Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14607/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14607-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Rodriguez
Appellant
Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14607

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cv-14211-JEM

ERIC RODRIGUEZ, 

 Petitioner-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(November 12, 2015)

Before MARCUS, JULIE CARNES, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM:

Eric Rodriguez, a Florida prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district 

court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We granted a 

certificate of appealability on these two issues: (1) whether Rodriguez’s section 

2254 petition was untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act (“AEDPA”); and (2) whether Rodriguez was entitled to equitable tolling of the 

AEDPA limitations period. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

AEDPA imposes a one-year statute of limitations for filing a section 2254 

petition, which begins to run, among other things, on “the date on which the 

judgment became final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A “properly filed application for 

State post-conviction or other collateral review” tolls the AEDPA limitations 

period while the state habeas petition is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Rodriguez’s conviction became final -- and his one-year limitations period 

began to run -- on 27 April 2010. The limitations period was tolled on 28 July 

2010 (after 92 days elapsed), when Rodriguez filed his state habeas petition. On 3 

August 2010, the state court dismissed Rodriguez’s petition without prejudice. 

The limitations period then ran for another 252 days until Rodriguez filed an 

amended state habeas petition on 12 April 2011. The limitations period was tolled 

again until 7 December 2012, when the mandate issued on the state appellate 

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court’s affirmance of the denial of Rodriguez’s amended petition. At that point, 21 

days remained in the limitations period. Rodriguez filed his section 2254 petition 

on 22 April 2013: 136 days after the mandate issued and 115 days after the 1-year 

limitations period expired. 

On appeal, Rodriguez concedes that, absent equitable tolling, his section 

2254 petition was untimely. Rodriguez raises no objections to the district court’s 

calculation of untolled days or the district court’s determination that his section 

2254 petition was filed after the limitations period had already expired. As a 

result, Rodriguez has abandoned that argument on appeal. See Timson v. 

Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (although we construe liberally pro 

se briefs, “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed 

abandoned.”). 

Rodriguez argues, instead, that he is entitled to equitable tolling of 

AEDPA’s one-year limitations period based on an alleged delay in receiving the 

state court’s 3 August 2010 order dismissing his initial state habeas petition. 

Rodriguez contends that he first learned of the state court’s 3 August dismissal in 

March 2011, after he inquired about the status of his petition. As a result, 

Rodriguez contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled between 

3 August 2010 and 14 March 2011, when the state trial court mailed him a second 

copy of its 3 August dismissal order. 

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“We review de novo the district court’s determination that the petition for 

federal habeas corpus relief was time-barred under section 2244(d).” Steed v. 

Head, 219 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000). We also review de novo the district 

court’s determination that equitable tolling is inapplicable. Id. Still, a district 

court’s determination of pertinent facts -- including a determination about a party’s 

diligence -- is reviewed only for clear error. Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 

1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2002). 

“Equitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy which is typically applied 

sparingly.” Steed, 219 F.3d at 1300. “[A] petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling 

only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that 

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” 

Holland v. Fla., 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2562 (2010) (quotations omitted). The petitioner 

bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling should apply. Drew, 297 

F.3d at 1286. 

We have explained that “[a] lengthy delay between the issuance of a 

necessary order and an inmate’s receipt of it might provide a basis for equitable 

tolling if the petitioner has diligently attempted to ascertain the status of that order 

and if the delay prevented the inmate from filing a timely federal habeas corpus 

petition.” See id. at 1288 (emphasis added). If a petitioner cannot establish due 

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diligence, we do not need to consider whether extraordinary circumstances existed. 

Diaz v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 362 F.3d 698, 702 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004). 

In recommending that Rodriguez’s section 2254 petition be denied as 

untimely, the magistrate judge found that Rodriguez failed to demonstrate that he 

acted with reasonable diligence.*

 In particular, the magistrate judge determined 

that Rodriguez (1) waited nearly eight months before inquiring about the status of 

his state habeas petition, (2) waited a month after actually receiving the state 

court’s 3 August dismissal order to file his amended state habeas petition, and (3) 

waited over four months after his state habeas proceedings became final to file his 

section 2254 petition. The magistrate judge concluded that -- even with the alleged 

delay in receiving the state court’s 3 August order -- Rodriguez could have filed a 

timely section 2254 petition had he acted with reasonable diligence. 

Rodriguez filed timely some objections to the magistrate judge’s report and 

recommendation. But important for this appeal, Rodriguez failed to challenge the 

magistrate judge’s factual determination that Rodriguez had not acted diligently. 

Thus, we review the district court’s determination on diligence only for plain error. 

See LoConte v. Dugger, 847 F.2d 745, 749-50 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Findings of fact 

 * The magistrate judge also concluded that Rodriguez was unentitled to equitable tolling because 

(1) Rodriguez failed to demonstrate that the alleged delay in receiving the state court’s 3 August 

order prevented him from filing a timely section 2254 petition and because (2) Rodriguez failed 

to provide sufficient proof that he never received the first copy of the state court’s 3 August 

order. Because Rodriguez has failed to demonstrate that he acted diligently, we need not 

consider the magistrate judge’s other independent grounds for denying Rodriguez equitable 

tolling. See Diaz, 362 F.3d at 702 n.7. 

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made by a United States magistrate under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 636, and 

which are accepted and adopted by the district court without objection by any 

party, may be reviewed on direct appeal only for ‘plain error or manifest 

injustice.’”). 

To the extent that Rodriguez raises the diligence issue on appeal, he says 

only that he “adamantly and consistently pursued his appellate State remedies.” 

Rodriguez provides no factual support for his contention that he acted diligently. 

He raises no challenge to the district court’s factual findings about the time that 

elapsed before Rodriguez inquired about the status of his state court petition and 

before he filed his amended state court and federal habeas petitions. In addition, 

Rodriguez offers no facts to excuse his delay in pursuing his habeas relief and fails

to counter otherwise the district court’s determination that he was not reasonably 

diligent. 

On this record, we cannot say that the district court plainly erred in 

determining that Rodriguez was less than diligent. Because Rodriguez failed to 

satisfy his burden of demonstrating that he acted diligently, he is entitled to no 

equitable tolling of the limitations period; and the district court dismissed correctly 

Rodriguez’s section 2254 petition as time-barred.

AFFIRMED.

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