Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02000/USCOURTS-ca10-90-02000-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellant
Stephanie Vaughan
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

Uoited Stata Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 2 5 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

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) 

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) 

No. 90-2000 

v. 

STEPHANIE VAUGHAN, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

(D.C. Criminal No. 89-335-SC-2) 

(D.N.M.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

A jury convicted appellee Stephanie Vaughan of both 

possession with intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of 

marijuana, in violation of 21 u.s.c. SS 84l(a)(l) and 

84l(b)(l)(B), and aiding and abetting in violation of 18 u.s.c. 

S 2. Vaughan filed a Motion for Acquittal Notwithstanding the 

Verdict pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). The trial court 

granted the motion finding that the evidence introduced at trial 

was insufficient as a matter of law to establish V~ughan's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant United States appeals the 

trial court's ruling arguing that the jury had sufficient evidence 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-2000 Document: 010110080433 Date Filed: 01/25/1991 Page: 1 
to find Vaughan guilty. Appellant asks this court to set aside 

the trial court's judgment of acquittal and reinstate the guilty 

verdict. For the reasons that follow, we decline the appellant's 

invitation and affirm the trial court's action. 

Vaughan and her two-year-old baby were passengers in a car 

driven by co-defendant Jan Baker when United States Border Patrol 

Agent Francisco Velasco, Jr. stopped the car at a fixed Border 

Patrol checkpoint. Agent Velasco observed that the car was 

"riding low" and appeared heavily weighed down. When Velasco 

approached the car to obtain citizenship declarations from the two 

occupants, he detected what he described as a strong "nauseating" 

smell of deodorizer in the car. He observed a small child in the 

back seat sitting among blankets and bags piled around the. baby's 

seat. Velasco asked the driver of the car, Baker, if there was 

anything in the trunk. Baker appeared nervous and did not 

respond. 

Velasco testified that from his experience and training, he 

knew that deodorizers are used as masking odors to cover the odor 

of narcotics. Although he did not smell any narcotics, based upon 

his suspicions he signaled Baker to d4ive the car to a secondary 

inspection point. At the secondary stop, Baker consented to open 

the trunk. Velasco observed packages wrapped in duct tape, which 

when opened smelled like marijuana. Baker was placed under arrest 

and Vaughan was asked to get out of the car. As Vaughan did so, 

Baker "blurted out" a number of times that Vaughan knew nothing 

about the marijuana. Vaughan, seeing Baker in handcuffs, became 

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loud and uncooperative and stated, "What the hell .is going on, 

what is this ___ ?" 

Further inspection of the car led to the discovery of 

additional marijuana bales on the floor behind the front seat 

under blankets and other covering. Four sheets of "Bounce" fabric 

softener were on top of the marijuana. The open box of "Bounce" 

and other air freshener were found in the trunk of the car. 

Upon seeing the marijuana bales in the back seat uncovered, 

Vaughan again stated, "What is that ___ ?" Vaughan was placed 

under arrest and she and Baker, after being read their 

constitutional rights, consented to questioning by the Border 

Patrol agents. 

Although no witnesses testified for co-defendant Baker, he 

testified on behalf of Vaughan. He stated that he met Vaughan at 

a party and after hearing her problems invited her to travel with 

him to El Paso. Baker admitted that the purpose of his trip was 

to p.ick up a load of marijuana. When asked why he wanted to take 

Vaughan he stated, "Truthfully, because I deemed it would be good 

cover for me; it would look good going through the Border Patrol." 

Rec. Vol. II at 79. Baker testified that Vaughan never knew that 

the purpose of his "business trip" was to pick up marijuana or 

that she was being used as cover. 

Baker, Vaughan and Vaughan's child drove straight through 

from Badger, California to El Paso, Texas. Vaughan did not drive 

the car at any time. Upon arrival in El Paso, Baker rented a 

hotel room for Vaughan and her child and he left in the car. 

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Baker testified that Vaughan did not go with him but stayed at the 

hotel. After loading the marijuana, Baker returned to the hotel 

early the next morning and told Vaughan they were leaving. Baker 

arranged Vaughan's personal belongings in the back seat of the car 

while Vaughan dressed her baby. Baker testified that he never 

told Vaughan that there was marijuana in the car. At the end of 

direct questioning, Baker admitted that he "used" Vaughan. 

Vaughan's testimony was consistent with Baker's testimony. 

She met him at a party and accepted his offer to travel to El Paso 

because she needed to clear her head after finding out she was 

pregnant and because Baker offered to pay all of her expenses. 

Vaughan stated that she borrowed the car from a friend telling her 

she planned to travel to Reno, Nevada. She changed her plans, 

however, when she realized she had no money. She testified that 

"[i]t didn't really matter where I went as long as I got away for 

a couple of days." 

Vaughan testified that she did not think it was unusual to 

drive straight to El Paso and leave to drive back the next 

morning.. She testified that she smelled fabric softener in the 

car but stated that she washed her child's clothes with fabric 

softener and assumed that the smell was from the clothes. Vaughan 

testified that she did not notice anything different about the car 

the next morning. She assumed that the blanket behind the 

driver's seat, in her direct line of vision, covered the ice chest 

which had been there on the trip to El Paso. Vaughan testified 

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that it was not until she saw Baker in handcuffs that she realized 

something was wrong. 

We must reinstate Vaughan's conviction and reverse the trial 

judge ·if we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the 

jury's verdict. In reviewing the record, we consider all proof, 

direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the 

government to determine if a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. 

Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403 (10th Cir.); United States v. Hooks, 780 

F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.). The evidence supporting the 

conviction must be substantial and raise more than a mere 

suspicion of guilt. Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321, 1332 (10th 

Cir.); United States v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 (10th Cir.). 

The government indicted Vaughan as both a principal 

participant under 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and as a secondary 

participant under 18 U.S.C. S 2, the aiding and abetting statute. 

To uphold a conviction under§ 84l(a)(l) there must be some 

evidence that Vaughan (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) possessed 

a controlled substance (3) with the intent to distribute it. 

Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531. Under the aiding and abetting statute 

the government had to introduce evidence that Vaughan "willfully 

associated [her)self in some positive way with the criminal 

venture by showing that [s]he has joined the enterprise as 

something [s]he wishes to bring about and by seeking to make it 

succeed by some action on [her] part." United States v. Zamora, 

784 F.2d 1025, 1031 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 

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Appellate Case: 90-2000 Document: 010110080433 Date Filed: 01/25/1991 Page: 5 
612 F.2d 1272, 1275 (10th Cir.)). Thus, the key to both statutes 

is the introduction of some evidence that Vaughan knew there were 

drugs in the car. 

The government's argument on appeal rests on circumstantial 

evidence. No direct evidence was introduced showing that Vaughan 

knew the purpose of Baker's "business trip" was to purchase 

marijuana. No direct evidence was introduced showing that Vaughan 

knew Baker had marijuana in the car when it was stopped. We can 

infer intent to distribute from the quantity of marijuana found in 

the car, see Brandon, 847 F.2d at 630, but we cannot infer that 

Vaughan had knowledge of the marijuana merely because she was 

present in the car containing the marijuana. See Hooks, 780 F.2d 

at 1532. 

The government urges that an inference can be made that 

Vaughan had constructive possession of the marijuana in the car. 

We have defined the constructive possession of narcotics as "an 

appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug." 

United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 879, 881 (10th Cir.) (quoting 

United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1354 (10th Cir.)). 

Constructive possession of the goods in a car can be inferred from 

ownership of the car or the ability to exercise dominion and 

control over the car. See United States v. Richardson, 848 F.2d 

509, 512 (5th Cir.); Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1531. Vaughan did borrow 

the car from a friend and technically had the right to exercise 

dominion and control over it. However, she was not the registered 

owner of the car and testimony at trial established that she never 

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actually drove the car at any time during the trip. She d~d not 

direct the driver. The inference of constructive possession 

sought to be made is not enough to establish knowledge. An 

inference on an inference is not enough. Thus, we examine the 

record to determine if there is additional circumstantial evidence 

sufficient to support a conviction. 

In Hooks we upheld a conviction for possession with intent to 

distribute although the jury had no direct evidence that the 

defendant was in knowing possession of PCP. Police officers 

stopped a truck for speeding and placed the driver under arrest 

for giving the officers false information. When the officers 

approached the truck to inventory its contents they smelled a 

strong odor coming from the inside of the truck which they 

identified with PCP. A bottle of grain alcohol, used to make PCP, 

was found on the seat and ultimately a jar containing PCP was 

found behind the seat. The defendant was searched and officers 

found a bag of bicarbonate of soda, also used to make PCP, in 

defendant's pocket. Defendant claimed he borrowed the truck and 

knew nothing about the PCP. 

In Hooks we rejected the government's argument that the 

defendant's willingness to endure the noxious odor of PCP was by 

itself sufficient proof to establish that defendant knowingly 

possessed the PCP. We upheld the conviction, however, because 

there was sufficient other circumstantial evidence for a 

reasonable jury to establish defendant's knowledge; namely, 

defendant's possession of the bicarbonate of soda; defendant's use 

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J 

of a fictitious name; defendant's bloodshot eyes and slurred 

speech without the smell of alcohol. See also United States v. 

Ashby, 864 F.2d 690, 693 (10th Cir.) (evidence showing that 

defendant was a passenger in a car registered in her name, with 

the odor of burnt marijuana in the interior was sufficient to 

establish knowledge); Zamora, 784 F.2d at 1031 (evidence 

establishing that defendant resided in house where working 

methamphetamine lab was found on kitchen counter in plain view of 

defendant and a strong narcotic odor permeated the house was 

sufficient to uphold an aiding and abetting conviction). 

After careful review of the facts in the present case taking 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we 

must agree with the trial court that a reasonable jury could not 

have found Vaughan guilty based on the circumstantial evidence 

presented. Unlike Hooks, Ashby and Zamora, no testimony was 

introduced showing there was a narcotic odor present in the car. 

Agent Velasco smelled fabric softener which although strong and 

"nauseating" to him may not have been so to those inside the car. 

The government's argument that "unless Vaughan's olfactory 

ability was nil, she could not have avoided the scent, and the 

purpose it served," is unpersuasive. Appellant's Brief at 16. 

While Border Patrol agents, using their training and experience, 

may equate the smell of fabric softener with narcotics we cannot 

say that the average citizen mother traveling with a baby would 

automatically do the same. See State v. Zelinske, 779 P.2d 971, 

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) 

974 (N.M. Ct. App.) ("deodorizers are used much more frequently 

for entirely innocent purposes than for transporting narcotics"). 

Moreover, we do not believe that a reasonable jury would find 

the facts surrounding Vaughan's ill-fated trip from California to 

El Paso inherently suspicious. Vaughan was distraught and upset 

after finding out she was pregnant and that her boyfriend was not 

sure that he wanted the child. She testified that she needed 

money to take a trip and clear her head. Baker's offer provided 

that opportunity. The fact that Baker drove straight to El Paso, 

conducted his business during the night, and left the next morning 

is sufficient for a reasonable jury to infer that the trip had a 

singularity of purpose. Even taking the· facts in the light most 

favorable to the government1 however, there is simply no evidence 

to make the leap from the purposeful nature of the trip to the 

inference that the purpose was to obtain marijuana. 

The government argues that a reasonable jury could infer from 

Vaughan's reaction to the discovery of drugs in the vehicle that 

she was nervous and faking a response. We agree that a reasonable 

jury could find that Vaughan was nervous and that nervousness can 

be suggestive of guilty knowledge. See Richardson, 848 F.2d at 

513. The evidence, however, suggests that Vaughan's nervousness 

occurred only after she saw Border Patrol agents handcuff Baker 

and discover the marijuana, not during the initial stop. Agent 

Velasco responded negatively when asked during cross-examination 

if Vaughan evidenced any of the same nervousness as Baker when 

asked for identification. While it is conceivable that a jury 

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could consider Vaughan's change in demeanor from "obnoxious" to 

calm as evidence that she was faking a response, the inference of 

guilty knowledge from the evidence presented is wholly 

unreasonable. 

Finally, we cannot say that Vaughan's story was highly 

improbable or an extenuated hypothesis of innocence. Her 

explanation of the events was corroborated by Baker who testified 

on Vaughan's behalf and to his own detriment. 

Thus, viewing all the circumstantial evidence in its 

totality, we must agree with the trial court's ruling. The 

decision to grant Vaughan's Motion for Acquittal Notwithstanding 

the Verdict is AFFIRMED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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