Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cr-00155/USCOURTS-caed-2_17-cr-00155-34/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregorio Nunez
Defendant
Luis Nunez
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Pablo Vargas
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

LUIS NUNEZ,

PABLO VARGAS,

GREGORIO NUNEZ,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:17-CR-155-MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: January 14, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case was set for a status conference on January 14, 2021. By this stipulation, the United 

States and defendant Pablo Vargas request that the Court continue the status conference (and possible 

change of plea) to March 25, 2021, and to exclude time under the Court’s General Orders, as well under 

Local Code T4, for the reasons set forth below. Defendants Luis Nunez and Gregorio Nunez have both 

pleaded guilty in this matter, and neither of them join in this stipulation.

On April 17, 2020, this Court issued General Order 617, which suspends all jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California scheduled to commence before June 15, 2020, and allows district judges to 

continue all criminal matters to a date after June 1. This and previous General Orders were entered to 

address public health concerns related to COVID-19. 

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

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openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant Pablo 

Vargas, by and through his counsel of record, T. Lance Archer, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By this stipulation, defendant Pablo Vargas now moves to exclude time between January 

14, 2021, and March 25, 2021, under Local Code T4. 

2. The parties to this stipulation agree, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes several reports, as well as video and audio surveillance, all of which the government has 

produced. In addition, there is physical evidence involved in this case. All of this discovery has 

been either produced directly to counsel, or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to review the discovery, and will 

need additional time. Defense counsel will also need time to review the current charges, to 

investigate and conduct research related to the current charges, and to discuss potential 

resolutions with his client, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. 

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period between January 14, 2021, and March 

25, 2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to this Court’s General Orders, and to 18 

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by 

the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served 

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by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 

3. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 11, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JAMES R. CONOLLY

JAMES R. CONOLLY

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: January 11, 2021 /s/ T. LANCE ARCHER

T. LANCE ARCHER

Counsel for Defendant 

PABLO VARGAS

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2021

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