Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03053/USCOURTS-caDC-14-03053-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roger Redrick
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 7, 2016 Decided November 8, 2016

No. 14-3053

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROGER REDRICK,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cr-00155-1)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender. Tony Axam Jr., Assistant Federal

Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Sharon A. Sprague, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief was Elizabeth

Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: SRINIVASAN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

SILBERMAN.

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SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge: Appellant pleaded

guilty to being a felon in unlawful possession of a firearm in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Under the Armed Career

Criminal Act (the “Act”), a felon so convicted is subject to a

mandatory minimum of fifteen years imprisonment if he was

previously convicted of three charges of either “violent felonies”

or “serious drug offenses.”1 The plea agreementrecognized that

appellant would be sentenced pursuant to this sentence

enhancement, which raised hissentence from a maximum of ten

years to a minimum of fifteen years imprisonment. (The court

imposed a sentence of 188 months in accordance with the

sentencing guidelines range.) Appellant now contests the

applicability of the enhancement in light of an intervening

Supreme Court opinion, Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct.

2551 (2015), which held that one of the Act’s definitions of a

violent felony – which appellant asserts the district court may

have relied on – is unconstitutionally vague. We affirm the

conviction because, whether or not the district judge relied on

the unconstitutional provision, as a matter of law, another of the

Act’s definitions of “violent felony” applies and therefore the 

appellant’s sentence remains valid.

I.

Appellant was indicted on three counts: possession with

intent to distribute at least twenty-eight grams of cocaine base,

unlawful possession of a firearm (and ammunition) by a

convicted felon, and such possession during a drug trafficking

1 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012) (mandatory minimum).

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offense.2 In return for pleading guilty to simple possession of

the firearm, the government dropped the other two counts. Four

of Redrick’s prior eleven convictions triggered the Act’s

mandatory minimum, raising his sentence from a maximum of

ten years to a minimum of fifteen years imprisonment. They

were: (1) a 1983 District of Columbia Armed Robbery

conviction (“D.C. armed robbery”); (2) a 1985 Maryland

Robbery with a Deadly Weapon conviction (“Maryland armed

robbery”); (3) a 1989 Maryland Robbery with a Deadly

Weapon conviction; and (4) a 1990 District of Columbia

Possession with Intent To Distribute PCP and Possession with

Intent To Distribute Marijuana conviction. 

The Act defines a “violent felony” as an offense punishable

by more than one year in prison that “has as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another,” or is the crime of burglary, arson, or

extortion, involves use of explosives, or is an offense that

“otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk

of physical injury to another.” These three clauses3 are referred

to as the force clause, the enumerated offense clause, and the

residual clause. The residual clause, as is apparent, sweeps very

broadly and, as we noted, in Johnson the Supreme Court – after

having twice affirmed its constitutionality – reversed itself and

2

 These counts were charged pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012), 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), and 18 U.S.C.

924(c)(1) (2012), respectively. 

3 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012) (emphasis added)

(definition of “violent felony”). The force clause is sometimes

referred to as the “elements clause.” E.g., Welch v. United States, 136

S. Ct. 1257, 1261 (2016); cf. United States v. Sheffield, 832 F.3d 296,

312 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 

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declared the clause unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557.

After Johnson, a crime is a “violent felony” only if it meets the

requirements of the force clause or the enumerated offense

clause. 

At the time of the plea agreement, it is fair to say that no

one – the government, the judge, or the appellant – could

reasonably have anticipated Johnson. All parties believed that

appellant was subject to the Act’s enhancement before Johnson,

although the record is unclear as to why the district court judge

thought so. In any event, appellant agreed in his plea deal to

“waive the right to appeal the sentence in this case . . . except to

the extent the Court sentences [him] above the statutory

maximum or guidelines range determined by the Court, in which

case [he] would have the right to appeal the illegal sentence or

above-guidelines sentence.” (emphasis added).

II.

The only prior convictions in dispute are the two Maryland

convictions for armed robbery. Appellant concedes that his drug

conviction is a qualifying “serious drug offense,” and it is

recognized by both parties that whether or not the D.C. armed

robbery conviction meets the violent felony test it wouldn’t be

sufficient to trigger the enhancement without the Maryland

convictions. It is also common ground that if the district judge

had imposed what the government refers to as a “truly illegal

sentence,” it should be vacated. By a truly illegal sentence, the

government apparently means one that relies, and could only

rely, on the unconstitutional residual clause. Yet the

government asserts paradoxically that appellant has completely

waived his right to appeal application of the Act because the

“understanding” in the plea agreement that appellant was subject

to the enhancement was part of the bargain by which the

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government dropped two counts. It should be obvious that the

government’s “truly illegal” concession is inconsistent with its

argument that appellant gave up any chance to contest the

application of the Act. Be that as it may, we have little

difficulty in concluding that a fair reading of the plea agreement

allows the appellant to challenge his sentence as illegal; i.e., in

excess of the statutory maximum. The government’s only

response is to assert the sentence is not illegal – which, of

course, is circular: the government’s waiver argument assumes

the merits.

Although the appellant did not waive his right to appeal the

sentence, he did forfeit the argument that his sentence is illegal. 

It is well established that if a defendant forfeits an argument in

a criminal case, a reviewing court should reverse only if there is

“plain error.” FED.R.CRIM. P. 52(b). Moreover, the error must

affect appellant’s “substantial rights” and “seriously affect the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (alteration 

omitted). That limited scope of review discourages a defense

counsel from sandbagging a district judge by holding in his

pocket a legal argument. This case strains the doctrine because

defense counsel, as well as the prosecutor and judge, would not

reasonably have thought the residual clause had a constitutional

infirmity after the Supreme Court had twice sanctioned it.4

Indeed, since it is also well established that a reviewing court

must apply the law as it exists at the time of the appeal, 

Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1129 (2013), – in

4

 In Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011) and James v.

United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), the Supreme Court rejected

arguments made in dissent that the residual clause was void for

vagueness. 

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this case, after Johnson – it seems rather anomalous to ask

whether the district court committed error – much less plain.

Assuming, however, that precedent calls for applying plainerror review, see, e.g., Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 1129; Johnson

v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), we first ask whether there

was “error” at all. The question before us is whether the two

prior Maryland convictions qualify as violent felonies under the

force clause. The key requirement is use of what the Supreme

Court calls “violent force,” which is “force capable of causing

physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson v. United

States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (construing “physical force”).

* * *

Normally, in asking whether a prior crime qualifies as a

violent felony, we look at the state or federal statute under which

a defendant has been convicted and ask simply whether the

elements of the prior crime meet the Act’s definitions of a

violent felony. If a prior conviction is based on a statute that

sweeps more broadly than this federal definition – let us say, a

conviction could be based on a minor battery – such a

conviction cannot qualify as a violent felony under the force

clause. See, e.g., id. at 141; Descamps v. United States, 133 S.

Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). 

This “categorical approach” to career criminal cases is

normally rather mechanical, but it can become complicated

when the prior conviction statute lists alternative elements and

so “effectively” creates several different crimes. Descamps, 133

S. Ct. at 2285. When we are dealing with a so-called “divisible”

statute, we are to employ the “modified categorical approach”

to determine which alternative crime the defendant committed. 

To do so, we look beyond the statute “to a limited class of

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documents (for example, the indictment, jury instructions, or

plea agreement and colloquy) to determine what crime, with

what elements, [the] defendant was convicted of.” Mathis v.

United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). The modified

categorical approach is, according to the Court, simply a “tool”

to implement the categorical approach, not an exception to the

elements-based approach. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285. 

The Maryland convictions, however, present a rather

unusual situation that does not fit squarely within either the

categorical or modified categorical approaches. Robbery in

Maryland is not a statutory crime; it retains its common law

character.5 Under Maryland case law, simple robbery is “the

felonious taking and carrying away of the personal property of

another, from his person or in his presence, by violence or

putting in fear.” Bowman v. State, 552 A.2d 1303, 1305 (Md.

1989) (emphasis added); see also West v. State, 539 A.2d 231,

234-35 (Md. 1988) (observing that Maryland simple robbery

includes larceny so long as the “victim resisted the taking and 

. . . her resistance had been overcome,” even absent physical

injury or force directed at the victim’s person). The government

has conceded that Maryland common law robbery is not a

violent felony. To be sure, the government made that

5

 In Descamps, the Supreme Court reserved the question

“whether, in determining a crime’s elements, a sentencing court

should take account not only of the relevant statute’s text, but of

judicial rulings interpreting it.” 133 S. Ct. at 2291. But in our case,

the very definition of the crime is partly based on the common law. 

Other circuits have stated that “the categorical/modified categorical

typologies apply equally to [both] statutory and common law crimes.” 

United States v. Aparicio-Soria, 740 F.3d 152, 155 n.2 (4th Cir. 2014)

(en banc); United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 444 (2d Cir. 2010); 

United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). 

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concession in the Fourth Circuit; whereas in a footnote in our

case, it declines to make the same concession. We would find

such a divergence in Justice Department policy quite troubling

if it were truly pressed, but the government really makes no

positive argument that Maryland common law robbery is a

violent felony, so we will rest on its Fourth Circuit concession.

Even though robbery remains a common law crime in

Maryland, the legislature did act prior to defendant’s

convictions; it passed a law providing that a person who

committed robbery is subject to imprisonment for not more than

fifteen years, but it also provided that a person who commits or

attempts to commit robbery with a dangerous or deadly weapon

is subject to imprisonment not exceeding twenty years. Md.

Code, Art. 27 §§ 486, 488 (repealed). These provisions appear

to create two separate crimes: robbery and armed robbery. 

The problem for us is that the Court of Appeals of Maryland

has described the dangerous weapon portion of the penalty

statute as a “sentence enhancement” to the single offense of

common law robbery, not an element of the separate offense of 

armed robbery. See, e.g., Bowman v. State, 552 A.2d 1303,

1305 (Md. 1989); Whack v. State, 416 A.2d 265, 266 (Md.

1980). Accordingly, appellant argues with some force that his

conviction was for simple rather than armed robbery; a sentence

enhancement, which is traditionally imposed by a judge after

conviction, is not an element of a distinct crime. If that were

true – if the dangerous weapon question was reserved for the

sentencing judge – appellant would be correct that it could not

be, as a matter of constitutional law, an “element” of a crime. 

See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). 

But it is not so. As the Maryland Court of Special Appeals

has applied the dangerous weapon provision, “the State must

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prove beyond a reasonable doubt, number one, that there was a

robbery, and number two, that it was committed with the use of

a deadly or dangerous weapon.” Battle v. State, 499 A.2d 200,

203 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985) (emphasis added); see also

Wadlow v. State, 642 A.2d 213, 216 (Md. 1994) (explaining that

under Maryland law, sentence enhancements having to do with

the “circumstances of the offense” must be charged in the

indictment, presented to the jury, and subjected to the reasonable

doubt standard). To say that the state must prove the use of a

dangerous or deadly weapon “beyond a reasonable doubt” is

simply another way of stating that it is a jury question or an

element of a crime: “‘Elements’ are the ‘constituent parts’ of a

crime’s legal definition – the things the ‘prosecution must prove

to sustain a conviction.’” Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248 (quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary 634 (10th ed. 2014)). Indeed, pattern

jury instructions used at the time of appellant’s Maryland

conviction instructed jurors that they were required to find that

the defendant had “the apparent ability to use the weapon.”

Essentially, then, Maryland, combining the common law

and a statute, created – at least for federal law purposes – two

separate crimes: simple robbery and robbery with a dangerous

or deadly weapon. That Maryland labels the “armed” aspect of

appellant’s conviction a “sentence enhancement” under

Maryland law does not dictate the result in this case because the

meaning of the term “element” in the Act is a question of federal

law. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 138 (2010)

(recognizing that the “meaning of ‘physical force’ in [the Act]

is a question of federal law, not state law”). Because Maryland

treats this issue exactly as if it were an element under federal

law, we consider it an element that creates an effectively distinct

crime for the purposes of the Act. 

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To look beyond the state law “sentence enhancement” label

is consistent with the aim of the Act, which avoids treating

similarly situated offenders differently under the Act’s

enhancement provisions. The Supreme Court, in Taylor v.

United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), recognized that “in terms of

fundamental fairness, the Act should ensure, to the extent that it

is consistent with the prerogatives of the States in defining their

own offenses, that the same type of conduct is punishable on the

Federal level in all states,” id. at 582. 

And in any event, even some Maryland cases refer to the

“separate offenses” of armed robbery and simple robbery:

“[R]obbery is usually characterized as one offense, with the

division between armed robbery and basic robbery being for

purposes of punishment. But, for some purposes, they are

regarded as separate offenses with robbery being the lesser

included offense of armed robbery.” Hagans v. State, 559 A.2d

792, 799 (Md. 1989) (citations omitted). Although the offenses

are the same for double jeopardy purposes, the Court of Appeals

of Maryland said, “only the offense of robbery with a deadly

weapon requires proof of an additional element.” Bynum v.

State, 357 A.2d 339, 341 (Md. 1976).

We have little difficulty, then, in concluding that Maryland

armed robbery – a crime that differs from simple robbery in its

requirement that the defendant commit the crime with the use of

a dangerous or deadly weapon6

 – contains “as an element the

6

 The Court of Appeals of Maryland has adopted an objective

definition of “dangerous or deadly weapon” and held that for an

instrument to so qualify under § 488, “the instrument must be (1)

designed as ‘anything used or designed to be used in destroying,

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use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person of another.” Common law robbery itself is, after all

– and has always been – a crime against a person. Certainly the

additional element of “use” of a dangerous or deadly weapon

supplies at minimum a “threat” of physical force against the

person of another. And because the means employed is a

“dangerous or deadly weapon,” the required degree of force –

that is, “violent force” – is present. In that respect our case is

different than a recent Ninth Circuit decision, United States v.

Parnell, 818 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2016), holding that a prior

Massachusetts armed robbery conviction was not a violent

felony under the force clause. Massachusetts armed robbery

does not require “use” of the dangerous or deadly weapon: the

victim does not even need to be aware of the presence of the

weapon. 

Appellant’s fall-back argument is that even if the crime

includes the dangerous or deadly weapon component as an

element, it still sweeps too broadly, because a weapon such as

poison, an “open flame,” or “lethal bacteria” could be used and

those dangerous weapons would not supply the requisite

“physical force against the person of another.” We doubt that

defeating, or injuring an enemy, or as an instrument of offensive or

defensive combat’; (2) under the circumstances of the case,

immediately useable to inflict serious or deadly harm (e.g., unloaded

gun or starter’s pistol useable as a bludgeon); or (3) actually used in

a way likely to inflict that sort of harm (e.g., microphone cord used as

a garrote).” Brooks v. State, 552 A.2d 872, 880 (Md. 1989) (citation

omitted) (quoting Bennett v. State, 205 A.2d 393, 394 (Md. 1964)). 

A victim’s subjective belief that the item was a “dangerous or deadly

weapon,” without more, is insufficient to sustain an armed robbery

conviction in Maryland.

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these weapons could be administered without at least some level

of physical force. Cf. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct.

1405, 1415 (2014) (reasoning that poison and other “indirect”

causes of physical harm require common-law “force”). But in

any event, we think the hypotheticals are too farfetched to give

us pause. The Supreme Court in other cases applying the

categorical approach has cautioned against excessive “legal

imagination.” Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193

(2007); Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1684-85 (2013). 

In determining whether a state statute qualifies as a violent

felony, we focus on “realistic probabilit[ies],” not “theoretical

possibilit[ies]” that Maryland “would apply its [law] to conduct

that falls outside” the force clause. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S.

at 193; see also Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1684-86 (“[O]ur focus

[under the categorical approach] on the minimum conduct

criminalized by the state statute is not an invitation to apply

‘legal imagination’ to the state offense.”). Appellant points us

to no Maryland case in which such a conviction has been

obtained and we eschew the kind of creative speculation the

Supreme Court has proscribed.

By the same token, we reject appellant’s claim that armed

robbery could be committed by threats against or damage to

property and, therefore, according to appellant, it could include

conduct that is not a threat against a person. (“If you don’t give

me your money, I’ll shoot up your Mercedes.”) To be sure, two

old intermediate Maryland courts hypothesize such a scenario,

Giles v. State, 261 A.2d 806 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970),

Douglas v. State, 267 A.2d 291 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970), but

in these cases the hypotheticals were dicta. And, the definition

of Maryland common law robbery, on which armed robbery

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depends, as we noted, refers to larceny against a person:

“Robbery is a compound larceny. It is a larceny from the person

accomplished by either an assault (putting in fear) or a battery

(violence).” Snowden v. State, 583 A.2d 1056, 1059 (Md.

1991). Assault and battery each require force or threatened

force against a person: “Under Maryland law, a common-law

assault consists of ‘(1) an attempt to commit a battery or (2) an

unlawful intentional act which places another in reasonable

apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.’ . . . A

‘battery,’ in turn, ‘is any unlawful application of force, direct or

indirect, to the body of the victim.’” United States v. Coleman,

158 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (emphasis added)

(quoting Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 446 (Md. Ct. Spec.

App.1992)). Even assuming the amount of force required by

simple robbery is insufficient to qualify as “violent force,” the

target of that force (the relevant question at this point) is a

person, not property. And armed robbery, accomplished by the

use of a “dangerous or deadly weapon,” explicitly contemplates

bodily harm. Weapons are “deadly” to humans, not property. 

* * * 

Because we have concluded that Maryland Robbery with a

Deadly Weapon is a violent felony under the Act’s still-valid

force clause, appellant’s 188-month sentence remains legal and

he is therefore not entitled to a new sentence. 

So ordered.

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