Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03115/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03115-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrin A. Perkins
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 18, 1998 Decided March 20, 1998

No. 96-3115

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DERRIN A. PERKINS,

APPELLANT

No. 96-3116

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANDRE P. WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

______

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No. 96-3117

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MCKINLEY L. BOARD,

APPELLANT

No. 96-3149

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GREGORY M. THOMAS,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 91cr00559-09) 

(No. 91cr00559-11) 

(No. 91cr00559-13) 

(No. 91cr00559-16) 

(No. 91cr00559-22)

Andrew Grosso, appointed by the court, argued the cause 

for the appellants. James Maloney, Paul Kay, Mary E. 

Davis and Marian Flynn, appointed by the court, were on 

the joint brief.

Michael A. Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Mary Lou Leary, United 

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States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and John R. 

Fisher, Thomas C. Black and Carmen R. Kelley, Assistant 

United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge; WILLIAMS and HENDERSON, 

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The appellants, 

McKinley Board, Gregory Thomas, Donnell Williams, Andre 

Williams and Derrin Perkins, were all convicted of drug 

conspiracy charges. They challenge the district court's denial 

of their motion for new trial based on a letter allegedly 

written after trial by government witness Stepfoun Hartwell 

that purported to recant Hartwell's trial testimony and to 

describe witness tampering by prosecutors. At the new trial 

hearings Hartwell refused to testify invoking his right against 

self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. The appellants contend that the district 

judge erred in failing to secure Hartwell's testimony either by 

granting him use immunity from prosecution or by finding he 

had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. We hold that the 

district judge lacked authority to grant immunity without a 

request from the United States Attorney and that neither the 

letter nor Hartwell's trial testimony constituted waiver of his 

Fifth Amendment privilege.

I.

The appellants were defendants in the second of four trials 

of members of the "R Street Crew," so called because they 

sold narcotics near the intersection of R Street and Lincoln 

Road in Northeast Washington, D.C. Among the government's trial witnesses were Hartwell, Frankie Pelham, Kenneth Sparrow and William O. Mayo, each of whom testified 

about his dealings with members of the R Street Crew. On 

February 11, 1993 the jury convicted all but one of the 

defendants of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with 

intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 

and 846, and of conspiracy to participate in a racketeer 

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influenced corrupt organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1962(d).1 The district judge sentenced each convicted defendant to life imprisonment.

On January 28, 1995 Lawrence E. Freedman, a Fairfax, 

Virginia lawyer, sent the district judge a handwritten letter 

purportedly signed by Hartwell. The letter recited that 

prosecutors had rehearsed the author's testimony with him 

before trial and that the "majority" of his testimony had been 

false and had been induced by prosecutors through bribery 

and threats. The letter also claimed that prosecutors allowed 

Hartwell, who was incarcerated at the time, to engage in 

sexual activity and to use alcohol and marihuana in return for 

his testimony. In a cover letter Freedman stated that Hartwell had sworn to him that the letter's contents were true.

On February 10, 1995 the appellants filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 for a new trial 

based on newly discovered evidence, namely Hartwell's letter. 

They later supplemented the motion with written statements 

from Pelham, Sparrow and Mayo recanting their trial testimony and alleging similar prosecutorial misconduct. On September 12, 1995 the district judge conducted a hearing to 

determine whether Hartwell was willing or could be compelled to testify in the new trial proceedings. At the hearing 

Hartwell invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. In an order and memorandum opinion dated 

September 14, 1995 the judge held that Hartwell had claimed 

a valid privilege and that he had not waived it.

The government subsequently filed proffers of testimony 

from Pelham, Sparrow and Mayo asserting that their trial 

testimony had been truthful and that they had neither been 

coerced nor received special favors or bribes from prosecutors. In addition, Sparrow's proffer asserted that Hartwell 

had signed his recantation "under duress" from appellant 

Board. At hearings conducted on November 3, 1995 and 

January 4, 1996 Sparrow, Mayo and Pelham each testified 

__________

1 Defendant Steve Williams was acquitted of all charges against 

him. Of the other defendants all but Andre Williams were convicted of other related offenses as well.

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that his trial testimony had been truthful and had not been 

influenced by prosecutorial misconduct. The district judge 

issued a memorandum opinion on September 6, 1996, denying 

the motion for new trial and again concluding that Hartwell's 

Fifth Amendment privilege protected him from testifying.

II.

The appellants challenge the denial of their motion for new 

trial on the grounds that (1) the district judge should have 

granted Hartwell use immunity and (2) Hartwell waived his 

Fifth Amendment privilege.

Immunity

The appellants first assert the district judge erred in not 

granting Hartwell use immunity from prosecution for his 

testimony at the new trial hearings, thereby averting the 

possibility of self-incrimination and the need to invoke the 

Fifth Amendment. We disagree.

It is true that a district judge is authorized by statute to 

immunize a witness claiming a Fifth Amendment privilege

but only "upon the request of the United States attorney." 

18 U.S.C. § 6003. The government made no such request of 

the district judge and the judge therefore lacked authority to 

invoke the statute. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 

616-17 (1984) ("We decline to extend the jurisdiction of courts 

to include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence 

of the formal request that the statute requires."); see also 

United States v. Lugg, 892 F.2d 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 

("The cases are legion and uniform that only the Executive 

can grant statutory immunity, not a court. We are not an 

exception to this universal rule and have previously approved 

the view that 'it is not the proper business of the trial judge 

to inquire into the propriety of the prosecution's refusal to 

grant use immunity to a prospective witness.' ") (citations 

omitted). The appellants nevertheless urge that we recognize 

an "inherent" judicial authority to grant use immunity without regard to the statute or to the government's position. In 

the past we have repeatedly rejected claims of judicial authorUSCA Case #96-3115 Document #339391 Filed: 03/20/1998 Page 5 of 9
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ity to grant such immunity. In Ellis v. United States, 416 

F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969), we observed that, in enacting the 

immunity statute, the Congress had "acted with care and 

particularity, limiting the power to grant immunityin the 

presence of a valid claim of privilegeto a limited group of 

federal officials" and therefore concluded that "[w]ith that 

statute on the books, the power to grant immunity is plainly 

outside the judicial province." 416 F.2d at 796-97. In United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. 

denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982), we upheld the district court's 

refusal to grant immunity, approving the view that " 'it is not 

the proper business of the trial judge to inquire into the 

propriety of the prosecution's refusal to grant use immunity 

to a prospective witness.' " 668 F.2d at 1283 (quoting United 

States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 779 (2d Cir. 1980) (Lombard, 

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 1077 (1981)). Finally, in United States v. Lugg, we 

concluded that "the District Judge did not err in not granting 

immunity that he could not grant nor in not ordering the 

prosecution to grant immunity when he could not so order," 

stressing that "the court had no power to order such immunity." 892 F.2d at 104. Under circuit precedent, therefore, the 

district judge lacked authority to grant Hartwell use immunity.2 Accordingly his failure to do so was not error.

__________

2

In Lugg the court noted that "[s]ome cases have indicated that 

the government may be compelled to grant a defense witness 

immunity in 'extraordinary circumstances.' " 892 F.2d at 104 (citing United States v. Pinto, 850 F.2d 927, 935 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,

488 U.S. 867 and 488 U.S. 932 (1988); United States v. Praetorius,

622 F.2d 1054, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980)). 

"At least the Seventh and Ninth Circuits," the Lugg court observed, 

"have indicated that courts may intervene in the prosecutorial 

immunity decision '[w]here the prosecutor's decision not to grant a 

witness use immunity has distort[ed] the judicial fact-finding process.' " Id. (quoting United States v. Paris, 827 F.2d 395, 403 (9th 

Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting; citing United States v. Taylor,

728 F.2d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 

1079, 1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976)). Without 

deciding "[w]hether or not we would join the Seventh and Ninth 

Circuits in this view were we presented with an appropriate case," 

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Waiver

Next, the appellants assert that Hartwell waived his Fifth 

Amendment privilege by testifying at trial and by writing the 

letter. We agree with the district court that there was no 

waiver.

In support of waiver the appellants rely on Rogers v. 

United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951), and, in particular, on the 

statement therein that " '[i]f the witness himself elects to 

waive his privilege, as he may doubtless do, since the privilege is for his protection and not for that of other parties, and 

discloses his criminal connections, he is not permitted to stop, 

but must go on and make a full disclosure.' " 340 U.S. at 372 

(quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896)) (footnote 

omitted). Construing Rogers we have held that "where a 

non-indicted witness has waived his Fifth Amendment privilege by testifying before a grand jury voluntarily and with 

knowledge of his privilege, his waiver extends to a subsequent 

__________

the Lugg court concluded that "[w]hatever it takes to constitute a 

deprivation of a fair trial by the prosecution's failure to exercise its 

broad discretion on immunity grants, the present case does not 

present it." Id. We reach the same conclusion here. The appellants argue that the prosecution's failure to immunize Hartwell for 

testimony he might provide during the new trial proceedings somehow deprived the trial itself of fairness. We fail to see the logic in 

this. If anything could be said to have affected the trial's fairness it 

would have been the prosecutorial misconduct before and during 

trial alleged in the Hartwell recantation letter, not the post-trial 

lack of immunity. And we cannot accept the allegations of the 

letter which the district court rejected as unworthy of belief. See

App. exh. 4 at 20, 22-23; United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 

F.3d 1028, 1037 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The district court's factual finding 

regarding whether the government did intentionally distort the factfinding process is reviewed for clear error."), cert. denied, 66 

U.S.L.W. 3557 (Feb. 23, 1998) (No. 97-7425); cf. United States v. 

Simmons, 699 F.2d 1250, 1253 (D.C. Cir.) (Edwards, J, dissenting) 

(district court finding that "prosecutor's conduct neither denied 

[defendant's] right to call a defense witness nor deprived him of a 

fair trial" subject to "clearly erroneous" review), cert. denied, 464 

U.S. 835 (1983).

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trial based on an indictment returned by the grand jury that 

heard his testimony." Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791, 

805 (D.C. Cir. 1969). At the same time, however, we cautioned that "[t]he privilege of course remains as to matters 

that would subject the witness to a 'real danger' of further 

crimination." Id. at 802 (quoting Hoffman v. United States,

341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951)). Because Hartwell never disclosed 

at trial that the testimony he was offering might be false, any 

post-trial testimony indicating that it waseven a simple 

acknowledgment that he wrote the recantation letterposed 

"a 'real danger' of further crimination." His trial testimony 

therefore cannot be construed as a waiver of the privilege he 

later invoked. See United States v. Wilcox, 450 F.2d 1131, 

1141 (5th Cir. 1971) ("And so when a witness is asked a 

question that could show that he had already committed a 

crime, i.e., perjury at a prior trial, his refusal to answer is 

permissible almost by the definition of self-incrimination. He 

is still criminally accountable for his perjury, but he may not 

be convicted out of his own mouth over his claim of privilege."), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 917 (1972).

Finally, we conclude the recantation letter was not a waiver 

of Hartwell's Fifth Amendment privilege. The appellants 

contend that the letter waived Hartwell's privilege against 

testifying about the truthfulness of his trial testimony just as 

the grand jury testimony in Ellis was found to have waived a 

witness's privilege as to its subject-matter. In Ellis, however, the court emphasized the importance to its holding of the 

"credibility and reliability" that necessarily attaches to grand 

jury testimony. 416 F.2d at 805 n.37. No such authority 

supports the contents of the recantation letter, which the 

district judge accurately characterized as "an undated, unsworn hearsay statement which has not been authenticated," 

App. exh. 4 at 22, and "wholly lacking in credibility," id. at 23; 

see also id. at 20. Accordingly, we cannot accept the letter as 

a waiver.3

__________

3 Nor does the record show, as it did in Ellis, that Hartwell 

intended a knowing and voluntary waiver of privilege. See 416 F.2d 

at 806 (noting that defendant "expressly stated to the grand jury 

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For the preceding reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is

Affirmed.

__________

that he had consulted a lawyer prior to going before the grand jury; 

that he wished to cooperate with the Government though he understood he did not have to; that this cooperation was voluntary, and 

that he knew anything he said could be used against him").

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