Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01357/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01357-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathleen Allison
Defendant
Ralph Diaz
Defendant
Marciano Flores
Plaintiff
Rosemary Ndoh
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCIANO FLORES,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

RALPH DIAZ, et al.,

 Defendants.

1:19-cv-01357-AWI-GSA-PC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 

RECOMMENDING THAT PLAINTIFF’S 

EX PARTE EMERGENCY MOTION FOR A 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

AND A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BE 

DENIED

(ECF No. 3.)

OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN 

FOURTEEN DAYS

I. BACKGROUND

Marciano Flores (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed the Complaint 

commencing this action on September 26, 2019, together with an ex parte emergency motion for 

a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) Plaintiff’s motion 

is now before the court.

II. PLANTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at the California City Correctional Facility in California 

City, California. The events in the Complaint allegedly occurred when Plaintiff was incarcerated 

at Avenal State Prison in Avenal, California. Plaintiff names as defendants Ralph Diaz (CDCR 

Secretary), Kathleen Allison (CDCR Director of Adult Institutions) and Rosemary Ndoh 

(Warden, Avenal State Prison) (collectively, “Defendants”).

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Plaintiff alleges that on December 12, 2017, defendant Allison authored a department 

memorandum which announced the expansion of the merger of the SNY (Sensitive Needs Yard, 

previously called Protective Custody) prisoners with the GP (General Population) prisoners in 

all level 1 and level 2 yards. On July 19, 2018, the Inmate Representatives at Avenal State Prison 

submitted a group statement to defendant Ndoh voicing their concerns and disagreement with the 

proposed merger. On September 10, 2018, defendant Diaz authored a department memorandum 

which set forth the schedule for the merger of the yards. The memo stated that the GP inmates 

at Avenal State Prison were scheduled to be merged with the SNY prison population in January 

of 2019. 

Plaintiff claims that it has been long understood by both the courts and CDCR officials 

that SNY prisoners cannot safely merge with GP prisoners. Each and every time these mergers 

have taken place intentionally or unintentionally, there have been well documented incidents of 

violence, whether the SNY prisoners attacked and assaulted the GP prisoners out of fear for their 

lives or were attacked and assaulted themselves by GP prisoners. This planned merger would 

place Plaintiff at serious risk of harm or injury, in violation of his right to be protected from 

violence. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are well aware of and are completely disregarding 

such an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety.

Plaintiff seeks no monetary damages and alleges that defendants Diaz, Allison, and Ndoh 

all acted in both their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining 

order, preliminary injunction, declaratory relief, and permanent injunction prohibiting a merger 

of SNY and GP prisoners together.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

Procedurally, a federal district court may issue emergency injunctive relief only if it has 

personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit. See

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (noting that one 

“becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of 

summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served

must appear to defend.). Furthermore, the pendency of this action does not give the Court 

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jurisdiction over prison officials in general. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 491–

93 (2009); Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court’s jurisdiction 

is limited to the parties in this action and to the viable legal claims upon which this action is 

proceeding. Summers, 555 U.S. at 491−93; Mayfield, 599 F.3d at 969. The court may not attempt 

to determine the rights of persons not before it. See, e.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 

245 U.S. 229, 234-35, 38 S.Ct. 65, 62 L.Ed. 260 (1916); Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727-28 

(9th Cir. 1983); Lathrop v. Unidentified, Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 817 F.Supp. 953, 961 

(M.D. Fl. 1993); Kandlbinder v. Reagan, 713 F.Supp. 337, 339 (W.D. Mo. 1989); Suster v.

Marshall, 952 F. Supp. 693, 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996); see also Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 

702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979) (injunctive relief must be “narrowly tailored to give 

only the relief to which plaintiffs are entitled”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2) 

an injunction binds only “the parties to the action,” their “officers, agents, servants, employees, 

and attorneys,” and “other persons who are in active concert or participation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

65(d)(2)(A)-(C).

A temporary restraining order is an extraordinary measure of relief that a federal court 

may impose without notice to the adverse party if, in an affidavit or verified complaint, the 

moving party “clearly show[s] that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result 

to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). 

The substantive purpose of a TRO is to preserve the status quo before a preliminary injunction 

hearing may be held; its provisional remedial nature is designed merely to prevent irreparable 

loss of rights prior to judgment. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto 

Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 439, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974). But the legal standard 

that applies to a motion for a TRO is the same as a motion for a preliminary injunction. See

Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001).

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citation omitted); Epona v. Cty. of Ventura, 

876 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2017) (same). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 

establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 

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the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an 

injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (citations omitted). An injunction 

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Id. at 22 (citation 

omitted). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just 

possible, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 

632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Requests for prospective relief are further limited by 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) of the 

Prison Litigation Reform Act, which requires that the court find the “relief [sought] is narrowly 

drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the 

least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” Section 3626(a)(2) 

also places significant limits upon a court’s power to grant preliminary injunctive relief to 

inmates. “Section 3626(a) therefore operates simultaneously to restrict the equity jurisdiction of 

federal courts and to protect the bargaining power of prison administrators – no longer may courts 

grant or approve relief that binds prison administrators to do more than the constitutional 

minimum.” Gilmore v. People of the State of California, 220 F.3d 987, 999 (9th Cir. 2000).

IV. DISCUSSION

In his motion, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction 

restraining Defendants Diaz, Allison, Ndoh, and all persons acting on their behalf from merging 

the SNY prisoners with the GP prisoners at Avenal State Prison.

Initially, the court notes that, on September 26, 2019, Plaintiff filed a notice of change of 

address indicating that he was transferred from Avenal State Prison to the California City 

Correctional Center in California City, California. (ECF No. 4.) Since Plaintiff has been 

transferred from Avenal and has not presented the court with any evidence demonstrating that he 

has a reasonable expectation of returning to Avenal State Prison, his request for injunctive relief 

relating to the policy at Avenal State Prison is moot. Nunez v. Diaz, No. 119CV00686SABPC, 

2019 WL 4127205, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2019), report and recommendation adopted sub 

nom. Nunez v. Diaz, et al., No. 119CV00686AWISABPC, 2019 WL 5390531 (E.D. Cal. Oct.

///

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22, 2019) (citing Johnson v. Moore, 948 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); see also

Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1053 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007)).

Further, even if Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is not moot, Plaintiff has not made 

a sufficient showing to warrant the granting of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 

injunction. First, Plaintiff filed this motion along with his Complaint and no defendant has been 

served with process. Until one or more of the Defendants has been served with process, this court 

lacks personal jurisdiction over them, and may not grant the injunctive relief Plaintiff requests. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2); Nunez, No. 119CV00686SABPC, 2019 WL 5390531 at *2 (citing

Murphy Bros., Inc., 526 U.S. at 350).

Second, the Court may issue a TRO without written or oral notice to the adverse party 

only if “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and 

irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard 

in opposition,” and Plaintiff “certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons 

why it should not be required.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A),(B). Although the restrictions 

imposed are stringent, they “reflect the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the 

notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been 

granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc., 415 U.S. at 438-39, 94 S.Ct. 1113.

Third, in order to establish that preliminary injunctive relief should be granted, a plaintiff 

must “demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Nunez, 2019 

WL 4127205, at *2. This requires that a plaintiff allege “specific facts in an affidavit or a verified 

complaint [which] clearly show” a credible threat of “immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or 

damage.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A). Plaintiff provides the declaration of Kim McGill, an 

organizer with the Youth Justice Coalition, describing the association’s efforts to challenge 

CDCR’s implementation of the merger policy, based on the association’s concerns about safety.1

 

1 McGill’s declaration implies Plaintiff’ s transfer to the California City Correctional Facility was 

retaliatory, but Plaintiff makes no such claim in his Complaint, or in his TRO. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC 

v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]here must be a relationship between the injury claimed 

in the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint. This requires a sufficient 

nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint 

itself.”); Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Devose’s motion is based on new assertions of 

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(ECF No. 3 at 12-16.) However, McGill’s declaration does not clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff 

has been, or is currently, assigned to a merged yard and faces imminent harm.

Plaintiff has also provided his own declaration. (ECF No. 3 at 17-21.) In his declaration, 

Plaintiff asserts that he does not want to integrate pursuant to the merger program. Plaintiff states 

that based on the integration so far, it is highly likely that violence will erupt, and he made a 

pledge to be a peacemaker. Plaintiff wishes to remove himself from high risk situations and to 

stay alive on the prison yards. Plaintiff also wishes to “live and plant seeds so others don’t 

experience what I’m going through.” (ECF No. 3 at 21.) 

Plaintiff’s declaration however does not contain any allegations that he has been, or is 

currently, assigned to a merged yard pursuant to the integration policy. In fact, Plaintiff’s 

declaration implies that Plaintiff has not been, and is not currently, assigned to a merged yard 

because he has received, and been found guilty of, at least one Rules Violation Report for 

Refusing to Accept Assigned Housing. (Id. at 20:10-12.) Therefore, Plaintiff has necessarily 

failed to show, for purposes of justifying preliminary injunctive relief, any likelihood of success 

on the merits of his claims. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s allegations that he currently faces immediate and irreparable harm 

are speculative. Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldridge, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) 

(“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a 

preliminary injunction.” (citation omitted)). Consequently, Plaintiff has failed to establish that 

he currently faces the type of immediate and credible threat of irreparable harm necessary to 

justify extraordinary injunctive relief at this stage of the case. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 

632 F.3d at 1131 (“Under Winter, plaintiff[ ] must establish that irreparable harm is likely, not 

just possible”); Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of State of Cal., 739 F.2d 466, 472 

(9th Cir. 1984) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury”); Rigsby v. State, No. 

CV 11-1696-PHX-DGC, 2013 WL 1283778, at *5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 28, 2013) (denying prisoner’s 

 

mistreatment that are entirely different from the claim raised and the relief requested in his inadequate medical 

treatment lawsuit. Although these new assertions might support additional claims against the same prison officials, 

they cannot provide the basis for a preliminary injunction in this lawsuit.”).

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TRO based on fear of potential future injury based on past assaults); Chappell v. Stankorb, No. 

1:11-CV-01425-LJO, 2012 WL 1413889, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2012) (denying injunctive 

relief where prisoner’s claims of injury based on current or future housing decisions were nothing 

“more than speculative”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11-CV-01425-LJO, 2012 

WL 2839816 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012). A presently existing actual threat must be shown, even 

though injury need not be certain to occur. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 

395 U.S. 100, 130-31, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969); FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 

1279-80 (9th Cir. 1997); Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., 844 F.2d at 674.

For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s ex parte emergency motion for a temporary 

restraining order and a preliminary injunction should be denied.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s ex parte 

emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, filed on 

September 26, 2019, be DENIED.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen 

(14) days after the date of service of these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file 

written objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 

(9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 30, 2020 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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