Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_24-cv-06125/USCOURTS-arwd-6_24-cv-06125-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arkansas State Police
Defendant
Bill Bryant
Defendant
Ron Casey
Defendant
Chris Chapmond
Defendant
Matthew Cheatham
Defendant
Hot Springs Police Department
Defendant
Michelle Lawrence
Defendant
Tana McCoy
Plaintiff
Office of the Prosecutor
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

TANA McCOY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 6:24-cv-06125 

 

HOT SPRINGS POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, et al DEFENDANTS 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendant Bill Bryant’s in his official capacity as Director of Arkansas 

State Police (“Bryant), and Ron Casey’s, in his official capacity as Corporal of the Arkansas State 

Police (“Casey”) Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 9. Plaintiff has not responded to the Motion. 

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3), the Honorable Susan O. Hickey, 

Chief United States District Judge, referred this case to the undersigned for the purpose of making

this Report and Recommendation. 

I. Background: 

This is a civil rights action filed by Plaintiff, Tana McCoy, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. Plaintiff maintains her rights under the Fourth, 

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated by the Defendants. Plaintiff has named as 

Defendants the Hot Springs Police Department and the Arkansas State Police, along with Chief 

Chris Chapmond (“Chapmond”), Detective Matthew Cheatham (“Cheatham”), Director Bill 

Bryant (“Bryant”), and Corporal Ron Casey (“Casey”) all in their Official Capacities. ECF No. 

1. Plaintiff also named the Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County and Prosecuting Attorney 

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Michelle Lawrence in her “Personal” and Official Capacity.0F

1 Id. Plaintiff’s lawsuit seeks 

damages as a result of an incident wherein Plaintiff was arrested for operating a stolen vehicle. 

Plaintiff claims she was the actual owner of the vehicle. Id. 

II. Applicable Law: 

A party may move to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a pleading must 

provide “a short and plain statement of the claim that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twonbly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). The complaint’s factual allegations are 

assumed true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in Plaintiff’s favor, “even if it strikes a savvy 

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. The Court, 

however, need not “blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleader from the facts.” 

Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 14486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). 

The complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S.). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. “Though pro se complaints are to be construed liberally, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 

U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285 (1976), they still must allege sufficient facts to support the claims 

advanced.” Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir.2004). 

1 The Court has dismissed all claims against Defendants Lawrence, Office of the Prosecutor of Garland County, the 

Hot Springs Police Department, and the Arkansas State Police. ECF No. 16. 

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III. Discussion: 

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action for the deprivation, under color of law, of 

a citizen’s “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United 

States. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) each defendant 

acted under color of state law and that (2) he or she violated a right secured by the constitution. 

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir.1999). 

Defendants Bryant and Casey contend (1) sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff's official capacity 

claims against them and (2) Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim as a 

matter of law. ECF No. 9.

 A. Sovereign Immunity

Plaintiff only sued Bryant and Casey in their official capacities. ECF No. 1, pg. 6. “A 

suit against a government official in his or her official capacity is another way of pleading an action 

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Baker v. Chisom, 501 F.3d 920, 925 (8th Cir. 

2007) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 

611 (1978)). In this case, Bryant and Casey, as employees of the Arkansas State Police, are agents 

of the State of Arkansas. However, “[n]either a state nor its officials acting in their official 

capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983” when sued for money damages. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State 

Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Thus, state officials may only 

be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 

157-60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908); Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, 

68 F.3d 253, 255 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Ex parte Young recognized that suits may be brought in federal 

court against state officials in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief to prevent 

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future violations of federal law.”). Here, Plaintiff requests money damages for relief. Because 

money damages are not available against Bryant and Casey in their official capacities as employees 

of the Arkansas State Police, Plaintiff's official capacity claims against Bryant and Casey fail as a 

matter of law.

Exceptions to the reach of the Eleventh Amendment exist only when the state has 

unequivocally waived its immunity or Congress has abrogated the immunity. Hutto v. Finney, 

437 U.S. 678, 693 (1978). The State of Arkansas has not waived its sovereign immunity. See 

e.g., Hadley v. North Ark. Cmty. Tech. Coll., 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996). Nor did 

Congress abrogate sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 

345 (1979). 

B. Failure to State a Claim1F

2

Defendants also argue Plaintiff’s complaint does not allege any personal involvement by 

either Bryant or Casey and therefore must be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure 

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In determining whether an action fails to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the 

Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of 

truth. Ashcroft, 566 U.S. 678. These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of 

the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” Id. Second, 

the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 679. A 

plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” Id.

2 Although Plaintiff specifically named these Defendants in their official capacity only, the court will 

address this argument as if Plaintiff also named the Defendants also in their Individual capacity.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint stems from a traffic stop in which it was discovered her vehicle was 

reported stolen. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges her vehicle was wrongly impounded and then 

delivered to another individual who forged a title transferring ownership of the vehicle to himself. 

Id. Plaintiff seeks damages for replacement of her vehicle, lost wages, punitive damages, and 

pain and suffering. Id. According to the Complaint, Plaintiff sent multiple emails to Defendant 

Casey expressing her concern about the quality of the investigation of this matter. ECF No. 1, 

pg. 15. Plaintiff’s allegation against Casey is that Casey told her that Arkansas State Police would 

“not get involved in a local investigation regardless of the level of incompetence, unfairness, or 

violations of Constitutional rights of arrestees.” Id. Plaintiff’s only allegation against Defendant

Bryant is that he “is charged with supervising employees, ensuring adequate training and effecting 

policies and customs that directly lead to the violation of Plaintiff’s Constitutional right to due 

process.” ECF No. 1-1.

To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege a violation of a 

constitutional right committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Andrews v. City of 

West Branch, Iowa, 454 F.3d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2006). “Suits against officials in 

their individual capacity seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions 

he takes under color of state law.” Handt v. Lynch, 681 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 

2012) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). To establish liability against 

officials in their individual capacity, “the plaintiff must show that the official, acting under color 

of state law caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Id. at 943 (citing Graham, 473 U.S. at 166) 

(emphasis added); see also Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128, 1132 (8th Cir. 

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2006) (“Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the 

deprivation of rights.”). 

In reviewing the Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege that either Bryant or Casey had any 

direct involvement in the incident giving rise to her alleged claims. At best her claims against 

these Defendants are limited to an allegation of failing to control or supervise the post-incident 

investigation. A claim of deprivation of a constitutional right cannot be based on a respondeat 

superior theory of liability. See Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 

(1978). “[A] supervisor is not vicariously liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an employee's 

unconstitutional activity.” White v. Holmes, 21 F.3d 277, 280 (8th Cir. 1994). Supervisors can 

“incur liability ... for their personal involvement in a constitutional violation, or when their 

corrective inaction amounts to deliberate indifference or tacit authorization of the violative 

practices.” Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir. 2010). 

Here, Plaintiff did not allege Defendants Bryant or Casey were present or involved in this 

incident when it occurred. Nor does she allege that the Defendants had notice that any training 

procedures and supervision were inadequate and likely to result in a constitutional violation. 

IV. Conclusion: 

Accordingly, I recommend Defendants Bryant and Casey’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 

9) be GRANTED and Plaintiff's case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE against them.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation 

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file 

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties 

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by 

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the district court.

DATED this 21st day of November 2024. 

 /s/ Barry A. Bryant 

 HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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