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Parties Involved:
Pedro V. Spedalieri
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

PEDRO V. SPEDALIERI, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

F I LUO 

Uflited Sci~§ CJutt qf Appcrals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG .. 7 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-2181 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. 88-0245-JB) 

William D. Fry, Assistant Federal Defender, Las Cruces, New 

Mexico, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Robert J. Gorence, Assistant United States Attorney, (William L. 

Lutz, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Albuquerque, 

New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before LOGAN, BALDOCK and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge. 

Defendant-appellant, Pedro v. Spedalieri, was convicted of 

armed robbery in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 2113(a) and (d), and 

sentenced to fifty-seven months imprisonment. On appeal, 

Spedalieri argues that the district court erred in 1) denying his 

motion for a judgment of acquittal on armed robbery(§ 2113(d)) 

because an actual bomb was not involved, 2) misapprehending its 

authority to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines, and 

Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 1 
3) not granting a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 

responsibility. We reject Spedalieri's contentions and affirm. 

I. 

Viewing the evidence and its inferences in the light most 

favorable to the government, we summarize the facts. Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 u.s. 307, 324 (1979). On April 8, 1988, a red and 

white Chevrolet Impala approached a drive-up window at the Bank of 

the Rio Grande in Las Cruces, New Mexico. The driver, later 

identified as the defendant, passed two hand-written notes to the 

teller, Irma Jo Schunior. She testified: 

Okay, the first note I read was very -- it was a 

small one, and it said, this is a robbery and I want all 

your money. The second note was a little larger, and it 

also said that this is a robbery and I want all your 

money, and that I had ten minutes to open the side-door 

[of the drive-up facility] so that he can get in to take 

the money and that he had a bomb. 

Well, after I read the notes, I was terrified. I 

couldn't move for a minute or two. 

Rec. vol. II at 61. Sent along with the two notes was 

Spedalieri's New Mexico driver's license. Schunior then noticed a 

device on the front seat of the Impala. Spedalieri picked the 

device up and waved it at her. She described the device as 

follows: 

Okay, it was a brown tube about ten to twelve 

inches tall. It was brown with -- somewhat a grey lid 

on top. It all looked like electrical tape to me. 

It was just a big round tube, brown, all the way. It 

was all brown except for the top. 

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Id. at 65. Schunior believed the object to be a real bomb and 

felt threatened by it. Id. at 71. Schunior then pulled the "bait 

money" in her money box which activates the silent alarm. She 

placed some cash in a canvas bag and sent the bag to Spedalieri 

via the mechanical bank drawer. Upon receipt, Spedalieri asked 

for his notes back. Schunior complied, but kept Spedalieri's 

driver's license. 

Two weeks later, Spedalieri crossed the border from Mexico 

into the United States. Because a warrant had been issued for his 

arrest, the license number of Spedalieri's vehicle was entered in 

the NCIC (National Crime Information Center) database. When 

Spedalieri entered the port of entry, his car license activated a 

Customs alarm. Upon hearing the alarm, Spedalieri threw his arms 

into the air and was arrested. Spedalieri had changed the color 

of his vehicle and had bleached his hair. His pockets contained 

numerous dog-racing tickets; however, none of the $19,001 taken in 

the robbery was recovered. 

Spedalieri has a history of mental illness, but was found 

competent to stand trial after treatment at Springfield, Missouri. 

He functions just above the level of a retarded person, with an 

I.Q. of 75. Rec. val. II at 165-66. 

At the close of the government's evidence, Spedalieri moved 

for a judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). 

Spedalieri conceded the sufficiency of the evidence for bank 

robbery, § 2113(a), but argued that the evidence was insufficient 

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to support armea bank robbery,§ 2113(d). 1 Rec. val. II at 

122-23. Relying upon United States v. Crouthers, 669 F.2d 635 

(lOth Cir. 1982), the district court denied the motion. 

After conviction, but prior to sentencing, Spedalieri filed 

objections to the presentence report. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 

32(c)(3)(D). Spedalieri objected to the failure of the probation 

office to recommend the two-level downward adjustment for 

acceptance of responsibility and to set out factors which would 

warrant a downward departure from the Guidelines because 

Spedalieri suffered from a diagnosable mental illness. Rec. val. 

I, doc. 37 at 2. 

II. 

Spedalieri first argues that the district court erred in 

denying his judgment of acquittal on armed robbery(§ 2113(d)) 

1 18 U.S.C. § 2113 provides: 

Bank robbery and incidental crimes 

(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, 

takes, or attempts to take, from the person or presence 

of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by 

extortion any property or money or any other thing of 

value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, 

management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or 

any savings and loan association; 

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not 

more than twenty years, or both 

(d) Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, 

any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this 

section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the 

life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or 

device, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or 

imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 4 
because the government did not prove that the device used in 

perpetrating the robbery was a dangerous weapon. According to 

defendant, "Spedalieri's conviction must fail because the evidence 

is insufficient to sustain a finding that the 'device' he waved at 

Schunior was in fact capable of being readily operated or wielded 

to inflict serious bodily injury or injury upon another person." 

Appellant's Brief at 7. Spedalieri argues in favor of a test 

which would require the government to prove that "the device was 

objectively capable of putting Schunior's life in danger." Id. at 

9. 

The district judge was bound to and did indeed follow Tenth 

Circuit precedent, 2 which is to the contrary. We have held that a 

fake bomb, as a matter of law, may constitute a dangerous weapon, 

regardless of its actual capabilities, when a victim confronted 

with it is placed in reasonable expectation of danger. United 

States v. Marx, 485 F.2d 1179, 1185 (lOth Cir. 1973), cert. 

denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974); accord United States v. Beasley, 438 

F.2d 1279, 1282 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971). 

The same is true of an unloaded gun used in the commission of a 

2 A district court must follow the precedent of this circuit, 

regardless of its views concerning the advantages of the precedent 

of our sister circuits. See Zuniga v. United Can. Co., 812 F.2d 

443, 450 (9th Cir. 1987); Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 

747 F.2d 863, 867 (3rd Cir. 1984) (just as one panel of the court 

of appeals is bound by earlier panel decisions, g fortiori, the 

district court is bound by this circuit's decisions); Hasbrouck v. 

Texaco, 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981) (district courts "are 

not to resolve splits between circuits no matter how egregiously 

in error they may feel their own circuit to be"), cert. denied, 

459 u.s. 828 (1982). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 5 
bank robbery. McLaughlin v. United States, 476 u.s. 16, 17 

(1986); Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639. 

In Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639, we reaffirmed our adoption of 

the reasonable person standard concerning the elements of armed 

robbery under§ 2113(d). To sustain a conviction on§ 2113(d.), 

there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: 

" ... created an apparently dangerous situation, (b) 

intended to intimidate his victim to a degree greater 

than the mere use of language, (c) which does, in fact, 

place his victim in reasonable expectation of death or 

serious bodily injury." 

Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639 (quoting Beasley, 438 F.2d at 1282). 

In adopting the Beasley reasonable person standard, we rejected 

the objective test of Bradley v. United States, 447 F.2d 264, 

274-75 (8th Cir. 1971), vacated due to abatement, 404 U.S. 567 

(1972), which would require that the instrumentality used by a 

bank robber be objectively capable of causing actual physical 

harm. Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639; see also United States v. 

Shannahan, 605 F.2d 539, 542 (lOth Cir. 1979) (section 2113(d) 

does not require proof that the dangerous weapon or device "be 

actually capable of putting the life of a person in jeopardy"). 

Spedalieri urges that we reevaluate our adoption of the 

reasonable person standard and decide this case on the basis of an 

objective test like that in Bradley. Numerous problems exist with 

this suggestion. We are persuaded that the Supreme Court 

implicitly has rejected such a test, at least in the circumstances 

of an unloaded gun used in the commission of a bank robbery. 

McLaughlin, 476 u.s. at 17-18 (listing three reasons why an 

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Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 6 
unloaded gun is a dangerous weapon). "[T]he display of a gun 

instills fear in the average citizen; as a consequence, it creates 

an immediate danger that a violent response will ensue." Id. 

Moreover, "[i]t would be unreasonable to expect the victim of a 

crime, . . . to risk [her] life in order to positively ensure that 

[her] assailant did indeed have a [bomb] and that [bomb] was [able 

to be detonated]." See Crouthers, 669 F.2d at 639. The objective 

test is not consistent with the dangerous response which may be 

evoked by armed robbery, whether the instrumentality is functional 

or not. 3 McLaughlin, 476 u.s. at 17-18. 

III. 

Spedalieri next contends that the district court erred by not 

granting a downward departure in sentence. Spedalieri asserts 

that the trial judge refused to exercise his discretion to 

consider the downward departure "because the jury returned a 

verdict of armed robbery, and, thus had determined that 

Spedalieri's defense of insanity was untenable." Appellant's 

Brief at 10. We think the record tells a different story. 

Spedalieri's first obstacle is that the discretionary failure 

to depart downward from the Sentencing Guidelines is not subject 

3 Even if we were inclined toward Spedalieri's position, which 

we are not, a panel cannot overrule circuit precedent. United 

States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1161 (1st Cir. 1989) ("As a 

panel, we are bound to adhere to prior circuit precedent."); 

United States v. Salas, 879 F.2d 530, 537 (9th Cir.) ("A 

three-judge panel of this court cannot disregard or overrule a 

prior decision of this court."), cert. denied, 110 s. Ct. 507 

(1989). 

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Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 7 
to appellate review under 18 U.S.C. § 3742. United States v. 

Richardson, 901 F.2d 867, 870 (lOth Cir. 1990); United States v. 

Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1529-30 (lOth Cir. 1990). Here, however, 

Spedalieri argues that the district court never exercised its 

discretion because the jury had returned a verdict rejecting 

Spedalieri's insanity defense. According to Spedalieri, the 

district court not only felt bound by the jury's verdict rejecting 

the insanity defense, but also refused to consider any evidence 

indicating diminished capacity, though short of insanity. We 

plainly have jurisdiction under 18 u.s.c. S 3742(e)(2) to review a 

district court's refusal to exercise discretion or its decision 

that it lacks discretion as a matter of law to depart downward. 

Davis, 900 F.2d at 1530 n.7. 

A trial court's discretionary power to impose a sentence not 

within the range established by the guidelines is derived from 18 

u.s.c. S 3553(b). 4 Departure is permissible only when the 

4 18 U.S.C. S 3553(b) provides: 

Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence. The 

court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within 

the range, referred to in subsection (a)4 unless the 

court finds that there exists an aggravating or 

mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 

adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 

Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 

result in a sentence different from that described. In 

determining whether a circumstance was adequately taken 

into consideration, the court shall consider only the 

sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official 

commentary of the Sentencing Commission. In the absence 

of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court shall 

impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for 

the purposes set forth in subsection (a)(2). In the 

absence of an applicable sentencing guideline in the 

(footnote continued on next page) 

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·,. 

Sentencing Commission did not adequately consider aggravating or 

mitigating circumstances in formulating the Guidelines. Id. 

Section 5Hl.3, policy statement [hereinafter p.s.], provides that 

"[m]ental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in 

determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines, 

except as provided in the general provision in Chapter 5." United 

States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 5Hl.3. p.s. 

(Nov. 1989) (hereinafter U.S.S.G.). 

Section 5K2 (§ 5K2.0 to§ 5K2.15, U.S.S.G.) "seeks to aid the 

court by identifying some of the factors that the Commission has 

not been able to fully take into account in formulating precise 

guidelines." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s. Section 5K2.13 speaks to 

departures based upon diminished capacity: 

Diminished Capacity (Policy Statement) 

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while 

suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not 

resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other 

intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to 

reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity 

contributed to the commission of the offense, provided 

that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate 

a need for incarceration to protect the public. 

Id. (emphasis supplied). We have reviewed the transcript of 

sentencing and are convinced that the district judge specifically 

expressed his agreement with the jury's implicit finding that 

(footnote continued from prior page) 

case of an offense other than a petty offense, the court 

shall also have due regard for the relationship of the 

sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines 

applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the 

applicable policy statements of the Sentencing 

Commission. 

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Appellate Case: 89-2181 Document: 01019371233 Date Filed: 08/07/1990 Page: 9 
Spedalieri committed a violent act. Then, relying on § 5K2.13 of 

the Guidelines, see rec. val. II at 282, the district judge 

exercised his discretion not to depart downward because of the 

potentially violent nature of bank robbery facilitated by a bomb, 

fake or not. 

The district judge was not constrained by the jury's 

rejection of the insanity defense and could consider the mental 

capacity of Spedalieri. However, the judge also could consider 

"the need for incarceration to protect the public." u.s.s.G. 

§ 5K2.13, p.s. Although, the district court placed greater weight 

on this second factor, this decision process does not constitute a 

failure to exercise discretion. 

This case is readily distinguishable from United States v. 

Cheape, 889 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1989), a bank robbery case relied 

upon by Spedalieri. In Cheape, the district court on three 

separate occasions indicated its desire to depart downward based 

upon coercion as a mitigating factor. Id. at 479. The court did 

not do so, however, holding that it was constrained by the jury's 

conviction of the defendant and its implicit rejection of the 

defendant's coercion and duress defense. Id. The Third Circuit 

held that "the [district) court was legally incorrect in ruling 

that the jury's verdict with regard to coercion as a defense 

precluded the court from considering coercion as a mitigating 

factor." Id. at 480. Conversely, in this case the district court 

expressed no such indication to depart downward after considering 

the guideline sections which provide some guidance on departure 

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.. 

when diminished capacity is at issue. It would be anomalous, 

indeed, for this panel to ignore the district court's attempt to 

comply with the spirit of guideline sentencing by looking to the 

guidelines for assistance, even in the area of downward departure. 

In the context of reviewing the reasonableness of upward 

departures, we have noted: "The district court does have 

discretion in this area, of course, and need only give a 

reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines to 

justify the reasonableness of the departure." 5 United States v. 

Harris, No. 89-5113, slip op. at 4 (lOth Cir. Jun. 21, 1990 [1990 

WL 83328]. Having determined that the district court did exercise 

its discretion leaving us "a reasonable methodology hitched to the 

Sentencing Guidelines," we are without jurisdiction to review the 

decision denying downward departure. See Richardson, 901 F.2d at 

870; Davis, 900 F.2d at 1529-30. 

IV. 

Spedalieri also asserts that the district court erred in not 

granting him the two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of 

5 The three-part test for evaluating upward departures from the 

Sentencing Guidelines contained in United States v. White, 893 

F.2d 276, 277-279 (lOth Cir. 1990), was adopted from the First 

Circuit's decision in United States v. Diaz-Villafane, 874 F.2d 

43, 49-50 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 177 (1989). The 

First and Eighth Circuits have now applied the same three-part 

test to review of downward departures made by district courts. 

United States v. Crumb, 902 F.2d 1337, 1339 (8th Cir. 1990); 

United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 962, 964 (1st Cir. 1989). 

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•.. 

.. responsibility. 6 u.s.s.G. § 3E1.1 Spedalieri makes the novel 

argument that "while he had denied having committed the offense to 

the probation officer who prepared the [presentence] report, he 

had, in effect admitted his conduct by presenting the affirmative 

defense of insanity at trial." Appellant's Brief at 15; see also 

rec. vol. I, doc. 37 at 2 ("The defendant argued at trial that he 

committed the offense but that he was insane at the time of the 

commission."). 

We review the "acceptance of responsibility" determination as 

a question of fact under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 18 

u.s.c. § 3742(e); United States v. Thomas, 870 F.2d 174, 176 (5th 

Cir. 1989). As such, the trial court's determination of whether a 

defendant has accepted responsibility is subject to "great 

deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is 

without foundation." Id.; see also u.s.s.G. § 3E1.1, comment. 

(n.S). 

6 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides: 

Acceptance of Responsibility 

(a) If the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition 

and affirmative acceptance of personal 

responsibility for his criminal conduct, reduce the 

offense level by 2 levels. 

(b) A defendant may be given consideration under this 

section without regard to whether his conviction is 

based upon a guilty plea or a finding of guilt by 

the court or jury or the practical certainty of 

conviction at trial. 

(c) A defendant who enters a guilty plea is not 

entitled to a sentencing reduction under this 

section as a matter of right. 

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•• 

Whether a defendant should be granted a two-level adjustment 

for acceptance of responsibility depends upon whether the 

defendant "clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative 

acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct." 

u.s.s.G. § 3El.l(a). The burden of proof is on the defendant and 

the quantum of proof is a preponderance of evidence. United 

States v. Wach, No. 89-4097, slip op. at 4 (lOth Cir. Jul. 13, 

1990) [1990 WL 95945]; United States v. Rogers, 899 F.2d 917, 924 

(lOth Cir. 1990), petition for cert. filed, No. 89-7763 (Jun. 15, 

1990). 

The difficulty with Spedalieri's argument is that he equates 

the admission of the offense, pursuant to his insanity defense, 

with the acceptance of responsibility and, of course, the two are 

not the same. Factual admissions implicit in some affirmative 

defenses, see Black's Law Dictionary 55 (5th ed. 1979), are not 

alone indicative of the contrition necessary under§ 3El.l. for 

acceptance of responsibility. Here, Spedalieri did not 

acknowledge responsibility, let alone commission of the offense, 

to the probation officer. Rec. supp. vol. I at 4. In these 

circumstances, Spedalieri completely failed to meet his burden of 

proof; consequently, the district court's denial of the adjustment 

cannot be clearly erroneous. 

AFFIRMED. 

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