Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01508/USCOURTS-caDC-00-01508-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
A.J. McNulty & Company, Inc.
Petitioner
Secretary of Labor
Respondent

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 11, 2002 Decided March 19, 2002

No. 00-1508

A.J. McNulty & Company, Inc.,

Petitioner

v.

Secretary of Labor,

Respondent

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

Arthur G. Sapper argued the cause and filed the briefs for

petitioner.

Ronald J. Gottlieb, Attorney, U.S. Department of Labor,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Joseph M. Woodward, Associate Solicitor, and Ann S. Rosenthal, Counsel. Charles F. James, Attorney, entered an appearance.

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 1 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Randolph and Tatel,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Tatel.

Tatel, Circuit Judge: Petitioner, a construction company,

challenges the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission's affirmance of a series of OSHA citations based on

the company's failure to comply with workplace safety regulations. Petitioner also challenges the Commission's classification of several violations as "willful." To the extent petitioner

has preserved its challenges for review, it has failed to

demonstrate that the Commission erred legally or that its

decision lacks substantial evidentiary support. The Commission's classification of some citations as willful presents a

closer question, but because this determination is also supported by substantial evidence, we reject those challenges as

well.

I.

The Occupational Safety and Health Act imposes a general

duty on employers to keep workplaces "free from recognized

hazards that are ... likely to cause death or serious physical

harm." 29 U.S.C. s 654(a)(1). Authorized by that Act to

promulgate and enforce workplace-safety regulations, see id.

s 655(b), the Secretary of Labor delegated most of her

authority to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), see 65 Fed. Reg. 50,017 (2000). OSHA compliance officers regularly inspect workplaces. If they identify a

violation of safety regulations, OSHA issues a citation in one

of three categories: "not serious," for which a fine of up to

$7000 "may be assessed"; "serious," for which a fine of up to

$7000 "shall be assessed"; and "willful," for which a fine of at

least $5000 but not more than $70,000 "may" be assessed. 29

U.S.C. s 666(a)-(c). Employers may challenge citations, in

which case an administrative law judge conducts a hearing

and issues a decision. Id. s 661(j); 29 C.F.R. s 2200.90(a)

(2001). Employers may appeal adverse ALJ decisions to the

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Id.

ss 2200.91-.92.

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 2 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Petitioner A.J. McNulty & Co. specializes in "precast concrete construction," in which huge, precast concrete slabs are

assembled to create walls, ceilings, and floors. Because the

concrete sections, known in the industry as "double-T's,"

weigh as much as forty tons and rise as high as three stories,

cranes are needed to lower them into place. As the crane

operator, who sometimes can see neither the double-T nor its

intended location, lowers the double-T into its approximate

position, McNulty employees use ropes to guide the slab into

its precise place. This process is dangerous, occasionally

requiring workers to move quickly to avoid an errant doubleT. Once a double-T has been properly positioned, McNulty

employees secure it by welding together steel plates embedded in each piece.

In 1993, construction project manager Whiting-Turner

Contracting Co. began work on a ten-deck parking garage in

White Plains, New York. The company Whiting-Turner

hired to perform the concrete construction in turn subcontracted with McNulty to install the double-T's. Shortly after

work commenced, Whiting-Turner issued written safety notices to McNulty complaining about the company's failure to

protect employee safety. These notices, which WhitingTurner issues only if informal verbal notices have been ignored, called attention to, among other things, McNulty's

failure to erect guardrails to protect workers from falling off

edges of recently-installed floor pieces. Representatives of

the two companies met to discuss the problem, but WhitingTurner once again issued written safety notices to McNulty

for continuing to expose employees to unsafe conditions.

After OSHA compliance officers surveyed the project, the

Agency cited McNulty for numerous willful violations of

workplace safety regulations that require construction companies to use guardrails or safety nets to protect workers from

dangerous falls. See generally 29 C.F.R. s 1926.105, id.

s 1926.500 (1994).

McNulty contested the citations. Following a hearing in

which an ALJ upheld the citations in all respects, McNulty

sought review before the Commission. The Commission afUSCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 3 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

firmed the ALJ's findings, but reduced the classification of

some citations from "willful" to "serious."

McNulty appeals ten citations. The issues presented are

both numerous and complex, and McNulty's counsel did not

help matters by submitting a confusingly organized brief that

contained a completely uninformative statement of issues.

See Fed. R. Appellate P. 28(a)(5) (requiring a statement of

issues). Prior to oral argument, we directed McNulty to

submit a revised statement of issues, warning that we would

decline to consider the merits of any "issue not specifically

listed." Order of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.

Circuit at 1, A.J. McNulty & Co. v. Sec'y of Labor (Jan. 3,

2002) (No. 00-1508). Working from the company's revised

statement of issues and following the sensible organization of

the Secretary's brief, we consider the challenged citations in

three categories: (1) failure to construct guardrails around

"floor openings" and "open-sided floors"; (2) failure to construct guardrails on narrow, elevated platforms; and (3)

failure to tie off adequately or otherwise secure workers using

a steel cage called a "man-basket."

II.

Familiar principles of administrative law govern our review

of the Commission's fact-finding and its application of law to

facts. Commission findings of fact stand if "supported by

substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole."

29 U.S.C. s 660(a); see also IBP, Inc. v. Herman, 144 F.3d

861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Its legal determinations stand

unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in

accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A); see also Loewendick & Sons, Inc. v. Reich, 70 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C. Cir.

1995). We owe "substantial deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations," which has "controlling

weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation." Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S.

504, 512 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In OSHA cases, there are two administrative actors:

the Secretary and the Commission. In Martin v. OccupaUSCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 4 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

tional Safety & Health Review Commission, the Supreme

Court explained that because the Secretary, not the Commission, has authority to make enforcement decisions and to

render definitive interpretations of OSHA regulations, courts

owe "substantial deference" only to the Secretary's interpretation. 499 U.S. 144, 151-57 (1991). We treat Commission

interpretations as "equivalent to [those made by] a 'nonpolicymaking' district court." Molineaux v. United States, 12 F.3d

264, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 154).

With these standards in mind, we consider the three categories of citations.

Floor Openings and Open-Sided Floors

OSHA issued these citations pursuant to two regulations.

The first requires that "[f]loor openings shall be guarded by a

standard railing ... on all exposed sides." 29 C.F.R.

s 1926.500(b)(1) (1994). OSHA cited McNulty for violating

this provision after compliance officers observed two instances in which the company failed to install guardrails along the

open edges surrounding the spaces where double-T floor

members remained to be installed on levels P-2 and P-5 of

the parking structure.

McNulty argues that the guardrail regulation is inapplicable because at the time of the citation, the surfaces in

question were not "floors" within the meaning of that regulation. Before addressing this contention, we must consider

whether, because McNulty raised this issue only in its brief

before the Commission and not in its petition for discretionary review (known as a PDR), we lack jurisdiction under 29

U.S.C. section 660(a): "No objection that has not been urged

before the Commission shall be considered by the court [of

appeals]." See also Power Plant Div., Brown & Root, Inc. v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 659 F.2d

1291, 1293 & n.3 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) ("We have previously

characterized [29 U.S.C. s 660(a)] as a limit upon our jurisdiction."), modified and aff'd on reh'g, 673 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.

Unit B 1982); Athens Community Hosp. v. Schweiker, 686

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 5 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

F.2d 989, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (courts may raise jurisdictional

issues sua sponte).

Resolving this issue requires an understanding of the Commission's appeal procedures as well as of section 660(a). An

employer wishing to challenge an ALJ decision begins the

appeal process by filing a PDR with the Commission. 29

C.F.R. s 2200.91(b). The Commission may review any issue

raised in the PDR or, on its own motion, any other issue. See

id. If the Commission directs review, it ordinarily requests

briefs, hears oral argument (if it chooses), and then issues a

final order disposing of the matter. See id. ss 2200.93,

2200.95. If the Commission fails to direct review of an issue

within thirty days of the PDR's filing, the ALJ report becomes the Commission's final order. See id. s 2200.90(d).

Either way, the Commission's final order is reviewable in the

appropriate court of appeals, subject to the limitation that

courts of appeals lack jurisdiction over "objection[s] ... not

... urged before the Commission." 29 U.S.C. s 660(a).

According to McNulty, the phrase "urged before the Commission" is broad enough to include raising an objection for

the first time in a Commission brief. In cases where the

Commission declines to review the ALJ decision, we and our

sister circuits have uniformly held that courts of appeals lack

jurisdiction over objections not raised in the PDR. See

Durez Div. of Occidental Chem. Corp. v. Occupational Safety

& Health Review Comm'n, 906 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see

also, e.g., P. Gioioso & Sons v. Occupational Safety & Health

Review Comm'n, 115 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 1997) (same).

We know of only one case that sheds light on the precise

issue here: What happens when the Commission agrees to

review an ALJ decision, and the employer, having failed to

present an objection in its PDR, does so in its Commission

brief? In Trinity Industries v. Occupational Safety &

Health Review Commission, 206 F.3d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 2000),

the Fifth Circuit held that an employer's failure to present an

essential objection in its PDR did not preclude judicial review

where the employer clearly raised that objection in its Commission brief. According to the Fifth Circuit, requiring the

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 6 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

employer also to have raised the objection in its PDR would

"place form above purpose." Id. at 542.

In our view, the result reached by the Fifth Circuit is

equally appropriate in this case. To begin with, nothing in

the phrase "urged before the Commission" suggests that an

employer must raise every objection in its PDR; to the

contrary, an employer that presents an objection in its brief

has, by any understanding of the word, "urged" it before the

Commission. Indeed, when Congress wants to limit judicial

review to objections raised at a particular stage of the administrative process, it does so expressly. For example, the

Federal Power Act provides that "[n]o objection to the order

of the [Federal Energy Regulatory] Commission shall be

considered by the court ... [unless] urged before the Commission in the application for rehearing." 16 U.S.C.

s 825l(b) (emphasis added); see also Platte River Whooping

Crane v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 876 F.2d 109, 113

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (interpreting this language to require that

petitioners seeking review of a FERC order must first "petition for rehearing of those orders and must themselves raise

in that petition all of the objections urged on appeal" and

emphasizing that "[n]either FERC nor this court has authority to waive these statutory requirements"). Permitting judicial review of objections raised for the first time in Commission briefs, moreover, preserves the role Congress intended

the Commission to play in the OSHA review process. Section

660(a)'s review-limiting clause ensures that the Commission

has a fair chance to consider objections to ALJ decisions prior

to judicial review. See Power Plant Div., Brown & Root, 659

F.2d at 1293-94 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. section 660(a) to

require only that "the Commission be alerted to the issues

and have the opportunity to pass on them before a court

begins its review of the administrative process") (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. also United States

v. L.A. Trucker Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) ("[O]rderly

procedure and good administration require that objections to

the proceedings of an administrative agency be made while it

has an opportunity for correction in order to raise issues

reviewable by the courts."). Presenting objections in ComUSCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 7 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

mission briefs achieves this end. To preclude judicial review

where McNulty has "put the Commission on notice of the

nature or basis for its challenge," Durez, 906 F.2d at 5, simply

because the company failed to include the objection in its

PDR would, indeed, "place form above purpose," Trinity

Indus., 206 F.2d at 542.

While McNulty has successfully preserved its claim that

the surfaces in question were not "floors" within the meaning

of the regulation, the argument lacks merit. Nothing in the

regulation suggests that the term "floors" applies only to

complete floors. On the contrary, the regulation expressly

"appl[ies] to temporary ... conditions where there is danger

of employees or materials falling through floor ... openings,"

29 C.F.R. s 1926.500(a) (1994), suggesting that it applies with

particular force to incomplete floors where yet-to-be-installed

double-T's create additional fall hazards. The ALJ decision

on which McNulty primarily relies, Spancrete Northeast, Inc.,

stands for the unremarkable and irrelevant proposition that

floors are incomplete until all double-T's are secured. 1981

WL 19242, *3 (ALJ Feb. 18, 1981) ("In precast concrete

construction, a 'floor' within the meaning of [the regulation] is

only complete when all the double T's constituting a level are

secured.").

McNulty's related argument--that the ALJ erred by excluding certain testimony about industry understanding of the

term "floor"--is waived. The company's only reference to

this argument appears in the section of its Commission brief

discussing willfulness. McNulty thus failed to give the Commission notice that its objections to the ALJ's evidentiary

rulings related to the company's arguments about the meaning of the term "floor."

McNulty next challenges the Commission's rejection of the

company's "infeasibility defense" to its failure to erect guardrails around floor openings. Although "[i]t is an affirmative

defense to a charge of violating an OSHA standard that

compliance was impossible or infeasible," Bancker Constr.

Corp. v. Reich, 31 F.3d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1994), an employer

mounting such a defense must show not only the infeasibility

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 8 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

of compliance, but also that it either used alternative means

of protection or that such means were infeasible. In this

case, we need not consider McNulty's many arguments that

compliance with the regulation was technically infeasible, for

the record contains substantial, undisputed evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion that the company could have

installed alternative means of fall protection. OSHA's compliance officer testified that "McNulty could have put freestanding ... guardrails back from the edge where they would

not have interfered with installing the floor piece." A.J.

McNulty & Co., 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1121, 1130 (O.S.H.R.C.

2000). Although McNulty claims that bolted-stanchion

guardrails would have interfered with installation of precast

concrete members, it never disputed, either before the Commission or this Court, the compliance officer's testimony that

free-standing guardrails were feasible. McNulty also contends that the Commission erred by imposing on it the

burden of proving the infeasibility of alternative methods of

fall protection. Not only is this claim directly contrary to

law, see Bancker Constr., 31 F.3d at 34; cf. 29 C.F.R.

s 1926.501(b)(2)(i) (2001) (placing burden on employer to

demonstrate infeasibility), but it too is waived, appearing in

neither the company's PDR nor Commission brief.

Equally unpersuasive is McNulty's argument that the Commission erred by rejecting its "greater-hazard defense" to the

failure to install guardrails around the floor opening on level

P-2. Employers seeking to establish such a defense must

prove "(1) the hazards of compliance with [the] standard are

greater than the hazards of noncompliance, (2) alternative

means of protection are unavailable, and (3) a variance [(a

procedure by which an employer formally requests an exception from OSHA regulations)] was unavailable or inappropriate." Dole v. Williams Enters., 876 F.2d 186, 188 (D.C. Cir.

1989). According to McNulty, workers erecting guardrails

around this particular floor opening would have been exposed

to dangers from the potential collapse of an unsecured

twenty-five-ton vertical wall member. As the Secretary correctly points out, McNulty mislabels this argument an infeasibility defense. Even properly labeled, however, the defense

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 9 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

fails. McNulty points to no record evidence disputing the

Commission's finding that even if installation of guardrails

might have been hazardous, "McNulty could have installed

perimeter protection before bringing the elevated wall piece

up to the floor for installation." A.J. McNulty, 19 O.S.H.

Cas. (BNA) at 1133 (emphasis addded). According to McNulty, this Commission finding "ignores [other] unrebutted testimony" by the company's chief compliance officer that installation of such guardrails was infeasible because "employees

would have had to walk on a dangerously narrow flange to

erect the guarding." Pet'r's Opening Br. at 39. But that

testimony addressed only the feasibility of bolted-stanchion

guardrails; the Commission's decision rests on its finding

that the company could have used free-standing guardrails

that can be quickly installed and removed, and--as photographs in the record indicate--would not have required workers to walk on the flange.

The other regulation involved in this category of citations

requires that "[e]very open-sided floor ... 6 feet or more

above adjacent floor or ground level ... be guarded by a

standard railing." 29 C.F.R. s 1926.500(d)(1) (1994). These

citations stem from the compliance officer's observation that

McNulty, having yet to install walls on levels P-2 (both north

and east sides), P-4, and P-5, had failed to erect guardrails

around the exposed edges of those floors.

Conceding it erected no guardrails on the north side of

level P-2, McNulty claims that the Commission should have

excused the failure because the violation occurred within the

"reasonable time" it was entitled to wait before installing

guardrails. Pet'r's Opening Br. at 36. We disagree. Not

only does the OSHA compliance officer's testimony suggest

that McNulty could have installed temporary free-standing

guardrails before beginning work in the area, see supra, but

the Act nowhere grants employers an undefined "reasonable

time" in which to bring workplaces into compliance. In fact,

we have expressly held that employers must install OSHArequired fall protection before exposing employees to risk.

See, e.g., Am. Bridge/Lashcon v. Reich, 70 F.3d 131, 134 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). Section 9(a) of the Act, also relied on by McNulty,

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 10 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

is entirely inapplicable, for it governs the Secretary's authority to establish a reasonable "abatement period" within which

an employer, once cited, may correct the violation in accordance with OSHA regulations. 29 U.S.C. s 659(a).

As to the east side of level P-2, McNulty offers a greaterhazard defense, again claiming that erecting guardrails would

have subjected workers to the possible collapse of the twentyfive-ton vertical wall member. But as indicated above, substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that the

company could have erected free-standing guardrails before

installing the wall member. See supra at 10.

With respect to the citations for the open-sided edges on

levels P-4 and P-5, McNulty offers a greater-hazard defense

(also mislabeled an infeasibility defense). But because

McNulty never raised this objection either in its PDR or its

Commission brief, the company has waived the opportunity to

assert it here.

Open-Sided Platforms

This group of citations relates to McNulty's failure to

provide fall protection for employees working on several

narrow, open-sided platforms, known as "picks" or "planks,"

ranging in width from twenty inches to two feet. OSHA

regulations require that platforms located "6 feet or more

above adjacent floor or ground level ... be guarded by a

standard railing." 29 C.F.R. s 1926.500(d)(1) (1994). After a

compliance officer observed several instances where McNulty

used picks without guardrails, OSHA issued three citations.

McNulty challenges only one: the citation for its failure to

install rails on a pick spanning an "exhaust shaftway" on level

P-2.

The company first argues that the platform regulations are

inapplicable for two reasons: picks are temporary, whereas

the regulation applies only to "surfaces that are part of a

structure," Pet'r's Opening Br. at 40, and picks are not

platforms at all, but rather scaffolds subject to OSHA regulations that prescribe specific safety standards for scaffolds, see

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 11 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

generally 29 C.F.R. s 1926.451 (1994) (establishing safety

requirements for scaffolds). The first contention is without

merit. As the Commission persuasively points out, not only

does the regulation expressly cover "temporary ... conditions," id. s 1926.500(a), but controlling circuit and Commission precedent makes clear that the regulation applies to

temporary, narrow platforms such as the one at issue here,

see Donovan v. Williams Enters., 744 F.2d 170, 176 (D.C. Cir.

1984) (noting that guardrail regulations apply to temporary

platforms); Armstrong Steel Erection, Inc., 17 O.S.H. Cas.

(BNA) 1385, 1388-89 (O.S.H.R.C. 1995) (stating that temporary planks constitute "runway" requiring guardrails).

Responding to McNulty's second argument--that picks are

scaffolds, not platforms--the Secretary argues that section

660(a) deprives us of jurisdiction to consider the objection

because the company failed to raise it before the Commission.

Insisting that it did, McNulty argues that the issue "is

identical to the reasoning" in cases cited in its Commission

brief. Pet'r's Opening Br. at 40. This argument is doubly

flawed. First, merely citing a case falls well short of

"put[ting] the Commission on notice of the nature of or basis

for [a] challenge," Durez, 906 F.2d at 5, particularly where, as

here, McNulty cited the case for the unrelated proposition

that the guardrail regulation does not govern temporary

structures. As the Seventh Circuit explained, "simply citing

a case below in one context and then, on appeal, arguing that

the same case stands for something else does not preserve an

argument." Modern Drop Forge Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 683

F.2d 1105, 1115 n.19 (7th Cir. 1982). Second, the primary

case on which McNulty now relies, Armstrong Steel, 17

O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1388-89, appears neither in its PDR

nor Commission brief.

McNulty also presents an infeasibility defense to this citation, arguing in excruciating detail that it could not have

placed guardrails on a pick as narrow as the one at issue

here. As the Commission points out, however, "an employer

claiming that a platform was too narrow for guardrails must

establish that it could not have substituted a wider one." A.J.

McNulty, 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1133. The record, moreUSCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 12 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

over, supports the Commission's finding that "[n]one of

McNulty's witnesses testified that a wider platform could not

have been substituted for the narrow one being used." Id.

Put another way by the Secretary, even if installing guardrails on picks was infeasible, "McNulty had no right to use its

equipment as it found it." Resp't's Br. at 53-54 (internal

quotation marks omitted). See also Cleveland Consol., Inc. v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 649 F.2d at

1160, 1166 n.11 ("An employer has a duty to plan a method of

construction that enables him to comply with OSHA regulations if possible.").

Man-Basket

The "man-basket" at issue here was "a cage with horizontal

rungs down which the employee would climb to reach and

stand to bolt precast pieces together. The device was hung

on a concrete wall." Pet'r's Opening Br. at 47. After a

compliance officer observed a McNulty employee "accessing[,]

egressing, and working from" a man-basket without securing

himself with a safety belt, OSHA cited the company for two

violations of a regulation requiring that "when workplaces are

more than 25 feet above the ground," "[s]afety nets shall be

provided ... where the use of ladders, scaffolds, catch platforms, temporary floors, safety lines, or safety belts is impractical." 29 C.F.R. s 1926.105(a) (1994). The Commission

affirmed these violations, though it reduced their severity

from "willful" to "serious."

Challenging both citations, McNulty argues that it complied with the regulation because a man-basket is a scaffold

within the meaning of the regulation, and that the scaffold

(i.e., man-basket) provided the required fall protection. Despite the Secretary's suggestion to the contrary, McNulty

preserved this objection by raising it in its Commission brief

(though the Commission chose not to entertain the claim).

Moreover, the first element of the company's argument--that

a man-basket is a scaffold--finds some support in both the

record and OSHA regulations, see 29 C.F.R. s 1926.450(b)

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 13 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

(2001) (defining "scaffold" as "any temporary elevated platform (supported or suspended) and its supporting structure

(including points of anchorage), used for supporting employees or materials or both"). Even if a man-basket is a

scaffold, however, the citation remains valid. Pointing out

that a man-basket provides no protection to workers entering

and exiting the basket, the Secretary interprets the regulation to require such workers to use one of the listed alternative means of protection, such as safety belts, during these

brief but precarious moments. This interpretation comports

with decisions holding that the safety-net regulation "requires

protection against each discrete fall hazard, even if of short

duration." Am. Bridge/Lashcon, 70 F.3d at 134; cf. Manganas Painting Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 273 F.3d 1131, 1134 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (upholding Secretary's interpretation of safety net

regulation to require effective fall protection as "reasonable

... indeed, ... obvious"). McNulty argues that as interpreted by the Secretary, the regulation requires redundant forms

of protection: "both safety belts and a ladder or scaffold."

Pet'r's Opening Br. at 49. This mischaracterizes the Secretary's position. She requires workers to use safety belts not

while working in a man-basket, but only while entering or

exiting it.

III.

Having sustained the Commission's affirmance of the ten

citations, we turn to McNulty's claim that the Commission

erred in affirming as willful the Company's failure to comply

with the two guardrail regulations. "Although the Act does

not define the term 'willful,' courts have unanimously held

that a willful violation of the Act constitutes 'an act done

voluntarily with either an intentional disregard of, or plain

indifference to, the Act's requirements.' " Ensign-Bickford

Co. v. Occupational Health & Safety Review Comm'n, 717

F.2d 1419, 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (quoting Cedar Constr. Co. v.

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 587 F.2d

1303, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). According to McNulty, the

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 14 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Commission may find willfulness only where the employer

exhibits reckless disregard. All circuits that have considered

the issue, including this one, however, have long accepted

"intentional disregard or plain indifference" as the appropriate standard for willfulness within the Act's meaning. See

Ensign-Bickford, 717 F.2d at 1422 (citing nine circuit court

cases embracing the "intentional disregard or plain indifference" standard). McNulty points out that in McLaughlin v.

Richland Shoe, the Supreme Court interpreted the term

"willful" to require "reckless disregard." 486 U.S. 128, 133

(1988). Not only did the company waive this argument by

failing to raise it before the Commission, but McLaughlin

involves a different statute: the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Disputing neither its awareness of the guardrail regulations

nor its failure to comply with them, McNulty claims it believed in good faith that it had successfully established an

infeasibility defense to each violation. "[A] good faith, reasonable belief by an employer that its conduct conformed to

the law negates a finding of willfulness." Sec'y of Labor v.

Keco Indus., 1987 WL 89096, *11 (O.S.H.R.C. March 27,

1987); see also McLaughlin v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 869

F.2d 1039, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A violation is not willful

when it is based on a nonfrivolous interpretation of OSHA's

regulations."). Because good faith is a question of fact, see,

e.g., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. United States, 765 F.2d 221, 229

(D.C. Cir. 1985), the issue for us is whether the record

supports the Commission's conclusion that McNulty did not

possess a good-faith belief that it had established a legally

sufficient infeasibility defense to the guardrail violations.

With respect to McNulty's failure to erect guardrails on

open-sided platforms (picks), the Commission's observation

that the record contains "scant evidence of good faith," A.J.

McNulty, 19 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1140, seems generous.

Ample record evidence, including McNulty's own rule requiring guardrails in areas of active construction, demonstrates

the company's heightened awareness of the need for fall

protection on these structures. Moreover, McNulty points to

no evidence that it believed guardrails on these particular

platforms to be infeasible; on the contrary, the record supUSCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 15 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ports the Commission's conclusion that the company never

"studied the situation in advance and determined that guardrails would be a problem." Id. Finally, the record supports

the Commission's conclusion that McNulty never "made a

good-faith evaluation of the facts and actually found that the

platforms could not be wider." Id.

Whether the Commission erred in affirming as willful

McNulty's failure to erect guardrails around floor openings

and open-sided edges presents a closer question, but we

affirm this conclusion as well. In support of its determination, the Commission cited several pieces of record evidence,

including Whiting-Turner's safety notices regarding McNulty's failure to install fall protection, McNulty's own safety

standards requiring guardrails, and most persuasively, two

"settlements" of the company's prior violations of the same

fall-protection regulations at issue here. Id. at 1139. As we

have held, prior citations for identical or similar violations

may sustain a violation's classification as willful. See, e.g.,

Cedar Constr., 587 F.2d at 1305. According to McNulty,

OSHA issued these prior citations under entirely different

circumstances (steel rather than precast concrete construction), but because this point appears for the first time in the

company's reply brief, we will not consider it. McBride v.

Merrell Dow & Pharms., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1211 (D.C. Cir.

1986) ("Considering an argument advanced for the first time

in a reply brief ... is not only unfair to an appellee but also

entails the risk of an improvident or ill-advised opinion on the

legal issues tendered." (internal citations omitted)).

Finally, McNulty contends that the Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to take account of the

company's reliance on various ALJ decisions that, according

to McNulty, gave rise to an objectively reasonable belief that

it need not comply with the guardrail regulations. Although

McNulty is right that the Commission failed to address the

company's reliance on these decisions, that failure does not

justify setting the decision aside, for we think the result

would have been the same even if the Commission had

considered the issue. See Envirocare of Utah, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 194 F.3d 72, 79 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 16 of 17
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

("[R]eversal and remand is 'necessary only when the reviewing court concludes that there is a significant chance that but

for the error the agency might have reached a different

result.' " (quoting Henry J. Friendly, Chenery Revisited:

Reflections on Reversal and Remand of Administrative Orders, 1969 Duke L.J. 199, 211)). Of the various ALJ decisions

on which McNulty claims to have relied, only Spancrete can

plausibly be read to create any exception to the guardrail

regulations. Even generously construed, however, Spancrete

stands only for the proposition that guardrails are not required at edges actively under construction. See Spancrete,

1981 WL 19242 at *3. So even if McNulty did rely in good

faith on the purported Spancrete exception, its reliance would

not alter the Commission's decision in light of the substantial

record evidence supporting the Commission's conclusion that

McNulty lacked a good-faith belief that these edges were

actively under construction.

The petition for review is denied.

` So 

ordered.

USCA Case #00-1508 Document #665751 Filed: 03/19/2002 Page 17 of 17