Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01521/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-01521-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Chris Alberico
Defendant
Homer Cissell
Defendant
X. Doe
Plaintiff
Lassen Community College District
Defendant
Mary Elizabeth Alberico Berry Murphy
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

X DOE,

 

Plaintiff,

v.

LASSEN COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DISTRICT, CHRIS

ALBERICO, MARY ELIZABETH

ALBERICO BERRY MURPHY

and HOMER CISSELL, 

 

Defendants.

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No. 07-CV-01521 LEW (DADx)

ORDER RE: 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO

DISMISS 

DEFENDANT DISTRICT’S

MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANT ALBERICO AND

MURPHY’S MOTION FOR MORE

DEFINITE STATEMENT 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

AMEND COMPLAINT

Defendant District’s Motion for Dismissal of First

Amended Complaint; Defendant District’s Motion to

Strike Portions of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint;

Defendant Cissell’s Motion for Dismissal of First

Amended Complaint; Defendants ALberico & Murphy’s

Motion to Dismiss; and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend

Complaint came on for regular hearing before this Court

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1 On August 20, 2007, Defendants moved to dismiss the

original complaint (filed July 26, 2007). However, Plaintiff’s

Opposition included an Amended Complaint effectively mooting

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. (See Sept. 25, 2007 Order.)

2

on December 14, 2007. Having considered all the papers

and arguments submitted on the matter, the Court HEREBY

RULES AS FOLLOWS:

As an initial matter, each of Defendants’ Request

for Judicial Notice is GRANTED.

This case arises out of alleged sexual harassment

of Plaintiff at the hands of her employer and various

employees. Plaintiff is suing her current employer

(Lassen Community College or "District") as well as

three individual defendants, Chris Alberico

(“Alberico”), Mary Alberico Berry Murphy ("Murphy") and

Homer Cissell (“Cissell”) (collectively "Individual

Defendants"). 

Plaintiff files the action1 using the pseudonym “X

Doe”. Plaintiff offers no explanation or justification

for failing to use her proper name in the filing of

this action. 

According to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

“the title of the complaint must name all the parties;

the title of other pleadings, after naming the first

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party on each side, may refer generally to other

parties.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 10(a). 

Whether a district court should allow a litigant to

proceed under a fictitious name depends largely on

whether the litigant has a sufficient privacy interest

in the information that would be revealed, in order to

justify an exemption from the normal rule that parties

must litigate under their own names. See, e.g., James

v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) ("privacy

or confidentiality concerns are sometimes sufficiently

critical that parties or witnesses should be allowed

this rare dispensation")(as cited in Doe v. Burton,

1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 12630 (9th Cir. 1996).) At least

one jurisdiction has found the District Court lacks

jurisdiction where a plaintiff fails to properly

identify himself. See Estate of Rodriquez v. Drummond

Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D. Ala. 2003)(holding that

failure to receive leave of Court to file anonymously

divested the Court of jurisdiction to hear the matter.)

The current factual allegations, while sensitive,

do not justify the use of a pseudonym, especially when

the issue was not properly raised with the Court prior

to filing the instant action. Based on Plaintiff’s

failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the Court hereby DISMISSES the First Amended

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2 Leave to amend is limited based on the rulings set forth

in this Order. 

3

 Each Defendant moves separately for dismissal, however

for the purposes of this Order, the Motions have been combined

except where separate arguments are necessary. 

4

Complaint with leave to amend2. 

Notwithstanding the above ruling, the Court further

rules on Defendants’ Motions as follows: 

I. Defendants’3

 Motions To Dismiss Plaintiff’s First

Amended Complaint

A. Defendant Cissell’s Motion to Dismiss based on

Insufficient Service of Process

Cissell alleges that he was not properly served and

thus the Complaint should be dismissed as to him for

insufficient service of process. (Cissell Mot. at 2-

3.) 

Under Rule 12(b)(5), a District Court may dismiss a

complaint for insufficiency of service of the summons

and the complaint. Cissell is accurate that the first

attempt at service was defective, however, Plaintiff

cured the defect prior to Cissell’s filing of the

instant motion. Cissell has responded to the Complaint

and was provided additional time with which to make his

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4

 Plaintiff contends that the Individual Defendants can be

sued in their personal capacity. (Opp. at 5.) However, this

section only examines whether District can be sued. 

5 Plaintiff alleges Federal Jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. 

5

response, consequently, there has been no prejudice to

Cissell. 

Thus, Cissell’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(5)

is DENIED. 

B. District’s Motion to Dismiss Based on Eleventh

Amendment Immunity

According to District, Plaintiff’s claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against District must be dismissed

because District enjoys “absolute immunity.” (District

Mot. at 4-5.) Plaintiff does not actually make a

specific claim for relief under section 1983, indeed

the Complaint is somewhat vague about the basis for

Plaintiff’s4 causes of actions. Nevertheless, because

it is not necessary for a Plaintiff to state the legal

grounds for each cause of action, a claim under section

1983 can be inferred from the language.5

Suits against State Agencies are considered suits

against the State for purposes of Eleventh Amendment

Immunity. See Florida Dept. of Health and

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Rehabilitative Services v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n,

 450

U.S. 147 (1981). 

The Eleventh Amendment bars damages actions brought

against state officials in their official capacity, as

the state is the real party-in-interest in these suits. 

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.

89 (1984). Community College Districts are state

entities entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. See

Mitchell v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 861

F.2d 198, 201 (9th Cir. 1988). California school

districts are immune from § 1983 suits. Belanger v.

Madera Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 250 (9th

Cir. 1992).

Consequently, any claims brought by Plaintiff against

District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cannot be sustained. 

Plaintiff is therefore prohibited from amending any

section 1983 claim against District and District’s

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with prejudice.

C. Individual Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims

Plaintiff appears to seek recovery from Alberico,

Murphy and Cissell under Title VII. Individual

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Defendants maintain that such recovery is not permitted

because they cannot be held personally liable under the

statute. 

Individual employees, including supervisors and

managers, are not personally liable as "employers"

under Title VII. See Pink v. Modoc Indian Health

Project, Inc., 157 F.3d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1998); see

also Lesane v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 226 Fed. Appx.

693, 700 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Thus, Plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the

Individual Defendants cannot survive and Individual

Defendant’s Motion in this regard are GRANTED with

prejudice. Consequently, Plaintiff is prohibited from

filing any amended Title VII claims against any of the

Individual Defendants. 

D. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Based on Statute

of Limitations

Defendants maintain that many, if not all, of

Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred and should therefore

be Dismissed. (Dist. Mot. at 6-8.) According to

Plaintiff, the quid pro quo sexual favors were demanded

on July 30, 2004 and the sexual relationship continued

until October, 2005. (Compl. ¶ 17-20.)

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Plaintiff contends that the harm was a continuous harm

from July, 2004, until the departure of Defendant

Cissell in July of 2007. (Opp. at 6.) 

Plaintiff does not state precisely which claims are

brought under which statutory scheme. Accordingly, it

is necessary to examine each potential statute to

determine whether the statute of limitations is

exhausted. 

The Fair Housing and Employment Act, Government

Code section 12960, states that “no complaint may be

filed after the expiration of one year from the date

upon which the alleged unlawful practice occurred. . .” 

Complaints brought under Title VII must be filed with

the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged

discriminatory act occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(e)(1). 

Plaintiff contends that neither of these statutes

has tolled because the last act of discrimination was

within the statute - specifically, July of 2007. 

However, each of Plaintiff’s claims revert to the quid

pro quo sexual advances made by Alberico from July 2004

to October 2005. 

District relies on Draper v. Coeur Rochester, 147

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28 9

F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998), which is particularly

on point. In that case, Plaintiff plead both hostile

work environment as well as quid pro quo harassment. 

The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court’s dismissal

of the quid pro quo allegations which fell outside the

statute of limitations. Id. The Court however found

that while the quid pro quo claims were barred, the

allegations of hostile work environment were not. Id.

at 1109-1111. 

A similar result is warranted here. Plaintiff

adequately pleads that she suffered from a hostile work

environment, which continues to this date. However,

any allegations based exclusively on the quid pro quo

sexual relationship are barred as untimely.

Therefore, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are

GRANTED with prejudice, as to each Defendant, to the

extent any claim is based exclusively on the quid pro

quo sexual relationship. Plaintiff is prohibited from

amending those claims. 

E. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss All California

Education Code section 220 Claims

 

Each Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims

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6

 No person shall be subjected to discrimination on the

basis of sex, ethnic group identification, race, national origin,

religion, color, mental or physical disability, or any actual or

perceived characteristic that is contained in the definition of

hate crimes set forth in Section 422.55 of the Penal Code in any

program or activity conducted by an educational institution that

receives, or benefits from, state financial assistance or enrolls

pupils who receive state student financial aid.

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under Cal. Ed. Code 2206 based on Plaintiff’s failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Review of the entire code illuminates the fact that

the code only applies to “Educational Institution,”

which according to the Education Code “means a public

or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school

or institution; the governing board of a school

district; or any combination of school districts or

counties recognized as the administrative agency for

public elementary or secondary schools.” Cal. Ed. Code

§ 210.1. 

District, which employs Plaintiff, is a college

institution and would not qualify as an educational

institution under the education code. Plaintiff’s claim

cannot survive. Therefore, the Court GRANTS with

prejudice, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

California Education Code section 220 claims, as to all

Defendants. Plaintiff is not permitted to amend these

claims. 

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7

 District attempted to dismiss the IIED claims on

unsuccessful grounds, however, because the claims are preempted

by statute it is unnecessary to examine the grounds enumerated by

District. 

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F. Defendants Motions to Dismiss All Intentional

Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims

According to Defendant Cissell7, Plaintiff’s

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”)

Claims necessarily fail because Plaintiff has not

complied with California Government Code Section 815. 

Under California Government Section 815:

Except as otherwise provided by statute: (a) A

public entity is not liable for an injury,

whether such injury arises out of an act or

omission of the public entity or a public

employee or any other person. (b) The liability

of a public entity established by this part

(commencing with Section 814) is subject to any

immunity of the public entity provided by

statute, including this part, and is subject to

any defenses that would be available to the

public entity if it were a private person.

Cal. Gov. Code § 815 

Plaintiff does not allege a violation of any

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28 12

specific law or statute in regards to the IIED claims. 

However, several California District Courts have held

that Cal. Gov. Code § 815 acts as a specific bar to

IIED claims against school districts or public

employees. Davison v. Santa Barbara High Sch. Dist., 48

F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1232 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("the claims

for . . . intentional infliction of emotional distress

against public entities and public employees fall well

within the [Cal. Gov. Code 815] immunities'

boundaries"); Bragg v. E. Bay Reg'l Park Dist., 2003

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23423, *18 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 

Therefore, IIED claims cannot be brought against public

employees or entities. Defendants’ Motions are hereby

GRANTED with prejudice as to any IIED claims, Plaintiff

is therefore not permitted to amend these claims. 

II. Defendant District’s Motion to Strike Portions of

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint

District requests the Court strike multiple

paragraphs of the First Amended Complaint, including

page 15, line 15 requesting “exemplary” damages against

Defendant Lassen Community College District. As

District is a government entity, and Cal. Gov. Code §

818 bars exemplary damages against government entities,

this section is STRICKEN. See, e.g. Austin v. Regents

of University of California, 89 Cal. App. 3d 354, 359

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(Cal. App. Ct. 1979) (affirming striking of punitive

damages against University of California).

Each other paragraph District moves to strike is

relevant to the claims brought forth in the First

Amended Complaint and thus will not be stricken. 

Therefore, District’s Motion is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part.

III. Alberico and Murphy’s Motion for a More

Definite Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e)

As an alternative to their Motion to Dismiss,

Alberico and Murphy filed a Motion for a More Definite

Statement Pursuant to Rule 12(e). 

Defendants Alberico and Murphy argue that Plaintiff

fails to attribute specific conduct to any specific

Defendants, that the FAC does not plead dates of the

conducts, and the Complaint does not mention statutory

bases for the claims.

Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Plaintiff does

attribute specific conduct to Alberico and Murphy. For

instance, FAC paragraphs 18, 19, 20, and 49 state

specific conducts as to Alberico. Moreover, FAC

paragraphs 28, 53, 54, and 75 state specific conducts

as to Murphy. 

In addition, these paragraphs recite certain

relevant dates. Plaintiff does not state a claim for

fraud, and the dates that Plaintiff recites are

sufficient to give Defendants notice of the bases for

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the claims.

Moreover, contrary to Defendants’ argument,

Plaintiff “is not required to state the statutory or

constitutional basis for his claim, only the facts

underlying it.” McCalden v. Cal. Library Ass’n, 955

F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir. 1992).

Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant Alberico and

Murphy’s Motion for a More Definite Statement Pursuant

to Rule 12(e) because the FAC is sufficiently definite.

V. Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Pleading

Plaintiff seeks to amend the Complaint under Rule

15. Rule 15 provides that a Complaint may be amended

when justice so requires. However, Plaintiff’s

proposed Second Amended Complaint is REJECTED based on

the above holdings. Plaintiff is hereby GRANTED thirty

(30) days from the issuance of this Order to submit a

proposed revised amended complaint in compliance with

each of the above rulings. 

 RONALD S.W. LEW

 U.S. Senior District Judge

DATED: December 27, 2007

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