Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02260/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Thomas Alfred Brydon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2260

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Thomas Alfred Brydon, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 2, 2007

Filed: April 10, 2007

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Thomas Alfred Brydon (Brydon) challenges the 210-month sentence imposed

by the district court1

 following his guilty plea to conspiracing to manufacture

methamphetamine. He argues the district court erred by treating him as a career

offender and declining to sentence him below his advisory United States Sentencing

Guidelines range based on his extraordinary post-offense, pre-arrest rehabilitation.

Appellate Case: 06-2260 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297146
-2-

We disagree. The district court correctly concluded Brydon qualified as a

career offender based on his Iowa felony convictions for conspiring to deliver a

controlled substance and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent. See

U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (stating a defendant is a career offender if the defendant “has at

least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled

substance offense”); United States v. Lindquist, 421 F.3d 751, 755 (8th Cir. 2005)

(concluding an Iowa offense for operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent is a

crime of violence for purposes of the career-offender enhancement).

To the extent Brydon challenges the district court’s refusal to depart from the

applicable advisory Guidelines range, that matter is unreviewable because the court

recognized its authority to depart but simply found Brydon’s rehabilitation was not

sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure, and further, that departure would run

afoul of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Lynch,

477 F.3d 993, 998 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Van Zee, 373 F.3d 869, 870 (8th

Cir. 2004) (holding discretionary decision not to grant departure is not reviewable

unless the record shows the court failed to recognize its authority to depart or had an

unconstitutional motive). As to the reasonableness of the sentence, the district court

fully and explicitly considered the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in

imposing Brydon’s sentence and fashioned a sentence reflective of those factors. See

United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2005) (explaining an

unreasonable sentence may be exhibited by the district court’s failure to consider a

relevant factor, by undue reliance on irrelevant factor, or by a clear error of judgment).

For these reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2260 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/10/2007 Entry ID: 3297146