Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01456/USCOURTS-ca8-09-01456-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jose E. Castellanos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable William Jay Riley became Chief Judge of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on April 1, 2010. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1456

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Jose E. Castellanos, also known as * 

Jose Navarrete, also known as *

Pescado, also known as *

Fish, also known as Guillermo Lujan, * 

* 

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: February 12, 2010

Filed: July 1, 2010

___________

Before RILEY,1

 Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

This is the second time this case has come before our court for review. In

United States v. Castellanos, 518 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 2008) (Castellanos I), Castellanos

appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during

a post-warrant search of his residence, claiming the warrant was based upon an

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unlawful pre-warrant search. We held a portion of the pre-warrant search was

unlawful, and we reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. On remand,

the district court found the evidence obtained during the post-warrant search was

admissible under the independent source doctrine. Castellanos appeals, claiming the

government (1) waived the right to raise the independent source doctrine on remand,

and (2) failed to prove the warrant was based on an independent source. 

I. BACKGROUND

Law enforcement officers received information from a confidential informant

and other sources that Castellanos was in the United States illegally, Castellanos was

selling large quantities of methamphetamine from his trailer residence, and a member

of Castellanos’s family had been kidnapped and killed. On February 23, 2006, at

approximately 6:15 a.m., six law enforcement officers, including Detective Luis Ortiz

(Detective Ortiz) with the Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department, and Special

Agent Tracy Raggs (Agent Raggs) of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,

went to Castellanos’s residence. 

Upon arrival, officers found the door partially open, and because they had

information about a possible kidnaping and murder, they entered the residence to

determine the welfare of the occupants. Finding no one inside, the officers exited to

the porch, where they observed Castellanos drive a pick-up truck into the residence’s

parking lot. When Castellanos saw the officers, he began to drive away. Agent Raggs

followed Castellanos in a car and stopped Castellanos for weaving his car. Detective

Ortiz was also present. The officers noticed Castellanos was intoxicated and had

urinated on himself. Initially, Castellanos refused to identify himself, but he

eventually provided the officers with the name Guillermo Lujan. Castellanos said he

had identification at home. Detective Ortiz asked Castellanos for consent to search

his trailer and pick-up truck, but Castellanos did not reply. 

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The officers drove Castellanos to his residence to verify his identity.

Castellanos opened the unlocked door of his residence, and Castellanos did not object

when Agent Raggs and Detective Ortiz followed him inside. Castellanos refused to

say his name and said “no” to Detective Ortiz’s request to search the residence. Agent

Raggs again asked Castellanos for his identification, and Castellanos “flipped his

hand” in the direction of his bedroom. Agent Raggs entered Castellanos’s bedroom

and searched a dresser and a chest of drawers, but did not locate any identification.

Agent Raggs did notice a notebook on the dresser with monetary figures written on

it, and saw similar papers in the living room, including a paper taped to the wall with

names, numbers and monetary figures. Agent Raggs testified the document on the

wall appeared to be a drug transaction ledger. 

Eventually, Agent Raggs noticed a wallet on a bookshelf next to Castellanos,

and retrieved identification from the wallet bearing the name of Guillermo Lujan.

Agent Raggs asked Castellanos if his name were Guillermo Lujan, and Castellanos

repeatedly responded, “what’s on the ID?” Agent Raggs also asked Castellanos about

his immigration status, and Castellanos admitted he was in the country illegally.

Detective Ortiz decided to apply for a search warrant, and during the execution of the

warrant, law enforcement officers found evidence of drug dealing. Castellanos was

then charged with federal drug and firearm related offenses. 

Castellanos filed a motion to suppress, claiming, among other things, that all

evidence found in execution of the search warrant should be suppressed because the

warrant was based upon observations of police during an unlawful search of

Castellanos’s home. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation, granted Castellanos’s motion to suppress as to the search of

Castellanos’s pick-up truck for reasons unrelated to this opinion, and denied the

motion to suppress in all other respects. 

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Castellanos entered a conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 500

grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)

and 846, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

Castellanos then appealed to our court, claiming law enforcement officers illegally

entered and searched his home. Castellanos also argued, for the first time on appeal,

that “[e]ven if the warrantless entry into his home was reasonable, police had no

reasonable basis by which to conclude that [Castellanos] had impliedly consented to

a search of his bedroom for identification.” 

We concluded the law enforcement officers lawfully entered Castellanos’s

residence, but Castellanos was too intoxicated to consent to a search of his bedroom.

Castellanos I, 518 F.3d at 970. We therefore reversed the district court’s denial of

Castellanos’s motion to suppress “with respect to the evidence seized from

Castellanos’s bedroom,” affirmed the district court’s ruling in all other respects, and

“remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with [our] opinion.”

Id. at 972. 

On remand, Castellanos filed a supplemental motion to suppress, arguing the

government waived its right to raise the independent source doctrine. He also claimed

the scope of the remand should be limited to a determination, based on the existing

evidentiary record, whether evidence obtained following the search of Castellanos’s

bedroom constituted fruit of the poisonous tree. In response, the government

suggested the court hold a hearing to determine whether the police would have sought

the warrant even if the unlawful entry into the bedroom had not occurred, and whether

the information obtained through the unlawful entry impacted the court’s decision to

issue the search warrant. The magistrate judge found (1) the government did not

waive its right to assert the independent source doctrine, (2) redacting the information

obtained by police during the unlawful search of Castellanos’s bedroom did not affect

the probable cause of the affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, and (3) additional

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evidence was needed to determine whether the illegal search motivated the officers

to procure a search warrant.

On December 1, 2008, the magistrate judge held an evidentiary hearing.

Detective Ortiz testified the records observed in the bedroom did not impact his

decision to seek a search warrant. Based upon Detective Ortiz’s testimony, the

magistrate judge drafted a second report, recommending the district court deny

Castellanos’s supplemental motion to suppress based upon a finding that “the officers

would have requested a search warrant even without having seen the logs which

appeared to be drug sales records in defendant’s bedroom.” On February 17, 2009,

the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s second report and recommendation,

and denied Castellanos’s supplemental motion to suppress. 

Castellanos now appeals, claiming the government waived its right to rely on

the independent source doctrine because the government did not raise the doctrine in

the initial proceeding, and the district court lacked jurisdiction on remand to reopen

the evidentiary record and allow the government to litigate a new theory of

admissibility for the challenged evidence. In the alternative, Castellanos argues,

“[e]ven if the government did not waive the independent source exception,” the

government failed to prove Detective Ortiz would have included information

regarding the drug trafficking notations observed in the living room absent the

unlawful observation of similar notations in the bedroom. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction to Reopen the Evidentiary Record

The law of the case doctrine and the related concept of waiver are prudential

rather than jurisdictional, and neither rule is an absolute bar to appellate review. See

Kessler v. Nat’l Enters., Inc., 203 F.3d 1058, 1059 (8th Cir. 2000); Crocker v.

Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 739-40 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The district court,

therefore, did not lack jurisdiction to decide those issues left open by our mandate, see

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United States v. Hessman, 493 F.3d 977, 981 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting a district court

is again vested with jurisdiction upon receipt of our judgment), nor did the district

court abuse its discretion by reopening the record to hold an evidentiary hearing, see

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 552 (1983) (“On remand, the

decision on whether to reopen the record should be left to the sound discretion of the

trial court.”). 

B. Standard of Review

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a suppression motion, we review the

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. See United

States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Solomon, 432 F.3d

824, 827 (8th Cir. 2005). We will affirm the district court’s decision to deny a motion

to suppress unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record; reflects an

erroneous view of applicable law; or after a thorough review of the record, we have

a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. See Bell, 480 F.3d at

863. 

C. New Issue on Remand

1. Earlier Proceedings

In order to determine the propriety of the district court’s actions on remand, we

must first consider what transpired in the earlier proceedings. First, Castellanos filed

a motion to suppress, which the district court denied in large part. Castellanos then

appealed, raising for the first time the issue that, “[e]ven if the warrantless entry into

his home was reasonable, police had no reasonable basis by which to conclude that

[Castellanos] had impliedly consented to a search of his bedroom for identification.”

Despite the apparent waiver of Castellanos’s argument as untimely, this court

adopted Castellanos’s position, and found Castellanos was too intoxicated to consent

to the officers’ entry into his bedroom. Castellanos I, 518 F.3d at 970. We then

reversed the district court “with respect to the evidence seized from Castellanos’s

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bedroom,” and directed that “the evidence seized during the unlawful search of

Castellanos’s bedroom must be suppressed.” Id. at 972. We affirmed the district

court’s ruling in all other respects and remanded the case for further proceedings

consistent with our opinion. Id. 

On remand, the court below was left with the task of deciphering our mandate

in Castellanos I. The magistrate judge recognized our court ordered all “evidence

seized during the unlawful search of Castellanos’s bedroom be suppressed,” when, in

fact, no evidence had actually been seized during the unlawful search. Instead, the

record demonstrates Agent Raggs observed a notebook in the bedroom with monetary

figures written on it. The magistrate judge concluded, “[b]ecause there is no evidence

to suppress . . ., it seems logical to conclude that the court of appeals intended the

analysis to go further, i.e., whether the suppression of that information would affect

the outcome.” Thus, the magistrate judge found the next step in the process must be

to determine whether officers would have had sufficient probable cause to obtain a

warrant absent the illegal search of the bedroom. The magistrate judge’s

interpretation of our indistinct holding was sound and “consistent with [our] opinion”

in Castellanos I, 518 F.3d at 972. 

In conducting this analysis, the magistrate judge rejected Castellanos’s

contention the government waived the right to raise the independent source doctrine.

The magistrate judge recognized strict application of waiver principles, as applied to

Castellanos, would result in denial of relief because Castellanos himself had failed to

assert properly that the entry into his bedroom was illegal before the appeal. The

magistrate judge decided, “[b]ecause the government could not foresee the Eighth

Circuit’s ruling . . . the government has raised the independent source doctrine at the

earliest practicable time in this case and therefore has not waived its right to assert that

doctrine.” After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge found the independent

source doctrine applied. Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,

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the district court denied Castellanos’s supplemental motion to suppress all the

evidence found pursuant to the search warrant. 

2. Law of the Case and the Mandate Rule

“‘Law of the case terminology is often employed to express the principle that

inferior tribunals are bound to honor the mandate of superior courts within a single

judicial system.’” United States v. Bartsh, 69 F.3d 864, 866 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting

18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice &

Procedure § 4478 (1981 & Supp. 1995)). “When an appellate court remands a case

to the district court, all issues decided by the appellate court become the law of the

case, and the district court on remand must ‘adhere to any limitations imposed on its

function . . . by the appellate court.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Cornelius, 968

F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992)) (internal citation omitted). Absent “instructions to hold

further proceedings, a district court has no authority to re-examine an issue settled by

a higher court.” Bethea v. Levi Strauss & Co., 916 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1990). In

contrast, “[w]hile a mandate is controlling as to matters within its compass, on the

remand a lower court is free as to other issues.” Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307

U.S. 161, 168 (1939). 

An application of this doctrine is visible in Cornelius, 968 F.2d at 704-06. In

that case, Cornelius appealed his sentence, and the government cross-appealed the

district court’s finding that Cornelius was not an armed career criminal under 18

U.S.C. § 924(e). Id. at 704. This court reversed and remanded for resentencing on the

issue raised in the government’s cross-appeal. Id. (discussing United States v.

Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1991)). At resentencing, Cornelius argued one of

his prior convictions was based on an invalid guilty plea and could not be used to

enhance his sentence for being an armed career criminal. Id. Cornelius also argued

two of the convictions were related cases and therefore could not be used to find he

was a career offender under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. Id. The

district court held it could not consider these new issues on remand. Id. at 704. This

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court reversed because “[w]e did not limit the district court’s further determination of

whether Cornelius was an armed career criminal,” and “the district court was free to

consider any new arguments raised at the resentencing as to whether Cornelius was

an armed career criminal that could have been considered at the first hearing.” Id. at

706. However, we affirmed the district court’s “refus[al] to consider new evidence

relating to Cornelius’[s] sentence enhancement as a career offender because that

determination was not before the district court on remand.” Id.; cf. United States v.

Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding defendant had not waived an

issue he raised for the first time during resentencing because the arguments were made

newly relevant by the court of appeals’ decision and the defendant did not have

“sufficient incentive to raise the issue in the prior proceedings”). 

In the present case, our mandate left several issues open for the district court to

decide and expressly ordered the district court to hold further proceedings consistent

with our opinion. Castellanos I, 518 F.3d at 972. The district court limited its review

and only considered one ultimate issue—whether the information obtained during the

unlawful search of the bedroom impacted the validity of the search warrant. We agree

with the district court’s reading of our mandate, and we commend the district court,

and particularly the magistrate judge, for its cogent analysis and commitment to

following the ill-defined directives of this court. 

3. Waiver

a. New Issue v. New Argument

Although lower courts are free to decide new issues left open on remand, this

court must also consider whether an issue not previously raised is deemed waived, and

therefore, not within the scope of remand. See Sprague, 307 U.S. at 168-69; United

States v. Husband, 312 F.3d 247, 250 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2002) (declaring “any issue that

could have been but was not raised on appeal is waived and thus not remanded”). Not

every new argument, or shift in approach, constitutes the raising of a new issue. See

Weitz Co. v. Lloyd’s of London, 574 F.3d 885, 890-91 (8th Cir. 2009); Universal

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Title Ins. Co. v. United States, 942 F.2d 1311, 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991). The

government argues it did not raise a new issue on remand, but merely continued to

advance the proposition “that the search warrant was based upon adequate probable

cause gained from lawful entry into the trailer.” This argument has merit.

In United States v. Duchi, 906 F.2d 1278, 1285 (8th Cir. 1990) (Duchi I), this

court “reverse[d] Duchi’s convictions on all counts because the evidence used to

convict him was the fruit of a warrantless entry without exigent circumstances.” We

noted the government was free to retry the appellant, but the government would have

to prove its case “without the benefit of the evidence gained from unconstitutionally

entering his home.” Id. On remand, the government attempted to argue, for the first

time, that the evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. See

United States v. Duchi, 944 F.2d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1991) (Duchi II). The district

court ruled the government could not argue a new ground for the introduction of

evidence when this court already held that evidence had been illegally obtained. Id.

In Duchi II, our court affirmed the district court, in relevant part, declaring, “[t]he

Government may not advance during a second trial previously unasserted grounds for

the admissibility of evidence seized in a warrantless search which an appeals court has

concluded should have been suppressed on the basis of arguments made at the first

trial.” Id. 

Castellanos cites Duchi II in his brief for the proposition that “if alternative

grounds for admission existed, then the Government should have presented those

theories in the prior case.” Id. at 393. However, Duchi II is distinguishable from

Castellanos’s case, and the reasoning of Duchi II supports the government’s position

on appeal. In Duchi I, 906 F.2d at 1285, our court announced the evidence at issue

had been illegally obtained and was inadmissible in the district court. We did not

remand for further proceedings on the issue of admissibility. See id. In contrast, in

Castellanos I, 518 F.3d at 972, this court found the evidence obtained in the bedroom

during the illegal search was inadmissible, but we did not make any findings as to the

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admissibility of the remaining evidence found in Castellanos’s residence, and we

remanded for further proceedings, consistent with our opinion. 

We agree with the proposition set forth in Duchi II that an “issue” addressed by

a court “is not the particular theory that would support the admission of evidence, but

the broader question concerning the admissibility itself.” Duchi II, 944 F.2d at 393.

Thus, the “issue” decided by this court in Duchi I was the overarching question of

“whether the search was constitutional,” not the narrower question of “whether

exigent circumstances justified the search.” Id. Applying this reasoning to

Castellanos’s case, the issue raised by the parties below and addressed by this court

in Castellanos I was the constitutionality of the entry and search of Castellanos’s

residence. The government then did not raise a new “issue” on remand when it argued

the evidence was admissible under the independent source doctrine, but merely

formulated a new argument in support of the position maintained by the government

in each proceeding. 

b. Application of the Waiver Doctrine to Castellanos

In his brief, Castellanos repeatedly cites cases which stand for the proposition

that issues not raised before the district court are waived, and therefore, cannot be

considered by this court on appeal. “The purpose of the rule is to inform promptly the

trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his

ruling and make any changes deemed desirable.” Morrow v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,

541 F.2d 713, 724 (8th Cir. 1976). However, we are not currently faced with a

scenario where an issue has been raised for the first time on appeal. In this case, the

district court considered the independent source doctrine when it was raised before the

district court on remand. Therefore, the only purposes which would be served by

invoking the waiver doctrine here would be to prevent “piecemeal appeals,” see

United States v. Carter, 490 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 2007), and to promote judicial

efficiency, see Morris v. American Nat’l Can Corp., 988 F.2d 50, 52 (8th Cir. 1993).

Neither of these interests would be served by finding the government waived its use

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of the independent source doctrine under the facts of this case. Cf. Universal Title,

942 F.2d at 1314 (noting appellate courts have the discretion to consider a new issue

on appeal when the proper resolution of the case is beyond any doubt, or if injustice

might otherwise result).

“The general rule is that, ‘where an argument could have been raised on an

initial appeal, it is inappropriate to consider that argument on a second appeal

following remand.’” Kessler, 203 F.3d at 1059. However, “appellate courts should

not enforce the rule punitively against appellees, because that would motivate

appellees to raise every possible alternative ground and to file every conceivable

protective cross-appeal, thereby needlessly increasing the scope and complexity of

initial appeals.” Id.; see also Crocker, 49 F.3d at 739-41; Field v. Mans, 157 F.3d 35,

41-42 (1st Cir. 1998). It is unclear when Castellanos believes the government should

have argued the independent source doctrine for the first time. Although the

government should be required to raise alternative theories for the admission of

evidence at the outset, the government cannot be expected to respond to arguments in

the district court which were not actually raised by the defendant until the appeal.

 

In Field, 157 F.3d at 37, 40-42, a bankruptcy court held in favor of the appellee,

and an appeal was pursued to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, and then to the First

Circuit. The First Circuit recognized that “to preserve an alternative theory, an

appellee might in some situations be required to raise the point in its appellate briefs.”

Id. at 41. However, the court declined to find the appellee waived an alternative

argument because it would be “extremely unrealistic” to expect appellee’s counsel to

argue “an alternate theory in support of the lower court’s judgment.” Id. The First

Circuit continued, “We are loath to find that [the appellee] waived the extension issue

merely by failing to file either a procedurally dubious cross-appeal in the district court

and in this court, or to brief and argue what, to any attorney, might have seemed an

entirely redundant point.” Id. at 41-42 (internal citation omitted). 

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Although parties should present alternative arguments whenever sound strategy

dictates, the government in this case was not required to anticipate every possible

outcome on appeal and formulate a responsive argument for each alternative. “[T]he

principle that a party who failed to raise an argument in its initial appeal is held to

have waived its right to raise that argument on remand or on a second appeal. . . . must

be limited to issues appropriate to be raised on appeal.” Robinson v. Johnson, 313

F.3d 128, 141 n.5 (3d Cir. 2002). “It does not require a party to raise an issue that had

not been previously treated or even raised in the district court.” Id. “Issues that arise

anew on remand are generally within the scope of the remand.” Husband, 312 F.3d

at 251 n.4; see also United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[O]n

remand and in the absence of special circumstances, a district court may address only

(1) the issues remanded, (2) issues arising for the first time on remand, or (3) issues

that were timely raised before the district and/or appellate courts but which remain

undecided.”). 

Under the facts of this case, the application of the independent source doctrine

was an argument arising for the first time on remand. Cf. United States v. Khabeer,

410 F.3d 477, 483-84 (8th Cir. 2005) (remanding to the district court to consider the

application of the independent source doctrine for the first time); United States v.

Namer, 680 F.2d 1088, 1097-98 (5th Cir. 1982) (same). In Castellanos I, we

explicitly directed the district court to engage in further proceedings consistent with

our opinion. Implicit in that order was an expectation that the district court would

consider arguments raised by both parties as to how the exclusion of the information

obtained during the illegal search of the bedroom would impact the validity of the

search warrant. The government raised the independent source doctrine at the earliest

practicable time, and did not waive the application of the independent source doctrine

on remand. The district court did not err in relying upon the independent source

doctrine when denying Castellanos’s supplemental motion to suppress. 

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D. Applicability of the Independent Source Doctrine

Castellanos argues the district court erred in finding Detective Ortiz would have

applied for the search warrant absent the illegal entry into the bedroom because “the

record did not establish that the information regarding the drug trafficking notations

on the paper in the living room was obtained independently of the unlawful

observations made by [Agent] Raggs during the search of [Castellanos’s] bedroom.”

We disagree.

In his second report and recommendation to the district court, the magistrate

judge listed various facts which supported Detective Ortiz’s decision to obtain a

warrant, separate and apart from either of the drug transaction ledgers observed in

Castellanos’s home, e.g., multiple confidential informants confirmed pertinent details

and Detective Ortiz presented his expert opinion on the applicable illegal drug

business. The magistrate judge emphasized one of the drug transaction ledgers had

been taped to the wall in the living room, kitchen, and dining room common area, and

was in plain view to anyone standing where Detective Ortiz was positioned in the

living room. Thus, the magistrate judge concluded the drug transaction ledger Agent

Raggs saw in the bedroom was duplicative, and Detective Ortiz would have applied

for the search warrant even if the drug transaction ledger had not been viewed in the

bedroom during the illegal search. The magistrate judge’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, and the district court did not clearly err in adopting

the magistrate judge’s factual findings. See United States v. Swope, 542 F.3d 609,

613 (8th Cir. 2008) (standard of review). 

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

______________________________

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