Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02402/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02402-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cedric J. Morris
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15-2402

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CEDRIC J. MORRIS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 13-CR-250 — Rudolph T. Randa, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 18, 2016 — DECIDED SEPTEMBER 9, 2016

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, KANNE and SYKES, Circuit 

Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. In 2015 Cedric Morris pleaded guilty 

to two counts of distributing heroin. The plea agreement 

called for the government to make several specific sentencing recommendations: what quantity of drugs should count 

as relevant conduct, what Morris’s base offense level should 

be, and whether Morris was entitled to an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction. The agreement also required the 

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government “to recommend a sentence within the sentencing guidelines range as determined by the [district court].”

At sentencing the judge determined that Morris’s Guidelines range was 70–87 months. In making that determination,

the judge applied a two-level enhancement for possession of 

a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense. See 

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Morris objected, and although the 

plea agreement made no mention of a dangerous-weapon 

enhancement, the government responded that the enhancement was appropriate because federal agents had recovered 

a handgun from Morris’s residence. The government furthermore recommended a sentence at the high end of the 

Guidelines range calculated by the judge. The judge imposed an 87-month sentence. Morris now appeals, arguing 

that the government breached the terms of the plea agreement and that the two-level enhancement for possession of a 

dangerous weapon was unwarranted.

There was no breach. The plea agreement expressly states

that the parties remained free to make sentencing recommendations not mentioned in the agreement, which is what 

the government did when it supported an enhancement for 

possession of a dangerous weapon. The government also 

clearly satisfied its obligation to recommend a sentence 

within the Guidelines range calculated by the district judge. 

Finally, the handgun that was found in Morris’s residence 

easily justifies application of the dangerous-weapon enhancement. Accordingly, we affirm Morris’s sentence. 

I. Background

Cedric Morris, a Chicago resident, was in the business of 

organizing regular shipments of heroin to a distributor in 

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No. 15-2402 3

Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Morris would hire female couriers to 

transport small, prepackaged quantities of the drug on the 

Amtrak train that runs between the two cities. In February 

2013 Morris’s distributor began cooperating with law enforcement. With the distributor’s assistance, federal agents 

observed and recorded transactions with two of Morris’s 

couriers. Based on those transactions, a grand jury in Milwaukee returned a four-count indictment charging Morris 

and the couriers with distributing heroin, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a),

(b) (Counts 1 and 3), and Morris with directing others to 

travel between states with the intent to carry on an unlawful 

activity, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (Counts 2 and 4). 

On January 8, 2014, agents attempted to execute arrest 

warrants for Morris and Raven Hayes, one of his couriers, at 

the residence they shared. Hayes was at home when the 

agents arrived, but Morris was not. The agents searched the 

residence, including the basement where Hayes indicated 

that Morris lived. There they found a bedroom containing 

men’s clothing and a number of personal effects bearing 

Morris’s name, including prescription medication, parking 

citations, and a plane ticket. In a laundry room adjacent to 

the bedroom, the agents found a Smith & Wesson .32-caliber 

handgun next to a small amount of heroin and a variety of

materials used for packaging heroin. Morris was apprehended two months later.

Morris eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a written 

plea agreement to the distribution charges in Counts 1 and 3

of the indictment; in exchange the government dropped the 

remaining counts. The agreement stated that the parties had 

discussed what they believed to be the relevant provisions of 

the Sentencing Guidelines, and the government agreed to 

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make three specific sentencing recommendations. First, it

would recommend that the judge attribute 400 to 700 grams 

of heroin to Morris as relevant conduct, resulting in a base 

offense level of 26. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(7). Second, 

the government would recommend an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction. See id. § 3E1.1. Finally, the government agreed “to recommend a sentence within the 

[S]entencing [G]uidelines range as determined by the [district court].”

The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) incorporated the parties’ recommendations regarding Morris’s base 

offense level and the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction.

However, the PSR also recommended two enhancements not 

mentioned in the plea agreement: one for possessing a 

dangerous weapon in connection with a drug offense, see

§ 2D1.1(b)(1), and one for having a leadership role in the 

offense, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Morris objected, and the 

prosecutor responded that both enhancements were appropriate.

The district judge did not apply a leadership-role enhancement, but he did adopt the rest of the PSR’s findings, 

including the dangerous-weapon enhancement. The resulting offense level was 25, which yielded a Guidelines range of

70–87 months when combined with Morris’s criminal history 

category of III. The judge then asked the government for its 

sentencing recommendation. Citing the plea agreement, the 

prosecutor recommended a sentence “within the advisory 

guidelines as calculated by this [c]ourt” but noted his view 

that Morris’s “responsibility falls closer to the higher end of 

that level than the lower end.” The prosecutor also noted 

that without the dangerous-weapon enhancement, Morris’s 

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Guidelines range would have been 57–71 months. After 

hearing arguments in mitigation from Morris’s attorney, the 

judge imposed an 87-month sentence, the top of the Guidelines range. 

II. Discussion

A. Breach of the Plea Agreement

Morris’s main argument is that the government breached 

the plea agreement in two respects: first, by supporting 

enhancements that were not mentioned in the plea agreement, and second, by recommending a sentence at the high 

end of the range the district judge calculated. Morris argues 

that the government was obligated to recommend a sentence 

within the range that would have resulted without the 

enhancement for possessing a dangerous weapon: 57–

71 months. He asks that we vacate his sentence and order 

resentencing before a different judge. 

Because Morris didn’t object to the government’s alleged 

breach at sentencing, our review is for plain error. See United 

States v. Orlando, 823 F.3d 1126, 1134 (7th Cir 2016). Under 

this standard, Morris will prevail only if “there was [an] 

error; the error was plain or obvious; the error affected his 

substantial rights; and the error seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” 

Id. (quotation marks omitted). To determine whether an 

error occurred, we must first decide whether the government actually breached the plea agreement. Id. We interpret 

the parties’ agreement using ordinary contract principles 

and resolving any ambiguities against the government. 

United States v. Brown, 779 F.3d 486, 492 (7th Cir. 2015). “We 

will hold the government to any explicit or implicit promises 

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it has made to the defendant in exchange for his guilty plea, 

but the government’s obligations, like the defendant’s, will 

be limited to matters on which they have actually agreed.” 

Id.

The plea agreement contains three explicit promises that 

relate to sentencing, each of which the government satisfied.

First, in paragraphs 16 and 17, the government agreed to 

recommend that the judge attribute 400 to 700 grams of 

heroin to Morris as relevant conduct, resulting in a base 

offense level of 26. It’s undisputed that the government

made that recommendation. Second, paragraph 18 required

the government to recommend an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction, which it did. Finally, paragraph 22 

required the government to “recommend a sentence within 

the [S]entencing [G]uidelines range as determined by the 

[district court].” The judge calculated a Guidelines range of

70–87 months, and the prosecutor recommended a sentence 

“at the higher end of that level.” 

Morris contends that Paragraph 14 of the plea agreement 

contains additional, implicit promises that the government 

did not fulfill. That provision provides in full: 

The parties acknowledge, understand, and 

agree that the [S]entencing [G]uidelines calculations included in this agreement represent 

the positions of the parties on the appropriate 

sentence range under the [S]entencing 

[G]uidelines. The defendant acknowledges and 

understands that the [S]entencing [G]uidelines 

recommendations contained in this agreement

do not create any right to be sentenced within 

any particular sentence range, and that the 

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court may impose a reasonable sentence above 

or below the [G]uideline[s] range. The parties 

further understand and agree that if the defendant has provided false, incomplete, or inaccurate information that affects the calculations, the government is not bound to make the 

recommendations contained in this agreement.

Morris reads this provision as prohibiting the government 

from making any recommendations not mentioned in the 

plea agreement and requiring the government to recommend a sentence within a Guidelines range of 57–71 months. 

That’s an overreading of the agreement. Paragraph 14 

required the government to make the three sentencing 

recommendations contained in the plea agreement unless 

Morris provided “false, incomplete, or inaccurate information that affect[ed] the calculations.” Nothing in paragraph 14 suggests that the government was limited to making only those recommendations. Indeed paragraph 21, 

which falls under the “Sentencing Recommendations” 

heading, is directly to the contrary: “Both parties reserve the 

right to make any recommendation regarding any other 

matters not specifically addressed by this agreement.” 

Likewise paragraph 14 does not even mention a Guidelines 

range of 57–71 months, let alone require the government to 

recommend a sentence within that range. To the contrary, 

paragraph 22 requires the government “to recommend a 

sentence within the [S]entencing [G]uidelines range as 

determined by the [district court].”

Morris relies on United States v. Navarro, 817 F.3d 494 (7th 

Cir. 2015), for the proposition that the government breached 

the plea agreement by recommending an enhancement that 

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the parties had not discussed. But in Navarro the government 

advocated for an upward variance from the Guidelines range 

that the district court had calculated, not an enhancement to 

the defendant’s base offense level. The distinction is important: By recommending an upward variance, the government violated the express terms of the plea agreement, 

which required it to recommend a sentence within the 

Guidelines range calculated by the district court. Id. at 499. 

In the present case, the government recommended an enhancement, which is not equivalent to seeking a sentence 

outside the Guidelines range. Cf. id. at 500 (“We have recognized a clear distinction between adjustments to the 

[G]uidelines range and departures from them.”). Nothing in 

the plea agreement prohibited the government from making 

that recommendation. 

In short the government fulfilled all of its obligations under the plea agreement, so there was no breach. Morris is not 

entitled to resentencing on this basis.

B. Enhancement for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon

Morris also renews his objection to the judge’s application of a two-level enhancement for possessing a dangerous 

weapon in connection with a drug offense. The basis for the 

enhancement was the handgun that agents found when they 

searched Morris’s residence. Morris contends the government failed to establish that he possessed the handgun. We 

review the judge’s application of the enhancement for clear 

error. United States v. Strode, 552 F.3d 630, 635 (7th Cir. 2009).

Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides for a two-level increase in 

the base offense level for a drug offense “[i]f a dangerous 

weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” Application 

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note 11 explains that “[t]he enhancement should be applied 

if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable 

that the weapon was connected with the offense.” § 2D1.1 

cmt. n.11. We have construed this provision to require the 

government to prove by a preponderance of evidence that 

the defendant possessed a weapon. United States v. Orozco, 

576 F.3d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 2009). The government can satisfy 

its burden by showing either actual possession or constructive possession, meaning “the defendant had the power and 

the intention to exercise dominion or control of the firearm.” 

United States v. Bothun, 424 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2005). If the

government meets its burden, the defendant must show that 

it’s clearly improbable he possessed the weapon in connection with the drug offense. Orozco, 576 F.3d at 751.

At sentencing the government pointed to the handgun’s 

location adjacent to Morris’s bedroom in the residence that 

Morris and Hayes shared. The government also noted that 

the gun was found near a small quantity of heroin and a 

variety of materials used to package heroin, including a

hydraulic press, razor blades, scales, and plastic bags. These 

facts are easily sufficient to establish that Morris, a convicted 

heroin distributor, constructively possessed the handgun. 

See Bothun, 424 F.3d at 585–86 (holding that the government 

established possession based solely on the fact that the 

weapons were found in the defendant’s home and near drug 

paraphernalia); see also United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 

746 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the defendant possessed 

firearms based on their location at his residence and business). 

Citing United States v. Harris, 230 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 

2000), Morris argues that the proximity between the handCase: 15-2402 Document: 32 Filed: 09/09/2016 Pages: 10
10 No. 15-2402

gun and his bedroom is not enough to establish that he 

possessed the handgun. Harris is inapposite. In that case the

defendant’s only connection to a weapon was the fact that he 

worked in various drug houses where firearms were stored 

and where other individuals regularly carried and used 

firearms. The government conceded that the defendant 

himself had never used or carried firearms, but it argued

that his access to the firearms and his proximity to others

who used them amounted to constructive possession. We 

rejected that argument, stating that the defendant’s “proximity to the firearms ... [was] insufficient to constitute constructive possession.” Id. at 1057. In the present case, the 

government did not concede that Morris never used or 

carried the handgun found in his residence. To the contrary, 

the prosecutor argued that the gun’s location in Morris’s

residence and near his personal effects permits the inference 

that the gun belonged to Morris. As we’ve just explained, 

that inference is entirely justifiable. 

Because the government established that Morris possessed the handgun, the burden shifted to Morris to show

that it’s clearly improbable that he did so in connection with 

his heroin-distribution activities. He didn’t come close 

making that showing, given the gun’s proximity to his 

bedroom and its location next to a small quantity of heroin 

and a variety of packaging materials. See Bothun, 424 F.3d at 

586 (“[G]uns found in close proximity to drug activity are 

presumptively connected to that activity.” (quotation marks 

omitted)). The judge was right to apply the two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1).

AFFIRMED.

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