Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03434/USCOURTS-ca3-15-03434-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Craven
Appellant
DCF
Appellee
Amanda Leach
Appellee
Amy Sampson
Appellee

Document Text:

CLD-228 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 15-3434

___________

WILLIAM CRAVEN,

Appellant

v.

AMANDA LEACH, NEW JERSEY DYFS; AMY SAMPSON, THE NEW JERSEY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD PROTECTION & PERMANENCY; 

JOHN DOES, (EMPLOYED THROUGH DHS), 

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; DCF, ET AL.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-01860)

District Judge: Honorable Esther Salas

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect or 

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 21, 2016

Before: FISHER, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 28, 2016)

_________

OPINION*

_________

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM

William Craven appeals pro se from the District Court’s dismissal of his civil 

rights complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm that order.

1

 

I.

Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 

of this case, we discuss that background only briefly. New Jersey’s Division of Child 

Protection and Permanency (“DCPP”) is part of the state’s Department of Children and 

Families (“DCF”).2 In January 2013, the DCPP received a report alleging that Craven’s 

son had been abused or neglected while in Craven’s home.

3

 Amanda Leach was the 

DCPP caseworker who was assigned to investigate the report. Amy Sampson was 

Leach’s supervisor. The investigation was officially closed in February 2013, with DCPP 

notifying Craven that there was no finding of abuse or neglect. 

In 2014, Craven filed a pro se complaint in the District Court against DCF, 

DCPP,4 Leach, and Sampson.5 Therein, Craven raised state-law claims and alleged that 

 

1 Craven’s request to join this appeal with Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & 

Permanency, C.A. No. 15-1448, is denied. Mammaro has already been decided, see

Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2016), and 

that appeal is now closed.

2 Until June 29, 2012, DCPP was known as the Division of Youth and Family Services

(“DYFS”). State v. Sumulikoski, 110 A.3d 856, 858 n.1 (N.J. 2015).

3 As the District Court noted, it appears that Craven did not have full custody of his son.

4 To the extent that Craven also intended to name DYFS as a defendant, there was no 

need to do so because, as noted above, DYFS and DCPP are one and the same. 

5 Leach and Sampson were sued in their individual capacities. Craven’s complaint also 

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the defendants’ conduct during the child abuse investigation violated his substantive due 

process rights and his right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants 

moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

On September 30, 2015, the District Court granted that motion. In doing so, the District 

Court concluded that (1) DCF and DCPP (hereinafter “the Agency Defendants”) were 

entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity with respect to Craven’s 

constitutional claims, (2) the constitutional claims against Leach and Sampson contained 

insufficient factual allegations to state a viable claim, and (3) it was appropriate to 

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Craven’s state-law claims. The District 

Court explained that its dismissal was without prejudice to Craven’s ability to file an 

amended complaint within thirty days. Thereafter, Craven did not file an amended 

complaint. Instead, he elected to file this appeal and subsequently declared his intention 

to stand on his complaint.

II.

“Generally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final 

nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting 

 

included “John Doe” defendants. In July 2014, Craven submitted a letter to the District 

Court, requesting that Dr. Allison Blake (DCF’s Commissioner) be substituted in place of 

the John Doe defendants. It appears that the District Court never ruled on this request, 

and there is no indication that Dr. Blake (or any John Doe defendant) was served with the 

complaint. Accordingly, neither Dr. Blake nor the John Doe defendants are parties to this 

appeal. See De Tore v. Local # 245 of the Jersey City Pub. Emps. Union, 615 F.2d 980, 

982 n.2 (3d Cir. 1980). Even if they were parties to this appeal, the outcome of this 

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the cause of action.” Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir. 1976) (per 

curiam). However, “if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on his 

complaint . . . the order becomes final and appealable.” Id. at 951-52. Because Craven 

has declared his intention to stand on his complaint, the District Court’s September 30, 

2015 order is a final order and properly before us pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our 

review of that order is plenary. See Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 601 

(3d Cir. 2015). We may affirm that order on any basis supported by the record, see

Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), and we may take 

summary action if this appeal fails to present a substantial question, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 

10.6.

III.

We begin our analysis with Craven’s constitutional claims. As noted above, the 

District Court concluded that the Agency Defendants were immune from these claims 

pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment. For the reasons given by the District Court, we 

agree with that determination. To the extent that Craven’s constitutional claims were 

brought against Leach and Sampson, we consider those claims below. 

Craven’s first constitutional claim alleged a violation of his substantive due 

process rights. To state a claim alleging such a violation, a plaintiff must allege facts 

demonstrating that the defendants acted “in an arbitrary manner that ‘shocks the 

 

appeal would remain the same.

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conscience.’” Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency, 814 F.3d 164, 169 

(3d Cir. 2016) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-48 (1998)). 

The District Court concluded that Craven’s complaint failed to allege facts demonstrating 

that this standard had been met. For substantially the reasons provided by the District 

Court in its thorough analysis, we agree with that determination. Accordingly, the 

District Court properly dismissed this claim.

Craven’s second constitutional claim alleged a violation of his right to privacy. 

This claim stemmed from his allegation that, during the child abuse investigation, Leach 

improperly disclosed unspecified “confidential information” about him to an unidentified 

third party. In dismissing this claim, the District Court concluded that Craven’s 

complaint lacked “any facts from which this Court can determine that [Craven] had a 

constitutionally protected privacy interest in the allegedly disclosed information—let 

alone whether [Leach’s and Sampson’s] conduct amounted to a violation of that interest. 

There are no specific allegations pertaining to this claim.” (Dist. Ct. Op. entered Oct. 1, 

2015, at 15.) We agree with the District Court’s conclusion and find no error in its 

decision to dismiss this claim.

We now turn to Craven’s state-law claims. As a general matter, a district court 

has diversity jurisdiction over state-law claims if the amount in controversy exceeds 

$75,000 and there is complete diversity amongst the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); 

Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 724 F.3d 337, 346 (3d Cir. 2013). “[C]omplete 

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diversity” means that “no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any of the 

defendants.” Johnson, 724 F.3d at 346 (quoting Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., 

Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003)). If diversity 

jurisdiction does not exist in a given case, the district court may exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over the state-law claims if certain conditions are met. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1367(a).

“The plaintiff has the burden of pleading the existence of the [district] court’s 

jurisdiction, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and, in a diversity action, the plaintiff must state all 

parties’ citizenships such that the existence of complete diversity can be confirmed.” 

Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 177 F.3d 210, 222 n.13 (3d 

Cir. 1999). We conclude that Craven failed to meet that burden in this case6; therefore, it 

was not appropriate for the District Court to exercise diversity jurisdiction over his statelaw claims. Although the District Court did have the authority to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over those claims, we agree with its decision declining to do so. See Hedges 

v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (“This Court has recognized that, where the 

claim[s] over which the district court has original jurisdiction [are] dismissed before trial, 

 

6

“Citizenship is synonymous with domicile, and the domicile of an individual is his true, 

fixed and permanent home and place of habitation.” McCann v. Newman Irrevocable 

Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, 

domicile requires more than the individual’s residency in a state; it also requires his intent 

to remain there indefinitely. See Krasnov v. Dinan, 465 F.2d 1298, 1300 (3d Cir. 1972). 

Here, Craven’s complaint only alleged that he had a mailing address in New York and 

did not allege facts from which it may be inferred that New York "is his true, fixed and 

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the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of 

judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative 

justification for doing so.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In light of the above, we agree with the District Court’s decision to grant the 

defendants’ motion to dismiss Craven’s complaint. Because this appeal does not present 

a substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s September 30, 2015 

order. Craven’s request for oral argument is denied. 

 

permanent home and place of habitation." McCann, 458 F.3d at 286.

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