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Parties Involved:
Pablo Duran
Appellant
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Appellee

Document Text:

FIL~ D 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Unit.ed States Court of Appeals Tenth c;~,,i~ 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT MAY 13 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

PABLO DURAN, Clerk 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) No. 91-2177 

) (D.C. No. CIV-90-553-JB) 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. S 405(g) after 

the Secretary of Health and Human Services denied his application 

for Social Security disability benefits and supplemental security 

income benefits. Plaintiff alleges disability since November 1, 

1986, due to back pain, depression, and drug addiction. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal . 10th Cir. R. 

36 : 3. 

Appellate Case: 91-2177 Document: 010110249155 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 1
Plaintiff's request for benefits was denied initially and on 

reconsideration. After a hearing, the administrative law judge 

{ALJ) denied Plaintiff's application. Appellant's App. at 42-48. 

The Appeals Council denied review, and the district court affirmed 

the Secretary's decision. Plaintiff appeals, asserting (1) the 

ALJ was required to order a consultative psychological evaluation 

and (2) the decision of the Secretary was not based on substantial 

evidence. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 

affirm. 

We review the Secretary's decision "to determine whether the 

findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the 

Secretary applied correct legal standards." Pacheco v. Sullivan, 

931 F.2d 695, 696 (10th Cir. 1991). "We must determine whether 

the Secretary's decision of nondisability ... is supported by 

substantial evidence, i.e., '"such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion."'" Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 

1988)(quoting Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 

1983)(quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 

In reviewing the Secretary's decision, we cannot weigh the 

evidence or substitute our discretion for that of the Secretary, 

but we have the duty to carefully consider the entire record and 

make our determination on the record as a whole. Dollar v. Bowen, 

821 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The Secretary has established a five-step sequential 

evaluation process to determine if a claimant is disabled. 

v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988)(listing five 

2 

Reyes 

steps): 

Appellate Case: 91-2177 Document: 010110249155 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 2
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 . If a claimant is determined to be 

disabled or not disabled at any step, the evaluation process ends 

there. Sorenson v. Bowen, 888 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The burden of proof is on the claimant through step four; then it 

shifts to the Secretary. See id. at 710 (citing Ray v. Bowen, 865 

F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989)). 

Plaintiff, a forty-nine year old man with a tenth grade 

education, claims disability since November 1, 1986, due to back 

pain, depression, and drug addiction. The medical evidence 

consisted of two informal "progress reports" dated 1988 and the 

consulting orthopedic surgeon's comprehensive report dated 

September 7, 1989. The ALJ determined at step five of the 

sequential evaluation process that Plaintiff had the residual 

functional capacity for light work and, applying the 

Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 1 concluded that "there are and have 

been jobs existing in significant nwnbers in the regional or 

national economies which [Plaintiff] could perform." 

App. at 48. 

Appellant's 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ disregarded h i s duty to 

develop fully and fairly the record when he declined to order a 

consultative psychological evaluation based on Plaintiff's claim 

of depression. While the ALJ must consider all relevant medical 

evidence of record, Baker v. Bowen, 886 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 

1989), he has broad latitude in ordering a consultative 

examination. Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d 

774, 778 (10th Ci r. 1990) . Unless the claimant presents objective 

1 20 C.F .R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App . 2. 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-2177 Document: 010110249155 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 3
evidence supporting the conclusion that he suffers from 

depression, the ALJ is not required to order a consultative 

evaluation. Id. 

Plaintiff's claim of disabling depression is based solely on 

notations made by an unidentified medical professional in 1988 of 

Plaintiff's own complaints of depression, and his mother's 

statement that he had been suicidal at times. Appellant's App. at 

67, 68. At the hearing, however, Plaintiff did not allege that he 

was depressed, nor did he explain how his depression interfered 

with his ability to work . See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 423(d)(l)(A)("disability" means the "inability to engage in any 

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment " ); accord Williams v. 

Bowen, 844 F.2d at 750; 20 C. F . R §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). 

Plaintiff also asserts error in the ALJ's conclusion that his 

drug addiction was in remission, on the ground that the consulting 

orthopedic surgeon's report did not discuss any mental impairment. 

Yet Plaintiff did not allege that his drug addiction was not in 

remission . Plaintiff testified that he had been on Methadone for 

the past year. Appellant's App. at 58, 59. If prescribed 

treatment can restore Plaintiff's ability to work, he is not 

disabled. See Pacheco v. Sullivan, 931 F . 2d at 697 (regulations 

require a recipient of disability benefits to follow prescribed 

treatment if the treatment can restore his or her ability to work, 

or benefits will cease). Accordingly, we determine that 

substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-2177 Document: 010110249155 Date Filed: 05/13/1992 Page: 4
Plaintiff's drug addiction did not affect significantly his 

residual functional capacity. 

Plaintiff presented no objective evidence that he was 

depressed as of the hearing date or that his depression adversely 

affected his ability to work. Similarly, the evidence was 

uncontroverted that his drug addiction was in remission. 

Consequently, we cannot say the ALJ erred in refusing to order a 

consultative psychological examination. See Diaz v. Secretary of 

Health & Human Servs., 898 F.2d at 778. Cf. Hill v. Sullivan, 924 

F.2d 972, 974- 75 (10th Cir. 199l)(evaluation required where record 

contained evidence of a mental impairment that allegedly prevented 

claimant from working) . 

Plaintiff also alleges the Secretary's decision was not based 

on substantial evidence because (1) the ALJ based his decision 

that Plaintiff could perform light work in part on a lack of 

medical evidence and (2) the ALJ disregarded the effect of 

Plaintiff's nonexertional impairments on his residual functional 

capacity. Appellant's Brief at 6-7 . 

We have carefully examined the record, including the ALJ' s 

decision and a detailed and comprehensive opinion by the district 

court, and we cannot add significantly to the district court's 

analysis. We agree with the district court that substantial 

evidence supports the Secretary' s decision that Plaintiff was not 

disabled withi n the meaning of the Social Security Act. We 

therefore affirm the district court's judgment for substantially 

the reasons set forth in its Memorandum Opinion and Order dated 

July 26, 1991. 

5 

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The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Wade Brorby 

Circuit Judge 

6 

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