Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01922/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01922-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Justice
Appellee
Drug Enforcement Agency
Appellee
Federal Narcotics Agents
Appellee
Officer Halfacre
Appellee
James Allen Nunley
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1922

___________

James Allen Nunley, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

* 

Department of Justice, United States * Appeal from the United States

of America; Drug Enforcement; * District Court for the Western

Agency; Officer Halfacre, Individually * District of Arkansas.

and in his official capacities; Federal *

Narcotics Agents, Individually and *

in their official capacities, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 21, 2005

Filed: October 14, 2005

___________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, and ARNOLD and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges. 

___________

ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. 

This case concerns the requirements of the due process clause with respect to

forfeiture notices sent to a prisoner. James Nunley filed a pro se complaint against

the Department of Justice, the "Drug Enforcement Agency," Officer Halfacre (a

member of a DEA task force), and unknown federal narcotics agents, charging that

the federal government violated his due process rights when it administratively

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forfeited some of his property (i.e., declared the property forfeited without a court

order, see 19 U.S.C. §§ 1607-1609; 21 U.S.C. § 881) while he was incarcerated. The

complaint alleges that the government did not convey forfeiture notices to Mr. Nunley

using a method that was reasonably calculated to reach him and, perhaps (the

complaint is not clear), that the few forfeiture notices that he did receive were

defective because they did not inform him that an indigent person need not post a

bond to contest a forfeiture. The district court entered summary judgment in favor

of the government and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We conclude that the

district court erred, in part, and remand.

I. 

A.

Working from a tip provided by an informant, law enforcement officers

executed a search warrant at Mr. Nunley's home. They seized, in addition to weapons

and illegal drugs, a Corvette and three separate lots of cash: one of $131,574, one of

$1,025, and one of $1,815. Later on, the government seized from other individuals

a speed boat and two more lots of cash, one of $10,000 and one of $5,000.

Mr. Nunley arguably had an interest in the items seized from his house as well as the

items seized from the other individuals.

The government issued forfeiture notices for the car, the separate lots of cash,

and the boat. It sent them via certified mail to Mr. Nunley at both the jail where he

was being held and his erstwhile residence. The notices sent to the jail were signed

for by one or another employee of the sheriff's office for the county in which the jail

is situated. Though the government received signed return-receipts for all of the

notices sent to the jail, the jail's mail log reflects the receipt of only the two notices

that Mr. Nunley admits to receiving: one for the $10,000 in cash and another for the

boat. As to the notices sent to Mr. Nunley's previous residence, he had shared that

home with Debbie Nunley, née Chaffin, prior to his arrest; she was his girlfriendcum-roommate at the time of his arrest and became his wife around the time that the

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forfeitures were taking place (the exact time is not relevant). Ms. Nunley still lived

at the residence at the time that the notices were sent there to Mr. Nunley. The

government also sent notices to Ms. Nunley at the same address and, with respect to

the $5,000, to Mr. Nunley in care of the defense attorney who represented him in the

criminal case that arose out of the seizure of the drugs. No objections to the

forfeitures were filed, so the government declared the property forfeited. See

19 U.S.C. § 1609; 21 U.S.C. § 881.

Mr. Nunley filed this action complaining of the sufficiency of the forfeiture

notices. The district court, adopting a magistrate judge's report and recommendation,

granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. It concluded that the notices

sent to Ms. Nunley and to Mr. Nunley at the residence that they had shared satisfied

the government's due process obligations because Ms. Nunley visited Mr. Nunley at

the jail and frequently sent him mail. The court did not base its summary judgment

decision on the notices sent directly to the jail because it concluded that there were

questions of fact about the operation of the jail's mail-distribution practices with

respect to these notices. 

I.

B.

Mr. Nunley argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants's

summary judgment motion. Summary judgment is appropriate if the "pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo and draw

all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Tatum v. Arkansas Dept.

of Health, 411 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 2005).

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The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall

"be deprived of ... property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. An

individual facing forfeiture risks being deprived of his or her property and thus is

entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Dusenbery v. United States,

534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002). The due process clause does not require that the interested

party receive actual notice of the pending action, however. Id. at 169-70. Instead,

due process is satisfied if the method of notice is "reasonably calculated, under all of

the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and

afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v. Central Hanover

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Notice by mail is ordinarily presumed

to be constitutionally sufficient. See, e.g., id. at 319; Tulsa Prof'l Collection Servs.,

Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490 (1988). But there is no rule that mailed notice need

always be considered adequate. See United States v. One Toshiba Color Television,

213 F.3d 147, 153 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); cf. Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S.

141, 146-47 (1956). 

In Dusenbery, the Supreme Court addressed some of the requirements of due

process with respect to forfeiture notices sent to prisoners. The Court held that the

government had satisfied the due process clause when it sent forfeiture notices via

certified mail to a prisoner in a facility that had the following standard mail-delivery

practices: A mailroom staff member would sign for the certified letter at the post

office and it would be entered into a logbook at the prison; a different staff member,

one assigned to the section of the prison in which the inmate lived, would sign the

letter out from the mailroom; and finally a staff member would deliver the letter to the

prisoner during "mail call." Id. at 168-69, 172-73. The Court determined that the

procedures established by the prison were sufficient for due process purposes, but it

never stated that such procedures were constitutionally obligatory. Id. at 172-73.

The government offers two arguments in support of the district court's entry of

summary judgment. First, it adopts the district court's argument that the notices sent

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to Mr. Nunley and to Ms. Nunley at their shared address satisfy the due process

clause. Second, it contends that Dusenbery holds that the due process clause is

satisfied when the government sends forfeiture notices via certified mail to the prison

in which the addressee is housed.

Contrary to the district court and the government, we conclude that the notices

sent to Ms. Nunley and to Mr. Nunley at their shared residence do not satisfy the due

process clause. In Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317, the Court approved the use of "indirect"

forms of notice when the person with an interest in the pending action is missing or

unknown. It concluded, however, that indirect forms of notice do not satisfy the due

process clause when the interested person's name and address are known. Id. at 318.

The notices relied upon by the district court in its summary judgment order were

indirect notices because they depended on an intermediary, Ms. Nunley, to convey

their information to the interested person, Mr. Nunley. Because Mr. Nunley's identity

and whereabouts were known to the government, under Mullane, these notices alone

do not satisfy the due process clause.

The government also provided notice by publication, i.e., by newspaper

advertisements, but such notice is insufficient where, as here, the name and address

of the interested person are known. Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S.

791, 799-800 (1983); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 318. Rather, the government must send

direct notice by mail or some other equally reliable means. Mennonite Bd., 462 U.S.

at 800. Thus, the answer to the question of whether Mr. Nunley received

constitutionally adequate notice turns on the sufficiency of the notices sent to the jail.

We first consider whether there should be a presumption that notice sent by

mail to the institution in which the addressee-prisoner is housed satisfies the due

process clause. If the presumption does not exist, we will then be required to

determine whether the notices mailed to the prison under the particular circumstances

of this case nonetheless satisfy the due process clause. (In the ensuing discussion, we

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use the terms "jail" and "prison" interchangeably, except with regard to Mr. Nunley's

specific circumstances.)

The best reason to abandon in the prison context the presumption that mailed

notice is adequate is that prison mail must navigate a second mail-distribution system.

A postal worker does not personally deliver mail to each prisoner in his or her cell.

Instead, the mail is left at some administrative office (or picked up at the post office

by a prison employee) and then distributed within the prison.

Courts have not settled on a single view of this issue, which we have yet to

address. The Seventh Circuit has decided that it will not "inquire into the details of

[the] internal mail delivery systems of jails and prisons." Chairez v. United States,

355 F.3d 1099, 1101-02 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 37 (2004). Instead,

it has concluded that the delivery of certified mail to a jail discharges the

government's obligations, remarking, "[s]ervice by certified mail has long been

considered an acceptable means to provide notice." Id. at 1101-02. The court added

that investigating mail-distribution procedures would be burdensome and that

determining whether a jail's mail system is reliable enough for constitutional purposes

would be difficult if not impossible given the fuzziness of the standard (i.e., the

method of notice must be reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise

the prisoner of the forfeiture action). Id. at 1101. Lastly, the court noted that, in its

view, Dusenbery does not require such an investigation. Id. Chairez thus essentially

offers a fuller view of the government's second argument.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Third Circuit decided in One Toshiba

Color Television, 213 F.3d at 155, that the government bears the burden of

demonstrating that the prison employs mail-distribution procedures that are

reasonably calculated to ensure that notice will be received. But Judge Alito wrote

a thought-provoking dissent. In it, he takes the majority to task for failing to justify

distinguishing between a notice sent to a person at "an inexpensive long-termAppellate Case: 04-1922 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/14/2005 Entry ID: 1963240
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occupancy hotel," which he presupposes would be presumed to be reasonably

calculated under the circumstances to apprise the addressee of a pending action, and

a notice mailed to a prisoner, which would not be presumed to be adequate. Id. at

159-60 (dissenting in part).

We believe that the right answer lies between Chairez and One Toshiba Color

Television: We hold that there is no irrebuttable presumption that a prison's internal

mail-distribution procedures are reasonably calculated to provide notice, but that the

prisoner, as the plaintiff, has the burden to demonstrate that the procedures are

inadequate.

To us, Chairez underemphasizes the likelihood that a second distribution

system affects the delivery of mail to prisoners, overemphasizes the difficulty of

assessing such systems, and misconstrues Dusenbery. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314,

directs courts to ensure that the method of notice is reasonably calculated, "under all

of the circumstances," to apprise the interested party of the action. In the case of a

prisoner, a relevant circumstance is that the interested party is imprisoned. This

means that he or she does not receive mail in the same way that most people do

because his or her mail must go through a second distribution system, run by the

prison. And prisons are not post offices; their mission is not mail distribution. It is

simply an ancillary responsibility that accompanies their duty as custodian of the

prisoners. Thus, one should not assume that a prison is as expert in mail distribution

as the postal service. We do not think, however, that it would take a heroic effort

(especially for other government officials) to find out how any particular prison's

mail-distribution system works – a few phone calls or e-mails before sending the

notice would probably get the job done. As for determining whether the system meets

the constitutional standard, we admit that it is not an exact science, but we have

confidence that the government could more often than not determine whether the

prison has a system such that "one desirous of actually informing the [interested

party] might reasonably [rely on] to accomplish it." Id. at 315. (We suspect that most

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prison mail-distribution systems will pass muster, and for the ones that do not, the

government can try to change them, send an agent down to the prison to hand the

notice to the interested prisoner, or do something else that is reasonably calculated

to inform the prisoner.) Finally, we find Chairez's invocation of Dusenbery

unpersuasive. Dusenbery does not address the question of whether courts need to

inquire into prisons' mail-distribution procedures, so it is not controlling on this point.

 Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386-87 n.5 (1992). 

With respect to the holding in One Toshiba Color Television, we do not agree

that the government should have the burden of proving that a prison's procedures

satisfy the due process clause. Time-worn rules require the conclusion that a prisoner

who files a suit claiming that he or she has received inadequate notice has the burden

of proving that the prison's procedures fall short of the minimum required by the

Constitution. See United States v. Cupples, 112 F.3d 318, 320 (8th Cir. 1997). We

see no reason to deviate from this norm here. Courts, to be fair (and to avoid

deterring too many meritorious suits), will sometimes shift the burden of proof if a

fact or group of facts is difficult for the plaintiff to ascertain, and relatively easy for

the defendant to procure. Cf. Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 585 (9th Cir. 2002),

cert. denied, 540 U.S. 938 (2003). But we do not think that it is difficult for a

prisoner to adduce facts about the mail-distribution procedures used in a jail: he or

she probably lives there and such facts are not likely to be closely guarded

penological secrets. 

As for Judge Alito's dissent, we think that it demands more evidence for

making judgments about the efficacy of means of notice than the Supreme Court

requires. For example, in Mullane, 339 U.S. at 319, when the Court endorsed the

mail as a method of notice reasonably calculated to provide notice under the

circumstances, it did not depend on record evidence. Instead, it stated, "however it

may have been in former times, the mails today are recognized as an efficient and

inexpensive means of communication." Id. In other words, the Court made a

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commonsense judgment about the reliability of a method of notice. Common sense

tells us that as compared to a resident of a cheap long-term-occupancy hotel, a

prisoner is less likely to receive his or her mail because residents of such hotels have

a greater ability to ensure effective mail distribution (by the hotel) via complaint and

voting with their feet. See One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 154. The point

is this: we have to make commonsense judgments about the efficacy of methods of

notice in different circumstances, and common sense indicates that prisoners are less

likely to receive their mail than free persons, even if the free people live in cheap

hotels. 

Having determined that there is no irrebuttable presumption that notice mailed

to prisons is adequate, we turn our attention to the specific circumstances of this case.

We conclude that the government was not entitled to judgment on all of Mr. Nunley's

claims of inadequate notice. To discharge its responsibility as the movant, the

government needed to demonstrate to the district court that there is an absence of

evidence to support one or more of Mr. Nunley's claims. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In its motion, the government essentially argues

that no evidence establishes that it failed to employ a method of notice reasonably

calculated to reach the jail. But as the above discussion makes clear, this argument

leaves unaddressed a crucial portion of Mr. Nunley's claims, namely, whether the

jail's internal mail-delivery procedures were constitutionally adequate. As the

government did not challenge Mr. Nunley's case in regard to the sufficiency of the

internal procedures, the burden never shifted to Mr. Nunley to produce evidence

regarding their adequacy. See id. at 323; Counts v. MK-Ferguson Co., 862 F.2d 1338,

1339-40 (8th Cir. 1988).

For clarity's sake, we note that the district court's request for supplemental

information about the jail's internal procedures does not require us to reach a

different conclusion. A district court can enter summary judgment sua sponte if " 'the

losing party was on notice that [it] had to come forward' " with its relevant evidence.

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Stone v. General Motors Corp., 400 F.3d 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Celotex,

477 U.S. at 326). Thus, a request for more information on an issue, depending on its

wording, could shift the burden of production to the non-movant who has the burden

of proof on that issue at trial. Here, however, the district court instructed the

government to supplement its motion for summary judgment with information about

"how certified mail, once received at the [jail], is delivered to prisoners" and stated

that Mr. Nunley could respond "if he desires to do so." We hold that this order did

not put Mr. Nunley on notice that he needed to come forward with evidence regarding

the jail's internal mail-distribution procedures because it addresses his role in

permissive terms, affording him the opportunity to address the issue, but not directing

him to do so. Thus, the question of whether the internal procedures were sufficient

is not cognizable on this record. 

The government is nevertheless entitled to summary judgment as to

Mr. Nunley's claims regarding the method of distribution of three of the notices. The

government afforded Mr. Nunley due process as to the $5,000 when it sent the

forfeiture notice to him in care of his attorney. Cf. Cupples, 112 F.3d at 320; United

States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1995). The

government is also entitled to summary judgment with respect to the notices for the

$10,000 and the boat: The attorney who represented Mr. Nunley at oral argument

conceded that Mr. Nunley received these notices, and a person cannot complain about

the constitutionality of the method used to provide notice when he or she has received

actual notice (assuming it is timely), for he or she has suffered no harm. See One

Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d at 155. 

 

II. 

Mr. Nunley also argues that the district court erred by granting summary

judgment on his supposed claims that the notices that he received did not afford him

due process because not one of them states that an indigent need not post a bond to

contest a forfeiture. The district court did not expressly rule on these purported

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claims, which Mr. Nunley specifically pressed in his response to the summary

judgment motion, though it did state that "the plaintiff's claims [are] dismissed." We

conclude that the district court should explicitly address the proper disposition of the

supposed content-of-the-notice claims on remand. See Glasgow v. United States

Drug Enforcement Admin., 12 F.3d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1993). What the appropriate

disposition of these claims is will depend on whether they can be said to have been

fairly raised in the original complaint (a question complicated by the fact that this is

a pro se complaint subject to a liberal standard of interpretation, Stone v. Harry,

364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004)). The answer to this question is not self-evident,

and "[i]n these circumstances, we will not affirm the summary dismissal of [potential]

claims the district court has not expressly addressed." Glasgow, 12 F.3d at 799. We

note that if the complaint fairly raised these claims, then summary judgment on the

present record probably would not be appropriate because it does not appear that the

government moved for summary judgment on these claims with the specificity

required by our previous cases. See, e.g., Counts, 862 F.2d at 1339-40.

III.

For the reasons given above, we conclude that the district court improperly

granted summary judgment as to Mr. Nunley's claims about the method of notice used

for the Corvette and the cash allotments of $131,574, $1,025, and $1,815, and as to

the potential claims regarding the contents of the notices. We affirm the district

court's entry of summary judgment as to the claims regarding the method of notice for

the $5,000, the $10,000, and the boat. We remand the case for proceedings consistent

with this opinion. 

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

I conclude that the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Administration to provide

notice of forfeiture proceedings to James Nunley were “reasonably calculated, under

all the circumstances,” to apprise Nunley of the pendency of the action and to afford

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him an opportunity to object to the forfeiture. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank

& Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The actions taken by the DEA were not

“mere gesture[s],” but means that “one desirous of actually informing the absentee

might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” Id. at 315. Therefore, I would affirm the

judgment of the district court.

Certified mail to Nunley at his place of incarceration was the principal means

employed by the DEA to provide Nunley with notice of the forfeiture proceedings,

and I believe it was sufficient. The DEA sent Nunley a notice of each disputed

forfeiture proceeding by certified mail to the Washington County Detention Center

where he was housed. The record shows that each mailing was received by an

employee of the sheriff’s office, with proof of signature presented. The motion for

summary judgment, as supplemented, established that the jail operated under a

written policy providing that incoming mail shall in no case be held longer than

24 hours, excluding weekends or holidays. The policy further dictated that

“[d]istribution of incoming mail shall be done by a detention officer, directly to the

receiving detainee’s hand,” and that mail shall not be “dropped on a table or other

convenient place for each detainee to come and look for his own.” (Def.’s Supp. to

Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. F, at 3).

As of 2000, a “clear plurality” of the federal courts of appeals held that

certified mail to a prisoner “is presumptively sufficient” to satisfy due process.

Whiting v. United States, 231 F.3d 70, 76-77 (1st Cir. 2000). In these circuits, absent

evidence that the government knew that mail delivery in a particular prison was

unreliable, or other special circumstances tending to rebut the presumption, the use

of certified mail to the institution was thought “reasonably calculated” to afford

notice. Id. at 76; see also United States v. 5145 North Golden State Blvd., 135 F.3d

1312, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Tree Top, et al., No. 96-3757, 1997

WL 702771, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1997) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States

v. Clark, 84 F.3d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1996).

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The Supreme Court, noting that “Courts of Appeals have reached differing

conclusions about what the Due Process Clause requires of the United States when

it seeks to provide notice to a federal inmate of its intention to forfeit property,” then

granted certiorari to consider the question. Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161,

166 (2002). In Dusenbery, the Court held that “actual notice” to an inmate is not

required, and that the government satisfies the Due Process Clause if its efforts are

“reasonably calculated” to afford notice and an opportunity to object. In that case,

the record showed that the FBI sent certified mail to an inmate at the facility where

he was incarcerated. Under standard procedures, prison staff traveled to a post office

daily to retrieve the mail, signed for all certified mail at the post office, transported

the mail back to the prison, and entered the mail in a logbook. Another staff member

then signed for the certified mail when it was removed from the mail room, and staff

distributed the mail to the inmate during the institution’s “mail call.” The Court

concluded that these procedures afforded due process, even assuming the inmate’s

contention that additional procedures could have improved delivery to some degree.

Id. at 172.

The only apparent difference between the internal mail procedures described

in Dusenbery and the procedures established in this case involves the logging of mail

in and out of a mail room at the correctional facility. The federal prison in Dusenbery

maintained such a log; the record in this case does not show whether the local jail

kept such a record of certified mail. Dusenbery, however, did not purport to establish

minimum procedures necessary to afford due process, and this variance does not

strike me as constitutionally significant. More persuasive is the view of the plurality

of pre-Dusenbery courts, and the only post-Dusenbery decision on point, Chairez v.

United States, 355 F.3d 1099, 1102 (7th Cir. 2004), that delivery of certified mail to

the institution is presumptively sufficient to satisfy due process. And where, as here,

the jail has a written policy requiring staff to transport mail “directly to the receiving

detainee’s hand” within 24 hours of delivery, we have more than delivery by certified

mail and a presumption of sufficiency. We have an internal policy that mandates

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prompt personal delivery of mail to detainees, and no evidence from Nunley to raise

a genuine question about the jail’s regular adherence to that policy. Under these

circumstances, I believe the use of certified mail was reasonably adopted by a federal

agency that was desirous of actually informing Nunley of the forfeiture proceedings.

To be sure, prisons are not post offices, and inmates are not like guests at a

cheap hotel who might, at least theoretically, vote with their feet and move to another

cheap hotel if mail service is faulty. But there is a presumption of regularity in the

conduct of public officials, and “market forces” of a different sort are not entirely

absent. If a jail regularly fails to comply with a policy on delivery of mail to inmates,

then there will be negative consequences for the jailer. It will become known to

government officials that mail service at the jail is unreliable. Such knowledge will

preclude the use of certified mail to notice forfeiture proceedings, Chairez, 355 F.3d

at 1102; Whiting, 231 F.3d at 77, thus increasing costs for other government agencies

or interfering in particular cases with the ability of the federal government to forfeit

property. This is not likely to sit well with federal agencies who provide valuable

resources and assistance to local law enforcement officials, not to mention with voters

who typically elect the sheriffs who oversee jails. It may even result in the loss of

shared forfeiture proceeds by the local government. And as the First Circuit

explained, it is not only the incentives of jailers that should be considered: “It is well

to be realistic about the situation: given the incentives, inmate denials that mailed

notice was actually received are doubtless much more common than misdelivery, and

knowledge is probably widespread among defendants in drug cases that the

government does look to harvest assets from drug dealers incident to criminal cases.”

Whiting, 231 F.3d at 77.

The Washington County Detention Center undoubtedly could adopt written

procedures to specify precisely which staff member is to retrieve inmate mail from

the point of delivery and distribute it “directly to the receiving detainee’s hand.” The

jail could institute a logbook to track who picks up and delivers the mail once it is

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received by the sheriff’s office. And if the jail did not enhance its procedures, then

the DEA could divert agents from investigative work to make hand deliveries of

forfeiture notices to inmates. But the overriding message of Dusenbery, as I read it,

is that the Due Process Clause does not require exacting scrutiny of internal jail

procedures for mail delivery, and the potential for new procedures that would

improve reliability does not necessarily demonstrate the infirmity of old ones. The

standard is one of reasonableness. 534 U.S. at 170. On the undisputed record in this

case, I conclude that the DEA’s use of certified mail addressed to Nunley, who was

incarcerated at a facility that maintained an internal policy of delivering mail directly

to a receiving detainee’s hand within 24 hours, was reasonably calculated to provide

Nunley with notice. Therefore, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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