Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06314/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06314-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nancy Ellan Boyer
Appellee
Andrew E. Karim
Appellant
David Lee Wear
Not Party

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ¥ i L li " 

Uoi ed St?-f.C§ (;,{)141t of A w.s 

In re: DAVID LEE WEAR 

Debtor 

ANDREW E. KARIM, 

Appellant, 

v. 

NANCY ELLEN BOYER, 

Creditor-Appellee. 

TENTH CIRCUIT 'fM"d•1 f:!rn•it 

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'"-.. 2 4 ;s 1 

ROBERT L. I>IOECKE 

Clerk 

No. 90-6314 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1117-W) 

( W. D. Okla. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellant Andrew Karim appeals from an order of the district 

court upholding the bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions 

pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9011. Appellant represented David 

Wear in his Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. Debtor filed his voluntary 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6314 Document: 010110034346 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 1 
petition under Chapter 7 on August 11, 1987. Appellee Nancy Ellan 

Boyer, a creditor and former wife of debtor, commenced an 

adversary proceeding objecting to debtor's discharge under 11 

U.S.C. § 727. She also sought to have debtor's property division 

alimony debt excepted from discharge under 11 U.S.C. 

§ 532(a)(2)(A). Following a hearing held on August 17, 1988, the 

bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of Boyer excepting the 

property division alimony judgment from discharge. At the same 

hearing the court denied Boyer's objections to discharge, but a 

discharge order was never entered. 

At a hearing held on September 20, 1988, the court announced 

it was dismissing debtor's bankruptcy case pursuant to 11 u.s.c. 

§§ 707(b) and 305(a), noting that debtor was improperly using the 

bankruptcy court as a forum to continue to litigate his divorce 

case. The court also expressed its intent to impose sanctions 

against debtor and his counsel. 

Debtor appealed this dismissal to the district court on 

September 30, 1988. On December 1, 1988, the bankruptcy court 

stayed its September 20 order dismissing the case pursuant to 

Bankruptcy Rule 8005. It ordered the case suspended until the 

district court ruled on debtor's appeal. The district court 

subsequently affirmed the order dismissing debtor's case. 

Following the entry of the stay order but before the district 

court's decision on debtor's appeal, the clerk of the court 

inadvertently entered an order discharging debtor's obligations. 

The court suggested Boyer file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 60 and 11 U.S.C. § 105 seeking revocation of 

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Appellate Case: 90-6314 Document: 010110034346 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 2 
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debtor's discharge as having been improvidently granted. The 

court believed such a motion was necessary to correct this 

clerical error. Boyer filed the motion on March 29, 1989. 

At a hearing on May 5, 1989, debtor argued the court lacked 

jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the discharge order. He 

asserted his debts had been discharged by the court's order on 

August 17, 1988. The court rejected this argument and granted 

Boyer's motion. It also imposed sanctions in the sum of $2,000 

against debtor and appellant jointly and severally. Appellant 

appealed the imposition of sanctions to the district court, which 

affirmed the order of the bankruptcy court. 

On appeal to this court, appellant argues the bankruptcy 

court was without jurisdiction to vacate the discharge and 

therefore lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions. This argument 

is without merit. We agree with the bankruptcy court's 

characterization of the entry of the dismissal order as a clerical 

order. The bankruptcy court had the power to vacate a discharge 

entered as a result of a clerical error. See Matter of Pilar 

Cordova Antuna, 45 B.R. 271, 272-74 (Bkrtcy. W.D. Mo. 1985). The 

court therefore had jurisdiction to impose sanctions. 

We agree with the district court that appellant's other 

arguments are without merit. We AFFIRM for substantially the same 

reasons given by the district court. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-6314 Document: 010110034346 Date Filed: 04/24/1991 Page: 3