Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00348/USCOURTS-cand-3_02-cv-00348-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steven Cambra
Respondent
James Estep
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JAMES ESTEP,

Petitioner,

 v

STEVEN CAMBRA, JR et al, Warden,

Respondent. /

No C 02-0348 VRW

ORDER

This case is before the court for consideration of 1) the

merits of James Estep’s petition for writ of habeas corpus

concerning his sentencing for his 1997 conviction for failing to

register as a sex offender pursuant to California Penal Code

section 290(g)(2) and 2) petitioner’s motion for appointment of

counsel. 

The trial court found that petitioner had four convictions of

lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under the age of 14, which

gave petitioner four strikes. The court further denied

petitioner’s motion to reduce his conviction, for 

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failing to register as a sex offender, to a misdemeanor and to

strike his prior four strikes. The court sentenced petitioner to

life in prison with a minimum term of twenty-five years. For the

following reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED, and the motion for appointment of counsel is GRANTED.

I

The factual summary of this case, as follows, is

contained in the opinion of the California court of appeal, which

is presumed correct pursuant to 28 USC section 2254(e)(1).

Defendant stipulated that he was required as a convicted

felony sex offender to register his residence with the

local police. He testified that, in 1983, he pled guilty

to four counts of child molestation.

Defendant registered the address of 72 North Fifth

Street, No 16, with the San Jose Police in April 1987. 

He notified them in person of the change of address to

175 North Eighth Street, No 4, in October 1987. In

September 1991 defendant notified the police in person of

another change of address to 454 Reynolds Circle. The

police provided defendant with a permanent registration

card reflecting his current address.

The last registered address the police had for defendant

was 464 Reynolds Circle, where defendant lived in a

warehouse rented by Bill Baker Enterprises. Defendant

worked for Bill Baker, maintaining video games. The

business and defendant moved from that location in July

1993. On July 29, 1993, defendant notified the

Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) of his new address in

San Jose, 46 South Seventh Street, No 5.

On March 12, 1996, the San Jose Police conducted a

routine DMV records check that revealed defendant’s new

address, 46 South Seventh Street, No 5. On July 10,

1996, the police went to this new address and arrested

defendant for failing to register. Defendant told the

arresting officer, Patrick Nation, the following. He did

not notify the Police Department that he had moved. He

could not remember if he had notified them. He was sure

he had gone down and notified them.

Defendant testified at trial that he mailed the police

department a form showing his change of address. He had

no documentation of this letter. He realized he did not

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receive a new registration card in three years at the new

address. He did nothing about it. Defendant said that

he lied about registering in person when he was arrested

because he panicked when the police arrived. 

Doc # 17, Ex C at 2-3.

At the sentencing hearing, the court denied defendant’s

motions to reduce his current conviction to a misdemeanor and to

strike his four prior strikes. The sentencing court reviewed the

defendant’s probation report, the circumstances of the defendant’s

arrest, several psychological assessments, the defendant’s personal

history of poverty and sexual abuse and the testimony of two

neighbors who testified that the defendant was with minor boys on

several occasions over a two to three year period. Doc # 17 Ex C

at 10-13. 

According to petitioner, a material and substantial issue

at sentencing was the circumstance of petitioner’s arrest. When

arrested on July 10, 1996, petitioner was with a ten your old boy

identified as “Willy,” who he had been babysitting alone. The

police officer noted that petitioner’s trouser zipper was unzipped,

although no allegations of molestation were asserted or directly

suggested at trial or sentencing.

The California court of appeal discussed the sentencing

of the petitioner, the evidence on which the sentencing court

relied, and ultimately the decision of the court to deny

defendant’s motion to strike his prior convictions.

Defendant argues that the trial court’s sentencing

rulings relied on evidence that was speculative and

misleading. The trial court applied the wrong standard

by focusing ‘only on the improper speculative evidence.’ 

Had the court considered the relevant factors, it would

have stricken defendant’s prior convictions.

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We do not understand defendant’s real complaint to be

about the nature of the information that the trial court

relied on. Defendant has not denied that when he was

arrested he was babysitting a 10-year-old boy who had

spent the night with him and whose father he had

befriended through work. Defendant’s opening brief

asserts, ‘the evidence relied upon the court, while

accurate in its, was clearly...speculative and unreliable

with respect to the conclusion drawn.’

What defendant objects to is that ‘the court implicitedly

[sic] concluded [defendant] had been molesting W.’ The

court concluded that defendant ‘must have engaged in some

sort of inappropriate conduct with W.’ The trial court

found that defendant ‘was probably guilty of additional

and far more serious crimes.’

The short answer to this argument is that the court did

not reach these speculative conclusions. Instead, as

quoted above, the court acknowledged there was no

allegation of molest. What bothered the court was

defendant’s questionable judgment, not inherently

improper behavior. Had defendant not molested children

14 years earlier, it might be innocuous that he was

babysitting for a friend. What bothered the court was

the potential for a repeat offense, not its actuality. 

It appears defendant is criticizing the trial court for

conclusions it did not draw. 

Doc # 17 Ex C, 14-16

After a two day hearing on June 27 and July 18, 1997, the

defendant was sentenced to a state prison term of twenty-five years

to life. Petitioner is currently serving this sentence at the Mule

Creek State Prison in Ione, California.

Petitioner filed a timely appeal of his conviction which

was denied in part and granted in part by the California court of

appeal, sixth appellate district, on February 18, 1999. Doc # 17

Ex C. Petition for review was denied on April 28, 1999 by the

California Supreme Court. Doc # 17 Ex D, E. 

Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus in the California court of appeal on or about July 9, 1999. 

The petition was denied, and petitioner was allowed to refile in

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Santa Clara superior court. Petitioner filed a writ of habeas

corpus in the superior court, which was denied on January 13, 2000. 

Doc # 17 Ex G, H. Petitioner appealed the decision to the

California court of appeal and the California Supreme Court. Both

courts denied the petition. Doc # 17 Ex I, J. 

On January 22, 2002, petitioner filed the instant petition for

writ of habeas corpus in this court pursuant to 28 USC § 2254. 

Petitioner alleges that the judgment rendered against him was in

violation of his (1) Sixth Amendment right to competent counsel;

(2) Fourteenth Amendment right to due process due to the

suppression of material evidence pertaining to his sentence; and

(3) Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and fundamental

fairness related to the trial court taking into account unreliable

and speculative evidence at sentencing. Petitioner seeks a writ of

habeas corpus vacating his sentence and remanding the case to

superior court for a new sentencing hearing. Briefing on the

petition was completed on January 13, 2005, with the filing of

petitioner’s reply memorandum.

II 

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas

corpus “in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment

of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” 28 USC § 2254(a). A state court’s determination is

reviewed for unreasonableness, not error. See Williams v Taylor,

529 US 362 (2000); Anderson v Alameida, 2005 US App LEXIS 1646 (9th

Cir 2005). Even if a ruling is an unreasonable application of law,

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the application must have a “substantial and injurious effect” in

order to justify overturning a conviction. Penry v Johnson, 532 US

782, 795 (2001). A federal court may grant habeas relief if the

state court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by

the [United States] Supreme Court” or was “based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in

the State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d). 

A

Turning to petitioner’s Sixth Amendment claim that he was

denied his right to effective representation, petitioner argues

that his trial counsel did not adequately represent him by failing

to locate and interview Willy, the boy found with petitioner at the

time of his arrest. According to petitioner, because of this

failure, the trial court speculated that petitioner had molested

Willy and, thus, sentenced Estep to a prison term of twenty-five

years to life. Doc # 3. 

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

cognizable as a claim of denial of the right secured by the Sixth

Amendment. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 686 (1984). To

demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

satisfy a two-prong test. First, he must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness

and, second, he must show that there was prejudice as a result. Id

at 687-92. With respect to the first prong, judicial scrutiny of

counsel’s performance must be highly deferential and a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id, see also

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Sanders v Ratelle, 21 F 3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir 1994). Counsel’s

conduct must be evaluated for purposes of the performance standard

of Strickland at the time of counsel’s conduct. Lowry v Lewis, 21

F 3d 344, 346 (9th Cir 1994). With respect to the second prong,

“the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability

that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Strickland, 466 US 668 at 694; see also Sanders, 21 F 3d at 1461. 

The petitioner has failed to show that his attorney’s failure to

interview Willy violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 

Petitioner may have a colorable argument that his counsel

failed to act effectively when he failed to interview the boy found

with the petitioner at the time of the arrest. Although the court

will generally presume that counsel acted appropriately,

Strickland, 466 US 668 at 694, counsel has a responsibility to

investigate in order to make reasonable decisions as to strategy. 

Id at 691. Without interviewing Willy, petitioner’s counsel may

well have lacked the information to ascertain whether Willy’s

testimony would assist or harm the defense. Yet even if petitioner

could show that his attorney’s failure to interview Willy fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness, petitioner fails to

meet the second prong necessary to prevail on his Sixth Amendment

claim.

Pursuant to the second prong, petitioner has failed to

show that, but for his counsel’s error in failing to interview

Willy, the sentencing proceeding would have been different. 

Although petitioner argues that Willy’s presence at the time of the

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arrest was a critical element in the trial court sentence, there is

significant evidence to the contrary. Although the trial court

spent some time reviewing the circumstances of the petitioner’s

arrest, specifically articulating concern that petitioner would put

himself in a position similar to the circumstances surrounding his

initial sex offenses, i e babysitting a young boy, the trial court

clearly stated that it did not assume that petitioner had committed

acts of molestation. Doc #17 Exh C, 16. Instead, the trial court

declined to exercise its extraordinary power to strike prior

offenses based on the facts of the arrest: the petitioner

exercised bad judgment given the circumstances of his previous

convictions. Thus, even if Willy had testified that petitioner had

not molested him, it appears such testimony would have had no

impact on the sentence. The court defers to, and agrees with, the

state appellate court’s findings related to the interpretation of

the trial court’s reasoning at sentencing. See Williams v. Rhodes,

354 F3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir 2004) (“On habeas review, state

appellate court findings – including those that interpret unclear

or ambiguous trial court rulings – are entitled to the same

presumption of correctness that we afford trial court findings”). 

The trial court did not conclude that petitioner had molested Willy

therefore Willy’s testimony would not have been relevant to the

sentence imposed. 

B

Second, petitioner claims that his conviction resulted

from the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right when the

prosecution allegedly failed to disclose the statements Willy made

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to the police at the time of the petitioner’s arrest. Petitioner

argues that this failure to comply with Brady v. Maryland

constituted prejudicial error in the petitioner’s sentence. 373 US

83 (1963). The petitioner’s argument fails.

It is unclear from the record whether Willy’s statements

to the police were disclosed to defense counsel. See Doc # 3 Ex A

at 2. Assuming the prosecutor did not disclose the statements,

petitioner has failed to show that Brady v Maryland applies.

Withheld material is not considered under the framework of Brady

unless it is both favorable to the defense and material to either

punishment or guilt. Id at 87. Evidence is material only “if

there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” United States v Bagley, 473 US 667, 682 (1985)

(plurality opinion). 

In this case, Willy’s testimony was not material to the

sentencing decision. As discussed above, the trial court firmly

asserted that there was no allegation of the petitioner molesting

Willy therefore any evidence supporting the position that the

petitioner did not molest Willy would have had virtually no impact

on the trial court’s sentence. In light of this, and the

supporting findings of the state appellate court, see Doc # 17 Ex

C, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that such disclosures

would have made any appreciable impact on the sentence.

C

Last, petitioner argues that his Fourteenth Amendment

right to a fundamentally fair sentencing hearing was violated

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because the trial court based its denial of defendant’s motion to

strike his prior convictions on the speculative and unreliable

evidence that petitioner had molested Willy. In order to prevail,

petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating improper reliance by

showing that the information was false or unreliable and that the

information was the basis for the sentence. United States v Lewis,

880 F2d 243, 246 (9th Cir 1989). In order to demonstrate reliance,

petitioner must cite to the record to show that the court based its

sentence on improper evidence. Id. 

Again, petitioner’s argument is grounded in the position that

the trial court based its sentencing decision on the belief that

petitioner molested Willy. As asserted above, this was not the

basis of the trial court’s decision. Thus, petitioner has failed

to demonstrate that the court based its sentence on an assertion of

molestation. 

III

Petitioner has requested that the court appoint counsel to

represent him, nunc pro tunc, in his writ of habeas corpus. Due to

the substantial and complex legal and factual questions that

provided the basis of the petitioner’s writ, the motion is GRANTED.

The decision to appoint counsel is within the discretion of 

the court. See Chaney v Lewis, 801 F2d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir 1986). 

The court may appoint counsel in exceptional cases where the case

turns on complex procedural, factual or legal questions and/or when

the petitioner is not in a position to investigate crucial or

complicated facts. 

//

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The habeas petition in question required the assistance of

counsel in order to present and argue adequately the constitutional

issues raised by petitioner. Given the financial indigence of the

petitioner, justice requires this court to GRANT petitioner’s

motion to appoint Alex Green as counsel, nunc pro tunc. 

IV

Based on the foregoing analysis of the legal issues

raised, the writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and the petition is

DISMISSED. The clerk is directed to close the file and terminate

all pending motions. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CHIEF JUDGE

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