Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01178/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01178-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Gonzales
Respondent
Nikolay Vladimir Ivanov
Petitioner
Nora Mkrtychevna Ivanova
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1178

___________

Nikolay Vladimir Ivanov; *

Nora Mkrtychevna Ivanova, *

*

Petitioners, *

* On Petition for Review of an

v. * Order of the Board of

* Immigration Appeals.

Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General *

of the United States of America, *

*

Respondent. *

___________

Submitted: October 20, 2006

Filed: April 24, 2007

___________

Before SMITH, BOWMAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

We have considered the government’s motion to amend our opinion in this

matter and the Ivanovs’ response to that motion. We now issue our revised opinion

granting the government’s motion in part and denying it in part. The opinion of the

Court filed February 12, 2007, is vacated. The revised opinion is substituted for the

earlier opinion, and is as follows.

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
1

The Ivanovs' application for asylum initially included their son, Alexsandr.

During the pendency of the Ivanovs' removal proceedings, however, Alexsandr

attained the age of twenty-one years and his case was severed from his parents' case.

2

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS, abolished the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS), and transferred INS functions to DHS. Pub. L. No.

107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). Although INS initiated the case against the Ivanovs,

because it has been abolished, we refer to the relevant agency as DHS.

3

Because we grant the Ivanovs' petition based on their argument that the IJ

abused his discretion in reopening the removal proceedings, we need not address the

additional arguments raised in their brief.

-2-

On January 18, 2002, an immigration judge (IJ) granted the application for

asylum filed by Nikolay Ivanov and Nora Ivanova (collectively, the Ivanovs).1

 On

January 22, 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)2

 filed a motion to

reopen the removal proceedings and terminate the grant of asylum based on

information DHS obtained after the proceedings were closed that suggested that the

Ivanovs had committed fraud in connection with their asylum application. The IJ

granted the motion to reopen on February 12, 2002. After conducting additional

hearings, the IJ denied the Ivanovs' application for asylum and other relief on July 14,

2004, and ordered the Ivanovs' removal. On December 20, 2005, the Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) adopted and affirmed the IJ's opinion, rejecting the

Ivanovs' argument that the IJ erred in granting DHS's motion to reopen. The Ivanovs

petition for review, arguing that the IJ improperly reopened the removal proceedings

and terminated their asylum.3

 We grant the petition. 

The Ivanovs entered the United States on February 21, 1995, and applied for

asylum in April 1995, claiming past persecution and fear of future persecution in the

Republic of Georgia because of their non-Georgian nationalities. The 1995

application for asylum described Nikolay's nationality as Russian and Nora's as

Armenian. The Ivanovs' application was denied, and they were placed in removal

proceedings. On July 21, 1998, the Ivanovs appeared before an IJ and submitted a

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
-3-

revised application for asylum, claiming that they were persecuted in the Republic of

Georgia not only because neither of the Ivanovs is Georgian but also because Nora's

mother was Jewish and thus Nora is considered to be Jewish. 

At a hearing before the IJ on January 15, 1999, the Ivanovs testified extensively

regarding their claims of persecution, submitted numerous documents in support of

those claims, and explained why they had failed to mention Nora's Jewish nationality

in their original asylum application. On June 6, 2001, the IJ conducted another

hearing at which a newly assigned DHS attorney requested additional copies of the

birth certificates previously submitted to the IJ by the Ivanovs. In addition, the DHS

attorney acknowledged that the agency's standard investigative procedures had

apparently not been followed in the Ivanovs' case: "I don't know–from looking

through the trial attorney notes it looks like the former Assistant District

Counsel . . . handled this matter. I don't see that any documents were submitted for

verification to either–normally these would be sent overseas for verification, but

sometimes we send them to the F. B. I. I don't see that either of those things were

done which I find a little distressing." Admin. R. at 275. The IJ continued the

proceedings for three months in order to give DHS "an opportunity to check these

documents." Id. at 278. Seven months later, on January 7, 2002, DHS faxed a request

for verification of the Ivanovs' documents to the United States Embassy in Tbilisi,

Republic of Georgia. 

The IJ conducted a final hearing on Friday, January 18, 2002, at which he

granted the Ivanovs' application for asylum. At the conclusion of the hearing, DHS

reserved the right to appeal the IJ's decision, but at no point during the hearing did

DHS move to continue the proceedings until the Embassy in Tbilisi responded to its

request for verification of the Ivanovs' documents. Later that day, representatives

from the Embassy in Tbilisi faxed a one-page response to DHS's request for

verification of the Ivanovs' documents. The fax stated that a comparison of the

Ivanovs' documents with the "original records at the civil archives" of the Republic

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
-4-

of Georgia confirmed the authenticity of all the Ivanovs' documents except Nora's

birth certificate, which was "false." Id. at 700. 

On Monday, January 22, 2002, DHS filed a motion to reopen the Ivanovs'

removal proceedings "pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)" based on the information DHS

received from the Embassy regarding the authenticity of Nora's birth certificate. Id.

at 699. In its motion to reopen, DHS stated that "reopening is warranted because there

is probative evidence tending to prove that the [Ivanovs] submitted a fraudulent

document and committed perjury in order to prove that . . . Nora Ivanov[] was of

Jewish nationality." Id. The Ivanovs filed a response urging the IJ to deny DHS's

motion to reopen "[b]ecause [DHS] has failed to show sufficient reason to reopen this

case." Id. at 687. On February 12, 2002, the IJ granted DHS's motion to reopen,

noting in its order that the motion "raise[d] serious issues which need to be addressed

before the Court." Id. at 685. 

After four additional hearings during which DHS and the Ivanovs submitted

further documentary and testimonial evidence, on July 14, 2004, the IJ reversed his

earlier decision and denied the Ivanovs' application for asylum. The Ivanovs appealed

to the BIA, which adopted and affirmed the IJ's decision denying asylum. Concluding

that the IJ did not abuse his discretion in reopening the Ivanovs' proceedings, the BIA

noted that DHS had raised "serious issues" and that "the [IJ] has discretion to reopen

cases even on his own motion at any time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1)." BIA Decision,

Dec. 20, 2005, at 2. The Ivanovs timely petitioned for review, arguing, inter alia, that

the IJ improperly reopened their removal proceedings. 

We review a decision to reopen removal proceedings for an abuse of discretion.

INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992); Gebremaria v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 734, 738

(8th Cir. 2004). When the BIA not only adopts an IJ's decision to reopen removal

proceedings but also adds its own reasoning, we review both decisions for abuse of

discretion. See Krasnopivtsev v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 2004). "An

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
4

As noted above, the regulations permit an IJ to reopen removal proceedings at

any time upon his or her own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). Such authority,

however, was not employed in this case, and the fact that it was not employed was

confirmed by DHS during oral argument. Because the removal proceedings were

reopened upon DHS's motion, we construe the regulations applicable to such motions.

-5-

abuse of discretion occurs if a decision is without rational explanation, departs from

established policies, invidiously discriminates against a particular race or group,

or . . . fails to consider all factors presented by the alien or distorts important aspects

of the claim." Feleke v. INS, 118 F.3d 594, 598 (8th Cir. 1997). Motions to reopen

removal proceedings are generally "disfavored because of the strong public interest

in bringing" such proceedings to a conclusion. Gebremaria, 378 F.3d at 737.

Although the Code of Federal Regulations provides that an IJ may reopen

removal proceedings "upon his or her own motion at any time," 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(1), if a motion to reopen is filed by either party, the regulations provide:

"(3) Motion to reopen. . . . A motion to reopen will not be granted unless the [IJ] is

satisfied that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and

could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing. Id.

§ 1003.23(b)(3) (emphasis added).4 This standard is conjunctive. The evidence

proffered in support of a motion to reopen removal proceedings must be material and

both unavailable and undiscoverable at the time of an earlier hearing. See

Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 878, 883–84 (8th Cir. 2006). And as we stated

in Hailemichael, "[N]o part of the regulation exempts DHS from the requirement that

a party seeking to reopen proceedings must show that the evidence it offers 'was not

available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.'" Id.

at 883 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.23(b)(3) (2000), later renumbered as 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.23(b)(3)). Thus, if the evidence DHS submitted in support of its motion to

reopen the Ivanovs' removal proceedings was available and discoverable and it could

have been presented by DHS at an earlier hearing, then the motion to reopen was

improperly granted. 

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
-6-

In support of its motion to reopen, DHS proffered a one-page fax from the

United States Embassy in Tbilisi summarizing the results of a document search

conducted in the civil archives located in Tbilisi. At DHS's request, representatives

from the United States Embassy searched the records at the civil archives, comparing

documents submitted by the Ivanovs in support of their asylum application with

documents retained in the archives by Georgian authorities. DHS does not—and

cannot—argue that the Ivanovs' documents were unavailable or undiscoverable until

after the proceedings were closed with the IJ's January 18, 2002, grant of asylum. Nor

does DHS argue that the records maintained in the civil archives against which the

Ivanovs' documents were compared were unavailable or undiscoverable until after the

proceedings were closed. Indeed, DHS acknowledged at the June 6, 2001, hearing

that a document comparison of the type eventually conducted is standard agency

procedure, but for unknown reasons, the investigation had not been completed in the

Ivanovs' case. After acknowledging this oversight, DHS waited an additional seven

months to request the document verification that resulted in the one-page fax DHS

received from Embassy representatives eleven days after its request. In these

circumstances, it appears that the evidence DHS submitted with its motion to reopen

was not previously unavailable and it was not undiscoverable upon the exercise of

reasonable diligence. Fongwo v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 2005). 

DHS argues, and the IJ and the BIA concluded, that the evidence presented by

DHS with its motion to reopen is material to the Ivanovs' asylum claim. We agree.

The fact that the information is material, however, is not sufficient under the

controlling regulations to permit reopening the removal proceedings. DHS has failed

to establish that the information submitted in support of its motion to reopen was not

only material, but was also unavailable and undiscoverable prior to the conclusion of

the Ivanovs' removal proceedings. And it is clear from the record that DHS cannot

establish that its evidence satisfied these further requirements. While we appreciate

that DHS's workload compels the judicious use of its limited investigative resources,

this fact cannot excuse the agency from complying with the regulatory requirements

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
-7-

for motions to reopen. See Hailemichael, 454 F.3d at 883. Therefore, we conclude

that the IJ abused his discretion in granting DHS's motion to reopen the Ivanovs'

removal proceedings. See id. at 884 (holding that IJ abused her discretion in

reopening removal proceedings and remanding case to IJ for specific finding that

evidence proffered with motion to reopen was not only material, but was also

unavailable and undiscoverable before final hearing); Fongwo, 430 F.3d at 947

(rejecting alien's petition for review from denial of motion to reopen where evidence

was available at the time of earlier hearing); Eta-Ndu v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 977, 987

(8th Cir. 2005) (same). 

Although we conclude that the IJ abused his discretion by granting DHS's

motion to reopen pursuant to § 1003.23(b)(3), we note, without deciding the point,

that it appears DHS has the authority to initiate new proceedings at which it may seek

termination of the Ivanovs' asylum based on their allegedly fraudulent asylum

application. See, e.g., Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing 8

C.F.R. § 1208.24(f) in affirming termination of asylum originally granted by BIA after

new removal proceedings initiated by DHS); see also Johnson v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d

164, 172 (2nd Cir. 2004) (concluding that BIA properly granted DHS's motion to

reopen based on material, previously unavailable evidence of expungement of state

conviction on which alien's removal was based, but erred in remanding to IJ for

submission of evidence of additional convictions; such evidence could be presented

in new removal proceedings). Thus, it seems that if DHS establishes in new removal

proceedings that material elements of the Ivanovs' asylum application were fraudulent,

and as a result the Ivanovs were not eligible for asylum, then the Ivanovs' prior grant

of asylum may be terminated. In addition, as previously noted, an IJ "upon

his . . . own motion" has authority to "reopen . . . any case in which he . . . has made

a decision." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1); see id. § 1208.24(f) (stating that an IJ may

reopen pursuant to § 1003.23 in order to terminate a grant of asylum).

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004
-8-

For the foregoing reasons, we grant the petition. The BIA's decision affirming

the IJ's order to reopen the proceedings and terminate the grant of asylum is vacated

and the IJ's order granting asylum is reinstated. 

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The court correctly recites our holding in Hailemichael v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d

878, 884 (8th Cir. 2006), that before an Immigration Judge grants a motion to reopen

filed by the Department of Homeland Security, the IJ must find that the evidence

proffered by the DHS was not available and could not have been discovered or

presented at the former hearing. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(3). In this case, in

reviewing the IJ’s decision, the BIA wrote that “[r]egarding the reopening grant, . . .

the Immigration Judge has discretion to reopen cases even on his own motion at any

time. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). On the facts of this case, we find no abuse of his

discretion by the Immigration Judge in reopening.” (Add. at 40). Because we

consider the reasoning of the BIA and the IJ together, Madjakpor v. Gonzales, 406

F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2005), it seems that the BIA’s invocation of the IJ’s

authority to reopen on his own motion may have provided a basis to uphold the

agency’s action, see Rana v. Gonzales, 175 F. App’x 988, 993-94 (10th Cir. 2006),

but the government expressly declined to rely on this authority when given an

opportunity. Ante, at 5 n.4. Under those circumstances, and given the ambiguity in

the agency’s written decisions, I concur with the court that the IJ’s decision to reopen

the proceedings should not be upheld unless the evidence at issue was previously

unavailable and undiscoverable. Rather than decide that question in the first instance,

however, I would grant the petition for review and remand the case to the agency with

directions to address whether the evidence considered on the motion to reopen

satisfies the criteria of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3). See Hailemichael, 454 F.3d at 884;

see generally INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (per curiam).

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-1178 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/24/2007 Entry ID: 3302004