Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50418/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50418-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Henrik Sardariani
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

HENRIK SARDARIANI,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50418

D.C. No.

2:10-cr-01343-VAP-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Virginia A. Phillips, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 7, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed June 19, 2014

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Richard R. Clifton, Circuit

Judges, and Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge.

*

Opinion by Judge Clifton

* The Honorable Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge for the District of

Nevada, sitting by designation.

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 1 of 9
2 UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI

SUMMARY**

Criminal Law

Affirming a sentence for conspiring to commit wire fraud

and other offenses, the panel held that a notary seal can be an

“authentication feature” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028, and that the

district court correctly applied an enhancement for use of an

authentication feature under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii).

COUNSEL

Jerald Brainin, Law Offices of Jerald Brainin, Los Angeles,

California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Ranee A. Katzenstein, Assistant United States Attorney, Los

Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

CLIFTON, Circuit Judge:

Defendant Henrik Sardariani appeals his sentence of 120

months imposed as a result of a guilty plea conviction for

conspiring to commit wire fraud and other offenses. We

affirm. In doing so, we hold that a notary seal can be an

“authentication feature” under 18 U.S.C. § 1028, and that the

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 2 of 9
UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI 3

district court, in calculating the advisory guidelines range in

this case, correctly applied an enhancement for use of an

authentication feature under Sentencing Guidelines

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) (formerly § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)(ii)).1

I. Background

Beginning in 2007, Sardariani, along with several coconspirators, developed and executed a scheme to procure

multiple loans from various private lenders by falsely

pledging as collateral properties he did not own. The

properties included: (1) a house in Burbank, California,

previously owned by Sardariani but subsequently sold in a

foreclosure sale; (2) a house in Glendale, California,

previously owned by Sardariani but subsequently transferred

to a sham entity under his control; and (3) a house in Sherman

Oaks, California, which Sardariani induced another to

purchase and then fraudulently transferred to the sham entity. 

Sardariani and his co-conspirators worked to conceal the truth

and lull the victims into a false sense that their money was

safe before absconding with the loan proceeds. The total

amount stolen in this way was $5,450,000. Sardariani

eventually pled guilty to charges of conspiring to commit

wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and transactional money

laundering (18 U.S.C. § 371); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343);

and engaging in unlawful monetary transactions (18 U.S.C.

§ 1957).

Among the many falsified documents relating to the

fraudulent scheme were a grant deed purportedly transferring

the Sherman Oaks property from another person to

1 Sardariani presents other challenges to his sentence that are resolved

in a memorandum disposition filed together with this opinion.

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 3 of 9
4 UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI

Sardariani’s company, SLK, and a reconveyance of an

outstanding deed of trust securing a prior lender’s loan on the

Burbank property. These two documents were recorded

bearing both forged signatures and forged notary seals. At

sentencing, the district court found that Sardariani “used the

notary seals and the notary commission numbers that he cut

and pasted” to further the commission of the crime. In

calculating the appropriate range under the advisory

SentencingGuidelines, the court imposed an enhancement for

use of an authentication feature under U.S.S.G.

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii). Sardariani appeals the application of

this enhancement.

II. Discussion

A district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing

Guidelines is reviewed de novo. United States v. Rivera, 527

F.3d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 2008).2

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a 2-level increase

“if the offense involved . . . the possession or use of any . . .

authentication feature.” § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii).3 To define

2 The Government argues that the plain error standard should apply

because Sardariani did not present his objection to the district court. We

need not resolve that argument because the outcome of our analysis does

not depend on the standard of review.

 

3

 The full text reads:

“If the offense involved (A) the possession or use of

any (i) device-making equipment, or (ii) authentication

feature; (B) the production or trafficking of any

(i) unauthorized access device or counterfeit access

device, or (ii) authentication feature; or (C)(i) the

unauthorized transfer or use of any means of

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 4 of 9
UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI 5

terms used in this subsection, the Guidelines refer to the

Secure Authentication Feature and Enhanced Identification

Defense Act of 2003 (“SAFE ID Act”), codified at

18 U.S.C. § 1028. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmts. 1, 10. 

“Authentication feature” is defined as a “symbol . . . or other

feature that either individually or in combination with another

feature is used by the issuing authority on an identification

document, document-making implement, or means of

identification to determine if the document is counterfeit,

altered, or otherwise falsified.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1).4

Sardariani argues that the court’s application of an

enhancement for use of an authentication feature under

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) was erroneous because the definition of

“authentication feature” is limited to symbols used on

identification documents issued by a governmental authority. 

Specifically, he argues that his actions did not constitute use

identification unlawfully to produce or obtain any other

means of identification, or (ii) the possession of 5 or

more means of identification that unlawfully were

produced from, or obtained by the use of, another

means of identification, increase by 2 levels. If the

resulting offense level is less than level 12, increase to

level 12.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11).

 

4

 The full text reads:

“[T]he term ‘authentication feature’ means any

hologram, watermark, certification, symbol, code,

image, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature

that either individually or in combination with another

feature is used by the issuing authority on an

identification document, document-making implement,

or means of identification to determine if the document

is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified[.]” 

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1).

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 5 of 9
6 UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI

of an authentication feature because the forged notary seals

used to further the crime were not issued by any state or

federal entity or agency, and the deeds on which the forged

seals were placed were not identification documents. This

position is not supported by the language of the statute.

First, actions by a notary public, including authentication

of a signature, are taken based upon the authority of the state. 

Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines a “notary

public” as a “person authorized by a state to administer oaths,

certify documents, attest to the authenticity of signatures, and

perform official acts in commercial matters.” The state itself

is an issuing authority within the statutory definition. 

“Issuing authority” is defined as “any governmental entity or

agency that is authorized to issue identification documents,

means of identification, or authentication features.” See

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(6).5

The fraudulent seals used here purported to represent

certification by a notary public acting under the authority and

 

5

 The full text reads:

“[T]he term ‘issuing authority’—

(A) means any governmental entity or agency that is

authorized to issue identification documents, means of

identification, or authentication features; and

(B) includes the United States Government, a State, a

political subdivision of a State, a sponsoring entity of

an event designated by the President as a special event

of national significance, a foreign government, a

political subdivision of a foreign government, or an

international government or quasi-governmental

organization[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(6).

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 6 of 9
UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI 7

as an agent of the state of California that the signatures in

question were genuine. The state relies upon notarization to

confirm the authenticity of a signature on a document to be

recorded. When a notary public acts under a state’s authority

in applying a notary seal, the notary public is properly

considered to be acting with the authority of the state, a

governmental entity authorized to issue an authentication

feature.

Second, although Sardariani may be correct that the deeds

of trust were not themselves identification documents, the

statute does not require that an authentication feature appear

on an identification document. The definition of

authentication feature includes features used “on an

identification document, document-making implement, or

means of identification.” 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1) (emphasis

added). “Means of identification” is further defined in

§ 1028(d)(7) as “any name or number that may be used, alone

or in conjunction with any other information, to identify a

specific individual.”

We have previously determined that a signature is a

means of identification within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1028(d)(7). United States v. Blixt, 548 F.3d 882, 886–88

(9th Cir. 2008). In that case, the defendant was charged with

a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (aggravated identity

theft) for forging the signature of her employer on checks

written for personal gain. Id. at 884–85. Defendant argued

that a signature was not a name and, therefore, not a “means

of identification” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7)

(applying to both §§ 1028 and 1028A). The district court

foreclosed this theory by instructing the jury that “a signature

is a name within the meaning of the phrase ‘Means of

Identification.’” Id. at 885. Defendant appealed, and we

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 7 of 9
8 UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI

affirmed, holding that “forging another’s signature constitutes

the use of that person’s name and thus qualifies as a ‘means

of identification.’” Id. at 886. Applying Blixt to the facts of

this case, we conclude that the forged notary seals were used

on a means of identification.

In support of his position that authentication features are

limited to symbols found on identification documents,

Sardariani points to the conference report explaining the

purpose of the SAFE ID Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 607, 117

Stat. 650, 689–91 (2003). The proposed statute was

described as “addressing the growing trade in illicit

authentication feature[s] for IDs.” H.R. Conf. Rep. 108-66,

reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 702. Yet the statute as

enacted was written more broadly than that language in the

conference report suggests.

“Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the

contrary, [the language of the statute] must ordinarily be

regarded as conclusive.” Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n. v.

GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). The

conference report refers to the growing trade in fake

identification documents as the motivation for proposing the

SAFE ID Act, but it does not explicitly limit the act’s

application to identification documents, and thus it does not

override the plain meaning of the statutory text. We “must

presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says there.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v.

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). The statute itself

does not limit the definition of authentication features to

those used on identification documents, and we must not

either.

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 8 of 9
UNITED STATES V. SARDARIANI 9

Sardariani used forged notary seals in furtherance of the

crime: he used them to convince the county recorder’s office

that the signatures on the falsified documents were genuine. 

Those forged signatures were means of identification under

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7). See Blixt, 548 F.3d at 886–88. The

notary seals were, therefore, authentication features applied

to means of identification—features which the country

recorder’s office used “to determine if the document

is counterfeit, altered, or otherwise falsified.” 

18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1). Sardariani’s use of notary seals to

authenticate forged signatures was the use of an

authentication feature as defined in § 1028(d)(1). In

calculating the advisory guidelines range in this case, the

district court correctly applied an enhancement for use of an

authentication feature under Sentencing Guidelines

§ 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) (formerly § 2B1.1(b)(10)(B)(ii)).

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 12-50418, 06/19/2014, ID: 9138084, DktEntry: 33-1, Page 9 of 9