Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043/USCOURTS-caDC-99-01043-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company
Intervenor
National Whistleblower Center
Petitioner
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 2, 2000 Decided April 11, 2000

No. 99-1002

National Whistleblower Center

Petitioner

v.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission and

United States of America,

Respondents

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company,

Intervenor

Consolidated with

99-1043

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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Peter B. Bloch argued the cause for petitioner. With him

on the briefs were Stephen M. Kohn, Michael D. Kohn and

David K. Colapinto.

John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With

him on the briefs were Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney

General, United States Department of Justice, Mark Haag,

Attorney, Karen D. Cyr, General Counsel, United States

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, E. Leo Slaggie, Deputy

Solicitor, and Marjorie S. Nordlinger, Senior Attorney.

David R. Lewis, argued the cause for intervenor Baltimore

Gas and Electric Company. With him on the briefs was

James B. Hamlin.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Williams and Sentelle,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge Edwards.

Edwards, Chief Judge: The petition for review in this case

presents a claim by the National Whistleblower Center

("Center") seeking to overturn a decision by the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or "Commission") denying

intervention by the Center in a nuclear power plant license

renewal proceeding. The relicensing at issue involves the

Calvert Cliffs nuclear facilities operated by Baltimore Gas &

Electric ("BG&E"). This is the second time that this matter

has come before this court. On November 12, 1999, the court

issued a judgment holding that the NRC erred in rejecting

the Center's petition to intervene in the Calvert Cliffs license

renewal proceeding. See National Whistleblower Center v.

NRC, No. 99-1002, Slip. Op. (D.C. Cir. Nov. 12, 1999). Following a sua sponte inquiry by the court, however, this

judgment was vacated, see National Whistleblower Center v.

NRC, 196 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1999), and the case was

reargued before the court on March 2, 2000. Upon reconsideration, we deny the Center's petition for review.

Any third party seeking to participate in a relicensing

proceeding must file a motion to intervene, followed by a

timely submission of "contentions." A contention is a specific

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issue of law or fact that the third party seeks to have

adjudicated; it must be substantiated by an explanation of its

bases, a statement of supporting facts or expert opinion,

appropriate references and citations, and sufficient information to indicate that a genuine dispute exists between the

party seeking to intervene and the applicant. The Center's

problems in this case arose when it failed to make a timely

filing of contentions in support of its petition to intervene in

the Calvert Cliffs relicensing proceeding.

The Center complains that the NRC erred in applying an

overly rigid standard in assessing their requests for extensions of time. According to the Center, the Commission was

required to adhere to a well-established "good cause" test in

considering petitions for extensions of time. The NRC replies, in turn, that it gave clear notice in a published policy

statement and in a subsequent referral order in the Calvert

Cliffs proceeding that the agency intended to adopt a streamlined schedule in license renewal proceedings. The referral

order specifically directed that "the Licensing Board should

not grant requests for extensions of time absent unavoidable

and extreme circumstances." In re Baltimore Gas & Elec.

Co., Order Referring Petition for Intervention and Request

for Hearing to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel,

CLI-98-14,6 (Aug. 19, 1998), reprinted in Joint Appendix

("J.A.") 23, 28.

We hold, first, that the NRC was free to adopt, without

resort to notice-and-comment rulemaking, the "unavoidable

and extreme circumstances" standard for application in the

Calvert Cliffs proceeding, so long as affected parties had

proper notice of the standard and it was not arbitrary and

capricious, or otherwise in violation of the law. There is no

doubt here that the agency's policy statement and subsequent

referral order at the start of the Calvert Cliffs proceeding

gave the Center and other interested parties adequate notice.

Furthermore, the agency's adoption of the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" standard did not reflect any arbitrary and capricious, or otherwise unlawful action. The revised standard was not an extreme departure from the "good

cause" standard and it was adequately explained by the

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Commission; and the agency was not bound by any law to

adhere to the old "good cause" standard.

Furthermore, on the record at hand, the Center can show

no cognizable injury. The disputed "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" test was undoubtedly applied once, when the

Licensing Board denied the Center's request for an extension

of time to file contentions. However, that action was reversed by the NRC when it granted the Center's petition for

more time. The Center thereafter failed to meet the extended deadline. The Center claims that it filed a subsequent

motion for an extension upon missing the extended deadline,

but the record belies this claim. And, even assuming, arguendo, that the October 1, 1998 filings to which the Center

refers can be viewed as a request for an additional extension

of time, it is clear that those filings do not indicate even good

cause for the purported request. In other words, the Center

was not denied any extension of time that might otherwise

have been obtained if the Commission had applied the "good

cause" standard. Thus, the Center suffered no prejudice from

the agency's application of the disputed "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test.

The record in this case indicates that the contested motion

to intervene was properly denied by the Commission, because

the Center failed to submit the required contentions within

the prescribed deadline. Accordingly, the petition for review

is hereby denied.

I. Background

The Calvert Cliffs relicensing process officially commenced

on April 8, 1998, when BG&E applied to renew its licenses to

operate the nuclear power plant. A few weeks later, the

application was made public and the Commission announced

that interested third parties would have an opportunity to

request a hearing. See Notice of Receipt of Application, 63

Fed. Reg. 20,663 (1998). On May 19, 1998, the Commission

accepted BG&E's application for docketing, again noted that

the application was publicly available, and again announced

that third parties would be afforded an opportunity to request

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a hearing. See Notice of Acceptance for Docketing of the

Application, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,601 (1998). On July 8, 1998, the

NRC published a notice outlining the rights of third parties to

seek a hearing in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding. See Notice

of Opportunity for a Hearing, 63 Fed. Reg. 36,966 (1998).

The July 8 Notice indicated that anyone seeking a hearing

would be required to file a request and an application to

intervene by August 7, 1998. The Notice also indicated that

such parties would be required to file "a supplement to the

petition to intervene which must include a list of contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter." Id. at 36,966.

The Calvert Cliffs case is the first of many nuclear power

plant license renewal proceedings. In view of the anticipated

large number of license renewal applications, and also in

response to "recent experience and criticism of agency proceedings," the Commission announced its intention to streamline procedures for adjudicatory actions before the agency.

Policy on Conduct of Adjudicatory Proceedings, 63 Fed. Reg.

41,872, 41,873 (1998). The NRC recognized that "the opportunity for hearing should be a meaningful one"; the Commission, however, noted that "applicants for a license are also

entitled to a prompt resolution of disputes concerning their

applications." Id. Accordingly, in this policy statement, the

Commission "identified certain specific approaches for its

boards to consider implementing in individual proceedings, if

appropriate, to reduce the time for completing licensing and

other proceedings." Id. In particular, the Commission stated that requests for extensions of time should only be granted

"when warranted by unavoidable and extreme circumstances." Id. at 41,874.

A few days after issuance of the policy statement, the

Center filed a petition to intervene in the Calvert Cliffs

proceeding. The Commission referred the motion to intervene to an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board ("Board") for

further action. See In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., Order

Referring Petition for Intervention and Request for Hearing

to Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, CLI-98-14

(Aug. 19, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 23. The NRC's Referral

order contained a number of directives to the Board, includUSCA Case #99-1043 Document #509519 Filed: 04/11/2000 Page 5 of 16
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ing limitations on the scope of the proceeding and a suggested

schedule for completing the proceeding. Drawing from its

policy statement, the Commission instructed the Board not to

grant "requests for extensions of time absent unavoidable and

extreme circumstances." Id. at 6, reprinted in J.A. 28.

On August 20, 1998, the Licensing Board issued an Initial

Prehearing Order. See In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,

ASLBP No. 98-749-01-LR, Memorandum and Order, Initial

Prehearing Order (Aug. 20, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 42. The

order contained deadlines for submissions as well as other

procedural directives. Specifically, the order directed the

Center to file its required contentions by September 11, 1998,

and noted that a prehearing conference would be held during

the week of October 13. The order also stated that any

requests for extensions of time were to be submitted three

business days before the due date for the pleading and

emphasized that such requests must "demonstrate 'unavoidable and extreme circumstances.' " Id. at 10, reprinted in

J.A. 51.

The day after the Board issued its Prehearing Order, the

Center filed two motions, one directed to the Commission

requesting that it vacate the referral order, and another

directed to the Board requesting that it extend the time for

contentions and delay the prehearing conference until at least

December 1, 1998. In the Motion to Vacate, the Center

objected to the NRC's directive that extensions of time be

granted only in "unavoidable and extreme circumstances."

The Center argued that "[i]t is illegal and improper for the

[Commission] not to follow the 'good cause' standard" set

forth in 10 C.F.R. s 2.711(a). Petition's [sic] Motion to

Vacate Order CLI-98-14, 7 (Aug. 21, 1998). In denying the

motion to vacate, the NRC stated that the agency had

"plenary supervisory authority over its adjudications and

adjudicatory boards," which "allows it to interpret and customize its process for individual cases." In re Baltimore Gas

& Elec. Co., Memorandum and Order, CLI-98-15, 6-7 (Aug.

26, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 55, 60-61. The Commission also

noted that the unavoidable and extreme circumstances standard "simply gives content ... to [the] rule's general 'good

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cause' standard." Id. at 6-7 n.5, reprinted in J.A. 60-61 n.5.

For these and other reasons, the Commission denied the

Center's Motion to Vacate.

The Board, in turn, denied the Center's Motion for Enlargement of Time. The Board held that the Center had

failed to demonstrate the requisite "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" required to justify an extension of time. See

In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., ASLBP No. 98-749-01-LR,

Memorandum and Order, Denying Time Extension Motion

and Scheduling Prehearing Conference, 3 (Aug. 27, 1998),

reprinted in J.A. 65, 67. Accordingly, the Center's deadline

for submitting contentions remained September 11, 1998.

The Center, however, filed no contentions on September 11.

Instead, it filed a Petition for Review with the Commission

appealing the Board's denial of its request for an extension.

The Center argued that the Board was wrong to deny it an

extension of time, and that the deadline for contentions was

itself improper. Under the current schedule, the Center

argued, it "should have had ... until September 30, 1998 to

make the required filings." Petition for Review, 6-7 (Sept.

11, 1998).

The Commission acquiesced. While it stood by the Board's

application of the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances"

test, the Commission nonetheless granted the Center until

September 30, 1998, to file its contentions. See In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., Memorandum and Order, CLI-98-19

(Sept. 17, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 71. The next day, the

Center filed a motion asking the Board to delay the prehearing conference, or, in the alternative, provide for a one-day

extension to accommodate a Jewish holiday. See Petitioner's

Motion to Vacate Pre-Hearing Conference or in Alternative

for an Extension of Time (Sept. 18, 1998). The Board denied

the request to delay the prehearing conference, but granted

the one-day extension, making the Center's contentions due

October 1, 1998. See In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co.,

ASLBP No. 98-749-01-LR, Memorandum and Order, Scheduling Matters and Electronic Hearing Database (Sept. 21,

1998), reprinted in J.A. 74.

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The Center missed the extended October 1, 1998 deadline.

No contentions were filed on that date. Rather, the Center

filed a "Status Report," a "Motion to Vacate and Re-Schedule

the Pre-Hearing Conference," and a "Motion Requesting to

be Informed of Communication Between the NRC Staff and

Applicant." The Center also filed an answer to questions

raised about its standing. The Status Report listed the

experts hired by the Center and the areas of concern that

they would cover. In the Motion to Vacate, the Center noted

that the Commission's staff had submitted "Requests for

Additional Information" ("RAIs") to BG&E and that BG&E

was not required to submit its responses to the RAIs until

November 21, 1998. The Center argued that it would be

prejudicial and unfair to the Center to require it to submit its

contentions before BG&E had submitted its responses to the

RAIs. Thus, the Center argued, "the pre-hearing conference

should be postponed until no sooner than 115 days after

[BG&E] submits its response to the RAI." Petitioner's Motion to Vacate and Re-Schedule the Pre-Hearing Conference,

6 (Oct. 1, 1998). The Motion Requesting to be Informed of

Communication Between the NRC Staff and Applicant asked

that the Center be included on the agency's service list for

written communications and given notification of status conferences regarding the BG&E application.

It was not until October 13, 1998, when the Center finally

filed two purported contentions. Subsequently, on October

16, 1998, the Board dismissed the Center's petition to intervene. The Board held that the Center had "failed to establish cause" for an extension, failed to file any contentions

before the prescribed deadline, and failed to show that the

contentions filed on October 13 met the late-filed contention

standards. In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., ASLBP No.

98-749-01-LR, Memorandum and Order, Denying Intervention Petition/Hearing Request and Dismissing Proceeding,

19-20 (Oct. 16, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 315, 333-34. The

Center then sought review by the NRC.

The Commission upheld the Board's dismissal, rejecting

the Center's argument that it was denied extensions of time

to which it was entitled under the "good cause" standard.

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Although the NRC defended the "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" test, it found no need to apply it. Rather, the

Commission held that the Center's "complete failure to provide specific information about its concerns precluded any

finding that 'good cause,' in a meaningful sense, justified [the

Center's] requested extensions of time prior to [October 1st]."

In re Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., Memorandum and Order,

CLI-98-25, 10-11 (Dec. 23, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 336, 345-

46. The Commission also upheld the Board's decision to

reject contentions filed by the Center on October 13, both

because the Center failed to meet the late-filed contention

standards, and also because the purported contentions were

wholly inadequate. This appeal followed.

II. Analysis

The Center has voiced many objections in protesting the

NRC's actions in this case. Almost all of the objections are

plainly meritless. One objection, however, warrants our attention. That one objection rests on the Center's claim that

the NRC erred in adopting and applying an "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test, in lieu of a "good cause" test, to

assess requests for extensions of time in which to file contentions in the Calvert Cliffs nuclear power plant license renewal

proceeding. We reject this claim, because the Commission

was fully justified in adopting the disputed test and, also,

because the Center suffered no prejudice in the Commission's

application of the new standard.

A. NRC's Authority to Change an Adjudicatory Rule

The Center contends that the Commission erred in applying the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test to its

requests for extensions of time. The correct standard, argues the Center, is the "good cause" test articulated in the

Commission's regulations. The Commission argues that the

"unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test simply gives

content to "good cause." Moreover, the NRC adds, the

adoption of the new standard resulted in no breach of law,

because the "Commission implemented it with a case-specific

adjudicatory order." Supp. Br. for Respondents at 9. The

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Commission has the better of this argument. We are in

complete accord with the Seventh Circuit's position that the

NRC possesses the authority "to change its procedures on a

case-by-case basis with timely notice to the parties involved."

City of West Chicago v. NRC, 701 F.2d 632, 647 (7th Cir.

1983) (citing NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294

(1974)). There is no claim here that the Center lacked timely

notice of the new "unavoidable and extreme circumstances"

standard. The Commission announced its intention to adopt

the standard in a policy statement published on August 5,

1998. Although the policy statement, alone, was not binding,

it nonetheless informed the Center and other interested

parties of the impending change. See Panhandle Eastern

Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 198 F.3d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

("Th[e] advance-notice function of policy statements yields

significant informational benefits, because policy statements

give the public a chance to contemplate an agency's views

before those views are applied to particular factual circumstances."). More importantly, the Center received express

notice that the new standard would be applied in the Calvert

Cliffs proceeding when the Commission adopted the standard

in its referral order to the Licensing Board. Indeed, the

Center responded to this notice when it objected to the

referral order, and to the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test specifically, in its August 21, 1998 Motion to

Vacate. See Petition's [sic] Motion to Vacate Order

CLI-98-14, 7 (Aug. 21, 1998).

In short, the Center's argument that the Commission

lacked authority to change an adjudicatory rule is simply

wrong.

B. The "Unavoidable and Extreme Circumstances" Standard is a "Procedural" Rule that Was Properly Adopted

Without Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking

We also hold that the disputed "unavoidable and extreme

circumstances" standard embodies a procedural rule. Rules

that "prescribe[ ] a timetable for asserting substantive rights"

are procedural. Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. ICC, 711 F.2d

295, 328 (D.C. Cir. 1983). And unless such rules "foreclose

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effective opportunity to make one's case on the merits," they

need not be promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment

rulemaking. Id.

The disputed agency action in this case merely altered a

standard for the enforcement of filing deadlines; it did not

purport to regulate or limit the Center's substantive rights.

In other words, the new rule was procedural, not substantive.

See JEM Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 327-28 (D.C.

Cir. 1994) (holding that a rule governing the content and

timing of case filings is "procedural," even when it arguably

"encodes the substantive value judgment that applications

containing minor errors should be sacrificed to promote efficient application processing"). As the court noted in JEM,

"agency housekeeping rules often embody a judgment about

what mechanics and processes are most efficient." Id. at 328.

This does not convert a procedural rule into a substantive

one.

The NRC has expressed a clear and reasonable goal of

expediting nuclear power plant license renewal proceedings,

both to accommodate the large number of cases to be heard

and to ensure fair processes for applicants and would-be

intervenors alike. The adoption of the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" standard did not foreclose participation by third parties seeking to intervene in the Calvert

Cliffs proceeding; rather, to facilitate expedited case processing, the new rule merely required parties who failed to meet

otherwise reasonable deadlines to demonstrate compelling

reasons before they could obtain any extensions of time

beyond prescribed deadlines.

The Center argues that, under Lamoille Valley, the NRC

could not adopt the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances"

standard except through notice-and-comment rulemaking, because the new rule, in conjunction with the other rules on

intervention, "create[d] a regime which renders it impossible

for the public to set forth substantive contentions." Petitioner's Supp. Br. at 10-11 (citing Lamoille Valley, 711 F.2d at

328). This is a specious claim. The Commission's determination to expedite license renewal proceedings resulted in tight

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schedules. However, would-be intervenors were not denied

an effective opportunity to be heard. BG&E's application

was publicly available for five months prior to the time when

the Center was required to submit contentions. Even using

the Center's preferred starting date, i.e., July 8, 1998 (when

the NRC published a notice outlining the rights of third

parties to seek a hearing in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding), the

Center still had 85 days to prepare its contentions. This was

a sufficient amount of time, especially considering that the

default period for submitting contentions is only 75 days. See

Rules of Practice, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,798, 17,799 (1978) (establishing that a pre-hearing conference is normally set 90 days

after the initial hearing notice and noting that contentions are

normally to be submitted 15 days prior to the prehearing

conference, thus allowing 75 days between the initial hearing

notice and the default deadline for contentions).

Thus, given that the prescribed deadline for filing contentions did not itself foreclose effective opportunity to be heard,

a fortiori, the Commission's decision to tighten the standard

for granting extensions of time did not, as the Center claims,

"create a regime which render[ed] it impossible for the public

to set forth substantive contentions."

C. NRC's Adoption of a New Procedural Standard Easily

Survives "Arbitrary and Capricious" Review

The only remaining question at issue is whether the NRC's

adoption of the new procedural standard in the Calvert Cliffs

proceeding was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,

or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C.

s 706(2)(A). It was not. A change to procedures in an

adjudicatory order is not arbitrary or capricious when it

merely refines an existing procedural standard and when no

affected party has detrimentally relied on the old standard.

See, e.g., Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294-95; Ruangswang v.

INS, 591 F.2d 39, 44-45 (9th Cir. 1978).

NRC's adoption of a new procedural standard did not

significantly or unreasonably change the regime pursuant to

which requests for extensions of time are judged, because the

"unavoidable and extreme circumstances" standard is not off

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the moorings of "good cause." See City of Orrville v. FERC,

147 F.3d 979, 988 n. 11 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the

Commission was within its discretion to use adjudication to

refine its regulation's "good cause" standard to require a

showing of "extraordinary circumstances"); In re Bjella, 806

F.2d 211, 216 (10th Cir. 1986) (en banc) ("There is no significant distinction between a showing of good cause and a

showing of unusual or extreme circumstances.").

Moreover, the Center has shown no detrimental reliance in

this case. The Center was bound to follow prescribed deadlines for the submission of required contentions. They had

no basis upon which to assume that those deadlines automatically would be waived upon request pursuant to the old good

cause standard. Indeed, the Center has offered nothing to

indicate that, in preparing their contentions, they acted to

their detriment on the assumption that their requests for

extension of time would be favorably considered pursuant to

the old good cause test. Quite frankly, such an argument

would be silly.

In short, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in

adopting the "unavoidable and extreme circumstances" test in

the Calvert Cliffs adjudicatory proceeding. The Center

makes a weak argument that the Commission's new procedural rule was arbitrary and capricious, because the agency

offered no adequate explanation for the changed policy. See

Petitioner's Supp. Reply Br. at 3. We disagree. As previously noted, the Commission's policy statement that immediately preceded the adoption of the adjudicatory order in the

Calvert Cliffs proceeding fully explained the need for expedited case processing. 63 Fed. Reg. at 41,873-74. Given the

wide latitude an agency has in designing its own proceedings,

see Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1978), the

NRC's decision to expedite case processing in license renewal

proceedings to accommodate an impending heavy docket was

well within the realm of the agency's discretion. The policy

statement, which was expressly cited in the Commission's

referral order to the Licensing Board, adequately supported

the Commission's adoption of the "unavoidable and extreme

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circumstances" test. The agency action easily survives arbitrary and capricious review.

D. The Center Has Shown No Prejudicial Error

In the end analysis, this case appears to be much ado about

nothing. The Center has complained strenuously about the

NRC's adoption of a new standard under which the agency

will assess requests for extensions of time in which a petitioner must file contentions. But the Center has offered absolutely nothing to show how the promulgation of the new rule,

even if, arguendo, in error, resulted in prejudice or other

cognizable harm to them. See 5 U.S.C. s 706 ("[D]ue account

shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error."); see also

Fried v. Hinson, 78 F.3d 688, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissing petitioner's claim for lack of a showing that he had

been prejudiced by the agency's adoption of modified procedures). We can find no prejudicial error in this case.

The Center's first request for an extension of time was filed

with the Licensing Board on August 21, 1998. See Petitioner's Motion for Enlargement of Time (Aug. 21, 1998). The

Board denied the request, applying the "unavoidable and

extreme circumstances" test. The Center petitioned the

Commission for review, claiming that, under the current

schedule, it was entitled until September 30, 1998 "to make

the required filings." See Petition for Review, 6-7 (Sept. 11,

1998). The Commission overturned the Board's decision,

granted the petition for review, and allowed the Center an

extension of time until September 30, 1998 in which to file

contentions. Subsequently, the Center requested "a one day

extension of the September 30, 1998 filing date" to accommodate a Jewish holiday observed by Petitioner's attorneys.

Petitioner's Motion to Vacate Pre-Hearing Conference or in

Alternative for an Extension of Time, 2 (Sept. 18, 1999). This

request was also granted. See In re Baltimore Gas & Elec.

Co., ASLBP No. 98-749-01-LR, Memorandum and Order,

Scheduling Matters and Electronic Hearing Database (Sept.

21, 1998), reprinted in J.A. 74. The Center missed the

extended deadline, failing once again to file contentions within

the prescribed time limit.

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On October 1, rather than file the required contentions, the

Center filed four different documents, none of which was

labeled as a request for an extension. The Center argues

that its October 1 "Motion to Vacate and Re-Schedule the

Pre-Hearing Conference" should be construed as a request

for an extension. Even if the so-called Motion to Vacate

could be viewed as a request for a further extension of time in

which to submit contentions, the Center's position would still

fail. The principal problem here is that the motion was not a

supported request for an extended deadline. Rather, it presented an argument that the Center should not be required to

submit contentions before BG&E had submitted responses to

staff RAIs. At oral argument, counsel for the Center candidly conceded that, as propounded in the Motion to Vacate, "the

RAI's were our peg." See Tr. of Oral Argument March 3,

2000 at 49. This "peg," however, provided absolutely no

support for a request for a further extension of time. It is

clear that, under prevailing law, the Center had no right to

the RAIs. See Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920

F.2d 50, 55-56 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In fact, at oral argument,

counsel conceded that the Center "did not have a right to

discovery or the RAIs." See Tr. of Oral Argument March 3,

2000 at 49. This being the case, it can hardly be claimed that

the Center could condition the filing of contentions on receipt

of RAIs and answers thereto.

At oral argument, counsel for the Center cited the Commission's Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings--Procedural Changes in the Hearing Process, 54 Fed.

Reg. 33,168 (Aug. 11, 1989), in an effort to bolster the claim

that the Center had a right to view RAI material before

submitting contentions. Under the cited provision, "an intervention petitioner has an ironclad obligation to examine the

publicly available documentary material pertaining to the

[nuclear power] facility in question with sufficient care to

enable the petitioner to uncover any information that could

serve as the foundation for a specific contention." Id. at

33,170. In other words, a potential intervenor must review

the NRC Public Document Room for any materials that

might be relevant to formulating contentions. See Tr. of Oral

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Argument March 3, 2000 at 49-50. According to the Center,

in order to satisfy this rule, a potential intervenor must have

access to the RAIs (which are kept in the Public Document

Room) before it can be required to file contentions. The

Public Document Room argument comes much too late. The

argument was never presented to the Commission and it was

not raised in any of the many briefs that have been submitted

to the court in this case. The claim is, in a word, untimely.

See United Transp. Union v. Surface Transp. Bd., 114 F.3d

1242, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cronin v. FAA, 73 F.3d 1126,

1134 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Even if we were to view the Public Document Room

argument as one that naturally flows from the Center's other

claims on RAIs, and thus properly within the compass of the

petition for review before this court, we would nevertheless

reject the argument as patently specious. The cited regulation merely says that an intervention petitioner is obliged "to

examine the publicly available documentary material." Obviously, if a document has not been filed in the Public Document Room, or if it is filed too late to be considered by an

intervention petitioner, then the petitioner cannot be held

responsible for reviewing it. Nothing in the rule suggests

otherwise. Therefore, we must surmise that the Center's

belated Public Document Room argument is nothing more

than an attempt to avoid the clear policy that denies would-be

intervenors any entitlement to RAIs as a condition precedent

to filing contentions.

There can be no doubt that, on the record before us, the

Center suffered no prejudicial error when the Commission

adopted the new "unavoidable and extreme circumstances"

standard in the Calvert Cliffs proceeding. The Center sought

and received from the NRC two extensions of time in which

to file contentions. When they failed to meet the extended

deadlines, their motion to intervene was properly denied.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, the petition for review is

denied.

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