Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01882/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01882-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B.E. Technology, L.L.C.
Appellant
Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,

Appellant

v.

SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS (USA) INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1882

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00029.

................................................................ 

B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,

Appellant

v.

GOOGLE, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1883, 2015-1884

______________________ 

Case: 15-1882 Document: 41-2 Page: 1 Filed: 08/12/2016
2 B.E. TECHNOLOGY v. SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS

Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. 

IPR2014-00031, IPR2014-00033.

............................................................ 

B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,

Appellant

v.

MICROSOFT CORPORATION,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1887

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00040.

............................................................ 

B.E. TECHNOLOGY, L.L.C.,

Appellant

v.

SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS AMERICA, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1888

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2014-

00044.

______________________ 

Case: 15-1882 Document: 41-2 Page: 2 Filed: 08/12/2016
B.E. TECHNOLOGY v. SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS 3

Decided: August 12, 2016

______________________ 

 DANIEL J. WEINBERG, Freitas Angell & Weinberg LLP, 

Redwood City, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT E. FREITAS. 

 JEFFREY PAUL KUSHAN, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellees Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc., Microsoft Corporation, Samsung 

Electronics America Inc. Sony Mobile Communications 

(USA), Inc., also represented by JOHN FLOCK, Kenyon & 

Kenyon LLP, New York, NY; PAUL T. QUALEY, Washington, DC; Microsoft Corporation, also represented by RYAN 

C. MORRIS, SCOTT BORDER, SAMUEL DILLON, ANNA 

MAYERGOYZ WEINBERG, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, 

DC; Samsung Electronics America, Inc., also represented 

by JOSHUA LEE RASKIN, Greenberg Traurig LLP, New 

York, NY.

BRIAN ROSENTHAL, Mayer Brown LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for appellee Google, Inc. Also represented by,

ANDREW JOHN PINCUS, PAUL WHITFIELD HUGHES, CLINTON 

BRANNON. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

B.E. Technology, L.L.C. (“B.E.”) appeals from four final written decisions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“the Board”), 

across five inter partes reviews (“IPR”), finding all three

claims of its U.S. Patent 6,771,290 (“the ’290 patent”) 

unpatentable. See Google, Inc. v. B.E. Tech., L.L.C., Nos. 

2014-00031, IPR2014-00033, 2015 WL 1570822, at *14 

(P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2015) (“Google Written Decision”); MiCase: 15-1882 Document: 41-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/12/2016
4 B.E. TECHNOLOGY v. SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS

crosoft Corp. v. B.E. Tech., L.L.C., No. IPR2014-00040, 

2015 WL 1570824, at *15 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2015) (“Microsoft Written Decision”); Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc. v. 

B.E. Tech., L.L.C., No. IPR2014-00044, 2015 WL 1570825, 

at *10 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2015) (“Samsung Written Decision”); Sony Mobile Commc’ns (USA) Inc. v. B.E. Tech., 

L.L.C., No. IPR2014-00029, 2015 WL 1570821, at *10 

(P.T.A.B. Apr. 6, 2015) (“Sony Written Decision”). As the 

above-captioned appeals present similar or identical

issues, we consolidated them for oral argument, Order, 

B.E. Tech. LLC v. Sony Mobile Commc’ns., No. 15-1882 

(Fed. Cir. May 24, 2016), and now address them in a 

single opinion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

The ’290 patent describes a computer program that allows access of data stored on a server through a user’s 

personal computer. See ’290 patent col. 5 ll. 5–42. The 

server stores a library of files for each user, as well as a 

profile that provides links to files in the user library. Id.

col. 5 ll. 43–61. When launched, the user enters login 

information, which allows the program to fetch the user 

profile from the server. Id. col. 26 l. 49–col. 27 l. 5. The 

program then uses the profile to populate a graphical user 

interface (“GUI”) with icons representing applications and 

links to files in the user’s library. Id. The GUI is divided 

into several regions, and each region can be selected by 

the user to open an associated program or item. See, e.g.,

id. col. 10 ll. 35–55; id. col. 13 ll. 41–58; id. col. 14 ll. 38–

46. The user can then click the links to access the associated files. Id. col. 8 ll. 3–50. Figure 5b, below, shows 

one embodiment of the invention:

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Id. fig.5b.

The three challenged claims are reproduced below. 

Claim 1 reads as follows:

1. A computer-readable memory for use by a 

client computer to provide a user of the computer 

with an integrated, customized, graphical user interface to a plurality of computer resources, the 

computer-readable memory comprising:

a non-volatile data storage device;

a program stored on said non-volatile data 

storage device in a computer-readable format;

said program being operable upon execution to 

display a graphical user interface comprising an 

application window separated into a number of 

regions,

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a first one of said regions including a number 

of graphical objects, at least some of which are 

each representative of a different software application and are selectable by the user via an input 

device, wherein said program is operable upon selection of one of said graphical objects to initiate 

execution of the software application associated 

therewith;

a second one of said regions including a number of user-selectable items, at least some of which 

are each associated with a different data set, said 

data sets each comprising a number of links to different information resources, wherein said program is operable in response to selection of at 

least one of said items to provide the user with access to its associated data set;

said program including a login module that is 

operable upon execution to identify the user of the 

computer; and

said program being operable following execution of said login module to provide an identification of the user to the server and to receive from 

the server a user profile containing one or more 

user data sets and user links to information resources, with said program further being operable 

to display in one of said regions a user-selectable 

item for each of said user data sets and each of 

said user links.

Id. col. 38 ll. 30–67.

Claim 2 is somewhat different in scope, focusing more 

on the networked aspect of the invention and omitting the 

“regions” of the GUI. Claim 2 reads as follows: 

2. A computer-readable memory for use by a 

client computer in conjunction with a server that 

is accessible by the client computer via a network, 

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the server storing a user profile and user library 

for each of a number of different users, with the 

user library containing one or more files and the 

user profile containing at least one user link that 

provides a[] link to one of the files in the user library, the computer-readable memory comprising:

a non-volatile data storage device;

a program stored on said non-volatile data 

storage device in a computer-readable format;

said program being operable upon execution to 

display a graphical user interface comprising an 

application window having a number of userselectable items displayed therein, wherein each 

of said items has associated with it a link to an information resource accessible via the network and 

wherein said program is operable upon execution 

and in response to selection by a user of one of 

said items to access the associated information resource over the network;

said program being operable upon execution to 

receive from server one of the user profiles and to 

display a user-selectable item for user links contained within the user profile, said program further being operable in response to selection by a 

user of one of the user links to access the file associated with the selected user link from the user library associated with the received user profile.

Id. col. 39 l. 1–col. 40 l. 11. 

Claim 3 depends on claim 2, and further requires: 

3. A computer-readable memory as defined 

in claim 2, wherein said program is operable upon 

execution and in response to selection by a user of 

one of said items to access the associated inforCase: 15-1882 Document: 41-2 Page: 7 Filed: 08/12/2016
8 B.E. TECHNOLOGY v. SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS

mation resource over the network using a browser.

Id. col. 40 ll. 12–17.

Google, Inc. (“Google”), Microsoft Corp. (“Microsoft”), 

Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (“Samsung”), and 

Sony Mobile Communications (USA) Inc. (“Sony”) (collectively, “Appellees”) filed petitions for inter partes review of 

the ’290 patent. Sony and Samsung both alleged that 

claims 2 and 3 were unpatentable as anticipated by 

international patent application publication WO 

97/09682, published March 12, 1995 (“Kikinis”). Kikinis 

describes a personalized Internet home page that can 

display links to a user’s email and other electronic documents. See, e.g., Kikinis at 3:2–21. Figure 3 depicts a 

preferred embodiment, the relevant portion of which is 

shown below: 

Id. fig.3. 

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In that embodiment, home page 73 acts as “an interface to data and other Web destinations.” Id. at 7:32. The 

home page also includes link buttons 117, 118, 120, and 

122, which can be used to access “e-mail, fax, and other 

electronic documents.” Id. at 8:13. Those documents are 

stored on a server, and the server runs programs specific 

to each particular type of document. See id. fig.2; id. at 

7:11–16. 

Google, like Sony and Samsung, alleged that Kikinis 

anticipated claims 2 and 3 of the ’290 patent, and also 

alleged that claims 2 and 3 would have been obvious in 

view of U.S. Patent 5,706,502 (“Foley”). Microsoft alleged 

that Kikinis anticipated claims 1–3 of the ’290 patent. 

B.E. did not file a preliminary response, and the Board 

instituted review on all asserted grounds. 

In the final written decision in the Microsoft case, the 

Board determined that each challenged claim had been 

proven unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis. Microsoft 

Written Decision at *14–15. First, the Board construed 

“region” in claim 1 to mean an “area,” rejecting B.E.’s 

argument that the term should be construed to mean “a 

non-overlapping part of an application window that is 

distinct or separate from other parts of the application 

window wherein each part is characterized by the presence of related functions or features that are different 

from the functions or features of another part.” Id. at *6. 

The Board determined that the ’290 patent did not explicitly define “region,” and noted that B.E.’s proposed construction was drawn from its own characterization of 

embodiments depicted in the specification, rather than 

language in the specification itself. Id. Accordingly, the

Board determined that “area” was the ordinary meaning 

of “region,” based on a dictionary and testimony from 

Microsoft’s expert as to the understanding of a person of 

ordinary skill in the art. Id.

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The Board found that Kikinis discloses the “program 

stored on a non-volatile data storage device” required by 

each claim of the ’290 patent because Kikinis discloses an 

Internet browser, which allows display of the home page 

and fetching of data from the server. Id. at *9, *12. 

Regarding claim 1, the Board found that Kikinis disclosed that its GUI was divided into a number of regions. 

Id. at *13–14. Specifically, the Board found that the left 

portion of Kikinis’s Figure 3 is divided into two regions: 

Buttons ABC and XYZ, and buttons 117, 118, 120, and 

122. Id. at *13. The Board determined that this finding

was also supported by Kikinis’s written description and 

testimony by B.E.’s expert. Id. Moreover, the Board 

rejected B.E.’s argument that the two regions needed to 

be functionally distinct; nevertheless, the Board found 

that the two areas of Kikinis were functionally distinct, 

and so fulfilled even B.E.’s construction of “region.” Id. at 

*14. 

Regarding claims 2 and 3, the Board found that Kikinis discloses “file[s] associated with [a] selected user link” 

by disclosing that the on-screen links were to “electronic 

documents reserved for the home page ‘owner.’” Id. at *10 

(quoting Kikinis at 7:35–36). The Board noted that B.E.’s 

expert agreed that the cited passage disclosed links to 

electronic documents. Id. Accordingly, the Board rejected 

B.E.’s argument that Kikinis only discloses links to databases, rather than to individual files. Id. at *10–11. In 

addition, the Board found that Kikinis’s databases were 

files as defined by the ’290 patent. Id. at *11. 

In the other IPRs, the Board found claims 2 and 3, the 

only claims challenged in those proceedings, unpatentable 

as anticipated by Kikinis for identical reasons. See Google 

Written Decision at *6–9; Samsung Written Decision at 

*6–9; Sony Written Decision at *6–9. The Board also 

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concluded that Foley rendered claims 2 and 3 unpatentable as obvious.1 Google Written Decision at *10–13.

B.E. timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

I. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION

We begin with B.E.’s argument that the Board erred

in its construction of the term “region.” 

In an IPR, a patent claim is given “its broadest reasonable construction in light of the specification of the 

patent in which it appears.” Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. 

Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2142 (2016) (quoting 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.100(b)).2 “[W]e review the Board’s ultimate claim 

constructions de novo and its underlying factual determinations involving extrinsic evidence for substantial evidence.” Microsoft Corp. v. Proxyconn, Inc., 789 F.3d 1292, 

1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Teva Pharm. USA Inc. v. 

Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831, 841–42 (2015)). 

B.E. argues that the Board’s construction is unsupported because, it asserts, the Board relied on a nontech-

 

1 As addressing B.E.’s arguments relating to

whether Kikinis anticipates claims 1–3 resolves these 

appeals, we need not, and do not, address B.E.’s arguments relating to the Board’s conclusion that the claims 

are unpatentable as obvious in view of Foley. 

2 In each of the present appeals, in which briefing 

was completed before the Supreme Court decided Cuozzo,

B.E. challenges the Board’s use of the broadest reasonable 

interpretation standard for claim construction. The 

Supreme Court has since ruled that use of the broadest 

reasonable interpretation standard is proper, Cuozzo, 136 

S. Ct. at 2142–46, and therefore there was no error in its 

use in these cases.

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nical dictionary and Microsoft’s expert, rather than the 

claim language or specification of the ’290 patent itself. 

B.E. contends that the Board’s construction does not 

account for narrower embodiments described in the 

specification, and that the context of the ’290 patent 

demonstrates that the broader construction is unreasonable. 

Microsoft responds that the Board’s construction is

consistent with the intrinsic record, and that B.E.’s construction is unsupported by the evidence. “Region” is not 

as narrow as B.E. argues, Microsoft contends, because the 

patent specification contains examples that would not fall 

within B.E.’s proposed construction. 

We agree with Microsoft that the Board properly construed the term “region” in claim 1 of the ’290 patent. 

The specification of the ’290 patent does not use “region” 

in a manner that indicates that the term has a special 

definition. For example, the written description specifically sets out explicit definitions for twenty terms that 

appear in the patent. ’290 patent col. 3 l. 65–col. 5 l. 4. 

“Region” is not among them. See id. Indeed, the Board 

noted that “[t]he ’290 patent does not provide an explicit 

definition for ‘region’” and that “[t]he portion of the written description relied upon by [B.E.] does not define the 

claim term ‘region.’” Microsoft Written Decision at *6. 

Those sections show that, far from B.E.’s argument to the 

contrary, the Board specifically considered the written 

description of the ’290 patent, and determined that “region” was not defined. 

The extrinsic evidence cited by the Board supports its 

determination of the ordinary meaning. Microsoft’s 

expert explained that a person of ordinary skill would 

understand “region” to mean “an area on the screen,” and 

the Board cited a dictionary as further support. Id. 

Although B.E. complains that the Board relied on a 

nontechnical dictionary, and the ’290 patent is a technical 

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patent, B.E. does not explain how the technical nature of 

the patent would change the definition, or provide contrary evidence from a technical dictionary. Accordingly, 

there was no error in construing “region” to mean “area.” 

B.E.’s arguments do not convince us otherwise. B.E.

contends that the Board’s construction is incorrect because it is broader than the examples depicted in the 

patent; however, we have rejected the notion that claim

terms are limited to the embodiments disclosed in the 

specification, absent redefinition or disclaimer. Phillips v. 

AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 

(en banc). B.E. does not argue that the ’290 patent contains any such redefinition or disclaimer. Moreover, and 

as the Board noted, B.E.’s construction is based on its own 

characterization of those embodiments, rather than any 

language appearing in the patent. See Microsoft Written 

Decision at *6. B.E. also ignores portions of the patent 

specification that are broader than its proposed construction. See, e.g., ’290 patent col. 17 ll. 15–21.

Finally, B.E. argues that the Board did not consider 

that its expert disagreed with the testimony of Microsoft’s 

expert relating to the construction of “region.” The testimony on which B.E. relies, however, essentially repeats 

B.E.’s construction without further support. See Joint 

App. in Appeal No. 15-1887 (“J.A.”) 3132. By rejecting 

B.E.’s construction and crediting Microsoft’s expert, the 

Board rejected B.E.’s evidence. See Microsoft Written 

Decision at *6. Accordingly, the Board did not err in its 

construction of “region.” 

II. ANTICIPATION

We turn next to B.E.’s argument that the Board erred 

in finding that Kikinis anticipates claims 1–3 of the ’290 

patent. “Anticipation is a question of fact reviewed for 

substantial evidence.” In re Rambus, Inc., 753 F.3d 1253, 

1256 (Fed. Cir. 2014). A finding is supported by substantial evidence if a reasonable mind might accept the eviCase: 15-1882 Document: 41-2 Page: 13 Filed: 08/12/2016
14 B.E. TECHNOLOGY v. SONY MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS

dence as sufficient to support the finding. Consol. Edison 

Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).

A. Claim 1 

B.E. argues that Kikinis does not anticipate claim 1 

because it does not disclose two regions that meet the 

requirements of the claims. Specifically, B.E. argues that 

the Board erred in finding that buttons ABC and XYZ are 

a different region from buttons 117, 118, 120, and 122, 

and that the Board should have instead found that the 

buttons, together, constituted a single region because 

there is nothing to distinguish one set of buttons from the 

other. Microsoft responds that the Board’s finding is 

supported by substantial evidence because the disclosure 

of Kikinis establishes that the buttons are in separate 

regions, as that term was construed by the Board. 

We agree with Microsoft that there is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s finding that Kikinis depicts 

the two required regions of claim 1. The cited buttons are 

in two areas of Figure 3, which meets the Board’s construction of “region.” Moreover, Kikinis states that the 

user’s home page may contain both links to email, faxes, 

voicemail, and other electronic documents, as well as 

links to a personal dictionary, spell checker, or thesaurus. 

Kikinis at 8:8–18. These two groups of buttons constitute 

two “areas” of the home page. The Board relied on both 

Figure 3 and the cited disclosure to find that Kikinis 

discloses the required regions. Microsoft Written Decision

at *13. Accordingly, the Board’s finding is supported by 

substantial evidence. 

B. Claims 2 and 3

B.E. argues that the Board’s determination that Kikinis anticipates claims 2 and 3 of the ’290 patent is not 

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supported by substantial evidence for two reasons.3 First, 

B.E. argues that the Internet browser disclosed by Kikinis 

does not meet the requirements of the “program” limitation in the claims. Second, B.E. argues that Kikinis only 

allows a user to select links to a database, not to a particular file as required by the claims. We address each 

argument in turn.

B.E. first argues that the Board erred in determining 

that the browser disclosed by Kikinis is a “program” 

because Kikinis’s browser stored on the user computer

interacts with software stored on the server to access files. 

B.E. argues that the claims require a program stored on 

the client computer, not the server, to access the files. 

Moreover, B.E. contends that because claim 3 requires the 

program to access a resource “using a browser,” ’290 

patent col. 40 ll. 15–16, the doctrine of claim differentiation counsels that the program in claim 2 cannot itself be 

a browser. 

Appellees respond that the Board’s finding is supported by substantial evidence because the claims do not 

require the client computer to access the files directly.4 

Instead, Appellees contend, the claims simply require that 

the program is “operable . . . to access the file,” ’290 patent col. 40 ll. 4, 9, and do not contain any requirements 

relating to how the file is accessed. Appellees also respond that a server must contain software that responds 

to requests from the client computer in order for any such 

system to function. Finally, Appellees respond that claim 

differentiation is a presumption that can be overcome, 

 

3 B.E. presents the same arguments relating to 

claims 2 and 3 in each of the four present appeals. 

4 Appellees’ responses to B.E.’s arguments relating 

to claims 2 and 3 do not meaningfully differ, and so are 

addressed collectively.

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and that the specification of the ’290 patent specifically 

defines an Internet browser as a “program.”

We agree with Appellees that the Board’s determination that Kikinis discloses the program of claims 2 and 3 

is supported by substantial evidence. Kikinis discloses 

that a user at the client computer can access files through 

the home page. Kikinis at 6:27–31; 7:26–8:10. The claims 

themselves do not contain any language that would 

require files to be accessed without the aid of server 

software. As the Board noted, B.E.’s expert admitted that 

a server requires some form of software in order to provide any files to the client computer. Microsoft Written 

Decision at *9. Therefore, the presence of intermediary 

software on the server does not preclude a finding of 

anticipation. See id. 

B.E.’s claim differentiation argument does not counsel 

otherwise. Claim differentiation “is a rebuttable presumption that may be overcome by a contrary construction dictated by the written description or prosecution 

history.” Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 

F.3d 1312, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In this case, the specification specifically defines a “browser” as “[a] program

that can communicate over a network using http or another protocol and that can display html information and 

other digital information.” ’290 patent col. 3 ll. 65–67 

(emphasis added). Thus, the written description of the

’290 patent dictates that an Internet browser is a “program,” and B.E. does not contest that the browser disclosed by Kikinis falls within the ’290 patent’s definition 

of “browser.” Accordingly, the Board’s finding that Kikinis discloses the claimed program is supported by substantial evidence. 

B.E. next argues that Kikinis does not anticipate 

claims 2 and 3 because Kikinis does not disclose that the 

home page contains links to specific files. Instead, B.E. 

argues, Kikinis discloses a system where the user selects 

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a link to a database, from which the user may access a 

specific document. Moreover, B.E. argues that it was 

improper for the Board to find that Kikinis’s databases 

could be the claimed files because, it alleges, that ground 

was not presented in the petition for review. 

Appellees respond that the Board’s finding is supported by substantial evidence because Kikinis discloses that 

the user home page contains links to specific files. Appellees further respond that the databases disclosed by 

Kikinis also meet that limitation.

We agree with Appellees that the Board’s finding that 

Kikinis discloses links to specific files is supported by 

substantial evidence. As the Board found, Kikinis specifically discloses that the home page has “on-screen links to 

electronic documents reserved for the home page ‘owner,’ 

such as e-mail and faxes.” Microsoft Written Decision at 

*10 (quoting Kikinis at 7:35–8:1). B.E.’s expert admitted 

that this passage discloses links to electronic documents. 

Id.; J.A. 3222. This evidence is sufficient to support the 

Board’s finding. Because the Board’s finding that Kikinis 

discloses links to specific files is supported by substantial 

evidence, we need not reach B.E.’s arguments relating to

Kikinis’s databases.

Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s determinations that claims 1–3 of the ’290 patent 

are unpatentable as anticipated by Kikinis. 

CONCLUSION

We have considered B.E.’s remaining arguments, but 

find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the 

decisions of the Board are affirmed. 

AFFIRMED

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