Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03005/USCOURTS-caDC-02-03005-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joey C. Alexander
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 17, 2003 Decided June 13, 2003

No. 02–3005

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOEY C. ALEXANDER,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 00cr00224–01)

Mary M. Petras, appointed by the court, argued the cause

for the appellant.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Roscoe C. Howard, Jr.,

United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, and Roy W.

McLeese III, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on

brief.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

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Before: SENTELLE, HENDERSON and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellant,

Joey C. Alexander, seeks reversal of his conviction for the

unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and, in the alternative,

vacatur of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed by the

district court. Specifically, Alexander challenges the district

court’s (1) admission of a 911 call under the ‘‘excited utterance’’ exception to the rule against hearsay; (2) admission of

prejudicial ‘‘other acts’’ evidence; (3) denial of his motion for

a new trial; and (4) imposition of a mandatory minimum

sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). He also challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence. For the reasons set forth below,

see infra Part II, we affirm the district court’s rulings and

uphold Alexander’s conviction and sentence.

I. Background

On June 17, 2000, at 5:40 p.m., Yvette Young called 911

from her workplace at 723 12th Street, N.E., in Washington,

D.C.1

 She told the emergency dispatcher that the man she

was dating had just threatened her at her workplace, told her

that he would return to ‘‘do something’’ to her and said that

he was going to go to her apartment to ‘‘mess’’ it up. Young

also told the dispatcher that her boyfriend had keys to her

apartment and that ‘‘he also has a gun.’’ When the dispatcher asked, ‘‘He got a gun on him now?,’’ Young replied, ‘‘Yeah.

And I need someone to go to my apartment [until] my mother

come[s] [to] pick me up from work to meet me there.’’ The

dispatcher told Young that the police would not go to her

apartment because, by giving her boyfriend keys to the

apartment, she had given him permission to enter. Nevertheless, the dispatcher told Young that she would send the

1 Although Young did not testify at trial, the government played

her 911 call for the jury. See 2/6/01 Tr. 180. Overruling defense

counsel’s hearsay objection, the district court ruled that Young’s call

qualified as an excited utterance. Id. at 143–44.

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police to her workplace so that Young could ‘‘fill out a report

for threats.’’

At approximately 5:52 p.m., MPD Officer Daynell Schaffrath arrived at the group home where Young worked. When

Schaffrath met Young at the front door of 723 12th Street,

she appeared ‘‘stressed, afraid, [and] frightened.’’ 2/6/01 Tr.

155. Soon after Schaffrath interviewed Young about the

report,2

 the appellant appeared at the front door. Young

then jumped out of her seat, pointed at Alexander and said,

‘‘[t]hat’s him right there, Officer.’’ Id. at 176. Although

Schaffrath ordered Alexander several times to step away

from the door and to keep his hands away from his body,

Alexander refused to comply. Instead, Alexander opened the

screen door and began to step inside the room. Schaffrath

then stepped toward Alexander, placing herself between him

and Young, and radioed for assistance. When Schaffrath

raised a can of pepper spray, Alexander finally complied with

her orders.

After Schaffrath arrested and handcuffed Alexander, MPD

Officer Craig Reynolds arrived at the scene. Reynolds subsequently searched the appellant, recovering $900 in cash, a

wallet, a set of keys, a driver’s license and a cell phone.

Shortly thereafter, Reynolds approached a brown Buick that

was parked on the street approximately 50 to 75 feet from the

group home. Looking through the windshield, he saw a

handgun lying on the floorboard of the car on the driver’s

side. On the passenger seat, he saw a blue baseball cap.

Crime scene search officer Ronny Arce recovered the

loaded weapon—a Colt revolver—from the floorboard and

used the keys found on Alexander to start the car. The

officers subsequently found the car’s registration and a seat

2 At trial, defense counsel asked Schaffrath if, during the interview, Young had stated ‘‘that she had seen Mr. Alexander with a

gun on him that day?’’ 2/7/01 a.m. Tr. 76. Schaffrath answered,

‘‘No.’’ Id. Although Schaffrath also testified during voir dire that

Young had told her that Alexander kept a revolver with a brown

handle in a nightstand drawer, 2/6/01 Tr. 70, the district court

excluded these statements as hearsay, id. at 144.

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belt citation in the car’s glove compartment. The former

indicated that the car was registered to Alexander, while the

latter indicated that Alexander had received a citation while

driving the Buick on April 6, 2000. Both documents listed

Alexander’s address as 253 16th Street, S.E., Washington

D.C., which is located approximately 10 to 14 blocks from 723

12th Street, N.E.

Based on the foregoing events, Alexander was indicted on

November 2, 2000 and charged with three counts: one count

of unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition by a

felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); one count of

threatening to kidnap, injure or physically damage, in violation of D.C. Code § 22–2307; and one count of tampering

with a witness, victim or informant, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1512(b)(1). At trial, the district court granted Alexander’s

motion for judgment of acquittal on the tampering charge at

the close of the government’s case-in-chief. On February 8,

2001, the jury acquitted Alexander of the threat charge and,

the next day, convicted him of the felon-in-possession charge.

After denying Alexander’s motion for a new trial, the district

court sentenced him to 180 months of incarceration, pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), followed by five years of supervised

release. Alexander now appeals, challenging both his conviction and, in the alternative, his mandatory minimum sentence.

II. Analysis

We address each of Alexander’s challenges in turn.

A. The Excited Utterance

Alexander objected on hearsay grounds to the introduction

of the 911 call and to Schaffrath’s testimony regarding

Young’s subsequent statements at the scene. 2/6/01 Tr. 4–13.

After conducting voir dires of Schaffrath, who testified for the

government, and Young, who testified for Alexander, the

district court ruled that the 911 call—but not Young’s subsequent statements to Schaffrath—qualified as an excited utterance and, as such, fell within an established exception to the

hearsay rule. Id. at 143–44. On appeal, Alexander renews

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his hearsay objection to the 911 call, arguing that the statements contained therein were not made while Young was

under the stress of excitement caused by Alexander’s alleged

threat.

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion. United States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1308

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1056 (2000); see also United

States v. Evans, 216 F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir.) (inadmissible

hearsay allegation reviewed under abuse of discretion standard), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 971 (2000). The district court’s

decision to admit evidence is therefore ‘‘entitled to ‘much

deference’ on review.’’ United States v. Ramsey, 165 F.3d

980, 984 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting United States v. Lewis, 693

F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 894

(1999).

Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) creates a hearsay3

 exception for ‘‘statement[s] relating to a startling event or condition

made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement

caused by the event or condition.’’ FED. R. EVID. 803(2).4

The rationale underlying the ‘‘excited utterance’’ exception is

that ‘‘excitement suspends the declarant’s powers of reflection

and fabrication, consequently minimizing the possibility that

the utterance will be influenced by self interest and therefore

rendered unreliable.’’ United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454,

458 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 944 (2002); see also

United States v. Joy, 192 F.3d 761, 766 (7th Cir. 1999) (‘‘This

exception is premised on the belief that a person is unlikely to

fabricate lies (which presumably takes some deliberate reflection) while his mind is preoccupied with the stress of an

exciting event.’’), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1250 (2000). Thus, to

qualify as an excited utterance, ‘‘the declarant’s state of mind

3 Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in evidence to

prove the truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). The

statement is not admissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule

applies. FED. R. EVID. 802.

4 The applicability of the excited utterance exception is unaffected

by the availability or unavailability of the declarant as a witness.

FED. R. EVID. 803.

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at the time that the statement was made [must] preclude[ ]

conscious reflection on the subject of the statement.’’ Joy,

192 F.3d at 766.

For a statement to qualify as an excited utterance, the

proponent of the exception must establish: (1) the occurrence

of a startling event; (2) that the declarant made the statement while under the stress of excitement caused by the

event; and (3) that the declarant’s statement relates to the

startling event. See, e.g., Brown, 254 F.3d at 458; Joy, 192

F.3d at 766.5

 Yet, unlike the hearsay exception for present

sense impressions, FED. R. EVID. 803(1), ‘‘[a]n excited utterance need not be contemporaneous with the startling event to

be admissible,’’ United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127 (2d

Cir.), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1096 (1998). ‘‘Rather, the utterance must be contemporaneous with the excitement engendered by the startling event.’’ Joy, 192 F.3d at 766.6

Although the lapse of time between the startling event and

the declarant’s statement is relevant to whether the declarant

made the statement while under the stress of excitement, the

temporal gap between the event and the utterance is not

itself dispositive. See United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103,

112 (2d Cir. 2002). Other relevant factors include: the

characteristics of the event; the subject matter of the statement; whether the statement was made in response to an

inquiry; and the declarant’s age, motive to lie and physical

and mental condition. See United States v. Marrowbone, 211

F.3d 452, 454–55 (8th Cir. 2000). If the trial court has access

5 The proponent must establish these three elements by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Collins, 60 F.3d 4, 8

(1st Cir. 1995) (citing Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681,

690 (1988)); see also United States v. Woodfolk, 656 A.2d 1145, 1150

n.14 (D.C. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1183 (1996).

6 Because the excited utterance exception is based upon ‘‘the

psychological impact of the event itself’’ and not upon the contemporaneity of the startling event and the declarant’s statement, the

exception ‘‘permits [the] admission of a broader range of hearsay

statements [than the hearsay exception for present sense impressions].’’ United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 112 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002)

(emphasis in original).

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to a recording of the declarant’s statement, it may also

consider the declarant’s ‘‘tone and tenor of voice’’ in determining whether the declarant made that statement while under

the stress of excitement. United States v. Woodfolk, 656

A.2d 1145, 1151 n.16 (D.C. 1995) (collecting cases), cert.

denied, 516 U.S. 1183 (1996).

Here, Alexander contends that the district court erred in

concluding that Young’s statements during the 911 call7

 were

made while under the stress of excitement.8

 Specifically,

Alexander maintains that the passage of time between the

alleged threats and the 911 call; Young’s intervening telephone call to her mother; and Young’s tone of voice during

the 911 call—when considered together—negate a finding

that the statements were made while under the stress of

excitement.9

 Alexander’s arguments address us as if we were

deciding the question anew. Whatever we might decide on de

novo review, we cannot conclude that the district court

abused its discretion in admitting the 911 call. See Evans,

216 F.3d at 85.

7 Young’s statement that Alexander ‘‘[has] a gun on him now’’ is

not rendered inadmissible simply because it was made in response

to the dispatcher’s question. See Joy, 192 F.3d at 767 (fact that

declarant answered dispatcher’s questions, rather than giving spontaneous narrative, did not disprove excitement); see also United

States v. Glenn, 473 F.2d 191, 194 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (‘‘Declarations

relating to the circumstances of a violent crime, made by the victim

shortly after its occurrence TTT may be admissible although made in

response to an inquiry.’’).

8 Alexander does not dispute (1) that the alleged threats constituted a startling event or (2) that Young’s statements related to

that startling event. See Br. for Appellant at 13–16.

9 Relying on Young’s voir dire testimony, Alexander also argues

that the 911 call lacks sufficient indicia of reliability because Young

‘‘in fact lied’’ about Alexander having a gun. Br. for Appellant at

15. This argument fails. Young’s subsequent statements ‘‘made

well after her 911 call are not part of the core evaluation whether

the statements made during the 911 call qualified as an excited

utterance when made.’’ Malloy v. United States, 797 A.2d 687, 690

(D.C. 2002).

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According to Young’s grand jury and voir dire testimony,

she telephoned 911 approximately 15 to 20 minutes after the

alleged threats. 2/6/01 Tr. 97, 115. Considering the nature

of the startling occurrence—Alexander allegedly had a gun

and threatened both to ‘‘do something’’ to Young and to

‘‘mess [up]’’ her apartment—the passage of 15 to 20 minutes

hardly suggests that the district court abused its discretion in

admitting the 911 call. See, e.g., United States v. Phelps, 168

F.3d 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 1999) (‘‘The lapse of 15 to 30

minutes between an exciting incident and a statement does

not render the statement inadmissible.’’); United States v.

Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir.) (statement occurring

within 15 minutes of startling event and immediately after

high-speed flight admissible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919

(1982). On the contrary, depending upon the other factors in

the ‘‘excitement’’ inquiry, courts of appeals have upheld the

admission of statements made even several hours after the

startling event. See, e.g., Tocco, 135 F.3d at 127–28 (statement of ‘‘all hyped’’ and ‘‘nervous’’ declarant admitted although made three hours after deadly fire).

The fact that Young telephoned her mother during this 15

to 20 minute interval does not, in our view, change the

calculus. Although the intervening call might suggest that

Young had time to reflect and deliberate before calling 911,

the nature of Alexander’s threats, the relatively short lapse of

time between those threats and the 911 call and the recipient

of Young’s initial call—her mother—all lend support to the

district court’s ruling. Given that the courts have upheld the

admission of statements made even hours after a startling

event—and we can reasonably assume that the declarants in

such cases likely did not remain silent in the intervening

hours—Young’s telephone call to her mother fails to establish

that she was not under the stress of excitement when she

then called 911.

Alexander’s strongest argument for reversal lies with the

‘‘tone and tenor’’ of the 911 call itself. ‘‘Ms. Young’s tone of

voice on the call was monotone and calm,’’ Alexander maintains, ‘‘demonstrating that she was not still under the stress

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of excitement from any alleged threats.’’ Br. for Appellant at

14. To be sure, Young’s tone of voice deviated from the

monotone only when she became irritated with the dispatcher

for refusing to send the police to her apartment. The district

court rejected Alexander’s argument, however, concluding

that ‘‘[i]t is clear she’s upset on that telephone call.’’ 2/6/01

Tr. 143. We will not disturb the district court’s ruling.

Although Young sounded composed for most of the 911 call,

she became agitated when the dispatcher informed her that

the police would not go to her apartment because she had

given Alexander a set of keys to the apartment. Alexander

would have us conclude that Young’s sudden burst of ‘‘excitement’’ conclusively established her lack of excitement earlier

in the call, namely, when she indicated that Alexander had ‘‘a

gun on him now.’’ But Schaffrath’s testimony that Young

appeared ‘‘stressed, afraid, [and] frightened’’ fifteen minutes

after the 911 call adequately supports the district court’s

conclusion that Young made the call while under the stress of

excitement. Id. at 155. We therefore conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Young’s

911 call.10

B. The ‘‘Other Acts’’ Evidence

Next, Alexander argues that the district court erred in

admitting prejudicial ‘‘other acts’’ evidence at trial, namely,

Young’s statement on the 911 call that Alexander ‘‘[has] a gun

on him now.’’ Because Alexander did not raise a Rule 404(b)

objection to the introduction of the 911 call below,11 we review

10 Alexander asserts that the district court’s decision to admit the

911 call as an excited utterance contradicts its decision to exclude

Young’s subsequent statements to Schaffrath at the scene. This

argument is meritless. Plainly, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that Young made the former statement—but

not the latter—while under the stress of excitement; after all,

Young’s statements to Schaffrath at the scene were made later and

under circumstances different from the 911 call.

11 Alexander did object to the government’s opening statement on

Rule 404(b) grounds, arguing that the government violated the

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his ‘‘other acts’’ challenge for plain error. See United States

v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1390 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 520 U.S. 1128 (1997).12 However, we find no error—

district court’s earlier ruling that ‘‘there would be no mention of a

prior possession of a pistol observed by Ms. Young in [the] opening.’’ 2/6/01 Tr. 44. Although Alexander claims that ‘‘a review of

the entire argument between the government’s opening statement

and [defense counsel’s] opening statement demonstrates that [the

Rule 404(b) objection] centered around all evidence from Ms. Young

regarding possession of a gun, including the 911 call,’’ Reply Br. at

8, the record fails to support Alexander’s claim, see 2/5/01 a.m. Tr.

45–65; 2/6/01 Tr. 44–53.

 To begin with, Alexander did not contend that Young’s statements on the 911 call constituted ‘‘other acts’’ evidence at the Rule

404(b) hearing. See 2/5/01 a.m. Tr. 45–65. The hearing addressed,

among other Rule 404(b) issues, whether Young could testify at trial

that she had seen Alexander on earlier occasions with a gun similar

to the one found in the brown Buick. Id. at 46–48. The district

court ruled that Young’s testimony would not constitute Rule 404(b)

evidence so long as she could testify that the gun she previously

observed in Alexander’s possession looked ‘‘terribly similar’’ to the

gun in the Buick. Id. at 62.

 More importantly, Alexander did not object to the government’s

reference to the 911 call during the bench conference that followed

his Rule 404(b) objection at trial. See 2/6/01 44–53. Alexander’s

objection to the government’s opening statement centered on the

government’s discussion of Young’s expected testimony, that is, the

testimony the district court addressed at the Rule 404(b) hearing.

See id. Although Alexander subsequently moved ‘‘to strike the

excited utterance’’ when it became apparent that Young would not

testify at trial, he did not base his motion to strike on Rule 404(b).

2/7/01 a.m. Tr. 27.

12 To meet the plain error standard, ‘‘there must be (1) error, (2)

that ‘affect[s] substantial rights’—i.e., that is prejudicial TTT and the

error must also be ‘plain.’ ’’ United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66,

72 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a)) (footnote

omitted). If these three conditions are met, ‘‘an appellate court

may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only

if [ ] the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings.’’ Johnson v. United States, 520

U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (internal quotations omitted). On plain error

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plain or otherwise—in the district court’s admission of the 911

call because Young’s statement that Alexander ‘‘[has] a gun

on him now’’ does not constitute ‘‘other acts’’ evidence within

the meaning of Rule 404(b).

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of

‘‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts TTT to prove the character of a

person in order to show action in conformity therewith.’’

FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Such evidence may be admissible,

however, if offered for purposes unrelated to the defendant’s

propensity to commit crime, ‘‘such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’’ Id. If the government plans

to introduce ‘‘other acts’’ evidence at trial, it must, ‘‘upon

request by the accused, TTT provide reasonable notice in

advance of trial TTT of the general nature of any such

evidence.’’ Id.

‘‘[B]ecause Rule 404(b) applies only to evidence of a defendant’s ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts,’ ’’ several of our sister

circuits have held that the rule ‘‘creates a dichotomy between

crimes or acts that constitute the charged crime and crimes

or acts that do not.’’ United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923,

927 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases).

These courts have reasoned that Rule 404(b) applies only to

‘‘extrinsic’’ evidence of other crimes and not to ‘‘intrinsic’’

evidence of the same crime. Id. at 927–29; see, e.g., United

States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir.) (‘‘The continuous

possession of the same gun does not amount to a series of

crimes, but rather constitutes a single offense.’’), cert. denied,

490 U.S. 1101 (1989). Although we have recently expressed

our dissatisfaction with the extrinsic-intrinsic distinction,13 see

review, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion with respect

to prejudice. Perkins, 161 F.3d at 72 n.6.

13 Given the practical and definitional problems that plague the

extrinsic-intrinsic distinction, we have called into question the need

for such distinction: ‘‘If the so-called ‘intrinsic’ act is indeed part of

the crime charged, evidence of it will, by definition, always satisfy

Rule 404(b). The rule bars bad acts evidence only when the

evidence is offered solely to ‘prove the character of a person in

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Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927–29, we have nonetheless recognized

that ‘‘at least in a narrow range of circumstances TTT evidence can be ‘intrinsic to’ the charged crime,’’ id. at 929. For

example, if evidence is offered as direct evidence of a fact in

issue, not as circumstantial evidence requiring an inference

regarding the character of the accused, ‘‘it is properly considered intrinsic.’’ Id. (citing United States v. Badru, 97 F.3d

1471, 1474–75 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1150,

and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213 (1997)).

Here, Young’s statement that Alexander ‘‘[has] a gun on

him now’’ constituted intrinsic, admissible evidence on the

felon-in-possession charge.14 See United States v. Bradley,

145 F.3d 889, 891–94 (7th Cir. 1998) (declarant’s excited

utterance during 911 call that ‘‘[h]e pulled a gun on me’’

provided relevant, probative evidence of defendant’s knowing

possession of firearm and ammunition); Woodfolk, 656 A.2d

at 1151 n.17 (declarant’s excited utterance during 911 call that

her boyfriend had gun was ‘‘directly relevant to the crime at

issue, linking appellant to the gun’’).15 Although Alexander

contends that the 911 call established only that Young knew

that Alexander possessed ‘‘some gun at some point,’’ Br. for

Appellant at 20, and thereby invited the jury to make an

impermissible propensity inference regarding Alexander’s

character, the record indicates otherwise.

order to show action in conformity therewith.’ Evidence that

constitutes the very crime being prosecuted is not of that sort.’’

Bowie, 232 F.3d at 927 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).

14 As an aside, Alexander’s assorted ‘‘severance’’ claims are without merit. First, Alexander never moved to sever the felon-inpossession charge from the threat charge. See 2/6/01 Tr. 49–53.

Second, the district court did not limit the admission of the 911 tape

to the threat charge. See 2/5/01 a.m. Tr. 59–62; 2/5/01 p.m. Tr. 174;

1/7/02 a.m. Tr. 24–25.

15 Alexander attempts to distinguish Bradley and Woodfolk by

arguing that ‘‘in those cases additional evidence connected the gun

referred to on the 911 call to the charged gun.’’ Reply Br. at 10.

While Alexander is correct on the factual distinction, neither decision turned on the existence of such ‘‘additional evidence.’’ See

Bradley, 145 F.3d at 892–94; Woodfolk, 656 A.2d at 1151 n.17.

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After Young told the dispatcher that Alexander had a gun,

the dispatcher asked: ‘‘He got a gun on him now?,’’ to which

Young responded, ‘‘Yeah.’’ Thus, as the government correctly observes, Young’s statement served ‘‘not [as] evidence of a

prior possession, or possession at some point,’’ but instead as

‘‘evidence of [Alexander’s] current possession, the possession

for which [Alexander] was arrested minutes later, and for

which he was charged.’’ Br. for Appellee at 31. In other

words, Young’s statement provided only ‘‘intrinsic’’ evidence

of the crime charged, not ‘‘extrinsic’’ evidence inviting an

inference regarding Alexander’s bad character.16 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting

Young’s statement on the 911 call that Alexander ‘‘[has] a gun

on him now.’’17

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Alexander contends that, ‘‘[v]iewing the evidence in the

light most favorable to the government, no reasonable juror

could reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that

[he] possessed the gun at issue here.’’ Br. for Appellant at 8.

According to Alexander, the government presented—at

best—evidence of ‘‘mere proximity,’’ i.e., that the police discovered a Colt revolver in a car registered to Alexander,

Alexander possessed keys to the car at the time the police

discovered the weapon and Alexander received a citation

16 Even if Young’s statement had constituted extrinsic ‘‘other

acts’’ evidence—which it did not—it is our view that the district

court’s admission of the statement would not have constituted plain

error. See United States v. Cassell, 292 F.3d 788, 794–95 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (‘‘A prior history of intentionally possessing guns, or for that

matter chattels of any sort, is certainly relevant to the determination of whether a person in proximity to such a chattel on the

occasion under litigation knew what he was possessing and intended

to do so.’’).

17 Because Young’s statements on the 911 call did not constitute

‘‘other acts’’ evidence within the meaning of Rule 404(b), we likewise

conclude that the government did not misuse the evidence in its

closing statement. See 2/7/01 p.m. Tr. 27, 37–38.

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while driving the car more than two months before his arrest.

Id. at 9. We reject this argument.

‘‘In considering a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence, we review the evidence of record de novo,

considering that evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, and affirm a guilty verdict where ‘any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ’’ United States v. Wahl,

290 F.3d 370, 375 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia,

443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)), cert. denied,

123 S. Ct. 247 (2002). In performing this task, ‘‘[w]e draw no

distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.’’

United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Criminal possession of a firearm may be either actual or

constructive.18 Wahl, 290 F.3d at 376; Moore, 104 F.3d at

381. For constructive possession, the evidence must establish

that ‘‘the defendant ‘had the ability to exercise knowing

dominion and control over the items in question.’ ’’ Wahl, 290

F.3d at 376 (quoting United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 617,

619 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted)). Although

‘‘mere proximity’’ to a gun is insufficient to establish constructive possession, ‘‘ ‘evidence of some other factor—including

connection with a gun, proof of motive, a gesture implying

control, evasive conduct, or a statement indicating involvement in an enterprise—coupled with proximity may’ suffice.’’

Moore, 104 F.3d at 381 (quoting United States v. Gibbs, 904

F.2d 52, 56 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).

In our view, sufficient evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Alexander constructively possessed the Colt revolver found in the brown Buick parked outside Young’s workplace. As earlier discussed, Young’s 911 call indicated that

18 To convict a defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm

under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant knowingly possessed a

firearm; (2) the firearm was transported in or affected interstate

commerce; and (3) at the time of his possession, the defendant had

been convicted of a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Here, the parties

stipulated to the last two elements. 2/7/01 a.m. Tr. 66–67.

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Alexander had ‘‘a gun on him now’’ just minutes before the

police discovered the weapon lying on the Buick’s driver’s

side floorboard. The registration and traffic citation recovered from the car’s glove compartment—as well as the keys

recovered from Alexander’s person at the scene—established

that Alexander owned and operated the vehicle. Given the

distance between Alexander’s abode and Young’s workplace

(approximately 10 to 14 blocks), the jury could have reasonably concluded that Alexander had driven the Buick to the

scene. Moreover, the jury could have reasonably concluded

that the baseball cap found lying on the passenger’s seat

made it more likely that a male had driven the car most

recently and that no one had been sitting in the passenger’s

seat when the driver parked outside the group home. Finally, Alexander’s threatening statements to Young provided a

motive for his possession of the revolver. See Moore, 104

F.3d at 381 (evidence of motive relevant to sufficiency inquiry).

Alexander’s challenge to the sufficiency of this evidence is

unpersuasive. Although Alexander correctly observes that

the discovery of a gun in a car owned and operated by the

defendant is insufficient, standing alone, to establish possession, see, e.g., Moore, 104 F.3d at 381, the government offered

additional, persuasive evidence of Alexander’s possession:

Young’s statement that Alexander had ‘‘a gun on him now’’

and that he had threatened to ‘‘do something’’ to her. The

additional evidence—coupled with Alexander’s ‘‘proximity’’ to

the Buick in which the revolver was found—suffices, in our

view, to support the jury’s verdict.19 Although Alexander

19 Relying on United States v. Clark, 184 F.3d 858 (D.C. Cir.

1999), Alexander argues that the evidence against him was insufficient because there was no evidence that he had been seen near, or

making gestures towards, the recovered gun. Although we held in

Clark that the defendant’s ‘‘reaching actions’’ were sufficient to link

him to the recovered gun—when asked for his driver’s license and

registration, Clark twice reached towards the floorboard behind his

seat where the police ultimately discovered the gun—we did not

establish, as Alexander seems to suggest, a ‘‘gesture requirement’’

for constructive possession. Id. at 862–65.

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maintains that Young’s statement on the 911 call cannot be

considered in weighing the sufficiency of the evidence, he is

mistaken. As already noted, see supra Part II.A–B, the

district court properly admitted Young’s statement. Moreover, we must consider all admitted evidence—whether admitted erroneously or not—in reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence. See Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 39–42 (1988).

Accordingly, Alexander’s sufficiency challenge fails.

D. Motion for a New Trial

Alexander also argues that the district court erred in

denying his motion for a new trial. Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 33 provides that, ‘‘[u]pon the defendant’s motion,

the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if

the interest of justice so requires.’’ FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a).

Here, Alexander claims that three prejudicial errors warranted a new trial: (1) the government’s opening statement

included allegations it ultimately failed to prove as a result of

Young’s refusal to testify; (2) Officer Reynolds testified to

inadmissible hearsay before the jury, namely, that Young

pointed to the brown Buick and stated that it belonged to

Alexander; and (3) the government’s closing argument misused Young’s statement on the 911 call. In reviewing the

district court’s denial of Alexander’s motion for a new trial,

‘‘we apply a deferential standard, and will reverse only if the

court abused its discretion or misapplied the law.’’ United

States v. Lafayette, 983 F.2d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1993).20

 Alexander’s emphasis on his lack of ‘‘evasive action’’ is similarly

misplaced. While we have found evidence of evasive action relevant

in constructive possession cases, such action—or lack thereof—is

hardly determinative. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 981 F.2d

1281, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (collecting ‘‘evasive action’’ cases) (defendant’s flight upon seeing uniformed officers ‘‘not particularly probative’’ of constructive possession because defendant ran towards

vehicle where illegal gun was located).

20 The government argues that we should review the district

court’s denial of Alexander’s new trial motion for plain error, citing

United States v. Thompson, 27 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

513 U.S. 1050 (1994). The government is mistaken. In Thompson,

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Finding no abuse of discretion here, we reject Alexander’s

arguments.21

In its opening statement, the government told the jury that

it would hear evidence that Young told the police that Alexander had a revolver, that Young described the revolver as

having a brown handle and that the police found a revolver

matching that description in Alexander’s car. 2/6/01 Tr. 39–

44. Young then refused to testify at trial and the district

court instructed the jury at the close of the evidence to

‘‘disregard the claims or statements made by the lawyers in

the openings if [they were] not proven in evidence.’’ 2/7/01

a.m. Tr. 77. Additionally, the district court further instructed

the jury not to speculate about Young’s absence nor ‘‘to draw

any adverse inference against either party’’ because she did

not testify. Id.

To determine whether a prosecutor’s opening statement

substantially prejudiced a defendant’s trial, we consider the

severity of the alleged misconduct, the curative measures

taken and the certainty of conviction absent the improper

remarks. United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 228, 246 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1033 (1997). Plainly, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Alexander’s new

we explained that ‘‘[f]or purposes of determining our standard of

review of an alleged error in admission of evidence TTT a postverdict motion for a new trial is not the same as a timely objection:

the delay eliminates any chance that the judge could correct the

error without a duplicative trial, and according review as if a timely

objection had been raised virtually invites strategic behavior by

defense counsel.’’ Id. at 673. Thus, where the defendant did not

timely object at trial, we held that we will review post-trial for plain

error only. Id. Unlike the defendant in Thompson, however,

Alexander timely objected to each of the alleged errors included in

his post-trial motion. See 2/6/01 Tr. 44–53 (government’s opening

statement); 2/6/01 Tr. 202 (hearsay objection); 2/7/01 p.m. Tr. 66–

67 (government’s closing argument).

21 Having concluded that the government did not misuse Young’s

statements on the 911 call either in its closing statement or in

Alexander’s trial generally, see supra note 17 and accompanying

text, we focus on Alexander’s other claimed errors.

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trial motion. As the district court noted, both the government and defense counsel ‘‘made a lot of statements’’ about

Young’s expected testimony in their respective openings.22

1/7/02 Tr. 28. As an initial matter, we are loath to question

the district court’s conclusion that the government made its

opening statement in good faith. Id. at 27. The district

court also specifically instructed the jury on Young’s absence.

2/7/01 a.m. Tr. 77–78. In our view, the instruction cured any

evidentiary problem created by Young’s refusal to testify.

See United States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 917–18 (D.C. Cir.)

(jurors presumed to follow court’s instructions), cert. denied,

522 U.S. 960 (1997).

Alexander’s reliance on the stricken hearsay testimony of

Officer Reynolds is similarly misplaced. Reynolds testified at

trial that Young pointed to the brown Buick and stated that it

belonged to Alexander. The district court sustained Alexander’s objection, however, informing the jury that ‘‘the last

answer is stricken. And that means it’s out of the record.

Don’t consider it.’’ 2/6/01 Tr. 204. Given the cumulative

nature of Reynolds’s testimony—the registration and traffic

citation amply established Alexander’s connection to the

Buick—we believe the district court’s instruction cured any

prejudice Reynolds’s hearsay testimony may have caused.

See White, 116 F.3d at 917–18. Accordingly, we conclude that

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Alexander’s motion for a new trial.

E. The Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Finally, Alexander challenges the district court’s imposition

of a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years of imprisonment pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Specifically, Alexander argues that the district court erred in concluding that

his 1991 conviction for attempted possession with intent to

22 Defense counsel told the jury in his opening statement that

Young told the police that (1) the brown Buick in which the police

found the Colt revolver belonged to her; (2) Alexander drove a 1985

burgundy Mercedes; and (3) Alexander drove the Mercedes when

he left her workplace earlier that day. 2/6/01 Tr. 55–56.

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distribute qualifies as a ‘‘serious drug offense’’ under 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) and that, as a result, the district

court erred in imposing the mandatory minimum.23 Reviewing Alexander’s claim de novo, see, e.g., United States v.

Gaviria, 116 F.3d 1498, 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (‘‘Legal questions relating to sentencing are reviewed de novo.’’), cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1082 (1998), we find no error in Alexander’s

sentence.

Section 924(e)(1), in pertinent part, directs that a defendant

convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years if he ‘‘has three previous

convictions TTT for a violent felony or a serious drug offense,

or both, committed on occasions different from one another.’’

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). As used in section 924(e), a ‘‘serious

drug offense’’ includes, inter alia, ‘‘an offense under State

law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with

intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as

defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21

U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment of

ten years or more is prescribed by law.’’ Id.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).

Emphasizing the fact that section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) does not

expressly include attempts within the definition of ‘‘serious

drug offense,’’ Alexander argues that his prior conviction for

attempted possession with intent to distribute cannot be used

as a qualifying conviction. ‘‘Had [the] Congress intended to

include[ ] attempted drug offenses within the definition of

serious drug offenses,’’ Alexander contends, ‘‘[the] Congress

would have specifically done so, as it did in the definition of

violent felon[ies] under [section 924(e)(2)(B)].’’ Br. for Appel23 Alexander does not challenge two of his qualifying convictions:

a 1972 conviction for armed robbery and a December 1977 conviction for bank robbery. See Br. for Appellant at 29–30. Although

Alexander’s brief discussed a fourth conviction—a July 1977 conviction for bank robbery—the district court did not consider, and the

government did argue on appeal, whether Alexander’s July 1977

conviction qualified as the third required conviction under 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(1). We do likewise.

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lant at 30–31. Violent felonies are defined, in relevant part,

as ‘‘any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year TTT that (i) has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of

another[ ] or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use

of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’’ 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added).

We reject Alexander’s reading of the statute. See United

States v. King, 325 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003) (prior conviction

for attempt to commit third-degree possession of controlled

substance qualified as ‘‘serious drug offense’’). As the government correctly observes, the Congress defined the terms

‘‘violent felony’’ and ‘‘serious drug offense’’ in decidedly different manners. Unlike the definition of ‘‘violent felony,’’ the

definition of ‘‘serious drug offense’’ does not speak in specifics; instead, it defines the term to include an entire class of

state offenses ‘‘involving’’ certain activities, namely, ‘‘manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture

or distribute’’ a controlled substance. 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Noting that ‘‘[t]he word ‘involving’ has

expansive connotations,’’ the Second Circuit recently observed

that the term ‘‘must be construed as extending the focus of

§ 924(e) beyond the precise offenses of distributing, manufacturing, or possessing, and as encompassing as well offenses

that are related to or connected with such conduct.’’ King,

325 F.3d at 113; see also United States v. Brandon, 247 F.3d

186, 190 (4th Cir. 2001) (‘‘[T]he word ‘involving’ itself suggests

that the subsection should be read expansively.’’ (internal

citation omitted)). We find the Second Circuit’s analysis to

be sound.

Moreover, as the district court recognized, the use of

‘‘attempted’’ in section 924(e)(2)(B)(i) does not—by itself—

indicate that the Congress intended to exclude attempt convictions from the definition of ‘‘serious drug offense[s]’’ in

section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). 1/7/02 Tr. 47–48. Indeed, wellestablished principles of statutory construction counsel otherwise; if we were to adopt Alexander’s reading of section

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ingless—‘‘distribution alone would qualify as a crime ‘involving’ distribution’’ and possession with intent to distribute

alone would qualify as a crime ‘‘involving’’ possession with

intent to distribute. United States v. Contreras, 895 F.2d

1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that possession

with intent to distribute is not crime ‘‘involving’’ distribution).

Because Alexander’s earlier conviction of attempted possession ‘‘involv[ed]’’ possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and, in addition, carried a maximum term of

imprisonment of more than ten years, we conclude that the

district court properly imposed a mandatory minimum sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that all of Alexander’s contentions are without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

Affirmed.

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