Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02876/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02876-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julie Crystal Fronk
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable James M. Rosenbaum, United States District Judge for the

District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2876

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota.

Julie Crystal Fronk, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 14, 2010

Filed: June 1, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Julie Crystal Fronk pleaded guilty to one count of obtaining a controlled

substance by fraud, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(3) and (d)(1). Fronk appeals

from her twelve-month sentence, arguing that the district court1

 erred in denying her

an offense-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and that her sentence is

unreasonable. We affirm. 

Appellate Case: 09-2876 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Entry ID: 3669715
-2-

I.

From March 2002 to July 2008, Fronk worked for Best Care Home Health (Best

Care) in Minneapolis, first as a registered nurse and eventually as the assistant director

of nursing. Fronk’s duties included dispensing medication to clients. In May 2008,

Best Care discovered that its clients’ controlled substance prescriptions were being

refilled prematurely. In July 2008, a client reported that Fronk had taken some of her

vicodin. Fronk admitted to Amanda Jackson, the director of nursing, that she had

taken the vicodin. She further admitted to taking morphine and dilaudid from other

clients. Fronk was terminated and later completed inpatient treatment for alcoholism.

Fronk entered into a plea agreement with the government, wherein she reserved

the right to contest two offense-level enhancements that the government sought to

apply: abuse of a position of trust pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines

Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3B1.3, and vulnerable victims pursuant to § 3A1.1. The

government agreed to recommend a two-level reduction for acceptance of

responsibility, which was conditioned upon Fronk’s refraining from acts inconsistent

with her acceptance of responsibility. The district court accepted Fronk’s guilty plea

and allowed her to be released until sentencing. Fronk violated a condition of her

release by attempting to obtain refills of a vicodin prescription when none had been

authorized. Following her violation, Fronk was detained until sentencing. 

Fronk suffers from a number of medical conditions, including fibromyalgia,

degenerative disc disease, and depression, and she takes numerous prescription

medications. Before sentencing, Fronk submitted a letter in which she wrote, “it is not

that I lied about my numerous physical problems, I just needed a little more

medication than I had which lead [sic] to my violation.” At sentencing, the district

court conducted an evidentiary hearing to resolve the disputed enhancements.

Nursing director Jackson testified regarding Fronk’s duties, Best Care’s clients, and

Appellate Case: 09-2876 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Entry ID: 3669715
-3-

the harm that Fronk’s conduct had caused to clients. The district court applied the

abuse of a position of trust and vulnerable victims enhancements and denied the

acceptance of responsibility reduction because of Fronk’s post-plea attempted criminal

conduct and the content of her letter to the court. The court concluded that the letter

“does not indicate in any fashion any kind of acceptance” and that “[s]he has entirely

not recognized her own situation and, as a result, ought not to be afforded the two

points for acceptance.” After calculating Fronk’s advisory guidelines range to be ten

to sixteen months’ imprisonment, the district court sentenced Fronk as set forth above.

II.

A.

 Fronk contends that the district court clearly erred by denying her the

acceptance of responsibility reduction, arguing that the district court misconstrued her

letter and that the violation of her release could not serve as a proper basis for the

district court to deny the reduction. It was Fronk’s burden to demonstrate that she was

entitled to the reduction. See United States v. Arellano, 291 F.3d 1032, 1034 (8th Cir.

2002). We review for clear error the district court’s factual determination that Fronk

had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Winters, 416 F.3d

856, 860 (8th Cir. 2005). 

A sentencing court may grant an offense-level reduction if “the defendant

clearly demonstrates acceptance responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).

A guilty plea does not entitle a defendant to a reduction as a matter of right. Id. cmt.

n.3. A court may consider whether the defendant has withdrawn from “criminal

conduct” in determining whether to grant the reduction. Id. cmt. n.1(b). Even minor

and unrelated criminal conduct may make an acceptance of responsibility reduction

inappropriate. United States v. Ngo, 132 F.3d 1231, 1233 (8th Cir. 1997); see also

Arellano, 291 F.3d at 1035. The district court was entitled to consider Fronk’s postAppellate Case: 09-2876 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Entry ID: 3669715
-4-

plea attempted procurement of unauthorized medications and the content of her letter

in determining whether she had clearly demonstrated acceptance of responsibility.

The district court did not clearly err in finding that Fronk failed to demonstrate

acceptance of responsibility.

B.

Fronk argues that her sentence is substantively unreasonable because it was

greater than necessary to promote the goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). She

contends that the district court failed to properly weigh the § 3553(a) factors because

it gave no weight to the fact that Fronk did not have a criminal history, largely ignored

Fronk’s medical conditions, and disregarded the letters of support. We review a

sentence for reasonableness in light of the § 3553(a) factors and reverse only if the

district court abused its discretion. United States v. Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 993 (8th

Cir. 2008). On appeal, we may presume a sentence within the properly calculated

guidelines range is reasonable. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007);

United States v. Linderman, 587 F.3d 896, 901 (8th Cir. 2009). “A district court

abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it fails to consider

a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper

factor, or considers the appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in

weighing those factors.” United States v. Miner, 544 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2008);

see United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc).

 Fronk’s arguments are belied by the record, which reveals that the district court

was aware of, and considered, her lack of a criminal history, her medical conditions,

the letters of support, and the § 3553(a) sentencing goals. Fronk personally drew the

court’s attention to her lack of criminal history. The district court explicitly

mentioned Fronk’s medical conditions: “I am sympathetic for the disabilities and the

discomforts that you have suffered yourself.” The court acknowledged that it had

received letters from a number of Fronk’s friends and that it had taken those letters

Appellate Case: 09-2876 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Entry ID: 3669715
-5-

into consideration. Fronk has failed to demonstrate that the court considered an

erroneous factor, placed too much emphasis on a proper factor, or committed a clear

error of judgement in weighing those factors. Accordingly, the district court did not

abuse its discretion in sentencing Fronk as it did. 

III. 

The sentence is affirmed.

 ______________________________

Appellate Case: 09-2876 Page: 5 Date Filed: 06/01/2010 Entry ID: 3669715