Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-30120/USCOURTS-ca9-08-30120-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Andrew Christensen
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 08-30120

v.  D.C. No.

MARK ANDREW CHRISTENSEN, 1:06-cr-00085-RFC

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 08-30121 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  1:07-cr-00101-RFC

MARK ANDREW CHRISTENSEN,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Richard F. Cebull, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 3, 2009—Portland, Oregon

Filed March 24, 2010

Before: Richard A. Paez and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Bruce S. Jenkins,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Paez

*The Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins, Senior United States District Judge

for the District of Utah, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

Kelly J. Varnes, Billings, Montana, for defendant-appellant

Mark Andrew Christensen.

Leif M. Johnson, Billings, Montana, for plaintiff-appellee

United States of America.

OPINION

PAEZ, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Mark Andrew Christensen (Christensen) was

convicted and sentenced to 210 months’ imprisonment for

enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activity and

obstruction of justice for failing to appear at trial. On appeal,

Christensen initially asserted that the district court erred in

applying a two-level enhancement under United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) (2005) for

unduly influencing a minor to engage in prohibited sexual

conduct. Christensen relied on precedent from the Sixth and

Seventh Circuits to argue that the enhancement should not

apply where the “minor” is actually an undercover officer

posing as a minor. See United States v. Chriswell, 401 F.3d

459, 469 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 353 F.3d

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552, 562 (7th Cir. 2003). In doing so, he argued that we

should reject the contrary view of the Eleventh Circuit in

United States v. Vance, 494 F.3d 985, 996 (11th Cir. 2007).

After the case was submitted, the United States Sentencing

Commission (the “Commission”) amended the Commentary

to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) such that it now precisely reflects Christensen’s argument: namely, that § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)’s enhancement should not be applied where the “minor” is actually an

undercover officer. Christensen argues that this amendment to

the Guidelines should be applied retroactively to his sentencing, and that we should thus find that the district court erred

in applying the two-level enhancement. He also challenges

the district court’s failure to comply with Application Note 3

to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6 in determining the Guidelines range for

the multiple counts of conviction. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and because we agree that the

amendment to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) should apply retroactively to

Christensen’s sentencing, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

I. BACKGROUND

Between January and June, 2006, using the screenname

“hornyguy59405,” Christensen participated in several online

instant messaging chats with an individual posing as a female

under the age of sixteen. That individual was actually Special

Agent Dan Vierthaler (Vierthaler) of the Billings, Montana

Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).1

During these online conversations, Christensen expressed

the desire to have sex with the fictitious minor. On at least

two occasions, Christensen sent her several photographs,

including images of an adult male’s penis. Christensen also

expressed interest in having sex with the fictitious minor’s

1We refer to this individual as the “fictitious minor” and use the female

pronoun. 

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friend, whom he also understood to be a female under the age

of sixteen.

Christensen informed the fictitious minor that he had a

truck in which she could listen to music and asked if she

would be willing to have sex with him there. He also offered

her money to have sex with him, and more money if she

found someone her age in the Great Falls area to have sex

with him as well.

Christensen subsequently contacted the fictitious minor to

arrange a meeting to have sex. When Christensen arrived to

meet the fictitious minor, he was arrested by law enforcement

agents. Christensen subsequently confirmed that “hornyguy59405” was his screenname, and admitted traveling from

Great Falls to Billings to have sex with the fictitious minor.

Christensen was indicted for coercion and enticement of an

individual under the age of eighteen to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Christensen was also

indicted for failing to appear for trial, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 3146. Investigation revealed that Christensen had

left Montana with a trailer that he bought several weeks

before the scheduled trial.

Christensen pled guilty to both charges. The court sentenced Christensen to 186 months’ imprisonment on the

enticement count, and 24 months’ consecutive imprisonment

on the failure to appear count, totaling 210 months’ imprisonment. Christensen timely appealed his sentence. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, the district court’s factual determinations for clear error, and the district court’s applications of the

Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion. United States

v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 2008).

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III. DISCUSSION

A. Application of U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)

In determining the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range

for Christensen’s offenses, the district court applied the twolevel enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) (2005)

for unduly influencing a minor to engage in prohibited sexual

conduct. That provision provides for such an enhancement

where “a participant otherwise unduly influenced a minor to

engage in prohibited sexual conduct.” Christensen asserts on

appeal, as he did during sentencing, that the enhancement was

inapplicable because the fictitious minor was actually an

undercover officer, not a minor. Christensen reasons that he

could not have unduly influenced a minor because there was

never a minor participating in the online conversations. 

To support that argument, Christensen initially relied on

favorable case law from the Sixth and Seventh Circuits. See

Chriswell, 401 F.3d at 469; Mitchell, 353 F.3d at 562. The

government, on the other hand, asserted that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to the issue in Vance should control. 494 F.3d

at 996 (concluding that “[t]he fact that the minors actually

were fictitious does not change the applicability of the twolevel enhancement pursuant to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)”). 

After we submitted the case, the United States Sentencing

Commission amended the Commentary to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)

such that it now precisely mirrors Christensen’s argument:

namely, that § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)’s sentencing enhancement

should not be applied where the “minor” is actually an undercover officer. See § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) cmt. n.3(B) (2009).

Accordingly, we ordered supplemental briefing on the issue

of whether this amendment to the Guidelines should be

applied retroactively to Christensen’s sentencing. The government’s supplemental brief conceded that the amendment

should apply retroactively, and we agree.

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[1] In the 2005 edition of the Guidelines—which the district court relied upon in calculating Christensen’s sentencing

range—Application Note 1 to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) defined

“minor” as:

(A) an individual who had not attained the age of 18

years; (B) an individual, whether fictitious or not,

who a law enforcement officer represented to a participant (i) had not attained the age of 18 years, and

(ii) could be provided for the purposes of engaging

in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) an undercover

law enforcement officer who represented to a participant that the officer had not attained the age of 18

years.

Id. cmt. n.1 (2005).

Application Note 3 of that same section provided that:

(B) Undue Influence.—In determining whether subsection (b)(2)(B) applies, the court should closely

consider the facts of the case to determine whether

a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior.

In a case in which a participant is at least 10 years

older than the minor, there shall be a rebuttable presumption, for purposes of subsection (b)(2)(B), that

such participant unduly influenced the minor to

engage in prohibited sexual conduct. In such a case,

some degree of influence can be presumed because

of the substantial difference in age between the participant and the minor.

Id. cmt. n.3(B) (2005). In his opening brief on appeal, Christensen argued that, when those application notes are read in

concert, there is latent ambiguity whether the “undue influence” sentencing enhancement should apply where the only

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“minor” involved in the offense is an undercover law enforcement officer. Fortuitously, during the pendency of this appeal,

the Commission resolved that ambiguity in the latest revisions

to the Guidelines. Amendment 732 to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. Manual supp. app. C (2009), which became

effective November 1, 2009, added the following critical language to the Commentary: “However, subsection (b)(2)(B)

does not apply in a case in which the only ‘minor’ (as defined

in Application Note 1) involved in the offense is an undercover law enforcement officer.” Id. cmt. n.3(B) (2009). Under

that provision, had Christensen been sentenced after November 1, 2009, the district court’s application of the two-step

enhancement would clearly have been in error. But, because

amendments to the Guidelines are not automatically applied

retroactively, United States v. Sanders, 67 F.3d 855, 856 (9th

Cir. 1995), the dispositive issue presented is whether the

amended Commentary to § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) should apply to

Christensen’s 2005 sentencing. 

In order for amendments to the Guidelines to apply retroactively, certain criteria must be met. Generally, “we may consider [a subsequent amendment] of the Sentencing Guidelines

only if that amendment is a clarification of existing law rather

than a substantive change in the law.” United States v. Morgan, 376 F.3d 1002, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Sanders,

67 F.3d at 856 (“The Ninth Circuit has consistently stated that

when an amendment is a clarification, rather than an alteration, of existing law, then it should be used in interpreting

the provision in question retroactively.”); U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.11(b)(2) (2009) (providing that “if a court applies an

earlier edition of the Guidelines Manual, the court shall consider subsequent amendments, to the extent that such amendments are clarifying rather than substantive changes”). 

[2] Under Morgan, three “prominent” factors we consider

in determining whether an amendment to the Guidelines

should be applied retroactively are: (1) whether the amendment is included on a list of retroactive amendments in

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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c); (2) whether the Commission characterized the amendment as a clarification; and (3) whether the

amendment resolves a circuit conflict. Morgan, 376 F.3d at

1011. Amendment 732 is not listed as a retroactive amendment under § 1B1.10(c). Nor did the Commission describe

Amendment 732 as a clarification. It did, however, state that

Amendment 732 was intended to resolve a circuit conflict. In

a similar context, we recently held that where an amendment

“was made for the express purpose of resolving a conflict

among the circuits that resulted from reasonable though differing interpretations of the Guideline[s],” retroactive application is appropriate. United States v. Van Alstyne, 584 F.3d

803, 818 (9th Cir. 2009).

The Commission’s “Reason for Amendment,” published in

the supplement to Appendix C of the Guidelines, specifically

states that the amendment “addresses a circuit conflict regarding application of the undue influence enhancement.”

U.S.S.G. Supp. to app. C, amend. 732 at 322 (2009). The

Commission proceeds to note that “[t]hree circuits have

expressed different views” on the matter. Id. at 323. Indeed,

there is a decisive split between the three circuits to have

addressed whether the enhancement applies in these circumstances (under § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) and its virtually identical predecessor, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B)2

). Id.

[3] As noted above, the Sixth Circuit has held that

2Section 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) applies to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)

that involve statutory rape, whereas § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) applies to offenses

involving minors, where—among other matters—a participant induces or

entices a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct as defined in

§ 2A3.1 cmt. n.1. As with § 2G1.3, the application notes to

§ 2A3.2(b)(2)(B) instructed courts to “closely consider the facts of the

case to determine whether a participant’s influence over the minor compromised the voluntariness of the minor’s behavior.” See U.S.S.G.

§ 2A3.2 cmt. n.4 (2003). There is a rebuttable presumption that a minor

was unduly influenced when the participant is at least 10 years older than

the minor. See id.

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§ 2A3.2(b)(2)(B), “is not applicable where the victim is an

undercover agent representing himself to be a child under the

age of sixteen.” Chriswell, 401 F.3d at 469. Also with respect

to § 2A3.2(b)(2)(B), the Seventh Circuit has held that

“[w]here the state of mind of the victim is critical, and perhaps dispositive, [the enhancement] simply cannot apply in

the case where the victim has no state of mind whatsoever

because she does not exist.” Mitchell, 353 F.3d at 562. On the

other hand, the Eleventh Circuit—the only circuit to have

dealt squarely with § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B)—concluded that “[t]he

fact that the minors actually were fictitious does not change

the applicability of the two-level enhancement pursuant to

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B).” Vance, 494 F.3d at 996. Noting these

divergent views, the Commission states that Amendment 732:

resolves [this] issue by providing in the Commentary

to §§ 2A3.2 and 2G1.3 that the undue influence

enhancement does not apply in a case in which the

only “minor” involved in the offense is an undercover law enforcement officer. The Commission

determined that the undue influence enhancement

should not apply in a case involving only an undercover law enforcement officer because, unlike other

enhancements in the sex offense guidelines, the

undue influence enhancement is properly focused on

the effect of the defendant’s actions on the minor’s

behavior. 

U.S.S.G. Supp. to app. C, amend. 732 at 323 (2009). The

Commission’s explanation thus makes clear its intent to

resolve an ongoing circuit dispute. Thus, under Morgan and

Van Alstyne, we hold that in light of the circumstances of

Christensen’s case, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(2)(B) cannot be

applied to enhance his sentence. We therefore reverse Christensen’s sentence and remand for resentencing.3

3

In light of this disposition, we need not address Christensen’s additional argument that the district court failed to comply with Application

Note 3 to U.S.S.G. § 2J1.6 in determining the Guidelines range for the

multiple counts of conviction. 

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IV. CONCLUSION

In light of the amended language of the Commentary to

§ 2G1.3(b)(2)(B), applicable retroactively as a clarification of

the law, the district court erred in applying the “undue influence” enhancement to Christensen’s sentence.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

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