Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04137/USCOURTS-ca10-92-04137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jorge Antonio Rosales
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL 1.il JJ 

U i~ States Cm.rt of Appea\P 

n rrenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT JAN O 5 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

J ORGE ANTONIO ROSALES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-4137 

(D.C. No. 91-CR-214-W) 

(D. Utah) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

Jorge Antonio Rosales appeals the denial of his motions to 

suppress evidence. Following the entry of the order appealed 

from, Mr. Rosales entered a plea of guilty. The record is silent 

whether he initiated this plea pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 

ll(a) (2) ; however, he states in his brief that he entered into a 

*This order and judgment has n o precedential value and shall not 

b e cited, o r used by any court within the Tent h Circuit, e x cept 

for purposes of establishing the doct r ines o f the law of the case, 

r es judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-4137 Document: 010110155961 Date Filed: 01/05/1993 Page: 1 
plea agreement in which the government stipulated he could appeal 

the ruling on the motions t o suppress. 

That agreement is not a part of the appellate record, but the 

government raises no issue regarding the defendant's failure to 

procure the approval of the district court or the entry of a 

conditional plea in accordance with Rule 11. We shall not, 

therefore, preclude a review on the merits. Following that 

review, however, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

While driving through the State of Utah, defendant was 

stopped by a state patrolman for speeding and for having an 

expired license plate on the vehicle he was operating. During the 

course of the stop, the officer became suspicious when the 

defendant and the other occupants of the vehicle were unable to 

identify its owner. In response to a question from the officer, 

defendant claimed the truck was owned by the "boyfriend" of one of 

the occupants, but when a registration for the vehicle was found, 

neither the defendant nor the passengers recognized the name of 

the registered owner. Following subsequent events, the officer 

discovered a secret compartment under the truck containing 94 

kilograms of cocaine which they seized. This seizure led to the 

charges and defendant's guilty plea. 

Although defendant contends the search and the seizure 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights, it is clear he has no 

standing to challenge the search. In United States v. Arango, 912 

F.2d 441, 445 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 U.S. 1318 

(1991), a case whose facts are remarkably similar to those before 

us here, we stated a defendant's standing was essential to his 

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Appellate Case: 92-4137 Document: 010110155961 Date Filed: 01/05/1993 Page: 2 
ability to raise a Fourth Amendment issue. Pertinent to standing 

is the defendant's proof that he had a reasonable expectation t o 

privacy in the vehicle searched which grew from his ownership or 

lawful possession of that vehicle. We concluded in Arango that a 

defendant's claim he was using the vehicle with the consent of the 

true owner was not sufficient proof of standing. Id. at 445. To 

like effect, see United States v . Roper, 918 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 

1990); United States v. Rascon, 922 F.2d 584, 587 (10th Cir. 

1990 ) , cert. denied, 111 S . Ct. 2037 (1991); and United States v. 

Abreu, 935 F .2d 1130 (10th Cir.), cert . denied, 112 S . Ct. 271 

(1991). On the basis of this authority, we conclude defendant did 

not carry his burden of establishing he had standing to object to 

the search and subsequent seizure, United States v. Erwin, 875 

F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1989); therefore, we do not consider his 

arguments relating to the validity of the seizure and the 

suppression of the evidence obtained. 

Defendant also argues his "post-arrest incriminating 

statement was not sufficiently an act of free will to purge the 

taint of his illegal detention." Unfortunately, he does not make 

clear which of many statements he refers to. He raises issues 

relating to questions directed to him after he was initially 

stopped by the patrolman, but connects those questions t o later 

statements he made while in custody in the Juab County Sheriff's 

office. (The latter statements were made after officers advised 

defendant of his "Miranda Rights.") In sum, defendant appears t o 

argue because the initial search of the v ehicle was invalid, any 

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Appellate Case: 92-4137 Document: 010110155961 Date Filed: 01/05/1993 Page: 3 
statements he made thereafter were tainted and inadmissible. 

Unfortunately, his argument is obscure. 

We are left in doubt what "incriminating" statements were 

made that should have been suppressed. Moreover, if the linkage 

to suppression is through the searches, we have already held 

defendant's lack of standing obviates our consideration of that 

subject. We are also hard-pressed to find whether this specific 

issue was presented to the district court. 

The magistrate judge ruled that prior to custodial 

questioning the defendant was properly advised of his rights, but 

then waived those rights and proceeded to respond to questioning. 

The magistrate, having heard disputed testimony on the question of 

waiver, nonetheless chose to disbelieve the defendant. We cannot 

find any basis for concluding this determination was clearly 

erroneous. 

AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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