Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00013/USCOURTS-alsd-1_05-cv-00013-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Donna E. Johnston
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DONNA E. JOHNSTON, :

Plaintiff, :

vs. CA 05-0013-WS-C

:

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security, :

Defendant. :

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3), seeking

judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

denying her claim for supplemental security income benefits. This action has

been referred to the Magistrate Judge for entry of a report and recommendation

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Upon consideration of the administrative

record, plaintiff's proposed report and recommendation, the Commissioner's

proposed report and recommendation, and the parties’ arguments at the August

8, 2005 hearing before the undersigned, it is determined that the decision to

deny benefits should be reversed and this cause remanded for further

consideration not inconsistent with this decision.

Plaintiff alleges disability due to dysthymic disorder, personality

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disorder with borderline features, back pain, asthma and obesity. The

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) made the following relevant findings:

3. The claimant has not proven that she has any severe

physical impairment.

4. The claimant has severe mental impairment(s) of Cocaine

Abuse, by history, Opioid Abuse, by history, Anxiolytic and

Sedative Abuse, by history, Dysthymic Disorder, by history, and

Personality Disorder, NOS with borderline features. She does

not, however, have an impairment or combination of impairments,

which meet or equal any impairment or combination of

impairments listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.

5. The undersigned finds that the claimant’s mental residual

functional capacity is limited to unskilled [work] with only

occasional interaction with the general public.

6. With that capacity, she can perform a significant number

of jobs, which were identified by administrative notice of reliable

job information.

7. The claimant was not under a “disability” as defined in the

Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision

(20 CFR 416.920(e)).

(Tr. 31) The Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ's decision (Tr. 4-6) and thus, the

hearing decision became the final decision of the Commissioner of Social

Security.

DISCUSSION

In supplemental security income cases where the claimant has no past

vocationally-relevant work, as here, it is the Commissioner’s burden to prove

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1 This Court's review of the Commissioner's application of legal principles, however, is

plenary. Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987).

3

that the claimant is capable of performing work which exists in significant

numbers in the national economy. See Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201

(11th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). The ALJ’s articulation of specific jobs the

claimant is capable of performing must be supported by substantial evidence. Id.

(citation omitted). Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and

means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28

L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). “In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we

must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well

as unfavorable to the [Commissioner’s] decision.” Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).1

The task for the Magistrate Judge is to determine whether the

Commissioner's decision to deny claimant benefits, on the basis that she can

perform those jobs the ALJ administratively noticed, is supported by substantial

evidence. Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support

a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d

842 (1971). "In determining whether substantial evidence exists, we must view

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the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as

unfavorable to the [Commissioner's] decision." Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d

129, 131 (11th Cir. 1986).

The claimant contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by: (1)

failing to find she has a severe physical impairment; (2) failing to obtain

testimony from a vocational expert; (3) failing to grant controlling weight to the

opinion of her treating physician; (4) failing to proffer additional evidence that

was obtained after the hearing; and (5) failing to order a consultative orthopedic

examination. Because it is found that the ALJ erred in failing to obtain

vocational expert testimony, this Court need not address the other issues raised

by plaintiff. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985)

(“Because the ‘misuse of the expert’s testimony alone warrants a reversal,’ we

do not consider the appellant’s other claims.”).

It is clear in this circuit that the Commissioner of Social Security must

develop "a full and fair record regarding the vocational opportunities available

to a claimant." Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted). As alluded to earlier, the Commissioner must articulate

specific jobs that the claimant can perform given her age, education and work

history, if any, "and this finding must be supported by substantial evidence, not

mere intuition or conjecture." See id. (citation omitted) One means by which

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2 See Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (“If nonexertional

impairments exist, the ALJ may use [the] Medical-Vocational Guidelines as a framework to evaluate

vocational factors, but must also introduce independent evidence, preferably through a vocational

expert’s testimony, of existence of jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.”). 

5

the Commissioner can satisfy her burden in this regard is by reliance upon the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grids). See id. Exclusive reliance upon the

grids is inappropriate, however, "'"either when the claimant is unable to perform

a full range of work at a given residual functional level or when a claimant has

a non-exertional impairment that significantly limits basic work skills."'" Id. at

1202 (quoting Walker, supra, 826 F.2d at 1002-1003, in turn quoting Francis

v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1562, 1566 (11th Cir. 1985)). 

In this case, the ALJ totally eschewed the grids; he did not even rely on

those guidelines as a framework for decision making.2 (Tr. 30-31)

In meeting the Commissioner’s burden to demonstrate that there

exists work in significant numbers in the national economy, the

undersigned has not found that a Grid Rule directs a decision

because there are non-exertional limitations involved. See 20

CFR 416.969. There is no need to seek the opinion of a

vocational expert because there is no issue regarding transferable

skills or “a similarly complex issue.” See 20 CFR 416.966(e);

SSR 00-4p. While the United States Court of Appeals for the

11th Circuit has noted in the past that the “preferred method of

demonstrating that the claimant can perform specific work is

through the testimony of a vocational expert,” MacGregor v.

Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1054 (11th Cir. 1986), reliable

vocational evidence (as opposed to testimony) taken from

official government sources is a permissible functional

equivalent when the issue presented can be resolved by a simple,

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mechanical process. For example, determining whether a

claimant’s residual functional capacity would be sufficient to

perform an occupation described in the Dictionary of

Occupational Titles (DOT) is a simple exercise in which the skill

level and capabilities in the residual functional capacity are

compared with the requirements detailed in the DOT. See SSR

00-4p. When the comparison shows no conflict or discrepancy,

clearly no expert vocational testimony or judgment is needed.

In the instant case, there are no complicated or complex

vocational issues that warrant expert testimony. Rather, it is a

case in which it is appropriate to take administrative notice of

reliable job data to determine: 1) whether there are occupations

that the claimant can perform with her residual functional

capacity and 2) whether such work exists in significant numbers

in the national economy. See 20 CFR 416.966(d). The DOT has

been used for the description of the jobs, including worker

functions, exertional requirements, and skill levels. The

Commissioner has found that each sedentary and light unskilled

job found in the DOT “represents numerous jobs found

throughout the national economy.”

With the claimant’s residual functional capacity, she can perform

the following jobs: 1) Cleaner-Housekeeping DOT # 323.687-

014. It is a light, unskilled job that requires no significant

interaction with the general public. There are 948,230 such jobs

in the national economy. 2) Sorter, Agricultural Produce, DOT #

529.687-186. It is a light, unskilled job with no significant

interaction with the general public. There are 56,210 such jobs in

the national economy. 3) Kitchen Helper, DOT # 318.687-010.

It is a medium, unskilled job with no significant interaction with

the general public. There are 505,000 such jobs in the national

economy. Clearly, there is work in the national economy that

exists in significant numbers and that is within the claimant’s

residual functional capacity.

(Id.) There are problems with this analysis, however, and these problems

necessitate a remand to the Commissioner for vocational expert testimony.

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3 The undersigned is of the opinion that in finding the grids inapplicable on the basis of the

existence of only non-exertional limitations (Tr. 30), the ALJ implicitly decided that plaintiff’s nonexertional limitations significantly eroded her occupational base at all exertional levels. Accordingly, the

ALJ necessarily need obtain vocational expert testimony to establish the existence of jobs in the national

economy that plaintiff can perform in light of her impairments and limitations.

7

While the ALJ correctly noted in the foregoing discussion that the

Eleventh Circuit in MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050 (11th Cir. 1986)

stated that "the preferred method of demonstrating that the claimant can perform

specific work is through the testimony of a vocational expert[,]" id. at 1054; see

also Francis, 749 F.2d at 1566 ("The preferred method of demonstrating job

availability when the grids are not controlling is through expert vocational

testimony."), he failed to note that such preference for vocational expert

testimony has effectively become a requirement, particularly where the grids are

inapplicable, Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (“If the

grids are inapplicable, the Secretary must seek expert vocational testimony.”).

In this case, in finding the grids inapplicable, the ALJ created a situation in

which he was required to obtain vocational expert testimony to carry the

Commissioner’s fifth-step3 burden and his failure to obtain such testimony

constitutes reversible error.

The failure to obtain vocational expert testimony in this case is

particularly glaring inasmuch as the lead job the ALJ identifies from the DOT

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as requiring no significant interaction with the general public, that is, work as a

cleaner/housekeeper (Tr. 31), in fact requires the worker to render “personal

assistance to patrons.” An individual who must render personal assistance to

patrons logically has significant interaction with the general public or, at the

very least, the comparison of plaintiff’s residual functional capacity with the

DOT’s description of cleaner/housekeeper creates a discrepancy which even the

ALJ indicates would require the input of a vocational expert. (See Tr. 30

(“[D]etermining whether a claimant’s residual functional capacity would be

sufficient to perform an occupation described in the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (DOT) is a simple exercise in which the skill level and capabilities in the

residual functional capacity are compared with the requirements detailed in the

DOT. See SSR 00-4p. When the comparison shows no conflict or discrepancy,

clearly no vocational testimony or judgment is needed.”)) The Magistrate Judge

is of the opinion that without input from a vocational expert in such

circumstances, the Commissioner’s fifth-step finding of no disability becomes

mere intuition and conjecture. 

Based upon the foregoing, this case must be remanded to the

Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings, including taking

testimony from a vocational expert. It is only through such testimony that the

Commissioner can satisfy her fifth-step burden of identifying what jobs, if any,

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plaintiff can perform in light of her impairments and limitations. 

CONCLUSION

The Magistrate Judge recommends that the decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying plaintiff benefits be be reversed and

remanded pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g), see Melkonyan v. Sullivan,

501 U.S. 89, 111 S.Ct. 2157, 115 L.Ed.2d 78 (1991), for further proceedings

not inconsistent with this decision. The remand pursuant to sentence four of §

405(g) makes the plaintiff a prevailing party for purposes of the Equal Access

to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 113 S.Ct.

2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993), and terminates this Court’s 

jurisdiction over this matter. 

The attached sheet contains important information regarding objections

to the report and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. 

DONE this the 12th day of August, 2005.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S EXPLANATION OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATION, AND

FINDINGS CONCERNING NEED FOR TRANSCRIPT

l. Objection. Any party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it must,

within ten days of the date of service of this document, file specific written objections with

the Clerk of this court. Failure to do so will bar a de novo determination by the district

judge of anything in the recommendation and will bar an attack, on appeal, of the factual

findings of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)©); Lewis v. Smith, 855 F.2d

736, 738 (11th Cir. 1988); Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. Unit B, 1982)(en

banc). The procedure for challenging the findings and recommendations of the Magistrate

Judge is set out in more detail in SD ALA LR 72.4 (June 1, 1997), which provides that:

A party may object to a recommendation entered by a magistrate judge in

a dispositive matter, that is, a matter excepted by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),

by filing a ‘Statement of Objection to Magistrate Judge’s Recommendation’

within ten days after being served with a copy of the recommendation,

unless a different time is established by order. The statement of objection

shall specify those portions of the recommendation to which objection is

made and the basis for the objection. The objecting party shall submit to the

district judge, at the time of filing the objection, a brief setting forth the

party’s arguments that the magistrate judge’s recommendation should be

reviewed de novo and a different disposition made. It is insufficient to

submit only a copy of the original brief submitted to the magistrate judge,

although a copy of the original brief may be submitted or referred to and

incorporated into the brief in support of the objection. Failure to submit a

brief in support of the objection may be deemed an abandonment of the

objection. 

A magistrate judge's recommendation cannot be appealed to a Court of Appeals;

only the district judge's order or judgment can be appealed.

2. Transcript (applicable Where Proceedings Tape Recorded). Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1915 and FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b), the Magistrate Judge finds that the tapes and

original records in this case are adequate for purposes of review. Any party planning to

object to this recommendation, but unable to pay the fee for a transcript, is advised that a

judicial determination that transcription is necessary is required before the United States will

pay the cost of the transcript.

s/WILLIAM E. CASSADY 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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