Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73356/USCOURTS-ca9-11-73356-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Avenal Power Center
Respondent-Intervenor
Jared Blumenfeld
Respondent
El Pueblo Para El Aire Y Agua Limpio
Petitioner
Insulators Local 16
Amicus Curiae - Pending
International Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 100
Amicus Curiae - Pending
Lisa P. Jackson
Respondent
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 246
Amicus Curiae - Pending

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SIERRA CLUB; CENTER FOR

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY;

GREENACTION FOR HEALTH AND

ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; LISA P. JACKSON, in her

official capacity as Administrator,

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency; GINA MCCARTHY, in her

official capacity as Assistant

Administrator, Office of Air and

Radiation, U.S. Environmental

Protection Agency,

Respondents,

AVENAL POWER CENTER,

Respondent-Intervenor.

No. 11-73342

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 1 of 27
2 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

EL PUEBLO PARA EL AIRE Y AGUA

LIMPIO,

Petitioner,

v.

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY; LISA P. JACKSON, in her

official capacity as Administrator of

the USEPA; JARED BLUMENFELD, in

his official capacity as Regional

Administrator for Region IX of the

USEPS,

Respondents,

AVENAL POWER CENTER,

Respondent-Intervenor.

No. 11-73356

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

United States Environmental Protection Agency

Argued and Submitted

October 8, 2013—San Francisco, California

Filed August 12, 2014

Before: N. Randy Smith and Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit

Judges, and Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Nguyen

* The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for the U.S.

District Court for the Western District of Michigan, sitting by designation.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 2 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 3

SUMMARY**

Environmental Law

The panel granted a petition for review brought by

environmental groups, and vacated the Environmental

Protection Agency’s decision to issue a Prevention of

Significant Deterioration Permit, allowing Avenal Power

Center LLC to build and operate the Avenal Energy Project,

a 600 megawatt natural gas-fired power plant, under the old

air quality standards.

The panel held that petitioners had standing because a

number of the petitioners had associational standing to

challenge EPA’s action. Turning to the merits, the panel held

that the EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Air Act. 

The panel applied Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984), analysis,

and held that the Clean Air Act unambiguously required

Avenal Power to demonstrate that the Avenal Energy Project

complied with the regulations in effect at the time the Permit

was issued. The panel further held that because Congress had

directly spoken on the issue, the EPA could not waive this

requirement. The panel remanded for further proceedings.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 3 of 27
4 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

COUNSEL

Paul R. Cort (argued) and George Torgun, Earthjustice,

Oakland, California, for Petitioners Sierra Club, Center for

Biological Diversity, and Greenaction for Health and

Environmental Justice.

Ingrid Brostrom and Brent Newell, Center on Race, Poverty

& the Environment, San Francisco, California, for Petitioner

El Pueblo Para El Aire y Agua Limpio.

Ignacia S. Moreno, Assistant Attorney General, and

Stephanie J. Talbert (argued), United States Department of

Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division,

Washington, D.C.; Brian Doster, David Coursen, Melina

Williams, and Julia Walters, United States Environmental

Protection Agency, for Respondents.

William R. Warne (argued), Jane E. Luckhardt, Elizabeth B.

Stallard, Gregory T. Broderick, and Nicholas Rabinowitch,

DowneyBrand LLP, Sacramento, California,forRespondentIntervenor.

John J. Davis, Jr. and Andrew J. Kahn, Davis, Cowell &

Bowe, LLP, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae

Avenal-Area Unions.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 4 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 5

OPINION

NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:

Avenal Power Center LLC (“Avenal Power”) applied to

the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)

for a Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit

(“Permit”), to build and operate the Avenal Energy Project,

a 600 megawatt natural gas-fired power plant in the city of

Avenal, California. Although EPA had a statutory duty under

the Clean Air Act to either grant or deny the Permit

application within one year, 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c), it failed to

do so. After the deadline passed but before taking any final

action, EPA tightened the applicable air quality standards. 

Avenal Power filed suit and sought to compel EPA to issue

the Permit under the old standards that would have applied

had EPA acted within the statutory deadline. Initially, EPA

responded that it could not legally do so, because the Clean

Air Act explicitly requires any newly constructed facility to

employ the best available control technology (“BACT”) for

regulated pollutants and meet air quality standards in effect

at the time a permit is issued. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 7475(a)(3)–(4). Months later, however, EPA reversed

course and granted Avenal Power the Permit without regard

to the new regulations, which by then had gone into effect. 

EPA contends that, under narrow circumstances, it has the

authority to grandfather certain permit applications like

Avenal Power’s, and that its decision is entitled to deference

under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). The Sierra Club,

Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice, Center for

Biological Diversity, and El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua

Limpio (collectively “Petitioners”), challenge EPA’s action.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 5 of 27
6 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

Applying Chevron, we hold that the Clean Air Act

unambiguously requires Avenal Power to demonstrate that

the Avenal Energy Project complies with the regulations in

effect at the time the Permit is issued. Because “Congress has

directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron,

467 U.S. at 842, EPA cannot waive this requirement. We

therefore GRANT the Petition for review, VACATE the

decision to issue the Permit, and REMAND for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Avenal Power proposes to build and operate a power

plant, the Avenal Energy Project, near the agricultural

communities of Avenal, Huron, and Kettleman City, within

California’s San Joaquin Valley Pollution Control District. 

The facility would generate electricity from two 180-

megawatt natural gas combustion turbine generators, and a

300-megawatt steam turbine generator that utilizes heat from

the combustion turbines. According to EPA, the facility “will

be equipped with state-of-the-art control technology and will

be one of the lowest emitting power plants of its kind.” It is

undisputed, however, that its expected emissions of several

pollutants, including nitrogen dioxide (“NO2”), carbon

dioxide (“CO2”), and sulfur dioxide (“SO2”), are sufficient to

subject it to regulation under the Clean Air Act.

On February 15, 2008, Avenal Power submitted an

application to EPA for a Permit. The Regional Administrator

determined the application to be administrativelycomplete on

March 19, 2008. As of that date, EPA had not yet

promulgated national ambient air quality standards

(“NAAQS”) for NO2 or SO2 emissions, or BACT

requirements for greenhouse gases, including CO2. NAAQS,

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 6 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 7

which are regularly reviewed and revised by the EPA

Administrator, set hourly limits on the emission of designated

pollutants. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7409(d)(1); 40 C.F.R.

§ 52.21(b)(50). The BACT requirement consists of “an

emission limitation based on the maximum degree of

reduction of each [regulated] pollutant” that EPA determines

is achievable “through application of production processes

and available methods, systems, and techniques” in view of

“energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other

costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3).

On June 16, 2009, after the one-year decision making

period had elapsed, see 42 U.S.C. § 7475(c), the Regional

Administrator finally issued a Statement of Basis describing

the reasons for the proposed approval of the Permit. The

Statement of Basis is subject to notice and comment

procedures that afford the public an opportunity to participate

in the review process by submitting written comments and

appearing at a hearing to voice support or concern. See

42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. §§ 124.10–12. During the

comment period in this case, EPA held an informational

meeting and two hearings. Concerned that the Avenal Energy

Project would adversely impact the environment and health

and quality of life of local residents, Petitioners filed

comments opposing issuance of the Permit.

While Avenal Power’s Permit application was still under

consideration, EPA adopted more stringent NAAQS and

revised the BACT requirement. Specifically, EPA tightened

NAAQS for NO2, capping hourly emissions at 100 parts per

billion (“ppb”), with the new regulations to take effect on

April 12, 2010. See Primary National Ambient Air Quality

Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,474, 6,475

(Feb. 9, 2010). EPA further subjected greenhouse gases such

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 7 of 27
8 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

as CO2to BACT requirements, effective January 2, 2011. 

See Reconsideration of Interpretation of Regulations That

Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act Permitting

Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,004 (Apr. 2, 2010). Finally, EPA

published a final rule establishing a new hourly SO2 NAAQS

of 75 ppb, to become effective August 23, 2010. See Primary

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Sulfur Dixoide,

75 Fed. Reg. 35,520 (June 22, 2010).

Facing a slew of new regulations, and frustrated by the

delay, Avenal Power filed suit on March 9, 2010, in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia, to

compel EPA to issue the Permit. Two months later, EPA

requested that Avenal Power complete a cumulative air

impact assessment of the Avenal Energy Project’s hourly

NO2 emissions to address its compliance with the revised

NAAQS. Although Avenal Power cooperated and submitted

additional documentation, the process took months.

In late August 2010, after the new NO2 and SO2 NAAQS

had gone into effect, Avenal Power requested an expedited

judgment on the pleadings from the D.C. district court in an

effort to compel EPA to issue the Permit without

consideration of the newly effective regulations. EPA

opposed the motion, arguing that even though it missed the

one-year statutory deadline to act on Avenal Power’s

application, the Clean Air Act prohibits the agency from

granting the Permit unless Avenal Power complies with the

superseding standards. In support of its position, EPA cited

public guidance issued by the Director of its Office of Air

Quality Planning and Standards.1See Memorandum from

1 We take judicial notice of this document as a public record. Fed. R.

Evid. 201; Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001).

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 8 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 9

Stephen D. Page, EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and

Standards, Applicability of the Federal Prevention of

Significant Deterioration Permit Requirements to New and

Revised National Ambient Air Quality Standards (Apr. 1,

2010) (hereinafter “Page Memo”), available at

http://www.epa.gov/region7/air/nsr/nsrmemos/psdnaaqs.pdf. 

EPA also promised the district court it would issue a final

decision by December 31, 2010—that is, before the revised

regulations on greenhouse gases went into effect on January

2, 2011. It eventually became clear, however, that a final

decision would not be forthcoming by that date, further

forestalling administrative proceedings.2 And sure enough,

the deadline passed without a final decision.

At this point, after conducting what it described as a

“policy review,” EPA reversed course. In a declaration

submitted to the D.C. district court, EPA contended that

“EPA believes it is appropriate to grandfather,” i.e., exempt,

Avenal Power’s application from the NO2 and SO2 hourly

NAAQS, and the BACT requirement for greenhouse gases. 

EPA concluded that it possessed inherent grandfathering

authority even absent express authorization under the Clean

Air Act or related regulations. The EPA Administrator then

transferred authority to issue a final decision on Avenal

Power’s application from the Regional Administrator for

Region 9 to the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Air

and Radiation. Consistent with its representation to the

district court, EPA issued a Supplemental Statement of Basis

2 EPA apparently took the position that the Avenal Energy Project would

not run afoul of the new SO2 hourly NAAQS. Nonetheless, EPA

determined that compliance with the revised SO2 and greenhouse gases

regulations would require further public notice and comment proceedings,

as well as hearings.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 9 of 27
10 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

proposing to grandfather the application under the old air

quality standards in effect at the time the application was

submitted.

Petitioners submitted comments to EPA objecting to

issuance of the Permit, and EPA’s assertion of grandfathering

authority. On May 26, 2011, as the administrative process

continued to drag on, the district court granted in part Avenal

Power’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and ordered

the EPA Administrator to render a decision by May 27, 2011,

and a final, non-appealable, agency action ripe for judicial

review by August 27, 2011. The next day, the Assistant

Administrator for the Office and Air and Radiation published

EPA’s responses to the public comments, and issued the

Permit.

Petitioners appealed to the EnvironmentalAppeals Board,

which declined to exercise jurisdiction to review EPA’s

asserted grandfathering authority, given the time constraint

imposed by the D.C. district court for a final administrative

action, but otherwise upheld issuance of the Permit.3

Petitioners timely filed two separate petitions for judicial

review, chiefly challenging EPA’s interpretation of its

statutory authority under the Clean Air Act.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1),

and consolidated the two petitions for review. Avenal Power

3 The Environmental Appeals Board also held that the Assistant

Administrator (rather than the Regional Administrator) was authorized to

issue the Permit, and that EPA’s environmental justice analysis comported

with Executive Order 12898. Because we hold that EPA exceeded its

statutory authority, we need not address the latter issue, which Petitioners

also raise for review.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 10 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 11

successfullymoved to intervene in these proceedings, and the

United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters Local 246,

International Brotherhood of Electric Workers Local 100, and

Insulators Local 16 successfullymoved to file a brief as amici

curiae.

ANALYSIS

I

As an initial matter, Avenal Power, though not EPA,

suggests that Petitioners lack standing. It falls to Petitioners,

as the parties invoking federal jurisdiction, to demonstrate

standing.

4 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561

(1992). However, only one Petitioner must establish standing

to enable review. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518

(2007).

“An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its

members when its members would otherwise have standing

to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are germane to

the organization’s purpose, and neither the claim asserted nor

the relief requested requires the participation of individual

members in the lawsuit.” Wilderness Soc’y, Inc. v. Rey,

622 F.3d 1251, 1256 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Friends of the

Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envt’l Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.

167, 181 (2000)). The record reflects, and Avenal Power

4 Petitioners were not required to establish standing before EPA, and

they now seek leave to submit declarations to establish standing for

purposes of this appeal. Avenal Power does not oppose the request, and

we grant it. See Nw. Envt’l Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin.,

117 F.3d 1520, 1528 (9thCir. 1997) (accepting supplemental affidavits in

support of petitioners’ standing, where no such requirement applied in

administrative proceedings).

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 11 of 27
12 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

does not dispute, that “the interests at stake are germane” to

Petitioners’ organizational interests, and that personal

participation by Petitioners’ individual members is not

necessary. Id.

The only question remaining, therefore, is whether

Petitioners’ individual members have standing in their own

right. On that score, Petitioners must first show that their

members “have suffered an injury in fact—an invasion of a

legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and

particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or

hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “Second, there must be a causal

connection between the injury and the conduct complained of

. . . .” Id. (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,

426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). And finally, “the injury will

[likely] be redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561

(internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Simon, 426 U.S. at

38, 43).

A

We first consider whether Petitioners, through the

declarations of their members, have established an injury in

fact. “An individual bringing a substantive claim related to

environmental harms may establish an injury in fact by

showing ‘a connection to the area of concern sufficient to

make credible the connection that the person’s life will be

less enjoyable—that he or she really has or will suffer in his

or her degree of aesthetic or recreational satisfaction—if the

area in question remains or becomes environmentally

degraded.’” W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink,

632 F.3d 472, 484 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ecol. Rights

Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230 F.3d 1141, 1149 (9th Cir.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 12 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 13

2000)). In addition, “evidence of a credible threat to the

plaintiff’s physical well-being from airborne pollutants” may

establish an injury in fact. Hall v. Norton, 266 F.3d 969, 976

(9th Cir. 2001).

Here, although we have doubts as to the Sierra Club’s

standing, we are satisfied that Greenaction for Health and

Environmental Justice, Center for Biological Diversity, and

El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, possess associational

standing to challenge EPA’s action.

Marciela Mares-Alatorre, the leader of El Pueblo para el

Aire y Agua Limpio, lives in Kettleman City, which is

located approximately 10 miles from the site of the Avenal

Energy Project. She was recently diagnosed with breathing

difficulty and symptoms that indicate asthma, problems she

avers are exacerbated when the air is more polluted. She

fears that the pollution expected from the Avenal Energy

Project will impair her health. Likewise, Mavi Sandoval, a

member of El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, as well as

Center for Biological Diversity, lives in Kettleman City,

works in Avenal, and states that she is concerned that her

respiratory problems will also be exacerbated by pollution

from the proposed plant. Maria Saucedo, a member of

Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice, lives in

Avenal and avers that her husband and daughter suffer from

serious respiratory problems associated with air pollution. 

She believes that air pollution created by the proposed facility

may further jeopardize the health of her family, and impact

her husband’s ability to work. These health threats are

credible, concrete, and, assuming the Project goes forward,

imminent—in sum, cognizable injuries in fact. Id.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 13 of 27
14 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

B

As to causation and redressability, it is undisputed that the

Avenal Energy Project will generate many tons of air

pollutants known to threaten public health, including NO2and

SO2

. Further, EPA implemented the revised NO2 and SO2

hourly NAAQS precisely because short-term exposure to

those pollutants at ambient levels is associated with asthma

and other respiratory ailments. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 7408(a)(1)(A) (commandingEPA Administrator to identify

and regulate “emissions which, in his judgment, cause or

contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be

anticipated to endanger public health or welfare”); see also

Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for

Nitrogen Dixoide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6,479 (concluding that

short-term exposure to ambient or near-ambient

concentrations of NO2increased airway irritation for

asthmatic individuals), and Primary National Ambient Air

Quality Standards for Sulfur Dixoide, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,525

(finding causal relationship between short-term exposure to

ambient NO2 and asthma and other respiratory symptoms). 

EPA also noted in its Supplemental Statement of Basis that

short-term exposure to NO2

likely causes adverse effects on

the respiratory system. Given this record, we have little

trouble concluding that NO2 and SO2 emissions from the

proposed Project will likely cause the identified injuries. 

Indeed, remedying such injuries is exactly the purpose and

function of these particular emissions limits, and more

broadly, the Clean Air Act. It is therefore sufficiently clear

that judicial review of EPA’s refusal to enforce the relevant

regulations will provide Petitioners’ members with redress.

Accordingly, we conclude that at least Greenaction for

Health and Environmental Justice, Center for Biological

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 14 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 15

Diversity, and El Pueblo para el Aire y Agua Limpio, have

association standing to proceed. We need not decide whether

Sierra Club has standing. See Kaahumanu v. Hawaii,

682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Watt v. Energy

Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 160 (1981) (“Because we hold

that [one plaintiff] has Article IIIstanding, we need not reach

the question whether [another plaintiff] also has Article III

standing”).

II

We now turn to the substance of Petitioners’ challenge,

that is, whether EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean

Air Act. When we review an agency’s interpretation of a

statute that it is responsible for administering, “[f]irst, always,

is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. “If the

intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for

the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–43. 

Only if “the statute is silent or ambiguous,” id. at 843, “‘must

[we] decide how much weight to accord an agency’s

interpretation.’” McMaster v. United States, 731 F.3d 881,

889 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tualatin Valley Builders Supply,

Inc. v. United States, 522 F.3d 937, 940 (9th Cir. 2008)).

EPA contends there is ambiguity or tension between two

mandates in the Clean Air Act—one, requiring it to enforce

current NAAQS and BACT requirements, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7475(a)(1), (3)–(4), and the other, requiring EPA to act on

applications within one year, id. § 7475(c). More

specifically, EPA argues that the statute does not specifywhat

it should do when, as was the case here, it failed to act by the

statutory deadline, and revised air standards have been

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 15 of 27
16 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

promulgated since the deadline passed. Thus, the argument

goes, EPA’s decision to grant Avenal Power the Permit is

entitled to Chevron deference. Petitioners, on the other hand,

insist that the statutory language is clear—EPA must enforce

the regulations in effect at the time the Permit was issued.

A

We begin with the statute “‘to determine whether the

language at issue has a plain and unambiguous

meaning. . . .’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438,

450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,

340 (1997)). In so inquiring, we must endeavor to read the

Clean Air Act “‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory

scheme,’” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,

529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,

513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995)), and “‘fit, if possible, all parts into

a harmonious whole[.]’” Id. (quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros.,

Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)).

The Clean Air Act states that “[n]o major emitting facility

. . . may be constructed . . . unless”:

(3) the owner or operator of such facility

demonstrates, as required pursuant to section

7410(j) of this title . . . that emissions from

construction or operation of such facility will

not cause, or contribute to, air pollution in

excess of any . . . national ambient air quality

standard in any air quality control region . . .

[and]

(4) the proposed facility is subject to the best

available control technology for each

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 16 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 17

pollutant subject to regulation under this

chapter emitted from, or which results from,

such facility . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(3)–(4) (emphasis added). The referenced

portion of § 7410(j), in turn, provides:

As a condition for issuance of any permit

required by this subchapter, the owner or

operator of each new or modified stationary

source which is required to obtain such a

permit must show to the satisfaction of the

permitting authority that the technological

system of continuous emission reduction

which is to be used at such source will enable

it to comply with the standards of

performance which are to apply to such

source . . . .

Id. § 7410(j) (emphasis added). The plain language of the

statute—which prohibits the construction of any “major

emitting facility” and refers to “any . . . national ambient air

quality standard,” and “the standards of performance which

are to apply to such source[,]” as the applicable

regulations—clearly requires EPA to apply the regulations in

effect at the time of the permitting decision. 42 U.S.C.

§§ 7475(a)(4), 7410(j); see also 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(k)

(referring to “any national ambient air quality standard in any

air quality control region”).

Up until now, there has never been any doubt that Permit

applicants must comply with current air quality control

regulations and BACT requirements. Indeed, EPA initially

advanced precisely this position against Avenal Power before

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 17 of 27
18 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

the D.C. district court, based on the public guidance it had

previously provided in the form of the Page Memo. To wit:

EPA generally interprets the [Clean Air Act]

and EPA’s . . . permitting program regulations

to require that each final . . . permit decision

reflect consideration of any NAAQS that is in

effect at the time the permitting authority

issues a final permit. As a general matter,

permitting and licensing decisions of

regulatory agencies must reflect the law in

effect at the time the agency makes a final

determination on a pending application.

[internal citations omitted]. [ ¶] Consistent

with such interpretations, EPA has previously

concluded that the relevant provisions cover

any NAAQS that is in effect at the time of

issuance of any permit.

Page Memo at 2 (emphasis added).

EPA’s prior interpretation is supported bySupreme Court

case law. For example, in Ziffrin, Inc. v. United States,

318 U.S. 73, 78 (1943), petitioner Ziffrin Truck Lines

challenged an order by the Interstate Commerce Commission

(“ICC”) rejecting its application for a permit to continue

operating as a common carrier, in an effort to claim the

benefit of a grandfathering clause in the Interstate Commerce

Act. While Ziffrin’s application was still pending before the

ICC—after a hearing was held, but before the application was

ultimately denied—Congress amended the Interstate

Commerce Act to require a finding by the ICC that

grandfathering such a permit would serve the public interest. 

Id. at 75. Applying the superseding requirement, the ICC

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 18 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 19

found grandfatheringwould not benefit the public, and denied

Ziffrin a permit. The Supreme Court upheld the ICC’s

decision, explaining: “We are convinced that the Commission

was required to act under the law as it existed when its order

of [denial], was entered.” Id. at 78. The Court reasoned:

A change in the law between a nisi prius and

an appellate decision requires the appellate

court to apply the changed law. A fortiori, a

change of law pending an administrative

hearing must be followed in relation to

permits for future acts. Otherwise the

administrative body would issue orders

contrary to the existing legislation.

Id. (citations omitted).

General Motors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 540

(1990), also provides support for the same basic principle that

EPA is bound to enforce administrative guidelines in effect

when it takes final action. Under certain provisions of the

Clean Air Act not relevant to the present case, the states are

required to propose State Implementation Plans to implement,

maintain, and enforce NAAQS. See generally 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(a)(1). The states also periodically revise the State

Implementation Plans, with approval from EPA, which

enforces them. Id. § 7410(a)(2)(H). In General Motors, EPA

moved to enforce certain provisions of Massachusetts’

existing State Implementation Plan. General Motors argued

that EPA lacked the authority to initiate enforcement

proceedings because, under the Administrative Procedure

Act, EPA had “unreasonably” delayed review of certain

proposed revisions to the State Implementation Plan that

would have relieved General Motors of liability. Id. at

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 19 of 27
20 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

539–42. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that EPA was

authorized to enforce the then-existing State Implementation

Plan regulations against General Motors, even assuming that,

but for EPA’s alleged unreasonable delay, a superseding State

Implementation Plan relieving the companyof liabilitywould

be in effect. Id. at 540. The Court noted that “[t]here is

nothing in the statute that limits EPA’s authority to enforce

the ‘applicable implementation plan’ solely to those cases

where EPA has not unreasonably delayed action on a

proposed [State Implementation Plan] revision.” Id. at 541.

The same is true here. Nothing in the statute precludes

EPA from enforcing current NAAQS and BACT

requirements even if it unreasonably delays taking action on

a Permit. Moreover, the Clean Air Act is not silent about the

consequences of such delay. “Congress has directly spoken

to [that] precise issue”—namely, by providing a private right

of action to compel timely action. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842

(emphasis added). Under 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2):

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, any person may commence a civil

action on his own behalf . . . against the

Administrator where there is alleged a failure

of the Administrator to perform any act or

duty under this chapter which is not

discretionary with the Administrator.

Avenal Power, of course, availed itself of this remedy and

brought suit in the D.C. district court. That court, correctly

in our view, did not find the appropriate remedy to be

issuance of the Permit without regard to the newly-

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 20 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 21

promulgated regulations.5Instead, it simply ordered the

agency to come to a final decision. See Avenal Power Ctr.,

LLC v. EPA, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D.D.C. 2011).

Although EPA now maintains that, having missed the

deadline to act, it cannot determine from the statute which

substantive standards to enforce against Avenal Power, we

discern no such uncertainty, and reject the agency’s position

that it possesses the power to resolve the matter as it sees fit. 

First of all, as a general matter, the agency’s “authority and

responsibility to resolve some questions left open by

Congress that arise during the law’s administration” does not

extend to “include a power to revise clear statutory terms that

turn out not to work in practice.” Utility Air Regulatory Grp.

v. EPA, No. 12-1146, — S. Ct. —, 2014 WL 2807314, at *13

(June 23, 2014) (citing Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 462). In other

 

5

 We find Brock v. Pierce Cnty., 476 U.S. 253, 256 (1986), instructive

in this regard. In Brock, a since-repealed provision of the Comprehensive

Employment and Training Act required the Secretary of Labor to issue a

final determination as to the misuse of certain funds within 120 days after

receipt of a complaint alleging misuse. Id. Although the statute used

mandatory language requiring the Secretary to investigate and issue

formal findings, it did not specify consequences for the Secretary’s failure

to act. Id. at 258–59. The Court rejected the argument that the 120-day

period was a statute of limitations that barred the Secretary from taking

further action on the complaint after the 120-day period expired,

reasoning: “We would be most reluctant to conclude that every failure of

an agency to observe a procedural requirement voids subsequent agency

action, especially when important public rights are at stake.” Id. at 260. 

And the Court then concluded, instead: “When, as here, there are less

drastic remedies available for failure to meet a statutory deadline, courts

should not assume that Congress intended the agency to lose its power to

act.” Id. (footnote omitted). The appropriate relief, the Court noted, was

an order compelling the agency to act. Id. at 260 n.7.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 21 of 27
22 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

words, “[a]n agency confronting resource constraints may

change its own conduct, but it cannot change the law.” Id.

Moreover, as for the particular proceedings at issue here,

we do not believe EPA’s legal or practical options were so

conflicted, or even very uncertain. Although Petitioners

suggest that EPA must deny a Permit application if it cannot

perform the required review within the one-year limit, that

does not appear to have been the agency’s only option.6 Even

after the deadline passes, at least absent suit, EPA could

presumably work with the applicant to ensure compliance

with whatever regulations are in effect, and then issue or deny

a Permit accordingly. In fact, that is what happened here:

well after the deadline passed, EPA requested, and Avenal

Power endeavored to provide, documentation demonstrating

the Avenal Energy Project’s compliance with the intervening

NO2 NAAQS. Ultimately, those efforts failed because

Avenal Power could not demonstrate compliance with the

Clean Air Act’s requirements by the date set by the D.C.

district court (a deadline imposed upon Avenal Power’s own 

motion). But the parties’ protracted negotiation of the Clean

Air Act’s requirements— frustrating and burdensome though

it may have been in this case—does not endow the EPA with

authority simply to waive the newly effective regulations on

an ad hoc basis by “rewriting unambiguous statutory terms”

in order to serve its own “bureaucratic policy goals.” Id. 

6 We need not decide whether a petitioner, other than the Permit

applicant, could sue EPAunder 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(a)(2), 7475(c), with the

ultimate effect of forcing the agency to deny, without delay, a noncompliant Permit application.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 22 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 23

B

In an effort to bolster its position, EPA points out that it

has long exercised authority to grandfather certain permit

applications from revised regulations. That is true: EPA first

asserted grandfathering authority shortly after the 1977

Amendments to the Clean Air Act passed. The issue at that

time was a conflict between two apparently inconsistent

provisions of the Clean Air Act—§ 165’s enforcement

requirements, and § 168’s statutory grandfathering measures. 

See Citizens to Save Spencer Cnty. v. EPA, 600 F.2d 844,

853–54 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[§] 168 would have the practical

effect of allowing permits to be issued for the construction of

many projects for which permits would be barred by the

rigorous environmental standards of [§] 165” ). EPA

ultimately chose not to make § 165 immediately effective,

and grandfathered certain projects from its requirements. See

1977 Clean Air Act Amendments to Prevent Significant

Deterioration, 43 Fed. Reg. 26,388, 26,391 (June 19, 1978)

(adopting grandfathering for new permitting requirements for

“any source the evaluation of which EPA would have

completed before March 1, 1978, but for an extension of the

public comment period pursuant to a meritorious request for

such an extension”). The D.C. Circuit upheld the agency’s

decision in an opinion rendered prior to Chevron. Id. at

881–84. But EPA’s decision, and the court’s analysis, in that

distinct statutory context does not resolve the question

presented here.7

7 To be clear, we do not doubt, or express any opinion on, EPA’s

traditional authority to employ formal rulemaking to implement

grandfathering.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 23 of 27
24 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

Since then, EPA has invoked grandfathering authority

from time to time to exempt certain projects from newlyimplemented NAAQS and BACT regulations. But EPA’s

traditional exercise of grandfathering authority does not at all

resemble the ad hoc discretion the agency now claims to

wield. When EPA implemented grandfathering in the past,

it consistently did so through formal notice and comment

rulemaking procedures, as expressly authorized by the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1), and the Administrative

Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553. For example, just last year,

when EPA implemented new standards for particulate matter

(“PM”), it implemented grandfathering to smooth the

transition process. As the agency explained:

In addition to today’s revisions to the primary

annual the PM2.5 NAAQS, EPA is taking final

action on a PSD implementation provision. 

To facilitate timely implementation of the

PSD requirements resulting from the revised

NAAQS, which would otherwise become

applicable to all PSD permit applications upon

the effective date of this final PM NAAQS

rule, the EPA is finalizing a grandfathering

provision for pending permit applications. 

This final rule incorporates revisions to the

PSD regulations that provide for

grandfathering of PSD permit applications

that have been determined to be complete on

or before December 14, 2012 or for which

public notice of a draft permit or preliminary

determination has been published as of the

effective date of today’s revised PM2.5

NAAQS.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 24 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 25

National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate

Matter, 78 Fed. Reg. 3,086, 3,249 (Jan. 15, 2013).

There is a significant difference between EPA’s

traditional grandfathering and its waiver of current applicable

regulations in this case. On almost every prior occasion, EPA

grandfathered a limited set of applications, in effect, by

specifying an operative date (or dates) for each new

regulation, as it was formally adopted.8

 In contrast to the ad

hoc waiver here, the former procedure does not, on its face,

violate the plain statutory mandate to enforce whatever

regulations are in effect at the time the agency makes a final

decision. That is because, in the past, EPA simply identified

an operative date, incident to setting the new substantive

standard, and the grandfathering of pending permit

applications was explicitly built into the new regulations. See

Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231–32 (1974) (holding that

“[t]he power of an administrative agency to administer a

congressionally created and funded program necessarily

requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to

fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress[,]” but

noting that “[n]o matter how rational or consistent with

8

See, e.g., Requirements for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of

Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation

Plans, 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,681–83 (Aug. 7, 1980) (implementing

grandfathering provision to facilitate implementation of new definitions

of key terms and revised regulations); Regulations for Implementing

Revised Particulate Matter Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 24,672, 24,683 (July

1, 1987) (implementing grandfathering for newly promulgated NAAQS);

Prevention of Significant Deterioration for Nitrogen Oxides, 53 Fed. Reg.

40,656, 40,659 (Oct. 17, 1988) (same); Prevention of Significant

Deterioration for ParticulateMatter, 58Fed.Reg. 31,622, 31,632–33 (June

3, 1993) (same).

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 25 of 27
26 SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA

congressional intent a particular decision might be, [such

decision] cannot be made on an ad hoc basis . . . ”).

The issue here is distinct. EPA now claims the authority

to waive the law’s requirements at will, without regard to the

regulations it has passed,9and without any precedential value

one way or another for future parties. That unbounded

discretion exceeds the agency’s authority. We cannot discern

any ambiguity or conflict between the Clean Air Act’s

enforcement requirements, and the statutory decision making

deadline. And the statute does not permit EPA to waive

current NAAQS and BACT requirements whenever it finds

it convenient to do so. The foregoing conclusion ends the

inquiry. Barnhart, 534 U.S. at 450; Chevron, 467 U.S. at

842–43. Congress has spoken, and at least without applicable

grandfathering provisions in the relevant regulations, EPA

must enforce the regulations in effect at the time each Permit

is issued, as the Clean Air Act clearly requires.

C

Finally, EPA relies heavily on the argument that the

equities weigh in favor of Avenal Power. In short, we agree. 

Avenal Power filed its application over six years ago, and

endeavored to work with EPA for years, even after filing suit,

to obtain a final decision. But however regrettable EPA’s

treatment of Avenal Power has been, we simply cannot

disregard the plain language of the Clean Air Act, or overlook

 

9

 In fact, EPA expressly refused to adopt a grandfathering provision in

connection with its promulgation of the greenhouse gases regulation at

issue in this litigation. See Reconsideration of Interpretation of

Regulations That Determine Pollutants Covered by Clean Air Act

Permitting Programs, 75 Fed. Reg. at 17,021–22.

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 26 of 27
SIERRA CLUB V. U.S. EPA 27

the reason why an applicant must comply with revised and

newly stringent standards —that is, “to protect and enhance

the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the

public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its

population.” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). Honoring the statute’s

plain language and overriding purpose, we must send EPA

and Avenal Power back to the drawing board.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the Petition for

review, VACATE the decision to issue the Permit, and

REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

Petitioners, as the prevailing parties, may recover the costs

and fees incurred in this litigation from EPA. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7607(f); Fed. R. App. P. 39(a)–(b).

 Case: 11-73356, 08/12/2014, ID: 9201448, DktEntry: 69-1, Page 27 of 27