Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-03418/USCOURTS-cand-3_96-cv-03418-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lockheed Martin Corporation
Counter-claimant
Space Systems/Loral
Counter-defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SPACE SYSTEMS/LORAL, INC.,

Plaintiff,

 v.

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP.,

Defendant. /

No. C 96-03418 SI

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

OF INVALIDITY OF U.S. PATENT NO.

4,537,375

On February 3, 2006, the Court heard argument on two motions for summary judgment brought

by defendant Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed”). The motions seek to have the patent at issue,

U.S. Patent No. 4,537,375 (“the ’375 patent”), declared invalid based on two separate provisions of 35

U.S.C. § 102. Having considered the arguments of the parties and the papers submitted, and for good

cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES Lockheed’s motions.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Space Systems/Loral, Inc. (“SSL”) is the owner of the ’375 patent. In 1995, SSL filed

suit against Lockheed Martin (“Lockheed”) for patent infringement. In 1998, SSL amended its

complaint to add claims based upon Lockheed’s alleged infringement of the ’375 patent. Lockheed’s

infringement of the ’375 patent is the only claim remaining in this lawsuit.

The Federal Circuit has described the ’375 patent as follows:

Loral is the owner of the ’375 patent for an improved method of maintaining the

orientation and attitude of a satellite in space. Satellites in orbit around the earth tend to

be pulled out of their proper position by the gravitational effects of the sun, earth, and

moon. To maintain the requisite position the satellite conducts “station-keeping

maneuvers” by firing its thrusters, based upon measurements of its position. However,

the station-keeping maneuvers may over-correct or may introduce new errors in position

and orientation, and the general procedure has been to conduct a second firing to correct

the errors of the first firing. These procedures require fuel, the on-board supply of which

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FACC had been the primary contractor involved with the development of INTELSAT V, the

predecessor to INTELSAT VI. It appears that FACC submitted a bid to develop INTELSAT VI, but

that the contract was ultimately awarded to Hughes Aircraft. It is undisputed that FACC’s proposal to

develop INTELSAT VI did not include the design described by the MBB Proposal.

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is limited, and limits the useful life of the satellite. The ’375 patent is directed to a

method of reducing the fuel consumption during station-keeping, by enhancing the

efficiency of the corrective procedure.

According to the ’375 patent, the satellite first estimates the probable correction

based on historical data from prior station-keeping maneuvers, and conducts a first firing

of the thrusters based on the estimated correction. This is called the “prebias” step of the

modulating response. After the prebias firing, the satellite measures the remaining actual

error in its position, adds the actual error to the historical error, and conducts a second

firing. This procedure overall uses less fuel than the prior method whereby a first firing

was calculated to attempt full correction, followed by a second firing. The fuel saving

that is achieved extends the life of the satellite.

Space Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 405 F.3d 985, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Space Sys. v.

Lockheed Martin Corp., 271 F.3d 1076, 1077-78 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

At a recent point in this litigation – the precise circumstances remain unclear – Lockheed made

the discovery that has led to the instant motions. Lockheed discovered that in 1981 MesserschmittBölkow-Blohm GmbH (“MBB”) created a proposal for a new satellite attitude determination and control

system (“ADCS”) that described a system substantially similar to the invention disclosed by the ’375

patent. MBB submitted the proposal (“MBB Proposal”) to the Ford Aerospace and Communications

Corporation (“FACC”), SSL’s predecessor, in connection with FACC’s preparation to bid on the

development of a next generation communications satellite for the International Telecommunications

Satellite Organization (“INTELSAT”). This new satellite was referred to as INTELSAT VI.1

After discovering the MBB Proposal, Lockheed brought two motions for summary judgment.

The first motion claims that the MBB Proposal constituted an offer for sale of the invention disclosed

in the ’375 patent made over a year before the ’375 patent application was filed, and that the patent is

therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). The second motion claims that the MBB Proposal

establishes that the inventor listed on the ’375 patent – Dr. Fred N. Chan – did not actually invent the

invention claimed in the ’375 patent, and that the patent is therefore invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f).

Although the Court finds there to be substantial merit to both contentions, it must nevertheless deny

Lockheed’s motions.

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LEGAL STANDARD

Because patents are presumed valid, a defendant must prove invalidity by clear and convincing

evidence. Abbott Laboratories v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999).

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a patent is invalid if “the invention was . . . on sale in this country,

more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States.” Id. at 1318. To

establish invalidity under § 102(b), a defendant must show two things: first, the invention must have

been the subject of a commercial offer for sale more than one year before the patent application was

filed; second, the invention must have been ready for patenting more than one year before the filing of

the application. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 

Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), a patent is invalid if the inventor “did not himself invent the subject

matter sought to be patented.” A party seeking to invoke this section must show both “(1) prior

conception of the invention by another and (2) communication of that conception to the patentee that

is sufficient to enable [him] to construct and successfully operate the invention.” Int’l Rectifier Corp.

v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The moving party, however, has

no burden to negate or disprove matters on which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof

at trial. The moving party need only point out to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to

support the non-moving party’s case. See id. at 325.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to “designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). To carry this burden, the nonmoving party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material

facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “The

mere existence of a scintilla of evidence . . . will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the

jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

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252 (1986).

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in its favor. Id. at 255.

“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from

the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge [when she] is ruling on a motion for summary

judgment.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Lockheed has brought two related summary judgment motions based on the MBB Proposal.

Although the Court finds that Lockheed’s evidence that raises serious questions about the validity of

the ’375 patent, it cannot find that summary judgment is appropriate. Rather, because questions remain

concerning how a person of ordinary skill in the art would have read the MBB Proposal, and because

some credibility issues remain in this lawsuit, this case must proceed beyond the summary judgment

stage. Accordingly, the Court DENIES both of Lockheed’s motions.

I. On-Sale Bar

The timing of the MBB proposal is not in dispute. The ’375 patent application was filed on

April 21, 1983, while the MBB Proposal was submitted in May 1981. Thus, if the MBB Proposal

constitutes an offer for sale of the invention disclosed by the ’375 patent, the patent is invalid. Given

this fact, both parties agree that Lockheed must establish three things to show that the on-sale bar

applies. First, it must show that the MBB Proposal constituted a commercial offer for sale. Second, it

must show that the MBB Proposal covered all the claims of the patent at issue. Third, Lockheed must

show that the ADCS described in the MBB Proposal was ready for patenting at the time of the proposal.

A. Offer for Sale

For an offer of sale to trigger the on-sale bar, it must “rise[] to the level of a commercial offer

for sale, one which the other party could make into a binding contract by simple acceptance.” Group

One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d1041, 1048 (Fed. Cir. 2001). In making this determination,

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In considering questions about the on-sale bar, the Federal Circuit has cited to Williston with

approval. See Linear Tech. Corp. v. Micrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

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SSL does not appear to contest that the MBB Proposal was submitted in response to a request

from FACC. In its opposition brief to Lockheed’s motion for summary judgment of invalidity based

on § 102(f), SSL states that “MBB submitted its proposal in response to a request for a proposal.” Pl.

Br. in Oppo. to Inventorship Mot., at 6.

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SSL has filed objections to the declarations of Gottzein and Astin. In light of the fact that the

Court is denying Lockheed’s summary judgment motion, the Court DISMISSES these objections as

moot.

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courts should apply “Federal Circuit law, to be analyzed under the law of contracts as generally

understood.” Id. at 1047. “As a general proposition, we will look to the Uniform Commercial Code

(‘UCC’) to define whether, as in this case, a communication or series of communications rises to the

level of a commercial offer for sale.” Id. “The Supreme Court has also cited the Restatement of

Contracts with approval in the commercial contract law context.” Id. at 1048.

The Court finds that the MBB Proposal constituted a commercial offer for sale. MBB submitted

its proposal in response to a request from FACC. Under general principles of contract law concerning

subcontractor bids the proposal constituted a offer that FACC could have accepted. Rhenalu v. Alcoa,

Inc., 224 F. Supp. 2d 773, 802 (D. Del. 2002) (“[A] bid made in response to an invitation for bids is

considered to be an offer.”); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 28, cmt. c (“[B]idders on both

prime contract and subcontract make offers when they submit bids . . . .”); Richard A. Lord, Williston

on Contracts § 4.10 at 338-39 (4th ed. 1990) (“[A]n ordinary advertisement for bids or tenders is not

itself an offer, but the bid or tender is an offer . . . .”).2

Lockheed’s evidence meets the clear and convincing evidence standard.3 Eveline Gottzein, head

of MBB’s Control and Simulations Department from 1963 to 1993, has supplied a declaration in which

she states that, “[a]round late 1980 or early 1981, [FACC] asked MBB to provide a proposal for

development of the [ADCS] system for INTELSAT VI.” Decl. of Eveline Gottzein in Support of OnSale Mot. (“Gottzein Decl.”), ¶ 3.4

 In response to the request, “MBB developed a detailed proposal”

and “provided this proposal to FACC” in May 1981. Id. at ¶ 4. A declaration from Ernest Astin, the

“subsystem lead engineer” for attitude control systems for the INTELSAT VI satellite platform at

FACC, confirms Gottzein’s statements. Astin’s declaration states that FACC submitted a request for

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proposal to MBB in 1980 or 1981, and that MBB responded in May 1981. Decl. of Ernest S. Astin in

Support of On-Sale Mot. (“Astin Decl.”), ¶¶ 4-5. Lockheed has provided both the FACC request for

proposal and the MBB response. See Decl. of George A. Riley in Support of On-Sale Mot. (“Riley OnSale Decl.”), Exh. 1 (MBB Proposal), 2 (FACC request for proposal); Astin Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6 (identifying

MBB Proposal and FACC request for proposal); Gottzein Decl., ¶¶ 5-7 (identifying MBB Proposal).

In addition, Lockheed has supplied a declaration from Roger Rusch, FACC’s INTELSAT VI Program

Manager. Decl. of Roger J. Rusch In Support of On-Sale Reply (“Rusch Decl.”), ¶ 1. Rusch’s

declaration supplies a detailed description of the planning process for the INTELSAT VI bid, and

identifies MBB as one of the “subcontract team members” for the INTELSAT VI bid. Id. at ¶ 3. Both

Rusch and Astin state that the MBB proposal was intended to be a definite offer to build the ADCS for

the INTELSAT VI. See Astin Decl., ¶ 8 (“FACC considered the MBB Proposal to be a definite offer

for the ADCS to be built for the INTELSAT VI satellite platform.”); Rusch Decl., ¶ 15 (“[FACC]

considered MBB’s subcontracting bid, received on May 26, 1981, to be a firm offer, in complete and

definite form, for an ADCS for Intelsat VI.”).

SSL provides a number of reasons why the MBB Proposal should not be construed as an offer

for sale. First, SSL argues that the MBB Proposal is missing key terms, such as price, quantity, and date

and time of delivery. This argument is not convincing. While courts have found that the details plaintiff

points to may be sufficient to create a offer, no court has ruled that those terms are required. See, e.g.,

Linear Tech, 275 F.3d at 1052 (purchase orders were sufficiently definite to create an enforceable

contract because they included quantity terms and clearly identified the product); Rhenalu, 224 F. Supp.

2d at 773 (“Generally, mere price quotations without other contractual terms (time and place of delivery,

terms of payment, etc.) do not constitute offers.”). In addition, SSL’s argument compares apples to

oranges. Lockheed does not assert that MBB offered to sell FACC a tangible product; rather, Lockheed

argues that MBB responded to FACC’s request for proposals in connection with its bid on the

INTELSAT VI contract. Thus, terms such as quantity, as well as time and place of delivery, simply are

inapposite to the question whether SSL’s offer was a commercial offer for sale.

As for the price of the MBB ADCS, Lockheed has submitted substantial evidence that the MBB

Proposal was accompanied by a cost proposal. Although Lockheed has not produced this cost proposal,

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the Court finds that Lockheed has established by clear and convincing evidence that such a cost proposal

existed. The strongest evidence of the cost proposal comes from Rusch’s declaration, which states that

FACC “expressly requested that each of its subcontractor team members provide price quotations for

their respective Intelsat VI systems at the same time as their respective technical proposals.” Id. at ¶

7. Rusch continues, “[i]n particular, [FACC] requested that MBB provide a price quotation for the

Intelsat VI [ADCS] at the same time as it provided its technical proposal for the ADCS. Thus, I am

confident that [FACC] would have received MBB’s price quotation for the Intelsat VI ADCS at the

same time as its technical proposal.” Id. Rusch also states in his declaration that the INTELSAT VI

team members, which included MBB, signed Memoranda of Understanding (“MOUs”) with FACC.

Id. at ¶ 8. This is confirmed by a document drafted in 1981 that appears to promote FACC over Hughes

Aerospace. The document states, “Written memoranda-of-understanding define agreements with each

team member relative to INTELSAT VI program content and negotiated price.” Id., Exh. A, at 48. The

purpose of the MOUs was to “outline[] the role of each of the team members, including the scope of the

work to be done and price to be paid.” Id. at ¶ 8. Finally, Rusch states in his declaration that, according

to his business diary, FACC performed “cost reviews” on April 20, 1981, and again on June 2, 3, 4, and

5, 1981. Id. at ¶¶ 13-14. Rusch further states that he believes FACC “must have received cost estimates

from MBB and the other subcontractors . . . by at least April 20, 1981,” and that FACC “reviewed the

costs of all of the Intelsat VI subsystems on [June 2, 3,4, and 5, 1981], including the cost of the Intelsat

VI ADCS to be provided by MBB.” Id.; see also id., Exh. B.

Rusch’s declaration is supported by both Astin and Gottzein. Astin’s declaration states that “[in]

connection with its Proposal, MBB also quoted cost information to FACC for building and

implementing the ADCS specified in its proposal. . . . I personally received this cost information from

MBB.” Astin Decl., ¶ 7. Gottzein’s declaration states that MBB “produced [an informal] cost analysis

for producing, testing and delivering the INTELSAT VI ADCS,” and that MBB “would have prepared

a formal cost proposal based on our internal cost analysis.” Gottzein Decl., ¶ 8. Lockheed has produced

the informal cost analysis that Gottzein refers to. See Gottzein Decl., ¶ 8; Supp. Decl. of George A.

Riley in Support of Pl. On-Sale Mot. (“Riley Supp. On-Sale Decl.”), Exh. 1.

SSL’s second reason why the MBB Proposal should not be construed as an offer is that the MBB

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SSL also argues that the Court should not rely on the Astin declaration. A declaration from

Richard Westall, a former employee at FACC responsible for “international procurements of satellite

hardware and subsystems,” states that “Astin was involved in the technical evaluation of the MBB

proposal” and did “not have any authority with respect to whether the MBB Proposal could or could not

be accepted or rejected.” Decl. of Richard J. Westall In Oppo. to Def. Mots., ¶ 2 (emphasis in original).

Westall also states that the MBB Proposal “was not capable of being accepted by Ford as submitted,”

without providing any basis for this legal conclusion. Id. at ¶ 3. In light of the Rusch declaration, the

Court finds that Lockheed has fixed any deficiencies in Astin’s declaration. 

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Proposal evidences an intent not to be bound because it begins with the language “[T]his proposal is

written in draft form, because FACC anyway will rewrite the complete proposal and perform the final

illustrations.” Riley On-Sale Decl., Exh. 1, at LMC-S 00003. SSL argues that this language is

inconsistent with an intent to be bound. The Court, however, finds this language fully consistent with

the submission of a subcontractor bid; the language merely clarifies that FACC will submit a

comprehensive proposal, containing all the accepted subcontractor submissions, for the INTELSAT VI

project.5

The Court finds that Lockheed has submitted clear and convincing evidence that MBB intended

to be bound by the its proposal. As the declarations above, and SSL’s own admissions, make clear,

MBB submitted its proposal in response to a request for proposal by FACC. This alone indicates an

intent to be bound. That MBB intended its proposal as an offer is corroborated by considerable

evidence. Most convincing to the Court is the description in Rusch’s declaration regarding the process

through with bids were submitted. Rusch’s declaration establishes that the subcontractor bids were

created through a detailed process that involved significant consultation between MBB and FACC.

Thus, it is clear to the Court that MBB was fully aware of the purpose of its proposal and intended that

its proposal, if it was found to be acceptable, would be used in FACC’s bid on the INTELSAT VI.

Finally, the level of detail of the MBB proposal itself suggests that it was intended to be a firm offer.

The proposal spans 200 pages, and contains a great deal of information, including detailed diagrams,

descriptions of needed equipment, and test data.

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35 U.S.C. § 102(b) also requires that an invention be on sale in this country. Plaintiff does not

argue that the MBB proposal did not occur in the United States. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 677

(Fed. Cir. 1985) (offer created in foreign country but sent to United States constitutes offer for sale in

this country under § 102(b)).

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SSL argues that the Gottzein declaration is inadmissible and therefore may not be considered

on summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (requiring evidence used on summary judgment to be

admissible). In support of this argument, SSL argues that Gottzein has not been designated as an expert,

and is therefore not qualified to testify at trial, rendering her declaration inappropriate for summary

judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2) (requiring disclosure of identities of trial experts); Fed. R. Civ.

P. 37(c)(1) (stating that a party who, “without substantial justification,” fails to disclose information

pursuant to Rule 26 is prohibited from using that information at trial). SSL’s argument, however,

overlooks the fact that Rule 37(c)(1) only applies where a party lacks a “substantial justification” for

the nondisclosure, and allows the evidence to be admitted when the nondisclosure was “harmless.”

Here, Lockheed has represented that it only recently learned of Gottzein’s existence. On-Sale Mot. at

1; cf. Gottzein Decl., ¶ 6 (“In July 2005, I met with attorneys for Lockheed Martin Corporation . . . .”).

Thus, it appears that Lockheed likely had a substantial justification for the nondisclosure. In addition,

a trial date has not yet been set in this matter. Thus, in all likelihood Lockheed’s nondisclosure was

completely harmless. Accordingly, the Court will consider the Gottzein declaration.

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Plaintiff’s arguments fail to raise any issues of fact regarding whether the MBB Proposal was

a commercial offer of sale. Thus, the Court finds that Lockheed has established by clear and convincing

evidence that the MBB Proposal was an offer for sale.6

 

B. Disclosure of Claims of ’375 Patent

The parties agree that, in order to trigger the on-sale bar, an invention must disclose all elements

of the patent at issue. See Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1045-46 (to invoke

on-sale bar, challenger must prove that the subject matter of the sale “fully anticipated the claimed

invention”).

Lockheed argues that the MBB proposal discloses all claims of the ’375 patent. In support of

its argument, Lockheed relies on the declaration of Eveline Gottzein.7 In her declaration, Gottzein walks

through the claims of the ’375 patent and compares them to components in the MBB Proposal,

concluding that each claim is disclosed by the MBB Proposal. Gottzein’s declaration is substantially

dependent upon the diagrams in the MBB Proposal, and refers to the proposal’s text only sparingly.

The Court finds that Gottzein’s declaration is strong evidence in support of Lockheed’s

argument. Gottzein worked for MBB as the head of its Control and Simulations department for 30

years, developing attitude control systems for over 40 satellites. Further, Gottzein was personally

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As described by defendant, the MBB Proposal is 200 pages long and consists of vast amounts

of highly technical information. While, as defendant has pointed out, portions of the MBB Proposal are

highly reminiscent of the ’375 patent, much of the proposal is not directly relevant to the specific

invention the patent describes. To gain a thorough understanding of the MBB Proposal, the Court must

rely on expert witnesses to sift through the MBB Proposal and determine what information is relevant

to the case at hand. The difficulty of such a situation was anticipated even before the development of

satellites:

CASSIUS: Did Cicero say any thing?

CASCA: Ay, he spoke Greek.

CASSIUS: To what effect?

CASCA: Nay, an I tell you that, Ill ne’er look you i’ the face again: but those that

understood him smiled at one another and shook their heads; but, for mine own

part, it was Greek to me.

William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act I, Scene II.

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involved in the development of the MBB Proposal. Thus, Gottzein is intimately familiar with the

technology of the ’375 patent generally, and the MBB Proposal specifically.

The Court, however, finds that there remains an issue of fact on this issue, for the following

reasons. First, the Court finds that the Gottzein declaration is insufficient to satisfy, as a matter of law,

the high evidentiary standard that defendant must meet. As an initial matter, Gottzein’s declaration is

not phrased in terms of what would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Spada, 911

F.2d 705, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (to anticipate, “the [prior art] reference must describe the applicant’s

claimed invention sufficiently to have placed a person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention in

possession of it.”). More importantly, while her declaration states that all claims of the ’375 patent are

disclosed by the MBB Proposal, her explanations are rather limited. In many instances, Gottzein does

not disclose “in detail how each claim element is disclosed in the prior art reference.” Schumer v.

Laboratory Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Rather, she states

her conclusion, and justifies that conclusion by pointing only to technical diagrams, the meaning of

which is by no means self-evident to the Court. See, e.g., Gottzein Decl., ¶¶ 21, 23-24 (referring Court

to figures in MBB Proposal). Given the highly technical subject matter of the ’375 patent, the Court

finds it inappropriate to accept the Gottzein declaration as adequate.8

 See Schumer, 308 F.3d at1316

(stating that a court should not “attempt to interpret confusing or general testimony to determine whether

a case of invalidity has been made out, particularly at the summary judgment stage.”).

The Court also finds summary judgment inappropriate because SSL has raised an issue of

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In section 1.6.7.10 of the MBB proposal, the proposal discusses a “telecommand” sent by a

“databurst” that may contain “bias values.” Riley On-Sale Decl., Exh. 1, at LMC-S 00180. In her

declaration, Gottzein explains that this refers to a command bias, calculated on the ground, and

communicated to the ADCS through the satellite’s telemetry and telecommand subsystem. Gottzein

Decl., ¶ 20. The MBB proposal further states that “[t]he ADCE stores the data burst and decodes the

meaning . . . .” Riley On-Sale Decl., Exh.1, at LMC-S 00180; see also id. at LMC-S 00181 (“The

analog values are consecutively converted to digital words during the time without TLM interrogation

and stored in registers which are linked to the other digital data.”). Thus, it appears that the MBB

Proposal does contemplate that the bias data is stored prior to the attitude maneuver. The Court’s

understanding, however, is not based upon what one skilled in the art would have known. Lockheed

has not conclusively demonstrated that one skilled in the art would have understood the MBB Proposal

to include storage. Summary judgment is therefore inappropriate.

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material fact. SSL has submitted a declaration from Dr. Marshall H. Kaplan, who concludes that “[t]he

MBB Proposal does not disclose or describe each element of the invention claimed in the ’375 patent”

because “[n]owhere in the MBB Proposal does the proposal describe storing prior to the stationkeeping

maneuver a value representative of an estimated disturbance torque.” Id. at ¶ 20.1; see also id. at 20.2-

20.4 (describing lack of a storing step in MBB Proposal in connection with other claims of ’375 patent).

Although the Court does not find SSL’s argument particularly convincing,9

 it is sufficient to create an

issue of fact. 

C. Ready for Patenting

The final element necessary to trigger the on-sale bar is proof that the invention was “ready for

patenting.” Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 424 F.3d 1276, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This

condition may be satisfied “in at least two ways: by proof of reduction to practice before the critical

date; or by proof that prior to the critical date the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions

of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the art to practice the

invention.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68. Lockheed argues that both conditions are satisfied here.

1. Reduction to Practice

Lockheed argues that the MBB Proposal actually reduced the invention described in the ’375

patent to practice. “In order to establish an actual reduction to practice, the inventor must prove that:

(1) he constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the interference

count; and (2) he determined that the invention would work for its intended purpose.” Taskett v.

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10Lockheed argues that “Reduction to practice does not require that a party actually build a

proposed system.” Def. Br. at 23. The only citation Lockheed offers in support of this contention,

however, is Taskett, which clearly requires the construction of an embodiment.

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Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003).10

However, Lockheed has provided no evidence that MBB created an embodiment of the proposed

ADCS design. Instead, Lockheed argues that the amount of test data contained in the MBB Proposal

demonstrates that the invention was reduced to practice. There are two problems with this argument.

First, Lockheed’s argument relies on too many inferences to be accepted at the summary judgment stage.

There are certainly other plausible explanations for the test data contained in the MBB Proposal other

than MBB’s construction of a working prototype ADCS. Second, Gottzein’s declaration never refers

to any actual testing of a physical product. Rather, Gottzein states that MBB tested the design through

“theoretical analytical techniques” and “analog computer simulation.” Gottzein Decl., ¶¶ 39-40. These

statements suggest that MBB never produced an embodiment of its invention.

Thus, the Court finds that issues of fact remain concerning whether MBB reduced the invention

to practice.

2. Enablement

As an alternative to reduction to practice, an invention is ready for patenting if “the inventor had

prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a

person skilled in the art to practice the invention.” Pfaff, 525 U.S. at 67-68. Lockheed argues that the

MBB Proposal meets this standard.

In support of its argument, however, Lockheed points to the MBB Proposal only in a general

manner. It has provided no testimony concerning what a person of ordinary skill in the art would have

understood the MBB Proposal to enable. The closest Lockheed comes to providing any evidence on

this subject is a declaration from SSL’s expert, Marshall Kaplan. In that declaration, dated November

15, 2002, Kaplan stated, “[e]ach of the structures used to sense the spacecraft’s position, detect any

attitude error, and transmit or store the detected error are described in Figures 2A and 2B [of the ’375

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11Lockheed’s reply brief also asserts that Kaplan states in his declaration, “the control loop

diagram at Figures 2A and 2B would make it clear to a person of ordinary skill that detected errors

would be fed through the feedback network for summing with the prebias value and subsequent further

modulation.” Def. Mot. at 12. Lockheed has not provided this page to the Court.

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patent.]” Riley Supp. On-Sale Decl., Exh. 3, at 10.11 These are precisely the figures that Lockheed has

seized on in its motion. 

While the MBB Proposal appears extremely detailed, and the technical diagrams seem

substantially similar to those in the ’375 patent, the Court cannot grant summary judgment without

additional evidence. Lockheed, in effect, requests that the Court base its judgment on the comparison

of a few technical diagrams, and on the length and detail of the MBB Proposal. Such an action by the

Court would clearly be inappropriate, especially at the summary judgment stage. Lockheed must

provide evidence of how one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the MBB Proposal.

II. Inventorship

Lockheed’s second motion for summary judgment claims that Chan was not the actual inventor

of the invention disclosed in the ’375 patent. To prevail on this point Lockheed must establish “(1) prior

conception of the invention by another and (2) communication of that conception to the patentee that

is sufficient to enable [him] to construct and successfully operate the invention.” Int’l Rectifier Corp.,

361 F.3d at 1366. Although Lockheed has provided evidence that raises serious questions about

whether Chan in fact was the inventor of the ’375 patent, the high burden Lockheed must meet at this

stage renders summary judgment inappropriate.

A. Prior Conception

Lockheed argues that the MBB Proposal demonstrates that scientists at MBB conceived of the

invention described in the ’375 patent well before Chan began his work on the ’375 patent. Although

Lockheed has submitted substantial evidence in support of its position, the Court finds that an issue of

fact remains.

Lockheed’s evidence establishes that Chan had access to the MBB Proposal well before he

purports to have conceived of his invention. FACC received the MBB Proposal in 1981. Decl. of

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George A. Riley in Support of Inventorship Mot. (“Riley Inventorship Decl.”), Exh. 1; Astin Decl., ¶ 6;

Gottzein Decl., ¶ 4. At that time, Chan was a scientist at FACC. Supp. Decl. of Ernest S. Astin in

Support of Inventorship Mot., ¶ 7. Shortly after FACC received the MBB Proposal, it formed a team,

known as the “Red Team,” to evaluate the technical adequacy of its proposed ADCS design. Id. at ¶¶ 7,

9. Chan was a member of the Red Team, and was assigned to “verify[] the control loop designs from

MBB’s proposed ADCS.” Id. at ¶ 10. As SSL has provided no evidence contrary to these assertions,

the Court finds that Lockheed has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Chan reviewed

the MBB Proposal shortly after FACC received it.

SSL argues, however, that Lockheed has not established that Chan reviewed the MBB Proposal

prior to the time he conceived of the invention. The Court agrees that there remains an issue of fact on

this point. Lockheed’s evidence certainly strongly suggests that Chan reviewed the MBB Proposal

before he conceived of the invention: FACC received the MBB Proposal in May 1981, and the Red

Team was convened “shortly thereafter,” but Chan does not claim to have conceived of the invention

disclosed by the ’375 patent until November 1981 at the earliest. In connection with another project

known as ARABSAT, Chan circulated a memorandum on November 11, 1981, suggesting that the

ARABSAT control system design was insufficient, and describing an alternative solution. Riley

Inventorship Decl. Decl., Exh. 7. This alternative solution was the genesis of the ’375 patent. See

Supp. Decl. of George A. Riley in Support of Inventorship Decl., Exh. 1 (“In November 1981, Dr. Chan

identified a way to reduce attitude errors caused by disturbance torques during stationkeeping

maneuvers.”); Exh. 2 (Q: “So as far as you know . . . November of 1981 was the earliest date that you

had the idea for the ‘’375 invention.” A: “That’s correct.”). Although SSL argues that the date of

conception can only be restricted to “prior to March 19, 1982,” Chan’s own deposition testimony shows

that November 1981 was the earliest he conceived of the invention.

Although Lockheed’s evidence is convincing, the Court finds that an issue of fact remains. Chan

testified at his deposition that he was the sole inventor of the ’375 patent. Rosen Decl., Exh. 4. In

addition, SSL has produced evidence to demonstrate that MBB and FACC cooperated in creating the

design contained in MBB’s proposal. Westall Decl., ¶ 4. Lockheed argues that Chan’s testimony is

insufficient because it does not reflect Chan’s understanding that he conceived of the invention. The

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Court, however, finds the testimony sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S.

at 255 (credibility determinations are inappropriate for summary judgment).

Accordingly, the Court finds that an issue of fact remains regarding whether Chan actually

conceived of the invention disclosed by the ’375 patent.

B. Communication

As mentioned above, to establish that Chan was not the inventor of the invention described in

the ’375 patent, Lockheed must establish that the MBB Proposal communicated its conception of the

invention to Chan in a manner “sufficient to enable [him] to construct and successfully operate the

invention.” Int’l Rectifier Corp., 361 F.3d at 1366. For the for the reasons discussed in the section of

this order concerning the on-sale bar, an issue of material fact remains regarding whether the MBB

Proposal was enabling.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and for good cause shown, the Court hereby DENIES Lockheed’s

motions for summary judgment of invalidity. [Docket ## 649, 670].

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 6, 2006

 

SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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