Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03037/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03037-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Sabri Yakou
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Filed May 9, 2005

No. 04-3037

United States of America,

Appellant

v.

Sabri Yakou,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00449-01)

BEFORE: Henderson* and Rogers, Circuit Judges, and 

 Williams, Senior Circuit Judge

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the appellant’s motion to clarify the

opinion, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion be granted in part and denied

in part. It is

FURTHER ORDERED that the opinion in United States

v. Yakou, 393 F.3d 231 (D.C. Cir. 2005), be amended as follows:

USCA Case #04-3037 Document #868866 Filed: 01/04/2005 Page 1 of 26
Page 234, second paragraph, lines 22-23, delete “Because”

and capitalize the letter “i” in the word “it”

Page 234, second paragraph, line 24, delete “and”

Page 234, second paragraph, line 27, after the comma insert

“and that the United States does not argue that he is otherwise

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for the purposes

of ITAR. Therefore,” 

Page 243, first full paragraph, line 28, after “States” insert

“or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 

Page 243, first full paragraph, lines 34-35, delete

“Brokering Amendment and the ITAR. See id.” and insert in

lieu thereof “ITAR unless “otherwise subject to the jurisdiction

of the United States.” Id. As noted, the United States does not

argue that Yakou is “otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.” ”

Page 243, second paragraph, line 10, after “States” insert

“or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” 

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Deputy Clerk

*Circuit Judge Henderson continues to concur in the judgment.

USCA Case #04-3037 Document #868866 Filed: 01/04/2005 Page 2 of 26
 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C.Reports. Users are requested to notify the

Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the

bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 4, 2004 Decided January 4, 2005

 Revised May 9, 2005

 

No. 04-3037

United States of America,

Appellant

v.

Sabri Yakou,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 03cr00449-01)

Lisa H. Schertler, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellant. With her on the briefs were Kenneth L. Wainstein,

U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Wendy L. Wysong, and Laura

A. Ingersoll, Assistant U.S. Attorneys. Roy W. McLeese III,

Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #04-3037 Document #868866 Filed: 01/04/2005 Page 3 of 26
2

Matthew M. Hoffman argued the cause for appellee. With

him on the brief was John Moustakas. 

Before: HENDERSON and ROGERS, Circuit Judges, and

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Opinion concurring in the judgment filed by Circuit Judge

HENDERSON.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The United States appeals the

dismissal of the indictment alleging that Sabri Yakou engaged in

brokering activities in violation of the Arms Export Control Act

(“AECA”), 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2), (c) (2000), and its

implementing regulations, the International Traffic in Arms

Regulations (“ITAR”), 22 C.F.R. §§ 129.2(a)-(b), -.3, -.5 to -.7

(2004). The United States contends that the district court made

three errors of law by: dismissing the indictment before trial,

when the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide a

mechanism for summary judgment; ruling that lawful permanent

resident (“LPR”) status can change without formal

administrative action by immigration officials, such that Yakou

was not a “U.S. person,” as defined by the ITAR, who is subject

to prosecution for brokering activities; and ruling that Yakou

could not be indicted separately under 18 U.S.C. § 2 as an aider

and abettor of his son’s alleged brokering violations. This court

has jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731, and we affirm the

dismissal of the indictment.

I.

A.

The AECA authorizes the President to establish the “United

States Munitions List,” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1), which includes

“defense articles” and “defense services” whose import and

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1

 Section 129.3(a) provides:

Any U.S. person, wherever located, and any foreign person

located in the United States or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of

export is subject to registration and licensing requirements, id. §

2778(b). It authorizes the President “to promulgate regulations

for the import and export of [defense] articles and services.” Id.

§ 2778(a)(1). The registration and licensing requirements

originally extended only to those individuals “engage[d] in the

business of manufacturing, exporting, or importing” the articles

and services on the Munitions List. Id. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(i); see

also id. § 2778(b)(2). In 1996, however, Congress enacted the

Brokering Amendment, which expanded the scope of the

AECA’s registration and licensing requirements to cover “every

person . . . who engages in the business of brokering activities

with respect to the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of”

the articles and services on the Munitions List. Id. §

2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I). The Brokering Amendment defines

“brokering activities” as “the financing, transportation, freight

forwarding, or taking of any other action that facilitates the

manufacture, export, or import of a defense article or defense

service.” Id. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II). Willful violation of the

Brokering Amendment and its implementing regulations is

subject to criminal prosecution with imprisonment upon

conviction for up to ten years and a fine of not more than one

million dollars. Id. § 2778(c).

The ITAR, promulgated by the State Department pursuant

to Executive Order 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 18, 1977),

defines the class of persons subject to the licensing and

registration requirements of the Brokering Amendment as “[a]ny

U.S. person, wherever located, and any foreign person located in

the United States or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.” 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a).1 In so construing the

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the United States (notwithstanding § 120.1(c)), who engages in the

business of brokering activities (as defined in this part) with respect to

the manufacture, export, import, or transfer of any defense article or

defense service subject to the controls of this subchapter (see § 121)

or any “foreign defense article or defense service” (as defined in

§ 129.2) is required to register with the Office of Defense Trade

Controls.

22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a). 

Brokering Amendment’s reference to “every person,” 22 U.S.C.

§ 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I), the ITAR reflects the legislative history

revealing that in enacting the Brokering Amendment Congress

was focusing on “U.S. persons” and “foreign persons located in

the [United States],” and was concerned particularly with “U.S.

persons [who] are involved in arms deals that are inconsistent

with U.S. policy.” H.R. REP. NO. 104-519(I), at 11, 12 (1996)

[hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. It is undisputed that Yakou is not

a United States citizen, that the indictment does not allege that

Yakou engaged in brokering activities within the United States,

and that the United States does not argue that he is otherwise

subject to the jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of the

ITAR. Therefore, the United States must show that Yakou is a

“U.S. person.” The ITAR defines a “U.S. person” as one “who

is [a] lawful permanent resident as defined by 8 U.S.C.

1101(a)(20) [the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)].” 22

C.F.R. § 120.15. The cross-referenced provision of the INA, in

turn, defines the term “lawfully admitted for permanent

residence” as “the status of having been lawfully accorded the

privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an

immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status

not having changed.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(20) (2004).

 B.

The material facts were undisputed in the district court.

Sabri Yakou was born in 1934 in Iraq, and he predominately

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lived there until the mid-1970s when he moved with his family

to Great Britain. In 1986, Yakou followed his children to the

United States, where he began to live and work pursuant to a L-1

visa. In 1989, his application for LPR status in the United States

was approved, and he was issued a “green card.” A few years

later, he was naturalized in the United Kingdom and received a

British passport, although he retained his Iraqi citizenship.

In early 1993, federal law enforcement agents searched

Yakou’s home and business in California and seized personal

papers as well as business files, records, and equipment. Yakou

believed that he had been mistreated by the United States, and he

decided that he would no longer live in this country. He so

informed his wife and children. Yakou resumed living in

London, primarily residing there from that time until 1998, at

which point he returned to Baghdad. He has lived and worked

in Iraq ever since, establishing a new personal life there as well.

By 1994, Yakou no longer owned any real property in the United

States. He has not worked in the United States since 1993, and

he last filed a federal income tax return in 1992. 

The parties disagree, however, on the legal significance of

the following circumstances. Although Yakou has not lived in

the United States in over ten years, he never formally renounced

his LPR status by filing Form I-407, “Abandonment of Lawful

Permanent Resident Status,” with United States immigration

authorities. Neither has the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) adjudged that his LPR status has changed. Since early

1993, Yakou has returned to the United States on less than ten

occasions for no more than a few weeks at a time. These trips

appear predominately, if not exclusively, to have involved

visiting his family, and he stayed with family members while in

the United States. Prior to January 2000, however, Yakou used

his “green card,” which indicates LPR status, to enter the

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country. At this point, he apparently lost the card, and, although

he may have requested a new card, he was admitted on his

British passport during his last three visits to the United States.

Yakou voluntarily returned to the United States in October

2003 only when a federal agent from Immigration and Customs

Enforcement contacted him while he was on business in

Thailand and suggested that he could assist his son, Regard, who

had been arrested in Iraq on brokering charges and would be

transported to the United States. Upon his arrival in the United

States, Yakou was arrested pursuant to a previously sealed

indictment. The single-count indictment alleges that Yakou and

his son engaged in brokering activities involving defense articles

and defense services with the government of Iraq without

obtaining written approval from the State Department, in

violation of the AECA, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2), (c), the ITAR,

22 C.F.R. §§ 129.2(a)-(b), -.3, -.5 to -.7, and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

Specifically, the indictment alleges that in Iraq, from

approximately November 2000 to July 2003, Yakou and his son

negotiated and arranged for the sale, purchase, transfer, and

construction of six armored patrol boats for the government of

Iraq in return for a fee, commission, and other consideration.

While the indictment does not allege that either Yakou or his son

is a “U.S. person,” it is undisputed that Yakou’s son is a United

States citizen. 

In the district court, Yakou moved to dismiss the indictment

under Rules 7 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure. Observing that the indictment appeared to be “poorly

drafted,” Yakou understood it to allege violation of five

regulations issued under the Brokering Amendment, and he

argued that he could not have violated those regulations as a

matter of law because after abandoning his LPR status in 1993

he was no longer a “U.S. person.” He noted that it was

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undisputed that the conduct identified in the indictment took

place outside the United States. Yakou also moved to strike the

indictment’s reference to 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) because the

indictment did not allege an offense under that provision. In

opposition to the motion, the United States did not contest

Yakou’s interpretation of the indictment but argued, as it does on

appeal, that Yakou’s LPR status could change only through an

administrative procedure, either by filing Form I-407 or by

formal adjudication of his status by the BIA. In addition, Yakou

advanced a variety of reasons why the aiding and abetting charge

was invalid, including that there was no meaningful distinction

in the statutory text between aiding and abetting and violating the

statute as a principal, that Congress did not intend to regulate the

overseas brokering activities of non-U.S. persons, and that an

aiding and abetting theory would violate international law. The

United States responded that the district court had jurisdiction

over Yakou as an aider and abettor notwithstanding his

citizenship and residency because one can be prosecuted as an

aider and abettor even if one is incapable of violating the statute

as a principal. 

The district court, while adopting the parties’ construction

of the indictment, rejected the United States’s position that the

loss of LPR status can occur only through administrative action

by immigration officials. It initially refused to dismiss the

indictment, however, because Yakou had not demonstrated that

his LPR status had changed. Upon reconsideration, the district

court reversed course, stating that it had improperly shifted the

burden to Yakou to demonstrate that he was no longer a “U.S.

person.” The United States agreed that it carried the burden of

proving that Yakou was a “U.S. person,” but argued, as it does

on appeal, that it met its burden by demonstrating that LPR status

continues until there has been formal administrative action

changing that status. Upon reexamining Yakou’s arguments, the

district court ruled that because Yakou had voluntarily

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relinquished his LPR status prior to the period alleged in the

indictment, he was no longer a “U.S. person” against whom

brokering charges may be brought. The district court also ruled

that Yakou could not be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2 as an

aider and abettor of his son’s alleged brokering violations

because “facilitating” a brokering act, which is a violation of the

Brokering Amendment, is equivalent to aiding and abetting such

an act and thus cannot be used as a separate basis for establishing

jurisdiction over him.

II.

This court reviews de novo the district court’s dismissal of

an indictment based on questions of law. See, e.g., United States

v. Marks, 379 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.

Atandi, 376 F.3d 1186, 1188 (10th Cir. 2004). On appeal, the

United States contends that the district court erred by dismissing

the indictment before trial, when the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure do not provide a mechanism for summary judgment,

by ruling that LPR status can change without administrative

action by immigration officials, such that Yakou was not a “U.S.

person,” as defined by the ITAR, who is subject to prosecution

for brokering activities, and by ruling that Yakou could not be

indicted separately under 18 U.S.C. § 2 as an aider and abettor of

his son’s alleged violations of the brokering provisions. The

United States does not contend that, notwithstanding the district

court’s ruling on Yakou’s loss of LPR status, the indictment

charges a valid offense against him as a principal under 22

U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); the district court did not rule on that issue,

and we do not address it.

A.

Pretrial dismissal of indictment. There is no federal criminal

procedural mechanism that resembles a motion for summary

judgment in the civil context. See, e.g., United States v.

DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 661 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v.

Nabors, 45 F.3d 238, 240 (8th Cir. 1995). Instead, Rule 12(b) of

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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “[a] party

may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request

that the court can determine without a trial of the general issue.”

The “general issue” has been defined as “evidence relevant to the

question of guilt or innocence.” United States v. Ayarza-Garcia,

819 F.2d 1043, 1048 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v.

Barletta, 644 F.2d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 1981)). 

While Rule 12(b) does not explicitly authorize the pretrial

dismissal of an indictment on sufficiency-of-the-evidence

grounds, the United States failed to object in the district court to

its pretrial determination of whether Yakou was a “U.S. person”

covered by the Brokering Amendment and the ITAR. Indeed,

the United States provided Yakou with discovery regarding his

pretrial jurisdictional claim and also introduced evidence to

bolster its claim that Yakou retained his LPR status, quite

possibly because it would have been unable to appeal a judgment

of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure as jeopardy would have attached, see United States v.

Alfonso, 143 F. 3d 772, 777 n. 7 (2d Cir. 1998). Several circuits

have upheld, in the absence of a government objection, the

district court’s pretrial dismissal of an indictment on sufficiencyof-the-evidence grounds where the material facts are undisputed

and only an issue of law is presented. See United States v.

Phillips, 367 F.3d 846, 855 & n.25 (9th Cir. 2004); United States

v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084, 1087-88 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Levin, 973 F.2d 463, 470 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Risk,

843 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1988). Other circuits have

recognized that a district court can properly adjudge the

sufficiency of the evidence before trial where the government

has made a full proffer of evidence or where there is a stipulated

record, situations similar to the undisputed facts at issue here.

See DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d at 660-61 (3d Cir.); Alfonso, 143 F.3d

at 776-77 (2d Cir.); cf. Nabors, 45 F.3d at 240 (8th Cir.). Only

the Eleventh Circuit has held that even where there are

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undisputed facts a district court may not engage in a pretrial

determination of the sufficiency of the evidence, see United

States v. Salman, 378 F.3d 1266, 1267-69 (11th Cir. 2004), but

there was no indication that the government failed to object in

the district court. Although this court has not directly spoken on

the issue, it has upheld a pretrial dismissal of counts of an

indictment based on a question of law. See, e.g., United States

v. Espy, 145 F.3d 1369, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v.

Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 147-50 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

The United States’s procedural challenge to the district

court’s pretrial ruling is untimely under well-established

principles of waiver, see, e.g., United States v. Hylton, 294 F.3d

130, 135-36 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and the existence of undisputed

facts obviated the need for the district court to make factual

determinations properly reserved for a jury, see, e.g., Phillips,

367F.3d at855 n.25; United States v. Korn, 557 F.2d 1089, 1090

(5th Cir. 1977). Although it is an “unusual circumstance[]” for

the district court to resolve the sufficiency of the evidence before

trial because the government is usually entitled to present its

evidence at trial and have its sufficiency tested by a motion for

acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, Risk , 843 F.2d at 1061, we join those circuits in

upholding the district court’s pretrial dismissal of the indictment

based on a question of law where the government has not made

a timely objection.

B.

LPR status. The INA, the Brokering Amendment, and the

ITAR are all silent regarding the manner and the point at which

LPR status changes. While 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A) defines

the “special immigrant[s]” exempt from numerical caps on entry

as, inter alia, LPRs who have been out of the country for a

“temporary visit abroad,” neither it nor other provisions of the

INA address when LPR status ceases to exist or whether certain

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procedures must take place to effect a change of status. The

Attorney General, by regulation, has created the BIA in the

Justice Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review

to interpret the immigration laws. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1)

(2004). While the administrative and enforcement

responsibilities for the INA are divided among the President, the

Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the

Secretary of State, among others, the Attorney General’s

interpretations and rulings “with respect to all questions of law

shall be controlling.” 8 U.S.C.A. § 1103(a). Further, while the

Attorney General retains the authority to review and modify BIA

decisions, see id. § 1103(g)(2); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g)-(h), absent

such a modification, BIA decisions are binding on all

immigration judges and officers and employees of the

Department of Homeland Security, see id. § 1003.1(g). The

Supreme Court, recognizing the BIA’s expertise over

immigration matters and its power to exercise the Attorney

General’s statutory authority to interpret the immigration laws,

has applied the principles of deference articulated in Chevron

U.S.A., Inc. v. NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 841 (1984), to BIA decisions. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,

526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999). Accordingly, we examine the

BIA’s decisions to determine if Yakou’s position that his LPR

status changed in 1993 is inconsistent with BIA precedent. 

Numerous BIA decisions express in dicta the BIA’s view

that LPR status can change outside the formal adjudicatory

process associated with removal. These decisions distinguish

between an involuntary termination of status as a result of

removal proceedings and a voluntary change in status outside

those proceedings. For example, in Matter of Lok, 18 I. & N.

Dec. 101 (BIA 1981), after ruling that it would “deem[] the

lawful permanent resident status of an alien to end with the entry

of the final administrative order of deportation,” id. at 105, the

BIA explained that “[o]ther circumstances under which lawful

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permanent resident status may change include: . . . when [one]

relinquishes such status, intentionally or unintentionally,” id. at

107 n.8 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in Matter of

Duarte, 18 I. & N. Dec. 329 (BIA 1982), the BIA stated that in

addition to a final administrative order of exclusion and

deportation, a person could “have been . . . divested of his lawful

permanent resident status . . . through abandonment, intentional

or unintentional.” Id. at 332 & n.3; see also Matter of Gunaydin,

18 I. & N. Dec. 326, 327 & n.1 (BIA 1982); Matter of Kane, 15

I. & N. Dec. 258, 260 & n.1 (BIA 1975). Thus, in adjudicating

an individual’s LPR status, the BIA has expressed its

understanding that the status changes at the point a LPR engages

in an abandoning act, like departing the United States for more

than a “temporary visit abroad,” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A), not

at the point when the BIA makes a determination of the person’s

status in a removal proceeding or when the individual files Form

I-407. For instance, in Matter of Kane, the BIA found that a

LPR’s status “ha[d] already changed because her trip or trips

[abroad] were not temporary.” 15 I. & N. Dec. at 265 n.3. The

BIA explained, “If any of her absences have been other than

temporary in nature, she has lost the status of lawfully admitted

immigrant and would not now have that status.” Id. Similarly,

in Matter of Montero, 14 I. & N. Dec. 399 (BIA 1973), the BIA

found that a LPR “lost” her status at the point “she departed . . .

with no fixed intent to return” to the United States. Id. at 401;

see also Matter of Huang, 19 I. & N. Dec. 749, 757 (BIA 1988).

None of these cases, however, are similar to Yakou’s

circumstances. Yakou has not been subject to removal

proceedings; nor has he sought readmission to the United States

by means of a reentry permit or a returning resident’s visa; nor

has he filed Form I-407. To the extent the BIA has expressed its

general interpretation of the INA in these cases, it was not

required to apply its interpretation of voluntary abandonment of

LPR status, thus leaving only dicta that is helpful, but not

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dispositive of Yakou’s contention that his status changed in

1993. It is nonetheless true, however, that the BIA has rejected

the notion that it must “overlook” abandonment of LPR status

where there has been no formal administrative action. Matter of

Abdoulin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 458, 460 (BIA 1980). In that case, the

BIA affirmed the denial of a visa for the wife of a purported LPR

after he had been absent from the United States for eleven years.

Despite the fact that there were no formal proceedings

adjudicating the abandonment of his LPR status and although he

could still test the continuation of that status before the BIA, the

BIA ruled that he had failed to meet his burden to show his status

continued, and it declined to afford him the benefits of that

status, thus implicitly recognizing that his LPR status had already

changed as a result of his ceasing to live in the United States. 

While the United States maintains these BIA decisions were

ruling only that a loss of LPR status is irreversible, none of them

suggest that the only way that one can voluntarily relinquish or

abandon LPR status is by filing Form I-407. There is no

regulation indicating that Form I-407 is required to change LPR

status, and Form I-407 itself allows individuals to indicate either

that they are seeking to abandon their LPR status or that they

already “have abandoned [that] status” prior to filing the Form.

The United States relies on a legal opinion from the Acting

General Counsel of the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(“INS”) stating that a LPR “remains a lawful permanent resident

until the Government proves otherwise in deportation or

exclusion proceedings against him or her, or until the petitioner

voluntarily abandons residence and adjusts to nonimmigrant

status [regarding diplomatic occupations under 8 U.S.C. § 1257],

or leaves the United States and executes a Form I-407,

Abandonment of Lawful Permanent Resident Status.” 1 INS &

DOJ Legal Opin. § 91-2 (Jan. 9, 1991) (internal citations

omitted). Whatever its legal merit, the opinion does not address

Yakou’s circumstances.

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There is yet another reason for adopting Yakou’s position

that LPR status can change without formal administrative action:

not only is there no regulatory indication that formal

administrative action is required before a LPR can voluntarily

relinquish that status, but it is consistent with Congress’s

determination that United States citizenship may be lost

automatically, without any administrative or judicial

determination, when a person has voluntarily engaged in certain

conduct with the requisite intent. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481, 1488

(2000);see also United States ex rel. Marks v.Esperdy, 315 F.2d

673, 676 (2d Cir. 1963), aff’d by an equally divided court, 377

U.S. 214 (1964); cf. Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 268 (1967).

There are no exceptions listed in § 1481 or § 1488 requiring

administrative or judicial determinations before citizenship is

lost as might lend support to the United States’s view that a

formal adjudication or filing is required before a change in LPR

status can occur. The United States relies on United States v.

Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1890), to support the proposition

that Yakou’s “breach” of LPR status (by reason of his alleged

violation of the AECA and the ITAR and departure from the

United States) cannot be used to escape criminal liability. But

Grimley is inapposite; under the ITAR, LPR status turns on

immigration law, and the United States fails to show that LPR

status operates in a way comparable to the military relationship

at issue in Grimley. 

The United States’s reliance on a 1996 revision to a

regulation defining LPR status, which provides that “[s]uch

[LPR] status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order

of exclusion, deportation, or removal,” 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) (2004),

is likewise misplaced. The Justice Department indicated in

response to comments about the 1996 amendment to 8 C.F.R. §

1.1(p) that the amendment was intended to codify the Lok rule

that is identical to the added text. See 61 Fed. Reg. 18,900,

18,900 (Apr. 29, 1996). Adopted to provide “finality in

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15

immigration proceedings,” id., the language upon which the

United States now relies was intended to apply only to

proceedings brought against a LPR, and it does not foreclose a

change in status by means other than formal termination. In

other words, “termination” of LPR status under 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p)

is only a subset of the “change” of such status mentioned in the

INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), and does not address the totality of

the means by which Yakou’s LPR status could change. 

No more persuasive is the United States’s contention that

permitting LPR status to change at the time an abandoning act

occurs outside of a formal administrative proceeding is

inconsistent with 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(ii), which recognizes an

individual who has abandoned LPR status as a “verified lawful

permanent resident” when he or she attempts to reenter the

United States. While this accurately states the regulation, it does

not conflict with Yakou’s contention that he abandoned his

LPR status in 1993 and his status changed at that time. If a

putative LPR “has abandoned or relinquished that status,” then,

upon return to the United States, he is “regarded as seeking an

admission” to the country, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C), and he

“must undergo an inspection as though an arriving alien,” Alaka

v. Elwood, 225 F. Supp. 2d 547, 553 (E.D. Pa. 2002). Although

such an individual would be considered a “verified lawful

permanent resident” if the United States’s data systems or other

available means so indicated, see 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(i), and

that would prevent his removal under expedited proceedings

because he is not clearly inadmissible, see id. § 235.3(b)(5)(ii),

he can still be subject to a regular removal proceeding under 8

U.S.C. § 1229a on the ground that he is no longer a LPR because

his status has changed, see id. While Yakou would contingently

retain his LPR status throughout a removal proceeding in an

effort to preserve his rights should he ultimately be found to have

retained that status, there is no reason to attach that status to him

in a criminal proceeding where he disclaims it and the

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16

undisputed facts would compel a finding of abandonment.

Whatever administrative complexity might result in the

absence of formal LPR abandonment proceedings, it arises

directly from the regulatory scheme for recognizing LPR status

derived from the immigration laws and indirectly from

Congress’s decision to terminate United States citizenship

automatically in certain instances without concern for the

regulatory implications of an undocumented change of status.

The United States’s suggestion that a federal court’s

determination of Yakou’s status interferes with the separation of

powers under which immigration matters are largely within the

province of the Executive Branch, see Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d

679, 680 (9th Cir. 1981), obscures the fact that the court is not

changing Yakou’s LPR status; rather, the court is looking, as the

ITAR directs, see 22 C.F.R. § 120.15, to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20)

as interpreted by the BIA to determine whether Yakou’s LPR

status changed over ten years ago when he departed the United

States for more than a “temporary visit abroad,” 8 U.S.C. §

1101(a)(27)(A). The cases relied upon by the United States are

to no avail. In United States v. Ryba, 441 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir.

1971), the LPR was seeking to have his selective service board

change his status, as opposed to claiming that his status had

already changed. And Foy v. Schantz, Schatzman & Aaronson,

P.A., 108 F.3d 1347, 1349 (11th Cir. 1997), is inapposite because

the court determined that “Congress intended to import” the

INA’s definition of LPR into the diversity jurisdiction statute, 28

U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000), to determine whether a person is a

“citizen of a State”; to find that Foy, who had not been granted

LPR status pursuant to the INA, was a “citizen of a State” for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a court would have had to act

beyond its authority by conferring LPR status on him. 

Having determined that nothing in the BIA’s decisions

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17

interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) is adverse to Yakou’s

position that LPR status can change outside removal proceedings

and without filing Form I-407, the question remains whether the

United States has met its burden to show that Yakou maintained

his LPR status through November 2000, the beginning of the

period alleged in the indictment. To qualify as a LPR upon

seeking reentry into the United States, Yakou “must have

acquired lawful permanent resident status in accordance with our

laws, must have retained that status from the time he acquired it,

and must be returning to an ‘unrelinquished lawful permanent

residence’ after a ‘temporary visit abroad.’” Matter of Huang, 19

I. & N. Dec. at 753, quoted in Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512,

1514 (9th Cir. 1997). The inquiry into whether Yakou left the

United States for only a “temporary visit abroad” is relatively

easy. Yakou departed the United States in 1993 with the intent

to never live here again. He moved to London, where he resided

until 1998, and then he returned to his native Iraq where he has

lived ever since. Although during the past eleven years he has

traveled to the United States approximately nine times to visit his

family, he has stayed for only a few weeks during each visit.

These infrequent and short stays in the United States are

insufficient, as a matter of law, to support retention of his LPR

status. See, e.g., Singh, 113 F.3d 1512; Matter of Huang, 19 I.

& N. Dec. 749; Matter of Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. 258; cf. Aleem

v. Perryman, 114 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 1997). The fact that

Yakou used his “green card” on several of these occasions to

enter the United States prior to 2000 is immaterial; the relevant

inquiry is not whether he may have wanted to retain his LPR

status, but whether his actions show that he has abandoned that

status. See Matter of Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 265.

Based on undisputed facts about Yakou’s whereabouts since

1993, we hold that because Yakou’s LPR status changed after he

left the United States in 1993, the United States has failed to

demonstrate that Yakou was a “U.S. person” during the period

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18

alleged in the indictment. The district court therefore properly

dismissed the indictment alleging that Yakou violated the

Brokering Amendment and the ITAR as a principal.

C.

Aiding and Abetting. The federal aiding and abetting statute

provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hoever commits an offense

against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,

induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”

18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000); see also United States v. Wilson, 160

F.3d 732, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The statute “typically applies to

any criminal statute unless Congress specifically carves out an

exception that precludes aiding and abetting liability,” United

States v. Angwin, 271 F.3d 786, 802 (9th Cir. 2001), and it long

has been established that a person can be convicted of aiding and

abetting another person’s violation of a statute even if it would

be impossible to convict the aider and abettor as a principal. See,

e.g., In re Nofziger, 956 F.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United

States v. Raper, 676 F.2d 841, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also

Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 447 (1895). 

The aiding and abetting statute, however, is not so broad as

to expand the extraterritorial reach of the underlying statute. In

the cases cited by the United States – aiding and abetting by

private citizen of police officers’ violations of civil rights, see

United States v. Lester, 363 F.2d 68, 72-73 (6th Cir. 1966),

aiding and abetting by United Nations’ employee exempt from

registration requirements of United States citizen’s failure to

register as a foreign agent, see United States v. Melekh, 193 F.

Supp. 586, 592 (N.D. Ill. 1961), aiding and abetting by adult of

minor’s unlawful possession of alcohol, see State v. Norman, 229

N.W.2d 55, 56 (Neb. 1975), aiding and abetting by deputy

sheriff of prisoners’ forbidden sex acts, see People v. Fraize, 43

Cal. Rptr. 2d 64, 65-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) – the evil sought

to be averted inherently relates to, and indeed requires, persons

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19

in certain categories. Here, by contrast, the United States can be

hurt every bit as much by brokering activities without “U.S.

persons” as with them. Accordingly, the congressional choice to

limit liability to “U.S. persons,” is highly significant and

inconsistent with catching the non-U.S. person who happens to

engage in brokering activities with a “U.S. person.” 

Congress legislates against the backdrop of the presumption

against extraterritoriality, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil

Co. (“ARAMCO”), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), and absent an

indication from Congress to the contrary, the crime of aiding and

abetting “confer[s] extraterritorial jurisdiction to the same extent

as the offense[] that underlie[s it].” United States v. Hill, 279

F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. Yousef, 327

F.3d 56, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Felix-Gutierrez,

940 F.2d 1200, 1205 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Layton,

855 F.2d 1388, 1395-96 (9th Cir. 1988). Federal laws are

deemed to apply only to the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States unless Congress provides “affirmative evidence” to the

contrary, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,

176 (1993), which is “clearly expressed,” ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at

248; see also United States v. Delgado-Garcia, 374 F.3d 1337,

1344-45 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

While the text of the Brokering Amendment refers to “every

person,” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I), Congress has

expressed its intent to limit the extraterritorial reach of the

Brokering Amendment and thus the ITAR to “U.S. persons.”

The legislative history of the Brokering Amendment indicates

that Congress targeted this class of persons, and, more

specifically, that Congress recognized that “U.S. persons are

involved in arms deals that are inconsistent with U.S. policy.”

HOUSE REPORT at 11, 12. In the Brokering Amendment, then,

Congress was concerned with both United States brokers of arms

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20

and foreign brokers of arms located in the United States, but not

with foreign brokers located outside the United States, see id.,

even though each type of individual could be involved in

brokering activities affecting the United States. The ITAR, in

turn, reflects Congress’s intent that the Brokering Amendment

apply extraterritorially solely to “U.S. persons.” Under the

ITAR, the Brokering Amendment applies only to “U.S.

person[s], wherever located, and any foreign person located in

the United States or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.” 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a). The ITAR’s structure and

text make clear that registration requirements vary based on the

individual’s relationship with the United States, and that foreign

brokers located and acting outside the United States were not

intended to be covered by the ITAR unless “otherwise subject

to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. As noted, the

United States does not argue that Yakou is “otherwise subject to

the jurisdiction of the United States.”

To adopt the United States’s position that Yakou can be

charged with aiding and abetting alleged brokering activities in

Iraq, even if Congress and the implementing regulations did not

contemplate such coverage, would greatly expand the scope of

the registration and licensing requirements by regulating not just

“U.S. person[s], wherever located, and any foreign person

located in the United States or otherwise subject to the

jurisdiction of the United States,” 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a), but also

regulating non-U.S. persons located and acting outside the

United States. Congress has not expressed with the requisite

clarity that it sought to apply the Brokering Amendment and, by

extension the ITAR’s brokering provisions, in such an

extraterritorial manner, see ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248; DelgadoGarcia, 374 F.3d at 1344-45; Nieman v. Dryclean U.S.A.

Franchise Co., 178 F.3d 1126, 1129 (11th Cir. 1999), as a nonU.S. person outside the United States is not punishable as a

principal except where subject to the jurisdiction of the United

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States, see 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a); HOUSE REPORT at 11.

Accordingly, while the Brokering Amendment and the ITAR

have extraterritorial effect for “U.S. persons,” they do not have

such effect for “foreign persons,” like Yakou, whose conduct

occurs outside the United States. To apply the aiding and

abetting statute to Yakou’s conduct in Iraq would confer

extraterritorial jurisdiction far beyond that which is available

directly under the Brokering Amendment and the ITAR. While

the AECA has been described as “inherently international in

scope,” United States v. Evans, 667 F. Supp. 974, 981, 985

(S.D.N.Y. 1987), in that case the court was concerned with the

transfer of American-made weapons that were exported from the

United States; no such allegation appears in Yakou’s indictment,

which refers only to brokering activities in Iraq, and the United

States makes no such claim on appeal. 

The other cases on which the United States relies are also

distinguishable. Felix-Gutierrez and Hill involved statutes that

do not differentiate between persons who are subject to

extraterritorial jurisdiction. Because Congress sought

extraterritorial effect for the statutes in Felix-Gutierrez and Hill,

they apply extraterritorially to any person who violates their

provisions and thus to any person who aids and abets a

violation. The Brokering Amendment and the ITAR, however,

apply extraterritorially to Yakou only if he is a “U.S. person.”

While there is some tension between the presumption against

extraterritoriality and the principle that aiders and abetters need

not be able to be convicted as principals, the presumption against

extraterritoriality, which recognizes courts’ limited foreign

policy expertise, see ARAMCO, 499 U.S. at 248, should control.

Given the legislative history of the Brokering Amendment, as

reflected in the ITAR, it reasonably follows that Congress and

the State Department did not go to such lengths to exclude nonU.S. persons located outside the United States from direct

extraterritorial liability under the Brokering Amendment only to

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22

permit these same persons to be charged under an aiding-andabetting statute for the identical conduct that they have

determined should not result in their punishment as principals.

Although United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1980),

upheld the conviction of a South African national for aiding and

abetting the illegal export of American-made arms from within

the United States, the government’s appeal, following the grant

of a post-verdict motion for judgment, addressed only the

sufficiency of the evidence to convict; the court was not

presented with the contention made by Yakou that aiding and

abetting liability does not apply to a non-U.S. person located

outside the United States. Because the Brokering Amendment

and the ITAR limit the extraterritorial liability for failing to

register with the State Department and to obtain a license before

engaging in brokering activities to “U.S. persons,” we hold that

Yakou, as a non-U.S. person located outside the United States,

cannot aid and abet his son’s alleged violation of the Brokering

Amendment and the ITAR outside the United States. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing

the indictment.

USCA Case #04-3037 Document #868866 Filed: 01/04/2005 Page 24 of 26
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the

judgment:

Although I concur in the judgment, I do so somewhat

reluctantly because the government has waived at least two

issues that, had they been raised, might have convinced me to

reverse. First, to me, the phrase “[a]ny U.S. person, wherever

located, ...,” 22 C.F.R. § 129.3(a) (emphasis added),

contemplates that the statute has extraterritorial reach over an

LPR, who is included in the term “U.S. person,” as well as a U.S.

citizen. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.15. Because a “U.S. person”

includes both citizens and LPRs, both can violate the Brokering

Amendment while outside (and, presumably, for longer than

“temporarily”) the United States, i.e., “wherever located.” If the

drafters had intended the statute’s extraterritorial reach to include

only U.S. citizens, the regulation would have provided “any U.S.

citizen, wherever located, and any other U.S. person or foreign

person located in the United States....” Although we conclude

that Yakou had lost his LPR status before he allegedly violated

the Brokering Amendment outside the United States, nonetheless

an LPR can violate the Brokering Amendment outside the

United States.

Second, the determination of Yakou’s status as a “U.S.

person” vel non seems to me to be a question of fact for the jury.

The majority appears to consider it both a question of law and a

sufficiency of the evidence issue. See Maj. Op. at 11 (“the

existence of undisputed facts obviated the need for the district

court to make factual determinations properly reserved for a

jury”); id. (“we ... uphold[] the district court’s pretrial dismissal

of the indictment based on a question of law....”). The

government, however, has chosen not to press either issue and,

accordingly, I agree with the majority that the district court must

be affirmed.

One further cautionary note: In upholding the district

court’s dismissal of the aiding and abetting count, the majority

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2

declares that “Congress ... did not go to such lengths to exclude

non-U.S. persons from direct extraterritorial liability under the

Brokering Amendment only to permit these same persons to be

charged under an aiding-and-abetting statute for the identical

conduct....” Maj. Op. at 23. The district court concluded that

“‘facilitating’ a brokering act is equivalent to ‘aiding and

abetting’ such an act” and therefore, without jurisdiction over

Yakou as a principal, the aiding and abetting count against him

could not stand. Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 17 (April 9, 2004) [YA

30]. In other statutory contexts, however — and in the absence

of the jurisdictional defect that is dispositive here — the

inclusion of “facilitating” as an illegal act has not prevented the

government from successfully charging a defendant with aiding

and abetting a facilitation. For example, paragraph two of 18

U.S.C. § 545 makes it a crime for any person to knowingly

“facilitate[] the transportation, concealment, or sale” of

smuggled goods after importation. Id. In United States v. Dodd,

43 F.3d 759 (1st Cir. 1995), the First Circuit upheld Dodd’s

aiding and abetting conviction based on his having facilitated the

transportation of smuggled weapons. Id. at 762–3. Thus, the

majority’s declaration should not, I believe, be read to mean that

an aiding and abetting conviction can never be secured under the

Brokering Amendment of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA).

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