Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-mj-00046/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-mj-00046-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jesus Zepeda Lopez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY HEARING

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

JESUS ZEPEDA LOPEZ,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-MJ-00046 SAB

STIPULATION TO CONTINUE 

PRELIMINARY HEARING AND TO 

EXTEND TIME WITHIN WHICH AN 

INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION 

MAY BE FILED; ORDER THEREON

Date: March 30, 2020

Time: 2:00 p.m.

Honorable Erica P. Grosjean

The United States of America, by and through MCGREGOR W. SCOTT, United States 

Attorney, and KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS, Assistant United States Attorney, and the defendant, by 

and through his attorney of record, Roger Bonakdar, hereby stipulate and agree as follows:

The defendant was charged by Criminal Complaint in the above-captioned matter on or about 

March 15, 2020 and arrested on March 16, 2020. He appeared that same day. The Preliminary Hearing 

in this matter is set for March 30, 2020 at 2:00 p.m. 

In response to the current COVID-19 public emergency, the Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention (CDC) has issued guidelines recommending against gatherings of fifty or more persons, 

effective March 15, 2020; on March 16, 2020, President Trump cautioned that gatherings should be 

limited to ten persons or fewer; the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic 

on March 11, 2020; President Trump declared the outbreak to constitute a national emergency on March 

Case 1:20-mj-00046-SAB Document 12 Filed 03/24/20 Page 1 of 7
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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY HEARING

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13, 2020; California Governor Gavin Newsom declared a state of emergency on March 4, 2020 and 

issued a shelter in place order on March 19, 2020.

The CDC currently recommends that people attempt to keep an appropriate distance between 

themselves and other people, a technique known as social distancing, which is especially important for 

individuals with a higher health risk, and that employers attempt to minimize exposure between 

employees and the public and to consider the public health and safety when scheduling group or public 

events; and

On March 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 611, suspending all jury trials in the Eastern 

District of California scheduled to commence before May 1, 2020. In addition, the Order left to the 

United States Attorney whether to call in the grand juries to indict cases. Thus far, the United States 

Attorney has not called the grand jury due to public health issues and no grand jury has been in session 

since the defendant’s arrest. This General Order was entered to address public health concerns related to 

COVID-19.

Pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), an information or indictment charging an 

individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within 30 days from the date on which such 

individual was arrested but “[i]f an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no 

grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the 

indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days”.

1

 In addition to this automatic exclusion, the Act 

excludes “[a]ny period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any judge . . . if the judge 

granted the continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action 

outweigh the best interest in the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3164, an additional speedy-trial requirement applies to a defendant who is (1) 

“being held in detention solely because he is awaiting trial” or (2) “released” but “designated by the 

1 This provision should apply to grand juries that remain available but are not sitting. The 

Supreme Court has referred to a grand jury being “not in session” to refer to the grand jury’s “schedule,” 

not its empanelment. Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214, 219 (1964); United States v. Towill, 548 

F.2d 1363, 1367 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A close reading of Jaben convinces us that the Court meant to equate 

‘session’ with the current ‘grand jury schedule,’ not with the theoretical possibility of summoning a 

grand jury on short notice.”). “In session,” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d)(1), similarly 

refers to a particular meeting of the grand jury; thus the Rule describes the “persons who may be present 

while the grand jury is in session[.]” Id.

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attorney for the Government as being ‘high risk.’” 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b). For such defendants, trial 

“shall commence not later than ninety days following the beginning of such continuous detention or 

designation of high risk by the attorney for the Government.” Id. Failure to do so shall result in release 

from custody or “automatic review . . . of the conditions of release.” Id. However, the “periods of delay 

enumerated in section 3161(h) are excluded in computing the time limitation specified in this section.” 

Id. Accordingly, the ends-of-justice exclusion applies to § 3164’s 90-day rule. 

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Order excludes delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

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States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the Preliminary Hearing. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2020. 

2. Pursuant to Rule 5.1(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and taking into 

account the public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, good cause exists to continue the 

preliminary hearing date to April 30, 2020.

3. Because no grand jury will likely be in session in the Eastern District of California until 

April 30, 2020, even if the additional 30-day extension under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) did not apply, a 

continuance should be granted because failure to grant a continuance in this matter would likely make a 

continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice, and the ends of justice 

served by a continuance in this case therefore outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a 

speedy trial. 

4. In addition, the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the best interests of the 

defendant and the public in a speedy trial because failure to grant a continuance would:

a) likely result in a miscarriage of justice;

b) deny counsel for the defendant and the government the reasonable time necessary 

for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 

c) The discovery associated with this case includes many recordings, videos, and 

reports and the government will provide such discovery to the defense so that counsel may 

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commence its investigation into the charges and consult with his client;

d) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review discovery and to confer 

with his client regarding a potential resolution of this matter.

e) Counsel for the parties believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence, especially in light of the closing of the United States 

Attorney’s Office due to possible exposure to COVID-19;.

f) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Order 611 and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because counsel or other relevant individuals have been encouraged to telework and 

minimize personal contact to the greatest extent possible. It will be difficult to avoid personal 

contact should the grand jury be required to meet or a trial be set to proceed.

5. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as 

requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date 

prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

6. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., 

within which trial and indictment must commence, the time period of March 30, 2020 to April 30, 2020, 

inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it 

results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s 

finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial

7. Therefore, the parties agree that time should be excluded from computation under the 

Speedy Trial Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

ACCORDINGLY, the parties respectfully ask the Court to find that:

Pursuant to Rule 5.1(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and taking into account the 

public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, good cause exists to continue the preliminary 

hearing date to April 30, 2020.

///

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Because no grand jury will be in session in the Eastern District of California for the 30-day 

period after the arrest of the defendant in this case, the period of time for filing of the indictment is 

therefore extended to 60 days pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), namely until May 16, 2020;

In any event, the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public 

and the defendant in a speedy trial, and the period of time from March 30, 2020 to and including April 

30, 2020, constitutes a period of delay that shall be excluded in computing the time within which an 

information or an indictment must be filed and within which trial must begin pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(7).

Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy 

Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must 

commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: March 24, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ Kathleen A. Servatius

KATHLEEN A. SERVATIUS

Assistant United States Attorney

DATED: March 24, 2020 /s/Roger Bonakdar

Roger Bonakdar

Attorney for Defendant Jesus Zepeda Lopez

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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE PRELIMINARY HEARING

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ORDER

Based upon the facts set forth above, the records of this case, the representations of counsel, and 

the stipulation of the parties,

IT IS THE FINDING OF THIS COURT that:

Pursuant to Rule 5.1(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and taking into account the 

public interest in the prompt disposition of criminal cases, there is good cause to extend the time limit 

for holding a preliminary hearing until April 30, 2020, at 2:00 PM before Magistrate Judge Stanley A. 

Boone.

Because no grand jury will likely be in session in the Eastern District of California for the 30-day 

period after the arrest of the defendant in this case, the period of time for filing of the indictment is 

extended to 60 days pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), namely until May 16, 2020;

The ends of justice served by the schedule set forth herein as requested outweigh the interest of 

the public and the defendants in a either an indictment or a trial within the original date prescribed by 

the Speedy Trial Act for the reasons stated in the parties’ stipulation. 

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the preliminary hearing in this case be continued from March 

30, 2020 until April 30, 2020 at 2:00 p.m before Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial 

Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) and 3164, within which an indictment must be returned and trial must 

commence, the time period of March 30, 2020 and April 30, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court 

at the parties’ request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2020 /s/

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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