Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-23-01827/USCOURTS-ca3-23-01827-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose Soto
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 23-1827

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

JOSE SOTO,

Appellant

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey

(District Court No. 2-20-cr-00903-002)

District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini

_____________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

March 28, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and McKEE, 

Circuit Judges

(Filed: November 20, 2024)

_______________

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Kevin A. Buchan 

Buchan Palo & Cardamone 

750 Broad Street 

Suite 202 

Shrewsbury, NJ 07702 

Counsel for Appellant 

Mark E. Coyne 

Richard J. Ramsay 

Office of United States Attorney 

970 Broad Street 

Room 700 

Newark, NJ 07102 

Counsel for Appellee

_____________

OPINION 

_____________

McKEE, Circuit Judge

A jury convicted Jose Soto of one count of conspiracy 

to commit bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, two 

counts of bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 

and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during and in 

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 

924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

 At sentencing, the 

District Court set his offense level at 29 and ultimately 

sentenced him at the high-end of his Guidelines range: 289 

months in federal prison (including two mandatory and 

consecutive seven-year terms). Soto’s offense level 

Case: 23-1827 Document: 59 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/06/2024
3

determination incorporated a two-level enhancement for 

obstruction of justice pursuant to United States Sentencing 

Guideline (“USSG”) §3C1.1. The District Court imposed this 

enhancement based on allegations that Soto improperly: (1) 

stepped onto an elevator full of jurors and asked one of them 

to press the first floor button; (2) interacted with a testifying 

witness’s brother on the weekend of trial; and (3) greeted 

victims as they entered the courthouse. Because the record 

inadequately supports this enhancement’s application, we will 

vacate and remand for a new sentencing.

I. Background

Law enforcement arrested Jose Soto and Nicholas 

Ortiz in connection with an armed robbery of PNC Bank in 

Passaic, New Jersey, on February 6, 2020, and an armed 

robbery of the Valley National Bank, in Little Falls, New 

Jersey, on February 27, 2020.

A jury trial ensued. After jury selection, an occasion 

arose wherein Soto got on an elevator with fourteen jurors for 

his trial.

1

 When he first stepped onto the elevator, he asked 

one of the jurors to press the button for the “[f]irst floor.” 

Two jurors reported the interaction to a court security officer 

(“CSO”). The Judge responded by reprimanding Soto. The

Judge told him that, “[h]is conduct is just inexplicable,”2and 

that “it’s pretty self-evident that a defendant in a case knows 

1 There is nothing in the record that indicates whether the 

jurors were wearing juror badges at the time, but the District 

Court assumed that they were. 

2Appx 193.

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he’s not to interact in any way with the jury.”3 Soto’s counsel 

did not deny that the interaction occurred, but noted that the 

Judge had not previously instructed Soto to avoid any 

interaction whatsoever with the jurors, and that Soto did not 

purposefully ignore any of the Court’s instructions. The 

Judge responded by focusing on the consequences of Soto’s 

conduct—not his intention. He said: 

I’ve had situations in [which] a defendant is 

walking down a hall, a juror is walking down 

the hall, the defendant smiles at the juror, says 

good morning, which is inappropriate too. 

Those don’t seem to be a big issue. Okay? The 

fact that at least two jurors reported [the 

elevator interaction] and took the time to come 

up, see [the CSO] . . . is something we have to 

address right now.4 

The Judge then interviewed each juror about the incident; one 

juror (Juror #2) stated that he could not be objective in 

weighing the evidence against Soto because of the interaction 

and was excused.

The prosecutors also alleged that—the morning 

following the elevator interaction, but before Soto was 

3

Id.

4 Appx 193.

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reprimanded by the Court—Soto “approached” the victims 

scheduled to testify on the steps of the courthouse, to “greet 

them.”5 He allegedly did so while neglecting to acknowledge 

any of the FBI agents accompanying the victims. The 

government averred that it did not see “any indication of a 

threat or anything like that ....”6 None of the victims testified 

about this interaction. In response to the government’s 

allegation, Soto’s counsel offered his version of the facts: “I 

was there, he was waiting for me on the courthouse steps. The 

word ‘approach,’ I don’t think he approached anybody. 

People walked in and he may have said ‘Good morning.’

Now that’s the extent of what I think happened this 

morning.”

7

 

Finally, over the weekend—after trial started, but 

before co-defendant Ortiz testified—Soto attended, with 

government permission, a family event in his neighborhood. 

The government reported that Soto approached one of Ortiz’s 

brothers on the street and asked him whether he was Ortiz’s 

brother. The brother allegedly did not reply and kept 

walking. The government then explained that Ortiz’s mother 

lives “very, very close to the defendant and that [Ortiz’s] 

brother was visiting the mother and so was in the area of the 

defendant’s residence at that time.”8 Additionally, the 

government stated that the defendant and Ortiz are “distant 

relatives,” so it is possible Ortiz’s brother and Soto knew each 

other.9 

5 Appx 190.

6 Appx 190.

7 Appx 192.

8 Appx 407.

9

Id.

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The prosecutor represented that FBI agents had 

interviewed Ortiz’s brother and “confirmed th[e] story” and 

that the agents were looking into whether they could find 

surveillance footage to further corroborate it.10 When later 

asked whether the government was prepared to bring Ortiz’s 

brother in to testify, the government said that he lived in 

South Jersey, so it would be difficult to get him to court, but 

they could possibly have him appear remotely. The Judge 

suggested that the prosecutor offer the agent’s report and said, 

“[t]hen we’ll go from there.”11 The prosecutor agreed. The 

prosecutor later represented that there existed video evidence 

of the two passing each other in the street, but neither the 

government’s notes, nor the surveillance footage are part of 

the record before us, and the Judge made no factual findings 

related to this interaction.

When deciding to apply the enhancement for 

obstruction of justice at Soto’s sentencing hearing, the Judge 

explained that §3C1.1 was “very applicable” to the elevator 

incident.

12 The Judge then acknowledged that the additional 

“two things” (greeting victims and interacting with Ortiz’s 

brother) “in their own right probably wouldn’t result in an 

enhancement, but when [combined] with, clearly, getting on 

an elevator during the course of the trial, not only could have, 

but did in fact impede and affect at least one juror and caused 

this Court to have to do a lengthy voir dire of the jurors 

because of his conduct getting on the elevator. That was not a 

mistake.”13

10 Appx 612.

11 Id.

12 Appx 988–98.

13 Appx 989.

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II. Analysis

On appeal, Soto argues that the District Court made 

several errors. The only argument that has merit is Soto’s 

claim that the District Court erroneously applied an 

enhancement for obstruction under USSG §3C1.1.14

A. Applicable Law

As we have previously recognized, individuals are 

entitled to due process at their sentencing hearings:

Prosecutors, of course, may not introduce any 

and all hearsay testimony at a sentencing 

proceeding. The admission of hearsay 

statements in the sentencing context is subject 

to the requirements of the Due Process Clause. 

Under the precedent of this Court, hearsay 

14 Soto also claims the Judge abused his discretion by: (1) 

allowing the government to admit photographs from Soto’s 

phone that depict stacks of cash and cash strewn about his 

home; (2) allowing Agent Barile to testify as a lay witness; 

(3) not permitting Soto to try on a piece of evidence (a glove); 

and (4) the manner in which he handled the jury’s note 

indicating that there was a deadlock. He also alleges that (5) 

the Judge failed to consider COVID-19 jail conditions under 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For the reasons the District Court 

explained, all these claims fail.

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statements must have some “minimal indicium 

of reliability beyond mere allegation.15

We review the factual findings underlying an 

obstruction of justice enhancement under §3C1.1 for clear 

error.16 Clear error exists only if the district court’s ruling 

was “completely devoid of a credible evidentiary basis or 

bears no rational relationship to the supporting data.”17 If the 

factual findings are adequately supported, then “we review 

the District Court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts 

for abuse of discretion.”18 

The standard of proof for determining willful 

obstruction of justice is by a “preponderance of evidence.”19 

The government has the burden of proving that it is “more 

likely than not” that the accused willfully obstructed 

justice.20 Notably, there must be evidence in the record 

15 United States v. Robinson, 482 F.3d 244, 246 (3d Cir. 

2007) (quoting United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 

1102 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also USSG §6A1.3(a). 

16 United States v. Gray, 942 F.3d 627, 633 (3d Cir. 2019). 

This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment under 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

17 United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2007) 

(quoting United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 

1997)). 

18 United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549, 555 (3d Cir. 2013).

19 United States v. Kim, 27 F.3d 947, 960 (3d Cir. 1994).

20 See, e.g., United States v. Belletiere, 971 F.2d 961, 966 (3d 

Cir. 1992) (finding that the prosecution failed to meet its 

burden because it failed to introduce any evidence that could 

have made it more likely than not that Belletiere “willfully” 

attempted to obstruct justice).

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supporting the District Court’s findings.21 Although the 

record need not contain direct evidence of the conduct, other 

evidence must be present in the record to support an inference 

that the individual willfully obstructed justice.22

B. The Factual Findings Do Not Support Soto’s 

Enhancement

Here, the factual findings required to support this 

enhancement are completely absent from the record. First, 

the District Court did not explicitly adopt the findings of the 

presentence report (“PSR”), which incorporated all three 

allegations of obstruction. But even if it had, after weighing 

the government’s evidence, courts “may accept any 

undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of 

fact.”

23 Instead, Soto objected and provided “detailed 

reasons” why the “findings were unreliable.”24 The PSR 

itself made that clear with respect to the family incident. A 

footnote specified that “[d]efense counsel objected to this 

claim and stated there was no evidence of any interaction 

21 See United States v. Douglas, 849 F.3d 40, 50–51 (3d Cir. 

2017), rev’d en banc on other grounds, 885 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 

2018) (finding that the district court inappropriately applied 

an obstruction of justice enhancement when it relied on 

factual findings not supported in the record regarding 

Douglas’s “willfulness”).

22 Kim, 27 F.3d at 960–61 (reasoning that even though the 

record did not contain direct evidence of Kim’s false 

cooperation and misstatements, other evidence in the record 

allowed the district court to make that inference).

23 Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) (emphasis added).

24 United States v. Campbell, 295 F.3d 398, 406 (3d Cir. 

2002)). 

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between Soto and Ortiz’s brother.”

25 The same footnote went 

on to note that the government “submitted video footage 

showing the two men passing on the street and Soto turning 

back several times,” and that there was “no audio recording of 

the interaction” that was reported to the police by Ortiz’s 

brother.

26 The Judge did not rule on these objections, 

rendering full adoption of the PSR impossible. Thus, the 

unadopted PSR could not have, by itself, supplied a factual 

basis to support the District Court’s findings. 

And while the record does include passing references

to an FBI affidavit and surveillance footage, neither piece of 

evidence is actually in the record, and it is far from clear that 

the District Court considered them. Meanwhile, Soto 

explicitly denied that there was ever any interaction with 

Ortiz’s brother, “much less an attempt at an ‘indirect 

threat.’”27 He also argued that any interaction with members 

of the jury or other witnesses was “inadvertent and not 

intended to be any kind of threat or obstruction of justice in 

any way.”28 The District Court declined to hold a hearing on 

these issues and failed to enter into the record any of the 

support the government claimed it had, but nonetheless 

applied the obstruction enhancement. 

Due process was therefore lacking here. In applying 

the obstruction enhancement, the District Court improperly 

relied upon the government’s unsubstantiated allegations 

about Soto’s interactions with victims and a testifying 

25 Appx 1031. 

26 Id.

27 Appx 940.

28 Id.

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witness’s brother. The District Court’s application of a

sentencing enhancement without supporting evidence requires 

remand and resentencing. 

C. The District Court Abused its Discretion by Inferring 

Soto’s Intent Solely from his Elevator Conduct

While there was adequate record evidence to support 

the District Court’s finding that Soto entered the elevator with 

jurors and asked them to press the button for floor one, it 

would have been an abuse of discretion for the District Court 

to infer wrongful intent from this action alone.

We have defined “willfully,” as used in §3C1.1, as 

acting consciously (“deliberately or intentionally”) with the 

purpose of obstructing justice, as opposed to “negligently, 

inadvertently, or accidentally.”29 Obstructive conduct under 

§3C1.1 includes “threatening, intimidating, or otherwise 

unlawfully influencing a co-defendant, witness, or juror, 

directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.”30 Further, we 

have held that the obstruction of justice enhancement may 

apply only when an individual acts willfully—that is, with the 

purpose of achieving an obstruction of justice.

District courts in our Circuit often infer willfulness 

based on behavior far more outlandish than what the court 

29 United States v. Jenkins, 275 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 

2001) (finding that the individual’s “failure to appear in state 

court was an intentional action, one taken with full awareness 

of the proceedings”).

30 USSG §3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(a).

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determined Soto did here.31 Although Soto’s behavior may 

have been “inappropriate,” the District Court’s focus was not 

31 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 238 (3d 

Cir. 2010) (yelling “bitch I oughta kill your fucking ass” at 

government witness); United States v. Williams, 591 F. App’x 

78, 96 (3d Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential opinion) (making 

threatening telephone calls to coerce co-defendant into not 

testifying at trial); United States v. Webb, 499 F. App’x 210, 

214 (3d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential opinion) (asking brother 

to confront a critical witness during his trial for armed 

robbery); United States v. Carter, 293 F. App’x 954, 957 (3d 

Cir. 2008) (nonprecedential opinion) (leaving a voice 

message for witness stating, “loose lips sink ships” and “you 

should be running instead of running your mouth” and 

witness testifying that they considered such statements to be a 

threat); United States v. Rinick, 219 F. App’x 238, 241–42 

(3d Cir. 2007) (nonprecedential opinion) (threatening to kill 

someone who called him a “rat”); United States v. Bush, 94 F. 

App’x 101, 102 (3d Cir. 2004) (nonprecedential opinion) 

(writing, in a letter to wife while awaiting sentencing, that he 

would “get that prosecutor . . . for doing this to me,” and 

would get witness “for fucking up our getaway trip for that 

weekend”).

The parties’ briefing on whether this conduct (alone or 

in combination with the two other incidents) rises to the level 

of obstruction necessary to justify an enhancement is sparse. 

Soto only cites Jenkins, 275 F.3d at 287, for the proposition 

that §3C1.1 requires willfulness. The government cites no 

analogous cases whatsoever but includes one string cite for 

the proposition that the district court, as the finder of fact, 

determines the motive for a defendant’s actions and what was 

meant by the defendant’s statements. The support for this 

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on Soto’s intent to obstruct—the critical element to apply this 

enhancement—but on the fact that two out of fourteen jurors 

were made uncomfortable by sharing an elevator with him. 

Indeed, the court made no mention of the other jurors who 

either did not care or, in some instances, did not even 

notice.32 In recognizing that an accused person greeting a 

passing juror by saying “good morning” is inappropriate but 

is not a “big issue,”33 the District Court acknowledged that 

not all “inappropriate” behavior creates an inference of intent 

necessary for an enhancement, and we certainly agree. While 

there is evidence that Soto’s conduct made Juror #2 

uncomfortable, that evidence does not bear on the ultimate 

issue: whether Soto intended to cause the jurors to feel 

proposition is largely out-of-circuit. The only in-circuit case 

the government includes is United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 

341, 354 (3d Cir. 2022), which stands for the proposition that 

the court can evaluate factual findings in the record for 

purposes of an enhancement of §3B1.1. In doing so, the 

government overlooks that much of what it describes is not in 

the record; they are accusations that the District Court 

apparently accepted without any factual finding or record 

support. 

32 See, e.g., Appx 204 (“JUROR NO. 3: No, actually nothing 

happened. He just -- he was, like, one of the last people to get 

in the elevator, so . . . .”); id. at 205 (“JUROR NO. 4: No, no, 

no, it’s fine. I’m okay with it. It’s fine.”); id. at 211 (In 

response to being asked whether Juror No. 9 would hold the 

interaction against the defendant he stated, “No, everybody’s 

gotta get downstairs”); id. at 211–12 (Jurors No. 10 and 11 

did not even recall that Soto stepped into the elevator).

33 Appx 193.

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uncomfortable. And, in any event, nearly all the other jurors 

were unfazed by this interaction, if they even noticed it at all.

 

Given the logistical limitations and configurations of 

many courthouses, it will often be difficult to prevent the kind 

of interaction that apparently occurred between Soto and his 

jurors without proof of the accused’s mindset.34 Without 

more, Soto’s request that a juror push an elevator button for a 

particular floor is simply the kind of interaction that occurs in 

daily life. After all, the juror may have been even more 

threatened if Soto had approached her and reached across her 

to push the button himself. Moreover, although it could be 

argued that Soto should simply have not gotten on the 

elevator, nothing suggests that he was ever so advised. In 

sum, there is simply not enough in this record to justify a 

conclusion that Soto intended to obstruct justice.

Moreover, we fail to see how Soto’s elevator behavior 

is materially different from the passing greeting the District 

Court described, and the District Court provides no 

explanation. It merely acknowledged that his behavior “did 

in fact impede” justice because the Court was required to 

conduct “a lengthy voir dire because of his conduct getting on 

the elevator.”35 The District Court imposed the enhancement 

because Soto’s conduct did in fact impede the proceedings; 

34 This risk is heightened where judges hold court at unusual 

hours, as here. See Appx 189 (“To be candid, I don’t think 

there [are] too many other jurors here for other cases here at 

8:00 in the morning because most judges don’t start early. I 

don’t know if there’s a better solution in terms of how we’re 

entering and exiting the courthouse and the courtroom.”). 

35 Appx 989.

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but the obstruction of justice enhancement under the 

Guidelines turns on his intent—not the consequences of 

actions.36 

In sum, the District Court committed clear error by 

improperly relying on allegations not supported in the record. 

Even if it had exclusively relied on what is in the record, the 

Court would have abused discretion by applying the 

enhancement; Soto’s behavior here is simply not enough to 

support an inference that he willfully intended to obstruct 

justice, and courts simply cannot read “obstruction” into such 

everyday interactions without more than what appears on this 

record. 

As the District Court noted, greeting a juror with 

“good morning” will often be inconsequential,37 even though 

it could also be interpreted as intimidation. Relying on such 

conduct to impose a sanction for obstruction of justice puts 

the accused on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand they 

may very well believe that ignoring a passing juror would be 

interpreted as an act of rudeness that would adversely reflect 

upon them. On the other hand, greeting the passing juror with 

something as mundane as “good morning” might be 

interpreted as ill-advised, an improper communication, or 

some kind of intimidation. The fundamental guarantee of due 

process simply does not allow a court to imprison someone 

for such conduct without more than what appears on this 

record. Accordingly, the District Court erred in applying a 

36 See USSG §3C1.1, cmt. n. 2 (advising the court to ensure 

behavior under this enhancement “necessarily reflect[s] a 

willful attempt to obstruct justice”) (emphasis added).

37 Appx 193.

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sentencing enhancement for this innocuous conduct under the 

circumstances here.

III. Conclusion

 

Although this record compels our conclusion that a 

sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice was not 

justified under the circumstances here, it goes without saying 

that jurors perform an absolutely essential function. We 

therefore take this opportunity to reiterate the importance of 

taking all reasonable and appropriate measures to ensure their 

safety and security as well as the need to create an 

atmosphere that will allow them to deliberate without fear or 

apprehension. Citizens who sacrifice their time and 

convenience to discharge the constitutional obligation of jury 

duty perform a service that is essential for the proper 

functioning of our system of justice. Courts must remain 

vigilant in ensuring that jurors do not have a reason to 

question the priority courts assign to providing a “safe space” 

for the discharge of that service. Nevertheless, for the 

reasons we have explained, we are satisfied that 

the defendant’s conduct here did not rise to the level of 

compromising the safety or security of these 

jurors. Accordingly, imposition of this obstruction 

enhancement was clear error. There is simply “no rational 

relationship” between the enhancement and “the supporting 

data.”38

38 Vitillo, 490 F.3d at 330.

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