Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03485/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03485-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrell L. Duncan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-3485

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DARRELL L. DUNCAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.

No. 3:15-cr-46-RLM — Robert L. Miller, Jr., Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MAY 24, 2016 — DECIDED AUGUST 12, 2016

____________________

Before ROVNER, SYKES, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. The only issue in this appeal is 

whether a conviction under Indiana’s robbery statute, Indiana 

Code § 35-42-5-1, includes as an element “the use, attempted 

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of 

another” such that it qualifies as a violent felony under the 

elements clause of the definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Our conclusion 

that Indiana robbery is a violent felony might seem about as 

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interesting as a prediction that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow. Nevertheless, the intricate law that has developed 

around the classification of prior convictions for recidivist 

sentencing enhancements can produce some surprising results. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. —, 136 S. Ct. 

2243 (2016) (burglary conviction not a violent felony under 

ACCA); Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (battery 

conviction not a violent felony under ACCA); United States v. 

Gardner, 823 F.3d 793, 804 (4th Cir. 2016) (North Carolina common law robbery conviction not a violent felony under 

ACCA).

A person can commit robbery under Indiana Code § 35-

42-5-1 by taking property by “putting any person in fear.” The 

statute itself does not tell us what the person must fear. Indiana case law teaches that the answer is fear of bodily injury. A 

conviction for such “robbery by fear” thus has as an element 

“the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force

against the person of another.” A conviction for robbery under the Indiana statute qualifies under the still-valid elements 

clause of the ACCA definition of violent felony.

I. Factual Background

In May 2015, Darrell Duncan was arrested on outstanding 

warrants. Police discovered a loaded pistol near the site of his 

arrest. Duncan eventually admitted that it belonged to him. 

He pled guilty to a single count of being a felon and unlawful 

user of controlled substances in possession of a firearm and 

ammunition, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (g)(3), and 

924(e).

Duncan had three prior Indiana state convictions for robbery, one in 2001, and two in 2008. The statute defines robbery 

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as “knowingly or intentionally tak[ing] property from another person or from the presence of another person” either 

“by using or threatening the use of force on any person” or 

“by putting any person in fear.” Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. Over 

Duncan’s objection, the district court found that those three 

convictions counted as “violent felonies” under the ACCA. 

Without the enhancement, Duncan faced a maximum sentence of ten years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). With the 

enhancement, he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years, § 924(e)(1), which is the sentence the court imposed.

II. Analysis

Whether a prior offense constitutes a violent felony under 

the Armed Career Criminal Act is a question of law that we 

review de novo. United States v. Gilbert, 464 F.3d 674, 677 (7th 

Cir. 2006). We first discuss the standards that govern whether 

a crime is a violent felony and then apply those standards to 

Indiana’s robbery statute. Under the ACCA:

(B) the term “violent felony” means any crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency

involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, 

or destructive device that would be punishable 

by imprisonment for such term if committed by 

an adult, that—

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or 

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use 

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct 

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that presents a serious potential risk of physical 

injury to another.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Clause (ii) does not apply to Duncan’s 

convictions. Robbery does not fit the specific list of offenses in 

the first half of the provision, and the Supreme Court invalidated the final clause—“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”—

as unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, 576 

U.S. —,135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015). We must focus on the “elements 

clause” of the definition of “violent felony” in 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i). 

“The meaning of ‘physical force’ in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a 

question of federal law....” Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 

133, 138 (2010). (For the sake of clarity, we refer to the Supreme Court’s 2010 Johnson ACCA decision as Curtis Johnson

and its 2015 ACCA decision as Samuel Johnson.) In Curtis Johnson, the issue was whether a Florida conviction for battery, 

which as a matter of state law could be based on “any intentional physical contact, ‘no matter how slight,’” qualified as a 

violent felony. Curtis Johnson, 559 U.S. at 138, quoting State v. 

Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 218 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis in original). 

The Court concluded that for purposes of the elements clause 

in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), “the phrase ‘physical force’ means violent

force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury 

to another person.” Id. at 140 (emphasis in original). Because 

even slight contact could support a conviction under the statute, Curtis Johnson’s battery conviction did not qualify as a 

predicate violent felony under ACCA. Id. at 145.

In Curtis Johnson, the government argued unsuccessfully

that the term “force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) could, in fact, be satisfied by simple offensive touching. One of the government’s 

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arguments and the Court’s response are particularly relevant 

here. The government argued that the absence of language in 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) specifying that “physical force” must rise to 

the level of bodily injury “proves that the merest touch suffices.” Id. at 143. The Court rejected that argument with language that guides us here: 

Specifying that “physical force” must rise to the 

level of bodily injury [in a different statutory 

section] does not suggest that without the qualification “physical force” would consist of the 

merest touch. It might consist, for example, of 

only that degree of force necessary to inflict 

pain—a slap in the face, for example.

Id. While mere touching is not enough to show physical force, 

the threshold is not a high one; a slap in the face will suffice.

With this understanding of “physical force” in mind, we 

turn to Indiana Code § 35-42-5-1. To determine when a prior 

conviction counts as a predicate offense under the ACCA, 

sentencing courts apply the “categorical” approach, looking 

only to the statutory elements of the offense, not the actual 

facts underlying the conviction. Descamps v. United States, 570 

U.S. —, —, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013), quoting Taylor v. United 

States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990). The issue is whether the Indiana robbery statute “has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” The statute reads in relevant part:

A person who knowingly or intentionally takes 

property from another person or from the presence of another person:

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(1) by using or threatening the use 

of force on any person; or

(2) by putting any person in fear;

commits robbery, a Level 5 felony.

Ind. Code § 35-42-5-1. Duncan focuses on the second subsection, arguing that because a person can be convicted for putting another person in fear, the offense does not include the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against 

another as an element.1

The answer depends on what Indiana courts require to 

convict a person of robbery by putting a person in fear. We 

begin with our opinion in United States v. Lewis, 405 F.3d 511 

(7th Cir. 2005), on which the district court correctly relied. 

Lewis held that a conviction for robbery under Indiana state 

law constituted a crime of violence under both the residual 

clause and the elements clause of the Sentencing Guideline 

definition of crime of violence in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) for the 

career offender guideline. The elements clauses of the ACCA 

definition and the Guideline definition are identical, so they 

have been interpreted to cover the same scope. United States 

v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2009); compare 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).2

 

1 The Indiana robbery statute was amended effective July 1, 2014 as 

part of a comprehensive revision of Indiana criminal statutes to change 

the classification of levels of felonies. Ind. Pub. L. 158–2013, § 450. The 

amendment did not affect the elements of the offense.

2 Whether the 2015 Samuel Johnson holding that the residual clause in 

the statute is unconstitutionally vague extends to the residual clause of the 

definition of “crime of violence” in the advisory Sentencing Guideline for 

career criminals, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2), is an open question that has 

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In Lewis, we reasoned that because robbery “entails taking 

property from the person of another by force or threat,” it had 

as an element “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 

physical force.” Lewis, 405 F.3d at 514. Recognizing the possibility that the statute covers robbery by putting another person in fear, without mentioning physical force, we explained: 

“The ‘fear’ in this formulation is fear of physical injury rather 

than of defamation; § 35-42-5-1 is not a blackmail statute.” Id., 

citing Cross v. State, 137 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1956), and Rigsby v. 

State, 582 N.E.2d 910, 912 (Ind. App. 1991); see also Jones v. 

State, 859 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. App. 2007), quoting Rigsby. 

In other words, we held that an Indiana robbery conviction 

satisfied the elements clause of the definition of a crime of violence. We also said that even without actual force, a robbery 

intrinsically involves “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” making it a crime of 

violence under the Guidelines’ residual clause as well. Lewis, 

405 F.3d at 514.

Duncan explains Lewis by trying to pair each of two types 

of Indiana robbery with a different Lewis holding. He argues 

that under Lewis, robbery involving the use or threatened use 

of force qualifies as a violent felony under the elements 

clauses in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and its guideline equivalent, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). He contends robbery by fear is 

 

divided the circuits. Compare United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (vagueness doctrine does not apply to advisory Guidelines),

with United States v. Pawlak, 822 F.3d 902 (6th Cir. 2016) (vagueness doctrine does apply to Guidelines). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari 

in a case presenting that issue. United States v. Beckles, 616 Fed. Appx. 415 

(11th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 15-8544 (U.S. June 27, 2016) (presenting 

this question). The ultimate answer to that question will not affect this appeal.

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covered only by the residual clause of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and its 

guideline equivalent, § 4B1.2(a)(2). Since the ACCA residual 

clause is no longer valid after Samuel Johnson, 576 U.S. —, 135 

S. Ct. 2551 (2015), he argues that Lewis can no longer justify 

treating robbery by fear as a violent felony.

Lewis did not hold, however, that robbery by fear qualified 

as a violent felony only under the residual clause. We made 

clear that robbery by “putting any person in fear” is Indiana’s 

equivalent of taking property from the person of another by 

threat of physical injury, so it falls under the still-valid elements clause, as well as the residual clause. 405 F.3d at 514. 

The relevant holding of Lewis—that any conviction under Indiana Code § 35-42-5-1 qualifies as a crime of violence under 

the elements clause and is thus a violent felony—remains 

good law.

Duncan also argues that the fear of physical injury required by Indiana’s robbery statute does not rise to the level 

of force demanded by Curtis Johnson—“that is, force capable 

of causing physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. 

at 140. He relies on Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 

2003). We held in Flores that an Indiana conviction for misdemeanor battery with bodily injury, see Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1, 

could not properly be considered a crime of domestic violence 

under an immigration statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E), that

uses the definition of “crime of violence” from 18 U.S.C. § 16. 

The “elements clause” of § 16 uses the same language as the 

ACCA definition: “has as an element the use, attempted use, 

or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” 

In Flores we reviewed Indiana law to conclude that: (1) Indiana’s battery statute encompasses “any contact, however 

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slight,” both direct and indirect, Flores, 350 F.3d at 669 (citations omitted); and (2) the threshold for bodily injury in Indiana is low: “a bruise suffices, as does any physical pain even 

without trauma.” Id. at 670 (citations omitted). Thus, a conviction for misdemeanor battery with bodily injury could encompass conduct such as lofting a paper airplane if that airplane “inflicts a paper cut,” or throwing a snowball if it 

“causes a yelp of pain.” Id. The key to the Flores decision was 

the fact that the Indiana battery-with-bodily-injury offense 

does not require intent to injure: “Indiana’s battery law does 

not make intent to injure an element of the offense; intent to 

touch must be established, but not intent to injure.” Id. at 671 

(emphasis in original).

Duncan seizes on the low level of physical injury required 

to satisfy Indiana’s definition of “bodily injury,” arguing that 

the fear of such minor injury or simple physical pain is not 

enough to render Indiana robbery by fear a crime of violence. 

If he means to argue that putting someone in fear of something as minor as a bruise or simple physical pain cannot 

qualify as a violent felony, the case law rejects that position. 

Curtis Johnson did not hold that “physical force” under the 

ACCA means a level of force likely to cause serious injury, or 

traumatic injury. Relying on Flores, the Court held that “physical force” requires no more than “force capable of causing 

physical pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. at 140, citing Flores, 350 F.3d at 672. The Court said that “physical force” 

might consist of nothing more than “a slap in the face.” Id. at 

143. Thus, neither Flores nor Curtis Johnson holds that a crime 

involving actual or threatened infliction of only pain or minor 

injury cannot qualify as a violent felony. A fear of a slap in the 

face is sufficient under Curtis Johnson. The fact that § 35-42-5-

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1(2) requires a fear of only “bodily injury” instead of “moderate” or “severe” bodily injury therefore does not exclude it 

from counting as a violent felony under the ACCA.

Duncan also argues that under Flores, a statute that does 

not otherwise include force as an element cannot be “transformed into a crime of violence with the addition of simple 

‘bodily injury.’” To the extent that the injury might be accidental, as permitted by the elements of the battery-with-bodily-injury offense in Flores, that is correct, but our focus here 

is on force that is intentionally applied or threatened. As 

noted, a conviction for Indiana robbery by fear requires a fear 

of bodily injury. Lewis, 405 F.3d at 514. Logically, this would 

require proof that the robber put the victim in fear that the 

robber was prepared to use “physical force” as defined by 

Curtis Johnson: “force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person,” 559 U.S. at 140, which can include 

force such as a slap in the face. Duncan has cited no cases 

holding that the statute might cover a hypothetical robbery in 

which a victim was induced to part with her property out of 

fear of a mere “offensive touching” that accidentally causes 

bodily injury. 

Duncan also argues that his robbery convictions cannot 

qualify as violent felonies because Indiana’s statute requires 

only that the victim be in fear of bodily injury, not that the 

criminal defendant actually have threatened to use physical 

force to cause that fear. We do not read Indiana case law as 

supporting this argument. In Rickert v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1139, 

1141 (Ind. App. 2007), the Indiana Court of Appeals explained: “Fear of bodily injury or personal harm in the case of 

noncompliance with the robber’s demands is required to support a conviction requiring a person be put in fear.” We do not 

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see how, in the ordinary case, the State will be able to prove 

that a victim feared bodily injury if he did not comply with a 

robber’s demands without showing that the robber employed 

a threat of physical force, either explicit or implicit. See, e.g., 

Hannah v. State, 311 N.E.2d 838, 841 (Ind. App. 1974) (“violent 

and oppressive circumstances” surrounding the taking of 

property allowed for the inference that victim was put in fear). 

Duncan contends that Jones v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1219 (Ind. 

App. 2007), allows a conviction for robbery by fear even if the 

robber does not use or threaten to use force. In Jones, the defendant approached the teller’s window in disguise, placed a 

note demanding money in it, and “loudly stated, ‘I just need 

to get this done as quickly as possible.’” Id. at 1221. The teller 

later testified that she was scared because she believed the defendant “might do something to her.” Id. at 1225. Duncan argues that there was no evidence of a threat to use force in that 

case. If a person can be convicted of robbery by fear without 

an explicit or implicit threat of violence, then robbery by fear 

cannot be a violent felony under the ACCA.

But we do not read Jones as holding that there need not be 

any threat at all to support a conviction for robbery by fear. In 

an earlier case discussing robbery by fear, the Supreme Court 

of Indiana quoted Cooley’s Blackstone to define the expression “putting in fear”: “it is enough that so much force, or 

threatening by word or gesture be used, as might create an 

apprehension of danger, or induce a man to part with his 

property without or against his consent.” Cross, 137 N.E.2d at 

33, quoting 2 Cooley’s Blackstone (4th ed.) p. 1404, and State 

v. Luhano, 102 P.2d 260, 262 (Nev. 1909). Jones shows only that 

robbery by fear can be shown by circumstances that communicated an implicit threat to use physical force, even if there 

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was no explicit threat. See also, e.g., Simmons v. State, 455 

N.E.2d 1143, 1148 (Ind. App. 1983) (discussing Cross “‘Using

or threatening the use of force’ can be, by our supreme court’s 

definition, the objective causation of the subjective reaction of 

fear.”).

Finally, Duncan argues that the Indiana statute contains no 

requirement that the victim’s fear of injury be reasonable. He 

theorizes that a person could be convicted of robbery under 

Indiana law if he “took property from an alektorophobe by 

showing him chickens, or a pteromerhanophobe by taking 

him on an airplane.” Such a scheme could, he argues, fulfill 

the requirement that the victim be placed in fear of physical 

harm or injury while failing to comply with § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)’s 

requirement that the crime involve a threat of physical force. 

But in “applying the categorical approach, we are concerned 

with the ordinary case, not fringe possibilities.” United States 

v. Taylor, 630 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2010), citing James v. United 

States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007) (categorical approach does not 

require that every conceivable factual offense qualify), overruled on other grounds by Samuel Johnson, 576 U.S. —, 135 S. 

Ct. 2551, and citing United States v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400, 404 

(7th Cir. 2009). Perhaps some extraordinary set of circumstances could arise in which a defendant could be guilty of 

robbery by placing someone in fear of bodily injury without 

threatening physical force. As shown by Duncan’s imaginative suggestions, such circumstances would be outliers, to put 

it mildly. See Taylor, 630 F.3d at 634 (“Taylor argues that there 

are ways to touch someone in a rude, insolent, or angry manner using a deadly weapon that do not necessarily involve the 

use, attempted use, or threatened use of force. While there 

may be hypothetical situations where this might be true (one 

involving utensils at a particularly contentious Thanksgiving 

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dinner came up during oral argument), such possibilities are 

outliers.”) (emphasis in original). In the ordinary case, robbery by placing a person in fear of bodily injury under Indiana law involves an explicit or implicit threat of physical force 

and therefore qualifies as a violent felony under 

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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