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Parties Involved:
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints
Appellee
Thomas S. Monson
Appellee
Edgar Tiedemann
Appellant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

EDGAR TIEDEMANN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF 

LATTER DAY SAINTS; THOMAS S. 

MONSON, Pres., 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

No. 15-4076 

(D.C. No. 2:13-CV-00452-CW) 

(D. Utah) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

Edgar Tiedemann, a Utah state prisoner, appeals the dismissal of his civilrights case filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We dismiss this appeal as frivolous under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 

BACKGROUND 

 Tiedemann brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, 

a church and its leader, violated his constitutional rights by endangering his soul. 

 *

 After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding 

precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral 

estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit 

November 25, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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Because Tiedemann is a prisoner, the district court screened his lawsuit under 28 

U.S.C. § 1915A and concluded that it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted. The district court dismissed Tiedemann’s case and cited 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(b)(1), which requires dismissal of a complaint if it “is frivolous, malicious, 

or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted . . . .” 

 Tiedemann timely appealed. He filed in the district court a motion to proceed 

in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. The district court denied Tiedemann’s motion 

after concluding that Tiedemann had accumulated three strikes under the Prison 

Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and disallowed him from 

proceeding on appeal without his prepaying the entire appellate-filing fee. See 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(g). 

DISCUSSION 

I. Strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 

Before addressing Tiedemann’s appeal, we consider whether he has 

accumulated three strikes and must first prepay the appellate-filing fee. We conclude 

that Tiedemann need not prepay, because before his present appeal he had 

accumulated only two strikes. 

Congress passed the PLRA to address the “sharp rise in prisoner litigation in 

the federal courts.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

Under the PLRA, prisoners obtain a “strike” against them for purposes of future IFP 

eligibility when their “action or appeal in a court of the United States . . . was 

dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon 

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which relief may be granted . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 

1262, 1265 (10th Cir. 2013). Once a prisoner accumulates three strikes, he must 

prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider his civil actions and 

appeals. Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th Cir. 2011). 

The district court denied Tiedemann leave to proceed IFP on appeal. It cited 

three cases where it believed that Tiedemann had accumulated separate strikes under 

the PLRA. First, the district court cited Tiedemann’s 2012 case that it had dismissed 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) after concluding that it failed to state a claim upon 

which relief could be granted. Tiedemann v. Corum, No. 2:11-CV-668, Doc. No. 10, 

at 5 (D. Utah May 5, 2012). We agree that the dismissal of this case counts as a 

strike. See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1176 (noting that a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B) counts as a strike for PLRA purposes). 

Second, the district court concluded that a strike was warranted for a case that 

Tiedemann had filed against law enforcement officers for violating his constitutional 

rights during his arrest. There, the district court dismissed Tiedemann’s complaint for 

failure to state a claim, but it appointed counsel to determine whether that case (and 

others) alleged any viable claims to include in an amended complaint. Tiedemann v. 

Stinson, No. 2:07-CV-00907-TC, Doc. No. 36, at 6–8 (D. Utah Jan. 27, 2009).

Appointed counsel later consulted with Tiedemann and told the district court that 

Tiedemann wished to voluntarily dismiss the case. Tiedemann v. Stinson, No. 2:07-

CV-00907-TC, Doc. No. 46, at 2 (D. Utah Feb. 25, 2010). The district court then 

dismissed the case and directed the clerk to close the matter. Id.

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We disagree with the district court that this dismissal counts as a strike against 

Tiedemann. The district court did not dismiss the case because of one of the statutory 

factors in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). See Phillips v. Humble, 587 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th 

Cir. 2009); Moya v. Schollenbarger, 465 F.3d 444, 449 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Rather, we 

‘endeavor to scrutinize [complaint dismissals] . . . closely in order to pinpoint those 

situations wherein, in a practical sense, the district court by its order has dismissed a 

plaintiff’s action as well.’” (quoting Petty v. Manpower, Inc., 591 F.2d 615, 617 

(10th Cir. 1979) (alterations in original))). Instead, the district court appointed 

counsel to determine whether Tiedemann had any claims that would merit an 

amended complaint. Counsel concluded that Tiedemann did not and asked for a 

voluntary dismissal of the case, which the district court granted. A voluntary 

dismissal does not count as a PLRA strike. See Hafed, 635 F.3d at 1176 (stating that, 

under the PLRA, a dismissal counts as a strike when an action or appeal “is 

dismissed as frivolous, as malicious, or for failure to state a claim”). 

But we agree that the district court’s third case—its dismissal in this very 

case—counts as a strike. The district court dismissed Tiedemann’s case for failure to 

state a claim and cited 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This dismissal counts as a strike for 

PLRA purposes. See Childs, 713 F.3d at 1266 (assessing a strike for a district-court 

dismissal under § 1915A). See also Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 

(2015) (holding that a prior dismissal on a ground listed in § 1915 counts as a strike 

even if the dismissal is the subject of an appeal). 

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We have reviewed Tiedemann’s remaining cases and all but one were 

voluntary dismissals that do not count as strikes under the PLRA.1

 Thus, Tiedemann 

has only two strikes. He can proceed on appeal without prepaying the filing fee. But 

we now assess a strike—Tiedemann’s third—in dismissing this appeal as frivolous. 

See Jennings v. Natrona Cty. Det. Ctr. Med. Facility, 175 F.3d 775, 780 (10th Cir. 

1999) (imposing a strike for dismissal of frivolous appeal). 

II. Tiedemann’s Appeal 

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. 

Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). Tiedemann is a pro se litigant, 

so we view his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 

1991). But we will not serve as Tiedemann’s attorney in constructing arguments and 

searching the record. See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 

840 (10th Cir. 2005). 

The district court correctly dismissed Tiedemann’s lawsuit. To state a claim 

under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege, among other things, that the defendant was 

 1

 The remaining case, Tiedemann v. Salt Lake Cty. Adult Det. Ctr., No. 2:08-

CV-00298-DAK, was dismissed for a failure to prosecute. We noted in Hafed that a 

dismissal for failure to prosecute would not necessarily count as a strike because the 

dismissal would not be for grounds listed in § 1915. 635 F.3d at 1179. But we 

assessed a strike for a dismissal based on failure to prosecute because the Seventh 

Circuit also had determined that Hafed’s appeal was frivolous. Id. at 1179. Here, the 

district court did not determine or state that Tiedemann’s case was frivolous, was 

malicious, or failed to state a claim. Thus, this dismissal cannot count as a strike. See 

id.; Butler v. Dep’t of Justice, 492 F.3d 440, 442–44 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (concluding 

that a dismissal for failure to prosecute was not a strike because such a dismissal was 

made without regard to the merits, and each of the three strike categories in § 1915(g) 

involve dispositions looking to the merits). 

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acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). This requires 

a defendant to have exercised power “possessed by virtue of state law and made 

possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” Id.

(quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). Tiedemann did not 

allege in his complaint how the plaintiffs acted under color of state law. 

Even liberally construing his appellate pleadings, we discern no coherent 

argument challenging the district court’s dismissal. Instead, we see Tiedemann 

reiterating that the defendants are endangering his soul (and defining what the “soul” 

means) and asserting that the district judge’s religious beliefs led him to an incorrect 

decision. Tiedemann has not raised a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and 

facts, and we dismiss his appeal. 

CONCLUSION 

 We dismiss Tiedemann’s appeal as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We also assess a strike for this frivolous appeal. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(g). Tiedemann now has three strikes under § 1915(g). He is barred from 

proceeding IFP in future civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he is “under 

imminent danger of serious physical injury,” § 1915(g), and unless he makes 

“specific [and] credible” allegations to that effect. Kinnell v. Graves, 265 F.3d 1125, 

1127–28 (10th Cir. 2001). We deny Tiedemann’s motion to proceed IFP on this 

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appeal, and we order immediate payment of the unpaid balance due. 

Entered for the Court 

Gregory A. Phillips 

Circuit Judge 

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