Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00246/USCOURTS-ared-5_14-cv-00246-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick L Dunbar
Plaintiff
Wendy Kelley
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

PINE BLUFF DIVISION 

DERRICK L. DUNBAR 

ADC#78977 PETITIONER 

VS. 5:14CV00246 KGB/JTR 

WENDY KELLEY, Director, 

Arkansas Department of Correction1 RESPONDENT 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge Kristine G. Baker. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

I. Background

Pending before the Court is a § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus 

filed by Petitioner, Derrick L Dunbar (“Dunbar”). Doc. 2. Before addressing 

1

 Wendy Kelley is automatically substituted as Respondent pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). 

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Dunbar’s habeas claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the case in 

state court. 

On July 15, 2013, Dunbar entered a guilty plea, in Pulaski County Circuit 

Court, to: (1) aggravated robbery; and (2) theft of property. Doc. 2 at 18-19. He 

received a twenty-year sentence in the ADC. Id. 

After Dunbar was sentenced, he did not pursue Rule 37 relief. However, on 

January 21, 2014, he filed a state habeas corpus petition, in Lee County Circuit 

Court, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict and sentence him 

because his defense counsel told him that he would only be required to serve 

seventy percent of his sentence before becoming parole eligible. Doc. 2 at 11-15. 

On January 31, 2014, the court entered an Order denying state habeas relief. 

Doc. 10-1. Dunbar appealed to the Arkansas Supreme Court, which affirmed on 

January 15, 2015. Dunbar v. State, 2015 Ark. 3, 2015 WL 225067 (2015). 

On June 24, 2014, Dunbar initiated this habeas action. Doc. 2. In his 

Petition, he argues that: (1) his sentence is illegal because his defense counsel and 

the trial court “led him to believe” that he would be parole eligible after serving 

seventy percent of his sentence; (2) he received ineffective assistance from his 

defense counsel who “coerced” him to plead guilty with the representation that he 

would be parole eligible after serving seventy percent of his sentence; (3) he was 

denied a “fair and impartial trial” by being coerced to plead guilty with defense 

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counsel’s representation that he would be parole eligible after serving seventy 

percent of his sentence; and (4) he was a denied a “fair trial” because he was not 

appointed a lawyer in a Rule 37 proceeding. Id. In her Response, Respondent 

argues that Dunbar has procedurally defaulted his claims. Doc. 10. 

For the reasons discussed below, the Court recommends that the Petition be 

denied, and that the case be dismissed, with prejudice. 

II. Discussion

All of Dunbar’s habeas claims are premised on his allegation that, prior to 

the entry of his guilty plea, his defense counsel mistakenly advised him that he 

would be parole eligible after serving only seventy percent of his sentence.2

 In 

Dunbar’s appeal from the denial of state habeas relief, the Arkansas Supreme 

Court rejected this argument because it was only cognizable in a timely-filed Rule 

37 Petition, not a state habeas action: 

Any allegation appellant desired to raise concerning counsel’s effectiveness 

should have been raised in a timely filed petition for postconviction relief 

pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1. A petition for writ of 

habeas corpus is not a substitute for proceeding under . . . Rule [37]. 

2

 Dunbar’s self-serving allegation that defense counsel misinformed him about parole eligibility is directly 

contradicted by the record. His Judgement and Commitment Order expressly states: “Defendant has 8 prior 

Aggravated Robbery convictions and a 2009 federal carjacking with a weapon conviction and [is] not eligible for 

parole pursuant to ACA 16-93-609.” Doc. 2 at 20 (emphasis added). Moreover, on July 14, 2013, Dunbar executed 

a “Plea Statement” which he checked and initialed “Yes” to the question: “If your negotiated plea involves a 

sentence of imprisonment, do you state that no one has made you any promises regarding parole eligibility, earning 

of meritorious good time, early release, or anything else of that nature in order to get you to enter this plea?” See 

Court’s Ex. A, which is marked and attached to this Recommended Disposition. 

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Dunbar v. State, 2015 Ark. 3, 2015 WL 225067 (Jan. 15, 2015) (internal citations 

omitted).3

A habeas petitioner must “fairly present” his claims in state court before 

seeking § 2254 relief in federal court. Murphy v. King, 652 F.3d 845, 848-49 

(2011). Furthermore, “[i]n all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his 

federal claims in state court, pursuant to an independent and adequate state 

procedural rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner 

can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged 

violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will 

result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Beaulieu v. Minnesota, 583 F.3d 

570, 573-74 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 

(1991)). 

As “cause” to excuse his procedural default, Dunbar claims that his defense 

counsel told him that he “had no right to appeal . . . whether direct or 

postconviciton,” and that he did not discover his postconviction rights under Rule 

37 until after the ninety-day time limit for filing had run. Doc. 11. However, under 

well-established law, a pro se litigant is still charged with knowing the law 

3

 Under Arkansas law, state habeas relief is codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103 and is limited to 

“either the facial invalidity [of the judgment and commitment order] or the lack of jurisdiction by the trial court and . 

. . additionally [requires] a showing by affidavit or other evidence of probable cause to believe that [the defendant] is 

illegally detained.” Dunbar, 2015 Ark. 3 at *2-3. Insofar as Dunbar was attempting to assert a claim for state habeas 

relief that was not an ineffective assistance claim, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Dunbar had made only 

conclusory allegations that did not state a claim for relief: “[Dunbar] offered nothing in his habeas petition to 

demonstrate that the trial court in his case did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear and determine cases 

involving violations of criminal statutes, and he failed to establish that the judgment was invalid on its face.” Id.

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relevant to his habeas claims, and he cannot fault others for “misinforming” him 

about the law. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Johnson v. 

Hobbs, 678 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2012). 

Dunbar also attempts to invoke Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), 

where the United States Supreme Court recognized a “limited” and “narrow” 

equitable exception to the procedural default doctrine in jurisdictions where an 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim must be raised for the first time in an 

“initial-review collateral proceeding.” However, the Martinez exception is not 

applicable to the circumstances of Dunbar’s case because he never initiated an 

“initial-review collateral proceeding,” i.e. a Rule 37 action. Martinez requires the 

habeas petitioner to at least initiate the “initial collateral review proceeding,” such 

that the failure to appoint counsel in that proceeding equitably precludes 

procedural default.4

Finally, Dunbar has not come forward with any argument or new evidence to 

satisfy the “actual innocence” exception to procedural default. 

4 See Jones v. Pennsylvania, 492 Fed. Appx. 242 (3rd Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“Because the Court spoke 

only of applying its exception to an ‘initial-review collateral proceeding, if undertaken without counsel or with 

ineffective counsel[,]’ we conclude that the Martinez analysis is inapplicable where the criminal defendant did not 

initiate any state collateral review proceeding whatsoever. Were it otherwise, the Martinez rule could potentially 

apply to any defendant who failed to petition for state collateral review.”); Castillo v. Ryan, 2013 WL 3282547 (D. 

Az. 2013) (holding that Martinez was inapplicable where the petitioner had not initiated a state court postconviciton 

proceeding); Anderson v. Koster, 2012 WL 1898781, *9 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (“Martinez is inapposite because, here, 

the petitioner himself is at fault for not filing a pro se [postconviction] motion in the first place.”). 

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III. Conclusion

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this habeas action be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of 

Appealability be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 

2254 Cases. 

DATED this 6th day of July, 2016. 

____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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Court Exhibit A

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