Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05365/USCOURTS-caDC-09-05365-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
BASF Corporation
Appellee
Vernon Blasingame
Appellant
Randy Hardin
Appellant
Lisa Perez Jackson
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 21, 2010 Decided October 29, 2010

No. 09-5365

RANDY HARDIN AND VERNON BLASINGAME,

APPELLANTS

v.

LISA PEREZ JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

AND BASF CORPORATION,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:04-cv-01299)

Gabrielle H. Kickham argued the cause for the appellants.

James B. Dougherty, James D. MacIntyre and William J. French

were on brief.

Robert H. Oakley, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for the federal appellee. Robert G. Dreher,

Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and Lisa E. Jones

and Angeline Purdy, Attorneys, were on brief. Robert P.

Stockman, Attorney, entered an appearance.

James B. Slaughter argued the cause for appellee BASF

Corporation. Kathryn E. Szmuszkovicz and Sarah S. Doverspike

were on brief.

USCA Case #09-5365 Document #1274411 Filed: 10/29/2010 Page 1 of 11
2

Before: HENDERSON, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: The

appellants, two Arkansas tomato farmers, brought this action

seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to require appellee Lisa

Perez Jackson, Administrator of the Environmental Protection

Agency, (EPA) to cancel the registration of “Facet” pesticides

that appellee BASF Corporation (BASF) has manufactured and

distributed to rice farmers for weed control. The appellants

claim that Facet has been drifting over and damaging their

tomato crops since 1992 when EPA registered the first Facet

pesticide, Facet 50 WP (Facet 50), under subsections 3(c)(7)(A)

and (B) of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide

Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(A), (B). They further assert

the 1992 registration was procedurally defective because EPA

should have registered Facet 50 under subsection 3(c)(7)(C),

which requires that EPA make findings regarding the pesticide’s

safety and the public interest, findings that EPA did not make.

The district court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction on the ground the appellants did not file the

complaint until 2004, which was beyond the six-year limitation

period prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).1

 Hardin v. Jackson,

648 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2009). We agree with the district

court that the action is time-barred and affirm the dismissal.

1

As we observed in P & V Enterprises v. U.S. Army Corps of

Engineers, 516 F.3d 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2008), we have “long held that

section 2401(a) creates ‘a jurisdictional condition attached to the

government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.’ ” 516 F.3d at 1026

(quoting Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 824 F.2d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (citations omitted)).

USCA Case #09-5365 Document #1274411 Filed: 10/29/2010 Page 2 of 11
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I.

Section 3(a) of FIFRA prohibits the distribution or sale of

a pesticide that EPA has not registered thereunder. 7 U.S.C.

§ 136a(a).2

 Under FIFRA, the registration is either

unconditional, id. § 136a(c)(5), or conditional, id. § 136a(c)(7).

A conditional registration—conditioned on submission of

additional data—is authorized under three circumstances. First,

EPA may conditionally register a pesticide if “the pesticide and

proposed use are identical or substantially similar to any

currently registered pesticide and use thereof, or differ only in

ways that would not significantly increase the risk of

unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,” id.

§ 136a(c)(7)(A); second, EPA may conditionally amend a

pesticide’s registration “to permit additional uses of such

pesticide,” id. § 136a(c)(7)(B); and third, EPA may

conditionally register a pesticide “containing an active

ingredient not contained in any currently registered pesticide for

a period reasonably sufficient for the generation and submission

of required data” but “only if [EPA] determines that use of the

pesticide during such period will not cause any unreasonable

adverse effect on the environment, and that use of the pesticide

is in the public interest,” id. § 136a(c)(7)(C). 

In January 1992, BASF submitted an application for

conditional registration of Facet 50, which contained the active

ingredient quinclorac, an effective weed control pesticide for

rice crops. On October 13, 1992, EPA notified BASF that it had

conditionally registered Facet 50 under subsections 3(c)(7)(A)

and 3(c)(7)(B). Along with the notice, EPA sent BASF a label

2

FIFRA defines “pesticide” as “(1) any substance or mixture of

substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating

any pest, (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use

as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant, and (3) any nitrogen

stabilizer.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(u).

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which was required to be affixed to the distributed product and

which displayed, inter alia, the fact and date of registration and

the registration number. In September 1994 and April 1998,

EPA registered two additional quinclorac products, Facet 75 DF

(Facet 75) and Facet GR, each under subsection 136a(c)(7)(A)

as each was “substantially similar to [a] currently registered

pesticide,” namely, Facet 50.

Beginning in March 1995, the appellants filed multiple civil

actions in Arkansas state court against Facet applicators,

alleging that “drift” from the sprayed Facet was damaging their

tomato crops. See Hardin, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 47. On June 26,

2000, the appellants (along with other Arkansas tomato farmers)

filed a class action against BASF in the Eastern District of

Arkansas, alleging their tomato crops had been damaged by

“uncontrolled and uncontrollable drift, migration or other

dispersal of Facet.” Complaint ¶ 41, Hardin v. BASF Corp,

4:00-cv-00500 (E.D. Ark. June 26, 2000). The district court

granted summary judgment to BASF on the ground the action

was expressly preempted by FIFRA, Hardin v. BASF Corp., 290

F. Supp. 2d 964, 967 (E.D. Ark. 2003), but on appeal the Eighth

Circuit remanded, Hardin v. BASF Corp., No. 03-3624 (8th Cir.

June 29, 2005). On remand the parties settled. Order of

Dismissal Pursuant to Settlement, Hardin v. BASF Corp, 4:00-

cv-00500 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 16, 2006).

In September 2003, the appellants filed an administrative

petition with EPA to revoke or to suspend and cancel all of

EPA’s registrations of Facet pesticides. The petition alleged that

BASF “fraudulently withheld or misrepresented material facts”

regarding its FACET products and that EPA conditionally

registered Facet “without making the findings required by law

for such a registration and contrary to the statutory terms which

preclude a conditional registration for a revolutionary product

such as Facet.” Petition to Revoke or to Suspend and Cancel

EPA Registrations for Facet® Herbicides, Hardin v. BASF, at

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72, reprinted at JA 210. While the administrative petition was

pending, the appellants filed this action against EPA on August

3, 2004. 

The complaint asserts three causes of action, one each under

FIFRA, the Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, and the

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. All three

claims are based on EPA’s conditional registration of Facet 50

in 1992. The complaint alleges in particular that EPA violated

FIFRA’s procedural requirements by (1) conditionally

registering Facet 50 under section 3(c)(7)(A) and (B) “in the

face of BASF’s failure to meet the criteria for conditional

registration” and (2) failing to obtain data or to make or publish

in the Federal Register factual determinations as required under

section 3(c)(7)(C). Complaint at 18, Hardin v. Leavitt, C.A. No.

04-01299 (Aug. 3, 2004). According to the appellants, because

EPA had not previously registered a quinclorac pesticide, Facet

50 was ineligible both for registration under subsection

3(c)(7)(A) (as “identical or substantially similar to a[] currently

registered pesticide”) and for amended registration under

subsection 3(c)(7)(B) (“to permit additional uses”)—the

subsections identified in the Facet 50 registration notice. 

Instead, because Facet 50 “contain[ed] an active ingredient not

contained in any [then] registered pesticide,” 7 U.S.C.

§136a(c)(7)(C), the appellants maintain the product was eligible

only for conditional registration under section 3(c)(7)(C), which

requires that EPA affirmatively determine that the registered

pesticide “will not cause any unreasonable adverse effect on the

environment, and that use of the pesticide is in the public

interest,” 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(C), findings that EPA did not

make.3

 The appellants further assert that EPA’s later derivative

3

EPA also failed to publish, as required, a pre-registration notice

of application (to be followed by a comment period) or a postUSCA Case #09-5365 Document #1274411 Filed: 10/29/2010 Page 5 of 11
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registrations of Facet 75 and Facet GR under section 3(c)(7)(A)

(as “identical or substantially similar to” Facet 50) were

consequently defective as well. Based on these procedural

defects, the complaint requests (1) a declaration that BASF’s

three Facet products “were not properly and validly registered”

and that their registrations are therefore “null and void,” (2) an

order requiring EPA to “cancel any and all purported

registrations of any BASF Quinclorac-based product, including

but not limited to Facet 50 WP and Facet 75 DF,” to remove

quinclorac-based products from the market and to refrain from

“the further distribution or sale of such products within the

United States” and (3) an award of costs, including attorney’s

fees. Complaint at 20-21, Hardin v. Leavitt, C.A. No. 04-

01299. 

EPA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground it was

filed outside the statutory limitation period (and for summary

judgment on other grounds). On July 27, 2005, the district court

denied EPA’s motion without prejudice “[i]n light of plaintiffs’

pending administrative petition that, if granted, could render the

instant case moot” and removed the case from the calendar

“pending the outcome of the on-going administrative action.”

Minute Order, Hardin v. Leavitt, C.A. No. 04-01299 (July 27,

2005). The court further directed the parties to file a joint status

report every 90 days. 

On August 14, 2007, the district court held a status hearing

at which it directed the parties to commence filing monthly

status reports and scheduled another status hearing for January

2008. In each of three consecutive monthly reports—filed in

October, November and December 2007—EPA informed the

court that it anticipated taking final administrative action no

later than December 31, 2007. When no final action had been

registration notice of issuance. See 40 C.F.R. § 152.102; 7 U.S.C.

§ 136a(c)(4). 

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taken by the time of the January 8, 2008 status hearing, the court

returned the case to the active docket and directed EPA to file an

answer. In March 2009, BASF intervened as a defendant. On

August 27, 2009 the court dismissed the complaint for failure to

commence the suit within six years after the appellants’ right of

action accrued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). The appellants

filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

The district court correctly concluded that the applicable

statute of limitations is 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), which provides:

Except as provided by the Contract Disputes Act of

1978, every civil action commenced against the United

States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed

within six years after the right of action first accrues.

The action of any person under legal disability or

beyond the seas at the time the claim accrues may be

commenced within three years after the disability

ceases.

Under this statute, a party challenging final agency action must

commence his suit within six years after the right of action

accrues and the “right of action first accrues on the date of the

final agency action.” Harris v. FAA, 353 F.3d 1006, 1009-10

(D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Felter v. Kempthorne, 473 F.3d 1255,

1259 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Actions usually accrue ‘when [they]

come[ ] into existence.’ ” (quoting United States v. Lindsay, 346

U.S. 568, 569 (1954))). Thus, ordinarily, the appellants’ right

of action accrued on October 13, 1992 when EPA conditionally

registered Facet 50 and the six-year limitation period began to

run on that day. In this case, however, the appellants insist their

right of action accrued much later because of the “discovery

rule.” 

Under the discovery rule, “a cause of action accrues when

the injured party discovers—or in the exercise of due diligence

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should have discovered—that it has been injured.” Nat’l

Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 392 F.3d 498, 501 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (internal quotation omitted). The appellants contend that,

under the rule, their right of action did not accrue until they

discovered their procedural injuries, which did not occur until at

least July 2000 when BASF raised its preemption defense in the

Arkansas class action and thereby put them on notice that the

Facet products had been registered under FIFRA.4 Thus, they

maintain, their August 3, 2004 complaint in this action was

timely filed. Appellants’ Br. 15; see also Pls.’ Combined Reply

in Supp. of Their Mot. For Summ. J. & Resp. in Opp’n. to

EPA’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 8-9, Hardin v. Johnson, C.A. No.

04-1299 (filed Oct. 27, 2008). The appellees respond that the

discovery rule does not apply to an action subject to section

2401(a)’s limitation period, which must be construed strictly in

favor of the government, or to a claim of procedural error, for

which applicable precedent directs that the limitation period

begins to run upon final agency action. We conclude, as did the

district court, that, even assuming the discovery rule applies

here—an issue we do not decide—the appellants’ action was

filed out of time. 

Exercising “due diligence,” the appellants or their counsel

should have discovered that EPA had registered the Facet

products long before BASF raised its preemption defense in July

4

“To establish injury-in-fact in a ‘procedural injury’ case,

petitioners must show that ‘the government act performed without the

procedure in question will cause a distinct risk to a particularized

interest of the plaintiff.’ ” City of Dania Beach, Fla. v. FAA, 485 F.3d

1181, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (quoting Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94

F.3d 658, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc)). The appellants have met

this standing threshold because EPA’s alleged failure to determine that

Facet 50 “will not cause any unreasonable adverse effect on the

environment” has caused a “distinct risk” to their “particularized

interest” in a healthy tomato crop. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(7)(C). 

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2000. It is undisputed that in 1995 the appellants filed suit

against Facet 50 applicators in Arkansas state court. See

BASF’s Mem. of Points & Auths. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss,

or, in the Alternative, for Summ. J., & in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. for

Summ. J. at 2 n.1, Hardin v. Johnson, C.A. No. 04-1299 (D.D.C.

filed Mar. 3, 2009); Appellants’ Br. 18 (acknowledging state

court actions involving “claims for negligence asserted against

neighbors and aerial applicators for misapplication of Facet”)

(emphasis omitted); Complaint, Blasingame v. Carwell Elevator

Co., No. CIV 95-034 (Poinsett County, Ark. Cir. Ct. filed Mar.

3, 1995) (appended to BASF’s Brief at add. doc. 2B) (Carwell

Compl.). That Facet 50 was registered was obvious from the

registration notice appearing on the label of Facet 50—a label

with which they plainly should have been familiar inasmuch as

Facet 50 was the product sub judice. See Parties’ Stipulation of

Facts and Exs., Hardin v. Johnson, C.A. No. 04-1299, Ex. 177

at 3 (July 10, 2008) (Facet 50 label);5 Carwell Compl. ¶ 4

(alleging Carwell “failed to follow the restrictions on the labels

of the herbicides it was spraying”) (emphasis added). As early

as 1995, therefore, the appellants were on notice of Facet 50’s

registration and could have requested registration documentation

from EPA that would have revealed Facet 50 had been

5

The Facet 50 label registration notice reads: 

A C C E P T E D

October 13, 1992 

Under the Federal Insecticide, 

 Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 

as amended, for the pesticide 

registered under 

EPA Reg. No. 7969-93 

Ex. 177 at 3.

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conditionally registered, albeit incorrectly,6 under

subsections 3(c)(7)(A) and 3(c)(7)(B), for which the appellants

claim it was ineligible. 

The appellants argue the state court suits are immaterial

because they asserted that Facet 50 was “misappli[ed],” not that

it was “defective” or “improperly registered.” Appellants’ Br.

18. We find this argument unpersuasive. The complaint in

Carwell expressly characterizes Facet 50 as “inherently

dangerous,” Carwell Compl. ¶ 4 (emphasis added), apparently

without regard to how it is applied. In any event, the Arkansas

district court (in language the appellants themselves cite,

Appellants’ Br. 18) observed that within “a few years” after

“Facet appeared on the market” and the appellants “began

suffering significant crop losses”—that is, a few years after

1992—state investigators, local cooperative extension service

personnel and University of Arkansas experts “reached a

consensus that quinclorac, the active ingredient in Facet, was

damaging [the Appellants’] tomatoes.” 290 F. Supp. 2d at 968-

69. The appellants give no explanation for their failure to

investigate the legality of quinclorac’s distribution at that time.

For the same reason, we reject the appellants’ argument that “it

was not until 1999, when University of Arkansas professors

undertook a special study of off-target Facet drift, that Plaintiffs

had sufficient evidence to bring their products liability action

against BASF.” Appellants’ Br. 18-19 (citing 290 F. Supp. 2d

at 969). The appellants believed Facet to be “inherently

dangerous” to their crops as early as 1995; they could have

investigated the product’s FIFRA registration as soon as they

were put on notice of it—that is, via the Facet 50 label

6

As the appellants argue and the district court concluded, EPA

could not lawfully register Facet 50 under section 3(c)(7)(A) or (B)

because EPA had not previously registered any quinclorac-based

pesticide. See supra p. 5; Hardin, 648 F. Supp. 2d at 44 n.4.

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displaying the FIFRA registration number—and filed a timely

lawsuit based on the results thereof. They had no reason to wait.

See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000) (“[I]n applying

a discovery accrual rule, [the Court] ha[s] been at pains to

explain that discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other

elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.”); United States v.

Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123 (1979) (plaintiff “armed with the

facts about the harm done to him, can protect himself by seeking

advice in the medical and legal community. To excuse him from

promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of his claim would

undermine the purpose of the limitations statute, which is to

require the reasonably diligent presentation of tort claims

against the Government.”). 

Because the appellants knew or should have known of their

injuries no later than 1995 when they filed their state lawsuits,

we conclude that, even under the discovery rule, the statutory

limitation period began to run more than six years before they

filed their complaint in this action on August 3, 2004.

Accordingly we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the suit

as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a).

So ordered.

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