Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06271/USCOURTS-ca10-94-06271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Cruz
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

FILED 

United States Cout·t or Appekll Tenth Circuit 

JUN20 1995. 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. No. 94-6271 

RICHARD CRUZ, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Western District of Oklahoma 

D.C. No. CR-94-46-C 

Jay F. McCown, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Edward J. Kumiega (Rozia McKinney-Foster, United States Attorney, 

with him on the brief), Assistant U.S. Attorney, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and BROWN, 

Senior District Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Wesley E. Brown, Senior District Judge for the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting 

by designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 1 
This appeal presents only one question: did the district 

court find facts at the time of sentencing sufficient to support a 

sentence of 60 months? The crime of conviction was conspiracy to 

introduce a prohibited object into a federal prison. Because of 

the confluence of statutory and sentencing guidelines criteria, to 

sentence the defendant to 60 months under the facts of this case, 

it was necessary for the district court to conclude the defendant 

believed the prohibited object was heroin. Although the district 

court carefully viewed the evidence and developed three distinct 

rationales for its holding, our reflective examination of the 

record leads us to believe there is a gap in the court's findings 

that deprives its conclusion of support. We therefore remand for 

resentencing. 

At the time the 

Richard Cruz had been 

underlying 

employed by 

events took place, defendant 

the Bureau of Prisons for 

fourteen years, serving the last seven years as a correctional 

counselor. Fernando Orozco Londono was an inmate at the Federal 

Correctional Institution at El Reno, Oklahoma, serving a 324-month 

sentence for drug crimes. Mr. Cruz was Mr. Orozco's counselor at 

El Reno. 

Mr. Cruz was arrested and charged as the result of an FBI 

sting operation. The sting was organized by FBI agent Herman 

Nichols, the investigator in the government crimes unit assigned 

to El Reno. Agent Nichols was informed by an El Reno inmate that 

Mr. Orozco was willing to bring heroin into the prison via his 

outside contact, Maria Martinez, and Mr. Cruz. That informant 

assisted in the sting by placing an "order" for two ounces of 

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heroin with Mr. Orozco, asking him to receive drugs and cash that 

were to be provided by one of the informant's associates outside 

prison. The FBI arranged for an undercover agent, Jose Contreras, 

to pose as the informant's associate and provide $1,500 cash and 

two ounces of simulated heroin to Ms. Martinez. Mr. Orozco spoke 

with Ms. Martinez on the phone several times, instructing her how 

to receive and deliver the drugs. 

Meanwhile, as counselor and inmate, Mr. Cruz and Mr. Orozco 

had regular contact at El Reno. Mr. Cruz testified that Mr. 

Orozco asked him to bring two Christmas gifts from Mr. Orozco's 

children, referring to the gifts as "nifias." The nifias were to be 

delivered to Mr. Cruz by Ms. Martinez. Mr. Orozco provided Mr. 

Cruz with the address and telephone ·number of a Days Inn in 

Oklahoma City, an airline flight number on which Ms. Martinez 

would arrive, and ·the name Francisco Franco.1 This information 

was written on a white slip of paper later found in Mr. Cruz' 

possession. Also in his possession was a yellow slip of paper 

with the name Fabiola Orozco, Mr. Orozco's mother, and the figure 

$500. 

Ms. Martinez flew from her home in Texas to Oklahoma City on 

the specified flight. Mr. Cruz met Ms. Martinez at the Days Inn 

on December 16 before Mr. Contreras made the delivery. Ms. 

Martinez and Mr. Cruz drove in Mr. Cruz' truck to a restaurant and 

1 It is not clear from the record to whom this refers. The 

government stated at oral argument and in.its brief this was the 

name of the undercover agent. However, in the record the agent is 

referred to as Jose Contreras. We can only infer the two names 

are aliases. 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 3 
then to a convenience store to make a telephone call. The 

telephones at the Days Inn were not operating that night. Ms. 

Martinez called Mr. Contreras, informing him her contact had 

arrived and she was ready for the delivery. Mr. Contreras asked 

to talk to Mr. Cruz, but Ms. Martinez stated Mr. Cruz refused to 

come to the telephone. Ms. Martinez and Mr. Cruz returned to the 

Days Inn, then Mr. Cruz departed. Later than night, Mr. Contreras 

delivered the money and putative drugs to Ms. Martinez. The 

putative drugs consisted of two heat sealed packets, packaged to 

resemble heroin, but actually containing talcum powder. Pursuant 

to Mr. Orozco's instructions, Ms. Martinez wrapped the packets as 

Christmas presents with decorative paper and tape. In his phone 

calls from prison, Mr. Orozco told Ms. Martinez to wrap the 

packages tightly so the carrier (Mr. Cruz) would not be tempted to 

open and use them himself, which Mr. Orozco referred to as "eating 

the caramel." He also instructed Ms. Martinez to tell Mr. Cruz 

not to open the nifias, "And say that's an order from the top man 

in San Diego." 

The next day, Mr. Cruz told Mr. Orozco he had met Ms. 

Martinez but she did not have the nifias. Mr. Orozco told him to 

go back again that night. Mr. Cruz later returned to the Days Inn 

as instructed. Ms. Martinez gave him a paper. sack containing two 

bottles of Vicks Vaporub and some chewing gum. In Mr. Cruz' 

presence, she took an envelope out of her purse. It was open and 

he could see it contained the two nifias. Ms. Martinez dropped the 

envelope in the sack. Mr. Cruz and Ms. Martinez did not discuss 

the contents of the ninas. However, Ms. Martinez stated Mr. Cruz 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 4 
would have understood what the nifias contained from the context of 

their conversation. Immediately upon leaving the motel with the 

paper sack, 

were seized. 

Mr. Cruz was arrested. The sack and its contents 

The evidence at sentencing included the testimony of Mr. Cruz 

and Mr. Orozco, along with that of Agent Nichols and two El Reno 

employees. The testimony included descriptions of 11 302's 11 

reports of the FBI interviews with Mr. Cruz and Ms. Martinez 

and recitations of transcribed, recorded telephone conversations 

between Mr. Orozco and Ms. Martinez. 

There was conflicting testimony about what Mr. Cruz believed 

the contents of the nifias to be. Mr. Orozco testified he offered 

Mr. Cruz $1,000 to pick up the nifias, -and he told Mr. Cruz the 

nifias contained heroin. Mr. Cruz denied being offered $1,000 and 

said he did not know what was in the nifias. Richard Sanchez, a 

fellow correctional counselor at El Reno, testified Mr. Orozco 

stated Mr. Cruz did not know the contents of the nifias. When 

confronted with his interview statement to Agent Nichols that Mr. 

Orozco had offered him $1,000, Mr. Cruz replied Agent Nichols must 

have misunderstood him. He testified Mr. Orozco had once jokingly 

offered him $1,000 to use the telephone at the prison. Mr. Cruz 

stated Mr. Orozco told him he did not need to know what was in the 

nifias. 

By his own admission, Mr. Cruz had previously delivered 

contraband to Mr. Orozco. Mr. Cruz and Mr. Orozco gave 

conflicting testimony about the exact nature of this contraband, 

but it undisputedly included clothing; and Mr. Orozco testified it 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 5 
included watches as well. The items were sent to Mr. Cruz' post 

office box by Ms. Martinez. Mr. Cruz was able to deliver the 

items to Mr. Orozco with impunity because, as a correctional 

counselor, he was not subject to search upon entering the prison. 

In return, Mr. Orozco gave Mr. Cruz some of the items. 

As a counselor, Mr. Cruz was well acquainted with Mr. Orozco 

and knew he was imprisoned on a serious drug charge. Mr. Cruz 

had been trained not to get too close to inmates and not to do 

favors for them including bringing anything into the prison. This 

was referred to at hearing as the 11 prime directive 11 of 

correctional counselor training. Mr. Cruz stated he had become 

friendly with Mr. Orozco, he was drawn in by Mr. Orozco, and 

agreed he should have known better than to comply with Mr. 

Orozco's request. 

Mr. Cruz was .initially indicted on three counts of federal 

drug charges. Pursuant to a written plea agreement, the 

indictment was dismissed, and Mr. Cruz pled guilty to a 

superseding information consisting of one count of conspiracy to 

provide contraband to an inmate in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1791. 

Under the terms of the plea agreement, the sentencing court was to 

hold an evidentiary hearing to determine Mr. Cruz' sentence. That 

sentence turned upon what Mr. Cruz believed the contents of the 

nifias to be.2 

2 The parties implicitly agree the determination of the 11 prohibited object 11 in this context turns upon the object Mr. Cruz 

believed he was providing, not the object actually provided. This 

comports with the actus reus of the conspiracy crime, which is the 

agreement, and not the actual commission of the crime. See United 

States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 510 (lOth Cir. 1993) (legal 

impossibility not a defense to conspiracy) . 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 6 
Following the hearing, the district court determined Mr. Cruz 

believed the nifias contained heroin. The court sentenced him to 

60 months' imprisonment. This appeal followed. 

We review the application of the sentencing guidelines de 

novo. United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419 (lOth Cir. 

1992) . However; evidentiary determinations of the district court 

at a sentencing hearing are reviewed for clear error. United 

States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1562-63 (lOth Cir. 1990). Here, 

Mr. Cruz challenges the district court's factual finding he 

believed the nifias contained heroin. Therefore, we review the 

issue on appeal for clear error. When reviewing a challenge to 

the sufficiency of evidence underlying the district court's 

sentence, we view the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in 

the light most favorable to the district court's determination.3 

The issue in this appeal rests upon the interplay between the 

federal criminal code and the sentencing guidelines. Although the 

issue is straightforward, the underlying statutory scheme is 

3 This Circuit has not articulated this tenet of evidentiary 

construction on review within the sentencing context. However, it 

is used in other contexts when the district court's findings are 

reviewed for clear error. See, e.g., United States v. UribeGalindo, 990 F.2d 522, 523 (lOth Cir. 1993) (motion to suppress); 

~omdng Wildlife Federation v. United States, 792 F.2d 981, 984 

(lOth Cir. 1986) (determining prevailing party under the Equal 

Access to Justice Act) . It is also used to review the sufficiency 

of evidence for guilty verdicts. See, e.g., United States v. 

Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 7 
complex. Mr. Cruz pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, 

which provides: 

If two or more persons conspire . . . to commit any 

offense against the United States . . . and one or more 

of such persons do any act to effect the object of the 

conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or 

imprisoned not more than five years, or both. 

Mr. Cruz was charged with conspiring with Ms. Martinez and Mr. 

Orozco to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a) (1), which states: 

Whoever . . . in violation of a statute or a rule or 

order issued under a statute, provides to an inmate of a 

prison a prohibited object, or attempts to do so ... 

shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this 

section. 

The statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1791, and the related sentencing 

guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2P1.2, have a parallel structure dividing 

the possible violations into subsections, .depending on the type of 

"prohibited object" involved. In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d) 

defines various prohibited objects, including controlled 

substances, firearms, currency, and "other" objects. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1791(b) sets forth the maximum sentence for each type of 

prohibited object, which ranges from 20 years for narcotic drugs 

to 6 months for "other" objects. Sentencing Guideline § 2P1.2 

sets forth the base offense level for each, which ranges from 

level 23 for a firearm to level 4 for "other" objects. Each type 

of prohibited object therefore corresponds to a substantive 

subsection of § 1791(d), a penalty subsection of § 1791(b), and a 

sentencing guideline subsection of § 2P1.2. Therefore, the 

particular subsection of § 1791(d) to which Mr. Cruz was pleading 

guilty depended on the outcome of the hearing. 

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Although U.S.S.G. § 2P1.2 specifies different offense levels 

for different prohibited objects, there is a cross-reference in 

the guideline that can take precedence over that differentiation. 

Guideline § 2P1.2 states: 

(c) Cross Reference 

(1) If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1791(a) (1) and is punishable under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1791(b) (1), the offense level is 2 plus the offense 

level from§ 2D1.1, but in no event less than level 26. 

It is undisputed that Mr. Cruz pled guilty to a count of providing 

a prohibited object under § 1791(a) (1). However, the crossreference applies only if the defendant is punishable under 

§ 1791(b) (1). Subsection (b) (1) corresponds to the prohibited 

objects enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d) (1) (C). T,hese include 

narcotic drugs, one of which is heroin. 21 U.S.C. § 802(17). 

The cross-reference in § 2P1.2 directs the court to add 2 

levels to the base offense level in § 2D1.1. The cross-reference 

also specifies a minimum level of 26. In this case, the minimum 

applies. Section 2D1.1 is the guideline section used to sentence 

drug crimes. It, in turn, refers to a detailed table listing 

quantities and types of drugs with their corresponding offense 

levels. The table specifies an offense level of 20 for 2 ounces, 

or 56.70 grams, of heroin. Therefore, the minimum offense level 

of 26 takes precedence over the cross-reference. 

Guideline § 2P1.2 also provides: 

(b) Specific Offense ~haracteristic 

(1) If the defendant was 

correctional officer or employee, 

Department of Justice, at the 

increase by 2 levels. 

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a law enforcement or 

or an employee of the 

time of the offense, 

Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 9 
The increase of 2 levels under § 2P1.2(b) for being a 

correctional officer 

object involved. The 

increase. 

does not 

district 

turn upon the type of prohibited 

court correctly applied this 

Thus, the correct offense level, based on the conclusion Mr. 

Cruz believed the nifias contained heroin, was 28. The sentence 

range for level 28 (with Mr. Cruz' criminal history category of 1) 

is 78 to 97 months. U.S.S.G. Ch.5, Pt.A, Sentencing Table. 

However, the statutory maximum for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 371 is 5 years. This maximum limits the sentence to 5 years, 

notwithstanding the statutory maximum of 20 years for heroin under 

18 U.S.C. § 1791(b). Because both the minimum (78 month$) and the 

maximum (97 months) for the applicable offense level of 28 are 

above the statutory maximum for the crime, the court applied the 

statutory maximum and not the sentencing guideline range. Based 

on its determination Mr. Cruz believed the nifias contained heroin, 

the court correctly applied the statutes and guidelines and 

sentenced Mr. Cruz to 60 months. 

Because of the interplay between statutory maximum sentences 

and the sentencing guidelines, a spectrum of sentences could have 

resulted from the sentencing hearing. Of course, it is neither 

practical nor necessary for us to enumerate all the possibilities. 

However, we note that if the prohibited object in question is not 

heroin, the cross-reference in the sentencing guideline may not 

apply. 

The remaining question, and the subject of this appeal, is 

whether the court had adequate evidence before it to support its 

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Appellate Case: 94-6271 Document: 01019279859 Date Filed: 06/20/1995 Page: 10 
conclusion Mr. Cruz believed the nifias contained heroin. The 

prosecution bears the burden to prove facts underlying sentencing 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Rutter, 897 F.2d at 1560. 

The district court found Mr. Cruz believed the nifias 

contained heroin based on three independent rationales. The court 

found that if Mr. Orozco's testimony were true, there was a 

preponderance of evidence proving Mr. Cruz believed the nifias to 

contain heroin. If Mr. Orozco's testimony were not true, there 

was enough circumstantial evidence of the same fact. Finally, if 

Mr. Cruz did not know the contents of the nifias, his deliberate 

ignorance gave him constructive knowledge of their contents. 

Mr. Cruz conceded at oral argument that if Mr. Orozco 

credibly testified he told Mr. Cruz the nifias contained heroin, 

our inquiry is at an end. However, he argued the district court 

failed to make an explicit finding of credibility. The government 

responded that we may infer such a finding of credibility because 

Rule 52 directs us to give deference to the district court's 

opportunity to judge witness credibility, and Mr. Orozco's 

credibility is an inference favorable to the district court's 

findings. Even so, the issue must turn on the district court's 

expressed findings. At sentencing, the district court stated Mr. 

Orozco's testimony was inconsistent with that of other witnesses, 

and the court disbelieved "Mr. Orozco's version of the events." 

Although this is not an explicit finding that Mr. Orozco lacked 

credibility, it is equivocal, thus depriving us of the ability to 

infer the court found Mr. Orozco credible. Moreover, because the 

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district court believed there was sufficient circumstantial 

evidence that Mr. Cruz knew what was in the packages, it 

specifically declined to make a determination as to Mr. Orozco's 

credibility in asserting he told Mr. Cruz about the heroin. 

In the alternative, the district court concluded there was 

enough circumstantial evidence of Mr. Cruz' belief to support the 

district court's finding. We observe at the outset there is 

little question Mr. Cruz believed he was providing more than gum 

and mentholated chest rub. The government points out no one would 

pay $1,000 for such items. Indeed, Agent Nichols testified those 

items would be worth no more than $30 inside the prison. In 

addition, the government points out there would be no need for Mr. 

Cruz to make two stops at a motel to pick up Christmas presents 

from Mr. Orozco's children. Mr. Cruz claims his first trip was 

only to take Ms. Martinez out to eat. However, Mr. Cruz does not 

explain why he believed Ms. Martinez would not have the nifias, 

which she presumably brought with her from the children in Texas. 

Ms. Martinez stated Mr. Cruz heard her part of the telephone 

conversation with Mr. Contreras and, therefore, would have 

inferred the nifias contained drugs. Mr. Cruz denied hearing the 

conversation. Finally, the record states the nifias felt like bags 

of powder underneath their wrapping, but there is no evidence Mr. 

Cruz ever handled them. 

The government further points out there would be no need to 

wrap the nifias carefully if the carrier did not know what was in 

them. Mr. Cruz counters the wrapping was designed to keep him 

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ignorant of the contents. Both these inferences are plausible, 

but Mr. Cruz may have been tempted to open the nifias even if he 

did not know their contents. The government further points out 

Mr. Cruz had received contraband for Mr. Orozco before and knew 

Mr. Orozco was in prison for drug crimes, and that Mr. Cruz was 

experiencing financial difficulties as a result of his recent 

divorce. Mr. Cruz responds his prior receipt of contraband 

implies he did not know the nifias contained drugs. When he 

received items for Mr. Orozco before, he carefully checked to 

ascertain they did not contain drugs. 

Finally, the government makes much of the slip of paper with 

Mr. Orozco's mother's name and the figure $500. The district 

court concluded this information "dovetails too conveniently" with 

the difference between the $1,000 promised to Mr. Cruz and the 

$1,500 given Ms. Martinez. However, Mr. Orozco's testimony 

regarding the planned disposition of the cash was far from 

consistent. He testified he offered Mr. Cruz $1,000 to deliver 

the nifias. He implied the remaining $500 was to be sent to or 

laundered through his mother, but Mr. Cruz' role in this 

undertaking is unspecified. Mr. Orozco also testified that Ms. 

Martinez, not Mr. Cruz, would send the money to Mr. Orozco's 

mother. At another point, Mr. Orozco testified the informant who 

placed the "order" for the heroin and cash would pay Mr. Cruz the 

$1,000. Mr. Orozco also testified the cash was to be delivered to 

the informant, rather than to Mr. Cruz or Mr. Orozco. If so, it 

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is unclear who would provide the $1,000 to Mr. Cruz. Moreover, 

none of the cash was actually given to Mr. Cruz, although Mr. 

Orozco testified Mr. Cruz was not to receive the cash until both 

nifias were separately delivered. Given all this possibly 

contradictory testimony from Mr. Orozco, along with the ambiguous 

statement of the district court, it is impossible to draw any 

clear inference on review from the notations on the slip of paper. 

In light of the evidence of record, we can draw only two 

inferences supporting the district court's finding. First, the 

court explicitly found Mr. Cruz was to receive $1,000 for his 

actions, based on the statements he made in his FBI interview and 

Mr. Cruz' lack of credibility in denying the contents of the 302. 

This was not a clearly erroneous finding. The evidence supports 

the inference Mr. Cruz knew the nifias contained something 

valuable. 

Second, Mr. Cruz refused to speak to Mr. Contreras. He made 

two stops to a motel to await the delivery of two purportedly 

innocuous Christmas gifts. Mr. Cruz had been trained that inmates 

may ask him to introduce controlled substances into 

Orozco was serving a sentence for drug crimes. 

prison. Mr. 

These facts 

support the inference Mr. Cruz knew the nifias contained a 

controlled substance. 

Without Mr. Orozco's testimony, these inferences taken 

together, only allowed the district court to conclude, at most, 

Mr. Cruz knew the nifias contained a valuable controlled substance. 

However, they do not allow the court to properly conclude Mr. Cruz 

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knew the nifias contained heroin. Indeed, the only evidence of 

which specific substance Mr. Cruz believed was in the nifias was 

the $1,000 he was offered to deliver them. However, the record 

contains no evidence of whicp controlled substances might fetch 

such a price. 

If Mr. Cruz merely believed the nifias contained a controlled 

substance, there could be a range of possible sentences, depending 

on the exact type of substance involved. As a result, the maximum 

sentence could be drastically reduced. For instance, if the 

prohibited object were a controlled substance defined under 18 

U.S.C. § 1791(d) (1) (D), it would be punishable by a maximum 

sentence of 1 year under § 1791(b) (4). Applying sentencing 

guideline§ 2P1.2(a) (3) yields a base offense level of 6, with an 

increase of 2 levels under§ 2P1.2(b), for a total offense level 

of 8. For a criminal history category of 1, this results in a 

sentence of 0 to 6 months. We further note this is the identical 

sentence range that would be due if Mr. Cruz merely intended to 

introduce gum into the. prison.4 

The court's third alternative rationale was deliberate 

ignorance. We need not linger long on this point because it does 

4 This is predicated upon a prohibited object defined under 18 

U.S.C. § 1791(d) (1) (F) ("other"), punishable by a maximum sentence 

of 6 months under § 1791(b) (5). Applying sentencing guideline 

§ 2P1.2(a) (4) yields a base offense level of 4, with an increase 

of 2 levels under§ 2P1.2(b), for a total offense level of 6. For 

a criminal history category of 1, this results in the identical 

sentence of 0 to 6 months. 

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not avoid the insufficiency problem in the second rationale. The 

court accurately cites United States v. de Francisco-Lopez, 939 

F.2d 1405, 1409 . (lOth Cir. 1991) (citations omitted), which 

describes deliberate ignorance as when "defendant was aware of a 

high probability of the existence of the fact in question and 

purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to 

have a defense in the event of a subsequent prosecuti"on." We need 

not reach the question, on which the parties focus, of whether or 

how Mr. Cruz should have taken steps to discover the contents of 

the niffas. In light of its unwillingness to rely on Mr. Orozco's 

testimony, the district court lacked sufficient evidence to 

conclude there was a "high probability" Mr. Cruz was aware the 

niffas contained the specific substance heroin. 

The government finally argues Ms. Martinez' belief the niffas 

contained heroin should be imputed to Mr. Cruz because the two 

were co-conspirators. The government cited no authority for this 

proposition, which it raised at oral argument. This proposition 

was not the basis for the district court's finding of fact. We 

therefore need not reach its merits. 

We conclude the findings made by the district court are 

insufficient to support the court's sentence of 60 months; 

therefore, that sentence is REVERSED. We REMAND this case to the 

district court for reexamination of the sentencing evidence in a 

manner it determines appropriate, or, in the exercise of its 

discretion, resentencing if the court concludes it can make no 

additional findings to resolve the problems described in this 

opinion. 

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