Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03122/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03122-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Brugada Holmes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2007 Decided November 27, 2007

No. 04-3122

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOHN BRUGADA HOLMES, A/K/A TIMOTHY ROBBINS,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00454-02)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Neil H. Jaffee, Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor,

U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, Mary B. McCord, and

Daniel P. Butler, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

EDWARDS.

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EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant John Holmes

was convicted in a jury trial of conspiracy, money laundering,

and false use of a social security number relating to a scheme to

receive, conceal, and retain money stolen from the United States

Department of Education (“DOE”). Holmes now appeals that

conviction, arguing that the trial was impermissibly delayed in

violation of the Speedy Trial Act, and that his trial counsel fell

below the level of competency guaranteed by the Sixth

Amendment.

Appellant offers a preserved challenge under the Speedy

Trial Act. We therefore review de novo the District Court’s

finding that Holmes’ trial on January 6, 2004 fell within the 70-

day time period allowed by the Act. We uphold that

determination based on a rule of completeness motion filed by

the Government on June 3, 2003. This motion tolled the speedy

trial clock at least until December 19, 2003, when the trial judge

ruled on a related defense motion concerning Bruton v. United

States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). When the time between the filing

of the rule of completeness motion and the trial court’s ruling on

the Bruton motion is taken into consideration, appellant’s trial

date did not run afoul of the Speedy Trial Act.

Appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument is

also unavailing. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), appellant must show both deficient performance and

prejudice. Appellant complains that attorney error led to the

introduction of damaging evidence under Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b). However, the trial court’s ruling on that

evidence was mooted by a superceding indictment. Even

assuming, arguendo, that trial counsel’s performance was

deficient, appellant’s case was not prejudiced. Accordingly, the

Sixth Amendment claim fails.

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I. BACKGROUND

On December 18, 2001, appellant John Holmes and two

codefendants, Stateson Francois and Dominique Germain, were

indicted on charges of conspiracy to receive, conceal, and retain

stolen property of the United States (Count One, 18 U.S.C.

§ 371), and conspiracy to launder money (Count Two, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1956(h)). Holmes was also indicted individually for false use

of a social security number (Count Three, 42 U.S.C.

§ 408(a)(7)(B)). These charges arose from a scheme to divert

nearly one million dollars of Department of Education Impact

Aid grant money. This scheme was referred to during trial as

“Impact Aid One.”

Holmes and Germain were arrested and arraigned on

January 4, 2002. At that time, Francois remained at large. At a

status hearing held on February 12, 2002, the trial judge

established a timetable for pretrial motions and scheduled a

status hearing for May 31, 2002. At the status hearing, the court

scheduled a motion hearing for August 21, 2002 and set a trial

date for September 9, 2002. On August 29, 2002, appellant

Holmes’ trial counsel moved to withdraw. On September 3,

2002, the grand jury issued a superceding indictment naming a

fourth defendant – Daniel Dorcely – as a member of the

conspiracy. The next day the Government moved for a

continuance of the trial date. On September 6, 2002, the trial

court granted Holmes’ counsel’s motion to withdraw, and the

trial date was postponed.

On October 23, 2002, Stateson Francois was arraigned. A

week later a status conference was convened during which the

court ordered the parties to submit pretrial motions before

December 6, 2002 and set a status hearing for that date.

Holmes’ attorney appeared at the October 30 hearing. Two days

prior to the December 6 deadline defendants moved to continue

the status hearing and extend the deadline. At a January 6, 2003

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status hearing, the judge scheduled a motion hearing for May 19,

2003, and set a trial date for June 9, 2003.

On January 10, 2003, appellant Holmes and his

codefendants submitted several pretrial motions, including a

motion to sever based in part on the admission of evidence

potentially in violation of Bruton. Specifically, the Government

planned to introduce statements that Dorcely had made to

federal law enforcement agents that were both self-inculpatory

and inculpatory with respect to his codefendant Francois. The

District Court held hearings on pretrial motions on May 19-20,

2003. Although most of the motions were resolved, the Bruton

motion was not, and the trial judge scheduled another hearing on

June 3, 2003. 

On June 3, 2003, the Government filed a “Motion In Limine

to Limit Evidence Under Fed. R. Evid. 106,” seeking to limit

defense counsel’s ability to include other parts of the statements

made by Dorcely to law enforcement officials under the rule of

completeness. Government’s Mot. In Limine to Limit Evidence

Under FED.R. EVID. 106 at 3, Appendix for Appellant (“App.”)

at 95-97. The same day a motion hearing was held. At that

hearing, the Government announced that on May 29, 2003, a

grand jury had returned an indictment in a new criminal case

involving a second diversion of DOE funds (“Impact Aid

Two”), and that it had obtained information linking Holmes to

that scheme. Tr. 6/3/03 at 2-4. The Government sought

admission of that information under Federal Rule of Evidence

404(b) as evidence against Holmes. Id. at 5. The trial court

ruled that the information would be inadmissible, because it was

too close to the trial date for Holmes to have an opportunity to

investigate. Id. at 11-13. The court decided to hold another

motion hearing on June 9, 2003, and planned to begin trial on

June 10.

At the motion hearing on June 9, counsel for Holmes

announced that he had received a box of discovery material from

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the Government over the weekend, and that he had not had an

opportunity to go through that material or discuss the material

with his client. Tr. 6/9/03 at 19-21. He requested a continuance

of two days in order to examine and discuss the material. Id. at

21. The trial judge granted that request. Because the term of the

jury pool was set to expire, a new trial date was set for June 17,

2003. Id. at 30-31. Shortly after the trial court set the new trial

date, the Government argued that, because of the delay in the

trial date, there was now sufficient time for Holmes to

investigate the Impact Aid Two evidence. Id. at 73-75. Defense

counsel objected and the court deferred ruling. Id. at 75-77.

Another motion hearing was scheduled for June 11, 2003.

At the June 11 hearing, the trial court heard argument from

the Government and Holmes’ attorney concerning the Impact

Aid Two evidence. The court ultimately decided to admit the

evidence, and continued the trial until June 24, 2003, in order to

give Holmes’ attorney an opportunity to investigate. Tr. 6/11/03

at 41-43.

On June 18, 2003, the Government filed an unopposed

request to continue the trial due to illness of Government’s

counsel. At a status hearing on June 24, the prosecutor stated

that he had just returned to the office and that he would need

approximately one week to prepare for trial. After consulting

with the attorneys and taking into consideration the court’s

docket, the trial judge rescheduled the trial for January 6, 2004.

Tr. 6/24/03 at 16.

On August 21, 2003, the grand jury issued a second

superceding indictment, adding charges against Holmes on a

second conspiracy to receive, conceal, and retain stolen U.S.

property (Count Six) and a second conspiracy to launder money

(Count Seven), stemming from the Impact Aid Two scheme.

Prior to the second superceding indictment, Dominique Germain

entered a guilty plea. Br. and Record Material (“RM”) for

Appellee at 2.

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The trial court issued a Memorandum Opinion on the

Bruton motion on December 19, 2003, ruling that Dorcely’s

statements implicating Francois were inadmissible in a joint trial

with Francois. United States v. Francois, 295 F. Supp. 2d 60

(D.D.C. 2003) (memorandum opinion), App. at 184. On

January 5, 2004, codefendant Francois entered a guilty plea,

mooting the Bruton issue. The jury trial of appellant John

Holmes and the remaining codefendant Dorcely commenced on

January 6, 2004. 

On January 30, 2004, the jury convicted codefendant

Dorcely on Count Five (false statements to the Federal Bureau

of Investigation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001) and acquitted

him on Counts One and Two. After further deliberation, the

jury found appellant Holmes guilty of the conspiracy charged in

Count One, money laundering in Count Two, and false use of a

social security number as charged in Count Three. The District

Court declared a mistrial on Counts Six and Seven after the jury

announced that it could not reach a verdict. 

On August 20, 2004, the District Court sentenced appellant

to concurrent terms of incarceration of 60 months on Counts

One and Two, respectively, and a 175-month term on Count

Three. The District Court imposed three concurrent three-year

terms of supervised release, and ordered Holmes to make

restitution to the DOE in the amount of $201,513.11. Appellant

consented to an order of forfeiture, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2461(C) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 982(a)(1),

resulting in a monetary judgment against him in the amount of

$63,315.51. Holmes timely noted the instant appeal on August

23, 2004.

Holmes challenges his conviction on two grounds. He first

argues that the delay between his indictment and trial violated

the Speedy Trial Act. Under the Speedy Trial Act, a criminal

trial must “commence within seventy days from the filing date

. . . of the information or indictment.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1).

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Certain delays are excluded from the permissible time period,

including “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the

filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or

other prompt disposition of, such motion.” Id. § 3161(h)(1)(F).

Second, Holmes argues that his counsel was constitutionally

inadequate. Holmes also contends that the trial court erred in

entering a restitution order for losses relating to the Impact Aid

Two scheme, when he was not convicted of any crime relating

to that scheme. Appellee concedes this last point. Br. and RM

for Appellee at vii n.1. Holmes further notes, and the

Government again agrees, that the District Court’s judgment

inadvertently transposed the sentence imposed on Counts One

and Three. Br. for Appellant at 3 n.5. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

A preserved “speedy trial challenge is reviewed de novo on

matters of law, and for clear error as to findings of fact.” United

States v. Sanders, 485 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (internal

citations omitted). On his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim, appellant must show that “counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the

defendant by the Sixth Amendment . . . [and that] the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. In reviewing an ineffective assistance claim, this court

must grant significant deference to the strategic choices of trial

counsel. “The Sixth Amendment guarantees reasonable

competence, not perfect advocacy judged with the benefit of

hindsight.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003).

B. Speedy Trial Act Violation

The dispute between appellant and appellee regarding the

application of the Speedy Trial Act is quite limited. The parties

agree that, as of June 24, 2003, 22 days had expired on the

speedy trial clock. The principal disagreement centers on the

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rule of completeness motion and whether it tolled the speedy

trial clock between June 2003 and January 2004. 

On June 3, 2003, the Government filed a “Motion In Limine

To Limit Evidence Under Fed. R. Evid. 106.” Government’s

Mot. In Limine to Limit Evidence Under FED. R. EVID. 106 at

3, App. at 95. This motion concerned statements made by

Dorcely to federal law enforcement officers. These statements

were also the basis of defendants’ Bruton motion. The

Government planned to submit to the jury three statements made

by Dorcely, during which he allegedly lied about and then later

admitted to his relationship with Francois. In its rule of

completeness motion, the Government sought to limit the

admission of additional statements made by Dorcely that might

otherwise be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. The

Government asked the trial court to exclude “the remaining

portions of defendant Dorcely’s statement[s] . . . if the

government only elicits . . . those portions which bear directly

on the charged offense.” Id., App. at 97.

On June 9, 2003, a hearing was held on the rule of

completeness motion. At that hearing, counsel for Dorcely

argued that the entirety of Dorcely’s statements should be

admitted, and the Government argued that the trial court should

exclude what amounted to “a self-serving statement” by Dorcely

designed to “exculpate himself in the face of [an] FBI special

agent.” Tr. 6/9/03 at 6. The trial court questioned Dorcely’s

attorney about the nature of his request and then deferred ruling

until the parties and the court “go through the Bruton analysis.”

Id. at 8. 

The District Court obviously acted reasonably in deferring

any ruling on the rule of completeness motion. If the court

found that Dorcely’s statements could not be admitted at a joint

trial with Francois, there would be no question about whether

additional statements of Dorcely would be needed under Federal

Rule of Evidence 106. It therefore made sense for the court to

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rule first on the Bruton question and then, if necessary, on the

rule of completeness motion. As it happened, the District Court

decided the Bruton motion on December 18, 2003, in favor of

defendants. The decision on the Bruton motion thus mooted the

rule of completeness motion. Francois, 295 F. Supp. 2d at 74,

App. at 205-06. The period between the June 9, 2003 hearing

and the trial court’s ruling on the Bruton motion is properly

excluded from the speedy trial clock, because the District Court

reasonably anticipated holding a hearing on the rule of

completeness motion in December 2003. Although a definite

hearing date was not set, both parties acknowledge that the court

contemplated a hearing. Br. for Appellant at 36; Br. and RM for

Appellee at 43. An anticipated hearing can toll the speedy trial

clock. See United States v. Maxwell, 351 F.3d 35, 38-40 (1st

Cir. 2003) (period after motion to sever was filed, until it was

withdrawn, was excluded because the trial court planned to hold

a hearing); see also United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 443-

44 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (time between the filing of a defense

opposition motion and a hearing on the motion was excluded,

even though the trial court never ruled on the motion because it

was mooted by subsequent events). 

In this case, neither appellant nor his codefendant objected

to the timetable proposed by the District Court, nor did they

demand an earlier hearing or decision on the rule of

completeness motion. Cf. United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263,

274 (4th Cir. 2005) (defendants cannot manipulate dates to put

off a hearing and then claim a Speedy Trial Act violation).

Without a defense objection, there was no reason for the District

Court to expedite the schedule that had been set for the

disposition of the pending motions. And appellant knew that the

trial court’s disposition of the Bruton motion might moot the

rule of completeness motion. The District Court deferred its

rule of completeness decision until after the anticipated

December 2003 hearing. The time is therefore excludable. 

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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The basis for appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel

claim is defense counsel’s June 9, 2003 request for a

continuance. Because the continuance was granted, the

Government revived its efforts to introduce Impact Aid Two

evidence through Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), and the trial

court agreed to allow the evidence. Appellant argues that the

decision to request a continuance fell below the required

standard of competency, because trial counsel should have

known, based on “the facts, law, and [the judge’s] earlier

statements,” that a continuance would open the door for the

Impact Aid Two evidence. Reply Br. for Appellant at 24-25.

Appellant further argues that his ability to argue intent was

seriously harmed when he became the only “‘common thread’

with a highly similar second conspiracy.” Br. for Appellant at

46. Holmes, the argument runs, was therefore significantly

prejudiced.

Even assuming, arguendo, that there was deficient

performance, there was no prejudice. Therefore, under

Strickland, appellant’s claim fails. If the trial judge at the

second hearing had declined to revisit the Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b) motion, and continued to rule that the Impact

Aid Two evidence was inadmissible, that evidence still would

have been admitted at trial. Even without the court’s Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b) ruling, the trial would have been

postponed until January 2004 (because the Government’s lawyer

was unavailable as of June 17, 2003), giving the Government the

opportunity to procure an indictment on the Impact Aid Two

scheme. Thus, while there was a negative ruling that arguably

resulted from ineffective assistance of counsel, there was no

prejudice because that ruling was mooted by the superceding

indictment.

It could be argued that counsel’s request for a continuance

also resulted in the delay that allowed for the superceding

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indictment. Defense counsel’s performance, however, was not

deficient with respect to the lengthy delay in trial that resulted,

because the delay was not a foreseeable consequence of the

request for continuance. While counsel’s decision to request a

continuance did result in the delay that allowed the Government

to pursue a superceding indictment, it was an unforeseeable

result of the counsel’s request for postponement, not the

“deficient performance” itself, that prejudiced the defense. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the delay between appellant’s

arraignment and trial did not violate the Speedy Trial Act, and

appellant’s trial counsel was not constitutionally infirm. His

conviction is therefore affirmed. This case is remanded to the

District Court so that the judgment can be corrected, per the

parties’ agreement, with respect to the restitution order and the

transposition of the sentences on Counts Two and Three. 

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