Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03129/USCOURTS-ca13-14-03129-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harry J. Conner
Petitioner
Office of Personnel Management
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HARRY J. CONNER,

Petitioner

v.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,

Respondent

______________________ 

2014-3129

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT-0831-12-0138-I-2.

______________________ 

Decided: March 12, 2015

______________________ 

 HARRY J. CONNER, Memphis, TN, pro se.

NICHOLAS JABBOUR, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

JOYCE R. BRANDA, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., STEVEN J.

GILLINGHAM; JESSICA JOHNSON, Office of General Counsel, 

Office of Personnel Management, Washington, DC.

______________________ 

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2 CONNER v. OPM

Before DYK, SCHALL, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

DECISION

Harry J. Conner petitions for review of the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) that 

sustained the decision of the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) determining the amount of the lump-sum 

credit to which he was entitled under 5 U.S.C. § 8342. 

Conner v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. AT-0831-12-0138-I-2 

(M.S.P.B. Apr. 10, 2014) (“Final Decision”). We affirm. 

DISCUSSION

I.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8342(a), a federal employee 

who separates from government service is entitled to be 

paid a “lump-sum credit.” What constitutes a lump-sum 

credit is set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 8331(8).

Mr. Conner is the son of the late Mary Conner Nelson, 

who was employed by the United States Postal Service for 

a period of time beginning in September of 1965. As the 

result of a compensable injury, on August 18, 1972, Ms. 

Nelson stopped working and ceased receiving pay. On 

August 21, 1972, she began receiving compensation from 

the Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs (“OWCP”). 

She was formally separated from employment in 1981 and 

retired in 1982. 

Ms. Nelson died on February 3, 2010. Following her 

death, Mr. Conner applied for benefits as her surviving 

child. On July 14, 2010, OPM issued a lump-sum benefit

decision awarding Mr. Conner $2,761.59. That sum was 

calculated to be the lump-sum benefit payable pursuant 

to 5 U.S.C. § 8342(c). In a reconsideration decision dated 

May 28, 2012, OPM affirmed its 2010 decision.

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CONNER v. OPM 3

Mr. Conner appealed to the Board. On October 30, 

2013, following Mr. Conner’s withdrawal of his request for 

a hearing, the administrative judge (“AJ”) to whom the 

case was assigned issued an initial decision in which he 

affirmed OPM’s benefits decision. Conner v. Office of 

Pers. Mgmt., No. AT-0831-12-0138-I-2 (M.S.P.B. Oct. 30, 

2013) (“Initial Decision”). On April 10, 2014, the Board 

denied Mr. Conner’s petition for review and affirmed the 

Initial Decision. Final Decision at 1, 9. This appeal 

followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1295(a)(9).

II.

Our scope of review in an appeal from a decision of 

the Board is limited. We must affirm the Board’s decision 

unless we find it to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence. 5. U.S.C. § 7703(c); Kewley v. Dep’t 

of Health & Human Servs., 153 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 

1998).

III.

Mr. Conner’s main argument on appeal is that the Final Decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 

Specifically, he contends that the evidence does not support the Board’s finding that Ms. Nelson was not in pay 

status after August 18, 1972, and that therefore OPM 

incorrectly calculated the lump-sum benefit to which he 

was entitled. The significance of the Board’s finding of 

non-pay status after August 18, 1972, is that if, in fact, 

Ms. Nelson was in pay status after August 18, 1972, 

deductions would have been made from her pay after that 

date, and those deductions, plus interest, would have been 

refundable to Ms. Nelson, or Mr. Conner as her heir, as a 

lump-sum credit pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 8331(8). In short, 

if Ms. Nelson was, in fact, in pay status after August 18, 

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4 CONNER v. OPM

1972, Mr. Conner is entitled to a larger lump-sum payment than the one he received.

We have no difficulty concluding that the evidence of 

record fully supports the Board’s finding as to when Ms. 

Nelson was in pay status. Like OPM, the Board properly 

relied on the Postal Service’s certification of Ms. Nelson’s 

employment record, as set forth in her individual retirement record (“IRR”). Final Decision at 5. 

We are not persuaded by Mr. Conner’s argument that 

various documents in the record are inconsistent with the 

Board’s finding that Ms. Nelson was not in pay status 

after August 18, 1972. Mr. Conner points to the Postal 

Service’s issuance of a work performance certification in 

November of 1972, as well as the fact that Ms. Nelson 

received a promotion in July of 1973 and a reassignment 

in July of 1975. None of these points, however, detracts 

from what is set forth in the IRRs. The AJ noted that, 

although in inactive status, Ms. Nelson would have remained a Postal Service employee during the period from 

1972 to 1981, when she was receiving OWCP payments. 

Initial Decision at 6–8. Significantly, pursuant to 5 

C.F.R. § 353.106(b), “[a]n employee absent because of 

compensable injury may be carried on leave without pay 

or separated.” Under these circumstances, it may have 

been necessary for the Postal Service to consider Ms. 

Nelson for promotion and reassignment. See 5 C.F.R. 

§ 353.106(c) (“Agency promotion plans must provide a 

mechanism by which employees who are absent because 

of compensable injury . . . can be considered for promotion.”); 5 C.F.R. § 351.702(c) (“An employee who is released from a competitive level during a leave of absence 

because of compensable injury may not be denied an 

assignment right solely because the employee is not 

physically qualified for the duties of the position if the 

physical disqualification resulted from the compensable 

injury.”). 

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CONNER v. OPM 5

In his attempt to impeach Ms. Nelson’s IRRs, Mr. 

Conner makes two additional arguments. First, he points 

to a declaration he submitted to the Board in which he 

recounted his personal memories of his mother’s employment with the Postal Service after August of 1972. We 

see no error, however, in the AJ’s decision to assign 

limited probative value to this testimony. Initial Decision

at 14–16. An AJ’s evaluation of a witness’s credibility is a 

matter within his or her discretion. Kahn v. Dep’t of 

Justice, 618 F.3d 1306, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing King 

v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 133 F.3d 1450, 1453 

(Fed. Cir. 1998)). Second, Mr. Conner suggests at various 

points in his brief that certain government documents 

were forged or falsified. We reject this argument. Apart 

from the fact that Mr. Conner provides no credible evidentiary support for his allegation, there is a presumption 

that government records have not been falsified. See, e.g., 

Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 

(“The ‘presumption of regularity’ supports official acts of 

public officers. In the absence of clear evidence to the 

contrary, the doctrine presumes that public officers have 

properly discharged their official duties.”). 

Finally, we have considered, and found to be without 

merit, Mr. Conner’s arguments that the AJ erred in 

various procedural rulings and should have recused 

himself and that the Board deprived him of due process.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the 

Board is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

No Costs.

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