Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03096/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03096-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vernon McCall
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 19, 2003 Decided May 23, 2003

Nos. 01-3026 & 01-3096

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DANIEL STOVER, A/K/A BUCK, A/K/A BLADE,

AND VERNON MCCALL,

APPELLANTS

–————

Nos. 01-3029 & 01-3037

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WALTER HENRY III, A/K/A MONEY, A/K/A HENRY WALKER

AND CHARLES HARRISON,

APPELLANTS

–————

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #01-3096 Document #750921 Filed: 05/23/2003 Page 1 of 25
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Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Nos. 98cr00235-04, -05, -06, -08)

Stephen C. Leckar, appointed by the court, for appellant

Henry, Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, for appellant McCall, Paul H. Zukerberg, for appellant

Stover, and Mary M. Petras, appointed by the court, for

appellant Harrison, argued the causes. With them on the

joint briefs was A. J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Walter Henry III filed pro se briefs.

Deborah Watson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were

Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, William D. Braun,

Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, and William J. O’Malley, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: EDWARDS, HENDERSON, and RANDOLPH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: In these consolidated appeals, four appellants, Charles Harrison, Walter Henry, Vernon McCall, and

Daniel Stover, raise numerous challenges to their convictions

and sentences for drug conspiracy and possession with intent

to distribute. After reviewing the challenged pre-trial, trial,

post-trial, and sentencing rulings of the District Court, we

affirm the District Court on all but two of its judgments. We

vacate the sentences of Henry, Harrison, and McCall and

remand to the District Court for a new calculation of the drug

quantity for which each is responsible. We also remand

McCall’s sentence for a new finding on the scope of his

conspiratorial agreement. We have accorded all of appellants’ arguments full consideration after careful examination

of the record, but this opinion addresses only those arguments that warrant discussion.

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I. BACKGROUND

This case involves a conspiracy to import heroin from

Thailand and other Asian countries and distribute it in the

Washington D.C. and Baltimore areas. The evidence presented at trial established that, from 1995 to 1998, Nuri

Lama, a citizen of Nepal residing in New York, arranged to

import heroin from Asia into the United States, and delivered

the heroin to appellant Walter Henry. Henry stored the

drugs at his mother’s home in Capitol Heights, Maryland, and

then sold the heroin to appellant Charles Harrison, who was

the ‘‘hub.’’ Harrison ‘‘cut’’ or diluted the heroin and sold it to

a network of dealers in the Washington D.C. and Baltimore

areas, including appellant Vernon McCall. Daniel Stover,

Harrison’s right-hand man, also ‘‘cut’’ heroin, packaged and

delivered it, and collected payment for it. Stover also operated a ‘‘stash house’’ for Harrison in Fort Washington, Maryland.

The Government’s investigation of the heroin conspiracy

produced tapes of more than 250 telephone conversations

intercepted on telephone lines belonging to Lama, Henry, and

Harrison. On various dates in June and July 1998, the

Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘‘FBI’’) searched the homes

of Harrison, McCall, Henry (who lived with his mother), and

Michael Ball (another distributor in the conspiracy); the FBI

also searched McCall’s car and Stover’s stash house. The

searches recovered heroin, guns, cash, documents connecting

individuals to the conspiracy, small baggies of heroin for

street distribution, cutting agents, cutting and packaging

equipment, and scales.

On May 4, 1999, appellants and others were charged with

one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

one kilogram or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846. Henry was also charged with two counts of possession

with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841.

Stover and Harrison were also charged with one count of

conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1956.

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From October 20, 1999 to January 12, 2000, all appellants

were tried in a jury trial before the District Court. Before

trial, Lama pled guilty to having engaged in a conspiracy and

provided evidence against appellants. Stover and McCall

were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute. Henry was convicted of possession with intent to distribute. Stover was acquitted of the money laundering conspiracy count. The jury was unable to reach a verdict as to

Henry and Harrison on the drug conspiracy count, and as to

Harrison on the money laundering conspiracy count. From

September 11 to October 20, 2000, a retrial on the drug conspiracy count against Henry and Harrison took place. The

District Court dismissed the money laundering conspiracy

count against Harrison. The jury returned a guilty verdict

as to both Henry and Harrison on the drug conspiracy count.

Henry and Harrison were sentenced to life imprisonment,

Stover to 360 months, and McCall to 235 months.

Appellants now appeal, seeking review of pre-trial, trial,

post-trial, and sentencing rulings of the District Court.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Stover Verdict Jury Note

Stover appeals his conviction on the ground the District

Court failed to act on a note from the jury that, he alleges,

cast doubt on its guilty verdict. The jury returned a verdict

convicting Stover of conspiracy on January 7, 2000; the jury

was polled and the verdict found unanimous. On January 12,

after the jury informed the court it was hung on the conspiracy count against Henry, the jury sent out the following note:

During deliberations for Daniel Stover, the question

of what pieces of evidence his fingerprints were on

came up. Some thought one way, some another.

After research, it was found that some who voted

based on these supposed facts were wrong. Some

want to redeliberate on this issue, some don’t. How

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do we, if possible, rectify this matter? Seat 4, Seat

11, Seat 6, Seat 8, Seat 12. Can we meet privately

on this matter?

Trial Transcript (‘‘Tr.’’), reprinted in 1 Joint Appendix (‘‘JA’’)

in 01-3026, at 5781. The judge informed the lawyers who

were present he intended to tell the jurors ‘‘they can’t do

anything about judgment having been entered as to Stover,

and whatever post-trial motions are filed will be filed.’’ Tr., 1

JA in 01-3026, at 5782. He then summoned the jurors and

informed them: ‘‘I have your notes, and I have decided to

terminate your deliberations.’’ Tr., 1 JA in 01-3026, at 5791.

Stover’s counsel, who had not been present, later filed a

motion to reconvene the jury for additional deliberation,

which the court declined to grant. We review the District

Court’s actions for abuse of discretion. See United States v.

Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 151-52 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (‘‘When

confronted with allegations of irregularity in the jury’s proceedings, the trial judge has broad discretion ‘to determine

what manner of hearing, if any, is warranted.’ TTT The trial

court correctly determined that no further inquiry was required and the judge did not abuse his discretion in responding to these allegations as he did.’’) (quoting United States v.

Wilson, 534 F.2d 375, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1976); citing United

States v. Parker, 549 F.2d 998, 1000 (5th Cir. 1977)). The

District Court below acted within its discretion and in accord

with Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).

Rule 606(b) provides:

(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment.

Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or

indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter

or statement occurring during the course of the

jury’s deliberations or to the effect of anything upon

that or any other juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the

verdict or indictment or concerning the juror’s mental processes in connection therewith, except that a

juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought

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to the jury’s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any

juror. Nor may a juror’s affidavit or evidence of any

statement by the juror concerning a matter about

which the juror would be precluded from testifying

be received for these purposes.

FED. R. EVID. 606(b). ‘‘Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) is

grounded in the common-law rule against admission of jury

testimony to impeach a verdict and the exception for juror

testimony relating to extraneous influences.’’ Tanner v.

United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987). This rule precludes

taking testimony from the jurors in this case regarding their

belated misgivings as it did under similar circumstances in

United States v. Dakins, 872 F.2d 1061, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

In Dakins the jury returned a partial verdict against one

defendant, the verdict was read aloud in the courtroom, the

jury was polled and unanimously assented to the verdict, and

the judge instructed the jurors to resume deliberating on the

two remaining defendants. At day’s end one juror informed

the judge she had a ‘‘question about the decision that was

made on Mr. Dakins.’’ 872 F.2d at 1064. At the judge’s

request, she wrote the question on a piece of paper which the

judge sealed, unread, in an envelope. When the envelope was

opened on appeal, the enclosed paper revealed the juror had

developed doubts about the sufficiency of the Government’s

proof of Dakins’s guilt. Upholding the trial court’s treatment

of the note, this court explained:

Juror No. 10’s second-thoughts were manifested

hours after the poll had been conducted, and the

jury had been returned to its deliberations by the

court. The verdict had been read into the court

record. Upon the 12th juror’s assent, also upon the

record, it was ‘‘recorded’’ for purposes of Rule 31(d).

The jury’s decision had become a final verdict, and

no juror could thereafter be allowed to impeach it.

Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) prohibits jurors from giving evidence about any matter pertaining to their verdicts

except extrajudicial influences. Juror No. 10’s unsealed note revealed that her misgivings derived

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from her post-verdict reflections about the weight of

the government’s proof at trial, and not from an

extrajudicial influence.

872 F.2d at 1065. Rule 606(b) similarly bars eliciting juror

testimony here to impeach the verdict against Stover, which

was unanimously rendered, as the contemporaneous polling

confirmed, five days before the judge received the note. See

also Tanner, 483 U.S. at 121 (relying on Rule 606(b) to

uphold trial judge’s refusal to consider juror testimony regarding drug and alcohol use by jurors during deliberation to

impeach verdict). Nonetheless, Stover argues for a different

result based on other court decisions. We find none of them

applicable here.

First, Stover cites two cases from other circuits in which a

judge changed a mistaken verdict based on juror testimony:

United States v. Dotson, 817 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1987),

vacated in other respect on rehearing, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir.

1987), and Attridge v. Cencorp Div. of Dover Techns. Int’l,

Inc., 836 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1987). In each of those cases,

however, the mistake lay in recording the wrong verdict after

the jury had unanimously assented to a different one. Neither case involved post-verdict juror misgivings or any sort of

inquiry into the juror’s deliberations.

Stover also cites United States v. Benedict, 95 F.3d 17 (8th

Cir. 1996), and United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140 (2d Cir.

1981), to assert that a partial verdict, such as the one entered

here, becomes irrevocable only if the judge advises the jury of

such a result in advance. In Dakins, however, the court

expressly rejected the argument that ‘‘the court erred in

accepting the jury’s partial verdict without first having specially instructed the jury as to a partial verdict’s finality’’:

We believe no special instruction to have been necessary, however. Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(b) expressly permits the jury to return a verdict ‘‘with respect to a

defendant or defendants as to whom it has agreed.’’

It says nothing to suggest that such a verdict, once

recorded, is open to reconsideration, and the case

law is to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v.

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Hockridge, 573 F.2d 752, 759 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied,

439 U.S. 821, 99 S.Ct. 85, 86, 58 L.Ed.2d 112 (1978).

Appellant cites none, and we are aware of no

precedent requiring a special finality instruction.

Indeed, it is not even required that the jury be

instructed about its right to return a partial verdict

at all. See, United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140

(2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938, 102 S.Ct.

1427, 1428, 71 L.Ed.2d 648 (1982). The trial record

here makes clear that the jury sent the note indicating that it had ‘‘reached one verdict’’ on its own

initiative. That verdict was then entered on a verdict form, announced by the foreperson in open

court, and orally confirmed by each and every juror – the same solemn formalities that attend a

verdict which ends an entire case. We find no

reason for the jury to have thought its partial verdict any less final than it would have been had the

jury been rendering a verdict as to all of the defendants.

872 F.2d at 1064. Stover offers no persuasive reason to reach

a different conclusion here. Stover also asserts, without

supporting authority, that the court erred in not summoning

Stover’s lawyer and responding to the jury note in open court

in his presence. Such action, however, would have availed

Stover naught as Rule 606(b) would nonetheless have foreclosed altering the verdict based on the note or additional

juror testimony. Cf. United States v. Stansfield, 101 F.3d

909, 916 (3d Cir. 1996) (‘‘Had the district court here questioned the three jurors prior to the jury’s discharge, the

jurors still would have been incompetent by virtue of Rule

606(b) to impeach the jury’s verdict.’’).

B. Ouaffai’s Testimony

At the separate trial of Henry and Harrison, the Government called Adelhamid Ouaffai. Ouaffai testified on direct

examination that on several occasions he had sold Harrison a

large number of ziploc baggies and chemicals to cut heroin;

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that Harrison had told him he was a heroin dealer; and that

Harrison had said he received heroin from Chinese suppliers.

Harrison’s counsel attempted to impeach Ouaffai by having

him acknowledge prior statements he made to the FBI on

May 4, 1998, statements that were supposedly inconsistent

with his testimony on direct or cross-examination. In particular, Ouaffai conceded that he told the FBI he had met

Harrison only three to seven times, although he testified on

direct that he had met with Harrison more than ten times;

although Ouaffai testified on cross-examination that Harrison

always arrived in a blue car, he admitted telling the FBI that

Harrison always arrived in ‘‘some non-descript American

car’’; Ouaffai testified on cross-examination that he dealt with

‘‘hundreds’’ of drug dealers, but he conceded telling the FBI

that Harrison was the only drug dealer with whom he was

involved. Harrison’s counsel then asked a series of questions

suggesting that Ouaffai’s testimony was not credible because

he wanted a plea agreement.

On redirect examination, the Government sought to introduce other statements from the FBI report, as well as

portions of the statement of facts from Ouaffai’s July 5, 2000,

plea agreement, consistent with Ouaffai’s testimony on direct

examination. Some of the statements addressed the inconsistency regarding the number of drug dealers that Ouaffai

knew; most of the statements only reiterated Ouaffai’s testimony on direct examination. In response to a defense objection, the Government argued, and the District Court agreed,

that the statements were admissible under FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(1)(b) to rehabilitate Ouaffai. (The judge instructed the

jurors that they could use prior consistent statements to

‘‘judg[e] the credibility of the witness TTT but not as proof

that what was said in the earlier statement was true.’’ Tr., 2

JA in 01-3037, at 474.) Harrison contends that the statements should have been excluded.

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement ‘‘offered in evidence

to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’’ FED. R. EVID.

801(c). Rule 801 provides that a prior consistent statement is

not hearsay if it is ‘‘offered to rebut an express or implied

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charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper

influence or motive.’’ FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court has interpreted the rule as requiring that the

offered statement be made before there was a motive to

fabricate. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995). According to Harrison, Ouaffai’s prior consistent statements

were made after he had a motive to fabricate – because

Ouaffai had already begun cooperating with the authorities –

and therefore were not admissible.

Rule 801(d)(1)(B) applies only when a prior consistent

statement is offered for its truth. See FED. R. EVID.

801(d)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note; Tome, 513 U.S. at

157. But statements may be introduced for reasons other

than their truth. Suppose a witness testifies on direct examination to fact X and then on cross-examination is asked about

his statement, made sometime before trial, suggesting that he

believed not-X. Could the party who called the witness ask

him to verify his prior consistent statements even though the

witness made them after he had a motive to shade the truth?

We think the answer is yes, and so do other courts of appeals.

See United States v. Simonelli, 237 F.3d 19, 26-27 (1st Cir.

2001); United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 919-20 (4th Cir.

1997); United States v. Pierre, 781 F.2d 329, 331-33 (2d Cir.

1986); United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 399-400 (7th

Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Rubin, 609 F.2d 51, 69-

70 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., concurring); cf. United States

v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1411 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Coltrane

v. United States, 418 F.2d 1131, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (decided before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence).

These prior statements would not be offered for the truth of

the matter asserted – fact X – and therefore would not need

to satisfy Rule 801(d)(1)(B). They would be introduced to

show that the witness did not give statements on direct that

were inconsistent with what he had said before. See Coltrane, 418 F.2d at 1140. The prior statements would be

admissible on this basis because of the cross-examination.

They would be relevant, under FED. R. EVID. 401, to a matter

of consequence – namely, that the witness made inconsistent

statements about fact X, which would tend to undermine his

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credibility. See, e.g., 22 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W.

GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5177,

at 143 (1978). In evaluating whether evidence is relevant, ‘‘the

judge must take account of the relationship of the evidence

offered to the evidence already admitted. Some matters are

properly provable only because the opposing party has made

them such.’’ United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 433 (D.C.

Cir. 1997).

Here, the only prior statements the Government introduced

on redirect that clarified an apparent inconsistency were

those concerning whether Ouaffai knew drug dealers other

than Harrison. These statements were properly admitted

(though not on the ground the District Court recited). The

rest of Ouaffai’s prior statements were not targeted at rebutting the inconsistencies probed during cross-examination, but

served only to show that most of Ouaffai’s testimony on direct

examination was consistent with his earlier statements. It

thus was error to admit them. See FED. R. EVID. 402.

The error does not require reversal. An objecting party

must state the ‘‘specific ground of objection, if the specific

ground [is] not apparent from the context.’’ FED. R. EVID.

103(a)(1). Although Harrison objected several times to the

admission of Ouaffai’s prior consistent statements, not once

did he state the grounds of the objections. Nor is it apparent

from the record that the ground of the objections was relevance. Cf. United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 667, 671 n.3 (D.C.

Cir. 1995). Accordingly, we review for plain error. See FED.

R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Weaver, 281 F.3d 228, 231

(D.C. Cir. 2002). Under this standard of review, a defendant

must show, inter alia, that the error affected his ‘‘substantial

rights’’ – that is, that the error affected the outcome of the

trial. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993).

Harrison has made no such showing. Other evidence, including a significant number of recorded conversations obtained

through wiretaps, established Harrison’s membership in the

conspiracy.

There is another issue concerning Ouaffai’s testimony.

Federal Rule of Evidence 614(b) permits a judge to ‘‘interroUSCA Case #01-3096 Document #750921 Filed: 05/23/2003 Page 11 of 25
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gate witnesses.’’ Judges enjoy broad latitude regarding the

type of questions asked and the extent of their questioning.

See United States v. Tilghman, 134 F.3d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir.

1998). It is an abuse of discretion, however, for a judge to

ask questions signifying that he finds the witness believable.

See id. Harrison contends the trial judge crossed the line in

the following exchange:

The Court: I have just one question. You understand, Mr. Ouaffai, before your sentencing by Judge

Legg in Baltimore, I have the opportunity to talk to

the Judge. Is there anything you’ve said to this

jury here today that is not the truth, the whole

truth, and nothing but the truth?

Def. Counsel: Objection, Your Honor.

The Court: Overruled.

Ouaffai: I said the truth, Judge.

The Court: Anything you want to change about any

of your testimony?

Ouaffai: No, Your Honor.

No reasonable juror would interpret the court’s questions

as indicating that it believed Ouaffai. If anything, the questioning suggests that the court disbelieved Ouaffai and was

permitting Ouaffai one last opportunity to change his testimony after being reminded of his oath and of his impending

sentencing. Although questions from the bench indicating

the court’s disbelief of a witness are also improper, see

Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 416, the error, if there was any,

worked to Harrison’s advantage. Furthermore, even if jurors

interpreted the court’s questions as an endorsement of Ouaffai’s credibility, the court corrected that misimpression by

admonishing the jury to ‘‘examine [Ouaffai’s] testimony with

caution and weigh it with great care’’ because Ouaffai had ‘‘a

motive to testify falsely’’ to secure a lighter sentence, Tr., 2

JA in 01-3037, at 476. See United States v. Sobamowo, 892

F.2d 90, 95 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1989); cf. Tilghman, 134 F.3d at

421.

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C. Tape Recordings

Henry and Harrison claim the District Court erred in

admitting two videotapes and two audiotapes. The videotapes capture Lama and undercover FBI Agent Eric Bryant

engaging in drug deals and negotiating a future exchange of

heroin for cocaine. On one of the videotapes, Lama tells

Agent Bryant that they should refer to drugs as clothes. The

audiotapes are of a conversation between Lama and Agent

Bryant in which Lama states that he is going to Washington,

D.C., for a drug deal.

The defendants objected that the tapes were irrelevant and

hearsay. The court overruled the objection, finding that the

recorded transactions were admissible as co-conspirator

statements, see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), and, presumably,

relevant as such. When the defendants later renewed their

objection, the court concluded that the recordings were admissible to establish that Lama was a drug dealer. Harrison

and Henry maintain that the court abused its discretion in

admitting the recordings. See United States v. Evans, 216

F.3d 80, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

A statement offered against a defendant is not hearsay if it

was made by a co-conspirator ‘‘during the course and in

furtherance of’’ a conspiracy between the declarant and the

defendant. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). According to the

Government, because the indictment alleged that Lama distributed heroin to ‘‘Henry and other coconspirators,’’ any

heroin that Lama distributed during the life of the conspiracy

was in furtherance of the conspiracy. The argument is not

well-taken. The Government must prove by a preponderance

of the evidence that 801(d)(2)(E)’s requirements have been

met. See United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 51 n.2 (D.C.

Cir. 1992); see also Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171,

175-76 (1987). An indictment may not be offered as evidence

to satisfy that burden. See Brown v. Dep’t of Justice, 715

F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The only affirmative evidence

purporting to show that the transaction between Lama and

Agent Bryant was in furtherance of the conspiracy involving

Henry and Harrison was that Lama eventually sold to Henry

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the same heroin that he had previously sought to peddle to

Agent Bryant. But this establishes only that Lama engaged

in drug deals with both Agent Bryant and Henry. We see no

basis to draw the further inference that Lama’s deals with

Agent Bryant and Henry were parts of the same conspiracy.

See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000);

Tarantino, 846 F.2d at 1393. The District Court thus erred

in admitting the recordings on this ground.

The Government has another reason why admission was

proper. It argues that the recordings did not constitute

hearsay, but were admissible as ‘‘verbal acts’’ to the extent

they demonstrated that Lama was a drug dealer and provided

context to other conversations in which Lama and his coconspirators used clothing terminology to refer to drugs. To

these ends, the recordings were clearly relevant: they made

more probable the existence of the facts of consequence that

Lama supplied drugs to Henry and Harrison (by showing

Lama was a drug dealer) and that the conspirators distributed drugs (by showing that their mentions of clothes referred

to drugs). See FED. R. EVID. 401.

The ‘‘verbal acts’’ doctrine does not apply here. According

to the advisory committee, a ‘‘verbal act’’ is a statement that

‘‘affects the legal rights of the parties.’’ FED. R. EVID. 801

advisory committee’s note. Such acts are limited to statements that have independent legal significance, such as contractual offers or inter vivos gifts. See 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN

& MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 801.11[3] (2d ed. 1997). Neither Lama’s negotiations with

Agent Bryant nor Lama’s statement that they should refer to

drugs as clothes falls within this definition. What the Government appears to mean by the term ‘‘verbal acts’’ is that

the recordings were offered for something other than their

truth. The veracity of the negotiations between Lama and

Agent Bryant was irrelevant. All that mattered was that

Lama engaged in those negotiations. See United States v.

Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 410 (8th Cir. 1998).

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As to using the recordings to establish context, the Government seems to be saying that all out-of-court statements

offered for context do not constitute hearsay. However, that

a statement provides context to other evidence does not mean

that the statement is not hearsay. All relevant evidence

provides context to the events underlying the charged crime.

See United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 928-29 (D.C. Cir.

2000). The question is whether the statement is offered for

its truth. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c); United States v. Jordan,

810 F.2d 262, 264 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Here, the Government

introduced Lama’s statement that Agent Bryant and Lama

should refer to drugs as clothes as evidence of the fact that

Lama used clothing terminology to refer to drugs in other

conversations. The statement is not probative of that fact

unless the Government offered the statement for the truth of

its content. The jury, using the statement, could infer that

Lama and his co-conspirators referred to drugs as clothes

only from the fact that Lama and Bryant referred to drugs as

clothes – that is, through the statement’s content. Cf. United

States v. Sesay, 313 F.3d 591, 599-600 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The

statement thus was hearsay, and its admission was erroneous.

See FED. R. EVID. 802.

The error, however, was harmless. Prosecution expert

Thomas Tyrone testified that Lama and his co-conspirators

used various code words, including clothing terms, to refer to

drugs. The defendants did not object to this testimony.

Accordingly, equivalent information would have been available to the jury. The error thus did not affect the trial’s

outcome. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a). See also United States

v. Graham, 317 F.3d 262, 267 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

D. Drug Quantity Findings

Henry, Harrison, and McCall appeal the District Court’s

findings at sentencing as to the drug quantity for which each

was responsible. Appellants argue that the District Court

made two errors in calculating the drug quantity for the

purposes of sentencing. First, the trial court assumed that

all of the heroin in the conspiracy was of at least 79% purity.

Second, the trial court multiplied by four the total quantity of

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16

heroin that Lama delivered to Henry over the course of the

conspiracy, on the theory that the heroin would have been

diluted and multiplied fourfold for street distribution. We

find that the District Court clearly erred in the second of

these steps in calculating the drug quantity.

At sentencing, the District Court noted that the record

showed that Lama had delivered at least 11.05 kilograms of

pure heroin to Henry over the course of the conspiracy. See

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for Sentencings

(‘‘Sentencing Findings’’), 5 JA in 01-3026, at 289. However,

the District Court found that Henry and Harrison were

responsible for more than triple that quantity of heroin, 39.4

kilograms. See id. at 291. The District Court arrived at this

quantity pursuant to the following method of calculation.

First, the District Court noted that a July 10, 1998, search

of Henry’s mother’s house had recovered heroin at 79%

purity. See id. at 289-90. Because this was the lowest purity

heroin recovered in the investigation of this drug conspiracy,

the District Court used this level of purity as ‘‘the standard

by which the remainder of the drugs should be judged.’’ See

id. n.13. The District Court thus assumed that all the heroin

that Lama delivered to Henry throughout the conspiracy was

79% pure heroin. The court then reasoned that, with the

exception of the 1.6 kilograms of heroin seized in the investigation that was never diluted, the heroin (the remaining 9.45

kilograms) must have been converted to street quality heroin

and distributed on the Washington D.C. streets. See id. at

290. The court concluded that, in being converted, the heroin

would have been ‘‘cut’’ twice – that is, diluted and multiplied

fourfold. This conclusion was based on the testimony of the

Government’s drug expert, Metropolitan Police Department

Detective Tyrone Thomas, who testified that 20% purity was

the strength that could be sold on the street without undue

risk of harm to the heroin user. See id. at 291. Thus, 79%

pure heroin would have to be diluted and multiplied fourfold

to bring it down to the 20% strength suitable for sale to

customers on the street. See id.

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The court thus multiplied the 9.45 kilograms of heroin by

four, to get 37.8 kilograms, and then to that quantity added

the 1.6 kilograms that were never diluted, to arrive at a total

of 39.4 kilograms of heroin for which Henry and Harrison

were each responsible. See id. Under § 2D1.1(c)(1) of the

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies to 30 kilograms or

more of heroin, this quantity resulted in a base offense level

of 38 for Henry and Harrison. See id. The quantity for

which McCall was held responsible during the shorter period

of his participation in the conspiracy was calculated accordingly. See id. at 318.

In reviewing appellants’ challenge to the District Court’s

drug quantity findings, this court reviews the factual findings

supporting a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines for

clear error. United States v. Graham, 162 F.3d 1180, 1183

(D.C. Cir. 1998). Facts at sentencing must be proven by a

preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Jackson,

161 F.3d 24, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We reverse a factual finding

supporting a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines ‘‘only

if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that it is

mistaken.’’ United States v. Toms, 136 F.3d 176, 187 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Appellants contend that there was an error in each step of

the District Court’s calculation of the drug quantity. First,

appellants dispute the District Court’s assumption that all of

the heroin that Lama delivered to Henry was of the uniformly

high quality of 79% purity as the heroin recovered in the July

10, 1998 search of Henry’s mother’s house. Appellants point

out that apart from that heroin, nobody ever testified about

the purity level of the heroin that Lama supplied. Appellants

contend that the evidence compels a finding that the remainder of the deliveries of heroin were of lower quality. See

Appellants’ Br. in 01-3026, at 65-70.

For example, appellants point out that Lama testified that

he agreed to deliver heroin to Henry for $80,000/kg. But

upon Lama’s April 1997 shipment of heroin, Henry complained of the inferior quality of the shipment. Lama then

reduced his price to Henry from $80,000/kg to approximately

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$47,000/kg. Appellants infer that the price reduction must

have been because the heroin was of lower quality. A bigger

price reduction was given for Lama’s March 9, 1998 delivery

of heroin. Henry paid between $25,000/kg to $32,000/kg and

expressed concern to Lama over the quality. See Appellants’

Br. in 01-3026, at 66-68. The Government disputes that

Henry paid such a low price, pointing to Lama’s testimony

that this payment was merely an installment of the total

price. See Appellee’s Br. in 01-3026, at 110 n.35. Around

March 27, 1998, Henry again complained in intercepted phone

calls about the shipment’s purity. See Appellants’ Br. in

01-3026, at 69-70.

We do not think that appellants have offered any plausible

evidence that the purity levels of heroin during the course of

the conspiracy were lower than 79%. Henry’s recorded

complaints about the quality of the deliveries and Lama’s

price reductions do not establish that the quality of any

shipment was lower than 79%, merely that Henry was unhappy with the purity level of the shipments. We do not even

know whether Henry considered 79% good or poor quality.

Appellants present no record evidence of the price per kilogram of 79% pure heroin, from which we could infer the

quality of the reduced-price shipments. Henry may have

complained and Lama may have reduced the price, simply

because the heroin was not of the highest quality – that is,

more than 79%.

Second, appellants argue that, even assuming that all of the

heroin was 79% pure, it was not routinely diluted fourfold to

20% for street sale. Appellants cite evidence presented at

trial that the heroin packaged for street distribution that was

actually seized consisted of 746 baggies of 27-29% pure heroin. Since these seized baggies were the only evidence of the

purity level of the heroin distributed on the street, appellants

contend that the heroin for street sale was not multiplied

fourfold, but rather by a factor of approximately 2.8. See id.

at 70-71; Reply Br. in 01-3026, at 25-26.

We find this second argument convincing. The only evidence of heroin packaged and ready for street distribution

USCA Case #01-3096 Document #750921 Filed: 05/23/2003 Page 18 of 25
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actually seized in the investigation was 27-29% pure, not 20%

pure. Assuming heroin of 79% purity, this indicates that the

heroin was not diluted fourfold, but by a factor substantially

smaller than four. In the face of this argument, the Government in its brief cites Detective Thomas’ testimony at trial

that 28% pure heroin ‘‘is much closer to what drug dealers

are capable of injecting,’’ Tr., 1 JA in 01-3026, at 445, and that

dealers purchase drugs on the advice of a ‘‘tester TTT an oldtime heroin user who has the body tolerance to accept high

doses of heroin,’’ Tr., 1 JA in 01-3037, at 91. The Government argues that the sentencing court could have concluded

that the baggies of 27-29% heroin seized were ‘‘testers’’ that

did not represent the purity of the heroin that was routinely

distributed at the street level. See Appellee’s Br. in 01-3026,

at 117-18. This argument, however, was not presented to the

District Court and cannot be considered for the first time on

appeal. See United States v. Hylton, 294 F.3d 130, 135 (D.C.

Cir. 2002). In any event, it seems very unlikely that the 746

baggies of 27-29% pure heroin found were all testers for other

dealers rather than for street sale, and no Government witness even suggested this.

The Government also cites a recorded conversation between McCall and Harrison, in which McCall said ‘‘I usually

get four step done not three,’’ to argue that we could infer

that the drugs were multiplied fourfold. See Appellee’s Br. in

01-3026, at 112 (citing 2 JA in 01-3026, at 195). However, the

sentencing court did not rely upon this recorded conversation

in finding that the heroin was multiplied fourfold. Thus, we

do not consider it.

We find that, in light of the 27-29% purity of the baggies

packaged for street distribution that were actually seized in

this case, the District Court had little basis for assuming that

the heroin was diluted to 20% purity and multiplying the

quantity by four. The District Court committed clear error in

so doing. This fourfold multiplication of the drug quantity

improperly increased Henry’s, Harrison’s, and McCall’s base

offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. We vacate appellants’

sentences and remand to the District Court for a new calculation of the drug quantity.

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E. Scope of McCall’s Agreement

Appellant McCall challenges the District Court’s finding at

sentencing that he was responsible, with Henry, Harrison,

and Stover, for the full scope of the conspiracy rather than

just for the drugs that he personally purchased from Harrison. We find that two of the four factors on which the

District Court relied in concluding that McCall was responsible for the full scope of the conspiracy were erroneous, and

we remand to the District Court for a new finding as to the

scope of McCall’s conspiratorial agreement.

McCall’s participation in the conspiracy ran from April 17

to July 10, 1998. At sentencing, the Government argued that

McCall was equally responsible with Henry, Harrison, and

Stover for all of the heroin that Lama sold to Henry during

the period of McCall’s membership. See Gov’t’s Proposed

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 5 JA in 01-3026, at

238-39. McCall argued that the scope of his agreement

during the 12 weeks of his participation was limited to an

agreement to buy heroin from Harrison that he could cut,

package, and sell on the street, and that he was not involved

in the Lama-Henry or Henry-Harrison transactions. See

Defendant McCall’s Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, 5 JA

in 01-3026, at 145-48.

The District Court rejected the contention that the scope of

McCall’s participation was limited merely to buying drugs

from Harrison and distributing them on the street. The

court found that McCall

operated at a level in this conspiracy which made the

distribution of the heroin delivered to Henry by

Lama in 1998 reasonably foreseeable to him and

within the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activityTTTT McCall was in fact a full participant in this

conspiracy and is thus responsible for its entire

scope during his membership.

Sentencing Findings, 5 JA in 01-3026, at 316. The court

based this finding on four facts, which ‘‘all combine to persuade the Court that the defendant’s agreement was not so

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limited as he now asserts’’: (1) McCall ‘‘accompanied Harrison to Baltimore for Harrison’s early discussions with Dytania Cannady concerning Mr. Harrison’s Baltimore efforts

including the initial discussions with Troy Schumpert’’; (2)

The very high ‘‘purity, packaging, and amount of some of the

drugs recovered in the search of McCall’s premises’’ indicated

that ‘‘McCall was not only purchasing drugs from Harrison

and Stover that were already cut and packaged but was also

being supplied with uncut drugs which McCall would then cut

and package’’; (3) McCall ‘‘had direct knowledge that Harrison distributed heroin to others’’; and (4) McCall had tried to

contact Troy Schumpert to collect money owed to Harrison.

Id. at 316-17. The District Court’s conclusion that McCall

was a full member of the conspiracy affected his sentence by

increasing McCall’s base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2D1.1.

In the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity, the

Sentencing Guidelines provide that, for the purpose of determining the base offense level, the court must take into

account ‘‘all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of

others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.’’ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). See also United States v.

Booze, 108 F.3d 378, 381 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that the

district court must ‘‘ascertain the quantity of drugs that could

be attributed to appellant by determining whether the acts at

issue were within the scope of the conspiracy in which appellant had agreed to participate, and whether the acts were

foreseeable to him’’). The scope of a defendant’s conspiracy

‘‘is not necessarily the same as the scope of the entire

conspiracy, and hence relevant conduct is not necessarily the

same for every participant.’’ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment.

(n.2). ‘‘A jury verdict convicting the defendants of participation in a single conspiracy does not obviate the need for

TTT individualized findings [as to the scope of a defendant’s

conspirational agreement] by the sentencing court.’’ United

States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The

District Court ‘‘must make ‘individualized findings TTT linking

each appellant’s scope of participation in the conspiracy with

the quantum of drugs attributed to [him].’ ’’ Id. (quoting

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22

United States v. Edmond, 52 F.3d 1080, 1105 (D.C. Cir.

1995)).

McCall contends that he should have been held responsible

only for the drugs that he personally purchased from Harrison, because he was not involved in the Lama-Henry or

Henry-Harrison sales; had never met or spoken with Stover;

and had no dealings with any Baltimore conspirators, other

than meeting with Cannady a few times and attempting to

collect a drug debt from Schumpert on Harrison’s behalf.

McCall contends that the District Court erred with respect to

two of the four factors on which the court based its finding

that McCall was responsible for the entire scope of the

conspiracy rather than simply a limited agreement with Harrison. See Appellants’ Br. in 01-3026, at 84-90.

First, McCall claims, and the Government concedes, that

the District Court’s finding that McCall accompanied Harrison to Baltimore for early discussions with Cannady or

Schumpert was not directly supported by the evidence at trial

and was therefore erroneous. See id. at 85-86; Appellee’s Br.

in 01-3026, at 132-33.

Second, McCall contends that the court’s finding that

McCall had direct knowledge that Harrison distributed heroin

to others was erroneous, because there was no evidence that

McCall knew, met, or spoke with any of Harrison’s other

customers, with the exception of Cannady. The intercepted

phone conversations in which McCall participated did not

involve any conspirator other than Harrison. See Appellants’

Br. in 01-3026, at 86. According to McCall, he ‘‘was in the

dark about everyone except his source, Charles Harrison.’’

Reply Br. in 01-3026, at 31.

The Government cites three-way telephone calls between

Stover, Harrison, and McCall, see Appellee’s Br. in 01-3026,

at 138-39, but McCall points out – without refutation from the

Government – that Stover’s presence on the line was unknown to McCall, see Reply Br. in 01-3026, at 32. Additionally, the Government cites telephone ‘‘conversations, in which

the major participants in the conspiracy, including McCall,

consulted about TTT the various searches,’’ Appellee’s Br. in

01-3026, at 140, but McCall points out that he informed only

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Harrison of the search of his own apartment and said nothing

about any searches of other premises, see Reply Br. in 01-

3026, at 33. The Government is unable to point to any

concrete evidence that McCall had ‘‘direct knowledge’’ of

Harrison’s distribution of heroin to others. We conclude that

the District Court’s finding that McCall had such direct

knowledge cannot stand on the record before us.

Finally, McCall argues that the remaining two factual

findings on which the District Court relied – that McCall

bought a high quantity of high purity heroin with the intention of cutting and packaging it for distribution, and that he

attempted to collect from Schumpert on a drug debt owed to

Harrison – are insufficient to support the District Court’s

conclusion that McCall’s agreement to purchase heroin from

Harrison encompassed the full scope of the conspiracy. See

id.

The District Court relied on four factors to conclude that

McCall was responsible for the full scope of the conspiracy.

The Government concedes that the first of these factors –

that McCall accompanied Harrison to Baltimore for early

discussions with Cannady or Schumpert concerning Harrison’s Baltimore efforts – was erroneous. We find that the

third factor – that McCall had direct knowledge that Harrison

distributed heroin to others – is not supported by the evidence or any finding of the District Court. We are unsure

whether the two factors that remain – the high purity and

quantity of the heroin found in McCall’s premises, and

McCall’s attempt to collect a drug debt from Schumpert – are

by themselves sufficient to support the conclusion that McCall

was responsible for the full scope of the conspiracy. We do

not know what the District Court would conclude as to the

scope of McCall’s agreement, once erroneous factors are

removed from consideration. We therefore remand to the

District Court for a new finding not inconsistent with this

opinion as to the scope of McCall’s agreement.

F. McCall’s Role in the Conspiracy

Next, McCall challenges the two-point managerial enhancement he received under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Section 3B1.1

provides:

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§ 3B1.1. AGGRAVATING ROLE

Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4

levels.

(b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor

(but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal

activity involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive, increase by 3 levels.

(c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other

than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.

The District Court found McCall was a manager in the

conspiracy because he ‘‘participated with Harrison’s drugrelated activities beyond the point of merely purchasing

drugs,’’ specifically noting that he ‘‘operated in close proximity to Harrison, he handled drugs of a very high purity, and he

assisted Harrison with some of Harrison’s drug-related activities.’’ Sentencing Findings, 5 JA in 01-3026, at 319. In

assigning McCall a managerial role, the court invoked Application Note 9 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 which states:

The purity of the controlled substance, particularly

in the case of heroin, may be relevant in the sentencing process because it is probative of the defendant’s

role or position in the chain of distribution. Since

controlled substances are often diluted and combined

with other substances as they pass down the chain of

distribution, the fact that a defendant is in possession of unusually pure narcotics may indicate a

prominent role in the criminal enterprise and proximity to the source of the drugs. As large quantities

are normally associated with high purities, this factor is particularly relevant where smaller quantities

are involved.

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Under this provision, the District Court properly considered

the 86% purity level of the 12.1 grams of heroin seized (along

with 9.5 grams of a cutting agent) from McCall’s apartment

as probative of his managerial role in Harrison’s distribution

ring. McCall may properly be viewed as a manager who

received drugs from Harrison, prepared them (in some cases

by cutting them to a salable level) for distribution on the

street through his network of ‘‘runners’’ and afterward collected the proceeds from the runners. See United States v.

Strothers, 77 F.3d 1389, 1393-94 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (affirming

upward supervisory adjustment for two conspirators who

‘‘directed and profited from numerous drug sales carried out

by subordinate ‘runners’ ’’); cf. Graham 162 F.3d at 1184

(reversing § 3B1.1(b) enhancement where record was ‘‘devoid

of any evidence that [defendant] received extra compensation

for serving as a manager, disciplined any lower ranking

member of the conspiracy, altered the conspiracy’s policies or

procedures in any respect, provided guidance to senior managers or subordinates, issued any orders on behalf of the

conspiracy, or otherwise held himself out as a link in the

chain of command’’). Accordingly, we find no error in the

two point enhancement the court assigned McCall under

U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court on

all but two of its judgments. First, because we find that the

District Court erred in calculating the drug quantity, we

vacate the sentences of Henry, Harrison, and McCall, and

remand for a new calculation of the drug quantity. Second,

because two of four factors supporting the District Court’s

finding on the scope of McCall’s conspiratorial agreement

were erroneous, we remand to the District Court for a new

finding on the scope in the absence of those erroneous

factors. We have considered all of appellants’ other claims,

including those not discussed in this opinion, and find them to

be without merit.

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