Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04249/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-04249-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dezettia Jamal
Plaintiff
Thompson & Associates, P.C.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DEZETTIA JAMAL,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMPSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C.,

Defendant.

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No. C09-4249 BZ

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Dezettia Jamal (“plaintiff”) seeks entry of default

judgment against defendant Thompson & Associates, P.C.

(“defendant”). Defendant has not appeared in this action and

did not respond to plaintiff’s application. As defendant has

not consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction, I will have

the case reassigned. In this report, I recommend the motion

be GRANTED.

On September 14, 2009, plaintiff filed a complaint

against defendant for violations of the Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and its

California equivalent, The Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act (“RFDCPA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq. By

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1 A court may not enter a default judgment against an

unrepresented minor, an incompetent person, or a person in

military service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); 50 App. U.S.C.

521. Defendant Thompson & Associates, P.C. is not subject to

these limitations.

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his motion, plaintiff seeks damages for defendant’s alleged

violations of both the FDCPA and the RFDCPA.

Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that defendant, a

“debt collector” as defined by both the FDCPA and the RFDCPA,

sections 1692a(6) and 1788.2(c) respectively, made a single

collection call to plaintiff, seeking payment for an alleged

consumer debt. During the call, while demanding payment,

defendant stated that “plaintiff had committed a crime for

writing a bad check” and threatened to “take further action

and have a claim against plaintiff.” Complaint at ¶ 14, 16. 

As such, plaintiff alleges that defendant violated sections

1692d, 1692e, 1692e(4), 1692e(5), and 1692e(7) of the FDCPA

and sections 1788.10(b), 1788.11(b), 1788.13(j), and 1788.17

of the RFDCPA. In addition, plaintiff also alleges that

defendant failed to provide notice of his rights as an alleged

debtor, in violation of section 1692g(a)(1-5) of the FDCPA and

section 1788.17 of the RFDCPA. 

Plaintiff served process on defendant’s authorized agent

on November 12, 2009. Doc. #6 Ex. A. Defendant failed to

answer the complaint or otherwise defend the action. On

December 15, 2009, the clerk of this Court entered defendant’s

default under Rule 55(a).1

By defaulting, defendant is deemed to have admitted the

well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint except those

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as to the amount of damages. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d); TeleVideo

Sys., Inc. V. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir,

1987). Plaintiffs have the burden of proving damages through

testimony, written affidavit, or other relevant evidence. See

Bd. of Trs. of the Boilermaker Vacation Trust v. Skelly, Inc.,

389 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 

Pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2), the Court may enter a default

judgment against a party against whom default has been

entered. The decision to grant or deny a default judgment

under Rule 55(b) is within the discretion of the Court. Eitel

v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). A formal

hearing is not required for a court to render a default

judgment. Davis v. Femdler, 650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981).

Liability for violating various provisions of the FDCPA and

the RFDCPA having been established on default, the remaining

issue is the amount of damages available to plaintiff. 

In his motion, plaintiff seeks damages totaling

$5,596.50, including $2,000 in damages as a result of

defendant’s statutory violations, $2,396.50 in attorneys’

fees, $350.00 in filing and service fees, and $750.00 in

anticipated collection costs. Mot. For Def. J. P.6.

A single violation of the FDCPA is sufficient to

establish civil liability. Bentley v. Great Lakes Collection

Bureau, 6 F.3d 60, 62 (2nd Cir. 1993). Statutory damages are

available without proof of actual damages. Baker v. G.C.

Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 1982). Under the

FDCPA, a plaintiff may recover statutory damages not exceeding

$1,000 and under the RFDCPA, a plaintiff may recover statutory

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damages “not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor greater

than one thousand dollars ($1,000).” 15 U.S.C. §

1692k(a)(2)(A); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.30(b). Such damages may

be awarded cumulatively under both statutes. See 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1692(n) (The federal law “does not exempt any person . . .

from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt

collection practices”); Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.32 (“The

remedies provided herein are intended to be cumulative and are

in addition to any other procedures, rights, or remedies under

any other provision of law.”).

Furthermore, the decision to award statutory damages and

the size of such award is left “to the sound discretion of the

district court.” Savino v. Computer Credit, 164 F.3d 81, 86

(2d Cir. 1998). In making its determination, “the court shall

consider, among other relevant factors . . . the frequency and

persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature

of such noncompliance, and the extent to which such

noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k)(b). Some

courts refuse to award any statutory damages where violations

are technical and de minimis. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr. v.

Huntsman, 408 F.3d 989, 993-94 (8th Cir. 2005). Moreover, at

least one court has refused to grant a plaintiff’s motion for

default judgment when the plaintiff failed to substantiate the

basis for his statutory damages. Thornton v. United

Collections Servs., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92997, at *2-3 (E.D.

Mich.). 

Plaintiff requests the maximum amount of statutory

damages under both the FDCPA and the RFDCPA. However, much of

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the conduct he complains about in his Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of

Default Judgment is not supported by the allegations of the

complaint or any proof filed in support of this motion. The

only violation that “meets the well-pleaded allegations”

standard is the alleged violation of section 1692g(a) of the

FDCPA and section 1788.17 of the RFDCPA. Section 1692g(a)

provides that a debt collector shall “send the consumer a

written notice” of his rights within five days of the initial

communication. Here, defendant failed to provide such notice. 

Complaint ¶ 17, 18. 

The rest of plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint are

not supported by well-pleaded facts. Section 1692d of the

FDCPA prohibits a debt collector from harassing, oppressing,

or abusing any person during the collection of a debt. 

Section 1692e prohibits a debt collector from engaging in

“false, deceptive, or misleading representation” during the

collection of any debt. And section 1692e(4), (5), and (7)

are the specific applications of section 1692e. See 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692e. In addition, section 1692f prohibits a debt

collector from engaging in “unfair and unconscionable” conduct

during the collection of a debt. Furthermore, in addition to

the RFDCPA’s equivalent sections, section 1788.11(b) of the

California statute prohibits a debt collector from “[p]lacing

telephone calls without disclosure of the caller’s identity.” 

Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.11(b).

Here, plaintiff alleges that while demanding payment,

defendant stated that plaintiff “had committed a crime for

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writing a bad check.” Complaint ¶ 15. But nowhere in the

complaint does plaintiff deny that he wrote a bad check or

that he committed a crime. Rather, plaintiff only states that

he “never wrote Defendant a check.” Complaint ¶ 17 (emphasis

added). Although an individual who writes a bad check does

not necessarily commit a crime, writing a bad check may be a

criminal offense if additional requirements are satisfied. 

See e.g., Cal. Penal. § 490.5(c). Since plaintiff does not

deny that he committed a crime, he has failed to establish

that defendant’s single phone call, constituted harassment or

a “false, deceptive, or misleading representation.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 1692e. Nor does plaintiff substantiate that such phone call

was unfair or unconscionable or that defendant’s threat to

take action against him is a threat that “cannot legally be

taken or that it is not intended to be taken.” 15 U.S.C. §

1692e(5). Furthermore, the complaint never alleges that the

caller failed to disclose her identity to plaintiff. In fact

plaintiff states that the caller’s name is Ms. Arnett. 

Complaint Ex. A. 

Other claims in plaintiff’s Memorandum are inconsistent

with his complaint. It is not correct that “in [the]

complaint, Plaintiff alleges: (1) Defendant constantly and

continuously placed collection calls to Plaintiff seeking and

demanding payment for Plaintiff’s boyfriend’s debt.” Mot. For

Def. J. P.4 (emphasis added). In fact the complaint alleges

that plaintiff only received a single phone call from the

defendant. 

Accordingly, I find the only violation that is “wellCase 3:09-cv-04249-MHP Document 15 Filed 02/03/10 Page 6 of 8
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pleaded” in plaintiff’s complaint is section 1692g(a)(1-5) of

the FDCPA and section 1788.17 of the RFDCPA. Such violation

is not technical or de minimis. See Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr.,

480 F.3d at 994. However, plaintiff provides no evidence to

suggest that defendant’s conduct warrants the maximum amount

of damages. Furthermore, since the violation occurred only

once and plaintiff provides no evidence to suggest that such

noncompliance was intentional, I recommend that plaintiff be

awarded $300 under the FDCPA and $300 under the RFDCPA.

Plaintiff also requests that the Court awards reasonable

attorneys’ fees and costs. Both the FDCPA and the RFDCPA

provide for an award of costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees

to a prevailing plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); Cal. Civ.

Code § 1788.30(c). The Ninth Circuit employs the lodestar

approach to determine whether a fee request is reasonable. 

Jordan v. Multnomath County, 815 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (9th Cir.

1987). “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the

number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expected on

the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Camacho v.

Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2008). The

lodestar is deemed to be presumptively reasonable, though the

district court has the discretion to consider an upward or

downward adjustment. Id. 

Here, the declaration of counsel and billing statement

attached thereto establish that billing rates are $290 per

hour with 7.1 hours in corresponding billable time, of which 3

hours were spent preparing and filing the Motion for Entry of

Default Judgment. Lee Decl. ¶ 6, Ex. A. Considering some

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allegations are factually and legally inconsistent with the

complaint, which counsel admitted at the hearing and which

suggests documents were carelessly drafted. I find 2 hours

rather than 3 hours reasonable for preparing and filing the

motion, for a total of 6.1 hours in attorneys’ fees. Counsel

also charged plaintiff $337.50 for 2.7 hours of paralegal time

billed at $125 per hour. Id. Therefore, I recommend awarding

$2106.50 in attorneys’ and paralegal fees. I also recommend

awarding the $350.00 in filing and service costs. 

As to plaintiff’s request for anticipated collection

costs of $750.00 pursuant to section 1692k(a)(3) of the FDCPA,

section 1692k(a)(3) simply does not apply here: this is not an

action to enforce liabilities. Accordingly, I recommend

plaintiff’s request for anticipated collection costs of $750

be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that plaintiff be

awarded a judgment of $600.00 in statutory damages, $350.00 in

costs, and $2106.50 in attorneys’ and paralegal fees.

Dated: February 3, 2010

 Bernard Zimmerman 

 United States Magistrate Judge

G:\BZALL\-BZCASES\JAMAL V. THOMPSON\REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION GRANTING

DEFAULT JUDGMENT.FINAL VERSION.wpd

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