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Parties Involved:
Stephanie Carol Keith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS UniJ's.!.~~PAppeal, Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

APR O 2 1993 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

STEPHANIE CAROL KEITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

No. 92-5074 

{D. C. No. 90-CR-100-C) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and BRIMMER,** District 

Judge. 

Defendant Stephanie C. Keith appeals the district court's 

revocation of her five -year probation sentence and imposition of a 

20 -months' prison sentence, to be followed by three years of 

supervised release, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3565{a), and that 

restitution be paid j ointly and severally with companion convicted 

defendants. We affirm the district court's revocation of 

probation but vacate the court's sentence of incarceration and 

remand the case to the district court for resentencing in light of 

this opinion. 

* This order and j udgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be c ited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

f o r purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36 . 3 . 

** The Honorable Clarence A. Brinuner, United States District Judge 

for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 1 
I. 

Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to use an unauthorized 

access device in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472 and was sentenced to 

five years' probation. R. Doc. 5 at 1. Condition 7 of the 

standard conditions of Keith's probation was that she not use or 

possess any controlled substance. Id. at 2. During her 

probation, Keith submitted urine samples indicating the presence 

of several narcotic substances, including marijuana and valium. 

R. Doc. 6 at 2. 

On March 2, 1992, the United States Probation Office filed a 

petition requesting revocation of Keith's probation based on the 

positive urinalysis tests as well as Keith's failure to report to 

the probation office as directed. R. Doc. 8. On March 17, 1992, 

Keith appeared before the district court, admitting that she "used 

controlled substances during the term of her probation", as 

alleged in the petition. R. Tr. 3. Keith expressly waived an 

evidentiary hearing on the matter. R. Tr. 4. 

Based on the foregoing facts, the district court found "that 

the violations have occurred and that the conditions of probation 

have been violated." Id. The court concluded it "[h]ad no 

discretion but to revoke probation" (id. at 7), and proceeded to 

sentence Keith to 20 months' imprisonment, followed by a three 

year term of supervised release. R. Doc. 10 at 2. 

relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3565 which provides in part: 

The court 

(a ) Continuation or revocation. If the defendant 

violates a condition of probation at any time prior to 

the expiration or termination of the term of probation, 

the court may ... 

2 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 2 
(1 ) continue him 

extending the term 

on 

or 

probation, 

modifying 

with or without 

or enlarging the 

conditions; or 

(2) revoke 

o t her sentence 

the time of the 

the sentence of probation and impose any 

that was available under subchapter A at 

initial sentencing. 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if 

a defendant is found by the court to be in possession of 

a controlled substance, thereby violating the condition 

imposed by § 3563(a) (3), the court shall revoke the 

sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not 

less than one-third of the original sentence. 1 

The court interpreted§ 3565(a) as mandating a prison sentence of 

no less than one-third the length of Keith's initial five -year 

probation sentence, i.e., 20 months. 

On appeal Keith contends, first, that the petition for 

revocation of probation did not specifically charge her with 

possession of drugs and that it therefore was improper for the 

district court to use possession of drugs as the basis for 

revoking her probation. Second, Keith claims the district court 

failed to exercise discretion properly in finding that she had in 

fact been in possession of drugs. Third, Keith says the court 

erred in imposing a prison sentence longer than that available 

under the Sentencing Guidelines for her original conspiracy 

conviction. Finally, Keith argues the court erroneously failed to 

consider relevant portions of the Sentencing Commission Policy 

Statements indicating a shorter sentence for the 

violation. 

1 

probation 

The last paragraph of§ 3565 was added by the Anti-Drug Abuse 

Act of 1988, Pub . L. No. 100-690, § 7303 (a) (2 ) , 102 Stat. 4181, 

4464 (1988 ) . 

3 

- --- - - -- ------------

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 3 
We review the district court's findings of fact under the 

clearly erroneous standard, United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 

1558, 1580 (10 th Cir. ) , cert. denied, 498 U.S. 829 (1990 ), while 

reviewing the court's interpretation and application of the law 

de novo. United States v. Maltais, 961 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 

1992) . 

II. 

A. Sufficiency of the Petition for Revocation . 

In United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d 770, 771-72 n. 2 (10th Cir. 

1992), we noted that a defendant "was not charged with possession 

of [a controlled substance], but merely with the breach of a 

condition of his supervised release." We then stated that "no 

issue was presented to the district court, nor is any before us, 

concerning whether § 3583(g ) [providing for revocation of 

supervised release and imposition of mandatory prison sentence] is 

applicable." Keith relies 

that because the government 

on the foregoing statements to argue 

did not obtain a formal criminal 

charge against her for possession of a controlled substance prior 

to the revocation hearing, the government could not rely on 

§ 3565(a} to revoke her probation and impose a prison sentence. 

We disagree. The quoted statements merely noted that no 

§ 3583(g) issue was raised in the case and hence our opinion would 

not decide it. Lee addressed whether policy statements are 

mandatory or advisory, relying in part on§ 3583(e); it does not 

bar the application of§ 3565(a) in a case like this. Instead, 

§ 3565(a) applies whenever "a defendant is found by the court t o 

be in possession of a controlled substance." 18 u.s.c. § 3565(a) 

4 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 4 
(emphasis added) . Accordingly, while a petition for revocation of 

probation must satisfy the requirements of Fed.R.Crim. P . 

32 .1 (a ) (2 ) (A) - (B) , 11 § 3565 (a) does not require that a defendant be 

formally charged or convicted of drug possession for the conduct 

to be considered in probation revocation or resentencing." United 

States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 1992 ). 

Here, the government's probation revocation notice alleged 

that Ke ith had "used" and "injected" drugs, as indicated by 

several positive urinalysis tests and her own admissions, and that 

the government therefore would seek revocation of Keith's 

probation. R. Doc. 8 at 2 . An allegation of drug "use" is 

tantamount to an allegation of drug "possession." See United 

States v. Rockwell, 984 F.2d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1993) ( " [t]here 

can be no more intimate form of [drug] possession than [drug] 

use" ). Accordingly, we are satisfied that "[f]rom [the 

government's] written petition, [defendant] should have 

anticipated that she would be questioned about her drug possession 

at the probation violation hearing" and that Rule 32 . l (a ) (2 ) (A ) -

(B) was thus satisfied. United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d a t 429 . 

B. The District Court's Alleged Failure t o Exercise Discretion. 

As Keith correctly points out, the district court had the 

right to determine whether Keith's positive urinalysis tests 

established possession of a controlled substance within the 

mea ning of § 356S (a ) . U.S . S.G. § 7Bl.4, Comment Note 5 (" [t]he 

Commissi on l e aves to the court the determination whether evidence 

of drug usage established solely by laboratory analysis 

cons titutes ' posse ssion o f a controlled substance' as s e t for th i n 

5 

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Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 5 
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) "); Gordon, 961 F.2d at 429. Keith contends 

the district court erred in finding drug possession here. 

We are not persuaded. At the probation revocation hearing, 

the district court considered the evidence before it and made an 

express factual finding of drug possession. R. Tr. 4, 9; R. 

Doc. 10 at 2. 2 Moreover, in the analogous context of § 3583 (g ) 

(governing revocation of supervised release), we have held that 

"'use' in this [revocation] context is synonymous with 

possession." Rockwell, 984 F.2d at 1114. Accordingly, both the 

record facts and the applicable law support the district court's 

finding that Keith violated the conditions of her probation by 

unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 

C. The District Court's Imposition of a Prison Sentence in Excess 

of the Guideline Range Applicable to Keith's Original Crime. 

Having found that Keith violated the terms of her probation 

by possession of a controlled substance, the district court 

sentenced Keith to a term of imprisonment, followed by a term of 

2 

The relevant evidence included not only the positive 

urinalysis tests but also Keith's admission that she "used 

controlled substances during the term of her probation." R. Tr. 

3. Only after making its determination of drug use and possession 

did the court conclude it had "no discretion but to revoke 

probation." R. Tr. 7. In short: 

The district court reviewed the evidence, 

exercised its factfinding power and determined that the 

defendant had possessed [drugs] and thereby violated 

probation .... Appellant has given us no reason to 

question the validity of the court's finding; 

accordingly, we affirm the district court's revocation 

of probation for possession of a controlled substance . 

United States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980, 981 - 82 (11th Cir. 

1992) . 

6 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 6 
supervised release, pursuant to§ 3565(a). R. Doc. 10 at 2. The 

court relied on the last portion of the statute which provides: 

Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if 

a defendant is found by the court to be in possession of 

a controlled substance, thereby violating the condition 

imposed by § 3563(a) (3), the court shall revoke the 

sentence of probation and sentence the defendant to not 

less than one-third of the original sentence. 

(Emphasis added.) The court interpreted the foregoing amendment 

to require imposition of a prison sentence of at least one-third 

the length of defendant's probation sentence. Because Keith's 

term of probation was 5 years, the court sentenced Keith to 20 

months' imprisonment. R. Tr. 9; R. Doc. 10 at 2. 

The d efendant argues that the judge misconstrued the statute. 

We have recently upheld this claim of error. In United States v. 

Diaz, No. 92-2158, F .2d (10th Cir. 3/22/93), we held that 

the term "'original sentence' in the 1988 Amendment [to§ 3565(a)] 

refers to the original term of incarceration available at the time 

of initial sentencing." 3 Id. at 7. Here the guideline range of 

incarceration applicable to Keith's original conspiracy conviction 

was 8-14 months. R. Add. to Presentence Rep. at 7. Accordingly, 

under§ 3565(a), the district court should have sentenced Keith to 

a prison term of no less than four and two-thirds months 

third of the original 14 month maximum guideline sentence. 

3 

oneOur reading of the statute comports with the interpretation 

endorsed by the majority of the courts of appeals which have 

addressed the issue. See United States v. Clay, 982 F.2d 959 (6th 

Cir. 1993); United States v. Granderson, 969 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 

1992); United States v. Gordon, 961 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1992). Two 

circuits have adopted a contrary interpretation. United States v. 

Byrkett, 961 F.2d 1399 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Corpuz, 

953 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1992). 

7 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 7 
In light of Diaz we must hold that the imposition of the 

20-month sentence, followed by three years of supervised release, 

was error. 

D. The District Court's Alleged Failure to Consider Sentencing 

Commission Policy Statements. 

As noted by Keith, 18 U.S.C. § 3553{a) (5) instructs district 

courts to consider "any pertinent policy statement issued by the 

Sentencing Commission" when imposing sentence. Chapter 7 of the 

guidelines contains policy statements relevant to prison sentences 

imposed following revocation of probation or supervised release. 

Specifically, § 7Bl.4 indicates a 3-9 month range of imprisonment 

for a Grade C probation violation such as Keith's drug possession 

violation. Keith argues that the district court' s sentence of 20 

months was improper because it exceeds the range indicated in the 

foregoing guideline policy statements. 

Here the district court's 20-month sentence was premised on 

the belief that § 3565(a) mandated the sentence imposed as a 

minimum. Diaz has now rejected that view. We are vacating the 

sentence and remanding for resentencing. In resentencing, the 

district judge should apply Diaz, as outlined above, imposing a 

sentence of no less than one-third of the original 14-month 

maximum guideline sentence. In this resentencing, the policy 

statements, which are advisory, United States v. Lee, 957 F.2d at 

772, must also be considered, although they are not binding and 

cannot override a statute. U.S.S.G. § lBl.7; United States v. 

Rockwell 984 F.2d at 1114 n.2; United States v. Brooks, 976 F.2d 

1358, 1360 {10th Cir. 1992), petition for cert. filed {U.S . Jan. 

6, 1993) (No . 92 -7214 ) . 8 

Appellate Case: 92-5074 Document: 010110200833 Date Filed: 04/02/1993 Page: 8 
On remand the judge should consider the policy statement as 

he imposes a new sentence that must not violate§ 3565(a). 

III. 

We AFFIRM the revocation of Keith's probation for unlawful 

possession of a controlled substance. We VACATE the sentence and 

REMAND for resentencing in accord with this order and judgment, 

with credit for time already served. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

William J. Holloway, Jr. 

United States Circuit Judge 

9 

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