Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00444/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cv-00444-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wesley Collins
Defendant
Matthew Fogel
Plaintiff
Grass Valley Police Department
Defendant
Michael Hooker
Defendant
Jarod Johnson
Defendant
Gary McClaughry
Defendant
Greg McKenzie
Defendant
Jason Perry
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MATTHEW FOGEL 

Plaintiff,

v.

GRASS VALLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT,

et al., 

Defendants. 

 No. Civ. 05-0444 DFL KJM

ORDER

Plaintiff Matthew Fogel (“Fogel”) painted a provocative

message on the back of his van. The police were called, and

Fogel was arrested. No charges were filed. Fogel subsequently

brought suit against defendants Grass Valley Police Department,

Captain Jarod Johnson (“Johnson”), Sergeant Michael Hooker

(“Hooker”), and Officers Jason Perry (“Perry”), Wesley Collins

(“Collins”), Gary McClaughry (“McClaughry”), and Greg McKenzie

(“McKenzie”). Fogel sought damages under § 1983, primarily on

the theory that his arrest violated the First Amendment. He also

brought claims based on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments as

well as state law claims for false arrest and assault and

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battery. 

Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The

individual defendants also asserted that they were entitled to

qualified immunity. Fogel cross moved for summary judgment on

the § 1983 claims. 

On February 13, 2006, the court granted defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on all claims and denied Fogel’s cross

motion for summary judgment. (2/13/2006 Order at 11.) 

Defendants now move for an award of attorneys fees and costs. 

For the reasons stated below, the court awards defendants’ costs

and but does not award attorneys fees.

I. Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees

Attorneys fees are only awarded to prevailing defendants in

section 1983 actions where “the plaintiff’s action is frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation.” Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S.

5, 14, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980). “An appeal is considered frivolous

in this Circuit when the result is obvious or the appellant’s

arguments of error are wholly without merit.” Vernon v. City of

Los Angeles, 27 F.3d 1385, 1402 (9th Cir. 1994). A case “is less

likely to be considered frivolous when there is ‘very little case

law directly apposite.’” Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. Silver State

Disposal Serv., Inc., 109 F.3d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Defendants argue that, because they prevailed on the motion

for summary judgment, Fogel’s action was meritless and without

foundation, justifying an award of attorneys fees. (Mot. at 5.) 

In addition, defendants’ counsel states in her declaration that,

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on at least two occasions, she requested that Fogel dismiss the

entire action, or at least dismiss all defendants except officers

Perry and Hooker. (Tonon Decl. at 12-13.) She argues that the

depositions of the parties confirmed that all the other officers

were merely following orders and could not be kept in the action

on a “group liability” theory. (Id. at 13.) Tonon also says she

recalls that Fogel’s counsel could not identify any

unconstitutional “policy or procedure” that the Grass Valley

Police Department instituted. (Id.) Nevertheless, Fogel

declined to dismiss defendants. (Mot. at 9-10.) 

Contrary to defendants’ assertion, Fogel’s argument was not

frivolous or wholly without merit. As discussed by the court in

the February 13 order, Fogel’s argument depended upon whether the

statements on his van were “true threats.” (2/13/2006 Order at

5.) To determine this, the fact-finder must determine “whether a

reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be

interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement

as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.” United

States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Given the facts in this case, the court found that a

reasonable jury might conclude that a reasonable person would

foresee that the words on the van would be taken “as a serious

expression of intent to harm.” (2/13/2006 Order at 6.) On the

other hand, a jury might find that Fogel’s words could not be

reasonably interpreted as a serious threat. (Id. at 7.) 

Therefore, Fogel’s First Amendment argument was not without

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merit. 

Nevertheless, defendants argue that the claim was meritless

because it was clear that they were entitled to qualified

immunity. The immunity question in this case turned on “whether

the state of the law [in 2004] gave [the officers] fair warning

that their alleged treatment of [Fogel] was unconstitutional.” 

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508 (2002). Fogel

argued that the officers had notice that their actions were

unconstitutional in light of Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.

705, 708, 89 S.Ct. 1399 (1969). The court found Watts 

distinguishable from this case both in what was said and where,

when, and how it was said. (2/13/2006 Order at 9.) However,

Fogel’s reliance on Watt was not meritless. To date, no post

9/11 case has addressed language comparable to that used by

Fogel, making it a novel issue. Therefore, Fogel’s use of an

analogous case, though unpersuasive, was not unreasonable. 

Fogel’s claim against the Grass Valley Police Department was

also not frivolous. Fogel noted in his motion that “Hooker was

the highest ranking officer of the department on duty at the time

of arrest,” and he “testified that he had final decision-making

authority that night.” (Pl.’s MSJ at 18.) Johnson “also

testified that he had final decision-making authority.” (Id.) 

While the court found that this evidence was insufficient to

demonstrate that the police department had policymaking

authority, it does not appear that Fogel made the claim in bad

faith. He merely misunderstood that final decision-making

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authority is distinct from final policymaking authority required

to impose liability on a municipality. 

For the reasons stated, the court DENIES defendants’ motion

for attorneys fees because Fogel’s claims were not so meritless

to warrant such a result. 

II. Motion for Award of Costs

“Except when express provision therefore is made either in a

statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than

attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing

party unless the court otherwise directs.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

54(d). Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920(2) and (4), a judge may tax as

costs: “[f]ees of the court reporter for all or any part of the

stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the

case,” and “[f]ees for exemplification and copies of papers

necessarily obtained for use in the case.” Defendants seek: (1)

court reporter fees totaling $1,443.82; and (2) fees for

exemplification and copies of depositions submitted to the court

totaling $702.00. Fogel objects on several grounds.

First, Fogel asserts that defendants failed to serve and

file the bill of costs within ten days after entry of judgment,

as required by Local Rule 54-292. (Opp’n at 1.) However, Fogel

miscalculated the time. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), when

computing any period of time prescribed by the local rules, the

day judgment was entered should not be included. In addition,

when the period of time prescribed is less than 11 days,

intermediate weekends shall be excluded in the computation. The

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court entered judgment on Tuesday, February 14, 2006. Defendants

filed their bill of costs on Tuesday, February 28, 2006, the

tenth day based on the Rule 6(a) computation. Therefore,

defendants filed on time. 

Second, Fogel asserts that the photocopy costs of the

deposition transcripts were not “necessarily incurred” because

they could have been filed with the court electronically. (Opp’n

at 2.) Local Rule 5-133(j) states that: 

Depositions shall not be filed through CM/ECF. Prior to

or upon the filing of a document making reference to a

deposition, counsel relying on the deposition shall

ensure that a courtesy hard copy of the entire

deposition so relied upon has been submitted to the

Clerk for use in chambers. Alternatively, counsel

relying on a deposition may submit an electronic copy

of the deposition in lieu of the courtesy paper copy to

the emailbox of the Judge or Magistrate Judge and

concurrently email or otherwise transmit the deposition

to all other parties. 

On December 19, 2005, defendants submitted a hard copy of

deposition transcripts for Fogel, Perry, McKenzie, Hooker,

McClaughry, Collins, and Johnson because they relied on these

depositions in support of their summary judgment motion. These

depositions totaled nearly 500 pages. Defendants should not be

penalized for choosing among the better of two alternatives for

filing provided in the local rule. When documents are this long,

e-mail is a less efficient method for both the sender and

recipient, and courtesy hard copies are encouraged by the court. 

Therefore, the court awards photocopying costs totaling $702.00. 

Third, Fogel argues that deposition costs were not

“necessarily incurred” because the depositions added very little

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to the information already recorded in the police reports, and

defendants relied on only small portions of the depositions in

their summary judgment motion. (Opp’n at 2.) This argument is

unconvincing. First, defendants relied on several portions of

the depositions in their statement of undisputed facts supporting

their summary judgment motion. Furthermore, even if defendants

ultimately gained little more than what was already in the police

reports, they were entitled to take depositions to see if any

additional evidence would support their defense. “An important

purpose of discovery is to reveal what evidence the opposing

party has, thereby helping determine which facts are undisputed 

. . . and which facts must be resolved at trial.” Computer Task

Group, Inc. v. Brotby, 364 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Therefore, the court awards defendants all court reporter fees

totaling $1,443.82.

Finally, Fogel argues that the court should use its judicial

discretion to deny all costs in this matter. “Rule 54(d)(1)

creates a presumption in favor of awarding costs to a prevailing

party, but the district court may refuse to award costs within

its discretion.” Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co.,

Inc., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has

“previously approved as appropriate reasons for denying costs: 

(1) a losing party's limited financial resources; (2) misconduct

by the prevailing party; and (3) the chilling effect of imposing 

. . . high costs on future civil rights litigants.” Id. The

Ninth Circuit has also approved of factors considered by other

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circuits, including: “(1) the issues in the case were close and

difficult; (2) the prevailing party's recovery was nominal or

partial; (3) the losing party litigated in good faith; and,

perhaps, (4) the case presented a landmark issue of national

importance.” Id. 

Fogel argues that costs should not be awarded here because:

(1) he is an unemployed, 24-year-old college student whose only

asset is worth $900; (2) he brought the suit in good faith; (3)

the case presented novel issues; and (4) imposing costs would

“have a ‘chilling effect’ on future civil rights litigants.” 

(Opp’n at 3.) These arguments are not compelling. The

presumption is in favor of awarding costs. Here, the costs

imposed on Fogel would only total $2,145.82, a relatively modest

sum given the overall burdens imposed upon the defendants by

Fogel’s decision to institute a losing action. 

III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the court DENIES defendants’

request for attorneys fees and GRANTS defendants’ request for

costs totaling $2,145.82. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 5/12/2006

DAVID F. LEVI

United States District Judge

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