Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aly Mohsen
Defendant
Amr Mohsen
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CASE NO. CR. 03-0095 WBS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 1-3 

 10, 19, AND 20

AMR MOHSEN and ALY MOHSEN,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendants Amr and Aly Mohsen (“Defendants”) move to

dismiss counts 1-3, 10, 19, and 20 of the March 15, 2005

Superseding Indictment. In support of this motion, defendants

argue that counts 2 and 3 are multiplicitous; counts 1, 10, and

19 fail to allege materiality as an element of the offense; and

the prosecution of count 20 was not commenced by a judicial

officer as required under 18 U.S.C. § 3148(c). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts are well known to the parties and have been

reiterated by the court several times in recent motions. 

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Proving a conception date earlier than the date the 1

patent was filed is important for preventing articles and other

inventions from being considered “prior” art that can invalidate

the patent by rendering it obvious or anticipated. See Am.

Standard v. Pfizer, 722 F. Supp. 86 (D. Del. 1989).

2

Therefore, an abbreviated set of facts is set forth below.

On February 26, 1998, Aptix sued QuickTurn Design

Systems (hereinafter “QuickTurn”) for infringement of its ‘069

patent. Between April and December of 1998, defendants, who are

brothers, allegedly engaged in a series of actions that are the

basis for the charges at issue in this motion. The parties in

the lawsuit contested the authenticity of two notebooks, one

allegedly written in 1988 and another in 1989, that included

information about the date that the inventor conceived of the

patented invention. Some time after discovery began, Judge Alsup 1

held an evidentiary hearing about the notebooks and determined

that, “Amr Mohsen, the founder, chairman, chief executive

officer, and lead inventor of Aptix Corporation, fabricated the

entire 1988 Notebook, numerous entries in the 1989 Notebook, the

three corroborative entries in his Daytimer and the rest of the

post-theft ‘corroboration’ – all in an effort to defraud

defendant and this Court.” Aptix v. QuickTurn, 2000 WL 852813,

at *23 (N.D. Cal. 2000). 

On March 15, 2005, the grand jury returned a

superseding indictment (only the counts relevant to this motion

are listed here). Defendants Aly and Amr Mohsen are charged with

conspiracy to obstruct justice and to commit perjury in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1) and obstruction of justice in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Count 19). Defendant Amr Mohsen

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3

is also charged separately with perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1621 (Counts 2-3), subornation of perjury in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1622 (Count 10), and contempt of court in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (Count 20).

II. Discussion

An indictment must inform the defendant of “the nature

and cause of the accusation in order that he may meet it and

prepare for trial, and after judgment, be able to plead the

record and judgment in bar of a further prosecution for the same

offense.” Wong Tai v. United States, 273 U.S. 77, 80-81 (1927). 

Additionally, the indictment serves to “ensure that the defendant

is being prosecuted on the basis of facts presented to the grand

jury and to allow the court to determine the sufficiency of the

indictment.” United States v. Lane, 765 F.2d 1376, 1380 (1985). 

A. Multiplicity of counts 2-3

Defendants contend that counts 2 and 3 of the

indictment charge defendant for the same offense and are

therefore multiplicitous. (Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts 1-3,

10, 19, and 20 at 3.) They ask that, as a remedy, the court

order the government to elect between these counts. (Id. at 6.) 

Where counts of an indictment are found to be multiplicitous, the

court in its discretion may require election either before trial

or after trial before imposition of sentence. See Ball v. United

States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985); United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d

1420, 1426 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484,

491 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Luskin, 926 F.2d 372, 378

(4th Cir. 1991); but see United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922

F.2d 934, 982 (2nd Cir. 1990).

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Defendant correctly notes that in United States v. 2

Salas-Camacho, 859 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1988) the Ninth

Circuit set out a different two-part test for determining whether

multiplicitous counts for making false statements under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001 are permissible (“The first is whether a declarant was

asked the same question and gave the same answer. The second

element is whether later false statements further impaired the

operations of the government.”) That test, however, applies

where the defendant is charged with making precisely the same

statement at two different times. It is inapplicable to the

circumstances here.

4

For some of the reasons expressed by the Tenth Circuit

in affirming the district court’s refusal to require the

government to elect between multiplicitous counts prior to trial,

this court in the exercise of its discretion will make its

determination on the issue of multiplicity now, rather than wait

until after verdict. See Johnson, 130 F.3d, at 1426 (“The risk

of a trial court not requiring pretrial election is that it ‘may

falsely suggest to a jury that a defendant has committed not one

but several crimes.’”) However, the court’s ruling at this stage

of the proceeding will be subject to reconsideration on the

motion of the defendant after the verdict but before judgment in

the event that the jury should return a verdict of guilty on both

counts 2 and 3.

“The test for multiplicity—charging a single offense in

more than one count—is whether each separately violated statutory

provision ‘requires proof of an additional fact which the other

does not.’” United States v. McKittrick, 142 F.3d 1170, 1176

(9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S.

299, 304 (1932)); see also United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329

F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003). In Gebhard v. United States, 422 2

F.2d 281, 290 (9th Cir. 1970), the Ninth Circuit found that

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perjury counts were multiplicitous when, “for all practical

purposes,” they were based upon the same question. As an

illustration, the following exchange was deemed multiplicitous by

the court in Gebhard:

Count 3: [Question:] Did you ever receive a

transmitter, receiver or both from Jacobs? 

Answer: No. 

Count 4. [Question:] Did Jacobs give you a device to be

repaired? 

Answer. No.

Gebhard, 422 F.2d at 290. 

Although the questions asked were not identical, the

court in Gebhard reasoned that a “[s]ingle punishment for a

single lie should suffice,” and that Count 3 was based on the

same question, practically speaking, as the question implicated

by Count 4. The court did not elaborate on its finding that the

questions were the same, but it is clear that each separately

violated statutory provision does not require “proof of an

additional fact which the other does not.” McKittrick, 142 F.3d

at 1176. This was because evidence that proved the second

question would conclusively prove the first. Looking at the

plain language of the questions, it is evident that if Jacobs had

given the defendant a transmitter, receiver, or both, Jacobs

would have given the defendant a device to be repaired. Thus,

after receiving an answer to the second question, the answer to

the first would be apparent, and both questions address the same

underlying issue. Therefore, the defendant’s answers could only

support one count of perjury.

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6

In the case presently before the court, Counts 2 and 3

each relate to different questions asked of defendant Amr Mohsen

in the a deposition held on April 29, 1999. (Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss Counts 4.) Count 2 is based upon the following

questioning:

Question: Did you ever deliver the original notebooks

to [Aptix’s attorneys] or an independent expert so that

they could do an independent test on those notebooks to

see what the test on those notebooks would show?

Answer: No.

Question: You never did that yourself?

Answer: No.

Count 3, on the other hand, is based upon this exchange:

Question: Other than the limited periods of time

necessary to make copies by both your lawyers and

[QuickTurn’s lawyers], were the original of those

notebooks ever out of your possession?

Answer: No.

Unlike the questioning in Gebhard, the second question asked of

defendant did not fully encompass the first, nor did the first

question fully encompass the second. Proving the falsity of each

of his answers requires proof of an additional fact which the

other does not. 

The first question asked whether defendant delivered

the notebooks to an independent expert so that the expert could

do tests on them. The second question asked if the notebooks

were ever out of defendant’s possession. He could have delivered

the notebooks to an expert for testing without giving up

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possession of them. Conversely, the notebooks could have left

his possession under some circumstances other than giving them to

an expert for testing. Indeed, the government represents that

intends to prove just that, i.e., (1) that defendant delivered

the notebooks to an expert for testing while defendant remained

present, thus not surrendering possession of them, and (2) that

defendant surrendered possession of the notebooks on a separate

occasion conceivably for other purposes. 

The test is whether each offense requires proof of an

additional fact that the other does not. United States v.

Kennedy, 726 F.2d 546, 547-48 (9th Cir. 1984). Because counts 2

and 3 meet that test, they are not multiplicitous and the

government need not elect between them. 

A. Motion to dismiss Counts 1, 10, and 19 for failure 

 to allege materiality

Next, defendants move to dismiss Counts 1, 10, and 19

for failure to allege materiality of these counts in the

indictment. As an initial matter, the government concedes that

count 10 is deficient for failure to allege materiality as an

element of the offense. Therefore, the court finds that count 10

is deficient and should be dismissed from the indictment.

However, materiality is not an element of Count 19,

obstruction of justice. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503; see also United

States v. Ruggiero, 934 F.2d 440, 446 (2d Cir. 1991) (“18 U.S.C.

§ 1503 contains no materiality element.”); United States v.

Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Under [§ 1503],

the government need only establish that a witness has

deliberately attempted to frustrate a grand jury’s investigation,

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Defendant cites United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 3

710 (7th Cir. 1999) for the proposition that materiality “becomes

a focus of inquiry” in obstruction of justice that is founded

upon perjury. (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Counts 4.) However,

elements are the requirements of a crime, and “in order for a

jury trial of a crime to be proper, all elements of the crime

must be proved to the jury (and . . . proved beyond a reasonable

doubt).” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000)

(Thomas, J., concurring). The fact that materiality may become a

focus of inquiry on the charge of obstruction does not establish

that it is an element of the crime that must be proven to the

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendants do not cite any cases

that establish that materiality is an element of obstruction of

justice. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Count 19 for failure

to allege materiality should be denied. 

8

not that the statements made were false or material” (internal

citations omitted).); United States v. Rankin, 1 F. Supp. 2d 445,

454 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Materiality is not an element of § 1503).3

Therefore, Count 19 should not be dismissed.

Count 1 requires a slightly different inquiry, because

it encompasses conspiracy to obstruct justice and to commit

perjury. (Mar. 15, 2005 Superseding Indictment.) “An indictment

charging a conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 should allege an

agreement, the unlawful object toward which the agreement is

directed, and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” 

Lane, 765 F.2d at 1380. In addition, “[c]ourts do not require as

detailed a statement of an offense’s elements under a conspiracy

count as under a substantive count.” United States v. Tavelman,

650 F.2d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Wong Tai, 273 U.S. at

81; United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 360-61 (9th Cir.

1976); United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th Cir.

1979).) Thus, even if a perjury charge should be dismissed for

failure to allege materiality, the same would not necessarily

hold for a conspiracy charge.

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In Lane, the court found that an indictment

sufficiently stated a conspiracy charge even though it was

lengthy, confusing, and lacked explicit allegations concerning

one portion of the government’s theory of the case. Lane, 765

F.2d at 1380 (1985). The court was persuaded of the sufficiency

of the indictment by the fact that a particular type of

conspiracy was alleged, and there was a recitation of overt acts

“sufficient to apprise Lane of the facts upon which the charges

were based and what the government would attempt to prove at

trial.” Id. 

The test here is whether the indictment informs

defendants of the charges before them such that he can adequately

prepare for trial, enables defendants to recognize instances of

double jeopardy, ensures that defendants are tried on the basis

of facts that were presented to the grand jury, and allows the

court to determine the sufficiency of the indictment. Id. In

Count 1 of the instant case, the Superseding Indictment alleges

that defendants “did knowingly and intentionally conspire to . .

. commit perjury in testimony given in connection with the Aptix

case, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1621.” (Mar. 15, 2005

Superseding Indictment ¶ 19.) In addition, the indictment also

describes the factual basis for the count and provides specific

information about the circumstances in which defendants “made

material false statements under oath.” (Id. ¶ 20.) The

indictment also provides citations to the statutes for the

underlying offenses. (Id.) Here, defendants have been given

more information in the indictment than was included in the

indictment in Lane, and this information is sufficient to allow

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 Indeed, defendant must rely solely on dicta in United 4

States v. Herrera, 29 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Tex. 1998), to make

his point. Herrera involved a pretrial services officer’s

attempt to initiate revocation of pretrial release pursuant to

the government attorney’s power to do so under 18 U.S.C. §

3148(b). Id. at 757. In deciding whether the pretrial services

officer had such power, the court opined “[t]hat § 3148(b)

authorizes only the attorney for the government to initiate a

revocation proceeding, and § 3148(c) empowers only the judicial

officer to commence a prosecution for contempt . . . .” Id. at

760-61 (emphasis added). The court finds this interpretation,

put forth without any analysis of subsection c, unpersuasive. 

Moreover, that court’s understanding of 3148(c) does not

foreclose the federal prosecutor’s ability to file an indictment

for contempt because, as the discussion in the text further

10

defendant to prepare for trial and recognize instances of double

jeopardy. The facts to be proven at trial were also presented to

the grand jury, as clearly demonstrated by the description of the

specific instances of perjury upon which Count 1 is based. 

Therefore, the court finds that Count 1 of the indictment is

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 

B. Motion to dismiss Count 20 for improper

prosecution

Defendant likewise cannot succeed on his motion to

dismiss Count 20, in which he is charged with contempt of court

for allegedly violating the conditions of his release. 

Defendant unconvincingly argues that 18 U.S.C. § 3148(c),

empowering “judicial officers” to “commence a prosecution for

contempt . . . if the [defendant] has violated a condition of

release,” delineates the government’s power to prosecute contempt

in its entirety and, by bestowing the power on “judicial

officers,” necessarily withholds this power from federal

prosecutors. Such a limitation upon the executive’s power to

pursue criminal contempt charges runs contrary to case precedent.4

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explains, the government attorney’s authority has never been

rooted in the Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3160.

11

In Steinert v. United States District Court for the

District of Nevada, 543 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1976), the Ninth

Circuit addressed the question posed by defendant here: whether

criminal contempt can be prosecuted by an indictment. The court

answered affirmatively, reasoning that “[a] prosecutor should be

able to seek indictments in such cases independently of any

directive of the court.” Id. at 71 n.1; see also United States

v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 838 (5th Cir. 1980) (“Criminal

contempt charges may be initiated by indictment . . . without any

prior or precipitating action by the court.”). Notably, the

court held that this power arose from 18 U.S.C. § 401, which

recognizes that disobedience of a court order is a punishable

offense. Steinert, 543 F.2d at 70; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401(3). 

Also significant in the instant case, the Fifth Circuit, relying

on Steinert, has recognized that the power to prosecute contempt

through an indictment encompasses contempts founded on a

defendant’s failure to adhere to the conditions of release. 

Williams, 622 F.2d at 839 (“18 U.S.C. 401(3) provides punishment

for the violation of any lawful court order, including orders

entered pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) restricting travel.”).

In the superseding indictment, the government in the

instant case charged defendant in Count 20 with contempt for

violating the conditions of his release “by applying for an

Egyptian passport . . . and by thereafter failing to surrender

said passport to the Court . . . .” (Mar. 15, 2005 Superseding

Indictment ¶ 44.) Under Steinert and Williams, and pursuant to

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18 U.S.C. 401(3), the government’s initiation of this charge via

indictment was unquestionably proper.

Defendant argues that the 1984 amendments to the Bail

Reform Act, which, as noted above, gave “judicial officers” the

power to initiate contempt proceedings, necessarily worked a

change in the law that undermined the federal prosecutor’s power

recognized in Steinert. However, the provision cited by

defendant, § 3148(c), was not intended to have such a sweeping

effect. Section 3148(c) was designed to respond to “criticisms

of the [existing] Bail Reform Act [that it had] fail[ed] to

provide adequate sanctions for the violation of release

conditions.” S. Rep. 98-225, at 34 (1983), as reprinted in 1984

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3217. The amendments thus merely sought to

provide those sanctions. Id. These changes aside, Congress

simply intended that it “carr[y] forward the provisions of

existing 18 U.S.C. § 3151”, which once read “Nothing in this

chapter shall interfere with or prevent the exercise by any court

of the United States of its power to punish for contempt.” Id.

at 36; Brown v. United States, 410 F.2d 212, 217 n.10 (5th Cir.

1969).

Since “[c]riminal contempt is a crime in the ordinary

sense,” the court here is guided by “a presumption against a

congressional intention to limit the power of the Attorney

General to prosecute offenses under the criminal laws of the

United States.” Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968);

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d 1356, 1366 (9th

Cir. 1987). Both the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have

noted that while Congress may reassign prosecutorial

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 As the government notes, the plain language of § 3148(c) 5

is not restrictive. The provision states in full that “[t]he

judicial officer may commence a prosecution for contempt, under

13

responsibility, “[t]o graft such an exception upon the criminal

law . . . require[s] a clear and unambiguous expression of the

legislative will.” Gen. Dynamics Corp., 828 F.2d at 1366

(quoting United States v. Morgan, 222 U.S. 274, 282 (1911)). 

Significantly then, nowhere in the legislative history cited

above did Congress express an intent to overrule cases such as

Steinert and Williams or to limit the federal prosecutor’s power

to initiate contempt proceedings. Indeed, as those cases did not

base the power of the government attorney to pursue criminal

contempt charges by indictment on the Bail Reform Act, the

possibility that § 3148(c) might interfere with this authority

was likely never discussed. 

Accordingly, the provisions of the Bail Reform Act

addressing release and detention pending judicial proceedings do

not divest federal prosecutors of authority, pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 401(3), to pursue criminal contempt charges using an

indictment. Provisions like § 3148(c) entrust courts “with the

power to initiate contempt proceedings to ensure that the

judiciary is not utterly dependent upon the other branches of

government to vindicate judicial authority.” United States v.

Neal, 101 F.3d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Young v. United

States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793, 795-96

(1987) (discussing the courts’ “inherent authority to initiate

contempt proceedings”)). But, section 3148(c) did not vest in

courts the sole power to commence criminal contempt proceedings.5

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section 401 of this title, if the person has violated a condition

of release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3148. This reads like a grant of a

unique prosecutorial power to the court, a power it does not

typically have, and in no way suggests an intent to limit the

government attorney’s power to prosecute the crime of contempt. 

Government attorneys, unlike courts, already had the power to

“commence a prosecution for contempt, under section 401” prior to

the 1984 amendments to the Bail Reform Act. Cf. United States v.

Roland, No. 05-111, 2005 WL 2318866, at *8-9 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31,

2005) (reasoning that Congress’ decision that one official “may”

do something does not mean that “only” that official may perform

the act and holding, contrary to Herrera, that the court may

initiate revocation proceedings under section 3148(b) on a

petition filed by the pretrial services officer, despite language

suggesting that the government attorney must file the petition). 

14

See also United States v. Doe, 125 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1997)

(recognizing the government’s power to file an information

charging a defendant with criminal contempt when the court was

not asked to initiate such proceedings in the underlying trial);

United States v. Armstrong, 781 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1986)

(recognizing the long-standing “power of the grand jury to

initiate contempt charges without any prior action by the

court”). 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, Counts 2 and 3 are not

multiplicitous; Count 10 is insufficiently alleged; Counts 1 and

19 are sufficiently alleged in the indictment and do not need to

allege materiality; and Count 20 was not improperly prosecuted. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

require the government elect between Counts 2 and 3 of the

indictment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED without prejudice

of the right of the defendant to renew the motion at the end of

trial before judgment and sentencing if the jury should return a

verdict of guilty on both counts 2 and 3.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss Count 10 of the indictment be, and the same hereby is,

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss Counts 1, 19, and 20 of the indictment be, and the same

hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: December 22, 2005

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