Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01087/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01087-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Griswold
Appellee
Arthur Paul
Appellee
Joseph C. Sun
Appellant
Oscar Tucker
Appellee
Chuck Williams
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of AppealG UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOSEPH C. SUN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

OSCAR TUCKER; CHUCK WILLIAMS; ARTHUR 

PAUL; and JERRY GRISWOLD, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

OCT 1 8 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 91-1087 

(D.C. No. 90-M-2213) 

(D. Colo.) 

Before McKAY, Chief Judge, EBEL, Circuit Judge, and SAFFELS,** 

District Judge. 

**Honorable Dale E. Saffels, Senior District Judge, United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Prose Plaintiff/Appellant Joseph C. Sun appeals the district 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1087 Document: 010110091380 Date Filed: 10/18/1991 Page: 1 
court's order of February 27, 1991, dismissing his Complaint as 

against Defendant/Appellee Jerry Griswold. Sun filed this action 

against Griswold, a federal employee, and three others, inmates at 

a federal correctional institution, in state court in Arapahoe 

County, Colorado. His Complaint alleged various common law tort 

claims against the Defendants as well as conspiracy. Griswold 

removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1442 

and 1446, and subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, 

or, in the Alternative, Motion to Dismiss. Sun filed a response 

to Griswold's motion and his own Motion to Remand, contesting the 

removal. The district court found the removal proper and granted 

Griswold's motion to dismiss, based on its conclusion that Sun's 

Complaint failed to state a claim against Griswold. The district 

court then remanded the case to state court. 

On appeal, Sun makes the following arguments: 1 1) removal of 

this case was improper because there is no federal question; 

2) removal was improper because Griswold was not acting under 

color of federal law; 3) removal was improper because the 

remaining Defendants did not join in the notice and because two of 

them were not served at the time of the removal notice; 4) the 

Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against Griswold. 

We review these issues de nova, as legal determinations regarding 

the propriety of removal and the sufficiency of Sun's Complaint. 

See Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 938 F.2d 591, 593 (5th 

Cir. 1991); Morgan v. City of Rawlins, 792 F.2d 975, 978 (10th 

1 In his brief, Sun adopts, by reference, the arguments made in 

his Motion to Remand. We construe his pleadings liberally as 

required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). 

2 

Appellate Case: 91-1087 Document: 010110091380 Date Filed: 10/18/1991 Page: 2 
Cir. 1986). 

Sun first argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because 

his Complaint raised no federal question, but was brought under 

state tort law. While Sun is correct that, in general, a case can 

be removed to federal court only if it could have been brought 

there originally, see Sullivan v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 813 

F.2d 1368, 1371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987), 

removal is a statutorily-created right, and the federal courts' 

removal jurisdiction derives from that right. See Goodrich v. 

Burlington N. R.R., 701 F.2d 129, 130 (10th Cir. 1983). Section 

1442 specifically authorizes removal of cases against any federal 

officer or "person acting under him" for any act "under color of 

such office." As long as these requirements are satisfied, 

jurisdiction is proper in the federal courts under this statute. 

Sun apparently concedes Griswold is a federal actor for 

purposes of the removal statute; he does not contend otherwise. 

He contends, however, that Griswold's alleged participation in a 

conspiracy to steal and deprive him of his personal property does 

not constitute action under "color of office." We disagree. 

Whether an act was performed under "color of office" is not 

dependent on the propriety of the alleged act itself, but on a 

causal connection between the act and the defendant's authority. 

Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 409 (1969). Our review of the 

pleadings indicates that Sun is challenging actions allegedly 

taken by Griswold while performing his duties at the federal 

correctional institution. Even had Sun alleged facts raising some 

question about whether Griswold had acted under "color of office," 

3 

Appellate Case: 91-1087 Document: 010110091380 Date Filed: 10/18/1991 Page: 3 
that issue alone would not preclude removal. See City of Las 

Cruces v. Baldonado, 652 F. Supp. 138, 139 (D.N.M. 1986). 

Sun challenges removal because the remaining three Defendants 

did not join in Griswold's removal notice, citing several cases 

which, as Griswold notes, do not deal with removal under S 1442. 

Under S 1442, a federal officer's right to remove is available 

regardless of the identity or joinder of the remaining parties. 

See, e.g., Thompson v. Wheeler, 898 F.2d 406, 409 (3d Cir. 

1990)(federal officer, as third-party defendant, could remove case 

to federal court where S 1442 requirements met). Based on the 

foregoing, we affirm the district court's ruling that removal of 

this case was proper. 

Finally, Sun argues that his Complaint states a claim against 

Griswold sufficient to survive Griswold's motion to dismiss. He 

contends that a party aiding and abetting is "just as guilty" as 

the other defendants. The issue is not whether, as an aider and 

abetter or co-conspirator, Griswold could be found liable. 

Liberally construing Sun's pro se Complaint, and accepting his 

factual allegations as true, we must decide whether Sun has stated 

a legally recognizable claim against Griswold. See Tri-Crown. 

Inc. v. American Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n, 908 F.2d 578, 582 (10th 

Cir. 1990). 

Reviewing Sun's Complaint, we agree with the district court 

that his allegations are vague and conclusory, and do not meet the 

challenge of Griswold's motion to dismiss. Accordingly, we affirm 

the district court's dismissal of Sun's Complaint. See Cotner v . . 

Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900, 902 (10th Cir. 1986). 

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Appellate Case: 91-1087 Document: 010110091380 Date Filed: 10/18/1991 Page: 4 
The judgment of the United States District Court for the 

District of Colorado is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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Appellate Case: 91-1087 Document: 010110091380 Date Filed: 10/18/1991 Page: 5