Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cr-05287/USCOURTS-caed-1_95-cr-05287-34/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Wayne Arnett
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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Although the mandate was issued by the Clerk on September 23, 1

2005, it was not filed with this court until September 28, 2005.

However, for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(e), the 70-day clock

begins to run on the date the mandate is issued and not on the date

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

)

)

TIMOTHY WAYNE ARNETT, )

)

)

Defendant. )

)

)

No. CR-F-95-5287 OWW

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL OR

TO DISMISS INDICTMENT (Doc.

524), REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY

(Doc. 564), REQUESTS FOR

SUBPOENAS (Docs. 523, 575,

577), AND APPLICATION TO

PUBLISH DECISION (Doc. 536)

By motion filed on December 5, 2005, defendant Timothy Wayne

Arnett, proceeding in pro per, moves to dismiss the Indictment

charging him with seven counts of use of a firearm during a crime

of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on the ground that

he was not tried within seventy days of the issuance of the

mandate on September 23, 2005 by Deputy Clerk Candace Pemillion

of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Defendant filed a motion 1

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the district court receives it. United States v. Lloyd, 125 F.3d

1263, 1265 n.1 (9 Cir. 1997). th

Arnett’s appeal in this case was consolidated by the Ninth 2

Circuit with his appeal in No. 00-30189, which involved his appeal

from his conviction of armed bank robbery and violation of Section

924(c) in the District of Oregon in 1996. 

Judicial notice is taken of the Ninth Circuit’s docket. A 3

court is permitted to take judicial notice of court records in

another case, including court records available to the public

through the PACER system via the internet. See United States v.

Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n. 1 (9 Cir.2004); Jacobsen v. th

Schwarzenegger, 357 F.Supp.2d 1198, 1207 (C.D.Cal.2004).

2

for discovery in connection with this motion to dismiss. Arnett

has also applied for the issuance of personal subpoenas and/or

subpoenas duces tecum to Ninth Circuit Deputy Clerk Pemillion,

Ninth Circuit Deputy Appellate Clerk Wayne Price, and to David

Porter, Arnett’s attorney on appeal. Arnett requests an

evidentiary hearing with regard to this motion. Finally, Arnett

moves to the court to publish its decision resolving this motion

to dismiss in the Federal Supplement 2 .

nd

These motions are DENIED. The reasons stated herein are

intended to incorporate and amplify the reasons for denying these

motions stated in open court on July 6 and 20, 2006.

A. Background.

Arnett was convicted in the Eastern District of California

of seven counts of armed bank robbery and seven counts of

violation of Section 924(c) in 1998. Arnett appealed to the

Ninth Circuit, which appeal was assigned Case No. 00-10170.2

According to the Ninth Circuit’s docket the appeal was submitted

to Judges Trott, Rymer and Tallman on February 13, 2003. On 3

April 24, 2003, the three-judge panel filed an unpublished

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opinion affirming Arnett’s convictions on all counts. Arnett

then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which petition was

granted by Chief Judge Schroeder on October 3, 2002. By Order

filed on December 24, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed all

Arnett’s bank robbery convictions but reversed his convictions of

violation of Section 924(c) and remanded those convictions for

retrial. However, for purposes of the instant motion, it must be

noted that the Ninth Circuit actually issued a Memorandum and an

Order on December 24, 2003. The Memorandum affirms Arnett’s

convictions of armed bank robbery and notes: “In a separate

published opinion filed contemporaneously with this disposition,

we address Arnett’s argument that the district court erred in

applying collateral estoppel to bar relitigation of Arnett’s

affirmative defense.” See United States v. Arnett, 84 Fed.Appx.

939, 2003 WL 23095754 (9 Cir. 2003). The Order filed on th

December 24, 2003 states:

On November 25, 2003, only two weeks before

these eight-year old cases were scheduled for

oral argument before this en banc court, the

United States filed a supplemental brief in

which it confessed error on the collateral

estoppel issue:

In federal criminal trials, the

United States may not use

collateral estoppel to establish,

as a matter of law, an element of

an offense or to conclusively rebut

an affirmative defense on which the

Government bears the burden of

proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

In our Case No. 00-10170, the confession of

error affects each of the counts charging use

of a firearm during a crime of violence,

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The mandate was filed with this court on February 12, 2004 4

(Doc. 279). The order recalling the mandate was filed with this

court on February 13, 2004 (Doc. 280).

4

which are Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 14. 

The convictions on those counts are REVERSED,

and the case is REMANDED for retrial or other

appropriate disposition of those counts. The

convictions on Counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13

and 15 are AFFIRMED. The sentence imposed in

the judgment filed on March 29, 2000 is

VACATED pending further proceedings on

remand.

The memorandum disposition filed on April 24,

2003, which was withdrawn by this court’s

order of October 3, 2003, is hereby

reinstated. Any sentencing issues raised

under Apprendi v. New Jersey ..., may be

considered as necessary on remand.

According to the Ninth Circuit’s docket, Arnett filed a petition

for rehearing and rehearing en banc on January 7, 2004. By Order

filed on February 2, 2004, Arnett’s petition was denied. On

February 6, 2004, Arnett filed a motion to stay the mandate. On

February 10, 2004, according to the Ninth Circuit’s docket, the

mandate was issued. On February 10, 2004, the Deputy Clerk

recalled the mandate as issued in error. On February 11, 2004, 4

Arnett’s motion to stay the mandate was granted. On May 5, 2004,

Arnett filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme

Court. On June 7, 2004, the Supreme Court denied the petition,

which denial is recorded on the Ninth Circuit’s docket on June

14, 2004, stating: “Filed Supreme Court order, certiorari denied

on 6/7/04.” On June 21, 2004, Arnett filed an application in the

Ninth Circuit to stay the mandate until the Supreme Court decided

his petition for rehearing. On June 29, 2004, the Ninth

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At the hearing on July 6, 2006, Arnett represented that he 5

telephoned Candy Pemillion of the Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office to

5

Circuit’s docket states: “Received letter from the Supreme Court

dated 6/23/04 re: granting aplt an ext of time to file a petition

for rehearing to and including July 15, 2004.” The following is

then noticed on the Ninth Circuit’s docket in pertinent part:

8/6/04 Filed order (Stephen S. TROTT, Pamela

A. RYMER, Richard C. TALLMAN,): On 6/7/04,

the USSC denied cert in this case. The stay

of the mandate issued on 2/11/04 is lifted. 

The aplt’s motion to stay the mandate pending

the USSC’s decision on his petition for

rehearing is denied. The mandate shall issue

forthwith. in 00-10170, 0030189 ....

8/6/04 MANDATE ISSUED [00-10170, 00-30189]

....

8/9/04 Received letter from the Supreme Court

dated 8/2/04 re: order denying petition for

rehearing ....

9/23/05 AMENDED MANDATE ISSUED, DC called and

never received the mandate. [00-10170] ....

The mandate issued by the Ninth Circuit on September 23, 2005 and

filed with this court on September 28, 2005 states in pertinent

part:

On consideration where, it is now ordered and

adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of

the said District Court in this cause be, and

hereby is AFFIRMED.

Filed and entered 12/24/03

Attached is a copy of the Memorandum; the mandate does not

include a copy of the Order. As noted above, it is the Order

that reverses and remands Arnett’s Section 924(c) convictions in

this court.5

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advise her that the mandate issued on September 23, 2005 was

incorrect and that Ms. Pemillion responded that the mandate she

issued was “fine”. Arnett further represented that the mandate

issued on September 23, 2005 was misdocketed by the Eastern

District of California Clerk’s Office in Arnett’s 2004 appeal.

Arnett contended that this is evidence of a conspiracy to cover-up

error by the Clerk’s Office. Ms. Pemillion’s alleged opinion about

the efficacy of the mandate issued on September 23, 2005 is

irrelevant and cannot provide the basis for any estoppel. Arnett’s

assertion that the mandate was misdocketed by District Clerk’s

Office is not supported by the docket in this criminal action. His

suggestion of conspiracy is also unsupported by the record in this

action and is based solely on speculation. 

6

In the meantime, on February 2, 2004, AUSA Rice sent a

memorandum to Judge Coyle’s courtroom deputy, advising that the

Ninth Circuit had reversed and remanded the Section 924(c)

counts, and requesting that the action be placed on Judge Coyle’s

February 17, 2004 calendar for appointment of counsel or

determination whether Arnett would exercise his right to selfrepresentation (Doc. 276). On February 11, 2004. Arnett, acting

in pro per, filed a Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on Double

Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution (Doc. 277). 

Federal Defender David Porter, who had represented Arnett on

appeal, filed on February 12, 2004 an application to remove the

requested status conference from Judge Coyle’s calendar and to

return Arnett to federal prison because the mandate had not

issued, thereby depriving this court of jurisdiction (Doc. 278). 

By Order filed on February 13, 2004, Judge Coyle vacated the

status conference and ordered Arnett returned to federal prison

because the Ninth Circuit had stayed issuance of the mandate

(Doc. 281). On May 20, 2004, Arnett, acting in pro per, filed an

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“Amended Motion to Dismiss the Indictment Based on the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution; or

Alternatively, Transfer Entire Case to the District of Oregon”

and an “Application to Remain at the Federal Prison in Lompoc,

California Until the Final Outcome of His Motion to Dismiss the

Indictment, or Transfer the Case” (Docs. 283, 284). By Order

filed on May 24, 2004, Judge Coyle allowed these motions to be

filed, but, noting that the mandate had not issued and that

Arnett had petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, ordered

Arnett to file a notice of hearing with respect to these motions

“if and when the Supreme Court denies defendant’s petition for

certiorari”. (Doc. 285). On July 2, 2004, Arnett, acting in pro

per, filed an “Application for an Amended Order Directing

Defendant to File Notice of Hearing Date for Motions” wherein

Arnett requested that the court extend the time within which he

is required to filed the notice setting the motions for hearing

until at least three weeks following the denial of the petition

for rehearing by the Supreme Court and the issuance of the

mandate by the Ninth Circuit (Doc. 287). Judge Coyle granted

this application by Order filed on July 15, 2004 (Doc. 289). 

Also on July 6, 2004, Arnett, acting in pro per, filed an

“Application for an Order Stating That His Sentence in This Case

Has Been Vacated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals” (Doc.

288). By Order filed on July 15, 2004, Judge Coyle denied

Arnett’s application in part because the Ninth Circuit had not

yet issued the mandate (Doc. 290). On August 23, 2004, Arnett,

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In a declaration filed on February 2, 2006 (Doc. 537), Arnett 6

avers that the statement quoted in Doc. 239 “is the direct result

of a phone call made by me from USP Lompoc to the Clerks office for

the ... Ninth Circuit, where the clerk merely checked the computer

read out of my appellate docket, and then told me according to

this, the mandate issued on August 6, 2004" and that he “did not

write the statement ... because I had been served with the Court of

Appeals mandate ....”

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acting in pro per, filed a “Notice of Defendant’s Application to

Remain at the Federal Prison in Lompoc, California Until the

Final Outcome is Decided of His Motion to Dismiss the Indictment,

or Transfer the Case to the District of Oregon; and To Exclude

Time Under the Speedy Trial Act” (Doc. 293). In this pleading, 6

Arnett states in pertinent part:

On August 6, 2004, the Court of Appeals

issued its mandate in respect to defendant’s

appeal. In compliance with the Court’s

Order, defendant serves notice setting the

motion [to dismiss or transfer the case] for

hearing on or about Monday, September 20,

2004 at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom One, before

Honorable District Court Judge Robert E.

Coyle.

By Order filed on September 17, 2004, Judge Coyle continued the

hearing on Arnett’s motions to September 27, 2004, in part

because “[t]he Ninth Circuit has not yet issued the mandate to

this court.” (Doc. 296). Augusta Giffen, law clerk to Judge

Coyle, and Linda Lucas, courtroom deputy to Judge Coyle, 

testified at the hearing on July 6, 2006 that a telephone call

was placed by Ms. Lucas to the Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office in

approximately September 2004 inquiring whether the mandate had

issued. Ms. Lucas was informed by the Clerk’s Office that the

mandate had issued. 

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9

In support of his motion to dismiss the Indictment because

of noncompliance with the Speedy Trial Act, Arnett has filed a

declaration in which he avers in pertinent part:

1) On September 21, 2005, at approximately

9:10 a.m., I called the Ninth Circuit Court

of Appeals ... and spoke to Deputy Clerk

Candace Pemillion about the status of my

pending appeal: USCA No.: 04-10575 [Arnett’s

appeal to the Ninth Circuit from Judge

Coyle’s denial of his motion to dismiss the

indictment on double jeopardy grounds]. 

During our conversation, she mentioned that

the Clerk of the Court for the District of

Oregon in Eugene had recently contacted her

in respect to an inquiry about the mandates

in my prior appeals: USA v. Arnett, USCA

Nos.: 00-10170 and 00-30189. She said there

was some confusion and asked me for

clarification since I was on the phone. 

After I explained to her that they had the

wrong appellate case number for the appeal

from Oregon, she said she would call the

Clerk in the District of Oregon and then she

would write back to me and tell me what

conclusions they had reached, and what action

they took; 

2) In response to this conversation, on

September 29, 2005, I received a legal mail

envelope from Deputy Clerk Pemillion. The

envelope contained two cover letters and a

‘Certified copy of the Decree of the Court’ -

mandates - in respect to my prior

consolidated appeals: USA v. Arnett, USCA

Nos. 00-10170 and 00-30189. In addition,

there was a cover address sheet which

contained a note from Deputy Clerk Pemillion

to myself. This note stated: ‘Never issued

8/6/04 when they should have C’. ...;

3) As soon as I had access again to a phone

in the Fresno County Jail’s Law Library, I

tried to call Deputy Clerk Pemillion to

discuss these matters and clarify what

happened in respect to the issuance of the

mandates. I was not able to reach her by

phone until October 5, 2005 at around 11:00

a.m. to 11:30 a.m.. [sic] At this time we

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discussed the question of when the mandates

were issued for USCA Nos.: 00-10170 and 00-

30189; 

4) She told me that the appellate docket

entrys [sic] for these appeals wrongly stated

that the mandates had issued. She further

stated that she had actually checked the

official appellate files in respect to these

appeals and no mandates were actually issued

on August 4, 2004, as the appellate docket

stated. She stated that one of the other

appellate deputy clerks had entered on the

appellate docket that the mandates had

issued, when in fact they never were issued. 

She explained that this is why I had just

received the mandates for the first time, and

would further explain why the mandates were

never issued, received and docketed until

just recently in both of my criminal cases in

the Eastern District of California, Case No.

95-CR-F-5287 OWW, and in the District of

Oregon (Eugene), Case No. 95-CR-60120 MRH. 

Moreover, she stated that their confusion in

the Clerk’s Office is reflected on the Ninth

Circuit’s appellate docket in USCA NO.: 00-

30189 [appeal from the District of Oregon] at

entries #114 and #115, where the mandate was

issued on two different dates (9/21/05 and

9/23/05);

5) When I asked her on what date the mandates

were actually ‘issued’ in respect to my

consolidated appeals, USCA Nos.: 00-10170 and

00-30189, Deputy Clerk Pemillion told me that

they were ‘issued’ on September 23, 2005, and

not on August 4, 2004, as is reflected in the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit’s appellate dockets for these

consolidated appeals;

6) The first time I ever received the

mandates from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals, in respect to USCA Nos.: 00-10170

and 00-30189, was on September 29, 2005. 

This was also the first time I ever received

and was able to see my appellate dockets for

these two appeals, because Deputy Clerk

Pemillion also included a copy of these

dockets with the mandates when she sent them

to me; and 

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7) On the morning of October 20, 2005, I

called Deputy Clerk Pemillion once again from

the fresno [sic] County Jail’s Law Library. 

During our conversation she told me that she

was the clerk that ‘issued’ both of the

mandates for USCA Nos.: 00-10170 and 00-30189

on September 23, 2005. She further stated

that before she issued the mandates, she had

called the Clerk’s office in the United

States District Court in Fresno ..., and told

the clerk that the mandate had never issued

on August 6, 2004, and that she was going to

issue the mandate that same day. The

district court clerk replied that she was

familiar with my case, knew who I was and

explained that I had already been retried

again, after my successful appeal;

8) Since I had never received the mandate

from the Court of Appeals or the District

Court, I wondered why I had not. I wanted to

investigate this earlier, but could not. Nor

did I have another procedural motion that I

could filed to request what I had already

asked for in my earlier motion - the basic

tools of an adequate defense;

9) The living conditions in the Fresno County

Jail are as bad as it can get, especially for

someone who is representing himself in court. 

The housing units are open all day and night

(except at court time). Thus, prisoners are

screaming, yelling and slamming dominoes at

all times. There are 2 TVs, one ran [sic] by

the Bulldog gang and one by the Blacks. Each

group tends to put their TV on a different

channel and then turn it up to try and drown

out the other TV. All this does is make for

a loud and unintelligent blarring [sic] noise

that permeates right into the cells. The

lights are on 24 hours a day in the dayroom,

which shines through the door into the cell. 

In the cell there is a 4 foot flourescent

[sic] light that is turned on for hours at a

time by the guards at count times and a [sic]

breakfast. Breakfast and lunch are served at

the same time - 4:00 a.m.. [sic] Because of

all of the noise, lights and the 4:00 a.m.

breakfast/lunch, I have not slept 8 hours

straight at one time in the entire 14 months

that I have been in the Fresno County Jail. 

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In fact, because of these living conditions,

stress and the anxiety of representing myself

and trial, I have lost 40 pounds since I came

to the Jail. In addition, each cell is a

three-man cell. Prior to trial and during

trial my two cellmates were constantly

running in and out of the cell, and smoking

crack-cocaine and snorting meth. I had to

labor under all of these conditions, and

more, while I was preparing for and during

trial in August of 2005;

10) My family, which lives in Modesto, have

had to suffer again the embarrassment, and

harrassment [sic] by others, because of my

August 2005 trial and conviction because it

was reported in the Modesto Bee newspaper

..., not to mention their anxiety, wondering

whether they would ever get their dad back

again;

...

12) I have exercised due diligence to the

best of my abilities to submit the instant

motion in light of the limited access I have

to the Jail’s Law Library, law books,

typewriter, and a copier.

Arnett’s motion to dismiss for violation of the Speedy Trial

Act was set to be heard on February 6, 2006. Arnett requested a

continuance on February 2, 2006 of all pending matters which was

granted by Order filed on February 3, 2006, the hearing date was

then set for April 3, 2006. On February 27, 2006, Arnett filed a

motion to stay all further proceedings in this action (doc. 551)

pending resolution of his “Urgent Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-

3(b)” filed in the Ninth Circuit in USCA No.: 00-10170. In the

“Urgent Motion” filed with the Ninth Circuit Arnett contended

that this case involves extraordinary and unusual circumstances

in respect to the timing and accuracy of the mandate sufficient

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Arnett appealed Judge Coyle’s “Order Denying Defendant’s 7

Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based on Double Jeopardy Clause” (Doc.

304). By Memorandum filed on May 22, 2006 in the Ninth Circuit in

No. 04-10575, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Coyle’s ruling. See

2006 WL 1381514. On June 5, 2006, Arnett filed a petition for

rehearing and rehearing en banc, which petition remains under

submission. 

Arnett also refers the court to Rule 36, Federal Rules of 8

Appellate Procedure. Rule 36 pertains to entry of judgment and

notice. Rule 36 does not appear to have any relevance to the

resolution of the issues presented in Arnett’s motion. 

13

to justify modifying or recalling the mandate to protect the

integrity of the Ninth Circuit’s processes; that the Double

Jeopardy Clause requires recalling the mandate in order to

prevent an injustice; that intervening changes in the law after 7

the Supreme Court denied certiorari but before the mandate issued

warrant recalling the mandate and amending the en banc opinion. 

A status conference was held in this court on March 3, 2006 and

all pending matters were continued because of Arnett’s “Urgent

Motion”. By Order filed in the Ninth Circuit on March 17, 2006

and with this court on March 20, 2006, Chief Judge Schroeder

ruled: “The motion to recall the mandate is DENIED.” (Doc. 563).

B. Effect on Arnett’s Conviction.

Arnett contends that all proceedings in this court since

August 6, 2004 to date are void because this court did not obtain

jurisdiction over this criminal action until the mandate was

issued on September 23, 2005.

Rule 41, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, pertains to

the issuance of the mandate. Rule 41 provides: 8

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(a) Contents. Unless the court directs that

a formal mandate issue, the mandate consists

of a certified copy of the judgment, a copy

of the court’s opinion, if any, and any

direction about costs.

(b) When Issued. The court’s mandate must

issue 7 calendar days after the time to file

a petition for rehearing expires, or 7

calendar days after entry of an order denying

a timely petition for panel rehearing,

petition for rehearing en banc, or motion for

stay of mandate, whichever is later. The

court may shorten or extend the time.

(c) Effective Date. The mandate is effective

when issued.

(d) Staying the Mandate. 

(1) On Petition for Rehearing or

Motion. The timely filing of a

petition for panel rehearing,

petition for rehearing en banc, or

motion for stay of mandate, stays

the mandate until disposition of

the petition or motion, unless the

court orders otherwise.

(2) Pending Petition for

Certiorari. 

(A) A party may move 

to stay the mandate pending the

filing of a petition for a writ of

certiorari in the Supreme Court.

....

...

(D) The court of 

appeals must issue the mandate

immediately when a copy of a

Supreme Court order denying the

petition for writ of certiorari is

filed.

As noted supra, the Mandate issued by the Ninth Circuit

Clerk’s Office on September 23, 2005 and filed with this court on

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September 28, 2005 is inaccurate and incomplete. Arnett’s

position is that this court did not obtain jurisdiction until

September 23, 2005 and that all proceedings in this case between

August 6, 2004 and September 23, 2005 are void because the

mandate did not issue until September 23, 2005. If Arnett’s

legal position is correct, the mandate still has not been issued

by the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s Office pursuant to Rule 41 because

the district court has not received from the Ninth Circuit’s

Clerk’s Office “a certified copy of the judgment [and] a copy of

the court’s opinion” reversing and remanding Arnett’s convictions

of Section 924(c). This fact negates any contention that

Arnett’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act have been violated

because he was not tried within 70 days of the issuance of the

mandate. Arguably, Arnett’s rights under the Speedy Trial Act

have not accrued. However, this fact does not negate his 

contention that all proceedings in this case since August 6, 2004

are void. 

In arguing that this court did not obtain jurisdiction until

September 23, 2005, Arnett refers to United States v. Foumai, 910

F.2d 617 (9 Cir. 1990). th

In Foumai, the defendant was convicted of driving without

insurance and driving with a suspended license by a United States 

Magistrate Judge. The defendant appealed to the District Court,

which reversed the conviction the suspended license conviction. 

Forty-eight days after the reversal order, the District Court sua

sponte withdrew the reversal order and requested further

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briefing. Defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit, alleging

double jeopardy. The Ninth Circuit ruled that a legitimate

expectation of finality had attached to the District Court’s

original order reversing defendant’s conviction and reversed the

District Court. In discussing the finality of judgments, the

Ninth Circuit noted in pertinent part:

Although the expiration of the time for

appeal may signify finality in federal trial

courts, appellate courts must follow

procedures for issuing judgments not required

of trial courts. In the present case, the

district court was sitting as a court of

appeals pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401. The

legitimacy of an expectation of finality of

an appellate order depends on the issuance or

not of the mandate required to enforce the

order. We have stated that ‘[u]ntil a

mandate is issued, a case is not closed. The

parties may petition the court for a

rehearing.’ United States v. Ross, 654 F.2d

612, 616 (9 Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 th

U.S. 926 ... (1982). The jurisdiction of the

court of appeals does not terminate until

issuance of the mandate. See Sgaraglino v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 896 F.2d

420 (9 Cir. 1990); United States v. Rivera,

th

844 F.2d 916, 921 (2 Cir. 1988). A court of nd

appeals may modify or revoke its judgment at

any time prior to issuance of the mandate,

sua sponte or by motion of the parties. 

Thus, finality of an appellate order hinges

on the mandate, as does a defendant’s

expectation of finality.

Arnett further refers to United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d

916 (2 Cir. 1988). In Rivera, the trial judge declared a nd

mistrial on March 16, 1986. Seven speedy trial days ran between

that date and April 2, 1986, when defendants filed motions for

double jeopardy dismissal of the indictment. The trial judge

denied those double jeopardy motions on April 22, 1986. 

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Defendants filed a notice of appeal from the denial of the double

jeopardy motions on April 22, 1986. The Second Circuit held that

the time under the Speedy Trial Act was excludable under 18

U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(1)(E) & (F). Because seven speedy trial act

days had run prior to the appeal, the issue before the Second

Circuit is when the speedy trial clock resumed following the

interlocutory appeal. The Second Circuit held in pertinent part:

In a case where the appellate court orders a

new trial after conviction, it is the appeal

that constitutes ‘the action occasioning the

retrial’, and the 70-day period begins to

run, according to § 3161(e), on the date the

appeal becomes final. In the situation at

hand, however, an interlocutory appeal after

the district court had declared a mistrial,

the 70-day period had already started to run

anew when the mistrial was declared, and the

speedy trial act resumed on the date the

exclusion allowed for an interlocutory

appeal, § 3161(h)(1)(E), ended, i.e., when

the appeal became final.

Defendants argue that the appeal became final

on August 28, 1986, the date we issued our

summary order affirmed Judge Walker’s denial

of their motions to dismiss. Alternatively,

they argue that the appeal became final on

September 19, 1986, because Fed.R.App.P. 41

provides that the mandate of the appellate

court ‘shall issue 21 days after entry of

judgment.’ If either date marked the end of

the interlocutory appeal, defendants argue,

more than 70 days would have elapsed before

the trial began, causing a Speedy Trial Act

violation. The government argues that the

clock resumed on the date when the mandate

actually issued, September 26, 1986, leaving

five days still available when the trial

actually began.

844 F.2d at 920. The Second Circuit noted that six circuits,

including the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ross, 654 F.2d

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612 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1090 (1981), 455 U.S. 926 th

(1982), have adopted a rule that for the purpose of Section

3161(e) an appeal becomes final on the date the mandate is

issued. Id. In following these six circuits, the Second Circuit

stated in pertinent part:

A general explanation of what a ‘mandate’ is

and how it issues in this circuit is a

necessary starting point. To begin, we

decide cases either by opinion or by summary

order. On the 21 day from the date on which st

an opinion issues, the clerk of the appellate

court files the mandate, which consists of a

copy of the opinion, a judgment that has been

drafted and signed by a clerk of the court,

and any direction as to costs ... In the case

of a summary order, a separate written

judgment is not included in the mandate. In

either case the clerk of the court signs her

name on a copy of the judgment or order that

is stamped ‘MANDATE’ at the top of the first

page and ‘true copy’ at the bottom of the

last page. The original copies of the

judgment or order and the opinion are

retained by the clerk’s office, and the ‘true

copy’, along with a second copy of the first

page of the judgment or order, plus a copy of

any opinion, is sent to the district court

from which the appeal was taken. The clerk

records this event, which is the issuance of

the mandate, by signing her name and the date

on the docket card next to a notation

indicating that the mandate has issued.

After receiving the mandate, the district

clerk signs the second copy and returns it to

the circuit court clerk’s office, where it is

filed. Once a month, the clerk’s office

sends to the clerk of each district court a

list of all the mandates issued to that court

during the month so that the district clerk

can verify receipt of all the mandates that

were sent.

Although, prior to December 20, 1987, parties

were not notified when a mandate issued, they

could, and often did, call either our clerk’s

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office to ascertain whether the mandate had

issued or the district clerk to determine

whether it had been received. In addition to

ascertaining when the mandate issues, a

diligent appellate attorney should check the

language of the judgment itself to insure

that it conforms to the order or opinion of

the appellate court. See R. Martineau,

Modern Appellate Practice, § 17.1 (1983).

We are advised by the circuit clerk’s office

that the mandate procedure has undergone reexamination in recent months. As a result,

the clerk’s office has added the following to

the procedures for issuance of the mandate. 

First, the copy of the judgment or summary

order that is sent to the district court, in

addition to being stamped ‘MANDATE’ and ‘true

copy’, will bear a sticker saying ‘mandate

issued’ and indicating the date of issuance. 

Second, the attorneys for the parties will be

sent a copy of the mandate that bears this

sticker. We trust that these additional

procedures will help to eliminate any future

confusion about when a mandate issues.

As our review of these procedures makes

clear, the subjective intent of the panel

deciding a particular case is irrelevant to

the fact of whether or not the mandate

actually issued. Nor is the mandate deemed

issued merely upon the filing of an opinion

or summary order. For the mandate to issue

there must be ‘[a] certified copy of the

judgment and a copy of the opinion, if any,

and any direction as to costs *** unless the

court directs that a formal mandate issue.’ 

See Fed.R.App.P. 41. Since the clerk has

responsibilities for entering a judgment,

Fed.R.App.P. 36, and for taxation of costs,

Fed.R.App.P. 39(d), it may fairly be inferred

that the duty to issue the mandate

contemplated by Rule 41 is also a

responsibility of the clerk.

While a panel or judge may give directions

affecting the mandate, it is the clerk, not

the judges, who ‘issues’ it. There is no

rule or formal authorization in this circuit,

or in any other circuit that we are aware of,

that provides for the issuance of the mandate

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by court order rather than by action of the

clerk. Nevertheless, appellants argue that

because we expressed, in our summary order of

August 28, 1986, what all parties and this

court concede was most likely an erroneous

belief that retrial was scheduled for

September 8, 1986, we must have intended to

revest jurisdiction in the district court

immediately when the order issued. 

Appellants rest this argument in part on § 41

of the Second Circuit’s Rules Supplementing

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

That section provides:

In all cases in which an appeal

from an order or judgment of the

district court or a petition to

review or enforce an order of an

agency is decided in open court,

the mandate shall issue forthwith

unless the court otherwise directs. 

The mandate shall also issue

forthwith in any case wherein the

clerk enters an order dismissing an

appeal or a petition to review or

enforce an order of an agency for

default in filings, as directed by

an order of the court or a judge.

This supplementary rule does not, however,

circumvent or make unnecessary the formal

requirement that the clerk’s office must

execute certain concrete procedures which

themselves constitute issuance of the

mandate. 

Simply put, jurisdiction follows the mandate. 

See Ostrer, 584 F.2d at 598 (‘The effect of

the mandate is to bring the proceedings in a

case on appeal in our Court to a close and to

remove it from the jurisdiction of this

Court, returning it to the forum whence it

came.’) accord ... Ross, 654 F.2d at 616 ....

For Speedy Trial Act purposes the same rule

applies whether the case involves retrial

following appeal or a pretrial interlocutory

appeal ....

Because issuance of the mandate is an event

of considerable institutional significance,

particularly since enactment of the Speedy

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Trial Act, we are unable to say, as

defendants would have us say, that the

mandate ‘issued’ simply because it should

have been issued, or because the panel may

have intended it to issue, or because the

statute commands it to issue. We note that

neither the Riveras nor Laguer called the

court’s attention to the fact that the

mandate was not issued on the 21 day, nor st

did any party move for issuance of the

mandate pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 27, 41. Had

they timely done so, the problem in this case

might have been avoided. 

844 F.2d at 920-921. 

The United States responds that Arnett’s contention that the

mandate did not issue until September 23, 2005 “is plainly wrong

and would not even be permitted under Federal Rules of Appellate

Procedure, Rule 41.” In so arguing, the United States relies on

Bell v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2825 (2005).

In Bell v. Thompson, petitioner was convicted of first

degree murder and his death sentence was upheld on direct appeal. 

He was denied state postconviction relief. He then filed a

petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court for the

Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging ineffective assistance of

counsel by failing to conduct an adequate investigation into his

mental health. The district court granted summary judgment on

the federal habeas claim for the state. The Sixth Circuit Court

of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing

which was denied. However, the Sixth Circuit stayed the issuance

of its mandate pending disposition of petitioner’s petition for

certiorari. The Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 1,

2003. On December 2, 2003, petitioner filed a motion in the

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Sixth Circuit seeking to extend the stay of mandate pending

disposition of his petition for rehearing in the Supreme Court. 

The Sixth Circuit granted the motion and “ordered that the

mandate be stayed to allow appellant time to file a petition for

rehearing from the denial of the writ of certiorari, and

thereafter until the Supreme Court disposes of the case.” On

January 20, 2004, the Supreme Court denied the petition for

rehearing, filing a copy of the order with the Sixth Circuit on

January 23, 2004. The Sixth Circuit did not issue its mandate. 

The state, under the impression that the federal habeas

proceedings had terminated, file a motion in state court to

schedule an execution date, which the state court set for August

19, 2004. From February to June 2004, there were proceedings in

both state and federal court related to petitioner’s competence

to be executed. While this claim was still pending before the

federal district court, the Sixth Circuit on June 23, 2004 issued

an amended opinion in the petitioner’s initial federal habeas

case, vacating the district court’s judgment denying habeas

relief and remanding the case for an evidentiary hearing on

petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In so

doing, the Sixth Circuit relied on its inherent power to

reconsider its opinion prior to the issuance of the mandate. The

Supreme Court granted certiorari, stating that “[a]t issue in

this case is the scope of the Court of Appeals’ authority to

withhold the mandate pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 41.” 125 S.Ct. at 2830. After quoting the provisions

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of Rule 41, the Supreme Court held in pertinent part:

Tennessee argues that the Court of Appeals

was required to issue the mandate following

this Court’s denial of Thompson’s petition

for certiorari. The State’s position rests

on Rule 41(d)(2)(D), which states that ‘[t]he

court of appeals must issue the mandate

immediately when a copy of a Supreme Court

order denying the petition for writ of

certiorari is filed.’ This provision, the

State points out, admits of no exceptions, so

the mandate should have issued on the date

that a copy of this Court’s order denying

certiorari was filed with the Court of

Appeals, i.e., December 8, 2003. 

The State further contends that because the

mandate should have issued in December 2003,

the Court of Appeals’ amended opinion was in

essence a recall of the mandate. If this

view is correct, the Court of Appeals’

decision to revisit its earlier opinion must

satisfy the standard established in Calderon

v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538 ... (1998). 

Calderon held that ‘where a federal court of

appeals sua sponte recalls its mandate to

revisit the merits of an earlier decision

denying habeas corpus relief to a state

prisoner, the court abuses its discretion

unless it acts to avoid a miscarriage of

justice as defined by our habeas corpus

jurisprudence.’ Id., at 558 ....

Thompson counters by arguing that Rule

41(d)(2)(D) is determinative only when the

court of appeals enters a stay of the mandate

to allow the Supreme Court to dispose of a

petition for certiorari. The provision,

Thompson says, does not affect the court of

appeals’ broad discretion to enter a stay for

other reasons. He relies on Rule 41(b),

which provides the court of appeals may

‘shorten or extend the time’ in which to

issue the mandate. Because the authority

vested by Rule 41(b) is not limited to the

period before a petition for certiorari is

denied, he argues that the Court of Appeals

had the authority to stay its mandate

following this Court’s denial of certiorari

and rehearing. Although the Court of Appeals

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failed to issue an order staying the mandate

after we denied rehearing, Thompson asserts

that the court exercised its Rule 41(b)

powers by simply failing to issue it.

To resolve this case, we need not adopt

either party’s interpretation of Rule 41. 

Instead, we hold that - assuming arguendo,

both that the Rule authorizes a stay of the

mandate following the denial of certiorari

and also that a court may stay the mandate

without entering an order - here the Court of

Appeals abused its discretion in doing so. 

125 S.Ct. at 2831-2832. The Supreme Court then stated its

reasons for finding an abuse of discretion. Relevant to the

resolution of Arnett’s motion is the following discussion:

Prominent among our concerns is the length of

time between this Court’s denial of

certiorari and the Court of Appeals’ issuance

of its amended opinion. We denied Thompson’s

petition for certiorari in December 2003 and

his petition for rehearing one month later. 

From this last denial, however, the Court of

Appeals delayed issuing its mandate for over

five months, releasing its amended opinion in

June.

The consequence of this delay for the State’s

criminal justice system was compounded by the

Court of Appeals’ failure to issue an order

or otherwise give notice to the parties that

the court was reconsidering its earlier

opinion. The Court of Appeals had issued two

earlier orders staying its mandate. The

first order stayed the mandate pending

disposition of Thompson’s petition for

certiorari. The second order extended the

stay to allow Thompson time to file a

petition for rehearing with this Court and

‘thereafter until the Supreme Court disposes

of this case.’ So by the express terms of

the second order the mandate was not to be

stayed after this Court acted; and when we

denied rehearing on January 20, 2004, the

Court of Appeals’ second stay dissolved by

operation of law. Tennessee, acting in

reliance on the Court of Appeals’ earlier

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orders and our denial of certiorari and

rehearing, could assume that the mandate

would - indeed must - issue. While it might

have been prudent for the State to verify

that the mandate had issued, it is

understandable that it proceeded to schedule

an execution date. Thompson, after all, had

not sought an additional stay of the mandate,

and the Court of Appeals had given no

indication that it might be revisiting its

earlier decision.

This latter point is important. It is an

open question whether a court may exercise

its Rule 41(b) authority to extend the time

for the mandate to issue through mere

inaction. Even assuming, however, that a

court could effect a stay for a short period

of time by withholding the mandate, a delay

of five months is different in kind. ‘Basic

to the operation of the judicial system is

the principle that a court speaks through its

judgments and orders.’ ... Without a formal

docket entry neither the parties nor this

Court had, or have, any way to know whether

the court had stayed the mandate or simply

made a clerical mistake ... The dissent

claims ‘the failure to notify the parties was

likely due to a simple clerical error’ on the

part of the Clerk’s office ... The record

lends no support to this speculation. The

dissent also fails to explain why it is

willing to apply a ‘presumption of

regularity’ to the panel’s actions but not

the Clerk’s ....

The Court of Appeals could have spared the

parties and the state judicial system

considerable time and resources if it had

notified them that it was reviewing its

original panel decision. After we denied

Thompson’s petition for rehearing, Tennessee

scheduled his execution date. This, in turn,

led to various proceedings in state and

federal court to determine Thompson’s present

competency to be executed ... All of these

steps were taken in reliance on the mistaken

impression that Thompson’s first federal

habeas case was final. The State had begun

to ‘invok[e] its entire legal and moral

authority in support of executing its

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judgment.’ ....

The parties’ assumption that Thompson’s

habeas proceedings were complete was all the

more reasonable because the Court of Appeals’

delay in issuing its mandate took place after

we had denied certiorari. As a practical

matter, a decision by this Court denying

discretionary review usually signals the end

of litigation. While Rule 41(b) may

authorize a court to stay the mandate after

certiorari is denied, the circumstances where

such a stay would be warranted are rare ...

In the typical case, where the stay of

mandate is entered solely to allow this Court

time to consider a petition for certiorari,

Rule 41(d)(2)(D) provides the default: ‘The

court of appeals must issue the mandate

immediately when a copy of a Supreme Court

order denying the petition for writ of

certiorari is filed.’ 

By providing a mechanism for correcting

errors in the courts of appeals before

Supreme Court review is requested, the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ensure

that litigation following the denial of

certiorari will be infrequent.

125 S.Ct. 2832-2833. 

Arnett replies that the United States’ reliance on Bell v.

Thompson is misplaced. Arnett contends that the position that

“the three-judge order is sufficient all by itself, and that it

is insignificant and irrelevant as to whether the mandate was

actually physically created and issued to the parties and the

district ... flys [sic] in the face of FRAP 41 and wellestablished principles of statutory construction and Thompson

itself.” Arnett reiterates that the “mandate ‘consists of a

certified copy of the judgment, a copy of the court’s opinion, if

any, and any direction about costs.’ Fed. R.App.P. 41(a).” Dils

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v. Small, 260 F.3d 984, 987 n.1 (9 Cir. 2001). Although Arnett th

recognizes that Rule 41(d)(2)(D) plainly provides that “[t]he

court of appeals must issue the mandate immediately when a copy

of a Supreme Court order denying the petition for writ of mandate

is filed”, he argues that the “general statutory provision” set

forth in Rule 41(d)(2)(D) “may not be used to nullify or to

trump” the specific provision set forth in Rule 41(a). See Cal.

Ex. Re. Sacramento Metro. Air Quality v. U.S., 215 F.3d 1005,

1013 (9 Cir. 2000)(“It is fundamental that a general statutory th

provision may not be used to nullify or to trump a specific

provision, irrespective of the priority of enactment.”). Arnett

contends:

This is especially true where FRAP 41 does

not even make even a general or ambiguous

statement, that could be construed by any

stretch of the imagination, authorizing an

order to issue a mandate as the equivalent of

actually creating a mandate and then issuing

it. To hold otherwise would

unconstitutionally render the mandatory

provisions of FRAP 41(a) and (c) superfluous,

void and insignificant.

In so arguing, Arnett notes that it is “‘a cardinal principle of

statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to

be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” 

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). Therefore, Arnett

argues, this court has a duty to give effect to every clause or

word in Rule 41(a) and (c) because the “issuance of the mandate

is ‘an event of considerable institutional significance.’” Miles

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v. Stainer, 141 F.3d 1351, 1352 (9 Cir.1998), citing United th

States v. Rivera, supra, 844 F.2d at 921. Furthermore, because

Rule 41(a) defines the mandate and Rule 41(c) defines when the

mandate is effective, Arnett argues that the court must follow

these explicit statutory definitions, and not a general order

from the Ninth Circuit, citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914,

942 (2000)(“When a statute includes an explicit definition, we

must follow that definition, even if it varies from that term’s

ordinary meaning.”). Arnett refers to Dils v. Small, supra, 260

F.3d at 987 n.1. In Dils, the Ninth Circuit’s order denying a

certificate of appealability was lodged with the district court

on April 17, 1998 and a subsequent minute order provided “the

mandate of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ... is hereby filed

and spread.” After noting that the order denying the COA was not

a mandate within the meaning of Rule 41(a), the Ninth Circuit

stated:

The verb ‘to spread’ as used in connection

with mandates is a special judicial usage ...

In our usage it means to note on the district

court case docket that mandate has issued. 

An order of this court is merely ‘lodged.’ 

Arnett contends that “[n]owhere on the docket did the clerk note

that the mandate was ‘spread.’” Arnett further notes that Rule

41(a), (b), (c), and (d)(2)(D) all use the term “issue”. Noting

that the term “issue” is not defined in the Rule, Arnett relies

on the principle:

When a statute does not define a term, a

court should construe that term in accordance

with its ‘ordinary, contemporary, common

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meaning.’ ... ‘To determine the “plain

meaning” of a term undefined by a statute,

resort to a dictionary is permissible.

Cleveland v. City of Los Angeles, 420 F.3d 981, 989 (9 Cir. th

2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1344 (2006). Arnett

notes that “issue” has been defined in Black’s Law Dictionary 850

(8 Ed. 1999) as “to send or distribute officially” and in th

Webster’s New World Dictionary 718 (3 Ed. 1988) as “put forth rd

and circulate; give out publicly or officially”. Arnett contends

that these definitions of the term “issue” require that the clerk

of the Ninth Circuit physically send out and distribute

officially a certified mandate to the parties and that nothing

less is sufficient, including “an order to issue a mandate that

is merely lodged on the appellate docket.” Arnett further argues

that the position of the United States is incompatible with the

language and history of Rule 41(c) that the “mandate is effective

when issued”:

In this case, the government’s view is that,

when the court of appeals received the order

from the Supreme Court denying certiorari,

and the order from the initial three-Judge

panel of the Court of appeals [sic], lifting

the stay and ordering that the mandate should

issue forthwith, and, where the Clerk Wayne

Price should have created and issued the

mandate, but did not, a final mandate was

issued. The necessary consequence of that

reading is that the mandate is effective when

it should have issued under Rule 41(d)(2)(D). 

That is directly contrary to the language of

Rule 41(c), which makes the mandate

effective, not when it ‘should’ issue, but

when it does issue.

Arnett further refers to the Minutes of the Meeting on the

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Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, reported at 1994 WL 880349

at *13-14:

Solicitor General Days had previously

proposed that Rule 41 be amended to state

that a mandate is effective upon issuance. 

Judge Logan invited him to discuss his

proposal. The Solicitor General noted that

the time at which a mandate becomes effective

is not specified in Rule 41. A mandate could

be considered effective when it issues, when

it is received by the district court or

agency to which it is sent, when it is

docketed, or when the court or agency acts

upon it. The effective date of the mandate

is especially important when a court of

appeals reverses a district court order

granting an injunction. The parties need to

know when they can rely on the decision of

the court of appeal. The fourth circuit has

a local rule stating that the mandate is

effective when issued. The Department of

Justice believes that incorporating such a

provision in the national rule would be

helpful.

Judge Logan asked the Solicitor General

whether the language at lines 22 and 23 of

the draft on page 14 of the Reporter’s

memorandum would be sufficient. That

language stated: ‘The court’s mandate is

effective on the day the court issues it.’ 

The Solicitor General responded

affirmatively. Committee discussion resulted

in amendment of the sentence to read as

follows: ‘The mandate is effective when

issued.’

The Solicitor General stated that there is

often a delay in issuing the mandate. The

Department would prefer that the rule provide

that the mandate is effective on the date

that the clerk should issue it, in accordance

with the rules, even if it is not issued on

that date because of clerical delay.

A member expressed opposition to that

position. The mandate should be effective

when issued, not when it should issue. A

judge may delay issuance of the mandate. If

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a mandate is not issued on the date

established by the rules and the approach

advocated by the Department of Justice were

accepted, one would have to determine whether

the delay was the result of clerical delay or

judicial intervention. The effective time

should be the time of actual issuance. Such

an approach provides an easily applied bright

line rule.

A motion was made and seconded to amend to

the rule to state that ‘the mandate is

effective when issued.’ The motion was

approved unanimously.

Arnett further argues that the following entry on the Ninth

Circuit’s docket is void:

8/6/04 Filed order (Stephen S. TROTT, Pamela

A. RYMER, Richard C. TALLMAN,): On 6/7/04,

the USSC denied cert in this case. The stay

of the mandate issued on 2/11/04 is lifted. 

The aplt’s motion to stay the mandate pending

the USSC’s decision on his petition for

rehearing is denied. The mandate shall issue

forthwith. in 00-10170, 0030189 ....

In so contending, Arnett refers to a prior docket entry:

2/11/04 Filed order (Mary M. SCHROEDER): 

Appellant’s motion to stay the mandate is

GRANTED. in 00-10170, 00-30189 ....

Because Judge Schroeder was acting on behalf of the en banc panel

when she granted the motion to stay, Arnett refers to Ninth

Circuit General Order 5.9, which provides:

A motion for stay of mandate in a case

decided en banc shall be forwarded to the

author of the disposition, who shall dispose

of the motion and then send all members of

the en banc court a copy of the motion and

the disposition of the motion. 

Arnett complains that the three-judge panel who were assigned to

his appeal before the petition for rehearing en banc was granted

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had no authority to issue that August 6, 2004 order lifting the

stay. In so arguing, Arnett refers to Scoop-Gonzalez v. I.N.S.,

272 F.3d 1176, 1187 n.8 (9 Cir. 2001), amended on other grounds,

th

289 F.3d 599 (9 Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 947 (2002): th

[F]ailure to raise an issue before an

original appellate panel does not preclude an

en banc panel’s jurisdiction over that issue. 

A court’s decision to rehear a case en banc

effectively means that the original threejudge panel never existed. This is why the

original panel disposition may not be cited

the very minute that a court votes to rehear

a case en banc. The en banc court does not

review the original panel decision, nor does

it overrule the original panel decision. 

Rather, the en banc court acts as if it were

hearing the case on appeal for the first

time. 

Arnett further refers to Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache, 341

F.3d 987, 995 (9 Cir.2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1098 (2004), th

quoting Summerlin v. Stewart, 309 F.3d 1193 (9 Cir. 2002): th

“‘when a case is heard or reheard en banc, the en banc [court]

assumes jurisdiction over the entire case, see 28 U.S.C. § 46(c),

regardless of the issue or issues that may have caused any member

of the Court to vote to hear the case en banc.’” Arnett contends:

In this case only Chief Judge Schroeder could

lift the stay she had imposed. Indeed, as a

well-established principle of stare decisis,

one three-judge panel of the court of

appeals, especially a panel without

jurisdiction to do so, cannot reconsider or

overrule an order of an en banc Panel to stay

the mandate.

In so asserting, Arnett also refers to Hart v. Massanari, 266

F.3d 1155, 1170-1172 (9 Cir. 2001). th

Hart v. Massanari does not address the issue being raised by

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Arnett in this section of his motion to dismiss. Massanari

involved whether an attorney should be disciplined for citing an

unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion in his opening brief. In the

cited portion of the opinion, the three-judge panel discussed the

effect and importance of binding precedent, stating in pertinent

part:

... Circuit law ... binds all courts within a

particular circuit, including the court of

appeals itself. Thus, the first panel to

consider an issue sets the law not only for

all the inferior courts in the circuit, but

also future panels of the court of appeals.

Once a panel resolves an issue in a

precedential opinion, the matter is deemed

resolved, unless overruled by the court

itself sitting en banc, or by the Supreme

Court.

266 F.3d at 1171. Furthermore, nothing in the cases cited by

Arnett stand for the proposition that the August 6, 2004 Order

issued by the three-judge panel lifting the stay of the mandate

issued by Chief Judge Schroeder of the en banc panel is void. 

Arnett cites no authority that holds or implies that the district

court could ignore a mandate on this ground. To take Arnett’s

position to its logical extreme, if the mandate had been issued

and filed with this court in August 2004 as required by Rule

41(a), this court still would not have had jurisdiction. 

Arnett’s position makes no sense and exalts form over substance. 

It is noted that a Memorandum and an Order were issued on

December 23, 2003. The Order was issued by the en banc panel. 

In that Order, the en banc panel stated that the “memorandum

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disposition filed on April 24, 2003, which was withdrawn by this

court’s order of October 3, 2003, is hereby reinstated.” The

Memorandum, which was reinstated by the en banc panel, was issued

by the three-judge panel. Consequently, it is arguable that the

August 6, 2004 order lifting the stay of the mandate was properly

issued by the three-judge panel. 

Arnett further contends that the Supreme Court’s order

denying his petition for rehearing was “filed” in the Ninth

Circuit on August 9, 2004. Pursuant to Rule 41(d)(2)(D), “[t]he

court of appeals must issue the mandate immediately when a copy

of a Supreme Court order denying the petition for writ of

certiorari is filed.” However, Arnett argues, the August 6, 2004

Order lifting the stay of the mandate issued on February 11, 2004

was entered three days before the Supreme Court’s order was filed

in the Ninth Circuit, thereby making the August 6, 2004 Order and

the docket entry of August 6, 2004 that “MANDATE ISSUED”

premature. 

Arnett’s analysis is flawed. Rule 41(d)(2)(D) refers to the

filing of the Supreme Court order denying the petition for writ

of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied Arnett’s petition for

writ of certiorari on June 7, 2004 and it is that denial which is

referenced in the August 6, 2004 order lifting the stay of the

mandate issued by Judges Trott, Rymer and Tallman. The August 9,

2004 docket entry states: “Received letter from the Supreme Court

dated 8/2/04 re: order denying petition for rehearing ....” 

Therefore, the August 6, 2004 order lifting the stay of the

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mandate was not premature as argued by Arnett. 

No case has been located involving circumstances analagous

to those presented here. The issue involved in Bell v. Thompson

is not present in this case. As noted, the Ninth Circuit’s

docket reflects the panel’s order of August 6, 2004 that “[t]he

mandate shall issue forthwith. in 00-10170, 0030189" and that the

mandate issued on August 4, 2004. There is nothing in this

action from which it may be inferred that the panel was

considering issuing an amended opinion as was the case in Bell v.

Thompson. In fact, as the United States notes in opposition to

this motion, Arnett filed two interlocutory appeals from rulings

made by Judge Coyle after August 4, 2004. On October 14, 2004,

Arnett filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit from Judge Coyle’s

October 5, 2004 denial of his Motion to Dismiss Indictment Based

on Double Jeopardy Grounds or To Transfer Action (Ninth Circuit

Case No. 04-10575). Arnett applied to the Ninth Circuit for a

stay of the commencement of retrial pending resolution of this

interlocutory appeal, which application was denied by the Ninth

Circuit. See Docs. 304, 306, 321. In addition, on December 1,

2004, Arnett filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit from Judge

Coyle’s November 22, 2004 denial of his Motion for Return of

Wrongfully Collected Assessments and Court Costs (Ninth Circuit

Case No. 04-10650). See Docs. 323, 328. There is no indication

from the Ninth Circuit that these later appeals were improper

because the Ninth Circuit intended to amend or revise its

opinions in connection with this criminal action. What appears

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is that the Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office failed to follow the

procedures set forth in Rule 41 for the issuance of the mandate

by failing to send a certified copy of the Ninth Circuit’s

decision to the Clerk of the Eastern District for filing in

August 2004. The Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office was called by

Judge Coyle’s courtroom deputy in September 2004. The district

court was told that the mandate had issued. It is undisputed

that Arnett, the United States, and the district court believed

that the mandate had issued, not only because of the Ninth

Circuit’s docket entry but also based on oral representations

made by members of the Ninth Circuit’s Clerk’s Office to Judge

Coyle’s staff. To conclude under these circumstances that the

trial court did not obtain jurisdiction as of August 6, 2004 and

that all of the hundreds of hours consumed in voluminous pretrial

proceedings, August 2005 jury trial, and extended and comples

post-trial proceedings are void is to exalt form over substance;

would defeat the reasonable expectations of all parties at the

trial level who sought to proceed in good faith to carry out the

orders of the court of appeal to retry the 924(c) counts, to

resentence defendant on his affirmed bank robbery convictions,

and to hold the retrial within the time required by law; and

would result in making a mockery of justice. 

 The contention that the Ninth Circuit will conclude, given

the totality ofcircumstances set forth above, that the mandate

did not issue until September 23, 2005 and that all proceedings

in this case between August 6, 2004 and September 23, 2005 are

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void is unpersuasive, notwithstanding the recognition that

issuance of the mandate is “an event of considerable

institutional significance.” Miles v. Stainer, supra, 141 F.3d

at 1350. This is especially true when, it is arguable that the

mandate still has not issued with respect to the reversal and

remand of the Section 924(c) counts, by virtue of the failure of

the September 23, 2005 “mandate” to refer to and file with the

district court the relevent judgment of the court of appeal in

Case No. 00-10170, DC No. 1:95-CR-5287 OWW The denial of

Arnett’s “Urgent Motion” to recall or modify the mandate is an

indication of the Ninth Circuit’s position.

In United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524 (2 Cir. 1989), nd

the defendants moved in the district court to dismiss the

indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The motion was denied and

defendants filed an interlocutory appeal as authorized by Abney

v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Second Circuit issued

an order on September 8, 1986 which stated:

Appellants Genaro Langella and Carmine

Persico appeal from the denial of their

motions to dismiss the indictment against

them on double jeopardy grounds. The Court,

having rejected the contentions of

appellants, and trial of the indictment

having been scheduled to begin on September

8, 1986, it is 

ORDERED, that the order of the United States

District Court for the Southern District of

New York, Richard B. Owen, Judge, be, and

hereby is, affirmed in all respects, a formal

opinion to be issued by the panel at a later

date.

The contemplated formal opinion was issued on October 30, 1986,

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and the mandate of the Second Circuit was issued on November 18,

1986. The trial in the district court ended on November 19,

1986, when guilty verdicts were returned against all defendants. 

On appeal from their convictions, defendants, citing United

States v. Rivera, supra, 844 F.2d 916, argued that, since the

mandate did not issue until the virtual completion of their

trial, the district court proceeded without jurisdiction as to

them, as a result of which their convictions are void and they

are entitled to a new trial. In rejecting this argument, the

Second Circuit stated in pertinent part:

Rivera, however, interpreted a provision of

the Speedy Trial Act which states that:

If the defendant is to be tried

again following an appeal, ... the

trial shall commence within seventy

days from the date the action

occasioning the retrial becomes

final.

... Rivera held that in circumstances akin to

those presented here, where an order was

followed by a formal opinion and the mandate

thereafter issued, the action of this court

with respect to the appeal became ‘final’

within the meaning of section 3161(c) upon

issuance of the mandate, in accordance with

the rule adopted by the seven other circuits

which had considered the issue ... Rivera ...

distinguished the question presented by the

prosecution of Persico and Langella in this

case ..., which question we now address.

Numerous circuit courts have ruled that a

district court may retain jurisdiction to

proceed with a trial, despite the pendency of

a defendant’s interlocutory double jeopardy

appeal, where the appeal is found to be

frivolous ....

Persico and Langella contend, however, that

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their double jeopardy appeal in Langella was

not found frivolous, as this court in effect

certified by issuing a formal opinion of

affirmance, so these cases have no

application here. We disagree. Clearly, in

all these cases, (1) no mandate had issued

‘restoring’ jurisdiction to the district

court, since trial was allowed to proceed

simultaneously with the pendency of the

interlocutory appeal, and (2) the trial was

allowed to proceed because of the high

likelihood, in view of the nature of the

appeal, that the district court’s ruling on

double jeopardy would be affirmed. Here,

however, that likelihood hardened into a

certitude when this court issued its order on

September 8, 1986 affirming the district

court’s denial of Persico and Langella’s

double jeopardy motion. Furthermore, the

applicable ‘divestiture of jurisdiction rule

is not based upon statutory provisions or the

rules of civil or criminal procedure. 

Instead, it is a judge made rule originally

devised in the context of civil appeals to

avoid confusion or waste of time resulting

from having the same issues before two courts

at the same time.’ ... On the admittedly

unusual facts here presented, we conclude

that the district court had jurisdiction to

proceed with the trial of Persico and

Langella on September 8, 1986.

868 F.2d at 539-540. However, in United States v. DeFries, 129

F.3d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the district court dismissed a mail

fraud count. The United States filed an interlocutory appeal

challenging that dismissal. On January 31, 1995, the District of

Columbia Circuit reversed the district court and reinstated the

mail fraud count. Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 41, the D.C.

Circuit withheld issuance of the mandate until seven days after

disposition of any timely petition for rehearing. Three weeks

later, the United States moved for expedited issuance of the

mandate, pointing out that the district court was almost ready to

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swear a jury. The defendant filed an opposition the next day, as

well as a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Rather

than issuing the mandate, the D.C. Circuit ordered the United

States to respond to the petition for rehearing. In the district

court, the parties and the court discussed whether the trial

could proceed in the absence of the mandate. After the United

States cited Salerno, the district court empaneled and swore the

jury. On March 1, after the trial had been underway for a week,

the D.C. Circuit issued its mandate and on April 7 denied the

petition for rehearing. Following their conviction in the

district court, appellants argued that because the D.C. Circuit

had not issued its mandate until after the trial began, the

district court lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the mail fraud

count. The District of Columbia Circuit ruled in pertinent part:

The relationship between district court

jurisdiction and the issuance of the appeals

court mandate is clear and well-known: The

filing of a notice of appeal, including an

interlocutory appeal, ‘confers jurisdiction

on the court of appeals and divests the

district court of control over those aspects

of the case involved in the appeal.’ ... The

district court does not regain jurisdiction

over those issues until the court of appeals

issues its mandate ... Courts have carved out

a few narrow exceptions to this rule, such as

where the defendant frivolously appeals ...

or takes an interlocutory appeal from a nonappealable order ....

Asking us to create an additional exception,

the government argues that because we had

issued our opinion by the time trial began,

proceeding to trial prior to the issuance of

the mandate neither caused confusion nor

wasted judicial resources and thus did not

contravene the purposes of the general rule

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on jurisdiction. As it did in the district

court, the government relies primarily on

Salerno ....

Involving ‘admittedly unusual facts’ ...,

Salerno has no applicability to the case

before us today. By clearly acknowledging

the trial was to start on the very same day

that it issued its order, the Second Circuit

led the district court into believing it had

jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. We

gave no such message to the district court. 

To the contrary, when the government moved

for expedited issuance of the mandate so that

the district court could proceed to trial as

scheduled, instead of immediately responding,

we directed the government to reply to

appellants’ pending rehearing motions. The

fact that one judge voted to rehear the case

in banc [sic] demonstrates that this court

was seriously considering the rehearing

motions. Moreover, it is clear from the

February 14 colloquy that both the government

and the district judge clearly understood

that this court had not completed its

consideration of the issues raised in the

interlocutory appeal, and that there was at

least a serious question about the district

court’s jurisdiction. Unlike Salerno,

nothing had ‘hardened into a certitude’ at

the time the district court, choosing to

disregard the fact that our mandate had not

issued, proceeded to swear the jury and begin

the trial. The district court thus lacked

jurisdiction over the ... mail fraud count

when it proceeded to trial on February 22. 

We therefore reverse appellants’ Section 1341

convictions ....

In reaching this conclusion, we fully

understand that appellants’ trial took

several months, consuming thousands of hours

of court and lawyer time. The mandate rule,

however, is clear, well-established, and

grounded in solid considerations of efficient

judicial administration. Because

‘jurisdiction is the power to act,’ it is

essential that well-defined, predictable

rules identify which court has that power at

any given time ... The mandate rule prevents

the waste of judicial resources that might

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result if a district court, prior to the

issuance of the appeals court’s mandate,

proceeds with a case, ruling on motions and

hearing evidence, after which the appeals

court reverses its original decision on

rehearing. That we ultimately sustained the

district court’s jurisdiction in this case is

of no moment; district court jurisdiction

cannot turn on retrospective examination of

appeals court action. Where, as here, our

mandate had not issued, the district court

lacked jurisdiction to proceed with trial

whether we later sustained its jurisdiction

or not. Fully aware that our mandate had not

issued, the district court choose to proceed

with trial. If the government wishes, the

district court must now rehear the case.

129 F.3d at 1302-1303. 

Here, the circumstances in this case are closer to those

involved in Salerno than in DeFries. The Ninth Circuit ordered

that the mandate issue after the Supreme Court denied Arnett’s

petition for rehearing and the Ninth Circuit’s official docket

reflected that the mandate had issued. No concern was expressed

by Arnett or the United States that the mandate had not issued

until after Arnett’s retrial and conviction. Although Judge

Coyle was concerned that the mandate had not issued, his

courtroom deputy, upon inquiry to the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s

Office, was told that the mandate had issued. All parties then

proceeded in the good faith belief that jurisdiction was revested

in the district court. No objection was ever raised by defendant

until after jury verdicts were returned in hius retrial. To hold

under these circumstances that the district court acted without

jurisdiction from August 6, 2004 to September 23, 2005, in

returning the defendant from prison for his retrial (or to the

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Because of the denial of Arnett’s position that this court 9

lacked jurisdiction from August 6, 2004 to September 23, 2005 (or

to the present), discussion of Arnett’s arguments that the

Indictment must be dismissed for violation of the Speedy Trial Act

is not necessary. 

43

present because of the incomplete mandate that was issued on

September 23, 2005), would defeat the purposes of the rule

respecting proceedings upon the issuance of the mandate, a judgemade rule, which is designed to avoid confusion and waste of

judicial resources 9

Arnett’s motion for a speedy trial or to dismiss the

Indictment is DENIED.

C. Arnett’s Applications for Personal Subpoena and Subpoena

Duces Tecum and Motion for Discovery.

Arnett also filed on December 6, 2005 an application for

authorization to issue a personal subpoena and a subpoena duces

tecum pursuant to Rule 17(b) and (c), Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, to Deputy Clerk Candace Pemillion , contending that

Ms. Pemillion’s “testimony and the official United States Court

of Appeals file is necessary to conclusively establish the

underlying factual basis for defendant’s motion to dismiss the

indictment with prejudice; that is, the Court of Appeals mandate

did not ‘issue’ ... until September 23, 2005. In addition,

Arnett filed applications for subpoenas to Ninth Circuit Deputy

Appellate Clerk Wayne Price and to David Porter, who was Arnett’s

appellate counsel. With regard to Wayne Price, Arnett contends: 

Deputy Clerk Wayne Price (‘wp’) entered on

the Court of Appeals docket ... on August 6,

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2004, that the ‘MANDATE ISSUED,’ but did not

actually create and issue the mandate to the

district court or the parties. An

evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish

the truth of this allegation.

With regard to David Porter, Arnett contends:

A fact that is at issue is whether or not the

Clerk of the Court of Appeals actually

created and then issued an earlier mandate on

August 6, 2004. The official appellate file

and the district court file is [sic] void of

an August 6, 2004 mandate. In addition,

Federal Public Defender, David Porter, did

not receive a copy of an August 6, 2004

mandate from the Court of Appeals, and the

file in his possession is also void of such a

mandate.

By Order filed on May 16, 2006 (Doc. 571), the United States was

ordered to respond to these requests for subpoenas and to

Arnett’s request for an evidentiary hearing.

In its response (Doc. 581), the United States argues that

the requested subpoenas and the evidentiary hearing are not

necessary. With regard to the subpoenas to the Ninth Circuit

court clerks, the United States argues that the official record

from the Ninth Circuit and in this court is clear and that the

Ninth Circuit clerks, even if they remember what was or was not

done, cannot add to the record. The same is true with regard to

the subpoena to David Porter. With regard to the request for an

evidentiary hearing, the United States contends that none is not

required because the dockets of the Ninth Circuit and this court

as well as the various orders and rulings speak for themselves.

Arnett’s requests for subpoenas and an evidentiary hearing

are DENIED. There is no question that the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s

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Office did not issue a mandate consisting “of a certified copy of

the judgment, a copy of the court’s opinion ... and any direction

about costs” as set forth in Rule 41(a) in August 2004. There is

also no question that the mandate as described in Rule 41(a) was

not filed with the district court in August 2004. These facts

are undisputed and the issue before the court is their legal

effect. As noted, Judge Coyle’s courtroom deputy made a

telephone call to the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s Office because of the

concern that the mandate had not issued and was told that the

mandate had issued. This is consistent with Arnett’s declaration

quoted above that he stated in a pleading filed with this court

that the mandate had issued because the Ninth Circuit Clerk’s

Office told him that it had. There is no reason to further delay

proceedings in this action for an evidentiary hearing under these

circumstances. The hearsay asssertions and opinions of the

appellate Court clerks would not add any helpful admissable

evidence. Arnett’s requests for the subpoenas and an evidentiary

hearing are denied.

Arnett has also filed a motion for discovery “permitting

discovery, if they even exist, of the August 6, 2004 mandates

from the ... Ninth Circuit ... in the possession of the United

States Attorneys Office.” 

Because it is clear from the record that the Ninth Circuit

Clerk’s Office did not issue a mandate described in Rule 41(a) in

August 2004, there is no need for the requested discovery and

Arnett’s motion is DENIED.

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D. Application for Publication.

Arnett has filed an application that any decision resolving

this motion to dismiss be published pursuant to Rule 83-171,

Local Rules of Practice. (Doc. 536).

Rule 83-171 has nothing to do with the publication of

decisions in Federal Supplement 2 . Rule 83-171 provides: nd

There is no official newspaper for the

Eastern District of California. In each

instance in which publication of any

document, notice or other matter is required

or permitted, the Court shall designate by

order the appropriate newspaper or other

vehicle for publication. In seeking such

designation, counsel shall file a motion

proposing the place and manner of

publication, setting forth such information

was the language to be published, the

frequency of publication, the reasons

underlying selection of the proposed vehicle

of publication, and all other relevant

matters.

Arnett’s request for publication is DENIED. A district

court does not make the law. Any publication of the resolution

of the issues raised by Arnett is better left to a higher court

that possesses the authority to make law. 

//

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//

//

//

//

//

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ACCORDINGLY, as set forth above:

1. Arnett’s motion for a speedy trial or to dismiss the

Indictment (Doc. 524) is DENIED;

2. Arnett’s request for discovery (Doc. 564) is DENIED;

3. Arnett’s requests for subpoenas (Docs. 523, 575, 577)

are DENIED;

4. Arnett’s application to publish decision (Doc. 536) is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED

Dated: July 20, 2006 /s/ Oliver W. Wanger 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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