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Parties Involved:
Jannazzo D. Boyd
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 22, 1995 Decided May 30, 1995

No. 93-3036

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JANNAZZO D. BOYD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(89cr00236-1)

Allen E. Burns, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for the appellant. On brief was

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Mary D. Rodriguez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for the appellee. On brief

were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Elizabeth Trosman,

Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge; GINSBURG and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFTHENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Jannazzo D. Boyd appeals his conviction on

one count of possessing with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and (b)(1)(B)(iii). Boyd contends he was denied a fair trial because (1) the

prosecutorimproperlycross-examined himonwhether police witnesses had given false testimonyand

attempted to bolster the officers' credibility during both cross-examination and closing argument and

(2) the judge failed to inform the jury that the court reporter could read portions of the testimony for

them. For the following reasons we affirm the conviction.

On appeal from a conviction, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, allowing it the benefit of allreasonable inferencesthat may be drawn from the evidence

and permitting the jury to determine the weight and credibility of the evidence. United States v.

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Smith, 964 F.2d 1221, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1992); United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124, 1126 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991). So viewed the evidence reveals the following facts.

OnJune 24, 1989MetropolitanPoliceOfficersAnthonyScarpine, DanielShereika and Steven

Packard entered an apartment building on Park Road, N.W. in the District ofColumbia to investigate

complaints of narcotics transactions. After passing through the first-floor hallway, the officers

climbed the stairway to the second floor. As Scarpine and Shereika topped the stairs, they saw Boyd

emerge from an apartment doorway carrying a brown sack. When Boyd spotted the officers he

"froze" for a moment and then threw the sack to the floor. He started back toward the apartment

only to encounter a closed door. He then turned around and again started walking toward the

officers. Scarpine told Shereika to stop Boyd while he himself retrieved the discarded sack. Inside

he found 123 ziplock bags containing a total of 41.3 grams of cocaine base. Boyd was arrested and

waslater indicted on one count of possessing with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine

base.

At trial Boyd testified he never had the sack in his possession. According to Boyd, Scarpine

told Shereika to hold him for no apparent reason and then "started snooping down" the hallway until

he "found" the bag containing cocaine base. Trial Tr. (9/13/89) 89-90. During cross-examination,

the prosecutor asked Boyd why Scarpine and Shereika were "making this up." Id. at 93. Boyd's

counsel responded "I object" and the judge immediately replied "Overruled." Id. The prosecutor

continued:

Q. Do they have something against you?

A. I don't know them. I know they don't know me.

Q. You have never seen them before?

A. I ain't never seen them before. I'd heard of them before though.

Q. But you had never seen them before?

A. No, I ain't never seen them before.

...

Q. So you have never seen those 123 ziplocks? Is that your testimony?

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A. Yes that's my testimony.

Q. You never saw that paper bag?

A. No. I didn't.

Q. You didn't walk out of Apartment 25 with that bag in your hand?

A. No.

Q. And these people that are in here putting their lives and their careersover twenty

years for Sergeant Shereika and over seventeen years for Scarpinethey are putting

them on the line to get you and you don't even know them.

A. (No response).

Id. at 94, 99-100. In closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors:

Well, now, you're the sole judges of credibility in this matter. It's up to you

to decide who to believewhether you're going to believe Jannazzo Boyd or Officer

Scarpine and Sergeant Shereika. It's up to you to decide by looking at the way they

testified, by looking at their behavior on the witness stand, and by looking at whether

they have a motive for not telling the truth.

Let's look at the motives here. Officer Scarpine and Sergeant Shereika have

38 years ofservice to this city between them. Does it make sense that they are going

to get on the stand and perjure themselvesto get Jannazzo Boyd? Doesit make sense

that they are going to put their careers and their retirement on the line for Jannazzo

Boyd, someone that they don't even know, and Jannazzo Boyd said he didn't even

know them before this? That they are going to get up there and put on the line all of

their time, their lives, and their honesty in order to get Jannazzo Boyd? No, it doesn't

make any sense.

And look at it this way. If they were going to make up a story, don't you think

they would have made it better? Don't you think they would have said, "Yes, we

found the drugs right in his right front pocket," and don't you think they would have

just put it in his pocket, hauled himdownstairsin front of all these witnessesthat were

supposed to be outside and said, "Oh, look what we found."

So why do we end up with a case where something has dropped, a bag?

Because that's what happened. That's the truth. They have no reason to make up

anything against Jannazzo Boyd.

Trial Tr. (9/14/89) 11-12.

The jury began deliberating at 2:57 p.m. on September 14, 1989. At 4:15 that afternoon the

trial judge read counsel a note fromthe jury asking "Has a transcript of yesterday'strial been prepared

and, if so can we have a copy?" Id. at 38. The judge informed counsel that he proposed to tell the

jurors that "the transcript has not yet been prepared and they are going to have to rely on their

collective recollection of the proceedings of yesterday." Id. at 38-39. The prosecutor responded

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*Had Boyd testified on his own that the officers were lying, such questioning might be proper. 

See United States v. Cole, 41 F.3d 303, 309 (7th Cir. 1994) (where "[g]enerally throughout his

testimony [the defendant] either implicitly or explicitly stated that the government witnesses lied,"

prosecutor's cross-examination regarding motives for lying was not error). 

"That'sfine," while defense counselsaid nothing. Id. at 39. The trial judge then announced "Hearing

no dissent, that's what I will tell them," id., and he did so. The jurors continued to deliberate

throughout the afternoon until the court recessed around 6:00 p.m. They resumed deliberations the

following morning and returned a guilty verdict at 2:15 that afternoon. Boyd appeals the verdict on

the grounds set out above.

First, Boyd arguesthat the prosecutor's cross-examination and closing remarksimpermissibly

infringed on the jury'sright to make credibility determinations. We agree but conclude the error does

not merit reversal. "Determinations of credibility are for the jury, not for witnesses." United States

v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). It is therefore error for a

prosecutor to induce a witness to testify that another witness, and in particular a government agent,

has lied on the stand. See, e.g., id. at 208 ("Prosecutorial cross-examination which compels a

defendant to state that law enforcement officerslied in their testimony isimproper."); Scott v. United

States, 619 A.2d 917, 924 (D.C. 1993) ("We have repeatedly condemned questioning by counsel

which prompts one witness to suggest that he or she is telling the truth and that contrary witnesses

are lying."). The prosecutor here did just that. Had she merely asked about Boyd's previous contacts

with the officers, allowing the jurors to draw their own conclusions regarding the witnesses'

credibility, her examination would have been unobjectionable. She erred, however, in asking Boyd

point-blank why the police witnesses would "make up" a story about him.*

The prosecutor compounded her error, both in cross-examination and, more extensively, in

closing argument, by "vouching" for the police witnesses' credibility, indicating that they would not

lie on the stand and thereby jeopardize their careers and risk criminal prosecution. This argument

relied on evidence not in the record and was clearly improper. See United States v. Martinez, 981

F.2d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 1992) (argument that police witness, if lying, would risk 18-year career,

without evidence to that effect, was "prosecutorial impropriety"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1874

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(1993); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1125 (3d Cir. 1990) (disapproving of

"prosecutor's commentsthat the U.S. Attorneys and law enforcement officers could not have behaved

as unscrupulously as defense counsel alleged they did without violating their oaths of office and

jeopardizing their careers" because unsupported by record evidence); Richter, 826 F.2d at 209

(condemning prosecutor's asking jury why experienced FBI agents would "come into this courtroom

and commit perjury and risk their careersto get [the defendant]"); United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d

721, 731 (7th Cir.) (argument that government agent "had no reason to lie and risk his career and

reputation" was "clearly improper when considered in isolation, because it amounted to vouching for

the credibility of a witness."), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 903 (1987); cf. United States v. Young, 470

U.S. 1 (1985) (prosecutor's expression of "personal impression" regarding guilt of defendant was

improper and error). Nevertheless, the prosecutor's error does not warrant reversing Boyd's

conviction.

Where, as here, the defendant fails to object or to state the specific ground for an overruled

objection, we may reverse only for plain error unless the defendant can demonstrate on appeal that

the ground for the objection was obvious from the context in which it was made. See Fed. R. Crim.

P. 51; United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14 (1985); United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589, 590-

91 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). Because nothing in the context of defense counsel's

unexplained objectionmade obviousthe ground therefor, we apply the plain errorstandard ofreview.

"The plain error standard, as recently clarified by the Supreme Court, requires us to determine (1)

whether there is unwaived legal error, (2) whether the error is "plain' or "obvious' under current law

and (3) whether the error was prejudicial." United States v. Merlos, 8 F.3d 48, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1993)

(citing United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777-78 (1993)). The prejudice prong permits

reversal only " "in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.' "

Olano, 113 S. Ct. at 1779 (quoting Young, 470 U.S. at 15). In other words, we "should correct a

plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity

or public reputation of judicial proceedings'." Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,

160 (1936)) (alteration by Olano Court). That is not the case here.

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The trial court specifically instructed the jurorsthat the "statements and arguments of counsel

are not evidence," Trial Tr. (9/14/89) at 23, that "[a] police officer's testimony should be considered

by [them] just as any other evidence in the case," id. at 30, and that "[i]n no event should [they] give

either greater or lesser credence to the testimony of any witness merely because he or she is a police

officer," id. These instructions, combined with the minimal importance of the challenged questions

and statements and the absence of any reason for the jury to disbelieve the substantial incriminating

testimony of the police witnesses, persuade usthat Boyd suffered no prejudice from the prosecutor's

improper questions and argument and that there is therefore no plain error to support reversing his

conviction. Cf. United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 361-62 (D.C. Cir.) (finding no plain error

in improper prosecutorial remarks where there was "a strong case against the defendants" and "any

possible prejudice was cured by the trial judge's instructions that arguments of counsel are not

evidence"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); United States v. Martinez, 981 F.2d at 871 (no

prejudice where prosecutorial vouching was "isolated" and any possible prejudice was "ameliorated

by the trial court's instruction to the jury that "the lawyers' statements ... and their arguments are not

evidence' ") (elipsis in original).

Next, we find no error in the trial court's failure to advise the jury sua sponte that, although

no transcript had been prepared, the court reporter could read it portions of the testimony. A trial

court enjoys broad discretion in responding to juryquestions generally, Salzman v. United States, 405

F.2d 358, 361 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and especially in deciding whether to provide requested testimony

either in written form, United States v. Betancourt, 838 F.2d 168, 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 486

U.S. 1013 (1988); or as read by a court reporter, United States v. Akitoye, 923 F.2d 221, 226 (1st

Cir. 1991); United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1084 (9th Cir. 1988). The court's failure here

to advise the jurors that the court reporter could read testimony to them was not an abuse of its

discretion, particularly given defense counsel's acquiescence in the judge's chosen course.

For the preceding reasons, the appellant's conviction is

Affirmed.

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