Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01090/USCOURTS-ca10-91-01090-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Alexander Henry
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT SEP 1 8 1992 

ROBERT L. HOEC.F.:F'S~ 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) 

) 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

JAMES ALEXANDER HENRY, aka Antonne) 

Hackett, aka Clyde Chadmen, aka ) 

Yak, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellant. ) 

Nos. 91-1090-1091 

(D.C. Nos. 90-CR-297-298) 

(D. Colo.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, Circuit Judge, and McWILLIAMS and BARRETT, Senior 

Circuit Judges. 

This case was initially set for oral argument. However, 

counsel for both parties thereafter waived oral argument. After 

examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has also 

determined that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. The cause is therefore submitted 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 

34. 1. 9. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-1090 Document: 010110353428 Date Filed: 09/18/1992 Page: 1
James Alexander Henry was the defendant in two indictments 

returned by a federal grand jury sitting in Denver, Colorado. The 

first indictment was returned on October 31, 1990, and will hereafter be referred to as 297. In that indictment the defendant was 

named as follows: "James Alexander Henry, a/k/a Antonne Hackett, 

a/k/a Clyde Chadmen, a/k/a "Yak." 

In the first count of 297, Henry was charged with unlawfully 

possessing with an intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base on September 28, 1990, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 u.s.c. § 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(A)(iii). 

In a second count, Henry was charged with unlawfully using the 

United States Postal Service on September 28, 1990, to facilitate 

the commission of a felony, namely, the possession with an intent 

to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 

21 U.S.C. §§ 84l(a) and 843(b). In a third and final count in 

that particular indictment, Henry was charged with providing on 

October 1, 1990, false and fictitious statements for the preparation of his Personal History of Defendant form USM-312, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, to wit, that his true and correct name 

was Antonne Hackett, when in fact he knew his true name was James 

Alexander Henry. 

ber 

A second indictment against Henry was also returned on 

31, 1990, and will hereinafter be referred to as 298. 

OctoIn 298 

the defendant was named as follows: "James Alexander Henry, a/k/a 

Antonne Hackett, a/k/a Clyde Chadmen." The charge in the one 

count contained in 298 was that Henry on July 18, 1990, possessed 

in and affecting commerce a firearm, to wit, a Smith and Wesson 

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Amm Model 639, after having been previously convicted of two felonies, including a conviction on December 20, 1984, in Los Angeles, 

California, for felony assault with a firearm and a conviction on 

June 8, 1987, for felony possession of a controlled substance in 

Los Angeles, California, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(l) 

and 924 (a)(l)(D). 

As concerns 297, a jury convicted Henry on all three counts 

in the indictment. As concerns 298, Henry entered into a plea 

agreement and Statement of Facts Relevant to Sentencing with the 

United States whereby he agreed to plead guilty to the one count 

in the indictment and the United States, in turn, agreed to recommend to the district court that any sentence imposed in 298 be 

served concurrently with the sentence imposed in 297. Pursuant to 

such understanding, Henry pleaded guilty to the one count in 298. 

Henry was thereafter sentenced to imprisonment for 262 months 

on count one in 297. Henry was sentenced to imprisonment for 48 

months on count two in 297 and 60 months on count three in 297, 

both sentences to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed 

on count one in 297. 

In 298, Henry was sentenced to imprisonment for 33 months 

also to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed on count 

one in 297. 

On appeal counsel raises two issues: (1) in 297 the district 

court erred in admitting evidence of Henry's aliases; and (2) in 

sentencing Henry, the district court erred in considering Henry's 

"prior unconstitutional conviction of shooting into an inhabited 

dwelling in calculating his criminal history scale." We are not 

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persuaded by either of these assignments of error, and therefore 

affirm. A brief recital of the facts adduced at the trial in 297 

will put these matters in focus . 

In September, 1990, Agent Pat Carr, a United States Postal 

Inspector, was alerted to a possible drug transport from Los Angeles, California, to premises located at Ursula Street and 13th 

Place in Aurora, Colorado. On September 27, 1990, Carr received a 

call from Postal Inspector Delaney, who stated that he had an express mail package addressed to an A. Jackson, 13031 East 13th 

Place, Apartment 6, Aurora, Colorado, from Los Angeles, California, and that a canine had alerted to the package. Carr obtained 

a search warrant for the package, and the ensuing examination 

thereof disclosed approximately 97 grams of crack cocaine. Carr 

retained a portion of the cocaine and then obtained permission 

from a magistrate to make a controlled delivery of the rest of the 

cocaine, which was repackaged. Carr then posed as a mailman and 

delivered the package to the manager of the apartment at 13031 

East 13th Place, Aurora, Colorado. The apartment house manager 

testified that he delivered the package to the defendant, who had 

formerly been a tenant in the apartment and whom the manager 

stated he knew only as "Yak." Henry was arrested at the scene, 

and the present prosecution followed. 

As concerns count three in 297, the parties sti pulated at 

trial that on or about October 1, 1990, the defendant stated to 

Deputy Marshall Margaret Louis in response to questions being 

asked during booking in order to prepare form USM-312, a personal 

history of the defendant, that his name was Antonne Hackett and 

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Appellate Case: 91-1090 Document: 010110353428 Date Filed: 09/18/1992 Page: 4
that his date of birth was June 5, 1965, when the defendant knew 

his true and correct name was James Alexander Henry and his true 

and correct date of birth was June 6, 1966. 

I. Evidence of Henry's Aliases 

Prior to trial in 297, defense counsel moved to sever count 

three from the trial of the first two counts. The motion was denied, and that order has not been challenged on appeal. Prior to 

trial in 297, defense counsel also moved to delete the several 

aliases from the indictment. As indicated, the defendant in 297 

was named as "James Henry Alexander, a/k/a Antonne Hackett, a/k/a 

Clyde Chadmen, a/k/a 'Yak.'" The district court denied 

defendant's motion to delete aliases, and, at trial, testimony 

concerning the aliases "Antonne Hackett" and "Yak" was received, 

apparently without objection. There was no testimony in the trial 

of 297 regarding defendant's use of the alias "Clyde Chadmen," and 

that alias was deleted before the case was submitted to the jury. 

In this regard, defense counsel advised the district court at the 

hearing on the motion to delete that the defendant had used the 

alias "Clyde Chadmen" in connection with the charge in 298, but 

not in_ connection with any of the charges in 297. 

We find no error in the district court's denial of the motion 

to delete the alias mentioned in count three in 297 which charged 

the defendant with giving a false statement in connection with the 

preparation of his personal history form by stating that his name 

was Antonne Hackett, when his true name was John Alexander Henry. 

The use of the alias "Antonne Hackett" was an essential element of 

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the crime charged in count three of 297. And, as indicated, defense counsel at trial stipulated that the defendant had in fact 

falsely stated that his name was Antonne Hackett. 

Further, there was no error in refusing to delete the alias 

"Yak." Donald Lucero, the manager of the apartment who testified 

that he delivered the package in question to the defendant, further testified that he knew defendant only by the nickname "Yak," 

not "John Alexander Henry." 

As indicated, there was no testimony in the trial of 297 concerning the alias "Clyde Chadmen," and that name was removed from 

the caption of the case when instructions were given the jury. 

Under such circumstances, we perceive no error. 

We are not impressed with counsel's argument that testimony 

concerning defendant's use of "other names" somehow constituted 

evidence of "other crimes." Nor are we particularly impressed 

with the further suggestion that the use of an alias by any defendant somehow necessarily indicates overall guilt. We are more 

impressed with the reasoning of the district court that the 

defendant's use of a false name (count three) is arguably some 

indication of guilty knowledge as to counts one and two. Be that 

as it may, we are in accord with the rationale in United States v. 

Hines, 955 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1992), where the Eleventh Circuit 

held that the use of an alias in an indictment and reference 

thereto in testimony is permissible if it is necessary to connect 

the defendant with the crimes charged. In the instant case, 

Donald Lucero, who testified that he delivered the package containing the cocaine to the defendant, stated that he had never 

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heard of the name "John Alexander Henry" and knew the defendant 

only as "Yak." As concerns the name "Antonne Hackett," it was 

stipulated that the defendant falsely gave that name to the authorities. Hence, it was proper to include that name as an alias 

in the indictment and to mention it in testimony at trial . 

II. Use of Prior Conviction in Sentencing 

On appeal, counsel also argues that the district court erred 

in factoring into the calculation of Henry's criminal history category his 1984 conviction in a state court in California for 

shooting into an inhabited dwelling (assault with a firearm). 

Prior to the defendant's pleading guilty to the one count charged 

in 298, defense counsel filed a motion to strike the two prior 

felony convictions in California that formed the predicate for the 

federal charge of possessing a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony. At the hearing on that motion, defense counsel, who does not represent Henry in this appeal, indicated that his position was that in neither of the California convictions had Henry made a voluntary waiver of his right to trial 

by jury. In colloquy between counsel and the court, the government attorney stated that she was prepared to offer certified copies of the California judgments, and defense counsel indicated 

that Henry was prepared to testify that he was not advised of his 

right to trial by jury. At that juncture the district court "suggested ... that if the government wants to use these things as 

prior convictions, and there's a challenge to the voluntariness of 

the plea, the government had better be prepared to show that the 

plea was voluntary or tell me why it's irrelevant [and] it seems 

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to me that it is relevant." The district court then continued to 

a future date defendant's motion to strike the prior California 

convictions. 

When the defendant's motion to strike came on for further 

hearing, the district court announced that under United States v. 

Mayfield, 810 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1987), the defendant could not 

in the present proceeding challenge the propriety of the prior 

California convictions. In Mayfield we held that a defendant 

charged with acquiring a firearm and in connection therewith 

falsely denying that he had previously been convicted of a felony 

could not challenge the propriety of his prior felony conviction, 

even though a void conviction, unless the prior conviction had 

been formally declared a nullity prior to the acquisition of the 

firearm. In so holding, we agreed that the unambiguous legislative intent was that it was a felony for a person who had previously been convicted of a felony to acquire a firearm by falsely 

denying that he had suffered a prior felony conviction, even 

though the conviction might be subject to collateral attack as 

being a void conviction. 

With this turn of events, the district court stated that 

there was no need for the government attorney to present evidence 

that defendant's pleas in the California convictions were based on 

a voluntary waiver of the right to trial by jury. However, government counsel then advised the court that a witness had been 

flown from California to Denver who would testify concerning the 

California convictions and that the propriety of those convictions 

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could possibly be raised by the defendant at sentencing, particularly in connection with the calculation of defendant's criminal 

history category. Accordingly, an assistant district attorney for 

the County of Los Angeles, California, testified regarding 

defendant's California convictions. As regards the 1984 conviction for assault with a firearm, which is the prior conviction 

involved here on appeal, that witness testified that the records 

thereof indicated a knowing waiver of right to trial by jury. 1 So 

far as we can tell from the record, Henry never did testify that 

he had not voluntarily waived his right to trial by jury in the 

1984 proceeding in California. 

As indicated, defendant, pursuant to a plea agreement, 

changed his plea in 298 to guilty. At sentencing, defense counsel 

made only one objection to the pre-sentence report which concerned 

an altercation in which Henry was involved while in jail on the 

present charges. There was no objection to the use of both California convictions in calculating Henry's criminal history category. 

On appeal, Henry's present counsel argues that the district 

court erred in using the 1984 conviction for assault with a firearm in calculating Henry's criminal history category. As indicated, this matter was not raised in the district court, and generally matters not raised in the district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal unless such be "plain error." 

1 As we understand it, the 1984 conviction in California came 

in a bench trial based on a transcript of a preliminary hearing 

after Henry waived his right to trial by jury. After conviction 

he was then placed on probation. 

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In view of the testimony of the assistant district attorney from 

Los Angeles, we are not inclined to find "plain error. 112 

Counsel also argues that there was ineffective assistance of 

counsel in the 1984 conviction in California. That, too, was 

never raised in the district court, and we see no need to remand 

this for further proceedings in the district court. There was no 

error in the district court's imposition of the maximum term of 

imprisonment permitted by the sentencing guidelines. Under the 

described circumstances, we perceive no miscarriage of justice. 

Judgment affirmed. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Robert H. Mcwilliams 

Senior Circuit Judge 

2 Counsel for Henry on appeal apparently agrees that at the 

time of Henry's sentencing the district court, under Sentencing 

Guideline 4Al.2, Commentary, Background, had the discretion to allow, or refuse to allow, Henry to collaterally attack his 1984 

conviction in California. 

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