Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00574/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-cv-00574-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Merrick Bank Corporation
Defendant
Deirdre Saoirse Moen
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEIRDRE SAOIRSE MOEN,

Plaintiff,

 v.

MERRICK BANK CORPORATION,

Defendant /

No. C 07-0574 MMC

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT;

ORDERING PLAINTIFF TO SHOW

CAUSE WHY SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHOULD NOT BE ENTERED ON FIRST

AND FOURTH CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Before the Court is defendant Merrick Bank Corporation’s motion, filed April 6, 2007,

for summary judgment on each claim in plaintiff Deidre Saoirse Moen’s complaint, pursuant

to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff has filed opposition, to which

defendant has replied. Also before the Court is plaintiff’s motion for partial summary

judgment, filed April 17, 2007, by which plaintiff seeks summary adjudication of two issues. 

Defendant has filed opposition thereto. Having considered the papers filed in support of

and in opposition to the motions, the Court deems the matter suitable for decision thereon,

VACATES the hearing scheduled for May 11, 2007, and rules as follows:

1. Plaintiff, in her opposition, states she wishes to dismiss the Second Claim for

Relief, alleging a claim for violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), Third Claim for Relief,

alleging a claim for violation of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1785.25(a), (b), (c), and (f), and Fifth

Case 3:07-cv-00574-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/07/07 Page 1 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

Defendant’s objection to plaintiff’s Exhibit L for lack of authentication is sustained,

although, as further noted, said exhibit is irrelevant.

2

Claim for Relief, alleging a claim for negligence. Accordingly, the Court will grant

defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to such claims.

2. With respect to the Sixth Claim for Relief, by which plaintiff alleges defendant

made false statements in an attempt to collect a debt, in violation of the Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, both parties seek summary

judgment on the issue of whether defendant is a “debt collector” for purposes of the

FDCPA. The FDCPA “treats assignees as debt collectors if the debt sought to be collected

was in default when acquired by the assignee.” See Schlosser v. Fairbanks Capital Corp.,

323 F. 3d 534, 536 (7th Cir. 2003). Because the FDCPA does not define “default,” district

courts employ the definition set forth in the parties’ contract, at least where the contractual

definition is unambiguous, to determine whether the debt at issue was in default when

assigned. See, e.g., Hartman v. Meridian Fin. Serv., Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1042-44

(W.D. Wis. 2002) (finding defendant was debt collector for purposes of FDCPA where

plaintiff’s loan was in default under terms of contract at time defendant obtained loan).

Here, it is undisputed that defendant is an assignee of the debt at issue. Defendant,

however, offers no evidence as to whether plaintiff’s debt was in default at the time of the

assignment, and, consequently, fails to demonstrate the absence of a triable issue as to its

status as a debt collector. Plaintiff, while providing a copy of a document she asserts sets

forth defendant’s “current standards for default,” (see Pl.’s Opp. at 9:1-7, Pl.’s Ex. L),1 does

not offer a copy of the potentially relevant contract, i.e., the contract that existed between

plaintiff and the original creditor, or otherwise establish the contracting parties’ agreement

as to the meaning of “default”; consequently, plaintiff likewise fails to demonstrate the

absence of a triable issue. Accordingly, neither party is entitled to summary judgment on

the Sixth Claim for Relief.

3. Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s Seventh Claim for Relief,

alleging a claim for violation of § 1788.17 of the California Civil Code. Section 1788.17 is

Case 3:07-cv-00574-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/07/07 Page 2 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Because, as discussed in the preceding section, defendant’s motion for summary

judgment, as it pertains to the Seventh Cause of Action, is based on a legal argument, as

opposed to plaintiff’s asserted lack of evidence, the principles set forth in Burlington

Northern Santa Fe R.R. are not implicated thereby.

3

preempted by 15 U.S.C. §1681t(b)(1)(F), which preempts state law claims “relating to the

responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” See

15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(1)(F); see, e.g., Pirouzian v. SLM Corp., 396 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130

(S.D. Cal. 2005) (holding claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17 against defendant who

allegedly reported false information to credit reporting agency preempted by §

1681t(b)(1)(F)). Conversely, plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment as to the Seventh

Claim for Relief on the issue of preemption because, as set forth above, such claim is

preempted.

4. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the First Claim for Relief, alleging a

claim for defamation, and the Fourth Claim for Relief, alleging a claim for false light

invasion of privacy, is premature. Although defendant argues plaintiff will not be able to

prove the merits of said claims, the motion was filed before initial disclosures have

occurred, and, consequently, plaintiff’s request for an opportunity to conduct discovery on

the merits of her claims ordinarily would be granted. See Burlington Northern Santa Fe

R.R. Co., v. Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes, 323 F. 3d 767, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding

where summary judgment motion is filed “early in the litigation, before a party has had any

realistic opportunity to pursue discovery relating to its theory of the case, district courts

should grant any Rule 56(f) motion fairly freely”).2

 Here, however, it appears to the Court that the First and Fourth Claims are, as is the

Seventh Claim, preempted by 15 U.S.C. §1681t(b)(1)(F). As noted, state law claims

“relating to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting

agencies” are preempted. See 15 U.S.C. §1681t(b)(1)(f). In her opposition, plaintiff

clarifies that the basis of her First and Fourth Claims for Relief is, in each instance,

defendant’s having made false and/or misleading reports to credit reporting agencies. (See

Pl’s Opp. at 5.) Accordingly, plaintiff will be ordered to show cause why the Court should

Case 3:07-cv-00574-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/07/07 Page 3 of 4
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

If plaintiff makes such showing, the Court will set a schedule for further briefing on

the merits of said claim.

4

not enter summary judgment in favor of defendant as to the First and the Fourth Claims for

Relief, on the ground of preemption.3

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated:

1. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part, as follows:

a. the motion is GRANTED as to the Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh

Claims for Relief, and,

b. the motion is DENIED as to the Sixth Claim for Relief.

2. Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is hereby DENIED.

3. Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to show cause, in writing and no later than May 27,

2007, why summary judgment in favor of defendant should not be entered as to the First

and Fourth Claims for Relief, on the ground of preemption.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2007 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

Case 3:07-cv-00574-MMC Document 12 Filed 05/07/07 Page 4 of 4