Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05613/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-05613-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Elmer Ayala
Petitioner
J. Solis
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ELMER AYALA,

Petitioner,

 v

J SOLIS, Acting Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 03-5613 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Before the court is petitioner Elmer Ayala’s petition for

a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 USC § 2254. Petition (Doc

#1). Petitioner seeks relief based on the following three claims:

(1) he was denied due process because the trial court failed to sua

sponte instruct the jury on the defense of accident or misfortune

under CALJIC No 4.45; (2) he was deprived of effective assistance of

counsel because his trial counsel failed to request the court to

instruct the jury on CALJIC No 4.45; and (3) he was denied due

process because the trial court failed to grant him a new trial

based on juror misconduct. For the reasons that follow, the court

DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 

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I 

On July 22, 2002, petitioner was convicted by a jury in

the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County

of Mendocino of assault with a deadly weapon. Petitioner admitted

to a prior felony conviction within the meaning of California’s

Three Strikes Law and was sentenced to six years in state prison. 

He is currently serving his sentence at the Correctional Training

Facility in Soledad, California. 

On May 21, 2003, the California Court of Appeal affirmed

the judgment of conviction and, on August, 13, 2003, the Supreme

Court of California denied review. 

On December 15, 2003, petitioner filed this instant

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court found that it

stated cognizable claims for relief, when liberally construed and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer and petitioner has

filed a response/traverse. 

II

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows: 

[D]efendant met the victim in this case at the

Welcome Inn bar in Fort Bragg, at approximately

10 pm on December 12, 2001. When the bar closed

at 2 am, they bought a 12-pack of beer and left

the bar. The two, intoxicated, walked to the

victim’s apartment, where the victim resided

with his wife and two children. After reaching

the apartment, defendant and the victim drank

two more beers each; the victim then announced

that he was sleepy and wished to go to bed. He

told defendant to leave, but defendant refused. 

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3

Defendant wanted to continue drinking, but the

victim stood up and insisted that defendant

leave the apartment. Defendant called the

victim a “son of a bitch” and told the victim to

“go to hell.” The victim tried to push

defendant out of the apartment and defendant

pulled out a knife. The victim backed around

the living room. Defendant followed and stuck

the victim in the stomach with the knife.

Defendant then ran out of the apartment. The

victim woke up his wife, who saw that he was

bleeding from a stomach wound. She attempted to

treat the injury and called the police. There

were four beer cans left in the living room, but

there was no sign of a struggle other than one

ornament that was knocked off the Christmas

tree.

When the police arrived, they found the victim

sitting on the couch, holding his bloody

abdomen, and smelling of alcohol. The

responding officer found a hat and empty leather

knife sheath on the front porch. He saw no

blood on the porch or in the living room, nor

did he see any signs of a struggle. He did not

locate a weapon. The officer broadcast

description of the suspect (later identified as

defendant), who was stopped 12 blocks away. He

had dried blood on the back of his hands and

some on one nostril. He was extremely

intoxicated. Defendant was shown the hat found

on the victim’s porch and denied that it was

his, claiming he gave it to a friend with whom

he was drinking at the bar. Defendant did not

know where he had been drinking and denied

having been in a fight. He did not admit having

been at the victim’s apartment.

The victim later identified defendant from a

photographic lineup. The victim was treated at

the hospital for a six-centimeter laceration in

the upper right quadrant of his abdomen that was

at least two inches deep. 

The defense presented evidence at the trial,

including prior statements to the police by the

victim, that indicated he fought with defendant

outside the apartment and that he told his

mother and wife that he ran into the kitchen and

living room before he was stabbed inside the

apartment. Defendant testified that he went to

the Welcome Inn bar and saw the victim snorting

drugs in the bathroom. Defendant said he drank

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4

two beers at the bar, and when it closed, the

victim asked him to walk him home because he was

high and drunk. The victim bought a 6-pack from

the bar and they walked to his apartment, where

they sat on the couch and drank the beer. After

about 35 minutes, defendant announced that he

had to go to work. The victim then grabbed

defendant in the buttocks and told him that he

wanted to have sex with him. Defendant told the

victim that he was high and crazy and that he,

defendant, was not a homosexual. Defendant

shouted that he was leaving. The victim told

defendant not to shout and punched him, making

his nose bleed. Defendant fell back and his

sheathed knife fell out of his pocket. 

Defendant picked it up and saw that the victim

was ready to hit him. The victim saw

defendant’s knife and ran to the kitchen,

retrieving a knife of his own. Meanwhile,

defendant had thrown his knife down to try to

open the lock on the front door, in order to

leave. The victim pulled back defendant’s hair;

he was holding a knife. The victim hit

defendant, who pushed back, causing the victim

to trip on the sofa legs and fall. Defendant

opened the door and ran. 

People v Ayala, No A099713, 2003 WL 21198246, at ** 2-3 (Cal Ct App 

May 21, 2003). 

III

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

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“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

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IV

A

1

Petitioner sets forth three claims in support of his

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court turns first to

petitioner’s claim that the trial court’s failure sua sponte to

instruct the jury on the defense of accident or misfortune under

CALJIC No 4.45, violated his due process. CALJIC No 4.45 provides

that “[w]hen a person commits an act or makes an omission through

misfortune or by accident under circumstances that show [neither]

[criminal intent [n]or purpose [nor] [criminal] negligence, [he] ...

does not thereby commit a crime.” 

In reviewing petitioner’s claim, the California Court of

Appeal applied the test set forth in People v Sanchez, 131 Cal App

3d 718, 735 (1982), which provides that a duty to instruct sua

sponte arises only if (1) it appears the defendant is relying on

such a defense, (2) there is substantial evidence supporting it and

(3) the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of

the case. Applying this test, the court concluded that the trial

court did not err in not giving this instruction sua sponte because 

defendant’s theory of the case, including his

appellate argument, is that the victim may have

fallen on his own knife, not that the defendant

accidentally stabbed the victim. Under these

circumstances, there was not evidence that

defendant was relying on the defense of

accident, as it is defined in CALJIC No 4.45,

nor is there substantial evidence supporting the

giving of that instruction, nor is the CALJIC

instruction consistent with defendant’s theory

of the case.

People v Ayala, 2003 WL 21198246, at *2. 

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2

A state trial court’s refusal to give an instruction does

not alone raise a ground cognizable in a federal habeas corpus

proceedings. See Dunckhurst v Deeds, 859 F2d 110, 114 (9th Cir

1988). The omission of an instruction is less likely to be

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law. See Walker v Endell,

850 F2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir 1987) (citing Henderson v Kibbe, 431 US

145, 155 (1977)). The error must so infect the trial that the

defendant was deprived of the fair trial guaranteed by the

Fourteenth Amendment. See id. Thus, a habeas petitioner whose

claim involves a failure to give a particular instruction bears an

“‘especially heavy burden.’” Villafuerte v Stewart, 111 F3d 616,

624 (9th Cir 1997) (quoting Henderson, 431 US at 155). 

An examination of the record is required to see precisely

what was given and what was refused and whether the given

instructions adequately embodied the defendant’s theory. See United

States v Tsinnijinnie, 601 F2d 1035, 1040 (9th Cir 1979). The

defendant is not entitled to have jury instructions raised in the

precise terms he prefers. It suffices that the given instructions

adequately embody the defense theory. See United Staes v Del Muro,

87 F3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir 1996); Tsinnijinnie, 601 F2d at 1040. A

determination is made whether what was given was so prejudicial as

to infect the entire trial and so deny due process. See id. If

constitutional error is found, the court also must find that the

error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the 

//

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jury’s verdict before granting relief in habeas proceedings. See 

Calderon v Coleman, 525 US 141, 146-47 (1998) (citing Brecht v

Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 637 (1993)).

3

 Applying California law to the facts of petitioner’s

case, the California Court of Appeal found that a duty to instruct

on CALJIC No 4.45 did not arise. This court finds that petitioner

is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his instructional error

claim because the California Court of Appeal’s rejection of the

claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable determination

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, or involved an

unreasonable determination of the facts. 28 USC § 2254(d). 

The California Court of Appeal interpreted CALJIC No 4.45,

to require that petitioner must affirmatively “commit[] an act * * *

through misfortune or by accident” in order for this instruction to

apply. Absent contrary Supreme Court precedent, this court must

give deference to the California Court of Appeal’s reasonable

interpretation of its own laws. See Hicks v Feiock, 485 US 624, 629

(1988). 

Applying Sanchez, the California Court of Appeal found

that petitioner did not rely on an accident or misfortune theory of

defense as defined under CALJIC No 4.45, nor that was there

substantial evidence in the record to support an instruction

inconsistent with petitioner’s primary defense theory. This

determination was not objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner testified that he did not stab the victim

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purposefully or accidently in self-defense. Pet’s Testimony,

Exhibit D8 in Support of State Courts’ Answer (Doc #8) at 143:24-27. 

Not surprisingly, petitioner presented no evidence, nor is there

evidence in the record, to support an accident or misfortune

defense. Quite to the contrary, petitioner presented evidence

consistent with his assertion that he never stabbed the victim and

that “the victim may have fallen on his own knife.” Pet’s Closing

Argument, Exhibit D8 in Support of State Courts’ Answer (Doc #8) at

184:26-27. At trial, for example, he testified that he “pushed [the

victim]” when the victim attempted to hit him, causing the victim to

“trip[] up on the sofa.” Petitioner then “opened the door” “to get

out of the house.” Pet’s testimony at 143:2-13. 

Due process does not require that an instruction be given

unless the evidence supports it. See Hopper v Evans, 456 US 605,

611 (1982); Miller v Stagner, 757 F2d 988, 993 (9th Cir), amended,

768 F2d 1090 (9th Cir 1985). Here, petitioner’s evidence supported

his primary defense theory that he “ran” and did not stab the

victim. It did not show a struggle between the victim and

petitioner, which would likely exist had petitioner in fact acted in

“self-defense.” Furthermore, the lack of evidence to support an

accident or misfortune defense demonstrates that petitioner was not,

in fact, relying on this defense. 

Moreover, had CALJIC No 4.45 been given, it could have

prejudiced the petitioner. The jury could have wrongly misconstrued

this to mean that petitioner, in fact, stabbed the victim, a theory

which is inconsistent with petitioner’s primary defense. 

Based on the lack of evidence to support CALJIC No 4.45

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and to indicate that petitioner was relying on such an instruction

in addition to the inconsistency of such an instruction with

petitioner’s primary defense, the California Court of Appeal did not

unreasonably find that such an instruction was unwarranted. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his claim

that he was denied due process because the trial court failed to sua

sponte instruct the jury on CALJIC No 4.45. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

B

1

The court turns next to petitioner’s claim that he was

denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney

failed to request an instruction of accident or defense under CALJIC

No 4.45. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

claims on the ground that he failed to meet his burden of proof to

show unreasonableness and prejudice under Strickland v Washington,

466 US 668 (1984). The court explained:

[G]iven the fact that the instruction was not

supported by the evidence, was inconsistent with

the defense, and that the defense was not

relying upon the defense of accident or

misfortune, defense counsel’s failure to request

an instruction on that defense can hardly be

said to fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness, nor can any prejudice to

defendant have resulted.

People v Ayala, 2003 WL 21198246, at *3. 

2

Under Strickland, petitioner must establish two things. 

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First, he must establish that counsel’s performance was deficient,

ie, that it fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness”

under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 at 687-88. 

The relevant inquiry is not what defense counsel could have done,

but rather whether the choices made by defense counsel were

reasonable. See Babbitt v Calderon, 151 F3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir

1998). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly

deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 US at 689. 

Second, petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s deficient performance, ie, that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id at 694. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the

confidence in the outcome. Id. 

3

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

Under Strickland, petitioner must first establish that

trial counsel’s failure to seek CALJIC NO 4.45 fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness. He does not. First, as

previously discussed (see IV A 3), the instruction did not apply to

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the facts of the case. Second, trial counsel argued that petitioner

did not commit the act of stabbing the victim. Because this

instruction required petitioner to “commit[] an act” (ie, stabbing

the victim), in order for the accident or misfortune defense to

apply, such an instruction could have harmed petitioner’s case. 

Finally, petitioner did not present evidence that the instruction

was warranted. Trial counsel’s decision not to request CALJIC No

4.45 cannot be said to have fallen below an objective standard of

reasonableness. 

Second, assuming petitioner made a showing under the first

prong of Strickland, he must establish that he was prejudiced by

trial counsel’s failure to request CALJIC No 4.45. To show

prejudice under Strickland from failure to file a motion, petitioner

must show that “(1) had his counsel filed the motion, it is

reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as

meritorious, and (2) had the motion been granted, it is reasonable

that there would have been an outcome more favorable to him.” 

Wilson v Henry, 185 F3d 986, 990 (9th Cir 1999). 

There is no such showing here. First, the instruction was

inconsistent with petitioner’s primary defense that he did not stab

the victim. Second, there was not substantial evidence in the

record to support an instruction that petitioner stabbed the victim

accidentally given the fact that petitioner relied on and provided

evidence for a defense that he did not commit this act. If counsel

had made a motion for such an instruction, it cannot be said that it

is reasonable that the trial court would have granted it as

meritorious, nor can it be said that it is reasonable that had the

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motion been granted there would have been an outcome more favorable

to the petitioner. See id. 

The California Court of Appeal reasonably applied the

Strickland standard in rejecting petitioner’s ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See 28 USC 

§ 2254(d). 

C

1

Finally, the court turns to petitioner’s claim that he was

denied due process because the trial court failed to grant him a new

trial based on juror misconduct. 

The California Court of Appeal provided the following

background for petitioner’s claim of jury misconduct:

During deliberations, it was discovered that one

of the jurors had announced, in the presence of

the panel, that he remembered defendant’s name

from the Mendocino county “PUFF” (Psychiatric

Health Facility or PHF). At a hearing regarding

the alleged misconduct, the jury foreperson

indicated that the other jurors asked the

offending juror if he had actually seen

defendant or just heard his name, and the juror

in question replied that he had not seen

defendant. After hearing this, the trial court

assembled the panel, reread CALJIC 1.02 (which

admonishes the jury not to consider the

statements of counsel as evidence), and

explained that the jurors were not to consider

the statement by the offending juror, just as

they could not consider the statements of

attorneys as evidence. The court also read a

portion of CALJIC 2.03, which admonishes the

jury not to make independent investigations and

that they must decide all questions of fact from

the evidence received in the trial, and not from

any other source, indicating that they could not

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consider, for example, matters they “heard out

on the street.” After asking each juror if he

or she could follow these instructions and

ignore any information they had received about

defendant being connected with PHF, and

receiving an affirmative response from each

juror, the trial court denied defendant’s motion

for mistrial.

People v Ayala, 2003 WL 21198246, at *3. 

To determine whether petitioner succeeded in his claim for

jury misconduct, the California Court of Appeal applied the

following test: 

[1]“ * * * ‘defendant must show misconduct on

the part of a juror; [2] if he does, prejudice

is presumed; the state must then rebut the

presumption or lose the verdict. [Citation]’

[Citation.]” People v Rodrigues, 8 Cal 4th

1060, 1178, (Cal Dec 1, 1994).

Id at 3. Assuming that petitioner met the first prong of the test 

for jury misconduct, the court rejected the claim because 

it

perceive[d] no resulting prejudice. Given the

information received by the trial court during

its hearing on this matter, which delineated the

limited information revealed by the offending

juror, and the procedure the trial court

employed to remind the jury of the instructions

to not consider information not received in

trial, to specifically instruct them to ignore

the information they received from the juror,

and to assure they could follow these

instructions,[the court saw] little or no

possibility that any prejudice could have

resulted from the juror’s conduct. 

Id. 

2

A federal court reviewing a habeas claim of juror

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misconduct may grant relief only if it can be established that the

exposure to extrinsic evidence had a “‘substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Sassounian

v Roe, 230 F3d 1097, 1108 (9th Cir 2000) (quoting Brecht v

Abrahamson, 507 US 619, 623 (1993)); see Jeffries v Blodgett, 5 F3d

1180, 1190 (9th Cir 1993) (same). In other words, the error must

result in “actual prejudice.” See Brecht, 507 US at 637.

Several factors are relevant in determining whether the

alleged introduction of extrinsic evidence constitutes reversible

error: 

(1) whether the extrinsic material was actually

received, and if so, how; (2) the length of time

it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to

which the jury discussed and considered it; (4)

whether the material was introduced before a

verdict was reached, and if so, at what point in

the deliberations it was introduced; and (5) any

other matters which may bear on the issue of 

* * * whether the introduction of extrinsic

material [substantially and injuriously]

affected the verdict. 

Lawson v Borg, 60 F3d 608, 612 (9th Cir 1995) (quoting Bayramoglu v

Estelle, 806 F2d 880, 887 (9th Cir 1986), and incorporating Brecht)

(sic in original). 

3 

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim for a new trial because of jury misconduct was not contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination fo the facts. See USC § 2254(d). 

The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined 

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that the trial court cured any potential possibility of prejudice

when it (1) spoke to the jury, (2) advised them to disregard the

juror’s statement regarding petitioner’s name possibly being on a

PHF list and (3) confirmed that such information would not bias any

juror. 

This conclusion is supported by the fact that the

information discussed by the juror was vague in nature and unrelated

to the issue at trial, ie, whether petitioner assaulted the victim

with a deadly weapon. See Lawson, 60 F3d at 612. Furthermore,

there is no indication that the jury discussed and considered the

improper information in coming to their verdict, especially viewed

in conjunction with the fact that the trial court advised them to

disregard the improper information. See id.

Petitioner raises various additional grounds for relief

for the first time in his traverse. It is, however, wellestablished that a traverse is not the proper pleading to raise

additional grounds for relief. See Cacoperdo v Demosthenes, 37 F3d

504, 507 (9th Cir 1994). Based on the record, it cannot be said

that the California Court of Appeal’s determination that petitioner

was not prejudiced by juror misconduct was objectively unreasonable. 

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his jury

misconduct claim. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

//

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Case 3:03-cv-05613-VRW Document 11 Filed 05/03/05 Page 16 of 17
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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V

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. The clerk shall ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of

respondent, CLOSE the file and TERMINATE all motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

Case 3:03-cv-05613-VRW Document 11 Filed 05/03/05 Page 17 of 17