Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00923/USCOURTS-caed-1_07-cv-00923-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel Adams
Respondent
Victor Rodriguez
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VICTOR RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

DARREL ADAMS, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

CV F 07-00923 LJO SMS HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

[Doc. 7]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

 BACKGROUND

In the instant petition, Petitioner contends that prison officials have improperly removed

funds from his trust fund account to pay his restitution orders. He claims that the officer’s

actions violate the Ex-Post Facto Clause and subject him to double jeopardy. 

On January 5, 2005, Petitioner submitted an administrative appeal to prison officials,

challenging the restitution payments being deducted from his trust account. (Exhibit 1, attached

to Respondent’s Motion.) The appeal was denied at the final level of review on September 23,

2005. (Exhibit 2.) Petitioner then filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Kings

County Superior Court on March 17, 2006. (Exhibit 3.) The petition was denied without

prejudice for failure to comply with the California Rules of Court for filing habeas petitions. 

(Exhibit 4.) Petitioner then filed a state petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth

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Appellate District on May 22, 2006, which was denied without prejudice. (Exhibits 5, 6.) On

June 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition in the California Supreme Court, which was denied on

January 17, 2007. (Exhibits 7, 8.)

Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on June 27, 2007. 

Respondent filed the instant motion to dismiss on August 30, 2007. (Court Doc. 7.) Petitioner

filed an opposition on December 11, 2007, and Respondent filed a reply on December 19, 2007. 

(Court Docs. 10, 11.) 

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the

petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” The Advisory Committee Notes to

Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases state that “an alleged failure to exhaust state

remedies may be raised by the attorney general, thus avoiding the necessity of a formal answer as

to that ground.” The Ninth Circuit has referred to a respondent’s motion to dismiss on the

ground that the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies as a request for the Court to dismiss

under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915

F.2d 418, 420 (1991); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Hillery v. Pulley,

533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982). Based on the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases and case law, the Court will review Respondent’s motion for dismissal pursuant to its

authority under Rule 4.

B. Failure to State Cognizable Claim Under § 2254

Respondent argues that the instant petition fails under § 2254 as it does not challenge the

legality of his incarceration or in any way impact the length of his incarceration. The Court

agrees. 

A habeas corpus petition is the correct method for a prisoner to challenge the “legality or

duration” of his confinement. Badea v. Cox, 931 F.2d 573, 574 (9th Cir. 1991), quoting, Preiser

v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 485 (1973); Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules

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Governing Section 2254 Cases. In contrast, a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is

the proper method for a prisoner to challenge the conditions of that confinement. McCarthy v.

Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1991); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 499; Badea, 931 F.2d at 574;

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 1 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

As Respondent correctly argues, contrary to Petitioner’s assertion otherwise, the pertinent

question is not whether he alleges any constitutional violation, but whether he alleges a

constitutional violation that may impact the fact or duration of his imprisonment. The deduction

of funds from Petitioner’s prison trust account does not affect the fact or duration of his

imprisonment and is therefore not cognizable via § 2254. 

C. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

of 1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 th

S.Ct. 586 (1997). The instant petition was filed on June 27, 2007, and thus, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, Section 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of

habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. 

The limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of

direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is

removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized

by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and

made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims

presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

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 In California, the Supreme Court, intermediate Courts of Appeal, and Superior Courts all have original 1

habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Nino 183 F.3d at 1006, n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999). Although a Superior Court order

denying habeas corpus relief is non-appealable, a state prisoner may file a new habeas corpus petition in the Court of

Appeal. Id. If the Court of Appeal denies relief, the petitioner may seek review in the California Supreme Court by

way of a petition for review, or may instead file an original habeas petition in the Supreme Court. See id. 

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(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or

claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this

subsection. 

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. However, in a situation such as this where the petitioner is challenging a

prison disciplinary action, the Ninth Circuit has held that direct review is concluded and the

statute of limitations commences when the final administrative appeal is denied. See Redd v.

McGrath, 343 F.3d 1077, 1079 (9 Cir.2003) (holding that the Board of Prison Term’s denial of th

an inmate’s administrative appeal was the “factual predicate” of the inmate’s claim that triggered

the commencement of the limitations period); Shelby v. Bartlett, 391 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9 Cir. th

2004) (holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until a petitioner’s

administrative appeal has been denied). Therefore, the limitations period commenced on

September 23, 2005, the day after Petitioner was informed that his Director’s Level appeal had

been denied. (See Exhibit B, Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.) Under section 2244(d)(1)(D),

Petitioner had one year from September 23, 2005, absent applicable tolling, in which to file his

federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed

application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent

judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In Nino v. Galaza, the Ninth Circuit held that the “statute of limitations is

tolled from the time the first state habeas petition is filed until the California Supreme Court

rejects the petitioner’s final collateral challenge.” Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000); see also Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557 (4th Cir. 1999);

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 The Court acknowledges the applicability of the mailbox rule to the filing of state habeas corpus petitions, 1

however, because it does not aid Petitioner is making the instant petition timely, the Court does not and need not

address its applicability.

 Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 4.551 states in relevant part: 2

(a)(1) Except as provided in (2) [good cause exception], the petition must be on the Petition for Writ of

Habeas Corpus (form MC-275), and must be served as required in Penal Code section 1475. 

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Barnett v. Lemaster, 167 F.3d 1321, 1323 (10th Cir. 1999). The Court reasoned that tolling the

limitations period during the time a petitioner is preparing his petition to file at the next appellate

level reinforces the need to present all claims to the state courts first and will prevent the

premature filing of federal petitions out of concern that the limitation period will end before all

claims can be presented to the state supreme court. Id. at 1005. The limitations period, however,

will not toll for the time a petition for writ of habeas corpus is pending in federal court. Duncan

v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).

As Respondent correctly argues, although Petitioner filed a petition in the Kings County

Superior Court on March 17, 2006, it did not serve to toll the limitations period because the 1

superior court determined that it did not comply with California Rules of Court, Rule

4.551(a)(1), finding the failure of good cause for non-compliance. (Exhibit 4.) A petition that 2

does not comply with filing rules is considered to be “improperly filed” and does not toll the

limitations period. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8-9 (2000); see also Chavis v. LaMarque, 382

F.3d 921, 927 (9 Cir. 2004), rev’d on other grounds, Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). th

Thus, the statute of limitations continued to run. 

On May 22, 2006, Petitioner filed a second petition in the Fifth District Court of Appeal. 

In denying this petition, the Court stated that Petitioner failed to exhaust through the superior

court. (Exhibit 6.) As Respondent submits, the meaning of this denial is unclear as there is no

superior court exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, the state appellate court’s decision is not an

unambiguous statement regarding whether this petition cured the defects as identified in the first

petition. However, as discussed infra, this uncertainty is inconsequential as the petition is still

untimely even if the second petition is considered to be properly filed. 

First, if Petitioner’s second appellate court petition was not properly filed, it did not serve

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 The Supreme Court noted that it has never squarely addressed the question whether equitable tolling is 3

available under AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In Pace, the Supreme Court again declined to do so and only

assumed for the sake of argument that it did, because Respondent assumed as much and Petitioner was not entitled to

tolling under any standard. 125 S.Ct. at 1814 n.8. 

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to toll the limitations period. As previously stated, the statute of limitations began to run on

September 23, 2005, and continued to run uninterrupted until June 22, 2006, when the California

Supreme Court petition was filed. At that time, 272 days of the limitations period expired. The

limitations period was tolled from June 22, 2006 through January 17, 2007, when the California

Supreme Court denied the petition. It was triggered again on January 18, 2007, and ran until the

instant petition was filed on June 27, 2007, resulting in an additional 161 days of the limitations

period elapsing. Thus, 433 days of the limitations period lapsed, far exceeding the one year

limitations period, and the instant petition is untimely. 

Second, even if Petitioner’s second appellate court petition was properly filed, and tolled

the limitations period, the clock stopped on May 22, 2006 – resulting in a lapse of 241 days

(September 23, 2005, through May 22, 2006). As just explained, an additional 161 days lapsed

until the federal petition was filed, resulting in 402 days of the limitations period expiring, and

the instant petition is still untimely and subject to dismissal. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1)

that he has been pursing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood

in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of 3

Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541

(9 Cir. 1998), citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert th th

denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to

tolling. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac.

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Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 (9th Cir.1993).

Petitioner’s claim that he is ignorant of the law and state court procedures, is insufficient

to support a claim for equitable tolling. Raspberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9 Cir. 2006) th

(“[A] pro se petitioner’s lack of legal sophistication is not, by itself, an extraordinary

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circumstance warranting equitable tolling.”). Petitioner’s further claim that he is entitled to

equitable tolling because he was diligently pursuing his state remedies even if he filed a defective

petition, is likewise insufficient. Petitioner’s first state habeas corpus petition was not “properly

filed” because it did not comply with California law. See Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 7-8

(2000) (“a petition is properly filed so as to toll the statute of limitations when its delivery and

acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings,” such as those

prescribing “the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in

which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee”). Because Petitioner’s first state habeas

petition was denied for violating California Rules of Court Rule 4.551, he is not entitled to

statutory or equitable tolling because the petition did not meet California’s filing requirements.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss the instant petition for failure to state a cognizable

claim and as time-barred under § 2244(d)(1) be GRANTED; and

2. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of Respondent. 

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 72-304 of

the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. 

Within thirty (30) days after being served with a copy, any party may file written objections with

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Replies to the objections shall be served

and filed within ten (10) court days (plus three days if served by mail) after service of the

objections. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time

may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th

Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 14, 2008 /s/ Sandra M. Snyder 

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icido3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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