Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03066/USCOURTS-ca10-91-03066-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan Gabriel Dozal-Bencomo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT DEC 3 1 i991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 91-3066 

JUAN GABRIEL DOZAL-BENCOMO, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 90-10042-2) 

Michael G. Christensen, Assistant United States Attorney (Lee 

Thompson, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, 

Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Peter John Orsi, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before HOLLOWAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BRORBY, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant Juan Dozal-Bencomo (Dozal) was convicted in the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas on five 

counts of distributing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C.§ 841(a)(1) 

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and 18 U.S.C. § 2, one count of possession of heroin with intent 

to sell in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(1) and 18 u.s.c. § 2, 

and one count of conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 

21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. § 846. The sole issue in this 

appeal is whether entrapment, as a matter of law, exists. 

Mr. Dozal appeals, claiming government agents induced him to 

commit the unlawful activity and the evidence produced at trial is 

insufficient as a matter of law to show he was predisposed to 

commit the offenses. The jury rejected defendant's entrapment 

defense and our review of the entire record convinces us the 

evidence clearly supports the verdicts. Accordingly, we affirm. 

In February 1990, Mr. Dozal developed a friendship with a 

musician named Tony Fardella who agreed to help promote 

defendant's music career. Unbeknownst to Mr. Dozal, however, Mr. 

Fardella served as an informant for the Drug Enforcement Agency 

(DEA). 1 Mr. Fardella soon told the DEA about a conversation he 

had with Mr. Dozal where he inquired whether Mr. Dozal knew anyone 

willing to front him cocaine. Mr. Fardella testified that Mr. 

Dozal responded negatively, but indicated he was "trying to move 

some heroin." 

1 Mr. Fardella agreed to supply the DEA with names of individuals 

trafficking in narcotics after agents found three grams of 

marijuana in his home during a search for documents on an earlier 

date.The DEA also paid Mr. Fardella a total of $1,900 over a four 

month period, including $750 for his role in defendant's case. 

Mr. Fardella was never under a threat of prosecution for the 

mar1Juana found in his home since the DEA never had a 

"prosecutable case" according to agents who testified. 

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Mr. Fardella took undercover DEA Agent Jim Woods to Mr. 

Dozal's home on April 12, 1990, to purchase some heroin. Agent 

Woods posed as a heroin dealer seeking a supply source for further 

distribution. When they first arrived Mr. Dozal was alone but 

stated he was waiting for a "very old friend." Shortly 

thereafter, a man named Reynaldo Rodrigez arrived. 2 During this 

first meeting Mr. Dozal made Agent Woods "swear to God that [he] 

was not a cop." Within two minutes of the encounter Mr. Dozal 

began negotiating the price of the heroin with Agent Woods, who 

was able to haggle the cost down from $2,300 to $2,200 per ounce. 

Agent Woods handed Mr. Rodrigez the money and he, in turn, handed 

the agent one ounce of brown Mexican heroin. 

Before Agent Woods left, he and Mr. Dozal agreed on specific 

"code" words to use when describing heroin in future telephone 

conversations. Mr. Dozal also agreed the price for future heroin 

buys would drop to $2,100 per ounce. Mr. Rodrigez gave Mr. Dozal 

$60 for his services in this transaction. 

Agent Woods telephoned Mr. Dozal three times to arrange 

purchases of heroin and Mr. Dozal invited him to his residence on 

at least one occasion. Transactions similar to the initial buy, 

but involving larger quantities of heroin, occurred at Mr. Dozal's 

residence on April 18, April 23, and again on April 30, 1990. All 

2 The reporter's spelling of "Rodrigez" differs from Appellant's 

version; the docket sheet also spells the name two different ways. 

The spelling used here mirrors that used in the indictment. 

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three times, Mr. Rodrigez handed Agent Woods heroin in exchange 

for cash. Mr. Dozal was present at each deal and continued to 

negotiate the price with Agent Woods. He indicated if ten ounce 

shipments were purchased the price would drop to $1950 per ounce. 

At one point Agent Woods inquired whether Mr. Dozal would be 

interested in swapping cocaine for heroin. Mr. Dozal responded by 

saying he would have to talk it over with Mr. Rodrigez. 

Following the buy on April 30th, Agent Woods discovered he 

had been shorted nearly one quarter ounce of heroin. He 

telephoned Mr. Dozal four times about the shortage and met with 

him at his residence. Mr. Dozal assured the agent that Mr. 

Rodrigez would correct the deficiency and offered to pay for the 

shortage himself. Mr. Dozal was visibly upset since he thought he 

had been "followed" after the previous day's transaction and 

because Agent Woods had used the word "gram" over the telephone. 

Agent Woods went to Mr. Dozal's residence again on Tuesday, 

May 8, 1990, this time to arrange purchase of six ounces of 

heroin. Mr. Dozal appeared "paranoid." Believing his house was 

bugged with transmitters, Mr. Dozal led the agent to a utility 

room he thought was safe. He searched Agent Woods for electronic 

transmitters and again made him swear he was not a law enforcement 

officer. Mr. Dozal then agreed the transaction with Mr. Rodrigez 

would take place the following day. 

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Agent Woods met both individuals at Mr. Dozal's house on 

Wednesday as planned. Mr. Dozal promptly went to the garage, 

returned with a cup and placed it in front of Mr. Rodrigez. Mr. 

Rodrigez pulled a baggie containing heroin out of the cup and 

tossed it to Agent Woods, saying "[t]hat's your shortage." Agent 

Woods weighed the plastic bag on electronic scales and Mr. 

Rodrigez handed him several more baggies containing six ounces of 

heroin. Agent Woods then stated he needed to go to his car to 

retrieve the $12,000. Mr. Dozal initially objected to the agent 

leaving the house with the heroin but then acquiesced, saying "go 

ahead and get the money and bring it back in." Agent Woods did 

not return. Instead, three other DEA agents entered the house and 

arrested the pair. 

At trial, Mr. Dozal admitted the elements of the offenses but 

claimed the government entrapped him. A jury rejected the 

entrapment defense after a four day trial and the district court 

sentenced Mr. Dozal to five years imprisonment on each count, to 

run concurrently. 

DISCUSSION 

Mr. Dozal contends the DEA initiated each of the illegal 

transactions and the government failed to show that he was 

predisposed to commit the offenses. In short, he argues the 

government brought forth no evidence other than his vulnerability 

to be "induced into the drug world by a mercenary." Mr. Dozal 

asserts "vulnerability" does not equate to predisposition and had 

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the DEA not induced him to arrange the drug purchases he would 

have remained "a poor and struggling, but law abiding, musician." 

Of immediate importance, Mr. Dozal asserts that whether 

sufficient evidence exists to constitute a triable issue of 

entrapment 

of Appeals. 

face, Mr. 

situation. 

is a question of law, reviewable de novo by the Court 

While this statement is technically correct on its 

Dozal misconstrues its applicability to the present 

For example, much of the support cited by Mr. Dozal goes to 

the threshold inquiry of whether the trial court should allow an 

entrapment defense in the first instance; it bears little 

relevance to the proper standard of review this court should 

accord a jury's findings of fact on the issue. Here, the trial 

court delivered, without objection, nearly the identical 

entrapment instruction requested by Mr. Dozal's counsel. Because 

the trial court submitted the entrapment defense to the jury 

essentially as requested by Mr. Dozal, we need not consider 

whether a triable issue of entrapment exists. 

However, we have examined Mr. Dozal's claim that the evidence 

supports a finding of entrapment as a matter of law. We "may find 

entrapment as a matter of law if the evidence satisfying the 

essential elements of entrapment is 'uncontradicted.'" United 

States v. Price, 945 F.2d 331, 332 (lOth Cir. 1991) (citations 

omitted). In other words, entrapment as a matter of law exists 

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"'only when there is undisputed testimony which shows conclusively 

and unmistakably that an otherwise innocent person was induced to 

commit the act.'" United States v. Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1434 

(lOth Cir. 1988) (quoting United States v. Gurule, 522 F.2d 20 

(lOth Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 976 (1976)). Our search 

of the record reveals sufficient disputed testimony arose at trial 

to preclude a finding that Mr. Dozal was entrapped as a matter of 

law. For instance, Mr. Dozal's testimony contradicts Mr. 

Fardella's assertion that the defendant, not the DEA, actively 

sought out a buyer for heroin. This confutation alone forestalls 

the need for further inquiry. 

Defendant carries a heavy burden in attempting to persuade an 

appellate court he has been entrapped as a matter of law, and for 

good reason. Where a properly instructed jury considers the 

entrapment defense, the matter becomes so intertwined with the 

issue of intent and so "typically based upon credibility 

determinations, [that it remains] an area traditionally reserved 

for jury resolution." Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1430; see also United 

States v. Riles, 928 F.2d 339, 342 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("Entrapment 

is an affirmative defense, which bears on the question whether a 

defendant is guilty of the crime charged [and] can only be 

resolved by trial of the general issue." (Citations omitted.)); 

United States v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1418 (lOth Cir. 1990) 

(when the trial court is convinced a genuine issue of entrapment 

exists, the matter becomes a question of fact for the jury). We 

generally will not supplant our judgment for that of the fact 

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finder where it has resolved the matter. The fact finder is 

traditionally in the best position to evaluate the evidence and 

determine credibility. Here, especially, the jury not only 

observed the testimony of the witnesses, but also heard the taped 

recordings of the actual meetings between Agent Woods and Mr. 

Dozal. Because the jury held as a matter of fact that Mr. Dozal 

was not entrapped into distributing heroin, "it would be anomalous 

for us to now hold that there was entrapment as a matter of law." 

Price, 945 F.2d at 332. Such a determination that entrapment was 

established as a matter of law can, however, be made in 

circumstances where the holding should be made without choosing 

between conflicting witnesses nor judging credibility. Sherman v. 

United States, 356 u.s. 369, 373 (1958) (entrapment held 

established from undisputed testimony of prosecution witnesses). 

Such is not the case here. 

Accordingly, we review only whether sufficient evidence 

exists to support the jury's verdict. See United States v. Hooks, 

780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 

(1986). A single test applies, whether the evidence relied upon 

is direct or circumstantial. The evidence, "together with the 

reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom -- is sufficient if, 

when taken in the light most favorable to the government, a 

reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Id. We have examined the entire record and 

find the evidence sufficient to sustain Mr. Dozal's convictions. 

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The purpose underlying the entrapment defense is to protect 

an otherwise unpredisposed individual from government coercion. 

Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165. The critical inquiry in entrapment, 

therefore, focuses on defendant's intent or predisposition to 

commit the offense rather than the degree of government 

involvement. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 488 

(1976); Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1433; Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165. Only 

when the government deceives the defendant in such a way as to 

"actually implant[] the criminal design" in the defendant's mind 

does entrapment come into play. Hampton, 425 u.s. at 489. The 

central question, therefore, is whether the criminal intent 

originated with the defendant or with the government agents. 

Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165. 

"Predisposition" is defined as a defendant's inclination, 

willingness or readiness to engage in the illegal activity for 

which he has been charged. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165. Here, the 

focus centers on the defendant's state of mind before government 

agents suggest illegal 

from direct evidence of 

activity. 

defendant's 

Id. Predisposition may arise 

prior involvement in the 

illegal activity, id., or may be inferred from "defendant's desire 

for profit, his eagerness to participate in the transaction, his 

ready response to the government's inducement offer, or his 

demonstrated knowledge or experience in the criminal activity 

under investigation." Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1433. Suffice it to 

say, "a defendant asserting an entrapment defense opens himself to 

a 'searching inquiry.'" Id. (citation omitted). 

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At the outset, we find the distinction between vulnerability 

and predisposition a matter of degree, not kind. The point at 

which an otherwise innocent person succumbs to an inherent 

willingness to 

remains largely 

participate in unlawful behavior, therefore, 

a factual issue. The record here indicates Mr. 

Dozal's role in the sale of heroin was significant. The evidence, 

taken as a whole, reveals Mr. Dozal as a willing and cooperative 

middleman in five heroin transactions, not the unwilling dupe he 

would have us believe. 

First, the evidence shows Mr. Dozal desired to profit from 

the transactions. He received $60 for his role the first exchange 

and a total of $200 for all five transactions. Agent Woods 

testified that after his arrest Mr. Dozal told him he was just 

trying to make some money and he did not see anything wrong with 

selling heroin. "It wasn't like I was killing anyone," Agent 

Woods quoted Mr. Dozal as saying. Additionally, Mr. Dozal admits 

on appeal that "[t]o get Fardella to help him with his music 

career, he started looking for somebody to front Fardella 

cocaine." All this evidence represents an indicia of profit 

motive. 

Likewise, Mr. Dozal displayed an eagerness to participate in 

the heroin transactions, which relates directly to the issue of 

predisposition. According to a government witness it was Mr. 

Dozal, not the DEA, who first suggested he had heroin to sell. 

Later, Mr. Dozal actively located Mr. Rodrigez as the supplier. 

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He arranged the initial meeting between Mr. Rodrigez and Mr. 

Fardella to discuss drugs at a restaurant where he performed and 

later arranged a similar meeting between Mr. Rodrigez and Agent 

Woods at his residence. In all, he hosted five separate heroin 

transactions in his home and served as the primary negotiator of 

the price. 

Similarly, Mr. Dozal was quick to respond to the undercover 

agents' inquiries about purchasing drugs. He told Mr. Fardella at 

their initial introduction he was trying to move some heroin and 

asked if he was interested. He also admitted attempting to find a 

cocaine source for Fardella. Again, a jury could properly 

consider this evidence as to Mr. Dozal's predisposition. 

Mr. Dozal also demonstrated substantial knowledge of the drug 

trade and the evidence strongly implicates him in the illicit 

activity. For instance, Mr. Dozal inquired whether Agent Woods 

was a law enforcement officer on several occasions and once 

searched him for a transmitter. He was acutely aware of the 

prevailing prices of heroin and openly negotiated the price with 

Agent Woods. Mr. Dozal also arranged to speak in code and 

conducted several transactions in his utility room where he 

thought it was safe from electronic bugs. He offered to pay Agent 

Woods for the shortage that occurred during the second buy on 

April 30. He became upset and paranoid when Agent Woods used the 

word "gram" on the telephone. Finally, on the morning of the 

arrest, it was Mr. Dozal who initially insisted Agent Woods not 

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leave the house with the heroin until he turned over the $12,000. 

In the final analysis, all of this evidence is consistent with a 

predisposition to take part in the sale of heroin. 

However, Mr. Dozal still insists that agents induced him to 

participate in the narcotics trade and the government failed to 

show any prior history of his involvement in drugs. Mr. Dozal's 

arguments have little merit. 

"Inducement" is defined as "'government conduct which creates 

a substantial risk that an undisposed person or otherwise lawabiding citizen would commit the offense.'" Sullivan, 919 F.2d at 

1418 (quoting Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165). Therefore, our inquiry 

focuses on whether the defendant stood eager or reluctant to 

participate in the charged criminal conduct. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 

1165. Inducement may take the form of "'"persuasion, fraudulent 

representations, threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises 

of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or friendship."'" 

Sullivan, 919 F.2d at 1418 (quoting Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165). 

Evidence that a government agent approached, solicited or 

requested the defendant "to engage in criminal conduct, standing 

alone, is insufficient to constitute inducement." Ortiz, 804 F.2d 

at 1165. Nor will inducement arise from evidence the government 

initiated the contact, id., or assisted in the unlawful activity, 

Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1433. It is also well established that in 

narcotics enforcement, officers may employ appropriate artifice 

and deception to uncover illicit activities. United States v. 

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Jobe, 487 F.2d 268, 270 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 

955 (1974). Merely providing a person "ready and willing tp 

violate the law" an opportunity to engage in the illegal acts is 

not entrapment. Id. 

In short, entrapment is a "relatively limited defense." 

Fadel, 844 F.2d at 1429 (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 

u.s. 423, 435 (1973)). Just as an accused seeking to raise the 

defense need only produce sufficient evidence to create a factual 

issue, id. at 1430, the government need only generate "sufficient 

independent evidence of predisposition to present a jury 

question," id. at 1434. The burden is not upon the government to 

produce absolute proof of predisposition, but rather it need only 

convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt the criminal intent 

originated with the defendant. Ortiz, 804 F.2d at 1165. 

Furthermore, in rebutting an entrapment defense, "the government 

is not required to show that the defendant has engaged in prior 

acts or prior violations of the narcotics laws." Fadel, 844 F.2d 

at 1433. 

Sufficient evidence appears in this record to find Mr. Dozal 

was a ready and willing participant in the sale of heroin, 

particularly where he initiated the heroin deals by asking the 

government informant if he was interested in purchasing heroin. 

Hence, it was Mr. Dozal, not the DEA, who planted the seed for the 

illegal activity. 

AFFIRMED. 

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