Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01258/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01258-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allvoice Developments US, LLC
Appellant
Microsoft Corp.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

MICROSOFT CORP.,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1258

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Washington in No. 2:10-cv-02102-

RAJ, Judge Richard A. Jones.

______________________ 

Decided: May 22, 2015

______________________ 

DANIEL J. SHIH, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Seattle, WA, 

argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by IAN B.

CROSBY, RACHEL S. BLACK; CHRIS PAUL PERQUE, Gardere 

Wynne Sewell LLP, Houston, TX.

DAVID JASON LENDER, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, 

New York, NY, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by EDWARD R. REINES, Redwood Shores, CA;

DOUGLAS WAYNE MCCLELLAN, Houston, TX; DAVID E.

KILLOUGH, Microsoft Corporation, Redmond, WA.

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2 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK, and O’MALLEY,

Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Allvoice Developments US, LLC (“Allvoice”) appeals 

the district court’s grant of summary judgment that

Microsoft Corporation’s (“Microsoft”) accused products do 

not infringe the asserted claims of U.S. Patent No. 

5,799,273 (the “’273 Patent”) and that claims 60–68 of the 

’273 Patent are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).1 

The district court’s December 23, 2013 judgment of noninfringement depended upon its findings that Allvoice’s 

infringement contentions did not disclose Allvoice’s only 

infringement theory for the “link data” limitation and

that Allvoice was not diligent in seeking to amend its 

infringement contentions. Because we find that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in reaching those 

conclusions, we affirm the judgment of non-infringement. 

Because claims 60–68 are not directed to one of the four 

statutory categories of inventions identified in 35 U.S.C. 

§ 101, we also affirm the judgment of invalidity as to 

those claims.

1 As of the date of the final judgment of noninfringement, only claims 28, 37–38, 49–51, 56–57, 71–74, 

and 77 of the ’273 Patent remained at issue. The district 

court’s summary judgment of invalidity regarding claims 

60–68 occurred on December 21, 2011. At that same time, 

the district court also found that claims 1–27, 40, 44–45, 

47, 52–55, 58–59, 65, 69–70, and 75–76 of the ’273 Patent 

were indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Allvoice does not 

appeal the indefiniteness judgment.

 

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BACKGROUND

Allvoice is the owner of the ’273 Patent. The ’273 Patent is directed to a speech recognition product that 

allows users to store an audio recording of a dictation, 

replay the recording to correct the recognized text, and

directly dictate into any application, as opposed to requiring a user to copy and paste the recognized language from 

a proprietary dictation application into other applications. 

’273 Patent col. 1 l. 59–col. 2 l. 55. The ’273 Patent 

achieves this by utilizing an interface application program

(“IAP”) that communicates with a speech-recognition 

engine and the user’s chosen text processing application. 

The interface forms link data that associates the positions 

of the recognized words with the audio data. This interface also updates the link data when changes to the text 

are made to ensure that the correct associations between 

text and audio data are maintained. 

In August 2009, Allvoice filed suit against Microsoft, 

alleging infringement of the ’273 Patent. The following 

July, Allvoice served its first amended infringement 

contentions (“operative infringement contentions”), asserting claims 1–3, 10–13, 15, 19, 20, 26, 28, 37–38, 40, 

44–45, 47, 49–75, and 77 of the ’273 Patent against Microsoft, identifying the particular Microsoft products 

accused of infringement, and specifying how those products met each claim limitation of the asserted claims. 

Following this exchange, the parties began the claim 

construction process by submitting a joint claim construction chart of disputed claim terms on September 3, 2010

and filing their respective claim construction briefs. 

Microsoft also amended its interrogatory responses disputing Allvoice’s infringement contentions, expressly 

disclaiming, among other things, that its products satisfy 

the “link data” limitation in the claims of the ’273 Patent. 

During this time, Microsoft also filed a motion for partial 

summary judgment of invalidity, where Microsoft alleged 

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4 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

that some of the asserted claims were invalid for failure to 

comply with § 101 and others were invalid under § 112. 

On May 13, 2011, the district court held a hearing on 

the parties’ claim construction disputes and Microsoft’s 

motion for summary judgment of invalidity. On December 21, 2011, the district court issued its order construing 

several terms and granting-in-part Microsoft’s motion. 

See Allvoice Devs. US, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:10-

cv-2102, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 21, 2011) (hereinafter, “Markman opinion”). Specifically, the district court 

concluded that claims 60–68 are invalid for failing to 

qualify as one of the four statutory categories of invention, 

because the claims did not describe a manufacture, as 

Allvoice asserted, but rather merely claimed software

instructions, which, alone, is not a tangible object. Id. at 

5–6. Additionally, the district court found that claims 1–

27, 40, 44–45, 47, 52–55, 58–59, 65, 69–70, and 75–76 are

invalid for indefiniteness. Id. at 6–8. With respect to the 

disputed claim terms, the district court construed “audio 

identifiers identifying audio components corresponding to 

each recognized word”—the “audio identifier” limitation—

to mean “[i]dentifiers that indicate, for each recognized 

word, (1) the file containing the corresponding audio 

component and (2) the position of the corresponding audio 

component within that file.” Id. at 15. Additionally, the 

district court adopted Microsoft’s proposed construction 

for the term “said link data comprising the audio identifiers and the determined positions of corresponding recognized words”—the “link data” limitation—finding that the 

term means “[l]ink data, which is stored in the interface 

application memory, includes the character positions of 

recognized words [or characters] in the text processing 

application and the corresponding audio identifiers for 

those words [or characters].” Id. at 16. 

Following the district court’s claim construction order, 

Allvoice filed a motion to amend its infringement contentions in April 2012, contending that it was necessary to do 

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so in order to provide clarification and also to address the 

court’s claim construction rulings. See Allvoice Devs. US, 

LLC v. Microsoft Corp., No. 2:10-cv-2102, slip op. at 1 

(W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 2012). Applying Local Patent Rule 

124, which allows for such amendments after a timely 

showing of good cause, the district court found that 

Allvoice had failed to meet this burden. Id. at 5. In order 

to demonstrate good cause, the district court required 

Allvoice to show that it was diligent in requesting the 

amendment and that Microsoft would not be prejudiced 

by the amendment. Id. at 2. Because Allvoice had served 

its operative infringement contentions on July 23, 2010, 

was aware of Microsoft’s claim construction arguments in 

September 2010, and had the order on claim construction 

from the court in December 2011, but did not move to 

amend its contentions until April 2012, and, did not 

attempt to show good cause for its delay, the district court 

concluded that Allvoice failed to prove that it had been

diligent in seeking an amendment. Id. at 3–4. While the 

district court recognized that Allvoice and Microsoft had 

agreed that Allvoice could file its motion to amend on or 

before April 12, 2012, the court concluded that this fact 

did not trump the need to demonstrate diligence, especially because Microsoft did not agree to the amendment, only 

the filing of a motion seeking leave to do so. Because it 

found that Allvoice had been dilatory in filing its motion 

to amend, the district court did not consider whether 

Microsoft would have been prejudiced, and denied 

Allvoice’s motion to amend. Id. at 5. 

Subsequently, Microsoft filed a motion for summary 

judgment of non-infringement, alleging that its accused 

products did not meet either the “link data” limitation or 

the “audio identifier” limitation as construed by the 

district court. Microsoft also argued that its accused 

products did not store an audio message as required by

claims 56 and 57, that its products did not infringe under 

the doctrine of equivalents, and that it did not indirectly 

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6 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

infringe the patent-in-suit. The district court agreed on 

all grounds and granted summary judgment in favor of 

Microsoft as to all remaining asserted claims, claims 28, 

37–38, 49–51, 56–57, 71–74, and 77. Allvoice Devs. US, 

LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 988 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1263 (W.D. 

Wash. 2013) (hereinafter, “Summary Judgment Order”). 

Allvoice timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Allvoice challenges several of the district 

court’s rulings, including its decisions regarding the

operative and proposed amended infringement contentions, the construction of the “link data” and “audio identifier” terms, the grant of summary judgment of no direct 

infringement for the “link data” and “audio identifier” 

terms, including the refusal to consider infringement of 

the “audio identifier” term under the doctrine of equivalents, the interpretation of claims 56 and 57 to require

the storage of audio data received from the speech recognition engine, the grant of summary judgment of no 

indirect infringement, and the grant of summary judgment of invalidity with respect to claims 60–68.2 

A. Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement

The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement, in part, because Allvoice could not prove 

that Microsoft’s accused products met the “link data” 

limitation, which is present in all asserted claims, includ2 Allvoice does not challenge the district court’s determination that claims 1–27, 40, 44–45, 47, 52–55, 58–

59, 65, 69–70, and 75–76 are invalid under 35 U.S.C. 

§ 112. Nor does it challenge the district court’s ruling 

regarding infringement of the “link data” limitation under 

the doctrine of equivalents. 

 

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ing claims 56 and 57. Summary Judgment Order, 988 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1260. Allvoice concedes that only the “Text 

Services Framework (“TSF”) property store” in the accused products arguably satisfies this limitation. The 

district court, however, found that Allvoice failed to 

identify the TSF property store in either its original or its 

first amended infringement contentions. Id. at 1259. 

Because Allvoice failed to disclose this theory in its operative infringement contentions, the district court concluded 

that Allvoice could not rely upon it for purposes of opposing summary judgment. In the absence of any allegation

that Microsoft’s products contained the claimed “link 

data,” the district court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Microsoft. Id. at 1260.

Allvoice contends that the district court abused its 

discretion when it determined that Allvoice’s operative

infringement contentions did not sufficiently identify 

where link data is found within the accused products. In 

the alternative, Allvoice argues that, even if its infringement contentions were deficient with respect to the “link 

data” limitation, the district court abused its discretion in 

denying Allvoice’s motion to amend those contentions to 

specifically include a reference to the TSF property store. 

If the district court had considered the TSF property store 

aspect of Microsoft’s products, Allvoice maintains that 

summary judgment of non-infringement would not have 

been granted. 

1. Operative Infringement Contentions

Allvoice alleges that its infringement contentions adequately identified the SAPI Server as meeting the “link 

data” limitation. Because it disclosed in its contentions 

that the link data is stored in the memory of the SAPI 

Server in Microsoft’s products and stated that the SAPI 

Server includes the TSF, Allvoice contends that it sufficiently disclosed that the link data is stored in the properCase: 14-1258 Document: 52-2 Page: 7 Filed: 05/22/2015
8 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

ty storage of the TSF, because that is what the SAPI 

Server’s memory is. 

Allvoice, however, fails to demonstrate how the district court’s decision that Allvoice was required to explicitly reference the TSF property store in its contentions was 

an abuse of discretion. This court gives “broad deference” 

to a district court’s enforcement of local patent rules. 

Sandisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., 415 F.3d 1278, 1292 

(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[T]his court gives broad deference to the 

trial court’s application of local procedural rules in view of 

the trial court’s need to control the parties and flow of 

litigation before it.”). This discretion extends to any 

decision to exclude evidence for failure to comply with 

disclosure requirements of the local patent rules. See O2 

Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., 467 F.3d 

1355, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining “that the exclusion 

of evidence is often an appropriate sanction for the failure 

to comply with [the local rule] deadlines”). Accordingly, 

“[d]ecisions enforcing local rules in patent cases will be 

affirmed unless clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; based on erroneous conclusions of law; clearly erroneous; or unsupported by any evidence.” Id. at 1366–67 

(citing Genentech Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 289 F.3d 761, 774 

(Fed. Cir. 2002)). 

Here, the district court acknowledged that Allvoice, in 

its operative contentions, had alleged that the SAPI 

Server “forms” link data and stores it in its memory. 

Summary Judgment Order, 988 F. Supp. 2d at 1256. 

But, it concluded, and Allvoice does not dispute, that 

there were no explicit references to the property store of 

the TSF in the operative infringement contentions. While 

Allvoice argued below that the documents cited within its 

contentions contained such a reference, the district court 

concluded that “a careful review” of the cited documents 

indicated that they referred to another program—the 

Speech TIP—and not the TSF property store. Id. at 1260. 

Allvoice does not dispute this point on appeal, arguing 

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simply that its references to the SAPI Server were sufficient to provide adequate notice of its infringement theory. We disagree. 

Western District of Washington Local Patent Rule 

124(c) requires that the party alleging patent infringement must provide infringement contentions that “identify[] specifically where each element of each Asserted 

Claim is found within each Accused Device.” W.D. Wash. 

Local Patent R. 124(c) (emphasis added). It is well within 

the discretion of a district court to require specificity in 

infringement contentions, especially considering that the 

purpose of these contentions is to require “parties to 

crystallize their theories of the case early in the litigation . . . .” O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1364 (quotation omitted); see W.D. Wash Local Patent R. 101 (explaining that 

the local patent rules were “designed to streamline the 

pre-trial and claim construction process, and generally to 

reduce the cost of patent litigation”). A review of the 

record and documents cited in Allvoice’s infringement 

contentions supports the district court’s finding that

neither Allvoice’s contentions nor the documents referenced therein discuss the TSF property store. Allvoice’s 

references to the SAPI Server were insufficient to satisfy 

its notice obligations. Without evidence that Allvoice did 

in fact specifically reference the TSF property store in its 

operative contentions, the district court’s decision to 

exclude the TSF property store theory at the summary 

judgment stage for Allvoice’s failure to comply with the 

local patent rules was not an abuse of discretion. 

2. Amended Infringement Contentions

In the alternative, Allvoice argues that the district 

court abused its discretion in finding that Allvoice was not 

diligent in seeking leave to amend its infringement contentions. If Allvoice was allowed to amend its infringement contentions to include a specific reference to the 

TSF property store, it alleges that the district court would 

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10 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

have had no basis to grant Microsoft’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement with respect to the 

“link data” limitation.

Under Western District of Washington’s Local Patent 

Rule 124, a party may only amend its infringement contentions “by order of the Court upon a timely showing of 

good cause.” W.D. Wash. Local Patent R. 124 (emphasis 

added). Good cause may be demonstrated in various 

ways, including: 

(a) a claim construction by the Court different 

from that proposed by the party seeking amendment; (b) recent discovery of material prior art despite earlier diligent search; and (c) recent 

discovery of nonpublic information about the Accused Device which was not discovered, despite 

diligent efforts, before the service of the Infringement Contentions.

Id. In order to establish good cause, the moving party 

first must demonstrate diligence in amending its contentions. O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366–67. If the moving 

party is not able to meet that burden, it is unnecessary to 

examine the potential prejudice of the amendment to the 

non-moving party. Id. at 1368.

Allvoice alleges that the district court’s decision not to 

allow it to amend its infringement contentions after the 

district court’s claim construction ruling was an abuse of 

discretion because the plain language of Local Patent 

Rule 124 allows for such an amendment if the district 

court adopts a claim construction “different from that 

proposed by the party seeking amendment.” W.D. Wash. 

Local Patent R. 124(a). Additionally, Allvoice contends 

that, because the parties stipulated that Allvoice could 

seek leave to amend its infringement contentions on or 

before April 12, 2012, it was unreasonable for the district 

court to fault Allvoice for its delay in filing the motion.

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Here, the district court found that Allvoice had failed 

to explain why it waited more than three months after the 

Markman order and over nineteen months after the joint 

claim chart of disputed terms—where Microsoft first 

proposed the construction that the district court ultimately adopted for the “link data” limitation—to file its motion 

to amend. Without any explanation for its delay, the 

district court determined that the mere fact that the 

parties had agreed that Allvoice could file a motion did 

not excuse Allvoice from providing a reason why it waited 

so long file its motion, especially considering that Allvoice

was aware of the possibility that the district court could 

adopt Microsoft’s construction as early as September 

2010. See O2 Micro, 467 F.3d at 1366 (“If the parties 

were not required to amend their contentions promptly 

after discovering new information, the contentions requirement would be virtually meaningless as a mechanism for shaping the conduct of discovery and trial 

preparation.”). While a different claim construction may

justify an amendment, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion when it concluded that the local rules do not 

allow a party to amend its infringement contentions as a 

matter of right whenever the district court adopts a claim 

construction position at odds with that urged by the 

moving party. Diligence still must be shown. While, if 

acting as the district court, one or more of us may have 

granted leave to amend in these circumstances, that is 

not the question before us. We assess only whether the

district court abused its discretion in requiring a showing 

of diligence and finding Allvoice’s showing inadequate; we 

conclude it did not. 

Although Allvoice also argues that the district court’s 

ruling was unjustified in light of the case schedule, which 

provided Microsoft sufficient time to conduct additional

discovery and prepare expert reports following an 

amendment of Allvoice’s contentions, these considerations 

go to whether Microsoft would suffer prejudice if Allvoice 

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12 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

were allowed to amend, not whether Allvoice was diligent 

in seeking an amendment. Because the district court did 

not abuse its discretion in deciding that Allvoice did not 

act diligently in moving to amend its infringement contentions, we need not consider the potential prejudice to 

Microsoft.3 

The district court granted summary judgment of noninfringement, in part, because it found an absence of 

evidence with respect to the “link data” limitation. We 

review the grant of summary judgment under the law of 

the regional circuit. Charles Mach. Works, Inc. v. Vermeer 

Mfg. Co., 723 F.3d 1376, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2013). The Ninth 

Circuit reviews the grant or denial of summary judgment 

de novo. Leever v. Carson City, 360 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th 

Cir. 2009). 

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); 

3 Allvoice also contends that this dispute regarding 

the adequacy of its infringement contentions and whether 

it should have been allowed to amend them could be 

rendered moot if we agree with it that the district court’s 

construction of the “link data” limitation was erroneous. 

Specifically, if we agree that the district court erred when 

it concluded that link data is stored in the IAP memory, 

Allvoice contends that its failure to reference the TSP 

property store would not matter. Neither this argument 

nor Microsoft’s arguments that Allvoice’s challenge to the 

“link data” claim construction is waived, irrelevant and 

inconsistent with prior positions taken by Allvoice need 

detain us long. We conclude that the language of the 

claims, the written description, the prosecution history of 

the ’273 Patent and Allvoice’s interference with the Holt 

Application all confirm that link data must be stored in 

the IAP memory. 

 

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Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 

A movant can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that 

the nonmoving party “failed to make a sufficient showing 

on an essential element of her case with respect to which 

she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Allvoice’s operative infringement 

contentions did not reference the “TSF property store,” 

which Allvoice concedes is the only element that arguably 

satisfies the “link data” limitation in its patent, and 

Allvoice was not allowed to amend its infringement contentions to specifically include this reference. Without 

any admissible theory as to how Microsoft’s accused 

products satisfied the “link data” limitation, the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment of noninfringement. 

Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement as to all remaining 

asserted claims, we need not reach Allvoice’s other infringement arguments. See Orion Tech., Inc. v. United 

States, 704 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“An appellate court can affirm a decision of the trial court upon any 

ground supported by the record.”) (citing Datascope Corp. 

v. SMEC, 879 F.2d 820, 822 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 

B. Invalidity of Claims 60–68

The district court also determined that claims 60–68 

were invalid for failing to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 

“We review the district court’s determination of patent 

eligibility under 35 U.S.C. § 101 de novo.” DDR Holdings, 

4 Because the district court invalidated these claims 

before entering summary judgment of non-infringement 

on the remaining claims, it did not apply its noninfringement judgment to them. We note, however, that, 

because each of these claims as construed also requires 

link data, even if valid, they are not infringed.

 

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LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 

2014).

Section § 101 defines patentable subject matter and 

states:

Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful 

process, machine, manufacture, or composition of 

matter, or any new and useful improvement 

thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to 

the conditions and requirements of this title. 

“Section 101 thus specifies four independent categories of 

inventions or discoveries that are eligible for protection: 

processes, machines, manufactures, and compositions of 

matter. ‘In choosing such expansive terms . . . modified 

by the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws would be given wide scope.”’ 

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010) (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)). If a 

claim is drawn to subject matter that falls outside the 

four statutory categories of § 101, it is not patent eligible. 

In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2007). This 

is true without regard to whether it might otherwise be 

ineligible because it encompasses a law of nature, natural 

phenomenon, or abstract idea. See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. 

CLS Bank Int’l, 124 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014). 

Except for process claims, “the eligible subject matter 

must exist in some physical or tangible form.” Digitech 

Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 

1344, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014). To be considered a machine 

under section 101, “the claimed invention must be a 

‘concrete thing, consisting of parts, or of certain devices 

and combination of devices.’” Id. at 1349 (quoting Burr v. 

Duryee, 68 U.S. 531, 571 (1863)). Similarly, “[t]o qualify 

as a manufacture, the invention must be a tangible article 

that is given a new form, quality, property, or combination through man-made or artificial means. Likewise, a 

composition of matter requires the combination of two or 

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more substances and includes all composite articles.” Id.

(citing Diamond, 447 U.S. at 308).

Here, claims 60–68 of the ’273 Patent do not recite a

process or tangible or physical object and, thus, do not fall 

within any of the categories of eligible subject matter. 

Independent claim 60 is directed to a speech-recognition 

“interface”: 

A universal speech-recognition interface that enables operative coupling of a speech-recognition engine to at least any one of a plurality of different 

computer-related applications, the universal 

speech-recognition interface comprising:

input means for receiving speech-recognition data 

including recognised words;

output means for outputting the recognised words 

into at least any one of the plurality of different 

computer-related applications to allow processing 

of the recognised words as input text; and

audio playback means for playing audio data associated with the recognised words. 

’273 Patent, col. 29 ll. 22–34.

Similarly, independent claim 64 recites:

A speech-recognition interface that enables operative coupling of a speech-recognition engine to a 

computer-related application, the interface comprising:

input means for receiving speech-recognition data 

including recognised words;

output means for outputting the recognised words 

into a computer-related application to allow processing of the recognised words as input text, including changing positions of the recognised 

words; and

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means, independent of the computer-related application, for determining positions of the recognised words in the computer-related application.

’273 Patent, col. 29 l. 65–col. 30 l. 9.

Before the district court, Allvoice explained that the 

claimed interfaces are described in the ’273 Patent’s 

specification as “interface applications,” and, thus, that 

these claims are limited to software. See Pl.’s Opening Cl. 

Constr. Br. at 9–10, Allvoice Devs. US, LLC v. Microsoft 

Corp., No. 2:10-cv-2102 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2010), ECF 

No. 107 (“As indicated above, claims 60 and 67 [which is 

dependent on claim 64] according to their preamble are 

limited to the ‘interface’ which is described in the patent 

in suit as an ‘interface application.’ Hence, these claims 

are limited to software.”). Before this court, Allvoice 

clarifies that the claimed interfaces are “software instructions.”5 Software may be patent eligible, but when a 

claim is not directed towards a process, the subject matter 

must exist in tangible form. Here, the disputed claims 

merely claim software instructions without any hardware 

limitations. 

Allvoice attempts to overcome this hurdle now by arguing that the claimed software must necessarily be in a 

machine readable, physical state in order to exist, and 

that the district court therefore should have concluded 

that these claims are directed to a manufacture, one of 

the four categories of patentable inventions. But, as this 

5 Although Allvoice did not ground its opposition to 

Microsoft's motion for summary judgment on any benefits 

received from employing functional claiming under 

§ 112(6), it is also significant that the means-plusfunction limitations, as construed by Allvoice, do not 

correspond to tangible structure, as opposed to software 

instructions. 

 

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Court has recognized, instructions, data, or information 

alone, absent a tangible medium, is not a manufacture. 

See Digitech Image Techs., 758 F.3d at 1349–50 (rejecting 

a patentee’s attempt to argue that the disputed claims 

were subject matter eligible because the claim language 

did not describe “any tangible embodiment of this information (i.e., in physical memory or other medium) or 

claim any tangible part of the digital processing system”); 

In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d at 1356 (declining to import a 

tangible medium element into the claims directed to only 

encoded signals, which were unpatentable under § 101). 

We decline to import or, as Allvoice argues, “imply” a

tangible medium into claims that fail to recite or reference any such medium.6 Because claims 60–68 are not 

directed to a tangible article and are not process claims, 

the district court did not err when it held these claims

were not patent eligible, and, thus, invalid. 

CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not abuse its discretion 

in enforcing the local patent rules, we affirm the district 

court’s grant of summary judgment of non-infringement 

as to claims 28, 37–38, 49–51, 56–57, 71–74, and 77 with 

respect to the “link data” limitation. In light of this 

ruling, we need not reach Allvoice’s other arguments 

regarding infringement of these claims. Additionally, 

with respect to the validity of claims 60–68 of the ’273 

Patent, Allvoice conceded that these claims were limited 

to software instructions without any hardware limitations. In the absence of such limitations, the claims as 

written fail to recite a manufacture, or any other statutorily recognized invention. Accordingly, we also affirm the 

6 Given our resolution of this issue, we decline to 

address Microsoft’s argument that Allvoice waived this 

argument by not raising it in its briefing to the trial court.

 

Case: 14-1258 Document: 52-2 Page: 17 Filed: 05/22/2015
18 ALLVOICE DEVELOPMENTS US, LLC v. MICROSOFT CORP. 

district court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity of 

claims 60–68 of the ’273 Patent. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1258 Document: 52-2 Page: 18 Filed: 05/22/2015