Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00818/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-00818-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carolina Cardenas
Plaintiff
Costco Wholesale Corporation
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CAROLINA CARDENAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

COSTCO WHOLESALE 

CORPORATION,

Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-00818-PJH 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Dkt. No. 15

Defendant Costco Wholesale Corporation’s (“Costco”) motion for judgment on the 

pleadings came on for hearing before this court on June 19, 2019. Defendant appeared 

through its counsel, Christopher Truxler. Plaintiff Carolina Cardenas did not make an 

appearance. Having read the papers filed by the parties and carefully considered their

arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the court hereby 

GRANTS defendant’s motion, for the following reasons. 

BACKGROUND

Cardenas began her employment with Costco in 2013. Dkt. 1-1, Ex. 1, Compl. 

¶ 10. According to the complaint, between 2014 and early 2017, plaintiff’s coworkers 

repeatedly sexually harassed plaintiff and, when plaintiff reported that conduct, 

management either ignored her complaints or took retaliatory action. Id. ¶¶ 11-22. On 

March 17, 2017, Costco terminated Cardenas’ employment based on allegations that 

Cardenas had violated Costco’s anti-harassment and discrimination policies. Id. ¶ 19. 

The complaint asserts six state law causes of action. Id. ¶¶ 23-59. The first three 

allege (1) sexual harassment, (2) failure to take steps to prevent discrimination and 

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harassment, and (3) retaliation in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing 

Act (“FEHA”). Id. ¶¶ 23-44 (the “FEHA claims”). The latter three are common law claims 

asserted against Costco for (4) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; 

(5) breach of written and implied-in-fact contract; and (6) breach of implied covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing. Id. ¶¶ 45-59. In response to defendant’s motion, plaintiff 

voluntarily dismissed claims four through six. Dkt. 23 at 8. Accordingly, all that remains 

are plaintiff’s FEHA claims.

The FEHA violations that plaintiff complains of have previously been the subject of 

three administrative charges filed with the California Department of Fair Employment and 

Housing (the “DFEH”) and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(the “EEOC”). 

On August 11, 2016, plaintiff filed her first charge of discrimination with the DFEH 

and EEOC, alleging discrimination and harassment. Dkt. 15-2, Req. Jud. Not., Ex. C.

1

 

After the DFEH investigated the charge and closed the case for insufficient evidence, the 

DFEH issued plaintiff a right-to-sue notice on August 2, 2017. Id., Ex. D.

On May 9, 2017, plaintiff filed a second charge with the DFEH, alleging that 

discrimination and retaliation resulted in her termination. Id., Ex. E. In conjunction with 

that charge, plaintiff requested an immediate right to sue and, on the same day, the 

DFEH issued her the notice. Id., Ex. F.

On June 6, 2017, plaintiff filed a third charge with the DFEH and EEOC, alleging 

discrimination and retaliation. Id., Ex. G. On April 30, 2018, and again on August 24, 

2018, the DFEH notified plaintiff that her June 6, 2017 charge was duplicative of her 

second charge and, therefore, closed the file because the DFEH no longer had

jurisdiction once a right-to-sue notice has been issued. Id. at 3 (April 30, 2018 letter), 5

(August 24, 2018 letter). The DFEH did not issue a new right-to-sue notice. Id.

 

1 The court takes judicial notice of defendant’s exhibits C through G. See Adetuyi v. City 

& Cty. of San Francisco, 63 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1080–81 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (judicially 

noticing DFEH and EEOC records).

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On September 12, 2018, the EEOC dismissed plaintiff’s June 6, 2017 charge. 

Id. at 4. That dismissal notified plaintiff that the EEOC had closed her file and adopted 

the DFEH’s findings on plaintiff’s June 6, 2017 charge. Id. The EEOC simultaneously 

issued plaintiff her federal right-to-sue notice. Id. 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

1. Rule 12(c)

Rule 12(c) provides: “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to 

delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” The analysis under Rule 

12(c) is “substantially identical to [the] analysis under Rule 12(b)(6).” Chavez v. United 

States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). Specifically, all factual allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true 

and construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Turner v. Cook, 362 

F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004). “Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when 

there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment 

as a matter of law.” Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and 

footnote omitted).

2. Administrative Exhaustion

Before suing for a FEHA violation, an employee must exhaust his or her 

administrative remedies by filing a timely and sufficient charge with the DFEH and 

receiving a right-to-sue notice. Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12960, 12965(b); Rodriguez v. 

Airborne Express, 265 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2001). The employee then has one year 

from the date of that notice to commence a civil action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(b); 

Gamble v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 

That statute of limitations has been strictly enforced. Mandurrago v. Int'l Paper Co., No.

16-cv-00024-BAM, 2016 WL 1382875, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2016) (collecting cases). 

However, two statutory exceptions, if qualified for, may extend the one-year filing 

period. First, the period may be tolled if the DFEH defers investigation of the charge to 

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the EEOC upon issuing a right-to-sue notice. Cal. Gov't Code § 12965(d)(1). Second, 

the period may be tolled if the EEOC defers investigation of the charge to the DFEH and,

after the DFEH’s investigation and determination, the EEOC performs a substantial 

weight review of the DFEH's determination or the EEOC conducts its own investigation of 

the claim. Id. § 12965(e)(1). If either exception applies, the time for commencing an 

action expires when the federal right-to-sue period expires—90 days after receipt of a 

federal right-to-sue notice—or one year from the date of the right-to-sue notice issued by 

the DFEH, whichever is later. Id. §§ 12965(d)(2), (e)(2); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. 

Ltd. P'ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Here, plaintiff only contends that the second exception applies. 

B. Analysis

The latest DFEH right-to-sue notice that plaintiff received was dated August 2, 

2017. See Ex. D. Plaintiff thus had until August 2, 2018, to file her complaint. See Cal. 

Gov’t Code § 12965(b). Plaintiff, however, did not file the present complaint until 

December 12, 2018. See Compl. at 12. Thus, plaintiff must bridge that approximately 

four-month gap in order to show that she has timely filed her complaint. To do so, 

plaintiff points to the § 12965(e) exception and argues that the statute of limitations is 

tolled here because “the EEOC defer[red] its investigation to the DFEH...” Dkt. 23 at 

6:11–12.2 

Critically, however, tolling under subsection (e) requires more than the EEOC’s 

deference to a DFEH investigation. Instead, subsection (e) does not provide a basis for 

tolling the statute of limitations unless, “[a]fter investigation and determination by the” 

DFEH, the EEOC “agrees to perform a substantial weight review of the determination of 

 

2 Plaintiff’s alternative reliance on the equitable tolling doctrine and the continuing 

violation doctrine is misplaced. As to the former, plaintiff provides no basis to conclude 

that her four-month delay was the result of “good faith and reasonable conduct.” Mitchell 

v. State Dep't of Pub. Health, 1 Cal. App. 5th 1000, 1010 (Ct. App. 2016), as modified on 

denial of reh'g (Aug. 22, 2016). The latter doctrine allows a charge to cover misconduct 

that occurred more than one year prior to a plaintiff filing her charge. In short, that 

doctrine has nothing to do with tolling a plaintiff’s time to file a complaint after receipt of a 

right-to-sue notice. 

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the [DFEH] or conducts its own investigation of the claim filed by the aggrieved person.” 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(e)(1)(C). It is on that requirement that plaintiff’s argument falls 

short. 

As an initial matter, plaintiff does not allege that the EEOC conducted its own 

investigation or completed a substantial weight review of the DFEH’s determination. Nor 

does the administrative record support such a conclusion. There is no indication that the 

EEOC ever responded to plaintiff’s August 11, 2016 or May 9, 2017 charges. And, as to

plaintiff’s duplicative June 6, 2017 charge, the EEOC’s September 12, 2018 notice

provides no basis for the court to infer that the EEOC conducted its own investigation or

performed a substantial weight review of the DFEH’s determination. Ex. G at 4

(indicating that the EEOC “adopted” the findings of the DFEH).

Even if the EEOC conducted such a review, the court doubts that the DFEH’s

issuance of an immediate right-to-sue notice on May 9, 2017, pursuant to plaintiff’s 

request, constitutes an “investigation and determination” that would satisfy subsection 

(e)(1)(C). See Cal. Gov’t Code § 12965(e)(1)(C); Ex. F at 3. The same goes for the 

DFEH’s April 30, 2018 and August 24, 2018 letters—both of which closed plaintiff’s June 

6, 2017 charge because it duplicated her May 9, 2017 charge. Ex. G at 3, 5. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that plaintiff’s FEHA claims are timebarred. Because plaintiff has voluntarily dismissed her other claims, the court GRANTS 

defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and DISMISSES the action WITH 

PREJUDICE. See Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522 F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (denying leave to amend because amendment would be futile when claims are 

barred by statute of limitations). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 28, 2019

__________________________________

PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

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