Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02530/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-02530-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lydia Bultemeyer
Plaintiff
CenturyLink Incorporated
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

WO

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Before the Court is Defendant CenturyLink Inc.’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 

291), in which they move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rules”) 59(e) and 

60(a), as well as Local Rule of Civil Procedure (“LRCiv”) 7.2(g), for a reconsideration and 

“clarification” of the Court’s recent Order (Doc. 287) granting Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Amend/Correct Clerk’s Judgment. For the following reasons, CenturyLink’s Motion will 

be denied in its entirety.1

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Reconsideration is disfavored and “appropriate only in rare circumstances.”

Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 909 F. Supp. 1342, 1351 (D. Ariz. 1995). Motions for 

reconsideration are “not the place for parties to make new arguments not raised in their 

original briefs,” nor should such motions “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has 

1 Because it would not assist in resolution of the instant issues, the Court finds the 

pending motion is suitable for decision without oral argument. See LRCiv. 7.2(f); Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 78(b); Partridge v. Reich, 141 F.3d 920, 926 (9th Cir. 1998).

Lydia Bultemeyer,

 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

CenturyLink Incorporated,

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No. CV-14-02530-PHX-SPL

ORDER

Case 2:14-cv-02530-SPL Document 295 Filed 12/06/24 Page 1 of 4
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

already thought.” Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, 215 F.R.D. 581, 582 

(D. Ariz. 2003). Under Local Rule 7.2(g), a motion for reconsideration should ordinarily 

be denied “absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority 

that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.” LRCiv 

7.2(g); see also School Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 

(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that granting a motion for reconsideration is appropriate where 

“the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear 

error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change 

in controlling law”). A motion for reconsideration may be brought based on “matters that 

the movant believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court.” LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).

However, “mere disagreement with a previous order is an insufficient basis for 

reconsideration.” See Adame v. City of Surprise, 2018 WL 3496955, at *1 (D. Ariz. July 

20, 2018).

Rule 60(b), which sets forth the grounds for relief from judgment, “provides for 

reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 

newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged 

judgment; or (6) ‘extraordinary circumstances’ which would justify relief.” School Dist. 

No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., 5 F.3d at 1263 (citation omitted). The moving party bears the 

burden of proving the existence of a basis for Rule 60(b) relief. Cassidy v. Tenorio, 856 

F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly, the Court may grant a motion under Rule 59(e) 

if the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, the 

initial decision was manifestly unjust, or there is an intervening change in controlling law. 

Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. V. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).

II. DISCUSSION

In the Memorandum (Doc. 292) accompanying its Motion for Reconsideration, 

CenturyLink argues the Court has committed “manifest error” for multiple reasons, none 

of which are availing. (Doc. 292 at 4). First, they argue that “the Court’s ruling was 

premised on the mistaken understanding that only CenturyLink had access” to information 

Case 2:14-cv-02530-SPL Document 295 Filed 12/06/24 Page 2 of 4
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

regarding the individuals on which CenturyLink obtained credit reports. (Id. at 5–6). 

CenturyLink’s contention that this Court “misunderstood” that Plaintiff actually possessed

such information (based on a February 2016 subpoena Plaintiff issued to TransUnion) is 

not “newly discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60 or LRCiv 7.2, and 

therefore provides no grounds for reconsideration.

2

Nor does CenturyLink provide this Court with any reason to reconsider its reliance 

on various Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions CenturyLink believes are 

“inapplicable.” As has been stated many times over in this Circuit, motions for 

reconsideration are not a vehicle for the Court “to rethink what it has already thought.”

Motorola, 215 F.R.D. at 582. Without a showing of manifest error, the fact that 

CenturyLink disagrees with this Court’s interpretation of the relevant law is immaterial. 

And it is entirely irrelevant that neither of the two Supreme Court decisions with which 

CenturyLink takes issue were not cited in the parties’ briefing.3

The Court also declines to provide CenturyLink with “clarification” on an Order 

that is already clear. (Doc. 292 at 10). The Court has already explained that Rule 

23(c)(3)(B) requires that the judgment in a class action “specify or describe those to whom 

the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom the 

court finds to be class members.” (Doc. 287 at 2). In granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend 

the Judgment, the Court has done so. Any issues CenturyLink has with the 56,075

2 And although the Court need not address this argument on the merits, it notes that 

while CenturyLink argues that Plaintiff should have identified the individuals on which 

CenturyLink obtained credit reports by serving further discovery on TransUnion, even 

TransUnion cannot provide a complete accounting of all class members subject to this 

lawsuit, as it would not be able to identify which potential class members signed arbitration 

agreements with CenturyLink. It remains indisputable that CenturyLink is the only “party 

that knows—or could know—the identities of the individuals whose credit reports it 

obtained during the class period and who did not sign a class action waiver or arbitration 

agreement.” (Doc. 287 at 3).

3 To the extent that CenturyLink implies that the Court improperly relies on various 

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases because they were “not cited in the parties’ 

briefing,” the Court reminds CenturyLink that it is not limited to the parties’ citations in 

formulating its decision; in fact, it is the Court’s duty to ensure that the law argued by the 

parties is accurate, and it cannot merely accept the parties’ legal assertions as true.

Case 2:14-cv-02530-SPL Document 295 Filed 12/06/24 Page 3 of 4
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

individuals to whom notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion, and whom 

this Court found to be class members are issues with the validity of their claims and are 

properly handled at the claims administration stage. (Id. at 5). To the extent that 

CenturyLink seeks to undermine the entire basis of this decade-long class action, perhaps 

its arguments are more appropriately raised in its pending appeal before the Ninth Circuit 

(Doc. 275).

Finally, CenturyLink continues to argue that Plaintiff failed to present evidence at 

trial that CenturyLink obtained the credit reports of all 56,075 identified class members, 

and to that end, CenturyLink misunderstands the entire purpose behind a Rule 23 class 

action. (Doc. 292 at 9–10). The purpose of the class action device is to “save[] the resources 

of both the courts and the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class 

member] to be litigated in an economical fashion under Rule 23.” Califano v. Yamasaki, 

442 U.S. 682, 701 (1979). Requiring the Plaintiff to present a jury with proof of every 

single class member’s injury would utterly subvert this purpose, and yet CenturyLink 

continues to ask this Court to impose such a draconian requirement. 

In sum, CenturyLink has provided this Court with no appropriate grounds on which 

to reconsider its previous Order, and accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant CenturyLink’s Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 

291) is denied. 

Dated this 5th day of December, 2024.

Honorable Steven P. Logan

United States District Judge

Case 2:14-cv-02530-SPL Document 295 Filed 12/06/24 Page 4 of 4