Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-06-70811/USCOURTS-ca9-06-70811-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric H. Holder Jr.
Respondent
Erlinda Silitonga
Petitioner
Riori Tampubolon
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RIORI TAMPUBOLON; ERLINDA  No. 06-70811

SILITONGA, Agency Nos.

Petitioners, A095-630-032

v.  A097-854-046

ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney ORDER AND

General, AMENDED

Respondent. OPINION 

On Petition for Review of Orders of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

February 4, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed March 9, 2010

Amended June 25, 2010

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Harry Pregerson and

Susan P. Graber, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Pregerson

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COUNSEL

Vera A. Weisz, Law Office of Vera A. Weisz, Los Angeles,

California, for the petitioners.

Kristin Edison and Eric W. Marsteller, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

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ORDER

The opinion filed March 9, 2010, slip opinion page 3737,

and appearing at 598 F.3d 521, is amended as follows:

On slip opinion page 3742, replace the last sentence of

footnote 1 with the following: “It appears that NSEERS was

used to identify undocumented immigrants and remove those

who comply.”

With this amendment, the panel has voted to deny the petition for panel rehearing.

OPINION

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge:

Riori Tampubolon (“Tampubolon”) and his wife, Erlinda

Silitonga (“Silitonga”) petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of their applications for asylum,

withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal from

Indonesia. We deny the petition with respect to the asylum

and cancellation of removal claims, but we grant the petition

with respect to the withholding of removal claim. We hold

that the BIA erred in failing to apply disfavored group analysis to petitioners’ withholding claim because the record compels a finding that Christians in Indonesia are a disfavored

group. We remand in accordance with INS v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002).

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioners, devout Protestant Christians, are natives and

citizens of Indonesia. In 1989, when he was 31 years old,

Tampubolon entered the United States on a tourist visa. LikeTAMPUBOLON v. HOLDER 9263

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wise, in 1992, when she was 22 years old, Silitonga entered

the United States on a tourist visa. Tampubolon and Silitonga

met in the United States and married in 1995. They have two

U.S. citizen daughters, ages 12 and 14. The entire family is

active in their local church. They attend weekly services,

Bible study, and prayer meetings. Silitonga teaches Sunday

School, and the children sing in the choir. Tampubolon and

Silitonga are both employed in the healthcare industry and

pay taxes; neither has been arrested for any crime.

Petitioners came to the attention of the Department of

Homeland Security (“DHS”) when they conformed to the

National Security Entry-Exit Registration System

(“NSEERS”)1 and registered with Immigration and Customs

Enforcement. In 2003 and 2004, respectively, DHS issued

Notices to Appear to Tampubolon and Silitonga, charging

them with removability for overstaying their visas. Tampubolon and Silitonga conceded removability and applied for

relief from removal, including cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT. 

The IJ denied all applications for relief.2 The IJ denied petitioners’ application for asylum because they failed to file their

applications within one year of arrival, and also failed to demonstrate changed circumstances. The IJ denied petitioners’

application for withholding of removal because neither had

1

“Special Registration” refers to the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (“NSEERS”). Following September 11, 2001, the Attorney

General instituted NSEERS, which required the collection of data from

aliens upon entry and periodic registration of certain aliens, from majorityMuslim states and North Korea, present in the United States. See Rajah

v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 2008); see also 8 C.F.R.

§ 264.1(f)(4) (2003) (enabling regulation for the NSEERS program). It

appears that NSEERS was used to identify undocumented immigrants and

remove those who comply. 

2Neither the IJ nor the BIA made an adverse credibility finding. Accordingly, this court must take petitioners’ testimony as true. See Kalubi v.

Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 1134, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004). 

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suffered past persecution and both had similarly situated siblings living in Indonesia who had not experienced problems

practicing their Christian faith. The IJ denied petitioners’

application for cancellation of removal because they failed to

demonstrate that removal would result in exceptional and

extremely unusual hardship to their two U.S. citizen daughters.3

The BIA adopted and affirmed the decision of the IJ, citing

Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (B.I.A. 1994). Petitioners timely petitioned for review. We have jurisdiction

over the petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Where, as here, the BIA cites its decision in Burbano, and

does not express disagreement with any part of the IJ’s decision, we review the IJ’s decision as if it were the BIA’s decision. See Cinapian v. Holder, 567 F.3d 1067, 1073 (9th Cir.

2009). The BIA’s determination that petitioners have not

established eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal is

reviewed for substantial evidence. See, e.g., Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2006).

Under the substantial evidence standard, the BIA’s determinations will be upheld “if the decision is ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record

considered as a whole.’ ” Zhao v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 1027,

1029 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d

1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). Reversal, however,

is appropriate when “the evidence in the record compels a rea3

In their opening brief, petitioners failed to raise any issues or advance

any arguments in favor of relief under CAT. Accordingly, petitioners

waived review of their CAT claim. See, e.g., Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d

1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the petitioner waived CAT

claim by failing to advance any arguments in favor of relief); MartinezSerrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that

petitioner waived a claim that was referenced in the statement of the case,

but not discussed in the body of the opening brief). 

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sonable factfinder to conclude that the [BIA’s] decision is

incorrect.” Id. 

Purely legal questions, including jurisdictional questions,

are reviewed de novo. See Taslimi v. Holder, 590 F.3d 981,

984 (9th Cir. 2010).

III. ASYLUM

[1] To qualify for asylum, an applicant must file her application within one year after arrival in the United States. 8

U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The limitations period will be tolled

if the applicant can establish changed circumstances that

materially affect her eligibility for asylum. 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(a)(2)(D); 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i). Contrary to the

government’s argument, we have jurisdiction to review an

agency’s changed circumstances determination. See Ramadan

v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)

(holding that the Real ID Act restored jurisdiction over the

“changed circumstances” question because this question

involved the application of a statutory standard to undisputed

facts). 

[2] Petitioners argue that Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922

(9th Cir. 2004), and Lolong v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1215 (9th

Cir. 2005) (“Lolong I”), rev’d, 484 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2007)

(en banc) (“Lolong II”), constituted changed circumstances

because they changed United States law in a way that materially affects their eligibility for asylum. 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.4(a)(4)(i)(B). We review the IJ’s changed circumstances determination for substantial evidence. See Ramadan,

479 F.3d at 657. Petitioners’ argument fails because both Sael

and Lolong were decided after petitioners filed their asylum

applications. Accordingly, those decisions could not have

tolled the one-year statute of limitations.4 We affirm the IJ’s

denial of petitioners’ asylum application as untimely. 

4Furthermore, neither Sael nor Lolong I materially affected petitioners’

eligibility for asylum. The panel’s decision in Lolong I is not precedential

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IV. WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL

[3] Unlike asylum, there is no statutory time limit for filing

a withholding application. Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 932,

937 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)). Accordingly, petitioners’ application for withholding of removal is

not time-barred. Petitioners argue that the BIA erred by failing to apply disfavored group analysis to their withholding

claim because Christians are a disfavored group in Indonesia.

We agree and remand to the BIA to use the disfavored group

analysis in determining whether petitioners are entitled to

withholding of removal.

A. Christians Are a Disfavored Group in Indonesia

[4] A “disfavored group” is “a group of individuals in a

certain country or part of a country, all of whom share a common, protected characteristic, many of whom are mistreated,

and a substantial number of whom are persecuted” but who

are “not threatened by a pattern or practice of systematic persecution.” Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1052, 1062 (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted). Although we held in Sael,

386 F.3d at 927, that the ethnic Chinese are a disfavored

group in Indonesia, and suggested in Wakkary, 558 F.3d at

1063, that Chinese Christians are disfavored in Indonesia, we

because it was vacated, reheard en banc, and not adopted in Lolong II. See

9th Cir. R. 35-3, Advisory Note 3 (“The three-judge panel opinion shall

not be cited as precedent . . . , except to the extent adopted by the en banc

court.”). Moreover, the holding in Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922 (9th Cir.

2004), that the ethnic Chinese minority in Indonesia are a disfavored

group, does not apply here because petitioners are not ethnically Chinese.

In addition, disfavored group analysis existed well before we decided Sael.

See Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the development of “disfavored group” analysis beginning with Kotasz

v. INS, 31 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, Sael does not constitute

a changed circumstance that materially affects petitioners’ eligibility for

asylum. 

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have never determined whether Christians who are not Chinese are a disfavored group in Indonesia. 

In Sael, we held that Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese minority

are a “disfavored group” because of Indonesia’s long history

of anti-Chinese violence and official discrimination. 386 F.3d

at 927. We noted that official policies of ethnic tolerance and

decreased numbers of racially motivated attacks did not

diminish the “disfavored” status of ethnic Chinese because

official discrimination continued and Chinese-Indonesians

experienced “centuries of persecution.” Id. at 929. Here, petitioners have also submitted compelling evidence that Christians in Indonesia are subject to violence and official

discrimination. 

[5] Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim country. Nearly 90 % of Indonesians are Muslim, while Protestant

Christians only account for 6 % of the population. According

to the 2003 U.S. State Department Country Report on Human

Rights Practices in Indonesia (“Country Report”), “[t]he Government . . . frequently failed to protect adequately the fundamental rights . . . of religious minorities.”

Muslims and Christians lived together in relative peace

until the 1990s when President Suharto began courting militant Islamic groups to maintain his political power. See Mieke

Kooistra, Minority Rights Group Int’l, Indonesia: Regional

Conflicts and State Terror 14 (2001). Consequently, militant

Islam increased in strength and political influence. Id. During

this time, Suharto purged his cabinet and army of Christians

and replaced them with fundamentalist Muslims. Id. Even

after Suharto’s regime ended, the military and political elite

continued to protect violent Muslim militia groups, such as

Laskar Jihad, whose goal is to kill, convert, or drive out all

non-Muslims from certain parts of Indonesia. Id. at 20; see

also Paul Marshall, Jihad Comes to Indonesia, The Weekly

Standard, Dec. 31, 2001, at 20.

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[6] The Indonesian government’s support of, or at the very

least, acquiescence in, militant expressions of Islam has subjected Christians to violent persecution in Indonesia. The

record demonstrates that Christian churches throughout Indonesia have been burned, bombed, and vandalized by Muslim

extremists. These attacks are often accompanied by threats,

such as: “God has no son. Jesus could not help you. Until

doomsday, Muslims will not make peace with Christians.

Death to all Christians.” See Seth Mydans, Jihad Seethes, and

Grows, on Indonesian Island, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 2002, at

A3. Petitioners’ family members who remain in Indonesia

have been affected by these attacks. For example, Silitonga

testified that Muslim extremists threatened to kill people who

attended worship service at her sister’s church in Sumatra on

Christmas Eve in 2000. According to the 2003 U.S. Department of State International Religious Freedom Report on

Indonesia (“Religious Freedom Report”), at least 25 churches

were destroyed in 2003. Although mosques are also subject to

attack, only one mosque was destroyed during the same

reporting period.

[7] Christians living in some areas, such as the Maluku

Islands, are subject to even greater violence, such as forced

conversions and ritual circumcisions. See, e.g., Catherine

Philp, Indonesian Christians Butchered in Islamic ‘Crusades’,

The Scotsman, July 8, 2001, at 18. In these areas, Christian

villages are attacked and Christians are forced to flee their

homes. Another concern is that Christians, who like all Indonesians must carry identification cards denoting their religious

affiliation, are murdered at unofficial identification checkpoints.

[8] Laskar Jihad is responsible for much of the Christiantargeted violence in Indonesia. The activities of this paramilitary group escalated the bilateral Muslim-Christian tensions to

a one-sided religious cleansing and slaughter of Christians

between 1998 and 2002. Marshall, supra at 20. According to

local eyewitnesses, the military participates in attacks on

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churches, and Indonesians widely believe that the government

cannot or will not protect Christians against Muslim attacks.

See, e.g., Indonesian Military Deny Allegations Soldiers Took

Part in Church Attack, Associated Press, Apr. 29, 2002 (witnesses stated that uniformed soldiers participated in an attack

on a church); Philp, supra at 18 (noting that the government’s

reaction to forced conversions and circumcisions was “astonishingly weak”); Kooistra, supra at 20 (noting that “it is obvious that [Laskar Jihad] is well-armed, well-financed and wellprotected by the military or powerful people with connections

to the former ruling elite”). Despite reductions of interreligious violence, the Religious Freedom Report notes that the

government failed to hold accountable religious extremists

who killed and terrorized Christians, even as it fully prosecuted and punished Christian leaders for subversion.

[9] In addition to condoning or turning a blind eye to the

persecution of Christians by private individuals, evidence in

the record indicates that the Indonesian government discriminates against Christians. For example, according to the Religious Freedom Report, Christians complained that the

government made it harder for them to build houses of worship than Muslims. Religious minorities also contend that

they are excluded from prime civil service postings and slots

at public universities.

[10] Christian Indonesians have also suffered private discrimination and marginalization by the general populace. For

example, the 2003 Country Report noted that estates housing

only Muslims have grown increasingly popular. Moreover,

according to a 2002 survey in Jakarta, 79.6% of respondents

believed that the government should outlaw groups that follow faiths other than Islam, 72.5% believed that members of

minority religions should not be permitted to teach in public

schools, 58% support an Islamic state, and 42% would not

allow churches to be built in their neighborhood. See Devi

Asmarani, Many Muslim Indonesians Say They Want an

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Islamic State, The Straits Times (Singapore), Jan. 2, 2002, at

1-2.

[11] Christian Indonesians are targeted for violence and

experience official and unofficial discrimination in many facets of their lives. Although the record demonstrates that the

Indonesian government does not promulgate facially discriminatory laws against Christians, this fact does not address its

discriminatory enforcement of facially neutral laws or its

acquiescence in widespread private discrimination and violence against Christians. See Sael, 386 F.3d at 929. The record

demonstrates that Christian Indonesians are mistreated, and

some are subject to persecution. See Wakkary, 558 F.3d at

1052. Accordingly, any reasonable factfinder would be compelled to conclude on this record that Christian Indonesians

are a disfavored group. 

B. Disfavored Group Analysis in the Withholding

Context

[12] As we recognized in Wakkary, disfavored group analysis is an evidentiary concept that applies when a petitioner

attempts to show that she will be individually singled out for

persecution.5Id. at 1063. Evidence of both individual and

5Two avenues are available for establishing eligibility for withholding

of removal: (1) past persecution, which creates a presumption of eligibility

for withholding of removal; and (2) a clear probability of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b); see also Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882,

888-89 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the “clear probability standard” for

withholding of removal). A clear probability of future persecution may be

established in one of two ways. First, the applicant may demonstrate that

it is more likely than not that she will be singled out individually for persecution on account of a protected ground. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2).

Second, in the absence of any individualized targeting, the applicant may

demonstrate that she is a member of a group that is subject to a “pattern

or practice of persecution” in her home country. Wakkary, 558 F.3d at

1060. 

Disfavored group analysis is triggered only when a petitioner attempts

to show that she will more likely than not be singled out individually for

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group targeting are relevant to demonstrate the likelihood that

a particular individual will be persecuted. Id. at 1062-63.

Therefore, “[t]he more evidence of group targeting an . . .

applicant proffers, the less evidence of individually specific

evidence [s]he needs to [satisfy her ultimate burden of

proof].” Id. at 1064. Nevertheless, a petitioner’s membership

in a disfavored group is not sufficient by itself to meet her

ultimate burden of proof; “some evidence of individualized

risk is necessary for the petitioner to succeed.” Id. at 1065. 

[13] Here, the BIA failed to analyze petitioners’ withholding claim according to disfavored group analysis. Because the

record compels the conclusion that Christians in Indonesia are

a disfavored group and petitioners are Christians, we must

remand to the BIA for it to determine whether the combination of disfavored group evidence and evidence of individualized risk is sufficient to establish a clear probability that

petitioners will be persecuted if removed to Indonesia.6 Wakkary, 558 F.3d at 1067.

V. CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL

The IJ denied petitioners’ application for cancellation of

removal because petitioners did not demonstrate that their

removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual

hardship to their two U.S. citizen daughters. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229b(b)(1)(D). This court lacks jurisdiction to review an

agency’s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” determination. See Romero-Torres v. Ashcroft, 327 F.3d 887, 888

persecution on account of a protected ground. That is the precise situation

in this case. Here, petitioners concede that they did not experience past

persecution and do not argue that Christians in Indonesia are subject to a

pattern or practice of persecution. Rather, petitioners rely on the “individualized risk of persecution” avenue to establish eligibility for withholding.

6The record reflects that petitioners’ family members continue to live in

Indonesia, but that unlike their family members, petitioners would return

Westernized to Indonesia after living in the United States for over twenty

years and raising two U.S. citizen children. 

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(9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the “ ‘exceptional and extremely

unusual hardship’ determination is a subjective, discretionary

judgment that has been carved out of our appellate jurisdiction”). This court retains jurisdiction, however, to review due

process challenges and other questions of law. See, e.g.,

Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 930 (9th Cir.

2005). We review our own jurisdiction de novo. Taslimi, 590

F.3d at 984.

[14] Petitioners argue that the BIA violated their due process rights by failing to consider the effect of Sael and Lolong

I. The BIA violates an alien’s due process rights if: “(1) the

proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was

prevented from reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the

alien demonstrates prejudice, which means that the outcome

of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged violation.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620-21 (9th

Cir. 2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

[15] We decided Sael and Lolong I after the IJ rendered his

decision. Both cases involved applications for asylum and

neither dealt with cancellation of removal. Accordingly, neither case changed the law for cancellation of removal. The

BIA’s failure to address two irrelevant cases does not render

the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Because petitioners fail

to state a colorable due process claim, we lack jurisdiction to

review the IJ’s denial of petitioners’ application for cancellation of removal.

VI. CONCLUSION

In summary, we hold that on this record, Christians are a

disfavored group in Indonesia and conclude that the BIA

erred in failing to analyze petitioners’ withholding claim

according to disfavored group analysis. Therefore, we grant

the petition for review and remand for the BIA to apply disfavored group analysis. We affirm the BIA and deny the petiTAMPUBOLON v. HOLDER 9273

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tion with respect to all other applications for relief. Costs on

appeal awarded to petitioners.

PETITION GRANTED IN PART, DENIED IN PART,

AND REMANDED.

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