Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01758/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01758-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Allen
Appellee
Carla Brashers
Appellee
Shawn Burch
Appellee
Tona Carter
Appellee
Dustin Douglas
Appellee
John Fulghum
Appellant
Billy Lee
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1758

___________________________

John Fulghum

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Jeffrey Allen; Billy Lee; Tona Carter; Shawn Burch; Dustin Douglas; Carla Brashers

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Springfield

____________

 Submitted: September 18, 2015

Filed: September 28, 2015

[Unpublished]

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Before BENTON, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Missouri prisoner John Fulghum appeals from the District Court’s order in his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, in which the court granted summary judgment on one claim,

dismissed a second claim for lack of exhaustion, and dismissed a third claim for

misjoinder. We grant Fulghum’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis, see Henderson

v. Norris, 129 F.3d 481, 484–85 (8th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (fee-collection

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procedures); we deny his motion for appointment of counsel on appeal; and we affirm

in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Fulghumasserted three federal claims: that defendants Allen and Lee retaliated

against him for filing a grievance by issuing a false conduct violation for which

Fulghumwas convicted, resulting in his placement in administrative segregation; that

the remaining defendants acted in retaliation when they placed a known violent

inmate in Fulghum’s segregation cell and refused his repeated requests to be moved

from the cell; and that the remaining defendants violated Fulghum’s Eighth

Amendment rights by failing to protect him from a violent assault by the inmate

placed in his cell. Fulghum also alleged that in allowing him to be assaulted,

defendants had acted negligently under state law.

We conclude that the DistrictCourt properly granted summary judgment on the

retaliation claimagainst Allen and Lee because the defendants adduced evidence that

Fulghumhad been convicted ofthe allegedly false disciplinary charge by an impartial

hearing officer. See Hartsfield v. Nichols, 511 F.3d 826, 831 (8th Cir. 2008)

(concluding that a prisoner’s retaliation claim failed because his disciplinary

violations were supported by some evidence and noting that “a report from a

correctional officer, even if disputed by the inmate and supported by no other

evidence, legally suffices as‘some evidence’ upon which to base a prison disciplinary

violation, if the violation is found by an impartial decisionmaker.”). We also agree

that dismissal without prejudice was appropriate asto the retaliation claimagainst the

remaining defendants because Fulghum did not rebut the defendants’ showing that

he had not filed a grievance in which he claimed that any of the defendants acted in

retaliation by placing a known violent offender in his cell. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)

(exhaustion requirement).

We conclude, however, that it was an abuse of discretion to dismiss for

misjoinder the claim that the remaining defendants violated Fulghum’s Eighth

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Amendment rights by placing a known violent inmate in his cell and failing to protect

him from a violent assault by that inmate. See Strandlund v. Hawley, 532 F.3d 741,

745 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review). This claim arose out of the same series of

occurrences as the other claims and presents questions of fact common to all

defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (stating that defendants may be joined in a

single action if any right to relief is asserted against them “arising out of the same

transaction, occurrence, orseries of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any question

of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action”); Mosley v. Gen.

Motors Corp. 497 F.2d 1330, 1333 (8thCir. 1974) (noting that the Supreme Court has

“strongly encouraged” joinder of claims, parties, and remedies and that Rule 20

permits “all reasonably related claims for relief by or against different parties to be

tried in a single proceeding”).

Accordingly, we vacate the dismissal of the failure-to-protect claim against

Carter, Burch, Douglas, and Brashers, along with Fulghum’s related state-law claim,

and remand to the District Court for further proceedings. Additionally, we instruct

the District Court to reinstate the two Doe defendants related to these claims, who

were dismissed from Fulghum’s original complaint, and to allow Fulghum the

opportunity to ascertain their identities through discovery. See Estate of Rosenberg

v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n action may proceed against a party

whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit

the identity of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery.”). We find no

error as to the District Court’s other rulings. On remand, Fulghum is free to again

move for appointment of counsel, if warranted, and to move for additional discovery.

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