Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03150/USCOURTS-ca10-92-03150-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mary Dimitt
Not Party
Terry W. Dimitt
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILL 11 

United State, C'Aurtol'Appeu UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

TERRY W. DIMITT, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

MARY DIMITT, 

Defendant. 

TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 9 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 92-3150 

(D.C. No. 90-1417-T) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY , Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant-appellant Terry Dimitt appeals from an order of the 

United States District Court for the District of Kansas denying 

his motion to open and vacate judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 92-3150 Document: 010110145707 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 1 
Civil Procedure 60(b). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1291 and affinn. 

This appeal arises out of an action brought by the United 

States on August 20, 1990 on behalf of the Fanners Home 

Administration (FHA) seeking recovery on two promissory notes and 

a security agreement executed by Terry Dimitt and his wife, Mary 

Dimitt, in consideration for loans made to them by the FHA. Mr. 

Dimitt moved to dismiss the cause of action as barred by the sixyear statute of limitations contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a). In 

a Memorandum and Order entered November 15, 1991, the district 

court denied Dimitt's motion and granted summary judgment in favor 

of the government. The court found Dimitt liable on the notes and 

further found that the claim was timely because the cause of 

action accrued in 1987, when the government accelerated Dimitt's 

note and demanded payment. 

Dimitt filed a motion to open and vacate judgment pursuant to 

Rule 60(b). He argued that he was entitled to Rule 60(b) relief 

because of newly discovered evidence that the notes were 

accelerated in 1983 and that the government was aware of this fact 

during the pendency of the action. On March 24, 1992, the 

district court denied the Rule 60(b) motion, stating that 11 [t]he 

documents upon which defendants rely could readily have been 

obtained through discovery while this action was pending .. 

Defendants have not shown due diligence as required by Rule 

60 (b) (2). 11 Dimitt appealed. 

We review a district court's ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion 

for an abuse of discretion. White v. American Airlines. Inc., 915 

-2-

Appellate Case: 92-3150 Document: 010110145707 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 2 
F.2d 1414, 1425 (10th Cir. 1990). In pertinent part, Rule 60(b) 

provides relief from judgment for "(2) newly discovered evidence 

which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 

move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 

heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, 

or other misconduct of an adverse party .... " Fed. R. Civ. P. 

60(b). We liberally construe Mr. Dimitt's pleadings to request 

relief under both provisions. 

The district court found that Dimitt's "newly discovered 

evidence" was available as far back as the summary judgment stage, 

and therefore was certainly available in time to move for a new 

trial. Dimitt has alleged no reason why he could not have 

obtained the evidence earlier; rather, he restates his argument 

that, regardless of when the information was available, he did not 

obtain it until January, 1992. The district court did not abuse 

its discretion in finding Dimitt's new evidence claims meritless. 

We also construe Mr. Dimitt's Rule 60(b) motion to allege 

fraud on the part of the government. Specifically, he states that 

the government "has acted with unclean hands knowing full well or 

should have known that the six (6) year limitations had expired." 

The district court did not address this issue in its memorandum 

and order. Remand is not necessary, however, because Dimitt does 

not allege that the government refused a discovery request or in 

any way concealed the information. See Bulloch v. United States, 

763 F.2d 1115, 1119 (10th Cir. 1985) (all information available to 

plaintiffs at first trial), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986); 

see also Manning v. Trustees of Tufts College, 613 F.2d 1200, 1204 

-3-

Appellate Case: 92-3150 Document: 010110145707 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 3 
(1st Cir. 1980) (no fraud or misconduct for nondisclosure where no 

court order to disclose). 

Petitioner's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 

The order of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall 

issue forthwith. 

-4-

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 92-3150 Document: 010110145707 Date Filed: 11/09/1992 Page: 4