Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00212/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00212-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincente Salvador Arenas-Garcia
Defendant
Miguel Zuniga Arteaga
Defendant
Armando Martinez
Defendant
Miguel Angel Sanchez-Meza
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Juan Vizuett-Resendiz
Defendant
Terry Whited
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

MIGUEL ZUNIGA ARTEAGA,

ARMANDO MARTINEZ,

TERRY WHITED,

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ-MEZA,

JUAN VIZUETT-RESENDIZ, and

VINCENTE SALVADOR ARENAS-GARCIA,

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00212 DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

AND ORDER

CURRENT HEARING DATE: January 27, 2021

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

PROPOSED HEARING DATE: April 28, 2021

COURT: Hon. Barbara A. McAuliffe

This case is set for status conference on January 27, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California until further 

notice, and allows district judges to continue all criminal matters. This, previous, and subsequent

General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

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judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant MIGUEL 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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ZUNIGA ARTEAGA, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Nicholas Reyes, defendant 

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZ-MEZA, by and through defendant’s counsel of record, Richard A. 

Beshwate, and VINCENTE SALVADOR ARENAS-GARCIA, by and through defendant’s counsel of 

record, Harry M. Drandell, seek a continuance of the current status conference to April 28, 2021 and 

hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 27, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 28, 

2021, and to exclude time between January 27, 2021, and April 28, 2021, under Local Codes T2 and T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

includes over 11,000 pages of Bates stamped discovery and several months of wiretap 

recordings. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, to 

review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review 

and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare 

pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Additionally, given the voluminous discovery and the fact that this case involved 

a wiretap investigation, it is so complex that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for 

pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself prior to April 28, 2021.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

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et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 27, 2021 to April 28, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) [Local Code T2], because it results from a continuance 

granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 18, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ANGELA SCOTT

ANGELA SCOTT

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: January 18, 2021 /s/ per email authorization

NICHOLAS REYES

Counsel for Defendant

MIGUEL ZUNIGA ARTEAGA

 Dated: January 18, 2021

/s/ per email authorization

RICHARD A. BESHWATE

Counsel for Defendant

MIGUEL ANGEL SANCHEZMEZA

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Dated: January 18, 2021

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED that the status conference is continued from January 27, 2021, to April 28, 

2021, at 1:00 p.m. before Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Time is excluded pursuant to 18 

U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) and 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 19, 2021 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

/s/ per email authorization

HARRY DRANDELL

Counsel for Defendant

VINCENTE SALVADOR 

ARENAS-GARCIA

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