Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02890/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-02890-14/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Margie Daniel
Plaintiff
Andrea Duarte
Plaintiff
Ford Motor Company
Defendant
Donna Glass
Plaintiff
Mary Hauser
Plaintiff
Robert McCabe
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

MARGIE DANIEL, individually 

and on behalf of a class of 

similarly situated 

individuals,

Plaintiff,

v.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a 

Delaware corporation,

Defendant.

CIV. NO. 2:11-02890 WBS EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION

FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Margie Daniel brought this action against 

defendant Ford Motor Company alleging a defect in rear suspension 

geometry in new 2005 through 2011 Ford Focus vehicles (“class 

vehicles”).

1 Presently before the court is plaintiff’s renewed 

 

1 There were originally five named plaintiffs in this 

action, but the court entered summary judgment against plaintiffs 

Robert McCabe, Mary Hauser, Donna Glass, and Andrea Duarte. (See

June 6, 2013 Order at 20 (Docket No. 84); May 17, 2016 Order at 

3, 22 (Docket No. 107).) Plaintiff Daniel is the only remaining 

plaintiff.

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motion for class certification. (Pl.’s Renewed Mot. to Certify 

Class (“Pl.’s Renewed Mot.”) (Docket No. 111).) 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

In January 2011, plaintiff purchased a class vehicle in 

California. (Def.’s Opp’n at 3 (Docket No. 114).) She alleges 

that class vehicles have an “alignment/geometry defect” in their 

rear suspensions that leads to premature tire wear, which, in 

turn, leads to safety hazards such as decreased control in 

handling, steering, and stability, and threat of catastrophic 

tire failure. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-20 (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiff

brings claims for: (1) breach of express warranty under 

California Commercial Code section 2313; (2) breach of implied 

warranty under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code §§ 1790-1795.8; (3) breach of warranty under the MagnusonMoss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-23122; (4) violation of the 

California Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750-

1784; and (5) violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law 

(“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210. (Id. at 28-34.) 

In an Order dated June 6, 2013, the court granted 

defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims and entered 

final judgment in its favor. (June 6, 2013 Order at 24-25 

(Docket No. 84).) On June 17, 2013, the court denied plaintiffs’ 

motion for class certification. (June 17, 2013 Order at 14 

(Docket No. 85).) 

 

2 The parties stipulate that pursuant to the Ninth 

Circuit’s opinion in this case, “class certification of 

[plaintiff’s claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act] 

should stand or fall with class certification of [plaintiff’s 

express and implied warranty claims under state law].” (Pl.’s 

Reply at 10 n.6.)

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Plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment Order and the 

Ninth Circuit reversed on all claims. Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 

806 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2015). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit 

stated, “In light of our reversal, we also instruct the district 

court to reconsider its denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for class 

certification.” Id. at 1227.

On remand, defendant moved for renewed summary judgment 

on several grounds that the Ninth Circuit declined to address on 

appeal. (See Def.’s Renewed Mot. for Summ. J., Br. (Docket 101-

1).) This court denied defendant’s renewed motion for summary 

judgment as to Daniel and granted it as to all other plaintiffs. 

(May 17, 2016 Order at 22 (Docket No. 107).) 

Presently before the court is plaintiff’s renewed 

motion for class certification. Plaintiff seeks to certify a 

class of “individuals who purchased or leased any class vehicle 

in California and who currently reside in the United States.” 

(Pl.’s Reply at 1 (Docket No. 116).) Counsel for plaintiff 

represented at oral argument and in plaintiff’s renewed motion 

that plaintiff does not seek to include in her class purchasers 

who have sold their vehicles. (Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 1.)

II. Legal Standard

To certify a class, plaintiff must satisfy the

‘numerosity,’ ‘commonality,’ ‘typicality,’ and ‘adequacy of 

representation’ requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

23(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Plaintiff must also establish an 

appropriate ground for bringing a class action under Rule 23(b). 

Id.

“Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A 

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party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate 

his compliance with the Rule . . . .” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). “[C]ertification is proper only 

if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that 

the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Id. at 

350-51 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

“Frequently that rigorous analysis will entail some overlap with 

the merits of the plaintiff’s underlying claim.” Id. at 351 

(internal quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). 

“Merits questions may be considered to the extent--but only to 

the extent--that they are relevant to determining whether the 

Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied.” 

Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 

1184, 1195 (2013).

III. Analysis

A. Numerosity

“[N]umerosity is presumed where the plaintiff class 

contains forty or more members.” In re Cooper Companies Inc. 

Sec. Litig., 254 F.R.D. 628, 634 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also, 

e.g., Collins v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 

300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger, J.). Plaintiff estimates, and 

defendant does not dispute, that the class in this case would 

include “tens of thousands” of people. (See Pl.’s Renewed Mot.

at 12; Def.’s Opp’n at 13.) Accordingly, plaintiff has satisfied

‘numerosity.’

B. Commonality and Predominance

The ‘commonality’ requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) requires 

that the plaintiff show that “there are questions of law or fact 

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common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). “All questions 

of fact and law need not be common to satisfy [Rule 23(a)(2)]. 

The existence of shared legal issues with divergent factual 

predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts 

coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Hanlon 

v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998). “What

matters to class certification . . . [is] the capacity of a 

class[-]wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive 

the resolution of the litigation.” Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 

(quoting Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of 

Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 132 (2009)). Class 

members’ claims “must depend upon a common contention . . . [that 

is of] such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution--

which means that determination of its truth or falsity will 

resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of 

the claims in one stroke.” Id.

Rule 23(b)(3), under which plaintiff seeks 

certification, requires that “questions of law or fact common to 

class members predominate over questions affecting only 

individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The 

‘predominance’ inquiry “tests whether proposed classes are 

sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.” 

Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). 

“Because Rule 23(a)(3) already considers commonality, the focus 

of the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry is on the balance 

between individual and common issues.” Murillo v. Pac. Gas & 

Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 476 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (citing Hanlon, 

150 F.3d at 1022). The ‘predominance’ requirement subsumes the 

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‘commonality’ requirement, Georgine v. Amchem Prod., Inc., 83 

F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem, 521 U.S. 

591, and is more difficult to satisfy, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 

133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013).

1. Express Warranty

The 2007 through 2011 Focus warranty,

3 under which 

plaintiff brings her express warranty claim, states:

[I]f:

--your Ford vehicle is properly operated and 

maintained, and

--was taken to a Ford dealership for a warranted 

repair during the warranty period,

then authorized Ford Motor Company dealers will, 

without charge, repair, replace, or adjust all parts 

on your vehicle that malfunction or fail during normal 

use during the applicable coverage period due to a 

manufacturing defect in factory-supplied materials or 

factory workmanship. . . .

Defects may be unintentionally introduced into 

vehicles during the design and manufacturing processes 

and such defects could result in the need for repairs. 

For this reason, Ford provides the New Vehicle Limited 

 

3 The warranty for 2005 through 2006 Focuses covers “all 

parts on [the customer’s] vehicle that are defective in factorysupplied materials or workmanship.” (Pl.’s Mot. to Certify Class 

Exs. F-G, 2005-2006 Ford Focus New Vehicle Limited Warranty 

(Docket No. 33-2).) That the 2005 through 2006 warranty may 

differ materially from the 2007 through 2011 warranty does not 

defeat a finding of ‘commonality’ and ‘predominance’ with respect 

to plaintiff’s express warranty claim, as such differences need 

only be noted once for all class members. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d 

at 1019 (“All questions of fact and law need not be common to 

satisfy [Rule 23]. The existence of shared legal issues with 

divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core 

of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the 

class.”); Melgar v. CSk Auto, Inc., No. 13-CV-03769-EMC, 2015 WL 

9303977, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (holding that potential 

necessity of subclasses does not defeat ‘predominance’ finding).

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Warranty in order to remedy any such defects that 

result in vehicle part malfunction or failure during 

the warranty period.

(Pl.’s Mot. to Certify Class (“Pl.’s Mot.”) Exs. H-L, 2007-2011 

Ford Focus New Vehicle Limited Warranty (“Focus NVLW”) (Docket 

No. 33-2).) The Ninth Circuit has held in this case that “[t]he 

warranty must be construed to guarantee against . . . design 

defects.” Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225.

Plaintiff has provided evidence that an alleged rear 

suspension geometry defect in class vehicles causes premature 

tire wear. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 8 (“Ford did alert 

its dealers to the [Focus’] rear suspension problem . . . 

[informing them] that some of these vehicles ‘may exhibit 

premature front and/or rear tire wear.’” (citing Pl.’s Mot. Ex. 

B, Ford Internal Records)); id. at 10 (“[A] Consulting Engineer . 

. . with nearly two decades in design engineering and related 

fields in private industry, has opined that the Class Vehicles 

have a common rear suspension defect, which causes . . . 

premature tire wear.”).) Defendant’s own engineer testified that

all class vehicles are built with the same rear suspension

geometry. (See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. HH, Eric Kalis Deposition 

Transcript (“Kalis Deposition”) at 160:4-161:15 (conceding that 

“suspension hard points” was fundamentally same for class 

vehicles) (Docket No. 33-6).) Because the court can resolve the 

central question in plaintiff’s express warranty claim--whether 

the rear suspension geometry is defective--once for all class 

members, plaintiff has met ‘commonality’ with respect that claim. 

See Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 

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(9th Cir. 2010) (plaintiffs “easily satisfy the commonality 

requirement” by alleging suspension geometry defect in same make 

and model of vehicle covered by same warranty).

Defendant notes that the warranty requires “malfunction 

or fail[ure] during normal use during the applicable coverage 

period” for coverage to apply. (Def.’s Opp’n at 14, 22.) 

Because determining “normal use” and “malfunction . . . during 

the applicable coverage period” requires examining individual 

class members’ driving habits and vehicles, the argument goes, 

resolution of plaintiff’s express warranty claim cannot take

place on a class-wide basis. See id. Plaintiff responds that 

whether class vehicles malfunction during “normal use” and “the 

applicable coverage period” is irrelevant because design defects 

like the one she alleges, by definition, cause malfunction ”from 

the moment each class vehicle left the factory.” (See Pl.’s 

Reply at 6.) Under that theory, it matters not how class members 

used their vehicle or at what point the tires needed replacement, 

as the tires would always wear faster with the alleged defect

than without. (Id. at 8-9.) In light of the Ninth Circuit’s 

holding that defendant’s 2007 through 2011 express warranty 

covers design defects like the one plaintiff alleges, the court 

must hold in favor of plaintiff on this issue.

Defendant further points out that there are “47 

configurations” of class vehicles and each configuration differs

with respect to tire wear and handling. (Def.’s Opp’n at 16.) 

Rear suspension geometry, according to defendant, is one of many

mechanical factors that determine how quickly tires wear, how 

much they wear, and how soon they need to be replaced. (See id.

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at 18-22.) Plaintiff’s experts do not deny this, according to 

defendant. (See id. at 9-11.) Because mechanical factors and 

other factors affecting tire wear (e.g., individual driving 

habits) vary from class member to class member, the argument 

goes, tire wear will also vary by class member. (See id. at 17.) 

That variance, defendant argues, precludes class certification.

Plaintiff’s theory of liability, however, does not 

depend on the extent of tire wear or even the rate of tire wear

itself. Instead, it depends on the rate of tire wear relative to 

how quickly the tires would wear without the alleged defect. 

(See Pl.’s Reply at 8-9.) Plaintiff’s experts have provided 

support for her express warranty claim under that theory by 

opining that all class vehicles experienced premature tire wear, 

(see Pl.’s Mot. Ex. LL, Op. Report of Andrew Webb at 2; id. Ex. 

NN, Op. Report of Thomas Lepper at 3-4), a position which their 

concession about variances in degree or absolute rate of tire 

wear does not undermine.

Defendant’s argument about variance in tire wear is 

ultimately an argument about damages under plaintiff’s theory of 

liability. With respect to that argument, the Ninth Circuit has 

held that damage calculations, while necessarily individual in 

nature, do not defeat class certification. Yokoyama v. Midland 

Nat. Life Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he 

amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does 

not defeat class action treatment.” (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted)); Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc., 802 

F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Yokoyama remains the law of this 

court, even after Comcast.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2410 

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(2016). That holding applies in products liability cases. See

Edwards v. Ford Motor Co., 603 F. App’x 538, 541 (9th Cir. 2015)

(individual damage calculations do not defeat class certification 

in vehicle defect case).

Because the Ninth Circuit has validated plaintiff’s 

theory of liability in this case, see Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225, 

defendant cannot defeat class certification merely by showing 

that class members’ tires wore to different degrees or at 

different rates. So long as plaintiff is able to show that the 

tires wore prematurely across the class, her request to certify 

her express warranty claim survives defendant’s ‘variance’

argument.4 See Vaquero v. Ashley Furniture Indus., Inc., 824 

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that while plaintiff 

must prove that “damages resulted from the defendant’s conduct,” 

“different damage calculations do not defeat predominance”).

Defendant also argues that causation, a required 

element under the express warranty, (see Focus NVLM (requiring 

malfunction or failure “due to” defect)), cannot be resolved on a 

class-wide basis. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 25.) As explained above, 

plaintiff need only prove that the alleged defect caused some, 

not necessarily the same, damage to class vehicles. Vaquero, 824 

F.3d at 1154. The court can resolve that question on a classwide basis because all class vehicles share the same rear 

 

4 The court recognizes the possibility that some 

purchasers of class vehicles may have sold their vehicles prior 

to replacing or experiencing noticeable issues with their tires. 

Such class members would find it difficult to quantify any 

damages at all. However, plaintiff no longer seeks to include 

purchasers who have sold their vehicles in her class. (Pl.’s 

Renewed Mot. at 1.) Accordingly, the issue is moot.

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suspension geometry. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172 (holding that 

“whether the [class vehicle’s] alignment geometry was defective”

due to its tendency to cause premature tire wear was a common 

question).

Susceptibility to statute of limitations defenses in 

some class members’ cases does not overcome class certification. 

See Cameron v. E.M. Adams & Co., 547 F.2d 473, 478 (9th Cir. 

1976) (“[E]ven if there exists questions of individual compliance 

with the Oregon statute of limitations, they are not sufficient, 

on balance, to negate the predominance of the common issues.”); 

Williams v. Sinclair, 529 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Given 

a sufficient nucleus of common questions, the presence of the 

individual issue of compliance with the statute of limitations 

has not prevented certification of class actions in securities 

cases.”); Tait v. BSH Home Appliances Corp., 289 F.R.D. 466, 486

(C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[C]ourts have been nearly unanimous . . . in 

holding that possible differences in the application of a statute 

of limitations to individual class members, including the named 

plaintiffs, does not preclude certification of a class action.” 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Neither does 

the question of whether class members took their vehicles in for 

repair during warranty periods, which the parties can efficiently 

resolve using defendant’s records or a claim form. See Melgar v. 

CSk Auto, Inc., No. 13-CV-03769-EMC, 2015 WL 9303977, at *11 

(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015) (individual inquiries that can be 

resolved via claim form or similar process do not defeat 

‘predominance’).

Plaintiff has shown that the court can resolve the 

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central question in her express warranty claim--whether the rear 

suspension geometry in class vehicles caused premature tire wear-

-on a class-wide basis. Because individual inquiries in this 

case do not hold much weight for purposes of Rule 23’s

‘predominance’ test under the relevant authorities, the court 

finds that plaintiff has met ‘predominance’ with respect to her

express warranty claim. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172 (where 

plaintiffs allege suspension geometry defect in same make and 

model of vehicle covered under same express warranty, a 

‘predominance’ finding is proper).

2. Implied Warranty

As an initial matter, defendant argues that the Ninth 

Circuit’s opinion in this case did not affect this court’s 

earlier decision to deny class certification on plaintiff’s 

implied warranty claim. Defendant is mistaken, as the Ninth 

Circuit instructed this court to “reconsider its denial of 

[plaintiff’s] motion for class certification.” Daniel, 806 F.3d 

at 1227. Plaintiff’s motion to certify her implied warranty 

claim for class action is presently before this court. 

With respect to that claim, the Song-Beverly Act 

requires that “every sale of consumer goods that are sold at 

retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer’s 

and the retail seller’s implied warranty that the goods are 

merchantable.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1792. The implied warranty of 

merchantability guarantees that goods: “(1) Pass without 

objection in the trade under the contract description. (2) Are 

fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. (3) 

Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled. (4) Conform to 

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the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or 

label.” Id. § 1791.1. Plaintiff’s implied warranty claim only 

alleges breach of fitness for ordinary purpose. (Compl. ¶¶ 112-

115.) 

In the context of motor vehicles, fitness for ordinary 

purpose means that “the product is in safe condition and 

substantially free of defects.” Brand v. Hyundai Motor Am., 226 

Cal. App. 4th 1538, 1546 (4th Dist. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted), as modified on denial of reh’g

(July 16, 2014); Isip v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 155 Cal. App. 

4th 19, 23 (2d Dist. 2007) (stating the same); Am. Suzuki Motor 

Corp. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1291, 1297 (2d Dist. 

1995) (stating the same), as modified on denial of reh’g (Sept. 

21, 1995).

The Ninth Circuit has held in this case that “[a] 

reasonable fact finder could infer that a vehicle that 

experiences premature and more frequent tire wear would pose an 

unreasonable safety risk.” Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1226. Plaintiff 

has provided evidence that an alleged defect in rear suspension

geometry causes premature tire wear on class vehicles, (see Pl.’s

Renewed Mot. at 8), and that all class vehicles share the same 

rear suspension geometry, (see Pl.’s Reply at 3 (citing Kalis 

Deposition at 160:4-161:15).) Plaintiff has shown that the court 

can resolve whether the vehicles were merchantable--the central 

issue in her implied warranty claim--on a class-wide basis.

5 

 

5 Defendant directs the court’s attention to Kramer v. 

Toyota Motor Corp., No. 13-56433, 2016 WL 4578370 (9th Cir. Sept. 

2, 2016), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld denial of class 

certification of plaintiffs’ Song-Beverly and CLRA and UCL claims 

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Accordingly, plaintiff has met ‘commonality’ with respect to that

claim.

Defendant raises the same issues concerning damages,

causation, statute of limitations, and vehicle misuse that it 

raised with respect to plaintiff’s express warranty claim. (See

Def.’s Opp’n at 30-32.) Because the court has addressed those

issues in the preceding section, it will not do so in detail 

here. Suffice to repeat that such issues, while undisputedly 

individual in nature, do not hold much weight for purposes of 

Rule 23’s ‘predominance’ test under relevant authorities.

Defendant also argues, specifically with respect to 

plaintiff’s implied warranty claim, that whether class vehicles 

constitute “consumer goods” within the meaning of the SongBeverly Act differs as to each class member. (Id. at 28.) 

“[C]onsumer goods” under the Act requires that a given product is 

“used, bought, or leased for use primarily for personal, family, 

or household purposes.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1791. This is another 

question the parties can efficiently resolve via a claim form or 

similar process. It will not dominate litigation. See Melgar, 

2015 WL 9303977, at *11.

 

because plaintiffs did not produce evidence of a common defect in 

the Toyota Prius’ braking system. Id. at *1-2. That case is 

easily distinguishable. There, the Ninth Circuit based its 

decision on the fact that plaintiffs failed to produce “any 

evidence of a common defect.” Id. at *2 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). Here, plaintiff has produced 

evidence of a common defect. (See Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 10 

(citing defendant’s internal communications indicating existence 

of a “rear suspension problem” in class vehicles); Kalis 

Deposition at 160:4-161:15 (conceding that “suspension hard 

points” was fundamentally same for class vehicles).) 

Accordingly, Kramer does not control this case.

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Under the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case, this

court can resolve whether an alleged defect in rear suspension 

geometry rendered the class vehicles unsafe, and thus whether the 

vehicles were merchantable, on a class-wide basis. Other 

inquiries do not outweigh that question. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at

1173 (where plaintiffs allege suspension geometry defect in same 

make and model of vehicle, a ‘predominance’ finding is proper 

with respect to their implied warranty of merchantability 

claims). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff has met 

‘predominance’ with respect to her implied warranty claim.

3. CLRA and UCL Claims

The CLRA prohibits certain “unfair methods of 

competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken 

by any person in a transaction intended to result or which 

results in the sale or lease of goods or services.” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1770(a). Among these are “[r]epresenting that goods or 

services have . . . characteristics . . . uses, benefits, or 

qualities which they do not have,” id. § 1770(a)(5), and 

“[r]epresenting that goods or services are of a particular 

standard, quality, or grade . . . if they are of another,” id. § 

1770(a)(7). The UCL proscribes “any unlawful, unfair or 

fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue 

or misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. 

Here, plaintiff claims that defendant violated the CLRA 

and UCL by fraudulently omitting the alleged defect when dealing 

with class members. (Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 14.) 

Under California law, a fraudulent omission claim 

requires proving that the defendant had a duty to disclose the 

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omitted information.

6 Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 346 

(1976). Such a duty exists when defendant has “sole knowledge or 

access to material facts and knows that such facts are not known 

to or reasonably discoverable by the other party.”

7 Id. at 347. 

Plaintiff must also show that she relied on the fraudulent 

omission. See Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225.

Plaintiff has shown that this court may resolve whether 

defendant had a duty to disclose the alleged defect on a classwide basis. The court can determine what defendant knew about 

the alleged defect, when it knew what, and at what point that 

knowledge was no longer exclusive once for all class members. 

See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1171 (holding that “[c]ommon issues 

 

6 Such a claim also requires showing that defendant 

breached a duty to disclose. Plaintiff states that some Ford 

dealers disclosed the alleged defect to class members after they 

purchased class vehicles, (see Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 7.), raising 

the possibility that some dealers disclosed the alleged defect 

prior to purchase (e.g., to persuade a customer to purchase a 

different Ford car). That possibility, however, does not defeat 

class certification. The same possibility was present in Wolin, 

for example, where the Ninth Circuit certified class for 

plaintiffs’ failure to disclose claims despite the fact that 

class members purchased their vehicles from dealers across 

multiple states who, presumably, may also have disclosed an

alleged defect to some class members. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 

1171.

7 A duty to disclose also exists when one party actively 

conceals material facts from another. See Goodman, 18 Cal. 3d at

347 (citing Herzog v. Capital Co., 27 Cal. 2d 349, 353 (1945)). 

Because the parties focus their dispute on whether a duty existed 

under the ‘sole knowledge’ doctrine, the court will address that 

issue instead. It notes, however, that defendant also likely had 

a duty to disclose under the ‘active concealment’ doctrine, as 

plaintiff has provided evidence that defendant concealed the 

alleged defect. (See Pl.’s Renewed Mot. at 5 (citing exhibits 

indicating Ford technicians denied existence of premature tire 

wear issue to dealers despite numerous customer complaints).)

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predominate such as whether Land Rover was aware of the existence 

of the alleged defect, whether [it] had a duty to disclose its 

knowledge and whether it violated consumer protection laws when 

it failed to do so”). As to the element of materiality, the 

Ninth Circuit has held in this case that “[m]ateriality is judged 

from the perspective of a ‘reasonable consumer,’” Daniel, 806 

F.3d at 1226 (quoting Ehrlich v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 801 F. Supp. 

2d 908, 916 (C.D. Cal. 2010)), signifying that it is an objective 

inquiry, see Edwards, 603 F. App’x at 541 (“[M]ateriality is 

governed by an objective ‘reasonable person’ standard under 

California law, an inquiry that is the same for every class 

member . . . .”).

With respect to whether class members relied on the 

alleged fraudulent omission, the Ninth Circuit has similarly held 

that an objective inquiry is proper. “To prove reliance on an 

omission, a plaintiff . . . [may] simply prov[e] ‘that, had the 

omitted information been disclosed, one would have been aware of 

it and behaved differently.’” Daniel, 806 F.3d at 1225 (quoting 

Mirkin v. Wasserman, 5 Cal.4th 1082, 1093 (1993)). “That one 

would have behaved differently can be presumed, or at least 

inferred, when the omission is material.” Id. As discussed 

above, materiality is an objective inquiry under California law. 

With respect to whether one would have been aware of the omitted 

information, the Ninth Circuit has held in this case that

interacting with an authorized Ford dealer prior to purchase is 

sufficient to show that one would have been aware of a 

disclosure. Id. at 1226. Because plaintiff’s class includes 

only purchasers of new Focuses who, presumably, interacted with 

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authorized Ford dealers prior to purchase, that inquiry, too, is 

amenable to class-wide resolution.

Defendant raises the same issues concerning existence 

of defect, damages, purchase for “consumer” use, and statute of 

limitations that it raised with respect to plaintiff’s other 

claims. (See Def.’s Opp’n at 45-50.) As stated above, such 

issues do not defeat class certification under the relevant 

authorities.

In light of the Ninth Circuit’s opinions in this and 

other cases, plaintiff has shown that common questions 

predominate in her CLRA and UCL claims.

C. Superiority

Rule 23(b)(3) also requires “that a class action is 

superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 

adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). It 

sets forth four non-exhaustive factors in determining 

‘superiority’: (A) class members’ interests in individually 

controlling the litigation; (B) the extent and nature of any 

litigation concerning the controversy already begun by class 

members; (C) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in 

the particular forum; and (D) likely difficulties in managing a 

class action. Id. 

Here, class members’ interest in individually 

controlling the litigation is low given that many members likely 

stand to recover relatively little compared to the costs of 

individual litigation. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Mot. at 26 (“Plaintiff 

was compelled to spend an amount measured in the hundreds of 

dollars to replace tires worn out prematurely by the suspension 

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defect.”).) The court is aware of neither any concurrent 

litigation in this case, nor a reason why this particular forum 

would be ill-suited to resolving plaintiff’s class action. 

Managing this class action would not present undue difficulties 

in light of the greater burden and inefficiency of trying the 

cases individually. See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1176 (“Forcing 

individual vehicle owners to litigate their cases, particularly 

where common issues predominate for the proposed class, is an 

inferior method of adjudication.”). Accordingly, plaintiff has 

met ‘superiority.’

D. Typicality

‘Typicality’ requires that plaintiff have claims 

“reasonably coextensive” with those of proposed class members. 

Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. The test for ‘typicality’ is “whether 

other members have the same or similar injury, whether the action 

is based on conduct which is not unique to the named plaintiffs, 

and whether other class members have been injured by the same 

course of conduct.” Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 

508 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendant sold her and the 

proposed class defective vehicles. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 14.) Even 

if plaintiff and members of the class did not suffer same damages 

from the alleged defect, they, according to plaintiff, suffered 

the same injuries (i.e., breach of warranties and violation of 

consumer protection laws) from the same inaction (i.e., 

defendant’s failure to repair and disclosed the alleged defect) 

and seek to recover pursuant to the same legal theories and 

warranties. (Id. 15-17.) This satisfies ‘typicality.’ See

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Hanon, 976 F.2d at 508; see also Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1175 (where 

plaintiffs “allege that they, like all prospective class members, 

were injured by a defective alignment geometry in the vehicles . 

. . [and] seek to recover pursuant to the same legal theories,” 

they have satisfied ‘typicality’).

E. Adequacy

Rule 23(a) requires that the class representative “will 

fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 23. This inquiry involves two questions: “(1) do the 

named plaintiffs and their counsel have any conflicts of interest 

with other class members and (2) will the named plaintiffs and 

their counsel prosecute the action vigorously on behalf of the 

class?” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020. 

Defendant argues that plaintiff is inadequate because 

she will be representing class members who may have suffered 

personal injuries from the alleged defect, yet is not seeking 

personal injury damages herself. (Def.’s Opp’n at 53.) 

Defendant contends that this “claim-splitting decision creates a 

conflict between Plaintiff’s interests and those of the putative 

class.” (Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., Civ. No. 

2:06-02573, 2009 WL 1514435, at *9 (E.D. Cal. May 28, 2009)

(Mendez, J.)).) Again, however, as the Ninth Circuit has told 

us, differences in damages do not defeat class certification. 

See Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1173; Edwards, 603 F. App’x at 541; 

Yokoyama, 594 F.3d at 1089; Pulaski, 802 F.3d at 988.

Plaintiff’s counsel are experienced attorneys who have 

prosecuted more than two hundred class actions. (Pl.’s Mot. at 

20.) They have committed significant resources to investigating 

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plaintiff’s claims, conducting discovery, litigating this case on 

summary judgment motions, and successfully appealing to the Ninth 

Circuit. (Id.) The court finds no reason to doubt that 

plaintiff’s counsel are qualified to conduct this litigation and 

will vigorously prosecute the action on behalf of class members. 

See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021 (“Although there are no fixed 

standards by which ‘vigor’ can be assayed, considerations include 

competency of counsel.”). 

Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff and 

plaintiff’s counsel are adequate representatives of the class. 

III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to 

certify a class of individuals who--(1) purchased or leased any 

2005 through 2011 Ford Focus vehicle in California, (2) currently 

own such a vehicle, and (3) currently reside in the United 

States--for her claims against defendant be, and the same hereby 

is, GRANTED.

Dated: September 23, 2016

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