Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00605/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00605-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Banks
Plaintiff
Pam Ahlin
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STEVEN BANKS,

Plaintiff,

v.

PAM AHLIN, Director of California 

Department of State Hospitals,

Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00605-AWI-MJS (PC)

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

(ECF NO. 1)

AMENDED COMPLAINT DUE WITHIN 

THIRTY (30) DAYS

Plaintiff is a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil 

rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s complaint is before the 

Court for screening.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The in forma pauperis statute provides, “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any 

portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if 

the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

II. PLEADING STANDARD

Section 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

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Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for 

vindicating federal rights conferred elsewhere. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 

(1989).

To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: 

(1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 

(2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state 

law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Ketchum v. Alameda Cnty., 811 F.2d 

1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1987).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations 

are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 

supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). 

Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.” Id. Facial plausibility demands more than the mere 

possibility that a defendant committed misconduct and, while factual allegations are 

accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id. at 677-78.

III. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is detained at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”). He names as Defendant

Pam Ahlin, Director of California Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”).

Plaintiff’s allegations may be summarized essentially as follows.

Plaintiff submits a form complaint in which the only fact specific to him is that he 

entered the custody of DSH on May 22, 2013, pursuant to California’s Sexually Violent 

Predator Act (“SVPA”).

1 See Compl. ¶ 11.

 

1

This same complaint has been submitted in practically identical form in multiple cases in this District on 

or around March 5, 2015. See, e.g., Carter v. Ahlin, 1:15-cv-0483-MJS, ECF No. 1; Cassells v. Ahlin, 2:15-

cv-0495-MCE-KJN, ECF No. 1; Acosta v. Ahlin, 2:15-cv-0497-WBS-DAD, ECF No. 1; Guzman v. Ahlin, 

1:15-cv-0786-BAM, ECF No. 1. 

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In the remainder of the pleading, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant is aware his

confinement is excessively restrictive in relation to the purposes of the SVPA and that he 

has been irrationally denied the benefits of outpatient treatment. Plaintiff contends that 

Defendant’s assessment of whether Plaintiff was likely to commit sexually violent 

predatory offenses if released into the community was based on an irrational and 

fraudulent assessment scheme. He points to various research studies and other articles 

purporting to demonstrate that recidivism rates for sexually violent predators are lower 

than perceived, that the assessment tools used by the State of California are unreliable,

and that supervised release and outpatient treatment of sex offenders are as effective 

as, if not more effective than, civil detention in ensuring such offenders do not recidivate. 

Plaintiff alleges that the assessment scheme and denial of outpatient treatment 

violate his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process, 

adequate treatment, equal protection, and to be free from conditions that are excessively 

restrictive in relation to their purported purposes.

Plaintiff also challenges various conditions of his confinement, including 

limitations on what he may possess, what privileges he may have, and what he may 

wear.

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the prospect of being subjected to future (1) 

assessments of his alleged current mental condition and current volitional control, (2) 

deprivations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to not be subjected to conditions that 

are excessively restrictive in relation to legitimate governmental interests, (3) violations 

of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and 

(4) violations of his First Amendment right to free speech and not have his ability to 

send, store and receive information be unreasonably interfered with. 

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Overview of Sexually Violent Predator Act

The SVPA, Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6600 et seq., provides for the civil 

commitment of “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against 

one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a 

danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in 

sexually violent criminal behavior.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6600(a)(1). The SVPA 

codifies a process involving several administrative and judicial stages to determine 

whether an individual meets the requirements for civil commitment. 

First, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) and 

Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) screens inmates who may be sexually violent predators

at least six months prior to their scheduled release dates. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6601(a)(1), (b). The screening is conducted in accordance with a structured screening 

instrument developed by the State Department of State Hospitals (“SDSH”). Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6601(b). If CDCR and BPH determine that an individual “is likely to be a 

sexually violent predator,” CDCR refers the individual to the SDSH for a full evaluation. 

Id.

The SDSH employs a standardized assessment protocol to determine whether a

person is a sexually violent predator under Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(c). If two 

SDSH evaluators, or in some circumstances, two independent evaluators, determine that 

the person has “a diagnosed mental disorder so that he or she is likely to engage in acts 

of sexual violence without appropriate treatment and custody,” the Director of SDSH 

forwards a request for a petition for commitment to the applicable county. Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6601(d)-(h).

If the county’s designated counsel agrees with the request, a petition for 

commitment is filed in Superior Court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601(i). “The filing of the 

petition triggers a new round of proceedings” under the SVPA. People v. Superior Court

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(Ghilotti), 27 Cal. 4th 888, 904 (Cal. 2002). The petition is reviewed by a superior court 

judge to determine whether the petition “states or contains sufficient facts that, if true, 

would constitute probable cause to believe that the individual named in the petition is 

likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6601.5. If so found, a probable cause hearing is conducted, at 

which the alleged predator is entitled to the assistance of counsel. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code §§ 6601.5, 6602(a). If, at the hearing, no probable cause is found, the petition is 

dismissed. Id. However, if probable cause is found, a trial is conducted. Id.

At trial, the individual is entitled to the assistance of counsel, to retain experts or 

other professionals to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to access all 

relevant medical and psychological records and reports. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6603(a). Either party may demand a jury trial. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6603(a)-(b). 

The trier of fact must determine whether the person is a sexually violent predator beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604. “If the court or jury determines that 

the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed for an 

indeterminate term to the custody of [SDSH] for appropriate treatment and confinement 

in a secure facility designated by the Director of State Hospitals.” Id.

Once committed, sexually violent predators must be reevaluated at least annually. 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(a). The annual report must include consideration of 

whether the person “currently meets the definition of a sexually violent predator and 

whether conditional release to a less restrictive alternative, pursuant to Section 6608, or 

an unconditional discharge, pursuant to 6605, is in the best interest of the person and 

conditions can be imposed that would adequately protect the community.” Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6604.9(b). If SDSH has reason to believe the person is no longer a sexually 

violent predator, it shall seek judicial review of the commitment. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 

§ 6605(c). If SDSH determines that conditional release or unconditional discharge is 

appropriate, it shall authorize the committed person to petition the court for conditional 

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release or unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6604.9(d). The committed 

person also may petition the court for conditional release without the recommendation or 

concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a).

The court may deny a petition for conditional release without a hearing if it is 

based on frivolous grounds. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). If the petition is not based 

on frivolous grounds, the court shall hold a hearing to determine “whether the person 

committed would be a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he 

or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior due to his or her diagnosed 

mental disorder if under supervision and treatment in the community.” Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6608(g). The committed person has the right to counsel and the appointment of 

experts for the hearing. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a), (g). The committed person 

bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, unless the SDSH’s 

annual reevaluation determines that conditional release is appropriate, in which case the 

State bears the burden of proof. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(k). If the court 

determines that the committed person would not be a danger while under supervision 

and treatment, the person shall be placed in a conditional release program for one year. 

Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(g). Thereafter, the committed person may petition the 

court for unconditional discharge. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(m).

If, upon receiving a petition for unconditional discharge, the court finds probable

cause to believe that the committed person is not a danger to the health and safety of 

others and is not likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if discharged, a 

hearing is conducted. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(2). At the hearing, the committed 

person is entitled to the same constitutional protections afforded at the initial trial. Cal. 

Welf. & Inst. Code § 6605(a)(3). Either party may demand a jury trial. Id. The state bears 

the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the committed person remains a 

danger to the health and safety of others and is likely to engage in sexually violent 

criminal behavior if discharged. Id. If the petition is resolved in the committed person’s

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favor, he is unconditionally released and unconditionally discharged. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6605(b). 

B. The SVPA Mental Health Assessments

1. Claims Must be Brought in Habeas Action

Insofar as Plaintiff is challenging the validity of his continued detention, the 

exclusive method for asserting that challenge is by filing a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Such 

claims may not be brought in a section 1983 action. Nor may Plaintiff seek to invalidate 

the fact or duration of his confinement indirectly through a judicial determination that 

necessarily implies the unlawfulness of the State’s custody. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. A 

section 1983 action is barred, no matter the relief sought, if success in that action would

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. Id. at 81-82; Heck v. 

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 489 (1994) (unless and until favorable termination of the 

conviction or sentence, no cause of action under section 1983 exists); Huftile v. MiccioFonseca, 410 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying Heck to SVPA detainees with 

access to habeas relief). 

While a claim for prospective relief often does not call into question the validity of 

a plaintiff’s confinement, see Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997), Plaintiff’s 

complaint can reasonably be construed as a direct challenge to his custody, which he 

may not bring in a section 1983 action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 78. Plaintiff’s allegation 

that he was denied outpatient treatment in violation of the Due Process and Equal 

Protection clauses clearly implicates the validity of his confinement. He does not seek 

outpatient treatment as a stand-alone mental health care claim; rather, he seeks 

outpatient treatment in lieu of civil detention.

2 Again, success on this claim would 

 

2

Plaintiff contends that his Equal Protection rights are being violated because his current mental status is 

not being considered while civilly committed compared to those similarly situated. The Equal Protection 

Clause requires that persons who are similarly situated be treated alike. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne 

Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). An equal protection claim may be established by showing that 

the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff based on the plaintiff's membership in a 

protected class, Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1082 (9th Cir. 2003), Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 

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invalidate Plaintiff’s confinement, and the claim therefore may not be brought in a section 

1983 action. Id. Moreover, Plaintiff’s claim that the assessment methodology violated his 

Due Process rights is barred on the same ground. See Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141

(concluding that challenge to SVPA assessments would imply invalidity of civil 

commitment and therefore could only be brought in habeas corpus). Insofar as his 

claims are based on the use of the assessments in his civil commitment proceedings, 

they present a direct challenge to the validity of his confinement, and may not be brought 

in this action. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 81. And finally, to the extent he attempts to assert 

due process rights in this assessment process itself, any claim as to the propriety of the 

assessments is so related to the civil commitment proceeding that success thereon 

would imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s confinement: absent the allegedly deficient 

assessments, no petition for commitment would have been filed, and there would have 

been no basis for the Superior Court to proceed on the petition to civilly commit Plaintiff 

under the SVPA. Huftile, 410 F.3d at 1141. 

In sum, until Plaintiff’s civil detention has been “reversed on direct appeal, 

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make 

such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of 

habeas corpus,” Plaintiff is barred from bringing his claims under section 1983.3 Heck, 

512 U.S. at 487.

 

F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001), or that similarly situated individuals were intentionally treated differently 

without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 

564 (2000); see also Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 592 (9th Cir. 2008); North Pacifica LLC 

v. City of Pacifica, 526 F.3d 478, 486 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff has not alleged that he is a member of a 

protected class or that Defendant intentionally treated Plaintiff differently than others similarly situated. 

Accordingly, he fails to state an Equal Protection claim. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the treatment of 

other sexually violent predators in other states do not reflect intentional disparate treatment on the part of 

Defendant.

3

The Court notes that the California Supreme Court has upheld the SVPA against due process, equal 

protection, and ex post facto challenges. See Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal.4th 1138 (1999), cited by 

People v. Mckee, 223 P.3d 566 (2010).

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2. Prospective Relief Related to Future Assessments

As noted, Edwards leaves open the possibility for Plaintiff to seek prospective 

relief in a section 1983 action to prevent future injury caused by future assessments. 520 

U.S. at 648. However, given its lack of clarity about his current commitment status and 

the question of whether he is subject to future assessments, Plaintiff’s complaint does 

not specifically articulate such a claim and its present allegations do not state a 

cognizable claim. 

Plaintiff alleges the assessments violated his procedural and substantive Due 

Process rights, but he does not identify any process due to him, under the SVPA or 

otherwise, that was denied in past assessments and that may be denied in future 

assessments. Significantly, the assessments are not determinative of whether Plaintiff’s 

detention should continue. Rather, Plaintiff may petition the court for conditional release 

without the recommendation or concurrence of SDSH. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 6608(a). 

Plaintiff’s continued detention is determined by a judge at a hearing in which Plaintiff has 

the right to counsel and to retain experts to rebut the State’s assessments. Cal. Welf. & 

Inst. Code § 6608. His ultimate release from commitment is determined by a judge or 

jury in a proceeding in which Plaintiff maintains the right to counsel and to retain experts, 

and the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal. Welf. & Inst. 

Code § 6605. The SVPA provides sufficient procedural mechanisms for Plaintiff to 

challenge the assessments, and to demonstrate that he no longer qualifies for civil 

detention. These protections are such that any flaws in the assessment process do not 

rise to a due process violation.

C. Defendant Ahlin

1. Supervisory Liability and Linkage

The Court turns next to the allegations directed against the sole Defendant, Pam 

Ahlin, who is named in both her individual and official capacities. Under Section 1983, 

Plaintiff bringing an individual capacity claim must demonstrate that each Defendant 

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personally participated in the deprivation of his rights. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 

930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). There must be an actual connection or link between the actions 

of the Defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 695 (1978).

Government officials may not be held liable for the actions of their subordinates 

under a theory of respondeat superior. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Since a government 

official cannot be held liable under a theory of vicarious liability in § 1983 actions, 

Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts showing that the official has violated the Constitution 

through his own individual actions by linking each named Defendant with some 

affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 676.

Liability may be imposed on supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if the 

supervisor: (1) personally participated in the deprivation of constitutional rights or 

directed the violations or (2) knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them. 

Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 

(9th Cir. 1989). Defendants cannot be held liable for being generally deficient in their 

supervisory duties.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ahlin knew that none of the restrictive conditions 

that he lists in the complaint would exist if civil detainees like Plaintiff were confined in 

non-penal residences. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Ahlin was aware that each of 

the restrictions listed violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights. 

However, Plaintiff does not tie the litany of allegedly unconstitutional restrictions to any 

particular facts. There are no facts that Defendant Ahlin knew of each of the alleged 

violations, what specific document, claim, or suit gave her notification, and how she 

failed to act to prevent the violations from continuing to occur. The complaint also fails to 

provide any allegations that this Defendant knew of the conditions to which the plaintiff in 

particular was subjected at CSH, let alone tending to show that some specific action or 

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omission by her caused him to be thus subjected. Stated simply, Plaintiff’s conclusory 

assertion that Defendant Ahlin should have known about the conditions under which he 

is housed is insufficient to state a claim against her 

2. Official Capacity

Under Section 1983, plaintiff may also seek prospective injunctive relief against 

defendant in her official capacity. See Thornton v. Brown, 757 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 

2013) (citing cases). “Official-capacity suits ... generally represent only another way of 

pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the 

government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit 

is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. 

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing, inter alia, Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of 

N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)).

In an official-capacity action, a governmental entity may be liable under Section 

1983 if it was the “moving force” behind the alleged violation of constitutional rights, 

based on the entity's “policy or custom.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67 (citations and 

internal quotation marks omitted). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained in 

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1127 (9th Cir. 2013):

A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not 

required to allege a named official's personal involvement in 

the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional 

violation. See id.; Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Rather, a plaintiff 

need only identify the law or policy challenged as a 

constitutional violation and name the official within the entity 

who can appropriately respond to injunctive relief. See L.A. 

Cnty. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29 (2010); Hafer [v. Melo], 502 

U.S. [21] at 25 [1991].

Plaintiff here has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Defendant Ahlin helped 

promulgate or ratified any policy or practice that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s rights. If 

Plaintiff chooses to amend, he must specifically identify the policy or custom and its 

contents, and to the best of his ability state when it was adopted, by whom, and how it 

led to the violation of his constitutional rights. Additionally, a defendant in a suit to enjoin 

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an allegedly unconstitutional policy or practice must be able to appropriately respond to 

court-ordered injunctive relief if the plaintiff prevails. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157-

61 (1908). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to assert that Defendant Ahlin has the ability to 

appropriately respond to court-ordered injunctive relief.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Conditions of Confinement Claim

The complaint’s final few pages challenge the conditions of Plaintiff’s confinement

by identifying numerous restrictions on the personal property that he may possess, what 

privileges he may have, and what he may wear.

Plaintiff, a civil detainee, is not a prisoner within the meaning of the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2000). He retains 

greater liberty protections than individuals detained under criminal process and is 

“’entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals 

whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.’” Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 

918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)). 

Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the 

substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.4

Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.

Treatment is presumptively punitive when a civil “detainee is confined in 

conditions identical to, similar to, or more restrictive” than his criminal counterparts. 

Jones, 393 F.3d at 933. To elaborate, a restriction on a civil detainee is punitive, for this 

 

4 Nonetheless, in analyzing a civil detainee's substantive due process claim, the Court may look to cases 

analyzing criminal convicts' Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claims where appropriate. That 

is, where a court has awarded relief on a convicted inmate's conditions claim under the Eighth 

Amendment, a fortiori that court would have awarded relief to a civil detainee under the more protective 

Fourteenth Amendment. As our Circuit has held,

Although civil detainees must be afforded more considerate treatment 

under the 14th Amendment than criminal convicts are afforded, the 

contours of the Eighth Amendment are better defined and can provide a 

useful barometer for measuring unconstitutional conduct.

Smith v. Solano Cty., 2013 WL 3930730, *4 (E.D. Cal. July 29, 2013) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 466 F.3d 

676, 699 (9th Cir. 2006)). “For example, conduct that would violate the Eighth Amendment rights of a 

criminal convict by definition [a fortiori] also violates the Fourteenth Amendment rights of a civil detainee.” 

Id.

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purpose, if it is expressly intended to punish, or if it is excessive in relation to a nonpunitive purpose, or if it is imposed to achieve an objective which could be accomplished 

through “many” less harsh alternative methods. Id. at 933-34; see also Demery v. 

Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2004). For this purpose, non-punitive 

governmental interests include ensuring the detainee's presence at trial, maintaining jail 

security, and effectively managing a detention facility. Jones, 393 F.3d at 931; see also

Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 

441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979)); Hallstrom v. Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1484 (9th Cir.

1993). Moreover, the civil detainee cannot state a substantive due process claim arising 

out of his conditions of confinement merely by alleging that the restrictive measures used 

were less desireable or less prudent than less restrictive alternatives that were available. 

Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993).

A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing his 

liberty interests against the relevant state interests”; the Constitution, however, is not 

concerned with de minimis restrictions on a patient’s liberties. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 

320. Additionally, there must be a reasonable relationship between “the conditions and 

duration of confinement” and the purpose for which the civilly confined person is 

committed. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001).

1. Personal Property

Plaintiff’s complaint lists over 60 restrictions to which he is presumptively 

subjected. Many of these restrictions concern personal property that he is prohibited 

from possessing, others concern his privacy interest, and still others concern limitations 

on his activities. The Court declines to consider the constitutionality of each of these 

restrictions in a vacuum. 

Nonetheless, the Court will address some points in order to provide Plaintiff with 

guidance should he decide to file an amended complaint. It is beyond dispute that civil 

detainees have a protected interest in personal property. Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 

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730 (9th Cir.1974). In this context, the Due Process Clause protects prisoners from 

being deprived of their property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 

539, 556 (1974). However, while an authorized, intentional deprivation of property is 

actionable under the Due Process Clause, neither negligent or “unauthorized intentional 

deprivations of property gives rise to a violation of the Due Process Clause if the state 

provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 n. 

14 (1983). In other words, only an authorized intentional deprivation of property is 

actionable under the Due Process Clause. Authorized deprivations of property are 

permissible if carried out pursuant to a regulation that is reasonably related to a 

legitimate penological interest. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).

Legitimate, non-punitive governmental objectives include maintaining security, 

ensuring a detainee's presence at trial, and managing the detention facility effectively. 

Jones, 393 F.3d at 932 (citing Hallstrom v. City of Garden City, 991 F.2d 1473, 1484 (9th 

Cir. 1993)). Moreover, there is no outright prohibition on housing SVPs in jails or prisons, 

Jones, 393 F.3d at 932, and “the actual treatment a prisoner [or detainee] experiences 

will depend upon predictions about him based upon his known history and the 

correctional officer's experience with him in the institutional setting.” Cerniglia v. Cty. of 

Sacramento, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1043-44 (E.D. Cal. 2008). Detainees “whose history 

suggests a risk of escape or the likelihood of violence within the institution will be 

subjected to closer security than those whose history is free of violence and whose 

institutional history has been free of problems.” Id. Plaintiff identifies a lengthy list of 

items that civil detainees may not possess. While this list is long, there are no allegations 

that he possessed personal property that was confiscated and that the confiscation was 

an authorized deprivation. 

For any unauthorized confiscations, California Law provides an adequate postdeprivation remedy for any property deprivations. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-895; 

Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994). California's Tort Claims Act 

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requires that a tort claim against a public entity or its employees be presented to the 

California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, formerly known as the 

State Board of Control, no more than six months after the cause of action accrues. Cal. 

Gov't Code §§ 905.2, 910, 911.2, 945.4, 950–950.2 (West 2014). Presentation of a 

written claim, and action on or rejection of the claim are conditions precedent to suit. 

State v. Superior Court of Kings County (Bodde), 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1245 (2004); 

Mangold v. California Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995). To state a 

tort claim against a public employee, a plaintiff must allege compliance with the Tort 

Claims Act. State v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th at 1245; Mangold, 67 F.3d at 1477; 

Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988).

2. Clothing

Next, Plaintiff complains of having to wear prison style uniforms that have been 

worn by others and not being able to possess more than a week’s worth of clothing. 

While “[t]he denial of adequate clothing can inflict pain under the Eighth Amendment,” 

Plaintiff fails to allege how he has been harmed by this restriction or how the restriction is 

meant to punish. Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1421 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Hoptowit 

v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982)), abrogated in part on other grounds by 

Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

3. Privacy

Though the Court addresses this issue further in the context of Plaintiff’s Fourth 

Amendment claim (see infra), Plaintiff also complains of having to share a room with 

others, being subjected to emergency drills that disturb him in his room, and a lack of 

privacy in using the toilets and showers. Plaintiff fails to allege that he has a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in his room or the shower area. He also fails to allege how he is 

harmed by his conditions or how they have caused him “to endure genuine privation and 

hardship over an extended period of time.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542 (1979).

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Plaintiff should note that mere double-bunking of residents at a treatment facility is 

not a per se violation of due process. Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (citing Cote v. Maloney, 152 

Fed. Appx. 6, 7 (1st Cir. 2005)). Some crowding and loss of freedom of movement is one 

of the inherent discomforts of confinement. Id.; See also Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 

1020, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that Bell determined that “the additional discomfort of 

having to share the already close corners with another detainee was not sufficiently 

great to constitute punishment.”). Even if sharing his room with another individual were 

to constitute more than de minimis harm, Plaintiff fails to allege that the condition was 

intended to punish or was excessive in relation to a non-punitive purpose. Jones v. 

Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 934 (9th Cir. 2004).

E. First Amendment Claim

Relatedly, Plaintiff contends that his First Amendment right “to send and receive 

information” is being violated because he is unable to possess, inter alia, computers, 

printers, scanners, and cell phones. Generally, the right to free speech includes “the right 

to utter or to print, ... the right to distribute, the right to receive, the right to read,” and the 

freedom of inquiry and thought. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). 

Although detainees retain their right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment, 

the right may be restricted. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545-46 (1979). Restrictions on 

prisoners' First Amendment rights are analyzed under the reasonableness standard set 

forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). “Interference is valid if it is 

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Safley, 482 U.S. at 89. Again, the 

Court is unable to evaluate Plaintiff’s claim because the form complaint is devoid of any 

facts. Plaintiff does not assert, for example, that he possessed any of these items and 

that they were confiscated, or that he asked to possess these items and his requests 

were unreasonably denied, and that he suffered injury as a result. Absent any 

allegations, the Court cannot say whether Plaintiff states a claim. 

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F. Fourth Amendment Claim

Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the “invasive searches of one’s bed room absent 

probable cause.” The Fourth Amendment right to be secure against unreasonable 

searches and seizures extends to civil detainees. Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 993 

(9th Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, ––– U.S. ––––, 129 S. Ct. 2431 (2009). “The 

watchword of the Fourth Amendment in every context is ‘reasonableness.’” Id. “Of 

course, ‘the reasonableness of a particular search [or seizure] is determined by 

reference to the [detention] context.’” Id. (quoting Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 

332 (9th Cir.1988)). “There are other concerns that mirror those that arise in the prison 

context, e.g., “‘the safety and security of guards and others in the facility, order within the 

facility and the efficiency of the facility's operations.’” Id. (quoting Andrews v. Neer, 253 

F.3d 1052, 1061 (8th Cir. 2001)).

Plaintiff’s form complaint asserts only that civil detainees are sometimes subject 

to searches of their bedrooms. Plaintiff does not claim that his bedroom has been 

searched unreasonably, when, and by whom. In any event, courts have generally 

“concluded that no Fourth Amendment claim lies because civil detainees do not have a 

reasonable expectation of privacy in their rooms.” Griego v. Allenby, 2012 WL 4670803,

at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2012), citing Rainwater v. Bell, 2012 WL 3276966, at *11 (E.D.

Cal. Aug. 9, 2012) (civil detainee did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

jail cell); Pyron v. Ludeman, 2011 WL 3293523, at *6 (D. Minn. June 6, 2011) (search of 

a civil detainee's personal items in his cell did not violate the Fourth Amendment), report 

and recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (D. Minn. Jul. 29, 2011); Banda 

v. Corzine, 2007 WL 3243917, at *7-8 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2007) (civil detainee unable to 

state Fourth Amendment claim as his expectation of privacy yielded to legitimate 

governmental interest in keeping facility free of controlled substances); Riley v. Doyle, 

2006 WL 2947453, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 16, 2006) (civil detainee cannot state Fourth 

Amendment claim for repeated contraband searches of cell); Gilmore v. Kansas, 2004 

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WL 2203458, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 2004) (upholding ban on pictures of children in 

general because of legitimate treatment interests); compare Stearns v. Stoddard, 2012 

WL 1596965, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 11, 2012.) (open question whether civil detainee 

housed in a secure facility has any expectation of privacy in his cell), report and 

recommendation adopted in full, 2012 WL 1597305 (W.D. Wash. May 7, 2012.).

This claim will therefore be dismissed and leave to amend be granted. Plaintiff is 

hereby advised that any Fourth Amendment claim must be premised on more than the 

mere possibility that a civil detainee will have his or her room searched periodically and 

must include specific facts as to Plaintiff. 

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim as discussed supra. Due to the lack of 

clarity regarding Plaintiff’s current commitment status, he will be given leave to amend. If 

he chooses to do so, he must specifically show that habeas relief is not available to him 

and that success in this action would not necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of his 

confinement or its duration. He also must allege facts to state a claim under the legal 

standards set forth above.

Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it 

is not for the purposes of adding new claims. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th 

Cir. 2007). Plaintiff should carefully read this Screening Order and focus his efforts on 

curing the deficiencies set forth above.

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that Local Rule 220 requires that an amended 

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. As a general rule, 

an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 

55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once an amended complaint is filed, the original complaint no 

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an 

original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be 

sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly titled “First 

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Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 

under penalty of perjury. Plaintiff's amended complaint should be brief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a 

right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted).

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff (1) a blank civil rights complaint form and 

(2) a copy of his complaint, filed March 5, 2015;

2. Plaintiff’s complaint (ECF No. 1) is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief may be granted;

3. Plaintiff shall file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the 

Court will recommend that this action be dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure 

to comply with a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 19, 2015 /s/Michael J. Seng 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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