Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-akd-3_18-cv-00187/USCOURTS-akd-3_18-cv-00187-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tami Ligus
Plaintiff
United States of America
Defendant

Document Text:

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

TAMI LIGUS,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:18-cv-000187-TMB

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT (DKT. 23)

I. INTRODUCTION 

The matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Tami Ligus’ Motion and Memorandum for 

Partial Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

1 Ms. Ligus filed suit

against the United States for damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., 

the Federal Torts Claims Act (“FTCA”).2 Ms. Ligus alleges that she suffered bodily injury as a 

result of the United States’ negligence.3 Now, in her Motion, Ms. Ligus requests the Court grant 

partial summary judgment as to certain facts that she argues are undisputed.4 Although the United 

States concedes that certain facts listed in Ms. Ligus’ Motion are undisputed, it nevertheless

1 Dkt. 23 (Motion).

2 Dkt. 1 (Complaint). 

3 Id. at 3–5.

4 Dkt. 23 at 2.

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 1 of 9
2

opposes the Motion.5 The matter has been fully briefed and is now ripe for resolution.6 For the 

reasons discussed below, Ms. Ligus’ Motion at docket 23 is GRANTED. 

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a slip and fall in a Burger King on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson

(“JBER”) in Anchorage, Alaska.7 The record is largely undisputed and is summarized below. 

On or about January 25, 2018, Ms. Ligus—a 96-year-old woman—was walking into the 

JBER Burger King with her son, Dr. Thomas Ligus.

8 After entering the vestibule of the JBER 

Burger King, Ms. Ligus slipped and fell.9 Dr. Ligus requested the JBER Burger King staff to call 

the paramedics.

10 The paramedics transported Ms. Ligus to the emergency room on JBER.11 At 

the hospital, a CT scan of Ms. Ligus’ pelvis showed right inferior and superior pubic rami fractures 

and a comminuted distal third clavicle fracture.12 On August 15, 2018, Ms. Ligus filed her 

Complaint against the United States.13

5 Dkt. 24 at 1–6 (Response). 

6 Dkts. 23, 24, 25 (Reply). 

7 Dkt. 1 at 3.

8 Dkts. 23-1 (Ballard Report); 23-2 at 4–5 (Ligus Deposition).

9 Dkt. 23-2 at 5–6.

10 Id. at 7–8. 

11 Id.

12 Dkt. 23-3 at 1–2 (JBER ER Medical Records).

13 Dkt. 1.

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 2 of 9
3

After Ms. Ligus filed her Complaint, she submitted to an examination by the United States’ 

medical evaluator, Dr. John Ballard, M.D.14 Dr. Ballard diagnosed Ms. Ligus with a right 

comminuted distal third clavicle fracture, right inferior and superior pubic rami fractures,

lumbosacral strain, thoracic kyphosis, and neck pain.15 In his opinion, Ms. Ligus’ injuries were 

caused by a slip and fall.16 Dr. Ballard also opined that the medical treatment Ms. Ligus received, 

“including the emergency room, diagnostic studies and her physical therapy,” was reasonable and 

appropriate.17

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable 

inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,18 “the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.”19 Material facts are those which might affect the outcome of the case.20 A genuine issue of 

material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 

14 Dkt. 23-1

15 Dkt. 23-1 at 6. 

16 Id. 

17 Id. 

18 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986); Jensinger 

v. Nev. F. Credit Union, 24 F.3d 1127, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1994).

20 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986) (“Only disputes over facts that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of 

summary judgment.”).

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 3 of 9
4

nonmoving party.”21 “There is no genuine issue of fact if, on the record taken as a whole, a rational 

trier of fact could not find in favor of the party opposing the motion.”22 A movant’s burden may 

be met by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of 

evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”23

Once a movant has met its initial burden, Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go 

beyond the pleadings and identify facts which show a genuine issue for trial.24 “[W]hen 

simultaneous cross-motions for summary judgment on the same claim are before the court, the 

court must consider the appropriate evidentiary material identified and submitted in support of 

both motions, and in opposition to both motions, before ruling on each of them.”25 Finally, 

“[w]here . . . the case turns on a mixed question of fact and law and the only disputes relate to the 

legal significance of undisputed facts, the controversy is a question of law suitable for disposition 

on summary judgment.”26

21 Id. at 248.

22 Mills v. Wood, No. 4:10-CV-00033-RRB, 2015 WL 2100849, at *1 (D. Alaska May 6, 2015), 

aff’d in part, 726 F. App’x 631 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)).

23 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

24 Id. at 323–24.

25 Fair Hous. Council of Riverside Cty., Inc. v. Riverside Two, 249 F.3d 1132, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001).

26 Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wash. Mut. 

Inc. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 4 of 9
5

IV. DISCUSSION

Ms. Ligus filed her Motion on December 20, 2019.27 Ms. Ligus’ Motion requests the Court 

find that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the following facts:

1. “The plaintiff incurred a comminuted distal third clavicle fracture, right inferior and 

superior pubic rami fractures, lumbosacral strain, thoracic kyphosis, and neck pain as 

a result of her slip and fall.”28

2. “As a direct result of these injuries the plaintiff underwent medical care, 

hospitalization, follow-up medical visits, which were reasonable and appropriate.”29

3. “As a result of this injury and the subsequent care received the plaintiff is entitled to an 

award of non-economic damages and economic damage related to these injuries.”30

In response, the United States does not dispute Ms. Ligus’ alleged injuries, that those 

injuries are consistent with a slip and fall, or that the subsequent medical care she received was 

reasonable and appropriate.31 However, the United States contends that these facts do not establish 

liability.32 Additionally, it argues that a finding as to what damages plaintiff may or may not be 

entitled to is premature at this stage.33

27 Dkt. 23. 

28 Id. at 6.

29 Id.

30 Id.

31 Dkt. 24 at 6.

32 Id.

33 Id. at 3‒4.

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 5 of 9
6

A. Ms. Ligus Is Entitled to Summary Judgment as to the Extent of Her Injuries that 

Resulted from the Slip and Fall.

Ms. Ligus has established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the scope 

and cause of her injuries. At the hospital, Ms. Ligus was initially diagnosed with right inferior and 

superior pubic rami fractures and a comminuted distal third clavicle fracture.34 Later, the 

government’s expert, Dr. Ballard, diagnosed Ms. Ligus with right inferior and superior pubic rami 

fractures, right comminuted distal third clavicle fracture, lumbosacral strain, thoracic kyphosis, 

and neck pain.35 Dr. Ballard attributed Ms. Ligus’ injuries to a slip and fall.36 The United States 

does not provide any evidence to challenge these two consistent diagnoses nor Dr. Ballard’s 

conclusion that the injuries resulted from a slip and fall. In fact, the United States concedes these 

facts.37 Therefore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact Ms. Ligus is entitled to summary 

judgment as to the extent of her injuries that resulted from her slip and fall.

Ms. Ligus has also established that there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to the 

quality of the medical care she received following her injuries. Dr. Ballard reported that the 

medical treatment Ms. Ligus received, “including the emergency room, diagnostic studies and her 

physical therapy” was reasonable and appropriate.38 Again, the United concedes this fact.

39

34 Dkt. 23-3 at 1–2.

35 Dkt. 23-1 at 6. 

36 Id.

37 Dkt. 24 at 3.

38 Dkt. 23-1 at 6.

39 Dkt. 24 at 3.

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 6 of 9
7

Therefore, Ms. Ligus is entitled to summary judgment as to the quality of her subsequent medical 

care.

Accordingly, Ms. Ligus’ Motion is GRANTED as to the extent of her injuries that resulted 

from her slip and fall and the “reasonable and appropriate” medical care she received to treat those 

injuries. 

B. Ms. Ligus Is Entitled to Summary Judgment as to the Appropriateness of NonEconomic Damages Should Liability Be Established

Ms. Ligus requests that this Court grant summary judgment that, assuming the United 

States was negligent, “[Ms. Ligus] is entitled to an award of non-economic damages and economic 

damage related to [her] injuries.”40 Ms. Ligus relies on Grant v. Stoyer41 for the proposition that 

the mere fact Ms. Ligus was injured and received medical care entitles her to some amount of noneconomic damages.42 The United States argues that a ruling on the type or amount of money 

damages is premature because Ms. Ligus has not yet proven the United States was negligent.43

It is undisputed that, as a result of her slip and fall, Ms. Ligus suffered physical injuries for 

which she required and received medical treatment.44 Under Grant, assuming her injuries resulted 

40 Dkt. 23 at 6.

41 10 P.3d 594 (Alaska 2000) (holding where plaintiff proved that she suffered physical injuries

and pain as a result of defendant’s negligence, the jury had discretion to determine nature and 

extent of pain and suffering caused by accident, could not refuse to award any noneconomic 

damages).

42 Dkt. 23 at 7.

43 Dkt. 24 at 5.

44 Dkts. 23-1 at 2, 23-2 at 8, 23-3. 

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 7 of 9
8

from the United States’ negligence, she would be entitled to some economic and non-economic 

damages.45

Nothing prevents courts from making rulings as related to the type or amount of damages 

at stake prior to establishing liability. Although, judgment on damages ordinarily follows a finding 

of liability, courts have on occasion ordered bifurcated trials proceed in reverse—whereby, the 

trial for establishing the amount of damages precedes the trial for establishing tort liability.46

The Court agrees with the United States in that Ms. Ligus’ request falls outside the usual 

sequence of issues. In almost every case, the question of damages will be put off until liability is 

established. However, damages are part-and-parcel of her negligence claim.47 The United States 

has not identified any caselaw which restricts a court to only ruling on the elements of Ms. Ligus’ 

claim in the order they might appear in hornbook law: duty, breach, causation, then harm. The 

United States is correct that Ms. Ligus has yet to prove that her injuries resulted from the United 

States’ negligence, and that if she fails, the question of damages becomes moot. However, because 

Ms. Ligus’ claim fails without all four elements, the sequence of proof is inconsequential. 

Therefore, proof of harm may established out of the ordinary order and a finding that damages is 

appropriate may precede the determination of negligence.”

45 10 P.3d 594.

46 Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In fact, courts have 

commonly used reverse bifurcation in asbestos cases.”) (citing Borman v. Raymark Indus., 960 

F.2d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 798 F.Supp. 940, 944 (E. 

& S.D.N.Y.1992), rev’d, 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.1993) and rev’d sub nom. Malcolm v. National 

Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1993); Hughes v. Owens–Corning Fiberglas Corp., No. 88–

3374, 1991 WL 242185 (E.D. La. Nov. 5, 1991). Bifurcation is committed to the discretion of 

district courts by Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b). Hirst v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1261 (9th Cir. 1982).

47 Dapo v. State, 454 P.3d 171, 178 (Alaska 2019) (“To establish negligence, a party must show 

‘(1) a duty of care; (2) breach of the duty; (3) causation; and (4) harm.’”).

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 8 of 9
9

Accordingly, Ms. Ligus’ Motion is GRANTED as to the fact that, assuming she proves 

the United States was negligent, that her injuries would entitle her to non-economic and economic 

damages. 

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Ligus’ Motion at docket 23 is GRANTED. The Court 

HEREBY FINDS as follows: 

1. Ms. Ligus incurred a comminuted distal third clavicle fracture, right inferior and 

superior pubic rami fractures, lumbosacral strain, thoracic kyphosis, and neck pain as 

a result of her slip and fall.

2. As a direct result of these injuries the Ms. Ligus underwent medical care, 

hospitalization, follow-up medical visits, which were reasonable and appropriate.

3. Assuming Ms. Ligus proves the United States was negligent, Ms. Ligus is entitled to 

an award of non-economic damages and economic damage for the injuries she received 

as a result of this slip and fall.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska, this 13th day of February, 2020.

/s/ Timothy M. Burgess

TIMOTHY M. BURGESS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:18-cv-00187-TMB Document 29 Filed 02/13/20 Page 9 of 9