Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04714/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-04714-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R.T.C. Grounds
Respondent
Andre D. Scott
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDRE D. SCOTT,

Petitioner,

v.

R.T.C. GROUNDS,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-04714-WHO (PR) 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Andre Scott seeks federal habeas relief from his state convictions because 

the trial court (1) failed to properly answer the jury’s question and (2) used an invalid 

juvenile adjudication to enhance his sentence. While the trial judge should have answered 

the jury’s question directly, as the California Court of Appeal noted, the error was 

harmless. And though the trial judge erroneously enhanced Scott’s sentence by using an 

invalid juvenile adjudication, Scott’s claim is moot because the California Court of Appeal 

modified Scott’s judgment to strike the enhancements. For the reasons set forth below, the 

petition for habeas relief is DENIED. 

BACKGROUND

In April, 2007, Scott and Larry Douglas, who were both pimps, shot at two persons 

as punishment for their failure to pay the prostitutes Scott and Douglas sent to them. 

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Roommates Muhamad Sagier and Jason Wilson asked two women at separate times to 

come to their apartment for sexual services. Each woman left without providing any such 

services. They were not paid. Scott and Douglas later came to the apartment armed. They 

chased after Sagier, who attempted to barricade himself in his bedroom, and kicked down 

the door:

Sagier, who was standing on his bed, ducking, with his arm over his face, 

was struck in his upper thigh, which, given his position, was close to his 

vital organs. Defendants did not flee after wounding Sagier but continued 

to Wilson’s bedroom. Wilson was holding the doorknob when defendants 

tried to open the door, so they must have known that he was behind the 

door when one of them tried to turn the knob. Knowing this, they fired 

shots through the door, a foot above the doorknob, where one would expect 

to find the vital organs of someone who was holding the doorknob. Indeed, 

Wilson was struck by one bullet in the shoulder and by another in the face. 

(Id. at 18.) The police recovered three .22 caliber shell casings and five .40 caliber shell 

casings from the apartment. (Id. at 3-5.) 

In 2010, a Santa Clara County Superior Court jury convicted Scott of two counts of

attempted murder and found true an allegation that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with 

premeditation in the commission of the attempted murders. (Ans., Ex. 4 at 1.) Scott admitted at 

trial to a prior juvenile adjudication, which the trial court counted as a strike conviction to 

enhance Scott’s sentence by ten years under California’s Three Strikes law (Cal. Penal 

Code section 667(a)). (Ans., Ex. 4 at 1-2 (State Appellate Opinion, People v. Scott, et al., 

No. H035845, 2012 WL 2343268 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 20, 2012) (unpublished).) He 

received a sentence of 40 years-to-life in state prison.

On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reduced Scott’s sentence to 30 years-tolife. Other than achieving this sentence reduction, Scott’s attempts to overturn his 

convictions and sentences through the state courts were unsuccessful. This federal habeas 

petition followed.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 

this Court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody 

in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). The petition may not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated 

on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted 

in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state 

court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question 

of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set of 

materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 

(2000).

“Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the 

writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the] Court’s 

decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 

413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes 

in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be 

unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court making the “unreasonable application” 

inquiry should ask whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law 

was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409. 

When presented with a state court decision that is unaccompanied by a rationale for 

its conclusions, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to 

determine whether the state-court decision is objectively reasonable. See Delgado v. 

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Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). This “[i]ndependent review is not a de novo

review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which [a federal court] 

can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable.” See 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). “[W]here a state court’s decision 

is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by 

showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” See Harrington 

v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). 

DISCUSSION

I. Trial Court’s Response to a Jury Question

Scott claims that the trial court’s response to the jury question about the attempted 

murder counts violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Pet. at 1.) The state 

appellate court summarized the facts as follows:

[During deliberations, the jury sent out a note that] concerned the attempted 

murder counts. It read: “We, as a jury, have found a ‘careless disregard for 

lethal consequence’ in regards to counts 1, 2, 5, and 6. We would like to 

further clarify the phrase ‘intent to kill.’ Does a ‘careless disregard for 

lethal consequences’ constitute an ‘intent to kill?’” [FN11.] The court 

responded in writing . . . to this note: “Please refer to Instruction Numbers 

251 [“Union of Act and Intent: Specific Intent or Mental State”] and 600 

[“Attempted Murder”]. The jury deliberated for half an hour more before 

retiring for the evening.

[FN11.] Although the parties see nothing in the arguments to suggest how 

the jury came up with this language, there is reason to believe that it might 

have been derived from the prosecutor’s argument that defendants had 

demonstrated they intended to kill by failing to call 911, which showed 

they “didn’t care” whether Sagier and Wilson died.

The next day, Douglas’s trial counsel put on the record the fact that he had 

objected to the court’s response to the note concerning the attempted 

murder counts. “[M]y suggested response was that [the answer to] the 

rather specific question was to say, no, the careless disregard, and use the 

same language they have in the question, does not constitute an intent to 

kill, because legally it would not, and I don’t believe the response directing 

them back to the CalCrim is sufficient because they already have those 

instructions, and despite those instructions, they still pose this question.” 

Douglas’s trial counsel moved for a mistrial on the ground that the jury’s 

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note reflected that it was “disregard[ing]” the court’s instructions. Scott’s 

trial counsel joined in the mistrial motion and suggested that the jury’s use 

of the words “careless disregard for legal [sic] consequences” reflected that 

it was engaging in misconduct by “consult[ing] other sources” and failing 

to follow the court’s instructions. The court denied the mistrial motion 

without comment. Later that day, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all 

counts, including the attempted murder counts, and found the premeditation 

allegations true.

(Id. at 10-15.)

The state appellate court rejected Scott’s claim because, while the trial court’s 

response was in error, there was no prejudice:

Here, when the jury asked: “Does a ‘careless disregard for lethal 

consequences’ constitute an ‘intent to kill?’”, it was essentially asking if a 

“careless disregard” for life was sufficient to satisfy attempted murder’s 

“intent to kill” element. This was a question of law that the trial court was 

obligated to affirmatively resolve. As defendants point out, the correct 

answer was “No.” Because, notwithstanding the fact that the jury had 

already received accurate instructions on the “intent to kill” element, the 

jury had still come to believe that “careless disregard” might satisfy the 

“intent to kill” element of attempted murder, the trial court had an 

obligation to debunk the jury’s misapprehension of the jury instructions. 

Referring the jury back to instructions that it had clearly misunderstood was 

inadequate. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in failing to 

respond “no” to the jury’s inquiry.

The next question is whether the trial court’s error was prejudicial. 

Defendants contend that the trial court’s error was a violation of the Sixth 

Amendment because it amounted to an erroneous instruction on an element 

of the offense. We disagree with this characterization of the trial court’s 

error. Although the court failed to properly respond “no” to the jury’s 

inquiry, it did not give any inaccurate instructions on the elements of the 

offense. Indeed, the trial court’s response to the jury’s inquiry was to refer 

the jury back to accurate instructions on every element of the offense. 

Hence, the trial court’s error was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment.

It follows that reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable that 

defendants would have attained a more favorable verdict if the court had 

properly responded “no” to the jury’s inquiry. [Footnote omitted.] The 

record does not support defendants’ claim that a more favorable result was 

reasonably probable in the absence of the court’s error.

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The jury was properly instructed with CALCRIM No. 600, and the trial 

court referred the jury back to this correct instruction in response to its 

inquiry. Although CALCRIM No. 600 does not elaborate on the meaning 

of “intended to kill,” it does not in any way suggest that “careless 

disregard” is the equivalent of “intended to kill.” The evidence that 

defendants intended to kill was also very strong. Defendants kicked open 

the door to Sagier’s room, pointed guns at a defenseless Sagier, and fired at 

least five shots, at least two of which were hollow point .40 caliber bullets, 

a particularly lethal bullet. Sagier, who was standing on his bed, ducking, 

with his arm over his face, was struck in his upper thigh, which, given his 

position, was close to his vital organs. Defendants did not flee after 

wounding Sagier but continued to Wilson’s bedroom. Wilson was holding 

the doorknob when defendants tried to open the door, so they must have 

known that he was behind the door when one of them tried to turn the knob. 

Knowing this, they fired shots through the door, a foot above the doorknob, 

where one would expect to find the vital organs of someone who was 

holding the doorknob. Indeed, Wilson was struck by one bullet in the 

shoulder and by another in the face. The circumstances under which 

defendants fired the many shots they directed at Sagier and Wilson strongly 

supported a finding that defendants intended to kill both men.

Nor does the record suggest that the jury actually rested its verdict on a 

“careless disregard” theory rather than a finding that defendants intended to 

kill. The jury not only found defendants guilty of attempted murder under 

CALCRIM No. 600 but also found true allegations that defendants had 

acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in the commission of 

the attempted murders. It is practically inconceivable that the jury could 

have concluded that defendants willfully, deliberately, and with 

premeditation acted with “careless disregard.” Deliberation and 

premeditation are the very antithesis of “careless disregard.”

As the evidence of intent to kill was very strong, and the jury’s findings on 

the premeditation allegations were inconsistent with reliance on a “careless 

disregard” theory, the trial court’s error in its response to the jury’s inquiry 

was not prejudicial.

(Id. at 17-19.) 

To obtain federal collateral relief for errors in the jury charge, a petitioner must 

show that the disputed instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting 

conviction violates due process. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991). The 

instruction may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be considered in the context 

of the instructions as a whole and the trial record. Id. In other words, a federal habeas 

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court must evaluate the jury instructions in the context of the overall charge to the jury as a 

component of the entire trial process. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) 

(citing Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977)). 

A trial judge has wide discretion in charging the jury, a discretion which carries 

over to the judge’s response to a question from the jury. Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 

988, 994 (9th Cir. 2003). Jurors are presumed to follow their instructions. See Richardson 

v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987). It is “presumed that the jury fully understood the 

judge’s answer and appropriately applied the jury instructions, ” if the jury does not ask a 

follow up question after a trial court has directed the jury’s attention to the constitutionally 

adequate instruction that answers its question. Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 196 

(2009). 

Habeas relief is not warranted because the state appellate court reasonably rejected 

the claim that the trial court’s response rendered Scott’s trial fundamentally unfair or 

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. While the trial court should have said “no” to the 

jury’s question, the trial court gave the jury the correct instructions before deliberations 

and guided the jurors back to those correct instructions in his response to their question. 

This Court must presume that the jury understood the trial court’s instruction and applied 

the correct standard. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 206; Sarausad, 555 U.S. at 196. 

As the state appellate court reasonably determined, there was no prejudice. The 

trial court directed the jury to the original instructions, which accurately stated the law. 

They were not misinformed or misled. The jury found true an allegation that Scott acted 

willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation in the commission of the attempted murders, 

the correct standard for attempted murder. And there was very strong evidence that Scott 

intended to kill. He and Douglas came to Sagier and Wilson’s apartment armed. They 

shot at the unarmed Sagier at least five times, injuring him. Then they pursued Wilson and 

shot him. The state appellate court’s decision was reasonable and therefore is entitled to 

AEDPA deference. This claim is DENIED.

 

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II. Use of Juvenile Conviction

At trial, Scott admitted that in 1997, when he was 16, he was found guilty at a 

juvenile proceeding of robbery. (Ans., Ex. 7, Vol. 18 at 3636-3638.)1 Defense counsel 

objected to the use of this conviction as a strike under Cal. Penal Code 667(a) because 

Scott did not have the right to a jury at the juvenile proceeding. (Id. at 3643.) The trial 

court overruled the objection, found that the conviction was a serious felony within 

California’s Three Strikes law, and imposed 10 years under the relevant statute, that is,

Cal. Penal Code 667(a). (Id., Vol. 19 at 3664-65.) 

Scott claims that the trial court’s use of his juvenile conviction to calculate his 

sentence violated his right to due process for the same reasons defense counsel raised in 

court. (Pet. at 1.) This claim is moot. The state appellate court concluded that a juvenile 

conviction does not qualify as a strike conviction under section 667(a), and in consequence 

Scott’s sentence was adjusted downward by 10 years, the same number of years imposed 

because of the putative strike. (Ans., Ex. 4 at 28, 30.) Because Scott’s sentence has been 

modified, there is no relief that this Court can give on his claim.2 

 

1 Rather than lodging the trial transcript in docket of this case, respondent directed the 

Court to use the exhibits filed in Douglas’s habeas action (Douglas v. Grounds, No. C 13-

4655 CRB). The citations to the trial transcript correspond the exhibits filed in Douglas’s 

action. 

2 This claim would also fail on the merits. Scott’s first contention, that the juvenile 

conviction violated due process and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury, is foreclosed by 

Supreme Court precedent. There is no federal constitutional right to a jury in a juvenile 

adjudication proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 

Scott’s second contention is that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), barred the 

trial court from using the admitted conviction. Under Apprendi, any fact, other than the 

fact of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty of a crime beyond the statutory 

maximum must be submitted to the jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 

490. Scott asserts that his juvenile conviction does not qualify under the prior conviction 

exception to Apprendi (meaning that the allegation of a prior conviction should have been 

submitted to Scott’s jury) because juvenile adjudications lack sufficient procedural 

safeguards, such as a jury trial and the requirement that guilt must be shown beyond a 

reasonable doubt. This contention fails for two reasons. First, Scott admitted to the 

conviction. Admission to the conviction waives his Sixth Amendment right to have the 

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CONCLUSION

The state court’s adjudication of Scott’s claims did not result in decisions that were 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor 

did they result in decisions that were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 

in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Accordingly, the petition 

is DENIED. 

A certificate of appealability will not issue. Reasonable jurists would not “find the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. 

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Scott may seek a certificate of appealability from 

the Ninth Circuit. 

The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2015

_________________________

WILLIAM H. ORRICK

United States District Judge

 

allegation submitted to the jury, as the Supreme Court affirmed in Blakely v. Washington, 

542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004), one of Apprendi’s progeny. Second, the Ninth Circuit has held 

that “in the absence of explicit direction from the Supreme Court, we cannot hold that the 

California courts’ use of [petitioner’s] juvenile adjudication as a sentencing enhancement 

was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, Supreme Court precedent.” 

Boyd v. Newland, 467 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2006). For these reasons, Scott’s due 

process claim lacks merit. 

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