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Parties Involved:
Robert Robinson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 10, 1996 Decided June 21, 1996

No. 95-3174

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT ROBINSON,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 95cr00083-01)

Teresa Alva, Assistant FederalPublic Defender, argued the cause for appellant. A.J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender, and Frances H. Pratt, were on the briefs.

Chun T. Wright, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee, with whom Eric

H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, John R. Fisher, Thomas C. Black and Michael F. Tubach,

Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SILBERMAN and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: "Give me one pack of 20s or I will shoot somebody in here now," read

the note with which appellant robbed a Washington, D.C. bank. The question before us is whether

those words amount to an "express threat of death" within the meaning ofsection 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) of

the Sentencing Guidelines. Holding that they do, we affirm the district court's two-level enhancement

of appellant's sentence.

I.

Section 2B3.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines governs sentences for robbery. Subsection (a)

establishes the base offense level; subsection (b) provides several grounds for raising the offense

level. Subsection (b)(2)(F) states that "if an express threat of death was made, increase [the offense

level] by two levels." USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). The commentary to the guideline states in full:

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An "express threat of death," as used in subsection (b)(2)(F), may be in the form of

an oral or written statement, act, gesture, or combination thereof. For example, an

oral or written demand using words such as "Give me the money or I will kill you",

"Give me the money or I will pull the pin on the grenade I have in my pocket", "Give

me the money or I will shoot you", "Give me your money or else (where the

defendant draws his hand across his throat in a slashing motion)", or "Give me the

money or you are dead" would constitute an express threat of death. The court

should consider that the intent of the underlying provision is to provide an increased

offense level for cases in which the offender(s) engaged in conduct that would instill

in a reasonable person, who is a victim of the offense, significantly greater fear than

that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of robbery.

USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F), comment. (n.6).

Appellant, Robert Robinson, pled guilty to robbing five banks in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2113(a), which makes it a crime to take money from any bank "by force and violence, or by

intimidation." Robinson used a different note in each robbery. He used the note we mention

above"Give me one pack of 20s or I will shoot somebody in here now"during a March 15th

robbery. In two other robberies, he used virtually identical notes: "I have a gun. Give me a pack of

20s or I will shoot somebody out here now"; and "I have a gun. Give me one pack of 20's or I will

shoot somebody out here now." During the fourth robbery, he used a note demanding two packs of

twenty dollar bills; during the final robbery, his note read simply, "I have a gun." Robinson never

actually had a gun during the robberies, but no one else was aware of that at the time.

Finding that Robinson had made an "express threat of death" in all five robberies, the

probation office recommended enhancing Robinson's offense level by two points under section

2B3.1(b)(2)(F). Robinson's counsel objected, arguing that the commentary's final sentence and all

of its examplesindicated that, in order to make an expressthreat of death, a robber had to "instillfear

of death in the victim teller." His counsel argued that because Robinson's notes at most threatened

only "somebody out here" or "somebody in here," his statements did not meet this requirement.

Apparently concluding that at least one of Robinson's notes constituted an express threat of death,

the district court applied the two-level enhancement and sentenced Robinson to 57 months

imprisonment.

II.

Robinson urges us to disregard the commentary as inconsistent with the guideline and,

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applying the plain language of the guideline to the statements he made during the robberies, to

conclude that none of them was an "express threat of death." He claims that the guideline's use of

the phrase "express threat of death" requires that the robber "directly, plainly, and unmistakably

indicate that the victim was going to die." Appellant's Br. at 8. According to Robinson, a threat of

death is not "express" if the victim must draw inferences in order to conclude that the robber is

threatening death. He thus argues that the guideline conflicts with two portions of the commentary:

the commentary's final sentence, because that sentence suggests that courts should examine the

inferencesthat a reasonable victimwould make; and the example, "Give me the money or I will shoot

you," because the threat to "shoot" explicitly threatens only injury, requiring a victimto infer that the

robber was threatening death.

Because Robinson did not make this argument before the district courtindeed, counsel

never even hinted at any inconsistency between the guideline and the commentarywe review his

argument under a plain error analysis. See United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 286-88 (D.C. Cir.

1993); United States v. Dawson, 990 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In interpreting a

guideline and its commentary, we are bound by a set of familiar principles. Courts must consider

commentary "that interprets or explains a guideline [to be] authoritative unless [the commentary]

violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading

of, that guideline." Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38; see also id. at 44-45 (1993). If

commentary is inconsistent with a guideline, courts should disregard the conflicting portions of the

commentary and rely upon the guideline itself. Id. at 43. Commentary is not "inconsistent" with a

guideline simply because it adopts what we might regard as one of the less likely interpretations of

a guideline. See United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Rather, since we must

treat commentary interpreting a guideline as we would an agency's interpretation of its own

regulations, Stinson, 508 U.S. at 44-45, commentary is inconsistent only if "an "alternative reading

is compelled by the [guideline]'s plain language or by other indications of the [Sentencing

Commission's] intent at the time of the [guideline]'s promulgation.' " Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.

Shalala, 114 S. Ct. 2381, 2386-87 (1994) (quoting Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485 U.S. 415, 430

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(1988)) (emphasis added); see also Stinson, 508 U.S. at 43 (requiring "flat inconsistency").

Applying these principles, we find no error, let alone plain error, in the district court's failure

to detect the alleged inconsistencies. Indeed, we perceive no inconsistency at all between the robbery

guideline and its commentary. While "express" may usually mean "[m]ade known distinctly and

explicitly, and not left to inference," it may also simplymean "clear." BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 580

(6th ed. 1990); see also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 803 (1993). The

Sentencing Commission could thus reasonably interpret "express" to mean "clear"; having done so,

it could determine that a robber "clearly" threatens another person with death even if a person on the

receiving end of the threat had to draw some inferences in order to conclude that the robber was

threatening to kill. Thus, to the extent the final sentence in the commentary suggests that the court

should evaluate a robber's statement from the perspective of "a reasonable ... victim" to determine

if it clearly threatens death, no irreconcilable conflict exists. Nor is there a conflict with the example,

"Give me the money or I will shoot you." Admittedly, "I will shoot you" does not threaten death as

unambiguously as "I will kill you." Yet the Sentencing Commission could reasonably determine that

when a bank robber hands a note to a teller stating, "Give me the money or I will shoot you," the

teller would clearly understand these words to be a threat to kill.

To support his argument that the guideline and commentary are inconsistent, Robinson cites

two Ninth Circuit cases. In United States v. Martinez-Cano, 6 F.3d 1400, 1401-03 (9th Cir. 1993),

the court found a guideline requiring higher sentencesfor offenderstrafficking in six or more " "sets'

" of documentsinconsistent with its commentary, instructing courtsto " "treat [a] set [of documents]

as one document.' " Id. at 1402 (quoting USSG § 2L2.1(b)(2), comment. (n.2)). The Ninth Circuit

reasoned that if a court were to follow the commentary, it could never achieve the six "sets" required

to enhance a sentence under the guideline, because "as soon as one thought one had a set it would

metamorphose into a single document only." Id. at 1403. The court thus concluded that the

commentary and guideline were "in inexorable conflict." Id. As we indicate above, no such conflict

exists here.

United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751 (9thCir. 1995), the other case cited byRobinson, does

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not support his position either. The O'Brien court found no inherent conflict between the guideline

and the commentary, but merely between the guideline and another circuit's interpretation of the

commentary. See id. at 754-56. O'Brien therefore stands for the rather uncontroversial principle

that courts should not construe the commentary as to create a conflict with the guideline, but should

read the commentary, if possible, in a way that harmonizes with the guideline's plain language. See

United States v. Anderson, 942 F.2d 606, 612 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).

Robinson also relies on a series of cases from the Eleventh Circuit, beginning with United

States v. Tuck, 964 F.2d 1079, 1080-81 (1992), as well as dissenting opinions in cases from the

Seventh and Eighth Circuits, finding various statements insufficiently clear to be express threats of

death. See United States v. Moore, 6 F.3d 715, 721 (11thCir. 1993); United States v. Canzater, 994

F.2d 773, 774-75 (11th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Cadotte, 57 F.3d 661, 662 (8th Cir.

1995) (Arnold, M.S., J., dissenting), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 783 (1996); United States v. Hunn, 24

F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). None of these opinions, however,

suggests ignoring the commentary because it is inconsistent with the guideline. Moreover, to the

extent that the Eleventh Circuit decided not to rely on the commentary, it did so for a reason since

rejected by the Supreme Court. In Tuck, the Eleventh Circuit declined to rely on the commentary

because it thought that it should treat the commentary like legislative history, resorting to it only if

the guideline itself is ambiguous. Tuck, 964 F.2d at 1081 (citing United States v. Stinson, 957 F.2d

813, 814 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993)). The Supreme

Court rejected that premise in Stinson, holding that commentary should be treated not like legislative

history, but like an agency's interpretation of its own regulations. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 42-45.

We are equally unpersuaded by Robinson's additional argument that we must ignore the

robbery guideline's commentary because it is inconsistent with the extortion guideline and its

commentary. Robinson contends that courts may enhance sentences under the robbery commentary

in the same broad range of circumstances as they may enhance sentences under the extortion

commentary. Because the robbery guideline authorizes a sentence enhancement only for an "express

threat," while the extortion guideline permits an enhancement for either "an express or implied

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threat," USSG § 2B3.2(b)(1) (emphasis added), Robinson argues that we must ignore the robbery

commentary in order to preserve the distinction between the two guidelines. We disagree with the

premise ofRobinson's argument. Even an expansive interpretation of the robbery commentary would

permit enhancementsina far narrowerrange of circumstancesthan those meriting enhancement under

the extortion commentary. Nothing in the robbery commentary even remotely suggests that courts

could enhance sentences for robbery, as they may for extortion, based on no more than an inference

that "reasonably could be" drawn from the offender's conduct, including inferences drawn from the

"reputation" of the offender. USSG § 2B3.2(b)(1) comment. (n.2).

III.

We now turn to Robinson's alternative argument, advanced before the district court, that his

statements were not express threats of death because he did not threaten the life of the immediate

victims of the robberythat is, the tellers he asked to hand over the money. According to Robinson,

the guideline requires that a robber must put a victim of the robbery in fear for his or her own life.

Since the tellers in this case were the only ones who read the notes, Robinson argues that to satisfy

the guideline he must have threatened their lives. He claims that, because the notes at most

threatened to shoot "somebody," they did not threaten any teller'slife with sufficient clarity to qualify

for a sentence enhancement.

We determine the meaning of a guideline de novo, giving "due deference" to the district

court's application of a guideline to the facts. United States v. Montague, 40 F.3d 1251, 1252-53

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (internal

quotationmarks omitted). To the extent possible, we read the commentary and its guideline together,

giving meaning to each term and treating the commentary as authoritative. See Anderson, 942 F.2d

at 612-13.

The guideline establishes the irreducible requirements that the robber must make a "threat,"

that the threat must be "of death," and that such a threat must be "express." Because we understand

"express" to mean "clear," to receive an enhanced sentence a defendant must clearly make a threat,

and that threat must clearly be to kill. While the commentary's final sentence indicates that we must

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evaluate the robber's words and actions from the perspective of a reasonable person, neither the

guideline nor the commentary declares how clear a threat must be. To us, however, the word

"express" suggests that the robber must leave little room for doubt. Indeed, in all of the

commentary's examples, a victimwould very likely, not just probably, understand that the robber was

making a threat and that the threat was to kill. Threats to slash a throat, pull a pin on a grenade, and

even to "shoot you," leave some room for hope that the robber might intend only to wound, but not

much: The target would very likely believe that the robber had threatened death. The guideline thus

requiresthat a reasonable person in the position of a victimwould be highly likely to view the robber's

words or actions as a threat to kill.

Reminding courts of the guideline's purpose, the final sentence of the commentary imposes

another requirement: that the robber's conduct be such that it "would instill in a reasonable person

... significantly greater fear than necessary to constitute the offense of robbery." This final sentence,

however, leaves two issues unresolved. First, the commentary does not specify how much fear is

necessary, particularly whether fear for someone else's life would suffice, such as the fear that could

exist if a robber passes a note to a bank teller stating, "If you don't give me the money, I will shoot

the young child standing by the door." The examples in the commentary do establish, however, that

fear for one's own life is enough to trigger an enhancement. Second, the commentary does not

indicate how likely it must be that a reasonable victim would feel the requisite amount of fear. The

finalsentence requires only that the robber's conduct must be such that it "would" instill the necessary

quantum of fear in a victim. Unlike "express," the word "would" only obliges courts to predict a

reasonable victim'sreaction; it does not specify a degree of probability. In this context, we think the

most natural interpretation of the word "would" is that it must be more likely than not that a

reasonable victim experience the necessary level of fear.

We therefore hold that a robber makes an "express threat of death" if a reasonable person in

the position ofthe immediate victimofthe robberywould have (1) verylikely believed that the robber

made a threat and that the threat was to kill and (2) likely thought that his or her life was in peril,

thereby experiencing "significantly greater fear" than the intimidation required to commit robbery.

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Applying thisstandard to the facts ofthis case, we must uphold Robinson'ssentence if just one of the

notes satisfies these requirements. See Hunn, 24 F.3d at 999 n.7.

We find Robinson's March 15th note meets these criteria. The statement, "Give me your

money or I'll shoot somebody in here," clearly threatens death. As the commentary establishes, a

reasonable person during a bank robbery would be highly likely to interpret a threat to "shoot" as a

threat to "kill." Robinson's note thus effectively read, "Give me your money or I'll kill somebody in

here," an unmistakable threat of death.

As for the level of fear, because Robinson has failed to offer any other reasons why a teller

would have felt immune from harm, we consider only Robinson's argument that he failed to threaten

the teller's life with sufficient clarity to put a reasonable person in those circumstances in fear for his

or her life. While Robinson's statement did not threaten a teller's life as unambiguously as the

example in the commentary, "Give me the money or I will shoot you," we have little doubt that a

person in the position of the teller during the March 15th robbery would have believed that Robinson

had threatened him with death. Just as a reasonable teller receiving a note from a bank robber would

very likely infer that "shoot" means "kill," a reasonable teller would also probably infer that a threat

to kill "somebody in here" referred to him. Indeed, in the highly-charged circumstances of a robbery,

we think that the threat to "shoot somebody in here" is practically indistinguishable from the threat

to "shoot you."

In reaching this conclusion, we have not addressed several issues that may well arise given

the commentary's lack of clarity. Because Robinson handed his March 15th note to the immediate

victim of a robbery, we need not consider whether a statement conveyed to othersfor example, a

statement to bystanders, such as "Get out of my way or I will kill you"could be an express threat

of death under the guideline. See United States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

115 S. Ct. 1969 (1995). Nor, as we mentioned above, have we considered whether a statement

threatening the life of an individual other than the person receiving the message could create the

requisite fear to satisfy the commentary.

We also do not decide whether the statements Robinson made during the other four robberies

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were express threats of death. In our view, however, each of Robinson's other notes was less likely

to satisfy the requirements set forth above. We doubt, for example, that Robinson's mere demand

to hand over a package of twenty dollar bills could qualify as an express threat of death. A

reasonable person reading thatstatement would be unlikely to interpret it as a threat, let alone a threat

to kill. We also find it difficult to imagine how such a statement would likely instill significantly

greater fear than the level of intimidation required to commit a robbery. Similarly, the statement, "I

have a gun," does not threaten death as clearly as the March 15th noteindeed, on its face, it is not

a "threat" at all. Finally, we think that Robinson's two remaining notes, threatening to shoot

"somebody out here" rather than "somebody in here," would be less likely to put a teller in fear for

his or her own life.

In interpreting the robbery guideline, we recognize that we add yet one more interpretation

ofsection 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) to the conflicting views adopted by oursister circuits. The Eleventh Circuit

appears to have adopted the narrowest interpretation, defining an expressthreat of death as one that

is "directly or distinctly stated, and not ... implied or left to inference." Canzater, 964 F.2d at 775;

see also Tuck, 964 F.2d at 1081. While agreeing that threats must be clear, we have concluded that

expressthreats of death can be based on inferences. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Eighth

and Ninth Circuits have effectively replaced the "express threat of death" requirement with the

commentary's finalsentence, permitting enhancement whenever the robber "instill[s] in a reasonable

victim "significantly greater fear than that necessary to constitute an element of the offense of

robbery.' " Cadotte, 57 F.3d at 662 (quoting USSG § 2b33.1, comment. (n.6)); see also United

States v. Strandberg, 952 F.2d 1149, 1151 (9th Cir. 1991). In contrast, our approach requires that

a robber clearly threaten death in addition to instilling a significantly greater quantum of fear than the

"intimidation" required for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)a view we think is faithful to

our obligation to give meaning to both the guideline and the commentary. Our analysis is closer to

the approaches of the Seventh and Fourth Circuits. Like the Seventh Circuit, we require a robber to

threaten death clearly, although one may do so by implication, see Hunn, 24 F.3d at 998 (allowing

enhancement when "a reasonable victim could understand [the offender]'s message loud and clear as

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a death-threat"). And, like the Fourth Circuit, we permit enhancement if a robber's conduct "would

place an ordinary person in the victim's position in reasonable apprehension for his or her life," see

United States v. Murray, 65 F.3d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir. 1995), although we leave open the possibility

that a court may enhance a sentence even if an ordinary person would be placed in fear for someone

else's life.

IV.

Because we reject Robinson's arguments that the guideline and its commentary are

inconsistent, and because Robinson's March 15th note clearly threatened death and would have led

a reasonable person receiving the note to believe that his or her life was in danger, we conclude that

Robinson made an express threat of death within the meaning of section 2B3.1(b)(2)(F). We thus

affirm his sentence.

So ordered.

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