Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01114/USCOURTS-ca8-05-01114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marques Good Low
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

 The Honorable Andrew W. Bogue, United States District Court Judge for the

District of South Dakota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-1114

___________

Marques Good Low *

*

Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the District 

* of South Dakota.

United States of America *

*

Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2005

 Filed: November 15, 2005 

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

MELLOY, Circuit Judge.

Marques Good Low brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b). Good Low sustained damages when a Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe

(“CRST”) police officer accidentally ran over him after Good Low had eluded

officers, driven into an alfalfa field, and vacated his vehicle. Following a bench trial,

the district court1

 entered judgment for the government. We affirm.

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I. Background

On September 11, 1999, Good Low, then 18-years old, went to a party where

he consumed a great deal of alcohol. In the early hours of September 12, 1999, Dan

Iron Road, a CRST police officer, observed Good Low speeding and driving

erratically. A chase ensued, and Good Low left the road and evaded the officer by

driving through a marsh. Good Low then drove into an alfalfa field where he crashed

into a bale of hay. During the course of the chase, Iron Road was joined by other

officers including CRST Sergeant Anthony Aungie. While driving on a road adjacent

to the field and using a spotlight, Aungie located Good Low’s vehicle resting against

the hay bale. The officers located a gate and drove their vehicles into the field.

 

Aungie was able to see that the door of Good Low’s vehicle was open, but he

could not see anyone inside. He continued to drive toward the vehicle at fifteen miles

per hour. Aungie used his spotlight and his headlights, although the latter were

obstructed by the alfalfa which was more than two feet high. None of the officers

used their flashing overhead lights or sirens. When Aungie was approximately 100

yards from Good Low’s vehicle, Good Low raised his head above the alfalfa. Good

Low was only a few feet in front of Aungie’s vehicle, and Aungie could not stop

before running over him with both his front and rear right tires. Good Low sustained

serious injuries including a fractured pelvis and a lacerated urethra. He continues to

suffer from complications including incontinence and a loss of sexual function. 

 

The district court found that Aungie was negligent for driving at an

inappropriate rate of speed in an area where he could not see persons or objects on

the ground. However, South Dakota law does not allow a plaintiff to recover if his

or her own negligence is more than slight when compared to the defendant’s

negligence. Because the district court found that Good Low was negligent and that

his negligence was not slight when compared to Aungie’s, it denied recovery. 

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II. Analysis

Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the federal government can be held liable

for injury caused by the negligent act “of any employee of the Government while

acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the

United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with

the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1).

The government employees at issue in this case are the police officers of the CRST.

The events at issue occurred in South Dakota, so we must look to the law of that state

in determining whether Good Law may recover damages. “South Dakota’s

comparative negligence statute bars recovery when a plaintiff’s contributory

negligence is greater than slight compared to the negligence of the defendant . . . .”

Estate of C.M. Largent, III v. United States, 910 F.2d 497, 498 (8th Cir. 1990).

Good Low raises two arguments on appeal. First, he asserts that any

negligence on his part was slight when compared to Aungie’s negligence. Second,

Good Low contends that even if his negligence is found to be more than slight, he

should not be denied recovery because of the “last clear chance” doctrine. We

address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Good Low’s Contributory Negligence

After a bench trial, the district court made findings of fact and conclusions

of law. It found “no evidence that [Good Low] was ejected from his vehicle when

the car hit the hay bale” and determined that “the only rational explanation” for his

laying in the alfalfa was that Good Low “voluntarily exited his vehicle and moved

to the place where he was struck by Aungie’s vehicle.” We agree with the district

court that “the inherent risks involved with lying face down in the alfalfa field,

after leading law enforcement on a high speed chase, are obvious and should have

been comprehended by the Plaintiff.” Thus, we also agree with the district court

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that Good Low’s “conduct was clearly a contributing cause . . . in bringing about

the injuries sustained.” 

The district court made several specific findings regarding the degree of

Good Low’s negligence. It stated:

[T]he Plaintiff aggressively attempted to avoid apprehension by fleeing

from law enforcement. His reckless conduct continued when he decided

to further elude his pursuers by hiding in the alfalfa field. His own

reckless conduct necessitated the presence of law enforcement officers

in the alfalfa field and he was equally culpable in causing the injuries he

sustained. The court finds this degree of negligence to be greater than

slight.

We review for clear error the district court’s finding that Good Low’s negligence was

more than slight when compared to the negligence of the defendants. Largent, 910

F.2d at 499.

Good Low disputes the district court’s finding that he was “hiding” in the

alfalfa. Although Good Low was too intoxicated to remember the events in the

alfalfa field, his attorney suggests that he may have left the vehicle in a state of shock

or simply passed out due to his intoxication. The district court concluded that another

explanation was more likely. It found that “the evidence suggests [Good Low]

voluntarily left his vehicle, and, in a further attempt to avoid apprehension, hid in the

alfalfa field.” It is undisputed that Good Low had already attempted to elude police

by driving into the field. Furthermore, Good Low did get up off the ground and raise

his head above the alfalfa shortly before being struck by the officer’s vehicle. Thus,

the evidence does not suggest that he was intoxicated or injured to the point that he

was unable to move. Although Good Low contends that the conclusion that he was

hiding was speculative, we cannot reject it as clearly erroneous. Craft v. Metromedia,

Inc., 766 F.2d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir. 1985) (“‘Where there are two permissible views

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of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.’”)

(quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). 

Good Low also argues that it was improper for the district court to consider the

fact that he fled law enforcement in determining the degree of his negligence. He

claims that because his vehicle was already inoperable at the time officers made the

decision to enter the field, any actions Good Low took prior to crashing his vehicle

were not the proximate cause of his injuries. We need not determine the precise

application of South Dakota law on this point because we find that even if the district

court improperly relied on the fact that Good Low led officers on a chase, it was

harmless error. Other portions of the district court’s opinion indicate that, looking

solely at Good Low’s actions after crashing his vehicle, the district court would still

have found him to be more than slightly negligent:

[T]he only rational explanation [for how Good Low ended up in the

alfalfa] is that he voluntarily exited his vehicle and moved to the place

where he was struck by Aungie’s vehicle. By so doing, he placed

himself in danger of being struck by the motor vehicles occupied by his

pursuers. The Plaintiff’s conduct was clearly a contributing cause which

cooperated with Aungie’s negligence in bringing about the injuries

sustained. 

The fact that the district court later described Good Low and Aungie as being

“equally culpable” for Good Low’s injuries further indicates that, even if the events

that occurred prior to entering the alfalfa field were removed from the equation, the

district court would still find Good Low more than slightly negligent. See Largent,

910 F.2d at 500 (considering the district court’s emphasis of other factors and

deciding that the district court would have reached the same decision even if it had

not improperly considered a factor later deemed to be irrelevant).

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B. Last Clear Chance Doctrine

Although we can ascertain no clear error in the district court’s finding that

Good Low was more than slightly negligent when his actions are compared to

Aungie’s, Good Low argues that he is still entitled to recovery based on the “last clear

chance” doctrine. This doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover despite his own

negligence in some cases where the defendant’s “negligent act was the final decisive

cause of the accident.” Nielsen v. Richman, 299 N.W. 74, 74 (S.D. 1941) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The district court’s opinion does not discuss the

applicability of this doctrine. Assuming arguendo that the issue was properly raised

below, we find that, under South Dakota law, the last clear chance doctrine does not

apply to the circumstances of this case. 

The district court concluded that Good Low was hiding in the alfalfa, and, as

discussed above, there is no clear error with that finding. Therefore, we must assume

that Good Low retained the ability to remove himself from danger by revealing

himself to the oncoming officers. Despite his intoxication, Good Low was able to

raise his head above the alfalfa and reveal himself to Aungie, albeit too late. As such,

his failure to protect himself from the oncoming police vehicles constitutes

continuing negligence. 

In South Dakota the continuing negligence of a plaintiff is neutralized by the

last clear chance doctrine only “if the evidence will support an inference that the

defendant actually discovered the peril” to the plaintiff and “thereafter failed to act

with reasonable care . . . .” Haase v. Willers Truck Service, Inc., 34 N.W.2d 313, 317

(S.D. 1948) (emphasis added). The South Dakota Supreme Court further explained

that this discovery must be actual, not just imputed:

The great weight of judicial authority denies the application of the last

clear chance doctrine in the situation where the defendant, while under

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a duty to discover the danger to the injured person, did not actually

discover it and the injured person was physically able to escape from the

peril at any time up to the moment of impact. 

Id. (internal quotations omitted). Although Aungie arguably should have known that

Good Low was somewhere in the alfalfa field, there is no evidence that he actually

discovered that Good Low was in his path prior to Good Low raising his head above

the alfalfa. When Good Low raised his head, Aungie was only a few feet away from

Good Low and could not stop his vehicle before striking him. 

The district court did find that Aungie was traveling faster than he should have

been in light of the low visibility in the alfalfa field. Even if Aungie’s prior

negligence was the reason he could not avoid hitting Good Low, however, the last

clear chance doctrine still does not apply. In Nielsen, the South Dakota Supreme

Court adopted Section 480 of the Restatement of Torts. Nielsen, 299 N.W. at 76.

Comment h in Section 479 of that text, which also deals with the last clear chance

doctrine, states: 

If the defendant, after discovering the plaintiff’s peril, does all that can

reasonably be expected of him, the fact that his efforts are defeated by

antecedent lack of preparation or a previous course of negligent conduct

is not sufficient to make him liable. 

Restatement (First) of Torts § 479 cmt. h (1934). The comment goes on to provide

an example that is especially relevant to this case: 

[I]f a railroad train is exceeding the statutory speed limit in approaching

a level crossing, but the engineer does not see the plaintiff’s helpless

peril on the crossing in time to stop the train, the fact that the train could

have been stopped in the distance between the two points if it had been

going at the lawful speed is not enough to make the defendant liable to

the negligent plaintiff.

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Id. For the foregoing reasons, we find that the last clear chance doctrine does not

allow Good Low to recover. 

III. Conclusion

We find no clear error in the district court’s determination that Good Low’s

negligence was more than slight when compared to Aungie’s. We also conclude that

the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable to this case and thus does not allow

Good Low to recover damages despite his own negligence. Accordingly, we affirm

the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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