Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03167/USCOURTS-caDC-96-03167-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sealed Case

Document Text:

<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 10, 1997 Decided September 4, 1998

No. 96-3167

In re: Sealed Case 96-3167

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cr00080-01)

Santha Sonenberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs.

Mary T. O'Connor, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. Mary Lou Leary, U.S. Attorney, John R.

Fisher, Steven J. McCool, Steven D. Mellin, and Elizabeth H.

Danello, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: Silberman, Randolph and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 1 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Garland, Circuit Judge: The defendant in this case was

charged with six related offenses, including unlawful possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, and using or

carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking

offense. After losing a motion to suppress evidence seized

from his house, the defendant entered a conditional plea of

guilty to the cocaine and firearm charges. Based on the

defendant's substantial assistance to law enforcement, the

government filed a motion for a downward sentencing departure, below the otherwise applicable statutory mandatory

minimums and sentencing guidelines ranges. The district

court granted the motion and sentenced the defendant to two

concurrent five-year terms of probation.

On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence obtained

from his house should have been suppressed because it

resulted from a warrantless entry that was not justified by

either the "hot pursuit" or "exigent circumstances" exception

to the warrant requirement, and because the subsequent

search of two bedrooms was not justified as either a "search

incident to arrest" or a "protective sweep" of the premises.

The defendant further contends that the district court should

have vacated his conviction on the firearm charge because of

the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Bailey v. United

States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995), which held that only firearms that

are "actively employed" satisfy the "using" prong of the

"using or carrying" a firearm offense.

We reject both contentions and affirm the defendant's

convictions.

I

In the early evening of February 22, 1994, Metropolitan

Police Department officers William Riddle and David Wilber

were driving in an unmarked police car through a residential

neighborhood in northeast Washington, D.C. Although it was

dark outside, the street was well-lit with high-intensity streetlights. The officers observed the defendant running or

"walking quickly" down the street. Appellant's Appendix

("App.") at 47. Neither knew the defendant, and neither

knew where he lived. They also did not know whether he

was armed.

Proceeding in their car, the two officers followed the defendant until he came to a house. Neither officer knew who

lived in the house. They watched as the defendant ran up a

path leading to the front door, opened the outer screen door,

and "struck the wooden door ... with his shoulder in such a

force that ... it appeared ... he was forcing the door open."

Id. at 41. The officers stopped their car and approached the

house to investigate. Officer Riddle went to the front, while

Officer Wilber went to the back.

Riddle saw that the front door was damaged and that there

was "a break in the door around the lock area, which further

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 2 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

led [him] to believe that the house was being burglarized."

Id. at 42. In fact, "the wood around that lock [was] broke[n]

completely off the door." Id. at 46. He also noticed there

were no lights on in the downstairs area of the house, despite

the fact that the defendant had just entered and it was dark

inside. Riddle loudly and repeatedly announced that he was

a police officer, but received no response. After again announcing his presence, Riddle tried to push on the front door.

Someone immediately pushed back from the other side without saying anything. This pushing back and forth lasted

approximately five to ten seconds, after which the pushing on

the other side stopped and Riddle could hear footsteps away

from the door. Based on what he had seen, Officer Riddle

"believed that someone was burglarizing the house with the

intent to either steal an item or injure someone within the

house." Id. at 43.

After again identifying himself as a police officer, Riddle

entered the house. Inside, Riddle saw the defendant running

up a flight of steps. The officer chased the defendant up the

stairs and into a large, darkened bedroom. Once there,

Officer Riddle saw the defendant "standing sideways" to the

door, and facing "an extremely dark corner of the bedroom."

Id. at 49. Repeatedly calling out his identity as a police

officer but receiving no answer, Officer Riddle pointed his

weapon at the defendant and instructed him to show his

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 3 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

hands. Before ultimately complying, the defendant's "hands

came away from his body around his waist area, went into a

dark corner of the bedroom, then came back toward the

middle of his body, and at that point he showed [Riddle] his

hands." Id. at 49-50. Amidst his shouted instructions, Riddle did not hear anything hit the floor.

Officer Riddle then led the defendant into the hallway,

patted him down for weapons, took him downstairs to the

first floor, and handed him off to other officers who had just

arrived. The defendant was not handcuffed. Riddle immediately returned upstairs to the large bedroom. Unable to turn

the light on, Riddle used his flashlight. In the darkened

corner, "where [defendant] was standing next to, and then his

arms and hands had went into," Riddle discovered "laying in

a chair, a plastic bag, which appeared to have busted open, or

come open in some manner, and several large white rocks,"

id. at 51, later identified as crack cocaine. On the floor

beside the chair was a semiautomatic handgun. The gun was

lying "on top of a pair of shoes, and I believe a handbag, or

some type of soft object." Id. at 63.

Upon finding this evidence, Riddle went directly back

downstairs and handcuffed the defendant. Thereafter, Riddle

and other officers "made a cursory exam of the house ... to

look for any other subjects that might have been in the house,

as in somebody that lived there, or a small child that might

have been scared by all the ruckus, in a closet or hiding, for

any other victims that might have been in the house." Id. at

55-56. As he entered the small bedroom on the second floor,

adjacent to the room in which he had apprehended defendant,

Riddle saw a clear plastic bag containing white rocks sitting

on a television stand. On the same stand was a triple-beam

scale. Like the others, these white rocks were later identified as crack cocaine, and Riddle testified that the scale was

of a kind "commonly used by narcotics distributors for the

purpose of the weighing in and out of narcotics." Id. at 56-

57. The officers also recovered from the defendant's person a

pager, which later investigation disclosed had received over

800 calls that month.

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 4 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

After completing the search, and while filling out arrest

paperwork, Riddle asked the defendant his address. The

defendant gave an address different than that of the house in

which he was arrested. The police did not learn until later

that the defendant actually lived in that house.

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from

his house. The district court first found that the police had

probable cause to arrest the defendant for burglary, based on

the fact that the defendant appeared to have broken open the

door, that the defendant had not responded when Officer

Riddle announced he was a police officer, and that he had

pushed back on the door when Riddle attempted to enter.

Id. at 179. The court also concluded that the warrantless

entry into the defendant's house was justified under the "hot

pursuit" exception to the warrant requirement suggested by

the Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294

(1967). Accordingly, the district court found it was "unnecessary" to consider "whether warrantless entry also was justified under exigent circumstances," pursuant to Dorman v.

United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See App. at

180-81.

The district court further held that Riddle "had a reasonable basis for pursuing the defendant up the stairs and into

the large bedroom," and that the items recovered from that

large bedroom were lawfully "seized incident to the arrest."

Id. at 180. Finally, the court held that the items found in the

other bedroom were in plain view and seized as a part of a

valid "protect[ive] sweep" under Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S.

325 (1990). Accordingly, the district court denied the defendant's motion to suppress.1

__________

1 The defendant also moved to suppress a post-arrest statement

to the police, in which he admitted throwing down the drugs and the

gun, both of which he had obtained from a crack dealer for whom he

sold on the street. App. at 80, 84-85. Because the officer who

advised the defendant of his rights at the time of his arrest could

not remember how the defendant responded to her warnings, the

government advised the court that it would not use the defendant's

statement in its case-in-chief. Id. at 138. The court therefore

After the denial of his motion to suppress, the defendant

entered a conditional plea of guilty to the cocaine and firearm

charge. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey,

and before his sentencing, the defendant moved to vacate his

conviction on the firearm charge. The district court denied

the motion, holding that the defendant had admitted that he

used "and carried" the firearm, and that this was sufficient

because Bailey had not changed the law relating to the

"carried" prong of that offense.

II

In order to determine whether the evidence in this case

was lawfully seized, we must first consider whether the

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 5 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

warrantless entry and arrest in the defendant's home were

valid, and then consider whether the subsequent warrantless

searches were proper. We consider the former issue in this

Part, and the latter in Part III below.

"It is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the

chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748

(1984) (internal quotation and citation omitted). For that

reason, "a search or seizure carried out on a suspect's premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police

can show ... the presence of 'exigent circumstances.' " Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75 (1971). Likewise, "warrantless felony arrests in the home are prohibited

by the Fourth Amendment, absent probable cause and exigent circumstances." Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749; see also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1979).

Here, the police did not have a warrant. Thus, for the

entry of the defendant's house to be held lawful, the government must meet two distinct burdens: it must demonstrate

that the police had probable cause to believe a crime was

being committed, and that there were exigent circumstances

__________

denied the motion to suppress the statement as moot, and did not

rely on it in deciding the defendant's various other motions. Id. at

139, 178.

justifying the police's failure to procure a warrant. See

United States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

We consider first whether there was probable cause, and then

whether there were exigent circumstances. We review de

novo the district court's conclusion that there was probable

cause, see Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996);

United States v. Streater, 70 F.3d 1314, 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1995),

as well as its conclusion that the warrantless entry and arrest

were justified by an exception to the Fourth Amendment's

warrant requirement, see Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699; United

States v. Timberlake, 896 F.2d 592, 595 (D.C. Cir. 1990);

United States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1988).2

The district court's underlying factual findings are reviewed

solely for clear error. See Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699; United

States v. Patrick, 959 F.2d 991, 996 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

A

We conclude, as did the district court, that Officers Riddle

and Wilber had probable cause to believe the defendant was

committing a burglary. The police observed someone appear

to break open the door to an unlit house and enter it without

turning on the lights. When the police approached the door

to investigate, they discovered that the lock was indeed

broken. When Riddle identified himself as a police officer,

the person who had entered the house did not respond in any

way. And, when Riddle again identified himself as a police

officer and tested the door, the person inside pushed back for

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 6 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

several seconds. The officer then heard steps going away

from the door. The totality of these circumstances gave the

officer probable cause to believe a burglary was in progress.

A forced door or window is a commonly recognized element

of probable cause in a burglary case. See, e.g., United States

v. (Emil) Johnson, 9 F.3d 506, 507 (6th Cir. 1993) (broken

window); United States v. Valles-Valencia, 811 F.2d 1232,

1235-36 (9th Cir. 1987) (pried-open window); United States v.

__________

2 The same standard applies to our review in Part III of the

district court's conclusion that the warrantless searches were justified by exceptions to the warrant requirement.

Dart, 747 F.2d 263, 265 (4th Cir. 1984) (sawed-off lock and

forced-open doors); United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273

(6th Cir. 1973) (pried-open door); see also United States v.

Tibolt, 72 F.3d 965, 970 (1st Cir. 1995) (unlocked rear door).

The same is true of the absence of lights, see Reardon v.

Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025, 1026 (7th Cir. 1987), and of silence in

response to an officer's calls, see Tibolt, 72 F.3d at 967;

Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir. 1995); (Emil)

Johnson, 9 F.3d at 509. The defendant's apparent flight

away from the door also added to the probable cause. See

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 366 n.4 (1983) (Brennan,

J., concurring) (noting that individual's flight in reaction to

investigatory stop by officer may "provide the necessary

information, in addition to that the officers already possess, to

constitute probable cause"); United States v. Green, 670 F.2d

1148, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Although these elements already

provided sufficient probable cause to believe a burglary was

in progress, they certainly justified the officer's next step of

testing the door. When the defendant pushed back without

any explanation, without requesting identification from the

officer, and without identifying himself as the homeowner,

Officer Riddle acquired further grounds to believe he had

discovered a burglary.

In rebuttal, the defendant argues that many of the abovecited precedents can be distinguished because they involved

police investigating neighbors' reports of suspected burglaries. But the fact that probable cause can be supplied by

third party reports of suspicious activity, does not mean the

police cannot act when they observe the suspicious activity

themselves. Quite the opposite is true.

The defendant also challenges the conclusion of probable

cause by focusing on its individual elements. He warns that

approving the search in this case would give the police carte

blanche to arrest any law-abiding citizen with the misfortune

to have a "sticky" door that requires an extra shove to open.

But probable cause here, as in every case, depends upon the

totality of the circumstances. See Dawkins, 17 F.3d at 403.

The police did not rely on their observation of the "shove"

alone. They relied on the shove, the broken door, the abUSCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 7 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

sence of light, the defendant's failure to respond to their

repeated inquiries, the push-back on the door, and the defendant's apparent flight away from it. This confluence of

events is unlikely to occur in the usual case of a homeowner's

"sticky door."

Finally, it is irrelevant to the probable cause inquiry that

the officers later learned the defendant had entered his own

house, and that he later offered evidence that the door had

been broken for several years prior to this incident. The

officers did not know these things at the time they entered

the home; what matters is their reasonable belief that unlawful activity was in progress at the time of the entry and

arrest. See Tibolt, 72 F.3d at 971; Murdock, 54 F.3d at 1444.

Of course, had the defendant immediately identified himself

as the owner of the house, the totality of the circumstances

might have been quite different. But the fact that he failed

to do so, when the officers could reasonably expect that the

true homeowner would have, adds rather than detracts from

the calculus of probable cause.

B

Probable cause alone does not justify the warrantless entry

of a home. There must also be some exception to the

warrant requirement. See, e.g., Dawkins, 17 F.3d at 403;

United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 1990).

The court below concluded that the entry was justified under

the "hot pursuit" exception suggested in Warden v. Hayden,

387 U.S. 294 (1967). On appeal, the government does not

press the "hot pursuit" exception, and instead argues that the

"exigent circumstances" exception, recognized by this court in

Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en

banc), justifies the entry and arrest. See also United States

v. Mason, 966 F.2d 1488, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1992). We agree

and affirm the district court's judgment on that basis, without

addressing the "hot pursuit" exception. See United States v.

Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

"Hot pursuit" is, of course, just one form of "exigent

circumstance." See Hayden, 387 U.S. at 298 (holding that

"under the circumstances of this case, the exigencies of the

situation made" entry without a warrant "imperative"); Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391. The Supreme Court also has recognized that "[t]he need to protect or preserve life or avoid

serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise

illegal absent an exigency or emergency." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100

(1990) (recognizing that warrantless entry may be justified by

"the risk of danger to the police or to other persons inside or

outside the dwelling"); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509

(1978) (holding that a "burning building presents an exigency

of sufficient proportions to render a warrantless entry 'reasonable' "); see also Mason, 966 F.2d at 1492-93; Timberlake, 896 F.2d at 596. The Court has also suggested that

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 8 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

warrantless entries are permissible to prevent the destruction

of evidence, see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. at 110; Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966); see also

Dawkins, 17 F.3d at 405; Timberlake, 896 F.2d at 596, or a

suspect's escape, see Olson, 495 U.S. at 100.

Although the Supreme Court has never provided a catalog

of all such exigencies, see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749, this court

has said that, at bottom, "[t]he test for exigent circumstances

is whether police had an 'urgent need' or 'an immediate major

crisis in the performance of duty afford[ing] neither time nor

opportunity to apply to a magistrate.' " United States v.

(James) Johnson, 802 F.2d 1459, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391). Other circuits have taken the

same view. See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d

766, 769 (2d Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("The essential question in

determining whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry is whether law enforcement agents were confronted by an 'urgent need' to render aid or take action.")

(citing Dorman, 435 F.2d at 391).

The government bears the "heavy burden" of proving such

"urgent need." See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 749-50; Dorman, 435

F.2d at 392. Like the determination of probable cause, the

question of whether there were "exigent circumstances" is

judged according to the totality of the circumstances. See

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 9 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Socey, 846 F.2d at 1446; (James) Johnson, 802 F.2d at 1462.

And like the standard for probable cause, the standard for

exigent circumstances is an objective one, focusing "on what a

reasonable, experienced police officer would believe." Timberlake, 896 F.2d at 596; Socey, 846 F.2d at 1446-47.

The government's claim of exigency in this case rests on

the officers' belief that the defendant was engaged in an

ongoing burglary attempt that could have endangered the

occupants of the house if the police had paused to obtain a

warrant. At the time he pursued the defendant into the

house, Officer Riddle "believed that someone was burglarizing

the house with the intent to either steal an item or injure

someone within the house." App. at 43. As we have held

above, that belief was objectively reasonable. Numerous

other circuits have found that probable cause to believe a

burglary is in progress constitutes exigent circumstances

sufficient to permit warrantless entry. See, e.g., Tibolt, 72

F.3d at 970; Murdock, 54 F.3d at 1442; (Emil) Johnson, 9

F.3d at 509-10; Reardon, 811 F.2d at 1025, 1029-30; Dart,

747 F.2d at 267; United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135, 1144

(8th Cir. 1982); Estese, 479 F.2d at 1274. We join those

circuits today.

As we have said before, "[b]reaking a dwelling house ...

creates a substantial risk of confrontation between the perpetrator and an occupant.... And where such a confrontation

occurs, there is a substantial risk that serious injury ... will

occur." United States v. Jackson, 113 F.3d 249, 253 (D.C.

Cir. 1997). For that reason, burglary of a house, with or

without a weapon, is considered a "crime of violence" under

provisions of the United States Code and the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. s 924(e)(2)(B) (burglary punishable by imprisonment for more than one year constitutes

"violent felony" for purposes of Armed Career Criminal Act);

U.S.S.G. s 4B1.2(a) (crime punishable by imprisonment for

more than one year, that is a "burglary of a dwelling ... or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential

risk of physical injury to another," is a "crime of violence" for

career offender Guideline). The need to prevent such a

confrontation, by intercepting the burglar before he potentialUSCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 10 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

ly confronts (or is confronted by) an occupant, is surely an

exigent circumstance.

The defendant argues that the police had no evidence he

was armed when he entered the house, and no evidence that

there were any occupants inside for him to endanger. But

since the police also had no evidence to the contrary, it was

appropriate for them to act on the basis of the kinds of risks

burglaries normally present. They did not have to wait until

they heard shots fired or an occupant scream. By that time,

the purpose of permitting immediate entry--preventing such

shots and screams--would have been lost. "Speed here was

essential," Hayden, 387 U.S. at 299, and that is the essence of

an exigent circumstance. As the Supreme Court recognized

in Hayden, "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not require police

officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do so

would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others." Id.

at 298-99.

III

We have concluded that the officers' entry to prevent what

appeared to be a burglary in progress was lawful. For the

same reason, the warrantless apprehension of the defendant

for that suspected burglary was lawful. We next must consider the propriety of the subsequent search of the two

bedrooms. The government does not allege that the exigent

circumstances of the burglary alone validated the searches.

Instead, it focuses on two more specific exceptions to the

warrant requirement, a different one for each bedroom. We

begin with the search of the large bedroom, which the district

court upheld as a search incident to arrest, and proceed to

that of the small bedroom, which the court upheld as a

protective sweep.

A

In Chimel v. United States, the Supreme Court held that,

incident to a lawful arrest, the police may properly search the

area within the arrestee's "immediate control." 394 U.S. 752,

763 (1960). A search of that area is permissible, regardless

whether in the circumstances of a particular case it is probable that "weapons or evidence would in fact be found" there.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); see also

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977); AbdulSaboor, 85 F.3d at 667. In this case, it is clear that the guns

and drugs Officer Riddle found in the large bedroom were

located in an area under the defendant's "immediate control."

The defendant was arrested while standing next to a chair in

the bedroom. The drugs were found on that chair, and the

gun was found beside it. App. 51-52.

The defendant contends that Chimel is inapplicable here.

"Although the larger bedroom was the room in which [he] had

been arrested," Defendant's Br. at 17,3 the defendant emphasizes that he was at the bottom of the stairs by the time the

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 11 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

bedroom was searched. By that time, the large bedroom was

no longer under his "immediate control." The critical time

for analysis, however, is the time of the arrest and not the

time of the search.

In New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court held that when

the police lawfully arrest the occupant of an automobile, they

may "as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the

passenger compartment," even if the occupant has been removed and is no longer in the car at the time of the search.

453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). We have since rejected the argu-

__________

3 In his brief, the defendant took the position that he "was

arrested ... when he was stopped at gun-point by Riddle and

transported downstairs to the custody of another officer. Thus ...

even before any contraband had been found, [the defendant] was

not free to leave." Defendant's Br. at 16. At oral argument,

however, he suggested he might not actually have been arrested

until the police discovered the gun and drugs, handcuffed him, and

formally placed him under arrest on those charges, rather than on

the burglary charges the police originally contemplated. That

formal arrest did not occur until after the defendant was already at

the bottom of the stairs. The defendant was correct the first time,

however. He was arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes when

Riddle apprehended him at gun-point in the large bedroom. See

Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991); United States v.

Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1428 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

ment that Belton applies only to automobiles, and affirmed

that the area under a defendant's "immediate control" for

Chimel purposes must be examined as of the time the arrest

occurs. See United States v. Brown, 671 F.2d 585, 587 (D.C.

Cir. 1982). In Brown, we validated the search of a pouch

taken from a defendant at the time of arrest, even though the

search took place after the pouch was moved out of the reach

of defendant's control. As long as a search is "contemporaneous with" and an "integral part of" a lawful arrest, we held,

the police may search a container that was within reach

"when the arrest occurs, even if the officer has since seized it

and gained exclusive control over it." Id. at 587; see United

States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423, 1429 (D.C. Cir. 1990)

(citing Brown).

Our recent decision in United States v. Abdul-Saboor

makes the same point, and is on all fours with the case at bar.

There, deputy United States marshals took the defendant into

custody in a bedroom, removed him from the room, handcuffed him, and seated him in a chair approximately "four feet

outside the bedroom doorway." 85 F.3d at 666. A marshal

then returned to the bedroom and seized two weapons. After

leaving the bedroom to make necessary arrangements, the

marshal again returned to search the bedroom, this time

finding drugs and additional guns. We upheld both searches

as incident to the arrest.

Reviewing the history of Belton and Brown, we concluded

that the "determination of immediate control must be made

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 12 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

when the arrest occurs." Id. at 668. In so holding, we noted

that our view was in accord with that of our sister circuits.4

__________

4 See Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d at 670, citing, inter alia: Davis v.

Robbs, 794 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (6th Cir. 1986) (arrestee handcuffed

and placed in squad car prior to seizure of rifle in house); United

States v. Cotton, 751 F.2d 1146, 1147-48 (10th Cir. 1985) (arrestees

handcuffed and apparently guarded by officer while trooper

searched vehicle); United States v. Silva, 745 F.2d 840, 847 (4th

Cir. 1984) (arrestees handcuffed and guarded by agents prior to

search of room); United States v. Palumbo, 735 F.2d 1095, 1096-97

(8th Cir. 1984) (arrestee surrounded by several officers and possibly

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 13 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

Indeed, we noted that making the test turn exclusively on the

time of the search "might create a perverse incentive for an

arresting officer to prolong the period during which the

arrestee is kept in an area where he could pose a danger to

the officer." Id. at 669. We emphasized, however, that a

search is incident to arrest only so long as it is an "integral

part" of the arrest process. The relevant distinction turns

upon "whether the arrest and search are so separated in time

or by intervening events that the latter cannot fairly be said

to have been incident to the former." Id. at 668. Such a

temporal separation did not occur in this case: Officer Riddle

searched the large bedroom immediately after arresting and

removing the defendant.

Notwithstanding our holding in Abdul-Saboor, the defendant contends that the search here was invalid under our

opinion in United States v. Lyons, 706 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir.

1983). In Lyons, we held that the search of a closet in the

hotel room where the defendant had been arrested, which

took place after the defendant had been handcuffed and

seated in a chair near the doorway to the room, was not a

valid search incident to arrest because it was "inconceivable

that [the defendant] could have gained access" to the closet.

706 F.2d at 330-31. We agree that there is some tension

between Lyons, which seems to focus on whether the space

searched was accessible at the time of the search, and our

earlier decision in Brown and later decision in Abdul-Saboor,

both of which focused on the time of the arrest. We need not

resolve that tension, however, to decide this case.

In Abdul-Saboor, we distinguished Lyons as a case that

added an extra requirement to the "search incident to arrest"

exception. Not only must the area searched be under the

defendant's "immediate control" at the time of the arrest, it

must also be "conceivably accessible" to the defendant at the

time of the search. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d at 669-70.

__________

handcuffed prior to search). See also United States v. Hudson, 100

F.3d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1996) (defendant handcuffed and removed

from house); United States v. Mitchell, 64 F.3d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir.

1995) (defendant handcuffed during search of briefcase).

Whether or not this added requirement is consistent with the

reasoning of Belton, Brown and Abdul-Saboor, it is satisfied

in this case. As we said in Abdul-Saboor, "showing that the

area searched was 'conceivably accessible at the time of the

search' was not meant to be difficult." Id. at 669. It was not

satisfied in Lyons, we said, because the defendant there had

briefly collapsed after his arrest and then been revived and

"immobilized," handcuffed in a chair, and surrounded by six

officers. Under those circumstances, it was not "conceivable"

that the defendant could have struggled free and lunged into

the closet--which was "several yards away" and to which he

had never previously sought access. Abdul-Saboor, 85 F.3d

at 669.

In Abdul-Saboor, by contrast we found the "conceivably

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 14 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

accessible" test satisfied. Although like Lyons, Abdul-Saboor had been handcuffed, he had not otherwise been "immobilized" or "physically restrained." In addition, he "did not

suffer any infirmity that would impede his physical ability,"

compared to Lyons who had collapsed after his arrest.

Moreover, unlike Lyons, Abdul-Saboor "had specifically requested entry to the area searched"--he had asked the

marshal to let him enter the bedroom to dress before being

taken away. And also unlike Lyons, Abdul-Saboor had

"demonstrated both the capacity and the desire to avoid

arrest"--upon entering the bedroom, he had tried to pick up

and hide a handgun. Finally, the hotel room in which Lyons

was arrested had been rented by the police, while the room in

which Abdul-Saboor was arrested was unfamiliar to the

officers and contained a weapon known to defendant. On the

basis of these circumstances, we concluded that, unlike Lyons,

it was "conceivable" that Abdul-Saboor might attempt to run

back into the bedroom after his removal, even though such an

attempt might not be "rational" or likely to succeed. 85 F.3d

at 670.

The case at bar satisfies the "conceivably accessible" test

even more readily than did Abdul-Saboor. Here, the defendant was not handcuffed or otherwise immobilized at the time

of the search of the large bedroom. He did not suffer any

physical infirmity; to the contrary, the officers had just

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 15 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

watched him move through the neighborhood at a rapid pace.

Like Abdul-Saboor, the defendant here both had specifically

sought access to the room being searched and had demonstrated the capacity and desire to avoid arrest: he had fled

from Officer Riddle into the very bedroom at issue. And also

like Abdul-Saboor, the defendant here had a motive for going

back to the room--he knew there was a weapon there.

Finally, although the defendant was at the bottom of the

stairs at the time of the search, only minutes before he had

raced up those very stairs in an effort to evade Riddle.

Under these circumstances, the bedroom here was no less

"conceivably accessible" to the defendant than was the bedroom in Abdul-Saboor.

B

We now proceed to the search of the small bedroom, which

the district court justified not as a search incident to arrest

under Chimel, but as a lawful "protective sweep" under

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). See App. at 180. We

agree with the district court's conclusion and affirm. We

note, moreover, that this rationale provides a second lawful

justification for the search of the large bedroom considered

above.

In Buie, the Supreme Court held that, incident to an

arrest, the police may conduct a "protective sweep, that is, a

quick and limited search of premises ... to protect the safety

of officers or others." 494 U.S. at 327. Such a search must

be "narrowly confined to a cursory visual inspection of those

places in which a person might be hiding." When limited to

looking "in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining

the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately

launched," it may be undertaken "as a precautionary matter

and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion." Id. at

334. A sweep of more remote areas may also be permitted,

but for that "there must be articulable facts which, taken

together with the rational inferences from those facts, would

warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the

area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 16 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

those on the arrest scene." Id. Because the government

does not contend that the search of the small bedroom was

supported by articulable suspicion, Gov't Br. at 27-28 n.6, we

consider only the first kind of Buie sweep.

As with a search incident to arrest, we analyze a protective

sweep from the vantage point of the time of the arrest and

ask whether the place searched was one "immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched." Buie, 494 U.S. at 334; see also AbdulSaboor, 85 F.3d at 669. The district court found that the

small bedroom "was only a few feet from the larger bedroom

door and only a few feet from the top of the stairs," and "was

a space from which an attack could be immediately launched."

App. at 338. We see no reason to disturb that finding. See

United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 213, 216-17 (2d Cir.

1995) (approving protective sweep of second room "immediately adjoining" room in which defendant had been arrested).

The defendant argues that our decision in United States v.

Ford, 56 F.3d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1995), demonstrates that Buie 's

first prong does not extend to the small bedroom at issue

here. To the contrary, Ford supports application of Buie to

this case. In Ford, we upheld, under Buie' s first prong, a

protective sweep of a bedroom adjoining a hallway in which

the defendant was arrested. We also upheld the seizure of a

gun clip found in plain view in that bedroom. See 56 F.3d at

270. What we declined to validate in Ford were seizures of

additional items found under a mattress and behind window

shades, "because these were not spaces from which an attack

could be immediately launched." Id. at 266. Those kinds of

seizures are not at issue here. In this case, Officer Riddle

discovered the drugs and triple-beam scale during a "cursory

visual inspection" of the small bedroom, see Buie, 494 U.S. at

334. Indeed, he discovered them immediately upon entering

the room, in what the district court found to be "plain view."

App. at 180. Accordingly, the search of the small bedroom

was lawful under the first prong of Buie.5

__________

5 In Ford, we distinguished Buie itself as a case where "the

defendant ... was arrested outside the basement and the search

Finally, we should note that in this case, the search of the

small bedroom might be justified by a second rationale: not

only to protect the officers, but also to protect the home's

residents. As the officers saw the situation, the defendant

was a burglar who had just charged up the stairs and into the

bedroom of someone else's house. In those circumstances, a

sweep to discover a hidden accomplice might be justified to

protect unsuspecting residents who return after the police

depart. It might also be justified to determine whether the

residents or their children were currently hiding--either injured or cowering in fear. See App. at 55-56 ("We made a

cursory exam of the house ... to look for any subjects that

might have been in the house, as in somebody that lived

there, or a small child that might have been scared by all the

ruckus, in a closet or hiding, for any other victims that might

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 17 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

have been in the house."); cf. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392

("[W]hen the police come upon the scene of a homicide they

may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if

there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises.").

We need not determine whether the scope of a search supported by such a rationale would be any broader than that

approved in Buie, as the first prong of Buie validates the

search the officers conducted here.

IV

The defendant's final contention is that the district court

should have vacated his conviction to the charge of violating

18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1), which applies to anyone who, during

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, "uses or carries" a

__________

was conducted in the basement, which presumably contained spaces

which were not immediately adjoining the place of Buie's arrest."

56 F.3d at 269 n.3. For that reason, the Buie basement had to be

evaluated under Buie' s second prong, which requires "articulable

suspicion." Unlike the Buie basement, however, neither the Ford

bedroom nor the bedroom here were large enough to "contain

spaces which were not immediately adjoining the place of" arrest.

Moreover, the evidence in this case was seized from a television

stand that was visible the moment officer Riddle entered the

bedroom.

firearm. In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995),

decided after the defendant entered his plea but before he

was sentenced, the Supreme Court held that to establish

"use" under s 924(c)(1), the government must show "active

employment of the firearm." Id. at 144. After Bailey, "[a]

defendant cannot be charged under s 924(c)(1) merely for

storing a weapon near drugs." Id. at 149. Both parties

agree that there was no evidence of "active employment" of a

weapon in this case, and hence that the defendant's conviction

cannot be sustained on the "use" prong of s 924(c)(1).

But s 924(c)(1) bars not only using, but also carrying a

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.6

And while Bailey interpreted the "use" prong narrowly, it

recognized that evidence that fails to show "use" may nonetheless support a conviction for "carrying." See 516 U.S. at

146; see also United States v. Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d 283, 284

(2d Cir. 1996). Indeed, last Term the Court interpreted the

"carry" prong broadly, relying on it to uphold a guilty plea

that could not satisfy the "use" prong. See Muscarello v.

United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998).

In Muscarello, the Fifth Circuit considered a defendant's

pre-Bailey plea to "using and carrying," which had been

based on the fact that the gun in question was found inside

the locked glove compartment of the car Muscarello had been

driving. Although the government conceded that after Bailey these facts could no longer support a conviction for "use,"

the Fifth Circuit sustained the plea on the alternative basis of

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 18 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

"carrying." See United States v. Muscarello, 106 F.3d 636,

638 (5th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court affirmed. The

Court held that Congress intended "carry" to convey its

ordinary meaning, which it said includes both carrying a

weapon directly on the person, and carrying one in a car. See

Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1916-19.

In this case, as in Muscarello, the defendant pled guilty to

using and carrying the weapon. That plea was contained in a

written plea agreement, see Plea Letter at p 1, repeated at

__________

6 The defendant does not contend there was any infirmity in

the proof of the "during and in relation to" element of the offense.

the plea proceeding,7 and confirmed by the district court upon

its review of the record after the defendant filed his motion,

see App. at 329.

The defendant's plea alone does not, of course, end the

matter. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(f) provides

that "notwithstanding" a plea, "the court should not enter a

judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as

shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." Fed.

R. Crim. P. 11(f); see also Cruz-Rojas, 101 F.3d at 285. To

demonstrate a satisfactory factual basis, the government

must have "evidence from which a reasonable juror could

conclude that the defendant was guilty as charged." United

States v. Ford, 993 F.2d 249, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1993). As long as

there is a satisfactory factual basis to support a "carrying"

charge, however, the defendant's conviction may be sustained

even though it would fail on the "use" prong alone. See

Muscarello, 118 S. Ct. at 1914; United States v. Harlan, 130

F.3d 1152, 1153 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mitchell, 104

F.3d 649, 652-53 (4th Cir. 1997).

The defendant's unadorned admission of guilt--while it

may add evidentiary support--is not alone sufficient to provide a factual basis for the plea. See Stanback v. United

States, 113 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 1997) ("holding that merely

conced[ing] culpability in the language that the statute uses

without acknowledging any concrete facts that fall within the

meaning of carrying" is insufficient to sustain plea); CruzRojas, 101 F.3d at 286. We also agree with the defendant

that the government's statement in its proffer to the district

court, that it would be able to prove defendant "did indeed

__________

7 The district court advised the defendant that he would be

pleading guilty to the following charge: "that you did unlawfully

and knowingly use and carry a firearm, that is, a Haskel .45 pistol,

during and in relation to the offense of unlawful possession with

intent to distribute cocaine base, a drug trafficking crime." App. at

238 (emphasis added). The court further explained: "So that's

what you'd actually be pleading guilty to, ... that you used and

carried this .45 caliber Haskel pistol." Id. (emphasis added). The

court then asked, "Do you understand that's what the charges are?"

Defendant replied: "Yes. Yes, sir." Id.

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 19 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

possess the .45 caliber handgun," App. at 245-46 (emphasis

added), is insufficient to establish "use" after Bailey. See,

e.g., Lee v. United States, 113 F.3d 73, 76 (7th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d 1379, 1393 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

Moreover, because "possess" may encompass various attenuated forms of constructive possession, it is also insufficient to

satisfy the "carry" prong of s 924(c). See United States v.

Sheppard, __ F.3d __, 1998 WL 390361 (6th Cir. 1998). See

generally Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir.

1997).

But the defendant's admission and the statement regarding

possession were not the only evidence the government offered. The proffer also recited the facts of the defendant's

arrest: specifically, that when directed to show his hands, the

defendant instead moved his hands away from his body and

towards the corner, before finally drawing them back to show

to the officer. Moments later, Officer Riddle found the gun

and drugs in the place towards which the defendant had

gestured. The government argues that this evidence supports an "inference that [the defendant] tossed away the gun

and drugs when cornered by the officer," and had "carried"

them up until that point--an inference that would satisfy the

definition of "carry" announced in Muscarello. Gov't Br. at

33. We agree. See Young, 124 F.3d at 801 (stating that

district court may rely on inferences in finding factual basis

under Rule 11(f)); United States v. Graves, 106 F.3d 342, 345

(10th Cir. 1997) (same); cf. United States v. Dunn, 846 F.2d

761, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that a reasonable jury could

find defendant possessed gun and drugs where officer saw

defendant make "pitching motion" toward couch and then

found gun on couch and drugs behind it).

In response to the government, it might be argued that,

although it is possible the defendant tossed the gun toward

the chair, it is equally possible that the gun was lying there

when he entered the bedroom. Had the gun been found

somewhere else in the room, this argument might be persuasive. But instead, the gun was found in the precise spot

toward which the defendant gestured when he was initially

apprehended. Moreover, since the gun was found lying atop

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 20 of 21
<<The pagination in this PDF may not match the actual pagination in the printed slip opinion>>

a soft object, the fact that the officer did not hear it fall does

not weaken the inference that the defendant tossed it there.

To the contrary, it is perfectly consistent with that inference.

We do not dispute that this is a close case. But we

conclude that a reasonable juror could have found that the

defendant carried the gun up the stairs and then tossed it

toward the chair when the officer ordered him to show his

hands. And those facts are sufficient, under Muscarello, to

sustain a plea to carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 924(c).

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's convictions are

affirmed.

USCA Case #96-3167 Document #379824 Filed: 09/04/1998 Page 21 of 21