Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-01477/USCOURTS-caDC-07-01477-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
USA Mobility, Inc.
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 8, 2008 Decided July 8, 2008

No. 07-1475

CTIA - THE WIRELESS ASSOCIATION,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND UNITED

STATES OF AMERICA,

RESPONDENTS

T-MOBILE USA, INC., ET AL.,

INTERVENORS

Consolidated with 07-1477 and 07-1480

On Petitions for Review of 

Orders of the Federal Communications Commission

Helgi C. Walker argued the cause for petitioners CTIA -

The Wireless Association and Sprint Nextel Corporation. With

her on the briefs were Thomas M. Messner and Christopher J.

Wright.

Matthew A. Brill argued the cause for petitioner USA

Mobility, Inc. With him on the briefs were Barry J. Blonien and

Erica R. Goldberg.

USCA Case #07-1477 Document #1126058 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 1 of 13
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The Commission’s rules include cellular and paging

service providers as CMRS providers. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(a).

Michael T. Fitch, Lynn R. Charytan, Samir C. Jain,

Craig E. Gilmore, Travis E. Litman, Carl W. Northrop, Thomas

J. Sugrue, Sara Leibman, T. Scott Thompson, and Christopher

A. Fedeli were on the brief for intervenors in support of

petitioners.

Nandan M. Joshi, Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the

briefs were Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General,

Robert B. Nicholson and James J. Fredricks, Attorneys,

Matthew B. Berry, General Counsel, Federal Communications

Commission, Joseph R. Palmore, Deputy General Counsel,

Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, and Richard

K. Welch, Acting Deputy Associate General Counsel.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Hurricane Katrina exposed

several weaknesses in the Gulf Coast’s communications

infrastructure, among which was the loss of power for critical

communications networks. To address this problem, the Federal

Communications Commission promulgated a rule requiring

commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) providers1

 to maintain

a minimum amount of emergency backup power for “all assets

necessary to maintain communications that are normally

powered from local commercial power.” In the Matter of

Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the

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The Commission provided exemptions for when

compliance with the backup power rule “is precluded by: (1)

federal, state, tribal or local law; (2) risk to safety of life or

health; or (3) private legal obligation or agreement.” 22 F.C.C.

Rcd at 18,024. For assets falling outside these specific

exemptions, a provider can submit an alternative compliance

plan that “ensure[s] backup power is available for 100 percent

of the area covered by any non-compliant asset.” Id. at 18,025.

Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 22

F.C.C. Rcd 18,013, 18,035 (2007) (“Reconsideration Order”).

The rule thus requires a backup power source (e.g., batteries or

generators) for every cell site and paging transmitter unless an

exemption is met.2

 Petitioners, who are wireless and paging

service providers, oppose the backup power rule on the grounds

that the Commission adopted it without statutory authority, that

the parties lacked notice, and that the Commission acted

arbitrarily and capriciously. We decline to address these

contentions now because the case is not ripe for review.

The backup power rule’s provisions do not take effect

until the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) approves

the information collection provisions contained in the rule’s

extensive reporting mechanism. See id. at 18,025, 18,026.

Providers must submit, within six months of the effective date

of the rule, lists of: each asset that is in compliance with the

backup power requirement; each asset that is not in compliance

but comes within one of the three exemptions; and each asset

that is not in compliance and not exempted. Id. at 18,024–25.

For a noncompliant asset that meets an exemption, providers

“must include a description of facts supporting the basis of the

. . . claim of preclusion from compliance.” Id. at 18,025. For a

noncompliant asset that does not meet an exemption, providers

must modify the asset or file an “emergency backup power

compliance plan” demonstrating how the “provider intends to

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provide emergency backup power to 100 percent of the area

covered by [the] non-compliant asset.” Id. This information is

crucial to the operation of the backup power rule. Without it,

the Commission would have difficulty enforcing the rule, and

the exemptions and alternative compliance plan might be

unworkable. 

 The need for OMB approval for information collections

derives from the Paperwork Reduction Act (“the Act”), 44

U.S.C. § 3501 et seq. Whenever an agency seeks to collect

information from the public, it must submit the collection plan

to OMB, which can approve, disapprove, or “instruct the agency

to make substantive or material change.” 44 U.S.C.

§ 3507(e)(1). OMB must “provide at least 30 days for public

comment prior to making a decision.” § 3507(b). Though the

Act only requires OMB approval of collections of information,

the Commission ordered that the entire backup power rule,

including the substantive minimum power requirements, “shall

be effective on the date of Federal Register notice announcing

OMB approval of the information collection.” Reconsideration

Order, 22 F.C.C. Rcd at 18,022. The Commission has not yet

submitted the rule’s information collection provisions to OMB

for review, and thus OMB has not reached any decision.

Because none of the backup power rule’s requirements

takes effect until OMB approves the information collections, the

case is unripe and we shall hold it in abeyance pending OMB’s

decision. The “basic rationale” of the ripeness doctrine “is to

prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication,

from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over

administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from

judicial interference until an administrative decision has been

formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,

148–49 (1967). The inquiry involves “a two-part analysis,

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evaluating ‘[1] the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and

[2] the hardship to the parties of withholding court

consideration.’” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. United

States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Abbott

Labs., 387 U.S. at 149). 

The fitness of an issue for review depends, among other

things, “on whether it is ‘purely legal, whether consideration of

the issue would benefit from a more concrete setting, and

whether the agency’s action is sufficiently final.’” Atl. States

Legal Found., Inc. v. EPA, 325 F.3d 281, 284 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

(quoting Clean Air Implementation Project v. EPA, 150 F.3d

1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). Though claims that the rule was

adopted without statutory authority and is arbitrary and

capricious “present purely legal issues[,] . . . even purely legal

issues may be unfit for review.” Id. Importantly, a “claim is not

ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events

that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at

all.’” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998) (quoting

Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 580–81

(1985)). 

These considerations weigh heavily in favor of holding

the case in abeyance. We did so in analogous circumstances in

Devia v. NRC, 492 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2007). That case arose

from a company’s desire to build and operate a spent nuclear

fuel storage facility on land belonging to an Indian tribe. Id. at

422. The company needed a license from the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC), a right-of-way from the Bureau

of Land Management (BLM), and a lease from the Bureau of

Indian Affairs (BIA). Id. After NRC granted the license, an

association of tribal members petitioned for review in this court.

Id. at 423. Later BLM and BIA denied the company’s

applications for the right-of-way and lease. Id. at 423. We

concluded that the petition for review of NRC’s decision was

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The Commission has not represented that it will exercise

this authority.

not ripe for adjudication because the “denials of approval by the

BLM and BIA appear to block the activity” of which the

petitioners complained. Id. at 425. It was possible that the

company could successfully petition for review of the BLM and

BIA decisions or that the agencies could reverse themselves,

thus clearing the way for construction of the facility, but those

possibilities were too speculative to render the case ripe for

review. Id. at 425–26. We made clear that the “question of

fitness does not pivot solely on whether a court is capable of

resolving a claim intelligently, but also involves an assessment

of whether it is appropriate for the court to undertake the risk.”

Id. at 424 (citation omitted).

As in Devia, the effects of the Commission’s action are

contingent upon future action by another administrative agency.

Though the other agencies in Devia had already denied

approval, the court indicated that even “await[ing] uncertain

approvals from other agencies” counsels against justiciability.

Id. at 426. OMB must evaluate the information collections, and

its disapproval would have a direct effect on the backup power

rule. Cf. Atl. States Legal Found., 325 F.3d at 285 (“[B]efore

the regulations have any effect, . . . New York must act and in

acting might alter EPA’s product.”). 

As an independent regulatory agency, the Commission

does have the power to overrule OMB, see 44 U.S.C.

§ 3507(f)(1), but that contingency cannot render this case

justiciable.3

 Cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729,

740–41 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The Commission might take that

course and then again it might not. If OMB disapproves and the

Commission fails to exercise its authority under § 3507(f)(1),

any opinion on the merits would have addressed questions that

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have become moot. See Devia, 492 F.3d at 426. If the

Commission only overrules OMB in part, for instance declining

to reinstate one of the exemptions, that would undoubtedly

impact our review of whether the rule is arbitrary and

capricious. OMB’s action and the Commission’s response are

entirely speculative at this point. Something more must happen

before the rule’s “effects [are] felt in a concrete way by the

challenging parties.” Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 148–49. This

case exemplifies “the usually unspoken element of the rationale

underlying the ripeness doctrine: If we do not decide it now, we

may never need to.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 101 F.3d

at 1431. 

As to the second prong of the ripeness test, we see little

hardship to the parties in not deciding the case now. Petitioners

note “the burden of extended uncertainty, as well as the cost of

committing resources to compliance or preparation for

compliance for an indefinite period of time.” Pet’rs Supp. Br.

13. But “mere uncertainty as to the validity of a legal rul[ing]”

does not “constitute[] a hardship for purposes of the ripeness

analysis.” Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of the Interior,

538 U.S. 803, 811 (2003). Petitioners’ concern over preparation

costs is more substantial – the Commission partially justified the

time-frame for complying with the rule on grounds that the

OMB process “giv[es] providers additional time to come into

compliance,” suggesting that providers should begin preparing

before the rule takes effect. Reconsideration Order, 22 F.C.C.

Rcd at 18,026. Nonetheless, until the rule does take effect,

petitioners “are ‘not required to engage in, or to refrain from,

any conduct’ during the time the case is held in abeyance.”

Devia, 492 F.3d at 427 (quoting Atl. States Legal Found., 325

F.3d at 285). Because petitioners are not required to do

anything to comply with the backup power rule while this case

is held in abeyance, the delay they cite does not overcome the

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judiciary’s “theoretical role as the governmental branch of last

resort.” Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 101 F.3d at 1431.

We recognize that parties still must petition for judicial

review of the Commission’s final orders within 60 days to

preserve their rights, even though the case may be nonjusticiable

due to pending OMB review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2344. We are not

concerned that the Commission will use this holding to delay

unnecessarily judicial review of its rules going forward. An

agency has no interest in putting off review in these

circumstances; its desire is to have its regulations take effect.

And we have long presumed that executive agency officials will

discharge their duties in good faith. See Sprint Nextel Corp. v.

FCC, 508 F.3d 1129, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing United

States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941)).

We will therefore hold this case in abeyance pending

OMB’s action.

So ordered.

USCA Case #07-1477 Document #1126058 Filed: 07/08/2008 Page 8 of 13
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring: While I agree that the

petition for review of the Commission’s emergency/backup

power rule is unripe, I write to emphasize that neither this

court’s interim stay of the rule nor the Paperwork Reduction Act

(“PRA”), 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq., justified the postponement

of PRA review of the rule’s information collection provisions by

the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”). This

misguided agency decision necessitates a holding that

potentially complicates and delays review under the Hobbs Act,

28 U.S.C. § 2344. 

 

A brief history of the rule illustrates the odd posture of this

case, an approach whose eventual results include delay of

potentially life-saving regulations and, ironically, significant

additional paperwork all around. On May 31, 2007, the Federal

Communications Commission adopted the emergency/backup

power rule, 47 C.F.R. §§ 12.1 & 12.2. In the Matter of

Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing Impact

of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 22 F.C.C.

Rcd. 10,541, 10,587-88 (released June 8, 2007). In adopting the

rule the Commission explained that it was implementing

recommendations in a study of communications problems that

endangered public safety and health during Hurricane Katrina.

See id. at 10,541. The rule set “requirements that will help

ensure the resiliency, redundancy and reliability of

communications systems, particularly 911 and E911 networks

and/or systems,” id. at 10,587 and these sections were to take

effect August 10, 2007, see Recommendations of the

Independent Panel, Final Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,655 (2007). 

Upon reconsideration, the Commission modified section

12.2 to include, among other things, the filing of inventory

reports and any claims of preclusion from compliance within six

months of the date of this requirement. In the Matter of

Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing Impact

of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 22 F.C.C.

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1

 By contrast, the Commission’s responsive brief of Mar. 24,

2008 stated that submission of the rule to OMB was “expected . . .

shortly.” Resp. Br. at 18. Since the Commission’s supplemental brief

was filed, the court has not been notified of any change in the status

of the rule.

Rcd. 18,013, 18,035-38 (Oct. 2, 2007) (“Order on

Reconsideration”). Notwithstanding the emergency/backup

power rule’s public safety and health rationale, and the

Commission’s acknowledgment that in emergencies “the cost of

failing to have [backup] power may be measured in lives lost,”

id. at 18,027, the Commission also ordered that all provisions of

the rule, including section 12.2 “shall be effective on the date of

the Federal Register notice announcing OMB approval of the

information collection now contained in that rule,” id. at 18,032.

The OMB has yet to begin review of the emergency/backup

power rule. This is because the Commission deferred to OMB’s

request not to submit the rule for review. In its supplemental

brief of May 19, 2008 the Commission states that “after this

Court issued its February 28, 2008 order in this case staying the

effective date of the rule pending judicial review, OMB

informally informed FCC staff that it would prefer that the

Commission not initiate the PRA process while the stay

remained in effect.” FCC Supplemental Br. at 5 (May 19,

2008).1

 No further explanation is offered. In the period

between filing its responsive and supplemental briefs, however,

the Commission appears to have altered its view concerning the

significance of the information gathering provisions. Although

the petitioners do not challenge the information and recordkeeping provisions of the rule, and the Commission never

suggested in its responsive brief that these provisions were

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 Even in its supplemental brief the Commission does no

more than repeat the provisions of the rule to the effect that it will not

become effective until approved by OMB or reaffirmed by the

Commission over an OMB disapproval pursuant to the PRA, 44

U.S.C. § 3507(f)(1) . FCC Supp. Br. at 9. During oral argument on

May 8, 2008, Commission counsel stated in response to the court’s

sua sponte concern about ripeness only that “the FCC seemed to

indicate in its reconsideration order that . . . th[e] [information

gathering provision] is not severable.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 21(emphasis

added).

inseparable from the backup requirement itself,2 the

Commission, in responding to the court’s sua sponte concern

about justiciability, see Order of May 9, 2008, has adopted the

view that the reporting requirements are so integral a part of the

rule that judicial consideration of the petition for review is

premature. FCC Supplemental Br. at 8. See Order on

Reconsideration, 22 F.C.C. Rcd. at 18,024-27; cf. Op. at 3-4. 

Given the importance of the emergency/backup power rule

to human life, public safety and health, the initial postponement

of OMB review can only be explained by assuming that the

court’s interim stay of the rule or the PRA were incorrectly

viewed as providing a basis for delaying mandated agency

review of regulations. In issuing a stay, the court is required to

determine whether there is a substantial likelihood that the

petitioner would succeed in its challenges to the rule, and

whether a stay would be in the public interest and not cause

undue prejudice to any party. See Wash. Metro. Area Transit

Comm. v. Holiday Tours Inc., 559 F.2d 841, 843 (D.C. Cir.

1977). However, this analysis does not consider, and should not

be used as a proxy for, the question of whether an agency rule

is so obviously unlawful that it is not worthwhile to carry out

statutory procedures prescribed by the PRA. Regardless of

which party might prevail upon appeal, the Commission

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3

 To avoid “uncertainty and gamesmanship in the process by

which FCC orders are appealed,” Petrs’ Supp. Br. of May 19, 2008 at

4, it may be the better part of discretion for the court, sua sponte, to

state in its stay orders that the stay of a rule shall not affect prompt

submission to OMB for PRA review. Otherwise delayed submissions

would produce “anomalous results . . . contrary to the court’s settled

construction of the Hobbs Act,” Petrs’ Supp. Br. at 4.

determined that the emergency/backup power rule was

necessary to protect public safety and health and the petitioners

have a right to judicial review pursuant to the Hobbs Act.

Similarly, nothing in the PRA suggests that it was intended to

interfere with the Commission’s rulemaking determinations, see

44 U.S.C. § 3507 (f)(1), or the Hobbs Act.3 See generally S.

COMM.ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,PAPERWORK REDUCTION

ACT OF 1980, S. REP. NO. 96-930 (1980), reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6241. 

Notwithstanding the inappropriate postponement of OMB

review, the court correctly accepts that the petition for review is

not prudentially ripe because OMB has not reached any decision

regarding the rule’s information gathering requirements, Op. at

4-5; see Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538

U.S. 803, 808 (2003); Town of Stratford v. FAA, 285 F.3d 84, 88

(D.C. Cir. 2002), and the Commission has not advised that it

would overrule any disapproval by OMB. The court relies on

Devia v. NRC, 492 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2007), in concluding that

the rule should be held in abeyance pending OMB review. Op.

at 5-6. But the court’s necessary response to the delay in

submission of the rule to OMB is not costless: In relying on the

dictum in Devia, 492 F.3d at 424; Op. at 6, the court

acknowledges the potential of a conundrum under the Hobbs

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2344, Op. at 8, for this court has held that the

finality of a rule published in the federal register is not affected

by the fact that the agency has not received OMB approval at

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 Unlike the emergency/back-up power rule, which as a whole

does not become effective until after OMB review, only the

information collection provisions of the rule in Career College were

subject to OMB approval under the PRA. 74 F.3d at 1267-68.

time of promulgation, Career Coll. Ass’n v. Reilly, 74 F.3d

1265, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1996).4 It also leaves uncertain the

propriety of the interim stay itself.

As a result of today’s holding that the petition for review is

prudentially unripe, the Commission should promptly submit the

final rule for OMB review, see Op. at 8, as its apparent

justifications for not doing so are not persuasive. More broadly,

the court’s holding should serve as a warning against using

unrelated interim stays to justify delay in mandated interagency

reviews.

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