Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05049/USCOURTS-ca10-91-05049-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Winston Dunaway
Not Party
Wanda Linda O'Leary
Appellee
Oklahoma Department of Human Services
Appellant
State of Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission
Not Party
The Delaware County Department of Human Services
Not Party
Pat Weaver
Not Party

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT I\PR2 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

WANDA LINDA O'LEARY, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. ) No. 91-5049 

) (D.C. No. 88-C-1621-B) 

OKLAHOMA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, ) (N.D. Okla.) 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

THE DELAWARE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES; WINSTON DUNAWAY; PAT 

WEAVER; STATE OF OKLAHOMA PUBLIC 

WELFARE COMMISSION, doing business as 

Department of Public Welfare, 

Defendants. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL, BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior District 

Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior 

States District Court for the District of 

designation. 

* 

District Judge, United 

Colorado, sitting by 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed . R. App. P . 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiff commenced an action under Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5, alleging sexual 

harassment and retaliation based on her filing of complaints of 

sexual harassment. After a bench trial, the district court 

permitted Plaintiff to amend her complaint to conform to the 

evidence presented at trial to include a constructive discharge 

claim. The district court entered Findings of Fact and 

Conclusions of Law in favor of Plaintiff. In its judgment, the 

court awarded front pay and back pay of $51,418.22 plus pre- and 

post-judgment interest. Defendant Oklahoma Department of Human 

Services appeals from the judgment, arguing (1) the district court 

erred in finding that Plaintiff was retaliated against due to her 

complaints filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

(EEOC) and Oklahoma Human Rights Commission (OHRC); (2) the 

district court erred in finding a hostile work environment and 

retaliation based on gender; and (3) the district court erred in 

concluding Plaintiff was constructively discharged. We affirm. 

Plaintiff began working for Defendant on August 23, 1971, as 

a social worker. Appellant's Add. ex . 1. On October 16, 1975, 

she transferred to the Division of Social Services, id. ex. 2, 

where her immediate supervisor was Pat Weaver, Appellant's App. 

Vol. II, pt. A at 97, who was supervised by Winston Dunaway, the 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 2
County Administrator, id. Vol. II, pt . Cat 441. Plaintiff worked 

for the Division of Social Services until December 16, 1977, when 

she transferred to the Court Related and Community Services Unit, 

which was in the county office building and where she was not 

under any supervision by Dunaway. Appellant's Add. ex. 4; 

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pt. A at 102. 

During the time she was under the supervision of Dunaway, 

Plaintiff testified that she was sexually harassed by Dunaway. On 

a trip to the field with Dunaway, Plaintiff testified that he 

requested they stop at her house where he grabbed and kissed her 

and suggested going to bed . Appellant's App. Vol . II, pt. A at 

95-99. Also, he "played" with her leg while she was driving. 

Additionally, during the 1970 ' s Plaintiff and other witnesses 

testified that they had witnessed Dunaway's sexual advances toward 

other female employees. Plaintiff and Barbara Chastain observed 

him with his hand down the blouse of one of the secretaries, 

fondling her breasts. Id. at 37, 100. Chastain also observed 

this type of conduct on another occasion. Although she did not 

observe other physical conduct, Chastain believed Dunaway's 

physical contacts were common knowledge . Id. at 38. She stated 

that when workers did not do as Dunaway wanted, he made things 

difficult for them. Id. While on a business trip with Dunaway, 

he took Chastain and others to a topless bar during working hours. 

Id. at 43 . During this time period, Dunaway admitted keeping 

pornographic magazines in his office and had a picture of a nude 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 3
woman hanging in his bathroom. 1 Appellant's App. Vol. II, pt. C 

at 476-77. 

As part of an administrative reorganization, the Court 

Related and Community Services Unit relocated from the courthouse 

annex to the county office building on December 16, 1986. 

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pt. B at 260-61. At that time, 

Plaintiff again was under the control and supervision of Dunaway. 

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pt. A at 102. 

Subsequent to her transfer, Plaintiff testified that on one 

occasion when she had failed to sign in, Dunaway slammed a 

clipboard into her chest and separated her breasts. Id. at 108. 

She observed him doing head-to-head touching of female employees, 

side-by-side rubbing, and putting his arms around female staff and 

squeezing them. Id. at 109. 

Other witnesses also testified as to Dunaway's sexual 

advances during this time period. Janetta Spyres testified that 

during her employment interview Dunaway stared at her breasts and 

did not look her in the eye. Id. at 48. She also observed other 

instances of sexual harassment. Id. at 56, 61. Linda Brumbaugh 

testified that she saw Dunaway rub female employees, hug them, and 

kiss them on the cheek. Id. at 79-80 . 

1 There was also evidence of sexual advances during the time 

Plaintiff was not under Dunaway's supervision. Plaintiff 

testified that at a work function in the early 1980's Dunaway 

invited her to sit by him, touched her leg, rubbed against her 

shoulders, looked at her l ongingly, and ogled her breasts. 

Appellant's App. Vol. I, pt. A at 105-06. Whe n she was pregnant 

in 1986, he told her how attractive she looked pregnant and ogled 

her breasts. Id. at 104-05. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 4
On August 12, 1987, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the OHRC 

contending that she was being sexually harassed. Appellant's Add. 

ex. 22. Plaintiff stated in the complaint that Dunaway acted in a 

hostile manner, called her names, threatened her with suspension 

or termination, unfairly reprimanded her, and glared at her. She 

believed Dunaway harassed her in retaliation for her rejection of 

his sexual advances. On August 24, 1987, Plaintiff filed a charge 

of sexual discrimination with the EEOC. Id. ex. 12. 

After Plaintiff filed the complaints, Dunaway changed her 

working hours and assigned her extra duties. Appellant's App. 

Vol. II, pt. A at 118-19. Also, he started watching and following 

her and monitoring her telephone calls, and he directed other 

employees to watch her. Id. at 68-70, 84, 86, 122-23, 196. Many 

employees would not associate with Plaintiff, because they could 

not be friends with both Plaintiff and Dunaway. Id. at 49-52, 68. 

Linda Bingham testified that the office environment changed after 

Plaintiff filed her sexual discrimination complaint. Id. at 195. 

Locks were placed on supervisors' doors, the outside door locks 

were changed, and a telephone was removed from an interview room. 

Id. at 195-96. Bingham further testified that there was a general 

atmosphere of intimidation and people were afraid of associating 

with Plaintiff. Id. at 196. She attributed the office atmosphere 

to Dunaway. Id. Additionally, there was evidence that after 

Plaintiff filed her complaints her leave time was monitored. 

Appellant's App. Vol. II, pt.Bat 417 and pt.Cat 493-94. 

On April 19, 1989, the OHRC dismissed Plaintiff's complaint, 

finding no evidence of sexual harassment after Plaintiff's 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 5
retransfer to the State office building in 1986 . Appellant's Add. 

ex. 30. On May 12, 1989, the EEOC, giving substanti al weight to 

the findings of the OHRC, detennined that Plaintiff did not 

establish violations of Title VII. Id . ex. 31. 

On April 19, 1989, Plaintiff filed a grievance alleging that 

Wahleah Jordan was making faces at her and that Jordan and Dunaway 

on one occasion had directed distorted faces and high pitched 

laughter at her. Id. ex. 32. On April 24, 1989, Plaintiff filed 

a grievance alleging discrimination and improper denial of a 

promotion. Id. ex. 38. 

On January 3, 1989, Plaintiff began receiving treatment from 

Dr. John Gastorf, a licensed psychologist, for anxiety and 

depression due to job stress. Appellant ' s App. Vol. II, pt. A at 

16-17. Dr. Gastorf wrote a letter on July 10, 1989, recommending 

that Plaintiff be given a leave of absence due to a decreased 

level of functioning due to job stress. Id. at 19-20, 24-25. It 

was his opinion that she should either transfer or not return to 

work. Id. at 24. 

In July, 1989, Plaintiff was granted approval for leave 

without pay and remained on leave for one year. Id. at 186. At 

the end of the year, she requested additional leave, which was 

denied with notice that failure to return would result in her 

termination. Id. at 186-87. When she did not return, Plaintiff 

was terminated. Id. at 185, 193-94. She appealed the 

termination. The appeal was denied. 

On December 15, 1988, plaintiff commenced this action in the 

district court. After a bench trial, the court found that 

6 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 6
Defendant had discriminated against, retaliated against, and 

constructively discharged Plaintiff. Defendant appealed. 

RETALIATION 

Defendant argues that the district court's finding that 

Plaintiff was retaliated against because of her complaints with 

the EEOC and OHRC is clearly erroneous. A finding of retaliation 

is a fact question reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 

Love v. RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 386 (10th Cir. 1984). 

A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court, after 

reviewing all the evidence, is left with a firm conviction that a 

mistake has been made. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 

U.S. 564, 573 (1985). "Where there are two permissible views of 

the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be 

clearly erroneous." Id. at 574. Due regard is given to the 

district court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses. Ebert v. Lamar Truck Plaza, 878 F.2d 338, 338 (10th 

Cir. 1989). 

After reviewing the record, we are convinced the district 

court's finding of retaliation is not clearly erroneous. The 

district court found that before Plaintiff filed her complaints, 

Dunaway stared at Plaintiff while she was working, directed other 

employees to watch her, had her telephone removed, and changed her 

working hours. Also, the court found that other employees became 

less friendly to Plaintiff. The district court determined that 

after she filed her complaints these practices persisted, many 

employees would not associate with Plaintiff, and false 

7 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 7
accusations of not following up with clients and attempting to run 

employees off the road were made . Although the district court's 

findings are not clearly erroneous, we note that some of the 

things the district court believed occurred before Plaintiff filed 

her complaint actually occurred after she filed her complaint. 

The evidence in support of retaliation was stronger than the 

district court found . 

HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT 

Defendant argues that the district court ' s finding of a 

hostile working environment and retaliation based on sex is 

clearly erroneous. The existence of a hostile work environment is 

a fact question reviewed pursuant to the clearly erroneous 

standard. Hicks v . Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 971 (10th Cir. 

1991) . 

Hostile work environment sexual harassment occurs 

conduct unreasonably interferes with an individual's 

when 

work 

performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 

working environment. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v . Vinson, 477 U.S . 

57, 65 (1986). "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must 

be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of 

[the victim's) employment and create an abusive working 

environment.' " Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 

F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)). "Whether the sexual conduct 

complained of is sufficiently pervasive to create a hosti le or 

offensive work environment must be determined from the totality of 

8 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 8
the circumstances." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F . 2d 1406, 

1413 (10th Cir. 1987). 

The district court found that there was an atmosphere of 

intimidation for female employees who rejected Dunaway's advances 

and favoritism toward other female employees. We conclude the 

record fully supports the district court's findings and conclusion 

of hostile work environment sexual harassment. 

CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE 

Defendant argues that the district court's finding that 

Plaintiff was constructively discharged is clearly erroneous. 

Defendant believes the circumstances existing prior to Plaintiff's 

separation were not such as would be viewed by a reasonable person 

as intolerable. 

Constructive discharge also is a fact question, which is 

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Daemi v. Church's 

Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1384 (10th Cir. 1991); 

Hirschfeld v. New Mexico Corrections Dep't, 916 F.2d 572, 580 

(10th Cir. 1990). "Plaintiff bears the burden of proving she was 

constructively discharged by a preponderance of credible evidence; 

mere uncontroverted evidence, if not credible, is insufficient. " 

Hirschfeld, 916 F.2d at 580. "The test for a constructive 

discharge claim brought under Title VII is 'whether a reasonable 

person would view the working conditions as intolerable.'" Id. 

(quoting Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Ci r. 

1986)(quotations, brackets, and footnote omitted)). 

9 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 9
The district court, applying the above standard, determined 

Plaintiff's termination following a medical leave was tantamount 

to a constructive discharge. Although there is thin evidence to 

establish an intolerable environment, we conclude there is enough 

evidence to support the district court's finding. Although a 

reasonable person perhaps could have tolerated the conditions in 

the workplace, Plaintiff alleged that additional things happened 

to her that did not happen to other female employees. Thus, we 

conclude the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

10 

Appellate Case: 91-5049 Document: 010110246170 Date Filed: 04/28/1992 Page: 10