Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06329/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06329-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Attorney General
Appellee
Donald Ray Davis
Appellant
Dan Reynolds
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

DONALD RAY DAVIS, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FILTI:D 

United State.:. CA: ir,. 01 ;..pper,Js 

'f'.~1,th l'.il'('Pit 

FEB 1 31991 

~OBERT L. HOECKF . 

Clerk 

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No. 90-6329 

DAN REYNOLDS; ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

State of Oklahoma, 

Respondents-Appellees. 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. CIV-90-1020-R) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Donald Ray Davis, an Oklahoma prisoner, appeals the denial of 

his prose petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

On February 15, 1989, Davis entered a guilty plea in state 

court to charges of possession of a controlled dangerous substance 

and possession of a firearm while committing a felony. He 

received a suspended sentence on each count, and community service 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6329 Document: 010110099960 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 1 
hours. Later that day, when the state discovered that Davis had 

eight prior felony convictions and was, therefore, statutorily ineligible for a suspended sentence, the state filed and was granted 

a motion to vacate the judgment and sentence. 1 

Davis was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of both 

charges. He immediately filed a petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. That court 

denied his petition, reasoning that Davis had an adequate 

statutory remedy for review of his convictions through a direct 

appeal or an application under Oklahoma's Post Conviction 

Procedure Act. 

After Davis was sentenced to two concurrent life terms, he 

filed an application for post-conviction relief, which was denied 

by the state trial court. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 

the denial, stating that "Petitioner has timely filed a notice of 

intent to appeal this conviction and the Oklahoma County Public 

Defender was appointed to represent him on appeal. The issues 

petitioner raises in his application are properly raised in his 

direct appeal. Post-conviction proceedings are not a substitute 

for the direct appeal process." Davis v. State, case no. PC-90-

592. 

While the direct appeal of his conviction was pending in 

state court, Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 

federal district court. The district court dismissed the petition 

1 The state's motion was filed in accordance with 12 o.s. 1981, 

§ 1021. 1, which prov ides in pertinent part: "Within thirty ( 3 O) 

days after the rendition of a judgment, the court, of its own 

initiative or on motion of a party, may correct, open, modify or 

vacate the judgment." 

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Appellate Case: 90-6329 Document: 010110099960 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 2 
for failure to exhaust state court remedies. Davis now appeals to 

this court, urging us to consider the same alleged constitutional 

violations that are central to his ongoing state court appeal. 

The doctrine mandating that a state prisoner exhaust available state judicial remedies prior to a federal court considering 

that prisoner's habeas corpus petition appears in caselaw as early 

as 1886 2 and was codified by Congress in 1948. In pertinent part, 

the statutory exhaustion doctrine provides: "An applicant shall 

not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has 

the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available 

procedure, the question presented." 28 u.s.c. § 2254(c). 

The purpose underlying this well-established requirement is 

clear. Exhaustion "serves to minimize friction between our 

federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an 

initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of 

prisoners' federal rights." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 

(1981) (per curiarn); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); 

Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971). While the rule is not 

ironclad, it creates a "strong presumption in favor of requiring 

the prisoner to pursue his available state remedies." Granberry 

v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 

515. "An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to 

obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so 

clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain 

relief." Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. at 3; White v. Meachum, 

2 See Ex parte Roybal!, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6329 Document: 010110099960 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 3 
838 F.2d 1137, 1138 (10th Cir. 1988); Prescher v. Crouse, 431 F.2d 

209, 210 (10th Cir. 1970). 

The case before us is not a difficult one. Davis admits that 

a direct appeal of his convictions is pending in state court, that 

court-appointed counsel will be representing him on appeal, and 

that a brief in support of the appeal had not yet been filed at 

the time the federal district judge dismissed his habeas petition. 

He has plainly not exhausted his state remedies because his claims 

have not yet been "fairly presented to the state courts". Picard 

v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 275; Nichols v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 1250, 

1252 (10th Cir. 1989). Additionally, neither of the articulated 

exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine apply. Indeed, Davis has a 

clear opportunity to obtain redress by direct appeal within the 

state court system, and he has made no argument that the appeals 

process is in any way deficient. Thus, although Davis would like 

us to ignore the exhaustion doctrine in order to right what he 

believes is his fundamentally unfair incarceration, we cannot 

accommodate him at this time. 

Because Davis has failed to make a substantial showing of the 

denial of an important federal right necessary for the issuance of 

a certificate of probable cause pursuant to 28 u.s.c. § 2253, we 

deny the certificate. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 

(1983). In addition, because Davis's petition "lack[s] an arguable basis either in law or in fact," Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 32-, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 (1989), we believe that it is 

frivolous and also deny the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6329 Document: 010110099960 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 4 
Accordingly, Davis's appeal is dismissed. The mandate shall issue 

forthwith. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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