Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00129/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-00129-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John E. Potter
Defendant
Lina S. Siam
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LINA S. SIAM,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOHN E. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 04-00129 MHP

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

Re: Motion for New Trial

Plaintiff Lina Siam brought this action against John E. Potter, in his official capacity as

Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), alleging discrimination based on

her race and national origin, as well as her sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e et seq. The parties appeared before this court for a two-week jury

trial, at the conclusion of which the jury returned a verdict for defendant. Now before the court is

plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, or for a new trial. Having considered the parties’

arguments and submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, the court rules as follows.

BACKGROUND

The background of this action is set forth in considerable detail in this court’s previous order

on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and need not be repeated in full here. Plaintiff

Lina Siam worked for the USPS between 1977 and 2001, beginning as a letter sorting machine

operator and rising to the position of Senior EEO Complaints Processing Specialist at the EEO

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Center in San Francisco, California—a position plaintiff held from 1993 to 2001. Plaintiff has

received many awards throughout her career for the quality of her work.

The instant lawsuit is based on plaintiff’s allegations that a glass ceiling for Asian/Filipina

females blocked her advancement within the USPS after 1993. She alleges that intersectional

discrimination on the basis of her race and national origin, on the one hand, and her gender, on the

other, have denied her training opportunities, performance awards, desirable temporary assignments,

opportunities to compete for promotions, participation in a bonus pay program, and information

about entitlement to overtime backpay.

Only one of plaintiff’s claims survived defendant’s motion for summary judgment: 

plaintiff’s claim under Title VII that she was denied several opportunities for advancement in her

position during 1999 and 2000 as a result of discrimination based on the combination of her race,

national origin, and gender. The alleged opportunities for advancement fall into two categories. The

first—so-called “details”—were short-term opportunities to take on the responsibilities of a higher

level position. For details lasting longer than 30 days, employees received additional compensation. 

The second missed opportunity was a permanent promotion to a Level 21 position, two levels higher

than plaintiff’s Level 19 position, which became available when the Postal Service EEO was

reorganized in 2000. Plaintiff was not offered any of the details or the promotion.

The parties presented evidence on the issue of defendant’s liability to a jury during a twoweek trial in October, 2005. After approximately two hours of deliberation, the jury returned a

unanimous verdict in favor of defendant. Plaintiff timely filed the instant motion for judgment as a

matter of law or for a new trial, alleging numerous errors in this court’s handling of plaintiff’s

claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Judgment As a Matter of Law

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, a court may grant judgment as a matter of law on

any claims for which “there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for

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that party on that issue.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). In ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of

law pursuant to Rule 50, a court must consider all evidence presented, drawing all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, without making credibility determinations or weighing

the evidence. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000). In evaluating

this evidence without making credibility determinations, the court must “disregard any evidence

favorable to the moving party which the jury is not required to believe.” Id. at 152.

II. New Trial

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) provides that a new trial may be granted “for any of

the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the

United States.” A new trial is appropriate to prevent “fundamental unfairness or a miscarriage of

justice.” City of Phoenix v. Com/Sys., Inc., 706 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1983). Such unfairness

may be found where “the verdict [is] against the weight of the evidence, . . . the damages are

excessive, or . . . [there were] alleged substantial errors in admission or rejection of evidence or

instructions to the jury.” Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 251 (1940). 

Determining whether such unfairness exists is left to the “sound discretion” of the district court. Id.;

Alma v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 684 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1982) (district court

determination may be reversed only if appellate court has “definite conviction that conclusion was a

clear error of judgment”) (non-jury trial).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on four distinct bases. First,

plaintiff argues that this court’s summary judgment ruling, which eliminated several of plaintiff’s

claims from the lawsuit, was erroneous. Second, plaintiff argues that defendant’s failure to produce

certain documents unfairly prejudiced plaintiff, and that the court compounded the prejudice by

failing to instruct the jury that it could draw an adverse inference based on defendant’s failure to

produce the documents in question. Third, plaintiff argues that various rulings by the court during

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the course of pretrial proceedings and trial were erroneous and highly prejudicial to plaintiff’s case. 

Fourth, plaintiff argues that the evidence presented at trial was so overwhelmingly in plaintiff’s

favor that the jury’s verdict was in error. The court considers each contention in turn.

I. Grant of Summary Judgment

To the extent that plaintiff seeks reconsideration of this court’s grant of partial summary

judgment on certain of plaintiff’s claims—her Title VII backpay claim, her claim for retaliation, her

hostile work environment claim, and her claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.

section 201 et seq.—the court declines to revisit its previous ruling. The court’s previous order sets

forth the reasons for granting partial summary judgment in defendant’s favor in great detail, and the

reasons need not be revisited here. Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on these claims is therefore

denied.

II. Discovery Issues

Plaintiff moves for a new trial on the ground that defendant “stonewalled” and refused to

produce documents relating to training opportunities during the period between 1993 and 1997. 

According to plaintiff, defendant’s failure to produce those documents deprived plaintiff of the

ability to prove that she was repeatedly denied training opportunities that were offered to her peers. 

Plaintiff argues that as a result of defendant’s failure to produce additional training records, the court

should have given an instruction to the jury explaining that defendant’s failure could be viewed as an

admission of liability.

In order to be entitled to an adverse inference instruction, plaintiff must first establish that

defendant has materials in its possession, or is obligated to have materials in its possession, which it

failed to produce. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Signature Flight Support Corp., No. C 05 -00490, 2005 WL

3481423, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2005) (James, Magis. J.) (“[A] party seeking an adverse

inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must establish . . . that the party having

control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed”). Here,

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defendant has represented that it produced all relevant training documents in its possession. The

testimony plaintiff presented at trial does not contradict this assertion. Randall Sims testified that

some training records existed at some time in the past, and that these records would have provided

some information about the number of hours of training received by each employee, but did not

establish that the records still exist or that defendant failed to produce these materials to plaintiff. 

Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) at 241–44.

Assuming that defendants failed to produce the training records identified by Sims, plaintiff

also has not produced any “extrinsic evidence that the subject matter of the lost or destroyed

materials would have been unfavorable to [the spoliator] or would have been relevant to the issues of

this lawsuit.” Hamilton, 2005 WL 3481423, at *8. Absent some indication that the evidence not

produced would have been favorable to the moving party, courts are reluctant to issue an adverse

inference instruction. The testimony elicited by plaintiff regarding training records provided no

information about their likely contents; Sims repeatedly stated that he did not recall having any

conversation about disparate levels of training with plaintiff. See, e.g., RT at 244:8–11 (“Q. So do

you recall having a discussion with her about training when she was looking at the printout of the

fiscal year of all of the EEO employees? A. I don’t recall that specific conversation, no.”).

The court also notes that the records in question would have little probative value in any

case, as they did not indicate the nature of the training received by EEO employees and apparently

only stated whether the required 20 hours per year of training had been completed. “Q. But the

final printout at the end of the year showing what training had occurred would list the nature of the

training, would it not? A. My recollection [is] it would only say that the person had the 20 hours

and it would have they had completed the 20 hours.” Id. at 243:21–25.

Finally, the decision to issue an adverse inference instruction is within the sound discretion

of the trial court. Id. at 107. Here, defendant has offered evidence that plaintiff was lax in

requesting training documentation and in clarifying what documents she believed were missing. On

April 18, 2005 the court ordered the parties to meet and confer in order to clarify what additional

documents in defendant’s possession might be produced. According to defendants, plaintiff did not

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initiate any further conversation about the allegedly missing documents until August 17, 2005,

nearly four months later. It would be unfair to issue an adverse inference instruction under these

circumstances, where the failure to obtain additional documents is at least in part attributable to

plaintiff’s own lack of diligence.

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on this basis is therefore denied.

III. Fair Trial

A. Verdict Form

Plaintiff first claims that the verdict form approved by the court improperly limited the issues

and evidence considered by the jury. The verdict form read as follows:

1. Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that from March, 1999 to

January, 2001, Bernadine Faison did not detail plaintiff to higher-level positions and

that plaintiff's race or gender or national origin was a motivating factor in that

decision. [yes / no]

2. Plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the evidence that from March, 1999 to

January, 2001, Maria Robinson did not promote plaintiff to higher-level positions and

that plaintiff's race or gender or national origin was a motivating factor in that

decision. [yes / no]

The verdict form properly frames the issues that survived the parties motions’ for summary

judgment. In its summary judgment order, the court denied defendants’ motion for summary

judgment only as to plaintiff’s failure to promote claims against Faison and Robinson for the period

beginning in 1999: “Plaintiff has created triable issues as to whether defendant’s denial of details in

1999 and 2000, and promotion in 2000, were animated by discrimination.” The court granted

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to all of plaintiff’s other claims.

Moreover, the jury form does not, as plaintiff suggests, preclude the jury from considering as

“background evidence” conduct which occurred prior to 1999. The form says nothing whatsoever

about evidence. It properly limits the timeframe for the alleged failures to promote to the period

between March 1999 and January 2001. Plaintiff’s contention is therefore without merit.

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B. Exclusion of Damages Evidence

Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in bifurcating the trial into liability and damages

phases because certain of plaintiff’s damages witnesses—Dr. Robert Kaplan, Jose Siam, and

plaintiff—would have presented testimony establishing that “Siam was severely depressed due to

her hostile work environment and discriminatory treatment by managers and staff.” Pl.’s Motion at

11.

As an initial matter, courts have substantial discretion in bifurcating trials in the interest of

judicial economy, and bifurcation of damages from liability is commonplace. See, e.g., Bates v.

United Parcel Serv., 204 F.R.D. 440, 448 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (Henderson, J.), appeal denied, 2002 WL

32615336 (9th Cir. Jan 17, 2002); Yamaha Hatsudoki Kabushiki Kaisha v. Bombardier Inc., No. SA

CV 00-549-DOCEEX, 2001 WL 501354, at *3–*4 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2001). Here, as the court

noted in ruling on defendant’s motion for summary judgment, although plaintiff put forth sufficient

evidence to survive summary judgment or a directed verdict, the outcome of the liability phase was

far from certain. Moreover, bifurcation in this case benefitted plaintiff considerably by allowing

plaintiff to use the entire period of trial time previously allocated to liability and damages—ten

hours—for the presentation of her liability case alone. The court therefore finds no error or

prejudice in its decision to bifurcate.

 As for the testimony that Dr. Kaplan allegedly would have offered, the court is unable to

see how general testimony about plaintiff’s “hostile work environment” and depression could have

had any material effect on the jury’s findings on the actual claims at issue. As the court noted when

it ruled to exclude Dr. Kaplan’s testimony, plaintiff failed to explain how Dr. Kaplan would be able

to offer testimony about plaintiff’s supervisors without relying on inadmissible hearsay. Dr.

Kaplan’s general testimony about plaintiff’s work environment would be of little relevance, as the

court previously granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s Title VII hostile

work environment claim. Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Kaplan or her husband had any personal

knowledge of Faison or Robinson, or their treatment of plaintiff, beyond what plaintiff already

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covered in her own testimony. The exclusion of Dr. Kaplan and plaintiff’s husband cannot have had

any prejudicial effect on the outcome of the case.

C. Attendance by Bernadine Faison

Plaintiff argues, without citing any authority, that defendant’s designation of Bernadine

Faison as its representative in this litigation violated witness sequestration rules. According to

plaintiff, Faison was not a proper representative because she is not currently employed by defendant. 

Plaintiff argues that Faison’s presence in the courtroom unfairly aided defendant in rebutting the

testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses and had a chilling effect on those witnesses, many of whom

previously worked under Faison.

The decision to exempt particular witnesses from an exclusion order, however, is within the

discretion of the court. United States v. Oropeza, 564 F.2d 316, 326 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,

434 U.S. 1080 (1978). In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 615 does not permit a court to exclude

a witness “whose presence is shown by a party to be essential to the presentation of the party’s

cause.” Fed. R. Evid. 615(3). Here, although Faison is no longer employed by the Postal Service,

she was in plaintiff’s chain of supervision during the relevant time period and has knowledge which

was absolutely central to the presentation of defendant’s case. Permitting Faison to attend the trial

was therefore appropriate.

D. Adverse Inference Instruction

As discussed above, the court’s refusal to issue an adverse inference instruction based on

defendant’s supposed discovery stonewalling was proper.

E. Time Limits

Plaintiff argues that the court’s imposition of a ten-hour time limit for presentation of her

case-in-chief was unfairly restrictive given the complexity of the case and the magnitude of

plaintiff’s burden.

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“Trial courts have broad authority to impose reasonable time limits. . . . Such limits are

useful to ‘prevent undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.’” 

Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 941 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied sub nom McLachlan v. Simon,

536 U.S. 941 (2002) (citing Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1513 (9th Cir.1997)). The ten-hour

limit was reasonable in this case for several reasons. First, despite plaintiff’s argument that this case

is exceptionally complex, it is far less complex than cases which have permitted both shorter and

longer time limits. See Zivkovic v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002)

(two-day time limit was reasonable for trial on two issues: “(1) whether Zivkovic was offered and

provided a reasonable accommodation; and (2) whether Edison failed to hire Zivkovic due to his

disability.”); Navellier, 262 F.2d at 941 (seven-day limit for presentation of a complex multiplaintiff securities lawsuit, including damages); Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1499, 1513 (time limit of

forty-six hours per side for “a complex, lengthy, and bitterly contested antitrust suit” was

reasonable). Here, plaintiff presented testimony over the course of four days on a relatively narrow

question: whether certain decisions made with respect to a single employee during a two-year

period were motivated by impermissible racial and gender bias. Permitting over ten hours on the

question of liability alone was more than reasonable.

Second, plaintiff’s counsel is largely responsible for whatever time pressure she experienced

during trial. As the court repeatedly noted, plaintiff’s counsel had great difficulty with basic

evidentiary procedures, such as laying the foundation for documents before publishing them to the

jury. Her questioning was not focused, and as a result she wasted an undue amount of time. The

court assisted plaintiff in presenting her case wherever possible and repeatedly admonished

plaintiff’s counsel to make wise use of her time. Time limits must be reasonable, but they need not

make allowance for gross incompetence.

Third, although it is may be improper to adhere rigidly to time limits that are not practicable,

here the court exercised considerable flexibility—by modifying the ten-hour limit to apply to

plaintiff’s liability case, rather than her entire case-in-chief, and then by permitting plaintiff to take

additional time cross-examining key witnesses after plaintiff exhausted her allocated time through

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incompetence and the presentation of minimally valuable testimony. Cf. Amarel, 102 F.3d at 1513

(“Rigid and inflexible hour limits on trials, however, are generally disfavored.”).

As observed by this court, the ten-hour time limit was not only reasonable, but necessary.

F. Prejudicial Comments Regarding Plaintiff’s Evidence

Plaintiff’s sole complaint with respect to the court’s commentary on plaintiff’s evidence is

that the court found certain evidence to be “irrelevant.” Granting a new trial based on judicial

misconduct or advocacy for a particular party is rare, and subject to a strict standard. See, e.g.,

Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282, 1289 (9th Cir. 1984) (“a trial is unfair when the

judge expresses his opinion as to an ultimate issue of fact in front of a jury or argues for one of the

parties in the suit” (quoting Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 471–72 (9th Cir.1978))). A

statement that certain evidence is not relevant, far from being an “opinion as to an ultimate issue of

fact,” is merely part of the court’s obligation to rule on the parties’ evidentiary objections. It does

not serve as a proper basis for requesting a new trial.

Taken together, plaintiff’s allegations of prejudicial misconduct fall far short of the level

required to justify a new trial. Both parties had a fair and full opportunity to present their cases to

the jury. Plaintiff’s failure to succeed on the merits is attributable both to the lack of skill with

which her attorney conducted the trial and to the lack of clear evidence of discrimination based on

race, gender, or national origin. The nature of the evidence presented is discussed below.

IV. Weight of the Evidence

Plaintiff’s final argument is that the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the

evidence.

In order to prevail at trial, plaintiff was required to carry her burden under the three-step

McDonnell Douglas standard for establishing unlawful discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas inquiry involves three analytical stages. 

First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc.,

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299 F.3d 838, 855 (9th Cir. 2002), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Second, the burden of production

shifts, requiring defendants to proffer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the challenged

action. Id. If defendant succeeds at carrying his burden of production, the plaintiff then has “the full

and fair opportunity to demonstrate,” through presentation of her case and through

cross-examination of the defendant’s witnesses, that discrimination, rather than the proffered reason,

was the true reason for the employment decision. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

511 (1993). Throughout these stages, a plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to prove unlawful

discrimination. Costa, 299 F.3d at 855.

Before turning to the merits of plaintiff’s argument, the court notes that plaintiff has made it

exceedingly difficult for the court to rule on her motion by filing a brief which cites, almost

exclusively, materials and testimony that are not part of the record before the jury. For example, the

section of plaintiff’s brief titled “Bernedine Faison Discriminated Against Plaintiff Based on Her

Race” consists almost entirely of citations to the depositions and affidavits of Michael Yee, William

Norris, and Lina Siam. All three individuals testified at trial, and none of their depositions was

admitted into evidence. Also, certain citations appear to be Bates numbers (e.g., “USA000601”) but

are not associated with any document, whether admitted into evidence or otherwise. Finally, other

passages in plaintiff’s brief state facts with no citation whatsoever.

Materials not before the jury, of course, cannot serve as the basis for plaintiff’s argument that

the jury’s verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, and plaintiff’s motion must be denied

on that basis alone.

Even if plaintiff were to file an amended brief containing proper citations to materials in the

record, the evidence is not so one-sided as to suggest the need for a new trial. Defendant’s stated

position in opposition to plaintiff’s claims of discrimination is that plaintiff’s career stalled as a

result of her lack of interpersonal skills and her animosity towards one of her coworkers, Judy

Martinez, rather than any racial or gender bias on the part of Faison or Robinson. The record

contains ample evidence to support this theory.

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First, Faison testified that she did not make any employment decisions on the basis of race or

gender, RT at 273–74, and that she actually rewarded plaintiff with details and monetary bonuses

prior to the period in question, RT at 137–143. Faison promoted other Asian employees, including

Filipino employees, to higher level positions. RT at 230:7–9, 273–74.

Second, several other witnesses, including one of plaintiff’s own witnesses, testified that

Faison did not make employment decisions based on race or gender. RT at 225:11–14, 267, 387,

544, 522:16–523:2.

Third, several witnesses, including plaintiff’s witness Michael Yee, testified at length about

the personal animosity between plaintiff and Martinez, which stemmed from a 1993 incident. RT at

468–470 (Yee); id. at 516–521 (Martinez). In 1993, Martinez complained to Yee that plaintiff was

lazy and was not doing “shit” in the office. Id. at 468. Plaintiff learned of this comment and

confronted Martinez. Id. at 517–18. Following the incident, the two women ceased speaking to

each other—a state of affairs which persists today. Id. at 521. Taken together, these facts support a

jury finding that defendant denied plaintiff promotions for lawful, nonpretextual reasons.

This is not to say that the record is devoid of evidence that defendant’s employees—

particularly Bernedine Faison—harbored prejudices against Asians generally, and against Filipinos

in particular. Yee testified that Faison refused to shop at a local shopping center, which Faison

disparagingly referred to as “Manila town.” RT at 496:16–25. Faison also complained to Yee that

an Asian family had moved in next door and caused a cockroach infestation. RT at 497:3–9. In

order to prevail on her Title VII claim, however, plaintiff was required to prove that racial or gender

bias was a motivating factor behind plaintiff’s failure to receive promotions. The jury found in favor

of defendant based on a record which might reasonably support either party’s position. Granting a

new trial under those circumstances would be an arbitrary substitution of the court’s conclusion for

that reached by the jury. Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, or for a new trial, is

therefore denied.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby DENIES plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law or a new trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2006 

MARILYN HALL PATEL

District Judge

United States District Court

Northern District of California

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