Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01481/USCOURTS-ca7-08-01481-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Demetrius S. Partee
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

*

After examining the briefs and the records, we have determined that oral argument

is unnecessary.  The appeals are submitted on the briefs and the records.  See FED. R. APP. P.

34(a)(2)(B).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 10, 2010*

Decided March 22, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐1481

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

           Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

DEMETRIUS S. PARTEE,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 07‐CR‐200

Rudolph T. Randa,

Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 08-1481 Document: 33 Filed: 03/22/2010 Pages: 3
Nos. 08‐1481, 08‐3546, 09‐1673 Page 2

No. 08‐3546

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,      

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

RITCHIE E. BUFFORD,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 08‐CR‐68‐C‐01

Barbara B. Crabb,

Chief Judge.

No. 09‐1673

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,      

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

OSCAR A. RASH,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 07‐CR‐201

C. N. Clevert, Jr.,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

We have consolidated for decision these three appeals because they all raise the same

issue: whether fleeing an officer in violation of Wisconsin Statute § 346.04(3) constitutes a

“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924, or a “crime of

violence” under the career offender guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.  The term “violent

felony” under the ACCA and “crime of violence” under the career offender guidelines are

nearly identical, and we apply the same interpretation to both provisions when determining

whether a prior conviction triggers increased penalties.  United States v. Templeton, 543 F.3d

378, 380 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 749 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Rosas, 410 F.3d 332, 335‐36 (7th Cir. 2005).  Here Demetrius Partee’s and Oscar

Rash’s prior convictions for fleeing an officer (when added to convictions for serious drug

offenses and a violent felony) triggered 15‐year mandatory minimum sentences under the

Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).  Ritchie Bufford’s prior conviction for

fleeing an officer was treated as a “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender

guideline, see §§ 4B1.1‐1.2, and he was eventually sentenced to 200 months’ imprisonment.

We affirm all three sentences.

The Wisconsin statute at issue here makes it unlawful to use a vehicle to knowingly

flee or elude a police officer by willfully and wantonly disregarding the officer’s signal so

Case: 08-1481 Document: 33 Filed: 03/22/2010 Pages: 3
Nos. 08‐1481, 08‐3546, 09‐1673 Page 3

1

We note as an aside, should there be any doubt as to the violent nature of vehicular

flight, that on March 1, 2010, a woman in Milwaukee was killed when she was hit by a van

being pursued by police—becoming the fourth person in two months to be killed by a

driver fleeing Milwaukee police.  Jesse Garza, Milwaukee woman killed by van fleeing police,

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Mar. 2, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR 4319589.

that one endangers the police, pedestrians, or other vehicles; or by speeding away in the

vehicle or extinguishing its lights.  WIS. STAT. § 346.04(3).  The Armed Career Criminal Act

defines a “violent felony,” and the sentencing guidelines define a “crime of violence,” to

include  “burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime that] involves use of explosives, or

otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to

another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B).  See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2).  In Begay v. United States, 128

S. Ct. 1581, 1586‐87 (2008), the Supreme Court construed such crimes to involve

“purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”

Defendants argue that the Wisconsin statute does not require “purposeful” conduct.

They contend that “purposeful” requires intent, and claim that the statute requires only

reckless, but not intentional conduct.  This argument, however, is foreclosed by our recent

opinion in United States v. Dismuke, 593 F3d. 582, 2010 WL 292671 (7th Cir. 2010), which

issued after briefing in these cases had finished.  In Dismuke, which directly addressed

§ 346.04(3) under the ACCA, we observed that vehicular flight easily satisfied Begay’s

“purposeful” requirement because the statute requires that one “knowingly flee or attempt to

elude.”  Dismuke, 2020 WL 292671, at *8.

Defendants also argue that the conduct prohibited by the statute is not “violent” or

“aggressive” because, they contend, the act of using a vehicle to flee an officer does not

inherently involve violence or aggression.  This argument is also foreclosed by Dismuke.

There we examined “whether fleeing is ‘violent’ in the way required by Begay” and

concluded that it was.  Dismuke, 2020 WL 292671, at *9 (“We . . . hold that Wisconsinʹs crime

of vehicular fleeing involves conduct that is similarly ‘violent and aggressive’ to burglary,

arson, extortion, or crimes that involve the use of explosives.”).1

AFFIRMED.

Case: 08-1481 Document: 33 Filed: 03/22/2010 Pages: 3