Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-19-20277/USCOURTS-ca5-19-20277-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BOKF, N.A.
Appellant
Guilherme Casalicchio
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20277

GUILHERME CASALICCHIO, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

BOKF, N.A., doing business as Bank of Texas, 

 Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:18-CV-160

Before JOLLY, SMITH, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In a companion case, No. 19-20246, we affirmed a district court judgment 

dismissing various claims brought by debtor Guilherme Casalicchio, who had 

sought to void a foreclosure sale of his residence. In this appeal, Casalicchio’s 

lender, BOKF, N.A. (“BOKF”), challenges the district court’s denial of its 

request for attorney’s fees.1 BOKF relies, principally, on a deed-of-trust 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

1 BOKF moved to consolidate the cases, but we denied that motion. Here, in contrast 

to the companion case, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is not a party. Thus, 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 6, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Case: 19-20277 Document: 00515335825 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/06/2020
No. 19-20277

2

provision purporting to allow it to “charge [Casalicchio] fees for services 

performed in connection with [his] default, . . . including . . . attorney’s fees.”

This provision seems a plausible basis for awarding attorney’s fees, 

particularly because an earlier panel of this court chose to award attorney’s 

fees in a case featuring an identical deed-of-trust provision. See In re 

Velazquez, 660 F.3d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 2011). We are, however, unable to reach 

the merits of the district court’s denial of fees because the order denying fees

does not provide any analysis or reasoning. “A district court must explain its 

decision to deny fees, and if, as here, it fails to give any explanation, we must 

remand.” N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., Ltd. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 898 

F.3d 461, 485 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). To the point, when the 

district court denies attorney’s fees in such a manner as to “deprive[] [us] of 

the benefit of [its] reasoning,” we “cannot exercise meaningful review.” 

CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec. LLC v. Harris Cty. Toll Rd. Auth., 436 F.3d 

541, 550 (5th Cir. 2006); Schwarz v. Folloder, 767 F.2d 125, 133 (5th Cir. 1985).

Thus, in accordance with our precedents, we VACATE the district court’s 

order denying attorney’s fees and REMAND for further proceedings not 

inconsistent with this opinion.

because this appeal involves distinct (albeit overlapping) parties, and because the legal issue 

here is clearly severable from those raised in the companion appeal, we exercised our 

discretion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b) to resolve the appeals separately. 

See Fed. R. App. P. 3(b)(2) (noting that “appeals may be joined or consolidated by the court of 

appeals” (emphasis added)).

Case: 19-20277 Document: 00515335825 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/06/2020