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Parties Involved:
Errol Alton Jones
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

Uoited States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

ERROL ALTON JONES, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

MAY 281991 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-1289 

(D. C. No. 89-CR-382) 

(D. Colorado) 

Before HOLLOWAY, Chief Judge, BARRETT, and McKAY, Circuit Judges. 

In this appeal, the defendant-appellant, Errol Alton Jones, 

challenges the district court's revocation of his supervised 

release. Jones claims that the government failed to prove that he 

violated a "special" condition of his supervised release, that he 

was denied procedural due process at the revocation hearing, and 

that there was insufficient evidence that Jones used a controlled 

substance in violation of the conditions of his supervised 

release. 

decision. 

We reject Jones' claims and affirm the district court's 

The pertinent facts are not in dispute. On March 16, 1990, 

pursuant to a written plea agreement, Jones pleaded guilty to the 

second count of a two count indictment charging him with firearms 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-1289 Document: 010110116660 Date Filed: 05/28/1991 Page: 1 
violations. The count charged that Jones had received a firearm 

while he was under indictment for a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year in violation of 18 

u.s.c. § 922(n) and§ 924. 

On this firearms conviction, Jones was sentenced to 

imprisonment for 169 days, time served, and a period of three 

years' supervised release. Jones' supervised release was subject 

to several standard terms or conditions, including the requirement 

that he "refrain from excessive use of alcohol and [that he] not 

purchase, possess, use, distribute, or administer any narcotic or 

other controlled substance, or any paraphernalia related to such 

substances, except as prescribed by a physician II IR. at 

8. In addition to the standard or general terms of Jones' 

supervised release, the court imposed several additional or 

special conditions. 

On August 29, 1990, the Probation Officer for the District of 

Colorado filed a Petition on Probation and Supervised Release with 

the district court. The petition charged Jones with 

violations of the terms of his supervised release: 

1. Violation of Special Condition of Supervised 

Release. A urine specimen taken from defendant on 

August 11, 1990 at Independence [Treatment Center] 

tested positive by National Health Laboratories for the 

presence of THC (marijuana). 

2. Violation of the Law. On August 18, 1990, 

defendant received a summons from Denver police officers 

for assault. Summons and Complaint number GC118296 is 

scheduled in Denver County Court, general sessions, on 

September 7, 1990. United States v. Jones, No. 

89-CR-382, at 1 (D. Colo. Sept. 4, 1990) (order granting 

petition for supervised release hearing). 

two 

On September 14, 1990, a hearing was held regarding the two 

alleged violations of Jones' supervised release. Although the 

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Appellate Case: 90-1289 Document: 010110116660 Date Filed: 05/28/1991 Page: 2 
district court did not make specific findings as to the 

disposition of the count in the petition regarding the allegation 

of assault, it intimated that the count was to be dismissed. II 

R. at 77-80. On the other count of the petition, the district 

court found that Jones had violated supervised release, which was 

revoked, and sentenced the defendant to two years' imprisonment. 

After a careful review of the record we find ample evidence 

to support the district court's finding that Jones violated the 

terms of his supervised release by using a controlled substance. 

Indeed, Jones admitted in a routine interview to his probation 

officer that he had used marijuana while on supervised release, II 

R. at 18, and he also testified at the revocation hearing that he 

had used drugs during the same period. II. R. at 65. In 

addition, on August 11, 1990, and on another occasion, his urine 

analysis tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC), an active 

ingredient in marijuana. IR. at 13-14, 79. 

Moreover, Jones does not challenge the fact that he was 

prohibited from using controlled substances as a condition of his 

supervised release. Instead, Jones argues that the precise 

language of the special conditions of his supervised release did 

not "specifically 

neither his use 

prohibit the use of marijuana" and, therefore, 

tetrahydrocannabinols 

of such conditions. 

of marijuana nor the presence of 

(THC) in his urine, constituted a violation 

Appellant's Br. at 6-7. This argument 

elevates form over substance to new heights and is meritless. 

While the special conditions of Jones' supervised release do not 

mention marijuana or THC, the standard conditions did prohibit the 

use of marijuana. A district court has authority to revoke 

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Appellate Case: 90-1289 Document: 010110116660 Date Filed: 05/28/1991 Page: 3 
supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment for any 

violation of "~ condition of supervised release." United States 

v. Dillard, 910 F.2d 461, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting 18 

u.s.c.A. § 3583(e)(3)) (emphasis added). 

Jones also argues that "[t]he record is barren of any 

testimony that 'THC' or 'marijuana' is a controlled substance as 

defined by statute." Appellant's Br. at 9. We reject this 

argument and take notice of statutes and regulations that clearly 

1 make marijuana a controlled substance. Once the district judge 

determined that Jones had used a controlled substance, he acted 

correctly by following the plain language of§ 3583(g) in revoking 

Jones' supervised release. 18 u.s.c.A. § 3583(g); 2 United States 

v. Ramos-Santiago, 925 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1991); United States 

v. Kindred, 918 F.2d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the 

trial court's decision to revoke Jones' supervised release was not 

error. 

1 

Both the original and updated schedules of the Controlled 

Substances Act, list "marihuana," 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(c), Schedule 

I(c)(l0) (1990), and 21 C.F.R. § 1308.ll(d)(16) (1990); and 

"tetrahydrocannabinol" (THC), 21 u.s.c.A. § 812(c), Schedule 

I ( c ) ( 1 7 ) ( 19 9 0 ) , and 21 C . F . R. § 13 0 8 . 11 , Schedule I ( d) ( 2 4 ) 

(1990); as controlled substances. Judicial notice of such 

statutes and regulations is proper. See Fed. R. Evid. 20l(b). 

2 

Section 3583(g) of Title 18 provides: 

If the defendant is found by the court to be in the 

possession of a controlled substance, the court shall 

terminate the term of supervised release and require the 

defendant to serve in prison not less than one-third of 

the term of supervised release. 

The knowing use of drugs is akin to possession. Kindred, 919 

F.2d at 487 n.3 (citing Dillard, 910 F.2d at 464 n.3). 

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Appellate Case: 90-1289 Document: 010110116660 Date Filed: 05/28/1991 Page: 4 
We review de !!QYQ Jones' claim that he was denied procedural 

due process because he was not provided with written notice that 

he had violated a "standard" condition of his supervised release. 

See United States v. Roberts, 898 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 

1990). In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Supreme 

Court held that a hearing was necessary before a defendant's 

parole could be revoked and that due process required certain 

minimal procedural protections: 

(a) written notice of the claimed violation of parole; 

(b) disclosure to the parolee [individual on supervised 

release]; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to 

present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the 

right to confront and to cross-examine adverse witnesses 

(unless the hearing officer specifically finds good 

cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral 

and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole 

board, members of which need not be judicial officers or 

lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders 

as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking 

parole. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. See also Gagnon v. 

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (same rights applicable 

at probation revocation hearings). 

Nevertheless, both Morrissey and the notes accompanying Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 32.l(a)(2), which establishes hearing requirements for 

Revocation or Modification of Probation or Supervised Release 

similar to those of Morrissey, emphasize that revocation hearings 

are a more flexible process than a criminal prosecution. United 

States v. Stephenson, 928 F.2d 728, 732 (6th Cir. 1991); see 

Schepp v. Fremont County, Wyo., 900 F.2d 1448, 1456 (10th Cir. 

1990) (although generally required, preliminary probable cause 

hearing unnecessary given facts of particular probation 

revocation); see also G. J. G. & Associates, Inc. v. Singleton, 

913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Morrissey, procedural 

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Appellate Case: 90-1289 Document: 010110116660 Date Filed: 05/28/1991 Page: 5 
protections required by due process vary with circumstances). 3 

After a careful review of the record we are convinced that 

Jones was not denied procedural due process. Both the summons and 

the Petition for Probation and Supervised Release provided Jones 

with notice of the government's charges and evidence that he had 

violated his supervised release by possessing and using a 

controlled substance, specifically identifying marijuana. In 

addition, Jones attended the revocation hearing, presented 

evidence in his own behalf, cross-examined adverse witnesses and 

was represented by counsel. Consequently, we AFFIRM. 

3 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

Chief Judge 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.l(a)(2), subtitled Revocation Hearing, 

requires that: 

[t]he revocation hearing, unless waived by the person, 

shall be held within a reasonable time in the district 

of jurisdiction. The person shall be given 

(A) written notice of the alleged violation: 

(B) disclosure of the evidence against the person: 

(C) an opportunity to appear and to present 

evidence in the person's own behalf 

(D) the opportunity to question adverse witnesses: 

and 

(E) notice of the person's right to be represented 

by counsel. 

The notes section applicable to Rule 32.l(a)(2) further provides 

in part: "[t]he hearing required by 32.l(a)(2) is not a formal 

trial: the usual rules of evidence need not be applied. See 

Morrissey v. Brewer, supra ('the process should be flexible enough 

to consider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other 

material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal 

trial') .... " 

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