Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00342/USCOURTS-azd-4_08-cv-00342-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Neuman
Plaintiff
Postmaster General
Defendant
John Potter
Defendant
United States Postal Service
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jack Neuman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

John Potter, Postmaster General United

States Postal Service, 

Defendant. 

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No. CV 08-342-TUC-FRZ(HCE)

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6). For

the following reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court grant in part

and deny in part without prejudice Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss (hereinafter

“Defendant’s Motion”).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has filed the instant pro se Complaint (Doc. No. 1) pursuant to Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq. (hereinafter “Title VII”),

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §633a (hereinafter “ADEA”).

Plaintiff’s claims arise from his termination from employment as Plant Manager at the

Tucson Mail Processing Plant of the United States Postal Service (hereinafter “USPS”).

(Complaint, ¶9). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him in violation of

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Title VII on the basis of Plaintiff’s race, which is Hispanic; his religion, which is Jewish; and

for his participation in protected activity. (Id. at ¶¶20-22). Plaintiff also alleges that

Defendant discriminated against him in violation of the ADEA on the basis of Plaintiff’s age,

which is over 40. (Id. at ¶¶4, 17-19). Plaintiff further alleges that he 

timely filed his charge of discrimination and retaliation with the Agency and

has completed all administrative requirements prior to the initiative [sic] of this

proceeding. The Plaintiff in this action filed after more than 180 days had

expired in the Administrative Process or after 30 days when notice was given

to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Office of Federal

Operations (OFO), thus giving Plaintiff the right to proceed to Federal Count

[sic] in accordance with 29 C.F.R. 1614 et. seq.

***

Plaintiff has fully complied with all prerequisites to jurisdiction of this Court.

(Id. at ¶¶ 4, 5).

II. DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant seeks

dismissal for lack jurisdiction of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims of discrimination based on race

and religion. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s ADEA claim. In his response to

Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states that he “stands on his ORIGINAL

COMPLAINT.” (Response, p.1 (Doc. No. 16)).

A. Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims of race and

religious discrimination in violation of Title VII because Plaintiff did not exhaust his

administrative remedies prior to filing such claims with this Court. 

1. Standard

 Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal is

appropriate when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a claim. Fed. R. Civ.

12(b)(1). Subject matter jurisdiction involves the power of the court to hear the plaintiff’s

claims in the first place and, therefore, imposes upon courts an affirmative obligation to

ensure that they are acting within the scope of their jurisdictional power. Because federal

courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, it is presumed that a cause lies outside the

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jurisdiction of federal courts unless proven otherwise. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction

exists. Tosco Corp. v. Communities for a Better Environment, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir.

2001); Thornhill Publishing Co. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 594 F.2d 730,

733 (9th Cir. 1979). 

“‘A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction may either attack the

allegations of the complaint or may...’” attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction as

a matter of fact. National Union Fire Insur. Co. v. ESI Ergonomic Solutions, LLC., 342

F.Supp.2d 853 (D. Ariz. 2004) (quoting Thornhill Publishing Co., 594 F.2d at 733). "When

a motion to dismiss attacks the allegations of the complaint as insufficient to confer subject

matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party." Id. (citing Federation of African Amer. Contractors

v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996)). Where the jurisdictional issue can

be separated from the merits of the case, the court may consider the evidence presented with

respect to the jurisdictional issue, resolving factual disputes if necessary. Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733. "When the motion is a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction, a defendant may

'rely on affidavits or any other evidence properly before the Court.'" National Union Fire

Insur. Co., 342 F.Supp.2d at 861 (citing St. Clair v. City of Chico, 880 F.2d 199, 201 (9th

Cir. 1989)); see also Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d. 704, 710 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In

reviewing a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the court may consider affidavits or any other evidence properly

before the Court.”). In the instance of a factual challenge, no presumption of truthfulness

attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not

preclude the court from evaluating the merits of jurisdictional claims. Thornhill, 594 F.2d

at 733.

2. Pertinent Facts

Plaintiff alleges that prior to his termination, he had worked for the USPS for over 27

years. (Complaint, ¶9). He became Tucson Plant Manager in May 2001. (Id.). On

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1

Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint of Discrimination in the Postal Service was set out on a

preprinted form that, among other things, provided boxes for Plaintiff to mark to indicate the

“Type of Discrimination You Are Alleging.” (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 7). The types of

discrimination listed are: race; color; religion, national origin; sex; age; retaliation; and

disability. (Id..). Plaintiff’s EEO Complaint was assigned the following case number: 4F852-0004-05. (Id.).

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September 14, 2004, Plaintiff received a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action: Removal

authored by Carl Grigel, Postmaster for Phoenix, Arizona. (Complaint, ¶15, Defendant’s

Motion, Ex. 1) Therein, Phoenix Postmaster Grigel cited the following charges in support

of the proposed removal: (1) unacceptable conduct; (2) improper influencing of employee’s

testimony; (3) appearance of impropriety; and (4) failure to follow proper procedures.

(Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 1). 

Thereafter, in November 2004, Plaintiff filed an “EEO Complaint of Discrimination

in the Postal Service” alleging that he was discriminated against by Charles Davis, Wayne

Garrison, Carl Grigel and Edie Murietta-Penn on the basis of age and retaliation.1

(Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 7). Plaintiff further alleged that the discriminatory action occurred

on September 17, 2004 when he was issued the Notice of Proposed Adverse Action:

Removal dated September 14, 2004. (Id.). According to Plaintiff, the Notice of proposed

removal was based on charges that “were fabricated as a result of the filing of a harassment

charge by Ms. Brindley; my reporting advances by Wayne Garrison to my supervisor....”

(Id.). In December 2004, Plaintiff was notified that, with regard to his claim of age

discrimination, the ADEA permitted “persons claiming age discrimination to go directly to

court without going through an agency’s administrative complaint procedures.” (Defendant’s

Ex. 8). Plaintiff was also advised as to the procedure and time frames for pursuing his

ADEA claim. (Id.). 

On January 3, 2005, Plaintiff’s complaint in case number 4F-852-0004-05 was

dismissed. (See Defendant’s Ex. 9). In dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint:

[t]he agency defined the claim as whether complainant was subjected to

discrimination on the bases of age (D.O.B. 10/04/52) and reprisal for prior

EEO activity when on September 17, 2004, he was issued a Notice of

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Proposed Adverse Action Removal dated September 14, 2004, charging him

with Unacceptable Conduct, Improper Influencing of Employee’s Testimony,

Appearance of Impropriety, and Failure to Follow Proper Procedures.

(See Id.). The Agency dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim under applicable

regulations because Plaintiff was unable to show that he suffered any concrete harm as a

result of being issued the Notice of proposed removal. (See Id.).

Plaintiff appealed the Agency’s decision. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 3 internal ex. 5).

He claimed that “a number of factors contributed to a pattern of harassment for prohibited

reasons and thus cannot be dismissed for reasons cited by the Agency.” (Id. at p.1). Plaintiff

cited retaliation for his participation in an EEO sexual harassment charge filed by another

employee and retaliation for Plaintiff’s own report to his supervisor “that the District

Manager of Human Resources had made a pass at [Plaintiff]....” (Id. at p.2). On May 20,

2005, the EEOC affirmed the agency’s decision dismissing Plaintiff’s EEO complaint in case

number 4F-852-0004-05. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 9).

While Plaintiff’s appeal of the agency’s dismissal of his retaliation and age claims

in case number 4F-852-0004-05 was pending, District Manager Charles Davis issued a Letter

of Decision dated April 5, 2005 wherein he essentially adopted the charges described in the

Notice of Proposed Adverse Action: Removal dated September 14, 2004, and informed

Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s removal from Postal Service employment effective April 15, 2005.

(Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 2). The Letter of Decision also contained information concerning

the appeal process. In pertinent part, Plaintiff was advised that if he “believe[d] that the

action is based, in whole or in part, on discrimination, you have the option of filing an appeal

with the M[erit] S[ystems] P[rotection] B[oard] [hereinafter “MSPB”] or filing an EEO

complaint with the Postal Service....If you file an EEO complaint, you will have no further

right concurrently to appeal the matter to the MSPB.” (Id. at p. 24).

On April 25, 2005, Plaintiff through counsel, filed an appeal of Mr. Davis’ April 5,

2005 Decision Letter challenging the removal decision on several grounds. (Defendant’s

Motion, Ex. 3) In filing his appeal, Plaintiff used the “Merit System Protection Board Appeal

Form” and he attached additional documentation to that form. In response to the form

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2

The November 27, 1999 EEO Complaint referenced by Plaintiff in his appeal was

filed against Paul Harris and Charles Davis on the basis of national origin discrimination and

retaliation. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 3 internal ex. 4). Therein, Plaintiff alleged

“[r]etaliation: [b]ased on prior EEO activity against Paul Harris. National origin: the

selection of Art Zastro [for the Plant Manager position] was to the exclusion of a better

qualified hispanic mail [sic] (Jack Neuman).” (Id.). In a December 28, 1999 statement,

Plaintiff provided additional information concerning his claim that he was not selected for

the Tucson Plant manager position because of discrimination based on national origin and

retaliation.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint filed with this Court, that prior to 2001,

he had applied for but not been selected to fill the position of Tucson Plant Manager.

(Complaint, ¶10). When he was not selected for the position, he filed “a discrimination

complaint against the Deciding Official, Charles Davis, on the grounds of retaliation and

national origin, as [Plaintiff] felt he was better qualified for the position than the individual

selected. The Plaintiff later withdrew the action after his eventual promotion in 2001 to the

Tucson Plant Manager position; Senior Plant Manager, Paul Harris, selected the Plaintiff for

the position and Davis concurred.” (Id.). 

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inquiry whether Plaintiff believed the action he was appealing violated the law, Plaintiff

indicated that the removal decision violated Title VII. When responding to the form inquiry

as to how such law was violated, Plaintiff responded “Retaliation” and referred to paragraphs

5, 7, and 10 of an attachment to his appeal form:

5. Charles Davis, District Manager, Arizona District, USPS, the Deciding

Official is biased and removed Appellant in retaliation for Appellant

naming Davis in an EEO complaint filed on 11/27/99, see attached

exhibit 4..[2]

***

7. The investigation was influenced by Wayne Garrison, District Director

of Human Resources, Arizona District, USPS, Appellant had refused

a homosexual advance by Mr. Garrison and reported the sexual

harassment to his superior.

***

10. Removed Appellant for participating in EEO process wherein he is

named as a witness in a sexual harassment/retaliation claim against the

Postal Service [EEOC No. 350-2005-00084X and USPS Case No. 47-

852-004-05 [sic], see attached exhibit 5. 

(Id.). (emphasis in original).

In response to the following form instruction:

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If you believe you were discriminated against by the agency in connection

with the matter appealed, because of your race color, religion, sex, national

origin, marital status, political affiliation, disability, or age, indicate so and

explain why you believe it to be true

Plaintiff wrote “Retaliation” and again cited paragraphs 5, 7, and 10 of his attachment as set

forth above with regard to his allegation under Title VII. (Id.) (emphasis omitted). In

answering other appeal form inquiries, Plaintiff also indicated that the removal decision was

taken because of whistleblowing activity in light of a July 7, 2004 letter he sent to the Office

of the Inspector General concerning inquiries Plaintiff had made “into the performance and

misconduct...” of two other USPS employees with regard to “the fact that the Tucson Plant

was significantly overrunning Total Operating Expenses....” (Defendant’s Ex. 3 internal ex.

6). In the July 7, 2004 letter, Plaintiff asserted that his inquiries resulted in an investigation

of himself and the filing “of false allegations [against him] in order to redirect the

investigation away from...” those people who had been the focus of Plaintiff’s inquiries.

(Id.). 

In February and March 2006, Plaintiff’s appeal came on for hearing before MSPB

Administrative Law Judge James A. Kasic (hereinafter “the ALJ”). (See Defendant’s

Motion, Ex. 4) On December 19, 2006, the ALJ issued his Initial Decision wherein, inter

alia, he: (1) dismissed Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation for having previously filed EEO case

number 4F-852-0004-05; and (2) mitigated the removal action to a demotion to the Manager

of Distribution Operations position that Plaintiff held prior to taking the Plant Manager

position from which he was removed. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 4). The Postal Service

appealed the ALJ’s decision and on March 4, 2008, the full MSPB reversed the ALJ’s order

on the issue of mitigation and sustained Plaintiff’s removal. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 5).

In the March 4, 2008 decision, the MSPB noted that Plaintiff had not filed a cross-petition

for review to challenge the ALJ’s finding concerning Plaintiff’s claim of retaliation. (Id. at

p.3).

Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Petition with the EEOC, Office of Federal Operations,

requesting review of the MSPB’s March 4, 2008 Opinion and Order. (See Defendant’s

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Motion, Ex. 6). The EEOC pointed out that “the Board noted that petitioner did not

challenge the finding regarding his retaliation claims.” (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 6, p.1).

The EEOC upheld the MSPB’s March 4, 2008 decision, as follows, in pertinent part:

Based upon a thorough review of the record, it is the decision of the

Commission to concur with the final decision of the MSPB finding no

discrimination. Petitioner failed to show that the agency’s reasons for

removing him were a pretext for retaliation. The Commission finds that the

MSPB’s decision constitutes a correct interpretation of the laws, rules,

regulations, and policies governing this matter and is supported by the

evidence in the record as a whole.

(Id. at p.2). 

On June 5, 2008, Plaintiff filed the instant action. 

3. Analysis

Defendant points out that Plaintiff failed to raise race or religion “during any portion

of his MSPB appeal.” (Defendant’s Motion, p.3). According to Defendant, Plaintiff’s

allegations of race and religious discrimination must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction

because Plaintiff failed to exhaust such claims as required by Title VII.

“In order to bring a Title VII claim in district court, a plaintiff must first exhaust [his

or] her administrative remedies.” Sommatino, 255 F.3d at 707-708 (citations omitted)

(affirming district court’s dismissal of Title VII claims for lack of jurisdiction). The Supreme

Court has held that failure to file a timely administrative complaint is not a jurisdictional

prerequisite to a Title VII claim, but is merely a statutory requirement subject to waiver,

estoppel, and equitable tolling. Id. at 708 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455

U.S. 385, 393 (1982)). Nonetheless, “substantial compliance with the presentment of

discrimination complaints to an appropriate administrative agency is a jurisdictional

prerequisite.” Id. at 708 (emphasis in original).

Ordinarily, when a federal employee such as Plaintiff asserts a discrimination claim

pursuant to Title VII, “[h]e or she must initially file a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Office of his or her agency. Once the agency issues a final decision, the

complainant may file an appeal of the agency resolution with the Equal Employment

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3

An employee may also file an action in district court if, after 180 days from the date

of appealing to the EEOC, the EEOC has not issued a final decision on the matter. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1614.407(d) (2008).

4

The MSPB is a quasi-judicial Government agency which was created by the Civil

Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et. seq., “to adjudicate Federal employee appeals of

agency personnel actions. The MSPB is charged with overseeing and protecting the merit

system, and adjudicating conflicts between Federal employees and employers.” Sloan, 140

F.3d at 1258-1259. The MSPB has pendant jurisdiction over discrimination claims brought

in connection with an “adverse action” otherwise appealable to the MSPB. Id. (citing 29

C.F.R. § 1614.302(1997)). 

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Opportunity Commission, or alternatively, file a civil suit in federal district court.”3

 Sloan

v. West, 140 F.3d 1255, 1260 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 29 C.F.R. §1614.310(a) (1997); 32

C.F.R. §588.26(f) (1997); 32 C.F.R. § 588 app.A, 1 (1997)) (footnotes omitted).

Additionally, when a federal employee such as Plaintiff “claims he or she has been

affected by both an ‘adverse employment action’ and a related Title VII violation,

administrative remedies may be exhausted for Title VII purposes by asserting both claims

before the MSPB.”4

 Id. (citing McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 1995)). This

type of case is known as a “mixed case complaint” which means that the complaint alleges

the employee suffered an adverse employment action that was affected, in whole or in part,

by unlawful discrimination. Id. Further, the term “mixed case appeal” refers to a case which

presents an appealable non-discrimination claim coupled with a discrimination claim. Id.

(citing 29 C.F.R. 1614.302(a)(2) (1997)). 

The employee “may initially file a mixed case complaint with an agency...or an

appeal on the same matter with the MSPB pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.5, but not both.” 29

C.F.R. §1614.302(b)(2006) (the employee “may not initially file both a mixed case complaint

and an appeal on the same matter....”). Once an employee has chosen the option of

proceeding before the MSPB, he or she must exhaust his or her claims in that forum before

filing a civil court action. McAdams, 64 F.3d at 1142. 

Generally, this Court lacks jurisdiction over incidents not listed in the plaintiff

employee’s administrative claim unless the allegations in the court action are “like or

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reasonably related to the allegations of the EEOC charge.” Stache v. International Union of

Bricklayers, 852 F.2d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 1988)(citation omitted); see also Leong v. Potter,

347 F.3d 1117, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). In determining whether an allegation under Title VII

is like or reasonably related to allegations contained in the administrative claim, “the court

inquires whether the original EEOC investigation would have encompassed the additional

charges.” Green v. Los Angeles County, 883 F.2d 1472, 1476 (9th Cir. 1989), overruled on

other grounds by National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002). This

evaluation “is not limited to the actual EEOC investigation, but can include the scope of an

‘EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of

discrimination.’” Sosa v. Hiraoka, 920 F.2d 1451, 1456 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Green, 883

F.2d at 1476) (emphasis in original). In making this determination, the Ninth Circuit views

the Plaintiff’s claim “with the utmost liberality.” Yamaguchi v. United States Dep’t. of the

Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997). In determining that a claim is reasonably

related, the Ninth Circuit has examined the text of the plaintiff’s administrative charge, Id.,

and whether a plaintiff attempts to litigate a new theory of discrimination not previously

presented through the appropriate administrative process. See Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital &

Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268, 271-272 (9th Cir. 1981). For example, where the plaintiff

alleged sex and national origin discrimination before the EEOC, the Ninth Circuit has refused

to consider additional claims of “race, color and religious discrimination” even though that

plaintiff “relie[d] on the same employer actions to demonstrate discrimination under...” these

new theories never investigated by the EEOC. Shah, 642 F.2d at 272.

Plaintiff herein elected to proceed before the MSPB and to file a mixed-case appeal

wherein he alleged violations of Title VII in the form of retaliation for prior EEO activity and

for complaining to his supervisor about alleged homosexual advances directed at him by the

Director of Human Resources. (See Defendant’s Ex. 3). Plaintiff also alleged retaliation for

his “whistleblowing” activity concerning other employees’ conduct and lack of compliance

with management procedures. (See Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 3). At no time during the

administrative proceeding did Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, raise the specific

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issue of race or religious discrimination. Nor did he cite any grounds to support such

theories. Further, Plaintiff’s current claims of race and religious discrimination are not akin,

i.e. like or reasonably related to, his allegations of retaliation nor could these new theories

reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination Plaintiff presented to the

MSPB and EEOC. See e.g., Green, 883 F.2d at 1476; Leong, 347 F.3d at 1121; Shah, 642

F.2d at 272. Under such circumstances, Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his Title VII claims

of discrimination based on race and religion.

To the extent that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement “is subject to waiver, equitable

estoppel, and tolling”, there has been no showing on the instant record that Plaintiff is

entitled to equitable relief to allow him to proceed on his claims of race and religious

discrimination. Leong, 347 F.3d at 1122-1123 (citations omitted). Consequently, the Court

lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Title VII claims of discrimination based on race and

religion and such claims must be dismissed. See Leong, 347 F.3d 1117 (affirming dismissal

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to exhaust claim and plaintiff was

not entitled to equitable relief to allow such claim); Sommatino, 255 F.3d 704 (affirming

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to present claims to the appropriate

administrative authority and no ground for equitable relief applied).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s ADEA

claim on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted. Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to pursue his ADEA claim within the

mandatory time limits and according to the manner prescribed under the statute. Defendant

acknowledges that the mandatory time limits are not jurisdictional. (Defendant’s Motion,

p.6 (citing Forester v. Chertoff, 500 F.3d 920, 929 (9th Cir. 2007)). In support of his Partial

Motion to Dismiss, Defendant has attached several documents including an affidavit from

an employee of the EEOC indicating that Plaintiff failed to file a notice of intent to sue with

regard to his ADEA claim. (Defendant’s Motion, Ex. 10). 

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In his Complaint filed with this Court, Plaintiff alleges that he completed all

administrative requirements prior to filing the instant action and that this action is filed

within the appropriate time frames. (Complaint, ¶4).

Unlike Rule 12(b)(1) which permits consideration of evidence outside the pleadings,

Rule 12(b)(6) does not allow for consideration of evidence outside the pleadings except in

limited circumstances not applicable herein. Under Rule 12(d), if the Court considers

documents outside the pleadings when resolving a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),

such motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. It is within the Court’s discretion

whether to consider documents outside the pleadings and, thus, convert the motion to dismiss

to a motion for summary judgment. See Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 5C

Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1366 (Civil 3d. ed. 2004) (“federal courts have complete

discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the

pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby

converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it.”). Given Plaintiff’s allegations

that he has satisfied all administrative requirements including compliance with applicable

time limits, resolution of Defendant’s Motion necessarily requires consideration of

documents attached to Defendant’s Motion.

The standard for a motion for summary judgment differs from the standard for a

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the Rules of Practice of the U.S.

District Court for the District of Arizona require that the moving party file a separate

statement of facts in support of a motion for summary judgment. See LR Civ. 56.1(a). The

Local Rule also imposes obligations upon the party opposing such motion. See LR Civ.

56.1(b). Given Plaintiff’s pro se status, Defendant’s arguments are more appropriately

addressed within the context of a motion for summary judgment filed pursuant to

Fed.R.Cvi.P. 56 and in compliance with the applicable Local Rule. Therefore, the Magistrate

Judge recommends the District Court decline to consider the documents filed in support of

Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion and deny such motion without prejudice with leave to

renew as a motion for summary judgment if Defendant so chooses.

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III. RECOMMENDATION

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court

GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART WITHOUT PREJUDICE Defendant’s Partial

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6). Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss should be granted

to the extent that the Plaintiff’s Title VII claims of discrimination based on race and religion

should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction. The

remainder of Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss, which is filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6), should be denied without prejudice and with leave to refile as a motion for

summary judgment if Defendant so chooses.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

ten days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may

respond to another party's objections within ten days after being served with a copy thereof.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). If objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number:

CV 08-342-TUC-FRZ.

Failure to file timely objections to any factual or legal determination of the Magistrate

Judge may be deemed a waiver of the party’s right to de novo review of the issues. See

United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S.

900 (2003).

DATED this 14th day of August, 2009.

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