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Parties Involved:
Tommy Berryhill
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS F I L E D 

United States Court oi Appeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circ•.1it 

APR 1 71989 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 88-1699 

TOMMY BERRYHILL, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 87-42-CR) 

Paul G. Hess, Assistant United States Attorney (Roger Hilfiger, 

United States Attorney with him on the brief), Muskogee, Oklahoma, 

attorney for plaintiff-appellee. 

Stephen J. Greubel, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, attorney for defendant-appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 1 
Tommy Berryhill {Berryhill) appeals from a judgment and 

sentence entered after a jury trial and an order of the district 

court denying his motion for a new trial. 

Berryhill was indicted and charged with violations of 18 

u.s.c. § 1201, kidnapping, 18 u.s.c. § 924(c)(l), use of a firearm 

in the commission of a felony, and 18 u.s.c. § 2312, interstate 

transportation of a stolen motor vehicle. Prior to trial, 

Berryhill moved for a change of venue due to frequent pre-trial 

prejudicial publicity and to suppress his identification based on 

prejudicially suggestive photographic lineups. Both motions were 

denied and the case proceeded to trial. 

At the close of the first day of trial, one of the jurors 

related that he knew or thought he knew Mrs. Swearingen, the 

victim, or her husband. Another juror acknowledged that he 

remembered reading about the Swearingen kidnapping in a local 

newspaper. The court, in the presence of counsel and the 

defendant, conferred with the two jurors in chambers and 

subsequently excused the juror who had related that he knew or 

thought he knew the victim. The court's examination of the juror 

who had read about the kidnapping showed that there was no 

significant possibility that the juror would be prejudiced 

thereby. The court properly found that this juror was qualified. 

See Rule 24, Fed. R. Crim. P. 

Following a four-day trial, the jury returned a gui lty 

verdict as charged on all three counts. Thereafter, Berryhill 

moved for a new trial, alleging that the court erred in: denying 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 2 
his motion for change of venue; failing to conduct an in-depth 

voir dire of prospective jurors; and in denying his motion for a 

mistrial at the close of the first day of trial. The court 

denied this motion via a minute order. Berryhill 1 s request for 

new counsel was similarly denied. Berryhill was sentenced to 300 

years with eligibility for parole after a minimum term of 99 years 

on Count I, and sentenced to five years on each of Counts II and 

III, said sentences to run consecutively. 

On appeal, Berryhill contends that: (1) we should reverse our 

United States v. o•oriscoll, 761 F.2d 589 (lOth Cir. 1985), cert. 

denied, 475 u.s. 1020 (1986}; ( 2 ) the district court erred in 

failing to conduct adequate voir dire; ( 3 ) the court erred in 

denying his motion for a mistrial; and ( 4 ) the court erred in 

failing to grant his moti on to s uppr ess in-court identification 

evidence of himself which was the fruit of out-of-court, overly 

suggestive and unfair photographic displays. 

I. 

Berryhill argues that we should revers e our decision in 

O'Driscoll and correct the illegal sentence given him pursuant to 

that decision. 

In O'Driscoll, we held tha t , inasmuch as 18 U.S.C. § 1201 

provided the penalty for kidnapping to be "imprisonment for any 

term of years or life, .. a sentence for a term of 300 years with 

eligibility for parole after a minimum t erm of 99 years was legal 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 3 
under § 1201 and 18 u.s.c. § 4205(b)(l}. 1 Berryhill argues that 

O'Driscoll was incorrect and t hat his sentence in reliance on 

O'Driscoll is illegal. Berryhill requests that we reverse our 

holding in O'Driscoll and order that his sentence be corrected by 

deleting therefrom the language requiring a minimum 99 years 

incarceration prior to parole consideration. 

In response, the government argues that since the sentence 

was within§ 1201, i.e., an "imprisonment for any term of years or 

for life," it was legal, and that a legal sentence is not cruel, 

excessive, or unusual punishment. The government also argues that 

O'Driscoll is the law of this circuit and that "[a] court of 

appeals panel may not disregard binding precedent absent an 

intervening Supreme Court or en bane c i rcuit decision. Fl owers v. 

United States, 764 F.2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985}. At present, the 

o•oriscoll case is the law of the Tenth Circuit and should be 

overruled only by concurrence of the court en bane." (Brief of 

Appellee at p. 4 ). We agree. See United States v . Taylor, 828 

F.2d 630, 633 (lOth Cir. 1987) (a panel is not authorized to 

overrule a prior decision of a court of appeals); Fed. R. App. P. 

35, 28 U.S.C.; lOth Cir. R. 35. However, to the extent that the 

1 § 4205(b), repealed in 1986, provided in part: 

Upon entering a judgment of conviction, the court having 

jurisdiction to impose sentence, when in its opinion the ends of 

justice and best interest of the public require that the defendant 

be sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, may 

(1) designate in the sentence of imprisonment imposed a minimum 

term at the expiration of which the prisoner shall become eligible 

for parole, which term may be less than but shall not be more than 

one-thirq of the maximum sentence imposed by the court •..• 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 4 
O'Driscoll opinion relied on§ 4205(b)(l), no en bane c i rcuit 

decision would be required to determine the eff ect that its 1986 

repeal may have on the O'Driscoll holding. 

Berryhill was sentenced on April 22, 1988, and during 

sentencing, the court stated: 

Tommy Berryhill it is adjudged that on Count 1 you 

are hereby committed to the custody of the Attorney 

General of the United States, or his authorized 

representative, for imprisonment for a term of three 

hundred years. 

It is further ordered that under the prov1s1ons of 

Title 18, United States Code, Section 4205(b){l), the 

Court is hereby designating that the defendant shall 

only become eligible for parole after a minimum term of 

99 years i ncarceration. 

(R., Vol. IV, p. 599). 

Although not discus sed by ei ther party o r the district court, § 

4205 was repealed, 2 effect ive November l, 1986, approximately 

eighteen months prior t o Berryhill's sentencing. Accordingly, we 

must determine if the trial court's reliance on§ 4205 following 

its repeal invalidated Berryhill's sentence. 

At the outset, we note that the reviewing court is to grant 

substantial deference to the discretion of the trial court in 

sentencing criminals. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 

Although no penalty is ~ se constitutional, id., successful 

challenges to the proportionality of particu lar sentences, outside 

the context of capital punishment, have been exceedingly rare. 

2 Although § 4205, enacted under t h e Parole Commission and 

Reorganization Act, March 15, 1976, §§ 4201 et seq., 18 u.s.c., 

was repealed by the Comprehensive Cr i me Control Act of 1984, the 

·penalty provision o f S 1201, "imprisonment for any term of years 

or for life," has not been amended or repealed since its enactment 

in 1972. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 5 
not request attorney-conducted voir dire , Berryhill nonetheless 

contends that he was forced to rely on the court 's voir dire. 

The government responds that the court did not err in its 

voir dire and that Berryhill's arguments in this regard are 

frivolous. The government cites to United States v . Hall 536 F.2d 

313, 324 (lOth Cir .), cert. deni ed, 429 U.S. 919 (1976) for t he 

rule that it is the practice in this circuit for the court to ask 

the voir dire questions; that conduct of voir dir e is within the 

discr etion of the district court ; and that the court's exercise of 

that discretion will not be disturbed unless there is a clear 

showing of abuse . The government also argue s that , inasmuch as 

defense counsel did not request attorney conduct ed voir dire 

during trial, Berryhill cannot raise th is issue for the first time 

on appeal. 

The conduct of voir dire is within the s ound discretion of 

the trial judge , United States v . Sutton , 732 F.2d 1483, 1493 

(lOth Cir. 1984), and t his discretion will not be disturbed absent 

a clear showing of abuse. Uni ted States v . Larrybirnus , 747 F.2d 

592, 598 (lOth Cir . 1984) , cert . denied , 471 u.s. 1067 (1985). We 

have ca refully reviewed the trial court' s voir dire. Nothing in 

the record befor e us indicates that the trial court was anything 

other than me ticulous , cons cientio us and fair in its voir dire. 

The trial court's voir dire insured that the jurors were competent 

to serve and that they we re impartial. United States v. Hall, 

supra, at 324 . 

Furthe rmore, following its voi r dire , the trial court 

solicited the aid and suggestions of counsel. (R., Vol. II, pp. 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 6 
30-31). Neither side expressed specific concern vis a vis the 

adequacy of the voir dire. Id. Onder these circumstances, we 

shall not attribute error to the trial court's voir dire. See 

United States v. Lawson , 670 F.2d 923, 926 (l Oth Cir. 1982 ). 

III. 

Berryhill makes a brief one-half page argument that the trial 

court erred in fai ling to grant his motion for a mistrial when, 

after the first day of trial, it became apparent that the court' s 

inadequate voir dire had led to the impaneling of two jurors who 

had not earlier disclosed their prior knowledge of the parties and 

the facts. Specifically, Berryhill contends : 

Mr. Berryhill was denied his right to intelligently 

exerc1se the peremptory challenges provided him. That 

denial resulted in the retention of a juror who had been 

exposed to earlier {possibly inaccurate) newspaper 

accounts of the abduction and rape of a local woman. 

When this fact became apparent , not only to the 

judge and attorneys, but to all the other jurors, a 

mistrial was the proper remedy. 

(Principal Bri ef of Defendant/Appellant at page 35). 

A ruling on a motion for a mistrial is within the sound 

discretion of the trial judge . United States v . Behrens, 689 F . 2d 

154, 162 (lOth Cir. 1982) . Moreover, the trial court's ruling 

will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Gibbons, 607 F. 2d 1320, 1330 (lOth 

Cir . 1979). 

As set forth, supra , at the close of the first day of trial , 

one of the jurors related for the first time that " I know this 

lady. I met ber one ··time. I know s omeone in her family ." (R. , 

Vol . II, p . 142). A second juror then stated ''Your Honor, I read 

-aAppellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 7 
about the case, or heard about it, but I didn't know what they 

were talking about until they brought up about the little boy." 

Id. The court, in the presence of the defendant and counsel, 

subsequently conferred with the two jurors in chambers. 

Thereafter, out of an abundance of caution, the court discharged 

the juror who had related that he knew or thought he knew the 

victim. The juror stated that he had met the victim briefly some 

eight or more years ago. Id. at 145-49. The court determined 

that the juror who had read about the kidnapping in a newspaper 

was qualified to serve. This juror stated that he recalled 

reading about a grandmother who had been kidnapped and taken outof-state, but he could not recall any names or details. Id. at 

156. The juror related that nothing he had read in the newspaper 

would influence him from being a fair and impart ial juror. Id. at 

157-58. 

Thereafter, counsel for Berryhill moved for a mistrial: 

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear what you have to 

say, Mr. Pyle, about both of them, actually. 

MR. PYLE: The case appears to be one of those 

occasional ones that all the t h ings keep going wrong in 

it. And based upon the first juror's admission of 

knowing or believing he knows Mrs. Swearingen or her 

husband or whoever, I would move for a mistrial based 

upon the statement he made while in the juror box of 

having knowledge o n it, and perhaps whatever influence 

it might have on the jury at that t ime. 

THE COURT: I don't think there was much said then, 

Dick, and I'll overrule that motion. 

* * * 

MR. PYLE: [N]ow we have a jury in the box and I'm 

sitting here and having waived peremptory challenges 

with a man now who said he's read somethi ng about it, 

and I didn ' t have a chance to inquire into that, and a 

man who says he knows the victim, or thinks he knows 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 8 
her, and doesn't know what he can do about that, 

don't have any chance to challenge h im now. Based 

the fact I 1 m sitting here now after having waived 

with that not being disclosed by either of them at 

point in time, I want to move for a mistrial. 

and I 

upon 

that, 

that 

(R., Vol . II at pp. 158, 161). 

After the trial court denied the motion for mistrial, 

Berryhill personally related to the court , in chambers: 

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I ain't got nothing against 

that other guy sitting on the jury . 

THE COURT: Sir? 

THE DEFENDANT: I ain 1 t got nothing against that 

other one sitting on the jury. 

THE COURT: The other gentleman who had read 

something in the paper or something? 

THE DEFENDANT : Ye s. There's nothing wrong with 

that, I don't think, but the other guy, you know, what 

he said and everything. I don't --

(R . , Vol. III at pp . 171-72). 

After the court excused the first juror questioned, he 

announced that the alternate juror would serve in his place. Id. 

at 165. No objections to the qualifications of this juror were 

made. Berryhill, as previously observed, stated that he had no 

objection to continued service of the second juror. The trial 

court, with the approval of both defense counsel and the 

defendant, Berryhill, thereafter informed the jury that after 

juror Latimer had stated that he was acquainted with a witness, 

the court talked with him at length and determined that it was 

best that he not participate any further as a juror. Id. at 174-

75. 

The competency of a juror to sit is a matter within the wide 

discretion of the trial court and the trial judge's decision will 

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Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 9 
not be interfered with except for an abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 

824 (1970). The court did not err in denying Berryhill's motion 

for a mistrial. 

IV. 

Berryhill contends that the trial court erred in failing to 

grant his motion to suppress the in-court identifications of him. 

Berryhill argues, citing Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 

(1968), that it is proper for a court t o suppress in-court 

identification evidence which is the fruit of out-of-court preaccusatory displays i f such displays were overly suggestive and 

unfair. Berryhill argues that: reliability is pivotal in 

determining the admissibility of identification testimonyi 

reliability was entirely absent here because ne i ther witness had 

an opportunity to view him for more than a few moments and both 

were attending to employment duties when they saw him; it was only 

during the second, and suggestive, photographic lineup that he was 

identified; and, under the totality of the circumstances, the outof-cou rt identificatio ns were unreliabl e, the result of unfair and 

overly suggestive lineup procedures. 

In response, the government contends that: the photographic 

lineups were not suggestive; Berryhill was identified by three 

witnesses; each of the witnesses had previously given descriptions 

of a suspect which were similar to Berryhill's appearance; and, 

under the totality of the circumstances, the court properly denied 

Berryhill's motion to suppress. We agree. 

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"The standard of review on an appeal of the denial of a 

motion to suppress evidence is that the reviewing court must 

accept the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous 

and must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

government." United States v. Soto-Ornelas 863 F.2d 1 487, 1490 

(lOth Cir. 1988). See also United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 

1414, 1417 (lOth Cir. 1987) (trial judge's de t erminations in 

suppression hearing which rest upon credibil ity and reasonable 

inferences will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous). A 

photographic identification procedure is not unconstitutionally 

suggestive, if, when viewed "in light of the totality of 

surrounding circumstances," it does not give rise t o a 

"photographic identification procedure . so impermissibly 

suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of 

irreparable misidentification." Simmons v. United States, 390 

u.s. at pp. 383-84. Furthermore, even when we do accept a 

defendant's contention t hat a photographic procedure was 

unnecessarily suggestive, "the degree of suggestiveness •.• [can 

be] easily outweighed by sufficient evidence of 

reliability." Baca v. Sullivan, 821 F.2d 1480, 1482 (lOth Cir. 

1987). See also Johnston v. Makowski, 82 3 F.2d 387, 391 {l Oth 

Cir. 1987 ) , cert. denied, u.s. (1988). 

In the instant case, the trial court, mindful of Si mmons v. 

United States and after a suppression hearing which included the 

testimony of the three witnesses who identified Berryhill, entered 

a detailed order finding: 

The evidence established that three prospective 

witnesses had viewed photographic lineups on different 

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occasions. Two of the prospective witnesses, Head and 

Singleton, each viewed two different photographic 

lineups on two different occasions. Plaintiff 1 s 

Exhibits 1 and 2. In the first photo lineup, both Head 

and Singleton picked a picture of a man, other than the 

defendant, who they said most closely resembled the man 

they had seen. In the second photo lineup, which 

contained a more recent picture of the defendant, both 

picked the defendant's picture as the one which most 

closely resembled the man they had seen. 

The witness Posey, viewing a different photo 

lineup, picked the defendant•s picture as the man she 

had seen. Plaintiff's Exhibit 4. Witness Posey had 

previously compiled a composite drawing of the suspect, 

plaintiff's Exhibit 3. All three witnesses had seen the 

suspect only seven to ten days before the photo lineups, 

and all had ample opportunity to view the defendant at 

that time . All of the witnesses were shown the photo 

lineups separately at different times and places. All 

the witnesses had previously given physical descriptions 

of the suspect, which were similar to the defendant•s 

appearance . 

* * * 

The court finds that the photographic lineups were 

not suggestive or conducive to a mistaken 

identification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 

(1968). Considering the totality of the circumstances, 

the court finds that neither the evidence of the 

photographic lineups themselves nor any in-court 

identification of the defendant by these witnesses 

should be suppressed. Allen v. Johnston, 413 F. Supp. 1 

(W.O. Okl. 1975); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 1972). 

Accordingly , the defendant•s Motion to Suppress is 

denied. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 27, pp. 1-2). 

Having carefully reviewed the suppression hearing transcript, 

we have found nothing supporting Berryhill 1 s allegations that the 

photographic displays were impermissibly suggestive. We hold 

that the trial court did not err in denying Berryhill's motion to 

suppress all in-court identification of him by witnesses who had 

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previously viewed photographic displays. 

AFFIRMED in part and REMANDED for further 

consistent herewith. 

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proceedings 

Appellate Case: 88-1699 Document: 01019595740 Date Filed: 04/17/1989 Page: 13