Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-00143/USCOURTS-ca2-18-00143-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
East Haven Police Department

Dyanna L. Green
Appellant
Town of East Haven
Appellee

Document Text:

18‐0143

Green v. Town of East Haven

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

3 ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

4 August Term, 2018

5 (Argued:  May 3, 2019                            Decided:  March 10, 2020)

6 Docket No. 18‐0143

7 _________________________________________________________

8 DYANNA L. GREEN,

9 Plaintiff‐Appellant,

10 ‐ v. ‐

11 TOWN OF EAST HAVEN,

12 Defendant‐Appellee,

13 EAST HAVEN POLICE DEPARTMENT,

14 Defendant.

15 _________________________________________________________

16 Before:  KEARSE, WESLEY, and CHIN, Circuit Judges.

17 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page1 of 37
1 District of Connecticut, Vanessa L. Bryant, Judge, dismissing, on summary judgment,

2 plaintiffʹs action against defendant Town of East Haven (ʺTownʺ) alleging age

3 discrimination in the termination of her employment, in violation of the Age

4 Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621‐634, and state law.  The

5 district court granted summary judgment on the sole ground that plaintiff had failed

6 to make out a prima facie case of any adverse employment action, because she chose

7 to retire rather than attend a scheduled disciplinary hearing‐‐the only merits‐based

8 challenge presented in the Townʹs summary judgment motion.  See Green v. East

9 Haven Police Depʹt, 3:16‐cv‐00321, 2017 WL 6498144 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2017).  On

10 appeal, plaintiff contends that the court erred in failing to view her evidence that the

11 retirement was not voluntary but was coercedby the threat oflikely termination‐‐and

12 hence constituted a constructive discharge‐‐in the light most favorable to her.  We

13 agree that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, sufficed to

14 present genuine issues of fact as to whether a reasonable person in plaintiffʹs shoes

15 would have felt compelled to retire.  We thus vacate the judgment and remand for

16 further proceedings.

17 Vacated and remanded.

2

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page2 of 37
1 KAREN R. KING, New York, New York (Jennifer X.

2 Luo, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton &

3 Garrison, New York, New York, on the brief),

4 for Plaintiff‐Appellant.

5 LYNCH,TRAUB, KEEFE&ERRANTE, New Haven,

6 Connecticut (Hugh F. Keefe, of counsel),

7 submitted a brief for Defendant‐Appellee.

8 KEARSE, Circuit Judge:

9 Plaintiff Dyanna L. Green appeals from a judgment of the United States

10 District Courtforthe District of Connecticut, Vanessa L. Bryant,Judge, dismissing her

11 action againstdefendantTown ofEast Haven (ʺTownʺ)for allegedagediscrimination

12 in terminating her employment, in violation of the Age Discrimination in

13 Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621‐634 (ʺADEAʺ), and the Connecticut Fair

14 Employment Practices Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a‐60 et seq. (ʺCFEPAʺ).  The district

15 court granted summary judgment dismissing the action on the sole ground that

16 Green had failed to make out a prima facie case of any adverse employment action,

17 because she chose to retire rather than attend a scheduled disciplinary hearing‐‐the

18 only merits‐basedchallengepresentedin theTownʹs summary judgment motion.  On

3

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page3 of 37
1 appeal, Green contends that the court erred in failing to view her evidence that the

2 retirement was not voluntary but was coerced by the threat oflikely termination‐‐and

3 hence constituted a constructive discharge‐‐in the light most favorable to her.  We

4 agree that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Green, sufficed to

5 present genuine issues of fact as to whether a reasonable person in Greenʹs shoes

6 would have felt compelled to retire.    Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and

7 remand for further proceedings.

8 I.  BACKGROUND

9 Many of the following facts are undisputed, as indicated by the partiesʹ

10 statements submitted pursuant to Local Rule 56(a) as to undisputed and disputed

11 material facts (ʺRule 56(a) Statementsʺ).    Other descriptions are, as indicated,

12 principally taken from the deposition testimony of the Townʹs Internal Affairs (or

13 ʺI.A.ʺ)OfficerJames Naccarato orfromthe affidavit submittedbyGreen in opposition

14 to the Townʹs motion for summary judgment.

4

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page4 of 37
1 A.  Greenʹs Employment at East Haven Police Department

2 From about May 2001 through December 2014, Green was an employee

3 of the Town, working at defendant East Haven Police Department (ʺEHPDʺ  or

4 ʺDepartmentʺ).  She was one of two full‐time employees in EHPDʹs records division,

5 responsible for processing arrest and accident reports, typing search and arrest

6 warrants, typing misdemeanor and infraction tickets, and entering data into EHPDʹs

7 computer system.  In 2012, EHPD Lieutenant David Emerman became supervisor of

8 the records division.    (See Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed ¶¶ 1‐3; see also id.

9 undisputed ¶ 27.)

10 Also in 2012, Jennifer Ward was hired to work in the records division,

11 replacing Greenʹs recently retired coworker.  (Seeid. undisputed ¶ 6.)  Green, 47 years

12 of age when she was hired, was 58 in 2012 (see Affidavit of Dyanna L. Green dated

13 September 6, 2017 (ʺGreen Aff.ʺ or ʺSeptember 2017 Affidavitʺ), ¶¶ 4‐5); Ward, in

14 2012, was approximately 30 years of age (see id. ¶ 7).  Green asserted that after Ward

15 was hired, Green began to experience treatment from Emerman and EHPD Chief

16 Brent Larrabee that she  ʺbelieve[s] . . . was intended to create a hostile work

17 environment and cause [her] to retire.ʺ  (Id. ¶ 12; see id. ¶ 17 (ʺI was singled outʺ and

18 ʺbelieve that I was subjected to deliberately disparate treatment and a hostile work

5

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page5 of 37
1 environment because of my age, which was intended to make my employment

2 intolerable and force me to resign or retireʺ).)

3 Green stated, inter alia, that from the time Ward arrived until Green left

4 EHPD, Green was made to feel ʺmarginalized in [her] roleʺ (id. ¶ 8), with Emerman

5 ʺengag[ing] in a sustained and systematic pattern of publicly criticizing,

6 micromanaging andscrutinizingʺ Greenʹs work and ʺsubject[ingher]toharassing and

7 demeaning demands and questioningʺ (id. ¶ 12).  Emerman also prepared and filed

8 a number of criticisms of Greenʹs work that Green viewed as unwarranted.  (See id.

9 ¶ 13.)  Meanwhile, Ward was given more desirable work assignments and training

10 opportunities that weredenied to Green (seeid. ¶¶ 8‐11) and was treated byEmerman

11 and Chief Larrabee ʺwith obvious favoritismʺ (id. ¶ 8).

12 B.  The December 2014 Biscuits and Basket Incident

13 Shortly after 8 a.m. on December 5, 2014, Green went to the EHPD

14 kitchen/breakroom area to borrow a wire basket that was kept there, to use in an

15 upcoming holiday party.    While there, she observed two canisters of Pillsbury

16 buttermilk biscuits dough that she had seen in the communal refrigerator since at

17 least Thanksgiving.  Green took one of the canisters, put it and the basket in her tote

6

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page6 of 37
1 bag, and took them back to her desk.  (See Green Aff. ¶¶ 21‐22.)

2 Shortly after noon that day, EHPD Lieutenant Joseph Murgo sent an

3 email to EHPD employees stating as follows:

4 We had two (2) canisters of Buttermilk flavored Pillsbury

5 biscuits that was [sic] brought in on Thanksgiving by one of our

6 officers.  There is now one canister left, which means one canister

7 grew legs and walked away.  IfYOU are in possession of Pillsbury

8 Grands Flaky layers Buttermilk biscuits, please return them to

9 their rightful owner.  We work in a police department people.

10 Too many things grow legs here.  Thank you.

11 (December 5, 2014 email from Joseph Murgo to All Police Department Employees.)

12 After receiving that email, Green ʺasked Lieutenant Emerman if there

13 were cameras in the kitchen.ʺ  (Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed ¶ 21.)  Green then

14 went into the kitchen area, carrying the biscuits in a bag, intending to return them to

15 the refrigerator.  (See id. undisputed ¶ 22.)  When she arrived, Chief Larrabee was

16 there; and the refrigerator was sealed with, inter alia, yellow  ʺcrime sceneʺ tape.

17 (Green Aff. ¶¶ 29, 27.)

18 Chief Larrabee asked Green what was in her bag; she responded only

19 that it contained her salad; she did not tell him that it also contained the biscuits,

20 which she had taken and was about to return to the refrigerator.  (See, e.g., Rule 56(a)

21 Statements, undisputed ¶¶ 23‐25.)  ʺChief Larrabee then looked in the bag and saw

7

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page7 of 37
1 the canister of biscuit[s].ʺ  (Green Aff. ¶ 29.)  Chief Larrabee took Green back to her

2 desk, as she attempted to explain that she had taken the biscuits with the intent of

3 baking them at home‐‐the communal kitchen at EHPD having no oven (see id. ¶ 22)‐‐

4 and bringing the baked biscuits back to the office for officers and staff (see id. ¶ 29).

5 ChiefLarrabee refusedto listen.  Arriving atGreenʹsdesk, ChiefLarrabee saw Greenʹs

6 tote bag and asked what was in it.  She showed him the wire basket and attempted

7 to explain that she was temporarily borrowing it for a holiday party, but again he

8 refused to listen.  (See id.)

9 Green was immediatelyplacedon administrative leave withpay,having

10 been found to have in her possession a basket that she admitted she had not asked

11 anyone whether she could borrow, and biscuits that she admitted she had not asked

12 anyone whether she could take.  (See, e.g., Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed ¶¶ 14,

13 18‐20; December 11, 2014 Interview of Green by EHPD Internal Affairs OfficerJames

14 Naccarato (ʺNaccarato Interview of Greenʺ) at 5‐6.)

15 C.  The Disciplinary Process and Greenʹs Resignation

16 EHPD in 2014 had a Code of Conduct policy and a policy governing

17 internal affairs complaints.  ʺUnder the policy governing the Internal Affairs Officer

8

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page8 of 37
1 [sic] and Complaints, the Chief of Police and Deputy Police Chief had the authority

2 to determine the merits of an investigation.ʺ  (Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed

3 ¶ 29.)    Under that policy, the Chief of Police and Deputy Police Chief had the

4 authority to issue ʺverbalreprimand[s], writtenreprimand[s], andsuspension[s]ʺ; but

5 for more serious allegations they were to forward the investigation to the Townʹs

6 Board of Police Commissioners (ʺTown BPCʺ  or  ʺBPCʺ); only the BPC had the

7 authority to terminate the employee.  (Id. undisputed ¶¶ 30, 32‐33.)  The Town and

8 the BPC were subject to a federal consent decree, see Agreement for Effective and

9 Constitutional Policing, United States v. Town of East Haven, East Haven Board of Police

10 Commissioners, No. 3‐12‐CV‐1652 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2012), Dkt. No. 11, which

11 required EHPD to follow a ʺdisciplinary matrixʺ governing offenses for which an

12 EHPD employee could be discharged (Deposition of James Naccarato (ʺNaccarato

13 Dep.ʺ or ʺDep.ʺ) at 111).  They ʺha[d] to follow the matrix.ʺ  (Id.)

14 In 2014, Naccarato was EHPDʹs I.A. Officer.  In that position, he was

15 required to investigate alleged violations of policies and procedures by EHPD

16 personnel.  He conducted an investigation with regard to potential Code of Conduct

17 violations by Green on December 5, 2014.    (Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed

18 ¶¶ 10‐15.)

9

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page9 of 37
1 As part of his investigation, Naccarato interviewed Green on December

2 11 in the presence of her union representative.  In thatinterview, Green admitted that,

3 as indicated above, she had taken the biscuits and the basket without asking anyoneʹs

4 permission.  She told Naccarato, as she had tried to tell Chief Larrabee on December

5 5, that she had merely been borrowing the basket for a Hanukkah party, and that she

6 had seen the biscuits in the refrigerator for more than a week and planned to bake

7 them at home and bring them back for officers and staff.  When Naccarato asked why

8 she had tried to conceal the basket, Green stated that she was not concealing it.  She

9 merely brought the tote bag because it made the basket easier to carry; and it had not

10 occurred to her to ask permission to borrow it, since for the past 13 years she and

11 others (she named two) had borrowed and returned such items as the basket without

12 asking anyone.  (See Naccarato Interview of Green at 8, 10‐12.)

13 Naccaratoʹs report on his I.A. investigation of Green‐‐ prepared over

14 several daysʹ time and signed on December 18 (see Naccarato Dep. 107, 109‐10)‐‐

15 discussed whether Green had violated EHPDʹs Code of Conduct by, inter alia,

16 ʺimpair[ing] the operation or efficiency of the Department or any memberʺ  or

17 ʺ[v]iolating any federal, state, and local laws,ʺ and concluded that she had done so by

18 engaging in ʺpremeditat[ed] . . . theftʺ and ʺpurposely conceal[ing] the canister of

10

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page10 of 37
1 biscuits and the basketʺ  (EHPD Internal Affairs Investigation Report No.

2 IA1400000019‐00039731 by James W. Naccarato, signed December 18, 2014

3 (ʺNaccaratoʹs I.A. Reportʺ or ʺI.A. Reportʺ), at 1, 3‐4).  As described in Parts I.D. and

4 II.C.2. below, Naccarato testified in his deposition that he reached his conclusions

5 withoutinterviewing the officer who ownedthe biscuits orthe twopersons identified

6 by Green as among those who previously had routinely borrowed baskets without

7 needing to ask permission (see Dep. 87‐88, 94‐96); he also testified as to what he may

8 have toldGreen he believed were her prospects forremaining employed atEHPD(see

9 id. at 35, 85‐90).

10 A hearing into the charges against Green had been scheduled for

11 December 15, 2014.  On thatdate, afterreceiving advice from herunion representative

12 whohadjustmet withTownrepresentatives,including ChiefLarrabee, she submitted

13 a letter stating, ʺI Dyanna Green, hereby retire from the town of East Haven, effective

14 January 1st 2015.ʺ

15 D.  The Present Action

16 In February 2016, Green, then proceeding pro se, commenced the present

17 action against EHPD and the Town.  After counsel was appointed to represent her,

11

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page11 of 37
1 a First Amended Complaint (ʺComplaintʺ) was filed, asserting that her employment

2 had been constructively terminated because of her age in violation of the ADEA, 29

3 U.S.C. §§ 621‐634, and CFEPA, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a‐60 et seq.  As Green had been

4 an employee of the Town, EHPD was dismissed from the action by stipulation.

5 In July 2017, after Green had taken the depositions of Emerman and

6 Naccarato,theTown movedfor summary judgmentdismissing the Complaint on the

7 ground, to the extent pertinent to this appeal, that Green had not made out a prima

8 facie case of discrimination.  In so contending, the Town argued only that because

9 Green had chosen to resign ratherthan participate in a hearing before the Town BPC,

10 see Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (a tenured public

11 employee is constitutionally entitled to, inter alia, a pretermination hearing at which

12 she is given an opportunity to present her position) (ʺLoudermill hearingʺ), she could

13 not establish that she had suffered an adverse employment action.

14 In opposition to the motion, Green disputed the claim that her

15 resignation had been voluntary, contending that she had essentially been forced to

16 resign because she was told that if she did not, she would be fired.  In support of her

17 contention, she submitted her September 2017 Affidavit, stating in part as follows:

12

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page12 of 37
1 31.    On December 11, 2014, I sat for an interview with

2 Officer Naccarrato [sic] as part of the EHPDʹs formal

3 investigation. . . .  Following the conclusion of the interview, I . . .

4 asked Officer Naccarato‐‐who held the position of Internal Affairs

5 Officer, was obviously familiar with the EHPDʹs disciplinary procedure

6 and matrix, and whose judgment I respected‐‐what was going to

7 happen to me.  Officer Naccarato responded in substance:  (i) that

8 I had stolen from the EHPD; (ii) that Chief Larrabee and other

9 members of the EHPD no longer trusted me or wanted me to continue

10 working at the EHPD; (iii) that I likely would be fired; and (iv) if there

11 was a possibility of me resigning or retiring, I should do so.

12 32.  Based on this conversation, I understood that as a result

13 of Officer Naccaratoʹs incorrect determination that I had engaged

14 in a theft, it was inevitable that I would be fired under the EHPDʹs

15 disciplinary matrix, and that my only option would be to retire.

16 33.  On or about December 15, 2014, I was scheduled to

17 appear with my union representatives, Sandy Santos and Tom

18 Fascio, before representatives from the Town, including the

19 Townʹs attorneys.

20 34.  At the meeting, Mr. Fascio met individually with the

21 Townʹs representatives.  Mr. Fascio then advised me thattheTown

22 had no interest in speaking with or hearing from me.  He then further

23 advised that the Townʹs position was that I could either retire or

24 move forward with a L[o]udermill hearing.  He advised me that,

25 based on his discussions with the Townʹs representatives, including

26 Chief Larrabee, I would almost certainly lose a L[o]udermill hearing.

27 35.    Based on the statements and advice of Officer

28 Naccarato, as confirmed by my union representativeʹs advice, I

29 was forced to ʺretireʺ effective as of December 31, 2014.  I did so

30 under duress.    It had been my intention to work for at least

31 another nine years, until I was 70.

13

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page13 of 37
1 (Green Aff. ¶¶ 31‐35 (emphases added).)

2 In support of the above statements that she had been advised by

3 Naccarato that she should resign because she was otherwise likely to be fired, Green

4 pointed, in part, to the following deposition testimony by Naccarato.  Although no

5 one had suggested to Naccarato ʺin substance,ʺ that ʺwe are going to try and fire

6 [Green] over this,ʺ he testified that

7 when you look at the disciplinary matrix, that violation falls in that

8 category.

9 Q.  A fire‐able offense?

10 A.  Yes.

11 Q.  So it was your expectation that she was going to be fired

12 over this?

13 A.  We have to follow the disciplinary matrix.

14 (Naccarato Dep. 89 (emphases added).)  And after Naccarato said that on December

15 11, 2014, he ʺprobablyʺ had some discussion with Green ʺthat was not recordedʺ in

16 her statement (id. at 33‐34), he testified as follows:

17 Q.  . . . [D]o you recall discussing with [Green] after the

18 statement was taken what was going to happen to her?

19 A.  I donʹt specifically remember but if she asked me, I would

20 have told her what I thought.

14

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page14 of 37
1 Q.  And what would you have told her?

2 A.  It didnʹt look good, stealing in the police department.

3 Q.  Did you tell her in substance that you recommended

4 that she retire because nobody trusted her anymore?

5 A.  I donʹt remember saying that.

6 Q.  Do you remember her asking you what you thought was

7 going to happen to her?

8 A.  I donʹt specifically remember but I couldnʹt say she didnʹt

9 ask me.

10 Q.  Okay.

11 A.  And if she asked me, I would have told her.

12 Q.  And what would you have told her?

13 A.    That itʹs stealing from a police department, you have a

14 potential to get fired for it.  We have a disciplinary matrix that we go by

15 and thatʹs where it falls in there.

16 Q.  Do you recall telling herthat it was likely she was going

17 to be fired unless she took retirement?

18 A.  I donʹt recall specifically saying that but if she asked me

19 what I thought, I would havetold her.  I would have been honest with

20 her.  I was always honest with her.

21 (Id. at 34‐35 (emphases added).)

15

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page15 of 37
1 E.  The District Courtʹs Decision

2 The district court, in an opinion dated December 19, 2017, granted the

3 Townʹs motion to dismiss the action for lack of a prima facie case.  See Green v. East

4 Haven Police Depʹt, 3:16‐cv‐00321, 2017 WL 6498144, at *6‐*9 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2017)

5 (ʺGreenʺ).  The court noted the burden‐shifting framework set forth in McDonnell

6 DouglasCorp. v. Green, 411U.S. 792 (1973)(ʺMcDonnellDouglasʺ),under whichaprima

7 facie case of discrimination

8 consists of proof that a plaintiff (1) was within a protected class;

9 (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was subject to an adverse

10 employment action; and (4) the adverse action occurred under

11 circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.

12 Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *6 (emphasis added).  Because the Town challenged only

13 the thirdMcDonnellDouglas element and the parties didnot address any ofthe others,

14 the court considered only whether Green adduced sufficient evidence to show a

15 triable issue as to whether she had suffered an adverse employment action.  See id.

16 at *4, *7.  It concluded that she had not.

17 The district court noted that an ʺadverse employment actionʺ is one that

18 causes a ʺmaterially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment,ʺ that

19 ʺ[o]ne example of a materially adverse action is constructive dischargeʺ‐‐a work

16

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page16 of 37
1 condition so intolerable ʺthat when[] viewed as a whole . . . a reasonable person in the

2 employeeʹs shoes would have felt compelled to resignʺ‐‐and that  ʺ[t]hreats of

3 termination can constitute evidence of constructive discharge.ʺ  Id. at *7 (internal

4 quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184,

5 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)(ʺample evidenceʺ demonstrated a triable issue offactthat plaintiff

6 was constructively discharged because plaintiff was notified ʺhe would be fired atthe

7 end ofthe 90‐day probationary period no matter what he did to improve his allegedly

8 deficient performanceʺ)).

9 However, the court also observed that a claim of constructive discharge

10 is not sufficiently supported merely by a showing that the plaintiff ʺresign[ed] to

11 avoid facing disciplinary chargesʺ or simply ʺfear[ed] termination.ʺ  Green, 2017 WL

12 6498144, at *7.    A  ʺplaintiffʹs failure to go through an available pre‐termination

13 hearing process is evidence that she was not constructively discharged,ʺ and this

14 ʺoftenprecludes a plaintiffʹs ability to survive summary judgment.ʺ  Id.  But ʺevidence

15 [that] an employee was given the choice to either resign or be fired can be sufficient

16 to create a triable issue of fact.ʺ  Id.  ʺWhen determining if a threat of termination is

17 sufficient, courts have relied on factors including whether the threats of termination

18 were repeated,direct, orinvolvedadditional adverse conduct.ʺ  Id.(internal quotation

17

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page17 of 37
1 marks omitted).

2 The court found particularly illustrative the case of Gorham v. Town of

3 Trumbull Board of Education, 7 F.Supp.3d 218 (D. Conn. 2014) (ʺGorhamʺ), in which a

4 high schoolʹs night custodian had found a musical instrument in the trash and,

5 assuming that it was abandoned, took it home intending to donate it to his church.

6 He was summoned to

7 a disciplinary hearing, charging him with  ʺtheft of items

8 belonging to a public entity,ʺ  ʺdishonesty and lying to [his]

9 supervisors,ʺ and ʺviolation of the trust inherent in his position.ʺ 

10 . . . .    He was informed that possible discipline included

11 suspension or termination. . . .    The Board of Education plant

12 administrator was alleged to have told him at the disciplinary hearing,

13 ʺLester, youʹre better off resigning right now; if not, weʹll have you

14 charged.ʺ  . . . .  The plaintiff also averred that his union representative

15 stated, ʺLester, this is tough.  If you donʹt . . . resign, theyʹll not only

16 have you charged; even if you feel like youʹre right . . . youʹll still be

17 messed up.ʺ    . . . .    The plaintiff resigned on the day of the

18 hearing. . . .   The court found the evidence sufficient to constitute

19 constructive discharge because ʺa reasonable person in Gorhamʹs shoes

20 would have felt compelled to resign.ʺ . . . .  In short, during the hearing

21 one of the decision makers and his union representative essentially

22 told Gorham the outcome of the hearing would be unfavorable and

23 advised him to resign immediately before the decision was rendered.

24 Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8 (quoting Gorham, 7 F.Supp.3d at 225, 232 (emphases

25 ours)).

26 The district court here found thatthe facts leading to Greenʹs resignation

18

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page18 of 37
1 did not measure up to the facts described in Gorham.  It stated that, ʺ[i]n analyzing a

2 constructive discharge claim, the Court must carefully balance the facts to determine

3 whether a reasonable person would have considered the pre‐termination hearing a

4 meaningful process or a formality with a predetermined negative outcome.ʺ  Green,

5 2017 WL 6498144, at*8 (emphases added).  It concluded that its ʺanalysis of thefactsin

6 this case reveals that the plaintiff choseʺ‐‐ʺshe elected on her ownʺ‐‐ʺto resign despite

7 having a viable pre‐termination hearing process . . . . fortwo reasons.ʺ  Id. (emphases

8 added).

9 First, Plaintiff had no basis to prejudge the decision makers.  Although

10 Officer Naccarato found that she had violated the Code of

11 Conduct, that she was found to have committed an act for which

12 she could be terminated, that Chief Larrabee and others did not

13 trust or want to work with her, and that he thought she should

14 resign, neither he nor Chief Larrabee were decision makers.  Neither . . .

15 had the authority to terminate her.

16 Id. (emphases added).    Second, despite Greenʹs assertion that  ʺʹ[b]ased on [her

17 December 11] conversation [with Naccarato], I understood that as a result of [his]

18 incorrect determination that I engaged in a theft, it was inevitable that I would be fired

19 under the EHPDʹs disciplinary matrix, and that my only option would be to retire,ʹʺ id.

20 (quoting Green Aff. ¶ 32 (emphases ours)), the court found such an understanding

21 unreasonable:

19

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page19 of 37
1 EHPD Policy Number 208.2 makes clearthat only the BPC has the

2 authority to terminate an employee and may do so only after a full

3 evidentiary Board hearing. . . .  Atsuch a hearing Plaintiff could have

4 offered the testimony of her longstanding coworkers demonstrating that

5 her conduct was conventional.  That process had not begun and no

6 one advised Plaintiff of the likely outcome of that process.  Indeed, a

7 reasonable person in Plaintiffʹs shoes would not have concluded it was

8 inevitable that she would be fired after speaking with someone

9 uninvolved in the decisionmaking process.

10 Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8 (ʺinevitableʺ emphasized in original; other emphases

11 added).  The district court found it

12 unavailing that [Greenʹs] union representative advised her  ʺthe

13 Townʹsposition was that[she] couldeitherretire ormove forward

14 with a L[o]udermill hearingʺ but that she ʺwould almost certainly

15 lose a L[o]udermill hearing.ʺ  [Green Aff.] ¶ 34.  In light of the fact

16 that there is no evidence Plaintiffʹs termination was automatic, the loss

17 of a Loudermill hearing would not have inevitably led to termination.

18 These statements appearto be nothing more than an educated guess

19 about a certain outcome.

20 Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8 (emphases ours).  The court found that

21 [u]nlike the plant administratorin Gorham, nobody gave Plaintiff an

22 ultimatum or threatened her with criminal charges, and there is no

23 evidence the final decision maker would have even terminated her

24 employment.    The Court finds that Plaintiff[] . . . cannot show

25 constructive discharge because she elected on her own to forego a

26 hearing made available to her.

27 Id. (emphases added).

20

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page20 of 37
1 The court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town, concluding

2 that ʺ[i]n failing to establish an adverse employment action, Plaintiff cannot establish

3 a prima facie case for her ADEA or CFEPA claims.ʺ  Id. at *9.

4 II.  DISCUSSION

5 On appeal, Green contends that the granting of summary judgment

6 against her for failure to show an adverse employment action was error because the

7 evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, showed that she was

8 constructively discharged by the Town because she believed, and objectively

9 reasonably believed, that if she did not resign she would be discharged.  As this was

10 the only merits‐related argument presented to and considered by the court, we agree

11 that summary judgment was inappropriate.

12 A.  ADEA Principles

13 The ADEA provides, in pertinent part, that as to a person over the age

14 of 40, see 29 U.S.C. § 631(a), ʺ[i]t shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to discharge

15 [the] individual . . . because of such individualʹs age,ʺ id. § 623(a)(1).  ʺIn order to

21

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page21 of 37
1 establish a prima facie case of age discrimination,ʺ the plaintiff ʺmust show (1) that

2 she was within the protected age group, (2) that she was qualified forthe position, (3)

3 that she experienced adverse employment action, and (4) that such action occurred

4 under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.ʺ    Gorzynski v.

5 JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010).  As to the fourth element of the

6 prima facie case, the Supreme Court has made  ʺclear that  ʹa plaintiff bringing a

7 disparate‐treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of

8 the evidence, that age was the ʺbut‐forʺ cause of the challenged adverse employment

9 actionʹ and not just a contributing or motivating factor.ʺ  Id. at 106 (quoting Gross v.

10 FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009)).  Only the third element of the

11 prima facie case is at issue on this appeal, however, because the only merits‐related

12 basis for summary judgment presented by the Townʹs motion was that Green had

13 failed to show an adverse employment action, and that was the only such basis for

14 summary judgment consideredby thedistrict court,see Green, 2017WL 6498144, at*4,

15 *7.

16 Plainly an employeeʹs ʺdischarge,ʺ 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), is an adverse

17 employment action.  To satisfy the third element of the prima facie case, a discharge

18 may consist of eitherthe employerʹs actual termination of the plaintiffʹs employment

22

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page22 of 37
1 or the existence of intolerable conditions, attributable to the employer, amounting to

2 a ʺconstructiveʺ discharge.  See,e.g.,Kirsch v. Fleet Street, Ltd., 148 F.3d 149, 161 (2d Cir.

3 1998) (ʺKirschʺ); Stetson v. NYNEX Service Co., 995 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1993)

4 (ʺStetsonʺ); Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983) (ʺPenaʺ).  ʺ[T]he

5 plaintiffʹs burden of establishing a prima facie case in a discrimination suit is

6 de minimis.ʺ  Chertkova v. Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., 92 F.3d 81, 90 (2d Cir.

7 1999)(ʺChertkovaʺ)(TitleVII claimof genderdiscrimination)(internalquotationmarks

8 omitted).

9 An employeeʹs rights under federal antidiscrimination statutes may be

10 ʺviolated by either explicit or constructive alterations in the terms or conditions of

11 employment,ʺ and if constructive, the alterations, to be actionable, ʺmust be severe or

12 pervasive.ʺ  Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (ʺEllerthʺ)

13 (emphasis added) (discussing Title VII principles announced in Meritor Savings Bank,

14 FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986)); see, e.g., Pena, 702 F.2d at 325 (ADEA claim).  ʺA

15 discriminatorily abusive work environment . . . can . . . discourageemployeesfrom remaining

16 on thejob . . . .ʺ  Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (emphases added);

17 see, e.g., id. at 19 (after the company presidentʹs last sexually harassing comment,

18 ʺHarris collected her paycheck and quitʺ).

23

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page23 of 37
1 A plaintiff may prove a constructive discharge by establishing that

2 his employer, rather than acting directly, deliberately ma[de his]

3 working conditions so intolerable that [he was] forced into an

4 involuntary resignation,

5 Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 161 (ADEA claim) (internal quotation marks omitted (emphases

6 ours)), and such an intolerable condition may be shown by evidence that the

7 employer gave the plaintiff the choice ofresigning or being fired,see,e.g., Lopez v. S.B.

8 Thomas,Inc., 831 F.2d1184, 1188 (2d Cir. 1987)(ʺLopezʺ)(claim of ethnicdiscrimination

9 in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981).

10 However, as the district court noted, a constructive discharge cannot be

11 shown simply by the fact that the employee was unhappy with the nature of her

12 assignments or criticism of her work, or where the employee found the working

13 conditions merely ʺdifficult or unpleasant.ʺ  See Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *7 (citing

14 Stetson, 995 F.2d at 360).  Rather, the standard for assessing whether the alterations

15 have become intolerable is an objective one:

16 Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an

17 objectively hostile or abusive work environment‐‐an environment

18 that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive‐‐is beyond

19 Title VIIʹs purview.

20 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (emphases added).    Accordingly, the principle we have

21 consistently applied is that a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of an adverse

24

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page24 of 37
1 employment action if she adduces evidence from which a rational juror could infer

2 that the employer made her working condition, viewed as a whole, ʺso difficult or

3 unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employeeʹs shoes would have felt

4 compelled to resign.ʺ  Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 161 (internal quotation marks omitted); see,

5 e.g., Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 89; Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361; Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1188; Pena, 702

6 F.2d at 325.

7 The factthatthis substantive standard is an objective one, however, does

8 not necessarily mean that what a reasonable person in the plaintiffʹs shoes would

9 have felt compelled to do is determinable as a matter of law, for an objective question

10 is often fact‐specific.  It hardly need be said that the determination of whether it was

11 objectively reasonable for an employee to feel compelled to resign in order to avoid

12 being fired requires at least an examination of the information possessed by the

13 employee.  If any relevant facts are in dispute or subject to competing inferences as

14 to their effects, or if there is admissible evidence from which a rational juror could

15 infer that a reasonable employee would have felt so compelled, rejection of the

16 constructive‐discharge theory as a matter oflaw is impermissible.  See,e.g.,Kirsch, 148

17 F.3d at 161‐62 (affirming denial of defendantsʹ posttrial motion for judgment as a

18 matter of law); Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1189 (reversing grant of defendantʹs motion for

25

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page25 of 37
1 summary judgment).  In Lopez, for example, we observed that

2 [t]he record in this case amply demonstrates that Lopez has

3 raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether he was constructively

4 discharged when, as he alleges, Hunsberger [a regional director

5 who was Lopezʹs supervisor] told him he would be fired at the end of

6 the 90‐day probationary period no matter what he did to improve his

7 allegedly deficient performance.    A trier of fact might find that

8 Hunsbergerʹs statement alone suffices to establish a constructive

9 discharge.  See Welch v. University of Tex. & Its Marine Science Inst.,

10 659 F.2d531, 533‐34 (5th Cir. 1981)(finding constructivedischarge

11 where employer clearly expressed his desire that employee resign

12 because such a statement would force a reasonable person to

13 resign).

14 Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1188‐89 (emphasis added).

15 In contrast, some cases present records so insubstantial that no rational

16 factfinder could infer that a reasonable employee in the plaintiffʹs shoes could have

17 felt compelled to resign.  In Stetson, for example, we found the evidence insufficient

18 to show a prima facie case of constructive discharge where the employer  ʺnever

19 mentioned retirement to Stetson and never either expressly or impliedly suggested

20 that Stetsonʹs employment would be terminated.ʺ  995 F.2d at 361; see also Pena, 702

21 F.2d at 325‐26 (reversing denial of the defendantʹs motion for a directed verdict for

22 lack of evidence of a constructive discharge where, although the plaintiffʹs role was

23 ʺsomewhatʺ changed, she was not faced with loss of pay or change in title, and it was

26

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page26 of 37
1 her  ʺown understanding throughout the relevant periodʺ‐‐ʺ[t]aking her own

2 testimony in the light most favorable to herʺ‐‐ʺthat [the employer] wished her to

3 remainʺ in its employ).

4 B.  Summary Judgment Principles

5 A motion for summary judgment may be granted only ʺif the movant

6 shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

7 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.ʺ  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  On such a motion,

8 ʺ[t]he inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whetherthere is the

9 need for a trial‐‐whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that

10 properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be

11 resolved in favor of either party.ʺ  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250

12 (1986) (ʺLiberty Lobbyʺ).  Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ʺthe

13 district court is required to resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences

14 that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.ʺ 

15 Kessler v. Westchester County Department of Social Services, 461 F.3d 199, 206 (2d Cir.

16 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).

17 ʺ[A]t the summary judgment stage the judgeʹs function is not himself to

27

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page27 of 37
1 weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether

2 there is a genuine issue for trial.ʺ    Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249.  ʺCredibility

3 determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate

4 inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge . . .ruling on a motion

5 for summary judgment . . . .ʺ  Id. at 255.

6 These standards also govern our review on appeal.  Where ʺ[s]ummary

7 judgment was granted for the employer, . . . we must take the facts alleged by the

8 employee to be true.ʺ  Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 747.

9 C.  The Present Case

10 In this case we have difficulties both with the substantive legal standard

11 adoptedby thedistrict court and with the courtʹs treatment ofthe summary judgment

12 record.

13 1.  The Substantive Legal Principle Adopted

14 In granting summary judgment against Green for lack of proof of any

15 adverse employment action, the district court stated in part that  ʺ[u]nlike the

16 [decisionmaker]in Gorham, nobody gave Plaintiff an ultimatum [to resign or be fired]

28

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page28 of 37
1 or threatened her with criminal charges.ʺ  Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8.  But Gorham

2 merelydiscussedevidence of statements that were especially clear, authoritative, and

3 ominous, from which a constructive discharge could be inferred.  That evidence did

4 not mark the minimum standard for what is actionable.

5 Abuses may take many forms and be delivered in many ways.  The

6 district courtʹs transmutation of the facts in Gorham into a substantive controlling

7 principle‐‐ruling that a plaintiff cannot show that a threat of termination constituted

8 a constructive discharge unless the threat (a) was a categorical ultimatum that if she

9 did not resign she would be fired, and (b) was delivered by an ultimate

10 decisionmaker as to firing‐‐imposed a legal standard at an unwarranted level of

11 specificity.

12 While the identity of the person delivering a termination threat or

13 prediction and the level of certainty expressed in such a threat or prediction are

14 considerations for a factfinder to weigh, neither an absolute statement nor a direct

15 communication by an ultimate decisionmaker is a sine qua non for evidence of a

16 constructive discharge.  For example, in Lopez, in which the plaintiff was told by his

17 supervisor that he would be fired at the end of his probationary period regardless of

18 how well he performed, we stated that a factfinder could permissibly ʺfind that [that]

29

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page29 of 37
1 statement alone suffices to establish a constructive discharge,ʺ 831 F.2d at 1188; but

2 nothing in our opinion suggested that the supervisor was a decisionmaker with

3 respect to firing.  In Stetson, in concluding that there was not sufficient evidence to

4 show a prima facie case of constructive discharge, we considered notjust whetherthe

5 employer told Stetson ʺexpresslyʺ that his employment would be terminated, but

6 alternatively whether he so ʺsuggestedʺ ʺimpliedly,ʺ 995 F.2d at 361.  And indeed, our

7 Lopez opinion indicated that a constructive discharge could properly be found where

8 an employer merely, albeit ʺclearly[,] expressed his desire that [an] employee resign

9 because such a statementʺ  could cause a reasonable person to feel compelled to

10 resign, 831 F.2d at 1188‐89 (emphasis added).

11 Thus, contrary to the standard applied by the district court here in

12 findingthatGreenʹs constructive‐discharge argumentfailedbecauseher evidencewas

13 less stark than that in Gorham, the established standard‐‐as discussed in Part II.A.

14 above, and indeed as reflected in Gorham itself‐‐is whether in light of the evidence as

15 a whole as to intolerable working circumstances,  ʺa reasonable person in the

16 employeeʹs shoes would have felt compelled to resign,ʺ  Kirsch, 148 F.3d at 161;

17 Chertkova, 92 F.3d at 89; Stetson, 995 F.2d at 361; Lopez, 831 F.2d at 1188; Pena, 702 F.2d

18 at 325; see Gorham, 7 F.Supp.3d at 232.

30

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page30 of 37
1 2.  The District Courtʹs Assessment of the Record

2 In addition to imposing an unduly stringent standard for proof of a

3 constructive discharge, the district court engaged in a ʺbalanc[ing of] the facts,ʺ from

4 which the courtinferred that a reasonableperson in Greenʹs shoes wouldnot have felt

5 compelled to resign in order to avoid termination, and found that Green in fact

6 ʺchoseʺ‐‐ʺelected on her ownʺ‐‐to resign rather than to proceed with the Loudermill

7 hearing, Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8.  But on a motion for summary judgment, the

8 courtʹs job was not to weigh the evidence, but rather was to accept as true the facts

9 that were sworn to or undisputed, and with all permissible inferences therefrom

10 drawn in Greenʹs favor, to determine whether a rational juror could find that a

11 reasonable employee would have felt so compelled.  The record as a whole, viewed

12 in the light most favorable to Green, precluded the grant of summary judgment.

13 Preliminarily, we note that one of the Gorham facts that the district court

14 noted Green failed to match was that Gorham had been expressly threatened with

15 criminalprosecution, whereasGreen was not so threatened.  Although ordinarily one

16 might reasonably have no fear of being criminally prosecuted for taking a $2‐$3

17 package of biscuit dough, EHPDʹs treatment of the biscuits affair was hardly

31

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page31 of 37
1 ordinary.  The district courtʹs suggestion that Green could have had no thought of

2 being prosecuted criminally ignored the facts that, on arriving in the EHPD kitchen

3 in her attempt to return the biscuits, Green had been ʺconfronted by Chief Larrabeeʺ

4 who, telling her  ʺit was a crime scene,ʺ barred her from opening the refrigerator,

5 which was covered with ʺyellow ʹcrime sceneʹ tapeʺ (Green Aff. ¶¶ 27, 29).

6 More importantly, we have difficulty with the district courtʹs view that

7 an employee in Greenʹs shoes would not have had any reasonable belief that her

8 firing was inevitable (as her affidavit claimed), an inference drawn from the district

9 courtʹs findings that ʺno one advised Plaintiff of the likely outcomeʺ of a BPC hearing,

10 and that she thus ʺhad no basis to prejudge the [Loudermill hearing] decision makers,ʺ

11 Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8.  The findings that ʺno oneʺ had given Green such

12 advice and that there was ʺno basisʺ for herto believe that she would lose in a hearing

13 did not take into account all of the evidence in the record, and surely did not view the

14 evidence in the light most favorable to Green.   First, the court characterized the

15 hearing scheduledforGreen as a ʺviableʺ preterminationprocess, in which she ʺcould

16 have offered the testimony of her longstanding coworkers demonstrating that her

17 conduct was conventional,ʺ id.(emphases added).  ButGreen had cited past customary

18 practices of herself and coworkers only to explain borrowing the basket; she did not

32

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page32 of 37
1 claim any longstanding practice with respect to taking the biscuits.  Moreover, the

2 court did not mention either (a) the I.A. Reportʹs findings that Green had committed

3 ʺpremeditat[ed] . . . theftʺ and had ʺpurposely concealedʺ the theft (I.A. Report at 3),

4 or (b) the undisputed fact that  ʺauthority to determine the merits of an [I.A.]

5 investigationʺ resided in the Chief of Police (Rule 56(a) Statements, undisputed ¶ 29

6 (emphasis added)).    Thus, although Chief Larrabee was not an ultimate

7 decisionmaker as to whether Green should be fired, the record is contrary to the

8 district courtʹs view that Green had a  ʺviableʺ  chance of having the Town BPC

9 overrule the Police Chiefʹs I.A. determinations that Green had engaged in theft and

10 duplicity.

11 Second,there was evidence inthe recordthatGreen receivedadvice from

12 knowledgeable persons, on both sides of the aisle, that the Loudermill hearing would

13 ʺlikely,ʺ and indeed ʺalmost certainly,ʺ result in her termination:

14 # EHPD was subject to a consent decree that required it to follow

15 a disciplinary matrix governing circumstances under which a

16 Department employee could be fired (see Naccarato Dep. 111);

17 # Naccarato, as EHPDʹs Internal Affairs Officer, was familiar with

18 (see id. 114‐16)‐‐and was understood by Green to be familiar with (see

19 Green Aff. ¶ 31)‐‐the EHPD disciplinary matrix;

20 # Green stated that when she asked Naccarato what he thought

33

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page33 of 37
1 was going to happen to her, Naccarato told her that Chief Larrabee and

2 other members of EHPD no longer trusted her and did not want her to

3 continue working at EHPD (see Green Aff. ¶ 31);

4 # Naccarato advised Green that if the I.A. charges were upheld

5 she, in accordance with the consent‐decree‐mandated disciplinary

6 matrix, ʺlikely would be firedʺ (id.);

7 # Green stated that Naccarato advised her that if she could

8 ʺresign[] or retir[e],ʺ she ʺshould do soʺ (id.);

9 # Naccarato testified that he did not remember  ʺspecificallyʺ

10 Greenʹs asking his view of what was going to happen to her(Dep. 34) or

11 ʺspecificallyʺ advising her that she should resign or retire (id. at 35); but

12 he testified that ʺif she asked,ʺ he would have told her what he honestly

13 thought (id.);

14 # Naccarato testified that he would have told Green that stealing

15 from the police department falls into the ʺdisciplinary matrixʺ category

16 of a ʺfire‐able offenseʺ (Dep. 35, 89);

17 # Naccarato testified that if I.A. charges showed a firing offense,

18 the disciplinary matrix left the BPC ʺvery littleʺ room for an exercise of

19 discretion (Dep. 111); and, finally,

20 # Green stated that on the day ofthe scheduled hearing, her union

21 representative met initially with Town representatives, who said the

22 Town did not want to hear from Green and that she could either have

23 the Loudermill hearing or retire; and her union representative advised

24 her, ʺbasedon hisdiscussions with theTownʹs representatives,including

25 Chief Larrabee,ʺ that she would ʺalmost certainlyʺ lose at the hearing

26 (Green Aff. ¶ 34).

27 The district courtʹs view that there was ʺno basisʺ for a reasonable belief that Green

34

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page34 of 37
1 would lose a Loudermill hearing is contradicted by the evidence.

2 While the district court did note Greenʹs statement that her union

3 representative advised her that she would ʺʹalmost certainly loseʹʺ in a Loudermill

4 hearing, Green, 2017 WL 6498144, at *8, the court found that advice‐‐though

5 admittedly  ʺeducatedʺ‐‐to be  ʺunavailingʺ  because there was no evidence that

6 termination was automatic or inevitable, id.  This outright dismissal as to any value

7 or effect of advice from the union representative seems to indicate the courtʹs belief

8 that, despite having received an I.A. officerʹs informed view that she has committed

9 a fire‐able offense, a reasonable employee, as a matter of law, cannot feel compelled

10 to resign rather than insist on a hearing when her union representative‐‐who is

11 presumably looking after her interests‐‐makes an ʺeducatedʺ prediction that she is

12 almost certain to lose in the hearing.  We know of no authority supporting such a

13 principle of law.  And to the extent that the court found the union representativeʹs

14 advice ʺunavailingʺ simply as a matter of fact‐‐i.e., as outweighed by other evidence

15 as to what a reasonable employee in Greenʹs shoes ʺwouldʺ have felt compelled to do,

16 id.‐‐the court so foundby impermissibly conducting its own weighing ofthe evidence

17 and by drawing all inferences adversely to Green.

18 In sum, the evidence to be considered as to whether Green suffered a

35

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page35 of 37
1 constructive‐discharge adverse employment action, viewed in the light most

2 favorable to Green on this issue, included the facts that the 61‐year‐old Green (1) had

3 admitted taking items from the EHPD kitchen without permission; (2) had admitted

4 initially lying to the Chief of Police about her actions; (3) had immediately been

5 caught by the Chief of Police in that lie; (4) was found in the Internal Affairs

6 investigation (a) to have stolen those items premeditatedly and (b) to have attempted

7 to conceal the theft; (5) had been told by the Internal Affairs Officer that the Chief of

8 Police and other members of the Department no longer trusted her and did not want

9 herto continue working at EHPD; (6) had been advised by the Internal Affairs Officer

10 (a) that if the I.A. Report were upheld she, in accordance with the EHPD consent

11 decree disciplinary matrix, ʺlikely would be fired,ʺ and (b) that if she could resign or

12 retire she ʺshould do soʺ; and (7) had been advised by her own union representative,

13 who had just conferred with the Town representatives, that she would  ʺalmost

14 certainlyʺ lose at a Loudermill hearing.  If this case were tried, a factfinder, applying

15 the correct legal standard to the issue of constructive discharge, could rationally find

16 that an employee in Greenʹs shoes would have felt compelled to submit her

17 resignation stating that she was retiring, rather than face nearly certain termination.

18 The district court erred in granting summary judgment on the basis that

36

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page36 of 37
1 such a finding would be impermissible.

2 CONCLUSION

3 We have considered all of the Townʹs appellate arguments in support of

4 summary judgment and have found them to be without merit.    The judgment

5 dismissing Greenʹs claims under the ADEA and CFEPA is vacated, and the matter is

6 remanded forfurther proceedings.  As the Townʹs merits challenge to Greenʹs action

7 focused only on the element of adverse employment action, we do not rule out the

8 possibility of further pretrial proceedings focusing on other elements.

9 If Green ultimately prevails on the merits of her action, she will be

10 entitled to the costs of this appeal.

37

Case 18-143, Document 93-1, 03/10/2020, 2797585, Page37 of 37