Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05106/USCOURTS-arwd-5_05-cv-05106-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Todd Sturgill
Plaintiff
United Parcel Service, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

FAYETTEVILLE DIVISION

TODD STURGILL PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 05-5106

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC. DEFENDANT

O R D E R

Now on this 2 day of November, 2006, comes on to be nd

considered Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law, or,

Alternatively, for New Trial, Remittitur, or Amendment of the

Judgment, and to Stay Execution of the Injunction (Doc. 74). The

Court, being well and sufficiently advised, finds and orders as

follows with respect thereto:

1. Plaintiff, Todd Sturgill (“Sturgill” or “plaintiff”),

instituted this action against the defendant -- his former

employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS” or “defendant”) --

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e, et seq. Plaintiff alleged that defendant denied him a

reasonable accommodation for his religious observation of the

Sabbath and discriminated against him on the basis of his religion

by terminating his employment. 

2. The case proceeded to trial before a jury on June 26,

2006. On June 30, 2006, the jury returned a verdict finding

against plaintiff on his religious discrimination claim, but 

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finding in favor of plaintiff on his religious accommodation

claim. The jury awarded plaintiff $103,722.25 in lost wages and

benefits and $207,444.50 in punitive damages.

3. On September 11, 2006, the Court entered an order (Doc.

72) granting plaintiff’s Motion For Reinstatement and Equitable

Relief (Doc. 59). The Court entered a separate judgment (Doc. 73)

contemporaneously therewith granting judgment to plaintiff on his

religious accommodation claim as follows:

* awarding plaintiff $103,722.25 in lost wages and

benefits and $207,444.50 in punitive damages;

* directing UPS to reinstate plaintiff, with all attendant

seniority and benefits, to his prior bid route or to a

position as an unassigned driver;

* directing UPS to pay plaintiff front-pay from the date

of the verdict to the date of his reinstatement, at the

rate of $259.96 for each workday; and

* enjoining UPS from failing to accommodate plaintiff’s

religious observation of the Sabbath in the future. 

4. Defendant now moves for judgment as a matter of law

(JAML), or in the alternative, for a new trial, remittitur, or

amendment of the judgment. The Court will address each of the

grounds for the motion in turn.

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5. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Plaintiff’s Accommodation

Claim 

Defendant argues that it is entitled to a JAML or a new trial

on plaintiff’s accommodation claim, as the evidence showed that

defendant could not accommodate plaintiff’s Sabbath observance

without violating the seniority system of the collective

bargaining agreement, incurring undue hardship, or discriminating

against other drivers. 

A motion for JAML should only be granted if the nonmoving

party "has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally

sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for the

party on that issue." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). A party seeking

to overturn a jury verdict based on the insufficiency of the

evidence faces an onerous burden. See Henderson v. Simmons Foods,

Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 2000). A JAML is proper

"'[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to

support the conclusion reached' so that no reasonable juror could

have found for the nonmoving party.'" Hathaway v. Runyon, 132

F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lavender v. Kurn, 327

U.S. 645, 653 (1946)). In evaluating a motion for JAML, the

court must "assume as proven all facts that the nonmoving party's

evidence tended to show, give [him] the benefit of all reasonable

inferences, and assume that all conflicts in the evidence were

resolved in [his] favor." Id.

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A motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure should only be granted if the jury's verdict

was against the great weight of the evidence so as to constitute

a miscarriage of justice. See Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d

999, 1010 (8th Cir. 2000).

The jury was instructed that to return a verdict in favor of

plaintiff on his accommodation claim, it had to find that

defendant refused to grant plaintiff a reasonable accommodation

and that the accommodation would not have imposed an undue

hardship on defendant. The jury was further instructed:

An accommodation is reasonable if it eliminates the

conflict between Todd Sturgill’s religious observation

of the Sabbath and UPS’s work requirements while

reasonably allowing Sturgill to continue to be employed

by UPS....

Any accommodation that would result in more than a

minimal cost to the operation of UPS’s business is an

undue hardship. Any accommodation that would result in

more than a minimal loss to the efficiency of UPS’s

business is an undue hardship. Any accommodation that

would result in more than a minimal increase in wages or

overtime that must be paid to UPS’s employees is an

undue hardship. 

Any accommodation that would cause UPS to violate

a bona fide collective bargaining agreement is an undue

hardship. This includes any accommodation that would

cause UPS to deprive another employee of seniority

rights. Any accommodation which would require UPS to

discriminate against other employees is an undue

hardship. Undue hardship requires more than some

fellow-worker’s grumbling; it requires actual imposition

on co-workers or disruption of the work routine....

(Tr. 566-68.) 

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See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j); Trans World Airlines, Inc. V. Hardison,

432 U.S. 63 (1977); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60

(1986); Seaworth v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1056, 1057 (8 Cir. 2000). th

Plaintiff presented evidence that defendant could have

accommodated his request to end his shift by sundown on Fridays by

“splitting” his delivery load, or, in other words, transferring

some of his packages to other drivers. According to plaintiff,

this was done on a daily basis to accommodate any driver that

needed to be off by a certain time for his child’s ball-games, PTA

meetings, etc. Plaintiff testified that he would have only needed

this accommodation during the holiday season -- after daylight

savings time ended and deliveries peaked. 

According to plaintiff, on the Friday he was terminated for

returning to the UPS facility before sunset without completing the

delivery of his packages, there were other drivers with less

seniority and lighter loads who could have delivered his remaining

packages. Plaintiff estimated that it would have only taken an

hour or less for another driver to complete the deliveries.

Based on the above evidence, the Court believes the jury

could have reasonably inferred and concluded that defendant could

have provided a reasonable accommodation to plaintiff’s religious

observance of the Sabbath and that doing so would not have caused

defendant any undue hardship. Accordingly, the Court rejects

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defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on

plaintiff’s religious accommodation claim.

6. Backpay and Reinstatement

Defendant alternatively argues that plaintiff is not entitled

to backpay or reinstatement because, in finding against plaintiff

on his religious-discrimination claim, the jury found that

plaintiff’s religion was not a motivating factor in his

termination. The Court thoroughly addressed this issue in its

order granting plaintiff’s motion for reinstatement and equitable

relief. 

As stated in the prior order, the evidence at trial indicated

that defendant terminated plaintiff for “job abandonment” because,

before sunset on a Friday, plaintiff returned to the UPS facility

without completing the delivery of his packages. There was no

evidence indicating that plaintiff “abandoned” his job for any

reason other than defendant’s refusal to accommodate his religious

beliefs. 

The jury found against plaintiff on his religious

discrimination claim but in his favor on his religious

accommodation claim. Thus, while the jury found that plaintiff

was terminated for job abandonment and not, per se, because of his

religion, the only reason shown by the evidence for the

“abandonment” was defendant’s refusal to accommodate plaintiff’s

religious beliefs. The Court believes it can be reasonably

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inferred from this evidence (and that the jury obviously did so

reasonably infer) that, had defendant accommodated plaintiff’s

observance of the Sabbath, he would not have returned to the

facility early without delivering all his packages (the

“abandonment”) and would not have been terminated for job

abandonment. Thus, the Court rejects defendant’s argument that

plaintiff is not entitled to backpay or reinstatement.

7. Punitive Damages

Defendant argues that the evidence did not support an award

of punitive damages. Punitive damages may be imposed if the

employer acted with malice or reckless indifference to the

employee’s rights. See Rowe v. Hussmann Corp., 381 F.3d 775, 783

(8 Cir. 2004). This standard does not require egregious th

misconduct, but there must be evidence that the employer

intentionally discriminated and had “knowledge that it may be

acting in violation of federal law.” Id. at 783-84 (quoting

Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 535 (1999)).

There was evidence in this case that plaintiff submitted his

first request for a religious accommodation in late July 2004.

Plaintiff subsequently submitted two more requests and followed-up

on them on a weekly basis but did not receive a response until

late October 2004, when he was advised that defendant was “unable

to provide the requested accommodation, given the substantial

impact of [its] operation.” (Tr. 71.) Plaintiff testified that

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Scotty Patton, the manager of the Springdale facility where

plaintiff worked, subsequently informed him that the real reason

defendant could not accommodate him was “because if they

accommodated [him], then everybody would request Friday off, and

if everybody requested Friday off, then they couldn’t do their

business.” (Tr. 72.) 

There was also evidence that defendant’s human resources

decision-makers denied plaintiff’s request without ever discussing

it with plaintiff. The decision-makers likewise never spoke with

the Springdale facility manager to obtain specific information

regarding that facility, possible accommodations that could be

made there, and how they would impact that facility. 

From this evidence, the Court believes a jury could have

reasonably concluded that defendant acted with malice or reckless

indifference to plaintiff’s rights. 

8. Remittitur 

Defendant argues that the total damage award of $311,166.75

($103,722.25 in lost wages and benefits and $207,444.50 in

punitive damages) should be reduced to $300,000.00, the statutory

maximum permitted under Title VII. The Court sees no merit to

this argument, as plaintiff’s lost wages are not to be included in

computing the statutory cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b). Thus, the

damage award did not exceed Title VII’s statutory maximum.

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9. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as a

Matter of Law, or, Alternatively, for New Trial, Remittitur, or

Amendment of the Judgment, and to Stay Execution of the Injunction

(Doc. 74) should be, and hereby is, DENIED in all respects.

In his previously filed Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs

(Doc. 63), plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he intended to

supplement the motion to include a fee request for time expended

on post-trial motions. Plaintiff shall have until November 10,

2006, to submit a supplement to his motion for fees. Defendant

shall have until November 17, 2006, to file a response thereto.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/JIMM LARRY HENDREN 

JIMM LARRY HENDREN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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