Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01409/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01409-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
K. Franklin
Defendant
Jomaine Jones
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOMAINE JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

K. FRANKLIN,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01409 DLB PC

ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 

WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND FOR 

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Plaintiff Jomaine Jones (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma 

pauperis in this civil rights action. Plaintiff filed his complaint on September 10, 2014. Pursuant to 

Court order, he filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) on March 25, 2015. He names K. 

Franklin as the sole Defendant.1 

A. SCREENING STANDARD

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The 

Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally 

“frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1),(2). “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge on September 24, 2014.

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the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or 

appeal . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 

is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, 

do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 

‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional or other 

federal rights by persons acting under color of state law. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 

(9th Cir 2009); Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones v. 

Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff’s allegations must link the actions or 

omissions of each named defendant to a violation of his rights; there is no respondeat superior 

liability under section 1983. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Simmons v. Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 

1011, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. Plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim 

for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). 

The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. 

B. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility in 

Corcoran, California, where the events at issue occurred.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 18, 2013, his former attorney mailed trial transcripts and other 

court documents to Plaintiff. The documents were relevant to his criminal matter.

On September 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed an inmate appeal in an attempt to locate the documents. 

Plaintiff explained to Defendant Franklin that he needed the documents to initiate a collateral attack 

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on his conviction. Without the documents, Plaintiff contends that his claims are just speculation and 

conjecture.

Defendant Franklin responded to Plaintiff’s appeal, stating, “[T]here are no transcripts in the 

mailroom. The mail and dates in question have been delivered to you and signed for attachments 

provided.” ECF No. 8, at 2. She further stated that she was unable to verify if the documents 

actually arrived at the institution.

Plaintiff contends that his attorney indicated that he was sending him all of the files on June 

18, 2013. However, Plaintiff was not given the documents from Defendant Franklin or the mailroom 

staff.

Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the First Amendment. 

C. DISCUSSION

Inmates have a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts. Lewis v. Casey, 518 

U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174 (1996); Silva v. DiVittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1101 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Phillips v. Hust, 588 F.3d 652, 655 (9th Cir. 2009). However, to state a viable claim for relief, 

Plaintiff must show that he suffered an actual injury, which requires “actual prejudice to 

contemplated or existing litigation.” Nevada Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th 

Cir. 2011) (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 348) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 

1823 (2012); Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S.Ct. 2179 (2002); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 

351; Phillips, 588 F.3d at 655. 

In the prior screening order, the Court explained that Plaintiff had not alleged any actual 

injury. The Court also explained that Plaintiff’s allegations, based “on information and belief,” were 

speculative and lacked factual support to state a claim.

Plaintiff failed to add any factual allegations to support his claims in his FAC. Although he 

changed the name of the First Amendment violation to “Loss and/or Destruction of Documents 

Needed for the Pursuit of Post-Conviction Relief,” his allegations remain unsupported. The Court’s 

prior analysis remains applicable:

Here, although Plaintiff mentions that the documents were necessary to challenge his 

criminal conviction, he does not allege any actual injury. 

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Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation against Defendant Franklin is based on “information 

and belief.” He states, “[u]pon information and belief, Defendant Franklin acted with 

reckless disregard towards Plaintiff when she maliciously discarded legal documents. . .” 

ECF No. 1, at 3. Such speculative allegations, without factual support, are wholly inadequate 

to link Defendant to an alleged violation. In fact, according to Plaintiff’s allegations, 

Defendant Franklin looked for his documents and responded accordingly.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff’s claims must be facially 

plausible to survive screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to 

reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 

U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th 

Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere 

consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

ECF No. 7, at 3-4.

For these reasons, Plaintiff again fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted.

D. ORDER

Plaintiff has been given an opportunity to amend, but he has failed to correct the factual 

deficiencies. In fact, Plaintiff submitted almost the exact same allegations. The Court finds that 

further leave to amend is not warranted. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); 

Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448-49 (9th 

Cir. 1987). 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s FAC is DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND for failure to 

state a claim for which relief may be granted.

This terminates this action in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 15, 2015 /s/ Dennis L. Beck 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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