Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05195/USCOURTS-arwd-5_06-cv-05195-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Burnthall
Defendant
Tom Keith
Defendant
Robert Scott Parks
Defendant
Theresa Catherynne W. Pryor-Kendrick
Plaintiff
Blythe Whiteherd
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

THERESA CATHERYNNE W. PRYOR-KENDRICK PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 06-5195 

JUDGE TOM KEITH; ROBERT 

SCOTT PARKS, Public Defender; 

BLYTHE WHITEHERD, Prosecuting

Attorney; and MARK BURNTHALL,

Probation/Parole Officer DEFENDANTS

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action filed by the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff

proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis. The plaintiff is an inmate of the Arkansas Department of

Correction. The case is before the undersigned for a determination of whether service of process

should issue.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff contends she was falsely accused of violating the terms of her probation. The

violations included new violations of the law. 

Plaintiff maintains her constitutional rights were violated in a number of ways in

connection with her prosecution for hot check violations and passing bad checks and her probation

revocation. Among other things, when she attempted to argue that the signatures on the checks

did not match and that her name was no longer Kendrick as of April 10, 2003, plaintiff states Judge

Keith became very violent and aggressive and denied her the right to bring her witnesses to court.

Plaintiff alleges she was denied the right to see the forged checks and no signature analysis was

ever done. Plaintiff asserts her probation officer Mark Burnthall lied in connection with the

revocation report.

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Her probation was revoked and on April 5, 2004, plaintiff was sentenced to a term of

imprisonment of ten years. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated on the probation revocation and

convictions of violations of the hot check law. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit asking that she be

released from prison, the probation revocation charge be removed from her record, and that she

be paid lost wages, compensatory, and punitive damages. 

DISCUSSION

This case is subject to dismissal. First, Judge Tom Keith is immune from suit. Mireles

v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991)("Judicial immunity is an

immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages."). See also Duty v. City of

Springdale, 42 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 1994). "Judges performing judicial functions enjoy

absolute immunity from § 1983 liability." Robinson v. Freeze, 15 F.3d 107, 108 (8th Cir. 1994).

“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done

maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98

S. Ct. 1099, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1978). 

Judicial immunity is overcome in two situations: (1) if the challenged act is nonjudicial;

and (2) if the action, although judicial in nature, was taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11. It is clear from the allegations of the complaint that neither

situation applies here.

In the past, claims for declaratory and injunctive relief “have been permitted under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against judges acting in their official capacity.” Nollet v. Justices of Trial Court

of Com. of Mass., 83 F. Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Mass. 2000), aff’d without op., 248 F.3d 1127 (1st

Cir. 2000)(citing Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1984)). 

“However, in 1996 Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement Act (“FCIA”), Pub. L. No.

104-317, Title III § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853, which legislatively reversed Pulliam in several

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important respects.” Nollet, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 210. As amended by the FCIA § 1983 now

precludes injunctive relief against a judicial officer “for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity . . . unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was

unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 Pryor-Kendrick does not allege that either of these prerequisites for injunctive relief are

met. See e.g., Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)(holding injunctive relief

against a quasi-judicial official is barred if the plaintiff fails to allege a violation of a declaratory

decree or the unavailability of declaratory relief); Fox v. Lee, 99 F. Supp. 2d 573, 575-576 (E.D.

Pa. 2000)(claim for injunctive relief dismissed where plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that

either of the prerequisites to injunctive relief were met); Ackermann v. Doyle, 43 F. Supp. 2d

265, 273 (E.D. N.Y. 1999)(dismissing action against judicial officers because plaintiff failed to

allege that a declaratory decree was violated or the declaratory relief was unavailable). Thus, to

the extent Pryor-Kendrick seeks injunctive relief her claims are subject to dismissal.

Furthermore, to be entitled to equitable relief, “plaintiff must show that [s]he has an

inadequate remedy at law and a serious risk of irreparable harm.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy

Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1392 (9th Cir. 1987)(citations omitted). Equitable

relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Pulliam, 466 U.S. at

542 & n. 22, 104 S. Ct. at 1981 & n. 22. See also Sterling v. Calvin , 874 F.2d 571, 572 (8th Cir.

1989). An adequate remedy at law exists when the acts of the judicial officer can be reviewed

on appeal or by extraordinary writ. Mullis, 828 F.2d at 1392 (citation omitted). See also Nelson

v. Com, 1997 WL 793060, 2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)(appellate review of conviction provides plaintiff

an adequate remedy under state law). See also J&M Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Hampton, 347 Ark.

126, 60 S.W.3d 481 (2001)(discussing when a writ of prohibition is appropriate). 

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Second, Blythe Whiteherd, a prosecuting attorney is not subject to suit. The United States

Supreme Court, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96 S. Ct. 984, 995, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128

(1976), established the absolute immunity of a prosecutor from a civil suit for damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 "in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case." Id., 424 U.S. at

427. This immunity extends to all acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of

the criminal process.” Id., 424 U.S. at 430. See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113

S. Ct. 2606, 2615, 125 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1993)(Prosecutor acting as an advocate for the state in a

criminal prosecution is entitled to absolute immunity while a prosecutor acting in an investigatory

or administrative capacity is only entitled to qualified immunity). Based on the allegations of the

complaint, it is clear the prosecuting attorney is entitled to absolute immunity. See also Brodnicki

v. City of Omaha, 75 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 1996)(County prosecutors were entitled to absolute

immunity from suit). 

To the extent Pryor-Kendrick’s complaint seeks injunctive relief, we find the claim not

cognizable. While the Supreme Court has not held that this immunity insulates prosecutors from

declaratory or injunctive relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 80 L. Ed.

2d 565 (1984), a plaintiff must show some substantial likelihood that the past conduct alleged

to be illegal will recur. Pryor-Kendrick can make no such showing here. Further, injunctive

relief is not appropriate where an adequate remedy under state law exists. Id., 466 U.S. at 542

& n.22. See also Bonner v. Circuit Court of St. Louis, 526 F.2d 1331, 1336 (8th Cir. 1975). 

Third, the claim against Robert Parks, a public defender, is subject to dismissal. To state

a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant, while acting under color of state

law, deprived her of a federal right. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S. Ct.

445, 70 L. Ed. 2d 509 (1981), the Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under

color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to indigent

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defendants in state criminal proceedings. Thus, when the claim is that the public defender failed

to adequately represent the client in her criminal proceedings, it does not state a cognizable claim

under § 1983. See also Gilbert v. Corcoran, 530 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1976)(conclusory allegations

of ineffective assistance of counsel do not state a claim against public defenders under § 1983).

Fourth, plaintiff’s claims against Mark Burnthall, her probation officer, are subject to

dismissal. Probation officers are absolutely immune from suits challenging conduct intimately

associated with the criminal judicial process. Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646, 649 (7th

Cir. 1998) (probation officers); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 157 (9th Cir. 1985) (parole

officers are entitled to absolute immunity with respect to the preparation of parole revocation

reports); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1983)("parole officials in deciding to

grant, deny, or revoke parole, perform functions comparable to those of judges," and are,

therefore, entitled to absolute immunity.).

Fifth, plaintiff’s claims for damages are barred by the Supreme Court decision of Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court

held that a claim for damages for "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for

other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid"

is not cognizable until "the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by

executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or

called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck, 512 U.S. 486-87.

Plaintiff is currently serving a term of imprisonment on the probation revocation. The probation

revocation has not been reversed or set aside.

CONCLUSION

I therefore recommend the case be dismissed on the grounds the claims are frivolous, fail

to state claims upon which relief may be granted, are asserted against individuals immune from

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suit, or are not presently cognizable under § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii)(IFP

action, or any portion thereof, may be dismissed on such grounds at any time). 

Pryor-Kendrick has ten days from receipt of the report and recommendation in

which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. Pryor-Kendrick is

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the

district court.

DATED this 13th day of November 2006.

/s/ Beverly Stites Jones 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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