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Parties Involved:
First National Bank of Bethany, Oklahoma
Appellee
Sophie Germano
Appellant
Vincent Germano
Appellant

Document Text:

F L 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE _£NTH CIRCUIT 

U,:iitt'd Siatet; Courr of Appeals 

T'P.nth Circuit 

FEB 7 1990 

VINCENT GERMANO; SOPHIE GERMANO, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

v. 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BETHANY, 

OKLAHOMA, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

!{OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6229 

(D.C. No. 87-525-P} 

(W.D. Okla.} 

Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a}; 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

submitted without oral argument. 

The case therefore is ordered 

Plaintiffs-appellants appeal the district court's order of 

June 27, 1989, denying plaintiffs' pleading "Non-Consent to 

Proceed Before a United States Magistrate (Robin J. Cauthron), 

Motion to Vacate All Orders Issued By Said Magistrate Or, in the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-6229 Document: 01019962924 Date Filed: 02/07/1990 Page: 1 
Alternative, Stay Execution of Same Pending All Appeals (To Be 

Determined En Banc)." 

On January 19, 1988, the district court entered an order 

dismissing counts two, three, and four of plaintiffs' complaint 

with prejudice, entering summary judgment against plaintiffs on 

count one of their complaint, denying plaintiffs' motion for leave 

to amend the complaint and add another party-defendant, denying 

plaintiffs' motion to disqualify the district court judge, and 

denying plaintiffs' request for a continuance. (District Court 

File No. 4, Doc. 103.) 1 That order is the subject of a related 

appeal (No. 88-1244). Thereafter, on January 28, 1988, 

defendant-appellee filed a motion for attorney's fees with 

supporting affidavit and brief. (District Court File No. 4, Docs. 

107, 108, and 109.) 

By order entered February 22, 1988, the district court, "[i]n 

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Court Rule on 

Magistrates," referred the matter to Magistrate Cauthron for a 

"hearing on Defendant's Application for Award of Attorney's Fees." 

(District Court File No. 4, Doc. 120.) On March 5, 1988, 

Magistrate Cauthron entered an order providing that "defendant 

have and recover against plaintiffs herein the sum of $23,324.39 

attorney's fees incurred as a result of the bad faith institution 

and pursuit of this lawsuit." The order further provided that 

"[a]ny party aggrieved by this order may appeal within ten (10) 

1 The record on appeal consists of the entire original district 

court record, which is comprised of File Nos. 1-5 and an 

expandable file. References are to the original file as described 

by the district court. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-6229 Document: 01019962924 Date Filed: 02/07/1990 Page: 2 
days from the date hereof as provided in Local Rule 39." 

(District Court File No. 4, Doc. 124 at 2.) 

On March 14, 1988, plaintiffs filed a "motion for extension 

of time to obtain legal council (sic)" which asked the district 

court "to set aside its order of 3/3/85 (sic) for an additional 30 

days in which to allow plaintiffs to obtain legal council (sic) to 

present our defenses." (District Court File No. 4, Doc. 125.) 

The district court did not rule on plaintiffs' motion. 

More than a year later, on June 8, 1989, defendant filed an 

"application for order to plaintiffs directing them to appear and 

answer as to assets and forbidding transfer or disposition of 

property." ( District Court File No. 4, Doc. 129.) The 

application recited that costs in the amount of $3,741.00 were 

taxed against plaintiffs on February 25, 1988, attorney's fees in 

the amount of $23,324.39 were awarded against plaintiffs on 

March 3, 1988, and such amounts are final. The application 

further averred: "[n]o appeal has been taken from either the 

award of costs or attorney's fees. No amount has been paid by the 

Germanos, or either of them, upon such amounts." (Id. at 2.) 

The day defendant filed its application and brief in support 

thereof, Magistrate Cauthron issued orders to both plaintiffs 

directing them to appear before the magistrate on June 28, 1989, 

to answer questions about their assets, to bring certain records 

with them, and to refrain from transferring or encumbering any of 

their nonexempt personal or real property until further order of 

the court. (District Court File No. 4, Docs. 131 and 132.) 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-6229 Document: 01019962924 Date Filed: 02/07/1990 Page: 3 
In response thereto, plaintiffs filed the "non-consent" 

motion that is the subject of this appeal. Plaintiffs asserted 

therein that they were never given notice by the clerk of the 

district court and an opportunity to consent to the magistrate's 

exercise of jurisdiction over the attorney's fees matter, as 

required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. Furthermore, plaintiffs said that 

"at no time have Plaintiff's (sic) consented to the appearance of 

any magistrate over this civil proceeding and therefore 

Plaintiff's (sic) have never voluntarily waived their rights to 

proceed before a Judge of the United States District Court." 

(District Court File No. 4, Doc. 136 at 3.) In their motion, 

plaintiffs challenged both the magistrate's order of 

March 3, 1988, concerning attorney's fees, and the magistrate's 

orders of June 8, 1989, commanding plaintiffs to appear and answer 

questions as to their assets. 

The district court summarily denied plaintiffs' motion by 

minute order dated June 27, 1989. (District Court File No. 4, 

Doc. 138.) Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal from that 

order on June 28, 1989. (District Court File No. 4, Doc. 140.) 

The challenges raised by plaintiffs in their "non-consent" 

motion concern orders of the magistrate which raise different 

issues. Therefore, we will address them separately, beginning 

with the order of March 3, 1988, concerning the award of 

attorney's fees. 

The district court's order of February 22, 1988, referred the 

attorney's fees matter to Magistrate Cauthron pursuant to 

28 u.s.c. § 636 and Local Rule 39 concerning magistrates. A 

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district court judge may 

determine certain 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A). 

to conduct hearings and 

designate a magistrate to hear and 

pretrial matters pursuant to 

The magistrate may also be designated 

submit proposed findings of fact and 

recommendations for disposition on other pretrial matters, 

pursuant to§ 636(b)(l)(B). Since the attorney's fees motion was 

not a pretrial matter, the reference to Magistrate Cauthron must 

not have been pursuant to§ 636(b)(l)(A) or (B). 

Section 636(c) provides that a district court judge may 

specially designate a magistrate, upon consent of the parties, to 

conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter 

and order the entry of judgment in the case. Plaintiffs, here, 

did not consent to the magistrate's adjudication of the attorney's 

fees motion, nor does the record reflect defendant so consented. 

As our sister circuits have recognized, the clear, unambiguous, 

and voluntary consent of the parties is necessary to the conduct 

of proceedings under§ 636(c). See,~, Lovelace v. Dall, 820 

F.2d 223, 225 (7th Cir. 1987); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644, 647 

(11th Cir. 1987); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 690 F.2d 

717, 720 (9th Cir. 1982). Absent the parties' consent, the 

magistrate did not have jurisdiction to proceed under§ 636(c). 

See Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. B.B. Andersen 

Constr. Co., 879 F.2d 809, 810 (10th Cir. 1989). 

We recognized in Colorado Building that§ 636(b) "does have 

an inclusive provision which allows a district court to assign a 

magistrate 'such additional duties as are not inconsistent with 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-6229 Document: 01019962924 Date Filed: 02/07/1990 Page: 5 
the Constitution and laws of the United States."' Id. at 811. We 

further recognized, however, that 

11 [a] magistrate exercising 'additional duties' 

jurisdiction remains constantly subject to the inherent 

supervisory power of the district judge and the judge 

retains the 'ultimate responsibility for decision making 

in every instance.'" 

Id. (quoting Harding v. Kurco, Inc., 603 F.2d 813, 814 (10th Cir. 

1979)(quoting Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976)). 

Even absent consent of the parties, the district court has 

the power to assign settlement of attorney's fees to the 

magistrate for proposed findings and a recommendation. 

28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3); Colorado Bldg., 879 F.2d at 811. The 

district court is required, however, to review the proposed 

ruling. Pelican Prod. Co. v. Marino, Nos. 86-2157 & 87-1855, 

slip. op. at 4, 10 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 1990); Colorado Bldg., 879 

F.2d at 811. Here, the district court did not exercise its 

supervisory power over the magistrate's decision regarding 

attorney's fees. Rather than make findings and a recommendation 

to the district court for its ultimate decision, the magistrate 

entered an order that has since been treated as final. This the 

magistrate was without jurisdiction to do. 

Therefore, we vacate that portion of the district court's 

order of June 27, 1989, that denies plaintiffs' challenge to the 

magistrate's order of March 3, 1988, and remand the matter to the 

district court for further proceedings. On remand, plaintiffs 

should be given an opportunity to make timely objection to the 

magistrate's order, and the district court shall review the order 

and any objections thereto in accordance with 28 u.s.c. § 636(b). 

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• 

We turn now to plaintiffs' challenge to the magistrate's 

order of June 8, 1989, directing plaintiffs' to appear and answer 

questions concerning their assets, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 69. 

The granting of such a post-judgment discovery motion is not a 

final appealable order, whether it be done by a magistrate or a 

district court judge. Rouse Constr. Int'l, Inc. v. Rouse Constr. 

Corp., 680 F.2d 743, 746 (11th Cir 1982); Childs v. Kaplan, 467 

F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1972). Because plaintiffs' present 

challenge to the magistrate's orders of June 8, 1989, is 

premature, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal to the extent it 

concerns plaintiffs' challenge to the magistrate's orders of 

June 8, 1989. See id. 

That portion of the district court's order concerning the 

challenge to the magistrate's jurisdiction is VACATED and REMANDED 

for further proceedings, and the balance of this appeal concerning 

the post-judgment discovery order is DISMISSED for lack of 

jurisdiction. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

PER CURIAM 

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