Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01174/USCOURTS-ca10-89-01174-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Kevin Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FIL.EO 

Uoited Srate!i e,pyrt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

NOV 2 6 1QQO 

ROBERT L. laJOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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No. 89-1174 

KEVIN WILLIAMS, aka MARCUS KEVIN 

OLIVER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 88-CR-348) 

Peter R. Bornstein of Berenbaum & Weinshienk, P.C., Denver, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant. 

John M. Hutchins, Assistant U.S. Attorney (Michael J. Norton, 

Acting United States Attorney; and Kathryn Meyer, Michael P. 

Carey, and Bernard E. Hobson, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, on the 

briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges, and COOK,* District 

Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable H. Dale Cook of the United States District Court 

for the Northern, Eastern, and Western Districts of Oklahoma, 

sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 1 
( 

Appellant Kevin Williams appeals from the district court's 

judgment denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to a 

violation of 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988). Williams contends he entered 

into his plea involuntarily. He also appeals from the district 

court's determination of his sentence under the Sentencing 

Guidelines. We affirm. 

I. 

A federal grand jury indicted Williams for possession with 

intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of cocaine and a 

conspiracy to do the same in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) 

and§ 846. Plea negotiations ensued and the Government and 

Williams agreed that Williams would plead guilty to a conspiracy 

charge involving approximately two kilograms of cocaine in 

exchange for the Government's dismissal of the substantive count 

and a binding recommendation of a sentence of sixty months 

pursuant to Rule ll(e)(l)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 

Procedure. 

In negotiating the plea, the attorneys had met for several 

hours to discuss sentencing. They calculated what they believed 

the sentence range would be under the Sentencing Guidelines. Both 

sides agreed that the offense severity rating would be 24. 

Williams previously had been convicted of: shoplifting, larceny, 

malicious destruction of property, and domestic violence battery. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 2 
After reviewing Williams' criminal record, the attorneys noted in 

the plea agreement only two prior offenses they considered relevant for purposes of sentencing: the domestic violence charge and 

one unarmed felony charge presumably for the larceny conviction. 

Based on these prior offenses, the attorneys calculated that 

Williams had no more than three criminal history points, which 

placed him in criminal history category II with a sentencing range 

of fifty-seven to seventy-one months. The prosecutor agreed to 

recommend a sixty-month sentence. After the attorneys had advised 

Williams of their preliminary calculations and the sentence recommendation, he agreed to plead guilty to the conspiracy count. 

Williams and the Government advised the district court that 

Williams sought to enter a conditional guilty plea based on the 

parties' binding plea agreement. The court stated that it could 

not be bound by the parties' sentencing computations and recommendation and that it therefore had to reject the plea agreement 

and the conditional plea. 1 

1 In rejecting the conditional plea, the court stated: 

"The Court will not be bound by your plea agreement. The Court will not accept the conditional plea of 

guilty. The only plea the Court will accept is an 

unconditional plea of guilty, absolute plea of guilty. 

I will carefully consider any agreement that you have, 

or stipulation, but the Court will not be bound by it. 

The Court's not of a mind to have the defendant proceed 

with the presentence report because it could take four 

or five weeks and at that time should the Court find 

something there that might concern the Court or that the 

Court might want to go above 60 months, the Court is 

bound by it. The Court rejects the plea and we start 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 3 
The parties had anticipated the court would reject the 

conditional plea. They submitted an alternative plea agreement in 

which Williams stated that he desired to enter an unconditional 

guilty plea. The conditional and unconditional agreements were 

substantively identical except the latter agreement included the 

Government's nonbinding recommendation that the defendant be 

sentenced to a sixty-month prison term. The sixty-month term was 

based on the parties' earlier understanding that Williams was 

within the fifty-seven to seventy-one month guideline range 

all over. But with the trial six weeks later, the Court 

doesn't think necessarily that the Court should be bound 

by any such plea, even at this time. You are directing 

the Court to find 60 months. You are usurping the 

discretion of the Court. It may very well be that the 

Court would go along with 60 months, but I would doubt 

that unless this is an absolute, unequivocal plea of 

guilty without any reservations or withdrawals of plea. 

"I would like to point out, though, I will carefully consider what your stipulation is. And I feel 

that that should be carefully considered by the Court. 

However, the Court will not be bound by it. The only 

thing the Court can tell the defendant that he will be 

sentenced within the applicable sentencing guidelines, 

this is a guideline case, and within the jurisdictional 

limits of the Court. 

"Mr. Hobson, do you understand the Court's 

observations, please? 

"MR. HOBSON: I do, Your Honor, and I do appreciate 

the Court's observations with regard to deference, and I 

understand the Court's opinion with regard to discretion 

as well, Your Honor." 

Rec., vol. II, at 6-7. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 4 
because he had a base offense level of 24 and a criminal history 

category of II. 

The terms of the plea agreement reflected its tentative 

nature. The parties expressly stated that the stipulated facts 

underlying the criminal history category determination and the 

Government's subsequent recommendation were preliminary: 

"The parties understand that the stipulation 

regarding criminal history of the defendant is 

tentative, and that the defendant is in a better 

position to know the relevant facts than is the 

Government. The criminal history category is more 

completely and accurately determined by the Probation 

Department and additional facts regarding the criminal 

history can greatly affect the final guideline range. 

Nevertheless, what is known of the defendant's criminal 

history is as follows: . 

"Mr. Williams is believed to have a misdemeanor 

conviction for a domestic disturbance and/or altercation 

in Aurora, Colorado within the past year. Details of 

the incident are uncertain, as are details of the 

adjudication thereof; however, the offense has been 

tentatively calculated into the criminal history 

guideline work sheet formula, as has a 1978 conviction 

for unarmed felony assault/robbery for which the 

defendant apparently only received a thirty (30') day 

sentence. Based on that information, if no other 

information were discovered, the defendant's criminal 

history category would be II." 

Rec., vol. I, doc. 4 at 3. The parties acknowledged that the 

court had the power, regardless of the plea agreement, to make its 

own findings of fact: 

"The Government and the defendant are aware that 

the guideline range(s) resulting from these stipulations 

are not binding on the Court, and the Court is free, 

pursuant to §§6Al.3 and 6Bl.4, to reach its own findings 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 5 
of facts and factors which are relevant to sentencing, 

accepting or rejecting the parties' positions herein." 

Id. at 2. 

Before the court accepted the guilty plea, it clearly stated 

that it would not be bound by the Government's sentencing recommendation and would have to consider it in conjunction with the 

Presentence Report (PSR): 

"I cannot enlarge on what I said before. I will 

carefully consider [the recommendation], I will give 

deference to it, but I will not be bound by it •.•. 

But I'm not going to do it in a vacuum, I will have to 

have a presentence report." 

Rec., vol. II, at 8. 

The defendant signified his understanding of the court's 

position: 

"THE COURT: Do you understand I'm not bound by the 

60-month agreement, do you understand that, please? The 

agreement between the lawyers, I'm not bound by that, 

other than I will consider it, do you understand that, 

please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: But you will consider it. 

"THE COURT: I will carefully consider it. 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

"THE COURT: But I'm not limited to that? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

"THE COURT: I'm not restricted to that, I will 

consider everything, but I will consider this, also, the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 6 
attorneys feel that that's proper, but it's up to me to 

determine if it's proper or not, not the lawyers, do you 

understand that? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 11 

Id. at 16-17. 

The court also informed the defendant of the possible consequences of his plea. The court told Williams his potential 

maximum sentence. The court also informed him that his sentence 

would be computed under the guidelines in view of the probation 

department's report and that he would be unable to withdraw his 

plea once he entered it. 

"THE COURT: Do you understand the potential penalty is 40 years in a penal institution and a fine of 

not more than $2 million, or both, plus a $50.00 assessment, do you understand that, please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes, I do. 

"THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court will 

consider carefully the recommendation of the government 

that a 60-month sentence would be appropriate but the 

Court will not make any commitment what the sentence 

will be other than I will carefully consider it, do you 

understand that, please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

"THE COURT: Do you understand the Court will not 

commit itself as to what the Court will do in regard to 

the sentencing guidelines other than after it's computed 

by the probation office, the respective attorneys and 

you will have the opportunity to review it, if you don't 

agree with it you may file pleadings in that regard, do 

you understand that, please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

Id. at 11-12. 

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The court continued: 

"Do you understand further if you plead guilty, and 

I accept your plea of guilty, you will not be allowed to 

change your plea in the future, do you understand that, 

please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: YES. 

"THE COURT: Pardon me, please. 

"You cannot take an appeal to the next highest 

court except as it be under the sentencing guidelines, 

do you understand that, please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes. 

"THE COURT: But you cannot withdraw your plea, you 

will not be allowed to withdraw your plea of guilty, do 

you understand that, please? 

"MR. WILLIAMS: Yes." 

Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). 

The district court accepted Williams' unconditional plea and 

subsequently sentenced him according to the probation department's 

PSR, which contained calculations different from those of the 

attorneys' embodied in the plea agreement. The probation department calculated that Williams was within criminal history category 

III, rather than category II. The PSR assessed three criminal 

history points for Williams' domestic violence violation, one 

point for the offense and two additional points because he committed the offense during probation. The probation department 

also assessed a criminal history point for Williams' 1978 

malicious destruction of property conviction, and one for the 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 8 
larceny conviction. Thus, according to the PSR, Williams had a 

total of five criminal history points, placing him in criminal 

history category III. 

The district court reduced the total offense level from 26 to 

24 for acceptance of responsibility and adopted the probation 

department's findings that placed Williams in criminal history 

category III. The resulting guideline range was sixty-three to 

seventy-eight months. The court imposed a seventy-eight month 

sentence for the conspiracy count and dismissed the remaining 

count. Subsequent to sentencing, Williams filed a Motion to 

Vacate Plea, which the court implicitly denied by entering 

judgment, including the sentence, under the Sentencing Reform Act. 

II. 

Two alleged errors are the basis of Williams' appeal. First, 

Williams maintains that he should have been permitted to withdraw 

his guilty plea. He claims it was involuntarily entered because 

he believed his sentencing range would be between 57 and 71 months 

as calculated by his and the Government's attorney. Williams also 

contends that the sentencing court erred in finding that he had 

five criminal history points, placing him in category III. He 

argues the correct category was category II as stipulated in his 

agreement with the Government. We consider these arguments in 

turn. 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 9 
A. 

A defendant may withdraw a plea that has been entered into 

involuntarily. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 

(1969). Whether a plea is voluntary is a question of federal law 

subject to de novo review. Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 

1186 (10th Cir. 1989). In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 

(1970), the Supreme Court set out the standard for determining the 

voluntariness of the guilty plea: 

"A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the 

direct consequences, including the actual value of any 

commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his 

own counsel; must stand unless induced by threats (or 

promises to discontinue improper harassment), 

misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 

unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are 

by their nature improper as having no proper 

relationship to the prosecutor's business (~, 

bribes)." 

Id. at 755 (citation omitted). Therefore, to determine whether a 

plea is voluntary, a court must assess whether the defendant fully 

understood the consequences of the plea. See McCarthy~ 394 U.S. 

at 464. 

Both the attorneys and the court have a duty to apprise the 

defendant of the consequences of the plea and ensure that it is 

voluntary. If these duties are not discharged, the defendant is 

not "fully aware" of the consequences of the plea and it is 

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therefore involuntary. The court's duties are delineated by Rule 

ll(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. With respect to 

advising the defendant as to his potential sentence in a guidelines case, the court's obligation under Rule 11 is to advise the 

defendant of the mandatory minimum and maximum penalties for the 

crime committed and that the guidelines will govern sentencing. 

See United States v. Rhodes, F.2d __ , No. 89-3241 (10th Cir. 

Sept. 6, 1990); United States v. Turner, 881 F.2d 684, 687 (9th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 199 (1989); see also United States 

v. Fernandez,·877 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1989)(under Rule 11 

district court must advise defendant of maximum possible penalty). 

When the court accepts -a guilty plea, it may expressly retain 

the power to determine relevant facts bearing on sentencing under 

the Guidelines, notwithstanding the parties' stipulations of 

facts. See United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1564-65 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 1990 WL 66991 (Oct. 1, 1990); United States 

v. Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 869 (10th Cir. 1990). If neither the 

plea agreement nor the court has guaranteed the defendant that the 

plea agreement stipulations are binding, a defendant cannot claim 

undue surprise or that the plea is rendered involuntary when the 

court exercises this power. See United States v. Stephens, 906 

F.2d 251, 254 (6th Cir. 1990). 

An attorney has more limited duties to the defendant, but she 

can potentially nullify a plea agreement if she materially mis-

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informs the defendant of the consequences of the plea or the 

court's probable disposition. Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1186. An 

erroneous sentence estimate does not necessarily render a plea 

involuntary. Id.; United States v. Estrada, 849 F.2d 1304, 1306 

(10th Cir. 1988); United States v. Sweeney, 878 F.2d 68, 70-71 (2d 

Cir. 1989). In order for the plea to be held invalid, the 

defendant must show the plea was a product of material misrepresentations. Laycock, 880 F.2d at 1.186. Thus, a preliminary 

sentence calculation must constitute a material misrepresentation, 

and the defendant must show he relied thereon. See Worthen v. 

Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 1988). 

In Stephens, the attorney's inaccurate sentence estimate did 

not render his client's guilty plea involuntary. The court held 

that although the sentence estimate was erroneous, the defendant 

was still "fully aware of the consequences of his plea." 906 F.2d 

at 254. The court noted that the defendant had disclaimed reliance on his attorney's sentence estimate because he '"acknowledged 

his understanding that any prediction of the sentence under the 

Guidelines would not be binding on the court ..•. " Id. at 253. 

Williams has not shown that the probable consequences of his 

guilty plea were materially misrepresented by the court or the 

attorneys. He argues that the court and the Government represented that he would be sentenced within the range calculated by 

the attorneys in the absence of new facts revealed by the PSR. 

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According to Williams, when the court sentenced him outside of the 

stipulated range he was subjected to a consequence he did not 

anticipate. Therefore, Williams argues, he tendered his guilty 

plea involuntarily. 

Williams' argument is contrary to the record. The district 

court repeatedly advised him it would not be bound by the parties' 

sentencing recommendation. Specifically, at the plea hearing, the 

court advised Williams it would not accept a conditional plea 

because it needed to retain its sentencing discretion until it 

received the PSR. The court informed Williams of his potential 

maximum sentence and only promised him that he would be sentenced 

within the applicable guideline range. It did not specify that 

Williams would be sentenced within a stipulated range. It pointed 

out that it would consider the PSR before making its decision. 

After the court had made it clear it refused to be bound by the 

parties' sentencing recommendations, Williams elected to proceed 

with an unconditional guilty plea. 

The defendant acknowledged he was aware that the district 

court was not bound to impose the stipulated sentence. He stated 

in court that his plea was not due to threats or promises by 

anyone of leniency or a light sentence. He stated he was pleading 

guilty because he was guilty. In the signed Plea Agreement and 

Stipulation of Facts, the parties acknowledged that the court was 

"free ••• to reach its own findings of facts and factors which 

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Appellate Case: 89-1174 Document: 01019955917 Date Filed: 11/26/1990 Page: 13 
are relevant to sentencing." Rec., vol. I, doc. 4 at 2. In his 

signed statement, Williams acknowledged that: "I understand that 

the judge can make no decision as to what the sentence will be 

until the presentence report has been received and reviewed by the 

judge." Id. at 6. Thus, contrary to Williams' claims, the record 

shows that Williams' plea was voluntary because it was made with 

the knowledge that the sentencing recommendation was nonbinding. 

Williams understood the "actual value of any commitments made to 

him by the court, prosecutor or his own counsel" regarding his 

sentence. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (citation omitted). 

Williams contends his plea should nonetheless be withdrawn as 

was the defendant's in United States v. Loman, 1 Fed. Sent. R. 290 

(W.D. Mo. 1988). However, in Loman, the attorneys and the 

probation office shared in the computation error. In this case, 

to the contrary, the probation office did not ratify the 

attorneys' calculations. Furthermore, we note that the imposed 

sentence of seventy-eight months is reasonably close to the 

maximum sentence of seventy-one months anticipated by the plea 

agreement. We are not inclined to broadly extend the application 

of Loman to these facts. See United States v. Bennett, 716 F. 

Supp. 1137, 1146 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 907 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 

1990) (declining to follow Loman, as to one of the co-defendants, 

where the sentence imposed was "clearly within the expectancy 

created by the plea agreement")· 

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B. 

Williams also argues that the district court improperly 

computed his sentence under the guidelines. He alleges two errors 

in the district court's calculation of his criminal history 

points. 

First, Williams alleges the court erred when it computed 

three criminal history points for his 1988 conviction and sentence 

for domestic violence. We disagree. The Sentencing Guidelines 

directed the court to count one criminal history point for 

Williams' domestic violence crime. See United States Sentencing 

Comm'n Guidelines Manual§ 4Al.l(c)(l989) [hereinafter Guidelines]. Section 4Al.2(c)(l) excludes some local ordinance 

violations, but not those for which, as here, a probation term of 

at least one year was imposed. No other exclusions under 

§ 4Al.l(c) apply to Williams' 1988 domestic violence conviction. 

The court correctly assessed two additional points because the 

defendant was on probation when he committed the offense. See 

Guidelines§ 4Al.l(d). We find no error in the computation of 

three criminal history points for the domestic violence 

conviction. 

Second, Williams contends that he erroneously received one 

criminal history point for the October 1978 conviction for 

malicious destruction of property. He argues that because the 

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conviction took place over ten years from the November 5, 1988 

commission of the offense of conviction, it should have been 

excluded from his criminal history computation pursuant to 

§ 4Al.2(e)(2) (includes prior sentences imposed within ten years 

of commencement of instant offense). The Government asserts that 

since the prior sentence was modified to probation on November 15, 

1978, the conviction was within the ten-year limit. We need not 

decide this issue because even if the 1978 sentence were outside 

the ten-year limitation, the resulting guideline sentence range 

would have been the same since criminal history category III 

includes criminal history points ranging from four to six. 

Eliminating the one point alloted for this conviction would still 

give Williams four criminal history points. See Part I, supra at 

8-9. Therefore, an error, if any, was harmless. See United 

States v. Lopez-Cavasos, __ F.2d __ , __ , 1990 WL 136761 at 4-5 

(9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1990) (court will not resolve criminal history 

category disputes where the same category would have resulted 

under either contested calculation). 

In consideration of the foregoing, we AFFIRM the denial of 

Williams' Motion to Vacate Plea and the district court's sentence. 

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