Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01310/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01310-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
MPHJ Technology Investments, LLC
Appellant
William Sorrell
Appellee
State of Vermont
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

STATE OF VERMONT,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS, LLC,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2015-1310

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Vermont in No. 2:14-cv-00192-wks, Judge 

William K. Sessions III.

______________________ 

Decided: September 28, 2015 

______________________ 

BRIDGET ASAY, Vermont Office of the Attorney General, Montpelier, VT, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Also 

represented by BENJAMIN D. BATTLES, NAOMI SHEFFIELD. 

WILLIAM BRYAN FARNEY, Farney Daniels PC, 

Georgetown, TX, argued for defendant-appellant. Also 

represented by STEVEN R. DANIELS; DAVID P. SWENSON, 

Minneapolis, MN. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, and O’MALLEY,

Circuit Judges.

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2 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge. 

On May 8, 2013, Plaintiff-Appellee State of Vermont 

(“Vermont” or “the State”) filed a state court action

against Defendant-Appellant MPHJ Technology Investments LLC (“MPHJ”) alleging violations of the Vermont 

Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. §§ 2451 et seq.

(“VCPA”). The complaint alleged that letters mailed to 

Vermont businesses informing them that they may be 

infringing certain patents were deceptive and otherwise 

violative of the VCPA. MPHJ removed the case twice to 

the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, once under the State’s original complaint (“original 

complaint”) and once under the State’s amended complaint (“amended complaint”). The district court remanded the case to state court both times. Before this court is 

MPHJ’s appeal of the district court’s second remand 

order. Because removal under § 1442(a)(2) is not authorized in the circumstances at issue here, and MPHJ does 

not appeal the district court’s other removal rulings in the 

second remand order, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

MPHJ is a non-practicing entity incorporated in Delaware that acts through a variety of shell corporations 

incorporated in many states. Beginning in September 

2012, businesses in Vermont began to receive a series of 

letters from one or more of the MPHJ shell corporations.

These letters alleged potential infringement of MPHJ’s 

patents and requested that the recipients either purchase 

licenses or confirm that they were not infringing the 

patents. Although the content and subject matter of 

MPHJ’s patents are irrelevant to this appeal, they generally cover systems in which computers are networked and 

connected to a scanner, such that scanned documents are 

sent directly to employee email addresses as PDF attachments. 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 3

MPHJ’s letters to each Vermont business followed a 

similar format and involved the same sequence of events. 

The first letter a business would receive stated, “We have 

identified your company as one that appears to be using 

the patented technology,” and gave a list of questions that 

the company needs to investigate regarding its computer 

server to determine if it is infringing. Exhibit A to Consumer Protection Complaint at 1, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. 

Invs., LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00192, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

3309 (D. Vt. Jan. 9, 2015), ECF No. 1. The letter explained that these questions were based on “[o]ur research, which includes review of several marketplace 

trends and surveys,” and that “you should enter into a 

license agreement with us at this time.” Id. at 3-4. It 

further stated that “we have had a positive response from 

the business community to our licensing program.” Id. 

The second and third letters were sent from the law 

firm of Farney Daniels PC, MPHJ’s counsel. They would

routinely arrive a few weeks after the first letter and 

second letter, respectively, if MPHJ did not hear back 

from the recipient. Both stated that the recipient’s nonresponse to the previous letters was taken as an admission of infringement. And, both implied that litigation 

would commence if the recipient did not enter into a 

license agreement. See Exhibit B to Consumer Protection 

Compl. at 1, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 

2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 1.

In response to complaints from the Vermont business 

community about these letters, the State filed its original

complaint against MPHJ on May 8, 2013 in state court. 

The original complaint asserted a single cause of action

under the Vermont Consumer Protection Act, 9 V.S.A. 

§ 2453(a). Under this cause of action, the complaint listed 

two bases for liability: “unfair trade practices” and “deceptive trade practices.” Consumer Protection Compl. at 8, 

MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), 

ECF No. 1. The State alleged that MPHJ engaged in 

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4 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

“unfair trade practices” by, inter alia, threating litigation 

even though litigation was unlikely, targeting small 

businesses, placing the burden on the recipient to do the 

investigation, and using shell corporations to minimize 

liability. Id. at 8-9. The State alleged that MPHJ engaged in “deceptive trade practices” by, inter alia, stating 

in its letters that it would bring suit immediately absent a 

license, the licensing program was successful with many 

businesses taking part, and the average license was 

$1000/employee. Id. at 9-10. The State sought various 

forms of relief, including two permanent injunctions:

(1) A permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant 

from engaging in any business activity in, into or 

from Vermont that violates Vermont law.

(2) A permanent injunction requiring Defendant 

to stop threatening Vermont businesses with patent-infringement lawsuits.

Id. 

A. First Removal

MPHJ timely filed a motion to remove the case to the 

United States District Court for the District of Vermont 

on June 7, 2013 (“the first removal”). MPHJ claimed that 

the court had diversity jurisdiction and that the court had

federal question jurisdiction because the validity, infringement, and enforcement of its patents were at issue. 

The State thereafter moved to remand, arguing that its 

complaint sounded solely in the VCPA, a state law. 

MPHJ then filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of 

personal jurisdiction and a motion for sanctions under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 11. The district court held a hearing on these pending motions on 

February 25, 2014, and expressed concern that the State’s 

second request for an injunction could prevent MPHJ 

from sending legitimate assertions regarding patent 

infringement to Vermont businesses. On March 7, 2014, 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 5

the State filed a motion to clarify or amend its complaint

to delete the second injunction request (“A permanent 

injunction requiring Defendant to stop threatening Vermont businesses with patent-infringement lawsuits”). 

On April 14, 2014, the district court issued an order

remanding the case to state court, without deciding the 

other pending motions, including the State’s motion to 

clarify or amend the complaint. Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. 

Invs., LLC, No. 2:13-cv-170, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52132, 

at *2 (D. Vt. Apr. 14, 2014). The court concluded that it 

did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated 

that, under the test set out in Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 

1059, 1065 (2013), federal patent law issues were not 

“necessarily raised” on the face of the State’s complaint 

because the claims in the original complaint did not 

challenge the validity of the patents nor require any 

determination of actual infringement. MPHJ, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 52132, at *17. The court also concluded that 

the original complaint did not raise a “substantial” federal 

question under Gunn, as any possible federal question

would at best involve “application of existing patent law 

to the facts of this case,” with no wide-reaching determinations about patent law itself. Id. at *27. The court also 

determined that there was no diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 

*29.

On May 13, 2014, MPHJ filed a notice of appeal of the 

remand decision to this court and petitioned this court for 

a writ of mandamus, claiming that the district court 

abused its discretion. Upon return to the state court, the 

State filed its amended complaint on May 7, 2014. During a subsequent motions hearing, the state court indicated that, because MPHJ had not yet answered, the State 

was entitled to amend its complaint as a matter of right 

under state court rules. Exhibit 1 of Vermont’s Mot. to 

Expedite Proceedings at 37-38, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 3. Despite 

having acknowledged that, however, the state court 

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6 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

ultimately granted the State’s motion to amend at the 

same time it denied MPHJ’s motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Exhibit 3-12 to MPHJ’s Notice of 

Removal at 2, 6, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 

2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 1. On August 11, 2014, this

court held that it did not have jurisdiction over either the 

appeal or the mandamus petition by virtue of 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1447(d). Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Invs., LLC, 763 F.3d 

1350, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Section 1447(d) provides that 

a remand order to a state court “is not reviewable on 

appeal or otherwise,” with a couple of specific, statutorilyprovided exceptions. Id. at 1353. The Supreme Court has 

concluded that this prohibition applies only to remands 

based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which includes the district 

court’s first remand order. Id.

B. Second Removal

MPHJ filed an answer and counterclaims to the 

State’s amended complaint on September 9, 2014. MPHJ 

claimed that the State, by requesting an injunction that 

required MPHJ’s compliance with “Vermont law,” sought 

to compel MPHJ to comply with the Vermont Bad Faith 

Assertions of Patent Infringement Act (“BFAPIA”), 9 

V.S.A. §§ 4195–99. The BFAPIA was passed on May 22, 

2013 and became effective on July 1, 2013, after the State 

filed the original complaint and while this case was 

pending in federal district court after the first removal. 

Its key provision, 9 V.S.A. § 4197, defines the factors that 

a court can consider in determining if a person made a 

“bad faith assertion of patent infringement,” including, 

among others, the contents of the demand letter, the 

extent of any pre-assertion investigation, demands for 

payment of a license fee in an unreasonably short time, 

and deceptive assertions of infringement. 

In its answer, MPHJ asserted that the BFAPIA was 

preempted by federal law because it permitted the State 

to bar MPHJ’s infringement assertions without a showing 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 7

of objective baselessness, contrary to our precedent in 

Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc., 

362 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004). MPHJ also asserted six 

counterclaims. It sought a declaratory judgment that the 

BFAPIA is invalid or preempted by the First, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments (counterclaim 1), or by Title 35 

of the U.S. Code, the Supremacy Clause, and the Patent 

Clause (counterclaim 2). MPHJ also sought a declaratory 

judgment that its patents were valid (counterclaim 3) and 

infringed (counterclaim 4), or at least that it was not 

objectively baseless for a reasonable person to believe so. 

Finally, MPHJ sought a declaratory judgment that the 

VCPA is invalid or preempted by the First, Fifth, and 

Fourteenth Amendments, the Supremacy and Patent 

Clauses, and Title 35 of the U.S. Code (counterclaim 5) 

and that it did not violate the VCPA (counterclaim 6). 

Based on these counterclaims, MPHJ sought relief from 

both the BFAPIA and the VCPA as applied to it. 

On the same day that MPHJ filed its answer and 

counterclaims, it filed a second notice of removal (“the 

second removal”) to federal court under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1442(a)(2) (“federal officer removal statute”), 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1443 (“civil rights removal statute”), and 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1454 (“patent removal statute”). MPHJ claimed that 

the amended complaint “now seeks an injunction requiring MPHJ to comply with the [BFAPIA],” and that enforced compliance with the BFAPIA affects the validity of 

35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271, 284, 285 and 287, as well as the 

First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supremacy 

Clause, and the Patent Clause of the Constitution. 

MPHJ’s Notice of Removal at 2, 4, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 1. MPHJ 

claimed that its notice of removal was timely because it 

was filed within thirty days of the August 28, 2014 state 

court order granting the motion to amend the complaint. 

Id. at 4. The State, in response, filed a motion to remand, 

insisting that the BFAPIA was not part of its amended 

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8 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

complaint, the validity of MPHJ’s patents was not at 

issue, and the second removal was untimely. 

The district court issued an opinion on the second notice of removal on January 12, 2015. The court found that 

the State’s amended complaint never “revived” MPHJ’s 

right to remove in the first place. MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309, at *12. According to the court, the State’s 

request for injunctive relief, “read in the context of the 

State’s pleading,” made clear that the State did not seek 

relief under the BFAPIA. Id. at *13. The district court 

further found that, even if the passage of the BFAPIA by 

the Vermont legislature provided a new opportunity for 

removal, the second removal was untimely. Vermont 

enacted the BFAPIA prior to the initial remand decision, 

and MPHJ cited the Act in its opposition to the first 

motion to remand, filed on September 18, 2013. The 

district court found, therefore, that MPHJ could have 

included the BFAPIA as a ground for its first removal and 

could have moved to amend to add counterclaims at that 

time. The court concluded that untimeliness under 28 

U.S.C. § 1446(b) can be based on evidence of an exchange 

of documents in the course of litigation that evidences a 

“party’s knowledge of the grounds for removal.” Id. at *14. 

The district court further concluded that the removal, 

even if timely, failed to meet the requirements of 28 

U.S.C. § 1442(a)(2), the federal officer removal statute. 

The court was “skeptical of Section 1442(a)(2)’s application to a patent case” based on the historical purpose of 

the statute. Id. at *18. In any event, the court held that 

removal could not be based on § 1442(a)(2) because 

MPHJ’s answer and counterclaims did not “call into 

question the validity of any federal law,” as required by 

that section. Id. The district court found that MPHJ’s 

assertion that the BFAPIA frustrates interests protected 

by federal statutes and the Constitution was irrelevant in 

light of its finding that the amended complaint did not 

require compliance with the BFAPIA. Finally, the court 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 9

also declined to allow removal under either 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1443 or 28 U.S.C. § 1454. MPHJ filed a timely notice of 

appeal to this court, challenging only the district court’s 

timeliness and 28 U.S.C. § 1442 analyses. Remands 

under § 1442 and § 1443 are exceptions to the bar of 

§ 1447(d). MPHJ has only appealed the district court’s 

decision under § 1442, and not § 1443, however. 

II. JURISDICTION

The parties dispute our jurisdiction over this appeal. 

The State asserts that we have none and asks that we 

dismiss the appeal. MPHJ argues that we do have jurisdiction over this appeal and correctly points out that, even 

if we disagreed with that contention, the appropriate 

remedy would be a transfer to the Second Circuit, not 

dismissal. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 defines the scope of this 

court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, it provides that this 

court has jurisdiction “in any civil action arising under, or 

in any civil action in which a party has asserted a compulsory counterclaim arising under, any Act of Congress 

relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). Because we 

find jurisdiction on the basis of at least one of MPHJ’s 

counterclaims, counterclaim 5, we have jurisdiction over 

this appeal. We, therefore, do not need to assess whether 

this court could exercise jurisdiction on the basis of 

MPHJ’s other counterclaims or Vermont’s claim. 

Counterclaim 5 seeks a declaratory judgment that the 

VCPA is invalid or preempted as applied under the First, 

Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Supremacy and 

Patent Clauses of the Constitution, and Title 35 of the 

U.S. Code. Ultimately, MPHJ seeks to prevent the State 

from relying on the VCPA in its action against it.1 

1 The State is correct that MPHJ did not argue 

counterclaim 5 as the basis of this court’s jurisdiction. 

Appellee Br. 27. See Appellant Br. 22-23; Appellant Reply 

 

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10 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

“[A] plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state

regulation, on the ground that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution must prevail, thus 

presents a federal question over which the federal courts 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.” 

Lawrence Cty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 40-1, 469 

U.S. 256, 259 n.6 (1985) (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines 

Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983)). Thus, while the Supremacy Clause does not itself create a cause of action for 

its violation, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 

135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015), a claim that a state law 

contravenes a federal statute remains “basically constitutional in nature” because “the application of preempted 

state law is . . . unconstitutional.” Id. at 1391 (Sotomayor, 

J., dissenting). Based on these principles, we have concluded that this court has jurisdiction over a complaint 

alleging that the state law is preempted by the patent 

laws. Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 

Br. 4-6. According to the State, this failure “defeats any 

claim of jurisdiction based on [that] counterclaim[ ].” 

Appellee Br. 27. The case the State cites in support of 

this assertion, Palmer v. Barram, 184 F.3d 1373, 1377 

(Fed. Cir. 1999), however, does not stand for the proposition that this court can relinquish jurisdiction where it 

clearly possesses it based on the factual allegations and 

causes of action claimed in the case. We must always 

fulfill our obligation to satisfy ourselves of our jurisdiction 

over any appeal. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. 

Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). 

The State also argues that we are bound by the motions panel determination that this court lacked jurisdiction to consider the first remand order. Appellee Br. 24. 

That argument merits scant attention. The order relating 

to the appeal of the first remand was predicated on 

§ 1447(d), which is not at issue here. 

 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 11

F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (deciding under preAmerica Invents Act (“AIA”) version of § 1295(a)(1) that, 

where a complaint seeks to enjoin enforcement of state 

law on grounds that it is preempted by the patent laws, 

this court has jurisdiction) (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 

n.14). 

Before the passage of the AIA, it was also well established that only complaints filed by one seeking to prevent 

enforcement of state law would give rise to federal jurisdiction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or § 1338, or to this 

court’s appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

See Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“Federal jurisdiction cannot be predicated on an actual or 

anticipated defense . . . Nor can federal jurisdiction rest 

upon an actual or anticipated counterclaim.”); Holmes 

Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 

831 (2002) (“a counterclaim—which appears as part of the 

defendant's answer, not as part of the plaintiff’s complaint—cannot serve as the basis for ‘arising under’ 

jurisdiction” under § 1295(a)(1)).

The AIA amended 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338 and 1295(a)(1)

and added 28 U.S.C. § 1454, however. Leahy-Smith 

America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 

(2011). § 1338(a) originally read: 

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 

of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, 

copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction 

shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent . . . cases.

and now, post-AIA, reads:

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction 

of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, 

copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall 

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12 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising 

under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . . 

§ 1295(a)(1) was changed from:

(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction— 

(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a 

district court of the United States . . . if 

the jurisdiction of that court was based, in 

whole or in part, on section 1338 of this title . . . ;

to: 

(a) The United States Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction— 

(1) of an appeal from a final decision of a 

district court of the United States . . . in 

any civil action arising under, or in any 

civil action in which a party has asserted a 

compulsory counterclaim arising under, 

any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . . 

The AIA also added § 1454, a new removal provision, 

which reads:

(a) In general. A civil action in which any party 

asserts a claim for relief arising under any Act of 

Congress relating to patents . . . may be removed 

to [federal] district court . . . .

These changes are commonly referred to as the 

“Holmes Group fix.” See, e.g., MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309 (citing Andrews v. Daughtry, 994 F. Supp. 2d 

728, 731-32 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (citing Joe Matal, A Guide to 

the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II 

of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 539 (2012))). See generally

Paul M. Schoenhard, Gaps, Conflicts and Ambiguities in 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 13

the Federal Courts’ Post-AIA Patent Jurisdiction, INTELL. 

PROP. & TECH. L.J., July 2013, at 20-23. In other words, 

they were intended to provide federal courts, and this 

court specifically, with a broader range of jurisdiction; 

that is, with jurisdiction over claims arising under the 

patent laws even when asserted in counterclaims, rather 

than in an original complaint. At the same time, the 

changes to § 1338 expressly remove such claims from the 

ambit of state court jurisdiction. Taken together, these 

provisions mean that seeking relief from application of 

state law on preemption grounds in a compulsory counterclaim will vest jurisdiction in this court as long as it 

“arises under” the patent laws. 

Turning to counterclaim 5, we first assess whether it 

is a compulsory counterclaim. Under Second Circuit law:

Whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive turns on whether the counterclaim arises out 

of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject 

matter of the opposing party’s claim, and this Circuit has long considered this standard met when 

there is a logical relationship between the counterclaim and the main claim.

Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 209 (2d Cir. 

2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

The “logical relationship” test does not require “an absolute identity of factual backgrounds,” but the “essential 

facts of the claims [must be] so logically connected that 

considerations of judicial economy and fairness dictate 

that all the issues be resolved in one lawsuit.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 

210 (“The essential facts for proving the counterclaims 

and the ECOA claim are not so closely related that resolvCase: 15-1310 Document: 51-3 Page: 13 Filed: 09/28/2015
14 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

ing both sets of issues in one lawsuit would yield judicial 

efficiency.”).2 

Counterclaim 5 meets the requirements of the “logical 

relationship” test. The State’s claims are premised on the 

alleged unlawful nature of MPHJ’s patent infringement 

inquiry letters under the VCPA. According to the State’s 

amended complaint, the essential facts involved in proving whether MPHJ violated the VCPA include whether 

MPHJ in fact “[s]tat[ed] that litigation would be brought 

against the recipients, when Defendant was neither 

prepared nor likely to bring litigation,” “[t]arget[ed] small 

businesses that were unlikely to have the resources to 

fight patent-litigation, or even pay patent counsel,” and 

“[s]en[t] letters that threatened patent-infringement 

litigation with no independent evidence that the recipients were infringing its patents,” among a series of other 

allegations. First Amended Consumer Protection Compl. 

at 8, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv00192), ECF No. 7. In counterclaim 5, MPHJ asserts that 

the VCPA would be preempted on the basis of the same 

essential facts. For example, MPHJ asserts that, “[u]nder 

at least some circumstances, federal law permits a patent 

owner to threaten suit even if the patent owner does not 

2 Because the concept of what constitutes a “compulsory counterclaim” now directly impacts our jurisdiction, it is governed by Federal Circuit law, rather than by 

that of the regional circuits. Arlington Indus. v. Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2014)

(“[w]e apply our own law, rather than regional circuit law, 

to questions relating to our own appellate jurisdiction”) 

(quoting Int'l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 

476 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). Because this court 

has not yet adopted a body of law governing what constitutes a compulsory counterclaim, we turn to Second 

Circuit law for guidance in this case. 

 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 15

intend to bring suit.” MPHJ’s Answer and Counterclaims 

at 26, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv00192), ECF No. 20. MPHJ further contends that, 

“[u]nder federal law, a patent owner may communicate an 

intention to bring suit for infringement without having 

conducted, or completed, such investigation as is necessary to satisfy FED. R. CIV. P. 11.” Id. at 27. MPHJ also 

asserts that “Counterclaim Defendants have no basis to 

allege that 35 U.S.C. § 271 exempts from liability for 

infringement those companies that are smaller than a 

certain size . . . .” Id. The same underlying facts are 

involved in both the State’s claim and counterclaim 5. 

The acts that the State alleges entitle it to relief under 

the VCPA are the same acts that MPHJ claims are protected under federal law. We find, therefore, that counterclaim 5 is a compulsory counterclaim.

Second, we must determine whether counterclaim 5 

“aris[es] under” the federal patent laws, as 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(1) requires. We conclude that it does. As noted, 

we concluded in BIO that a preemption claim does “arise 

under” the patent laws. BIO, 496 F.3d at 1368. Since 

BIO, however, the Supreme Court has provided additional 

guidance on whether and when an action arises under the 

patent laws. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013). We, thus, 

consider anew whether a claim such as that in counterclaim 5 arises under the patents laws for purposes of 

§ 1295(a)(1). 

An action “aris[es] under” federal law: (1) where “federal law creates the cause of action asserted,” and (2) in a 

“special and small category of cases” in which arising 

under jurisdiction still lies.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064. 

For this second category of cases, “federal jurisdiction 

over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) 

necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, 

and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without 

disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Id. at 1065. “Arising under” is interpreted identiCase: 15-1310 Document: 51-3 Page: 15 Filed: 09/28/2015
16 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

cally and interchangeably under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 

U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id. at 1064. This court recently clarified that the interpretation of § 1338(a) necessarily implicates interpretation of § 1295(a)(1), and vice versa. 

Madstad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 

756 F.3d 1366, 1370-71 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Through 28 

U.S.C. § 1338(a), Congress placed the resolution of actions 

arising under an Act of Congress relating to patents 

exclusively within the federal courts. Through 28 U.S.C. § 

1295(a)(1), Congress placed appeals from such matters 

exclusively within the province of the Federal Circuit”). 

This court has since applied the Gunn test to assess 

“arising under” jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1). See Jang 

v. Boston Sci. Grp., 767 F.3d 1334, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (state law contract dispute regarding royalties 

under patent license met Gunn test because analysis 

required determination of infringement and validity of 

underlying patents); Krauser v. BioHorizons, Inc., 753 

F.3d 1263, 1268–70 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (state law claim for 

ownership over a dental implant system did not meet

Gunn test). 

Because counterclaim 5 is not a cause of action created by the federal patent laws, we ask whether it falls into 

the “special and small category of cases” in Gunn. Gunn, 

133 S. Ct. at 1064. Resolution of a federal question is 

clearly “necessary” to MPHJ’s counterclaim, as proving 

preemption of the VCPA by federal patent laws would 

necessarily require proving that the patent laws preclude 

enforcement of the VCPA as applied. Thus, MPHJ’s right 

to relief on the counterclaim depends on an issue of federal law. The federal issue is also “actually disputed.” 

Indeed, the federal issue here “is the central point of 

dispute.” Id. at 1065. 

Under Gunn, the “substantiality” inquiry looks to “the 

importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole” 

and not the significance “to the particular parties in the 

immediate suit.” Id. at 1066 (citing Grable & Sons Metal 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 17

Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005)). 

In other words, we focus on the broader significance of the 

federal issue and ask ourselves whether allowing state 

courts to resolve these cases undermines “the development of a uniform body of [patent] law.” Id. at 1066-67 

(quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 

489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)). Counterclaim 5 also passes 

this test. Whether federal patent laws preempt or invalidate the VCPA as applied has considerable significance 

beyond the current case. A hypothetical finding that the 

VCPA is not invalid or preempted in state court would 

affect the development of a uniform body of patent law, as 

such a decision would be binding in Vermont, but would 

not be in other states with similar laws or in federal 

court. The facts of this case are fundamentally unlike 

Gunn, in which the Court recognized that the federal 

issue was a “backward-looking . . . legal malpractice 

claim” that would be unlikely to have any “preclusive 

effect” on future patent litigation and was, therefore, not 

substantial. Id. at 1067. As an “as applied” challenge, 

counterclaim 5 depends to a certain extent on the specific 

facts of this case, but the resolution of this case would 

assist in delineating the metes and bounds of patent law 

and clarifying the rights and privileges afforded to patentees in pursuing patent infringement claims. 

Finally, we find that the last prong of the Gunn test, 

“capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting 

the federal-state balance,” is satisfied. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. 

at 1065; see Grable, 545 U.S. at 310. Allowing a state 

court to resolve a patent law preemption question risks 

“inconsistent judgments between state and federal 

courts.” Jang, 767 F.3d at 1337 (quoting

Forrester Envtl. Servs. v. Wheelabrator Techs., Inc., 715 

F.3d 1329, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). We cannot permit such 

a result when Congress has vested exclusive appellate 

jurisdiction over patent cases in this court. We conclude 

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18 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

that, because the requirements of § 1295(a)(1) are satisfied, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

When analyzing “a procedural issue not unique to patent law,” we apply the law of the applicable regional 

circuit, here the Second Circuit. Versata Software, Inc. v. 

Callidus Software, Inc., 780 F.3d 1134, 1136 (Fed Cir. 

2015). The Second Circuit reviews a district court’s 

removal determination, and a district court’s analysis of 

subject matter jurisdiction, de novo. Isaacson v. Dow 

Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 2008). Where, as 

here, the defendant asserts federal jurisdiction in a removal petition, the defendant has the burden of establishing that removal is proper. Veneruso v. Mount Vernon 

Neighborhood Health Ctr., 933 F. Supp. 2d 613, 618 

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. CenterMark Props. Meriden Square, Inc., 30 

F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994)), aff’d, 586 F. App’x 604 (2d 

Cir. 2014).

Section 1442(a) is commonly known as the federal officer removal statute and normally authorizes removal by 

federal officers sued in state court. Section 1442(a)(2) 

expands the circumstances in which removal is authorized to allow owners of federally-derived property rights 

to remove a cause of action to federal court—even where a 

federal officer is not a defendant—if the action “affects the 

validity of any law of the United States.” § 1442(a)(2). 

Removal under § 1442(a)(2) requires that (1) an action be 

instituted in state court; (2) the action be against or 

directed to the holder of a property right; (3) the property 

right be derived from a federal officer; and (4) the action 

would “affect” the validity of a federal law. Id. MPHJ 

asserts that its patents were property rights, derived from 

the Patent and Trademark Office pursuant to Title 35 of 

the U.S. Code, and that the State’s action—which it 

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asserts would frustrate MPHJ’s ability to assert its patent 

rights—“affects” the interests protected under the Patent 

Act. As with other removal decisions, we review de novo a 

district court’s determination of whether removal is 

authorized under § 1442(a)(2). Isaacson, 517 F.3d at 135. 

B. No Basis for Removal

On appeal, the parties dispute whether: (1) MPHJ’s 

second removal was timely and (2) the requirements for 

removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 are met. With respect to 

the requirements for removal, the State asserts that: 

patent rights are not property rights within the meaning 

of § 1442(a)(2); because the patents at issue were transferred to MPHJ from the original patent owner, they were 

not directly “derived from a federal officer”; and because 

the state court complaint neither alleges a violation of nor 

seeks relief under the BFAPIA, there is no risk that the 

state court action can affect the validity of federal law. 

MPHJ vigorously disputes each of these points. Importantly, however, MPHJ concedes that, if the BFAPIA 

is not at issue in the state court action, its assertions that 

the current action would affect its rights under the Patent 

Act and, thus, affect the validity of that act, are not well 

taken. Oral Argument at 05:34-6:20, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1310.mp3. Because it is dispositive, we address only 

whether claims under the BFAPIA are in the amended 

complaint. We find that they are not. Because the 

amended complaint neither asserts claims under, nor 

requests an injunction requiring MPHJ to comply with, 

the BFAPIA, we find there was no basis in the amended 

complaint for removal under 28 U.S.C. 1442(a)(2). We, 

therefore, affirm. 

At this stage in the proceedings, we do not consider 

whether the action was removable under the original 

complaint. As we explained in our decision on appeal of 

the first remand, a remand order to a state court under 

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20 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

§ 1447(c) is immune from review under § 1447(d). MPHJ, 

763 F.3d at 1353; see Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 

517 U.S. 706, 711–12 (1996). Therefore, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1446(b)(1), which sets forth the procedural requirements 

for the removal of civil actions removable based on the 

allegations in an original complaint, does not apply.3 

We are left to decide, therefore, if the previously nonremovable action became removable under § 1446(b)(3). 

The district court framed the issue as “whether the 

Amended Complaint ‘revived’ MPHJ’s right to remove 

after its first removal was unsuccessful.” MPHJ, 2015 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309, at *12. The court noted that “an 

amendment of the complaint will not revive the period for 

removal if a state court case previously was removable . . . 

,’ [although] a different result generally is reached if the 

pleading amendment provides (1) a ‘new basis for removal’ or (2) ‘changes the character of the litigation so as to 

make it substantially a new suit.’” Id. (quoting Braud v. 

Trans. Serv. Co. of Illinois, 445 F.3d 801, 806 (5th Cir. 

2006)). The court then proceeded to determine whether 

the intervening passage of the BFAPIA by the Vermont 

legislature “revived” MPHJ’s right to remove. Because 

the original complaint was not removable, however, it is 

unnecessary to search for a new basis for removal in the 

amended complaint, but rather only necessary to search 

for a basis for removal under § 1446(b)(3). Semantics 

aside, we agree with the district court that there is no 

3 There is no dispute that the original complaint did 

not invoke the BFAPIA. See, e.g., Appellant Reply Br. 17-

18 (“At the time [the State’s original complaint was filed], 

the BFAPIA was not part of state law. Thus, obviously, 

the original complaint did not seek relief involving the 

BFAPIA. Indeed, in a rare agreement, the State, MPHJ, 

and the district court all agree the original complaint did 

not invoke the BFAPIA.”) 

 

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basis for removal because the injunction the State seeks

does not include compliance with the BFAPIA. 

MPHJ’s Notice of Removal clearly bases removal under § 1442(a)(2) solely on its claim that the BFAPIA is 

inconsistent with and preempted by federal law. See 

MPHJ Notice of Removal at 3, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 1 (“Removal of 

this case is authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(2) 

because the Amended Complaint [seeks to] require MPHJ 

to comply with the [BFAPIA]”). As the district court 

noted, MPHJ’s Opp’n to the State’s Mot. to Remand cites 

only to the BFAPIA as “affect[ing] the validity” of federal 

statutes, 35 U.S.C. §§ 261, 271, 284, 285 and 287, and 

certain parts of the Constitution. MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 3309, at *18. And, as noted, MPHJ conceded at 

oral argument that whether there is a basis for removal 

under § 1442(a)(2) hinges entirely on whether the State 

seeks compliance with the BFAPIA under its amended 

complaint. Oral Argument at 05:34-6:20, available at

http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=20

15-1310.mp3. 

The parties dispute, however, whether the amended 

complaint either implicates or requests an injunction 

requiring compliance with BFAPIA. The State amended 

its original complaint to delete one request for an injunction, leaving only one. The remaining injunction requested reads: 

(1) A permanent injunction prohibiting Defendant 

from engaging in any business activity in, into or 

from Vermont that violates Vermont law.

The issue is, thus, whether the phrase “Vermont law” 

encompasses not only the VCPA, but also the BFAPIA. 

The State has consistently argued that the BFAPIA is not 

part of its amended complaint, just as it was not part of 

its original complaint. In its motion to remand, it stated 

that it “did not add or change any allegations or change 

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22 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

its claim. The amendment removed a single phrase in the 

request for relief.” Vermont’s Mot. to Remand at 6, 

MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), 

ECF No. 22-1. According to the State, the amended 

complaint “merely alleges that MPHJ’s actions—sending 

unfair and deceptive licensing solicitations into Vermont—violate Vermont’s consumer protection statute.”

Id. at 13. 

MPHJ, on the other hand, maintains that the amended complaint includes the BFAPIA—i.e., a provision of 

Vermont law—and that the State cannot now “disavow 

that its suit seeks this relief.” MPHJ’s Resp. in Opp’n to 

Mot. to Remand at 16 n.31, MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 26. The state legislature passed the BFAPIA between the time of the filing of 

the original complaint and the State’s motion to amend 

the complaint. MPHJ argues that, therefore, although 

the amendment to the State’s complaint did not add any 

new text, it implicitly added new meaning to the phrase 

“Vermont law.” 

The district court found MPHJ’s interpretation of the

amended complaint unpersuasive. Specifically, the court 

found that the State made explicit efforts to limit its 

reach to MPHJ’s purported violations of the VCPA. The 

title of the amended complaint, “First Amended Consumer Protection Complaint,” tracks the title of the original 

complaint, “Consumer Protection Complaint,” which 

neither party disputes concerned only the VCPA. First 

Amended Consumer Protection Compl., MPHJ, 2015 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 3309 (No. 2:14-cv-00192), ECF No. 7. The 

first sentence states that the Vermont Attorney General 

“brings this suit under the Vermont Consumer Protection 

Act.” Id. at 1. The sole allegations in the amended complaint are that MPHJ violated the VCPA. Importantly, 

the BFAPIA does not appear at all on the face of the 

complaint. Thus, the district court found that the amended complaint did not “revive” MPHJ’s ability to remove 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 23

the case. MPHJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309, at *13. 

Notwithstanding this finding, however, the district court 

proceeded to analyze the removal under § 1442(a)(2). 

Unsurprisingly, it concluded, “the Amended Complaint is 

brought exclusively under the VCPA, and does not seek 

relief under any other statute or legal provision. The 

Court therefore declines to allow removal under Section 

1442(a)(2).” Id. at *18. 

On appeal, the parties reiterate their positions with 

respect to the BFAPIA. MPHJ assigns significance to 

Vermont’s decision not to limit its injunction explicitly to 

compliance with the VCPA. Since March 7, 2014, the date 

on which Vermont sought leave to amend its complaint, 

was after the date the BFAPIA became effective, July 1, 

2013, MPHJ argues that “the Amended Complaint indisputably [seeks] to compel MPHJ to comply with the 

BFAPIA.” Appellant Br. 11. MPHJ also argues that

Vermont Attorney General William Sorrell made clear in 

an interview published by Law 360 that the BFAPIA was 

specifically designed to prohibit MPHJ from sending its 

inquiry letters. Id. at 8. 

The State opposes MPHJ’s characterization of the 

amended complaint as seeking relief under the BFAPIA. 

First, the State correctly points out that the amended 

complaint never mentions that statute by name. Appellee 

Br. 7. Second, the State says its deletion from the original 

complaint narrowed its request for relief, not broadened 

it. Id. at 30. Third, the State argues that it did not assert 

a claim against MPHJ under the BFAPIA because the 

conduct the State challenges pre-dated the statute: “[t]hat 

statute was passed in May 2013, after MPHJ stopped 

sending the letters described in the State’s complaints, 

and after the State filed this action.” Id. at 27. 

We resolve this issue based on the State’s concession 

at oral argument and our own understanding of the 

amended complaint. Counsel for the State conceded at 

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24 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

oral argument that the BFAPIA is not—and never was—

part of the State’s amended complaint. Indeed, when 

asked whether counsel would stipulate that the amended 

complaint does not cover the BFAPIA, counsel responded: 

A: We have asserted that repeatedly in filings in 

multiple courts, that we are seeking, we are not 

asserting a claim under the new statute and we 

are not seeking relief under that statute. 

Q: You mean not seeking an injunction that would 

require them to comply with that statute?

A: No, we’re not, your Honor.

Oral Argument at 14:30-15:45, available at http://

oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=2015-

1310.mp3. We hold the State to its concession at oral 

argument; it has expressly disavowed any request to 

enjoin MPHJ’s conduct under the BFAPIA. 

Even if the State had not conceded at oral argument 

that the injunction does not include a request for an 

injunction under the BFAPIA, we are not persuaded that 

MPHJ’s reading of the amended complaint is a fair one. 

We begin with the language of the amended complaint, 

which never mentions the BFAPIA on its face. Rather, as 

the State explained, the amended complaint is identical to 

the original complaint except that the State’s original 

request for an injunction requiring MPHJ to stop threatening Vermont businesses with patent infringement 

lawsuits has been deleted. As the district court pointed 

out, the amended complaint is entitled “First Amended 

Consumer Protection Complaint,” and the first sentence 

states that the suit was brought “under the Vermont 

Consumer Protection Act.” And under “III. Statutory 

Framework” of the amended complaint, the only statute 

listed is the VCPA. “V. Cause of Action: Unfair and 

Deceptive Trade Practices” likewise mentions only the 

VCPA. The language of “Unfair and Deceptive Trade 

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 25

Practices” comes directly from VCPA § 2453(a) and has no 

counterpart in the BFAPIA. The word “unfair” is absent 

from the BFAPIA, and while the word “deceptive” appears 

once in § 4197, there is no mention of “trade practices.” 9 

V.S.A. § 4197(b)(7).4 When read in its entirety, it is clear 

that the phrase “Vermont law”—as used in the amended 

complaint—refers only to the VCPA. 

This interpretation finds further support in the record 

evidence regarding the parties’ understanding of the

amendment and its purpose. The district court expressed 

concern about the State’s second injunction request at a 

hearing to discuss pending motions following the first 

removal.5 Less than two weeks later, the State filed its 

motion to clarify and/or amend the complaint. In the 

motion, the State explained that it did not intend to 

prevent MPHJ from engaging in lawful patentenforcement activities. Rather, recognizing that “such 

broad injunctive relief may be preempted by federal 

patent law,” the State sought to limit the relief sought “by 

4 The BFAPIA lists circumstances in which “[t]he 

claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive” as 

a factor which would militate in favor of finding a violation of the provisions of the Act. 9 V.S.A. § 4197(b)(7).

5 The district court observed at the February 25, 

2014 hearing: “This seems to suggest that in Vermont, 

they’re not allowed to enforce a patent. And doesn’t that, 

unto itself, raise a patent law issue which would be 

preempted . . . .,” and, “But when you, in your complaint, 

suggest that you are requesting an order to prevent the 

exercise of patent rights, broadly speaking, not related in 

any way to deception or violation of the [VCPA], then 

that’s–is that a horse of a different color?” Transcript of 

Mots. Hearing at 11-13, MPHJ, No. 2:13-cv-170, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52132 (D. Vt. Feb. 25, 2014), ECF No. 

50.

 

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26 STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS

removing paragraph two” of its injunction requests. 

Vermont’s Conditional Mot. to Clarify And/Or Amend 

Compl. at 2, MPHJ, No. 2:13-cv-170, 2014 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 52132, ECF No. 45. The State further explained 

explicitly in its motion to amend that “[t]his proposed 

revision does not change the State’s claim as originally 

filed” and “[t]his change does not alter the nature of the 

State’s claim, which arises from Vermont’s consumer 

protection act.” Id. at 2-3. The timing and nature of the 

proposed amendment show that it was clearly a response 

to the district court’s criticism of the scope of the second 

injunction request. The purpose of the amendment was to 

narrow the scope of the complaint, not broaden it. 

Finally, although MPHJ relies on a Law 360 article 

featuring an interview with Vermont Attorney General 

William Sorrell, which it originally included as an exhibit 

to its notice of removal, that article supports the State’s 

position. In that interview, which was published two 

months after the State filed its conditional motion to 

amend, Sorrell was asked whether the lawsuit against 

MPHJ was filed under the VCPA: 

Q: So the case against MPHJ was filed under the 

then existing consumer protection law?

A: Yes. 

Exhibit 3-9 to Notice of Removal at 170, MPHJ, No. 2:14-

cv-00192, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3309, ECF No. 1-12. 

And, when asked about how the BFAPIA would be enforced, Sorrell’s response revealed that he did not think 

lawsuits had been filed yet under the BFAPIA: 

Q: Concerning Vermont's new consumer protection law, has thought been given to what analysis 

would be required to determine which accused 

products are covered by the claims of the asserted 

patents?

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STATE OF VERMONT v. MPHJ TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS 27

A: . . . I think when the first lawsuits are filed under the new Vermont statute, I'm sure there will 

be more flesh added to the bones of the statute 

through those cases . . . . 

Id. at 171. In these circumstances, we see no reason to 

disturb the district court’s finding that the State is not 

seeking an injunction that requires MPHJ’s compliance 

with the BFAPIA. Given this conclusion, if the State 

prevails on the merits in state court, it may not seek an 

injunction requiring MPHJ to comply with the BFAPIA 

based on the amended complaint. Because MPHJ relies 

on the BFAPIA as its basis for removal under 

§ 1442(a)(2), the necessary consequence of our decision is 

that we find no grounds for removal to federal court. 

Given these conclusions, we decline to decide whether 

§ 1442(a)(2) applies to intellectual property rights or 

whether the phrase “derived from” a federal officer means 

the property right at issue must have been obtained by 

the removing defendant itself from such an officer, rather 

than by a predecessor in interest to that defendant. 

Because MPHJ has not appealed the district court’s 

ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1454, we have no occasion 

to address the timeliness or propriety of MPHJ’s attempted removal under that statute or how that newly enacted 

provision should be interpreted in light of the other 

amendments to jurisdictional statutes adopted in the AIA. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that there is no basis for removal to federal court under § 1442(a)(2). We, 

therefore, affirm. 

AFFIRMED

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