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Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Green Aviation Management Co., LLC
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 12, 2012 Decided April 17, 2012

No. 11-1260

GREEN AVIATION MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,

PETITIONER

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,

RESPONDENT

On Petition for Review of an Order of 

the Federal Aviation Administration

Gregory Sean Winton argued the cause and filed the briefs

for petitioner. 

Benjamin S. Kingsley, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, and Michael Jay Singer,

Attorney.

Before: HENDERSON, ROGERS and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal from the denial of

attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),

5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). After commencing an administrative civil

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penalties proceeding, the Federal Aviation Administration

(“FAA”) withdrew its complaint and the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) before whom the complaint had been pending

dismissed the proceedings with prejudice. Nonetheless, the FAA

Administrator ruled that the subject of the complaint was not a

“prevailing party” as that term has been interpreted in

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep’t of

Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001). Because the

dismissal with prejudice has res judicata effect and ended the

proceedings, we grant the petition and remand the case to the

Administrator to determine whether the filing of the complaint

was substantially justified, and if not, to award fees.

I.

On February 6, 2007, the FAA filed a complaint against

Green Aviation Management Co., LLC, alleging that on a

chartered flight from New Jersey to the Bahamas on December

30, 2005, returning January 2, 2006, its plane carried ten, rather

than the approved nine, passengers. The tenth passenger was the

daughter of the pilot, and the FAA alleged that she was either an

unapproved tenth passenger or an untrained flight attendant and

sought a civil penalty of $33,000 for violations of three FAA

safety regulations. Green Aviation responded that the daughter

was a non-required crew member, and as an employee of Green

Aviation, she was permitted by FAA regulations to occupy the

jump seat on the plane. On June 1, 2007, Green Aviation moved

to dismiss, arguing that the daughter was an employee who only

served food and drink during the flight, and noting that the FAA

had already withdrawn its complaint in the certificate action

against the pilots based on the same set of facts. The FAA

opposed summary judgment because the daughter’s employment

status was in doubt and there was no proof she was not simply

coming along on vacation. On June 19, 2007, Green Aviation

moved for dismissal of the complaint with prejudice on the

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ground, incorrectly, that the FAA failed to respond to the motion

to dismiss. The ALJ denied the motions for summary disposition

on June 28, 2007, finding that material disputed questions of fact

remained regarding the daughter’s employment status.

Green Aviation sought reconsideration on August 3, 2007,

submitting an affidavit from its customer service representative

stating that the daughter functioned as a crew member on the

subject flights, assigned only to serve food and drinks. The FAA

responded with a newer affidavit from the customer service

representative stating that her previous affidavit was incomplete

and the daughter was expected to be trained to perform safety

duties. The ALJ denied the motion for reconsideration and

scheduled a hearing for October 16, 2007.

On September 18, 2007, Green Aviation moved to exclude

the customer service representative’s testimony at the hearing,

attaching an email between her and one of the flight captains in

which she disclaimed knowledge of the daughter’s role on the

flight. The FAA, on October 1, 2007, withdrew its complaint. 

In view of the withdrawal, Green Aviation moved the following

day for dismissal of the proceedings with prejudice. Pursuant to

14 C.F.R. § 13.215 (2012), the ALJ dismissed the proceedings

with prejudice on October 2, 2007.

Green Aviation filed an application for attorneys fees and

other expenses pursuant to the EAJA on October 19, 2007. The

ALJ found that Green Aviation was the “prevailing party” under

the EAJA, which was uncontested, but denied the request for

fees, finding that the FAA was substantially justified in bringing

the complaint given the unclear nature of the daughter’s role,

training, and employment status. Upon appeal, the FAA

Administrator found that Green Aviation was not the “prevailing

party,” under the interpretation of that phrase in Buckhannon. 

The Administrator reasoned that because the ALJ was required

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by regulation to dismiss the proceedings with prejudice once the

FAA withdrew its complaint, and because the regulation did not

require the ALJ’s consent for the FAA to do so, there was no

exercise of judicial discretion or any judicial imprimatur to the

dismissal order. The Administrator thus sustained the denial of

fees. 

II.

Green Aviation petitions for review, contending that

Buckhannon’s interpretation of “prevailing party” does not

necessarily apply to that phrase in EAJA claims under 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(a)(1) and that the Administrator’s analysis is contrary to

precedent, inasmuch as Green Aviation obtained a court-ordered

change in the legal relationship of the parties and the necessary

judicial relief. We review de novo whether Green Aviation was

a “prevailing party” under 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1), see Turner v.

Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 608 F.3d 12, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and

because the EAJA is a statute of general application, we do not

defer to any one agency’s interpretation, id.

A.

The EAJA provides that “[a]n agency that conducts an

adversary adjudication shall award, to a prevailing party other

than the United States, fees and other expenses incurred by that

party . . . , unless the adjudicative officer of the agency finds that

the position of the agency was substantially justified or that

special circumstances make an award unjust.” 5 U.S.C.

§ 504(a)(1). The Supreme Court interpreted the phrase

“prevailing party” in a different fee-shifting statute in

Buckhannon, holding that it was insufficient that a plaintiff’s

lawsuit may have led to “a nonjudicial alteration of actual

circumstances,” 532 U.S. at 606 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), and instead requiring that a party demonstrate

“the necessary judicial imprimatur” such that a “judicial

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pronouncement” is accompanied by “judicial relief,” id. at

605–06 (internal quotation marks, citations, and emphasis

omitted). The Court noted that it has “interpreted [] fee-shifting

provisions consistently.” Id. at 603 n.4. This court, accordingly,

concluded that the phrase “prevailing party” in such statutes

“should be treated the same . . . unless there is some good reason

for doing otherwise,” Oil, Chem., & Atomic Workers Int’l Union,

AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Energy, 288 F.3d 452, 455 (D.C. Cir.

2002), and has joined other circuits in acknowledging that the

burden of establishing “good reason[]” not to apply Buckhannon

is “not easily met,” Alegria v. Dist. of Columbia, 391 F.3d 262,

264 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

The court has not expressly decided that the Buckhannon

interpretation of “prevailing party” applies to the EAJA’s

administrative adjudication provision, see Thomas v. Nat’l Sci.

Found., 330 F.3d 486, 493 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Turner, 608

F.3d at 15 n.3, although it has applied Buckhannon to the

EAJA’s civil litigation provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), see

Thomas, 330 F.3d at 492–93. In Turner, the court applied

Buckhannon’s definition of “prevailing party” to EAJA’s

administrative provision without “determin[ing] whether . . .

Buckhannon necessarily or always applies to that phrase in §

504(a)(1),” 608 F.3d at 15 n.3, because the party seeking fees

saw no distinction between agency and court cases. Although

Green Aviation contends there is a distinction, its effort to

establish it as a “good reason” not to apply Buckhannon fails.

Green Aviation contends that Buckhannon should not

control the meaning of “prevailing party” in section 504(a)(1)

civil penalty proceedings on the basis of several policy reasons,

including the potential creation of a perverse incentive for the

FAA to file unfounded complaints that it could later withdraw

after the defendant has incurred monetary and other costs. As

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Green Aviation points out, unlike FED. R. CIV. P. 41, which

grants a judge discretion to dismiss with or without prejudice

after approving a voluntary withdrawal of a complaint, the FAA

regulation mandates dismissal with prejudice, see 14 C.F.R.

§ 13.215 (2012). As a result, if the FAA is correct that

Buckhannon’s interpretation of “prevailing party” turns on the

judge’s discretion, then application of Buckhannon in this

context would permit the FAA to avoid fees, regardless of

whether the complaint was frivolous or otherwise not

substantially justified, by withdrawing its complaint prior to or

during a hearing. This circumstance, however problematic, is

insufficient to prevent application of Buckhannon to the

administrative provision of the EAJA, 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1). 

First, the court has applied Buckhannon to attorneys fee

applications in another administrative setting, see Alegria, 391

F.3d at 264. Second, most significantly, in Buckhannon, the

Supreme Court rejected the relevance of such policy arguments

as Green Aviation presents given its view of the “clear meaning”

of the phrase “prevailing party.” 532 U.S. at 610. Green

Aviation’s policy reasons thus do not establish a good reason not

to apply Buckhannon’s interpretation of “prevailing party” to the

EAJA’s administrative provision. Consequently, this appeal

turns on whether the ALJ’s dismissal with prejudice satisfies

Buckhannon’s requirements.

B.

Upon the FAA’s withdrawal of its complaint against Green

Aviation, the ALJ was required to dismiss the proceedings with

prejudice. FAA regulations provide:

At any time before or during a hearing, an agency

attorney may withdraw a complaint . . . without the

consent of the administrative law judge. If an agency

attorney withdraws the complaint . . . , the

administrative law judge shall dismiss the proceedings

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under this subpart with prejudice.

14 C.F.R. § 13.215 (2012). The FAA found that Green Aviation

was not a “prevailing party” because the regulation did not

provide any discretion to the ALJ in whether to dismiss the

complaint with or without prejudice, and thus the dismissal order

lacked the “judicial imprimatur” required by Buckhannon, 532

U.S. at 605.

In applying Buckhannon, the court considers a three-part test

for determining whether one is a “prevailing party”:

(1) there must be a court-ordered change in the legal

relationship of the parties; (2) the judgment must be in

favor of the party seeking the fees; and (3) the judicial

pronouncement must be accompanied by judicial relief.

Turner, 608 F.3d at 15 (quoting Straus, 590 F.3d at 901 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Where a defendant is

seeking fees, as here, the court has applied only the latter two

prongs. See Dist. of Columbia v. Ijeabuonwu, 642 F.3d 1191,

1194 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Turner, 608 F.3d at 15; Straus, 590 F.3d

at 901.1

 Because the ALJ’s order dismissed the proceedings, the

1

 The FAA contends that the first prong should also apply to

a defendant. In Turner, the court noted that it need not decide whether

a defendant must also establish the first prong, because in that case,

the defendants did not meet the third. 608 F.3d at 12. Here, the FAA

does not contest that there has been a change in the legal relationship

of the parties; it concedes that res judicata effect applies to the

dismissal order. See FAA Decision & Order, at 14 (June 13, 2011). 

Instead, it contends that the change was not “court-ordered” because

the ALJ lacked discretion under FAA regulations once the complaint

was withdrawn. See Resp.’s Br. at 20–21. Because the court rejects

FAA’s same substantive argument in determining whether there has

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second prong is easily satisfied. And there was a clear “judicial

pronouncement”; the ALJ signed a dismissal order. The

remaining question is whether the order granted judicial relief.

In recognizing that a defendant who obtains a favorable

decision gains “prevailing party” status if “the judicial

pronouncement [is] accompanied by judicial relief,” Turner, 608

F.3d at 15 (quoting Straus, 590 F.3d at 901), the court explained

that “a party need receive only some form of judicial relief,” id., 

and that “res judicata effect would certainly qualify as judicial

relief where, for example, it protected the prevailing [party] from

having to pay damages or alter its conduct,” Straus, 590 F.3d at

902. Nonetheless, the FAA, in concluding Green Aviation was

not a prevailing party, found Turner “instructive” because the

FAA did not need the ALJ’s permission to withdraw its

complaint under applicable procedural rules. FAA Dec. &

Order, at 15 (Jun. 13, 2011). This reliance was misplaced. 

In Turner, the court was considering a certificate action

against two pilots before the National Transportation Safety

Board (“NTSB”). 608 F.3d at 13. Prior to the scheduled

hearing, the FAA withdrew its complaints and the ALJ issued an

order terminating the proceedings without stating whether the

dismissal was with or without prejudice. The court held that the

pilots were not “prevailing parties” upon applying the

presumption that when a complaint is dismissed at the request of

the plaintiff, it is without prejudice — a presumption the NTSB

been a “judicial pronouncement . . . . accompanied by judicial relief,”

(i.e., the third prong), there is no occasion to decide whether a

defendant is required to satisfy the first prong of the test. Simply said,

it does not matter whether the first prong applies because the ALJ’s

dismissal with prejudice is itself a “court ordered change in the legal

relationship of the parties.”

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itself had previously applied to a dismissal that was silent on the

question. See id. at 15–16. 

Because the ALJ dismissed the cases without prejudice,

there was nothing in th[e] case analogous to judicial

relief. . . . [T]he FAA had unilaterally ended the

adversarial relationship between the parties, leaving

them where they were before the complaint was filed. 

The order of the ALJ dismissing the cases was just an

administrative housekeeping measure, not a form of

relief, because the FAA did not need the ALJ’s

permission to withdraw a complaint.

Id. at 16 (internal citations omitted). Here, by contrast, Green

Aviation and the FAA are not “where they were before the

complaint was filed.” Id. Instead Green Aviation is “protected

. . . from having to pay damages,” Straus, 590 F.3d at 902,

arising from events underlying the February 6, 2007 complaint. 

Although the two-year statute of limitations had not lapsed at the

time the complaint was withdrawn, see 14 C.F.R. 13.208(d), the

FAA could not re-file a complaint based on the same set of facts

because the dismissal with prejudice has res judicata effect. See

Straus, 590 F.3d at 902. 

Further, unlike in Thomas, where the grant of a preliminary

injunction and partial summary judgment were “not the end but

the means of the litigation,” 330 F.3d at 494 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted), the dismissal with prejudice brought

a final end to the February 6, 2007 proceedings. Even though the

ALJ’s permission was not needed for the complaint to be

withdrawn, the resulting dismissal was a clear form of judicial

relief, not simply a “housekeeping measure,” Turner, 608 F.3d

at 16. Similarly, the dismissal order was not “merely a

formality,” as in Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers, where the

dismissal order was unnecessary, 288 F.3d at 457 (citing FED.R.

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CIV. P. 41(a)(1)). The FAA regulation, 14 C.F.R. § 13.215,

makes clear that the dismissal order is necessary; if it were not,

there would be no purpose to providing the defendant an

interlocutory appeal by right to obtain one, see id. §

13.219(c)(2). Because a silent dismissal order is presumed to be

without prejudice, see Turner, 608 F.3d 15–16, an explicit

dismissal with prejudice, even if mandated by regulation, must

be accorded substantively meaningful rather than insignificant

effect, cf. Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1566 (2009). 

The dismissal order is thus not a mere formality or a

housekeeping measure; rather it is the means by which Green

Aviation can obtain res judicata protection.

 The FAA’s focus on the ALJ’s lack of discretion mistakes

the clear import of Buckhannon, which is about whether the party

seeking fees has “obtain[ed] any judicial relief.” 532 U.S. at

606. In the context of an administrative proceeding,

Buckhannon’s interpretation of “prevailing party” does not turn

on whether a federal agency decides to require, by regulation,

that dismissals be with prejudice once a complaint has been

withdrawn. The EAJA already protects the government from

paying fees where it, despite not prevailing, was “substantially

justified” in filing the complaint or where “special

circumstances” are present that disfavor a fee award. See 5

U.S.C. § 504(a)(1); LePage’s 2000, Inc. v. Postal Regulatory

Comm’n, No.10-1031, slip op. at 6–7 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 7, 2012). 

Green Aviation obtained judicial relief by the dismissal order;

nothing in Buckhannon or this court’s precedent requires more. 

This conclusion comports with the purpose of the EAJA, which

is to prevent defendants from “be[ing] deterred from seeking

review of or defending against unreasonable governmental action

because of the expense involved.” H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-

1434, at 21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003, 5010

(1980).

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Because the October 16, 2007 dismissal order has res

judicata effect and brought the February 6, 2007 proceedings

against Green Aviation to an end, Green Aviation obtained 

sufficient judicial relief to be a prevailing party. Accordingly,

we grant the petition and remand the case to the FAA

Administrator to determine whether the filing of the February 6,

2007 complaint against Green Aviation was substantially

justified, and if not, to determine the amount of fees to which it

is entitled.

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