Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07094/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07094-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bristol-Myers Squibb Company
Appellee
Otsuka America Pharmaceutical, Inc.
Appellee
Sharon M. Rollins
Appellant
Wackenhut Services, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 7, 2012 Decided December 28, 2012

No. 11-7094

SHARON M. ROLLINS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE

ESTATE OF DEVIN DARRELL BAILEY,

APPELLANT

v.

WACKENHUT SERVICES, INC., ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00047)

Gregory Stuart Smith argued the cause and filed the briefs

for appellant. 

Matthew W. Carlson argued the cause and filed the brief for

appellee Wackenhut Services, Inc. 

Daniel S. Pariser argued the cause for appellees

Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, et al. With him on the brief

was Timothy M. Broas. Adam S. Nadelhaft entered an

appearance.

Before: ROGERS, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

USCA Case #11-7094 Document #1412422 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 1 of 17
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Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

Concurring opinion by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Sharon Rollins’s son committed

suicide using a gun provided by his employer while he was

taking prescribed medication manufactured and distributed by

two pharmaceutical companies. On appeal from the dismissal

of her wrongful death and survival action against the employer

and pharmaceutical companies, Rollins presents three issues. 

First, she contends that the district court erred in ruling she

failed to state a claim of negligence against the employer when

the court invoked, sua sponte, District of Columbia law that

suicide is an intervening and independent cause of death subject

to limited exceptions that were inapplicable. Alternatively, she

urges certification of the negligence-liability question to the

D.C. Court of Appeals. Finally, she disputes the district court’s

ruling that the complaint failed to state a plausible claim of

products liability against the pharmaceutical companies and

contends that the court then erred in denying her leave to amend

the complaint. For the following reasons, we must conclude that

these contentions are unpersuasive, and we affirm.

I.

Devin Bailey, Rollins’s son, had a history of mental illness. 

Accepting as true the factual allegations in the complaint, see

Thompson v. District of Columbia, 530 F.3d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir.

2008), Bailey withdrew from Penn State University after two

years because of increased depression and serious mental health

problems. Compl. ¶ 11. In 2006, he joined the United States

Navy but was quickly discharged after having been hospitalized

for psychosis only a few days into his service. Compl. ¶ 12. In

April 2007, Rollins tried unsuccessfully to have her son

transported to a mental hospital for inpatient treatment. Compl.

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¶ 13. When the police arrived in response to a radio-run for a

family disturbance and tried to restrain Bailey, he kicked one

officer in the leg; Bailey was subsequently charged with

assaulting a police officer and carrying a dangerous weapon —

an 8-inch knife found in his pocket. Compl. ¶¶ 14–15. After he

was committed by the court in July to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital

for a competency evaluation, Compl. ¶ 15, Bailey was diagnosed

as having “Bipolar Disorder, Most Recent Episode Mixed,

Severe with Psychotic Features,” Compl. ¶ 17. He was released

on prescribed medications, Rispardal and Depakene, after about

three weeks. Compl. ¶ 17. In early 2008 he successfully

completed a course in basic real estate principles at Montgomery

College in Maryland and passed the written and physical

examinations for a position as a firefighter/EMT in Fairfax

County, Virginia. Compl. ¶¶ 18–19.

In May 2008, Bailey voluntarily admitted himself to

Washington Adventist Hospital in Maryland, where doctors

prescribed him the antipsychotic drug ABILIFY®. Compl. ¶ 21. 

An accompanying “black-box warning” stated: “Children,

adolescents, and young adults taking antidepressants for major

depressive disorder (MDD) and other psychiatric disorders are

at increased risk of suicidal thinking and behavior. (5.2).” 

Compl. ¶ 23. Section 5.2 warns of “long-standing concern”

about inducing worsening of depression and emergence of

suicidality during early phases of treatment. Compl. ¶ 23. 

Bailey was discharged from the Hospital after about a week with

instructions to take 20 mg of ABILIFY® daily, along with

Prolixin to improve compliance. Compl. ¶ 24. In July and

August he received additional prescriptions for ABILIFY® with

instructions to increase the dosage to 30 mg daily, the maximum

dosage. Compl. ¶ 25. ABILIFY® is manufactured and

distributed in the United States by Otsuka America

Pharmaceutical, Inc. (“Otsuka”), and Bristol-Myers Squibb

Company (“Bristol-Myers”). Compl. ¶¶ 3–4.

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In September 2008, Bailey applied for a job with

Wackenhut Services, Inc., a contractor that provides security

services to the federal government. Compl. ¶¶ 6, 26. 

Wackenhut hired him the following month as an armed security

guard at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Compl. ¶ 27. The

offer of employment was contingent on completion of a

“weapons qualification” and “criminal justice screening.” 

Compl. ¶ 27. In early November, Wackenhut’s National

Research Center prepared a background screening report stating

there was an outstanding September 10, 2007 arrest warrant for

Bailey for failing to appear in court on “UNDISPOSED” assault

and weapon charges. Compl. ¶¶ 28–29. Although the report

was forwarded to the Field Manager and Chief of Guards who

extended the offer of employment to Bailey, Wackenhut did not

follow up on this information. Compl. ¶¶ 28, 30. Neither did

Wackenhut obtain Bailey’s military service record. Compl.

¶ 34. Instead, Wackenhut tested Bailey’s firearms proficiency

and issued him a gun to use in his work. Compl. ¶¶ 31–32. On

November 15, 2008, Bailey received a “Diploma” declaring him

a “graduate” of Wackenhut’s “Security Officer Course.” 

Compl. ¶ 35.

On December 9, 2008, Bailey shot and killed himself with

a work-issued gun while on duty in a Walter Reed guard shack. 

Compl. ¶ 36. He was 23 years old. See Compl. ¶ 10.

Rollins, individually and as representative of her son’s

estate, filed suit in the D.C. Superior Court against Wackenhut,

Otsuka, and Bristol-Myers. The complaint alleged that

Wackenhut negligently issued Bailey a gun without adequately

investigating his background and mental health history, Compl.

¶ 40, and that the pharmaceutical companies were strictly liable

for manufacturing and distributing ABILIFY® “in a defective

condition unreasonably dangerous to users and consumers, and

particularly young adults such as Devin Bailey.” Compl. ¶ 43. 

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Rollins sought compensatory damages of $1 million each for

wrongful death and for survival on behalf of Bailey’s estate

against all defendants, and $3 million in punitive damages

against Wackenhut. On January 11, 2010, the defendants

removed the lawsuit to the federal court, based on diversity

jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. The pharmaceutical

companies filed answers to the complaint the same day. The

following week, on January 20, 2010, they moved to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). 

Wackenhut, which had not filed an answer, moved for dismissal 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Rollins

opposed the motions. 

The district court dismissed the complaint against

Wackenhut for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

and granted judgment on the pleadings to the pharmaceutical

companies pursuant to Rule 12(c). Rollins v. Wackenhut Servs.,

802 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2011). Rollins appeals. Our

review is de novo. Rudder v. Williams, 666 F.3d 790, 794 (D.C.

Cir. 2012); Thompson, 530 F.3d at 915. 

II.

Rollins alleged that her son’s employer, Wackenhut,

violated a special relationship and duty of protection it owned to

her son by “carelessly and negligently” (1) failing to investigate

the charges listed on its screening report and the information in

his military service record; (2) issuing him a gun when it should

have known that he was prohibited from possessing a weapon

under federal law; and (3) allowing him to possess the gun for

over a month. Compl. ¶ 40. The district court rejected

Wackenhut’s argument, citing Grillo v. National Bank of

Washington, 540 A.2d 743, 744 (D.C. 1988), that Rollins’s

exclusive remedy was under the D.C. Workers’ Compensation

Act, D.C. Code § 32-1504(a) & (b). That Act provides it “shall

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not apply where injury to the employee was occasioned solely

by his intoxication or by his willful intention to injure or kill

himself or another.” D.C. Code § 32-1503(d) (emphasis added). 

The district court agreed with Rollins, and so do we, that the Act

was inapplicable, but the district court noted that by relying on

D.C. Code § 32-1503(d) to escape the Act’s coverage, Rollins

“effectively admitted that the suicide was a willful and

intentional act.” Rollins, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 120; see Pl’s Mem.

In Opposition to Defendant Wackenhut Services, Inc.’s Motion

To Dismiss Feb. 3, 2010. Observing further that Rollins

claimed Wackenhut’s negligence was a substantial factor in her

son’s death, see Compl. ¶ 42, the district court, sua sponte,

invoked District of Columbia tort law and granted Wackenhut’s

motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. Id.

at 121. Rollins contends the district court erred in dismissing

the complaint on the basis of a legal theory never briefed or

argued in the district court, which it interpreted too narrowly,

and alternatively she seeks certification of the local law question

to the D.C. Court of Appeals.

A.

The district court may sua sponte dismiss a claim pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6) without notice where it is “patently obvious”

that the plaintiff cannot possibly prevail based on the facts

alleged in the complaint. Baker v. Dir., U.S. Parole Comm’n,

916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990). In District of Columbia v.

Peters, 527 A.2d 1269 (D.C. 1987), the District of Columbia

Court of Appeals endorsed the general rule that one may not

recover damages in negligence for the suicide of another, subject

to the irresistible impulse exception. The rationale underlying

the rule is that “[t]he act of suicide generally is considered to be

a deliberate, intentional, and intervening act which precludes a

finding that a given defendant is, in fact, responsible for the

decedent’s death.” Id. at 1275. Drawing on the RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977), the court held that to come

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within the exception to the general rule a plaintiff must show

more than that the alleged negligent incident started a chain of

circumstances that led to the suicide. The plaintiff must prove,

as a result of the defendant’s action, “the decedent could not

have decided against and refrained from killing himself, and

because of such uncontrollable impulse, the decedent committed

suicide.” Id. at 1276 (quoting Orcutt v. Spokane County, 364

P.2d 1102, 1105 (Wash. 1961) (en banc)). In WMATA v.

Johnson, 726 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1999), the D.C. Court of Appeals,

sitting en banc, reaffirmed the general rule in Peters, holding

that the last clear chance doctrine “may not be employed to

restore liability in another for a plaintiff’s suicidal act.” Id. at

178. The court additionally noted a second exception to the

general rule, that liability can be restored where “an institution,

such as a psychiatric hospital, ha[s] a duty of custodial care” to

prevent reasonably foreseeable suicide. Id. at 177 n.8. The

district court concluded neither exception applied to Rollins’s

claim against Wackenhut. Rollins, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 120–21.

On appeal, Rollins acknowledges the general rule under

District of Columbia law against negligence liability for suicide,

and appears to concede that her claim against Wackenhut does

not fall within the irresistible impulse exception “as traditionally

understood,” Reply Br. 5 n.2. Rather, she contends, her claim

falls within the second exception because Wackenhut assumed

a “special relationship” with her son by issuing him a gun

outside the normal firearms-distribution process. See Compl. ¶

40. As Rollins sees it, Wackenhut puts its employees through a

private background screening in lieu of the normal background

checks that would ordinarily adhere to purchases made at

licensed firearms dealers. Rollins’s approach extends the

special relationship exception far beyond its moorings. 

The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) explains

that a special duty is imposed where a defendant “takes the

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custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the

other of his normal opportunities for protection.” As interpreted

by the D.C. Court of Appeals, the special relationship exception

applies where an institution or treatment facility, such as a

hospital or jail, assumes physical custody over an individual. 

Johnson, 726 A.2d at 177 n.8. Previously the court had applied

the exception where the person who committed suicide was

confined in the D.C. Jail, see Phillips v. District of Columbia,

714 A.2d 768 (D.C. 1998), or a juvenile facility for delinquent

youth, see Clark v. District of Columbia, 708 A.2d 632 (D.C.

1997). In Johnson, the en banc court also favorably cited

McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983), which

described the special relationship exception as applying where

a person, such as a psychiatrist, has special medical training

requiring care for the suicidal individual’s mental well-being. 

Rollins’s complaint does not allege that Wackenhut had physical

custody of Bailey or had special medical training requiring it to

care for his mental well-being.

Rollins maintains, nonetheless, that the district court erred

by excluding the possibility that other exceptions to the general

rule in Peters may exist. For example, Rollins alleged that if

Wackenhut had properly investigated Bailey’s background, it

would have discovered that he was prohibited from possessing

a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). See Compl. ¶¶ 32–33. That

provision prohibits firearms possession by any “fugitive from

justice,” “mental defective,” or person “who has been committed

to a mental institution.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(2), (4). The district

court noted that other courts had generally rejected suicide

negligence claims premised on violations of § 922(g) or other

gun control statutes. Rollins, 802 F. Supp.2d at 121 n.6, citing

Johnson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 439, 443 (7th Cir.

2009). Rollins offers that there is no firm alignment of courts on

the question and cites a federal district court case and an

intermediate appellate state court case as suggesting “additional

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circumstances” could result in liability. See Knight v. Wal-Mart

Stores, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 1532 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Crown v.

Raymond, 764 P.2d 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). These

authorities do not advance Rollins’s cause. 

The D.C. Court of Appeals has not yet addressed a case of

negligent firearm distribution that resulted in suicide but it has,

since Knight and Crown were decided, affirmed a broad general

rule against negligence liability for suicide. See Johnson, 726

A.2d at 177–78. More recently, the Seventh Circuit in WalMart Stores, 588 F.3d at 443–44, observed that Illinois courts

were in much the same posture and that most other jurisdictions

to address the firearms question also adhere to the “traditional

rule” that suicide is an intervening, intentional act that breaks

the chain of causation. Aside from Knight and Crown, Rollins

provides no support for the conclusion that negligent issuance of

a gun to an adult should fall within an exception to the general

rule in Peters. Her references to the Restatement’s discussion

of the two exceptions recognized by the D.C. Court of Appeals

are either unpersuasive or inapposite. See Appellant’s Br. at

33–34 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314A,

455). As the district court observed, Rollins’s allegations “raise

serious questions about the diligence and care with which

Wackenhut performs background checks on the employees to

whom it provides firearms,” Rollins, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 121, but

taking her allegations as true, “Bailey’s suicide was an

intervening act that precludes [Wackenhut’s] liability under

D.C. law,” id. 

B. 

Rollins’s suggestion, therefore, that this court should certify

two questions1

 to the D.C. Court of Appeals pursuant to D.C.

1

 Rollins’s two questions are:

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Code § 11-723(a) is unavailing. Certification is authorized

where “it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling

precedent in the decisions of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals.” D.C. Code § 11-723(a). Consequently it is

appropriate only where this court is “genuinely uncertain” about

a question of District of Columbia law that is vital to the

underlying case. Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418, 426

(D.C. Cir. 1988).

Rollins’s hypothesis that the D.C. Court of Appeals might

adopt other exceptions to the general rule against negligence

liability in cases of suicide, citing Kivland v. Columbia

Orthopaedic Group, LLP, 331 S.W. 3d 299, 309 (Mo. 2011) (en

banc), fails to acknowledge that the D.C. Court of Appeals,

sitting en banc, reaffirmed the general rule in limiting the lastclear-chance doctrine and that the second question she seeks to

have certified reflects the views of a dissenting judge. See

Johnson, 726 A.2d at 177–78; id. at 180–81 (Ruiz, J.,

dissenting). Although the en banc court acknowledged that it

(1) Under District of Columbia law, may a plaintiff recover

for the wrongful death of a person who committed suicide,

against a third party that gave that person the firearm used in

that suicide, when the third party knew or should have known

that the person was prohibited by law from possessing a

firearm?

(2) Under District of Columbia law, and under the facts set

forth in the Complaint, may a plaintiff recover for the

wrongful death of a person who committed suicide, where the

person committing suicide had an impairment that limited the

suicide victim’s ability to appreciate his peril or encounter it

purposely, in the form of a prescribed medication that had a

recognized risk of increased suicidality?

Appellant’s Br. 38. 

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was not deciding a question in the context of a claim of

diminished mental capacity, see id. at 174, Rollins cannot take

advantage of that reservation because, in order to avoid the

exclusive coverage of the D.C. Workers’ Compensation Act, she

“effectively admitted that [her son’s] suicide was a willful and

intentional act.” Rollins, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 120; see D.C. Code.

§ 32-1503(d). Certification based on the possibility that the

D.C. Court of Appeals might adopt additional exceptions to its

general rule, then, has no logical stopping point and no federal

court could ever resolve an issue of state law because state

courts always might choose to create new exceptions to their

general rules. This court has not read certification authority

pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-723(a) so broadly. 

III.

Rollins sought to hold the two pharmaceutical companies

strictly liable under the rule in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 402A, alleging that:

By manufacturing and distributing ABILIFY®

within the United States, despite its known risks of

increasing suicidality in certain patients, Defendants

Otsuka America and Bristol-Myers are liable for

selling a product in a defective condition unreasonably

dangerous to users and consumers, and particularly

young adults such as Devin Bailey . . . . 

Compl. ¶ 43. The district court granted the pharmaceutical

companies’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c) on the

ground that Rollins failed to allege sufficient facts to state a

plausible products liability claim. Rollins, 802 F. Supp. 2d at

121. 

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A.

Under the Supreme Court’s rearticulation of pleading

requirements in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), “[t]o survive

a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The facts alleged must “allow[] the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; see also Rudder, 666

F.3d at 794 (quoting Iqbal and Twombly). Rollins responds —

Iqbal and Twombly notwithstanding — that her complaint

satisfied the pleading standard under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 8 because Otsuka and Bristol-Myers filed responsive

answers to the complaint. The filing of an answer focuses on

notice pleading requirements, but does not mean that the

requirements of Iqbal and Twombly do not apply to a Rule 12(c)

motion, which here is functionally equivalent to a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. See Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1254 (D.C.

Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hartman v. Moore,

547 U.S. 250 (2006). Other circuits have held that Iqbal and

Tombly apply to Rule 12(c) motions, see Cafasso v. Gen.

Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1054 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011)

(citing cases from other circuits); 5C WRIGHT & MILLER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, n.10.4 (Supp.

2012), and we do likewise.

The D.C. Court of Appeals has recognized three distinct

categories of defective products under section 402A of the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: “(1) a manufacturing

defect; (2) an absence of sufficient warnings or instructions; or

(3) an unsafe design.” Warner Fruehauf Trailer Co. v. Boston,

654 A.2d 1272, 1274 (D.C. 1995). Rollins’s complaint did not

specify which, if any, of these categories of defects she intended

to pursue. It alleged no facts to support a manufacturing defect

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claim. It affirmatively pleaded that the ABILIFY® warning

label warned of the precise risk of increased suicidal tendencies

among young adults. See Compl. ¶ 23. It also alleged no facts

that plausibly could satisfy either the risk-utility test for design

defects, see Warner Fruehauf, 654 A.2d at 1276–77, or the more

demanding test for unavoidably unsafe products under Comment

k to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A,2 see Fisher

v. Sibley Mem’l Hosp., 403 A.2d 1130, 1134 (D.C. 1979). 

Instead, the complaint alleged facts regarding the maximum

legal dosage of ABILIFY®, promotion of off-label uses, and

Bailey’s autopsy report, see Compl. ¶¶ 22, 25, 37, which bear no

apparent relevance to her strict liability claim.

B.

Rollins’s second response, that the district court erred by

denying her leave to amend the complaint, is without merit. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that a district

court “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so

requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). But Rollins failed to comply

with the law of this circuit by filing a motion for leave to amend

her complaint and attaching a proposed amended complaint. 

Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 

Instead, she requested leave to amend as an alternative argument

in her opposition to the companies’ motions to dismiss. “[A]

bare request in an opposition to a motion to dismiss — without

any indication of the particular grounds on which amendment is

sought — does not constitute a motion within the contemplation

of Rule 15(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). D.C.

District Court Local Civil Rule 15.1 requires a motion for leave

2

 Comment k, regarding “unavoidably unsafe products,” as is

“especially common in the field of drugs,” in part states that the

product is “not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous” where it

is “properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and

warning.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k.

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to amend to include a proposed amended complaint. Rollins’s

request neither included a proposed amended complaint nor

otherwise indicated that she would be able to plead sufficient

facts to state a plausible claim for relief. As a result, “it could

hardly have been an abuse of discretion” for the district court to

deny leave to amend. Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines,

995 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 

To the extent Rollins separately objects, summarily, that the

district court erred in dismissing her claim against the

pharmaceutical companies with prejudice, Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 41(b) provides, in part, that “[u]nless the dismissal

order states otherwise, [an involuntary dismissal] — except one

for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party

under Rule 19 — operates as an adjudication on the merits.” 

See Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 285–86 (1961). 

Adjudication on the merits in this context means dismissal with

prejudice. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531

U.S. 497, 505–06 (2001). This court has instructed that

“dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when a trial court

determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” 

Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard in

Belizan, the court observed that “[t]he standard for dismissing

a complaint with prejudice is high.” 434 F.3d at 583. Most

recently in Rudder, the court reaffirmed that “[d]ismissal with

prejudice is the exception, not the rule, in federal practice,

because it ‘operates as a rejection of the plaintiff’s claims on the

merits and [ultimately] precludes further litigation of them.’” 

666 F.3d at 794 (quoting Belizan, 434 F.3d at 583, and citing see

also Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A, 130 S. Ct. 2485, 2494

(2010) (noting “the preference expressed in the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure . . . for resolving disputes on their merits”)). 

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The Firestone standard is met here. The district court, in

denying Rollins’s request for leave to amend her complaint as

“futile,” found that Rollins “has not indicated that she will be

able to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief.” Rollins,

802 F. Supp. 2d at 125 n.10. Although this is not the same as a

determination by the district court that Rollins “could not allege

additional facts that would cure the deficiencies in her

complaint,” Belizan, 434 F.3d at 584, Rollins’s objection to

dismissal of her complaint with prejudice nonetheless fails. Any

new allegations to support a defective product claim under

section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS would

not be “consistent with the challenged pleading,” Firestone, 76

F.3d at 1209, because Rollins’s complaint alleged that the

pharmaceutical companies knew ABILIFY®, when

manufactured as designed, would increase the risk of suicidality

to individuals like her son; indeed, that its warning label

explicitly so stated, see Compl. ¶ 23. It follows, in view of

Comment k to section 402A, that a design defect claim also

would fail in the circumstances pled by Rollins. See supra Part

II.A & n.2. Rollins did not file a motion for reconsideration

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), see City of

Harper Woods Employees’ Retirement Sys. v. Olver, 589 F.3d

1292, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and on appeal she has not

identified any alleged facts to cure the deficiencies in her

complaint. Under the circumstances, Rollins’s claims against

the pharmaceutical companies were properly dismissed with

prejudice. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing the complaint.

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the 

Court’s thorough opinion and add one observation about the 

state of this Circuit’s law on dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

As the Court correctly explains, when a district court 

grants a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim, that dismissal “operates as an adjudication on the 

merits” under Rule 41(b) “[u]nless the dismissal order states 

otherwise.” And “an adjudication on the merits” is 

synonymous with a dismissal with prejudice. See Semtek 

International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 

505 (2001). Therefore, a district court order that dismisses a 

case under Rule 12(b)(6) without stating whether it is with or 

without prejudice operates as a dismissal with prejudice.

In this case, the District Court’s dismissal order did not 

state whether it was with or without prejudice. Under Rule 

41(b), we thus must construe the order as a dismissal with 

prejudice.

That in turn raises the question of when a dismissal with 

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6) is permissible. Rule 41(b) also 

answers that question. By providing that Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissals are with prejudice unless the district court in its 

discretion states otherwise, Rule 41(b) indicates that Rule 

12(b)(6) dismissals are typically with prejudice and do not 

require particular justification by the district court. See

Okusami v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, Inc., 959 F.2d 

1062, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for 

failure to state a claim “is a resolution on the merits and is 

ordinarily prejudicial”). That conclusion is buttressed by 

Rule 41(b)’s proviso that dismissals on certain other grounds 

– lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to join a

required party – are without prejudice. 

Any potential unfairness that could otherwise result from 

this procedural framework is addressed by the Rules in two 

ways. First, Rule 15(a) provides that if a defendant files a 

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a 

claim, the plaintiff may amend the complaint as a matter of 

USCA Case #11-7094 Document #1412422 Filed: 12/28/2012 Page 16 of 17
2

course within 21 days of service of the motion to dismiss. 

That aspect of Rule 15(a) ensures, among other things, that 

the plaintiff has an opportunity to amend a complaint so as to 

avoid dismissal based on a technicality or readily corrected 

error that the defendant has identified. Moreover, under Rule 

15(a), a district court in its discretion also may grant leave for 

a plaintiff to amend a complaint even outside the time period

for amending as a matter of course. Second, under Rules 

41(b) and 12(b)(6), a district court has discretion to dismiss a 

complaint without prejudice when the district court concludes 

that the circumstances so warrant. In short, Rules 12(b)(6),

15, and 41(b) work in tandem to establish a fair and efficient 

process for civil plaintiffs and defendants alike.

But as District Judge Bates has perceptively noted, this 

Court’s case law on Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals is not fully 

aligned with the Rules. See In re Interbank Funding Corp. 

Securities Litigation, 432 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54-55 & n.4 

(D.D.C. 2006). Some of this Court’s cases, without citing 

Rule 41(b), have suggested that Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals with 

prejudice are disfavored. Those decisions have imposed a

“high” bar for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals with prejudice. See, 

e.g., Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579, 583-84 (D.C. Cir. 

2006). By their terms, however, it is not evident that the 

Rules impose such a constraint on the discretion of district 

courts in issuing Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals. On the contrary, 

Rule 41(b) contemplates that a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal 

ordinarily operates as a dismissal with prejudice, unless the 

district court in its discretion states otherwise.

In any event, I join the Court’s opinion here, which

correctly resolves and analyzes this case under our existing 

precedents.

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