Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00667/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00667-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Jacquez
Respondent
Ismael Jesus Perez
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ISMAEL JESUS PEREZ, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

FRANCISCO JACQUEZ, Warden, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:09-CV-00667 OWW GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING PETITION FOR WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Kern, following his conviction by jury

trial on November 7, 2006, of first degree murder (Cal. Penal Code § 187(a)) with use of a firearm

(Cal. Penal Code § 12022.53(c)-(d)), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Cal. Penal

Code § 12021(a)(1)). (LD 4:2.) The trial court also found true the prior conviction allegations. (LD

1

4:2.) Petitioner was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of 80 years to life in state prison. (LD

4:2.) 

“LD” refers to the documents lodged by Respondent with his response.

1

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 1

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 1 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner timely appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

(hereinafter “Fifth DCA”). On May 27, 2008, the Fifth DCA affirmed the judgment in a reasoned

opinion. (LD 4.) Petitioner then filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. (LD 5.) 

On August 22, 2008, the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition. (LD 6.) 

On April 14, 2009, Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition. Petitioner raises the

following grounds for relief: 1) The prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that

defense counsel’s alternative fallback argument for conviction on a lesser-included offense should be

viewed by the jury as a concession on the issue of Petitioner’s identity as the perpetrator; 2) Jury

instruction CALCRIM No. 316 is a constitutionally defective instruction which improperly permits

the jury to disregard evidence that a prosecution witness has engaged in criminal conduct in

evaluating his or her credibility; 3) Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing

to request jury instruction CALCRIM No. 522; and 4) Cumulative error. Respondent filed an answer

to the petition on September 8, 2009. Petitioner did not file a traverse.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

Angelina had known defendant about 10 years. They had lived together on and off for

about eight years and they had two children together. Defendant went by the nickname “Little

Man.” Even though they were no longer together, defendant would send Angelina letters

expressing his love for her.

Angelina moved into a rental house about three weeks before the shooting. Their two

children lived with Angelina's mother. A few days before the shooting, defendant came over

and asked to leave his clothes and things at Angelina's house, but she refused because she did

not want him to feel that it was his house and he could do whatever he wanted. Defendant

was “kind of mad or upset.”

On Saturday, April 29, 2006, Angelina was working at a Fastrip store. She worked

FN2

from 4:00 p.m. until midnight. When she got home, her friend, Ann, was already at her

house. About 15 or 30 minutes later, Cesar arrived. Angelina and Cesar were dating. Cesar

drove a rental car and parked it in front of her house. When he came inside, Angelina showed

him around her new house and then they went into her room to talk. Ann stayed in the living

room and watched television.

FN2. All dates refer to 2006 unless otherwise noted.

At about 3:00 a.m., defendant knocked on the door. Angelina opened the door and

went outside to talk to him because she did not want him to come inside. She stood in front

of the door and held the knob to block him from going in the house. She yelled at Ann to lock

The factual background is taken from the opinion of the state appellate court and is presumed correct. 28

2

U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 2

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 2 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the door and she heard it lock. Defendant asked Angelina, “Who is inside?” He asked her if

her ex-boyfriend, Chuckie, was inside and she told him he was not. She told him no one was

inside and she repeatedly told him to leave. Defendant was angry. Angelina had seen him

angry before; he was acting just as he had during the 10 years she had known him.

Ann opened the door slightly and saw Angelina and defendant talking. Ann saw

defendant's car parked in front of the house. Ann asked if everything was okay.

At one point, defendant yelled at Angelina, “‘Tell that punk motherfucker to come

outside and quit being a bitch.’” He noticed Cesar's rental car and said, “‘Oh, is that his

car?’” Defendant got into Cesar's rental car and started going through things. He pulled on

the GPS device attached to the dashboard. Angelina yelled at him to get out of the car and she

threatened to call the police. She went to him and pulled him out of the car. They continued

arguing and she told him he had to leave. He told her, “‘So long as I'm not happy, you are not

going to be happy.’” She told him she “wasn't happy anyway so what he was doing there

wasn't fazing [her] so he needed to quit acting like a kid and just leave.” He turned around,

got in his car and drove away. Angelina went back inside the house. According to Ann,

Angelina did not appear upset. She was normal and quiet.

Between 15 and 60 minutes later, Ann decided to go home. She was going to walk,

but Cesar offered her a ride. Angelina decided to go along, so the three of them left the house

and walked toward Cesar's car. Cesar got in the driver's seat, Angelina got in the front

passenger seat, and Ann got in the back seat behind Angelina. After Angelina got in, she sat

forward in her seat as she examined a CD. All the car doors were shut and Cesar started the

car. Angelina heard a tap at Cesar's window. She turned her head to the left and immediately

heard gunshots. There was a pause in the shooting and she heard someone say, “‘fuck.’” She

recognized defendant's voice, his frustration, and his distinctive manner of speaking that

word. When she heard the word, she had no doubt it was defendant speaking it. She saw the

figure of the shooter and knew the shooter was defendant. It appeared that his gun had

jammed and he was sliding it back to clear it. Then she heard more gunshots. Ann ducked

down. Cesar had already started driving away.

Angelina's neighbor heard the gunshots at about 3:40 a.m. A minute or so later, the

neighbor looked out the bedroom window and saw a man running to a car. He was Hispanic

and he appeared to be about five feet four inches or five feet six inches tall and weigh

approximately 150 to 170 pounds. The man got in the car and drove away. The neighbor did

not see his face and could not identify him later. Another neighbor had seen the same car

earlier that night at about midnight.

After driving a short distance, Cesar started to swerve. Angelina asked him if he was

hit but he could not answer. She told him to stop so she could drive him to the hospital. He

stopped the car and she ran around to his side. Angelina could not move Cesar, so she tried to

put the car in park. Cesar's foot slid off the brake and hit the accelerator. The car took off and

crashed into a light pole. Angelina was knocked to the ground. When she got up, she looked

back to be sure defendant was not coming up the street to continue shooting at them. She ran

to the car and found Cesar slumped over and coughing up blood. Ann was on the floorboard

in the back.

Angelina stirred Ann and tried to convince her they should leave before the police

arrived. She told Ann, “‘We gotta go.’” Ann did not want to leave, so Angelina told her what

they would say to the police. She said, “‘Okay, when the cops come, you just tell them that I

still live at your house and that we were going to the store for some beer and we were driving

down the street and we just heard shots fired.’” Their story would implicate drive-by

shooters. Ann wanted to tell the truth, but it was Angelina's instinct to avoid talking to the

police. She did not want to be known as a “snitch” and she was afraid someone would take

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 3

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 3 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

retribution against her for talking to the police. She feared for the safety of her children and

herself.

When the police arrived at the scene of the crash, they put Angelina and Ann in

separate vehicles. Angelina told them the story she had fabricated. As Angelina sat in the

police vehicle with an officer, at about 3:50 a.m., she received a cell phone call from

defendant's friend, Abel. He asked her if she was okay.

Defendant made four calls on his cell phone between 1:30 a.m. and 3:47 a.m., all of

which were placed from a region around Angelina's house.FN3

FN3. The electronic surveillance investigator for the district attorney testified that cell

phone technology could locate within a square mile or so the location from which a

call was placed or ended.

Detective Jelletich arrived on the scene at about 4:30 a.m. He spoke first to Ann, but

he did not believe her story about the drive-by shooting. Angelina was more willing to speak

to him, but she told him the same story. After Ann told the police that Little Man, the father

of Angelina's children, had been to the house earlier and had argued with Angelina, the

detectives approached Angelina again. She then told them a second story. This time, she

described an ex-boyfriend coming to the house earlier, but she identified Little Man as Ian T.

She said she had not see the shooter so she could not identify him as Ian T. She described his

car as a two-door silver-grey Pontiac. Angelina knew Ian T. had died in 2000; she did not

identify defendant because she did not want to be a snitch.

Detective Bonsness arrived at about 5:00 a.m. He observed Cesar's rental car, driven

up onto the curb and crashed head-on into a light pole. The engine hood was crumpled and

the right front tire was flat. The driver's window and the left rear passenger windows were

shattered. There were multiple bullet holes in the driver's side of the car and two in the back

of the driver's headrest. One bullet went all the way through and the other remained lodged in

the headrest. The angle of those shots indicated they came from above and left. If the bullets

had continued on, they would have traveled toward the car stereo in the front console, to the

right of the steering wheel. The windshield appeared to have been shot from the inside and

there were two bullet strikes on the rearview mirror. Glass fragments were on the back seat.

The steering wheel and dash were covered with blood splatter and blood also stained the

center console. The floor around the accelerator and brake pedal was covered with shattered

glass. Cesar's shirt, cut off by medical personnel, contained two bullet holes, one on the left

back and one on the left sleeve. The top of the center console was broken off. A lighter was

in the cup holder.

In the area in front of Angelina's house, Detective Bonsness found a large amount of

broken glass and several spent nine-millimeter shell casings that had been ejected from a

semi-automatic pistol. There were five casings on the street in front of the house and eight

more trailing on the street around the corner, indicating that the shooter had been moving as

the shots were fired. One of the casings was dented on the front end, which was evidence the

casing had become jammed in the pistol and had to be cleared by racking the slide to eject the

casing. A nearby Toyota Tercel had been hit by three shots and its right rear passenger

window was shattered. Neither defendant's fingerprints nor his DNA were found at either

scene. No vehicle associated with defendant was found.

Cesar had been shot twice. The bullet lacerating his lung and pulmonary artery was

fatal.

Meanwhile, at the police station, Detective Jelletich continued interviewing Angelina.

She said Ian T. had been at her house that night. The detective obtained a booking photo of

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 4

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 4 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ian T., which Angelina verified. But when the detective showed Ann a photographic lineup

containing Ian T., she said that Little Man was not in the lineup.

At about 5:15 a.m., defendant called his friend and coworker, Steve. Steve's girlfriend

answered the phone and defendant asked her if Steve had left for work. Then defendant

called again to ask why Steve had not gone to work. She explained that Steve was not at

home because they had gotten in an argument.

Defendant called his friend, Sean, and asked if he could stay at his house because he

was in a bind and needed a place to stay. Defendant said the police wanted to ask him some

questions about something he had not been involved in. He said he needed a ride somewhere

south. Sean let defendant stay at his house while he waited for a ride out of town.

Later that morning, Angelina's mother drove past Angelina's house on her way to

work and saw the police tape on the street and around the house. She thought something had

happened to Angelina, so she returned home and called defendant. She asked him if he knew

what had happened to Angelina and if she was okay. He said he did not know anything. He

said he would go to Angelina's house to check and call her back. He never called. Angelina's

mother called him several times from work later that day but he did not answer. Angelina FN4

later told her mother what had happened. She told her she did not see the shooter's face, but

she did see his body.

FN4. The custodian of records for Sprint Nextel testified that the last call received on

defendant's cell phone on April 30 was at 7:03 a.m. After that, all incoming calls went

to his voicemail. Detective Bonsness testified that during his investigation he placed

numerous calls to defendant's cell phone and received a voicemail message as

follows: “This is [defendant]. I'm unavailable to answer the phone so leave your name

and number. I'll get back to you as soon as possible. Thanks. Bye.” The detective

recognized the voice as defendant's.

According to the custodian, on May 5, defendant's cell phone number was deactivated

and a different number was activated. The subscribing customer, however was not defendant,

but Oscar E. 

Oscar E. testified that he did not know defendant. In April, Oscar had a cell phone

account through Sprint, but it did not include defendant's number. When Oscar was billed for

defendant's number plus two others that were not his, he contacted Sprint and the company

opened an investigation. 

The detectives attempted to locate Ian T., but on May 1 they discovered he was

deceased. They unsuccessfully attempted to contact Angelina at her home and on her cell

phone.

On May 2, the detectives located Ann at her home and spoke to her again. Her taped

interview was played for the jury. According to Detective Jelletich, Ann's demeanor was

more cooperative and forthcoming during this interview; however, when the detectives

presented her with a photographic lineup that included defendant, her demeanor changed

immediately and she stated she could not identify anyone. She became difficult and

uncooperative. She stated her concern about being a snitch and having to identify someone in

court. She appeared nervous and upset.

During this interview, the detectives learned that defendant and Angelina had two

children together. The detectives became concerned that defendant or Angelina might abduct

the children, who were staying with Angelina's mother. The detectives had been unable to

contact Angelina for two days.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 5

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 5 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The detectives contacted Child Protective Services the same day and confirmed that

the children were in the custody of Angelina's mother. The children were already wards of the

court. The detectives and a CPS representative went to Angelina's mother's house. When they

were there, Angelina happened to call her mother and Angelina spoke to the detectives on the

telephone. They asked her where she was and told her they were going to pick up her children

for their safety. She told the detectives she would reveal her location if they would leave her

children at her mother's house, but the detectives took the children into protective custody.

The detectives interviewed Angelina and told her they knew Ian T. was dead. They

told her she needed to do the right thing and start telling the truth. At first, she did not like

being told what to do, but upon reflection she agreed that telling the truth was the right thing

and the only way Cesar could rest in peace. Although she was upset that her children had

been taken into protective custody, it did not influence what she told the detectives. She

identified defendant as Little Man and she identified him as the shooter from a photographic

lineup.

After the shooting, defendant stayed at Sean's house for five or six days until Sean's

friend, Brian, gave him a ride out of town. On May 8, officers located defendant in Arroyo

Grande, California. Defendant falsely identified himself as David Prez. In his motel room,

the officers found a large duffel bag containing a backpack, men's clothing and an envelope

of documents. The photographic identification inside the envelope bore defendant's personal

information.

When Detective Jelletich received word that defendant had been arrested, he and

Detective Bonsness drove to Arroyo Grande to pick him up. When Detective Jelletich

interviewed defendant, he acknowledged knowing Angelina and having been at her house in

the past, but he denied having any knowledge about a shooting or murder at her house or that

police were looking for him. He also denied having a cell phone, even when confronted with

his personal voicemail message. He said he was unemployed and had no permanent resident

around the time of April 30. On the night of April 29, he was staying with Steve.

Defendant acknowledged that he and Angelina had been split up for a year and a half

and he explained that he did not want another man with her around his children. However, he

said it would not have bothered him if a man named Chuckie had been at Angelina's house on

April 30. Defendant denied contacting Angelina's mother the morning of April 30, and he

denied knowing anyone named Brian. When asked how he got to Arroyo Grande, he said he

got dropped off on May 9. He said it was irrelevant who dropped him off and he denied that

it had been Brian. Defendant explained he possessed only a plastic grocery bag of belongings.

After Angelina spoke to the detectives, she fled. She was afraid and wanted to avoid

testifying. First, she went to Riverside, then to Nevada. When she returned to Bakersfield for

a week or two, the district attorney's investigator located her at Ann's house. Angelina told

the investigator she was not the person he was looking for. He showed her that he had her

photograph and he tried to convince her to do the right thing. He served her with a subpoena,

but she did not show up for the court appearance. After that, she went to Big Bear for a

month or more, and then to Florida for a few weeks. She knew law enforcement was looking

for her. During one of Angelina's absences, Detective Jelletich stayed in contact with her via

her cell phone.

In July, the district attorney's investigator located Ann and served her with a

subpoena. Ann told the investigator that she saw defendant shoot Cesar and there was no way

she would testify in court.

When Angelina was in Marysville, she received a message on her cell phone from the

district attorney's investigator, asking her to call back. The week before trial, the investigator

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 6

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 6 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

went to Marysville to meet her and bring her back to Bakersfield. The investigator had been

looking for her for two months. Angelina had remained in custody since then, not only

because there was a warrant for her because she was a necessary witness in this case, but also

because a misdemeanor embezzlement charge was pending against her. The district attorney

had agreed that her testimony could not be used against her in other cases, but had not made

any other deals or promises in exchange for her testimony. Angelina finally decided to testify

because she was tired of running and tired of her guilty conscience. She wanted to get on

with her life.

On cross-examination, Angelina testified she returned to work at Fastrip after her

interview on May 2 until she was arrested on July 7 for embezzlement. After she was bailed

out, she left town. She ran to avoid testifying in this case, not because she was charged with

embezzlement. She denied stealing from Fastrip, but when she agreed to testify, she did hope

to obtain immunity in her embezzlement case.

Defense Evidence

The public defender's investigator testified that she interviewed Angelina on

October 25, a day or so before trial began, while she was in custody. Angelina told the

investigator she had not seen the shooter and did not know who the shooter was. She said she

had been in hiding because of the shooting. When she learned that the police had picked up

her children, she called the police to tell them Little Man had committed the shooting. She

told them this to ensure she could get her children back. She said she had received threats

from the police about taking her children and she had received threats from Cesar's friends

who wanted her to testify.

Officer Wilson testified he was dispatched to Fastrip on July 8 regarding an

embezzlement investigation. When he spoke to Angelina, she told him, “‘Hey, there are a lot

of other people here that make money orders, I'm not the only one.’” He asked her if she

knew anything about using other employees' access numbers. She said she only used her own

number. But when he told her she had been videotaped using someone else's access number,

she said, “‘If you want me to, I can pay it all back.’”

The owner of Fastrip testified he had known Angelina for over seven or eight months.

He believed she had committed fraud and embezzlement. When a customer came into the

store to pay for gas with a credit card, Angelina rang up his sale and also rang up a separate

charge for a $500 money order on his credit card. When she did so, she used another

employee's code. She did this a second time to another customer. When one of the customers

came in to complain about the $500 charge, the owner investigated the register and the

surveillance videotape. The tape showed Angelina making the two money orders with

another employee's code.

Ann denied telling an investigator that although she watched defendant shoot and kill

Cesar, she would not testify. She also never told a detective, investigator or police officer that

she recognized the shooter as defendant.

(LD 4:2.) 

DISCUSSION

I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant

to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 7

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 7 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

375 fn.7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the U.S.

Constitution. In addition, the conviction challenged arises out of the Kern County Superior Court,

which is located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 2241(d). Accordingly,

the Court has jurisdiction over the action. 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. 

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997), quoting Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 769 (5 Cir.1996), cert. th th

denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)

(holding AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute's enactment). The instant petition was

filed after the enactment of the AEDPA; thus, it is governed by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

This Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

The instant petition is reviewed under the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act which became effective on April 24, 1996. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70

(2003). Under the AEDPA, an application for habeas corpus will not be granted unless the

adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in

light of the evidence presented in the State Court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Lockyer,

538 U.S. at 70-71; see Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must "first decide what constitutes 'clearly established

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.'" Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). In ascertaining what is "clearly established Federal law," this Court

must look to the "holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 8

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 8 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

of the relevant state-court decision." Id., quoting Williams, 592 U.S. at 412. "In other words, 'clearly

established Federal law' under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by

the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id.

Finally, this Court must consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72,

quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the

writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a

question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. 

“Under the ‘reasonable application clause,’ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably

applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

“[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its

independent judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law

erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A

federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

 Petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to or

involved an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle,

94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). Although only Supreme Court law is binding on the states,

Ninth Circuit precedent remains relevant persuasive authority in determining whether a state court

decision is objectively unreasonable. See Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600-01 (9th

Cir.1999). 

AEDPA requires that we give considerable deference to state court decisions. The state

court's factual findings are presumed correct, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), and we are bound by a state's

interpretation of its own laws. Souch v. Schaivo, 289 F.3d 616, 621 (9th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537

U.S. 859 (2002), rehearing denied, 537 U.S. 1149 (2003). 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 9

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 9 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

III. Review of Petition

A. Ground One

In his first claim, Petitioner alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct by suggesting that

defense counsel’s argument regarding voluntary manslaughter may have been an admission of

Petitioner’s guilt. Petitioner argues the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by implying

defense counsel believed Petitioner was guilty of killing the victim. 

1. Factual Background3

During defense counsel's closing argument, he stated the following:

“In terms of murder, you will be looking at instruction No. 525, and it talks about

murders.... [¶] And then we go down to another section which is this: ‘A decision made to

kill rashly, impulsively or without careful consideration is not deliberate and is not

premeditated.’ [¶] I don't believe that there is enough evidence to convict [defendant] of

murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree, even manslaughter. I don't believe it

because I don't believe [Angelina] or [Ann]. I do not believe them. I don't believe it. But if

you start to weigh it, remember that a decision to kill rashly, impulsively or without careful

consideration is not deliberate or premeditated.

“Interestingly, when [the prosecutor] started to talk to you, he mentioned

manslaughter a few times and he actually said he wasn't going to talk to you about it and I

wasn't quite sure that he didn't talk to you about it. But nevertheless, one of the things that he

talks about in this case is motive. And what does [the prosecutor] say about motive?

Basically he says, you know, there was an argument, [defendant] was a jealous man, he called

the other guy out, hey, come out of this house whoever you are and [defendant] used some

terms that most of us don't use on a regular day and certainly wouldn't use in the courtroom,

called the guy out. He said some other things, all of which pointed in the direction, according

to [the prosecutor], to the motive. [¶] Well, if [the prosecutor] is pointing you in that

direction, that motive is a manslaughter motive. That's not a murder first degree, second

degree motive. He is pointing you in that direction. His motive points you in that direction.

[I]f you look at the manslaughter instruction, what it says is, ‘The defendant killed someone

because of a sudden quarrel or in a heat of passion if the defendant was provoked. As a result

of the provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion that

obscured his reasoning or judgment.’ And that's where [the prosecutor] pointed. He said, you

know, this guy is in love, he read you a couple letters, ... he showed [defendant] was still in

love and he might be jealous and that would be the motive.... [¶] Basically [CALCRIM No.

570] says, ‘The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant did not kill as a result of a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.’ It seems to me

that while they have that burden, they certainly haven't met it and they have, in fact, pointed

the case in that direction.”

Defense counsel also explained attempted voluntary manslaughter for the jurors, as follows:

“We move from attempted murder, two counts down, to attempted voluntary

manslaughter. ‘An attempted killing that would otherwise be attempted murder is reduced to

The factual background for this claim is taken from the opinion of the appellate court. (LD 4:13- 3

14.) 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 10

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 10 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

attempted voluntary manslaughter if the defendant attempted to kill someone because of a

sudden quarrel or in [the] heat of passion....’ ... The defendant attempted to kill [ ] because he

was provoked. The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act

rashly and without due deliberation and that is from passion rather than from judgment. And

most of us would say there is no reasonable man who would kill anybody over a wife that

they found sleeping with a neighbor or any of that and yet the law classically recognizes that

as voluntary manslaughter. You got so upset you couldn't see straight, you saw red, you killed

a guy that was sleeping with your wife. Voluntary manslaughter.... [R]easonable men don't

kill people. But there are situations that the law recognizes so provoke[ ] men that they will

kill, and under those circumstances the law recognizes it as manslaughter.”

In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor said the following, to which defendant now objects:

“I'm sitting hearing and I'm listening to the defense and I'm listening to their defense

in this case, and there are a few questions that kind of popped into my head. One was when

bringing up voluntary manslaughter, is that an admission that the defendant was the shooter?

That's something that I thought about because why, if you weren't there and you didn't shoot,

why would you even think about second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter? There is

all of a sudden a plea during their defense saying, now, wait a minute, the People haven't

proved that this wasn't done rashly or heat of passion doesn't apply because if heat of passion

could apply, then it's voluntary manslaughter so consider that. Well, why even go that far,

right? I mean, if you are [defendant] and [defendant] is innocent until proven guilty and the

defense is I didn't do it, someone else did, then why even argue? That's just something that I

was thinking.”

2. Analysis of Claim by State Court

This claim was presented on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA, where it was rejected in a

reasoned opinion. (LD 4:12-17.) Petitioner then presented the claim to the California Supreme Court

where it was summarily denied. (LD 6.) The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying

review of the Fifth DCA’s decision, is presumed to have denied the claim presented for the same

reasons stated in the opinion of the Fifth DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

The Fifth DCA rejected the claim as follows:

“‘The applicable federal and state standards regarding prosecutorial misconduct are

well established. “‘A prosecutor's ... intemperate behavior violates the federal Constitution

when it comprises a pattern of conduct “so egregious that it infects the trial with such

unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” ‘“[Citations.]’” (People v.

Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 960.) A prosecutor's comments may “‘so infect[ ] the trial

with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.’[Citation.]”

(Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181; People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819.)

Under state law, a prosecutor who uses deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either

the court or the jury has committed misconduct, even if such action does not render the trial

fundamentally unfair. (People v. Smithey, supra, at p. 960; People v. Hill, supra, at p. 819).)

If a prosecutorial misconduct claim is based on the prosecutor's arguments to the jury,

we consider how the comments would, or could, have been understood by a reasonable juror

in the context of the entire argument, and whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the

jury construed or applied any of the questionable remarks in an objectionable fashion.

(People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 960.) No misconduct exists if a juror would have

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 11

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 11 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

taken the remarks to state or imply nothing harmful. (People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754,

793.) To preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appellate review, a defendant must

raise a timely and specific objection and, where practical, request a curative admonition.

(Evid.Code, § 353; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 638.) Absent such an objection

and request for admonition, any error is forfeited. (People v. Noguera, supra, at p. 638.)

Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal only if it prejudices the defendant. (People

v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 363.) Where it infringes upon the defendant's constitutional

rights, reversal is required unless the reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt

that the misconduct did not affect the jury's verdict. (People v. Hall (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th

813, 817, citing People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1083.) Prosecutorial misconduct

that violates state law only is cause for reversal when it is reasonably probable that a result

more favorable to the defendant would have occurred had the prosecutor refrained from the

untoward comment. (People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 245.) We presume the jury

relied on the trial court's instruction on the law rather than upon the prosecutor's comments.

(People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 47.)

In People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d 502, upon which defendant relies, the prosecutor

argued in rebuttal “that defense counsel had spent some time on the special circumstances

issues, ‘and for a man who says that his client didn't commit the crime, that must be a waste

of time. But, on the other hand, he might be worried that he did commit it.’” (Id. at p. 537.)

The court explained: “It is improper for a prosecutor to argue to the jury as an analysis of the

defense argument or strategy that defense counsel believes his client is guilty. [Citation.] [¶]

The People suggest that the remark was not improper here since the prosecutor was not

making a factual statement of defense counsel's belief, but was simply pointing out the

‘internal disharmony’ between the defense theories that the crimes were not premeditated and

that the charge against defendant involved mistaken identity. A similar argument was rejected

in [People v.] Purvis [(1963)] 60 Cal.2d 323, and is equally unavailing here. There is no

inconsistency in denying that an accused was the perpetrator of an offense while

simultaneously arguing that no matter who committed it the crime was not premeditated. We

note also that while comment on apparent inconsistencies in argument is permissible, defense

counsel's personal belief in his client's guilt or innocence is no more relevant than the belief

of the prosecutor. [Citation.] Inviting the jury to speculate about such belief is misconduct.”

(People v. Bell, supra, at pp. 537-538; see also People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 112

[it is “improper for the prosecutor to argue to the jury that defense counsel does not believe in

his client's defense”].)

In this case, assuming the claim was not forfeited, we conclude the prosecutor's

comments did not invite the jury to wonder or believe that defense counsel thought defendant

was guilty. Instead, the comments pointedly highlighted the apparent contradictions in

defendant's case. In People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, the Supreme Court held that very

similar comments did not constitute misconduct. The prosecutor in Welch “referred to the

contradiction in the defense-that on the one hand, defendant testified that he did not commit

the murders, and on the other, trial counsel tried to prove that defendant did not premeditate

and deliberate. The prosecutor stated: ‘So, the basic defense is I'm not guilty because I wasn't

there. But if you find me there and don't believe me, it is only second-degree murder because

of my mental delusions and mental impairment.... Remember that. Remember that. They

want it both ways.’” (Id. at p. 752.) The court concluded: “It is no misconduct to pointedly

highlight, as the prosecutor did here, the contradictions in a defendant's case. [Citation.]” (Id.

at p. 753; People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 385 [same; prosecutor commented on

discrepancies between defense counsel's opening statement and defendant's actual testimony,

and pointed out gaps in defense counsel's argument]; People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p.

537 [comment on apparent inconsistencies in argument is permissible].) We believe the

prosecutor's comments in this case were a variation on Welch's theme and therefore were not

misconduct.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 12

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 12 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

But even if the prosecutor's comments could be viewed as suggesting defense counsel

believed defendant was guilty, in the context of defense counsel's emphatic argument that he

did not believe there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of anything because he did

not believe the testimony of either Angelina or Ann, we conclude there was no possibility the

comments accomplished this end. Thus, if the comments were misconduct, they were

harmless under any standard.

(LD 4:14-17.)

3. Federal Standard and Review of Claim

A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief if the prosecutor’s misconduct “so infected the

trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). To constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial

misconduct must be “of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair

trial.” Greer v. Miller, 485 U.S. 756, 765 (1987), quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667

(1985). Any claim of prosecutorial misconduct must be reviewed within the context of the entire

trial. Greer, 485 U.S. at 765-66; United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1291 (9 Cir. 1994). th

The court must keep in mind that “[t]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged

prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor” and “the

aim of due process is not punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of

an unfair trial to the accused.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). 

"Improper argument does not, per se, violate a defendant's constitutional rights." Thompson

v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9 Cir.1996), quoting, Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1191 (9th th

Cir.1993)). A violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights occurs only where the prosecutor’s

remarks so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.

Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643. 

Even if prosecutorial misconduct is established, and it was constitutional error, the error is

considered harmless if it did not have a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict” or did not result in actual prejudice. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38

(1993); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1577 (9 Cir.1996). th

In this case, the state court reasonably concluded the prosecutor’s remarks were not

misconduct. The prosecutor did not argue that defense counsel believed his client was guilty. He also

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 13

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 13 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

did not invite the jury to wonder or believe that Petitioner was guilty. He made no

misrepresentations, he did not misstate the law or mischaracterize the evidence, and he did not act

deceptively. What the prosecutor did was comment on the apparent contradictions in the defense. It

is permissible to point out problems in opposing counsel’s arguments. Moreover, the prosecutor

made the remarks at issue during his rebuttal and the comments were directed at the disharmony in

defense counsel’s closing. The remark was an isolated event. Where a “consistent and repeated

misrepresentation of a dramatic exhibit in evidence may profoundly impress a jury and may have a

significant impact on a jury’s deliberations . . . ., [i]solated passages of a prosecutor’s argument,

billed in advance to the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the same

proportions.” Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 646. “Such arguments, like all closing arguments of counsel, are

seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; improvisation frequently results in syntax left

imperfect and meaning less than crystal clear.” Id. at 646-47. Therefore, Petitioner has not

demonstrated the state court determination that the prosecutor did not commit misconduct was

unreasonable.

Moreover, the evidence against Petitioner was overwhelming. Even if the prosecutor’s

alleged misconduct was considered constitutional error, the error was harmless. Petitioner was

identified as the shooter by his girlfriend of 10 years. (RT 194.) The shooting took place outside the 4

girlfriend’s home after Petitioner had confronted her, demanded the victim come out of the house

and face Petitioner, and then vandalized the victim’s vehicle. (RT 116-122, 129-141, 177-182.) The

girlfriend identified Petitioner as the assailant from his appearance at the car’s window and his voice

when the gun had jammed. (RT 194.) In light of the evidence, the state court reasonably determined

that any prosecutorial error was harmless under any standard of review. The claim should be denied.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner next alleges the state court denied his right to due process and a fair trial when it

instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 316 which informed the jury that it may, rather than must,

consider a witness’s prior criminal conduct when assessing credibility. He argues that the instruction

“RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal. 4

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 14

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 14 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

may have influenced the jury not to consider witness Angelina’s embezzlement from her employer as

negatively affecting her credibility.

CALCRIM No. 316, as given by the trial court, provided:

If you find that a witness has committed a crime or other misconduct, you may consider that

fact only in evaluating the credibility of the witness’s testimony. ¶ The fact that a witness

may have committed a crime or other misconduct does not necessarily destroy or impair a

witness’s credibility. It is up to you to decide the weight of that fact and whether that fact

makes the witness look less believable.

(LD 4:18 at fn.5.) 

1. Review by State Court

This claim was also presented and rejected on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. (LD 4:17-18.)

Petitioner then presented the claim to the California Supreme Court where it was summarily denied.

(LD 6.) The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the Fifth DCA’s

decision, is presumed to have denied the claim presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the Fifth DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

The appellate court rejected the claim as follows:

In Anderson, the court stated: “The function of CALCRIM No. 316 is not to inform

the jury what evidence may or may not be considered. CALCRIM No. 220 informs the jury it

must consider ‘all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial.’ The function of

CALCRIM No. 316 is to inform the jury how prior crimes evidence may be used. Such

evidence may be considered only in evaluating the witness’s credibility. Thus, CALCRIM

No. 220 tells the jury it must consider all evidence and CALCRIM No. 316 limits

consideration of prior crimes evidence to the issue of credibility. Defendant does not

challenge the limitation on the use of prior crimes evidence.” (People v. Anderson, supra,

152 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940-941; see also People v. Felix (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 849, 859

[same regarding CALCRIM No. 318]. We adopt the reasoning in Anderson and hold the trial

court neither erred nor denied defendant due process or a fair trial by giving the instruction.

(LD 4:18.) 

2. Federal Standard and Review of Claim

A challenge to a jury instruction solely as an error under state law does not state a claim

cognizable in a federal habeas corpus action. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991). To

obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must show that the ailing

instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Id. at

72. Additionally, the instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in

the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. The court must evaluate jury

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 15

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 15 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a component of the entire trial process.

United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982), citing, Henderson v, Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154

(1977). Furthermore, even if it is determined that the instruction violated the petitioner’s right to due

process, a petitioner can only obtain relief if the unconstitutional instruction had a substantial

influence on the conviction and thereby resulted in actual prejudice under Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 

(whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict). Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9 Cir. 1996). The burden of demonstrating that an th

erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional

validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error

on direct appeal. Id. 

As stated above, in this case the state court determined that the instruction was proper under

state law. Federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law. Oxborrow v.

Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). A “mere error of state

law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal

habeas.” Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring). Further, there

is no question that the alleged error did not violate any of Petitioner’s federal constitutional rights.

The jury instruction was reasonable under any standard. Jurors are presumed to follow their

instructions. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394 (1999). The challenged instruction informed

the jury how prior crimes evidence may be used. The instruction informed the jury that this evidence

could only be used to evaluate the witness’ credibility. A separate instruction, CALCRIM No. 220,

informed the jury that all evidence must be considered. Respondent further notes correctly that the

Ninth Circuit model instructions and Federal Jury Practice and Instructions similarly use “may”

rather than “must” in considering prior crimes evidence to determine a witness’ credibility. Ninth

Cir. Crim. Jury Instr. 4.8 (2003); Kevin F. O’Malley, et al., Federal Jury Practice and Instructions,

§ 15.07 (6 ed. 2008). The claim should be denied. th

C. Ground Three

Petitioner claims his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request

CALCRIM No. 522, a pinpoint instruction to consider provocation to reduce first degree murder to

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 16

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 16 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

second degree murder.

CALCRIM No. 522 provides:

Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree [and may reduce

a murder to manslaughter]. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for

you to decide. [¶] If you conclude that the defendant committed murder but was provoked,

consider the provocation in deciding whether the crime was first or second degree murder.

[Also, consider the provocation in deciding whether the defendant committed murder or

manslaughter.]

1. Review by State Court

This claim was also presented and rejected on direct appeal to the Fifth DCA. (LD 4:18-21.)

Petitioner then presented the claim to the California Supreme Court where it was summarily denied.

(LD 6.) The California Supreme Court, by its “silent order” denying review of the Fifth DCA’s

decision, is presumed to have denied the claim presented for the same reasons stated in the opinion

of the Fifth DCA. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991). 

The appellate court denied this claim as follows:

When faced with a claim that defense counsel has provided ineffective assistance at

trial, “[w]e presume that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable

professional judgment in making significant trial decisions.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15

Cal.4th 619, 703.) The burden is on the defendant to show both “‘that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and ... that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, a determination more

favorable to defendant would have resulted. [Citations.] If the defendant makes an

insufficient showing on either one of these components, the ineffective assistance claim

fails.’” (Ibid.) Also, “if the record does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for counsel's

actions, we will not, on appeal, find that trial counsel acted deficiently.” (People v. Stewart

(2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 459.) On a direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective

assistance of counsel only when the record demonstrates there could have been no rational

tactical purpose for counsel's challenged act or omission. (People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th

415, 442 [reviewing courts reverse convictions on direct appeal on the ground of

incompetence of counsel only if the record demonstrates there could be no rational tactical

purpose for counsel's omissions]; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1058 [if the

record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, unless

counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could

be no satisfactory explanation, the contention must be rejected].)

Here, defendant's general defense was that he was not the shooter, suggesting that an

instruction on provocation might have undermined his claim that he was not present at the

shooting. Defense counsel, however, also argued there was evidence defendant was still in

love with Angelina and was jealous and angry because she was seeing another man. Both

sides argued provocation and voluntary manslaughter, and the court instructed on

provocation in the context of voluntary manslaughter when it gave CALCRIM No. 570.FN7

Under these circumstances, the record sheds no light on the reason defense counsel did not

request CALCRIM No. 522, despite arguing the possibility of provocation. Nevertheless,

decisions regarding what defense to pursue and what additional instructions to request for a

particular defense are tactical decisions, and the record reflects defense counsel may have had

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 17

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 17 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

sound tactical reasons for not requesting CALCRIM No. 522, such as a desire not to focus

the jurors' attention on second degree murder but to instead focus on persuading them to

return a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. Defense counsel's

failure to request the instruction appears to reflect a reasoned decision not to distract the

jurors with other issues in hopes they would conclude the provocation was sufficient to find

voluntary manslaughter. Thus, defendant cannot show this record affirmatively discloses a

lack of tactical purpose or satisfactory explanation for defense counsel's omission. (People v.

Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215.) Rather, as the court in People v. Morales (1979) 88

Cal.App.3d 259 long ago noted, “the difference between [defense] counsel's approach and

appellate counsel's hindsight analysis [of what defense counsel should have done] is simply

one of tactics....” (Id. at p. 268.) Defendant has not shown defense counsel was ineffective for

failing to request CALCRIM No. 522.FN8

FN7. Both parties agreed that lesser included offenses on count 1 included not only

second degree murder, but voluntary manslaughter, and that lesser included offenses

on counts 2 and 3 included only attempted voluntary manslaughter.

FN8. Because in this case we conclude either that no errors occurred or that any errors

were harmless, we need not address defendant's contention of cumulative error.

(LD 4:19-21.)

2. Federal Standard and Review of Claim

The law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is clearly established for the

purposes of the AEDPA deference standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Canales v. Roe, 151

F.3d 1226, 1229 (9 Cir. 1998.) In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance

th

of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9 Cir. 1994). First, the petitioner must show that th

counsel's performance was deficient, requiring a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he

or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness, and must identify counsel’s alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of

reasonable professional judgment considering the circumstances. Id. at 688; United States v.

Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1348 (9 Cir. 1995). Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance is th

highly deferential. A court indulges a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the

wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Sanders v. Ratelle, 21

F.3d 1446, 1456 (9 Cir.1994). th

Second, the petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result ... would have been different," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 18

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 18 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Petitioner must show that counsel's errors were so egregious as to deprive defendant of a fair trial,

one whose result is reliable. Id. at 688. The court must evaluate whether the entire trial was

fundamentally unfair or unreliable because of counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.; Quintero-Barraza, 78

F.3d at 1345; United States v. Palomba, 31 F.3d 1356, 1461 (9 Cir. 1994). th

A court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining

the prejudice suffered by the petitioner as a result of the alleged deficiencies. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

697. Since the defendant must affirmatively prove prejudice, any deficiency that does not result in

prejudice must necessarily fail. However, there are certain instances which are legally presumed to

result in prejudice, e.g., where there has been an actual or constructive denial of the assistance of

counsel or where the State has interfered with counsel’s assistance. Id. at 692; United States v.

Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, and n. 25 (1984).

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are analyzed under the “unreasonable application”

prong of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Weighall v. Middle, 215 F.3d 1058, 1062 (2000). 

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state

court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [United States Supreme Court] decisions

but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at

413. The habeas corpus applicant bears the burden to show that the state court applied United States

Supreme Court precedent in an objectively unreasonable manner. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634,

640 (2003). 

In this case, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that the state court unreasonably determined that

counsel’s actions were not constitutionally deficient. The defense strategy was two-fold. On one

hand, the defense argued that Petitioner was not the shooter. On the other, the defense argued there

was evidence in the record that Petitioner was in love with Angelina and was jealous and angry of

Angelina seeing another man. However, this argument was made as an alternative in order to reduce

the crime from first degree murder to voluntary manslaughter. The state court reasoned that one

possible sound tactical strategy of defense counsel could have been to focus the jury on provocation

so as to persuade them to return a verdict on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter. By

focusing instead on provocation sufficient to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter, the

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 19

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 19 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

defense was able to argue provocation without requiring the defense to produce direct evidence of

Petitioner’s mental state, which would have negated his alternative theory that he was not the

shooter. Also, as pointed out by Respondent, a verdict of voluntary manslaughter would have

secured Petitioner a sentence substantially less than either first or second degree murder.

Accordingly, the state court determination that defense counsel possessed sound tactical reasons for

not requesting the provocation instruction was not unreasonable.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Petitioner was provoked. Rather, the record reflected

that Petitioner and the victim never had a confrontation. Petitioner surreptitiously approached the

victim while the victim was attempting to leave in his vehicle, tapped on the window of the vehicle

with his firearm and shot at the victim multiple times. There is absolutely no evidence to show the

victim provoked Petitioner. Therefore, defense counsel cannot be faulted for failing to request an

inapplicable instruction. And regardless of counsel’s failure, Petitioner cannot demonstrate any

prejudice. This claim should also be denied.

D. Ground Four

Finally, Petitioner claims that habeas relief should be granted in light of the cumulative effect

of the errors alleged. He asserts the errors violated his due process right to a fair trial.

A defendant may prove that he has suffered prejudice based on the cumulative effect of

errors. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 421-22, 440-41 (1995) (in determining whether exculpatory

evidence suppressed by state is sufficiently material to violate Due Process Clause, court is required

to assess “cumulative” or “net” effect of all suppressed evidence and commits legal error if it only

conducts piecemeal analysis of each item of suppressed evidence); O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S.

432, 435-36 (1995) (accepting lower court’s assumption that “confusion arising out of a trial court

instruction about the state of mind necessary for conviction combined with a related statement by a

prosecutor” required habeas corpus relief if “combined” error was not harmless); Fuller v. Roe, 182

F.3d 699, 704 (9 Cir.1999) (“cumulative effect of several errors may prejudice a defendant to the th

extent that his conviction must be overturned”); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1333 (9th

Cir.1978) (concluding cumulative effect of alleged errors may demonstrate prejudice), cert. denied,

440 U.S. 974 (1979). 

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 20

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 20 of 21
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In this case, however, none of the claims raised by Petitioner have merit. Accordingly,

Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice resulting from the cumulative effect of the errors, because

there are no errors affecting the verdict to accumulate. Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 632, (9th

Cir.1997) (per curiam). The claim should be rejected. 

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

be DENIED WITH PREJUDICE. It is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Clerk of Court be

DIRECTED to enter judgment.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned District Judge, pursuant to

the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30) days after being served with the

Findings and Recommendation, any party may file written objections with the Court and serve a

copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's

Findings and Recommendation." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within

fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. 

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 4, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California 21

Case 1:09-cv-00667-OWW -GSA Document 20 Filed 02/04/10 Page 21 of 21