Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06333/USCOURTS-ca10-89-06333-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Moore, Oklahoma
Not Party
Tim A. Doran
Appellant
Pia P. Hubbert
Appellee
Thomas Hubbert
Appellee
Alan McCoy
Appellant
Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company
Not Party

Document Text:

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

C-404 United States Courthouse 

1929 Stout Street 

Denver Colorado 80294 

January 14, 1991 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: No. 89-6333, Hubbert v. City of Moore 

Attached is a corrected cover page for the opinion. The 

cover page has been corrected to reflect the identity of the 

appellants and the defendants who did not appeal. And to delete 

counsel for non-appealing defendants. 

Very truly yours, 

By: 

P trick Fisher 

Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 1 
PUBLISH 

FILED 1/9/91 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THOMAS HUBBERT and PIA P. HUBBERT, 

husband and wife, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

CITY OF MOORE, OKLAHOMA, a/k/a City of Moore) 

Police Department, and ) 

OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, ) 

Defendants, 

and 

OFFICER TIM A. DORAN and OFFICER ALAN McCOY, 

Defendants-Appellants.· 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 89-6333 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-2096-R) 

Reggie N. Whitten (Kathryn D. Mills, Mills, Whitten, Mills, Mills 

& Hinkle, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), Mills, 

Whitten, Mills, Mills & Hinkle, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellants Officer Tim A. Doran and Officer Alan McCoy. 

Rex K. Travis (Michael s. Homsey, Gary B. Homsey and Jimmie A. 

Franklin, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 2 
PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

THOMAS HUBBERT and PIA P. HUBBERT, ) 

husband and wife, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

CITY OF MOORE, OKLAHOMA, a/k/a City of Moore) 

Police Department, and ) 

OKLAHOMA GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, and ) 

OFFICER TIM A. DORAN and OFFICER ALAN McCOY, ) 

) 

Defendants-Appellants. ) 

FILED 

Uoitcd States. Court ,:,f .Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JAN 9 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 89-6333 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. CIV-87-2096-R) 

Reggie N. Whitten (Kathryn D. Mills, Mills, Whitten, Mills, Mills 

& Hinkle, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, with him on the briefs), Mills, 

Whitten, Mills, Mills & Hinkle, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for 

Defendants-Appellants Officer Tim A. Doran and Officer Alan McCoy. 

Hugh D. Rice of Rainey, Ross, Rice & Binns on the brief for 

Defendant-Appellant Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company. 

Rex K. Travis (Michael S. Homsey, Gary B. Homsey and Jimmie A. 

Franklin, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, on the briefs), Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees. 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

TACHA, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 3 
Defendants-appellants Tim Doran and Alan McCoy appeal a 

district court order denying their motion for summary judgment. 

On appeal, Doran and McCoy argue the distict court erred in 

finding: (1) the determination of probable cause in a criminal 

proceeding resulting in an acquittal has no preclusive effect in a 

subsequent civil action and (2) a genuine question of material 

fact remained on the issue of probable cause as it relates to 

their defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs-appellees Thomas 

and Pia Hubbert (Mr. & Mrs. Hubbert) argue we do not have 

jurisdiction because of a defect in the notice of appeal. We 

conclude we have jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and reverse 

the district court's ruling. 

On May 7, 1987, an Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company _(OG&E) 

field man, Kelly Clonts, was sent to the Hubberts' home to collect 

an overdue electric bill. Clonts knocked on the door and was met 

by Mr. Hubbert, who said he had already paid the bill. Clonts 

called his dispatcher and was informed there was no record of the 

payment. Clonts returned to the house and told Mr. Hubbert he 

would cut off service if he was not paid immediately. The two men 

then engaged in a verbal dispute. Mr. Hubbert told Clonts he 

would throw him off the porch if he did not leave. 

Clonts then called the dispatcher and asked for assistance 

from the Moore Police Department. Meanwhile, Mr. Hubbert called 

the OG&E office and was informed there was no record of his 

payment. Mr. Hubbert stated he would go immediately to the OG&E 

office and pay the bill a second time. 

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Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 4 
Soon after Mr. Hubbert left to pay the bill, Officers McCoy 

and Doran arrived at the Hubberts' residence. Clonts explained 

the situation to the officers. He then spoke to his supervisor, 

who told him to collect payment or disconnect the service. Clonts 

spoke with Mrs. Hubbert, who also refused to pay him. He then 

proceeded to the Hubberts' backyard to disconnect the service. 

McCoy and Doran followed him. 

After entering the gate, Clonts and the two officers 

encountered Mrs. Hubbert, who was running in their direction with 

a knife in her hand. McCoy drew his gun and Doran pulled out his 

baton. They ordered Mrs. Hubbert to drop the knife. She refused 

to do so and ran back into the house. The officers asked Mrs. 

Hubbert to come outside, but she did not comply. After Mr. 

Hubbert returned, he convinced his wife to leave the house. Mrs. 

Hubbert was arrested for assault with a dangerous weapon. 

Criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Hubbert in Cleveland 

County, Oklahoma. At the preliminary hearing, Clonts, McCoy, and 

Doran testified and were cross-examined by Mrs. Hubbert's counsel. 

After hearing the testimony, the judge determined there was 

probable cause for the arrest. Mrs. Hubbert was bound over for 

trial. 

Clonts, McCoy, and Doran testified at the trial. Mrs. and 

Mr. Hubbert and another witness also testified on Mrs. Hubbert's 

behalf. The case was submitted to the jury and Mrs. Hubbert was 

acquitted. 

The Hubberts filed this civil action in federal district 

court against the City of Moore, OG&E, Doran, and McCoy, alleging 

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Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 5 
various pendant state claims and civil rights violations under 

42 u.s.c~ §§ 1983 and 1985. At the heart of this lawsuit is the 

Hubberts' assertion that Mrs. Hubbert was arrested without 

probable cause. 

Doran and McCoy filed a motion for summary judgment. The 

district court granted this motion on the state claims and the 

section 1985 claim. The court, however, denied Doran and McCoy's 

motion for summary judgment on the section 1983 claim based on 

qualified immunity, concluding there was a material issue of fact 

concerning whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Mrs. 

Hubbert. 

Doran and McCoy filed a motion to reconsider with the 

district court. They also filed a notice of appeal with this 

court. The appeal was dismissed because the district court had 

not yet ruled on the motion to reconsider. That motion was 

subsequently denied by the district court. 

Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Civil Court of Appeals decided 

Adamson Y.!.. Dayton Hudson Corp., 774 P.2d 478 (Okla. App. 1989), a 

case addressing the preclusive effect of a finding of probable 

cause in a criminal proceeding resulting in an acquittal. Because 

of this decision, the City of Moore, OG&E, Doran, and McCoy 

jointly filed an application for leave to file a motion for 

summary judgment out of time, which was granted. The defendants 

argued in their motion that the Hubberts were collaterally 

estopped from arguing the officers had arrested Mrs. Hubbert 

without probable cause because the question already had been 

decided at Mrs. Hubbert's preliminary hearing. The district court 

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Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 6 
denied the motion for summary judgment on October 10, 1989. Doran 

and McCoy filed their notice of appeal with this court on that 

day. The City of Moore and OG&E did not join in this appeal. 

We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to consider 

this appeal. The Hubberts contend the notice of appeal does not 

meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) 

because it does not specify the parties appealing from the 

district court's order. The caption of the notice of appeal 

includes the City of Moore, OG&E, Doran, and McCoy. The body of 

the notice states: "[n]otice is hereby given that Defendants 

appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 

from the Order denying their summary judgment. • " The 

Hubberts assert this appeal· must be dismissed under the Supreme 

Court's decision in Torres Y..!.. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 

(1988), because the notice does not clearly indicate only Doran 

and McCoy are appealing. 

In Torres, the Supreme Court characterized Rule 3(c) as a 

jurisdictional requirement, emphasizing that failure to name a 

party in a notice of appeal constitutes a failure to appeal. Id. 

at 314. Such a defect is not merely an excusable "informality." 

Id. As the Court pointed out, "[p]ermitting such vague 

designation would leave the appellee and the court unable to 

determine with certitude whether a losing party not named in the 

notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse judgment or held 

liable for costs or sanctions." Id. at 318. 

The Court, however, left open the possibility that def~cts in 

a notice of appeal may be remedied by filing other documents 

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Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 7 
supplying omitted information. It stated that "if a litigant 

files papers in a fashion that is technically at variance with the 

letter of a procedural rule, a court nonetheless may find that the 

litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant's action is 

the functional equivalent of what the rule requires." Id. at 316-

17 (emphasis added). In interpreting Torres the Third and Fifth 

Circuits have held a court has jurisdiction if the appellant files 

additional documents resolving any defects in the notice within 

the time limit for filing a notice of appeal. See Masquerade 

Novelty, Inc. Y...!.. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 664-65 (3d 

Cir. 1990); Warfield Y...!.. Fidelity~ Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322, 325 

(5th Cir. 1990); Brotherhood of~ Carmen Y...!.. Atchison, Topeka~ 

Santa Fe~' 894 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. 

Ct. 131 (1990). 

We agree with this interpretation of Torres. In the present 

case, Doran and McCoy filed their docketing statement within the 

time limit for filing a notice of appeal. This document indicates 

the parties filing the appeal are "Defendants/Appellants, Tim 

Doran and Alan McCoy." The filing of the docketing statement 

cures the defect in the notice of appeal. 

This case is distinguishable from our recent decision in 

Laidley Y...!.. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990). There, we 

concluded the docketing statement could not cure a defect in the 

notice because it was filed after the time for filing a notice of 

appeal had expired. We pointed out that filing a late docketing 

statement to cure a defective notice is no different than untimely 

filing an adequate notice of appeal. See id. at 1389; see also 

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Santos-Martinez :Y:.!.. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 176 (1st Cir. 

1988) (no jurisdiction when defective notice of appeal not cured); 

cf. Pride :Y:.!.. Venango River Corp., 916 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 

1990) (refusing to consider any document functional equivalent of 

notice of appeal). Unlike the situation in Laidley, Doran and 

McCoy filed a docketing statement containing the information 

required by Rule 3(c) before the deadline for filing a notice of 

appeal had passed. We find no bar to our jurisdiction over Doran 

and McCoy's appeal. 

Doran and McCoy contend the question of probable cause was 

determined conclusively in the criminal proceeding and no genuine 

issue of material fact remains for the district court to 

determine. In reviewing a court's denial of a motion for summary 

judgment, we apply the same standard that the district court used 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Weir :Y:.!.. Anaconda 

Co., 773 F.2d 1073, 1079 (10th Cir. 1985). We examine the record 

in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to ascertain 

whether any genuine issue of material fact remains and, if not, 

whether the lower court correctly applied the substantive law. 

Franks :Y:.!.. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1986). We review 

de novo the legal question whether collateral estoppel bars 

relitigation of the issue of probable cause in a subsequent civil 

action. See,~, Devargas :Y:.!.. Montaya, 796 F.2d 1245, 1248 

(10th Cir. 1986). 

In Allen :Y:.!.. Mccurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980), the Supreme 

Court held a federal court considering a section 1983 action must 

give preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same 

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Appellate Case: 89-6333 Document: 010110015397 Date Filed: 01/09/1991 Page: 9 
extent a court in that state would. Because the preclusive effect 

of a prior state court judgment is defined by that state's law, 

~, ~, Thournir Y.:.. Meyer, 803 F.2d 1093, 1094 (10th Cir. 

1986);' Carpenter Y.:.. Reed, 757 F.2d 218, 219 (10th Cir. 1985); 

Slayton Y.:.. Willingham, 726 F.2d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1984), we must 

turn to Oklahoma law to determine whether a probable cause finding 

in a criminal proceeding resulting in an acquittal collaterally 

estops consideration of that issue in a civil case. 

In a recent decision, Adamson Y.:.. Dayton Hudson Corp., 774 

P.2d 478 (Okla. App. 1989), the Oklahoma Civil Court of Appeals 

considered the preclusive effect of a prior finding of probable 

cause. In Adamson, the plaintiff brought a civil action for false 

arrest after having been detained by a security guard at a 

department store. At a preliminary hearing, the court found there 

was probable cause to believe the plaintiff had committed the 

crime of larceny. She was tried and acquitted. In the subsequent 

action for false arrest, the plaintiff claimed the security guard 

did not have probable cause to detain her. Id. at 479. The court 

held the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

question of probable cause at the preliminary hearing and was thus 

estopped from relitigating the issue in the civil suit. Id. at 

480. The court noted "a finding of probable cause was not only 

necessary to bind Plaintiff over for trial, but a requirement 

which must be met by affirmative evidence." Id. 

The Adamson decision is consistent with the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court's decision in Lee Y.:.. Knight, 771 P.2d 1003 (Okla. 1989). In 

Lee, the court held the parties in a civil action are collaterally 

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estopped from relitigating issues that are conclusively determined 

in a prior criminal proceeding resulting in a conviction. Id. at 

1006. Because we read the Adamson decision as a logical extension 

of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's holding in Lee, we are convinced 

the question of probable cause is conclusively determined at a 

preliminary hearing when the parties have had a full and fair 

opportunity to litigate that issue. See Adamson, 774 P.2d at 480; 

see also Mccurry, 449 U.S. at 95 (collateral estoppel cannot apply 

when party did not have full and fair opportunity to litigate 

issue). We reject the district court's argument that Lee allows 

preclusion on the issue of probable cause only when the case 

results in a conviction. Whether the jury eventually convicts the 

defendant of the crime has no bearing on the question whether the 

officer had probable cause to make the arrest. We conclude the 

Adamson opinion correctly states Oklahoma law on the preclusive 

effect of a probable cause finding at a preliminary hearing. 

The Hubberts contend an issue of material fact remains about 

whether they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the 

question of probable cause at the preliminary hearing because the 

hearing was "tainted" by false or misleading testimony by the 

arresting officers. Our review of the record, however, reveals no 

genuine dispute about whether Mrs. Hubbert had an opportunity to 

fully and fairly litigate the issue. Her counsel had ample 

opportunity to present evidence, review evidence the prosecution 

presented, and cross-examine the witnesses against her. We hold 

no genuine issue of material fact remains because probable cause 

was fully and fairly litigated in the prior criminal proceeding 

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and cannot be relitigated in this civil action. We conclude Doran 

and McCoy had probable cause to make the arrest and thus are 

entitled to qualified immunity from liability in the Hubberts' 

section 1983 action, see Harlow Y...!.. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 

(1982); Jones Y...!.. City and County of Denver, Colorado, 854 F.2d 

1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1988). We therefore REVERSE the district 

court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

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