Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-09-03159/USCOURTS-ca6-09-03159-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cleveland Clinic
Appellee
Cleveland Clinic Health System
Appellee
Curtis Dowling
Appellant
Patricia Dowling
Appellant
The Cleveland Clinic Foundation
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 10a0015p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

PATRICIA DOWLING and CURTIS DOWLING,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE CLEVELAND CLINIC FOUNDATION, THE

CLEVELAND CLINIC, and CLEVELAND CLINIC

HEALTH SYSTEM,

 Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 09-3159

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 07-02320—Donald C. Nugent, District Judge.

Argued: November 20, 2009

Decided and Filed: February 3, 2010 

Before: MARTIN, BOGGS, and COLE, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Harry D. Rankin, SUTTON RANKIN LAW, PLC, Edgewood, Kentucky, for

Appellants. Keith Hansbrough, BONEZZI, SWITZER, MURPHY, POLITO & HUPP CO.,

L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Harry D. Rankin, SUTTON RANKIN

LAW, PLC, Edgewood, Kentucky, for Appellants. Bret C. Perry, James E. Stephenson,

BONEZZI, SWITZER, MURPHY, POLITO & HUPP CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for

Appellees.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Patricia Dowling slipped and fell in a

puddle of water while walking down a hallway adjacent to the cafeteria at the Cleveland

Clinic. Appellants Patricia and Curtis Dowling filed an action against appellees the

Cleveland Clinic Foundation, the Cleveland Clinic, and Cleveland Clinic Health System

1

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(collectively, “the Clinic”) in federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The

Dowlings appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Clinic. However,

because the Dowlings did not proffer any evidence of how long the water hazard had existed

before her fall such that an employee would have constructive notice, as required by Ohio

slip-and-fall law, the district court did not err in granting the Clinic’s motion for summary

judgment. Additionally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

Dowlings’ motion for additional discovery because the Dowlings made no discovery

requests until after the Clinic had completed its discovery and filed its motion for summary

judgment, fifteen months after the Dowlings filed their suit in federal court, and did not

complete their discovery during the sixty days offered by the court. For the reasons

discussed below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I.

On April 27, 2004, the Dowlings arrived at the Clinic around lunchtime to consult

with a physician. Mrs. Dowling testified that she slipped and fell in a puddle of water in a

hallway between the lobby and the cafeteria. Mrs. Dowling stated that the activity in the

hallway was busy and that people were rushing back and forth from the cafeteria carrying

“pop and water and stuff.” At her deposition, Mrs. Dowling stated that she fell because

“[t]there was water in the hallway. It was just a fairly small puddle.” During her deposition,

Mrs. Dowling testified that she fell in a wide, tiled hallway and that there was nothing

concealing her view of the hallway. She further stated that she had no knowledge where the

water came from, how long the water had been in the hallway, whether anyone else had

fallen in the spill, or whether anyone else was aware of the water in the hallway. 

According to the deposition testimony of Katherine MacKenzie, the facility manager

employed by Crothall, a health service contractor hired by the Clinic to oversee the Clinic’s

Environmental Services Department, MacKenzie was not aware of any prior reports of falls

in the area in which Mrs. Dowling is alleged to have fallen. Additionally, she testified that

the area was subject to constant monitoring by employees dedicated to that area. She

acknowledged that the chances of a spill would be greater near the cafeteria around

mealtimes because of increased activity and stated that a spill in the area at some point would

be “inevitable.”

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1

The Dowlings had previously asserted these claims in a state court action filed in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas on April 25, 2006, Case No. CV-06-589999. This was filed within the

applicable two-year statute of limitations after her April 27, 2004 slip-and-fall at the Clinic. The Dowlings

voluntarily dismissed the state court action pursuant to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 41(A)(1)(a) on or

about August 2, 2006, without conducting any discovery, because Mrs. Dowling continued to undergo

treatment for her injuries. The action at issue here was filed within the one-year statute of limitations to

re-file afforded by Ohio law. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (West).

The Dowlings filed a complaint on July 30, 2007 and an amended complaint on

August 3, 2007, alleging that Mrs. Dowling suffered serious injuries as a result of the

negligence and carelessness of the Cleveland Clinic Foundation, Cleveland Clinic, and

Cleveland Clinic Health System.1

 The Dowlings claim that Mrs. Dowling’s injuries

resulted from the Clinic’s negligence in allowing water to accumulate and/or remain on

the floor of its premises, thereby creating an unreasonably dangerous condition.

After a scheduling conference in October 2007, the Clinic issued interrogatories

and requests for production of documents and noticed the depositions of the Dowlings.

After the completion of the Clinic’s discovery requests in December 2007, the Clinic

filed a motion for summary judgment. The Dowlings then responded to the substance

of the motion for summary judgment before requesting additional time to file a sur-reply

for the purpose of conducting additional discovery, which the district court granted on

February 26, 2008, permitting the Dowlings to conduct discovery to respond to the

motion for summary judgment until May 1. 

The Dowlings’ first “discovery request” during this litigation was an email sent

in March 2008, three months after the Clinic’s summary judgment motion, stating:

Here are the answers to your interrogatories........ I am going to want to

take the deposition of the Maintenance Supervisor and the Property Risk

Manager of your client at the time of my client’s fall some time in April

since the Court has given me until May 1 to supplement my response to

your MSJ......I also want to take the deposition of “Dorothy” who was at

the information desk in the area where my client fell when she fell......I

also would like copies of any maintenance manuals for the care, upkeep

and supervision of your client’s premises where my client fell......I also

would like to know if the area where my client fell was subject to camera

surveillance and whether any videotapes of my client’s fall either exist

now or ever existed....Please let me know if we can handle these

discovery requests informally or if you want a formal set of

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Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and/or

Things......Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions

and/or want to discuss these or any other matter related to this case.....

Thanks for all of your patience and professionalism throughout this

case!!!!!!!

Though the Clinic responded that the persons would be identified and dates provided,

no information was given. After several email exchanges, a deposition with MacKenzie,

the Clinic’s risk management manager, was scheduled for the afternoon of June 5.

However, on the morning of June 5, having denied the Dowlings’ motion for an

extension of time to file a sur-reply on June 5, the district court granted the Clinic’s

motion for summary judgment. The district court found that, while the Clinic failed to

prove that the condition causing Mrs. Dowling’s fall was open and obvious, the

Dowlings presented no evidence that the Clinic created, was aware of, or had

constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition.

On June 16, the Dowlings moved to alter, amend and/or vacate the district court’s

grant of summary judgment because of various difficulties encountered during discovery

and the fact that the Dowlings’ counsel had relocated his law practice. The Dowlings

requested additional time to conduct discovery in light of the circumstances which

supposedly prevented their attorney from filing a more thorough response to the Clinic’s

motion for summary judgment. 

On August 7, following a status conference, the district court, having found that

the Dowlings did not have adequate time for discovery before it granted the Clinic’s

motion for summary judgment, granted the Dowlings’ motion to alter, amend, and/or

vacate the grant of summary judgment. The Dowlings were given sixty days to depose

MacKenzie before the next status conference on October 8. The Dowlings sent several

additional emails to the Clinic requesting a time to schedule the deposition. However,

supposedly due to scheduling conflicts, the deposition was delayed until September 30.

On September 30, the Dowlings deposed MacKenzie—who had been identified

in response to the Dowlings’ request to depose the Clinic’s facility manager—pursuant

to a Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum dated September 17. However, they contend

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that it was not until the day of the deposition that it became clear that MacKenzie

worked for a third-party subcontractor and not the Clinic itself. Additionally, though the

Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum requested that she bring:

1. Any and all written policies and procedures to assure the safe

condition of the floors at the Cleveland Clinic from foreign substances

that create slip and fall hazards; and

2. Any and all written policies and procedures applicable to when

a reported slip and fall incident occurs at the Cleveland Clinic,

neither MacKenzie nor the Clinic’s attorneys brought such documents with them to the

deposition, though MacKenzie testified that they existed. 

A status conference was held on October 8, at which time the district court was

informed that the Dowlings had completed the requested deposition and had filed a

second motion for extension of time to file a sur-reply to conduct additional discovery.

The Clinic opposed the motion and filed a motion for an order reinstating the district

court’s previous summary judgment ruling. Another status conference was held on

November 7, at which time the district court denied both motions. The district court

ordered the parties to re-file motions for summary judgment and granted judgment in

favor of the Clinic on January 12, 2009. The Dowlings timely appealed.

II.

A. Grant of Summary Judgment

The Dowlings assert that the district court erred in finding that no genuine issue

of material fact existed from which a reasonable juror could conclude that the Clinic had

constructive knowledge of an accumulation of water which created a slip-and-fall hazard

prior to Mrs. Dowling’s injury. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and must view

“the facts and any inferences that can be drawn from those facts . . . in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party.” Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th

Cir. 2005) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587

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(1986)). Summary judgment is only appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56).

As we noted in Beard v. Kroger Co., Inc., 133 F. App’x 174, 175-75 (6th Cir.

2005), under Ohio law, a plaintiff may prevail in a slip-and-fall negligence claim in one

of three ways. As an Ohio appellate court recently explained,

The law in the state of Ohio is clear that in order for a plaintiff to recover

damages from a slip and fall accident as a business invitee, the following

must be established:

1. That the defendant through its officers or employees was responsible

for the hazard complained of; or

2. That at least one of such persons had actual knowledge of the hazard

and neglected to give adequate notice of its presence or remove it

promptly; or

3. That such danger had existed for a sufficient length of time reasonably

to justify the inference that the failure to warn against it or remove it was

attributable to a want of ordinary care.

Combs v. First Nat’l Supermarkets, Inc., 663 N.E.2d 669, 670 (Ohio App.1995) (quoting

Johnson v. Wagner Provision Co., 49 N.E.2d 925, 928 (Ohio 1943)).

Under the third avenue for relief at issue here, generally referred to as a

constructive knowledge theory of liability, Ohio courts “ha[ve] consistently followed

Anaple [ v. Standard Oil Co., 124 N.E.2d 128 (Ohio 1955),] and held that evidence of

how long the hazard existed is mandatory in establishing a duty to exercise ordinary

care.” Combs, 663 N.E.2d at 671. In Williams v. Anderson’s, Inc., No. L-00-1365, 2001

WL 574958 (Ohio Ct. App. May 25, 2001), the court applied this principle in rejecting

the negligence claim of a woman who had slipped and fallen on an orange peel. “To

show constructive knowledge,” the court stated at the outset, “the invitee must present

evidence to show how long the hazard existed.” Id. at *1. But “[n]otably”, the court

added, “appellant did not present any evidence tending to show that any of appellee’s

employees saw the orange peel on the floor before appellant fell,” and “she did not

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present evidence showing the amount of time that the hazard existed before the fall.”

Id. at *2. Thus, the court dismissed her claim.

Harrison v. Andersons, Inc., No. L-99-1368, 2000 WL 819057 (Ohio Ct. App.

June 23, 2000), hews to the same path. The court granted summary judgment even

though an employee saw the hazard on the floor. “Assuming, as we must for summary

judgment purposes, that this employee did notice the [hazard] prior to appellant’s slip,

there is simply no evidence regarding how long that employee knew of the grapes prior

to appellant’s accident.” Id. at *2.

In this case, as the district court noted in its memorandum opinion granting

summary judgment, 

Mrs. Dowling testified that she possesses no knowledge, or evidence, as

to the cause of the accumulation of water; whether any employee of

defendants was aware of the accumulation of water; how long the water

had been in the hallway; or that any other individual fell in the hallway

so as to put defendants on notice of the condition. While Ms. MacKenzie

testified that the area where Mrs. Dowling fell was subject to constant

monitoring, and that it was foreseeable that someone would spill liquid

in the area because of its location near the cafeteria, she also testified that

she has no knowledge of actual prior spills or falls in the area where Mrs.

Dowling fell. There is simply no evidence that [the Clinic] had any

knowledge of the alleged hazard and no evidence upon which to impute

knowledge to [the Clinic].

In so doing, the district court properly applied the requirements of Ohio law for

slip-and-fall tort suits that rely upon constructive knowledge to establish negligence.

The Dowlings claim that the district court erred in relying upon MacKenzie’s

testimony that the area is constantly monitored, arguing that just because it is supposed

to be constantly monitored does not mean that it is. However, the Dowlings present no

evidence from which to infer that the area was not monitored constantly and that the

water had been present for long enough for the Clinic to have had constructive

knowledge of its existence. 

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Thus, because the district court properly applied the requirements of Ohio law

for slip-and-fall tort suits that rely upon constructive knowledge to establish negligence,

the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the Clinic.

B. Denial of the Dowlings’ Motion to Allow Additional Discovery

The Dowlings further argue that the district court abused its discretion in denying

their motion to allow additional discovery. 

We review a district court’s denial of additional time for discovery for abuse of

discretion. Audi AG v. D’Amato, 469 F.3d 534, 541 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Plott v.

General Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1197 (6th Cir. 1995)). Factors that should be

considered include: (1) when the moving party learned of the issue that is the subject

of discovery; (2) how the discovery would affect the ruling below; (3) the length of the

discovery period; (4) whether the moving party was dilatory; and (5) whether the

adverse party was responsive to prior discovery requests. Id. The overarching inquiry

in these overlapping factors is whether the moving party was diligent in pursuing

discovery.

1. When the Dowlings Learned of the Issue

The Dowlings assert that they continue to require discovery related to the policies

and procedures for the cleaning and maintenance of the area in which Mrs. Dowling

slipped and fell. In response to their requests for a deposition with the Clinic’s

“Maintenance Supervisor and the Property Risk manager,” the Clinic arranged a

deposition with MacKenzie. The Dowlings contend that they learned at the deposition

that MacKenzie worked for a third-party subcontractor and not the Clinic itself and that

she was allegedly not the correct party to depose because she was not in charge of the

area in which Mrs. Dowling fell at the time that she fell. However, it is not clear that

this is a real issue. MacKenzie was employed by the Clinic as the Facility Services

Director with the Department of Environmental Services, a department that provides

housekeeping and maintenance, which includes addressing spilled liquids. It is a fact

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in dispute as to whether MacKenzie was responsible for the area in which Mrs. Dowling

fell. However, the Dowlings never issued an interrogatory seeking the identity of the

person responsible for that area. Instead, their attorney repeatedly sent exclamationpoint-laden emails. Furthermore, had the Dowlings filed a formal request for a

deposition of MacKenzie earlier in the case, either when the Clinic was performing its

discovery or after the court granted them additional time to file the sur-reply, when the

Clinic had informed them that they would respond only to formal discovery requests,

they could have learned all she had to testify about before the deadline. Had they done

so, they also would have had a record to point to in order to establish diligence in

seeking discovery. There is no reason that the Dowlings could not have learned of this

potential discrepancy earlier in the case.

The Dowlings also assert that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court

to deny their request for additional time to acquire the documents that the Clinic and

MacKenzie did not bring to the deposition, despite testimony that the documents exist.

They claim that the documents may contain information inconsistent with the Clinic’s

defenses and demonstrate that the Clinic failed to take reasonable measures to ensure the

safety of its premises. However, it is unclear why this information could not have been

requested in an earlier request for written discovery; indeed, the Dowlings first asked for

the “maintenance manuals” via email several months earlier before the Clinic informed

them that it would only respond to formal discovery requests. Thus, the Dowlings did

not first learn of this information on the day of the deposition and could have obtained

it earlier had they been more diligent. 

Additionally, the Dowlings were only granted the additional sixty days to take

the deposition of the “Clinic’s Risk Management Director,” not to acquire documents.

Moreover, requests for production of documents accompanying a notice of deposition

to a party deponent must be sent at least 30 days before the deposition to permit

objections to the document request. Here, the request was made less than three weeks

before the deposition. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(2); FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2). Thus, the

Dowlings’ arguments that the Clinic failed to object to the request are unavailing.

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2

The Clinic suggests that we should consider the original state court filing as well. The state

court filing was made on April 25, 2006. The Dowlings conducted no discovery before voluntarily

dismissing the case on or about August 2, 2006 because Mrs. Dowling was continuing to undergo

treatment for her injuries. We need not consider this three-month period during which discovery could

have taken place because there was sufficient time to conduct discovery when considering only the federal

claims. However, it should be noted that discovery could not have been taken between the pendency of

the state and federal claims, as the Clinic seems to suggest, because no litigation was then pending.

2. How the Discovery Would Affect the Ruling Below

The Dowlings assert that, if permitted to conduct additional discovery, they

would depose Tony Cummings, the individual that they claim was on duty on the day

Mrs. Dowling fell and may discover that the Clinic had not adequately protected the

premises. Further, they assert that they would request the written materials described

above. However, they have not shown that this testimony and the written materials

would affect the district court ruling, merely that they may contain relevant information.

3. The Length of the Discovery Periods

In this case, the Dowlings did not file their motion for additional time for

discovery until fifteen months after they filed their lawsuit in the district court on July

30, 2007.2

 At no time during the pendency of the lawsuit did the Dowlings request

written discovery from the Clinic nor did they move for an extension of time to conduct

discovery for the purpose of opposing the motion for summary judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). The Dowlings’ first “discovery request” was an

email sent in March 2008—three months after the Clinic’s motion for summary

judgment was filed and after the Dowlings had responded to the summary judgment

motion—vaguely and informally requesting two depositions, “any maintenance

manuals” for the care of the floor, and any videotapes of the fall. After granting the

Clinic’s motion for summary judgment on the day that the MacKenzie deposition was

scheduled, the district court granted the Dowlings’ motion to alter, amend, and/or vacate

the grant of summary judgment because the Dowlings had not had sufficient time to

conduct the deposition. Given sixty days to conduct the additional discovery, the

Dowlings’ counsel again relied on informal emails to schedule the deposition. Due to

alleged scheduling conflicts, the deposition was delayed until September 30. Though

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the Dowlings issued a Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum dated September 17, the

requested documents were not brought. The Dowlings still did not file a Rule 56(f)

motion for an extension to conduct additional discovery, instead filing a motion for an

extension of time to conduct additional discovery on October 7. 

Thus, the Dowlings had a substantial amount of time to conduct discovery,

including the additional sixty days granted by the court after it vacated the grant of

summary judgment. 

4. Whether the Dowlings’ Counsel was Dilatory

The Dowlings assert that their counsel was not dilatory in seeking discovery.

However, as noted above, the Dowlings did not conduct discovery for substantial periods

of time and then only through very informal and vague emails. In response to the first

email, the Clinic informed the Dowlings that formal discovery requests would be

required, including interrogatories and requests for production of documents, but they

were never filed. While the Dowlings’ counsel should be applauded for beginning

discovery requests informally, he was dilatory in failing to make formal discovery

requests when informal requests proved unavailing. 

5. Whether the Clinic was Responsive in Prior Discovery Requests

The Dowlings assert that the Clinic engaged in conduct that appears to have been

intended to interfere with the Dowlings’ ability to discover relevant evidence and they

appear to be correct. It appears that the Clinic delayed providing available dates and

deflected informal discovery attempts. The Clinic can hardly be lauded for its discovery

tactics. Its decision to delay and slow the process is unfortunate, but the Clinic does

appear to have complied with prior formal discovery requests. In short, it does not

appear that the additional time for discovery requested would have a substantial effect

on the outcome of the case. The Dowlings had substantial time to conduct discovery

and, while the Clinic was not responsive as to informal discovery requests, the Dowlings

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have the burden of making appropriate formal requests when informal requests are

unavailing. 

Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Dowlings’

motion for additional time to conduct discovery.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary

judgment for the Clinic and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the Dowlings’ motion

for additional time to conduct discovery.

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