Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02503/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-02503-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Toy Terrell Smith
Petitioner
Jeanne Woodford
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TOY TERRELL SMITH,

Petitioner,

v.

JEANNE WOODFORD, director,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-2503 SI (pr)

ORDER OF DISMISSAL 

INTRODUCTION

Toy Terrell Smith filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254. Now before the court for consideration is respondent's motion to dismiss the petition

as time-barred. The court finds that the petition, filed sixteen years after the conviction became

final, was untimely. Respondent’s motion will be granted and the action will be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

Smith was convicted in Alameda County Superior Court of attempted murder in the first

degree and was found to have personally used a firearm and to have personally inflicted great

bodily injury on the victim. In 1988, he received an indeterminate life sentence in prison. He

appealed. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and the California Supreme

Court denied his petition for review on June 27, 1990.

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Smith filed two state habeas petitions. His first habeas petition was filed in the California

Court of Appeal on November 20, 2003, and denied on January 15, 2004. His second state

habeas petition was filed in the California Supreme Court on November 5, 2004, and denied on

September 21, 2005 with a citation that indicated it had been rejected as untimely. 

The petition in this action was stamped “filed” on April 11, 2006. The habeas petition

was deemed filed March 29, 2006, the date of the post-mark on the envelope in which it came

to the court, because there is no evidence that Smith gave it to prison officials any earlier than

that day to mail. See Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001) (pro se prisoner's

federal habeas petition is deemed filed when prisoner delivers petition to prison authorities for

mailing), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002). 

The current action is Smith’s second federal habeas action. His first federal petition was

filed in the Eastern District on October 4, 1996, transferred to this district on December 2, 1996,

and dismissed on January 13, 1997, for failure to submit an in forma pauperis application or pay

the filing fee. See Smith v. Gomez, N. D. Cal. No. C 96-4339 SI (formerly E. D. Cal. No. 96-

CV-01744-GEB-GHH). 

DISCUSSION

Petitions filed by prisoners challenging non-capital state convictions or sentences must

be filed within one year of the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final after

the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for seeking direct review; (2) an impediment

to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such action

prevented petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional right asserted was recognized by the

Supreme Court, if the right was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive

to cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the claim could have been discovered

through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). For cases in which the

convictions became final before the April 24, 1996 enactment of the Anti-Terrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), the petitioners had a one-year grace period so that their

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petitions were due by April 24, 1997. See Patterson v. Stewart, 251 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 978 (2001). 

The first step is to determine when the limitations period began. Smith’s conviction

became final in 1990, so he is one of the petitioners who had a one-year grace period to file

federal habeas petitions after the enactment of the AEDPA. The presumptive deadline for Smith

to file was April 24, 1997. He missed that by nine years, so unless he is entitled to some tolling,

his petition was very untimely. 

The next step is to determine whether any statutory tolling applies. The one-year

limitations period will be tolled for the "time during which a properly filed application for State

post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). No tolling is allowed under § 2244(d)(2) for federal

petitions. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2001). Smith’s first state habeas

petition was filed on November 20, 2003, and the last one denied on September 21, 2005. By

the time Smith’s first state petition was filed, the limitations period had already ended so he

receives no statutory tolling for the state habeas petitions. "Once the limitations period is

expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the statute of limitations." Rashid v.

Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

The last step is to determine whether any equitable tolling is warranted. Equitable tolling

of the limitations period is available upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances beyond a

petitioner's control which prevented him from timely filing the petition. See Calderon v. United

States District Court (Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997) (equitable tolling will not be

available in most cases because extensions of time should only be granted if extraordinary

circumstances beyond prisoner's control make it impossible for him to file petition on time), cert.

denied, 523 U.S. 1061, 1099 (1998), overruled in part on other grounds by Calderon v. United

States District Court (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1060

(1999). In his opposition brief, Smith presents a grab-bag of reasons he should receive equitable

tolling. The court will not require the parties to develop the evidence on Smith’s various excuses

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because, even if they are assumed to be true and sufficient to warrant tolling, they do not toll the

limitations period for enough time to save Smith, as shown below.

The limitations period started on April 24, 1996. At least 6 days of the 365-day

limitations period passed before the first potential tolling event of him being transferred to

Salinas Valley State Prison in May 1996. He states that the new AEDPA rules were posted but

“the newly opened prison’s law library was not up and running for approximately four to five

months from its opening.” Petitioner’s Reply, p. 3 (Docket # 6.) Assuming he went to Salinas

Valley on the first day of May, the law library inadequacy might have tolled the limitations

period for May - September 1996.

Perhaps no additional days of the limitations period occurred between the end of the

tolling event of the inadequate law library and the start of the next tolling event of the filing of

the first federal petition on October 4, 1996. Of course, the filing of the first federal petition

undermines any suggestion that Smith should get any tolling for the law library problem – if the

unopened law library prevented him from filing from May - September 1996, one wouldn’t

expect him to have filed his first federal habeas petition on October 4, 1996.

After the first federal petition was denied on January 13, 1997, at least another 137 days

went by before the next potential tolling event, a prison riot in June 1997 in which Smith “was

an involuntary participant,” id. Smith states that as a result of his activity in the riot, he was put

in a segregated housing unit and separated from his legal work until his transfer to Calipatria

State Prison in October 1997. He states that when he was at Calipatria, he “then continued

habeas corpus preparations and proceedings.” Id. 

Assuming Smith was transferred to Calipatria State Prison on the last day of October

1997, at least another 273 days passed before the next potential tolling event, i.e., his first

alleged state habeas petition in the state superior court. Smith states that he filed a state habeas

petition on some date in August 1998 that was denied on August 31, 1998. He states that a

lockdown then occurred that interfered with his ability to present his habeas petition to the next

level in state court for an unstated amount of time. 

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By the time Smith arrived at Calipatria, the limitations period had already expired, as at

least 416 days (6+137+273) of untolled time had already passed since the one-year limitations

period began on April 24, 1996. The analysis could end here, but the court continues onward

because there are at least another 222 days of untolled time immediately before this action was

filed. When those 222 days are added to the 416 days, the untimeliness become even more

pronounced. 

The next potential tolling event occurred in August 1999, when Smith was put in the

correctional clinical case management system for mental health care and suffered from

depression. He states that he was transferred to Pelican Bay on September 28, 1999 to receive

mental health care and remains at that prison. He states that Pelican Bay was on lockdown when

he arrived for an unidentified period of time. The conditions at Pelican Bay and any mental

health problems Smith might have had were not such as to completely prevent Smith from

litigating. Smith filed a state habeas petition on November 20, 2003, filed another state habeas

petition on November 5, 2004, and filed a pro se civil rights case in this court on August 19,

2005, i.e., Smith v. Woodford, C 05-3373 SI. Smith actively pursued that civil rights action in

the seven months after it was filed and immediately before this action was filed, as indicated by

the court’s receipt from him of a complaint and pauper application on August 19, 2005, a letter

on September 19, 2005, a letter on December 9, 2005, a letter on December 19, 2005, an

amended complaint on January 5, 2006, a letter on January 19, 2006, a letter on March 3, 2006,

a letter on March 6, 2006. There is no reason to believe that Smith’s mental health or the

conditions at the prison prevented him from filing the current habeas action in the seven months

(222 days) preceding its filing when he was able to pursue his civil rights action. Adding that

222 days to the 416 untolled days that had passed before he arrived at Calipatria means that he

filed his petition after 638 days (or more than 21 months) of untolled time had passed. Since he

had only 365 days of untolled time to get to federal court, he missed the deadline by about 273

days (or more than nine months). 

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Smith’s federal petition was deemed filed on March 29, 2006. By that date, at least 638

days of untolled time had passed since the one-year limitations period started. Smith missed the

deadline by more than nine months. 

CONCLUSION

Respondent's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. (Docket # 4.) This action is dismissed

because the petition was not filed before the expiration of the habeas statute of limitations

period. The clerk will close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 21, 2007 

 SUSAN ILLSTON

United States District Judge

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