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Parties Involved:
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent
YMCA Of The Pikes Peak Region, Inc.
Petitioner

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

United St9Ul~ t.:mm of Appeals 'f enth Clreuit 

SE:P 2 6 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL~QBERT L. HOECKER 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

YMCA OF THE PIKES PEAK REGION, . 

INC., 

Petitioner, 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2963 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 

Respondent. 

Appeal from the National Labor Relations Board 

(No. 27-CA-9482) 

Raymond M. Deeny (N. Dawn Webber, with him on the brief), of 

Sherman & Howard, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Petitioner. 

Fred L. Cornnell (Peter Winkler, Supervisory Attorney; Joseph E. 

Desio, Acting General Counsel; Robert E. Allen, Associate General 

Counsel; Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate General Counsel, 

with him on the brief), National Labor Relations Board, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent. 

Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and SEAY,* District 

Judge. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

* The Honorable Frank H. Seay, Chief Judge, United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 1 
Petitioner YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc., challenges a 

National Labor Relations Board order adopting the Administrative 

Law Judge's ruling that the YMCA violated sections 8(a)(l), (3), 

and (4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. §§ 

158(a) (1), .,.(3), .. and (k) .(1988) .. The .Board .. filed a crossapplication for enforcement of the order. We have reviewed the 

arguments of the YMCA, and we hold that enforcement of the Board 

order is warranted. 

I. 

The YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region is a nonprofit, charitable, 

membership organization with two branches in Colorado Springs, a 

Downtown Center and a Garden Ranch Center. These facilities offer 

swimming pools, exercise equipment, weight rooms, tanning beds, 

meeting areas, and locker rooms, some of which are equipped with 

saunas, whirlpools, color television, and free toiletries and 

towels. The YMCA provides a range of health, educational, and 

recreational programs for children, adults, and senior citizens, 

including swimming instruction, yoga, aerobics, karate, weight 

reduction, and smoking cessation programs. The two facilities 

have a membership of approximately ten thousand. 

Each member of the YMCA receives a card which has a statement 

of purpose on the back reading in part: "'The purpose of the Y. 

is to establish-and maintain a-fellowship of individuals and 

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families of all faiths, and ..• build a Christian society 

through activities and services which contribute to spiritual, 

intellectual, physical and social growth.'" Rec., vol. I, at 52. 

The YMCA's membership.dues and.program.fees constitute its 

principal source of income. During calendar year 1986, its gross 

revenues were $2,674,500, of which $56,700 went to purchase 

supplies and materials directly from suppliers located outside the 

State of Colorado. See rec., vol. II, g.c. ex. 2. The YMCA of 

the Pikes Peak Region is affiliated with the YMCA of the U.S.A., 

to which the local YMCA pays a percentage of its income in 

exchange for use of the logo, an employee retirement fund, and a 

number of other services. Local YMCAs must follow the 

constitution of the national YMCA, but their national affiliation 

does not require that they honor memberships from locations 

outside Colorado. 

The YMCA's Garden Ranch Center first hired Rita Ague in July, 

1985, to work as a substitute on the aquatic staff. In September, 

she began working twenty hours a week on a regularly scheduled 

part-time basis. On October 6, during an informal meeting called 

by aquatic director Diane Sanford and consisting of the entire 

aquatic staff, Ague voiced concerns she and other employees held 

about pool safety, wage, and overtime pay problems. Ague 

suggested to those at the meeting that because of these concerns, 

the employees.might want to consider bringing in a union, and she 

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passed around an envelope for interested employees to sign. Ague 

and four other employees put down their names. Ague then 

contacted the Office and Professional Employees Union, Local No. 

5. 

The next day, Sanford and Fawn Kirkland, Ague's immediate 

supervisor, reported to Ray Weber, the Garden Ranch Center 

executive director, that Ague had circulated the sign-up sheet. 

On October 8, Weber approached Ague while she was working in the 

pool area and asked her to come into his office. With Sanford 

present, Weber expressed his concern that Ague had not come to him 

first with the problems she saw at the YMCA. According to Ague, 

Weber then asked her whether she had contacted the union, and when 

she said that she had, he asked her what specific person she had 

contacted. He also requested that Ague inform him of "any union 

activities that might be occurring, or would occur in the future." 

Rec., vol. I, at 88. At some point in the conversation, they 

discussed the termination of an employee, whom Ague believed was 

fired for his union activities, but whom Weber asserted had 

resigned voluntarily. Within a few weeks of Ague's conversation 

with Weber, YMCA employees and a union representative began to 

meet. 

On October 14, Fawn Kirkland telephoned Ague to inform her 

that her hours "had been cut way back. 11 Id. at 91. Kirkland told 

her that there ,had not been any problem with her work performance, 

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but that Sanford had told Kirkland that Ague's "hours were being 

cut back radically and that Ray Weber wanted to get rid of the 

troublemaker," Id, at 92. Kirkland also told her that she had 

recently submitted her own resignation, 

Ague confronted Sanford, who denied making the "troublemaker" 

comment. Ague informed her that she intended to contact the union 

regarding her hours change, and she did so, According to Ague, 

Sanford then told her that "she was still in the process of 

reshuffling [the schedule], and she would get back to (Ague]." 

Id, at 94. The union sent the YMCA a letter dated October 24 

expressing its intent to organize the YMCA workers, and noting 

that any change in Ague's working conditions as a result of her 

organizing activities would violate section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 

See rec., vol. II, r. ex. 7, By the end of October, Ague's hours 

essentially had been restored. 

On November 13 and 14, James Klever, the YMCA's president and 

chief executive officer, conducted mandatory meetings for all 

employees in order to discuss the current unionization efforts. 

At one point during a meeting at which Ague was present, Klever 

commented that "it took a hundred men to build a barn, but one 

jackass to tear it down," 1 Rec., vol, I, at 98. When Klever 

1 Klever testified that he said "any jackass can tear down a 

barn, but it takes a craftsman to build one," Rec., vol, I, at 

498. 

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opened up the meeting for general discussion, Ague stood up and 

explained that she was the "jackass" referred to because she was 

the person who had called the union. She then elaborated upon the 

reasons why she thought a union was necessary. 

At a later meeting with Klever, Ague again stood up to 

explain why she favored unionization. She also stated her concern 

that "when employees had tried to organize ... they had been 

asked to resign." Id. at 102. According to Ague, Klever then 

told her that "'[i]f you knew what a limb you've climbed out onto, 

you'd have heart failure.'" Id. She replied, "'I don't threaten 

easily,'" and Klever responded, "'Neither do I.'" Id. at 102-03. 

During this time, efforts to organize the employees 

continued. One of the union activists, Bernadette O'Bryan, had a 

conversation about unionization with co-employee Dennis Schwed on 

November 15 while both were working in the physical services area. 

O'Bryan testified that she had asked Schwed, who is mildly 

retarded and has emotional problems, what he thought of the 

meetings concerning union organization efforts. He told her he 

wanted to talk to a friend about unions. O'Bryan suggested he 

also might want to talk to YMCA employees, and then she mentioned 

she felt "really frustrated with the narrow-mindedness of the 

employees that have come to [her] over the-years complaining about 

different policies at the Y and then not doing anything about it." 

Id. at 222. 

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About a week later, O'Bryan's supervisor, Jim Asleson, called 

O'Bryan into his office and handed her a letter. The letter was a 

warning to her that any similar discussion regarding union matters 

would res.ult . . in. her. termination .... Asleson ... told .. her. that Schwed had 

been very upset after the conversation, and had claimed that 

O'Bryan had called him a coward. O'Bryan denied that she had 

referred to Schwed as a coward. She also testified that she had 

never been reprimanded in the past for conversations not related 

to work, nor had her co-workers ever been disciplined for 

solicitations relating to football tickets or restaurants, for 

example. 

On December 19, the union filed an unfair labor practices 

charge with the Board. On February 14, 1986, the parties entered 

into a settlement agreement in which the YMCA promised not to 

threaten employees with a cut in hours or any other type of 

retaliation because of their union involvement. The YMCA also 

agreed not to forbid union solicitation where the YMCA did not 

forbid other types of solicitation, and to rescind and remove the 

warning letter from O'Bryan's personnel file. See rec., vol. II, 

r. ex. 10 (a) • 

After the settlement agreement, the employees had further 

unionization meetings. Towards the end of February, just before 

Ague left on.a.vacation, a number of employees signed union 

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authorization cards in Ague's presence. One of these employees 

was Wes Beal. When Ague returned from her vacation, she 

discovered that Beal had been fired on March 5 for sexual 

harassment of Marnie Duke, a sixteen year-old high school student 

who worked at,~the .... Garden -Ranch .. -Center.-.as. a ... lifeguard and an 

instructor. Ague tried to get more information about the firing 

from other employees, but was unable to learn very much; her 

co-workers told her that she should talk to Duke if she wanted to 

learn more. 

Ague testified she initially called Beal, who told her that 

he was "in a state of shock," that "[h]e was extremely surprised 

at being fired," and that he did not feel he had done anything to 

warrant the sexual harassment charge. Rec., vol. r, at 117, Ague 

asked him whether he thought his firing could be the result of 

union activities, and Beal responded that he may have aroused the 

hostility of YMCA management by defending Ague at one of the 

November meetings with Klever, According to Ague, she then "asked 

[Beal] if he felt that he wanted to pursue this matter [with the 

union], and he said yeah, he thought he did," Id. at 119, 

Ague contacted the union representative, and agreed to give 

an affidavit on March 19 to an investigating Board agent. Shortly 

before she was scheduled to give the affidavit, Ague testified 

that she tried to discuss Beal's firing with Sanford, but Sanford 

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told her she was too busy to talk to her. Ague stated that 

Sanford promised to get back to her later, but did not. 

After unsuccessfully attempting to speak to Duke at the YMCA 

on March .18,. Ague .~told. Duke .she~would-calLher at .home, and she 

did so on the morning of March 19. According to Ague, she began 

the conversation by emphasizing that she was opposed to sexual 

harassment, and then she asked "'what in the devil did [Beal] do 

to you to cause you . . . to file a [sexual harassment 

grievance] . f II Id. at 124. 2 When Duke said she did not know, Ague 

was more specific and inquired whether Beal had touched her or 

asked her to go to bed with him. To each of these questions, Duke 

responded in the negative. Ague testified she then explained to 

Duke that she was calling because she had to give an affidavit 

that day and that she wanted to ascertain whether Beal had been 

fired for "the right reasons," or because of his union activities. 

Duke did not elaborate on the substance of the sexual harassment 

charge, but suggested that Ague call another employee who had 

problems with Beal. Immediately after the conversation, Duke told 

her mother that Ague had just telephoned, and her mother called 

Weber after Duke left for school to express her anger that Ague 

had called and upset her daughter. Later that day, Weber spoke to 

2 Duke's account differs somewhat: Duke testified that Ague 

ignored Duke's protestations that she had to leave to go to 

school, and demanded that Duke tell her "why the hell [Beal] was 

fired." Rec., vol. I, at 294. Duke also characterized Ague's 

questions as "demeaning" and "belittling," and she stated that she 

was very upset by the conversation. 

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Duke, and she relayed the conversation to him, including the fact 

that Ague was about to give an affidavit. 

The next morning Weber, with Sanford, called Ague into his 

off ice .. to, question..:.her .. about.0-the..:,previous . day.~ s, .telephone 

conversation with Duke. Ague verified that she had asked Duke 

certain questions, and she explained that she had been concerned 

that Beal was fired not for sexual harassment, but for his union 

activity. Ague also asked whether she could meet with Duke and 

Weber to discuss the charges. Weber told her that he would 

-consider the matter and determine what action to take. Later that 

afternoon, Weber called Ague back into his office, where he told 

her she was being terminated for "gross interference in a sexual 

harassment complaint." Id. at 134. 

The union filed an unfair labor practices charge with the 

Board in which it alleged that the YMCA had discriminated against 

Ague by firing her because of her union activity, had coerced and 

restrained Ague because of her union activity, and had unlawfully 

discriminated against O'Bryan by issuing her a letter of 

reprimand. The administrative law judge ruled that the YMCA had 

violated sections B(a)(l), (3), and (4) of the Act. In so doing, 

the ALJ set aside the settlement agreement because it found that 

the YMCA engaged in post-settlement unfair labor practices. The 

Board affirmed the findings and conclusions of the ALJ and adopted 

the ALJ's order. 

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II. 

The YMCA first argues that the YMCA's impact on interstate 

commerce ... was. insufficient. to., warrant. .. the .Board ~s .. exercise of its 

jurisdiction. Board jurisdiction is of two types, statutory and 

discretionary. Statutory jurisdiction derives from section lO(a) 

of the Act, which grants the Board the power "to prevent any 

person from engaging in any unfair labor practice ... affecting 

commerce." 29 u.s.c. § 160(a) (1988). Because Congress has 

vested in the Board "the fullest jurisdictional breadth 

constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause," NLRB v. 

Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963) (per curiam), 

the Board may exercise its broad statutory jurisdiction whenever 

"an employer 'has more than a de minimis impact on the flow of 

interstate commerce.'" NLRB v. Southeast Ass'n for Retarded 

Citizens, Inc., 666 F.2d 428, 430 (9th Cir. 1982)(citation 

omitted). 

Although its statutory jurisdiction is quite broad and 

therefore is not challenged by the YMCA, the Board has limited its 

jurisdictional reach under its discretionary powers. The Board 

curtails its jurisdiction by adhering to self-imposed minimum 

jurisdictional guidelines based on dollar amounts, which enables 

the Board to distinguish between those enterprises essentially 

local in character.and.those with a pronounced.impact on the flow 

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of interstate conunerce. See R. Gorman, Labor Law§ 2 (1976). A 

business generally must meet one of two relevant dollar 

limitations before the Board will assert its jurisdiction. If a 

business is a retail enterprise, it ordinarily must have a gross 

annual busine.ss __ ,volume. of $500, ooo~,,and .must .. make. substantial 

purchases from or sales to other states on a direct or indirect 

basis. The Board will generally assert jurisdiction over a 

non-retail establishment if the gross outflow or inflow of 

revenues across state lines is at least $50,000. See NLRB v. 

Marsden, 701 F.2d 238, 241 (2d Cir. 1983). Of course, it is 

important to remember that "all of the above dollar standards are 

adopted and applied as a matter of the Board's discretion .... 

Thus, the Board has asserted jurisdiction regardless of whether 

its dollar standards have been satisfied where 'public policy 

requires the Board to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest 

extent.'" Gorman, Labor Law§ 2, at 25 (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, "[i]n light of the broad discretion given to the 

Board in the exercise of its jurisdiction, courts should intervene 

only where there is obvious unjust discrimination." Southeast 

Ass'n, 666 F.2d at 431. 

The YMCA raises several points in support of the argument 

that the Board inappropriately exercised its discretionary 

jurisdiction. First, the YMCA asserts that the ALJ incorrectly 

applied the retail standard to it. The basis for the YMCA's 

argument is not.altogether clear. It emphasizes its charitable 

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character, and thus seems to equate retail with for-profit and 

non-retail with not-for-profit. As the ALJ correctly pointed out, 

however, it is the fact that the YMCA's "services are directly to 

ultimate consumers," rec., vol. III, doc. 1, at 5, that makes it a 

retail establishmen:t •. ~ . .S.ee '" -~, .. Bussey.,.,.:Williams .. Tire Co., 122 

NLRB No. 137, 43 LRRM 1266 (1959). The YMCA's gross annual 

business volume and its purchases from other states satisfies this 

retail standard. Even if the YMCA is categorized as a non-retail 

establishment, the direct inflow of materials from outside of 

Colorado in 1986 was $56,700. This amount meets the Board's 

jurisdictional guidelines. 

The YMCA also argues that the Board should have asserted 

jurisdiction only upon finding that the YMCA had a "significant" 

impact on interstate commerce. Citing Ming Quong Children's 

Center, 210 NLRB No. 125, 86 LRRM 1254 (1974), it contends that 

charitable organizations as a general rule do not have such an 

impact. This contention misstates the law. In The Rhode Island 

Catholic Orphan Asylum (St. Aloysius Home), 224 NLRB No. 70, 92 

LRRM 1355, 1357 (1976), the Board expressly did away with the Ming 

Quong rule: 

"[W)e see no reason to establish separate standards for 

institutions that seek to accomplish the same end but 

differ only in whether they are charitable or 

noncharitable. The sole basis for declining or 

asserting jurisdiction over charitable organizations 

will now be identical with those which are not 

charitable." 

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That non-profit institutions should be analyzed for 

jurisdiction in a manner identical to that applied to their forprofit counterparts has been consistently reaffirmed. See NLRB v. 

Lighthouse for the Blind, 696 F.2d 399, 404 n.21 (5th Cir. 1983) 

( ti 'Congress. appears~.~to .have. agreed.c.that .nonprof.it. institutions 

tlaffect commercetl under modern economic conditions'tl) (quoting 

NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 681 n.11 (1980)); Long 

Stretch Youth Home, Inc., 280 NLRB No. 79, 122 LRRM 1272, 1275 

(1986); Conway R.R. YMCA, 237 NLRB No. 178, 99 LRRM 1157, 1158 

(1978) (tithe Board for jurisdictional purposes no longer 

distinguishes between profit and nonprofit organizationst1). 

Furthermore, it is irrelevant for jurisdictional purposes that an 

enterprise is wholly charitable in its purpose, as well as in its 

organizational structure. 3 See The United Way of Howard County, 

Inc., 287 NLRB No. 98, 127 LRRM 1185 (1988) (nonprofit 

corporations engaged in activities solely for benevolent purposes 

cannot avoid the rule of St. Aloysius Home and the inclusion of 

such corporations within NLRB jurisdiction); Conway R.R. YMCA, 99 

LRRM at 1158 (charitable or worthy purpose not basis for declining 

jurisdiction). 

As with all organizations, charitable organizations must have 

a sufficient impact on interstate commerce for the Board to 

3 Although we need not decide whether the YMCA has a charitable 

purpose, we agree with the ALJ that the statement of purpose 

notwithstanding, the YMCA is in many ways indistinguishable from a 

for-profit health club. See rec., vol. III, doc. 1, at 6. 

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exercise its jurisdiction. See United Way, 127 LRRM at 1185, 

Because the YMCA has met the discretionary jurisdictional 

standards, see Greater Boston YMCA, 243 NLRB No, 70, 101 LRRM 1521 

(1979), we conclude that the Board did not abuse its discretion in 

finding .the., .. YMCA,f s ... ,,impact .... on interstate. c.ommerce •.. to be 

"sufficient. 114 

III. 

The YMCA challenges the Board's finding of unfair labor 

practices based on both pre-settlement and post-settlement 

conduct. With regard to pre-settlement conduct, the YMCA contends 

that the settlement agreement entered into by the parties 

precludes what in effect is relitigation of that earlier conduct. 

Even if the Board properly set aside the settlement agreement, the 

YMCA argues that the evidence is insufficient to find it committed 

unfair labor practices by interrogating Ague and reprimanding 

O'Bryan. It likewise argues that the evidence of post-settlement 

conduct is insufficient to support a finding that the firing of 

Ague constituted an unfair labor practice. 

4 The YMCA makes one final argument. It contends that the 

Board's exercise of jurisdiction was inappropriate because the 

Board only adopted the ALJ's opinion and did not articulate its 

own reasons for assertion of jurisdiction. This argument has no 

merit. We have long held that the Board need not restate the 

ALJ's opinion in its entirety if the ALJ's findings sufficiently 

inform the parties of the disposition of the arguments made. See 

The Artra Group, Inc. v. NLRB, 730 F.2d 586, 590 (10th Cir. 1984); 

NLRB v. Wichita Television Corp., 277 F.2d 579, 585 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 364 U.S. 871 (1960). 

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A. 

As a preliminary matter, we note that a court reviewing a 

Board order..,."should .. grant .. enforcement if .. the. Board ... correctly 

interpreted and applied the law and if its findings are supported 

by substantial evidence in the record, considered in its 

entirety." Presbyterian/St. Luke's Medical Center v. NLRB, 723 

F.2d 1468, 1471 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Universal Camera Corp. 

v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488-91 (1951); Le'Mon v. NLRB, F.2d 

__ , __ ,No. 88-2833, slip op. at 5-6 (10th Cir. May 7, 1990); 29 

u.s.c. § 160(e) (1988) ("The findings of the Board with respect to 

questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the 

record considered as a whole shall be conclusive"). Substantial 

evidence is defined as "'such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" 

Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 477 (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. 

v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

B. 

A settlement agreement is binding on all parties to it, but 

it "will be set aside if its provisions are breached or if 

postsettlement unfair labor practices are committed." Lawyers 

Coop. Publishing Co., 273 NLRB No. 31, 118 LRRM 1213, 1215 n.4 

(1984); see also Soule Glass & Glazing Co. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055, 

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ll09 (1st Cir. 1981). If the settlement agreement is set aside, 

the employer's pre-settlement conduct may be assessed for unfair 

labor practices. Moreover, in order to determine whether 

post-settlement conduct constitutes an unfair labor practice, 

"presett.lement.. conduc.t. may .be .. considered .. as ~background evidence in 

determining the motive or object underlying a respondent's 

postsettlement conduct." Lawyers Coop., 118 LRRM at 1215 n.4; see 

also NLRB v. Shurtenda Steaks, Inc., 397 F.2d 939, 945 (10th Cir. 

1968) (employer unfair labor conduct antedating settlement 

admissible to determine purpose and intent of post-settlement 

conduct); Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 270 NLRB No, 71, 116 

LRRM 1073, 1074-75 (1984) (employer conduct prior to settlement 

agreement relevant regarding lack of anti-union animus). 

Because a finding of a post-settlement unfair labor practice 

or breach of a provision of the settlement agreement is necessary 

before the pre-settlement conduct can be re-examined, we turn 

first to the issue of Ague's discharge, which is the basis of her 

claim that the YMCA committed post-settlement unfair labor 

practices. 

c. 

The ALJ found that the discharge of Ague constituted an 

unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)(l), (3), and 

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(4). 5 A violation of sections 8(a)(l) and (3) occurs where four 

factors are present. An employee must have been engaged in 

concerted activity, the employer must have known of the concerted 

nature of the activity, the concerted activity must be protected 

under the. Act,_ and ,the. employer.'.s .discrimination.must have been 

motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity. See 

Meyers Industr. (Meyers I), 268 NLRB 493, 115 LRRM 1025, 1029 

(1984), remanded on other grounds, Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941 

(D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, Meyers Industr., Inc. v. Prill, 

474 U.S. 948 (1985), on remand, 281 NLRB No. 118, 123 LRRM 1137 

(1986), aff'd, Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2847 (1988). 

5 The relevant portions of section 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988) 

read: 

"(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an 

employer--

(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce 

employees in the exercise of the rights 

guaranteed in section 157 of this title; 

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure 

of employement or any term or condition of 

employment to encourage or discourage 

membership in any labor organization ..• ; 

(4) to discourage or otherwise discriminate 

against an employee because [she] has filed 

charges or given testimony under this 

subchapter. . 11 

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Section 7 of the Act, 29 u.s.c. § 157 (1988), guarantees that 

employees "have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or 

assist labor organizations, ... and to engage in other concerted 

activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 

mutual a.id _or ... ,protec:tion.X .,The. ALJ, .focusing. on Ague's telephone 

call to Duke, found that call to be "concerted activity" within 

the meaning of section 7. 6 

The YMCA disputes the finding of concertedness. It asserts, 

for example, that no employee specifically asked Ague to telephone 

Duke, that Beal admitted his discharge was due to his sexual 

harassment of Duke, that Beal never stated he was certain his 

discharge was due to his union activities, and that it was 

6 Ague was discharged for '"gross interference with the YMCA's 

enforcement of anti-harassment, and intimidating and demeaning 

employees who have filed sexual harassment charges.'" Rec., vol. 

III, doc. 1, at 24. The ALJ analyzed the unfair labor practice 

charge by focusing on Ague's phone call and using the four-part 

test. Although we will follow this approach in assessing the 

sufficiency of the evidence, we note the existence of alternative 

ways to structure the analysis. In NLRB v. Transportation 

Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983), for example, the 

Supreme Court stated that "if the employer fires an employee for 

having engaged in union activities and has no other basis for the 

discharge, or if the reasons that [it] proffers are pretextual, 

the employer commits an unfair labor practice." A court therefore 

could avoid determining whether the phone call, standing by 

itself, was concerted activity and instead focus on the entire 

range of Ague's union activity and inquire whether the phone call 

was a mere pretext for the discharge. Because the ALJ found that 

the YMCA "seized upon this telephone conversation in order to rid 

itself of the leading union adherent; and that she would not have 

been discharged but for her union activities," rec., vol. III, 

doc. 1, at 27-28, and because our review of the record yields 

substantial evidence to sustain this finding, the ALJ's result 

could be upheld under the alternate analysis. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 19 
Ague who suggested taking a complaint to the union. These 

contentions by the YMCA are either inaccurate or irrelevant. Our 

review of the record shows that while Beal emphasized he was 

charged with sexual harassment, he did not understand why he had 

been fired, .. ,and ... that. perhaps. it .was. a.result of; .. his support of 

Ague at the meeting with Klever, The fact that Ague suggested 

further investigation and consultation with the union is 

completely irrelevant. Concerted activity is activity "engaged in 

with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by and 

on behalf of the employee [herself]," Meyers I, 115 LRRM at 1029. 

Evidence that Ague received authority from Beal to pursue the 

matter on his behalf is sufficient to support a finding of 

"concertedness, 117 See B & P Motor Express Inc. v, NLRB, 413 F,2d 

1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1969) (action in support of fellow employee 

over her grievance is concerted activity within meaning of section 

7); see also rec., vol, III, doc, 4, at 2 (Board found that 

"Ague's telephone call to Duke was concerted activity engaged in 

with or on·the authority of other employees, and not solely by and 

on behalf of the employee herself"), 

7 The YMCA also asserts that Local No. 5, the union Ague 

contacted, was not the official collective bargaining 

representative and was less interested in Beal than in pursuing 

its own agenda. The union's status, of course, has no bearing on 

whether Ague herself was engaged in concerted activity, since 

section 7 protects employees who assist labor organizations or 

"engage in other concerted activities," 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 20 
The YMCA then contends that the ALJ had insufficient evidence 

to support her finding that the YMCA knew Ague's telephone call to 

Duke was concerted activity protected under section 7. 8 We 

disagree. As the ALJ noted, Duke told Weber that Ague had 

referredto..an __ ,"affidavit'' she had.to give •.. See.id., doc. 1, at 

25. Additionally, Ague testified that she expressed her concern 

about Beal's discharge to Sanford prior to her telephone call to 

Duke. See rec., vol, I, at 121. 

The YMCA's next contention is that Ague's telephone call 

caused harm as defined by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 

u.s.c. § 2000e (1982), and created an intimidating and coercive 

environment for other employees in the exercise of their statutory 

rights. The call, according to the YMCA, therefore should lose 

the protection of the Act. In support of its argument, the YMCA 

engages in a lengthy discussion in which it emphasizes the 

potential liability it would face for any acts of retaliation 

against a sexually-harassed employee and for acts of sexual 

harassment of one of its employees by another. We agree with the 

ALJ that these arguments lack merit. Title VII makes it unlawful 

"for an employer to discriminate against any" employee who has 

complained of sexual harassment. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-3(a) (1982) 

(emphasis added). Ague was neither the employer nor acting on her 

employer's behalf. Unlike Arnold v. City of Seminole, 614 F. 

8 The YMCA does not contend that it lacked knowledge of Ague's 

union organizational effort. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 21 
Supp. 853, 859, 870 (E.D. Okla. 1985), which the YMCA cites, this 

case does not involve a city police chief threatening a plaintiff 

with discharge if she pursued her right to be free of sexual 

harassment. Here, by contrast, Ague was not in a position of 

authority. over,.Duke,.nor .. was she .threatening her.with discharge. 

This is also not a case in which the telephone call contributed to 

the hostile working environment envisioned by Title VII, since the 

regulations prohibit "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual 

nature ... [which] has the purpose or effect of ... creating 

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." 

29 C.F.R. § 1604.ll(a) (1989) (emphasis added). Ague's conduct is 

not consistent with that described by the regulations. 

Finally, we must consider whether Ague's concerted activity 

should lose the protection of the Act because it was otherwise 

"unlawful, violent, in breach of contract or 'indefensible.'" 

Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980), 

citing NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962). We 

have reviewed the record, and we agree with the ALJ that Ague's 

conduct does not fall into any of these unprotected categories, 

nor does it "amount to egregious misbehavior that should rob this 

effort to assist fellow employee Beal of its protected character," 

rec., vol. III, doc. 4, at 3. Although Ague's call was somewhat 

imprudent and "lacking in sensitivity," id., doc. 1, at 26, there 

is substantial evidence to conclude that Ague was simply 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 22 
attempting to ascertain whether Beal's discharge was 

union-related. 9 

The fourth and final factor we must consider is whether 

Ague's discharge,_was ..• motivated. by_ . .her .protected _activity. The 

YMCA does not dispute that Ague's telephone call to Duke to 

investigate Beal's discharge, determined to be a concerted, 

protected activity, was the basis for her discharge. This alone 

would be sufficient for a section 8(a)(l) and (3) violation. But 

even if the telephone call itself were not protected, we agree 

that the YMCA failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 

that Ague's discharge rested on her unprotected conduct, and not 

on her union activity. See NLRB v. Transportation Management 

Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 399-403 (1983); 10 see also Head Division, 

9 We disagree with the dissent that this court's decisions in 

Timpte Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1979), and Montgomery 

Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1967), require a 

different outcome. In Timpte, we emphasized that the employee's 

conduct was not impulsive but constituted a deliberate refusal to 

stop using filthy language in union campaign material after being 

requested to do so. See 590 F.2d at 873-74. In Mongtomery Ward, 

the employee called a customer of the store a bastard and a 

son-of-a-bitch. See 374 F.2d at 611 n.4. Here, Ague and Duke 

were co-employees, and while we do not condone Ague's conduct and 

believe whether it should be unprotected is a close question, we 

are not persuaded the Board erred in its determination. 

10 The Supreme Court in Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 

402-03, approved of the Board's allocation of the burden of proof 

as set out in Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enf'd, 662 F.2d 

899 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 989 (1982). As 

characterized by the Court, Wright Line held that "the General 

Counsel carried the burden of persuading the Board that an 

antiunion animus contributed to the employer's decision to 

discharge an employee," but that the employer could assert an 

affirmative defense and. "avoid the finding that it violated the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 23 
AMF, Inc. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1979) ( "the 

discharge of employees who are actively engaged in union affairs 

gives rise to an inference of impermissible, anti-union 

discrimination"}, The YMCA failed to prove that the telephone 

call was. anything. but . a .pretext for .Ague.~ s discharge. 

Furthermore, we agree with the ALJ that because the YMCA generally 

required employees engaged in comparable conduct to undergo 

counseling but did not discharge them, the 

"disparity and severity of the discipline accorded Ague 

is indicia of unlawful motivation, and warrants an 

inference that [the YMCA] seized upon this telephone 

conversation in order to rid itself of the leading union 

adherent; and that she would not have been discharged 

but for her union activities," 

Rec., vol. III, doc. 1, at 27-28 (citation omitted). The Board's 

determination that the YMCA violated sections 8(a)(l) and (3) by 

discharging Ague is therefore supported by substantial evidence. 

The ALJ also found that the YMCA, by discharging Ague because 

she gave an affidavit to a Board agent, violated section 8(a)(4), 

which prohibits discrimination against an employee who gives 

testimony in an unfair labor practices investigation. The YMCA 

contends that this finding is not supported by substantial 

evidence because there was no proof it had knowledge of Ague's 

intention to give an affidavit, and because Ague was terminated 

statute by demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence that 

the worker would have been fired even if [s]he had not been 

involved with the union." Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 

395. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 24 
solely for interfering with a sexual harassment investigation. As 

the ALJ noted, however, Duke told Weber of Ague's intention to 

give an affidavit, and the unfair labor practice charge concerning 

Beal's discharge was received by Weber's office prior to Ague's 

discharge. .Since. we,have already .. held. that the.evidence supports 

a finding that Ague's investigation, a concerted and protected 

activity, motivated her termination, we conclude there is 

substantial evidence that the YMCA violated section 8(a)(4). 

D. 

The YMCA argues that its post-settlement conduct was 

unrelated to the pre-settlement conduct, and that this conduct 

therefore should not be used to set aside the agreement. In 

support of its position, the YMCA cites to Deister Concentrator 

Co., 253 NLRB No. 40, 106 LRRM 1053, 1056 (1980), which held that 

rescission of a settlement agreement was unnecessary where the 

employer had substantially complied with the agreement and where 

post-settlement violations were essentially unrelated to the 

subject matter of the agreement. Here, by contrast, we have 

upheld the Board's conclusion that the YMCA effectively violated 

the agreement by retaliating against Ague for her activities on 

behalf of the union. See rec., vol. II, g.c. ex. l(h), at 2 

(settlement agreement). Moreover, the YMCA's pre- and 

post-settlement conduct were related since, as the ALJ observed, 

the prior conduct ·included threats of action against Ague, and the 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 25 
latter "involve[d] the implementation of those threats--her 

discharge." Rec., vol. III, doc. 1, at 24. Accordingly, we 

reject the YMCA's arguments and agree with the Board that the 

settlement agreement was properly set aside. We therefore turn to 

11 

an assessment_ .oL. the pre-settlement, conduct. . . - .. 

The YMCA objects to four findings of the ALJ concerning the 

pre-settlement conduct. It contends that the Weber/Ague 

conversation did not constitute coercive interrogation; that 

Kirkland's comments to Ague were not coercive; that Klever's 

statements to Ague during the meeting were not coercive; and that 

the letter of reprimand to O'Bryan because of her discussion with 

Schwed did not violate sections 8(a)(l) and (3). We have reviewed 

the record as a whole with due regard for the ALJ's responsibility 

to judge the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. We are 

persuaded there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ's 

findings. 

We therefore grant enforcement of the Board's order. 

11 The YMCA makes one additional argument that the six-month 

statute of limitations in section lO(b) of the Act, 29 u.s.c. § 

160(b) (1988), bars reinstatement of the settled charge. That 

settled charge was timely filed, and we recognize the established 

doctrine that section lO(b) notwithstanding, the General Counsel 

may litigate matters embraced in a settlement agreement later 

validly set aside. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Local 19, 281 

NLRB No. 86, 124 LRRM 1110 (1986). If this doctrine were not 

valid, there would be little to prevent a party from breaching a 

settlement agreement with impunity once the six-month period had 

expired. 

-26-

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 26 
No. 88-2963, YMCA of the Pikes Peak Region, Inc. v. National Labor 

Relations Board. 

BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 

The court correctly holds that the YMCA was engaged 

sufficiently in .interstate commerce .. to. fall .. under .. the jurisdiction 

of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 u.s.c. § 160(a). I take 

issue, however, with the court's conclusion that the YMCA violated 

the Labor Act when it discharged Rita Ague for harassing Marnie 

Duke. Although substantial evidence supports the Board's 

determination that Ague's call constituted concerted activity, the 

rude and insensitive manner in which Ague conducted her 

investigation placed her conduct outside the protection of Section 

7, 29 u.s.c. § 157. 

I. 

Marnie Duke began working at the Garden Ranch YMCA in 1985 

when she was fifteen years old. Rec. vol. I at 279-80. Duke's 

first exposure to Wes Beal's advances took place in September of 

that year: 

I was cleaning in the lobby and he mentioned for me to 

come into the pool area. He had something to talk to me 

about. [H]e was sitting down in a chair and he pulled 

me over by my leg and he put his hands in between my 

legs and he start[ed] up my thigh quite a ways. 

Id. at 281-81. In the following months, Beal repeatedly and 

without permission played with Duke's hair and rubbed her 

shoulders. Id. at 282-83. In January 1986, Duke was sitting next 

to the swimming pool, with a towel over· her lap.-· Beal sat down 

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 27 
next to her, placed his hand underneath the towel and between her 

thighs. Id. at 284. Duke was frightened by the incident but 

declined to report Beal's behavior because she believed 

(incorrectly) that the YMCA managers were friends of Beal. Id. 

Thereafter, Beal continued to take liberties with Duke's person 

until March 1986 when she garnered the courage to report the 

harassment to Jim Klever, the regional president and chief 

executive officer. Id. at 288-89. Klever assured Duke that he 

would take care of the situation; Beal was discharged the 

following day. Id. at 290. Duke and her mother remained 

frightened that Beal would continue to harass her. Ray Weber, 

executive director of the Garden Center facility, assured Duke and 

her mother that the YMCA would do everything in its power to 

protect Duke from further harassment. Id. at 334, 390-91. 

On the morning of March 18, Duke received a telephone call 

from Rita Ague requesting in a demeaning manner information on 

B 1 , f. . 1 ea s 1.r1.ng: 

[S]he told me that she had a few questions to ask about 

Wes's termination. And I told her that I did not have 

time to talk because I was going to school. She ignored 

that and she went on and she said that Wes does not know 

why the hell he was fired. She asked what I had said to 

get him fired, and I again just was ignoring. I was 

trying to get away from it. I was very nervous. I did 

not know what to say. She was an adult. I wasn't. I 

1 Although Ague's version of the conversation differs somewhat, 

her testimony confirmed Duke's in all important respects. Ague is 

not sure she used the term "why in the hell" suggesting instead 

that she said "why the devil." She also denies using a 

condescending tone. Rec vol. I at 180. However, Ague 

acknowledged· asking Duke ·"a string of,· questions: · ·' Did he touch 

you? Did he ... ask you to sleep with him? Did he say anything_ 

to you?'" Id. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 28 
was taught to respect adults, I felt that it was none 

of her business at this point. She continued and once 

more said Wes does not know why the hell he was fired. 

And I told her that I had to go to school. And she 

again -- she said, 'I mean it wasn't as if he asked you 

to go to bed with him or anything.' Demeaning me, 

belittling me. 

Id, at 29.5,-96 '"'. Ague.~s. call .. had .. an .. ,intimidating .. effect upon Duke: 

"I felt like this was never going to end. I had adults coming on 

to me and I was only 16 years old and they were just really coming 

on to me strong," Id, at 297-98. 

Mrs, Duke was furious when she learned of Ague's conversation 

with her daughter. Id, at 338, She contacted Weber at the YMCA 

and told him that "we were not going to tolerate that [sic] kind 

of actions against our daughter," Id, at 338-39, Mrs, Duke 

demanded to know what the YMCA was going to do to protect her 

daughter from further harassment by Ague, Id, at 392. Weber 

discussed Ague's phone call with Diane Sanford, Ague's supervisor, 

expressing shock that a grown women would interfere in the private 

matter between Duke and the YMCA and would then press the matter 

once Duke stated repeatedly that she did not wish to talk to Ague, 

Weber told Sanford that the YMCA had a continuing duty to protect 

victims of sexual harassment, Id, at 456, Weber also discussed 

the situation with James Klever. Klever was appalled by Ague's 

conduct and expressed concern that the YMCA could be subject to 

liability for not taking action in response to Mrs, Duke's 

complaints. Id. at 525, 527-28. 

The following day, Weber called Ague into his office and 

inquired about the telephone· call·, · Ague stated that Duke did not 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 29 
understand what sexual harassment was, but did acknowledge making 

the telephone call and asking Duke specific questions concerning 

Beal. Id. at 396, 459. Later that day, Weber convened a second 

meeting with Ague whereupon he informed her that she was 

terminated for, .. interfering, with the YMCA's protection of sexual 

harassment victims. Id. at 402. 

II. 

Section 7 of the Labor Act guarantees workers "the right to 

join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively 

through representative of their own choosing, and to engaged in 

other concerted activities for the purpose of collective 

bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ..•. " 29 u.s.c. 

§ 157 (emphasis supplied). "[I]n enacting§ 7 . , Congress 

sought generally to equalize the bargaining power of the employee 

with that of his employer by allowing employees to band together 

in confronting an employer regarding the terms and conditions of 

their employment." NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, 465 U.S. 822, 

835 (1984). Section 7 fundamentally seeks to protect workers' 

freedom of association in attaining improved wages and working 

conditions. See Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work 

Relations: Reflections on the Current State of Labor Law and its 

Prospects, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1012, 1028-29 (1984). While Section 

7 does not define "concerted activity," the term "clearly ... 

embraces the activities of employees who have joined together in 

order to achieve common goals."· City.Disposal, 465 U.S. at 830-

31. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 30 
In determining whether an employee's action is "concerted," 

the touchstone inquiry is whether the action "reflect[s) actual 

group will in the workplace." JMC Transp. v. NLRB, 776 F.2d 612, 

618 (6th Cir. 1985). An individual acting alone engages in 

concerted. activity .. ;when.she .. acts .,on.behalf .of .. :the .. workforce. See 

City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 831. 2 A conversation between an 

individual worker and her employer therefore may be concerted 

activity, so long as the conversation is related to group action 

in the interest of the employees. NLRB v. Empire Gas, 566 F.2d 

681, 684 (10th Cir. 1977) (following Mushroom Transp. v. NLRB, 330 

F.2d 683, 685 (3d Cir. 1964)). On the other hand, personal, 

albeit work-related, complaints by an individual employee do not 

constitute protected Section 7 activity. City Disposal, 465 U.S. 

at 833 n.10. 

Action on behalf of an individual grievance also may 

constitute concerted activity. See Intermountain Rural Elec. 

Ass'n v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 754, 763 (10th Cir.) (employee argued with 

employer on behalf of fellow worker), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 932 

(1984). As Judge Learned Hand explained, the act of association, 

rather than the object of association, forms the basis of Section 

2 See,~, Ewing v. NLRB, 861 F.2d 353, 361 (2d Cir. 1988); 

Rockwell Int'l v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1987); 

Dayton Typographic Serv. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188, 1191 (6th Cir. 

1985); JMC Transp., 776 F.2d at 618; Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. NLRB, 

544 F.2d 320, 327-28 (7th Cir. 1976); Randolph Div, Ethan Allen 

Inc. v. NLRB, 513 F.2d 706, 708 (1st Cir. 1975); Owens-Corning 

Fiberglas v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1357, 1365 (4th Cir. 1969); see 

generally Gorman & Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of 

"Concert" Under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 u. Penn. L. 

Rev . 2 8 6 ( 19 81 ) . · · · · ·· 

-5-

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 31 
7's protections: 

When all the other workmen in a shop make common cause 

with a fellow workman over his separate grievance ... 

they engage in a 'concerted activity' for 'mutual aid or 

protection,' although the aggrieved workman is the only 

one of them who has any immediate stake in the outcome. 

The rest know that by their action each one of them 

assures .. himself,, ~in., case ·--his . turn ever .. comes., of the 

support of the one whom they are helping; and the 

solidarity so established is 'mutual aid' in the most 

literal sense, as nobody doubts. 

NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates, 130 F.2d 503, 505 

(2d Cir. 1942) (L. Hand, J.). 

"The fact that an activity is concerted ... does not 

necessarily mean that an employee can engage in the activity with 

impunity." City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837. Section 7 does not 

protect concerted activity that is unlawful, violent, in breach of 

contract or otherwise indefensible. NLRB v. Washington Aluminum 

Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962); ~ also R. Gorman, Basic Text on 

Labor Law 302-07 (1976). An employer therefore may discipline an 

employee for uttering defamatory or otherwise inappropriate 

statements, .even when those statements constitute concerted 

activity. See Old Dominion Branch No. 946, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter 

Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-73 (1974) (federal labor law 

does not pre-empt application of state libel law where statements 

uttered with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the 

truth) (interpreting Linn v. Plant Guard Workers of Am. Local 114, 

383 U.S. 53, 61 (1966)). 3 Neither do profane or otherwise 

3 See,~, Bowling Green Mfg; v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 371, 375-76 

(6th Cir. 1969) (defamatory statements in radio interview during 

organizing campaign);·Maryland·Drydock·Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538, 

( footnote continued to next page). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 32 
intemperate expressions carry the protections of Section 7. See 

Timpte Inc. v. NLRB, 590 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1979) 

(circulation of letter disparaging employer in profane language). 4 

But not every impropriety committed during concerted activity 

places the employee beyond the protective shield ... of Section 7. 

NLRB v. Thor Power Tool Co., 351 F.2d 584, 587 (7th Cir. 1965). 

"[L]abor disputes are ordinarily heated affairs, 

and .•. confrontations between management and employees cannot 

be held to the standards of cool, analytical impartiality 

characteristic of the debating society." Boaz Spinning Co. v. 

NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1968). The employee's right to 

engage in concerted activity must permit some leeway for impulsive 

behavior. Thor, 351 F.2d at 587; see Coors Container Co. v. NLRB, 

628 F.2d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 1980) (vulgar language directed at 

security guard improperly interrogating employee's "boycott Coors" 

sign protected). 5 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

539 (4th Cir. 1950) (distribution of "scurrilous and defamatory 

literature" during organizing campaign); NLRB v. Atlantic Towing 

Co., 180 F.2d 726, 726 (5th Cir. 1950) (false accusation that 

employer committed unfair labor practice) (per curiam). 

4 See also Borman's Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 1138, 1139 (6th Cir. 

1982) (employee wore T-shirt emblazoned with profane anti-employer 

slogan); Boaz Spinning Co. v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 

1968) (employee called manager "Castro" in open plant meeting). 

5 See also NLRB v. Southwestern Bell, 694 F.2d 974, 976-78 (5th 

Cir. 1982) (expletive uttered by shop steward in heated argument 

with supervisor over allocation of overtime work); Crown Central 

Petroleum v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 73Q:-~1 (5th C.~r,: • .. 1970) (course 

language in course of grievance committee meeting). 

-7-

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 33 
In determining whether Section 7 protects concerted 

statements, courts must examine the overall context in which the 

statement was uttered, see NLRB v. New York Univ. Medical Center, 

702 F.2d 284, 290 (2d Cir,), vacated on other grounds, 464 U.S. 

805-805 (1983 .. ) ... ,. balanc.ing.,the employees .r.ight".to ,.engage in 

concerted impulsive behavior against the right of the employer to 

maintain order and respect, Thor, 351 F.2d at 587, Where a 

worker's intemperate language is unrelated to any labor dispute, 

the concerted nature of those remarks does not invoke Section 7 

protections. Compare NRLB v. Local 1299, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. 

Workers, 346 U.S. 464, 476-77 (1953) (distribution of handbills 

attacking company not protected where handbills made no reference 

I 

to labor dispute) with Sierra Publishing Co, v. NLRB, 889 F,2d 

210, 215-16 (9th Cir. 1989) (where letter by newspaper employees 

was directly related to labor dispute, distribution of letter to 

newspaper's advertisers protected). Disparaging remarks by union 

activists engaged in concerted activity therefore are entitled to 

less protection when directed against casual third parties than 

when addressed to management or non-striking employees. 

Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, .374 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1967) 

(picketing employee's epithets toward customer crossing picket 

line unprotected). 6 

6 See also Hotel Holiday Inn De Isla Verde v. NLRB, 723 F,2d 

169, 171 (l~t Cir .• 198}) (dispc3:ra.ging,,re:n:ia:r;~s,t9_hotel guests by 

picketing employees not protected), 

-8-

Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 34 
III. 

In the instant case, Ague had at least some reason to 

conjecture that Beal had been fired for his expression of union 

support. Although Ague's telephone call, at least in Duke's eyes, 

appears. mo.re .. officious intermeddling .... than .union;.organizing, 

evidence in the record exists from which the Board reasonably 

could conclude that Ague was acting on Beal's behalf when she made 

the call. Accordingly, given our highly deferential standard of 

review, Ague's telephone call to Duke constituted concerted 

activity. See City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 829 (determination by 

Labor Board as to whether particular activity is concerted for 

purposes of Section 7 "implicates its expertise in labor 

relations."). 

The court states that although Ague's telephone call was 

"somewhat imprudent and lacking in sensitivity," Ct. op. at 22, it 

did not "'amount to egregious misbehavior that should rob this 

effort to assist fellow employee Beal of its protected 

character[.]'" Id. (quoting rec. vol. III, doc.4, at 3). The 

record reflects, however, that Marnie Duke suffered repeated 

humiliation at the hands of Wes Beal; only after much anguish did 

she garner the courage to report Beal's conduct to his superiors. 

Duke remained afraid of retaliation and relied upon assurances by 

the YMCA that she would be protected from further abuse. Viewing 

Ague's telephone call within the overall context of Duke's 

relationship with the YMCA,.§.§§. New York University, 702 F.2d at 

290, and.consider-ing-the-dispa1:ity -in age between,Ague and Duke, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2963 Document: 01019847421 Date Filed: 09/26/1990 Page: 35 
Ague's conversation falls within the category of expressions that 

this court held unprotected in Timpte, 590 F.2d at 873. Informing 

a sixteen year old victim of sexual harassment that "its wasn't as 

if he asked you to go to bed with him or anything," rec. vol. I at 

296, after. ignoring,.her. repeated pleas .to end. the conversation is 

indefensible. For a stranger in this situation to subject a 

victim of sexual harassment to an explicit inquisition over 

precisely what formed the basis of her complaint when such 

information already had been provided to the YMCA and the victim 

clearly did not wish to discuss the matter is beyond acceptable 

discourse. See Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 17. Ague's 

insensitive attitude toward Duke is illustrated by her subsequent 

statement that Duke did not ·know what sexual harassment was. Rec. 

vol. I at 459. If Ague needed to know the details of Beal's 

harassment of Duke, such information could have been elicited 

through a formal grievance procedure or an NLRB hearing. Her 

telephone call therefore was not merely "imprudent," Ct. op. 22; 

she addressed Duke "in such an abusive manner that (s]he los(t] 

the protection of§ 7." City Disposal, 465 U.S. at 837. 

By relying upon Coors, 628 F.2d at 1287, to support its 

holding that Ague's telephone call was protected activity, the 

court ignores the crucial distinction between concerted language 

directed against employers and such conduct directed toward 

innocent third parties. Although the rancor which often 

accompanies labor-management disputes precludes the application of 

parlor etiquette -to concerted ac-tivity, in Montgomery. Ward this 

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court held that a much higher standard of decency is required 

where concerted statements are directed at parties not involved in 

the dispute. 374 F.2d at 608-09. In Coors, course language was 

uttered during an argument between employees and company 

officials; .. we. held .. ,the employees'. ,imprudent language to be an 

outburst subject to Section 7 protections. 628 F.2d at 1285-88. 

In contrast, Ague directed her derisive comments, not toward her 

employer, by rather toward a highly-reticent sixteen-year-old girl 

with no involvement in the unionization effort. Ague's comments 

were not impulsive statements uttered in the heat of a dispute; 

she "thought long and hard" before calling Duke. Rec. vol. I at 

181. The court's reliance on Coors therefore is misplaced. This 

case is controlled instead by our holding in Montgomery Ward where 

we held that an epithet voiced by a picketing employee toward a 

customer crossing the picket line was unprotected concerted 

conduct. 374 F.2d at 608-09. Just as we held the picketing 

employee's conduct indefensible in Montgomery Ward, so should the 

court have held Ague's conduct unworthy of the protections of 

Section 7. 

None of the policies underlying the relaxed standard for 

concerted statements are implicated in this case. Had Ague's 

remarks been uttered in the context of formal grievance procedure 

where frank exchange is necessary to the successful resolution of 

disputes, her concerted statements might be protected under 

Section 7. See Crown Central Petroleum v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 724, 

730-34 (5th Cir·. 1970)·(because unfettered exchange necessary in 

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resolution of grievances, employees' intemperate remarks uttered 

during grievance committee meeting protected). However, Ague's 

abusive comments were made on her own initiative in a private 

telephone conversation with no adjudicative function. There is no 

reason why .such.-statements. uttered .. in. this. private. context are 

entitled to any of the protections guaranteed by Section 7. 

III. 

The court states that even if Ague's telephone call to Duke 

was unprotected conduct, the YMCA seized upon the call as a 

pretext to rid itself of a union activist. Ct. op. at 23. I 

disagree. A preponderance of the evidence supports the view that 

the YMCA's discharge of Ague represented a legitimate effort to 

shield itself from Title VII liability from Marnie Duke and her 

parents. Even if the YMCA entertained some anti-union animus when 

it discharged Ague, the record shows that a well-grounded fear of 

Title VII exposure constituted an independent and legitimate basis 

for her discharge. As explained below, such fears were entirely 

reasonable given the current state of Title VII. See NLRB v. 

Transportation Management Corp., 463 U.S. 393, 397 (1982) (where 

employer would have discharged employee for permissible reasons 

irrespective of union activity, improper motivation does not 

confer liability under the Labor Act). 

A plaintiff may maintain an action for sexual harassment 

under Title VII, 43 u.s.c. § 2000e-2(a), by showing that her 

employer created -a·-host-ile working·environment. · ·Meritor Sav. Bank 

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v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 

F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987). A hostile working environment 

exists when sexual conduct "has the purpose or effect of 

unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or 

creating an intimidating,, .hostile'" or .. offensive working 

environment." Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65 (quoting 29 C.F.R. 

§ 1604.ll(a)(3)). To prevail on a hostile environment theory, a 

plaintiff must prove that the harassment was "sufficiently severe 

or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment 

and create an abusive working environment.'" Hicks, 833 F.2d at 

1413 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 

1982)). Conduct need not be explicitly sexual to constitute 

sexual harassment under Title VII. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1415. 7 

Rather, "an actionable harassment claim must establish by the 

totality of the circumstances, the existence of a hostile or 

abusive environment which is severe enough to affect the 

psychological stability of a minority employee." Vance v. 

Southern Bell, 863 F.2d 1503, 1510 (11th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in 

original). To determining whether an employer is liable for 

creating a hostile environment, we must "look to agency principles 

for guidance." Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72; Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1417. 

"Thus, if a plaintiff proves that management-level employees had 

actual or constructive knowledge about the existence of a sexually 

hostile environment and failed to take prompt and adequate 

7 See also Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 

(3d Cir. 1990); McKinney v.-Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. 

Cir. 1985). 

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remedial action, the employer will be liable." Andrews v. City of 

Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990); see Silver v. 

KCA, Inc., 586 F.2d 138, 142 (10th Cir. 1978). 

In the instant case, Duke suffered repeated and uninvited 

sexual contact_ from .. YMCA. employee.~Wes. Beal. Once . the YMCA learned 

of Beal's conduct, it had an affirmative duty under Title VII to 

take prompt remedial action. Although Beal was promptly 

discharged, Ague's intrusive call inquiring into the intimate 

details of Duke's problems with Beal over Duke's repeated 

objections constituted further harassment. The court states that 

because Ague's conduct was not explicitly sexual in nature, it 

could not fall under Title VII. Ct. op. at 22. This ignores our 

earlier holding in Hicks that explicitly sexual conduct is not 

necessary to effectuate a hostile working environment under Title 

VII. 833 F.2d at 1483. Demanding another detailed account of 

Beal's conduct in a belittling demeanor from a sixteen year old 

sexual harassment victim who did not wish to discuss the matter 

contributed to the hostile environment in which Duke was obliged 

to work. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 65. Duke was not able to 

distinguish between Beal's conduct and Ague's conduct; they were 

all part of the same pattern. 8 In determining whether the YMCA 

8 The fact that in Duke's eyes the conduct of Ague and Beal 

were part of the same pattern is illustrated by Duke's comments to 

her mother after the phone call: 

I told her that I was really tired of the whole 

situation. It was just continuing. And I told her that 

maybe it would have been best if I would have just quit 

at that time-,- before I had even said anything about Wes 

(footnote continued to next page) 

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' / 

created a hostile working environment, a court therefore could 

look to the totality of the circumstances considering Ague's 

telephone call along with Beal's untoward conduct. See Vance, 863 

F.2d at 1510. 

The .,YMCA. had ... actual knowledge .both of Beal' s. harassment and 

Ague's intrusive telephone call. Indeed, following Ague's 

telephone call, the YMCA was faced with a demand by Duke's mother 

to protect her daughter from further harassment. Rec. vol. I at 

338-39, 392. Had YMCA management not acted on these demands, the 

organization could have been exposed to Title VII liability on an 

agency theory. See Vinson, 477 U.S. at 72; Hicks, 833 F.2d at 

1417. Although the ALJ found that potential Title VII._liability 

did not form the basis of the YMCA's decision to fire Ague, this 

finding was based upon an erroneous understanding of the agency 

principles underlying Title VII. Accordingly, the ALJ's finding 

that Title VII exposure was not a component of the YMCA's decision 

to fire Ague was not entitled to deference by this court. See 

Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). 

The dismissal of Rita Ague by the YMCA did not violate the 

National Labor Relations Act. I respectfully dissent. 

(footnote continued from previous page) 

Beal. And then none of this would have happened .•• 

She told me that, yes, that would have been the easy way 

out, but we both decided mutually that, no. Wes Beal 

and Rita Ague were both harassing people, They were 

bothering us. The had no right to do that, and I stood 

up for not only me, but other people too that would 

further along get the same treatment I had. 

Rec. vol. I' at 305. 

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