Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01871/USCOURTS-azd-2_14-cv-01871-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Christopher Gordon
Defendant
Tanga.com LLC
Plaintiff

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WO 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Tanga.com LLC, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

Christopher Gordon, 

Defendant.

No. CV-14-01871-PHX-GMS

ORDER 

 Pending before the Court is Defendant Christopher Gordon’s Motion to Dismiss 

for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Alternative Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue 

or to Transfer Venue. (Doc. 12.) For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss for 

lack of personal jurisdiction is granted and the Alternative Motion to Dismiss for 

Improper Venue or to Transfer Venue is denied as moot. 

BACKGROUND 

This suit arises from a copyright and trademark dispute between Plaintiff 

Tanga.com LLC (“Tanga”) and Defendant Christopher Gordon. Gordon created a popular 

Internet video by replacing the existing audio of a nature video about honey badgers with 

his own comical narration. In the video, Gordon often uses the phrase, “Honey Badger 

Don’t Care.” Gordon has allegedly copyrighted his narration in the video and 

trademarked the phrase, “Honey Badger Don’t Care.” 

Plaintiff Tanga.com LLC (“Tanga”) is a Delaware limited liability company with 

its headquarters in Chandler, Arizona that sells merchandise over the Internet. Gordon 

alleges that Tanga sells t-shirts and other merchandise bearing the “Honey Badger Don’t 

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Care” trademark and other expressions from Gordon’s copyrighted narration. 

 On July 25, 2014, Gordon sent Tanga a cease and desist letter, and on August 15, 

2014, Tanga filed suit for declaratory relief, requesting a declaration of non-infringement 

and cancellation of Gordon’s federal trademark registrations. Gordon, in response, filed 

the current Motion, claiming that Gordon does not have sufficient contacts in Arizona to 

support personal jurisdiction. Tanga has submitted affidavits and other evidence of 

Gordon’s contacts in Arizona, which include travelling to a bookstore in Tempe to 

promote a book about honey badgers, selling his book through that bookstore, placing a 

phone call to a radio station to promote the book, creating a website that allows Arizona 

residents to purchase memorabilia over the Internet, and sending the cease and desist 

letter to Tanga. 

DISCUSSION 

I. Legal Standard

 Because the Court is resolving this Motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, 

Tanga “need make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the 

motion.” Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995); see Brainerd v. 

Governors of the Univ. of Alberta, 873 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1989). That is, it “need 

only demonstrate facts that, if true, would support jurisdiction over the defendant.” 

Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498. “Conflicts between parties over statements contained in 

affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin 

Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles 

Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588 (9th Cir. 1996)). 

 To establish the prima facie case for personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff has the 

burden of showing that: (1) the forum state’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over 

the nonresident defendant; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with principles of 

due process. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 269 (9th Cir. 

1995). Arizona’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by 

the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a); Doe v. 

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American Nat’l Red Cross, 112 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 1997). Due process requires a 

nonresident defendant to have “certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 

maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal citation 

omitted). There are two types of personal jurisdiction, general and specific. Burger King 

Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 n.5 (1985). General jurisdiction allows a court to 

entertain all actions against defendants because they have significant, continuous contacts 

with a forum state, while specific jurisdiction allows only actions against defendants that 

relate directly to their contacts with the forum state because the contacts are minimal. See 

id. In its Response to Gordon’s Motion, Tanga makes no argument that this Court may 

exercise general jurisdiction over Gordon. Rather it asserts that specific jurisdiction 

exists. 

A. Specific Jurisdiction 

 Defendants’ contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject them to the 

state’s specific jurisdiction if (1) they purposefully directed tortious activities at the 

forum or a resident thereof or performed some act by which they purposefully availed 

themselves of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, (2) the claims arise out 

of or result from the defendant’s forum-related activities, and (3) the exercise of 

jurisdiction is reasonable. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat. Inc., 223 F.3d 

1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000); Brainerd, 873 F.2d at 1259. 

 1. Purposeful Availment and “Arising out of” 

 The Ninth Circuit has held that the specific jurisdiction test “may be satisfied by 

purposeful availment of the privilege of doing business in the forum; by purposeful 

direction of activities at the forum; or by some combination thereof.” Yahoo! Inc. v. La 

Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1206 (9th Cir. 2006) (per 

curiam) (applying this hybrid purposeful availment/direction test to a plaintiff’s claims 

for declaratory judgment regarding the enforceability of orders issued by a French court). 

Under either of these tests, plaintiffs must also show that their suit arises out of the 

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defendant’s contacts in the forum state. See Terracom v. Valley Nat. Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 

561 (9th Cir. 1995); Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1088. This “arising out of” 

requirement is met if, but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state, the 

cause of action would not have arisen. See Omeluk, 52 F.3d at 271. 

 Purposeful availment “requires that the defendant engage in some form of 

affirmative conduct allowing or promoting the transaction of business within the forum 

state. This focus on the defendant’s affirmative conduct is designed to ensure that the 

defendant is not haled into court as the result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated 

contacts.” Gray & Co. v. Firstenberg Mach. Co., 913 F.2d 758, 760 (9th Cir. 1990) 

(citation omitted). A defendant has engaged in affirmative conduct and thereby 

“purposely availed himself of the benefits of a forum if he has deliberately ‘engaged in 

significant activities within a State or has created “continuing obligations” between 

himself and the residents of the forum.’” Gray, 913 F.2d at 760 (quoting Burger King, 

471 U.S. at 475–76); see Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 

1997) (stating that “the ‘purposeful availment’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant 

has taken deliberate action within the forum state or if he has created continuing 

obligations to forum residents”) (citing Ballard, 65 F.3d at 1498). 

 In contrast, courts evaluate purposeful direction using the Calder “effects test.” 

See Brayton Purcell LLP v. Recordon & Recordon, 606 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Under the “effects test,” the defendant must allegedly have: “(1) committed an intentional 

act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is 

likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 

1111 (9th Cir. 2002). All three elements of the test must be satisfied. Schwarzenegger v. 

Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 805 (9th Cir. 2004). “A finding of ‘express 

aiming’ . . . does not mean ‘that a foreign act with foreseeable effects in the forum states 

always gives rise to specific jurisdiction.’” Dole, 303 F.3d at 1112 (quoting Bancroft, 223 

F.3d at 1087). Under the causing harm requirement, the Ninth Circuit has made it clear 

that any intentional conduct must be “targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to 

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be a resident of the forum state.” Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1087. 

 Tanga has not met its burden of showing that Gordon purposefully availed himself 

of the opportunity of doing business in Arizona, or that he purposefully directed activity 

at this state or its occupants. As mentioned above, Gordon’s contacts include making a 

trip to a bookstore in the Tempe to promote a book about honey badgers, selling his book 

through that bookstore, making a phone call to a radio station to promote the book, 

creating a website that allows Arizona residents to purchase memorabilia over the 

Internet, and sending the cease and desist letter to Tanga. These activities, taken together, 

would likely constitute purposeful availment of the opportunity of doing business in 

Arizona if they were the events that gave rise to the current suit. See Sher v. Johnson, 911 

F.2d 1357, 1363–64 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that a partnership’s making phone calls and 

sending letters into the forum state, visiting the state for business, and having a deed of 

trust executed in favor of the partnership gave rise to the plaintiff’s suit and provided 

sufficient evidence of purposeful availment). However, in this case the only activity of 

Gordon’s that was the “but for” cause of Tanga’s suit against Gordon was the cease and 

desist letter that Gordon sent to Tanga. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath 

Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123–24 (9th Cir. 2002) (refusing to analyze 

defendant’s contacts of shipping products into the forum state as purposeful availment 

because they did not give rise to the suit and holding that there was no personal 

jurisdiction over defendant); Bryant v. Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, 42 

F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a defendant’s brief unrelated trip did not give rise 

to the plaintiff’s suit and was, thus, not considered in the personal jurisdiction analysis). 

Thus, the cease and desist letter is the only contact that could give rise to personal 

jurisdiction in this case. 

 It is well settled law that “a cease and desist letter is not in and of itself sufficient 

to establish personal jurisdiction over the sender of the letter.” Yahoo, 433 F.3d at 1208; 

see also Cascade Corp. v. Hiab–Foco AB, 619 F.2d 36, 38 (9th Cir. 1980); Kransco Mfg., 

Inc. v. Markwitz, 656 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1981); Douglas Furniture Co. of Cal., 

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Inc. v. Wood Dimensions, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 899, 903 (C. D. Cal. 1997). In both Yahoo

and another recent case, Bancroft & Masters, the Ninth Circuit found specific personal 

jurisdiction to exist over defendants who sent cease and desist letters into a forum state 

because, beyond sending the letters, they had other forum related activities that gave rise 

to the plaintiffs’ claims. See Yahoo, 433 F.3d at 1208; Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 

1087. (emphasis added). In Yahoo, the defendant had obtained orders from French courts 

directing the plaintiff to perform actions in the forum state, which gave rise to the 

plaintiff’s claims in the forum state. 433 F.3d at 1208. In Bancroft & Masters, the sent a 

cease and desist letter both to the plaintiff and to a third-party corporation, which had 

competing claims to an Internet domain name, with the intent of triggering the dispute 

resolution procedures of the third-party corporation. 223 F.3d at 1087. The court in 

Bancroft & Masters found that this triggering of the dispute resolution procedures gave 

rise to the plaintiff’s suit and held that it constituted purposeful direction. Id. 

 In the present case, as noted above, Gordon has directed no activity at Arizona that 

gave rise to Tanga’s claims beyond sending a cease and desist letter to Tanga. This 

differentiates the present case from both Yahoo and Bancroft & Masters and prevents this 

Court from acquiring jurisdiction over Gordon. 

 2. Reasonableness and Venue

 Because Tanga has not satisfied the first and second prongs of the personal 

jurisdiction test, the Court need not consider the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction. 

See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. Because the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over 

a defendant, the venue concerns in the present case have become moot. See Bryant v. 

Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, 42 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming a 

district court’s decision to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and deny a motion to 

transfer venue as moot). 

CONCLUSION

 Tanga has failed to meet its burden of making a prima facie case of personal 

jurisdiction over Gordon. Dismissal is appropriate, and the venue concerns raised by 

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Gordon have become moot. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Christopher Gordon’s Motion 

to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction is GRANTED, and the Alternative Motion 

to Dismiss for Improper Venue or Transfer Venue, (Doc. 12.) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED directing the Clerk of Court to terminate this 

action and enter judgment accordingly. 

 Dated this 9th day of February, 2015. 

Honorable G. Murray Snow

United States District Judge

 

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