Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01134/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01134-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Richard Daniel Martin
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Richard Daniel Martin asserts he is entitled to supplemental security income under 

Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in 

evaluating the credibility of his subjective complaint. Because the ALJ identified clear and convincing 

reasons to support the adverse credibility determination, the administrative decision is AFFIRMED, 

and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19) is GRANTED. 

BACKGROUND

On May 21, 2013, Plaintiff filed an application for benefits, in which he alleged disability 

beginning April 20, 2013. (Doc. 11-3 at 12) The Social Security Administration denied the application 

at the initial level and upon reconsideration. (Id.; Doc. 11-5 at 3, 12) Plaintiff requested a hearing, and 

testified before an ALJ on March 5, 2014. (Id. at 12, 26) The ALJ determined Plaintiff was not 

disabled under the Social Security Act, and issued an order denying benefits on March 14, 2014. (Id. at 

RICHARD DANIEL MARTIN, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-01134 - JLT

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION 

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DIRECTING 

ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 

DEFENDANT, CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, AND 

AGAINST PLAINTIFF RICHARD MARTIN

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12-20) Plaintiff filed a request for review of the decision with the Appeals Council, which denied the

request on May 22, 2014. (Id. at 2-7) Therefore, the ALJ’s determination became the final decision of 

the Commissioner of Social Security. 

On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff initiated this action for judicial review of the ALJ’s decision by 

filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Plaintiff filed his opening brief in the matter on May 

7, 2015. (Doc. 18) Defendant filed a brief in opposition on June 5, 2015. (Doc. 19)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 

the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 

such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal standards 

were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 

must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 

DISABILITY BENEFITS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish he is unable to 

engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if:

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not 

only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and 

work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 

the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in 

which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would 

be hired if he applied for work. 

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42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 

the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 

gainful employment. Maounis v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984).

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 

evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920(a)-(f). The process requires 

the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 

alleged disability, (2) had medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of the

listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) had 

the residual functional capacity to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform other work 

existing in significant numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider testimonial 

and objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

A. Relevant Medical Evidence

On April 20, 2013, Plaintiff was admitted into the hospital on a psychiatric “5150 hold” as a 

danger to himself after he called 911. (Doc 11-8 at 6; Doc. 11-9 at 4) Plaintiff reported “his wife 

recently left... and took the kids,” after which he tried to cut his own neck. (Doc. 11-8 at 6) Dr. Bauer 

noted Plaintiff had a “very small” and superficial cut on his neck, and exhibited a depressed mood and 

suicidal ideation. (Id. at 6-7) On April 21, Plaintiff reported he no longer had suicidal ideations, and 

denied having any hallucinations. (Id. at 13) He was given a urine drug screen and HCG test, and 

tested positive for methamphetamines. (Id. at 17) Plaintiff admitted he had a history of using 

methamphetamines, cannabis, heroin, and cocaine. (Id. at 14-15) He was discharged from the 5150 

hold on April 22, and referred to Fresno County Department of Behavioral Health. (Id. at 12, 21)

On April 30, 2013, Dr. Lois Ratzlaff noted Plaintiff had been diagnosed with “adjustment 

disorder with depressed mood.” (Doc. 11-8 at 21) Dr. Ratzlaff noted Plaintiff reported he “was under 

the influence of methamphetamine and [alcohol] at the time of the [suicide] attempt.” (Id. at 22) He 

reported he his family was “evicted from their apartment because of the constant flow of guests who 

partied at the apartment,” and “his wife separated from him and took their 4 children with her.” (Id.) 

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In addition, Dr. Ratzlaff noted Plaintiff admitted he was “drinking 3 bottles of tequila every day” and 

used “‘a lot’ of meth daily for the last 8 to 10 years; he didn’t have to pay for it.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

described the suicide attempt as a “wake up call,” and said that though he had suicidal thoughts “about 

twice a week,” he was “not concerned about having the thoughts and state[d] he will never attempt 

suicide again.” (Id.) Dr. Ratzlaff found “no 5150 criteria and . . . no need for [Department of 

Behavioral Health] services. (Id.)

Dr. Elke Kurpiers performed a psychological evaluation on June 28, 2013. (Doc. 11-8 at 30) 

Plaintiff told Dr. Kurpiers that he was “really depressed.” (Id.) He reported that “he started drinking 

and using marijuana at age 16,” began using meth at age 18, “and later [used] crystal meth and heroin.” 

(Id. at 31) Plaintiff estimated that before his attempted suicide, “he was drinking as much as three 

bottles of tequila and a 12 pack of beer every day...[and] he smoked marijuana and was using meth on 

a daily basis.” (Id.) He told Dr. Kurpiers he did not use alcohol or drugs after his hospitalization. (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiff told Dr. Kurpiers that he was able to read and write at a fourth grade level, and

graduated from high school after taking classes for learning disabled students. (Id. at 30) He told Dr. 

Kurpiers he had previously worked “several jobs, including working in security and fast food,” but “he 

was unable to do reports when he worked in security.” (Id.) Plaintiff said he “would get into 

arguments with his bosses... because he lacked motivation to work and preferred to be at home.” (Id.

at 32) Because he was not currently working, Plaintiff said he spent his days “watching television,” 

helping with chores such as laundry, and playing with his niece and nephews. (Id. at 31-32) 

Dr. Kurpiers administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale- 4

th Edition (WAIS) and 

Wechsler Memory Scale-4

th edition (WMS). (Doc. 11-8 at 30, 32-33) Dr. Kurpiers determined 

Plaintiff’s full scale IQ score was 74, which was in the “[b]orderline range.” (Id. at 32) In addition, 

Dr. Kurpiers found Plaintiff’s “[m]emory assessment scores [were] slightly higher than intellectual 

scores,” and were in the low average to average ranges. (Id. at 33, 34) Dr. Kurpiers opined:

A. The claimant has moderate restrictions of daily activities due to depressed mood and 

associated lack of energy.

B. He has mild to moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning.

C. He has mild to moderate difficulties of concentration, persistence and pace.

D. He may experience repeated episodes of emotional deterioration in work-like situations 

depending on his personal situation. 

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(Id. at 34) Dr. Kurpiers concluded Plaintiff had “the ability to understand, carry out and remember 

simple verbal instructions;” “to respond appropriately to usual work situations;” and “to deal with 

changes in routine work setting.” (Id. at 34-35) However, she believed Plaintiff’s low self-confidence 

and “history of getting defensive with his supervisors . . . would interfere with his ability to consistently 

respond appropriately to co-workers, supervisors and the public.” (Id. at 35) Further, Dr. Kurpiers 

believed Plaintiff “remain[ed] in an acute emotional crisis, with risk of relapse.” (Id.) She gave Plaintiff 

a GAF score of “60 to 62”

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and believed his prognosis was “[f]air to good, with treatment for [alcohol 

and other drug abuse] and mental health issues.” (Id.) 

On July 24, 2013, Dr. Bugg noted Plaintiff “did not allege any physical problems” in his 

application, although he told Dr. Kurpiers he had headaches and back pain. (Doc. 11-4 at 7) Dr. Bugg

also noted Plaintiff was able to help with household chores and did not take any medication for 

physical pain. (Id.) He concluded Plaintiff’s physical impairments were “non severe.” (Id. at 7) 

On November 6, 2013, Dr. Eugene Campbell reviewed the record and found Plaintiff’s 

medically determinable impairments could produce his pain or other symptoms, but the record did not 

support Plaintiff’s “statements about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of the 

symptoms.” (Doc. 11-4 at 34) According to Dr. Campbell, Plaintiff’s credibility was undermined by 

his activities of daily living, as well as “[t]he location, duration, frequency and intensity of . . . [his] 

pain and other symptoms.” (Id.) Dr. Campbell determined that Plaintiff was “not significantly limited” 

with the ability to understand, remember, and carry out “very short and simple instructions; and was 

“moderately limited” with the ability to maintain concentration and attention. (Id. at 35-36) He 

opined Plaintiff was able to perform simple, repetitive tasks “with limited social contact.” (Id. at 33)

B. Administrative Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff testified that he took Special Education classes in school, as well as Speech and RSP 

classes. (Doc. 11-3 at 29-30) Plaintiff stated he had problems reading and writing, and preferred not 

 

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GAF scores range from 1-100, and in calculating a GAF score, the doctor considers “psychological, social, and 

occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum of mental health-illness.” American Psychiatric Association, 

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 34 (4th ed.) (“DSM-IV). GAF scores of 51-60 indicate “moderate 

symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumstantial speech, occasional panic attacks) OR moderate difficulty in social, 

occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflict with peers or co-workers).” Id. at 34. GAF scores of 61-70

indicate “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or 

school functioning . . . but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Id.

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to try because he had “to ask everybody how to spell the words.” (Id. at 30) He reported he had 

completed the twelfth grade—although he was not sure if he received a diploma or a certificate of 

completion—and had no further education, including vocational training. (Id. at 29, 31)

Plaintiff reported he held several jobs, but he never worked for more than two to three hours at 

a time. (Id. at 32, 38) He explained he worked security positions for Contemporary Services and Burns 

International, which required him to “walk around . . . to watch parked cars” and sit in a post. (Id. at 

32) Plaintiff said he “was fired from one of the jobs for falling asleep.” (Id. at 37) He reported that he 

didn’t “like listening” and was suspended three times for “not following directions.” (Id. at 37-38) 

He also recalled working at Jack-in-the-Box, where he cooked hamburgers under the 

supervision of his sister. (Doc. 11-3 at 32, 42) Plaintiff said his sister was “scary” and “[s]he would 

get [him] at home” if he did not listen, so Plaintiff was disciplined only one time. (Id. at 46) Plaintiff 

said he was unable to learn how to work as a cashier because he “couldn’t read the words or see the 

things, because [he] was supposed to be wearing glasses” and “didn’t understand the buttons.” (Id. at 

33, 45) Plaintiff believed he was unable to work, explaining: “Every time I go to try [to] fill out the 

paperwork, I can’t do it. I can only understand half the stuff they ask [me] to fill out.” (Id. at 33)

He testified that he tried to kill himself because his wife left and he “was drinking and doing 

narcotics.” (Doc. 11-3 at 34) Plaintiff said he had stopped all drugs and alcohol after leaving the 

recovery center. (Id.) He reported that he never taken any medication for depression, and looked for a 

therapist but it cost too much for him to see one or receive treatment. (Id. at 34, 40) Plaintiff said he 

was told about meetings at the recovery center, but he did not attend. (Id. at 35) Plaintiff reported that 

he still thought about committing suicide “a lot.” (Id. at 41) 

Further, Plaintiff reported he had back pain, and that he was told previously that his spine “rubs 

bone to bone.” (Doc. 11-3 at 43) Plaintiff’s counsel informed the ALJ that his office had requested 

records from the doctor, but the documents were dated “well before” the alleged onset date, and were 

“archived, stored, and then no longer retrievable by the provider.” (Id.)

He testified his daily activities involved sleeping, walking around, and watching television. 

(Doc. 11-3 at 44) Plaintiff testified that he had minimal household duties, and he would “only pick up 

dog poop.” (Id.) He explained that when he washed the dishes, his family “didn’t like it because they 

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say they’re still greasy.” (Id.) He said his mom also would not allow him to mow the lawn because he 

had “a habit of breaking [her] lawn mower.” (Id.)

Vocational Expert Thomas Dachelet (“VE”) testified after the Plaintiff at the hearing. (Doc. 11-

3 at 48) The ALJ asked the VE to consider a “a hypothetical individual of the claimant’s age and 

education” assuming the worker “is limited to performing only simple routine tasks, with superficial 

interaction with co-workers, supervisors, and the public.” (Id.) The VE testified that an individual with 

such limitations could not “perform any of the claimant’s past work” as a security officer or fast food 

worker. (Id.) However, the VE testified that this individual would be able to perform other unskilled, 

light work such as a packing floor worker, DOT 920.686-026; a garment sorter, DOT 222.687-014; and 

a package operator, DOT 920.685-082. (Id. at 49)

Next, the ALJ asked the VE to consider the “same individual,” but who “would be off-task 25 

percent of the time.” (Doc. 11-3 at 49) With this additional limitation, the VE opined that there would 

not be any jobs “as normally found” in the national economy. (Id.) Similarly, the VE believed there 

would not be jobs available for a person who was “off task . . . 15 percent of the time” but would also 

“have repeated episodes of...deterioration...in work life situations.” (Id. at 50) 

C. The ALJ’s Findings

Pursuant to the five-step process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not engage in substantial 

activity after the alleged onset date of May 21, 2013. (Doc. 11-3 at 14) Second, the ALJ found Plaintiff 

“has the following severe impairments: depressive disorder, learning disorder and polysubstance 

dependence.” (Id.) These impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (Id. at 14-

15) Next, the ALJ determined:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels. He is capable of performing simple repetitive tasks, with superficial 

interaction with coworkers and supervisors.

(Id. at 16) With this residual functional capacity, the ALJ found Plaintiff was able to perform “jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy,” including work as a packing floor worker, 

garment sorter, and package operator. (Id. at 19) Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not 

disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (Id. at 20)

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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s sole argument in his appeal is that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the credibility 

of his subjective complaints. (See generally Doc. 14 at 5-9) When evaluating a claimant’s credibility, 

an ALJ must determine first whether objective medical evidence shows an underlying impairment 

“which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. 

Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th 

Cir. 1991)). Next, the ALJ must make specific findings as to the claimant’s credibility. Id. at 1036. 

An adverse credibility determination must be based on clear and convincing evidence where there is no 

affirmative evidence of malingering and “the record includes objective medical evidence establishing 

that the claimant suffers from an impairment that could reasonably produce the symptoms of which he 

complains.” Carmickle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. The ALJ’s Credibility Analysis

The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s “medically determinable impairments could reasonably be 

expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.” (Doc. 7-3 at 32) However, the ALJ found his 

“allegations concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms are less than 

fully credible.” (Id. at 31) To support these conclusions, the ALJ considered inconsistencies between 

Plaintiff’s testimony and actions, his level of activity, the lack of treatment received, and the objective 

medical evidence. (Doc. 11-3 at 18)

Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to articulate legally sufficient reasons” to support the 

adverse credibility determination. (Doc. 14 at 8) On the other hand, the Commissioner argues, “The 

ALJ provided valid reasons supported by substantial evidence to discount [Plaintiff’s] subjective 

complaints.” (Doc. 19 at 5, emphasis omitted) Significantly, the Ninth Circuit has determined factors 

considered by the ALJ are relevant to evaluate a claimant’s credibility. See Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 

597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002)

1. Conflict between Plaintiff’s testimony and conduct

The Ninth Circuit has determined an ALJ may rely upon inconsistencies with a claimant’s 

“testimony and his own conduct” to support an adverse credibility determination. Light v. Social 

Security Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th 

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Cir. 1996) (an ALJ may use “ordinary techniques of credibility evaluation” including inconsistent 

statements “and other testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid”). Here, the ALJ noted 

Plaintiff “indicated he was unable to read or write,” but “he was able to complete the Function Report.” 

(Doc. 11-3 at 18) Because Plaintiff’s ability to complete the report contradicted his assertion that he 

could not read or write, the inconsistency between his testimony and conduct supports the adverse 

credibility determination.

2. The medical record and lack of treatment

In general, “conflicts between a [claimant’s] testimony of subjective complaints and the 

objective medical evidence in the record” can constitute “specific and substantial reasons that 

undermine . . . credibility.” Morgan v. Comm’r of Social Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 

1999). The Ninth Circuit explained that “testimony cannot be rejected on the sole ground that it is not 

fully corroborated by objective medical evidence,” but “the medical evidence is still a relevant factor in 

determining the severity of the claimant’s pain and its disabling effects.” Rollins, 261 F.3d at 857. 

Because the ALJ did not base the decision solely on the fact that the medical record did not support the 

degree of symptoms alleged by Plaintiff, the objective medical evidence was a relevant factor in 

determining Plaintiff’s credibility. 

However, if an ALJ cites the medical evidence as part of a credibility determination, it is not 

sufficient for the ALJ to make a simple statement that the testimony is contradicted by the record. 

Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001) (“general findings are an insufficient basis 

to support an adverse credibility determination”). Rather, an ALJ must “specifically identify what 

testimony is credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Greger v. Barnhart, 

464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Dodrill v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 1993) (an 

ALJ “must state which . . . testimony is not credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not 

credible”). 

Here, the ALJ noted that Dr. Ratzlaff found Plaintiff “did not meet the criteria for a 5150 

involuntary hold” and “did not need services from the Department of Behavioral Health.” (Doc. 11-3 

at 18; see also Doc. 11-8 at 22) Further, Plaintiff was “never provided with medication for mental 

health problems” and “had not received any other treatment for mental impairments.” (Id.) Similarly, 

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the ALJ noted there were “no records of treatment” for the back problems Plaintiff alleged. (Id.)

Accordingly, the ALJ met his burden of identifying evidence—including findings of a physician 

that Plaintiff did not need treatment—undermining the credibility of Plaintiff’s complaints. Notably, 

the lack of a need for treatment also supports an adverse credibility determination. See Burch v. 

Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Although lack of medical evidence cannot form the sole 

basis for discounting pain testimony, it is a factor that the ALJ can consider in his credibility 

analysis”).; Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (the ALJ properly considered the 

physician’s failure to prescribe medical treatment as part of the credulity determination). Thus, the 

medical record supports the adverse credibility determination. See Greger, 464 F.3d at 972; Dodrill, 12 

F.3d at 918. 

3. Level of activity

When a claimant spends a substantial part of the day “engaged in pursuits involving the 

performance of physical functions that are transferable to a work setting, a specific finding as to this 

fact may be sufficient to discredit a claimant’s allegations.” Morgan v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. 

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Fair, 885 F.2d at 603). For example, a claimant’s

ability to cook, clean, do laundry and manage finances may be sufficient to support an adverse finding 

find of credibility. See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008); see also 

Burch v. Barchart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (the claimant’s activities “suggest she is quite 

functional. She is able to care for her own personal needs, cook, clean and shop. She interacts with her 

nephew and boyfriend. She is able to manage her own finances...”). Likewise, an ALJ may conclude 

“the severity of . . . limitations were exaggerated” when a claimant exercises, gardens, and participates 

in community activities. Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 693 (9th Cir. 2009). 

However, an ALJ must make a specific finding relating to the transferability of the activities to a 

workplace to refute a plaintiff’s allegations of disability. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639.

In this case, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s activities—which included cleaning the living room, 

cutting the grass, preparing simple meals, and shopping with his mother—and concluded his activities 

were inconsistent with his complaints of disabling back pain. (Doc. 11-3 at 15, 18) However, the ALJ 

failed to find Plaintiff’s activities could be transferred to a work setting, or state Plaintiff spent a 

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“substantial” part of his day engaged in such activities. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit opined, “Daily 

household chores and grocery shopping are not activities that are easily transferable to a work 

environment.” Blau v. Astrue, 263 Fed. App’x 635, 637 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, Plaintiff’s activities of 

daily living were not clear and convincing evidence to discount his credibility. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 

F.3d 503, 517 (9th Cir. 2001) (limited activities did not constitute convincing evidence that the 

claimant could function regularly in a work setting). 

B. Reliance on an invalid reason

When an ALJ sets forth a legally insufficient to support the adverse credibility determination, 

the Court must consider whether the reliance on invalid reasons was a harmless error. See Batson v. 

Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195-97 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying a harmless error 

standard where the credibility finding was invalid). The Ninth Circuit explained, “So long as there 

remains ‘substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion’s on credibility’ and the error ‘does not 

negate the validity of the ALJ’s ultimate credibility conclusion,’ such [error] is deemed harmless.” 

Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162 (quoting Batson, 359 F.3d at 1197). Here, the finding regarding Plaintiff's 

daily activities was legally insufficient. However, the ALJ set forth clear and convincing reasons for 

finding Plaintiff lacked credibility—including inconsistencies between his testimony and conduct, the 

lack of treatment, and the medical record—and the RFC determination is supported by substantial 

evidence in the record, including the opinions of Drs. Kurpiers and Campbell, who opined Plaintiff 

was able to perform simple, repetitive tasks, with some restrictions on interactions with others.2 (See 

Doc. 11-8 at 34-35; Doc. 11-4 at 33) Accordingly, the ALJ’s partial reliance upon an invalid reason 

was a harmless error.

///

 

2 When an examining physician such as Dr. Kurpiers forms an opinion that “rests on his own independent 

examination,” the opinion is substantial evidence. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001); see also 

Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 632 (9th Cir. 2007) (when an examining physician provides independent clinical findings, 

such findings are substantial evidence in support of an ALJ's ultimate decision). The opinions of non-examining 

physicians, such as Dr. Campbell, are substantial evidence when “consistent with other independent evidence in the 

record.” Tonapetyan, 242 F.3d at 1149. Because the opinion of Dr. Kurpiers was formed based upon the examination of 

Plaintiff and administration of the IQ and memory scores, the opinion qualifies as substantial evidence. Similarly, the 

opinion of Dr. Campbell that Plaintiff is able to perform simple and repetitive tasks qualifies as substantial evidence 

because it is consistent with the opinion of Dr. Kurpiers. 

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VI. Conclusion and Order

For the reasons set for above, the Court finds the ALJ identified clear and convincing reasons to 

find Plaintiff’s subjective complaints lacked credibility that were “sufficiently specific to permit the 

court to conclude the ALJ did not arbitrarily discredit [the] claimant’s testimony.” Thomas, 278 F.3d at 

958. Therefore, the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is not disabled must be upheld by the Court, 

because the ALJ set forth clear and convincing reasons to support the adverse credibility determination, 

supported by substantial evidence. Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED; 

2. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED; and

3. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant 

Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff 

Richard Daniel Martin.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 30, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:14-cv-01134-JLT Document 20 Filed 09/30/15 Page 12 of 12