Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01219/USCOURTS-ca13-14-01219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc.
Appellant
Swatch AG (Swatch SA) (Swatch Ltd.)
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

M.Z. BERGER & CO., INC.,

Appellant

v.

SWATCH AG 

(SWATCH SA) (SWATCH LTD.),

Appellee

______________________ 

2014-1219

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. 77/222,620.

______________________ 

Decided: June 4, 2015

______________________ 

ROBERT THOMAS SMITH, Katten Muchin Rosenman 

LLP, Washington, DC, argued for appellant. Also represented by HOWARD ROBERT RUBIN, DANIEL LIPTON; 

SAMSON HELFGOTT, JESSICA MEGAN GARRETT, New York, 

NY. 

JEFFREY A. LINDENBAUM, Collen IP, Ossining, NY, argued for appellee. Also represented by JESS M. COLLEN. 

______________________ 

Before LOURIE, CHEN, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges. 

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2 M.Z. BERGER & CO. v. SWATCH AG

CHEN, Circuit Judge. 

M.Z. Berger & Co., Inc. (Berger) appeals from the

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Board) decision to

sustain an opposition on grounds that Berger, at the time

of its application for the mark “iWatch,” lacked a bona

fide intent to use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). 

See Swatch AG v. M.Z. Berger & Co., 108 U.S.P.Q.2d

(BNA) 1463 (T.T.A.B. 2013) (Opinion). The Board concluded that Berger merely intended to reserve a right in

the mark and thus lacked the requisite intent. Because

substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination, 

we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Berger is a business that manufactures, imports, and

sells watches, clocks, and personal care products. On July

5, 2007, it filed an intent-to-use application at the Patent

and Trademark Office (PTO), seeking to register the mark

“iWatch” for over thirty different goods, each of which

belongs to one of three general categories: watches,

clocks, and goods related to watches and/or clocks (e.g.,

clock dials, watch bands, and watch straps).1 

The application included a declaration which states

that Berger has “a bona fide intention to use or use

through [Berger’s] related company or licensee the mark

in commerce on or in connection with the identified goods 

and/or services.” Joint Appendix (J.A.) 1022. 

1 Berger applied for the mark in standard characters and thus would have had no claim to any particular 

style or lettering of the mark. 37 C.F.R. § 2.52(a). We 

nonetheless refer to the mark in its mixed-case form 

(iWatch) for ease of reference and because that is how 

Berger presented the mark in its application.

 

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The PTO approved the application for publication on 

May 21, 2008. On October 22, 2008, Swatch AG (Swatch)

filed a Notice of Opposition on the basis that “iWatch” is

confusingly similar to its mark, “Swatch.” Swatch later 

added a claim opposing the mark on ground that Berger 

lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce at

the time Berger filed the application. 

The Board assessed whether Berger had the requisite

intent to use the iWatch mark by separately considering

each of the three general categories of goods. Opinion at

1475. With respect to Berger’s intent to use the iWatch

mark on two of the categories, clocks and goods related to

watches/clocks, the Board considered the testimony of 

Berger’s owner and CEO, Bernard Mermelstein. Id. Mr.

Mermelstein not only created the iWatch mark and instructed that the trademark application be filed, but he

was Berger’s sole witness designated under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6). Id. The Board thus treated 

Mr. Mermelstein’s testimony as representing the views of 

the company at the time the application was filed. Id. 

Although the trademark application recited watches,

clocks, and goods related to clocks and watches as the

goods Berger intended to sell with the proposed mark, Mr.

Mermelstein testified that Berger never intended for the

mark to be used for any goods other than watches:

Q. Are there other products other than watches 

that you anticipate for use with the iWatch mark?

A. No. 

J.A. 847. Mr. Mermelstein further testified:

Q. At the time you filed the application you didn’t 

expect the iWatch mark to be used for clocks and 

personal care products?

A. No. Correct.

J.A. 848. 

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Berger’s paralegal who filed the application, Monica

Titera, testified that Mr. Mermelstein instructed her to

register the mark only for watches and clocks. J.A. 979. 

When asked why the other related goods were identified

in the application, Ms. Titera claimed that the list was

“standard” and used to “leave all doors open.” J.A. 985. 

Based on Mr. Mermelstein’s and Ms. Titera’s testimonies, 

the Board concluded that Berger lacked a genuine intent

to use the mark on clocks and related goods. Opinion at

1475.

With respect to the third category of goods, watches,

the Board also concluded that Berger lacked a genuine

plan to commercialize the iWatch mark on such goods. 

The Board considered the documentary evidence of record

but found that such evidence did not demonstrate intent

because the documents related solely to prosecution of the

trademark application. As for the testimonial evidence

presented by Berger, the Board found that Berger’s employees failed to tell a consistent story about the company’s intent at the time the application was filed. The

Board lastly considered the company’s long history in the

watch business, but found that Berger’s inaction with

respect to a potential iWatch product diminished the

value of such evidence. 

The only documents relating to the potential use of 

the mark consisted of: (i) a trademark search performed

by the paralegal; (ii) an internal email describing the

substance of a discussion between the paralegal with the

trademark examining attorney concerning the application; and (iii) a series of internal emails forwarding images of watches and a clock bearing the iWatch mark. Id. at

1472–73. 

The Board agreed with Swatch that the documentary

evidence only related to the trademark application and

thus did not evidence a genuine intent to commercialize

certain watches using the iWatch mark. It found that the

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M.Z. BERGER & CO. v. SWATCH AG 5

trademark search was performed only a few days prior to

the filing of the application.2 The Board found that the

forwarded images were also prosecution-driven because

they appeared to have been created and submitted to the

PTO in response to the examining attorney’s request for

additional information on how Berger planned to use the

mark. Id. at 1472, 1473–74 (noting that the images were

created shortly before they were submitted to the PTO in

response to the request). 

Moreover, the Board found there was conflicting testimony among Berger employees regarding what the

images actually depicted. Some employees testified that

the images were pictures of actual mockup watches and

clocks. Id. at 1473. On the other hand, Mr. Mermelstein 

testified that no such mockups were ever made and that

the images were generated for purposes of advancing the

trademark application. J.A. 867–68. And although

Berger employees claimed that creating physical models 

and renderings was a normal part of its product development process, Berger did not present any physical or 

documentary evidence relating to the iWatch mark beyond the images submitted to the PTO. Opinion at 1474. 

Based on Mr. Mermelstein’s admissions and the timing of the creation of the documents, the Board concluded

that the documentary evidence did not establish that

Berger had a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Id. at 1474–75. 

The Board then considered the remaining evidence, 

which consisted of Berger employee testimony, and likewise found that it failed to establish that Berger genuinely intended to use the mark in commerce. For example,

2 From our review of the record, it appears that the 

trademark search was actually performed on July 5, 2007, 

the same date the application was filed. 

 

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Berger’s vice president of merchandising, Brenda Russo,

generally recalled having discussed the iWatch mark for a 

few minutes with a buyer during a discussion in a Berger 

showroom. See id. at 1476. But this testimony conflicts

with that of Mr. Mermelstein, who denied that Berger had

discussions regarding the iWatch mark with anyone

outside the company. J.A. 849 (“Q. Has the iWatch mark

been discussed outside of your office except with respect

to the counsel in this proceeding? A. No.”).

Ms. Russo’s testimony also appears to contradict representations Berger made to the PTO during prosecution

of the trademark application. In particular, the examiner 

rejected the mark as descriptive because the “i” in iWatch

could be interpreted as a well-established reference to

“interactive.” J.A. 50. In response to that rejection, 

Berger alleged: 

The “i” does not refer to any particular feature of 

the watches or clocks. The “i” is purely arbitrary. 

The images we previously submitted were just 

mock-ups to show a buyer. However, the buyer 

decided that models which previously had interactive features were too expensive. Thus, there will 

be no interactive features on any models.

J.A. 75. Ms. Russo, who was the only Berger witness who

claimed to have met with a buyer, testified to the contrary. She recalled mentioning to the buyer that the watch

would have certain technological features, and when

asked at her deposition whether that buyer expressed 

concern about the cost of the iWatch watch, she answered 

“no.” See Opinion at 1476. Because the evidence relating

to Ms. Russo’s discussion with the buyer conflicted with

Berger’s statement during prosecution, the Board chose

not to credit the alleged meeting as demonstrating bona

fide intent. Id. 

The Board considered that some of Berger’s employees 

testified to having attended internal brainstorming sesCase: 14-1219 Document: 47-2 Page: 6 Filed: 06/04/2015
M.Z. BERGER & CO. v. SWATCH AG 7

sions and merchandising meetings about the iWatch

mark, none of which were documented in the record. But

there was testimony from Mr. Mermelstein that suggested

any alleged meetings would not have been particularly

meaningful. For example, he testified that, as of 2010,

three years after the application was filed, Berger had yet 

to figure out what type of watch it intended to sell with

the iWatch mark, or even whether such a watch would

have any particular features. J.A. 846. Mr. Mermelstein 

also stated that, at the time of the filing, Berger had little

more than an aspiration to reserve rights in the mark in

case it later decided to develop an associated watch:

Q. Okay. And how did you come up with that

mark?

A. I think that I came up with the mark because

of the advent of technology and information gathering around the globe over the last I guess few

years, I thought that if we decided to do a — either a technology watch or information watch or 

something that would have that type of characteristics that would be a good mark for it.

J.A. 845 (emphasis added). 

Finally, the Board considered the fact that Berger had

been in the business of making and selling watches and

clocks for many years. It determined, however, that

Berger’s history of making and selling watches was not

particularly relevant to the instant dispute because

Berger employees testified they had not previously made

a watch with technological features, and admitted they

never took any step toward developing any such features,

either contemporaneous with the filing of the application

or in the eighteen months thereafter. Opinion at 1476. 

Though Berger represented to the PTO that the mark was

not restricted to “interactive” watches, the Board found

Berger’s inaction was significant in light of its contention 

that the idea was to use the mark with a “smart” watch. 

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Id. at 1476–77. Berger argued that its intent to use the

iWatch mark was corroborated by its use of a subsequent

mark, i-Kidz and its efforts to develop the mark iMove for

watches. The Board found this evidence unpersuasive, as

these efforts were related to different marks and had

occurred almost three years after the iWatch application

was filed. Id. at 1477 (noting intent must be considered

at the time the application was filed).

The Board ultimately concluded that some of Berger’s

evidence, reviewed in isolation, may have been sufficient

to establish intent. However, the circumstances as a 

whole—including the lack of documentary evidence and

the conflicting testimony of Berger witnesses—

demonstrated that Berger lacked a bona fide intent to use

the mark in commerce as required, and sustained the

opposition under Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act. Id. 

Berger appealed the Board’s decision to sustain the

opposition on this ground.3 We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(B). 

II. DISCUSSION

A 

We review the Board’s legal conclusions without deference and its factual findings for substantial evidence. 

In re Pacer Tech., 338 F.3d 1348, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ and 

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind would 

accept as adequate’ to support a conclusion.” Id. (quoting 

Consol. Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

3 The Board separately found that there was no 

likelihood of confusion between the Swatch and iWatch 

marks. Swatch challenges that finding in its briefing. 

Because we affirm on the basis of lack of bona fide intent, 

we do not address that aspect of the Board’s decision. 

 

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B 

The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA) contemplated the very scenario presented by this case. The 

TLRA changed the Lanham Act by permitting applicants 

to begin the registration process before actual use of the 

mark in commerce at the time of filing, so long as the 

applicant had a “bona fide intention . . . to use [the] mark 

in commerce” at a later date. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) 

(emphasis added).

The prior version of the Lanham Act required that a 

trademark applicant already be using the mark in commerce at the time of the application’s filing to qualify for 

trademark registration. See Aycock Eng’g, Inc. v. Airflite, 

Inc., 560 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This requirement, however, led to the practice of some applicants 

engineering a “token use,” which refers to the most minimal use of a trademark, designed purely to secure rights 

in that mark before an applicant is truly prepared to 

commercialize a good or service in connection with a given 

mark. In the legislative record of the TLRA, Congress 

noted that token use was problematic for a number of 

reasons, including that such uses were not uniformly 

available across industries. S. REP. NO. 100-515 (“Senate 

Report”), at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 

5577, 5582. For example, token use for large or expensive 

products, such as airplanes, or for service industries was 

“virtually impossible.” Id. Another problem was that the 

rules allowed registration based on minimal use, which 

led to an undesirable surplus of registered but virtually 

unused marks. Id. On the other hand, Congress also 

recognized that the use requirement placed “significant 

legal risks on the introduction of new products and services” and disadvantaged certain industries and smaller 

companies in the marketplace. Id. at 5. An applicant 

already using a mark in commerce risks, for example, 

potential infringement of a competitor’s pre-existing mark 

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prior to being able to begin the process of securing its own 

rights. 

Congress sought to address these problems in passing 

the TLRA. Id. To address the problem of “token use,” the 

TLRA heightened the burden for use applications by 

requiring that an applicant’s use be “bona fide use of [the] 

mark in the ordinary course of trade.” Trademark Law 

Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 

(effective November 16, 1989) (codified at 15 

U.S.C. § 1127) (emphasis added). Concurrently, the 

TLRA lowered the bar to starting registration by allowing 

applicants to proceed on the basis that they have a “bona 

fide intention to use the mark in commerce” at a later 

date. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1); see H.R. REP. NO. 100-1028

(“House Report”), at 8–9 (1988) (“By permitting applicants 

to seek protection of their marks through an ‘intent to use’ 

system, there should be no need for ‘token use’ of a mark 

simply to provide a basis for an application. The use of 

the term ‘bona fide’ is meant to eliminate such ‘token use’ 

and to require, based on an objective view of the circumstances, a good faith intention to eventually use the mark 

in a real and legitimate commercial sense.”); J. Thomas 

McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19.14, at 19.47–48 (4th ed. 2014) (McCarthy on 

Trademarks).

While applicants can begin the registration process 

having only a sincere intent, the TLRA also requires that 

applicants filing such intent-to-use applications must in 

due course either (i) file a verified statement of actual use 

of the mark, or (ii) convert the application into a use 

application. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(b)(3), (c), (d). In other 

words, such applicants are eventually required to show 

that the mark is being used in commerce before obtaining 

a registration on the mark.

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C 

Because this court has not previously done so, we first 

address the issue of whether lack of a bona fide intent is 

proper statutory grounds on which to challenge a trademark application. The PTO has long held that lack of 

such intent is a proper basis on which an opposer can 

challenge an applicant’s registration.4 We agree. An 

opposer is “entitled to rely on any statutory ground which 

negates appellant’s right to the subject registration[.]” 

Lipton Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 670 F.2d 1024, 

1031 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 

490, 501 (1975)). Because a bona fide intent to use the 

mark in commerce is a statutory requirement of a valid 

intent-to-use trademark application under Section 1(b), 

the lack of such intent is a basis on which an opposer may 

challenge an applicant’s mark. We note that the one 

other circuit court to address this issue has likewise so 

held. Aktieselskabet AF 21. Nov. 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 

525 F.3d 8, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

D 

We turn now to the question of what “bona fide intention” means under Section 1(b) of the Lanham Act. In its 

entirety, Section 1(b)(1) specifies that:

4 See, e.g., L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 U.S.P.Q.2d 

(BNA) 1434, 1442–43 (T.T.A.B. 2012); Lane Ltd. v. Jackson Int’l Trading Co., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1351, 1355–56 

(T.T.A.B. 1994); Commodore Elecs. Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1503, 1506–07 (T.T.A.B. 

1993); see also 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 20:21, at 20-

74–75; Trademark Board Manual of Procedure 

(TBMP) § 309.03(c), note 18 (3rd ed. 2011) (collecting 

cases).

 

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A person who has a bona fide intention, under circumstances showing the good faith of such person, 

to use a trademark in commerce may request registration of its trademark on the principal register 

hereby established by paying the prescribed fee 

and filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an 

application and a verified statement, in such form 

as may be prescribed by the Director.

15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1).

There is no statutory definition of the term “bona 

fide,” but the language is clear on its face that an applicant’s intent must be “under circumstances showing the 

good faith of such person.” Id. The reference to “circumstances showing the good faith” strongly suggests that the 

applicant’s intent must be demonstrable and more than a 

mere subjective belief. Both the PTO and the leading 

treatise on trademark law have arrived at this same 

understanding. See Lane, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1355; 3 

McCarthy on Trademarks § 19.14, at 19.48 (“Congress did 

not intend the issue to be resolved simply by an officer of 

the applicant later testifying, ‘Yes, indeed, at the time we 

filed that application, I did truly intend to use the mark 

at some time in the future.’”). 

This interpretation is confirmed by the legislative history, where Congress made clear that whether an applicant’s intent is “bona fide” should be assessed on an 

objective basis:

Although “bona fide” is an accepted legal term, it 

can be read broadly or narrowly, subjectively or 

objectively, by a court or the Patent and Trademark Office. In connection with this bill, “bona 

fide” should be read to mean a fair, objective determination of the applicant’s intent based on all 

the circumstances. 

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Senate Report at 24 (emphasis added); see also id. at 23 

(“Bona fide intent is measured by objective factors.”); 

House Report at 8–9 (“The use of the term ‘bona fide’ is 

meant to . . . require, based on an objective view of the 

circumstances, a good faith intention to eventually use 

the mark in a real and legitimate commercial sense.”). In 

addition, an applicant’s intent must reflect an intention to 

use the mark consistent with the Lanham Act’s definition 

of “use in commerce”: 

[T]he bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary 

course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a 

right in a mark.

15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Senate Report at 24–25 (quoting 

the definition). The applicant’s intention to use the mark 

in commerce must have been “firm.” Senate Report at 24. 

Neither the statute nor the legislative history indicates the specific quantum or type of objective evidence 

required to meet the bar. Indeed, Congress expressly 

rejected inclusion of a statutory definition for “bona fide” 

in order to preserve “the flexibility which is vital to the 

proper operation of the trademark registration system.” 

Id.5 

5 The PTO has promulgated a rule specifying that 

an applicant’s ongoing efforts to make use of a mark “may 

include product or service research or development, 

market research, manufacturing activities, promotional 

activities, steps to acquire distributors, steps to obtain 

governmental approval, or other similar activities.” 37 

C.F.R. § 2.89(d). Although this rule relates to the required showing of “good cause” for an extension to file a 

statement of use, i.e., at a time after the initial filing, 

such evidence may also indicate sources of objective 

 

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Accordingly, we hold that whether an applicant had a 

“bona fide intent” to use the mark in commerce at the 

time of the application requires objective evidence of 

intent. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1). Although the evidentiary 

bar is not high, the circumstances must indicate that the 

applicant’s intent to use the mark was firm and not 

merely intent to reserve a right in the mark. See 

id. § 1127; see also Senate Report at 24–25. The Board 

may make such determinations on a case-by-case basis 

considering the totality of the circumstances. 

III. M.Z. BERGER’S APPEAL

A 

Berger argues that it satisfied the minimal standard 

for intent, and that the Board improperly discounted 

Berger’s evidence. Berger’s arguments hinge on its belief 

that the Board should have found the intent requirement 

satisfied because Berger offered some objective evidence 

in support of its position. Viewed in isolation, the evidence Berger prefers to focus on could perhaps lead a 

reasonable fact-finder to conclude there was bona fide 

intent. As discussed above, however, all circumstances 

regarding an applicant’s bona fide intent must be considered, including those facts that would tend to disprove 

that Berger had the requisite intent. 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1051(b)(1); see also Lane, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1353 

(“[W]hether an applicant has a bona fide intention . . .

must be an objective determination based on all the 

circumstances.” (emphasis added)). 

Here, viewing the evidence as a whole, we find that 

substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion. 

First, we agree with the Board that the documentary 

evidence of an applicant’s bona fide intent to use the mark 

in commerce.

 

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evidence offered by Berger appears to relate only to the 

prosecution of the trademark application. See Opinion at 

1474–75 (citing Research In Motion Ltd. v. NBOR Corp., 

92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926, 1931 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (“If the 

filing and prosecution of a trademark application constituted a bona fide intent to use a mark, then in effect, lack 

of a bona fide intent to use would never be a ground for 

opposition or cancellation, since an inter partes proceeding 

can only be brought if the defendant has filed an application.”)). The paralegal who performed the trademark 

search testified that such searches are routinely conducted before Berger files a trademark so that Berger does not 

waste time filing an application on an unavailable mark. 

It is undisputed that the internal email relaying the 

substance of a discussion with the trademark examining 

attorney also relates to the application. The other internal emails, which forwarded the images of two watches 

and a clock bearing the mark, were undisputedly submitted to the PTO in response to the trademark examining 

attorney’s request for documents showing how the mark 

would be used. Opinion at 1473–74. 

Faced with conflicting statements from Berger witnesses about whether the images were created for prosecution or for business reasons evidencing intent, the 

Board exercised its discretion in crediting the testimony of 

Mr. Mermelstein, Berger’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness, over that 

of other Berger employees. Id. at 1474 (relying on Mr. 

Mermelstein’s admissions that the images were created 

for the trademark application). We defer to the Board’s 

determination of the weight and credibility of such evidence. See, e.g., Velander v. Garner, 348 F.3d 1359, 1371 

(Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating, in a PTO interference proceeding, that it is “within the discretion of the trier of fact to 

give each item of evidence such weight as it feels appropriate”). Having found that the documentary evidence 

was generated in relation to the trademark application, 

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the Board reasonably determined that such images were 

likely created with an intention to advance the prosecution of the trademark application rather than an intention 

to move forward on an actual product in commerce. See 

Opinion at 1474–75. 

Berger has offered no reason to disturb the Board’s 

findings based on the remaining testimonial evidence. 

The Board properly exercised its judgment in finding that 

Berger lacked a bona fide intent to use the mark on any of 

the goods identified in the application. Mr. Mermelstein 

admitted that there was no intent to use the iWatch mark 

for clocks, and Ms. Titera conceded that the other accessories and related goods were only designated to leave 

Berger’s options open. Id. at 1475. 

With respect to watches, the Board considered conflicting testimony about Berger’s alleged meeting with a 

buyer, as well as whether the watch would be technological in nature. The Board was within its discretion to 

disagree with Berger’s bottom-line position that it possessed a bona fide intent, given the inability of the Berger 

witnesses to pull together a consistent story on a number 

of issues, e.g., would the watch be technological, did 

actual physical samples exist, were potential customers 

ever consulted. Critically, Mr. Mermelstein all but conceded that Berger had not yet made a firm decision to use 

the mark in commerce at the time of its application. J.A. 

845 (“[I]f [Berger] decided to do a — either a technology 

watch or information watch or something that would have 

that type of characteristics that [iWatch] would be a good 

mark for it.”). See, e.g., Research in Motion, 92 

U.S.P.Q.2d at 1931 (applicant’s stated belief that the 

mark would be “a good mark for future use” does not 

establish a bona fide intent to use). 

We also find unavailing Berger’s contention that the 

Board ignored Berger’s history in the watch industry. 

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The Board did consider Berger’s past but noted that even 

though the iWatch mark was allegedly to be used with a 

“smart” watch, Berger had never made such a watch and 

took no steps following the application to develop such a 

watch. Opinion at 1476–77. We find no error with the 

Board’s determination that there was no nexus between 

Berger’s general capacity to produce watches and the 

capacity required to produce a “smart” watch. 

Ultimately, we find that the Board properly exercised 

its judgment as the trier of fact in assessing the evidence 

and concluding that Berger did not have a bona fide 

intent to use the mark at the time of its application. 

Berger’s contention that the Board “missed the forest for 

the trees” by systematically discrediting each piece of 

evidence is misplaced. Quite to the contrary, the Board’s 

opinion reflects that it carefully considered Berger’s 

evidence and understandably found that Berger lacked 

“bona fide” intent to use the iWatch mark on the recited 

goods at the time of the application was filed. E.g., id. at 

1474, 1476. 

The bar for showing a bona fide intent is not high. 

But in our view, considering the inconsistent testimony 

offered by Berger employees and the general lack of 

documentary support, substantial evidence supports the 

Board’s conclusion that Berger’s intent at the time of the 

application was merely to reserve a right in the mark, and 

not a bona fide intent to use the mark in commerce. Id. at 

1477. 

B 

Berger also argues that the Board applied the wrong 

legal standard for bona fide intent, “because it insisted 

upon evidence that [Berger] had taken steps to promote, 

develop and market the iWatch mark at the time that it 

filed its original application.” Appellant’s Br. at 32; see 

also id. at 18, 19, 22, 23, 34, 37, 41, 42. Berger argues 

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18 M.Z. BERGER & CO. v. SWATCH AG

that the Board’s emphasis on objective evidence conflicts 

with the application and registration steps outlined in the 

PTO’s administrative review process and regulations. Id. 

at 37–44. In other words, Berger contends the Board 

erred by applying a more stringent threshold for bona fide 

intent than required by statute or by the PTO’s regulations and procedures. 

We disagree. Nowhere did the Board state that the 

applicable standard requires an applicant to have actually 

promoted, developed, and marketed the mark at the time 

of the application. Nor did the Board state that it applied 

such a standard. To the contrary, the Board’s opinion 

reflects that it reached its conclusions by considering all 

the relevant facts and circumstances, including those that 

indicated Berger lacked intent. This is indeed the proper 

inquiry under the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) 

(intent to use must be “under circumstances showing the 

good faith of such person”). 

We also find that the Board’s opinion is not inconsistent with PTO practice. The PTO is within its discretion to allow intent-to-use applications to proceed, at the 

time of filing, upon only a verified statement of bona fide 

intent to use. See id. § 1051(b)(3)(B). However, the 

agency has the statutory authority to seek further evidence of the applicant’s “bona fide” intent. See 

id. § 1051(b)(1). Indeed, not only did the agency contemplate that an applicant’s intent to use may be at issue in 

inter partes proceedings, but it reserved the right to make 

its own inquiry into the issue under appropriate circumstances: 

Generally, the applicant’s sworn statement of a 

bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce 

will be sufficient evidence of good faith in the ex 

parte context. Consideration of issues related to 

good faith may arise in an inter partes proceeding, 

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M.Z. BERGER & CO. v. SWATCH AG 19

but the USPTO will not make an inquiry in an ex 

parte proceeding unless evidence of record clearly 

indicates that the applicant does not have a bona 

fide intention to use the mark in commerce.

Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP) 

§ 1101. 

We find that the Board did not err in its application of 

the standard for bona fide intent. As discussed supra, 

whether an applicant has a bona fide intent to use a mark 

in commerce is an objective inquiry based on the totality 

of the circumstances. The Board conducted such an 

inquiry. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We have considered Berger’s remaining arguments 

and find them unavailing. For the foregoing reasons, we 

conclude that the Board properly sustained the opposition 

on the basis that Berger lacked a bona fide intention to 

use the mark in commerce at the time of the application. 

AFFIRMED

Case: 14-1219 Document: 47-2 Page: 19 Filed: 06/04/2015