Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03069/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03069-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leroy Lafoon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

" 

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

FIL · 

Unit.eel States Court of Appeals Ten.th Cir~i~ 

NOV 2 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. No. 92 - 3069 

LEROY LAFOON, 

Defendant-Appellant . 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. NO. 87-10052-02) 

SUBMITTED ON THE BRIEFS : * 

Leroy Lafoon, Pro Se, Three Rivers, Texas, Appellant. 

Lee Thompson, U.S. Attorney, and Kim M. Fowler, Assistant U.S. 

Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge . 

Leroy Lafoon appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S . C. § 2255 . We affirm. 

Lafoon pled guilty in the United States District Court for 

the District of Kansas to one count of possession of amphetamine 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimousl y that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument . 

Appellate Case: 92-3069 Document: 010110145639 Date Filed: 11/02/1992 Page: 1 
.., 

.. 

with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a) (1), 

and received a 15-year sentence. He filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

motion to set aside his sentence, arguing that the Director of the 

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs ("BNDD") and the Secretary 

of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW") failed to comply with the 

statutory requirements of 21 U.S.C. §§ 811-812 when they transferred amphetamine from a Schedule III to a Schedule II substance 

in 1971. Thus, he argued before the district court as he does 

here, he was improperly sentenced for possessing a Schedule II 

1 drug. 

After receiving a response from the government, the district 

court summarily denied Lafoon's motion, without providing any factual findings or legal conclusions for the denial. Lafoon argues 

on appeal that: (1) the district court erred in failing to provide 

a written opinion with its factual findings and legal conclusions 

supporting the denial of his petition, thereby obligating this 

court to review his claims de novo; and (2) his conviction is 

"null and void" because of the allegedly improper reclassification 

in 1971 of amphetamine from Schedule III to Schedule II. 

We need not address whether the district court erred in failing to proffer its conclusions and facts supporting its denial of 

Lafoon's motion. Even assuming it did, Lafoon's section 2255 

motion fails for two other reasons and we therefore affirm its 

dismissal. 

1 Classification is significant because, pursuant to statute, 

possession of a Schedule II drug permits a longer sentence than 

possession of a Schedule III drug. 

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Appellate Case: 92-3069 Document: 010110145639 Date Filed: 11/02/1992 Page: 2 
./ 

First, Lafoon pled guilty to a violation involving a Schedule 

II substance. There is no indication that, nor does he argue 

that, his guilty plea was anything other than freely and voluntarily given, upon advice of counsel. He has therefore waived any 

argument relating to scheduling of the controlled substance 

involved. See United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989) 

(defendant who enters a voluntary and intelligent plea upon advice 

of competent counsel cannot collaterally attack the validity of 

the plea); United States v. Davis, 900 F.2d 1524, 1525-26 (10th 

Cir.) ("By entering a voluntary plea of guilty, Davis waived all 

nonjurisdictional defenses."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 155 

(1990). 

Further, we reject his argument on its merits. Amphetamine 

has been classified as a Schedule II substance since 1971. Lafoon 

contends that the Director of the BNDD and the Secretary of HEW 

failed to follow the statutory requirements of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 811(a)- (c), 812 in 1971 when they transferred amphetamine from 

Schedule III to Schedule II of the 1970 Controlled Substance Act. 

Lafoon's specific argument is that the Attorney General failed to 

gather the "necessary data" and request from the Secretary of HEW 

a "medical and scientific evaluation", as required by Section 

2 811(a). Further, he asserts that the evaluation conducted by the 

2 21 U.S.C. § 811(a) provides in pertinent part as follows: 

[T]he Attorney General may by rule--

(1) add to ... a schedule or transfer 

between ... schedules any drug or other 

substance if he--

[footnote continued] 

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Appellate Case: 92-3069 Document: 010110145639 Date Filed: 11/02/1992 Page: 3 
,,. 1 

HEW Secretary, Elliot L. Richardson, was inadequate. 3 

This court recently held that "amphetamine was properly 

classified as a Schedule II controlled substance pursuant to 21 

C.F.R. § 1308.12(d) ." United States v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 370, 

373 (10th Cir. 1992). In doing so, we specifically rejected a 

challenge to the adequacy of Secretary Richardson's scientific and 

medical evaluation of amphetamine, contained in a letter to the 

[footnote continued] 

(A) finds that such drug or other 

substance has a potential for abuse, and 

(B) makes with respect to such drug or 

other substance the findings prescribed by 

subsection (b) of Section 812 of this title 

for the schedule in which such drug is to be 

placed; 

21 U.S.C. § 811(a) (1) (A)- (B). 

3 Section 811(b) requires the Secretary to provide the Attorney 

General with "a [written] scientific and medical evaluation, and 

his recommendations, as to whether [a] drug or other substance 

should be ... controlled or removed as a controlled substance." 

21 U.S.C. § 811(b). In doing so, the Secretary must consider the 

following factors: 

(1) Its actual or relative potential for abuse. 

(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological effect, 

if known. 

(3) The state of current scientific knowledge regarding 

the drug or other substance. 

(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse. 

(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse. 

(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health. 

(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence liability. 

(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor of a 

substance already controlled under this chapter. 

21 U.S.C. § 811(c). 

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Appellate Case: 92-3069 Document: 010110145639 Date Filed: 11/02/1992 Page: 4 
Attorney General. "Although, in retrospect, a more detailed 

evaluation would have been preferable, we conclude that this 

evaluation was adequate." Id.; see also United States v. Casey, 

788 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd sub nom. United States v. 

Alexander, 962 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that 

the Secretary's letter was an insufficient scientific and medical 

evaluation of methamphetamine). 

Other courts have similarly held that amphetamine and methamphetamine (a derivative of amphetamine) were properly rescheduled, 

finding no error in the conduct of the Secretary or the Attorney 

General or the Director of the BNDD. See United States v. 

Allison, 953 F.2d 870, 874 (5th Cir.) ("delegation [of authority 

to reschedule substances] to BNDD was sufficient, and coupled with 

[the Drug Enforcement Administrations's] later republication of 

the results, properly classified methamphetamine as a schedule II 

controlled substance."), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2319 (1992); 

United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362, 368 (5th Cir. 1991) ("the 

Attorney General followed proper procedure in reclassifying methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled substance."), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 2290 (1992); United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 

886, 889 (9th Cir. 1991) ("It is no longer an open question 

whether methamphetamine has properly been designated a Schedule II 

controlled substance."); United States v. Lane, 931 F.2d 40, 41 

(11th Cir. 1991) ("the Attorney General and the [BNDD] followed 

the proper procedures in reclassifying methamphetamine."); United 

States v. Roark, 924 F.2d 1426, 1429 (8th Cir. 1991) (after 

reviewing the procedures followed by the Director of the BNDD, the 

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court concluded "that methamphetamine was and is a Schedule II 

controlled substance."). 

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court 

dismissing Lafoon's petition for a writ of habeas corpus is 

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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