Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03676/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-03676-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company
Defendant
Globe Imports Limited
Plaintiff
Globe Properties
Plaintiff
Robert Maxon
Plaintiff
Nationwide Insurance
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GLOBE IMPORTS LIMITED, INC., 

GLOBE PROPERTIES, and ROBERT 

MAXON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ALLIED PROPERTY AND CASUALTY 

INSURANCE CO. and NATIONWIDE 

INSURANCE,

Defendants.

________________________________/

No. C 14-3676 CW

ORDER ON MOTION 

FOR PARTIAL 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Docket No. 22)

Defendant Nationwide Insurance1 moves for partial summary 

judgment. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Having considered the 

parties' submissions, the Court denies Defendant's motion. 

BACKGROUND

The undisputed facts of this case may be simply stated. 

Plaintiffs owned three buildings in Eureka, California that were 

 

1 Counsel for Nationwide also represents the other named 

Defendant, Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company, in this 

case. The two Defendants' relationships to each other and to the 

case are not clear from the filings presently before the Court. 

The motion for partial summary judgment was filed only on behalf 

of Defendant Nationwide. 

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United States District Court

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damaged by a fire in December of 2006. At the time of the fire, 

Plaintiffs held a commercial property insurance policy with 

Nationwide. Plaintiffs filed a claim under this policy, thus 

beginning a multi-year negotiation regarding the valuation of the 

loss. In June of 2009, Nationwide mailed two letters, each with a 

check enclosed, explaining its calculations and paying the 

balances due on the undisputed portion of the repair costs for two 

of the buildings, referred to by the parties as buildings one and 

three. The parties continued their negotiations. In November of 

2009, Nationwide sent a letter regarding buildings one and three 

stating that Nationwide "will be closing this aspect of the 

claim." Plaintiffs responded with a letter in December of 2009 

requesting that Nationwide keep the files on buildings one and 

three open because Plaintiffs have "issues regarding payment." 

Over subsequent years the parties continued corresponding and 

negotiating regarding the damage to building two. The parties did 

not discuss buildings one and three until January of 2013, when 

Plaintiffs sent some information regarding those buildings as part 

of a "comprehensive package" addressing remaining issues on the

entire insurance claim. In September of 2013 Nationwide responded 

that it had closed its files on buildings one and three in 2009, 

that the policy's appraisal process was unavailable to resolve 

Plaintiffs' remaining disputes on the claim and that Plaintiffs' 

recourse was to seek a "judicial determination." 

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On October 1, 20132, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior 

Court of California, County of Humboldt, asserting that Defendants 

breached their contract in their handling of the claims with 

regard to all three buildings. Defendants removed the case to 

this Court asserting diversity jurisdiction. Defendant Nationwide

now moves for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Court 

must dismiss Plaintiffs' claims regarding buildings one and three

because the one-year statute of limitations contained in the 

policy as required by the California Insurance Code has passed. 

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is appropriate only where the moving party 

demonstrates there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 

and that judgment as a matter of law is warranted. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 

Material facts are those that might affect the outcome of the 

case, as defined by the framework of the underlying substantive 

law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict for either party. Id.

The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the 

district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those 

 

2 Plaintiffs and Defendant Nationwide request that the Court 

take judicial notice of the October 1, 2013 filing date, citing 

Federal Rule of Evidence 201. These requests are GRANTED. United 

States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (court may 

take judicial notice of public records, including records of other 

courts) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 201). 

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portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that 

demonstrate the absence of a disputed issue of material fact. 

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In opposing the motion, the non-moving 

party may not rely merely on the allegations or denials in its 

pleadings, but must set forth “specific facts showing that there 

is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citing 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court must construe the evidence in 

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, making all 

reasonable inferences that can be drawn. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 

Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Intel 

Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551, 1558 (9th 

Cir. 1991); Eisenberg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 815 F.2d 1285, 1289 

(9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION

California Insurance Code sections 2070 and 2071 require all 

fire insurance contracts to contain a one-year statute of 

limitations on legal actions arising under those contracts. In 

Prudential-LMI Com. Ins. v. Superior Ct., the California Supreme 

Court held that the above-cited code provisions establish (1) that 

the one-year statute of limitations begins running at the 

inception of the loss, and (2) that the limitation period is 

"equitably tolled from the time the insured files a timely notice, 

pursuant to policy notice provision, to the time the insurer 

formally denies the claim in writing." 51 Cal. 3d 674, 679 

(1990). In Prudential, as in the case presently before the Court, 

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the insured and insurer undertook a prolonged negotiation to 

determine coverage and the amount of loss; the California Supreme 

Court described the moment equitable tolling ceased as the moment 

when the insureds' "claim was denied unequivocally." Id. at 692. 

Of course, not all fire insurance claims are denied; if the 

parties settle the claim, equitable tolling ceases when the final 

payment is made. Marselis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 Cal. App. 4th 

122, 125 (2004).

Defendant Nationwide argues that equitable tolling ceased,

and the statute of limitations resumed, on November 13, 2009, when 

Nationwide sent Plaintiffs a letter stating that Nationwide had

closed its files on buildings one and three. At that point, 

Nationwide argues, it had made its final payment and the letter

unequivocally notified Plaintiffs that their claim for further 

payments was denied. 

The Court cannot grant Nationwide's motion for partial 

summary judgment. In making this argument, Nationwide seeks to 

take Plaintiffs' single claim, brought under their single policy 

for losses suffered due to a single fire and divide the claim into 

individual assets for purposes of calculating the statute of 

limitations to file suit. Nationwide argues that equitable 

tolling ceased for buildings one and three even though 

negotiations regarding the remainder of Plaintiffs' claim, that 

for building two, were ongoing. Nationwide cites no legal 

authority for dividing the claim into individual assets for the 

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purpose of calculating when a claim accrues. In their opposition, 

Plaintiffs expose the lack legal authority in support of this 

fundamental point of Nationwide's motion and Nationwide replies

only that Plaintiffs' argument is "belied by the facts." 

Certainly, the undisputed facts may show that Plaintiffs did not

actively pursue further compensation for buildings one and three

from November 2009 to September 2013. However, absent authority 

that such inaction has legal import when Plaintiffs were actively 

addressing other portions of their claim, Nationwide cannot 

prevail in partial summary judgment. Nationwide has not shown

entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Nationwide's

motion for partial summary judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 19, 2015 CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

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