Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03325/USCOURTS-ca8-06-03325-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John L. Heavner
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

The Honorable Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice of the United States

Supreme Court, (Ret.), sitting by designation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 294(a).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

________________

No. 06-3325

________________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

John L. Heavner, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

________________

 Submitted: December 10, 2007 

 Filed: December 14, 2007

__________________

Before LOKEN, Chief Judge, O’CONNOR,* Associate Justice (Ret.) and

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge. 

________________

PER CURIAM. 

This case is before us on remand from the United States Supreme Court for

reconsideration in light of Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. ---, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (June

21, 2007). In Rita, the Supreme Court held that the “presumption [of reasonableness]

applies only on appellate review.” Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2465. “[T]he sentencing court

does not enjoy the benefit of a legal presumption that the Guidelines sentence should

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The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western

District of Missouri.

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apply.” Id. After reconsidering Heavner’s sentence as directed by the Supreme Court,

we affirm. 

Heavner pled guilty to one count of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2113(a). The district court1

 sentenced Heavner to 151 months’ imprisonment, a

sentence within his advisory sentencing guidelines range of 151 to 188 months.

Heavner appealed his sentence, and this court affirmed the district court’s sentence.

Further discussion of the underlying facts may be found at United States v. Heavner,

227 Fed. Appx. 524 (8th Cir.), vacated, --- U.S. ---, 76 U.S.L.W. 3223 (U.S. Oct. 29,

2007) (No. 07-5473). 

At sentencing, the district court followed the three-step procedure outlined in

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2005). It first determined the

appropriate guidelines range, it then decided whether a traditional departure was

appropriate, and it finally considered the other 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See id.

While the district court also noted that a sentence within the advisory guidelines range

was presumptively reasonable, Heavner did not object or argue at sentencing that the

district court’s use of this presumption was incorrect. Therefore, we now review his

sentence for plain error. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir.

2005) (en banc). 

Under plain error review, the defendant has the burden of proof. Id. (citing

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734-35 (1993)). He must prove that there was

“(1) error, (2) that [was] plain, and (3) that affect[ed] substantial rights. If all three

conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a

forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or

public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520

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U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997)). The district court committed error by stating that a

sentence within the advisory guidelines range was presumptively reasonable. The

error is plain at this time. See id. However, this error did not affect substantial rights

and was not prejudicial to Heavner because the record does not reveal any “reasonable

probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence” without the

presumption. Id. at 551. The district court followed the correct procedure and

considered the nature and circumstances of Heavner’s bank robbery offense; the

history and characteristics of Heavner; and the need for the sentence to reflect the

seriousness of Heavner’s crime, promote respect for the law, provide a just

punishment, protect the public from further crimes, provide Heavner with the

necessary educational and medical care, and avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

among similar defendants involved in similar crimes. After this proper consideration

of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court announced that “a sentence within the

guideline range is an appropriate sentence.” 

While the district court also noted that it regretted the impact its sentence would

have on Heavner before concluding that his sentence was “required under the law,”

this general statement does not satisfy Heavner’s burden to prove that the district court

would have imposed a shorter sentence had it not made the erroneous presumption.

See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 553 (“[W]here the effect of the error on the result in the

district court is uncertain or indeterminate—where we would have to speculate—the

appellant has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability that the result

would have been different but for the error.”) (quotation omitted). Because the district

court stated that it believed Heavner’s sentence was “required under the law”

immediately after its thorough analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, we conclude that the

district court’s statement referred to its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors. At a

minimum, we merely would be speculating if we held that the district court’s

statement instead referred to its earlier invocation of the erroneous presumption. 

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Therefore, we are convinced that Heavner cannot carry his burden of showing

that he would have received a lesser sentence in the absence of the district court’s

erroneous presumption. Accordingly, we affirm Heavner’s sentence. 

______________________________

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