Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00651/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00651-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roddrick Donnel Bazemore
Petitioner
H. Shirley
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

RODDRICK DONNEL BAZEMORE, 

Petitioner, 

vs. 

H. SHIRLEY, Warden, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-0651-GEB-EFB P (TEMP)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered 

against him on February 9, 2011 in the Solano County Superior Court on four counts of robbery 

and two counts of attempted robbery, with jury findings that he had suffered two prior strike 

convictions. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) joinder of the robbery 

and attempted robbery charges in one trial violated his right to due process; (2) the identification 

procedures conducted in this case were unduly suggestive; and (3) his trial counsel rendered 

ineffective assistance. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, and for 

the reasons stated below, petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief must be denied. 

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I. Background

 In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner’s judgment of 

conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District provided the 

following factual summary: 

Roddrick Bazemore appeals from convictions of four counts of 

robbery and two counts of attempted robbery. He contends that he 

was prejudiced by consolidation of the cases against him, which 

arose from four separate incidents; that the pretrial identification 

procedures used were unduly suggestive; and that there was 

insufficient evidence to support one of the robbery counts.1

 We 

affirm. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

On January 20, 2009, a consolidated information was filed with the 

Solano County Superior Court, charging appellant with four counts 

of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211)2 and two counts of 

attempted second degree robbery (§§ 664/211): robbery of Sally's 

Beauty Supply (R.M.) on January 24, 2008 (count 1); attempted 

robbery of Tommy Bahamas (S.K.) on January 30, 2008 (count 2); 

attempted robbery of Tommy Bahamas (C.C.) on January 30, 2008 

(count 3); robbery of Entenmann's Bakery (N.C.) on February 26, 

2008 (count 4); robbery of Entenmann's (C.C.) on February 26, 

2008 (count 5); and robbery of Fallas (E.M.) on March 4, 2008 

(count 6).3 It was further alleged that appellant had suffered two 

prior robbery convictions within the meaning of section 1170.12, 

subdivisions (a) through (d), section 667, subdivision (b) through 

(i), and section 667, subdivision (a)(1).4

Appellant was arraigned on January 20, 2009, and entered a plea of 

not guilty. 

On January 28, 2010, appellant moved to sever the two attempted 

robbery counts from the robbery counts. This motion was denied 

on February 2, the first day of jury trial. On February 9, the jury 

found appellant guilty of all the charged offenses; the next day, it 

found the two prior conviction allegations true. 

 1

 During the pendency of this appeal, appellant has additionally filed two petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

2

 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 

3

 Counts 1, 2, 3 and 6 were originally charged in case No. SCR253307; counts 4 and 5 

were originally charged in Solano County Superior Court case No. FCR253372. 

4

 An amended consolidated information was filed on September 9, 2010, adding 

enhancement allegations based on two federal convictions. These enhancement allegations were 

subsequently stricken by the prosecution on February 10, 2011. 

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Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the prior strike convictions 

under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. 

He also filed a motion for new trial, based on new information 

provided by the prosecutor's office that appellant claimed would 

allow him to bolster the third party culpability argument he tried to 

make at trial.5

 The new trial motion was denied on May 9, 2011. 

On July 17, the court struck one of the priors as to counts 1, 2, 3 

and 6, but denied the motion to strike as to counts 4 and 5.6 The 

court then sentenced appellant to a total prison term of 25 years to 

life, plus 30 years.7

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 31, 2011. 

Appellant, in propria persona, subsequently filed two petitions for 

writ of habeas corpus, the first on July 25, 2012 (case No. 

A136042) and the second on October 15, 2012 (case No. A136805), 

which we ordered to be considered with the appeal. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS 

Sally's Beauty Supply (count 1) 

On January 24, 2008, Rosa Martinez was working at the register at 

Sally's Beauty Supply in Fairfield. At about 6:45 p.m., a man 

Martinez identified at trial as appellant came into the store. He was 

wearing a black beanie, black sweatshirt and black jeans, he was 

clean-shaven and he had a Band–Aid on the upper part of his cheek. 

The man told Martinez he was looking around and waiting for his 

wife to come in, walked around for about 10 minutes, then left. 

Ten or 15 minutes later, he returned, grabbed a brush, came to the 

 5

 The prosecutor had become aware of three robbery cases involving a different suspect 

which bore some similarity to the robberies of which appellant was convicted. 

6

 The court explained that appellant was 54 and a half years old and had an “exemplary” 

record during his more than three years of presentence incarceration, acting as a mentor to others 

in the jail and battling substance abuse, and earning highly laudatory letters of support from the 

director of the jail's treatment program. On the other hand, appellant's more than 30–year history 

of committing felonies made it “hard” to view him as “outside the scheme of the three strikes 

law.” 

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 The court sentenced appellant as a three-striker on counts 4 and 5, imposing for each of 

these counts the indeterminate term of 25 years to life plus 10 years for the two section 667, 

subdivision (a)(1) priors, with the sentences on these two counts to run concurrently. On the 

other counts, as to which the court had stricken one of the prior convictions, the court sentenced 

appellant as a two-striker: On each of counts 2 and 3, the court imposed aggravated terms of three 

years, doubled to six years because of the strike, concurrent with each other but consecutive to the 

indeterminate term; on each of counts 1 and 6, the court imposed one year (one third of the 

midterm), doubled to two years because of the strike, consecutive to each other and to the other 

terms imposed. Finally, the court imposed an additional term of 10 years for the two prior 

conviction enhancements. 

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register and told Martinez to “stay calm,” he was there to rob her. 

She opened the register and asked “how he wanted [her] to put the 

money,” and he grabbed the money and walked out of the store. 

Martinez testified that the store was well lit. When the man first 

came in, she was talking to him from about six feet away. The 

second time, she was at the register and he came to the opposite 

side; initially, they were looking straight at each other, and she 

thought he was just a customer. As soon as he said he was there to 

rob her, she looked down and did not look at him again. At this 

point she was afraid, thinking he might have a weapon or hurt her. 

The man did not threaten her or mention a weapon. he [sic] amount 

taken from the register was $370. In addition to describing the 

clothes he was wearing, Martinez told the police the man was five 

foot nine inches tall and about 40 years old. 

Subsequently, on March 6, the police showed Martinez a single 

photograph of appellant and she recognized him as the person who 

robbed her. Martinez recognized that this was a surveillance 

photograph; as will be explained, it was taken from a surveillance 

video of a different robbery in which appellant was a suspect. On 

cross-examination, Martinez acknowledged that when shown the 

surveillance photograph, she recognized the person's build; asked to 

acknowledge that she did not recognize the person's face, she 

testified that she did not remember whether she did or did not. 

Martinez subsequently identified appellant in a photographic lineup 

on March 12 and a live lineup on March 27. The forms Martinez 

signed at these identifications contained admonishments including 

that the person might or might not be included in the lineup. 

Fairfield Detective Steven Trojanowski, who conducted the live 

lineup, testified that in March 2008, appellant was 51 years old, 

about six feet tall, and weighed about 210 pounds. At trial, 

Martinez testified that the hat in exhibit No. 23, which had been 

seized in a search of appellant's home, was a similar color to the 

beanie the robber was wearing, but did not look like the beanie 

because the beanie did not have a bill. 

Tommy Bahamas (counts 2 & 3) 

On January 30, 2008, Sean Kerwin and Christine Corsello were 

working in a Tommy Bahamas clothing outlet store in Vacaville. 

At about 8:45 p.m., shortly before closing time, while Kerwin and 

Corsello were both at the cash registers, a man both identified at 

trial as appellant entered the store. The man was wearing a heavy 

black windbreaker-type jacket, had a Band–Aid under one of his 

eyes, and smelled heavily of marijuana. He asked whether the 

clothes were the “spring selection” and Kerwin began his routine 

answer about clothing in the outlet coming from the retail store. 

Appellant interrupted, saying he did not care, this was “an armed 

robbery.” Corsello testified that appellant leaned forward, hands on 

the countertop, and said “I just want to let you know I have a gun. 

Open your register and give me your money.” Corsello told 

appellant that the registers were closed and her keys were in the 

back. Appellant said they would go to the back. Corsello stumbled 

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over a box as she turned. She had tried to trip the alarm and 

appellant said, “You pressed the alarm,” and left the store. 

Kerwin testified that appellant was in the store for five to ten 

minutes; Corsello indicated it was a shorter time. Until appellant 

said he was there to rob him, Kerwin had thought appellant was just 

a customer, but once appellant stated his intention, Kerwin became 

afraid. He thought appellant said he had a gun, but he did not see 

one. Kerwin testified that it was easy for him to see appellant; the 

store lighting was bright, appellant was no more than three or four 

feet away from him, and they were facing each other. Corsello 

testified that appellant was two to three feet away; she made eye 

contact with him and he kept looking at both her and Kerwin. 

During the incident, Corsello was “very” afraid that she, Kerwin, or 

one of the people in the store was going to be injured. She 

described the robber to the police as about five feet nine inches but 

commented at trial that she was a bad judge of height. She testified 

that he did not look like the store's usual patron, who would be 

older and heavier. 

Corsello testified that on the night of the incident she talked to her 

regional manager and risk management contact and obtained 

pictures taken by the surveillance camera, including the two in 

exhibit No. 20. She gave some of the pictures to the police. On 

March 13, the police showed Corsello a photographic lineup and 

she was not able to identify anyone “a hundred percent,” going 

back and forth between numbers one and three. When the officer 

asked which she was more inclined to pick, she chose number one. 

Appellant's photograph was number three. At a subsequent live 

line up on March 27, she identified appellant. Corsello read and 

followed the instructions at each of the lineups. Officer Polen 

testified that appellant was the only person who was in both the live 

lineup and the photographic lineup Corsello viewed. 

Kerwin testified that some time after the robbery, he was shown a 

still photograph taken from the store's surveillance video. A week 

or two after this, he was shown a photographic lineup at the police 

station and identified appellant's photograph. Kerwin also attended 

a live lineup, where he identified someone other than appellant. 

Kerwin testified that he was nervous and afraid the people in the 

lineup could see him, although he was told they could not; he felt 

intimidated, and he rushed his identification so he could leave. 

Vacaville Police Officer Chris Polen testified that a couple of 

weeks after the live lineup, he contacted Kerwin and showed him a 

still photo of the lineup he had seen. Kerwin identified appellant, 

explaining that he made his selection through a process of 

elimination. Polen did not have any of the other witnesses come to 

the police department after the photographic lineup and live lineup. 

He testified that shortly after the robbery, Kerwin said he had 

started carrying a golf club as a result of what had happened, and 

Kerwin said after the live lineup that he was scared and intimidated. 

Officer Polen explained that he received a video of the attempted 

robbery, and still photographs from the video, from a loss 

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prevention agent. He circulated the still photos to other agencies in 

the county, then received a call from Detective Trojanowski of the 

Fairfield Police Department, who said he had identified appellant as 

a potential suspect in the case. Polen gave Trojanowski the 

information he had about the Tommy Bahamas case and a 

subsequent Vacaville robbery at Fallas Paredes. After appellant 

was arrested on March 12, Polen used his booking photograph to 

create a photographic lineup. 

In late February or March 2008, Detective Steven Trojanowski 

searched appellant's home and seized a black leather jacket, a suede 

jacket, a solid black neck tie, a checkered men's shirt and a “billed 

beanie type cap” from appellant's bedroom. He seized these items 

because in the surveillance photograph from the Tommy Bahamas 

attempted robbery, appellant was wearing a black beanie type hat 

with a bill, checkered shirt, black tie and black jacket. Trojanowski 

was aware that the victim in the Sally's robbery had described the 

robber wearing a black sweatshirt and black jeans. He did not find 

a black hooded sweatshirt. Although there were a lot of black pants 

and, he believed, black jeans, there was “nothing descriptive 

enough to take as evidence.” Corsello testified that the hat in 

exhibit No. 23 looked similar to the one appellant was wearing 

during the attempted robbery. 

The surveillance video of the attempted robbery at Tommy 

Bahamas was played for the jury. 

Entenmann's Bakery (count 4) 

On February 26, 2008, Natalie Caballero and Carol Crane were 

working at Entenmann's Bakery in Fairfield. At about five minutes 

before 7:00 p.m., just before closing time, a man both identified at 

trial as appellant came in and asked if they had hamburger buns. 

Caballero testified that he was clean-cut, wearing a dark baseball 

cap or other hat with a bill, and had a Band–Aid on his face. The 

hat was similar to exhibit No. 23. Crane testified that she saw the 

man's face clearly, paying attention to it because she noticed the 

Band–Aid. Caballero walked over and showed him where the buns 

were, and he selected some. Caballero went to the register and 

started to ring up the purchase as appellant stood across from her. 

When the register drawer opened, appellant leaned over, pushed 

Caballero aside and took the money, about $166, from the register. 

Appellant said something to the effect that he was going to rob her. 

Caballero tried to push the drawer closed to get appellant's hands 

out of it, and appellant said, “Don't trip,” then looked at Crane, said 

he had a gun, took the money and bag of buns, and left. Caballero 

testified that during the incident she was afraid appellant might 

have a gun and she might be hurt. Crane testified that she did not 

feel fear but was angry. When appellant said he was going to rob 

them, Crane was going to call 911, but as she started going to the 

back room, Caballero told her not to. Asked if she intended to call 

911 absent Caballero's admonition, Crane stated that she intended 

to take a bar that was nearby and “beat the hell out of him for what 

he was doing to us. He violated us.” Crane testified that appellant 

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was trying to take the money against her will, that she was 

threatened, and that he was trying to intimidate her. 

When Crane called 911 after appellant left the store, she described 

him as an African American male wearing black clothing. She at 

first said he had a Band–Aid above his eye, then said it was below 

his eye. Crane, who is nearsighted, acknowledged that she was not 

wearing her glasses at the time of the robbery, but testified that 

while she could not see small details from a distance, she needed 

her glasses mostly for driving; she was able to identify the person 

sitting next to the prosecutor from the witness stand without her 

glasses. Caballero told the police that the robber looked about 30 

years old. 

Caballero remembered someone coming to show her photographs 

sometime after the robbery, but did not remember whether it was 

one photograph or five or six; when shown the surveillance 

photograph (exhibit No. 24) and photographic lineup (exhibit No. 

11) at trial, she did not remember seeing the former but thought she 

remembered the latter and recognized her signature on it. She 

subsequently attended a live lineup and identified appellant. Crane 

also did not remember whether she was shown the single 

surveillance photograph. She remembered being shown a 

photographic lineup and saw her signature on exhibit 1 No. 3. She 

remembered being able to identify someone in the photographic 

lineup and in a live lineup. 

Detective Trojanowski testified that he showed the surveillance 

photograph he had received from Vacaville to the witnesses in the 

Entenmann's and Sally's robberies on March 6, 2008. When he 

learned appellant's name as a possible suspect, he prepared a 

photographic lineup including appellant's photograph and five 

others with similar physical characteristics. He showed this lineup 

to Caballero and Crane, separately, on March 12, after reading each 

the admonishment on the lineup forms and ascertaining that they 

understood it. Caballero and Crane each said that number two 

“looks like” the robber but she was not a hundred percent sure, and 

that number two “could be” the person who committed the robbery. 

Fallas Paredes (count 6) 

On the evening of March 4, 2008, Teresa Jackson and Elaine 

Marinucci were working at Fallas Paredes in Vacaville. A man 

came in whom Marinucci identified at trial as appellant. Jackson 

described the man as African American, about five feet eight or 

nine inches tall, weighing in “the two hundreds,” wearing a sweater 

and a black beanie. Marinucci testified that the man was in his 40s 

or 50s and was wearing a dark knit beanie and blue or black athletic 

pants, and a gray tee shirt, and he had a key ring around his neck. 

Marinucci was at the register when appellant entered the store. 

Jackson greeted him and testified that he said he was looking for his 

wife. Jackson went to the back of the store and appellant came to 

the counter and asked for change for the pay phone. Marinucci 

thought this was “funny” because he already had two dimes and a 

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nickel, but asked her for quarters. She had an “inner feeling” that 

“just didn't feel right.” She opened the register to give him the 

change, and he reached over the counter and grabbed money from 

the register. She put her hand on his hand and he reached over with 

his hand in his pocket and told her, “Chill, man. I have a gun.” She 

let go, not wanting to risk getting shot if he had a gun. She thought 

he could have a gun because he kept one hand in his pocket and she 

saw a “big bulge.” He told her not to call the police and ran out the 

door. Jackson came out of the office to see the man leaving the 

store with money in his hand. 

Jackson was in the back during the robbery and was not in fear until 

after it happened. She told the police the man was 35 or 40 years 

old, and that his face was shaved, possibly with “little specks 

coming in” but nothing around his mouth. 

Marinucci recognized exhibit No. 15 as the photo lineup she was 

shown by the police. She testified that she identified appellant in 

the lineup, although exhibit No. 15 bears no mark indicating an 

identification. She identified appellant in a live lineup a few days 

later. 

Jackson first testified that she did not remember being shown a 

series of photographs, then, when shown the photographic lineup in 

exhibit No. 17, testified that she saw it but did not remember being 

able to identify anyone. She testified that if she had identified 

anyone, she was being honest. She attended a live lineup, which 

she remembered because she did not want to do it. She explained 

to the police, as she had when shown the photographs, that she did 

not know exactly what the robber looked like, having only greeted 

him while rushing to get her job done and go home. Following 

instructions that directed her to put a question mark on the lineup 

form if she saw someone similar to the robber but she was not 

positively sure, she put a question mark on number 2. 

Officer Polen, who created the photographic lineup in exhibit No. 

17 using appellant's March 12 booking photo, testified that 

appellant's photo was in the number three position. When Officer 

Polen showed the lineup to Jackson on March 13, she went back 

and forth between numbers one and three, but settled on number 

three. Polen testified that he always asked witnesses if they 

understood the admonitions he gave before showing a lineup, and 

would not show a lineup if the witness did not understand the 

admonitions. Jackson was “pretty confident” about her selection, 

but asked to view a live lineup to be sure of her identification, and 

attended the lineup on March 27. 

Toward the beginning of Jackson's testimony, the prosecutor 

commented that she kept looking to the prosecutor's left and asked 

why. Jackson said she was “just looking around” and “just 

nervous.” Jackson acknowledged that she had been subpoenaed to 

appear in court the preceding Tuesday, but did not appear that day, 

Wednesday or Thursday; then she received a call telling her she 

might get in trouble if she did not come. 

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Defense 

Mitchell Eisen, Ph. D., testified as an expert on eyewitness 

identification, memory and suggestibility. He testified that, 

according to the research, in traumatic situations, stress overwhelms 

coping mechanisms and people tend to focus on key elements of the 

event, limiting the information taken in. Longer exposure to a 

person will generally increase the chance of a witness being able to 

differentiate the person from others later. Reports given closer in 

time to the event tend to be more complete and accurate, both 

because the information is “fresher” and because such reports are 

less influenced by post-event information from seeing pictures, 

talking with others and imagining the event. 

According to Eisen, it is well understood that when given an 

identification task such as a lineup, a person will assume the police 

know something and the suspect is likely there. This is why a 

standard admonishment is given directing the witness not to assume 

the guilty party is present, but the admonishment will not 

necessarily outweigh the assumption. Often, witnesses who do not 

immediately recognize anyone in a lineup will stick with the task, 

comparing the options and choosing the one who most closely 

matches their memory, even if the actual perpetrator is not among 

the choices. Research has also demonstrated that a person's 

memory for a face cannot be tested more than once without the 

potential for that exposure to influence future identifications: Once 

a witness has been exposed to a person's face, that face will be 

familiar to the witness and the witness may pick it in a subsequent 

identification simply for that reason. Additionally, the officer 

conducting the identification procedure may inadvertently give cues 

to the witness. More errors in identification occur where the 

witness is of a different race than the perpetrator. 

Eisen further testified that research demonstrates people tend to 

stick with their initial identification in future ones, striving for 

consistency and searching for the previously identified person. The 

identified person becomes the face of the perpetrator in the 

witness's mind, overriding the witness's memory of the actual event. 

Where the initial identification was mistaken, the witness may 

confuse the identified face with the face of the actual perpetrator. A 

person's confidence in his or her identification is not related to 

accuracy, and people tend to become more certain about their 

identifications over time regardless of whether the identifications 

were accurate and even if the initial identification was tentative. 

Also, over time the witness may be exposed to information that is 

interpreted as confirming the identification, such as learning 

someone else identified the same person. Research shows that a 

person's confidence in his or her identification can be artificially 

boosted or undermined by giving feedback indicating the choice 

was correct or incorrect. 

People v. Bazemore, No. A132865, 2013 WL 3778353, at **1-6 (Cal. 1st Div. July 17, 2013). 

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II. Standards of Review Applicable to Habeas Corpus Claims 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a 

state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 

U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). 

 Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas 

corpus relief: 

 An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 

person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not 

be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the 

merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 

claim - 

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), “clearly established federal law” consists of 

holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. 

Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. 

___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. 

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent “may be persuasive in determining 

what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably.” Stanley, 

633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit 

precedent may not be “used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court 

jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced.” Marshall 

v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2155 

(2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to “determine whether a particular rule of law is so 

widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, 

be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of 

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an issue, it cannot be said that there is “clearly established Federal law” governing that issue. 

Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006). 

 A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it applies a rule 

contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court 

precedent on “materially indistinguishable” facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s 

decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. 8 Lockyer v. 

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; Chia v. Cambra, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 

(9th Cir. 2004). In this regard, a federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 

(2007); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (it is “not enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent 

review of the legal question, is left with a ‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. 

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 

Accordingly, “[a]s a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner 

must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law 

beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

 If the state court’s decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing 

court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner’s claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 

527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) 

 8

 Under § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision based on a factual determination is not to be 

overturned on factual grounds unless it is “objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

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(en banc) (“[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of 

§ 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by 

considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.”). 

 The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If 

the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a 

previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of 

the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). “When 

a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be 

presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication 

or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption 

may be overcome by a showing “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). 

Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 

S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013). 

 Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “Independent review of the record is not de novo 

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether 

a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no 

reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of “showing there was no 

reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. 

 A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner’s claims. 

Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze 

just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the 

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state court record to determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny 

relief.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court “must determine what arguments or theories ... could 

have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded 

jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior 

decision of [the Supreme] Court.” Id. at 102. The petitioner bears “the burden to demonstrate 

that ‘there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.’” Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 

925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98). 

 When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner’s 

claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal 

habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 

F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Petitioner’s Claims 

 A. Improper Joinder

 Petitioner claims in his first ground for relief that the trial court violated his due process 

right to a fair trial when it denied his motion to sever the two counts of attempted robbery at the 

Tommy Bahama store from trial on the remaining counts of robbery. ECF No. 1 at 6, 13; ECF 

No. 18 at 4.9

 He argues that consolidating the attempted robbery and the robbery counts in one 

trial “bolster[ed] the weaker counts with a stronger one” and “dramatically increase[d] prejudice.” 

Id. at 5. 

 The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows: 

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

consolidating trial of the four incidents in this case. In appellant's 

view, the attempted robbery at Tommy Bahamas was a much 

stronger case against him than the other three incidents. The 

attempted robbery was captured on a surveillance video, depicting 

the perpetrator wearing clothing that matched clothing later seized 

from appellant's bedroom. By contrast, appellant was connected to 

the three robberies solely by eyewitness testimony which appellant 

characterizes as “not particularly strong.” Appellant argues that 

consolidation was prejudicial because it allowed the three weaker 

cases to be bolstered by the stronger case, and because appellant 

 9

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page numbers reflected on the court’s 

CM/ECF system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties. 

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was prosecuted for several offenses rather than a single one. 

Additionally, appellant urges that because all the incidents were 

“garden variety” robberies of commercial businesses, with no 

distinctive features, evidence of the incidents would not have been 

cross-admissible on issues of identity or modus operandi if they had 

been tried separately, and that little economy was gained by trying 

the cases together. 

As indicated above, appellant was initially charged in two separate 

cases, one concerning the attempted robberies at Tommy Bahamas 

and the robberies of Sally's and Fallas (case No. SCR253307) and 

the other concerning the robbery of Entenmann's (case No. 

FCR253732). Prior to the preliminary hearing, the prosecution 

moved to consolidate the two cases. In opposition, appellant 

argued that consolidation would be prejudicial and improper 

because it was unlikely any evidence would be cross-admissible, 

trying multiple cases based only on eyewitness testimony together 

would bolster relatively weak individual cases, and the evidence 

from one robbery had nothing to do with the others. The motion to 

consolidate was denied, the court expressing particular concern 

about the fact that different witnesses described the suspect having 

a Band Aid in different places on his face, which the court felt 

could easily confuse the jury, and prejudice appellant, because of 

the “difficulty of keeping that sort of significant factor related to 

eyewitness testimony separated from one case to the next.” 

After the prosecution filed the information in case No. SCR253307, 

appellant moved to sever the counts of attempted robbery (Tommy 

Bahamas) from the counts of robbery (Sally's and Fallas). He 

argued that evidence would not be cross-admissible on the question 

of identity because the incidents were not sufficiently similar in 

terms of description of the suspect or method used and there was no 

common physical evidence; the stronger evidence of the attempted 

robbery, which included the surveillance video and clothing seized 

from appellant's home, would bolster the robbery cases, which 

depended only on imperfect eyewitness testimony; and the 

similarity of the charges and number of witnesses created a danger 

of juror confusion. 

The prosecution countered that there was cross-admissible evidence 

in that appellant was identified as a suspect through evidence from 

both the Fairfield and Vacaville incidents and the Sally's and 

Tommy Bahamas incidents both involved an unarmed suspect with 

a Band Aid on his face engaging the employees in small talk before 

demanding money from the register, and that while the Tommy 

Bahamas evidence may have been stronger, the other cases were 

not weak. The prosecution also sought reconsideration of the order 

denying consolidation with the Entenmann's robbery charges, for 

the same reasons it opposed the motion to sever. 

The court denied the motion to sever, finding a “high likelihood of 

cross-admissibility of at least some evidence” and “numerous 

similarities common to these events,” including “similar 

descriptions of the suspect and how the suspect acted during the 

events, proximity and time among all three of the events, 

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similarities in time of day. None of the crimes is particularly more 

inflammatory than any other. There are other features such as the 

Band–Aid which is common to two out of those three cases.” The 

court noted that there were at least two common police witnesses, 

and no “gross difference in the relative strength of any one crime, 

event, or count over any of the others.” Although it recognized that 

the surveillance photographs would be of significance to the trier of 

fact, the court found they would not cause the level of 

disproportionate weight that would make it unfair to proceed in a 

single trial. 

The court made similar findings regarding the motion to 

consolidate: “We have similar descriptions of the suspect and how 

the suspect acted in all four cases. We have the band-aid on the 

face, somewhere on the face, appearing in three out of four of the 

cases. We have similar descriptions of . . . how the suspect acted 

and how the suspect in each of the four events committed the actual 

robbery.” Finding a “high likelihood” of cross-admissibility of 

evidence among the four cases, and noting the presumption in favor 

of consolidation absent a showing of undue prejudice to the 

defendant, the court granted the motion to consolidate. 

Just before the beginning of the trial, appellant again moved to 

sever the two attempted robbery counts. In addition to previously 

raised points, appellant maintained that in order to make his 

strongest argument that the identifications in the Sally's and 

Entenmann's cases were tainted - because the witnesses were shown 

the surveillance photograph from the Tommy Bahamas case - the 

defense would have to concede that the photograph was appellant, 

which would ensure a guilty verdict on the Tommy Bahamas counts 

in a joint trial. 

In denying appellant's motion to sever the attempted robbery 

counts, the court (a different judge this time) stated that the 

surveillance video was “strong evidence” but was “somewhat 

offset” by Kerwin's “equivocations” about who came into the 

Tommy Bahamas store and Corsello's having picked two 

photographs from the lineup. The court also felt the other cases 

were not weak, as all involved eye witnesses who were physically 

close to the suspect and identified appellant. The court stated there 

were “some common characteristics” and “[t]here conceivably is 

cross-admissibility, at least as to the Band–Aid, the gun, or lack 

thereof.” It continued, “And as to the issue of identity, we could 

argue a little bit more about whether or not those are signature 

characteristics or not . . . . [¶] But in terms of common plan or 

scheme or intent, you know, less of a signature quality is required 

for those kinds of - that kind of evidence to be crossly admissible.” 

Finally, the court noted that the severance motion “should have 

been raised sooner,” when the video “became of knowledge to both 

sides.” 

“Under section 954, ‘[a]n accusatory pleading’ may charge ‘two or 

more different offenses of the same class of crimes or offenses, 

under separate counts.’” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 

551.) “The law favors the joinder of counts because such a course 

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of action promotes efficiency. (Alcala v. Superior Court (2008) 43 

Cal.4th 1205, 1220.)” (People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 

1200.) Accordingly, “[t]he burden is on the party seeking 

severance to clearly establish that there is a substantial danger of 

prejudice requiring that the charges be separately tried.” (People v. 

Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 759, 773 (Soper).) “A trial court has 

discretion to order that properly joined charges be tried separately 

(§ 954), but there must be a ‘clear showing of prejudice to establish 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's 

severance motion’ (People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 

160). In assessing a claimed abuse of discretion, we assess the trial 

court's ruling by considering the record then before the court. 

(Soper, supra, at p. 774; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 

575.)” (People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p.1200.) 

In exercising its discretion to order separate trials, “a trial court 

should consider (1) whether the evidence relating to the various 

charges would be cross-admissible in separate trials, (2) whether 

some of the charges are unusually likely to inflame the jury against 

the defendant, (3) whether a weak case has been joined with a 

strong case or with another weak case, and (4) whether one of the 

charges is a capital offense or the joinder of the charges converts 

the matter into a capital case. (People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 

566, 581.)” (People v. Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 551.) “If the 

evidence underlying each of the joined charges would have been 

cross-admissible under Evidence Code section 1101 had they been 

prosecuted in separate trials, ‘that factor alone is normally sufficient 

to dispel any suggestion of prejudice and to justify a trial court's 

refusal to sever properly joined charges.’ (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th 

at p. 775; see People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 855.)” (People 

v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1200–1201.) 

However, “lack of cross-admissibility is not dispositive of whether 

the court abused its discretion in denying severance. (§ 954.1; 

People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 350 [‘When two crimes of 

the same class are joined, cross-admissibility is not required.’].)” 

(People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) Even if the 

evidence would not have been cross-admissible, the reviewing court 

must determine “‘whether the benefits of joinder were sufficiently 

substantial to outweigh the possible “spill-over” effect of the 

“other-crimes” evidence on the jury in its consideration of the 

evidence of defendant's guilt of each set of offenses.’ (People v. 

Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 938; see People v. Thomas, supra, 52 

Cal.4th at p. 350.)” (People v. Myles, at p. 1201.) After 

consideration of all the factors bearing on joinder, the court must 

“‘“balance the potential for prejudice to the defendant from a joint 

trial against the countervailing benefits to the state.” [Citation.]’” 

(Ibid., quoting People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 798–799.) 

Appellant devotes substantial argument to his claim that the 

evidence of the separate robberies and attempted robbery would not 

have been cross-admissible. Evidence that a defendant committed 

other crimes may be admissible when relevant to prove a fact such 

as motive, opportunity, intent or identity (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. 

(b)), but only when the offenses are sufficiently similar to prove the 

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fact at issue. “The greatest degree of similarity is required for 

evidence of uncharged misconduct to be relevant to prove identity. 

For identity to be established, the uncharged misconduct and the 

charged offense must share common features that are sufficiently 

distinctive so as to support the inference that the same person 

committed both acts. (People v. Miller [ (1990) ] 50 Cal.3d 954, 

987.) ‘The pattern and characteristics of the crimes must be so 

unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.’ (1 McCormick 

[on Evidence (4th ed. 1992) ] § 190, pp. 801–803.)” (People v. 

Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 403.) “The highly unusual and 

distinctive nature of both the charged and uncharged offenses 

virtually eliminates the possibility that anyone other than the 

defendant committed the charged offense.” (People v. Balcom

(1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 425.) 

A lesser degree of similarity is required where the uncharged 

offenses are used to establish the existence of a common design or 

plan: For this purpose, “the common features must indicate the 

existence of a plan rather than a series of similar spontaneous acts, 

but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual.” 

(People v. Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.) Other crimes 

evidence is admissible to show a common design or plan, however, 

“only to prove that the defendant engaged in the conduct alleged to 

constitute the charged offense, not to prove other matters, such as 

the defendant's intent or identity as to the charged offense.” (Ibid.) 

Where it is undisputed that the charged offense was committed by 

someone, and the only question is whether the defendant was the 

perpetrator, evidence sufficient to demonstrate a common plan but 

not distinctive enough to establish identity generally would not 

admissible because it would be cumulative and unduly prejudicial. 

(Id. at p. 406.) 

Appellant urges that the offenses with which he was charged were 

“garden variety type robberies,” none involving common features 

that were sufficiently distinctive to make them admissible. This 

characterization downplays the overall similarities between the 

incidents: All occurred in a relatively small geographical area, 

within less than six weeks of each other, at similar times of day, 

perpetrated by a man wearing dark clothing and a beanie or billed 

cap who engaged in small talk with an employee, then came to the 

register, gave the impression or stated he was armed but in fact was 

not, and, when the register was opened, grabbed the money and left. 

In three of the four incidents, the perpetrator was described as 

having a Band–Aid on his upper cheek (although Crane initially 

told the 911 operator the Band–Aid was above his eye, then said it 

was below his eye). 

We need not determine whether the evidence would have been 

cross-admissible because, as indicated above, even if it was not, the 

lack of cross-admissibility would not necessarily mean the trial 

court abused its discretion in denying severance. (People v. Myles, 

supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) Here, consideration of the other 

factors bearing on severance demonstrates that it did not. 

 

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Two of the remaining factors clearly militate in favor of 

consolidation. None of the charges was likely to unusually inflame 

the jury against the defendant (People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 

p. 1202), as the charged offenses were of the same type, with 

similar facts and no egregious circumstances in any of the four 

incidents. And none of the charges involved a capital offense. 

(Ibid.) The only real question is whether the joint trial permitted 

weak charges to be bolstered by strong ones. 

This is the heart of appellant's argument - that the attempted 

robbery counts were supported by strong evidence in the form of 

the surveillance video and clothing seized from his home, while the 

robbery charges were weak because they rested purely on 

eyewitness testimony that appellant challenges as tainted and 

unreliable. The trial court disagreed, finding that although the 

video was strong evidence, the cases based solely on eyewitness 

testimony were not weak because the witnesses were close to 

appellant during the incidents and identified him on multiple 

occasions. 

We find no abuse of discretion. As will be discussed in the 

following section of this opinion, appellant's challenges to the 

eyewitness testimony are unavailing. All of the witnesses were in 

close contact with the perpetrator during the incidents. All but one 

(one of the two witnesses in the Fallas robbery) identified appellant 

at trial. All the witnesses in the Sally's, Entenmann's and Fallas 

robberies identified appellant in both the photographic and the live 

lineups. The only witnesses who did not identify appellant in one 

of the two pretrial identification procedures were the witnesses in 

the Tommy Bahamas attempted robbery (the incident captured on 

video), one of whom picked a different person in the photographic 

lineup (but identified appellant in the live lineup) and the other of 

whom picked someone different at the live lineup (but identified 

appellant in the photographic lineup and in a still photograph of the 

live lineup). The defense at trial tried to undermine the credibility 

of these identifications; the various factors bearing on the witnesses' 

ability to accurately perceive and remember the events, and the 

opportunities for mistakes, were pointed out on cross-examination, 

through expert testimony and in argument. We find no reason to 

believe the jury would not have credited the eyewitness testimony if 

it had not also had the benefit of the surveillance video and clothing 

from the Tommy Bahamas case. “[T]he benefits of joinder are not 

outweighed - and severance is not required - merely because 

properly joined charges might make it more difficult for a 

defendant to avoid conviction compared with his or her chances 

were the charges to be separately tried. (E.g., Zafiro v. United 

States (1993) 506 U.S. 534, 540 [“[D]efendants are not entitled to 

severance merely because they may have a better chance of 

acquittal in separate trials”]; accord, [State v.] Richards [ (Mont. 

1995) ] 906 P.2d 222, 227.)” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 781.) 

Finally, we must consider the benefits to the state from jointly 

trying these cases. (People v. Myles, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1201.) 

In addition to the case-specific benefits that accrue when there is an 

overlap in the evidence pertaining to the joined counts (Soper, 

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supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 783), such benefits include conserving 

judicial resources and public funds: “A unitary trial requires a 

single courtroom, judge, and court attaches. Only one group of 

jurors need serve, and the expenditure of time for jury voir dire and 

trial is greatly reduced over that required were the cases separately 

tried. In addition, the public is served by the reduced delay on 

disposition of criminal charges both in trial and through the 

appellate process.” (People v. Bean [,supra,] 46 Cal.3d [at pp.] 

939–940; Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 781–783.) “Manifestly, 

severance of properly joined charges denies the state the substantial 

benefits of efficiency and conservation of resources otherwise 

afforded by section 954.” (Soper, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 782.) 

Appellant relies upon People v. Earle (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 372 

(Earle) to argue these benefits are minimal in the present case. 

Earle found a prejudicial abuse of discretion in the refusal to sever 

two “entirely distinct and dissimilar” cases with “no apparent 

historical connection to one another,” one a very strong (indeed, 

“tacitly conceded”) misdemeanor indecent exposure case and the 

other a “considerably stronger” felony sexual assault. (Id. at p. 

378.) The indecent exposure occurred in broad daylight, the victim 

recorded the perpetrator's license plate, which belonged to the 

defendant's car, and the victim identified the defendant from a 

properly conducted photographic lineup. (Ibid.) The sexual 

assault, on the other hand, happened at night in a car lit only by 

overhead parking lot lights, the victim's description of her assailant 

differed markedly from the defendant's appearance,10 there were 

discrepancies regarding the victim's description of the car involved 

in the incident and the defendant's car, and the defendant was “a 

world-class competitor in the sport of ‘submission grappling,’” yet 

during the incident, the victim was able to break her assailant's 

grasp and escape from the vehicle in which he was trying to subdue 

her. (Earle, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 378–379.) Although the 

indecent exposure was not relevant to any issue in the trial of the 

assault, the prosecutor explicitly asked the jury to convict the 

defendant of the assault based on his commission of the unrelated 

indecent exposure, likening the latter to DNA evidence and 

“‘modus operandi’” despite the absence of any evidence that a 

person who engages in indecent exposure has a propensity or 

predisposition to commit a sexual assault. (Id. at pp. 379, 398–

400.) 

 

 10 The victim described her assailant as looking Mexican, with “light brown skin 

resembling her own,” whereas the defendant was described by a police officer as “white,” had a 

“pallid, European appearance” in photographs, and apparently looked European to the victim of 

the indecent exposure, as indicated by the photographs in a lineup resulting from her description; 

she described the assailant as “skinny” while the defendant had an “athletic build”; and the victim 

did not describe notable physical characteristics of the defendant, including “a deeply furrowed 

brow and protruding, possibly damaged ears” and “an unmistakably athletic bull neck.” (Earle, 

supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 378–379.) 

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Considering the many significant weaknesses in the assault case -

which the court took pains to detail at great length - and the bias 

against the defendant likely instilled in the jury by the virtually 

conceded indecent exposure and the prosecutor's “pervasive 

reliance upon it” (Earle, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401–407, 

409), as well as the absence of any overlap in evidence or 

witnesses, the Earle majority held that the “systemic economies” of 

joint trial could not “counterbalance the very substantial risk that 

evidence of the indecent exposure played a dispositive role in the 

verdict on the assault charge.” (Id. at p. 408.) 

The present case involves nothing like the extreme disparity in 

strength between the cases for which severance was sought in 

Earle: As we have said, while the evidence in the Tommy Bahamas 

case was strengthened by the surveillance video and seized 

clothing, the eyewitness testimony in the other cases was still 

strong. Nor does the present case present the risk of irrelevant 

emotional bias that drove the court's analysis in Earle. Even the 

Earle court highlighted the systemic benefits resulting from a joint 

trial, stressing their importance although finding them overcome, in 

that case, by the defendant's right to a fair trial, without the jury 

hearing otherwise inadmissible and inflammatory evidence. (Earle, 

supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 408–409.) Here, there is no 

comparable risk of prejudice to outweigh the benefits of a joint 

trial. 

Bazemore, 2013 WL 3778353, at **6-12. 

 The question presented in this federal habeas corpus petition is whether the state appellate 

court’s adjudication of this issue resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. Federal habeas relief is appropriate 

for claims of improper joinder only where the “simultaneous trial of more than one offense . . . 

actually render[ed] petitioner’s state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due 

process.” Sandoval v. Calderon, 241 F.3d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Featherstone v. 

Estelle, 948 F.2d 1497, 1503 (9th Cir. 1991)). See also Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 

(9th Cir. 2004); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000). As the United States 

Supreme Court has explained, “[i]mproper joinder does not, in itself, violate the Constitution.” 

United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 n.8 (1986). “Rather, misjoinder would rise to the level 

of a constitutional violation only if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth 

Amendment right to a fair trial.” Id. “The requisite level of prejudice is reached only if the 

impermissible joinder had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the 

jury’s verdict.” Davis, 384 F.3d at 638 (quoting Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772). 

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 A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on severance motions. Herd v. Kincheloe, 800 

F.2d 1526, 1529 (9th Cir. 1986). The relevant factors are judicial economy and prejudice. United 

States v. Lewis, 787 F.2d 1318, 1320 n.3 (9th Cir.), amended 798 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1986). A 

reviewing court must consider: (1) whether strong evidence of one count is presented with 

relatively weak evidence on another count; (2) whether the evidence of the other count is crossadmissible; and (3) whether the state trial court admonished the jury as to the limited use of the 

other crimes evidence. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1084-86 (9th Cir. 1998). Even if 

the evidence is not cross-admissible, joinder generally does not result in prejudice if the evidence 

of each crime is simple and distinct and the jury is properly instructed so that it may 

compartmentalize the evidence. Id. at 1085-86; see also United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 

1071 (9th Cir. 1987). 

 Under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

petitioner’s severance motion. As the state appellate court found, the evidence on all counts 

against petitioner was relatively strong and some of the evidence on all of the charges was crossadmissible. Even assuming arguendo that the state trial court erred in denying petitioner’s 

motion for severance, the misjoinder did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence 

in determining the jury’s verdict.” Davis, 333 F.3d at 991 (quoting Sandoval, 241 F.3d at 772). 

Nor did the trial court’s failure to sever the Tommy Bahama counts “actually render [his] state 

trial fundamentally unfair.” Featherstone, 948 F.2d at 1502. See also Herring v. Meachum, 11 

F.3d 374, 377 (2nd Cir. 1993) (“In considering whether a violation of due process occurred, the 

emphasis must be on the word ‘actually.’”). The crimes charged against petitioner were clearly 

distinct and the jury should have been easily able to distinguish the evidence introduced with 

respect to one charge from that introduced in the others. There is no evidence that the jury was 

confused or was unable to consider separately the evidence which pertained to each charged 

crime. The evidence supporting petitioner’s convictions was not materially unequal, none of the 

offenses was significantly more inflammatory than the other, and there was sufficient evidence to 

support a conviction of each offense without use of evidence introduced in connection with the 

other. 

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 The court also notes that the United States Supreme Court has never squarely held that a 

trial court’s failure to provide separate trials on different charges implicates the defendant’s right 

to due process of law. See Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the 

petitioner’s argument that Lane provides “clearly established federal law” governing a state 

court's denial of a motion to sever the trials of defendants who present mutually antagonistic 

defenses); Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 776-77 (9th Cir. 2012) (same). Thus, petitioner 

cannot show that the state court decision denying his claim of improper severance is contrary to 

or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority. “[I]t cannot be said 

that a state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law” when Supreme Court 

precedent “give[s] no clear answer to the question presented.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 

120, 126 (2008) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

 Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his 

claim of improper joinder. 

B. Identification Procedures

 In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that unduly suggestive pretrial 

identification procedures violated his right to due process and a fair trial. ECF No. 1 at 13-14; 

ECF No. 17-9 at 120-27. He argues that trial witnesses Martinez, Caballero and Crane may have 

identified him at the photographic and live lineups only because they were previously shown a 

still photograph of him that had been extracted from the Tommy Bahama surveillance video. 

ECF No. 17-9 at 121; ECF No. 18 at 6. He argues his face was “familiar” to these witnesses 

because they had seen his photograph prior to the lineups. ECF No. 18 at 6. Petitioner contends 

that “the showing of suspects singly to a witness for identification is ‘[o]ne of the most 

condemned pretrial identification procedures.’” ECF No. 17-9 at 121. 

 Petitioner also notes that witnesses Caballero and Crane identified him at a live lineup 

after they had seen both the photograph from the Tommy Bahama surveillance video and a photo 

lineup containing his photograph. Id. at 123. Petitioner states that he was “the only person who 

was included in both the photo lineups, and the live lineup.” Id. He argues this fact contributes 

to the suggestive nature of the identifications that occurred in this case. Petitioner explains: 

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Here, the witnesses were shown a still photo which came from a 

surveillance video. Later, they were shown a photo lineup 

containing [petitioner’s] picture, and later still, were asked to 

identify [petitioner] from a live lineup in which all the subjects 

were wearing jail clothing and [petitioner] was the only person 

whose likeness had also been included in the photo lineup. 

Id. at 124. Petitioner argues that under the totality of the circumstances his identification by 

witnesses Martinez, Caballero and Crane was not reliable. 

 In the traverse, petitioner states that the single photograph shown to these witnesses was in 

the form of a Vacaville Police Dept. flyer, which is attached to the traverse. ECF No. 18 at 11. 

The flyer contains a photograph of a man entering a store, with the words “211 PC suspect” 

written in bold at the top of the page.11 Id. Petitioner argues that the flyer was “so impermissibly 

suggestive that it caused defendant to stand out in a way that it would suggest the witness should 

select him.” Id. at 6-7. He points out that the state appellate court opined the showing of a single 

photograph of petitioner to witnesses was “possibly” suggestive. Id. at 6. 

 Petitioner also argues that the pretrial identification procedures used with witness Kerwin 

were impermissibly suggestive. ECF No. 17-9 at 126. He notes that Kerwin identified him from 

the photo lineup but chose a different person at a subsequent live lineup. Id. Two weeks later, 

Kerwin was asked to come back to the police station to review a photograph of the live lineup 

without petitioner or his representative being present. Id. Petitioner notes that no other witnesses 

were asked to go to the police department after the photo and live lineups were conducted. Id. 

He argues it is likely Kerwin identified petitioner because he recognized him from the earlier 

lineups. 

 In sum, petitioner argues, “[t]he identifications of [petitioner] by Martinez, Crane, 

Caballero and Kerwin were not strong, and were not sufficiently reliable, considering the totality 

of circumstances, to negate the taint caused by the unduly suggestive pre-trial identification 

procedures.” Id. at 127. 

///// 

 

11 It is not clear whether these words were contained on the photograph shown to Martinez, 

Caballero and Crane. 

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 1. State Court Decision

 The California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as follows: 

Prior to trial, appellant moved to exclude in-court identifications by 

Martinez, Crane, Caballero and Kerwin on the grounds that 

identification by these witnesses had been tainted by unduly 

suggestive pretrial identification procedures. The trial court denied 

the motion, finding that appellant failed to meet his burden of 

showing that the procedures were unduly suggestive and 

unnecessary or that the ultimate identification was not reliable. 

Appellant now argues that his constitutional rights to due process 

and a fair trial were violated by the use of impermissibly suggestive 

pretrial identification procedures. His claim is based on the facts 

that the witnesses in the Sally's and Entenmann's robberies were 

shown a surveillance photograph of the suspect in the Tommy 

Bahamas robbery before they identified appellant in photo and live 

lineups; that appellant was the only subject included in both the 

photographic lineups and live lineups; and that one of the victims in 

the Tommy Bahamas attempted robbery identified someone other 

than appellant in the live lineup, then later identified appellant in a 

photograph of the live lineup after being requested to come to the 

police station. 

We apply the independent standard of review to a trial court's 

determination that a pretrial identification procedure was not 

unduly suggestive. (People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 609, 

disapproved on other grounds in People v. Williams (2010) 49 

Cal.4th 405, 459.) “In order to determine whether the admission of 

identification evidence violates a defendant's right to due process of 

law, we consider (1) whether the identification procedure was 

unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and, if so, (2) whether the 

identification itself was nevertheless reliable under the totality of 

the circumstances, taking into account such factors as the 

opportunity of the witness to view the suspect at the time of the 

offense, the witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense, 

the accuracy of his or her prior description of the suspect, the level 

of certainty demonstrated at the time of the identification, and the 

lapse of time between the offense and the identification. (Manson 

v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 104–107, 114; Neil v. Biggers

(1972) 409 U.S. 188, 199–200; People v. Ochoa [ (1998) ] 19 

Cal.4th 353, 412; People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1216; 

People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242.) [¶] The 

defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of an 

unreliable identification procedure. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 19 

Cal.4th 353, 412; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1222.) 

‘The question is whether anything caused defendant to “stand out” 

from the others in a way that would suggest the witness should 

select him.’ (People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 367.)” 

(People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 989–990.) 

Appellant argues that it is likely Martinez, the witness in the Sally's 

robbery, identified appellant at the lineups not because she 

recognized him from the incident but because his face was familiar 

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from the surveillance photograph the police showed her. He 

emphasizes that Martinez recognized the photo was from a 

surveillance camera, that she recognized the subject's build but not 

his face, and that the photograph depicts a man with a mustache 

while at the time of the robbery Martinez described the suspect as 

clean shaven. 

Courts have noted the danger that a witness who first identifies a 

suspect from photographs may base a subsequent identification on 

the memory of the photograph rather than of the incident itself. 

(Simmons v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 377, 383.) Use of a 

single photograph for identification is particularly problematic 

because of the suggestion it conveys to the witness that the police 

believe the person in the photograph is the suspect. (People v. 

Contreras (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 813, 820; see, Simmons, supra, 

390 U.S. at p. 383; Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 432 U.S. at pp. 

107–109.) 

But photographic identifications play a critical role in criminal 

investigations. As Simmons explained, “[d]espite the hazards of 

initial identification by photograph, this procedure has been used 

widely and effectively in criminal law enforcement, from the 

standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent 

suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to 

exonerate them through scrutiny of photographs. The danger that 

use of the technique may result in convictions based on 

misidentification may be substantially lessened by a course of 

cross-examination at trial which exposes to the jury the method's 

potential for error.” (Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 U.S. at 

p. 384.) Identifications based on a single photograph may play a 

necessary and valid role in an investigation, and the fact that a 

witness first identified the defendant from a single photograph does 

not necessarily impermissibly taint a subsequent identification. 

(People v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 273; Wilson v. 

Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 751, 757; People v. Greene

(1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 622, 644–645.) “[E]ach case must be 

considered on its own facts, and . . . convictions based on 

eyewitness identification at trial following a pretrial identification 

by photograph will be set aside on that ground only if the 

photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification.” (Simmons, supra, 390 U.S. at p. 

384.) 

People v. Johnson is particularly apt. There, police were 

investigating a series of robberies or attempted robberies of gas 

stations in the Sacramento area. Still photographs taken from the 

video surveillance recording of one of these incidents were shown 

to the victim of an uncharged incident, and she recognized the 

subject in the photographs as the person who attempted to rob her. 

(People v. Johnson, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 271.) She 

subsequently identified the defendant in a live lineup. (Ibid.) 

Rejecting the contention that use of the photographs before the live 

lineup improperly tainted the witness's identification, the court first 

noted that because the photographs were not part of the record, it 

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did not know exactly what they depicted and therefore could not 

determine what prejudicial effect they could have had on the 

subsequent identification. (Id. at pp. 272–273.) The court then 

stated, “We certainly cannot say the procedure was unnecessary. A 

police sergeant from a different jurisdiction asked Mar to view the 

photos based on the similarity in the crimes and in order to solve 

the crime against Mar.” (Id. at p. 273.) 

In the present case, Vallejo Police Officer Polen circulated the 

surveillance photograph from the attempted robbery at Tommy 

Bahamas to other agencies, and Fairfield Police Officer 

Trojanowski showed the photograph to victims of robberies that 

occurred in his jurisdiction. There is nothing inherently suggestive 

about the photograph: It simply depicts a man walking into a 

clothing store, with the store door part way open behind him. 

Given the background of the photograph, it could not have been 

used in a photographic lineup because other photographs would 

necessarily have had different backgrounds.12 There was nothing 

unreasonable about Officer Trojanowski attempting to determine 

whether the attempted robbery suspect seen in the surveillance 

photograph was the same person responsible for the Fairfield 

robberies. 

Appellant emphasizes that Martinez recognized the photograph she 

was shown as a surveillance photograph. But this in itself is not 

suggestive. The purpose of a surveillance camera aimed at a store's 

door is to capture images of persons entering and leaving the store; 

any customer visiting the store would be so documented. 

Appellant's description of Martinez having testified that she 

recognized the build of the person in the surveillance photograph 

but not his face overstates the testimony. Martinez testified that she 

recognized the person's build and that she did not remember 

whether she recognized his face or did not recognize it. Martinez 

did describe appellant to the police as clean-shaven while the 

surveillance photograph shows a man with a mustache, but this 

discrepancy is not sufficient to conclude the surveillance 

photograph was unduly suggestive. The other discrepancies that 

appellant notes are that Martinez described the suspect as five foot 

nine inches tall and about 40 years old, while appellant was “about” 

six feet tall and 51 years old. Neither of these is so far off as to 

undermine the reliability of the identification. Rather, these were 

the kind of factors the jury was instructed to consider in 

determining the credibility of eyewitness testimony. (CALCRIM 

No. 31510; see Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at 

p. 757 [discrepancy between witness estimate of height (five feet 

six inches) and actual height (six feet two inches) “may cast doubt 

on the victim's credibility and the defense can rightly draw a jury's 

attention to them”].) 

 12 Officer Trojanowski testified that in preparing a photographic lineup, he tries to make 

the photographs as similar as possible in terms of factors such as age, race, skin tone and 

background. (RT 290). When he prepared the photographic lineup he used in this case, he did not 

use the surveillance photograph because the background would have been different from other 

photos. (RT 290). 

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Martinez had ample opportunity to observe appellant at the time of 

the robbery. She testified that the store was well lit, and she talked 

to him first from about six feet away and then, upon his return, from 

across the counter at the register. Although she looked down once 

she realized a robbery was underway, she and appellant initially 

were looking straight at each other. There is no basis for us to 

conclude her identifications from the photographic lineup, live 

lineup and at trial were not reliable. 

With respect to the witnesses in the Entenmann's robbery, Caballero 

and Crane, appellant notes that neither was able to positively 

identify the suspect from the photographic lineup, indicating only 

that appellant “could be” the robber but they were “not a hundred 

percent sure”; that appellant was the only person included in both 

the photographic and live lineup, and that all the subjects in the live 

lineup were wearing jail jump suits. He further points to 

Cabellero's description of the suspect as about 30 years old, 20 

years younger than appellant's actual age; her testimony that she did 

not realize appellant was bald until she saw him at the live lineup; 

and the facts that Crane was not wearing her glasses at the time of 

the robbery and told the 911 operator first that the Band Aid on the 

suspect's face was above his eye, then that it was below his eye. 

Again, the discrepancies to which appellant points were factors for 

the jury's consideration, and the defense emphasized these and other 

similar points on cross-examination and in closing argument. 

“[T]he fact that defendant alone appeared in both a photo lineup 

and a subsequent live lineup does not per se violate due process.” 

(People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1355.) A defendant bears 

the burden of showing that an identification procedure was unduly 

suggestive and unfair “as a demonstrable reality, not just 

speculation.” (People v. DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1222.) As 

indicated above, due process is violated “only if the identification 

procedure is ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very 

substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’” (People v. 

Cook, at p. 1355, quoting Simmons v. United States, supra, 390 

U.S. at p. 384.) 

In arguing that the subsequent identifications were tainted by the 

witnesses first being shown the surveillance photograph, appellant 

attempts to distinguish People v. Hernandez (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 

639 (Hernandez), a case rejecting such a challenge. In Hernandez, 

the witness was first shown a photographic lineup that did not 

include the defendant's photograph and did not identify anyone. He 

was later shown another photographic lineup and stated that the 

defendant's photograph looked “more like” the burglar than any of 

the others. The detective, informed that the burglar was wearing a 

cap, showed the witness a single photograph of the defendant 

wearing a hat. The witness still did not make a positive 

identification because “‘he had his hands up in front of his face and 

[the witness] couldn't get a good look at his face.’” (Id. at pp. 644–

645.) The witness identified the defendant at trial. (Id. at p. 653.) 

Upholding the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the incourt identification as the product of an unfair pretrial identification 

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procedure, Hernandez noted that the police did not initiate the 

identification procedure by showing a single photograph but 

showed it only after the witness pointed to the defendant's 

photograph in a lineup as most resembling the burglar, and that 

even with the single photograph, the identification was only 

tentative, “indicating that the showing of the single photo of 

defendant had no effect.” (Hernandez, supra, 204 Cal.App.3d at 

pp. 653–654.) Appellant argues that the present case is different 

because the police used the single photograph at the beginning of 

the identification procedure, and the witnesses' subsequent 

identifications were not tentative. While the distinctions appellant 

notes are accurate, they do not undermine our conclusion that 

appellant has not demonstrated that the use of the single photograph 

in this case was unduly suggestive or the subsequent identifications 

were unreliable. 

Bazemore, 2013 WL 3778353, at **12-15. 

 2. Applicable Law

 The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits the use of 

identification procedures which are “unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 

mistaken identification.” Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967), overruled on other grounds 

by Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 326 (1987). See also Boyer v. Chappell, 793 F.3d 1092, 

1100 (9th Cir. 2015). A suggestive identification violates due process if it was unnecessary or 

“gratuitous” under the circumstances. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972). An 

identification procedure is suggestive where it “[i]n effect . . . sa[ys] to the witness ‘This is the 

man.’” Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 443 (1969). “[E]ach case must be considered on its 

own facts” and whether due process has been violated depends on “the totality of the surrounding 

circumstances.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968) (citing Stovall, 388 U.S. at 

302). 

 In Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 716 (2012), the United States 

Supreme Court clarified that due process bars admission only of unreliable identifications arising 

from “improper law enforcement activity.” Id. at 720–21 (listing instances of improper police 

activity, such as rigging a lineup, showup, or photo six-pack). Case law makes clear that “what 

triggers due process concerns is police use of an unnecessarily suggestive identification 

procedure, whether or not they intended the arranged procedure to be suggestive.” Id. at 721 n.1. 

However, “even when the police use [a suggestive identification] procedure, suppression of the 

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resulting identification is not the inevitable consequence.” Id. at 719. Courts must assess each 

case to determine whether improper police conduct created a “substantial likelihood of 

misidentification.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 201. “Where the ‘indicators of [a witness’] ability to 

make an accurate identification’ are ‘outweighed by the corrupting effect’ of law enforcement 

suggestion, the identification should be suppressed.” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 719 (quoting Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 116 (1977)). 

 Factors indicating the reliability of an identification include: (1) the opportunity to view 

the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention (including any police 

training); (3) the accuracy of the prior description; (4) the witness’s level of certainty at the 

confrontation; and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. Brathwaite, 

432 U.S. at 114 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200). Additional factors to be considered in 

making this determination are “the prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the 

existence of any discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual 

description, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification by picture of 

the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the 

lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup identification.” United States v. Wade, 388 

U.S. 218, 241 (1967). The “central question,” is “whether under the ‘totality of the 

circumstances’ the identification is reliable even though the confrontation procedure was 

suggestive.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. See also United States v. Drake, 543 F.3d 1080, 1088 

(9th Cir. 2008). 

 If the flaws in the pretrial identification procedures are not so suggestive as to violate due 

process, “the reliability of properly admitted eyewitness identification, like the credibility of the 

other parts of the prosecution’s case is a matter for the jury.” Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 719; Foster, 

394 U.S. at 443 n.2. Absent improper law enforcement activity, “it suffices to test reliability 

through the rights and opportunities generally designed for that purpose,” such as “vigorous 

cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility of 

eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

Perry, 132 S.Ct. at 721, 727 (noting that “[m]ost eyewitness identifications involve some element 

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of suggestion,” as “all in-court identifications do”). See also Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116 

(“[j]uries are not so susceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of identification 

testimony that has some questionable feature”); United States v. Jones, 84 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (unless the procedure used is so suggestive that it raises a “very substantial likelihood 

of irreparable misidentification,” doubts go to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence 

and “identification evidence is for the jury to weigh”) (quoting United States v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 

584, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1982)). On the other hand, if an out-of-court identification is inadmissible 

due to unconstitutionality, a related in-court identification is also inadmissible unless the 

government establishes that it is reliable by introducing “clear and convincing evidence that the 

in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect other than the lineup 

identification.” Wade, 388 U.S. at 240. See also United States v. Hamilton, 469 F.2d 880, 883 

(9th Cir. 1972) (in-court identification admissible, notwithstanding inherent suggestiveness, 

where it was obviously reliable). Under the harmless error standard, a court must determine 

whether a constitutional error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining 

the jury's verdict.’” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (citation omitted).13

 3. Analysis

 Assuming arguendo that the pretrial identification procedures used in this case were 

impermissibly suggestive, the court concludes that the in-court identifications were nonetheless 

reliable because they were not likely to yield an “irreparable misidentification.” Manson, 432 

U.S. at 116 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 

 13 Under California law, an extrajudicial identification violates a defendant’s right to due 

process only if the identification procedure was unduly suggestive and unnecessary, and the 

identification itself, under the totality of the circumstances, was unreliable. People v. Carpenter, 

15 Cal.4th 312, 366-367 (1997). The defendant has the burden of showing the identification 

procedure was unfair “as a demonstrable reality, not just speculation.” People v. DeSantis, 2 

Cal.4th 1198, 1222 (1992). See also People v. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th 353, 412 (1998). If the 

challenged procedure is not impermissibly suggestive, the reviewing court’s inquiry into the due 

process claim ends. Ochoa, 19 Cal.4th at 412; DeSantis, 2 Cal.4th at 1224 n.8. The crucial 

question under California law is whether the defendant was singled out from the others in such a 

way that his identification was a foregone conclusion under the circumstances. People v. 

Faulkner, 28 Cal.App.3d 384, 391 (1972) disapproved on other grounds in People v. Hall, 28 

Cal.3d 143, 156, fn.8 (1980) and People v. Bustamonte, 30 Cal.3d 88, 102 (1981)). 

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 Rosa Martinez had ample opportunity to observe the robber. She testified that the robber 

came into the store a couple of times. ECF No. 17-6 at 166-67. He told her he was waiting for 

his wife to come in, walked around the store, and left. Id. at 167. He returned to the store 

approximately 30 minutes later. Id. Apparently recognizing the man, Martinez asked him 

whether his wife had come back and he responded that she was not coming in. Id. at 168. He 

grabbed a brush, walked to the register, and told Martinez he was there to rob her. Id. at 167-68. 

As related by the California Court of Appeal, the store was well lit, Martinez had several 

conversations with the robber, she was only about six feet away from him during the first 

conversation and only a few feet away during the second conversation, and she was looking 

straight at him. Id. at 171-72. 

 Martinez’s description of the robber to the police matched petitioner’s description in 

several particulars, including the Band-Aid on his face. Id. at 180, 187-88. She identified 

petitioner in the courtroom without hesitation. Id. at 166. She also identified petitioner as the 

robber after seeing his photograph shortly after the robbery, at a later photo lineup, and at a live 

lineup. Id. at 180. Martinez was cross-examined extensively on her identification of petitioner as 

the robber. Id. at 181-90. 

 Carol Crane testified without hesitation that petitioner was the person who committed a 

robbery at the Entenmann’s Bakery. Id. at 271. He was the only customer in the store at that 

time. Id. at 272. She described in detail from memory the robber’s movements, actions, and 

statements after he entered the store. Id. at 272-77. Although she did not look at the robber for a 

long time, she was only a short distance from him, was facing him, and paid particular attention 

to him because he had a Band-Aid on his face. Id. at 273. She saw his face clearly and when he 

told her he was armed, she looked at him “face on.” Id. at 273, 277. The store was well lit during 

these events. Id. at 273. Crane was also cross-examined about her ability to identify petitioner as 

the robber. Id. at 285-86. 

 Natalie Caballero also testified without hesitation that petitioner was the person who 

robbed the Entenmann’s store. Id. at 250, 264. She was able to describe in detail the robber’s 

movements, appearance, and statements after he entered the store. Id. at 250-56. She was the 

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employee who waited on the robber. Id. at 251-52. The robber asked her about some of the 

merchandise while Caballero was standing approximately an arm’s length from him. Id. at 252. 

Caballero also remembered that the robber had a Band-Aid on his face. Id. at 259. Caballero was 

thoroughly cross-examined about her ability to identify petitioner as the robber. Id. at 265-67. 

 Sean Kerwin testified without hesitation that petitioner was the person who robbed the 

Tommy Bahama store. Id. at 195. He also described in detail the events surrounding that 

robbery, including the robber’s description, actions, and statements. Id. at 196, et seq. Kerwin 

talked to the robber “eye to eye or face to face.” It was “pretty bright” in the store and he could 

see the robber easily. Id. at 201-02. He identified the robber from a photographic lineup after 

having seen a surveillance photo of the robber that his corporate office had sent. Id. at 202-03. 

As noted by the California Court of Appeal, Kerwin originally identified someone other than 

petitioner at a live lineup, but later identified petitioner after seeing a photograph of the live 

lineup he had previously seen. 

 All of the victims’ descriptions of the robber to the police shortly after the robberies 

occurred were reasonably accurate. All of them had ample opportunity to view the robber at 

close range for at least several minutes and engaged in short conversations with him. They all 

agreed that petitioner was the person who had robbed them. They all identified petitioner at trial 

without apparent hesitation. It appears from the testimony of these victims that their in-court 

identification of petitioner was based on their memory of the robber at the time of the crimes and 

not on the out-of-court identifications. Under the “totality of the circumstances,” this court 

concludes that the in-court identifications of witnesses Crane, Martinez, Caballero and Kerwin 

were reliable. Any discrepancies between petitioner’s actual appearance and the descriptions of 

the robber given by these witnesses to the police were thoroughly explored during crossexamination, as were all other possible weaknesses in their testimony. In this case, the indicators 

of the witnesses’ ability to make an accurate identification are not “outweighed by the corrupting 

effect” of law enforcement suggestion. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 719. 

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 Because the in-court identifications of petitioner by the witnesses were not unreliable, 

petitioner is not entitled to relief on his challenges to the victims’ identification of him as the 

perpetrator of the robberies. The decision of the California Court of Appeal to the same effect is 

not “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. 

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

 Petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 

investigate and present an alibi defense for the Fallas Paredes robbery and in failing to challenge 

the application of the Three Strikes Law to his case. After setting forth the applicable legal 

principles, the court will evaluate these claims in turn below. 

 1. Applicable Legal Standards

 The applicable legal standards for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel are set forth 

in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To succeed on a Strickland claim, a defendant 

must show that (1) his counsel's performance was deficient and that (2) the “deficient 

performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. Counsel is constitutionally deficient if his or 

her representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” such that it was outside 

“the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. at 687–88 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). “Counsel’s errors must be ‘so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 

fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687). 

 A reviewing court is required to make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of 

hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 

conduct from counsel's perspective at the time.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 669; see Richter, 131 

S.Ct. at 789. Reviewing courts must also “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct 

falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 

This presumption of reasonableness means that the court must “give the attorneys the benefit of 

the doubt,” and must also “affirmatively entertain the range of possible reasons [defense] counsel 

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may have had for proceeding as they did.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011) 

(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). 

 Defense counsel has a “duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Counsel 

must, “at a minimum, conduct a reasonable investigation enabling him to make informed 

decisions about how best to represent his client.” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1035 (9th 

Cir. 1995) (quoting Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal citation and 

quotations omitted). See also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (counsel’s failure to 

take “even the first step of interviewing witnesses or requesting records” and ignoring “pertinent 

avenues for investigation of which he should have been aware” constituted deficient 

performance). “A lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence, 

records that demonstrate his client's factual innocence, or that raise sufficient doubt as to that 

question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.” Vaga v. Ryan, 

735 F.3d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 

1999)). 

 On the other hand, where an attorney has consciously decided not to conduct further 

investigation because of reasonable tactical evaluations, his or her performance is not 

constitutionally deficient. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 734 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Siripongs II); Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998); Hensley v. Crist, 67 

F.3d 181, 185 (9th Cir. 1995). “A decision not to investigate thus ‘must be directly assessed for 

reasonableness in all the circumstances.’” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (200) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691). Furthermore, “‘ineffective assistance claims based on a duty to 

investigate must be considered in light of the strength of the government’s case.’” Bragg v. 

Galaza, 242 F.3d 1082, 1088 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Eggleston v. United States, 798 F.2d 374, 

376 (9th Cir. 1986)). See also Rhoades v. Henry, 638 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2011) (counsel 

did not render ineffective assistance in failing to investigate or raise an argument on appeal where 

“neither would have gone anywhere”). 

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 Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 

Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 792. A reviewing court “need not first determine whether counsel’s 

performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 

the alleged deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 

lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

 Under AEDPA, “[t]he pivotal question is whether the state court's application of the 

Strickland standard was unreasonable.” Id. at 785. “[B]ecause the Strickland standard is a 

general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has 

not satisfied that standard.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). 

 2. Alibi Defense

 In his third ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to thoroughly investigate an alibi for the robbery committed on March 4, 

2008 at the Fallas Paredes clothing store in Vacaville, California. ECF No. 1 at 28. Petitioner 

explains that he was out of the state at the time of the robbery attending his stepson’s basketball 

game and that he gave his trial counsel “witnesses and documentation that enabled her to obtain 

evidence of time, date, and places that would prove and corroborate defendant’s alibi.” That 

evidence includes: (1) pictures obtained “from the internet” showing defendant attending his 

stepson’s basketball game in Seattle, Washington; (2) rental car receipts showing the rental and 

return of a rental car on the relevant dates; and (3) “interviews of witnesses by counsel’s 

investigator.” Id. Petitioner also alleges his trial counsel failed to investigate information that he 

was stopped by an Oregon police officer during his return back to California “which would have 

provided a documented time, date, and place that would have corroborated defendant’s alibi.” Id. 

He argues that all of this evidence would have proved that he did not commit the robbery at the 

Fallas Paredes store on March 4, 2008. Id. at 29. Petitioner also states that his trial counsel told 

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him she couldn’t continue with her investigation into petitioner’s alibi because her investigator 

had to take time off for surgery. Id. at 29. 

 In support of these allegations, petitioner has attached two defense investigation reports. 

The first report describes an interview with petitioner’s brother Raymond Bazemore wherein Mr. 

Bazemore stated that he used his credit card to rent a car for petitioner between 6:00 a.m. on 

February 27, 2008 until 6:00 a.m. on March 5, 2008, so that petitioner could drive to Seattle to 

watch his stepson play in a college basketball game. Id. at 32. Mr. Bazemore stated he did not 

see petitioner between the time he rented the car and the time he met him to return the car. Id. 

 The second defense investigative report describes an interview with petitioner’s wife, 

wherein she states that she accompanied petitioner to the Sacramento Airport to meet Raymond 

Bazemore at a car rental agency and that she, petitioner, and a friend of her son drove to Seattle to 

watch her son play basketball. Mrs. Bazemore further explains that petitioner returned the rental 

car to the Sacramento Airport on Wednesday morning. Although this report does not contain the 

dates the described events occurred, petitioner has added handwritten notations on the report 

indicating that the rental car was returned to the Sacramento Airport on the morning of March 5, 

2008, and that petitioner returned home from Seattle at approximately 12:00 a.m. on March 4, 

2008. Id. at 33.14

 Petitioner raised this claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California 

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition with citations to In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 

750, 767-69 (1993) (the court will not consider repetitious, piecemeal, or delayed claims) and 

People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995) (vague and conclusory claims that do warrant habeas 

relief will be dismissed). Id. at 34. 

 Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to this claim; i.e., that the result 

of the proceedings would have been different if his trial counsel had investigated an alibi defense 

with respect to the Fallas Paredes store. Petitioner has not provided copies of the pictures 

 14 In his habeas petition filed in the California Superior Court, petitioner’s handwritten 

notation reflected that he arrived home from Seattle at approximately 12:00 p.m. on March 4, 

2008. ECF No. 17-9 at 11. In the petition filed in this court, petitioner has crossed out “p.m.” 

and written “a.m.” above it. 

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obtained “from the internet” showing defendant attending his stepson’s basketball game in 

Seattle, Washington; rental car receipts showing the rental and return of a rental car on the 

relevant dates; or any proof that he was stopped by a state trooper on the way home from 

Seattle.15 The declaration of petitioner’s brother reflects that he did not see petitioner between the 

time he rented the car on February 27, 2008 and the time he met him to return the car on March 5, 

2008, after the robbery had taken place. Further, regardless of whether petitioner’s handwritten 

notations at the bottom of the investigation report describing the defense investigator’s interview 

with petitioner’s wife are accurate, the latest time petitioner returned from Seattle was 12:00 p.m. 

on March 4, 2008, which would have left him time to commit the robbery at the Fallas Paredes 

store on 7:20 p.m. on March 4. Under these circumstances, petitioner has failed to show his trial 

counsel would have presented or prevailed on an alibi defense with respect to this robbery 

 The court also notes that petitioner’s trial counsel was in possession of the investigative 

reports described above but chose, apparently for a tactical reason, not to pursue an alibi defense. 

Reasonable tactical decisions, including decisions with regard to the presentation of the case, are 

“virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-90. Because petitioner has failed to 

show either deficient performance or prejudice with respect to this claim, he is not entitled to 

federal habeas relief. 

 3. Three Strikes Law

 In his final ground for relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to challenge the application of California’s Three Strikes Law to his sentence. 

ECF No. 1 at 38-42. He explains that his trial counsel for the 2000 robbery case rendered 

ineffective assistance in giving him incorrect advice about the consequences of his guilty plea in 

the event of a future conviction. Trial counsel in the 2000 case apparently advised petitioner 

when he pled guilty that his conviction could result in only a one to five year enhancement to his 

sentence in the event of a future conviction. Id. at 38. Instead, as described above, petitioner’s 

 15 In his traverse, petitioner states that his trial counsel had the car rental agreement in 

her possession but chose not to present it at trial “for whatever reasons that were never made clear 

to petitioner.” ECF No. 18 at 8. 

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prior conviction was found to be a “strike” and contributed to petitioner’s lengthy sentence under 

the Three Strikes Law. In his claim before this court, petitioner is apparently arguing that his trial 

counsel in this case rendered ineffective assistance in failing to challenge the use of his prior 

conviction as a “strike” on the grounds that his trial counsel in 2000 rendered ineffective 

assistance in failing to inform him of the consequences of his plea. 

 Petitioner raised this claim in the California Superior Court. ECF No 17-8. The Superior 

Court denied the claim, reasoning as follows: 

In this petition, Petitioner contends that his robbery conviction in 

FCR181404 from 2000 was improperly used against him as a strike 

in [the instant case]. He seems to be claiming that his attorney in 

FCR 181404 performed deficiently (IAC) by failing to inform him 

of the strike consequences of his plea, thus rendering his conviction 

in FCR 181404 invalid. He also claims that his attorney in [the 

instant case] committed IAC by failing to challenge the application 

of the Three Strikes Law on this ground. 

Successive, delayed and piecemeal presentations of habeas claims 

constitute an abuse of the writ. (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 

769-70; In re Reno (Aug. 30, 2012, S124660) --- Cal. 4th --- [p. 

29].) Petitioner filed a habeas petition (case No. FCR 289524) on 

December 8, 2011 with this Court attacking the validity of his 

conviction in [the instant case] on various grounds, including IAC. 

Petitioner offers no justification for why the claims raised in this 

petition were not raised in his December 8, 2011 habeas petition, 

nor does he offer any justification for his delay in raising these 

claims. (Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 774 & 786-87; Reno, supra, --- Cal. 4th_--- [p. 29].) 

Even if Petitioner’s claims were properly before the Court, 

Petitioner fails to state a prima facie case for relief. (People v. 

Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 475.) 

First, Petitioner claims that his attorney in FCR 181404 committed 

IAC by failing to inform him of the strike consequences of his plea. 

However, Petitioner does not set forth any evidence to support that 

counsel in FCF 181404 failed to advise him that his conviction in 

that case could be used as a strike in the future. (Strickland v. 

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Petitioner also cites no 

authority to support that counsel’s failure to advise him of the 

potential strike consequences of his plea, a collateral consequence, 

constitutes ineffective assistance. (See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 

Cal.4th 557, 634; People v. Bernal (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1455, 

1457; People v. Crosby (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1355; People v. 

Sipe (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 468, 479; see also People v. Reed

(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 593, 597 & 601 (“[A]n attorney’s failure to 

inform his or her client of the collateral consequences of [a] plea 

does not constitute incompetent representation under the Strickland

criteria.”).) 

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Additionally, Petitioner presents no evidence whatsoever to 

establish prejudice, i.e. that he would have insisted on going to trial 

in FCR 181404 had counsel in that case advised him of the strike 

consequences of his conviction. (Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 

687.) Petitioner fails to offer any evidence showing that he was 

innocent or had some sort of defense to the charges in FCR 181404. 

Second, Petitioner fails to state a prima facie case for relief with 

regard to his claim that his attorney in [the instant case] committed 

IAC by failing to challenge the use of his conviction in FCR 

181404 as a strike on the aforementioned grounds. (Duvall, supra, 

9 Cal.4th at p. 475.) Petitioner has not shown that there is any valid 

basis for attacking the validity of his conviction in FCR 181404 

based on IAC or any other ground. 

This petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

Id. at 7-9. 

 Petitioner subsequently raised this claim in the California Court of Appeal, which 

summarily denied relief after soliciting a responsive brief from the state. ECF No. 17-9 at 39 - 

81. Petitioner next raised the claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the California 

Supreme Court. Id. at 177. The Supreme Court denied that petition with a citation to In re Clark, 

5 Cal.4th 750, 767-79 (1993). Id. at 199. 

 Respondent argues that the California Supreme Court’s citation to In re Clark constitutes 

a state procedural bar which precludes this court from addressing the merits of this ineffective 

assistance claim. ECF No. 16-1 at 17-18. As a general rule, “[a] federal habeas court will not 

review a claim rejected by a state court ‘if the decision of [the state] court rests on a state law 

ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.” Walker 

v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 314 (2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53 (2009). However, a 

reviewing court need not invariably resolve the question of procedural default prior to ruling on 

the merits of a claim. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1997); see also Franklin v. 

Johnson, 290 F.3d 1223, 1232 (9th Cir. 2002): (“Procedural bar issues are not infrequently more 

complex than the merits issues presented by the appeal, so it may well make sense in some 

instances to proceed to the merits if the result will be the same”); Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 

720 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting that although the question of procedural default should ordinarily be 

considered first, a reviewing court need not do so invariably, especially when the issue turns on 

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difficult questions of state law). Where deciding the merits of a claim proves to be less 

complicated and less time-consuming than adjudicating the issue of procedural default, a court 

may exercise discretion in its management of the case to reject the claim on the merits and forgo 

an analysis of procedural default. See Franklin, 290 F.3d at 1232 (citing Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 

525). Under the circumstances presented here, the court finds that petitioner’s claim can be 

resolved more easily by addressing it on the merits. Accordingly, the court will assume that the 

claim is not defaulted. 

 Petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing 

hearing should be rejected. The Strickland standards apply in the context of noncapital 

sentencing proceedings. Daire v. Lattimore, No. 12-55667 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 2016.) See also

Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 202-04 (2001); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1372, 1385-86 

(2012). However, petitioner has failed to demonstrate deficient performance or prejudice with 

respect to this claim. As respondent points out, under California law “a criminal defendant may 

not challenge a prior conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel in the course of 

a current prosecution for a noncapital offense.” Garcia v. Superior Court, 14 Cal.4th 953, 956 

(1997). Petitioner’s trial counsel did not render deficient performance in failing to make an 

argument that was improper under California law. Petitioner has also failed to provide sufficient 

support for his conclusory claim that his trial counsel in 2000 incorrectly advised him about the 

possible future consequences of his plea of guilty in that case, or that petitioner would have 

rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial if he had been correctly advised. Accordingly, there 

is no evidence that petitioner was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to make the sentencing 

argument he now suggests.16 

 For the foregoing reasons, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim. 

///// 

 16 Any claim that petitioner’s trial counsel in his 2000 criminal case rendered ineffective 

assistance is not cognizable in this proceeding. As a general rule, if a prior conviction used to 

enhance a state sentence is fully expired in its own right, the defendant may not collaterally attack 

his prior conviction through a § 2254 petition. Lackawanna County District Attorney v. Coss, 

532 U.S. 394, 403-04 (2001). 

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41

IV. Conclusion 

 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any reply to the objections 

shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. 

Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 

1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue 

in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a 

final order adverse to the applicant). 

DATED: July 26, 2016. 

Case 2:14-cv-00651-GEB-EFB Document 20 Filed 07/26/16 Page 41 of 41