Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01181/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-01181-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cozad Trailer Sales LLC
Plaintiff
Danny Rackley
Defendant
Rackley Bilt Trailer Sales, Inc
Defendant

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

COZAD TRAILER SALES LLC., a

California limited liability

company,

NO. CIV. S-05-1181 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

RACKLEY BILT TRAILER SALES,

INC., a California

corporation, DANNY RACKLEY, an

individual, and VARIOUS JOHN

or JANE DOES and XYZ

COMPANIES,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

On June 14, 2005, plaintiff Cozad Trailer Sales, LLC

brought suit against defendants Rackley Bilt Custom Trailers,

Inc. and Danny Rackley, alleging violations of the Lanham Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1125(a), and California Unfair Competition laws, Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200-17203, 17500, 17535. Defendants now

move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56.

/// 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is a leading manufacturer of low-bed heavy

haul industrial trailers and has been in the business since the

mid-1950s. (Pl.’s Separate Statement of Disputed and Undisputed

Facts ¶¶ 1, 3.) For approximately 20 years, defendant Rackley

purchased plaintiff’s trailers, which, among other design

elements, “featur[e] four to six inch round holes placed

proportionately in the side web of the trailer assembly.” (Id. ¶

8.) Around 2000, however, Rackley formed Rackley Bilt Custom

Trailers and began to manufacture trailers in a style similar, if

not identical, to that plaintiff’s trailers. (Compl. ¶ 18.)

Plaintiff first realized that defendants had embarked

on their own trailer manufacturing venture in March, 2005, when

it inspected a parked trailer that was observed sagging under the

weight of its load. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff feared that “one of

its own products was in imminent threat of collapse . . . .” 

(Id.) However, after a closer look, plaintiff’s general manager

“surmised that, despite its similarity of design . . . the

trailer had not . . . been manufactured by Cozad.” (Id.) 

Further investigation revealed that the trailer was purchased

from defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff sent a cease and desist letter

to defendants on May 19, 2005, and filed suit when defendants, in

spite of plaintiff’s protests, continued to produce their

allegedly infringing trailer design. (Id. ¶ 20.) 

Although many of the early filings in this case,

including a temporary restraining order stipulated to by the

parties, focused on the proportionally spaced round holes found

on the trailer frames, plaintiff clarified in its opposition to

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1 Although the holes have been the main focus of this

litigation until now, plaintiff did allege in its complaint that

“No other manufacturer of low-bed heavy haul industrial trailers

uses the same stylized design elements as Cozad.” (Compl. ¶ 15

(emphasis added).) This language seems to support an argument

that round holes are not now, nor were they ever, the only trade

dress element at issue. Given the liberal federal pleading

standard, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), the court finds that this

language provided defendants with sufficient notice that

additional elements were part of plaintiff’s trade dress claim.

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defendants’ motion for summary judgment that its trade dress

claims are based on more than just round holes. Specifically, in

addition to the holes placed throughout the webbing, plaintiff

also claims that defendants copied plaintiff’s “gooseneck V-latch

system which connects the neck of the trailer to the towing

truck,” the angled design of the suspension, and the unique shape

of the steering mechanism.1 (Pl.’s Mot. of P. & A. in Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 3-4; Galloway Decl. ¶ 4.) To redress

these alleged injuries, plaintiff seeks both injunctive and

monetary relief. 

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of

the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a

reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party’s

favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

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fact and can satisfy this burden by presenting evidence that

negates an essential element of the non-moving party’s case. 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). 

Alternatively, the movant can demonstrate that the non-moving

party cannot provide evidence to support an essential element

upon which it will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at 324 (quoting Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-movant “may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of the adverse party’s pleading.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(e); Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1137

(9th Cir. 1989). However, any inferences drawn from the

underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to

the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In addition,

the court must not engage in credibility determinations or weigh

the evidence, for these are jury functions. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

255.

The substantive law governing a case determines the

materiality of a fact. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. P. Elec.

Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore,

because this case is governed by the law on trade dress, the

court must consider the facts relevant to (1) whether the product

design is non-functional, (2) whether the design is inherently

distinctive or has acquired a secondary meaning, and (3) whether

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there is a likelihood of confusion. Disc Golf Ass’n, Inc. v.

Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002, 1005 (9th Cir. 1998). If

the court finds that the design is functional though, the inquiry

ends there. Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532

U.S. 23, 33 (2001).

III. Discussion

A. Functionality

In the Ninth Circuit, trade dress “refers to the ‘total

image of a product’ and may include features such as size, shape,

color, color combinations, texture, or graphics.” Int’l Jensen,

Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., 4 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993). But

trade dress protection under the Lanham Act extends only to nonfunctional product features or, when a collection of features is

at issue, elements that taken together are non-functional. 

Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 824

(9th Cir. 1987); Clicks Billiards Inc. v. Sixshooters Inc., 251

F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that functional elements

can be arranged in a “tapestry of visual effects” that

constitutes protectable trade dress). “[A] product feature is

functional if it is essential to the [product’s] use . . . or if

it affects the cost or quality of the article.” Inwood Labs.,

Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982). Such

features “constitute the actual benefit that the consumer wishes

to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular

entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.” Vuitton Et Fils

S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774-75 (9th Cir.

1981) (quoting Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co.,

633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980)).

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Functionality is determined by looking at “(1) whether the

design yields a utilitarian advantage, (2) whether alternative

designs are available, (3) whether advertising touts the

utilitarian advantages of the design, and (4) whether the

particular design results from a comparatively simple or

inexpensive method of manufacture.” Clicks Billiards, 251 F.3d

at 1260 (quoting Disc Golf, 158 F.3d at 1006). Here, the

evidence presented by the parties to address these factors

reveals a factual dispute. While defendant Rackley claims that

the size and placement of round holes in the trailer webbing

constitutes a functional element that provides “flexible tie down

configurations,” David Galloway, plaintiff’s general manager,

states that “[l]oads should not be tied down by chain or straps

passed through the round holes . . . because . . . the load will

not be safely secured.” (Rackley Decl. ¶ 7; Galloway Decl. ¶ 8.) 

According to Galloway, tie down functionality is provided instead

by D-rings installed along the webbing and positioned according

to customer specifications. (Galloway Decl. ¶¶ 8-9.)

Additionally, while Rackley states that the holes are

functional in that they lighten the weight of the trailer without

sacrificing structural integrity, Galloway asserts that its holes

are not included to reduce the weight of the trailer. (Rackley

Decl. ¶ 8; Galloway Decl. ¶ 7.) Finally, while Rackley claims

that holes in the webbing are an essential feature and round

holes are most cost effective, plaintiff’s expert, David

Fletcher, disagrees. (Rackley Decl. ¶ 11; Fletcher Decl. ¶ 6.) 

Flether opines that a trailer without holes is the most

structurally sound design, given that the trailer’s essential

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2 Although the undated Delta Star letter might, as an out of

court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter

asserted, be a classic example of hearsay, the court finds

reliance on it justified for two reasons. First, because the

letter is on company letterhead, discusses business matters, and

is addressed to the party who has offered it into evidence, the

letter might be admissible under the business records exception. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). Second, plaintiff did not object to

the letter attached to the Rackley Declaration and it is

consequently admissible at this stage. See Young v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1114 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“[D]istrict

courts in the Ninth Circuit must consider even inadmissible

evidence at the summary judgment stage unless a party has . . .

objected to it.”).

3 As discussed during oral argument, the court will not

address the photographs of plaintiff’s “Client of the Month”,

allegedly depicting plaintiff’s client using the round holes in

the webbing for tie downs. (Oct. 24, 2005 Meath Decl. Attachs.

A-C.) Given the size and quality of these exhibits, the court

cannot determine with any degree of certainty whether the straps

go through the holes or are tied to some other object attached to

the web. Moreover, several of the pictures come from plaintiff’s

customer’s website and therefore do not prove that

plaintiff promotes functional use of the holes. 

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purpose is to “hold, carry and bear a specified range of load

measured by weight or tonnage.” (Fletcher Decl. ¶¶ 5-7.) Thus

far, the court has before it only evidence of disputed issues of

material fact regarding the Clicks Billiards functionality test.

Defendants also present a letter from one of their

customers2 that specifically requests that round holes be placed

throughout the trailer. (Rackley Decl. Ex. A (Delta Star

Letter).) The letter details the functional advantages that have

led this customer to prefer round holes. (Id.) However, in

light of plaintiff’s affidavits, the court cannot make a finding

regarding functionality at this time. To do so would involve a

credibility determination, something that is beyond the scope of

the court’s role.3

Furthermore, even if defendants’ customer has

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4 Defendants further argue that because “[v]arious

manufacturers [have used] proportionately spaced holes of various

shapes and sizes including triangular, oval, square, rectangle,

and trapazoidical,” holes in the side webbing of a trailer must

be functional. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for

Summ. J. at 5.) However, this evidence might also suggest that

the shape, size, and configuration of holes in the webbing is a

common method of distinguishing trailers based on structure,

given that a trailer’s appearance might be cosmetically rebranded by the manufacturers’ customers. (See, e.g., Oct. 24,

2005 Meath Decl. Attach. C at 3 (Cozad trailer owned by Taylor

Heavy Haul).) This evidence submitted regarding functionality is

inconclusive.

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specifically requested round holes because it has found a

functional use for them, this evidence does not negate an

essential element of plaintiff’s case. “[A] trademark which

identifies the source of goods and incidentally serves another

function may still be entitled to protection.” Vuitton Et Fils,

644 F.2d at 775 (discussing aesthetic trademarks); Chrysler Corp.

v. Vanzant, 44 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1070 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (observing

that “mere existence of utility” does not preclude trademark

protection). The ultimate question the court must resolve in a

trade dress case is whether the dress was designed to serve a

source identifying purpose. Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp.,

296 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2002). The parties’ conflicting

declarations on this matter lead the court to conclude that

disputed issues of material fact remain at this stage in the

case.4

B. Distinctiveness

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment does not end

with the court’s inability to make a finding regarding

functionality. Even if a trade dress is non-functional, “the

plaintiff must still show that the mark or dress is either

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5 Rather than make a “secondary meaning” argument,

defendants argued that the use of proportionally spaced round

holes was widespread in the trailer industry, such that their use

was generic. (Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ.

J. at 9-10.) Defendants collected several sample images of other

trailers with round holes. (Aug. 30, 2005 Meath Decl. Apps. AE.) However, other design elements, in addition to the size,

spacing, and number of the holes in these examples, distinguish

them from the two trailer designs at issue in this case. This

evidence is not inconsistent with plaintiff’s claim that the

“size, number, selection, spacing and design of round holes in

the side web of [defendants’] trailer” infringes on plaintiff’s

trade dress. (Compl. ¶ 14.) Whereas plaintiff’s and defendants’

trailers are strikingly similar, the same cannot be said about

the examples offered by defendants.

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distinctive or has a secondary meaning.” Int’l Jensen, 4 F.3d at

824. These are alternative standards, but the Supreme Court has

held that a product design, like the trailer design at issue

here, cannot qualify as inherently distinctive. Wal-Mart Stores,

Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000); see also

Int’l Jensen, 4 F.3d at 824. Product design is protectable “only

upon a showing of secondary meaning.” Id. at 216.

However, defendants apparently assumed that their

functionality argument would succeed and consequently argued only

that “secondary meaning need not be considered.” (Defs.’ Mem. of

P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 17.) Given the lack of

any arguments from either side on this matter, the court cannot

make a finding as a matter of law that the design of plaintiff’s

trailers carries no secondary meaning.5

C. Likelihood of Confusion

Regardless of whether a trade dress is non-functional

and distinct, plaintiff must still demonstrate “the core element

of trademark infringement”--that defendants’ use of the dress is

likely to confuse customers. Int’l Jensen, 4 F.3d at 825

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(quoting E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280,

1290 (9th Cir. 1992)). “A likelihood of confusion exists when

consumers ‘are likely to assume that a product or service is

associated with a source other than its actual source because of

similarities between the two sources’ marks or marketing

techniques.’” Int’l Jensen, 4 F.3d at 825 (quoting Metro Publ’g,

Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir.

1993)).

Courts consider several factors when evaluating

likelihood of confusion, including: (1) the strength of the

dress, (2) the similarity of the dresses, (3) evidence of actual

confusion, (4) the marketing channels used, (5) the type of goods

and the sophistication of the purchaser, and (6) defendant’s

intent in selecting the mark. Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville

Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, defendants’

evidence appears to address the second and fifth factors. 

(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 17-21.) 

Defendants also allege, without evidentiary support, that they

did not intend to copy plaintiff’s dress for the purpose of

misleading customers, but rather engaged in copying because

plaintiff’s design offered superior functionality. (Id. at 21-

22.)

Regarding the second factor, similarity of dress,

defendants claim that because they brand their trailers with

Rackley stickers and mud flaps, consumer confusion is improbable. 

(Id. at 18, 20.) Plaintiff does not dispute that Rackley uses

source-identifying labels on its products, but offers evidence

that these identifiers are at most temporarily effective because

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of their potential to wear away or be removed. (Galloway Decl. ¶

12 (according to Galloway, mud flaps “are often destroyed or

removed and/or replaced by the purchasing customer” and “[s]mall

decals wash off under pressure washing” ).) In addition,

plaintiff notes that the small size of the labels makes them an

inadequate means for avoiding customer confusion. (Id.

(“[D]ecals and badges are hard to see and customers are unlikely

to pay close attention to what they say.”).)

“[I]n the Ninth Circuit . . . ‘post-purchase

confusion,’ i.e. confusion on the part of someone other than the

purchaser who, for example, simply sees the item after it has

been purchased, can establish the required likelihood of

confusion under the Lanham Act.” Karl Storz Endoscopy Am., Inc.

v. Surgical Techs., Inc., 285 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations

omitted). Therefore, plaintiff’s arguments citing the potential

for confusion outside the sale setting are relevant and preclude

an award of summary judgment based on defendants’ use of sourceidentifying labels. If, as plaintiff’s affiant asserts, these

labels are indeed temporary or hard to see, then only the

trailer’s structural design remains to identify its source. 

Given the striking resemblance between plaintiff’s and

defendants’ unadorned trailers, (compare Pistacchio Decl. Ex. E

(Cozad trailer), with id. Ex. F (Rackley trailer)), a reasonable

jury member could find a likelihood of confusion.

Regarding the fifth factor, purchaser sophistication,

defendants further argue that customers purchasing custom built

trailers manufactured by defendants are unlikely to be confused

and think they are instead contracting for plaintiff’s product. 

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(Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. at 19-

20.) In support, defendants offer into evidence a copy of one of

their advertisements, which explains that “Rackley Bilt Custom

Trailers” “Build[s] Lowbed Trailers and Specialized Dollies.” 

(Rackley Decl. Attach. C). From this evidence, however, the

court cannot say with certainty that defendants’ customers know

that “custom built” means “manufactured” and not simply

“assembled.” Drawing all inferences in favor of the non-moving

party, as the court must in a motion for summary judgment, the

court cannot hold that defendants’ customers know that their

trailers are unaffiliated with plaintiff based on these facts.

Additionally, the court cannot resolve the likelihood

of customer confusion issue in favor of defendants on the

sophistication of defendants’ purchasers alone. The court

recognizes that sophisticated purchasers of expensive goods are

assumed to be capable of finding “exactly what they are searching

for.” Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v. Epix Inc., 184 F.3d

1107, 1110 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,

599 F.2d 341, 353 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that expensive goods

and sophisticated purchasers cut against a likelihood of

confusion)). Such customers are likely involved here, for if

plaintiff’s prices are typical, the trailers at issue cost

anywhere from $90,000 to $400,000. (Pistacchio Decl. ¶ 6.) 

However, when, as in this case, “the [dress is] quite similar, .

. . the care and skill which a purchaser will have used when

deciding which instrument to buy will not have necessarily

extended to his decision regarding which retailer to buy from.” 

Daddy’s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy’s Family Music

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Ctr., 109 F.3d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1997). Under such

circumstances, this factor has at best a minimal impact on the

likelihood of confusion analysis. Id.

IV. Conclusion

Defendants have failed to present sufficient evidence

to show that plaintiff will not be able to demonstrate customer

confusion at trial. Moreover, questions of fact remain regarding

whether the similar design elements of plaintiff’s and

defendants’ trailers constitute non-functional trade dress and

whether defendants’ product labels are sufficient to avoid

customer confusion. Accordingly, summary judgment is not

warranted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.

DATED: November 2, 2005

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