Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01730/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01730-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Meridian Products, LLC
Appellee
United States
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

MERIDIAN PRODUCTS, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2016-1730

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:13-cv-00018-RKM, Senior Judge R. Kenton 

Musgrave.

______________________ 

Decided: March 28, 2017

______________________ 

ALEXANDER SCHAEFER, Crowell & Moring, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also represented by DANIEL CANNISTRA; FRANCES PIERSON HADFIELD, 

New York, NY.

TARA K. HOGAN, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, REGINALD 

T. BLADES, JR.; JESSICA M. LINK, Office of Chief Counsel 

for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States 

Department of Commerce, Washington, DC.

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2 MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and WALLACH, 

Circuit Judges. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

In 2012, Appellee Meridian Products, LLC (“Meridian”) asked the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) to issue a scope ruling that certain aluminum 

trim kit packages (“trim kits”) do not fall within the scope 

of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on

aluminum extrusions from the People’s Republic of China 

(“the Orders”). Commerce found the trim kits subject to

the Orders’ scope, and Meridian challenged that ruling

before the U.S. Court of International Trade (“the CIT”). 

Five opinions and three remands later, the CIT sustained

Commerce’s third remand determination, in which Commerce found, under protest, that the trim kits do not fall 

within the Orders’ scope. See Meridian Prods., LLC v. 

United States (Meridian V), 145 F. Supp. 3d 1329, 1331 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2016). 

Appellant United States (“Government”) appeals. We 

possess subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(5) (2012). We reverse. 

BACKGROUND

The instant appeal addresses whether particular

products fall within the scope of existing antidumping and 

countervailing duty orders. As a result, we examine the 

Orders’ scope, the description of the products in question, 

and the procedural history before turning to the merits.

I. The Subject Orders

Commerce generally investigates whether a foreign 

government or public entity provided “a countervailable 

subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production, or 

export” of merchandise that has entered the United 

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MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES 3

States, 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(1) (2012), and whether particular merchandise was sold in the United States “at less 

than its fair value,”1 id. § 1673(1). At the conclusion of an 

investigation, if Commerce and the U.S. International 

Trade Commission (“the ITC”) make the requisite findings,2 Commerce publishes an order imposing duties on 

imported merchandise covered by the investigation. Id.

§§ 1671e(a), 1673e(a). In each order, Commerce must 

“include[] a description of the subject merchandise[] in 

such detail as [it] . . . deems necessary.”3 Id.

§§ 1671e(a)(2), 1673e(a)(2).

1 Congress has instructed Commerce to make these 

determinations using separate statutory formulas. A 

subsidy is countervailable if it provides a form of a “financial contribution” to a person, confers a “benefit” on that 

person, and is “specific.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5), (5A). A 

foreign exporter sells merchandise at less than its fair 

value (i.e., dumps) when the merchandise’s “normal 

value” (i.e., the merchandise’s price in the home market) 

“exceeds the [merchandise’s] export price or constructed 

export price” (i.e., the merchandise’s price in the United 

States). Id. § 1677(35)(A).

2 The ITC determines whether the merchandise 

“materially injure[s]” a domestic industry, “threaten[s]” 

the industry with material injury, or “materially retard[s]” the industry’s “establishment.” 19 U.S.C. 

§§ 1671(a), 1673(a).

3 The discretion that Congress afforded to Commerce to describe the subject merchandise comports with 

the principle that “remedial legislation,” like the trade 

remedy laws, “should . . . be given a liberal interpretation” 

and “exemptions from its sweep should be narrowed and 

limited to effect the remedy intended.” Piedmont & N. 

Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 286 U.S. 299, 

311, 311−12 (1932); see, e.g., Guangdong Wireking 

 

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4 MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES

In 2011, Commerce published the Orders. See Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China

(Antidumping Duty Order), 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of 

Commerce May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the 

People’s Republic of China (Countervailing Duty Order), 

76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011).4 

The scope of the Orders describes the subject merchandise 

as “aluminum extrusions” that “are shapes and forms, 

produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified 

aluminum alloys. Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 

at 30,650. The subject extrusions possess “a wide variety 

of shapes and forms” in “a variety of finishes.” Id. The 

subject extrusions also “may be described at the time of 

importation as parts for final finished products that are 

assembled after importation” and “may be identified with 

reference to their end use.” Id. at 30,650, 30,651.

The Orders’ scope contains several exclusions. In relevant part, the scope

excludes finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a “finished goods kit.” A finished goods kit is 

understood to mean a packaged combination of 

parts that contains, at the time of importation, all 

of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or 

fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is 

Housewares & Hardware Co. v. United States, 745 F.3d 

1194, 1205−06 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (discussing the “remedial 

nature” of the antidumping and countervailing duty 

laws). 

4 The Orders recite the same scope. Compare Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650–51, with 

Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653–54. 

We refer only to the scope in the Antidumping Duty Order 

for ease of reference.

 

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MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES 5

assembled “as is” into a finished product. An imported product will not be considered a “finished 

goods kit” and therefore excluded from the scope 

of the [Orders] merely by including fasteners such 

as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an 

aluminum extrusion product.

Id. at 30,651. The instant appeal concerns whether 

Meridian’s trim kits meet the terms of the “finished goods 

kit” exclusion.

II. Meridian’s Trim Kits

“[B]ecause the descriptions of subject merchandise” in 

an order’s scope pertain to a class or kind of goods and 

therefore “must be written in general terms,” questions 

arise as to whether a particular product falls within the 

scope of an existing order. 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a) (2012); 

see 19 U.S.C. § 1677(25) (defining “subject merchandise” 

as “the class or kind of merchandise that is within the 

scope of an . . . order”). Congress has authorized Commerce to issue scope rulings clarifying “whether a particular type of merchandise is within the class or kind of 

merchandise described in an existing . . . order.” 19 

U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi); accord Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. 

v. United States, 669 F.2d 692, 699 (CCPA 1982) (confirming Commerce’s authority to issue scope rulings). An 

interested party may submit an application to Commerce 

to obtain clarification about an order’s scope.5 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(c); see Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 

F.2d 683, 685–86 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (explaining that scope 

rulings clarify the terms of the original order but do not 

modify or amend them).

Meridian, the importer of the trim kits, asked Commerce to issue a scope ruling that “confirm[s]” the kits do 

5 An “interested party” includes, inter alia, “an importer[] of subject merchandise.” 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(A).

 

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6 MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES

not fall within the Orders’ scope. J.A. 200. Meridian 

described the trim kits as “an aesthetic frame around the 

perimeter of (though not attached to) a major home kitchen appliance,” such as a “freezer” or “refrigerator.” 

J.A. 200, 201. According to Meridian, the “[t]rim kits are 

sold as a package of finished parts” and “consist[] of 

extruded aluminum forms[] made from aluminum alloy” 

covered by the Orders’ scope. J.A. 201. Meridian further 

stated that “[t]he trim kits also include a customer installation kit for the consumer to use during the final assembly in the residential kitchen,” with the installation kit 

consisting of “a hexagonal wrench,” “fasteners,” “[a] set of 

instructions,” and “hinge covers.” J.A. 201, 203. 

III. Procedural History

In its initial scope ruling, Commerce found the trim 

kits subject to the Orders. J.A. 186–88. Commerce found 

that the trim kits “are aluminum extrusions which are 

shapes and forms[] made of an aluminum alloy that is 

covered by the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 187 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Commerce also rejected Meridian’s contention that the trim kits meet the finished goods 

kit exclusion. J.A. 187–88. Assessing the trim kits 

against the Orders’ scope and prior scope rulings, Commerce found that the trim kits did not meet the terms of 

the finished goods kit exclusion because, as the exclusion 

states, a kit’s inclusion of “fasteners” and other extraneous materials does not remove it from the Orders’ scope. 

J.A. 187–88.

Meridian appealed to the CIT, which then remanded 

Commerce’s initial scope ruling. Meridian Prods., LLC v. 

United States (Meridian I), No. 1:13-cv-00018-RKM, 2013 

WL 2996233, at *1 (Ct. Int’l Trade June 17, 2013). Observing that “a remand is sometimes needed if an intervening event may affect the validity of the agency action,” 

the CIT agreed with Meridian’s argument that Commerce 

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MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES 7

failed to consider a prior scope ruling interpreting terms 

of the Orders not at issue in the instant appeal. Id.

Subsequent litigation resulted in four more CIT opinions that included two additional remands to Commerce. 

See Meridian Prods., LLC v. United States (Meridian II), 

971 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1271 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (remanding Commerce’s first remand determination that the 

trim kits are within the scope of the Orders); Meridian 

Prods., LLC v. United States (Meridian III), 37 F. Supp. 

3d 1342, 1354 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2014) (sustaining Commerce’s second remand determination that the trim kits 

are within the scope of the Orders); Meridian Prods., LLC 

v. United States (Meridian IV), 77 F. Supp. 3d 1307, 

1318–19 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015) (granting motion for reconsideration of Meridian III and remanding Commerce’s 

second remand determination for reconsideration). In the 

third remand determination, Commerce concluded that it 

must “find that the trim kits . . . are excluded from the 

Orders as finished goods kits” to comport with the CIT’s 

interpretation of the Orders’ scope. J.A. 25. In so doing, 

Commerce observed that “it appears that the [CIT]’s 

instructions resulted in a tension between the [CIT]’s 

holding and the plain language of the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 25. The CIT sustained Commerce’s third 

remand determination in its final opinion. See Meridian 

V, 145 F. Supp. 3d at 1330–31. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

 We apply the same standard of review as the CIT

when reviewing a Commerce scope ruling, see Shenyang 

Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 

F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015), though we “give due 

respect to the [CIT’s] informed opinion,” Novosteel SA v. 

United States, 284 F.3d 1261, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Under that

standard, we uphold a Commerce scope ruling that is

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8 MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES

supported “by substantial evidence on the record” and 

otherwise “in accordance with law.” 19 U.S.C. 

§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “Substantial evidence is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.” Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United 

States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted).

II. The Trim Kits Fall Within the Unambiguous Terms of 

the Orders’ Scope

This appeal hinges on the interpretation of the Orders’ scope. The Government alleges that “the plain 

language of the Orders demonstrates that [the] . . . trim 

kits are within the scope of the Orders.” Appellant’s Br. 

16 (capitalization modified). The Government further

contends that, “even assuming the scope language of the 

Orders were ambiguous, the [CIT] failed to defer to Commerce’s reasonable interpretation of the scope language.” 

Id. at 24 (capitalization modified). After discussing the 

applicable legal framework, we address these arguments 

in turn.

A. Legal Framework

“[N]o specific statutory provision govern[s] the interpretation of the scope of antidumping or countervailing 

orders.” Shenyang, 776 F.3d at 1354. Commerce has 

filled the statutory gap with a regulation that sets forth a 

two-step test for answering scope questions, 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k), and our case law has added another layer to 

the inquiry. First, Commerce must look to the text of an

order’s scope; second, Commerce will consult descriptions 

of the merchandise in other sources; and third, if still 

necessary, Commerce may consider additional factors 

comparing the merchandise in question to merchandise

subject to the order. 

Commerce’s inquiry must begin with the order’s scope 

to determine whether it contains an ambiguity and, thus, 

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is susceptible to interpretation.6 See, e.g., Mid Continent 

Nail Corp. v. United States, 725 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. 

Cir. 2013) (explaining that the inquiry begins with “the 

language of the final order” and turns to other sources 

only if the scope itself “is ambiguous”); ArcelorMittal, 694 

F.3d at 87 (similar); see also Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United 

States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (explaining 

that the scope is the “cornerstone” of the analysis and “a 

predicate for the interpretive process”). If the scope is 

unambiguous,7 it governs. See, e.g., ArcelorMittal, 694 

F.3d at 87 (“If [the scope] is not ambiguous, the plain 

meaning of the language governs.”); accord Walgreen Co. 

v. United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 

(similar). “[B]ecause the meaning and scope of . . . orders 

are issues particularly within [Commerce’s] expertise and 

special competence,” we grant Commerce “substantial 

deference” with regard to its interpretation of its own 

antidumping duty and countervailing duty orders. King 

Supply Co. v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Nevertheless, the question of whether the unambiguous terms of a scope control the inquiry, or whether some 

ambiguity exists, is a question of law that we review de 

novo. See, e.g., Allegheny Bradford Corp. v. United States, 

6 Although a “low threshold” exists for Commerce to 

find ambiguity, Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1272, Commerce 

must not “identify an ambiguity where none exists,” 

ArcelorMittal Stainless Belg. N.V. v. United States, 

694 F.3d 82, 89 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 7 The relevant scope terms are “unambiguous” if 

they have “a single clearly defined or stated meaning.” 

Unambiguous, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged (1986). 

 

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342 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1183 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2004) (“[A] 

scope determination is not in accordance with the law if it 

changes the scope of an order or interprets an order in a 

manner contrary to the order’s terms.” (citing Duferco, 

296 F.3d at 1094–95)); accord Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 3d 

1331, 1344 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016) (same); Walgreen Co. v. 

United States, 33 Ct. Int’l Trade 1620, 1623 (2009) (similar), aff’d, 620 F.3d 1350. The question of whether a 

product meets the unambiguous scope terms presents a 

question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. See, 

e.g., Novosteel, 284 F.3d at 1269. 

“Scope orders are interpreted with the aid of” other 

sources as described by regulation. Duferco, 296 F.3d at 

1097 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Specifically, Commerce “will” consult “[t]he descriptions of 

the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial 

investigation, and [prior] determinations of [Commerce] 

(including prior scope determinations) and the [ITC].” 19 

C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1). Although a party’s description of 

merchandise in these sources may aid Commerce in 

making its determination, that description “cannot substitute for language in the order itself” because “[i]t is the 

responsibility of [Commerce], not those who [participated 

in] the proceedings, to determine the scope of the final 

orders.” Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1097 (footnote omitted). 

Commerce’s analysis of these sources against the product 

in question produces factual findings reviewed for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United 

States, 755 F.3d 912, 919–22 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reviewing 

Commerce’s analysis under § 351.225(k)(1) for substantial 

evidence).

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If the descriptions in the § 351.225(k)(1) sources “are 

not dispositive,”8 Commerce will consider the following

factors: “(i) [t]he physical characteristics of the product; 

(ii) [t]he expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) [t]he 

ultimate use of the product; (iv) [t]he channels of trade in 

which the product is sold; and (v) [t]he manner in which 

the product is advertised and displayed.” 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(2). “In conducting this analysis, it is well 

settled that Commerce has discretion in how to balance” 

these factors. Novosteel SA v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 

2d 720, 732 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2001) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted), aff’d, 284 F.3d 1261. Commerce’s analysis of these factors against the product in 

question yields factual findings reviewed for substantial 

evidence. See, e.g., Crawfish Processors All. v. United 

States, 483 F.3d 1358, 1363–64 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (reviewing Commerce’s analysis under § 351.225(k)(2) for substantial evidence). 

B. The CIT’s Interpretation Conflicts with Precedent and 

the Orders’ Unambiguous Terms

According to Commerce, the CIT erred in its interpretation of the Orders’ scope because “a reasonable reading 

of the [O]rders as a whole” demonstrates that “an aluminum extrusion product and fasteners, without more, will 

not qualify for the finished goods kit exclusion.” Appellant’s Br. 14. The CIT disagreed. See, e.g., Meridian IV, 

77 F. Supp. 3d at 1318−19. We agree with Commerce. 

We must first assess whether the plain language of 

the Orders’ scope, in light of the disputed 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(1) sources, is unambiguous. The relevant 

8 The term “dispositive” means that the descriptions in the § 351.225(k)(1) sources “definitively answer 

the scope question.” Sango Int’l, L.P. v. United States, 

484 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 

 

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exclusion to the Orders excludes finished goods kits, 

which it defines as “packaged combination[s] of parts that 

contain[], at the time of importation, all of the necessary 

parts to fully assemble a final finished good and require[]

no further finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or 

punching, and [are] assembled ‘as is’ into a finished 

product.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

30,651. Commerce contends that this exclusion contains 

an exception, which explains that “[a]n imported product 

will not be considered a ‘finished goods kit’” and therefore 

excluded from the scope of the Orders “merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging 

with an aluminum extrusion product.” Appellant’s Br. 17 

(quoting Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

30,651). In Commerce’s view, products that “meet the 

preliminary requirements for the finished goods kit 

exclusion[] may nonetheless be subject to the [O]rders” if 

a kit contains only aluminum extrusions and fasteners. 

Id.

Reading the terms of the Orders’ scope, the CIT disagreed with Commerce’s interpretation. The CIT instead 

found that “[c]ontext renders unreasonable Commerce’s 

reading of the exclusionary language of the scope.” Meridian IV, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 1316. The CIT reasoned that, 

because the products satisfy the definition of a “finished 

goods kit,” “[t]he inclusion of ‘fasteners’ or ‘extraneous 

materials’ is not determinative when qualifying a kit 

consisting of multiple parts which otherwise meets the 

exclusionary requirements.” Id. The CIT added that 

“there is nothing in the language [of the exclusion] that 

indicates that the parts in an otherwise qualifying kit 

cannot consist entirely of aluminum extrusions.” Id. 

Thus, the CIT determined that a kit covered by the exclusion should not be removed from the exclusion because it

includes fasteners considered to be “parts necessary for 

forming a complete finished good.” Id. at 1317.

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The CIT’s interpretation of the Orders’ scope suffers 

from three flaws. First, in the CIT’s view, the inquiry 

ends if a disputed product meets the definition of a “finished goods kit,” thereby resulting in the disputed product’s exclusion from the Orders. That interpretation fails 

to consider all of the terms of the exclusion (i.e., the 

statement that a product will not be considered a finished 

goods kits “merely by including fasteners”) and improperly elevates certain aspects of the exclusion over others by 

ignoring the qualifying language that Commerce describes as an exception. See, e.g., King Supply, 674 F.3d 

at 1350 (interpreting a scope so that it is “informative and 

non-superfluous”); Eckstrom, 254 F.3d at 1073 (rejecting a 

construction that rendered scope terms “mere surplusage”). Where (as here) multiple sentences comprise an 

order’s scope and “there is no indication that one sentence 

helps to define the scope while the other does not,” we will 

not read out a sentence intended by Commerce to be given 

effect. Allegheny, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 1190. Second, the 

CIT would exclude a kit even if it consists entirely of 

unassembled aluminum extrusions and fasteners. That 

interpretation would render the Orders’ scope, which by 

its terms covers aluminum extrusions, meaningless. See, 

e.g., Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1095 (stating that “Commerce 

cannot interpret an . . . order so as to change the scope of 

that order” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Third, the CIT’s interpretation would “render[] the 

[O]rders internally inconsistent” because it would allow 

for kits containing only unassembled aluminum extrusions and fasteners to be excluded from the scope of the 

Orders, whereas aluminum extrusions imported individually or as parts would be explicitly included in the scope. 

Wheatland Tube Co. v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1371 

(Fed. Cir. 1998); see King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1349 (stating that “requisite clear exclusionary language must leave 

no reasonable doubt that certain products were intended 

to be outside the scope of the . . . order”).

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Commerce did not err in its interpretation of the finished goods kit exclusion in the initial scope ruling. See 

J.A. 178–89. The exclusion states that, to fall outside the 

scope of the Orders, a finished goods kit must contain 

more than only aluminum extrusion parts necessary for 

final assembly. See Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 30,651 (describing the finished goods as those 

“containing aluminum extrusions” and packaged in a kit 

with a “combination of parts” (emphases added)). The 

exclusion does not limit the kits to aluminum extrusions 

and, instead, suggests the inclusion of non-aluminum 

parts in the kit with other materials. See id. Qualifying 

language further narrows the exclusion by reinforcing 

that the “mere[]” addition of fasteners will not bring a kit 

with only aluminum extrusions outside the scope of the 

Orders. Id. Finally, the exclusion states that the component parts of the kit relevant to the analysis are those 

parts in a “packaged combination of parts” that are “necessary . . . to fully assemble a final finished good,” regardless of additional materials that may be included in a kit’s 

packaging, but which are not otherwise included in the 

final assembled product. Id. 

Commerce’s determination is further supported by 

“prior scope rulings interpreting the same antidumping 

order[, which] are particularly relevant under [19 C.F.R. 

§] 351.225(k)(1).” Mid Continent, 725 F.3d at 1304 n.4 

(citation omitted). Commerce, in its interpretation of the 

Orders’ scope, looked to prior rulings that found a kit with 

aluminum components and extraneous materials could 

not be excluded from the Orders’ scope using the same 

interpretation of the exclusion’s terms argued here. See 

J.A. 187–88 & n.32 (discussing, inter alia, J.A. 249−64). 

Thus, in light of its terms and Commerce’s prior scope 

rulings, the exclusion’s terms are unambiguous and, 

therefore, control the inquiry. See ArcelorMittal, 694 F.3d 

at 87. 

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Although not necessary to our analysis, other aspects

of the Orders’ scope confirm the relevant exclusion’s 

unambiguous nature. For example, products “containing 

aluminum extrusions as parts” and “non-aluminum 

extrusion components” belonging to kits are generally 

excluded from the scope of the Orders. Antidumping Duty 

Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. By contrast, products that 

contain only aluminum extrusions are included in the 

Orders’ scope. See id. (explaining that products containing aluminum extrusions and nothing more are within the 

scope, “regardless of whether they are ready for use at the 

time of importation”). The plain text of the other passages in the Orders thus contemplates a basic divide between 

products whose components relevant to the scope inquiry 

consist of non-aluminum extrusion parts, which are

excluded from the scope of the Orders, and products 

whose components relevant to the scope inquiry contain 

only aluminum extrusion parts, which are not excluded. 

C. Substantial Evidence Supports Commerce’s Finding

That the Orders’ Scope Covers Meridian’s Trim Kits

We must now examine whether Meridian’s trim kits 

meet the unambiguous terms of the finished goods kit 

exclusion.9 Commerce concedes that Meridian’s trim kits 

“meet the preliminary requirements for the finished goods 

9 Because Commerce asks us to sustain its initial 

scope ruling, Appellant’s Br. 28, we assess whether substantial evidence supports Commerce’s conclusion that 

the trim kits meet the Orders’ scope’s unambiguous 

terms, as Commerce concluded in the initial scope ruling, 

J.A. 187–88. We will not review Commerce’s findings as 

to the definition of “fasteners” or “extraneous materials” 

because they were not briefed or contested on the record 

before Commerce issued the initial scope ruling. See J.A. 

190−98 (Petitioner’s Comments on Scope Request), 

200−43 (Meridian Scope Ruling Request). 

 

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kit exclusion.” Appellant’s Br. 17. Thus, the only question that remains is whether the trim kits comprise an 

aluminum extrusion product that merely includes fasteners and other extraneous materials, such that the trim 

kits meet the exception to the finished goods kit exclusion. 

Substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding 

that the trim kits meet the exception to the finished goods 

kit exclusion. Meridian explained that “[a] typical trim 

kit” includes the following items: trim, grilles, strips, 

brackets, screws, hinge covers, wrenches, and assembly 

instructions. J.A. 202; see J.A. 203. Meridian does not 

dispute that the trim, grilles, and strips are aluminum 

extrusions subject to the Orders. See Appellee’s Br. 12. 

Commerce found the brackets and screws to be “fasteners” 

that “meet the definition of extraneous fasteners and 

packaging materials described in” the qualifying language 

of the exclusion, J.A. 188, a determination that the record 

supports, see, e.g., J.A. 217 (where the assembly instructions demonstrate that the brackets and screws hold the 

aluminum extrusions in place). Commerce further found 

that the hinge covers, wrench, and assembly instructions 

are not relevant to the inquiry because they are “not 

assembled into or part of the assembled trim kit.” 

J.A. 188; see J.A. 105. That rationale comports with the 

Orders’ unambiguous scope. See Antidumping Duty 

Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651 (explaining that only parts 

comprising the final assembled product are considered for 

purposes of the finished goods kit exclusion). To conclude 

otherwise would introduce a condition not present in the 

Orders’ scope and, therefore, conflict with precedent. See, 

e.g., Smith Corona, 915 F.2d at 685−86 (explaining that 

scope rulings clarify the terms of the original order but do 

not modify or amend them).

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. We (1) reverse the CIT’s 

Case: 16-1730 Document: 38-2 Page: 16 Filed: 03/28/2017
MERIDIAN PRODS., LLC v. UNITED STATES 17

decision in Meridian V affirming Commerce’s third remand determination; (2) vacate the CIT’s decisions in 

Meridian I, Meridian II, Meridian III, and Meridian IV; 

(3) instruct the CIT to vacate Commerce’s first, second, 

and third remand determinations; and (4) order the CIT 

to reinstate Commerce’s initial scope ruling. Accordingly, 

the decision of the U.S. Court of International Trade is

REVERSED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

Case: 16-1730 Document: 38-2 Page: 17 Filed: 03/28/2017