Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03777/USCOURTS-cand-4_13-cv-03777-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Matthew Cate
Defendant
M. A. Cook
Defendant
Jeffrey Anthony Franklin
Plaintiff
G. D. Lewis
Defendant
J. D. Lozano
Defendant
P. J. Smith
Defendant
T. A. Wood
Defendant

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

JEFFREY ANTHONY FRANKLIN,

Plaintiff, 

v. 

G. D. LEWIS, et al., 

Defendants. 

Case No. 13-cv-03777-YGR (PR) 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT; AND SETTING 

BRIEFING SCHEDULE 

I. INTRODUCTION 

On June 4, 2013, Plaintiff Jeffrey Anthony Franklin, a state prisoner currently incarcerated 

at Folsom State Prison, filed this pro se civil action in the Del Norte County Superior Court, Case 

No. CVUJ13-1181, alleging constitutional and state law violations stemming from his previous 

incarceration at Pelican Bay State Prison (“PBSP”) from 2011 through 2012. He seeks monetary 

damages stemming from the alleged constitutional violations. 

Defendants Matthew Cate, M. A. Cook, G. D. Lewis, J. D. Lozano, P. J. Smith, T. A. 

Wood (“Defendants”) removed the action to federal court on the ground that some of his claims 

arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

In an Order dated August 28, 2014, the Court issued a scheduling order upon finding that 

Plaintiff had alleged the following cognizable claims against the named Defendants and certain 

unnamed “PBSP officials” or Doe Defendants: 

(1) a violation of the First Amendment based on Plaintiff’s 

allegations that Defendants, on various occasions: 

 (a) improperly failed to deliver his “privileged” 

incoming and outgoing mail “on or about the 30th day of September 

2011 and on or about the 5th day of October 2011 up to and 

including the 26th day of July 2012”; and 

 (b) participated in “a series of events that led to their 

witholding [sic], seizing, [and] storing [his] privileged 

correspondences of September 30, 2011 and October 5, 2011”; 

(2) similar violations of the First Amendment against those 

Defendants who reviewed Plaintiff’s prison grievances and/or 602 

inmate appeals and did not remedy the aforementioned First 

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Amendment violations; and 

(3) a retaliation claim against Defendants for retaliating against 

Plaintiff for filing prison grievances relating to the aforementioned 

First Amendment violations. 

Dkt. 13 at 2 (citing Dkt. 1 at 13-301

). In addition, the Court determined that it would exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Id. at 2. 

 Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the ground that 

Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 

(“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as to his federal claims. Dkt. 27. Plaintiff opposed the motion 

and filed and a related request for judicial notice.2 Dkts. 38-41. Defendants filed their reply. Dkt 

43. Having read and considered the papers submitted herewith, the Court GRANTS in part and 

DENIES in part the motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims and continues to retain 

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 

II. BACKGROUND 

The central issue presented in Defendants’ summary judgment motion is whether Plaintiff 

properly exhausted his administrative remedies. Before turning to the facts of this case, the Court 

briefly reviews the requirements of the PLRA and administrative review process applicable to 

California prisoners. 

A. Legal Framework 

The PLRA requires a prisoner to exhaust “available administrative remedies” before 

bringing an action with respect to prison conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[T]he PLRA’s 

exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general 

circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other 

wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). 

Exhaustion of all “available” remedies is mandatory; those remedies need not meet federal 

standards, nor must they be “plain, speedy, and effective.” Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739-

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filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff. 

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 Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice is GRANTED. Dkt. 41. 

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40 (2001). The PLRA requires proper exhaustion of administrative remedies. Woodford v. Ngo, 

548 U.S. 81, 83 (2006). “Proper exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and 

other critical procedural rules because no adjudicative system can function effectively without 

imposing some orderly structure on the course of its proceedings.” Id. at 90-91. Thus, 

compliance with prison grievance procedures is required by the PLRA to properly exhaust. Id. 

The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) provides its 

inmates and parolees the right to appeal administratively “any departmental decision, action, 

condition, or policy which they can demonstrate as having an adverse effect upon their welfare.” 

Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a). It also provides its inmates the right to file administrative 

appeals alleging misconduct by correctional officers. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(e). 

On January 28, 2011, certain revisions to the California prison regulations governing 

inmate grievances became operative. See History, Note 11, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2. In 

order to exhaust available administrative remedies within this system, a prisoner must submit his 

complaint on CDCR Form 602 and proceed through three levels of appeal: (1) first formal level 

appeal filed with one of the institution’s appeal coordinators, (2) second formal level appeal filed 

with the institution head or designee, and (3) third formal level appeal filed with the CDCR 

director or designee (i.e., “Director’s level”). Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, §§ 3084.1(b), 3084.7. 

Under specific circumstances, the first level review may be bypassed. Id. The third level of 

review constitutes the decision of the Secretary of the CDCR and exhausts a prisoner’s 

administrative remedies. Id. § 3084.7(d)(3). A California prisoner is required to submit an inmate 

appeal at the appropriate level and proceed to the highest level of review available to him. Butler 

v. Adams, 397 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005); Bennett v. King, 293 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 

2002). In accordance with the revised regulations, in submitting a grievance, an inmate is required 

to “list all staff members involved and shall describe their involvement in the issue.” Cal. Code 

Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(3). Further, the inmate must “state all facts known and available to him/her 

regarding the issue being appealed at the time,” and he or she must “describe the specific issue 

under appeal and the relief requested.” Id. § 3084.2(a)(4). 

Exhaustion of administrative remedies may occur if, despite the inmate’s failure to comply 

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with a procedural rule, prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the 

merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process. Reyes v. Smith, 810 

F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2016); see e.g., id. at 659 (although inmate failed to identify specific 

doctors, his grievance plainly put prison on notice that he was complaining about denial of pain 

medication by defendant doctors; therefore, prison officials easily identified role and involvement 

of unidentified doctors on Pain Management Committee in the decision-making process). 

B. Factual Summary 

In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that certain unnamed PBSP officials failed to 

deliver “three (3) separate pieces of privileged correspondences” on September 30, 2011 and 

October 5, 2011. Dkt. 1 at 14. Specifically, Plaintiff described these correspondences as follows: 

“two (2) [were] incoming, one each from Attorney V. Wefald, and the other one from Attorney M. 

McMahon, the third piece was outgoing to an elected public official—J. Clark, Los Angeles 

County Clerk.” Id. As to the aforementioned incoming mail, Plaintiff claims that unnamed prison 

officials “did not issue said privileged correspondences to [him] as they [were] expected and 

legally required to do.” Id. Meanwhile, as to the outgoing mail, Plaintiff claims that the 

aforementioned letter was not delivered, and that unnamed prison officials failed to give him 

notice that such correspondence was undeliverable. Id. at 14-15. Nor did these unnamed prison 

officials return such correspondence to him. Id. at 15. 

On December 16, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a 602 inmate appeal, log no. PBSP-11-02886 

(“PBSP-11-02886”), alleging that the aforementioned three pieces of legal mail was mishandled 

by “PBSP officials” and that such action was only brought to his attention on November 22, 2011. 

Voong Decl., Ex. C at AGO_00020-AGO_00023. Plaintiff requested that the three pieces of legal 

mail be issued to him, that he receive monetary compensation, that PBSP officials stop 

mistreating/mishandling incoming and outgoing legal mail, and that PBSP staff adhere to 

departmental rules and regulations concerning the processing of legal mail. See id. at 

AGO_00020, AGO_00022. PBSP-11-02886 was pursued through the first, second and third level 

of appeals. See id. at AGO_00028-AGO_00033, AGO_00018-AGO_00019. On July 26, 2012, at 

the third level review, PBSP-11-02886 was denied, indicating as follows: 

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Following through analysis of the submitted documentation, the 

appeals examiner has determined that the appellant’s allegations 

have been reviewed and properly evaluated by administrative staff at 

PBSP. An appeal inquiry was conducted by appropriate supervising 

staff and the appeal was reviewed by the institution’s warden. 

Despite the appellant’s dissatisfaction, this review finds no evidence 

of a violation of existing policy or regulation by the institution based 

upon the arguments and evidence presented. 

The appellant has failed to provide any evidence that staff did not 

process his incoming legal mail. The appeal has also failed to prove 

any evidence that his access to the courts has been obstructed, or 

that he has suffered any material adverse affect [sic]. The appellant 

has clearly been successful in sending and receiving legal 

correspondence at PBSP. Staff at PBSP are not withholding the 

appellant’s legal mail for any reason. 

Although the appellant has the right to submit an appeal, his request 

for monetary compensation is beyond the scope of the departmental 

appeals process. The appellant has failed to provide any new or 

compelling information that would warrant a modification to the 

decision reached by the institution. Relief at the Third Level of 

Review is not warranted. 

Id. at AGO_00018 (brackets added). As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that the alleged 

mishandling and withholding of legal mail began on September 30, 2011 (the first date on which 

his legal mail was not delivered) and lasted until July 26, 2012 (the date Defendants denied PBSP11-02886—his grievance relating to the mishandling of his legal mail—at the final level of 

review). See Dkt. 1 at 13-30. 

Plaintiff alleges that the named Defendants are liable because they were directly involved 

“or had something to do with” processing PBSP-11-02886, and that Defendants retaliated against 

him based on filing grievances and “complaining about his condition of confinement within the 

[PBSP]-Security Housing Unit [“SHU”],” including the aforementioned First Amendment 

violations. Dkt. 1 at 17-18, 26-27. Defendants Smith and Wood, who held positions as PBSP 

Associate Warden and PBSP Facility Captain, respectively, processed PBSP-11-02886 at the first 

level of review. Voong Decl., Ex. C at AGO_00028-AGO_00030. Defendant Cook, who held the 

position of PBSP Chief Deputy Warden, reviewed PBSP-11-02886 at the second level of review. 

Id. at AGO_00025. Defendant Lewis, who was the former PBSP Warden, processed PBSP-11-

02886 at the second level of review. Id. at AGO_00031-AGO_00033. Finally, Defendant 

Lozano, who was the former Chief of the Office of Appeals, reviewed and processed PBSP-11-

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02886 at the third level of review, along with Appeals Examiner K. J. Allen, who is not named as 

a Defendant in the instant action. Id. at AGO_00018-AGO_00019. 

 In its Order of Service, the Court had read liberally the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint 

as stating a claim against certain Doe Defendants for a violation of the First Amendment based on 

Plaintiff’s allegations that certain “PBSP officials” mishandled his legal mail in 2011.3 Dkt. 13 at 

2. The Court also found that Plaintiff had stated cognizable claims against those named 

Defendants that reviewed PBSP-11-02886 (pertaining to the mishandled legal mail) and failed to 

provide a sufficient remedy. See id. Plaintiff has indicated that those involved are Defendants 

Cate, Lewis, Cook, Smith, Wood, and Lozano. See id. Finally, the Court found that Plaintiff had 

stated a cognizable claim that these Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. See id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party may move for summary judgment 

on some or all of the claims or defenses presented in an action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)(1). “The 

court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.; see Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The moving party has the burden of 

establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (requiring citation to “particular parts of materials in 

the record”). If the moving party meets this initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 

477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 

(1986). 

The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised 

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 The Court dismissed these Doe Defendants, identified as “Doe[s] 1-5,” because the use of 

Doe Defendants is not favored in the Ninth Circuit. Dkt. 13 at 2-3 (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). The dismissal was without prejudice, however. See id. at 3. 

Plaintiff was instructed that should he learn these Doe Defendants’ identities through discovery, 

he may move to file an amended complaint to add them as named defendants. See id. (citing 

Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1195-98 (9th Cir. 2003)). To date, Plaintiff has 

not done so. 

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in a motion for summary judgment. See Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (en 

banc). The defendants have the initial burden to prove “that there was an available administrative 

remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. If the 

defendants carry that burden, “the burden shifts to the prisoner to come forward with evidence 

showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally 

available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. The ultimate burden of 

proof remains with defendants, however. Id. “If material facts are disputed, summary judgment 

should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. at 1166. 

A district court may only consider admissible evidence in ruling on a motion for summary 

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In support of the motion for summary judgment, Defendants have presented a declaration from 

Chief of the Office of Appeals M. Voong and attached supporting exhibits. Dkt. 29. 

As noted, Plaintiff has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; 

however, the opposition is not verified and will not be considered because it was not signed under 

“penalty of perjury.” Dkt. 38 at 14. However, because the original complaint as well as Plaintiff’s 

declaration in support of his opposition are verified, dkts. 1 at 32, 39 at 5, the Court will construe 

them as opposing affidavits under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, insofar as it is based on 

personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder v. 

McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995). 

IV. DISCUSSION 

As mentioned above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants: (1) mishandled his legal mail in 

2011; (2) reviewed PBSP-11-02886 (his grievance relating to the mishandled mail) and failed to 

provide sufficient remedy; and (3) retaliated against him for filing grievances. Dkt. 1 at 13-31. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as to all his 

claims. Dkt. 27 at 2.4

 Specifically, Defendants claim that while Plaintiff submitted a relevant 

grievance complaining that his legal mail was mishandled in 2011—PBSP-11-02886—he failed to 

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identify Defendants Cate, Lewis, Lozano, Wood, Cook, or Smith in this appeal by name or 

position. Id. Additionally, Defendants note that Plaintiff “acknowledges in his verified Complaint 

that Defendant Cate, who is named in his former capacity as the Secretary of the [CDCR], was at 

all times relevant to this action in Sacramento, California, and not at the prison were the alleged 

wrongful conduct occurred.”5 Id. Defendants point out that it was only Defendants Lewis, 

Lozano, Wood, Cook, and Smith who processed PBSP-11-02886. Id. Defendants argue that, 

prior to initiating this action, Plaintiff never properly exhausted any alleged wrongful conduct by 

Defendants with respect to the alleged mishandling of legal mail or processing of PBSP-11-02886, 

and to any retaliation claim. Id. 

A. Claim Relating to Mishandling of Legal Mail 

 Plaintiff raised his claim relating to the mishandling of his legal mail in PBSP-11-02886, 

which he pursued through to the third and final level of review where it was denied. See Voong 

Decl., Ex. C. Among his requested relief in PBSP-11-02886, Plaintiff requested that he receive 

monetary compensation, which is the same relief requested in the instant federal action. Compare 

id. with Dkt. 1 at 29. Based upon these allegations, it could be said that PBSP-11-02886, liberally 

construed, includes the same subject and request for relief with respect to the claim relating to the 

mishandling of Plaintiff’s legal mail in the instant action. See Griffin v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117, 

1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that grievance suffices if it alerts prison to nature of wrong for 

which redress is sought). 

 Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust properly his administrative remedies as to 

this claim because he failed to identify adequately any of the named Defendants in PBSP-11-

02886, as required by section 3084.2(a)(3)-(4) of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. 

Dkt. 39 at 11-12. However, Plaintiff argues that pursuant to the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in 

Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654 (9th Cir. 2016), this procedural defect was waived when Defendants, 

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 The Court notes that, as to Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Cate, Defendants have not 

made a separate argument that summary judgment is warranted on the ground that Plaintiff has not 

produced any evidence showing that this Defendant had a personal involvement in any alleged 

deprivation of his constitutional rights, or that there is a causal connection between this Defendant 

and a constitutional violation. Therefore, the Court need not address this issue at this time. 

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who handled the grievance at different levels of appeal, addressed PBSP-11-02886 on the merits.6 

Dkt. 38 at 12-13. 

 In Reyes, the Ninth Circuit recently joined other circuits in holding that a prisoner exhausts 

available administrative remedies under the PLRA “despite failing to comply with a procedural 

rule if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the merits of the 

grievance at each available step of the administrative process.” Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658. Thus, the 

Ninth Circuit determined in Reyes that a California prisoner whose health care appeal concerning 

inadequate pain management failed to identify two prison doctors, as required by CDCR’s appeal 

process, nevertheless exhausted his claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs 

against the two prison doctor defendants because the appeal was decided on its merits at all levels 

of review. See id. at 656-57. But this does not mean that a claim decided on the merits must be 

deemed exhausted as to all possible defendants because there must be a sufficient connection 

between the claim in the appeal and the unidentified defendants to provide prison officials with 

“notice of the alleged deprivation” and an “opportunity to resolve it.” Id. at 659. In Reyes, the 

two unidentified prison doctors had a sufficient connection with the plaintiff’s claim in the appeal 

concerning inadequate pain management because prison officials plainly knew that the two 

unidentified prison doctors served on the pain management committee that had determined that the 

plaintiff should not receive narcotic pain medication. See id. 

 Here, in the instant action, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s reliance on Reyes is 

“misplaced.” Dkt. 43 at 4. According to Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim against the named 

Defendants was “based on their processing of his appeal PBSP-11-02886” and “could not have 

been ‘fully vetted’ within the same grievance appeal, as the issued had not happened until after the 

appeal was initiated and was not addressed during the appeal process.” Id. at 4-5. 

 As to the applicability of Reyes, the Court agrees with Plaintiff and finds Defendants’ 

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 The Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s other argument that the amendments of section 

3084.2 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations were not yet in effect during the relevant 

time frame because Note 11 of the regulatory history confirms that the aforementioned 

amendments became operative on January 28, 2011—almost a year before Plaintiff submitted 

PBSP-11-02886 on December 16, 2011. See History, Note 11, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2. 

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argument unavailing. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not name Defendants in PBSP-11-02886. 

See Voong Decl., Ex. C. First, to the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with 

a procedural requirement by not naming Defendants in PBSP-11-02886, this deficiency is not 

necessarily fatal to Plaintiff’s claim pursuant to Reyes. See 810 F.3d at 658. In Reyes, the Ninth 

Circuit recounted the purposes of the PLRA exhaustion requirement: 

The PLRA attempts to eliminate unwarranted federal-court 

interference with the administration of prisons, and thus seeks to 

afford corrections officials time and opportunity to address 

complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal case. 

Requiring exhaustion provides prison officials a fair opportunity to 

correct their own errors and creates an administrative record for 

grievances that eventually become the subject of federal court 

complaints. Requiring inmates to comply with applicable 

procedural regulations furthers these statutory purposes. 

Id. at 657. The Ninth Circuit reasoned, however, that “when prison officials address the merits of 

a prisoner’s grievance instead of enforcing a procedural bar, the state’s interests in administrative 

exhaustion have been served. Prison officials have had the opportunity to address the grievance 

and correct their own errors and an administrative record has been developed.” Id. Stated 

differently, the Ninth Circuit found: 

When prison officials opt not to enforce a procedural rule but 

instead decide an inmate’s grievance on the merits, the purposes of 

the PLRA exhaustion requirement have been fully served: prison 

officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed 

deprivation and an administrative record supporting the prison’s 

decision has been developed. Dismissing the inmate’s claim for 

failure to exhaust under these circumstances does not advance the 

statutory goal of avoiding unnecessary interference in prison 

administration. Rather, it prevents the courts from considering a 

claim that has already been fully vetted within the prison system. 

Id. at 658. 

 Second, to the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to comply with procedural 

requirements because he did not describe Defendants’ involvement based on their processing of 

PBSP-11-02886, such an argument also fails. Plaintiff clearly alleged in PBSP-11-02886 that his 

legal mail was mishandled in 2011. See Voong Decl., Ex. C. However, it matters not that PBSP11-02886 only complained of mishandling of legal mail because Defendants handled the related

grievance. The defendants in Reyes—doctors who were members of the Pain Management 

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Committee that determined the plaintiff did not require narcotic pain medication—made a similar 

argument. See 810 F.3d at 658. They argued that the appeal only related to the treating 

physician’s determination that narcotic pain medication was unnecessary. Id. The Ninth Circuit 

rejected this argument, finding that 

[u]nder the PLRA, a grievance “suffices if it alerts the prison to the 

nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.” Sapp v. Kimbrell, 623 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Griffin, 557 F.3d at 

1120). The grievance “need not include legal terminology or legal 

theories,” because “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert 

the prison to a problem and facilitate its resolution, not to lay 

groundwork for litigation.” Griffin, 557 F.3d at 1120. The 

grievance process is only required to “alert prison officials to a 

problem, not to provide personal notice to a particular official that 

he may be sued.” Jones[ v. Bock], 549 U.S. [199,] 219, 127 S. Ct. 

910 [(2007)] (citations omitted). 

Id. at 659 (brackets added). In the instant case, PBSP-11-02886 clearly put PBSP officials on 

notice as to the nature of his grievance: that his legal mail was mishandled in 2011. See Voong 

Decl., Ex. C. This was sufficient to put PBSP officials on notice of the alleged deprivation and 

give them an opportunity to resolve the issue. 

 Additionally, this Court notes that in Reyes it was the appeal reviewers, and not the 

plaintiff, who identified the Pain Management Committee’s involvement in the denial of the 

plaintiff’s pain medication. See 810 F.3d at 659. Here, Defendants’ involvement in the alleged 

constitutional violation was equally plain to prison officials: they reviewed and decided the merits 

of Plaintiff’s related appeal— PBSP-11-02886. Reyes therefore is directly on point and contrary 

to Defendants’ argument. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with administrative regulations—requiring 

him to name all staff members involved and describe their involvement—is not a bar to his claim 

relating to the mishandling of his legal mail. 

 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative as to his claim 

against Defendants Lewis, Cook, Smith, Wood, Cate, and Lozano relating to the mishandling of 

legal mail, and DENIES the motion for summary judgment as to this First Amendment claim. 

B. Claim Relating to Retaliation for Filing Grievances 

The Office of Appeals of the CDCR receives and maintains all inmate administrative 

appeals accepted for the third and final level of review with the exception of inmate health care 

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appeals. Voong Decl. ¶ 3. Upon review of its database, the Office of Appeals shows that Plaintiff 

exhausted four non-healthcare-related administrative grievances at the third level of review 

between September 30, 2011 (the date of the initial mishandling of legal mail) and June 4, 2013 

(the date this action was filed in state court), including log nos.: (1) PBSP-11-02109; (2) PBSP-11-

02886; (3) PBSP-12-01290; and (4) PBSP-12-03295. Id. ¶ 5, Ex. A. But none of these four 

appeals concerned allegations relating to Plaintiff’s claim that the named Defendants’ allegedly 

retaliated against him for filing grievances. Voong Decl. ¶ 10, Ex. A-E. Defendants point to the 

last two of the four appeals and argue as follows: 

Specifically, following Franklin’s appeal PBSP-11-02886, Franklin 

initiated only two additional appeals that reached the final level of 

review prior to Franklin filing the present lawsuit—appeal PBSP12-01290 and appeal PBSP-12-03295. (See Voong Decl. Exs. A-E.) 

Neither of these appeals, however, identify Defendants Cate, Lewis, 

Lozano, Wood, Cook, or Smith by name or position. (See id.) 

Likewise, neither of these appeals complain that Franklin’s legal 

mail was mishandled or that he experienced any retaliatory 

misconduct. (Id.; UMF No. 14-15.) 

Dkt. 27 at 12. As mentioned above, the Court has rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff had 

failed to exhaust his claim relating to the mishandling of his legal mail. Therefore, the Court only 

focuses on Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim relating to Defendants 

retaliating against him for filing grievances. 

The Court has reviewed the aforementioned appeals—log nos. PBSP-12-01290 and PBSP12-03295, and agrees with Defendants’ assessment that Plaintiff failed to mention anything about 

the named Defendants’ allegedly retaliatory conduct. See Voong Decl., Exs. D, E. According to 

the Director’s level response in PBSP-12-01290, Plaintiff’s position was that prison officials 

“inappropriately retained him on SHU Indeterminate status.” See Voong Decl., Ex. D at 

AGO_00036-AGO_00037. Meanwhile, the Director’s level response in PBSP-12-03295, 

Plaintiff’s position was that he disagreed with the prison gang validation process, which 

apparently had adversely affected him. See Voong Decl., Ex. E at AGO_00050-AGO_00051. 

Furthermore, the Court has also reviewed the first appeal—PBSP-11-02109. See Voong Decl., 

Ex. B. According to the Director’s level response in PBSP-11-02109, Plaintiff’s position was that 

he disagreed with the denial of his transfer to another SHU institution. See id. at AGO_00003-

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AGO_00004. Again, nowhere does the Director’s level reviewer in any of the aforementioned 

appeals handle Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against the named Defendants. 

The Court further notes that even if Plaintiff had raised his retaliation claim as an 

additional issue in the last of the four aforementioned appeals—PBSP-11-02886, such a retaliation 

claim would have been likely screened out as a separate issue from his claim relating to the 

mishandling of his legal mail. According to state regulations, each inmate appeal is limited to one 

issue or related set of issues. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(1). “The inmate . . . shall not 

combine unrelated issues on a single appeal form for the purpose of circumventing appeal filing 

requirements. Filings of appeals combining unrelated issues shall be rejected and returned to the 

appellant by the appeals coordinator with an explanation that the issues are deemed unrelated and 

may only be submitted separately.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court notes that the prison did not even 

acknowledge that such an issue was brought up in PBSP-11-02886; therefore, there were no issues 

to screen out. See Voong Decl., Ex. C. 

In sum, Defendants met their initial burden as the moving party by setting forth evidence 

to demonstrate Plaintiff’s non-exhaustion, specifically by conducting a search of the CDCR’s 

records and finding no grievances submitted to the Director’s level by Plaintiff concerning his 

retaliation claim. See Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendants cite 

the declaration of Chief Voong of the Office of Appeals, who states that none of the four 

aforementioned exhausted appeals that Plaintiff submitted at the third level of review (from 

September 30, 2011 to June 4, 2013) claim that Defendants Lewis, Cate, Lozano, Wood, Cook, or 

Smith retaliated against Plaintiff for filing grievances. See Voong Decl. ¶ 10. Under Albino, 

Defendants have therefore proven that there was an available administrative remedy and that 

Plaintiff did not exhaust that available remedy. See Paramo, 775 F.3d at 1191. 

Upon the burden shifting to Plaintiff, in regards to his retaliation claim, he has failed to 

show that “there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available 

administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him by ‘showing that the local remedies were 

ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, inadequate, or obviously futile.’” Id. Plaintiff does 

not discuss or even mention exhaustion of his retaliation claim in his opposition to the motion for 

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summary judgment. See Dkts. 38-39. On this record, he has offered no evidence that he 

exhausted his administrative remedies as to his retaliation claim before bringing this civil rights 

action, and he offers no reason that the exhaustion requirement should be excused. He has not, 

then, shown evidence that precludes summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims. 

Instead, as mentioned above, Plaintiff merely relies on PBSP-11-02886 as proof of exhaustion, but 

his reliance is unwarranted because the retaliation issue was not presented in that grievance. Thus, 

the aforementioned evidence presented by Plaintiff is insufficient to defeat Defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment as to his retaliation claim. Meanwhile, the evidence produced by the 

Defendants is sufficient to carry their ultimate burden of proof in light of Plaintiff’s verified 

factual allegations. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 

claim that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. The Court now directs 

Defendants to address the remaining First Amendment and state law claims pursuant to the 

scheduling order set forth below. 

V. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons outlined above, the Court orders as follows: 

1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s 

retaliation claim and DENIED as to his First Amendment claim relating to the mishandling of 

legal mail. Dkt. 27. The Court also retains supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. 

2. The parties shall abide by the following briefing schedule: 

 a. No later than twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, 

Defendants shall file a motion for summary judgment as to the remaining First Amendment and 

state law claims. The motion shall be supported by adequate factual documentation and shall 

conform in all respects to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. If Defendants are of the opinion 

that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, they shall so inform the Court prior to the 

date the summary judgment motion is due. All papers filed with the Court shall be promptly 

served on Plaintiff. 

 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment shall be filed 

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with the Court and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on 

which the aforementioned Defendants’ motion is filed. 

 c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, they shall do so no later than 

fourteen (14) days after the date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed. 

 d. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date. 

3. Upon a showing of good cause, requests for a reasonable extension of time will be 

granted provided they are filed on or before the deadline they seek to extend. 

4. This Order terminates Docket No. 27. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: September 13, 2016 

______________________________________ 

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS 

United States District Judge 

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