Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03009/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-03009-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Audrey K. King
Respondent
Harvey Mack Leonard
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

HARVEY MACK LEONARD, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

AUDREY K. KING, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:12-cv-3009-KJM-EFB P 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Petitioner is involuntarily committed to Coalinga State Hospital as a sexually violent 

predator (SVP) and proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Respondent moves to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations. 

ECF No. 13. For the reasons that follow, the motion must be denied. 

I. Procedural Background 

 On September 3, 2008, a jury found the petitioner to be a sexually violent predator within 

the meaning of section 6600 of California’s Welfare and Institutions Code. ECF No. 14 

(“Lodged Docs.”) 1. The trial court committed petitioner to an indeterminate term with the 

Department of Mental Health. Lodged Doc. 2. 

 Petitioner filed a direct appeal with the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

District. See Lodged Doc. 3 (Opinion filed in the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 

District, on March 30, 2010). In response to petitioner’s claim that “his indeterminate sentence 

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violates his right to equal protection,” the court remanded the case to the trial court to determine 

whether sufficient justification had been shown for treating SVPs differently than other groups of 

individuals who are involuntarily committed. See id. In all other respect, the court affirmed the 

order of commitment. Id. The record is silent as to if and when the trial court addressed the 

equal protection claim on remand. 

 On April 30, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for review with the California Supreme 

Court, challenging only the “issues affirmed by the Court of Appeal.” Lodged Doc. 4. The 

California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on June 9, 2010. Lodged Doc. 5. 

 On September 2, 2010, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Supreme Court. Lodged Doc. 6. In that petition, petitioner alleged that the equal 

protection claim remained pending in the trial court. Id. at 6, ¶ 17. The California Supreme 

Court denied the petition on April 20, 2011. Lodged Doc. 7. 

 On December 13, 2012, petitioner commenced this action, in which he challenges the 

September 3, 2008 order of commitment. ECF No. 1. Court records reflect that petitioner 

previously challenged the order of commitment in this court, in an action designated Leonard v. 

Ahlin, 2:10-cv-1701-JKS (E.D. Cal.).1 In an order addressing whether petitioner had satisfied the 

requirement that he exhaust his state judicial remedies, U.S. District Judge James K. Singleton 

observed the following: 

 

This case . . . presents a somewhat unique situation. Because the California Court 

of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings on the 

equal protection question, not all of [petitioner]’s potential constitutional claims 

are exhausted. In his Traverse, in his apparent strong desire to have this Court rule 

on his exhausted claims, [petitioner] specifically eschews raising any equal 

protection claim in his Petition to this Court. What [petitioner] overlooks is that, if 

this Court entertains the exhausted claims on the merits and denies relief, should 

[petitioner] lose his unexhausted equal protection claim in the state courts, he 

would more likely than not be barred from seeking further habeas relief in this 

Court as a second or successive petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). On the other 

hand, because the state-court judgment is not yet final, the one-year limitation has 

not yet started to run on any of [petitioner]’s claims. Therefore, dismissal of 

[petitioner’s] Petition without prejudice would not necessarily bar refilling the 

 1

 A court may take judicial notice of court records. See MGIC Indem. Co. v. Weisman, 

803 F.2d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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Petition and raising in that new Petition all of his grounds, including the equal 

protection claim upon its exhaustion in the state courts. 

Leonard v. Ahlin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11832, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012) (emphasis 

added; footnotes omitted). On March 12, 2012, Judge Singleton dismissed the petition without 

prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Judge Singleton, 

noting that the state appellate review process had “not yet been completed,” and that petitioner’s 

SVP civil commitment proceeding “is still on-going,” explained: 

If this Court were to grant [petitioner] the relief requested, it would effectively 

render any further action by the California state courts a nullity. The effect would 

be the same as if this Court entered an order enjoining the Placer County Court 

from proceeding to adjudicate [petitioner]’s continued commitment as a SVP as 

instructed by the California Court of Appeal. This Court may not, under the 

Younger doctrine, enter such a judgment. Indeed, it lacks jurisdiction to do so. 

Accordingly, this Court must abstain and dismiss this action. 

Leonard v. Ahlin, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33568, at *6-8, (E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012). 

II. The Limitations Period and Statutory Tolling 

Under the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a one-year 

limitations period for seeking federal habeas relief begins to run from the latest of: (1) the date the 

judgment became final on direct review (or April 25, 1996, if the judgment became final prior to 

AEDPA’s enactment), (2) the date on which a state-created impediment to filing is removed, (3) 

the date the United States Supreme Court makes a new rule retroactively applicable to cases on 

collateral review, or (4) the date on which the factual predicate of a claim could have been 

discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D); Malcom v. 

Payne, 281 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir. 2002). 

No statute tolls the limitations period “from the time a final decision is issued on direct 

state appeal [to] the time the first state collateral challenge is filed . . . .” Nino v. Galaza, 183 

F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if a petitioner properly files a state post-conviction 

application prior to the expiration of the limitations period, the period is tolled, and remains tolled 

for the entire time that application is “pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). “[A]n application is 

‘properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and 

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rules governing filings.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000). In California, a properly filed 

post-conviction application is “pending” during the intervals between a lower court decision and 

the filing of a new petition in a higher court that elaborates on the claims raised in the lower-court 

petition (rather than raises different claims). Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 953 (9th Cir. 2012);

Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 223 (2002). A federal habeas application does not provide a basis 

for statutory tolling. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001). Nor does a state petition 

filed after the federal limitations period has expired. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 

(9th Cir. 2003). 

III. Motion to Dismiss 

Respondent argues that the petition should be dismissed as untimely. She asserts that the 

statute of limitations began to run on September 8, 2010, after the 90-day period for seeking 

direct review of the California Supreme Court’s June 9, 2010 order, expired. See ECF No. 13 at 

3. She acknowledges that the limitations period was tolled from September 8, 2010 through April 

20, 2011, while petitioner’s second petition before the California Supreme Court was pending, 

id., but reasons that with the benefit of this tolling, the statute of limitations expired one year 

later, on April 20, 2012. Id. She concludes that the instant petition, filed December 13, 2012, 

was filed nearly eight months too late. Id.

However, the assertion that the statute of limitations began to run on September 8, 2010 

lacks support in the record. Respondent submits that petitioner’s order of commitment became 

final after the time for appealing the California Supreme Court’s June 9, 2010 order had passed 

and attributes no significance to the fact that Court of Appeal remanded the matter to the trial 

court for a determination of whether petitioner’s indeterminate sentence violated his right to equal 

protection. As Judge Singleton previously observed, the remand order caused petitioner’s SVP 

civil commitment proceedings to remain ongoing. The record is silent as to how, or even if, the 

trial court ever resolved the issue on remand, or if petitioner thereafter sought further review. 

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Therefore, the court cannot determine when the order of commitment became final for purposes 

of triggering the statute of limitations. 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the limitations period 

shall run from “the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or 

the expiration of the time for seeking such review”). For these reasons, respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition as untimely must be denied. 

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation 

 For the reasons stated above, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 

1. Respondent’s July 1, 2013 motion to dismiss (ECF No. 13) be denied; and 

2. Respondent be directed to file an answer to the petition within 60 days of any order 

adopting these findings and recommendations. 

 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days 

after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 

“Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections 

within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. 

Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991 

Dated: February 12, 2014. 

 2

 Judge Singleton’s dismissal order, dated March 12, 2012, indicates that the issue on 

remand remained pending in the trial court as of that date. 

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