Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01321/USCOURTS-caed-1_08-cv-01321-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pam Ahlin
Defendant
California Department of Mental Health
Defendant
Barbra Devine
Defendant
Linda Fields
Defendant
Richard S. Kindred
Plaintiff
Stephen Mayberg
Defendant
Cynthia Radavsky
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RICHARD S. KINDRED, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

DEPT. OF MENTAL HEALTH, et al., )

)

)

Defendants. )

 )

 /

CASE NO. 1:08-cv-01321-GSA PC

ORDER REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO EITHER

FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT OR NOTIFY

COURT OF WILLINGNESS TO PROCEED

ONLY ON CLAIMS FOUND TO BE

COGNIZABLE

(Doc. 1)

RESPONSE DUE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

Screening Order

I. Screening Requirement

Plaintiff is civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff has consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). This action proceeds on the complaint brought by Plaintiff against the

following defendants: California Department of Mental Health; Stephen Mayberg; Cynthia

Radavsky; Linda Clark; Barbra Devine; Pam Ahlin; Linda Fields. Plaintiff claims that defendants

have infringed on his right to the free exercise of his religious beliefs. 

The Court is required to screen complaints brought that seek relief against a governmental

entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must

dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the plaintiff has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or

malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief

from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding

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any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any

time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited

exceptions,” none of which applies to section 1983 actions. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S.

506, 512 (2002); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). 

“Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. However, “the liberal pleading

standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Neitze v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330

n.9 (1989). “[A] liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

of the claim that were not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

II. Plaintiff’s Claims

A. Summary of Complaint

Plaintiff is currently housed at Coalinga State Hospital, where the events complained of

occurred. Plaintiff alleges that he did not have access to a protestant chaplain, that a spiritual book

was destroyed and that he was denied a prayer rug. Plaintiff specifically alleges that in September

of 2008, the protestant chaplain informed Plaintiff (and other inmates) that he would be leaving to

work at another facility. Plaintiff alleges that “since this time, with the exception of two times, there

has been no chaplain to provide for the spiritual needs of the protestant community or to hold

services.” (Compl. ¶ IV.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Clark, the Assistant Chief of Central

Program Services is responsible for hiring another chaplain. She failed to do so, and is therefore

responsible for the absence of a chaplain.

Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied permission to possess a prayer rug, though it is not

considered contraband and other patients at the hospital possess them. Plaintiff alleges that “this

action was denied by Defendant Barbra DeVine, who was the Program Director for Program One,

but has since moved to another program. It was fully supported by Pam Ahlin, Executive Director.

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(Attach. 1 to Compl.)

Regarding Plaintiff’s allegation that his spiritual book was damaged, Plaintiff alleges that

“this was done by defendant Linda Fields, level of care staff and fully supported by her supervisors,

who as of date have not taken any action to replace or compensate plaintiff for the cost of the book.”

 (Attach. 1 to Compl.)

B. First Amendment

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution providesthat “Congress shall

make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” 

U.S. Const., amend. I. “Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment . . .

including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion”. O’Lone v. Estate of

Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974); Cruz v. Beto,

405 U.S. 319 (1972)). However, “‘[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or

limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our

penal system.’” Id. (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)). “In order to establish a

free exercise violation, [a prisoner] must show the defendants burdened the practice of his religion,

by preventing him from engaging in conduct mandated by his faith, without any justification

reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Freeman v. Arpaio,125 F.3d 732, 736 (9th

Cir. 1997). 

As to the chaplain, The Ninth Circuit, in Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 520 (9 Cir. th

1991), citing Allen v. Toombs, 827 F.2d 563, 569 (9 Cir. 1987), held that prisons need only provide th

inmates with a “reasonable opportunity” to worship in accord with their conscience. Allen, 827 F.2d

at 569. In that case, Mr. Johnson did not show that the prison’s failure to provide a chaplain denied

him a “reasonable opportunity” to exercise his faith. Therefore, the prison’s failure to make a

chaplain available did not violate the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. See also Cruz v. Beto, 405

U.S. 319, 322 n.2 (1972). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he does not have access to a chaplain, but

has not alleged any facts indicating that such lack of access has deprived him of a reasonable

opportunity to exercise his faith. Specifically, there are no allegations that, without a chaplain,

Plaintiff can not participate in any other expressions of his faith.

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Here, Plaintiff alleges facts indicating that Defendants DeVine, Ahlin and Fields deprived

Plaintiff of his religious property despite the fact that the property was not considered contraband. 

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of his spiritual book and a prayer rug. A liberal

construction of the complaint indicates that Plaintiff has stated a claim for relief against Defendants

DeVine, Ahlin and Fields for a First Amendment violation.

C. RLUIPA

The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”) provides:

No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a

person residing in or confined to an institution. . . , even if the burden results from

a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition

of the burden on that person–

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. In order to state a claim for violation of RLUIPA, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that the defendants substantially burdened the exercise of his/her religious beliefs. 

Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir. 2005). Liberally construed, Plaintiff has 1

alleged facts indicating that Defendants DeVine, Ahlin and Fields, knowing that Plaintiff was

authorized to possess a prayer rug and spiritual book, deprived Plaintiff of these items. Whether

possession of the items is central to Plaintiff’s religious practice is not before the Court at this stage

of the litigation. “RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s right to

exercise his religious beliefs.” Id. Under RLUIPA, “religious exercise” is defined to include “any

exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A); Greene v. Solano County Jail, 513 F.3d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 2008). “In fact,

RLUIPA ‘bars inquiry into whether a particular belief or practice is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s

religion.’” Id. (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005)).

D. Supervisory Liability

1Plaintiff’s omission of a citation to the RLUIPA in his complaint does not foreclose him

from pursuing claims under the RLUIPA where his factual allegations are sufficient to have

presented a claim under the RLUIPA so as to have amounted to “fair notice” of that claim, even

though the statute was not cited in the complaint itself. Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1159 (9th

Cir. 2008).

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As to Defendants Mayberg, Radavsky, Ahlin and Clark, liability may be imposed on

supervisory defendants under § 1983 only if (1) the supervisor personally participated in the

deprivation of constitutional rights or (2) the supervisor knew of the violations and failed to act to

prevent them. Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Taylor v. Lst, 880 F.2d 1040,

1045 (9th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff does not allege that facts indicating that the supervisory defendants

participated in, or knew of and failed to prevent, the alleged wrongs. Defendants Mayberg, Clark

and Radavsky should therefore be dismissed from this action. Defendant Ahlin should be dismissed

for Plaintiff’s failure to state any claims against her in her supervisory capacity.

III. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s complaint states claims under the First Amendment and RLUIPA against

Defendants Devine, Ahlin and Fields. However, the complaint does not state any cognizable claims

against Defendants Mayberg, Radavsky and Clark or Defendant Ahlin in her supervisory capacity. 

The Court will provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint curing the

deficiencies identified by the Court in this order. Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th Cir.

1987). Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated claims in his

amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot”

complaints).

If Plaintiff does not wish to file an amended complaint and is agreeable to proceeding only

on the claims identified in this order as cognizable, Plaintiff may so notify the Court in writing, and

the Court will issue an order for dismissal of the other defendants, and will forward Plaintiff three

summonses and three USM-285 forms for completion and return. Upon receipt of the forms, the

Court will direct the United States Marshal to initiate service of process.

If Plaintiff opts to amend, his amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but

must state what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or

other federal rights, Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 987-88. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual

allegations must be [sufficient] to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (citations omitted). 

Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint,

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Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997); King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567

(9th Cir. 1987), and must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded

pleading,” Local Rule 15-220. Plaintiff is warned that “[a]ll causes of action alleged in an original

complaint which are not alleged in an amended complaint arewaived.” King, 814 F.2d at 567 (citing

to London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Forsyth, 114 F.3d at

1474.

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff must either:

a. File an amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in

this order, or

b. Notify the Court in writing that he does not wish to file an amended

complaint and wishes to proceed only against Defendants Devine, Ahlin and

Clark for violations of the First Amendment and RLUIPA.

3. If Plaintiff fails to comply with this order, this action will be dismissed for failure to

obey a court order.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 17, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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