Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04221/USCOURTS-ca3-14-04221-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General Pennsylvania
Not Party
David Morris Barren
Appellant
Wesley Berkebile
Not Party
Anthony DeLuca
Not Party
District Attorney Somerset County
Not Party
Stuart Frome
Not Party
John A. Litchko
Not Party
Pennsylvania State Police
Not Party
Jesse D. Pettit
Not Party
Mike Schmidt
Not Party
Michael J. Volk
Not Party

Document Text:

DLD-239 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4221

___________

DAVID MORRIS BARREN,

 Appellant

v.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE; TROOPER WESLEY BERKEBILE; 

TROOPER SERGEANT ANTHONY DELUCA; TROOPER MIKE SCHMIDT; 

TROOPER JOHN A. LITCHKO; MICHAEL J. VOLK; TROOPER STUART FROME;

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section;

ATTORNEY GENERAL PENNSYLVANIA; DEPUTY A.G. JESSE D. PETTIT; 

DISTRICT ATTORNEY SOMERSET COUNTY

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 3-14-cv-00134)

District Judge: Honorable Nora B. Fischer

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

June 11, 2015

FISHER, SHWARTZ and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 18, 2015)

_________

OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

Case: 14-4221 Document: 003111994411 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/18/2015
2

David Morris Barren is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se. In June 2014, Barren 

commenced this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States 

District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Barren claimed that his 

constitutional rights had been violated during a February 2003 traffic stop that led to an 

unlawful arrest, search, seizure, and ultimate forfeiture of property recovered in the 

traffic stop. Barren claimed that his constitutional rights had also been violated during 

the recent state-court proceedings that he initiated to retrieve the forfeited property.1 

Barren alleged violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and 

named as defendants: the Pennsylvania State Police; Trooper Wesley Berkebile; Trooper 

Sergeant Anthony Deluca; Trooper Mike Schmidt; Trooper John A. Litchko; Trooper 

Stuart Frome; Trooper Michael J. Volk; Office of Attorney General, Asset Forfeiture and 

Money Laundering Section; former Attorney General Gerald J. Pappert; former Deputy 

Attorney General Jesse D. Petit; and District Attorney Lisa Lazarri-Strasier. By way of 

relief, Barren requested: an “injunction” against the Court of Common Pleas’ 2004 

forfeiture order; an order declaring that the defendants acted in violation of the United 

States Constitution; and $500,000.00 in damages. 

 

1 Barren explained that, in December 2011, he filed a motion for return of property in the 

Court of Common Pleas because he was unaware of the 2004 forfeiture judgment. As of 

the date of this Opinion, that matter appears to be presently before the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court on Barron’s petition for allowance of appeal. See In re Barren, No. CP56-MD-0000008-2012. 

Case: 14-4221 Document: 003111994411 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/18/2015
3

A magistrate judge reviewed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 

and recommended that it be dismissed before service because: (1) Barren’s claims 

concerning the allegedly unlawful 2003 arrest, search, and seizure, as well as the 

allegedly unlawful 2004 forfeiture proceedings, were time-barred under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983, see Fitzgerald v. Larsen, 769 F.2d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that 

Pennsylvania’s two-year limitation period for personal injury actions governs all § 1983 

actions brought in Pennsylvania);2(2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded the 

District Court from reviewing the state-court forfeiture judgment, see Exxon Mobil Corp.

v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291-92 (2005) (explaining that the RookerFeldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction 

over final state-court judgments because such appellate jurisdiction rests solely with the 

United States Supreme Court); and (3) defendants Deputy Attorney General Petit and 

D.A. Lazzari-Straisser are entitled to prosecutorial immunity for their roles in the 

forfeiture and return-of-property proceedings, see Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 

135 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]cts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of 

judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate 

for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity.”) (quotation and 

 

2 Although the running of a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, see Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(c), a court may dismiss a claim sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) 

if it is obvious from the face of the complaint that the claim is barred by the applicable 

statute of limitations and no development of the record is necessary. See Jones v. Bock, 

549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007). 

Case: 14-4221 Document: 003111994411 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/18/2015
4

citation omitted). Upon review, the District Court overruled Barren’s objections, adopted 

the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, and dismissed the complaint for 

failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This appeal followed. 

We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we 

granted Barren leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we must screen this appeal pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous. 

An appeal is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke 

v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Our review confirms that, for the reasons stated 

by the District Court and magistrate judge, there is no arguable legal basis to challenge 

the District Court’s decision.3 

Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Because we are able to determine that dismissal is appropriate based on 

the allegations in the complaint and the relevant state-court docket reports, see S. Cross 

Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Wah Kwong Shipping Grp., Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 427 (3d Cir. 

1999), Barren’s motion to expand the record is denied as unnecessary. 

 

3 Generally, a district court should provide a plaintiff an opportunity to amend his 

complaint before dismissing it for failure to state a claim. We note, however, that we do 

not see how Barren could have amended his complaint to overcome the statute-oflimitations and Rooker-Feldman obstacles discussed above. Therefore, any amendment 

would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d 

Cir. 2002). 

Case: 14-4221 Document: 003111994411 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/18/2015