Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00465/USCOURTS-almd-2_15-cv-00465-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James River Insurance Company
Plaintiff
Mickey Phillips
Defendant
Retro, LLC
Defendant
Rewind
Defendant
Natalie Lina Richardson
Defendant
Jessica Lynn Tompkins
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

JAMES RIVER INSURANCE CO., )

) 

 Plaintiff, )

) 

 v. ) 

) 

CASE NO. 2:15-CV-465-WKW 

(WO) 

RETRO, LLC, et al., )

) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 Before the court is Plaintiff James River Insurance Company’s motion for 

summary judgment in this insurance coverage case. (Doc. # 39.) Also before the 

court is James River’s motion for the court to take judicial notice of the complaints 

in the underlying state court actions. (Doc. # 37.) Upon consideration of the 

motions, the court concludes that they are due to be granted as to Defendants 

Tompkins and Richardson. 

I. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 

Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

To succeed on summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate “that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 

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as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the evidence and 

the inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 

Jean–Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 820 (11th Cir. 2010). 

The party moving for summary judgment “always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion.” Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). This responsibility includes 

identifying the portions of the record illustrating the absence of a genuine dispute 

of material fact. Id. Alternatively, a movant who does not have a trial burden of 

production can assert, without citing the record, that the nonmoving party “cannot 

produce admissible evidence to support” a material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(1)(B); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (“Subdivision 

(c)(1)(B) recognizes that a party need not always point to specific record materials 

. . . . [A] party who does not have the trial burden of production may rely on a 

showing that a party who does have the trial burden cannot produce admissible 

evidence to carry its burden as to the fact.”). 

If the movant meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to 

establish—with evidence beyond the pleadings—that a genuine dispute material to 

each of its claims for relief exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. A genuine dispute of 

material fact exists when the nonmoving party produces evidence allowing a 

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reasonable fact finder to return a verdict in its favor. Waddell v. Valley Forge 

Dental Assocs., 276 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2001). 

III. UNDISPUTED FACTS1

In August 2009, James river issued an insurance policy (Doc. # 38-4 at 4–

61) to Defendant Retro, LLC, d/b/a Rewind (“Retro”), which operated a bar in 

Montgomery, Alabama called Rewind. The policy obligated James River to 

provide Retro and its member/manager, Defendant Mickey Phillips,2

 defense and 

indemnity in cases arising out of bodily injury occurring on Retro’s premises 

during the policy period.3

 (Doc. # 38-4 at 7.) However, pursuant to an assault and 

battery exclusion, James River had no duty to defend or indemnify with respect to 

bodily injury “arising out of, resulting from, or in connection with” the following: 

1. Assault or battery, whether or not caused by or at the 

instructions of, or at the direction of or negligence of [Retro], any 

insured, any person, or any causes whatsoever; 

2. The failure to suppress or prevent battery by [Retro], any 

insured, or any person; 

                                                             1

 The court has reviewed and takes judicial notice of the content of the state court records 

and the documents filed in the underlying tort cases. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 

1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a court may take judicial notice of the existence and contents 

of documents filed in another court, but not of the truth of the matters asserted therein). 

2

 Retro is the named insured on the policy. As a member and manager of the LLC, 

Phillips is also an insured with respect to conduct related to Retro’s business. (Doc. # 38-4 at 4, 

15.) 

3

 It is undisputed that the incidents giving rise to the coverage dispute occurred on 

Retro’s premises during the policy period. 

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3. The failure to provide an environment safe from assault or 

battery, including but not limited to the failure to provide adequate 

security, or the failure to warn of the dangers of the environment 

which could contribute to assault and battery; [or] 

4. The negligent employment, investigation, hiring, supervision, 

training, or retention of any person. 

(Doc. # 38-4 at 35.) 

 The policy defines assault and battery as follows: 

Assault includes, but is not limited to, assault, sexual abuse, sexual 

assault, intimidation, sexual harassment, verbal abuse, and any 

threatened harmful or offensive contact between two or more persons, 

whether or not caused or committed by or at the instructions of, or at 

the direction of or negligence of [Retro], any insured, any person, or 

any causes whatsoever. 

Battery includes, but is not limited to, battery, sexual abuse, sexual 

battery, sexual molestation, and any actual harmful or offensive 

contact between two or more persons, whether or not caused or 

committed by or at the instructions of, or at the direction of or 

negligence of [Retro], any insured, or any causes whatsoever. 

(Doc. # 38-4 at 35.) 

In consolidated state court cases filed in 2012, Jessica Lynn Tompkins and 

Natalie Lina Richardson sought judgments against Phillips and Cornell Nobles, Jr., 

for injuries arising out of incidents when Nobles attacked them while they were 

invitees on Retro’s premises.4

 In their complaints, they alleged that, prior to the 

assaults, Phillips knew Nobles had a history of violence and crime, including 

                                                             4

 According to the allegations of the state court complaints, Nobles attacked Tompkins on 

May 28, 2010, and Richardson on June 8, 2010. 

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assaults on women. They asserted the following claims against Phillips: 

negligence/premises liability (for improper lighting and security conditions); 

negligent supervision (for failing to implement and properly train employees in a 

security plan to protect patrons); failure to warn; and wantonness (in failing to keep 

the premises safe). (Doc. # 38-1; Doc. # 38-2.) 

IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

On July 2, 2015, James River filed this declaratory judgment action against 

Richardson, Tompkins, Retro, and Phillips. (Doc. # 1.) James River seeks a 

declaratory judgment that, pursuant to the terms of the assault and battery 

exclusion in the insurance policy, it owes no duty to defend or indemnify Retro or 

Phillips in the state court cases filed by Richardson and Tompkins. (Doc. # 1.) 

On October 15, 2016, the Clerk entered default against Retro and Phillips. 

(Doc. # 30.) On April 1, 2016, James River filed motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. # 39) and a motion for the court to take judicial notice of the complaints in 

the underlying actions. (Doc. # 37.) 

On April 26, 2016, the court held an off-the-record status and scheduling 

conference by telephone to address certain scheduling matters necessitated by the 

fact that Tompkins had obtained new counsel after one of her previous attorneys 

passed away. Counsel for James River and Tompkins participated in the 

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conference; Richardson had notice of the conference but was not represented at the 

conference. (Doc. # 47 at 1 n.1.) 

On May 16, 2016, Tompkins filed a response to the summary judgment 

motion. (Doc. # 48.) With commendable candor, Tompkins’s attorney stated that, 

under Alabama law, he could make no reasonable argument that James River owed 

coverage for the claims and injuries alleged in Tompkins’s complaint. Richardson 

did not respond to the motion for summary judgment. 

On May 23, 2016, James River filed a reply in support of its motion for 

summary judgment. (Doc. # 49.) The motion is now under submission. 

V. DISCUSSION 

The relevant facts are undisputed, the terms of the policy are unambiguous, 

and Alabama law is clear. Pursuant to the plain language of the assault and battery 

exclusion, James River owes no duty to defend or indemnify Retro or Phillips with 

respect to bodily injury “arising out of, resulting from, or in connection with” 

assault or battery, including but not limited to injuries arising from failure to 

prevent battery, failure to provide adequate security or provide a safe environment, 

failure to warn, and negligent supervision. (Doc. # 38-1 at 35.) 

Tompkins’s and Richardson’s injuries arise out of, result from, and were 

incurred in connection with assault and battery. Their state court claims consist of 

negligence in maintaining adequately secure and well-lit premises; negligent 

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supervision (specifically, failing to implement a policy and train employees to 

provide a safe environment and prevent battery); failure to warn; and wantonness 

in failing to keep the premises safe. Thus, Tompkins’s and Richardson’s injuries 

and state court claims are wholly excluded from coverage under the plain terms of 

the policy. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Alfa Mut. Ins. Co., 817 So. 2d 687, 691 (Ala. 

2001) (“A contract of insurance, like other contacts, is governed by the general 

rules of contracts. Insurance companies are entitled to have their policy contract 

enforced as written.” (citations omitted)); see Admiral Ins. Co. v. Pryce-Williams, 

129 So. 3d 991 (Ala. 2013) (holding, in a case involving injuries caused by an 

assault and battery that occurred on the insured’s premises, that an assault and 

battery exclusion precluded coverage for negligent and wanton failure to 

implement a risk-management program); Gregory v. W. World Ins. Co., 481 So. 2d 

878, 881 (Ala. 1985) (holding, in coverage case involving applicability of a similar 

exclusion to premises liability claims for injuries sustained in a bar fight, that “[i]t 

is not disputed that the bodily injury in question here was injury ‘arising out of 

assault and battery.’ The exclusion, therefore, being applicable, the trial court was 

correct in granting summary judgment for the [insurer].”). 

Although Tompkins has expressly stated that she does not oppose the 

motion and Richardson entirely failed to respond to it, the court does not base its 

summary judgment ruling on the fact that the motion is unopposed. Rather, having 

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considered James River’s motion and evidentiary submissions, the terms of the 

policy, the allegations and claims in the state court complaints, and governing 

Alabama law, the court concludes that James River met its burden to demonstrate 

that it is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of the law and the undisputed 

facts. United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 SW 74th Ave., 

Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1101 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that, where the 

opposing party fails to respond to a summary judgment motion, “the district court 

cannot base the entry of summary judgment on the mere fact that the motion was 

unopposed, but, rather, must consider the merits of the motion.”); see also Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(e) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to 

properly address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the 

court may . . . grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—

including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it.” 

(emphasis added)); Twin City Fire, 817 So. 2d at 691 (holding that an insurer “has 

the burden of proof in asserting that a claim is excluded under its policy of 

insurance”). 

Therefore, as a matter of law, James River is entitled to summary judgment. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Rhodes, 870 

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So.2d 695, 697 (Ala. 2003) (holding that, where the terms of an insurance policy 

are plain and unambiguous, the interpretation of the contract and its legal effect are 

questions of law for resolution by the court). 

VI. CONCLUSION 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff James River Insurance Company’s motion for the court to take 

judicial notice of the complaints in the underlying actions (Doc. # 37) is 

GRANTED. 

2. Plaintiff James River Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment 

(Doc. # 39) is GRANTED as to Defendants Jessica Lynn Tompkins and Natalie 

Lina Richardson. 

3. In accordance with Fed R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), on or before June 17, 2016, 

Plaintiff James River Insurance Company shall file an application for default 

judgment against Defendants Mickey Phillips and Retro, LLC. 

DONE this 9th day of June, 2016. 

 /s/ W. Keith Watkins 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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