Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00689/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00689-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joyce Gilmore
Plaintiff
RDIC, LLC
Defendant
Russell Lands, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

JOYCE GILMORE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:14-cv-689-MHT-PWG

)

RDIC, LLC, and )

RUSSELL LANDS, INC., )

)

Defendants. )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This matter is before the court on an opposed motion for summary judgment

(Doc. 50) filed by Plaintiff Joyce Gilmore. The motion has been briefed and is ripe

for review. This is an action for declaratory and injunctive relief under Title III of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. Plaintiff seeks

redress from RDIC, LLC (“RDIC”), for architectural barrier violations of the ADA. 1

The property at issue in this litigation is located in Prattville, Alabama, and does

business as Russell Do-It Center. It is undisputed that Defendant owns and operates

this business. Plaintiff alleges that she is a person with a qualifying disability who

lives 5.4 miles from RDIC’s Prattville location, and that she desires to visit RDIC in

 On April 21, 2015, Defendant Russell Lands, Inc., was dismissed as a party 1

to these proceedings. (Doc. 37).

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the future. (Doc. 8 at ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff asserts thatshe is disabled within the meaning

of the ADA because she suffers “from sever Crohn’s disease, a permanent

inflammatory bowel disease ... and an associated inflammation disorder that results

in generalized joint inflamation and arthritisthroughout the joints of her arms, hands,

and legs.” (Doc. 8 at ¶ 3). Plaintiff alleged that RDIC made some minor repairs, but

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has refused to make more costly repairs and does not “intend to comply with the

ADA.” (Doc. 8 at ¶ 6). Therefore, Plaintiff alleged that she “has been denied full and

equal enjoyment of [RDIC’s] premises on the basis of her disability.” (Doc. 8 at ¶ 7). 

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I. JURISDICTION

Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as to Plaintiff’s

federal cause of action. The parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue, and

the court finds sufficient information of record to support both. See 28 U.S.C. §

1391. On November 25, 2014, the above-styled matter was referred to the

undersigned for review by United States District Judge Myron H. Thompson. (Doc.

16); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Rule 72, Fed. R. Civ. P.; United States v. Raddatz,

For the purposes of summary judgment, RDIC does not challenge that 2

Plaintiff is a disabled individual under the ADA. (Doc. 57 at p.15).

Defendants answered theAmended Complaint denying “plaintiff’s allegations

3

that defendant is in violation of the ADA and ... that plaintiff is entitled to any relief

whatsoever.” (Doc. 32 at ¶ 20). 

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447 U.S. 667 (1980); Jeffrey S. v. State Board of Education of State of Georgia, 896

F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1990).

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper “if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together

with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012,

1023 (11th Cir. 2000). The party asking for summary judgment always bears the

initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and identifying

those portions of the pleadings or filings which it believes demonstrate the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party

has met its burden, Rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings

and, by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for

trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are

irrelevant. Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 248 (1986). All reasonable doubts about the facts and all justifiable inferences

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are resolved in favor of the non-movant. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023; Fitzpatrick

v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). When opposing a motion for

summary judgment, however, the nonmovant can no longer rest on mere allegations,

but must set forth evidence ofspecific facts. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996)

(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). A dispute is

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1023. “If the

evidence [presented by the nonmoving party to rebut the moving party’s evidence]

is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be

granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (internal citations omitted).

III. BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

On August 28, 2012, counsel for Plaintiff sent a letter to RDIC alleging that it

was in violation of the ADA and had discriminated against Plaintiff pursuant to the

ADA. (Doc. 10-1 at pp.1-2). The letter alleged 10 numbered violations of the ADA

and alluded to other undisclosed violations. (Doc. 10-1 at pp.1-22). RDIC hired ADA

compliance expert James G. Scott, who conducted an evaluation on the RDIC

property and suggested improvementsto bring RDIC into compliance with the ADA.

(Doc. 8 at ¶ 6.d.; Doc. 57-2). Based on the recommendations of Scott, RDIC made

improvements intended to remedy the ADA public accommodation barriers and

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notified Plaintiff’s counsel of those improvements. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 6.e.; Doc. 57-3).

Unsatisfied with the improvement made by RDIC, Plaintifffiled her Complaint

in this court on July 18, 2014, alleging 26 violations of the ADA. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14.a.-

z.). RDIC answered Plaintiff’s Complaint with a general denial that it was in

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violation of any provision of the ADA. (Doc. 32 at ¶¶ 17-20). On November 23,

2015, Plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff’s

“testimony” and the report of her ADA expert Kirk Tcherneshoff provide undisputed

evidence of all the elements necessary to establish that she is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law to have the barriers removed to the maximum extent feasible. (Doc.

50 at p.15, 23).

IV. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues in response that Scott’s affidavit (Doc. 56-

4) cannot be properly considered because it was submitted after the “discovery

cutoff” of October 30, 2015, and that “[w]ithout the affidavit, the evidence is

undisputed as to the violation of the design standards and the appropriate relief.”

(Doc. 58 at pp.1-2). Plaintiff offers no citation to authority to support her proposition

that this court is barred from considering an affidavit submitted after a discovery

Plaintiff amended her Complaint on September 24, 2014, alleging 16 specific 4

violations of the ADA. (Doc. 8 at ¶ 17.a.-p.). 

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deadline but contemporaneously with a filing in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment. Moreover, Plaintiff has not moved this court to strike Scott’s affidavit. 

Rule 56(c)(4), Fed. R. Civ. P., statesthat “[a]n affidavit or declaration used to support

or oppose a motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify

on the matters stated.” Accordingly, consideration of Scott’s affidavit is proper

pursuant toRule 56(c)(4), Plaintiff’s argument is without merit, and as Plaintiff notes,

the affidavit of Scott does dispute the evidence upon which Plaintiff would rely for

her motion for summary judgment.5

Title III of the ADA provides that:

No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in

the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,

advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation

by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of

public accommodation.

42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). “Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 to remedy widespread

discrimination against disabled individuals.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 531 U.S. 661,

674 (2001). The purpose of the ADA is, therefore, remedial and not punitive.

Congress enacted the ADA on January 25, 1993. After this date,

In a court-ordered statement of justiciable issues, Plaintiff admitted that 5

“RDIC’s expert report statessome ofthe violations differently than [Palintiff]’s report

states them...” (Doc. 40 at p.5). 

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facilities have to meet exacting design and implementation standards to

be in compliance with the ADA. The ADA imposes different

requirements on the owners and operators of facilities that existed prior

to its enactment date. For those facilities, the ADA states that

discrimination includes a private entity's “failure to remove architectural

barriers ... where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. §

12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Where removal is not “readily achievable,” failure

of the entity to make goods, services and facilities “available through

alternative methods if such methods are readily achievable,” may

constitute discrimination under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §

12182(b)(2)(A)(v).

Gathright Dietrich v. Atlanta Landmarks, Inc., 452 F.3d 1269, 1272-73 (11th Cir.

2006).

New construction (and alterations[FN1] to a facility affecting its

usability) built after the enactment of the ADA must be designed to

make the facility “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with

disabilities, including individuals who usewheelchairs” to the maximum

extent feasible. Id. § 12183(a)(2). Failure to make such construction

(and alterations) accessible constitutes intentional discrimination. Id.

_____

[FN1] Not every change to an existing facility is an “alteration”

under the statute. Relevant regulations define alteration as “a change to

a place of public accommodation or a commercial facility that affects or

could affect the usability of the building or facility or any part thereof.”

28 C.F.R. § 36.402.

Norkunas v. Seahorse NB, LLC, 444 F. App'x 412, 415 (11th Cir. 2011).

“A plaintiff alleging Title III ADA discrimination must initially prove that (1)

he is a disabled individual; (2) the defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public

accommodation; and (3) the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the

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meaning of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).” Norkunas, 444 F. App'x 412, 416 (11th

Cir. 2011). For the purposes of summary judgment, the parties do not dispute that

Plaintiff “is disabled or that the subject property is owned by [RDIC] and is a place

of public accommodation.” (Doc. 57 at p.15). Accordingly, the sole issue for

determination is whether RDIC discriminated against Plaintiff under the ADA. 

Plaintiff argues that she has “previously presented undisputed evidence about the

existence of barriers at the [RDIC’s] property...” and lists 16 specific improvements

that she argues are necessary to remove the alleged barriers. (Doc. 50 at pp.22-26).

In response, RDIC argues that it “responded in good faith to plaintiff’s original

assertions of ADA violations by hiring an expert and seeking to make improvement

to remedy those items its expert noted” such that “those areas meet the ADA

Guidelines or fall within acceptable variation standards.” (Doc. 57 at p. 16). RDIC

further notes that “there are factual differences where measurements made by

plaintiff’s expert are not the same as those made by [RDIC’s] expert” and that

“numerous alleged areas where plaintiff asserts there was discrimination ... actually

fall within acceptable construction building tolerances, have other means of

equivalent facilitation, or are temporary barriers only.” Id. RDIC relies in part on the

affidavit submitted by its expert, in which Scott states, among other things, that his

measurements of various slopes are significantly different from those reported by

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Tcherneshoff and that Scott’s measurements “are within acceptable conventional

construction tolerances.” (Doc. 57-4 at ¶¶ 4-6, 10). Scott also argues that a number

ofthe alleged barriers could be remedied by improvements assimple asthe placement

of planters or changing the location of seasonal merchandise and nonstructural

display items to compliant areas. (Doc. 57-4 at ¶¶ 6-9, 11). Scott’s affidavit further

states that several other alleged barriers have either been removed or removed to the

maximum extent possible under the applicable standards. (Doc. 57-4 at ¶¶ 12-14). 

Moreover, Plaintiff appears to concede that but for Scott’s affidavit, Plaintiff’s

evidence would be undisputed. (Doc. 58 at p.1).6

It is well established that “[t]he district court's function, in a summary

judgment proceeding, is not to resolve factual issues but to determine

whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. In making its

determination, the court may not weigh conflicting affidavits to resolve

disputed fact issues.” Farbwerke Hoeschst A.G. v. MV Don Nicky, 589

F.2d 795, 798 (5th Cir. 1979). Tobelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line

Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1018 (3rd Cir. 1942). Frey v. Frankel, 361 F.2d

437, 442 (10th Cir. 1966).

Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir.

1983). Accordingly, the factual issues in dispute between the parties, as evidenced

by their conflicting reports, affidavits, and allegations demonstrate that there exist

genuine issues of material fact as to both the existence of certain barriers and the

“Without [Scott’s] affidavit, the evidence is undisputed as to the violation of 6

the design standards and the appropriate relief.” (Doc. 58 at p.1)

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appropriate improvements necessary to remove those barriers. Therefore, Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment is due to be denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, for the reasons asstated, it isthe RECOMMENDATION of the

Magistrate Judge that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 50) is due to

be DENIED.

It is ORDERED that the parties shall file any objections to the said

Recommendation on or before April 15, 2016. Any objections filedmust specifically

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party

objects. Frivolous, conclusive or general objections will not be considered by the

District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order

of the court and, therefore, it is not appealable.

Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations

in the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by

the District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from

attacking on appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District

Court except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright,

677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982). See Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33

(11th Cir. 1982).

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DONE and ORDERED this 1st day of April, 2016.

 /s/ Paul W. Greene 

United States Magistrate Judge

 

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