Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05248/USCOURTS-caDC-94-05248-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Election Commission
Appellee
National Republican Congressional Committee
Appellant
National Republican Senatorial Committee
Appellant
Republican National Committee
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 1995 Decided February 20, 1996

No. 94-5248

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE,

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE

AND

NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE,

APPELLANTS

v.

FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 94cv01017)

Jan W. Baran argued the cause for appellants, with whom Thomas W. Kirby was on the briefs.

Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel, Federal Election Commission, argued the cause for

appellee, with whom Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, and David B. Kolker, Attorney, Federal

Election Commission, were on the brief. Vivien Clair, Attorney, Federal Election Commission,

entered an appearance for appellee.

Before: EDWARDS, Chief Judge, SENTELLE and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge SENTELLE.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: At issue in this appeal is a Federal Election Commission regulation

interpreting what political committees must do under the Federal Election Commission Act to

demonstrate that they have exercised their "best efforts" to encourage donors to disclose certain

personally identifying information. For more than a decade, the Commission considered a political

committee to have exercised "best efforts" if the committee made a clear request for the information

in its initial solicitation for funds. Concerned about low reporting rates, the Commission issued the

regulation that is the focus of this appeal. This new regulation requires political committees to send

a follow-up request to donors who fail to supply the information in response to the original

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solicitation; requires the inclusion of a statement that federal law requires political committees to

report the information to the FEC; and prohibits committees from including in the follow-up request

any material other than the request for the information, the mandatory statement, and an expression

of gratitude for the contribution. Finding the new regulation not contrary to the Act, arbitrary or

capricious, or inconsistent with the First Amendment, the district court granted summary judgment

for the Commission. We agree with the district court as to the requirement of a stand-alone

follow-up request. Because the language of the mandatory statement is inaccurate and misleading,

however, we conclude that this portion of the regulation is contrary to the statute.

I.

The Federal Election Commission Act, first enacted in 1971, requires the treasurer of a

political committee to report to the FederalElectionCommission the name, address, occupation, and

employer of donors giving more than $200 in a single year. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(13), 434(b)(3)(A)

(1994). Neither the Act nor any other law, however, requires donors to disclose this information. 

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976), the Supreme Court upheld the political

committee reporting requirement against aFirst Amendment challenge. Applying "exacting scrutiny,"

id. at 64, the court sustained the requirement as "appear[ing] to be the least restrictive means of

curbing the evils of campaign ignorance and corruption that Congress found to exist," id. at 68.

In 1976, Congress amended the Act by adding the following provision:

When committee treasurers and candidates show that best efforts have been used to

obtain and submit the information required by this subsection, they shall be deemed

to be in compliance with this subsection.

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 480

(formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1976)) (emphasis added). Congress did not define the term

"best efforts"; nor did it do so three years later when it recodified the "best efforts" provision,

deleting "candidates" as persons to whom the provision applied, but leaving the remaining language

essentiallyintact. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat.

1339, 1347 (formerly codified at 2 U.S.C. § 432(i) (1976 & Supp. 1979)).

Soon after the 1979 amendments became effective, the Commission issued a regulation that

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for the first time interpreted "best efforts." 11 C.F.R. § 104.7 (1981 ed.). According to the

regulation, if a political committee failed to report identifying information for a contributor whose

gifts exceeded the $200 annual threshold, the committee could satisfy the "best efforts" provision by

showing that its original solicitation, whether written or oral, included "a clear request" for the

information that "inform[ed] the contributor that the reporting ofthe information isrequired by law."

§ 104.7(b).

Over a decade later, dissatisfied with the extent to which political committees were obtaining

the requested information from contributors, the Commission gave notice that it intended to revise

and strengthen the 1980 "best efforts" regulation. 57 Fed. Reg. 44, 137 (1992). After public

comment and hearing, the Commission issued a regulation providing that political committees would

"only be deemed to have exercised best efforts" if, in addition to their request in the initialsolicitation,

they made a separate follow-up request to those contributors not disclosing all the information. See

58 Fed. Reg. 57,725, at 57,729 (Oct. 27, 1993) (codified at 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b) (1994)). The new

regulation provides that the follow-up request, like the request in the original solicitation, can be

either oralif documented in writingor written. 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b)(2). Both the original

solicitation and the follow-up request must include, in a "clear and conspicuous manner," the

following statement:

Federal law requires political committees to report the name, mailing address,

occupation and name of employer for each individual whose contributions aggregate

in excess of $200 in a calendar years [sic].

11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b)(1)-(2). According to the regulation, the follow-up request may not contain

anything other than the request for the missing information, the mandatory statement, and an

expression of gratitude. The new regulation became effective on March 3, 1994.

Presenting both statutory and constitutional arguments, the Republican NationalCommittee,

the National Republican Senatorial Committee, and the National Republican Congressional

Committeethe primary political committees of the Republican Party at the national

levelchallenged theCommission's newregulationintheUnited States District Court for the District

of Columbia. They claimed that the plain language and legislative history of the "best efforts"

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provision, as well as the Commission's previous interpretations of it, made clear that Congress

intended to require no more than one request for the identifying information. Arguing that the

Commission had failed to give a reasoned explanation for its new regulation, the Committees

challenged it as arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A) (1994). The Committees also argued that the mandatory statement, the prohibition of

additional "speech" in the follow-up request, and the regulation's alleged financial and administrative

burdens, violate the First Amendment.

The district court granted summary judgment for the Commission. It found the regulation

consistent with the Act and adequately justified by the Commission. Republican Nat'l Comm. v.

Federal ElectionComm'n, No. 94-1017,slip op. at 7-10 (D.D.C.July 22, 1994). Relying on Buckley

v. Valeo, the district court also rejected the Committees' First Amendment challenges, finding the

regulation narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest of disclosing information about

political contributors. Id. at 10-14. Repeating the arguments they advanced in the district court, the

Committees appeal.

II.

The Committees' challenge to the regulation as contrary to the language, purpose, and

legislative history of the "best efforts" provision of the Act presents us with a typical Chevron issue.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Using "traditional

tools ofstatutory construction," we first examine whether the statute "directly [speaks] to the precise

question at issue." Id. at 842 & n.9. If so, we follow the statute's instructions. If the statute "has

not directly addressed the precise question at issue," we defer to the agency's interpretation if it is

reasonable. Id. at 843.

We note at the outset that the Committees do not challenge the Commission's authority to

issue regulations defining "best efforts," and with good reason: the statute clearly authorizes the

Commission to issue implementing regulations. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(8); see also Federal Election

Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37 (1981) (noting the FEC's

broad rulemaking authority). Although the Commission certainly could have chosen to judge "best

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efforts" on a case-by-case basis, we have no doubt that it is equally authorized to interpret the term

through rulemaking. See New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 749 F.2d 804, 813

(D.C. Cir. 1984) ("The decision whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication lies within the

[agency's] discretion.").

Beginning with the statute's language, as we do in all Chevron cases, we find nothing in the

phrase "best efforts" to preclude the Commission from requiring committees to make more than one

request for the information. Inherently general and open-ended, the phrase "best efforts" is

well-suited for administrative refinement. Had Congress intended to limit the Commission to

requiring a single request, it certainly could have made this clear.

The Committees claim to find the requirement of a single request in the Act's legislative

history. They point to a report of the Committee on House Administration accompanying the 1979

amendments. Noting that "[t]he best efforts test is crucial since contribution information is

voluntarily supplied by persons who are not under the control of the committee," that report advises:

If the committee made an effort to obtain the information in the initialsolicitation and

the contributor ignored the request, theCommission should not require the committee

to make the same request two, three, or four times. On the other hand, if the best

effortstest is not met, the committee must be required to take corrective action, such

as contacting the contributor and requesting the information.

H. Rep. No. 96-422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979). According to the Committees, this language

proves that Congress intended to limit the Commission to requiring a single request. We disagree.

For one thing, because the 1979 "best efforts" provision carried over the 1976 provision without

substantial change, the House report is essentially post-enactment history, carrying little probative

weight. See Democratic Congressional Campaign v. Federal Election Comm'n, 831 F.2d 1131,

1134 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discounting floor statements regarding judicial review provisions of Federal

Election Commission Act Amendments of 1979 in part because the provisions "carried over without

substantive change" an earlier provision). Moreover, the report never defines "best efforts."

Although referring to "an effort ... in the initialsolicitation," it failsto say whether that effort satisfies

the "best efforts" test. While stating that the Commission should not require a committee to make

the "same request" repeatedly, the report goes on to state that "if the best efforts test is not met, the

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Committee must be required to take corrective action, such as contacting the contributor and

requesting the information." The report is thus insufficiently clear to limit the open-ended phrase

"best efforts" to a single request.

Nor do we find support for the Committees' argument in the legislative history of the original

1976 Act. When introducing the "best efforts" provision, the sponsoring senator said only that it was

an "anti-nit-picking amendment," which "merely says that if a finding is made that they tried in good

faith to try to comply with the law they shall not be harassed." 122 Cong. Rec. 7922-23 (1976)

(statement of Sen. Packwood). Stating that a "good faith effort" is "not quite enough," the same

senator explained that "[y]ou cannot use the standard, "I did not know because I did not ask.' " Id.

Nothing in these statements limits "best efforts" to a single request.

Relying on comments ofseveral FEC Commissioners during a meeting on the proposed 1980

regulation, the Committees next argue that the Commission itself interpreted "best efforts" to allow

no more than one clear request. The Committees point out that in that meeting, the Commission,

abandoning a proposal to require a follow-up request, decided instead to require only one request in

the initialsolicitation. According to the transcript of the meeting, some Commissioners believed that

a single initial request would respond to Committee staff concerns. But whether these

Commissioners thought the statute mandated only one request, or even whether their views were

shared by other Commissioners, is not at all clear. In the end, however, none of this is relevant

because even if in 1980 the Commission had interpreted the House Report to require only one clear

request, such an interpretation would not bind us for purposes of Chevron step-one analysis. Cf.

International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 707-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that

court need not sustain agency interpretation that was based, not on agency's judgment, but on its

erroneous interpretation of statute).

Thus unpersuaded by the Committees'Chevron step-one arguments, we next ask whether the

Commission'sinterpretation of "best efforts" isreasonable "inlight ofthe language, legislative history,

and policies ofthe statute." Natural Resources DefenseCouncil v. United States EPA, 822 F.2d 104,

111 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Examining again the statute and its

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legislative history, we find no basis for questioning the reasonableness of requiring a stand-alone

follow-up request. As we have already concluded, nothing in the statute or its legislative history

limits the Commission to requiring a single request, or precludes the Commission from requiring a

follow-up. The Commission adopted the regulation to further the Act's purposes: gathering donor

information to inform the electorate of the sources of campaign money and to deter corruption. See

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68. Finding that political committees were not collecting sufficient data, the

Commission concluded that an uncluttered follow-up request would yield more information.

Although the Commission's interpretation of "best efforts" to permit a stand-alone follow-up

requirement is not "the only plausible one," Natural Resources Defense Council, 822 F.2d at 117,

it reflects a reasonable reading of the statute.

We are equally unpersuaded by the Committees' argument that the follow-up request is

unreasonable because, for more than a decade, the Commission had consistently required only one

clear request. As the Court stated in Chevron, "[a]n initial agency interpretation is not instantly

carved in stone." 467 U.S. at 863. "[T]o engage in informed rulemaking," the Court observed, an

agency "must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis."

Id. at 863-64. That is exactly what the Commission did here. The mere fact that the Commission

changed the prior regulation does not make the new regulation an unreasonable construction of the

statute.

We reach a different conclusion as to the regulation's mandatory statement. The required

languagethat "[f]ederal law requires political committees to report the name, mailing address,

occupation and name of employer for each individual" contributing more than $200 a yearis

inaccurate and misleading. The statute does notrequire politicalcommitteesto report the information

for "each" donor. It only requires committees to use their best efforts to gather the information and

then report to the Commission whatever information donors choose to provide. Moreover, because

the regulation requires committees to use the mandatory statement to satisfy the "best efforts"

standard, the statement's inaccuracy could produce unreasonable and wholly unauthorized results.

If instead of sending out the mandatory statement, for example, a political committee used a more

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accurate explanation of the lawsuch as, "federal law requires us to use our best efforts to collect

the information"or even a direct quote from the statute, the Commission would presumably find

the committee not to have exercised its "best efforts." We simply do not believe that Congress

authorized the Commission to forbid political committees from accurately stating the law.

Themandatorystatementsuffersfroma second,related defect: its inaccurate characterization

of the law may lead unsuspecting donors to believe that they must supply the requested information.

Federal law, however, does not so require. The law only requires political committees to ask donors

for the information; no federal law requires donors to report their name, address, occupation, and

employer as a condition of supporting the political party of their choice. Although the mandatory

statement'slanguage maywellproduce higherreporting rates, we doubt that Congress authorized the

Commission to accomplish this purpose by misleading donors. The mandatory statement is thus

unreasonable and contrary to the statute.

III.

Inadditionto theirChevron arguments, theCommittees challenge the "best efforts" regulation

as arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Because we have

already invalidated the mandatory statement, we focus here on the Committees' challenge to the

stand-alone follow-up request. Echoing their Chevron arguments, the Committees contend that the

Commission reversed its long-standing interpretation without providing a reasoned explanation.

Because the Commission changed its regulation, our task is to determine whether the

Commission based its new regulation on "reasoned analysis." Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983). Our inquiry here overlaps somewhat with our

Chevron step-two analysis. See Arent v. Shalala, 70 F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("[W]hether

an agency action is "manifestly contrary to the statute' is important both under Chevron and under

State Farm."). At the same time, however, a permissible statutory construction under Chevron is not

always reasonable under State Farm: "we might determine that although not barred by statute, an

agency's action is arbitrary and capricious because the agency has not considered certain relevant

factors or articulated any rationale for its choice," Arent, 70 F.3d at 620 (Wald, J., concurring in the

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judgment). Although we may not substitute our judgment for the Commission's, see Citizens to

Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), we consider whether the agency

has "examin[ed] the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including

a "rational connection between the facts found and the choice made,' " State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43

(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)). Not "particularly

demanding," this requirement is satisfied if the agency " "enable[s] us to see what major issues of

policy were ventilated ... and why the agency reacted to them as it did.' " Public Citizen, Inc. v.

Federal Aviation Admin., 988 F.2d 186, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (second alteration in original) (quoting

Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).

With these principles in mind, we examine the Commission's justification for its new

regulation. Our starting point is the Commission's initial request for public comment on its proposal

to require a "separate and distinct" follow-up request "with an accompanying notice of the reporting

requirement." 57 Fed. Reg. at 44,137-38. According to the notice of proposed rulemaking, the

Commission felt that strengthening the "best efforts" regulation was necessary because "weaknesses

in the current ... regulations appear to have led to a significant percentage of incomplete itemizeable

contributions for some committees." Id.

Fourteengroups, including theRNC,submittedwrittencomments onthe proposed regulation;

six witnesses, again including the RNC, testified at a public hearing; and the Commission surveyed

200 randomly selected committees, each having at least forty donors contributing in excess of $200

per year. Responses were mixed as to the efficacy of the proposed regulation, its cost and burden,

and the Commission's statutory authority to change the rules. Several witnesses and commenters

shared the Commission's concern about low levels of donor compliance. One group claimed that the

political committees of the 1992 Republican and Democratic presidential candidates failed to report

information for "well over half of their large individual contributions." Another group claimed that

"millions of dollars in campaign contributions pass through the system undocumented."

Witnesses disagreed about both the cause of low donor response rates and the appropriate

solution. According to several witnesses, low donor response rates were the responsibility of political

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committees who either lacked the will to collect the information or whose efforts were entirely

inadequate. The RNC acknowledged that "it may well be that some campaigns make a more serious

effort to achieve a higher degree of compliance than others." One witness revealed that some

committees put their requests for donor information in small print, or buried them among other

material. Another testified that it had increased the number of donors providing identifying

information from 30 percent to about 67 percent by making follow-up requests. At least two groups

urged the Commission to go beyond a follow-up request and require political committees to return

all contributionslacking the required informationwith a request that donorsresubmit the contribution

with the identifying information.

Not all witnesses thought that political committees were responsible for low response rates.

One witnesstestified that low ratesstemmed fromresistance by contributors. This witness urged the

Commission to direct political committees to emphasize that the statute required the reporting of

donor information. Agreeing that resistance by contributors was the problem, other groups argued

that the proposed regulation would not substantially increase response rates.

Survey responses were equally mixed. Twenty-six of seventy-four respondents listed

follow-up phone calls "solely devoted to obtaining the missing information" as their most successful

method for obtaining donor information. Twenty-five of seventy-four listed follow-up letters solely

devoted to obtaining the information as most successful. At the same time, twenty-one of

seventy-four respondentslisted follow-up letterssolely devoted to obtaining the information asleast

successful.

Assessments of the costs of compliance also conflicted. Several witnesses were concerned

about the stafftime, resources, and money required to comply. The RNC estimated $5 to $6 for each

follow-up request. By comparison, another witness estimated "at least 50 cents per letter." Nineteen

of seventy-four survey respondents felt that a stand-alone follow-up phone call would impose an

"unreasonable expense"; fourteen said that a stand-alone follow-up letter would be unreasonable.

In its testimony and written comments before the Commission, the RNC argued, as it does

here, that the proposed "best efforts" regulation exceeded the Commission's statutory authority.

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Others disagreed, arguing that nothing in the statute or itslegislative history prohibited the follow-up

requirement.

Following the comment period and the public hearing, the Commission published its new

regulation, explaining that "[a]fter careful consideration of the full legislative history," it had

concluded that the statute does not "preclude [the Commission] fromrequiring that committeestake

additional measures when the information ... is not forthcoming." 58 Fed. Reg. at 57,728. Stating

that it had "weighed ... the cost, burdensomeness, and effectiveness of various modifications to the

regulations," the Commission concluded that the new regulation would impose minimal burdens. Id.

at 57,726.

Based on the evidence before the Commissionthat certain political committees had low

reporting rates, that an uncluttered follow-up request would encourage greater disclosure, and that

compliance costs were not unreasonable for most committeeswe find that the Commission's

requirement of a stand-alone follow-up request resulted from reasoned analysis. We have no trouble

seeing "what major issues of policy were ventilated" or why the Commission "reacted to them as it

did." Public Citizen, 988 F.2d at 197. We are equally satisfied that the Commission's discussion of

the legislative history adequately responded to the RNC's challenge to the Commission's authority to

promulgate the new regulation. Because the Commission had adequate justification for its new

regulation, the fact that some groups opposed the follow-up request does not, as the Committees

argue, render the requirement arbitrary and capricious. In the end, the Commission's new regulation

results from exactly the kind of agency balancing of various policy considerations to which courts

should generally defer. See Hinton v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 57 F.3d 1144, 1151 (D.C. Cir.

1995). Congress gave the Federal Election Commission, not this court, responsibility for determining

the most effective techniques for obtaining donor information.

We turn finally to the Committees' argument that we should construe the statute to invalidate

the Commission's stand-alone follow-up requirement in order to avoid what they argue are

"substantial" First Amendment questions. Committees' Brief at 32. Their argument rests on the

proposition that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious

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constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems." Edward J.

DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988);

see also Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991). This canon of statutory construction is based

on "the prudential concern that constitutional issues not be needlessly confronted," DeBartolo Corp.,

485 U.S. at 575, and on "respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in light of constitutional

limitations," Rust, 500 U.S. at 191.

We applied this canon most recently in Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. FEC,

69 F.3d 600, 604-05 (D.C. Cir. 1995). That case involved a challenge to an FEC regulation defining

the term "members" for purposes of political communications and solicitations by membership

organizations. Finding that the Commission's regulation presented "grave constitutional issues," id.

at 604, we declined Chevron deference. We think the present case is quite different. Because we can

easily resolve the Committees' First Amendment challenges through the application of controlling

precedent (see Section IV below), we do not face the sort of serious constitutional questions "that

would lead usto assume Congress did not intend to authorize [the regulation's] issuance." Rust, 500

U.S. at 191.

IV.

The Committees focus their First Amendment arguments primarily on the mandatory

statement that we have already invalidated. We thus consider only their First Amendment challenge

to the stand-alone follow-up request. According to the Committees, this requirement burdens

constitutionally-protected political solicitation by forcing them to incur additional costs to send out

additional messages.

The simple answer to the Committees' argument is Buckley's holding that the Act's disclosure

requirements are not inconsistent with the First Amendment. 424 U.S. at 82-83. The Supreme Court

considered the important privacy and association rights at stake for donors, acknowledged that

"public disclosure of contributionsto candidates and political parties will detersome individuals who

otherwise might contribute," and held that the disclosure requirements were "the least restrictive

means" of furthering the substantial government interests in informing the electorate on the sources

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of campaign money, deterring corruption, and detecting violations of the Act's contribution

limitations. Id. at 67-68. Indeed, because the "best efforts" provisionadded to the Act after the

Court decided Buckleyessentially offers an optionalsafe harbor or affirmative defense for political

committees unable to secure the identifying information, it actually makes the Act's reporting

requirements less stringent than the absolute disclosure requirements upheld in Buckley. As the

district court explained, "the "best efforts' regulation does not compel political committees to do

anything, and there is no penalty for violation of the "best efforts' regulation." Republican Nat'l

Comm., No. 94-1017, slip op. at 11. Because the absolute disclosure requirement at issue in Buckley

does not violate the First Amendment, neither can an optionalsafe harbor for those unable to comply

with the absolute disclosure requirement.

The Committees nevertheless argue that the restriction on additionalspeech is content-based

and not narrowly tailored to the interestsidentified in Buckley. To determine whether the regulation

is content-based (in which case we would apply strict scrutiny) or content-neutral (in which case we

would apply intermediate scrutiny) we ask whether "the government has adopted a regulation of

speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys," or "whether the regulation ... serves

purposes unrelated to the content of expression." Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791

(1989) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,

771 (1976)). Applying this standard, we conclude that the Commission's 1994 regulation is

content-neutral. It forbids additional speech not because of any hostility to the content of that speech,

but to "ensure that a written request for the information is not overlooked." 58 Fed. Reg. at 57,727.

Content-neutral regulations are valid if they are " "narrowly tailored to serve a significant

government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' " United States

v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460

U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). The Commission's regulation satisfies this standard. The administrative record

identifies as one cause of low donor response rates the burying of requests for donor information

among other material. Because the regulation prohibits that practice, we are satisfied that it promotes

the very gathering of information that Buckley found to be in the public interest.

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The regulation also leaves political committees free to express their views to donors in other

communications. Even at the Committees' estimate of up to $6 per follow-up request, the cost is only

about three percent of a $200 contribution, an amount not likely to inhibit political committees from

"speaking." We agree with the district court that "such a minimal burden is not unconstitutional in

light of Buckley's recognition of the strong governmental interest involved." Republican Nat'l

Comm., slip op. at 13. Buckley itself upheld the Act's reporting requirements, despite the Court's

recognition that these requirements would financially burden campaigns by deterring some donors

from contributing. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. Thus, prohibiting political committees from including

additional information in their follow-up requests does not violate the First Amendment.

V.

Because the Commission's initial proposed regulation did not even include the requirement

of a mandatory statement, see 57 Fed. Reg. 44,137, we have little doubt that the regulation is

severable. See North Carolina v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 730 F.2d 790, 795-96 (D.C.

Cir. 1984) (remand proper when "there is substantial doubt" as to whether the agency intended its

regulation to be severable). Accordingly, as to the regulation's requirement of a stand-alone

follow-up request, we affirm the district court's grant ofsummary judgment to the Commission. As

to the mandatory statement, we reverse and remand with instructionsto entersummary judgment for

the Committees.

So ordered.

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although I agree with

most of the majority's analysis, I write separately because I reason somewhat differently, and more

importantly, because I cannot agree with the majority's conclusion that the "stand alone" portion of

the regulation can be severed and saved. First, I agree with the majority that the Commission's

interpretation of the Act falls as unreasonable under Chevron analysis, but I would also strike the

regulation as arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act.

1. Chevron

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We apply the Chevron analysis where, as here, we are reviewing an interpretation of a statute

by the agency that Congress has chosen to administer that statute. This is a two-step analysis, in

which we first determine whether the statute is ambiguous in the sense that Congress has not clearly

precluded the agency's interpretation, and then determine whether the agency's interpretation is

reasonable. See 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984). I agree with the majority that the Commission's

interpretation in this case plainly surmounts the first step of Chevron. The statute does not

unambiguously delineate what a political committee's "best efforts" entail. The statute's bare

reference to "best efforts" does not preclude the Commission from expecting a little more from

political committees than it has in the past.

I further agree that the Commission's new rule stumbles on Chevron's second step. The

Commission arguesthat itsrule merely establishes one possible means bywhich a political committee

may demonstrate "best efforts," but the language of the new rule is clear and to the contrary.

According to the rule, "the treasurer and the committee will only be deemed to have exercised best

efforts" ifthe committee followsthe procedure prescribed by the Commission. 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b)

(emphasis added). It is not reasonable for the Commission to declare that only strict adherence to

its selected format will qualify as a political committee's best efforts. The phrase "best efforts" itself

implies a range of actions should be acceptable. Nothing in the record suggests that the procedure

endorsed bytheCommission isthe onlymannerinwhich a committee could make an effective request

for information. In fact, testimony suggests that some political committees had adopted other

reasonable approaches to obtain the information prior to the promulgation of the new rule. Based

on this record, the Commission cannot decide that its chosen means by which a political committee

obtainsinformation categorically precludes compliance with the "best efforts" provision by any other

efforts a political committee attempts.

The unreasonableness of the Commission's new rule may be easily illustrated. If a political

committee sendsseven follow-up letters, each proclaiming the prescribed statement in headline-sized

type, but notes in small print in each that the law requires disclosure only from political committees,

not political contributors, then that committee has not demonstrated best efforts under 11 C.F.R. §

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104.7(b)(2). If a committee sends seventy times seven follow-up letters, but in each asks after the

health ofthe contributor'sfamily, it also has not shown best efforts under the new rule. In either case,

the fault is not in the committeewhich has done all that the statute could have conceivably

envisionedbut in the unreasonableness of the rule promulgated by the Commission.

2. Arbitrary and Capricious

That the rule permits only the one narrow means of demonstrating "best efforts" becomes

more unreasonable upon examination of the procedure mandated by the Commission. The

Commission demands that all response material of a political committee intone that "[f]ederal law

requires political committees" to disclose information about "each individual" donor to the FEC. The

prescribed statement is clearly misleading in this context. Federal law does not require an individual

to divulge his employer or his occupation, only that a political committee that receives such

information must in turn disclose it to the FEC. Yet, a donor reading the required statement as it is

currently worded is not likely to discern that distinction. Cf. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.

350, 383 & n.37 (1977) (noting that the legal sophistication of the audience is a key consideration

in determining whether legal advertising is misleading). Even if the donor should notice that the

statement by its terms only binds a political committee, the donor may still conclude that the

statement intends to inform him that federal law compels a donor to divulge the information

requested. Were it otherwise, a reasonable person would be right to wonder why this statement is

even mentioned to the donor.

The required format of the follow-up request exacerbates the misleading nature of the

prescribed warning. The Commission has very much limited the statements that may appear in the

follow-up request because it fears that a political committee may hide its request for information

amidst other visual clutter. Because of these limits on the request, however, a committee cannot

include even a single clause to explain the warning in that follow-up. If a committee wishes to inform

its contributors of the true extent of the law, it must send or otherwise convey an accompanying, but

separate, explanation of the statement at its own additional expense in order to reassure the donor

that it is not illegal to maintain his privacy.

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The unreasonably misleading nature of the prescribed statement, coupled with the

Commission's prohibition of additional explanation, provides sufficient grounds for us to hold the

regulation arbitrary. Courts have suggested that an agency cannot mislead an individual. See, e.g.,

Covington v. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 750 F.2d 937, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding a

retirement to be involuntary when the result of a misleading notice issued by an agency); Shields

Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 615, 633 (1993) (indicating that if an agency's

procurement procedure was misleading, it would be arbitrary). Likewise, the Commission cannot

attempt to coerce through misleading statements of the law the individual disclosure that Congress

chose not to require.

Not only isthe prescribed statement misleading, but the Commission also did not sufficiently

justify its choice of language for that statement in its decision. When an agency rejects other suitable

alternatives without discussion, this court cannot reassure itself that the agency did not act arbitrarily

by choosing an option that suffers a significant flaw. See City of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co. v. FCC,

822 F.2d 1153, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Here, the Commission did not solicit or encourage comment

on the specific language to be used in such a prescribed warning. In discussing the language actually

selected, the Commission only compared one statement, which told the donor that a committee was

required to disclose donor information to the FEC, with a single other statement, which said that a

committee was required by law to ask the donors for information. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 57,727. The

Commission then briefly explained its preference for the former based on the single factor that the

former may have contributed to higher levels of disclosure. The Commission apparently never

considered many other obviousand more accurateexplanations of the law. For example, the

Commission offered no justification for not prescribing a more complete statement of the Act, which

would note that a political committee must only use its best effortsto obtain certain information from

persons who contribute more than $200 and that it must then disclose any such information obtained

to the FEC. Failure of an agency to discuss obvious alternatives "has led uniformly to reversal." City

of Brookings Mun. Tel. Co., 822 F.2d at 1169 (citations omitted). I would thus find the statement

of the law prescribed by the Commission in 11 C.F.R. § 104.7(b) to be an abuse ofits discretion. See

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5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).

CONCLUSION

I agree that the Commission may change its interpretation of "best efforts." It may not,

however, unreasonably limit the possible avenues for a political committee to show "best efforts" to

a single format. I also agree that it may not prescribe a misleading statement of the law as part of a

required format without permitting a political committee some opportunity to explain that statement.

Because the Commission'sinterpretation is not a reasonable one, I would reverse the judgment ofthe

District Court. I do not follow the majority's reasoning that the requirement for a stand-alone mailing

separate from the requirements of the contents of that mailing can be severed and saved. I would

simply remand for the invalidation of the entire regulation.

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