Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03086/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03086-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian D. Marsh
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 6, 2016 Decided July 19, 2016

No. 12-3086

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

BRIAN D. MARSH,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:03-cr-00423-1)

Mary E. Davis, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Jay Apperson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause 

for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth Trosman 

and Elizabeth H. Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: TATEL, SRINIVASAN, and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 1 of 11
2

TATEL, Circuit Judge: This case raises the question

whether 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e), which provides that “[a] term of 

supervised release does not run during any period in which [a]

person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a 

Federal, State, or local crime,” tolls a supervised-release term

during a period of pretrial detention if the defendant is later

convicted of the charges on which he is held and receives 

credit toward his sentence for the time served in pretrial 

detention. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that it does 

not. 

I.

In 2004, appellant Brian Marsh pled guilty to one count 

of unlawful possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or 

more of phencyclidine. Shortly thereafter, the district court 

sentenced him to 63 months’ imprisonment, followed by four 

years of supervised release. Marsh completed his term of 

incarceration on May 9, 2008. His term of supervised release 

was, therefore, set to expire on May 8, 2012.

Roughly nine months prior to that scheduled expiration, 

on August 11, 2011, Marsh was indicted for several new 

drug-trafficking offenses. He was arrested six days later, on 

August 17, and detained pending trial. He ultimately pled 

guilty to the new charges on June 19, 2012, and, on 

September 20, a different district judge sentenced him to 150 

months’ imprisonment, with credit for time served, followed 

by five years of supervised release.

Marsh’s convictions for these later offenses established

that he had violated the conditions of his supervised release 

by engaging in criminal activity. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)

(mandating, as a condition of supervised release, that “the 

defendant not commit another Federal, State, or local crime 

during the term of supervision”). Thus, on September 21, the 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 2 of 11
3

day after his sentencing in the second case, the district court 

that presided over his 2004 conviction held a hearing to 

address the apparent violation. At the hearing, the court 

purported to revoke Marsh’s supervised-release term and to

sentence him to the statutory maximum of 36 months’ 

imprisonment, to run consecutive to the 150 months imposed 

for the new charges. See Revocation Hr’g Tr. 24 (Sept. 21, 

2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

Marsh now appeals, raising two principal challenges.

First, he contends that his supervised-release term ended on 

May 8, 2012, and that the district court consequently lacked 

jurisdiction in September 2012 to revoke his term of 

supervised release and to impose an additional period of 

incarceration. Second, he contends that even if the district 

court had jurisdiction, it plainly erred in sentencing him by, 

among other things, applying an across-the-board policy of 

imposing the maximum sentence available when a defendant 

commits a crime while on supervised release. Because we 

agree with Marsh’s first challenge—that the district court 

lacked jurisdiction to revoke his term of supervised release 

and to impose a further period of incarceration—we need not

address the alleged defects in the district court’s sentencing 

procedures.

II.

As a threshold matter, Marsh contends that, in September 

2012, the district court lacked authority to revoke his term of 

supervised release and to impose an additional period of 

imprisonment because he was no longer under its supervision. 

We review that jurisdictional question de novo. See Board of 

Trustees of Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 25 v. 

Madison Hotel, Inc., 97 F.3d 1479, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see

also, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 1310, 1311 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 3 of 11
4

(11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (reviewing a district court’s 

jurisdiction to revoke a supervised-release term de novo).

A.

Both parties agree that, absent tolling, Marsh’s 

supervised-release term was set to expire on May 8, 2012. 

Both parties also agree that the district court had no authority 

to act after the expiration of Marsh’s supervised-release term 

because no warrant or summons ever issued with respect to 

his supervised-release violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) 

(providing that a district court’s “power . . . to revoke a term 

of supervised release . . . and to order the defendant to serve a 

term of imprisonment . . . extends beyond the expiration of 

the term of supervised release for any period reasonably 

necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its 

expiration if, before its expiration, a warrant or summons has 

been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a violation”

(emphasis added)).

The question, then, is whether Marsh’s supervisedrelease term was tolled for any reason. The government

argues that it was, and that it continued well beyond 

September 2012, because it was tolled during the thirteen 

months that Marsh was in pretrial detention for his new drugtrafficking offenses. The government relies on 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3624(e), which provides that “[a] term of supervised release 

does not run during any period in which the person is 

imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a Federal, 

State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period 

less than 30 consecutive days.” As the government sees it,

pretrial detention qualifies as a “period in which the person is 

imprisoned in connection with a conviction” if the defendant 

is ultimately convicted of the charges on which he is held and 

receives credit toward his sentence for the time served in 

pretrial detention. And because Marsh was later convicted of 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 4 of 11
5

the charges on which he was held from August 17, 2011, to 

September 20, 2012, and because he received credit toward 

his sentence for that time, the government contends that his

supervised-release term continued well after September 2012.

Whether section 3624(e) tolls a term of supervised 

release during a period of pretrial detention where the 

defendant is ultimately convicted of the charges on which he 

is held is a matter of first impression in this circuit. Five other

circuits have, however, considered the issue and are split. 

One circuit—the Ninth—has ruled that “pretrial detention

does not constitute an ‘imprisonment’ within the meaning of 

§ 3624(e) and thus does not operate to toll a term of 

supervised release.” United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 

1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999). That court reasoned that the 

phrase “imprisoned in connection with a conviction” 

necessarily implies “imprisonment resulting from or 

otherwise triggered by a criminal conviction”—that is, 

imprisonment following, not preceding, a conviction. Id. at 

1105. It further reasoned that “Congress uses the terms 

‘imprisonment’ and ‘detention’ very differently,” and that the 

former indicates “a penalty or sentence” following a 

conviction. Id. The court also saw nothing in the statute 

indicating that Congress intended courts to conduct 

“backward-looking” tolling analyses. Id. According to the 

court, moreover, such a backward-looking approach would be 

“impractical.” Id. The court explained that if section 3624(e) 

tolls a supervised-release term while a defendant is in pretrial 

detention so long as he is ultimately convicted of the charges 

on which he is held and receives credit for time served, then 

there would be times when courts would be unable to

determine whether they retained jurisdiction over defendants 

because those defendants had served time in pretrial detention

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 5 of 11
6

but had yet to be acquitted or convicted of the charges on 

which they were held. Id. at 1105–06.

After the Ninth Circuit ruled, four other circuits—the 

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh—reached the opposite 

conclusion. The first of these to rule, the Sixth Circuit, began 

its analysis by rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the 

word “imprisoned” necessarily refers to periods of 

confinement following a conviction. See United States v. 

Goins, 516 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). In its view, the 

plain meaning of “imprisoned” is to be held in confinement

by the state irrespective of whether that confinement precedes 

or follows a conviction. Id. The court further reasoned that the 

Ninth’s Circuit’s definition of “imprisoned” would render the 

phrase “in connection with a conviction” superfluous because 

“imprisoned” would already connote the existence of a 

conviction. Id. at 421. Having rejected the Ninth Circuit’s 

analysis, the Sixth Circuit zeroed in on the phrase “in 

connection with a conviction” and concluded that it “plainly” 

encompasses periods of pretrial detention where the person is 

later convicted and receives credit for time served. Id. at 422. 

Those periods, the court stated, are periods of confinement 

served “in connection with a conviction.” Id.

While acknowledging that its interpretation would 

sometimes require a backward-looking tolling analysis to 

determine whether a supervised-release term continues to run, 

the Sixth Circuit believed that “nothing in the statute suggests

that only forward-looking analysis is appropriate.” Id.

Moreover, unlike the Ninth Circuit, it was unconcerned about 

the potential problems that judges might encounter in trying 

to ascertain their jurisdiction. Id. at 423. “The only time . . . 

[jurisdictional] indeterminacy would exist,” the court 

explained, “is when . . . [a] defendant is between the period of 

his pretrial detention and the conclusion of his trial” because 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 6 of 11
7

after trial the judge would know whether the defendant was 

convicted of the charges on which he was held and, therefore,

whether the pretrial-detention period tolled the defendant’s 

supervised-release term. Id. On those “rare” occasions, the 

court saw “no reason why the judge who is asked to 

determine jurisdiction . . . could not continue the proceedings 

until a conviction or an acquittal is rendered in the other 

case.” Id. at 424. 

Shortly after the Sixth Circuit ruled, the Fourth, Fifth, 

and Eleventh circuits followed suit. See United States v. Ide, 

624 F.3d 666, 667 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. MolinaGazca, 571 F.3d 470, 471 (5th Cir. 2009); Johnson, 581 F.3d 

at 1311–13. They generally agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s 

reasoning, including its assessment that the phrase 

“imprisoned in connection with a conviction” makes no 

temporal distinctions between pre- and postconviction periods 

of confinement. See Ide, 624 F.3d at 670; Molina-Gazca, 571 

F.3d at 473–74. The Fourth and Fifth circuits also reinforced 

the idea that the term “imprisoned” does not necessarily imply

a period of confinement following a conviction, pointing out 

that Congress has used the term to refer to pretrial detention

in at least one other statute. Ide, 624 F.3d at 670; MolinaGazca, 571 F.3d at 474; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3041 (providing 

that, prior to trial, offenders may be “arrested and imprisoned

or released as provided in chapter 207 of this title” (emphasis 

added)). The Fourth Circuit additionally stressed its view that 

the phrase “during any period” indicates Congress’s intent to 

toll supervised-release terms during all periods of 

confinement—“both before and after a conviction”—so long 

as those periods are ultimately connected to a conviction, and 

that a contrary interpretation of the statute would “nullify the 

word ‘any.’” Ide, 624 F.3d at 669.

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 7 of 11
8

B.

We begin our own inquiry into section 3624(e)’s 

meaning by examining its text. See Schindler Elevator Corp. 

v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407–10 (2011); 

United States v. Cordova, 806 F.3d 1085, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 

2015) (per curiam). If the text is clear, we must enforce the 

statute as written. Schindler Elevator Corp., 563 U.S. at 412; 

Cordova, 806 F.3d at 1098.

After carefully reviewing the statutory language, we

conclude, as did the Ninth Circuit, that section 3624(e) does 

not toll supervised-release terms during periods of pretrial 

detention—though we reach that conclusion for different 

reasons than those articulated by the Ninth Circuit and 

advocated by Marsh. Notably, we do not rely on the phrase 

“imprisoned in connection with a conviction” to conclude that 

supervised-release terms are tolled only during periods of 

incarceration “resulting from or otherwise triggered by” 

criminal convictions. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105; 

Appellant’s Br. 11–12. Nor do we rely on the statute’s use of 

the word “imprisoned” as opposed to “detained.” See

Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105; Appellant’s Br. 12. Instead, 

our conclusion rests on a word that our sister circuits and the 

parties have appeared to ignore—the word “is.”

Critically, the statute provides that “[a] term of 

supervised release does not run during any period in which 

the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a 

Federal, State, or local crime . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e)

(emphasis added). By phrasing the statute in the present tense, 

Congress has foreclosed the type of backward-looking tolling 

analysis that the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh circuits 

allow. When a person is held in pretrial detention, one cannot 

say that the person “is imprisoned in connection with a 

conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime” for an obvious 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 8 of 11
9

reason: he has yet to be convicted. To be sure, if the person is

later convicted and receives credit for time served, it might be 

appropriate to say that the person was imprisoned or has been

imprisoned “in connection with a conviction.” But Congress

did not phrase the statute in the past or present perfect tense; it 

framed it in the present. 

Congress’s use of the present tense matters. Both the 

Supreme Court and this court have frequently looked to verb 

tense to ascertain the meaning of statutes. See, e.g., Carr v. 

United States, 560 U.S. 438, 447–49 (2010) (relying on 

Congress’s use of the present as opposed to the past or present 

perfect tense to conclude that a statute should be given a 

“forward-looking construction”); United States v. Wilson, 503 

U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (“Congress’ use of a verb tense is 

significant in construing statutes.”); Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 

F.3d 388, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The use of the present tense 

in a statute strongly suggests it does not extend to past 

actions.”). “The Dictionary Act also ascribes significance to 

verb tense.” Carr, 560 U.S. at 448. It provides that “[i]n 

determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 

context indicates otherwise[,] . . . words used in the present 

tense include the future as well as the present.” 1 U.S.C. § 1.

“By implication, then, the Dictionary Act instructs that the 

present tense generally does not include the past.” Carr, 560 

U.S. at 448.

Of course, as the Dictionary Act states, if something in

the context of section 3624(e) suggested that Congress

intended a backward-looking tolling analysis, then the use of 

the present tense might not be dispositive. But nothing about 

the statute’s context so indicates. Consequently, we believe 

that Congress’s use of the present tense makes clear that the 

question whether a term of supervised release is tolled during 

a period of imprisonment is to be answered by looking at 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 9 of 11
10

present circumstances, i.e., by looking at whether the

defendant’s imprisonment is, at the time, connected to a 

conviction, rather than by looking retroactively at whether the

period of imprisonment can be characterized as having been 

served in connection with a conviction.

Significantly, this interpretation gives effect to each word 

in the statute and avoids the kind of surplusage that concerned 

the Fourth and Fifth circuits. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 

U.S. 526, 536 (2004) (recognizing courts’ general “preference 

for avoiding surplusage constructions”). The phrase “in 

connection with a conviction” clarifies that the statute does 

not toll a term of supervised release any time the person “is 

imprisoned” or confined by the state, but rather only during 

those periods in which the person’s imprisonment is triggered 

by a conviction. The phrase “during any period” clarifies that 

a term of supervised release is tolled not only during the 

period of imprisonment initially imposed upon conviction, but 

also any additional period of imprisonment flowing from a 

conviction, such as a period imposed for a supervised-release 

violation. 

The interpretation we adopt also makes the most sense.

As the Ninth Circuit observed, under the contrary 

interpretation, situations may arise in which district courts

will be unable to determine whether they retain jurisdiction 

over defendants who had been under their supervision 

because it remains to be seen whether those defendants will 

be convicted of charges on which they were held in pretrial 

detention and, hence, whether their terms of supervised 

release will extend beyond their initial expiry dates. See 

Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d at 1105–06. The idea that the statute 

would lead to such situations strikes us as rather odd. For one 

thing, we are unaware of any other area of the law in which 

district-court jurisdiction is similarly contingent on future 

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 10 of 11
11

events, and the government was unable to point us to any at 

oral argument. For another, such situations appear rather 

unfair to defendants, who would have no idea whether they

continue to be subject to court supervision. We doubt 

Congress intended to create such situations. 

Finally, we note that if the system functions as Congress 

intended, tolling generally would be unnecessary for a district 

court to preserve its jurisdiction to revoke a defendant’s 

supervised-release term in circumstances like those in this 

case. Under section 3583(i), a district court may address a 

supervised-release violation after the end of a supervisedrelease term if a warrant or summons issues prior to that 

term’s expiration. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). That process—not 

followed here—provides fair notice to the defendant and 

certainty for all.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district 

court was without jurisdiction. Accordingly, we vacate the 

order revoking Marsh’s supervised-release term and 

sentencing him to 36 months’ imprisonment.

So ordered.

USCA Case #12-3086 Document #1625475 Filed: 07/19/2016 Page 11 of 11