Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01205/USCOURTS-azd-2_07-cv-01205-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adan Rodriguez Nunez
Petitioner
Maria Esther Montes Ramirez
Respondent

Document Text:

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WO HJ

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Adan Rodriguez Nunez, 

Petitioner 

vs.

Maria Esther Montes Ramirez, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 07-01205-PHX-EHC

ORDER

Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s Ex Parte Verified Petition for Return of

Children and Request for Expedited Hearing (Dkt. 1), Petitioner’s Ex Parte Verified

Petition for Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 4), and Petitioner’s Verified

Request for Registration of Foreign Custody Agreement (Dkt. 5). An evidentiary hearing

was held on March 14, 2008, at 1:30 p.m. and continued on March 18, 2008, at 9:30 a.m.

I. Background

Petitioner Adan Rodriguez Nunez and Respondent Maria Esther Montes Ramirez

are the married parents of the subject minor children. Petitioner and Respondent married

on February 3, 1998, in Los Angeles, California. While living together in California, the

couple had two children. JRM, the older of the two children was born on March 18, 1999,

and the younger, IRM, was born on May 23, 2001. Both children are United States

Citizens. In December of 2001, Petitioner and the oldest child traveled to La Huerta,

Jalisco, Mexico. The next month, the oldest child returned to California to be with

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Respondent while Petitioner remained in Mexico because he had no legal status in the

United States and was not allowed to re-enter the border. In February 2002, Respondent

and both children moved themselves and their belonging to Mexico to be with Petitioner. 

Respondent testified that she went to stay with Petitioner in Mexico temporarily so that

the children, who had been sick, would get well. Her intention was always to come back

to the United States. While she was residing in Mexico, the children’s American birth

certificates were recorded in the La Huerta, Jalisco Civil Registry, establishing their

Mexican citizenship. The children were also enrolled in school in La Huerta, the oldest

since 2002 and the youngest since 2004.

On April 29, 2005, Respondent moved out of the family’s home. Petitioner

testified that Respondent had problems with his niece and that he and Respondent had

discussed that she would move into her mother’s house. Petitioner’s view is that

Respondent left on her own accord. Respondent testified that Petitioner and his niece had

“struck” her and that she was essentially “chased” out of the house. Petitioner

subpoenaed Respondent to appear before a municipal law judge to discuss their problems

and attempt to reach an agreement regarding custody of the children. On May 4, 2005,

Petitioner and Respondent, each represented by an attorney, met before La Huerta

Municipal Judge Faviola Nogales Guitierez. No agreement was reached. 

While Respondent was living at her mother’s house, the children remained at

Petitioner’s house. Respondent would come and visit with them. Petitioner testified that,

at first, he allowed Respondent to take the children with her during her visits. Sometime

in July 2005, however, Petitioner stopped allowing Respondent to take the children

during visits. Petitioner testified that Respondent had threatened to take the children to

the United States and he was afraid that she might follow through on that threat. 

Respondent believed that Petitioner was wrongfully preventing her access to the children.

On July 15, 2005, Petitioner filed for custody and guardianship of the children

with the Mixed Court of First Instance of the 29th Judicial District in Cihuatlan, Jalisco. 

Respondent testified that she was not served with notice of this action. On the morning of

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The Custody Order provides in relevant part:

[A]t this time temporary custody is declared in favor of the father, Adan Rodriguez

Nunez without implying any restrictions to the coexistence between the mother and

the minor children so that they will not lose the bonds that should exists between

children and parents so long as such does not involve harm, danger, or attempts to

remove said children from their identified home and under no circumstances are they

to leave the related City much less the State or Country while a final resolution is

pending.

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December 16, 2005, without notice to Petitioner, Respondent took the children from their

schools and brought them to the United States. Petitioner testified that he did not know

where Respondent and the children had gone and that he made various attempts to locate

them. On May 15, 2006, as a result of his July 15, 2005, filing, the Jalisco court granted

temporary guardianship and custody of the children to Petitioner (the “Jalisco custody

order”)1

 On June 9, 2006, Petitioner filed a Hague Convention application with the

Mexican Central Authority. Petitioner filed a Hague Convention Petition in this Court on

June 19, 2007.

II. Analysis

Congress enacted the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 11601 et seq. (“ICARA”) to implement the Convention on Civil Aspects of

International Child Abduction done at the Hague on October 25, 1980 (the

“Convention”). Both the United States and Mexico are signatories to the treaty, and thus,

are Contracting States within the meaning of the treaty. In enacting the federal legislation

implementing the Convention, Congress recognized that “[p]ersons should not be

permitted to obtain custody of children by virtue of their wrongful removal or

retention[,]” and that “[i]nternational abductions and retentions of children are increasing,

and only concerted cooperation pursuant to an international treaty can effectively combat

this problem.” 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(2)-(3). The express objectives of the Convention

are “to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any

Contracting State; and to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one

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Contracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.” Convention,

Art. 1, (reprinted at 51 FR 10494); see also Koch v. Koch, 450 F.3d 703, 711 (7th Cir.

2006) (“An action under the Convention and ICARA is not an action to determine the

merits of custody rights....” “The court’s task is to simply determine which country is the

proper forum for that custody determination.”). 

Thus, pursuant to Article 12 of the Convention, the Court is required to order the

return of the subject minor children if they were wrongfully removed from Mexico or

retained in the United States. A child is wrongfully removed or retained under the

meaning of the Convention where:

(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person, an institution or any

other body, either jointly or alone, under the law of the State in which the child

was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and

(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either

jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

Convention, Art. 3.

A. Wrongful Removal or Retention from State of Habitual Residence

The evidence in the record establishes that Mexico was the children’s habitual

residence at the time Respondent removed them to the United States. Habitual residence

is the place where the children were living before the wrongful removal and retention. 

Kiljowska v. Haines, 431 F. Supp. 2d 873, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (the court looks back in

time, not forward). “To determine habitual residence, the court must focus on the child,

not the parents, and examine past experiences, not future intentions.” Kiljowska, 431 F.

Supp. 2d at 878. Habitual residence is essentially “the child’s ordinary residence at the

time of the allegedly improper removal.” Kiljowska, 431 F. Supp. 2d at 879 (citing

Miller v. Miller, 240 F.3d 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2001).

Prior to Respondent bringing the children to the United States on December 16,

2005, the children had been living in Mexico for more than 3 years, a time period

constituting the majority of each child’s life at the time. The children were registered as

citizens in Mexico and were attending school in Mexico. Respondent contends that the

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United States is the country of the children’s habitual residence but provides no

persuasive legal authority or facts supporting that view. The evidence presented

demonstrates that Petitioner and Respondent had a difficult marital situation. There is

evidence that Petitioner prevented Respondent from having access to her children while

still in Mexico. Nevertheless, these facts do not bear upon the issue of habitual residence. 

If Respondent believed that she and the children had been wrongfully retained in Mexico

for three years from February 2002 until December 2005, her remedy would have been to

seek return in the Mexican Courts of the children to the United States under the

protections of the Hague Convention, not to unilaterally remove the children to the United

States. 

The Ninth Circuit has held that “[t]he Convention is designed to prevent child

abduction by reducing the incentive of the would-be abductor to seek unilateral custody

over the children in another country. The greater the ease with which habitual residence

may be shifted without the consent of both parents, the greater the incentive to try.” 

Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001). The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in

Friedrich v. Friedrich is particularly instructive on this point:

Every family dispute has its own unique set of facts, and the case before us

certainly is no different. However, there is a central core of matters at which the

Hague Convention was aimed: situations where one parent attempts to settle a

difficult family situation, and obtain an advantage in any possible future custody

struggle, by returning to the parent’s native country, or country of preferred

residence. That is exactly what happened here. The rights and wrongs of the

actions of the respective parents are not before us for disposition on the merits. But

it is clear, as shown both by actions at the time and by the subsequent strenuous

course of this litigation, that both parents maintained a lively interest in their

relationship with their child, Thomas.

Under such circumstances, the Hague Convention is clearly designed to insure that

the custody struggle must be carried out, in the first instance, under the laws of the

country of habitual residence, which is Germany in this case.

The affirmative defenses of Section 11603(e)(2) of the Act offer an opportunity, in

extraordinary cases, for a court in the country of flight to consider the practical

realities of the situation. However, it is the clear import of the Convention that in

most cases the duty of that court, when the niceties of the convention are met, is to

return the child to the country of habitual residence for resolution of the custody

dispute under the laws of that country.

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The Court previously noted that this element had been established. (See Dkt. 37,

Order on Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (“Respondent does not dispute that

Petitioner was exercising his custody rights. Thus, further development of this issue is

unnecessary for a ruling in Petitioner's favor.”)). 

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Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1403 (6th Cir. 1993). Moreover, much of

Respondent’s evidence relating the relative parenting skills of her versus Petitioner are

irrelevant in deciding a Hague Convention petition. See e.g., Adams ex rel. Naik v. Naik,

363 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027 (D. Ill. 2005) (“The parties provide extremely divergent

factual statements regarding the relative fitness of each to parent Kai. They are not

relevant here, and I make no findings as to custody or parental fitness of the parties. My

jurisdiction in cases brought under the Convention does not extend to the determination

of custody rights.”). These are considerations for the family court that will eventually

determine custody in this matter. 

The facts in the record demonstrate that Mexico was the children’s regular,

ordinary and established home at the time they were removed to the United States. 

Further, at the time of the children’s removal to the United States, both Petitioner and

Respondent had natural parental rights to custody of the children, and no court had

awarded either with sole custody. Even though it appears that Petitioner was preventing

Respondent from exercising her joint right to custody of the children, that is not an issue

for this Court. The children were living with Petitioner and, as their father, he also had

some rights to custody. Thus, Petitioner has established the second element of his case.2

B. Exceptions

The Court is not bound to order the children’s return if Respondent can

demonstrate one of several defenses or exceptions. The first two defenses require a

showing by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) judicial proceedings were not

commenced within one year of the children’s removal and they are well-settled in their

new environment; or (2) the children object to being returned and have obtained the age

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3

 Detailed discussion of this exception is not necessary. At the March 14, 2008,

hearing, the Court refused to hear the testimony of the oldest child, aged 8. Numerous cases

have held that children of such a young age are too young to testify in these types of

proceedings. See Giampolo, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (10-year-old child interviewed in

camera and the Court determined that the child appeared to have “internalized Respondent’s

views about the possibility of being returned” and had been “influenced by Respondent’s

preference for her to remain here.”); Hazbun Escaf v. Rodriguez, 200 F. Supp. 2d 603, 615

(E.D. Va. 2001) (return ordered despite objection of 13-year-old); Garcia, 2006 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 64828 at *38-39 (11-year-old, though well mannered and articulate, was not of

sufficient age and maturity); Than v. Duquette, 613 A.2d 486 (1992) (noting that defense

does not apply to 9-year-olds).

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and degree of maturity at which it is appropriate to take account of their views.3 The third

defense that is potentially applicable here requires a showing by clear and convincing

evidence that there is a grave risk that the children’s return would expose them to

physical or psychological harm or otherwise place them in an intolerable situation. Even

if an affirmative defense or exception applies, the Court still has discretion to order return

of the children if it would “further the aims of the Hague Convention.” Giampolo v.

Erneta, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1280 (N.D. Ga. 2004).

1. The Grave-risk Exception

A court may deny return of a child to the habitual residence if “there is a grave risk

that his or her return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or

otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.” 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(A). This

defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Under the Convention, “grave

risk of harm” exists in two situations: (1) when return of the child puts the child in

imminent danger prior to resolution of the custody dispute (e.g., returning child to a zone

of war, famine, or disease); or (2) where there is serious abuse or neglect, or extraordinary

emotional dependence, when the court in the country of habitual residence, for whatever

reason, may be incapable or unwilling to give the child adequate protection. Friedrich v.

Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1068 (6th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Proof of grave risk of

harm requires “specific evidence of potential harm” to children. Rydder v. Rydder, 49

F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995). 

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Respondent contends that one of the physical incidents occurred in front of JRM and

Respondent’s oldest child from a previous marriage. This incident occurred in May 2003,

when the couple was still living together. 

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Respondent has presented some evidence that she and Petitioner engaged in heated

arguments, including occasions when she alleges that Petitioner struck her physically.4

These acts are not relevant to the issue of whether the children would be placed in an

intolerable situation or in grave risk of harm if returned to Mexico. See Nunez-Escudero

v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 375-78 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying defense where

respondent’s allegations that she was physically, sexually, and verbally abused by her

husband and treated as a prisoner by her husband and father in law concerned problems

she had between her and her husband and father in law, and did not concern any potential

risk to the baby); see also Tabacchi v. Harrison, 2000 WL 190576 (N.D. Ill) (although

petitioner’s behavior toward his wife was unacceptable, to qualify as a grave risk of harm

under the Convention, the risk must be to the child). 

Respondent also testified that Petitioner has struck the children on different

occasions, including striking them with a belt. This evidence is contested. Even if true,

however, this evidence is not clear and convincing proof that return of the children to

Mexico would cause them a “grave risk” of harm that the Mexican courts are not ready

and able to protect the children from. See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 (“In thinking about

these problems, we acknowledge that courts in the abducted-from country are as ready

and able as we are to protect children. If return to a country, or to the custody of a parent

in that country, is dangerous, we can expect that country’s courts to respond

accordingly.”) (contrasting Nunez Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 377 (8th Cir.

1995) (if parent in Mexico is abusive, infant returned to Mexico for custody

determination can be institutionalized during pendency of custody proceedings)). Thus,

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The Court has also considered whether or not removal of the children from the care

of their mother would cause them psychological harm justifying this exception. Respondent

relies on the case of Steffen F. v. Severina P., 966 F. Supp. 922 (D. Arizona 1997) (Roll, J.).

In that case, the Court was persuaded by the “compelling testimony” of a Doctor that the

child faced “a grave risk of psychological harm if he [was] returned to Germany.” The

Doctor’s testimony established that removal of the child from “his mother for any period of

time longer than a few weeks would likely result in unbonding and unattachment” and that

“a grave risk exists because a child being unbonded and unattached often produces longterm, serious psychological problems.” The District Court adopted the reasoning of the

Eighth Circuit in Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995), which recognized that

separating a child from his or her primary caretaker creates a risk of psychological harm.

Nonetheless, the Eight Circuit refused to find a grave risk of harm in Rydder, emphasizing

that the mother had failed to present “specific evidence of potential harm to the children at

issue.” 

Here, while the Court can surmise that psychological harm might result from

separation from the mother, Respondent has not presented specific evidence of potential

harm to these children. Moreover, the Court’s review of the authorities has not revealed a

case in which a Court, sua sponte, has ordered a psychological examination of the children.

Reports from Ebony House refer to psychological diagnoses and treatments, but the

individual making the reports was not called as a witness.

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Respondent has not met her burden of proof, and the “grave risk” exception is therefore

inapplicable.5

2. The Well-Settled Exception

Under the Convention, the Court is not required to order return of the children to

the country of their habitual residence prior to their wrongful removal if it shown by a

preponderance of the evidence that judicial proceedings were not commenced within one

year of the children’s removal and they are now well-settled in their new environment. 

See Convention, Art. 12; 42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(2)(B). Respondent brought the children

to the United States on December 16, 2005. Petitioner filed a Hague Application with the

Mexican Central Authority on June 9, 2006, and the application was later transferred to

the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children on or about July 14, 2006. The

current matter was not filed until June 19, 2007, eighteen months after the removal.

Petitioner urges the Court to find that the one-year period has been equitably

tolled. Petitioner relies on Lops v. Lops, 140 F.3d 927, 946 (11th Cir. 1998), a case in

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which the Eleventh Circuit recognized that the one-year period in Article 12, may be

equitably tolled. It appears that the Eleventh Circuit is the only Court of Appeals to have

concluded that equitable tolling applies to the one-year period in Article 12. Other

district courts have come to conflicting conclusions, although a majority appear to agree

that equitable tolling applies. See, e.g., Belay v. Getachew, 272 F. Supp. 2d 553, 563 (D.

Md. 

2003) (holding that equitable tolling applies); Mendez Lynch v. Mendez Lynch, 220 F.

Supp. 2d 1347, 1362-63 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (same); with Anderson v. Acree, 250 F. Supp.

2d 872, 875 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (expressing doubts that equitable tolling applies); Matovski

v. Matovski, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65519 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (equitable tolling does not

apply); Jimenez v. Lozano, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10175 (D. Wash. 2007) (equitable

tolling applies).

The Southern District of New York’s discussion of the issue in Matovski provides

some insight into the reasons various district courts have refused to equitably toll the oneyear period in Article 12. First and foremost, these district courts have recognized that

the one-year period is not a “limitations period” that should be subject to tolling. The

Matovski Court noted:

A petition for the return of a child is not barred if it is filed over one year from the

date of removal. Rather, the drafters of the Hague Convention decided that after

the passage of a year, it became a reasonable possibility that the child could be

harmed by its removal from an environment into which the child had become

settled, and that the court ought to be allowed to consider this factor in making the

decision whether to order the child’s return.

Matovski, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65519 at *32 (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson,

250 F. Supp. 2d at 875.). The Convention’s framers also recognized that “although its

aim is to ensure the return of abducted children without reaching the merits of underlying

custody disputes, there could come a point at which a child would become so settled in a

new environment that repatriation might not be in its best interest. In other words, if

more than one year has passed, a ‘demonstration that the child is now settled in its new

environment’ may be a sufficient ground for refusing to order repatriation.” Blondin v.

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The Court is not bound the by the decision in Jimenez v. Lozano. 2007 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 10175 (D. Wash. 2007) (“Although Mr. Jimenez filed his Hague Convention petition

November 10, 2005, more than a year after Mrs. Lozano wrongfully removed RLJ from

Mexico, equitable tolling applies in this case, as Mr. Jimenez did not definitely learn of

RLJ’s location until November 11, 2004 when an agency working for the Central Authority

confirmed RLJ and Mrs. Lozano’s location.”).

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Dubois, 238 F.3d 153, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Explanatory Report at p. 107). 

Although this analysis arguably requires the Court to reach the underlying custody

dispute, a matter generally outside the scope of the Convention, the framers “settled on

the one-year time limit, which, ‘although perhaps arbitrary, nevertheless proved to be the

‘least bad’ answer to the concerns which were voiced in this regard.’” Blondin, 238 F.3d

at 164 (citing Explanatory Report at p. 107). While at least one other district court in the

Ninth Circuit has tolled the one-year period as suggested by Petitioner, the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals has not ruled on this issue.6

 The Court finds the reasoning of the

Second Circuit and the Southern District of New York compelling. Thus, the Court will

not equitably toll the one-year period as suggested by Petitioner.

Even if the Court were to accept the possibility of equitably tolling the one-year

period, it is unclear exactly why Petitioner waited eighteen months to file his application

in this Court. Petitioner contends that the delay was caused by his inability and the

inability of the respective agencies to locate Respondent and the children. There is,

however, credible evidence that Petitioner knew or could have discovered Respondent’s

whereabout within one year. Respondent contends that Petitioner knew she had family in

the Phoenix area and could have contacted them. What is clear is that when Petitioner

eventually did file his application before this Court, eighteen months after Respondent

brought the children to the United States, the children were already well-settled in

Arizona. The record demonstrates that the children are attending school here, bonding

with their older brother and Respondent’s family, attending counseling, and otherwise

adjusting to their new lives. Because Petitioner waited over one year to file his action in

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this Court and because the children are now well-settled in Arizona, the Court will deny

their return to Mexico under Article 12.

III. Petitioner’s State Law Claim

Petitioner has also brought an Arizona state law claim pursuant to Arizona’s

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, A.R.S. § 25-1001 et seq.

(“UCCJEA”). Pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-1005(B), “a child custody determination made in

a foreign country under factual circumstances in substantial conformity with the

jurisdictional standards of this chapter must be recognized and enforced under Article 3

of this chapter.” The UCCJEA states that a “court of this state shall treat a foreign

country as if it were a state of the United States....” A.R.S. § 25-1005(A). To determine

whether the “factual circumstances” of the Jalisco custody order are in substantial

conformity with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA, it is necessary to look to the

jurisdictional chapter in Article 2. That chapter provides that “a court of this state has

jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following is

true...[t]his state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the

proceeding....” A.R.S. § 25-1031. The jurisdictional chapter also has detailed provisions

regarding notice and opportunity to be heard. See A.R.S. § 25-1035(A)-(B). 

Specifically, Article 2 does not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination

made without notice or an opportunity to be heard.” A.R.S. § 25-1035(B).

The Order issued by the Jalisco court on May 15, 2006, references a summons

issued to Respondent on August 5, 2005, to appear before the court within 8 days to

present her case or face entry of default, the Court deeming her failure to respond as an

admission to Petitioner’s charges. Respondent testified that she never received notice of

the Jalisco action, nor did she participate in any of the hearings. Petitioner has not filed

any evidence proving that Respondent was served. When properly served with a

subpoena to appear before the Municipal Law Judge on May 4, 2005, she did appear and

was represented by an attorney. The Court does not believe that Respondent, whose

actions have consistently demonstrated a desire for custody over the children, would

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The Court also notes the inherent contradiction between Petitioner’s Federal claim

and his UCCJEA claim. On the one hand, Petitioner is contending that the Mexican courts

have jurisdiction over the underlying custody dispute and that this Court must order their

return to Mexico for continued custody proceedings there pursuant to the Hague Convention.

On the other hand, Petitioner’s UCCJEA claim requires this Court (a court in Arizona) to

reach the merits of the underlying child custody determination by registering and enforcing

the Jalisco custody order pursuant to Arizona’s UCCJEA.

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ignore a summons to appear at a custody hearing. Thus, it is the finding of this Court that

the Jalisco custody order was not issued in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional

requirements of Article 2 of Arizona’s UCCJEA.7

IV. Conclusion

The Court finds that although Petitioner has arguably met his burden under the

Hague Convention, return of the children to Mexico would be improper under Article 12,

because judicial proceedings were not commenced within one-year of the children’s

removal and they are now well-settled in Arizona. In addition, Petitioner’s UCCJEA

claim is denied because the Jalisco custody order was not entered in substantial

conformity with the jurisdictional requirements of Arizona’s UCCJEA.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Ex Parte Verified Petition for Return of

Children and Request for Expedited Hearing (Dkt. 1).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Verified Request for

Registration of Foreign Custody [Order] (Dkt. 5).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Ex Parte Verified Petition for

Warrant in Lieu of Writ of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. 4).

//

//

//

//

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DATED this 28th day of March, 2008.

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