Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00089/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00089-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
D. Adams
Respondent
Alfred Espinoza
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 This information is derived from the petition for writ of habeas corpus and Respondent’s motion to 1

dismiss the petition. (Court Docs. 1, 8.) 

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALFRED ESPINOZA,

Petitioner,

v.

D. ADAMS,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 06-0089 DLB HC

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT’S

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DIRECTING

CLERK OF COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT

[Doc. 8]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), the parties have consented to

the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. (Court Docs. 3, 6, 9.)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Petitioner pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine while an inmate and admitted to

the prior conviction enhancement. Petitioner received a determinate state prison term of six

years. (Lodged Docs. 1-2.) 

On August 2, 2002, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District affirmed the

judgment. (Lodged Doc. 2.) 

Petitioner did not seek review in the California Supreme Court.

On September 10, 2004, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

Case 1:06-cv-00089-DLB Document 10 Filed 07/18/06 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 3.) The petition was denied on August 31, 2005. 

(Lodged Doc. 4.) 

Petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 27, 2006. 

Pending before the Court is Respondent’s motion to dismiss, filed May 1, 2006. Petitioner did

not file an opposition. 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one year

limitations period prescribed by Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Rule 4 of the Rules Governing

Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the face

of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the

district court . . . ." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer

if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of

the state’s procedural rules. See e.g. O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) th

(using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White

v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a

response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F.

Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C.

2244(d)(1)'s one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in

procedural standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state

procedural default and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review

Respondent’s motion to dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

Case 1:06-cv-00089-DLB Document 10 Filed 07/18/06 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on November 30, 2005, and thus, it is subject to

the provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially

recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the

Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment

or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, Petitioner pled guilty on July 25, 2001. The California Court of

Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on August 2, 2002. Petitioner did not file a petition for

review. According to the Rules of Court, a decision becomes final thirty (30) days after filing,

and an appeal must be taken to the California Supreme Court within ten (10) days of finality. 

Cal.R.Ct. 24(a), 28(b); Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir. 2002). Petitioner would have th

one year from September 11, 2002, absent equitable tolling, in which to file his federal petition

for writ of habeas corpus. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245 (9 Cir. 2001) (holding th

Case 1:06-cv-00089-DLB Document 10 Filed 07/18/06 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 The petition in this action was initially filed with the Northern District of California on November 30, 2

2005, and was subsequently transferred and filed in this District on January 27, 2006. 

 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 3

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

4

that Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the calculation of statutory tolling

applicable to the one year limitations period.) Therefore, the statute was set to expire on

September 11, 2003. Petitioner did not file the instant petition until November 30, 2005. 

2

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 3

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

On September 10, 2004, Petitioner filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the

California Supreme Court. (Lodged Doc. 3.) However, this first and only collateral challenge

was filed over a year after the limitations period expired. Because the limitations period had

already expired, the collateral challenge had no tolling consequence. Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9th Cir.2000) (Petitioner is not entitled to tolling where the limitations period has

Case 1:06-cv-00089-DLB Document 10 Filed 07/18/06 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

already run); see also Webster v. Moore, 199 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir.2000); Rendall v. Carey, 2002

WL 1346354 (N.D.Cal.2002). Consequently, the statute of limitations expired on September 11,

2003, and the instant petition is untimely. 

D. Equitable Tolling

 The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control” have made it impossible for the petition to be filed on time. 

Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. th

United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. 814, 118 S.Ct. 60, 139 th

(1997); Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283,1288 (9 Cir.), overruled th

in part on other grounds by, Calderon v. United States Dist. Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9 Cir. th

1998) (en banc) (noting that "[e]quitable tolling will not be available in most cases, as extensions

of time will only be granted if 'extraordinary circumstances' beyond a prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time"). "When external forces, rather than a petitioner's lack of

diligence, account for the failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9 Cir.1999), citing th

Kelly, 163 F.3d at 541; Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288-1289.

Petitioner did not file an opposition and has not presented any grounds for equitable

tolling. Thus, the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus is barred by the statute of limitations

and must be dismissed, with prejudice.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition is GRANTED; and

2. The instant petition is dismissed, with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 17, 2006 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

3b142a UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:06-cv-00089-DLB Document 10 Filed 07/18/06 Page 5 of 5