Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04604/USCOURTS-cand-4_08-cv-04604-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
B. Curry
Respondent
Johnny L. Smith
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1 The Board of Prison Terms was abolished effective July 1,

2005, and replaced with the Board of Parole Hearings. Cal. Penal

Code § 5075(a).

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SMITH,

Petitioner,

 v.

B. CURRY, Warden,

Respondent. ___________________________

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No. C 08-04604 CW (PR)

ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT'S

MOTION TO DISMISS

(Docket nos. 4, 5)

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Johnny L. Smith, a state prisoner incarcerated at

the Correctional Training Facility, filed a pro se petition for a

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging the

denial of parole by the California Board of Parole Hearings

(Board).1 In an Order dated June 16, 2009, the Court ordered

Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. 

Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition

as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), the statute of limitations

established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). Petitioner opposes Respondent's motion to dismiss. 

Respondent has filed a reply to Petitioner's opposition. For the

reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Respondent's motion to

dismiss.

 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1989, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder. He

was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in state prison. 

On December 14, 1994, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the

conviction. Petitioner challenges the Board's denial of parole on

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2

 Respondent concedes that August 30, 2007 is the date on

which Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Santa Clara

County Superior Court. (Reply at 2.) 

3

 The date of the transfer is substantiated by the transfer

order. (Reply, Ex. 1.) 

2

January 6, 2006. 

The following facts are taken from Petitioner's opposition. 

Petitioner fails to attach any exhibits substantiating some of the

dates below; the dates that are substantiated will be indicated as

such.

Petitioner claims he filed his "first" state habeas petition

in the Alameda County Superior Court on June 13, 2006. (Opp'n at

3.) On July 25, 2007, his mother went to "said Court house and

received the notice that her sons [sic] Johnny Lee Smith's Writ of

Habeas Corpus had been denied about 11 1⁄2 months prior." (Id.) 

Thus, based on Petitioner's assertion, his first state habeas

petition was denied on approximately August 15, 2006. 

On August 30, 2007, Petitioner alleges "the Court exercised

their power to permit Petitioner to re-submitted [sic] his Writ of

Habeas to the Superior Court, . . . ." (Id.) 

On August 30, 2007, Petitioner claims he filed his "second"

state habeas petition in the Santa Clara County Superior Court.2

(Id.) On December 10, 2007, because Santa Clara County was not the

proper venue for habeas review, the Santa Clara County Superior

Court transferred Petitioner's habeas petition to the Alameda

County Superior Court.3 (Reply, Ex. 1.) According to Petitioner,

after the transfer, the Alameda County Superior Court denied his

state hebeas petition "at the end of 2008." (Opp'n at 3.) 

However, Respondent has attached a copy of the Alameda County

Superior Court's denial, which is dated December 14, 2007. (Mot.

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4 There is nothing in the record indicating when Petitioner

filed his state habeas petition in the appellate court.

5 While Petitioner asserts that he filed his habeas petition

in the state supreme court on May 20, 2008, the official website of

the California Supreme Court indicates March 20, 2008 as the filing

date.

6

 A pro se federal or state habeas petition is deemed filed

on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for mailing. See

Saffold v. Newland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated

and remanded on other grounds, Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214

(2002) (holding that a federal or state habeas petition is deemed

filed on the date the prisoner submits it to prison authorities for

filing, rather than on the date it is received by the court). 

September 24, 2008 is the date the state petition was signed and

the earliest date that the petition could have been delivered to

prison authorities for mailing. For the purposes of this

discussion, the Court deems that the petition was filed on that

date.

3

to Dismiss, Ex. 1.) The Alameda County Superior Court based its

denial on grounds of untimeliness, noting:

[T]he petition is untimely and petitioner has not

demonstrated good cause for the delay of almost two

years since the parole board's decision became final. 

In addition, petitioner has not explained why the

petition is exempt from the timeliness requirements.

(Id.) 

On February 6, 2008, Petitioner alleges, "the Sixth Appellate

Court transferred his Writ to the First Appellate District being

denied on 4/5/08."4 (Opp'n at 3.) Petitioner filed his state

habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on March 20, 2008.5

His petition was denied on August 20, 2008. (Id. at 4.) 

On September 24, 2008,6 Petitioner filed the instant federal

habeas petition. (Pet. at 1.) 

DISCUSSION

The AEDPA, which became law on April 24, 1996, imposes a

statute of limitations on petitions for a writ of habeas corpus

filed by state prisoners. Prisoners challenging non-capital state

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convictions or sentences must file a petition within one year of

the latest of the date on which: (1) the judgment became final

after the conclusion of direct review or the time passed for

seeking direct review; (2) an impediment to filing an application

created by unconstitutional state action was removed, if such

action prevented Petitioner from filing; (3) the constitutional

right asserted was recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right

was newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to

cases on collateral review; or (4) the factual predicate of the

claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). 

The AEDPA limitations period also applies when a prisoner is

challenging an administrative decision such as the revocation of

good time credit or denial of parole. Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d

1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2003); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1063

(9th Cir. 2004). However, administrative decisions are not

governed by section 2244(d)(1)(A) because the word "judgment" in

that section refers to a judgment of conviction and sentence, and

the phrase "direct review" refers to the direct appellate review of

that judgment. Id. at 1081. Instead, administrative decisions are

governed by section 2244(d)(1)(D). 

Section 2244(d)(1)(D) states that the limitations period to

file a federal habeas petition will begin to run on "the date on

which the factual predicate of the claim . . . presented could have

been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." When the

petition is directed to a denial of parole, as here, the date the

statute of limitations begins to run is determined under subsection

(D) of 2244(d)(1), i.e., it is the date when the factual predicate

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of the claim could have been discovered through the exercise of due

diligence, and in parole cases that usually will be the date the

parole denial became final. See Redd v. McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077,

1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (limitations period began to run when Board

denied prisoner's administrative appeal challenging the Board's

decision that he was unsuitable for parole).

Once a petitioner is notified that his petition is subject to

dismissal based on AEDPA's statute of limitations and the record

indicates that the petition falls outside the one-year time period,

the petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating that the

limitations period was sufficiently tolled under statutory and/or

equitable principles. See Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809, 814 (9th

Cir. 2002). 

In this case, the Board's parole denial became final on

January 6, 2006. (Pet., Ex. D at 50:23-24.) The limitations

period began to run the following day, on January 7, 2006.

Accordingly, Petitioner was required to file his federal habeas

petition no later than January 7, 2007. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Therefore, his petition filed on September 24, 2008, more than one

year and eight months after the limitations period had expired, is

untimely absent either statutory or equitable tolling.

I. Statutory Tolling

The present petition may be timely if the limitations period

was tolled under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) for a substantial period of

time. As noted earlier, AEDPA's one-year limitations period is

tolled under § 2244(d)(2) for "[t]he time during which a properly

filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral

review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." 

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7 In California, the supreme court, intermediate courts of

appeal, and superior courts all have original habeas corpus

jurisdiction. Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 n.2 (9th Cir.

1999). Although a superior court order denying habeas corpus

relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas

corpus petition in the appellate court. Id. If the appellate

court denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the

California Supreme Court by way of a petition for review, or may

instead file an original habeas petition in the supreme court. Id.

at 1006 n.3.

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28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The limitations period is also tolled

during the time between a lower state court's decision and the

filing of a notice of appeal to a higher state court. Carey v.

Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). In California, where prisoners

generally use the state's original writ system,7 this means that

the limitations period remains tolled during the intervals between

a state court's disposition of an original state habeas petition

and the filing of the next original state habeas petition in a

higher court, provided the prisoner did not delay unreasonably in

seeking review in the higher court. See id. at 220-25.

Here, Petitioner has the burden of proving that he filed his

"first" state habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior Court

on June 13, 2006 before the limitations period can be tolled under

§ 2244(d)(2). However, he did not attach any exhibits supporting

his claim that he filed the 2006 petition. (Opp'n at 3.) The

record supports Petitioner's allegation that the superior court

considered his "second" habeas petition after it was transferred

from the Santa Clara County Superior Court in 2007. In its

December 14, 2007 denial, the Alameda County Superior Court based

its decision on the fact that the petition was untimely and

Petitioner had not demonstrated good cause for the delay of almost

two years since the parole board's decision became final. (Mot. to

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Dismiss, Ex. 1.) There is no mention of a prior habeas action

filed in the Alameda County Superior Court on June 13, 2006. 

Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove he filed the 2006 petition,

and he has failed to meet his burden of proof under Smith.

Because Petitioner has failed to prove that the 2006 petition

was filed, the limitations period ran unabated from January 6,

2006, the date the denial of parole was finalized, until it expired

on January 6, 2007. A state habeas petition filed after the

AEDPA's statute of limitations ended cannot toll the limitations

period. See Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir.

2003) ("[S]ection 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the

limitations period that has ended before the state petition was

filed," even if the state petition was timely filed). Section

2244(d)(2) cannot "revive" the limitations period once it has run

(i.e., restart the clock to zero); it can only serve to pause a

clock that has not yet fully run. Accordingly, Petitioner's August

30, 2007 habeas petition filed in the Santa Clara Superior Court

does not revive the limitations period that has already run. 

Petitioner does not present any grounds for equitable tolling

during this period. 

Even if Petitioner could prove that he filed the 2006

petition, his federal petition would still be untimely. Prior to

June 13, 2006, the date Petitioner alleges he filed his "first"

state petition, the limitations period ran unabated for a total of

157 days (from January 7, 2006 through June 13, 2006). Petitioner

would have been entitled to statutory tolling during the two-month

period during which his state habeas petition was pending in the

Alameda County Superior Court. However, Petitioner would not have

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been entitled to statutory tolling during the 380-day period

between the Alameda County Superior Court's denial on December 14,

2007 and the filing of his "second" habeas petition in the Santa

Clara County Superior Court on August 30, 2007. Nino concluded

that the limitation period "remains tolled during the intervals

between the state court's disposition of a state habeas petition

and the filing of a petition at the next state appellate level." 

Nino, 183 F.3d at 1005 (emphasis added). Petitioner alleges he

filed two state habeas petitions at the state superior court level;

therefore, there is no tolling of the limitations period during the

gap between the two superior court state habeas petitions. Thus,

the limitations period would have began to run the day after his

"first" state habeas petition was denied on approximately August

15, 2006. Petitioner would have then had 208 days (365 days minus

157 days) to file his federal habeas petition before the

limitations period would have expired on March 11, 2007. 

Petitioner's "second" state habeas petition filed in the Santa

Clara Superior Court on August 30, 2007 would not have revived the

limitations period because it had already run. See Ferguson, 321

F.3d at 823. 

Petitioner was not eligible for statutory tolling during the

time his state habeas petitions were pending in the state appellate

and supreme courts because "[o]nce the limitations period is

expired, collateral petitions can no longer serve to avoid the

statute of limitations." Rashid v. Kuhlmann, 991 F. Supp. 254, 259

(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 

Thus, even if Petitioner had met his burden of proving that he

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filed the 2006 petition, the present petition would still be

untimely unless he showed he is entitled to equitable tolling.

II. Equitable Tolling

The one-year limitations period can be equitably tolled

because § 2244(d) is a statute of limitation and not a

jurisdictional bar. Calderon v. United States District Court

(Beeler), 128 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir. 1997), overruled in part on

other grounds by Calderon v. United States District Court (Kelly),

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc). "When external forces,

rather than a petitioner's lack of diligence, account for the

failure to file a timely claim, equitable tolling of the statute of

limitations may be appropriate." Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104,

1107 (9th Cir. 1999). Equitable tolling will not be available in

most cases because extensions of time should be granted only if

"extraordinary circumstances beyond [a] prisoner's control make it

impossible to file a petition on time." Beeler, 128 F.3d at 1288

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)(brackets in

original). The prisoner must show that "the 'extraordinary

circumstances' were the cause of his untimeliness." Spitsyn v.

Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 799 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 

Another statement of the standard is that a litigant seeking

equitable tolling bears the burden of establishing two elements:

"(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way," preventing

timely filing. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).

As mentioned above, the petitioner "bears the burden of

showing that this extraordinary exclusion should apply to him." 

Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002). Indeed,

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"'the threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling [under

AEDPA] is very high, lest the exceptions swallow the rule.'" Id.

at 1066 (quoting United States v. Marcello, 212 F.3d 1005, 1010

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 878 (2000)). 

The grounds for granting equitable tolling are "highly fact

dependant." Lott v. Mueller, 304 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Where a prisoner fails to show "any causal connection" between the

grounds upon which he asserts a right to equitable tolling and his

inability to file a timely federal habeas application, the

equitable tolling claim will be denied. Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d

1030, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2005), amended, 447 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.

2006).

To invoke equitable tolling, Petitioner would have the burden

of proving that he is entitled to such tolling of the 208 days

between August 15, 2006 (the date he claims his 2006 petition was

denied) and July 25, 2007 (the date on which his mother allegedly

discovered that the denial had been issued). (Opp'n at 3.) 

According to Petitioner, this 208-day period should be equitably

tolled because after he filed his 2006 petition, "the Court failed

to respond to written inquiries or send any kind of written notice

as to the status of the 6/13/06 writ." (Opp'n at 3.) However,

Petitioner fails to substantiate these alleged written inquiries in

any manner. Furthermore, California law requires a state court to

"rule on a petition for writ of habeas corpus within 60 days after

the petition is filed." Cal. R. Ct. 4.551(a)(3)(A). Petitioner

had constructive notice that he should have received a decision

from the superior court on or about sixty days after he filed the

2006 petition. Accordingly, the limitations period would not be

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equitably tolled, even if Petitioner could prove that he filed a

first habeas petition in 2006.

Accordingly, the petition is dismissed because it was not

timely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondent's motion to dismiss the

petition as untimely (docket no. 4) is GRANTED. The Clerk of the

Court shall enter judgment in favor of Respondent, terminate as

moot all pending motions, including Petitioner's motion entitled,

"Motion of the Could Have Admit, Denials and Allegations to

Petition of Habeas Corpus" (docket no. 5), and close the file. 

This Order terminates Docket nos. 4 and 5.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 2/23/10 _______________________________

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge 

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHNNY L. SMITH,

Plaintiff,

 v.

B. CURRY et al,

Defendant. /

Case Number: CV08-04604 CW 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District

Court, Northern District of California.

That on February 23, 2010, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said

copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said

envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle

located in the Clerk's office.

Johnny L. Smith E-20392

CTF Central

Soledad State Prison

P.O. Box 689

Soledad, CA 93960-0689

Dated: February 23, 2010

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Sheilah Cahill, Deputy Clerk

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