Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-18-16692/USCOURTS-ca9-18-16692-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City and County of Honolulu
Appellee
Sterling Naki
Appellee
Joshua Omoso
Appellee
Hyun Ju Park
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HYUN JU PARK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY AND COUNTY OF 

HONOLULU; STERLING NAKI;

JOSHUA OMOSO,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-16692

D.C. No.

1:17-cv-00142-ACKKSC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Hawaii

Alan C. Kay, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted October 22, 2019

Honolulu, Hawaii

Filed March 13, 2020

Before: Susan P. Graber, Milan D. Smith, Jr., and 

Paul J. Watford, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Watford;

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by 

Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

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2 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

SUMMARY*

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an 

action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against police 

officers and the City and County of Honolulu alleging that 

defendants violated plaintiff’s substantive due process right 

to bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff was shot while working as a bartender after an 

off-duty police officer attempted, while intoxicated, to load 

his already-loaded firearm, which accidentally discharged. 

Plaintiff alleged that the officer’s reckless handling of his 

firearm exhibited deliberate indifference to her personal 

safety, and that two other off-duty police officers were liable 

for failing to intervene to stop the dangerous conduct. 

Plaintiff also alleged that Police Department policies or 

customs caused her injuries. Plaintiff settled her claims 

against the officer who shot her, and the district court 

granted the remaining defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

The panel first held that because the two off-duty officers 

at the scene did not act or purport to act in the performance 

of their official duties, they were not acting under color of 

state law. The panel therefore affirmed district court’s 

dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against the officers.

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of 

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the County, brought 

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 3

pursuant to Monell v. New York City Department of Social 

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The panel rejected plaintiff’s 

assertions that the County was liable because the Chief of 

Police failed to amend a Honolulu Police Department policy 

to prohibit officers from carrying firearms whenever they 

consumed alcohol in any amount. The panel also rejected 

plaintiff’s assertion that the Chief of Police failed to 

implement mandatory whistleblowing policies, which would 

have rooted out a culture of silence. The panel concluded 

that plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the Chief of 

Police had actual or constructive notice that his inaction 

would likely result in the deprivation of plaintiff’s federally 

protected rights.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge M. 

Smith joined the majority opinion as applied to the two offduty officers and agreed that the § 1983 claims against them 

should be dismissed for failure to plausibly allege that they 

were acting under color of law. However, Judge M. Smith 

respectfully disagreed with the majority’s analysis of 

plaintiff’s Monell claim against the County.

COUNSEL

Eric A. Seitz (argued), Della A. Belatti, Gina Szeto-Wong, 

and Kevin A. Yolken, Honolulu, Hawaii, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Robert M. Kohn (argued), Nicolette Winter, Traci R. Morita 

and Tracy S. Fukui, Deputies Corporation Counsel, 

Department of the Corporation Counsel, City and County of 

Honolulu, Honolulu, Hawaii, for Defendant-Appellee City 

and County of Honolulu.

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4 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

Sterling Naki, Ewa Beach, Hawaii, pro se DefendantAppellee.

Joshua Omoso, Honolulu, Hawaii, pro se DefendantAppellee.

OPINION

WATFORD, Circuit Judge:

Hyun Ju Park used to work as a bartender at a sports bar 

in Honolulu, Hawaii. Late one night, while Park was 

working, three off-duty police officers employed by the 

Honolulu Police Department stopped at the bar for drinks. 

After consuming seven beers over the course of two hours, 

one of the officers, Anson Kimura, decided to inspect his 

personal revolver, which the department had authorized him 

to carry. He apparently did so to ensure that it was loaded. 

The other two officers, Sterling Naki and Joshua Omoso, 

watched as their intoxicated colleague recklessly attempted 

to load his already-loaded firearm. Kimura’s revolver 

accidentally discharged, and a single bullet struck Park. She 

suffered serious, life-threatening injuries as a result. 

Park filed this action against the three officers and the 

City and County of Honolulu under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 

Hawaii state law. In her second amended complaint—the 

operative complaint in this case—Park alleges that the 

defendants violated her substantive due process right to 

bodily integrity under the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the 

individual officers, Park alleges that Kimura’s reckless 

handling of his firearm exhibited deliberate indifference to 

her personal safety, and that Naki and Omoso are liable for 

failing to intervene to stop Kimura’s dangerous conduct. 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 5

As a basis for establishing the County’s liability under 

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 

U.S. 658 (1978), Park alleges that two Honolulu Police 

Department policies or customs caused her injuries. First, 

Park alleges that, at the time of the incident, Honolulu Police 

Department Policy 2.38 required off-duty officers to carry a 

firearm at all times, except when an officer’s “physical 

and/or mental processes are impaired because of 

consumption or use of alcohol.” According to Park, this 

policy required Kimura to possess his firearm when he 

entered the bar to begin drinking, and prohibited him from 

carrying it only when he had consumed enough alcohol to 

render his physical or mental processes impaired—at which 

point he posed an immediate danger to anyone in his 

vicinity. Park contends that the policy was deficient for the 

further reason that it failed to instruct officers how to 

determine when they had become impaired and what to do 

with their firearms in the event of impairment. 

Second, Park alleges that the Honolulu Police 

Department tacitly promoted a “brotherhood culture of 

silence” that condoned police misconduct and affirmatively 

discouraged officers from reporting their colleagues’ 

transgressions. She asserts that this well-established custom 

within the department “emboldened” Kimura to act with 

impunity, even when doing so put others in danger. 

Park settled her claims against Kimura early on, and he 

is no longer a party to these proceedings. The remaining 

defendants (Naki, Omoso, and the County) moved to dismiss 

Park’s second amended complaint under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted their 

motion as to the § 1983 claims and declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction over Park’s state-law claims. On 

appeal, Park urges us to reinstate her § 1983 claims.

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6 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

I

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under 

Rule 12(b)(6). Vega v. United States, 881 F.3d 1146, 1152 

(9th Cir. 2018). We begin with Park’s claims against Naki 

and Omoso. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against 

“[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, 

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws” of the United States. To state a claim under this 

provision, Park must allege that she suffered the deprivation 

of a federally protected right and that “the alleged 

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of 

state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The 

district court properly dismissed Park’s claims against Naki 

and Omoso because, even assuming that their conduct 

violated Park’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily 

integrity, she has not plausibly alleged that the officers 

committed the deprivation while acting under color of state 

law. 

Our circuit has developed a three-part test for 

determining when a police officer, although not on duty, has 

acted under color of state law. The officer must have: (1) 

acted or pretended to act in the performance of his official 

duties; (2) invoked his status as a law enforcement officer 

with the purpose and effect of influencing the behavior of 

others; and (3) engaged in conduct that “related in some 

meaningful way either to the officer’s governmental status 

or to the performance of his duties.” Anderson v. Warner, 

451 F.3d 1063, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 7

Park’s claims against Naki and Omoso fail at the first 

step. The complaint does not plausibly allege that either 

officer was exercising, or purporting to exercise, his official 

responsibilities during the events that led to her injuries. 

Both officers were off-duty and dressed in plain clothes, 

drinking and socializing at the bar in their capacity as private 

citizens. They never identified themselves as officers, 

displayed their badges, or “specifically associated” their 

actions with their law enforcement duties. Naffe v. Frey, 789 

F.3d 1030, 1038 (9th Cir. 2015). Thus, even accepting 

Park’s allegations as true, there is no sense in which Naki 

and Omoso performed or purported to perform their official 

duties on the night in question.

Park alleges that, although Naki and Omoso were offduty and present at the bar in their capacity as private 

citizens, everything changed when they saw Kimura pull out 

his firearm. According to the complaint, Naki and Omoso 

became “effectively on-duty” at that moment, as the 

Honolulu Police Department requires even its off-duty 

officers to affirmatively protect the community when a 

dangerous situation arises in their presence. But as our cases 

make clear, the critical question is not whether the officers 

were technically on or off duty, but instead whether they 

exhibited sufficient indicia of state authority for us to 

conclude that they were acting in an official capacity. See, 

e.g., Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 838–39 

(9th Cir. 1996). For instance, in Van Ort, we held that an 

officer did not act under color of state law when he robbed a 

house that he had searched a few days earlier while on duty. 

Id. at 839–40. We did not rest our decision on the fact that 

the officer was off-duty when he returned to the house; 

rather, we emphasized that he was not in uniform, did not 

identify himself as a policeman, and did not pretend to 

exercise his official responsibilities in any way. Id. at 838–

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8 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

40. The same analysis applies here. Because Naki and 

Omoso did not act or purport to act in the performance of 

their official duties, they were not acting under color of state 

law. We accordingly affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Park’s claims against Naki and Omoso. 

II

The remaining question is whether Park has plausibly 

alleged a claim against the County. A municipality may be 

held liable as a “person” under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 when it maintains a policy or custom that causes the 

deprivation of a plaintiff’s federally protected rights. 

Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. To state such a claim, a plaintiff 

must allege either that (1) “a particular municipal action 

itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so”; 

or (2) the municipality, through inaction, failed to implement 

adequate policies or procedures to safeguard its community 

members’ federally protected rights. Board of 

Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 

404, 407–08 (1997); see also Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 

698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012). When, as here, a 

plaintiff pursues liability based on a failure to act, she must 

allege that the municipality exhibited deliberate indifference 

to the violation of her federally protected rights. Tsao, 698 

F.3d at 1143. We agree with the district court that Park’s 

Monell claim must be dismissed because she has not 

plausibly alleged that the County’s inaction reflected 

deliberate indifference to her Fourteenth Amendment right 

to bodily integrity.

1

1 To hold a municipality liable for its inaction, a plaintiff must allege 

that a municipal employee violated her federally protected rights while 

acting under color of state law. See Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 9

Deliberate indifference is “a stringent standard of fault, 

requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a known 

or obvious consequence of his action.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 

410. Deliberate indifference exists when the need “for more 

or different” action “is so obvious, and the inadequacy [of 

existing practice] so likely to result in the violation of 

constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can 

reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to 

the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 & 

n.10 (1989). A plaintiff can meet this standard in one of two 

ways. In some circumstances, the policy may be so facially 

deficient that any reasonable policymaker would recognize 

the need to take action. Brown, 520 U.S. at 409. When that 

is the case, a plaintiff need point only to the policy itself to 

establish that the municipality’s policymakers were on 

notice that the plaintiff’s federally protected rights would 

likely be violated if they failed to act. See id. Alternatively, 

if the policy is not obviously, facially deficient, a plaintiff 

must ordinarily point to a pattern of prior, similar violations 

of federally protected rights, of which the relevant 

policymakers had actual or constructive notice. Connick v. 

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011); Clouthier v. County of 

Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1253 (9th Cir. 2010), 

overruled on other grounds by Castro, 883 F.3d at 1070. 

Park premises her claim against the County on the failure 

of the relevant policymaker—here, the Chief of Police—to 

address deficiencies in the two Honolulu Police Department 

F.3d 1175, 1194 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro 

v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc);

Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d 1054, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998). 

For purposes of this analysis, we assume that Kimura was acting under 

color of state law when he attempted to load his firearm and that his 

conduct violated Park’s Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity. 

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10 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

policies or customs mentioned earlier. As to Policy 2.38, 

Park contends that the Chief of Police failed to amend the 

policy to prohibit officers from carrying firearms whenever 

they consumed alcohol in any amount. As to the 

“brotherhood culture of silence,” Park alleges that the Chief 

of Police failed to implement mandatory whistleblowing 

policies, which would have rooted out the culture of silence. 

Even accepting those allegations as true, Park has not 

plausibly alleged that the Chief of Police had actual or 

constructive notice that his inaction would likely result in the 

deprivation of her federally protected rights.

Park’s allegations concerning Policy 2.38 assert that the 

policy’s facial deficiencies were so obvious that any 

reasonable policymaker would have recognized the need for 

reform. As Park reads the policy, it required off-duty 

officers to carry a firearm while consuming alcohol up until 

the point of impairment—a situation that would almost 

certainly endanger the safety of anyone in the officer’s 

immediate surroundings. We do not think that the policy can 

sensibly be read in that way.2

 First, the policy required that 

officers possess holstered pistols, which does not encompass 

taking out a firearm when doing so is unnecessary. Second, 

2 The policy states in relevant part:

All officers . . . shall be in possession of the . . . 

holstered pistol . . . at all times unless otherwise 

specified by directive, law, or the situation below:

Police officers whose physical and/or mental 

processes are impaired because of consumption or use 

of alcohol, medication, or any other substance which 

could impair a person’s physical or mental processes, 

are prohibited from carrying firearms while in such an 

impaired condition.

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 11

the policy’s explicit purpose was to prohibit officers from 

carrying firearms while in an impaired condition. It in no 

way directed off-duty officers like Kimura to carry their 

firearms with them when going to a bar to drink—an activity 

that could obviously result in one’s “physical and/or mental 

processes” becoming impaired “because of consumption or 

use of alcohol.” Even if Kimura somehow interpreted the 

policy to require such action, it is far from obvious that any 

reasonable officer would have interpreted the policy in that 

fashion. Thus, Park has not plausibly alleged that this is a 

situation in which “the need for more or different” action 

was “so obvious” that we can infer deliberate indifference 

from the text of the policy alone. City of Canton, 489 U.S. 

at 390. 

Park has not plausibly alleged that the Chief of Police 

was aware of prior, similar incidents in which off-duty 

officers mishandled their firearms while drinking. In her 

complaint, she alleges only that, on two prior occasions, she 

witnessed Kimura drunkenly brandish his firearm in the 

presence of Naki and Omoso while drinking at the bar. As 

Park acknowledges, however, the Chief of Police did not 

learn of those incidents before her injury, and she alleges no 

other prior incidents that would have alerted the Chief of 

Police that officers were interpreting Policy 2.38 to require 

conduct that endangered members of the public. Instead, she 

asserts that the Chief of Police knew or should have known 

of Policy 2.38’s foreseeable consequences because the 

Honolulu Police Department referenced on its website a 

Hawaii statute prohibiting individuals with alcohol-abuse 

disorders from possessing firearms. That allegation falls far 

short of establishing deliberate indifference. 

Park’s allegations concerning the “brotherhood culture 

of silence” fare no better. Park asserts that the Chief of 

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12 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

Police had actual notice of the foreseeable consequences of 

his inaction because he knew about three prior instances in 

which officers attempted to conceal each other’s 

misconduct. But Park offers no details about the type of 

misconduct allegedly committed by these officers or the 

extent to which their actions implicated community 

members’ federally protected rights. Without any 

information about the nature of the prior incidents, we 

cannot reasonably infer that the Chief of Police knew or 

should have known that the culture of silence would likely 

result in the deprivation of Park’s constitutional rights. For 

instance, Park does not even allege that those prior incidents 

involved the deprivation of an individual’s federally 

protected rights, as opposed to more minor transgressions 

such as the violation of department overtime policies or the 

misuse of a police vehicle for personal pursuits. Unless the 

Chief of Police had reason to know that the culture of silence 

extended to concealment of misconduct involving the 

deprivation of federally protected rights, he cannot be said 

to have been deliberately indifferent to a foreseeable risk that 

Park’s own rights would be violated. See Tsao, 698 F.3d at 

1145.3

3 Even if Park had alleged that these prior incidents involved the 

deprivation of federally protected rights, more would be required to 

establish deliberate indifference. Park does not describe how the 

Honolulu Police Department responded to the three incidents or whether 

the officers involved in the cover-ups faced any repercussions for their 

behavior. Park alleges only that the Chief of Police knew about the 

incidents and failed to implement whistleblowing policies. But whether 

the Chief of Police’s failure to implement such policies exhibited 

deliberate indifference to Park’s constitutional rights depends, at least in 

part, on whether he took other measures to address the officers’ 

misconduct. 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 13

Finally, although Park frames Policy 2.38 and the 

“brotherhood culture of silence” as separate theories of 

liability, we do not think that she can salvage her claim by 

combining the two sets of allegations. Park asserts that the 

Chief of Police would have known about Kimura’s prior 

incidents of drunkenly brandishing his firearm (and thus 

would have become aware of the deficiencies in Policy 2.38) 

had he addressed the culture of silence by mandating that 

officers report their colleagues’ transgressions. At most, 

however, this assertion suggests that Park’s injuries could 

have been avoided if: (1) the Chief of Police had 

implemented mandatory whistleblowing policies; (2) Naki 

and Omoso had reported Kimura’s behavior pursuant to 

those policies; and (3) the Chief of Police had taken 

appropriate steps to deter Kimura from committing such 

misconduct again in the future. Whether the Chief of Police 

could have prevented Park’s injuries goes to the issue of 

causation, a separate question from whether his inaction 

reflected deliberate indifference to Park’s federally 

protected rights. The Chief of Police’s failure to address the 

culture of silence could establish his deliberate indifference 

to the risk posed by Kimura’s conduct only if he knew that 

the culture of silence extended to incidents involving the 

deprivation of community members’ federally protected 

rights and still turned a blind eye. As just explained, Park’s 

complaint fails to plausibly allege that fundamental premise. 

Because Park has not plausibly alleged that the Chief of 

Police’s inaction exhibited deliberate indifference to her 

federally protected rights, we affirm the district court’s 

dismissal of her § 1983 claim against the County. 

AFFIRMED.

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14 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part:

I join the majority opinion as applied to Officers Naki 

and Omoso, and agree that the § 1983 claims against them 

should be dismissed for failure to plausibly allege that they 

were acting under color of law. However, I respectfully 

disagree with the majority’s analysis of Park’s Monell claim 

against the County. 

I. Officer Kimura

The majority assumes for purposes of its Monell analysis 

that Park plausibly alleges that Officer Kimura acted under 

color of law and violated Park’s Fourteenth Amendment 

right to bodily integrity. Because I would find that Park has 

also plausibly alleged deliberate indifference on the part of 

the County, as discussed below, it is necessary for me to 

explain why I think the majority’s assumption about Officer 

Kimura indeed reflects the correct legal result. 

The facts alleged in Park’s Second Amended Complaint 

(SAC) plausibly demonstrate that Officer Kimura was acting 

under color of law in two respects. First, “a state employee 

who . . . exercises his official responsibilities in an off-duty 

encounter, typically acts under color of state law.” Naffe v. 

Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2015). Park alleges that 

Officer Kimura’s purpose for handling his firearm at the 

time of the shooting was to exercise his official 

responsibilities. Specifically, Honolulu Police Department 

(HPD) Policy No. 2.38 required HPD officers to carry a 

pistol at all times, even when not scheduled for work, except 

when “impaired” by alcohol. Park alleges that Officer 

Kimura was carrying and attempted to reload his revolver 

that night for purposes of compliance with HPD Policy No. 

2.38.

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 15

This is “typically” enough to find action under color of 

law, and I see no reason to stray from the general rule here. 

Id. at 1037. It is irrelevant that Officer Kimura technically 

violated HPD Policy No. 2.38 by possessing his firearm 

while impaired by alcohol. See Screws v. United States, 325 

U.S. 91, 111 (1945) (“Acts of officers who undertake to 

perform their official duties are included whether they hew 

to the line of their authority or overstep it.”). Defendants do 

not offer a counter-explanation for Officer Kimura’s firearm 

handling, let alone one “so convincing” as to make Park’s 

explanation “implausible.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 

1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 

The color of law test we articulated in Anderson v. 

Warner, 451 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2006), fits poorly in the 

circumstances here. We developed the second prong of that 

test—“the officer’s pretense of acting in the performance of 

his duties must have had the purpose and effect of 

influencing the behavior of others,” id. at 1069—to address 

circumstances in which an off-duty officer was neither 

exercising nor even attempting to exercise his official duties. 

See id. at 1065–66 (off-duty county jail custodial officer 

assaulted plaintiff after plaintiff accidentally rear-ended 

officer’s personal truck); Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 

F.3d 831, 833–34 (9th Cir. 1996) (off-duty sheriff’s deputy 

attempted to rob plaintiffs at gunpoint); Naffe, 789 F.3d at 

1033 (off-duty county prosecutor published derogatory 

statements about plaintiff on prosecutor’s personal blog and 

Twitter). As alleged in the SAC, Officer Kimura was 

similarly off duty but was attempting to exercise his official 

duties, his failure to properly heed HPD’s impairment policy 

notwithstanding. I do not believe we need look for a purpose 

of invoking official status to influence others when we have 

the more direct purpose of exercising official duties for 

official ends. See Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1037 (distinguishing 

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16 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

cases involving “a state employee who . . . exercises his 

official responsibilities in an off-duty encounter,” from “[a] 

state employee who is [entirely] off duty,” and applying the 

Anderson test only to the latter). As we acknowledged in 

Anderson, “[t]here is no ‘rigid formula’ for determining 

whether a state or local law official is acting under color of 

state law.” 451 F.3d at 1068 (quoting Ouzts v. Md. Nat’l Ins. 

Co., 505 F.2d 547, 550 (9th Cir. 1974) (en banc)). 

Based on this analysis, Park plausibly alleges that 

Officer Kimura handled his revolver on the night in question 

for HPD reasons, not personal reasons. Construing the facts 

in Park’s favor, Officer Kimura therefore acted under color 

of law. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 

(2007); Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1037.

Second, even if we were to apply the Anderson test, it is 

satisfied when we consider Park’s allegations regarding 

Officer Kimura’s prior conduct. The law of our circuit does 

not per se proscribe consideration of prior conduct. I would 

find that the prior conduct alleged here bears a sufficient 

nexus to the conduct on the night of the shooting to include 

it within the scope of our color of law analysis. 

On Park’s alleged facts, Officer Kimura plausibly 

“pretend[ed] to act under color of law” on previous 

occasions by flaunting his officer status, as well as by 

brandishing his firearm. Naffe, 789 F.3d at 1037. His 

pretense plausibly had the “purpose and effect of influencing 

the behavior of” Park so that she would tolerate his 

dangerous and drunken misbehavior at her bar, whenever he 

appeared. Id. He did not need to assert his officer status on 

every occasion in order to have this effect; asserting it 

regularly served the purpose well enough. The harm he 

inflicted on Plaintiff “related in some meaningful way” to 

his officer status, id., in that he “used ‘the badge of [his] 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 17

authority’” to ensure his impaired firearm handling would be 

tolerated, Anderson, 451 F.3d at 1069 (quoting McDade v. 

West, 223 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000)). If he had not 

had the protection of purported state authority, he would 

likely have been banned from the bar or indeed arrested for 

his conduct.1 And Park would not have ended up shot.2

Our decision in Huffman v. County of Los Angeles, 147 

F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 1998), though facially similar, is 

distinguishable. See id. at 1058 (plainclothes, off-duty 

police officer did not act under color of state law when he 

inadvertently shot opponent during bar brawl). First, the 

officer in Huffman had a personal purpose for handling his 

firearm, namely securing his loose gun during a personal 

brawl. See id. at 1056. By contrast, Officer Kimura 

1 Hawaii law allows open carry of a loaded handgun only with a 

license, which an applicant can obtain “only ‘[w]here the urgency or the 

need has been sufficiently indicated’ and the applicant ‘is engaged in the 

protection of life and property.’” Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1048 

(9th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019) 

(quoting H.R.S. § 134-9). 

2 The Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 

516 (4th Cir. 2003), is persuasive. In that case, off-duty deputy sheriffs 

went to various stores to buy out all copies of a newspaper that criticized 

their department. Id. at 520. The officers were out of uniform, not 

wearing badges, and using their personal vehicles. Id. They were,

however, “carrying their state-issued firearms, and some of those 

firearms were visible during the evening.” Id. at 526. The Fourth Circuit 

highlighted the fact that, despite being out of uniform and making no 

overt threats, the officers “were recognized as police officers by store 

employees throughout the county,” and, according to one store clerk, 

“basically came off real intimidating.” Id. Since “[p]roprietors of small 

stores often feel a keen need to stay on the right side of local law 

enforcement,” the Fourth Circuit found that the officers’ “status as 

sheriff’s deputies enabled them to execute their scheme in a manner that 

private citizens never could have.” Id.

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18 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

plausibly had an official purpose for handling his firearm. 

Cf. McDade, 223 F.3d at 1141 (distinguishing Huffman

because the county employee in McDade was “committ[ing] 

an act that was related to her official duties”). Second, the 

officer in Huffman not only “never identified himself as a 

sheriff’s deputy on the evening of the shooting,” id. at 1058, 

but he also attempted to disguise his status by telling the 

victim he “owned an air conditioning company,” id. at 1056. 

Officer Kimura made no attempt to disguise his officer 

status, and indeed had engaged in a pattern of behavior 

designed to ensure his officer status would be recognized, 

and respected, whether he asserted it or not. Cf. McDade, 

223 F.3d at 1141 (distinguishing Huffman because the 

county employee in McDade acted under pretense of state 

authority by entering her state passcode into a database of 

private information).3

Our decision in Van Ort is also distinguishable. See 92 

F.3d at 838–39 (off-duty police officer did not act under 

color of state law when he tortured and attempted to rob the 

residents of a home he had previously entered while on 

duty). As in Huffman, the officer in Van Ort had a personal 

purpose for handling his firearm, in this case robbing his 

victims at gunpoint. See id. at 834. As in Huffman, the 

3 In McDade, we considered a § 1983 lawsuit against a clerical 

employee at a county District Attorney’s office. 223 F.3d at 1137. The 

employee had used her official access to a state medical database to 

locate her husband’s ex-wife at a battered women’s shelter. Id. The 

employee’s purpose was to enable her husband to serve papers on his exwife relating to child custody issues. Id. We held that the employee 

acted under color of law, despite being engaged in a purely personal 

pursuit, because she “acted under the pretense of state employment by 

asserting her state-authorized passcode to enter into the database.” Id. at 

1141. Notably, we did not rely on the fact that the employee accessed 

the database during her scheduled work hours.

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 19

officer in Van Ort attempted to disguise his official status 

during his crime. See id. at 838–39; cf. McDade, 223 F.3d 

at 1141 (distinguishing Van Ort for the same reasons as 

Huffman). Thus, it was not enough in Van Ort that the victim 

alleged he recognized the officer on account of a previous 

on-duty visit, because the officer “did not use his authority 

to gain entry to the home or to induce [the victim] to open 

his front door,” nor did the officer “purport to be acting as a 

policeman.” Id. at 839. By contrast, Officer Kimura’s 

identity as an officer was not just incidentally recognized by 

Park. Officer Kimura ensured Park would recognize his 

officer status by regularly flaunting it and by demonstrating 

his authority to wield a weapon in her bar without 

consequence.

Thus, contrary to the County’s arguments, I conclude 

that prior conduct is potentially relevant to our under color 

of law analysis, and is in fact dispositive in this case. On the 

facts plausibly alleged in the SAC, I have no doubt that 

Officer Kimura’s drunken wielding of his revolver in a bar 

full of people was an abuse of power “possessed by virtue of 

state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is 

clothed with the authority of state law.” Naffe, 789 F.3d at 

1036 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 

(1941)). Thus, I believe that the majority’s assumption that 

Officer Kimura acted under color of law in fact reflects the 

correct result. I therefore also have no doubt that Park has 

plausibly alleged a Fourteenth Amendment violation of her 

right to bodily integrity, given the plausible allegation of a 

state actor, and of deliberate indifference by the County as I 

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20 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

discuss below.4 See P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302–04

(9th Cir. 1996).

II. Monell Liability

Contrary to the majority, I would find that the facts in the 

SAC plausibly give rise to § 1983 liability for the County 

under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of 

New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the basis of the County’s 

role in causing Officer Kimura’s actions. To state a Monell 

claim, a plaintiff must allege “that the government ‘had a 

deliberate policy, custom, or practice that was the “moving 

force” behind the constitutional violation.’” GraveletBlondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) 

(quoting Galen v. Cty. of L.A., 477 F.3d 652, 667 (9th Cir. 

2007)). In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 

municipality acted with “deliberate indifference” to her 

constitutional rights. Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

The “moving force” showing requires both causation-infact and proximate causation. Gravelet-Blondin, 728 F.3d at 

1096. To demonstrate causation-in-fact, a plaintiff must 

plausibly “establish ‘that the injury would have been 

4 Park likely alleges a plausible Fourteenth Amendment violation by 

Officer Kimura himself, in terms of unconstitutionally excessive use of 

force—it was likely “objectively unreasonable” for Officer Kimura to 

wield (or attempt to reload) his gun while drunk in a bar full of people. 

Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1122–24 (9th Cir. 2018). Cf.

Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2002) (en 

banc) (merely pointing a gun may constitute Fourteenth Amendment 

excessive force). But this is unnecessary to resolve for Monell purposes. 

See, e.g., Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en 

banc) (“[A] municipality may not be held liable for a § 1983 violation 

under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its 

subordinates.”).

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 21

avoided’ had proper policies been implemented.” Long v. 

Cty. of L.A., 442 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

Gibson v. Cty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1196 (9th Cir. 

2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 

1076). Park points to many policy corrections that plausibly 

would have prevented her injuries, including a prohibition 

on firearm possession while consuming alcohol in any 

amount, guidance regarding assessing impairment and 

preventing firearm misuse by impaired officers, mandatory 

reporting of officer misconduct, and whistleblower 

protections for reporting officers. I would reject 

Defendants’ suggestion that a policy prohibiting firearm 

carrying while “drinking” would have been just as 

ineffective as the actual policy—prohibiting firearm 

carrying while “impaired”—because “impairment starts 

with the first sip.” Most people do not consider themselves 

impaired after “one sip.” Similarly, I disagree with the 

majority’s conclusion that HPD Policy No. 2.38 did not 

require HPD officers to carry their firearms with them to a 

bar. It is unclear when exactly the majority reads the policy 

to direct (or even permit) officers to dispossess themselves 

of their holstered pistols in relation to a plan to drink at a bar, 

nor is it clear what the officers should then do with the pistol. 

Officers who fail to carry their pistol while at a bar but not 

impaired would violate the policy’s plain terms. Officers 

who become impaired while carrying a holstered pistol are 

dangerous.

To demonstrate proximate causation, a plaintiff must 

plausibly establish that any “intervening actions were within 

the scope of the original risk and therefore foreseeable.” Van 

Ort, 92 F.3d at 837 (quoting Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 

F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir. 1987)). Park plausibly alleges that HPD 

Policy No. 2.38 created a foreseeable risk that an officer 

would carry his gun while drinking; that HPD’s 

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22 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

“brotherhood culture of silence” created the foreseeable risk 

that he would not be reported if he then misused his gun 

while drinking; and that the lack of reporting created the 

foreseeable risk that his misuse would continue until he 

accidentally shot someone.5 Accordingly, Park plausibly 

alleges that HPD’s policies were the “moving force” behind 

her injuries.

The “deliberate indifference” inquiry is an objective one, 

concerning whether the need for different policies or 

procedures was “so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to 

result in the violation of constitutional rights,” that the 

municipality “can reasonably be said to have been 

deliberately indifferent to the need.” Castro, 833 F.3d at 

1076. The set of inferences just described as plausibly 

demonstrating foreseeability for purposes of proximate 

causation also plausibly demonstrate “obvious[ness]” for 

purposes of deliberate indifference.6

 Id. 

5 Huffman is again distinguishable. See 147 F.3d at 1061 (policy 

requiring deputies to carry guns at all times, without warning about 

dangers of carrying guns while intoxicated, albeit “bad policy,” was not 

the proximate cause of shooting because “County could not have 

foreseen [officer’s] actions”). In Huffman, the officer was not acting 

under color of law, the bar brawl was an unforeseeable intervening event 

between carrying a gun while drinking and the act of discharging the 

gun, and the department had no knowledge of—nor was there any 

allegation of—past incidents involving the defendant officer. See id. at 

1060.

6 Three recent district court decisions—each of which allowed a 

similar Monell claim to go forward even when the relevant officer was 

not acting under color of law—are persuasive regarding the 

foreseeability and obviousness here: 

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PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU 23

A municipality must also have had “actual or 

constructive notice” of the substantial certainty of a 

constitutional violation, which likewise invites an objective 

inquiry. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting City of Canton 

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 

concurring in part and dissenting in part)). I disagree with 

the majority’s conclusion that Park has failed to plausibly 

allege that the County had notice here. Officer Kimura’s 

repeated engagement in drunken and dangerous weapons 

handling occurred in the presence of other HPD officers. 

This put the County on at least “constructive” notice of the 

substantial risk of harm, whether on account of its policies 

generally or on account of its policies’ effects on Officer 

In Wagner v. Cook County Sheriff’s Office, 378 F. Supp. 3d 713 

(N.D. Ill. 2019), the district court allowed a Monell claim against the 

county where an intoxicated off-duty officer, not acting under color of

law, physically attacked and held a knife to the head of a bartender. Id.

at 714–15. The plaintiff alleged that the officer had a history of 

misconduct involving excessive force and intoxication, and that the 

county had a policy or custom of insufficiently investigating or 

disciplining its officers. Id. at 714. 

In Falcon v. City of Chicago, No. 17-C-5991, 2018 WL 2716286 

(N.D. Ill. June 6, 2018), an intoxicated off-duty police officer, not acting 

under color of law, accidentally discharged her gun at her friend’s home 

and killed her friend. Id. at *1, *3. The district court allowed a Monell

claim against the city for failure to properly train officers and failure to 

adequately enforce its regulations regarding the handling of guns while 

drinking. Id. at *6. 

And in LaPorta v. City of Chicago, 277 F. Supp. 3d 969 (N.D. Ill. 

2017), an intoxicated off-duty officer’s friend suffered a paralyzing 

bullet wound from the officer’s gun, either after the friend shot himself 

in an attempted suicide or after the officer shot him. Id. at 974. The 

district court found that fact issues precluded summary judgment for the 

city on the friend’s Monell claim premised on the city’s “code of silence” 

and failure to discipline officers for misconduct. Id. at 991–93.

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24 PARK V. CITY & CTY. OF HONOLULU

Kimura specifically. I certainly would not shield the County 

from being charged with “constructive notice” of Officer 

Kimura’s past behavior where the very reason individual 

policymakers may not have had “actual” notice was the 

offending brotherhood culture of silence. To the extent that 

the majority identifies additional facts that, if alleged, would 

have made out a more compelling case for constructive or 

actual notice, Park should be given leave to amend.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent as to the 

dismissal of Park’s Monell claims against the County. I 

would reverse the district court and allow that portion of 

Park’s lawsuit to proceed.

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