Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01279/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01279-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Raymond Madden
Respondent
Marcos Palomar
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCOS PALOMAR,

Petitioner,

v.

RAYMOND MADDEN,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:15-cv-01279-DAD-SAB-HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION 

RECOMMENDING DENIAL OF PETITION

FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent declined magistrate judge jurisdiction and this matter 

was therefore referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) 

and Local Rule 302.

I.

BACKGROUND

On February 14, 2013, Petitioner was convicted after a jury trial in the Madera County 

Superior Court of oral copulation upon a child ten years or younger (count 1), lewd and 

lascivious acts upon a child fourteen years or younger (counts 2 and 3), and a lewd and 

lascivious act upon a child fourteen years or younger by use of force, violence, duress, menace, 

or threat of great bodily harm (count 4). (CT1119–22). On May 3, 2013, Petitioner was 

 

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―CT‖ refers to the Clerk‘s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on November 25, 2015. (ECF No. 15).

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sentenced to a determinate term of sixteen years and a consecutive indeterminate term of fifteen 

years to life. (CT 184–87).

On March 11, 2015, the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, affirmed the 

judgment with the exception of finding that the trial court erred in imposing a $750 presentence 

report fee. People v. Palomar, No. F067273, 2015 WL 1089544, at *22 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 

2015). The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner‘s petition for review on June 17, 2015.

(LDs26, 7).

On August 20, 2015, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

(ECF No. 1). Therein, Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: (1) violation of his

Miranda rights; (2) erroneous omission of unanimity instruction with respect to count 1; (3) 

insufficient evidence of force to support conviction on count 4; (4) erroneous application of an 

amended sentencing scheme with respect to count 4; and (5) erroneous prohibition of defense 

counsel‘s use of visual aid during closing argument. On November 23, 2015, Respondent filed 

an answer. (ECF No. 14). Petitioner has filed a traverse and supplemental traverse. (ECF Nos. 

19, 23).

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS3

[D]uring a period of about one year, defendant sexually abused his then nine- or 

ten-year-old daughter in their home. At trial, Jane Doe testified her father touched 

her breasts and vagina on more than one occasion. In a forensic interview 

conducted shortly after her allegations surfaced, Jane told the interviewer 

defendant had also pushed her head down and placed his penis in her mouth. The 

interview was played for the jury after Jane denied during her trial testimony that 

conduct had occurred.

Defendant testified as well. He claimed he touched his daughter‘s breasts only in 

response to her complaints of pain in that area. Further, he stated he touched her 

briefly on one occasion, over her clothing, to ensure she was wearing a sanitary 

napkin overnight because she was menstruating.

With specific regard to the admissions of sexual contact with his daughter made 

during an interview with Detective Mark Trukki several days after his arrest, 

defendant testified the only reason he admitted to placing his penis in his 

 

2

―LD‖ refers to the documents lodged by Respondent on November 25, 2015. (ECF No. 15).

3 The Court relies on the California Court of Appeal‘s March 11, 2015 opinion for this summary of the facts of the 

crime. See Vasquez v. Kirkland, 572 F.3d 1029, 1031 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009).

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daughter‘s mouth was because Trukki told defendant before the recorded portion4

of the interview began that only he (Trukki) could help get defendant out of jail, 

and such an admission was necessary for defendant to receive that help. 

Defendant further testified he ―made up‖ the other admissions regarding sexual 

contact with his daughter as a way to further elicit Trukki‘s assistance. He 

testified he never placed his penis in his daughter‘s mouth nor did he ever touch 

her sexually as was alleged.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *1–2.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody 

pursuant to the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution or laws 

or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed 

by the U.S. Constitution. The challenged convictions arise out of Madera County Superior Court, 

which is located within the Eastern District of California. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241(d).

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 

of 1996 (―AEDPA‖), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its 

enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is 

therefore governed by its provisions.

Under the AEDPA, relitigation of any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court is 

barred unless a petitioner can show that the state court‘s adjudication of his claim:

 

4 The California Court of Appeal stated with respect to Petitioner‘s conversation with law enforcement:

Defendant testified he had a conversation with Detective Trukki before Trukki turned on the 

recording device. He says Trukki offered his assistance in exchange for defendant admitting he 

placed his penis in his daughter‘s mouth. That, defendant testified, is the reason he admitted to 

doing so. Nevertheless, when listening to the recording, one can plainly hear someone outside of 

the room saying ―Hey, come in.‖ A door opens and Detective Trukki asks the arriving individual 

whether he is ―Marcos,‖ and after receiving an affirmative reply, Trukki introduces himself and 

Detective Josh Chavez. Trukki then asks defendant to move in a little closer so they can ―shut the 

door.‖ Trukki thanks someone and the door can be heard closing. After review of this evidence, 

there is no reason to believe a conversation occurred between Trukki and defendant prior to the 

beginning of the audio recording.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *2 n.2.

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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 97–98 (2011); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 

U.S. 63, 70–71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

As a threshold matter, this Court must ―first decide what constitutes  ̳clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.‘‖ Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In ascertaining what is ―clearly established Federal law,‖ this 

Court must look to the ―holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court‘s] decisions as 

of the time of the relevant state-court decision.‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. ―In other words, 

 ̳clearly established Federal law‘ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles 

set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.‖ Id. In addition, 

the Supreme Court decision must ― ̳squarely address [] the issue in th[e] case‘ or establish a legal 

principle that  ̳clearly extend[s]‘ to a new context to the extent required by the Supreme Court in 

. . . recent decisions‖; otherwise, there is no clearly established Federal law for purposes of 

review under AEDPA. Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. 

Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008)); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70 (2006). If no clearly established Federal law exists, the inquiry is at an 

end and the Court must defer to the state court‘s decision. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70; Wright, 552 

U.S. at 126; Moses, 555 F.3d at 760.

If the Court determines there is governing clearly established Federal law, the Court must 

then consider whether the state court‘s decision was ―contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, [the] clearly established Federal law.‖ Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72 (quoting 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d)(1)). ―Under the  ̳contrary to‘ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the 

state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of materially 

indistinguishable facts.‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 412–13; see also Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. ―The 

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word  ̳contrary‘ is commonly understood to mean  ̳diametrically different,‘  ̳opposite in character 

or nature,‘ or  ̳mutually opposed.‘‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 405 (quoting Webster‘s Third New 

International Dictionary 495 (1976)). ―A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to 

[Supreme Court] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the 

governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases.‖ Id. If the state court decision is ―contrary to‖ 

clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the state decision is reviewed under the preAEDPA de novo standard. Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

―Under the  ̳reasonable application clause,‘ a federal habeas court may grant the writ if 

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court‘s decisions but 

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner‘s case.‖ Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.

―[A] federal court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent 

judgment that the relevant state court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously 

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.‖ Id. at 411; see also Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 75–76. The writ may issue only ―where there is no possibility fair minded jurists 

could disagree that the state court‘s decision conflicts with [the Supreme Court‘s] precedents.‖

Richter, 562 U.S. at 102. In other words, so long as fair minded jurists could disagree on the 

correctness of the state court‘s decision, the decision cannot be considered unreasonable. Id. If 

the Court determines that the state court decision is objectively unreasonable, and the error is not 

structural, habeas relief is nonetheless unavailable unless the error had a substantial and injurious 

effect on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court 

judgment. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 

1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially 

incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both 

decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 

1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). ―When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the 

state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the 

merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.‖ 

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Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing ―there is reason to 

think some other explanation for the state court‘s decision is more likely.‖ Id. at 99–100 (citing 

Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)).

Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine 

whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. 

Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). ―Independent review of the record is not de novo

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine 

whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.‖ Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. While 

the federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, 

the federal court must review the state court record to determine whether there was any 

―reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court ―must 

determine what arguments or theories ... could have supported, the state court‘s decision; and 

then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or 

theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.‖ Id. at 102.

IV.

REVIEW OF CLAIMS

A. Miranda Claim

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that he twice received defective Miranda

warnings. (ECF No. 1 at 8).5Petitioner contends that the state court erred in denying his motion 

to suppress his statements based on defective Miranda admonitions and that counsel was 

ineffective in failing to preserve this claim for appeal. (Id. at 8–9). Respondent argues that 

Petitioner‘s Miranda claim is procedurally barred and the state court‘s rejection of Petitioner‘s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not unreasonable or contrary to Supreme Court 

precedent. (ECF No. 14 at 15).

Petitioner‘s Miranda claim was raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, 

Fifth Appellate District, which found that Petitioner had forfeited the claim. Palomar, 2015 WL 

 

5

Page numbers refer to ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page.

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1089544, at *6. The claim also was raised in the petition for review, which the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied. (LDs 6, 7). Where ―the last reasoned opinion on the claim 

explicitly imposes a procedural default, [the Court] will presume that a later decision rejecting 

the claim did not silently disregard that bar and consider the merits.‖ Ylst, 501 U.S. at 803.

1. Procedural Default

A federal court will not review a petitioner‘s claims if the state court has denied relief on

those claims pursuant to a state law procedural ground that is independent of federal law and 

adequate to support the judgment. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30 (1991). This 

doctrine of procedural default is based on the concerns of comity and federalism. Id. at 730–32.

However, there are limitations as to when a federal court should invoke procedural default and 

refuse to review a claim because a petitioner violated a state‘s procedural rules. Procedural 

default can only block a claim in federal court if the state court ―clearly and expressly states that 

its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.‖ Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989).

Here, the California Court of Appeal found that Petitioner failed to preserve his Miranda

claim for appeal under California Evidence Code section 353(a) because Petitioner‘s stated 

grounds for objection at trial were different from the arguments he presented on appeal. Palomar, 

2015 WL 1089544, at *5–6. As the California Court of Appeal clearly and expressly stated that 

its decision on the Miranda claim rests on a state procedural bar, procedural default is 

appropriate if the state procedural bar is independent and adequate.

To qualify as ―independent,‖ a state procedural ground ―must not be  ̳interwoven with the 

federal law.‘‖ Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. 

Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983)). ―To qualify as an  ̳adequate‘ procedural ground, a state 

rule must be  ̳firmly established and regularly followed.‘‖ Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 

(2011) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. 53, 60 (2009)). The Ninth Circuit has taken a burdenshifting approach to determining the adequacy of a state procedural ground. See Bennett v. 

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 586 (9th Cir. 2003). First, the state must plead an independent and 

adequate state procedural bar as an affirmative defense. The burden then shifts to the petitioner 

―to place that defense in issue,‖ and can be satisfied by ―asserting specific factual allegations that 

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demonstrate the inadequacy of the state procedure, including citation to authority demonstrating 

inconsistent application of the rule.‖ Id. If the petitioner satisfies his burden, the burden shifts 

back to the state, which bears ―the ultimate burden of proving the adequacy‖ of the state 

procedural bar. Id. at 585–86.

Respondent asserts that the state court denied Petitioner‘s Miranda claim pursuant to an 

independent and adequate state procedural ground. (ECF No. 14 at 23). In finding that Petitioner 

failed to preserve his Miranda claim for appeal, the California Court of Appeal relied on 

California Evidence Code section 353(a), which ―allows a judgment to be reversed because of 

erroneous admission of evidence only if an objection to the evidence or a motion to strike it was 

 ̳timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection.‘‖ People v. 

Demetrulias, 39 Cal. 4th 1, 20 (2006) (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 353(a)). This state procedural 

ground is independent as it is not interwoven with federal law. It is also ―firmly established‖ 

since the statute became effective on January 1, 1967, and codified well-settled California 

procedural rules. Cal. Evid. Code § 353 cmt. It is also ―regularly followed‖ since the California 

Supreme Court has recognized that pursuant to this statute, it has ―consistently held that the 

 ̳defendant‘s failure to make a timely and specific objection‘ on the ground asserted on appeal 

makes that ground not cognizable.‖ People v. Seijas, 36 Cal. 4th 291, 302 (2005) (quoting People 

v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 22 (1980)). Petitioner has not raised any challenges to the independence 

and adequacy of this state procedural ground and thus, has failed to place the defense in issue. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the California Court of Appeal applied an independent and 

adequate state procedural ground, and Petitioner has procedurally defaulted his Miranda claim.

A petitioner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by demonstrating either 

―(1)  ̳cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law,‘ 

or (2)  ̳that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.‘‖ 

Jones v. Ryan, 691 F.3d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750)). As 

Petitioner has failed to raise the issues of cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of 

justice, the Court finds that Petitioner is procedurally barred from bringing his Miranda claim 

and it should be dismissed. 

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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In his first claim for relief, Petitioner also asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing 

to preserve his Miranda claim for appeal. (ECF No. 1 at 9). This claim was presented on direct 

appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the claim in a 

reasoned decision. Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *6–8. The claim also was raised in the 

petition for review, which the California Supreme Court summarily denied. (LDs 6, 7). As 

federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court will ―look through‖ the 

California Supreme Court‘s summary denial and examine the decision of the California Court of 

Appeal. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2276 (2015); Johnson v. Williams, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1094 n.1 (2013); Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806.

In denying Petitioner‘s ineffective assistance claim regarding trial counsel‘s failure to 

preserve the Miranda claim for appeal, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Alternatively, defendant argues his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by 

failing to object.

An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that ―counsel‘s 

action was, objectively considered, both deficient under prevailing professional 

norms and prejudicial.‖ (People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 666, citing 

Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687 (Strickland ).) ―[T]he burden 

is on the defendant to show (1) trial counsel failed to act in the manner to be 

expected of reasonably competent attorneys acting as diligent advocates and (2) it 

is reasonably probable that a more favorable determination would have resulted in 

the absence of counsel‘s failings.‖ (People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 288; 

see People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 961.) This means the defendant 

―must show both that his counsel‘s performance was deficient when measured 

against the standard of a reasonably competent attorney and that counsel‘s 

deficient performance resulted in prejudice to [the] defendant in the sense that it 

 ̳so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Kipp

(1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366, quoting Strickland, supra, at p. 686.)

As to the first element, an appellate ―court will indulge in a presumption that 

counsel‘s performance fell within the wide range of professional competence and 

that counsel‘s actions and inactions can be explained as a matter of sound trial 

strategy. Defendant thus bears the burden of establishing constitutionally 

inadequate assistance of counsel. [Citations.] If the record on appeal sheds no 

light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, an appellate 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected unless counsel was 

asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or there simply could be no 

satisfactory explanation. [Citation.]‖ (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 207; 

see People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)

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Were we to assume here that defense counsel‘s performance was deficient 

because of his failure to object, defendant cannot show he was prejudiced. To do 

so, he ―must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.‖ 

(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694.) However, prejudice must be established as 

―  ̳a ―demonstrable reality,‖ not simply speculation as to the effect of the errors or 

omissions of counsel.‘ ‖ (In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 766.)

Defendant contends this case, in the absence of his admissions, was based entirely 

upon the victim‘s questionable credibility. Therefore, defendant argues he 

suffered prejudice by admission of that evidence, entitling him to reversal. We are 

not swayed.

It is plain the inconsistencies between Jane Doe‘s trial testimony and the 

statements she made during the forensic interview shortly after her father‘s arrest 

are the result of Jane‘s wish for her father to come home. Notably, too, Jane was 

very nervous.

At trial, Jane repeatedly denied any act of oral copulation—she said her father‘s 

―middle part‖ (penis) was never in her mouth. She also testified she did not 

remember telling the police officer and the forensic interviewer otherwise. At one 

point, Jane said her mouth ―almost‖ touched her father‘s middle part, followed 

immediately by her statement that she doesn‘t ―really remember‖ and ―tried to 

forget it.‖ Later, Jane claimed her father ―pulled‖ her down and her mouth almost 

touched his middle part. It happened more than once.

Jane did testify her father touched her breasts and her ―middle part‖ (vagina) on 

more than one occasion. Jane never wavered from her numerous statements that 

she told both the police officer and the forensic interviewer the truth. She also 

testified her father told her not to tell anyone about the touching. Jane never 

wanted to touch her father and testified she was ―grossed out‖ and ―anxious‖ 

about what had happened. When she was asked the worst thing that happened 

when her father abused her, Jane replied, ―probably everything that happened.‖

Officer Rosel testified Jane told him her father had been touching her for the past 

two years. He touched Jane‘s breasts and vagina. The officer said at one point 

Jane told him her father forced her head down toward his middle part and told her 

to lick it. Jane cried throughout the interview.

Forensic interviewer Josefina Roderick testified at trial. She conducted an 

interview with Jane Doe in February 2012. The interview was video recorded. 

Roderick testified the video recording is accurate. It was played for the jury.

Defendant contends the interview ―reveals a demeanor that does not provide 

much confidence in what [Jane] was saying.‖ He notes she was ―fidgety and 

distracted‖ and appeared to be suffering from a cough and cold. We have 

reviewed the videotape of Roderick‘s interview of Jane Doe. Defendant‘s 

complaints are not well taken. While the recording does depict an obviously 

nervous young girl who appears to be suffering the effects of a cold, we find 

nothing at all to support an inference of a lack of credibility. ―A child witness is 

not a miniature version of an adult witness. Young children think, relate, and 

communicate in a qualitatively different manner than adults.‖ (Couzens & 

Bigelow, Sex Crimes: Cal. Law and Procedure (The Rutter Group 2014) § 8.2.)

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There was no evidence Jane had a motive to lie about being sexually abused by 

her father. She testified she loved her dad and she thought they had a good 

relationship. She missed him and wanted him to come home. In fact, that evidence 

tends instead to lend support to the inference Jane was motivated to minimize her 

father‘s abuse in her testimony at trial. Additionally, as Jane explained, she did 

not directly report the abuse. Rather, she told her closest friend Breanna. Breanna 

counseled Jane to tell someone. Jane did not, but Breanna did.

Lastly, we are not persuaded by defendant‘s assertion that In re Edward S. (2009) 

173 Cal.App.4th 387 is similar to this case. The claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel in Edward S. pertained to counsel‘s failure to investigate potentially 

exculpatory evidence and the resulting prejudice. Counsel was aware of certain 

issues bearing on the 10–year–old witness‘s credibility, including that she ―had 

been exposed to more sexual conduct than most 10–year–olds [and] that on a 

specific occasion she threatened to lie in order to work her will,‖ a claim that 

could purportedly be corroborated by more than one individual. (Id. at p. 408.) 

Edward S. is unlike this case because here there is no potentially exculpatory 

evidence at issue, nor are there similar concerns regarding Jane‘s credibility. Even 

assuming error on the part of defense counsel, on this record we find any error to 

be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *6–8.

a. Legal Standard

The clearly established federal law governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging 

ineffective assistance of counsel, the court must consider two factors. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

687. First, the petitioner must show that counsel‘s performance was deficient, requiring a 

showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the ―counsel‖ 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 687. The petitioner must show that counsel‘s 

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and must identify counsel‘s 

alleged acts or omissions that were not the result of reasonable professional judgment 

considering the circumstances. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105 (―The question is whether an attorney‘s 

representation amounted to incompetence under  ̳prevailing professional norms,‘ not whether it 

deviated from best practices or most common custom.‖) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).

Judicial scrutiny of counsel‘s performance is highly deferential. A court indulges a strong 

presumption that counsel‘s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 

assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A reviewing court should make every effort ―to eliminate 

the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel‘s challenged 

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conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel‘s perspective at that time.‖ Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689. 

Second, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel‘s unprofessional errors, the result would have been different. It is not enough ―to show 

that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.‖ Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 693. ―A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.‖ Id. at 694. A court ―asks whether it is  ̳reasonable likely‘ the result would have been 

different. . . . The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.‖ 

Richter, 562 U.S. at 111–12 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696, 693). A reviewing court may 

review the prejudice prong first. See Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955 (9th Cir. 2002).

Because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude 

to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. See Yarborough v. 

Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (―[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable 

requires considering the rule‘s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts 

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.‖). In effect, review of ineffective 

assistance of counsel claims under the AEDPA is ― ̳doubly deferential‘ in order to afford  ̳both 

the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt.‘‖ Woods v. Donald, 135 S. Ct. 

1372, 1376 (2015) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013)).

b. Analysis

Petitioner has failed to establish that the state court‘s determination that Petitioner was 

not prejudiced by counsel‘s failure to preserve his Miranda claim for appeal was contrary to, or 

an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, or was based on an unreasonable 

determination of fact. A ―fairminded jurist‖ could agree with the California Court of Appeal‘s 

determination that the victim was credible and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice 

from the admission of his statements. It was not objectively unreasonable for the state court to 

find that the inconsistencies between the victim‘s trial testimony and her forensic interview were 

the result of her nervousness and her wish for Petitioner to come home. It also was not 

objectively unreasonable for the state court to find that there was no evidence the victim had 

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motive to lie about Petitioner‘s abuse and that the evidence lends support to the inference the 

victim was motivated to minimize Petitioner‘s abuse in her testimony at trial. See Wood v. Allen, 

558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (―[E]ven if  ̳[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree‘ 

about the finding in question,  ̳on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial 

court‘s . . . determination.‘‖) (second alteration in original) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 

333, 341–42 (2006)). In the forensic interview, the victim stated that ―[t]here were—like—only 

two times‖ she put her mouth on Petitioner‘s penis. (Supp. CT665–69). At trial, the victim 

testified that Petitioner touched her ―middle part‖ and breasts ―more than one time.‖ (1 RT7140). 

(See 1 RT 140–44, 157–58, 161, 170–71; Supp. CT 45, 56–57, 59–61). The victim also testified 

that Petitioner grabbed her hand and was still holding onto her hand when she touched his 

―middle part.‖ (2 RT 324–25; Supp. CT 52–54, 62). In light of the victim‘s trial testimony and 

statements during the forensic interview, it was not unreasonable for the state court to find that 

Petitioner failed to show ―that there is a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.‖ Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the state court‘s decision denying 

Petitioner‘s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination 

of fact. The decision was not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 

and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 

562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his first claim, and it 

must be denied.

B. Omission of Unanimity Instruction

In his second claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erroneously failed to 

instruct the jury on unanimity with respect to count 1. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Petitioner contends that

there were at least two possible acts on two different occasions for which the jury could have 

convicted Petitioner of count 1, and that there were sharply different defenses to the two possible 

 

6

―Supp. CT‖ refers to the Supplemental Clerk‘s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on November 25, 

2015. (ECF No. 15).

7

―RT‖ refers to the Reporter‘s Transcript on Appeal lodged by Respondent on November 25, 2015. (ECF No. 15).

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acts. (Id. at 12). Respondent argues that the state court‘s adjudication was not unreasonable or 

contrary to Supreme Court precedent because a unanimity instruction is not constitutionally 

required and the omission was harmless. (ECF No. 14 at 21).

This claim was raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate 

District, which denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *8–9.

The claim was also raised in the petition for review, which was summarily denied by the 

California Supreme Court. (LDs 6, 7). As federal courts review the last reasoned state court 

opinion, the Court will ―look through‖ the California Supreme Court‘s summary denial and 

examine the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 

501 U.S. at 806. In denying Petitioner‘s claim regarding the omission of a unanimity instruction 

on count 1, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Defendant maintains the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on 

unanimity as to the oral copulation alleged in count 1. He further contends the 

error requires reversal. Plaintiff concedes the instruction should have been given, 

however, she claims the error was harmless.

We review a claim of instructional error de novo. (People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 

Cal.4th 547, 581; People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 733.) In a criminal 

case, a jury verdict must be unanimous. (People v. Collins (1976) 17 Cal.3d 687, 

693.) The jury must agree unanimously that the defendant is guilty of a specific 

crime. (People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263, 281.) ―[W]hen the evidence 

suggests more than one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among 

the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal act.‖ 

(People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) ―The [unanimity] instruction is 

designed in part to prevent the jury from amalgamating evidence of multiple 

offenses, no one of which has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done something

sufficient to convict on one count.‖ (People v. Deletto (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 

458, 472.) Even if a unanimity instruction is not requested, the trial court has a 

duty to give the instruction whenever the evidence warrants it. (People v. Carrera

(1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 311, fn. 8.)

Count 1 alleged defendant had committed the crime of oral copulation pursuant to 

section 288.7, subdivision (b). Accordingly, the jury was instructed with 

CALCRIM No. 1128:

―The defendant is charged in Count One with engaging in oral copulation 

with a child 10 years of age or younger.

―To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove 

that:

―1. The defendant engaged in an act of oral copulation with Jane Doe;

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―2. When the defendant did so, Jane Doe was 10 years of age or younger;

―3. At the time of the act, the defendant was at least 18 years old.

―Under the law, a person becomes one year older as soon as the first 

minute of his or her birthday has begun.

―Oral copulation is any contact, no matter how slight, between the mouth 

of one person and the sexual organ or anus of another person. Penetration 

is not required.‖ (Original italics.)

Moreover, the jury was also instructed regarding the credibility of witnesses, 

evaluating conflicting evidence, the testimony of a single witness to prove any 

fact, and conviction of a sexual assault crime can be based solely on the testimony 

of the complaining witness.

Even if we assume the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury 

with a unanimity instruction, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

because the jury clearly believed Jane Doe‘s testimony. And, the failure to give a 

unanimity instruction is harmless ―if the record indicate[s] the jury resolved the 

basic credibility dispute against the defendant and would have convicted the 

defendant of any of the various offenses shown by the evidence to have been 

committed.‖ (People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 307.)

Despite some conflict between Jane Doe‘s testimony at trial and the statements 

she gave during the forensic interview, the record reveals the jury resolved the 

basic credibility dispute against defendant and would have convicted him of any 

of the various offenses shown by the evidence to have been committed.

During the forensic interview, Jane said that there ―were—like—only two times‖ 

that she put her mouth on her father‘s penis. On one occasion, Jane was taking a 

shower and her father was in the bathroom with her. He ―cleaned his middle 

thing‖ with water. Jane did not want to touch it, but he tried to ―put [her] head 

down there so [she] could lick it.‖ Her father told her to look down; Jane did so. 

Then her mouth was close to her father‘s penis and he was looking at her and 

signaling with his eyes for her to lick it. He pushed her head down with his hand. 

She did not want to lick it. On another occasion, Jane was lying on the floor 

sleeping and her father had laid down next to her. He directed Jane to slide down 

so she was facing his ―middle thing.‖ He put his hand on her head and told her to 

open her mouth. He pushed her head and she ―licked‖ his penis. It went in her 

mouth and it felt ―gross.‖ Afterward, Jane got up and brushed her teeth. Her dad 

told her not to tell anyone. Although Jane‘s description of these two events—one 

in the bedroom and one in the bathroom—could be interpreted as describing one 

completed act of oral copulation because Jane did not explicitly describe her 

father‘s penis being inside her mouth in the bathroom incident, she did begin her 

description of the bedroom and bathroom incidents by saying her father‘s penis 

had been in her mouth ―two times.‖

In his statement to detectives, defendant admitted he placed the tip of his penis in 

Jane‘s mouth on one occasion. He claimed Jane came into the bathroom while he 

was taking a shower. He opened the shower curtain and asked her to ―do 

something‖ for him. She asked ―what?‖ and he signaled what he wanted. He told 

her to put his penis in her mouth; she touched the tip of his penis with her mouth 

and then said she did not like it. Defendant admitted also that there were other 

times he tried to have Jane orally copulate him, but she pulled away on those 

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other occasions. He told the detectives that he ―respected when [Jane] said no.‖ 

When the detective was summarizing his admissions, defendant again 

acknowledged his penis went in Jane‘s mouth on one occasion while they were in 

the bathroom, and when defendant wanted to put his penis in Jane‘s mouth on the 

other occasions, she did not want to so he did not force her to do so.

The jury watched Jane‘s forensic interview and also heard defendant‘s statement 

to the detectives. Both Jane and her father had reason to minimize their respective 

conduct; she because she loved him and wanted him out of jail and back at home, 

and he for obvious reasons.

Lastly, we are simply not persuaded by defendant‘s complaints regarding the 

interview technique and his interpretations of the interview here. We have 

reviewed the forensic interview and find no fault.

Following a review of this record, we are satisfied any instructional error was 

harmless. It is plain the jury resolved any credibility dispute against defendant and 

convicted him of oral copulation and all other charged sex offenses. (People v. 

Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 307.) There is simply no reasonable possibility the 

verdict would have been different if the jury had been instructed on unanimity. 

Accordingly, we conclude any error by the trial court for failing to instruct the 

jury sua sponte with a unanimity instruction pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3500 was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *8–9.

Here, the California Court of Appeal found that even assuming the trial court erred by 

failing to sua sponte instruct the jury on unanimity with respect to count 1, any error ―was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.‖ Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *9. The Supreme Court 

has held that ―when a state court determines that a constitutional violation is harmless, a federal 

court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the harmlessness determination itself was 

unreasonable.‖ Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (citing Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12 

(2003) (per curiam)). A ―state-court decision is not unreasonable if  ̳fairminded jurists could 

disagree on [its] correctness.‘‖ Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2199 (2015) (alteration in 

original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 101). That is, Petitioner 

must show that the state court‘s harmless error determination ―was so lacking in justification that 

there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of 

fairminded disagreement.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 

103).

In the instant case, the jury was instructed that ―[y]ou may believe all, part, or none of 

any witness‘s testimony.‖ (CT 159). They were further instructed to ―not automatically reject 

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testimony just because of inconsistencies or conflicts,‖ and ―if you think the witness lied about 

some things, but told the truth about others, you may simply accept the part that you think is true 

and ignore the rest.‖ (CT 160). In light of the jury‘s return of guilty verdicts on all counts, it was 

not objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to find that the jury resolved the 

fundamental credibility dispute against Petitioner and would have convicted Petitioner of any of 

the various offenses shown by the evidence admitted at trial, despite inconsistencies between the 

victim‘s trial testimony and her forensic interview and conflicts between the victim‘s and 

Petitioner‘s statements and testimony. There is sufficient evidence in the record from the 

victim‘s forensic interview and Petitioner‘s statements to the detectives that it was not 

objectively unreasonable for the California Court of Appeal to find no reasonable possibility the 

verdict would have been different if the jury had been instructed on unanimity. See Henderson v. 

Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 155 (1977) (noting that an omitted jury instruction ―is less likely to be 

prejudicial than a misstatement of the law‖).

The Court finds that the state court‘s harmless error determination regarding the omission 

of the unanimity instruction was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of fact. The decision 

was not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 

existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. 

Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his second claim and it must be denied.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

In his third claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that there was insufficient evidence of force 

to support his conviction on count 4. (ECF No. 1 at 5). Petitioner contends that the victim 

testified that Petitioner guided her hand toward him, but when she pulled away he did not resist. 

(Id. at 15). Respondent argues that the state court‘s adjudication was not unreasonable or 

contrary to Supreme Court precedent. (ECF No. 14 at 37). This claim was raised on direct appeal

to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the claim in a reasoned 

opinion. Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *10–13. The claim was also raised in the petition for 

review, which was summarily denied by the California Supreme Court. (LDs 6, 7). As federal

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courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court will ―look through‖ the California 

Supreme Court‘s summary denial and examine the decision of the California Court of Appeal. 

See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. In denying the sufficiency of evidence 

claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

[D]efendant contends there was insufficient evidence of force regarding the 

forcible lewd conduct alleged in count 4. Plaintiff maintains there is substantial 

evidence supporting the jury‘s finding.

In assessing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court‘s task is 

to review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to 

determine whether it contains substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable, 

credible, and of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review is the same in 

cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. It is the 

jury that must be convinced of a defendant‘s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If 

the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact‘s findings, the opinion of the 

reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a 

contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment. (People v. Watkins

(2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1019–1020; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11; 

see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 317–320; People v. Johnson (1980) 

26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate courts do not 

determine the facts. We examine the record as a whole in the light most favorable 

to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier of fact could 

reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. (People v. Kraft

(2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053.) If the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, a 

reviewing court must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute its 

evaluation of a witness‘s credibility for that of the fact finder. (People v. Ochoa

(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 1206.) The testimony of a single witness—unless 

physically impossible or inherently improbable—is sufficient for a conviction. 

(Evid.Code, § 411; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.) Before the 

judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence, ―it 

must clearly appear that on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial 

evidence to support the verdict of the jury.‖ (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 

Cal.App.3d 423, 429; see People v. Conners (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 443, 453.)

Under section 288, subdivision (a), it is a crime to commit a lewd or lascivious act 

on a child under age 14 with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of 

the perpetrator or the child. Any touch with the requisite sexual intent is a 

violation of subdivision (a). (People v. Martinez (1995) 11 Cal.4th 434, 440–441, 

452.) Subdivision (b)(1) of section 288 prohibits the commission of such an act 

―by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful 

bodily injury on the victim or another person.‖ ―[T]he force used for a subdivision 

(b) conviction [must] be  ̳substantially different from or substantially greater than 

that necessary to accomplish the lewd act itself.‘ [Citation.]‖ (People v. Soto

(2011) 51 Cal.4th 229, 242.)

The ―force‖ requirement of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) will be deemed 

satisfied when the defendant uses any force that is ―different from and in excess 

of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a 

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victim‘s consent.‖ (People v. Neel (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1784, 1790.) 

―According to the majority of courts, this includes acts of grabbing, holding and 

restraining that occur in conjunction with the lewd acts themselves.‖ (People v. 

Alvarez (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 999, 1005 [force element met where defendant 

resisted victim‘s attempts to push him away, holding victim while digitally 

penetrating her before grabbing victim‘s hands and placing them on his penis]; 

People v. Babcock (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 383, 388 [force element met when 

defendant grabbed victims‘ hands and made them touch his genital area].)

Here, during trial, Jane testified her father would sometimes enter the bathroom 

while she was showering and peek at her through the shower curtain. The 

following occurred thereafter:

―[PROSECUTOR] Q After he opens the curtains, what‘s the next thing 

that happens?

―[JANE DOE] A He reaches—he tries to grab me.

―Q What does he reach with?

―A His hand.

―Q And what part of you does he try to grab?

―A My hand.

―Q What's the next thing that happens?

―A Well, he pulls—he pulls me but not that hard.

―Q When you say he pulls you, could you tell me what part of him he is 

using and what part of you he is touching?

―A His hand and my hand.

―Q What direction does he pull you?

―A His direction.

―Q And what's the next thing that happens?

―A I don‘t really remember that time.

―Q Have you ever seen your dad‘s middle part?

―A Yes.‖

Asked about a time she saw her father‘s middle part, Jane recalled an occasion 

wherein she was taking a shower and defendant came into the bathroom before 

work, ―unzipped his zipper and took [his middle part] out.‖ Asked whether she 

had ever touched his middle part, Jane answered affirmatively and said her hand 

moved because she pulled it away; she wasn‘t stopped from doing so. Noting that 

touching had occurred while she was in the shower on more than one occasion, 

Jane testified she thought her dad wanted her to touch his middle part with her 

hand on more than one occasion. She touched it with her hand once or twice.

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On cross-examination, the following colloquy occurred:

―[DEFENSE COUNSEL] Q ... You mentioned yesterday that at one point 

in time I think you said—correct me if I am wrong—but I think you said 

that there was one time when your dad had grabbed your hand and asked 

you to—had pulled it towards you and wanted you to touch his middle 

part; is that right?

―[JANE DOE] A Yes.

―Q And when you say he grabbed your hand, you also said that you were 

able to pull your hand away?

―A Yes.

―Q Was he holding onto you? Did he grab you and hold onto you real 

tight?

―A No.

―Q Okay. Was there a lot of pressure on your hand or did he grab your 

hand or arm?

―A My hand.

―Q Your hand. So if he grabbed your hand like this—

―A Yes.

―[PROSECUTOR]: For the record, counsel‘s right hand is over the top of 

his left fingers with the thumbs touching.

―[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Thank you.

―THE COURT: Yes.

―[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Q ... So, Jane, he grabbed you by the hand with 

his hand. Okay. And did he squeeze it tight?

―A No.

―Q And you said that he kind of moved it towards himself, right?

―A Yes.

―Q Moved your hand towards his body?

―A Yes.

―Q And then you pulled your hand away?

―A Yes.

―Q Now, did you pull your hand away before or after you touched his 

middle part?

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―A Before.

―Q All right. Now the time—I think you said there‘s a time when you 

actually did touch his middle part, correct?

―A Yes.

―Q Was there one time or more than one time?

―A One time.

―Q And on that time when you touched his middle part, did he grab ahold 

of your hand at that time?

―A Yes.

―Q He did? Okay. And you didn‘t—were you able to pull your hand away 

that time?

―A I don‘t really remember.

―Q But you did actually touch it?

―A Yes.

―Q Did he still have ahold of your hand? Had he grabbed your hand and 

was he still holding onto your hand when you touched his middle part?

―A Yes.

―Q And was he holding it tightly?

―A I don‘t really remember.‖

During redirect examination, Jane indicated most of the incidents occurred in the 

shower, and although she was not afraid of her father, she was ―grossed out‖ and 

anxious about what was happening.

In her forensic interview, Jane spoke about an incident occurring in the shower. 

Her mother told her to a take a shower because it had been three or four days. 

While Jane was taking a shower, her dad came into the bathroom. He looked or 

―peek[ed]‖ at her. He opened the shower curtain and used his eyes and hands to 

signal Jane to come closer. Jane leaned away from him; he tried to touch her 

breasts. Her dad ―grabbed‖ her when she turned. More specifically, Jane said:

―[JANE DOE] A: Um, like—he was, like—elbowing me a little bit closer. 

He, like, kinda went—well, he grabbed me, like, not before. But kinda 

grabbed me when, like, when he made—he, like, almost made me touch 

his middle thing.

―[INTERVIEWER] Q: Okay. How did he—uh—how‘d he grab you?

―A: Like, he—he grabbed me but not, like, hard.

―Q: Okay. Where did he grab you?

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―A: Like, on the hand.

―Q: On what part of the hand?

―A: It was right here.

―Q: Is that just one hand or—or with both hands?

―A: One hand. [¶] ... [¶]

―Q: What did he use to grab your hand?

―A: His hand.

―Q: His hand? Okay. So he grabbed you by the hand and then what?

―A: Like, he tried to make me grab his middle thing.

―Q: He tried to grab you—make you grab his middle thing? How did he 

try to make you grab his middle thing?

―A: Because he pulled his pants down and, like, take it out. Then I almost 

touched it. [¶] ... [¶]

―Q: How [did he try to get you to touch his middle thing]?

―A: Like, with my hand. He, like—he—he put his on my hand and then 

he, like, wanted to, like, touch it.

―Q: Okay. He made you touch it or he made you kinda touch it or what is 

it that... 

―A: He made me, like, kinda touch it.

―Q: He—he made you kinda touch it? What do you mean—mean by kinda 

touch it.

―A: Like, I touched it but not that much.

―Q: You touched it but not that much?

―A: Like the very tip of it.‖

Jane clarified that her father made her touch his middle part by grabbing her hand 

and pulling her hand close to his middle part; her hand touched his middle part as 

a result. Later, the following exchange occurred:

―[INTERVIEWER] Q: ... And so you said he was doing that when he—

uh—while you were touching his middle part. Okay. How were you 

touching his middle part?

―[JANE DOE] A: Like, he made me touch it, though.

―Q: How did he make you touch it?

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―A: With his hand, he would put my hand on [ ]his thing.

―Q: He put your hand on his thing? Okay. And so what did you do his—to 

his thing with your hand?

―A: I—I—like—I grabbed it but I didn‘t do nothing to it.

―Q: You grabbed it but you didn‘t do anything with it? Okay. When you 

grabbed his—um—his thing—his dick—what did he—um—did he still 

have his hand on yours? Yeah? Okay. And when he—when—um did you 

move your hand at all? No? Okay....‖

In sum, at trial Jane testified defendant grabbed her with his hand while she was 

in the shower, pulling her toward him. Asked what happened next, Jane said she 

could not remember. On cross-examination, Jane ultimately testified that on that 

occasion her father ―grabbed [her] hand and was ... still holding onto [her] hand 

when [she] touched his middle part.‖ Similarly, in the forensic interview, Jane 

recounted an incident in the shower wherein her father ―grabbed‖ her hand with 

his hand, putting her hand on the ―very tip‖ of his penis. She later indicated he 

kept his hand on her hand.

This record contains evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value upon 

which the jury could find defendant used force on at least one occasion to commit 

a lewd and lascivious act against his daughter. (People v. Watkins, supra, 55 

Cal.4th at pp. 1019–1020.)

We are not persuaded by defendant‘s reliance upon People v. Senior (1992) 3 

Cal.App.4th 765, nor do we agree with defendant that the holdings of People v. 

Neel, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1784 and People v. Bolander (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 

155 dictate another outcome here. Briefly stated, we agree with the other appellate 

courts that have rejected Senior.

Examining the record as a whole, in the light most favorable to the judgment, we 

find there is sufficient evidence of force where defendant grabbed Jane Doe‘s 

hand with his own and put her hand on his penis. (People v. Alvarez, supra, 178 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1005; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1053.) This is 

simply not a case where a review of the record reveals ―that on no hypothesis 

whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence‖ to support this jury‘s finding of 

guilt on count 4. (People v. Hicks, supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 429.) Hence, there 

is no reason to set aside the judgment.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *10–13 (footnote omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has held that when reviewing a sufficiency of the 

evidence claim, a court must determine whether, viewing the evidence and the inferences to be 

drawn from it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could find 

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979). A reviewing court ―faced with a record of historical facts that supports 

conflicting inferences must presume—even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record—that 

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the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that 

resolution.‖ Id. at 326. State law provides ―for  ̳the substantive elements of the criminal offense,‘ 

but the minimum amount of evidence that the Due Process Clause requires to prove the offense 

is purely a matter of federal law.‖ Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (quoting 

Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

Here, the California Court of Appeal stated that the force requirement of California Penal 

Code section 288(b)(1) is satisfied when a defendant uses any force, including acts of grabbing 

and holding that occur in conjunction with the lewd acts themselves, that is different from and in 

excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a victim‘s 

consent. Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *10. This determination is binding on this Court. See

Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (―[A] state court‘s interpretation of state law, 

including one announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court 

sitting in habeas corpus.‖). 

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact 

could have found true beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner used force that is different from 

and in excess of the type of force which is used in accomplishing similar lewd acts with a 

victim‘s consent. As noted by the California Court of Appeal, at trial the victim testified that 

Petitioner grabbed her hand and was still holding onto her hand when she touched his ―middle 

part.‖ (2 RT 324–25). Additionally, in the forensic interview, the victim stated that Petitioner 

grabbed her hand, pulled her hand close, and made her touch his ―middle thing.‖ (Supp. CT 52–

54, 62). Jackson ―makes clear that it is the responsibility of the jury—not the court—to decide 

what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial. A reviewing court may set 

aside the jury‘s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact 

could have agreed with the jury.‖ Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 4 (2011). Under this deferential 

standard of judicial review, the Court finds that a rational trier of fact could find that Petitioner 

used force beyond a reasonable doubt. The state court‘s decision denying Petitioner‘s sufficiency 

of evidence claim with respect to use of force was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application 

of, clearly established federal law. The decision was not ―so lacking in justification that there 

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was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 

fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to 

habeas relief on his third claim, and it must be denied.

D. Application of Amended Sentencing Triad

In his fourth claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erroneously applied an

amended sentencing scheme with respect to count 4, in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause and 

the Sixth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 17). Respondent argues that the state court‘s adjudication 

was not unreasonable or contrary to Supreme Court precedent. (ECF No. 14 at 46). This claim 

was raised on direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which 

denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *13–16. The claim was 

also raised in the petition for review, which was summarily denied by the California Supreme 

Court. (LDs 6, 7). As federal courts review the last reasoned state court opinion, the Court will 

―look through‖ the California Supreme Court‘s summary denial and examine the decision of the 

California Court of Appeal. See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806. In denying 

Petitioner‘s ex post facto claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Defendant argues the ex post facto clause was violated, as well as his right to have 

a jury determine every fact required for imposition of a mandatory minimum 

sentence, when the trial court applied the amended sentencing triad to count 4 in 

the absence of a jury finding that the conduct occurred before the effective date of 

the amendment. Plaintiff contends the trial court properly sentenced defendant to 

an eight-year term on count 4.

More specifically, defendant maintains the court erred because prior to September 

9, 2010, a court could impose three, six, or eight years for a conviction of section 

288, subdivision (b)(1). Here, when the court imposed the eight-year sentence as 

the middle or median term, it was referring to the triad in place following the 

2010 amendment, to wit: five, eight, or ten years. Defendant contends, because 

the jury did not make a finding that the crime alleged in count 4 took place on or 

after September 9, 2010, the eight-year sentence cannot be imposed because the 

jury could have convicted defendant for crimes committed prior to the 2010 

amendment. We hold to the contrary.

A. The Pertinent Law

―The United States Constitution and the California Constitution proscribe 

ex post facto laws. (U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Cal. Const., art. I, § 9.) Both 

constitutions protect against the later adoption of a statute that inflicts 

greater punishment than the law in effect at the time of the commission of 

the crime. (Collins v. Youngblood (1990) 497 U.S. 37, 42–43; People v. 

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Grant (1999) 20 Cal.4th 150, 158.)‖ (People v. Riskin (2006) 143 

Cal.App.4th 234, 244.)

―[I]t is the prosecution‘s responsibility to prove to the jury that the charged 

offenses occurred on or after the effective date of the statute providing for the 

defendant‘s punishment. When the evidence at trial does not establish that fact, 

the defendant is entitled to be sentenced under the formerly applicable statutes 

even if he raised no objection in the trial court.‖ (People v. Hiscox (2006) 136 

Cal.App.4th 253, 256.)

An ex post facto violation resulting in an unauthorized sentence may be raised on 

appeal even if the defendant failed to object below and may be corrected at any 

time. (People v. Dotson (1997) 16 Cal.4th 547, 554, fn. 6.)

B. The Relevant Proceedings Below

In the second amended information, count 4 was alleged as follows:

―For a further and separate cause of action, being a different offense of the 

same class of crimes and offenses as the charge set forth above, the said 

defendant(s) ... did, on or about and between February 23, 2011 and 

February 13, 2012, in the County of Madera, State of California, commit a 

FELONY, namely, violation of Section 288(b)(1) of the Penal Code of the 

State of California, in that the said defendant did willfully, unlawfully, and 

lewdly commit a lewd and lascivious act upon and with the body and 

certain parts and members thereof of Jane Doe, a child under the age of 

fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, and gratifying the 

lust, passions, and sexual desires of the said defendant and the said child, 

by use of force, violence, duress, menace, and threat of great bodily harm, 

when defendant grabbed Jane Doe‘s hand and forced her to touch his 

penis.‖

The dates alleged in the operative information correspond with Jane‘s 10th 

birthday and the date of defendant‘s interview with detectives.

The jury‘s verdict found defendant guilty of Penal Code section 288, subdivision 

(b)(1) ―as charged in Count Four of the Information on file herein.‖

At the sentencing hearing, after defendant and Jane‘s mother addressed the court 

and after counsel argued their respective positions regarding an appropriate 

sentence, the court sentenced defendant as follows:

―[THE COURT:] So [defendant], in this matter you are sadly mistaken. I 

listened to the evidence in this trial and I listened to your daughter and it—

she didn‘t want to be up here. It was clear that she did not want to have to 

testify against her father. And I believed that much more happened than 

she testified to given your statement to the police and given the statement 

that she gave at the time to—pursuant to the interview that she had given. 

In addition, I find your testimony about what the officers did absolutely 

ludicrous. I have no sympathy for you. I have tremendous sympathy for 

[Jane Doe‘s mother] and her daughters. You have destroyed their lives. 

You had a great life with them. And you just destroyed it. So in this matter 

probation is denied pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.065, Subdivision 

(a)....

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―As to Count 2, a felony violation of Section 288, Subdivision (a), Court 

imposes the median term of 6 years, deems that the principal term. As to 

Count 3, a felony violation of Section 288, Subdivision (a) of the Penal 

Code, Court imposes two years State Prison, which is ... one third of the 

median term of 6 years. That‘s imposed consecutive pursuant to Section 

1170.1 Subdivision (a) and deemed a subordinate term.

―As to Count 4, a felony violation of Section 288, Subdivision (b)(1) of 

the Penal Code, Court imposes 8 years State Prison, median term. And 

that's imposed full separate and consecutive pursuant to Penal Code 

Section 667.6, Subdivision (d). Aggregate term of the determinate term is 

16 years in State Prison. Pursuant to Penal Code Section 669, the 

determinate term is to be served prior to the indeterminate term imposed in 

Count 1 and the determinate term is consecutive to each other and 

consecutive to the indeterminate term which will be imposed in Count 1. 

As to Count 1, a felony violation of Section 288.7, Subdivision (b) of the 

Penal Code, Court imposes 15 years to life—to life in State Prison, 

consecutive. The aggregate term of the indeterminate term is 15 years to 

life in prison.‖

C. Our Analysis

We find no ex post facto violation here. The operative information specifically 

alleged defendant had committed a violation of section 288, subdivision (b)(1) 

between February 23, 2011 and February 13, 2012. The relevant amendment to 

section 288 occurred September 9, 2010. More than five months passed between 

the date the statutory amendment took effect and the earliest date alleged in the 

information. Defendant argues the five-month period is ―reasonably close‖ to the 

date of amendment and thus the jury should have made a finding that the violation 

took place on or after September 9, 2010. We do not agree.

Although the record does include Officer Rosel‘s testimony that Jane told him 

defendant began molesting her when she was seven or eight years old—possibly 

implicating the September 2010 amendment—the record also properly includes 

defendant‘s statement to detectives. In that statement, defendant denies touching 

Jane when she was seven or eight years old. The first time he touched Jane was 

eight or ten months prior to the interview. On that occasion, he touched her 

breasts over her clothing because he said she had complained of pain. Six or 

seven months prior to the interview he touched her breasts and her vagina; Jane 

was not clothed. Defendant agreed with the detective‘s assessment that he started 

out with good intentions (8–10 months prior to interview) then became aroused by 

the contact with Jane and it led to more. The first time defendant touched Jane‘s 

vagina was six months prior to the interview and he had done so three times since. 

Further, defendant indicated his penis touched Jane‘s vagina ―only‖ two or three 

times. On one occasion, defendant indicated his penis was in his daughter‘s 

mouth. Defendant explicitly indicated he began touching Jane ―a little after [she 

turned] 10 years old‖ and that he had been touching her for less than a year at the 

time of his interview. Finally, defendant was asked when he last touched his 

daughter and he indicated it had been about a week prior to his arrest or ―last 

Wednesday.‖

We recognize that Jane testified she did not remember how old she was when her 

father began touching her. On cross-examination, Jane was asked whether she 

remembered ―when these things happened,‖ and she replied, ―No, I tried to forget 

it this whole year.‖ Jane‘s testimony was vague as to any date and/or her age at 

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the time the offenses were being committed. She testified frequently that the 

various touchings happened more than one time. Jane told her friend Breanna first 

and believed it was about a month later that police came to speak with her.

We agree with the People that defendant‘s reliance upon our decision in People v. 

Riskin, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 234 is misplaced. In Riskin, the amendment at 

issue occurred during the relevant charging period. In other words, Riskin was 

alleged to have committed certain crimes between June 1994 and June 1998; the 

one strike law was enacted in November 1994. However, as noted above, the 

charging period specifically alleged here is February 23, 2011, through February 

13, 2012. (E.g., People v. Hiscox, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 257–258 [11 

counts alleged over ―  ̳years of 1992 through 1996‘ ‖ where the one strike law 

took effect Nov. 30, 1994].)

In conclusion, this is not a case where the information alleged various acts were 

committed during a particular time period and within that identifiable time period 

the relevant statute was amended, thereby increasing the potential punishment. 

Rather, here, the information alleged the acts had occurred between the time Jane 

turned 10 years of age until the date of defendant‘s interview with detectives. 

Jane‘s trial testimony and forensic interview do not shed light on the relevant 

dates associated with the molestations she disclosed. Nevertheless, in defendant‘s 

statement to detectives—wherein he acknowledges very similar conduct to that 

which Jane testified—he expressly denied touching Jane before she turned 10 

years old. As a result, unlike the authorities upon which defendant relies, there 

was no ex post facto violation here. Lastly, because we find no ex post fact 

violation, we do not address defendant‘s related Sixth Amendment argument.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *13–16 (footnotes omitted).

―The Constitution prohibits both federal and state governments from enacting any  ̳ex 

post facto Law.‘‖ Peugh v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2072, 2081 (2013) (quoting U.S. Const., art. 

I, §§ 9, 10). One category of ex post facto law includes ―[e]very law that changes the 

punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when 

committed.‖ Id. (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.)). The 

statute at issue here is California Penal Code section 288(b)(1). Before September 9, 2010, a 

former version of section 288(b)(1) imposed a determinate sentencing range of three, six, or 

eight years for forcible lewd conduct. Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1) (2009). On September 9, 

2010, the sentencing range increased to five, eight, or ten years. Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1) 

(2010). See People v. Soto, 51 Cal. 4th 229, 237 n.4 (2011). In the instant case, the second 

amended information alleged in count 4 that on or about and between February 23, 2011, and 

February 13, 2012, Petitioner committed a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under the age of 

fourteen years by use of force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of great bodily harm. (CT 89). 

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The jury found Petitioner guilty as charged in count 4 of the information. (CT 122).

The California Court of Appeal acknowledged that at trial there was testimony that the 

victim told an officer that Petitioner began molesting her when she was seven or eight years old, 

which would have occurred before the September 2010 amendment. (2 RT 340). However, the 

court also recognized that the victim‘s testimony was inconclusive as to any date and her age at 

the time the offenses were committed. Further, Petitioner explicitly stated to detectives that he 

did not touch the victim before she turned ten years old. (Supp. CT 29–30). The information 

alleged the offense was committed between the time the victim turned ten years old and the date 

of Petitioner‘s statement to detectives. The amendment to the sentencing scheme occurred before 

the time period alleged in the information. Thus, the Court finds that the state court‘s decision 

denying Petitioner‘s ex post facto claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of fact. The 

decision was not ―so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and

comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 

U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his fourth claim, and it 

must be denied.

E. Exclusion of Defense Counsel’s Visual Aid

In his fifth claim for relief, Petitioner asserts that the trial court erroneously prohibited 

defense counsel from using a visual aid during closing argument. (ECF No. 1 at 20). Respondent 

argues that the state court‘s adjudication was not unreasonable or contrary to Supreme Court 

precedent. (ECF No. 14 at 53). This claim was raised on direct appeal to the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, which denied the claim in a reasoned opinion. Palomar, 2015 

WL 1089544, at *16–18. The claim was also raised in the petition for review, which was 

summarily denied by the California Supreme Court. (LDs 6, 7). As federal courts review the last 

reasoned state court opinion, the Court will ―look through‖ the California Supreme Court‘s 

summary denial and examine the decision of the California Court of Appeal. See Brumfield, 135 

S. Ct. at 2276; Ylst, 501 U.S. at 806.

///

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In denying this claim, the California Court of Appeal stated:

Defendant contends it was error for the trial court to refuse defense counsel‘s 

request to use a chart illustrating the concept of reasonable doubt during closing 

argument. The People contend the trial court properly denied the request to use a 

visual aid illustrating the burden.

After the defense rested and before the jury was instructed prior to deliberations, 

the record contains the following:

―[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We had some off the record discussions 

regarding a demonstrative evidence not—strike that. Demonstrative tool 

for argument which the Court and the people objected to. The Court has 

ruled inadmissible, and I just want to place that on the record.

―THE COURT: I hadn‘t ruled inadmissible but I will—it seems to try and 

define beyond a reasonable doubt inappropriately, so I am not going to 

allow it.‖

The demonstrative tool in question was made a part of the record on appeal by 

way of augmentation ordered August 20, 2013. Referred to as ―Exhibit B,‖ the 

proffered graph is depicted as follows:

The trial court has the authority and duty to control proceedings during trial and 

may limit the introduction of evidence and argument of counsel. (Pen.Code, § 

1044; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 397.) Absent a patent abuse of 

discretion, the trial court‘s decision under section 1044 will be upheld on appeal. 

(People v. Cline (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1334.) We see no abuse of 

discretion.

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―Advocates are given significant leeway in discussing the legal and factual merits 

of a case during argument. [Citation.] However,  ̳it is improper for the prosecutor 

to misstate the law generally [citation], and particularly to attempt to absolve the 

prosecution from its ... obligation to overcome reasonable doubt on all elements 

[citation].‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666.) 

Similarly, we believe it would have been improper for the trial court to permit 

defense counsel to use the chart illustrated above because it misstates the law 

generally.

Nontraditional explanations of the phrase ―beyond a reasonable doubt‖ have 

generally been discouraged. (People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 745.)

―The case law is replete with innovative but ill-fated attempts to explain 

the reasonable doubt standard. (See People v. Johnson (2004) 119 

Cal.App.4th 976, 985–986; People v. Garcia (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 61, 

63.) We have recognized the  ̳difficulty and peril inherent in such a task,‘ 

and have discouraged such  ̳ ―experiments‖ ‘ by courts and prosecutors. 

(Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 745.)‖ (People v. Centeno, supra, 60 

Cal.4th at p. 667.)

The jury was instructed as to the accepted reasonable doubt standard:

―The fact that a criminal charge has been filed against the defendant is not 

evidence that the charge is true. You must not be biased against the 

defendant just because he has been arrested, charged with a crime, or 

brought to trial.

―A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This 

presumption requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I 

mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt unless I specifically 

tell you otherwise.

―Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding 

conviction that the charge is true. The evidence need not eliminate all 

possible doubt because everything in life is open to some possible or 

imaginary doubt.

―In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a 

reasonable doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the 

evidence that was received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence 

proves the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is entitled to an 

acquittal and you must find him not guilty.‖

Defense counsel‘s request was viewed as inappropriate by the trial court. It 

considered the chart or visual aid as one that would experiment or tinker with the 

accepted definition of reasonable doubt found in CALCRIM No. 220. It could 

also have served to mislead or confuse the jury.

We acknowledge that ―not all visual aids are suspect [and that the] use of charts, 

diagrams, lists, and comparisons based on the evidence may be effectively and 

fairly used in argument to help the jury analyze the case.‖ (People v. Centeno, 

supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 671.) Here, however, the chart illustrated above is not one 

based on evidence that would have effectively or fairly assisted the jury in 

analyzing the case.

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In a supplemental brief dated April 30, 2014, defendant asks that we consider a 

then very recent holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entitled Frost v. 

van Boening (9th Cir.2014) 757 F.3d 910, wherein the federal circuit court ruled it 

was reversible, structural error to prohibit defense counsel from using a visual aid 

in summation regarding the burden of proof. Nevertheless, in late 2014, the 

United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision in Glebe v. 

Frost (2014) ––– U.S. –––– [135 S.Ct. 429]. The high court held that even 

assuming its prior decision in Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853 

―established that complete denial of summation amounts to structural error, it did 

not clearly establish that the restriction of summation also amounts to structural 

error.‖ (Glebe v. Frost, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 431, italics omitted.) It also held that 

the Ninth Circuit erred because it went ―much too far to suggest that our cases 

clearly establish that this supposed extraction of a  ̳taci[t] admi[ssion]‘ is 

structural error.‖ (Id. at pp. 431–432.)

Defendant‘s supplemental brief also argued that apart from the question of 

whether the error was structural, Frost v. van Boening ―illustrates the significance 

of the type of error in this case, which goes to the heart of reasonable doubt.‖ 

Initially, we note the obvious—that in light of Glebe v. Frost, Frost v. van 

Boening is no longer viable legal authority. Additionally, we note ―[d]ecisions of 

the lower federal courts interpreting federal law, though persuasive, are not 

binding on state courts.‖ (Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352.) In 

any event, we find Frost v. van Boening distinguishable. Defense counsel was not 

denied the ability to argue whether the People had met their required burden of 

proving the crimes alleged beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, defendant was 

merely restricted from using a visual aid to make his arguments to the jury.

In the main, we assign no error to the trial court‘s ruling that defense counsel was 

prohibited from using a visual aid concerning the concept of reasonable doubt.

Palomar, 2015 WL 1089544, at *16–18 (footnote omitted).

―[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants  ̳a meaningful opportunity to present 

a complete defense.‘‖ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. 

Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)). Further, ―[t]he right to effective assistance of counsel 

extends to closing arguments.‖ Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003). The Supreme Court 

case implicated by Petitioner‘s claim is Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975). In Herring, 

the Supreme Court held that a state statute, which allowed judges in a nonjury criminal trial to 

deny counsel any opportunity to make a closing summation before rendition of judgment,

violated the right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 865. See also Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429, 431 

(2014). Importantly, however, Herring recognized that the right to assistance of counsel is not 

unlimited and a court ―must be and is given great latitude in . . . limiting the scope of closing 

summations . . . [to] ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise 

impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial.‖ Herring, 422 U.S. at 862.

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The Court finds United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2013), instructive.8In Doe, 

the defendant argued that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the 

defense was prevented from arguing during closing argument that the government had the 

burden of disproving the defendant‘s public authority defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 

1149. Applying Herring, the Ninth Circuit found no error because the trial court ―did not forbid 

Doe from making a closing argument or from presenting his public authority theory; it merely 

prevented him from arguing incorrect statements of law, something that is well within the court‘s 

discretion.‖ Id. Similarly, here, defense counsel was not prevented from making a closing 

argument or from arguing that it was the prosecution‘s burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt. The jury was given instruction regarding the prosecution‘s burden and the definition of 

reasonable doubt. (CT 156–57). The trial court merely prevented the defense from using a visual 

aid that did not precisely reflect the accepted definition of reasonable doubt.

The Court finds that the state court‘s rejection of Petitioner‘s challenge to the prohibition 

of the defense‘s use of a visual aid during closing arguments was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The decision was not ―so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.‖ Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, Petitioner is 

not entitled to habeas relief on his fifth claim, and it must be denied.

IV.

RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the petition for writ of habeas 

corpus be DENIED.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District 

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within 

 

8

―Although circuit caselaw is not governing law under AEDPA, [the Court] may look to circuit precedent in 

determining what law is clearly established.‖ Byrd v. Lewis, 566 F.3d 855, 860 n.5 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Duhaime 

v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600–01 (9th Cir. 2000)). In addition, Ninth Circuit ―precedents may be pertinent to the 

extent that they illuminate the meaning and application of Supreme Court precedents.‖ Campbell v. Rice, 408 F.3d 

116, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

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THIRTY (30) days after service of the Findings and Recommendation, any party may file 

written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be 

captioned ―Objections to Magistrate Judge‘s Findings and Recommendation.‖ Replies to the 

objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The 

assigned District Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge‘s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 

waive the right to appeal the District Court‘s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 

(9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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