Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03572/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-03572-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Geray
Petitioner
William Muniz
Respondent

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON GERAY,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

Case No. 14-cv-03572-VC (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S 

MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING 

PETITIONER’S MOTIONS; ISSUING 

PARTIAL CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABIILTY

Re: Dkt. Nos. 30, 36, 39, 40

Petitioner Jason Geray has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his state conviction in the Santa Clara County Superior Court. The 

respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. For the following reasons, the 

motion is granted. 

BACKGROUND

On January 13, 2010, Geray pled nolo contendere to assault with a deadly weapon and 

admitted having two prior strike convictions. On November 19, 2010, the court struck one prior 

strike conviction and sentenced Geray to nineteen years in prison. Geray did not appeal his 

conviction.

On April 13, 2011, Geray filed two motions in the superior court for the production of 

transcripts and the record of his court proceedings. These motions were denied on May 9, 2011 

because Geray had not filed a notice of appeal. 

On May 12, 2011, Geray served on the Office of the Attorney General an application for 

relief from default and permission to file a belated notice of appeal in the court of appeal. 

Subsequently, Geray filed a motion for modification of the restitution order that 

accompanied his sentence, which the superior court denied on September 14, 2011. 

Geray submitted a notice of appeal on or around December 24, 2012. The superior court 

sent Geray a letter stating that his notice of appeal was received on that date but was not filed 

because it was untimely. 

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On March 5, 2013, Geray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior court 

claiming that his attorney provided ineffective assistance by abandoning him on appeal and by 

allowing him to plead no contest even though no evidence supported the charges against him. On 

March 27, 2013, the superior court denied the petition. 

On June 24, 2013, Geray sent to the superior court a notice of appeal of the denial of his 

habeas petition. On July 24, 2013, the superior court issued an order explaining that the denial of 

the habeas petition was not an appealable order. 

On August 29, 2013, Geray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the court of 

appeal. On November 7, 2013, the court denied the petition without prejudice to refiling it in the 

superior court. 

On December 3, 2013, Geray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the superior 

court on the grounds that: (1) he was denied the right to a speedy trial; (2) he was incompetent to 

stand trial; (3) the prosecutor misled the defense about the evidence; and (4) his trial attorney 

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to perfect his appeal. He also submitted motions for 

transcripts and for modification of the restitution fine. On January 27, 2014, the superior court 

denied the habeas petition and the motions.

On August 7, 2014, Geray filed this federal habeas petition.

On October 8, 2014, Geray filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court. On December 10, 2014 the California Supreme Court denied the petition. 

DISCUSSION

I. Applicable Limitations Period

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, petitions filed by 

prisoners challenging noncapital state convictions or sentences generally must be filed within one 

year of the date on which the judgment became final after the conclusion of direct review or the 

date the time expires for seeking direct review, whichever is later. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). 

Geray was sentenced on November 19, 2010, and had sixty days to seek direct review by

the California Court of Appeal. Cal. Rule of Court 8.308. Therefore, he had until January 18, 

2011 to file an appeal. Because Geray did not file a direct appeal, his judgment became final on 

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January 18, 2011, and the federal one-year limitations period began on that date. See Mendoza v. 

Carey, 449 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). The deadline for Geray to file his federal habeas 

petition was therefore January 18, 2012. He filed the petition on August 7, 2014, over two and 

one half years after the federal limitations period expired. Therefore, unless Geray qualifies for 

statutory or equitable tolling, the petition is untimely.

II. Statutory Tolling 

AEDPA's one-year limitations period is tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for the “time during 

which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect 

to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” However, the statute is not tolled for state court 

petitions filed after the AEDPA deadline has expired. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003) (section 2244(d)(2) does not permit the renewal of the limitations period that has 

ended before the state petition was filed). 

Geray filed his first state habeas petition on March 5, 2013, after the federal limitations 

period had expired. Therefore, statutory tolling does not apply. Furthermore, gap tolling, the 

tolling of time during the intervals between the filing of state habeas petitions, is not applicable 

also because the statute of limitations expired before Geray filed his first state petition. Id. (state 

petition filed after expiration of AEDPA’s one-year period does not reinitiate limitations period);

Bernal v. Ryan, 2014 WL 31808, *3-4 (D. Ar. Jan. 6, 2014) (because statute of limitations expired 

before filing of first petition, there was no limitations period to toll during gap between end of first

petition and filing of second petition). 

III. Equitable Tolling

AEDPA's statute of limitations is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland 

v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010). However, “a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if 

he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary 

circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at 649; Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “The threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is 

very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The petitioner must show that “the extraordinary circumstances were the cause of his 

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untimeliness and that the extraordinary circumstances ma[de] it impossible to file a petition on 

time.” Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). Where a prisoner fails to show “any 

causal connection” between the grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his 

inability to timely file a federal habeas petition, equitable tolling will be denied. Gaston v. 

Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005)

Geray argues he is entitled to equitable tolling on the following grounds: (1) his attorney 

abandoned him; (2) he has a mental health disability; (3) he lacked access to a law library and 

legal assistance; and (4) California courts failed to provide him with transcripts and records of his 

state court proceedings.

A. Attorney Abandonment

Geray contends that his trial attorney advised him that she was going to file an appeal from 

his conviction, but there was a breakdown in communication and she never filed the appeal. On 

April 13, 2011, when Geray realized the attorney was not going to file an appeal, he filed motions 

in the trial court for production of the transcripts and records of his state court proceedings.

Although an attorney’s negligence, for example, missing a filing deadline, does not 

provide a basis for equitable tolling, an attorney’s abandonment of his client does provide the 

extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner’s control required for equitable tolling. Maples 

v. Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 923-24 (2012). 

Although the record does not show exactly what happened between Geray and his attorney, 

for purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true Geray’s statements that his attorney stopped 

communicating with him after his sentencing and he did not become aware that she was not going 

to file his appeal until April 13, 2011. Therefore, Geray is entitled to approximately three months 

of equitable tolling from January 18, 2011, the beginning of the one-year deadline, through April 

13, 2011. However, even with three months of tolling, his petition, filed two and one half years

after the statutory deadline, is untimely.

B. Mental Health Disability

Exhibits attached to Geray’s petition and opposition indicate that he suffers from a mental 

health disability. The one page of a January 11, 2011 Confidential Psychological Report Geray 

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has submitted indicates he was referred for psychological testing because he had reported memory 

problems and confusion. A mental health treatment summary dated April 13, 2011 states that 

Geray: (1) reported he had a history of hearing voices but at other times he denied hearing voices; 

(2) reported no history of psychosis; and (3) was diagnosed with depression and poor coping 

skills. A March 15, 2012 mental health summary states that Geray was placed in the Secured 

Housing Unit because he had committed battery on an inmate and that his symptoms were: (1) 

vague and inconsistent reporting; (2) persecutory delusions; (3) poor reality testing; and (4) highly 

assaultive behavior due to lack of impulse control. His diagnosis was changed from mood 

disorder to schizophrenia. After Geray attacked other inmates on July 29 and August 1, 2012, he 

began receiving psychiatric medications involuntarily because he posed a danger to others. From 

the exhibits attached to his petition, it appears that Geray may still be receiving medication 

involuntarily.

To be eligible for equitable tolling due to mental impairment, the petitioner must show the 

following: (1) his mental impairment was so severe that either (a) he was unable rationally or 

factually to understand the need to timely file, or (b) his mental state rendered him unable 

personally to prepare a habeas petition and effectuate its filing; and (2) he was diligent in pursuing 

the claims to the extent he could understand them, but that the mental impairment made it 

impossible to meet the filing deadline. Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d 1092, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2010). 

In practice, to evaluate whether a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling due to mental 

impairment, the district court must: (1) find the petitioner has made a non-frivolous showing that 

he had a severe mental impairment during the filing period that would entitle him to an evidentiary 

hearing; (2) determine, after considering the record, whether the petitioner satisfied his burden that 

he was in fact mentally impaired; (3) determine whether the petitioner’s mental impairment made 

it impossible to timely file on his own; and (4) consider whether the circumstances demonstrate 

the petitioner was otherwise diligent in attempting to comply with the filing requirements. Id.; see 

Orthel v. Yates, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 4529336, at *2-3 (9th Cir. July 28, 2015). 

Although, through his exhibits, Geray has made a non-frivolous showing that he has a 

severe mental impairment, the Court concludes that his mental impairment did not make it 

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impossible for him to timely file a habeas petition on his own during the statutory period. Given 

the three months of equitable tolling based on attorney abandonment, the statutory period began 

on April 13, 2011 and ended on April 13, 2012. Geray filed a number of motions, applications 

and petitions for relief during this time period, demonstrating that his mental illness did not cause 

the untimely filing. In 2011, he filed the following: (1) two motions in the superior court for 

production of transcripts and the record of his court proceedings; (2) an application served on the 

Office of the Attorney General for relief from default and permission to file a belated notice of 

appeal in the court of appeal; and (3) a motion in the superior court for modification of the 

restitution order. In 2012, he sent a notice of appeal to the superior court and, in March 2013, he 

filed his first habeas petition in the superior court. He also attaches to his opposition his affidavit,

signed on December 11, 2012, stating that, as soon as he arrived at Salinas Valley State Prison in 

September 2012, he tried, but was unable, to gain access to the prison law library and he argued 

that the lack of access was hurting his chances to challenge his criminal conviction. This affidavit 

and the motions and documents Geray filed demonstrate that his mental illness, which appears to 

manifest in assaultive behavior, did not prevent him from understanding the need to timely file a 

petition or from personally preparing a petition. See e.g., Yeh v. Martel, 751 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th 

Cir. 2014) (although petitioner had history of mental illness, it was not severe enough to cause his 

delay because he repeatedly “sought administrative and judicial remedies, and throughout these 

proceedings showed an awareness of basic legal concepts”); Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 

773 (9th Cir. 2010) (mental incompetence did not cause untimeliness where petitioner filed several 

petitions in state court during time for which he sought equitable tolling); Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 

998 (petitioner not entitled to equitable tolling where he filed other motions in state and federal 

court during relevant period).

Furthermore, even the fact that Geray is being treated with psychiatric medication does not 

establish that he was or is incapable of understanding the need to file a timely petition. That 

Geray has filed a well-reasoned opposition to the motion to dismiss demonstrates this point. See 

Fite v. Martel, 2011 WL 1648581, *6 n.10 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (petitioner’s taking psychiatric 

medication alone insufficient for application of equitable tolling, especially when medication 

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stabilized his condition during relevant time period). 

Accordingly, equitable tolling is not warranted on the basis of Geray’s mental health 

disability.

C. Lack of Access to Law Library and Lack of Legal Experience

Geray contends that he lacked access to a law library and writing materials before April 12, 

2011, when he was in administrative segregation at San Quentin, and that he lacked access to a 

law library from September through December 2012, when he was transferred to Salinas Valley. 

Without more, this claim is not persuasive. “Ordinary prison limitations on [petitioner’s] 

access to the law library and copier . . . were neither “extraordinary” nor made it “impossible” for 

him to file his petition in a timely manner. Given even the most common day-to-day security 

restrictions in prison, concluding otherwise would permit the exception to swallow the rule . . . .” 

Ramirez, 571 F.3d at 998. As in Ramirez, Geray offers no explanation for how his temporary 

placement in administrative segregation or his restricted law library access made it impossible for 

him to file a timely federal petition. See id. Furthermore, even assuming he totally lacked access 

to any legal materials during the time periods he mentions and he received equitable tolling for 

these time periods, his petition would still be untimely. 

Geray’s contention that he has no knowledge of the law and is dependent on other inmates 

is insufficient for equable tolling. See Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) 

(pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication, by itself, is not extraordinary circumstance 

warranting equitable tolling).

D. Lack of Access to Transcripts and Other Material

Geray contends he could not file his petition on time because California courts failed to 

provide him with transcripts and records of his state court proceedings. Without an explanation of 

why the state records were necessary for filing a petition, this reason is insufficient for equitable 

tolling. See Waldron-Ramsey v. Pacholke, 556 F.3d 1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 2009) (petitioner did not 

point to specific instances where he needed a particular document and even without state 

documents, he could have prepared a basic form habeas petition and filed it to satisfy AEDPA 

deadline); Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 232 (2004) (petitioners not required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254

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to attach to their petitions, or to file separately, state court records). 

IV. Geray’s Motions

Geray moves for an evidentiary hearing, but does not indicate what evidence he would 

present. Geray would be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on disputed facts if his allegations, if 

proven, would entitle him to relief. Perez v. Rosario, 459 F.3d 943, 954 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006); 

Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). He is not entitled to an evidentiary 

hearing in light of the fact that he has failed to present any allegations which, if proven, would 

show that his petition was timely filed. Furthermore, “where the record is amply developed, and 

where it indicates that the petitioner’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the 

untimely filing of his habeas petition, a district court is not obligated to hold evidentiary hearings 

to further develop the factual record, notwithstanding a petitioner’s allegations of mental 

incompetence.” Orthel, 2015 WL 4529336, at *3. The record is amply developed and the Court 

has found that Geray’s mental incompetence was not so severe as to cause the untimely filing of 

his petition. 

Geray also moves for appointment of counsel because of his mental disability. The Sixth 

Amendment’s right to counsel does not apply in habeas corpus actions. Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 

791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). Appointment is mandatory only when the circumstances of a 

particular case indicate that appointed counsel is necessary to prevent due process violations. 

Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 1986). As discussed above, the record shows that 

Geray’s petition was untimely filed and his mental disability was not the cause of the 

untimeliness; thus, appointed counsel is not required to prevent due process violations. 

Geray moved for an extension of time to file a response to the respondent’s reply and then 

responded by moving to strike the reply. The motion for an extension of time is denied as moot 

because Geray has filed a response. The motion to strike the reply is denied. See Civil L. R. 7-

3(c) (allowing the filing of a reply to an opposition).

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court orders as follows:

1. The Court grants the motion to dismiss the petition as untimely. 

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2. The Court denies Geray’s motions.

3. The Court issues a certificate of appealability on the issue of whether Geray is entitled to 

equitable tolling because of his mental disability. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000) (when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds, a Certificate of Appealability 

should issue when jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the procedural ruling was 

correct). 

4. This order terminates docket numbers 30, 36, 39 and 40.

5. The Clerk of the Court will issue a separate judgment, terminate all pending motions and 

close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 1, 2015

______________________________________

VINCE CHHABRIA

United States District Judge

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JASON GERAY,

Plaintiff,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-03572-VC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on September 1, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by 

placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Jason Geray ID: AF 4262

Salinas Valley State Prison d-4-114

PO Box 1020

Soledad, CA 93960 

Dated: September 1, 2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

Kristen Melen, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable VINCE CHHABRIA

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