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Parties Involved:
William Carter
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 27, 1995 Decided November 28, 1995

No. 92-3286

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE 

v.

WILLIAM CARTER,

APPELLANT 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(91cr00482-01)

Mary M. Petras argued the cause for appellant. Robert E. Morin was on the briefs.

Leslie A. Blackmon, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on

the brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Elizabeth Trosman, and

Margaret A. Flaherty, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, WALD and RANDOLPH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: On August 12, 1991, three Metropolitan Police officers stopped

a car they believed to be stolen. Carter bolted from the car. Two officers pursued him on foot. The

third stayed with two suspects still in the car. At Carter's trial, all three officers testified that, during

the chase, they saw Carter throw something fromthe bridge that runs over the rail yard behind Union

Station. After apprehending Carter, the officers searched the rail yard and found three plastic bags

containing approximately 56 grams of cocaine base.

Carter was charged with possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine

base. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). At trial, Carter and his counsel tried to establish

that there were four men in the car that daynot three, as the police testifiedand that while both

Carter and the fourth man ran, the fourth manand not Carterthrew the drugs from the bridge.

Carter's counsel argued that the "Keystone Kops" police had concocted the story about Carter to hide

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1Carter attempted to argue his appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(C). 

But as Rule 16(a)(2) states, the Jencks Actand not Rule 16governs the discoverability of

"statements made by government witnesses." FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2); United States v.

Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1414 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988). Thus, the

government's tardiness in turning over the tape could not have been a Rule 16 violation, and the

Rule 16 cases upon which Carter relies are inapposite. 

the fact that they had let the real culpritthe fourth manescape.

That theory suffered a serious blow when the government introduced, as part of its rebuttal

case, a tape recording of police radio transmissions made in the minutes surrounding Carter's arrest.

On the taperecorded in the heat of the chase, before the police would have had time to fabricate

any storythe officers indicate that there were three people in the car ("White vehicle is occupied

three times."); that only one of them ran ("He's on foot, black shorts, white T-shirt."); and that the

one who ran threw something from the bridge ("He is throwing something over the bridge."). In its

closing argument, the government stressed the importance of the tape and invited the jury to listen

to it again. After an hour of deliberations, the jury accepted that invitation. Less than a half hour

later, it returned its verdict of guilty.

Carter appeals on the ground that the government impermissibly delayed giving him the tape

until the morning of the second day of trial. The government acknowledges that the Jencks Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3500, required it to produce at least a portion of the tape before Carter'strial began.1 Once

a government witness has testified on direct examinationat trial or at a suppression hearingthe

government, on motion of the defendant, must produce any statement in its possession made by the

witness and relating to the subject matter of the witness's testimony. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b); FED. R.

CRIM. P. 12(i). The Jencks Act defines "statement" to include a contemporaneous, verbatim

recording of the witness's oralstatements. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(2). Officer Elisa Brown testified at

a suppression hearing the day before Carter's trial. The government, therefore, was obliged, at that

time, to provide the defense with at least the portions of the tape containing her radio transmissions.

The government had a duty to provide the rest of the tape at trial when the officerstestified on direct

examination. Yet despite having assured both the defense and the court that it would produce all

Jencks Act material before trial, the government failed to supply any portion of the tape until the

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second day of the trial, after the officers had left the stand.

For reasons we will explain in a moment, we believe the question here is whether the trial

judge committed error in admitting the tape in spite of these Jencks Act violationsor, to put the

matter differently, whether the trial judge erred in not excluding the tape as a sanction for the

violations.

The Jencks Act, passed in the wake of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957),

enhances the defense's ability to impeach or discredit prosecution witnesses through

cross-examination. See Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961). Noncompliance with

the Jencks Act may impede the defense in this respect. The potential prejudice is that, in the eyes of

the jury, the government's witnesses might appear more credible than they otherwise would have

appeared had the defense impeached themwith their priorstatements. Palermo v. United States, 360

U.S. 343, 350 (1959). In this light it is easy to see why the Jencks Act "does not contemplate

automatic sanctions even when the material has been rendered completely unavailable through loss

or destruction." United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting

United States v. Rippy, 606 F.2d 1150, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). If the unproduced statement could

not have assisted the defense in cross-examining the witness, there is no reason for the trial court to

order a mistrial or for an appellate court to reverse a conviction. When, for instance, the missing

Jencks material duplicates what the defense already has in its possession, "it would deny reason to

entertain the belief that defendant could have been prejudiced by not having the opportunity to

inspect" that material. Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 371 (1959). So too when the

missing Jencks material duplicates the witness's testimony. United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924

F.2d at 310.

Lam Kwong-Wah fits this case like a glove. The tape recording, far from impeaching the

officers, supported them. On the stand, the officers said there were three people in the car, that only

one of them ran, and that the one who ran threw something from the bridge. On the tape, the officers

said there were three people in the car, that only one of them ran, and that the one who ran threw

something from the bridge.

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Carter thus cannot, and does not, claim that the government's delay in producing the tape

recording prejudiced his efforts to discredit the officers through cross-examination. The harm he

identifies is of a different sort. By the time the government produced the tape, Carter's counsel

already had informed the jurythrough his opening argumentof his fourth-man theory. If the

government had complied with the Jencks Act, Carter says, he would have known that the

government had a tape that put the lie to this theory. Armed with that knowledge, he may well have

opened with a different defense theory. (This assumes that compliance with the Jencks Act at the

pre-trial suppression hearing would have alerted Carter to the fact that the tape did not support his

fourth-man theory.) We have no idea what that defense might have been; at oral argument, Carter's

counsel was unable to say. Carter maintains that for these reasons the trial court erred in not

excluding the tape recording.

We see things differently. Carter, it seems to us, wants to have his cake and eat it too. If the

tape had never been received in evidence, Carter would have had no cause for complaint, as we have

already mentioned. Yet Carter himself bears the responsibility for the tape's admission. The

government produced itshortlybefore completing its case-in-chief. The prosecutor promised defense

counsel that she would not use the tape in the government's case-in-chief. Presumably in view of this

self-imposed restriction, Carter did not then ask for any sanctions. Nor did Carter ask for time to

study the tape, despite the provision in the Jencks Act authorizing district courtsto grant a recessfor

this purpose. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c). Exactly when Carter's counsel learned of the tape's contents the

record does not reveal.

After the government rested, Carter called Levi Horton, one of his companions in the car.

Horton testified that Carter and another individualthe fourth manran from the car when the

police arrived. After a break for lunch, Carter took the stand and testified contrary to what the tape

revealedthat there was a fourth man and that he and this individual left the car running.

It wasin view ofthis defense testimony, byHorton and Carter, that the tape recording became

properly admissible in the government's rebuttal case. Matters might have been very different if

Carter had refrained from putting on that evidence. Then the tape recording would not have rebutted

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the defense case. Rebuttal evidence is admitted for the purpose of explaining or refuting evidence

offered by the other side. See, e.g., United States v. Tejada, 956 F.2d 1256, 1266 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 124 (1992). To allow a defendant to present evidence supporting a version of

events that, on appeal, the defendant all but admits is false, and at the same time to disable the

government from revealing the truth to the jury, is a sanction thatif ever warrantedcould be

imposed only in the face of most egregious Jencks Act violations. This is plainly not the situation

here. Carter's counsel told the court that he was not even claiming bad faith on the part of the

government. Even if the tape recording were otherwise inadmissible because of the delay in its

production, Carter opened the door when he presented Horton and testified on his own behalf in

contradiction to what the tape revealed. See United States v. Garcia, 900 F.2d 571, 575 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 862 (1990).

Affirmed.

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