Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02567/USCOURTS-ca13-16-02567-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Transportation
Respondent
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent
R. Scott Stevens
Petitioner

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

R. SCOTT STEVENS,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-2567

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-1221-15-0481-W-1.

______________________ 

Decided: February 7, 2017

______________________ 

R. SCOTT STEVENS, Douglasville, GA, pro se.

JEFFREY GAUGER, Office of the General Counsel, United States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK, KATHERINE M. SMITH. 

______________________ 

Before DYK, CLEVENGER, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

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2 STEVENS v. MSPB

R. Scott Stevens seeks review of the final decision of 

the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”) dismissing his Individual Right of Action (“IRA”) appeal for 

lack of jurisdiction. The Board found Mr. Stevens’s allegations too vague and conclusory to bring his complaint 

within the protection of the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act (“WPEA”), 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). 

Because Mr. Stevens has not overcome the jurisdictional 

burden of showing that he made protected disclosures 

within the meaning of the WPEA, this court affirms. 

I 

The facts of this case are set forth with great specificity in the administrative judge’s (“AJ”) opinion. Set forth 

below are only those facts necessary to resolve the issues 

presented on appeal. Mr. Stevens is a Supervisory Computer Specialist within the Department of Transportation’s Office of Information and Technology (“AIT”), 

Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”), in Atlanta, 

Georgia. The agency underwent reorganization between 

2011 and 2013. In approximately July 2013, the agency 

assessed its information technology employees and then 

notified them of their new assignments within AIT. As a 

result of the reassignments, Mr. Stevens became Manager, Infrastructure Applications, in the Infrastructure and 

Operations Service Division.

On approximately November 21, 2013, he filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (“OSC”), alleging 

that AIT employees were improperly assigned to new 

positions using noncompetitive processes during the 

reorganization. On November 22, 2013, Mr. Stevens

complained to his fifth-level supervisor about the reassignments and informed him that he was in the process of 

making disclosures regarding the reassignments. In late 

November 2013, he filed a complaint with the agency 

Administrator’s Hotline. He also filed related Inspector 

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STEVENS v. MSPB 3

General complaints in November 2013 and February 

2014.

In June 2014, Mr. Stevens applied for the position of 

Deputy Director, Enterprise Program Management Service. He was not selected for the position, and alleged in 

his OSC complaint that he was significantly more qualified than the person who was ultimately selected. 

On September 5, 2014, Mr. Stevens filed a complaint

with OSC, alleging that he suffered adverse personnel 

actions, including non-selection for various promotion 

positions, because of his previous complaints. Specifically, he complained that four senior agency executives 

placed approximately 700 information technology employees in positions without completing the necessary and 

proper job documentation and without open and fair 

competition during the reorganization. On April 7, 2015, 

OSC informed Mr. Stevens that it had investigated his 

complaint and terminated its inquiry into his allegations. 

Mr. Stevens then filed an IRA with the Board’s regional 

office.

In his initial decision, the AJ found that Mr. Stevens’s 

jurisdictional response failed to specify the type of protected disclosure that he allegedly made and held that 

“vague and conclusory allegations like those provided by 

the appellant here are not sufficient to bring the matter 

within the protection of the [WPEA].” Stevens v. Dep’t of 

Transp., No. AT-1221-15-0481-W-1, Initial Decision at 9

(M.S.P.B. July 13, 2015). Accordingly, the AJ dismissed 

Mr. Stevens’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Mr. Stevens then filed a petition for review of the AJ’s

initial decision with the Board. The Board agreed with 

the AJ that Mr. Stevens merely alleged generally that the 

agency’s noncompetitive reassignment of personnel during the reorganization violated merit systems principles. 

Stevens v. Dep’t of Transp., No. AT-1221-15-0481-W-1,

Final Order at 6 (M.S.P.B. July 1, 2016). Considering Mr. 

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4 STEVENS v. MSPB

Stevens’s status as “a supervisory employee with managerial aspirations” and a person with “32 years of supervisory and technical leadership experience, 24 years in the 

U.S. Navy, and [certification] as a project management 

professional[,]” the Board found that he had “at least 

some familiarity with agency reorganization and sources 

of authority for the reassignment of employees in some 

circumstances.” Id. at 7. Thus, the Board concluded that 

he could not have had a reasonable belief to speculate 

that a noncompetitive reassignment is, by its very nature, 

suspect. Id. (citing Phillip v. M.S.P.B., No. 2016-1002, 

2016 WL 929856, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 11, 2016) (holding 

that a claim that “possible unscrupulous practices” were 

occurring at the workplace did not constitute a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure)). The Board 

found that, at most, Mr. Stevens’s disclosures constituted 

a general disagreement with the agency regarding the 

reorganization, which does not otherwise constitute a 

protected disclosure under the WPEA. Id. at 8. Thus, the 

Board affirmed the AJ’s initial decision. Mr. Stevens 

timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).

II

This court will affirm the Board’s decision unless it is 

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 

not in accordance with law; obtained without required 

procedure; or unsupported by substantial evidence. 5 

U.S.C. § 7703(c); Ellison v. M.S.P.B., 7 F.3d 1031, 1034 

(Fed. Cir. 1993). The Board’s dismissal of an appeal for

lack of jurisdiction presents an issue of law that we review without deference. Delalat v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 

557 F.3d 1342, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

To maintain an IRA under the WPEA, a petitioner 

must establish Board jurisdiction by demonstrating by a 

preponderance of the evidence that: “1) she engaged in a 

whistleblowing activity by making a disclosure protected 

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STEVENS v. MSPB 5

under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); 2) based on the protected 

disclosure, the agency took or failed to take, or threatened 

to take or fail to take, a ‘personnel action’ as defined in 

5 U.S.C. § 2302(a); and 3) her administrative remedies, 

including those available through the OSC, have been 

exhausted.” King v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 133 

F.3d 1450, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 

Protected whistleblowing occurs when an appellant 

makes a disclosure that he reasonably believes evidences 

a violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority, or a 

substantial and specific danger to public health and 

safety. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A); see also Chambers v. 

Dep’t of the Interior, 515 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 

The test for determining whether an employee had a 

reasonable belief that his disclosures were protected is 

whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the 

essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the 

employee could reasonably conclude that the actions 

evidence one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in 

§ 2302(b)(8)(A). Lachance v. White, 174 F.3d 1378, 1381 

(Fed. Cir. 1999). 

We address the issue of whether Mr. Stevens made a 

non-frivolous allegation that his statements were the kind 

of disclosures protected under the WPEA. Mr. Stevens

contends that he made allegations of gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, and an abuse of authority. 

The Board has defined “gross mismanagement” as “a 

management action or inaction that creates a substantial 

risk of significant adverse impact upon the agency's 

ability to accomplish its mission.” Embree v. Dep’t of the 

Treasury, 70 M.S.P.R. 79, 85 (1996). For gross mismanagement, the employee must disclose “such serious errors 

by the agency that a conclusion the agency erred is not 

debatable among reasonable people,” and the matter that 

is the subject of the disclosure must be “significant.” 

White v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 391 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. 

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6 STEVENS v. MSPB

Cir. 2004). Additionally, a “gross waste of funds” is 

defined as a “more than debatable expenditure that is 

significantly out of proportion to the benefit reasonably 

expected to accrue to the government.” Van Ee v. E.P.A., 

64 M.S.P.R. 693, 698 (1994) (quoting Nafus v. Dep’t of the 

Army, 57 M.S.P.R. 386, 393 (1993)). Further, the Board 

has defined an abuse of authority as an “arbitrary or 

capricious exercise of power by a federal official or employee that adversely affects the rights of any person or 

that results in personal gain or advantage to himself or to 

preferred other persons.” Ramos v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 

72 M.S.P.R. 235, 241 (1996) (citation omitted). 

The record shows that the agency conducted an investigation into Mr. Stevens’s allegations and terminated its 

inquiry after finding no policy violation and that the 

agency had authority to reassign employees noncompetitively. We agree with the Board’s characterization of Mr. 

Stevens’s position as, at most, a disagreement with the 

agency’s actions, which does not otherwise constitute a 

protected disclosure under the WPEA. On the record 

before us, we cannot say that the Board erred in finding 

that Mr. Stevens failed to allege specific facts that show 

that the agency’s reassignment process constituted a 

violation of law or agency regulations or created a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s 

ability to accomplish its mission, that the agency misappropriated funds, or that the agency’s course of action in 

dealing with Mr. Stevens was anything less than a reasonable exercise of discretion in the agency’s handling of 

personnel matters. Mr. Stevens himself agrees that “my 

pleadings may appear vague on the surface.” Informal 

Br. of Pet’r 11–12. Accordingly, we find that the Board 

did not err in concluding that Mr. Stevens’s multiple 

complaints were not protected disclosures under the 

WPEA because he did not sufficiently allege gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, or abuse of authority. Nor does the record indicate that Mr. Stevens’s 

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STEVENS v. MSPB 7

complaints specifically alleged facts consistent with any 

other category of § 2302(b)(8). 

CONCLUSION

Because we agree with the Board that Mr. Stevens 

failed to make a non-frivolous allegation that he made a 

protected disclosure, this court affirms the Board’s dismissal of Mr. Stevens’s IRA appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs.

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