Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00576/USCOURTS-almd-2_14-cv-00576-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Overall
Plaintiff
State of Alabama
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 

NORTHERN DIVISION 

MARK OVERALL, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff, ) 

 ) 

v. ) CASE NO. 2:14-cv-576-MEF 

 ) 

STATE OF ALABAMA, ) 

 ) 

 Defendant. ) 

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 Before the court is pro se Plaintiff’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Defendant’s Response (Doc. 5). Regardless of the 

claims made within the Petition, Defendant asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider these claims as Plaintiff does not meet the “in custody” requirement of § 

2254(a). Def.’s Resp. (Doc. 5) at 2. 

 The Petition is centered on Plaintiff’s contention that he was wrongly convicted 

and sentenced to serve twenty-four hours in the county jail for contempt of court on or 

about July 29, 2013. Plaintiff contends that the contempt proceedings violated his due 

process rights under the United States Constitution. 

 Based on these facts, the court was also concerned that Plaintiff did not meet the 

“in custody” requirement of § 2254. Accordingly, the undersigned ordered Plaintiff to 

show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed. To that end, Plaintiff filed a 

Response (Doc. 10) to the order to show cause, stating that he was under the impression 

that he could proceed under § 2254. Plaintiff is mistaken. 

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 Only those unfortunate enough to be “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added), may 

proceed under the “great writ.”1

 This statutory language requires “that the habeas 

petitioner be “in custody” under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his 

petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). While “the ‘in custody’ 

language [does not require] that a prisoner be physically confined in order to challenge 

his sentence on habeas corpus . . . once the sentence imposed for a conviction has 

completely expired, the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves 

sufficient to render an individual ‘in custody.’” Id. at 491-92. 

 Here, Plaintiff’s sentence fully expired on or around July 30, 2013 and this 

Petition was filed June 9, 2014. Thus, this Petition is improperly filed and is properly 

dismissed. See id. (“We have never held, however, that a habeas petitioner may be ‘in 

custody’ under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully 

expired at the time his petition is filed.”). 

 Accordingly, it is the RECOMMENDATION of the Magistrate Judge that this 

case be DISMISSED. Further, it is 

 ORDERED that the parties are DIRECTED to file any objections to the said 

Recommendation on or before August 14, 2014. Any objections filed must specifically 

identify the findings in the Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation to which the party is 

objecting. Frivolous, conclusive, or general objections will not be considered by the 

 

1

 “Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95, 2 L. Ed. 554 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[W]hen we say the writ of 

habeas corpus, without addition, we most generally mean that great writ which is now applied for.”). 

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District Court. The parties are advised that this Recommendation is not a final order of 

the court and, therefore, it is not appealable. 

 Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations in 

the Magistrate Judge’s report shall bar the party from a de novo determination by the 

District Court of issues covered in the report and shall bar the party from attacking on 

appeal factual findings in the report accepted or adopted by the District Court except 

upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 

(5th Cir. 1982); see Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 667 F.2d 33 (11th Cir. 1982); see 

also Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopting as 

binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to 

the close of business on September 30, 1981. 

 Done this 31st day of July, 2014. 

 /s/ Wallace Capel, Jr. 

 WALLACE CAPEL, JR. 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

 

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