Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00336/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00336-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Brand
Defendant
City of Fowler
Defendant
David Elias
Defendant
Darrell Jamgochian
Defendant
Derek Thomason
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEREK THOMASON,

 Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF FOWLER, FOWLER CITY 

MANAGER DAVID ELIAS, an individual, 

POLICE CHIEF MICHAEL BRAND, an 

individual, and TEN UNKNOWN NAMED 

EMPLOYEES OF THE CITY OF FOWLER,

 Defendants.

Case No.: 1:13-CV-00336-AWI-BAM

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

TO COMPEL 

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is Plaintiff Derek Thomason’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Compel Production of 

Documents and Deposition Answers. (Docs. 62, 67.) The Parties filed joint discovery statements on 

August 22, 2014. (Doc. 67). The Motion was heard on August 29, 2014, at 9:00 AM, before the United 

States Magistrate Judge Barbara A. McAuliffe. Counsel Kaveh Navab personally appeared on behalf of 

Plaintiff Derek Thomason (“Plaintiff”). Counsel Jenell VanBindsbergen personally appeared on behalf 

of the Defendants. Having considered the joint statement of the parties, argument presented at the 

hearing, as well as the Court’s file, the motion is DENIED. 

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

This action for damages arises from the termination of Plaintiff Derek Thomason from his 

employment with Defendant City of Fowler (“City”) by individual defendants City Manager David Elias 

(“Elias”) and Police Chief Michael Brand (“Brand,” collectively “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that he 

was a whistleblower when he notified the Fowler City Council that there was a large backlog of un-filed 

criminal cases at the Fowler Police Department (“FPD”) and that FPD would not act to prosecute those 

responsible. He alleges that he was wrongfully terminated as a result of these actions. In his complaint, 

Plaintiff alleges claims for violation of his free speech rights under the First Amendment in violation of 

42 U.S.C. § 1983, state law claims for violation of various California Labor Code statutes and

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy under 

California common law. (Doc. 1).

B. Relevant Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed this action on March 8, 2013. On November 4, 2013, the parties participated in an 

Initial Scheduling Conference. (Doc. 39). The Court reviewed the parties’ joint recommendations, and 

on November 13, 2013, entered a Scheduling Order requiring all non-expert discovery, including 

motions to compel, be completed by July 10, 2014. (Doc. 42 at 3). The Scheduling Order stated that all 

discovery, including motions, were to be completed by the cut-off date. (Doc. 42 (“Compliance with 

these discovery cutoffs requires motions to compel be filed and heard sufficiently in advance of the 

cutoff so that the Court may grant effective relief within the allotted discovery time.”)) The parties 

stipulated on June 10, 2014 to a continuance of the non-dispositive and dispositive motion deadlines. 

(Doc. 58). The stipulation was granted in part and denied in part, and the Court extended the nondispositive motion filing deadline to July 23, 2014. (Doc. 59). In that order, the Court reminded the 

parties that their “failure to have a discovery dispute heard sufficiently in advance of the discovery 

cutoff may result in denial of the motion as untimely.” (Doc. 59). On July 2, 2014, the parties filed 

another stipulation requesting a five-day extension of the non-expert discovery deadline to July 17, 2014 

for the limited purpose of completing additional fact and expert witness depositions. (Docs. 60, 61). 

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The following day, the Court granted the parties request for an extension. On July 23, 2014, Plaintiff’s 

Motion to Compel followed. 

C. Background of the Parties’ Discovery Efforts

Since discovery opened, Plaintiff has propounded four sets of requests for production of 

documents (RFP), totaling over 270 specific document requests. Shortly after the scheduling order 

issued, Plaintiff first propounded RFP’s on Defendants Elias, Brand, and Fowler beginning on 

November 22, 2013. Declaration of Kunti Dudakia, “Dudakia Decl.”, at ¶¶ 2-7. Dudakia Decl. at ¶ 2. 

Defendants sent responses on January 27, 2014. Dudakia Decl., at ¶¶ 6-7. Defendant Fowler sent a

second supplemental response on April 25, 2014. Plaintiff sent a second set of RFP’s on February 24, 

2014, and Defendants responded on April 9, 2014. Dudakia Decl., at ¶ 7. Plaintiff then sent a third set of 

RFP’s to Defendant Fowler on May 30, 2014 who responded on June 30, 2014. Kirby F. Cañon, “Cañon 

Decl.”, at ¶ 13. Most recently, on June 10, 2014, Plaintiff sent RFP’s, Set Three to Defendants Brand 

and Elias and Set Four to Defendant Fowler and received responses on July 10, 2014. Cañon Decl., at ¶ 

14

Beginning on June 24, 2014, Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter regarding what he believed 

were deficient responses to Plaintiff’s first set of RFP’s propounded on November 22, 2013. Plaintiff’s 

primary concern was that Defendants refused to produce several categories of documents based on a 

variety of privilege objections. Plaintiff argued in his meet and confer letter that Defendants responses 

were inadequate, not subject to any privileges, and should have been accompanied by a privilege log. 

Navab Decl., at ¶ 5. 

On July 7, 2014, Defendants responded to Plaintiff’s meet and confer letter to Plaintiff 

reasserting its privilege objections and on July 9, 2014, Plaintiff’s counsel contacted Defendants’

counsel via phone to discuss Defendants continued unwillingness to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery

requests and failure to provide an adequate privilege log. Navab Decl., at ¶ 5. During that meet and 

confer, Defendants agreed to produce a limited privilege log. 

On July 21, 2014, counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants met and conferred again, for two hours,

to resolve all outstanding issues by telephone. Cañon Decl., at ¶ 17. As a result of these meet and confer 

efforts, the parties reached an agreement as to several discovery requests. Id. However, the parties were 

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unable to reach a mutually agreeable resolution on other specific requests for production and issues. Id. 

As a result of the unsuccessful attempts to meet and confer on the outstanding discovery issues, Plaintiff

filed the instant motion to compel on July 23, 2014—the non-dispositive discovery deadline—and set a 

hearing for August 29, 2014. (Doc. 30). The Court issued a minute order reminding the parties to 

comply with Local Rule 251 which requires the moving party to file a joint statement addressing the 

parties’ discovery dispute. (Doc. 63). Defendant provided Plaintiff their response to the joint statement 

on August 14, 2014 and the parties filed their joint statement on August 22, 2014. (Doc. 67). 

D. Plaintiff’s Motion for Requests for Production and Deposition Answers 

Out of 272 individual RPD’s, the majority of the requests remain in dispute. Plaintiff states that 

Defendants provided sufficient responses to only twenty-six RFP’s, and that 246 requests are disputed. 

Instead of reproducing all 246 RFP’s in dispute, Plaintiff identifies several “categories” of contested 

discovery, which include documents related to Defendants’ personnel files, internal investigation 

documents, prior complaints, policy manuals, disciplinary issues, communications between Defendants, 

and documents Defendants intend to rely on for a motion for summary judgment, as well as challenges 

related to the deposition of former Chief of Police Darrell Jamgochian. Plaintiff argues that despite the 

basic nature of these requests, Defendants failed to adequately produce documents or provide an 

appropriate privilege log. Navab Decl., at ¶ 2; Cañon Decl., at ¶¶ 6, 15. 

Plaintiff’s Motion seeks an order compelling Defendants the City of Fowler, Fowler City 

Manager David Elias, and Police Chief Michael Brand to: (1) adequately respond to discovery; (2) 

provide an adequate privilege log and produce any allegedly privileged documents in camera for the 

Court’s review; (3) produce the underlying documents supporting Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment or enter an order barring Defendants from using these “privileged” documents to defeat 

liability; and (4) produce former Chief of Police Darrell Jamgochian for 1-2 hours of future deposition 

testimony at Defendants’ expense. 

In addition to objecting to the nature of Plaintiff’s discovery requests, Defendants object to the 

Motion to Compel as untimely. According to Defendants, Plaintiff waited over five months to begin the 

meet and confer process and only tried to meet and confer by telephone on the day before the nondispositive motion cutoff. 

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DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard for Modifying the Scheduling Order 

Pursuant to the Court’s amended scheduling order, the discovery deadline in this action expired 

on July 17, 2014. Plaintiff’s motion to compel seeks additional discovery after fact discovery has 

closed. Therefore, any relief ordered by this Court would require a modification of the scheduling order 

to be modified. Districts courts must enter scheduling orders in actions to “limit the time to join other 

parties, amend the pleadings, complete discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3). Once 

entered by the court, a scheduling order “controls the course of the action unless the court modifies it.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d). Scheduling orders are intended to alleviate case management problems. Johnson v. 

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992). As such, a scheduling order is “the heart 

of case management.” Koplove v. Ford Motor Co., 795 F.2d 15, 18 (3rd Cir.1986).

Rule 16 “recognizes the inherent power of the district court to enforce its pretrial orders through 

sanctions, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f), and the discretion of the district judge to apply an appropriate level of 

supervision as dictated by the issues raised by each individual case.” In re Arizona, 528 F.3d 652, 657 

(9th Cir. 2009) (citing e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 918 (2009). A “scheduling 

conference order is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded 

without peril.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610.

The Ninth Circuit has clarified why the Rule 16 deadlines should be taken seriously:

In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and state systems 

routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and 

resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken 

seriously by the parties, and the best way to encourage that is to enforce the deadlines. 

Parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with 

scheduling and other orders, and that failure to do so may properly support severe 

sanctions and exclusions of evidence.

Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005); see also, Singh v. Arrow 

Truck Sales, Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47917, 2006 WL 1867540, at *2 (E.D. Cal., July 5, 2006) 

(“Rules are rules - and the parties must play by them. In the final analysis, the judicial process depends 

heavily on the judge’s credibility. To ensure such credibility, a district judge must often be firm in 

managing crowded dockets and demanding adherence to announced deadlines. If he or she sets a 

reasonable due date, parties should not be allowed casually to flout it or painlessly to escape the 

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foreseeable consequences of noncompliance”), citing Legault v. Zambarano, 105 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st 

Cir. 1997).

The Ninth Circuit is protective of this particular rule, as it deems Rule 16 to be an essential tool 

in controlling heavy trial court dockets by recognizing the importance of a “district court’s ability to 

control its docket by enforcing a discovery termination date, even in the face of requested supplemental 

discovery that might have revealed highly probative evidence, when the [party’s] prior discovery efforts 

were not diligent.” Cornwell v. Electra Central Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006). "The 

use of orders establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is commonplace, and has impacts generally 

helpful to the orderly progress of litigation, so that the enforcement of such an order should come as a 

surprise to no one.” Id. As the Ninth Circuit has emphasized, “[d]istrict courts have wide latitude in 

controlling discovery, and [their] rulings will not be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of 

discretion.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Plaintiff’s Motion is Not Timely Pursuant to the Scheduling Order

Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure place no time limit on the outside date for the 

filing of a motion to compel discovery, motions to compel filed after the close of discovery generally are 

deemed untimely. See, e.g., Watts v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153136, 2012 WL 

5289314 (E.D. Cal., 2012); Clinton v. California Dept. of Corporations, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42205, 

2009 WL 1308984 (E.D. Cal., 2009). “Greater uncertainty occurs where the motion is made very close

to the discovery cut-off date.” In re Sulfuric Acid, 231 F.R.D. 331, 333 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Generally, “the 

matter is left to the broad discretion possessed by the district courts to control discovery.” Id.

Pursuant to the Court’s initial scheduling order, later modified by the parties’ stipulated request 

for continuance of the fact and expert discovery deadlines, fact discovery closed in this case on July 17, 

2014. (Doc. 42, 61). The initial scheduling order stated that all non-expert discovery, including motions 

to compel, shall be completed no later than July 10, 2014. (Doc. 42 at 3). The parties later requested a 

five-day extension of the fact discovery cut-off for the limited purpose of conducting three depositions. 

(Doc. 60). On July 3, 2014, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation and extended the non-expert 

discovery deadline to July 17, 2014. (Doc. 61). Thus, all discovery was due on or before July 17, 2014. 

(Doc. 61). 

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The parties also requested on June 10, 2014 an extension of the non-dispositive discovery 

deadline. The Court granted the parties’ request in part and continued the non-dispositive motion 

deadline to July 23, 2014. In granting the stipulation, the Court warned the parties that compliance with 

the non-dispositive motion filing deadline requires motions to “be filed and heard sufficiently in 

advance of the cutoff so that the Court may grant effective relief within the allotted time period.” (Doc. 

59). The Court further cautioned that “a parties’ failure to have a dispute heard sufficiently in advance 

of the discovery cutoff may result in denial of the motion as untimely.” (Doc. 59).

The Court finds Plaintiff’s motion is untimely. Plaintiff filed his motion to compel on July 23, 

2014, the last day of the non-dispositive motion deadline and noticed the hearing for August 29, 2014—

six weeks after the close of discovery. Even assuming that Plaintiff operated under a belief that his 

motion to compel was timely filed on the day of the non-dispositive deadline, Plaintiff noticed his 

hearing for thirty-seven days after the non-dispositive deadline, and well after discovery had closed. By 

noticing the hearing on the Motion to Compel after the close of fact discovery and after the last day of 

the non-dispositive motion deadline, the Court cannot provide any effective relief at this stage without 

modifying the scheduling order.

Further, this discovery dispute is massive. The parties have submitted over 815 pages of exhibits 

and supporting declarations and over 113 pages of points and authorities seeking to compel over 200 

Requests For Production. The fact discovery phase of this case is long over and the dispositive motion 

deadline expired on July 30, 2014. Indeed, Defendants filed its motion for summary judgment on July 

30, 2014 and Plaintiff filed his opposition on August 29, 2014. (Docs. 64, 70). The Court would be 

required to extend all pre-trial and trial deadlines to determine this motion and require production of 

such massive amounts of discovery. The Court is not inclined to further extend discovery deadlines, 

without good cause. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s Motion is not timely.

C. Unnecessary Delay in Seeking Adequate Discovery 

Good cause does not exist to modify the scheduling order in this case. Modification of a 

scheduling order requires a showing of good cause, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), and good cause requires a 

showing of due diligence, Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992).

Plaintiff’s first set of RFP’s were sent to Defendants shortly after discovery opened in this case 

on November 22, 2013. Between February 24, 2014 and June 10, 2014, Plaintiff propounded three 

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additional sets of RFP’s. While Plaintiff maintains throughout his Motion that Defendants repeatedly 

objected to these Requests for Production and lodged multiple boilerplate privilege objections without 

producing a privilege log, plaintiff did not bring these responses to the Court’s attention.1 Despite the 

inadequate discovery responses, Plaintiff failed to notify the Court about the parties’ discovery disputes 

or seek relief until the instant motion was filed July 23, 2014. Thus, five months passed before Plaintiff 

sought relief from the Court through either a formal motion or an informal discovery conference. 

Moreover, the Court finds that efforts at meet and confer were not diligent. While discovery 

requests were propounded as early as November, some were served as late as June 10, 2014. This 

selected timing meant that the discovery would be responded to on the last day of the discovery cut off. 

Much of the dispute centers upon these later served RPD. Further, from the Court’s review of the 

record, the serious meet and confer attempts did not begin until late June 2014. With a discovery cut off 

of July 10, and nondispositive motion cut off of July 23, 2104 looming, this meet and confer timing fails

to satisfy diligence to support good cause to modify the scheduling order.

Certainly, Plaintiff is entitled to delay discovery as a part of a broader litigation strategy, but that 

strategy is not without risk. Discovery disputes are a common component of any civil matter, and they 

should be anticipated. Discovery disputes are not grounds which render a litigant “unable to comply 

with the scheduling order’s deadlines due to matters that could not have reasonably been foreseen at the 

time of the issuance of the scheduling order.” Kuschner v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 256 F.R.D. 684, 687 

(E.D. Cal. 2009). 

Plaintiff’s belated attempt to conduct or compel discovery in this case does not constitute good 

cause to modify the scheduling order. A district court has an ongoing obligation to construe and 

administer the federal rules “to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 

and proceeding” (see Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). Numerous courts within the Ninth Circuit have declined to 

modify scheduling orders to accommodate late discovery because to do otherwise would jeopardize the 

orderly resolution of that case and disrupt the court’s overall management of its busy docket. See 

 

1

Plaintiff has brought discovery disputes to the Court’s attention previously. In an informal discovery conference, the Court 

granted Plaintiff’s request and set a date and time for the percipient witness deposition. (Doc. 46). Again on January 6, 2014, 

a month after the start of discovery, the Court held another informal discovery conference where Plaintiff argued that 

Defendants failed to adequately respond to discovery. The Court again granted relief in Plaintiff’s favor and ordered 

Defendants to produce documents responsive to Plaintiff’s discovery requests by no later than 4:00pm on January 8, 2014. 

(Doc. 49).

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Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Rehrig Pacific Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17507, 2013 WL 492103 *6 (E.D. 

Cal. 2013) (both parties’ motions to compel filed on the last day of discovery deemed untimely because 

it would result in the court ordering discovery after the cutoff date); Oliva v. National City Corp., 2010 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56362, 2010 WL 1949600 *4 (D. Nev. 2010) (motion to compel filed seven weeks 

after close of discovery and three weeks after deadline to file dispositive motions denied as untimely). 

Plaintiff has failed to argue or show good cause for modifying the scheduling order. Further, 

Plaintiff has not demonstrated diligence in attempting to comply with the Court’s discovery and motion 

deadlines as they relate to this motion. Whether the delay in discovery resulted from Defendants lack of 

cooperation or Plaintiff’s litigation strategy, the Court cannot provide relief at this late hour. Plaintiff 

has not shown that he engaged in diligent discovery in this matter and there is no good cause to amend 

the scheduling order. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to compel is DENIED 

in its entirety. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 9, 2014 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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