Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50260/USCOURTS-ca9-14-50260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Roach
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ROBERT ROACH,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-50260

D.C. No.

2:12-cr-00165-PSG2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

June 3, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 8, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, Consuelo M.

Callahan, Circuit Judge, and Edward R. Korman, District

Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Korman

* The Honorable Edward R. Korman, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. ROACH

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a conviction for storing and causing

the storage of hazardous waste without a permit in violation

of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(d)(2)(A), in a case in which the defendant argued that

the statutory definition of “storage” expressly excludes acts

constituting “disposal” of hazardous waste, and that he was

guilty of disposal and therefore not of storage.

The panel held that even accepting the defendant’s

argument based on the technical definitions of “storage” and

“disposal,” the defendant was clearly engaged in storing

hazardous waste in sealed and intact containers left in his

former electroplating facility. The panel therefore did not

need to resolve the issue whether, if he had been so charged,

the defendant could not have been found guilty of both

storage and disposal of containers that were leaking.

The panel rejected the defendant’s alternative argument

that he could not be guilty of storage because he disposed of

all of the containers left in the former facility by

“abandoning” them in the building in which they were stored. 

The panel explained that while the defendant may have

abandoned the premises in which the containers were stored,

the containers were not abandoned, and he is liable as a

principal for “causing the storage of waste” under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2(b).

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ROACH 3

COUNSEL

Lawrence Jay Litman (argued), Los Angeles, California, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Stephanie Yonekura, Acting United States Attorney, Robert

E. Dugdale, Assistant United States Attorney and Chief,

Criminal Division, and Heather C. Gorman (argued) and

Dennis Mitchell, Assistant United States Attorneys,

Environmental Crimes Section, United States Department of

Justice, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

KORMAN, District Judge:

After a bench trial, Robert Roach was convicted of one

count of storing and causing the storage of hazardous waste

without a permit in violation of the Resource Conservation

and RecoveryAct (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). On

this appeal, Roach argues that the statutory definition of

“storage” expressly excludes acts constituting “disposal” of

hazardous waste, and that he was guilty of disposal and

therefore not of storage. Our review of the record persuades

us that Roach was guilty of storing hazardous waste and that

he was properly convicted of that offense.

BACKGROUND

1. Roach’s Business

All Metals Processing Company (“AMP”) was an

electroplating business located in Burbank, California, for

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4 UNITED STATES V. ROACH

which Roach served as an owner, officer, and director. In

those capacities, Roach was involved in hazardous waste

management. The AMP facility, which was located in a

building at 264 West Spazier Avenue, included a “drum

storage area” containing hundreds of receptacles filled with

potentially hazardous substances. From 1990 through 2007,

however, AMP did not have a permit to store hazardous

waste.

On January 18, 2007, the executor of the Estate of Helen

L. Powers (“Powers Estate”)—the successor in interest to

AMP’s landlord—filed an unlawful detainer action against

AMP on the basis of the company’s failure to pay rent. In

February 2007, the parties lodged a stipulated judgment in

favor of the Powers Estate in which AMP agreed to vacate,

“remove toxic material from,” and clean up the premises by

March 16, 2007. AMP was evicted on March 20, 2007. A

large number of barrels containing hazardous waste, some of

which were corroded and others of which were “sealed and

did not appear to be leaking,” were left behind. Although the

Powers Estate granted AMP permission to hire a hazardous

waste transport company to enter the property and remove the

waste, AMP did not do so, purportedly because of cost.

2. Inspections and Sampling

In June 2007, nearly three months after the eviction, the

former AMP facility was inspected by a Hazardous Materials

Specialist with the Los Angeles CountyFire Department, and,

later, a contractor for the U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”). The investigators testified that they found

numerous receptacles containing waste, and also observed

that some (but not all) of the containers were leaking. 

Samples collected from substances within closed receptacles

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UNITED STATES V. ROACH 5

were found to contain hazardous concentrations of chemicals

that had the substantial potential to be harmful to humans and

to the environment. The EPA ultimately emptied and

demolished the building.

3. Indictment, Conviction and Sentencing

On February 23, 2012, a grand jury returned a singlecount indictment charging Roach and one co-defendant with

storing and causing the storage of hazardous waste without a

permit from the EPA or the California Department of Toxic

Substances, in violation of the RCRA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(d)(2)(A). The unlawful act was alleged to have

occurred in the former AMP facility from June 16, 2007, to

at least June 27, 2007—three months after the eviction.

On June 2, 2014, the district judge found Roach guilty. 

The record does not indicate that the judge made any specific

findings of fact, either in open court or in a written opinion. 

Such findings are, however, only required where requested by

the parties, Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c), which does not appear to

be the case here. Roach was sentenced principally to a term

of imprisonment of a year and a day.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, including

questions of statutory interpretation, are reviewed de novo. 

United States v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2014)

(citing United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 590 (9th Cir.

2010)). “There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction

if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

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6 UNITED STATES V. ROACH

United States v. Duran, 189 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999)

(citation omitted). This standard applies to both bench and

jury trials. United States v. Spears, 631 F.2d 114, 117 (9th

Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

1. Statutory Definitions

Roach was accused of violating 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(d)(2)(A), which imposes criminal liability on an

individual who “knowingly . . . stores . . . any hazardous

waste . . . without a permit,” and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), which

provides that “[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done

which if directly performed by him or another would be an

offense against the United States, is punishable as a

principal.” Under the RCRA, “storage” of hazardous waste

is defined as “the containment of hazardous waste, either on

a temporary basis or for a period of years, in such a manner

as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous waste.” 

42 U.S.C. § 6903(33). “Disposal,” in turn, refers to the

“discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or

placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any

land or water so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or

any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be

emitted into the air or discharged into any waters . . . .” Id.

§ 6903(3).

2. Roach’s Argument on Appeal

The evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable

doubt that, as a factual matter, Roach knowingly stored

hazardous waste in the former AMP facility without a permit

to do so. Indeed, Roach conceded as much in a joint

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UNITED STATES V. ROACH 7

stipulation at trial, and again at oral argument on appeal. 

Nevertheless, he argues that he cannot be found guilty of

unlawfully storing hazardous waste, because the RCRA

defines “storage” as “containment of hazardous waste . . . in

such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such hazardous

waste,” and the evidence at trial established that there was

extensive leaking and leeching of waste in the former AMP

building.

Roach’s argument rests primarily on United States v.

Humphries, which held that a defendant’s intent to eventually

dispose of hazardous materials does not immunize him from

conviction for unlawfully storing the waste in the meanwhile. 

728 F.3d 1028, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2013). In the course of its

opinion, resolving an entirely different issue than that

presented here, the panel noted that, “[u]nder the [RCRA],

‘disposal’ and ‘storage’ are mutually exclusive: a person

cannot be convicted of storing waste once the person has

disposed of it.” Id. at 1031. Roach acknowledges, however,

that his conviction was based solely on the hazardous waste

contained in five containers that were sealed and were not

leaking. Humphries’s common-sense observation that “a

person cannot be convicted of storing waste once the person

has disposed of it,” id., does not provide a basis for a defense

where, as here, waste from certain barrels leaked onto the

ground while waste in other barrels, on which the defendant’s

conviction rests, remained completely contained. Even

accepting Roach’s argument based on the technical

definitions of “storage” and “disposal” contained in the

RCRA, he was clearly engaged in storing hazardous waste in

the sealed and intact containers left in the premises located at

264 West Spazier Avenue. Thus, it is not necessary for us to

resolve the issue whether, if he had been so charged, Roach

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8 UNITED STATES V. ROACH

could not have been found guilty of both storage and disposal

of the containers that were leaking.

Roach argues alternatively that he disposed of all of the

containers left in the former AMP facility—even those that

were sealed and intact—by “abandoning” them in the

building in which they were stored. This argument is

premised on the statutory language defining “disposal” as the

“placing” of waste on the land such that it “may enter the

environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Even though the

containers were sealed and stored inside a building, Roach

argues that they posed a “potential danger[]” of entering the

environment when left in “an abandoned and unsupervised

hazardous waste site.” Specifically, “containers of

flammable, oxidizing and reactive chemicals . . . if stored too

long, may deteriorate and cause a spill which could result in

a fire or explosion.” Roach also observed that “[a]rson is

common at abandoned waste sites and a large fire could

expose downwind populations to toxic smoke and particles.”

This argument is without merit. While Roach may have

abandoned the premises in which the containers were stored,

the containers were not abandoned. They continued to be

stored in the same building in which they had always been

housed, which was owned and overseen by the Powers Estate.

This was not “an abandoned and unsupervised hazardous

waste site.” Indeed, Roach violated the express terms of the

stipulated judgment requiringAMP to “remove toxic material

from” the building by March 16, 2007. Roach’s

“abandonment,” in effect, merely transferred custody of the

storage containers to his former landlord.

Roach is therefore liable as a principal under 18 U.S.C.

§ 2(b), which “is based on the precept that an individual with

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UNITED STATES V. ROACH 9

the requisite criminal intent may be held liable as a principal

if he is a cause in fact in the commission of a crime,

notwithstanding that the proscribed conduct is achieved

through the actions of innocent intermediaries.” United

States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 131 (2d Cir. 1982),

abrogated on other grounds by McNally v. United States,

483 U.S. 350 (1987) (citations omitted); accord United States

v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1987). The

indictment in this case specifically charged Roach with

“causing the storage of waste” under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), and he

is clearly guilty of that offense.

There is another reason whyRoach’s abandonment theory

fails. Roach conceded at oral argument that he was guilty of

storage before he abandoned the premises—and before the

start of the time period charged in the indictment—but argues

that the act of abandonment transformed his behavior from

storage to disposal. This theory is premised on the notion that

waste left within an abandoned site is more likely to “enter

the environment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). Roach’s theory

proves too much. Passing over the fact that the building in

which the containers were stored was not an abandoned site,

the risk, if any, that the hazardous waste in the sealed

containers would enter the environment as a result of arson,

vandalism, or deterioration existed well before Roach’s

eviction. If “may enter the environment” bears the weight

that Roach would give it, then “storage”—which, as Roach

repeatedly emphasizes, is defined to exclude any action that

constitutes disposal—would be stripped of all effect. This

cannot possibly have been the intent of Congress. 

AFFIRMED.

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