Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01122/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Rivers
Petitioner
Idaho Rivers United
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 16, 2004 Decided June 22, 2004

No. 03-1122

IN RE: AMERICAN RIVERS AND

IDAHO RIVERS UNITED,

PETITIONERS

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

Jonathan R. Lovvorn argued the cause for the petitioners.

Amy R. Atwood and Eric R. Glitzenstein were on brief.

Dennis Lane, Solicitor, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for the respondent. Cynthia A.

Marlette, General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, was on brief. Beth G. Pacella, Attorney, Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission, entered an appearance.

James B. Vasile, Hubert A. Farbes, Jr. and Mark J.

Mathews were on brief for the intervenor.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: EDWARDS and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: In 1997 a

coalition of environmental organizations petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to formally consult under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act with the

National Marine Fisheries Service of the National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)1

 regarding FERC’s

ongoing regulatory authority over hydropower operations affecting threatened and endangered anadromous2

 fish in the

Snake River basin. The petition has gone unanswered for

more than six years. Now petitioners American Rivers and

Idaho Rivers United (collectively, petitioners) seek a writ of

mandamus compelling a response, alleging that FERC’s sixyear delay is unreasonable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). For the reasons set forth

below, we grant the writ and order FERC to respond to the

petition within 45 days of the issuance of this opinion.

I.

The Endangered Species Act (ESA or Act), 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1531 et seq., is generally regarded as ‘‘the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species

ever enacted by any nation.’’ Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill,

437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978); see also Rancho Viejo, LLC v.

Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124

S. Ct. 1506 (2004). Finding that various species of fish,

wildlife and plants valuable to the health and welfare of the

nation have become extinct or face extinction because of

‘‘economic growth and development untempered by adequate

concern and conservation,’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1)-(3), the

1 The NOAA is an agency within the United States Department

of Commerce. See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 360

F.3d 21, 23 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004). The National Marine Fisheries

Service (Service) is a part of NOAA. See id.

2 ‘‘Anadromous’’ fish, such as salmon, migrate upriver from the

sea to breed in fresh water. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 76 (1993).

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Congress enacted the ESA to provide a means for conserving

endangered and threatened species as well as the ecosystems

they depend on, see id. § 1531(b); Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at

1064.

The ESA confers on the United States Departments of the

Interior (Interior) and of Commerce (Commerce) shared responsibilities for protecting threatened3

 or endangered4 species of fish, wildlife and plants. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a).

The Commerce Secretary has, in turn, delegated his authority

to list threatened or endangered marine and anadromous

species to the Service. Id. § 1533(a)(2)(A); 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.01(b); see 50 C.F.R. §§ 223.102 (threatened species),

224.101 (endangered species).

Section 7 of the ESA requires all federal agencies, ‘‘in

consultation with and with the assistance of the [Commerce

or Interior] Secretary,’’ to further the ESA’s purpose by

‘‘carrying out programs for the conservation’’ of listed species.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). An agency must ensure that its

actions, including licensures, are ‘‘not likely to jeopardize the

continued existence of any endangered or threatened species

or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat

of such species which is determined by the Secretary TTT to

be critical.’’ Id. § 1536(a)(2); see Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at

1064. Upon determining that its activity ‘‘may affect listed

[marine or anadromous] species or critical habitat,’’ an agency

must initiate formal consultation with the Service5

 by submitting a written request containing, inter alia, descriptions of

3 A species is ‘‘endangered’’ if it ‘‘is in danger of extinction

throughout all or a significant portion of its range.’’ 16 U.S.C.

§ 1532(6).

4 A species is ‘‘threatened’’ if it ‘‘is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a

significant portion of its range.’’ 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20).

5 If, following a biological assessment, see 50 C.F.R. § 402.12, or

informal consultation with the Service, see id. § 402.13, the agency

determines—and the Service concurs—that the contemplated action

is ‘‘not likely to adversely affect any listed species or critical

habitat’’ or ‘‘if a preliminary biological opinion, issued after early

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the contemplated action and listed species or critical habitat

that may be affected by it. 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a), (c). Formal consultation ordinarily culminates with the Service’s issuance of a biological opinion that makes a ‘‘jeopardy’’ or ‘‘no

jeopardy’’ conclusion. Id. § 402.14(g)(4), (h)(3); see 16 U.S.C.

§ 1536(b)(4). If it determines that the action ‘‘is likely to

jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or result

in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat,’’

the opinion suggests ‘‘reasonable and prudent alternatives, if

any,’’ the agency can take to avoid violating section 7. 50

C.F.R. § 402.14(h)(3); see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A). According to the Service’s regulations, formal consultation must

usually be concluded within 90 days. See 50 C.F.R.

§ 402.14(e).

In 1955 FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power Commission (Commission), granted a 50–year license to the Idaho

Power Company (IPC) to construct, operate and maintain the

Hells Canyon Complex, a hydropower project composed of

three dams—Oxbow, low Hells Canyon and Brownlee—in the

Hells Canyon area of the Snake River. See Idaho Power Co.,

Opinion & Order, 14 F.P.C. 55 (Aug. 4, 1955), reprinted in

Petitioners’ Addendum (P.A.) 1, 20. The Commission recognized then that the project ‘‘would adversely affect the fish

and wildlife resources of the area, and particularly the anadromous fish.’’ P.A. 7. Because the project ‘‘would block the

runs of anadromous fish,’’ the Commission concluded that

‘‘some type of fish facilities would have to be provided for the

protection of this resource.’’ P.A. 17. Accordingly, to minimize the project’s impact on the anadromous fish, the Commission required the IPC to construct and maintain ‘‘fish

ladders, fish traps or other fish handling facilities or fish

protective devices and provide fish hatchery facilities for the

purpose of conserving the fishery resources.’’ P.A. 21–22.

The IPC’s license also included a ‘‘re-opener’’ clause, providconsultation under § 402.11, is confirmed as the final biological

opinion,’’ formal consultation is not required. Id. § 402.14(b)(1)-(2).

‘‘Informal consultation’’ is an ‘‘optional process TTT designed to

assist the [f]ederal agency in determining whether formal consultation or a conference is required.’’ Id. § 402.13(a).

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ing that the company must ‘‘comply with such reasonable

modifications of the project structures and operation in the

interest of fish life as may be prescribed hereafter by the

Commission upon its own motion or upon the recommendation of the Secretary.’’ P.A. 22.

It is not disputed that hydropower projects have contributed to declining populations of anadromous fish—namely,

salmon and steelhead trout species—in the Snake River and

the Columbia River basin. See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Species; Proposed Endangered Status for Snake River

Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 14,055, 14,058 (Apr. 5, 1991)

(proposed rule (‘‘[C]urrent annual salmon and steelhead production in the Columbia River Basin is more than 10 million

fish below historical levels, with 8 million of this annual loss

estimate attributable to hydropower development and operation.’’)). So far the Service has listed three Snake River

anadromous fish species as endangered and one as threatened, each time listing hydropower development as a factor

contributing to population decline.6

 In 1991 the Service listed

the Snake River sockeye salmon as endangered. See 56 Fed.

Reg. at 58,623. It listed two more species of salmon, the

Snake River spring/summer chinook salmon and the Snake

River fall chinook salmon, as threatened the following year7

and as endangered two years later through an emergency

6 See Endangered and Threatened Species: Listing of Several

Evolutionary Significant Units (ESUs) of West Coast Steelhead, 62

Fed. Reg. 43,937, 43,950 (Aug. 18, 1997) (final rule); Endangered

and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Emergency Reclassification

of the Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon and the Snake

River Fall Chinook Salmon From Threatened to Endangered Status, 59 Fed. Reg. 54,840 (Nov. 2, 1994) (emergency rule); Endangered and Threatened Species; Status of Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 59

Fed. Reg. 42,529, 42,530 (Aug. 18, 1994) (emergency interim rule);

Endangered and Threatened Species; Endangered Status for

Snake River Sockeye Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,619, 58,622 (Nov. 20,

1991) (final rule).

7 See Endangered and Threatened Species; Threatened Status

for Snake River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon, Threatened

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rule.8

 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 54,840; 59 Fed. Reg. at 42,531–32.

In 1993 the Service also designated an area including the

Hells Canyon reach of the Snake River as critical habitat for

these three salmon species. See Designated Critical Habitat;

Snake River Sockeye Salmon, Snake River Spring/Summer

Chinook Salmon, and Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 58

Fed. Reg. 68,543, 68,546 (Dec. 28, 1993) (final rule). And in

1997, the Service listed the Snake River population of west

coast steelhead trout as threatened. See 62 Fed. Reg. at

43,950.

Reacting to these developments, a coalition of environmental organizations (including petitioner American Rivers) requested FERC in November 1997 to initiate formal consultation with the Service regarding FERC’s ongoing regulation of

IPC’s operation of the Hells Canyon Complex.9

 See Petition

to Initiate Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act at

1-17, reprinted in P.A. 40-56 [hereinafter 1997 petition]. The

petition asked FERC to act within 30 days ‘‘[b]ecause time is

running out for the endangered salmon.’’ P.A. 56. The

coalition further recited that it would consider FERC’s failure

to respond within 30 days a constructive denial of the petition

and would file immediately for rehearing. P.A. 56.

Status for Snake River Fall Chinook Salmon, 57 Fed. Reg. 14,653

(Apr. 22, 1992) (final rule).

8 The emergency designation is no longer in effect. See 16 U.S.C.

§ 1533(b)(7) (emergency regulation ceases to have force after 240

days); 50 C.F.R. § 424.20(a) (same); see also Endangered and

Threatened Species; Withdrawal of Proposed Rule to List Snake

River Spring/Summer Chinook Salmon and Fall Chinook Salmon

as Endangered, 63 Fed. Reg. 1807, 1811 (Jan. 12, 1998) (proposed

rule; withdrawal (withdrawing proposed rule to reclassify Snake

River spring/summer and fall chinook salmon as endangered)).

9 The coalition filed its request pursuant to 18 C.F.R.

§ 385.207(a)(5), which provides that ‘‘[a] person must file a petition

when seeking TTT [a]ny other action which is in the discretion of

[FERC] and for which this chapter prescribes no other form of

pleading.’’ Id.

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When FERC failed to meet the deadline, the coalition

reacted as promised. It notified FERC that it considered the

agency’s inaction a denial of the petition and requested

rehearing. See Request for Rehearing of Constructive Order

Denying Petition to Initiate Consultation Under the Endangered Species Act at 1-3, reprinted in P.A. 111-13. FERC

subsequently denied rehearing, noting ‘‘[b]ecause there has

been no order from which to seek rehearing, [the] rehearing

request is premature and must be rejected.’’ Idaho Power

Co., Order Rejecting Request for Rehearing, 82 FERC ¶ 61,-

049 (Jan. 22, 1998) (footnote omitted). The coalition then

petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for review of

FERC’s denial of the petition effected by its failure to act.

See American Rivers v. FERC, 170 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 1999).

It met with no more success there. Id. at 897. The Ninth

Circuit dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction, explaining that ‘‘appellate jurisdiction is dependent on the issuance

of an order by FERC’’ and the agency’s ‘‘[m]ere inaction TTT

cannot be transmuted by petitioners into an order rejecting

their petition.’’ Id.

Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, coalition members

along with other groups have repeatedly requested FERC to

either grant the 1997 petition and immediately initiate section

7 consultation or formally deny the petition.10 More than six

years later, FERC has yet to respond to the 1997 petition.

The petitioners now ask us to grant a writ of mandamus

compelling FERC to act formally on the 1997 petition. We

have jurisdiction to entertain the request in order to safeguard our prospective jurisdiction under the Federal Power

Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b). See Telecomms. Research & Action

10 See Letter from Robert J. Masonis, American Rivers, to Spencer Abraham, Sec’y of Energy, et al. 6 (Aug. 28, 2002), reprinted in

P.A. at 140; Letter from Pat Ford, Save Our Wild Salmon, et al., to

Patrick Henry Wood III, Chairperson, FERC, & Kevin P. Madden,

Office of General Counsel, FERC 4 (Nov. 1, 2001), reprinted in P.A.

at 144; Letter from Aaron Courtney, Pacific Envtl. Advocacy Ctr.,

et al., to Spencer Abraham, Sec’y of Energy, et al. 6 (Apr. 19, 2001),

reprinted in P.A. at 133.

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Center v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (‘‘Because the

statutory obligation of a Court of Appeals to review on the

merits may be defeated by an agency that fails to resolve

disputes, a Circuit Court may resolve claims of unreasonable

delay in order to protect its future jurisdiction.’’) [hereinafter

TRAC].

II.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for extraordinary circumstances. See, e.g., In re United Mine

Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 549 (D.C. Cir.

1999). An administrative agency’s unreasonable delay presents such a circumstance because it signals the ‘‘breakdown of

regulatory processes.’’ Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 897

n.156 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, we will interfere with

the normal progression of agency proceedings to correct

‘‘transparent violations of a clear duty to act,’’ In re Bluewater Network, 234 F.3d 1305, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2000), because

‘‘[i]t is obvious that the benefits of agency expertise and

creation of a record will not be realized if the agency never

takes action.’’ TRAC, 750 F.2d at 79. In considering a

charge of unreasonable delay, however, we must satisfy ourselves that the agency has a duty to act and that it has

‘‘unreasonably delayed’’ in discharging that duty. 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(1); see id. § 555(b); In re Bluewater Network, 234

F.3d at 1315. Although our test to determine whether to

address an alleged unreasonable delay is ‘‘hardly ironclad,’’

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80, we are guided by the standard

announced in TRAC:

(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be

governed by a ‘‘rule of reason’’; (2) where Congress has

provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with

which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling

statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for

this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable

in the sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable

when human health and welfare are at stake; (4) the

court should consider the effect of expediting delayed

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action on agency activities of a higher or competing

priority; (5) the court should also take into account the

nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay;

and (6) the court need not ‘‘find any impropriety lurking

behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency

action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’ ’’

In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d at

549 (quoting TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80).

Rather than attempting to demonstrate the reasonableness

of its more than six-year delay, FERC defends its inaction

indirectly with arguments that proceed along two related and,

at times, conflicting fronts. FERC first asserts that it is not

obligated to address the 1997 petition at all. In FERC’s

view, simply filing a petition seeking agency action does not,

by itself, require FERC to respond to it. Moreover, according to FERC, neither a re-opener clause in a hydropower

licensee’s license nor the Service’s listing of endangered or

threatened species or designation of critical habitat requires

it to initiate formal consultation under section 7 of the ESA.

In this regard, FERC maintains that ‘‘the ESA prerequisite

for instituting formal consultation has not yet been met and

the precise obligations of FERC in these circumstances are

far from clear under the statute or regulations.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 17. Both of FERC’s assertions are founded on

fundamental misunderstandings; the former of the law, the

latter of the legal issue before us.

FERC’s insistence that it is not obligated to address a

petition filed under one of its own regulations allowing requests for discretionary action, see 18 C.F.R. § 385.207(a)(5),

is without merit. Under the APA a federal agency is obligated to ‘‘conclude a matter’’ presented to it ‘‘within a reasonable

time,’’ 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and a reviewing court may ‘‘compel

agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed.’’

Id. § 706(1); see In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d

1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curiam). FERC may not

wish to respond to the 1997 petition but any person aggrieved

by a FERC action—including a failure to act—is entitled to

judicial review under the Federal Power Act, see 16 U.S.C.

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§ 825l(b). Indeed, the primary purpose of the writ in circumstances like these is to ensure that an agency does not thwart

our jurisdiction by withholding a reviewable decision. See

TRAC, 750 F.2d at 76.

FERC’s assertions that it is not obligated to initiate formal

consultation under section 7 either by virtue of the re-opener

clause in IPC’s license or based on the Service’s ESA actions

are beside the point. FERC is obligated under the APA to

respond to the 1997 petition. Moreover, these contentions go

not to the reasonableness of FERC’s delay but to the merits

of the petition itself. We are not concerned here with what

answer FERC might ultimately give the petitioners; rather,

we are reviewing its failure to give them any answer for more

than six years.

FERC’s second front involves contentions that again, in

one way or another, address the merits of the 1997 petition.

FERC contends that, given its involvement in (or notice of)

ongoing efforts to resolve complex litigation regarding Snake

River water rights, ‘‘it is difficult to see what more FERC

could do’’ and that ‘‘[n]othing more is or can be required.’’

Respondent’s Br. at 14, 15. FERC also points out that

‘‘interim measures[ ] agreed to by the affected agencies and

parties’’ address the Service’s listing of the salmon and

steelhead species until the water rights litigation is resolved.

Respondent’s Br. at 18. FERC further explains that, because resolution of the water rights litigation will bear on the

section 7 formal consultation regarding the operation of the

Hells Canyon Complex, the Service has ‘‘counsel[led] forbearance’’ and asked FERC to ‘‘suspend information gathering

until negotiations to settle that litigation have run their

course.’’ Respondent’s Br. at 18.

In a similar vein, FERC stated during oral argument that

it had already ‘‘done what was requested in the 1997 petition.’’

Oral Arg. Tr. at 11. FERC’s assertion that it responded to

the 1997 petition by doing what the petition requested runs

counter to its position on brief and discussed above. More

significantly, FERC’s resort to certain record items does not

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constitute an unequivocal—or even coherent—response to the

1997 petition.11

While FERC makes various attempts to rationalize its

delay, none of its reasons comports with the specific considerations outlined in TRAC. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 80. There

is ‘‘no per se rule as to how long is too long’’ to wait for

agency action, In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d at

1149, but a reasonable time for agency action is typically

counted in weeks or months, not years. See Midwest Gas

Users Ass’n v. FERC, 833 F.2d 341, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1987)

(‘‘[T]his court has stated generally that a reasonable time for

an agency decision could encompass ‘months, occasionally a

year or two, but not several years or a decade.’ ’’ (quoting

MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 322, 340 (D.C. Cir.

1980))). FERC’s six-year-plus delay is nothing less than

egregious.12

Not only has FERC neglected a petition seeking action

under a law designed to ‘‘halt and reverse the trend toward

11 Compare Letter from J. Mark Robinson, Director, Office of

Energy Projects, FERC, to Robert Lohn, Regional Administrator,

Service 1 (Oct. 25, 2002) (‘‘I’m requesting formal consultation with

your office, pursuant to section 7 of the [ESA], with respect to the

impacts of the Hells Canyon Complex Project TTT on threatened or

endangered species and/or critical habitat.’’), reprinted in P.A. 146,

with Letter from James C. Tucker, IPC, to J. Mark Robinson,

Director, Office of Energy Projects, FERC 1 (Dec. 2, 2002) (‘‘We

were advised [during a meeting on November 6, 2002] that FERC

was not initiating § 7(a)(2) consultationTTTT’’), reprinted in P.A.

147.

12 We have questioned a similar delay, see Pub. Citizen Health

Research Group v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sixyear delay ‘‘tread[ed] at the very lip of the abyss of unreasonable

delay’’), and shorter ones too, see, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l v.

Civil Aeronautics Bd., 750 F.2d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (five-year

delay unreasonable); Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (threeyear delay unreasonable); MCI Telecomms. Corp., 627 F.2d at 324–

25, 338–42 (four-year delay unreasonable).

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species extinction, whatever the cost,’’13 but its dilatoriness is

apparently—it offers nothing to the contrary—uncharacteristic of the relatively swift treatment it routinely gives similar

petitions.14 Further, FERC offers no ‘‘plea of administrative

error, administrative convenience, practical difficulty in carrying out a legislative mandate, or need to prioritize in the face

of limited resources.’’ Cutler, 818 F.2d at 898. While FERC

vacillates between claiming that it is not obligated to respond

to the 1997 petition and asserting it can do no more, it has in

no way indicated that any practical impediments have prevented a response or that any ‘‘agency activities of a higher or

competing priority’’ have required its attention.15 See In re

13 Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 184; see also 16 U.S.C.

§§ 1531(b), 1536.

14 See Puget Sound Energy, Inc., Order Dismissing Petition, 95

FERC ¶ 61,015 (Apr. 2, 2001) (dismissing petition for formal consultation within three months), available at 2001 WL 477657; PhelpsDodge Morenci, Inc., Order Denying Petition, 94 FERC ¶ 61,202

(Feb. 23, 2001) (denying petition for formal consultation in less than

two years), available at 2001 WL 275411; Montana Power Co.,

Order Dismissing Petition, 83 FERC ¶ 61,290 (June 12, 1998)

(dismissing petition seeking damages and restitution within one

month), available at 1998 WL 308087; South Suburban Citizens

Opposed to Polluting Our Env’t v. Chewton Glen Energy–Ford

Heights, LLC, Order Dismissing Petition for Declaratory Order, 79

FERC ¶ 61,291 (June 2, 1997) (dismissing petition for declaratory

order within four months), available at 1997 WL 290241; Modesto

Irrigation Dist., Turlock Irrigation Dist., City and County of San

Francisco, CA, Order Dismissing Petition, 35 FERC ¶ 61,356 (June

19, 1986) (dismissing petition requesting permit cancellation in less

than two years), available at 1986 WL 77869.

15 Under the final TRAC criterion, ‘‘[t]he court need not find any

impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that

agency action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’ ’’ 750 F.2d at 80 (quoting

Pub. Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C.

Cir. 1984)). Nonetheless, FERC candidly admits its disdain for the

petitioners’ effort to seek review of the agency’s inaction. See

Respondent’s Br. at 14 (asserting that petitioners’ ‘‘call for formal

consultation appears to have the sole function of obtaining a FERC

order [they] can appeal’’).

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United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d at 549.

* * *

The petitioners are entitled to an end to FERC’s marathon

round of administrative keep-away and soon. Accordingly,

we hereby direct FERC to issue a judicially reviewable

response to the 1997 petition within 45 days from the date of

the issuance of this opinion.

So ordered.

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