Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01609/USCOURTS-ca8-14-01609-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Boaz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-1609

___________________________

Thomas Boaz

lllllllllllllllllllllMovant - Appellant

v.

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: June 10, 2015

 Filed: June 29, 2015

[Unpublished]

____________

Before GRUENDER, MELLOY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Three years after his conviction became final, Thomas Boaz filed a petition for

relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. He alleged Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2276 (2013), created a "newly recognized [right] . . . made retroactively applicable

to cases on collateral review," 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), that should excuse the

Appellate Case: 14-1609 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Entry ID: 4289466 
untimeliness of his petition. Because Descamps did not make any new argument

available to Boaz, we affirm the dismissal of his petition as untimely.

I.

In 2006, a jury convicted Boaz of being a felon in possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). At that time, the district court sentenced him as an

armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), finding that he previously had

been convicted ofthree violent felonies, including an Arizona conviction for burglary

under Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1506 (1978). On appeal, we held the burglary

conviction qualified as a violent felony. United States v. Boaz, 558 F.3d 800, 806–07

(8th Cir. 2009). Boaz also appealed as to one of the other predicate offenses, arguing

the state court record as presented at his federal sentencing failed to establish he was

the person convicted in the prior state court proceedings. Id. at 808–09. We vacated

his sentence and remanded for the district court to address the identity issue. Id. at

809. On remand, the district court rejected Boaz's arguments on the identity issue

and, again, sentenced him as an armed career criminal. He unsuccessfully appealed

the identification issue to our court. United States v. Boaz, 598 F.3d 936 (8th Cir.

2010). The Supreme Court subsequently denied his petition for writ of certiorari on

October 4, 2010, at which time his conviction became final. Boaz v. United States,

562 U.S. 874 (2010). 

Almost three years later, on September 3, 2013, Boaz filed the present petition

for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Recognizing that his petition would

otherwise be barred by the one-year limitation period of § 2255(f)(1), Boaz argued

that the Supreme Court's opinion in Descamps created a new rule of law that triggered

-2-

Appellate Case: 14-1609 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Entry ID: 4289466 
a new one-year limitation period pursuant to § 2255(f)(3). The district court denied 1

relief.2

II.

We review de novo the district court's determination that a § 2255 petition is

untimely. Anjulo-Lopez v. United States, 541 F.3d 814, 817 (8th Cir. 2008).

A crime alleged as a qualifying predicate offense is overinclusive if it

criminalizes both conduct that qualifies as a violent felony and conduct that does not.

See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281. An overinclusive offense is "divisible" if it lists

separate, alternative elements to identify the different manners in which the offense

may be committed. Id. An overinclusive offense is not divisible if, without setting

forth alternative elementsto define the offense, it broadly encompasses both conduct

that qualifies as a violent felony and conduct that does not. Id.

Prior to Descamps, it was well established that the modified categorical

approach could be used to examine limited materials to determine whether a prior

conviction for an overinclusive offense qualified as a violent felony. See Shepard v.

United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). In Descamps, the Supreme Court clarified that

the modified categorical approach could be used only where the underlying

overinclusive offense was divisible. 133 S. Ct. at 2285. Therefore, both before and

after Descamps, the modified categorical approach could be used to assess whether

a divisible and overinclusive offense qualified as a violent felony.

Boaz raised other issues, but they are not within the scope of his certificate of 1

appealability and are not properly before our court.

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western

2

District of Missouri.

-3-

Appellate Case: 14-1609 Page: 3 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Entry ID: 4289466 
Boaz argues that the Arizona statute at issue is divisible in that it sets forth

alternative elements for obtaining a conviction. Because Descamps did not change

the analysis employed to assess whether a divisible and overinclusive statute defines

a violent felony, Descamps presents no new rule material to Boaz's argument. As

such, Descamps cannot excuse the untimeliness of Boaz's § 2255 petition.

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

-4-

Appellate Case: 14-1609 Page: 4 Date Filed: 06/29/2015 Entry ID: 4289466