Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03644/USCOURTS-ca7-13-03644-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Ramer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-3644

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL RAMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:10-cr-00012-LA-2 — Lynn Adelman, Judge.

____________________

SUBMITTED MAY 15, 2015* — DECIDED MAY 29, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and RIPPLE,

Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Michael Ramer was convicted after a bench 

trial of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 1343, 1349. The conviction stemmed from a sham 

* After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral 

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and 

record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).

 

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2 No. 13-3644

investment scheme in which Mr. Ramer and a codefendant

solicited more than $1 million from individuals, but did not 

invest the money as they had promised.

1 For his role in the 

operation, the district court sentenced Mr. Ramer to 42 

months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $1,077,500 in 

restitution. The court also imposed a 3-year term of 

supervised release and, as a special condition, directed that 

Mr. Ramer make restitution payments “at a rate of not less 

than $100 per month.” Mr. Ramer filed this appeal, and in 

his brief he argues solely that the district court erred by not 

conditioning the restitution payments on his ability to pay.

Before the Government filed its brief, however, the 

district court had amended the judgment to state that 

Mr. Ramer’s obligation to pay $100 each month as part of his 

supervised release is “conditioned on” his ability to pay. 

That modification was made in response to the parties’ joint 

request, and thus the Government argues in its brief that 

Mr. Ramer’s appeal is moot. Mr. Ramer, inexplicably, has 

not moved to dismiss his appeal. See FED. R. APP. P. 42(b). 

Nor has he filed a reply brief commenting on the 

Government’s contention that the appeal is moot.

We begin by addressing whether the district court 

retained subject-matter jurisdiction to revise the judgment 

after Mr. Ramer had filed a notice of appeal. Ordinarily, 

filing a notice of appeal divests a district court of 

jurisdiction. See United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 781, 787 (7th 

1

The judgment identifies the offense of conviction as wire fraud, 18 

U.S.C. § 1343, when in fact the indictment and the district court’s verdict 

were for conspiracy to commit wire fraud, id. §§ 1343, 1349. The district 

court can correct this clerical error at any time. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 36.

 

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No. 13-3644 3

Cir. 2013); United States v. McHugh, 528 F.3d 538, 540 (7th Cir. 

2008). But there are exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g., 

Brown, 732 F.3d at 787 (stating that district court may 

address ancillary issues such as attorneys’ fees and clerical 

mistakes after notice of appeal is filed); United States v. 

Centracchio, 236 F.3d 812, 813 (7th Cir. 2001) (explaining that 

district court retains jurisdiction despite Government’s 

interlocutory appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 from order 

suppressing evidence); United States v. Byrski, 854 F.2d 955, 

956 n.1 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that appeal from frivolous 

motion to dismiss indictment on ground of double jeopardy 

does not divest district court of jurisdiction); United States v. 

Cannon, 715 F.2d 1228, 1231 (7th Cir. 1983) (explaining that 

notice of appeal challenging nonappealable order does not 

divest district court of jurisdiction); Terket v. Lund, 623 F.2d 

29, 33 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting that general rule divesting 

district court of jurisdiction upon filing notice of appeal is 

judge-made doctrine, not statutory or mandatory rule).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) district courts may “modify, 

reduce, or enlarge the conditions of supervised release, at 

any time prior to the expiration or termination of the term of 

supervised release.” We have not yet considered this 

statutory provision in a published decision, but the First 

Circuit has. That court concluded that § 3583(e)(2) authorizes 

a district court to modify conditions of supervised release 

even while a direct appeal from the conviction and sentence 

is pending. See United States v. D’Amario, 412 F.3d 253, 255 

(1st Cir. 2005). We agree with the First Circuit’s conclusion 

and hold that the district court retained jurisdiction to 

modify the conditions of Mr. Ramer’s supervised release 

while this appeal was pending.

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4 No. 13-3644

In his brief Mr. Ramer asks only that we remand with 

instructions to modify his obligation to pay restitution while 

on supervised release to reflect that it is dependent on his 

ability to pay. The district court already has properly 

granted that relief. Accordingly, we agree with the 

Government that the appeal is moot because we cannot give 

Mr. Ramer any effective relief. See Calderon v. Moore, 518 U.S. 

149, 150 (1996); A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 

2004). 

DISMISSED.

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