Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-15-01335/USCOURTS-ca4-15-01335-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Intellectual Property Law Association
Amicus Curiae
Bayer Consumer Care AG
Appellant
Bayer Healthcare LLC
Appellant
Jamie Belcastro
Appellee
Belmora LLC
Appellee
Does
Appellee
Michelle K. Lee
Intervenor

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1335

BELMORA LLC,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

BAYER CONSUMER CARE AG, a Swiss corporation; BAYER 

HEALTHCARE LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company,

Defendants - Consolidated Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

BELMORA LLC, a Virginia Limited Liability Company; JAMIE 

BELCASTRO, an individual; DOES, 1-10, inclusive,

Consolidated Defendants - Appellees,

and

MICHELLE K. LEE, Undersecretary for Intellectual Property 

and Director of the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office (Director),

Intervenor.

---------------------

AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION,

Amicus Curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District 

Judge. (1:14-cv-00847-GBL-JFA)

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 1 of 35
2

Argued: October 27, 2015 Decided: March 23, 2016

Before AGEE, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the 

opinion, in which Judge Floyd and Judge Thacker joined.

ARGUED: Bradley Louis Cohn, PATTISHALL, MCAULIFFE, NEWBURY, 

HILLIARD & GERALDSON LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Appellants. 

Martin Schwimmer, LEASON ELLIS LLP, White Plains, New York, for 

Appellee. Lewis Yelin, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Intervenor. ON BRIEF: Phillip Barengolts, 

Andrew R.W. Hughes, PATTISHALL, MCAULIFFE, NEWBURY, HILLIARD & 

GERALDSON LLP, Chicago, Illinois; Robert J. Shaughnessy, Eric C. 

Wiener, WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY LLP, Washington, D.C., for 

Appellants. Craig C. Reilly, Alexandria, Virginia; John L. 

Welch, WOLF, GREENFIELD & SACKS, P.C., Boston, Massachusetts; 

Lauren B. Sabol, LEASON ELLIS LLP, White Plains, New York; 

Rebecca Tushnet, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, Washington, 

D.C., for Appellees. Mark R. Freeman, Civil Division, UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.; Dana J. Boente, 

United States Attorney, Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

Assistant Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Washington, D.C.; Nathan K. Kelley, Solicitor, 

Christina J. Hieber, Associate Solicitor, Mary Beth Walker, 

Associate Solicitor, Benjamin T. Hickman, Associate Solicitor, 

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Alexandria, Virginia, 

for Intervenor. Sharon A. Israel, President, AMERICAN 

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, INC., Arlington, 

Virginia; Jennifer L. Kovalcik, STITES & HARBISON, PLLC, 

Nashville, Tennessee, for Amicus Curiae.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 2 of 35
3

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

In this unfair competition case, we consider whether the 

Lanham Act permits the owner of a foreign trademark and its 

sister company to pursue false association, false advertising, 

and trademark cancellation claims against the owner of the same 

mark in the United States. Bayer Consumer Care AG (“BCC”) owns 

the trademark “FLANAX” in Mexico and has sold naproxen sodium 

pain relievers under that mark in Mexico (and other parts of 

Latin America) since the 1970s. Belmora LLC owns the FLANAX 

trademark in the United States and has used it here since 2004 

in the sale of its naproxen sodium pain relievers. BCC and its 

U.S. sister company Bayer HealthCare LLC (“BHC,” and 

collectively with BCC, “Bayer”) contend that Belmora used the

FLANAX mark to deliberately deceive Mexican-American consumers 

into thinking they were purchasing BCC’s product. 

BCC successfully petitioned the U.S. Trademark Trial and 

Appeal Board (“TTAB”) to cancel Belmora’s registration for the 

FLANAX mark based on deceptive use. Belmora appealed the TTAB’s 

decision to the district court. In the meantime, BCC filed a 

separate complaint for false association against Belmora under 

§ 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, and in conjunction 

with BHC, a claim for false advertising. After the two cases 

were consolidated, the district court reversed the TTAB’s 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 3 of 35
4

cancellation order and dismissed the false association and false 

advertising claims. 

Bayer appeals those decisions. For the reasons outlined 

below, we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand 

this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

This appeal comes to us following the district court’s 

grant of Belmora’s Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss Bayer’s complaint and Belmora’s Rule 12(c) 

motion for judgment on the pleadings on the trademark 

cancellation claim. In both circumstances, we “assume all wellpled facts to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in 

favor of” Bayer as the plaintiff. Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 

226, 234 (4th Cir. 2013).1

A. The FLANAX Mark

BCC registered the trademark FLANAX in Mexico for 

pharmaceutical products, analgesics, and anti-inflammatories. 

It has sold naproxen sodium tablets under the FLANAX brand in 

Mexico since 1976. FLANAX sales by BCC have totaled hundreds of 

millions of dollars, with a portion of the sales occurring in 

 1 We have omitted internal quotation marks, alterations, and 

citations here and throughout this opinion, unless otherwise 

noted.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 4 of 35
5

Mexican cities near the United States border. BCC’s FLANAX 

brand is well-known in Mexico and other Latin American 

countries, as well as to Mexican-Americans and other Hispanics 

in the United States, but BCC has never marketed or sold its 

FLANAX in the United States. Instead, BCC’s sister company, 

BHC, sells naproxen sodium pain relievers under the brand ALEVE

in the United States market. 

Belmora LLC began selling naproxen sodium tablets in the 

United States as FLANAX in 2004. The following year, Belmora

registered the FLANAX mark in the United States. Belmora’s 

early FLANAX packaging (below, left) closely mimicked BCC’s 

Mexican FLANAX packaging (right), displaying a similar color 

scheme, font size, and typeface. 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 5 of 35
6

J.A. 145. Belmora later modified its packaging (below), but the 

color scheme, font size, and typeface remain similar to that of 

BCC’s FLANAX packaging. 

Id.

In addition to using similar packaging, Belmora made 

statements implying that its FLANAX brand was the same FLANAX 

product sold by BCC in Mexico. For example, Belmora circulated

a brochure to prospective distributors that stated, 

For generations, Flanax has been a brand that Latinos 

have turned to for various common ailments. Now you 

too can profit from this highly recognized topselling 

brand among Latinos. Flanax is now made in the U.S. 

and continues to show record sales growth everywhere 

it is sold. Flanax acts as a powerful attraction for 

Latinos by providing them with products they know, 

trust and prefer. 

J.A. 196. Belmora also employed telemarketers and provided them 

with a script containing similar statements. This sales script 

stated that Belmora was “the direct producers of FLANAX in the 

US” and that “FLANAX is a very well known medical product in the 

Latino American market, for FLANAX is sold successfully in 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 6 of 35
7

Mexico.” Id. Belmora’s “sell sheet,” used to solicit orders 

from retailers, likewise claimed that “Flanax products have been 

used [for] many, many years in Mexico” and are “now being 

produced in the United States by Belmora LLC.” Id. 

Bayer points to evidence that these and similar materials 

resulted in Belmora’s distributors, vendors, and marketers 

believing that its FLANAX was the same as or affiliated with 

BCC’s FLANAX. For instance, Belmora received questions 

regarding whether it was legal for FLANAX to have been imported 

from Mexico. And an investigation of stores selling Belmora’s 

FLANAX “identified at least 30 [purchasers] who believed that 

the Flanax products . . . were the same as, or affiliated with, 

the Flanax products they knew from Mexico.” J.A. 416. 

B. Proceedings Below

1.

In 2007, BCC petitioned the TTAB to cancel Belmora’s 

registration for the FLANAX mark, arguing that Belmora’s use and 

registration of the FLANAX mark violated Article 6bis of the 

Paris Convention “as made applicable by Sections 44(b) and (h) 

of the Lanham Act.” J.A. 89. BCC also sought cancellation of 

Belmora’s registration under § 14(3) of the Lanham Act because 

Belmora had used the FLANAX mark “to misrepresent the source of 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 7 of 35
8

the goods . . . [on] which the mark is used.” Id.; see also

Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).

The TTAB dismissed BCC’s Article 6bis claim, concluding 

that Article 6bis “is not self-executing” and that § 44 of the 

Lanham Act did not provide “an independent basis for 

cancellation.” J.A. 95. However, the TTAB allowed Bayer’s 

§ 14(3) claim to proceed. In 2014, after discovery and a 

hearing, the TTAB ordered cancellation of Belmora’s FLANAX 

registration, concluding that Belmora had misrepresented the 

source of the FLANAX goods and that the facts “d[id] not present 

a close case.” J.A. 142. The TTAB noted that Belmora 1) knew 

the favorable reputation of Bayer’s FLANAX product, 2) “copied” 

Bayer’s packaging, and 3) “repeatedly invoked” that reputation 

when marketing its product in the United States. J.A. 143-45.

2.

Shortly after the TTAB’s ruling, Bayer filed suit in the 

Southern District of California, alleging that 1) BCC was 

injured by Belmora’s false association with its FLANAX product 

in violation of Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A), and 2) BCC and BHC 

were both injured by Belmora’s false advertising of FLANAX under 

§ 43(a)(1)(B). The complaint also alleged three claims under 

California state law. 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 8 of 35
9

Belmora meanwhile appealed the TTAB’s cancellation order 

and elected to proceed with the appeal as a civil action in the 

Eastern District of Virginia.2 It argued that the TTAB erred in 

concluding that Bayer “had standing and/or a cause of action” 

under § 14(3) and in finding that Belmora had misrepresented the 

source of its goods. J.A. 218. Belmora also sought a 

declaration that its actions had not violated the false 

association and false advertising provisions of Lanham Act 

§ 43(a), as Bayer had alleged in the California district court 

proceeding. Bayer filed a counterclaim challenging the TTAB’s 

dismissal of its Paris Convention treaty claims. 

The California case was transferred to the Eastern District 

of Virginia and consolidated with Belmora’s pending action. 

Belmora then moved the district court to dismiss Bayer’s § 43(a) 

claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and for judgment on the pleadings

under Rule 12(c) on the § 14(3) claim. On February 6, 2015, 

after two hearings, the district court issued a memorandum 

opinion and order ruling in favor of Belmora across the board.

The district court acknowledged that “Belmora’s FLANAX 

. . . has a similar trade dress to Bayer’s FLANAX and is 

 2 A party to a cancellation proceeding who is dissatisfied 

with the TTAB’s decision may either “appeal to” the U.S. Court 

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a), or 

elect to “have remedy by a civil action” in the district court, 

id. § 1071(b). Belmora chose the latter option.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 9 of 35
10

marketed in such a way that capitalizes on the goodwill of 

Bayer’s FLANAX.” J.A. 475. It nonetheless “distilled” the case 

“into one single question”:

Does the Lanham Act allow the owner of a foreign mark 

that is not registered in the United States and 

further has never used the mark in United States 

commerce to assert priority rights over a mark that is 

registered in the United States by another party and 

used in United States commerce? 

J.A. 476. The district court concluded that “[t]he answer is 

no” based on its reading of the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 

134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). J.A. 476. Accordingly, the district 

court dismissed Bayer’s false association and false advertising

claims for lack of standing. At the same time, it reversed the 

TTAB’s § 14(3) cancellation order.

Bayer filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The U.S. Patent and 

Trademark Office (“USPTO”) intervened to defend the TTAB’s 

decision to cancel Belmora’s registration and to argue that the 

Lanham Act conforms to the United States’ commitments in Article 

6bis of the Paris Convention.3

 3 The district court had agreed with the TTAB that Article 

6bis does not create an independent cause of action for the 

cancellation of Belmora’s FLANAX registration. Because Bayer 

appears to have abandoned its treaty claims on appeal and their 

resolution is not necessary to our decision, we do not address 

any issue regarding the Paris Convention arguments. 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 10 of 35
11

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s decision to dismiss 

a proceeding under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), accepting as true 

all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and 

drawing all reasonable factual inferences in the plaintiff’s 

favor. Priority Auto Grp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 757 F.3d 

137, 139 (4th Cir. 2014); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, 

“a court evaluates the complaint in its entirety, as well as 

documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.” E.I. du 

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 

(4th Cir. 2011).

A. False Association and False Advertising Under Section 43(a)

The district court dismissed Bayer’s false association4 and 

false advertising claims because, in its view, the claims failed 

to satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in

Lexmark. At the core of the district court’s decision was its

conclusion that 1) Bayer’s claims fell outside the Lanham Act’s 

“zone of interests” –- and are not cognizable -- “because Bayer 

 4 As the district court pointed out, we have sometimes 

denominated Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(A) claims as “false 

designation” claims. We think it preferable to follow the 

Supreme Court’s terminology in Lexmark and instead refer to such 

claims as those of “false association,” although the terms can 

often be used interchangeably. 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 11 of 35
12

does not possess a protectable interest in the FLANAX mark in 

the United States,” J.A. 485, and 2) that a “cognizable economic 

loss under the Lanham Act” cannot exist as to a “mark that was 

not used in United States commerce.” J.A. 488-89. 

On appeal, Bayer contends these conclusions are erroneous 

as a matter of law because they conflict with the plain language 

of § 43(a) and misread Lexmark.

1.

“While much of the Lanham Act addresses the registration, 

use, and infringement of trademarks and related marks, § 43(a)

. . . goes beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp. v. 

Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2003). 

Written in terms of the putative defendant’s conduct, § 43(a)

sets forth unfair competition causes of action for false 

association and false advertising:

Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or 

services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce 

any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any 

combination thereof, or any false designation of 

origin, false or misleading description of fact, or 

false or misleading representation of fact, which --

(A) [False Association:] is likely to cause 

confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as 

to the affiliation, connection, or association of 

such person with another person, or as to the 

origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her 

goods, services, or commercial activities by 

another person, or

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 12 of 35
13

(B) [False Advertising:] in commercial 

advertising or promotion, misrepresents the 

nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 

origin of his or her or another person’s goods, 

services, or commercial activities,

shall be liable in a civil action by any person who 

believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged 

by such act.

Lanham Act § 43(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1). Subsection A, 

which creates liability for statements as to “affiliation, 

connection, or association” of goods, describes the cause of 

action known as “false association.” Subsection B, which 

creates liability for “misrepresent[ing] the nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of goods, 

defines the cause of action for “false advertising.” 

Significantly, the plain language of § 43(a) does not 

require that a plaintiff possess or have used a trademark in 

U.S. commerce as an element of the cause of action. Section 

43(a) stands in sharp contrast to Lanham Act § 32, which is 

titled as and expressly addresses “infringement.” 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1114 (requiring for liability the “use in commerce” of “any 

reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a 

registered mark” (emphasis added)). Under § 43(a), it is the 

defendant’s use in commerce -- whether of an offending “word, 

term, name, symbol, or device” or of a “false or misleading 

description [or representation] of fact” -- that creates the 

injury under the terms of the statute. And here the alleged 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 13 of 35
14

offending “word, term, name, symbol, or device” is Belmora’s 

FLANAX mark. 

What § 43(a) does require is that Bayer was “likely to be 

damaged” by Belmora’s “use[] in commerce” of its FLANAX mark and 

related advertisements. The Supreme Court recently considered 

the breadth of this “likely to be damaged” language in Lexmark, 

a false advertising case arising from a dispute in the usedprinter-cartridge market. 134 S. Ct. at 1383, 1388. The lower 

courts in Lexmark had analyzed the case in terms of “prudential 

standing” -– that is, on grounds that are “prudential” rather 

than constitutional. Id. at 1386. The Supreme Court, however,

observed that the real question in Lexmark was “whether Static 

Control has a cause of action under the statute.” Id. at 1387. 

This query, in turn, hinged on “a straightforward question of 

statutory interpretation” to which it applied “traditional 

principles” of interpretation. Id. at 1388. As a threshold 

matter, the Supreme Court noted that courts must be careful not 

to import requirements into this analysis that Congress has not 

included in the statute:

We do not ask whether in our judgment Congress should

have authorized Static Control’s suit, but whether 

Congress in fact did so. Just as a court cannot apply 

its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause 

of action that Congress has denied, it cannot limit a 

cause of action that Congress has created merely 

because ‘prudence’ dictates.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 14 of 35
15

Id. The Court concluded that § 43(a)’s broad authorization --

permitting suit by “any person who believes that he or she is or 

is likely to be damaged” -- should not be taken “literally” to

reach the limits of Article III standing, but is framed by two 

“background principles,” which may overlap. Id. 

First, a plaintiff’s claim must fall within the “zone of 

interests” protected by the statute. Id. The scope of the zone 

of interests is not “especially demanding,” and the plaintiff 

receives the “benefit of any doubt.” Id. at 1389. Because the 

Lanham Act contains an “unusual, and extraordinarily helpful” 

purpose statement in § 45, identifying the statute’s zone of 

interests “requires no guesswork.” Id. Section 45 provides:

The intent of this chapter is to regulate commerce 

within the control of Congress by making actionable 

the deceptive and misleading use of marks in such 

commerce; to protect registered marks used in such 

commerce from interference by State, or territorial 

legislation; to protect persons engaged in such 

commerce against unfair competition; to prevent fraud 

and deception in such commerce by the use of 

reproductions, copies, counterfeits, or colorable 

imitations of registered marks; and to provide rights 

and remedies stipulated by treaties and conventions 

respecting trademarks, trade names, and unfair 

competition entered into between the United States and 

foreign nations.

Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.5 

 5 In the same section, the Lanham Act defines “commerce” as 

“all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.” 

Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1227. We have previously construed

this phrase to mean that the term is “coterminous with that 

(Continued)

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 15 of 35
16

The Supreme Court observed that “[m]ost of the enumerated 

purposes are relevant to a false-association case,” while “a 

typical false-advertising case will implicate only the Act’s 

goal of ‘protecting persons engaged in commerce within the 

control of Congress against unfair competition.’” Lexmark, 134 

S. Ct. at 1389. The Court concluded “that to come within the 

zone of interests in a suit for false advertising under 

[§ 43(a)], a plaintiff must allege an injury to a commercial 

interest in reputation or sales.” Id. at 1390. 

The second Lexmark background principle is that “a 

statutory cause of action is limited to plaintiffs whose 

injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.” 

Id. The injury must have a “sufficiently close connection to 

the conduct the statute prohibits.” Id. In the § 43(a) 

context, this means “show[ing] economic or reputational injury 

flowing directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s 

advertising; and that that occurs when deception of consumers 

causes them to withhold trade from the plaintiff.” Id. at 1391. 

 

commerce that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause of 

the United States Constitution.” Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe 

des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 

359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003). “Commerce” in Lanham Act context 

is therefore an expansive concept that “necessarily includes all 

the explicitly identified variants of interstate commerce, 

foreign trade, and Indian commerce.” Id. at 364 (citing U.S. 

Const. art. I, § 8, cl.3); see also infra n.6).

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 16 of 35
17

The primary lesson from Lexmark is clear: courts must 

interpret the Lanham Act according to what the statute says. To 

determine whether a plaintiff, “falls within the class of 

plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue,” we “apply 

traditional principles of statutory interpretation.” Id. at 

1387. The outcome will rise and fall on the “meaning of the 

congressionally enacted provision creating a cause of action.” 

Id. at 1388. 

We now turn to apply these principles to the case before 

us. 

2. 

a. 

We first address the position, pressed by Belmora and 

adopted by the district court, that a plaintiff must have 

initially used its own mark in commerce within the United States 

as a condition precedent to a § 43(a) claim. In dismissing 

BCC’s § 43(a) claims, the district court found dispositive that 

“Bayer failed to plead facts showing that it used the FLANAX 

mark in commerce in [the] United States.” J.A. 487. Upon that 

ground, the district court held “that Bayer does not possess a 

protectable interest in the [FLANAX] mark.” Id. 

As noted earlier, such a requirement is absent from 

§ 43(a)’s plain language and its application in Lexmark. Under 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 17 of 35
18

the statute, the defendant must have “use[d] in commerce” the 

offending “word, term, name, [or] symbol,” but the plaintiff

need only “believe[] that he or she is or is likely to be 

damaged by such act.” Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). 

It is important to emphasize that this is an unfair 

competition case, not a trademark infringement case. Belmora 

and the district court conflated the Lanham Act’s infringement 

provision in § 32 (which authorizes suit only “by the 

registrant,” and thereby requires the plaintiff to have used its 

own mark in commerce) with unfair competition claims pled in 

this case under § 43(a). Section 32 makes clear that Congress 

knew how to write a precondition of trademark possession and use 

into a Lanham Act cause of action when it chose to do so. It 

has not done so in § 43(a). See Russello v. United States, 464 

U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular 

language in one section of a statute but omits it in another 

section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress 

acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 

exclusion.”). 

Given that Lexmark advises courts to adhere to the 

statutory language, “apply[ing] traditional principles of 

statutory interpretation,” Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1388, we lack 

authority to introduce a requirement into § 43(a) that Congress 

plainly omitted. Nothing in Lexmark can be read to suggest that 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 18 of 35
19

§ 43(a) claims have an unstated requirement that the plaintiff 

have first used its own mark (word, term, name, symbol, or 

device) in U.S. commerce before a cause of action will lie 

against a defendant who is breaching the statute.

The district court thus erred in requiring Bayer, as the 

plaintiff, to have pled its prior use of its own mark in U.S. 

commerce when it is the defendant’s use of a mark or 

misrepresentation that underlies the § 43(a) unfair competition 

cause of action. Having made this foundational error, the 

district court’s resolution of the issues requires reversal.6

Admittedly, some of our prior cases appear to have treated 

a plaintiff’s use of a mark in United States commerce as a 

 6 Even though the district court’s error in transposing 

§ 43(a)’s requirements for a defendant’s actions upon the 

plaintiff skews the entire analysis, the district court also 

confused the issues by ill-defining the economic location of the 

requisite unfair competition acts. As noted earlier, supra n.5, 

a defendant’s false association or false advertising conduct 

under § 43(a) must occur in “commerce within the control of 

Congress.” Such commerce is not limited to purchases and sales 

within the territorial limits of the United States as the 

district court seems to imply at times with regard to § 43(a) 

and § 14(3) claims. See J.A. 483, 506 (as to § 14(3), stating 

that “Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States”); 

J.A. 487 (as to § 43(a), stating that “Bayer failed to plead 

facts showing that it used the FLANAX mark in commerce in [the] 

United States”). Instead, as we explained in International 

Bancorp, Lanham Act “commerce” includes, among other things, 

“foreign trade” and is not limited to transactions solely within 

the borders of the United States. Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at

364. Of course, any such “foreign trade” must satisfy the 

Lexmark “zone of interests” and “proximate cause” requirements 

to be cognizable for Lanham Act purposes. 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 19 of 35
20

prerequisite for a false association claim. See Lamparello v. 

Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Both infringement

[under § 32] and false designation of origin [under § 43(a)] 

have [the same] five elements.”); People for the Ethical 

Treatment of Animals v. Doughney, 263 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 

2001) (same); Int’l Bancorp, 329 F.3d 361 n.2 (“[T]he tests for 

trademark infringement and unfair competition . . . are 

identical.”); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon v. Alpha of Va., 

Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]o prevail under 

§§ 32(1) and 43(a) of the Lanham Act for trademark infringement 

and unfair competition, respectively, a complainant must 

demonstrate that it has a valid, protectible trademark[.]”). 

However, none of these cases made that consideration the ratio

decidendi of its holding or analyzed whether the statute in fact 

contains such a requirement. See, e.g., 5 J. Thomas McCarthy, 

Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 29:4 (4th ed. 2002)

(observing that International Bancorp merely “assumed that to 

trigger Lanham Act § 43(a), the plaintiff’s mark must be ‘used 

in commerce’”). Moreover, all of these cases predate Lexmark, 

which provides the applicable Supreme Court precedent 

interpreting § 43(a). See U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. 

v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 983 F.2d 578, 581 (4th Cir. 1992) 

(“A decision by a panel of this court, or by the court sitting 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 20 of 35
21

en banc, does not bind subsequent panels if the decision rests 

on authority that subsequently proves untenable.”). 

Although the plaintiffs’ use of a mark in U.S. commerce was 

a fact in common in the foregoing cases, substantial precedent

reflects that § 43(a) unfair competition claims come within the 

statute’s protectable zone of interests without the 

preconditions adopted by the district court and advanced by 

Belmora. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, § 43(a) “goes 

beyond trademark protection.” Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 29. 

For example, a plaintiff whose mark has become generic –- and 

therefore not protectable –- may plead an unfair competition 

claim against a competitor that uses that generic name and

“fail[s] adequately to identify itself as distinct from the 

first organization” such that the name causes “confusion or a 

likelihood of confusion.” Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded Am. 

Veterans Found., 872 F.2d 1035, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also

Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118-19 (1938) 

(requiring the defendant to “use reasonable care to inform the 

public of the source of its product” even though the plaintiff’s 

“shredded wheat” mark was generic and therefore unprotectable); 

Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203-04 (1896) 

(same, for “Singer” sewing machines). 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 21 of 35
22

Likewise, in a “reverse passing off” case, the plaintiff 

need not have used a mark in commerce to bring a § 43(a) action.7 

A reverse-passing-off plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) 

that the work at issue originated with the plaintiff; (2) that 

origin of the work was falsely designated by the defendant; (3) 

that the false designation of origin was likely to cause 

consumer confusion; and (4) that the plaintiff was harmed by the 

defendant’s false designation of origin.” Universal Furniture 

Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 438 

(4th Cir. 2010). Thus, the plaintiff in a reverse passing off 

case must plead and prove only that the work “originated with”

him -- not that he used the work (which may or may not be 

associated with a mark) in U.S. commerce. Id. 

The generic mark and reverse passing off cases illustrate 

that § 43(a) actions do not require, implicitly or otherwise, 

that a plaintiff have first used its own mark in United States 

commerce. If such a use were a condition precedent to bringing 

a § 43(a) action, the generic mark and reverse passing off cases 

could not exist.

 7 Reverse passing off occurs when a “producer misrepresents 

someone else’s goods or services as his own,” in other words, 

when the defendant is selling the plaintiff’s goods and passing 

them off as originating with the defendant. Universal Furniture 

Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 438 

(4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 28 n.1).

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 22 of 35
23

In sum, the Lanham Act’s plain language contains no 

unstated requirement that a § 43(a) plaintiff have used a U.S. 

trademark in U.S. commerce to bring a Lanham Act unfair 

competition claim. The Supreme Court’s guidance in Lexmark does 

not allude to one, and our prior cases either only assumed or 

articulated as dicta that such a requirement existed. Thus, the 

district court erred in imposing such a condition precedent upon

Bayer’s claims.8

As Bayer is not barred from making a § 43(a) claim, the 

proper Lexmark inquiry is twofold. Did the alleged acts of 

unfair competition fall within the Lanham Act’s protected zone 

of interests? And if so, did Bayer plead proximate causation of 

 8 A plaintiff who relies only on foreign commercial activity 

may face difficulty proving a cognizable false association 

injury under § 43(a). A few isolated consumers who confuse a 

mark with one seen abroad, based only on the presence of the 

mark on a product in this country and not other misleading 

conduct by the mark holder, would rarely seem to have a viable § 

43(a) claim.

The story is different when a defendant, as alleged here, 

has -- as a cornerstone of its business -- intentionally passed 

off its goods in the United States as the same product 

commercially available in foreign markets in order to influence 

purchases by American consumers. See M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. 

Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) (“[E]vidence of 

intentional, direct copying establishes a prima facie case of 

secondary meaning sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion 

to the defendant on that issue.”). Such an intentional 

deception can go a long way toward establishing likelihood of 

confusion. See Blinded Veterans, 872 F.2d at 1045 (“Intent to 

deceive . . . retains potency; when present, it is probative 

evidence of a likelihood of confusion.”).

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 23 of 35
24

a cognizable injury? We examine the false association and false 

advertising claims in turn.

b. 

i. 

As to the zone of interests, Lexmark advises that “[m]ost 

of the [Lanham Act’s] enumerated purposes are relevant to falseassociation cases.” 134 S. Ct. at 1389. One such enumerated

purpose is “making actionable the deceptive and misleading use 

of marks” in “commerce within the control of Congress.” Lanham 

Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco 

Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 784 n.19 (1992) (Stevens, J., 

concurring) (“Trademark law protects the public by making 

consumers confident that they can identify brands they prefer 

and can purchase those brands without being confused or 

misled.”). As pled, BCC’s false association claim advances that

purpose. 

The complaint alleges Belmora’s misleading association with 

BCC’s FLANAX has caused BCC customers to buy the Belmora FLANAX 

in the United States instead of purchasing BCC’s FLANAX in 

Mexico. For example, the complaint alleges that BCC invested 

heavily in promoting its FLANAX to Mexican citizens or MexicanAppeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 24 of 35
25

Americans in border areas.9 Those consumers cross into the 

United States and may purchase Belmora FLANAX here before 

returning to Mexico. And Mexican-Americans may forego 

purchasing the FLANAX they know when they cross the border to 

visit Mexico because Belmora’s alleged deception led them to 

purchase the Belmora product in the United States. 

In either circumstance, BCC loses sales revenue because 

Belmora’s deceptive and misleading use of FLANAX conveys to 

consumers a false association with BCC’s product. Further, by 

also deceiving distributors and vendors, Belmora makes its 

 9 Bayer alleges in its complaint that:

11. [BCC] has sold hundreds of millions of dollars of 

its FLANAX medicines in Mexico. This includes 

substantial sales in major cities near the U.S.-Mexico 

border.

12. [BCC] has spent millions of dollars promoting and 

advertising the FLANAX brand in Mexico, including in 

major cities near the U.S.-Mexico border.

13. As a result of [BCC’s] extensive sales and 

marketing, the FLANAX brand is extremely well known in 

Mexico and to Mexican-American consumers in the United 

States.

. . . . 

30. Defendants have marketed Belmora’s FLANAX products 

by targeting Hispanic consumers likely to be familiar 

with [BCC’s] FLANAX products and deliberately 

attempting to deceive those consumers into believing 

that Belmora’s FLANAX products are the same thing as 

the FLANAX medicines they know and trust from Mexico. 

J.A. 156, 159 (Compl. ¶¶ 11-13, 30).

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 25 of 35
26

FLANAX more available to consumers, which would exacerbate BCC’s 

losses. See J.A. 196 (stating in a brochure for distributors 

that “Flanax is now made in the U.S.” and “acts as a powerful 

attraction for Latinos”); J.A. 410 (noting a distributor’s 

concern that the product “is legal to sell in the US”). In each 

scenario, the economic activity would be “within the control of 

Congress” to regulate. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 

We thus conclude that BCC has adequately pled a § 43(a) 

false association claim for purposes of the zone of interests 

prong. Its allegations reflect the claim furthers the § 45 

purpose of preventing “the deceptive and misleading use of 

marks” in “commerce within the control of Congress.” 

ii.

Turning to Lexmark’s second prong, proximate cause, BCC has 

also alleged injuries that “are proximately caused by 

[Belmora’s] violations of the [false association] statute.” 134 

S. Ct. at 1390. The complaint can fairly be read to allege

“economic or reputational injury flowing directly from the 

deception wrought by the defendant’s” conduct. Id. at 1391. As 

previously noted, BCC alleges “substantial sales in major cities 

near the U.S.-Mexico border” and “millions of dollars promoting 

and advertising” its FLANAX brand in that region. J.A. 156 

(Compl. ¶¶ 11-12). Thus, BCC may plausibly have been damaged by 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 26 of 35
27

Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the FLANAX mark in at least 

two ways. As reflected in the zone of interests discussion, BCC 

FLANAX customers in Mexico near the border may be deceived into

foregoing a FLANAX purchase in Mexico as they cross the border 

to shop and buy the Belmora product in the United States. 

Second, Belmora is alleged to have targeted Mexican-Americans in 

the United States who were already familiar with the FLANAX mark 

from their purchases from BCC in Mexico. We can reasonably 

infer that some subset of those customers would buy BCC’s FLANAX 

upon their return travels to Mexico if not for the alleged 

deception by Belmora. Consequently, BCC meets the Lexmark

pleading requirement as to proximate cause.

BCC may ultimately be unable to prove that Belmora’s 

deception “cause[d] [these consumers] to withhold trade from 

[BCC]” in either circumstance, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391, but 

at the initial pleading stage we must draw all reasonable 

factual inferences in BCC’s favor. Priority Auto Grp., 757 F.3d 

at 139. Having done so, we hold BCC has sufficiently pled a § 

43(a) false association claim to survive Belmora’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. The district court erred in holding otherwise.

c. 

BCC and BHC both assert § 43(a)(1)(B) false advertising 

claims against Belmora. BHC’s claim represents a “typical”

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 27 of 35
28

false advertising case: it falls within the Act’s zone of 

interests by “protecting persons engaged in commerce within the 

control of Congress against unfair competition.” Lexmark, 134 

S. Ct. at 1389 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127). As a direct 

competitor to Belmora in the United States, BHC sufficiently 

alleges that Belmora engaged in Lanham Act unfair competition by 

using deceptive advertisements that capitalized on BCC’s 

goodwill. See J.A. 163 (Compl. ¶ 54) (asserting that Belmora 

was deceptive with “claims in their marketing materials and 

communications with distributors”); Appellees’ Br. 77 

(acknowledging that “BHC is a competitor of Belmora’s in the 

United States naproxen sodium market” and “can in theory bring a 

false advertising action against a competitor”). If not for 

Belmora’s statements that its FLANAX was the same one known and 

trusted in Mexico, some of its consumers could very well have 

instead purchased BHC’s ALEVE brand. These lost customers 

likewise satisfy Lexmark’s second prong: they demonstrate an 

injury to sales or reputation proximately caused by Belmora’s 

alleged conduct. 

BCC’s false advertising claim is perhaps not “typical” as

BCC is a foreign entity without direct sales in the territorial 

United States. Nonetheless, BCC’s claim advances the Act’s 

purpose of “making actionable the deceptive and misleading use

of marks.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. As alleged, 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 28 of 35
29

Belmora’s advertising misrepresents the nature of its FLANAX 

product in that Belmora implies that product is the same as 

consumers purchased in Mexico from BCC and can now buy here.

To be sure, BCC’s false advertising claim overlaps to some 

degree with its false association claim, but the two claims 

address distinct conduct within the two subsections of § 43(a). 

Belmora’s alleged false statements go beyond mere claims of 

false association; they parlay the passed-off FLANAX mark into 

misleading statements about the product’s “nature, 

characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin,” all hallmarks 

of a false advertising claim. Lanham Act 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. 

1125(a)(1)(B).10 

Belmora’s alleged false statements intertwine closely with 

its use of the FLANAX mark. The FLANAX mark denotes history: 

Belmora claims its product has been “used [for] many, many years 

in Mexico” and “Latinos have turned to” it “[f]or generations.” 

J.A. 196. FLANAX also reflects popularity: Belmora says the 

product is “highly recognized [and] top-selling.” Id. And 

FLANAX signifies a history of quality: Belmora maintains that 

Latinos “know, trust and prefer” the product. Id. Each of 

these statements by Belmora thus directly relates to the 

 10 Because each of these claims is anchored as a factual 

matter to the FLANAX mark’s history “in the Latino American 

market,” we disagree with Belmora’s argument that the statements 

amount to mere puffery. See J.A. 160.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 29 of 35
30

“nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin” of 

its FLANAX as being one and the same as that of BCC. Lanham Act 

§ 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). Because these

statements are linked to Belmora’s alleged deceptive use of the 

FLANAX mark, we are satisfied that BCC’s false advertising 

claim, like its false association claim, comes within the Act’s 

zone of interests. As we can comfortably infer that the alleged 

advertisements contributed to the lost border sales pled by BCC, 

the claim also satisfies Lexmark’s proximate cause prong (for 

the same reasons discussed above regarding the false association 

claim). 

d.

We thus conclude that the Lanham Act permits Bayer to 

proceed with its claims under § 43(a) –- BCC with its false 

association claim and both BCC and BHC with false advertising

claims. It is worth noting, as the Supreme Court did in 

Lexmark, that “[a]lthough we conclude that [Bayer] has alleged

an adequate basis to proceed under [§ 43(a)], it cannot obtain 

relief without evidence of injury proximately caused by 

[Belmora’s alleged misconduct]. We hold only that [Bayer] is 

entitled to a chance to prove its case.” 134 S. Ct. at 1395.

In granting Bayer that chance, we are not concluding that

BCC has any specific trademark rights to the FLANAX mark in the 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 30 of 35
31

United States. Belmora owns that mark. But trademark rights do 

not include using the mark to deceive customers as a form of 

unfair competition, as is alleged here. Should Bayer prevail 

and prove its § 43(a) claims, an appropriate remedy might

include directing Belmora to use the mark in a way that does not 

sow confusion. See Lanham Act § 34(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a)

(authorizing injunctions based on “principles of equity”). Of 

course, the precise remedy would be a determination to be made 

by the district court in the first instance upon proper 

evidence.11 We leave any potential remedy to the district 

court’s discretion should this case reach that point. We only 

note that any remedy should take into account traditional 

trademark principles relating to Belmora’s ownership of the 

mark.

B. Cancellation Under Section 14(3)

The TTAB ordered the cancellation of Belmora’s FLANAX 

trademark under § 14(3), finding that the preponderance of the 

 11 For example, a remedy might include altering the font and 

color of the packaging or the “ready remedy” of attaching the 

manufacturer’s name to the brand name. Blinded Veterans, 872 

F.2d at 1047. Another option could be for the packaging to 

display a disclaimer -- to correct for any deliberately created 

actual confusion. See id. (“The district court could, however, 

require [Blinded American Veterans Foundation] to attach a 

prominent disclaimer to its name alerting the public that it is 

not the same organization as, and is not associated with, the 

Blinded Veterans Association.”). 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 31 of 35
32

evidence “readily establishe[d] blatant misuse of the FLANAX 

mark in a manner calculated to trade in the United States on the 

reputation and goodwill of petitioner’s mark created by its use 

in Mexico.” J.A. 142. In reversing that decision and granting

Belmora’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district 

court found that BCC, as the § 14(3) complainant, “lack[ed] 

standing to sue pursuant to Lexmark” under both the zone of 

interests and the proximate cause prongs. J.A. 505. The 

district court also reversed the TTAB’s holding that Belmora was 

using FLANAX to misrepresent the source of its goods “because 

Section 14(3) requires use of the mark in United States commerce 

and Bayer did not use the FLANAX mark in the United States.” 

J.A. 505-06. 

On appeal, Bayer argues that the district court erred in 

overturning the TTAB’s § 14(3) decision because it “read a use 

requirement into the section that is simply not there.” 

Appellants’ Br. 49. For reasons that largely overlap with the 

preceding § 43(a) analysis, we agree with Bayer.

1.

Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act creates a procedure for 

petitioning to cancel the federal registration of a mark that 

the owner has used to misrepresent the source of goods:

A petition to cancel a registration of a mark, stating 

the grounds relied upon, may . . . be filed as follows 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 32 of 35
33

by any person who believes that he is or will be 

damaged . . . by the registration of a mark . . .

. . . . 

(3) At any time . . . if the registered mark is 

being used by, or with the permission of, the 

registrant so as to misrepresent the source of 

the goods or services on or in connection with 

which the mark is used.

Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3). The petitioner must 

establish that the “registrant deliberately sought to pass off 

its goods as those of petitioner.” See 3 McCarthy, § 20:30 (4th 

ed. 2002). 

If successful, the result of a § 14(3) petition “is the 

cancellation of a registration, not the cancellation of a 

trademark.” Id. § 20:40. Cancellation of registration strips

an owner of “important legal rights and benefits” that accompany 

federal registration, but it “does not invalidate underlying 

common law rights in the trademark.” Id. § 20:68; see also B & 

B Hardware Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 

(2015).

To determine what parties § 14(3) authorizes to petition 

for cancellation, we again apply the Lexmark framework. The 

relevant language in § 14(3) closely tracks similar language 

from § 43(a) that the Supreme Court considered in Lexmark: 

“[A]ny person who believes that he is or will be damaged” by the 

mark’s registration may petition for cancellation under § 14(3), 

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 33 of 35
34

just as “any person who believes that he or she is or is likely 

to be damaged” may bring an unfair competition action under 

§ 43(a). The same two-prong inquiry from Lexmark provides the 

mode of analysis.

To determine if a petitioner falls within the protected 

zone of interests, we note that § 14(3) pertains to the same 

conduct targeted by § 43(a) false association actions -- using 

marks so as to misrepresent the source of goods. Therefore,

“[m]ost of the [Lanham Act’s] enumerated purposes are relevant”

to § 14(3) claims as well. See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389. As 

for proximate cause, we once again consider whether the 

plaintiff has “show[n] economic or reputational injury flowing 

directly from the deception wrought by the defendant’s 

[conduct].”12 Id. at 1391. As with § 43(a), neither § 14(3) nor 

Lexmark mandate that the plaintiff have used the challenged mark 

in United States commerce as a condition precedent to its claim. 

See Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 

1278 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In the proceedings before the Board, 

 12 The USPTO suggests that § 14(3) might require a lesser 

showing of causation because it sets forth an administrative

remedy, whereas the Supreme Court based its Lexmark analysis on 

common law requirements for judicial remedies. See Empresa 

Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. 

Cir. 2014) (“A petitioner is authorized by statute to seek 

cancellation of a mark where it has both a real interest in the 

proceedings as well as a reasonable basis for its belief of 

damage.”). We need not resolve this issue for purposes of the 

current decision.

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 34 of 35
35

however, Cubatabaco need not own the mark to cancel the 

Registrations under [Section 14(3)].”). 

2.

Applying the framework from Lexmark, we conclude that the 

Lanham Act authorizes BCC to bring its § 14(3) action against 

Belmora. BCC’s cancellation claim falls within the Lanham Act’s 

zone of interests because it confronts the “deceptive and 

misleading use of marks.” Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 

And BCC has also adequately pled a proximately caused injury to 

survive Belmora’s Rule 12(c) motion for the same reasons 

previously discussed for the false association and false 

advertising claims. The district court thus erred in reversing 

the TTAB’s decision cancelling the registration of Belmora’s 

FLANAX mark. 

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Bayer is 

entitled to bring its unfair competition claims under Lanham Act 

§ 43(a) and its cancellation claim under § 14(3). The district 

court’s judgment is vacated and the case remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

Appeal: 15-1335 Doc: 57 Filed: 03/23/2016 Pg: 35 of 35