Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01314/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01314-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cutsforth, Inc.
Appellant
MotivePower, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CUTSFORTH, INC.,

Appellant

v.

MOTIVEPOWER, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1314

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, in No. IPR2013-

00268.

______________________ 

Decided: April 6, 2016

______________________ 

ROBERT P. COURTNEY, Fish & Richardson P.C., Minneapolis, MN, argued for appellant. Also represented by

MATHIAS WETZSTEIN SAMUEL, CONRAD GOSEN. 

JASON ALEXANDER ENGEL, K&L Gates LLP, Chicago, 

IL, argued for appellee. Also represented by ALAN L.

BARRY, ROBERT J. BARZ, BENJAMIN EDWARD WEED. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-1314 Document: 43-2 Page: 1 Filed: 04/06/2016
2 CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, CLEVENGER, and MOORE,

Circuit Judges.

MOORE, Circuit Judge.

Cutsforth, Inc. appeals from the final written decision 

of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) in an inter 

partes review (“IPR”) concluding that claims 14, 16–19, 

and 21–22 of U.S. Patent No. 7,141,906 are anticipated. 

Because the Board erred in construing the claim terms

“projection extending from” and “brush catch coupled to 

the beam,” we reverse. 

BACKGROUND

The ’906 patent is directed to a removable brush holder assembly used in electrical devices or slip ring assemblies, such as electric generators and motors. ’906 patent 

col. 1 ll. 14–16. A “brush” is a component in an electrical 

device that passes electrical current from a rotating 

conductive surface to other structures, or vice versa. Id. 

col. 1 ll. 20–26. A brush holder assembly holds a brush in 

contact with a moving conductive contact surface so that 

electrical current can pass into or out of the moving 

conductive contact surface. Id. col. 1 ll. 33–35. The 

invention makes it easier to remove and replace brushes 

during operation as the brushes wear down, which allows 

for safer and more cost effective maintenance. Id. col. 1 ll. 

35–40, col. 2 ll. 14–16.

Claim 14, the only independent claim on appeal, recites (emphases added):

14. A brush holder assembly for holding a brush 

having a conductive element, the brush holder assembly comprising:

a mounting block including an engagement portion;

a beam having an engagement portion 

complementary with the mounting block 

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CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 3

engagement portion, wherein the mounting block engagement portion is slidably 

engaged with the beam engagement portion, and wherein the beam is slidable relative to the mounting block between a 

first, disengaged position and a second, 

engaged position;

a brush catch coupled to the beam for selectively engaging the brush; and

a brush release extending from the mounting block and configured for sliding engagement with the brush catch said brush 

release is a projection extending from the 

mounting block.

MotivePower, Inc. petitioned for IPR of claims 1, 2, 4, 

5, 10–14, 16–19, 21, and 22 of the ’906 patent on nine 

grounds of unpatentability.1 On November 1, 2013, the 

Board instituted IPR as to all asserted claims, but only on 

the following three grounds: (i) claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10–14, 

16–19, 21, and 22 as anticipated by U.S. Patent 

No. 3,864,803 (“Ohmstedt”), (ii) claims 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 

16–19, 21, and 22 as anticipated by U.S. Patent 

No. 3,387,155 (“Krulls”), and (iii) claims 12 and 13 as 

 

1 MotivePower petitioned for IPR of five related patents, including the ’906 patent. The Board instituted all 

five IPRs and every challenged claim was either cancelled 

by Cutsforth or found to be unpatentable by the Board. 

Cutsforth appealed three of the five decisions, including 

this one and Appeal Nos. 2015-1315 and -1316, which 

were consolidated for oral argument before this Court. 

We have already resolved Appeal Nos. 2015-1315 and -

1316. Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 626 F. App’x 

1011 (Fed. Cir. 2015); Cutsforth, Inc. v. MotivePower, Inc., 

No. 2015-1316, 2016 WL 279984 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 22, 2016).

Case: 15-1314 Document: 43-2 Page: 3 Filed: 04/06/2016
4 CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 

obvious over Krulls and Ohmstedt. During the IPR 

proceeding, Cutsforth canceled claims 1, 2, 4, 5, and 10-13, 

rendering the third ground moot. The Board issued its 

final written decision on October 30, 2014. The Board 

construed the claim terms at issue, and based on those 

constructions, found that Ohmstedt and Krulls each 

anticipated independent claim 14 and its dependent 

claims 16–19, 21–22 of the ’906 patent (“claims-at-issue”). 

Cutsforth timely appealed the Board’s final written 

decision to this Court. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).

DISCUSSION

In IPRs, the Board gives claims their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. 

In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1279 (Fed. 

Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 84 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Jan. 15, 

2016) (No. 15-446). We review claim construction de novo 

except for subsidiary fact findings based on extrinsic 

evidence, which we review for substantial evidence. Id. at 

1280. Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 is a question of 

fact, and we review the Board’s factual findings for substantial evidence. Kennametal, Inc. v. Ingersoll Cutting 

Tool Co., 780 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 

I. The “Projection Extending From” Limitation

The claims-at-issue recite “a brush release extending 

from the mounting block and . . . said brush release is a 

projection extending from the mounting block.” The Board 

construed the phrase “projection extending from the 

mounting block” to have its plain meaning without 

providing a specific construction. It rejected Cutsforth’s 

proposed construction—“a structure that protrudes outwardly from the mounting block”—as not supported by 

the specification, and concluded that the phrase is not 

limited only to projections extending outwardly from the 

mounting block.

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CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 5

Cutsforth argues that the Board failed to explicitly 

address the parties’ key dispute for this term: whether a 

projection must “jut out” from its surroundings. It argues 

that the direction of a projection—whether it projects 

outward or inward—is not the issue. It argues that the 

Board’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with the plain 

English meaning of “projection,” which requires a jutting 

out. It argues that no reasonable interpretation of a 

“projection extending from the mounting block” could 

cover the ramp 59 in Ohmstedt that the Board found 

disclosed this limitation, as that ramp 59 neither “extends” 

out above the surface of the brush box 13 nor “projects” 

from the brush box 13’s face. We agree with Cutsforth 

that the Board’s claim construction was erroneous.

While claims are given their broadest reasonable interpretation in IPR proceedings, claim interpretation still 

“must be reasonable in light of the claims and specification.” PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Commc’ns 

RF, LLC, --- F.3d ---, No. 2015-1364, 2016 WL 692369, at 

*5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 22, 2016). The Board’s interpretation of 

“a projection extending from the mounting block” far 

exceeds the scope of its plain meaning and is not justified 

by the specification. We hold that the Board’s interpretation, which encompasses a structure that recedes into the 

mounting block rather than jutting out from it, is unreasonable. 

Cutsforth presented evidence that the plain meaning 

of “projection” in the context of a mechanical device requires a protrusion that juts out from its surroundings. 

See, e.g., J.A. 471 (Webster’s 3rd New Int’l Dictionary 

1813 (1993) (defining “projection” as “(1): a jutting out or 

causing to jut out (2): a part that projects or juts out: an 

extension beyond something else”)). This plain meaning 

is consistent with the language of the claims. Claim 14

twice recites that the projection “extend[s] from the 

mounting block,” consistent with the dictionary definition, 

“an extension beyond something else.” The specification 

Case: 15-1314 Document: 43-2 Page: 5 Filed: 04/06/2016
6 CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 

uses the term “projection” consistent with its plain meaning. The claimed “projection extending from the mounting 

block” corresponds to the brush release 110 shown in 

figure 12 of the ’906 patent specification. While the brush 

release 110 may not be jutting out from the beam 14 (i.e., 

the shaded element), it does jut out from the lower mounting block 16 as required by the claim.

FIGURE 12 (’906 PATENT) 

MotivePower does not dispute that the plain meaning 

of “projection” requires a jutting out from its surroundings. 

Rather, it argues that the Board was free to reject 

Cutsforth’s dictionary definition and expert testimony. 

We recognize that the Board has wide discretion in its 

treatment of such extrinsic evidence. However, even 

without the evidence put forth by Cutsforth, MotivePower 

presented no evidence to justify the Board’s interpretation. 

Unless the patentee acted as his own lexicographer, no 

reasonable interpretation of a “projection extending from 

the mounting block” can encompass something that 

protrudes into the mounting block. But “[t]o act as its 

own lexicographer, a patentee must clearly set forth a 

definition of the disputed claim term other than its plain 

and ordinary meaning.” Thorner v. Sony Computer 

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CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 7

Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(citation and quotation marks omitted). There is no 

evidence that the inventors intended to give a special 

definition to the term “projection” that far exceeds the 

scope of its plain meaning. Thus, we conclude that a 

“projection extending from the mounting block” must jut 

out from the mounting block.

We next address the Board’s finding that Ohmstedt 

discloses the “projection” limitation. MotivePower argues 

that if we adopt the construction advanced by Cutsforth, 

we should remand for the Board to determine whether 

Ohmstedt discloses the claimed “projection.” We disagree. 

As an initial matter, MotivePower has preserved no 

argument that Ohmstedt discloses the “projection” limitation under Cutsforth’s construction. See Petitioner’s 

Reply to Patent Owner’s Response at 12–13, MotivePower, 

Inc. v. Cutsforth, Inc., No. IPR2013-00268, 2013 WL 

8595963 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 2013), Paper No. 21. Even if 

MotivePower had preserved this argument, under the 

construction we adopt today, no reasonable fact finder 

could conclude that Ohmstedt’s ramps 59 are “projection[s] 

extending from” its brush box 13. We thus reverse the 

Board’s finding that Ohmstedt anticipated the claims-atissue.

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8 CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 

EXCERPT FROM FIGURE 1 (OHMSTEDT) 

II. The “Brush Catch Coupled to the Beam” Limitation

The claims-at-issue recite “a brush catch coupled to 

the beam.” Cutsforth argued before the Board that this 

claim language prohibits the “brush catch” from being a 

sub-component of the “beam.” The Board disagreed, and 

held that a “brush catch” may be a sub-component of the 

“beam” and still be considered to be “coupled to the beam.”

Cutsforth argues that the Board’s interpretation renders the phrase “coupled to” meaningless. It argues that 

the Board expanded the meaning of the term “coupled to” 

beyond its plain meaning without any supporting evidence. We agree with Cutsforth that the claims-at-issue

require a “brush catch” to be a physical structure that is 

separate from, and not a sub-component of, the claimed 

“beam.” It goes beyond the plain meaning of “coupled” to 

say that a sub-component (e.g., an engine in a car) is 

“coupled to” the component as a whole (e.g., the car). No 

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CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 9

evidence shows that the inventors intended to deviate 

from the plain meaning of “coupled to.”

Turning to the Board’s analysis of the Krulls reference, the Board found that Krulls discloses a “brush 

magazine 12” that is coupled to a portion of the “resilient 

member 56,” teaching the claimed “beam” and “brush 

catch,” respectively. Under the correct construction, 

substantial evidence does not support the Board’s findings. The “brush magazine 12” in Krulls comprises a 

number of components, including the “resilient member 

56.” Since the “resilient member 56” is a sub-component 

of the “brush magazine 12” as a whole, it is not “coupled 

to” the “brush magazine 12.” In other words, the “resilient member 56” is a part of the “brush magazine 12”; it is 

not “coupled to” the “brush magazine 12.” 

Even if the Board found Krulls disclosed the “beam” 

through the remaining portion of the “brush magazine 

12,” excluding the sub-component “resilient member 56,” 

substantial evidence does not support the Board’s finding

of anticipation. While such a determination might support a finding that the “coupled to” limitation was met, no 

reasonable fact finder could conclude that the “slidably 

engage[]” limitation would be met under such an interpretation. The claims-at-issue require the “beam” to include 

an “engagement portion” that slidably engages with the 

mounting block. There is no dispute that the only part of 

the “brush magazine 12” that slidably engages with a 

mounting block is the “resilient member 56.” Thus, while 

viewing Krulls’ “brush magazine 12” less the “resilient 

member 56” as the claimed “beam” may satisfy the “coupled to the beam” limitation, it would frustrate the “slidably engage[]” limitation. No substantial evidence 

supports the Board’s finding of anticipation by Krulls.

MotivePower preserved no argument that Krulls anticipates the claims-at-issue under Cutsforth’s construction. Moreover, MotivePower did not dispute before the 

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10 CUTSFORTH, INC. v. MOTIVEPOWER, INC. 

Board that the “slidably engaged with the beam engagement portion” limitation cannot be met under Cutsforth’s 

construction. See Petitioner’s Reply to Patent Owner’s 

Response at 14, MotivePower, Inc. v. Cutsforth, Inc., 

No. IPR2013-00268, 2013 WL 8595963 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 1, 

2013), Paper No. 21. We reverse the Board’s finding that 

Krulls anticipated the claims-at-issue.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Board’s determination that claims 14, 16-19, and 21-22 of the ’906 

patent are anticipated by each of the Ohmstedt and 

Krulls references. Because anticipation was the only 

ground upon which the IPR was instituted as to these 

claims, there are no remaining issues that warrant a 

remand. 

REVERSED

COSTS

Costs to Cutsforth.

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