Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03784/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03784-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Carolyn W. Colvin
Defendant
Carrie Murphy
Plaintiff

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United States District Court 

Northern District of Californi

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

CARRIE MURPHY, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant. 

Case No. 14-cv-03784-YGR 

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. Nos. 29, 33 

Plaintiff Carrie Murphy filed this action seeking judicial review of Social Security 

Administration Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) John Heyer’s decision finding that she was not 

disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”). Pending before 

the Court are the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 29, 33.) Plaintiff 

argues the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to provide clear and convincing reasons to discredit plaintiff’s 

testimony in part; (2) failing to provide clear and convincing reasons to discount the opinions of 

plaintiff’s treating medical sources; (4) according great weight to the opinion of a reviewing 

physician; (4) failing to discuss the lay witness statement of plaintiff’s mother; and (5) finding 

plaintiff could perform the full range of unskilled light occupations. 

Based thereon, plaintiff argues that remand for an award of benefits is proper. Having 

carefully considered the papers submitted and the entire record in this case, and for the reasons set 

forth below, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the Commissioner’s cross motion are 

both GRANTED IN PART. As set forth herein, the Court grants plaintiff’s motion with respect to all 

but one treating source and remands to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent herewith. 

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I. BACKGROUND

 On January 31, 2011, plaintiff filed an application for social security disability insurance 

benefits pursuant to Title II of the Act, alleging that she became disabled on March 16, 2010 and 

was thereby denied full benefits. (Record at 16.) She later amended her disability onset date to 

October 14, 2010. (Id. at 212.) Plaintiff based her disability claim primarily on histories of 

depression with bipolar disorder, as well as side-effects following her kidney transplant. (See id.

at 18.) Plaintiff also alleged obesity, history of polysubstance abuse (including alcohol, 

methamphetamines, heroin, and computer cleaner or “dust off”), hypertension, diabetes mellitus, 

carpel tunnel syndrome in her left arm, heel pain caused by mild calcaneal spurring, and lingering 

neck and shoulder pain from a July 2009 motor vehicle accident. (See id. at 18-19; 340; 478.) 

 The Social Security Administration denied plaintiff’s application initially and on 

reconsideration. (Id. at 16.) On December 12, 2012, the ALJ held a hearing and, on January 9, 

2013, issued his final decision finding that plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act.1

 

(Id. at 14-16.) Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, which denied her 

request for review, rendering the ALJ's decision final. (Id. at 2-5.) Plaintiff then filed the instant 

action, which became ripe for decision on July 17, 2015. (See Dkt. No. 34.) 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

 This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. section 405(g). The Court may reverse the 

ALJ's decision only if it “contains legal error or is not supported by substantial evidence.” Orn v. 

Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). Substantial evidence is 

“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). It is “more than a mere scintilla but less 

than a preponderance.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the 

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational conclusion, the Court must uphold the ALJ. 

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 The ALJ ultimately determined that plaintiff has not been disabled within the meaning of 

the Act since March 16, 2010. (See Record at 25.) This is the disability onset date that plaintiff 

originally provided in her application. (See id. at 212.) Plaintiff later amended her disability onset 

date to October 14, 2010. (See id.) The ALJ offers no explanation as to why he did not use the 

amended disability onset date. 

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Burch, 400 F.3d at 679. 

 The Act uses a five-step sequential framework to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 

At Step One, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful 

activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). A person is involved in substantial work activity if she 

engages in work that involves significant physical or mental activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(a). 

Gainful work activity is defined as “work usually done for pay or profit,” regardless of whether 

the claimant receives a profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572(b). If the claimant is engaged in substantial 

gainful activity, she is not disabled. If the claimant does not engage in substantial gainful activity, 

then the ALJ proceeds to Step Two of the evaluation. 

At Step Two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has an impairment or 

combination of impairments that is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A “severe” impairment is 

defined in the regulations as one that significantly limits an individual's ability to perform basic 

work activities. If the claimant does not have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

she is not disabled. If the claimant does have a severe impairment or combination of impairments, 

then the ALJ proceeds to Step Three. 

At Step Three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine whether a claimant's 

impairment or combination of impairments “meets or equals” the criteria of an impairment listed 

in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526. If 

the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listing and the 

duration requirement, the claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. If the impairment or 

combination of impairments does not meet the criteria of a listing or does not meet the duration 

requirement, the ALJ proceeds to the next step. 

Before reaching Step Four in the sequential evaluation, the ALJ must determine the 

claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). A claimant's RFC 

consists of her ability to engage in physical and mental work activity on an ongoing basis, in spite 

of any limitations from impairments. The ALJ considers both severe and non-severe impairments 

in determining the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545. 

At Step Four, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past 

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relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant 

work, she is not disabled. If the claimant is unable to do past relevant work or has no past relevant 

work, the ALJ proceeds to the final step in the sequential evaluation. 

 At Step Five, the ALJ considers the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience 

in determining whether the claimant can perform any other work besides past relevant work. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520(g). “Substantial work activity is work activity that involves doing significant 

physical or mental activities . . . . [W]ork may be substantial even if it is done on a part-time basis 

or if you do less, get paid less, or have less responsibility than when you worked before.” 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1572(a), 416.972(a). If the claimant can perform other work, she is not disabled. If 

the claimant cannot perform other work and fulfills the duration requirement, she is disabled. 

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION

 In a ten-page decision, the ALJ applied the five-step sequential analysis described above to 

determine plaintiff was not eligible for disability insurance benefits. The ALJ concluded that 

plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d) of the Act during the relevant time 

period. A summary of his decision follows below. 

 At Step One, the ALJ found that plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since March 16, 2010 and meets the insured status requirements of the Act through December 31, 

2015. (Record at 18.) 

At Step Two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has the following severe impairments: 

bipolar disorder, history of kidney transplant, obesity, and history of polysubstance abuse.” (Id.) 

The ALJ further found plaintiff to suffer from other, nonsevere impairments, including: 

hypertension, diabetes, carpel tunnel syndrome, heel pain from calcaneal spurring, and neck and 

shoulder pain from a past car accident. (Id. at 18-19.) In making this determination, the ALJ gave 

“great weight” to the opinion of a state agency consultant and treating source Dr. John Valdin, 

M.D. as to the nonsevere impairments. Specifically, he gave them great weight because he found 

their assessments consistent with one another and with the record. (Id. at 19.) 

At Step Three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff does not have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of the criteria of listings 

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12.04 and 12.09. (Id.) To arrive at this conclusion, the ALJ considered whether plaintiff’s mental 

impairments resulted in at least two of the following: (i) marked restriction in the activities of 

daily living; (ii) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; (iii) marked difficulties in 

maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; or (iv) repeated episodes of decompensation, each 

of extended duration. (Id. at 19.) The ALJ found that plaintiff “has mild limitation in the 

activities of daily living and social functioning, moderate limitations in concentration, persistence 

or pace,” but “has experienced no episodes of decompensation...of extended duration.” (Id.) The 

ALJ further found that her “mental impairments do not cause at least two “marked” limitations or 

one “marked” limitation and “repeated” episodes of decompensation.” (Id.) 

Before reaching Step Four, the ALJ determined plaintiff’s RFC. Plaintiff’s RFC consists 

of her ability to engage in physical and mental work activity on an ongoing basis, despite any 

limitations from her impairments. The ALJ ultimately determined that plaintiff retained the 

capacity to perform light work. (See id. at 20.) With respect to plaintiff’s physical impairments 

related to her kidney transplant, the ALJ first accorded “limited weight” to the opinions of Nurse 

Practitioner Christian Visci, FNP and Dr. Kerri Ashling, M.D. – that plaintiff had tremors from 

her anti-kidney rejection medication, uncontrolled bipolar disorder, and a generally reduced 

capacity to work – because their opinions were “inconsistent with the objective evidence of record 

and with the claimant’s lack of treatment for active symptoms.” (Id. at 22.) The ALJ also gave 

one of the state agency reviewers’ assessments of the limitations Plaintiff faced as a result of her 

kidney transplant “little weight” because the ALJ found the claimant’s obesity and renal problems 

do not impose limitations to the degree alleged. (Id.). With respect to plaintiff’s kidney function, 

the ALJ gave “great weight” to Dr. Valdin’s March 2012 opinion that plaintiff kidney is 

functioning well because it was consistent with the record. (Id.) 

With respect to plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ gave “little” or “limited” weight to 

all six treating medical source opinions. Although Dr. Michael Levy, M.D. opined that plaintiff 

cannot work eight hours in a day, would miss work more than five times a month, and has marked 

functional limitations in all realms, the ALJ reasoned that Dr. Levy’s opinion was entitled to “little 

weight” because “the record shows that while claimant continues to suffer from some degree of 

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depression, her symptoms are not as limiting as alleged. Since the alleged onset date, her 

symptoms have improved and her mental state has been generally stable.” (Id. at 23.) The ALJ 

likewise discounted the opinion of therapist Gary Schwager, M.F.T., that plaintiff would have 

difficulty holding down a job as a result of her ailments, for the same reasons he provided for Dr. 

Levy. (Id.) The ALJ also gave “limited weight” to the October 2012 opinions of Nurse 

Practitioner Visci and Dr. Ashling, and to the November 2012 opinions of Dr. Helena Chan, M.D. 

and Dr. Flora Chan, Psy. D. – that, due to her depression, claimant would have difficulty working 

a competitive job, completing tasks, getting to work, and sustaining a forty hour work week. (Id.) 

The ALJ held that these opinions “are inconsistent with the progress notes of these treaters, with 

the claimant’s GAF score of 55, and with the record as a whole. Further, they seem to rely heavily 

on the claimant’s subjective reporting without corroborating signs on exams.” (Id.) 

The ALJ provided additional reasons for his determination that plaintiff retained the RFC 

to perform light work despite the opinions of plaintiff’s medical sources. First, he recounted, in 

detail, plaintiff’s treatment history and status from February 2009 to October 2012, which 

generally evidenced improvement in plaintiff’s condition. (Id. at 22-23.) Second, the ALJ gave 

only some weight to the written testimony of plaintiff’s friend, Jasmine Torres, because, “the 

record does not corroborate much of her report. For example, [contrary to testimony of Ms. 

Torres], nowhere in the record did the claimant report that she falls.” (Id. at 23-24.) By contrast, 

the ALJ gave greater weight to the opinion of the state agency consultant Dr. Beverly Morgan, 

M.D., that plaintiff could perform simple, repetitive tasks because the ALJ found “[h]is 

assessment is consistent with the treatment record, the claimant’s breadth of activity and her 

presentation at the hearing and the undersigned affords it the most probative weight.” (Id.; see also

Record at 83.) (internal citation omitted.) 

Having made the RFC determination, the ALJ proceeded to Step Four to determine that 

plaintiff ultimately did not have the RFC to perform her past relevant work. (Id. at 24) In making 

this determination, the ALJ credited the testimony of the vocational expert, who testified that 

plaintiff can no longer perform her previous skilled, full-time job. (Id.) 

At Step Five, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not under a disability, as it is defined in 

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the Act, from March 16, 2010, through the date of his decision. (See id. at 25-26.) 

IV. DISCUSSION

 Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (A) failing to provide clear and convincing reasons for 

only partially crediting plaintiff’s testimony; (B) failing to provide clear and convincing reasons 

for discounting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating medical sources; (C) according the most weight 

to the opinion of a reviewing physician; (D) failing to discuss the lay witness statement of her 

mother; and (E) finding plaintiff could perform the full range of unskilled light occupations. 

Based thereon, plaintiff argues that remand for an award of benefits is proper. 

 In opposition, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff’s 

credibility, properly weighed the opinion evidence provided by the treating and reviewing medical 

sources, did not err in failing to address lay witness testimony, and properly relied on vocational 

expert testimony to determine plaintiff’s RFC. The Commissioner maintains that should the Court 

find the ALJ erred, remand for further administrative proceedings, rather than an award of 

benefits, is proper. The Court considers each of these five arguments in turn. 

A. Credibility of Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing that she felt she was unable to work because of her 

“depression and the symptoms that come with it.” (Id. at 47.) The ALJ found plaintiff only 

partially credible, noting that plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, [her] statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons 

explained in this decision.” (Id. at 21.) Plaintiff argues that the reasons provided by the ALJ for 

partially discrediting her testimony were not clear and convincing. Upon review of the record and 

the ALJ’s decision, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the ALJ’s 

determination that plaintiff was only partially credible was sufficiently supported by record as set 

out in the specific, clear, and convincing reasons he provided.2

 

 2

 The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not need to provide clear and convincing 

reasons to discount plaintiff’s testimony. The Court does not reach this argument because it finds 

that the ALJ provided sufficiently clear and convincing reasons for discounting plaintiff’s 

testimony, affirming this aspect of the ALJ’s decision under a less stringent standard than that 

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1. Legal Standard 

To assess a claimant's subjective testimony, an ALJ must engage in a two-step inquiry. 

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 

1281–82 (9th Cir. 1996)). First, “the claimant ‘must produce objective medical evidence of an 

underlying impairment’ or impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree 

of symptom.” Id. Second, if the claimant provides the evidence required by step one, and there is 

no affirmative evidence of malingering, then the ALJ can reject the claimant's testimony as to the 

severity of the symptoms “only by offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” 

Id. (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1283–84). “The clear and convincing standard is the most 

demanding required in Social Security cases.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 

2014) (citation omitted). 

An ALJ “may find the claimant’s allegations of severity to be not credible,” but the ALJ 

“must specifically make findings which support this conclusion.” Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 

341, 345 (9th Cir. 1991). In other words, “[t]he ALJ must state specifically which symptom 

testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.” Smolen, 80 F.3d at 

1284. “These findings, properly supported by the record, must be sufficiently specific to allow a 

reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant's testimony on permissible 

grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony....” Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ALJ may consider inconsistencies between a 

claimant's testimony and conduct, daily activities, work record, and testimony from physicians and 

third parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the symptoms of which claimant 

complains. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958–59 (9th Cir. 2002). But “[i]f the ALJ's 

credibility finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the reviewing court “may 

not engage in second-guessing.” Id. at 959. 

\\\ 

 

proposed by the Commissioner. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014 (9th Cir. 2014) 

(holding that an ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons to discount a claimant’s 

subjective testimony when there is no affirmative evidence of malingering).

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2. The ALJ’s Credibility Analysis 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons for partially 

discrediting her testimony, constituting reversible error. The ALJ properly engaged in the twostep inquiry prescribed by Tommasetti for credibility determinations on subjective testimony, 

though he did not refer to it as the Tomasetti inquiry. See 533 F.3d at 1039. (Record at 20.) At 

the first step, the ALJ explained plaintiff’s self-reported ailments, her capabilities, and the 

activities in which she regularly engaged, and ultimately agreed that plaintiff’s medicallydeterminable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms. (Id. at 

20-21.) The parties do not dispute whether the ALJ’s analysis at step one was sufficient. 

With respect to the second step, however, the parties dispute the sufficiency of the ALJ’s 

determination that plaintiff’s impairments were not as limiting as she alleged. The ALJ began by 

summarizing plaintiff’s medical treatment history from February 2009 to October 2012. This 

summary indicated that plaintiff’s conditions were both improving over time and made 

manageable by her medication. (See Record at 21-24.) Specifically, he reasoned: 

Despite allegations of disabling symptoms, the claimant engages in 

a breadth of daily activity. The claimant attends to her personal care 

without limitation, does chores and laundry, uses public 

transportation, shops in stores, manages her finances but has some 

issues with tracking them, reads, watches television, and attends 

social events such as birthday parties (Ex. 4E). During a field office 

interview in February 2011, the claimant was pleasant, well 

groomed and well prepared. She had no observed limitations in 

understanding, concentrating, answering, sitting, standing or 

walking (Exs. 1E; 4E). The evidence shows that she has remained 

physically and mentally stable since the alleged onset date. Recent 

mental health progress notes also show that the claimant has 

cancelled several sessions, indicating that her symptoms are not as 

severe as alleged (Ex. 15F). The claimant was able to understand 

and fully respond to all questions posed of her at the hearing, she 

actively cares for her mother, and she testified that she is seeking 

employment. 

(Id. at 24.) The Court finds that these reasons both specifically state the symptom testimony that 

the ALJ did not find credible and point to the facts in the record the ALJ relied on in reaching his 

conclusion. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284. 

 Moreover, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision is based on substantial evidence in the 

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record. Although it is clear from the record that plaintiff has significant health issues, the ALJ’s 

inference that plaintiff’s medical records are inconsistent with the alleged extent of her incapacity 

is nonetheless supported by substantial evidence. First, her physical condition appears to be 

stable. Plaintiff underwent a kidney transplant in 2009, but her “physical condition has been 

stable on medication and...her kidney is functioning well, despite limited follow up care.” 

(Record at 22; see also id. at 680 (noting kidney function is normal).) Plaintiff’s mental health 

appears to be less stable than her physical health: she is consistently diagnosed as bipolar and 

generally depressed throughout the record. (See, e.g. id. at 683 (“Current problems or complaints: 

depression and substance abuse.”); id. at 451 (noting plaintiff suffers from Bipolar II).) However, 

the record as a whole reasonably suggests that the debilitating effects of plaintiff’s depression 

would not prevent her from ever working again. For example, in March of 2010, plaintiff missed 

a group therapy session to attend a birthday party. (See id. at 432.) And treatment notes from 

another March 2010 mental health appointment indicate that plaintiff was not regularly attending 

therapy. (See id. at 442-43.) Treatment notes from a September 2011 appointment indicate that 

her mental status was normal and her mood was less depressed than in the past because of 

medications she was taking at that time. (See id. at 464.) The narrative summary from another 

September 2011 visit includes the notation “[m]ood continues to be better- sleeping well, though 

still eating too much....” (Id. at 467.) At a November 2012 mental health appointment, plaintiff 

stated that she was feeling “ok, not great but not bad.” (Id. at 519 (internal quotation marks 

omitted).) Thus, while there is no dispute that plaintiff suffers from depression, the record 

supports the ALJ’s determination that her symptoms are not as debilitating as she suggests. 

3. Plaintiff’s Arguments on Appeal 

In support of her motion, plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied on four insufficient reasons to 

support of his credibility determination. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. 

First, plaintiff contends that cancellation of several mental health sessions cannot 

constitute a clear and convincing reason to discredit her testimony. The Court is not persuaded. 

The ALJ may consider the failure to seek or follow prescribed treatment in making his credibility 

determination on plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. See, e.g. Burch, 400 F.3d at 681 

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(“The ALJ is permitted to consider lack of treatment in his credibility determination.”). Plaintiff’s 

argument on this point is primarily that cancellation of several mental health sessions actually 

supports her subjective testimony. In other words, she cancelled or rescheduled at least one 

session because she was feeling too depressed to get out of bed. The portion of the record cited by 

plaintiff in support of this argument, however, shows she only cancelled one session for this 

reason. (See Record at 518.) There is no explanation provided for another session that she 

cancelled. (See id. at 516.) Further, other parts of the record reflect that plaintiff missed a 

treatment session to attend a birthday party (see id. at 432), and had a phone exchange with a 

therapist where the therapist only agrees to continue to excuse her from work if she begins 

attending group therapy, suggesting that she missed multiple sessions. (See id. at 442-43.) While 

plaintiff’s argument has intuitive appeal, one could also reasonably conclude that the record as a 

whole shows otherwise. Thus, the ALJ did not err in considering the fact that plaintiff cancelled 

one or more mental health sessions. 

Second, plaintiff argues that her breadth of daily activities neither equates with their 

performance on a regular, daily basis, nor does it demonstrate an ability to perform substantial 

gainful activity. The ALJ may consider a claimant’s daily activities that “may be seen as 

inconsistent with the presence of a condition which would preclude all work activity.” Curry v. 

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding denial of disability benefits where 

claimant could “take care of her personal needs, prepare easy meals, do light housework, and shop 

for some groceries”); see also Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (upholding 

ALJ’s decision to deny benefits based, in part, on the determination that claimant performed daily 

activities transferable to a work setting). The ability to care for others may properly serve as the 

basis for an adverse credibility finding as to the allegedly debilitating effect of a claimant’s 

symptoms. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding ALJ’s adverse 

credibility determination of a claimant’s testimony in part because she was able to care for her two 

young children). 

Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiff’s daily activities and her ability to care for her 

mother undermined her claim that she suffered from totally debilitating symptoms. As in Curry, 

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plaintiff testified that she engages in a moderate breadth of daily activities, suggesting some 

remaining capacity to work. See Curry, 925 F.2d at 1130. Plaintiff devotes much of her argument 

on this point to the contention that her daily activities do not equate to her ability to meet the 

demands of a full time job. Plaintiff’s argument is misplaced. The ALJ found that plaintiff’s RFC 

only gave her the ability to perform light, part time work – not a full time job. (See Record at 20.) 

The ALJ may consider plaintiff’s daily activities and her ability to care for her mother in making 

his adverse credibility determination. (See, e.g. Record at 24.) The Court finds the ALJ’s 

analysis of plaintiff’s daily activities in the record was clear and convincing, and constitutes an 

appropriate basis on which he may support his credibility determination. 

Third, plaintiff contends that the fact that she was seeking part time work should not be 

held against her. Plaintiff primarily relies on Garrison v. Colvin and Kornock v. Harris for the 

proposition that she should not be penalized for attempting to live a normal life, which includes 

looking for part time work. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016 (“disability claimants must not be 

penalized for attempting to lead normal lives...”); Kornock v. Harris, 648 F.2d 525, 527 (9th Cir. 

1980) (“The ability to work only a few hours a day or to work only on an intermittent basis is not 

the ability to engage in ‘substantial gainful activity’”). Again, plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is 

misplaced. Both of these cases address evidence of a claimant seeking work in the context of an 

ALJ’s improper inference that the claimant’s daily activity level affected an RFC determination. 

In neither case was the Ninth Circuit discussing whether an ALJ may consider the fact that a 

claimant was seeking part time work in making a credibility determination. In that regard, the 

Commissioner’s unpublished authority holding that an ALJ may consider the fact that a claimant 

is looking for part time work in making a credibility determination is more persuasive. See, e.g.

Merritt v. Colvin, 572 Fed. Appx. 468, 470-71 (9th Cir. 2014) (concluding that claimant’s interest 

in starting a new job was a clear and convincing reason in support of an ALJ’s adverse credibility 

determination regarding the claimant’s subjective testimony). Therefore, it was not improper for 

the ALJ to consider the fact that plaintiff sought part time employment in making his credibility 

determination that her symptoms were not as severe as alleged. Plaintiff’s search for part time 

work is a clear and convincing reason in support of the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination. 

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Fourth, plaintiff argues that her appearance at the hearing, where she was alert and able to 

respond to all the questions the ALJ asked her, does not contradict her testimony about the 

limiting impact of her symptoms. Plaintiff makes a similar argument regarding the ALJ’s reliance 

on her appearance at an earlier Social Security Administration field office interview. This 

particular argument does persuade. The hearing lasted from 9:34 a.m. to 10:04 a.m. (id. at 45, 63), 

but the record does not indicate the duration of the field office interview (id. at 153-155). 

Appearing alert for a thirty minute hearing does not logically equate to the ability to work even a 

part time job. The Court agrees with plaintiff that her appearance at the hearing cannot constitute 

a clear and convincing reason to support an adverse credibility determination. Even where the 

ALJ erred in part on a credibility determination, providing other valid reasons for his decision 

supports upholding his overall credibility finding. See Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115 (“error is 

harmless so long as there remains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision and the error 

does not negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion”) (internal quotations omitted). The 

Court finds this error harmless in light of the other clear and convincing reasons provided by the 

ALJ and supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

 Finally, plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not fulfill his duty to develop the record fully and 

fairly by asking plaintiff about her contradictory statements at her hearing. While such a duty 

exists, the Court does not agree that the ALJ failed to perform his duty in this instance. See 

Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (explaining the ALJ has a duty to 

develop the record fully and fairly even when claimant is represented by counsel). The transcript 

of the hearing reflects that the ALJ asked plaintiff about apparent contradictions he saw between 

the record and her testimony. (See Record at 50-54.) Specifically, the ALJ: (i) asked her 

questions about how her symptoms are as limiting as alleged considering her ability to care for her 

mother, (ii) questioned her concerning specific treatment notes showing her physical and mental 

conditions have improved, (iii) inquired about the fact she has applied for jobs and expressed 

interest in going back to school, and (iv) also probed into her daily activities. (See id.) The ALJ’s 

questioning at the hearing and the reasons provided in his written decision show that the ALJ 

carried out his duty to develop the record fully and fairly. See Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1150-51 

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(finding that the ALJ did not fully develop the record by simply relying on a physician’s opinion). 

Accordingly, the Court declines to disturb the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding on this basis as 

well. 

For these reasons, the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff lacked credibility was sufficiently 

supported by the clear and convincing reasons he provided. Any inferences that the ALJ drew 

against plaintiff were reasonably drawn from the record, which he frequently and accurately cited. 

The Commissioner’s motion on this ground is GRANTED. 

B. Discounting the Opinions of Treating Medical Sources 

Next, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be vacated because he improperly 

gave “little” or “limited” weight to the opinions of plaintiff’s treating medical providers without 

providing the requisite clear and convincing reasons. Specifically, the ALJ assigned only little or 

limited weight to the opinions of all six of plaintiff’s treating medical sources opining on her 

mental ailments and symptoms.3 The Court largely agrees. The ALJ failed to “do more than offer 

his conclusions.” Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988). He did not set out the 

required “detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, [along 

with] stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Id. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS plaintiff’s motion on this ground with 

respect to physicians Dr. Levy, Dr. Helena Chan, Dr. Flora Chan, Dr. Ashling, and Nurse 

Practitioner Visci, and GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion with respect to Mr. Schwager. 

1. Legal Standard 

In determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Act, the ALJ must 

consider all medical opinion evidence. Tomasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(b)). Medical opinions are arranged in a hierarchy of three groups, namely opinions from 

(i) treating physicians, (ii) examining physicians, and (iii) non-examining physicians, with the 

 3

 In fact, of all of the medical sources involved in plaintiff’s treatment, the ALJ explicitly 

gave only the opinion of Dr. Valdin “great weight,” and only as regards plaintiff’s physical 

ailments. (Record at 22 (citing record at 488-89).) Dr. Valdin opined only on plaintiff’s physical 

impairments related to her kidney transplant, concluding that she did not face significant 

limitations, but also noting he did not treat her mental impairments. (Id. at 488-89.) 

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opinions of treating physicians generally accorded the most weight. See Valentine v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec. Admin, 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that there are three types of medical 

opinions in social security cases); Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222 

(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that opinions of treating physicians are entitled to more weight than 

opinions of examining physicians). The rationale for giving greater weight to a treating 

physician's opinion is that he or she is employed to cure and has a greater opportunity to know and 

observe the patient as an individual. Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.1987) 

(citations omitted). All of the physicians whose opinions the ALJ rejected in this case were 

treating physicians. The ALJ may only reject4 the uncontroverted (as opposed to contradicted) 

opinion of a treating physician by providing “clear and convincing” reasons supported by 

substantial evidence in the record. Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th 

Cir. 2008). “The ALJ can meet [the clear and convincing reasons] burden by setting out a detailed 

and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation 

thereof, and making findings.” Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421 (quoting Cotton v. Bowen, 799 F.2d 

1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1986)). “However, an ALJ need not give controlling weight to the opinion of 

a treating physician. Although a treating physician's opinion is generally afforded the greatest 

weight in disability cases, it is not binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an 

impairment or the ultimate determination of disability. The ALJ may disregard the treating 

physician's opinion whether or not that opinion is contradicted.” Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

359 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 

Here, the six treating medical source opinions that the ALJ discounted were 

uncontroverted, as they all agreed that plaintiff would not be able to perform the responsibilities 

 4

 The Court recognizes that the ALJ never explicitly “rejects” the opinions of the treating 

physicians, but rather accords them “little weight” or “limited weight,” thereby significantly 

discounting their opinions. This is a distinction without a difference in our case law. The terms 

“reject” on the one hand and “discount” on the other are used interchangeably by the Ninth Circuit 

in evaluating instances where an ALJ gives less than full credit to the opinion testimony of 

treating medical sources. See, e.g., Tomasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040-41. As such, the Court makes no 

distinction herein between rejecting and discounting opinion testimony of treating medical 

sources. 

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required by a competitive job consistently in the future. Of the medical providers whose opinions 

the ALJ rejected, four are physicians.5 Mr. Schwager is a family therapist and Ms. Visci is a nurse 

practitioner. (See Record at 455, 503.) Different standards apply to judicial review of the reasons 

the ALJ gave for the weight he accorded to the opinions of providers of medical services who are 

not physicians.6 “Nurse practitioners and therapists are considered ‘other sources.’ While their 

opinions must still be evaluated, the ALJ may discount testimony from these ‘other sources’ if the 

ALJ gives reasons germane to each witness for doing so.” Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c); Molina, 674 F.3d at 

1111) (some internal quotations omitted). Thus, the opinion of Mr. Schwager will be evaluated 

under the “other sources” rubric. By contrast, because Ms. Visci was a co-signatory on a medical 

opinion questionnaire co-signed by Dr. Ashling (see Record at 502-04), the ALJ appropriately 

treated the opinion of Ms. Visci in the same manner as that of three other physicians (id. at 23).7 

The Court considers the sufficiency of the reasons the ALJ provided to discount the 

opinions of each of the treating source opinions below. 

2. Psychiatrist Dr. Levy and Therapist Mr. Schwager 

With respect to Dr. Levy, plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision should be overturned 

because he improperly gave little weight to the opinion of her former psychiatrist. The ALJ gave 

little weight to Dr. Levy’s opinion that plaintiff cannot work eight hours in a day, would miss 

more than five days of work per month, has marked functional limitations in all areas, and would 

have difficulty maintaining a job. (Record at 23 (referring to Record at 458-63).) The ALJ’s 

 5

 The treating physicians are Dr. Levy, Dr. Helena Chan, Dr. Flora Chan, and Dr. Ashling. 

6

 The parties did not raise the issue that two of the medical sources whose opinions are at 

issue here, are not physicians. Because different standards apply to the Court’s review of the 

ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of a non-physician, the Court notes this important 

distinction. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2014). 

7

 Under the referenced standard, the Court applies the heightened standard for discounting 

physicians to Drs. Levy, H. Chan, F. Chan, and Dr. Ashling together with Ms. Visci. See Taylor v. 

Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 659 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that the opinion of a 

nurse practitioner should be treated as that of a physician where the nurse practitioner and 

physician had a sufficiently close relationship in treating the claimant). 

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discussion of Dr. Levy and his reasons for discounting Dr. Levy’s opinion were conclusory rather 

than clear and convincing. Specifically, the ALJ simply stated that he found “the record shows 

that while the claimant continues to suffer from some degree of depression, her symptoms are not 

as limiting alleged. Since the alleged onset date, her symptoms have improved and her mental 

state has been generally stable.” (Id. at 23.) These are not the types of clear and convincing 

reasons necessary to reject Dr. Levy’s opinion. 

Dr. Levy’s treatment notes spanning from February 2010 to January 2011 provide 

evidence that could support the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff’s mental health has improved. 

When Dr. Levy saw plaintiff on February 19, 2010, he noted her mental state was normal, but she 

was tearful, liable, agitated, and not sleeping well. (Id. at 304.) She was not on psychotropic 

drugs at the time. (Id.) His narrative noted that “she has been reasonably stable on drug regimen 

following her kidney transplant but is concerned that she has been having a glass of wine every 

night and smoking speed once a month and is fearful of falling back into her old habits. She has 

also been liable and irritable with mixed moods and weight gain is an issue as is a craving for 

alcohol.” (Id.) At plaintiff’s March 10, 2010 visit to Dr. Levy he noted that plaintiff was “quite 

agitated,” placed her on a new drug regimen, and scheduled a follow up visit. (Id. at 314.) His 

narrative reads: “[plaintiff] is seen with a friend and her therapist after feeling she couldn’t do cdpr 

and coming here unscheduled on an urgent basis. She is only on Neurontin and is tearful and 

agitated and can’t sleep. She states she has 18 days off speed and pot. She is asking for meds and 

retroactive disability.” (Id.). At a subsequent visit to Dr. Levy, on September 21, 2010, Dr. Levy 

notes plaintiff has been “quite depressed and anxious as she struggles to stay off speed. She has 

completed cdrp and a 30 day treatment program and hopes to get into a longer term program in the 

city. Though Neurontin and Seroquel help some with clinical anxiety and sleep she is still quite 

depressed. She is coping well since she has had her kidney transplant.” (Id. at 317.) 

By January 4, 2011, Dr. Levy’s notes seem to indicate that plaintiff is feeling better. (See 

id. at 320.) He notes that her mental status is normal with only intermittent mood liability. (Id.) 

His narrative summary of the visit states that plaintiff is “in the inpatient residential program at 

Harbor Lights in San Francisco and their questionnaire is filled out. At this time she is off 

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inhalants and speed and her mood is reasonably stable on seroquel, celexa and neurontin. 

Disability is extended until 4/1 as long as she stays at Harbor Lights.” (Id.) Dr. Levy also 

assigned plaintiff a GAF score of 51-60, reflecting his diagnosis that her symptoms were 

‘moderate.’ (See e.g. id. at 305.) 

Thus, Dr. Levy’s treatment notes provide some support for the ALJ’s stated reasons for 

giving little weight to Dr. Levy’s opinion on the limiting effects of plaintiff’s symptoms. By 

contrast, the ALJ’s conclusion suffers from a lack of the necessary analysis and interpretation of 

the record. The ALJ does not specifically relate any of the information summarized above to his 

ultimate finding to reject Dr. Levy’s opinion. Although one could speculate as to the import of the 

information recounted above, this Court cannot affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not 

rely. See Orn, 495 F.3d at 630 (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). 

While the Court is “not deprived of [its] faculties for drawing specific and legitimate inferences 

from the ALJ's opinion,” it may do so only “if those inferences are there to be drawn.” Magallanes 

v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, the ALJ simply failed to explain in sufficient 

detail the specific conflicts he saw in the record and how those conflicts led him to his ultimate 

decision on the amount of weight to give to Dr. Levy’s opinion. In other words, while the ALJ set 

“out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts,” he failed to state the conflicting clinical 

evidence specifically, and his interpretation of it; nor did he explicitly state the findings he made 

that led him to his ultimate conclusion on the weight to accord Dr. Levy’s opinion. See Embrey, 

849 F. 2d at 421. As such, the Court finds that the ALJ did not provide the requisite clear and 

convincing reasons for giving only little weight to the opinion of treating physician Dr. Levy. 

With respect to Mr. Schwager, however, a different standard applies. The ALJ gave Mr. 

Schwager’s opinion that plaintiff would miss more than 5 days of work a month little weight for 

the exact same reasons he discounted Dr. Levy’s opinion, or because (1) the disabling effects of 

plaintiff’s depressive symptoms were not as severe as alleged, and (2) her symptoms improved 

over time – in contradiction to their opinions. The ALJ’s decision contains only a single sentence 

in which he discounted Dr. Levy’s and Mr. Schwager’s opinions, providing these same two 

reasons for discounting both opinions. While these reasons were not clear and convincing as 

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required for discounting the opinion of a treating physician, the Court finds they are germane to 

Mr. Schwager. Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1161. 

Like Dr. Levy, Mr. Schwager’s treatment notes from September 2011 provide evidence 

germane to the ALJ’s stated reasons for discounting their opinions. These records track the 

narrative of gradual improvement in plaintiff’s condition highlighted by the ALJ in his written 

explanation of his decision. (See id. at 22-24.) Earlier notes from meetings in June and July of 

2011 indicate that plaintiff’s mood and general mental state were worse when she first entered 

treatment. (See e.g. id. at 472, 471.) Mr. Schwager’s treatment notes for September 1, 2011, on 

the other hand, note that plaintiff is stable on medication and her mood is generally stable. (Id. at 

467.) Mr. Schwager’s treatment notes from September 29, 2011 note that plaintiff is less 

depressed on her current meds, and that her mental status is generally good. (Id. at 464.) His 

summary of their visit reads: “[plaintiff] is stable at present. She is dealing effectively with issues 

related to: abstinence from drugs/alcohol and issues related to recovery. She is attending outside 

support meetings. The patient’s bipolar disorder appears to be stable. She is compliant with 

medication and treatment plan.” (Id.) And among other things, the narrative summary of that 

same visit includes the notation: “An attorney took her SSDI case. This will be based on [history] 

of chronic depression, even though her mood is better lately.” (Id.) 

The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Mr. Schwager’s testimony were germane and 

substantiated by the record. Specifically, the record as a whole supports the ALJ’s conclusion that 

Mr. Schwager’s opinion was contradicted by his treatment notes showing that plaintiff’s 

depressive symptoms were not as severe as he opined and that her symptoms had improved over 

time. See Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1161 (“A conflict between treatment notes and a treating provider's 

opinions may constitute an adequate reason to discredit the opinions of a treating physician or 

another treating provider.”) (citing Molina, 674 F.3d at 1111–12). Consequently, the Court will 

not disturb the ALJ’s determination with respect to the appropriate weight to afford Mr. Schwager. 

3. Dr. Helena Chan, Dr. Flora Chan, Dr. Ashling, and Nurse Practitioner Visci 

The ALJ’s decision should also be remanded because he improperly gave only limited 

weight to the opinions of four treating medical sources. The ALJ gave the opinions of these 

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physicians (and one cosigning nurse practitioner) limited weight for four reasons. First, the ALJ 

stated that these treating source opinions were inconsistent with the physicians’ corresponding 

treatment notes. He also determined they were inconsistent with plaintiff’s GAF scores, seemed 

to rely heavily on plaintiff’s subjective reporting without corroborating signs on exam, and were 

inconsistent with the treatment record as a whole. (Id. at 23.) Similar to Dr. Levy and Mr. 

Schwager, the treatment notes of these medical sources suggest that plaintiff was quite depressed 

at the outset of treatment, but has shown steady improvement over time. (See, e.g. id. at 511-19.) 

Here, again, the Court finds that the ALJ failed to provide the requisite clear and convincing 

reasons for rejecting the uncontroverted opinions of these treating physicians. 

The ALJ summarized the observations and opinions of these three treating physicians and 

nurse practitioner in a single paragraph, and only provided two conclusory sentences listing his 

reasons for giving limited weight to their opinions. (See id. at 23.) To provide the requisite clear 

and convincing reasons, more is required. The ALJ’s dismissal of these opinions, like his 

conclusory dismissal of Dr. Levy’s opinion, lacks analytical support or interpretation. The ALJ’s 

explanation is devoid of support. “Particularly in a case where the medical opinions of the 

physicians differ so markedly from the ALJ’s, it is incumbent on the ALJ to provide detailed, 

reasoned, and legitimate rationales for disregarding the physicians’ findings....The ALJ failed to 

do so here.” Embrey, 849 F. 2d at 422 (internal citation omitted). 

* * * 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the ALJ has failed to “do more than 

offer [his] conclusions” for discounting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians. See 

Embrey, 849 F.2d at 421. Plaintiff’s motion is therefore GRANTED with respect to the opinions of 

Dr. Levy, Dr. Helena Chan, Dr. Flora Chan, Dr. Ashling, and Ms. Visci. On remand, the ALJ must 

provide specific, clear, and convincing reasons for discounting the uncontroverted opinions of 

plaintiff’s treating physicians (and co-signer Nurse Practitioner Visci.), which he did not do in the 

decision currently before the Court. 

 With respect to Mr. Schwager, the Court finds the ALJ provided reasons germane for 

discounting his opinion and that the reasons were supported by substantial evidence. The 

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Commissioner’s motion is GRANTED on this ground. 

C. State Agency Reviewer Dr. Beverley Morgan 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should not have accorded the most probative weight to the 

opinion of state agency reviewer Dr. Beverley Morgan, that plaintiff could perform simple, 

repetitive tasks. (Id. at 23 (citing Ex. 3A, a disability determination explanation completed, in 

relevant part, by Dr. Morgan (id. at 77-90)).) The ALJ accorded Dr. Morgan’s assessment the 

most probative weight because he found it was “consistent with the treatment record, the 

claimant’s breadth of activity, and her presentation at the hearing.” (Id.) Plaintiff argues this 

explanation is not a legally sufficient reason for rejecting the unanimous opinions of plaintiff’s 

treating medical sources in favor of Dr. Morgan’s opinion. For the reasons discussed above, the 

Court agrees with plaintiff that the ALJ did not provide sufficiently clear and convincing reasons 

for discounting the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians. However, this does not necessarily 

lead to the conclusion that the ALJ erred in giving great weight to the opinion of Dr. Morgan. 

In the hierarchy of medical opinions, Dr. Morgan is a non-examining physician, whose 

opinions are generally accorded the least probative weight. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 

830-831 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The opinion of a nonexamining physician cannot by itself constitute 

substantial evidence that justifies the rejection of the opinion of either an examining physician or a 

treating physician”). The ALJ’s decision to discount the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians 

was not entirely based on Dr. Morgan’s assessment. The ALJ summarily provided other reasons, 

and the Court has already determined that those other reasons were not clear and convincing. On 

remand, the ALJ must provide clear and convincing reasons if he again chooses to discount the 

uncontroverted opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians in favor of Dr. Morgan’s opinion. But 

the ALJ may also consider Dr. Morgan’s opinion in reaching his ultimate determination of 

whether plaintiff is disabled. See Morgan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 602 (9th 

Cir. 1999) (“But we have consistently upheld the Commissioner's rejection of the opinion of a 

treating or examining physician, based in part on the testimony of a nontreating, nonexamining 

medical advisor.”) (emphasis in original). There not being a sufficient basis to believe the ALJ 

assessed solely on the relative weight given to plaintiff’s treating physicians, the Commissioner’s 

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motion on this ground is GRANTED. 

D. Lay Witness Testimony 

 Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ committed harmful error in failing to address a letter 

written by plaintiff’s mother. The Court disagrees. 

 Lay testimony is valid opinion testimony, which the ALJ must consider. Nguyen v. 

Chater, 100 F.3d 1462, 1467 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ’s failure to discuss lay opinion testimony 

constitutes harmless error when the ALJ explains his reasons for discounting other lay opinion 

testimony, and the lay opinion testimony he does not discuss is substantially similar to the 

testimony he provided specific reasons for discounting. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F. 3d 1104, 

1122 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694 (“In light of our conclusion that the ALJ 

provided clear and convincing reasons for rejecting [plaintiff’s] subjective complaints, and 

because [the lay witness’] testimony was similar to such complaints, it follows that the ALJ also 

gave germane reasons for rejecting her testimony”). 

Although the ALJ did not explicitly discuss the letter from plaintiff’s mother in his 

decision, he did provide reasons why he did not find plaintiff’s own subjective testimony entirely 

convincing. (Id. at 20-24.) The ALJ also specifically addressed the lay opinion testimony of 

plaintiff’s friend Ms. Torres, which came in the form of a function report. (Id. at 23-24.) The 

letter from plaintiff’s mother explains afflictions that are substantially similar to the afflictions 

described in plaintiff’s testimony and Ms. Torres’ function report. The letter explains that while 

plaintiff was historically “an exceptionally bright, articulate self-starter...there’s a sluggishness 

and sadness that seems to permeate every area of her life these days.” (Id. at 210.) The letter 

continues with her mother’s observations that days exist where plaintiff cannot get out of bed all 

day, plaintiff has many fewer friends than before, plaintiff increasingly struggles to maintain her 

concentration, plaintiff has trouble honoring time commitments, and plaintiff is consistently 

fatigued. (Id.) Reduced to its essence, the letter paints a picture of a depressed person, but it does 

not introduce any new information that is not captured by the combination of Ms. Torres’ function 

report and plaintiff’s own testimony. (See, e.g. id. at 50 (“I feel very discouraged and sometimes 

just getting out of bed is very difficult for me.”); id. at 56 (“I lose my train of thought easily...”); 

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id. at 170 (stating that plaintiff “[d]oes not have to [sic] much of social life anymore only 

relationship with residents that she live with.”).) Thus, the ALJ’s failure to discuss the letter from 

plaintiff’s mother specifically was harmless. See Valentine, 574 F.3d at 694. The 

Commissioner’s motion is GRANTED on this ground. 

E. Vocational Expert Testimony 

Finally, plaintiff argues the ALJ committed reversible error by relying on a hypothetical 

propounded upon the vocational expert that did not accurately reflect her actual limitations. The 

substance of plaintiff’s argument stems from her contention that the ALJ’s RFC determination was 

flawed because the ALJ did not properly consider plaintiff's stated limitations and the opinions of 

her treating physicians. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175-76 (“In arguing the ALJ's 

hypothetical was incomplete, [the claimant] simply restates her argument that the ALJ's RFC 

finding did not account for all her limitations because the ALJ improperly discounted her 

testimony and the testimony of medical experts.”). As set forth above, the Court finds the ALJ 

erred in discounting the opinions of her treating physicians. On remand, the ALJ must revisit the 

degree to which the opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians should be credited, which partially 

formed the basis for his ultimate determination of her RFC. Upon further proceedings in this case 

on remand and consideration of the record evidence, the RFC may change. Accordingly, the 

Court need not address the propriety of specific questions posed to the vocational expert based on 

the ALJ's flawed RFC. 

F. Remand for Benefits 

Plaintiff urges the Court to exercise its discretion to remand for an award of benefits. The 

Ninth Circuit applies “a three-part credit-as-true standard, each part of which must be satisfied in 

order for a court to remand to an ALJ with instructions to calculate and award benefits.” 

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. The standard is met where “(1) the record has been fully developed 

and further administrative proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed to 

provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether claimant testimony or medical 

opinion; and (3) if the improperly discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.” Id. (footnote and citations omitted). 

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Based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude that a finding of disability is 

inevitable on remand. Rather, the Court finds that a remand for the ALJ to suitably address the 

credibility of plaintiff’s treating physician opinions is proper. As the Ninth Circuit stated in 

Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, when “evaluating this issue, we 

consider whether the record as a whole is free from conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps, whether all 

factual issues have been resolved, and whether the claimant's entitlement to benefits is clear under 

the applicable legal rules.” 775 F.3d 1090, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). It is “the 

‘rare circumstances’ that allow us to exercise our discretion to depart from the ordinary remand 

rule.” Id. at 1101. 

The ALJ’s legal error in “fail[ing] to provide sufficiently specific reasons for rejection the 

testimony of [the treating physicians] does not, without more, require the court to credit [their] 

testimony as true.” Id. at 1106. Here, there remain conflicts between the opinions of the treating 

physicians and their own records of plaintiff’s treatment, which the ALJ must adequately resolve 

on remand. The state of this record also “raises crucial questions as to the extent of [plaintiff’s] 

impairment given inconsistencies between [her] testimony and the medical evidence in the record. 

These are exactly the sort of issues that should be remanded to the agency for further 

proceedings.” Id. at 1105 (citing Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir.1995)). 

While the Court recognizes that this case presents a rare instance of an ALJ insufficiently 

discounting five uncontroverted treating source opinions, without more, an award of benefits as a 

matter of law upon remand is not yet warranted. 

V. CONCLUSION

 For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN 

PART and the Commissioner’s cross motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART. This 

action is hereby REMANDED to the ALJ for further proceedings consistent with this Order. 

Judgment will be entered accordingly. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: November 2, 2015 ______________________________________ 

 YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

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