Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01494/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-01494-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sean L. Joyner
Petitioner
William Muniz
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SEAN L. JOYNER,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM MUNIZ,

Respondent.

No. 2:15-cv-1494 MCE CKD P

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Petitioner, a state prisoner, is proceeding through counsel with a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his 2012 conviction for second 

degree murder and related enhancements, for which he was sentenced to a prison term of 40 years 

to life. (ECF No. 1.) Respondent has answered the petition (ECF No. 11), and petitioner has 

filed a traverse. (ECF No. 14.) 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned will 

recommend that the petition be denied for the reasons set forth below. 

BACKGROUND

In its affirmation of the judgment on appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third 

Appellate District, recounted the facts of petitioner’s conviction:

Around 2 a.m. on October 23, 2009, victim David Blanks was 

fatally shot six times in a nightclub parking lot. The circumstances 

of the shooting were these: As Blanks was leaving the nightclub, 

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someone asked him, “[W]hat’s up Blood?” Blanks replied, 

“[W]hat’s up ‘cuz?” “Blood” was a reference to the Blood criminal 

street gang and “cuz” was a reference to the rival Crip criminal 

street gang. One Nicholas Newsome started “mugging” (making 

mean faces at) Blanks. Newsome was an Oak Park Blood. Someone 

asked Blanks where he was from, to which he responded, “29th 

Street,” as Blanks was an affiliate of the 29th Street Crip gang. 

Others, including Newsome and defendant Sean Joyner, yelled out, 

“nigga, this is Oak Park.” Defendant was also an Oak Park Blood. 

Blanks turned around, and someone repeatedly shot him.

The day after the shooting, defendant texted Damanique McCoy, 

the mother of his three-year-old son, the following: “[B]abe, please. 

This is real serious. I fucked up. I think it’s over, babe. On God, on 

my son, I didn’t mean to do it.” She responded, “[W]hat’s over?” 

Defendant texted, “Babe, I fucked up. But on God I didn’t mean to 

do it.” During a conversation McCoy had with a police detective, 

she told the detective that defendant told her, “some guy got shot at 

[the nightclub],” “it was an accident,” and he (defendant) was there. 

When she asked if he was the shooter, he would not tell her and 

said he did not want to talk about it. [1]

[FN 1: McCoy had the conversation with defendant while they 

were both at the police station. The only reason McCoy went to the 

police station is because police lied to her and told her defendant 

wanted to speak to her.]

Defendant and Newsome were both tried together in front of a jury 

for first degree murder with enhancements that at least one 

principal personally discharged a firearm and the murder was 

committed for the benefit of the Oak Park Bloods. [2]

[FN 2: In closing, the People argued Newsome was the shooter and 

defendant was the aider and abettor, based on at least one witness 

identifying Newsome as the shooter. There was also evidentiary 

support for an argument that defendant was the shooter. According 

to the trial testimony of at least one witness, there was a man with 

an outstretched hand from which flashes emanated just before the 

witness heard shots being fired, and that man was dark skinned 

(defendant was dark skinned at the time of the shooting, and 

Newsome was light skinned). The jury specifically found not true 

an allegation that Newsome personally discharged the firearm. 

Although Newsome appealed his conviction to this court, his appeal 

was ultimately dismissed.]

A jury found defendant (and Newsome) guilty of second degree 

murder and, as to defendant, found true the murder was committed 

for the benefit of the Oak Park Bloods and that at least one principal 

personally discharged a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant 

to 40 years to life in prison.

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(Lod. Doc. 4 at 1-3.1)

Following a jury trial in the Sacramento Superior Court, a jury convicted petitioner of 

second degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)2), found true that the crime was committed for 

the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22(b)(1)), and found that a principal discharged a 

firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53(e)(1)). (1 CT 20, 2 CT 375-376, 390.)

On May 24, 2012, the trial court sentenced petitioner to a state prison term of 15 years to 

life for the murder, plus 25 years to life for the firearm allegation, for an aggregate sentence of 40 

years to life. (1 CT 23, 2 CT 410-411.)

On October 25, 2013, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District 

affirmed the judgment as to petitioner. (Lod. Doc. 4.) On January 15, 2014, the California 

Supreme Court denied the petition for review. (Lod. Doc. 6.) 

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court, which 

was denied on July 8, 2015. (Lod. Docs. 7-8.) 

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition on July 12, 2015. (ECF No. 1.) 

ANALYSIS

I. AEDPA

The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

 

1

See ECF No. 15 (Respondent’s Notice of Lodging Documents in Paper).

2 All further references are to the California Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

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As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed “that § 

2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have 

been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).

Rather, “when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied 

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence 

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784-785, citing Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when it is unclear 

whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another basis). “The 

presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation for the state 

court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785.

The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state 

court decisions under AEDPA as follows: “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable 

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 

supra, 131 S. Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000). “A state court’s 

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded 

jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786, citing 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004). Accordingly, “a habeas court must 

determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported[] the state court’s 

decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those 

arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. 

“Evaluating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s 

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in 

case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the stringency of this standard, which “stops 

short of imposing a complete bar of federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state 

court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has cautioned that “even a strong case for relief does not 

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 

538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003).

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The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of 

state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct 

subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret “unreasonable” in § 

2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1) – i.e., the 

factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the same record could not 

abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly 

that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006). 

The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively 

unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner “must show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 786-787. Clearly established” law is 

law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United States Supreme Court. Wright v. Van 

Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of settled law to unique situations will not 

qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76 (2006) (established 

law not permitting state sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by 

compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards 

does not qualify as clearly established law when spectators’ conduct is the alleged cause of bias 

injection). The established Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on 

constitutional principles, or other controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of 

statutes or rules binding only on federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9 (2002).

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, supra, 537 U.S. at 8. Where the state 

courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any reasoned opinion, the federal 

court will independently review the record in adjudication of that issue. “Independent review of 

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the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which 

we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003).

“When a state court rejects a federal claim without expressly addressing that claim, a 

federal habeas court must presume that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits – but that 

presumption can in some limited circumstances be rebutted.” Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1096 (2013). “When the evidence leads very clearly to the conclusion that a federal claim 

was inadvertently overlooked in state court, § 2254(d) entitles the prisoner to” de novo review of 

the claim. Id. at 1097.

II. Petitioner’s Claims

A. Ineffective Assistance

1. Claim

Petitioner claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to suppress the police 

recording of petitioner’s conversation with his child’s mother, Daminique McCoy, which took 

place after petitioner requested that an attorney be present for further questioning. (ECF No. 1 at 

17-24.) Petitioner claims he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, as his jailhouse 

conversation with McCoy “was the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case in an otherwise weak 

case.” (ECF No. 1 at 22.)

As recounted by the court of appeal, petitioner and his friends encountered Blanks outside 

a nightclub on October 23, 2009. After a brief exchange of words, Blanks was fatally shot.

The next day, petitioner texted McCoy: “’[B]abe, please. This is real serious. I fucked 

up. I think it’s over, babe. On god, on my son, I didn’t mean to do it.” McCoy responded: 

“[W]hat’s over?” Petitioner texted: “Babe, I fucked up. But on God I didn’t mean to do it.”

Petitioner’s codefendant Newsome was arrested on October 25, 2009, and a warrant was 

obtained to search his cell phone records. (2 CT 398-99.) Reviewing Newsome’s phone records, 

police discovered the above texts between petitioner (using Newsome’s phone) and McCoy. (2 

CT 399-400.)

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Petitioner was arrested on January 20, 2010. (2 CT 400.) Sacramento Detective Higgins 

read him his Miranda rights. (Pet. Ex. C, ECF No. 1-4.) Petitioner denied knowing anything 

about the shooting and said he was home at the time. After Higgins told him he was being 

investigated for first degree murder, petitioner said: “I need a lawyer then cause this is not right.” 

Higgins stopped questioning petitioner, but told him that McCoy “want[ed] to say goodbye” and 

would be coming to talk with him for a few minutes. (Id.) 

McCoy was waiting at the station to see petitioner. As the court of appeal noted, “The 

only reason McCoy went to the police station is because the police lied to her and told her 

defendant wanted to speak with her.” (Lod. Doc. 4 at 2, n.1.) Prior to seeing petitioner, McCoy 

was questioned by Detective Higgins. (2 RT 415-534.) In a lengthy interview, she provided 

detailed information about her interactions with petitioner the day after Blanks was killed. 

Higgins summarized her statements as follows: 

DET. HIGGINS: Okay, let me make sure I got this kind of right. . . 

. [S]o that day you get a text message from Sean, you don’t 

recognize the number. You wake up to that message, you were 

supposed to go to breakfast that day, that’s why you reacted the 

way you did. We text back and forth. You don’t know what he 

was talking about. He told you to go to the Motel 6 by Denny’s . . . 

[Y]ou end up at the Motel 6 on Hambra . . . He said, I think I 

fucked up, it was an accident. I didn’t mean to do it, you’re like, do 

what – he said, someone got shot at Center Court. We said, what 

does that mean? What does – were you there? He said, yeah, I was 

up – you said, who else, he said a whole bunch of us. So what 

happened, he said a whole bunch of people were there and then the 

gun went off. You said, who had the gun, did you have the gun, did 

you pull the trigger. And he’s like, Daminique, I don’t want to talk 

about it. I said, what does that mean, did you do it? And he said, I 

don’t want – I don’t want to talk about it, I just want to hold you. 

He said, uh, he shouldn’t have been there. He just wanted to hold 

you, he was depressed, sad, looked like he was going, like 

remorseful really bad. Then you guys went to Togos –

D. MCCOY: Mm-hmmm.

(2 RT 531-32.) After the interview, Higgins sent McCoy in to talk with petitioner.

McCoy’s conversation with petitioner, which lasted over an hour, was monitored by 

police. (Pet. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-3; 2 CT 415-482.) McCoy tearfully apologized to petitioner for 

her statements to Higgins, saying “now it’s gonna look like I sent you to jail.” (2 RT 422.) 

Petitioner and McCoy agreed that she had been tricked into telling Higgins something that was 

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not true. Petitioner repeatedly urged McCoy to tell family members to inform police that 

petitioner had been home on the night of the shooting.

At trial, defense attorney Lisa Franco filed a motion in limine to exclude, among other 

evidence, “any statements made by defendant Joyner made while in custody during a recorded 

conversation by police detectives after he had asked for an attorney stated to Dominique McCoy 

be excluded because they are hearsay and made in violation of Miranda.” (1 CT 272.) The trial 

court’s hearing on this portion of the motion proceeded as follows: 

THE COURT: [A]pparently Mr. Joyner invoked his right to a 

lawyer at some point during questioning. 

MS. FRANCO: Correct. 

THE COURT: Then the officers left him in a room by himself. 

MS. FRANCO: Correct. 

THE COURT: And then at some point brought in or allowed 

somebody named Dominique McCoy to – to enter the room. 

MS. FRANCO: Correct. 

THE COURT: And they recorded a conversation. There’s no law 

enforcement involved in questioning but Dominque McCoy and 

Defendant Joyner have a conversation of some kind? 

MS. FRANCO: Correct. 

THE COURT: And your motion is 1.2, that’s Miranda violation. 

And do you have any support for fact that – that it would be 

violation of his Miranda rights since there is no custodial 

questioning? I mean, he’s clearly in custody, it sounds like, but 

there is no questioning by a government agent. 

MS. FRANCO: It’s my understanding that anything that – I don’t 

think there is any admissions made or anything spoken after he 

invoked to the officer. [Withdraws that portion of the motion.] 

And then at that point the officer left and then that’s the other part 

that I – we had talked about earlier. That’s withdrawn. 

THE COURT: Okay. So number 28 . . . will be withdrawn, the 

entire motion? 

MS. FRANCO: That’s correct. 

THE COURT: Without prejudice you – you may bring it up later 

or object to it based on how [the prosecutor] decides how to present 

that evidence. 

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MS. FRANCO: Thank you. Correct. 

(1 RT 158-159.)

The prosecutor played the entire recording of McCoy’s jailhouse conversation with 

petitioner for the jury. (3 RT 879-882.) In closing argument, she stated: 

Then they put [Joyner and McCoy] in that room together, and that’s 

when we know it’s the truth, right? . . . She starts crying. I told 

him you were there. I told him you told me that you were at Center 

Court. Does Sean Joyner ever say what on earth did you ever tell 

them that for? I never told you that. . . . He says . . . you got to tell 

them. You got to tell them that I was at home babysitting. Why is 

he trying to convince her that she has to go lie to the police? Why 

is he doing that? Because he was at Center Court. 

. . . 

And when you go through those interviews and those tapes and you 

look at the quality and the truth coming out in them, in spite of 

what [McCoy] said here, you’re gonna hold him accountable for 

killing David Blanks[.]

(5 RT 1251-1252.)

After petitioner’s conviction, his habeas counsel asked Ms. Franco (then Ms. Murillo) 

why she withdrew the motion to suppress petitioner’s conversation with McCoy. “Ms. Murillo

stated that she wanted the Joyner/McCoy conversation excluded, and that she had no strategic 

reason for withdrawing the motion to exclude the Joyner/McCoy conversation. She did not 

remember withdrawing the motion but added that the only reason she would have done so was 

because she believed that the district attorney would not offer the conversation at trial.” (Pet. Ex. 

D (Quinn Decl.), ECF No. 1-5 at 7.)

2. State Court Opinions

Petitioner first raised his ineffective assistance claim as to the McCoy conversation on 

direct appeal. Rejecting this claim, the state court of appeal reasoned: 

Defendant contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 

suppress the recording of his conversation with McCoy in which he 

made incriminating statements to McCoy. He argues counsel had 

no tactical reason for not making an argument pursuant to Miranda 

v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) and that the recording 

violated his Fifth Amendment rights. “Miranda requires that a 

suspect be given certain advisements to preserve the privilege 

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against self-incrimination, or to ensure its voluntary and intelligent 

waiver, during the inherently coercive circumstances of a ‘custodial 

interrogation.’ ” (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 525–526.)

Counsel was not ineffective because her performance was not 

deficient. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 718 

[counsel’s deficient performance is the first prong of an ineffective 

assistance of counsel analysis].) Miranda warnings do not apply 

even when a suspect’s girlfriend, at police direction, tape records 

conversations in which she elicited admissions concerning the 

homicide. (People v. Webb, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 524–526.) Here, 

the situation was even more remote than in Webb. McCoy did not 

record the conversation and elicit incriminating statements at police 

direction. Rather, she talked to defendant because police told her 

(incorrectly) that defendant said he wanted to talk with her, so she 

went to the police station to talk with him.

(Lod. Doc. 4 at 6.)

Petitioner next asserted this claim in a petition for habeas corpus in the California 

Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. (Lod. Docs. 7-8.)

3. Legal Standards

The California Supreme Court’s summary denial of this claim on habeas review 

constitutes a denial on the merits; thus, the decision is subject to AEDPA review. See Sully v. 

Ayers, 725 F.3d 1057, 1067, n.4 (9th Cir. 2013) (summary denial by California Supreme Court 

constitutes an adjudication on the merits, even without evidentiary hearing); Harrington v. 

Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011).

The Supreme Court has enunciated the standards for judging ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, a defendant must 

show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To this end, the defendant must identify 

the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 

judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then determine, whether in light of all the circumstances, 

the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professional competent assistance. 

Id. Second, a defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice. Id. at 693. Prejudice is found where 

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is “a probability 

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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. See also United States v. Murray, 751 

F.2d 1528, 1535 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schaflander, 743 F.2d 714, 717-718 (9th Cir. 

1984) (per curiam).

As to ineffective assistance claims in the federal habeas context, the Supreme 

Court has instructed: “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly 

deferential,’ . . . and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so[.] . . . . When § 

2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is 

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”

Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (internal citations omitted).

4. Analysis

Petitioner argues that defense attorney Franco’s failure to suppress the jailhouse 

conversation with McCoy fell “outside the wide range of professional competent assistance” 

under Strickland. Respondent counters that a reasonable jurist could find that the jailhouse 

conversation was not coercive interrogation prohibited by the Fifth Amendment, and that any 

motion to suppress would have been denied.

Involuntary confessions in state criminal cases are inadmissible under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960). “[C]oercive police activity is a 

necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the 

Due Process Clause.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). Police deception alone 

“does not render [a] confession involuntary,” United States v. Miller, 984 F.2d 1028, 1031 (9th 

Cir. 1993). In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 , 296 (1990), the Supreme Court held that an 

undercover officer need not give Miranda warnings to an incarcerated suspect before asking him 

questions aimed to elicit an incriminating response, as such conversations “do not implicate the 

concerns underlying Miranda.” 

In People v. Webb, 6 Cal. 4th 494 , 525-26 (1993), the California Supreme Court held that 

a defendant’s statements to his girlfriend over a jail telephone were not obtained during custodial 

interrogation and thus did not require a Miranda warning. The Webb court reasoned: 

Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking 

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advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a 

fellow prisoner or ally. (Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297.) 

Under the circumstances, defendant’s tape-recorded statements 

were completely voluntary and compulsion-free. The trial court 

correctly denied defendant’s motion to exclude this evidence under 

the Fifth Amendment. 

(Id. at 526.)

Reviewing petitioner’s appeal, the state courts concluded that, under Webb, any motion to 

suppress the McCoy conversation would have been denied. Similarly, under AEDPA, jurists of 

reason could conclude that Franco’s failure to file the motion was not constitutionally deficient 

because the motion lacked merit. 

Jurists of reason could also conclude that petitioner was not prejudiced by counsel’s 

performance, as suppression of the McCoy conversation likely would not have changed the trial’s 

outcome. Petitioner’s texts and conversation with McCoy the day after the shooting were far 

more damaging to his case than anything he told her in jail. In that conversation, petitioner 

repeatedly denied being present at the shooting, but insisted he had been home and McCoy had 

been tricked into saying otherwise. 

Thus petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his ineffective assistance claim. 

B. Insufficient Evidence of Gang Enhancement

Petitioner claims there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement, and by 

determining otherwise, the state courts made an unreasonable determination of the facts. 

Addressing this claim on direct review, the court of appeal reasoned: 

Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of the gang 

enhancement. He argues the record is “complete[ly] lack[ing] of 

any evidence that the shooting was gang related or gang motivated, 

or that [defendant’s] conduct was in any way gang-related.” Not so.

We begin with the words of the gang enhancement, which applies 

an increased term of incarceration to: “[A]ny person who is 

convicted of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction 

of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the specific 

intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 

members.” (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The facts, in the 

light most favorable to the judgment (which is the standard of 

review for a sufficiency-of-evidence argument) (Jackson v. Virginia 

(1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319), provided sufficient evidentiary support 

for this enhancement. The victim’s fiancé and the gang expert both 

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testified the victim was a 29th Street Crip. The mother of 

defendant’s son and the gang expert testified defendant and 

Newsome were both members of the rival Oak Park Bloods. The 

victim verbally acknowledged his gang affiliation before the 

shooting began when he stated, “29th Street.” After this 

acknowledgement, and before the victim was shot, Newsome and 

defendant yelled out, “nigga, this is Oak Park.” Based on this 

evidence, the jury could reasonably conclude the victim was shot 

because he was a rival Crip and that defendant orally proclaiming 

his membership in a rival street gang before the shooting 

demonstrated that the murder was an act specifically intended to 

benefit the rival Oak Park Blood street gang.

[FN 3: Defendant’s argument that expert testimony alone cannot 

prove the gang enhancement is a non-starter because the gang 

expert did not provide all the evidence regarding the gang 

enhancement.]

(Lod. Doc. 4 at 3-5) (emphasis added).

Petitioner disputes the above finding that he yelled out “nigga, this is Oak Park” or in any 

way proclaimed his gang membership before Blanks was shot. Petitioner argues that this finding 

is not supported by the trial record, and without it, “no reasonable juror could have found that 

Joyner intended to commit a gang crime.” (ECF No. 1 at 24.) 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient 

evidence to support a conviction if, “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond 

a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “A petitioner for a federal 

writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used 

to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds.” Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 

1274 (9th Cir. 2005). In order to grant the writ, the federal habeas court must find that the 

decision of the state court reflected an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson and 

Winship to the facts of the case. Id. at 1275 & n. 13.

On federal habeas review, the court applies the Jackson standard “with explicit reference 

to the substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law.” Davis v. Woodford, 

384 F.3d 628, 639 (9th Cir. 2004), citing Jackson, supra, at 324 n. 16. Here, the state court set 

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forth the substantive elements of the gang enhancement under California law.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found 

beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner participated in a gang-motivated killing. Sacramento 

gang expert Justin Saario testified that petitioner and Newsome were members of the F.A.B. 

subset of the Oak Park Bloods, and that one of the gang’s primary rivals was the 29th Street 

Crips. (3 RT 714, 718, 725, 729.) Daminque McCoy also testified that petitioner and Newsome 

were members of F.A.B. (3 RT 894-895.)

Blank’s fiancé, Damali Smothers, testified that there were a lot of people in the parking lot 

after the club let out on the night of the shooting. As she and Blanks were walking to the car, 

someone asked Blanks where he was from and he replied “29th Street.” Then the “whole crowd” 

started yelling, “This is Oak Park.” (2 RT 316-319.) 

Sacramento Detective Thomas Shrum testified that he interviewed Smothers the day after 

the murder, and she indicated that two men, one dark-skinned and one light-skinned, started 

yelling “Oak Park” at Blanks. (3 RT 615.) Shrum testified that Smothers stated that the lightskinned man walked toward Blanks and began shooting him. In a subsequent photo lineup she 

identified Newsome as the light-skinned man. (3 RT 616, 618-620.) 

Teresa Cornish, a friend of Blanks who was present at the shooting, recalled at trial that a 

dark-skinned man and another man “were the main ones” advancing toward Blanks. (2 RT 430-

431.) Cornish described the dark-skinned man as being about nineteen years old, 5’9 or 5’10” 

tall, with a fade haircut. (2 RT 440-441.) Petitioner’s subsequent actions, such as his texts to 

McCoy, suggested he had been involved in the killing as more than a bystander.

The prosecution argued in closing that Newsome was the shooter and Blanks was the 

dark-skinned man described by witnesses. Sufficient evidence was presented for the jury to 

conclude that petitioner was the dark-skinned man walking toward Blanks and yelling “Oak Park” 

at a rival gang member just before he was shot. As the state court’s analysis was not an 

objectively unreasonable application of Jackson or Winship, petitioner is not entitled to habeas 

relief on this claim.

////

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C. Trial Court Erred in Refusing to Bifurcate Gang Enhancement

Petitioner claims that his right to due process and a fair trial were violated by the trial 

court’s (1) admission of prejudicial gang evidence and (2) failure to bifurcate the gang 

enhancement allegation.3 

Rejecting this claim on direct review, the state court of appeal reasoned: 

Defendant contends his due process right to a fair trial was violated 

when the court admitted gang evidence and failed to bifurcate the 

gang enhancement allegation.

We review an order denying bifurcation for abuse of discretion. 

(People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1048.) The burden is 

on the party seeking bifurcation (here, defendant) to show a 

substantial danger of prejudice. (Id. at p. 1049.) The trial court 

properly concluded that the evidence of defendant’s gang 

membership was admissible to show motive, was not unduly 

prejudicial, and therefore no purpose would be served by 

bifurcation. (Id. at pp. 1049–1050.) In Hernandez, the California 

Supreme Court upheld the denial of bifurcation where a gang 

member told a woman just before robbing her and her friend, 

“‘[Y]ou don’t know who you are dealing with,’” naming a street 

gang. (Id. at p. 1045.) The court found: “Much of the gang 

evidence here was relevant to the charged offense. Indeed, 

defendant Hernandez himself injected his gang status into the 

crime. He identified himself as a gang member and attempted to use 

that status in demanding money from the victim.” (Id. at pp. 1050–

1051.)

Here, as the trial court noted, this case presented a “classic [case of] 

gang retaliation.” The victim verbally identified as being from 29th 

Street, which is an affiliate of the Crip street gang. Defendant then 

yelled out this was Oak Park, which was the rival Oak Park Blood 

street gang. Without this evidence, the shooting would have made 

no sense. Thus, because the evidence supporting the gang 

enhancement was admissible at trial to make sense of the shooting 

and thus would have come in anyway, an inference of prejudice 

was dispelled and bifurcation was not necessary. (People v. 

Hernandez, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1049–1050.)

(Lod. Doc. 4 at 4-5.)

The due process inquiry in federal habeas review is whether the admission of evidence 

was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. See Romano v. 

 

3

Petitioner argues that, “as with Ground Two, the state court of appeal made an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in concluding, ‘Defendant yelled out this was Oak Park.’” (ECF No. 1 

at 25.) This contention was addressed above. 

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Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1994). “A habeas petition bears a heavy burden in showing a due 

process violation based on an evidentiary decision.” Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159, 1172 (9th 

Cir. 2005). There is no clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent that defines 

when the admission of evidence constitutes a denial of due process. See Holley v. Yarborough, 

568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Although the Court has been clear that a writ should be 

issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, it has not yet made 

a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process 

violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.”).

In Windham v. Merkle, the Ninth Circuit found that evidence tending to support the 

prosecution’s gang involvement theory, including testimony by a gang expert, was properly 

admitted. 163 F.3d 1092, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Solis v. 

Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 n. 7 (9th Cir.2000). The court reasoned that “[t]he admission of ‘other 

acts’ evidence, which a defendant contends is unduly prejudicial, will violate due process only 

when ‘there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence.’” The Ninth 

Circuit found that gang evidence was admissible to “demonstrate Windham’s motive for 

participating in the alleged crimes.” Id. at 1104. Similarly, here, the state courts reasonably 

determined that “the evidence supporting the gang enhancement was admissible at trial to make 

sense of the shooting” and was not unduly prejudicial. 

As to bifurcation, the Supreme Court has never decided whether a trial court’s failure to 

bifurcate trial on a gang enhancement allegation implicates due process. However, in Spencer v. 

State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 568 (1967), the Supreme Court noted: “Two-part jury trials are rare 

in our jurisprudence; they have never been compelled by this Court as a matter of constitutional 

law, or even as a matter of federal procedure.” The Ninth Circuit has held that there is no clearly 

established federal law within the meaning of AEDPA setting forth constitutional standards for 

severance of counts or defendants. See Collins v. Runnels, 603 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (9th Cir.

2010); Grajeda v. Scribner, 541 Fed. Appx. 776, 778 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Supreme Court has 

not held that a state or federal trial court’s denial of a motion to sever can, in itself, violate the 

Constitution.”).

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Federal habeas relief is available only for violations of the Constitution or laws or treaties 

of the United States. See 28 U .S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). As 

petitioner has not shown that the state courts’ ruling on this claim was unreasonable under 

AEDPA, petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 

D. Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner seeks an evidentiary hearing on his federal habeas claims. In Cullen v. 

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011), the Supreme Court held that federal habeas review 

under § 2254(d)(1) and § 2254(d)(2) is limited to the record that was before the state court that 

adjudicated the claim on the merits. See Sully, 725 F.3d at 1075-76 (“[A]n evidentiary hearing is 

pointless once the district court has determined that § 2254 precludes habeas relief.”). Thus the 

undersigned will recommend that the petition be denied without an evidentiary hearing. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s application for a writ of 

habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” In his objections petitioner 

may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of 

the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district 

court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the 

applicant). Any response to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after 

service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: November 28, 2016

2 / joyn1494.hc

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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