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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Craig Venson
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted February 10, 2010

Decided February 17, 2010

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge 

No. 08-4222

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CRAIG VENSON,

Defendant-Appellant.

 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division.

No. 05-cr-980-1

Blanche M. Manning,

Judge.

O R D ER

Craig Venson pleaded guilty to 18 criminal counts, including one count of conspiring

to possess with intent to distribute large amounts of heroin, crack, and cocaine, see 21 U.S.C.

§§ 841(a)(1), 846; eight counts of possessing with intent to distribute multiple controlled

substances, see id. § 841(a)(1); and nine counts of using a telephone to facilitate the

distribution of drugs, see id. § 843(b). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 262 months

in prison for the conspiracy count and two drug possession counts, 240 months for each of

the remaining § 841(a)(1) counts, and 48 months for each of the § 843(b) counts. Venson

appeals, but his appointed counsel has moved to withdraw because he cannot identify any

nonfrivolous argument to pursue on appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

 FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

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No. 08-4222 Page 2

(1967). Venson opposes counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). We confine our review to the

potential issues identified in counsel’s facially adequate brief and Venson’s response. See

United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 974 (7th Cir. 2002); CIR. R. 51(b).

Counsel begins by telling us that Venson does not wish to withdraw his plea, and

Venson, in his response, does not dispute counsel’s representation. Thus counsel properly

refrains from discussing possible challenges to the voluntary nature of the plea or the

adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670-72 (7th Cir. 2002).

Next, counsel and Venson both assess whether the district court erred by applying a

two-level increase to his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a gun in

connection with Venson’s criminal conduct. At sentencing the government offered

evidence of Venson’s involvement in a shooting incident and a “gun-trade” deal. The

shooting victim identified Venson as the gunman, and bullet casings recovered from the

scene later matched a gun found in Venson’s coconspirator’s apartment, which he regularly

used to store large quantities of drugs. Regarding the gun trade, the government provided

a recording of a phone call in which Venson admitted to having one weapon, and then told 

his associate to get him a second gun so he could make a two-for-one trade. Venson argues

that this evidence was insufficient to support an increase under § 2D1.1(b)(1) because there

is no proof that the gun deal ever took place, and his presentence report included an FBI

agent’s statement that “there was no evidence that any of the defendants were known to

carry firearms during drug transactions or otherwise.” 

We agree with counsel, however, that any argument challenging the § 2D1.1(b)(1)

application would be frivolous because the government met its burden of proving that

Venson possessed at least one gun during the commission of his crimes. See United States v.

Womack, 496 F.3d 791, 797 (7th Cir. 2007). The government did not need to prove that

Venson used a gun in furtherance of one of his offenses, only that he possessed a gun

during the offense. See United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 837 (7th Cir. 2008). Even if the

gun deal did not go through, as Venson claims, the recording contains his admission that he

possessed at least one gun. As for the shooting, the victim’s identification as well as the

matching physical evidence recovered from both the crime scene and Venson’s

coconspirator’s apartment was sufficient evidence to link Venson to the gun. Evidence of

either of these incidents would be sufficient to support the guidelines application. 

Next, counsel considers whether Venson could argue that the district court erred by

applying a four-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) for his leadership role in the

conspiracy. To qualify for the § 3B1.1(a) increase, Venson must have been an “organizer or

leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise

extensive.” See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). In his plea declaration and at sentencing, Venson

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conceded that he qualified for a two-level increase under § 3B1.1(a) for his role as an

organizer or leader of his three direct subordinates, but he denied that the conspiracy

involved, or that he controlled, at least five participants as required under § 3B1.1(a). 

Counsel correctly concludes that it would be frivolous for Venson to challenge the

four-level increase because the district court properly found that at least five others had

participated in Venson’s drug operation. The court accepted the government’s

evidence—testimony from an FBI agent, transcripts from related court proceedings, and

recorded phone calls—to find that at least four individuals delivered drugs for Venson and

that at least four others had been convicted of the drug conspiracy. This evidence—together

with Venson’s admission that he controlled three of the coconspirators—was more than

enough to support the district court’s assessment of a four-level increase under § 3B1.1(a). 

See United States v. Blaylock, 413 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2005).

Counsel also considers whether Venson could challenge the reasonableness of his

sentence. Counsel notes that the court did not provide a lengthy statement as to its findings

rejecting Venson’s arguments for mitigation (i.e., the effects of an untreated injury,

testimony from his wife and letters from his family describing his good character, and the

relative sentences that his codefendants had received). 

As counsel points out, however, any challenge to Venson’s sentence would be futile. 

First, the district court correctly calculated Venson’s within-guidelines sentence, and we

presume a within-guidelines sentence to be reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,

347 (2007); United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537 F.3d 722, 727 (7th Cir. 2008). Second,

although the court said little in response to Venson’s arguments in mitigation, it did agree

with the government that Venson had refused the medical treatment arranged by the

marshals. Finally, the court properly applied the statutory factors set forth in § 3553(a),

again endorsing the government’s arguments that Venson had a long and violent criminal

history, that he had not learned from his past prison sentences, and that he deserved a

longer sentence than his codefendants because he was at the very top of the drug

distribution conspiracy. Although brief, the district court’s explanation of its sentencing

decision sufficiently demonstrates that the court properly considered the § 3553(a) factors

and adequately addressed Venson’s arguments in mitigation. See United States v. Dean, 414

F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).

Finally, counsel assesses whether Venson could challenge the district court’s denial

of his motion to correct sentencing. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a). Venson filed his Rule 35(a)

motion seven days after judgment was entered, arguing that the court should reconsider its

§ 3B1.1(a) assessment because one of the named participants allegedly had been cleared at

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No. 08-4222 Page 4

1

 Rule 35(a) was amended in December 2009 to lengthen the filing time for Rule 35(a)

motions to 14 days.

sentencing of the conspiracy count—thereby removing the factual basis for a § 3B1.1(a)

increase. 

We agree with counsel that any challenge to the district court’s denial of the Rule 

35(a) motion would be frivolous. Although Venson timely filed the motion, the court did

not rule on it within the jurisdictional seven-day time period specified in Rule 35(a).1

 FED.

R. CRIM. P. 35(a); see United States v. Wisch, 275 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2001). The expiration

of the time limit before the court has ruled is treated as the functional equivalent to a denial

on the merits, and the judgment becomes final “on the date the district judge’s power to

alter the sentence expired.” Wisch, 275 F.3d at 626 (quoting United States v. Turner, 998 F.2d

534, 536 (7th Cir. 1993)). Moreover, Rule 35(a) motions are very narrow and allow the court

to correct a sentence only for “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error”; reconsideration

of the discretionary application of the guidelines is inappropriate. See United States v. Clark,

538 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2008). In Venson’s case, not only did his renewed § 3B1.1(a)

challenge fall outside the scope of Rule 35(a), but the court had no authority to act after the

seven-day time period expired.

We therefore GRANT the motion to withdraw and DISMISS Venson’s appeal.

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