Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01176/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01176-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Alicia Ramirez
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ALICIA RAMIREZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01176-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‘S SOCIAL 

SECURITY APPEAL

Plaintiff Alicia Ramirez (―Plaintiff‖) filed this action seeking judicial review of the final 

decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (―Defendant‖ or ―Commissioner‖) 

denying Plaintiff‘s application for benefits under the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 1.) All 

parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge for all purposes. 

(ECF Nos. 7, 9.)

Plaintiff applied for Social Security benefits due to diabetes mellitus and left ankle 

tendinitis. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff‘s appeal from the final decision of the 

Commissioner is denied.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits. Plaintiff‘s application was 

denied on March 23, 2010. (AR 90.) Plaintiff requested reconsideration of the denial on or 

around January 10, 2011. (AR 101.) Plaintiff‘s request for reconsideration was denied on April 

25, 2011. (AR 102.) Plaintiff requested a hearing by an Administrative Law Judge on or around 

May 10, 2011. (AR 108.)

A hearing before Administrative Law Judge Susanne Lewald (―ALJ‖) took place on May 

10, 2012. (AR 38-61.) Plaintiff was represented by an attorney at the hearing. (AR 38.) On 

May 25, 2012, the ALJ issued her written decision finding Plaintiff to be not disabled. (AR 75-

85.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff‘s request for review on May 13, 2014. (AR 7.)

A. VE Testimony

The sole issue raised in this appeal is whether the ALJ erred in relying on the testimony 

of the vocational expert. Linda Ferra testified as a vocational expert (―the VE‖) at the hearing 

before the ALJ on May 10, 2012. (AR 55.) The ALJ presented the following first set of 

hypothetical limitations to the VE:

 Same age, education, and work experience as Plaintiff;

 Can sit six hours in an eight hour day;

 Can stand and walk short distances for four hours in an eight hour day;

 Can lift up to 10 pounds frequently, 20 pounds occasionally;

 Can occasionally climb stairs; and

 Can perform simple, repetitive tasks.

(AR 57.) The VE testified that such a person could not perform Plaintiff‘s past relevant work. 

(AR 57.) However, the VE testified that other work could be performed with such hypothetical 

limitations, such as those where there is a stool available. (AR 57.) The VE identified ―parking 

lot attendant‖ and ―cashier II‖ as two such occupations. (AR 57-58.) The VE further testified 

 

1 Citations to the Social Security Administrative Transcript will be designated as ―AR‖ (administrative record). 

Page numbers will refer to the page numbers as stamped and indexed in the lodged transcript. (See ECF No. 10.)

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that the number of parking lot attendant jobs and cashier II jobs that could be performed with 

such hypothetical limitations would be eroded by about 60 percent to accommodate the fact that 

the person would be on or off a stool at their discretion. (AR 58.)

B. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

 Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2014;

 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 3, 2009, the alleged 

onset date;

 Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: diabetes mellitus and left ankle tendinitis;

 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1;

 Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except she can stand and walk short distances up to 

four hours in an eight-hour day, occasionally climb stairs, and is limited to simple 

repetitive tasks;

 Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work;

 Plaintiff was born on October 14, 1957, and was 51 years old, which is defined as an 

individual closely approaching advanced age, on the alleged disability onset date;

 Plaintiff has a limited education and is able to communicate in English;

 Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because Plaintiff‘s past relevant 

work is unskilled;

 Considering Plaintiff‘s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, 

there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can 

perform; and

 Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from 

August 3, 2009, through the date of the ALJ‘s decision.

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(AR 80-85.)

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

DETERMINATIONS

An individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court ―reviews the 

Commissioner‘s final decision for substantial evidence, and the Commissioner‘s decision will be 

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.‖ Hill v. 

Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). ―Substantial evidence‖ means more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). ―Substantial evidence is  ̳such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‘‖ Id. (quoting Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). ―[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a 

whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.‖ Hill, 

698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

However, it is not this Court‘s function to second guess the ALJ‘s conclusions and substitute the 

Court‘s judgment for the ALJ‘s. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(―Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ‘s 

conclusion that must be upheld.‖)

III.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff raises a single issue in this appeal. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in 

accepting the testimony of the VE. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the VE testified that 

Plaintiff could only perform work as a parking lot attendant or a cashier II if the job 

accommodated Plaintiff‘s need to sit and stand at will. Plaintiff argues that the accommodation 

described by the VE was impermissible.

The VE provided the following testimony regarding the erosion of jobs related to the 

sit/stand option:

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A There would be some light jobs that are performed while – you 

know, where there is a stool available. And I can give you a 

couple of examples of those. Obviously the numbers are 

substantially reduced since light work typically assumes standing 

and walking of six out of eight hours. And one example would be

parking lot attendant, DOT 915.473-010. It is light and unskilled. 

And reducing the number by probably 60 percent to – just to 

accommodate the fact that the person would be on – be able to be 

on a stool or off of it at discretion rather than having to be standing 

every time a car came by or walking throughout a parking garage 

or something, I would say that would leave approximately 4,000 of 

those jobs in the state and 40,000 in the nation. A second example 

would be cashier II, DOT 211-462.010. It is also light and 

unskilled. And taking the same reduction, there would be 

approximately 50,000 of those jobs in the state and 500,000 in the 

nation....

(AR 57-58.)

A vocational expert may testify to an ―erosion‖ of job numbers based upon a limitation in 

a claimant‘s residual functional capacity which would prevent the claimant from performing 

some, but not all, of the total number of jobs which exist in the national economy. See Watts v. 

Astrue, No. CV 09-2335-JEM, 2010 WL 1854075, at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2010) (jobs eroded 

by 50% due to sit/stand option); Scott v. Astrue, No. ED CV 08-396-PLA, 2009 WL 1159995, at 

*10 n.14 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2009) (job numbers eroded by 50% due to standing and walking 

limitations). This type of testimony from a VE is consistent with the policies set forth in SSR 

83-12: ―Where the extent of erosion of the occupational base is not clear, the adjudicator will 

need to consult a vocational resource.‖ SSR 83-12, 1983 WL 31253, at *2 (Jan. 1, 1983). SSR 

83-12 also specifically provides sit/stand options as an example of a limitation which may cause 

erosion of job numbers: ―In cases of unusual limitation of ability to sit or stand, a VS [vocational 

specialist] should be consulted to clarify the implications for the occupational base.‖ Id. at *4.

Plaintiff argues that the Commissioner may not consider jobs which Plaintiff can only 

work if provided ―reasonable accommodation‖ by the employer. In the context of the Americans 

with Disabilities Act, ―reasonable accommodation‖ is defined as:

(9) Reasonable accommodation

The term ―reasonable accommodation‖ may include—

(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily 

accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and

(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, 

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reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of 

equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of 

examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of 

qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations 

for individuals with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). In Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 803 

(1999), the Supreme Court stated that, in the Social Security context, the Commissioner does not 

take the possibility of ―reasonable accommodation‖ into account when determining whether a 

claimant is disabled.

Plaintiff argues that the VE invoked the ―reasonable accommodation‖ concept from the 

ADA context when she testified that the job numbers would be eroded by 60% to 

―accommodate‖ the fact that Plaintiff would need to be able to get on and off her feet at her 

discretion. However, given the context of the VE‘s testimony, the Court disagrees. The 

Americans with Disabilities Act was not mentioned once during the entirety of the VE‘s 

testimony. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the VE intended to invoke ADA terminology simply 

by mentioning ―accommodate.‖ Further, the VE said ―accommodate,‖ not ―reasonable 

accommodation.‖ The VE did not mention modification of an existing job to provide 

―reasonable accommodation‖ for Plaintiff‘s impairment. Thus, it is more likely that the VE‘s 

testimony referred to the percentage of jobs with pre-existing accommodations to suit Plaintiff‘s 

sit/stand option. In other words, approximately 40% of all the parking lot attendant jobs in the 

nation could naturally accommodate a sit/stand option because the employee would have access 

to a pre-existing seat or stool, and not because the employer could provide a seating option that 

did not otherwise exist. Similarly, 40% of all the cashier II jobs in the national could naturally 

accommodate a sit/stand option because the employee would have access to a seat of some kind. 

The VE made no mention of modifying or adding special stools or chairs to existing jobs to 

accommodate the sit/stand option. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the VE was invoking the 

―reasonable accommodation‖ concept from the ADA context in his testimony.

The Court finds that the ALJ‘s interpretation of the VE‘s testimony was reasonable. See

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) (―Where evidence is susceptible to more 

than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ‘s conclusion that must be upheld.‖) Accordingly, 

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the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in accepting the VE‘s testimony regarding the number of 

jobs in the national economy which Plaintiff could perform.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‘s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‘s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner is 

DENIED;

2. JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

and against Plaintiff Alicia Ramirez; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 17, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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