Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03043/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03043-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Derrick J. Heard
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 18, 2003 Decided February 27, 2004

No. 03-3043

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

DERRICK J. HEARD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00266–01)

Jensen E. Barber II, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

Jessie K. Liu, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C. Howard,

Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W. McLeese III,

and Kristina L. Ament, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-3043 Document #806006 Filed: 02/27/2004 Page 1 of 17
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Before: SENTELLE and GARLAND, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.*

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

GARLAND, Circuit Judge: The United States and defendant

Derrick Heard agreed to resolve a criminal charge against

Heard through a plea agreement that called for a sentence of

48 months’ imprisonment. The parties agreed to disagree,

however, as to whether that sentence should run concurrently

with, or consecutively to, a term of imprisonment that Heard

was already serving for committing a different offense. The

district court decided to run Heard’s new sentence consecutively to his old one, so that the 48–month period would not

commence until after Heard completed his existing sentence.

Heard now appeals, contending that the district court erred

in not imposing a concurrent or partially concurrent sentence.

The issue is governed by United States Sentencing Guideline

§ 5G1.3. Finding no error in the district court’s determinations, we affirm the defendant’s sentence.

I

On January 21, 2000, Heard was arrested after police

officers, in the course of executing a search warrant at his

apartment, found a revolver, 132 grams of crack cocaine, and

approximately $2000 in cash. On May 5, 2000, Heard pled

guilty to two counts stemming from the January 2000 arrest:

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and

(b)(1)(A)(iii); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Heard was released on his

personal recognizance pending sentencing, as part of an

agreement to cooperate with the government. On January

27, 2001, while still on release awaiting sentencing, Heard was

again arrested — this time with 1.4 grams of crack in his

possession.

* Senior Judge Silberman was a member of the panel at the time

of oral argument, but did not participate in the decision.

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On February 14, 2003, a United States District Judge for

the District of Columbia sentenced Heard for his January

2000 offenses. The judge imposed concurrent sentences of

133 months’ imprisonment on the cocaine count and 30

months’ imprisonment on the firearm count.

Six days later, on February 20, 2003, Heard reached a plea

agreement with the government regarding his January 2001

offense. That agreement was entered into pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C), which provides

that a plea agreement may specify that ‘‘the attorney for the

government will TTT agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case.’’ FED. R.

CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C) (2002).1

 Rule 11(e)(1)(C) further provides

that ‘‘[s]uch a plea agreement is binding on the court once it

is accepted by the court.’’ Id.

Heard agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession

with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), for his January 2001 offense. In

return, the government agreed to a sentence of 48 months’

imprisonment. Both parties ‘‘specifically agreed not to put in

the plea agreement whether the sentence, if the court were to

accept it, would run concurrent[ly] or consecutively’’ to

Heard’s undischarged sentence for the January 2000 offenses,

‘‘but TTT rather reserve[d] that for argument at the time of

sentencing.’’ Hr’g Tr. at 6 (Apr. 18, 2003).

Prior to the sentencing hearing, the U.S. Probation Office

prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that

calculated a sentencing range of 188–235 months’ imprisonment under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The

Probation Office initially calculated Heard’s criminal history

category as III, and his base offense level as 18 — the latter

because his offense involved 1.4 grams of cocaine base. PSR

¶¶ 13, 26; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

§ 2D1.1(c)(11) (drug quantity table) (2002) [hereinafter

1 By the time of the defendant’s plea, Rule 11(e)(1)(C) had been

recodified as Rule 11(c)(1)(C). See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(C)

(2003). The parties continue to refer to the Rule as 11(e)(1)(C),

and, for purposes of consistency, we do so as well.

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U.S.S.G.]; id. § 4A1.1 (criminal history categories). It then

added a 3–level enhancement because Heard committed the

offense while on release for another crime. PSR ¶ 14; see

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.7.

A substantial further enhancement was required, however,

because Heard’s February 20, 2003, conviction, together with

another previous conviction for a drug felony in 1990, rendered him a career offender under Guideline § 4B1.1(a).

Under the career offender guideline, Heard’s offense level

was increased to 34 and his criminal history category was

raised from III to VI. PSR ¶¶ 19, 27; see U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.1(b).2

 After applying a 3–level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)–(b), the Probation Office concluded that Heard’s total offense level was

31. That, together with a criminal history category of VI,

yielded a guidelines sentencing range of 188–235 months’

imprisonment. PSR ¶¶ 20, 21, 57; see U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A

(sentencing table). The Probation Office noted, however, that

the ‘‘Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement caps the defendant’s

custody range [at] 48 months.’’ PSR ¶ 59.

On April 18, 2003, a district judge different than the one

who had sentenced Heard for his January 2000 offenses held

a hearing to determine whether to accept Heard’s Rule

11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement. After both the defense counsel

and the prosecutor stipulated that the PSR contained no

material inaccuracies, the judge accepted the PSR ‘‘as findings of fact on the issues that are not in dispute.’’ Hr’g Tr. at

3. The judge then noted ‘‘for context purposes what the

guidelines calculation would be in this case,’’ reciting the

calculations set out above. Id. Next, the focus of the

proceeding turned to whether the judge should accept the

plea and how to impose the agreed-upon sentence relative to

2 Guideline § 4B1.1(b) mandates a criminal history category of VI

for all career offenders. It also mandates a base offense level of (at

least) 34 when the instant offense of conviction carries a statutory

maximum of 25 years or more, as does Heard’s violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) after having previously been convicted of a

felony drug offense.

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the defendant’s undischarged term. In that respect, the

judge stated that he was not ‘‘taking the prior offense conduct

into account[,] TTT nor does the presentence report take it

into account with respect to the sentence actually imposed,

which again is the 11(e)(1)(C) sentence of 48 months.’’ Id. at

36.

Both sides presented argument concerning the application

of Guideline § 5G1.3, which guides a court in choosing between concurrent and consecutive sentences, to Heard’s stipulated sentence. The defendant argued that his case fell

within § 5G1.3(b), which requires the court to run the sentence for the instant offense concurrently with an undischarged term from a prior offense. Alternatively, the defendant argued that if the judge instead found that the case was

governed by § 5G1.3(c) — which grants the court authority to

run the sentence consecutively, concurrently, or partially

concurrently — the judge should choose the latter. The

district judge rejected both arguments and granted the government’s request to run the sentence consecutively.

II

The United States Code provides that, ‘‘if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to

an undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run

concurrently or consecutively.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). In

deciding whether to impose a term concurrently or consecutively, courts are directed to consider, inter alia, the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. §§ 3584(b), 3553(a)(4), 3553(b); see United States v. Lafayette, 337 F.3d 1043, 1050–52 (D.C. Cir.

2003). The relevant guideline is § 5G1.3, which is entitled

‘‘Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an

Undischarged Term of Imprisonment,’’ and which is divided

into three subsections applicable to three categories of cases.

As we have previously explained, ‘‘subsection (a) describes the

cases in which the district court must impose a consecutive

sentence; subsection (b) describes those in which the sentence must be concurrent; and subsection (c) gives the court

discretion, in ‘any other case,’ to sentence TTT consecutively

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or concurrently’’ or partially concurrently. United States v.

Hall, 326 F.3d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

Both parties agree that subsection (a) does not apply here.

That subsection requires a consecutive sentence when ‘‘the

instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment TTT or after sentencing for, but

before commencing service of, such term of imprisonment.’’

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). Heard did not commit the instant offense (the 2001 cocaine violation) while he was imprisoned or

after he was sentenced for the prior offenses (the 2000

cocaine and firearm offenses), but rather while he was still

awaiting sentencing for those offenses. Accordingly, the

dispute focuses on the remaining two subsections of § 5G1.3,

which, in the relevant (2002) edition of the Guidelines Manual,3

 provide as follows:

 (b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the

determination of the offense level for the instant

offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be

imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged

term of imprisonment.

 (c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for

the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the

prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a

reasonable punishment for the instant offense.

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), (c) (emphasis added). The district court

concluded that subsection (c) was the applicable subsection,

that it gave the court discretion to determine how to run the

sentences, and that a consecutive sentence was the most

appropriate.

3 A sentencing court must ‘‘use the Guidelines Manual in effect on

the date that the defendant is sentenced,’’ U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a), p.s.,

unless use of that version ‘‘would violate the ex post facto clause of

the United States Constitution,’’ in which event ‘‘the court shall use

the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the offense of

conviction was committed,’’ id. § 1B1.11(b)(1).

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Heard asserts two arguments on appeal: (1) that the

district court erred in not applying subsection (b), which

requires a concurrent sentence; and (2) that even if subsection (c) applies and the district court had discretion, the court

abused that discretion by imposing a consecutive rather than

partially concurrent sentence. As discussed below, Heard’s

first challenge turns on a question of law, which we therefore

review de novo. See United States v. Goodwin, 317 F.3d 293,

297 (D.C. Cir. 2003). We review his second challenge only for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Velasquez, 136 F.3d

921, 923 (2d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases from several circuits).

A

Heard’s first contention is that the district court erred in

not imposing a concurrent sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(b).

We note at the outset that we have some doubt as to whether

that subsection has any application to a sentence imposed

pursuant to a plea accepted under Rule 11(e)(1)(C). Subsection (b) applies only when ‘‘the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken

into account in the determination of the offense level for the

instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (emphasis added). A

sentence arising from a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea, however, does

not result from the determination of an appropriate guidelines offense level, but rather from the agreement of the

parties: an agreement that is ‘‘binding on the court once it is

accepted by the court.’’ FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1)(C). As we

have previously noted, although a court is ‘‘free to consider

the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range’’ in deciding

‘‘whether to accept an agreed-upon sentence’’ under Rule

11(e)(1)(C), it is ‘‘not compelled to do so.’’ United States v.

Goodall, 236 F.3d 700, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Nonetheless,

because the government does not press this point, because

sentences under Rule 11(e)(1)(C) are not wholly divorced

from sentencing guideline calculations,4

 and because there

may be at least some Rule 11(e)(1)(C) sentences that do rest

4 See U.S.S.G. § 6B1.2(c), p.s. (‘‘In the case of a plea agreement

that includes a specific sentence [Rule 11(e)(1)(C)], the court may

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on a determination of offense levels,5

 we will proceed as if the

fact that Heard pled guilty pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) were

not dispositive.6

Heard contends that § 5G1.3(b) governs his case because

his 2000 offenses were ‘‘taken into account’’ in the following

sense: the Probation Office recited them in the PSR, and the

district court discussed them at the sentencing hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 13. It is enough, Heard argues, that his prior

offenses were ‘‘addressed at all.’’ Oral Arg. Tape (Nov. 18,

2003). The question, however, is not whether those offenses

were taken into account in some colloquial sense, but whether

they were ‘‘fully taken into account in the determination of

the offense level for the instant offense,’’ as required by the

words of the guideline.

A number of courts of appeals have held that a prior

offense is not ‘‘taken into account’’ for purposes of § 5G1.3(b)

unless the conduct underlying that offense is part of the

‘‘relevant conduct’’ — as defined by Guideline § 1B1.3(a) —

accept the agreement if the court is satisfied either that: (1) the

agreed sentence is within the applicable guideline range; or (2) the

agreed sentence departs from the applicable guideline range for

justifiable reasons.’’) (brackets in original); Goodall, 236 F.3d at 705

(holding ‘‘that the policy statement in § 6B1.2 was promulgated to

guide, not to constrain, courts in deciding whether to accept or to

reject a plea agreement’’ and therefore is not binding on district

courts).

5 An argument could be made, for example, that a sentence

imposed under a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea is in fact based on an offense

level when the agreed-upon sentence is the same as that which

would have resulted from using the applicable guidelines offense

level.

6 Compare United States v. Williams, 260 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir.

2001) (holding ‘‘that a district court is obligated to apply section

5G1.3(b) to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea bargains that are mute about how

the sentence is to interact with an existing undischarged sentence’’),

with id. at 172 (Haden, J., concurring) (arguing that § 5G1.3(b) is

inapplicable to a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreement ‘‘for the simple reason

that [the court] was not required to, and in fact did not, ‘determin[e]

TTT [an] offense level for the instant offense’ ’’) (quoting § 5G1.3(b)).

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used to determine the appropriate offense level for the instant offense.7

 See United States v. Johnson, 324 F.3d 875,

878–80 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Raleigh, 278 F.3d

563, 568 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lange, 146 F.3d

555, 556 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 1080,

1084 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Gondek, 65 F.3d 1, 4

(1st Cir. 1995). That view is supported by several considerations. First, earlier editions of the Guidelines Manual contained language that suggested that only such relevant conduct can trigger § 5G1.3(b).8

 Although that text was not

retained in the 2002 edition applicable here, the Sentencing

Commission did not suggest that it was making a material

change when it deleted the language.9

 To the contrary, the

7 As is particularly relevant here, § 1B1.3(a) provides that, for

certain offenses including drug crimes, a defendant’s base offense

level ‘‘shall be determined on the basis of [among other things] TTT

all acts and omissions TTT that were part of the same course of

conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.’’

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2).

8 In 1991, § 5G1.3(b) required concurrent sentencing where the

‘‘undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that

constituted part of the same course of conduct as the instant offense

and have been fully taken into account in the determination of the

offense level for the instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (1991).

In 1992, the text of the guideline was changed to the version that

was in place at the time of Heard’s sentencing in 2002, but an

application note was added that provided: ‘‘Subsection (b) TTT

addresses cases in which the conduct resulting in the undischarged

term of imprisonment has been fully taken into account under

§ 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in determining the offense level for the

instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), cmt. n.2 (1992). Finally, in

1995, the Commission altered the application note to move the

reference to § 1B1.3 from the introductory text of that note to its

example, see U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b), cmt. n.2 (1995), which is how

matters stood when Heard was sentenced in 2002, see U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3(b) & cmt. n.2 (2002).

9 See U.S.S.G. app. C (vol. I), amendment 465 at 347 (2003)

(stating reason for 1992 amendment); id. app. C (vol. I), amendment 535 at 468 (stating reason for 1995 amendment).

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only example that the 2002 edition provides of a case appropriate for treatment under § 5G1.3(b) is one in which the

prior offense conduct was in fact used as relevant conduct in

determining the sentence for the instant offense:

Example: The defendant is convicted of a federal offense

charging the sale of 30 grams of cocaine. Under § 1B1.3

(Relevant Conduct), the defendant is held accountable for

the sale of an additional 15 grams of cocaine, an offense

for which the defendant has been convicted and sentenced in state courtTTTT The guideline range applicable

to the defendant is 10–16 months[, based on a base]

offense level of 14 for sale of 45 grams of cocaineTTTT

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, cmt. n.2 (2002). And while we do not rely

on subsequent developments to decide this case, we do note

that the Sentencing Guidelines were amended at the end of

last year to ‘‘clarif[y]’’ that ‘‘subsection (b) shall apply only to

prior offenses that are relevant conduct to the instant offense

of conviction and that resulted in an increase in the offense

level for the instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G. app. C (vol. II),

amendment 660 at 410 (2003).10

Limiting subsection (b)’s requirement of concurrent sentences to cases in which the earlier offense is considered

relevant conduct with respect to the instant offense is consonant with the Supreme Court’s description of both the subsection’s operation and its purpose:

[T]he Guidelines TTT explicitly contemplate the possibility

of separate prosecutions involving the same or overlapping ‘‘relevant conduct.’’ TTT Because the concept of

relevant conduct under the Guidelines is reciprocal,

§ 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the possibility that the

fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly increase a defendant’s sentence. If a defendant is serving

10 Subsection (b) now applies when ‘‘a term of imprisonment

resulted from another offense that is relevant conduct to the instant

offense of conviction under TTT § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) and

that was the basis for an increase in the offense level for the instant

offenseTTTT’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) (2003); see id. cmt. n.2(A), 2(B).

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an undischarged term of imprisonment ‘‘result[ing] from

offense(s) that have been fully taken into account [as

relevant conduct] in the determination of the offense

level for the instant offense,’’ § 5G1.3(b) provides that

‘‘the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to

run concurrently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.’’ TTT Significant safeguards built into the Sentencing Guidelines therefore protect petitioner against having the length of his sentence multiplied by duplicative

consideration of the same criminal conductTTTT

Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 404–05 (1995) (emphasis

added) (brackets in original). Following the Supreme Court,

many circuits have concluded that ‘‘[t]he guideline’s purpose

TTT is to prevent TTT double-counting’’ of the same offense

conduct. United States v. Garcia–Hernandez, 237 F.3d 105,

109 (2d Cir. 2000).11 When a prior offense constitutes relevant conduct with respect to the instant one, the Guidelines

treat it as though it were part of the instant offense. See

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3; supra note 7. In such circumstances, the

prior offense has necessarily ‘‘been fully taken into account in

the determination of the offense level for the instant offense,’’

and § 5G1.3(b) operates to prevent double-counting. Although there may be other circumstances that could result in

double-counting — an issue we need not decide today — we

agree with the Second Circuit that ‘‘in most instances only

consideration similar to that given to relevant conduct will

‘fully’ take into account separate offenses.’’ Garcia–Hernandez, 237 F.3d at 109 n.3.

11 See, e.g., United States v. Rangel, 319 F.3d 710, 714 (5th Cir.

2003) (‘‘Section 5G1.3 ‘operates to mitigate the possibility that the

fortuity of two separate prosecutions will grossly increase a defendant’s sentence.’ ’’) (quoting Witte, 515 U.S. at 405); United States

v. Swan, 275 F.3d 272, 277 (3d Cir. 2002) (Section 5G1.3(b) is ‘‘aimed

at the situation in which, unless the sentences were concurrent, the

defendant would be serving two sentences for essentially the identical offense.’’); United States v. Caraballo, 200 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir.

1999) (‘‘[Section] 5G1.3(b)’s central aim is to ensure that no defendant is punished twice for the same crimeTTTT’’).

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Heard’s January 2000 offenses were not taken into account

as ‘‘relevant conduct’’ in determining (what, but for the Rule

11(e)(1)(C) plea, would have been) his offense level for the

January 2001 offense, and the consecutive sentences did not

otherwise cause him to suffer duplicative punishment. Both

the Probation Office and the court treated the former as

separate crimes, unrelated to the latter. The PSR calculated

a base offense level using a drug quantity of only 1.4 grams of

cocaine base, see PSR ¶ 13, rather than the total quantity

involved in both the 2000 and 2001 offenses (133.4 grams), see

Government’s Br. at 20. And, the district judge — who was

not the judge in Heard’s first case — emphasized that ‘‘I

don’t even know the particulars of the prior offense conduct.’’

Hr’g Tr. at 36.

Heard nonetheless argues that his earlier offenses were

taken into account because they were part of the calculation

that led to the PSR’s designation of him as a career criminal,

and hence to a higher guidelines range than otherwise would

have been appropriate. Heard does not argue that the fact

that the earlier offenses increased his criminal history category qualified him for subsection (b) treatment. Such an argument would be without merit, because subsection (b) only

applies where the prior offense is taken into account ‘‘in the

determination of the offense level’’ — not where it is taken

into account in determining criminal history.12 But Heard

notes that the fact that he is a career criminal had a second

effect on his guidelines calculation: it not only increased his

criminal history category from III to VI, but it also increased

his adjusted offense level from 1813 to 31. See supra Part I.

12 Under the Guidelines, the applicable sentencing range is determined by a combination of the defendant’s offense level and criminal history category. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table).

13 Had Heard not been a career offender, his base offense level of

18 would have been increased by three because the instant offense

was committed while he was on release, and then reduced by three

because he accepted responsibility for his crime. See PSR ¶¶ 14,

20.

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As a consequence, Heard’s guidelines sentencing range

jumped from 33–41 months to 188–235 months.14

Heard’s argument has two defects. First, were we to

apply § 5G1.3(b) to his case, Heard’s 2001 offense would be

penalty-free. If that offense’s 48–month sentence were run

concurrently with the 133–month sentence for the 2000 offenses, Heard would suffer no consequence for committing

the second offense. Indeed, that would be the case for any

career criminal whose prior offense carried a sentence substantially longer than did his instant offense, such that the

latter is subsumed within the former if they are run concurrently. This would not simply vitiate the penalty-enhancing

effect of the career criminal guideline; it would turn it on its

head: while the sentence for a non-career criminal could be

run consecutively under § 5G1.3(c), that for a career criminal

would have to be run concurrently with the undischarged

term under § 5G1.3(b). Surely the Sentencing Commission

did not intend § 5G1.3 to treat those who fall under its career

offender guideline more leniently than those who do not.

Second, this contention ignores the adverb ‘‘fully’’ in

§ 5G1.3(b)’s requirement that the prior offenses have been

‘‘fully taken into account’’ in determining the offense level for

the instant offense. See Swan, 275 F.3d at 277 (declaring

that § 5G1.3(b)’s ‘‘inclusion of the word ‘fully’ and the provision’s purpose of avoiding double-counting indicate that more

than just some effect on the offense level is required’’); see

also Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 175 (2001) (rejecting a

construction that would render a word in a statute ‘‘insignificant, if not wholly superfluous’’). Even if we continue to

ignore the fact that there was no true ‘‘offense level’’ involved

in this Rule 11(e)(1)(C) sentence, and even if we do not

require Heard’s 2000 offenses to have been used as relevant

conduct with respect to the 2001 offense, there is still no

sense in which those prior offenses were ‘‘fully’’ taken into

account in determining the ‘‘offense level’’ for Heard’s 2001

14 See U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (sentencing table) (listing a range of

33–41 months for offense level 18 and criminal history category III,

and 188–235 months for level 31 and category VI).

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offense. As we noted in Part I above, the offense level

appropriate for Heard’s conduct and career criminal status

was 31. Combined with a criminal history category of VI,

that offense level would have yielded a guidelines sentencing

range of 188–235 months. The district court, however, imposed a sentence of only 48 months — 140 months below the

lower boundary of the guidelines range. Thus, even if the

Probation Office did ‘‘take[ ] into account’’ Heard’s prior

offense in calculating what his offense level would have been

under the career criminal guideline, the district court did not

‘‘fully’’ do so when it imposed a sentence that bore no

relationship to that offense level. As the court emphasized,

Heard’s prior offense conduct was not ‘‘take[n ] into account

with respect to the sentence actually imposed, which again is

the 11(e)(1)(c) sentence of 48 months.’’ Hr’g Tr. at 36.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that § 5G1.3(b),

and its requirement that the court impose a sentence to run

concurrently with an undischarged term of imprisonment,

does not apply to this case.

B

Where subsections (a) and (b) of Guideline § 5G1.3 are

inapplicable, the applicable subsection is (c), which provides:

(Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for

the instant offense may be imposed to run concurrently,

partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable

punishment for the instant offense.

U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). Applying that subsection, the district

court determined that it was appropriate to impose Heard’s

48–month sentence consecutively to his prior undischarged

term of imprisonment. The defendant contends that, even if

subsection (c) is the appropriate provision, the district court

erred by declining to exercise its authority to impose a

partially concurrent sentence under that subsection.

By contrast to subsections (a) and (b) — which command

that the instant sentence ‘‘shall be’’ imposed to run consecuUSCA Case #03-3043 Document #806006 Filed: 02/27/2004 Page 14 of 17
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tively if the case falls within (a) and concurrently if it falls

within (b), see id. § 5G1.3(a), (b) — subsection (c) plainly

leaves the decision ‘‘[i]n any other case’’ to the discretion of

the district court. For cases in that category, the sentence

‘‘may be’’ imposed to run ‘‘concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively.’’ Id. § 5G1.3(c); see Hall, 326 F.3d at

1300. The breadth of the court’s discretion is made clear by

the criterion the subsection provides to guide it: the choice is

to be made ‘‘to achieve a reasonable punishment for the

instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) (emphasis added). And

it is further evidenced by the long and indeterminate list of

factors that the commentary to the subsection sets forth for

the court’s consideration in making its choice, including, inter

alia, ‘‘any other circumstance relevant to the determination of

an appropriate sentence for the instant offense.’’ Id. § 5G1.3,

cmt. n.3(d).15 We may overturn the district court’s exercise

of its discretion under § 5G1.3(c) only if that discretion has

been abused. See Velasquez, 136 F.3d at 923.

We detect no such abuse here. Heard’s 48–month sentence

was at least 140 months shorter than the 188–235 month term

appropriate under the Sentencing Guidelines. See supra note

14. Even when that 48–month sentence is run consecutively

to the 133–month sentence for his 2000 offenses, the total

15 Application Note 3 states that, ‘‘[t]o achieve a reasonable

punishment and avoid unwarranted disparity, the court should

consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3584 (referencing 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)).’’ U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, cmt. n.3. Those factors

include: ‘‘the nature and circumstances of the offense and history

and characteristics of the defendant’’; ‘‘the need for the sentence

imposed TTT to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote

respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense’’;

and ‘‘the sentencing range TTT as set forth in the guidelines.’’ 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(4). The application note also states that the

court should, inter alia, ‘‘be cognizant’’ of: ‘‘the type TTT and length

of the prior undischarged sentence’’; ‘‘the time served on the

undischarged sentence and the time likely to be served before

release’’; and ‘‘any other circumstance relevant to the determination of an appropriate sentence for the instant offense.’’ U.S.S.G.

§ 5G1.3, cmt. n.3.

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181–month sentence is still lower than the lowest guidelines

sentence (188 months) Heard could have received for the

instant offense alone. Accordingly, even if Heard’s sentence

is evaluated by the measure most favorable to him, he still

received a substantial benefit for his plea bargain.

Heard, though, wants an even better result. He contends

that the district court should have run his sentence partially

concurrently so that the marginal increase in his total sentence was not 48 months, but only 33. He bases that

argument on the fact that, without the enhancement for being

a career criminal, his guidelines offense level would have been

18 and his criminal history category III, yielding a guidelines

sentencing range of 33–41 months. See supra notes 13, 14.

But the foundation of this argument is the contention that we

have already rejected above: that by taking the 2000 offenses

into consideration in designating Heard a career criminal, the

sentence for the 2001 offense constitutes a form of doublecounting. To the contrary, the court did not base the later

sentence on the conduct underlying the prior offenses. Rather, it properly took into account the fact that Heard was a

recidivist who had violated the trust of both the government

and the court by committing another offense while on release.16 As the judge said in explaining his decision:

[T]here is a substantial degree of merit to the arguments

that the government has made with respect to the seriousness of this offense and the context of this offense

with respect to the ability of someone who is cooperating

[with the government] to then go and commit offenses

that are very inconsistent with release for cooperation

purposes. When the court sorts all of that out, it comes

down on the side of the sentence as agreed to in the plea

16 See Witte, 515 U.S. at 400 (‘‘In repeatedly upholding TTT

recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges

because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense is

not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional penalty for

the earlier crimes, but instead as a stiffened penalty for the latest

crime, which is considered to be an aggravated offense because a

repetitive one.’’) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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agreement of 48 months being the appropriate sentence

in a real sense for the conduct that is at issue here, which

is the conduct that the defendant was charged with and

pled guilty to in this case, not other conduct.

Hr’g Tr. at 44–45.

Finally, Heard urges a rule of lenity, arguing that because

the plea agreement was ambiguous as to whether the sentence should be imposed consecutively or concurrently, we

should construe it in his favor and choose the latter. But

there was no ambiguity here. Instead, as defense counsel

made clear at the sentencing hearing, both parties agreed to

disagree — and expressly agreed to leave the matter for the

district court to resolve. Id. at 6. For the reasons stated

above, we conclude that in resolving the matter in favor of a

consecutive sentence, the court neither erred as a matter of

law nor abused its considerable discretion.

III

The judgment of the district court is therefore

Affirmed.

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