Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02862/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02862-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tom Carey
Respondent
Christopher Dixon
Petitioner

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHRISTOPHER DIXON,

Petitioner,

v.

TOM CAREY,

Respondent.

NO. C05-2862 TEH 

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on the petition of Christopher Dixon for a writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After conducting an initial review, the Court

concluded that the petition stated cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered Respondent,

Tom Carey, to show cause as to why the petition should not be granted. Respondent filed an

answer contending that the petition should be denied, and Dixon filed a traverse. Upon

careful consideration of the record, the parties’ arguments, and governing law, the Court

DENIES habeas relief for the reasons discussed below. 

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The California Court of Appeal’s opinion described the facts and evidence presented

in this case as follows: 

Prosecution Case

Geevarughese Philipose lived in a three-bedroom house in San

Carlos with his wife, Molly, and their two sons, who were 8 and 4 years

old at the time of trial. Molly worked as a nurse on the 4:00 p.m. to

12:30 a.m. shift. She was at work when Geevarughese went to bed at

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10:00 p.m. on March 7, 2001. The Philiposes’s older son was asleep in

his own bedroom and their younger son was with Geevarughese in the

master bedroom.

On March 8 at 12:45 a.m., Geevarughese woke up and saw a

man he did not recognize standing in the bathroom of the master

bedroom. Realizing Geevarughese was awake, the man came to the

side of the bed and started punching him all over his side, head, and

face. Geevarughese’s younger son woke up and started crying. The

man asked Geevarughese to get his wallet. Geevarughese truthfully

told him the wallet was in another bedroom. The man cut part of the Tshirt Geevarughese was wearing and used it to tie his hands. He led

Geevarughese into the living room where he told him to lie down on

the floor. The man took the night garment Geevarughese was wearing,

tore it into strips, and tied Geevarughese’s hands, legs, and mouth. He

got leather belts from another room and tied Geevarughese’s hands and

legs more securely with them. Lying on the living room floor,

Geevarughese could hear the man pulling out drawers and taking things

out of the closet.

Molly arrived home from work at approximately 12:50 a.m. on

March 8 and parked her car in the street in front of the house. She

noticed no unusual cars parked or moving in the vicinity of her house. 

As Molly opened the front door with her key, she heard her husband

making a strange sound from somewhere in the living room.

Immediately after she entered, a man she did not recognize came at her

from the master bedroom and attacked her. The purse, shoes, and

lunchbox she had been holding scattered and she fell to the ground. 

The man began kicking her in the head and face. It was very painful

and she cried out repeatedly: “Help. Help. Help.” The man ran out

through the open front door. Molly was never able to see him in a good

light. 

Molly rushed to close and lock the front door. After using a

kitchen knife to untie her husband, she called 911. She was bleeding

from her mouth, and feeling pain in her head, jaw, face, and eyes. An

X-ray the next day showed that her lower jaw was fractured. At the

time of trial, 14 months later, Molly could chew but biting was difficult

and she was still experiencing pain on the left side of her head. 

Officer Buelow responded to the scene just after 1:00 a.m. He

saw no pedestrians near the house. Inside, the house had been

ransacked. Clothes were scattered on the floor and drawers were open.

A glass vase with American and Singaporean coins had been removed

from the closet and the coins spread out on the bed. 

Examining the outside of the house, police found that a garage

door was open and screens had been pried from several windows. 

Geevarughese noticed that a screwdriver and wrench were missing

from a box he kept in the garage. A stool was stacked on top of a lawn

chair below the window of the master bathroom. Bottles of shampoo

and soap were stacked on the ground nearby. When Geevarughese

looked over the house and garage, he concluded that the man had come

in through the master bathroom window. A police officer testified that

the burglar could have crawled through the window above where the

lawn chair and stool were stacked. 

Two strips of tape had been stuck on the outside of the

Philiposes’s older son’s bedroom window. A matching roll of clear

adhesive tape was sitting on the ledge. The window was a two-sided

horizontal sliding window in which one side was fixed and the other

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slid along a track to open and close. A police expert testified that it

appeared someone had attempted to pry the window open and that the

tape had been placed there to deaden the sound or prevent the glass

from shattering. The window had been cracked underneath the tape. 

The Philiposes described the intruder as a Caucasian male, under 30

years of age, with a thin face and no glasses. He was wearing a white

T-shirt with a dark vest, long pants, and a dark cap with no sunshade in

front, like a baseball cap turned backwards. Molly worked with a

police sketch artist to help him make the sketch, but she did not think

the completed sketch was a close match to the intruder. 

The crime lab processed the strips of clear packing tape found

on the older son’s window for latent prints. Seventeen prints were

found on the sticky side of the tape. Sixteen of these were identified as

defendant’s. The 17th print could neither be positively identified as

defendant’s nor could he be excluded as its source. 

As a result of the fingerprint identification, defendant was

arrested on March 10, 2001. He was taken into custody approximately

a block and a half from the Philipose home as he was about to drive

away in a car registered to his girlfriend, Rosanna Perry. Defendant

was wearing a baseball cap turned backwards. His right pinky and ring

fingers were injured and were bandaged with a splint holding the two

fingers together. Police found a roll of masking tape on the driver’s

side front floorboard, and a flashlight on the driver’s seat. On the

passenger side, they found a screwdriver, crescent wrench, and black

beret-style cap. A Singaporean 20-cent piece like those Geevarughese

kept in the glass vase was found on the rear seat. 

The Philiposes viewed defendant in a field show up 30 minutes

after his arrest. Geevarughese was 50 percent sure defendant was the

intruder. Molly was 70 to 80 percent sure. Following defendant’s

arrest, Officer Richard Dickerson asked Molly and Geevarughese

individually whether either of them had bitten the intruder. Both

responded negatively. The next day, Molly called Dickerson and told

him she now remembered that she did bite the intruder’s finger when he

first grabbed her and put her on the floor. A forensic dentist testified at

trial that the injuries to Molly’s mouth and to defendant’s finger were

consistent with Molly having bitten the defendant. According to the

witness, defendant’s hand injuries were not consistent with being cut by

punching a windshield or coming in contact with a broken crack pipe. 

Defendant gave a statement to police denying that he burglarized

the Philipose house. He stated that he had gotten into a fight with his

girlfriend and had been sleeping in his car and staying in a vacant

apartment in the same complex his girlfriend lived in, located within a

block of the Philipose residence. He stated that he had injured his

finger two or three weeks earlier, and mentioned that he had hit the

windshield of his girlfriend’s car two weeks earlier because he had

been angry about his girlfriend sleeping with another man. Rosanna

Perry initially told police that she first noticed an injury to defendant’s

finger on the morning of March 8. Defendant told her he had been in a

bar fight with a man who bit his finger. At the preliminary hearing,

Perry testified that she first saw the injury on March 7, and that

defendant first told her he had been in a bar fight and later said the

injury was caused by broken glass when he was trying to retrieve drugs

that had fallen on the carpet.

At a live line-up after defendant’s arrest, Molly picked

defendant out as the “possible” perpetrator. Geevarughese thought that

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both defendant and another man resembled the intruder. At trial, Molly

and Geevarughese testified there were similarities between defendant

and the intruder, including his age, height, build, and skin color, but

they could not identify defendant with 100 percent certainty.

At trial, Geevarughese identified the screwdriver and wrench as

the tools taken from his garage on March 8. He could not positively

identify the beret found in the defendant’s car as the one the intruder

was wearing, but the vertical stitching on the beret was similar to that

shown on the sketch artist’s drawing of the intruder. The sketch artist

testified that he would not have shown vertical striations in his sketch

of the cap unless the Philiposes had described that to him.

Defense Case

Defendant had shown Officer Dickerson a receipt for a tax

refund he received on or about the day of the incident to show that he

was not in need of money. Defendant’s friend, Scott Croce, testified

that defendant and Perry came over to Croce’s house in Sunnyvale at

10:30 p.m. on March 7, 2001 and stayed until approximately midnight

or possibly as late as 12:30 a.m.2

 He recalled that defendant had told

him that he had taken his taxes into H & R Block that day and asked

Croce if he could use Croce’s house as the mailing address for the

refund he was expecting. It was stipulated that it would take 20 to 25

minutes to drive from Croce’s house to the Philipose residence. 

An H & R Block employee testified that defendant had his taxes

prepared and applied for a loan against his expected federal refund in

the Sunnyvale office on March 7, 2001. He returned the next day to

pick up a check for $867.05, which reflected his refund less fees for tax

preparation and the loan. 

Defendant’s friend, Michelle Cocchi, testified that she was

present when defendant injured his finger a week or two before her

March 13 birthday in 2001. Cocchi testified that defendant lost his

temper and struck a windshield after learning that Perry had been

unfaithful to him. Perry’s mother testified that she had used the car

defendant was arrested in until February 2001, and that her husband

had placed tools in the car that could have included those Geevarughese

had claimed were his. She further testified that the Singaporean coin

found in the car could have been hers because she kept a jug of coins in

the car that included coins from other countries, including Singapore. 

Croce, Cocchi, and Perry’s mother all testified defendant was cleanshaven during the time period of the crime. Defendant was cleanshaven at the time of his arrest. According to the Philiposes, the

intruder had a French beard or goatee. The police sketch artist testified

that he would not have released the picture if Molly and Geevarughese

had told him it did not resemble the suspect.

SSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 2

On rebuttal, the prosecution produced a letter defendant wrote

from jail to a friend directing the friend to tell Croce’s wife to say that

defendant was at her home on the night of March 7.

People v. Dixon, No. A102305, slip op. at 2-7 (Cal. App. May 10, 2004) (available at 2004

WL 1045924) (Resp’t Ex. G).

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On June 13, 2002, a jury convicted Dixon of the following crimes: (1) residential

burglary in violation of Penal Code section 460, subdivision (a), with special allegations that

Dixon personally inflicted great bodily injury under sections 1203.075 and 12022.7,

subdivision (a), and that the offense was a violent felony under section 667.5, subdivision

(c)(21); (2) false imprisonment in violation of section 236; (3) robbery of an inhabited

residence in violation of section 212.5, subdivision (a), with special allegations that Dixon

personally inflicted great bodily injury under sections 1203.075 and 12022.7; (4) battery

resulting in serious bodily injury under section 243, subdivision (d), with a special allegation

that Dixon inflicted great bodily injury within the meaning of section 1192.7, subdivision

(c)(8); and (5) receiving stolen property in violation of section 496, subdivision (a). Clerk’s

Tr. at 7-11, 209-15 [hereinafter “CT”] (Resp’t Ex. A).

The prosecution also alleged that Dixon had prior convictions that qualified for

sentence enhancements under California’s “Three Strikes Law,” California Penal Code

section 667, subdivisions (b)-(i). On March 24, 2003, after Dixon waived a jury trial on the

prior conviction allegations, the trial court found that: Dixon had been convicted of four

felonies within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4); that Dixon

committed a violent or serious felony while he was on state prison parole under Penal Code

section 3000, within the meaning of Penal Code section 1203.085, subdivision (b); that

Dixon had four felony convictions within the meaning of Penal Code section 1170.12,

subdivision (c)(2); that Dixon had one serious felony conviction within the meaning of Penal

Code section 667, subdivision (a); and that Dixon had served two prison terms within the

meaning of Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). CT 11-14, 90, 399-400. 

On April 4, 2003, the trial court sentenced Dixon under California’s Three Strikes

Law as follows: consecutive terms of 25 years to life as to counts one and three; sentences

stayed under Penal Code section 654 as to counts two, four, five; an additional 3 years for the

special allegation under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a), as to count three; an

additional 5 years for the prior conviction allegation under Penal Code section 667,

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subdivision (a); and an additional 4 years (2 years each) for the two prior conviction

allegations under Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b). CT 399-414. 

Dixon appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeals. The appellate court

remanded the case to reduce the section 667.5 enhancements to one year each, but the court

otherwise affirmed Dixon’s conviction and sentence. Resp’t Ex. G at 17. Dixon then

appealed to the California Supreme Court, which denied review. Resp’t Ex. I. 

On July 13, 2005, Dixon timely commenced this federal habeas action under 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), asserting the following grounds: 

(1) The trial court’s exclusion of evidence concerning a thirdparty suspect violated Dixon’s due process right to present a

defense;

(2) The trial court’s refusal to order the fingerprinting of a

third-party suspect violated Dixon’s due process rights; and

(3) Dixon’s 1986 juvenile adjudication of robbery could not be

used as a “strike” because Dixon did not have the right to a

jury trial in the juvenile court proceeding. 

The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn below.

III. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this habeas action for relief under

28 U.S.C. § 2254. This action is in the proper venue because the challenged conviction

occurred in San Mateo County, California, which is located within this judicial district. 

28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).

IV. EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

A state prisoner must exhaust all remedies available in the state courts on each ground

before a petition for a writ of habeas corpus may be considered by a federal court. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A); see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). The parties do not

dispute that Dixon has exhausted all of his available state remedies as to all grounds, and the

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Court is satisfied that Dixon has afforded the state courts a full and fair opportunity to review

his claims. 

V. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Dixon’s

petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in

state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409-12 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring and delivering the opinion of the Court on this point). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court

arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. A decision is an

“unreasonable application of” clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. The source of “clearly

established law” is limited to the “[Supreme] Court’s jurisprudence.” Id. at 412. 

The writ for habeas relief may not be granted simply because the district court

“concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Instead, the district court

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must determine whether the state court’s application of clearly established law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) 

In “assessing whether an application of federal law is objectively unreasonable, courts will

often have to engage in an intensive fact-bound inquiry highly dependent upon the particular

circumstances of the given case.” Chia v. Cambria, 360 F.3d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 2004). 

“Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states, our Circuit precedent remains

relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court decision is objectively

unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2004) 

In addition, to obtain habeas relief on the basis of an evidentiary error, a petitioner

must show not only that the error was one of constitutional dimension but also that the error

did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). The “harmless-error standard”

applies to all habeas claims that argue a “constitutional error of the trial type.” Id. at 638. 

VI. DISCUSSION

A. Exclusion of evidence concerning Jeffrey Nichols 

Dixon’s first claim alleges that the trial court’s exclusion of evidence concerning

Jeffrey Nichols violated Dixon’s due process right to present a defense. At the in limine

hearing before the trial court, Dixon attempted to introduce a police sketch prepared by the

victims, a photo of Dixon, and a photo of Nichols. Dixon then argued that the sketch

resembled Nichols more than himself in several facial features, including shape of the eyes,

hair, facial hair, and jawline. In addition, Dixon attempted to submit evidence that Nichols

had a motive to falsely implicate Dixon, including evidence of an ongoing dispute between

Nichols and Dixon and evidence that Nichols said he was “going to get” Dixon. Lastly,

Dixon wanted to present evidence that Nichols had committed an alleged “break-in” near the

Phillipose house. Dixon sought to use all of the above evidence to show that Nichols could

have planted Dixon’s fingerprints at the crime scene and that Nichols also had a motive to do

so. The trial court excluded all evidence concerning Nichols because the link between

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Nichols to the perpetration of the crime was insufficient. Rep.’s Tr. 44-63 (Resp’t Ex. B). 

Subsequently, the state appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling and concluded that the

probative value of the proffered evidence was outweighed by its potentially prejudicial

effect. Resp’t Ex. G at 10. 

 The exclusion of evidence does not violate the Due Process Clause unless “it offends

some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be

ranked as fundamental.” Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 42-43 (1996) (quoting Patterson

v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977)) (internal quotations omitted). However, a

defendant does not have an unfettered right to offer evidence that is incompetent, privileged

or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence. Id. Petitioner bears the burden

of demonstrating that a fundamental principle of procedure was violated when seeking

habeas relief. Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202

One of the fundamental rules that may be violated by the erroneous exclusion of

critical, corroborative defense evidence is the Sixth Amendment’s right to present a defense. 

DePetris v. Kuykendall, 239 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi,

410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973)). When deciding whether the exclusion of evidence violates this

right, a court balances the following factors: the probative value of the excluded evidence on

the central issue; the reliability of the evidence; the capability of evaluation by the trier of

fact; the cumulativeness of the evidence; and the importance of the evidence in defendant’s

attempted defense. Chia, 360 F.3d at 1003. A defendant must also show that “his interest

clearly outweighs the state’s before we will interfere with routine procedural matters.” Perry

v. Rushen, 713 F.2d 1447, 1453 (9th Cir. 1983). 

Here, Dixon claims that the excluded evidence would have been a major part of his

attempted defense because it would have established a link between the crime scene and

Nichols, thereby supporting Dixon’s theory that he was framed by Nichols. However, none

of Dixon’s arguments on this point is persuasive because the evidence Dixon sought to

introduce was unreliable and not probative of critical facts. 

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First, Dixon claims that the police sketch of the perpetrator resembled Nichols and did

not resemble Dixon. However, the accuracy of the police sketch is in question because the

victims had a limited opportunity to observe the perpetrator; even Molly Philipose admitted

that the sketch was not an accurate depiction of the intruder. In addition, the probative value

of the police sketch is also lessened because the victims selected Dixon in person with some

confidence in both the field show up and the later line-up identification.

Second, Dixon claims that Nichols had motive because the evidence would have

shown that Dixon failed to return Nichols’s jacket and, therefore, Nichols wanted to retaliate

by framing Dixon. However, as the state appellate court noted, this motive is speculative,

and there is no evidence supporting why Nichols would go about his revenge in such a

circuitous or serious manner. 

Third, Dixon claims that Nichols allegedly committed a similar break-in at an

apartment in the same neighborhood three days before the burglary of the Philiposes’ house,

therefore showing modus operandi. However, as the state appellate court noted, Nichols’s

alleged break-in was not similar to the crime at issue here. In the earlier instance, Nichols

forced his way into the apartment to retrieve his own belongings, and he left without

attacking the residents or taking any of the residents’ belongings. Nichols’s previous alleged

break-in is therefore insufficient to show modus operandi, as Dixon asserted. 

Moreover, Dixon has not shown that his interests clearly outweigh the state’s. The

state’s interests in preventing confusion to the jury and wasting time were substantial in this

case: All of the excluded evidence was unreliable and non-probative of the critical facts,

while none of the excluded evidence sought to explain the highly inculpatory evidence

against Dixon. Dixon’s proffered evidence would not, for example, have proven why and

how Dixon’s fingerprints were found on the adhesive tape at the scene of the crime. In

addition, the excluded evidence was speculative because there were no plausible links

between Nichols and the crime scene except the fact that a police sketch could have

resembled Nichols. In light of all of the above, this Court does not find the exclusion of

evidence regarding Nichols to have been objectively unreasonable.

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Kinderprinting is a more detailed and accurate form of fingerprinting that allows

more complete ridge detail to be taken from the hand and fingers. 

11

Furthermore, even assuming that excluding evidence regarding Nichols was

constitutional error – which the Court does not find in this case – the error was harmless

under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The state appellate court noted, and this Court agrees, that

Dixon has not demonstrated that the admission of the excluded evidence regarding Nichols

would have had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict” because of the substantial circumstantial evidence inculpating Dixon in this case:

The wrench and screwdriver from the victim’s house was in the car that Dixon drove; a

Singaporean coin linked to the house was found within the car that Dixon drove; Dixon’s

hand injuries were consistent with Molly Philipose’s bite; Dixon gave contradictory

explanations of the hand injuries; and 16 out of 17 fingerprints at the scene of the crime

matched Dixon’s. Id. Thus, any error in excluding evidence of Nichols would have been

harmless under Brecht.

Accordingly, Dixon is not entitled to habeas relief based on his claim that the trial

court’s exclusion of evidence regarding Nichols violated Dixon’s due process right to present

a defense. 

B. Refusal to order the kinderprinting of a third-party Nichols

In his second claim, Dixon contends that the refusal to issue a discovery order for

kinderprinting of Nichols violated Dixon’s due process rights to compulsory process and to

present a defense. Following the jury verdict, Dixon moved the trial court to compel

kinderprinting of Nichols on the grounds that one latent fingerprint was found on the vanity

of the Philiposes’ bathroom which did not match Dixon’s.1

 At the time of the trial, Nichols

was on probation, which subjected him to searches and seizures. In considering the motion

to compel kinderprinting, the trial court found that Nichols did not waive his Fourth

Amendment rights for all purposes and denied Dixon’s motion because it determined that

Dixon failed to present sufficient evidence connecting Nichols to the crime. The state

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appellate court found that the trial court’s refusal to kinderprint was not an abuse of

discretion because of the lack of factual support inculpating Nichols. See supra at 9-10

(discussing the speculative link of Nichols to the crime scene). 

Here, Dixon cites, among other cases, United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707 (1980), and

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), for the proposition that the court has the right

to compel fingerprinting of a third party. However, Dixon cites no authority to support his

argument that refusing to compel kinderprinting of Nichols rises to the magnitude of a

constitutional violation. The trial court may have had the right to compel fingerprinting, but

that does not mean that it was error for the court to refuse to exercise that right. 

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that fingerprinting a suspect is not

unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment if, at minimum, “there is reasonable suspicion

that the suspect has committed a criminal act . . . “ Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817

(1985) (emphasis added). Here, there was no credible evidence linking Nichols to the crime

scene, let alone enough evidence to constitute reasonable suspicion that Nichols committed

the crimes that Dixon was convicted of. It was therefore not objectively unreasonable for the

trial court to have refused to compel kinderprinting of Nichols.

In addition, even assuming that the trial court erred by refusing to compel Nichols to

kinderprinting, such error would have been harmless under the Brecht standard. For the

reasons discussed above as to other inculpating evidence presented at trial against Dixon, the

Court finds that the refusal to compel kinderprinting would not have had a substantial and

injurious effect on the jury’s determination. Accordingly, Dixon is not entitled to habeas

relief based on his claim that the trial court’s refusal to order kinderprinting of Nichols

violated Dixon’s due process rights to compulsory process and to present a defense.

C. Construing Dixon’s 1986 juvenile adjudication of robbery as a “strike”

Finally, Dixon contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial

because the trial court found that he suffered a prior “strike” conviction based on a juvenile

court adjudication. In this petition, Dixon reiterates the same arguments he made in the state

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appellate court, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and United States v.

Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, he contends that Shepard v. United

States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), now reflects clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent holding that nonjury juvenile adjudications cannot be used for sentence

enhancements. 

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction,

any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must

be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 

In interpreting Apprendi, the Ninth Circuit in Tighe held that the trial judge’s use of a

defendant’s prior nonjury juvenile adjudication to increase the statutorily mandated

maximum punishment violated defendant’s right to jury trial because the use of prior

convictions for sentence enhancements are “limited to prior convictions resulting from

proceedings that afforded the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194. The Tighe court went on to hold that

“[j]uvenile adjudications that do not afford the right to a jury trial and a beyond-a-reasonabledoubt burden of proof, therefore, do not fall within Apprendi’s ‘prior conviction’ exception.” 

Id. 

California courts have disagreed with the majority opinion in Tighe by holding that

Apprendi does not preclude the use of nonjury juvenile adjudications for sentencing

enhancements. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Andrades), 113 Cal. App. 4th 817, 833-

834 (2004); People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th 387 (2002). Similarly, the Third and

Eighth Circuits have disagreed with Tighe by holding that nonjury juvenile adjudications can

be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence. United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d

Cir. 2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002). The United States

Supreme Court has yet to resolve the differing interpretations as to whether nonjury juvenile

adjudications can be used for sentence enhancements. 

Although Tighe continues to be the law in this circuit, the Ninth Circuit recognized in

2004 that Tighe’s opinion as to nonjury juvenile adjudications did “not represent clearly

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The ACCA makes burglary a violent felony only if committed in a building or

enclosed space, but not in a boat or motor vehicle (“generic burglary”). Some States define

burglary more broadly, as by extending it to entries into boats and cars (“nongeneric

burglary”). 

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established federal law ‘as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Boyd v.

Newland, 393 F.3d 1008, 1017 (9th Cir. 2004). In Boyd, a habeas petitioner contended that

a state trial court violated clearly established federal law by using a nonjury juvenile

adjudication to increase his sentence. Id. at 1016. There, the court held that “in absence of

explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the California courts’ use of

Petitioner’s juvenile adjudication as a sentencing enhancement was contrary to, or involved

an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” Id. at 1017. The court therefore

denied Boyd’s request for habeas relief based on the precise claim that Dixon now asserts

here. Id.

Dixon submits, however, that he is not bound by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Boyd

because the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Shepard v. United States clearly

establishes that nonjury juvenile adjudications cannot be used for sentence enhancements. 

544 U.S. 13 (2005); see Petitioner’s brief at 18 (stating that “Shepard has now established

that prior convictions do not fall outside of the Apprendi jury trial right”). Contrary to

Dixon’s assertions, however, Shepard does not address whether nonjury juvenile

adjudications necessarily fall within or without the Apprendi “prior conviction” exception. 

In Shepard, the Supreme Court addressed the kind of evidence that a court sentencing under

the Armed Career Criminal Act 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) [“ACCA”] can look to for determination

of sentence enhancements. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 1263. The Court held that in determining

whether a guilty plea to burglary as defined by a nongeneric statute necessarily admitted

elements of the generic offense, a court is limited to examining evidence like the charging

documents and jury instructions, but not the underlying police reports, complaint

applications, or the like.2 Id. at 1257, 1263. Thus, the Shepard court only addressed the

evidentiary limits of what a court may look to when applying sentence enhancements under

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the ACCA. The Shepard court did not mention Tighe, nor did it clearly establish that

nonjury juvenile adjudications cannot used for sentencing enhancement. 

In light of the above, Shepard does not apply here, nor does Shepard disturb the

holding of Boyd v. Newland. Thus, the Court finds Boyd controlling and follows Boyd in

holding that Tighe’s view regarding nonjury juvenile adjudications does not reflect clearly

established Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, this Court does not find that the use of a

prior nonjury juvenile adjudication to increase Dixon’s sentence under California’s Three

Strikes Law was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, and Dixon is therefore not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.

VII. CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons discussed above, Dixon has failed to show that trial error or

sentencing error warrants habeas relief in this case. Accordingly, Dixon’s petition for a writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED, and the Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 03/09/06 

 THELTON E. HENDERSON, JUDGE

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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