Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00952/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00952-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Calamco
Defendant
California Ammonia Company
Defendant
California Sportfishing Protection Alliance
Plaintiff
United States
Amicus

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING

PROTECTION ALLIANCE, a nonprofit corporation,

NO. CIV. S-05-0952 WBS JMF

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S MOTION

CALIFORNIA AMMONIA COMPANY FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

d/b/a CALAMCO, a non-profit PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL

corporation, SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff California Sportfishing Protection Alliance

(“CSPA”) filed this action against defendant California Ammonia

Company d/b/a Calamco (“Calamco”) alleging four causes of action

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly known as

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (“CWA” or “Act”). 

Currently before the court are defendant’s motion for partial

summary judgment on the first and fourth causes of action, or in

the alternative summary adjudication, and plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment with respect to the second and third causes of

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action. The court will deny both motions for reasons set forth

in this order. 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff CSPA is a non-profit public benefit

corporation organized under the laws of the State of California. 

(Compl. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff’s mission is to protect the wildlife and

natural resources of the waters of California. (Id.) 

Plaintiff’s members reside in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

(“Delta”) and San Francisco Bay area and use and enjoy the Delta

for recreational and other activities. (Id. ¶ 9.) 

Defendant Calamco is a non-profit corporation that

operates a facility on twenty-two acres of land leased from the

Port of Stockton in Stockton, California. (Pl.’s Statement of

Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 1.) Defendant’s facility is

located in the Port’s East Complex, a parcel consisting of some

640 acres. (Id.) Defendant primarily receives and stores

ammonia products prior to distribution to its cooperative

members. (Id. # 2). These products include anhydrous ammonia

and urea ammonium nitrate (UN-32). (Id.) 

Congress enacted the CWA in 1972. The CWA’s stated

objective is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. §

1251(a). Congress created the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit program as part of the CWA

and thereby authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”

or “Agency”) and state agencies with approved water quality

programs to “regulate[] point sources of pollution that reach the

waters of the United States.” 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(b); County

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Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. County of Kern, 127 Cal. App. 4th 1544,

1562 n.18 (2005). “[O]n May 14, 1973, California became the

first state to be approved by the EPA to administer the NPDES

permit program.” County of Kern, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1565-66;

39 Fed. Reg. 26061 (July 16, 1974).

In 1996, defendant applied for and received a NPDES

permit, NPDES Permit No. CA0083968, in connection with its use of

water from the San Joaquin River to warm ammonia as it is being

processed. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts #

3.) Defendant’s NPDES permit was terminated as of October 27,

2006, when defendant discontinued the use of river water to warm

ammonia. Cal. Reg’l Water Control Bd. Order No. R5-2006 (Central

Valley Reg’l Oct. 27, 2006).

Defendant’s NPDES permit authorized it to discharge

contaminants in storm water as long as defendant met several

requirements. One, defendant must have implemented Best

Available Technology (“BAT”) and Best Conventional Pollutant

Control Technology (“BCT”) to reduce or eliminate industrial

storm water pollution. (NPDES permit ¶ 28.) Two, defendant must

have developed and administered its Storm Water Pollution

Prevention Program (“SWPPP”) in accordance with the requirements

of Attachment C to the permit. (Id. ¶ 19.) Three, defendant

must have not discharged materials other than storm water, which

were not otherwise authorized by the permit, into surface water

or surface water drainage courses. (Id. (A)(3).) Four,

defendant must have not caused certain listed conditions in the

receiving water. (Id. (C)(1)-(13).) Five, defendant must have

complied with the Monitoring and Reporting Program (“MRP”)

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Plaintiff notes that prior to the construction of the 1

detention pond in 1998, storm water from the defendant’s facility

entered the San Joaquin untreated in violation of the NPDES

permit. (Pl.’s Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 12.) 

Because this action is governed by a five-year statute of

limitations, the truth of that assertion is irrelevant. 28

U.S.C. § 2462; Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,

608 F. Supp. 440, 450 (D. Md. 1985).

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attached to its permit. (Id. Monitoring and Reporting Program

No. 96-201.) 

 Defendant captures some of the storm water that falls

onto its facility for reuse in its industrial processes. (Pl.’s

Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 6.) The rest of the

water flows into the Port’s Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System

(“MS4”). (Morris Decl. Ex. I 59:1-12.) Defendant’s storm water

runoff enters the Port’s East Complex storm water retention basin

through a series of culverts and ditches that serve other tenants

of the Port’s East Complex and are a part of the MS4. (Pl.’s

Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts # 8.) This man-made

basin (“detention pond”), which is approximately 12.75 acres in

area, was added in 1998 as a structural control device. (Id. # 1

12). Storm water remains in this basin for some period of time

before discharge into the San Joaquin River, allowing for the

Port to sample the water and control the discharges into the San

Joaquin River, and to allow some pollutants to settle or

dissipate. (Id. # 9-10, 12-20.) Water from the detention pond is

discharged via a pipe to a pool. (Id. # 15.) Water in that pool

then flows through an outfall under the levee into the San

Joaquin River. (Id.) 

On February 24, 2005, plaintiff provided several

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federal and state agencies with “notice of Defendant’s violations

of the Act, and of its intention to file suit against Defendant.” 

(Compl. ¶ 2); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A) (requiring

plaintiffs to give 60 days notice to designated entities before

filing a citizen’s suit under the act). Plaintiff alleges that

none of the agencies authorized to litigate this matter elected

to do so. (Id. ¶ 3.) Accordingly, plaintiff filed this suit on

May 13, 2005, pursuant to the citizen’s action provision of the

CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1365. Plaintiff brings four causes of action,

alleging violations of sections 301(a) and 402 of the CWA, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342, and the conditions of defendant’s NPDES

permit. In the first claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant

discharged materials other than storm water. In the second

claim, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to develop and

implement an adequate SWPPP, BAT, and BCT. In the third claim,

plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the terms of its permit

by failing to develop and implement an effective monitoring

program. In the fourth and final claim, plaintiff alleges that

defendant discharged contaminated storm water. 

On October 17, 2006, defendant filed a motion for

summary judgement, or in the alternative summary adjudication, on

plaintiff’s first and forth causes of action. Defendant argues

that plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient because plaintiff has

failed to allege what the receiving water is in which defendant

supposedly made an unauthorized discharge and plaintiff has not

produced any evidence that defendant has caused any exceedances

of pollutants in the receiving water. On November 1, 2006,

plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the

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second and third causes of action. Plaintiff argues that it is

entitled to summary judgment on these claims as a matter of law

because defendant’s shortcomings in its implementation of SWPPP,

BAT, BCT, and the monitoring program violate its NPDES Permit. 

II. Discussion

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon . . . mere

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Defendant has moved, in the alternative, for summary 2

adjudication. While caselaw exists suggesting that a party may

move for summary adjudication of issues, see, e.g., Barker v.

Norman, 651 F.2d 1107, 1123 (5th Cir. 1981); First Nat’l Ins. Co.

v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 977 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Cal. 1997),

this is not the type of motion originally contemplated by Rule

56. Moreover, motions for summary adjudication of issues request

that the court resolve issues that dispose of neither a party nor

a claim, and seldom accomplish anything. Importantly, defendants

do not distinguish between their general request for summary

judgment and particular issues apt for summary adjudication. 

Therefore the court’s following discussion applies to both

requests.

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allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading . . . .” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135,

1137 (9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in a light most favorable to the

party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.

Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Additionally, the

court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh the

evidence, for these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 2

255. 

The plaintiff movant “must establish beyond

peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or

defense to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn

Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original);

see also Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002) (“a

substantially higher hurdle must be surpassed, particularly where

. . . the moving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion .

. . at trial”). 

A. Plaintiff’s Standing

Standing is “an essential and unchanging part” of the

Article III case-or-controversy requirement, and is a threshold

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jurisdictional issue in every federal case. Lujan v. Defenders

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.

490, 498 (1975). Consequently, to come into federal court,

litigants must establish “(1) an ‘injury in fact’ that is (2)

‘fairly traceable’ to the [defendant’s actions] that he

challenges, and (3) that is ‘likely [to be] redressed by a

favorable decision.’” Jackson v. Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health,

399 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81

(2000)). An organization representing its members can meet the

first standing requirement if a member can aver specific facts

that show he or she has suffered an injury in fact. Laidlaw, 528

U.S. at 181. 

Defendant challenges plaintiff’s ability to show an

injury in fact because plaintiff’s affidavits from Messrs. Fries,

Holt, and Jennings demonstrate plaintiff would suffer an injury

for pollutants in the San Joaquin River, but not for pollutants

in the Port’s drains, channels, and detention pond. Defendant

proffers admissions by plaintiff that no members of CPSA use the

Port’s detention pond or the ditches and pipes that take

defendant’s storm water to that pond for recreational or any

other purpose. (Morris Reply Decl. Ex. AA.) The Supreme Court

has held that “environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury

in fact when they aver that they use the affected area and are

persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the

area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” Laidlaw, 528

U.S. at 181 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735

(1972)). As water from the Port’s detention pond is pumped into

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the San Joaquin River, plaintiff demonstrates an injury by

averring that their use and enjoyment of the San Joaquin has been

curtailed because of defendant’s activities. Natural Res. Def.

Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 994 (9th Cir. 2000).

To establish that the injury is fairly traceable to

defendant’s activities, plaintiff need only show that defendant

“discharges a pollutant that causes or contributes to the kinds

of injuries alleged in the specific geographic area of concern.” 

Id., 236 F.3d at 994. There is no requirement to pinpoint the

“origins of particular molecules.” Id. If defendant violated

the CWA, there is a sufficient relationship between plaintiff’s

injury and defendant’s activities. 

Should the court find that defendant failed to comply

with the CWA, and impose civil penalties, it is well established

that would sufficiently redress the injuries of which plaintiff

complains. P.I.R.G. v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d

64, 73 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The general public interest in clean

waterways will be served in this case by the deterrent effect of

an award of civil penalties.”). 

Defendant argues at length that plaintiff has failed to

conclusively establish standing with respect to the second and

third causes of action. (Def.’s Opp’n 9-23.) Defendant

specifically argues that even if standing is found for the first

and forth causes of action, standing does not automatically

extend to the second and third causes of action. (Def.’s Opp’n

10 (citing Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993

(11th Cir. 2004).) In Parker, the Eleventh Circuit conducted

separate standing analyses for plaintiff’s claims under the CWA

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and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901.

386 F.3d at 1002-04. The court fails to see how this authority

supports the proposition that it must conduct separate standing

inquiries for all four causes of action when all four were

brought under the same statutory provisions, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311,

1342. See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Sw. Marine, Inc., 39 F.

Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (“If a plaintiff has Article

III standing to seek at least one remedy [under the CWA], that

plaintiff has standing to seek other available remedies even if a

court would conclude that that same plaintiff would not have

standing with respect to an additional remedy otherwise

insufficient.”). The court concludes that plaintiff has standing

to maintain this action.

B. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendant moves for summary judgment on plaintiff’s

first and fourth causes of action, or in the alternative summary

adjudication. In the first cause of action, plaintiff alleges

that defendant discharged materials other than storm water in

violation of the CWA. In the fourth cause of action, plaintiff

alleges that defendant discharged contaminated storm water.

The CWA makes it unlawful for any person or entity to

“discharge any pollutant” without an NPDES permit or in violation

of the provisions of an existing permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), §

1342(a). “Discharge of any pollutant” is defined as “any addition

of any pollutant to navigable waters from a point source.” §

1362(12)(a). The CWA defines “navigable waters” as “the waters

of the United States, including the territorial seas.” § 1362(7). 

The Agency has further defined “waters of the United

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40 C.F.R. 122.2 Reads: Waters of the United States or 3

waters of the U.S. means:

(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past,

or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,

including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the

tide;

(b) All interstate waters, including interstate “wetlands;”

(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams

(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,

“wetlands,” sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes,

or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which

would affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce

including any such waters:

(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign

travelers for recreational or other purposes;

(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and

sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes

by industries in interstate commerce;

(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the

United States under this definition;

(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a) through

(d) of this definition;

(f) The territorial sea; and

(g) “Wetlands” adjacent to waters (other than waters that are

themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of

this definition.

Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons

designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than cooling

ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the criteria

of this definition) are not waters of the United States. This

exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which neither

were originally created in waters of the United States (such as

disposal area in wetlands) nor resulted from the impoundment of

waters of the United States. [See Note 1 of this section.] Waters

of the United States do not include prior converted cropland.

Notwithstanding the determination of an area’s status as prior

converted cropland by any other federal agency, for the purposes

of the Clean Water Act, the final authority regarding Clean Water

Act jurisdiction remains with EPA. (emphasis added).

This definition is repeated in a nearly identical form

in the definition of “waters of the United States” governing the

Army Corps of Engineers. See 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (waste treatment

system exception is defined at 33 C.F.R. 328.3 (a)(8)). 

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States” in its governing regulations at 40 C.F.R. 122.2.3

Specifically, “Waste treatment systems, including treatment ponds

or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA (other than

cooling ponds as defined in 40 CFR 423.11(m) which also meet the

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criteria of this definition) are not waters of the United

States.” 40 C.F.R. 122.2. 

To qualify for the exclusion from the definition of

waters of the United states under 40 C.F.R. 122.2, a treatment

pond must be designed to meet the requirements of the CWA. 

Courts have struggled to ascertain exactly what this means. The

Second Circuit noted in United States v. TGR Corp., 171 F.3d 762,

765 (2d Cir. 1999), that the “regulations provide that this

‘exclusion applies only to manmade bodies of water which neither

were originally created in waters of the United States (such as

disposal area in wetlands) nor resulted from the impoundment of

waters of the United States.’” (citing 40 C.F.R. 122.2). The TGR

Corp. court held that a particular brook could not be considered

a “waste treatment system” because it was not a man-made storm

water system and was instead a “natural tributary of a navigable

water.” Id. (affirming the district court’s conclusion, which the

district court reached after a one-day bench trial).

However, the portion of the regulation to which the

Second Circuit cites was suspended by the EPA in 1980. 45 Fed.

Reg. 48620 (July 21, 1980) (suspending, “This exclusion applies

only to manmade bodies of water which neither were originally

created in waters of the United States (such as a disposal area

in wetlands) nor resulted from the impoundment of waters of the

United States.”). The Agency’s purpose with that sentence “was

to ensure that dischargers did not escape treatment requirements

by impounding waters of the United States and claiming the

impoundment was a waste treatment system, or by discharging

wastes into wetlands.” Id. Industry petitioners argued that “the

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language of the regulation would require them to obtain permits

for discharges into existing waste treatment systems, such as

power plant ash ponds, which had been in existence for many

years.” Id. The Agency also had “issued permits for discharges

from, not into, these systems.” Id. The current regulations

continue this suspension. 40 C.F.R. 122.2 n.1. 

The United States District Court for the Northern

District of California found significance with the word

“designed” in the regulations. N. Cal. River Watch v. City of

Healdsburg, No. 01-4686, at *33-34 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2004),

aff’d, 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006). In Healdsburg, the City

argued that a pond, formed by an old gravel mining pit, acted as

percolating filter so that the city was entitled to the waste

treatment exception. Id. at *34. After a four-day bench trial,

the District Court held that the City was not entitled the

exception because the pond “itself was not ‘designed’ to meet the

requirements of the Clean Water Act or ‘designed’ to be part of

the waste-treatment system.” Id. Because the pond pre-existed

the CWA and pre-existed the city’s treatment plant, the court

found that the pond was not “designed” with sewage disposal in

mind. Id. 

In affirming, the Ninth Circuit held that the “waste

treatment system exemption was intended to exempt either water

systems that do not discharge into waters of the United States or

waters that are incorporated in an NPDES permit as part of a

treatment system.” Healdsburg, 457 F.3d at 1031-32 (citing 44

Fed. Reg. 32858 (June 7, 1979)); In the Matter of: Borden,

Inc./Colonial Sugars, 1984 1 E.A.D. 895 (E.P.A. 1984)). The

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Ninth Circuit held that while the pond may be part of a waste

treatment system, “it does not fall under the exemption because

it is neither a self-contained pond nor is it incorporated in an

NPDES permit as part of a treatment system.” Healdsburg, 457

F.3d at 1032. 

The Ninth Circuit counsels that “this exception was

meant to avoid requiring dischargers to meet effluent discharge

standards for discharges into their own closed system treatment

ponds.” Healdsburg, 457 F.3d at 1032 (citing 45 Fed. Reg. 48620

(July 21, 1980)). “Regulations under the CWA, however, still

extend to discharges from treatment ponds.” Id. This court is

bound by the Ninth Circuit and concludes that the waste treatment

exemption would apply to waters that are incorporated into an

NPDES permit as part of a treatment system. Id. at 1031-32. 

The key question is whether the Port’s detention pond

is a treatment system covered by a valid NPDES permit. Defendant

bears the burden to prove that the exception applies to its

activities. Healdsburg, 457 F.3d at 1031. Defendant asserts

that the Port’s detention pond constitutes a treatment system

covered by the Port’s NPDES permit. (Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J.

12.) The Port’s NPDES permit refers to the Port’s detention pond

as the “East Complex retention basin.” (Wall Decl. Ex. A ¶ 9.) 

The detention pond discharges from a “point source” into the San

Joaquin River, a water of the United States. (Id.) The Port’s

NPDES permit envisions “a cooperative partnership” between the

Port and defendant to control pollutants in storm water

discharges. (Id. ¶ 24 (citing 58 Fed. Reg. 61157).) The Port’s

NPDES permit requires it to apply “best management practices that

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reflect BAT/BCT to minimize or avoid [discharges of the specified

pollutants.]” (Id. § A.5.) 

Plaintiff raises several doubts as to whether defendant

has met its burden. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the Port

requires its tenants to abide by their own NPDES permits. (Pl.’s

Opp’n 15-16.) Evidence submitted by the plaintiff indicates that

the Port may not contemplate application of the Port’s NPDES

permit to defendant’s activities. Specifically, a port official

testified that “the port requires their tenants to comply with

their NPDES permits.” (See Lozeau Supp. Dec. Ex. C.) Defendant

includes the Port’s NPDES permit without explaining its

application to defendant. (See Wall Decl. Ex. A.) Defendant

does not point to any place in the Port’s NPDES permit stating

that it covers defendant’s activities. Although this is a

question of law, “[c]ourts are entitled to assistance from

counsel, and an invitation to search without guidance is no more

useful than a litigant’s request to a district court at the

summary judgment stage to paw through the assembled discovery

material.” Albrechtsen v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.,

309 F.3d 433, 436 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing United States v.

Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like

pigs, hunting for truffles buried in” the record.)). 

Accordingly, the court must deny defendant’s motion for summary

judgment for failure to demonstrate that the Port’s NPDES permit

applies to defendant. 

Moreover, plaintiff raises doubts as to whether the

detention pond constitutes a best management practice (“BMP”). 

The Port’s NPDES permit requires use of BMPs reflecting BAT/BCT. 

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BMPs are “schedules of activities, prohibitions of 4

practices, maintenance procedures, and other management practices

to prevent or reduce the pollution of ‘waters of the United

States.’” 40 C.F.R. 122.2 “BMPs also include treatment

requirements, operating procedures, and practices to control

plant site runoff, spillage or leaks, sludge or waste disposal,

or drainage from raw material storage.” Id. 

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(Wall Decl. Ex. A § A.5.) BMPs are defined in the CWA. 33

U.S.C. § 1314(e); see also 40 C.F.R. 122.2. The CWA also gives 4

as guidance for BAT several factors, including “the age of

equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the

engineering aspects of the application of various types of

control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such

effluent reduction, [and] non-water quality environmental

impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (the factors for assessing

BCT are defined at 33 U.S.C. § 1314 (b)(4)(B) and are similar). 

In order for the Port’s detention pond to be a “waste treatment

system,” it must comply with the CWA. 40 C.F.R. 122.2. The CWA

prohibits discharge of any pollutant in violation of the

provisions of an existing NPDES permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), §

1342 (a). The Port’s NPDES permit requires the use of BMPs that

reflect BAT/BCT, and the Ninth Circuit has held that for the

waste treatment exemption to apply, there must be a treatment

system incorporated into an NPDES permit. Healdsburg, 457 F.3d

at 1031-32. 

Therefore, to be a waste treatment system as reflected

by the terms of the Port’s NPDES permit and consequentially for

the waste treatment exemption to apply here, the Port’s detention

pond must be a BMP reflecting BAT/BCT. Defendant cites an Agency

publication indicating that a detention pond is an effective BMP. 

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(Wall Decl. Ex. E.) Plaintiff’s expert argues that through

evaporation, the detention pond may increase the concentration of

some pollutants. (Lozeau Supp. Decl. Ex. D.) Further, Thomas

Trexler, an expert for the defendant, argues that the grass and

weeds in the detention pond reduce oil and grease as those

materials would adhere to the grass and weeds. (Lozeau Supp.

Decl. Ex. F.) Plaintiff’s expert offers photographic evidence

that the detention pond is almost completely unvegetated along

its sides. (Bond Decl. Exs. F, G.) Plaintiff’s evidence raises

a disputed material fact as to whether the Port’s detention pond

is a BMP reflecting BAT/BCT. Since the court has concluded as

matter of law that Port’s detention pond must meet that

requirement under the provisions of its NPDES permit for the

waste treatment exception to apply, the court must deny

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as a disputed question of

material fact remains. 

Lastly, the EPA’s intent in promulgating the waste

treatment exemption was to prevent entities from claiming the

exemption by simply impounding “waters of the United States.” 45

Fed. Reg. 48620. Plaintiff argues that the Port’s detention pond

is simply that, an impoundment of “waters of the United States.” 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 25-26.) Specifically, plaintiff argues that the

drains and channels that empty into the Port’s detention pond are

themselves “waters of the United States.” The EPA’s mandate and

logic would dictate that something does not lose its status as a

water of the United States by impoundment. See W.Va. Coal Ass’n

v. Reilly, 782 F. Supp. 1276, 1289-90 (S.D.W.Va. 1989.) (instream

treatment ponds are method for treating pollutants resulting from

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coal mining in which the flow of a natural stream is interrupted

to construct treatment ponds; since the pond interrupts a stream

it is a water of the United States); Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v.

Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 589 (6th Cir. 1988) (power

company’s “facility merely changes the movement, flow, or

circulation of navigable waters when it temporarily impounds

waters from Lake Michigan in a storage reservoir, but does not

alter their character as waters of the United States”).

Plaintiff’s argument depends on this court concluding

that the drains and channels flowing into the Port’s detention

pond are “waters of the United States.” The storm water flowing

from defendant’s facility to the Port’s drains and channels would

not be considered “waters of the United States” if the Port’s

detention pond is a treatment facility covered by a NPDES Permit.

Healdsburg, 457 F.3d at 1032 (dischargers need not meet effluent

discharge standards for discharges into their treatment ponds but

only from them). The situation here is materially different from

an instream treatment pond or withdrawing water from a lake. All

of the storm water on defendant’s facility flows to the detention

pond prior to it being pumped into the San Joaquin River. Those

waters never obtained the status of “waters of the United States”

if the waste treatment exemption applies, distinguishing the

cases mentioned above. Although the court will deny defendant’s

motion for summary judgment, the court does not deny the motion

on these grounds. 

C. Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

The CWA imposes a duty on the NPDES holder to comply

with the terms of its Permit. 40 C.F.R. 122.41 (“The permittee

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Best Technology Available is governed by 33 U.S.C. § 5

1314(b)(1)(B) and is largely similar to the criteria utilized for

BAT and BCT.

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must comply with all conditions of this permit. Any permit

noncompliance constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act and

is grounds for enforcement action; for permit termination,

revocation and reissuance, or modification; or denial of a permit

renewal application.”) Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on

the second and third causes of action. In the second cause of

action, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to develop and

implement an adequate SWPPP, BAT, and BCT. In the third cause of

action, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated the terms of

its permit by failing to develop and implement an effective

monitoring program. 

As previously mentioned, several factors need to be

considered to assess BAT-compliance, including “the age of

equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the

engineering aspects of the application of various types of

control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such

effluent reduction, [and] non-water quality environmental

impact.” 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). Factors for BCT are

similar. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B). Assessing such factors is

often considered a question of fact. Hudson Riverkeeper Fund v.

Orange & Rockland Utils., 835 F. Supp. 160, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)

(“Best Technology Available, under the statute, is something

which exists, and can be ascertained as fact.”) Specifically, in 5

this case, plaintiff argues that defendant did not comply with

BAT because it did not install certain measures on its own 

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facility, such as sediment filters and hydrocarbon pads. 

Plaintiff further argues that defendant’s monitoring was

defective because it did not sample enough storm drains to

accurately represent the quantity and quality of storms water

discharging from the facility and did not test for pollutants

that it should reasonably have expected to be present in its

storm water discharges as required by the defendant’s MRP. 

Defendant presents a disputed material fact as to

whether the Port’s detention pond complies with the BAT/BCT

requirement in defendant’s NPDES permit, thus rendering summary

judgment inappropriate as to the second cause of action. 

Defendant also presents evidence that (1) defendant’s monitoring

of some, but not all, of its drains satisfies the

representativeness requirement of the permit in that the drains

tested adequately covered the land from which pollutants could

originate, and (2) defendant tested for the constituents

enumerated in its MRP, rendering summary judgment inappropriate

on the third cause of action. Cf. Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold

Mines, 421 F.3d 1133, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005) (conflicting expert

testimony raises a genuine issue of material fact). Therefore,

the court cannot grant plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment. 

 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) defendant’s motion for summary judgment, or in the

alternative summary adjudication, be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED; and

///

///

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(2) plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the

second and third causes of action be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED. 

DATED: January 26, 2007

 

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