Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-20-01003/USCOURTS-ca10-20-01003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Donna G. Sneller
Appellant
Weld County
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

WELD COUNTY, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DONNA G. SNELLER, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 20-1003

(D.C. No. 1:19-MJ-00258-GPG-LTB)

(D. Colo.)

_________________________________

ORDER

_________________________________

Before BRISCOE, HOLMES, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Appellant Donna Sneller filed a pro se pleading in which she attempted to remove 

her state court criminal case to federal court. The federal district court summarily 

remanded the matter to state court. Ms. Sneller filed this appeal. This court issued an 

order directing Ms. Sneller to address appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s 

remand order. In response, Ms. Sneller asserts the general authority of the federal courts 

to exercise jurisdiction.

A district court’s order remanding a case to state court due to a defect in the 

removal procedure or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not an appealable order. 

See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to the State court from which it 

was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise . . . .”); Things Remembered, Inc. 

v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 (1995) (holding that § 1447(d)’s bar on review applies to 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

January 28, 2020

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

Appellate Case: 20-1003 Document: 010110296332 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 1
2

remands based on a timely raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction). When the district court purports to remand based on lack of subject 

matter jurisdiction, our inquiry is limited to a superficial determination that the “basis for 

the district court’s decision can be ‘colorably characterized as subject matter 

jurisdiction.’” See Moody v. Great Western Ry. Co., 536 F.3d 1158, 1162 (10th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., 551 U.S. 224, 234 (2007)). 

In remanding the case, the district court stated that Ms. Sneller failed to comply 

with the statutes governing the procedure for removal of both criminal prosecutions and 

civil cases and that even construing the notice of removal liberally, the court was unable 

to ascertain any legitimate basis for removal under the relevant statutes. The district 

court’s remand was based on both a defect in the removal procedure and what can be 

colorably characterized as lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, we conclude that 

§ 1447(d) bars our review of this appeal.

APPEAL DISMISSED. 

Entered for the Court

CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

by: Sunil N. Rao

 Counsel to the Clerk

Appellate Case: 20-1003 Document: 010110296332 Date Filed: 01/28/2020 Page: 2