Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03007/USCOURTS-caDC-12-03007-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Khaled Mohamed Shabban
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 3, 2014 Decided April 3, 2015

No. 12-3007

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

KHALED MOHAMED SHABBAN, ALSO KNOWN AS KHALED 

SHABBAN, ALSO KNOWN AS KHALED MUHAMAD RASHAD 

SHABBAN, ALSO KNOWN AS MOHAMED RASHAD KHALED,

ALSO KNOWN AS KHALED MOHAMED RASHAD MOHAMED,

ALSO KNOWN AS KHALED MOHAMED RASHAD MOHAMED 

MAHMOUD SHABBAN, ALSO KNOWN AS KHALED RASHAD,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:06-cr-00290-1)

Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the brief was A.J. 

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

David P. Saybolt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, 

Chrisellen R. Kolb, and Carolyn K. Kolben, Assistant U.S. 

Attorneys.

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 1 of 10
2

Before: GRIFFITH and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge GRIFFITH.

GRIFFITH, Circuit Judge: Khaled Shabban challenges his 

conviction for international parental kidnapping on the ground 

that his trial counsel gave him constitutionally defective 

assistance. We disagree and affirm his conviction. 

I

Shabban is an Egyptian national who met Araceli 

Hernandez, a Mexican national, in Washington, D.C.1 They 

had a son together in August 2001. Because the couple did not 

live together, they entered into a consensual order governing 

the custody of their son in the Superior Court of the District of 

Columbia. The parties agreed that Hernandez would have

primary physical custody of the boy, Shabban would have

unsupervised visitation rights, and that their son would “‘not 

be removed from the country without the express[] written 

consent of both parties.’” United States v. Shabban, 612 F.3d 

693, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Trial Tr. 203 (June 19, 

2007)) (alterations in original). Despite this agreement, three 

years after entering into the custody order, Shabban began 

preparing to take his son to Egypt without Hernandez’s 

permission. He sold his coffee business and made 

 1 The facts stated here are taken largely from our earlier 

description of this case in Shabban’s first appeal. See United States 

v. Shabban, 612 F.3d 693 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In that case, Shabban 

argued that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence 

and that his trial counsel’s performance was defective. We found 

sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction, but remanded for an 

evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 2 of 10
3

arrangements for his roommate to take over the lease on their 

apartment. He told his roommate of his plan to take the boy to 

Egypt and claimed that Hernandez did not care. Shabban 

called Hernandez on November 21, 2001, and asked if he 

could take their son to an amusement park. Hernandez agreed. 

Later that day, she tried to call Shabban, but he did not 

answer. She went to his apartment, but he was not there. That 

evening, Shabban and his son boarded a flight to Cairo, with 

Shabban flying under the name “Khaled Rashad.” A week 

later, Shabban called Hernandez and told her that he and their 

son were in Egypt. Hernandez contacted the authorities and 

eventually worked with the FBI over the course of the next 

twenty-two months to convince Shabban to bring the child

back to the United States. 

During their conversations, which were taped, Shabban 

referred to their son’s difficulty learning to communicate and 

told Hernandez that he had taken the child to Egypt to learn a 

single language, Arabic, rather than the three he was hearing 

at home, Arabic, Spanish, and English. Shabban admitted 

taking the child without the permission of Hernandez. Upon 

the FBI’s advice, Hernandez asked and eventually convinced 

Shabban to return their son to the United States in time for the 

next school year. Federal agents arrested Shabban at the 

airport when he arrived in New York. After his arrest, 

Shabban told the FBI that he had taken his son to Egypt 

because the child was having difficulty speaking and 

understanding others. Shabban also admitted that Hernandez 

would not have given him permission to take the child abroad 

had he asked first. 

Shabban was charged with international parental 

kidnapping in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1204(a), which makes 

it a crime to “remove[] a child from the United States, or 

attempt[] to do so . . . with intent to obstruct the lawful 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 3 of 10
4

exercise of parental rights.” At trial, Shabban argued that he 

lacked the specific intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental 

rights that the statute requires because his sole purpose in 

taking their son was to place him in an environment that 

would improve his speech. Shabban’s trial counsel pursued 

this defense by introducing recordings of Shabban’s phone 

calls with Hernandez and cross-examining Hernandez and 

FBI witnesses. The prosecution argued that while Shabban no 

doubt intended to help his son, he also intended to obstruct 

Hernandez’s rights, which was all that was needed to support 

a conviction. The jury agreed with the prosecution and 

convicted Shabban. The trial judge sentenced him to thirty-six 

months’ imprisonment. 

Shabban appealed, arguing that there was insufficient 

evidence to support his conviction and that his trial counsel’s 

performance was defective for numerous reasons, including 

that he failed to call a school teacher and a social worker, both 

of whom worked with the child at school and would have 

testified that he had problems with speech and 

comprehension. We rejected Shabban’s challenge to the 

weight of the evidence but remanded his claim of ineffective 

assistance for an evidentiary hearing. See Shabban, 612 F.3d 

at 697-98; see also United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 

909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Due to the fact-intensive nature of 

the [ineffective assistance of counsel] inquiry . . . this court’s 

general practice is to remand the claim for an evidentiary 

hearing.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

At the hearing, the district court considered affidavits 

from Shabban and his trial counsel, Steven McCool, along 

with testimony from McCool. In Shabban’s affidavit he

alleged that “[t]he social worker and teachers at my son’s 

school said that my son was slow [and] that he should be put 

into some kind of ‘special education’ class.” J.A. 76. Shabban 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 4 of 10
5

averred that he had given McCool the name of his son’s 

teacher and the school’s contact information. He asked, “[i]f 

Mr. McCool was able to locate my son’s teacher and 

interview her, why did he not ask her about the social 

worker’s name because they worked in the same school? And, 

why did he not ask them to come to the Court to testify about 

my son’s condition[?]” J.A. 77. 

In his affidavit, McCool replied that he had hired an 

investigator who visited the child’s school. The investigator 

did not interview the social worker because Shabban “did not 

provide the name of [his son’s] social worker.” J.A. 52. In any 

event, according to McCool, any testimony the social worker 

could have provided was already before the jury because “Ms. 

Hernandez testified [at trial] that a social worker told her that 

[her son] had difficulty with verbal communication.” J.A. 52. 

According to McCool’s affidavit, the investigator interviewed 

the principal, who “would not have provided evidence 

favorable to Mr. Shabban,” and the child’s teacher, who 

“would not have provided evidence unfavorable to Mr.

Shabban.” J.A. 51-52. But at the evidentiary hearing, McCool 

testified somewhat differently. The teacher’s testimony, he 

asserted, would not have been favorable to Shabban and 

would have been consistent with the principal’s testimony. 

The teacher would have testified that even though the child

“did indeed have some language difficulties, . . . he was 

progressing at school, and . . . that there was no need to take 

him to Egypt for three years to work on his language 

difficulties.” Evid. Hear. 12. 

The district court denied Shabban’s claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, holding that McCool had thoroughly 

investigated the teacher, found that her testimony would have 

been unfavorable (without mention of the contradictory 

affidavit), and made an informed decision not to call her as a 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 5 of 10
6

witness. This was a “strategic choice” to which the court was 

required to defer. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

690-91 (1984). As for the social worker, the court determined

that even if McCool should have done more to find her, 

Shabban suffered no prejudice because Hernandez had 

testified at trial about the social worker’s concerns with the 

boy’s language skills. Shabban now appeals. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II

An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel 

must show: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient and 

(2) “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 694. 

Although we review the district court’s factual findings for 

clear error, the standard of review for a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel is unsettled in this circuit. Such a claim 

presents mixed questions of law and fact, which are 

sometimes reviewed de novo and sometimes only for abuse of 

discretion. See United States v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 432-33 

(D.C. Cir. 2005). We have not yet decided which should 

apply because we have not yet confronted an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim in which the standard made a 

difference. See id. And we see no reason to select between the 

standards now, because Shabban’s claim “fails even under the 

more searching de novo standard.” Id. at 433. 

A

First, we must ask whether trial counsel’s performance 

was deficient. Our review is “highly deferential” with “a 

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the 

wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 6 of 10
7

466 U.S. at 689. Counsel’s strategic choices made after 

thorough investigation are “virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 

690. 

Shabban challenges McCool’s decision not to call the

teacher as a witness. Before we can determine whether this 

decision was deficient, we must ask whether the district court 

erred in finding that McCool concluded that the teacher’s 

testimony would have been unfavorable to Shabban. 

According to Shabban, the teacher would have testified that 

his son had difficulty speaking and understanding English, 

which would have bolstered his defense that he had no other 

aim in taking his son to Egypt but to help him. See J.A. 76-77. 

Shabban points to the statement in McCool’s affidavit that the 

teacher “would not have provided evidence unfavorable to 

Mr. Shabban.” J.A. 51-52. But at the hearing, McCool 

contradicted his affidavit and clearly explained that the 

teacher’s testimony would not have helped Shabban. Instead, 

she would have testified that, despite some difficulties, the 

child was “progressing at school” and that “there was no need 

to take him to Egypt for three years to work on his language 

difficulties.” Evid. Hear. 12. The district court credited 

McCool’s testimony at the hearing and found that he did not

call the teacher to the stand because he determined that her

testimony would not have been favorable to Shabban. This 

factual finding was not clearly erroneous. Though the district 

court made no mention of the contradictory affidavit, it was 

reasonable for the court to conclude that the more detailed 

hearing testimony was accurate. The language in the affidavit, 

it seems, likely contained an unfortunate typographical error

that created an unintended double negative. The statement 

that the teacher’s testimony “would not have been 

unfavorable” likely should have said that it “would not have 

been favorable,” a description that is supported by McCool’s 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 7 of 10
8

testimony. Thus, the district court did not clearly err and we 

uphold its findings.

We have no trouble concluding that McCool’s decision 

not to call the teacher to testify was well within the “wide 

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 689. It was only after McCool interviewed the teacher 

and learned that what she had to say would have been 

unfavorable to Shabban that he decided not to call her as a 

witness. Such a judgment based on a thorough investigation is 

precisely the kind of “sound trial strategy” that Strickland

directs us to protect from challenge. See id. (internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

Nor was McCool deficient in failing to call the social 

worker to testify. Shabban argues that, like the teacher, the 

social worker “presumably could have testified with more 

expertise and authority” than Hernandez about the child’s

communication difficulties. Although this may be true, as

McCool explained, not only did Shabban never identify the 

social worker to him, but McCool did not recall Shabban ever 

telling him that his son saw a social worker at school. We find 

it reasonable that McCool “would not have asked [an 

investigator] to identify a social worker that [he] was not 

aware of.” Evid. Hear. 13. Shabban does not counter 

McCool’s version of the events, but argues that McCool 

would have found the social worker with a more diligent 

investigation of the school. We disagree. McCool took 

adequate measures to locate witnesses at the child’s school. 

After concluding that both the teacher and the principal would 

provide testimony unfavorable to Shabban, McCool 

determined that no further investigation was needed. Under 

the circumstances, this decision was reasonable. McCool was 

“entitled to . . . balance limited resources in accord with 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 8 of 10
9

effective trial tactics and strategies.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 107 (2011). 

B

Not only does Shabban fail to show that McCool’s 

performance was defective, we also conclude that he has not 

shown any prejudice. Even had the social worker and teacher 

testified about the child’s language difficulties, evidence of 

this kind was already introduced at trial through recorded 

phone calls between Hernandez and Shabban, Hernandez’s 

own testimony, and testimony from an FBI agent who 

interviewed Shabban. As the district court stated at the 

evidentiary hearing, “there is no question the trial established 

that [Shabban’s] son suffered from language and 

communication problems. There is no question that he took 

his son, in his eyes, to Egypt to improve his language 

communication problems. All of that was brought out at 

trial.” Evid. Hear. 111. Thus, any testimony from the teacher 

or social worker would have been cumulative only. See 

United States v. Mitchell, 216 F.3d 1126, 1131 & n.2 (D.C. 

Cir. 2000); see also Toms, 396 F.3d at 434-35. More 

importantly, this testimony could not have undermined the 

significant evidence that Shabban was aware his actions 

would obstruct Hernandez’s parental rights. The statute 

requires only an “intent to obstruct” parental rights, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 1204(a), and as Shabban conceded, evidence of multiple 

motives does not exonerate a defendant where there is 

evidence of the requisite intent. See Shabban, 612 F.3d at 696. 

Shabban argues that the testimony from the teacher and the 

social worker would have established his intent to help his son 

with language development. Maybe so. Regardless, that 

testimony in no way diminishes the substantial evidence that 

indicates Shabban’s intent to obstruct Hernandez’s parental 

rights, including his lies to Hernandez about his plans for their 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 9 of 10
10

child and his admission to the FBI that she would not have 

given him permission to take their son. Shabban’s actions

directly violated the custody agreement he signed. The 

government therefore demonstrated the intent the statute 

requires. Shabban’s attempt to prove that he had some 

additional motive accomplishes nothing so long as the 

evidence of his intent to impede Hernandez’s rights remains 

unchallenged. Thus, Shabban’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim fails on both Strickland prongs. 

III

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction is affirmed. 

USCA Case #12-3007 Document #1545764 Filed: 04/03/2015 Page 10 of 10