Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00904/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-00904-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ceres Department of Public Safety
Defendant
City of Ceres
Defendant
Klinge
Defendant
Alfonso Zabala
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ALFONSO ZABALA, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CITY OF CERES; CERES 

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; 

OFFICER KLINGE, first name 

unknown, and DOES 1-20, 

Defendants. 

No. 1:15-cv-00904-GEB-SAB 

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ 

UNOPPOSED DISMISSAL MOTION 

 

Defendants City of Ceres (“City”), Ceres Department of 

Public Safety (“Department”), and Officer Klinge, (collectively, 

“Defendants”) move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 

12(b)(6) for dismissal of Plaintiff’s first, second, fourth, and 

fifth claims in his Complaint. Plaintiff alleges claims under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act 

(“Unruh Act”), the California Bane Act (“Bane Act”), and he 

alleges California negligence and false imprisonment claims. 

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Defendants also seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s § 1983 punitive 

damages prayer, and move under Rule 12(e) for a more definite 

statement “[s]hould the Court deem any claim . . . survives [the 

motion].” (Mem. P. & A. Supp. Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (“Mot.”) 12:11-

13, ECF No. 9.) 

Germane to each claim involved in the motion are the 

following allegations: “Officer Klinge . . . punched Plaintiff 

repeatedly in the face,” and he “detained and arrested 

[Plaintiff] without any lawful justification.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 

17.) Defendants argue: 

Plaintiff’s [f]irst [c]laim . . . fails for 

two reasons. First, Plaintiff fails to plead 

the requirements [in Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. 

Servs., 436 U.S. 659 (1978)] necessary to 

sustain a § 1983 claim against the City and 

Department. In addition, Plaintiff fails to 

plead[] the necessary facts to [state] a 

prima facie § 1983 claim against all 

Defendants . . . as no constitutional or 

federal statutory rights deprivations have 

been pled. 

Plaintiff’s [s]econd [c]laim intermingles 

threadbare recitals of the elements required 

for claims under the Unruh [Act] and the Bane 

Act, without a factual basis to support [each 

claim] . . . . 

Plaintiff’s . . . [f]ourth and [f]ifth 

[c]laims[] fail . . . . [since] Plaintiff 

fails to allege the violation of a mandatory 

statutory duty in [either claim] . . . . 

[and] . . . Plaintiff has failed to plead the 

necessary elements to support a claim under 

common law [f]alse [i]mprisonment and 

[n]egligence . . . .

Last, . . . . [i]t has been well-established 

that public entities are immune from punitive 

damages. In addition, the Complaint is devoid 

of facts to support [punitive damages] 

against Officer Klinge. 

(Mot. 1:12-2:10.) 

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I. LEGAL STANDARD 

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a 

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. 

Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 

2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). “A claim 

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 

(2007)). 

“For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we accept all 

well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe 

them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” 

Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 (9th 

Cir. 2012). However, “[t]he tenet that a court must accept a 

complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to threadbare 

recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere 

conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. 

II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 

The following factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 

Complaint concern the motion: 

On or about December 29, 2013, [P]laintiff 

was . . . visiting his friends at a private 

residence . . . . A medical emergency arose 

[for] an individual present[ at the 

residence,] and emergency services were 

thereupon summoned. 

Defendants . . . responded to the location 

for the medical emergency. 

Upon entering the private residence, 

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Defendant Officer Klinge . . . punched 

Plaintiff repeatedly in the face . . . . 

Plaintiff did not try to resist, obstruct, or 

delay Officer Klinge . . . . 

Plaintiff attempted to cover his head and 

body from the attack by Officer Klinge . . . 

but was caught by surprise and suffered 

numerous contusions and lacerations to his 

head and body. 

. . . . 

Officer Klinge . . . [then] seized and 

arrested Plaintiff . . . . without any 

warrant or order of commitment . . . [,] 

accused Plaintiff of committing a criminal 

offense . . . . [and] delivered Plaintiff to 

the Stanislaus County jail . . . where he was 

imprisoned. 

(Compl. ¶¶ 10-13, 18-19.) 

III. DISCUSSION 

a. Plaintiff’s First Claim: § 1983 

The City and the Department argue Plaintiff’s first 

claim alleged against these movants under Monell should be 

dismissed, contending: “Plaintiff’s Complaint is devoid of any 

facts suggesting that the City or Department adopted a policy to 

deprive Plaintiff of his Constitutional rights.” (Mot. 4:16-17.) 

To allege a plausible § 1983 municipal liability claim 

against governmental entities under Monell, “a plaintiff must 

[allege] (1) that [he] possessed a constitutional right of which 

[]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) 

[and] that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the 

plaintiff's constitutional right.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 

654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint: “[B]y acting 

pursuant to its custom, practice and policy, Defendants . . . 

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violated Plaintiff’s federally protected civil rights under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983, including Plaintiff’s right to be free from 

unlawful arrest, intimidation, and false imprisonment.” (Compl. ¶ 

27.) These conclusory statements do not allege a plausible claim 

that either entity Defendant had a custom, practice, or policy 

that was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights. Therefore, Plaintiff’s first claim against the City and 

the Department is dismissed. 

Officer Klinge also argues “Plaintiff’s [f]irst [c]laim 

against [him] should be dismissed,” contending: this claim “fails 

to allege that Officer Klinge violated any of Plaintiff’s 

constitutional rights[ and thus], he is forced to speculate which 

constitutional right[s were violated].” (Mot. 5:11-14.) 

“42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against a 

person who . . . deprives another of rights guaranteed under the 

Constitution. Section 1983 does not create any substantive 

rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge 

actions by governmental officials. To [plausibly allege a claim] 

under section 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that . . . the 

action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or 

federal statutory right . . . .” Henderson v. City of Simi 

Valley, 305 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Plaintiff alleges that Officer Klinge violated his 

“constitutionally-protected rights to be free from threats, 

intimidation, coercion, false arrest, [and] imprisonment” by the 

following actions: he “punched Plaintiff repeatedly in the 

face[;]” “seized and arrested Plaintiff[;]” and “delivered 

Plaintiff to the Stanislaus County jail, where Plaintiff was 

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imprisoned.” (Compl. ¶¶ 12, 18-19, 27.) These allegations 

plausibly allege that Officer Klinge subjected Plaintiff to 

excessive force and unreasonably seized and imprisoned him in 

violation of his Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendment rights. 

Therefore, this portion of the motion is denied. 

b. Plaintiff’s Second Claim 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s second claim should be 

dismissed for the following reasons: 

[It] is horribly confusing. On one hand, it 

references the Unruh Civil Rights Act. See 

Compl. ¶ 31. The caption of this [c]laim 

states “DAMAGES FOR VIOLATION OF UNRUH CIVIL 

RIGHTS ACT.” See Compl. 5:24. However, 

Plaintiff cites to California Civil Code 52.1 

and 52.3 as well[,] which is part of the Bane 

Act. See Compl. ¶ 32, 5:25. The Bane Act is 

separate from, and not part of, the Unruh 

Act. [See] Stamps v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. 

App. 4th 1441, 1450-1452 ([] 2006); [see 

also] Goldman v. Standard Ins. Co. [,] . . . 

341 F.3d 1023, 1027, []n.4 [(9th Cir. 2003) 

([l]imiting discussion of the Unruh act to 

California Civil Code section 51.)] 

. . . . 

[Further,] Plaintiff’s [s]econd [c]laim . . . 

pleads elements of both [a]cts. For instance 

. . . . [in t]he first sentence of ¶ 31 

Plaintiff pleads the City and Department are 

businesses under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 

However, in the second sentence of ¶ 31, 

[Plaintiff] pleads elements of the Bane Act. 

. . . . 

[T]he [s]econd [c]laim is [also] devoid of 

any allegations that Plaintiff was 

discriminated against in any manner for any 

reason. Failure to allege discrimination 

nullifies any Unruh Civil Rights Act claim. 

. . . . 

Plaintiff has [also] failed to allege facts 

sufficient to support a claim under the Bane 

Act as the conclusory allegation that 

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Defendants employed threats, intimidation, 

and coercion is merely an effort to parrot 

the statutory language of the Bane Act. See 

Compl. ¶¶ 31-32. Moreover, Plaintiff has 

failed to plead any facts showing that any 

alleged coercion was independent of the 

arrest itself. 

(Mot. 5:19-7:12.) 

California Civil Code § 51.7 of the Unruh Act 

establishes the right of individuals “to be free of violence, 

committed against their persons” for numerous reasons, none of 

which is alleged in the Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff has not 

stated a plausible Unruh Act claim. 

The Bane Act proscribes in California Civil Code § 52.1 

a person from doing the following: “interfer[ing] by threats, 

intimidation, or coercion, or attempt[ing] to interfere by 

threats, intimidation, or coercion, with the exercise or 

enjoyment by any individual or individuals of rights secured by 

the Constitution or laws of the United States, or of the rights 

secured by the Constitution or laws of this state.” “The essence 

of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified 

improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried 

to or did prevent the plaintiff from doing something he . . . he 

had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do 

something that he . . . was not required to do under the law. 

Shoyoye v. County of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 4th 947, 955-56 

(2012) (quoting Jones v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329, 334 

(1998)). “A defendant is liable if he or she interfered with or 

attempted to interfere with the plaintiff's constitutional rights 

by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Id. at 846. 

Plaintiff’s allegations do not plead a plausible Bane Act claim. 

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Therefore, this claim is dismissed. 

c. Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims: False 

Imprisonment and Negligence 

Defendants argue Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims 

(false imprisonment and negligence) should be dismissed, 

contending: 

[P]ublic entities are not liable for common 

law torts pursuant to the California 

Government [Tort] Claims Act [(Cal. Gov’t 

Code § 815 et seq.)] . . . . Thus, [] 

[P]laintiff must plead enough facts to show 

that the City and Department are vicariously 

liable for the torts of their employees 

acting within the scope of their employment. Here, Plaintiff has failed to plead facts to 

support a prima facie cause of action for 

either [f]alse [i]mprisonment or 

[n]egligence. 

(Mot. 7:23-27) (emphasis added). The California Government Tort 

Claims Act prescribes in in sections 815-815(a) and 815.2(a): 

Except as otherwise provided by statute[, a] 

public entity is not liable for an injury, 

whether such injury arises out of an act or 

omission of the public entity or a public 

employee . . . . [A] public entity is liable 

for injury proximately caused by an act or 

omission of an employee of the public entity 

within the scope of his employment if the act 

or omission would, apart from this section, 

have given rise to a cause of action against 

that employee . . . . 

(emphasis added). Specifically, “under the concept of respondent 

superior, a public employer is responsible for the tort of false 

imprisonment by the conduct of a public employee acting within 

the course and scope of his employment.” Scannell v. Cnty. of 

Riverside, 152 Cal. App. 3d 596, 605 (1984). Further, “public 

entities . . . may be held vicariously liable for the negligent 

acts of their individual employees.” Nozzi v. Hous. Auth. of City 

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of Los Angeles, 425 F. App'x 539, 542 (9th Cir. 2011). 

i. False Imprisonment 

Defendants argue their motion should be granted on 

Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim, contending: “Plaintiff 

fails to plead that the allegedly false imprisonment was without 

[a] lawful privilege which undermines Plaintiff’s contentions 

that the arrest was made without a warrant, reasonable suspicion, 

or probable cause.” (Mot. 9:27-10:2.) 

“The tort of false imprisonment is the nonconsensual, 

intentional confinement of a person, without [a] lawful 

privilege, for an appreciable length of time, however short.” 

City of Newport Beach v. Sasse, 9 Cal. App. 3d 803, 810 (1970). 

“A person is falsely imprisoned ‘if he is wrongfully deprived of 

his freedom to leave a particular place by the conduct of 

another.’” Ciampi v. City of Palo Alto, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 

1110 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Hagberg v. California Federal Bank 

FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 373) (emphasis added). 

Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that Officer 

Klinge seized him without justification and then imprisoned him. 

Therefore, Defendants’ motion is denied on Plaintiff’s false 

imprisonment claim. 

ii. Negligence 

 Defendants also argue Plaintiff has “failed to plead 

the necessary elements to support a [negligence] claim.” (Mot. 

2:6-7.) 

To plead a negligence claim, 

Plaintiff[] must [allege that:] (1) the 

[defendant] owed plaintiff a duty of care; 

(2) the [defendant] breached [that] duty by 

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failing to use such skill, prudence, and 

diligence as other members of the [the] 

profession commonly possess and exercise, (3) 

[that] there was a proximate causal 

connection between the [defendant’s] 

negligence conduct and the resulting injury 

to the plaintiff; and (4) [that] the 

[defendant’s] negligence resulted in actual 

loss or damage to the plaintiff. 

Ortega v. City of Oakland, No. C07-02659-JCS, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 

85183, at *40 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2008). 

Plaintiff has stated a plausible claim that Officer 

Klinge breached his “duty to Plaintiff to use due care to prevent 

unlawful detention and arrest . . . false imprisonment, 

[intimidation,] and coercion . . . from occurring” and that 

Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of Officer Klinge’s 

actions. (Compl. ¶¶ 60, 62.) Therefore, Defendants’ motion to 

dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim is denied. 

d. Punitive Damages 

The City and the Department argue: “Punitive damages 

may not be recovered against public entities [under] . . . . 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .” (Mot. 11:14-18.) 

“A municipality is immune from punitive damages under § 

1983.” City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 

(1981). Therefore, this portion of the motion is granted. 

Officer Klinge also argues: 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth any 

articulable facts supporting his claims for 

punitive damages against Officer Klinge as 

the Complaint is devoid of any factual 

allegations that Officer Klinge specifically 

violated Plaintiff’s constitutionally 

protected rights . . . . 

(Mot. 12:4-8.) 

[P]unitive damages are recoverable [under § 

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1983] when the defendant's conduct is shown 

to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or 

when it involves reckless or callous 

indifference to the federally protected 

rights of others. Section 1983 punitive 

damages can also be awarded to address 

malicious, wanton, or oppressive acts or 

omissions. Conduct is oppressive if done in a 

manner which injures or damages or otherwise 

violates the rights of another person with 

unnecessary harshness or severity as by 

misuse or abuse of authority or power 

. . . . 

Knapps v. City of Oakland, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 

2009), amended in part (Sept. 8, 2009). 

Officer Klinge has not shown that Plaintiff’s prayer 

against him for punitive damages should be dismissed. Therefore, 

this portion of the motion is denied. 

e. Motion for a More Definite Statement 

Defendants also argue they are entitled to a more 

definite statement under Rule 12(e) regarding any claim that is 

not dismissed. This motion is denied since Defendants have not 

“point[ed] out the defects complained of and the details desired” 

as required by Rule 12(e).

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the stated reasons, the motion is DENIED on 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Officer Klinge; Plaintiff’s 

false imprisonment and negligence claims; and Plaintiff’s § 1983 

prayer for punitive damages against Officer Klinge. Further, 

Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement is DENIED. The 

motion is GRANTED on Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against the City 

and Department; Plaintiff’s Unruh Act and Bane Act claim; and 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 prayer for punitive damages against the City 

and the Department. 

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Plaintiff has ten days from the date on which this 

Order is filed to file an amended complaint addressing the 

referenced deficiency in any dismissed claim. 

Dated: September 3, 2015 

 

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