Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01379/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01379-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Hamidullah Abdul
Plaintiff
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HAMIDULLAH ABDUL,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting 

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-1379 CKD

ORDER

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying an application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title 

XVI of the Social Security Act (“Act”). For the reasons discussed below, the court will deny 

plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant the Commissioner’s cross-motion for 

summary judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, born April 24, 1986, applied on July 27, 2011for SSI, alleging disability 

beginning June 30, 2009. Administrative Transcript (“AT”) 128-136. Plaintiff alleged he was 

unable to work due to multilevel spondylosis, congenital stenosis, severe back pain and numbness

in the legs. AT 147. In a decision dated December 21, 2012, the ALJ determined that plaintiff 

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was not disabled.1 AT 9-18. The ALJ made the following findings (citations to 20 C.F.R. 

omitted):

1. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity 

since July 22, 2011, the application date.

2. The claimant has the following severe impairments: lumbar 

stenosis and degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine.

3. At no time relevant did claimant have an impairment or 

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of 

the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

4. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned 

finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to 

perform light work as defined in [the regulations] except claimant is 

 

1 Disability Insurance Benefits are paid to disabled persons who have contributed to the 

Social Security program, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Supplemental Security Income is paid to 

disabled persons with low income. 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. Both provisions define disability, in 

part, as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity” due to “a medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment. . . .” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(a) & 1382c(a)(3)(A). 

A parallel five-step sequential evaluation governs eligibility for benefits under both programs. 

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 404.1571-76, 416.920 & 416.971-76; Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 

137, 140-142, 107 S. Ct. 2287 (1987). The following summarizes the sequential evaluation: 

Step one: Is the claimant engaging in substantial gainful 

activity? If so, the claimant is found not disabled. If not, proceed 

to step two. 

Step two: Does the claimant have a “severe” impairment? 

If so, proceed to step three. If not, then a finding of not disabled is 

appropriate. 

Step three: Does the claimant’s impairment or combination 

of impairments meet or equal an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R., Pt. 

404, Subpt. P, App.1? If so, the claimant is automatically 

determined disabled. If not, proceed to step four. 

Step four: Is the claimant capable of performing his past 

work? If so, the claimant is not disabled. If not, proceed to step 

five. 

Step five: Does the claimant have the residual functional 

capacity to perform any other work? If so, the claimant is not 

disabled. If not, the claimant is disabled.

 

Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). 

The claimant bears the burden of proof in the first four steps of the sequential evaluation 

process. Bowen, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. at 2294 n.5. The Commissioner bears the 

burden if the sequential evaluation process proceeds to step five. Id.

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limited to occasional climbing, stooping, kneeling, crouching and 

crawling. He can frequently balance.

5. The claimant has no past relevant work.

6. The claimant was born on April 24, 1986 and was 25 years old, 

which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the date the 

application was filed.

7. The claimant has at least a high-school education and is able to 

communicate in English.

8. Transferability of job skills is not an issue in this case because 

the claimant does not have past relevant work. 

9. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and 

residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant 

numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the 

Social Security Act, since July 22, 2011, the date the application 

was filed.

AT 11-17. 

ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding that he did not meet a Listing and improperly 

rejected the opinion of his treating physician. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

The court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether (1) it is based on 

proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record 

as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial 

evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 

F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th 

Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). “The ALJ is 

responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving 

ambiguities.” Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 

“The court will uphold the ALJ’s conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one 

rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

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The record as a whole must be considered, Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th 

Cir. 1986), and both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the ALJ’s 

conclusion weighed. See Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not 

affirm the ALJ’s decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. Id.; see 

also Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the 

administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a finding of either disability 

or nondisability, the finding of the ALJ is conclusive, see Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 

1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in

weighing the evidence. See Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

ANALYSIS

A. Listing 1.04

Plaintiff contends he meets Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine) because of his spinal 

stenosis. The Social Security Regulations “Listing of Impairments” is comprised of impairments 

to certain categories of body systems that are severe enough to preclude a person from performing 

gainful activity. Young v. Sullivan, 911 F.2d 180, 183-84 (9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1520(d). Conditions described in the listings are considered so severe that they are 

irrebuttably presumed disabling. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). In meeting or equaling a listing, all 

the requirements of that listing must be met. Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1550 (9th Cir. 

1985).

To meet a listed impairment, a claimant must establish that he meets each characteristic of 

a listed impairment relevant to his claim. To equal a listed impairment, a claimant must establish 

symptoms, signs and laboratory findings “at least equal in severity and duration” to the 

characteristics of a relevant listed impairment, or, if a claimant’s impairment is not listed, then to 

the listed impairment “most like” the claimant’s impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526. A finding of 

equivalence must be based on medical evidence only. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(d)(3).

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly considered whether he met Listing 1.04. The 

ALJ adequately and accurately summarized the medical records and noted that “[n]o treating or 

examining physician has mentioned findings equivalent in severity to the criteria of any 

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musculoskeletal or neurological, listings, [sic] nor does the evidence show medical findings that 

are the same or equivalent to those of any listed impairment of the Listing of Impairments.” AT 

12. The ALJ was not required to address in more detail why plaintiff did not meet or equal a 

Listing. See Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1990).

Although the burden is on plaintiff at step three, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he 

meets or equals all of the requirements for either Listing 1.04A or 1.04C. Listing 1.04A requires

“[e]vidence of nerve root compression characterized by neuro-anatomic distribution of pain, 

limitation of motion of the spine, motor loss (atrophy with associated muscle weakness or muscle 

weakness) accompanied by sensory or reflex loss and, if there is involvement of the lower back, 

positive straight-leg raising test (sitting and supine).” Plaintiff fails to demonstrate motor loss. 

Examinations usually indicated plaintiff retained full strength. AR 248 (“motor full and equal”), 

264 (5/5 strength in both upper and lower extremities), 281 (5/5 strength in bilateral lower 

extremities), 317 (motor strength 5/5 in bilateral lower extremities); cf. AT 277 (plaintiff 

demonstrated reduced motor strength because he could not perform to full strength due to pain). 

Although plaintiff had occasional positive straight leg tests, the medical records do not show that 

plaintiff had positive tests in both the sitting and supine positions, as required under Listing 

1.04A. In addition, plaintiff generally demonstrated intact sensation, with normal reflexes. AT 

238 (intact sensation to light touch in seated position), 248 (sensation grossly intact), 255 (intact 

patellar, ankle reflexes), 281 (sensation intact to light touch at L2-S1 dermatomes).

Listing 1.04C requires “[l]umbar spinal stenosis resulting in pseudoclaudication, 

established by findings on appropriate medically acceptable imaging, manifested by chronic 

nonradicular pain and weakness, and resulting in inability ambulate effectively, as defined in 

1.00B2b.”2 There is no record evidence that plaintiff could not ambulate effectively. Plaintiff’s 

contention that he meets or equals Listing 1.04A or 1.04C is meritless. There was no error in the 

step three analysis.

 

2

 Listing 1.00B2b provides in pertinent part that “[i]nability to ambulate effectively means an 

extreme limitation of the ability to walk, i.e. an impairment(s) that interferes very seriously with 

the individual’s ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities.

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B. Treating Physician’s Opinion

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinion of his treating physician, 

Dr. Kono. The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered 

by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th 

Cir. 1995). Ordinarily, more weight is given to the opinion of a treating professional, who has a 

greater opportunity to know and observe the patient as an individual. Id.; Smolen v. Chater, 80 

F.3d 1273, 1285 (9th Cir. 1996). 

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to 

considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record, 

and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a 

treating or examining medical professional only for “clear and convincing” reasons. Lester, 81 

F.3d at 831. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be 

rejected for “specific and legitimate” reasons, that are supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 

830. While a treating professional’s opinion generally is accorded superior weight, if it is 

contradicted by a supported examining professional’s opinion (e.g., supported by different 

independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala , 53 F.3d 

1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). In 

any event, the ALJ need not give weight to conclusory opinions supported by minimal clinical

findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician’s conclusory, 

minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes , 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a 

non-examining professional, without other evidence, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a 

treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831.

Dr. Kono saw plaintiff twice, once on July 7, 2010 and again on July 15, 2011. AT 248-

49, 258-59. The purpose of the first visit was for treatment; at that time Dr. Kono performed a 

physical examination and noted that plaintiff had a normal gait, full motor strength and grossly 

intact sensation. AT 248. At the second visit, the purpose of the visit was listed as “back pain 

and filling out a form.” AT 258. No examination was performed at the second visit and Dr. 

Kono noted that the disability form was filled out “based on patient’s estimation of his 

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capability.” AT 259. Dr. Kono advised plaintiff at that time that “it would be better to get the 

surgeon’s input” regarding plaintiff’s limitations. AT 259. Dr. Kono opined in a medical source 

statement dated July 15, 2011 that plaintiff was extremely limited in his physical capacity, being 

limited to only occasionally lifting less than 10 pounds and limited to less than 2 hours in an 8 

hour workday of standing and/or walking. AT 232. In the section of the form asking for specific 

restrictions and supportive evidence, Dr. Kono stated that such restrictions would “have to be 

recommended by the spine specialist.” AT 233. 

The ALJ accorded no weight to Dr. Kono’s opinion that plaintiff could not even perform 

sedentary work. AT 15. The ALJ reasoned that Dr. Kono specifically noted that functional 

limitations should be assessed by a spine surgeon and that the limitations set forth by Dr. Kono 

were conclusory, based on plaintiff’s discredited subjective symptoms, and were unsupported by 

the record medical evidence. AT 15-16, 244-45, 255. In formulating the residual functional 

capacity, the ALJ instead properly relied on the opinions of the state agency physicians that 

plaintiff was capable of a range of modified light work, and which opinions are supported by 

substantial evidence. AT57-59, 385. In assessing a light capacity, the state agency physicians 

recognized that although plaintiff had a positive MRI, he had full strength testing, range of 

motion was good and that plaintiff responded to epidural steroid injections. Assuming arguendo 

that Dr. Kono should be considered a treating physician, despite the minimal contact with 

plaintiff, the reasons set forth by the ALJ are specific and legitimate and supported by substantial 

evidence. There was no error in rejecting a conclusory opinion based on properly discredited 

subjective complaints and which was unsupported by the medical record evidence. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is denied;

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2. The Commissioner’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 16) is granted; 

and 

3. Judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

Dated: March 25, 2015

4 abdul.ss

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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