Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02054/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02054-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Scott N. Johnson
Plaintiff
Indru Kriplani
Defendant
Pramila Kriplani
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SCOTT N. JOHNSON, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

INDRU KRIPLANI AND PRAMILA 

KRIPLANI, individually and as 

trustees of the Kriplani Family 

Trust, and DOES 1 through 10, 

inclusive, 

 Defendants. 

 /

No. Civ. 2:06-CV-02054 JAM GGH

Order Granting Motion for 

Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Scott N. Johnson (“Johnson”) brought this action 

against defendants Indru and Pramila Kriplani, individually and 

as trustees of the Kriplani Family Trust (collectively 

“Defendants”) pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181 et seq., and California’s Unruh 

Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), California Civil Code §§ 51 et 

seq. Defendants now move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 

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56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Johnson opposes the 

motion. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.1 

I. UNDISPUTED FACTS 

 In April 2003, Defendants purchased seven of the eight 

parcels that comprise the College Greens Shopping Center 

(“Shopping Center”). One of the tenants is an Arby’s fast food 

restaurant which is located in a stand-alone building. Another 

tenant is the local office of the United States Social Security 

Administration (“SSA”). Since at least 2003, there has been a 

van accessible disabled parking space in front of the SSA 

office. As of July 2006, the Shopping Center parking lot 

contained 380 parking spaces, eight of which were disabled 

access parking spaces, including one that was van accessible. 

Currently, both Arby’s and the SSA have a van accessible 

disabled parking space in front of their respective 

establishments as well as an adjacent access aisle. 

II. BACKGROUND 

 On July 31, 2006, Johnson allegedly visited Arby’s but was 

unable to access the restaurant purportedly due to the lack of a 

properly configured van accessible disabled parking space. 

Compl. ¶ 3. As a consequence, Johnson was forced to dine 

1

 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 78-230(h). 

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elsewhere. Id. Thereafter, Johnson allegedly returned to 

Arby’s on three other occasions but, again, was forced to dine 

elsewhere purportedly due to the lack of a properly configured 

van accessible disabled parking space. Id. On August 2, 2006, 

Johnson allegedly sent a letter titled, “30 DAY CORRECTION 

NOTICE,” to the establishment neighboring Arby’s warning about 

this problem. Id. ¶ 4. 

On September 15, 2006, Johnson filed the instant action 

against Defendants seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary 

relief pursuant to the ADA and the Unruh Act. Docket at 1. In 

his complaint, Johnson alleges that he is a person of physical 

impairment of quadriplegia and is a “person with a disability” 

and a “physically handicapped person” under 42 U.S.C. § 

12102(2)(A). Compl. ¶ 1. Johnson further alleges that as a 

result of his physical impairment he uses a wheelchair for 

mobility and drives a full size van equipped with hand-controls 

and a wheelchair lift. Id. ¶¶ 1, 9. According to Johnson, this 

action is predicated upon the denial of an accessible route to 

Arby’s. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. Specifically, Johnson asserts that the 

major architectural barrier is the lack of a properly configured 

van accessible disabled parking space. Id. Johnson maintains 

that Defendants intentional failure to provide such a space 

amounts to a denial of his civil rights under both California 

and federal law. Id. Through this action, Johnson seeks 

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injunctive relief to require Defendants to create an accessible 

entrance to Arby’s in compliance with the ADA, the Americans 

with Disabilities Act Architectural Guidelines for Building and 

Facilities (“ADAAG”), and the California Building Standards Code 

(“CBC”). Id. 

III. OPINION 

A. Motion to Strike 

 Defendants raise several evidentiary objections to the 

evidence submitted by Johnson in support of his opposition to 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. First, Defendants move 

pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) to strike the declarations of Bill 

Zellars (“Zellars”) and Sofia Fernandez (“Fernandez”) on the 

ground that Johnson failed to disclose these individuals as 

potential witnesses in violation of Rule 26. Rule 26 requires 

parties to disclose the identity of persons with discoverable 

information (i.e., potential witnesses) and the identity of 

expert witnesses “accompanied by a written report prepared and 

signed by the witness.” See Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a). Under Rule 

26(e) parties have an obligation to supplement their initial 

disclosures with the name of every person who may have 

discoverable information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e). Rule 37(c)(1)

gives teeth to these requirements by forbidding the use on a 

motion or at trial of any information required to be disclosed 

by Rule 26 that is not properly disclosed, unless the parties’ 

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failure to disclose the required information is substantially 

justified or harmless. See Yetti by Molly Ltd. v. Deckers 

Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1) (“If a party fails to provide information 

or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the 

party is not allowed to use that information or witness to 

supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless 

the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.”)). 

Rule 37(c)(1) was designed to be self-executing in order to 

produce a strong incentive for disclosure of material that the 

disclosing party would expect to use as evidence whether at 

trial, at a hearing, or on a motion, such as one under Rule 56. 

Rule 37 Fed.R.Civ.P., Advisory Comm. Note (1993). The party 

failing to disclose the required information bears the burden of 

demonstrating their failure was either substantially justified 

or harmless. See Yetti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107. Here, 

Defendants contend that Johnson failed to serve initial 

disclosures as required by Rule 26, including disclosing Mr. 

Zellars and Ms. Fernandez as potential witnesses in this case. 

Kathleen Finnerty (“Finnerty”) Decl. ¶¶ 3-4. Because Johnson 

did not respond in opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike, 

the Court will treat this failure as a concession that Mr. 

Zellars and Ms. Fernandez were not properly disclosed in 

violation of Rule 26. Accordingly, because Johnson did not 

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demonstrate that his failure to disclose this information was 

harmless or substantially justified, the declarations of Mr. 

Zellars and Ms. Fernandez are stricken pursuant to Rule 

37(c)(1).

 Second, Defendants move pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1) to strike 

Exhibits E-U (photographs) attached to Johnson’s declaration on 

the ground that Johnson failed to properly disclose this 

information in violation of Rule 26. Rule 26 requires parties 

to disclose a copy of all documents that the disclosing party 

has in its possession, custody, or control and may use to 

support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely 

for impeachment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A). Here, Defendants 

contend that Johnson failed to serve initial disclosures as 

required by Rule 26, including disclosing Exhibits E-U. 

Finnerty Decl. ¶ 3. Because Johnson has not responded in 

opposition to Defendants’ motion to strike, the Court will treat 

this failure as a concession that Exhibits E-U were not properly 

disclosed in violation of Rule 26. Accordingly, because Johnson 

did not demonstrate that his failure to disclose this 

information was harmless or substantially justified, Exhibits EU are stricken pursuant to Rule 37(c)(1). Moreover, because 

Exhibits E-U and W-X (photographs) attached to Johnson’s 

declaration are dated on or after April 20, 2008, approximately 

two months after the discovery cut-off deadline set forth in the 

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scheduling order (Rule 16 Order), it is clear that Johnson 

failed to fulfill his discovery obligations with respect to this 

information. As such, Johnson is precluded from using Exhibits 

E-U and W-X to oppose Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. 

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(A); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 16(f) (a 

court on its own motion may order sanctions as provided in Rule 

37(b)(2)(A), including the preclusion of evidence, where a party 

or party’s attorney fails to obey a scheduling order). 

 Third, Defendants move to strike portions of Johnson’s 

declaration on the ground that he failed to lay a proper 

foundation for his personal knowledge with respect to various 

measurements to which he testifies, including measurements 

relating to running slope, cross-slope and the Arby’s restroom. 

Because Johnson’s declaration does not state that he made these 

measurements himself or specify how he acquired this knowledge, 

it is unclear whether Johnson has personal knowledge of these 

facts or has merely been advised of them by others. In fact, 

Johnson concedes that Zellars Concrete was responsible for the 

measurements related to the entrance to Arby’s, and that Ben 

Waters was responsible for the measurements related to the 

Arby’s restroom. Johnson Dep. at 85:11-25, 86:1-3, 109:18-21, 

110:9:17. Thus, because Johnson did not state that he was 

personally involved in any of the measurements to which he 

testifies, and because personal knowledge cannot be inferred, 

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the statements in Johnson’s declaration referencing such 

measurements are stricken (e.g., Johnson Decl. at 4:20-26, 5:3-

14, 6:1-8, 6:11-16, 8:3-6). See Edwards v. Toys “R” Us, 527 

F.Supp.2d 1197, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (under Rule 56(e), a 

declaration not based on personal knowledge is inadmissible at 

the summary judgment stage); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) 

(“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in 

evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 

competent to testify to the matters stated therein”).2 

B. Summary Judgment Standard 

 Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, the 

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits 

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law when the nonmoving party fails to make a 

sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim in the 

case on which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985). There is no 

genuine issue of fact for trial where the record, taken as a 

 

2

 To the extent that Defendants seek to strike Johnson’s 

statements asserting new ADA violations discovered during the 

discovery period but not specifically pled in his complaint, the 

Court will address this issue below in section III. C. 

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whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the 

nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (nonmoving party must present 

specific, significant probative evidence, not simply “some 

metaphysical doubt”). Conversely, a genuine dispute over a 

material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting 

the claimed factual dispute, requiring a judge or jury to 

resolve the differing versions of the truth. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 253 (1986). Summary judgment 

is proper if, viewing the evidence and the inferences therefrom 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no 

genuine issues of material fact in dispute and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Valandingham v. 

Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 1989). 

C. Standing 

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine which 

architectural barriers are properly before the Court. That is, 

whether Johnson’s action is limited to the specific ADA 

violations pled in his complaint. In this regard, the Court 

finds that Johnson lacks standing to assert new ADA violations 

that were discovered during the discovery period but not 

specifically pled in his complaint. Although Johnson’s 

complaint need only state a “short and plain statement of the 

claim showing that he is entitled to relief,” see Fed.R.Civ.P. 

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8(a)(2), Johnson must still provide “fair notice” of the basis 

for specific claims not pled in his complaint. Thus, because 

Johnson did not assert new ADA violations until, at the 

earliest, two days before the close of discovery, the Court 

finds that the newly asserted violations are not actionable. 

See Eiden v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2006 WL 1490418, *5-6 (E.D. 

Cal. 2006) (ADA violations discovered during the discovery 

period that are not pled in the complaint, and not disclosed to 

defendant in sufficient time to permit defendant to address them 

in discovery and by way of law and motion, are not actionable). 

Here, the discovery cut-off deadline was February 29, 2008. 

Johnson, however, asserted new ADA violations in his responses 

to interrogatories dated February 27, 2008, in his deposition 

taken on February 28, 2008, and in his declaration in opposition 

to summary judgment dated April 23, 2008. Accordingly, because 

the new ADA violations were not disclosed in sufficient time to 

permit Defendants to address them in discovery and by way of law 

and motion, these violations are not actionable. See id.

D. The ADA 

 Defendants argue that summary adjudication is appropriate 

with respect to Johnson’s ADA claim because the Shopping Center 

parking lot contained a properly configured van accessible 

disabled parking space when Johnson visited Arby’s in July 2006. 

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 Title III of the ADA establishes that “[n]o individual 

shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the 

full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public 

accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or 

operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12182(a). Here, Johnson alleges that Defendants discriminated 

against him by failing to remove certain architectural barriers 

at the Arby’s restaurant. Specifically, Johnson alleges that 

Defendants violated the ADA by failing to abide by the ADAAG 

standards. The ADAAG regulations are divided into three 

categories. The first category of regulations require that 

newly-constructed public accommodations must comply with 

specific accessibility requirements set forth in the ADAAG. See

28 C.F.R. Pts. 36.401, 36.406. The second category of 

regulations concerns the accessibility requirements imposed on 

public accommodations altered after January 26, 1992. See id.

The third category requires the removal of architectural 

barriers in preexisting public accommodations. See 28 C.F.R. 

Pt. 36.304. “Under the ADA’s continuing barrier removal 

obligation, it is discriminatory for owners, operators, lessors 

or lessees to fail to remove architectural barriers that deny 

disabled persons the goods and services offered to the general 

public.” Wilson v. Pier 1 Imports (US), Inc., 439 F.Supp.2d 

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1054, 1066 (E.D. Cal. 2006). Here, neither party offered any 

evidence indicating whether Arby’s is a newly-constructed public 

accommodation, a public accommodation altered after January 26, 

1992, or a preexisting public accommodation. As such, the Court 

will assume, without deciding, that Defendants are required to 

comply with the higher accessibility standards imposed on new 

facilities rather than the lower standards imposed on existing 

facilities. The Court will therefore assume that Arby’s must 

comply with the ADAAG standards. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36.406 

(newly constructed public accommodations must comply with the 

accessibility requirements set forth in the ADAAG).3 

In order to make a prima facie case under Title III of the 

ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he has a disability, (2) 

 

3

 Under the ADA, existing facilities are obligated to bring 

their facilities as close to compliance with the ADAAG standards 

as is readily achievable. Pascuiti v. New York Yankees, 87 

F.Supp.2d 221, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). To succeed on an ADA claim 

of discrimination on account of an architectural barrier in an 

existing facility, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the 

architectural barrier is prohibited under the ADA, and (2) the 

removal of the barrier is readily achievable. Wilson, 439 

F.Supp.2d at 1067. If plaintiff satisfies his burden, the 

burden shifts to the defendant to show that removal of the 

barriers is not readily achievable. Id. The presence of 

structures or other obstacles which do not meet the ADAAG 

standards does not alone make a prima facie ADA violation for 

existing facilities because they must also show that the barrier 

removal is readily achievable. Id. However, non-compliance 

with ADAAG standards can demonstrate a prima facie barrier, 

which the defendants may rebut by demonstrating that, despite 

the non-conformance with the guidelines, the alleged barrier is 

not actually hindering equal access by the plaintiff. Id.

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defendants’ facility is a place of public accommodation, and (3) 

he was denied full and equal treatment because of his 

disability. Wilson, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1067. Compliance with the 

standards set forth in the ADAAG constitutes compliance with ADA 

requirements. Id. at 1066. Here, because the parties do not 

dispute that Johnson is disabled or that Arby’s is a place of 

public accommodation, the question is whether Johnson was 

discriminated against on account of his disability based on an 

architectural barrier. That is, whether Defendants violated the 

ADA by contravening specific standards set forth in the ADAAG. 

In this regard, Johnson claims that Defendants violated the ADA 

by failing to provide a properly configured van accessible 

disabled parking space in front of Arby’s. However, because 

Johnson concedes that, as of July 2006, the Shopping Center 

parking lot did in fact contain a van accessible disabled 

parking space in front of the SSA office, and because the 

existence of this space satisfies the ADAAG standards, 

Defendants are entitled to summary adjudication on this issue.4 

 

4

 ADAAG 4.1.2(5)(a) provides in relevant part: “If parking 

spaces are provided for self-parking by employees or visitors, 

or both, then accessible spaces complying with 4.6 shall be 

provided in each such parking area in conformance with the table 

below.” The table provides that there must be at least 8 

accessible parking spaces in a parking lot containing between 

301 to 400 parking spaces. Id. ADAAG 4.1.2(5)(b) provides in 

relevant part that: “One in every eight accessible spaces, but 

not less than one, shall be served by an access aisle 96 in 

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Alternatively, because Johnson concedes that the Shopping Center 

parking lot currently contains several ADA compliant van 

accessible disabled parking spaces, including one in front of 

Arby’s, this claim is subject to dismissal as moot under the ADA 

since the only available remedy under the ADA is injunctive 

relief. See Pickern v. Best Western Cove Lodge Marina Resort, 

194 F.Supp.2d 1128, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (generally, a 

defendant’s successful remedial efforts will render a 

plaintiff’s ADA suit subject to dismissal as moot). 

To the extent that Johnson seeks to state an ADA violation 

predicated upon a non-compliant route of travel from the van 

accessible disabled parking space in front of the SSA office to 

the entrance of Arby’s, the Court finds that, even assuming that 

this violation is actionable, it does not survive summary 

judgment.5 In support of this alleged ADA violation, Johnson 

 

(2440 mm) wide minimum and shall be designated “van accessible” 

as required by 4.6.4.” Here, because the Shopping Center 

parking lot contained 380 parking spaces in July 2006, eight of 

which were disabled parking spaces, including one that was van 

accessible, the parking lot was compliant with the ADAAG 

standards and, therefore, was compliant with ADA requirements. 

5

 The Court notes that the complaint contains a vague 

reference to the fact that Defendants failed to create an 

accessible entrance into Arby’s, including an accessible route. 

For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume, without 

deciding, that such pleading provided sufficient “fair notice” 

to Defendants of ADA violations based on a lack of an accessible 

route of travel and a lack of an accessible entrance to Arby’s. 

As such, the Court will assume that these violations are 

actionable. 

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asserts that there are four possible accessible routes from the 

van accessible disabled parking space in front of the SSA office 

to the entrance of Arby’s, including a route through the parking 

lot, which Johnson concedes is 48 inches wide and compliant with 

running slope and cross-slope standards set forth in the ADAAG. 

Johnson Decl. ¶ 11. Johnson, however, maintains that this route 

of travel is non-compliant with the ADA because it contains a 

pot-hole, “which could prove dangerous,” and is not marked with 

directional signage. The Court finds these assertions, standing 

alone, insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material 

fact for trial. First, Johnson’s vague charge that the 

existence of a pot-hole “could prove dangerous,” without more, 

does not establish a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether the parking lot route of travel was non-compliant with 

the ADA. Johnson did not offer any evidence demonstrating that 

the pot-hole constituted an obstruction preventing access to 

Arby’s. See ADAAG 3.5 “Definitions.” (defining accessible route 

as “[a] continuous unobstructed path connecting all accessible 

elements and spaces of a building or facility . . .”); see also

28 C.F.R. § 36.403 (e)(1) (defining “path of travel” as “a 

continuous, unobstructed way of pedestrian passage by means of 

which the altered area may be approached, entered, and exited, 

 

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and which connects the altered area with an exterior approach 

(including sidewalks, streets, and parking areas), an entrance 

to the facility, and other parts of the facility.”). Indeed, 

Johnson’s failure to offer evidence identifying the size of the 

pot-hole puts the Court in the position of having to guess 

whether the parking lot route of travel prevented access to 

Arby’s. This kind of showing is insufficient to establish a 

genuine issue of material fact justifying a trial on this issue. 

Second, Johnson presented neither compelling argument nor 

controlling authority supporting the proposition that the 

parking lot route of travel was required to be marked with 

directional signage. See Eiden, 2006 WL 1490418 at *11 (summary 

judgment appropriate where plaintiff alleged non-compliance with 

the ADAAG standards based on a lack of directional signage along 

a route of travel because plaintiff failed to inform the court 

of the basis as to this barrier). Accordingly, because a 

parking lot can be an accessible route of travel under the ADA, 

see Wilson, 439 F.Supp.2d at 1071, and because Johnson failed to 

inform the Court of the basis as to the directional signage 

barrier, the Court finds that Johnson failed to raise a genuine 

issue of material fact for trial on the issue of whether the 

parking lot route of travel was non-compliant with the ADA. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on this issue. See Miller v. Glenn Miller 

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Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 987 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Summary 

judgment for a defendant is appropriate when the plaintiff fails 

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to [his] case, and on which [he] will bear the 

burden of proof at trial.”). 

Finally, to the extent that Johnson seeks to state ADA 

violations predicated upon a lack of an accessible entrance to 

Arby’s, the Court finds that, even assuming that these alleged 

violations are actionable, they do not survive summary judgment. 

Johnson has not offered any admissible evidence supporting a 

basis as to these alleged barriers. There is no admissible 

evidence before the Court demonstrating that Defendants violated 

the ADAAG standards with respect to the entrance to Arby’s. 

Accordingly, summary adjudication is granted in favor of 

Defendants on this issue. 

E. The Unruh Act 

Johnson’s second claim for relief seeks to state violations 

of the Unruh Act predicated upon violations of rights under the 

ADA. See Lentini v. California Center for the Arts, Escondido, 

370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004) (a violation of any right 

under the ADA is a violation of the Unruh Act). However, 

because Johnson’s Unruh Act claims turn on ADA liability, and 

because Johnson failed to prove a violation of any right under 

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the ADA, summary adjudication is granted in favor of Defendants 

on Johnson’s Unruh Act claims. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion is 

GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in accordance 

with this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 2, 2008 

 

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