Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02392/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02392-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Keith Ray
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2392

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

KEITH RAY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

 for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 02-CR-1064-1—James F. Holderman, Chief Judge.

ARGUED OCTOBER 30, 2009—DECIDED MARCH 17, 2010

Before CUDAHY, POSNER, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. On November 4, 2002, while

en route from Chicago to Minneapolis, Keith Ray was

arrested for possessing almost two kilograms of crack

cocaine. Due to his significant cooperation, Ray and the

government entered into a plea agreement that provided

for 263 months’ imprisonment. This was significantly

below the relevant Guidelines range of 292-365 months.

The agreement did not state that the specified sentence

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
2 No. 09-2392

was based upon the Guidelines; nor did it elucidate

how the parties arrived at the 263-month figure. After

he was sentenced to the agreed term, the Sentencing

Commission issued Amendment 706, which lowered

the offense level for crack-cocaine offenses. Had this

amendment been in effect during his prosecution, Ray’s

Guidelines range would have been 235 to 293 months.

Contending that the 263-month term in the plea agreement represented a 10% reduction from the low end of

the relevant Guidelines range (292 months), Ray filed a

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) motion for a lower sentence. The

district court denied the motion on the ground that the

sentence he received was based on the stipulated term

of imprisonment rather than on the Guidelines. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Beginning in early September 2002, Keith Ray began

a series of trips between Minneapolis and Chicago for

the purpose of acquiring crack cocaine and bringing it to

Minnesota for distribution. This improvident course of

action reached its inevitable conclusion on November 4,

2004, when Ray and Dorian Bowlds acquired some 1,955

grams of crack cocaine in Chicago and boarded a train

to Minneapolis. While en route, Ray was approached by

law enforcement agents. Despite a futile effort on Ray’s

part to hide the cocaine by passing it to Bowlds, the

agents discovered the drugs and arrested the pair.

On January 16, 2003, Ray pleaded guilty to conspiracy

to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 50 grams’

crack cocaine. Due to Ray’s substantial assistance to the

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
No. 09-2392 3

prosecution, he and the government entered into a plea

agreement that provided for a sentence of 263 months’

imprisonment. This represented a marked reduction

from the relevant Guidelines range, which in light of his

criminal history and other pertinent factors was 292-365

months. Although the agreement did not explain the

basis upon which the 263-month figure was determined,

it is 10% less than the low end of the then-existing Guidelines range. The district court accepted the plea agreement and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

On November 1, 2007, the Sentencing Commission

issued Amendment 706 to U.S.S.G. § 2d1.1, which

reduced the base-offense level for crack-cocaine offenses

by two levels. Ray brought a motion under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2), requesting that the district court reduce

his sentence to 212 months’ imprisonment, which represented a 10% reduction from the low end of his

amended Guideline range of 235 to 293 months.

The district court denied Ray’s motion, finding that his

term of imprisonment was not based on a sentencing

range that had subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Rather, the court determined that

Ray’s prison term was based on an agreed sentence

under what is now Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Ray

now appeals this decision.

II. DISCUSSION

The issue before us is a relatively straightforward one.

Section 3582(c)(2) provides that with respect to “a defenCase: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
4 No. 09-2392

dant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently

been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. 994(o) . . . the court may reduce the term of

imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth

in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if

such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” In

the present case, there is no question that the Commission lowered the sentencing range for crack-cocaine

offenses. The only issue presented for our determination

is whether Ray was sentenced “based on” the Sentencing

Guidelines. If so, he is entitled to file a § 3582(c)(2)

motion and to petition the district court for a reduced

sentence.

Ray’s plea agreement provided that the government

would move the court “to depart from the applicable

sentencing guidelines range . . . and to impose the

specific sentence agreed to by the parties.” The agreement further specified that “the sentence imposed by

the Court shall include a term of imprisonment in the

custody of the Bureau of Prisons of 263 months.” On this

basis, the appellant invites us to hold that his 263-month

sentence was based on the Guidelines range of 292-365

months, rather than specifically on his agreement with

the government. We decline to do so.

Ray’s argument centers, as it must, on the uncontroversial contention that the Sentencing Guidelines played a

role in the process by which he and the government

arrived at the figure of 263 months. To be sure, it seems

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
No. 09-2392 5

most unlikely that the agreed sentence was arrived upon

by chance and without regard to the Guidelines, which

presumably featured prominently in the parties’ negotiations. At oral argument, counsel for the government

conceded that such negotiations typically begin based

on the relevant Guidelines range. But it is a far cry

from the unremarkable observation that the Guidelines

influenced the negotiations that ultimately resulted in

the agreed term of 263 months to the more dubious

contention that that sentence was “based on” the Guidelines. One must examine the intent of the plea agreement, which, of course, is the ultimate basis of the sentence. Does the plea agreement clearly reflect an intent

to tie the sentence to the Guidelines so that, if the Guidelines are subsequently adjusted, the sentence should be

similarly adjusted? If so, the sentence may be said to be

“based on” the Guidelines. Here, however, there is no

indication of such an intent.

Ray urges us to recognize that the 263-month figure is

not a random result, but rather represents 90% of the

low end of the relevant Guidelines range. This might

well be true. It is entirely plausible that the parties

viewed a 10% reduction from the low end of the Guidelines range as the appropriate sentence in the present

case. But since the parties failed to specify this relationship in writing, we can only surmise its existence. Accord

United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d 275, 282 (3d Cir. 2009).

Such speculation provides insufficient basis for us to

conclude that the 263-month sentence was “based on” the

Guidelines.

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
6 No. 09-2392

Moreover, even if we were completely confident that

the 263-month result was derived in this manner, it does

not follow that the parties would have agreed to a

10% reduction on the low end of the new Guidelines

range, had it been in effect at the time of Ray’s prosecution. The government may view a 10% reduction from

292 months (the low end of the old range) to the agreedupon 263 months to be acceptable, and yet not deem the

same percentage reduction from 235 months (the low

end of the new range) to 212 months to be appropriate.

How are we to presume that the government would

define a reasonable reduction in such a linear manner?

Ultimately, the written agreement does not state that

the parties intended for the appropriate sentence to be

10% below the low end of the relevant Guidelines

range. And it is the intent of the parties at the time of

the plea agreement, as memorialized in it, which is determinative.

Our conclusion that Ray’s sentence was “based on”

his plea agreement, rather than the Guidelines, is

bolstered by numerous decisions of our sister circuits. See

United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2009)

(holding that where a district court departs from the

Guidelines by imposing a below-Guidelines sentence, a

defendant cannot be said to have been sentenced “based

on” those Guidelines); United States v. Sanchez, 562 F.3d

275, 282 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Peveler, 359 F.3d

369, 379 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Scurlack, 560

F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C),

the court therefore was bound to sentence [defendant]

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
No. 09-2392 7

pursuant to the terms of the parties’ agreement, and

§ 3582(c)(2) became inapplicable because [defendant’s]

sentence was based on the agreement and not ‘a sentencing range that ha[d] subsequently been lowered by

the Sentencing Commission’ ”); United States v. Trujeque,

100 F.3d 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1996) (same); see also United

States v. Cook, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL 481270, at *2 (D.C. Cir.

Feb. 12, 2010); United States v. Cieslowski, 410 F.3d 353, 363-

64 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hemminger, 114 F.3d

1192, 1997 WL 235838, at *1 (7th Cir. May 2, 1997).

Confronted with this unpropitious precedent, Ray

focuses our attention on a recent decision of the Tenth

Circuit. In United States v. Cobb, that court held that a

defendant who had entered into a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement could bring a motion for a sentence reduction

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 584 F.3d 979, 981 (10th Cir.

2009). There, the parties had stipulated to a sentence at

the low end of the Guidelines. Id. at 982. Reasoning that

“[i]t is simply unrealistic to think that the applicable

guideline range is not a major factor (if not the major

factor) in reaching a stipulated sentence,” the court concluded that “nothing in the language of § 3582(c)(2) or

in the language of Rule 11 precludes a defendant who

pleads guilty under Rule 11 from later benefitting from

a favorable retroactive guideline amendment.” Id. at 984-

85 (emphasis original).

Despite this ostensibly favorable ruling, Cobb does not

benefit the appellant in the present case. As the Tenth

Circuit made clear in distinguishing prior case law, the

appellant in Cobb had stipulated to a sentence tied to a

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
8 No. 09-2392

correctly determined Guidelines range rather than to a

sentence outside the sentencing range. Id. at 983. Ray

obviously entered into an agreement with the government to a below-Guidelines term of imprisonment. Moreover, in Cobb, the appellant’s “sentencing disposition

was tied to the guidelines at every step.” Id. at 983.

The Tenth Circuit case may arguably be said to have

found that the intent of the plea agreement was to tie

the sentence to the Guidelines range, which was

moved. Such is clearly not the case with respect to

Ray, whose plea agreement draws no connection between the agreed-to sentence and the relevant Guidelines

range.

Only if an intent to modify is apparent at the time of

the agreement is the sentence modifiable since the issue

is one of contract principle. Our case law makes clear

that the sentence imposed under a plea bargain rests

firmly on the parties’ agreement. See United States v.

Woods, 581 F.3d 531, 534 (7th Cir. 2009) (observing that a

“plea agreement is a type of contract subject to contract

law principles” and that “[w]e interpret the terms of the

agreement according to the parties’ reasonable expectations”); United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552, 556 (7th

Cir. 2009) (“As a general matter, we interpret plea agreements in accordance with ordinary principles of contract law.”); United States v. Ataya, 864 F.2d 1324, 1329

(7th Cir. 1998) (“This Court has long recognized that a

plea agreement is a contract.”). Since plea agreements

under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(C) are creatures of contract, there is no reason why such agreements could not

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
No. 09-2392 9

Just as a defendant can bargain away his right to seek a 1

reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), so surely a defendant may bargain for his sentence to move in tandem with any

future favorable amendment in the Guidelines. Compare

Hemminger, 1997 WL 235838, at *1 (observing that a defendant

bargained away his right to receive a lower sentence) with

Cobb, 584 F.3d at 979 (allowing a defendant to bring a motion

under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) where the plea agreement explicitly

tied the agreed sentence to the Guidelines, which evidenced

an intent that the agreed sentence would change in line with

any subsequent alteration in the Guidelines).

provide for the modifiability of the Guidelines. Ray’s 1

plea agreement, however, contained no such provision and evidenced no clear intent that his sentence be

adjusted in tandem with any future adjustment in the

Guidelines. This being the case, we cannot conclude

that his 263-month sentence was “based on” the Guidelines.

III. CONCLUSION

In the absence of explicit language in the agreement

to the contrary, a sentence imposed pursuant to a Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement cannot be said to be

“based on” the Sentencing Guidelines. An agreement

must clearly reflect an intent that the sentence be

modified when the Guidelines shift. Ray’s plea agreement did not reflect such an intent. That being so,

the district court was correct to conclude that Ray’s

263-month sentence was not based on the Guidelines

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10
10 No. 09-2392

and that, as a result, he could not bring a 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2) motion. The judgment of the district court

is therefore

AFFIRMED.

3-17-10

Case: 09-2392 Document: 22 Filed: 03/17/2010 Pages: 10