Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-30322/USCOURTS-ca9-08-30322-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sylvester J. Alderman
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 08-30322 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  2:08-cr-00084-MJP

SYLVESTER J. ALDERMAN,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

July 6, 2009—Seattle, Washington

Filed April 15, 2010

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Andrew J. Kleinfeld and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Kleinfeld

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COUNSEL

Ralph Hurvitz, Seattle, Washington, for the appellant.

Michael S. Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney, Seattle,

Washington, for the appellee. 

OPINION

KLEINFELD, Circuit Judge:

This is a sentence appeal, with two issues. We hold that the

first degree theft crime under Washington law of which

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Alderman was convicted is a “crime of violence” for purposes

of the guidelines enhancement, and that the shooting in this

case was an assault under Washington law. 

Facts.

The district court and we have watched Alderman commit

the crime on television. The events were recorded by a surveillance camera aimed at the Seattle apartment complex

parking lot where they occurred. A man named Roosevelt

Montgomery drove up and parked, approached Alderman, and

they talked. Then Montgomery began punching Alderman. He

got Alderman on the ground and landed numerous punches

and a few kicks, while a woman apparently with Montgomery

rifled Alderman’s pockets. Then the beating ended, and

Alderman backed away, hitching up his pants.

Alderman then drew a gun and started shooting toward

Montgomery. The tables being turned by the gun, Alderman

now chased Montgomery around Montgomery’s car, shooting

at him, as Montgomery tried to get into his car and drive

away. Alderman fired eight shots at Montgomery as he chased

him around his car and another car, then left, firing one additional parting shot. He never hit Montgomery, and Montgomery drove off. Montgomery later told police that he was

grazed by one bullet, but he did not seek medical attention.

Alderman was a convicted felon, and the Glock nine millimeter pistol he had used to shoot at Montgomery was easily

tied to him. He confessed and pleaded guilty to being a felon

in possession.1 In the plea agreement, he admitted that he had

previously been convicted of second degree robbery and, in

another case, first degree theft.

His guidelines calculation was adjusted upward for the

1

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). 

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prior felonies, on the theory that they were “crimes of violence.”

2

An additional upward adjustment in his offense level was

imposed on the theory that he had used the unlawfully possessed pistol “in connection with another felony,” shooting at

Montgomery.

Alderman argues that his prior theft conviction could not

properly be counted as a “crime of violence” under the guidelines, and that shooting at Montgomery could not properly be

deemed a felony. 

Analysis.

We review the district court’s interpretation of the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines de novo,

3

 the district court’s factual

findings for clear error, and the district court’s application of

the Guidelines to the facts for abuse of discretion.4

Alderman’s Washington judgment says that he was convicted in 2005 of “theft in the first degree.” The information

alleged that he and Bobby Barnard Beasley assaulted a man

and took his car “from the person” of the victim. The police

report said that he and Beasley stuck a gun in a man’s face as

the victim was driving away from a Kentucky Fried Chicken,

told him he was being robbed, and ripped a necklace off the

victim’s neck. The victim escaped as Alderman and Beasley

drove off in the victim’s car. Our question is whether the

crime defined by the state statute is “categorically”

5

 a crime

of violence.

As Alderman concedes, we held in United States v. Jennings6

2U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 (Nov. 2007). 

3United States v. Gomez-Leon, 545 F.3d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 2008). 

4

Id. (citing United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 2007)).

5United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). 

6

515 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2008). 

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that the relevant portion of Washington first degree theft was

indeed a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act.7

The Armed Career Criminal Act uses the same definition for

“violent felony” as the Guidelines do for “crime of violence.”

8

Jennings applies our holding and reasoning in United States

v. Wofford.

9

 Alderman argues that Jennings and Wofford are

no longer good law, because the Supreme Court in Begay v.

United States10 narrowed the construction of “violent felony”

in a way that excludes Washington first degree theft from the

“crime of violence” category.

[1] Wofford, another felon in possession case, did a categorical analysis of grand theft from a person under California

law.11 We held that California grand theft from a person was

categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career

Criminal Act because it required direct physical contact

between the perpetrator and the victim, thereby creating a

serious potential risk of physical injury to another.12 We held

that California grand theft from a person fell within the “otherwise” clause of the subsection of the “violent felony” definition:13 “burglary, arson, or extortion, involved the use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”

14 The risk of

physical injury arose because the victim might resist or a

bystander intervene and a struggle ensue.15

Jennings, the Washington case, also involved a sentencing

7

Id. at 989. 

8Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) with U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (2007). 

9

122 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1997). 

10128 S. Ct. 1581 (2008). 

11Wofford, 122 F.3d at 792-94. 

12Id. at 793. 

13Id.

1418 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

15Wofford, 122 F.3d at 793-94. 

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enhancement on a federal felon in possession conviction.16

We held that the same conviction as Alderman’s under the

identical statute was categorically a “violent felony” under the

Armed Career Criminal Act.17 We held that Wofford controlled.18

The government argues that we should review only for

plain error, under Rule 52 and United States v. Olano,

19

because Alderman did not argue before the district court that

Begay undermined Wofford and Jennings. Our analysis is

unaffected by the different standard applicable to plain error,

because we conclude that there would be no error even if

Alderman had argued from Begay. Begay leaves the WoffordJennings holdings in force.

[2] In Begay, the prior conviction was for drunk driving.

The question was whether felony driving under the influence

under New Mexico law was a “violent felony” under the

Armed Career Criminal Act.20 The Court held that it was not.21

The reason was that drunk driving was too dissimilar to the

listed crimes — burglary, arson, extortion, and explosives

crimes — to fall within the “otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”

clause.

In our view, the provision’s listed examples — burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of

explosives — illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall

within the statute’s scope. Their presence indicates

that the statute covers only similar crimes, rather

16Jennings, 515 F.3d at 983. 

17Id. at 989. 

18Id.

1962 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (9th Cir. 1995); see also United States v.

Rendon-Duarte, 490 F.3d 1142, 1147-48 (9th Cir. 2007). 

20Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1583. 

21Id. at 1588. 

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than every crime that “presents a serious potential

risk of physical injury to another.”

22

The Court applied a straightforward ejusdem generis analysis,

requiring that “otherwise” crimes be “roughly similar, in kind

as well as in degree of risk involved” to the listed crimes.23

The listed crimes “typically involve purposeful, violent and

aggressive conduct,” while drunk driving, though creating

great risk to others, typically does not.24 The listed crimes

“also show an increased likelihood that the offender is the

kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull

the trigger,”

25 while drunk driving does not.

Likewise, in Chambers v. United States the Court held that

criminal “failure to report” for penal confinement was not a

violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.26

The crime was malum prohibitum, not malum in se. The Court

noted that “the crime amounts to a form of inaction,” unlike

the enumerated offenses in the statute.27 Not showing up is

unlikely to be “purposeful, violent, and aggressive” or to indicate “an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of

person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”28

[3] First degree theft under the pertinent Washington statute required, when Alderman committed it, a personal, physical encounter between thief and victim. The property had to

22Id. at 1585 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

23Id.; see also United States v. Christensen, 559 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th

Cir. 2009) (“The Court used an ejusdem generis analysis, concluding that

crimes covered by the catch-all clause must involve conduct similar to the

conduct in the four crimes specifically named in the statute[.]”). 

24Id.

25Id. at 1587. 

26129 S. Ct. 687, 691-92 (2009). 

27Id. at 692. 

28Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1587. 

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be “taken from the person” of the victim, not just from his car

or his house or business: 

(1) A person is guilty of theft in the first degree if he

or she commits theft of: 

. . .

(b) Property of any value other than a firearm as

defined in RCW 9.41.010 taken from the person of

another. 

(2) Theft in the first degree is a class B felony.29

This relevant aspect of Washington first degree theft is similar

enough for ejusdem generis purposes to the listed crimes,

“burglary, arson, or extortion, [or a crime that] involves use

of explosives.” Like burglary, indeed probably more than

most burglaries, theft from the person is a purposeful aggressive act directed toward a person who, unless he submits,

invites violence from the criminal. The thief has to be aggressive enough to intimidate the victim into submission or hopeful that despite personal contact the victim will not realize his

possession was stolen until it is too late to resist. An offender

bold and aggressive enough to steal from the person of

another shows a greatly increased likelihood, compared to a

drunk driver, that he is “the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.”

30

29Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.030 (b) (2005) (emphasis added). There is

another subsection of § 9A.56.030(1), subsection (a), which makes the

theft of “property or services which exceed(s) one thousand five hundred

dollars in value” an instance of theft in the first degree even if the property

is not taken from the person of another. Alderman’s briefs on this appeal,

however, proceed uniformly on the basis that the conviction was under

subsection (b), so we do as well. We express no view as to whether a conviction under subsection (a) was a crime of violence. 

30Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1587. 

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“[P]urposeful, violent and aggressive”

31 conduct cannot

mean that violence has to occur, because burglary, which is

listed, does not require commission of a violent act or an

intent to commit violence. The burglar may hope that the

house is empty, an arsonist may hope that the building is

empty, and an extortionist may hope that the victim just pays

the money without resistance, but they cannot count on peaceful submission from the victim and have to be aggressive

enough to be prepared for violent resistance. Where force is

actually used or threatened, the crime falls under the first subsection of the guideline,32 not the subsection which includes

the “otherwise” clause covering burglary of a dwelling, etc.

Because the first subsection would be superfluous if the “otherwise” clause in the second subsection required actual violence, the “otherwise” clause cannot be construed to require

actual violence.33

We held in United States v. Christensen34 that under Begay,

statutory rape is not a “violent felony” because statutory rape

may involve consensual sexual intercourse, which is neither

31Id. at 1586. 

32U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 defines “crime of violence”: 

(a) The term “crime of violence” means any offense under federal

or state law punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding

one year, that — 

(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person of another, or 

(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another. 

33See United States v. Wenner, 351 F.3d 969, 975 (9th Cir. 2003)

(rejecting a reading of the catchall phrase in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) that

would make the enumerated examples “mere surplusage”); 2A Norman J.

Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:6, at 181-94 (6th ed. 2000)

(setting forth the canon of statutory construction that each word, clause,

and phrase must be given effect). 

34559 F.3d 1092 (2009). 

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violent nor aggressive.35 If not forcible, statutory rape may be

just someone too old with a girlfriend or boyfriend too young.

It is unlike the listed crimes in not being violent or aggressive

(if not forcible) and does not give any indication that the older

sexual partner is “the kind of person who might deliberately

point the gun and pull the trigger.”

36 Nor is it necessarily even

purposeful, if the statute does not require knowledge of the

victim’s age.37 We said that the conduct, to satisfy Begay, had

to be purposeful, violent and aggressive, in the context of

deciding whether statutory rape was like or unlike burglary of

a dwelling, arson, extortion or explosives crimes for ejusdem

generis purposes.38 We of course had no occasion to decide

just what “violent, purposeful and aggressive” meant in the

context of a malum in se crime inherently more aggressive

than one or two of the listed crimes. The central holding in

Christensen is that we are to apply an ejusdem generis analysis to the “otherwise” clause, and that is what we have done.

“The language of a decision is used to explain why the particular result follows from the concrete facts of the case, and

must be read with reference to the dispute before the court in

that case.”

39

We distinguished Christensen in United States v. Terrell,

40

on the basis that “the ‘typical’ case of statutory rape does not

involve violent and aggressive conduct,” while rape that

included sexual assault committed on a sleeping, drugged, or

deceived victim left open the “possibility that the victim may

figure out what’s really going on and decide to resist,” as may

35Id. at 1095. 

36Begay, 128 S. Ct. at 1587. 

37See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.44.079. 

38Christensen, 559 F.3d at 1094-95. 

39United States v. Herron, 45 F.3d 340, 342 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Karl

N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 36 (1930)); see also United States v.

Frank, 36 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 1994). 

40United States v. Terrell, 593 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2010). 

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a victim of theft from a person.41 Likewise we held in Terrell

that burglary not in a dwelling fell within the “otherwise”

clause even though it did not fall within the designated “burglary of a dwelling” crime.42 (We note that the decision in

Terrell is not yet final because the mandate has not issued.)

[4] Alderman also argues that his first degree theft conviction should be considered under Washington’s 2008 statute,43

not the 2005 statute under which he was convicted,44 because

the guidelines require that the defendant be sentenced under

the version of the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing.45

He was indeed sentenced under the version of the guidelines

then in effect, and those guidelines directed the court to look

at the crime of which he was convicted.46 He was convicted

of the 2005 crime, not the crime as it might have been had he

committed it three years after he did.

Alderman also argues that the district court should not have

imposed the upward adjustment to his guidelines calculation

for possessing the pistol he shot at Montgomery “in connection with another felony offense.” His theory is that shooting

at Montgomery nine times was not shown to be a felonious

41Id. at 1090. 

42Id. at 1093-95. 

43In 2007, Washington’s theft statutes were amended to exclude theft of

a motor vehicle from first degree theft and create a new crime of theft of

a motor vehicle. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.030 (2008) (setting out

“theft in the first degree — other than firearm or motor vehicle”); Wash.

Rev. Code § 9A.56.065 (2008) (“A person is guilty of theft of a motor

vehicle if he or she commits theft of a motor vehicle.”). 

44Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.56.030 (2005). 

45U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a). 

46See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-02 (courts “look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense); James v. United

States, 550 U.S. 192, 197 (2007) (applying a categorical analysis to how

“Florida defined the crime of burglary at the time of James’ conviction”

even though a different version of the statute was in effect in 2003 when

James was sentenced). 

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assault because the evidence did not show that he intended to

hit Montgomery or that Montgomery was put in fear. The district judge found that Alderman shot at Montgomery “to

frighten” and “from my review of the videotape, he accomplished that. That’s an assault.”

47 Indeed.

AFFIRMED. 

47See also State v. Miller, 426 P.2d 986, 988 (Wash. 1967) (under

Washington law, apprehension of harm may be inferred when a person has

a weapon pointed at him). 

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