Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cr-00095-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Aly Mohsen
Defendant
Amr Mohsen
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

CASE NO. CR. 03-0095 WBS

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S SECOND 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 

 OBTAINED DURING A SEARCH OF

HIS JAIL CELL

AMR MOHSEN and ALY MOHSEN,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Defendant Amr Mohsen (“Defendant”) moves a second time

to suppress any and all evidence obtained during a search of his

jail cell on June 15, 2005, pursuant to a warrant. Defendant’s

first motion to suppress evidence was based on his assertion of

the marital communications privilege and the claim that the

government had insufficient procedural protections to preserve

defendant’s attorney-client privilege. In his second motion to

suppress the same evidence, defendant argues that the search

violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the attorney-client

privilege, and the work product doctrine. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

On March 25, 2003, a 19-count indictment was filed

charging defendant with one count of conspiracy to obstruct

justice and to commit perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371

(Count 1), four counts of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1621 (1) (Counts 2-5), one count of subornation of perjury in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (Count 10), eight counts of mail

fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Counts 11-18), and one

count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503

(Count 19). The trial of these charges was originally scheduled

for March 31, 2004 before Judge Alsup. (Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to

Def.’s Mot. to Disqualify 6.) On March 27, 2004, defendant was

arrested based upon information that he was planning to flee the

country. (Id.) On March 29, 2004, Judge Alsup ordered defendant

to be detained in the Santa Rita jail pending trial. (Id.)

While defendant was detained at the Santa Rita jail, an

inmate contacted law enforcement and reported that defendant

wanted him to facilitate acts of murder and witness intimidation.

(Def.’s Mot. to Suppress Jail Cell Evidence Ex. B (Application &

Aff. for a Search Warrant ¶¶ 4, 5, 18).) Agents of the Federal

Bureau of Enforcement, in turn, obtained a search warrant for

defendant’s jail cell. (Montoya Decl. ¶ 2.) The search was

conducted by F.B.I. Special Agents Joseph Montoya and Charles

John Gunther and took place on or about June 15, 2004. (Id. at

¶¶ 1, 2.) Montoya and Gunther discovered a number of items for

which seizure was authorized by the warrant. (Id. at ¶ 3.) The

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According to an F.B.I. form filed by Agents Montoya and 1

Gunther the day after the search,

The following items of evidence were seized:

1. Book entitled “Sybil.”

2. Documents referring to “Kemo” and mental disorders.

3. Writings referring to Psychological Disorders and

medications.

4. Book entitled “DSM-IV”.

5. Book entitled “A Beautiful Mind”.

6. Book entitled “I Can See Tomorrow”.

7. Handwritten notes (21 pages), page 1 addressed to Mervat.

8. Document with Arabic writing, and two papers with “KEMO”

“408-428-0388".

9. Document pertaining to Insanity Trial.

10. Documents in Arabic, and Documents referring to Harm,

and medication.

11. Documents referring to medication and mental illness;

envelope with medication.

12. Five envelopes with various medications hidden in a

book.

(Montoya Decl. Ex. 1 (June 16, 2004 Post-search form).) 

3

agents collected and seized all of these materials. (Id. ¶ 3.)1

Included in the material seized were some handwritten notes,

attached as Exhibit 3 to the government’s opposition to the

previous motion; some of which are attached as Exhibit A to

defendant’s declaration. 

Special Agent Gunther delivered all of the seized

materials to Assistant United States Attorney Ben Burch. 

(Montoya Decl. ¶ 3; Gunther Decl. ¶ 3.) The application and

affidavit for this search provided that 

[i]n order to protect Mohsen’s attorney-client privilege,

this search will be executed by FBI Special Agents and an

experienced Assistant United States Attorney (‘AUSA’),

Charles Ben Burch, who is one of the Professional

Responsibility Officer [sic] for the United States

Attorney’s Office, all of whom will not be further involved

in the prosecution of Mohsen’s criminal case.

(Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Suppress Ex. B (Application &

Aff. for Search Warrant) ¶ 25.) Former AUSA (now Judge) Burch

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declares that the procedure was followed: he screened the written

documents seized for those that, in his estimation, were

privileged. (Burch Decl. ¶ 3.) Of the 21 pages of handwritten

notes, three of those pages were withheld by Burch from the

prosecuting attorneys. (Id. at ¶ 4.)

On July 27, 2004, the grand jury issued a superseding

indictment charging Amr Mohsen with contempt of court in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (Count 20), attempted witness

tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) (Count 21),

solicitation to commit arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373

(Count 22), and solicitation to commit the murder of a federal

judge in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 373 (Count 23).

Defendant first moved to suppress evidence seized from

a search of his jail cell on August 8, 2005. The court denied

that motion and held that defendant did not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of his jail

cell, the search procedure did adequately protect the search

and/or seizure of documents falling within the attorney-client

privilege, and the marital communications privilege did not apply

to defendant’s handwritten notes. (Oct. 5, 2005 Order re: Mot.

to Suppress Evidence Seized in Def.’s Jail Cell.) Defendant now

moves again to suppress evidence obtained from the search of his

jail cell, this time arguing that: (1) his Fourth Amendment right

was violated by the search, (2) the government lacked probable

cause to conduct the search, and the warrant issued contained

misleading and false information, (3) items that were seized that

are not listed in the warrant should be suppressed as outside the

scope of the search, (4) items that were in an envelope stamped

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with the words “attorney-client materials” should be suppressed

because they are protected under the attorney-client privilege

and work-product doctrine, and 5) information from the

confidential informant to the government should be suppressed as

a violation of the attorney-client privilege because the

informant was serving as defendant’s paralegal.

II. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides

that, 

The right of the people to be secure in their 

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 

be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 

affirmation, and particularly describing the 

place to be searched, and the persons or things 

to be seized. 

U.S. Const. Am. IV. In order to allege a Fourth Amendment

violation, a defendant must possess a “reasonable expectation of

privacy” in the place searched. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.

83, 101 (1998). 

The court has previously noted that “the Fourth

Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not

apply within the confines of the prison cell.” (Oct. 25, 2005

Order 6; citing Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984).) It

has also noted that the Fourth Amendment protects neither

defendants who are in prison before trial nor defendants who are

in prison because they have been convicted of a crime. (Id.,

citing Hudson, 468 U.S. at 538); see also Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75

F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996) (“An inmate ordinarily has no

reasonable expectation of privacy as to his jail cell or his

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possessions within it.”); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d

285, 287, 290-91 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a pretrial

detainee’s minimal or nonexistent expectation of privacy in phone

calls made from jail means that “the Fourth Amendment is

therefore not triggered by the routine taping of such calls”);

Portillo v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Ariz., 15 F.3d 819, 823

(9th Cir. 1994) (“[I]t is well established that society does not

recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy

that a prisoner might have in his prison cell.”); Nakao v.

Rushen, 766 F.2d 410, 412 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[B]ecause a prisoner

does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison

cell, the fourth amendment’s proscription against unreasonable

searches does not apply to the confines of a prison cell.”). 

The Second Circuit has not read Hudson so broadly and

instead interprets it to permit warrantless searches of prison

cells only when done to serve institutional needs of the prison. 

United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1986). 

Significantly, however, the Ninth Circuit precedent cited above

constrains the court to read Hudson as expansively as its

language suggests and to find that “society is not prepared to

recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy

that a prisoner might have in his prison cell.” Hudson, 468 U.S.

at 525-26. Moreover, in Cohen, 796 F.2d at 24, an Assistant

United States Attorney improperly initiated a warrantless search

solely to obtain information for a superseding indictment. The

situation in Cohen is somewhat analogous to the situation in this

case, but with one major exception. In this case, the government

obtained a warrant before conducting a search of defendant’s

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Defendant also argues that the information in the 2

affidavit that came from a confidential informant was obtained in

violation of the Sixth Amendment right to prepare a defense

because the informant was defendant’s paralegal. (Def.’s Mot. to

Suppress Jail Cell Evidence 10.) Defendant only cites United

States v. Irwin, 612 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1980) for support. 

However, Irwin dealt with governmental interference in

conversations between a defendant and his attorney, so it does

not directly pertain to the situation of a “paralegal” turned

government informant. In addition, the “extension of the

[attorney-client] privilege to non lawyers [] must be strictly

confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the

logic of its principle and should only occur when the

communication was made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining

legal advice from the lawyer.” In re: Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig.,

343 F.3d 658, 661 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Blumenthal v. Drudge,

186 F.R.D. 236, 243 (D.D.C. 1999)). Here, defendant contends

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cell. 

A. Validity of the search warrant

Even where a defendant maintains a reasonable

expectation of privacy, the government may conduct a search

pursuant to a valid warrant. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.

109, 120, n. 17 (1984) (citations omitted). “To say that a

warrant is required for a search is to say that the police must

get judicial approval [that there is probable cause to search]

before acting.” United States v. Warren, 997 F. Supp. 1188, 1194

(E.D. Wis. 1998). “[P]robable cause requires only a probability

or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing

of such activity. By hypothesis, therefore, innocent behavior

frequently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause

. . . .” Ill. v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 (1983). 

Defendant argues that the affidavit submitted to the

magistrate to obtain the warrant contained false and misleading

statements and omissions of fact, and further that this

dishonesty was necessary to establish probable cause. (Def.’s 2

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that he hired the paralegal himself, and makes no mention of any

relationship or communications between the paralegal and

defendant’s attorneys. Extending Sixth Amendment protection to

this relationship, without more, would be inconsistent with

confining the privilege “within the narrowest possible limits.” 

Finally, defendant has not claimed that his interactions with the

paralegal related to communications “made in confidence for the

purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer.” Therefore,

defendant has not established that his Sixth Amendment rights

were violated.

8

Mot. to Suppress Jail Cell Evidence 7-8.) Defendant requests

that the court hold an evidentiary hearing to decide this issue. 

(Id.) The Supreme Court has found that:

[W]here the defendant makes a substantial 

preliminary showing that a false statement

knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, was included by the 

affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the

alleged false statement is necessary to a 

finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment

requires that a hearing be held at the 

defendant’s request.

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). Therefore, in

order to receive a Franks hearing, defendant must (1) make a

substantial preliminary showing that a (2) false statement was

included in the affidavit (3) knowingly and intentionally or

recklessly, and (4) that said false statement is necessary to a

finding of probable cause.

In Franks, the defendant made a substantial preliminary

showing that merited a hearing when he claimed that two of the

sources quoted in the affidavit were not personally interviewed

by the warrant affiants. Id. at 158. In addition, although they

may have spoken with another police officer, they did not give

any officer the information for which they were quoted, and

defendant further charged that this information was included in

the affidavit in bad faith. Id. The Court specifically noted

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that there is “a presumption of validity with respect to the

affidavit supporting the search warrant,” and that “the

challenger’s attack must be more than conclusory and must be

supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine.” Id. at

171. Not only must there be allegations of deliberate falsehoods

by the affiant, but there also must be an offer of proof. Id. 

“Affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of

witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily

explained.” Id. 

Defendant has not made a showing that rises to the

level of the preliminary showing required in Franks, and his

allegations therefore do not merit a hearing. First, defendant

has not shown that a false statement was included in the

affidavit. Instead, defendant has alleged that there are

omissions of fact within the affidavit that would have placed his

behavior in a much less suspicious light. Specifically,

defendant points out the omission of the fact that he had been

diagnosed with and treated for depression and that he had

experienced other symptoms of mental health problems. (Def.’s

Mot. Suppress Jail Cell Evidence 9.) He argues that this omitted

fact would have made the question he posed to his daughter, a

psychology student, regarding the symptoms of psychosis seem less

suspect. (Id. at 8.) 

Defendant’s argument relies on omission of information,

not the clear incorporation of falsehoods into the affidavit. It

is far from clear that these facts were omitted “intentionally

and knowingly or with a reckless disregard from the truth.” 

Franks, 438 U.S. at 154; see also United States v. Meling, 47

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F.3d 1546, 1553 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Defendant disbelieves the FBI

[in its claim that it unintentionally omitted facts from the

affidavit], but that disbelief does not amount to the substantial

showing required under Franks.”); United States v. Perdomo, 800

F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that challenging the

veracity of the informant to an affiant was not enough under

Franks; challenging the veracity of the affiant was required).

Furthermore, defendant’s offer of proof is not a “substantial

showing;” it is limited to a declaration by counsel, a redacted

search warrant affidavit, and some notes of his that were seized

in the search. (Id. Exs. A-C.) He does not provide “affidavits

or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses;” nor does he

explain their absence. Finally, defendant’s information, whether

present or absent, was unlikely to have affected the

determination of probable cause. 

Defendant’s behavior arguably could have been depicted

in a less suspicious light; nonetheless, there was some

probability that defendant was planning to commit criminal

activity. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245 n.13 (“[P]robable cause

requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal

activity, not an actual showing of such activity. By hypothesis,

therefore, innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis

for a showing of probable cause . . . .”). Even if defendant was

suffering from depression, that would not preclude defendant from

attempting to fabricate another mental illness that would be more

amenable to an insanity defense. Furthermore, the defense merely

comes to one, relatively reasonable, conclusion of the several

that exist to explain the same set of facts. Given the fairly

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undemanding standard to establish probable cause, defendant has

not sufficiently shown its absence to merit a Franks hearing. 

B. Execution of the search warrant

Defendant also argues that certain items that were

seized should be suppressed because they were outside the scope

of the search warrant, and points to nine pages written by

defendant that were not described in the warrant. (Def.’s Mot.

to Suppress Jail Cell Evidence 11.) As an initial matter, “[a]

search must be limited to the terms of the warrant.” Bivens v.

Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.

388, 394 n. 7 (1971); see also United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d

591, 595 (9th Cir. 1982). The terms of the warrant here included

the following description of evidence to be seized in item 4:

“Any and all notes . . . and other written materials referring to

any mental, emotional, or psychiatric condition, including, the

‘Diagnosis Manual of Mental Disorder IV;’ ‘A Beautiful Mind;’

‘Sybil;’ and ‘Psychotic Drugs-Fast Facts.’” (Def.’s Mot. to

Suppress Jail Cell Evidence Ex. B Search Warrant Attach. A.) 

The officers conducting the search here seized

documents that were grouped together, some of which were the

pages highlighted by defendant as being outside of the scope of

the warrant. (USA’s Opp’n to Def.’s Motion to Suppress Jail Cell

Evidence 17.) Specifically, although pages G1, G2, and G8

admittedly fell under the description in item 4 of the search

warrant in that defendant discusses an insanity defense within

them, defendant argues that pages G3, G4, G5, G6, G7, and W1 of

that same set of papers did not. However, the court notes that

almost every one of the pages admittedly within the scope of the

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warrant ends in the middle of a sentence which is completed in

the next page argued to be outside the scope of the warrant. It

was necessary to have the contested pages to put the other pages

in context. It would be foolish to expect the government to

seize only some pages in the series and leave behind the others. 

To do so would have invited even more criticism from the defense.

C. Materials subject to the attorney-client privilege

Defendant also contends that some materials seized from 

his cell were in an envelope labeled attorney-client materials,

and should be suppressed pursuant to the attorney-client

privilege and work product doctrine. In support, defendant

submits his declaration that there were items in an envelope so

marked. (Amr Mohsen Decl., Oct. 31, 2005 ¶ 2, Ex. A.) The

government counters that the items contained in Exhibit A were

not in one envelope, but were found scattered throughout the jail

cell. (USA’s Opp’n to Mot. to Suppress Jail Cell Evidence 18

(citing Montoya Decl. ¶¶ 5-6).) In addition, the government

claims that no envelope labeled “Attorney-Client Materials” was

found in the search. (Montoya Decl. ¶¶ 7-21.) 

Thus, the court has before it two declarations that

contradict each other. To determine which version to accept, the

court would ordinarily hold an evidentiary hearing.

However, even if defendant is correct that these

documents were in an envelope labeled “attorney-client

materials,” they would still not be protected by the attorneyclient privilege because of the crime-fraud exception. 

Communications made to a lawyer in order to effect a criminal

purpose are not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 

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Zolin contains a two-step procedure for determining 3

whether privileged material is subject to the crime-fraud

exception when that material is being withheld by the party

claiming privilege. 491 U.S. at 572. First, the opposing party

must make a prima facie showing that the crime-fraud exception

applies, and next, the court holds an in camera privilege

hearing. Id. However, defendant has attached to the declaration

of Amr Mohsen, executed on October 31, 2005 all the documents for

which he claims the privilege. Therefore, the extra procedures

to protect privileged information that were outlined in Zolin are

not required.

13

United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988, 1001 (9th Cir. 2002)

(citing United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989)).3

The test for invoking the crime-fraud 

exception to the attorney-client privilege 

is whether there is “reasonable cause to 

believe that the attorney’s services were 

utilized in furtherance of the ongoing 

unlawful scheme.” Reasonable cause is more 

than suspicion but less than a preponderance 

of evidence. The government must submit 

“evidence that[,] if believed by the jury[,] 

would establish the elements of an ongoing 

violation.”

United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir. 1995). The

attorney’s state of mind regarding the communications is not

relevant; what matters to the determination is the client’s

knowledge and intentions. Martin, 279 F.3d at 1001.

Defendant claims privilege for documents he wrote and

compiled in preparation of the defense in his criminal case, with

the intention of giving them to his attorneys. (Amr Mohsen Decl.

¶ 2.) The documents clearly demonstrate reasonable cause to

believe that defendant intended to use his attorneys’ services to

mount a false insanity defense, starting with the legal standard

for mounting an insanity defense and then constructing a

narrative such that defendant could meet that standard. The

first document included is a sample fax that appears to consists

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of notes about a patient with either dual personality disorder or

multiple dissociative identity disorder. (Amr Mohsen Decl., Oct.

31, 2005 ¶ 2, Ex. A. at US006123.) The patient is described as

having a primary, passive identity and an alternate identity or

identities that were controlling, hostile, and self-destructive

with more complete memories. (Id.) 

A large portion of the exhibit is a chapter from

Matthew Bender entitled “Insanity Trial” with notations and

emphasis on various passages. (Id. at US006125-40.) Portions of

the article relating to procedure in an insanity trial and the

standard by which the insanity defense is determined have been

underlined. (Id. at US006125, US006131.) Particular emphasis

was added to sections relating to the M’Naghten Standard for

determining whether insanity can be used as a defense,

underlining and circling a section that explains that a defendant

must prove that he was incapable of “knowing and understanding

the nature and quality of his act.” (Id. at US006126.) In

addition, there was emphasis added to the phrase “personality or

adjustment disorder” and to the following portion: “proof that

the defendant knew that his or her act was against the law will

not preclude a finding of insanity if he or she was not aware

that the act was inherently or morally wrong.” (Id.) Emphasis

was also placed on the following portion: “If found sane, the

defendant must be sentenced. If found insane, the defendant must

be committed to a treatment facility, unless it appears to the

court that the defendant has fully recovered sanity.” (Id. at

US006134.) Defendant appears to have wanted to discuss the

insanity defense with his attorneys and was conducting research

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on the various elements of the defense. 

Throughout the documents, there are multiple references

to multiple identity disorder and its symptoms and various

medications. (Id. at US006141-42, US006152.) In addition, there

is a Prison Health Services Medical Request Form on which

defendant self-reports suffering from a headache, insomnia,

fatigue, lack of energy, an inability to focus or make decisions,

and foggy thinking, and notes the use of some medication. (Id.

at US006143.) Next, there is a report written by defendant

titled “Report from Phsychiatrist/Physychologist [sic].” (Id. at

US006151.) This “report” includes information about personality

disorder and its symptoms of insomnia, headache, foggy thinking,

and an inability to make critical decisions. (Id. at US006151.) 

Thus, there is reasonable cause to believe that defendant was

constructing a mental illness that fit in with the legal standard

for insanity and that he hoped to receive a diagnosis in support

of that from prison medical services. 

Furthermore, in these pages, there is also reasonable

cause to believe defendant was constructing a narrative about the

genesis of his multiple identity disorder. In defendant’s own

writing, certain pages read like a psychiatrist’s notes about

defendant and include a narrative about a personality disorder

arising from defendant’s early experience of trauma and

molestation that resulted in the creation of two identities: Amir

[sic] and Omar. (Id. at US006155-57.) Amir was repressed and

entrapped by his father’s expectations and conditional love; Omar

was unrestrained and expressed the seething/boiling rage that

Amir could not. (Id. at US00626.) There are also notes on

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“Substance-Induced Persisting Amnestic Disorder,” and the

medications that may cause this disorder. (Id. at US006158.) On

one page, defendant notes “[w]hen Amr is angry - AID Omar takes

over to defend him. . . Usually Omar is not reluctant to return

the body.” (Id. at US006159.) This, in particular, fits in with

the pages from Matthew Bender and the notion of a defendant who

is periodically mentally ill but could recover – the kind of

defendant who could commit a crime under the influence of

insanity and thus be acquitted, but not one who would then be

committed to a mental institution. (See id. at US006134.) 

To reiterate the court’s holding in Chen, 99 F.3d at

1503, reasonable cause requires more than a suspicion, but less

than a preponderance of the evidence. Defendant’s writings and

annotations clearly offer a great deal more than a reasonable

suspicion that defendant was attempting to use his attorneys’

assistance to obstruct justice by fabricating a defense of mental

insanity. There is reasonable cause to believe that defendant is

attempting to apply the law to determine what facts would lead to

the most favorable outcome in his case, and his intention in

sending these documents to his attorneys was to seek their

assistance in fabricating an insanity defense that would help him

to avoid criminal liability. 

Moreover, another page of an example of a fax from a

psychologist begins with the phrase “TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN” and

describes the psychological therapy provided by Dr. Mohammed

Ahmad in Cairo to defendant since the early 1960s. (Id. at

US006162.) This “fax” describes defendant’s depressive disorder

with psychotic features of hallucinations and memory gaps and

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Defendant makes a conclusory statement that the work 4

product doctrine applies to these documents and does not cite

caselaw. The court notes that the work product doctrine does not

apply to these communications written by defendant, because they

were not written by, or prepared at the request of, his attorney. 

Walker v. County of Contra Costa, 227 F.R.D. 529, 536 (N.D. Cal.

2005) (affording no work product protection to a document because

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further notes the drugs prescribed to defendant.” (Id.) The

“fax” also notes that Dr. Ahmad died in 2002, his therapy was

taken over by one Dr. Habib, and then Dr. Habib died last year. 

(Id.) Thus, these pages set out a record of a previous mental

illness that would be difficult to corroborate, as the expert

witnesses supposedly responsible for the diagnosis are deceased.

Finally, the last page of the documents for which the

defendant claims privilege has three separate diagnoses, listed

as A, B, and C. (Id. at US006163.) The first is multiple

personality disorder/dissociative identity disorder 300.14, the

second is substance-induced persisting amnestic disorder 292.83,

and the third is obsessive-compulsive personality disorder and

attention-deficit disorder. (Id.) 

Taken together, this evidence prevents much more than a

suspicion that defendant was constructing a mental illness that

would allow him to plead the defense of insanity, and that he was

seeking his attorneys’ help in obtaining expert witnesses and

arguing this defense at trial. See Chen, 99 F.3d at 1503. 

Because there is reasonable cause to believe that defendant

intended to engage his attorney in the obstruction of justice in

future proceedings by fabricating a mental health defense that

would absolve him of guilt, the crime-fraud exception to the

attorney-client privilege applies to these communications.4

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the work product doctrine must "protect against disclosure of the

mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of

an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the

litigation," and there was “no reason to believe that the

[document at issue] contains mental impressions, opinions or

legal theories of an attorney.”)

 

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At the hearing on the motion, counsel for defendant

made the additional argument that the last four words, “including

books on psychosis,” in paragraph 20 of the Affidavit in Support

of the Search Warrant should be stricken because they amount

information about defendant’s trial strategy which should be

suppressed under Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206

(1964). The court need not determine whether that phrase does

amount to a revelation concerning defendant’s trial strategy, or

whether it should be excluded from the affidavit, because the

court finds under Franks that if those words are expurgated from

the affidavit it would still contain probable cause to support

the issuance of the warrant.

III. Conclusion

The court finds that the defendant had no reasonable

expectation of privacy in his jail cell, the search warrant was

properly obtained, and defendant’s description of the

government’s confidential informant as his “paralegal” does not 

implicate the attorney-client privilege. Further, items that

defendant contends were in an envelope stamped with the words

“attorney-client materials” should not be suppressed because they

are subject to the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client

privilege. 

///

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to

suppress the evidence that was obtained from the search of

defendant’s jail cell be, and the same hereby is, DENIED. 

DATED: December 22, 2005

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