Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30320/USCOURTS-ca5-09-30320-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marlow Dewayne Ashley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

REVISED MARCH 26, 2010

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30320

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

MARLOW DEWAYNE ASHLEY

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of

Louisiana, Shreveport Division

08-CR-00302-01

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

In this appeal, we consider several issues raised by Marlow Ashley who

was convicted of drug trafficking offenses. For the following reasons, we

AFFIRM Ashley’s conviction.

I.

On September 30, 2008, the defendant Marlow Ashley and a female

companion Markiya Atkins approached Roberta Figueroa, a ticket agent at the

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

March 25, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-30320

2

Kerrville bus station in Humble, Texas to purchase a bus ticket. Atkins

presented Figueroa with a driver’s license and paid cash for a one-way bus ticket

to Shreveport, Louisiana. Atkins then requested a baggage check claim form for

one bag. On the claim form, Figueroa handwrote the place of origin and the

destination of the bag. Figueroa noticed that when the bus arrived, Ashley, and

not the ticket-holder Atkins, boarded the bus. At trial, Figueroa testified that

the ticket and baggage check issued to Atkins were the only ones issued to

passengers in Humble destined for Shreveport that day and that, aside from

Ashley, no one else boarded the bus from Humble to Shreveport. After the bus

departed, Figueroa exited the bus station to take a break and noticed Atkins

sitting in her car.

In Shreveport, police officers received confidential information from the

Houston Police Department that two people involved in drug trafficking were on

their way from Humble to the Shreveport bus station. The confidential

information described the appearance and clothing of the male on the bus and

the model, color, and license plate of the car driven by the female. Several

Shreveport plain-clothes officers arrived at the Shreveport terminal one half

hour before the bus was scheduled to arrive. Soon after their arrival, officers

noticed a car matching the description given by the confidential informant,

parking on a street next to the bus station. When the bus arrived, five or six

passengers disembarked but only one of the passengers, Ashley, matched the

description given to law enforcement. Officers testified that upon alighting from

the bus, Ashley appeared nervous, frantically making calls and text messaging

on his cell phone. Without approaching the checked luggage removed from the

bus, Ashley exited the bus station and began walking down the street.

Only a cardboard box and a black roller bag were removed from the bus’s

cargo hold. The officers brought in a drug dog which made a positive alert to the

black roller bag. On the outside of the bag, a baggage claim check read “To

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 At trial, Figueroa testified that the information on the baggage claim check was 1

written in her handwriting. 

3

Shreveport, Louisiana from Humble, Texas via Humble, Texas.” When it 1

became evident that no one would claim the luggage, officers opened the black

bag and discovered 225 grams of crack cocaine and 28.3 grams of powder cocaine

wrapped in dryer sheets and electrical tape.

Officers located Ashley walking down the street next to the bus station;

they detained him, read him his rights, and searched him. Ashley had no

identification or luggage claim ticket, and when asked, denied knowing Atkins.

Officers then asked if they could look at Ashley’s cell phone and he agreed. On

the cell phone, officers found numerous text messages between Atkins and

Ashley exchanged during the time Atkins had been on the bus. These text

messages indicated that Ashley was expecting Atkins to pick him up in

Shreveport. A call history on Ashley’s cell phone also revealed that Ashley had

placed several calls to Atkins’ phone upon his arrival at the bus station. 

Though there seems to be conflicting testimony about when officers began

observing Atkins at the bus station, it appears undisputed that officers observed

Atkins enter the bus station and plug her cell phone into an electrical outlet to

recharge it. When officers approached Atkins, she refused to identify herself and

denied having driven to the bus station. She also denied knowing Ashley but

allowed officers to view her cell phone on which they retrieved the same text

messages that Ashley had sent from the cell phone in his possession. 

After a trial, Ashley was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to distribute

and possess with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine He was also

convicted of two substantive offenses of possession with intent to distribute crack

and powder cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. 

Ashley timely appealed. On appeal, he raises three issues which we now

address in turn.

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II.

A.

Ashley first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction. When a defendant preserves his challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence, this court reviews the evidence as a whole in the light most favorable

to the verdict and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v.

Ekanem 555 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 2009). 

The Government maintains that because Ashley neither moved for a

judgment of acquittal at the close of his case nor filed a written motion for

judgment of acquittal within the seven-day period after judgment allowed by

FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(c), this court must address Ashley’s sufficiency of the

evidence claim under plain error review. Ashley argues that despite his failure

to move for judgment of acquittal at the close of his case, he nonetheless

preserved his sufficiency of the evidence argument on appeal. Ashley asserts

that he did move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the Government’s

case-in-chief, and since his case-in-chief consisted of only one witness, his motion

for acquittal at the close of all the evidence would have been an empty ritual.

As such, he contends, he preserved his sufficiency of evidence argument for

appeal. See e.g. United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 597 n.2 (5th Cir 1994).

However, we need not resolve whether Ashley preserved this issue for

appeal, since even if we assume that his argument was properly preserved and

we apply the usual standard of review, we find the evidence sufficient to support

Ashley’s conviction.

B.

To prove a conspiracy pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, the

Government must present evidence that: (1) an agreement existed between two

or more persons to violate the narcotics law; (2) the defendant had knowledge of

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the agreement; and (3) the defendant voluntarily participated in the conspiracy.

United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1994). An agreement may be

inferred from a “concert of action.” Id. Knowledge of a conspiracy and voluntary

participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from a collection of circumstances.

Id. (citing United States v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1157 (5th Cir. 1993)). To

prove that a defendant possessed the drugs with intent to distribute, the

Government must present evidence that: (1) the defendant possessed the drugs

either constructively or actually; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the drugs;

and (3) the defendant intended to distribute the drugs. Casilla, 20 F. 3d 603.

Constructive possession may be proved by any showing that the defendant

exercised ownership, dominion, or control of the drugs or of the premises in

which they are found. Id. Possession may be actual or constructive and may be

proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence. United States v. RosasFuentas, 970 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1992). 

 With respect to the conspiracy count, the behavior exhibited by Ashley

and Atkins indicates the presence of an agreement and action in concert to

accomplish the agreement. Atkins bought the bus ticket using her identification

and sought the baggage claim ticket for one bag. Ashley then rode the bus using

Atkins’ ticket while Atkins followed the bus in her car. Throughout the journey,

Ashley kept in constant contact with Atkins. Text messages exchanged between

the two after the bus arrived in Shreveport showed that Ashley expected Atkins

to pick him up at the station. Additionally, the discovery that the only bag

placed on the bus in Humble contained drugs was particularly damaging.

Finally, the denials by both Ashley and Atkins reflect their guilty knowledge

that they acted together to violate narcotics law. 

With respect to the possession count, Ashley argues that his conviction

was based on an attenuated set of inferences drawn from a series of unconnected

circumstances. But circumstances may, by their number and joint operation,

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be sufficient to constitute sufficient proof to show knowledge of the presence of

drugs. United States v. Davis, 993 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1993). Despite Ashley’s

attempt to remove all personal association with the bag in which the drugs were

found, testimony at trial supports a finding that Ashley knowingly possessed the

drugs with the intent to distribute them. Only one bus ticket was sold for

Shreveport from Humble the day of Ashley’s arrest and only one baggage claim

ticket–on which Figueroa handwrote the bag’s city of origin and destination–was

issued. Figueroa personally observed Ashley enter the bus and testified that

Ashley was the only passenger from Humble to board the Shreveport bound bus

on that day. Finally, the bag in which the drugs were found had a claim check

written in Figueroa’s handwriting. As noted above, Ashley’s behavior indicated

guilty knowledge of the contents of the bag; additionally, Ashley’s prior

conviction for transporting drugs under circumstances very similar to those in

this case, and the quantity of the drugs found in the bag were probative of intent

and modus operandi. See United States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484,

1491 (5th Cir. 1989) (intent to distribute may be inferred from the value and

quantity of the substance possessed). 

Therefore, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, a

rational trier of fact could have easily found the elements of both conspiracy and

possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.

Ashley argues next that the district court erred in denying him the ability

to try on the clothes, in the presence of the jury, from the bag in which the drugs

were found and, second, that in doing so the district court’s error deprived

Ashley of his Sixth Amendment right to put on evidence in his own defense. 

After presenting its only witness, counsel for Ashley sought permission to

have Ashley try on the clothes before the jury in order to show that the clothes

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 During closing argument, defense counsel stated, “Officer Townley testified that there

2

were clothes inside the bag with the narcotics. He testified the clothes appeared to be baggie

and larger, even though he wouldn’t specify. They didn’t bother to get Mr. Ashley’s exact

measurements to see if the clothes fit him or did not fit him, but it was obvious the clothes

weren’t exactly his size.” 

7

in the bag were not his. The district judge denied defense counsel’s request,

holding that whether the clothing fit Ashley was irrelevant. 

A district court’s ruling either admitting or excluding evidence is reviewed

on appeal for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 522 (5th

Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court in United States v. Abel, recognized

A district court is accorded a wide discretion in determining the

admissibility of evidence under the Federal Rules. Assessing the

probative value of [the proffered evidence] and weighing any factors

counseling against admissibility is a matter first for the district

court’s sound judgment under Rules 401 and 403 . . . . 

469 U.S. 45, 54 (1984).

The district court reasoned that proof that the clothes in the bag did not

fit Ashley had so little probative value it was not relevant. We agree that the

evidence had little, if any, probative value. We need not decide, however,

whether the judge erred in refusing Ashley’s request because, even if this were

error, it was harmless error. The district court allowed Ashley to argue that the

clothes in the bag did not fit him. The record shows that counsel for Ashley

questioned the arresting officer about the size of the clothes in the bag and

whether the officer thought the clothes might fit Ashley. Also, at closing

argument, defense counsel argued that the clothes did not fit Ashley and

attacked the arresting officer’s failure to investigate whether the clothes fit

Ashley before making the arrest. Finally, the bag and all of its contents were 2

admitted into evidence and the record indicates that the bag was sent to the jury

deliberation room along with the other exhibits. Thus the jury, who saw the

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defendant during trial, had access to the clothes in the jury room during

deliberations, and was free to examine the clothes and decide for themselves

whether the clothes were probative of Ashley’s innocence or guilt. Therefore,

even if the district court’s refusal to allow Ashley to try on the clothes was in

error, it was harmless.

Ashley also argues that the district court’s actions denied him the

opportunity to present a defense as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.

Whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights were violated is reviewed de

novo. United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 156 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).

In this case, even if the district court did err in refusing Ashley’s request, the

error, if any, was harmless as explained above and therefore no Sixth

Amendment violation occurred. See United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439,

448–49 (5th Cir. 2008).

IV.

Finally, Ashley argues that the district court erred in admitting evidence

of his prior arrest. At trial, the Government introduced evidence that Ashley

had been previously convicted for transporting cocaine. Similar to the facts in

this case, when Ashley was arrested on the earlier offense, he was traveling on

a bus from Texas to Louisiana with a ticket in another person’s name. 

We review the district court’s decision to admit evidence of prior acts

under 404(b) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Nguyen, 504 F.3d 561,

573 (5th Cir. 2007). FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove

the character of a person in order to show action in conformity

therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such

as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that

upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall

provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the

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court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general

nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.

To determine whether evidence is admissible under 404(b), this court applies the

two pronged test set out in United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.

1978) (en banc). The test requires that the court first determine if the extrinsic

evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character, and

second, pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 403, that the court must weigh the probative

value of the evidence against any unfair prejudice it may cause. Id.

With respect to the first prong under Beechum, the district court stated

that it had admitted the evidence for “the limited purpose of showing Ashley’s

motive, intent, and knowledge.” As to the second prong, the court remarked, “I

recognize that this evidence is prejudicial to Ashley. However, all evidence is

prejudicial to one side or the other. In this case, the prejudice to Ashley does not

substantially outweigh the probative value of the extrinsic evidence.” The

district court further noted that it based its decision to admit evidence of

Ashley’s prior offense on our decision in United States v. Hernandez-Guevara,

162 F.3d 863 (5th Cir. 1998). 

We are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the evidence as probative of Ashley’s motive, intent, and knowledge.

In this case, the Government was required to prove that Ashley intentionally

participated in transporting the drugs. Ashley, however, sought to persuade the

jury that he was an innocent bystander with no connection to the bag of drugs.

Therefore, evidence of the prior offense in which Ashley used an identical modus

operandi is relevant to show Ashley’s motive, intent, and knowledge.

The second prong of Beechum requires the court to weigh the probative

value of the evidence against the unfair prejudice produced by the evidence’s

admission. In Beechum, this court recognized that the similarity between the

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elements of the extrinsic and charged offense may enhance the probative value

of the extrinsic offense; however, the court noted, a close resemblance between

the extrinsic and the charged offense can also increase the unfair prejudice to a

defendant. Beechum, 582 F.2d at 913, 915 n.20. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative

value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Also, the court’s limiting

instruction was helpful in preventing the jury from drawing an improper

inference from the extrinsic evidence. See Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 872

(“[The defendant’s] prior misconduct lacked the hallmarks of highly prejudicial

evidence. They were not violent acts, nor were they greater in magnitude than

the crimes for which [the defendant] was on trial nor did they occupy more of the

jury’s time than the evidence of the charged offenses.”); United States v.

Williams, 900 F.2d 823, 827 (5th Cir. 2001) (“As long as it is clear to the jury

that the extrinsic evidence . . . is presented only to show modus operandi, to

prove knowledge, and intent, there is little danger that presentation of the

extrinsic evidence will cause unfair prejudice.”) (citations omitted). 

In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence

of Ashley’s prior conviction. 

V.

For these reasons, we affirm Ashley’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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