Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02606/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02606-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Latonya Arnold
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Rodney W. Sippel, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2606

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Latonya Arnold, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: May 23, 2007

Filed: May 29, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, MAGILL, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Latonya Arnold appeals the 110-month prison sentence imposed by the district

court1

 upon her guilty plea to possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Arnold concedes that her prison sentence is within

the applicable advisory Guidelines range of 110 to 137 months, but she argues that the

sentence--reflecting the categorical enhancement for offenses involving cocaine base--

is unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), because (1) the district court failed to

address her argument that the sentence overstated the seriousness of her particular

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offense, and (2) under the particular facts of her case, the sentence overstates the

seriousness of her crime, given that she was a “mere courier.”

 

When, as here, there is no dispute about the applicable advisory Guidelines

range, we consider whether the sentence imposed is unreasonable in light of the

section 3553(a) factors, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005), and

essentially review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, see United

States v. Mathis, 451 F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2006). 

We conclude that there is no basis for finding the district court abused its

discretion in its handling of Arnold’s arguments, because the court properly and

sufficiently considered the relevant factors under section 3553(a), including the

seriousness of Arnold’s offense, her extensive history of prior convictions, the need

to protect the public from further crimes, and the need for deterrence. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B) (factors include nature and circumstances of offense, history and

characteristics of defendant, and need for sentence to reflect seriousness of offense

and to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct); United States v. Long Soldier,

431 F.3d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 2005) (relevant inquiry is not whether district court

quoted or cited § 3553(a), but whether court actually considered § 3553(a) factors and

whether appellate court’s review of those factors leads it to conclude that they support

finding of reasonableness). 

We further conclude that Arnold’s 110-month prison sentence, at the low end

of her advisory Guideline range, is not unreasonable. See United States v. Johnson,

474 F.3d 515, 522 (8th Cir. 2007) (sentence for possession of 6 grams cocaine base

not unreasonable when court refused to consider disparity between penalties for

distributing crack versus powder cocaine under the Guidelines; neither Booker nor

§ 3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject 100:1 quantity ratio mandated by

Congress and reflected in Guidelines). Finally, we find no merit to Arnold’s bare

assertion that she was a “mere courier”. Nothing in the record supports the assertion,

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and she admitted that she possessed the drugs with the intent to distribute them for

personal gain.

Accordingly, we affirm.

______________________________

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