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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Javail Winston
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted March 10, 2010

Decided March 11, 2010

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 09‐1446

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

JAVAIL WINSTON,

Defendant‐Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 07 Cr 661‐1

George W. Lindberg,

Judge.

O R D E R

Javail Winston pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to one count of bank

robbery, admitting that a bank teller handed over $1,540 after he gave her a note threatening

to kill her if she refused.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  The district court sentenced him to 175

months’ imprisonment, well above his applicable guidelines range of 46 to 57 months.

Winston filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed lawyers have concluded that the case is

frivolous and seek to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  We

invited Winston to respond to counsel’s motion, though he did not.  See CIR. R. 51(b).

Because counsel’s brief is facially adequate, we limit our review to the potential issues he

has identified.  United States v. Cano‐Rodriguez, 552 F.3d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam);

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973‐74 (7th Cir. 2002).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 09‐1446 Page 2

This case marks Winston’s sixth bank robbery and tenth felony conviction.  Between

December 1980 and June 1981, Winston committed a series of four armed robberies yielding

four convictions, two each in federal and state court.  Winston added a fifth conviction, for

escape, after he fled the state courthouse following his sentencing for the bank robberies.

Even so, he was released from custody in October 1990, and about eight months later he

embarked on another crime spree, robbing two women and his fifth bank.  For the bank

robbery he was sentenced in federal court as a career offender to 168 months’

imprisonment, and for the other robberies he was sentenced in an Illinois court to a total of

11 years to run concurrently with the federal sentence.  After his release in 2004, Winston

was suspected of committing three additional bank robberies before he was arrested for his

current offense in October 2007.  

Despite this extensive criminal history, the probation officer calculated a total offense

level of 21 and a category III criminal history, yielding an imprisonment range of just 46 to

57 months.  That is because only four criminal history points total were assessed for the fifth

bank robbery and a 2006 conviction for driving while intoxicated.  Many of his other

convictions were too old to count, and he also caught a very lucky break: neither of his

most‐recent state convictions for robbery were counted because those sentences were never

reported to, or recorded in the records of, the Illinois Department of Corrections.

The government moved for an above‐guidelines sentence, arguing that Winston’s

criminal history category did not reflect the seriousness of his criminal past and the great

likelihood of his recidivism.  Although this time the career‐offender guideline, U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1, did not apply, the government argued that Winston should be sentenced again as

though he was a career offender within the range of 151 to 188 months.  The government

also urged the district court to assess a sentence longer than the 168 months Winston

received for his fifth bank robbery, which had not been a sufficient deterrent.  

Winston conceded that his category III criminal history under‐represented his

criminal history but argued that a sentence within the career‐offender range would be too

harsh.  Instead, he proposed a sentence of 100 to 125 months in prison.  Winston apologized

for his actions and explained that his robbery was “an act of desperation” to prevent his

family from being evicted from their home.  The district court, however, noted the obvious

pattern of behavior and how quickly Winston had resumed his criminal behavior after

being released from prison.  Incarceration, the court reasoned, was the only way to protect

the public from Winston, and the court was convinced that the only reason Winston had not

committed more robberies was because he was in prison most of his adult life.  The court

agreed with the government that the new term should exceed 168 months and imposed a

sentence of 175 months’ imprisonment.

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In their Anders submission counsel note that Winston wants his guilty plea set aside,

so they examine the plea colloquy for a possible appellate claim.  See United States v. Knox,

287 F.3d 667, 670‐72 (7th Cir. 2002).  But counsel have noticed only one shortcoming in the

colloquy: the district court did not advise Winston of his right at trial to present evidence on

his own behalf.  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(E).  Because Winston did not move to withdraw

his plea in the district court, our review would be for plain error.  See United States v. Vonn,

535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002); United States v. Villarreal‐Tamayo, 467 F.3d 630, 632 (7th Cir. 2006).

It would be frivolous to argue that the district court committed plain error.  The

court essentially informed Winston of his right to present evidence when it explained that

he could testify in his own defense and compel others to testify for him.  And Winston

cannot claim to be ignorant of that right because the information was covered in Winston’s

written plea declaration, which he acknowledged having read and understood.  See United

States v. Blalock, 321 F.3d 686, 688‐89 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 771

(7th Cir. 2001).  Therefore, we would not find that this minor omission affected Winston’s

decision to plead guilty.  See United States v. Griffin, 521 F.3d 727, 730 (7th Cir. 2008); United

States v. Cross, 57 F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 1995).

Counsel also have considered arguing that Winston’s prison sentence, which is 118

months above his guidelines range, is unreasonably high.  We would uphold as reasonable

a sentence that exceeds the range recommended by the guidelines as long as the district

court applies the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and articulates an adequate

statement of its reasons for imposing the sentence. See United States v. Hurt, 574 F.3d 439,

442 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Wise, 556 F.3d 629, 632‐33 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.

Tockes, 530 F.3d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 2008).

Counsel correctly conclude that this argument would be frivolous because the

district court thoroughly analyzed the § 3553(a) factors and amply justified sentencing

Winston to 175 months.  The court explained that Winston’s professed financial hardship

did not “lessen the violent impact that the crime undoubtedly had on the persons present

during the bank robbery” and those in the surrounding community.  The court recounted

Winston’s pattern of robberies (several of which occurred while he was still on probation or

parole) and the violent nature of his criminal history, and concluded that a guidelines range

of 46 to 57 months would not adequately deter Winston from criminal behavior or protect

the public when his prior 168‐month sentence had failed to do so.  And the court surmised

that Winston’s criminal history score, which already under‐represented his criminal record,

would likely be even higher had Winston not been in prison from 1992 to 2004 and thus

prevented from committing other crimes during the 15‐year period the guidelines look to

for his criminal history.  We have affirmed above‐range sentences in similar cases where the

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No. 09‐1446 Page 4

defendant’s criminal history did not adequately account for his extensive criminal conduct.

See United States v. Jackson, 576 F.3d 465, 470 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jackson, 547 F.3d

786, 793‐94 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. McIntyre, 531 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 2008) (per

curiam); United States v. Valle, 458 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2006).  Moreover, although the district

court did not address the clerical error that resulted in the two 1992 state robberies being

excluded from Winston’s criminal history, this fluke would also be a reason for the district

court to depart so far above the guidelines range.  See McIntyre, 531 F.3d at 483‐84.  If these

two robberies had been scored, Winston would have qualified as a career offender under

§ 4B1.1.

Finally, counsel consider whether Winston could challenge the district court’s failure

to specify the number of drug tests he must undergo while on supervised release. The

district court should have set the number of required drug tests. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); United

States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998).  But Winston said nothing about the

omission at sentencing, and the error is not one that we would correct on plain‐error review.

See United States v. Harvey, 484 F.3d 453, 458‐59 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tejeda, 476

F.3d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 2007).  Thus, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to raise

this point on appeal.  

Accordingly, we GRANT counselʹs motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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