Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01633/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01633-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Laurel Ames
Plaintiff
Californians for Alternatives to Toxics
Plaintiff
Ann McCampbell
Plaintiff
Gary Schiff
Defendant
Jack Troyer
Defendant
USDA Forest Service
Defendant
Wilderness Watch
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

CALIFORNIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES

TO TOXICS, a non-profit

corporation; WILDERNESS WATCH,

a non-profit corporation,

LAUREL AMES, an individual and

ANN MCCAMPBELL, an individual,

NO. CIV. S-05-1633 FCD KJM

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACK TROYER, in his official

capacity; USDA FOREST SERVICE;

GARY SCHIFF, in his official

capacity,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

This matter is before the court on defendants’ motion to

dismiss the instant action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1) on the ground the case no longer presents a

“case or controversy” for purposes of Article III of the United

States Constitution. Specifically, defendants contend the action

is now moot since subsequent to the court’s grant of a

preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs, defendant United

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 1 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The following statement of facts is taken from

plaintiffs’ complaint, filed August 15, 2005. In its motion to

dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), defendants do not deny or controvert

any of the allegations in the complaint. Therefore, for purposes

of the motion, the allegations are taken as true. Trentacosta v.

Frontier Pacific Aircraft Industries, Inc., 813 F.2d 1553, 1559

(9th Cir. 1987).

2

States Forest Service (the “Forest Service”) withdrew the special

permit authorizing the California Department of Fish and Game

(“CDF&G”) to proceed with the project to restore the threatened

Paiute cutthroat trout to its historic range in Silver King Creek

in the Carson-Iceberg Wilderness in California. Because there is

no “reasonable likelihood” that the Forest Service’s

administrative decision will be reinstated, in that the project

has been cancelled “indefinitely,” defendants seek dismissal of

the action. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, arguing defendants’

“voluntary cessation” of their wrongful activity does not moot

the action. 

For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS

defendants’ motion.

BACKGROUND1

In July 2002, the Forest Service issued for public comment

an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) under NEPA to analyze the

effects of authorizing the CDF&G to poison with the aquatic

pesticide rotenone certain reaches of Silver King Creek and

Tamarack Lake in the Carson-Iceberg Wilderness in the Sierra

Nevada in California (the “Project”). (Compl., ¶ 24.) In March

2003, the Forest Service announced that it would not issue a

public decision on the proposed Project but, rather, would decide

internally whether to approve it. (Id.) The Forest Service

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 2 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

thereafter approved the Project without responding to public

comments on the EA and without preparing a decision document

under NEPA. (Id. at ¶ 25.) Conservationists filed suit to

challenge the agency’s approval of the Project. (Id.) 

Subsequently, the parties entered into a settlement agreement

whereby the Forest Service agreed to prepare an analysis under

NEPA and the conservationists agreed to dismiss the case. (Id.

at ¶ 26.) 

In February 2004, the Forest Service issued a draft EA

related to the Project and, following public comment on the draft

EA, issued a Decision Notice to approve it on April 30, 2004 and

a final EA on May 5, 2004. The Forest Service also issued a

Finding of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) under NEPA stating

that it would not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement

(“EIS”) for the Project. (Id. at ¶ 28.) In July 2005, CDF&G

secured the final Clean Water Act approval for the Project. (Id.

at ¶ 39.) CDF&G planned to start to implement the Project on

August 21, 2005.

On August 15, 2005, however, plaintiffs filed the instant

suit. 

On August 23, 2005 and September 1, 2005, respectively, the

court issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary

injunction enjoining the Project. The court found that

plaintiffs made a strong showing of irreparable harm if the

Project was not enjoined and that the balance of interests tipped

decisively in their favor. As such, to prevail on the motion,

plaintiffs were only required to raise “serious questions” as to

the merits of their NEPA claims (namely, that the Forest Service

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 3 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

violated NEPA in failing to prepare an EIS and/or that the

Service’s EA was inadequate), which the court found they did. 

(Am. Mem. & Order, filed Sept. 1, 2005.) 

Thereafter, on September 30, 2005, CDF&G asked the

California State Water Resources Control Board (“State Board”) to

rescind the Clean Water Act permit allowing it to commence

poisoning. (Defs.’ Ex. A. to Mot., filed Nov. 4, 2005.)

Specifically, CDF&G requested that the State Board “rescind the 

. . . permit issued to the [CDF&G] for the Paiute cutthroat trout

Recovery Project” because the “Department has canceled the

project indefinitely” and requested that the annual permit fees

be waived. (Id.) On October 20, 2005, the State Board rescinded

the permit. (Id. at Ex. B.) 

Also, on October 20, 2005, the Forest Service issued a

letter withdrawing the Decision Notice that had granted the

special use permit to CDF&G. (Id. at Ex. C.) That letter was

forwarded by the Forest Service to plaintiffs on October 25,

2005; it stated in pertinent part:

Regional Forester Jack Troyer approved the [Decision Notice]

for use of motorized equipment and piscicides in the 

Silver Creek, Carson-Iceberg Wilderness, on April 30,

2004.

The [Decision Notice] is hereby withdrawn. Approval

of all activities under the DN is revoked, including

the use of a power auger and the application of 

piscicides in Silver King Creek.

(Id.)

Before and after issuance of the agency’s letter, the

parties conferred related to any motion to dismiss. Among other

things, plaintiffs proposed that the parties stipulate that the

court would set aside the Decision Notice and that the Forest

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 4 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Service would agree to prepare a NEPA analysis before authorizing

any similar project affecting Silver King Creek. (Pls.’ Ex. C to

Opp’n, filed Dec. 23, 2005.) The Forest Service did not agree. 

(Id.) Plaintiffs next proposed that the Forest Service stipulate

that if it authorized this or a similar project in the future, it

would agree to give plaintiffs and the public advance notice of

such a project and the chance to comment upon and appeal it. 

(Id. at Ex. D.) The Forest Service did not agree. Instead,

defendants filed this motion, arguing such stipulations were

unnecessary as the instant action had become legally moot by

virtue of the above actions by the Forest Service and other

agencies.

STANDARD

“A case becomes moot whenever it loses its character as a

present, live controversy of the kind that must exist if we are

to avoid advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.” 

Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(internal quotations and citation omitted.) “‘Simply stated, a

case is moot when the issues are no longer ‘live’ or the parties

lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’” County of

Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citation

omitted). A defendant’s voluntary action can render a case moot. 

However, that defendant bears a “heavy” burden of proof, Friends

of the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989,

995 (9th Cir. 1993), that:

‘(1) subsequent events [have] made it absolutely clear 

that the alleged wrongful behavior [cannot] reasonably

be expected to recur, and (2) interim relief or events

have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects

of the alleged violation.’

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 5 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis in

original) (citation omitted). “When both conditions are

satisfied it may be said that the case is moot because neither

party has a legally cognizable interest in the final

determination of the underlying questions of fact and law.” City

of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 631. Thus, the central inquiry is

“whether there can be any effective relief.” Cantrell, 241 F.3d

at 678; see also Neighbors of Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303

F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (only if effective relief is

still available to counteract the effects of the alleged

violation is the controversy live and present). 

Specifically in the administrative review context, the Ninth

Circuit has held that a case may become moot when the challenged

agency decision at issue is rescinded, superceded or has expired. 

See e.g., Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, 329 F.3d 1089,

1096 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenge to a Biological Opinion is moot

when opinion has been superceded by a later opinion); Nome Eskimo

Community v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1995) (case

rendered moot when challenged lease sale was cancelled due to

lack of bids and Department of Interior had no immediate prospect

for another lease sale); Aluminum Co. of America v. Bonneville

Power Admin., 56 F.3d 1075, 1078 (9th Cir. 1995) (challenge to an

agency decision was moot when challenged Record of Decision

expired).

ANALYSIS

1. Likelihood that Challenged Activity Will Recur

Defendants contend the case is now moot because the Project

has been withdrawn, in that all necessary approvals and permits

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 6 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

have been rescinded, and the Project is cancelled “indefinitely.” 

There is no present intention to re-institute the Project in any

respect. Thus, defendants maintain “it can be said with

assurance that there is no reasonable expectation . . . that the

alleged violation will recur.” City of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at

631 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

This court agrees. The Project has been withdrawn and 

cancelled, and there is no intention to restart it; plaintiffs do

not dispute these critical facts. Moreover, even if defendants

were to decide to revive the Project there is no reasonable

likelihood that they would rely on the same EA given this court’s

issuance of a preliminary injunction against implementation of

the Project based on that EA. Moreover, any future project would

likely need to be revised based on new data and scientific

information. (See Reply, filed Jan. 10, 2006, at 4 n. 2.) Also

in that same regard, by statute, should defendants seek to reinstitute the Project, they would be required to issue a new

administrative decision and provide notice to those who commented

on the EA and an opportunity to appeal. 16 U.S.C. § 1612; 36

C.F.R. Part 215. Accordingly, plaintiffs would have an

opportunity to challenge defendants’ actions before any alleged

harm could recur.

For these reasons, the cases cited by plaintiffs finding the

defendant’s voluntary cessation of the alleged illegal activity

not sufficient to render the case moot are distinguishable. 

Significantly, the cited cases involved the voluntary cessation

of ongoing activities that had already caused harm and could be

resumed before judicial review could be obtained. See e.g. Buono

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 7 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 2004) (challenged cross

remained standing and the land on which it stood would possibly

revert back to the Department of the Interior); Neighbors of

Cuddy Mountain v. Alexander, 303 F.3d 1059, 1065 (9th Cir.

2002)(challenged logging had already taken place but mitigation

measures were possible to diminish the damage caused); Friends of

the Payette v. Horseshoe Bend Hydroelectric Co., 988 F.2d 989,

995 (9th Cir. 1993) (challenged action had taken place and a

wetland had been destroyed); De Jong Packing Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of

Agric., 618 F. 2d 1329, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1980) (enforcement

action against practices of a private company where practices

could be resumed at will); Wilcher v. City of Wilmington, 139

F.3d 366, 370 n.2 (3rd Cir. 1998) (involving a challenge to city

practice that had been in effect and where defendant “explicitly

reserved the right to use [the challenged procedure] in the

future”); Sierra Club v. Cargill, 732 F. Supp. 1095 (D. Colo.

1990) (challenged Forest Plan determinations would continue to

govern ongoing actions while a new rule was implemented). In

contrast here, there has been no on-the-ground implementation of

the Project and judicial review can be obtained before any future

implementation of the Project, thus preventing any alleged future

harm to plaintiffs.

That this case involves a “federal defendant” does not,

contrary to plaintiffs’ arguments, change the analysis. 

Plaintiffs cite United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629

(1953) as holding that “it is inappropriate to dismiss a case as

moot when a federal defendant suddenly ceases an allegedly

unlawful practice because ‘courts have rightly refused to grant

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 8 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

defendants such a powerful weapon against public law

enforcement.’” (Pls.’ Opp’n, filed Dec. 23, 2005, at 2. [quoting

W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632]) However, in W.T. Grant, the Court

was referring to voluntary cessation by private defendants in

cases brought by the federal government, not suits brought

against the federal government. W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 630,

632. Additionally, plaintiffs’ reliance on Mannington Mills,

Inc. v. Shinn, 877 F. Supp. 921, 928 (D. N.J. 1995) is also

inapposite. Plaintiffs contend Mannington stands for the

principle that voluntary cessation will not moot cases concerning

“an agency regulation or practice, i.e., a position of general

regulatory significance that the agency can reassert at will.”

However, not only did the court in Mannington find that the

agency’s withdrawal of its decision mooted the plaintiff’s claims

for injunctive and declaratory relief, id., but the instant case

does not involve a “position of general regulatory significance.”

Rather, this case involves a challenge to a specific agency

permitting decision regarding a specific proposed recovery

action. 

Rather than these cases, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in

Nome Eskimo Community, involving a federal agency defendant,

provides the most analogous case and the controlling law. There,

the plaintiffs sought a declaration recognizing their aboriginal

rights to the sea floor, an injunction prohibiting mineral lease

sales without the plaintiffs’ consent, and an accounting for any

money the Secretary of Interior obtained from the leases. 

However, the day after the suit was filed, the court was notified

that the lease sale had been cancelled for lack of bids, and that

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 9 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

the Department of Interior had no immediate prospect of another,

similar, lease sale. 67 F.3d at 815. The Ninth Circuit held

upon that notification, “That was the end of the ‘case,’

constitutionally and practically.” Id.

Thus, for all these reasons, the court finds that defendant

has met its “heavy” burden to establish the unlikelihood that the

alleged violation will recur.

2. Whether Events have Eradicated the Effects of the

Alleged Violation 

In one sense, this factor is inapplicable to this case as

the subject Project never commenced. As such, subsequent events

could not “eradicate” any “effects” of the Project itself. 

However, in another sense, in deciding whether the case is moot,

it is still relevant to determine whether the subsequent events

in this case, namely, the withdrawal and cancellation of the

Project, have foreclosed any “effective relief” to which

plaintiffs may be entitled. Plaintiffs argue that despite

defendants’ voluntary cessation of the Project, this court can

grant them a declaration finding that defendants violated NEPA by

failing to prepare an EIS (thus, “dissuading [defendants] from

repeating its illegal practice [Opp’n at 8]”) and/or an

injunction upon ruling on a motion for summary judgment, barring

any future poisoning of the subject area absent compliance with

NEPA.

As defendants aptly point out in their reply, plaintiffs’

argument ignores that any decision the court may make about the

adequacy of the Decision Notice in this case and the 2004 EA

would be confined to the facts of that Decision Notice and EA. 

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 10 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Yet, those documents have been withdrawn. They are no longer in

effect and any opinion of this court via a declaration would be

merely advisory. Moreover, a prospective injunction would be

inappropriate because as set forth above, defendants would not in

the future seek to rely on this EA as any new Project would be

based on a different project proposal, data, expert opinions, and

scientific information. (Reply at 6.) Thus, this court cannot

grant any injunctive relief relating to a future, unidentified,

project as the facts involving any such project are not before

it. 

Additionally, like the above, the cases relied on by

plaintiffs are distinguishable. See Byrd v. U.S. E.P.A., 174

F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. 1999); Natural Resources Def. Council v.

Abraham, 223 F. Supp. 2d 162, 181-82 (D. D.C. 2002). The courts

in these cases found that “effective relief” could be granted

because the injury (damage) had occurred from the alleged conduct

and could be mitigated or remedied by the court’s order. See

also Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 678 (finding demolition of Navel

Station insufficient to render case moot because if required to

undertake additional administrative review, “the defendants could

consider alternatives to the current reuse plan, and develop ways

to mitigate the damage to the birds’ habitat by, for example,

creating new nesting and foraging areas on the land that was

formerly the station or utilizing other nearby land for

mitigation purposes”). No such mitigation or remedial measures

are relevant here as the Project never commenced.

Accordingly, defendants have likewise met their burden to

establish that the subsequent events in this case have eradicated

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 11 of 12
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 In dismissing the action, the court does not place any

specific conditions on defendants, as requested by plaintiffs. 

Specifically, plaintiffs asked that the court, in conjunction

with any dismissal of the action, order the “Decision Notice is

set aside” and that the “Forest Service cannot approve or allow

the same or similar poisoning project in the Silver King Creek

basin without public notice, comment, and an opportunity for

interested entities to file an administrative appeal.” (Opp’n at

9.) For the reasons detailed in this order, no such conditions

are merited. There is no basis to conclude that defendants will

not act in accordance with the law in the future; indeed, the

United States Supreme Court has instructed that courts should

presume that an agency will act in accordance with the law. 

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,

415 (1971). 

12

any alleged harm to plaintiffs. There is no present relief this

court can award plaintiffs. Therefore, this case is moot.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss the

action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is

GRANTED. Defendants’ voluntary cessation of the subject Project,

in the manner described above, prevents this court from awarding

plaintiffs any effective relief, thus rendering the case moot.2

The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 DATED: February 24, 2005

 /s/ Frank C. Damrell Jr. 

FRANK C. DAMRELL, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:05-cv-01633-FCD-KJM Document 104 Filed 02/27/06 Page 12 of 12