Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00462/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00462-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Honofre James O Chargualaf
Petitioner
Rafael Zuniga
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONOFRE JAMES O CHARGUALAF,

Petitioner,

v.

RAFAEL ZUNIGA,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00462-LJO-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (ECF No. 1) AND 

RESPONDENT‟S MOTION TO DISMISS 

(ECF No. 16)

ORDER DISCHARGING AUGUST 6, 2015 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF No. 15)

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 

I.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner is presently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Mendota, 

California. In the instant petition filed on March 25, 2015, Petitioner challenges his May 10, 

1996, conviction and sentence in United States District Court for the District of Guam. (ECF 

No. 1). On May 6, 1997, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner‟s conviction. 

See United States v. Chargualaf, 114 F.3d 1196, WL 272225 (1997). On June 15, 1998, the 

United States Supreme Court denied Petitioner‟s petition for writ of certiorari. See Chargualaf v. 

United States, 118 S.Ct. 2323 (1998). 

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On April 9, 2015, Petitioner filed a motion to file a supplemental pleading to his habeas 

petition pursuant to Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the supplemental 

pleading. (ECF No. 6). On June 9, 2015, the Court issued an order denying Petitioner‟s motion 

to supplement. (ECF No. 8). The Court also ordered Petitioner to show cause why the petition 

should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8). On July 1, 2015, Petitioner 

submitted his brief to show cause why his petition has jurisdiction under the savings clause 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). (ECF No. 14). On August 6, 2015, the Court issued an order 

for Respondent to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to obey a court 

order because he did not file his reply to Petitioner‟s response to the order to show cause. (ECF 

No. 15). Later that day, Respondent filed his reply to Petitioner‟s brief, a motion to dismiss, and 

a response to the Court‟s order to show cause. (ECF No. 16).

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

A federal court may not entertain an action over which it has no jurisdiction. See 

Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). A federal prisoner who 

wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his federal conviction or sentence must do 

so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the 

sentencing court. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir. 1988); Stephens v. Herrera, 

464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1313 (2007). In general, a prisoner

may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Grady v. United States, 929 F.2d 468, 470 (9th 

Cir.1991); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162. In contrast, a prisoner challenging the manner, location, or 

conditions of that sentence‟s execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 

U.S.C. § 2241 in the district where the petitioner is in custody. See Stephens, 464 F.3d at 897; 

Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-65; Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990).

Petitioner asserts that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated because he was charged 

for allegedly using two separate weapons, a firearm and a silencer, under Section 924(c), Title 18 

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of the United States Code in a single count in count 5 of the Indictment. Petitioner further 

asserts that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Count 5 of the Indictment. 

Petitioner cites to the United States Supreme Court cases United States v. O‟Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 

130 S.Ct. 2169, 176 L.Ed.2d 979 (2010), and Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120, 120 S.Ct. 

2090, 147 L.Ed.2d 94 (2000).1

In Castillo, the United States Supreme Court addressed the machine gun provision in the 

version of Section 924, Title 18 of the United States Code prior to the 1998 congressional 

amendments. The United States Supreme Court unanimously held that the machinegun 

provision was an element of the offense. Castillo, 530 U.S. at 124-131. In O‟Brien, the 

Supreme Court determined “whether the fact that the firearm was a machinegun is an element to 

be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or a sentencing factor to be proved to the judge 

at sentencing” for the machinegun provision of Section 924, Title 18 of the United States Code 

in light of the 1998 congressional amendments and the United States Supreme Court decision in 

Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002). O‟Brien, 560 U.S. at 221. The pre-1998 version 

of Section 924(c)(1), which was applicable in Castillo, read:

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking 

crime which provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by 

the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which he 

may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a 

firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such 

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to 

imprisonment for five years, and if the firearm is a short-barreled 

rifle [or a] short-barreled shotgun to imprisonment for ten years, 

and if the firearm is a machinegun, or a destructive device, or is 

equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, to 

imprisonment for thirty years.

18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (effective Dec. 11, 1988 and repealed Nov. 13, 1998).

The criminal conduct underlying Petitioner‟s conviction occurred in 1994 and 1995, and 

 

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Petitioner asserts that in O‟Brien and Castillo, the United States Supreme Court found that firearm silencers are 

elements of a separate substantive offense rather than sentence enhancements. (ECF No. 7 at 3). However, the 

United States Supreme Court determined that the provisions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), including firearm silencers, 

must be found by a jury as an element of the offense. The United States Supreme Court did not find that a silencer 

must be a separate offense. 

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he was convicted in 1996. The analysis in O‟Brien related to the post-1998 version of the 

subsection of the statute that was enacted after Petitioner‟s trial. Moreover, in O‟Brien, the 

United States Supreme Court determined that the “analysis and holding of Castillo controls this 

case.” O‟Brien, 130 S.Ct. at 2180. Therefore, any material change in federal law relevant to 

Petitioner‟s conviction occurred years before the 2010 O‟Brien decision. Thus, this Court must 

determine whether Castillo supports jurisdiction pursuant to the “savings clause” for Petitioner‟s

claims. 

Petitioner‟s argument pursuant to Castillo is clearly a direct challenge to his conviction, 

not to the execution of his sentence. Indeed, Petitioner concedes as much in his petition. 

Therefore, Petitioner is challenging the validity and constitutionality of his federal sentence 

imposed by the United States District Court for the District of Guam, rather than an error in the 

administration and execution of his sentence, and a Section 2255 motion is appropriate.

The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged that petitioners may proceed under Section 2241

pursuant to the “savings clause,” when the petitioner claims to be: “(1) factually innocent of the 

crime for which he has been convicted; and, (2) has never had an „unobstructed procedural shot‟ 

at presenting this claim.” See Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059-1060 (9th Cir.) (as 

amended), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1051 (2003) (citing Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 954 (9th 

Cir.2000)). In explaining that standard, the Ninth Circuit stated:

In other words, it is not enough that the petitioner is presently 

barred from raising his claim of innocence by motion under § 

2255. He must never have had the opportunity to raise it by 

motion.

Ivy, 328 F.3d at 1060. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or 

ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963). The remedy under § 

2255 usually will not be deemed inadequate or ineffective merely because a prior § 2255 motion 

was denied, or because a remedy under that section is procedurally barred. See Aronson v. May, 

85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (finding that a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 

inadequate); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (holding that a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal 

treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate).

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Here, Petitioner argues that § 2255 is inadequate and ineffective for gaining relief, 

because he did not have an opportunity to raise his claim based on Castillo in his Section 2255 

motion. The Court notes that Castillo was decided on June 5, 2000, and O‟Brien was decided on 

May 24, 2010, but Petitioner did not file the instant petition until 2015. Petitioner‟s first Section

2255 motion was denied by the District Court of Guam on August 9, 2001. Petitioner claims that 

he was unaware of Castillo until the O‟Brien decision, but that does not amount to Petitioner 

never having an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim. Therefore, Petitioner had 

the opportunity to raise any claims pursuant to Castillo in his first Section 2255 motion in the 

District Court of Guam. Thus, he does not satisfy that prong of the savings clause. 

Furthermore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that his claims qualify under the 

“savings clause” of Section 2255 because Petitioner's claims are not proper claims of “actual 

innocence.” The standards announced by the various circuit courts for an “actual innocence” 

claim contain two basic features: actual innocence and retroactivity. E.g., Reyes–Requena v. 

United States, 243 F.3d 893, 903 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2000); In re 

Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998); In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 1997); In re 

Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997). 

In the Ninth Circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the Section 2255 

“savings clause” is tested by the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 

Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). In Bousley, the Supreme Court explained that, 

“[t]o establish actual innocence, petitioner must demonstrate that, in light of all the evidence, it is 

more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 

623 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “actual innocence means factual 

innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Id. 

Here, Petitioner‟s claim of innocence focuses only on his conviction for count five, 

unlawful carrying of a firearm equipped with a firearm silencer during a drug trafficking crime. 

Petitioner argues that he should have been charged with two counts under § 924(c), one for the 

Beretta pistol and a second one for the silencer. Petitioner asserts that it is unclear whether the 

jury convicted him in count 5 for the Beretta pistol or the silencer. These arguments are not 

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proper claims of factual innocence. Count five of the Superseding Indictment did specifically 

refer to the silencer, the jury was instructed on the applicable law, and the jury found the 

allegation that the Beretta was equipped with a firearm silencer to be true. (ECF No. 16-1 at 3, 

8, 12-13). Petitioner‟s claims are purely claims of legal innocence, not factual innocence. 

Furthermore, Petitioner admitted carrying a “pistol and silencer in order to protect himself while 

attempting to resell the methamphetamine.” United States v. Chargualaf, 114 F.3d 1196, 1997 

WL 272225 (9th Cir. 1997). Therefore, Petitioner has not shown that he is factually innocent as 

required by the savings clause. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623. Thus, Petitioner does not satisfy the 

savings clause. 

Motions pursuant to § 2255 must be heard in the sentencing court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); 

Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864-65. Because this Court is only the custodial court and construes the 

petition as a §2255 motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition. Hernandez, 204 F.3d 

at 864-65. Therefore, the petition should be dismissed. In sum, should Petitioner wish to pursue 

his claims in federal court, he must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his 

sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the sentencing court.

B. Order For Respondent to Show Cause 

On August 6, 2015, the Court issued an order for Respondent to show cause why 

sanctions should not be imposed for Respondent‟s failure to obey a court order because he had 

not submitted his reply to Petitioner‟s response to the order to show cause. (ECF No. 15). Later 

that day, Respondent submitted a response to the Court‟s order to show cause. (ECF No. 16). 

Respondent‟s counsel indicated that she had mistakenly overlooked the fact that Respondent was 

ordered to file a reply to Petitioner‟s response. Respondent‟s response to the order to show cause 

also included a motion to dismiss as a reply to Petitioner‟s briefing. Respondent‟s counsel has 

indicated that she will be more careful in the future. Good cause having been shown, the Court 

will discharge the pending order to show cause issued on August 6, 2015. 

III.

ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS that the order to show cause issued on 

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August 6, 2015, is DISCHARGED.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

1. Respondent‟s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16) be GRANTED;

2. The Petition be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; and 

3. The Clerk of Court be DIRECTED to close the case.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

thirty (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, Petitioner may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge‟s Findings and Recommendation.” The assigned District Judge 

will then review the Magistrate Judge‟s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Petitioner 

is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of 

rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. 

Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 19, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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