Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02246/USCOURTS-ca7-14-02246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Qubid M. Coleman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2246

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

QUBID M. COLEMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois, Rock Island Division.

No. 4:12-CR-40031-SLD-JEH-6 — Sara Darrow, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 9, 2015 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 24, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, ROVNER, Circuit Judge, and

SHAH, District Judge.*

SHAH, District Judge. Faced with a mandatory life sentence, Qubid Coleman agreed to cooperate with the government, signed a plea agreement, and entered a plea of 

guilty to a drug conspiracy charge. The plea agreement con-

 * Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

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2 No. 14-2246

tained a waiver of Coleman’s right to collaterally attack his 

conviction or sentence. At the guilty-plea hearing, Coleman 

said that he reviewed the agreement, understood it, and 

talked about it with his lawyer, but the district judge did not 

expressly discuss the collateral-attack waiver with Coleman. 

At sentencing, the district court imposed conditions of supervised release that included conditions that have since 

been determined to be impermissibly vague (and the court 

did not expressly tailor the conditions to an assessment of 

the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).

Although the plea colloquy did not track Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11 with respect to the collateral-attack 

waiver, we affirm the conviction because the omission did 

not affect Coleman’s substantial rights. But we remand for 

resentencing in light of our recent decisions concerning the 

imposition of conditions of supervised release. E.g., United 

States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015).

I

Coleman was a runner for a drug conspiracy organized

by his brother, Frederick Coleman, and Jerry Brown. Coleman’s role was to deliver crack to customers in Kewanee, Illinois, collect money from the sales, and give the proceeds to 

his brother and Brown. 

Shortly after indictment, Coleman’s lawyer sought an 

evaluation of Coleman’s competency. The evaluator determined that Coleman was malingering. Coleman’s lawyer 

sought another evaluation, but Coleman refused to cooperate with the second doctor and his own counsel. Eventually, 

Coleman’s case was severed from his co-defendants’, the 

court found Coleman to be competent, and Coleman admitCase: 14-2246 Document: 77 Filed: 11/24/2015 Pages: 9
No. 14-2246 3

ted that his refusal to engage with the process was just an 

act.

Coleman’s brother, his partner, and other runners were 

convicted at trial, and as Coleman later put it in his own 

words at his sentencing hearing, he “just had to come to [his] 

senses and do the right thing.” He entered into a plea 

agreement with the government. In the agreement, Coleman 

admitted to his role in the conspiracy, and also admitted that 

his relevant conduct involved at least 280 grams of crack cocaine. He acknowledged that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment because he had two or 

more prior convictions for a felony drug offense. 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. Coleman agreed to cooperate with law 

enforcement officials in the hopes of a reduced sentence, and 

the agreement contained waivers of the right to appeal and 

to collaterally attack the conviction and sentence.

The collateral-attack waiver provided, in part:

The defendant and the defendant’s attorney 

have reviewed [28 U.S.C. § 2255], and the defendant understands the defendant’s rights 

under the statute. Understanding those rights, 

and having thoroughly discussed those rights 

with the defendant’s attorney, the defendant 

knowingly and voluntarily waives the defendant’s right to collaterally attack the conviction 

and/or sentence. The defendant’s attorney has 

fully discussed and explained the defendant’s 

right to attack the conviction and/or sentence 

collaterally with the defendant. The defendant 

specifically acknowledges that the decision to 

waive the right to challenge any later claim of 

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the ineffectiveness of the defendant’s counsel 

was made by the defendant alone notwithstanding any advice the defendant may or may 

not have received from the defendant’s attorney regarding this right. Regardless of any advice the defendant’s attorney may have given 

the defendant, in exchange for the concessions 

made by the United States in this plea agreement, the defendant hereby knowingly and 

voluntarily waives the defendant’s right to collaterally attack the conviction and/or sentence. 

The rights waived by the defendant include the 

defendant’s right to challenge the amount of 

any fine or restitution, in any collateral attack, 

including, but not limited to, a motion brought 

under [§ 2255], excepting only those claims 

which relate directly to the negotiation of this 

waiver itself.

At his change-of-plea hearing—after taking the oath to 

tell the truth—Coleman said he could read and write in English, and he understood his plea agreement. He confirmed 

that his lawyer read the plea agreement to him verbatim. 

The court asked Coleman if he had “gone over in detail the

waivers, the appellate waiver provisions with [counsel] in 

your plea agreement,” and Coleman said he had. The court 

then advised Coleman that “you’re waiving almost all of 

your rights to appeal any sentence that the Court might impose in this case,” and, “You’re reserving just one small right 

to appeal, and that’s in [counsel’s] representation of you in 

negotiating this plea agreement itself.” But the court did not 

address the collateral-attack waiver. At the end of the colloquy, Coleman pleaded guilty.

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No. 14-2246 5

At sentencing, the government made a motion to reduce 

Coleman’s sentence based on his substantial assistance in the 

investigation or prosecution of others, and the district court 

noted that such a motion was “a gift” because “most people 

in [Coleman’s] shoes would be going away for life.” The 

court found that Coleman lied during his competency proceedings and faked being mentally ill. His stubbornness persisted until he had a “breakthrough” when his co-defendants 

were found guilty at trial. Nevertheless, because his assistance led to a new charge against another person, the court 

granted the government’s motion and sentenced Coleman to 

324 months’ imprisonment.

The court then imposed a ten-year term of supervised release that included “standard conditions.” In its oral pronouncement of these conditions, the court did not discuss 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) or describe what the “standard conditions” 

were.

Coleman did not object to the plea colloquy or the conditions of supervised release. He now appeals both his conviction and sentence, arguing that his plea colloquy did not inform him of the collateral-attack waiver as required, and that 

several conditions of his supervised release are unconstitutionally vague.

II

Before a district court accepts a guilty plea, Rule 11 requires it to address the defendant personally in open court 

and determine that he understands “the terms of any pleaagreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). The 

district judge here covered the appellate waiver, but did not 

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personally inform the defendant of the collateral-attack 

waiver. This was a Rule 11 error. Coleman did not object at 

the time, and so under plain-error review, he cannot undo 

his conviction unless he shows the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Polak, 573 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 

2009). This means he must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the 

plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 

(2004).

Compliance with Rule 11 is not meant to exalt ceremony 

over substance. United States v. Davila, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 

2139, 2147 (2013) (quoting Advisory Committee’s 1983 Note 

749). In this context, the defendant’s burden stems from the 

“particular importance of the finality of guilty pleas” and so 

“should not be too easy.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 82. If 

the record reveals an adequate substitute for the missing 

Rule 11 safeguard, and the defendant fails to show why the 

omission made a difference to him, his substantial rights 

were not affected. See United States v. Sura, 511 F.3d 654, 662

(7th Cir. 2009). We look at the entire record to assess the 

probability that Coleman would have exercised his right to 

trial but for the trial court’s failure to personally address the 

collateral-attack waiver. See Davila, 133 S.Ct. at 2150; United 

States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 74–75 (2002); United States v. Williams, 559 F.3d 607, 613 (7th Cir. 2009).

Coleman has not met his burden. The written plea 

agreement and his admissions that his lawyer explained the 

agreement to him and he understood the agreement—

presumed to be true, see United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 

730 (7th Cir. 2008)—are adequate substitutes for the verbal 

in-court colloquy about the collateral-attack waiver. The disCase: 14-2246 Document: 77 Filed: 11/24/2015 Pages: 9
No. 14-2246 7

trict court noted a concern that Coleman was semi-illiterate, 

but the record as a whole reveals that Coleman corresponded in writing with his lawyer, said he could read and write, 

and had the agreement read to him verbatim by his lawyer. 

The language of the collateral-attack waiver, although containing some cumbersome phrases apparently meant to ensure that Coleman was making a personal choice to waive 

his rights, was not incapable of being explained to Coleman 

by his counsel. The district court mentioned that the plea 

agreement had “some pretty complicated wording” and 

made sure that Coleman understood it and had no questions 

about it. This understanding about the entire agreement necessarily included the collateral-attack waiver.

But the waiver in Coleman’s agreement had a problem. It 

excluded from its scope only those claims directly related to 

the negotiation of the waiver itself. This was too narrow. As 

we explained in Hurlow v. United States, 726 F.3d 958, 965–66

(7th Cir. 2013), waivers of collateral-attack rights are not enforceable against claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 

with regard to the plea agreement as a whole. The government concedes that the language in the agreement was not 

accurate, and promises that it will not attempt to enforce the 

collateral-attack waiver against ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. This concession corrects any risk that the 

waiver will be enforced impermissibly, and provides Coleman with the precise admonition that a properly-conducted 

Rule 11 colloquy would have provided.

Finally, there is no reasonable probability that Coleman 

would have gone to trial had he been advised by the judge 

about the proper scope of his waiver. Coleman was facing a 

mandatory life sentence and he came to his senses not beCase: 14-2246 Document: 77 Filed: 11/24/2015 Pages: 9
8 No. 14-2246

cause of a poorly phrased collateral-attack waiver, but because his co-defendants (including fellow runners) were 

convicted at trial. At oral argument, his counsel acknowledged that the evidence against Coleman was strong (and 

we note the evidence is even stronger now that Coleman has 

testified at a sentencing hearing and admitted to conspiring 

to distribute crack), but argued that Coleman still would prefer to roll the dice on an outright acquittal. Counsel also argued that Coleman’s persistence in pursuing this claim on 

appeal reflects the sincerity of his belief. These arguments do 

not provide a basis to conclude that it was the waiver that 

tipped Coleman’s cost-benefit analysis from trial to guilty 

plea. Moreover, Coleman’s arguments on appeal are insufficient to meet his burden. “Having submitted not so much as 

his own affidavit averring that he did not adequately comprehend the nature of his [collateral-attack rights] and that 

he would not have waived the right had he properly understood it, [Coleman] has failed to produce any evidence 

which would demonstrate that his substantial rights were 

affected.” Williams, 559 F.3d at 613. Coleman has been found 

to intentionally interfere with proceedings when he thinks it 

to his advantage. On this record, it would take more than his 

word that he wants a trial to persuade us that an omission in 

his Rule 11 colloquy affected his substantial rights.

III

Coleman was sentenced in May 2014. Since then, “several 

decisions of this court have clarified the analysis required to 

decide what conditions [of supervised release] to impose in 

what circumstances.” United States v. Harper, —F.3d —, 2015 

WL 6839542, at *3 (7th Cir. Nov. 6, 2015). Before imposing a 

term of supervised release, the sentencing court should give 

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No. 14-2246 9

advance notice of the conditions being considered, and when 

imposing the conditions, the court must justify the conditions by an adequate statement of reasons reasonably related 

to the § 3553(a) factors. Kappes, 782 F.3d at 842–45. These 

procedural safeguards were omitted from Coleman’s sentencing, and, as a substantive matter, certain conditions imposed on Coleman were impermissibly vague (e.g., “the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged in 

criminal activity”). See id. at 849 (citing United States v. 

Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2015)).

The government concedes the error and also waives any 

reliance on Coleman’s appellate waiver to avoid a remand.

Coleman requests a remand for full resentencing. We have 

described prison and supervised release as substitutes as 

well as complements, and therefore, it makes sense to remand for a full resentencing to allow the district judge to 

reexamine the entire sentence. United States v. Downs, 784 

F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015) (“When a sentence consists of 

more than one form of punishment, such as prison, a fine, 

restitution, and supervised release, and one of the forms is as 

in this case altered by the appellate court, it cannot be assumed that the others should be unaffected.”).

IV

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of conviction, but VACATE the sentence and REMAND for resentencing.

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