Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00697/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00697-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
ACX Pacific Northwest Inc.
Defendant
John E. Gombos
Defendant
John M. Gombos
Defendant
Pablo Hernandez
Plaintiff
Pacific Leasing, LLC
Defendant
Miguel Rojas-Cifuentes
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MIGUEL ROJAS-CIFUENTES on 

behalf of himself, on behalf 

of all others similarly 

situated and in the interest 

of the general public,

Plaintiff,

v.

ACX PACIFIC NORTHWEST INC., 

PACIFIC LEASING, LLC, JOHN M. 

GOMBOS, JOHN E. GOMBOS and 

Does 1-20,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-00697-JAM-CKD

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

This matter is before the Court on Miguel Rojas-Cifuentes’ 

(“Plaintiff’s”) Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint in its suit 

against ACX Pacific Northwest Inc., Pacific Leasing, LLC, John M. 

Gombos, John E. Gombos, and Does 1-20 (collectively 

“Defendants”).1

 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. 

 

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for September 20, 2016.

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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff and Pablo Hernandez filed this wage and hour suit 

against Defendants on March 14, 2014, seeking to represent 

themselves and a class of non-exempt employees employed by, or 

formerly employed by, ACX Pacific Northwest Inc. Compl., ECF No. 

1, at 2. Plaintiff worked for Defendants for a little more than 

one year, up to about May 13, 2013. Declaration of Season Susko

in Support of Defendants’ Opposition (“Susko Decl.”), ECF No. 

40:2, at 2:19–20.

Plaintiff filed his First Amendment Complaint (“FAC”) on May 

6, 2014, which no longer included co-plaintiff Pablo Hernandez. 

ECF No. 5. In his scheduling report, filed June 9, 2016, 

Plaintiff proposed a “deadline for amendments to the pleadings 

after substantial discovery has occurred” and reserved “the right 

to amend the pleadings as evidence is discovered through the 

course of litigation.” ECF No. 11 at 4:11–14. Four days later, 

Judge Burrell adopted Plaintiff’s proposed Briefing Schedule

without any modifications to the proposed amendment timeline. 

ECF 12. The parties filed a Joint Status Report on November 23, 

2015, which proposed “that the deadline for amendments to the 

pleadings be set as May 1, 2016, after substantial discovery has 

occurred.” ECF No. 16 at 4:21–27. Again, Plaintiff reserved the 

right to amend as evidence is discovered. Id. The case was 

reassigned to Judge Mendez on January 8, 2016. ECF No. 18. The 

Class Certification Schedule was moved out several more times, 

ECF Nos. 22 & 26, and discovery is ongoing, ECF Nos. 23, 24, 38, 

41, & 47. Currently, the deadline for Plaintiff to file a Motion 

for Class Certification and Motion to Certify a collective action 

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under the Fair Labor Standards Act is November 14, 2016. ECF No. 

26. The Court has not issued a pretrial scheduling order or 

otherwise set a deadline for amendment of the pleadings. 

Plaintiff filed this Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint on 

July 12, 2016. ECF No. 29. The motion as filed was deficient 

and the Court required re-notice in compliance with Local Rule 

230(a). ECF No. 33. The motion hearing was rescheduled for

September 20, 2016. ECF No. 34. With his motion, Plaintiff 

filed a Declaration from Marco Palau, the attorney primarily 

responsible for discovery, with a copy of the proposed Second 

Amended Complaint attached. Declaration of Marco A. Palau 

(“Palau Decl.”) Ex. 1, ECF No. 31:1. Palau’s Declaration relates 

that the reason for seeking amendment at this late date is that 

certain issues with the pleadings were raised by opposing counsel 

early this year as the parties conferred over discovery. See

Palau Decl.;2 see also Declaration of Kevin D. Sullivan 

(“Sullivan Decl.”), ECF No. 40:1 at 2:12–21 (confirming the 

discovery dispute). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel 

production of discovery on some of these disputed matters. ECF 

No. 38. Magistrate Judge Delaney conditionally granted that 

motion pending resolution of this motion. ECF Nos. 46 & 47.

II. OPINION

A. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may 

amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent 

 

2 The Court received Defendants’ Objections to Declaration of 

Marco A. Palau. The Court has only considered those statements 

appropriate for submission by declaration.

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or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when 

justice so requires.” Leave to amend “lies within the sound 

discretion of the trial court” and “[t]he denial of a motion to 

amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” DCD Programs, Ltd. 

v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185-86 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations 

omitted). The Ninth Circuit has noted that “Rule 15’s policy of 

favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme 

liberality.” U.S. v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981). 

In deciding whether to deny leave to amend, a court considers 

“bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party,

futility of amendment, and whether the plaintiff has previously 

amended the complaint.” Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 

(9th Cir. 1999). “Delay, by itself, is insufficient to justify 

denial of leave to amend.” DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. On 

the other hand, futility of amendment alone can justify such

denial. Bonin v. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff wishes to add a meal period cause of action to the 

fourth claim for relief and factual meal period allegations 

throughout the complaint, including to the Unfair Labor 

Competition (UCL) claim. Mot. at 1. Plaintiff also wants to add 

to his allegations concerning Defendants’ alleged failure to 

compensate for all hours worked. Id. The deficiencies in the 

complaint that Plaintiff seeks to remedy came to counsel’s

attention through a discovery dispute with Defendants that arose 

as the parties conferred earlier this year. Id. at 1-4; Palau 

Decl. at 2:7–15, 2:20–22; accord Sullivan Decl. at 2:12–21.

Defendants argue that amendment would be futile because the 

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changes would not relate back to Plaintiff’s original claims and 

because Plaintiff’s new factual allegations fail to state a claim 

entitling Plaintiff to relief. Opp. at 1. Defendants also 

contend that Plaintiff “unduly delayed” pursuit of amendment by 

waiting over two years to further amend the complaint and that 

Defendants will be prejudiced if leave to amend is granted. Id.

1. Futility of Amendment

“[T]he general rule that parties are allowed to amend their 

pleadings does not extend to cases in which any amendment would 

be an exercise in futility or where the amended complaint would 

also be subject to dismissal.” Novak v. U.S., 795 F.3d 1012, 

1020 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Federal courts will 

determine the legal sufficiency of the proposed amendment under 

the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Miller v Rykoff-Sexton, Inc., 845 

F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) abrogated by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662 (2009); see Gibson Brands, Inc. v. John Hornby Skewes & 

Co., Ltd., No. CV 14-00609 DDP(SS), 2015 WL 4651250, at *4 n.4 

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015) (“[A]s the Miller court noted, the test 

for futility is the same as the test applied on a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion. After Ashcroft v. Iqbal, that pleading standard is no 

longer viable. Thus, the proper standard is Iqbal's plausibility 

standard.”) (citations omitted). The Court will therefore 

consider whether Plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, state a 

plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Leave 

to amend is warranted if the deficiencies can be cured with 

additional allegations that are ‘consistent with the challenged 

pleading’ and that do not contradict the allegations in the 

original complaint.” U.S. v. Corinthian Coll., 655 F.3d 984, 995 

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(9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 

291, 296–97 (9th Cir. 1990)).

a. Meal Period Claim and Allegations

In Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s 

statement of the “Nature of the Action” includes Defendants’ 

“failure to comply with rest and meal period requirements.” FAC 

¶ 2. In the “Factual Background” section, Plaintiff includes the

“failure to provide timely proper meals periods of a full thirty 

minutes as a result of donning and doffing and walking time, or 

to pay PLAINTIFFS and the Class additional pay for improper meal 

periods” as one of the unlawful practices and policies Defendants

maintained or enforced against their non-exempt employees. FAC 

¶ 15. In “Count Four,” Plaintiff quotes the California Labor 

Code section that sets forth the state’s law regarding meal and 

rest periods, but only asserts claims for rest period violations. 

FAC ¶¶ 52–57. Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to include 

meal period violations in Count Four, allegations related to meal 

period violations to support his minimum wage claims (Count One 

and Two), and meal period violations as an additional predicate 

for his UCL claim. Palau Decl. Ex. 1 at 10–12, 14–15, 21. 

Defendants argue that these additions are time-barred because 

Plaintiff last worked for Defendants in May of 2013, over three 

years ago. Opp. at 14; Susko Decl. at 2:19–20.

Meal period claims brought under Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7 are 

subject to the three-year statute of limitations for liabilities 

created by statute. Murphy v. Kenneth Code Prod., Inc., 40 Cal.

4th 1094, 1114 (2012); Cal. Code Civ. P. § 338. Plaintiff argues 

that the statute of limitations “is extended to four years when 

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the wage claim is accompanied by an Unfair Competition claim 

under California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et 

seq.” Mot. at 9. Plaintiff seeks to add the meal period 

violations to not only his UCL claims but also to his independent

Labor Code claims. Relying only on the California Supreme 

Court’s holding in Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Prod., Co., 

23 Cal. 4th 163, 168 (2000), Plaintiff seems to contend that when 

a wage claim under the Labor Code serves as predicate for a UCL 

claim, the statute of limitations period extends for each cause 

of action. 

The Court finds that the Cortez holding does not extend as 

far as Plaintiff claims. Under Cortez, a four-year statute of 

limitations will apply to a UCL claim predicated on a Labor Code 

violation with a shorter statute of limitations. Id. Cortez

does not hold that once a violation serves as predicate to a UCL 

claim the statute of limitations for the independent Labor Code 

violation also extends to four years. As Judge Levi in this 

District explained, when a plaintiff borrows the violation of 

another law in order to make a UCL claim, “the two causes of 

action do not become one.” Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Jesse M. 

Lange Distrib., Inc., No. CIVS051180DFLKJM, 2005 WL 3507968, at 

*6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2005). “The UCL claim must remain a 

separate cause of action because the UCL provides its own 

procedural guidelines and limited remedies[;] . . . [m]erely 

bringing a UCL claim does not allow a plaintiff to circumvent the 

statute of limitations already developed by the California 

legislature for different remedies under a different statute.” 

Id; see also Singer v. Becton, Dickenson & Co., No. 08cv821 IEG 

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(BLM), 2008 WL 2899825 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (dismissing a 

labor code violation as time barred but allowing the violation to 

serve as a predicate for the UCL claim). Insofar as Plaintiff 

asserts the meal period violations as a cause of action separate 

from his UCL claim, the three-year statute of limitations 

applies. 

Plaintiff may overcome this barrier if his new claim relates 

back to the original filing. “When, as here, state law provides 

the applicable limitations period an amended complaint relates 

back to an original complaint when it satisfies either state or 

federal law on relation back.” Rosholm v. Byb Brands Inc., No. 

SACV 15-1728 JVS (KESx), 2016 WL 1445592 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 

2016) (citing Butler v. Nat’l Cmty. Renaissance of Cal., 766 F.3d 

1191, 1201 (9th Cir. 2014)). In California, “amendments alleging 

a new theory of liability against the defendant have been found 

to relate back to the original complaint, so long as the new 

cause of action is based on the same set facts previously 

alleged.” Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 

1199–200 (2008). “[T]he critical inquiry is whether the 

defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original 

pleading.” Point San Diego Residential Cmty., L.P. v. Procopio, 

Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP, 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 277 (2011). 

Federal law permits relation back when the amendment asserts a 

claim that “arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence 

set out—or attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Federal courts compare the original 

complaint with the amended complaint and decide “whether the 

claim to be added will likely be proved by the same kind of 

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evidence offered in support of the original pleading.” Percy v. 

S.F. Gen. Hosp., 841 F.2d 975, 978 (9th Cir. 1988). “To relate 

back, ‘the original and amended pleadings must share a common 

core of operative facts so that the adverse party has fair notice 

of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct called into 

question.’” ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 

1004 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d 

322, 325 (9th Cir. 1989)). 

As noted above, Plaintiff’s FAC includes factual allegations 

that Defendants failed to provide the required meal periods or to 

pay Plaintiff additional pay for improper meal periods. FAC 

¶ 15. Defendants were thus on notice of the meal period issue

and the claim will relate back to the original complaint. 

Defendants further argue that even if the meal period claim 

relates back to the original complaint, the claim would not 

survive a motion to dismiss and is thus futile. Opp. at 17. The 

Court will briefly address this contention but has not considered

Defendants’ argument beyond the page limit. See Section III, 

infra.

Meal period requirements are governed by California Labor 

Code § 512. Employers must provide the employee with a meal 

period of not less than 30 minutes for a work period of more than 

five hours per day, except if the total work period per day is no 

more than six hours or there is a valid waiver. Cal. Lab. Code 

§ 512(a). A second meal period must be provided for a work 

period of more than ten hours per day, except if the total hours 

worked is no more than twelve hours and certain waiver conditions 

are met. Id. As interpreted by the California Supreme Court, an 

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employer satisfies its obligation under Section 512 “if it 

relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over 

their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity to 

take an uninterrupted 30-minute break and does not impede or 

discourage them from doing so.” Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Super. 

Ct., 53 Cal. 4th 1004, 1040 (2012). “[T]he employer is not 

obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is 

performed.” Id.

Plaintiff’s meal period claim survives the plausibility 

standard. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants failed 

to provide proper meal periods “as a result of donning and 

doffing and walking time.” FAC ¶ 15. Though sparse, these 

allegations are not merely conclusory and sufficiently state a 

plausible claim for relief. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 

b. Additional Allegations

Plaintiff also seeks to elaborate on the allegations 

supporting his claims for unpaid minimum wages and overtime 

wages. Mot. at 1. In his First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges that Defendants failed to pay all minimum wages due as a 

result of unpaid time and all overtime wages due as a result of 

unpaid time. FAC at 5. In his proposed Second Amended 

Complaint, Plaintiff specifies that “unpaid time” is for time 

worked “on and off the clock.” Palau Decl. Ex. 1 at 5:20–23. 

Plaintiff further elaborates, in support of Fair Labor Standards 

Act claims, Count One, that Defendants “fail[ed] to pay for all 

time worked on the clock, failing to pay for all time worked off 

the clock, and as a result of practices that include unpaid 

donning and doffing and walking time, rounding of employee time 

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that resulted over time in failure to compensate properly for all 

hours worked, automatic deductions of time for meals breaks, and 

other failures to pay for all hours worked and for work completed 

in excess of 40 hours at the required overtime rate.” Id. at 

11:1–7. Similar additional facts are alleged under Count Two, 

Failure to Pay State Minimum Wages. Id. at 12:3–8. Plaintiff’s 

counsel states Plaintiff seeks to add these allegations due to 

Defendants’ objection to production of records sought in 

discovery to support Plaintiff’s unpaid wages claim. Palau Decl. 

at 2:23–3:1, 3:14–16. 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s time rounding allegations 

do not relate back to the original complaint, that the new theory

of unlawful rounding fails to state a cause of action, and that 

the motion fails to provide foundation for Plaintiff’s new theory 

of unlawful rounding. Opp. at 6–13. Defendants analogize this 

situation to that of Williams v. Boeing Co., where the Ninth 

Circuit found that a new claim for compensation discrimination 

was “a new legal theory depending on different facts, not a new 

legal theory depending on the same facts,” and held that the 

amendment did not relate back to the original complaint. 517 

F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2008). 

Plaintiff’s allegations arose from the same conduct, 

transaction, or occurrence attempted to be set forth in the 

original pleading, making relation back proper. See Guerrero v. 

RJM Acquisitions, LLC, 499 F.3d 926 (9th Cir.) (approving the

district court’s decision to permit the plaintiff’s amendment to 

add more specific facts where the federal relation back standard 

was satisfied). Plaintiff does not seek to add a new claim or 

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defense, but, instead, to elaborate on Defendants’ behavior in 

support of claims already made. That behavior concerns 

Defendants’ time-keeping practices and work policies, which 

Defendants were already aware would be central to this 

litigation. Unlike the situation in Williams, Plaintiff—in 

contrast to the meal period amendment—does not seek to add a new 

claim to his complaint. The unpublished district court decisions 

Defendants cite are also distinguishable from the current matter

and thus are not instructive. In Richie v. Blue Shield of Cal., 

the plaintiff, in moving for class certification, sought to 

certify claims for “infrastructure expenses” that were not 

enumerated in her pleadings for other types of expenses. No. C13-2693 EMC, 2014 WL 6982943 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2014). Noting 

that the plaintiff had never sought to amend her allegations to 

include these expenses and that a class certification motion had 

already been filed, the court would not permit the addition. Id. 

In Brewer v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., the court, at summary 

judgment, determined that a waiting time penalties claim that the

plaintiffs first asserted in the third amended complaint would 

not relate back to the original complaint. No. 11-CV-3587 

YGR2015 WL 5072039 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2015). Neither case 

involved a plaintiff seeking to amend a complaint to include more 

specific allegations to support a previously asserted claim. 

Defendants further argue that the addition of time-rounding 

allegations is futile because time-rounding policies are lawful. 

Opp. at 11. The federal time-rounding regulation, as interpreted 

by federal courts and adopted by the California Appellate Court 

in See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Court, “permits employers 

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to use a rounding policy for recording and compensating employee 

time as long as the employer’s rounding policy does not 

consistently result in a failure to pay employees for time 

worked.” 210 Cal.App.4th 889, 907 (2012) (quoting Alonzo v. 

Maximus, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). 

“Assuming a rounding-over-time policy is neutral, both facially 

and as applied, the practice is proper under California law 

because its net effect is to permit employers to efficiently 

calculate hours worked without imposing any burden on employees.” 

Id. at 903. In support of their argument, Defendants point to 

Harding v. Time Warner, Inc., an unpublished decision in which 

the district court found that the plaintiff’s “bare factual 

allegation of a practice of rounding of reported time worked to 

the nearest 15 minutes” could not save her complaint from 

dismissal. No. 09CV1212-WQH-WMc, 2009 WL 2575898, at *4 (S.D. 

Cal. Aug. 18, 2009). In this case, however, Plaintiff does not 

merely assert that Defendants had a practice of time-rounding; 

Plaintiff’s amended complaint would assert that Defendants’

rounding practices, over time, resulted in a failure to 

compensate for hours worked. See Palau Decl. Ex. 1 at 8:5-9, 

11:4-5, 12:5-6. Although a relatively close issue, at this stage 

of the litigation the Court finds these allegations meet the 

plausibility standard and survive a motion to dismiss. See

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Defendants’ final argument, that the Court should reject 

Plaintiff’s amendments because his motion fails to provide 

foundation for the unlawful rounding allegations, is 

unconvincing. Defendants do not cite to any evidentiary standard 

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for amendments to the pleadings. This Court will not make a 

dispositive ruling, based on the insufficiency of the evidence, 

on the unlawful rounding allegations at this point in the 

proceedings, where Plaintiff seeks to amend his pleading in order 

to advance the discovery process. 

For the reasons explained above, and in light of Rule 15’s 

generous amendment policy, the Court does not find that 

Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile. 

2. Prejudice, Undue Delay, Bad Faith, and Prior 

Amendment

The Court may also consider prejudice to opposing party, 

undue delay, bad faith, and prior amendment in deciding whether 

to grant leave to amend. The Court will consider these factors 

without the benefit of argument from Defendants’ Opposition or 

Plaintiff’s Reply, as both argued these points beyond the set 

page limit. See Section III, infra.

In their introduction, Defendants argue that Plaintiff 

unduly delayed pursuit of amendment by waiting more than two 

years to seek amendment and that amendment would prejudice 

Defendants because they would have to re-investigate and reprepare its defenses to Plaintiff’s claims. Opp. at 1. They do 

not allege any bad faith. Plaintiff argues that no trial date or 

discovery cutoff has been set and that Defendants have been aware 

of the of the issues raised in the amendments due to 

communications between the parties through the discovery process. 

See Rep. at 2; Mot at 3, 13; Palau Decl. at 2:7–15, 2:20–22;

accord Sullivan Decl. at 2:12–21. Further, Plaintiffs contend 

that all of the time and payroll records necessary for trial are 

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within Defendants control and Defendants will have plenty of time 

to complete discovery and prepare for trial. Rep. at 2.

The Court finds that no factors are present that would 

warrant denial of leave to amend. As Plaintiff points out, no 

trial date has been set and discovery is ongoing. Further, as 

discussed in the futility analysis above, the new claim and 

allegations arise from a core of operative facts that put 

Defendants on notice that such allegations could arise. The 

parties themselves began discussing these issues during discovery 

several months ago. Despite the fact that the amendments will 

require additional discovery and preparation, Defendants will not 

be prejudiced to an extent that would warrant denial, especially 

before a scheduling order has issued. Finally, Plaintiff 

explained that the reason for delay was that the deficits in the 

FAC did not become apparent until the parties conferred over 

discovery this past spring. Although Plaintiff waited over two 

years to request the amendments, that delay, alone, cannot 

justify denial. See DCD Programs, 833 F.2d at 186. 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend. Plaintiff shall file his 

Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) within five days of the date of 

this Order. Defendants shall file their responsive pleading 

within twenty days of the SAC filing date. 

Finally, the Court issued its Order re Filing Requirements 

for Cases Assigned to Judge Mendez (“Order”) on January 8, 2016. 

ECF No. 19-1. The Order requires that memoranda in support of or 

in opposition to all motions—other than those filed under Federal 

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Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and 65, post-judgment, and post-trial 

motions—not exceed fifteen pages and that reply memoranda in 

support of the motion not exceed five pages. The Order also 

states that violations of the page limit will result in the 

imposition of monetary sanctions against counsel in the amount of 

$50.00 per page and that the Court will not consider any 

arguments made past the page limit. Defendants’ Opposition to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint exceeds the limit 

by six pages. Plaintiff’s reply exceeds the five page limit by 

fourteen pages. The Court imposes sanctions against counsel for 

the Defendant in the amount of $300.00 and against counsel for 

the Plaintiff in the amount of $700.00. The Court has not 

considered any arguments made after page fifteen of either 

memoranda and page five of Plaintiff’s reply. The attorneys for 

both parties shall pay these monetary sanctions within five days 

of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2016

Case 2:14-cv-00697-JAM-CKD Document 48 Filed 10/25/16 Page 16 of 16