Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cr-01836/USCOURTS-azd-2_12-cr-01836-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Adrienne Marta Frazer
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Adrienne Marta Frazer, 

Defendant.

No. CR-12-01836-001-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Adrienne Marta Frazer’s Motion for New 

Trial. (Doc. 106.) For the following reasons, the Motion is denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 On April 15, 2009 Defendant filed false amended tax returns for the 2005, 2006, 

and 2007 tax years. (Doc. 115 at 63.) On that same date Defendant also filed a false 

original tax return for the 2008 tax year. (Id.) In all of these returns Defendant made false 

claims that entitled her to large tax refund amounts. (Id. at 65.) On June 3, 2009, the IRS 

erroneously paid her a tax return of $593,651.00 for the 2008 tax return. (Id. at 77.) The 

following month, the IRS sent, and the Defendant received, frivolous filer letters for the 

2005 through 2007 amended tax returns. (Id. at 91.) Nevertheless, the next year she again 

filed an additional false tax return for the 2009 tax year. (Id. at 109.) The United States 

charged the Defendant with five counts of Filing False and Fictitious Claims in violation 

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of 18 U.S.C. § 287—one count for each of the five tax years listed above. 

 At trial, Defendant admitted that the returns were false. (Doc. 115 at 65.) Her main 

defense was that she did not knowingly file the false tax returns because she legitimately 

believed the tax instruction she had received from Thomas McFadden—a charlatan who 

offered false tax advice in seminars that she paid to attend. She began attending these 

seminars in early 2009. (Doc. 112 at 63.) 

 The evidence at trial demonstrated that after she received the erroneous refund 

check for her false 2008 return, and after she had received the frivolous filing letters from 

the IRS, she began to recruit others to attend Mr. McFadden’s seminars, showing a copy 

of her refund check during his instruction to demonstrate the legitimacy of his method. 

(Doc. 115 at 90–94.) The next year, on April 16, 2010, she again filed her tax returns for 

the 2009 tax year, using Mr. McFadden’s fraudulent method. (Id. at 109.) 

 A month later the IRS, which had unsuccessfully been trying to obtain repayment 

of the erroneously-issued refund check for the 2008 tax year, levied her personal financial 

accounts. (Doc. 112 at 36.) The levy only recouped about $14,000 of the $593,651.00 the 

IRS had erroneously paid to the Defendant, and the Defendant’s bank account statements 

showed that most of the money had been spent by the date of the levies. (Id. at 40.) The 

government also demonstrated that shortly after receiving the refund almost a year earlier 

the Defendant spent large sums at Saks Fifth Avenue, on home improvements, on 

personal care and other personal items, and that she made large gifts to family members. 

(Doc. 115 at 76–83.) 

 The IRS sent and the Defendant received several letters and forms in early June 

2010, stating that she owed the government $621,062.00. (Doc. 112 at 28–29.) Defendant 

testified that upon the advice of Thomas McFadden, she mailed these forms back to the 

IRS after she signed them back over to the IRS apparently as an assertion of some form 

of payment. (Doc. 115 at 114–15.) On September 9, 2010 Special Agent Neri met with 

Defendant and informed her that she was under investigation for criminal violations of 

the tax code. (Doc. 95 at 8.) 

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 After all of these events, Defendant consulted a tax attorney, Mr. Becker. (Doc. 

115 at 34–35.) At trial, the Defendant testified that as a result of a conversation she had 

with Mr. Becker she felt no immediate need to return to the IRS her erroneous refund: 

 

Q: And after that conversation, did you – what did you do with regard to trying to repay this money? 

A: Based on his advice, I was waiting to see how this would be resolved with the IRS. 

 (Doc. 115 at 36.). At this point the Government objected to this testimony as hearsay, 

and the Court, after discussions with the Parties, sustained the objection, struck the 

testimony, and instructed the jury to disregard Defendant’s comments.1

 (Id. at 37.) The 

Court later allowed the Defendant to testify that she was “under the impression” that she 

was not required to return the money until after the criminal matter had been decided. (Id.

at 136.) After a five-day trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of all five counts on 

November 13, 2014. (Doc. 98.) 

 Defendant has since filed a motion for new trial in which she asserts four grounds 

supporting her request. First is the Court’s erroneous exclusion of the Defendant’s 

testimony regarding the advice she received from Mr. Becker concerning repayment of 

the erroneous refund to the IRS. Second is the admission into evidence of the draft tax 

return for the 2008 tax year that was prepared for the Defendant by her tax accountant but 

which was different from the return the Defendant filed with the IRS. The Defendant 

nevertheless subsequently claimed this draft return from her accountant and faxed it to a 

California corporation by the name of Taskrow (hereafter “the Taskrow fax”). (Doc. 115 

at 9.) Defendant claims that admission of such evidence was error. Third, the Defendant 

claims the Prosecutor committed misconduct by objecting to part of her closing 

argument, and fourth, the prosecutor committed misconduct during its closing argument 

by representing that the jury as taxpayers were among the victims of the Defendant’s 

 

1

 The jury is presumed to have followed the Court’s instructions. United States v. 

Johnson, 618 F.2d 60, 62 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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misconduct. (Doc. 106.) 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard 

 “On a defendant’s motion, the court may grant a new trial to that defendant if the 

interests of justice so require.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. “The district court need not view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict; it may weigh the evidence and in so 

doing evaluate for itself the credibility of the witnesses.” United States v. A. Lanoy 

Alston, D.M.D., P.C., 974 F.2d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. 

Lincoln, 630 F.2d 1313, 1319 (8th Cir. 1980)). “If the court concludes that, despite the 

abstract sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict, the evidence preponderates 

sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of justice may have 

occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the issues for 

determination by another jury.” Id.

 Because the Court concludes it erred in striking the Defendant’s testimony that 

Mr. Becker told her she need not repay the erroneous refund until after the matter with 

the IRS concluded, it applies the “harmless error standard for nonconstitutional error.” 

United States v. Moran, 493 F.3d 1002, 1014 (9th Cir. 2007). Under this standard, a court 

should grant a new trial “‘unless there is a “fair assurance” of harmlessness or, stated 

otherwise, unless it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the 

verdict.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 1997). 

 To determine whether a serious miscarriage of justice occurred on other grounds 

that Defendant has raised in this Motion—the Taskrow evidence and the Government’s 

closing argument—the Court applies the more restrictive “plain error” review because 

Defendant failed to object on these grounds at trial. See United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 

588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Absent plain error, a conviction will not be reversed 

on evidentiary grounds not revealed to the trial court at the time of the assertedly 

erroneous ruling, even though the omitted argument is eventually made at some later 

stage of the trial.”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52 (stating any error that is harmless or 

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“does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded” and any “plain error that affects 

substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court’s 

attention”).2

II. Analysis 

 A. Mr. Becker Testimony 

Defendant cites Moran, for the proposition that the Court committed error in 

striking the Defendant’s testimony that, based upon the advice of her attorney, she did not 

repay her the amount wrongfully paid her by the United States until the termination of the 

criminal matter. (See Doc. 123, Ex. 5.) 

 In Moran, the Defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Moran were charged with various 

criminal counts related to their promotion of a fraudulent tax scheme about which they 

held classes and instructed taxpayers. 493 F.3d at 1007–08. The Moran’s principal 

defense was that they “held a good faith belief that the programs in which [they] 

participated were legal . . . based, among other things, on opinions from a CPA and 

outside experts.” Id. at 1001. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred when it 

refused to allow the Defendant to testify about what a CPA had told her about the legality 

of her tax scheme because it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted—that the 

Moran’s tax scheme involving off-shore investments was in fact legal—but was offered 

for the fact that the Morans would have believed it was legal. Id. The Moran Court then 

determined that the error was not harmless because it went to the very heart of the 

Morans’ defense, “which entitled her to ‘rebut the Government’s proof of willfulness by 

establishing good faith reliance on a qualified accountant after full disclosure of tax-

 

2

 Although these standards are typically applied by appellate courts to review a district court’s actions, several district courts have applied the plain error standard in considering their own exclusion of evidence on a motion for new trial under Rule 33 

because the district court is performing a quasi-appellate function. See United States v. 

Washington, 263 F.Supp.2d 413, 426 n.7 (D. Conn. 2003); United States v. Yevakpor, 501 F. Supp. 2d 330, 334 (N.D.N.Y. 2006); United States v. Erickson, No. 2:12-CR00001-LRH, 2012 WL 4194504, at *4 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2012). This comports with the 

plain language of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 51 and 52 and Federal Rule of 

Evidence 103, which apply to courts in a general sense without distinguishing between district and appellate courts. In any event, the Court does find that any error that occurred was harmless. 

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related information.’” Id. at 1013 (quoting United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1106 

(9th Cir. 2002)).

 In a similar case, United States v. Ross, the Ninth Circuit explained the 

circumstances under which a district court’s exclusion of testimony would constitute 

harmless error. 442 F. App’x 290 (9th Cir. 2011). The district court in Ross, similar to the 

district court in Moran, excluded as hearsay the defendants testimony about tax advice 

that he received from various tax advisors. Id. at 293. However, the district court allowed 

the defendant to state the advice that he received couched as what he “‘understood’ or 

learned from those advisors.” Id. The district court also allowed many documents and 

other evidence in to allow the jury to adequately understand the defendant’s good faith 

reliance defense. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that although “the district court erred as a 

matter of law in ruling that testimony reporting the tax advice was ‘hearsay,’” the error 

was harmless because the jury received ample evidence on the defendant’s main defense. 

Id.

 After reviewing Moran and Ross, the Court concedes it was error to exclude the 

evidence that Defendant was under the impression that she need not return the money to 

the IRS because her tax attorney, Mr. Becker, advised her she need not do so. However, 

unlike the excluded evidence in Moran, and like that in Ross, the Becker evidence had 

virtually no effect on Defendant’s defense, which in this case rested on her state of mind 

at the time she filed the false returns on April 15, 2009 and April 16, 2010. This evidence 

only went to the timing of her repayment of the amount she had wrongfully received. 

Further, the evidence established that, at the time that the Defendant received this advice 

from her attorney, she did not have the money with which to repay the IRS because she 

had already spent it. 

 In contrast to both Moran and Ross, the tax advice that was stricken here did not 

go to the Defendant’s good faith belief as to the legitimacy of the tax scheme pursuant to 

which she filed her returns. Her alleged good faith belief in that scheme was based on the 

advice of Mr. McFadden and not her tax attorney. She was able to put in front of the jury 

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all of the evidence relating to the instruction of Mr. McFadden concerning the tax 

scheme. All such events took place before, and in most instances long before, she sought 

the advice of Mr. Becker in late 2010.3

 For example, she attended the seminars of 

Thomas McFadden in early 2009. (Doc. 112 at 63.) She filed the false amended tax 

returns for the years 2005, 2006, and 2007 and the false original tax return for the year 

2008 on April 15, 2009. (Doc. 115 at 63.) She received the return check for $593,651.00 

on June 3, 2009. (Id. at 77.) She received frivolous filer letters for the 2005 through 2007 

amended tax returns on July 9, 2009. (Id. at 91.) She attended other seminars later in 

2009. (Doc. 112 at 63.) She filed the last fraudulent tax return for which she was charged 

on April 16, 2010. (Doc. 115 at 109.) Her personal bank accounts were levied in May 

2010. (Doc. 112 at 36.) She received several letters and forms from the IRS in early June 

2010, stating that she owed $621,062.00 at that time. (Id. at 28–29.) Then on September 

9, 2010 Special Agent Neri met with Defendant and informed her that she was under 

investigation for criminal violations of the tax code. (Doc. 95 at 8.) And it was only after 

all of this that Defendant consulted Mr. Becker about whether she should repay money to 

the IRS or wait until after trial. (Doc. 115 at 34–35.) 

 Further, the evidence admitted by the government establishes that in September 

2010 the IRS had already levied the approximately fourteen thousand dollars that the 

Defendant had in her financial accounts. (Doc. 112 at 36.) That levy also demonstrated 

that she had spent much of the $593,651.00 that she had been erroneously paid. (Id.) The 

advice of Defendant’s attorney that Defendant had no immediate obligation to repay, 

delivered more than a year after she had been paid the erroneous refund, and after she had 

already spent that refund, and after the IRS had instituted a levy on her financial accounts 

is not materially relevant to whether she had knowledge that her returns were false when 

she filed them. As well, the Court allowed Defendant to testify that she was under the 

impression that she was not required to repay the money until after the criminal matter 

 

3

 Although the evidence presented at trial does not indicate the specific date when Defendant consulted with Becker, she states that she met him at some point after meeting with Special Agent Neri on September 9, 2010. (Doc. 115 at 34–35.) 

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was resolved. (Doc. 115 at 136.) 

 The Defendant presented all of the evidence on her “good faith” defense and 

because the excluded evidence was unrelated to this defense, the Court’s erroneous 

decision to strike the Defendant’s testimony concerning what her tax attorney told her 

was harmless error. 

 B. Taskrow Fax 

Defendant next objects to the admission at trial of the Government’s evidence 

showing that Defendant requested from her accountant a draft copy of her tax return for 

the year 2008—instead of her completed 2008 tax return—and faxed that draft to 

Taskrow to receive an unspecified benefit. At trial, Defendant presented evidence 

suggesting that although her accountant faxed to Taskrow the draft 2008 tax return, she 

also sent to Taskrow the version of her 2008 return that she filed independent of her 

accountant. (Doc. 115 at 605.) As noted above, the Court will apply the plain error 

standard because Defendant did not object to the Government’s admission of this 

evidence at trial. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d at 274. Defendant now objects to this line of 

reasoning for the first time under Federal Rules of Evidence 403 and Rule 404(b).4

 It was not plain error for the Court to admit this evidence under Rule 404(b). The 

Government’s offered evidence showed that Defendant’s accountant did send a fax to 

Taskrow of the draft 2008 tax return. Further, apart from Defendant’s testimony, there 

was no evidence produced at trial showing that Taskrow received the version of the 2008 

tax return that Defendant filed. Defendant concedes that the Government did not offer 

this evidence as proof of a crime or wrongful act under Rule 404(b): “[t]he government 

presented no evidence whatsoever that [Defendant] actually used the 2008 draft return 

that she obtained in June 2009 for any reason legal or illegal.” (Doc. 106.) Rather, the 

Government offered this evidence to show that Defendant knew that there was something 

 

4

 Defendant asks for leniency in not objecting sooner because the Government did not properly give notice of this testimony before trial. However, the Government’s notice 

discloses this anticipated testimony, and, in any case, Defendant fails to provide an excuse for not objecting either at or prior to trial. 

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illegitimate about the tax return that Defendant filed at the advice of Thomas McFadden. 

Under Rule 404(b), such evidence of “other acts” is admissible to prove knowledge so 

long as the Government provides “reasonable notice of the general nature of any such 

evidence.” The Government asserted the following in its Notice of Intent to Introduce 

Inextricably Intertwined Evidence and 404(b): “Frazer did, however, request that Shapiro 

fax the original return to a firm called TASKROW.” (Doc. 39.) Because the Government 

provided Defendant ample notice of the general nature of the Taskrow evidence, the 

Court did not commit plain error by admitting it. 

 Further it was not plain error for the Court to admit this evidence under Rule 403 

because the probative value of the evidence was higher than Defendant asserts. This 

evidence tended to show that the draft return prepared by Defendant’s accountant for the 

2008 tax year is not the return she submitted to the IRS in April 2009. It also showed that 

Defendant knew that the 2008 tax return was false. Defendant was able to provide 

rebuttal testimony that she sent to Taskrow all of her financial information, including the 

tax returns that she filed using the technique taught to her by Thomas McFadden. 

Defendant has not persuasively argued why the jury should have been precluded from 

drawing its own conclusion about this testimony or why it posed a danger of unfair 

prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. See United States v. Rizk, 660 

F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n view of the inherently fact-specific nature of the 

Rule 403 balancing inquiry, and the special deference to which district courts’ decisions 

to admit evidence pursuant to that Rule are entitled, it is the rare exception when a district 

court’s decision to admit evidence under Rule 403 constitutes plain error.”) (quoting 

United States v. Plunk, 153 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled on other 

grounds). Admission of this evidence was not plain error. 

 C. Closing Argument 

Defendant finally argues that the Government committed prosecutorial misconduct 

during closing argument by (1) objecting during Defendant’s closing argument to the 

Defense’s statement that the Government could have looked at Defendant’s credit report 

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to determine if she had truly used the 2008 tax return to apply for a loan and (2) stating 

during its own closing that the money that Defendant obtained came from them as well as 

other tax payers. To find prosecutorial misconduct, the Court must determine not only 

whether the prosecution committed error but also ““whether it is more probable than not 

that the prosecutor’s conduct materially affected the fairness of the trial.” United States v. 

McKoy, 771 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir. 1985). 

 Defendants’ contention that the Government committed misconduct by objecting 

during the Defense’s closing fails to even demonstrate error because the Court overruled 

the objection and allowed Defendant to present this argument. (See Doc. 119, Ex. 1.) 

 Defendant’s second contention regarding prosecutorial misconduct, also comes 

belatedly because the Defendant did not raise an objection to the Government’s conduct 

at trial. Thus, the plain error standard will apply. See United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 

967, 982 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Mousseau did not object at trial to these acts of alleged 

misconduct. Accordingly, he must show that the district court plainly erred when it did 

not sua sponte address the alleged misconduct.”). 

 While the Defendant cites to some out-of-circuit authority that holds that it is error 

to refer to “the individual pecuniary interests of juror as taxpayers” in argument, see 

United States v. Palma, 473 F.3d 899, 902 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Schimmel, 

943 F.2d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 1991), all courts addressing this issue to which Defendant 

cites have held that such errors are harmless. This is especially true when the 

Government’s case is strong, the Court instructs the jury that the attorney’s arguments are 

not evidence, and the Government does not misstate evidence. See Palma, 473 F.3d at 

902; Schimmel, 943 F.2d at 806; United States v. Scott, 660 F.2d 1145, 1177 (7th Cir. 

1981) (“Although inflammatory argument may be grounds for reversal, the government 

should not be restricted to sterile recitation of uncontroverted facts.”). 

 In the present case, the Government’s statement to the jury that the victim of 

Defendant’s crime was “you, and every one of the U.S. taxpayers” was error. (Doc. 123, 

Ex. 2.) The Government, however, provided substantial evidence from which a jury could 

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return a guilty verdict, including, among other things, that the scheme by which 

Defendant was allegedly deceived was transparently fraudulent; that Defendant did not 

consult her accountant before filing her tax return; that Defendant’s accountant drafted 

different tax returns for four out of the five years than the Defendant ultimately filed; that 

the Defendant faxed copies of her accountant’s non-filed tax return for 2008 with a 

separate financial institution; and that Defendant had received frivolous filer letters from 

the IRS before submitting the most recent false return. Nothing indicates that the 

Government misstated the evidence, and the Court properly instructed the jury that the 

attorneys’ statements were not to be considered evidence. The Government’s remarks 

invoking the pecuniary interests of the jury did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct 

because they did not “materially affected the fairness of the trial,” and it was not plain 

error for the Court to not address these remarks sua sponte. See Sullivan, 522 F.3d at 982; 

Scott, 660 F.2d at 1177. 

CONCLUSION 

 The Court did err when it excluded Defendant’s statement regarding the advice of 

her tax attorney concerning the timing of her repayment of the erroneously paid return. 

This error was not prejudicial because a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that 

the error did not materially affect the jury’s verdict. Further, Defendant contends that the 

Government committed prosecutorial misconduct by using improper arguments during 

closing statements and by objecting to Defendant’s arguments improperly. The only 

instance of error was the Government’s reference to the jurors’ pecuniary interests. This 

was not misconduct because it did not affect the fairness of the trial, and it was not plain 

error for the Court to not address this sua sponte. Finally, neither the Court’s exclusion of 

the tax attorney evidence nor the Government’s statement, viewed separately or together, 

“preponderate[] sufficiently heavily against the verdict that a serious miscarriage of 

justice may have occurred, it may set aside the verdict, grant a new trial, and submit the 

issues for determination by another jury.” Alston, 974 F.2d at 1211. 

/ / / 

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Adrienne Marta Frazer’s 

Motion for New Trial. (Doc. 106) is DENIED. 

 Dated this 5th day of March, 2015. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

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