Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07114/USCOURTS-ca13-15-07114-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donald E. Golemon
Appellant
Robert A. McDonald
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

DONALD E. GOLEMON,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

ROBERT A. MCDONALD, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-7114

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 14-177, Judge Lawrence B. Hagel.

______________________ 

Decided: January 8, 2016

______________________ 

DONALD E. GOLEMON, Mobile, AL, pro se.

ADAM E. LYONS, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent-appellee. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., BRIAN A.

MIZOGUCHI; Y. KEN LEE, JONATHAN KRISCH, Office of 

General Counsel, United States Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Washington, DC. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-7114 Document: 20-2 Page: 1 Filed: 01/08/2016
2 GOLEMON v. MCDONALD

Before REYNA, TARANTO, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. 

This case arises from a decision by the Department of 

Veterans Affairs (VA) denying disability benefits to Donald E. Golemon (Mr. Golemon) for three conditions: 

(1) adenocarcinoma of the colon; (2) peripheral neuropathy of the right and left upper extremity; and (3) multiple 

myeloma. The Board of Veterans’ Appeals (Board) affirmed and the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Veterans Court) remanded-in-part and 

affirmed-in-part. Specifically, the Veterans Court remanded Mr. Golemon’s claims for benefits relating to 

colon cancer and peripheral neuropathy and affirmed the 

denial of benefits for myeloma. Because Mr. Golemon’s 

arguments are either without merit or will be addressed 

in the partial remand to the Board, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Mr. Golemon served on active duty in the United 

States Army from January 1970 to July 1971. During his 

service, Mr. Golemon sustained combat injuries for which 

he was subsequently awarded the Purple Heart. 

In June 2003, Mr. Golemon filed a claim seeking disability benefits for, among other things, peripheral neuropathy. He later filed an additional claim requesting 

benefits for colon cancer. Then, in May 2008, he sought 

benefits for multiple myeloma due to exposure to herbicides. The VA denied benefits for these injuries. In a 

June 4, 2013 decision, the Board affirmed (Board Decision). Thereafter, on August 17, 2013, Mr. Golemon 

sought reconsideration of the Board’s decision. On September 26, 2013, the Board Deputy Vice Chairman issued 

a letter denying Mr. Golemon’s request for reconsideration (Denial of Reconsideration). 

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GOLEMON v. MCDONALD 3

Mr. Golemon appealed to the Veterans Court, identifying the September 26th Denial of Rehearing as the 

Board decision from which he was appealing, rather than 

the June 4th Board Decision. Because the Veterans Court

docketed the appeal as arising from the June 4th Board 

Decision, Mr. Golemon sent a letter, dated January 13, 

2015, requesting that the Veterans Court recognize the 

September 26th Denial of Reconsideration decision as the 

final Board decision from which he was appealing. The 

Veterans Court does not appear to have addressed this 

letter and, on May 4, 2015, issued a single-judge memorandum decision vacating and remanding the portion of 

the Board’s decision relating to adenocarcinoma of the 

colon and peripheral neuropathy of the upper extremities. 

Specifically, the Veterans Court concluded that the Board 

did not appropriately consider Mr. Golemon’s contention 

that his neck injury was caused, at least in part, by the 

injuries he sustained while in combat. The Veterans 

Court affirmed the remainder of the Board’s decision, 

including the Board’s determination that there was 

insufficient evidence to support a diagnosis of multiple 

myeloma. 

In response to the single-judge decision, Mr. Golemon 

filed several motions before the Veterans Court, raising 

several arguments: (1) a motion for panel review of the 

Veterans Court’s single-judge decision; (2) a motion to 

correct the date of his combat entry used by the Veterans 

Court; and (3) a motion to establish a veterans’ bill of 

rights, benefiting all veterans. The Board granted panel 

review, but declined to alter the May 4, 2015 decision. 

The Veterans Court denied the remaining two motions. 

Mr. Golemon then filed a motion seeking review by the 

full Veterans Court. The Veterans Court denied this 

motion because review was not “necessary to secure or 

maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions” and the 

decision did not implicate “a question of exceptional 

importance.” Golemon v. McDonald, No. 14-0177, 2015 

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4 GOLEMON v. MCDONALD

WL 4929692, at *1 (Vet. App. Aug. 19, 2015). Accordingly, the Veterans court entered judgment on August 19, 

2015, and Mr. Golemon timely appealed to this court. 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction over appeals from the Veterans Court 

is limited. Under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), we may review the 

“validity of a decision of the [Veterans] Court on a rule of 

law or any statute or regulation . . . or any interpretation 

thereof (other than a determination as to a factual matter) that was relied on by the [Veterans] Court in making 

the decision.” We review the Veterans Court’s interpretation of a statute de novo. Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 

1354 (Fed. Cir. 2009). We must also decide “all relevant 

questions of law” and will “set aside any regulation or any 

interpretation thereof (other than a determination as to a 

factual matter)”—relied upon in the decision of the Veterans Court—that we find “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, 

or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; 

or (D) without observance of procedure required by law.” 

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). We are not permitted, however, to 

review “a challenge to a factual determination” or a 

“challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of 

a particular case,” unless the appeal presents a constitutional issue. §§ 7292(d)(2)(A)–(B). See Conway v. Principi, 353 F.3d 1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 

Notably, Mr. Golemon does not assert that the Veterans Court incorrectly affirmed the Board’s conclusion that 

Mr. Golemon could not be diagnosed with multiple myeloma. Even if Mr. Golemon had raised such an argument, 

we would lack jurisdiction to address such a factual 

determination. Instead, Mr. Golemon objects to the 

Veterans Court’s use of the June 4th Board Decision as 

the decision for review, rather than the September 26th 

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GOLEMON v. MCDONALD 5

Denial of Reconsideration decision. Mr. Golemon also 

requests that we correct the date of his combat injury 

from June 2, 1971, to May 21, 1971. 

I 

The Veterans Court’s jurisdiction and scope of review 

is governed by statute. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252. Thus, 

whether the Veterans Court properly determined which of 

the Board’s decisions was subject to its review relates to 

the contours of the Veterans Court’s statutorily prescribed 

jurisdiction. As a question of statutory interpretation, 

this issue falls within our jurisdiction.

Congress provided that “[t]he Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims shall have exclusive jurisdiction to 

review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.” 38 

U.S.C. § 7252(a). Section 7103 addresses motions for 

reconsideration and explains that “[t]he decision of the 

Board . . . is final unless the Chairman [of the Board of 

Veterans’ Appeals] orders reconsideration of the decision . . . .”1 38 U.S.C. § 7103(a). The VA’s regulations 

further explain that “[t]he Chairman will review the 

sufficiency of the allegations set forth in the motion [for 

reconsideration] and determine whether to deny or allow 

the motion. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1001(c). Accordingly, under 

the governing statutes and regulations, a decision deny1 The decision denying Mr. Golemon’s motion for 

reconsideration was signed by David C. Sprinkler, Deputy 

Vice Chairman of the Board. Mr. Golemon does not 

challenge the authority of the deputy vice chairman to 

issue such a decision. We nevertheless recognize that 

such authority is consistent with the VA’s regulations. 

See 38 C.F.R. § 20.102(a) (providing that the authority 

exercised by the Chairman to decide requests for reconsideration “may also be exercised by the Vice Chairman of 

the Board and by Deputy Vice Chairmen of the Board”). 

 

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6 GOLEMON v. MCDONALD

ing a motion for reconsideration is an action by the 

Chairman, rather than by the Board. 

The Government points to our decision in Mayer v. 

Brown as establishing that actions by the Chairman, like 

motions to reconsider, are not subject to Veterans Court 

review, unless the motion to reconsider includes some 

showing of new evidence or circumstances. 37 F.3d 618, 

620 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“An action by the Chairman is not a 

decision of the board”), overruled in part on other grounds 

by Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 

banc). Relevant here, Mayer made clear two things: (1) 

the Veterans Court hears appeals from Board decisions; 

and (2) an action by the Chairman denying reconsideration of a Board decision is not itself a Board decision. See 

37 F.3d at 619–20. Thus, the Veterans Court, consistent 

with the statute and Mayer, did not err by designating the 

June 4th Board Decision as the decision on appeal rather 

than the September 26th Denial of Reconsideration 

decision by the Deputy Vice Chairman.

Mr. Golemon nevertheless asserts that 38 C.F.R. 

§ 18b.73(b) instructs that his appeal to the Veterans 

Court should have proceeded from the Denial of Reconsideration. Section 18b.73(b) provides that after a hearing 

and decision by an administrative law judge or after a 

claimant files exceptions to that decision, “the reviewing 

authority shall review the recommended or initial decision and shall issue a decision thereon, which shall become the final decision of VA, and shall constitute ‘final 

agency action’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. 704.” This 

regulation relates only to hearings conducted in the 

context of discrimination claims. See 38 C.F.R. § 18b.1 

(“The rules of procedure in this part . . . govern the practice for hearings, decisions, and administrative review 

conducted by the Department of Veterans Affairs pursuant to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .”). 

Thus, section 18b.73(b) has no bearing on Mr. Golemon’s 

appeal from a denial of disability benefits.

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GOLEMON v. MCDONALD 7

Mr. Golemon also argues that the Veterans Court’s 

course of action violates his rights secured by the Fifth 

and Ninth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We understand Mr. Golemon to be arguing that by 

designating the Board Decision as the decision on appeal, 

the Veterans Court violated Mr. Golemon’s due process 

rights. It appears that Mr. Golemon may be seeking 

review of his request that the transcript from his hearing 

before the Board be corrected to reflect the Board’s representation that his claims for peripheral neuropathy of the 

right upper extremity and the left upper extremity would 

be “linked” and addressed “together as one ruling.” 

Supplemental Appendix 57–58. He also may be asserting 

that the Board represented to him that these neuropathy 

claims would be linked with a purported claim relating to 

a lower back injury. Mr. Golemon’s neuropathy claims

regarding his neck injury, however, were remanded back 

to the Board by the Veterans Court for further proceedings. See Golemon v. McDonald, No. 14-0177, 2015 WL 

1966717, at *4–5 (Vet. App. May 4, 2015) (explaining that 

38 U.S.C. § 1154(b) requires that the Board consider Mr. 

Golemon’s evidence that he suffered combat-related neck 

trauma that could have led to his peripheral neuropathy).

Namely, the Veterans Court directed the Board to “order 

a new VA medical opinion and, following receipt of that 

opinion, provide an adequate statement of reasons or 

bases for its decision.” Id. at *5. In addition, the Veterans Court expressly recognized that Mr. Golemon would 

be “free to submit additional evidence and argument” on 

remand. Id. (citing Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 

369, 372–73 (1999) (per curiam order)). Thus, Mr. Golemon will have the opportunity to raise his concerns 

about these alleged statements by the Board on remand. 

If his concerns are not adequately addressed during the 

course of those proceedings, Mr. Golemon may then raise 

the issue if he appeals the Board’s ultimate decision on 

his claim for benefits for his peripheral neuropathy. We 

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8 GOLEMON v. MCDONALD

therefore conclude that due process does not require 

remand or reversal. 

For these reasons, we find no error in the Veterans 

Court’s designation of the Board Decision as the decision 

on appeal. 

II

When Mr. Golemon was originally awarded his Purple Heart, the award stated that he suffered a combat 

injury in Vietnam on May 21, 1971. However, his Purple 

Heart was later amended to correct the spelling of his 

name and his social security number. The re-issued 

Purple Heart certificate identifies June 2, 1971, as the 

date on which Mr. Golemon received his combat injury. 

Mr. Golemon now requests that we correct this discrepancy in the court records and conclude that the date of his 

combat injury was the earlier date, May 21, 1971. 

We lack jurisdiction to address the date on which he 

was injured in combat. Determination of the date on 

which Mr. Golemon was injured is a question of fact, not 

within the jurisdiction of this court to review. 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7292(d)(2). Even if we could exercise jurisdiction over 

this question, it would have no effect on the Veterans 

Court’s decision because no part of that decision turned on 

the precise date of Mr. Golemon’s combat injury. 

AFFIRMED

No Costs.

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