Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01174/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01174-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc.
Appellant
Gaymar Industries, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

GAYMAR INDUSTRIES, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

CINCINNATI SUB-ZERO PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2014-1174

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of New York in No. 1:08-cv-00299-WMSJJM, Chief Judge William Skretny.

______________________ 

Decided: June 25, 2015 

______________________ 

JODYANN GALVIN, Hodgson Russ LLP, Buffalo, NY, 

argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by ROBERT 

J. LANE, JR. 

THOMAS J. BURGER, Wood, Herron & Evans, LLP, Cincinnati, OH, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by PAUL J. LINDEN; TIMOTHY J. GRABER,

MELISSA M. MORTON, Gibson, McAskill & Crosby, LLP, 

Buffalo, NY. 

______________________ 

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2 GAYMAR INDUSTRIES, INC. v. CINCINNATI SUB-ZERO PRODUCTS

Before PROST, Chief Judge, BRYSON, and DYK, Circuit 

Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

Cincinnati Sub-Zero Products, Inc. (“CSZ”), the prevailing party in this patent infringement case, appeals the 

district court’s denial of attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 285. In holding that this was not an “exceptional case,” 

the district court found that plaintiff Gaymar Industries, 

Inc.’s (“Gaymar”) litigation position was not objectively 

baseless. In assessing the totality of the circumstances, 

the district court relied on several instances of defendant 

CSZ’s purported litigation misconduct as a basis for

finding that the case was not exceptional. We affirm the 

district court’s finding of a lack of objective baselessness. 

We reverse the exceptional case finding insofar as it was 

based on CSZ’s purported misconduct, and remand. 

BACKGROUND

Gaymar is the owner by assignment of U.S. Patent 

No. 6,517,510 (“the ’510 patent”), which is directed to a 

patient temperature control system, including a blanket 

that can conductively warm or cool the patient.1 On April

1 Representative claim 1 of the ’510 patent provides:

A device for delivering a desired medium at certain temperature ranges for temperature management of a mammal, comprising:

an inlet source receives the desired medium and directs the desired medium to a 

temperature-control device;

 

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18, 2008, Gaymar sued CSZ, asserting that CSZ’s 

Blanketrol III device infringed claims 1, 2, 5, 7–12, 19, 20, 

23, 25–27, 29–31, 37, 38, 41, 43–45, 47–49, and 55 of the 

’510 patent. On July 15, 2008, Gaymar moved for a 

preliminary injunction against CSZ.

a bio-feedback device measures the mammal’s actual temperature, and transmits 

the measurement to the temperaturecontrol device;

depending on the measurement, the temperature-control device alters the temperature of the desired medium; and

an outlet source directs the desired medium to manage the temperature of the 

mammal;

wherein the mammal is to have its temperature set to a predetermined-desired 

temperature which is entered into the 

temperature-control device;

wherein when the actual temperature is 

above the predetermined-desired temperature, the temperature-control device alters 

the temperature of the desired medium to 

a predetermined differential from the actual temperature; and

wherein when the actual temperature is 

below the predetermined-desired temperature, the temperature-control device alters 

the temperature of the desired medium to 

a pre-set differential from the actual temperature.

J.A. 54–55.

 

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On July 31, 2008, CSZ filed an inter partes reexamination request with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), asserting that all 134 claims of the 

’510 patent were invalid primarily based on the combination of the ’510 patent’s description of the Medi-Therm II 

device (“MT-II”) and SARNS, a manual for a surgical 

blood-warming device. On September 9, 2008, CSZ moved 

to stay the district court action in light of the pending 

reexamination request. On October 24, 2008, the PTO 

granted the reexamination request and issued a first 

Office Action rejecting all claims of the ’510 patent as 

anticipated or obvious over prior art cited in CSZ’s request. On September 28, 2009, the district court denied 

Gaymar’s motion for a preliminary injunction based on a 

substantial issue of patent validity, and granted CSZ’s 

motion to stay the case pending the conclusion of the 

reexamination. On November 23, 2009, the PTO reaffirmed its rejection of all claims of the ’510 patent.

Gaymar filed a notice of appeal with respect to the 

PTO’s cancellation decision, but ultimately determined 

not to pursue it. Gaymar filed an express abandonment of 

all claims on April 16, 2010, and the PTO concluded the 

reexamination on July 13, 2010, cancelling all of the 

claims. The district court lifted the stay on January 20, 

2012, and referred the case to a magistrate judge on 

February 21, 2012. Although the PTO’s unappealed 

cancellation had resolved the merits of the district court 

action, the question of attorney’s fees remained.

CSZ moved for attorney’s fees under § 285, alleging 

that Gaymar’s litigation position was frivolous and that 

Gaymar had engaged in litigation misconduct. On August

8, 2013, the magistrate judge issued a report (the “first 

report”) recommending the denial of CSZ’s § 285 motion. 

In the first report, the magistrate judge found that “CSZ 

has not proven by clear and convincing evidence 

that . . . Gaymar’s claims were objectively baseless.” J.A. 

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17. The magistrate judge further found that although 

Gaymar intentionally gave a misleading response to a 

discovery request relating to a prior art reference, that 

alone was insufficient to render the case exceptional. J.A. 

24. Finally, the magistrate judge noted that he “would 

not recommend an award of attorney’s fees even if the 

case was exceptional,” J.A. 24, relying primarily on apparent litigation misconduct by CSZ based on four examples of purported “misrepresentations to the court” or 

“shifting legal theories,” J.A. 26. The district court adopted in full the magistrate judge’s recommendations on 

November 21, 2013, and denied the motion for attorney’s 

fees.

Following the Supreme Court’s April 29, 2014, decision in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), CSZ moved for reconsideration of its attorney’s fees motion. The magistrate judge 

issued a second report on July 3, 2014 (the “second report”), recommending the denial of CSZ’s motion for 

reconsideration. While the magistrate judge did not 

revisit his finding of a lack of objective baselessness, the 

magistrate judge “disagree[d]” that the primary focus 

under Octane was the objective reasonableness inquiry. 

J.A. 36. The magistrate judge denied fees relying on the 

litigation misconduct findings from the first report, stating that “[g]iven CSZ’s own litigation misconduct, it does 

not have ‘clean hands’ sufficient to render this an ‘exceptional case.’” Id. (citing J.A. 25–27). The district court 

again adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations in 

full on September 30, 2014, concluding that Octane did 

not require a different result and denying reconsideration. 

CSZ appeals the denial of its attorney’s fees motion. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). We 

review de novo whether the district court applied the 

correct legal standard under § 285. Monolithic Power Sys. 

v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 726 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 

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2013). We review the district court’s factual findings 

underlying an exceptional case determination for clear 

error. Id. And we review the district court’s determination of whether a case is “exceptional” for an abuse of 

discretion. Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 

Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1748–49 (2014). 

DISCUSSION

I 

Section 285 provides: “The court in exceptional cases 

may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing 

party.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Supreme Court in Octane

rejected the two-pronged standard articulated in Brooks 

Furniture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, 

Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), for determining 

whether a case is exceptional under § 285. The Supreme 

Court explained that “[t]here is no precise rule or formula 

for making” that determination. Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 

1756 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Instead, “[d]istrict courts may determine whether a case 

is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 

The inquiry into the objective reasonableness of a party’s

litigating position may still be relevant under Octane

because, if a case “stands out from others with respect to 

the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position

(considering both the governing law and the facts of the 

case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was 

litigated,” it is “exceptional” under § 285. Id.

In the first order, the court noted that CSZ’s claim 

that Gaymar’s litigation position was objectively baseless 

was solely based on Gaymar’s apparent knowledge of 

prior art which disclosed “the only feature that distinguished the asserted claims of the ’510 patent from the 

prior art.” J.A. 10 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The court found that CSZ had failed to estabCase: 14-1174 Document: 47-2 Page: 6 Filed: 06/25/2015
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lish by clear and convincing2 evidence that Gaymar’s 

litigation position was objectively baseless, relying on the 

fact that CSZ could have but did not move for summary 

judgment in lieu of awaiting the outcome of the PTO 

reexamination, suggesting that “this case was closer than 

CSZ would now have this court believe.” J.A. 25. The 

court also relied on the fact that “[i]n its reply papers, 

Gaymar addressed CSZ’s invalidity arguments at great 

length and in considerable detail.” J.A. 16. 

While on appeal CSZ takes issue with the district 

court’s finding that Gaymar’s litigation position was not 

objectively baseless, it has failed to establish that the 

district court abused its discretion in reaching that conclusion. CSZ relies on the fact that Gaymar lost at the 

PTO, but as the Supreme Court made clear in Octane, fee 

awards are not to be used “as a penalty for failure to win 

a patent infringement suit.” 134 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting 

Park-In-Theatres, Inc. v. Perkins, 190 F.2d 137, 142 (9th 

Cir. 1951)). In other words, fees are not awarded solely 

because one party’s position did not prevail. CSZ also 

relies on factors relevant only to the subjective inquiry,3

such as Gaymar’s pre-suit knowledge of the prior art 

SARNS manual and failure to withdraw its preliminary 

injunction motion during the pendency of the PTO reex2 CSZ does not argue on appeal that the district 

court’s use in the first report of the clear and convincing 

standard, which was reversed by Octane in favor of a 

preponderance of the evidence standard, requires a remand on this issue. See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1758.

3 The subjective inquiry remains relevant under Octane. See 134 S. Ct. at 1757 (“[A] case presenting either 

subjective bad faith or exceptionally meritless claims may 

sufficiently set itself apart from mine-run cases to warrant a fee award.”).

 

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amination. CSZ has not established that the district 

court erred in its determination that Gaymar’s claims 

were not objectively baseless.

II

Under Octane, a district court may consider “the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position,” including objective reasonableness, when determining if the 

case “stands out from others.” Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756. 

Here, after Octane, the district court chose not to rest its 

decision on the reasonableness of Gaymar’s litigation 

position—a step it might have taken—but instead refused

to award fees under Octane based in significant part on 

its finding that “[g]iven CSZ’s own litigation misconduct, 

it does not have ‘clean hands’ sufficient to render this an 

‘exceptional case.’” J.A. 36 (citing J.A. 25–27 (first report)).4 

To be sure, the conduct of the parties is a relevant factor under Octane’s totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry,5

including the conduct of the movant, but we conclude that 

the district court committed clear error here in finding

misconduct by CSZ. 

4 The district court also adopted the magistrate 

judge’s finding that he would not have awarded fees even 

if the case were exceptional, but that determination was 

also largely based on CSZ’s purported litigation misconduct.

5 See Octane, 134 S. Ct. at 1756; see also, e.g., Power 

Mosfet Techs., L.L.C. v. Siemens AG, 378 F.3d 1396, 1415 

(Fed. Cir. 2004) (district court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying fees under § 285 “because all of the parties had 

conducted themselves without the decorum required when 

practicing before a federal court”).

 

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The first example cited by the magistrate judge related to a July 21, 2008, initial status conference hearing 

(the “July 2008 hearing”) before Judge Skretny:

[CSZ’s] telling Judge Skretny on July 21, 2008 

that [CSZ] needed to identify an expert in the 

technology, then later asserting that it had maintained “from the outset” that no technological expert was needed[.] 

J.A. 26 (citing J.A. 942 and quoting J.A. 6489) (internal 

citations omitted). The first statement is from the July

21, 2008 hearing, where CSZ noted that Gaymar had 

“identified three experts” and that “[w]e need to identify 

our own expert in the technology. And we also would like 

to have an expert witness on patent practice.” J.A. 942. 

The second, and supposedly inconsistent, statement arose 

four years later in the context of Gaymar’s November 20, 

2012, motion to strike the declarations in support of CSZ’s 

§ 285 motion by Richard Killworth, CSZ’s expert in “the 

field of patent law and, specifically, [PTO] practice and 

procedure.” J.A. 5389. Gaymar argued that Killworth 

was not a technical expert who could properly opine on 

whether the patent was obvious. CSZ argued that while 

Killworth was not a technical expert, he was a PTO 

expert who could opine on obviousness. CSZ asserted:

[T]he technology at issue in the current matter is 

generally understandable and does not require an 

expert with technical skill in the art. CSZ has 

maintained this position from the outset, where it 

challenged the validity of the ’510 patent at the 

preliminary injunction phase without the aid of a 

technical expert.

J.A. 6489 (emphasis added).

Apparently, in finding misconduct, the district court 

was taxing CSZ for use of the phrase “from the outset” 

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with regard to the lack of a need for a technical expert, 

because at the July 2008 hearing—more than four years 

earlier—CSZ’s attorney stated that “[w]e need to identify 

our own expert in technology.” J.A. 942. But CSZ’s use of 

“from the outset” here is clearly referring to the point at 

which “it challenged the validity of the ’510 patent at the 

preliminary injunction phase without the aid of a technical expert,” J.A. 6489, i.e., CSZ’s opposition to Gaymar’s 

motion for a preliminary injunction. There CSZ first laid 

out its invalidity defense, relying on the declaration of 

Killworth, who was not a technical expert. The fact that 

between the July 2008 hearing and the October 14, 2008, 

opposition CSZ decided that it did not need to rely on a 

technical expert does not amount to litigation misconduct, 

and the district court’s contrary finding was clearly erroneous. 

The second example cited by the magistrate judge is: 

[CSZ’s] having Mr. Killworth opine on prior art 

from the perspective of one skilled in the art, then 

later denying that he did so[.] 

J.A. 26 (citing J.A. 5394, 6489) (internal citations omitted). The first reference is to Killworth’s October 25, 

2012, supplemental declaration in support of CSZ’s § 285 

motion. Relying on the PTO’s findings on reexamination, 

a prior art manual, and the testimony of Gaymar’s own 

President (Dr. Stewart), Killworth concluded that “it 

would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill to 

minimize patient discomfort by operating the MT-II [prior 

art] device in Manual mode to maintain the gradient.” 

J.A. 5394 (emphasis added). The second reference is to

CSZ’s opposition to Gaymar’s motion to strike: 

Mr. Killworth’s opinions are not based from the

perspective of one of ordinary skill in the art. Rather, his opinions are based on the perspective of 

the USPTO examiner conducting a hypothetical 

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examination of the ’510 patent in light of the references withheld by Gaymar. . . . It is . . . a perspective for which Mr. Killworth is well-qualified 

through his background as a patent examiner and 

decades of experience as a patent attorney.

J.A. 6489 (emphasis added). 

In this second example, the district court was apparently taxing CSZ for stating that Killworth’s “opinions are 

not based from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in 

the art,” J.A. 6489, whereas in an earlier filing Killworth 

referred to what “would have been obvious to a person of 

ordinary skill,” J.A. 5394. Read in context, Killworth was 

not opining from the perspective of one of ordinary skill in 

the art, but rather relying on others—the PTO examiner 

and Dr. Stewart—to support his opinions as a PTO expert.6 Thus, CSZ’s statements were not inconsistent, this 

was not litigation misconduct, and the district court’s 

finding otherwise was clearly erroneous. 

The final two examples of supposed misconduct arose 

against a background of a dispute between the parties as 

to whether Gaymar had the burden of addressing validity 

in its preliminary injunction (to show likelihood of success) or whether Gaymar was obligated to address the 

issue only after CSZ raised the issue.7 

6 We do not suggest that the use of such an expert 

is appropriate. See Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 7 Invalidity is an affirmative defense, and the patentee need not address invalidity as an initial matter in 

filing for a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Titan Tire 

Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“To begin, the patent enjoys the same 

presumption of validity during preliminary injunction 

 

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The third example cited by the magistrate judge is: 

proceedings as at other stages of litigation. Thus, if a 

patentee moves for a preliminary injunction and the 

alleged infringer does not challenge validity, the very 

existence of the patent with its concomitant presumption 

of validity satisfies the patentee’s burden of showing a 

likelihood of success on the validity issue.” (citations 

omitted)); Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 473 F.3d 

1196, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“[I]n order to defeat the 

[preliminary] injunction based on invalidity or unenforceability defenses . . . the party bearing the burden of proof 

on the issue at trial[] must establish a substantial question of invalidity or unenforceability . . . .”); PHG Techs., 

LLC v. St. John Cos., 469 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 

(“In order to defeat the [preliminary] injunction on 

grounds of potential invalidity, [the alleged infringer], as 

the party bearing the burden of proof on the issue at trial, 

must establish a substantial question of invalidity.”).

On appeal, CSZ continues to rely on Nutrition 21 v. 

United States, 930 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1991), for the 

contrary view, i.e., that Gaymar bore the initial burden on 

validity at the preliminary injunction phase. Nutrition 21

held that “at the preliminary injunction stage, because of 

the extraordinary nature of the relief, the patentee carries 

the burden of showing likelihood of success on the merits 

with respect to the patent’s validity, enforceability, and 

infringement.” 930 F.2d at 869 (emphasis in original). 

But in Nutrition 21, the alleged infringer “raised substantive issues respecting the validity and enforceability of the 

[patent-in-suit] based on evidence of record,” id., and our 

holding there is fully consistent with Titan Tire and other 

cases which make clear that the alleged infringer bears 

the initial burden of asserting invalidity at the preliminary injunction phase. See Titan Tire, 566 F.3d at 1377; 

Abbott, 473 F.3d at 1201; PHG, 469 F.3d at 1365.

 

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[CSZ’s] claiming that “[a]t the hearing in July, 

Gaymar denied that it had any obligations regarding validity,” whereas in fact Gaymar correctly 

told Judge Skretny that its obligation to address 

validity would not arise until CSZ had alleged and 

introduced evidence of invalidity[.]

J.A. 26 (quoting J.A. 3055 and citing J.A. 947–49) (internal citations omitted). There is no inconsistency. CSZ’s 

consistent position was that Gaymar was taking the 

position that it did not have any initial burden with 

respect to validity—an accurate statement of Gaymar’s

position. Once again, this is not a misrepresentation, and 

the district court’s reliance on this example was clearly 

erroneous. 

The fourth and final example is similar to the third: 

[CSZ’s] claiming that “this court gave Gaymar an 

opportunity to address its flawed position, with a 

chance to update its motion for a preliminary injunction. . . . Instead, Gaymar chose to ignore its 

obligations regarding validity,” whereas in fact 

Judge Skretny agreed with Gaymar’s proposal to 

defer discussion of validity until its reply papers, 

after CSZ had asserted the defense of invalidity.

J.A. 26 (quoting J.A. 3056 and citing J.A. 949) (internal 

citations omitted). CSZ accurately stated that the district 

court gave Gaymar the opportunity to supplement its 

preliminary injunction pleadings, and CSZ’s reference to 

Gaymar’s “flawed position” expressed CSZ’s own position 

that Gaymar’s argument (which was that Gaymar should 

address the issue in its reply) was flawed, not the district 

court’s view of Gaymar’s position. This is clear from other 

portions of CSZ’s filings, which the magistrate judge 

relied on in finding that “[t]he effect of CSZ’s misrepresentations is only exacerbated by repetition.” J.A. 26. 

For instance, the magistrate judge cited CSZ’s October 17, 

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2008, memorandum in support of its motion for a protective order, where CSZ asserted:

Three months ago, [Gaymar] brought a Motion 

[for] Preliminary Injunction that was facially devoid of any evidence of the validity or enforceability of its asserted [’510 patent]. When [CSZ] 

brought this omission to Gaymar’s and this 

Court’s attention just six days later, this Court 

point blankly asked Gaymar if it was prepared to 

stand on what it had submitted, and Gaymar said 

“yes.” Nevertheless, this Court graciously gave 

Gaymar a second chance to reassess whether it 

had everything in its papers and supplement its 

pleadings, but Gaymar did nothing.

J.A. 1674; see also J.A. 3081 (“At the initial hearing in 

July, Gaymar asserted, incorrectly, that it could show 

likelihood of success on the merits merely by establishing 

infringement. Even after this Court gave Gaymar an 

opportunity to supplement its motion for a preliminary 

injunction, Gaymar chose not to address validity or enforceability.”); J.A. 4814 (“At the initial hearing in July 

2008, CSZ explained Gaymar’s deficiency and cited Nutrition 21. This Court gave Gaymar an opportunity to 

supplement its preliminary injunction motion. But Gaymar ignored Nutrition 21 and did nothing.”8 (citations 

omitted)). The district court’s reliance on this fourth 

example was also clearly erroneous.

8 As described above, CSZ was relying on Nutrition 

21’s statement that “at the preliminary injunction stage, 

because of the extraordinary nature of the relief, the 

patentee carries the burden of showing likelihood of success on the merits with respect to the patent’s validity, 

enforceability, and infringement.” 930 F.2d at 869.

 

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Without question, CSZ’s arguments (particularly as to 

the third and fourth examples) could be properly characterized as overstatements. But none of the cited examples 

amounts to misrepresentation or litigation misconduct. 

In addressing potential litigation misconduct in analogous

contexts, other circuits have concluded that isolated 

overstatements do not rise to the level of sanctionable 

litigation misconduct under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 83 (2d 

Cir. 2010) (a “possible overstatement” does not violate 

Rule 11); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 3 F.3d 464, 

467 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Rule 11 neither penalizes overstatement nor authorizes an overly literal reading of each 

factual statement.”); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Tekfen 

Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 443–45, 444 n.6 

(7th Cir. 1988) (vacating Rule 11 sanctions “even if [a] 

minor argument were off the mark” and “not meritorious” 

when the defendant’s “persistence, perhaps more than the 

substance of its arguments, led to the sanctions”); see also, 

e.g., A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 

1401, 1402–03 (9th Cir. 1992) (Under a statute providing 

grounds for vacating an arbitration award procured by 

“undue means,” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1), “mere sloppy or 

overzealous lawyering” does not “constitute[] ‘undue 

means.’”). 

III

In summary, the examples cited by the district 

court—whether considered in isolation or in the aggregate—amount to sloppy argument, at worst. While such 

sloppiness on the part of litigants is unfortunately all too 

common, it does not amount to misrepresentation or 

misconduct. In view of the serious consequences of a 

finding of misconduct, it is important that the district 

court be particularly careful not to characterize bad 

lawyering as misconduct. “CSZ’s own litigation misconduct,” J.A. 36, was cited by the district court for finding 

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that this was not an exceptional case in light of Octane. 

Because none of the examples cited by the district court 

constitutes litigation misconduct, a remand is required. 

We reverse the district court’s denial of attorney’s 

fees, and remand for reconsideration on the totality of the 

circumstances under Octane. On remand, the district 

court remains free to deny attorney’s fees based on the 

totality of the circumstances, including the strength of 

Gaymar’s litigation position and the sustained finding 

that Gaymar’s litigation position was not objectively 

baseless. 

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party to bear its own costs.

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