Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02623/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02623-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Chad Michael Lee Welsh
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The HONORABLE JOHN A. JARVEY, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2623

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the

v. * Southern District of Iowa.

*

Chad Michael Lee Welsh, * [TO BE PUBLISHED]

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: June 1, 2010

Filed: June 11, 2010

___________

Before LOKEN, BYE, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Chad Welsh pleaded guilty to receiving and distributing child pornography, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and possessing child pornography, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B). Granting Welsh a downward variance from the

advisory Guidelines imprisonment range of 151-188 months, the district court1

sentenced him to concurrent terms of 100 months in prison and 10 years of supervised

release that included a number of special conditions. Welsh timely appeals. His

counsel has moved to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

Appellate Case: 09-2623 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/11/2010 Entry ID: 3673387
-2-

U.S. 738 (1967), raising two issues, the reasonableness of Welsh’s sentence and the

constitutionality of a supervised-release condition imposing a lifetime requirement to

register as a sex offender. 

First, after careful review of the record, we conclude that the district court

committed no procedural sentencing error, made an individualized assessment of facts

relevant to sentencing, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, and did

not impose an unreasonable sentence. See United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, 849

(8th Cir. 2009). 

Second, counsel advises that he raised the lifetime registry issue at Welsh’s

request but believes that Welsh does not understand that the court only required, in

both an express and a special condition of supervised release, that he “register with

the state sex offender registration agency” in the State where he resides or works, and

“comply with all sex offender laws” in that State. Counsel is correct. These

conditions of supervised release are limited to the ten-year period of supervised

release. Whether Welsh will be subject to sex-offender registration requirements after

that term will depend upon applicable state and federal statutes, not this judgment. If

Welsh is also contending that the district court abused its discretion in imposing these

registration conditions, the contention is without merit because Congress has

mandated their inclusion for those convicted of sex offenses. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d); 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911(1), 16913(a); United States v. Rhone, 535 F.3d 812,

813 (8th Cir. 2008).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we affirm, and we

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 09-2623 Page: 2 Date Filed: 06/11/2010 Entry ID: 3673387