Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04004/USCOURTS-ca8-03-04004-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeraldine Cole
Appellant
The May Department Stores Company
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-4004

___________

Jeraldine Cole, *

*

Appellant, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the Eastern

v. * District of Missouri.

*

The May Department Stores Company, * [UNPUBLISHED]

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: September 20, 2004 

___________

Before MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, BRIGHT, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Jeraldine Cole, an African American, was initially employed by The May

Department Stores Company in 1987 as a debt collector. She later became a training

supervisor. In November 1994, Cole filed a discrimination charge alleging May had

not given her a managerial title because of race discrimination. The charge resulted

in a finding of “no probable cause,” and Cole never requested a right to sue. May

promoted Cole to training manager in January 1995, entitling her to a salary and

executive benefits. Following May’s consolidation of all its debt collection

departments into one location in another city, May reassigned Cole to the new

location. Her title, benefits, and pay did not change with the move. Cole took a

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*

The Honorable Frederick R. Buckles, United States Magistrate Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by agreement of the parties. 

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medical leave of absence from December 1995 to June 1996 for anxiety and

depression, additional intermittent medical leave, and more leave to care for sick

family members. In August 1998, Cole took a medical leave of absence to care for

her seriously ill daughter and mother, who were both battling cancer, and to help care

for her daughter’s four children. Cole never returned to work. She applied for and

received long-term disability benefits through November 2000. Cole contends she

is still disabled, and May eventually dropped Cole from its employee rolls in

November 2001, more than three years after she last worked. 

Cole brought this employment discrimination action alleging that May

retaliated against her for filing discrimination charges and that May constructively

discharged her. The district court*

 granted summary judgment to May, concluding

Cole failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or constructive discharge. On

appeal, Cole contends there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the grant

of summary judgment. Having reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo

and having drawn all reasonable inferences in Cole’s favor, we conclude there is no

genuine dispute of material fact and May is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 792-93 (8th Cir. 2004). We thus

affirm the district court. 

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Cole had to show she engaged in

an activity protected by Title VII, she suffered an adverse employment action, and the

existence of a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse

action. Id. at 797. Cole presents a long list of complaints that she believes shows

adverse action by May, including her promotion to training manager at a salary below

her total compensation the previous year, her failure to receive a promised review and

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pay increase soon after her promotion, and her failure to get an office after moving

to the new location. 

Having reviewed all of Cole’s complaints, including some we need not discuss,

we agree with the district court that Cole failed to show any adverse employment

action. To show adverse action, Cole must establish “‘a material employment

disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities.’” Tademe v.

Saint Cloud State Univ., 328 F.3d 982, 992 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Bradley v.

Widnall, 232 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir. 2000)). Although outright termination and

other lesser actions that interfere with an employee’s ability to do her job may satisfy

the standard, “not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable

adverse action.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

In this case, when May promoted Cole to the managerial position in January

1995, Cole was taken off hourly pay and given a stable salary of $35,000. Although

the salary was $1600 less than Cole earned in hourly pay and bonuses in 1994, Cole’s

bonuses fluctuated yearly. In 1993, for example, Cole earned only $32,700. Further,

as a manager, Cole was eligible for other valuable executive benefits, including up

to ninety days per year in sick pay and the option of participating in May’s long-term

disability plan. Indeed, less than a year after Cole became a manager, she took her

first leave of absence, which lasted six months. She received a full ninety days of pay

for that time, amounting to about $10,000, which she would not have received as an

hourly employee. In addition, Cole began receiving long-term disability benefits in

November 1998, and received the payments for two years. This substantial increase

in managerial benefits offset the decrease in pay. Likewise, May’s failure to raise

Cole’s salary a couple of months after she took the managerial position is not adverse

employment action. Id. Indeed, the record shows Cole received her review and raise

a few months later after May had moved the combined collections group to the new

location. Cole also continued to receive regular raises and favorable reviews

throughout the next three years. See id. Cole received a salary increase in 1997 to

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$38,000, and another in 1998 to $42,500. Cole also complains about various actions

of Joe Williams, the Vice President of Collections, but the alleged actions, such as

moving Cole’s cubicle near him, being rude, and failing to invite her to meetings, did

not cause any material employment disadvantage. See LaCroix v. Sears, Roebuck &

Co., 240 F.3d 688, 692 (8th Cir. 2001). Similarly, May’s failure to give Cole an office

at the new location did not impact Cole’s ability to perform her job duties, and her

increase in workload was a result of the consolidation. 

We also agree with the district court that Cole failed to show any connection

between the alleged adverse actions and her filing of a discrimination charge. Cole's

starting managerial salary was higher than the salary paid to two white managers with

more managerial experience than Cole. Further, the timing of Cole’s promotion and

her discrimination charge do not establish a causal connection between the promotion

and the discrimination charge. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136

(8th Cir. 1999). There is no evidence that anyone who was aware of the

discrimination charge caused the delay in Cole’s review or set her managerial salary.

Williams’s alleged remark that Cole’s raise “went bye-bye” is no more than a stray

remark by someone who did not make the challenged employment decision. Denesha

v. Farmers’ Ins. Exchange, 161 F.3d 491, 500 (8th Cir. 1998). Likewise, the person

responsible for assigning offices did not know of Cole’s discrimination claim. 

To prevail on her constructive discharge claim, Cole had to show that May

deliberately created intolerable working conditions with the intention of forcing her

to quit, and that she did quit. Breeding v. Arthur J. Gallagher & Co., 164 F.3d 1151,

1159 (8th Cir. 1999). After filing her discrimination charge, Cole continued to work

for May for more than three years. Cole did not show any change in conditions that

rendered the workplace more intolerable immediately before she left on her last leave

of absence. See Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 716 (8th Cir. 2002). Cole's

increased workload was simply a result of the consolidation and the need to train

many people at the new location. Although Cole may have been unhappy with May’s

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business decisions, her working conditions were not so bad that a reasonable person

would resign. Instead, the evidence shows Cole did not return to work because of

tragic family circumstances. In late 1998, Cole’s doctors indicated Cole was

suffering significant stress because she was the only caretaker for her terminally ill

daughter, her daughter’s four children, and her invalid mother. The doctors indicated

Cole’s condition was not due to injury or sickness arising out of her employment. 

Having concluded Cole failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation or

constructive discharge, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to

May.

______________________________

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