Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50164/USCOURTS-ca9-13-50164-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Huey Jacque Carter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HUEY JACQUE CARTER, AKA Baby

Huey, AKA Reesio,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 13-50164

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-00358-

MMM-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

February 4, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed July 28, 2015

Before: Michael J. Melloy,

*

 Jay S. Bybee,

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Melloy

* The Honorable Michael J. Melloy, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

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2 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed a criminal judgment in a case in which

the defendant, who asserts he was under the influence of

prescription drugs at the time he entered his guilty plea,

contends that the district court, by insufficiently inquiring as

to the effect of those drugs at the plea hearing, failed to fulfill

its duty under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b) to ensure the defendant

entered the plea knowingly and voluntarily.

The panel held that the scope of the district court’s

inquiry was sufficient to ensure that the defendant entered his

plea knowingly and voluntarily, and it therefore did not

commit a constitutional or procedural error.

COUNSEL

Michael Tanaka (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender;

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Max B. Shiner (argued), Assistant United States Attorney,

Violent & Organized Crime Section; Robert E. Dugdale,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division;

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Los Angeles,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 3

OPINION

MELLOY, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Huey Carter timely filed a direct appeal

following a guilty plea. He asserts he was under the influence

of prescription drugs at the time he entered his plea. Carter

asks us to vacate the plea because he contends the district

court insufficiently inquired as to the effect of those drugs at

his plea hearing. Without a more searching inquiry, Carter

argues, the district court failed to fulfill its duty under Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b) to ensure he entered the

plea knowingly and voluntarily. Because the scope of the

district court’s inquiry was constitutionally and procedurally

sufficient, we affirm.

I

Huey Carter sold crack cocaine to a confidential

informant in December 2010. A grand jury returned an

indictment in April 2011, charging Carter with distributing

crack cocaine. Carter was arrested and arraigned in February

2012. He pleaded not guilty, and the court appointed a public

defender to represent him.

A few weeks later, Carter asked the court to allow him to

represent himself. A hearing on self-representation was set

for March, but the parties stipulated to postponing the hearing

date to April. At the April hearing, Carter explained he had

attended school through the twelfth grade, represented

himself in another case, and researched the law about selfrepresentation. He specifically mentioned he wanted to

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4 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

“exercise [his] Faretta1rights.” To ensure that Carter was

competent to represent himself, the district court asked him

about an allegation that his hearing had been postponed

because he had been placed on suicide watch. Carter denied

the allegation. Carter’s public defender expressed no

concerns about Carter’s ability to carry out the basic tasks of

representing himself. The district court granted Carter’s

request to represent himself. The district court nevertheless

expressed concern about the suicide-watch issue and asked

the government to look into it.

The government filed a report in May explaining Carter

was insubordinate while in custody. It was that

insubordination, not suicide watch, that forced Carter to

postpone the hearing.

Carter and the government eventually signed a plea

agreement in August 2012. In exchange for pleading guilty,

the government agreed to dismiss an information regarding a

prior drug conviction, effectively taking a ten-year

mandatory-minimum sentence off the table. In the plea

agreement, the government explained the penalties, the

elements of the offense, and the constitutional rights that

Carter was waiving. The agreement also included an appeal

waiver, allowing Carter to appeal based only on the

voluntariness of the guilty plea.

The district court held a plea hearing in September 2012. 

The district court asked about Carter’s mental state. Before

administering the oath, the district court instructed Carter to

tell the court if there was anything he did not understand. 

The district court asked Carter for his name, whether he

 

1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 5

wanted to withdraw his initial plea, and for his new plea. It

then administered the oath.

The district court asked Carter about his age and

education. He responded, “Forty-two” and “Twelfth Grade,”

respectively. Carter stated he did not have a high school

diploma and confirmed he was a United States citizen. The

following exchange then took place regardingCarter’s mental

illness and medications:

THE COURT: Have you recently been

treated for any kind of

mental illness or addiction

to narcotics, Mr. Carter?

MR. CARTER: Yes; mental illness.

THE COURT: And are you taking any

medication for that right

now?

MR. CARTER: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: Can you tell me what

kinds of medication you’re

taking?

MR. CARTER: Seroque l and some

depression pills.

THE COURT: Are those affecting you in

any way so it’s hard for

you to understand the

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6 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

things that I’m saying or

the lawyer is saying?

MR. CARTER: No, ma’am.

THE COURT: Do you believe that you

understand the purpose of

the hearing we’re having

today?

MR. CARTER: Yes, ma’am.

THE COURT: What are you going to do

today, sir?

MR. CARTER: Pleading guilty.

THE COURT: Okay. The Court finds

t h a t M r . C a r t e r

understands both the

nature of the proceeding as

well as the statements

being made in the

courtroom, and that he is

in full possession of his

faculties.

There was no objection to the district court’s finding, and

the district court continued with a normal plea colloquy. The

district court explained to Carter the rights he was waiving,

discussed the potential penalties, asked about the plea

agreement, and provided details about sentencing. Carter

appropriately responded to questions with either “Yes,

ma’am” or “No, ma’am.” The government explained the

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 7

elements of the crime and laid out the factual basis for the

plea. The prosecutor explained that Carter agreed to sell

drugs to an confidential informant, purchased drugs from a

supplier, and then sold the informant over 50 grams of crack

cocaine. The district court finished the colloquy, throughout

which Carter continued to respond with either “Yes, ma’am”

or “No, ma’am.” At no point did Carter answer contrary to

what was expected or indicate there was anything he did not

understand. When the district court asked him whether he

was “guilty or not guilty,” Carter responded, “Guilty.” The

district court accepted the plea.

The district court sentenced Carter in March 2013. Carter

neither moved to withdraw his guilty plea nor suggested to

the court that he entered his plea involuntarily or

unknowingly.

In April 2013, however, Carter filed a direct appeal,

claiming that the district court failed to ensure that he entered

his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

II

Carter contends the district court did not sufficiently

inquire about the effects of medications on his mental state. 

Carter suggests that the alleged failure amounts to a Rule

11(b) violation and requires reversal. See Godinez v. Moran,

509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993) (explaining that before a district

court can accept a defendant’s plea, it must ensure that the

defendant is entering the plea knowingly and voluntarily).

Although we review de novo whether a defendant entered

a plea knowingly and voluntarily, United States v. Timbana,

222 F.3d 688, 701 (9th Cir. 2000), we apply only plain error

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8 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

review when a defendant appeals based on an unobjected-to

Rule 11 procedural violation, United States v. Dominguez

Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76 (2004).

Carter fails to argue, in either his opening or reply brief,

that he actually entered his plea involuntarily or

unknowingly. He fails to point to any evidence to

demonstrate the alleged involuntariness of his plea. Further,

he does not explain how the medications at issue would have

impacted his ability to enter a plea knowingly and voluntarily. 

Rather, the fighting issue is simply whether the district court

erred by failing to undertake a sufficient inquiry “to ensure

that the constitutional requisites [of voluntariness and

knowingness] were met.” At its core, the appeal presents a

Rule 11 procedural question. And because Carter did not

object, plain error review is appropriate.2

Under the plain error standard, we grant relief only if we

find (1) there was error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the

error affected substantial rights. United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). Because we hold that the district

court’s inquiry here was constitutionally and procedurally

sufficient, “there was no error, plain or otherwise.” See

United States v. Covian-Sandoval, 462 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th

Cir. 2006). Accordingly, we need not reach the second and

third prongs of the plain error analysis.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), a

district court has the duty to ensure “the defendant

2

 This conclusion also finds support in cases cited by Carter. See, e.g.,

United States v. Yang Chia Tien, 720 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 2013)

(applying plain error review to an unobjected-to Rule 11 claim); United

States v. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000) (same).

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 9

understands” the rights that he is giving up, the nature of the

charge, the applicable penalty range, and the contours of the

plea agreement. Rule 11 has two main purposes. First, it

helps ensure a defendant is pleading guilty voluntarily. 

McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969). 

Second, it helps the district court produce a complete record. 

Id. Carter alleges the district court erred by failing to ask

more than just a few questions about his medications. No

case from this court or Supreme Court is directly on point.

In a similar situation, however, this court addressed the

requisite mental-state inquirywhen a defendant with a known

mental issue attempted to plead guilty. Timbana, 222 F.3d at

702–07. On the heels of a competency hearing where the

district court found the defendant competent to stand trial, the

defendant sought to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 692–93. A plea

hearing occurred roughly a month and a half after the

competency hearing, and the district court began by ensuring

that the defendant remained competent. Id. at 693. The

district court asked the defendant about his education, about

any potentially mind-altering substances, and whether he

understood the purpose of the plea hearing. Id. The district

court asked both parties whether they had any additional

qualms about the defendant’s ability to understand the

proceedings, and both parties responded that there were no

new developments since the defendant’s competencyhearing. 

Id.

On appeal, the defendant contended that even if he had

been competent to plead, his plea should nonetheless be

vacated because the district court failed under Rule 11 to

ensure that the defendant understood the factual basis for his

plea. Id. at 704. He argued that the district court should have

asked him “to state in his own words” what he had done,

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10 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

pointing to several cases from our sister circuits supporting

the proposition that the Rule 11 colloquy must be “broadened

under certain circumstances.” Id. at 704–05. The Timbana

majority concluded that the inquiry conducted in this case

satisfied the inquiry demanded by the cases cited, observing

that the district court had not “ignore[d] evidence” that the

defendant lacked understanding and had “conducted a

searching inquiry.” Id. at 707. It thus found no Rule 11

violation. Id.

Although Timbana considered the Rule 11 colloquy

standard, that case did not deal with the precise question at

issue here: whether a defendant’s statement that he presently

is or may be under the influence of medication triggers an

expanded Rule 11 colloquy to ensure that the defendant is

“knowingly and voluntarily” entering a guilty plea. We, like

the majority in Timbana, look outside the Circuit for

guidance. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth,

and Tenth Circuits have all addressed the issue before us. 

Every circuit that has considered the issue agrees the district

court has some additional duty to follow up with the

defendant upon learning the defendant is under the influence

of some medication or substance.

But the depth of that inquiry is unclear. Surveying case

law across the circuits, a few commonalities emerge. District

courts should ask about the types of drugs and whether the

medications are affecting the defendant’s mental state. They

need not (but are nonetheless encouraged to) inquire about

the exact names or dosages of the medications. And, when

determiningwhether defendants are competent, district courts

are entitled to rely on their own observations of defendants,

the defendants’ answers throughout the proceeding (not just

when discussing competency), and the defendants’ medical

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 11

histories (or lack thereof). In general, appellate courts have

vacated pleas only when the district court failed completely

to engage in any meaningful follow-up with a defendant.

The Third Circuit first took up the question in 1987. 

United States v. Cole, 813 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1987). The

Third Circuit held that when a district court is alerted to the

possibility that a medication or other drug may cloud a

defendant’s judgment, the district court must inquire further

to determine whether the defendant is entering his plea

voluntarily and knowingly. Id. But the case failed to define

the contours of the inquiry. See id. at 46–47. It held only

that, after learning that the defendant had ingested drugs the

previous evening, asking, “Do you understand what I have

said to you?” is insufficient. Id. at 45–47. In 2007, the Third

Circuit revisited the issue in a case where the defendant

disclosed that he was presently seeing three mental-health

professionals and he had taken “[t]wo Ativan” the morning of

the plea hearing. United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 193

(3d Cir. 2007). The district court asked if the medication

“affect[ed the defendant’s] ability to understand and

appreciate what is taking place.” Id. The defendant

explained that he understood what was happening in the

courtroom. Id. He further explained that the medication

“puts [him] in perspective” and “calms [him] down” so he

can “deal with the circumstances.” Id. The court concluded

that the district court “sufficiently discharged its duty under

Rule 11 to inquire into [defendant’s] capacity to enter a

knowing and voluntary plea and, in fact, found she did just

that.” Id. at 196.

In 1988, the Second Circuit adopted Cole’s holding. 

United States v. Rossillo, 853 F.2d 1062, 1066–67 (2d Cir.

1988). The Second Circuit vacated a guilty plea where the

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12 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

district court made no inquiry into the defendant’s state of

mind despite the defendant admitting he was on medication. 

Id. In 2013, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its holding in

Rosillo. It vacated a guilty plea after the district court learned

the defendant was on medication but failed “to ascertain

whether [the medications] could impact his ability to

proceed.” United States v. Yang Chia Tien, 720 F.3d 464,

470 (2d Cir. 2013). “[O]nce the district court learned that

[the defendant] was on a series of medications, there should

have been further inquiry into the specific medicines and their

side effects.” Id. The Second Circuit explained that, at a

minimum, the district court must “ask about the effects of

[the] medications, and [] conduct an inquiry into the

defendant’s state of mind.” Id. at 471.

In 1991, the First Circuit suggested the best practice

would be to ask about the types, effects, and dosages of

medications. See United States v. Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d

588, 596 (1st Cir. 1991). Then, in 1999, the First Circuit

affirmed a plea where the defendant disclosed he had taken

Xanax and Ativan and where the district court asked why the

defendant took the medications, when the defendant last took

the medications, and whether the medications “in any way

affected [the defendant’s] capability or ability to understand

today’s proceedings.” Miranda-Gonzalez v. United States,

181 F.3d 164, 166 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Circuit found

this inquiry as well as the absence of any “warning flags” in

the defendant’s answers or behavior during the colloquy was

sufficient to affirm the plea. Id. at 167.

In 2000, the First Circuit reaffirmed what it considered

the best practice—“to identify which drugs a defendant is

taking, how recently they have been taken and in what

quantity, and (so far as possible) the purpose and

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 13

consequences of the drugs in question.” United States v.

Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 268 (1st Cir. 2000). It

clarified, however, that “there is certainly no settled rule that

a hearing cannot proceed unless precise names and quantities

of drugs have been identified,” and the district court can rely

on “practical judgments” to determine the likely or actual

effects of a particular drug on the voluntariness of the plea. 

Id. at 268–69. And it also stated that above all, “[t]he critical

question is whether the drugs—if they have a capacity to

impair the defendant’s ability to plead—have in fact done so

on this occasion.” Id. at 268. To conclude that the plea is

voluntary, district courts may rely on the defendant’s own

assurances, the defendant’s performance during the plea

hearing, and any prior medical history. Id. at 269.

Since Savinon-Acosta, the First Circuit has distinguished

Parra-Ibanez from other cases because the district court in

Parra-Ibanez “failed to follow up with any question

whatsoever about whether the defendant’s medication

affected his competence,” and the Circuit has held that the

district court is not required to seek out the name and dosage

of every medication. See United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d

36, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2014) (finding guilty plea proper when the

district court received assurances that the defendant could

understand the proceeding despite the court not asking “the

name and dosage of each medication”).

The Fourth Circuit has held that “when an answer raises

questions about the defendant’s state of mind, the court must

broaden its inquiry to satisfy itself that the plea is being made

knowingly and voluntarily.” United States v. Damon,

191 F.3d 561, 565 (4th Cir. 1999). In Damon, the Fourth

Circuit vacated a plea when the district court learned that the

defendant was under the influence of medication but failed to

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14 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

determine what, if any, effect the medication had on the

defendant. Id. It remanded the case to allow the district court

to determine whether the medication’s potential effects could

have affected the defendant’s plea. Id. at 566.

The Tenth Circuit has not expressly held that a district

court must ask follow-up questions when a defendant reveals

that he is under the influence of medication. See United

States v. Browning, 61 F.3d 752, 753–54 (10th Cir. 1995). In

Browning, however, the Court found no Rule 11 violation

after the district court “inquired as to whether the medication

had in any way affected [the defendant’s] ability to think or

comprehend” and the defendant “assured the court [the

medication] had not [affected his ability to think or

comprehend],” the district court questioned the defendant’s

counsel if he had any qualms about the defendant’s mental

state, the district court clarified the purposes of the

medication, and the district court noted that the defendant had

not previously been treated for mental illness. Id. at 754. 

This information along with the district court’s “own

observations” led the district court to find the defendant

competent. Id. The Tenth Circuit also put some onus on the

defendant to demonstrate the alleged intoxicating effects of

the medication. It held that, even if the district court “’did

not probe deep enough,’” the defendant was not entitled to

reversal because “the complete absence of evidence that his

ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea was affected by

the medications renders any deficiency harmless.” Id.

The Eighth Circuit applies a somewhat more relaxed

requirement. In United States v. Dalman, the district court

asked the defendant if he was under the influence of any

medication, to which the defendant responded he was taking

four different types of medications but could not remember

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 15

the specific names of the drugs. 994 F.2d 537, 538 (8th Cir.

1993). When asked whether he could understand what was

going on “right now,” the defendant responded, “Yes.” Id.

At no time during the change of plea hearing did the

defendant demonstrate that he might have been confused or

that his mental condition was otherwise affected. Id. The

Eighth Circuit found this inquiry, along with the defendant’s

“performance during the plea hearing,” was sufficient to

uphold the plea. Id. at 538–39. The Court noted that Dalman

“simply . . . made no showing that the medications so affected

him at the time of his plea hearing as to make him incapable

of knowingly and intelligently entering his plea of guilty” and

that his plea performance was inconsistent with his “after-thefact claim that he did not understand the proceedings.” Id. at

539.

The Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the necessity to

inquire “how much of each drug” the defendant ingested and

“what effects the medications . . . might have [had] on [the

defendant’s] clear-headedness.” United States v. Hardimon,

700 F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted). It explained that a district court’s questions

regarding whether the defendant could think clearly during

the plea hearing were sufficient. Id. The Court recognized

that mere coherence may not be conclusive, but it also

recognized that “[a] combination of deeply confused or

clouded thinking with coherent speech and a normal

demeanor is rare.” Id. at 943. It cautioned district courts not

to assume simply because a defendant is taking a medication

that he cannot “think straight.” Id. at 944. It also placed the

onus on the defendant to show a debilitating effect from the

medication; if a defendant wants to withdraw his plea, “the

defendant needs to present the affidavit of a qualified

psychiatrist” in the absence of clear incoherence. Id.

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16 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

These cases all suggest the same conclusion—if a district

court learns that a defendant is under the influence of some

medication, it has a duty to determine, at a minimum, what

type of drug the defendant has taken and whether the drug is

affecting the defendant’s mental state. When determining

whether there is any effect on defendants, district courts may

rely on defendants’ answers to their inquiries as well as their

observations of defendants during the hearing. See MirandaGonzalez, 181 F.3d at 167; Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269;

Browning, 61 F.3d at 753–54; Dalman, 994 F.2d at 539. 

District courts may also consider a defendant’s medical

history, including the defendant’s history of mental illness.

See Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269; Browning, 61 F.3d at

753–54; Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d at 596 n.16. And while it

may be helpful to look at the dosage and specific names of

medications, this is not required. See Kenney, 756 F.3d at

46–47; Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269.

Indeed, the complete failure to undertake any additional

inquiry into the mental state of the defendant, after the

defendant has alerted the court of medication, will not satisfy

Rule 11’s demands. See Cole, 813 F.2d at 46–47 (reversing

when, after learning the defendant had taken drugs the

previous evening, the district court asked only, “Do you

understand what I have said to you?” and did not ask about

the effect of the drugs); Rosillo, 853 F.2d at 1066 (reversing

where there was no on-the-record determination whether the

defendant’s ability to understand the proceeding was affected

by the influence of any medication); Parra-Ibanez, 936 F.2d

at 595–96 (reversing where the defendant revealed he took

three medications and the district court posed no questions as

to whether those medications affected the defendant’s

comprehension); Damon, 191 F.3d at 565 (remanding for

harmless-error analysis where district court failed to ask

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UNITED STATES V. CARTER 17

about any potential effect of medication after it was “put on

direct notice that [defendant] could be under the influence of

a drug while entering his plea”).

These cases are persuasive and lead us to find that the

district court in the present case did not err. Here, the district

court asked Carter mental-state-related questions after Carter

revealed he was under the influence of medication. It asked

Carter the type of medication. Carter responded, “Seroquel

and some depression pills.” It asked if those drugs were

“affecting [Carter] in any way so it’s hard for [him] to

understand the things that [the court] or the lawyer is saying,”

and Carter responded, “No, ma’am.” The district court

continued its inquiry, askingwhether Carter “underst[ood] the

purpose of the hearing.” Carter responded affirmatively. To

ensure that Carter understood, the district court then asked

Carter to tell it what was the purpose of the hearing. Carter

responded, “Pleading guilty.”

It was only after this inquiry that the district court

declared Carter competent to proceed with the guilty plea. 

Carter’s performance during the rest of the plea hearing also

supports the conclusion of competency. Carter responded

appropriately to the questions posed by the district court. 

Although Carter’s responses generally consisted simply of

“Yes, ma’am” or “No, ma’am,” Carter’s answers were

responsive to the questions asked and were consistent with

affirming understanding or indicating he had no questions for

the court. To the extent Carter now argues that the alleged

suicide watch should have forced the district court to

undertake a more thorough inquiry, the record belies the

argument. Carter disavowed any threat of suicide, and the

government submitted evidence showing that the reason for

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18 UNITED STATES V. CARTER

postponing the hearing date was Carter’s insubordination, not

an alleged placement on suicide watch.

Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s inquiry

was sufficient to ensure that Carter entered his plea

knowingly and voluntarily, and it therefore did not commit a

constitutional or procedural error. In reaching this

conclusion, we join the majority of circuits that have

considered this issue.3

AFFIRMED.

3

Indeed, the closest Carter comes to pointing to contrary authority is in

suggesting that the district court’s inquiry would fail under the First

Circuit’s best practices—that a district court should determine the name

and dosage of anymedications. See Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 268. But

as the First Circuit has subsequently held, this is not required. Kenney,

756 F.3d at 46–47.

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