Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-19-05019/USCOURTS-caDC-19-05019-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lisa Lewis
Appellant
United States Department of the Treasury
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-5019 September Term, 2019

FILED ON: JUNE 5, 2020 

LISA LEWIS, 

APPELLANT

v. 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:16-cv-02437) 

Before: ROGERS, GRIFFITH and RAO, Circuit Judges

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the 

District of Columbia and on the briefs of the parties. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R.

34(j). The Court has afforded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not 

warrant a published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). It is 

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the judgment of the district court be AFFIRMED. 

Lisa Lewis sued the Department of the Treasury (“the Treasury”) pursuant to Title VII of 

the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., alleging that management’s decision not to promote 

her discriminated against her on the basis of race and sex. Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 93–116. The 

district court, upon concluding that the Treasury had proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reason for the decision not to promote Lewis and that Lewis had not submitted sufficient evidence

from which a reasonable jury could find that the Treasury’s reason was pretextual, granted the 

Treasury’s motion for summary judgment. Lewis v. Mnuchin, 2019 WL 120772, at *1 (D.D.C. 

Jan. 7, 2019). On appeal, Lewis contends that the district court erred because it did not, as it must, 

regard the evidence of pretext in the light most favorable to her as the nonmoving party.

Briefly stated, Lewis, an African-American woman, and Evin Gossin, a white man, worked 

as Personnel Security Technicians in the Treasury’s Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

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(“OCC”). In 2011, their second-level supervisor, Roger Mahach, requested the Human Resources 

Department to conduct a “desk audit” of Gossin in order to unilaterally promote him to a Security 

Specialist position. Human Resources advised Mahach to announce the position publicly to ensure 

fair and open competition for other qualified candidates within the OCC. Mahach did, and Lewis 

and Gossin applied for the position. When the two “subject matter experts” reviewed their 

applications and rated Gossin as more qualified, Mahach selected Gossin as the best qualified

applicant.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual with 

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). If an 

employer “articulate[s] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection,”

the plaintiff bears the burden “to show that [the] stated reason for [the] rejection was . . . pretext.” 

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973). At this stage, “the district 

court must resolve one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable jury to find that the employer’s asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual 

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against the employee on the basis of race, 

color, religion, sex, or national origin?” Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 

(D.C. Cir. 2008).

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo, Haynes v. D.C. Water & Sewer 

Auth., 924 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2019), and upon viewing the evidence “in the light most 

favorable” to Lewis as the nonmoving party, id., and “draw[ing] all reasonable inferences” in her 

favor, id. (quoting Thompson v. District of Columbia, 832 F.3d 339, 344 (D.C. Cir. 2016)), the 

court affirms. 

First, the Treasury offered a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason” for not selecting

Lewis for the promotion. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 493–94. The Treasury asserted that Gossin was 

more qualified than Lewis given his stronger annual performance evaluations in 2010 and 2011, 

his training in process improvement methodologies such as Lean Six Sigma, and his superior 

scores from the “subject matter experts” on the application tracking and rating sheets. Lewis 

maintains that the Treasury’s grading systems in the annual performance evaluations and the 

application tracking and rating sheets were subjective and vague. But the grading systems relied 

on specific qualifications and skills and constituted a “clear and reasonably specific explanation”

for the Treasury’s decision to promote Gossin instead of Lewis. See Figueroa v. Pompeo, 923 

F.3d 1078, 1092–93 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Lewis objects to the Treasury’s reliance on Gossin’s higher 

summary score in his 2011 performance evaluation because the 2011 evaluations were not 

completed until several months after the promotion. But to the extent she maintains she and Gossin

received “identical summary scores” in 2010, Reply Br. 15, the 2010 evaluations were not identical 

because Gossin received higher scores than Lewis on four skill elements. Thus, any error as to the 

2011 scores, appears harmless. See Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

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Second, Lewis otherwise fails to identify record evidence from which a reasonable jury 

could infer that the Treasury’s “explanation was pretextual” and “that this pretext shielded 

discriminatory motives.” Murray v. Gilmore, 406 F.3d 708, 713 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Lewis points 

to evidence that the management pre-selected Gossin for promotion and tailored the job description 

to match his qualifications. The en banc court has observed that “pre-selection by itself is neither 

unusual nor illegal.” Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 139 F.3d 958, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated 

on other grounds, 527 U.S. 526 (1999). Although “[e]vidence of pre-selection may of course be 

‘relevant to the question of discriminatory intent’ insofar as an employer’s departure from its own 

hiring and promotion procedures might suggest that the reasons it advances for its actions are 

pretextual,” id. (quoting Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1984)), Lewis points to no 

hiring or promotion procedures from which the Treasury departed to her detriment. Mahach

originally proposed to act unilaterally but then adopted Human Resources’ recommendation to 

advertise the position. In developing the position description he conferred with Gossin and 

referred to elements of his training. But Lewis does not show these actions foreclosed her 

opportunity to present evidence of her qualifications, including training in criminal justice that she 

considered made her the superior applicant. Human Resources had stated she was qualified for 

the position. Mahach chose to use a panel of two “subject matter experts” to rank the applicants

and this procedure, according to Mahach and uncontested by Lewis, was approved by Human 

Resources. Even if Lewis’s challenges to the selection of these “experts” may have some slight 

force, they do not give rise to a reasonable inference that their selection was evidence of race or 

sex discrimination.

Lewis offers evidence of an environment that she claims tilted the scales in Gossin’s favor. 

She points, for example, to testimony of a minority female co-worker that her supervisory 

responsibilities were shifted to a recently hired white male. She also notes that the last four hires

in her office were white males. Perhaps recognizing that these anecdotal examples are not 

sufficient to establish pretext, Lewis argues that her supervisors have also offered inconsistent 

explanations for promoting Gossin. Specifically, Lewis emphasizes that one of her supervisors 

stated “that the promotion was not created for Mr. Gossin,” even though employees in Human 

Resources have said that the position was in fact tailored for him. Appellant’s Br. 22–23 (citing 

Mahach Decl. at 4 (Nov. 7, 2011)). As noted, Mahach admitted that he initially wanted to promote 

Gossin on the basis of a desk audit. Lewis’s counsel conceded during oral argument that he could 

have done so absent a contrary “internal policy” and could point to no such policy in the record. 

Oral Arg. Tape at 11:00–12:05 (May 8, 2020). In any event, Lewis never explains how advertising

the position to allow fair and open competition as Human Resources recommended is comparable 

to the type of “improper procedures and uncreditable testimony” the court has upheld as evidence 

of discrimination. Krodel, 748 F.2d at 709. The minor inconsistencies in the statements Lewis 

identified are not sufficiently inconsistent to be “probative of pretext.” Geleta v. Gray, 645 F.3d 

408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 853 (4th Cir.

2001)); see Aka v. Washington Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). 

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Lewis’s more concerning argument rests on her contention that management provided only 

Gossin with career advancement opportunities that “played an integral part in Mr. Gossin’s 

promotion,” and that this preferential treatment is probative of pretext. Appellant’s Br. 26–28. 

Her coworker’s deposition testimony indicates that in 2008, the entire office volunteered to 

participate in a Lean Six Sigma training but her supervisor selected only Gossin to attend, and that 

Gossin received more adjudication assignments as well as permission to travel for training during 

a spending freeze. But Lewis provides almost no evidence that she ever asked for or was denied 

these opportunities. Although she did ask for Lean Six Sigma training and it was denied, her 

request was oral, she can’t recall when she made it, and she admits she did not pursue the matter 

further. Neither does she dispute that when Gossin was selected for Lean Six Sigma training there 

was only one slot available. Even accepting Lewis’s claim that she requested training and did not 

receive the same training or assignments as Gossin, the evidence she proffers is insufficient to 

show discrimination. See Weber v. Battista, 494 F.3d 179, 186–88 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Viewed in 

the light most favorable to her, the evidence of Gossin’s preferential treatment fails to “cast doubt 

upon” management’s statements that Gossin actively pursued these opportunities whereas Lewis 

did not “show the real reason” for denying Lewis access to these same opportunities was 

discriminatory. Cf. id. at 186. According to Gossin’s supervisors, he was a “self-starter,” who 

repeatedly asked for these sorts of opportunities. Gossin’s 2011 Performance Evaluation at 3; see 

also Gossin’s 2010 Performance Evaluation at 4. 

Taken together, Lewis’s evidence of possibly problematic office practices is not 

sufficiently developed for a reasonable jury to find that the Treasury was doling out career 

advancement opportunities in a discriminatory manner based on race or sex. See Evans v. Sebelius, 

716 F.3d 617, 620–22 (D.C. Cir. 2013). To the extent Lewis maintains that a jury could infer 

pretext because she was more qualified than Gossin, her burden was to show that she was 

“significantly better qualified,” Adeyemi v. District of Columbia, 525 F.3d 1222, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 

2008) (quoting Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 897 (D.C. Cir. 2006)), and she has not. The 

expert panel identified Gossin’s specific qualifications, including his Lean Six Sigma training and 

his experience conducting personnel security adjudications and working with emergency 

management and information security programs; the panel noted that Lewis lacked these skills and 

experiences. Lewis may be more senior in length of service, receiving glowing performance 

evaluations and have a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice, but these qualifications do not create 

a gap between Lewis and Gossin that is “great enough to be inherently indicative of 

discrimination,” id. at 1227 (quoting Jackson v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 703, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2007)).

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is 

directed to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition 

for rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41.

Per Curiam

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FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY:

Deputy Clerk

/s/ 

Daniel J. Reidy

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