Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-02309/USCOURTS-ca4-06-02309-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia Dillon
Appellant
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission
Appellee

Document Text:

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-2221

CYNTHIA DILLON,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING

COMMISSION,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 06-2309

CYNTHIA DILLON,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING

COMMISSION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Greenbelt. William Connelly, Magistrate Judge.

(8:04-cv-00994)

Submitted: November 19, 2007 Decided: December 11, 2007

Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 1 of 6
- 2 -

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Adrian Robert Gardner, General Counsel, William C. Dickerson,

Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-appellee. Michael P.

Deeds, KESTELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Crossappellant.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 2 of 6
1The parties consented to the exercise of the district court’s

jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)

(2000).

- 3 -

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated appeals arise from Cynthia Dillon’s

successful action against the Maryland-National Capital Park and

Planning Commission (“Commission”), alleging that she was

wrongfully terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave

Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000) (“FMLA”). The Commission

asserts that the district court erred when it denied its motions

for judgment as a matter of law, as well as when it denied in part

its motion in limine and overruled its evidentiary objections to

exclude Dillon’s post-termination evidence regarding her

qualification for FMLA protection. Dillon has cross-appealed and

asserts that the district court erred when it granted, in part, the

Commission’s summary judgment motion and dismissed her liquidated

damages claim, and when it reduced the jury’s backpay award.

Finding no error, we affirm. 

We find that the district court,1

 in a thorough

memorandum opinion explaining its denial of the Commission’s

renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, properly determined

that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict in Dillon’s

favor. See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 333 F.3d 536,

543 (4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, because it was Dillon’s burden to

establish that her leave qualified for FMLA protection, see

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 3 of 6
2The Commission also summarily asserts that the district court

erred in refusing to answer the jury’s post-instruction question as

to whether violating the Commission’s merit rules constituted

“insubordination.” We find that the district court appropriately

directed the jury to make its own determination by relying on the

district court’s jury instruction defining “insubordination.” See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)

(“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the

drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,

not those of a judge.”).

- 4 -

Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 549 (4th

Cir. 2006), the district court correctly found Dillon’s posttermination evidence of which the Commission was unaware to be

relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401. The Commission’s assertions to

the contrary, we find that any prejudicial effect that this

evidence may have had was significantly reduced by the district

court’s limiting instruction to the jury to consider the posttermination evidence only in the context of determining whether

Dillon’s leave qualified for FMLA protection, and not whether the

Commission violated the Act. See United States v. Love, 134 F.3d

595, 603 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that we will not overturn a

district court’s Fed. R. Evid. 403 judgment “except under the most

extraordinary of circumstances, where a trial court’s discretion

has been plainly abused”) (internal brackets and quotation marks

omitted); United States v. Francisco, 35 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir.

1994) (“We generally follow the presumption that the jury obeyed

the limiting instructions of the district court”).2

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 4 of 6
- 5 -

We also conclude that the district court did not abuse

its discretion in granting the Commission summary judgment on

Dillon’s liquidated damages claim. See Taylor v. Progress Energy,

Inc., 493 F.3d 454, 459-60 (4th Cir. 2007) (analogizing FMLA claims

to Fair Labor Standards Act claims); Mayhew v. Wells, 125 F.3d 216,

218 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that this court reviews the district

court’s denial of liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards

Act for abuse of discretion). The record supports the district

court’s conclusion that the Commission considered the possibility

that Dillon’s request for leave constituted a request for FMLA

leave and gave her several opportunities to clarify her

relationship with her grandmother. Although the jury later found

the Commission’s determination that Dillon’s leave was not FMLAprotected to be incorrect, the record establishes that the

Commission reasonably believed Dillon’s leave did not qualify for

FMLA protection. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court

did not abuse its discretion in denying Dillon’s request for

liquidated damages. Cf. Roy v. County of Lexington, SC, 141 F.3d

533, 548-49 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court’s denial of

liquidated damages claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act where

there was no evidence the defendant’s actions were designed to

circumvent the Act). 

 Last, we find that the district court did not err when it

amended the judgment reducing Dillon’s backpay award to reflect the

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 5 of 6
- 6 -

evidence presented by Dillon. See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v.

Barton, 897 F.2d 729, 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Neither the existence,

causation nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess or

speculation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s final amended judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

Appeal: 06-2309 Doc: 51 Filed: 12/11/2007 Pg: 6 of 6