Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01315/USCOURTS-caed-1_11-cv-01315-10/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rowan Brooks
Petitioner
James Yates
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding through appointed counsel with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The original petition in this case was filed on August 9, 2011 by Petitioner’s then-counsel of 

record, Gregory H. Mitts. (Doc. 1). On August 15, 2011, after a preliminary review of the petition 

indicated that the petition may be untimely under federal law, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order to 

ROWAN BROOKS,

 Petitioner,

v.

JAMES YATES,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:11-cv-01315-LJO-JLT

ORDER VACATING OCTOBER 5, 2012 ORDER 

DENYING MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT (Doc. 31)

ORDER ON REMAND GRANTING 

PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 

JUDGMENT DATED JUNE 13, 2012 (Doc. 12)

ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT ENTERED ON 

NOVEMBER 22, 2011 (Doc. 10)

ORDER REMANDING CASE TO MAGISTRATE 

JUDGE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

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Show Cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely, and afforded counsel thirty days 

within which to file a response. (Doc. 6). Mr. Mitts filed no response. 

On October 20, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued Findings and Recommendations to dismiss 

the petition and gave counsel twenty days within which to file objections. (Doc. 8). Mr. Mitts did not 

file objections. On November 22, 2011, this Court adopted the Findings and Recommendations, 

entered judgment, and closed the file. (Docs. 9 & 10). 

On June 13, 2012, Petitioner, without assistance of his counsel, filed a series of documents, 

including the instant motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). (Doc. 12). In 

his motion for relief from judgment, Petitioner made a number of allegations charging Mr. Mitts with 

egregious negligence and ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file a timely federal petition. 

Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that his family retained Mr. Mitts in March 2010 to represent him in 

Petitioner’s habeas corpus proceedings and other related legal matters; that Mr. Mitts did not keep 

Petitioner and his family apprised of various rulings in state court despite Petitioner’s monthly 

communications with Mr. Mitts; that Petitioner sent Mr. Mitts Petitioner’s entire file on or about 

August 6, 2011 [sic]; that Mr. Mitts filed the original petition in this case on August 9, 2011; that Mr. 

Mitts did not communicate with Petitioner and Petitioner only learned of this Court’s dismissal of the 

petition when Petitioner’s wife discovered that fact on the internet on November 25, 2011. (Doc. 12, 

pp. 5-6). Petitioner contended that counsel’s actions were negligent and entitle Petitioner to equitable 

tolling under federal law that would make his petition timely despite being filed beyond the one-year 

limitation period.

On October 5, 2012, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion for relief. (Doc. 31). Of particular 

note, the Court rejected Petitioner’s claim of actual innocence as well as his claim that Mr. Mitts 

committed gross attorney negligence in his handling of Petitioner’s case, as distinct from ordinary 

attorney negligence. Petitioner filed a notice of appeal in the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth 

Circuit, on October 22, 2012. (Doc. 32). On October 28, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted a certificate 

of appealability as to certain issues and permitted the appeal to go forward. (Doc. 42). 

Subsequently, on March 28, 2016, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion which affirmed in part 

and reversed in part the decision of this Court. (Doc. 43). The Ninth Circuit affirmed that portion of 

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the judgment regarding actual innocence. Brooks v. Yates, 818 F.3d 532, 533-534 (9th Cir. 2016). 

However, the appellate court reversed the judgment as to whether Petitioner’s counsel had abandoned 

him, concluding that Mitts was “grossly negligent in his representation of [Petitioner] at the time the 

district court ordered [Petitioner] to show cause why his petition should not be dismissed as 

untimely.” Brooks, 818 F.3d at 534 (Emphasis supplied).

The Ninth Circuit pointed out that this Court had focused its inquiry on Mitt’s performance 

leading up to the habeas petition’s late filing, and determined that, because Mitt’s miscalculation of 

the filing deadline was only simple attorney negligence, Petitioner was not entitled to equitable tolling.

The Court went on to state that 

“[t]his was not the proper inquiry.

...

Instead, the proper inquiry is whether ‘extraordinary circumstances prevented [Petitioner] from 

taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment,’ [i.e.], the relevant judgment 

being the district court’s ultimate dismissal of the petition.”

Brooks, 818 F.3d at 534 (Emphasis supplied). 

Noting that, “[e]ven where a petitioner is abandoned by counsel, the petitioner must also show 

that he diligently pursued his rights before relief can be granted,” and because the Court had not made 

express findings as to Petitioner’s diligence, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to this Court for the 

specific purpose of making such findings regarding Petitioner’s diligence or lack thereof. Id. at 535.

On April 20, 2016, mandate issued from the Ninth Circuit. On May 9, 2016, counsel for 

Petitioner entered her appearance. (Doc. 46). On May 16, 2016, the Court ordered the parties to file 

briefs addressing the issue on remand, i.e., Petitioner’s diligence. (Doc. 48). On July 7, 2016, 

Respondent filed his brief. (Doc. 50). On July 15, 2016, Petitioner filed his brief with attachments. 

(Doc. 51).

DISCUSSION

A. Requirements For Granting A Rule 60(b) Motion.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the district 

court. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds 

of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) 

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fraud . . . of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied . . . or (6) 

any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). A 

motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, in any event “not more than one year 

after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” Id.

Moreover, when filing a motion for reconsideration, Local Rule 230(j) requires a party to show 

the “new or different facts or circumstances claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown 

upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion.” Motions to reconsider are 

committed to the discretion of the trial court. Combs v. Nick Garin Trucking, 825 F.2d 437, 441 

(D.C.Cir. 1987); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 460 (9th Cir. 1983) (en banc). To succeed, a party 

must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior 

decision. See, e.g., Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 

1986), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1987). 

As the Ninth Circuit observed in its opinion, “[G]ross negligence by counsel amounting to 

‘virtual abandonment’ can be an “extraordinary circumstance’ that justifies [relief under] Rule 

60(b)(6).” Brooks, 818 F.3d at 534, citing Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012). 

B. Analysis. 

The issue of whether some extraordinary circumstance stood in Petitioner’s way has been 

answered by the Ninth Circuit’s decision, which concluded that Mr. Mitts had engaged in gross 

attorney negligence amounting to “virtual abandonment” of his client. The Ninth Circuit remanded

the case to this Court for the sole purpose of determining whether Petitioner met the diligence 

requirement for Rule 60(b) relief.

In his brief filed following remand, Respondent states that he “finds no basis to challenge 

diligence....” (Doc. 50, p. 2). Further, Respondent states that he

...will not task Petitioner to go through the motions to say what is obvious. That is, 

Respondent will not quarrel with a finding that six and one-half months was a reasonable time 

for him to accumulate and present the matters that he did present for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, as 

part of his effort to make a case that to re-open would not be futile.”

(Doc. 50, p. 3).

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However, Respondent goes on to contend that granting the motion for relief from judgment 

would be futile because putting Petitioner in the status quo ante, i.e., as of the time period after filing 

of the petition but prior to entry of judgment, would still not cure an untimely petition. (Id., p. 4). 

Petitioner’s brief emphasizes that the only issue on remand, i.e., Petitioner’s diligence or lack 

thereof, was conceded by Respondent, and thus the motion for relief from judgment should, ipso facto,

be granted. (Doc. 51, pp. 19-27). However, Petitioner goes on to dispute Respondent’s argument that 

granting the motion for relief would be futile, contending, essentially, that granting the motion for 

relief from judgment would do nothing more than give Petitioner the right to litigate the very issue, 

i.e., equitable tolling, he had been denied the opportunity to litigate by his virtue of his attorney’s 

abandonment. Petitioner then goes on to argue strenuously that entitlement to equitable tolling has 

already been established in this record based on Mitt’s gross negligence, and therefore the Court 

should, in addition to granting the motion for relief, deem the petition timely and allow the case to 

proceed on the merits. (Doc. 51, pp. 26-38). 

After considering all of these arguments, what seems clear is that Petitioner has met the 

standards for granting Rule 60(b) relief in that he has shown gross attorney negligence that precluded 

him from responding to the Magistrate Judge’s original Order to Show Cause or otherwise “taking 

timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment,” and he has shown diligence in filing his 

motion for relief, as conceded by Respondent. 

Having concluded that Petitioner is entitled to relief from the judgment, the Court is not, at this 

juncture, inclined to accept the parties’ invitation to address the underlying, and possibly dispositive,

issue of whether Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling based on Mitts’ conduct prior to the filing of 

the instant petition. That is an issue properly within the authority of the Magistrate Judge once this 

Court has referred the case back to her for further proceedings.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

1. The judgment entered on June 13, 2012 (Doc. 12), is VACATED and SET ASIDE;

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2. The October 5, 2012 order denying Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment (Doc. 31), 

is VACATED;

3. Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment dated June 13, 2012 (Doc. 12), is GRANTED; 

and,

4. The matter is referred back to the U.S. Magistrate Judge assigned to this case for further 

proceedings.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 9, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

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