Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07084/USCOURTS-caDC-04-07084-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Irene Branham
Appellee
The Government of the District of Columbia
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 9, 2005 Decided October 25, 2005

No. 04-7084

IRENE BRANHAM, AS NEXT FRIEND OF THE MINOR CHILD

TERRANCE BRANHAM,

APPELLEE

v.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cv00986)

Mary T. Connelly, Assistant Attorney General, Office of

Attorney General for the District of Columbia, argued the cause

for appellant. With her on the briefs were Robert J. Spagnoletti,

Attorney General, and Edward E. Schwab, Deputy Attorney

General.

Paul S. Dalton argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee.

Before: EDWARDS, TATEL, and BROWN, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Unable to convince a hearing officer

that his public school placement was inappropriate under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, thirteen-year-old

Terrance Branham and his mother took their case to United

States District Court. Siding with the Branhams, the district

court reversed the hearing officer and ordered the District of

Columbia (1) to provide Terrance with four years of remedial

tutoring and (2) to pay for his attendance at a private school. On

appeal, the District, conceding that it denied Terrance the free

and appropriate public education to which federal law entitles

him, argues that nothing in the record supports the tutoring and

private placement awards. We agree. Both the Supreme Court

and this circuit have held that district courts may order school

districts to implement educational programs for handicapped

students only after finding, based on record evidence, that the

programs are tailored to meet the students’ specific educational

needs. Because the district court here made no such findings

with respect to either the tutoring or the private placement—

indeed, the record is so barren of evidence that making such

findings would have been impossible—we reverse and remand

for the court to develop an evidentiary record and fashion an

educational program designed to meet Terrance’s needs.

I.

Earlier this year in Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d

516 (D.C. Cir. 2005), we described the Individuals with

Disabilities Education Act (known as “IDEA”) this way:

Under [IDEA], states and territories, including the District

of Columbia, that receive federal educational assistance

must establish “policies and procedures to ensure,” among

other things, that “free appropriate public education,” or

“FAPE,” is available to disabled children. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1)(A). . . . School districts may not ignore

disabled students’ needs, nor may they await parental

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demands before providing special instruction. Instead,

school systems must ensure that “[a]ll children with

disabilities residing in the State . . . regardless of the

severity of their disabilities, and who are in need of special

education and related services, are identified, located, and

evaluated.” Id. § 1412(a)(3)(A). Once such children are

identified, a “team” including the child’s parents and select

teachers, as well as a representative of the local educational

agency with knowledge about the school’s resources and

curriculum, develops an “individualized education

program,” or “IEP,” for the child. See id. §§ 1412(a)(4),

1414(d). Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in

Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School

District, Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102

S. Ct. 3034, 73 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1982), the IEP must, at a

minimum, “provid[e] personalized instruction with

sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit

educationally from that instruction.” See id. at 203, 102 S.

Ct. 3034. . . . “If no suitable public school is available, the

[school system] must pay the costs of sending the child to

an appropriate private school.” Jenkins v. Squillacote, 935

F.2d 303, 305 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Reid, 401 F.3d at 518-19 (second omission in original).

At issue in Reid was whether the district court had abused

its discretion in ordering, without explanation, tutoring in the

amount of one hour for each day that a learning-disabled

sixteen-year-old boy went without a FAPE. Although we

confirmed that compensatory education awards are available for

IDEA violations, id. at 522-23, we rejected the district court’s

“mechanical” calculation of that award, id. at 524. Reasoning

that a “cookie-cutter” approach, id. at 523, cannot be squared

with IDEA’s conferral of equitable authority to “grant such

relief as the district court determines is appropriate,” 20 U.S.C.

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§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), we held that “the ultimate [compensatory]

award must be reasonably calculated to provide the educational

benefits that likely would have accrued from special education

services the school district should have supplied in the first

place,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 524. Unlike “ordinary IEPs [that] need

only provide ‘some benefit,’ compensatory awards must do

more—they must compensate.” Id. at 525 (emphasis in

original). We emphasized repeatedly that this inquiry must be

qualitative, fact-intensive, and above all tailored to the unique

needs of the disabled student. Id. at 524.

Like the student in Reid, Terrance Branham is a teenager

whom the District of Columbia Public Schools (or “DCPS”)

classified as learning disabled. In October 1999, DCPS placed

Terrance at the Prospect Learning Center, a full-time special

education facility. Terrance’s first IEP was prepared the

following June.

Two and a half years later, Terrance’s test scores indicated

he had made only “very limited” progress while at Prospect.

Appellant’s App. 66 (testimony before hearing officer). His

performance remained “significantly below grade level.” Id. at

95 (Terrance’s IEP). School officials and Terrance’s mother,

appellee Irene Branham, met in January 2003 to develop a new

IEP that might better serve Terrance’s needs. Although

Terrance’s mother signed the IEP, she indicated her

disagreement with its contents in the space above her signature.

Later that month, the Branhams petitioned for an impartial

due process hearing, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(A) (providing

right to due process hearing), alleging that DCPS had denied

Terrance a FAPE and seeking a private-school placement and

compensatory tutoring. The hearing officer found that DCPS

was providing Terrance with a FAPE and dismissed the

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complaint. When Terrance later “aged out” of Prospect, he

enrolled at Cardozo High School, a general education school.

In the meantime, the Branhams brought suit in the United

States District Court for the District of Columbia, see 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i)(2)(A) (providing right to bring civil action), and filed

a motion for summary judgment. When DCPS missed the

deadline for responding, the district court entered a default

judgment in the Branhams’ favor. Branham v. District of

Columbia, No. 03-986 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2003). One week later,

DCPS moved to vacate the judgment, claiming it had

misunderstood the briefing schedule. In opposition, the

Branhams argued that Terrance had already “secured an

appropriate placement at the High Road’s Upper School of

Washington, D.C.” and that vacating the judgment would harm

Terrance’s education. Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Alter or

and or [sic] in the Alternative to Vacate Order of Nov. 4, 2003,

at 2. The following day, DCPS filed its motion opposing the

grant of summary judgment, but said nothing about the proposed

placement at High Road. In their reply to DCPS’s opposition

brief, the Branhams asked the court to order DCPS “to place and

fund Terrance with transportation at High Road Upper School

of Washington D.C.,” Pl.’s Reply Mem. to Def.’s Opp. to

Summ. J. 6, but provided no information about the school. The

district court eventually vacated the default judgment and

considered the summary judgment motion on the merits.

Branham v. District of Columbia, No. 03-986 (D.D.C. Dec. 9,

2003).

In order to get a handle on the deficiencies in the record, the

district court held a status conference on April 15, 2004. The

court began the conference by observing that the “paucity” of

evidence introduced at the hearing regarding Terrance’s

disability, and in particular the lack of academic evaluations

detailing what support Terrance needed, would pose “a serious

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practical problem”: “[W]e don’t have any of that information on

the record now in terms of ordering the relief that [Terrance is]

requesting.” Tr. of 4/15/04 Status Conf. 4. The judge told the

parties she was considering remanding the case so that a hearing

officer could get “further evidence on [Terrance’s] academic

progress or particularly the lack of it, and the reasons for it,

whether any evaluations were conducted.” Id.

Vehemently objecting to a remand, the Branhams argued

that the deficiencies in the record resulted from DCPS’s failure

for more than four years to evaluate Terrance. The Branhams’

lawyer again reported that Terrance had been “accepted at High

Roads,” which he described as “a full-time [special education]

program . . . that accepts and has a contract with the District of

Columbia public schools,” id. at 3, and emphasized that High

Road would be “a lateral move” for Terrance, id. at 6.

After questioning the Branhams’ counsel (though not about

High Road), the district court asked DCPS’s attorney whether he

had anything “to add or to say.” Id. at 10. “I don’t have much

to add,” he responded, “except that this is an appeal from a

hearing officer’s decision based upon the record.” Id. When the

judge pointed out that “the record says nothing,” counsel

repeated his belief “that the [hearing officer’s] opinion is

supported by the record.” Id. Pressed about DCPS’s failure to

monitor and evaluate Terrance, counsel said he “wasn’t prepared

to address those issues,” but reiterated that “[i]f it’s not in the

record, or if it is in the record, the Court has to give due

deference to the hearing officer’s opinion.” Id. at 11. Despite

having known for a year and a half about Terrance’s request for

private placement, and for at least four months about his

acceptance by High Road, DCPS mentioned neither High Road

nor any other private placement.

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One week later, the district court entered judgment for the

Branhams. Overruling the hearing officer, the court found that

DCPS had failed to show that Terrance’s IEP and his placement

at Prospect were adequate to meet his individual needs, that the

hearing officer’s conclusion to the contrary had no support in the

record, that Terrance’s placement at Prospect was inappropriate,

and that the District had denied him a FAPE. Branham v.

District of Columbia, No. 03-986, slip op. at 9-12 (D.D.C. Apr.

22, 2004). The district court gave Terrance two forms of relief.

First, it awarded “a lump sum grant of compensatory education

in the form of individual tutoring for denial of a FAPE for the

[four] years Terrance spent at Prospect.” Id. at 13. Although

the court offered no further explanation of the compensatory

award, both parties now agree that “the lump sum grant”

amounted to four years of tutoring as compensation for the four

years that DCPS denied Terrance a FAPE. Second, given

DCPS’s longstanding failure to meet its IDEA obligations, the

court concluded that a private placement would be most

appropriate. Because DCPS “ha[s] not provided any evidence

in the due process hearing or in [its] Opposition brief,

suggesting that the High Road School of the District of

Columbia is in any way inappropriate or that Terrance would not

benefit from that placement,” the court ordered DCPS to “enroll

Terrance in the High Road School of the District of Columbia

beginning in the 2004-2005 school year at no cost to [the

Branhams].” Id. 

On appeal, the District does not challenge the district

court’s conclusion that DCPS denied Terrance a FAPE. It

appeals only the tutoring and private placement remedies,

arguing that the district court failed to make findings of fact

relating to their appropriateness, and in any event had

insufficient evidence to make any such findings.

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II.

We begin with the tutoring remedy. In its opinion, which

of course predated Reid, the district court neither assessed “what

services [Terrance] needs to elevate him to the position he

would have occupied absent the school district’s failures,” nor

offered any hint that the remedy was carefully tailored to

provide those services. See Reid, 401 F.3d at 527. The court’s

unexamined “lump sum grant of compensatory education . . . for

the years Terrance spent at Prospect” represents just the kind of

“cookie-cutter” approach to compensatory remedies that Reid

has now explicitly disavowed. Id. at 522-25.

Asked at oral argument to explain how the award of four

years of tutoring for four years without a FAPE was tailored to

Terrance’s needs, the Branhams’ counsel insisted that “[i]t just

happens to be that those numbers are equal and therefore you

can reasonably make [the] assumption” that the district court

tailored the award. Oral Arg. at 15:11. We may assume no such

thing. The district court never engaged in the qualitative, factintensive analysis that Reid now requires, and in any event the

“paucity” (the district court’s own word) of record evidence

about Terrance’s disability would have precluded it from doing

so. Because the court’s compensatory tutoring award thus fails

to meet Reid’s demanding standard of “an informed and

reasonable exercise of discretion,” Reid, 401 F.3d at 527, we

will reverse and remand for reconsideration in light of Reid.

III.

Turning next to the question of Terrance’s placement, we

begin by observing that an award of private-school placement is

not, like the tutoring award, retrospective relief designed to

compensate for yesterday’s IDEA violations, but rather

prospective relief aimed at ensuring that the child receives

tomorrow the education required by IDEA. Although the two

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forms of relief have different purposes, placement awards, like

compensatory awards, see Reid, 401 F.3d at 523-25, must be

tailored to meet the child’s specific needs. IDEA itself so

requires: It guarantees disabled students “special education and

related services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). In Rowley, the Supreme

Court emphasized that “the benefits obtainable by children at

one end of the [disability] spectrum will differ dramatically from

those obtainable by children at the other end, with infinite

variations in between.” 458 U.S. at 202. As such, determining

what constitutes a FAPE will always require a fact-intensive and

child-specific inquiry.

To inform this individualized assessment, “[c]ourts

fashioning discretionary equitable relief under IDEA must

consider all relevant factors.” Florence County Sch. Dist. Four

v. Carter, 510 U.S. 7, 16 (1993); see also Reid, 401 F.3d at 523-

24. Specifically, courts have identified a set of considerations

“relevant” to determining whether a particular placement is

appropriate for a particular student, including the nature and

severity of the student’s disability, the student’s specialized

educational needs, the link between those needs and the services

offered by the private school, the placement’s cost, and the

extent to which the placement represents the least restrictive

educational environment. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 202 (noting

that “sufficient educational benefit” will vary from child to

child); McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1985)

(affirming district court’s placement decision that took into

consideration the student’s “individual needs”); id. at 1534-35

(affirming private placement based on match between a

student’s needs and the services offered at a particular school);

Carter, 510 U.S. at 16 (holding that tuition reimbursement may

be reduced if the cost of the private education is

“unreasonable”); Holland v. District of Columbia, 71 F.3d 417,

425 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (remanding for consideration, among other

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things, whether the costs of a private placement were

reasonable); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free School Dist., 142 F.3d

119, 132 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing IDEA’s preference for less

restrictive environments). Because placement decisions

implicate equitable considerations, moreover, courts may also

consider the parties’ conduct. Reid, 401 F.3d at 524.

The record in this case contains none of the required

information. DCPS’s repeated failure to evaluate Terrance led

to a “paucity” of record evidence about Terrance’s disability.

The record provides no insight about the precise types of

educational services Terrance needs to progress. Still less does

the record reveal what services High Road would provide, the

cost of those services, whether those services would meet

Terrance’s needs, or whether the school would provide the least

restrictive appropriate educational environment. To be sure, at

the April 15 status conference the Branhams’ lawyer told the

district court that High Road provided full-time special

education services and had a contract with DCPS. But even

assuming for the sake of argument that these unsupported

assertions could be considered evidence, they tell us next to

nothing about High Road’s program or how it might serve

Terrance’s specific educational needs. In short, the district court

knew so little about Terrance’s needs and High Road’s services

that its placement order could not have amounted to “an

informed and reasonable exercise of discretion.” Id. at 527.

IV.

We close by addressing what we learned at oral argument

about Terrance’s plight. Asked whether setting aside the

remedial order might disrupt Terrance’s education, the District’s

counsel assured us that DCPS would continue supporting

Terrance at High Road until the district court approved a new

IEP. But the Branhams’ counsel then informed us that Terrance

had never actually attended High Road because, given the

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District’s decision to appeal to this Court, the school thought it

too risky to accept Terrance. According to counsel, Terrance

instead continued attending Cardozo High School until “he got

into trouble” and was sent to the Oak Hill Youth Center, Oral

Arg. at 17:00, “a juvenile detention facility with a history of

problems so serious that even the District has called it a

‘troubled program,’” District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 738 A.2d

1206, 1212 (D.C. 1999). Terrance has been moved yet again,

this time to a “secured group home in Baltimore.” Oral Arg. at

21:43.

We describe Terrance’s “education” to emphasize the

consequences of DCPS’s utter failure to fulfill its IDEA

obligations. It is because DCPS shirked its duty to evaluate and

monitor Terrance that the record says so little about his

academic needs. DCPS provoked the default judgment that

prompted Mrs. Branham to seek an alternative placement for her

son in the first place. And DCPS has offered no explanation for

its total failure from November 2003 to April 2004 to make any

effort, whether in supplemental motions or at the April 15 status

conference, to inform the district court that it objected to the

High Road placement—a particularly serious failure given its

claim here that the district court was out of line in ordering the

placement.

At the time the district court issued its decision, Terrance

had spent four years without a FAPE, and his mother had spent

fifteen months contesting his placement. Terrance is now fifteen

years old, but there is still time to help him.

V.

We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Although

Reid permits the district court either to take supplemental

evidence or to return the case to the hearing officer, see Reid,

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401 F.3d at 526, in light of the educational harms Terrance has

already suffered, we encourage the district court to undertake the

evidentiary hearing itself in order to minimize the potential for

further delay. On remand, both parties may submit evidence as

to the appropriateness of their preferred plan for Terrance, and

of course IDEA continues to obligate DCPS to come forward

with a plan that meets Terrance’s needs. See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1412(a)(1)(A). In the end, it is the district court’s

responsibility to ensure it has a record sufficiently developed to

fulfill its obligation under IDEA, namely, to weigh “all relevant

factors,” Carter, 510 U.S. at 16, and “grant such relief as [it]

determines is appropriate,” § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii).

So ordered.

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