Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01703/USCOURTS-caed-2_11-cv-01703-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Helm
Plaintiff
Jay Negus
Defendant
United States Postal Service
Defendant
United States of America
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOSEPH HELM,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant.

No. 2:11-CV-01703-MCE-EFB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Through this personal injury action, Plaintiff Joseph Helm (“Plaintiff”) seeks to 

recover from the United States of America (“United States” or the “Government”) under 

the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. 

Presently before the Court is the United States’ Motion in Limine to exclude all of 

Plaintiff’s experts (ECF No. 82) and Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 83). For 

the following reasons, the Motion in Limine is DENIED without prejudice, and the Motion

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

1

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 1 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local Rule 230(g).

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BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally initiated this action in June 2011 against the United States 

Postal Service and its employee, rural mail carrier Jay Negus, alleging claims for 

(1) negligence and (2) negligent hiring, entrustment, and supervision arising out of a car 

accident. Compl., ECF No. 1. The following year, the United States substituted in as the 

proper party Defendant and successfully moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s second cause of 

action. Order, ECF Nos. 21, 26. 

As to the remaining claim, Plaintiff contends that Mr. Negus, while driving in the 

scope and course of his employment, negligently made an unlawful turn in front of him 

as he was approaching from the opposite direction. Compl. at ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff 

swerved to avoid hitting the postal carrier, who had come to a stop in Plaintiff’s path, and 

instead hit another vehicle and then a tree. Id. at ¶16. As a result, Plaintiff contends he 

suffered a “right shoulder tear resulting in surgery, neck injury, back injury, puncture 

wound, and other injures.” Id. at ¶ 21. 

In his disclosures pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26,

2 Plaintiff makes 

clear: 

Plaintiff is not claiming lost wages; his economic losses are 

composed of past medical bills, most of which have been 

produced, in the amount of about $44,000;

future, possible neck surgery, estimated to be in excess of 

$50,000, including surgeon’s fee, hospital and related costs, 

and the cost to rehabilitate through physical therapy; and,

lost earning capacity (Plaintiff will, with the physical limitations 

placed on him because of his injuries, be unable to do certain 

things, such as serve in the armed forces), including benefits 

and military pension losses, amount to be determined by 

expert testimony, but likely exceeds $500,000; and,

general damages for pain and suffering, humiliation, worry, 

frustration, despair, anger, and related symptoms likely will 

exceed $350,000.

 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted.

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Pl.’s Supp. Discl., ECF No. 43-3, at 4-5.

3

 Plaintiff also disclosed a retained accident 

reconstruction and biomechanics expert, four non-retained treating physicians, and a 

California Highway Patrol officer. Plaintiff did not disclose an expert to testify on lost 

earning capacity, military benefits and military pension losses, or regarding any physical 

limitations placed on him because of his injuries. Gov. Sep. Statement of Undisputed 

Facts (“SSUDF”), ECF No. 83-2, Nos. 12-14. He also did not designate any witness 

from the military to testify that Plaintiff cannot serve in the armed forces, nor did he 

disclose an economic expert. Id., Nos. 15-16. For its part, the Government disclosed its 

own medical expert, Dr. John O. Missirian, (ECF No. 49) after which all experts were 

deposed. 

The Government subsequently filed its instant motions arguing that all of Plaintiff’s 

experts should be excluded and that, absent such expert testimony, summary judgment 

is proper because Plaintiff is unable to establish medical causation or lost earning 

capacity and future medical damages. Plaintiff opposed the Government’s motion for 

summary judgment, but did so without relying on any of his own expert testimony. The 

Government’s Motion in Limine is thus DENIED without prejudice as moot.

4

 Its Motion 

 3 All page citations are to the page numbers electronically assigned when the documents are filed 

on CMECF. 

4 Plaintiff set the hearing date on his Motion in Limine for October 16, 2014, and his summary 

judgment hearing for November 13, 2014. In violation of Eastern District of California Local Rule 230(c), 

Plaintiff failed to timely oppose the Government’s evidentiary motion, and, on October 8, 2014, the Court 

issued an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) directing Plaintiff to show in writing why that Motion should not be 

granted. ECF No. 84. On October 18, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel responded, explaining that “one reading of 

the Local Rules mandated opposition seven days before hearing of said motion” and that he had intended 

to file his opposition on October 9. ECF No. 90 at 1. In addition, counsel reasoned that “it [was] doubtful a 

meaningful opposition could have been filed by October 2, 2014, because the personal computer, back-up 

system, and central server of the office of Plaintiff’s attorney crashed the night of September 18, 2014, or 

the morning of September 19, 2014.” Id. at 1-2. “All data stored on the system was corrupted.” Id. at 2. 

According to counsel, he utilized data recovery specialists to try to recover the data, which they were 

apparently able to do by the date the OSC was issued. Id. Counsel indicated that he would file Plaintiff’s 

opposition within a few days. Id. Eight days later, on October 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a response opposing 

in part the Government’s evidentiary motion. Counsel’s explanation for his failure to timely respond to the 

Motion in Limine, especially given his ability to respond to the substantive motion during the same time 

period and the fact that he failed to seek an extension or update the Court at any time when he had ample 

opportunity to do so, is wholly insufficient. Counsel is hereby sanctioned $250 for failure to comply with 

the Local Rules and orders of this Court. Counsel is admonished that further failures of this kind will result 

in the imposition of further sanctions.

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for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED IN PART. 

STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when “the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). One of the principal purposes of Rule 56 is to 

dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

Rule 56 also allows a court to grant summary judgment on part of a claim or 

defense, known as partial summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“A party may 

move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each 

claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Madan, 889 F. Supp. 374, 378-79 (C.D. Cal. 1995). The standard that applies to a 

motion for partial summary judgment is the same as that which applies to a motion for 

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); State of Cal. ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic 

Substances Control v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 780 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying summary 

judgment standard to motion for summary adjudication).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial 

responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the 

portions in the record “which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. If the moving party meets its initial 

responsibility, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine 

issue as to any material fact actually does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 

253, 288-89 (1968).

In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual 

dispute, the party must support its assertion by “citing to particular parts of materials in 

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the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, 

affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do 

not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party 

cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The 

opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that 

might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 251-52 (1986); Owens v. Local No. 169, Assoc. of W. Pulp and 

Paper Workers, 971 F.2d 347, 355 (9th Cir. 1987). The opposing party must also 

demonstrate that the dispute about a material fact “is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is 

such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 

477 U.S. at 248. In other words, the judge needs to answer the preliminary question 

before the evidence is left to the jury of “not whether there is literally no evidence, but 

whether there is any upon which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the 

party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.” Id. at 251 (quoting 

Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)) (emphasis in original). As the 

Supreme Court explained, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 

[56(a)], its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical 

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Therefore, “[w]here the 

record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving 

party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 87.

In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to 

be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed 

before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255. Nevertheless, inferences are not drawn out of the air, and it is the opposing party’s 

obligation to produce a factual predicate from which the inference may be drawn. 

Richards v. Nielsen Freight Lines, 602 F. Supp. 1224, 1244-45 (E.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 

810 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1987).

///

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ANALYSIS

“The FTCA waives the federal government's sovereign immunity for tort claims 

arising out of the negligent conduct of government employees and agencies in 

circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the 

claimant under the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” Bailey v. 

United States, 623 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2010). In order to establish negligence under 

California law, a plaintiff must establish four required elements: (1) duty; (2) breach; 

(3) causation; and (4) damages.” Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 

2003). The Government moves for summary judgment here arguing Plaintiff cannot 

prove medical causation (i.e., that the injuries he claims arose from the accident he 

alleges) or future damages for lost earning capacity or anticipated medical care. 

“The law is well settled that in a personal injury action causation must be proven 

within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony. Mere 

possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Jones v. Ortho 

Pharmaceutical Corp., 163 Cal. App. 3d 396, 402 (1985). Similarly, “the plaintiff has the 

burden of proving, with reasonable certainty, the damages actually sustained by him as 

a result of the defendant's wrongful act . . . .” Chaparkas v. Webb, 178 Cal. App. 2d 257, 

259 (1960). “[D]amages which are speculative, remote, imaginary, contingent or merely 

possible cannot serve as a legal basis for recovery.” Mozzetti v. City of Brisbane, 

67 Cal. App. 3d 565, 577 (1977). Accordingly, the Government is correct that if Plaintiff 

cannot produce evidence linking the injuries he claims to the accident with Mr. Negus, 

that he will need additional medical care due to those injuries in the future, and that he 

lost the ability to pursue a military career because of the accident, summary judgment is 

warranted. 

In opposition, Plaintiff does not produce any of his own expert testimony or other 

competent evidence capable of showing the requisite causation and damages. Instead, 

he argues first that “[i]t is quite astounding that . . . the USA produces no evidence of 

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comparative fault and fails utterly to show that its postal carrier . . . was not a cause of 

the subject collision.” Pl.’s Opp., ECF No. 91,at 3. He further contends that, regardless, 

“an expert witness is not needed to show that Joseph Helm suffered a laceration to his 

right flank and a bump on his head in the subject collision.” Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff makes no 

mention of the Government’s damages argument. Plaintiff has thus failed to point to 

triable issues of material fact underpinning the bulk of his negligence claim. 

Indeed, Plaintiff’s first argument is easily dispatched. The Government did not 

move for summary judgment on the basis of who caused the accident. Any such inquiry 

is premature. 

In addition, there is no evidence before the Court as to any damages Plaintiff 

might recover for his anticipated lost earning capacity. While Plaintiff asserts in his 

Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Pl.’s Resp.”) that 

“Plaintiff . . .can and will testify as to the reasons he has not enlisted and the statements 

made to him which led to his rejection from military service,” (ECF No. 86, No. 15) this is 

plainly insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Not only would statements made to 

Plaintiff be inadmissible hearsay, but neither those statements nor his own testimony 

would prove that Plaintiff is entitled to over $500,000 in damages for lost military wages, 

benefits, and pensions. Moreover, even if Plaintiff did intend to rely solely on his own 

testimony, he was obligated to produce that evidence now. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 

sum, Plaintiff was required to put on evidence to create a triable issue of fact, and he has 

not. The Government’s motion is GRANTED as to these damages. 

Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to point to any competent evidence that he suffered 

shoulder, back, or neck injuries as a result of the accident. Instead of relying on his own 

experts, Plaintiff relies on portions of the testimony offered by the Government’s expert, 

Dr. Missirian. According to Plaintiff, Dr. Missirian stated that some of Plaintiff’s treatment 

was reasonable and necessary, the MRI findings with regard to the cervical spine were 

not normal for a person Plaintiff’s age, and there was no evidence of any spinal injury 

///

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either prior to the accident or that would have been caused thereafter. Pl.’s Resp., 

No. 3. 

Dr. Missirian did testify that Plaintiff was injured in the accident. According to 

Dr. Missirian, Plaintiff “had a laceration of his flank, laceration of his elbow, and . . . a 

bump on his forehead.” Missirian Depo., ECF No. 88-1, at 10. It followed that some 

treatment was also appropriate: 

I think his visit to the emergency room and to have his 

laceration sutured was reasonable. The evaluations in the 

emergency room were reasonable. Subsequent to his 

discharge from the emergency room, a couple visits to his 

pediatrician or his treating doctor would have been 

reasonable. That would have been what I would have liked 

to see as treatment. At 17 years old, the potential to recover 

is very, very good as compared to a 70 year old man. 

Id. at 11. Ultimately, however, Dr. Missirian opined in his report that:

[I]n the opinion of this examiner, the entire medical and 

surgical care that [Plaintiff] came to acquire for his right 

shoulder following the motor vehicle accident in question 

should be viewed as unrelated to any physical injuries he 

could have sustained. 

. . .

It is the strong opinion of this examiner that the motor vehicle 

accident in question resulted in lacerations along [Plaintiff’s] 

right flank, right elbow, and a bump over his forehead with no 

other injuries specifically referable to the neck or the right 

shoulder joint. 

The soft tissue injuries to these areas could have resulted in 

a temporary period of discomfort over a period of four to six 

weeks and then would have subsided. Besides the visit to 

the emergency department on the day of the accident in 

question, two or three visitations to his treating physician to 

remove his stitches and to monitor his progress and reassure 

him about his condition were all that were reasonably 

necessary following the accident of June 24, 2009. Instead, 

the patient has received an extensive amount of medical and 

surgical care, not commensurate with the possible objective 

injuries he could have sustained. 

Id. at 24-25.

5

 5 The Court notes that Dr. Missirian was asked, “Is it possible that Mr. Helm’s spine at C3-C4 was, 

in fact, injured in the June 24, 2009, collision?” Id. at 13. Dr. Missirian responded, “Is it possible? It is 

possible, but the symptoms or the findings on the record do not support that.” Id. This statement, even 

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Accordingly, even assuming Plaintiff eventually proves that Mr. Negus caused the 

accident, because Plaintiff adopted the opinions of the Government’s expert, he is 

limited to pursuing recovery for his two skin lacerations, the bump on his head, and for 

the emergency room visit and subsequent primary care visits necessitated thereby.

6

 

The Government’s Motion is DENIED with respect to these injuries and medical 

expenses and GRANTED in all other respects.

CONCLUSION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Not later than ten (10) days following the date this Memorandum and Order

is electronically filed, Plaintiff’s counsel, Russell A. Robinson, is directed to pay 

sanctions in the amount of $250 to the Clerk of the Court for failure to comply with local 

rules and the orders of this Court; 

2. The Government’s Motion in Limine (ECF No. 82) is DENIED without 

prejudice; 

3. Its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 83) is GRANTED in part and 

DENIED in part consistent with the foregoing; 

4. Given the dramatically diminished nature of Plaintiff’s claims, trial on this 

matter, currently set for Monday, May 4, 2015, and all other pretrial dates are 

VACATED; and 

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 taken out of context, is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries 

because Plaintiff is required to prove causation “within a reasonable medical probability based on 

competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to establish a prima facie case.” Jones, 

163 Cal. App. 3d at 402. 

6 Because Plaintiff is limited to claims relating to these injuries, any testimony as to future medical 

expenses due to a purported back or neck injury are irrelevant. See Pl.’s Resp., No. 16 (advising that 

“Plaintiff’s non-retained expert surgeon, Vikram Talwar, M.D., opined as to the costs of future surgery”). 

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5. The parties are ordered to participate in a settlement conference before 

Magistrate Judge Carolyn K. Delaney. The Magistrate Judge will issue a scheduling 

order, and counsel is instructed to have a principal with full settlement authority present 

at the Settlement Conference or to be fully authorized to settle the matter on any terms. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 6, 2015

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