Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01862/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01862-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leon R. Johnson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

FRANCIS LAWRENCE, ANTHONY O. JACKSON,

DAVID L. ANDERSON, AND LEON R. JOHNSON,

Defendants-Appellants.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

Nos. 98 CR 47, 00 CR 93, 02 CR 103,

and 98 CR 145—Rudy Lozano, Judge.

____________

ARGUED JUNE 3, 2008—DECIDED JULY 25, 2008

____________

Before KANNE, SYKES, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

TINDER, Circuit Judge. This case involves the consolidated

appeals of Francis Lawrence, Anthony Jackson, David

Anderson, and Leon Johnson, who filed motions with

the district court to reduce their sentences under the

retroactive sentencing guideline reductions for crack

cocaine offenses. The court granted the defendants’

motions and reduced their sentences according to the

guidelines, but the court also, apparently inadvertently,

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2 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

included language in the orders that converted each

sentence into “time served.” Within a few weeks, the

court recognized the error and entered modifications to

correct the language. Accordingly, the defendants are

challenging the district court’s authority to substantively modify their sentences outside of the seven-day

window permitted by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

35.

I. Background

In order to decrease the disparity between sentences

for crack cocaine offenses and powder cocaine offenses,

the United States Sentencing Commission reduced the

penalties for crack cocaine offenses by amending the

sentencing guidelines in 2007. The Commission also

voted to make the changes to the guidelines retroactive,

effective March 3, 2008. The amendment to the guidelines generally results in a base offense level of two levels

less than the original offense level. See U.S.S.G. app. C,

amend. 706.

A district court has the authority under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) to modify a defendant’s sentence where the

sentence included a term of imprisonment based on a

sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the

Commission. Lawrence, Jackson, Anderson, and Johnson

were sentenced for crack cocaine offenses prior to the

amendment of the guidelines. Each defendant filed a

motion for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2). Lawrence

had originally been sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment, and his motion asked the court to reduce his sentence to 151 months. Jackson had originally been sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, and his motion

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 3

asked the court to reduce his sentence to 121 months.

Anderson had originally been sentenced to 97 months’

imprisonment, and his motion asked the court to reduce

his sentence to 78 months. Johnson had originally been

sentenced to 151 months’ imprisonment, and his motion

asked the court to reduce his sentence to 61 months. The

government filed a response to each motion and agreed

that the calculations proposed by Lawrence, Jackson, and

Anderson were appropriate. The government disagreed

with Johnson’s calculation and proposed that 120 months

should be required because Johnson was subject to a

mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years; Johnson filed

a response and agreed that the government’s calculation was proper.

The district court granted Johnson’s motion in an order

on March 4, 2008. The court granted Lawrence’s and

Anderson’s motions in orders on March 6, 2008. The

court granted Jackson’s motion in an order on March 13,

2008. Each order reduced the sentence to the number of

months agreed upon by the parties and contained an

effective date of ten days after the order date. Each order

also included the following language: “If this sentence

exceeds the amount of time the defendant has already

served, the sentence is reduced to a ‘Time Served’ sentence” (emphasis added). On March 26, 2008, the district

court entered an order in each defendant’s case stating

that the previous order contained a clerical error that

was being corrected. It then entered an order for each

defendant amending the prior order: “If this sentence is

less than the amount of time the defendant has already

served, the sentence is reduced to a ‘Time Served’ sentence” (emphasis added).

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4 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

1 The district court’s use of the language at issue may have

resulted from a recommendation by the Bureau of Prisons that

used the same language and was transmitted to the judiciary

for use in retroactive crack sentencing cases by the Judicial

Conference’s Committee on Criminal Law. The mistake

was discovered and corrected in a letter transmitted to the

judiciary by the Committee on March 13.

II. Rules 35 and 36

We review a challenge to the district court’s authority

to modify a sentence de novo. United States v. Daddino,

5 F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 1993). A district court may correct within seven days the imposition of a sentence that

contained an “arithmetical, technical, or other clear

error.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a); see also United States v.

McHugh, 528 F.3d 538, 540 (7th Cir. 2008); Daddino, 5

F.3d at 265. It is clear that the court’s inclusion of the

language converting the sentences to “time served” was

inadvertent.1

 The government concedes that the corrections were made more than seven days after the orders

were entered. We consider, however, whether the court’s

use of an “effective date” ten days after the order was

entered extended the amount of time the court had to

correct the error; if so, the correction of Jackson’s sentence was timely. (The modifications of the other defendants’ sentences would be untimely as of either date.)

Rule 35(a) applies within seven days “after sentencing.”

The rule defines “sentencing” as the “oral announcement

of the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c). The definition

was added to Rule 35 in 2004 to resolve a circuit split as

to whether the imposition of a sentence occurred at the

oral sentencing or upon the entering of the written judgment by the court. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(c) advisory

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 5

committee’s note (explaining the need for a definition of

“sentencing”); United States v. Wisch, 275 F.3d 620, 626 (7th

Cir. 2001) (describing circuit split). Here, the court did

not hold hearings or make oral announcements when

granting the defendants’ motions to reduce their sentences.

We conclude that the sentences were imposed and the

seven-day periods began when the written orders were

entered, and so the modifications by the court were

untimely for all four defendants under Rule 35(a).

Rule 36 provides an exception that allows a court to

correct a “clerical error” in an order at any time, see

McHugh, 528 F.3d at 540; Daddino, 5 F.3d at 264, and the

court here characterized the language in its order as

containing such an error. Rule 36 is limited, however, to

errors that are truly clerical in nature; it cannot be used to

fix “judicial gaffes.” See McHugh, 528 F.3d at 540.

We have previously considered the scope of Rule 36 on

several occasions. In Daddino, the district court’s written

sentencing order omitted payment of costs of incarceration and supervision, but the court amended the written

order to include those costs two months later. We held

that the omission of those costs stemmed from an oversight of the court itself and, therefore, the correction

was not permitted by Rule 36. Daddino, 5 F.3d at 265. In

United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2006),

the court revoked the defendant’s two concurrent terms

of supervised release and ordered imprisonment followed by additional supervised release. The court referred to the additional supervised release as “a term” and

did not specify orally or in writing that the supervised

release was for two concurrent terms. The court later

revoked the defendant’s second supervised release and

ordered the defendant to be imprisoned for two conCase: 08-1862 Document: 20 Filed: 07/25/2008 Pages: 13
6 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

secutive terms. We noted that Rule 36 could not be used to

correct the prior erroneous imposition of a single term of

supervised release, and we held, therefore, that the court

lacked the authority to re-sentence the defendant to two

consecutive terms of imprisonment. Id. at 934-35. In

McHugh, the court orally sentenced the defendant and

recommended to the Bureau of Prisons that the defendant

be afforded the opportunity to participate in substance

abuse education and treatment programs. The written

order included the oral recommendation but limited

the recommendation to programs “which do not include

an early release.” While the recommendation was being

appealed, a different judge at the district court modified

the order to remove the additional words upon the pro se

motion of the defendant. We held that the district court

lacked the authority to make the change for several reasons, including that Rule 36 was inapplicable where

nothing in the record indicated that the additional limitation in the written order had been added without the

original judge’s knowledge or approval. McHugh, 528

F.3d at 540. Other circuits have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Penson, 526 F.3d 331, 335

(6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting use of Rule 36 where the court

inadvertently orally sentenced the defendant to three

concurrent terms of 310 months and later corrected it in

a written order to two concurrent terms of 240 months

and one consecutive term of 70 months); United States v.

Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting

use of Rule 36 where the court failed to announce that

the defendant was placed on probation but later corrected it in a written order).

Here, the district court modified the sentence by substituting the words “is less than” for the word “exceeds.”

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 7

The corrected sentence reflected the parties’ and the

court’s intent. However, “[a] district judge may . . . correct

a final judgment in a criminal case to reflect the sentence he actually imposed but he cannot change the

sentence he did impose even if the sentence was erroneous.” Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 934. Unlike in Daddino, Eskridge,

and McHugh, we do not have an oral pronouncement of

the sentence to consider, and so the sentences “actually

imposed” were the written orders that converted the

sentences to time served. The error cannot be deemed a

clerical error under Rule 36, and the March 26, 2008,

orders modifying each defendant’s sentence and the

explanatory orders must be vacated.

II. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

We now turn to the reduced sentences ordered on March

4, 6, and 13, which will again be in effect when the

March 26 orders are vacated. The defendants argue that

those orders are not properly before us because the government did not appeal from the orders and has waived

any challenge to them. The government contends the

orders are properly before us because the district court

lacked jurisdiction to sentence the defendants to time

served in those orders.

We consider whether the court had subject-matter

jurisdiction to enter the orders; the district court’s subjectmatter jurisdiction is always properly before us and

cannot be waived by a party. United States v. Smith, 438

F.3d 796, 799 (7th Cir. 2006); Luna v. United States, 454

F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2006). Subject-matter jurisdiction is

“the courts’ statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate

the case.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,

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8 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

2 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) provides: 

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once

it has been imposed except that . . . in the case of a

defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), upon motion of the

(continued...)

89 (1998); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002).

It “delineat[es] the classes of cases . . . falling within a

court’s adjudicatory authority.” Eberhart v. United States,

546 U.S. 12, 16 (2005) (citing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443,

455 (2004)). 

Generally, district courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to revisit sentences already imposed upon defendants.

United States v. Goode, 342 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2003).

Congress has authorized courts to revisit sentences,

however, in three situations specified by § 3582(c). The

district court can modify a sentence where: (1) the

Bureau of Prisons has filed a motion and either extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction or the

defendant is at least 70 years old and meets certain

other requirements; (2) where another statute or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 expressly permits a

sentence modification; or (3) where a defendant has

been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a

sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by

the Commission. We have previously recognized that

§ 3582(c) is indeed a jurisdictional grant. See Smith, 438

F.3d at 799 (“Because § 3582(c) limits the substantive

authority of the district court, it is a real ‘jurisdictional’ rule . . . .”). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2),2

 the

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 9

2 (...continued)

defendant or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or

on its own motion, the court may reduce the term of

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in

section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,

if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.

28 U.S.C. § 994(o) gives the Commission the authority to periodically review and revise the guidelines.

3 Section 851(a) prohibits a court from imposing an increased

sentence based upon a defendant’s prior conviction unless the

United States Attorney files an information with the court

prior to trial.

relevant subsection for sentence reductions due to a

guideline change, the court can exercise its jurisdiction

over this “class of cases” upon motion of a defendant, the

Bureau of Prisons, or the court sua sponte. Section 3582(c)(2)

also sets forth limitations on the court’s authority to reduce

the sentence, by requiring that the court consider the

§ 3553(a) factors in determining whether to reduce the

sentence and by requiring that the reduction be consistent

with the applicable policy statements issued by the Commission. We will assume, without deciding, that the

court’s action of sentencing the defendants to time served

was inconsistent with the applicable policy statements,

in order to consider whether that action would deprive

the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

In United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2002),

we considered whether 21 U.S.C. § 851(a) was jurisdictional in nature.3

 We concluded that the district court’s

subject-matter jurisdiction was provided by 21 U.S.C.

§ 3231, which creates a court’s jurisdiction over offenses

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10 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

against the laws of the United States. Id. at 691. Section

851(a), we determined, only created a procedure that

affected a court’s power to impose specified penalties.

Id. at 692. We noted that “[o]nce subject-matter jurisdiction has properly attached, courts may exceed their authority or otherwise err without loss of jurisdiction.” Id. at

691 (citing United States v. Prou, 199 F.3d 37, 45 (1st Cir.

1999)); see also Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630-31 (holding that

defects in an indictment do not affect the subject-matter

jurisdiction of the court to determine the case presented

in the indictment); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 90 (finding that a

statute giving the district court “jurisdiction” over a

cause of action to impose civil penalties did not make all

of the elements of that cause of action jurisdictional;

rather, it specified the remedial powers of the court).

In contrast to the above-cited cases, here the district

court’s jurisdiction as well as its authority to impose

specified penalties stemmed from the same source,

§ 3582(c)(2). That the subject-matter jurisdiction and

the limitations on its authority are contained within the

same section (indeed, the same sentence) does not

change our analysis. Section 3582(c)(2) creates a class of

cases that the district court is empowered to act upon—

cases where a defendant has been sentenced to a term

of imprisonment and the guideline range has subsequently been lowered by the Commission. Subject-matter

jurisdiction is proper when a case falls within that class. 

Section 3582(c)(2) also limits the court’s authority to

reduce a sentence by requiring that it consider § 3553(a)

and reduce a sentence only if it is consistent with the

applicable policy statements. If a court has re-sentenced

a defendant outside of these boundaries, it has erred.

Such an error, however, is not a jurisdictional one:

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 11

4 In United States v. Taylor, 520 F.3d 746, 748 (7th Cir. 2008),

we noted that the post-Booker advisory nature of the guidelines

might allow for argument that the defendant could be resentenced below the new guidelines range and remain “consistent” with the applicable policy statements as required by

§ 3582(c)(2); however, the issue was not argued in Taylor, so

we “[took] no position on it.” Id. Our conclusion in this case

that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of any potential error in reducing the defendants’ sentences precludes us from answering this question again today.

“[s]ubject-matter jurisdiction is absent when a federal

court may not issue a binding decree on a subject.”

United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1990). Here,

the court had the ability to issue a binding decree on the

defendants; it just (arguably) erred in applying the

proper remedy.4

 “[T]he fact that the judgment actually

entered embodied a sentence that [differed from] the

level authorized by Congress did not divest the court of

jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Prou, 199 F.3d at 46

(referring to § 851(a)).

Because the district court had the power to adjudicate the

class of case at issue here, the court did not lack subjectmatter jurisdiction. The order sentencing the defendants

to time served is, therefore, not properly before us because it was not appealed.

The question remains, however, whether the government has waived the issue. In Greenlaw v. United States,

128 S.Ct. 2559 (2008), a defendant appealed the length of

his sentence and the government failed to file a crossappeal. Finding plain error, the Eighth Circuit sua sponte

increased the defendant’s sentence by 15 years to comply

with a statutory minimum that the district court had

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12 Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862

overlooked. The Supreme Court clarified that under

the cross-appeal rule, it is impermissible for an appellate

court to alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing

party. Id. at 2564. The Supreme Court noted that Congress,

through its specification of the instances in which the

government could seek review of a sentence, had given

the government “the prerogative to seek or forgo appellate correction of sentencing errors,” and “[t]hat measure should garner the Judiciary’s full respect.” Id. at 2565-

66. The Court also discussed that the interests of the

parties and the legal system in fair notice and finality

would be undermined by a modification of a judgment

that had not been appealed. Id. at 2569.

Congress has given the government the authority to

appeal a sentence if the sentence was imposed in violation of law, was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, is less than the guidelines

minimum sentence, or was imposed for an offense for

which there is no sentencing guideline and the sentence

is plainly unreasonable. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). The government has 30 days after the entry of the order being appealed to file a notice of appeal with the district court.

Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(B). Here, the government’s time

to file a notice of appeal had not yet expired, when, on

March 26, the district court sua sponte entered new orders.

At that point, the government had no reason to appeal the

original orders because the orders had been superseded

by sentences that presumably no longer fit within the

appealable conditions specified by § 3742(b). It appears

that here, unlike in Greenlaw, the government had not

yet exercised its prerogative to forgo appeals because the

time periods had not expired when the court purported

to correct the sentences. Now that the sentences of

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Nos. 08-1856, 08-1857, 08-1858, and 08-1862 13

March 4, 6, and 13 are at issue again, it would not seem

to run afoul of the cross-appeal rule or undermine the

interests of fair notice and finality to permit the government to file notices of appeal within the remainders of

the 30-day time periods that had not expired as of

March 26. If the government chooses to appeal, the district court should consider whether the defendants

should be detained pending the appeals pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 3143(c). Any such appeals should be returned

to this panel as successive appeals under Operating

Procedure 6(b).

III. CONCLUSION

The district court lacked the authority to correct the

sentences on March 26, 2008, and we VACATE those

orders and the explanatory orders of the same date. The

prior sentence orders of March 4, 6, and 13 are again

in effect.

USCA-02-C-0072—7-25-08

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