Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-1_06-cv-00591-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hanford
Defendant
Randy Deshazier
Plaintiff
Russell Hilyard
Defendant
Mitch Smith
Defendant
Dale Williams
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RANDY DESHAZIER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

)

DALE WILLIAMS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

 )

1:06-cv-00591-AWI-SMS

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR MONETARY

SANCTIONS (DOC. 30)

Plaintiffs are proceeding with a civil action in this Court.

The matter has been referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rules 72-302(c)(1) and 72-303.

Pending before the Court is the motion of Defendants Hanford

Police Officers Dale Williams and Mitch Smith, Hanford Police

Sergeant Russell Hilyard, and the City of Hanford, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 37, for terminating sanctions or, in the

alternative, continuance of all scheduled dates in this case and

an order compelling Plaintiff’s attendance at deposition;

Defendants also move to monetary sanctions.

The motion was filed on August 28, 2007, and included a

notice of motion, memorandum, and declaration of Justus C.

Spillner. Service was effected electronically on Plaintiff’s

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28 Local Rule 78-230(c) provides that no party will be entitled to be heard in opposition to a motion at oral

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arguments if opposition has not been timely filed by that party.

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counsel. No opposition was timely filed, and the Court by minute

order dated October 3, 2007, vacated the hearing and pursuant to

Local Rule 78-230(c) and (h). 1

Thereafter, on October 8, 2007, Plaintiff’s counsel filed a

request for limited additional time (approximately thirty days)

to respond to a pending motion and/or cure a default. Plaintiff’s

counsel’s request is untimely, and the Court will not consider

it. The Court will proceed to file findings and recommendations,

and Plaintiff’s counsel will have the opportunity to file

objections as set forth in the concluding paragraphs of this

order. 

Defendants move for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 

37 as well as pursuant to the Court’s inherent power.

I. Sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 37

If a party fails to obey an order to provide or permit

discovery, including an order compelling discovery, the court in

which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the

failure as are just, including 1) an order that the matters

regarding which the order was made or any other designated facts

shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the action

in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order; 2)

an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or

oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party

from introducing designated matters in evidence; and 3) an order

striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further

proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action

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or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by

default against the disobedient party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).

The court may also treat the failure to obey as a contempt of

court (except with respect to an order to submit to a physical or

mental examination) and may require the party and/or the party's

attorney to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s

fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the

failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances

make such an order unjust. Id.

Further, Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d) expressly provides that a

failure of a party to attend his own deposition may result in

orders taking designated facts to be established, limiting claims

or defenses or the introduction of evidence, or striking out

pleadings, staying proceedings, dismissing the action, or

rendering a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d).

The standards governing dismissal for failure to obey court

orders are the same under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) or 41(b).

Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th

Cir. 1987). Dismissal, default judgment, and taking a plaintiff's

allegations as established are authorized under extreme

circumstances where there is a finding that the violations are

due to wilfulness, bad faith, or fault of the defaulting party.

United States v. Kahaluu Construction Co, Inc., 857 F.2d 600, 603

(9th Cir. 1988). Wilfulness is correctly defined as disobedient

conduct not shown to be outside the control of the litigant.

Fjelstad v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc., 762 F. 2d 1334,

1341 (9th Cir. 1985). Dismissal under Rule 37(b) has been held

appropriate where the failure to provide discovery is knowing and

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deliberate. In re the Exxon Valdez, 102 F.3d 429, 432 (9th Cir.

1996).

In determining whether to dismiss a case as a punitive

measure, a district court must weigh five factors: 1) the

public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; 2) the

court's need to manage its docket; 3) the risk of prejudice to

the defendants; 4) the public policy favoring disposition of

cases on their merits; and 5) the availability of less drastic

sanctions. Malone v. United States Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128,

130. The Court need not make explicit findings regarding these

factors; however, in the absence of findings, a reviewing court

will independently review the record to determine if there has

been an abuse of discretion. Id.

In determining the propriety of sanctions, it is permissible

to consider all incidents of a party's conduct with respect to

discovery in the litigation. Adriana International Corp. v.

Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1411-1412 (9th Cir. 1990).

It is established that sanctions, including dismissal, may

issue for a complete or serious failure to respond to discovery,

such as failure to appear for a deposition, even absent a prior

court order compelling the discovery. Sigliano v. Mendoza, 642

F.2d 309, 310 (9 Cir. 1981). th

A forced cancellation of a deposition a day before the date

set for it has been held to constitute a failure to appear within

the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d). Henry v. Gill Industries,

Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 947 (9 Cir. 1993). th

II. Facts

The declaration of Mr. Spillner, Defendants’ counsel,

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submitted in support of the motion establishes that Defendants’

counsel’s office set the deposition of Plaintiff and non-party

witness Verniece DeShazier for June 26, 2007, after receiving no

response to several telephone messages for Mr. Little, counsel

for Plaintiff. Notice of the deposition was given on May 29,

2007, by mail, and witness Verniece was personally served with a

deposition subpoena on June 10, 2007. A courtesy letter

confirming the depositions was sent to Little on June 21, 2007,

by FAX and mail. On June 25, 2007, at 3:37 p.m., Little sent

Spillner an e-mail message cancelling the depositions, which were

scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. the following morning; Little

explained that due to a criminal trial’s last-minute continuance,

he had not been able to meet with his clients and thus simply

could not proceed. (Decl., Ex. A.) Spillner’s secretary e-mailed

a reply, requesting rescheduling of the depositions for July 13,

2007, which Plaintiff’s counsel accepted by e-mail on June 27,

2007. Additional notices and a subpoena to the non-party witness

were sent out for the depositions to be held on July 13.

On July 12, 2007, at 2:57 p.m., Plaintiff’s counsel e-mailed

Spillner’s secretary, cancelling the depositions, which were then

set for the following day, for the second time. Little stated

that he had just realized that he had a hearing scheduled in

Lemoore that made it impossible to attend the depositions;

further, Plaintiff had informed counsel the day before that his

mother (who apparently was the non-party witness, Verniece

DeShazier) had health problems that made it extremely difficult

to be away from home all day. Spillner’s secretary requested

rescheduling for a mutually convenient date, and Plaintiff’s

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counsel failed to respond to an e-mail sent on that date as well

as another sent on July 19. Likewise, there was no response to

Spillner’s letter of July 26, which concerned the depositions’

rescheduling and the need to extend scheduled dates.

Defendants’ counsel’s office rescheduled the depositions for

August 15, 2007, in Hanford, as requested by Mr. Little, gave

notice to them in writing, and attempted to confirm the

deposition times via e-mails on August 9 and August 14, without

response from Plaintiff’s counsel. 

Defendants’ counsel appeared for the depositions set for

August 15, but neither of the deponents nor Plaintiff’s counsel

appeared at the deposition in Hanford, which Defendants’ counsel

noted on the record.

Defendants’ counsel has not been able to establish contact

with Mr. Little, Plaintiff’s attorney; the last communication

received was on July 12, 2007, when Mr. Little cancelled the

deposition.

In addition, Plaintiff’s counsel allowed the deadline for

expert witness disclosures, which had been July 6, 2007, to pass

without providing any disclosures, but never addressed the issue.

III. Analysis of Sanctions

Here, it appears that it was impossible for Defendants’

counsel to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel in compliance

with Local Rule 37-251 because the latter failed to communicate

for an extended period of time. Thus, the requirement of a joint

stipulation should not bar Defendants from relief.

Further, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in

several wilful discovery violations. Counsel repeatedly cancelled

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depositions that had been properly set for reasons over which he

had control, namely, the scheduling of hearings or matters in

other cases, and his own calendar. Although he could not control

the Plaintiff’s mother’s health, the difficulty that Plaintiff’s

mother had with attending a deposition did not explain the

failure of Plaintiff himself to attend. Thus, counsel engaged in

disobedient conduct not shown to be outside the control of the

litigant. Further, it appears that counsel was able to

communicate when it involved cancelling a deposition but was and

is inexplicably unresponsive when it comes to other types of

communications at pertinent times.

Further, it appears that Plaintiff wilfully and without

justification failed to provide Defendants with expert witness

disclosures due on July 6, 2007, pursuant to the Court’s

scheduling order of October 24, 2006 (at pp. 1, 6).

The public interest in expeditious resolution of the

litigation weighs in favor of dismissal. The first amended

complaint (FAC) seeks damages and declaratory relief, and it

alleges discriminatory detention and false and retaliatory arrest

as a result of profiling occurring on or about May 12, 2005.

Formal discovery appears to have commenced in February 2007, and

then Plaintiff’s counsel was unavailable for a week in April.

(Memo. p. 4; Doc. 28.) Thereafter, it does not appear that

Plaintiff’s counsel was meaningfully available for communication

for the following four months. Almost two and one-half years have

passed since the allegedly offending conduct, and yet the case

has not proceeded, and it cannot be scheduled because Plaintiff’s

counsel and Plaintiff have failed to appear for the Plaintiff’s

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deposition and have failed to comply with a discovery deadline

concerning expert disclosure. 

Further, because it does not appear that Plaintiff or his

counsel are amenable to the orders of the Court, the Court’s need

to manage its docket does not preponderate in favor of continuing

the case in its present deadlocked condition. 

Defendants claim that they are prejudiced because they are

unable to depose Plaintiff and thus unable to clarify and

evaluate the merits of the claims against them, discover any

additional witnesses who need to be deposed or other evidence to

be investigated, or prepare their defense. Plaintiff’s delays

have caused Defendants to suffer difficulty in meeting the dates

that were scheduled when the motion was filed but which have now

been vacated by the Court’s minute order of September 4, 2007, in

which the Court denied Defendants’ ex parte application to

shorten time for hearing the motion for sanctions, and further

vacated all dates that had been scheduled, including the pretrial

conference of December 14, 2007, and jury trial of February 19,

2008. Defendants also claim, without further specification, that

the delays have interfered with their ability to achieve a just

resolution to the litigation.

With respect to prejudice, in the context of sanctions

pursuant to Rule 37(b), a defendant suffers prejudice if a

plaintiff's actions impair the defendant's ability to go to trial

or threaten to interfere with the rightful decision of the case.

Adriana International Corporation v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d 1406, 1412

(9 Cir. 1990). Although delay alone has been held to be th

insufficient, Kahaluu, 857 F.2d 600, 604, failure to produce

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documents as ordered has been held to be sufficient. Adriana

International Corporation v. Theoren, 913 F.2d at 1412, citing

Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Seaboard Corp., 666 F.2d 414,

417 (9th Cir. 1982). Further, repeated failure of a party to

appear at scheduled depositions, when compounded by a continuing

refusal to comply with court-ordered production of documents, has

been held to constitute an interference with the rightful

decision of the case. Adriana International Corp. v. Thoeren, 913

F.2d at 1412. 

At this point, there has been not only delay, but

obstruction of access to a key witness in the instant case.

Although it does not appear affirmatively that any permanent loss

of evidence or other irreversible harm has been suffered with

respect to the Defendants’ ability to mount a defense, it further

appears that Defendants have been unable to proceed with

fundamental discovery, and thus Defendants are, albeit

unwillingly, not fully aware of the status of the evidence and of

Defendants’ own defenses. Plaintiff has also failed to disclose

experts as ordered by the Court. It appears that Defendants are

unable to proceed to discern anything concerning the merits of

the case. Thus, the risk of prejudice to Defendants is real.

Further, it does not appear that Defendants have the means to

avoid or to limit any potential prejudice because there is no

apparent, realistic possibility of managing the case to cause it

to proceed to a position of readiness for adjudication. 

The public policy favoring disposition of cases on their

merits generally weighs against imposing a terminating sanction,

but the repeated failure of Plaintiff and counsel to appear for

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deposition, the failure to comply with the expert disclosure

deadline, and the repeated, broader failure of Plaintiff’s

counsel to communicate with the Defendants’ counsel are

preventing any progress towards a position wherein the case might

be adjudicated. It is the very conduct of Plaintiff and

Plaintiff’s counsel that are obstructing progress towards

disposing of the case on the merits. 

As to the availability of less drastic sanctions, Defendants

also seek monetary sanctions but assert that such sanctions will

not remedy the problems caused by Plaintiff’s misconduct because

there is no indication that lesser sanctions will motivate

Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s counsel to comply with future deposition

notices.

With respect to the impact of dismissal and the availability

and adequacy of lesser sanctions, the Ninth Circuit has set forth

a three-part analysis for reviewing a district court’s

consideration of this factor: 1) whether the court explicitly

discussed the feasibility of less drastic sanctions and explained

why alternative sanctions would be inappropriate; 2) whether the

court implemented alternative sanctions before ordering

dismissal, and 3) whether the court warned the party of the

possibility of dismissal before actually ordering it. Adriana

International Corp. v. Thoeren, 913 F.2d at 1412-1413. 

The Court agrees with Defendants’ assertion that lesser

sanctions will not remedy the problem. In addition to not

appearing and not making his client available for deposition,

Plaintiff’s counsel failed repeatedly to respond to reasonable

attempts on the part of Defendants’ counsel to communicate;

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Plaintiff’s counsel failed to respond timely and meaningfully

even to the instant motion for sanctions. Plaintiff has failed to

comply with the deadline for expert witness disclosure. The Court

finds that Plaintiff’s counsel cannot be depended upon to respond

rationally to, and communicate concerning, normal developments

and communications occurring in the progress of a case. It

further appears that the prospect of monetary sanctions or

proceedings for sanctions before the Court has been of no

importance to Plaintiff’s counsel, who has not responded to those

lesser possibilities, either. The Court thus has no basis for any

finding that a lesser sanction would be effective.

 Although the Court has not expressly warned Plaintiff or

Plaintiff’s counsel with dismissal or other severe sanctions for

the particular failures presently before the Court, the Court’s

order setting mandatory scheduling conference warned that should

counsel failure to comply with the directions set forth in the

order, which concerned timely efforts to schedule the case and

comply with set dates as firm dates, then an ex parte hearing

might be held and judgment of dismissal, default, or other

appropriate judgment might be entered, or sanctions might be

imposed or ordered. (Doc. 5.) The need to comply with scheduled

dates and the possible consequences have thus been made

sufficiently clear. Further, counsel had notice from the text of

Rule 37(b) that dismissal is a possible sanction for failure to

obey discovery orders. See, Valley Engineers Inc. v. Electric

Engineering Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9 Cir. 1998). Because th

the Court has found that the conduct in question was wilful, and

further finds that it is not reasonably anticipated that

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28 It appears that Defendants’ request for these monetary sanctions is separate and not in the alternative. 2

(Doc. 33, p. 2.)

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Plaintiff or his counsel will comply with the Court’s orders, it

would not be unfair to impose sanctions without a prior warning;

any warning would be and would have been futile. The Court

concludes that there has been a pattern of discovery abuse which

has made it impossible for the Court to ready the case for trial,

let alone try it with any reasonable assurance that the truth

would be available. The circumstances in the present case are

egregious and call for the drastic sanction of termination.

In view of the conclusions set forth hereinabove, which are

based on Rule 37(b) and (d), the Court does not consider it

necessary to consider sanctions pursuant to the Court’s inherent

power, or the Defendants’ request for an order compelling

Plaintiff’s deposition attendance and resetting of dates.

IV. Monetary Sanctions

 Defendants seek monetary sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 2

P. 37(d), which provides that if a party fails to appear for

deposition after being served with proper notice, the Court

“shall require” the party failing to act or the attorney advising

him or both to pay reasonable expenses, including attorney’s

fees, caused by the failure unless the Court finds that the

failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances

make an award of expenses unjust.

There is no justification before the Court or other

circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust. It appears

that the written notice of the deposition mailed on July 31,

2007, was reasonable notice of the August 15 deposition. (Decl.,

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Ex. C.) 

Defendants’ counsel declared that he incurred and may incur

fees and expenses as a result of Plaintiff’s repeated failure to

appear at properly noticed depositions and of other discovery

violations, including 1) $925.00 in attorney’s fees, calculated

at 5 hours at $185.00 per hour for 1.7 hours preparation for the

depositions of August 15, 2007, and 3.3 hours for round-trip

travel to Hanford and time spent waiting for Plaintiff to appear

at the proceeding; and 2) Court reporter’s fees for appearance at

the deposition on August 15 and preparation of a transcript

thereof, in the amount of $112.00; 3) $3450.00, consisting of 23

hours at $150.00 per hour, the rate of an associate who prepared

the moving papers, for preparation of this motion, supporting

documents, and the ex parte application to hear the motion on

shortened time and all documents pertaining thereto; 4) $375.00

anticipated to be expended for preparing for, traveling to, and

attending the hearing on the motion, calculated at 2.5 hours at

$150.00 per hour; and 5) any filing fees for this motion or the

ex parte application, although no amount was specified. The total

amount sought is $4,862.00.

Because the hearing on the motion was vacated, the Court

concludes that no time was actually expended for preparation,

travel, and attendance relating to the hearing. The hourly rates

for attorney’s fees sought appear to be reasonable in light of

the prevailing rates in the community. The motions (both the

motion for sanctions and the ex parte application for an order

shortening time) appear to have taken an excessive amount of time

for what the Court deems to be reasonable for the preparation of

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all pleadings; sixteen (16) hours, or two full eight-hour days,

seems more appropriate. It is appropriate to award reasonable

attorney’s fees for a failure to appear even in the absence of

wilfulness; negligence is sufficient. Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754

F.2d 1420, 1426 (9 Cir. 1985). th

Therefore, the Court shall recommend an award of additional

monetary sanctions in the amount of $3,437.00.

V. Recommendation

Accordingly, it IS RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion for

terminating and monetary sanctions BE GRANTED, that Plaintiff’s

counsel, Kevin Gerard Little, BE ORDERED to pay $3,437.00 to

Defendants’ counsel, and that the action BE DISMISSED.

This report and recommendation is submitted to the United

States District Court Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of the

Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court,

Eastern District of California. Within thirty (30) days after

being served with a copy, any party may file written objections

with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings

and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served

by mail) after service of the objections. The Court will then

review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636

/

//

///

////

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(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to

appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d

1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2007 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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