Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00283/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cr-00283-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Marvin Ballard
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES of AMERICA

Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN MARVIN BALLARD

Defendant.

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05-cr-00168-JCC

06-cr-00283-JCC

ORDER

On December 4, 2007, the Court heard argument on defendant

John Ballard's motions: 

1. to dismiss the superseding indictment in case number

06-cr-00283 for improper influence of the grand jury, 

2. to unseal the grand jury record for the indictment, 

3. to strike surplusage from the indictment, 

4. to dismiss the indictment because Ballard is factually

innocent, 

5. to dismiss the indictment because the probation

officer's instructions were illegal, 

6. to dismiss the alleged violation of supervised release

in case number 05-cr-00168 because the probation

officer's instructions were illegal, and 

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7. to suppress defendant’s statements to the probation

officer because they were compelled in violation of the

Fifth Amendment. 

Jan David Karowsky appeared on behalf of John Ballard;

Samuel Wong appeared for the government. 

In an order dated December 12, 2007, the Court denied

Ballard’s motions to dismiss the indictment for improper

influence of the grand jury, to unseal the grand jury record, and

to strike surplusage from the indictment. 

Following further argument on January 7, 2008, and having

considered the arguments of counsel, the papers submitted, the

applicable law, and the record in this case, the Court now DENIES

Ballard’s remaining motions: to dismiss the indictment because

Ballard is factually innocent; to dismiss the indictment and the

supervised release violations because the probation officer’s

instructions were illegal; and to suppress Ballard statements.

I. BACKGROUND

In case number Cr. S-99-050 John Ballard was convicted by a

jury of interstate travel for the purposes of having sex with a

minor. In November, 2001, he was sentenced to 63 months

imprisonment and three years of supervised release. During the

term of his supervised release, in July, 2003, he made false

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statements to his probation officer, for which he was indicted

and convicted in case number Cr. S-05-168. On February 17, 2006,

he was sentenced to 15 months incarceration and a term of

supervised release of 36 months in that case. The same “Standard

Conditions” of supervised release which had been imposed in Cr.

S-99-050 were again imposed in Cr. S-05-168. Conditions 2 and 3

of the “Standard Conditions” read as follows:

2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer

and shall submit a truthful and complete written report

within the first five days of each month;

3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries

by the probation officer and follow instructions of the

probation officer.

Ballard was released from custody on May 26, 2006. He was

flown directly to Sacramento where probation officers met him at

the airport terminal. At his request he was taken directly to

the probation office where he was advised of the terms of his

probation. Ballard was then transported to a local facility

called the Parolee Transitional Living Center (PTLC) where he was

instructed to reside until he could find a suitable alternative.

Ballard had requested that he live with his mother, whose

residence is in the Sacramento area. Based on Ballard’s prior

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criminal history, the probation office determined that Ballard

should not live with his mother. As Ballard was without

financial or other resources to procure alternative housing the

only immediately available housing was at the PTLC. 

Probation also determined that Ballard required strict

supervision of his daily activities. Standard Conditions of

Supervision numbers 2 and 3 require the probationer to regularly

report to the probation officer and to follow the officer’s

instructions and answer the officer’s questions truthfully. 

Pursuant to these two conditions, probation required Ballard to

plan his activities on a weekly basis with the officer and to

keep a written journal, updated daily, of all his activities for

the officer’s review. In addition, the officer required Ballard

to report to her on a daily basis. The same conditions had been

imposed during Ballard’s previous term of supervised release in

July, 2003. Ballard stated that he understood these conditions.

During Ballard’s first week at PTLC his probation officer

allowed him to go to each outside destination he requested. On

Friday, May 26, 2006, Ballard requested and was granted

permission to attend mass on Sunday, May 28. That Sunday, on the

way back from mass, Ballard stopped at McDonald’s for lunch. 

This particular restaurant has a playground frequented by

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children. According to Ballard he was there for two minutes,

just long enough to pick up a to-go order. Ballard met with the

officer on May 30, and did not mention that he had stopped at

McDonald’s on May 28, an activity neither planned nor approved,

nor did he disclose the event in his journal.

On May 31, Ballard visited a public library where he checked

out a book on child sexual psychology entitled Harmful to Minors:

the Perils of Protecting Children From Sex. In his journal entry

for that day, he reported that he visited the library, and that

he had reserved a novel entitled Plum Island, but made no

disclosure in his journal of checking out the psychology book.

On June 1, 2006, Ballard informed the officer that he was

planning to go to a facility called Primary Care. The officer

advised against the trip because of how long it would take if

Ballard did not arrive first thing in the morning, but the

officer did not otherwise object and Ballard decided to go. As

the time approached for Ballard’s return to PTLC the officer went

to the Primary Care facility to check on Ballard’s progress

there. When the officer found Ballard, he had a shopping bag

from a Tower Bookstore. The officer directed Ballard to wait in

the Primary Care lobby while the officer reviewed the contents of

the bag. Ballard went inside, but when the officer entered the

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facility a few minutes later, Ballard could not be found.

In the bag the officer found the library book on child

sexual psychology, a fashion magazine for children entitled Vogue

Bambini, and the Sacramento News & Review. The probation officer

then went to the nearby Tower Bookstore and reviewed the security

camera video tape which depicted Ballard purchasing the

periodicals. Further investigation revealed that the psychology

book had been checked out of the library the previous day on May

31.

Ballard called to advise that he was done at Primary Care

and was returning to PTLC. The officer met Ballard there and

searched Ballard’s possessions at PTLC. Among those possessions

were lists of sex offenders, websites for children’s movies,

magazine photos of children, newspaper clippings, correspondence

with another sex offender, and a list of dispositions for other

sex offenders’ cases. Ballard was instructed to complete his

journal entry for the day and submit the journal to the officer. 

The journal entry did not include the stop at Tower Bookstore or

the purchases made there.

Ballard was arrested on June 7, 2006, for violating the

terms of his supervised release. The Form 12 supporting the

arrest charged five violations: (1) On May 28, 2006, Ballard did

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not follow the officer’s instructions when he stopped at

McDonald’s on the way back from mass; (2) On June 1, 2006,

Ballard did not follow the officer’s instructions when he went to

Tower Bookstore; (3) Ballard made false statements to the

officer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(3), when he omitted

the McDonald’s stop from his journal entry of May 28, 2006; (4)

Ballard made false statements to the officer when he omitted his

acquisition of the child sexual psychology book from his journal

entry of May 31, 2006; (5) Ballard made false statements to the

officer when he omitted the stop at Tower Bookstore from his

journal entry of June 1, 2006. 

On July 13, 2006, Ballard was indicted in case Cr. S-06-283

for the alleged false statements which had been charged in the

Form 12. Following an initial hearing on Ballard’s challenges to

the indictment, a two-count superseding indictment was returned

on September 6, 2007. Count One alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1001, charging that Ballard did not report in his journal that

he went to the library to check out the book on child sexual

psychology, instead reporting only that he went to the public

library to reserve Plum Island when in fact he went there to

check out the book on child sexual psychology. Count Two also

alleges an 18 U.S.C. § 1001 violation, charging that Ballard did

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not report in his journal that he had purchased a children’s

fashion magazine from Tower Bookstore.

As already described the Court dismissed three of Ballard’s

motions on December 12, 2007. The remaining four motions are now

before the Court.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Factual Innocence

An indictment returned by a lawful grand jury is valid on

its face and is enough to compel a trial of the charges on the

merits. United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992). A

party may raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or

request that the court can determine without a trial of the

general issue. Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2). 

In a pretrial motion under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 12(b)(2), the Court is not to consider evidence which

does not appear on the face of the indictment. United States v.

Jensen, 93 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1995). A motion to dismiss

the indictment cannot be used as a device for a summary trial of

the evidence. Id. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do

not provide for a pre-trial consideration of the available

evidence like the summary judgment procedure in Rule 56 of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id (citing United States v.

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Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 307 (11th Cir. 1992)). A defendant is

entitled to a trial on the charges of the indictment but not to a

pre-trial finding of factual innocence. See Jensen, 93 F.3d at

669. 

B. Power of the Probation Officer

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3603, Congress has granted probation

officers broad statutory authority to supervise offenders and to

enforce a sentencing court's terms and conditions of supervised

release and probation. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876,

880 (9th Cir. 2005). Where the court makes the determination of

whether a defendant must abide by a condition, it is permissible

to delegate to the probation officer the details of where and

when the condition will be satisfied. Id. A probation officer

may not decide the nature or extent of the punishment imposed

upon a probationer because the Constitution, under the Article

III power over "cases and controversies," reserves for the court

the right to impose punishment provided by law. Id at 881

(citing United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 241, 250 (3d Cir. 2005)

and Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916)).

C. Fifth Amendment Right to Remain Silent

Under the Fifth Amendment, if an individual is subjected to

a practice that denies him a free choice to admit, deny, or to

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refuse to answer, then any statement he makes is considered

involuntary and cannot be used in a criminal proceeding. Garner

v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 657 (1976)(citing Lisenba v.

California, 314 U.S. 219, 241 (1941)). The Ninth Circuit has

held that a probationer who provides incriminating information to

his probation officer in response to questions from that officer,

and does so pursuant to a probation condition that requires him

to “promptly and truthfully answer all reasonable inquiries” from

the officer or face a revocation of his probation, is “compelled”

to give incriminating evidence within the meaning of the Fifth

Amendment. United States v. Saechao, 418 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.

2005). However, proper invocation of the Fifth Amendment

privilege against compulsory self-incrimination allows a witness

to remain silent, but not to swear falsely. Brogan v. United

States, 522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) (citing United States v.

Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 117 (1980)).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Factual Innocence

Ballard argues that he is factually innocent of the

violations alleged in the indictment. He argues that he did not

conceal the fact that he checked out the book on child sexual

psychology nor the fact that he purchased the magazine because he

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in fact revealed those facts when he surrendered the book and

magazine to the officer.

As to the count related to the magazine, the factual

circumstances recited appear to raise a serious doubt as to

whether the government can show an intent on Ballard’s part to

conceal the fact that he purchased the magazine. It seems

instead to support a conclusion that he was well aware, at the

time he made his journal entry, that the officer knew he had

purchased the magazine. The factual circumstances relevant to

the knowledge of the officer, however, come chiefly from the Form

12 descriptions of the alleged supervised release violation and

not from the indictment. The facts related to the recovery of

the shopping bag and its contents do not appear in the

superseding indictment. As such the Court may not consider them

on pretrial motion. See Jensen, 93 F.3d at 669. It may well be

that if those are the facts established at trial, that the

government's case may fail in the face of a Rule 29 motion. At

this stage, however, the Court may not dismiss the indictment

which is valid on its face. See Williams, 504 U.S. at 54.

As to the count related to the library book, Ballard’s

concealment argument is inapposite as his journal entry failing

to disclose his acquisition of the book was made before probation

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had any knowledge of the book. In any event, the facts relied

upon by Ballard are extrinsic to the indictment and the Court may

not dismiss in the face of a valid indictment. See id.

B. Legality of Probation Officer's Directions

Ballard argues that the probation officer's strict reporting

instructions were effectively a punishment imposed by the

probation officer and not by the court, contrary to Article III. 

See Stephens, 424 F.3d at 881 (holding that the sentencing court

could not delegate to the probation officer the number of drug

tests to which the defendant must submit). According to Ballard

the reporting instructions functioned very much like the drug

test in Stephens in that, like the drug tests, stringent

reporting put Ballard in jeopardy of a new prosecution, as

demonstrated by the original indictment in which he was charged

for failing to mention in his journal that he stopped at

MacDonald's for take-out and for failing to mention that he had

purchased a magazine. Cf. id at 883. The number of reports

Ballard was required to make, so his argument goes, should have

been determined by the court, not by the probation officer.

In response the government argues that the power of the

probation officer "cannot be overstated." The standard

conditions of supervised release and 18 U.S.C. § 3603 provide

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ample authority to justify the probation officer's instructions

for Ballard.

One distinction between Stephens and this case is that drug

testing is a mandatory condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3563. See id

at 883. Section 3563 explicitly requires that the drug testing

be ordered by the court. Time and manner of reporting to the

probation officer is not mandated by statute, and the conditions

of that reporting are not assigned by statute to the court for

determination. Another distinction is that the reporting

requirements, unlike drug testing, represent the core of the

relationship between the probation officer and the defendant. 

Either of these distinctions is sufficient to justify

forbearance on the Court's part from extending the rule of

Stephens to the reporting requirements of a person on supervised

release. Requiring the probation officer to seek the Court's

micro-management of a condition as basic as reporting to the

officer would not only be practically untenable but also

undermine Congress's intention in § 3603 to bestow upon the

probation officer "broad ... authority to supervise offenders and

to enforce a sentencing court's terms and conditions of

supervised release." Id at 880. The reporting requirements that

the probation officer imposed on Ballard were justified by law. 

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His motions to dismiss the supervised release violations and the

superseding indictment for the illegality of those requirements

must be denied. 

C. Motion to Suppress Ballard's Statement

Ballard relies on Saechao to argue that when he made the

culpable statements he was under a classic penalty situation. 

See Saechao, 418 F.3d at 1075. Unfortunately, Ballard

misinterprets Saechao.

Saechao makes inadmissible a defendant’s inculpatory

statements where the defendant’s silence will be met with a

penalty. See id. However, Saechao cannot be read to extend to a

defendant’s false material statements. In contrast, the Supreme

Court has expressed quite explicitly that the Fifth Amendment

will not protect a defendant from his own lies. See Brogan, 522

U.S. at 404-405. Brogan can likewise be distinguished from

Ballard’s case in that Brogan was not in the kind of penalty

situation Ballard faced. Cf. id.

Moreover, Ballard’s penalty situation is not the same as

Saechao. Ballard’s truthful answer would not clearly have

resulted in a penalty. Cf. Saechao, 418 F.3d at 1075 (where the

defendant admitted possessing a rifle after having been convicted

of a felony). Had Ballard told the truth, questions as to his

conditions of supervised release might have been raised, but he

would not have admitted the commission of a separate crime. At

best, the probation officer might have been better able to

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oversee Ballard’s rehabilitation. The false answer that Ballard

gave simply thwarted the probation officer in her duties without

saving Ballard from any self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment

cannot be used to protect Ballard from his false statements, only

from his inculpatory honesty. See id and Brogan, 522 U.S. at

404. His statements cannot be suppressed.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Ballard's motions to dismiss

the indictment and the supervised release violations and to

suppress his statements are DENIED. The Court cannot dismiss an

indictment that is valid on its face. The probation officer’s

instructions to Ballard were authorized by law and the standard

conditions of Ballard’s supervised release. The Fifth Amendment

cannot be used to protect Ballard from his own dishonesty.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: January 23, 2008 By 

D. LOWELL JENSEN

United States District Judge

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