Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01663/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01663-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General United States of America
Respondent
Jose Juan Chavez-Alvarez
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________

No. 16-1663

________________

JOSE JUAN CHAVEZ-ALVAREZ,

Petitioner

v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Respondent

________________

On Petition for Review of a Final Order 

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew Arthur

(No. A092-167-374)

________________

Argued January 17, 2017

Before: AMBRO, VANASKIE, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: March 9, 2017)

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Craig R. Shagin, Esquire (Argued)

The Shagin Law Group

120 South Street

The Inns of St. Jude

Harrisburg, PA 17101

Counsel for Petitioner

Benjamin C. Mizer

 Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

 Civil Division

Anthony P. Nicastro

 Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation

Sabatino F. Leo, Esquire (Argued)

Hillel R. Smith, Esquire

U.S. Department of Justice

P.O. Box 878, Ben Franklin Station

Washington, DC 20044

Counsel for Respondent

________________

OPINION OF THE COURT

________________

AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Petitioner Jose Juan Chavez-Alvarez appears before us 

again, this time challenging a second decision of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) that he be removed, among 

other things, for committing sodomy while serving in the 

United States Army. In the simplest of terms, the BIA 

reasoned that the President—through his delegated authority 

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to define punishments for those who commit military 

crimes—essentially could create the definition of those 

crimes himself. He cannot, as the latter is a power reserved to 

Congress. We therefore grant the petition for review and 

reverse the BIA’s decision.

I. BACKGROUND

Chavez-Alvarez is a citizen of Mexico. He entered 

the United States without admission or parole but became a 

lawful permanent resident in 1989. Following the adjustment 

of his status, he served in the United States Army for over 

twelve years. 

While deployed to South Korea in August 2000, 

Chavez-Alvarez assaulted an intoxicated female platoon 

member by penetrating her vagina with his fingers and 

performing oral sex on her without consent. When 

questioned about the incident by military officials, ChavezAlvarez denied the allegations against him on two separate 

occasions. After formal charges were brought before a courtmartial, he entered into a stipulation of fact admitting the 

assault. The military judge accordingly convicted him of 

violating three sections of the Uniform Code of Military 

Justice (the “Code”) as enacted at the time of his conviction: 

Article 107 (10 U.S.C. § 907) for making false official 

statements when he had earlier denied the allegations against 

him (two separate violations, one for each statement); Article 

125 (10 U.S.C. § 925) for sodomy; and Article 134 (10 

U.S.C. § 934) for adultery and indecent assault. He was 

discharged and confined for 18 months. 

Nearly a decade later, Chavez-Alvarez was detained 

by the Department of Homeland Security and charged as 

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removable because, under § 237, 8 U.S.C. §1227,

1 of the 

Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”), he had been 

convicted of an aggravated felony with a term of 

imprisonment of at least one year, see 8 U.S.C. §§ 

1101(a)(43)(F), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and two or more crimes 

involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme 

of criminal misconduct, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 

The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) found him removable under 

both provisions of § 237 of the INA, determined he was 

ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under INA § 212(h), 

and ordered him removed to Mexico. The BIA affirmed the 

IJ’s decision that Chavez-Alvarez was removable under 8 

U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he committed the 

aggravated felony of forcible sodomy after his admission to 

the United States. It held off determining whether he was 

also removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) 

(committing two separate crimes involving moral turpitude).

On appeal, we reversed the BIA because it incorrectly 

determined that Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction 

resulted in a term of imprisonment of one year or more. 

Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 783 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 

2015). Because there was no specific proof in the record 

“regarding the way in which the sentence was rendered as to 

each charge” by the military judge, it was impossible to 

determine whether the apportionment of the sentence as to his 

aggravated felony conviction was at least one year. Id. at 

483-84. Accordingly, we remanded to the BIA.

With the case back, it concluded that Chavez-Alvarez 

was nonetheless removable under the crimes-involvingmoral-turpitude provision of the INA. He argued that he was 

 

1 We refer interchangeably to the INA section and that 

in the U.S. Code. 

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only convicted of sodomy, a constitutionally protected 

activity under Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The 

BIA disagreed, determining that because Chavez-Alvarez’s 

particular crime was subject to a sentence enhancement 

because it was committed forcibly, and because the 

application of the enhancement in his case was the 

“functional equivalent” of a conviction for the enhanced 

offense, he was convicted of forcible sodomy. Finding that 

this was a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA also 

determined that his two false-statements convictions were 

separate crimes of moral turpitude that were not within the 

same criminal scheme as that of his forcible sodomy 

conviction. Hence the BIA found him removable, and he 

petitions us for review.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final removal 

order under INA § 242(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Our 

jurisdiction here is limited to review whether there is a 

colorable constitutional claim or question of law. Id. We 

review legal questions de novo. Valansi v. Ashcroft, 278 F.3d 

203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002). “When the BIA issues its own 

decision on the merits, rather than a summary affirmance, we 

review its decision, not that of the IJ.” Syblis v. Att’y Gen. of 

U.S., 763 F.3d 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted). 

III. ANALYSIS

On appeal, Chavez-Alvarez contends that his 

convictions arose from a “single scheme” of criminal 

misconduct and thus he is not subject to removal. He also 

asserts that he was convicted of sodomy—not forcible 

sodomy—and the former is not a crime involving moral 

turpitude. We address each issue in turn. 

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A. The BIA’s Interpretation of a “Single 

Scheme” Is Reasonable

Per 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), the Government may 

remove an alien who is convicted of “two or more crimes 

involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a single scheme 

of criminal misconduct,” after his admission to the United 

States. Chavez-Alvarez claims that his two convictions of 

alleged crimes involving moral turpitude—his sodomy 

offense and making false statements—stem from the same 

scheme of criminal misconduct. The rationale is that because

only seven hours elapsed between the commissions of the two 

crimes and there is no evidence that he was not intoxicated 

throughout that time, Chavez-Alvarez had not yet dissociated 

himself from his single criminal enterprise when he made 

false statements following the assault.

The BIA deems a single scheme to exist “where one 

crime constituted a lesser offense of another, or where the two 

crimes flow from and are the natural consequence of a single 

act of criminal misconduct.” Matter of Adetiba, 20 I. & N. 

Dec. 506, 509 (BIA 1992). No single scheme exists simply 

because the acts may be the same, be similar in character, or 

even because one may closely follow the other. Id. At least 

five other Courts have affirmed this interpretation as 

reasonable and within the latitude the BIA possesses in 

interpreting the INA under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 

Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 

See, e.g., Balogun v. INS, 31 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1994); 

Akindemowo v. INS, 61 F.3d 282 (4th Cir. 1995); Iredia v. 

INS, 981 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1993); Abdelqadar v. Gonzales, 

413 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2005); Thanh Huu Nguyen v. INS, 991 

F.2d 621 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 

253 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cabranes, J., concurring); Hyacinthe v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 215 F. App’x 856 (11th Cir. 2007). All agree 

there is no clear definition of “single scheme” within the INA. 

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Thus there is a presumption that we defer to the agency’s 

interpretation of that phrase so long as it is reasonable. See 

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45. Indeed, that interpretation need 

not be the most reasonable. Iredia, 981 F.2d at 849. Finding 

no issue with the BIA’s construction of a “single scheme,” we 

join our fellow Courts in concluding that the BIA’s 

interpretation is reasonable. 

Here the BIA ruled that, although the two crimes were 

committed hours apart, there was a substantial interruption of 

time between them. It determined that making false 

statements with the intent to deceive was of such a different 

nature than sodomy that the former did not flow from nor was 

the natural consequence of the latter. The BIA further noted 

that neither is a lesser crime of the other. Given the lapse in 

time, Chavez-Alvarez had the opportunity to reflect on what 

he had done but chose—on two separate occasions—to make 

false statements denying his actions. Thus the BIA was 

correct to affirm the IJ’s finding that Chavez-Alvarez’s 

alleged commission of two crimes involving moral turpitude 

was not from a single scheme of criminal misconduct.

B. Chavez-Alvarez’s Sodomy Conviction

At the heart of this appeal is whether the BIA correctly 

determined that Chavez-Alvarez’s sodomy conviction was 

one of moral turpitude, thereby making him removable under 

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii). The BIA concluded that the 

conviction was for forcible sodomy, which is akin to rape and 

therefore a crime involving moral turpitude. Chavez-Alvarez 

challenges that ruling, insisting that he only was convicted of 

“sodomy” under the Code, as “forcible sodomy” appears 

nowhere in the statute that he violated. (As will be discussed 

later, this distinction is important to Chavez-Alvarez’s 

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removability if “sodomy” is not a crime involving moral 

turpitude.) 

The Government contends that, because the charging 

document accused Chavez-Alvarez of forcible sodomy 

(which was proven beyond a reasonable doubt by his 

stipulation of fact), this was the offense he committed. And, 

the contention continues, when the crime of sodomy is 

committed forcibly, Article 125 of the Manual for CourtsMartial (the “Manual”) allows the military judge to enhance 

the punishment imposed. From this the Government asserts 

that the Manual (which lists various sentence enhancements 

based on the specific circumstances of sodomy convictions), 

when read as a complement to the Code, creates divisible 

crimes—here, consensual sodomy and forcible sodomy. If 

so, we may look to Chavez-Alvarez’s specific conduct to 

determine which of these divisible crimes he committed, and 

thus bypass the controlling categorical approach that we 

would normally use in reviewing his claim. See Partyka v. 

Att’y Gen. of U.S., 417 F.3d 408, 411 (3d. Cir. 2005). We 

disagree.2

When determining whether a conviction becomes one

of moral turpitude for the purposes of removal under the INA, 

we apply the categorical approach: we “look to the elements 

of the statutory . . . offense, not to the specific facts 

[underlying the particular offense], reading the applicable 

 

2 The Government requests that we remand this case to 

the BIA to determine if the Code and the Manual collectively 

create separate sodomy offenses, and thus whether the 

modified categorical approach should apply in light of Mathis 

v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). Because that is a 

legal question that we resolve, remand is unnecessary, and we 

deny the Government’s motion to remand. 

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statute to ascertain the least culpable conduct necessary to 

sustain conviction under the statute.” Jean-Louis v. Att’y 

Gen. of U.S., 582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) 

(quotations omitted); see also Denis v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 633 

F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2011) (we are prohibited from 

“consideration of evidence other than the statutory definition 

of the offense, thus precluding review of the particular facts 

underlying a conviction.” (quotations omitted)). 

However, when a statute “list[s] elements in the 

alternative, and thereby define[s] multiple crimes . . . [, a] 

sentencing court . . . requires a way of figuring out which of 

the alternative elements listed . . . was integral to the 

defendant’s conviction.” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. It may 

in that case “look[] to a limited class of documents (for 

example, the indictment, jury instructions, or plea agreement 

and colloquy) to determine what crime, with what elements, a 

defendant was convicted . . . .” Id. A statute merely sets

alternative means of satisfying a necessary element of the 

crime when it lists “illustrative examples” of that element; on 

the other hand, a statute creates separate (that is, divisible)

crimes when it includes disjunctive elements (for example, a 

law that criminalizes both lawful and unlawful entry into 

another’s house with intent to steal, and the latter constitutes a 

more serious crime). Id. When a statute lists disjunctive 

elements, a court may conduct a limited review of the record 

to determine what conduct formed the basis of the conviction 

and therefore the crime committed. 

Chavez-Alvarez pled guilty to violating the following 

Code provision as it existed in 20003:

 

3 The Code was later amended to criminalize only 

forcible sodomy. 10 U.S.C § 925(a).

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(a) Any person subject to this chapter who 

engages in unnatural carnal copulation with 

another person of the same or opposite sex or 

with an animal is guilty of sodomy. 

Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to 

complete the offense.

(b) Any person found guilty of sodomy shall be 

punished as a court-martial may direct.

10 U.S.C § 925 (2000). It did not distinguish between 

forcible or consensual sodomy. What did distinguish types of 

sodomy was the Manual—guidelines promulgated by the 

President to courts-martial on how to impose punishments for 

various military crimes, including sentence enhancements 

based on how the crime was committed. It provided that 

when “the act was done by force and without the consent of 

the other person,” the punishment may include a greater 

sentence of “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay 

and allowances, and confinement for life.” Manual (2000 

ed.), part IV, ¶ 51(b)(3) & (e)(1)). The Manual thus 

authorizes a military judge to consider the facts underlying a 

crime to decide whether to enhance the sentence. 

The Government insists that the Manual in conjunction 

with the Code creates separate sodomy offenses. But can a 

sentencing consideration under the Manual become an 

element of the offense under the Code? We think not, for we 

cannot consider “sentencing factors . . . in lieu of the 

unambiguous statutory language which speaks only in terms 

of the conviction.” Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159, 162 

(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 668 

(9th Cir. 1997)). The reason is obvious: sentence-enhancing 

factors do not define the crime; they affect the punishment of 

it. Even the United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals 

interprets its own authorization to impose sentence 

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enhancements under the Manual in this way. See United 

States v. Thomas, 45 M.J. 661, 664 n.4 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 

1997) (regarding the Manual’s sodomy sentence 

enhancements, “these are sentence-increasing circumstances, 

and not statutory elements . . . ”). Thus, under the clear and 

unambiguous language of the sodomy statute contained in the 

Code as defined by Congress, Chavez-Alvarez was convicted 

of sodomy, not forcible sodomy. The BIA’s conclusion to the 

contrary is incorrect.4

Here, however, the BIA determined that “for 

immigration purposes a sentence enhancement can serve as 

the functional equivalent of an ‘element’ of an offense” so 

long as it (the sentencing factor) is proven beyond a 

reasonable doubt. J.A. at 6. It bases that authority from its 

own precedent. See id. (citing Matter of Martinez-Zapata, 24 

I. & N. Dec. 424 (BIA 2007)). That reasoning (and line of 

precedent) cannot stand, as it violates our constitutional 

doctrine of separation of powers between branches of the 

 

4 Moreover, Mathis directs us to use the categorical 

approach not only because the underlying statute of 

conviction does not contain various elements that create 

separate crimes, but also because the INA makes removable 

an alien who “is convicted of two or more crimes” involving 

moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis 

added). We have explained that in Mathis the Supreme Court 

instructed that the “use of the phrase ‘conviction’ indicates 

Congress’s intent to apply the categorical approach.” United 

States v. Dahl, 833 F.3d 345, 350 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252). Thus we will not consider the 

facts underlying Chavez-Alvarez’s conviction (that it was 

committed forcibly) in deciding whether he committed a 

crime involving moral turpitude. 

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federal government. It is black-letter law that “[t]he 

definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to 

the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, 

which are solely creatures of statute.” Dixon v. United States, 

548 U.S. 1, 7 (2006) (quoting Liparota v. United States, 471 

U.S. 419, 424 (1985)). This means that “in a criminal case . . 

. the law must be written by Congress.” United States v. 

Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 523 (2008) (citing United States v. 

Hudson, 11 U.S. 32 (1812)); see also United States v. 

Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1170 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 

Constitution generally assigns the job of specifying federal 

crimes . . . to the Legislative Branch.”). 

The takeaway is that the Executive Branch, whether

through the President or one of its agencies, cannot create 

criminal statutes; only Congress can do so. The Manual, 

created by the President, is used by those in the Executive 

Branch to sentence military crimes. The BIA, as an 

Executive Branch arm, determined that it can supplement—in 

reality, supplant—the Code to create separate, divisible 

crimes. Not so. The President certainly may define the terms 

of a punishment for one convicted of a military crime. 

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (“Congress 

[may] delegate authority to the President to define the 

aggravating factors that permit imposition of a statutory 

penalty . . . .”). Yet his authority to do so is cabined by 

Congress’s definition of the relevant “criminal offense . . . 

within the field covered by the statute.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). 

The Government persists that the military justice 

system is unique and separate from our criminal justice 

system in federal court, and thus the same rules do not apply. 

No doubt “Congress has created and [the Supreme Court] has 

long recognized two systems of justice, to some extent 

parallel: one for civilians and one for military personnel.” 

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Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1983) (citation 

omitted). But though military personnel are subject to a 

separate justice system with separate statutory rights and 

crimes, the Constitution is clear that Congress alone has the 

power to create that separate statutory regime. See Weiss v. 

United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (“[T]he Constitution 

contemplates that Congress has plenary control over rights, 

duties, and responsibilities in the framework of the Military 

Establishment . . . .” (quotation omitted)); Schweiker v. 

Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 422-23, 436 (1988) (“Congress, in the 

exercise of its plenary constitutional authority over the 

military, has enacted statutes regulating military life . . . .” 

(quotation omitted)); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 (Congress is 

“the constitutionally authorized source of authority over the 

military system of justice”). It does so through enactment of 

the Code. The Manual is not a creature of Congress and thus 

cannot be used to displace the military justice system that 

Congress envisioned. 

Accordingly, under Mathis it is impermissible to use a 

modified categorical approach to examine the facts 

warranting the application of a particular sentenceenhancement factor when that factor was not an element of 

the statute of conviction. Here the use of force in the 

commission of sodomy was not an element that Congress 

sought separately to criminalize at the time of ChavezAlvarez’s conviction. Chavez-Alvarez therefore was 

convicted of sodomy, not forcible sodomy. 

C. The Code Definition of Sodomy Is Not a 

Crime Involving Moral Turpitude

We now turn to the crime of which Chavez-Alvarez 

actually was convicted under the Code—sodomy—and 

whether it is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Supreme 

Court requires us not to look behind the elements of a crime 

set out in a nondivisible statute, and here the applicable 

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version of the Code in 2000 did not distinguish between 

consensual and forcible sodomy (only the Manual did so and, 

as noted, that sentencing tool cannot add elements to the

legislative definition of a crime). Per Lawrence v. Texas, the 

“crime” in the Code affecting Chavez-Alvarez does not 

withstand constitutional scrutiny (hence the change to the 

Code provision long after the charge here). He was convicted 

of sodomy, not forcible sodomy, and this cannot serve as a 

separate crime involving moral turpitude that makes him 

removable under the INA. 

* * * * *

 In this context, the statute as written at the time of 

Chavez-Alvarez’s conviction cannot survive as a predicate 

“crime” that triggers the pertinent removability provision of 

the INA. Thus we grant the petition for review and reverse 

the BIA’s holding that Chavez-Alvarez is removable under 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). 

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