Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01386/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01386-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Architectural Glass & Aluminum Company
Appellee
Bagatelos Architectural Glass Systems, Inc.
Appellee
Bucher Glass, Inc.
Not party
Jangho Curtain Wall Americas Co. Ltd.
Appellant
Overgaard Limited
Appellant
Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Industry Engineering Co., Ltd.
Appellant
United States
Appellee
Walters & Wolf
Appellee
Yuanda USA
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

SHENYANG YUANDA ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 

ENGINEERING CO., LTD., OVERGAARD LIMITED, 

JANGHO CURTAIN WALL AMERICAS CO. LTD., 

AND YUANDA USA,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

AND

BUCHER GLASS, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

UNITED STATES, WALTERS & WOLF,

BAGATELOS ARCHITECTURAL GLASS SYSTEMS, 

INC., AND ARCHITECTURAL GLASS & ALUMINUM 

COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

______________________ 

2014-1386, -1387, -1388

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States Court of International 

Trade in Nos. 1:12-cv-00420-RKE, 1:12-cv-00423-RKE, 

and 1:12-cv-00424-RKE, Judge Richard K. Eaton.

______________________ 

Decided: January 21, 2015

______________________ 

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2 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

THOMAS M. BELINE, Cassidy Levy Kent (USA) LLP, of 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. With 

him on the brief were JAMES R. CANNON, JR. and THOMAS 

M. BELINE. Of counsel on the brief were KRISTEN SMITH

and MARK LUDWIKOWSKI, Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, 

P.A., of Washington, DC. 

TARA K. HOGAN, Senior Trial Counsel, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for defendantappellee United States. With her on the brief were 

STUART F. DELERY, Assistant Attorney General, JEANNE 

E. DAVIDSON, Director, and REGINALD T. BLADES, JR.,

Assistant Director. Of counsel on the brief was SCOTT 

MCBRIDE, Office of the Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, United States Department of 

Commerce, of Washington, DC. 

DAVID M. SPOONER, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, of 

Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee Walters 

& Wolf. With him on the brief was CHRISTINE J. SOHAR 

HENTER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, PLAGER and WALLACH, Circuit 

Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Industry Engineering 

Co., Ltd., Jangho Curtain Wall Americas, Co., Ltd.

(“Jangho”), Overgaard Limited, and Bucher Glass, Inc. 

(collectively, “Yuanda”) appeal the January 30, 2014, 

judgment of the United States Court of International 

Trade (“CIT”) affirming the Department of Commerce’s 

(“Commerce”) determination that curtain wall units are 

within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing 

duty orders on aluminum extrusions from the People’s 

Republic of China. Because the CIT’s decision is supportCase: 14-1386 Document: 78-2 Page: 2 Filed: 01/21/2015
SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 3

ed by substantial evidence and is in accordance with law, 

this court affirms.

BACKGROUND

The United States International Trade Commission 

(“ITC”) initiated an investigation into whether a domestic 

industry was materially injured or threatened with material injury by reason of imports of certain aluminum 

extrusions from the People’s Republic of China on March 

31, 2010. See Certain Aluminum Extrusions from China, 

USITC Pub. 4153, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-475, 731-TA-1177, at 

1 (June 2010) (Preliminary) (“ITC’s Preliminary Determinations”). On May 26, 2011, Commerce issued antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum 

extrusions from the People’s Republic of China. See Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: 

Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of 

Commerce May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the 

People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 

Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011) (the 

“Orders”).

In October 2012, Defendants-Appellees, Walters & 

Wolf, Bagatelos Architectural Glass Systems, Inc., and 

Architectural Glass & Aluminum Co., collectively referred 

to as the Curtain Wall Coalition (the “CWC companies”), 

submitted an amended scope request to Commerce pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c) (2012). The scope request 

asked Commerce to “issue a scope ruling confirming that 

curtain wall units and other parts of curtain wall systems 

are subject to the scope of the [Orders].” J.A. 4. In the 

scope request, the CWC companies explained that curtain 

walls are comprised of numerous curtain wall components, which can be categorized into three groups: 

(i) an aluminum extruded frame, which includes 

anchors, overlays, and other devices that attach 

the unit to the cement structure and adjoining 

units; (ii) infill material; and (iii) hardware to atCase: 14-1386 Document: 78-2 Page: 3 Filed: 01/21/2015
4 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

tach the curtain wall parts to the building, as well 

as to adjoining units, including fasteners, elastomeric lineal gaskets, anchor assemblies and components, clips, screws, nuts and bolts, steel 

embeds, splices to adjoin units, sealants used between the frames, infill material, and aluminum 

extrusion trim to physically attach the suspending 

curtain wall to the building structure.

Appellee’s Br. 10 (citing J.A. 986–93).

Yuanda challenged the standing of the CWC companies, arguing that the CWC companies had not demonstrated they produced aluminum extrusions. Commerce 

found the CWC companies qualified as interested parties 

under § 771(9)(C) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 

“as manufacturers, producers, or wholesalers of a domestic like product, and thus ha[d] standing to bring the 

Amended Scope Request.” Final Scope Ruling on Curtain 

Wall Units and Other Parts of a Curtain Wall System 

from the PRC (Dep’t of Commerce, Nov. 30, 2012), ECF 

Dkt. No. 56-37 (“Final Scope Ruling”) (J.A. 117–26); see 19 

U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C) (2006). 

After resolving standing, Commerce initiated a scope 

investigation of the Orders and determined Yuanda’s 

curtain wall units were within the scope. Since it found 

the Order language dispositive, Commerce determined it 

was “unnecessary to consider” the secondary criteria set 

forth in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2). Final Scope Ruling at 

8. The CIT affirmed Commerce’s determination and 

found Commerce correctly declined to consider the secondary (k)(2) factors. Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum 

Indus. Eng’g Co., v. United States, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1291 

(Ct. Int’l Trade 2014); see also 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(1), 

(2). 

Yuanda timely appeals. This court has jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (2012).

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 5

DISCUSSION

This court reviews Commerce’s final determinations 

by reapplying the same standard used by the CIT; that is, 

the question is whether Commerce’s determination is 

supported by substantial evidence and is otherwise in 

accordance with law. Global Commodity Grp. LLC v. 

United States, 709 F.3d 1134, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 

This court “grant[s] significant deference to Commerce’s own interpretation of [scope] orders.” Duferco 

Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1094–95 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002) (citing Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). “This 

deference is appropriate because the meaning and scope 

of . . . orders are issues ‘particularly within the expertise’ 

and ‘special competence’ of Commerce.” King Supply Co. 

v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 

(quoting Sandvik Steel Co. v. United States, 164 F.3d 596, 

600 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). A party challenging a scope ruling 

by Commerce under the substantial evidence standard 

“has chosen a course with a high barrier to reversal.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

I. Legal Framework

There is no specific statutory provision governing the 

interpretation of the scope of antidumping or countervailing orders. However, Commerce’s regulations permit an 

importer to “request a scope ruling as to whether a particular product is covered by an . . . order.” Sango Int’l 

L.P. v. United States, 484 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(c)(1)). The language of the 

order is the “cornerstone” of a scope analysis and “a 

predicate for the interpretive process.” Duferco Steel, 296 

F.3d at 1097. 

The regulations require Commerce, when determining 

the scope of an order, to engage in a two-step process. 

First, Commerce must consider the scope language conCase: 14-1386 Document: 78-2 Page: 5 Filed: 01/21/2015
6 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

tained in the order itself, the descriptions contained in the 

petition, and how the scope was defined in the investigation and in the determinations issued by Commerce and 

the ITC. Duferco Steel, 296 F.3d at 1097; 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(1). The petition and preliminary determinations of Commerce and the ITC involved in the underlying 

duty investigations “may provide valuable guidance as to 

the interpretation of the final order.” Id. If Commerce 

concludes the product is, or is not, included within the 

scope of the order, Commerce issues a final scope ruling. 

See Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 

1071 (Fed. Cir. 2001). If a subsection (k)(1) analysis is not 

dispositive, then Commerce proceeds to an analysis of the 

Diversified Products Criteria under subsection (k)(2) of its 

regulations. These criteria are: (1) physical characteristics, (2) expectations of ultimate purchasers, (3) ultimate 

use, (4) channels of trade in which the product is sold, and 

(5) manner of advertising and display. 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(2). 

II. Analysis

A. The CWC Companies Had Standing

As a threshold matter, Yuanda argues the CWC companies “do not produce aluminum extrusions, but instead 

produce . . . unitized curtain wall units, made by permanently sealing glass in a frame made from purchased 

aluminum extrusions” and therefore they lacked standing 

to file the scope ruling request. Appellants’ Br. 15; see 

also id. at 23 (The ITC found injury to producers of aluminum extrusions but “did not find material injury to 

purchasers of aluminum extrusions that use them to 

produce different products.”). Under 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(c), only an interested party may apply for a 

scope ruling. In relevant part, the antidumping and 

countervailing duty statutes define an interested party to 

include a “manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in the 

United States of a domestic like product,” 19 U.S.C. 

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 7

§ 1677(9)(C), as well as “a trade or business association a 

majority of whose members manufacture, produce, or 

wholesale a domestic like product in the United States,” 

id. § 1677(9)(E). 

Relying on certifications of each member that “it produces, manufactures and fabricates aluminum extrusions 

for the production of curtain wall units and parts of 

curtain wall systems in the United States,” J.A. 975–77, 

and that curtain wall units are expressly covered by the 

scope of the orders, Commerce determined each CWC 

company is a manufacturer, producer, or wholesaler in 

the United States of a domestic like product. Final Scope 

Ruling at 2 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1677(9)(C)). In response to 

Yuanda’s standing arguments, Commerce found “no 

evidence on the record that calls the accuracy of these 

certifications into question,” discussed the broad scope of 

the Orders, and noted they encompassed “a myriad of 

industries.” Id. at 10. 

Parts for curtain walls were included from the beginning of the investigation. See, e.g., Aluminum Extrusions 

from the People’s Republic of China, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,109, 

22,114 (Dep’t of Commerce Apr. 27, 2010) (initiation of 

antidumping duty investigation) (“[S]ubject aluminum 

extrusions may be described at the time of importation as 

parts for final finished products . . . including . . . curtain 

walls.”). In response to Yuanda below, Commerce explicitly held that “curtain walls assembled after importation 

are within the scope [of the Orders],” J.A. 1230, and since 

curtain walls are comprised of curtain wall units, the 

scope ruling included the units. The ITC Final Report 

also indicates the ITC considered curtain wall units in its 

initial investigation. See Certain Aluminum Extrusions 

from China, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-475 & 731-TA-1177, USITC 

Pub. 4229 (May 2011) (Final). 

Appellants insist the “record shows that the Commission never collected data or otherwise investigated the 

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8 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

condition of, and the effect of subject imports on, domestic 

producers of curtain wall units.” Appellants’ Br. 23 (citing 

J.A. 1163). Yuanda provides no legal support for its 

contention that such an investigation is necessary, and, in 

fact, the purpose of a scope proceeding is to clarify whether a specific product is covered. As the Government 

points out, “appellants’ suggestion that the ITC must find 

injury as to all domestic producers is akin to requiring 

every producer of aluminum extrusion products expressly 

listed in the scope, and those covered by an order but not 

expressly listed, to participate in an investigation.” 

United States’ Br. 18. Yuanda’s unsupported contention 

accordingly fails. 

Similarly, Yuanda also relies on Wheatland Tube Co. 

v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998), to 

argue “[t]he Orders [c]annot [l]awfully [e]xtend to 

[i]mports of [c]urtain [w]all [u]nits [w]ithout a [f]inding of 

[i]njury to the [d]omestic [c]urtain [w]all [u]nit 

[i]ndustry.” Appellants’ Br. 22. That case is inapposite. 

Here, the investigations included aluminum extrusion 

parts, such as those used for curtain walls, J.A. 1220–34, 

whereas in Wheatland, line pipe was not included in the 

injury determinations and so the court held the order 

could not be expanded beyond that injury determination. 

See Wheatland Tube Co., 161 F.3d at 1369. 

If Commerce or the CIT had determined producers of 

curtain wall units are not “producers, manufacturers, or 

wholesalers of the domestic like product” it would mean 

that curtain wall units are not within the scope of the 

Orders. This finding would be in direct conflict with the 

Final Scope Ruling, at issue in this case, that curtain wall 

units are within the scope of the Orders. See Final Scope 

Ruling at 10. The CIT thus correctly found the CWC 

companies “produce and manufacture ‘aluminum extrusions for the production of curtain wall units and parts of 

curtain wall systems,’ products that the court finds fall 

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 9

within the ambit of the Orders.” J.A. 18. Accordingly, the 

Defendants-Appellees had standing. 

B. The Scope Language of the Orders Includes Curtain 

Wall Units

Scope language is the “cornerstone” of any scope determination. See Walgreen Co. of Deerfield, IL v. United 

States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 

Duferco Steel, 296 F.3d at 1097). The scope, in relevant 

part, of Commerce’s antidumping and countervailing duty 

Orders regarding certain aluminum extrusions from the 

People’s Republic of China recites:

The merchandise covered by these Orders is aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, 

produced by an extrusion process, made from 

aluminum alloys having metallic elements . . . .

Aluminum extrusions are produced and imported 

in a wide variety of shapes and forms, including, 

but not limited to, hollow profiles, other solid profiles, pipes, tubes, bars, and rods. Aluminum extrusions that are drawn subsequent to extrusion 

(drawn aluminum) are also included in the 

scope. . . . 

Subject aluminum extrusions may be described at 

the time of importation as parts for final finished 

products that are assembled after importation, including, but not limited to, window frames, door 

frames, solar panels, curtain walls, or furniture. 

. . . 

The scope also excludes finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are 

fully and permanently assembled and completed 

at the time of entry, such as finished windows with 

glass, doors with glass . . . . 

Final Scope Ruling 3–4 (emphases added). 

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10 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

Yuanda’s primary argument on appeal is that “Commerce [u]nlawfully [e]xpanded the [s]cope of the Orders 

on [a]luminum [e]xtrusions to [i]nclude [c]urtain [w]all 

[u]nits.” Appellants’ Br. 21. Specifically, Yuanda contends both Commerce’s and the CIT’s decisions “stand on 

a ‘formal fallacy,’ i.e., a flaw in the logical structure of the 

argument which renders the argument invalid.” Id. 

Yuanda agrees “[a]luminum extrusions are subject to the 

Orders” and “may be described as parts for curtain walls.” 

Id. at 22. Yuanda disagrees, however, that these propositions lead to the conclusion that its curtain wall units are 

subject to the Orders. Instead, Yuanda argues, the plain 

language of the Orders demonstrates curtain wall units 

are subject to the Orders only “if aluminum extrusions are 

imported as parts for curtain walls,” id. at 28, and that 

“[c]urtain wall units are different from the aluminum 

extrusions used to make their frame,” id. at 26; see also 

id. at 28 (explaining Commerce undertook no analysis “to 

show that unitized curtain wall units ‘otherwise meet the 

definition of’ aluminum extrusions”). 

Commerce’s expertise is often required to clarify scope 

language and determine whether products fall within the 

language of the order, which is typically written in general terms. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(a); see also Duferco 

Steel, 296 F.3d at 1096. The Orders here cover “aluminum extrusions which are shapes and forms, produced by 

an extrusion process, made from aluminum alloys having 

metallic elements corresponding to [certain] alloy series 

designations.” J.A. 1011. Its definition of subject aluminum extrusions is broad and covers products with a “wide 

variety of shapes and forms,” and “with a variety of finishes (both coatings and surface treatments), and types of 

fabrication.” Id. (emphases added). Curtain wall units, 

such as Yuanda’s, “can be ordered from multiple foreign 

sources as assembled aluminum framed units, and [may 

be] sometimes pre-glazed with glass.” J.A. 989. They 

contain aluminum extrusions. That Yuanda’s products 

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 11

are called “curtain wall units,” rather than “aluminum 

extrusions” does not preclude them from the scope since 

they otherwise meet the physical description of the subject merchandise. 

Indeed, curtain wall parts and units are often classified and imported under the Harmonized Tariff Schedule 

of the United States (“HTSUS”) subheadings 7610.90 and 

7610.10, which cover “aluminum structures and parts of 

structures; other.” HTSUS 7610.10, 7610.90. Appellant 

Jangho contends “‘[a] product’s tariff classification is 

merely of peripheral interest to suggest the general 

nature of a good’ and is not dispositive of whether a 

product falls under the scope of an order.” Jangho Reply 

11 (quoting Torrington Co. v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 

718, 722 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1990)). Here, neither Commerce 

nor the CIT found the HTSUS subheadings dispositive; 

the HTSUS merely bolstered what is already explicitly 

included in the language of the Orders. See J.A. 1230. 

Yuanda also disregards the Orders’ explicit inclusion 

of parts for curtain walls. The Orders include (1) “subject 

aluminum extrusions . . . described at the time of importation as parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation, including . . . curtain walls,” (2) 

“aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., 

by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies (i.e., 

partially assembled merchandise),” and (3) aluminum 

extrusions that are “identified with reference to their end 

use.” Final Scope Ruling at 4. Each of these three categories applies to curtain wall units. 

Yuanda further contends the CIT “acknowledges implicitly that aluminum extrusions and curtain wall units 

are different products,” suggesting the scope does not 

extend to curtain wall units or parts of curtain walls. 

Appellants’ Br. 26 (citing Shenyang Yuanda, 961 F.Supp. 

2d at 1298–99). To Yuanda, Commerce “impermissibly 

assumed that because the Orders mention ‘parts’ for 

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12 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

‘curtain walls,’ they therefore extend to unitized curtain 

wall units.” Id. at 28. As the CIT explained, curtain wall 

units are “undeniably components that are fastened 

together to form a completed curtain wall,” Shenyang 

Yuanda, 961 F.Supp. 2d at 1298, and “the CWC [companies] sought a ruling on what products were covered by 

the Orders, not whether specific companies’ merchandise 

could be excluded from them.” Id. at 1301. Yuanda 

essentially argues the whole is something different than 

the sum of its parts. This could be true if essential character changed from what was considered in the investigation. Here, however, as explicitly provided for in the 

scope language, parts for curtain walls are part of the 

subject matter of the Orders. This court discerns no flaw 

in Commerce’s determination that Yuanda’s curtain wall 

parts are within the plain language of the Orders. 

In addition to the plain language of the Orders, Commerce will also consider the descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial investigation, 

and the prior determinations of Commerce and the ITC. 

See King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1345. Those descriptions in 

the petition initiating the antidumping and countervailing duty orders as well as the ITC investigation also show 

parts for curtain walls are included within the Orders’ 

scope. The ITC noted “aluminum extrusions serve in a 

wide variety of applications such as window and door 

frames and sills, curtain walls, thresholds, gutters, solar 

panel frames, and vehicle parts” and emphasized the 

broad range of end uses for the subject aluminum extrusions, including “[b]uilding and [c]onstruction,” which 

specifically included “high-rise curtain wall” products. 

J.A. 1128–30 (emphasis added). The ITC noted 

“[a]ccording to petitioners, the wide and varied uses of 

aluminum extrusions are due to their combination of 

desirable performance characteristics such as high 

strength, low weight, high corrosion-resistance, and 

relative workability and/or machineability.” J.A. 1128. 

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 13

Accordingly, the petition and investigation support the 

CIT’s holding. 

C. Yuanda’s Products Do Not Fall Within the “Finished 

Merchandise” Exception

Yuanda argues that “[e]ven if it were possible to read 

the scope language of the Orders as otherwise including

curtain wall units, the [Orders’] explicit exclusion for 

‘finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as 

parts that are fully and permanently assembled and 

completed at the time of entry’ would remove unitized

curtain wall units from [their] scope.” Appellants’ Br. 28. 

The CIT acknowledged this argument, rejecting Yuanda’s 

contention “the term ‘parts for’ somehow means something smaller or less manufactured than a curtain wall 

unit.” Shenyang Yuanda, 961 F.Supp. 2d at 1298. Ultimately, the CIT determined that “there is nothing in the 

‘parts for’ language that would suggest this kind of restriction, and the court will not add any.” Id. 

Commerce explicitly considered whether Yuanda’s 

merchandise fell into one of the enumerated exclusions 

from the Orders and found that the parts of curtain walls 

subject to the scope ruling did not satisfy the “finished 

merchandise” exclusion. Commerce explained that the 

CWC companies defined curtain wall as “an aluminum 

extrusion framed non-weight bearing exterior wall” that 

is supported by the structure of the building to which it is 

secured. Final Scope Ruling at 3. Commerce also explained “curtain wall parts fall short of the final finished 

curtain wall that envelopes [sic] the entire building structure. Certain curtain wall parts are assembled into 

modules that are designed to be interlocked with other 

curtain wall parts, like pieces of a puzzle.” Id. 

Commerce determined finished merchandise is a 

“complete product upon entry,” but that units for curtain 

walls are designed to be attached to other units to eventually form a completed curtain wall. The CIT also deCase: 14-1386 Document: 78-2 Page: 13 Filed: 01/21/2015
14 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

termined an individual curtain wall unit “has no consumptive or practical use because multiple units are 

required to form the wall of a building.” Shenyang Yuanda, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1298–99. Yuanda itself concedes 

that “absolutely no one purchases for consumption a 

single curtain wall piece or unit.” Id. at 1298 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). A single unit does 

not a curtain wall make, nor is it a finished product. As 

the CIT correctly explained, “[c]urtain wall units are [] 

undeniably components that are fastened together to form 

a completed curtain wall. Thus, they are ‘parts for,’ and 

‘subassemblies’ for, completed curtain walls.” Id. A part 

or subassembly, here a curtain wall unit, cannot be a 

finished product. 

Moreover, although the scope excludes “windows with 

glass,” it does not exclude curtain wall units with glass. 

J.A. 125; see also Shenyang Yuanda, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 

1298 (“[I]t is apparent that the Orders separately and 

intentionally distinguish windows from curtain wall 

units, and that the ‘finished merchandise’ exception does 

not encompass curtain wall units.”). Under the doctrines 

of expressio unius est exclusio alterius1 and noscitur a 

sociis,2 that finished windows with glass are excluded by 

1 Typically used in statutory interpretation, this 

Latin phrase translates to mean the express mention of 

one thing excludes all others. See Barnhart v. Peabody 

Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003) (“The canon depends on 

identifying a series of two or more terms or things that 

should be understood to go hand in hand, which [is] 

abridged in circumstances supporting a sensible inference 

that the term left out must have been meant to be excluded.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2 “The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is 

known by the company it keeps, while not an inescapable 

rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of 

 

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SHENYANG YUANDA v. US 15

name means that walls with glass are necessarily included, leaving aside that curtain walls are also specifically 

included by name. Accordingly, the CIT correctly determined Yuanda’s curtain wall parts are not finished merchandise because it is nonsensical to construe “parts 

for . . . curtain walls” to mean finished merchandise. Id. 

at 1299 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

D. Commerce Properly Declined to Consider the 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(2) Factors

Both the plain language of the Orders and the description of the merchandise in the investigations clearly 

demonstrate that curtain wall units and other parts of 

curtain walls are within the scope of the Orders. Accordingly, contrary to Appellants’ argument, Commerce did 

not err by declining to consider the additional factors of 

19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2). Had Commerce considered 

these factors after finding the scope language dispositive, 

it would have been in conflict with this court’s precedent 

and the regulations. See Eckstrom Indus., Inc., 254 F.3d 

at 1076 (“Commerce may only look to the factors enumerated in 19 C.F.R. § 351.225(k)(2) if its consideration of the 

order in light of the underlying petition, investigations, 

and determinations is not dispositive.”); 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k)(2).

CONCLUSION

The scope language explicitly includes “parts for . . . 

curtain walls” and curtain wall units are parts of a finished curtain wall. Therefore, Yuanda’s curtain wall 

units meet the definition of the subject aluminum extrusions. Accordingly, the decision of the CIT is 

many meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 

breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G. D. Searle 

& Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 

 

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16 SHENYANG YUANDA v. US

AFFIRMED

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