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Parties Involved:
Communications Workers of America, Local Union No. 7011
Appellant
Joan Frick
Appellant
Toni Lopez
Appellant
Janice Young
Appellee

Document Text:

• 

FILED 

Uruted Statei Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DEC .. 6 1990 

&OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

JANICE YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA, 

LOCAL UNION NO. 7011; TONI LOPEZ; 

JOAN FRICK, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 89-2107 

) (D.C. No. 87-1392-JP) 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before McKAY, LOGAN, and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

Following a bench trial, the United States District Court for 

the District of New Mexico entered judgment for plaintiff Janice 

Young upon finding that defendant Connnunications Workers of 

America, Local Union No. 7011 (union) had breached its duty of 

fair representation when it failed to file or process a valid 

grievance on her behalf. The union timely appealed and we affirm. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 1 
Facts 

The events underlying this dispute began on August 27, 1985, 

when plaintiff Young, a twelve-year union member and employee of 

Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell), 

abruptly left her work station in the middle of a shift in order 

to seek treatment for a psychiatric illness. Mountain Bell 

considered this action an abandonment of her position and 

terminated Ms. Young's employment effective that date. Ms. Young 

had not intended to abandon her employment, however, and believed 

when she left that day that she would be able to return to her 

position with the company once she had completed treatment. 

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 3 (Feb. 24, 1989). 

The district court found that union steward Judy Melian 

contacted Ms. Young several days later, learned that Young had not 

intended to quit her job and then offered to try to have Mountain 

Bell change its personnel records to reflect that Young was on 

sick leave rather than terminated. Id. at 2. Melian also 

volunteered during the conversation to seek sickness disability 

benefits on Young's behalf. Id. Young responded that she wanted 

Melian to take these steps. Id. During this phone call, which 

Melian denied making, 1 the district court also found that Melian 

told Young that she was in the process of moving to another 

position out of state, but that she would transfer responsibility 

for Young's grievance to union steward Janet Ogelsbie. Id. at 

1 Union 

August 27 

that date. 

steward Melian denied talking to Young about her 

departure from work or talking to her at any time after 

Deposition of J. Melian at 36. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 2 
2-3. As a result of this conversation, the district court 

concluded that Young reasonably believed that the union would 

pursue action, in the form of a grievance if necessary, to 

persuade Mountain Bell to reinstate her. Id. at 3. 

The district court further found that Melian talked to 

Ogelsbie about processing a grievance for Young, but did not 

contact Mountain Bell officials or take any other action in 

response to her telephone conversation with Young. Id. at 4-5. 

Union steward Ogelsbie also failed to investigate or take any 

other action with respect to Young's grievance, even after giving 

assurances to Young that she would look into the matter. Id. As 

a result, neither steward or any other union official developed 

the information necessary to determine if Young had a valid 

grievance, 2 and no grievance was ever filed on Young's behalf by 

the union. See id. at 4-5. If union officials had conducted the 

necessary investigation, the district court concluded that they 

should have determined that Young did have a valid grievance, 

2 There is no evidence in the record, for example, that either 

Melian or Ogelsbie talked to Mountain Bell about Young's situation 

after learning that Young had not intended to quit her position. 

The only other union official having any involvement in this 

matter, chief steward Mary Lands, talked briefly to company 

officials off-the-record after receiving a general inquiry about 

Young's termination from one of Young's sisters. Lands never 

talked to Young, however, or with stewards Melian or Ogelsbie to 

learn Young's version of the events leading up to her termination, 

Tr. 2/16/89 at 70, 74, and also never requested that the company 

produce any documentation or other- evidence supporting its account 

of these events. Id. at 71. Lands also was uncertain whether she 

talked to company officials before expiration of the thirty-day 

period for filing a grievance. Id. at 70, 74. 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 3 
which, if properly filed and processed, would have resulted in 

Mountain Bell changing its records and reinstating Young. Id. 

at 6. 

On September 30, 1987, Ms. Young filed this action in New 

Mexico state court against the union and several of its officials. 

In it she alleged that the union had breached its statutory duty 

of fair representation by its arbitrary failure to file and 

process a grievance challenging her wrongful discharge and that 

this breach was motivated by personal animosity towards Young for 

her earlier failure to join in a union strike. After removal to 

federal district court and a two-day bench trial, the district 

court entered judgment for Young upon finding that the union's 

failure to file or process a grievance on Young's behalf 

constituted an arbitrary and perfunctory handling of a valid 

grievance and as such was a breach of its duty of fair 

representation to Young. The district court also found, however, 

that the union's failure to file was not the result of bad faith 

or hostile or discriminatory motive. On the first day of trial, 

the district court also rejected the union's attempt to assert a 

statute of limitations defense on the ground that the union had 

waived the defense by failing to raise it at any point before 

trial. 

Analysis 

The union challenges both the district court's holding on the 

merits of Young's claim and its refusal to consider the union's 

statute of limitations defense. With respect to the district 

court's decision on the merits, the union first argues that the 

4 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 4 
district court erred as a matter of law in holding that Young 

could prove a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation 

without proving that the union acted in bad faith or in a 

discriminatory, hostile or dishonest manner. Because this issue 

concerns the proper legal standard for determining a breach of the 

duty of fair representation, we review the district court's 

definition of this standard de nova. See In re Tri-State Equip., 

Inc., 792 F.2d 967, -970 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The union argues that a breach of the duty of fair 

representation only occurs when a union has acted in bad faith or 

in a discriminatory, dishonest or hostile manner. As support for 

this standard, it cites the Supreme Court's decision in 

Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach 

Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), in which the Supreme 

Court stated without discussion that proof of a union's breach of 

the duty of fair representation must include "'substantial 

evidence of fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct.'" Id. 

at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)). In 

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), however, which was decided 

before Lockridge, the Court held more broadly that a union 

breaches its statutory duty of fair representation whenever its 

"conduct towards a member of the collective bargaining unit is 

arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 113 Vaca, 368 U.S. at 

3 The Court emphasized that proof of bad faith or 

discrimination is not mandatory to state a claim by affirming that 

a union breaches its statutory duty of fair representation 

whenever it "arbitrarily ignore(s] a meritorious grievance or 

process(es] it in a perfunctory fashion." Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191. 

The Court also stated that a union may fail the Vaca standard if 

it simply fails to "make decisions as to the merits of particular 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 5 
190 (emphasis added). In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 

424 U.S. 554 (1976), a case decided after Lockridge, the Court 

reiterated the Vaca standard without reference to Lockridge's 

apparent requirement that bad faith or other intentional union 

misconduct always be shown. See Hines, 424 U.S. at 568-70. The 

Supreme Court has continued to rely upon and invoke Vaca's threepart "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith" standard instead 

of Lockridge's stricter standard to the present. See. e.g., 

United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 110 s. Ct. 1904, 1911 (1990); 

DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 164 (1983). 

To the best of our knowledge, the Seventh Circuit is the only 

court to have read this line of Supreme Court cases as requiring 

evidence of bad faith, . fraud, discrimination or similar 

intentional misconduct to prove that a union has breached its duty 

of fair representation to a union member. See, e.g., Hoffman v. 

Lonza, Inc., 658 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1981); see generally 

Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., No. 86-1287, 1990 WL 113869 

at 7-8 (7th Cir. Aug. 10, 1990). Every other circuit, including 

this one, has adhered to the view that arbitrary union conduct, 

defined generally as conduct evincing a "'reckless disregard' for 

the rights of the individual employee," 4 Peterson v. Kennedy, 

771 F.2d 1244, 1254 (9th Cir. 1985)(citations omitted), cert. 

grievances." Id. at 194. 

4 Union conduct will also be considered arbitrary under the 

Vaca test if it is "'without rational basis,' or is 'egregious, 

unfair and unrelated to legitimate union interests.'" Peterson, 

771 F.2d at 1254 (citations omitted); see =R=u=z=i=c~k=a=-v .......... _Ge==n=e=r=a=l 

Motors Corp., 649 F.2d 1207, 1211 n.3 (6th Cir. 1981). 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 6 
denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986), may in and of itself constitute a 

breach of a union's duty of fair representation to its members. 

See, e.g., Foust v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 572 F.2d 710, 

715-16 (10th Cir. 1978)(affirming holding that union breached its 

duty of fair representation by its arbitrary and perfunctory 

handling of a union member's complaint), modified on other 

grounds, 442 U.S. 42 (1979); Morgan v. St. Joseph Terminal R.R. 

Co., 815 F.2d 1232, 1234 (8th Cir.)(union's conduct may be 

arbitrary and thus breach duty of fair representation even though 

union acted in good faith and without hostile motive), cert. 

denied, 484 U.S. 846 (1987); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 649 

F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1981)(bad faith is not an essential 

element of an unfair representation claim); Ryan v. New York 

Newspaper Printing Pressmen's Union No. 2, 590 F.2d 451, 455 

(2d Cir. 1979)(arbitrary union conduct breaches duty even in 

absence of bad faith or hostility); see also Le'Mon v. NLRB, 

902 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1990)(arbitrary union conduct 

breaches the union's duty of fair representation). We find no 

reason at this late date to abandon the majority rule in favor of 

the previously rejected Seventh Circuit test. See Foust, 572 F.2d 

at 715. 5 Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err 

in holding that the union breached its duty even though the union 

did not act discriminatorily or in bad faith. 

5 The union argues that Foust does not stand for our adoption 

of the three-part Vaca standard over the more restrictive 

Lockridge standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit. A careful 

reading of both the legal analysis and holding in Foust, however, 

demonstrates that we not only considered the Lockridge standard in 

that case, but also rejected it. See Foust, 572 F.2d at 714-15. 

7 

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• 

The union also challenges the district court's finding that 

the union acted arbitrarily and perfunctorily with respect to 

Young's grievance. 6 Specifically, the union argues that it cannot 

be held liable for its failure to act on Young's grievance because 

the record shows either that it reasonably concluded after 

investigation that the grievance was not meritorious or that it 

was merely negligent in failing to follow through on its 

assurances to Young. 

If the union had persuaded the district court to accept 

either of these alternate factual theories, then the district 

court would have been required to enter judgment in the union's 

favor. See United Steelworkers, 110 s. Ct~ at 1911 (negligent 

conduct does not breach a union's duty of fair representation); 

Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71 ("mere errors of judgment" do not breach 

the duty of fair representation). The district court, however, 

specifically found that the union was aware of Young's complaints, 

promised to act to protect her interests, and yet failed to 

investigate the merit of her grievance or take any other action to 

protect her rights. Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law at 

2-6. These factual findings are supported by substantial evidence 

6 Because this mixed question of fact and law is primarily 

factual in nature, we review it under the clearly erroneous 

standard. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 

1986); see also Allen v. Allied Plant Maintenance Co., 881 F.2d 

291, 297 (6th Cir. 1989)(applying clearly erroneous standard to 

determination of arbitrary union conduct); Warren v. International 

Bhd. of Teamsters, 544 F.2d 334, 341 (8th Cir. 1976)(same); but 

~ Galindo v. Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502, 1513 (9th Cir. 

1986)(applying de novo standard to determination of whether union 

breached its duty of fair representation). 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-2107 Document: 010110093948 Date Filed: 12/06/1990 Page: 8 
in the record and provide ample support for the district court's 

ultimate finding that the union acted arbitrarily and 

perfunctorily in ignoring Young's meritorious grievance. See 

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191 ("a union may not arbitrarily ignore a 

meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion"); 

Landry v. The Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Co., 880 F.2d 846, 852 

(5th Cir. 1989)(union breaches its duty of fair representation 

when it fails to investigate a member's complaint or fails to 

prosecute a grievance without having decided that the grievance 

lacked merit or should not be pursued for some other reason). In 

the absence of any showing that these findings were clearly 

erroneous, we affirm the district court's holding that the union 

acted arbitrarily and thereby breached its duty of fair 

representation to Young. 

The union also argues that the district court erred in 

denying it leave to amend its answer to raise a statute of 

limitations defense. Although leave to amend "shall be freely 

given when justice so requires," Fed. R. Civ. P. lS(a), "whether 

leave should be granted is within the trial court's discretion." 

Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 

1185 (10th Cir. 1990). Untimeliness alone may be a sufficient 

basis for denying leave to appeal and prejudice to the opposing 

party need not be shown. Id. Here, the union failed to plead or 

otherwise raise the statute of limitations defense in either of 

its answers in this action, in the pretrial order or at any other 

9 

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• 

point before the opening day of trial. Under these circumstances, 

we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying the union leave to amend its answer to raise this defense. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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