Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02492/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02492-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dedra Bouchard
Defendant
Catholic Healthcare West
Defendant
Dignity Health
Defendant
Linda M. Lowry
Plaintiff
Mercy Medical Group
Defendant
Shelly Noyes
Defendant
A.C. Saechou
Defendant
Linda M. Schaldach
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

LINDA M. SCHALDACH, fka LINDA M. 

LOWRY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

DIGNITY HEALTH, SHELLY NOYES, 

DEDRA BOUCHARD, A.C. SAECHOU, 

and MERCY MEDICAL GROUP, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:12-cv-02492-MCE-KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

Through this action, Plaintiff Linda M. Schaldach (“Plaintiff”) seeks redress from 

Defendants Dignity Health, Mercy Medical Group1

, Dedra Bouchard, Shelly Noyes, and 

A.C. Saechou for violations of state and federal law related to Plaintiff’s termination from 

employment with Dignity Health in July 2011. 

/// 

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 1

 Defendants state that Dignity Health Medical Foundation was erroneously sued as Mercy 

Medical Group. 

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Specifically, Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 

(“ADA”) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), as well as state law 

claims for violations of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), and 

common law claims for fraud, wrongful termination in violation of public policy, breach of 

contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff originally 

filed the case in California Superior Court, County of Sacramento. (ECF No. 1.) 

Defendants removed the case to federal court on October 3, 2012. (ECF No. 1.) 

Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.2 

(ECF No. 4.) Defendants also requested that the Court take judicial notice of certain 

documents.3

 (ECF No. 4-2.) Plaintiff filed a timely opposition. (ECF No. 6.) 

For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.4

BACKGROUND5

Plaintiff began working as a medical assistant for Defendant Dignity Health in 

October 1988, at a clinic located in Sacramento, California. That clinic was operated at 

the time by Catholic Healthcare West. In December 2000, Plaintiff accepted a medical 

assistant position with Defendant Dignity Health at a clinic located in Carmichael, 

California. 

/// 

 2

 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise noted. 

3

 Because the Motion to Dismiss may be resolved without reference to the documents of which 

Defendants request the Court take judicial notice, the Request for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 4-2) is denied 

without prejudice at this time. 

4

 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 

submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. Local R. 78-230(g). 

5

 The following recitation of facts is taken, sometimes verbatim, from Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF 

No. 1.) 

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That clinic was also operated by Catholic Healthcare West. In March 2004, Plaintiff 

submitted an ADA request for accommodation due to physical illness to Defendant 

Dignity Health’s Human Resource Department. In March 2005, Defendant Dignity 

Health granted Plaintiff’s request for accommodation, and Plaintiff and Defendant Dignity 

Health agreed that Plaintiff would transfer to a medical office receptionist position. In 

that position, Plaintiff would be allowed to work thirty-two hours per week in the Internal 

Medicine Department of the Carmichael clinic. Plaintiff transferred positions, and was 

thus afforded the ADA accommodation, in April 2005. The accommodation was 

reaffirmed in March 2011, following an updated review of Plaintiff’s medical condition in 

February 2011. 

In her new position as a medical office receptionist, Plaintiff’s duties included 

checking patients out; assigning appointment dates and times; answering telephone 

calls and messages for the physicians; making physician-patient return telephone calls; 

making internal specialty referrals and obtaining authorizations; verifying patient 

insurance coverage; ordering supplies for the department; handling incoming and 

outgoing facsimile transmissions; and handling “walk-in” patients. Plaintiff’s duties did 

not include checking in patients at the front desk. 

Beginning in August 2010, Defendant Dedra Bouchard, an interim supervisor for 

the unit in which Plaintiff was employed, began an ongoing series of false disciplinary 

allegations against Plaintiff. These allegations were all directed at the limitations in 

Plaintiff’s employment which had been addressed in Plaintiff’s ADA accommodation. 

Around September or October 2010, Defendant Bouchard also began transferring 

younger employees to the medical clinic where Plaintiff was employed. These transfers 

were the result of a meeting held in 2008 with the supervisors of various clinics, including 

Defendant Shelly Noyes. At the 2008 meeting, then-president of Defendant Mercy 

Medical Group informed the supervisors that they should staff their positions with “young 

and cute, perky and pretty” employees in preference to the older, established 

employees. 

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In October through November 2010, Defendant Noyes compiled a list which included all 

employees which the management decided needed to be terminated. Plaintiff’s name 

was on the list. According to Plaintiff, all employees on the list were medical or Family 

Leave Act qualified employees, who had generally been employed for long periods of 

time with Catholic Healthcare West and who had frequently limited or restricted their 

periods of employment. As these employees were terminated, younger employees filled 

the open positions. Many of the younger employees were children of supervisors 

employed at Mercy San Juan Medical Clinic. These younger employees were not 

disciplined for violations of workplace rules and regulations, which Plaintiff contends is 

favorable treatment in contrast to the discipline meted out to older employees. 

On November 16, 2010, Defendant A.C. Saechou interrogated Plaintiff about an 

incident involving Plaintiff’s then-incapacitated adult son, who was a patient of the Mercy 

Medical Group clinics. Defendant Saechou accused Plaintiff of accessing patient 

medical files in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 

(“HIPAA”)6

, and of discussing and disclosing private health information with an individual 

who was not entitled to know such information. Both of these accusations were grounds 

for discipline. As a result of this interrogation, Defendant Saechou issued a disciplinary 

letter on December 13, 2010. The disciplinary letter accused Plaintiff of violating HIPAA 

and Catholic Healthcare West policies for accessing patient records of family members. 

Defendant Saechou knew these accusations were false. The following day, Plaintiff 

contacted Defendant Saechou and requested that Defendant Saechou make a full 

investigation of the accusations contained in the December 13 disciplinary letter. 

Defendant Saechou responded that he would not investigate the disputed factual 

allegations. Defendant Saechou also informed Plaintiff that the HIPAA violations were a 

complaint from the medical provider himself, and because Plaintiff could have been 

summarily terminated for such violations, Plaintiff would be better served by saying 

nothing adverse to the content of the December 13 letter. 

 6

 The Complaint erroneously refers to the law as “HIPPA.” 

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Nearly a year later, on November 17, 2011, Plaintiff learned that these accusations had 

been fabricated by Defendant Saechou as a basis for establishing a first level of 

discipline to have Plaintiff terminated. 

In December 2010, Plaintiff applied to transfer to a position as a referral 

department clerk. Had Plaintiff transferred to the new position, she would have received 

a pay raise and a new job classification. Plaintiff was qualified for this position due to her 

prior training and work experience as a referral coordinator. In January 2011, Defendant 

Bouchard and Shelley Wilson interviewed Plaintiff for the position. At this interview, 

Defendant Bouchard threatened to terminate Plaintiff for any small mistake, and twice 

told Plaintiff that her continued employment was “simply a grievance waiting to happen.” 

Wilson and Defendant Bouchard gave Plaintiff the impression that she was not wanted 

in the new position she had applied for. Shortly thereafter, a younger employee who 

was a child of a clinic supervisor was promoted to the position that Plaintiff had applied 

for and been discouraged from taking. 

In June 2011, Defendant Saechou again accused Plaintiff of violating HIPAA and 

the Network Usage Policy. This time, the accusations were related to Plaintiff making an 

appointment and taking a personal message for Plaintiff’s father, who was a patient of 

Defendant Dignity Health. When Plaintiff denied these accusations, Defendant Saechou 

told Plaintiff that there would be a full investigation. However, no investigation ever took 

place. 

At some point during her employment, Plaintiff led efforts to organize a collective 

bargaining election, which resulted in the S.E.I.U. union becoming the exclusive union 

bargaining agent for the various clinics operated by Catholic Healthcare West under the 

name of Mercy Medical Group. Plaintiff also led efforts to obtain sufficient patient 

complaints documenting the unhealthy airborne environment of the common lobby 

shared by Internal Medicine and Family Practice. The complaints resulted in Defendant 

Dignity Health removing the carpet, exterminating the mold found underneath the carpet, 

and installing new carpet. 

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Plaintiff was terminated from her position on July 28, 2011. Up until the time that 

Plaintiff was terminated, Plaintiff’s annual reviews were all above average or better. 

Plaintiff’s termination resulted from false accusations prepared by Defendants Bouchard 

and Saechou. Plaintiff also contends that her termination resulted from her organizing 

the collective bargaining election and obtaining patient complaints about the airborne 

environment. 

Plaintiff made a request to return to her employment, through a union grievance 

proceeding, which was denied by Defendant Noyes on September 27, 2011. Plaintiff 

alleges that as a result of her termination, she has suffered loss of earnings, loss of her 

employer’s matching contribution to her pension plan account, loss of PTO 

compensation, loss of her employer’s matching FICA and Medicare insurance premiums, 

and uninsured medical expenses. 

STANDARD 

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 

Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain 

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” in order to “give the 

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 

47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 

detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 

his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 

couched as a factual allegation.” 

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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 

Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain 

something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally 

cognizable right of action.”)). 

Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 

assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3 (internal citations and 

quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 

to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 

the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing 5 Charles 

Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, supra, at § 1202). A pleading must contain “only enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . 

have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their 

complaint must be dismissed.” Id. However, “[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed 

even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a 

recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 

232, 236 (1974)). 

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 

grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 

“undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 

to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of the 

amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 

Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 

be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 

merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 

carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 

185 (9th Cir. 1987). 

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Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not 

be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 

1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); 

Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need 

not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in 

futility . . . .”)). 

ANALYSIS 

Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for retaliation in 

violation of FEHA, her fifth cause of action for fraud, her seventh cause of action for 

breach of contract, and her eighth cause of action for breach of the covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing. (ECF No. 4.) Defendants also contend that Plaintiff has failed to 

assert a claim against the individuals named in the Complaint— Defendants Noyes, 

Bouchard and Saechou— and seek dismissal of all eight causes of action as pled 

against these Defendants. (ECF No 4.) 

A. Retaliation in Violation of FEHA 

Plaintiff alleges that she was terminated in retaliation for: (1) organizing a 

collective bargaining election and (2) being instrumental in obtaining sufficient patient 

complaints documenting the unhealthy air borne environment of a common lobby.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 17.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that 

she engaged in a protected activity under FEHA, and thus has failed to state a claim for 

retaliation under FEHA. 

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FEHA prohibits employers from “refusing to hire or employ . . . or [barring] or 

[discharging] a person from employment” or “discriminat[ing] against the person in 

compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” on the basis of “race, 

religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, 

medical condition, genetic information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity, 

gender expression, age, or sexual orientation.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(a), (j). Section 

12940(h) of the California Government Code makes it an unlawful employment practice 

to “discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices 

forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or 

assisted in any proceeding under this part.” Doe v. City of S.F., 835 F. Supp. 2d 762, 

772 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Thus, an employee may sue his or her employer for retaliating 

against the employee in violation of FEHA. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

under FEHA, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she engaged in a protected activity; (2) she 

suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link existed between the 

protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Leramo v. Premier Anesthesia 

Med. Grp., 2:09-cv-02083 LJO JTL, 2011 WL 2680837, at *16 (E.D. Cal. July 8, 2011) 

(citing Morgan v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 69 (2000)). “Based on 

these standards, [a plaintiff] must establish that she suffered an adverse employment 

action that was caused by a ‘statutorily protected expression.’” Id. at *17 (quoting 

E.E.O.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1983)). “The 

‘protected activity’ in a retaliation case refers to an employee’s statement that is 

‘opposed to an unlawful employment practice [under FEHA].’” Id. (quoting E.E.O.C., 

720 F.2d at 1012); see also Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h). 

In this case, Plaintiff does not allege that she opposed an employment practice 

that is unlawful under FEHA. 

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Rather, she alleges that she engaged in the activity of encouraging a collective 

bargaining election that resulted in the SEIU union becoming the exclusive bargaining 

agent for various clinics operated by Defendant Dignity Health, and by obtaining patient 

complaints documenting the unhealthy airborne environment in a common lobby. There 

is no case law or language in FEHA suggesting that these activities are “protected 

activities” under FEHA, or that FEHA is designed to protect employees from engaging in 

union-related activities or raising complaints about safety issues in the workplace. 

Rather, FEHA protects employees from retaliation by their employer when the employee 

complains of discrimination or harassment of the sort that violates FEHA. See Cal. Gov. 

Code § 12940(h). 

As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for retaliation in violation of FEHA. 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is therefore granted with 

leave to amend. 

B. Fraud 

 “To establish a cause of action for fraud, a plaintiff must allege the following 

elements: misrepresentation, knowledge of falsity, intent to induce reliance, justifiable 

reliance, and resulting damages.” Conrad v. Bank of Am., 45 Cal. App. 4th 133, 156 

(1996). In Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., the California Supreme Court held that “wrongful 

termination of employment ordinarily does not give rise to a cause of action for fraud or 

deceit, even if some misrepresentation is made in the course of the employee’s 

dismissal.” 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 1178 (1993). In that case, the plaintiff was falsely told by 

his supervisor that the corporation had decided to eliminate his position. Id. at 1179. On 

the basis of that representation, the plaintiff signed a document setting forth his 

resignation. Id. The Court explained that the employer had “simply employed a 

falsehood to do what it otherwise could have accomplished directly.” Id. at 1184. 

/// 

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Thus, the Court found that plaintiff was unable to establish all the elements of a fraud 

claim, because plaintiff “did not rely to his detriment on the misrepresentation.” Id. The 

Court thus concluded that an employee may maintain an action for fraud “only if the 

plaintiff can establish all of the elements of fraud with respect to a misrepresentation that 

is separate from the termination of the employee contract, i.e., when the plaintiff’s fraud 

damages cannot be said to result from the termination itself.” Id. 

In Lazar v. Superior Court, the defendant employer asked the plaintiff to leave his 

employment in New York and work instead for the defendant in Los Angeles. 12 Cal. 

4th 631, 635 (1996). When the plaintiff expressed concern about relocating, the 

defendant falsely told the plaintiff his job in Los Angeles would be secure and would 

involve significant pay increases. Id. at 635-36. Shortly after the plaintiff relocated, the 

defendant fired the plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was thus “burdened with payments on Southern 

California real estate he [could] no longer afford,” in addition to losing past and future 

income and employment benefits. Id. at 637. On these facts, the California Supreme 

Court held that the plaintiff had established the elements of fraud. Id. at 643. The Court 

stated that it had “expressly left open in Hunter the possibility ‘that a misrepresentation 

not aimed at effecting termination of employment, but instead designed to induce the 

employee to alter detrimentally his or her position in some other respect, might form a 

basis for a valid fraud claim even in the context of wrongful termination.’” Id. at 640 

(quoting Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1185). The Court explained that Hunter “did not call into 

question generally the viability of traditional fraud remedies whenever they are sought by 

a terminated employee,” id. at 641, but established that a plaintiff fails to state a claim for 

fraud if “the element of detrimental reliance [is] absent,” id. at 643. In addition, the Court 

clarified that Hunter does not allow for recovery for fraud “where the result of the 

employer's misrepresentation is indistinguishable from an ordinary constructive wrongful 

termination.” Id. at 643. 

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Thus, together, “Hunter and Lazar reveal employees can maintain a cause of 

action for fraud against their employer only if they allege all of the elements of such a 

claim, including detrimental reliance, and if they allege damages distinct from the 

termination itself.” Maffei v. Allstate Cal. Ins. Co., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055 (E.D. Cal. 

2006). In short, “[n]o independent fraud claim arises from a misrepresentation aimed at 

termination of employment.” Jones v. Bayer Healthcare LLC, 08-2219 SC, 2009 WL 

1186891, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2009) (citing Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1185). 

In this case, Plaintiff’s fraud claim arises from an alleged misrepresentation aimed 

at terminating Plaintiff’s employment. (ECF No. 1 at 21-22.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges 

that she relied on Defendant Saechou’s representations that she should not pursue the 

December 13 disciplinary letter, and also relied on Defendant Saechou’s representations 

that there would be an investigation regarding the June 2011 allegations against Plaintiff. 

(ECF No. 1 at 21.) Plaintiff alleges that “as a direct and proximate consequence of the 

actions, lies, and false representations made by Defendant A.C. Saechou, Plaintiff’s 

employment was terminated . . . .” (ECF No. 1 at 22.) Plaintiff alleges no damages 

distinct from the termination itself. (See ECF No. 1 at 22.) Thus, the fraud Plaintiff 

alleges “arises from a misrepresentation aimed at termination of employment.” Jones, 

2009 WL 1186891, at *3 (citing Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1185). 

As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraud upon which relief can be 

granted, and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted with leave to amend as to this 

cause of action. 

C. Breach of Contract 

Next, Defendants contend that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 195, preempts Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract. Defendants also 

argue that Plaintiff cannot bring a breach of contract claim because Plaintiff failed to 

follow the mandatory arbitration procedure called for under the contract. 

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Section 301(a) provides federal jurisdiction over “[s]uits for violation of contracts 

between an employer and a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). “Section 301 

creates a federal cause of action for breach of collective bargaining agreements . . . 

even if brought in state court. Applying federal law to these cases ensures a uniform 

interpretation of labor contract terms, a goal the Supreme Court had described as 

particularly compelling.” Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 1988). 

To achieve this goal, when a “right is created by state law . . . [but the application of state 

law] requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement,” the state law claim 

is preempted by section 301. Hayden v. Reickerd, 957 F.2d 1507, 1509 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988)). “The 

preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state claim 

based on a collective bargaining agreement and any state claim whose outcome 

depends on analysis of the terms of the agreement.” Young v. Anthony's Fish Grottos, 

Inc., 830 F.2d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 1987). However, while “the scope of section 301 is 

‘substantial,’ [it is] not infinite. ‘If a court can uphold state rights without interpreting the 

[collective bargaining agreement . . . allowing suit based on the state rights does not 

undermine the purpose of section 301 preemption.” Hayden, 957 F.2d at 1509 (quoting 

Miller, 850 F.2d at 545-46). 

In this case, Plaintiff specifically alleges that in 2010 and 2011, Plaintiff was a 

member of the SEIU. (ECF No. 1 at 24.) Plaintiff also alleges that the union contract in 

effect between May 1, 2008 and April 30, 2012, states that “the employer may only 

discipline or terminate an employee for just cause.” (ECF No. 1 at 24.) Finally, Plaintiff 

alleges that the contract provides procedural safeguards for employees whose conduct 

warrants discipline. (ECF No. 1 at 25.) Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendants 

violated these contractual provisions in terminating Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 25.) 

Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract is therefore based on the collective bargaining 

agreement. 

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Thus, determining whether Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for breaching the terms of 

the contract requires analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See 

Kirton v. Summit Med. Ctr., 982 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“The CBA must 

be interpreted to determine whether Defendants breached the CBA by discharging 

Plaintiff without good cause . . . .”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim is preempted by 

section 301. 

While Plaintiff contends that “lying about circumstances allegedly used as 

discipline, and subsequently for termination, does require any one to interpret anything” 

in the contract’s “just cause” provision (ECF No. 6 at 15), this argument is unpersuasive. 

Plaintiff’s citation to Espinal v. Nw. Airlines, 90 F.3d 1452 (9th Cir. 1996), is likewise 

unavailing. In that case, the Ninth Circuit clearly states: “[w]here a plaintiff contends that 

an employer's actions violated rights protected by the [collective bargaining agreement],” 

the claim is subject to preemption. 90 F.3d at 1456. Espinal does state that “where a 

plaintiff contends that an employer’s actions violated a state-law obligation, wholly 

independent from its obligations under the [collective bargaining agreement], there is no 

preemption.” Id. However, in the present case, Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants’ 

actions violated an obligation independent from Defendants’ obligations under the 

collective bargaining agreement. Rather, Plaintiff specifically alleges that Defendant’s 

conduct violated the contract—that is, the collective bargaining agreement. (See ECF 

No. 1 at 24-25.) 

Cramer v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001), also 

provides no support for Plaintiff’s position. In Cramer, the Ninth Circuit held that an 

employee’s state law claims against an employer is not preempted by section 301 if the 

claim is unrelated to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. 255 F.3d at 689. 

“If the plaintiff’s claim cannot be resolved without interpreting the applicable [collective 

bargaining agreement]—as, for example, in Allis-Chalmers, where the suit involved an 

employer’s alleged failure to comport with its contractually established duties—it is 

preempted.” 

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Id. at 691 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985)). Such is precisely 

the case here—as set forth above, Plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract cannot be 

resolved without interpreting the “just cause” provision of the collective bargaining 

agreement. See supra. 

Thus, section 301 clearly preempts Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, and 

Plaintiff has therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.7 See 

supra. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is therefore 

granted with leave to amend. 

D. Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 

The Ninth Circuit has held that claims for breach of an implied covenant are 

preempted under section 301 where the terms of the collective bargaining agreement 

encompass the same rights and protections that are alleged to arise from the implied 

covenant. See Chmiel v. Beverly Wilshire Hotel Co., 873 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir. 

1989) (finding covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim preempted by collective 

bargaining agreement containing job security term); Jackson v. S. Cal. Gas Co., 

881 F.2d 638, 644–45 (9th Cir. 1989) (same). “Claims for breach of the implied 

covenant of good faith and fair dealing are designed to protect the job security of 

employees who at common law could be fired at will.” Kirton, 982 F. Supp. at 1386 n.1 

(quoting Newberry v. Pac. Racing Ass’n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 1988)). Thus, 

“[f]or employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement that expressly includes 

job security and good cause for termination provisions, the express terms prevail and 

section 301 preempts any implied covenant claim.” Reagans v. AlliedBarton Sec. 

Servs., LLC, 12-cv-02190 YGR, 2012 WL 2976766 (N.D. Cal. July 19, 2012); see also 

Kirton, 982 F. Supp. at 1386 n.1 (citing Newberry, 854 F.2d at 1147). 

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 Because the breach of contract claim is preempted by section 301, the Court declines at this 

time to address whether Plaintiff’s alleged failure to follow the mandatory arbitration agreement under the 

contract also prevents Plaintiff from stating a claim for breach of contract. 

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Specifically, a collective bargaining agreement that “permits discharge for just cause only 

and provides a grievance procedure to safeguard that right . . . provides comparable job 

security” such that a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing is preempted by section 301. Kirton, 982 F. Supp. at 1390 n.1. 

Here, Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good 

faith and fair dealing concerns matters that are directly addressed by the collective 

bargaining agreement: termination and good cause. (See ECF No. 1 at 24-27.) Plaintiff 

specifically alleges that the collective bargaining agreement covers employee discipline 

and discharge, that the collective bargaining agreement permitted discharge only for just 

cause (ECF No. 1 at 24), and that there were procedural safeguards in place (ECF No. 1 

at 25). Thus, the terms of the collective bargaining agreement provide comparable job 

security terms to that of a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

Cf. Kirton, 982 F. Supp. at 1390 n.1. Plaintiff’s claim for breach of the implied covenant 

is therefore preempted by section 301. 

As such, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this cause of action is granted with leave to amend. 

E. Claims against Individual Defendants 

1. First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Causes of Action 

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s first, second, third, fourth and sixth causes of 

action may not properly be asserted against individuals. (ECF No. 4 at 20.) Plaintiff 

agrees that these causes of action cannot be pled against an individual, and thus does 

not oppose dismissal of these causes of action against Defendants Noyes, Bouchard, 

and Saechou. (ECF No. 6 at 13.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

first, second, third, fourth, and sixth causes of action is granted with leave to amend as 

to the individual defendants. 

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2. Fifth Cause of Action 

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff’s fifth claim for fraud fails against the 

individual defendants because the claim is not cognizable under California law. (ECF 

No. 4 at 20.) As stated above, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for fraud against both 

the entity Defendants and the individual Defendants. See supra. Accordingly, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for fraud is granted with 

leave to amend as to Defendants Noyes, Bouchard and Saechou. 

3. Breach of Contract and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair 

Dealing 

Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth claims for breach of 

contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be asserted 

against these individual defendants because they are not parties to the contract at issue. 

(ECF No. 4 at 22.) Plaintiff agrees that these causes of action do not state facts 

sufficient to establish personal liability for the three individual defendants, and requests 

that the Court dismiss these causes of action without prejudice, should discovery provide 

information that would allow Plaintiff to state a cause of action for breach of contract or 

breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing against one or more of the 

individual defendants. (ECF No. 6 at 13-14.) Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to 

Dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh and eighth causes of action against the individual Defendants 

is granted with leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth, 

fifth, seventh and eighth causes of action is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to 

all Defendants. 

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Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s first, second, third and sixth causes of action is 

also GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to the individual Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: December 20, 2012 

________________________________________ 

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., CHIEF JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

DEAC_Signature-END: 

c4d6b0d3 

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