Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04107/USCOURTS-ca10-15-04107-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeremiah D. Fogarty
Appellee
Fogarty Enterprises
Appellee
Hoffman Construction Company of America
Appellee
William L. McGrath
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

WILLIAM L. McGRATH, 

 Plaintiff Counter Defendant -

 Appellant, 

v. 

JEREMIAH D. FOGARTY; FOGARTY 

ENTERPRISES, 

 Defendants Counterclaimants 

 Crossclaim Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

HOFFMAN CONSTRUCTION 

COMPANY OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant Crossclaimant - 

 Appellee. 

No. 15-4107 

(D.C. No. 2:14-CV-00146-DAK) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before GORSUCH, McKAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

March 29, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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In 2004 or 2005, Plaintiff McGrath and Defendant Fogarty negotiated a buyout 

agreement under which Mr. McGrath would gradually take over Mr. Fogarty’s 

business. By summer 2008, the agreement had clearly been breached, and a number 

of causes of action had accrued. However, Mr. McGrath did not file suit until 

February 2014. He now challenges the district court’s decision that February 2014 

was too late and that, based on the statute of limitations, the defendants were entitled 

to summary judgment. 

Mr. McGrath identifies two factual disputes that, he argues, should have 

precluded summary judgment. First, he claims a jury could find he had a written 

contract with Mr. Fogarty, allowing him to take advantage of the longer statute of 

limitations for written contracts. Second, he claims Mr. Fogarty recently 

acknowledged his debt to Mr. McGrath, and this acknowledgment reset the clock and 

gave Mr. McGrath a new period in which to file his claims. 

We address the second argument first. Mr. McGrath appeals to a Utah statute 

under which “[a]n action for recovery of a debt may be brought within the applicable 

statute of limitations from the date . . . [on which] a written acknowledgement of the 

debt . . . is made by the debtor.” Utah Code § 78B-2-113. Mr. McGrath argues Mr. 

Fogarty has made two such written acknowledgments of the debt: the first in an 

email in April 2008 and the second in an affidavit filed with the district court in May 

2014. In response, Mr. Fogarty argues neither of these documents actually 

constituted a written acknowledgement of the debt. 

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We would incline to agree with Mr. Fogarty, but the question is moot. Even if 

the May 2014 affidavit qualifies as a written acknowledgement of the debt, under 

Utah law it cannot extend the statute of limitations if it “occur[red] after the 

applicable statute of limitations ha[d] run.” State Bank of S. Utah v. Troy Hygro Sys., 

Inc., 894 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Therefore, if the suit was timebarred when it was filed in February 2014, the May 2014 affidavit could not revive it. 

As to the April 2008 email, it could extend the statute of limitations into 2014 

only if the six-year statute for written contracts applies—the four-year statute for Mr. 

McGrath’s other causes of action would still have expired in 2012. Consequently, 

the 2008 email can matter only if we accept Mr. McGrath’s first argument and hold 

there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the parties had a written 

contract. 

We therefore return to Mr. McGrath’s first argument. Mr. McGrath identifies 

only two pieces of evidence from which a jury could find there was a written 

contract: first, a document he calls the “Commission Agreement”; and second, his 

affidavit, which explains the “Commission Agreement” as follows: 

Although the Commission Agreement . . . is marked as a “Draft” version 

and is unsigned, [McGrath] and Fogarty understood that this document 

constituted a final and binding contract between the parties that 

memorialized the material terms of that contract . . . . In fact, the parties 

carried forward with work . . . with the expectation and understanding that 

the Commission Agreement governed the terms under which each would 

receive their compensation . . . . 

(Appellant’s App. at 131.) 

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In order for the Commission Agreement to be a contract, there must have been 

“mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.” 

Brown’s Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In this case, 

the document itself contains not the slightest evidence of mutual assent. It not only 

lacks signatures; it lacks even a place to put signatures. It does not even bear the title 

“Commission Agreement.” Its heading is “DRAFT,” followed in smaller print by 

“Below shows an estimated income of $5.0 to 5.5 M in seven years not including 

future compensation from salary and other opportunities.” (Appellant’s App. at 87.) 

By itself, the document does not resemble a contract at all, but merely an estimate of 

Mr. Fogarty’s future income under a particular set of assumptions. 

Nevertheless, the Draft’s explanation of its assumptions—entitled “NOTES & 

CLARIFICATIONS”—does describe procedures for employing and compensating 

Mr. Fogarty. Further, it is conceivable that, after the Draft had been written for other 

purposes, the parties might have agreed to be bound by its description of their 

relationship. This case therefore turns on whether Mr. McGrath’s affidavit provides 

enough evidence for a jury to conclude that the parties “mutually assent[ed]” to the 

Draft in a manner that “manifest[ed] their intention to be bound by its terms.” 

Brown’s Shoe, 995 P.2d at 363. 

We hold it does not, for two reasons. First, the district court ruled that the 

relevant parts of the affidavit would be inadmissible. (Appellant’s App. at 188.) The 

court noted that, rather than describing Mr. Fogarty’s statements or actions, the 

affidavit speaks exclusively in terms of what Mr. Fogarty subjectively “understood” 

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and “expect[ed].” (Id.) The court then concluded that Mr. McGrath was not 

competent to testify about Mr. Fogarty’s subjective understandings and expectations. 

(Id.) Because an affidavit used to oppose a summary judgment motion must “show 

that the affiant . . . is competent to testify on the matters stated,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(c)(4), this conclusion is fatal to Mr. McGrath’s case.1

Second, even if it were admissible, the affidavit’s relevant language is entirely 

conclusory. The affidavit does not identify any words or deeds by which the parties 

“manifest[ed] their intention to be bound” by the Draft. Brown’s Shoe, 995 P.2d at 

363. Neither does it describe any dealings in which the parties obeyed the terms of 

the Draft, or even claim they ever did obey the terms of the Draft.2

 It asserts that the 

still-unsigned Draft was somehow “executed” (Appellant’s App. at 125, 131), but it 

does not say where or when or how. It asserts further that the parties believed the 

Draft was a contract, but it does not say why the parties believed the Draft was a 

contract or how Mr. McGrath knew what Mr. Fogarty believed. Conclusory 

assertions like these do not create a genuine issue of material fact. 

 1

 We leave the district court’s decision on this point undisturbed because Mr. 

McGrath did not challenge it until his reply brief. “This court does not ordinarily 

review issues raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 

533 (10th Cir. 2000). 

2

 Indeed, the rest of the affidavit suggests that the parties’ dealings did not 

obey the terms of the draft. For example, the Draft states Mr. Fogarty “w[ould] be 

elected a Company Official & Board member” (Appellant’s App. at 87), and yet the 

affidavit insists Mr. Fogarty “was not actually a McLane Associates employee or 

officer” (Id. at 128.) 

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Because there is no admissible evidence of a written contract, the four-year 

statute of limitations applies and Mr. McGrath’s suit is too late. The district court’s 

judgment is AFFIRMED. Mr. McGrath’s outstanding motion is DENIED as moot. 

Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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