Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03337/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03337-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon J. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court ol Appeals Tenth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

MAY 13 1996 

PATRICK FISHER 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRANDON J. SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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ORDER ON REMAND 

No. 94-3337 

Before TACHA and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and ELLISON,* District Judge. 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

After defendant-appellant Brandon Smith's motions for a judgment of acquittal on a 

charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l) were denied, Smith was convicted on one co~t of 

possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, and on one count under§ 924(c)(l) of 

using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffi eking offense. A charge of 

!he Honorable James 0. Ellison, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern 

District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3337 Document: 01019277463 Date Filed: 05/13/1996 Page: 1 
conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute was dismissed by the trial judge 

at the close of the prosecution's case. United States y. Smith, 857 F. Supp. 1466, 1467 

(D. Kan. 1994). On his direct appeal we affirmed the convictions. United States y. Smith, 

63 F. 3d 956 (1995), vacated, 116 S. Ct. 900 (1996). 

Smith petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. On February 20, 1996, the Court 

granted the writ, vacated the judgment and remanded the case to us for reconsideration in 

light of Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995). We requested and received 

supplemental briefs from the parties on the application of Bailey, which have been 

considered. We now reverse the district court's judgment of conviction on the firearms 

count, the conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute 

remaining undisturbed. 1 

I 

Smith was arrested during the execution of a search warrant at his residence. His 

cocaine conviction was based on evidence of cocaine base seized during the execution of the 

search warrant, and the firearms conviction was based on evidence of weapons found during 

the search, including a pistol which was found in plain view on a dresser i~ the bedroom 

1

In his supplemental memorandum to us after the remand by the Supreme Court, the 

defendant-appellant stated that he renews and reserves the additional assignments of error 

presented in his original appeal to this court which "have not been resolved by the Supreme 

Court on the petition for certiorari." Supplemental Memorandum at 10, n. 7. We may not, 

however, undertake functions that were not assigned to us by the mandate and order of the 

Supreme Court, which vacated only the firearms conviction and sentence under § 924( c )(1) 

and directed only that we reconsider the firearms conviction and sentence in light of Bailey. 

2 

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where Smith was when the police entered the residence. Smith admitted at trial that he 

owned that pistol and two others which had been found in other rooms of his house. Smith, 

63 F.3d at 959-60. 

Prior to Bailey we had employed a broad definition of the term "uses" in section 

924(c)(1). ~Smith, 63 F.3d at 964-65. The Court in Bailey held that the term must be 

given a narrower construction. In response to the Court's holding, the government has 

conceded that the evidence in this case was insufficient to support a conviction for use of a 

firearm. In its brief in the Supreme Court in response to the petition for certiorari in this 

case, the government stated that under the standard for proof of "uses" adopted in Bailey, as 

to Brandon Smith "the evidence was insufficient to support petitioner's conviction for 'use' 

under Section 924(c)(1)." Brief for the United States at 12. The concession is also made in 

the Memorandum Brief of Appellee at 7, filed April19, 1996, with this court. 

II 

The government argues, however, that the evidence was sufficient to support a 

conviction for carrying a fireann in relation to the drug trafficking offense and urges that we 

therefore reaffirm Smith's conviction on the firearms count on that basis. We conclude that 

we may not do so. We are convinced that the evidence at trial was not sufficient to support 

a conclusion that Smith carried a firearm during and in relation to his drug trafficking 

offense. Thus the § 924(c)(1) conviction must be reversed and, because on this record 

double jeopardy principles bar a retrial for the government to attempt to prove a charge under 

the carrying prong of § 924( c )(1 ), no new trial may be had on the firearms charge. 

3 

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The indictment charged Smith in the disjunctive, alleging that he "did knowingly use 

or carry firearms .... " I R. Doc. 1 at 1. The instructions given on the firearms count were 

similarly worded in the disjunctive, Instructions 17 & 18, ida. at Doc. 83, and they defined 

the offense as follows: 

In determining whether . . . the defendant[] used or carried a firearm, 

you may consider all of the factors received in evidence in the case including 

the nature of the underlying crime of drug trafficking alleged, the proximity 

of the defendantO to the firearms in question, the usefulness of the firearms to 

the crime alleged, and the circumstances surrounding the presence of the 

firearms. 

A defendant "uses" a firearm when it (1) is readily accessible, (2) is an 

integral part of the criminal undertaking, and (3) increases the likelihood of 

success for that undertaking. The government is not required to show that a 

defendant actually displayed or fired the weapon to prove "use." However, 

you must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm played a 

role in or facilitated the commission of the drug offense charged 

Id., Instruction 20. As we have noted above, it is clear that the definition of "uses" in the 

above instruction, although in accordance with our case law at the time, is incorrect under 

Bailey. ~United States v. Spring, _F.3d_, 1996 WL 148539, at *13 (lOth Cir. 1996). 

When a defendant is charged in the disjunctive and one charge is unsupported by any 

evidence whatsoever, a conviction may be affirmed on the assumption that the jury rejected 

the "factually insufficient theory" and convicted on the alternative ground for which the 

evidence was sufficient. United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123, 1130 (lOth Cir. 1992) (citing 

and quoting Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59 (1991), and United States v. Townsend, 

924 F.2d 1385, 1414 (7th Cir. 1991)), cert. denied sub nom. Leonard v. United States, 507 

U.S. 966 (1993); accord United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 990-91 (lOth Cir. 1994). In 

4 

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~' however, we adopted the reasoning of Townsend, which had been cited with approval 

in Griffin, recognizing "a distinction between legal and factual sufficiency." 981 F.2d at 

1130. Where, as here, the evidence was legally insufficient to prove the "use" of a firearm, 

because of the change in the legal definition announced in Bailey, we cannot assume that the 

jury did not convict on this legally erroneous basis, premised on the invalid instruction on 

"uses." ~United States y. Self, 2 F.3d 1071, 1092-94 (lOth Cir. 1993). 

As Justice Scalia has observed: 

Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particuhir theory of 

conviction submitted to them is contrary to law -- whether, for example, the 

action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to 

come within the statutmy definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have 

been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no 

reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from 

that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the 

option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors ~ well 

equipped to analyze the evidence .... 

Griffin, 502 U.S. at 59 (first emphasis added). 

Therefore, even if the evidence that Smith "carried" the firearm were sufficient, we 

could not allow his § 924( c )(1) conviction to stand on that basis because we have no 

assurance that the jury did not convict on the legally insufficient evidence and erroneous 

instruction regarding use of the firearm. 

We reached this same conclusion in Spring. Here, as in Spring, the instruction given 

to the jury included a definition of "use" which is incorrect under Bailey and drew no 

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distinction between "use" and "carry. "2 Accordingly, Smith's conviction on the firearms 

count must be reversed. 

III 

The question then arises whether the evidence would have been sufficient to support 

a conViction for canying a firearm under a proper instruction. If so, then we can remand for 

a new trial without violating double jeopardy principles. United States y. Wacker, 72 F.3d 

1453, 1464-65 (lOth Cir. 1995). However, if the evidence was insufficient so that a directed 

verdict of acquittal should have been entered, remand would violate the Double Jeopardy 

Clause. Id. (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)). 

In Spring we concluded that Bailey '"provides some guidance regarding the correct 

application of the "cany" prong of section 924(c)(l). "' _ F.3d at_, 1996 WL 148539, at 

*15 (quoting United States v. Riascos-Suarez, 73 F.3d 616, 623 (6th Cir. 1996)). We said 

that Bailey suggests that "neither storage nor possession of a gun, without more, satisfies the 

'carry' prong of§ 924(c)(l)." Id. We noted that our previous definition of the "carrying" 

prong required two elements: "'possession of the weapon through the exercise of dominion 

or control; and transportation of the weapon.'" Id. at * 16 (quoting United States y. Martinez, 

912 F.2d 419, 420 (lOth Cir. 1990)). 

The difficulty here is that the government points us to no evidence that this weapon 

was transported by defendant Smith during and in relation to the drug trafficking crime. The 

2

Unlike in Spring, where we ordered a retrial when the evidence was viewed as 

sufficient, we here hold the evidence was fatally insufficient on carrying. 

6 

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government relies on Smith's post-arrest statement that he possessed the guns for protection 

of the drugs, a recorded statement which the jury heard at trial. Smith, 63 F.3d at 965. 3 

From this premise, the government contends that Smith admitted that he "placed (carried and 

set down) the firearms to protect the drugs .... " Memorandum Brief of Appellee at 9. 

Thus, the government invites us to assume that at some unknown time during and in relation 

to the drug trafficking crime, Smith moved the weapon from some unknown previous 

location to the dresser where it was found. There is no evidence supporting such an 

inference. Our record shows that there were ten adults (and one infant) in the house when 

the police entered. In the bedroom where a loaded pistol was found, defendant's girlfriend 

and her infant were located when the search began. And a number of footsteps had been 

heard in the house before the officers entered 63 F.3d at 959. Hence we can only speculate 

whether defendant Smith, or any one of the several other persons in the house, during and 

in relation to the drug trafficking offense, moved the firearms or placed them where they 

were found during the search. 

We cannot rest a conviction on mere susptcton. 4, United States y. 

Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F. 3d 1469, 1472 (lOth Cir. 1994) ("'the evidence presented to support 

the conviction must be substantial; that is, it must do more than raise a mere suspicion of 

guilt."' (quoting United States y. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 944 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 502 

3

The "tape interview" (Government Ex. 17) attached to the Memorandum Brief of 

Appellee, contains no statement by Smith that he carried or placed the firearms in the house 

during and in relation to the drug trafficking offense, or caused anyone else to do so. Nor 

does the trial testimony furnish such evidence against Smith. 

7 

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U.S. 845 (1991))). We hold that the absence of evidence to support a finding that Smith 

carried the firearms, or caused them to be carried, during and in relation to his drug 

trafficking crime, is fatal to his conviction under the carrying prong of§ 924(c)(1). 

Accordingly, we REVERSE Smith's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) on 

Count ill, and REMAND with directions that the conviction and sentence thereon be set 

aside. 

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