential informant may have been false. It does not show 

or tend to show that the affiants knowingly falsified the 

affidavit or recklessly disregarded the truth.lo 

10 

We note that Owens specifically argues that "the confidential 

informant lied in giving information of the officer/affiants and 

that the lies were material to the issue of probable cause to 

issue the search warrant.'' Brief of Appellant - Owens, p. 16. 

Owens' argument, as well as the evidence at the hearing is focused 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

11 

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In United States v. Barr~ra, 843 F.2d 1576, 1579 (10th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 153 (1988), we held that 

affidavits submitted in support of a Franks-type hearing which 

attack the informant's reliability and the correctness of the 

informant's statements "do not meet the substantial preliminary 

showing of falsity required by Franks." Here, the evidence only 

shows that some of the information given to the affiants by the 

confidential informant may have been false. The evidence does not 

establish that officers Harper and Nestor knowingly falsified the 

affidavit or recklessly disregarded the truth. 

Owens next argues that Mr. Farrah should have supported the 

motion to suppress with an offer of proof and with affidavits. 11 

It is true that allegations of deliberate falsehood or of reckless 

disregard for the truth "must be accompanied by an offer of 

proof." Franks,. 438 U.S. at 171. And "[a]ffidavits or sworn or 

otherwise reliable statements of witnesses should be furnished, or 

their absence satisfactorily explained." Id. But even if Mr. 

Farrah had made an offer of proof, and even if the motion to 

suppress had been supported by affidavits or other sworn 

statements, Owens would not have been entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing because the evidence strongly demonstrates that the 

officers carefully attempted to corroborate the statements of the 

informant and believed them to be true. 

(Footnote continued): 

on the veracity of the informant, not the veracity of the 

affiants. 

11 

Farrah attempted to subpoena Thompson, but was unable to 

effect service. II R. 16. Farrah did not obtain Thompson's 

affidavit to support the motion to suppress. II R. 16. 

12 

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The affiants confirmed a description of Owens' residence 

given by the informant. II R. 68, 87. They also confirmed with 

postal authorities that Thompson lived at 2218 Henry Rd. and that 

Owens lived at 2230 Henry Rd. II R. 69, 87. In addition, officer 

Harpster wrote down the registration plate number of a Pontiac 

near the residence and discovered that it was registered to Owens. 

II R. 71-72. The affiants showed a photo spread to the informant, 

although he was unable to positively identify Owens. 

79. 

II R. 72, 

The informant had told the officers that he had been to 

Owens:' house and while there smelled a pungent chemical odor and 

observed a chemical process which officer Harpster thought was the 

manufacturing of methamphetamine. II R. 70-71. The affiants had 

the informant obtain methamphetamine from Owens through Thompson. 

II R. 70. They also obtained· a rap sheet on Donald Freeman Owens 

which indicated a number of convictions. II R. 73-74. The 

officers advised the informant that he could be prosecuted for 

giv,ing false information . 12 The a.ffadavi t describes in detail the 

efforts by the affiants to corroborate the information received 

from the informant. 

We think this is ample evidence that the affiants did not 

deliberately falsify their affidavits or recklessly disregard the 

truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Owens did not make a substantial 

showing that Harper and Nestor knew of, or recklessly disregarded 

12 

The affidavit states that "[t]he affiants advised the 

informant· that if its information is false, the informant is 

likely to be prosecuted for the criminal charges, and the false 

information will be provided to the District Attorney or 

sentencing authorities." 

13 

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the truth, and that showing is necessary to entitle him to a 

Franks hearing. Id. Owens has not identified any evidence which 

Mr. Farrah could have included in an offer of proof or in 

affidavits which would have made the substantial preliminary 

showing that Franks requires. Thus Owens did not have a 

meritorious Fourth Amendment claim for a Frank hearing. 13 Without 

a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim such as he asserts, Owens' 

Sixth Amendment claim fails and he is not entitled to habeas 

relief. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 375. 

B. 

The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

If Owens had established a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim 

he would still be required to show under Strickland that he had 

been denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 

counsel. "Although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is 

necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment cla-im • . • , a good 

Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal 

habeas relief. Only those habeas prisoners who can prove under 

Stickland that they have been denied a fair trial by the gross 

incompetence of their attorneys will be granted the writ and will 

be entitled to retrial without the challen_ged evidence." 

13 

Our holding that the Owens does not have a meritorious Fourth 

Amendment claim is based solely on his failure to make a 

substantial preliminary showing that the affiants knowingly, or 

with reckless disregard for the truth, falsified the affidavit. 

We note that even if Owens had made that showing, he would still 

ha~e to show that absent the challenged material, there was 

insufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding 

of probable cause to have a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim. 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-172. We do not reach this issue. 

14 

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Kirrunelman, 477 U.S. at 382. Hence we address briefly the merits 

of Owens' Sixth Amendment claim. 14 

The Sixth Amendment "right to counsel is the right to the 

effective assistance of counsel." Strickland,. 466 U.S. at 686. 

An ineffective assistance claim has two components. "First, the 

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." 

Id. at 687. The proper standard for attorney performance is "that 

of reasonably effective assistance." Id. Judicial scrutiny of 

counsel's performance must be highly deferential and we must 

indulge a strong presumption "that counsel's conduct falls within 

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 

defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the 

circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound 

trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 

U.S. 91, 101 (~955)). 

"An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, 

does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal 

proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." Id. at 

691. Any defictencies in counsel's performance "must be 

prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective 

assistance under the Constitution." Id. at 692. Actual 

ineffective assistance claims such as this one, see Kimmelman, 477 

U.S. at 384, are subject to a general requirement that the 

14 

While our conclusion that Owens' Fourth Amendment claim lacks 

merit is dispositive, we will assume, for the sake of analysis, 

that Owens had established a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim 

and will go on to evaluate the Sixth Amendment claim. We discuss 

Strickland because the magistrate's proposed findings and 

recorrunended decision denied the§ 2255 relief under Strickland's 

prejudice prong. 

15 

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defendant affir-matively prove prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

693. It is not enough for the defendant to show that the error 

had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Id. 

He must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 

Id. at 694. 

In making this determination, we must consider the totality 

of the evidence before the judge and jury. Id. at 695. 15 Here it 

was found that the defendant's convictions were supported by 

evidence from the various firearms dealers and other sources not 

obtained pursuant to the contested search warrant~ 16 These 

factual findings are supported by the record. Therefore we agree 

that Owens was not prejudiced by evidence obtained in the search 

within the meaning of the Strickland standard under which he had 

"the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably 

15 

A court 'need not determine whether counsel's performance was 

deficient before deciding whether the defendant has been 

prejudiced as a result of alleged deficiencies. If it is "easier 

to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that 

course should be followed." Id. at 697. 

16 

After a de novo review of the magistrate's factual findings 

and recommended disposition and after written objections had been 

filed, the district court adopted the magistate's proposed 

findings and recommended disposition. I R. 64. We review 

findings of fact in § 2255 cases under the clearly erroneous 

standard, see Crail v. United States, 430 F.2d 459, 460 (10th Cir. 

1970); United States v. Arellanes, 767 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 

1985)(magistrate's finding in§ 2255 case reviewed under clearly 

erroneous standard), although the performance and prejudice prongs 

under Strickland involve mixed questions of law and fact which we 

review de novo. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. See also Osborn v. 

Shillinger~l F.2d 612, 626 n.13 (10th Cir. 1988). 

16 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 16 
likely have been different absent the errors." 466 U.S. at 696. 

Agent Fuller testified at the hearing that the gun receipts seized 

from Owens' home during the search either had nothing to do with 

the counts upon which the defendant was convicted or were receipts 

from Ron Peterson Guns. Fuller was already aware of those 

receipts as a result of his investigation of the gun store, an 

investigation that had taken place prior to the search. II R. 53-

59, 65. 

Owens' trial attorney, Mr. Farrah confirmed this testimony 

when asked why he did not appeal . the denial of the motion to 

suppress: 

I'm quite certain that the evidence that was 

admitted against Mr. Owens was obtained from gun 

dealers, and the process of obtaining those had started 

before the search warrant. And the only evidence that 

was introduced against Mr. Owens that was as a result of 

.the search warrant, direct evidence, was a .38 caliber 

pistol that was found in Miss Shelly Watkins' purse, and 

Mr. Owens wa~ acquittea of that. And as far as where 

all this other, the investigation and so forth started, 

it started with an Officer Jim Martin a couple of years 

beforehand, it appeared to me, ~nd I think the actual 

work by ATF in getting the firearms forms had started . prior to the execution of the war rant. 

So I don't I felt that it would have been a 

frivolous thing to raise because there was no evidence 

or fruits of the warrant which was introduced into 

evidence in the trial itself. That is not to say that I 

agree with the judge denying my motion without a 

hearing, however. 

II R. 18. 

The district court's finding that Owens' convictions were 

supported by evidence not obtained pursuant to the contested 

search warrant is not clearly erroneous. Given this finding and 

the overwhelming evidence against Owens, see Owens, Slip op. at 2, 

17 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 17 
s, 17 we agree with the-district court that Owens. failed to show 

prejudice. 

AFFIRMED 

17 

The court's slip opinion in Owens' direct appeal, No. 84-

1856, stated at p.2 that "Owens testified in his own behalf, and, 

in the main, admitted doing the acts complained of by the 

government. His defense was that because of illiteracy there was 

no guilty knowledge on his part." 

18 

Appellate Case: 87-1639 Document: 01019835939 Date Filed: 08/10/1989 Page: 18