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Parties Involved:
Katrell B. Morris
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐2407

KATRELL B. MORRIS,

Applicant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

____________________

On Motion for an Order Authorizing  

the District Court to Entertain a Second or Successive  

Motion for Collateral Review

____________________

SUBMITTED JUNE 9, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2016

____________________

Before BAUER, FLAUM, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Katrell Morris has filed an application pursu‐

ant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), seeking authorization to file a

successive motion to vacate under § 2255. Morris was sen‐

tenced as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)

and now wants to challenge his sentence under Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), which held that the resid‐

ual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitu‐

Case: 16-2407 Document: 7 Filed: 07/01/2016 Pages: 5
2 No. 16‐2407

tionally vague. The Supreme Court has made Johnson retroac‐

tive. Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016). Morris has

made a prima facie showing that he may be entitled to relief.

Morris proposes to challenge only one of his three predi‐

cate offenses: his conviction for attempted robbery in Illinois,

720 ILCS 5/8‐4(a), 18‐1(a) (1997). The government points out

in its response that this court determined in an unpublished

decision that attempted robbery is a crime of violence (the

guidelines equivalent to a violent felony) under the elements

clause of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, app. n.1(B)(iii). United States v. Gra‐

nados‐Marin, 83 F. App’x 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2003). But that de‐

cision is nonprecedential. Moreover, to determine whether an

attempt offense constitutes a violent felony, a court must ex‐

amine how state courts have applied the general attempt stat‐

ute to the particular crime attempted. James v. United States,

550 U.S. 192, 197, 202–03 (2007); United States v. Collins, 150

F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Therefore, we must also look to

Wisconsin caselaw to see how the Wisconsin courts have in‐

terpreted the attempt statute in the context of burglary.”);

United States v. Davis, 16 F.3d 212, 217–18 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The

language of the attempt statute, standing alone does not

greatly advance our inquiry... . An examination of Illinois

caselaw, however, makes clear that a defendant must come

within ‘dangerous proximity to success’ to be convicted [of

attempted burglary] under the attempt statute.”). Granados‐

Marin lacks this analysis.

Accordingly, we GRANT Morris’s application and

AUTHORIZE the district court to consider his claim, along

with the government’s defenses. The clerk of court will

TRANSFER the papers to the district court for filing as a

§ 2255 action.

Case: 16-2407 Document: 7 Filed: 07/01/2016 Pages: 5
No. 16‐2407 3

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. The surge in applica‐

tions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) after Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), is raising questions about whether to

treat as violent felonies prior convictions for attempts to com‐

mit crimes that would, if completed, clearly be violent felonies

under the surviving elements clause of the definition in 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). I have voted to grant this application be‐

cause I am not yet certain it should be denied. A fair decision

on its merits requires more time and attention than the 30

days allowed to us by statute, and an erroneous denial would

essentially be final. But I am skeptical about the applicant’s

prospects for relief. A brief explanation of my thinking may

help the parties develop the issues in this and similar cases

that will proceed in district courts.1

Attempt requires intent to commit the completed crime

plus a substantial step toward its completion. We are granting

Mr. Morris’s application on the theory that it is possible to

commit attempted robbery in Illinois without having actually

used or threatened to use physical force against another per‐

son or his property. See, e.g., People v. Terrell, 459 N.E.2d 1337,

1341 (Ill. 1984) (defendant takes substantial step toward rob‐

bery when he possesses materials necessary to carry out crime

at or nearthe place planned forits commission). The key point

                                                 

1 Most earlier litigation about attempt offenses under the Armed Career

Criminal Act has involved the residual clause that was struck down in

Johnson. See James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007) (attempted bur‐

glary under Florida law was violent felony under residual clause); United

States v. Collins, 150 F.3d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1998) (same under Wisconsin

law); United States v. Davis, 16 F.3d 212 (7th Cir. 1994) (same under Illinois

law). Burglary has always posed challenges under ACCA because even

the completed offense has not qualified as a violent felony under the ele‐

ments clause.

Case: 16-2407 Document: 7 Filed: 07/01/2016 Pages: 5
4 No. 16‐2407

in this theory is that the substantial step toward the complete

crime need not itself be a violent step. The argument in favor

of Morris’s application is that actual, attempted, or threatened

use of physical force is thus not an essential element of the

attempt crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).

The government has argued in opposing this application

that a conviction for attempting to commit a crime that, if

completed, would be a violent felony should necessarily qual‐

ify as a violent felony under the elements clause of the defini‐

tion. Even though the substantial step(s) may have fallen

short of actual or threatened physical force, the criminal has,

by definition, attempted to use or threaten physical force be‐

cause he has attempted to commit a crime that would be vio‐

lent if completed. That position fits comfortably within the

language of the elements clause of the definition. It surely fits

within the intended scope of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Consider, for example, a person who attempts murder by

constructing an explosive device intended to destroy a federal

building, or by waiting with a loaded sniper rifle for the in‐

tended target of a murder to come within range. Neither

crime involves actual use or threats of physical force, but in

both the criminal intends to use such force and takes substan‐

tial steps toward doing so. That seems to me as if an element

of the attempt crime is the attempted use of physical force.  

As for attempted robbery, consider our decision in United

States v. Muratovic, 719 F.3d 809, 816 (7th Cir. 2013), where the

conspirators planned to rob a shipment of illegal drug money.

The conspirators planned the robbery carefully, conducted

surveillance and collected weapons, duct tape, and disguises,

but did not actually come to the point of threatening the target

Case: 16-2407 Document: 7 Filed: 07/01/2016 Pages: 5
No. 16‐2407 5

of the robbery with physical force. We had no difficulty find‐

ing a factual basis for the attempt charge. I suspect the Con‐

gress that enacted ACCA would have wanted the courts to

treat such attempts at violent felonies as violent felonies un‐

der the Act.

As a matter of statutory interpretation, an attempt to com‐

mit a crime should be treated as an attempt to carry out acts

that satisfy each element of the completed crime. That’s what is

required, after all, to prove an attempt offense. If the com‐

pleted crime has as an element the actual use, attempted use,

or threatened use of physical force against the person or prop‐

erty of another, then attempt to commit the crime necessarily

includes an attempt to use or to threaten use of physical force

against the person or property of another. The alternative

view would seem to require that we treat as a non‐violent fel‐

ony even a conviction for attempted murder. Imagine the ex‐

plosive device or waiting sniper described above. Even if the

particular attempt involved firing a shot that missed, the al‐

ternative view would find no violent felony because violence

is not an element of the attempt crime.

Or so at least the government has argued here, though it

cites only non‐precedential decisions of this and other cir‐

cuits. Because of the 30‐day time limit for our decision under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and the low standard for granting an

application based on “a prima facie showing,” I think the best

course for now, in this and similar cases where application of

ACCA depends on an attempt conviction, is to grant the ap‐

plication to allow further development of the attempt issue in

the district courts.

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