Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06341/USCOURTS-ca10-95-06341-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wayne E. Alley
Respondent
Terry Lynn Nichols
Petitioner
United States of America
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Court of Appcnb 

Tenth Circuit 

DEC 0 1 1995 

PATRICK FISHER ----=-~=~~===== Clerk 

TERRY LYNN NICHOLS, ) 

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Petitioner, 

v. No. 95-6341 

WAYNE E. ALLEY, District Judge, 

Respondent. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Real Party in Interest. 

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CR-95-llcr-A) 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Michael E. Tigar, Austin, Texas, Ronald G. Woods, Houston, Texas, 

and D. Kate Rubin, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (Adam Thurschwell, Of 

Counsel), for Petitioner. 

Patrick M. Ryan, United States Attorney, Jerome A. Holmes, 

Assistant U.S. Attorney, Joseph H. Hartzler, Larry A. Mackey, and 

Sean Connelly, Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Real Party in Interest. 

Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Norman, Oklahoma, for Respondent. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The motion for oral argument is 

therefore denied and the case ordered submitted on the briefs. 

Appellate Case: 95-6341 Document: 01019280227 Date Filed: 12/01/1995 Page: 1 
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

On April 19, 1995, a bomb exploded at the Alfred P. Murrah 

Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion destroyed the 

Murrah Building, killed 169 people, injured many others, and 

caused extensive damage in the surrounding vicinity. The 

explosion inflicted massive damage (upwards of $1,000,000) to the 

United States Federal Courthouse, which is located one block south 

of the Murrah building. Over one hundred windows shattered and 

were blown out. The explosion caused substantial damage to 

interior ceilings, walls, and fixtures. The explosion decimated 

the glass doors at the entrance to the courthouse. District court 

chambers located on the third and fourth floors along the north 

side of the courthouse, including Judge Alley's third floor 

chambers and courtroom, were heavily damaged. Flying glass 

damaged woodwork and furniture in Judge Alley's courtroom. Parts 

of the ceiling collapsed in Judge Alley's chambers. Plaster 

ceiling tiles fell from the office ceilings and light fixtures 

were dislodged and left hanging. The skylight in Judge Alley's 

courtroom shattered, covering the courtroom floor in an inch of 

broken glass. 

Although Judge Alley lost no family or friends in the 

bombing, the explosion slightly injured a member of his staff, and 

injured other court personnel. Some court personnel and employees 

had friends or relatives who were injured or killed in the Murrah 

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Appellate Case: 95-6341 Document: 01019280227 Date Filed: 12/01/1995 Page: 2 
building explosion. It is likely that other court personnel and 

two judges would have been severely injured had they been at their 

desks. 

Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were charged by grand jury 

indictment with the bombing. The indictment charges defendants 

with a total of eleven counts of violating the laws of the United 

States: one count of Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass 

Destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a; one count of the 

Use of a Weapon of Mass Destruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2332a and 2(a) & (b); one count of Destruction by Explosive in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 844(f) and 2(a) & (b); and eight counts 

of First Degree Murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1111 and 

2 (a) & (b) • 

Mr. McVeigh filed a motion for recusal of 

judge, the Honorable Wayne E. Alley, who had 

assigned to the case. Thereafter, Mr. Nichols 

the presiding 

been randomly 

filed his own 

recusal motion, arguing additional bases for recusal not presented 

by Mr. McVeigh. By order dated September 14, 1995, Judge Alley 

denied both recusal motions. Mr. Nichols then filed a petition 

for writ of mandamus with this court, seeking disqualification of 

all judges of the Western District of Oklahoma (including Judge 

Alley) or, in the alternative, an order directing Judge Alley to 

permit discovery and hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the 

factual bases for disqualification issues raised in the recusal 

motion. Thus, this matter is before us as an original proceeding 

in the nature of mandamus. 

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Appellate Case: 95-6341 Document: 01019280227 Date Filed: 12/01/1995 Page: 3 
An order denying a motion to recuse is interlocutory and is, 

therefore, not immediately appealable. Lopez v. Behles (In re 

American Ready Mix, Inc.), 14 F.3d 1497, 1499 (lOth Cir.), cert. 

denied, 115 S. Ct. 77 (1994). It is established in this circuit, 

however, that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle by which to 

challenge a district court's denial of a recusal motion. Id.; 

United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 996 n.9 (lOth Cir. 

1993) (collecting and comparing cases). Although a district 

court's denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed for an abuse of 

discretion, Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 

1488, 1508 (lOth Cir. 1995), because we are reviewing the district 

court's order by means of mandamus, the higher standard dictated 

by that writ governs our review, In re American Ready Mix, 14 F.3d 

at 1501. Mandamus is available only upon a showing of a clear and 

indisputable right to relief. Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 

F.3d 860, 864 (lOth Cir. 1994). A petitioner seeking mandamus 

relief must demonstrate a clear abuse of discretion, or conduct by 

the district court amounting to a usurpation of . judicial 

authority. Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 

309 (1989). "To ensure that mandamus remains an extraordinary 

remedy, petitioners must show that they lack adequate alternative 

means to obtain the relief they seek .... " Id. 

Mr. Nichols argues that Judge Alley's recusal is mandated by 

28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which states that a judge "shall disqualify 

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 

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Appellate Case: 95-6341 Document: 01019280227 Date Filed: 12/01/1995 Page: 4 
reasonably be questioned."l In order to "promote public 

confidence in the integrity of the judicial process," the statute 

was broadened in 1974 by replacing the subjective standard with an 

objective test. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 

U.S. 847, 858 n.7 (1988). "[W]hat matters is not the reality of 

bias or prejudice but its appearance." Liteky v. United States, 

114 S. Ct. 1147, 1154 (1994). Given the statutory parameters, we 

must determine "'whether a reasonable person, knowing all the 

relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's 

impartiality.'" Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993 (quoting United States v. 

Burger, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (lOth Cir. 1992) (further quotation 

omitted)); see also Maez, 54 F.3d at 1508; United States v. 

Greenspan 26 F.3d 1001, 1005 (lOth Cir. 1994); Hinman v. Rogers, 

831 F.2d 937, 939 (lOth Cir. 1987). 

The goal of section 455(a) is to avoid even the 

appearance of partiality. If it would appear to a 

reasonable person that a judge has knowledge of facts 

that would give him an interest in the litigation then 

an appearance of partiality is created even though no 

actual partiality exists because the judge does not 

recall the facts, because the judge actually has no 

interest in the case or because the judge is pure in 

heart and incorruptible. 

Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860 (quotation omitted). In applying this 

objective standard, the initial inquiry is whether a reasonable 

factual basis exists for questioning the judge's impartiality. 

Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993. We are limited in this regard to outward 

manifestations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. 

1 Mr. Nichols also urges 

prejudice under 28 U.S.C. 

disposition under § 455(a), 

statutory arguments. 

recusal based on 

§§ 144 & 455 (b) (1). 

we do not reach 

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actual bias and 

In light of our 

these remaining 

Appellate Case: 95-6341 Document: 01019280227 Date Filed: 12/01/1995 Page: 5 
"In applying§ 455(a), the judge's actual state of mind, purity of 

heart, incorruptibility, or lack of partiality are not the issue." 

Having stated what § 455(a) is intended to accomplish and the 

standards for analyzing a recusal motion under that statute, we 

now note the cautions that must accompany our analysis. The 

statute "'must not be so broadly construed that it becomes, in 

effect, presumptive, so that recusal is mandated upon the merest 

unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice.'" Id. 

(quoting Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (lOth Cir. 

1986) (further quotation omitted)). Neither is the statute 

intended to bestow veto power over judges or to be used as a judge 

shopping device. Greenspan, 26 F.3d at 1006; Cooley, 1 F.3d at 

993. Further, we are mindful that a judge has as strong a duty to 

sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to 

recuse when the law and facts require. Greenspan, 26 F.3d at 

1005; In re American Ready Mix, Inc., 14 F.3d at 1501; Hinman, 831 

F.2d at 939. 

We begin our application of the legal standards to these 

facts by recognizing that cases within§ 455(a) are extremely fact 

driven "and must be judged on [their] unique facts and 

circumstances more than by comparison to situations considered in 

prior jurisprudence." United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 

(5th Cir. 1995). As a starting point, in Cooley this court 

compiled a nonexhaustive list of various matters not ordinarily 

sufficient to require§ 455(a) recusal: 

(1) Rumor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, 

suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters; (2) 

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the mere fact that a judge has previously expressed an 

opinion on a point of law or has expressed a dedication 

to upholding the law or a determination to impose severe 

punishment within the limits of the law upon those found 

guilty of a particular offense; (3) prior rulings in the 

proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they 

were adverse; (4) mere familiarity with the 

defendant(s), or the type of charge, or kind of defense 

presented; (5) baseless personal attacks on or suits 

against the judge by a party; (6) reporters' personal 

opinions or characterizations appearing in the media, 

media notoriety, and reports in the media purporting to 

be factual, such as quotes attributed to the judge or 

others, but which are in fact false or materially 

inaccurate or misleading; and (7) threats or other 

attempts to intimidate the judge. 

1 F.3d at 993-94 (citations omitted). We are faced with none of 

those circumstances here. Neither do we have a case in which a 

judge is threatened and the judge determines that recusal is at 

least one of the movant's objectives. Greenspan, 26 F.3d at 1006. 

Further, all of the reasons Mr. Nichols asserts for recusal under 

§ 455(a) arise from extra-judicial sources, a consideration the 

Supreme Court recently held should be a factor in our analysis. 

The Court held, however, that acquisition of alleged bias or 

prejudice from extra-judicial sources is neither a necessary nor 

sufficient condition for§ 455(a) recusal. Liteky, 114 S. Ct. at 

1157. 

Needless to say, there is no case with similar facts to which 

we can look for guidance in our application of the law to the 

facts in this case. Both the government and Judge Alley, in his 

invited response to the mandamus petition, point to several cases 

in which courts have held that the situation was not such that a 

judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Those cases 

are all legally sound, strong authority for the general principles 

for which they are cited. Unfortunately, however, they do not 

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particularly aid our analysis because, as we stated previously, 

our determination in this case is extremely fact driven, and all 

those cases, in addition to those uncovered by our own research, 

are factually inapposite. If the question of whether§ 455(a) 

requires disqualification is a close one, the balance tips in 

favor of recusal. United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344, 1349 

(6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1188 (1994). 

In light of the settled principle that a judge has as strong 

an obligation not to recuse when the situation does not require as 

he has to recuse when it is necessary, we commend Judge Alley for 

his integrity in upholding what he sees as his clear judicial 

duty. There is certainly no allegation here of judicial 

impropriety; Judge Alley has conducted himself and these 

proceedings with true professionalism. Were the standard by which 

we must judge this case a subjective one, we could end our 

discussion here. But our task is to address the objective 

requirements of § 455(a). 

The government maintains that no reasonable person could have 

a basis for questioning the judge's impartiality. We disagree. 

We conclude based on the extraordinary circumstances of this case 

that a "reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would 

harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." Cooley, 1 F.3d at 

993. Judge Alley's courtroom and chambers were one block away 

from the epicenter of a massive explosion that literally rocked 

downtown Oklahoma City, heavily damaged the Murrah building, 

killed 169 people, and injured many others. The blast crushed the 

courthouse's glass doors, shattered numerous windows, ripped 

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plaster from ceilings, dislodged light fixtures, showered floors 

with glass, damaged Judge Alley's courtroom and chambers, and 

injured a member of his staff, as well as other court personnel 

and their families. Based on these circumstances, we conclude 

that a reasonable person could not help but harbor doubts about 

the impartiality of Judge Alley. Because Judge Alley's 

"impartiality might reasonably be questioned" in the instant case, 

28 U.S.C. § 455(a) mandates recusal. 

Based on the extraordinary facts of this case, we further 

conclude that Mr. Nichols has satisfied the demanding standard for 

mandamus relief and has established a clear and indisputable right 

to relief. See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 309; In re Weston, 18 F.3d at 

864. Further, Mr. Nichols has no adequate alternative means to 

obtain the relief he seeks. See Mallard, 490 U.S. at 309. 

Consequently, we hold that Mr. Nichols has discharged his burden 

of proving he is entitled to a writ of mandamus. 

As the Fifth Circuit concluded in Jordan, "[p]ublic respect 

for the judiciary demands this result." 49 F.3d at 157. The 

effect of our decision today may, indeed, be to "bar trial by [a] 

judge[] who ha[s] no actual bias and who would do [his] very best 

to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. 

But to perform its high function in the best way justice must 

satisfy the appearance of justice." Id. (quotation omitted). In 

reachi.ng this result, we have considered the totality of the 

circumstances and looked to the future of this case. United 

States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459, 464 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 429 

u.s. 951 (1976). We have also balanced the possible questioning 

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of impartiality by a reasonable person against the relative ease 

of replacing Judge Alley with an available judge from a very large 

pool of judges outside the State of Oklahoma. 

Finally, we have considered and reject as meritless all other 

arguments raised. The petition for writ of mandamus solely as it 

pertains to the named respondent is GRANTED, and the matter is 

referred to the Chief Judge for the Tenth Circuit for 

reassignment. See Texaco v. Chandler, 354 F.2d 655, 657 (lOth 

Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) .2 

SO ORDERED. 

2 Petitioner's request to file a reply brief is denied. The 

Petitioner's motion to supplement the record is denied. 

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