Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05137/USCOURTS-ca10-89-05137-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benham Group, Inc.
Not Party
Grand River Dam Authority
Appellee
Transpower Constructors
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBL1SH 

FILED 

United St4te3 Court of Appeals Tenth cf rcult 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JUN 1 5 1990 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TRANSPOWER CONSTRUCTORS, a 

Division of Harrison 

International Corporation, 

v. 

Plaintiff-Appellee/ 

Cross Appellant, 

GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, an 

Oklahoma Public Corporation, 

and 

Defendant-Appellant/ 

Cross-Appellee, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

BENHAM GROUP, INC., a Delaware ) 

Corporation, ) 

Defendant. 

) 

) 

) 

--------------------------------) 

TRANSPOWER CONSTRUCTORS, a 

Division of Harrison 

International Corporation, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

GRAND RIVER DAM AUTHORITY, an 

Oklahoma Public Corporation, 

Defendant, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 89-5131, 89-5137, 

89-5172, 90-5023 

No. 89-5132 

Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 1 
) 

and ) 

) 

BENHAM GROUP, INC., a Delaware ) 

Corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the Northern District of Oklahoma 

D.C. No, 86-C-14-E 

Edward H. Tricker of Woods & Aitken, Lincoln, Nebraska, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. 

Rodney A. Edwards (Robert S. Erickson with him on the briefs) of 

Jones, Givens, Gotcher & Bogan, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 

Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 

Harry M. Crowe, Jr., of Crawford, Crowe & Bainbridge, Tulsa, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before MOORE and MCWILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge.* 

MOORE, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable Howard C. 

District Court for the 

designation. 

Bratton, 

District 

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Senior Judge, United States 

of New Mexico, sitting by 

Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 2 
This appeal arises from the successful suit by Transpower 

Constructors against the Grand River Dam Authority (GRDA) in 

breach of contract and against The Benham Group, Inc., GRDA's 

construction manager, in negligence. GRDA contends that the 

verdict on the breach-of-contract claim should be reversed because 

the jury's award was speculative and because the contract as well 

as several non-contractual defenses bar Transpower's claim for 

damages. Benham asserts that reversal is necessary because 

Transpower failed to prove that Benham acted in bad faith, proof 

of which the contract imposes as a prerequisite to Benham's 

liability in tort. These claims are without merit. 

GRDA and Benham also challenge the trial court's ~ward of 

certain attorney's fees as well as the court's imposition of 

postjudgment interest on the fees awarded. Transpower crossappeals the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest. We 

conclude that the trial court ruled properly on these issues and 

affirm. 

I. FACTS 

Transpower entered a contract to construct a transmission 

line for GRDA. The contract required Transpower to install the 

poles, wires, and accessories which GRDA furnished. GRDA awarded 

the contract to Transpower based on Transpower's bid of 

approximately $1,5 million, which included a unit price rock 

excavation bid of $50 per lineal vertical foot for an estimated 

2500 lineal feet. The contract also provided that Benham would 

represent GRDA during construction and that it was responsible for 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 3 
certifying Transpower 1 s applications for payment and requests for 

time extensions. 

Under a separate contract with GRDA, Benham agreed to design, 

inspect, and administer the construction of the transmission line. 

GRDA also entered separate contracts for the clearance of the 

right of way and for the manufacture and delivery of the poles. 

Transpower subcontracted with Tri-State Drilling and Equipment 

Company for the excavation work. 

Transpower 1 s contract with GRDA required Transpower to 

complete construction of the line by April 30, 1985. Because of a 

delay in the delivery of the poles, GRDA, on Benham 1 s 

recommendation, agreed to extend Transpower 1 s deadline by 32 days 

and to pay it an additional $47,500. Transpower, Benham, and GRDA 

subsequently formalized this modification of the contract in 

Change Order No. 2. 

Besides the late delivery of the poles, several other factors 

led to delays in the project, including bad weather, slow 

clearance of the right of way, unexpected subsurface rock 

conditions, and Tri-State's slow 

work. Benham did not recommend 

performance of the excavation 

that GRDA grant any of 

Transpower's requests for extension of the April 30 deadline based 

on these other delays until after Transpower had completed the 

project. Instead, after a progress meeting in January 1985, GRDA 

ordered, upon Benham's recommendation, that Transpower accelerate 

its progress and place sufficient people and equipment on the job 

to meet the contract deadline. Pursuant to this order, Transpower 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 4 
increased the number of workers and amount of equipment on the 

project as well as the number of hours and days worked. 

Near the project's completion, Transpower submitted to Benham 

a claim for additional compensation to cover the cost of the 

accelerated work schedule. It also submitted a claim for 

additional compensation on behalf of Tri-State. After GRDA, 

following Benham's recommendation, rejected all of Transpower's 

claims, Transpower filed this action against GRDA and Benham, 

seeking $1,808,621.95 from GRDA for breach of contract, including 

$481,980.50 on behalf of Tri-State, and $1,326,441.45, plus 

punitive damages, from Benham for negligence. Transpower alleged 

that GRDA was responsible for the additional costs which 

Transpower and Tri-State had incurred in meeting GRDA's 

acceleration order because GRDA had failed to meets its 

contractual obligations for timely material deliveries and speedy 

right-of-way clearance, delaying the construction schedule and 

thus creating the conditions which ultimately required the 

acceleration order. Transpower alleged that Benham had 

negligently administered the contract by failing to grant any of 

its requests for extensions of the April 30 deadline, other than 

the extension granted in Change Order No. 2, until after the 

project had been completed and by certifying that Transpower's 

slow performance was the reason for GRDA's acceleration order. 

The jury awarded Transpower $1,124,312.49 against GRDA and 

$663,220.72 against Benham. The trial court entered judgment 

against GRDA and Benham, jointly and 

negligence claim. It subsequently 

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severally, on Transpower's 

denied GRDA's and Benham's 

Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 5 
motions for a directed verdict, judgment n.o.v., to alter or amend 

the verdict, and for a new trial. It also denied Transpower's 

motion for prejudgment interest but granted its motion to tax 

attorney's fees and for postjudgment interest on those fees. GRDA 

and Benham claim that the trial court erroneously denied their 

post-trial motions, improperly calculated the award of fees, and 

erroneously imposed postjudgment interest on the fees awarded. 

Transpower asserts that the trial court erred in denying its 

motion for prejudgment interest. 

II. GRDA's APPEAL 

A. 

GRDA contends that the trial court erred in denying its 

motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. We review 

rulings on motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. 

under the same standard. Hurd v. American Hoist and Derrick Co., 

734 F.2d 495, 498 (10th Cir. 1984). We will reverse the trial 

court's denial of either motion only if, after a de novo review, 

we determine that the evidence taken in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party and all reasonable inferences to be drawn 

therefrom point but one way, in favor of the moving party. 

Mitchell v. Mobil Oil Corp., 896 F.2d 463, 467 (10th Cir. 1990). 

Oklahoma law defines the measure of damages in a breach-ofcontract action as "the amount which will compensate the party 

aggrieved for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, or 

which, in the ordinary course of things, would be likely to result 

therefrom." Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 21 (West 1987). Although 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 6 
the jury may not speculate about the fact of damages, Hardesty v. 

Andro Corp.-Webster Div., 555 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Okla. 1976), 

uncertainty about their exact amount will not preclude recovery. 

Larrance Tank Corp. v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346, 350 (Okla. 1970); 

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sheets, 62 P.2d 91, 93 (Okla. 

1936). Once a party has established the fact· of damages, 

moreover, "'it is proper to let the jury determine what the loss 

is from the best evidence the nature of the case admits.''' 

Hardesty, 555 P.2d at 1035 (quoting Southwest Ice & Dairy Prods. 

Co. v. Faulkenberry, 220 P.2d 257, 261 (Okla. 1950)). This 

evidence need not support a mathematically precise measure of 

damages. Fiedler v. McKea Corp., 605 F.2d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 

1979) (applying Oklahoma law). A reasonable approximation of the 

loss will suffice. Hoffer Oil Corp. v. Carpenter, 34 F.2d 589, 

592 (10th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 608 (1930). 

GRDA asserts that Transpower's evidence of damages was 

insufficient because Transpower established only the difference 

between its total costs and the contract price without 

apportioning responsibility for the cost overruns between itself, 

Tri-State, and GRDA and without establishing the share of the cost 

overruns attributable to each alleged breach. GRDA contends that 

without such evidence, the jury could only speculate about the 

proper measure of damages. As a result, the trial court should 

have either withheld Transpower's breach-of-contract claim from 

the jury or else granted judgment in GRDA's favor notwithstanding 

the jury's verdict. 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 7 
GRDA's argument ignores the rule in Oklahoma that the 

prohibition against the recovery of damages because of uncertainty 

applies to the fact of damages and not to their amount. Hardesty, 

555 P.2d at 1034. Our review of the record indicates that there 

was sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably 

approximate Transpower's loss. Besides the extensive and detailed 

evidence of Transpower's total costs, the record includes 

documentary evidence and testimony concerning the claims of 

Transpower and Tri-State against each other. Indeed, the jury 

must have considered this evidence since its award compensates 

Transpower for only a little more than sixty percent of its total 

claim. 

GRDA also complains that Transpower's evidence of damages was 

insufficient because it would not permit the jury to allocate 

damages on a claim-by-claim basis or to determine the exact 

percentage of the cost overruns for which Transpower was 

responsible. Oklahoma law, however, requires only that the 

evidence be the best which the nature of the case admits. Id. at 

1035. Transpower introduced ample testimony that the interrelated 

nature of its claims prevented it from establishing damages on a 

claim-by-claim basis. Although GRDA disputed these assertions, it 

produced no evidence of its own claim-by-claim calculations to 

contradict Transpower's position. The jury, therefore, had before 

it the best evidence of damages which the nature of the case 

admits. That this evidence might not permit a mathematically 

precise apportionment of damages is irrelevant under Oklahoma law. 

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B. 

GRDA moved for a new trial, claiming that the trial court 

improperly instructed the jury on the measure of damages because 

it refused to give GRDA's proffered instruction on the "Total Cost 

Theory" of damages. GRDA also claimed that the evidence was 

insufficient to support the court's general damages instruction. 

The trial court denied GRDA's motion. We review the trial court's 

denial for a manifest abuse of discretion. Patty Precision 

Prods., Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg., Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th 

Cir. 1988). 

The trial court found that there was sufficient evidence to 

support a general damages instruction and so instructed the jury. 1 

GRDA claims that because Transpower relied solely on evidence of 

its total cost, its evidence of damages was insufficient to 

support a general damages instruction. Since we have already 

concluded that Transpower's evidence of damages was sufficient to 

avoid a directed verdict, it was also sufficient to support a 

general damages instruction. GRDA further asserts that even if 

the gener~l damages instruction were proper, the trial court 

abused its discretion by failing to instruct the jury that 

Transpower had failed to meet the elements of the Total Cost 

1The jury was instructed in pertinent part: 

[A] party need not prove the amount of his damages with 

mathematical exactness. It is sufficient if the party 

furnishes data from which the amount of damages can be 

established with reasonable certainty. You are 

instructed that a party has proven the amount of his 

damages with reasonable certainty if he has presented 

evidence which shows the amount of damages as a matter 

of just and reasonable inference. 

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Theory. We agree with Transpower, however, that the trial court's 

determination that a general damages instruction was appropriate 

made a jury instruction on Transpower's failure to satisfy the 

prerequisites of the Total Cost Theory unnecessary. This court, 

moreover, will not disturb a jury verdict unless it "'has a 

substantial doubt whether the jury was fairly guided in its 

deliberations."' Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 174 

(10th Cir. 1982) (quoting Mid-Texas Communications v. American 

Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 

U.S. 912 (1980)). We entertain no such doubt in this case. 

C. 

GRDA further contends that even if the evidence supports the 

jury's verdict based on a general damages instruction, the trial 

court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and for 

judgment n.o.v. because the contract bars Transpower's claims for 

duration-related damages resulting from unanticipated rock 

conditions as well as for additional damages resulting from GRDA's 

acceleration order. GRDA also contends that Transpower's claims 

are barred by accord and satisfaction and by estoppel. These 

claims are without merit. 

The bid instructions which Transpower received prior to 

bidding on its contract with GRDA required all bidders to make a 

careful examination of the construction site. Both Transpower and 

Tri-State conducted a site investigation prior to bidding on the 

contract. The contract between GRDA and Transpower included a 

unit price for rock excavation of $50 per lineal vertical foot for 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 10 
an estimated 2500 lineal feet. During the course of its 

excavation work, Tri-State encountered a subsurface condition 

known as seamy limestone which made it much more difficult than 

expected to blast the subsurface rock. In addition, the total 

amount of rock which Tri-State had to excavate was fifty percent 

greater than the estimate in the contract. At trial, Transpower 

claimed, on behalf of Tri-State, that although GRDA had 

compensated Transpower at the contract price for the rock 

excavated beyond the contract estimate, this amount did not take 

into account the additional duration-related costs resulting from 

the unforeseen seamy limestone and the excessive subsurface rock. 

GRDA asserts that the trial court should have directed a 

verdict against Transpower on this claim. It contends that the 

bidding instructions, which require a careful site examination, 

and Article XV of the contract between GRDA and Transpower, which 

provides that Transpower will bear the risk of loss resulting from 

damage to the project. caused by the elements, 2 unambiguously 

2Article XV provides in pertinent part: 

The performance of this contract and the work hereunder 

is at the risk of the Contractor until the final 

acceptance thereof and payment therefor. He shall take 

all responsibility for the work and shall bear all 

losses resulting to him on account of the amount or 

character of the work, or because the nature of the land 

in or on which the work is done is different from what 

is assumed or expected, or on account of the weather, 

floods, fire, windstorm or other action of the elements 

. . . . If the work or any part ... thereof is 

destroyed or damaged from any of the aforesaid causes, 

the Contractor, at his own cost ... shall restore the 

same ..•. 

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require Transpower to bear the risk of unexpected site conditions. 

We disagree. 

Article XV of the contract is inapposite because it is no 

more than a 

Transpower's 

common builder's risk provision. Instead, 

claim falls squarely within Article V of the 

contract, which specifically provides that Transpower is entitled 

to an extension in the project's deadline if it encounters 

unforeseeable conditions. 3 Since GRDA has not challenged the 

jury's determination that the seamy limestone and additional 

subsurface rock were unforeseeable and since Article V of the 

contract entitles Transpower to recover its duration-related 

damages resulting from unforeseeable conditions, we must reject 

GRDA's argument. 

D. 

We also reject GRDA's claim that Transpower cannot recover 

damages for its additional costs because it failed to comply with 

Articles XVIII and XIX of the contract, which provisions contain 

specific procedures for filing claims for additional 

compensation. 4 At trial, Transpower argued that the parties had 

3Article V of the contract provides in pertinent part: 

The Contractor agrees that the work shall be 

prosecuted regularly, diligently, and uninterruptedly as 

far as possible, but it is expressly understood and 

agreed that the rate of progress and the time for 

completing the work is subject to extension and revision 

in the event that the Contractor is delayed in 

performance due to unforeseeable causes beyond his 

control and without his fault. 

4Article XVIII required Transpower to submit an itemized account 

(Continued to next page.) 

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abrogated Articles XVIII and XIX through their course of conduct. 

Oklahoma law permits parties to a construction contract to alter 

or abrogate through their course of conduct contractual 

requirements for submitting claims for extra work. Flour Mills v. 

American Steel Bldg. Co., 449 P.2d 861, 863 (Okla. 1969) (Syllabus 

by the Court). Furthermore, the question whether the parties have 

modified or abrogated a contractual provision through their course 

of conduct is one for the jury. See Coston v. Adams, 224 P.2d 

955, 961 (Okla. 1950). 

Transpower produced evidence of several instances where GRDA, 

upon Benham's recommendation, paid Transpower for additional work 

even though Transpower had not complied with Articles XVIII and 

XIX. GRDA, for instance, compensated Transpower, pursuant to 

Change Order No. 2, for extra work resulting from the late 

delivery of poles even though Transpower submitted its itemized 

statement of the claim three weeks late. In fact, the Benham 

official responsible for administering the contract on behalf of 

GRDA admitted that Benham never denied one of Transpower's 

requests for additional compensation because Transpower had not 

timely filed the claim. Since our review of the record indicates 

(Continued from prior page.) 

for each month's additional work by the tenth day of the 

succeeding month and provided that Transpower's failure to comply 

with this procedure would bar it from receiving compensation for 

the extra work. Article XIX required Transpower to submit to 

Benham within 45 days of any damage caused by GRDA a written 

statement of the nature of the damage sustained. It also required 

that on the fifteenth day of the month succeeding the filing of 

the damage statement, Transpower submit an itemized account of the 

damage. Finally, the Article required Transpower to submit, 

within a reasonable time, a written protest against any additional 

work which it considered to be outside the contract. 

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that Transpower produced sufficient evidence to support the jury's 

determination that the parties had modified ihe contract through 

their course of conduct, we find no error in the trial court's 

denial of GRDA's post-trial motions based on this ground. 

GRDA maintains, nonetheless, that Article XXVII of the 

contract prevented the parties from abrogating the requirements of 

Articles XVIII and XIX through their course of conduct. Article 

XXVII provides that no payment for, or acceptance of, work by 

Benham or GRDA will operate as a waiver of any contractual 

provision and that no waiver of a breach of the contract shall 

constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach. The time for GRDA I 

to invoke this provision, however, has passed. Although GRDA may 

have relied on it during Transpower's performance of the contract 

to prevent Transpower from entering into a course of conduct which 

would abrogate the requirements of Articles XVIII and XIX, it 

would be manifestly unjust for us to enforce this provision after 

GRDA, through its own course of conduct, has essentially waived 

the benefits of the provision's protection. 

E. 

GRDA also argues that Transpower's claims are barred either 

by accord and satisfaction or by estoppel. It contends that 

Change Order No. 2 was an accord and satisfaction of all of 

Transpower's claims for damages resulting from late pole 

deliveries. It also contends that because Transpower executed 

Change Order No. 2 without informing GRDA and Benham that it was 

preparing an additional claim against them, Transpower is estopped 

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from pursuing its additional claim. These contentions are without 

merit. 

The defenses of accord and satisfaction and of estoppel turn 

on questions of fact for the jury. A successful defense of accord 

and satisfaction requires the jury to find that the parties 

intended a subsequent agreement to discharge a prior obligation. 

Polin v. American Petrofina Co., 589 P.2d 240, 242 (Okla. 1978). 

The defense of estoppel requires the jury to find that one party's 

conduct reasonably led another to believe that the first party had 

relinquished some right. Crowell v. Thoreau Center, 631 P.2d 751, 

752 (Okla. 1981). Since our review of the record indicates that 

there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could determine 

that the parties did not intend Change Order No. 2 to discharge 

any other obligation and that Transpower did not demonstrate by 

its conduct any intention to relinquish a contractual right, we 

affirm the trial court's denial of GRDA's motions for a directed 

verdict and for judgment n.o.v. based on these defenses. 

F. 

GRDA finally contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by entering judgment jointly and severally against GRDA 

for the jury's award on Transpower's negligence claim against 

Benham. GRDA asserts that the trial court's ~ction resulted in 

unfair surprise and undue prejudice because it had no indication 

prior to the trial court's action that it would be held 

responsible for Benham's negligence. GRDA concludes that if it 

had known that Transpower was suing it for Benham's negligence, it 

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could have raised contributory or comparative negligence as a 

defense, proceeded in different areas of inquiry in its discovery, 

and provided additional expert testimony at trial. 

GRDA's claim is disingenuous. GRDA received Benham's 

proposed jury instructions prior to the commencement of trial. 

Those instructions unequivocally indicate that Transpower 

considered Benham to be GRDA's agent and that Transpower expected 

the jury to award any damages against Benham jointly and severally 

against GRDA. If GRDA were surprised that it could be held 

jointly and severally liable for Benham's negligence, it could 

have moved for a continuance of the trial. GRDA, however, filed 

motion. GRDA also fails to support its claim of undue 

It cites no evidence which it could have produced at 

it known at an earlier time that it could be held 

no such 

prejudice. 

trial had 

jointly and severally liable for Benham's negligence. We, 

therefore, reject GRDA's final assignment of error. 

Benham contends 

III. 

that 

BENHAM'S APPEAL 

the trial court erred in denying its 

on Transpower's negligence claim 

Transpower and GRDA indemnifies 

motion for a directed verdict 

because the contract between 

Benham against its own negligence absent a showing that Benham's 

tortious act or omission was in bad faith. Benham asserts that 

since Transpower produced no evidence that Benham had acted, or 

failed to act, in bad faith, the contract bars Transpower's 

recovery in tort as a matter of law. We disagree. 

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Oklahoma's courts strictly construe agreements to indemnify a 

party against its own negligence. Fretwell v. Protection Alarm 

Co., 764 P.2d 149, 152 (Okla. 1988). To be enforceable, the 

agreement must meet the following three conditions: (1) the 

parties must express their intent to exculpate in unequivocally 

clear language; (2) the agreement must result from an arm's-length 

transaction between parties of equal bargaining power; and (3) the 

exculpation must not violate public policy. See id. at 152-53; 

Webb v. Western Carter Cty. Water and Sewage Corp., 575 P.2d' 124, 

126 (Okla. 1977); Mohawk Drilling Co. v. McCullough Tool Co., 271 

F.2d 627, 632 (10th Cir. 1959) (applying Oklahoma law). In this 

case, the parties dispute only whether the alleged indemnification 

clause is sufficiently unambiguous to warrant enforcement. 

Benham contends that the following language in Article III of 

the contract between GRDA and Transpower suffices to indemnify it 

against its own negligence absent a showing of bad faith: 

Neither the Engineers' authority to act under this 

article or elsewhere in the contract documents nor any 

decision made by the Engineers in good faith either to 

exercise or not exercise such authority shall give rise 

to any duty or responsibility of the Engineers to the 

Contractor .. 

(Emphasis added,) Benham relies primarily on Colorado Milling & 

Elevator Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co., 382 F.2d 

834 (10th Cir. 1967) (applying Oklahoma law), to support its 

interpretation of this provision. 

In Colorado Milling, a lessor of property claimed that the 

lease required the lessee to indemnify the lessor for injuries to 

a third party resulting from a condition on the lessor's property 

which condition preexisted the lease. The lease required the 

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lessee to indemnify the lessor "against all claims 

out of injury . or death ... connected 

condition whatsoever in the premises." Id. at 

... arising 

with ... any 

835-36. The 

lessee sought to avoid liability under this clause by claiming 

that it did not apply to the condition which caused the injury 

because that condition existed prior to the execution of the 

lease. This court rejected the argument, reasoning that the 

"all-inclusive" language of the indemnification provision was 

unambiguous and, therefore, enforceable. Id. at 836. Benham 

asserts that the language in Article III referring to "any duty," 

like the language in Colorado Milling referring to "any condition 

whatsoever," is all-inclusive and sufficiently unambiguous to 

warrant enforcement. We disagree. 

Colorado Milling is distinguishable from this case because it 

did not turn on whether the contractual provision was 

sufficiently clear to exculpate the lessor from its own 

negligence but rather on whether the exculpatory clause applied 

to a preexisting condition on the land. Article III, moreover, 

simply does not express in sufficiently unambiguous language 

Transpower's intent to exculpate Benham from its own negligence 

absent a showing of bad faith. Although a specific reference to 

"negligence" is unnecessary, Article III lacks the "broad and 

comprehensive language relating to exculpation from negligence" 

which Oklahoma law requires. Standard Ins. Co. v. Ashland Oil & 

Refining Co., 186 F.2d 44, 46-47 (10th Cir. 1950) (applying 

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Appellate Case: 89-5137 Document: 01019867848 Date Filed: 06/15/1990 Page: 18 
Oklahoma law). 5 In fact, Article III is no more clear than the 

language in another alleged indemnification provision which we 

held did not meet the requisite standard of clarity that Oklahoma 

law requires. See Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Brown, 333 F.2d 

967, 968-69 (10th Cir. 1964) (refusing to enforce as an 

indemnification provision a clause which provided, "Contractor . 

. . agrees . to hold [Sinclair] harmless from any and all 

liability for damages to the person ... of any and all persons 

resulting from the operation of Contractor hereunder"). Since 

Article III does not unequivocally exculpate Benham from its own 

negligence, the trial court properly denied Benham's motion for a 

directed verdict. 

The trial court also properly denied Benham's motion for a 

directed verdict based on its defense of accord and satisfaction. 

Benham contends that since the facts underlying Transpower's 

negligence claim are the same as those underlying the dispute 

which was settled through the execution of Change Order No. 2, 

5see and compare Fretwell, 764 P.2d at 152 (enforcing 

indemnification provision which stated, "Subscriber agrees to 

indemnify ... and hold Protection harmless from any and all 

claims ... whether these claims be based upon ... negligence . 

. on the part of Protection"); Tyler v. Dowell, Inc., 274 F.2d 

890, 894-95 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 812 (1960) 

(enforcing indemnification provision which stated that contractor 

agrees to "assume and bear all risk of accidents and damages to 

persons and property which may occur in the course of contractor's 

operations and to indemnify and hold [owner] harmless 

against ... such accidents and damages"); Trumbower v. Sports 

Car Club, 428 F. Supp. 1113, 1116-17 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (applying 

Oklahoma law) (enforcing indemnification provision which stated 

that the Undersigned "hereby releases ... the Sports Car Club . 

• • from all liability to the Undersigned ... for all losses or 

damage on account of injury to the ... Undersigned, 

whether caused by the negligence of the [Sports Car Club] or 

otherwise"). 

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the Change Order was an accord and satisfaction not only of 

Transpower's breach-of-contract claim against GRDA but also of 

Transpower's negligence claim against Benham. Benham's argument 

is fundamentally flawed. Since the jury rejected GRDA's defense 

of accord and satisfaction based on Change Order No. 2, Benham 

certainly cannot take refuge from Transpower's negligence claim 

behind that agreement. Cf. Cox v. City of Freeman, 321 F.2d 

887, 892-93 (8th Cir. 1963) (jury's finding of accord and 

satisfaction bars contractor's breach-of-contract claim against 

owner as well as its negligence claim against owner's 

construction engineer). 

IV. TRANSPOWER'S CROSS-APPEAL 

Transpower cross-appeals the trial court's 

motion for prejudgment interest. The trial 

denial of its 

court held that 

Transpower was not entitled to prejudgment interest because its 

damages were not certain or calculable prior to judgment. We 

will reverse the trial court's finding of fact only if it is 

clearly erroneous. Bill's Coal Co. v. Board of Pub. Utils., 887 

F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1989). 

The law of the forum state governs the availability of 

prejudgment interest in a diversity action. See Kinsella v. 

Leonard, 415 F.2d 574, 

provides that "[a]ny 

578 . (10th Cir. 1969). Oklahoma law 

person who is entitled to recover damages 

certain, or capable of being made certain by calculation ... is 

entitled also to recover [prejudgment] interest." Okla. Stat. 

Ann. tit. 23, § 6 (1987). Damages are certain if they are 

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"liquidated or capable of ascertainment by calculation or resort 

to well-established market values." Sandpiper North Apartments, 

Ltd. v. American Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 680 P.2d 983, 993 

(Okla. 1984). Damages are not certain where their calculation is 

left to the best judgment of the fact-finder. See City of Tulsa 

v. Copp, 260 P. 16, 19-20 (Okla. 1927); Liberty Nat'l Bank & 

Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Div., 540 F.2d 1375, 1383 (10th Cir. 1976) 

(applying Oklahoma law). 

Transpower contends that the trial court erred in denying its 

motion for prejudgment interest because its damages were 

calculable prior to judgment by resort to the fixed market value 

of the additional labor and materials which it provided as a 

result of GRDA's breaches of contract, Transpower argues that 

its claim is indistinguishable from that of the contractor in 

Cook v. Oklahoma Bd. of Pub, Affairs, 736 P,2d 140, 153 (Okla. 

1987), who was awarded prejudgment interest because the cost of 

his additional work was readily calculable by reference to the 

market value of the extra labor and materials he provided. 

Transpower also cites City of Tulsa where a homeowner was awarded 

prejudgment interest because the amount of damage to his home 

resulting from the City's negligence was readily calculable based 

upon "fixed standards of costs and value.'' 260 P. at 20. 

Contrary to Transpower's assertion, Cook and City of Tulsa 

are distinguishable from this case. In both those cases, the 

jury exercised no discretion in calculating damages. See Cook, 

736 P.2d at 152; City of Tulsa, 260 P. at 20. In this case, 

however, the jury had to assess the evidence to apportion 

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liability for the additional costs of constructing the 

transmission line. Indeed, the jury, in exercising its best 

judgment, awarded Transpower just over sixty percent of its total 

claim against GRDA. If Transpower's damages were capable of 

being made certain prior to trial, then the jury's award would 

not have differed from Transpower's total claim by such a 

significant amount. Since Transpower has not demonstrated that 

its damages were calculable prior to trial, we must reject its 

contention that the trial co~rt's denial of its motion for 

prejudgment interest was clearly erroneous. 

V. ATTORNEY'S FEES 

A prevailing party cannot recover attorney's fees in Oklahoma 

in the absence of a statute or an enforceable contract which 

provides for their recovery. Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, 

1049 (Okla. 1984). The contract between Transpower and GRDA 

makes no provision for the recovery of attorney's fees. Oklahoma 

law does permit the recovery of fees in a breach-of-contract 

action, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 936 (1987), but not in a 

negligence action. See Sisney, 690 P.2d at 1051. 

The trial court awarded Transpower attorney's fees for the 

time it expended in preparing its breach-of-contract action 

against GRDA. The court included in the fee award the time 

Transpower devoted 

Benham's negligence. 

to discovering and 

The court reasoned 

presenting evidence of 

that since Benham's 

negligent acts were also GRDA's breaches of contract, Transpower 

would have necessarily expended the time in discovering and 

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presenting evidence of Benham's negligence whether or not Benham 

had been a party to the litigation. We will reverse the trial 

court's finding only if it is clearly erroneous. Bill's Coal 

Co., 887 F.2d at 244. A finding is clearly erroneous if "it is 

without factual support in the record." LeMaire v. United 

States, 826 F.2d 949, 953 (10th Cir. 1987). 

GRDA contends that since neither its contract with Transpower 

nor Oklahoma law provides for the recovery of fees in a 

negligence action, the trial court's fee award was erroneous 

because it included fees which Transpower incurred solely in 

prosecuting its negligence action against Benham. GRDA further 

contends that Sisney v. Smalley, 690 P.2d 1048, requires the 

trial court to apportion fees between those incurred prosecuting 

a breach-of-contract action and those incurred prosecuting a 

related negligence action. Since GRDA produced evidence that 

Transpower incurred a portion of its attorney's fees solely on 

its negligence action against Benham, the trial court erred by 

failing to limit Transpower's recovery of fees to those incurred 

prosecuting its breach-of-contract action. 

We disagree with GRDA's reading of Sisney. In that case, the 

court affirmed the trial court's apportioning of fees based on 

the undisputed evidence that the prevailing party's attorney 

devoted seventy-five percent of his services to a property-damage 

claim and twenty-five percent to a related negligence claim. The 

court rejected the appellant's argument that the prevailing party 

was not entitled to recover any fees because his attorney had 

devoted a portion of his time on the negligence claim. 690 P.2d 

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at 1051. Sisney, therefore, does not, as GRDA contends, require 

attorneys to apportion fees in every case involving a negligence 

claim and some other claim for which fees are recoverable. 

Instead, it holds that a prevailing party can recover fees for 

that portion of his attorney's work not expended solely in 

prosecuting a related negligence action. 

Here, the trial court found that all of the time which 

Transpower devoted to discovering and preparing its negligence 

claim against GRDA would have been necessarily incurred even if 

Benham had not been a party to the litigation. The record 

supports the court's finding. At the hearing on attorney's fees, 

Transpower produced undisputed testimony that it could not have 

succeeded in its claims against GRDA without proving Benham's 

negligence. The pretrial order and jury instructions also attest 

to the interrelated nature of Transpower's breach-of-contract and 

negligence claims. Since there is factual support in the record 

for the trial court's finding; we must reject GRDA's contention 

that it was clearly erroneous. 

VI. POSTJUDGMENT INTEREST 

The trial court awarded Transpower postjudgment interest on 

attorney's fees. It relied on Everaard v. Hartford Accident and 

Indem. Co., 842 F.2d 1186, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 1988), which held 

that in a diversity action 28 U.S.C. § 1961, rather than state 

law, governs the award of postjudgment interest on a money 

judgment. The statute provides in pertinent part that 

"[i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a civil 

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case recovered in a district court.'' 28 u.s.c. § 1961. GRDA 

challenges the trial court's ruling which we will affirm unless 

it is clearly erroneous. Bill's Coal Co., 887 F.2d at 244. 

GRDA contends that Everaard is distinguishable from this case 

because we awarded postjudgment interest on a money judgment, not 

on attorney's fees. GRDA further contends that all of the cases 

on which Transpower relies to support its assertion that fees are 

part of a money judgment and, therefore, subject to interest 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 involve a federal question. See, e.g., 

R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (8th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 464 U.S. 1009 (1983) (U.S. Const. Amend. IV, XIV; 42 

U.S.C. § 1983); Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 

542 (5th Cir. 1983) (15 U.S.C. § 1). The rationale for including 

attorney's fees as part of a money judgment and taxing interest 

on them is the same, however, whether state or federal law 

provides the basis for the underlying cause of action. As the 

Ninth Circuit has explained, 

[T]here exists no real distinction between judgments for 

attorneys' fees and judgments for other items of damages 

..•. [O]nce a judgment is obtained, interest thereon 

is mandatory without regard to the elements of which 

that judgment is composed. 

Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 487 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1973) 

quoted in R.W.T., 712 F.2d at 1234. 

GRDA also asserts that even if this court would apply§ 1961 

to the award of fees in a diversity action, extending that holding 

to this case would violate the precepts of Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). GRDA argues that since interest on 

attorney's fees is not recoverable under Oklahoma law, McAlester 

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( 

Urban Renewal Auth. v. Hamilton, 521 P.2d 823, 826 (Okla. 1974), 

the imposition of interest on fees would create a substantive 

right available in federal court which is unavailable in state 

court. We disagree with GRDA's characterization of interest on 

fees as substantive. At best, it is "'in the uncertain area 

between substance and procedure'" and, therefore, "'rationally 

capable of classification as either.'" See Weitz Co. v. Mo-Kan 

Carpet, Inc., 723 F.2d 1382, 1386 (8th Cir. 1983) (quoting Hanna 

v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)), See also Nissho-Iwai Co. v. 

Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 623 (5th Cir. 1988). 

We are, moreover, unconcerned that the application of§ 1961 

in diversity cases where the forum state's law does not provide 

for interest on fees will result in forum shopping. Rules 

regarding postjudgment interest "do not furnish any greater 

incentive[] to use the courts of the United States than most of 

the other procedural features which are unique to the federal 

forum." Nissho-Iwai, 848 F.2d at 624. Since we conclude that 

attorney's fees fall within § 196l's purview and that the 

imposition of interest on fees is a procedural matter, we agree 

with the trial court that Everaard governs this case and reject 

GRDA's contention that the trial court's ruling was clearly 

erroneous. 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Since we find that the trial court ruled correctly on all the 

issues raised on appeal, we AFFIRM its judgment in all respects. 

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