Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03788/USCOURTS-ca7-09-03788-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Fernandes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

Argued July 8, 2010

Decided July 28, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐3788

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

Plaintiff‐Appellee, District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

v. No. 08 CR 588‐1

WILLIAM FERNANDES, Robert M. Dow, Jr., Judge.

Defendant‐Appellant.

O R D E R

William Fernandes pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1),

for disposing of a computer hard drive during a criminal investigation of his

distribution of child pornography.  He was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment, the

bottom of the guidelines range.  He appeals only his sentence, arguing that the district

court committed procedural error by speculating about the contents of the unrecovered

hard drive, by failing to address adequately mitigating factors that he believes

warranted a below‐guidelines sentence, and by failing to explain the sentence

sufficiently.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-3788 Document: 21 Filed: 07/28/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09-3788 Page 2

Fernandes challenges the sentence only for procedural error, so it is not

necessary to examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.  See Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).  We review sentences for procedural errors under a non‐

deferential standard of review.  United States v. Johnson, 534 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2008).

To avoid procedural error, a district court must calculate the advisory guidelines range

correctly, apply the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), rely on properly supported

facts, United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d 786, 792 (7th Cir. 2008), and “adequately explain

the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the

perception of fair sentencing,” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.  When explaining the chosen

sentence, a sentencing court should discuss the effect of mitigating factors when those

factors have a factual basis and recognized legal merit.  United States v. Cunningham, 429

F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005).

Fernandes principally argues that the district court procedurally erred by

speculating about additional evidence that might have been on the missing hard drive.

Elaborating on this point, he contends that, because the court characterized his offense

as a “hybrid of obstruction and child pornography,” the court sentenced him based on

unsubstantiated child‐pornography accusations.  (Sent. Tr. at 32:1‐4.)

Contrary to Fernandes’s argument, the district court did not sentence Fernandes

for what may have been on the missing hard drive or as if he had been convicted of (or

pleaded guilty to) a child‐pornography crime.  True, the court said at sentencing that

Fernandes “cut a break” by destroying evidence that might have otherwise led to child‐

pornography charges.  (Sent. Tr. at 11:4‐7.)  But this merely means, unremarkably, that

Fernandes might have been in greater legal jeopardy had the government been able to

charge him with a child‐pornography crime in addition to obstruction.  The record

shows that the court explicitly refused to speculate about what may have been on the

missing hard drive.  And the court’s description of the offense’s guideline as a “hybrid

of obstruction and child pornography” was apt.  (Sent. Tr. at 32:1‐4.)  The obstruction

guideline contains a cross‐reference that required incorporation of the child

pornography guideline.  See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2(c)(1).

Fernandes also argues that because the court viewed him as having received a

sentencing break by avoiding a child‐pornography charge, the court refused to consider

whether mitigating factors warranted a below‐guidelines sentence.  The record again

belies Fernandes’s contention.  The court did consider a below‐guidelines sentence

based on Fernandes’s mitigating factors (such as his work and military history, skills,

Case: 09-3788 Document: 21 Filed: 07/28/2010 Pages: 3
No. 09-3788 Page 3

and attempted rehabilitation from alcoholism), which it said were persuasive reasons

for a lower sentence.  But the court concluded that his carefully planned obstruction‐‐he

diverted government agents to his mother’s home so that he could destroy all evidence

on the hard drive that was stored at his sister’s apartment‐‐demonstrated a serious

disregard for the law and warranted a sentence within, but at the bottom of, the

guideline range.  Accordingly, the court considered and balanced Fernandes’s

mitigating factors in formulating his sentence.

Last, Fernandes argues that the court failed to explain how his one‐time

destruction of evidence was characteristic of the behavior of someone deserving a

within‐guidelines sentence.  But the court did so.  It reasoned that Fernandes’s actions

were not the result of spur‐of‐the‐moment decisions, or a product of drunkenness, but

were “a calculated effort to mislead the agents and to have them go one way while the

defendant was going the other way.”  (Sent. Tr. at 33:24 ‐ 34:3.)  A more comprehensive

explanation is not required, United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729‐30 (7th Cir. 2005),

because these reasons are enough to assure this court that the sentencing judge gave

proper consideration of Fernandes’s behavior, see United States v. Smith, 562 F.3d 866,

873 (7th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

Case: 09-3788 Document: 21 Filed: 07/28/2010 Pages: 3