Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01057/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01057-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge A
Defendant
Joshua A.
Plaintiff
Rocklin Unified School District
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Joshua A, a minor, by 

and through Jorge A., 

his guardian ad litem, Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 

Rocklin Unified School 

District, and Does 1-25 

 

 Defendants. 

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No. CV 07-01057 LEW(KJMx)

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff, Joshua A, filed a Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on February 9, 2008. Defendant filed

an Opposition on February 22, 2009. This matter was

taken under submission by the Court, on February 28,

2008. Having considered all documents filed in

connection with this Motion, including Plaintiff’s

Reply, the Court NOW FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: 

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A. Legal Standard

1. Jurisdiction

This Court has jurisdiction to hear disputes under

the IDEA pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(A). However,

jurisdiction is historically as a reviewing court for an

underlying decision by the state educational agency. 

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A).

2. Standard of Review

The standard of review for the Court's review of an

administrative hearing decision arising under the IDEA

is set forth in the IDEA at 20 U.S.C. section

1415(e)(2), which provides as follows: 

In any action brought under this paragraph the

court shall receive the records of the

administrative proceedings, shall hear

additional evidence at the request of a party,

and, basing its decision on the preponderance

of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the

court determines is appropriate.

This standard requires that "due weight" be given to the

administrative proceedings. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick

Hudson Central Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,206,

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102 S. Ct. 3034, 3050 (1982). The amount of deference

so accorded is subject to the court's discretion. 

Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311

(9th Cir. 1987). In making that determination, the

thoroughness of the ALJ's findings should be considered,

with the degree of deference increased where said

findings are "thorough and careful." Capistrano Unified

Sch. Dist. v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884, 892 (9th Cir.

1995), citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d 1519,

1524 (9th Cir. 1994).

III. ANALYSIS

1. Due Deference is Owed to the ALJ Decision

Plaintiff argues that the Court should not defer to

the ALJ's findings citing four reasons: (1) that the

ALJ's decision includes inaccurate factual findings; (2)

that the ALJ ignored key testimony; (3) that three

exhibits are missing from the Administrative record; and

(4) that portions of the ALJ's decision are similar to a

decision rendered by a different ALJ in a different

case. (See Mot. at 14-26.) 

Each of these arguments are without substantial

merit. While the Court does concede that there appear

to be some factual inaccuracies, none of the

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inaccuracies to which Plaintiff takes issue would have

formed the basis of the ALJ’s decision. Indeed, most, if

not all, of these inaccuracies amount to little more

than typographical errors. 

The record demonstrates that the ALJ carefully

considered the facts of Plaintiff’s educational care. 

The ALJ examined the qualifications of each of the

professionals who played a role in Plaintiff’s

educational plan. The record also reflects that the ALJ

reviewed and relied on the testimony and evidence

introduced by both parties. 

Similarly, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ

improperly weighed the evidence presented at the

administrative hearing is without merit. The ALJ is in

the best position to weigh the credibility of the

witness testimony and the documentary evidence because

he directly heard and observed the testimony of each of

the witnesses at hearing. Judge Geren fully explained

the basis for the inferences he drew from the testimony

and from the documentary record. By way of example

only, Judge Geren explained that Ms. DiRegolo’s

testimony was given considerable weight based on her

experience, as well as her demeanor, manner, and

attitude when testifying. (See OAH Decision, AR pg. 7.)

At its most basic level, Plaintiff’s argument is that he

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1

 Plaintiff’s argument that the fact that three trial

exhibits are missing should persuade this Court to ignore the ALJ

decision is not supported by the evidence. 

5

doesn’t agree with how the ALJ viewed the evidence, that

is not reason enough to disregard the ALJ’s

determination.

 Finally,1 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ decision

should be afforded no deference because the instant

decision used similar, and at times identical language,

to a decision from another case. (Mot. at 18.) 

In his decision, ALJ Geren made 16 "Conclusions

of Law." Plaintiff maintains that six of the 16 were

borrowed from Student v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch.

Dist. Additionally two footnotes, one specific to the

arguments put forth by Plaintiff, were copied verbatim.

Plaintiff contends that these facts raises concerns

regarding the impartial and thorough analysis that the

administrative hearing officer is required to conduct

under the IDEIA. “Such corner cutting behavior on the

part of the ALJ should be weighed in determining how

much weight to give to the decision of the

administrative hearing officer.” (Mot. at 20.) 

Even if this Court assumes arguendo that the

language was borrowed from a similar case, there is no

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indication that the conclusions were incorrect, or that

the conclusions of law were not well founded. Absent

some showing that the ALJ’s decision was not well

reasoned, it should be afforded deference. 

Based on the above analysis, the ALJ decision will 

be awarded substantial deference. 

2. District Has Met Its Burden of Proving the

2006-2008 IEP Offers Plaintiff A Free

Appropriate Public Education

In this matter, the ALJ made specific findings that

the District prevailed on all issues in dispute, noting

that the District offered Plaintiff a FAPE with respect

to: (a) the 14 proposed goals; (b) the supervision and

aide supports; (c) the proposed transition plan; and (d)

the eclectic methodology. In challenging the ALJ's

findings, Plaintiff claims the IEP at issue denied him

FAPE because it does not offer an ABA program.

According to the definitions contained in the Act,

a "free appropriate public education" consists of

educational instruction specially designed to meet the

unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such

services as are necessary to permit the child "to

benefit" from the instruction. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley,

458 U.S. 176, 189 (U.S. 1982). 

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The purpose of the Education of the Handicapped Act

was to "open the door of public education to handicapped

children on appropriate terms [rather] than to guarantee

any particular level of education once inside." (Id. at 

192.) The Court determined that a student's IEP must be

reasonably calculated to provide the student with some

educational benefit, but that the IDEA does require

school districts to provide special education students

with the best education available or to provide

instruction or services that maximize a student's

abilities. (Id. at 198-200.) Indeed, the Rowley

opinion sets forth the well-established principle that,

as long as a district offers an appropriate educational

program, the choice regarding the methodology used to

implement the IEP is left to the district's discretion. 

Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208. 

In Rowley, the United States Supreme Court

expressed reluctance to interject itself into the

methods and means of instruction used by a school

system, stating "courts must be careful to avoid

imposing their view of preferable education methods upon

the states. 

The District's program appears to have been

tailored to Plaintiff’s needs and based upon the

District's belief that Plaintiff would make meaningful

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benefit from the program. The ALJ properly applied the

legal standards and determined that while the District’s

IEP plan did not identify an ABA approach for

Plaintiff’s educational program for the 2006-2007 school

year, it nonetheless satisfied the requirements of FAPE.

(See OAH Decision, pg. 24-25.) 

Plaintiff contends that this Court should consider

the Rowley standard in light of more recent

Congressional language inferring that “peer review

research” services are required. The Court declines to

do so. It does not appear that congress intended that

the service with the greatest body of research be used

in order to provide FAPE. Likewise, there is nothing in

the Act to suggest that the failure of a public agency

to provide services based on peer-reviewed research

would automatically result in a denial of FAPE.

As other Ninth Circuit courts have noted, if

Congress intended to modify the Rowley standard, it

would have said so. San Rafael Elementary School

District v. California Special Education Hearing Ofice,

482 F. Supp. 2d 1152, (N.D. Cal. 2007.) Indeed, in 2006,

the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the FAPE standard - whether

the proposed educational program is "reasonably

calculated" to provide educational benefit. Park v.

Anaheim Union High School District, 464 F.3d 1025, 1031

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(9th Cir. 2006.) The applicable legal standard, as set

forth in Rowley, is the controlling law and was followed

by the ALJ in ruling on the issues in the underlying

case. (See OAH Decision, AR pg. 16-1 9.)

When applying the Rowley standard, District has met

its burden in the instant matter. Plaintiff failed to

provide any argument in regards to whether the record

supports the ALJ’s conclusion that the IEP at issue was

designed to meet Plaintiff’s areas of need. The ALJ

found, and the record supports, that the annual goals

proposed for Plaintiff for the 2006-2007 school year

were appropriate for Plaintiff, as they were designed to

meet his core areas of deficit and educational need. 

The ALJ properly found that the 14 annual goals were

designed to meet all of Plaintiff’s areas of need that

resulted from his disability, as they were designed to

address speech, conversational skills, expressive

language, receptive language, social skills, social

interaction, safety skills, attending skills, school

readiness, and academics. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for

Summary Judgment is DENIED. With the exception of

referring to minor discrepancies between the ALJ's

decision and the record, Plaintiff has failed to make

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the requisite showing to prevail in this matter. 

Instead, District demonstrated that the record supports

the ALJ's decision.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

 HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW

Senior, U.S. District Court Judge

DATE: March 13, 2008

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