Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15769/USCOURTS-ca9-12-15769-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
E.M.
Appellant
Lafayette Board of Education
Appellee
Lafayette School District
Appellee
M.M.
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

M.M.; E.M., individually and on

behalf of their minor son C.M.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAFAYETTE SCHOOL DISTRICT, a

local educational agency;

LAFAYETTE BOARD OF EDUCATION,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15769

D.C. No.

3:10-cv-04223-SI

M.M.; E.M., individually and on

behalf of their minor son C.M.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LAFAYETTE SCHOOL DISTRICT;

LAFAYETTE BOARD OF EDUCATION;

STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT

OF EDUCATION; JACK O’CONNELL,

as State Superintendent of Public

Instruction for the State of

California; DANA SASSONE;

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

GENERAL SERVICES; WILL BUSH,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 12-15770

D.C. No.

3:09-cv-04624-SI

OPINION

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2 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Susan Illston, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 5, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed September 16, 2014

Before: Sidney R. Thomas and Johnnie B. Rawlinson,

Circuit Judges, and Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Thomas;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

SUMMARY**

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Affirming in part and reversing in part the district court’s

judgment, the panel held that a school district’s failure to

provide educational testing data to parents violated the

procedural requirements of the Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act and prevented the parents from meaningfully

* The Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by

designation.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 3

participating in the creation of their son’s individualized

education program, thereby denying him a free appropriate

public education under the IDEA.

The panel held that the school district did not fail to

properly incorporate “Response-to-Intervention” or “RTI”

testing data into the student’s initial evaluation. The school

district did, however, violate the IDEA by failing to insure

that the RTI data was documented and carefully considered

by the entire IEP team and failing to furnish the parents with

the data, thereby making it unable for them to give informed

consent for both the initial evaluation and the special

education services their son received. The panel held that

this procedural violation denied the student a FAPE because

it seriously infringed his parents’ opportunity to participate in

the IEP formulation process.

The panel did not reach questions of whether the resulting

IEPs were reasonably calculated to enable the student to

receive educational benefits, whether the school district

otherwise procedurally violated the IDEA, or whether an

assessment of the student was otherwise appropriate. In light

of its holding that the student was denied a FAPE, the panel

remanded for reconsideration of whether the parents were

entitled to reimbursement for the cost of private instruction.

Addressing issues concerning two earlier proceedings

before the Office of Administrative Hearings, the panel

affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the parents’ claim

for reimbursement of the cost of an evaluation was moot. 

The panel held that the parents were not denied due process

in the first OAH proceeding. The panel affirmed the district

court’s determination that two of the three claims raised in

the second OAH proceeding were time-barred.

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4 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

The panel affirmed the dismissal of claims against the

State of California Department of Education for failing to

properly oversee the OAH proceedings and for staying its

investigation. 

The panel affirmed in part the dismissal of retaliation

claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and remanded

for the district court to consider one claim in the first

instance.

The panel remanded for reconsideration the issue of the

parents’ request for attorneys’ fees under 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(3)(B).

Judge Rawlinson dissented from the majority’s holding

that the school district failed to provide the student a FAPE

and from the reversal of the award of attorneys’ fees. She

wrote that no procedural violation of the IDEA was

committed by the school district because the RTI assessments

were not a mechanism used to identify students in need of

special education. Judge Rawlinson also disagreed that the

district court failed to address one Rehabilitation Act claim. 

She wrote that she would affirm the district court’s judgment

in its entirety.

COUNSEL

Lina Foltz, Oakland, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Amy R. Levine (argued), Dannis Woliver Kelley, San

Francisco, California; Louis Leone, Stubbs & Leone, Walnut

Creek, California, for Defendants-Appellees LafayetteSchool

District and Lafayette Board of Education.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 5

Amy Bisson Holloway, General Counsel, Edmundo Aguilar,

Assistant General Counsel, and Leonard Garfinkel (argued),

Deputy General Counsel, California Department of

Education, Sacramento, California,forDefendants-Appellees

California Department of Education and Jack O’Connell.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we consider, among other matters, whether

a school district’s failure to provide educational testing data

to parents violated the procedural requirements of the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400–1487 (“IDEA” or “Act”). We conclude that it did. 

We also conclude that the failure to provide the data 

prevented the parents from meaningfully participating in the

creation of his individualized education program (“IEP”),

thereby denying their son a free appropriate public education

(“FAPE”) under the IDEA.

I

These consolidated appeals arise out of three

administrative complaints and three district court lawsuits

concerning the educational opportunities provided to C.M., a

child who has been identified as an individual with learning

disabilities. C.M.’s parents, M.M. and E.M., appeal from the

district court’s decision to affirm the Office of Administrative

Hearings (“OAH”) judge’s conclusion that the Lafayette

School District’s (the “District”) did not violate the IDEA.

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6 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

During the 2005–2006 school year, the District

implemented a new Response-to-Intervention (“RTI”) 

approach to assist struggling learners in the general education

program. The District used RTI as an intermediate step

before referring a student for special education placement. 

Reading Specialist Carol Harris conducted “universal

assessments” of all students in kindergarten through third

grade three times each school year, which included the

Slosson Oral Reading Test (“SORT”) and the Dynamic

Indicators of Basic Early Literacy Skills (“DIBELS”) test. 

District staff then came together after each assessment period

to discuss each student’s results to “pinpoint children that

need support beyond . . . general instruction,” to guide the

intervention—or additional instruction—the child would then

receive, and to monitor the progress the student made in

response to the implemented intervention. These meetings

were called “Assessment Wall” meetings, and they were

attended by Principal Mary Maddux, Instructional Support

Teacher (“IST”) Jane Jones, Reading Specialist Harris, and

the general education teachers from each grade level. The

complete RTI assessment results and related graphs were not

given to parents.

That same year, C.M. began kindergarten at Lafayette

Elementary School when he was six years old. Through RTI,

the District identified C.M. as in need of reading intervention

and began providing him additional instruction, which

continued throughout his kindergarten year and into the

following summer via a special summer class. Specifically,

C.M.’s DIBELS results during his kindergarten year placed

him at benchmark in Phoneme Segmentation Fluency but

below benchmark in Initial Sound Fluency, Letter Naming

Fluency, and Nonsense Word Fluency. His kindergarten

report card indicated some areas in reading and writing where

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 7

he met grade level standard and some areas where he was

approaching grade level standard.

In first grade, C.M. continued to receive reading

intervention. In October, his parents submitted a written

request to the District to perform an evaluation of C.M. for

learning disabilities. The District convened two Student

Study Team (“SST”) meetings with the parents in November

and February before referring C.M. for the special education

evaluation. The SST meeting notes referenced in narrative

form C.M.’s difficulties, the parents’ and teachers’ concerns,

and the interventions he was receiving. C.M.’s RTI data

graphs were not reviewed during the SST meetings, and the

February meeting notes reference only his mid-year SORT

score and his overall DIBELS Strategic rating, which denotes

a below benchmark rating.

The District eventually completed a special education

Assessment Plan on February 20, 2007, and on that same day

obtained E.M.’s consent to move forward with the initial

evaluation. The District conducted the evaluation in March

and April, which included an educational readiness

assessment by IST Jones and intellectual development and

developmental history assessments by School Psychologist

Intern Michelle Charpentier. Although the Assessment Plan

also included social/emotional and motor/perceptual

development assessments those assessments were not

performed.

The District emailed the assessment results to C.M.’s

parents on April 17, 2007, and held the first meeting of

C.M.’s IEP team the following day. Based on the evaluation,

the IEP team, which included the parents, determined C.M.

was eligible for special education because he had a

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phonological processing disorder.1 A phonological

processing disorder is one subset of an auditory processing

disorder and relates specifically to the phonemic awareness

pillar of reading,

2 which “refers to a person’s ability to detect

and access the sound structure of language.” Based on this

eligibility determination, the IEP team developed an

education program in which C.M. would begin participating

in the school’s Instructional Support Program (“ISP”),

receiving instruction in language arts from IST Jones for 45

minutes a day, four times a week, to help him with his

difficulties in reading and writing. The IEP team meeting

lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

C.M. participated in the ISP for the remainder of his first

grade year, and at the end of the year, his DIBELS results

placed him above benchmark in Phoneme Segmentation

Fluency but below benchmark in Nonsense Word Fluency

and Oral Reading Fluency. His first grade report card

indicated he was below grade level standard in reading and

approaching grade level standard in writing.

In second grade, C.M. continued to participate in the ISP. 

In late November, his parents obtained a private evaluation

from Doctor of Audiology Dimitra Loomos. Dr. Loomos’s

evaluation revealed that C.M. had a central auditory

1 C.M.’s Specific Learning Disability Eligibility Summary form, which

commemorates his eligibility determination, provides a list for the IEP

team to mark which particular Processing Disorder a child may have. The

list included: Attention, Auditory Processing, Phonological Processing,

Visual Processing, Working Memory, Sensory-Motor Skills, Cognitive

Abilities, and Executive Functioning.

2 The five pillars of reading are phonemic awareness, decoding, fluency,

comprehension, and vocabulary.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 9

processing disorder (“CAPD”) that was related to his learning

disability. Auditory processing “is defined as the execution

and coordination of specific auditory mechanisms in an

interactive manner . . . that allows the central nervous system

to detect, decode, synthesize and interpret auditory

information.”

Similar to the DIBELS assessment, C.M. demonstrated

good phonemic awareness as well as good auditory

discrimination, auditory closure, auditory figure/ground

ability, and auditory attention. Conversely, C.M.’s

performance showed “a deficit for integrating auditory

information within the central auditory nervous system. . .

[and] in the ability to perform binaural separation of auditory

signals.”

Dr. Loomos explains in her report that “[b]ecause we

view the world simultaneously through the individual senses,

we are constantly working to fit all the pieces together in

order to get the whole picture. If the central nervous system

is not properly integrating the auditory input with other

sensory input (visual, tactile, etc.), the child ends up with an

incomplete puzzle . . . . Children displaying signs of poor

integration skills on CAP tests may also demonstrate deficits

in auditory-visual and/or visual-motor integration skills (e.g.

writing, reading recognition, spelling, etc.).” Dr. Loomos

made a number of recommendations for C.M. in terms of

environmental modifications, direct interventions, and

compensatory strategies.

C.M.’s second grade teacher, Jody Carson, was aware of

Dr. Loomos’s evaluation because she completed a report for

Dr. Loomos, and E.M. gave a copy of the final evaluation

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report to Ms. Carson, IST Jones, and the school front desk

when school resumed after the holiday break.

As of February, C.M.’s RTI SORT scores were declining. 

On March, 18, 2008, the District convened C.M.’s first

annual IEP review meeting, and the IEP team developed a

renewed IEP. However, the new IEP was not only identical

to the previous IEP, it also failed to reference C.M.’s CAPD

or provide for any modifications or accommodations to

address his unique deficits. C.M.’s parents consented to the

renewed IEP. About one week later, the parents received the

final evaluation report for another private evaluation they

obtained from Speech-Language Pathologist Deborah Swain,

which found that C.M. “experiences a range from average

ability to significant difficultywith specific skills of auditorybased language processing.”

Thus, throughout the spring, the parents paid for C.M. to

attend sound-based therapy, and conversations between E.M.

and C.M.’s teachers were ongoing concerning C.M.’s CAPD

and the recommendations contained in both evaluation

reports. In May, an informal meeting was held at the parents’

request to discuss C.M.’s need for a speech and language

assessment and clarification of the IEP to address C.M.’s

CAPD. No amendments were made to the IEP. By the end

of his second grade year, C.M. scored Below Basic in

language arts on a state standardized test, which was shared

with his parents. His DIBELS results placed him below

benchmark in Oral Reading Fluency. His second grade report

card indicated he was below grade level standard in both

reading and writing.

Three weeks into C.M.’s third grade year, on September

17, 2008, the District convened an interim IEP team meeting

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 11

at the parents’ request to discuss, inter alia, their concern

over his lack of meaningful academic progress, the need for

improved goals and objectives in the IEP, and amendments to

the IEP to better address C.M.’s CAPD. At the meeting, the

parents also advised the District that they disagreed with the

2007 Assessment results, and later that day they requested in

writing an independent educational evaluation (“IEE”) at the

District’s expense.3 For two months, the District did not

respond to the IEE request and instead sought the parents’

consent to reevaluate C.M., but the parents did not consent

and they did not withdraw their request for an IEE.

In December, the parents obtained an evaluation at their

own expense by Licensed Psychologist Tina Guterman. Dr.

Guterman’s educational evaluation, which included a review

of C.M.’s prior evaluations and background, found that C.M.

had auditory processing weaknesses and severe dyslexia and

that his IEP services were insufficient to meet his needs. Her

report states that students with similar profiles as C.M. “make

larger and more resilient gains through systematic immersion

in a research based multi-sensory program delivered at a high

level of intensity.” Dr. Guterman made a number of

recommendations for C.M.’s instructional program.

The parents subsequently withdrew C.M. from the ISP

and enrolled him in an intense private reading and

comprehension program that better addressed his multi3 Once the parents disagreed with the assessment and requested an IEE,

the District had two choices under the IDEA. It could, “without

unnecessary delay,” either provide the requested IEE or file a due process

complaint with the California Department of General Services to defend

the 2007 Assessment. 34 C.F.R. § 300.502(b)(2); Cal. Educ. Code

§ 56329(c).

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sensory integration deficits while they and the District

continued to negotiate his IEP. The IEP team participated in

a series of facilitated meetings over a period of seven months. 

The parents did not ultimately agree to a renewed IEP for

C.M. until the end of his third grade year.

On November 18, 2008, the same day as the first

facilitated IEP team meeting, the parents filed a compliance

complaint with the California Department of Education

(“Department of Education”), alleging that the District failed

to comply with the IDEA procedures after their request for an

IEE. Early in December, the District responded to the IEE

request by filing a due process complaint with the California

Department of General Services, defending the 2007

Assessment. The District also asked the Department of

Education to stay its investigation of the parents’ complaint

because the IEE issue was pending in the OAH, and the

Department of Education closed its investigation. After a

three day hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)

issued a decision holding that the District unnecessarily

delayed in defending the 2007 Assessment and also found

that the parents waited too long to request the IEE. The ALJ

therefore ordered the District to reimburse the parents for

only half the cost of Dr. Guterman’s evaluation. The ALJ

also found that conditions warranted reevaluation, and

permitted the District to proceed with new assessments of

C.M.

On April 16, 2009, the parents filed a due process

complaint with the OAH, alleging 16 separate claims against

the District regarding its identification of C.M. as a child with

a disability and its development of an assessment plan, the

appropriateness of the 2007 Assessment, and the District’s

development and oversight of the IEP. In August of that

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year, the parents filed a second due process complaint with

the OAH, alleging in four claims that the District denied C.M.

a FAPE. The ALJs dismissed the claims that arose before

April 16, 2007, as being outside the statute of limitations, and

after an eleven day hearing, held that the 2007 Assessment

was appropriate, the District did not deny C.M. a FAPE, and

C.M. was not entitled to receive reimbursement for his

private compensatory education services.

Between August 2009 and September 2010, the parents

initiated three lawsuits against the District and its Director of

Student Services Dr. Dana Sassone, the Lafayette Board of

Education, the Department of Education and its

Superintendent, and the California Department of General

Services and its Director, in federal district court seeking

reversal of the OAH decisions, attorney’s fees, and remedies

for various violations of the IDEA, § 504 of the

Rehabilitation Act, and the Constitution.

The district court issued multiple orders dismissing

portions of the lawsuits and consolidating the remaining

claims.4 On February 7, 2012, the district court issued its

final order, finding in favor of the District on all but one

claim, and issued its final judgment on March 8, 2012. The

parents timely filed notices of appeal. We have jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part and

reverse in part.

We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear

error even when they are based on the written record of

4

In a previous appeal concerning claims in the first lawsuit, we affirmed

the district court. M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.

2012).

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administrative proceedings. Burlington N., Inc. v.

Weyerhaeuser Co., 719 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1983);

Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th

Cir. 1987). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the

evidence in the record supports the finding but “the reviewing

court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake

has been committed.” Burlington N., Inc., 719 F.2d at 307. 

Questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law are

reviewed de novo. Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1310.

II

“The IDEA provides states with federal funds to help

educate children with disabilities if they provide every

qualified child with a FAPE that meets the federal statutory

requirements.” Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty.

Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 2001). Congress

enacted the IDEA “to ensure that all children with disabilities

have available to them a free appropriate public education

that emphasizes special education and related services

designed to meet their unique needs . . . .” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)(1)(A). The IDEA provides for a cooperative

process between parents and schools that culminates in the

creation of an IEP for every disabled student. See generally

20 U.S.C. § 1414.

A core principle throughout the IDEA is meaningful

participation by parents and informed parental consent,

making the parents an integral part of the team that

determines both whether the child is a child with a disability

and the content of the child’s IEP. See 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1400(c)(5)(B), 1414(a)(1)(D), 1414(b)(4)(A); 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.306(a)(1). In crafting the Act, Congress also placed

great emphasis on procedural safeguards to “ensure that the

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rights of children with disabilities and parents of such

children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(B). 

“Procedural compliance is essential to ensuring that every

eligible child receives a FAPE, and those procedures which

provide for meaningful parent participation are particularly

important.” Amanda J., 267 F.3d at 891.

A FAPE is defined by the IDEA as “special education and

related services that . . . are provided in conformity with the

individualized education program required under section

1414(d) of this title.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). “Special

education” is defined as “specially designed instruction, at no

cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a

disability . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(29). An IEP is “a written

statement for each child with a disability that is developed,

reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 1414(d) of

this title.” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(14).

A school district “must comply both procedurally and

substantively with the IDEA.” N.B. v. Hellgate Elementary

Sch. Dist., ex rel. Bd. of Dirs., Missoula Cnty., Mont.,

541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Thus, to determine whether a school district has

provided a FAPE, we make a two-part inquiry. First, we

determine whether the school district “complied with the

procedures set forth in the Act,” and second, we determine

whether “the individualized educational program developed

through the Act’s procedures [was] reasonably calculated to

enable the child to receive educational benefits.” Bd. of

Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,

458 U.S. 176, 206–07 (1982).

“Under the 1997 amendments to the IDEA, a school must

provide a student with a ‘meaningful benefit’ in order to

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satisfy the substantive requirement[]. . . .” N.B., 541 F.3d at

1212–13. “However, the court need not reach the question of

substantive compliance if the court finds procedural

inadequacies that result in the loss of educational opportunity,

or seriously infringe the parents’ opportunity to participate in

the IEP formulation process, or that caused a deprivation of

educational benefits.” N.B., 541 F.3d at 1207 (internal

quotation marks omitted). The parents contend that the

District failed to comply with both the procedural and

substantive requirements of the IDEA.

A

C.M.’s parents argue that the District violated the

procedural requirements of the IDEA because it failed to

properly incorporate C.M.’s RTI data into C.M.’s initial

evaluation and it failed to provide them with C.M.’s RTI data. 

They argue that the failure to provide them the RTI data

forestalled them—as members of the IEP team—from

carefully considering all available information in making the

eligibility determination, prevented them from giving

informed parental consent for both the initial evaluation and

the services C.M. would receive, and violated their right to

examine C.M.’s records. We conclude that the District did

not fail to incorporate the RTI data into the evaluation, but

that it violated the IDEA’s procedural requirements by failing

to provide the parents with the RTI data.

1

In conducting the initial evaluation, the school district

must “use a variety of assessment tools and strategies to

gather relevant functional, developmental, and academic

information” to determine both whether the child is a child

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 17

with a disability and the content of the child’s IEP. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(b)(2)(A); accord 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(1). The

agency “shall not use any single measure or assessment as the

sole criterion” for determining eligibility. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(b)(2)(B); accord 34 C.F.R. § 300.304(b)(2). In 2004,

in response to scientific research establishing “that the

‘severe discrepancymodel’ is not necessarilya good indicator

of whether a child has a learning disability,” Congress

eliminated the “severe discrepancy” requirement and

expressly permitted use of the “response to intervention

model,” allowing for either model to be used. Michael P. v.

Dept. of Educ., 656 F.3d 1057, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2011). See

also 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(6) (“when determining whether a

child has a specific learning disability . . . a local educational

agency shall not be required to take into consideration

whether a child has a severe discrepancy . . . [and] may use a

process that determines if the child responds to scientific,

research-based intervention as a part of the evaluation

procedures”). We held in Michael P., that the Hawaii

Department of Education violated the IDEA by using only the

severe discrepancy model without permitting use of the

response to intervention model. 656 F.3d at 1067.

Here, although the District had the choice, it used the

severe discrepancy model for C.M.’s initial evaluation. To

the extent the District argues it used solely the severe

discrepancy model, the District would have violated the

IDEA. Id. However, the record reflects that the District not

only used a variety of assessment tools, but it also used

C.M.’s RTI data to corroborate the 2007 Assessment. C.M.’s

Eligibility Summary form noted that his “learning problem

[was] corroborated by other assessment data.” School

Psychologist Patrick Gargiulo testified, while referencing that

form, that “[w]e noted that the Student had been participating

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in response to intervention,” and that the RTI data was the

corroborating data. Thus, the District properly used a variety

of tools, including C.M.’s RTI assessment data.

The parents argue that the IEP team was required to

review the RTI data as part of the initial evaluation, citing

20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1). That section provides that “[a]s part

of an initial evaluation (if appropriate) and as part of any

reevaluation under this section, the IEP Team and other

qualified professionals, as appropriate, shall review existing

evaluation data on the child, including . . . current

classroom-based, local, or State assessments” to “identify

what additional data, if any, are needed” to determine

eligibility or other needs. The qualifier “if appropriate,”

negates an express statutory requirement to review existing

evaluation data as a part of the initial evaluation. We

therefore conclude that the District did not procedurally

violate the IDEA with respect to C.M.’s RTI data and the

2007 Assessment.

2

The district violated the IDEA by failing to insure that the

RTI data was documented and carefully considered by the

entire IEP team and failing to furnish the parents with the

data, thereby making it unable for them to give informed

consent for both the initial evaluation and the special

education services C.M. received.

“In interpreting evaluation data for the purpose of

determining [both] if a child is a child with a disability . . .

and the educational needs of the child, each public agency

must [d]raw upon information from a variety of sources,

including aptitude and achievement tests, parent input, and

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 19

teacher recommendations, as well as information about the

child’s physical condition, social or cultural background, and

adaptive behavior; and [e]nsure that information obtained

from all of these sources is documented and carefully

considered.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.306(c)(1) (emphasis added).

The District argues it drew upon a variety of sources and

ensured the documentation and consideration of all

information. As we have noted, the District drew upon a

variety of sources, including C.M.’s RTI data. However, the

record shows that the District failed to ensure that the RTI

data was documented and carefully considered by the entire

IEP team. Although C.M.’s Eligibility Summary form noted

corroboration of his RTI data, the form also directs, “Attach

documentation.” The District failed to attach or otherwise

share with the entire IEP team any RTI documentation. Dr.

Sassone testified that the documentation that should have

been attached was the SST meeting notes that the parents

already received. However, an email in which she instructed

District staff to both attach the missing RTI documentation to

the form and provide her with better copies of the SST

meeting notes conflicts with her testimony.

Additionally, “[u]pon completion of the administration

and other evaluation measures, a copy of the evaluation report

and the documentation of determination of eligibility shall be

given to the parent.” 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(b)(4)(B); accord 34

C.F.R. § 300.306(a)(2) (and “at no cost to the parent”). The

“documentation of the determination of eligibility” must

contain a number of particular statements. The first relevant

statement is “[t]he basis for making the determination,

including an assurance that the determination has been made

in accordance with § 300.306(c)(1).” 34 C.F.R.

§ 300.311(a)(2). The second relevant statement comes into

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20 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

play “[i]f the child has participated in a process that assesses

the child’s response to scientific, research-based intervention”

and requires a statement of “[t]he instructional strategies used

and the student-centered data collected; and [t]he

documentation that the child’s parents were notified about”

certain state policies, strategies to increase the child’s

learning rate, and the parent’s right to request an evaluation. 

34 C.F.R. § 300.311(a)(7).

The District argues first that § 300.311 requires only a

statement, not documentation, and that it provided such a

statement. The regulation does require only a statement, and

the Eligibility Summary form does provide a statement that

the determination is in accordance with § 300.306, to satisfy

§ 300.311(a)(2). As for § 300.311(a)(7), the form provides

statements that C.M. participated in RTI and that there was

corroboration with other assessment data, and it provides a

statement covering all documentation of which the parents

were notified. However, it does not include a statement of

the instructional strategies used and the student-centered data

collected.5

 

5

 The dissent notes that § 1414(b)(1) requires an educational agency to

provide the parents of a child with disability notice of the evaluation

procedures the agency “proposes to conduct.” Id. The dissent argues that

the agency never proposed to use the RTI assessment to determine C.M.’s

eligibility for special education services, and therefore the district was not

obligated to notify C.M.’s parents. However, this argument ignores the

wholly separate requirement imposed by § 1414(b)(4). Under

§ 1414(b)(4), “documentation of determination of eligibilityshall be given

to the parent” upon completion of the evaluation. Id. Moreover, the

dissent’s position conflicts with the additional requirement that this

documentation of determination of eligibility include a statement of the

“instructional strategies used and the student-centered data collected” if

the child has “participated in a process that assesses the child’s response

to scientific, research-based intervention.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.311(a)(7). The

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The District argues that § 300.311(a)(7) is only applicable

if RTI was used to determine C.M.’s eligibility, it did not use

an RTI method to determine C.M.’s eligibility, and neither of

the formal evaluations relied on the RTI data. However, the

District fails to cite to any authority establishing that

§ 300.311(a)(7) is limited to when RTI was used to determine

eligibility, and the regulation conditions a statement if the

child participated in a “process that assesses the child,” not a

process that determines the child’s eligibility. That C.M.

participated in RTI assessments and the severe discrepancy

model was corroborated by C.M.’s RTI data is sufficient to

deem the data applicable to the regulation. Dr. Sassone

testified that she cannot say that the RTI that C.M.

participated in would be the same as the scientific, researchbased intervention referenced in the regulation. But the fact

that the Eligibility Summary form otherwise tracks the

requirements of the regulation undermines her testimony. 

Moreover, she testified that the information on the Eligibility

Summary form “provide[s] information related to what was

used in . . . making a determination.” Had the District either

provided the required statement or attached the RTI

documentation as the form instructed, the entire IEP team,

including the parents, would have had all the information they

needed to make a procedurallyvalid eligibility determination.

In addition, to ensure that underachievement is not due to

a lack of appropriate instruction, “the group must consider, as

part of the evaluation . . . [d]ata-based documentation of

repeated assessments of achievement at reasonable intervals,

most natural reading of the statute is that § 1414(b)(1) requires that the

agency provide notice to the parent regarding the tests it intends to

conduct on a child, and § 1414(b)(4) requires that the agency inform the

parent of the results of those tests.

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22 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

reflecting formal assessment of student progress during

instruction, which was provided to the child’s parents.” 34

C.F.R. § 300.309(b)(2).

The District argues that this provision is inapplicable

because RTI was not used to determine eligibility, but again

the District fails to cite to any authority. This provision

particularly does not appear to call for RTI data only if that

data was used to determine eligibility. To the contrary,

because this provision is meant to ensure that

underachievement is not due to a lack of appropriate

instruction, it calls for any documentation of any repeated

assessments. The RTI assessments performed on C.M. would

have been beneficial here, especially given that the District

staff met three times per year to discuss C.M.’s progress

based on that data. We therefore conclude that the District

procedurally violated the IDEA by failing to provide the

entire IEP team with C.M.’s RTI data for the purpose of

making his eligibility determination.

Finally, the IDEA requires informed parental consent

before conducting an initial evaluation and before providing

special education services to a child. 20 U.S.C.

§ 1414(a)(1)(D)(i). The school district must also establish

procedural safeguards that provide “[a]n opportunity for the

parents of a child with a disability to examine all records

relating to such child.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(1)(A). 

Examination of records by parents is critical to the

development of an IEP. Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark

Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 892 (9th Cir. 2001). In

Amanda J., the parents argued that Amanda was denied a

FAPE because they were not provided with all of her school

records, some of which indicated that she may have autism. 

Id. at 890. Because “[a]n IEP which addresses the unique

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 23

needs of the child cannot be developed if those people who

are most familiar with the child’s needs are not involved or

fully informed,” we agreed. Id. at 892.

Without C.M.’s RTI complete data, his parents were

unable to give informed consent for both the initial evaluation

and the special education services he received. His parents

did not request in writing all records relating to C.M., until

the middle of his third grade year. However, the District had

a procedural duty to share C.M.’s RTI data with his parents

as early as C.M.’s first grade year, when it sought to obtain

their informed consent for the initial evaluation. The District

also had a procedural duty to provide the IEP team with the

RTI data at the April 18, 2007, meeting for making the

eligibility determination. The District therefore violated the

procedural safeguards of the IDEA by not providing the

parents with an opportunity to examine all records relating to

C.M.

B

Having determined that the District procedurally violated

the IDEA by not providing the parents with his complete RTI

data, and because not all procedural violations deny a child a

FAPE, R.B., ex. rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,

496 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2007), we now consider whether

the violation “result[ed] in the loss of educational

opportunity, or seriously infringe[d] the parents’ opportunity

to participate in the IEP formulation process, or . . . caused a

deprivation of educational benefits,” N.B. v. Hellgate

Elementary Sch. Dist., ex. rel. Bd. of Dirs., Missoula Cnty.,

Mont., 541 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2008).

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24 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

Although the other members of C.M.’s IEP team were

familiar with his RTI data because they participated in his

Assessment Wall meetings three times a year, the parents

were unfamiliar with the data and, more importantly, the

picture the data painted of C.M.’s deficits and his progress

during his kindergarten through third grade years. C.M.’s

DIBELS measures on Initial Sound Fluency, Letter Naming

Fluency, and Nonsense Word Fluencywere belowbenchmark

prior to his initial evaluation, but his measure on Phoneme

Segmentation Fluency was at benchmark. Based on the 2007

Assessment results, the IEP team determined C.M. was

eligible for special education services based upon a

phonological processing disorder. This result conflicts with

his Phoneme Segmentation Fluency score, especially his

above benchmark Phoneme Segmentation Fluency score and

below benchmark Oral Reading Fluency score at the end of

his first grade year. Without a complete presentation of the

RTI data, the parents were unaware of the discrepancy and

thus unable to properly consider C.M.’s particular processing

disorder and the instructional strategies he needed. Also, at

the time of the first annual IEP meeting in C.M.’s second

grade year, his RTI data showed that his progress in the

language arts had declined after receiving special education

services for nearly one year. Despite his lack of progress, the

IEP team made no changes to his educational program. 

Without the RTI data, the parents were struggling to decipher

his unique deficits, unaware of the extent to which he was not

meaningfully benefitting from the ISP, and thus unable to

properly advocate for changes to his IEP. We therefore

conclude that the District’s procedural violations prevented

the parents from meaningfully participating in the IEP

process. Therefore, the District denied C.M. a FAPE.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 25

C

Because we hold that the District failed to comply with

the procedures mandated by the IDEA and that this failure

denied C.M. a FAPE, we need not address the question of

whether the resulting IEPs were reasonably calculated to

enable C.M. to receive educational benefits. See Amanda J.

ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 267 F.3d 877, 895

(9th Cir. 2001). Nor do we need to reach whether the District

otherwise procedurally violated the IDEA or whether the

2007 Assessment was otherwise appropriate.

D

School districts may be ordered to reimburse parents of a

child who has been denied a FAPE for the cost of private

instruction. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii); see also 34

C.F.R. § 300.148(c). During the OAH hearing and at the

district court, the parents sought reimbursement for C.M.’s

audiology and processing assessments, sound-based therapy,

and private reading programs that they provided for C.M. at

their own expense. Both the ALJ and the district court

determined that the parents were not entitled to

reimbursement because they had concluded that the District

had not denied C.M. a FAPE. Because we conclude

otherwise, we remand to the district court for reconsideration

of this issue.

III

The parents contest three of the district court’s rulings

related to the first two OAH proceedings.

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26 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

A

The district court properly concluded that the parents’

claim for reimbursement of the cost Dr. Guterman’s

evaluation was moot. In the first OAH proceeding, the ALJ

ordered the District to reimburse the parents for half of the

cost of Dr. Guterman’s evaluation and permitted the District

to complete a reevaluation of C.M. C.M.’s parents argue that

the ALJ erred in reducing the reimbursement and authorizing

the reevaluation. The district court determined that both

issues are moot because the District not only paid half of Dr.

Guterman’s evaluation cost, but on September 2, 2011,

voluntarily paid the other half as well. Additionally, by June

24, 2010, the District had completed its reevaluation of C.M.

“The jurisdiction of federal courts depends on the

existence of a ‘case or controversy’ under Article III of the

Constitution.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 100 F.3d

1451, 1458 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks

omitted). No justiciable controversy is presented where the

question sought to be adjudicated has been mooted by

developments subsequent to filing of the complaint. Church

f Scientology of Cal. V. U.S., 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992). The

District’s payment for the full cost of Dr. Guterman’s

evaluation and completion of its reevaluation have mooted

both issues.

C.M.’s parents claim the issues are not moot because the

court otherwise had jurisdiction under § 1415 of the IDEA. 

However, regardless of other bases for jurisdiction, “[t]he

court must be able to grant effective relief, or it lacks

jurisdiction.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 100 F.3d at 1458. 

Since the court could no longer grant full reimbursement or

deny reevaluation, the issues were moot. The parents also

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 27

argue that they requested as a remedy declaratory relief. Yet,

there must still be an “actual controversy” for a court to issue

declaratory relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The parents further

argue that the reevaluation performed by the District “was not

the same reevaluation,” but the record shows that the

reevaluation sought by the District in the first proceeding was

an evaluation to update the out-of-date 2007 Assessment. By

June 2010, the District completed that evaluation. Finally,

the parents argue that the reevaluation issue is live because

they claim that the District’s “conduct violated § 504 [of the

Rehabilitation Act].” But, that argument is irrelevant because

their § 504 claims were not deemed moot.

The parents further argue that collateral consequences

prevent the claims from being moot. One exception to the

mootness doctrine exists where a claimant would suffer

“collateral legal consequences” if the action appealed were

allowed to stand. Doe v. Madison Sch. Dist. No. 321, 177

F.3d 789, 799 (9th Cir. 1999). The parents base their

argument on their attempt to recover prevailing party

attorneys’ fees. However, “[t]he existence of an attorneys’

fees claim . . . does not resuscitate an otherwise moot

controversy.” Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235, 1238

(9th Cir. 1996). The parents also argue that as a collateral

consequence, they and other parents are tainted by the ALJ’s

erroneous finding. This argument is not well taken. C.M.’s

parents bring their claims individually and, as aptly stated by

the District, “the mere existence of an adverse decision does

not revive a moot claim, lest the mootness doctrine would

become meaningless.”

Finally, the parents argue that their claims are capable of

repetition yet evading review. Another exception to the

mootness doctrine provides that an otherwise moot issue will

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28 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

be heard “if it presents an issue that is capable of repetition

while evading review.” Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 100 F.3d

at 1459. To determine whether an issue is capable of

repetition yet evades review, we determine (1) whether “the

challenged action is of limited duration,” and (2) whether

there is “a reasonable expectation that the same complaining

party will be subjected to the same action again.” Wiggins v.

Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1011 (9th Cir. 1985). The ALJ based

his reimbursement and reevaluation decisions on the 17-

month delay between the 2007 Assessment and the parents’

request for an IEE. The parents argue that they are likely to

again delay in requesting an IEE in the future because of

summer vacation periods and unresolved issues that persist

with C.M.’s IEP, and because the District is “likely to employ

similar delay tactics and seek reevaluation to discourage

making an IEE request because it can moot such claims at

will.” However, each reevaluation that could lead to an IEE

request will be based on unique circumstances, just as the

2007 Assessment was based on unique circumstances. Thus,

the district court did not err in determining the claims are not

capable of repetition and otherwise moot.

B

The district court properlyconcluded that the parents’ due

process rights were not violated by a change in the wording

of the issue presented. The parents claim that the ALJ in the

first OAH proceeding altered the hearing issues when he

determined that reevaluation was warranted, therebyviolating

their due process rights and the IDEA. The District’s due

process complaint stated as an issue, “[w]hen conditions

warrant reassessment, the District has the right to conduct

that assessment using its own personnel. Therefore, if

reassessment is warranted, the District has the right to

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 29

conduct that assessment pursuant to the assessment plan

proposed on September 24, 2008.” Additionally, the ALJ’s

Order Following Pre-Hearing Conference stated the issue as,

“Does District have the right to assess Student as described in

the September 24, 2008, assessment plan?” The district court

correctly concluded that the complaint “contemplated an

analysis of whether conditions warrant reassessment” and that

the parents were put on notice of the issue to be decided.6

C

The district court correctly determined that two of the

three claims raised in the second OAH proceeding were timebarred. In that proceeding, the parents’ first three claims

related to the District’s failure to timely identify C.M. as a

student with a learning disability and its failure to timely

develop its Assessment Plan. The ALJ dismissed those

claims that arose before April 16, 2007, because they were

outside the two-year statute of limitations, and the parents did

not allege any exception to the statute. The district court

agreed that the claims were time barred despite the parents’

contentions that an exception to the statute applied.

The statute of limitations for due process complaints in

California precludes claims that occurred more than two years

prior to the date of filing the request for due process. Cal.

Educ. Code § 56505(l); 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(c). The

statute does not apply where “the parent was prevented from

requesting the due process hearing due to either of the

6 The parents raise three additional arguments that pertain to the

alteration of issues by the ALJs that we will not consider because they

were argued for the first time on appeal. Cold Mountain v. Garber,

375 F.3d 884, 891 (9th Cir. 2004).

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30 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

following: (1) Specific misrepresentations by the local

educational agency that it had solved the problem forming the

basis of the due process hearing request. (2) The withholding

of information by the local educational agency from the

parent that was required under this part to be provided to the

parent.” Cal. Educ. Code § 56505(l).

First, the parents argue that the District withheld from

them a procedural safeguards notice, which the District was

required by 34 C.F.R. § 300.504 to make available to them,

at the latest, upon the referral for C.M.’s initial evaluation on

February 20, 2007. The parents claim they did not receive

such a notice until the first IEP meeting on April 18, 2007. 

However, the district court correctly determined that the

record reveals otherwise. IST Jones testified that on February

20, 2007, “[a]long with the assessment plan, [E.M.] would

have been given a copy of her parents’ procedural

safeguards.” Although Jones did not have a “present

recollection” of giving E.M. that exact document, the ALJ

found Jones’s testimony credible under Federal Rule of

Evidence 406 (“Evidence of a person’s habit or an

organization’s routine practice may be admitted to prove that

on a particular occasion the person or organization acted in

accordance with the habit or routine practice.”). The ALJ

found Jones more credible than E.M. on what documents

were received when theymet, and it was not erroneous for the

district court to defer to the ALJ’s credibility finding where

the decision was thorough and careful. Seattle Sch. Dist., No.

1 v. B.S., 82 F.3d 1493, 1499 (9th Cir. 1996) (where findings

are based on determinations regarding the credibility of

witnesses, even greater deference is due the trial court’s

findings); R.B., ex. rel. F.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist.,

496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (the amount of deference

accorded the hearing officer’s findings increase where the

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 31

officer is “thorough and careful”). Moreover, Jones’s

testimony is corroborated by the testimony of Principal

Maddux and Dr. Sassone, as well as the Assessment Plan that

E.M. signed on February 20, 2007:

You are being supplied a written statement of

Parent Rights which summarizes the laws that

apply to Special Education and describes the

process for resolving possible disputes

through local mediation, alternative dispute

resolution services and/or a hearing conducted

by persons authorized by the State

Department of Education. . . . If you have any

questions regarding this letter or your rights as

a parent, please contact your child’s teacher,

the school principal, or Jane Jones at 283-

6231.

Second, the parents argue that the statute does not apply

because the District withheld C.M.’s RTI data. Although we

have concluded that the District procedurally violated the

IDEA by withholding C.M.’s RTI data, we find that the

procedural violation occurred at the earliest as of February

20, 2007, when the District sought to obtain the parents’

informed consent for C.M.’s initial evaluation. The parents

fail to demonstrate how receipt of the RTI data, and for that

matter the notice of procedural safeguards, in February rather

than April would have caused them to file the due process

complaint earlier. We therefore conclude that the district

court did not err in deciding that the claims that arose before

April 16, 2007, were time barred.

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IV

The district court properly dismissed the parents’ claims

against the Department of Education. In the first two

lawsuits, the parents brought claims against the Department

of Education for failing to properly oversee the OAH

proceedings and for staying its investigation. In the second

lawsuit, the parents’ first amended complaint also included

claims against the Department of Education under the IDEA. 

The district court dismissed all claims against the Department

of Education in both cases in its June 2, 2010, and March 3,

2011, orders.

The parents argue they can state a claim against the

Department of Education for “breach of their duty to ensure

IDEA procedural safeguards and fundamental fairness in

OAH hearings.” The parents dispute the ALJs’ alteration of

issues and barring of certain witness testimony. However, the

district court determined that the Department of Education

has no authority over the OAH, and that determination was

affirmed by this Court and will not be reviewed again. M.M.

v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012)

(“[The Department of Education] does not have authority or

responsibility to directly supervise or review each decision

made by an ALJ in a due process hearing.”).

The parents argue they can state a claim against the

Department of Education for staying its investigation because

the IDEA provides them a private right of action. However,

the district court correctly dismissed this claim because the

Department of Education abided by the regulatory mandate

to stay the investigation while the due process hearing was

pending. 34 C.F.R. § 300.152(c)(1) (“If a written complaint

is received that is also the subject of a due process hearing . . .

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 33

the State must set aside any part of the complaint that is being

addressed in the due process hearing until the conclusion of

the hearing.”). The parents argue the issues in the complaint

and due process hearing were not the same because they

raised the District’s delay in seeking due process after the

Department of Education investigation was closed. But this

is without merit. The due process hearing was focused on the

parents’ request for an IEE and whether the District was

responsible for funding it. That question necessarily

depended on the District’s compliance with the IDEA in

responding to the parents’ request.7

The parents argue that they can state a claim against the

Department of Education for breach of its duties under

§§ 1412(a) and 1415(a) of the IDEA. However, the district

court correctly determined that those provisions do not

provide a private right of action. Section 1412 discusses the

policies and procedures that a state is required to have in

place in order for the state to be eligible for assistance under

the IDEA, and § 1415 is a mandate for a state to establish

procedural safeguards. Neither section contains a private

right of action, and indeed § 1415(f) specifically requires

complaints to be heard in an impartial due process hearing

and then provides an express right of appeal for review of any

7 The parents also raise a new argument that the Department of

Education was required to address corrective action before closing the

investigation. However, this new argument will not be reviewed for the

first time on appeal. Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 891.

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34 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

administrative decision.8 Thus, the district court did not err

in dismissing all claims against the Department of Education.

V

The district court properly dismissed the parents’

retaliation claims under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

pertaining to (1) the District’s request to stay the Department

of Education’s investigation of the parents’ complaint; (2) the

District’s use of facilitated IEP meetings; and (3) the

District’s effort to reevaluate C.M. after their IEE request. 

The parents fail to brief the stayed Department of Education

investigation theory, and it is therefore waived.9 United

States v. Williamson, 439 F.3d 1125, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2006)

(issues raised in brief but not supported by argument are

abandoned); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9)(A). We address the

remaining two claims in turn.

A

Prior to its final order, the district court dismissed the

parents’ § 504 retaliation claim that the District used the

facilitated IEP meetings coercively because the parents failed

8 The parents claim that the Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.

677, 688 n.9 (1979), factors for determining whether to imply a private

right of action come out in their favor, but they offer only a partial

argument in their brief and fail to discuss the dispositive factor of whether

Congress intended to create a private right of action. See Greene v. Sprint

Commc’ns Co., 340 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Therefore, we

decline to reach whether a private right of action can be implied in

§§ 1412 and 1415 of the IDEA.

9 Likewise, we do not address number 14 and number 26 of the parents’

questions presented for failure to brief the arguments.

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to exhaust the issue at the administrative hearing. The

parents contend the dismissal was in error.

Under Robb v. Bethel School District, 308 F.3d 1047,

1048 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled by Payne v. Penninsula

School District, 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (overruled on

other grounds by Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir.

2014)), the district court dismissed the claim for failure to

exhaust because that case stood for the proposition that where

a “plaintiff has alleged injuries that could be redressed to any

degree by the IDEA’s administrative procedures and

remedies[,] . . . exhaustion of those remedies is required.” 

Accord 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). The parents argue that the court

erred because exhaustion is not needed for this claim and

bases their argument on Payne. In that case, we clarified that

the IDEA’s exhaustion provision applies only in cases where

the relief sought is available under the IDEA. Payne,

653 F.3d at 871. Thus, the parents go on to conclusively

claim, “Educational services available through the IDEA’s

administrative process could not remedy the effect of

facilitated IEP team meetings. However, remedies are

available under § 504.”

However, we have clarified Payne and explained that to

determine what constitutes a claim for relief under the IDEA,

we “consider whether a plaintiff seeks (1) monetary relief as

the ‘functional equivalent’ of a remedy available under the

IDEA, (2) ‘prospective injunctive relief to alter an IEP or the

educational placement of a disabled student,’ or (3) ‘to

enforce rights that arise as a result of a denial’ of a FAPE.” 

C.O. v. Portland Pub. Schs., 679 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir.

2012) (quoting Payne, 653 F.3d at 875). Here, the parents’

retaliation claim is the functional equivalent of a procedural

defect claim under the IDEA where they claim violation of

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36 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

§ 1414(d)(1)(B)(iv) concerning the individuals that comprise

an IEP team. Their claim for relief thus falls under the IDEA,

and they are bound by its exhaustion requirement. The

district court did not err in dismissing the claim for failure to

exhaust.

B

The parents argue that the district court erred because it

“did not resolve or address the [reevaluation] retaliation

claim.” Indeed, the district court dismissed the facilitated IEP

meetings claim and the stayed Department of Education

investigation claim but not the reevaluation claim. Although

the district court granted the District’s motion for summary

judgment, which included the question whether the District

had any ill motive in requesting the reevaluation, we agree

that the district court erred by not explicitly addressing their

§ 504 claim. Additionally, the parents assert that

“[d]iscovery was still pending on CM’s retaliation claims”

when the district court issued its final order. We therefore

remand the issue to the district court for it to consider the

claim in the first instance.

VI

Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), the parents sought

attorneys’ fees at the district court for prevailing on the IEE

reimbursement issue—the parents were awarded $2400 in the

first OAH proceeding for the cost of the IEE and $800 in the

second lawsuit for the fee Dr. Guterman charged to attend the

March 2009 IEP meeting. Ultimately, the district court

reduced the parents’ attorneys’ fees award based on their

limited degree of success and for unreasonablyprotracting the

final resolution of the controversy. In light of our reversal as

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 37

to C.M.’s FAPE, we remand this issue for reconsideration by

the district court.

VII

In conclusion, we reverse the district court’s

determination that the District did not procedurallyviolate the

IDEA by failing to provide the parents with his complete RTI

assessment data and that the District provided C.M. with a

FAPE. We remand for reconsideration of both the

reimbursement due the parents for his private instruction and

their attorneys’ fees award, and we remand for consideration

of the parents’ § 504 reevaluation retaliation claim. We

otherwise affirm the judgment of the district court. Each

party shall bear its or their own costs on appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART;

REMANDED.

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the

Lafayette School District failed to provide M.M. a Free

Appropriate Public Education, and from the reversal of the

award of attorney’s fees. Giving appropriate deference to the

findings of the state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), I

conclude that no procedural violation of the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) was committed by the

School District. Neither do I agree that the district court

failed to address Plaintiffs’s claim brought pursuant to

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

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38 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

My disagreement with the majority primarily stems from

our differing view of the Response-to-Intervention (RTI)

model utilized by the School District to measure achievement

levels of all students in the school. It is undisputed that these

assessment tools were administered to all students to identify

those who might benefit from extra assistance, and were NOT

a mechanism used to identify students in need of special

education. Nevertheless, the majority holds that failure to

provide these test results to C.M.’s parents resulted in a

violation of the IDEA.

The ALJ explored this matter in detail following an

eleven-day hearing in which he actively participated. We

have consistently recognized the expertise of administrative

judges who routinely preside over hearings addressing the

adequacy of special education plans adopted and

administered by local school districts. The decisions of these

specialized judges are entitled to substantial deference. In

J.W. v. Fresno Unified School Dist., 626 F.3d 431, 438 (9th

Cir. 2010), we reminded ourselves that we must not substitute

our “own notions of sound educational policy for those of the

school authorities” when considering cases under the IDEA

(citation omitted). We specifically noted that increased

deference is afforded the decision of a hearing officer when

his findings “are thorough and careful.” Id. (citation

omitted). We generallyconsider findings to be “thorough and

careful” when the hearing officer participates in questioning

witnesses, and pens a decision containing a complete

recitation of the facts and a comprehensive analysis of the

issues. Id. at 40–41 (citation omitted); see also J.M. v.

Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 908 (9th Cir.

2009), as amended (determining that a twenty-page opinion

met the standard of “thorough and careful”). The ALJ’s

decision easily meets these criteria.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 39

In a comprehensive, detailed, forty-eight page decision,

the ALJ rejected the claim that the School District was

required to incorporate the RTI documents as part of the

assessment process to determine C.M.’s eligibility for special

education services. See ALJ Decision, p. 18. The ALJ

described credible testimony from the principal at C.M.’s

school, who explained that the school’s RTI program is

primarily used to assign students to teachers based on

achievement level. See id. at p. 5. At the beginning of each

school year, every student is administered a battery of

screening assessments. From these assessments, a card is

prepared for each student listing the student’s grade level, test

scores, biographical information, screening results, and

classroom observations. See id. The purpose of this RTI

model “is to provide early and effective intervention to

students requiring additional support. . . .” Id. During the

month of October, the school held assessment sessions for

each grade level. During these assessment sessions students

were placed into one of three categories: Intensive (those

students performing well below grade level), Strategic (those

students performing within the grade level curriculum range,

but in need of additional support), and Benchmark (those

students performing at or above grade level). See id. at pp.

5–6. Classes are then “comprised of a blend of students from

each category.” Id. at p. 5.

From this description, it is apparent that the RTI

assessments were for the purpose of determining the makeup

of the classrooms rather than assessing any child for

eligibility for special education services. Indeed, the RTI

assessment is part and parcel of the School District’s general

education system. See id. at p. 6. These assessments took

place three times each school year to monitor the educational

progress of all students, not just those in need of special

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40 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

education. See id. It was only after concerns were raised

regarding C.M.’s lack of academic progress in the area of

language arts that C.M. was referred for testing to determine

his eligibility for special education services. See id. at p. 9.

The ALJ made a clear distinction between use of the RTI

as a means to assign students to their respective classrooms

and use of the RTI as an assessment tool to determine

eligibility for special education services. The ALJ explained

that school districts have the option of using an RTI model to

determine eligibility for special education services, or using

a “student’s ability versus student’s actual achievement

discrepancy model.” Id. at p. 19 and n.10. The ALJ noted

that it was undisputed that the Lafayette School District used

the “ability to achievement discrepancy model” to determine

C.M.’s eligibility for special education services. Id. n.10. 

The record supports this determination. As the majority

acknowledges, RTI assessments are based on the Slosson

Oral Reading Test and the Dynamic Indicators of Basic Early

Literacy Skills Test. See Majority Opinion, p. 6. However,

the assessment used to determine C.M.’s eligibility for

special education services were the Woodcock Johnson III

reading comprehension test and the Comprehensive Test of

Phonological Processing. C.M.’s Eligibility Summary form

documenting his eligibility for special education services did

NOT list the RTI in the assessments used to make the

determination of eligibility or to corroborate the

determination of eligibility.

Rather than deferring to the ALJ’s considered resolution

of this issue, the majority embarks upon a de novo review of

the record to reach a conclusion contrary to that of the ALJ

and at odds with the record.

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 41

As the district court noted, Plaintiffs’ reliance on

20 U.S.C. § 1414(c) is misplaced. That statute provides in

pertinent part:

Additional requirements for evaluation

and reevaluations

(1) Review of existing evaluation data

As part of an initial evaluation (if

appropriate) and as part of any reevaluation

under this section, the [Individualized

Education Program] Team and other qualified

professionals, as appropriate, shall–

(A) review existing data on the child . . .

20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A) )(emphasis added).

It is important that this provision is tethered to the

evaluation and assessments conducted by the team

responsible for determining the student’s eligibility for

special education services. Because the record reflects that

the RTI assessments were not used to determine C.M.’s

eligibility for special education services, this provision does

not support the majority’s conclusion that the School District

was required to provide the RTI data to C.M.’s parents under

the IDEA, especially considering that the statutory language

is tempered by inclusion of the phrase “if appropriate,”

thereby reflecting deference to the discretion of the school

officials. See Our Children’s Earth Found. v. United States

EPA, 527 F.3d 842, 851 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that use of “if

appropriate” in the statute signifies a grant of discretion); see

also United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1029 (9th

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42 M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST.

Cir. 2009) (recognizing that because the governing statute

provided for a hearing, “if appropriate,” the hearing might

never occur); K.D. v. Hawaii Dept. of Educ., 665 F.3d 1110,

1119 (9th Cir. 2011) (describing “if appropriate” as a

“qualifier”). This same discretionary language vested the

Lafayette School District with discretion to determine which

assessment should be administered and, correspondingly,

which data should be reviewed in evaluating C.M. for special

education services. Exercising its statutory discretion, the

School District elected NOT to use the RTI as an assessment

model. Consequently, no legal obligation arose to review or

provide the RTI data in conjunction with the evaluation of

C.M.’s eligibility for special education services.

Plaintiffs’ argument fares no better under the provisions

of § 1414(b), which requires the educational agency to notify

the parents of the description of evaluation procedures the

educational agency “proposes to conduct.” Because the

School District did not propose to utilize the RTI model to

evaluate C.M.’s eligibility for special education services, this

provision did not mandate notification of the RTI data. In

sum, the majority’s conclusion that the School District relied

upon the RTI data and was required to provide that data to

C.M.’s parents as part of the IDEA procedural requirements

ignores the factual findings made by the ALJ and the district

court, and deviates from the language of the IDEA.

I also disagree that the district court failed to explicitly

address Plaintiffs’ claim under the Rehabilitation Act. This

claim was encompassed within Plaintiffs’ assertion that the

school district’s motives for seeking a reevaluation of C.M.

were vindictive. The district court explicitly addressed this

claim under a section titled “Whether the District Unlawfully

Retaliated by filing a Due Process Complaint.” District

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M.M. V. LAFAYETTE SCH. DIST. 43

Court Opinion, p. 45. The district court restated Plaintiffs’

contention that “the District engaged in retaliatory behavior

against plaintiffs in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act to intimidate, punish, and discourage Plaintiffs from

asserting their rights. . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks

omitted). The district court referenced the finding from the

ALJthat the due process complaint filed by the school district

did not influence the decision of the California Department of

Education (CDE) to dismiss Plaintiffs’ compliance complaint. 

Rather, the CDE dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint “on its own

volition.” Id. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that C.M.

offered insufficient evidence of retaliation. See id.

The district court agreed with the ALJ’s analysis of the

§ 504 issue, and added that this issue had been previously

addressed in the court’s order resolving Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss. The court explained that the issue was addressed

as to the CDE in its order addressing the motion to dismiss. 

However, the court held that the “same reasoning holds true

for the District.” Id. at p. 46. The school district acted in

compliance with the governing regulation, which negated a

retaliatory motive. See id. Rather than failing to address the

§ 504 issue, the district court actually addressed it twice. The

Plaintiffs’ contrary allegation lacks merit.

Cases brought under the IDEA are complicated, and

emotions sometimes run high. It is completely

understandable that the parents of a child with a disability

would leave no stone unturned in their effort to ensure that

their child’s legal rights are fully protected. However, in this

case, I agree with the ALJ and the district court judge that the

Lafayette School District complied with the requirements of

the IDEA. I would affirm the district court judgment in its

entirety.

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