Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05366/USCOURTS-caDC-96-05366-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Valdas V. Adamkus
Appellee
Carol M. Browner
Appellee
Great Lakes United
Appellant
Michigan United Conservation Clubs
Appellant
National Wildlife Federation
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 11, 1997 Decided November 4, 1997 

No. 96-5366

NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

CAROL M. BROWNER,

IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY AND 

VALDAS V. ADAMKUS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS REGIONAL 

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, REGION V,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 95cv01811)

Neil S. Kagan argued the cause for appellants, with whom 

Glenn P. Sugameli was on the briefs.

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John A. Bryson, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 

argued the cause for appellees, with whom Lois J. Schiffer,

Assistant Attorney General, and David C. Shilton, Attorney, 

were on the brief.

Before: SILBERMAN, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The National Wildlife Federation 

and others 1appeal from the judgment dismissing its citizen 

suit under the Clean Water Act and denying its motion for 

summary judgment. The Federation sought to compel the 

Environmental Protection Agency to review and evaluate 

certain water quality standards. In view of the deference due 

to the agency's interpretation of its regulations, we find no 

merit to the Federation's contention that under the regulations the agency had a nondiscretionary duty to act, and 

accordingly, we affirm.

I.

The Clean Water Act ("the Act") requires states to establish water quality standards for every body of water within a 

state. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1988). These standards include 

three components: (1) designated uses for each body of 

water, such as recreational, agricultural, or industrial uses; 

(2) specific limits on the levels of pollutants necessary to 

protect those designated uses; and (3) an antidegradation 

policy designed to protect existing uses and preserve the 

present condition of the waters. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10-.12 

(1996). The antidegradation policy is further divided into 

three general levels of protection. "Tier I" establishes the 

minimum level of water quality that must be maintained in 

every body of water. See id. § 131.12(a)(1). "Tier II" applies to waters whose quality already exceeds the level "necessary to support propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife 

and recreation in and on the water," and only allows a 

__________

1 Appellants are the National Wildlife Federation, Great Lakes 

United, and Michigan United Conservation Clubs. For ease of 

reference we refer hereinafter to appellants as "the Federation."

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reduction in quality when "necessary to accommodate important economic or social development." Id. § 131.12(a)(2). 

For certain high quality bodies of water, "Tier III" prohibits 

any degradation of existing water quality standards with a 

limited exception for short-term or temporary changes in 

quality. See id. § 131.12(a)(3); Water Quality Standards 

Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (1983) (preamble). 

Waters falling into Tier III are designated "outstanding 

National resource waters" ("ONRW"). Id.

The Act requires states to review their water quality 

standards at least once every three years (a "triennial review"). See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) (1988). They must submit 

the results of this review to the Environmental Protection 

Agency ("EPA"). See id. EPA is then responsible for 

reviewing any new or revised standards adopted by the states 

to determine if the standards are consistent with the Act and 

EPA regulations promulgated under the Act. See id.

§ 1313(c)(2)(A), (c)(3). If EPA disapproves the standards, 

the state has ninety days to correct the deficiencies else EPA 

must promulgate its own standards for the state. See id.

§ 1313(c)(3), (4).

Under Michigan's existing water quality standards, Lake 

Superior was in a special category created for the protection 

of the Great Lakes, called "outstanding state resource waters." See Mich. Envtl., Health & Safety Regs. rule 

323.1098(7) (1996). The standards for this category are more 

stringent than those required by EPA under its "Tier II" 

classification and correspond to a "Tier II1/2" level recognized 

by EPA "to provide a very high level of water quality 

protection without precluding unforeseen future economic and 

social development considerations." Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards Handbook § 4.2, at 4-

2 (2d ed. 1994) (hereinafter Water Quality Standards Handbook or Handbook). Nevertheless, in October 1994, the 

Federation formally petitioned the state of Michigan to designate the lake an ONRW subject to the highest level of 

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antidegradation protection.2 The Federation also asked 

Michigan to consider its request as part of the state's current 

triennial review and to seek public comment on the issue. On 

February 23, 1995, Michigan denied the Federation's petition 

on the ground that the state "does not think that it is 

appropriate or necessary to hold public hearings to discuss 

your request ... since we do not intend to proceed with the 

designation."

The Federation thereafter filed a citizen suit against EPA 

under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) for its failure to review Michigan's 

denial of the Federation's petition. The first count of the 

complaint, the only one at issue, claimed that EPA was under 

a mandatory duty to review and either approve or disapprove 

of state decisions to maintain existing water quality standards, as well as state decisions to adopt new or revised 

standards.3 This duty allegedly arose under both the Act and 

EPA's regulations. The Federation argued that Michigan's 

rejection of its petition constituted the completion of the 

state's review of water quality standards for Lake Superior, 

and that its failure to submit this decision to EPA was a 

__________

2 The Federation also petitioned the states of Minnesota and 

Wisconsin to designate Lake Superior as an ONRW, and requested 

a similar designation from the Canadian province of Ontario. 

Minnesota and Wisconsin are currently conducting their review of 

the lake's water quality standards and are not involved in the 

instant case. Canada's response is not revealed in the record.

3 Only Count I of the complaint is at issue in the instant appeal. 

Count II alleged that EPA had a mandatory duty under the Act to 

designate Lake Superior as an ONRW despite the state refusal, a 

claim the Federation does not pursue on appeal. Counts III and 

IV, brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleged that 

EPA's failure to review Michigan's decision was arbitrary and 

capricious and that EPA's inaction amounted to action unlawfully 

withheld and unreasonably delayed. The district court dismissed 

both of these counts without prejudice because the Federation had 

not exhausted its administrative remedies and, hence, there was no 

final agency action to review under 5 U.S.C. § 704. See National 

Wildlife Fed'n v. Browner, No. 95-1811, 1996 WL 601451, at *6 

(D.D.C. Oct. 11, 1996).

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"constructive submission" of existing water quality standards 

for the lake, thereby triggering EPA's mandatory duty of 

review.

EPA moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The 

Federation, in turn, moved for summary judgment. The 

district court granted EPA's motion to dismiss, ruling that 

neither the Act nor the regulations imposed a nondiscretionary duty on EPA to review the state's decision to deny the 

Federation's petition, and therefore, the citizen suit could not 

be maintained. See National Wildlife Fed'n, 1996 WL 

601451, at *12-*14. The court consequently denied the Federation's motion for summary judgment.

II.

The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act allows 

private individuals to sue EPA in federal district court "where 

there is alleged a failure of the Administrator [of EPA] to 

perform any act or duty under [the Act] which is not discretionary with the Administrator." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) 

(1988). On appeal, the Federation has abandoned its claim 

that the Act imposes a mandatory duty on EPA and instead 

focuses solely on EPA's regulations. The primary issue on 

appeal, therefore, is whether the district court correctly ruled 

that EPA's regulations did not impose a mandatory duty on 

the agency to review and evaluate Michigan's denial of the 

Federation's petition.4 Our review of the dismissal of a 

complaint and denial of summary judgment is de novo. See 

Waterview Mgmt. Co. v. FDIC, 105 F.3d 696, 699 (D.C. Cir. 

1997); Tao v. Freeh, 27 F.3d 635, 638 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

__________

4 Although EPA moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction, see Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. 

United States, 105 F.3d 599, 602 (11th Cir. 1997), in addition to 

failure to state a claim, the district court invoked Fed. R. Civ. P. 

12(b)(6) and its dismissal was based on its conclusion that the 

Federation had failed to satisfy one element of its cause of action. 

Hence we are not confronted with the issue addressed by the 

Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 603.

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The Federation contends that EPA has a mandatory duty 

to review Michigan's denial of its petition under 40 C.F.R. 

§ 131.20(c), which provides in pertinent part:

The State shall submit the results of the [triennial] 

review ... and any revisions of the standards to the 

Regional Administrator for review and approval, within 

30 days of the final State action to adopt and certify the 

revised standard, or if no revisions are made as a result 

of the review, within 30 days of the completion of the 

review.

40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) (1996) (emphasis added). The Federation maintains that the phrase "for review and approval" 

applies regardless of whether the state has adopted any new 

or revised standards. EPA interprets the regulation to mean 

that while states must submit both revised and unrevised 

standards, the agency is only required to approve or disapprove modifications to the standards. In EPA's view, the 

Federation provides no reason for its broader reading to 

include all previously approved but unchanged water quality 

standards. Consequently, EPA contends, its decision to evaluate existing state water quality standards is purely discretionary.

As a preliminary matter, EPA maintains that district 

courts lack jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision to 

enforce "obligations created by regulations." The agency 

interprets the citizen suit provision narrowly, to allow only for 

suits to enforce nondiscretionary duties that are explicitly 

established in the Act. We need not decide this question,5

however, because even assuming that mandatory regulatory 

duties can provide the bases for citizen suits, no such duty 

exists here.6

__________

5 EPA's contention that only a duty imposed by the Clean 

Water Act itself can support a citizen suit appears to be an issue of 

first impression in the federal courts. EPA relies on dicta in a 

footnote in Maine v. Thomas, 874 F.2d 883, 888 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989).

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EPA interprets 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) to impose no mandatory duty of review over existing water quality standards. 

Focusing on the fact that the Act itself only imposes a 

mandatory duty on the agency to review and approve or 

disapprove new or revised standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3), 

EPA contends that the regulation is focused on the duties of 

the states, not the agency, and that there is no evidence to 

suggest that the agency intended to expand its statutory 

mandatory duties in promulgating the regulation. Generally, 

the court accords substantial deference to an agency's interpretations of its own regulations. See Auer v. Robbins, 117 

S. Ct. 905, 911 (1997); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,

512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994). Provided the interpretation "does 

not violate the Constitution or a federal statute, it must be 

given 'controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or 

inconsistent with the regulation.' " Stinson v. United States,

508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) (quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock &

Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)).

The Federation's contention that the court should not defer 

to EPA's interpretation of this regulation because it is "no 

more than a convenient litigating position" is unpersuasive. 

The mere fact that an agency offers its interpretation in the 

course of litigation does not automatically preclude deference 

to the agency. It is true that "agency 'litigating positions' are 

not entitled to deference when they are merely appellate 

counsel's 'post hoc rationalizations' for agency action, advanced for the first time in the reviewing court." Martin v. 

Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 

156 (1991). This reluctance to defer to agency counsel stems 

from two concerns. First, appellate counsel's interpretation 

may not reflect the views of the agency itself. See FLRA v. 

United States Dep't of Treasury, 884 F.2d 1446, 1455 (D.C. 

Cir. 1989). Second, it is likely that "a position established 

only in litigation may have been developed hastily, or under 

special pressure," and is not the result of the agency's 

deliberative processes. FLRA, 884 F.2d at 1455; see also 

__________

al base for a citizen suit under the Act. Cf. Sierra Club v. Thomas,

828 F.2d 783, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Clean Air Act).

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Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 165 (D.C. Cir. 

1986) (en banc) (Silberman, J. concurring). However, as the 

Supreme Court has recently affirmed, deference to an interpretation offered in the course of litigation is still proper as 

long as it reflects the "agency's fair and considered judgment 

on the matter." Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 912; accord Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

There is no reason to suspect that EPA's interpretation of 

40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) represents anything less than the agency's considered opinion. While the Federation claims that 

EPA has never explicitly interpreted this regulation in a prior 

agency adjudication or rulemaking, there is nothing to suggest that the agency has ever before had any reason to 

address the issue. See General Servs. Admin. v. FLRA, 86 

F.3d 1185, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Nor does the Federation 

offer evidence that EPA has ever adopted a different interpretation of the regulation or contradicted its position on 

appeal. To the contrary, several passages in an official 

agency document support EPA's contention that in practice it 

has, at least implicitly, followed the same interpretation that 

it advances on appeal. EPA's Water Quality Handbook

includes a flowchart outlining the "EPA Water Quality Standards [WQS] Review Process." Handbook § 6.2, at 6-9 fig. 

6-2. The directions in the chart state that after a "State 

Adopts or Revises WQS," it "Submits Revisions, Methods, 

Justifications ... to [the] Regional Administrator for Review," and the Administrator then approves or disapproves of 

the revisions. Id. No similar procedure is outlined for the 

review and evaluation of a state's existing water quality 

standards. The Handbook's overall structure and content 

thereby suggest that in the past EPA has interpreted the 

regulation in the same manner as it does in the instant 

appeal. Absent any showing to the contrary, EPA's interpretation is entitled to deference if it is reasonable.

The Federation's challenge to EPA's interpretation of its 

regulation rests entirely on a textual analysis of 40 C.F.R. 

§ 131.20. Essentially, the Federation views the phrase "for 

review and approval" as modifying all of the preceding clauses in the sentence. 40 C.F.R. § 131.20(c) (1996). It mainUSCA Case #96-5366 Document #306819 Filed: 11/04/1997 Page 8 of 12
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tains that the regulation thus requires states to submit the 

results of their triennial reviews to EPA and the agency to 

approve or disapprove them regardless of whether there are 

any new or revised standards. Reading this sentence differently, EPA contends that the phrase, and thus the duty of 

approval, only refers to the immediately preceding phrase 

"any revisions of the standards." Id. Even if the Federation 

might have the better reading of the text, this awkwardly 

drafted regulation is capable of supporting either interpretation. The Federation's interpretation of § 131.20 is not "compelled by the regulation's plain language," Gardebring v. 

Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430 (1988), and nothing in the record 

indicates that such an interpretation of § 131.20 was intended 

by EPA.7 Cf. id.

Although the Federation presents a colorable construction 

of § 131.20 viewed in isolation, EPA's interpretation is eminently reasonable in light of the structure and purpose of the 

water quality standard regulations taken as a whole. See 

Adams Telecom, Inc. v. FCC, 38 F.3d 576, 580 (D.C. Cir. 

1994); cf. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990); 

Tataranowicz v. Sullivan, 959 F.2d 268, 275-77 (D.C. Cir. 

1992). EPA concedes that states are required to submit 

existing water quality standards to the EPA upon completion 

__________

7 To support its interpretation of the regulation, the Federation 

points to 40 C.F.R. § 131.5, which supplies "benchmarks" by which 

EPA will review submitted water quality standards. This regulation does not explicitly distinguish between revised or existing 

standards, and is worded generally to apply to all "State-adopted 

water quality standards" reviewed by EPA. 40 C.F.R. § 131.5(a) 

(1996). However, these "benchmarks" merely describe the criteria 

to be used by EPA when it does review state standards without 

addressing when EPA must review those standards. No more 

persuasive is the Federation's reliance on the fact that the final rule 

contained a change in the language of § 131.20(a) to require states 

to review "all" water quality standards during their triennial reviews, see Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. at 

51403, since this change addressed the extent of the state triennial 

review process and sheds no light on the subsequent duties of EPA 

in reviewing the results of that process. See id.

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of a triennial review. EPA, however, is not automatically 

required under the Act to review and approve those standards. Instead, EPA observes, the agency is granted discretionary authority under § 303(c)(4)(B) of the Act to force a 

state to accept "a revised or new standard ... [if] necessary 

to meet the requirements of" the Act. 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1313(c)(4)(B) (1988). This discretionary power is reflected 

as well in the agency's regulations. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.22(b) 

(1996). Therefore, under § 131.20 of the regulations states 

are only required to submit existing water quality standards 

to EPA to enable it to make an informed decision about 

whether to exercise its discretion to supplant the state standards.

EPA points to other regulations as aids in clarifying the 

agency's responsibilities, focusing primarily on § 131.21(a), on 

which the district court had relied. This section, entitled 

"EPA review and approval of water quality standards," provides:

After the State submits its officially adopted revisions,

the Regional Administrator shall either:

(1) Notify the State within 60 days that the revisions 

are approved, or

(2) Notify the State within 90 days that the revisions 

are disapproved.

40 C.F.R. § 131.21(a) (1996) (emphasis added). EPA contends that the "clear import of these provisions" is that its 

duty to approve or disapprove of water quality standards is 

limited to "revisions" of state standards. Even if EPA may 

overstate the clarity of this regulation, it does lend support to 

the agency's interpretation of § 131.20. While establishing 

deadlines for the agency's approval of revised standards, 

§ 131.21(a) contains no similar provision relating to the review of existing water quality standards. If, as the Federation contends, the agency were under a nondiscretionary duty 

to evaluate both existing and revised standards, presumably 

the regulations would provide deadlines for that review as 

well. Further, EPA suggests, were it required to review 

every state's decision within the time frames that the FederaUSCA Case #96-5366 Document #306819 Filed: 11/04/1997 Page 10 of 12
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tion maintains are required, it "would be overwhelmed by the 

vast scope of such an obligation," contrary to the legislative 

scheme reserving to EPA a discretionary decision whether to 

force a state to change its standard.

Finally, the Federation's contention that EPA's interpretation of the water quality regulations will upset the balance 

between state and federal environmental authorities intended 

by Congress in enacting the Clean Water Act is also unpersuasive. The Federation maintains that absent a mandatory 

duty on the part of EPA to review and to approve or 

disapprove existing standards, states could frustrate the goals 

of the Act by refusing to revise their water quality standards 

at all. Yet this position fails to take into account EPA's 

statutory authority to promulgate its own water quality standards for a recalcitrant state. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4)(B) 

(1988); 40 C.F.R. § 131.22(b) (1996). In the event a state 

refuses to make any revisions after completing its triennial 

review, or fails to conduct a review of its water quality 

standards within a three year period, EPA retains discretion 

to take appropriate action after reviewing the state's submissions. If EPA subsequently failed to review the existing 

water standards of a delinquent state, the Federation would 

not be without legal recourse. Although it would not be able 

to bring a citizen suit, it could still sue EPA under the 

Administrative Procedure Act to compel the agency to act. 

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 706 (1988); supra note 3. Under these 

circumstances, EPA's refusal to exercise its discretion might 

constitute an action "unreasonably delayed" or considered to 

be "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion." Id.

§ 706(1), (2)(A).

Because EPA's interpretation of its water quality standards 

regulations is neither "plainly erroneous" nor "inconsistent 

with the regulation," Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945), the court must defer to the agency's 

interpretation and therefore conclude that the regulations do 

not impose a mandatory duty on EPA to approve water 

quality standards that a state leaves unmodified after compleUSCA Case #96-5366 Document #306819 Filed: 11/04/1997 Page 11 of 12
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tion of its triennial review.8 Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment dismissing the Federation's citizen suit and denying 

its motion for summary judgment.

__________

8 Because we hold that EPA is not under a mandatory duty to 

review and evaluate existing (i.e., non-new and non-revised) water 

quality standards submitted by the states, we need not address the 

Federation's contention that the court should adopt a theory of 

"constructive submission" for circumstances where states have 

failed to submit their water quality standards to EPA. See Scott v. 

City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996-98 (7th Cir. 1984).

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