Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00223/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00223-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Randy Moore
Defendant
United States Forest Service
Defendant
Peter Wiechers
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PETER WIECHERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

RANDY MOORE, in his official capacity as 

Regional Forester for the Pacific Southwest 

Region of the United States Forest Service, and 

the UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE,

Federal Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:13-CV-00223-LJO-JLT

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER RE CROSS MOTIONS FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOCS. 30 & 

25); AND MOTION TO STRIKE (DOC. 

29).

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Peter Wiechers brings this challenge to implementation by the U.S. Forest Service 

(―Forest Service‖ or ―Federal Defendant‖) of the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (―REA‖) 

fee program in the Sequoia National Forest, located in the southern Sierra Nevada in California. See

Doc. 1, Complaint, at 2. Among other things, REA permits the Forest Service to charge users a 

―standard amenity recreation fee,‖ but only at cites providing certain amenities. 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f). 

REA also explicitly prohibits charging fees ―[s]olely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking 

along roads or trail sides.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d). Plaintiff‘s first cause of action alleges the Forest Service 

improperly charged an amenity fee at several locations within Sequoia National Forest without 

providing the required amenities listed in REA in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act 

(―APA‖), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (permitting a court to set aside final agency action that is ―arbitrary, 

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capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with law‖). Doc. 1 at ¶ 37. The second cause of action, also 

arising under the APA, alleges that the Forest Service improperly charged an amenity fee to enter certain 

sites, ―regardless of whether [the visitor] use[s] the developed facilities and services.‖ Doc. 1 at ¶ 39. 

Before the court for decision are cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits of 

Plaintiff‘s claims. The parties filed a joint statement of undisputed facts. Doc. 25-1. Plaintiff filed his 

opening brief on October 11, 2013. Doc. 25-2. Federal Defendants filed a combined opposition and 

cross-motion on November 22, 2013. Doc. 30-1. Plaintiff filed a combined opposition and reply on 

December 18, 2013. Doc. 33. Federal Defendants filed a reply on January 14, 2014. Doc. 37. Plaintiff 

was granted leave to and did file a sur-reply addressing a narrow issue. Doc. 43, filed Jan. 29, 2014. 

Federal Defendants were, in turn, granted leave to and did file a brief response to documents attached to 

Plaintiff‘s sur-reply. Doc. 44-1, filed February 3, 2014. 

To provide adequate time for the Court to review the voluminous materials submitted, the 

hearing on the cross-motions, originally set for hearing on February 20, 2014, was vacated. Doc. 47. 

Having thoroughly reviewed the papers and those portions of the extensive Administrative Record 

(―AR‖) cited by the parties, the Court believes that the issues are sufficiently developed so as to obviate 

the need for oral argument. The Court therefore issues the following decision based upon the papers 

without a hearing pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (“REA”). 

Under the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, Congress permitted federal landmanagement agencies to charge fees for recreating on federal lands when certain facilities were provided 

by the agency to the public. In 1996, Congress created the ―Recreational Fee Demonstration Program.‖ 

Pub. L. No. 104–134, § 315, 110 Stat. 1321 (―Fee Demo Program‖), which required the Forest Service 

and three other federal land management agencies to develop a pilot program to ―charge and collect fees 

for ... [the] use of outdoor recreation sites.‖ Id. at § 315(a) & (b)(1). The stated purpose of the Fee Demo 

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Program was to shift more of the operational costs of public lands onto the agencies managing those 

lands, and also to address the need for funds to reduce an extensive maintenance backlog on public 

lands. Id. at § 315(c)(3). The Fee Demo Program provided that eighty percent of the generated revenue 

would be returned to the national parks, national forests, and other public lands where the fees were 

collected. Id. at § 315(c)(1)(A) & (c)(2)(A).

Response to the Fee Demo Program was not entirely positive. Prior to renewal of the Program in 

2003, Representative Peter DeFazio of Oregon introduced an amendment to limit the Fee Demo to 

National Parks, and eliminate it on lands managed by the Forest Service and other agencies. 

Representative De Fazio stated: 

[There are] those of us who feel very strongly that levying these fees 

indiscriminately across the Forest Service and the BLM, to nondeveloped 

areas in particular, is of great concern. Basically, if you want to drive your 

car around a park and go hunting or go fishing or just walk with the kids 

or the dog, you have to buy a pass for nondeveloped sites, and a lot of us 

have strong concerns about that.

149 Cong. Rec. H7025-06 at H7033, 2003 WL 21673066 (daily ed. July 7, 2003). In response to these 

concerns, the chairman of the House Committee on Resources, Representative Richard Pombo of 

California stated:

That is something that we are going to change. There is going to be very 

strict guidelines that come out of an authorization that goes to these 

agencies so that this does not happen in the future.

I will say I oppose doing the amendment at this point in time, but I will 

tell the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DeFazio) that in the future, if we 

cannot authorize this program and change the way that it is being run, that 

I would join him in eliminating the program all together, because I think 

people that are paying to go into these Federal lands, these public lands 

should be getting something for their money, and I think there is a big 

question as to whether or not they are, the way the program is currently 

being run.

Id. at H7034.

On December 8, 2004, Congress passed the Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act 

(―REA‖). 16 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq. REA specifically repealed the Fee Demo Program, 16 U.S.C. 

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§ 6812(b) & (e)(3), and authorized the Forest Service to establish, charge, and collect recreation fees on 

the National Forests in accordance with specific criteria, including the following:

(1) The amount of the recreation fee shall be commensurate with the 

benefits and services provided to the visitor.

(2) The Secretary shall consider the aggregate effect of recreation fees on 

recreation users and recreation service providers.

(3) The Secretary shall consider comparable fees charged elsewhere and 

by other public agencies and by nearby private sector operators.

(4) The Secretary shall consider the public policy or management 

objectives served by the recreation fee.

(5) The Secretary shall obtain input from the appropriate Recreation 

Resource Advisory Committee, as provided in section 6803 (d) of this 

title.

(6) The Secretary shall consider such other factors or criteria as 

determined appropriate by the Secretary.

16 U.S.C. § 6802(b).

REA specifically prohibits charging an entrance fee for recreational use of lands managed by the 

Forest Service. 16 U.S.C. § 6802(e)(2). However, the Forest service may impose a ―standard amenity 

recreation fee‖ (―SARF‖) or an ―expanded amenity recreation fee‖ (―EARF‖) if certain conditions are 

met. A SARF may be assessed only at certain specific sites or sites providing specified amenities as 

follows: 

Except as limited by subsection (d), the Secretary may charge a standard 

amenity recreation fee for Federal recreational lands and waters under the 

jurisdiction of the Bureau of Land Management, the Bureau of 

Reclamation, or the Forest Service, but only at the following:

(1) A National Conservation Area.

(2) A National Volcanic Monument.

(3) A destination visitor or interpretive center that provides a broad range 

of interpretive services, programs, and media.

(4) An area--

(A) that provides significant opportunities for outdoor recreation;

(B) that has substantial Federal investments;

(C) where fees can be efficiently collected; and

(D) that contains all of the following amenities:

(i) Designated developed parking.

(ii) A permanent toilet facility.

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(iii) A permanent trash receptacle.

(iv) Interpretive sign, exhibit, or kiosk.

(v) Picnic tables.

(vi) Security services.

16 U.S.C. § 6802(f). Areas where SARFs are imposed are referred to as standard amenity fee areas 

(―SAFAs‖). 

An EARF may be imposed by the Forest Service as follows: 

Except as limited by subsection (d), the Secretary may charge an expanded 

amenity recreation fee, either in addition to a standard amenity fee or by 

itself, at Federal recreational lands and waters under the jurisdiction of the 

Forest Service ... but only for the following facilities or services:

(A) Use of developed campgrounds that provide at least a majority of the 

following:

(i) Tent or trailer spaces.

(ii) Picnic tables.

(iii) Drinking water.

(iv) Access roads.

(v) The collection of the fee by an employee or agent of the 

Federal land management agency.

(vi) Reasonable visitor protection.

(vii) Refuse containers.

(viii) Toilet facilities.

(ix) Simple devices for containing a campfire.

***

16 U.S.C. § 6802(g). Areas where EARFs are imposed are referred to as expanded amenity fee areas

(―EAFA‖). 

Both fee provisions are subject to the limitations set forth in, 16 U.S.C. 6802(d):

(d) Limitations on recreation fees

(1) Prohibition on fees for certain activities or services

The Secretary shall not charge any standard amenity recreation fee 

or expanded amenity recreation fee for Federal recreational lands 

and waters administered by the Bureau of Land Management, the 

Forest Service, or the Bureau of Reclamation under this chapter for 

any of the following:

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(A) Solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking 

along roads or trailsides.

(B) For general access unless specifically authorized under 

this section.

(C) For dispersed areas with low or no investment unless 

specifically authorized under this section.

(D) For persons who are driving through, walking through, 

boating through, horseback riding through, or hiking 

through Federal recreational lands and waters without using 

the facilities and services.

(E) For camping at undeveloped sites that do not provide a 

minimum number of facilities and services as described in 

subsection (g)(2)(A).

(F) For use of overlooks or scenic pullouts.

(G) For travel by private, noncommercial vehicle over any 

national parkway or any road or highway established as a 

part of the Federal-aid System, as defined in section 101 of 

Title 23, which is commonly used by the public as a means 

of travel between two places either or both of which are 

outside any unit or area at which recreation fees are 

charged under this chapter.

(H) For travel by private, noncommercial vehicle, boat, or 

aircraft over any road or highway, waterway, or airway to 

any land in which such person has any property right if 

such land is within any unit or area at which recreation fees 

are charged under this chapter.

(I) For any person who has a right of access for hunting or 

fishing privileges under a specific provision of law or 

treaty.

(J) For any person who is engaged in the conduct of official 

Federal, State, Tribal, or local government business.

(K) For special attention or extra services necessary to meet 

the needs of the disabled.

16 U.S.C.A. § 6802(d).

The House Committee Report on REA stated that these provisions were ―overly prescriptive to 

alleviate concerns of those who no longer trust certain federal land management agencies with the 

recreation fee authority‖ by, among other things, making it clear that the Forest Service ―will not be 

permitted to charge solely for parking, scenic pullouts, and other non-developed areas....‖ H.R. REP. 

108-790(I), 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2004, 2004 WL 2920863 at *18. 

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REA requires the Forest Service to provide the public with opportunities to participate in the 

development of recreation fee programs established under REA‘s authority. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 6802(b)(5) 

& 6803(a). Among other things, REA calls for the establishment of Recreation Resource Advisory 

Committees (―RRAC‖) for each region, which ―may make recommendations‖ to the Forest Service 

concerning a SAFA or EAFA under certain circumstances. 16 U.S.C. § 6803(d)(2). 

In April 2005, the Forest Service issued ―Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA): 

Forest Service Interim Implementation Guidelines‖ (―Interim Implementation Guidelines‖ or 

―Guidelines‖) concerning the application of REA on National Forest System lands. AR 49-81. The 

Guidelines interpreted REA as providing authority to charge SARFs within ―high impact recreation 

areas‖ (―HIRAs‖), a term not defined in REA. The Guidelines defined a HIRA to mean:

[A] clearly delineated, contiguous area with specific, tightly defined 

boundaries and clearly defined access points (such that visitors can easily 

identify the fee area boundaries on the ground or on a map/sign); that 

supports or sustains concentrated recreation use; and that provides 

opportunities for outdoor recreation that are directly associated with a 

natural or cultural feature, place, or activity (i.e., waterway, canyon, travel 

corridor, geographic attraction - the recreation attraction).

AR 70. Forests were directed to review existing recreation fee areas to determine whether those areas 

satisfied the additional criteria for charging a recreation fee under REA, as well as additional criteria for 

HIRAs set forth in the Guidelines. 

Where fees are charged, the Forest Service may require visitors to display a hangtag as proof of 

payment. 16 U.S.C. § 6811(a)-(c). The failure to pay a recreation fee is punishable as a federal 

misdemeanor. See 16 U.S.C. § 6811(d); 36 C.F.R. § 261.17. The fine imposed for a first offense of 

nonpayment shall not exceed $100. Id.

B. Disputed Recreational Sites.

At issue in this case are eight developed recreation sites in the Kern River Ranger District, within 

the Sequoia National Forest. The Live Oak, Miracle Hot Springs, Lower Richbar, and Upper Richbar 

SAFA sites are located along the Lower Kern River (―Lower Kern River sites‖). AR 733-36. The 

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Auxiliary Dam, South Fork and Old Isabella sites, as well as the Camp 9 site, are located along Lake 

Isabella (―Lake Isabella sites‖). AR 384.

All of the recreation sites at issue in this case are located within a two-hour drive from Los 

Angeles and are popular weekend destinations for visitors from Los Angeles County. AR 738. They are 

also close to the surrounding communities of Bakersfield, Fresno, and Kern County. Kern River Valley 

communities use the Lake Isabella sites as a regional or community park. Id. According to documents in 

the AR, on an average summer weekend, approximately 300 to 500 people and over one hundred 

vehicles use the Lake Isabella sites; on an average summer holiday weekend, and during special events, 

use grows to 3,000 to 5,000 visitors and over 1,000 vehicles. Id. 

In the Sequoia National Forest, visitors may pay recreation fees by several different methods, 

including by purchasing a daily or annual Southern Sierra Pass, by displaying the America the Beautiful 

National Parks and Federal Recreational Lands Pass, see AR 718, or by fee envelope at the Kern River 

sites, see e.g. AR 724 (showing fee envelope depository at Miracle Hot Springs). It is undisputed that 

recreation fees collected from these sites are used for maintenance, operations, interpretive programs 

and structural improvements that directly benefit recreational users. AR 587-610.

Plaintiff Peter Wiechers uses the sites at issue in this case to hike, kayak, and gain access to 

undeveloped portions of the Sequoia National Forest and/or access Lake Isabella. Second Declaration of 

Peter Wiechers, Doc. 25-3 at ¶¶ 6, 9, 15. He has paid the recreation fee(s) required to enter the sites to 

engage in these activities. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. On June 30, 2012, while parked at the Miracle Hot Springs 

site to gain access to the Kern River to kayak, Plaintiff received a ―Notice of Required Fee‖ from a 

Sequoia National Forest law enforcement official. Id. at ¶ 5 & Ex. B. On other occasions in 2013, he 

also purchased one of several types of day passes before visiting the disputed sites along the Kern River 

and at Lake Isabella. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. 

//

//

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III. STANDARD OF DECISION

Agency compliance with REA is reviewed under the APA. See Sherer v. U.S. Forest Serv., 727 

F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085-87 (D. Colo. 2010) aff'd 653 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying the APA to a 

challenge arising under REA). Here, Plaintiff raises two claims in his Complaint. The First Claim for 

Relief alleges that Forest Service took actions that are arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in 

accordance with law within the meaning of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) & (D), by charging Plaintiff 

and other visitors a fee to enter the sites at issue in this case without providing all six of the required 

amenities listed in 16 U.S.C. 6802(f)(4)(D). The Second Claim for Relief alleges that the forest service 

also violated the APA by charging Plaintiff a fee for entering the sites at issue in this case ―to engage in 

recreation even though he has not used developed facilities and services, in violation of 16 U.S.C. §

6802(d)(1).

Because REA does not supply a separate standard for judicial review, the APA provides the 

relevant standard. See San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 2014 WL 975130 *9, --- F.3d 

--- (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2014). Section 706(2) of the APA provides that an agency action must be upheld 

on review unless it is ―arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). A reviewing court ―must consider whether the decision was based on a 

consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.‖ San Luis,

2014 WL 975130 *9 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 

(1971), abrogated in part on other grounds as recognized in Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105

(1977)). 

Although [a court‘s] inquiry must be thorough, the standard of review is 

highly deferential; the agency's decision is ―entitled to a presumption of 

regularity,‖ and we may not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. 

[Overton Park, 401 U.S.] at 415–16. Where the agency has relied on 

―relevant evidence [such that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion,‖ its decision is supported by ―substantial 

evidence.‖ Bear Lake Watch, Inc. v. FERC, 324 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th 

Cir.2003). Even ―[i]f the evidence is susceptible of more than one rational 

interpretation, [the court] must uphold [the agency's] findings.‖ Id.

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San Luis, 2014 WL 975130 *9. A plaintiff must satisfy a ―high threshold‖ to set aside federal agency 

actions under the APA. River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010). 

―The court‘s task is not to make its own judgment,‖ because ―Congress has delegated that responsibility 

to the [agency.]‖ Id. at 1070. Instead, ―[t]he Court‘s responsibility is narrower: to determine whether the 

[agency‘s action] comports with the requirements of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.‖ Id. ―The 

[agency‘s] action ... need only be a reasonable, not the best or most reasonable, decision.‖ Id. (quotation 

and citations omitted). 

Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings and the record demonstrate that ―there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‖ 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A court conducting APA judicial review may not resolve factual questions, but 

instead determines ―whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted 

the agency to make the decision it did.‖ Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 90 (D.D.C. 2006) 

(quoting Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.1985)). ―[I]n a case involving review 

of a final agency action under the [APA] ... the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) does not apply because 

of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.‖ Id. at 89. In this context, summary 

judgment becomes the ―mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law, whether the agency action is 

supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent with the APA standard of review.‖ Id. at 

90.

Eastern District of California Local Rule 260(e) directs that each motion for summary judgment 

shall be accompanied by a ―Statement of Undisputed Facts‖ that shall enumerate each of the specific 

material facts on which the motion is based and cite the particular portions of any document relied upon 

to establish that fact. In APA cases, such statements are generally redundant because all relevant facts 

are contained in the agency's administrative record. See San Joaquin River Grp. Auth. v. Nat'l Marine 

Fisheries Serv., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1083-84 (E.D. Cal. 2011).

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IV. DISCUSSION

A. Motion to Strike. 

Alongside his motion for summary judgment and opposition, Plaintiff filed his Second and Third 

Declarations and accompanying exhibits. See Docs. 25-3 & 33-2. The Forest Service moves to strike 

portions of the Second Wiechers Declaration and all of his Third Declaration. Docs. 29 and 35. 

Some portions of the Second Wiechers declaration relate to Plaintiff‘s standing. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 

3 (―Because I enjoy kayaking on the Lower Kern River below Lake Isabella, I have visited the 

recreation sites that provide access to the river many times.‖), ¶ 45 (―I have visited the Lower Kern 

River sites several times ... and I plan to return ... as early as October 12, 2013....‖). The Forest Service 

does not object to these aspects of the Second Wiechers Declaration. Doc. 29 at 7. Material in Plaintiff‘s 

declarations going to the issue of standing will be considered. 

However, the Forest Service does object that ―the vast majority of the information contained in 

the [Second] Wiechers Declaration, as well as its accompanying exhibits, is improper factual or opinion 

testimony or information which the court has already determined should not be considered in this case.‖ 

Id. at 7. The Forest Service also objects that the Third Declaration consists of extra record materials of 

which Plaintiff should have previously requested supplementation or materials that post-date the Forest 

Service‘s motion for summary judgment. Doc. 35 at 2. 

1. General Standard Applicable to Supplementation of the Administrative Record. 

The APA limits the scope of judicial review to the administrative record. 5 U.S.C. § 706

(directing the court to ―review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party‖); Fla. Power & 

Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743–44 (1985) (―The task of the reviewing court is to apply the 

appropriate APA standard of review ... to the agency decision based on the record the agency presents to 

the reviewing court.‖). The appropriate scope of review is normally limited to ―the administrative record 

in existence at the time of the [agency] decision and [not some new] record that is made initially in the 

reviewing court.‖ Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Southwest 

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Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service, 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 1996)).

Nevertheless, the administrative record prepared by the agency may be supplemented by extrarecord materials in an APA case under four narrow exceptions:

(1) when it needs to determine whether the agency has considered all relevant factors and 

has explained its decision;

(2) when the agency has relied upon documents or materials not included in the record;

(3) when it is necessary to explain technical terms or complex matters; and

(4) when a plaintiff makes a showing of agency bad faith.

Southwest Center, 100 F.3d at 1450. ―These limited exceptions operate to identify and plug holes in the 

administrative record.‖ Lands Council, 395 F.3d at 1030. Yet, ―[t]he scope of these exceptions permitted 

by [Ninth Circuit] precedent is constrained, so that the exception does not undermine the general rule.‖ 

Id.

―There is a danger when a reviewing court goes beyond the record before the agency. When a 

reviewing court considers evidence that was not before the agency, it inevitably leads the reviewing 

court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.‖ San Luis, 2014 WL 975130, *10, --- F.3d ---. 

This is because agency action, including designation and certification of an administrative record, is 

entitled to a ―presumption of regularity.‖ See McCrary v. Gutierrez, 495 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1041 (N.D.

Cal. 2007) (citing Bar MK Ranches v. Yuetter, 994 F.2d 735, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1993) (while the agency 

―may not unilaterally determine what constitutes the administrative record‖ the courts ―assume[ ] the 

agency properly designated the [AR] absent clear evidence to the contrary‖)). The party seeking 

supplementation bears the burden of overcoming this presumption by ―clear evidence.‖ See Bar MK 

Ranches, 994 F.2d at 740; Pinnacle Armor, Inc. v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1232 (E.D. Cal. 

2013); Glasser v. NMFS, 2008 WL 114913, *1 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10 2008).

//

//

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2. Plaintiff’s Request to Supplement Under Any of the Southwest Center Exceptions is 

Untimely.

The Scheduling order in this case set August 2, 2013 as the deadline for motions to supplement 

the AR. Doc. 13. Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement pursuant to that schedule which requested an 

order requiring the Forest Service to include in the AR any documentation regarding the timing of the 

placement of certain interpretive signs at the Lower Kern River recreation sites. Doc. 19 at 7-8. 

Alternatively, in the absence of information about the timing of placement, Plaintiff requested an order 

striking from the AR photographs of those signs. Id. at 8. Both of Plaintiff‘s requests were denied. 

Reasoning that Plaintiff totally failed to establish that the requested additional information falls within 

one of the Southwest Center exceptions, the Magistrate Judge refused to order the Forest Service to 

supplement the AR with additional information concerning the placement date of the signs. Doc. 23 at 4-

6. In addition, the Magistrate Judge refused to strike the existing photographs of those signs from the 

record, reasoning that Plaintiff had not established they would cause any prejudice. Id. at 6. Plaintiff did 

not move for reconsideration of these rulings. 

Plaintiff attempts now to invoke certain of the Southwest Center exceptions to resist the Forest 

Service‘s motion to strike. Plaintiff‘s opportunity to request consideration of documents under those 

exceptions has long since past, and Plaintiff offers no justification whatsoever for considering these 

requests out of time.1Therefore, any request to consider the documents in question under any of the 

Southwest Center exceptions is DENIED. This finding obviates the need to deal with many of the 

specific objections and responses raised in the pending motion to strike. Remaining is the question of 

whether any of the documents may be considered for reasons outside the Southwest Center exceptions. 

3. The Disputed Declarations and Exhibits.

The Forest Service moves to strike the following exhibits attached to the Second Wiechers 

Declaration:

 

1

It is irrelevant that Plaintiff did not previously request consideration of these specific documents. The Scheduling 

Order set a deadline for motions to supplement. Plaintiff was obligated to present any documents he wanted considered by 

the August 2, 2013 deadline. 

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 Exhibit A is a photograph of the ―Miracle Hot Springs Dirt Parking Lot – Kern River, 

California‖ showing what appears to be a packed earth parking lot with a ―porta-pottie‖ 

prominently located near some parked vehicles. Doc. 25-3 at p. 10 of 17.

2

 Exhibit B is an image of a Notice of Required Fee issued to a vehicle bearing the California 

license plate number 7Z47252 on June 30, 2012 explaining that ―[a] valid recreation pass 

must be displayed on your vehicle at this site‖ and that the Notice can be remedied by 

sending a personal check or money order for the $10.00 recreation use fee to the Forest 

Service in the enclosed envelope. Id. at p. 11 of 17. 

 Exhibit C is an image of a $10.00 Daily National Forest Southern Sierra Pass and receipt for 

the purchase of the same dated January 12, 2013. Id. at p. 12-13 of 17. 

 Exhibit D is an image of a Recreation Fee Permit envelope bearing the Purchase Date of May 

17, 2013. Id. at p. 14-16 of 17. 

 Exhibit E is an image of a Southern Sierra Pass bearing the expiration date of May 29, 2013.

Id. at p. 17 of 17. 

The Forest Service objects to any references to the above documents contained within the 

Second Wiechers Declaration, specifically the following excerpts: ¶ 5:15 (discussing receipt of Exhibit 

A), ¶ 6:20 (same), ¶ 12:20 (explaining purchase of the Southern Sierra Day Pass ―out of fear of punitive 

action‖), ¶ 13:24-26 (explaining purchase ―under protest‖ of ―Recreation Fee Permit‖), and ¶ 14:7 

(explaining purchase, again ―under protest‖ of Southern Sierra Pass). 

The Forest Service also requests that the Court strike the following paragraphs and excerpts from 

the Second Wiechers Declaration: 

 ¶ 20 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations that there were no interpretive signs, exhibits, or 

kiosks at the Auxiliary Dam site on January 12, 2013); 

 

2 The Forest Service argues that this photograph should be stricken because it duplicates photographs already found in 

the Administrative Record. Doc. 29 at 7. In support of this argument, the Forest Service points to a photograph of the miracle 

Day use ―Developed Parking‖ which shows a different view of a packed dirt parking lot without any portable toilet or other 

structure. See id. (citing AR 657). The photographs are not identical, and Exhibit A will not be stricken on this ground.

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 ¶ 23 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations that there were no picnic tables, interpretive 

signs, exhibits, or kiosks at the Old Isabella site on January 12, 2013); 

 ¶ 28 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations that there were no toilet facilities, interpretive 

signs, exhibits, or kiosks at the Miracle Hot Springs site on January 12, 2013, during 

which time the site was closed for the season); 

 ¶ 31 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations that there were no interpretive signs, exhibits, or 

kiosks at the Upper Richbar site on January 12, 2013); 

 ¶ 33 (same as to the Lower Richbar site, while acknowledging it was closed for the 

season at the time, January 12, 2013);

 ¶ 35 (same as to the Live Oak sign);

 ¶¶ 38-45 (discussing, among other things, Plaintiff‘s observations that ―The Mighty Kern 

Provides‖ signs were being added to certain sites starting in April 2013, signs which 

Plaintiff did not observe to be present prior to that time)

 ¶ 17:19-22 (describing Plaintiff‘s observations that the only place he could park to access 

Lake Isabella or the Kern River near Camp 9 was a large day use area in the center of 

Camp 9); 

 ¶193:2-4 (explaining that at Auxiliary dam Plaintiff observed there was ―no place to part 

at the site solely to hike down to the lake without having to pay the recreation fee at this 

site‖);

 ¶ 22:14-15 (same as to Old Isabella); 

 ¶ 25:26-27 (same as to South Fork); ¶ 26:28 & 1-5 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations 

that on January 12, 2013, there were no designated parking or interpretive signs, exhibits, 

or kiosks at the South Fork site); 

 

3 The Forest Service‘s motion to strike appears to have a typographical error where it requests that the Court strike ¶ 

18: 2-4, see Doc. 29 at 8, as no such excerpt exists. It appears that the Forest Service was referring to ¶ 19:2-4. 

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 ¶ 29:18-19 (explaining Plaintiff‘s observations that on May 29, 2013 the Miracle Hot 

Springs site was open and the only toilet facilities present there were two ―porta-potties‖).

4. Plaintiff’s Arguments For Consideration of This Evidence.

Plaintiff makes several arguments in support of consideration of these documents and 

observations. For the reasons set forth above, any such arguments that concern the Southwest Center

exceptions are DENIED as untimely. For example, citing predecessors to the Southwest Center decision, 

Plaintiff argues that his Declarations should be considered as background and explanatory evidence. 

Doc. 34 at 5-8. This is a clear invocation of one or more of the Southwest Center exceptions and will not 

be considered.4

Plaintiff also argues that ―justice requires‖ that his Declarations and Exhibits be considered

because excluding them would leave Plaintiff in the ―untenable position of having to prove a negative, 

that something did not exist – interpretive signs – at the time the Forest Service took back management 

of the Lower Kern River sites from the concessionaire, at the time he was issued his Notice of Required 

Fee, and at the time he was charged fees.‖ Doc. 34 at 9. While it may be the case that Plaintiff will be 

left without evidence to meet his burden of proof, the Court already permitted him an opportunity to 

move to supplement the record with such evidence. He missed that deadline and offers absolutely no 

basis for this Court to belatedly treat his opposition to Federal Defendant‘s motion to strike as a motion 

to supplement the AR.5

 

4

Plaintiff‘s assertion that the Magistrate Judge‘s August 30, 2013 ruling ―declined to address the difficult issue of 

whether plaintiff‘s information should have been supplemented into the record,‖ Doc. 34 at 9, is misplaced. Plaintiff never 

presented any such evidence at that time, making it impossible for the Magistrate Judge to comment on whether it should be 

appended to the existing AR. His presentation of such evidence now is untimely. Nor is it helpful to Plaintiff‘s cause that he 

attempted to include a reference to his new evidence in the Joint Statement of Undisputed Fact. See Doc. 34 at 9. 

5

Plaintiff also argues that consideration of his new evidence concerning the timing of the placement of the amenities 

would be ―consistent with‖ the Magistrate Judge‘s previous ruling on his motion to supplement the AR. Doc. 34 at 10.

Specifically, Plaintiff points to a footnote in the Magistrate Judge‘s ruling addressing Plaintiff‘s contention that the Forest 

Service‘s May 23, 2013 photographs should be stricken from the AR because they were taken after the date of the final 

agency decision. Doc. 23 at 6. In a footnote, the Magistrate Judge noted: ―In this way, it appears that Plaintiff is seeking an 

order that the District Judge cannot consider [the May 23, 2013 photographs of signs] when determining whether all of the 

amenities were in place at the time of the agency decision. However, this is an argument to be made to the District Judge.‖ 

Doc. 23 at 6 n.3. Plaintiff seems to be suggesting that because the Magistrate Judge deferred this issue until the merits phase, 

the Court likewise should consider his additional evidence during the merits phase. But, Plaintiff ignores the context of this 

footnote. In the same paragraph, the Magistrate Judge concluded Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the May 23, 2013 

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Plaintiff next argues that this evidence may be considered because it goes to the issue of 

mootness. Doc. 34 at 2-4. As discussed below, Federal Defendants argue that many of Plaintiff‘s claims 

in this case are moot because ―[e]ven assuming that at one time some of the Kern River or Lake Isabella 

sites lacked all the amenities required under 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f)(4)(D), the [AR] clearly demonstrates 

that all of the standard amenity fee recreation areas along the Kern river currently provide all six 

amenities ... and that the Lake Isabella sites provide all the amenities required under 16 U.S.C. 

§ 6803(g).‖ Doc. 30-1 at 16.

Plaintiff is correct that, in general, a court may consider extra record evidence to determine 

whether a claim is moot. See Friends of the Clearwater v. Dombeck, 222 F.3d 552, 560-61 (9th Cir. 

2000). Plaintiff asserts generally that the disputed Declarations and Exhibits are relevant to determining 

whether Plaintiff is still entitled to relief in light of events that have occurred since the filling of the 

Complaint. Unlike with the untimely arguments rejected above, Plaintiff has an excuse for not 

previously raising mootness as a basis for consideration of his evidence. Mootness was not squarely 

presented until the Forest Service filed its motion for summary judgment. 

But, Plaintiff fails to connect the actual documents and evidence presented to the mootness 

inquiry. Plaintiff asserts that his Declarations rebut the Forest Service‘s claims that the interpretive signs 

were in place at the Lower Kern River sites when it took over management of these sites on June 18, 

2012. Doc. 34 at 3. Plaintiff misunderstands the thrust of the Forest Service‘s mootness argument. The 

Forest Service maintains that the AR establishes that all of the required amenities are now present at 

each of the Kern River sites, thereby mooting Plaintiff‘s claims. See Doc. 30-1 at 18. Nothing in 

Plaintiff‘s declarations even attempts to undermine the Forest Service‘s representations as to the current

presence of certain amenities. Rather, Plaintiff‘s evidence disputes the timing of the addition of certain 

 

photographs should be stricken. As an aside, the Magistrate Judge noted that when the merits issues were presented, the 

District Court would have an opportunity to address whether the May 23, 2013 photographs should be ―considered‖ when 

evaluating whether all of the amenities were in place at the time of the agency decision. This was an acknowledgement of the 

distinct possibility that the District Court would find photographs taken May 23, 2013 irrelevant to the determination of 

whether certain amenities were in place prior to that date. The footnote does not suggest in any way that it would be 

appropriate for the District Court to consider an untimely motion to supplement the AR with further photographic evidence. 

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amenities at certain cites. Federal Defendant‘s assertion of mootness will rise or fall on the evidence in 

the AR, which only establishes the presence of certain amenities as of the dates of the respective 

photographs of those amenities: May 23, 2013. Plaintiff‘s assertions as to the status of those amenities 

prior to the dates on which the Forest Service took its own photographs are not relevant to the mootness 

inquiry.6Plaintiff cannot make an end run around the conclusion that his motion to amend is untimely 

by arguing that the evidence in question is presented to refute mootness when that evidence is not 

necessary to do so.

Relatedly, Plaintiff maintains that his Declaration and Exhibits may be used to show that the 

Court can still provide relief to Plaintiff. Specifically, Plaintiff maintains that this evidence establishes 

that ―the Court can provide the Plaintiff with a specific remedy in the form of a refund or restitution in 

equity of moneys he should not have had to pay.‖ Doc. 34 at 4. In making this argument, Plaintiff 

presumably is referring to Exhibits A-E, which document the fees Plaintiff was required to pay to utilize 

the disputed recreational sites. Here, Plaintiff is correct. These documents establish that he suffered an 

injury that, while minor, can be remedied by the Court if Plaintiff succeeds on the merits of his claims.

Exhibits A through E will be considered for this purpose only. 

The Court will not consider those portions of Plaintiff‘s motions papers that reference or rely 

upon the challenged materials in any other way, including those portions listed at page 8, lines 17-22 of 

the Forest Service‘s motion to strike. See Doc. 29 at 8:17-22. 

Finally, The Forest Service also moves to strike the entirety of paragraphs 7 and 28, and 

paragraph 3, line 9, of the Wiechers Declaration as improper legal argument. See Doc. 29 at 8 (citing, 

e.g., ¶ 28 (toilet ―not what one would consider a  ̳permanent toilet‘‖); and ¶ 3, line 9 (―where the Forest 

Service charges a fee for parking.‖)). Plaintiff does not dispute that these statements are improper legal 

 

6

Plaintiff also argues that the Forest Service‘s May 23, 2013 photographs showing the amenities in question ―cannot 

technically be part of the Administrative Record‖ because they did not exist at the time and could not have been considered 

by the agency when it made the relevant decisions at issue in this case. Doc. 34 at 3. Again, any such objection is untimely. 

The Scheduling Order required any ―objections or a motion to supplement the record‖ to be filed no later than August 2, 

2013. Doc. 13 at 3. Plaintiff cannot now, belatedly, object to the presence of these photographs in the record. 

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argument. The motion to strike these excerpts is GRANTED. 

B. Standing. 

Even though Plaintiff‘s standing is not disputed by the Forest Service, a court has a sua sponte

duty to examine standing in every case. Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 

2002). Standing is a judicially created doctrine that is an essential part of the case-or-controversy 

requirement of Article III. Pritikin v. Dept. of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir.2001). ―To satisfy the 

Article III case or controversy requirement, a litigant must have suffered some actual injury that can be 

redressed by a favorable judicial decision.‖ Iron Arrow Honor Soc. v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983). 

―In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits 

of the dispute or of particular issues.‖ Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).

The doctrine of standing ―requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to 

ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.‖

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), abrogated on other grounds, Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static 

Control Components, Inc., 2014 WL 1168967, --- S. Ct. --- (Mar. 25, 2014). ―The court is powerless to 

create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of standing.‖ Whitmore v. 

Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 155–56 (1990); Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 

817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002). Standing requires three elements:

First, the plaintiff must have suffered an ―injury in fact‖—an invasion of a 

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) 

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be 

a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—

the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 

defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party 

not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 

speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

In addition to the constitutional requirements of Article III, courts have developed a set of 

prudential considerations to limit standing in federal court to prevent a plaintiff ―from adjudicating 

 ̳abstract questions of wide public significance‘ which amount to  ̳generalized grievances' pervasively 

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shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative branches.‖ Valley Forge Christian 

College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474–75, (1982) 

(quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499–500). To that end, ―the plaintiff's complaint must fall within  ̳the zone 

of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.‘ ‖ Valley 

Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 (quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 

(1970)). In cases arising under the APA, this requirement is particularly important given the limitations 

of 5 U.S.C. § 702, which ―grants standing to a person  ̳aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of 

a relevant statute.‘ ‖ Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., 397 U.S. at 153–54 (citing § 702). 

The Supreme Court has described a plaintiff's burden of proving standing at various stages of a 

case as follows:

Since [the standing elements] are not mere pleading requirements but 

rather an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case, each element must be 

supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears 

the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required 

at the successive stages of the litigation. At the pleading stage, general 

factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant's conduct may 

suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we presume that general allegations 

embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim. In 

response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no 

longer rest on such ―mere allegations,‖ but must ―set forth‖ by affidavit or 

other evidence ―specific facts,‖ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(e), which for 

purposes of the summary judgment motion will be taken to be true. And at 

the final stage, those facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately 

by the evidence adduced at trial.

Lujan, .

1. Injury in Fact. 

The first element of Article III standing is injury-in-fact, which Lujan defines as ―an invasion of 

a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not 

 ̳conjectural or hypothetical.‘ ‖ 504 U.S. at 560 (internal citations omitted). Here, Plaintiff has already 

been injured by the Forest Service‘s issuance of a ―Notice of Required Fee,‖ as well as having to pay 

fees for recreating at the various sites along Lake Isabella and the Lower Kern River where he asserts 

those fees are illegal. Second Wiechers Decl., Doc. 25-3, at ¶¶ 6-7, 12-14. Mr. Wiechers will also suffer 

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injuries in the future if Defendants are allowed to continue charging him a fee solely to park for hiking 

or access to the lake or river when he does not plan to use the amenities, as he plans to return to those on 

certain future dates and for the rest of his life. Id. ¶¶ 9-11, 18, 21, 24, 46; see Sequoia ForestKeeper v. 

Tidwell, 847 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1231 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (―[A] declarant who intends to establish imminent 

future injury must also specify when that declarant intends to return to visit the site of the specific Forest 

Service project.‖). 

The second standing requirement, causation, requires that the injury be ―fairly traceable‖ to the 

challenged action of the defendant, and not be ―the result of the independent action of some third party 

not before the court.‖ Tyler v. Cuomo, 236 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2000). The causation element is 

lacking where an ―injury caused by a third party is too tenuously connected to the acts of the defendant.‖ 

Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 975 (9th Cir. 2003). For the purposes 

of determining standing, while the causal connection cannot ―be too speculative, or rely on conjecture 

about the behavior of other parties, [it] need not be so airtight ... as to demonstrate that the plaintiffs 

would succeed on the merits.' ‖ Ocean Advocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th 

Cir. 2005). Here, there can be no dispute that Plaintiff‘s claimed injuries were or will be caused by the 

challenged implementation of REA by the Forest Service at the disputed recreational sites. 

Standing also requires that the injury likely can be redressed by a favorable court decision. 

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Plaintiffs seek reimbursement of the fees he paid as well as declaratory relief. A 

favorable decision from the Court providing Plaintiff‘s requested relief of a refund of his fees paid 

and/or declaratory relief will redress his injuries. 

Finally, Plaintiff‘s APA ―complaint must fall within  ̳the zone of interests to be protected or 

regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.‘ ‖ Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475

(quoting Ass'n of Data Processing Service Orgs., 397 U.S. at 153). The interest asserted by the plaintiff 

must bear a plausible relationship to the policy underlying the statute. Natural Res. Defense Council v. 

Patterson, 791 F. Supp. 1425, 1429–30 (E.D. Cal. 1992).

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[T]he source of the plaintiff's claim to relief assumes critical importance 

with respect to the prudential rules of standing that, apart from Art. III's 

minimum requirements, serve to limit the role of the courts in resolving 

public disputes. Essentially, the standing question in such cases is whether 

the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly 

can be understood as granting persons in the plaintiff's position a right to 

judicial relief....

Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.

Again, there can be no question that the statutory provision at issue in this case, REA, properly 

can be understood as granting persons in Plaintiff‘s position a right to judicial relief. The statute was, at 

least in part, designed to limit the Forest Service‘s ability to charge fees of recreational users. See H.R. 

REP. 108-790(I), 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2004, 2004 WL 2920863 at *18 (House Committee Report 

stating that REA‘s provisions were ―overly prescriptive to alleviate concerns of those who no longer 

trust certain federal land management agencies with the recreation fee authority‖ by, among other 

things, making it clear that the Forest Service ―will not per permitted to charge solely for parking, scenic 

pullouts, and other non-developed areas....‖). 

In a general sense, Plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims. As discussed below, however, he 

lacks standing to pursue one aspect of his challenge to the provision of required amenities at the specific 

SAFA sites. Standing is evaluated on a claim by claim basis. Get Outdoors II, LLC v. City of San Diego, 

Cal., 506 F.3d 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2007).

C. Mootness. 

The Forest Service argues that to the extent Plaintiff‘s claims are based upon the failure to 

provide all of the required amenities at particular sites, Plaintiff‘s claims are moot. Doc. 30-1 at 16-18. 

Even assuming that at one time some of the sites lacked all of the required amenities, the Forest Service 

maintains that the AR demonstrates that all of the required amenities are currently present at those sites. 

Doc. 30-1 at 16. 

―A case becomes moot—and therefore no longer a  ̳Case‘ or  ̳Controversy‘ for purposes of 

Article III— ̳when the issues presented are no longer ―live‖ or the parties lack a legally cognizable 

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interest in the outcome.‘ ‖ Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 726 (2013) (quoting Murphy v. 

Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982) (per curiam)). ―The underlying concern is that, when the challenged 

conduct ceases such that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated, then it 

becomes impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.‖ City of 

Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (internal citations and quotations omitted). If the parties 

cannot obtain any effective relief, any opinion about the legality of a challenged action is advisory. Id.

―Mootness has been described as the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal 

interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its 

existence (mootness).‖ Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n. 22 (1997) (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). ―[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not 

merely at the time the complaint is filed.‖ Id. at 67. Even if a case is technically moot, a case may 

nevertheless be judiciable if one of three exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies: (1) where a 

plaintiff ―would suffer collateral legal consequences if the actions being appealed were allowed to 

stand‖; (2) where defendant voluntarily ceased the challenged practice; and (3) for ―wrongs capable of 

repetition yet evading review.‖ Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lohn, 511 F.3d 960, 964–66 (9th Cir. 

2007). ―The party asserting mootness has a heavy burden to establish that there is no effective relief 

remaining for a court to provide.‖ In re Palmdale Hills Property, LLC, 654 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 

2011).

First, the question of mootness is simply not applicable to some of Plaintiff‘s claims. Plaintiff 

claims that the port-a-potties currently present at the Miracle site do not qualify as ―permanent toilet 

facilities.‖ Doc. 25-2 at 15-16; AR 653 (showing port-a-potties present as of May 23, 2013). Thus, 

Plaintiff‘s claims as to Miracle are not moot. Plaintiff also claims that the signs currently present at the 

Lower Kern River sites do not qualify as ―interpretive signs‖ under the Guidelines and raises certain 

arguments regarding those signs that are not impacted by the Forest Service‘s recent upgrades to those 

signs. Doc. 25-2 at 19-20; compare AR720-21 with AR722 (Live Oak signage); AR723-24 with AR725-

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26 (Miracle signage); AR727-28 with AR729 (Lower Richbar signage); AR730-31 with AR732 (Upper 

Richbar signage). Likewise, Plaintiff raises a generic challenge to the Forest Service‘s practice of 

charging fees to users who do not use the developed amenities. Doc. 25-2 at 23-25.

As to Plaintiff‘s other claims, Plaintiff maintains that the Court can nevertheless afford him relief 

because he paid fees. The APA waives a federal agency‘s sovereign immunity only with respect to 

claims for equitable relief. Section 702 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 702, waives sovereign immunity over 

claims for equitable relief based on agency action. Section 702 of the APA provides:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely 

affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant 

statute, is entitled to judicial relief thereof. An action in a court of the 

United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim 

that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an 

official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed 

nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United 

States or that the United States is an indispensible party. The United States 

may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree 

may be entered against the United States.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis added). Here, among other things, Plaintiff is requesting a refund of the fees 

he paid to access the recreational sites. Specific relief in the form of restitution of fees paid is an 

equitable remedy available against an agency under the APA. See Harger v. Dep’t of Labor, 569 F.3d 

898, 905 (9th Cir. 2009); America's Community Bankers v. FDIC, 200 F.3d 822, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 

(plaintiff‘s action seeking refund of fee overpayment pursuant to statute is specific relief, not damages, 

within the scope of 5 U.S.C. § 702); see also Adams v. U.S. Forest Service, No. CV 08-283-TUC-RCC, 

Slip. Op., Dkt. #34 at 4 (D. Ariz. March 9, 2010) (attached to the Second Declaration of René Voss, 

Doc. 33-1, as Exhibit A) (finding jurisdiction under APA to adjudicate request for restitution of REA 

fees paid by recreational users). Thus, by providing the Plaintiff with the available equitable relief of a 

refund of fees he paid, the Court can provide effective relief even if the Forest Service has corrected 

some or all of the alleged violations. Federal Defendant‘s motion for summary judgment that certain of 

Plaintiff‘s claims are moot is DENIED.

Because the Court finds that Plaintiff‘s claims are not moot because the Court can provide 

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effective relief, the Court declines to address Plaintiff‘s alternative objections to a mootness finding, 

including his invocation of the voluntary cessation exception to the mootness doctrine.

D. REA Compliance at the Eight Sites.

1. Kern River Sites (Live Oak, Miracle Hot Springs, Lower Richbar, Upper Richbar).

The Sequoia National Forest took over management of the Live Oak, Miracle Hot Springs, 

Lower Richbar, and Upper Richbar sites from a concessioner, and, on June 18, 2012, designated these 

four sites as SAFAs. AR 433. The Upper Richbar site is open year-round. AR 736. The other three sites 

are open from May to September. AR 733-35.

a. Port-a-Potties at Miracle Hotsprings.

REA explicitly requires any SAFA to contain a ―permanent toilet facility.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 

6802(f)(4)(D)(ii). Plaintiff argues that the Miracle Hot Springs (―Miracle‖) site lacks a permanent toilet 

facility and therefore that the Forest Service is violating REA by charging a SARF to access that site. 

Doc. 25-2 at 15-17. It is undisputed that the only bathroom facilities provided at the Miracle site are 

portable bathrooms made of plastic or fiberglass (i.e. ―port-a-potties‖). AR 653 (image of toilet facilities 

at Miracle Day Use Area). The Forest Service removes these port-a-potties when the site is closed for 

the winter to prevent vandalism and weather damage. Doc. 30-1 (citing AR 735). 

The Forest Service maintains that port-a-potties qualify as ―permanent toilet facilities‖ under 

REA. Doc. 30-1 at 10-12. In support of this assertion, the Forest Service relies on its Guidelines, which 

defines ―permanent toilet facility‖ as ―[a] toilet building with a floor, walls, and roof that is permanently 

affixed or that is available (year after year) in locations that serve visitors during the primary use season 

but are moved during the non-use season because of environmental or weather concerns.‖ AR 70. 

It is undisputed that the Guidelines were never subjected to notice and comment rulemaking. 

While a noticed rule would be entitled to substantial Chevron deference, the Guidelines are entitled to 

more limited deference under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). See Christensen v. 

Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (―Interpretations contained in policy statements, agency 

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manuals, enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law -- do not warrant Chevron-style 

deference.‖); Adams v. U.S. Forest Serv., 671 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012) (appearing to approve of district 

court‘s application of Skidmore to the Guidelines). Under Skidmore, agency interpretations are ―entitled 

to respect,‖ but only to the extent that those interpretations have the ―power to persuade.‖ Christensen, 

529 U.S. at 587.

Here, whether or not the Forest Service‘s interpretation of the statutory language ―permanent 

toilet facility‖ is persuasive is a question of statutory interpretation. When terms used in a statute are 

undefined, a court must give them ―their ordinary meaning.‖ Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 

179, 187 (1995); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259, 1264 (2011)(―Statutory construction must 

begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that 

language accurately expresses the legislative purpose‖)(citation omitted). Websters offers several 

definitions of permanent: 

lasting or continuing for a very long time or forever: not temporary or 

changing; continuing or enduring without fundamental or marked change: 

stable.

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/permanent (last visited February 27, 2014). The Forest 

Service maintains that its interpretation of the term ―permanent toilet facility‖ comports with this 

definition. Doc. 30-1 at 11. The Forest Service does argue that ―the Agency removes the toilet when the 

site is gated and closed for the winter,‖ during which times fees are not charged. Doc. 30-1 at 12. This 

entirely misses the point. Although the Forest Service may have good reasons why it might not want to 

leave a restroom facility in a particular area year round (e.g., to prevent vandalism or weather damage), 

the Court is at a total loss as to how a port-a-potty that is admittedly only present at a site part of the year 

could ever qualify as a ―permanent toilet facility.‖ The Forest Service‘s practice with respect to the 

provision of toilet facilities at Miracle is not aligned with the concept of permanence, as the toilets they 

provide there do not ―continue or endure without fundamental or marked change.‖ Just because users 

can predict that the port-a-potty will be there during Miracle‘s open season does not transform the portCase 1:13-cv-00223-LJO-JLT Document 48 Filed 04/10/14 Page 26 of 45
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a-potty into a permanent toilet facility. 

Moreover, the Forest Service‘s interpretation would render the term ―permanent‖ totally 

superfluous in the statutory language. If all Congress wanted to require was a ―toilet facility‖ it could 

have said so and fees could only be charged when a ―toilet facility‖ is present at the site. This is, in 

effect, what the Forest Service does at Miracle, charging fees when the port-a-potty is present, but not 

when it has been removed. The only plausible explanation for Congress‘ addition of the term 

―permanent‖ to the statute was that Congress wanted the public to have access to a more permanent (and 

presumably higher quality) toilet facility at Forest Service sites where fees were charged.7

The Forest Service‘s definition of the term ―permanent toilet facility‖ to include port-a-potties, 

even if they are predictably present at a site during its open season, is simply not persuasive and is 

therefore not entitled to Skidmore deference.

Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment that the Miracle site does not meet the requirements of 

the REA to charge a SARF is GRANTED; Federal Defendant‘s cross motion is DENIED. 

b. Interpretive Signs at the Kern River Sites.

REA also requires any SAFA to display an ―interpretive sign, exhibit, or kiosk.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 

6802(g). The Guidelines provide the following definition: 

Interpretive Sign, Exhibit or Kiosk – Each site or area must contain at least 

one public display designed to develop a visitor‘s interest, enjoyment, and 

understanding of the natural or cultural environment. This requirement is 

in addition to facilities needed to inform visitors of recreation 

opportunities, facilities, and applicable regulations and restrictions. 

Messages should be relevant to the setting and the visitor – generic posters 

and safety information are not adequate. The design, content, and medium 

should be of professional quality. The information may be incorporated 

into a bulletin board or presented through other signing or media. In 

general, single displays should be a minimum of roughly 25 x 30 inches. 

 

7 The Court is not persuaded by the Forest Service‘s argument that ―[n]othing in REA requires that once an amenity is 

provided, the Agency must continue to provide it in perpetuity.‖ Doc. 30-1 at 12. This may be true, but it begs the question of 

whether the amenity has ever been provided accordance with legislative command. Here, a port-a-potty simply cannot satisfy 

any reasonable interpretation of the statutory language ―permanent toilet facility.‖

Nor is the Court persuaded by the fact that Congress did not specifically require ―flush‖ toilets at SAFAs. AR 70. 

The Forest Service offers the Court no basis upon which to conclude it would be impossible to provide a non-flush permanent 

toilet facility.

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Consideration should be given to bilingual and accessibility needs.

AR 70. Plaintiff does not argue that this definition is unlawful or otherwise inappropriate. Rather, he 

argues (1) that no interpretive amenities were provided when the Lower Kern River sites were 

designated as SAFAs on June 19, 2012, and (2) that that the signs that were eventually placed at the 

Lower Kern River sites do not comply with the Guidelines. Doc. 25 -2 at 17-19.

(1) Were Interpretive Amenities Present When the Lower Kern River 

Sites Were Designated?

Plaintiff argues that the record is devoid of evidence demonstrating that interpretive amenities 

were available at any of the Lower Kern River sites at the time they were designated SAFAs. Doc. 25-2 

at 17-19. Plaintiff acknowledges that the AR contains several photographs of signs at each of the four 

Lower Kern River SAFAs taken May 23, 2013. AR 652, 647, 643, 676. Plaintiff maintains, however, 

that the AR is devoid of evidence demonstrating when those signs were placed and, in particular, of any 

evidence indicating that the interpretive signs were in place when he received his Notice of Required 

Fee on June 30, 2012. See Doc. 25-2 at 17-18. 

Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the agency‘s action is arbitrary and capricious. See 

George v. Bay Area Rapid Transit, 577 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting City of Olmsted Falls, 

Ohio v. FAA, 292 F.3d 261, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A Court must be ―highly deferential‖ in an APA 

review case, and must ―presum[e] the agency action to be valid ....‖ Nw. Ecosystem Alliance v. U.S. Fish 

& Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2007).

8

Plaintiff appears to acknowledge as much, 

asserting that he has provided such evidence, in the form of the extra-record declaration discussed 

above. See Doc. 33 at 5. Yet, Plaintiff failed to timely petition for its consideration. Absent proof to the 

contrary, it must be presumed that the signs were in place at the time the Lower Kern River sites were 

designated and at the time Plaintiff received his Notice of Required Fee. Therefore, Plaintiff‘s motion 

 

8

Plaintiff‘s invocation of the substantial evidence standard, see Doc. 33 at 6-7 (citing Love Korean Church v. 

Chertoff, 549 F.3d 749, 754 (9th Cir, 2008), is misplaced. That standard applies only when an agency is charged with making 

formal factual findings pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 or 557 or ―otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 

provided by statute.‖ See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).

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for summary judgment that the forest service failed to demonstrate the presence of interpretive amenities 

at the Lower Kern River sites when they were designated SAFAs is DENIED for lack of proof; Federal 

Defendant‘s cross motion is GRANTED. 

(2) Do the “Mighty Kern Provides” Signs Shown in the Forest Service 

Photographs Comply with the Guidelines? 

Next, Plaintiff argues that the signs shown in the May 2013 photographs do not comply with the 

Guidelines‘ requirements for interpretive signs. The images in the AR show laminated copies of a poster 

stapled to existing bulletin boards. AR 643, 647, 652, 676. The Guidelines define an ―interpretive, sign, 

exhibit or kiosk,‖ as follows: 

Each site or area must contain at least one public display designed to 

develop a visitor‘s interest, enjoyment, and understanding of the natural or 

cultural environment. This requirement is in addition to facilities needed 

to inform visitors of recreation opportunities, facilities, and applicable 

regulations and restrictions. Messages should be relevant to the setting and 

the visitor – [G]eneric posters and safety information are not adequate. 

The design, content, and medium should be of professional quality. The 

information may be incorporated into a bulletin board or presented 

through other signing or media. In general, single displays should be a 

minimum of roughly 25 x 30 inches. Consideration should be given to 

bilingual and accessibility needs.

AR 70. 

First, Plaintiff maintains that the signs are ―generic,‖ in that the same sign is used at all four sites. 

Doc. 25-2 at 19. The Forest Service maintains that a sign is not ―generic,‖ even if it is used at more than 

one site, if it is specific to the sites in question. Doc. 30-1 at 13. For example, the ―Mighty Kern 

Provides‖ signs, which are found at all of the Lower Kern River sites, specifically display information 

about the Kern River. AR 643, AR 722 (Live Oak); AR 647, AR 729 (Lower Richbar); AR 652, AR

725-26 (Miracle); AR 676, AR 732 (Upper Richbar). Presumably, such signs would be distinguishable 

from a hypothetical sign that discusses some general feature of nature not specific to the particular site 

in question. The Forest Service‘s interpretation of its own Guidelines does not run contrary to any 

statutory instruction and has the ―power to persuade,‖ which is sufficient under Skidmore. See

Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment as to this ground for relief is 

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DENIED. 

Second, Plaintiff argues that the signs are not presented in a ―professional medium.‖ See AR 

720-21, 723-24, 727-28, 730-31 (showing signs in context posted on upright bulletin boards). The Forest 

Service responds in two ways to this argument. First, the Forest Service maintains that Plaintiff is 

relying on outdated information, pointing to new versions of the signs, which are ―clearly‖ of 

―professional quality.‖ It is true that the AR contains images of upgraded signs, more formally mounted 

onto boulders at the fee sites. Compare AR720-21 with AR722 (Live Oak signage); AR723-24 with

AR725-26 (Miracle signage); AR727-28 with AR729 (Lower Richbar signage); AR730-31 with AR732 

(Upper Richbar signage). But, the Forest Service does not even contend that Plaintiff was required to 

pay a fee to access those sites at a time when the newer versions of the signs were in place. The 

upgrades are therefore irrelevant to the inquiry.9

The Forest Service also maintains that the original, laminated signs were presented in a 

―professional‖ manner. The images of those signs reveal that they were laminated and incorporated into 

a bulletin board. Again, although the placement and design of these signs certainly could be more 

impressive, this Court cannot definitively say they are not of ―professional quality.‖ In fact, the 

Guidelines themselves acknowledge that the ―information may be incorporated into a bulletin board or 

presented through other signing or media.‖10

Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the signs do not qualify under the Guidelines because they are 

not bilingual and do not meet accessibility needs because of their location on the backs of existing 

bulleting boards where the viewer must step off the payment, over a curb, and behind the panel to view 

the sign. See AR 720-21, 723-24, 727-28, 730-31 (showing signs in context). However, neither the REA 

nor the Guidelines require the signs to be bilingual or accessible. The Guidelines merely state that 

 

9

Likewise, that the Forest Service upgraded the signs is not proof that they were previously inadequate. Plaintiff has 

presented no authority suggesting that an agency may not upgrade facilities without impliedly admitting that prior facilities 

were insufficient. 

10 That the Forest Service has recently upgraded the Guidelines‘ definition of ―Interpretive Sign, Exhibit or Kiosk‖ is 

not relevant to this Court‘s review of the agency‘s compliance with the Guidelines in force at the time the original signs were 

placed. 

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―consideration should be given to bilingual and accessibility needs.‖ AR 70. 

Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment that the Forest Service failed to provide interpretive 

amenities at the Lower Kern River sites is DENIED.

2. Camp 9. 

Plaintiff‘s motions papers do not argue that the required amenities are not present at Camp 9.

Therefore, Federal Defendant‘s cross motion for summary judgment that Plaintiff‘s claims regarding 

Camp 9 are unsupported is GRANTED. 

3. Lake Isabella SAFA.

On July 16, 2008, the Forest Service approved fee increases for day and overnight use at the 

Lake Isabella SAFA. AR 421; AR 423. Plaintiff maintains that this action violated REA, because, at the 

time the fee increase was approved, the Forest Service failed to provide the required amenities, namely: 

designated developed parking; a permanent toilet facility; a permanent trash receptacle; an interpretive 

sign, exhibit, or kiosk; picnic tables; and security services. Doc. 25-2 at 21; 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f).

Plaintiff points to a June 1, 2008 ―Revised Business Plan for the Lake Isabella High Impact Recreation 

Area,‖ which includes a statement of ―Amenities Provided‖ at Auxiliary Dam, Old Isabella, and South 

Fork, which only mentions the presence of ―flush toilets,‖ ―picnic tables,‖ ―trash collection [and] ... 

dumpsters.‖ AR 394-95. There is no mention of any interpretive amenities. Id. The absence of 

interpretive amenities at that time was acknowledged by the Forest Service when it responded to the 

2011 REA review by stating that such amenities were not present, but that the Forest Service ―plan[ned]

to install a 3rd panel at the existing visitor information station in 2011.‖ AR 454. 

The Forest Service responds by asserting that the Lake Isabella SAFA was re-designated into 

three separate EAFAs (Old Isabella, Auxiliary Dam, and South Fork) in 2012. See AR499-500, 507, 510

(July 2012 memo specifically discussing immediate implementation of re-designation of Lake Isabella 

SAFA into three EAFAs). Unlike SAFAs, which require the presence of all of the six amenities listed 

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above, an EAFA requires the presence of ―a majority‖ of the amenities listed in 16 U.S.C. § 1608(g).11

There is no dispute that all three sites currently meet, and have met since 2012, the requirements for 

EAFAs. 

Plaintiff points out that the re-designation was not formally approved by the RRAC until 

September 13, 2013. AR 767-68. Plaintiff maintains that, until the formal approval, the Forest Service 

was required to have all six amenities required of a SAFA in order to charge fees there, and that because 

the Forest Service has admitted no interpretive amenities existed within the Lake Isabella SAFA, the 

Forest Service could not lawfully charge fees within that area prior to September 13, 2013. Doc. 25-2 at 

22.

It is somewhat unclear, however, whether the Forest Service claims that the re-designation of the 

Lake Isabella SAFA into the three EAFAs is fatal to Plaintiff‘s claims on the merits because the 

conversion took place before his claimed injury, or whether that the re-designation moots Plaintiff‘s 

claims. In fact, the Forest Service‘s brief appears to make both arguments. See Doc. 30-1 at 14-15, 17-

18. The timing of the relevant events is not clearly articulated in the briefs but is critical to the Court‘s 

analysis.

A close examination of the AR reveals that the Forest Service received approval from the 

Washington Office for its proposal to eliminate the Lake Isabella SAFA and convert it to three standalone EAFAa in January of 2012. AR 492-96. But, this general approval, applicable to numerous 

proposals, acknowledged that some proposals might not be implemented as proposed because ―[t]he 

next step in the ... process is public involvement.‖ AR 495.

12 Subsequent guidance from the Washington 

Office, issued May 16, 2012 by the Deputy Chief of the national Forest System, directed Regional 

Foresters as follows: 

 

11 16 U.S.C. § 6802(g) provides an EAFA must ―provide at least a majority of the following: (i) Tent or trailer 

spaces[;] (ii) Picnic tables[;] (iii) Drinking water[;] (iv) Access roads[;] (v) The collection of the fee by an employee or agent 

of the Federal land management agency[;] (vi) Reasonable visitor protection[;] (vii) Refuse containers[;] (viii) Toilet 

facilities[;] (ix) Simple devices for containing a campfire.‖

12 The Court finds this general acknowledgement of the applicability of the public involvement process not to be in

conflict with the Forest Service‘s later, far more specific finding that certain types of re-designations need not undergo preapproval by an RRAC. 

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On March 25, 2011, I issued guidance for reviewing our 97 large standard 

amenity recreation fee areas with multiple recreation sites or complexes. 

That guidance resulted in proposals to remove the large area designation 

from 73 of these areas and reduce most of the remaining 24 areas, which 

were concurred with in letters from my office in December, 2011 and 

February, 2012. As a result, many lower developed recreation sites are 

proposed for elimination from the recreation fee program. This is a 

significant change to our recreation fee program, one that puts us on sound 

footing for future success, and I want to applaud you for your hard work 

and diligence.

I recognize that public participation, including Recreation Resource 

Advisory Committee (RAC) review, is required by the Federal Lands 

Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) to implement these proposals. 

However, it is important that we demonstrate commitment to this 

approach.

To that end, I am directing that you not enforce standard amenity 

recreation fees or issue notices of required fees for any portion of a large 

area that has been proposed for elimination from the recreation fee 

program. If a large area is being divided into smaller areas with a single 

recreation site or tight cluster of sites, ensure that all these sites contain all 

the required amenities and services before continuing to enforce fees or 

issue notices of required fees at those sites. Sites may include some 

designated overflow parking areas if they are key to the function and use 

of the site.

You may convert a standard amenity recreation fee for an area to another 

type of recreation fee, such as an expanded amenity recreation fee or 

special recreation permit fee, provided there is no change in the fee 

amount and the criteria for charging that type of fee under REA and the 

Forest Service‘s Interim Implementation Guidelines on REA are met.

AR 499-500, AR 507 (emphasis added).

More specifically, a May 11, 2012 document provided ―Guidance for Standard Amenity Fee 

Areas Proposed to be Changed Pending Public Input‖: 

1) Do not enforce standard amenity recreation fees or issue notices of 

required fees for any portion of an area that has been proposed for 

elimination from the recreation fee program.

2) If an area is being divided into smaller areas with a single recreation 

site or tight clusters of sites, ensure that all these sites contain all the 

required amenities and services before continuing to enforce fees or issue 

notices of required fees at those sites. Sites may include some designated 

overflow parking areas if they are key to the function and use of the site.

3) You may convert a standard amenity recreation fee for an area to 

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another type of recreation fee, such as an expanded amenity recreation fee 

or special recreation permit fee, provided there is no change in the fee 

amount and the criteria for charging that type of fee under the Federal 

Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) and the Forest Service‘s 

Interim Implementation Guidelines on REA are met.

4) Remove standard amenity recreation fee signs at all locations where 

standard amenity recreation fees for areas will not be enforced.

5) For large areas where fee enforcement will change, post a notice at the 

entrances to those areas and at recreation sites within those areas that 

indicates where recreation fees will and will not be enforced (see sample 

notice).

AR 501 (emphasis added).

But, it was not until July 5, 2012 that the Pacific Southwest Regional Office directed Sequoia 

National Forest to ―immediately‖ manage the Lake Isabella SAFA as three stand-alone EAFAs. AR 

507-510. Therefore, the Court will consider the informal conversion of the Lake Isabella sites to have 

taken place on July 5, 2015. 

Yet, this begs the question of whether this informal conversion was lawful. The Forest Service 

insists that the informal re-designation was sufficient to alter the status of the Lake Isabella sites from a 

SAFA to three EAFAs for purposes of REA, pointing to the Deputy Chief‘s guidance that the Forest 

Service may ―convert a standard amenity recreation fee for an area to another type of recreation fee, 

such as an expanded amenity recreation fee or special recreation permit fee, provided there is no change 

in the fee amount and the criteria for charging that type of fee under REA and the Forest Service‘s 

Interim Implementation Guidelines on REA are met.‖ AR 499. Such policy guidance documents are 

entitled to Skidmore deference. See Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587 (―[I]nterpretations contained in formats 

such as opinion letters are  ̳entitled to respect‘ under our decision in Skidmore....‖). As mentioned above, 

such a document is entitled to respect to the extent that it has the ―power to persuade.‖ Id. ―The weight 

of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, 

the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors 

which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.‖ Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,

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140 (1944).

Plaintiff maintains that the informal conversion violated REA because public involvement is 

required before implementing such a change. See Doc. 33 at 14. In support of this argument, Plaintiff 

sites 16 U.S.C. § 6803, which provides, in pertinent part: 

(a) In general

As required in this section, the Secretary shall provide the public with opportunities to 

participate in the development of or changing of a recreation fee established under this 

chapter.

(b) Advance notice

The Secretary shall publish a notice in the Federal Register of the establishment of a new 

recreation fee area for each agency 6 months before establishment. The Secretary shall 

publish notice of a new recreation fee or a change to an existing recreation fee established 

under this chapter in local newspapers and publications located near the site at which the 

recreation fee would be established or changed.

Plaintiff asserts that the conversion of a SAFA to an EAFA is a ―change‖ requiring RRAC review.13

The key question is whether the Forest Service‘s interpretation of this statutory language, as set 

forth in the May 2012 Guidance, has the ―power to persuade.‖ Essentially, the Forest Service‘s position 

is that because the fee charged did not ―change‖ and the requirements of REA applicable to EAFAs 

were met, public participation was not required prior to the conversion of the Lake Isabella SAFA to an 

EAFA. While the May 11, 2012 Guidance document does not provide explicit reasoning to justify its 

interpretation of REA, it does nevertheless present a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. 

Subsections (a) and (b) of 16 U.S.C. § 6803 use the word ―change‖ to trigger the requirement of public 

participation. REA does not define the word ―change,‖ so the court must give the term its ordinary 

meaning. Milner, 131 S. Ct. at 1264. Websters defines ―change‖ to mean: ―to become different: to make 

(someone or something) different: to become something else.‖ http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/change (last visited April 8, 2014). In the statutory text, this term modifies the 

terms ―recreation fee‖ or ―existing recreation fee.‖ It is not unreasonable to interpret this language to 

 

13 It is undisputed that the RRAC did not complete a review of the Lake Isabella sites until September 2013. AR 767.

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mean that the fee itself must change for RRAC pre-approval to be required.

14

Having found the informal conversion to be lawful, the Court declines to address the extended, 

arguments in the parties‘ briefs (including the entirety of the sur-reply and response) concerning the 

effectiveness of the RRAC‘s September 2013 formal approval of the changed designation. 

The Court‘s conclusion regarding the informal conversion is also fatal to Plaintiff‘s claims 

regarding application of REA to the Lake Isabella SAFA, because the informal conversion in July 2012 

took place before Plaintiff claims to ever have been harmed at the Lake Isabella SAFA sites.15 While, 

Plaintiff claims to have received a Notice of Required Fee at one of the Lower Kern River sites on June 

30, 2013, see Second Wiechers Decl., Doc. 25-3 at ¶¶ 4-6, he does not claim to have visited the Lake 

Isabella sites until January 2013, see id. at ¶¶ 15-26, by which time the informal conversion of the Lake 

Isabella sites to EAFAs had clearly taken place. Therefore, he does not have standing to pursue a 

challenge based upon the imposition of fees at the Lake Isabella sites prior to January 2013. It is not 

sufficient that he professed a vague ―hesitat[ion] to visit‖ the fee areas on Lake Isabella subsequent to 

his receipt of the Notice of Required Fee in June 2012. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 

 

14 The Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff‘s reference to 16 U.S.C. § 6803(d)(2), which explains that the duties of 

RRAC‘s include the following: 

...[A] Recreation Resource Advisory Committee may make recommendations to the Secretary regarding a standard 

amenity recreation fee or an expanded amenity recreation fee, whenever the recommendations relate to public 

concerns in the State or region covered by the Committee regarding—

(A) the implementation of a standard amenity recreation fee or an expanded amenity recreation fee or the 

establishment of a specific recreation fee site;

(B) the elimination of a standard amenity recreation fee or an expanded amenity recreation fee; or

(C) the expansion or limitation of the recreation fee program.

The conversion of the Lake Isabella SAFA arguably resulted in the ―limitation‖ of that fee program insofar as the geographic 

boundaries within which fees would be charged was thereafter limited to those areas included in the three, smaller EAFAs. 

However, the fact that the statute authorizes a RRAC to make recommendations on such issues does not alter the plain 

meaning of subsections (a) and (b), which control when public participation is required prior to taking action under the REA. 

This distinction is reflected in the Forest Service‘s guidance contained within the AR. In reference to the fact that ―many 

lower developed recreation sites [were] proposed for elimination from the recreation fee program,‖ the Deputy Chief of the 

National Forest System acknowledged that public participation is required by REA to implement such changes. AR 499. 

However, where there is ―no change in the fee amount and the criteria for charging that type of fee‖ are met, a Forest may 

convert a SAFA to another type of recreation fee. Id. This is a reasonable and persuasive interpretation of the statutory 

language. 

15 This also makes it unnecessary to address Federal Defendant‘s alternative argument that the informal re-designation 

of the Lake Isabella SAFA into three EAFAs moots plaintiff‘s claims. 

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495 (2009) (plaintiff cannot establish standing based upon future visits to an impacted area unless he 

demonstrates specific plans to visit locations impacted by allegedly unlawful activity). Moreover, any 

challenge to the imposition of fees after January 2013 would have to be based upon the Forest Service‘s 

failure to provide the amenities required of EAFAs. Because it is undisputed that the sites satisfied the 

standards for EAFAs, Plaintiff‘s claim must fail.16 Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment that 

charging him fees at the Lake Isabella sites violated REA is DENIED; Federal Defendant‘s cross motion 

is GRANTED.

4. Charging Visitors Who Do Not Use the Developed Amenities.

REA specifically limits the Forest Service‘s ability to charge fees in SAFAs or EAFAs by, 

among other things, providing that the Forest Service ―shall not charge any standard amenity recreation 

fee or expanded amenity recreation fee ... (A) [s]olely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking 

along roads or trailsides[;] (B) [f]or general access unless specifically authorized under this section[;] ... 

[or] (D) [f]or persons who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding 

through, or hiking through Federal recreational lands and waters without using the facilities and 

services....‖ 16 U.S.C.A. § 6802(d); see also 16 U.S.C. § 6802(f)-(g) (applying these limitations to 

SAFAs and EAFAs).

The Ninth Circuit addressed the limitations set forth in § 6802(d) in Adams v. U.S. Forest

Service, 671 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012). There, recreational visitors to the Coronodo National Forest 

challenged the Forest Service‘s collection of fees from all drivers who park their vehicles in a milewide, 28-mile long piece of Catalina highway, the only paved road to the summit of Mount Lemmon, 

near Tucson, Arizona. Id. at 1139-40. The area in which the fees were charged was designated a HIRA 

under the Guidelines, a designation that requires the presence of the specific SAFA amenities discussed 

 

16 Plaintiff cannot now argue that the sites fail to satisfy the standards for an EAFA, as no such claim is contained 

within the Complaint. As mentioned above, the First Claim for Relief specifically alleges that the Forest Service acted 

unlawfully by charging fees at the challenged sites without providing all of the six required amenities listed in 16 U.S.C. §

6802(f). Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 36-37. The Second Claim for Relief alleges generally that the Forest Service acted unlawfully by 

charging those fees of visitors, ―regardless of whether they use the developed facilities and services.‖ Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.

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above, as well as certain additional requirements, such as: 

[A] clearly delineated, contiguous area with specific, tightly defined 

boundaries and clearly defined access points (such that visitors can easily 

identify the fee area boundaries on the ground or on a map/sign); that 

supports or sustains concentrated recreation use; and that provides 

opportunities for outdoor recreation that are directly associated with a 

natural or cultural feature, place, or activity (i.e., waterway, canyon, travel 

corridor, geographic attraction - the recreation attraction).

Id. at 1141; see also AR 70. At the Mt. Lemmon HIRA, the Forest Service chose to exempt all visitors 

who entered the area without a car, but did not exempt visitors who drove into the area, parked their 

cars, then picnicked, camped, or hiked in undeveloped areas accessible from the highway. Id. at 1142. 

Any such visitor who failed to pay the required fee was subject to a fine. Id. The district court granted 

the Forest Service‘s motion to dismiss, finding that the Forest Service‘s interpretation of the Guidelines 

as applied to the site was reasonable. Id.

The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the ―REA unambiguously prohibits the standard amenity 

recreation fee structure in place at [the site].‖ Id. at 1143. 

Subsection (d)(1) is a freestanding prohibition on collecting standard and 

expanded amenity recreation fees ―for‖ a list of eleven activities or 

services. This list of prohibited fees includes those that are: ―[s]olely for 

parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides‖; 

―[f]or persons who are driving through, walking through, boating through, 

horseback riding through, or hiking through Federal recreational lands and 

waters without using the facilities and services....‖ 16 U.S.C. § 

6802(d)(1)(A), (D), & (E). The statute is abundantly clear that a standard 

amenity recreation fee cannot, under any circumstances, be charged for 

those activities.

The Forest Service is prohibited from charging an amenity fee ―[s]olely 

for parking.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(A). There is nothing ambiguous 

about that text. If all a visitor does is park, and he is charged a fee, that fee 

is imposed ―[s]olely for parking.‖ If a visitor parks at Mount Lemmon, he 

is charged a fee. If a visitor goes to Mount Lemmon but does not park 

there, he is not charged a fee. [Citation omitted] It may often be the case 

that a visitor, after parking, does something else. Then the fee would not 

be ―[s]olely for parking,‖ and so long as the ―something else‖ is not 

another activity for which subsection (d)(1) prohibits an amenity 

recreation fee, the agency is free to charge him. But if a visitor does 

nothing other than park, the fee is solely for parking and is therefore 

plainly prohibited by the REA.

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Id. at 1143-44. The Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the proposition that a fee is ―[s]olely for parking‖ 

only ―where the other amenities required by REA are absent.‖ Id. at 1144.

That is incorrect. If it were true, a ―[s]olely for parking‖ fee would be 

possible only in places where the REA requires amenities, but then the 

parking fee prohibition would never limit fees in those places, where by 

definition amenities are present. And subsection (d)(1)(A) would never 

apply to expanded amenity recreation fees, because those are permitted 

only for certain ―facilities and services.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 6802(g)(2). ―[A]n 

agency's interpretation of a statute is not entitled to deference when it goes 

beyond the meaning that the statute can bear,‖ MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. 

Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994), and here, the Forest 

Service's interpretation so diminishes the entire prohibition on fees 

―[s]olely for parking‖ as to defy the statute's meaning.

Id.

Critically, the Ninth Circuit reasoned: ―REA clearly contemplates that individuals can go to a 

place offering facilities and services without using the facilities and services and without paying a fee.‖ 

Id. 

For example, subsection (d)(1)(D) prohibits fees ―for persons who are 

driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding 

through, or hiking through ... without using the facilities and services.‖ 16 

U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(D) (emphasis added). The statute thus distinguishes 

between merely recreating in an area and actually using an area's 

amenities.

Id. at 1144-45.

Here, Plaintiff asserts that he uses the sites at issue in this case solely to access nearby natural 

features and therefore should not be subject to fee collection at any of the sites. Doc. 25-2 at 25. He 

specifically points out that there are no places to park at these sites that are dedicated to those users who 

solely wish to access these natural features without using any of the available amenities. It is Plaintiff‘s 

position that, under Adams, the Forest Service may not charge recreation fees for parking at developed 

recreation sites, so long as the visitor only parks at the site and intends to recreate only in nearby, 

undeveloped areas., 

The Forest Service attempts to distinguish Adams on several grounds. First, the Forest Service 

points out, correctly, that Adams was decided on a motion to dismiss, which required that the court 

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assume the truth of all facts asserted in the complaint. Adams, 671 F.3d at 1142-43; Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Relatedly, the Forest Service points out that the facts of Adams are unique insofar as that case 

concerned fees charged for parking anywhere within a 28 mile long, mile-wide stretch of highway. Id. at 

1139. Here, by contrast, the challenged fee areas along the Lower Kern River are significantly smaller, 

encompassing between five and ten acres. See AR 686 (Kern River sites map). The Forest Service 

argues that because the amenities are located in close proximity to the parking areas, if a member of the 

public visits the sites, one can assume that the visitor is using the amenities present there. Doc. 37 at 11. 

Finally, and most persuasively, the Forest Service argues that Adams is distinguishable because 

16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(A) prohibits a series of activities, each of which is modified by the prepositional 

phrase ―along roads or trailsides.‖ In other words, because 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(A) prohibits the 

Secretary from charging any standard amenity recreation fee ―[s]olely for parking, undesignated 

parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides,‖ the prohibition only applies to fees charged: (1) solely 

for parking along roads or trailsides; (2) solely for undesignated parking along roads or trailsides; or (3) 

solely for picnicking along roads or trailsides.‖ The Forest Service is correct that Plaintiff has failed to 

make any allegation that would support a finding that he has been or is being charged solely for parking 

or picnicking along a road or trailside. Doc. 37 at 11-12. 

Plaintiff concedes that each clause of 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(A) is limited by the ―along roads or 

trailsides‖ language. Doc. 33 at 20-21. In his opposition/reply, Plaintiff abandons his reliance on that 

statutory provision and instead turning to subsection (d)(1)(D), which prohibits the imposition of fees 

―[f]or persons who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding through, or 

hiking through Federal recreational lands and waters without using the facilities and services.‖ Plaintiff 

points to the following language from Adams, where the Ninth Circuit reasoned:

REA clearly contemplates that individuals can go to a place offering 

facilities and services without using the facilities and services and without 

paying a fee. For example, subsection (d)(1)(D) prohibits fees ―for persons 

who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback 

riding through, or hiking through ... without using the facilities and 

services.‖ 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(D) []. The statute thus distinguishes 

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between merely recreating in an area and actually using an area's 

amenities.

Adams, 671 F.3d at 1144-45. But, Plaintiff fails to consider this reasoning in context. There, the Ninth 

Circuit was addressing the hypothetical argument that at Mt. Lemmon the Forest Service might not be 

imposing a fee ―solely for parking‖ because it is possible that a parker might proceed to use other facilities. 

Id. at 1144. Rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit offered an elaborate analogy: 

Because ―for‖ is, of course, not defined in the statute, we must give it ―its 

ordinary or natural meaning.‖ Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 

(1993) (citation omitted). This might seem like an impossible task—

according to Webster's, ―for‖ has over thirty non-obsolete meanings. 

Webster's Third New International Dictionary 886 (2002). ―Ambiguity,‖ 

however, ―is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory 

context.‖ Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). And the statutory 

context here—a ―[p]rohibition on fees for certain activities or services‖—

allows only one definition. 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1). In common 

understanding, a buyer pays a fee ―for‖ something he chooses to buy, even 

if that ―something‖ is simply an option to do or use something (like $17.99 

―for‖ an all-you-can-eat buffet). Consider what would happen if a 

restaurant-goer inspected his bill and noticed an unexpected charge. If told 

that the fee was for ten bottles of wine that the patron's group neither 

ordered nor drank, the patron would rightly be outraged. He would not 

find much solace in a waiter's explanation that the wine cellar contained 

ten bottles, which the patron could have ordered if he wished.

Id. Only then did the Ninth Circuit offer the language of 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(D) as further support 

for its conclusion that the prohibitions of 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d) nevertheless apply even where a user 

might use available developed amenities. In the case of 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(D), applicable to 

―persons who are driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding through, or 

hiking through,‖ the statute is explicit that fees may not be charged if those users do not use the facilities 

and services. The quoted portion of Adams stands for the proposition that, in the case of 16 U.S.C. § 

6802(d)(1)(A), prohibiting the imposition of fees upon visitors ―[s]olely for parking, undesignated 

parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides,‖ the statute likewise prohibits the imposition of fees 

even if it is possible that such users might use developed amenities. 

The problem for Plaintiff here is that neither provision applies to him. He admits 16 U.S.C. § 

6802(d)(1)(A) does not apply because this case does not involve parking alongside a road or trailside. 

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Likewise, 16 U.S.C. § 6802(d)(1)(D) does not apply because he Plaintiff‘s interaction with the sites in 

question went beyond ―driving through, walking through, boating through, horseback riding through, or 

hiking through‖ the area. He admits that he entered the SAFAs on the Lower Kern River and parked 

there. In imposing a fee upon Plaintiff under such circumstances, the Forest Service properly avoided 

running afoul of either prohibition. 

Finally, Plaintiff‘s interpretation of Adams would totally eviscerate the fee program REA was 

designed to implement. The Forest Service is correct that under Plaintiff‘s interpretation, it would be 

forced either to use an honor system for fee collection, or maintain a heavy enforcement presence 

throughout each fee area to determine whether non-payors are in fact using the facilities and services 

provided. In construing a statute, the court must interpret the statute as a whole and not interpret a 

provision in a manner that renders another provision of the statute ―inconsistent, meaningless, or 

superfluous.‖ Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 942 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 

1991). REA specifically authorizes the Forest Service to require display of a recreation pass on a 

vehicle, rather than having to patrol each fee area, ask for proof of payment, and personally cite each 

violator. 16 U.S.C. § 6811(b).

To the extent Plaintiff argues that REA and Adams require the Forest Service to provide free 

alternate parking for visitors who do not intend to use the amenities at developed recreation sites, Doc. 

25-2 at 25, the Court agrees with the Forest Service that any such argument lacks merit. Nothing in REA 

or Adams requires the Agency to provide free alternate parking, and Plaintiff has not pointed to any such 

requirement. REA does prohibit the imposition of fees upon visitors under certain circumstances, none 

of which apply to the facts of this case. 

5. Additional Agency Actions.

The Court has expended inordinate amounts of time imposing some structure upon the parties‘ 

somewhat jumbled arguments. One straggling issue merits some additional attention. In his opposition, 

Plaintiff asserts that he is also challenging agency actions in the form of licenses, permits and sanctions 

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imposed upon him. Doc. 33 at 7. Specifically, he asserts that the Forest Service has taken distinct final 

agency action against him by issuing Plaintiff various recreation permits, licenses, or sanctions under the 

authority of REA, which ―take the form of the Southern Sierra Pass or other passes that must be 

displayed on a vehicle after purchase to use a recreation fee site.‖ Id. 

The APA applies only to ―[s]gency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action for 

which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 704. The 

APA defines reviewable ―agency action‖ to include ―the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, 

sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.‖ 5 U.S.C. § 551(13). Although the 

Court has been unable to locate any analogous cases addressing whether the issuance of a recreation 

pass would constitute ―final agency action‖ under the APA, ―courts have long recognized that the term 

 ̳agency action‘ is not so all-encompassing as to authorize us to exercise judicial review over everything 

done by an administrative agency.‖ Wild Fish Conservancy v. Jewell, 730 F.3d 791, 800-01 (9th Cir. 

2013). ―Final agency actions‖ are actions (1) which ―mark the consummation of the agency‘s 

decisionmaking process‖ and (2) ―by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which 

legal consequences will flow.‖ Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997). It is not necessary, 

however, for the Court to resolve this underdeveloped issue here, because even if the sale of a recreation 

pass (or even the issuance of a Notice of Required Fee) constitutes ―final agency action‖ for purposes of 

the APA, consideration of any such additional agency actions changes nothing in this case from a 

practical perspective. The lawfulness of the Forest Service requiring Plaintiff to pay any fee turns on 

whether or not the Forest Service properly imposed fees upon users recreating at the challenged fee 

areas. Those issues have been thoroughly addressed above. 

E. Relief. 

The Court has ruled in favor of Plaintiff on one merits issue. The Forest Service improperly 

charged recreation fees at the Miracle site, which did not and does not offer a permanent toilet facility. 

The Forest Service argues that another round of briefing should ensue regarding the appropriate relief to 

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ensure that the relief is narrowly tailored. Doc. 30-1 at 23-24. Plaintiff maintains there is no reason for 

further proceedings because, under the APA, a court must set aside agency action that is ―arbitrary, 

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‘ ‖ 5 U.S.C. § 706. 

―Typically, when an agency violates the Administrative Procedure Act ... [a court should] vacate the 

agency's action and remand to the agency to act in compliance with its statutory obligations.‖ Defenders 

of Wildlife v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 420 F.3d 946, 978 (9th Cir. 2005), rev‘d on other 

grounds, Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildife, 549 U.S. 1105 (2007). 

Here, there is no question that Plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement of the fees he expended to 

access the Miracle site. The Court trusts that the parties can formulate an appropriate stipulated 

judgment that calculates an appropriate amount of reimbursement. In the alternative, an amount can be 

determined and paid, making further discussion moot.

As to any additional injunctive or declaratory relief, including vacatur, the Court is at a loss as to 

how the Forest Service could act in compliance with its statutory obligations without suspending fee 

collection at the Miracle site, at least in the interim period until new toilet facilities can be constructed, if 

that is what the Forest Service plans to do. Nor can the court envision any more ―narrowly tailored‖ 

remedy. Yet, the Court likewise cannot see the harm in affording the Forest Service a brief amount of 

time to propose an appropriate form of judgment to the Court. 

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

//

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Accordingly, the parties are directed to meet and confer regarding the scope of a judgment in this 

case. To the extent the parties cannot agree, they shall so indicate in a joint proposal. To the extent they 

cannot agree, the parties may include separate proposals along with brief supporting legal citations. Any 

such proposals shall be merged into a single document that shall be filed with the Court on or before 

May 9, 2014. Cooperation among the parties is expected by the Court, and a lack of cooperation to 

prepare and submit this document will be dealt with severely

V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above:

(1) The Forest Service‘s motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART:

(a) It is GRANTED as to evidence pertaining to standing and as to the consideration 

of Exhibits A-E to the Second Wiechers Declaration for the sole purpose of establishing 

the availability of a judicial remedy;

(b) The motion is DENIED as to all other evidence for all other purposes;

(2) Plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART 

and Federal Defendant‘s cross motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART: 

(a) Plaintiff‘s motion is GRANTED and Federal Defendant‘s cross motion is 

DENIED as to Plaintiff‘s contention that the toilet facilities at the Miracle SAFA site are 

not ―permanent toilet facilities‖ under REA; 

(b) Plaintiff‘s motion is DENIED and Federal Defendant‘s cross motion is GRANTED as 

to all other arguments and claims; and

(3) The Parties are instructed to file joint proposed form of judgment in compliance with the 

above instructions on or before May 9, 1014.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 9, 2014 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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