Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00178/USCOURTS-alsd-1_04-cv-00178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darren L. Baldwin
Plaintiff
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DARREN L. BALDWIN, :

 :

Plaintiff, :

 :

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 04-0178-P-M

 :

JO ANNE B. BARNHART, :

Commissioner of :

Social Security, :

 :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Application for 

 Attorney Fees Under the Equal Access to Justice Act (Doc. 23)

and Defendant's Notice of No Objection to Plaintiff's

Application for Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Equal Access to

Justice Act (Doc. 24). After consideration of the pertinent

pleadings, it is recommended, without objection, that the

Application be granted and that Plaintiff's attorney be

awarded an EAJA attorney's fee in the amount of $1,812.50.

Plaintiff filed this action on March 23, 2004 (Doc. 1). 

On February 18, 2005, the Court entered judgment remanding

this action to the Commissioner for further proceedings

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (Docs. 21,

22). On May 9, 2005, Byron A. Lassiter, counsel for

Plaintiff, filed an Application for Attorney Fees Under the

Equal Access to Justice Act, in which Plaintiff requests a fee

Case 1:04-cv-00178-M Document 25 Filed 05/25/05 Page 1 of 7
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of $1,812.50, computed at an hourly rate of $125.00 for 14.50

hours spent in this Court (Doc. 23). Defendant in her Notice

of No Objection filed May 23, 2005, stated that she has no

objection to Plaintiff’s Application (Doc. 24). 

The EAJA requires a court to 

award to a prevailing party ... fees and

other expenses ... incurred by that party

in any civil action ..., including

proceedings for judicial review of Agency

action, brought by or against the United

States ..., unless the court finds that the

position of the United States was

substantially justified or that special

circumstances make an award unjust.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The EAJA further requires that a

prevailing party file an application for attorney's fees

within thirty days of final judgment in the action. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2412(d)(1)(B). The court's judgment is final sixty days

after it is entered, which is the time in which an appeal may

be taken pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292,

113 S.Ct. 2625, 2632 (1993).

Defendant concedes that Plaintiff became the prevailing

party when the Court remanded this action, Schaefer, 113 S.Ct.

at 2631; that the fee application was timely filed; and that

her position was not substantially justified (Doc. 24).

The EAJA, like 42 U.S.C. § 1988, is a fee-shifting

Case 1:04-cv-00178-M Document 25 Filed 05/25/05 Page 2 of 7
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statute. The Supreme Court has indicated that “‘the most

useful starting point for determining the amount of a

reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on

the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.’” 

Watford v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1562, 1586 (11th Cir. 1985)(EAJA),

quoting Hensley v. Eckerhartt, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct.

1933, 1939 (1983)(§ 1988). In describing this lodestar method

of calculation, the United States Supreme Court stated:

This calculation provides an objective

basis on which to make an initial estimate

of the value of a lawyer’s services. The

party seeking an award of fees should

submit evidence supporting the hours worked

and the rates claimed. Where the

documentation of hours is inadequate, the

district court may reduce the award

accordingly. The district court also

should exclude from this initial fee

calculation hours that were not “reasonably

expended” .... Cases may be overstaffed,

and the skill and experience of lawyers

vary widely. Counsel for the prevailing

party should make a good-faith effort to

exclude from a fee request hours that are

excessive, redundant, or otherwise

unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private

practice ethically is obligated to exclude

such hours from his fee submission. In the

private sector, ‘billing judgment’ is an

important component in fee setting. It is

no less important here. Hours that are not

properly billed to one’s client also are

not properly billed to one’s adversary

pursuant to statutory authority.

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted). Counsel must

use professional judgment in billing under EAJA. A lawyer

Case 1:04-cv-00178-M Document 25 Filed 05/25/05 Page 3 of 7
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should only be compensated for hours spent on activities for

which he would bill a client of means who was seriously intent

on vindicating similar rights. Norman v. Housing Authority,

836 F.2d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 1988).

 The Court, after examination of Plaintiff’s Application

and supporting documentation, and after consideration of the

reasonableness of the hours claimed, finds that Plaintiff’s

time expended in prosecuting this action for a total of 14.50

hours is reasonable. 

With respect to a determination of the hourly rate to

apply in a given EAJA case, the express language of the Act

provides in pertinent part as follows:

The amount of fees awarded under this

subsection shall be based upon prevailing

market rates for the kind and quality of

the services furnished, except that ...

attorney fees shall not be awarded in

excess of $125 per hour unless the court

determines that an increase in the cost of

living or a special factor, such as the

limited availability of qualified attorneys

for the proceedings involved, justifies a

higher fee.

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

In Meyer v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir. 1992), the

Eleventh Circuit determined that the EAJA establishes a twostep analysis for determining the appropriate hourly rate to

be applied in calculating attorney's fees under the Act.

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1 Subsequent to Meyer, the cap was raised from $75.00 per hour

to $125.00 per hour, as set out above in 28 U.S.C. §

2412(d)(2)(A)(Supp. 1997).

5

The first step in the analysis, ... is to

determine the market rate for "similar

services [provided] by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience,

and reputation." ... The second step,

which is needed only if the market rate is

greater than $75 per hour, is to determine

whether the court should adjust the hourly

fee upward...to take into account an

increase in the cost of living, or a

special factor.

Id. at 1033-34 (citations omitted & footnote omitted)1. The

applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence

that the requested rate is in line with prevailing market

rates. NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1338 (11th

Cir. 1987). Satisfactory evidence at a minimum is more than

the affidavit of the attorney performing the work. Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 n.11 (1984). 

Where the fees or time claimed seem expanded or there is lack

of documentation or testimony in support, the court may make

an award on its own experience. Norman v. City of Montgomery,

836 F.2d 1292, 1303 (11th Cir. 1988). Where documentation is

inadequate, the court is not relieved of its obligation to

award a reasonable fee, but the court traditionally has had

the power to make such an award without the need of further

pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Id. 

Case 1:04-cv-00178-M Document 25 Filed 05/25/05 Page 5 of 7
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The prevailing market rate in the Southern District of

Alabama is $125.00 per hour. See Smith v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0812-P-M (October 25, 2001); Boone v. Apfel, Civil

Action 99-0965-CB-L (August 30, 2001); Lee v. Massanari, Civil

Action 00-0518-RV-S (June 29, 2001); Willits v. Massanari,

Civil Action 00-0530-RV-C (May 4, 2001); and Square v. Halter,

Civil Action 00-0516-BH-L (April 12, 2001). Because the

market rate is not greater than the statutory rate of $125.00

per hour, the Court need not reach the second step set out in

the Meyer case. Multiplying the 14.50 hours by the Southern

District of Alabama inflation-adjusted prevailing market rate

of $125.00 results in a fee of $1,812.50. 

 In conclusion, it is recommended, without objection, that

Plaintiff's Application be granted as set out above and that

Plaintiff's attorney be awarded an EAJA attorney's fee in the

amount of $1,812.50.

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION

AND FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

1. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation

or anything in it must, within ten days of the date of service

of this document, file specific written objections with the

clerk of court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo

determination by the district judge of anything in the

recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the

factual findings of the magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. §

636(b)(1)(C); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d 736, 738 (11th Cir.

1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B,

1982)(en banc). The procedure for challenging the findings

Case 1:04-cv-00178-M Document 25 Filed 05/25/05 Page 6 of 7
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and recommendations of the magistrate judge is set out in more

detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a

magistrate judge in a dispositive matter, that is, a

matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), by

filing a “Statement of Objection to Magistrate

Judge’s Recommendation” within ten days after being

served with a copy of the recommendation, unless a

different time is established by order. The

statement of objection shall specify those portions

of the recommendation to which objection is made and

the basis for the objection. The objecting party

shall submit to the district judge, at the time of

filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s

recommendation should be reviewed de novo and a

different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted

to the magistrate judge, although a copy of the

original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the

objection. Failure to submit a brief in support of

the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection.

A magistrate judge’s recommendation cannot be appealed to

a Court of Appeals; only the district judge’s order or

judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable where proceedings tape recorded). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the

magistrate judge finds that the tapes and original records in

this action are adequate for purposes of review. Any party

planning to object to this recommendation, but unable to pay

the fee for a transcript, is advised that a judicial

determination that transcription is necessary is required

before the United States will pay the cost of the transcript.

DONE this 24th day of May, 2005.

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR. 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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