Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03127/USCOURTS-ca10-89-03127-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert L. Pettit
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FI LED 

Uflited States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Ci:-::uit 

MAY 2 5 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee,. ) 

) 

v. ) No. 89-3127 

) 

ROBERT L. PETTIT, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

For the District of Kansas 

D.C. No. 88-20117-01 

Submitted on the Briefs: 

Benjamin L. Burgess, 

Robinson, Assistant U. 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jr., United 

S. Attorney, 

States Attorney, Julie 

Kansas City, Kansas, 

A. 

for 

Michael G. 

Assistant 

Appellant. 

Katz, Federal 

Public Defender, 

Public Defender, Susan L. Foreman, 

Denver, Colorado, for DefendantBefore MOORE and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and BABCOCK, District 

Judge.* 

BABCOCK, District Judge. 

*Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, United states District J.udge for the 

District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 1
The agents again watched the house on December 15, 16, 19, and 

20, 1988. On those days, they saw Mr. Pettit, twice wearing a 

grayish-blue jacket, arrive at the house between 8:50 and 9:30 a.m. 

and stay for a brief time. On two occasions, a man arrived with 

Mr. Pettit and remained at the house. On December 20, 1988, the 

agents noticed that after the two men arrived at the house the 

porch light went off. Moreover, after the men arrived, several 

people would stop at the house. 

On December 21, 1988, in front of 1904 Hallock street, the 

agents executed a federal search warrant authorizing them to search 

Mr. Pettit's person and vehicle. Mr. Pettit was first seen sitting 

in his car parked in front of the house. After identifying 

themselves to Mr. Pettit as agents, they took him out of the car 

and patted him down for weapons. They told him that they had a 

search warrant for his person and car. However, the agents did not 

show Mr. Pettit the search warrant until after the search and they 

did not give him a copy of the warrant. The agents found twentyone baggies containing crack cocaine in two film canisters seized 

from the front pocket of the grayish-blue jacket Mr. Pettit was 

wearing. 

When searched and arrested, Mr. Pettit said that the canisters 

contained film. He further stated: "Now, you didn't get those from 

me. You had those. Those belong to you. 11 During the booking 

process, Mr. Pettit told another agent that the film canisters were 

in the jacket when he borrowed the jacket from his girlfriend, 

Roberta Hearron (Hearron). 

3 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 2
Defendant-appellant, Robert L. Pettit (Mr. Pettit), was 

convicted by a jury for possession with intent to distribute 

approximately 10 grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine 

base in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1). The sentencing judge 

increased Mr. Pettit' s offense level under the United States 

Sentencing Commission Guidelines (Guidelines), finding that Mr. 

Pettit was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of the 

criminal activity. Mr. Pettit appeals the trial court's denial of 

his motion in limine to exclude certain testimony, the trial 

court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence, and the trial 

court's upward adjustment under Guidelines§ 3Bl.l(c). We affirm 

the conviction, but reverse the sentence and remand to the district I 

court for resentencing. 

I. 

For one half hour on three occasions in October and November 

1988, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents watched a 

house at 1904 North Hallock Street, Kansas City, Kansas. The house 

was rented to Mr. Pettit. On each occasion, the agents saw five 

to seven people drive up to the house, park their cars, and make 

an "exchange" with persons at the house. The agents' observations 

confirmed information they had received regarding apparent drug 

activity at the house. Based upon this information and 

surveillance, the agents opened a formal investigation in December 

1988. 

2 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 3
Drug Enforcement Agent LaMere, although not offered as an 

expert witness, opined that while the amount of drugs seized was 

consistent with personal consumption, the drugs were packaged for 

sale. 

Mr. Pettit was charged in a one count Superseding Indictment 

with violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a) (1). Following a hearing on 

his motion to suppress, the court made a bench ruling denying the 

motion. After trial to a jury the jury found Mr. Pettit guilty as 

charged. 

Mr. Pettit filed a Motion for New Trial which was argued and 

denied at sentencing. On May 8, 1989, the court sentenced Mr. 

Pettit to 120 months to be followed by 4 years of supervised 

release. He was fined $5,000 and assessed $50.00. I 

II. 

Mr. Pettit appeals the denial of his motion in limine to 

exclude Kansas city Police Officer Michael Simmons' (Simmons) 

testimony that he had made three narcotic purchases from Hearron 

in March and April 1988. One sale occurred inside the house at 

1904 North Hallock and two occurred in cars parked outside that 

address. Each time, Mr. Pettit was in the vicinity of the house 

and directed Simmons to Hearron when Simmons asked what was going 

on and if they were selling anything. However, Mr. Pettit was not 

present in the house or the cars when the sales occurred and 

Simmons never purchased narcotics directly from Mr. Pettit. 

In its pretrial motion in limine, the government tendered 

Simmons' testimony to establish Mr. Pettit' s knowledge that he 

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Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 4
possessed the crack cocaine with intent to distribute it. 

Defendant had denied such knowledge, possession, and intent. 

Mr. Pettit contends that Simmons' testimony was irrelevant 

because it was 1) remote in time and dealt with Hearron's bad acts, 

and 2) any probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect 

under Fed.R.Evid. 403. He further asserts that the trial court's 

limiting instruction was insufficient to protect him from unfair 

prejudice. We disagree. 

The trial court determined before trial both that the evidence 

was proper 404 (b) material and that its probative value "far 

outweighs any possible prejudicial effect for the limited purpose 

of having relevancy as to intent and guilty knowledge .... " Our 

standard of review is for abuse of discretion. 

Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1373 (10th Cir. 1989). 

United States v. 

In United States v. Hogue, 827 F.2d 660, 662-663 (10th Cir. 

1987), we held that to be admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b), the 

evidence: 

1) must tend to establish intent, knowledge, motive, 

identity or absence of mistake or accident; 2) must also 

be so related to the charge that it serves to establish 

intent, knowledge, motive, identity or absence of mistake 

or accident; 3) must have real probative value, not just 

possible worth; and 4) must be close in time to the crime 

charged. 

Moreover, we have previously stated that under Rule 404(b): 

[S]imilar act evidence is relevant only if the jury can 

reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the 

defendant was the actor. We understand this to mean that 

before similar 'bad acts' may be admitted against an 

individual, there must be reasonable indication in the 

record that the defendant was in fact a party to the bad 

acts sought to be brought in against him. We do not 

believe that the relevance requirement under Rules 

5 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 5
404(b), 402 and 104(b) can be met with respect to one 

defendant by introducing evidence of the bad acts of the 

defendant's other associates. 

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989). 

(Citations 

omitted). (Emphasis in original). 

Here, although the sales occurred 9 months before Mr. Pettit's 

arrest, and although Mr. Pettit was not convicted of any crime in 

relation to Hearron' s sales, the record shows that the sales 

occurred with Mr. Pettit' s direction and assistance and in Mr. 

Pettit's car in front of his rental house. Accordingly, while Mr. 

Pettit was not the principal actor, the evidence establishes that 

Mr. Pettit was a party to the criminal activity. Simmons' 

testimony that Mr. Pettit directed him to Hearron for the cocaine 

transactions, therefore, was probative of Mr. Pettit's knowledge I, 

that crack cocaine was being sold, that he knew cocaine was in the 

pocket of the jacket he allegedly borrowed from Hearron, and that 

he intended to distribute the crack cocaine. We therefore conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

defendant's motion in limine to exclude Simmons' testimony. 

Any evidence regarding Mr. Pettit's association with Hearron was 

developed by the defense during cross-examination only. Further, 

despite Mr. Pettit's assertion to the contrary, the trial court's 

limiting instruction when the Rule 404(b) evidence was admitted, 

reiterated in Instruction No. 16 of the general charge, was 

sufficient to protect him from unfair prejudice. See United states 

v. Rivera, 837 F.2d 906 (10th cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 

6 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 6
874 F.2d 754 (10th Cir.), en bane. See also United States v. Doar, 

882 F.2d 1511, 1524-1525 (10th Cir. 1989). 

III. 

Mr. Pettit contends that the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to suppress evidence because the warrant was issued without 

probable cause. He also asserts that the search was conducted in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

and Fed.R.Crim.P. 41. Again, we disagree. 

The Fourth Amendment provides that search warrants shall be 

issued only upon probable cause. Where, as here, probable cause 

for the issuance of a search warrant is based upon an informant's 

information, the proper standard for determining probable cause is 

the totality of the circumstances. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 

U.S. 727 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 

In this case, the informant's reliability and credibility was 

assessed for over three months. The informant's information was 

corroborated by independent law enforcement surveillance in October 

and November 1988, and on four days in December 1988. Furthermore, 

other information provided by the informant was corroborated 

through other law enforcement surveillance and techniques. 

Mr. Pettit also contends that Rule 41 (c) (1) was violated 

because the face of the warrant states that the search should be 

executed on or before December 20, 1988, but the search was not 

executed until December 21, 1988. Mr. Pettit further argues that 

failure to show him the search warrant before the search violated 

Rule 41(d). 

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Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 7
These arguments were not raised in the trial court. Mr. 

Pettit testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he 

never received a copy of the search warrant. The agent testified 

that he did not show Mr. Pettit the warrant until after the search 

and arrest. However, neither Mr. Pettit's written pretrial motion 

to suppress nor oral argument on the pretrial motion mention 

noncompliance with Rule 41. There is no showing of any impediment 

that precluded his raising these issues in the trial court. 

Issues not raised in the trial court will not be considered 

for the first time on appeal. United States v. Rowe, 565 F.2d 635 

(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Glover, 677 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 

1982). Where, as here, a party advances arguments available but 

not presented to the trial court, and where, as here, a party has 

\ 

had ample opportunity to make the point timely in the trial court, 

the issue will not be entertained on appeal. 

Mitchell, 783 F.2d 971, 976 (10th Cir. 1986). 

IV. 

United states v. 

Finally, Mr. Pettit contends that the trial court incorrectly 

applied Guidelines§ 3Bl.1. Under Guidelines§ 3B1.1, the trial 

court gave Mr. Pettit a two level offense enhancement for being an 

"organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal 

activity .... " § 3Bl.l(c). Mr. Pettit argues that the trial court 

failed to make findings of fact on this adjustment, thereby 

violating 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). He further contends, citing United 

States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d 1071 (7th Cir. 1990) as supplemental 

8 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 8
authority, that the record does not support an upward adjustment 

pursuant to§ 3B1.l(c). 

18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), as amended, directs that the court at 

sentencing "shall state in open court the reasons for its 

imposition of the particular sentence." Where, as here, we do not 

have a departure from the Guidelines, but instead an upward 

adjustment to a point still within the Guidelines, "the strict and 

added requirements for departure do not apply." United states v. 

Beaulieu, F.2d , No. 88-2568, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. April 

17, 1990), 1990 WL 43117; See 18 u.s.c. § 3553(b) and (c) (2). 

In this case, the probation department recommended a two level 

upward adjustment on the ground that Mr. Pettit "allowed others to 

live in the house who used the house to conduct the sale of crack 

cocaine." Mr. Pettit argued at sentencing that the evidence was 

insufficient to justify the two level increase. The trial court 

overruled Mr. Pettit's objection to the recommendation and 

sentenced him to 120 months, within the Guideline range of 97 to 

121 months. In doing so, the trial court found that "[t]he crime 

involves distribution of crack cocaine and from the evidence that 

the court heard at trial, the defendant has.an aggravating role in 

the offense behavior." This finding is adequate under the 

Guidelines and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). See United States v. Beaulieu, 

supra at 5. 

Mr. Pettit's second argument is that the information before 

the sentencing judge did not support the judge's finding that 

appellant was a "leader, manager, or supervisor" of the criminal 

9 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 9
activity. Although the district court's application of the 

Sentencing Guidelines to the facts is reviewed under a "clearly 

erroneous" standard, 18 u.s.c. § 3742(e) (West Supp.1989); United 

states v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1181-1182 (10th Cir. 1990), 

where, as here, the district court draws legal conclusions with 

respect to the Guidelines, we review de novo. United States v. 

smith, 888 F.2d 720 (10th cir. 1989), cert. denied, __ s.ct. 

1990 WL 5784 (Apr. 2, 1990). 

Guidelines§ 3Bl.l provides: 

Based on the defendant's role in the offense, increase the 

offense level as follows: 

(a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of 

a criminal activity that involved five or more 

participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 

levels. 

(b) 

(but not 

activity 

otherwise 

If the defendant was a manager or supervisor 

an organizer or leader) and the criminal 

involved five or more participants or was 

extensive, increase by 3 levels. 

( c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity other 

than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels. 

(Emphasis added). 

In United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d at 1074, the Seventh 

Circuit held: 

The problem with the sentence imposed by the 

district court is that it applied Guidelines§ 3Bl.l(c) 

to a defendant who was convicted of [an] offense that 

only involved himself. Guidelines§ 3Bl.l(c) requires 

the sentencing judge to look at 'the defendant's role in 

the offense' of conviction not his role in any 

relevant aggravating conduct in which he may have 

engaged. Further, the elements of the offense enhanced 

under Guidelines § 3Bl.l(c) must include the 

participation of more than one person or else the 

10 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 10
district court cannot weigh the relative culpability of 

the parties. 

(Emphasis in original). 

We agree with the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that the plain 

language of the Guidelines§ 3B1.1 requires that the sentencing 

court focus on the "defendant's role in the offense," rather than 

other criminal conduct. 

Guidelines§ 3B1.l(c) allows the sentencing court to increase 

the offense level if the defendant was an "organizer, leader, 

manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity." See United 

States v. Rutter, No. 89-1015, slip op. at 10-13 (10th Cir. March 

13, 1990). On the other hand, Guidelines§ 3B1.2 allows the court 

to decrease the offense level if the defendant was a "minimal" or 

"minor" participant. See Guidelines§ 2B1.2(a) and (b). The 

introductory commentary to these two sections states that "[w)hen 

an offense is committed by more than one participant, § 3B1.1 or 

§ 3B1. 2 ( or neither) may apply. 11 

recognized: 

As the Seventh Circuit 

The Guidelines do not otherwise provide for 'role in the 

offense' adjustments, except when the defendant abused 

a position of trust or μsed a special skill in committing 

the offense. See Guidelines§ 3B1.3. In delimiting the 

'role in the offense' adjustment in this fashion, the 

Sentencing Commission explicitly recognized that many 

offenses are committed by a single individual or by 

individuals of roughly equal culpability, and that 'none 

of them receive an adjustment under this Part.' 

Guidelines§ 3B1.4 Commentary .... 

United States v. Tetzlaff, 896 F.2d at 1074. 

Here, Mr. Pettit was convicted of possession with intent to 

distribute approximately 10 grams of crack cocaine. 21 u.s.c. § 

11 

Appellate Case: 89-3127 Document: 010110555327 Date Filed: 05/25/1990 Page: 11
841(a)(l). While the record established Mr. Pettit's extensive 

involvement in various drug transactions which occurred at the 

house he rented at 1904 Hallock Street, no drugs sales were 

observed at the time of or in relation to his offense of 

conviction. Hence, we conclude that in making its upward 

adjustment, the sentencing court considered defendant's role in 

other criminal conduct for which he was not convicted. 

Accordingly, the conviction is AFFIRMED, the sentence is 

REVERSED, and the case REMANDED to the district court for 

resentencing. 

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