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Parties Involved:
District of Columbia
Appellee
Dwight E. Robbins
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 15-7072 September Term, 2015

 FILED ON: JUNE 10, 2016

DWIGHT E. ROBBINS,

APPELLANT

v.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-cv-02207)

Before: TATEL and MILLETT, Circuit Judges, and SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

J U D G M E N T

This appeal was considered on the briefs of the parties and the record from the United States 

District Court for the District of Columbia. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. CIR. R. 34(j). The 

Court has accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a 

published opinion. See D.C. CIR. R. 36(d). It is

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the district court’s judgment be AFFIRMED.

Dwight Robbins, an African-American male, alleges that his former employer, the District of 

Columbia Public Schools (“District”), retaliated against him for opposing racially discriminatory 

practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The district 

court granted summary judgment to the District. We affirm because Robbins failed to adduce any 

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that he opposed a practice made unlawful under 

Title VII. 

As relevant here, Title VII prohibits employers, including District of Columbia agencies, 

from discriminating against their employees on the basis of race. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) & 

16(a); Singletary v. District of Columbia, 351 F.3d. 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Title VII also makes 

it unlawful to discriminate or retaliate against any employee “because he has opposed any practice 

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter,” or because the employee “has made a 

charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 

USCA Case #15-7072 Document #1618577 Filed: 06/10/2016 Page 1 of 4
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under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 

Robbins argues that the District retaliated against him because he opposed a practice made 

unlawful by Title VII. To prevail, Robbins had to show, with summary-judgment caliber evidence 

that a reasonable jury could credit, “(1) that he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII; (2) 

that the employer took a materially adverse action against him; and (3) that the employer took the 

action ‘because’ the employee opposed the practice.” McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1380 

(D.C. Cir. 2012). Although such “opposition activity may be protected even though the employer’s 

practices do not amount to a violation of Title VII, the employee-plaintiff must have a good faith and 

reasonable belief that the practices are unlawful” under that statute. Grosdidier v. Broadcasting Bd. 

of Governors, 709 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

Following the elimination of his prior position for budgetary reasons, the District placed 

Robbins at Jefferson Middle School as a physical education teacher for the 2010–2011 school year. 

Robbins applied for an open full-time position at that school for the following academic year, but 

Principal Patricia Pride hired someone else. Robbins alleges that he was passed over for the job in 

reprisal for his opposition to discriminatory practices at the school. Namely, Robbins asserts that he 

had previously “complained to Ms. Pride of the unfair distribution of classrooms to teachers, with 

race being a factor,” and that “[w]hen [he] saw no efforts at resolution concerning the injustice, he 

advised Ms. Pride that the EEOC could become involved.” J.A. 104.

The problem for Robbins is that the summary-judgment record contains no evidence

whatsoever that he ever mentioned or otherwise indicated to Pride, or to anyone else, anything about 

“race being a factor” in classroom assignments. Nor has Robbinsidentified any evidence suggesting 

that he ever opposed any racially discriminatory practice by Pride or the District for which his nonselection could possibly constitute retaliation. As a result, nothing in the record would allow a 

reasonable jury to conclude that Robbins’ termination had anything to do with his complaints about

employment activities that Title VII proscribes.

Robbins’ alleged “protected activity” began with a letter and an email he sent to Pride on 

February 14, 2011, in which he complained that he and his fellow physical education teacher, 

Howard Mebane, had been assigned homeroom classes, while three other non-physical-education 

teachers were not. Robbins wrote that, in his experience, “normally Physical Education Teachers are 

not assigned homeroom because of the need to get the gymnasium ready for classes.” J.A. 203 

(letter); see also id. at 147 (email).

1

 He further asserted that “[t]he scheduling of homeroom should 

be done on an equal basis” because, “[i]f Mr. Mebane and I, the only PE teachers at Jefferson MS, 

both have a homeroom assignment, we will end[] up covering both homeroom groups if he is/or I am 

absent.” Id. Robbins then identified “three other teachers without homerooms,” and concluded that 

it was “not fair” for Mebane, who was part-time, and Robbins to have homerooms “while three 

teachers who are assigned to Jefferson on a full-time basis have none.” Id.

 1 The letter appears to be a revised version of Robbins’ email to Pride. Both documents are dated 

February 14, 2011, and they are largely identical in content. See J.A. 147 and 203.

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Following a meeting with Robbins, Pride sent Robbins an email declining to change the 

assignments, as “[she did] not see a difference in classroom set-up for PE teachers that is any more 

demanding than science teachers to social studies teacher[s].” J.A. 225. Robbins’ response was 

terse: “The time it has taken you to reply speaks for it self [sic]. EEOC.” Id. Robbins claims he 

also mentioned the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in a “verbal” conversation with 

Pride. J.A. 32. He did not at that time file a complaint with the EEOC, but instead initiated

grievance proceedings with the teachers’ union.

There is not a single word about race or any other protected status in Robbins’

correspondence with Pride. He did not mention the race or protected status of any of the individuals 

mentioned, nor did he indicate any belief whatsoever that the homeroom assignments were the result 

of unlawful discrimination.2

 Instead, his focus was on a perceived inequality of assignments based 

on the academic disciplines of the teachers, a fact he openly conceded multiple times in his 

deposition testimony. See J.A. 28 (the problem was that homeroom assignments were not “equally 

distributed according to either subject matter * * * or discipline”); J.A. 29–30 (“Disciplines. Equal 

distribution. If you have three English classes, okay, and you have three P.E. classes, and two 

English teachers have two home rooms, the two P.E. teachers have two home rooms. But if you 

have an English group that has four home rooms, then that’s not equal.”). Significantly, when asked 

at his deposition why he complained to Pride, Robbins expressly denied doing so because of race and 

instead reiterated that the issue was unequal distribution of homerooms across academic disciplines. 

See J.A. 31 (Q: “And when you made your complaint to Ms. Pride, did you complain that it was 

because of race, you thought, that the distribution was unequal?” A: “No. I actually did it because 

the discipline wasn’t equal.” Q: “Because of the disciplines?” A: “Yes. Because there were two 

English teachers on that floor that didn’t have home rooms.”).

But unequal treatment based on academic discipline, even if true, is not “a practice made 

unlawful by Title VII.” McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380. Accordingly, any action allegedly taken against 

Robbins due to his opposition to the homeroom assignments cannot qualify as retaliation under Title 

VII. Simply put, without more, discrimination based on academic disciplines “is not an act ‘made 

unlawful by this subchapter’—i.e., by Title VII—and hence is not subject to its anti-retaliation 

provision.” Id. at 1382. 

In addition, there is no evidence in the record at all that Robbins believed in good faith that

such academic-discipline-based “discrimination” was prohibited by Title VII. Nor would it have 

been reasonable for him to do so. See McGrath, 666 F.3d at 1380 (“[I]f the practice the employee 

opposed is not one that could reasonably and in good faith be regarded as unlawful under Title VII, 

this element is not satisfied.”); see also Clark County School Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270–

271 (2001) (even assuming the “reasonable, good faith belief” interpretation of the Act is correct, 

“no one could reasonably believe that the incident * * * violated Title VII”).

Robbins’ threat to contact the EEOC does not help his cause. The bare invocation of 

“EEOC,” divorced from any allegation of unlawful discrimination on a statutorily prohibited ground, 

 2 Howard Mebane is also an African-American male. 

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does not constitute protected activity under Title VII. Indeed, the EEOC hears complaints under a 

broad variety of non-discrimination statutes in addition to Title VII, including those that prohibit age, 

disability, and genetic-information discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); 29 U.S.C § 633a; 42 

U.S.C. § 2000ff. Robbins’ naked reference to the “EEOC” thus does not provide any basis for 

inferring opposition to racial discrimination. Cf. Broderick v. Donaldson, 437 F.3d 1226, 1232 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (“Not every complaint garners its author protection under Title VII.”); Sitar v. Indiana 

Dep’t of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 727–729 (7th Cir. 2003) (complaining about being “picked on,” 

without mentioning discrimination or otherwise indicating that gender was an issue, does not 

constitute protected activity).

Robbins also contends (Br. 22-25) that the district court abused its discretion in granting 

summary judgment on a ground “not argued or presented by” the District—that is, that Robbins had 

not opposed any employment practice made unlawful by Title VII. But the district court may grant 

summary judgment “on grounds not raised by a party” as long as the court “giv[es] notice and a 

reasonable time to respond.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(f); see also Stewart v. Credit Bureau, 734 F.2d 47, 

53 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Sua sponte summary judgments are justified only after ‘the party against 

whom the judgment will be entered was given sufficient advance notice and an adequate opportunity 

to demonstrate why summary judgment should not be granted.’”) (quoting 10A, C. Wright, A. 

Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2720 at 27). Not only did Robbins describe his 

alleged protected activity in detail in his opposition to summary judgment, but he also addressed the 

issue in a sur-reply that the district court allowed after he was put on notice that the District contested

whether Robbins had opposed a discriminatory practice. Beyond that, because “a plaintiff seeking to 

defeat summary judgment on [his] retaliation claim must point to evidence from which a reasonable 

juror could conclude that the employer took adverse employment action against [him] in retaliation 

for [his] protected activity,” Allen v. Johnson, 795 F.3d 34, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2015), Robbins can hardly 

profess unfair surprise that he was expected to prove an essential element of his claim.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed 

to withhold issuance of the mandate until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for 

rehearing or rehearing en banc. See FED. R. APP. P. 41(b); D.C. CIR. R. 41(a). 

Per Curiam

 FOR THE COURT:

 Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/ 

 Ken Meadows

 Deputy Clerk

 

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