Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02046/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02046-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dulce Hernandez-Garcia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT . 

No. 89-2046 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

DULCE HERNANDEZ-GARCIA, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

FILED 

United StatfS CG!!ft of Appeals 

·r t~11rh Cir .. -~..1.it 

APR 2 3 1990 

ROBERT L. f-IOECKER 

Clerk · 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR-88-373) 

Tova Indritz, Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico,. 

for Defendant-Appellant~ 

Presiliano A. Torrez, Assistant United States Attorney (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR and McWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER, 

District Judge.* 

MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. 

* Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Chief Judge of the United States 

District Court for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 1 
Dulce Hernandez-Garcia (Hernandez) was convicted on three 

counts of transporting illegal aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 

1324(a)(l)(B). Each count involved a different illegal alien. 

Hernandez appeals, contending that the district court erred in its 

instructions to the jury, as well as in its polling of the jury 

when the verdicts were received. We perceive no reversible error 

and accordingly affirm. 

The jury was instructed that in each count of the indictment 

Hernandez was charged with knowingly and in reckless disregard of 

the fact that a named individual was an alien who had entered the 

United States in violation of the law, transported said alien in 

furtherance of such violation of the law. 8 u.s.c. § 

1324(a) (l)(B) (1970). 

A subsequent instruction advised the jury that one essential 

element of the crime charged was that the defendant knew that the 

alien named in each count of the indictment was not lawfully in 

the United States or was in reckless disregard of the fact that 

the alien named had entered the United States in violation of the 

law. 

In a written communication to the district court, the jury 

noted that the indictment charged the defendant with "knowingly 

and in reckless disregard" of the fact that the person he was 

transporting was an illegal alien, whereas the subsequent instruction setting forth the essential elements of the crime charged 

stated that one element was that the defendant "knew . . . or was 

in reckless· disregard of the fact" that the person he was 

transporting was an illegal alien. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 2 
The thrust of the jury's inquiry was whether the government 

had to prove that the defendant both "knew" and "was in reckless 

disregard" of the fact, that the person he was transporting was an 

illegal alien, or whether the government need only show that the 

defendant "knew" or "was in reckless disregard" of the fact that 

the person he was transporting was an illegal alien. The gist of 

the district court's response to this inquiry was that the first 

instruction advised the jury of what was in the. indictment, 

whereas the subsequent instruction advised the jury "what the 

government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt." 

The jury then resumed deliberations and about two hours later 

sent a second written communication to the district court, which 

read as follows: 

"It appears that we are having a problem 

reaching a verdict and that it is unlikely 

that we will be able to agree. What action 

can we take?" 

Af~er consultation with counsel, the district judge, without 

objection, proceeded to give the jury a so-called Allen instruction. 1 However, the district judge first asked the jury if it 

still had problems with his answer to the jury's first inquiry. 

When informed that there was still "confusion,'' the district judge 

gave a further instruction on that matter. The district judge, 

after noting that the third essential element of the crimes 

charged was that the defendant "knew" or "was in reckless 

disregard" of the fact that the person he was transporting was an 

illegal alien, spoke as follows: 

"This third element means that the government 

is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

1 The Allen instruction derives its name from Allen 

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v. United 

Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 3 
either of these two things, but not necessarily both." 

The district judge next gave the jury the so-called Allen 

instruction, which is set forth in its ·entirety as Attachment A to 

this opinion. 

The jury resumed again its deliberations and returned guilty 

verdicts on all three counts about one and a half hours later. 

The jury was polled, and the first six jurors, when polled, 

indicated the guilty verdicts were his, or her, verdicts. 

However, the seventh juror when polled indicated uncertainty. The 

colloquy between the district judge and the seventh juror, Mr. 

Jamie L. Lucero, is set forth in its entirety as Attachment B to 

this opinion. 

As indicated, there was no objection to the district court's 

giving of an Allen instruction, nor was there any objection to the 

content of the instruction itself. Accordingly, on appeal our 

only concern is whether.the giving of the instruction constitutes 

"plain error." "Plain error," in this context, is error that "affects the [defendant's] fundamental right to a fair and impartial 

trial." Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 

1966). We find no such error in the present record. 

Although trial counsel did not object to the Allen instruction, appellate counsel argues ~hat it is one-sided and ''impermissibly coercive" in its ef feet. 2 Appellate counsel takes 

States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 s. Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896). 

2 An Allen instruction is permissible in this circuit, and, 

although we have suggested it should be used with care and caution, the giving of such instruction even after the jury has commenced its deliberations is not ~ se error. United States v. 

McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. 

Blandin, 784 F.2d 1048, 1050 (10th Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 4 
particular aim at that part of the Allen instruction which states 

that if the jury should fail to agree on a verdict, "the case is 

left op~n and must be tried again." Counsel argues that such 

statement is incorrect, since, if the present jury should not 

agree, the government thereafter might elect not to pursue the 

matter further, or there might be a plea bargain, or for other 

reasons the matter might not be retried. 

The Allen instruction which the district court gave the jury 

in the instant case appears as footnote 4 in United States v. Bottom, 638 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1981). That instruction was prepared 

by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions District Judges Association Fifth Circuit 1975, and provides, inter alia, that if 

"you should fail to agree on a verdict the case is left open and 

must be tried again." (emphasis added). In this regard, however, 

it is of interest to note that the district judge in Bottom 

replaced the word "must" with "may," so that he instructed the 

jury that if it did not agree on a verqict "the case is left open 

and may be tried again." (emphasis added). It would appear to us 

that in this context the use of the word "may" is preferable to 

the use of "must." Be that as it may, we do not deem such to be 

reversible error. 

United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1988) sheds 

light on our present problem. There the district court advised 

the jury in its Allen instruction that if it failed to reach a 

verdict "the parties will be put to the expense of another trial 

and will once again have to endure the mental and emotional strain 

of a trial" and that "[i]f the case is retried, a future jury must 

be selected in the same manner and from the same source as you 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 5 
have been chosen . " (emphasis .added) . In Smith we agreed with 

the appellant that actually "there were many reasons why there 

might not be another trial if the jury fails to reach a verdict." 

Notwithstanding, in Smith we declined to find reversible error in the wording of the Allen instruction. We observed that it 

probably would have been "more accurate" to have added qualifying 

language such as "unless, for some reason the case does not have 

to be retried again . " However, we concluded that such 

"exhaustive. amplification is unnecessary." 

In Smith, counsel made a specific objection in the trial 

court to that part of the instruction which indicated that the 

case would be retried should the jury not reach a verdict. In 

.Smith we found "no harmful error" in the Allen instruction. In 

the instant case, no objection was made in the trial court to the 

instruction, and under the rationale of Smith we decline to find 

"plain error." 

Hernandez' principal contention in this court is that the 

district court committed reversible error in its polling of ju.ror 

Lucero. The district court's polling of juror Lucero is set forth 

in Attachment B to this opinion. Counsel points out that the 

district judge asked juror Lucero five times if the guilty 

verdicts signed by the jury foreman were his verdicts, and that 

only on the fifth attempt did juror Lucero give a flat "yes" 

answer to the inquiry. Such, argues counsel, indicates that juror 

Lucero was "coerced" by the district judge, and, in a sense, by 

his fellow jurors, into giving an affirmative answer. From his 

"coercion" argument, counsel argues that the verdicts in reality 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 6 
were not "unanimous verdicts." We are not persuaded by this line 

of reasoning. 

In Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948), the 

Supreme Court held that "[u]nanimity in jury verdicts is required 

where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply." Fed. R. Crim. P. 

3l(a) provides that "[t]he verdict shall be unanimous. It shall 

be returned by the jury to the judge in open court." Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 3l(d) provide~ as follows: 

"When a verdict is returned and before it is 

recorded the jury shall be polled at the 

request of any party or upon the court's own 

motion. If upon the poll there is not a 

unanimous concurrence, the jury may be 

directed to retire for further deliberations 

or may be discharged." 

United States v. Morris, 612 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1979) sheds 

light on this aspect of the case. In that case we commented as 

follows: 

We start with the proposition that in a 

federal, criminal case the requirement of 

unanimity applies not only by reason of 

F.R.Crim.P., Rule 3l(a), but also by reason of 

the Sixth Amendment. It is a right so 

fundamental that it may not be waived. 

Polling is one means of ensuring unanimity. It is available on request of any party 

or on the court's own motion. F.R.Crim.P., 

Rule 3l(d). Where upon a poll one or more 

jurors express some uncertainty as to the 

verdict, the trial judge is vested with 

discretion under F.R.Crim.P., Rule 3l(d), to 

direct the jury to retire for further 

deliberations or to discharge the jury. 

Although not expressly so stated in the rule, 

the power to repoll the jury is also among the 

judge's discretionary powers. This power is 

most helpful where, for instance, the jury has 

been confused by multiple parties or counts. 

In any case upon the appearance of any 

uncertainty or contingency in a jury's verdict 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 7 
it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve 

that doubt, for "[t]here is no verdict as long 

as there is any uncertainty or contingency to 

the finality of the jury's determination." In 

the Cook case, it was held that the trial 

cour~rred by refusing to repoll where an 

uncertainty as to the verdict developed. 

There the uncertainty appeared due to a notation on the verdict and the jurors' responses 

to the initial poll, conditioning the verdict 

to a strong leniency rec~mmendation. 

(Footnotes and citations omitted.) 

Under the rationale of Morris, where a juror when polled 

gives an uncertain or equivocal answer, it would seem that before 

discharging the jury or directing it to resume its deliberations, 

a district judge should first attempt to clear up the 

uncertainty. 4 . When first polled, juror Lucero in response to the 

district court's inquiry as to whether the guilty verdicts were 

his verdicts said, "Ah, qualifications, yes, sir." Certainly that 

response warranted additional query. In response to the district 

court's second inquiry, the juror stated, "Ah, I'll go along with 

3 In Cook v. United States, 379 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1967), the jury 

returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty as charged, but 

penciled on the verdict was a request that the court give to the 

defendant "every degree of leniency possible." Upon the 

defendant's request, the district court polled the jury and all 

but two jurors responded that they had found the defendant guilty 

"based on the note at the bottom." The defendant thereupon asked 

the district court to repoll the jury in order to clarify the 

verdict, but the district court refused. On appeal, the Fifth 

Circuit held that this refusal to repoll was reversible error 

because of "serious doubt that the jury did not qualify its 

verdict of guilty by predicating and conditioning it on the 

request for 'every degree of leniency possible.'" The district 

court's failure to clarify the uncertainty, when requested to do 

so by the defendant and when there was an opportunity to do so, 

was fatal to the verdict. Id. at 971. 

4 The fact that in the first instance a juror, when polled, 

indicates uncertainty "does not require setting the trial at 

naught" ~nd further inquiry "can serve to clear up apparent confusion" on the part of a juror. Williams v. United States, 419 F.2d 

740 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 8 
the jury." A third inquiry elicited this response from Lucero: 

"Just that I went along_ with the experience and conviction of the 

majority. I trust in what they believe." The district judge then 

stated that he must ask the juror "directly again" whether the 

guilty verdicts were "in fact" his verdicts, to which Lucero 

stated , "Ahm , w i th the jury . " 

At this juncture the district court conferred with counsel at 

side bar out of the earshot of the jurors. Defense counsel suggested that the juror Lucero be subject to "voir dire" by court, 

and counsel, in the privacy of the judge's chambers. The district 

judge eschewed this suggestion and indicated he would ask the 

juror one more time whether these were his verdicts and ask for a 

"yes or no" answer. Defense counsel then suggested that the juror 

be asked to make a "yes or no" answer "if he was able to." The 

district judge followed this suggestion and inquired of the juror 

Lucero as follows: "If you can, sir, I must ask you to state 

either y.es or no as to whether ·or not this is your verdict." To 

that question, juror Lucero answered, "Yes." 

The balance of the jurors when polled answered in the affirmative. Before the jury was discharged, defense counsel again 

indicated a desire to voir dire juror Lucero in chambers "outside 

the hearing of others." The district judge refused this suggestion, commenting that juror Lucero "is one of the better educated 

members of the jury," would not appear susceptible to influence, 

and although he may have had some reluctance, he "has now answered 

clearly that this is his verdict." 

In our view, the district court did not mishandle the polling 

of juror Lucero. Most certainly when Lucerd gave his first 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 9 
equivocal answer, the district court was not required to discharge 

the jury and declare a mistrial, or order the jury to resume its 

deliberations. The preferred route is to first try to clear up 

the juror's equivocal response. The juror at this point could 

\. 

have said, "No, these are not my verdicts." But he did not make 

such response. Rather, in response to what we view as limited 

inquiry, the juror responded that these were indeed his verdicts. 

In our study of the record the district judge did not coerce the 

juror into saying, "Yes." 

Judgment affirmed. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 10 
Attachment A 

Now I'm also going to give you this following 

instruction and I would appreciate your listening carefully. I am going to ask that you continue your 

deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict and 

dispose of this case and I have a few additional comments that I would like for you to consider as you do 

so. This is an important case. The trial has been 

expensive in time, effort and money to both the defense 

and the prosecution. If you should fail to agree on a 

verdict, the case is left open and must be tried again. 

Obviously, another trial would only serve to increase 

the cost to both sides and there is no reason to believe 

that the case can be tried again by either side better 

or more exhaustively than it has been tried before you 

(emphasis added). Any further jury must be selected in 

the same manner from the same source as you were chosen 

and there is no reason to believe that the case could 

ever be submitted to 12 men and women more conscientiously or impartial or more competent to decide it, or 

that more or clearer evidence could be produced. If a 

substantial majority of your number are for a conviction, each dissenting juror ought to consider whether a 

doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable one since 

it appears to make no effective impression upon the 

minds of the others. On the other hand, if a majority 

or even a lesser number of you are for acquittal, the 

other jurors ought seriously to ask themselves again and 

most thoughtfully whether they do not have a reason to 

doubt the correctness of a judgment which is not shared 

by several of your fellow jurors and whether they should 

distrust the weight and sufficiency of evidence which 

fails to convince several of their fellow jurors beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Remember at all times that no juror 

is expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or 

she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence, 

but remember, also, that after full deliberation and 

consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your 

duty to agree upon a verdict if you can do so without 

surrendering your conscientious conviction. You must 

also remember that if the evidence in the case fails to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused --

that the accused should have a unanimous verdict of not 

guilty. 

Let's see. I'm not sure I read that carefully. 

You must also remember that if the evidence in the 

case fails to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, 

the accused should have your unanimous verdict of not 

guilty. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations 

as the occasion may require and should take all the time 

which you feel is necessary. I would ask now that you 

retire once again and continue your deliberations with 

these additional comments in mind to be applied, of 

course, in conjunction with all of the instructions that 

I have previously given to you. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2046 Document: 01019623128 Date Filed: 04/23/1990 Page: 11 
... 

Attachment B 

THE COURT: Mr. Lucero, would you please 

stand, sir. Is this your verdict, Mr. Lucero? 

JUROR JAMIE L. LUCERO: Ah, qualifications, yes, 

sir • 

THE COURT: All right. I must ask you whether, in 

fact, you agree and concur in this verdict in its 

entirety? 

JUROR JAMIE L. LUCERO: Ah, I'll go along with the 

jury. 

THE COURT: Well, I need -- I'm sorry, sir, but I 

must confirm on an individual basis that each of the 

members of the jury agrees to this verdict, and if you 

do not personally agree, I would like for you to tell me 

that. 

JUROR JAMIE L. LUCERO: Just that I went along with 

the experience and conviction of the majority. I trust 

in what they believe. 

THE COURT: 

directly again: 

Lucero? 

Well1 then, sir, let 

Is this, in fact, your 

,me ask 

verdict, 

JUROR JAMI,E L. LUCERO: Ahm, with the jury. 

you 

Mr. 

THE COURT: Okay. Let me ask counsel to approach 

the bench, if you would, please. You may be seated, Mi. 

Lucero and Mr. Smith. 

• . . . [District court at this point confers with 

counsel at side bar.] 

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lucero, let me ask you to 

stand again, sir, and let me say this first: It is 

important that I ascertain that any verdict rendered is 

the unanimous verdict of the jury and for that reason, 

we have this process of polling the jury which involves 

asking each juror separately to confirm concurrence in 

the verdict. This is not done to single any one out for 

purposes of embarrassment and please understand my 

questioning you is not in that light. 

If you can, sir, I must ask you to state either yes 

or no as to whether or not this is your verdict. 

JUROR JAMIE L. LUCERO: Yes. 

THE COURT: 

seated. 

(Emphasis added.) 

Thank you, Mr. Lucero. You may be 

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