Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00074/USCOURTS-ared-5_19-cv-00074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Henderson
Plaintiff
James Shipman
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

CENTRAL DIVISION 

MARK HENDERSON PLAINTIFF 

ADC #78763

V. No. 5:19CV00074-BSM-JTR 

JAMES SHIPMAN, Warden DEFENDANT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION 

 The following Recommended Disposition has been sent to United States 

District Judge Brian S. Miller. You may file written objections to all or part of this 

Recommendation. If you do so, those objections must: (1) specifically explain the 

factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and (2) be received by the Clerk of this 

Court within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Recommendation. If you do not 

file objections, Judge Miller can adopt this Recommendation without independently 

reviewing all of the evidence in the record. By not objecting, you may waive the 

right to appeal questions of fact.

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff Mark Henderson (“Henderson”) is a prisoner in the Varner Supermax 

Unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”). He has filed this pro se 

action alleging that, by restricting his ability to purchase “Islamically permissible” 

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food items from the commissary, Defendant Deputy Warden James Shipman 

(“Shipman”) violated his constitutional rights as protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 

the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 

(“RLUIPA”). Doc. 2.1

 

 Shipman has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, a Brief in Support, a 

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and a Reply, arguing that Henderson’s 

claims should be dismissed because he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies 

available to him at the ADC. Docs. 12, 13, 14, 24 & 28. Henderson has filed 

Responses. Docs. 19, 20 & 21. Thus, the issues are joined and ready for disposition.2

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Specifically, Henderson alleges that he is a Muslim inmate in restrictive housing with 

disciplinary commissary restrictions, which prevent him from purchasing halal food items. 

According to Henderson, due to being deprived of halal Islamic meals or adequate alternatives, he 

lost 29-33 pounds while in restrictive housing from November 2, 2018 through the filing of his 

Complaint on February 21, 2019. He alleges that Shipman violated his rights, under § 1983 and 

RLUIPA, by forcing him to choose between “starvation” and the free exercise of his Islamic 

beliefs. He names Shipman in his individual and official capacities, and seeks damages and 

injunctive relief. Doc. 2 at 1-2. 

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Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in a light most favorable to 

the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. 

v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 

(1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 

dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Thereafter, the nonmoving party must present 

specific facts demonstrating that there is a material dispute for trial. See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c); 

Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011). 

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II. Discussion 

 A. ADC Procedures Governing the Exhaustion of Administrative 

Remedies 

 The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires prisoners to exhaust 

their administrative remedies before filing a § 1983 action: “No action shall be 

brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other 

Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 

until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 

1997e(a). The purposes of the exhaustion requirement include “allowing a prison to 

address complaints about the program it administers before being subjected to suit, 

reducing litigation to the extent complaints are satisfactorily resolved, and 

improving litigation that does occur by leading to the preparation of a useful record.” 

Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). In Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 

(2006), the Court held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is “mandatory.” See 

also Muhammad v. Mayfield, 933 F.3d 993, 1000 (8th Cir. 2019). 

 The PLRA requires prisoners to: (1) fully and properly exhaust their available 

administrative remedies as to each claim in the complaint; and (2) complete the 

exhaustion process before filing an action in federal court. Jones, 549 U.S. at 211, 

219-20, 223-24; Woodford,, 548 U.S. at 93-95; Burns v. Eaton, 752 F.3d 1136, 1141-

42 (8th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Jones, 340 F.3d 624, 626-28 (8th Cir. 2003). 

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Importantly, “it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 

boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218; see also Woodford, 548 

U.S. at 90 (explaining that administrative exhaustion “means using all steps that the 

agency holds out, and doing so properly so that the agency addresses the issues on 

the merits”). Thus, to satisfy the PLRA, a prisoner must comply with the exhaustion 

requirements of the incarcerating facility before he can properly file a § 1983 action. 

 The ADC provides a three-step administrative grievance process. ADC Adm. 

Dir. 14-16 §§ IV(E)-(G) (“AD 14-16”).3

 “If no one responds at Steps One and Two 

– or if the responses at those steps are dissatisfactory – an inmate may appeal to the 

level of ADC’s ‘Chief Deputy/Deputy/Assistant Director’ at Step Three.” 

Muhammad, 933 F.3d at 997-98. 

 The ADC administrative grievance policy requires that, in connection with 

each claim, a prisoner must “specifically name each individual involved,” and 

include a “brief statement that is specific as to the substance of the issue or complaint

to include the date, place [and] personnel involved or witnesses.” AD 14-16 § 

IV(C)(4) & (E)(2) (emphasis added). The grievance forms themselves contain these 

instructions to ensure prisoners are aware of them. AD 14-16, Att. 1 (“[B]e specific 

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Shipman submitted a copy of AD 14-16 with his summary judgment papers. Doc. 12, Ex. 

A. 

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as to the complaint, date and place, name of personnel involved and how you were 

affected.”). Finally, the ADC’s policy cautions prisoners that, if they fail to “exhaust 

their administrative remedies as to all defendants at all levels of the grievance 

procedure ... their lawsuits or claims may be dismissed immediately” under the 

PLRA. AD 14-16 § IV(N); see also § IV(C)(4) & (D)(2) (both advising inmates to 

fully exhaust a grievance prior to filing a lawsuit). 

B. Shipman’s Motion for Summary Judgment 

 In his Motion, Shipman contends that, before initiating this lawsuit on 

February 21, 2019, Henderson did not fully exhaust any grievances naming him or 

describing his alleged failure to provide Henderson with access to halal foods while 

in restrictive housing. In support of his Motion, Shipman submits: (1) a Declaration, 

dated June 3, 2019, from Terri Grigsby, the ADC’s Inmate Grievance Supervisor, 

Doc. 12, Ex. B; (2) relevant grievance documents, id., Ex. C; and (3) his own 

Declaration, Doc. 28, Ex. 1. 

 In her Declaration, Grigsby states that she found one fully exhausted 

grievance regarding Henderson’s claims, VSM19-00477, which did not mention 

Shipman and was not completely exhausted until June 3, 2019, almost four months 

after Henderson filed this action. Doc. 12, Ex. A ¶¶ 14-22. 

According to the grievance documents for VSM19-00477, Henderson filed a 

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Step One informal resolution on February 12, 2019, alleging that he was being 

“denied halal Islamic meal accommodations” while subject to commissary 

restrictions in restrictive housing and that, since November 6, 2018, he had lost 29 

to 30 pounds. The grievance did not name any specific ADC personnel. Id., Ex. C at 

7. On February 22, 2019, Henderson proceeded to Step Two. Warden James Gibson 

(a nonparty) denied his grievance, and Henderson appealed. On June 3, 2019, ADC 

Director Dexter Payne (a nonparty) responded: “I find that you have not specified 

which dietary items which you claim to be Haram (forbidden). Even so, the ADC 

supplies a religious diet that is both Halal and nutritionally sufficient. This diet 

includes some of the items you request. You are provided with an appropriate diet 

by the ADC without access to commissary. Your appeal is without merit.” Id., Ex. 

C at 4.4 

 In response to Shipman’s documentation, Henderson concedes that VSM19-

00477 did not mention Shipman and was not fully exhausted until June 3, 2019. Doc. 

21 ¶¶ 21-22. Thus, he cannot rely on VSM19-00477 to establish exhaustion of the 

§ 1983 and RLUIPA claims he is asserting against Shipman. See Townsend v. 

Murphy, 898 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2018) (ADC prisoner failed to exhaust 

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Henderson’s grievance appeal states that he was unable to eat the meals provided by the 

ADC because of “daily threats” that his meals “would be contaminated (poisoned) with infectious 

germs, body fluids, spit and/or human waste.” Doc. 12, Ex. C at 5. He also says he “filed for halal 

accommodations which were originally denied and remained denied.” Id. 

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administrative remedies with respect to officials that were not named or otherwise 

described in his grievance); Burns, 752 F.3d at 1137 (clarifying that a prisoner must 

exhaust his specific claims against each separate defendant); Johnson, 340 F.3d at 

627 (“If exhaustion was not completed at the time of filing, dismissal is mandatory.”) 

(emphasis added); see also Mosley v. Correctional Care Solutions, 671 Fed. Appx. 

401, 402 (8th Cir. 2016) (dismissal for failure to exhaust was proper where prisoner 

“filed a pertinent grievance that was ultimately exhausted after he initiated this [§ 

1983] action”). 

 Instead, Henderson argues that he exhausted another grievance, VSM16-

02867, regarding the ADC’s failure to provide him Islamically acceptable and/or 

halal meal accommodations. He asserts that, because this is an “ongoing continuing 

free exercise issue,” exhaustion of VSM16-02867 should be sufficient to exhaust the 

claims he has raised in this action. Docs. 19, 20 & 21 ¶¶ 19 & 23 . 

 Henderson’s argument fails. His claims in this case concern an alleged 

constitutional violation by Shipman that began when Henderson was placed in 

restrictive housing on November 2, 2018. Doc. 2 at 1. Henderson initiated VSM16-

02867 on August 23, 2016, and his Step Three appeal was decided on October 27, 

2016. Doc. 20 at 2. This was more than two years before the events giving rise to 

the claims Henderson is now asserting against Shipman. A grievance from 2016 

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cannot exhaust a claim about a violation that did not take place until 2018. See AD 

14-16 § IV(E)(1) (grievance must be submitted within fifteen days after the 

occurrence of the alleged incident). Furthermore, VSM16-02867 did not name 

Shipman, who was not even working at VSM during that time. See Doc. 28, Ex. 1. 

Finally, the claim raised in VSM16-02867 was that Henderson wanted to receive 

monthly packages with certain halal foods, which is different from his current claim 

that the commissary items available to him in restrictive housing do not allow access 

to halal foods. See Doc. 20 at 2. 

 Thus, Henderson cannot rely on VSM16-02687 to establish exhaustion of the 

§ 1983 and RLUIPA claims he is asserting against Shipman in this action. 

Because Henderson failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to 

him about Shipman’s alleged denial of access to Islamically permissible foods, 

dismissal of Henderson’s claims is “mandatory.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 211; see 

Muhammad, 933 F.3d at 1000-03 (holding that, because ADC prisoner failed to 

exhaust his administrative remedies on his First Amendment and RLUIPA claims 

about the denial of daily halal meat, district court improperly granted injunctive 

relief in the prisoner’s favor on those claims). Accordingly, Henderson’s claims 

against Shipman should be dismissed, without prejudice. 

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III. Conclusion 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (Doc. 12) be GRANTED, and Henderson’s § 1983 and 

RLUIPA claims be DISMISSED, without prejudice. 

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2020. 

 ___________________________________ 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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