Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04065/USCOURTS-ca10-91-04065-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colleen Bartell
Appellee
Charles Hobbs
Appellee
David R. Jolivet
Appellant
Robert E. Steele
Appellee

Document Text:

FI L~ D UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United St.ates Court of Appealo 

Tcr. (';-r::uit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

DAVID R. JOLIVET, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ROBERT E. STEELE; CHARLES HOBBS; 

COLLEEN BARTELL, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

APR 3 0 1992 

3.0BER'l' L. HOECKEl~ 

) Clert 

) 

) 

) 

) No . 91-4065 

) (D.C. No. 89-CV-9) 

) (D. Utah) 

) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before EBEL and BARRETT, Circuit Judges, and KANE,** Senior 

District Judge. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., Senior 

States District Court for the District of 

designation. 

District Judge, United 

Colorado, sitting by 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

* 

The case is therefore ordered 

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 1
Plaintiff-appellant David R. Jolivet appeals from a judgment 

dismissing his 42 U. S.C . § 1983 action for injunctive relief and 

damages arising out of Defendants' December 1, 1988, postponement 

of Plaintiff's marriage to Dorothy Jolivet, which had previously 

been scheduled for that date. The district court dismissed as 

moot the claim for injunctive relief but not the claim for damages 

after Plaintiff was permitted to marry on January 14, 1989. It 

later granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment on 

Plaintiff's damages claim. 

Plaintiff argues that the district court failed to make a de 

novo review of the magistrate judge ' s Report and Recommendation 

and objections thereto, and failed to consider Dorothy Jolivet's 

affidavit. He further argues that Defendants improperly relied on 

a prison visitation policy to postpone Plaintiff's marriage. We 

reject these contentions and affirm. 

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an inmate at Uinta II 

facility, a maximum security prison in Utah. He began 

corresponding with Dorothy Jolivet (then Dorothy Pacheco) in 1986 

but could not visit with her because her divorce from another 

inmate, Sam Stevenson Pacheco, was pending. Her divorce was 

finalized in late 1987. Plaintiff was then informed by a 

nondefendant that Dorothy Jolivet could visit Plaintiff if she 

provided a copy of her divorce papers. She provided a copy of her 

divorce judgment, which showed that her maiden name was Jarrell, 

and her driver's license, which showed that her married name was 

Pacheco. She was allowed to visit Plaintiff beginning in March 

1988. R. I, doc. 31 at 2-3. None of the Defendants were normally 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 2
involved in verifying proper identification, which is within the 

jurisdiction of Internal Security and Bureau of Enforcement and 

Investigation. R. I, doc. 38 at 2. 

Plaintiff asserts, and Defendants deny, that on April 19, 

1988, Plaintiff submitted to Defendant Colleen Bartell, a social 

service worker at Uinta, a request for permission to marry Dorothy 

Jolivet. The request was approved by Defendants Bartell and 

Robert Steele, the Executive Officer of the Uinta facility 

responsible for overseeing the management and security of the 

Uinta facilities, on July 6, 1988. Plaintiff requested that the 

wedding occur on September 1, 1988. In late August 1988, 

Defendant Bartell told Plaintiff that the marriage request form 

had been lost and he would have to submit another form. The 

September ceremony was cancelled. R. I, doc. 31 at 1-4. 

However, it is undisputed that in late June or early July 

1988, Plaintiff submitted an application for permission to marry 

Dorothy Jolivet. The application was approved July 6, 1988. 

Plaintiff completed the necessary arrangements and chose December 

1, 1988, as a wedding date. Because December 1, 1988, was not a 

regular visiting day, special clearance was required for visitors 

participating in and attending the wedding. Four visitors were 

given clearance to attend the wedding: Judge A. A. Mitchell, 

Dorothy Laverne Jarrell, William Steiner, and Kimberly Laverne 

Steiner. R. I, doc. 40 at 1-2. 

Dorothy Jolivet paid for a marriage license, which was valid 

for thirty days; arranged for the services of a judge; and took 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 3
three days off from school to prepare for the ceremony, incurring 

expenses in the amount of $360.00. R. I, doc. 31 at 5-6. 

On December 1, 1988, Defendant Steele was contacted by 

Internal Security Officer Alan Blanchard, who had noticed a 

discrepancy in the identification presented by two women visitors 

claiming they were present to attend Plaintiff's wedding. The 

women presented photographic identification in the names of 

Dorothy Pacheco and Kimberly Shaffer. R. I, doc. 39 at 2-3. 

Blanchard had clearance for visitors named Dorothy Jarrell and 

Kimberly Steiner. R. I, doc. 37 at 4. The Utah Department of 

Corrections had a policy that visitors eighteen years of age or 

older are required to show positive photographic identification 

prior to being admitted to visit. R. I, doc. 37 at 2. 

Defendant Steele decided to postpone the wedding and deny 

future visits by Dorothy Jolivet until she obtained positive 

identification. Dorothy Jolivet informed Defendant Steele that 

she had divorce documents showing that her maiden1 

name was 

Jarrell. Defendant Steele would not accept the written documents 

in lieu of positive photographic identification pursuant to the 

Utah Department of Corrections policy, and because the documents 

were not certified. He treated Dorothy Jolivet no differently 

than he would any other visitor who presented improper 

identification. R. I, doc. 39 at 3. None of the Defendants had 

1 While Defendant Steele's affidavit states that the divorce 

papers showed Dorothy's married name was Jarrell, R. I, doc. 39 at 

3, in light of the remainder of the record which indicates that 

Jarrell was her maiden name, we deem this to be a typographical 

error. 

4 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 4
been involved in previous decisions allowing Dorothy Jolivet to 

visit Plaintiff. R. I, docs. 38 at 2-3, 39 at 2, 40 at 2-3. 

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. A 

magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation in which he 

concluded that Plaintiff's December 1 marriage was postponed 

because of the prison's visitation policy requiring visitors over 

eighteen years of age to show positive photographic identification 

before being admitted to visit, and guest "Dorothy Jarrell" only 

had photographic identification in the name of "Dorothy Pacheco." 

The magistrate judge further concluded that the visitation policy 

is reasonably related to penological interests of security. 

Plaintiff filed objections to the Report and Recommendation, 

noting that the prison had permitted Dorothy Jolivet to visit 

previously with the same identification. After reviewing the 

objections, the court noted it appeared that one of the prison's 

concerns in postponing the wedding was Dorothy Jolivet's marital 

status at the time she was to marry Plaintiff. The court then 

concluded the Report and Recommendation was correct "in all 

essential respects," and adopted it in its entirety. R. I, doc. 

47 at 2. 

Plaintiff asserts that the district court failed to make a de 

novo review of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation 

and Plaintiff's objections thereto, as required by 28 u.s.c. 

§ 636(b)(l). The substance of his argument is that the court was 

wrong in believing that the prison had a legitimate concern about 

Dorothy Jolivet's marital status on December 1, 1988. While 

concerns over the marital status of a bride-to-be visitor could 

5 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 5
conceivably justify a stricter adherence to the visitation policy, 

Defendant Steele2 did not state in his affidavit that such 

concerns motivated his decision to postpone the wedding. Rather, 

he stated that he was simply applying the prison's visitation 

policy. We therefore agree with Plaintiff that concerns over 

Dorothy Jolivet's marital status did not motivate the decision to 

postpone the December 1 wedding. 

Nevertheless, we are '"free to affirm a district court 

decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to 

permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the 

district court.'" Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th 

Cir. 1988)(quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 

(2d Cir. 1987)). As discussed below, grounds exist for affirming 

the district court's decision. 

Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge and court 

improperly ignored Dorothy Jolivet's affidavit. While it is true 

that neither the magistrate judge nor the court referred to or 

indicated acceptance of the affidavit, they did not refer to or 

indicate acceptance of any affidavit. Rather, the magistrate 

judge recited the undisputed facts set forth in all the 

affidavits, and the district court adopted his Report and 

Recommendation. Many of these facts are included in Dorothy 

Jolivet's affidavit. Plaintiff has not shown the relevance of 

other allegations in the affidavit that the magistrate judge did 

not mention. We will not sift the record to find evidence to 

2 Defendant Steele was the only defendant 

decision to prevent the December 1 wedding. 

6 

involved in the 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 6
support his argument or manufacture his argument for him. 

Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1513-14 (10th Cir. 

1990). 

Turning to the merits, we review the district court's grant 

of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards that the 

district court applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Applied 

Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 

1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). We first determine whether there are 

any genuine issues of material fact in dispute; if not, we 

determine whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Id. 

We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party. Id. 

The parties dispute Plaintiff's claim that he requested 

permission to marry in April 1988, was granted permission, but 

permission was later withdrawn because prison officials lost his 

request form. Such a factual dispute would prevent the grant of 

summary judgment only if the dispute went to a genuine issue of 

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 

247-48 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude 

the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are 

irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248. 

The present claim is limited to a request for damages 

incurred as a result of the cancellation of the December 1, 1988, 

wedding ceremony. Plaintiff has not alleged that he suffered any 

damages as a result of the alleged previous cancellation. If 

evidence of the alleged previous cancellation is intended to show 

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Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 7
a motive to prevent Plaintiff from marrying, it is irrelevant. 

Plaintiff claimed that Defendant Bartell informed him that the 

first application had been lost, and he would have to submit 

another form. However, Defendant Bartell had nothing to do with 

the decision to postpone the December 1 wedding. Plaintiff has 

not alleged that Defendant Steele, who made the decision to 

postpone the December 1 wedding, had anything to do with the 

alleged previous cancellation of the wedding. The dispute as to 

whether the previous cancellation occurred does not go to a 

genuine issue of material fact and does not preclude the granting 

of summary judgment. The parties have not identified any other 

factual disputes. 

Prisoners retain a right to marry, subject to substantial 

restrictions as a result of incarceration. Turner v. Safley, 482 

U.S. 78, 95 (1987). "[L]egitimate security concerns may require 

placing reasonable restrictions upon an inmate's right to marry." 

Id. at 97. In determining whether a restriction is reasonable, 

the relevant factors are whether there is a valid, rational 

connection between the regulation and the legitimate government 

interest put forward to justify it; whether there are alternative 

means of exercising the right that remain open to inmates; what 

impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will 

have on guards, other inmates, and the allocation of prison 

resources generally; and whether there are ready alternatives that 

fully accommodate the prisoner's rights at de minimis costs to 

valid penological interests. Id. at 89-91. 

8 

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The district court determined that the visitation policy 

satisfied the Turner test. First, the prison had concerns about 

identifying visitors in order to reduce the likelihood that a 

visitor will commit a crime or some act contrary to prison policy 

or assist prisoners with escape attempts, and to account for 

visitors in case of emergencies. Second, the policy does not 

deprive prisoners of all visitation. Third, eliminating the 

policy would adversely impact inmates, guards, and prison 

resources. Finally, there are no easy alternatives. 

Plaintiff does not challenge the district court's 

determination that the visitation policy is reasonably related to 

penological interests of security, and we therefore uphold that 

determination. Instead he argues that Dorothy Jolivet had always 

been permitted to visit in the past based on the same 

identification she presented on December 1, 1988, and Defendants' 

application of the visitation policy was "reaching for straws" to 

prevent the marriage. We perceive the issue to be whether the 

visitation policy, valid on its face, was arbitrarily applied to 

deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional right to marry. 

Although a prison regulation itself may not violate the 

constitution, prison officials cannot invoke the regulation to 

arbitrarily prohibit protected activities. Esposito v. Leddy, 618 

F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Ill. 1985). However, inconsistent 

results are 

irrationality. 

(1989). 

not necessarily 

Thornburgh v. 

9 

signs 

Abbott, 

of 

490 

arbitrariness or 

U.S. 401, 417 n.15 

Appellate Case: 91-4065 Document: 010110246222 Date Filed: 04/30/1992 Page: 9
It is undisputed that prison personnel other than the 

Defendants had permitted Dorothy Jolivet to visit Plaintiff 

beginning in March 1988, on the basis of the same identification 

she presented on December 1, 1988. However, it is also undisputed 

that 1) to have allowed any visitor into the facility based on the 

identification Dorothy Jolivet presented on December 1, 1988, 

would have violated the prison policy requiring positive 

photographic identification prior to a visit, R. I, doc. 37 at 4; 

2) Dorothy Jolivet had been visiting with improper identification, 

R. I, doc. 39 at 2. , and 3) Defendant Steele treated Dorothy 

Jolivet no differently than he would any other visitor who 

presented improper identification, had never met Dorothy Jolivet 

prior to December 1, 1988, did not know she visited Plaintiff 

prior to this date, and had he known she had been visiting with 

improper identification, would have called it to the attention of 

Internal Security. R. I, doc. 39 at 2-3. 

We agree with the magistrate judge that the mere fact the 

visitation policy was violated by other prison officials on other 

occasions did not require that the policy be violated on 

December 1, 1988. The district court properly dismissed 

Plaintiff's complaint. 

The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Utah is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

James E. Barrett 

Senior Circuit Judge 

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