Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-1_14-cv-04839/USCOURTS-cand-1_14-cv-04839-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Garry Eagles
Defendant
Mindy Fattig
Defendant
Humboldt County Board of Education
Defendant
Humboldt County Child Welfare
Defendant
Humboldt County Office of Education
Defendant
Humboldt County SELPA
Defendant
Juvenile Probation Services
Defendant
T. R.
Plaintiff
Semper Virens Psychiatric Health Facility
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

EUREKA DIVISION

T. R.,

Plaintiff,

v.

HUMBOLDT COUNTY OFFICE OF 

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04839-NJV

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: Dkt. No. 28 & 36

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 20). On March 20, 

2015, Defendants Eagles, Fattig, Humboldt County Board of Education (“HCOE Board”), 

Humboldt County Office of Education (“HCOE”), and Humboldt County SELPA (collectively 

“School Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28), to which Plaintiff filed a Response

(Doc. 32). On April 28, 2015, Defendants Humboldt County Child Welfare, Juvenile Probation 

Services, and Semper Virens Psychiatric Health Facility (collectively “County Defendants”) filed 

an Answer to the Amended Complaint (Doc. 33) and are not a part of the pending Motion. On 

May 12, 2015, School Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 34), and this court took the pending Motion 

to Dismiss under submission (Doc. 36). Plaintiff responded by filing a Motion to Strike the Reply 

as untimely filed. (Doc. 36). For the reasons that follow, the court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss 

and the Motion to Strike.

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II. CLAIMS

Plaintiff‟s amended complaint alleges three claims for relief, as follows: 

A. 42 U.S.C. §1983

Plaintiff alleges that Garry Eagles and Mindy Fattig, in their individual capacities, and 

County defendants, violated § 1983 by depriving plaintiff of his rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment during his nine months of detention at Humboldt Juvenile Hall by denying him of 

“any appropriate mental health services or adequate means to communicate.” Amend. Comp. 

(Doc. 20) at ¶72. This claim further alleges that Eagles and Fattig were “deliberately indifferent to 

T.R.‟s rights as a special education student” and failed to “consider all placement options” 

pursuant to “state and federal law.” Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages 

against Director Eagles and Ms. Fattig for the alleged violations of §1983.

B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

Plaintiff alleges that HCOE, the HCOE Board, SELPA, and County Defendants violated 

Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by discriminating against Plaintiff based on his disability 

during his detention at Juvenile Hall. The alleged discrimination took the form of “failing to offer 

him appropriate mental health services while incarcerated in the hall” and by “failing to provide 

[him] an appropriate placement.” Id. at ¶81. This claim further alleges that “T.R. was placed and 

held in Juvenile Hall solely because of [his] disability.” Id. at ¶82. Plaintiff seeks compensatory 

damages for the alleged violation.

C. Americans With Disabilities Act

Plaintiff alleges that HCOE, the HCOE Board, SELPA, and County Defendants violated 

Title II of the ADA by “failing in their responsibilities under Title II to provide services, programs 

and activities in a full and equal manner to T.R. as described above,” including but not limited to 

“failing to provide T.R. with appropriate mental health services.” Id. at ¶90. Plaintiff seeks 

“special and general damages” for the alleged violations of the ADA.

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III. LEGAL STANDARD

School Defendants bring their motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), alleging that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In 

order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. 

Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812 (9th Cir. 2010). “For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we 

accept all well-pleaded allegations of material fact as true and construe them in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sateriale v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 697 F.3d 777, 783 

(9th Cir. 2012). Thus, in order to survive a motion to dismiss, the nonmoving party must allege 

facts that are “enough to raise a right to above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all 

the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “But so long as the plaintiff alleges facts to support a theory 

that is not facially implausible, the court‟s skepticism is best reserved for later stages of the 

proceedings when the plaintiff‟s case can be [evaluated] on evidentiary grounds. „[A] well-pleaded 

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is 

improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.‟” In re Gilead Sciences Secs. Litig., 

536 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

IV. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS1

Plaintiff is a minor student “with a disability and is entitled to legal rights and remedies set 

forth in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et.seq. and is 

an individual with exceptional needs within the meaning of that term under California Education 

Code §56026.” Amend. Comp. (Doc. 20) at ¶4.

 

1

 Defendants included a “factual allegations” section within the Motion to Dismiss, which adequately 

summarizes the facts contained within the Amended Complaint and which the court adopts in large part 

here.

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Defendant HCOE is a public school district under the laws of the State of California and 

was the local education agency responsible for providing juvenile delinquent youth who reside in 

the Humboldt Juvenile Hall full and equal access to the public education programs in compliance 

with the requirements of state and federal law. Id. at ¶7.

Defendant Humboldt County Board of Education is the governing board of HCOE, 

defendant Garry Eagles is the Superintendent of HCOE, and defendant Mindy Fattig is the 

“Special Education Local Plan [“SELPA”] Director of HCOE.” Id. at ¶8, 12, & 13. Defendant 

SELPA is a “public education agency comprised of all of the local education agencies in 

Humboldt County,” and is “responsible for administering the allocations of special education 

funding throughout Humboldt County,” and “for coordinating the implementation of special 

education placement and services for all special needs students within Humboldt County.” Id. at 

¶8. 

In July of 2012, Plaintiff was adjudicated as a dependent child of the Juvenile Court 

pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code §300. Id. at ¶22. “This happened because T.R.‟s 

behavior was beyond the control of his grandparents and school officials.” Id. Plaintiff “acted 

paranoid at home and engaged in violent behavior.” Id. He “made little progress at school . . . 

ignored all rules . . . spent considerable time living in the homeless community [and] believed the 

homeless community was his family.” Id.

In May of 2012, the Juvenile Court, “at the direction of the Humboldt County Child 

Welfare,” placed T.R. in a group home in San Diego, California, which “specialized in treatment 

for deaf students with social and emotional needs.” Id. at ¶¶23, 24 During his time at the group 

home, Plaintiff displayed “physically assaultive behavior, including self-harm, property 

destruction, atypical conduct (urinating all over the facility), defiant behaviors and elopement.”

Id. at ¶24. During periods of his elopement, Plaintiff would “live on the streets and exchange 

sexual acts for drugs.” Id.

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In September of 2012, Plaintiff returned to Humboldt County and was placed by Child 

Welfare Services in a number of unsuccessful placements. Id. at ¶25. Child Welfare Services was 

unable to place him in a locked facility because no such facility exists in California. Id. Upon his 

return to Humboldt County, Plaintiff “acted paranoid and would express delusional thoughts.” Id. 

at ¶26. He spent much of his time with the homeless community, carried out “illegal tasks” at the 

direction of homeless adults, “engaged in substance abuse,” and “exchanged sex for drugs.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief that “Defendants” were “aware” of his 

“dangerous and self-injuries activity” and failed to “supervise and protect” him “from harming 

himself and others.” Id. at ¶27. In November of 2012, shortly after being discharged from an 

unsuccessful placement, Plaintiff was apprehended for public intoxication and was placed in the 

Humboldt Juvenile Hall. Id. at ¶30. Defendant HCOE is responsible for providing “special 

education services, including related mental health services to minors at Juvenile Hall,” pursuant 

to the California Education Code, and was responsible for providing these services to plaintiff 

during his detention there. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that throughout his nine-month incarceration at Juvenile Hall “HCOE, 

Probation, or County Mental Health failed to provide him with appropriate mental health 

services,” that he was wrongfully denied a “locked residential facility,” and that School 

Defendants Fattig and Eagles “failed to take any action to ensure that [his] special education needs 

were met.” Id. at ¶32, 34, 36, & 37.

Plaintiff further alleges that he was wrongfully denied access to the services of an 

American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter during non-school hours in Juvenile Hall, as well as 

appropriate “psychiatric services.” Id. at ¶45, 47. While he was in Juvenile Hall, a psychologist 

retained by Child Welfare Services, at the direction of the Juvenile Court, opined that Plaintiff 

should be placed in a locked residential facility located in Florida, which specialized in providing 

“therapeutic” services to deaf children. Id. at ¶40.

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Plaintiff was discharged from Juvenile Hall on July 3, 2013, “after his public defender 

brought to the [Juvenile] Court‟s attention that they [sic] had no reason to continue to hold him,” 

and further alleges that his “approximately nine-month stay at the hall far exceeded any 

punishment warranted for public intoxication.” Id. at ¶50. The complaint alleges that 

“[c]ollectively, Defendants caused T.R. to be incarcerated for almost nine months because of his 

disabilities.” Id. at ¶51. Upon his release from Juvenile Hall plaintiff was “quickly removed from 

his grandparent‟s home because he became violent.” Id. at ¶54.

On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff‟s grandparents initiated an administrative due process 

proceeding with the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) on behalf of themselves and T.R. 

pursuant to the IDEA and state law, entitled Parent v. Humboldt County Office of Education and 

Northern Humboldt Union High School. Id. at ¶55. During the pendency of the OAH 

proceedings, Plaintiff briefly attended, and then stopped attending McKinleyville High School, 

which is within the Northern Humboldt School District. Id. at ¶56. He was then placed in a “high 

security group home” located in Humboldt County in September 2013, where he “remained for 

four hours prior to eloping back into the streets.” Id. at ¶56, 57. The director of the group home 

“was not able to get T.R. to school because of T.R.‟s significant mental health and behavioral 

issues.” Id. at ¶57.

On December 24, 2013, after the OAH hearings had concluded, the Administrative Law 

Judge issued a written decision, which included an Order for relief. The ALJ determined that 

HCOE had denied Plaintiff a Free Appropriate Public Education (“FAPE”) during his detention in 

the Juvenile Hall, and ordered HCOE to provide Plaintiff “with extensive compensatory education 

services, including residential treatment.” Id. at ¶64. 

V. DISCUSSION

A. The § 1983 Claims against Eagles & Fattig

Defendants assert that “Plaintiff‟s § 1983 claim is simply a disguised claim for alleged 

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violations of [P]laintiff‟s rights arising under the IDEA, [Section 504 of] the Rehabilitation Act, 

and [the] ADA, all of which preclude private causes of actions for damages to be made against 

individual (i.e. nonentity) defendants.” Mot. (Doc. 28) at 18. Plaintiff counters that his § 1983 

claims are premised on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the IDEA and that he has 

alleged sufficient facts to support separate causes of actions under Section 504 of the 

Rehabilitation Act, and the ADA.

While a federal statute such as IDEA can create a right enforceable through § 1983, see

Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997), such an action is not cognizable where 

congress has either expressly or impliedly created “a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 

incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 

285 n. 4 (2002) (quoting Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341.). “Section 1983 is not an available remedy for 

violations of the IDEA, Title II of the ADA, or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The 

comprehensive enforcement scheme of the IDEA evidences Congress‟ intent to preclude a § 1983 

claim for the violation of rights under the IDEA.” A.A. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 

3488963, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2014) (citing Blanchard v. Morton Sch. Dist., 509 F.3d 934, 

938 (9th Cir. 2007)). Indeed, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has ruled that, because Congress provided a 

comprehensive remedial scheme for individual suits under both Title II and the Rehabilitation Act, 

it intended to preclude suits seeking to enforce Title II rights through § 1983.” Chadam v. Palo 

Alto Unified Sch. Dist, 2014 WL 325323, *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2014) (citing Vinson v. Thomas, 

288 F.3d 1145, 1155 (9th Cir. 2002)).

However, the claim contained in the Amended Complaint asserts that Eagles and Fattig‟s 

actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, and resulted in Plaintiff being improperly 

incarcerated for nine months, which deprived him of appropriate mental health services and led to 

“phsychological harm, mental distress, and fear.” Amend. Compl. (Doc. 20) at 14. The Amended 

Complaint alleges that; Eagles and Fattig were aware of Plaintiff‟s “dangerous and self-injurious 

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activities” and failed to take action to ensure that Plaintiff‟s special education needs were met; that 

Fattig misrepresented HCOE‟s legal responsibilities; and that the actions of both Defendants led to 

continued incarceration which resulted in continued mental deterioration. The court does not find 

that the claims brought against Eagles and Fattig are predicated on violations of the IDEA, Title II 

of the ADA, or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but rather, as expressly stated, on the 

Fourteenth Amendment. This is not unlike Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., a case quoted by and heavily 

relied on by Defendants in their Motion, wherein the court found that “this cause of action is 

dismissed to the extent that the Section 1983 claims are based on violations of the ADA, Section 

504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the IDEA. This claim remains as to violations of the 

Fourteenth Amendment.” A.A. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 3488963, *6 (E.D. Cal. July 

14, 2014) (emphasis added). “[T]he IDEA and its requirement are not intended to „shield school 

officials from all liability for conduct that violates constitutional and statutory rights that exist 

independent of the IDEA and entitles a plaintiff to relief different from what is available under the 

IDEA.‟” Everett H. v. Dry Creek Joint Elementary Sch. Dist., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1182 (E.D. Cal. 

2014) (quoting Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011) (rev‟ on other 

grounds)).

Defendants also assert that Plaintiff is unable to state a claim against Eagles and Fattig

under § 1983, because the denial of educationally-related services during confinement does not 

constitute “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. Defendants preface this 

argument by asserting that while challenges made by “pre-trial detainees” are properly brought 

under the Fourteenth Amendment, “in cases alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, 

the Eighth Amendment standard applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. 

Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243–44 (9th Cir. 2010).” Mot. (Doc. 28) at 

14. Defendants move for dismissal of this claim, arguing that Plaintiff is unable to show “denial 

of educationally-related services constitutes „cruel and unusual punishment‟ under the Eighth 

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Amendment.” Id. at 19. Plaintiff counters that the Eighth Amendment standard does not apply to 

juvenile detainees who have not been convicted and that even if the court were to apply such a 

standard Plaintiff has asserted facts sufficient to meet the Eighth Amendment deliberate 

indifference test. See Resp. (Doc. 32) at 8-11.

The court finds that Defendants have failed to establish that Plaintiff was in custody, or 

subject to confinement such that an Eighth Amendment analysis is possible. The cases relied 

upon by Defendants either relate to pre-trial detainee adults awaiting criminal prosecution, or to

juveniles following conviction.

2

 In the present case, Plaintiff was “adjudicated a dependent child 

of the Juvenile Court pursuant to the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.” Amend. Comp. 

(Doc. 20) at 5. “Nothing in the state welfare laws at issue in the child custody proceedings or the 

manner in which the state conducts these proceedings indicates that the laws are by nature 

criminal.” Doe v. Mann, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236 (N.D. Cal. 2003) aff’d, 415 F.3d 1038 (9th 

Cir. 2005) (discussing the status of a juvenile over whom the state had exerted jurisdiction under 

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300). Accordingly, the Due Process clause of the 

 

2

 For example, Defendants point this court to Herrera v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2010 WL5313314 (C.D. 

Cal. 2010), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 482 F. App‟x 263 (9th Cir. 2012), for the proposition 

that “the District Court adopted the Eighth Amendment „deliberate indifference to serious medical needs‟

standard involving a detained juvenile.” Mot. (Doc. 28) at 15. However, a closer look reveals that the 

district court‟s decision in Herrera was based on the distinction that the juvenile had had been criminally 

convicted. Specifically, the court stated that:

Moreover, unlike in cases where the Fourteenth Amendment standard was applied, see, 

e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir.1987) (analyzing the 

constitutional claims of wards incarcerated at a Oregon juvenile facility under the 

Fourteenth Amendment where wards had not been convicted of a crime and their 

confinement was solely for noncriminal and non-penal purposes), Plaintiff was confined to 

the detention center following a judicial determination that he broke the law.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added). Thus, Herrera is instructive in as much as it informs this court that the proper 

course is to follow Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir.1987) which, “analyz[ed] the 

constitutional claims of wards incarcerated at a Oregon juvenile facility under the Fourteenth Amendment 

where wards had not been convicted of a crime and their confinement was solely for noncriminal and nonpenal purposes.” Id.

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Fourteenth Amendment governs Plaintiff‟s claim and the request to dismiss this claim is denied.

See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (Due Process standard applied to 

conditions at an Oregon juvenile detention facility where the juvenile justice system was 

noncriminal and nonpenal in nature); cf. R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1152 (D. Haw. 

2006) (applying Due Process standard to juveniles confined by Hawaii Family Courts where

wards were adjudicated delinquent and not convicted of a crime.).

B. The Rehabilitation & ADA Claims

Defendants claim that “Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a plausible claim 

for violation of the Rehabilitation Act” and the ADA. Mot. (Doc. 23) at 20, 23. Defendants 

focus on Plaintiff‟s allegations against Defendants of failing to offer appropriate mental health 

services while Plaintiff was in Juvenile Hall and of failing to provide Plaintiff an appropriate 

placement. Defendants appear to argue that these allegations amount to a claim of an incorrect 

evaluation and to sustain a challenge under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act requires 

“„something more than an incorrect evaluation, or a substantively faulty individualized education 

plan, in order for liability to exist.‟ T.B. v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 2012 WL 1611021 

(S.D. Cal. 2012).” Id. at 22. 

In response, Plaintiff points to facts in the Amended Complaint which allege intentional 

discrimination and a deliberate indifference to Plaintiff‟s needs as follows:

The Amended Complaint alleged that in November of 2012, T.R. was placed in the 

Humboldt Juvenile Hall and became the responsibility of the HCOE. Amended 

Complaint at 6, ¶ 29-31. The HCOE was aware of T.R.‟s previous identified needs 

specific to his mental health issues. Amended Complaint at 8, ¶ 33-34. While 

placed in the juvenile hall, Dr. Stika, a nationally recognized expert for deaf 

students, provided a comprehensive report recommending that T.R. receive 

intensive psychiatrically focused interventions and placement in a locked 

residential facility. Amended Complaint at 9, ¶ 40. This was not the first, but the 

second time such information had been provided to the defendants. Dr. Stika 

opined that these mental health services were necessary if any improvement were to 

be made. Id. 

This was not simply a disagreement as to what services T.R. required, as alleged by 

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the School Defendants. On the contrary, as asserted in the Amended Complaint, the 

School Defendants failed to “consider alternative placements for T.R” other than 

juvenile hall and completely shirked their legal responsibility to offer him any 

educational placement. Amended Complaint at 15, ¶ 81. Defendant FATTIG 

attended T.R.‟s juvenile hearings and misrepresented the legal obligation of School 

Defendants to offer any school placement for T.R. Id. at 8, ¶ 35. FATTIG 

specifically represented that the HCOE could only offer school placement options 

when T.R. was released from juvenile hall. Id. at 10, ¶ 48.

Resp. (Doc. 32) at 14. Taking the allegations contained in the Amended Complaint as true, the 

court finds that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to plead intentional discrimination, or at least

deliberate indifference, to support his claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. See Mark 

H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e have held that plaintiffs must prove a 

mens rea of „intentional discrimination,‟ to prevail on a § 504 claim, but that that standard may be 

met by showing „deliberate indifference,‟ and not only by showing “discriminatory animus.”).

Defendants also argue that they “cannot be liable as a matter of law for failing to make 

appropriate decisions with respect to T.R.‟s special education needs because, while he was 

incarcerated at Juvenile Hall, the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction over all decisions with 

respect T.R.‟s custody.” Mot. (Doc. 28) at 22. Plaintiff counters that School Defendants caused 

his “extensive Juvenile Hall placement” and asserts that “[i]n California, a county office of 

education (such as the HCOE) is responsible to provide a Free Appropriate Public Education 

(“FAPE”) under the IDEA to children who are confined in juvenile hall. Ed. Code § 48645.1, 

48645.2, 56150.” Resp. (Doc. 32) at 15.

Indeed, “[i]n California, a county office of education is responsible for the provision of a 

FAPE to individuals who are confined in juvenile hall schools within that county during the 

pendency of their detention.” Los Angeles Cnty. Office of Educ. v. C.M., 2011 WL 1584314, at *3 

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2011). Accordingly, Defendants‟ requests to dismiss Plaintiff‟s claims 

pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are denied.

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C. The Claims Against SELPA

Finally, Defendants assert that “Plaintiff‟s amended complaint erroneously names the 

“Humboldt County Special Education Local Area Plan” (“SELPA”) as a separate entity subject to 

suit for the alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.” Mot. (Doc. 28) at 24. 

Moreover, Defendants assert that “[l]iability under the IDEA, ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act is 

premised upon receipt of federal funds, and that HCOE is the direct recipient of federal funds for 

the Humboldt-Del Norte Multi-District SELPA.” Id. at 24-25.

Plaintiff has alleged that SELPA is responsible for administering the allocation of special 

funding throughout Humboldt County. “SELPA and other school district „SELPAs‟ have been 

maintained as defendants apart from their school district in the District Court.” A.A. v. Clovis 

Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 3488963, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2014) (citing R.G. v. Clovis 

Unified Sch. Dist., 2011 WL 1103182 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2011) and Z.F. v. Ripon Unified Sch. 

Dist., 2011 WL 4056084 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2011)); see also, S.L. ex rel. Loof v. Upland Unified 

Sch. Dist., 747 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2014); Park, ex rel. Park v. Anaheim Union High Sch. Dist., 

464 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint alleges that SELPA receives federal funding.

On this motion to dismiss, Plaintiff[‟s] allegations are taken as true. Defendants‟

affidavits submitted under penalty of perjury do not change the legal standard at

this stage of the pleadings. Plaintiff has alleged that SELPA ensures compliance 

with federal regulations by taking specific actions, and receives federal funds . . . . 

Defendants contend that SELPA is not an entity separate from [HCOE], but is an 

“arm” of the same, and does not receive federal funding directly, but through 

[HCOE] . . . On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Defendants‟ affidavits are given no 

weight.

A.A. v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 2014 WL 3488963, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2014). “The Court 

construes the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and SELPA will not be dismissed at this 

stage.” Id. 

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D. The Motion to Strike

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike Defendants‟ Reply brief as untimely. (Doc. 36). 

Defendants admit that the Reply was untimely, due to a calendaring mistake, and assert that 

Plaintiff suffered no prejudice by its untimely filing. See Resp. to Mot. to Strike (Doc. 37).

While the normal course for the court would be to strike a reply as untimely filed,3the 

court takes the admission of mistake by counsel in good faith and agrees that Plaintiff suffered no 

prejudice as the court considered the Reply when denying the Motion to Dismiss. 

VI. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, and for the reasons stated above, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 28) and the 

Motion to Strike are DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 8, 2015

______________________________________

NANDOR J. VADAS

United States Magistrate Judge

 

3

 The court would note that while the Order taking the motion under submission (Doc. 35) posted 

on the docket after the Reply was filed, the Order was drafted prior to the court seeing the Reply 

and the timing was a reflection of the process of having documents electronically uploaded to the 

docket, rather than a tacit acceptance of the untimely Reply.

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