Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06105/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06105-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Cowley
Appellee
Willie Thomas
Appellant

Document Text:

FI LED 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

United StateJ Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

WILLIE THOMAS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

JACK COWLEY, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

) 

) 

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AUG 8 1991 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

) No. 90-6105 

) (D.C. No. CIV 89-2115-T) 

) (W.D. Okla.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before LOGAN, MOORE, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case is therefore ordered 

Willie Thomas (petitioner), a state prisoner, appeals from a 

district court order denying his petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2254. Petitioner has challenged 

his convictions and sentences by an Oklahoma court for robbery 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6105 Document: 010110131455 Date Filed: 08/08/1991 Page: 1 
with a firearm, after former conviction of a felony, on the 

following grounds: 

(1) Petitioner was denied due process and equal 

protection when the trial court allowed the state to 

inquire of petitioner on cross-examination whether he 

had been accused of other robberies and an assult (sic) 

and in allowing the state to present extrinisic (sic) 

proof of other crimes in rebuttal. 

(2) The trial court erred in admitting petitioner's 

confession when it required the defense to bear the 

burden of proving the illegality of the warrantless 

arrest and the lack of voluntariness of the confession. 

(3) The trial court committed fundamental error by 

failing to give proper instruction on the defense of 

alibi which should have provided clearly that it was the 

prosecution's burden to disprove petitioner's alibi 

beyond a reasonable doubt. 

(4) The trial court committed reversable (sic) error in 

refusing to deliver the petitioner's requested 

cautionary eye-witness (sic) identification instruction. 

(5) The trial court erred in requiring the jury to 

deliberate further after having given an "Allen" 

instruction sua sponte although the jurors had indicated 

they were hopelessly deadlocked. 

(6) Prosecutorial misconduct occuring (sic) during the 

cross examination of the petitioner and during closing 

argument deprived appellant of a fair trial. 

(7) The verdict forms and trial court instructions 

violated petitioner's constitutional right to jury 

determination of the former conviction issue. 

(8) Petitioner was denied due process of law and equal 

protection when the trial court ... failed to 

administer a bifurcated proceeding as is required under 

the Oklahoma Statute 22 o.s. § 860. 

The district court's order dealt fully and fairly with each 

of the issues raised by petitioner. 

court's order is attached hereto. 

proceedings we find no reversible error. 

2 

A copy of the district 

Upon our review of the 

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Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED for substantially 

the reasons set forth in its order. 

The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

Entered for the Court 

Bobby R. Baldock 

Circuit Judge 

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE 

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

WILLIE THOMAS, 

Petitioner 

vs. 

JACK COWLEY, Warden, and 

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 

THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, 

Respondents 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

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) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FEB 2 8 90 

Petitioner, a state prisoner, appearing pr? se and in forma 

pauperis, brings this action for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant 

to 28 u.s.c. §2254. The Respondents have filed their Rule 5 

response, and the matter is at issue. The Court determines that 

an evidentiary hearing is not necessary, as the issues can be 

resolved on the basis of the record. Towensend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 

293 (1963); Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1216 (10th Cir. 

1986), aff'd, 486 U.S. 356 (1988). 

In this proceeding, Petitioner attacks the validity of his 

convictions for two offenses of robbery with firearms after former 

conviction of a felony, Case Nos. CRF-83-5950 and CRF-83-5951 in 

the District Court of Oklahoma County, wherein the Petitioner was 

sentenced to 45 years imprisonment on each charge, to be served 

consecutively. 

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that by this habeas 

corpus action, the Petitioner is attacking a state court judgment 

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for which he is presently in custody. The proper Respondent in 

such a case is the person having custody over the Petitioner. 28 

u.s.c. §2242; Rule 2(a), Rules Governing §2254 Cases in the United 

states District Courts, 28 U.S.C. This is of course the warden of 

the facility in which the Petitioner is incarcerated, and the 

Petitioner has properly named the warden as a Respondent. However, 

the Petitioner has also named the Attorney General as a party 

Respondent. The Attorney General is a proper Respondent in a 

habeas corpus action only when the Petitioner is not presently in 

custody pursuant to the judgment he attacks, but may be subject to 

such custody in the future. Rule 2 (b), Rules Governing §2254 Cases 

in the United States District Courts. Since the Petitioner is 

attacking a state court judgment for which he is presently in 

custody, it is clear that the warden of the correctional facility 

is the only proper party Respondent, and the Attorney General 

should be and is hereby dismissed as a Respondent. 

The facts relevant to a disposition of this matter are that 

on November 9, 1983, at approximately 4:00 p.m. a driver for the 

United Parcel Service (UPS), Jerry Blake, was robbed as he returned 

to his van after making a delivery in Oklahoma City. Blake 

testified at trial that he was able to view a man that he later 

identified as the Petitioner several times at close range, and he 

gave a description to the police. At approximately 5:15 p.m. that 

same day, Gill White, another driver for the UPS, was robbed while 

making a delivery in another part of town. White also testified 

that he had an opportunity to view the robber on several occasions 

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during the incident. Three weeks later both men identified the 

Petitioner in a photographic lineup, after the Petitioner had been 

arrested by Edmond police officers for allegedly planning to rob 

another UPS truck. Oklahoma City police detective Larry Kettler 

testified at trial that the Petitioner gave a statement to him 

admitting that he committed the UPS robberies, but the statement 

was not reduced to writing. 

Police Department testified 

Detective Bemo of the Oklahoma City 

that he was present during the 

interrogation when the Petitioner admitted his involvement in the 

robberies. The Petitioner, for his defense, put on several 

character witnesses who testified that the Petitioner was honest, 

well-liked and had a positive reputation in the. community. The 

Petitioner also presented an alibi defense by testifying that he 

was at his parent's house playing with his nieces and nephews 

during the time of the robberies. 

The Petitioner further testified as to the facts surrounding 

his arrest on November 23, 1983. He testified that he had called 

a man he had known in the penitentiary and asked that man to drive 

him to the unemployment office in Edmond. When they stopped at a 

gas station to ask directions, they were arrested by the police who 

claimed the men were planning to rob a UPS truck that they were 

purportedly following. The questioning by Detective Kettler 

occurred later that day after the Petitioner's arrest. The 

Petitioner denied that he had confessed to the robberies, and he 

stated that he was determined to change his life for the better 

since he had a 1972 conviction for robbery with a firearm, for 

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which he had received a sentence of 50 years. 

As a first ground for relief, the Petitioner alleges that his 

rights to due process and equal protection were denied when the 

state was allowed to inquire during cross-examination and to 

present rebuttal testimony concerning whether the Petitioner had 

been accused of other robberies. As noted, the record reflects 

that the defense put forth witnesses who testified favorably as to 

the Petitioner's standing in the community, his honesty, and other 

positive character traits. The trial court then allowed the state 

to cross-examine the Petitioner on whether he had been accused of 

certain other robberies, including the robbery of a gas station and 

other UPS delivery trucks. The Petitioner admitted that he had 

been accused of the other robberies, but he denied that he 

confessed his involvement in those robberies to Detective Kettler. 

Detective Kettler was then allowed to testify in rebuttal that the 

Petitioner had admitted involvement in the various crimes, 

including robberies of three other UPS vehicles. Because the trial 

court found that the Petitioner had "opened up his total and 

complete character," these questions, and the testimony of 

Detective Kettler were allowed. 

State court rulings on the admissibility of evidence are not 

grounds for habeas relief unless they render the trial so 

fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal 

constitutional rights. Chavez v. Kerby, 848 F.2d 1101, 1102 (10th 

Cir. 1988); Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 850 (10th Cir. 1979), 

cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047 (1980) (specifically denying habeas 

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relief for admission of testimony regarding "other acts"). The 

Petitioner is deprived of a fundamentally fair trial if there is 

a reasonable probability that in the absence of the erroneous 

evidentiary rulings, the outcome of the trial would have been 

different. Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295-1296 (11th Cir. 

1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987). 

With respect to the inquiry of other alleged robberies during 

Petitioner's cross-examination, the state appeals court held that 

the evidence was admissible to rebut evidence of good character put 

forth by the Petitioner under the provisions of Okla. Stat. Tit. 

12 §2405(A) which allows cross-examination into "relevant specific 

instances of conduct." The state court furth~r held that the 

rebuttal testimony by Detective Kettler concerning Petitioner's 

alleged confession of robberies of other UPS drivers, was 

admissible "under the common. scheme or plan" exception to the 

"other crimes" prohibition contained in Okla. Stat. Tit. 12 

§2404(b) (1981). The state court 'finally held that testimony by 

Kettler as to Petitioner's confession of robberies of a gas 

station, a shoe store and a beer truck should not have been 

admitted because they did not fit within any of the exceptions 

contained in §2404 (b). Since there was a confession by the 

Petitioner and eyewitness identification (discussed below), the 

state appeals court held that "the introduction of this extraneous 

evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of its 

cumulative effect." This Court agrees with that determination. 

In addition, the record indicates that the trial judge gave 

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cautionary instructions both after Kettler testified and before the 

jury was sent to deliberate warning of the limited scope of this 

testimony. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the 

rebuttal testimony deprived him of a fundamentally fair trial and 

would have altered the outcome had it not been admitted. 

Petitioner's first ground for relief is without merit. 

Thus, 

The Petitioner next contends that his constitutional rights 

were denied because his confession stemmed from the taint of an 

illegal arrest and thus, was erroneously admitted. The record 

reflects that an in-camera proceeding was held to determine if the 

Petitioner's confession was admissible. During the hearing, the 

investigating detective testified as to the circumstances of the 

Petitioner's arrest, stating that he was advised by the Edmond 

Police Department that they received a call from a UPS dispatcher 

that a car was apparently following one of their trucks. Since 

there had been several recent robberies of UPS trucks, the Edmond 

Police Department dispatched a car which followed the vehicle 

behind the UPS truck. When the officers observed a gun thrown out 

of the window of the vehicle, it was stopped, and the Petitioner 

and a companion were taken into custody. Based on these 

circumstances, the Court ruled that there was probable cause to 

stop and arrest the Petitioner. Since the Petitioner has had a 

full and fair hearing on the issue of his arrest, the Petitioner 

cannot obtain federal habeas review of his claim that his arrest 

was illegal. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 

Davis v. Blackburn, 803 F.2d 1371, 1372 (5th Cir. 1986) (per 

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curiam) ( federal habeas courts should dismiss Fourth Amendment 

claim sua sponte when petitioner had the opportunity to fully 

litigate claim in state system). 

As to his claim concerning the alleged tainted confession, the 

Supreme Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), set forth 

the standard for collateral review of claims of an unlawfully 

obtained confession. The standard is whether under the "totality 

of the circumstances" the challenged confession was obtained in a 

manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution. The 

Court held that the issue of voluntariness is a legal question and 

a matter for independent federal determination. Id. at 112. It 

is thus the duty of this Court to examine the record and make an 

independent determination of the ultimate issue of voluntariness. 

United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 1987). 

However, the trial court's rulings on "subsidiary factual 

questions," such as whether the suspect was particularly 

susceptible to police coercion are 'given deference under 28 u.s.c. 

§2254(d) 's presumption of correctness to state court factual 

findings. 

The Petitioner's contention in challenging the confession is 

that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof of 

demonstrating the voluntariness of the confession upon the defense. 

The record reflects that after the Court had adjourned for an incamera hearing to determine the voluntariness of the confession, 

Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 (1964), the trial court, 

in responding to defense counsel's statement that it was his 

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understanding that the burden of establishing voluntariness was on 

the prosecution, stated: "You' re the one that's wanting to 

suppress it. The burden's on you. Do you want to--do you want to 

proceed or don't you?" Subsequently defense counsel called 

Detective Kettler to testify as to the circumstances of the 

incriminating statements made by the Petitioner. Detective Kettler 

testified that he advised Petitioner of his constitutional rights: 

"I told him that he had the right to remain silent. Anything he 

said could and would be used against him in a court of law. He had 

the right to have an attorney or have an attorney appointed, to 

represent him if he wished one and could not afford him. I advised 

him if he wanted to make a statement now, he had the right to stop 

answering questions at any time." (TR-88). 

Kettler further testified that the Petitioner stated that he 

understood his rights. Kettler stated that he made no promises of 

leniency or deals during the interview, and that the Petitioner 

"would have to make up his own mirid" whether or not he wanted to 

talk with him. Upon cross-examination by the state, Detective 

Kettler stated that he used no force or coercion to entice the 

Petitioner to talk to him. The Petitioner then testified in camera 

as to the voluntariness of the confession. He testified that the 

detectives began the interview asking him questions about UPS truck 

robberies and the fact that a gun matching the description of some 

other robberies was found after being thrown out of the car in 

which Petitioner was arrested. The Petitioner stated that al though 

he did not remember the detectives reading him his rights, it was 

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possible that they were given to him. The Petitioner further 

testified that the detectives stated they had "19 to 15 cases to 

file" on him and if he would cooperate with them, they would file 

only three charges, with no guarantee of any certain time to serve. 

The Petitioner stated that at no time did he tell Detective Kettler 

that he committed the robberies. Based upon this evidence, the 

trial court ruled that the confession was voluntary and that there 

was no state coercion in inducing the statements. Thus, Kettler 

was permitted to testify before the jury concerning the alleged 

confession. 

In the jury's presence, Kettler testified as follows: 

I advised him that he had the right to re~ain silent; 

that anything that he said could and would be used 

against him in a court of law. I advised him that he had 

the right to talk with an attorney and have an attorney 

present while he's being questioned if he wished one. 

And that attorney would be appointed to represent him for 

any questioning if he could not afford to hire one. I 

further advised him that he had -- if he decided to make 

a statement now, he still had the right to stop answering 

questions at any time. 

(TR-122-123). 

Kettler further testified that the Petitioner stated that he 

understood his rights and that the Petitioner agreed to talk with 

him, that he appeared to be intelligent and communicative and was 

not intoxicated at the time of the statement. Although there is 

some variance between Kettler's in-camera testimony and his trial 

testimony regarding the Miranda warnings that he advised the 

Petitioner of, the Court finds that Kettler's testimony satisfied 

constitutional requirements. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 

467 (mandating use of Miranda formulation or "other procedures 

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which are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of 

their right of silence and assuring a continuous opportunity to 

exercise it"); see also, California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-

3 60 ( 1981) (per curiam) (no "talismanic incantation" of Miranda 

warnings required); Bailey v. Hambey. 744 F.2d 24, 25-26 (6th Cir. 

1984) (same); Guam v. Snaer, 758 F.2d 1341, 1342-1343 (9th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 (1985) (same). 

The Court finds that the state trial . court's finding of 

voluntariness is supported by the record. Coercive police activity 

is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not 

"voluntary" within the meaning of the due process clause. Colorado 

v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). In regards to Petitioner's claim 

that the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof of 

demonstrating voluntariness of the confession on the defense, the 

Supreme Court has held that the Jackson v. Denno procedure is not 

"framed in terms of a burden of proof," but only that the trial 

judge would admit into evidence cohfessions found to be voluntary 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. Twomey. 404 U.S. 477, 

486 (1972). Finally, while formal findings of fact are not 

required, a finding that a confession is voluntary must be 

reflected clearly in the record. Simms v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 

544 (1967). The record before the Court indicates that the trial 

court was correct in determining that no coercion was present, and 

that the Petitioner received the Miranda warnings. Even assuming 

that Kettler promised him more lenient treatment on pending charges 

in exchange for his statement as alleged by the Petitioner, this 

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b 

is not in itself enough to render his confession involuntary. 

United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 178-179 (1st Cir. 1985) 

(confession voluntary despite promise to bring defendant's 

cooperation to attention of DEA when the defendant signed a valid 

waiver, after receiving Miranda warnings twice and no signs of 

coercion). 

The Petitioner next contends that the trial court erred in 

giving an improper jury instruction on the alibi defense. The 

Petitioner states that the instruction was "fatally flawed by 

making no mention of which party bares [sic] the burden of proof 

on the issue." However, as the Respondent indicates, the 

Petitioner's counsel did not object to this .instruction, nor 

present any alternative instructions. Before obtaining collateral 

relief based upon a challenge to a jury instruction, the Petitioner 

must show that the instruction by itself "so infected the entire 

trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." United 

States v. Frady. 456 U.S. 152, 169 1 (1982), reh'g denied, 456 U.S. 

1001 (1982), citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977). 

Thus, the test is whether the instruction had "such an effect upon 

the trial as to render it so fundamentally unfair that it 

constitutes the denial of a fair trial in a constitutional sense." 

Linebarger v. Oklahoma, 404 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. 

denied, 394 U.S. 938 (1969). See also, Ortiz v. Baker, 411 F.2d 

263 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 935 (1969). In 

Mcinnes v. Anderson, 366 F.Supp. 983, 987 (E.D. Okla. 1973) the 

Court, in citing Ortiz, held that "the matter of erroneous 

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instructions by the trial court, moreover, is ordinarily only a 

trial error and of no constitutional significance so as to entitle 

a petitioner to habeas corpus relief." However, jury instructions 

must not have the effect of relieving the state of its burden of 

proof of every essential element of a crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, 

442 U.S. 510 (1979). 

The alibi instruction used by the trial court in the instant 

case stated the following: 

The defendant has interposed in this case as one of his 

defenses what is known in law as an alibi. That is, the 

defendant was at another and different place at the time 

of the commission of the crime charged. The law is that 

such a defense is proper and legitimate and you should 

consider all of the evidence bearing thereon, whether 

introduced by the state or the defendant, and if after 

a careful consideration of all of the evidence in the 

case, you entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether the 

defendant was present at the time and place where the 

crime was committed, if it was committed, then in that 

event the jury should give the defendant the benefit of 

the doubt and acquit him. 

(O.R.-39). 

Clearly, this instruction did not place the burden of proof 

of any essential element of the crime upon the Defendant. In 

earlier instructions, the trial court set out the elements of the 

offense and instructed the jury that the state had the burden of 

"proving the material allegations of the information" beyond a 

reasonable doubt. (O.R.-33-36). The Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate how this instruction denied him a fundamentally fair 

trial. 

The Petitioner further challenges the Court's failure to give 

a "cautionary eyewitness instruction." The Petitioner maintains 

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that such an instruction was essential in the case because 

identification was a crucial element of the evidence at trial "and 

a serious question exists concerning the reliability of 

identification." Again, the state appeals court noted that the 

Petitioner failed to present the requested instruction for the 

trial court's consideration. Under the cases cited above, such an 

instruction is not constitutionally required unless the Petitioner 

can demonstrate that he was denied a fair trial. 

The relevant evidence concerning the eyewitness identification 

is that UPS driver, Jerry Blake, testified that he observed the 

Petitioner walking towards the back end of his truck. Suddenly, 

the man jumped onto his truck, pulled a gun and said for him to 

drive away. Blake testified that he made a definite effort to 

remember what the man looked like as they drove, although the 

robber told him to look away. Later, as the robber told Blake to 

get into the back end of the truck, Blake got another look at him. 

Blake subsequently gave a description of the suspect, stating that 

he was about five feet eight inches tall, about 140 pounds, about 

28 years old, with a "bushy moustache" and wearing a brown stocking 

cap. Gill White, another UPS driver, testified that he was 

delivering some packages when a man walked up and asked about a dog 

chained to a nearby tree.- As White went back to his truck, the man 

again approached and pulled a gun. While again, the man told White 

not to look at him, White testified that he did in fact look at 

him. White subsequently called the police, gave them a description 

of the robber as five feet eight or nine inches, with a moustache, 

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weighing about 150 pounds. He further testified that he twice had 

the opportunity to view the robber at close range. He stated that 

the robber had a bushy moustache and wore an orange wool stocking 

cap. 

Both Blake and White identified the Petitioner in court and 

stated that they were sure of their descriptions and testimony, and 

remained so under vigorous cross-examination. Since no "corrupting 

effect" of identification procedures has been alleged, Manson v. 

Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 {1977), the Petitioner was not 

deprived of due process by the admission of identification evidence 

at trial, as the issue of credibility was a jury question and not 

cognizable for habeas review. Chavez v. Kerby, .supra. 

The Petitioner's next claim is that the trial court erred when 

it required the jury to deliberate further after deliberating six 

hours and reaching a verdict as to guilt on one offense but were 

deadlocked on the other offense, and on punishment for the first 

offense. In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the 

Supreme Court explicitly approved the trial court's practice of 

admonishing a deadlocked jury to make a further effort to reach a 

verdict. Such an instruction is referred to as an Allen charge. 

Id. at 501-502. An order by the judge to the jury to continue 

deliberations, however, may not be coercive, and this determination 

rests upon the facts of each case. United States. v. McKinney, 822 

F.2d 946, 950-51 {10th Cir. 1987). See also, United States. v. 

Mobile Materials, 881 F.2d 866 {10th Cir. 1989) (although 

preferable to give Allen charge prior to jury deliberations, no per 

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se rule that charge prohibited once the jury has commenced 

deliberations). Since this issue again concerns general trial 

error, the standard for review is whether the Petitioner was denied 

fundamental fairness. Brinlee v. Crisp, supra. The Allen 

instruction given in the present case, while urging the jury to 

"deliberate with a view of reaching an agreement," stated that "you 

should not surrender your honest convictions concerning the weight 

of the evidence in order to be congenial or to reach a verdict 

solely because of the opinions of the other jurors." The judge 

further admonished the jury in a method recently cited with 

approval in United States v. Smith, 857 F.2d 682, 685 (10th Cir. 

1988), when he told the jury that "there is no reason to suppose 

the case will ever be submitted to 12 individuals more intelligent, 

more impartial and more competent to decide it." Thus, it cannot 

be said that this instruction was coercive and fundamentally 

unfair. 

The Petitioner next contends that he was denied a fair trial 

because of prosecutorial misconduct. The Petitioner alleges that 

the prosecutor improperly cross-examined him by asking why his 

parents and his niece were not present to testify in his behalf, 

improperly attempted to define reasonable doubt in closing 

argument, advised the jury it could use evidence of other crimes 

for improper purposes, and commented on the failure of the 

Petitioner's girlfriend to testify in support of Petitioner's alibi 

defense. The Petitioner concludes that "the pervasive misconduct 

deprived the Petitioner of due process of law and a fair trial." 

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Habeas corpus relief is available for prosecutorial misconduct 

only when the prosecution's conduct is so egregious in the context 

of the entire trial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 642-648 (1974). Improper 

remarks by a prosecutor must therefore prejudicially affect 

defendant's due process rights so as to deprive a defendant of a 

fair trial. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1509 (10th Cir. 

1987) (no "reasonable probability" that outcome of trial would have 

been different, but for improper conduct of prosecutor). The 

primary concern is whether the Defendant had been deprived of a 

fair trial. United States v. Washita Construction Co., 789 F.2d 

809, 822 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Improper prosecutorial argument will only warrant federal 

habeas relief if it renders a petitioner's trial or sentencing 

"fundamentally unfair." Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th 

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); citing Brooks v. 

Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1397 (llth ' Cir. 1985), vacated on other 

grounds, 478 U.S. 1016 (1986); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 

at 642; see also, Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 507 (5th Cir. 

1988), cert. denied, 108 s.ct. 2918 (1988). To establish that a 

prosecutor's remarks were so inflammatory that they prejudiced the 

substantial rights of the petitioner, a petitioner must demonstrate 

either persistent and pronounced misconduct·, or that the evidence 

was so insubstantial that absent the remarks, a conviction probably 

would not have occurred. Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d at 508, citing 

Bridge v. Lynaugh, 838 F.2d 770, 774 (5th Cir. 1988); Felde v. 

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() 0 

Blackburn, 795 F.2d 400, 403 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 

U.S. 873 (1987). 

Upon the Court's review of the evidence, it cannot be said 

that the actions of the prosecutor denied the Petitioner 

fundamental fairness so as to warrant federal habeas relief. With 

respect to the comments of the prosecutor concerning the failure 

of the Petitioner to call material witnesses to support his alibi 

defense, including his parents, niece, and girlfriend, Oklahoma law 

allows comment by the state in such circumstances, Assadollah v. 

state, 632 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. 1981), and the federal 

Constitution is not offended by such comments. o' Bryan v. Estel le, 

714 F.2d 365, 366-388 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den~ed, 465 U.S. 1013 

(1984). The prosecutor's comments concerning other crime evidence 

were permissible as rebuttal to the character evidence introduced 

by the Petitioner, as discussed above. Finally, the other comments 

made by the prosecutor during closing arguments were not objected 

to by the Petitioner's attorney at trial and were not considered 

by the state appeals court for this reason. In light of the 

evidence of guilt including the Petitioner's confession and two 

eyewitness identifications, the Court finds that these comments did 

not deny the Petitioner a fair trial. 

Finally, the Petitioner contends that the trial court erred 

by providing verdict forms for the jury which did not provide for 

an alternative finding of guilt or innocence of his prior 

conviction, and by instructing for punishment only as a habitual 

offender, the minimum sentence being ten years imprisonment. This 

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... . 
0 (J 

method thus negated the bifuricated procedure which is the normal 

course of events in a trial where the defendant is charged as a 

habitual offender, requiring the state, after obtaining a guilty 

verdict on the principal offense, to then offer proof of the prior 

offense to the jury in a second hearing. Okla. Stat. Tit. 22 §860 

(1981). However, the Petitioner admitted during cross-examination 

that he had a prior final conviction, and that he had been 

represented by counsel. Under Oklahoma law this admission made it 

permissible for the trial court to proceed in a one-stage 

adjudication since there was no question of fact for the jury as 

to the prior offense. See Englebaecht v. State, 569 P.2d 484, 486 

(Okla. Crim. 1977), citing Jones v. State, 527 P.?d 169, 172 (Okla. 

Crim. 1974); overruled on other grounds, Fulton v. State, 541 P.2d 

871 (Okla. Crim. 1975). Thus, this alleged trial error does not 

raise a question of constitutional significance. Brinlee v. Crisp, 

supra. 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the petition 

for writ of habeas corpus should be denied • 

.fl" IT IS SO ORDERED this ~f day of February 1990. 

/ 'j 

~-~-·t1-=-

RALPH G. THOMPSO~ 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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