Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10318/USCOURTS-ca9-14-10318-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Edward Dixon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

JAMES EDWARD DIXON,

Defendant–Appellant.

No. 14-10318

D.C. No. 

2:12-cr-00222-

GMN-VCF-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted 

September 18, 2015—San Francisco, California

Filed November 20, 2015

Before: William A. Fletcher, Marsha S. Berzon, and

Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bea

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2 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel vacated a sentence and remanded for

resentencing in a case in which the district court found that

the defendant had three prior convictions for “violent

felonies,” as defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act.

The panel held that Calif. Penal Code § 211 (robbery) is

not a categorical match to the ACCA’s definition of “violent

felony” because § 211 criminalizes conduct not included

within the ACCA’s definition. The panel also held that § 211

contains only alternative means and is not divisible. The

panel therefore concluded that a conviction for violating

§ 211 cannot serve as a predicate “violent felony” conviction

for the application of a mandatory minimum sentence under

the ACCA.

COUNSEL

Angela H. Dows, Premier Legal Group, Las Vegas, Nevada,

for Defendant-Appellant.

William Ramsey Reed (argued) and Elizabeth Olson White,

Assistant United States Attorneys, Reno, Nevada, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

 * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 3

OPINION

BEA, Circuit Judge:

James Dixon pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession

of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Upon

conviction, and at sentencing, the district court found that

Dixon had three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” as

defined by the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B): two robbery convictions under

California Penal Code (“CPC”) § 211 and one assault-with-adeadly-weapon conviction under Nevada Revised Statutes

(“NRS”) § 200.471. As a result, the district court sentenced

Dixon to 15 years of imprisonment, the mandatory minimum

sentence under the ACCA when a defendant has three prior

“violent felony” convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

Dixon appeals the district court’s imposition of the

mandatory minimum sentence, contending that his prior

convictions are not “violent felony” convictions as defined by

the ACCA. We hold that a violation of CPC § 211 does not

meet the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” As Dixon

therefore does not have three predicate “violent felony”

convictions, we vacate his mandatory minimum sentence and

remand this case to the district court for resentencing.

I

The relevant facts are not in dispute. In 2012, a Nevada

Highway Patrol officer pulled Dixon over because the

windows of his vehicle were excessively tinted. When the

officer approached the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and saw

a small amount of marijuana in an open pocket of a backpack

inside the vehicle. A second officer arrived at the scene and

searched the vehicle, finding a .38 caliber revolver among

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4 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

Dixon’s work tools. Dixon admitted he knew the gun was

there, but claimed he was holding it for a co-worker and had

forgotten about it.

Dixon, who had nine prior felony convictions, pleaded

guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court found that three

of Dixon’s prior convictions qualified as “violent felony”

convictions, as defined by the ACCA: 1983 and 1987

convictions for robbery under CPC § 211 and a 2002

conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under NRS

§ 200.471. As a result, the district court imposed a 15-year

prison sentence, the mandatory minimum sentence under the

ACCA when a defendant has three prior “violent felony”

convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Dixon appeals only

his sentence, claiming, as he did in the district court, that he

does not have three “violent felony” convictions, as defined

by the ACCA, and thus does not qualify for the mandatory

minimum sentence.

II

The ACCA prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence of

15 years of imprisonment when a defendant has three prior

convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses.”

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The district court imposed the

mandatory minimum sentence after finding that Dixon had

three prior convictions for “violent felonies,” as defined by

the ACCA.1

 For purposes of the ACCA, a “violent felony” is:

 1 The ACCA’s definition of “serious drug offense” is not at issue in this

case.

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 5

[A]ny crime punishable by imprisonment for

a term exceeding one year . . . that—

(i) has as an element the use, attempted

use, or threatened use of physical

force against the person of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, [or]

involves use of explosives . . . .2

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). To determine whether a state

statute of conviction meets the ACCA’s definition of “violent

felony,” a court must apply the categorical approach

announced by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. United States,

495 U.S. 575 (1990). See, e.g., United States v. Grisel,

488 `F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). We review de

novo whether a state statute of conviction is a categorical

match to the definition of “violent felony.” See id. at 846.

A. Taylor’s Categorical Approach

Under Taylor’s categorical approach, a court determines

whether a prior conviction under a state statute qualifies as a

“violent felony” conviction under the ACCA by looking

“only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of

the prior offense,” not to the facts underlying the conviction.

Id. at 847 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). A violation of a

 2 The ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” also contains a catchall

“residual clause” for crimes that “involve[] conduct that presents a serious

potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

This clause was recently declared unconstitutionally vague by the

Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).

We therefore do not consider it as part of the ACCA’s definition of

“violent felony.”

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6 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

state statute is categorically a “violent felony” under the

ACCA “only if the [state] statute’s elements are the same as,

or narrower than,” those included in the ACCA’s definition

of “violent felony.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct.

2276, 2281 (2013). In identifying the elements of a state

statute, a court considers the language of the statute and

judicial opinions interpreting it. Rodriguez–Castellon v.

Holder, 733 F.3d 847, 853 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v.

Bonat, 106 F.3d 1472, 1475–76 (9th Cir. 1997). To evaluate

whether a state statute matches one of the offenses

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)—burglary, arson,

or extortion—a court compares the elements of the state

statute with the elements of the “generic” crime, or the

offense as commonly understood. See Rodriguez–Castellon,

733 F.3d at 853; see also Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.

If a state statute defines as criminal more conduct than is

included in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony,” then

a court must determine whether the state statute can be

divided into violations that constitute “violent felonies” under

the ACCA and others that do not. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct.

at 2283–84; see also Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077,

1084–86 (9th Cir. 2014). To be divisible, a state statute must

contain “multiple, alternative elements of functionally

separate crimes.” Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1085 (emphasis

omitted). If a state statute is divisible, a court may then take

into consideration certain documents, such as charging

documents or a plea agreement, to determine whether the

defendant was convicted of violating a prong of the statute

that meets the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” Id. at

1083–84. If, however, a state statute defines as criminal more

conduct than is included in the ACCA’s definition of “violent

felony” and is not divisible, then a conviction under that

statute cannot serve as a predicate “violent felony” conviction

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 7

under the ACCA for application of a mandatory minimum

sentence. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283–86.

B. Application of the Categorical Approach to CPC § 211

We turn first to whether CPC § 211 is a categorical match

to the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” We conclude

that CPC § 211 is not a categorical match because it

criminalizes conduct not included within the ACCA’s

definition of “violent felony.”

CPC § 211 prohibits “the felonious taking of personal

property in the possession of another, from his person or

immediate presence, and against his will, accomplished by

means of force or fear.” We previously determined that CPC

§ 211 is categorically a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2 because, in all its applications, CPC § 211 always

constitutes either generic robbery or generic extortion, both

of which are included in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2’s definition of

“crime of violence.” See United States v. Flores–Mejia,

687 F.3d 1213, 1215–16 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.

Becerril–Lopez, 541 F.3d 881, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2008). Unlike

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, however, the ACCA’s definition of

“violent felony” includes only generic extortion; it omits

generic robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Thus,

although they are useful precedents, Flores–Mejia and

Becerril–Lopez do not control the outcome of this case.

Generic extortion, which is an enumerated offense

included in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony,” is

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8 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

defined broadly enough3 to encompass many violations of

CPC § 211, but not all. See Becerril–Lopez, 541 F.3d at

891–92. In Becerril–Lopez, we cited People v. Torres, 39 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 103 (Ct. App. 1995), as an example of a case in

which the defendant violated CPC § 211 without committing

extortion. Becerril–Lopez, 541 F.3d at 892. In Torres, the

defendant demanded money from the victims, struck one

victim with a gun, and shot another; the use of force negated

any possible finding that the defendant intended to take the

victims’ property with their consent. See id. (discussing

Torres, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111–12). Such a violation of CPC

§ 211 would not constitute extortion, which requires the

taking of property to be consensual, but would constitute

generic robbery, which has no consent requirement.4 Id.

Because the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” lacks

“robbery” by name, any violation of CPC § 211 that does not

constitute extortion must have “as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).5 This element test

 3 Generic extortion is defined as “obtaining something of value from

another with his consent induced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or

threats.” Becerril–Lopez, 541 F.3d at 891 (quoting Scheidler v. Nat’l Org.

for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 409 (2003)).

 4

 In Becerril–Lopez, we adopted the Fifth Circuit’s definition of generic

robbery: “aggravated larceny, containing at least the elements of

misappropriation of property under circumstances involving immediate

danger to the person.” 541 F.3d at 891 (emphasis omitted) (quoting United

States v. Santiesteban–Hernandez, 469 F.3d 376, 380 (5th Cir. 2006)).

 5

 A state statute may also categorically match the ACCA’s definition of

“violent felony” if it “is burglary, arson, or . . . involves use of

explosives.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). We set these provisions aside,

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 9

contains two additional requirements. First, the “physical

force” used must be “violent force,” or “force capable of

causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson

v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Second, the use

of force must be intentional, not just reckless or negligent.

United States v. Lawrence, 627 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir.

2010); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 12–13 (2004).

Although some violations of CPC § 211 not constituting

extortion—such as the conduct described in Torres—would

meet the element test, other violations of CPC § 211 would

not.

In People v. Anderson, the California Supreme Court

clarified that one may violate CPC § 211 by accidentally

using force. 252 P.3d 968, 972 (Cal. 2011). The facts of

Anderson illustrate why CPC § 211 is not a categorical match

to the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.” Anderson broke

into an unoccupied car that was parked in a parking garage,

intending to steal it. Id. at 970–71. He drove the car out of its

parking spot and attempted to leave the garage, but could not

because the gate was closed and he did not have a way to

open it. Id. After the gate opened, Anderson sped out of the

garage in the stolen car, running over the car’s owner in the

process. Id. Although Anderson claimed this was an accident,

the California Supreme Court upheld his CPC § 211

conviction, ruling that the statute does not require finding the

defendant acted with the intent to use force against another,

as long as the defendant did use force against another person

with the intent to steal. Id. at 971–72.

as they do not, in the ordinary case, apply to the conduct proscribed by

CPC § 211.

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10 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

Anderson thus delineates one narrow class of CPC § 211

violations that do not satisfy the ACCA’s definition of

“violent felony”: those in which (1) the taking is not

consensual (thereby failing the definition of generic

extortion); and (2) the defendant uses force against a person,

but only accidentally or negligently, rather than intentionally

(thereby failing the element test of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) as interpreted by Lawrence and Leocal). We

acknowledge that the facts underlying the vast majority of

convictions under CPC § 211 likely meet the definition of

generic extortion, the element test, or both. However,

Taylor’s categorical approach is an “elements-based inquiry,”

not an “evidence-based one.” Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287.

Because Anderson shows that one can realistically violate

CPC § 211 in a manner that is not covered by the ACCA’s

definition of “violent felony,” a violation of CPC § 211 is not

categorically a “violent felony” under the ACCA. See Grisel,

488 F.3d at 850 (noting that a state statute is not a categorical

match to its federal counterpart only if there is a “realistic

probability” that the statute would apply to conduct not

included in the federal definition) (citing Gonzales v.

Duenas–Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)).

C. Divisibility of CPC § 211

Having found that CPC § 211 criminalizes conduct not

included in the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony,” we

turn next to whether CPC § 211 is divisible into violations

that meet the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” and

others that do not. We have little trouble finding that CPC

§ 211 is not divisible.

To be divisible, a state statute must contain “multiple,

alternative elements of functionally separate crimes.”

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 11

Rendon, 764 F.3d at 1085 (emphasis omitted). A statute is not

divisible merely because it is worded in the disjunctive. Id. at

1086. Rather, a court must determine whether a disjunctively

worded phrase supplies “alternative elements,” which are

essential to a jury’s finding of guilt, or “alternative means,”

which are not. Id. at 1085–86. That is, if a statute contains

alternative elements, a prosecutor “must generally select the

relevant element from its list of alternatives. And the jury, as

instructions in the case will make clear, must then find that

element, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

1085 (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290). But if a statute

contains only alternative means, a jury need not agree as to

how the statute was violated, only that it was. Id.

CPC § 211 has two disjunctively worded phrases—

“person or immediate presence,” “force or fear”—and CPC

§ 212, which defines “fear” as it is used in CPC § 211,

contains several more. The California model jury instructions

explain that the elements of CPC § 211 are: (1) the defendant

took property that was not his own, (2) the property was in

the possession of another person, (3) the property was taken

from the other person or his immediate presence, (4) the

property was taken against the other person’s will, (5) the

defendant used force or fear to take the property or to prevent

the other person from resisting, (6) when the defendant used

force or fear, he intended to deprive the owner of the property

permanently, and (7) the defendant’s intent to take the

property was formed before or during the time he used force

or fear. See Criminal Jury Instructions § 1600 (Jud. Conf. of

Cal. 2015).

The disjunctively worded phrases in the statute and jury

instructions are alternative means, not alternative elements.

To return a guilty verdict on a CPC § 211 charge, a jury must

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12 UNITED STATES V. DIXON

find that the elements are satisfied, but jurors need not agree

on the disjunctively worded alternatives. For example, jurors

must agree that element (3) is met—but the jury can return a

guilty verdict even if some jurors believe the defendant took

property from the victim’s person and other jurors believe the

defendant took the property from the victim’s immediate

presence. Similarly, for element (5), a jury can return a guilty

verdict even if some jurors believe the defendant used force

and others believe the defendant used fear. Jurors are also not

required to agree on the defendant’s state of mind as to the

use of force, as long as they find that the defendant had the

intent to steal at the time he used force. Id.; see Anderson,

252 P.3d at 971–72. As a result, CPC § 211 contains only

alternative means and is not divisible. See Rendon, 764 F.3d

at 1084–88.

D. The Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Because CPC § 211 criminalizes conduct not included in

the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony” and is not

divisible, a conviction for violating CPC § 211 cannot serve

as a predicate “violent felony” conviction for the application

of a mandatory minimum sentence under the ACCA. See

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283. Ignoring Dixon’s 1983 and

1987 convictions for violating CPC § 211, Dixon does not

have three prior “violent felony” convictions, as defined by

the ACCA, and the ACCA’s mandatory minimum sentence

therefore does not apply. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (requiring

three prior convictions for “violent felonies” or “serious drug

offenses”). As a result, we vacate the district court’s

imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence and remand

this case to the district court for resentencing. See, e.g.,

Grisel, 488 F.3d at 852.

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UNITED STATES V. DIXON 13

E. Dixon’s Remaining Arguments

Having found that Dixon does not have three predicate

“violent felony” convictions under the ACCA, we do not

reach the question whether Dixon’s 2002 conviction for

violating NRS § 200.471 qualifies as a “violent felony”

conviction. Likewise, we do not address Dixon’s remaining

arguments.

III

Because a violation of CPC § 211 is not a “violent

felony” under the ACCA, the district court incorrectly

determined that it was required to apply the mandatory

minimum sentence. As a result, we vacate Dixon’s sentence

and remand this case to the district court for resentencing.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

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