Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00031/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00031-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Diego Lua-Garcia
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS

KATHERINE E. SCHUH

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

DIEGO LUA-GARCIA,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00031 NONE SKO

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS 

CONFERENCE DATE AND PROPOSED 

ORDER THEREON

Date: April 20, 2020

Time: 1:00 p.m.

Honorable Sheila K. Oberto

The United States of America, by and through MCGREGOR W. SCOTT, United States 

Attorney, and KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS and KATHERINE E. SCHUH, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, and the defendant, by and through his attorney of record, hereby stipulate to continue the 

status conference in this case from April 20, 2020 until August 17, 2020 at 1:00 p.m and for such time 

between those dates be excluded from the calculation as to the time within which the defendant should 

be tried.

On March 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 611, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. This General Order was 

entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

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openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the [event]. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

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STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and 

through their respective counsels of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 20, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, the parties now move to continue the status conference until August 

17, 2020, and to exclude time between April 20, 2020, and August 17, 2020, under Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The discovery associated with this case includes voluminous investigative reports, 

wire interceptions recordings and electronic messages, precise location information data, and 

more, approximately 82,000 pages/files. Supplemental discovery was provided last week. All of 

this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection 

and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery and to confer 

with his client regarding a potential resolution of this matter.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the hearing proceed.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 20, 2020 to August 17, 2020, 

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inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] 

because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of 

the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest 

of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: April 14, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ Kathleen A. Servatius

KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS

Assistant United States Attorney

DATED: April 14, 2020 /s/ Victor Perez

Victor Perez, Attorney for Diego Lua-Garcia

ORDER

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference in this case be continued from April 20, 

2020, until August 17, 2020 at 1 p.m.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the ends of justice served by the schedule set forth herein as 

requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date 

prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act for the reasons stated in the parties’ stipulation. For the purpose of 

computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must 

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commence, the time period of April 20, 2020 through August 17, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court

at the parties’ request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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