Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13018/USCOURTS-ca11-22-13018-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allen J. Pendergrass
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13018

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ALLEN J. PENDERGRASS, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00224-AT-CMS-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13018

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JILL PRYOR and BRASHER, 

Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:

Defendant Allen Pendergrass appeals his conviction for participating in a scheme to steal unclaimed property belonging to 

others. Pendergrass, along with co-defendant Terrell McQueen, 

contacted the City of Atlanta and other city and county governments and requested lists of unclaimed funds being held by those 

entities. They then mailed fraudulent documents to the entities,

falsely representing that they were acting on behalf of the owners

to recover the funds. After a trial, a jury found Pendergrass guilty 

of aiding and abetting bank fraud, conspiracy to commit money 

laundering, and aiding and abetting identity theft. At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a sentence of 46 months’ 

imprisonment.

On appeal, Pendergrass challenges his convictions and sentence on multiple grounds. As to his convictions, he argues, among 

other things, that his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were violated because of the government’s delay in indicting him and that 

there was insufficient evidence to support some of his convictions 

for aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft. As to his sentence, 

he says that the district court erred in applying an enhancement for 

fraud involving an authentication feature and in failing to give him 

an opportunity to allocute at sentencing.

After careful review, and having heard oral argument, we 

affirm Pendergrass’s convictions because no Fifth or Sixth 

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22-13018 Opinion of the Court 3

Amendment violation occurred and there was sufficient evidence 

to support his convictions for aggravated identity theft. As to his

sentence, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it applied an enhancement for fraud. The district 

court did, however, commit plain error when it failed to afford 

Pendergrass an opportunity to allocute at the sentencing hearing. 

Accordingly, we affirm in part and vacate in part. We remand for 

resentencing after he has been given an opportunity to allocute.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Pendergrass’s Fraudulent Scheme and Initial Arrest

Pendergrass’s fraudulent scheme began when he and 

McQueen discussed teaming up to run an asset recovery business

in Atlanta. Pendergrass had submitted an open records request to 

the City of Atlanta and received a “holder’s list” identifying individuals and companies who had unclaimed funds that the city government was holding. He and McQueen planned to find contact information for the individuals or companies and try to convince them 

to hire the two of them to recover the funds. Pendergrass and 

McQueen would keep a percentage of the money recovered.

The initial plan was legal. But when it proved unsuccessful, 

Pendergrass and McQueen turned to fraud. They submitted fraudulent documents to claim funds on behalf of the individuals and 

companies appearing on the holder’s list, even though they were

not authorized to act on the holders’ behalf. The co-conspirators 

would keep the recovered funds for themselves.

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13018

At first, they had trouble successfully implementing their 

fraudulent scheme. After they fooled the City of Atlanta into mailing them a $359,000 check made out to Holland & Knight “LLLP,”

they managed to convince a PNC bank branch employee to open 

a checking account in McQueen’s name, “d/b/a Holland & 

Knight.” Doc. 264 at 95–96.1 But the check never cleared. The next 

time—when a Texas county mailed them $160,000 in checks made 

out to the Lee Family Trust—they adjusted their approach by hiring an escrow agent to hold the funds instead of trying to deposit 

them directly. But the escrow agent got suspicious, figured out that 

Pendergrass and McQueen were not actually working for the Lee 

Family Trust, and contacted the Trust’s attorney.

As they continued to refine their approach, they learned that 

the City of Atlanta would issue checks in the name of an asset recovery company instead of the holder to whom the funds belonged. And so, in early 2013 Pendergrass opened a bank account 

in the name of a nonexistent company, “Asset Financial Recovery

Inc.,” and the fraudulent activities charged in this case began in earnest. Pendergrass and McQueen sent letters on Asset Financial letterhead to the City of Atlanta requesting funds owed to Asset Financial’s purported clients. With each letter, they attached fraudulent power-of-attorney forms. The forms, which authorized Asset 

Financial to act on a purported client’s behalf, appeared to be 

signed by an employee of the client and notarized. But no client 

had signed the document, nor had it been notarized. Rather, the 

1 “Doc.” refers to the district court’s docket entries.

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signature was forged, often by Pendergrass. The notary stamp on 

the document also was forged, often by Pendergrass’s subordinate,

Eric Fitchpatric, who acted at Pendergrass’s direction. Pendergrass 

and McQueen directed their scheme mainly at victims who were 

owed money by the City of Atlanta, but they also sought funds 

from the City of Fort Collins, Colorado, on behalf of a purported 

client called Tousa Homes.

Eventually, a representative of one of Pendergrass and 

McQueen’s purported clients learned that her signature had been 

forged and funds had been stolen. She reported the theft to the City 

of Atlanta. Atlanta police traced Asset Financial’s post office box to 

Pendergrass. Officers also obtained video showing Pendergrass 

cashing one of the checks he had received from the City of Atlanta.

In late 2013, Atlanta police obtained warrants to search Asset 

Financial’s office and to arrest Pendergrass and McQueen on state 

charges. A team including Atlanta police officers and United States 

postal inspectors executed the warrants. The postal inspectors 

were involved because the United States Postal Inspection Service 

was investigating Pendergrass for another fraudulent scheme that 

involved the use of Asset Financial’s post office box. After the 

search warrant was executed, all computers, documents, and other 

evidence that had been seized were turned over to the United 

States Postal Inspection Service.

After his arrest, Pendergrass initially was held in a local jail.

After about two weeks, he was released on pretrial supervised release. The supervision ended in early 2014 based on a standing 

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Fulton County Superior Court order dictating that supervision 

ends after four months if no indictment is returned.

After Pendergrass was released from the local jail, he was 

indicted in the Southern District of Ohio on charges of bank fraud 

arising from an unrelated scheme in which allegedly he cashed 51 

treasury checks and stole over $500,000. And while that case was 

ongoing, he was arrested for theft in Fort Collins, Colorado, in connection with the Tousa Homes fraud. He pleaded guilty in both 

cases.

Before he was sentenced in the Ohio federal court case, a 

probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report

(“PSR”). The PSR listed Pendergrass’s criminal history. It noted 

that he had been arrested in 2013 in Atlanta for “Theft by Taking . . . and Forgery.” Doc. 79-2 at 22. It noted, “These charges are 

currently pending.” Id. The district court in the Ohio federal case 

sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment. The state court in the 

Colorado case also sentenced him to 30 months’ imprisonment, to 

run concurrently to his Ohio federal sentence.

B. Pendergrass’s 2017 Federal Indictment and Trial

In 2017, Pendergrass had almost finished serving his concurrent sentences. Before he was released from prison, a grand jury in 

the Northern District of Georgia indicted him. The grand jury 

charged him with five counts of aiding and abetting bank fraud 

(Counts One through Five), one count of conspiracy to commit 

money laundering (Count Six), and four counts of aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft (Counts Seven through Ten).

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Before trial, Pendergrass moved to dismiss the indictment. 

He asserted that the delay in indicting him violated his Fifth and 

Sixth Amendment rights. To support his argument, he pointed to 

documents showing that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Northern 

District of Georgia had met with both Atlanta police and federal

law enforcement to discuss their respective investigations of him

as early as 2014, yet he was not indicted until 2017. But he struggled 

to obtain records to build his argument. When his attorney subpoenaed records about him from Fulton County’s District Attorney, she was told that the office had no records. When she later 

tried to subpoena records from the Atlanta Police Department, she 

was told that the city had turned over all its paper records to the 

U.S. Attorney and that the police were unable to retrieve emails 

due to a cyberattack. Ultimately, the district court denied the motion to dismiss.

At trial, the government presented evidence from witnesses 

including Douglas Ricks, the Atlanta officer who investigated the 

scheme; several victims; McQueen; and Fitchpatric. The evidence 

primarily concerned the crimes charged in the indictment, but the 

government also sought to introduce other evidence of Pendergrass’s bad acts—his convictions in Ohio and Colorado, as well as

evidence of his similar-but-uncharged fraudulent acts against Holland & Knight and the Lee Family Trust, among others. The district court prohibited the government from presenting evidence

about the Ohio conviction but allowed it to introduce the other 

evidence with a limiting instruction. The court’s limiting instruction specified that the evidence was “intrinsic to the charged 

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conduct” and necessary “to complete the story of the crimes” 

charged but was not evidence of “the crimes actually charged” and 

should therefore be understood and assessed accordingly. Doc. 264 

at 65–66.

McQueen and Fitchpatric offered detailed testimony about 

the criminal scheme. They had both been involved in the scheme 

but opted to cooperate with the government—McQueen because 

of a plea deal and Fitchpatric as part of an agreement not to be 

charged at all. McQueen testified that he and Pendergrass “always 

worked together.” Id. at 93. He explained that it had been Pendergrass’s idea to involve an escrow agent for the Lee Family Trust 

fraud attempt. Fitchpatric testified that Pendergrass directed him 

to prepare fraudulent notary documents. He described sending 

documents back and forth with Pendergrass for alteration and review. He said that Pendergrass had him alter at least 20 documents.

Pendergrass’s primary defense at trial was that he had not 

knowingly taken part in the fraud. According to Pendergrass, he 

believed that McQueen had been submitting legitimate claim requests. He maintained that McQueen acted alone and made up the 

story of Pendergrass’s involvement.

The jury convicted Pendergrass on all counts.

C. Pendergrass’s Sentencing

Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a PSR. In the 

PSR, the probation officer determined that a two-level enhancement applied because Pendergrass’s offense involved the use of an 

authentication feature. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual 

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§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii). Pendergrass objected to the enhancement, 

but the district court concluded that the sentencing enhancement 

applied.

At sentencing, the district court found that the relevant loss 

amount was approximately $221,000. Based on this loss amount 

and after applying several enhancements, including the enhancement for using an authentication feature, the district court determined that Pendergrass’s total offense level was 25. Given this offense level and his category II criminal history score, the district 

court calculated his guidelines range as 63 to 78 months. The district court also noted that Pendergrass was subject to a 24-month 

mandatory sentence for the aggravated identity theft counts.

After weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors,2

the district court sentenced Pendergrass to a total term of 46

2 Under § 3553(a), the district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but 

not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of the statute. 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). These purposes include the need to: reflect the seriousness 

of the offense; promote respect for the law; provide just punishment; deter 

criminal conduct; protect the public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct; and effectively provide the defendant with educational or vocational 

training, medical care, or other correctional treatment. Id. § 3553(a)(2). The 

court must also consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available, the 

applicable guidelines range, the pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing 

Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the 

need to provide restitution to victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)–(7).

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months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed this sentence 

without giving him an opportunity to address the court.3

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review constitutional questions de novo.” United 

States v. Castillo, 899 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2018).

“We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the 

Sentencing Guidelines de novo . . . . Questions of statutory or Guidelines interpretation [also] receive de novo review.” United States v. 

Taylor, 818 F.3d 671, 673–74 (11th Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

On appeal, we focus on Pendergrass’s constitutional speedytrial challenges, his arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his convictions, and his challenges to his sentence. First, 

we examine the constitutional challenges—namely, his contention 

that both his Fifth Amendment due process right and his Sixth

Amendment right to a speedy trial were violated because he took 

part in the charged fraudulent scheme in 2013 but was not indicted

until 2017. Second, we consider his argument that the government 

failed to introduce sufficient evidence for two of his four counts of 

aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft. Third, we focus on

his two sentencing challenges—that the district court erroneously 

applied a two-level enhancement for use of an authentication 

3 After Pendergrass filed notice of his appeal, the district court allowed him to 

remain on bond while this appeal was pending.

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feature to his conduct involving fake notary seals and that the district court committed plain error when it gave him no opportunity 

to allocute before sentencing.

A. Constitutional Challenges

Although the government secured an indictment within the 

limitations period for each charged crime, Pendergrass argues that 

the government’s delay in indicting him violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a 

speedy trial. We address each issue in turn.

1. Fifth Amendment Right to Due Process

Pendergrass was arrested in Atlanta in late 2013. His pretrial 

supervised release ended four months later, in early 2014, with no

indictment. He was not indicted in Georgia until 2017. He claims 

that this delay violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process.

To establish a constitutional due process violation based on 

a delay in indictment, a defendant must show: (1) “actual prejudice . . . from the delay” and (2) “that the delay resulted from a deliberate design by the government to gain a tactical advantage.” 

United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332, 1339 (11th Cir. 1995). We do 

not reach the second requirement because Pendergrass failed to 

demonstrate evidence of actual prejudice.

Pendergrass argues that he was prejudiced because, 

“[a]lthough he was arrested in 2013, . . . when he was released from 

pre-trial supervision in Fulton County [in 2014] . . . it did not appear 

the county was going to prosecute him.” Appellant’s Br. 34. In 

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effect, he argues that he was given a false sense of security because 

“he was not on notice of any prosecution.” Id. But he ignores that 

there were signs indicating that he could face criminal charges arising from his Atlanta arrest. For example, his 2015 PSR in his Southern District of Ohio case included a criminal history section that 

listed his Fulton County Superior Court charges as “pending.” This 

document should have put Pendergrass on notice that he could still 

face charges in Georgia.

Pendergrass nevertheless says that he was prejudiced because of the order of events. He argues that by the time he was 

tried in the Northern District of Georgia, the government could 

introduce evidence of his convictions in Ohio and Colorado, as well 

as similar-but-uncharged “bad acts” involving the Lee Family Trust 

fraud in Texas and Holland & Knight in Georgia, as evidence of 

guilt in this case. But there is no prejudice from the other acts evidence for constitutional purposes. The delay may have meant that 

this trial took place only after Pendergrass had been convicted of 

the additional crimes, but the district court judge prevented the introduction of evidence of his Ohio and Colorado convictions. And 

though the district court did allow evidence of the other frauds, 

that evidence would have been available to the government even 

without a delay. For example, Harris County, Texas investigators 

knew about the Lee Family Trust incident in 2013. The Holland & 

Knight check was deposited at a PNC Bank branch in early 2013,

and the City of Atlanta was in contact with Holland & Knight 

shortly thereafter. Yet Pendergrass was not arrested until late 2013 

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and his pretrial release did not occur until early 2014. Thus, Pendergrass’s timing-based argument lacks merit.4

Pendergrass also argues that he was prejudiced because the 

delay impaired his ability to collect evidence. He says he “currently 

suffers from memory loss and now takes medicine to enhance his 

memory” and he therefore believes that the delay unjustly exacerbated his “inability to recall specific events related to this case.” 

Doc. 101 at 5. He also points to “the destruction of a swath of City 

of Atlanta records resulting from third party hacking of City of Atlanta data systems” that occurred between his initial arrest and 

eventual prosecution. Doc. 177 at 4.

We have previously held that, to establish that a delay prejudicially impaired the defendant’s ability to collect evidence, the 

4 Pendergrass raises these incidents in an evidentiary challenge as well, arguing 

that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the government to 

introduce evidence about these other frauds. We disagree. The district court 

properly concluded that this evidence was intrinsic and thus admissible. See 

United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204, 1216 (11th Cir. 2018) (evidence is admissible as intrinsic if it arises “out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offenses,” is “necessary to complete the story of the 

crime,” or is “inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the 

charged offenses”); see also United States v. Muscatell, 42 F.3d 627, 630 (11th Cir. 

1995) (evidence is intrinsic when it “involv[es] the same principal actors, in the 

same roles, employing the same modus operandi”). Furthermore, the district 

court gave a limiting instruction about the narrow purpose for which the jury 

could consider the evidence to mitigate the risk of unfair prejudice. And we 

also cannot say the district court abused its discretion in determining that the 

probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403.

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defendant may not simply “speculat[e]” that he would have uncovered favorable evidence. United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1164 

(11th Cir. 1984). Rather, we expect him to “name any specific potential witnesses who might have aided his defense,” identify what 

their testimony would have been, and describe how it would have 

been material to his defense. Id. at 1163–64. We have rejected prejudice assertions based solely on a defendant’s faulty memory. Cf., 

e.g., United States v. Corbin, 734 F.2d 643, 648 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting a due process challenge based only on “[f]aded memories” 

over the passage of time). So too have we rejected prejudice arguments based on lost evidence when they were raised without any 

added showing that the loss “impaired [the defendant’s] ability to 

provide a meaningful defense.” United States v. Solomon, 686 F.2d 

863, 872 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that there was no due process 

violation where allegedly exculpatory records were destroyed in a 

motel fire).

Pendergrass has not established that the delay prejudicially 

affected his ability to collect evidence. He introduced no specific 

evidence about his medication or how his defense would have been

aided if he had a better memory, and he made nothing more than

cursory allegations that the loss of records made it difficult to fully 

investigate his defense.5 See Corbin, 734 F.2d at 647–48 (concluding 

5 In Solomon, the defendant asserted that the records destroyed in the fire 

“would have shown how little merchandise he bought from Collum, how 

much he paid, and how the price compared with what he paid legitimate vendors.” Solomon, 686 F.2d at 872. He also argued that the destroyed records 

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there was no prejudice where defendants pointed to witnesses’ 

faded memories and listed other dead witnesses’ names without

any further indication of what the substance of their testimony

would have been). We thus conclude that Pendergrass failed to 

demonstrate prejudice and, because he has not done so, we decline 

to address his arguments that the delay resulted from a deliberate 

design by the government to gain a tactical advantage.

Pendergrass’s fallback position is that the district court 

should have held an evidentiary hearing before denying his motion. He relies on Gravitt v. United States, 523 F.2d 1211, 1214 (5th 

Cir. 1975), in which the court held that a 16-month delay necessitated an evidentiary hearing. Pendergrass’s arguments based on 

Gravitt are unavailing, however, and the district court did not err 

in denying Pendergrass’s motion to dismiss without an evidentiary 

hearing.

It is true that our predecessor court concluded that Gravitt’s 

case needed to be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. But Pendergrass invokes Gravitt for his Fifth Amendment arguments; we 

based our conclusions in that case on Gravitt’s Sixth Amendment 

rights. Gravitt, 523 F.2d at 1214. Nothing in our opinion addressed 

a defendant’s entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on a Fifth 

Amendment delayed-indictment claim. And for reasons we explain 

“would have shown when and how he first met Collum.” Id. The defendant’s 

allegations regarding lost records were far more specific than Pendergrass’s, 

yet he failed to establish prejudice nonetheless.

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below in Section III.A.2, Gravitt does not support his Sixth Amendment challenge either. See infra note 8.

Gravitt aside, we agree with the district court that Pendergrass is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing without “any specific 

and concrete evidence” as to prejudice. Doc. 177 at 4. To obtain an 

evidentiary hearing on pre-indictment delay, Pendergrass must 

make at least a prima facie showing of actual prejudice as well as 

deliberate design by the government to gain a tactical advantage 

over him. See United States v. Farias, 836 F.3d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 

2016) (analogizing to similar prima facie standards for obtaining evidentiary hearings on selective prosecution and improper disclosure claims). Pendergrass’s argument that he cannot make that 

showing without an evidentiary hearing simply begs the question, 

as does arguing that only with additional subpoenas will he be able 

to obtain more evidence.

We therefore conclude that Pendergrass’s Fifth Amendment 

due process right was not violated.

2. Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a 

speedy trial. The Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment’s protection is triggered only when a person is accused by the 

federal government through “formal indictment or information” 

or the “actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a 

criminal charge.” United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 325 

(1971). Here, Pendergrass argues that his Sixth Amendment rights 

were violated by the delay of roughly four years between when he 

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was first arrested and when he eventually stood trial. But this argument fails at the outset because his 2013 arrest was effected by Atlanta police, not federal officers. For Sixth Amendment purposes, 

he was not accused by the federal government until he was indicted, which occurred only one month before he was arraigned 

and two months before he was given a bond.

Pendergrass disputes his speedy-trial-clock start date, arguing two alternatives: either his 2013 arrest was, in fact, a federal 

arrest or we should recognize a ruse exception to treat his criminal 

proceedings as having been initiated with that arrest. We reject

both arguments; we tackle each in turn below.

First, Pendergrass’s 2013 arrest by Atlanta police officers was 

not a federal arrest because he was not arrested by federal authorities, taken before a federal magistrate, or charged with a federal 

crime in Georgia. Certainly, the federal government was involved: 

Federal agents were present at the arrest, assisted in executing the 

search warrant, received all the electronic evidence obtained in the 

search, communicated with the Fulton County District Attorney’s 

office about the case, and ultimately took over the investigation in 

2014. But, under our precedent, none of these factors is sufficient 

to start the speedy-trial clock. We have held that even when federal 

authorities were highly involved in the defendant’s initial arrest—

as was the case here—the clock did not start until after the federal 

indictment. United States v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 277 (11th Cir. 1987). 

We have also recognized that the clock for a defendant who was 

the subject of a joint state and federal investigation—like 

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Pendergrass—started not when the federal government “took control” of the case, but rather when it arrested him on federal charges. 

United States v. Russo, 796 F.2d 1443, 1450–51 (11th Cir. 1986).

Second, Pendergrass points out that some circuits have recognized a “ruse exception” through which a speedy-trial clock may 

start—even without a federal arrest or indictment—when there is 

evidence of collusion between state and federal authorities. E.g., 

United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1993). But

the burden is placed “on the detainee to establish that the primary 

or exclusive purpose of the [nonfederal] civil detention was [a ruse]

to hold [the detainee] for future prosecution.” United States v. Drummond, 240 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001).6

To begin with, this Court “has not previously applied the 

ruse exception in this context.”7 Appellant’s Br. 37. But even if we 

were to entertain the ruse exception here, the circumstances 

6 We have been unable to locate any case law suggesting that the ruse exception applies to Sixth Amendment claims; rather, it appears to be invoked only 

under the Speedy Trial Act. Pendergrass does not make any argument under 

the Speedy Trial Act. But when a case involves action by both federal and state 

governments, the analysis for both Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial Act 

claims examines when the federal speedy-trial clock starts. And the ruse exception speaks directly to that question. Thus, for purposes of determining when 

the clock started in this case, we look to Sixth Amendment and Speedy Trial 

Act case law interchangeably.

7 The only context in which this Court has recognized the ruse exception is 

federal immigration detention cases. See, e.g., Drummond, 240 F.3d at 1336 

(holding that routine immigration detention incident to deportation could 

trigger the speedy-trial clock if used as a ruse). 

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Pendergrass advances to show collusion between the federal and 

state governments simply are not enough. He says that federal 

agents were “involved in the case at the time of . . . arrest, evidence 

was turned over to federal authorities, state investigators acknowledged that the case was going to be indicted by federal authorities, 

and . . . no state case charges were ever lodged.” Id. at 36. Facts like 

these have not triggered the ruse exception in cases from other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Iaquinta, 674 F.2d 260, 268 (4th Cir. 

1982) (holding that the actions of federal officers present and assisting with arrest and obtaining search warrants were insufficient to 

trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s time limit); United States v. Johnson, 

65 F.4th 932, 938 (7th Cir. 2023) (“[S]tate and federal prosecutors 

consult and cooperate with one another all the time. Routine consultations and decisions by one to defer to the other . . . fall far short 

of what might be needed to invoke the possible exception.”); United 

States v. Mearis, 36 F.4th 649, 654 (5th Cir. 2022) (holding that 

emails between federal and state prosecutors regarding their respective charges were not evidence of collusion); United States v. 

Clark, 754 F.3d 401, 405 (7th Cir. 2014) (“If an agency relationship 

were present this might be a closer point . . . .”).8

Because Pendergrass’s 2013 arrest was neither a federal arrest nor an arrest occasioned by collusion sufficient to invoke a ruse 

8 Some of the cases discussed here do not refer explicitly to a “ruse exception”—including Clark, which both Pendergrass and the government cite. 

Nevertheless, cases that do not use the term “ruse” use analogous language

like “substantial federal presence,” Iaquinta, 674 F.2d at 266–67, or “impermissible collusion,” Mearis, 36 F.4th at 654, and all cases engage in similar analyses.

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exception, we adopt Pendergrass’s 2017 federal indictment date as 

the pertinent one for his Sixth Amendment challenge. He was indicted, arraigned, and released on bond within the span of a few 

months in 2017 and, as the government notes, “does not complain 

of any post-indictment delays that might involve speedy trial 

rights.” Appellee’s Br. 44. The several-month period is also far 

shorter than the one-year “presumptively prejudicial” threshold 

that the Supreme Court has suggested should trigger further inquiry under the Sixth Amendment. See Doggett v. United States, 

505 U.S. 647, 651–52, 652 n.1 (1992) (holding that one-year delays 

are “presumptively prejudicial,” thus triggering a court’s consideration of other factors).

We thus conclude that Pendergrass’s Sixth Amendment 

right to a speedy trial has not been violated.9

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence Challenge

Pendergrass argues that the government failed to introduce 

sufficient evidence to show that he aided or abetted McQueen in 

9 Above, we addressed and rejected Pendergrass’s request for an evidentiary 

hearing in part because he incorrectly invoked Gravitt, a Sixth Amendment 

case, as his primary support for his Fifth Amendment argument. See supra Section III.A.1. Gravitt would not help his Sixth Amendment argument, either. In 

Gravitt, the district court’s speedy-trial-clock calculations failed to include the 

date when a federal complaint was filed, and so an evidentiary hearing was 

necessary for the court to determine the relevant date and corresponding calculations. Gravitt, 523 F.2d at 1214–15. But because it is undisputed here that 

the government did not file any criminal complaint or indictment until 2017, 

this case is not like Gravitt.

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two of the four counts of aggravated identity theft—Counts Seven 

and Eight. He says that the only evidence in the record about these

two charges was McQueen’s testimony that he, not Pendergrass, 

prepared the corresponding documents and paperwork requesting 

money from the City of Atlanta. We find no merit in this challenge.

A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to 

examine “whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and accepting reasonable inferences 

and credibility choices by the fact-finder, would enable the trier of 

fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United 

States v. Monroe, 866 F.2d 1357, 1365 (11th Cir. 1989). We may reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence only if there is “no reasonable construction of the evidence” from which the jury could 

have convicted the defendant. United States v. Garcia, 405 F.3d 1260, 

1269 (11th Cir. 2005).

A reasonable jury could have convicted Pendergrass on the 

two aggravated identity theft counts in question based on 

McQueen’s and Fitchpatric’s trial testimony. McQueen testified 

that, for each fraud, both he and Pendergrass signed the fake signatures on the power-of-attorney forms so that each party’s handwriting would look different. He testified that he and Pendergrass 

“would discuss everything before [they] submitted” false claims. 

Doc. 264 at 155. And Fitchpatric testified that he acted at Pendergrass’s direction when he prepared the notary seals on the false documents. He said that he always gave his finished work to Pendergrass, not McQueen. From this testimony, a reasonable jury could 

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have found that Pendergrass played a role in submitting the fraudulent documents on which Counts Seven and Eight were based

and therefore aided and abetted those identity thefts.

Pendergrass points to other parts of McQueen’s testimony 

where McQueen suggested that he had worked alone on the two 

instances of fraud charged in Counts Seven and Eight. But it is not 

enough for him to show that there was conflicting evidence about 

whether he aided and abetted the identity theft underlying these 

charges. Construing the evidence in the government’s favor, as we 

must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which a 

reasonable jury could find Pendergrass guilty of the crimes charged 

in Counts Seven and Eight.

C. Sentencing Challenges

1. Enhancement for Use of an Authentication Feature

Pendergrass argues that the district court erred at sentencing 

when it applied a two-level enhancement for use of an authentication feature. We disagree.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a two-level enhancement 

applies when the defendant’s offense involved “the possession or 

use of any . . . authentication feature.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii). Commentary to the Guidelines explains that 

the term “authentication feature” is defined by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1028(d)(1). Section 1028(d)(1) defines an authentication feature as 

“any hologram, watermark, certification . . . or other feature . . . 

used by the issuing authority on an identification document, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine 

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if the document is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified.”

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1). A person who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification 

of another person” is subject to an additional two-year consecutive 

sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). Taken together, the two provisions could present a risk of double counting: For example, the 

same instance of illegal activity could simultaneously involve the 

use of a watermark on an identification document, triggering 

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)’s enhancement, and the use of a “means of identification of another person,” triggering § 1028A(a)(1)’s two-year consecutive sentence.

We have previously addressed how to avoid this potential 

double-counting problem. See Taylor, 818 F.3d at 675. In Taylor, we 

explained that the Guidelines’ commentary resolved the overlap 

issue and ensured that a defendant is not “doubly penalized for the 

same conduct.” Id.; see also U.S.S.G. § 2B1.6(a) cmt. 2 (stating that 

if a sentence under § 1028A “is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense,” then no “specific offense characteristic for the transfer, possession, or use of a means of identification” should be applied “when determining the sentence for the 

underlying offense”). But we also recognized that § 1028A and 

§ 2B1.1(b)(11) were not co-extensive in scope, and thus an enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(11) was appropriate “when a defendant’s 

criminal activity involved conduct that is separate from or in addition to the simple transfer, possession, or use of [a] means of identification.” Taylor, 818 F.3d at 676.

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To assess whether there is a double-counting problem here, 

we look at whether the conduct giving rise to the enhancement for 

possession or use of an authentication feature was separate from or 

in addition to Pendergrass’s transfer, possession, or use of a means 

of authentication. Here, Pendergrass and McQueen mailed powerof-attorney forms containing names and forged signatures of victims. They also used notary seals on those forms. Under Taylor, 

Pendergrass’s “simple transfer, possession, or use of [a] means of 

identification” was his use of the victims’ names and signatures on 

the forms. And his “criminal activity involv[ing] conduct that isseparate from or in addition to” that use was his illicit placement of 

“authentication features”—fake notary seals—on those same 

forms. See id. at 676. In other words, the enhancement arose from 

conduct that was in addition to the use of the means of identification.

Pendergrass disagrees, arguing that the authentication feature (the notary seal) became “indivisible” from the power-of-attorney forms containing the means of identification (the names and 

forged signatures of victims). It is true that the two appeared on the 

same form and are related in that the notary witnesses the signature. But there is good reason to consider the two as separate. The 

signature’s purpose is to affirm that the person granting the power

of attorney has in fact agreed to transfer authority. The notarization’s purpose is to verify the document’s authenticity. The government might reasonably seek to punish more harshly a defendant who both forges a person’s signature and falsifies a notary seal

to create the appearance of legitimacy.

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Our precedent tracks such reasoning in similar circumstances with respect to adjacent guideline subsections. Taylor, discussing § 2B1.1(b)(11)(B)(i)’s similar enhancement for producing 

unauthorized access cards, notes that “[b]y including an enhancement for production,” the Sentencing Commission intended that 

“a defendant who creates the means . . . to engage in criminal activity should not enjoy the same punishment as the individual who 

simply uses an already-existing item to engage in criminal activity.” 

Id. at 677. Likewise, United States v. Cruz, 713 F.3d 600, 605–608 

(11th Cir. 2013), discussed § 2B1.1(b)(10)(A)(i)’s similar enhancement for possessing device-making equipment and found it reasonable to separate the defendants’ use of a credit card skimmer to create fake credit cards from the subsequent use of those fake cards 

with other people’s account numbers on them.10 Therefore, we affirm the district court’s application of the enhancement here.

2. Allocution

Lastly, Pendergrass argues that the district court plainly 

erred by failing to give him an opportunity to allocute at sentencing. The government agrees that there was plain error but specifies 

10 This Court reached the same conclusion, using the same reasoning, in a 

more analogous but unpublished opinion in United States v. James, 744 F. App’x 

664 (11th Cir. 2018) (unpublished). There, the defendant presented a fake 

driver’s license that included another person’s name, the defendant’s picture, 

and a hologram. Id. at 666–67. The defendant argued that the hologram was 

indivisible from the license, but we pointed out that identity theft via the use 

of another’s name on a license was separate from the use of a hologram to 

fraudulently lend legitimacy to that license. Id. at 667.

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that he is “entitled to an opportunity to allocute and have the court 

resentence him” without any opportunity to “file new objections to 

the PSR, file a new sentencing memorandum, or reassert or reargue any of his objections to the PSR.” Appellee’s Br. 69–70. We 

agree that the district court committed plain error. And we agree 

with the government that Pendergrass is entitled to an opportunity 

to allocute but not to an entirely new sentencing proceeding.

To establish plain error, a defendant must show that 

“(1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United 

States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). An error is plain 

if it is “clear” or “obvious.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 

(1993).

We previously have held that because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) “specifically requires the district court 

to offer the defendant the opportunity to allocute, the court’s failure to do so was a ‘clear’ or ‘obvious’ error.” United States v. Prouty, 

303 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2002). Here, because the district 

court never asked Pendergrass whether he wished to speak, it committed plain error.

This error affected Pendergrass’s substantial rights. A failure 

to afford allocution affects a defendant’s substantial rights, thereby 

prejudicing him, when the “possibility of a lower sentence exist[s].” 

Id. Such is the case here, when “Pendergrass could have advocated 

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for a further downward variance.” Appellant’s Br. 61. And we have 

recognized that “[b]ecause allocution plays a central role in the sentencing process, the denial of this right is not the sort of isolated 

error that does not impact the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Prouty, 303 F.3d at 1253 (alterations 

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The only remaining question is what Pendergrass is entitled 

to on remand. Our precedent dictates that, like other defendants 

who were not afforded an opportunity to allocute, Pendergrass “is 

entitled to an opportunity to allocute and have the court resentence him after he says what he wishes to say to the judge,” but he 

is “not entitled to an entirely new resentencing—he may not reassert or reargue any of his objections to the PSR, file new objections 

to the PSR, or file a new sentencing memorandum.” United States v. 

George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1209 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we affirm the district court on all of 

Pendergrass’s challenges except allocution. We vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing so that he may allocute.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN 

PART.

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