Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03912/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03912-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jimmy Quinn
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable E. Richard Webber, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the

Honorable Frederick R. Buckles, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern

District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3912

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Jimmy Quinn, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: January 25, 2005

Filed: February 7, 2005

___________

Before BYE, RILEY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

A jury found Jimmy Quinn guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm as a

previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). He

appeals his conviction and his sentence as an armed career criminal. Quinn’s counsel

has moved to withdraw and filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), arguing the district court1

 erred in denying Quinn’s motion to suppress,

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because the search of Quinn’s home was conducted without his consent, a warrant,

or legal justification; and the written statement Quinn later made at the police station

resulted from coercion and was not made knowingly and voluntarily, given Quinn’s

mild mental retardation and minimal reading ability. Counsel further argues the

government’s witnesses perjured themselves, the government presented insufficient

evidence for the jury to find Quinn guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and Quinn had

ineffective trial counsel. We affirm.

The district court properly denied the suppression motion. See United States

v. Morgan, 270 F.3d 625, 630 (8th Cir. 2001) (court reviews district court’s factual

findings for clear error, and its conclusions of law de novo). Detective John Blakely,

Jr., testified that Quinn not only gave his oral consent to the search, but also signed

a consent form, which Blakely had read aloud to him, and which indicated Quinn had

willingly given consent to Blakely to search his home. There is no evidence that

Blakely coerced Quinn into consenting, that Quinn appeared irrational or incoherent,

or that Quinn’s limited intelligence and reading ability affected the voluntary nature

of his consent. See United States v. Gipp, 147 F.3d 680, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1998)

(whether voluntary consent to search has been given is question for trial court based

on totality of circumstances; holding defendant voluntarily consented to search where

defendant appeared rational when offering his consent and was clearly cooperating

with authorities); United States v. Hall, 969 F.2d 1102, 1105-09 (D.C. Cir. 1992)

(consent voluntary even though 18-year-old defendant had low IQ, second-grade

reading level, and psychological problems); United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377,

381-82 (8th Cir. 1990) (voluntary-consent factors). 

As to the written statement, Blakely testified that Quinn was told he could

leave at any time, and that Quinn volunteered to come down to the police station and

make a formal statement. Both Blakely and Detective Flint Dees testified that Dees

had read the statement aloud to Quinn before he signed it, and that Quinn appeared

rational. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (finding

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defendant was not in custody where he voluntarily went to police station to make

statement, and police advised defendant he was not under arrest). Further, the

evidence from the suppression hearing indicates Quinn was advised of his Fifth

Amendment rights, and the fact that Quinn is mildly mentally retarded does not

invalidate his waiver of those rights. See United States v. Turner, 157 F.3d 552, 555-

56 (8th Cir. 1998) (valid waiver by defendant with low-average to borderline IQ);

Rice v. Cooper, 148 F.3d 747, 749-52 (7th Cir. 1998) (valid waiver by illiterate

defendant with mild mental handicap), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1160 (1999); Correll v.

Thompson, 63 F.3d 1279, 1288 (4th Cir. 1995) (valid waiver by defendant with IQ

of 68 who had prior experience with legal system), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1035

(1996).

Regarding the trial claims, we note that credibility determinations are for the

trier of fact. See Weber v. Block, 784 F.2d 313, 316-17 (8th Cir. 1986). We

conclude that the trial evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict,

amply supports the jury’s guilty verdict. Quinn admitted at both the house and the

police station that the military rifle described in the indictment was his. He stipulated

at trial that he was a convicted felon, and that the rifle had traveled in and affected

interstate commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (felon-in-possession elements); United

States v. Stroh, 176 F.3d 439, 440 (8th Cir. 1999) (sufficiency-of-evidence standard

of review). Any ineffective-assistance claim should be raised in 28 U.S.C. § 2255

proceedings. See United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir. 1998).

Having carefully reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80

(1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw, and we affirm. 

______________________________

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