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Parties Involved:
Mary Cynthia Hogan
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

F'ILED 

United States Coutt of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 17 1 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

MARY CYNTHIA HOGAN, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 90-6142 

(D.C. No. CR-89-270-W) 

(W.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges. 

Defendant Mary Cynthia Hogan (Appellant) appeals her 

conviction by a jury in the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Oklahoma. Hogan was convicted of bank fraud 

and aiding and abetting bank fraud in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

§ 1344 and 18 u.s.c. § 2. 

During Hogan's tenure as the financial aid director of the 

Stillwater School of Cosmetology (the "school"), the Stillwater 

National Bank and Trust Company (the "bank") received an 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6142 Document: 010110069671 Date Filed: 01/07/1991 Page: 1 
application for a government student loan from an applicant named 

"Donna S. Stroud." Stroud was purportedly enrolled or about to 

enroll in the Stillwater School. After processing the application 

the bank issued a check payable to Donna S. Stroud in the amount 

of $3,880.00 and ultimately paid that amount in cash to an 

individual who endorsed the name "Cindy Hogan" before a bank 

teller. Suspicions fell upon Hogan when the authorities surmised 

that Donna S. Stroud was a fictitious character. 

Upon the completion of investigations by the Federal Bureau 

of Investigation (FBI), Hogan was indicted for knowing execution 

of a scheme to defraud and to obtain monies of the bank by means 

of false or fraudulent pretenses or representations. 

Specifically, the Indictment charged Hogan with preparing or 

causing to be prepared loan documentation that stated the loan 

proceeds would be used by Donna S. Stroud, even though "in truth 

and in fact, as the defendant ... then and there well knew, Donna 

S. Stroud was a fictitious individual and the proceeds were to be 

received and used and were, in fact, received and used by 

defendant for her own use and benefit." The Indictment 

further charged Hogan with receipt of the fraudulently induced 

check and receipt of $3,880.00 upon the endorsement and conversion 

of the check. 

Upon her conviction by jury trial, Hogan was sentenced to 

three years of probation, ordered to pay restitution in the amount 

of $5,000.00 to the bank, and ordered to pay a special assessment 

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of $50.00. 

sufficiency 

testimony. 

Hogan timely appealed to this court, challenging the 

of evidence and the admission of certain rebuttal 

In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented 

against her, Hogan argues "[t]he evidence introduced at trial, 

even when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 

simply does not support the jury's conclusion that Hogan devised 

or carried out the scheme described in the indictment." We 

disagree. 

The standard for appellate review of the sufficiency of 

evidence to support a criminal conviction is well defined in our 

case law. "[W]e must view the evidence--both direct and 

circumstantial, together with all reasonable inferences to be 

drawn therefrom--in the light most favorable to the government. A 

criminal conviction may be sustained on wholly circumstantial 

evidence." United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529 (10th 

Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1986). 

"The evidence ... is sufficient if, when taken in the light most 

favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1531. See 

also United States v. Shelton, 736 F.2d 1397, 1401 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984). If the jury verdict is 

supported by substantial evidence it cannot be set aside for 

insufficiency. Id. at 1402. 

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In order to prove bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1344, the government has the burden of establishing three 

elements: "(l) a scheme or artifice to obtain the moneys, funds 

or credits under the · custody or control of a federally insured 

financial. institution; . (2) the Defendant's participation in the 

scheme by means of false pretenses, representations, and promises 

which were material; and (3) that the Defendant acted knowingly." 

United States v. Swearingen, 858 F.2d 1555, 1556 (11th Cir. 1988), 

cert. denied, 109 s. Ct. 1540 (1989); see also United States v. 

Goldblatt, 813 F.2d 619, 623 (3rd Cir. 1987). The government met 

its burden. 

There is abundant evidence supporting the jury verdict. 

Hogan was implicated by the combined testimony of numerous 

witnesses. FBI Special Agent Folmar testified that his suspicions 

were initially aroused during his first conversation with Hogan. 

Folmar found it quite odd that, although Hogan could remember the 

Stroud application specifically, and could tell him exactly how 

she set the check aside, unsigned, for return to the bank, Hogan 

"could not remember even a general description of Donna Stroud." 

Hogan could not describe Stroud's hair color, height, or any other 

characteristic. Folmar also discussed several handwriting 

exemplars he obtained from Hogan (and from the files of the 

Stillwater School) for examination at the FBI lab in Washington, 

D.C. 

Other testimony suggested Hogan had access to vital 

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statistics in a co-worker's personnel file that were used in 

Section I of the Stroud application. 1 The co-worker, Dana Stout, 

testified that she (Stout) had nothing to do with the Stroud 

application. 

The bank teller who accepted the loan check and paid out 

$3,880.00 also testified for the government. The loan check had 

already been endorsed "Donna Stroud" when it was brought to him. 

He said "at that time of the cashing of the check, the name 

underneath was written at the time that I gave the money to the 

second person who signed it." The second endorsement was in the 

name "Cindy Hogan." Although the teller could not recall what the 

customer to whom he gave the cash looked like, he testified that 

he required a driver's license for identification from the person 

who presented herself as Cindy Hogan. 

Among other witnesses for the prosecution, the most important 

is FBI Special Agent Schlinz, an examiner of questioned documents. 

Schlinz was accepted as an expert witness before the court, and 

testified at length concerning his analysis of the Stroud loan 

application, Hogan's handwriting exemplar and office-work samples, 

and the endorsements on the check. Schlinz testified: 

1 

I determined that Cindy Hogan, the writer of the known 

handwriting provided to me, prepared the Cindy Hogan 

signature and the hand-printed Cindy Hogan on ... the 

application and promissdry note for a Plus loan. 

The loan application was made on a standard government form 

containing three sections to be filled out separately by the 

applicant, the school, and the lending institution, respectively. 

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I also determined that she prepared the handprinted Cindy Hogan endorsement on ... the check. 

After the government rested, Hogan testified on her own 

behalf. She admitted filling out only Section II of the Stroud 

application as part of her job as director of financial aid. She 

denied any involvement with falsifying information on the 

application or forging names on the check. Hogan also denied 

taking the check to the bank, presenting it or receiving cash for 

it. On cross-examination, Hogan mischaracterized the opinion of 

Ernie Smith, a handwriting expert hired by the defense to examine 

the important signatures in the case, by testifying Smith had not 

said she signed the check. 

The government then called Ernie Smith to rebut the testimony 

given by Hogan. Smith stated it was his opinion that Hogan was 

the person who wrote the name "Cindy Hogan" on both the loan check 

d th 1 1 . t" 2 an e oan app ica ion. 

In applying the evidence in this case to the elements of bank 

fraud, we again note that "[a] criminal conviction may be 

sustained on wholly circumstantial evidence." Hooks, 780 F.2d at 

1529. The government's case is based on both direct and 

circumstantial evidence. The government's evidence established "a 

scheme ... to obtain the moneys ... under the custody or control 

of a federally insured financial institution," Swearingen, 858 

2 Hogan's challenge to the admission of Smith's testimony is the 

second issue raised on appeal. It is discussed below. 

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F.2d at 1556, through proof that a loan had been obtained for a 

fictitious person. 3 The evidence also showed the bank is insured 

by the FDIC. 

established. 

The first element of bank fraud is therefore 

The second element of proof, Defendant's participation 

through material and false pretenses and representations, was 

established with physical evidence the presence of Hogan's 

handwriting on both the loan application and bank check. The 

nonexistence of Donna Stroud demonstrates the element of falsity. 

Given Hogan's role as the director of financial aid who filled out 

the loan form on behalf of the fictitious applicant, as well as 

the unexplained presence of Hogan's endorsement on the loan check, 

the jury had sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude Hogan 

knew Stroud did not exist. The materiality of the false pretenses 

or promises is obvious, in that the false application induced the 

bank loan. 

bank. 

Hogan denies she participated in any scheme to defraud the 

Hogan argues that all the information she wrote in Section 

II of the application is true, and that the government offered no 

3 A bank officer testified that all mail sent by the bank to the 

address listed in the Stroud application was returned because that 

address was invalid. All the bank's attempts to locate Donna 

Stroud were unsuccessful. The owner of the Stillwater School 

testified that no record of a "Donna Stroud" ever applying to or 

enrolling in the school could be found in the student files. A 

special agent of the United States Department of Health and Human 

Services, Office of Inspector General, testified that the social 

security number listed for Donna Stroud in the loan application 

was invalid, and had never been issued. 

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evidence that she completed Sections I or III. Given that the 

jury properly concluded Hogan filled out Section II knowing that 

Stroud was fictitious, no direct evidence regarding Section I was 

necessary. Furthermore, the evidence showed that much of the 

information used in Section I was either close or identical to the 

vital statistics of Dana Stout. Hogan admitted having at least 

temporary access to that information. Her admission provides 

circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude Hogan 

was responsible for Section I as well. We hold this evidence is 

sufficient. 

Hogan also claims no evidence was introduced to establish 

either her receipt of the check or her receipt of any cash from 

the bank. This argument simply ignores two critical aspects of 

the government's case. First, two document analysts identified 

Hogan as the person who signed the name "Cindy Hogan" on the back 

of the check. Obviously, if Hogan signed the check she first must 

have received it. Second, the bank teller testified he gave 

$3,880.00 in cash to the person who signed the name "Cindy Hogan" 

on the back of the check in his presence. The teller also 

testified that the signer was identified by a driver's license. 

If the jury accepted the testimony of the document analysts and 

the teller, it would necessarily conclude Hogan personally cashed 

the check. This evidence fully refutes Hogan's argument. 

Hogan also quibbles that no evidence was introduced proving 

Hogan forged the first "Donna Stroud" endorsement, and "if the 

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name 'Donna Stroud' had not been signed on the back of the check, 

the check could not have been cashed." The relevance of this 

argument escapes us. We hold sufficient evidence was presented to 

establish Hogan's participation in the scheme by material and 

false representations. 

Finally, the evidence indicated Hogan acted knowingly. The 

FBI agent's testimony as to Hogan's selective memory, as well as 

Hogan's position as financial aid director, would support the jury 

in concluding Hogan knew "Donna s. Stroud" was a fiction. 

Testimony of the handwriting experts and the bank teller supports 

the jury's conclusion that Hogan knowingly endorsed and converted 

the loan check. 

We hold the evidence supports the conclusion that the Stroud 

application was a false representation knowingly made or caused to 

be made with intent to defraud the bank. Therefore the evidence 

is sufficient to establish the elements of bank fraud and to 

enable a jury to convict Hogan of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1344 and 

18 u.s.c. § 2. 

Hogan's second principal challenge is to the district court's 

admission of rebuttal testimony by Ernie Smith. As noted above, 

Smith is an expert document examiner who was hired by the defense. 

After learning Smith would not be called as a defense witness, the 

government tried to call Smith during its case in chief. The 

court disallowed the testimony, ruling it would be cumulative with 

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that of handwriting expert Schlinz. Later, however, during crossexamination by the government, Hogan testified that Smith had not 

said she signed the check. Hogan explained that Smith said he 

could not state that she printed the "Cindy Hogan" signature on 

the loan check. Hogan further stated "(Smith] told me that--he 

told my lawyer, excuse me, that he could not testify that I did 

not make the signature. He never said that I did." The court 

subsequently allowed the government to call Smith for rebuttal 

testimony. Defense counsel made no objection whatsoever. Smith 

stated his opinion that the same person signed both the loan check 

and loan application. 

On appeal, Hogan argues "the trial court erred in permitting 

Smith to testify as a rebuttal witness, for three reasons: 

Smith's testimony was cumulative; it was improper rebuttal; and 

his testimony violated the spirit of the Criminal Justice Act's 

provision for appointment of expert witnesses." Defense counsel 

attempts to explain the failure to object at trial by claiming the 

trial court accepted Smith as a rebuttal witness "[b]efore Hogan's 

counsel had an opportunity to object .... " 

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, "[e]rror may not be 

predicated upon~ ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless 

~ substantial right of the party is affected, and [i]n case 

the ruling is one admitting evidence,~ timely objection or motion 

to strike appears of record " Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(l) 

(emphasis added). Although the Rules enable this court to take 

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.. 

notice of "plain errors affecting substantial rights although they 

were not brought to the attention of the court," Fed. R. Evid. 

103(d), no such error appears in the record before us. We can not 

base a finding of error on an evidentiary objection not presented 

to the trial court. Furthermore, Hogan has made no showing of 

prejudice to any "substantial right," Fed. R. Evid. 103(a), 

resulting from the admission of Smith's testimony. 

Nevertheless, we have considered Hogan's second argument and 

find it to be without merit. Counsel cites no authority for the 

first - two contentions, and only contrary authority for the third. 

Furthermore, this court may not reverse the evidentiary rulings of 

the district court in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 467 U.S. 1255 (1984). See also, United States v. Posey, 

647 F.2d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 1981). In effect, the trial court 

ruled on the admissibility of Smith's testimony when the 

government called Smith for rebuttal, stating "I think he [the 

Assistant U.S. Attorney] can [call Smith] now." We find neither 

error nor abuse of discretion, in the district court's admission 

of Smith's rebuttal testimony upon the false testimony of Hogan. 

Having held the evidence presented was sufficient to permit 

the jury to find the ne~essary elements of bank fraud, and having 

found no error in the district court's admission of Ernie Smith's 

rebuttal testimony, we AFFIRM Hogan's conviction by jury trial. 

Entered for the Court: 

WADE BRORBY 

United States Circuit Judge 

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