Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-05-03471/USCOURTS-ca6-05-03471-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Margaret Bagley
Appellee
Abdullah Sharif Kaazim Mahdi
Appellant

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0153p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

ABDULLAH SHARIF KAAZIM MAHDI, f/k/a Vernon

Smith,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

MARGARET BAGLEY, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

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No. 05-3471

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 02-00978—Paul R. Matia, District Judge.

Argued: March 6, 2007

Decided and Filed: April 11, 2008 

Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MOORE and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert K. Lowe, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER

COMMISSION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Carol Ann Ellensohn, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, CAPITAL CRIMES SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert

K. Lowe, Kimberly S. Rigby, PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, OHIO PUBLIC DEFENDER

COMMISSION, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellant. Carol Ann Ellensohn, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL, CAPITAL CRIMES SECTION, Columbus, Ohio, Michael L. Collyer, ASSISTANT

ATTORNEY GENERAL, CAPITAL CRIMES SECTION, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. 

_________________

OPINION _________________

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Petitioner-appellant Abdullah Sharif Kaazim

Mahdi (f/k/a Vernon Smith) appeals the district court’s denial of his habeas corpus petition. Mahdi

argues that the district court erred in finding that: (1) his trial counsel was not ineffective; (2) his

appellate counsel was not ineffective; and (3) the retroactive application of a change in Ohio case

law did not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. For the following reasons, we affirm

the district court’s denial of Mahdi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

1

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I.

The Supreme Court of Ohio summarized the facts underlying this case as follows:

On the evening of May 26, 1993, defendant-appellant, Vernon Smith, n.k.a.

Abdullah Sharif Kaazim Mahdi, and Herbert Bryson robbed the Woodstock Market

located at the corner of Woodstock and Avondale in Toledo. During the robbery,

Smith fired a single shot at the upper chest of Sohail Darwish, causing his death.

Approximately two weeks later, Smith was arrested and then indicted on one count

of aggravated murder with a firearm specification, and a death penalty specification

alleging that Smith was the principal offender in committing aggravated murder

during an aggravated robbery. Smith was also indicted on three counts of aggravated

robbery. Subsequently, Smith was found guilty as charged by a jury and sentenced

to death.

During the afternoon of May 26, 1993, Smith met up with Herbert Bryson and

Lamont Layson at a dirt basketball court in a park at Highland and Maplewood in

Toledo. The trio discussed “hitting a lick,” i.e., committing a robbery. The group got

in Bryson's car, and Smith directed them to the corner of Woodstock and Avondale,

where the Woodstock Market was located. Layson remained in the car while Smith

and Bryson headed toward the carryout. Jeremiah Bishop, who was two houses down

from the Woodstock Market at that time, saw Smith and another person enter the

carryout.

Bryson testified that after he and Smith entered the carryout, they noticed only two

people in the store, both of whom were behind the counter. Bryson asked about a

type of beer, and the storeowner, Sohail Darwish, came around the counter and

walked over to the cooler to assist him. Darwish retrieved a forty-ounce beer bottle

from the cooler and placed it on the counter. Bryson did the same. As Darwish was

ringing up the sale on the cash register, Smith brandished a black gun and ordered

Darwish to “open the cash register, motherfucker.”

Darwish, who was standing next to Bryson, put his hands up in the air and did not

resist. Bryson went behind the counter and hit several buttons on the cash register,

trying to open it. Bryson then ordered Darwish to open the cash register, which he

did. Darwish then put his hands back up in the air.

Osand Tahboub, a former co-worker who was visiting Darwish at the carryout at that

time, testified that the gunman then told Darwish to “move and empty your wallet,

motherfucker.” As Darwish was reaching for his wallet, Smith fired a single shot,

hitting Darwish in the chest. Smith then ordered Tahboub to empty his wallet as well,

and the two assailants then fled the scene. Darwish was able to push the alarm button

before he fell to the floor. As a result of the single gunshot wound to the upper left

side of his chest, Darwish bled to death.

After Smith and Bryson left the carryout, Layson, who was waiting in Bryson’s car,

noticed Smith holding a gun in his hand when he and Bryson climbed back into the

automobile. According to Layson, Smith exclaimed, “Dang, I forgot the beer.” When

Bryson asked Smith “why did he do it,” Smith replied that he shot the man “in the

arm” because “he moved too slow,” and that “he took too long . . . opening the cash

register.”

According to Layson, Smith then said, “Fuck him, he in our neighborhood anyway.

He shouldn't be in our neighborhood with a store no way.” Later, Smith and Bryson

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split the money taken in the robbery, which was apparently over $ 400. They also

gave Layson all the stolen food stamps from the robbery plus $ 50.

On June 9, approximately two weeks after the murder, police detective Dennis

Richardson received information that persons possibly involved in a homicide were

incarcerated in the Sandusky County Jail. Based on this and other information he

received from sources, Richardson made up an eight-man photo array, including a

photo of Herbert Bryson, to show to Tahboub. The next day, upon viewing the array,

Tahboub selected Bryson's photo as “not the guy with the gun, but the other guy.”

Based on this information and the fact that computer records showed Smith as a

known associate of Bryson, Richardson compiled a second photo array that included

a picture of Smith. Richardson showed Tahboub the second photo array, and

Tahboub immediately selected Smith's photo as that of the gunman.

Consequently, Smith was arrested, and along with Bryson and Layson, was indicted

by the grand jury in the Darwish murder. In count one, Smith was charged with

aggravated felony-murder during an aggravated robbery. A death penalty

specification attached to this count alleged that Smith was the principal offender in

the aggravated murder during a robbery, R.C. 2929.04(A)(7). The second count

charged Bryson and Layson with aggravated felony-murder during an aggravated

robbery. Counts three through five charged all three defendants with aggravated

robbery of the carryout, of Darwish, and of Tahboub respectively. All five counts

also carried firearm specifications.

State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d 645, 648-49 (Ohio 2000), recons. denied, 735 N.E.2d 457 (Ohio 2000),

cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167 (2001).

At trial, Mahdi was convicted of aggravated felony-murder and of three counts of aggravated

robbery. He presented no evidence in the guilt phase. At the subsequent penalty phase, Mahdi’s

presentation included testimony of a Muslim counselor that Mahdi had converted to Islam while

awaiting trial and now counseled other prisoners. The counselor also testified that Mahdi had told

him that the shooting had been unintentional, that Mahdi had been nervous and scared, and that the

trigger had just gone off. Mahdi’s wife testified that Mahdi had been upset and nervous the evening

of the shooting and for days afterward. She further testified that, when he heard on the news that

Darwish was dead, Mahdi sat down and cried and told her that the murder had been an accident.

Moreover, Mahdi’s wife testified that, on the afternoon before the crime, she and her husband went

to see the film Menace II Society, whose opening scene depicted an interracial crime in which a

black man had words with a store owner and angrily shot him. A psychologist also testified at the

mitigation hearing and noted the striking parallels between the film and the crime, opining that it

could not have been coincidence that Mahdi later committed a crime so similar to the one he

witnessed in the film. In addition, the psychologist testified to the effects of various social and

cultural factors on Mahdi, all of which, he believed, impaired Mahdi’s ability to conform his conduct

to the law. The pschologist further opined that these factors combined with Mahdi’s difficult

childhood caused a mental illness, although the psychologist was unable to identify the illness with

specificity due to Mahdi’s lack of cooperation during the interview process.

At the end of the mitigation hearing, the jury returned with a death sentence; in turn, the trial

court sentenced Mahdi to death and to a consecutive term of eighteen to fifty-three years in prison.

On direct appeal, the state court of appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. The Ohio

Supreme Court affirmed the court’s decision. State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d at 660. Mahdi

subsequently exhausted his state post-conviction remedies.

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1

Although the district court granted a certificate of appealibility on Mahdi’s “first and sixth claims for relief

as they relate to his right to voir dire the venire on racial grounds,” Mahdi clearly incorporated a claim regarding trial

counsel’s failure to voir dire on religious grounds into this first (failure to voir dire on racial grounds) claim when

presented in his reply brief. Thus, we interpret the district court’s certificate of appealibility to encompass Mahdi’s

claims that are predicated on the failure to voir dire on both racial and religious grounds. 

In 2002, Mahdi filed a federal habeas corpus petition, raising the following ten claims as

grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel were ineffective in failing to voir dire prospective jurors on

racial bias; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of

involuntary manslaughter; (3) the penalty-phase jury instructions were incorrect; (4) the state court

of appeals denied Mahdi his constitutional rights by refusing to consider residual doubt; (5) trial

counsel were ineffective in not objecting to flawed penalty-phase jury instructions and in not

requesting a competency hearing; (6) counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the state court of

appeals; (7) trial counsel were ineffective in the penalty phase in not presenting certain mitigating

evidence; (8) the trial court erred in failing to hold a competency hearing sua sponte; (9) the

cumulative effect of the errors and omissions presented in the habeas petition deprived Mahdi of his

constitutional rights; and (10) the Ohio Supreme Court conducted an inadequate proportionality

review. Mahdi abandoned the tenth claim in his reply brief. The district court denied the rest of the

petition and dismissed the case, but granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on Claim 1, as

well as Claim 6 to the extent it raised the failure to voir dire prospective jurors on racial and

religious bias. This court expanded the COA to include Claim 4. Thus, before this court on appeal

are three claims: (1) whether trial counsel were ineffective in failing to voir dire prospective jurors

on racial and religious bias;1

 (2) whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the

state court of appeals; and (3) whether the state court of appeals denied Mahdi his constitutional

rights pursuant to the Due Process Clause by refusing to consider residual doubt.

II.

The government argues that Mahdi’s first claim – that his trial counsel were ineffective – has

been procedurally defaulted. We, however, need not address whether in fact Mahdi has procedurally

defaulted this first claim. As noted by the district court in its grant of a COA, Mahdi’s contentions

that both his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective are analytically linked. Mahdi

claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not appealing the ineffectiveness of his trial

counsel. Thus, each claim relies on the underlying argument that Mahdi’s trial counsel were

ineffective. Because we must reach the merits of whether trial counsel were ineffective in order to

dispose of Mahdi’s claim that his appellate counsel were ineffective, we decline to address whether

Mahdi’s claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is procedurally defaulted. Indeed, this court has

held that “federal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding

against the petitioner on the merits,” especially where the procedural default issue is “complicated”

and “is unnecessary to [the] disposition of the case.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir.

2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997) (“Judicial economy might counsel

giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas

petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law.”)). 

For related reasons, the three issues presented to this court can be consolidated to two issues.

As discussed below, we conclude that Mahdi’s trial counsel were not ineffective. Such a

determination is dispositive of the first two issues Mahdi argues on appeal; if Mahdi’s trial counsel

were not ineffective, then his appellate counsel cannot have been ineffective for failing to raise the

claim that trial counsel were ineffective. We therefore address only two issues, which enable us to

dispose of the three claims presented by Mahdi to this court: (1) whether Mahdi’s trial counsel were

ineffective for failing to voir dire prospective jurors on racial and religious bias, and (2) whether the

state court of appeals deprived Mahdi of his constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause by

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retroactively applying a new state law that determined residual doubt was no longer to be considered

to be a mitigating factor. We consider each issue in turn.

1.

Mahdi argues that counsel rendered ineffective assistance on his first appeal of right by not

raising as error trial counsel’s ineffective assistance in failing to voir dire prospective jurors on

racial and religious bias. In turn, Mahdi also claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to appeal his conviction on these grounds. The Warden responds, among other arguments,

that these claims are meritless because Mahdi has failed to establish that trial counsel’s failure to

voir dire prospective jurors on racial and religious bias constitutes objectively deficient

performance. And, if the ineffectiveness claims against trial counsel lack merit, no prejudice could

have resulted from the appellate counsel’s failing to appeal Mahdi’s conviction and sentence on

these grounds.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are judged under the Strickland standard, which

requires that the appellant affirmatively establish “(1) that counsel’s performance was objectively

deficient; and (2) prejudice, which means that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Haliym

v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 694 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing and quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984)). In addition, defendants are constitutionally entitled to effective

assistance of counsel for appeals of right. Bowen v. Foltz, 763 F.2d 191, 194 n.3 (6th Cir. 1985)

(citing Gilbert v. Sowders, 646 F.2d 1146 (6th Cir. 1981)). 

The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee a criminal defendant an impartial jury in

state court. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 n.6 (1976); see also Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,

722 (1961) (“[T]he right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of

impartial, indifferent jurors”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mahdi argues that by not

conducting a voir dire that addressed religious and racial bias his counsel failed to ensure that an

impartial jury would hear Mahdi’s case.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA):

a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas to a petitioner in state custody with

respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the state

court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . or (2) the state

court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.

Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)) (quotation

marks omitted). “A state-court decision is considered ‘contrary to . . . clearly established federal

law’ if it is ‘diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed.’” Ivory

v. Jackson, __ F.3d __, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 26458, at *12 (6th Cir. Nov. 15, 2007) (citing

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000) (quotation marks omitted)). In order to constitute an

“‘unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law,’ a state-court decision on the

merits must be ‘objectively unreasonable,’ not simply erroneous or incorrect.” Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 409-11). Furthermore, “[t]he state court’s findings of fact are presumed to be correct

unless they are rebutted by ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” Id. (citing Benge v. Johnson, 474 F.3d

236, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)).

The Ohio Supreme Court addressed Mahdi’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on

the merits as follows:

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Reversal of a conviction for ineffective assistance requires that the defendant show,

first, that counsel's performance was deficient and, second, that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, (1984). Accord State v. Bradley, 42

Ohio St. 3d 136 (1989).

Smith [n.k.a. Mahdi] asserts many conclusions, one of which is that the trial was

racially charged, since the murder was committed by a black man and the victim was

“a man of Arabic descent who operated a grocery store in the inner city.”

Characteristic of Smith's arguments under this proposition is his conclusion that

“because the conflict between blacks and the immigrant newcomers envelops the

overall debate on black/white relations, racism may have been a factor in the jury's

decision to convict [Smith] of aggravated murder.” (Footnote omitted.) Other

examples of Smith’s argument that the entire trial was fraught with racially charged

evidence include trial counsel's strategy during the mitigation phase to highlight the

black “gangsta” movie “Menace II Society,” relying on the testimony of an Islamic

jail counselor, citing the movie “Malcolm X,” and relating defendant's story of life

in the inner city.

Smith relies on Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36-37 (1986), for the proposition that

a capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to have the venire

questioned so as to reveal any possible racial bias. Smith contends that, in the

racially charged atmosphere of this case, competent counsel would have taken

advantage of that entitlement.

In our view, Smith’s arguments are purely speculative and unconvincing. We have

held that “the conduct of voir dire by defense counsel does not have to take a

particular form, nor do specific questions have to be asked.” State v. Evans, 63 Ohio

St. 3d 231, 247 (1992). Moreover, as we noted in State v. Watson, 61 Ohio St. 3d 1

(1991), under Turner v. Murray, the actual decision to voir dire on racial prejudice

is a choice best left to a capital defendant’s counsel. Id., 476 U.S. at 37, and fn. 10.

State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d at, 651-52. Nothing in the Supreme Court of Ohio’s analysis could be

construed as contrary to clearly established federal law. In fact, the court reasonably interpreted

Supreme Court precedent, noting that decisions about the content of questions during voir dire are

typically left to the discretion of the trial counsel. See, e.g., Lear v. Cowan, 220 F.3d 825, 829 (7th

Cir. 2000) (holding that trial counsel’s failure to voir dire jurors on racial bias was not

“unprofessional, subpar representation per se,” and noting that “there are tactical reasons why a

lawyer would not want to direct the jurors’ attention to the interracial character of the crime, and the

[Turner] Court recognized this”); accord Hasan v. Ishee, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83926, at *28-32

(S.D. Ohio Aug. 14, 2006). Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, 

Counsel could have properly determined that the examination of jurors’ racial views

during voir dire would be unwise, since the subject of racial prejudice is sensitive to

most people, and raising it during voir dire could cause some jurors to be less candid

if confronted with direct questions attempting to discern any hint of racial prejudice.

In addition, our reading of the record leads us to conclude, contrary to Smith’s

assertions, that racial issues were not “woven into the fabric of trial.”

State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d at 652. This observation is especially appropriate in this case, since

Mahdi’s counsel apparently hoped that the jury would conclude that the murder of Darwish had been

an accident. Conducting a voir dire on racial and religious grounds could have emphasized the

possible role of racial and religious animus in the commission of the crime, bolstering the

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prosecution’s claim that the murder had been intentional. Thus, counsel had to weigh the potential

harm that could flow from a voir dire on racial and religious bias against its arguable benefit. Trial

counsel’s decision not to voir dire prospective jurors on racial and religious bias seems a reasonable

tactical decision. 

Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded, 

Yet, even if we viewed counsel’s trial strategy as questionable, such a strategy

should not compel us to find ineffective assistance of counsel. In these situations,

we normally defer to counsel’s judgment. State v. Clayton, 62 Ohio St. 2d 45, 49

(1980). Since we find no legitimate basis for Smith’s assertions that counsel were

ineffective for not examining the venire on racial or religious bias, this proposition

is not well taken.

State v. Smith,731 N.E.2d at 652. Such an application cannot be said to constitute an objectively

unreasonable application of federal law. Instead, it is based upon a particular view of the factual

record in this case, determinations that under AEDPA are presumed to be correct, to which the court

applied its reasonable interpretation of federal law. Consequently, Mahdi’s claim that his trial

counsel were ineffective fails. In turn, because Mahdi has failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel

were ineffective, the claim that his appellate counsel were ineffective also fails. Given that Mahdi’s

trial counsel were not ineffective, Mahdi cannot argue that he suffered prejudice from his appellate

counsel’s failure to raise trial counsel’s decision not to question jurors about religious and racial

bias. No prejudice flows from the failure to raise a meritless claim.

2.

Mahdi next argues that he was denied due process on his first appeal of right when the state

court of appeals, in its independent review of his death sentence, applied a change in case law that

retroactively forbade consideration of one of the mitigators he had relied on at trial: residual doubt.

Indeed, when Mahdi was tried, Ohio law recognized residual doubt as a mitigating factor. See State

v. Watson, 572 N.E.2d 97, 111 (Ohio 1991). Accordingly, Mahdi now argues that he devoted, what

he describes as, “a significant portion” of his efforts at the penalty phase to presenting residual-doubt

evidence, arguing that there existed some doubt as to his intent to kill. In fact, Mahdi persuaded the

trial court to instruct the jury on employing residual doubt as a mitigating factor. While his case was

before the state court of appeals on direct appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio declared that

residual doubt was not an acceptable mitigator under the state death-penalty statute, thus abrogating

Watson. See State v. McGuire, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1123 (Ohio 1997). As a result, the state court of

appeals held that it could not consider residual doubt when independently determining whether the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors in Mahdi’s case. The Ohio Supreme Court

subsequently held that it was not error to apply McGuire retroactively, State v. Smith, 731 N.E.2d

at 657 (citing State v. Bey, 709 N.E.2d 484, 503 (Ohio 1999)), but also went on to conclude that

residual doubt would be entitled to very little weight in mitigation. Id. at 660.

Mahdi emphasizes that he does not challenge the constitutionality of McGuire; instead,

Mahdi only challenges the retroactive application of McGuire to his case. He argues that due

process was violated because it was fundamentally unfair for the court of appeals to apply McGuire

retroactively given that Mahdi’s strategy at the mitigation hearing relied on the then-good law of

Watson. He further argues that, because Ohio law granted him two appeals of right, the intermediate

appellate court’s failure to consider residual doubt denied him due process by depriving him of his

right to a meaningful dual review of his death sentence.

We need not determine whether the Supreme Court of Ohio unreasonably applied clearly

established federal law in applying McGuire retroactively. Despite its approval of the retroactive

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2

Mahdi further points out that O.R.C. § 2929.05 grants a capital defendant the right to a dual review of his

sentence. Mahdi argues that his due process rights were violated, despite the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court

considered residual doubt, because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not consider residual doubt. Therefore, Mahdi claims,

he did not get two meaningful reviews of his sentence as required by Ohio law and this violation of state law amounts

to a deprivation of his due process rights under the federal constitution. 

We believe that Mahdi’s argument is foreclosed, however, by Rust v. Hopkins, 984 U.S. 1486 (1993). In Rust, the Supreme Court addressed a defendant’s claim that he had been deprived of a two-tier sentencing procedure as

required by Nebraska law. Id. The Court agreed with the defendant’s argument because it determined that the threejudge sentencing panel had not applied the reasonable doubt standard for aggravating circumstances. Id. at 1493. Doing

so, explained the Court, violated Rust’s liberty interests and, because the initial review was so seriously flawed, it could

not be cured by subsequent review. Id. In doing so, the Supreme Court stated: “We recognize, of course, that an

appellate court is fully competent to ‘cure’ some sentencing deficiencies in capital cases. However, we think such

appellate remedies are appropriate when the initial sentencing was tainted by relatively minor errors (such as the

improper consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance).” Id. (emphasis added). Here, the sentencing jury

considered residual doubt. So did the Supreme Court of Ohio. Rust instructs that any deficiency in the Ohio Court of

Appeals’ review was cured by that of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Under Rust, Mahdi received meaningful appellate

review of his sentence.

application of McGuire, the Ohio Supreme Court in fact weighed residual doubt and noted that it

was entitled to little weight. The court noted that the testimony of defense mitigation witnesses that

Mahdi claimed the shooting was accidental was unpersuasive and that the eyewitness testimony

negated the absence of intent to kill. Mahdi was not in fact deprived of an appellate weighing of

residual doubt.2

III.

Because the claims presented were adjudicated on the merits by the Supreme Court of Ohio,

and such adjudication did not contradict clearly established federal law, we affirm the district court’s

denial of Mahdi’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

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