Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04997/USCOURTS-ca4-06-04997-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ali Asad Chandia
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 06-4997

ALI ASAD CHANDIA, a/k/a Abu

Qatada,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.

Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge.

(1:05-cr-00401-CMH-1)

Argued: October 30, 2007

Decided: January 23, 2008

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion.

Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge

King joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. John T. Gibbs, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chuck

Rosenberg, United States Attorney, David H. Laufman, Assistant

United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

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OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge: 

Ali Asad Chandia appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, on

three counts of providing material support to terrorists or terrorist

organizations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. Chandia challenges

his convictions on several grounds, although he does not contest the

sufficiency of the evidence. He also argues that the district court erred

in sentencing when it applied the terrorism enhancement under

U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. We affirm Chandia’s convictions but, because the

district court failed to make the factual findings necessary to impose

the §3A1.4 enhancement, we vacate the sentence and remand for

resentencing. 

I.

This case arises out of the government’s investigation into an

alleged terrorist support network based in the suburbs of Washington,

D.C. Much of the investigation centered on individuals associated

with the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia,

where a man named Ali Timimi was a lecturer and vocal supporter

of violent jihad against the enemies of Islam.1 Chandia, the defendant

in this case, is a Pakistani national who lived in Germantown, Maryland, and regularly attended Dar al Arqam in Falls Church. 

The key event in the government’s investigation (at least with

respect to Chandia) occurred on May 8, 2003, when the FBI executed

a search warrant covering six suburban D.C. residences, including

Chandia’s. The warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit by FBI

Special Agent John Wyman. Wyman asserted in his affidavit that the

six men whose homes were targeted — Chandia, Masoud Khan,

Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Donald Surratt, Caliph Abdur Raheem, and

Mohammed Aatique — had participated in a training program, along

with other members of Dar al Arqam, that used the game of paintball

1Ali Timimi (also known as Ali al-Timimi) was convicted in April

2005 by a jury in the Eastern District of Virginia on various charges,

including soliciting others to levy war against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 373. 

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as a means to prepare for engaging in violent jihad. Wyman also

asserted that several of those targeted, including Chandia, had traveled to Pakistan to attend military training camps run by Lashkar-eTaiba (LET), an organization that the United States government designated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in December 2001.

(We examine the details of the Wyman affidavit more closely in part

IV, where we consider Chandia’s challenges to the affidavit’s validity.) 

The search of Chandia’s residence uncovered a significant amount

of information ultimately introduced at trial, including numerous emails between Chandia and a high-level LET official named Mohammed Ajmal Khan. Chandia was not home at the time the FBI agents

executed the search warrant, but his wife informed the agents that he

had driven a black Dodge Neon to work at Costco in Gaithersburg,

Maryland. An agent then located the car and observed inside it materials potentially relevant to the investigation. Based on these observations and the information in the Wyman affidavit, the agents sought,

and the magistrate issued, a second warrant authorizing a search of

the car. That search also yielded items introduced against Chandia at

trial, most notably a CD-ROM containing a video glorifying the September 11, 2001, attacks and those who perpetrated the attacks. 

In June 2003 eleven people (but not Chandia) were indicted for

various offenses related in part to their participation in the paintball

training program. Chandia was the only one of the six men targeted

in the May 8, 2003, search who was not charged in this indictment.

Six of the eleven indicted ultimately pled guilty, two were acquitted,

and three were convicted after a bench trial. See United States v.

Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the three convictions).

Chandia was separately charged in a four-count indictment in September 2005. He was charged with a conspiracy and a substantive

count of providing material support to terrorists, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2339A, and a conspiracy and a substantive count of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Though Agent Wyman had alleged in his affidavit that Chandia participated in the paintball training program, the

government abandoned that contention prior to indictment. Instead,

the indictment charged, and the government pressed at trial, two basic

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sets of allegations against Chandia. First, the government alleged that

Chandia, at the urging of Ali Timimi, traveled to Pakistan in November 2001 to attend an LET training camp. The defense admitted that

Chandia was in Pakistan from November 2001 to February 2002, but

it claimed that the purpose of his trip was to provide care for his

father, who underwent a thyroid operation, and to assist in the preparations for his brother’s wedding. Second, the government alleged

that during a series of events, occurring primarily between February

2002 and April 2003, Chandia provided material support to Mohammad Ajmal Khan (Ajmal Khan), an LET official whom Chandia

allegedly met while in Pakistan. Specifically, the government alleged

that Ajmal Khan traveled to the United States to secure high-tech

equipment and other materials for LET and that Chandia provided

material support to Ajmal Khan during his trips. The alleged material

support included picking up Ajmal Khan at the airport, providing him

access to a computer and e-mail at Chandia’s residence, and assisting

him in shipping paintballs to Pakistan for LET use in military training

operations. The defense acknowledged Chandia’s relationship with

Khan but claimed Chandia was unaware of Khan’s association with

LET. 

The jury convicted Chandia on three counts and acquitted him on

the substantive § 2339A count of providing material support to terrorists. The government appears to concede that the acquittal on the one

count serves as a rejection of its contention that Chandia attended an

LET training camp while in Pakistan. 

At sentencing the government sought the terrorism enhancement

under U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. A conviction under the material support statutes provides a base level guidelines range of 63-78 months’ imprisonment for those, like Chandia, with no criminal history. See

U.S.S.G. §2M5.3. Application of the terrorism enhancement, however, increases Chandia’s guidelines range to 360 months to life.

Chandia argued that the terrorism enhancement was not warranted in

his case and, in addition, contested several factual assertions in the

presentence report (PSR). The district court did not resolve the factual

disputes and did not explicitly state that the terrorism enhancement

applied, but the court did conclude in its oral disposition that

Chandia’s guidelines range was "properly assessed at . . . 360 months

to life." J.A. 2384. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Chandia to

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a total of 180 months in prison, which equals the statutory maximum

for a single material support conviction.2

Chandia now appeals. He advances several challenges to his conviction, although he does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence

on any of the three counts for which he was convicted. In addition,

Chandia challenges the district court’s application of the terrorism

enhancement in determining his sentence. 

II.

We turn first to Chandia’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is

unconstitutional. This argument runs squarely into our decision in

United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), which

upheld § 2339B against several constitutional challenges that mirror

those advanced here by Chandia. First, Chandia’s argument that

§ 2339B violates the First Amendment right of association is foreclosed by Hammoud, which rejected a similar argument because the

statute "does not prohibit mere association; it prohibits the conduct of

providing material support to a designated FTO." 381 F.3d at 329.

Second, Chandia advances a series of related arguments — based on

principles or doctrines ranging from due process to nondelegation of

congressional authority — that boil down to a contention that

§ 2339B is unconstitutional because it empowers the executive to designate LET as an FTO (a designation that Chandia cannot challenge).

These arguments fail under Hammoud’s holding that a criminal

defendant’s inability to challenge the FTO designation does not violate his constitutional rights because "the fact of an organization’s

designation as an FTO is an element of § 2339B, but the validity of

the designation is not." 381 F.3d at 331. 

2The district court imposed the statutory maximum on each count,

which it found to be 60 months for the § 2339A count and 180 months

for the § 2339B counts. The court chose (without explanation) to run the

sentences concurrently, although it could have run them consecutively in

order to impose a total punishment within the guidelines range of 360

months to life. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 cmt. n.1. The government did not

cross-appeal any aspect of the sentence. 

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Our decision in Hammoud also precludes Chandia’s argument that

§ 2339B cannot be applied against him because certain terms related

to the definition of a "terrorist organization" are vague. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B(g)(6) (defining "terrorist organization" as "an organization

designated as a terrorist organization" under the procedures established in 8 U.S.C. § 1189). Even if we assume for argument’s sake

that certain terms in the definition are vague, that circumstance would

be relevant only to an organization seeking to challenge the validity

of its own designation. As we held in Hammoud, the mere fact of designation, rather than the designation’s validity, is what is relevant to

a defendant (such as Chandia) who stands accused of providing material support. 381 F.3d at 331.

III.

Chandia argues that the three counts for which he was convicted

are multiplicitous or violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We agree

with the government that conviction on all three counts was permissible because "[e]ach offense contains one statutorily-mandated element that the other[s] [do] not, and Congress has not expressed a clear

intention that multiple punishment not be imposed." United States v.

Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 1996). 

When a single course of conduct violates multiple statutes, multiple

punishments may be imposed without violating the Double Jeopardy

Clause, if that is what Congress intended. Terry, 86 F.3d at 355 (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)). Our only

task is to determine whether Congress intended to impose multiple

punishments. We begin the inquiry into legislative intent by examining "whether proof of each crime ‘requires proof of an additional fact

which the other does not.’" Terry, 86 F.3d at 355 (quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). If the statutory elements "do not overlap, then multiple punishments are presumed to be

authorized absent a clear showing of contrary Congressional intent."

Terry, 86 F.3d at 356. 

The elements of the separate crimes charged under § 2339A and

§ 2339B do not overlap. Section 2339B requires proof that Chandia

provided material support to an organization designated as a foreign

terrorist organization. By contrast, § 2339A requires proof that

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Chandia provided material support or resources that he knew would

"be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [18

U.S.C. § 956]," which prohibits conspiracies to injure persons or

damage property outside the United States. Because each statute

requires proof of an element that the other does not, we presume that

Congress authorized multiple punishments. 

Chandia has not made the showing of clear congressional intent

necessary to overcome this presumption. The sole support cited for

his argument is congressional testimony given in April 2005 by Barry

Sabin, a Justice Department official. Sabin’s testimony purportedly

suggests that material support cases are typically prosecuted under

§ 2339A prior to an organization’s designation as a foreign terrorist

organization and under § 2339B after designation. This testimony was

given well after the passage of the statutes in question and, therefore,

sheds no light on legislative intent. 

We also disagree with Chandia’s argument that Congress did not

intend to authorize multiple punishments for a conspiracy and a substantive violation under § 2339B. Chandia’s argument is based on the

language of the statute, which prohibits the conspiracy and the actual

provision of material support in the same section. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2339B(a)(1)("Whoever knowingly provides material support . . . or

attempts or conspires to do so . . ."). But, as the Supreme Court has

held, the "settled principle" that "the commission of the substantive

offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct

offenses" does not give way simply because the statute describing the

substantive offense also specifically prohibits conspiracies. Callanan

v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).

IV.

Chandia contends that the district court should have suppressed

evidence obtained during the May 8, 2003, searches of his residence

and automobile. 

A.

Chandia argues that evidence from searches of his residence and

automobile should have been suppressed primarily because the

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Wyman affidavit supporting those searches contained false and misleading statements as well as material omissions. Specifically,

Chandia argues that the Wyman affidavit omitted information,

obtained by the government in its investigation, that would have

negated probable cause with respect to Chandia by showing that he

did not participate in the paintball training program. 

This argument would typically be evaluated under the Supreme

Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which

defines the circumstances when a defendant can attack a facially sufficient affidavit. Under Franks a defendant can obtain an evidentiary

hearing on an affidavit’s integrity by making "a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or

with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the

warrant affidavit." United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th

Cir. 1990) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). A Franks hearing

is also warranted if the defendant makes a substantial showing that

the "affiant[ ] omit[ted] material facts with the intent to make, or in

reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading." Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Ultimately, suppression under Franks is called for if the district court

determines that the affidavit contained false or misleading statements

or omissions that were "essential to the probable cause determination." Id.

In his motion to suppress filed in district court, Chandia did not

expressly request a Franks hearing. Therefore, we review for plain

error the issue of whether the district court should have held such a

hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.

725, 731-32 (1993). In his motion to suppress Chandia asserted that

the Wyman affidavit was tainted by false statements and material

omissions. But these bare allegations did not entitle Chandia to a

Franks hearing. Rather, to make the "substantial preliminary showing" required by Franks, a defendant’s "allegations [of Franks-type

misconduct] must be accompanied by an offer of proof." Franks, 438

U.S. at 171. For instance, "[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable

statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained." Id. Because Chandia did not make the required

offer of proof in support of his allegations of misconduct, the district

court did not err in omitting a Franks hearing. 

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B.

Our inquiry does not end simply because Chandia is not entitled to

relief under Franks. Suppression would still be warranted if the information contained in the Wyman affidavit was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search Chandia’s residence. In addition to his

Franks-like claims of deliberate falsehoods and material omissions,

Chandia asserts (albeit somewhat indirectly) that the affidavit is inadequate because some of its most important allegations are "bare conclusions" lacking any independent basis in fact. See Illinois v. Gates,

462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (magistrate’s probable cause determination

"cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others").

Because we give "great deference" to a magistrate’s probable cause

decision, our review is limited to determining whether there was "a

substantial basis for the [magistrate’s] decision." United States v.

Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks

omitted). 

Chandia first takes issue with several statements in the affidavit

that link him to the paintball training program. Specifically, Agent

Wyman included in his affidavit a statement from a confidential informant, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, that a man named "Ali Asad," who lived in

Maryland and attended the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls

Church, participated in paintball. Wyman also stated that he (Wyman)

believed that this "Ali Asad" was in fact Ali Asad Chandia. Chandia

argues that Wyman’s belief was unsupported and should not have

been relied upon in the probable cause calculus. We disagree. Even

if ultimately proven erroneous, Wyman’s belief was not a bare conclusion advanced with no supporting facts. Instead, the magistrate

could have deemed the belief reasonable based on the facts in the affidavit demonstrating that Chandia likewise lived in Maryland,

attended Dar al Arqam, and associated with other paintball participants. 

Chandia also objects to the affidavit’s inclusion of a statement from

another confidential informant, Yong Kwon, suggesting that Chandia

attended an LET training camp in Pakistan. The affidavit stated that

Kwon had seen Chandia at an LET office in Pakistan soon after Kwon

had attended an LET training camp. (The affidavit included information confirming that Chandia was in Pakistan at the relevant time.)

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The affidavit further stated that Kwon believed, based on his conversation with Chandia at that LET office and his prior knowledge of

Chandia from Dar al Arqam, that Chandia planned to attend the camp

as well. The affidavit did not, however, flesh out the details of the

conversation which led Kwon to form this belief. As a result, we

believe that Kwon’s statement, considered alone, could not support a

probable cause determination. But we see no reason why the magistrate was not permitted to rely on this statement as one part of the

probable cause calculus. When we consider Kwon’s statement beside

the other information in the affidavit, particularly that Chandia’s conversation with Kwon occurred at an LET office in Pakistan, that

Chandia was confirmed to be in Pakistan during the relevant time

frame, and that other information suggested that Chandia participated

in paintball, we have no basis to second-guess the magistrate’s determination that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause. 

C.

Chandia also argues that the agents conducted an impermissible

general search of his residence that exceeded the scope authorized by

the warrant. This argument, too, lacks merit. Chandia does not identify any item that was outside the scope of the warrant but was nonetheless seized and introduced against him at trial. Instead, he

apparently contends that the purported breadth of the search justifies

blanket suppression of all items seized. Blanket suppression due to an

overly broad general search is only justified when officers exhibit flagrant disregard for the terms of the warrant. United States v. Foster,

100 F.3d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000) (the "extraordinary remedy

of blanket suppression" has applied only when officers have seized

"large quantities of evidence clearly not within the scope of the warrant"). After comparing the scope of the warrant with the lists of the

items seized, we find no basis for concluding that the officers in this

case flagrantly disregarded the terms of the warrant.

D.

We also reject Chandia’s argument that, even if the search of his

residence was supported by probable cause, there was no nexus to

support the second warrant for the search of his automobile. The

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agent’s plain view sighting of potentially relevant material inside the

car, when combined with the additional information about Chandia

contained in the Wyman affidavit, was sufficient to establish probable

cause for the warrant authorizing the automobile search.

V.

We turn next to Chandia’s contention that the district court committed reversible error by admitting into evidence two video clips

from a CD-ROM found on the front seat in the search of Chandia’s

car. The clips, which together were approximately three minutes in

length, glorify the September 11, 2001, attacks and those who perpetrated them, including Osama Bin Laden. 

Chandia argues that video clips should have been excluded because

they were not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, constituted barred character evidence under Rule 404, and were unfairly

prejudicial under Rule 403. Chandia claims that a new trial is warranted because the clips were so powerful that their admission risked

causing the jury to act on the basis of fear and hatred, rather than on

a rational evaluation of the evidence. 

We disagree. Even if admission of the video clips was error, it was

harmless in this case. The clips were not a central part of the government’s case; in fact, they took up only three minutes during the nearly

five days the government spent presenting its case-in-chief. In addition, the clips were shown only once, were not used to frame the government’s case at the trial, and were not unduly emphasized during

the government’s arguments to the jury. Most important, the central

thrust of Chandia’s prejudice argument — that the video clips were

so overpowering that they caused the jury to convict based on emotion rather than the evidence presented — is discredited to a significant extent by the jury’s rejection of one of the four counts charged

in the indictment. The jury found Chandia not guilty on the substantive count that charged him with providing material support to terrorists. This outcome suggests that the jury conducted a rational

evaluation of the evidence in reaching its verdict and was not misled

by emotion.3

3Chandia makes a brief argument that the district court erred in denying certain pretrial discovery motions. He also argues that the district

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VI.

Finally, Chandia contends that his sentencing proceedings were

flawed. He argues first that the district court failed to resolve disputed

issues of fact that were relevant to the application of the terrorism

enhancement under U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. Alternatively, he argues that the

facts of his case do not warrant application of the enhancement. 

Application of the terrorism enhancement provides a twelve level

enhancement — and an automatic criminal history category of VI —

when the "offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to promote, a federal crime of terrorism." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. The key term,

"a federal crime of terrorism," is defined to consist of two elements:

(1) the commission of one of a list of specified felonies, which

includes each of the material support offenses at issue in this case,

and (2) a specific intent requirement, namely, that the underlying felony was "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government

by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). In Hammoud we applied the terrorism

enhancement in a material support case and held that the intent

requirement was satisfied because the trial evidence established that

the defendant provided the material support "with the intent to influence or coerce government conduct." 381 F.3d at 356. 

In this case Chandia’s PSR stated that the terrorism enhancement

applied but gave no explanation for this conclusion. Chandia’s convictions under the material support statutes clearly satisfied the first

element of the enhancement. However, the PSR did not contain any

factual assertions and the district court did not make any factual findings related to the intent element. Instead, both appeared to assume

(erroneously) that the enhancement automatically applies to a material

support conviction. 

court erred in denying his request for a hearing under Daubert v. Merrell

Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), with respect to the

government’s expert witness on Islamic terrorism. These arguments fail

because the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of the rulings

cited by Chandia. 

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The government argues that we should nonetheless affirm the sentence. It attempts to rely on Hammoud, which affirmed application of

the enhancement in a material support case based, among other

things, on evidence that the defendant personally supported Hezbollah’s violent activities. 381 F.3d at 356. But the government has not

pointed to similar evidence here. Instead, it appears to suggest that we

should infer the required intent from the basic facts that gave rise to

the conviction. While it is true that Chandia did not (in his objections

to the PSR) dispute the allegations that he provided support to Ajmal

Khan by, for instance, helping him ship paintballs to Pakistan, these

facts alone do not support application of the enhancement. Unlike in

some cases where the enhancement has been applied, the acts underlying the conviction in this case were not violent terrorist acts. See,

e.g., United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004) (conspiracy to force changes in government policy by blowing up public

utility structures). Therefore, these acts cannot, standing alone, support application of the terrorism enhancement. Because there has been

no factual finding on the intent element, and because the basic facts

supporting the conviction do not give rise to an automatic inference

of the required intent, we must vacate Chandia’s sentence and remand

for resentencing. 

On remand the district court may reconsider whether the enhancement should apply in this case. In doing so, the court must determine

whether Chandia had the intent required by §3A1.4.4 To make this

determination, the court must resolve any factual disputes that it

deems relevant to application of the enhancement. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 32(i)(3)(B). If the court finds that Chandia had the requisite intent,

it should identify the evidence in the record that supports its determination.

* * *

4This court has not decided whether the § 3A1.4 intent requirement

must be found by clear and convincing evidence or merely by a preponderance. See Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 354-55 (discussing split of authority

on the issue but not resolving it). We reserve consideration of this issue,

both because it has not been briefed and because we will be in a better

position to address it in a case where we are presented with relevant findings. 

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For the reasons stated above, we affirm Chandia’s convictions but

vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing. 

AFFIRMED IN PART,

VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

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