Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03017/USCOURTS-caDC-09-03017-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Larry Brinson-Scott
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 14, 2013 Decided May 7, 2013

No. 09-3017

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LARRY BRINSON-SCOTT, ALSO KNOWN AS LARRY SCOTT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cr-00145-1)

Sicilia C. Englert argued the cause for the appellant. 

Michael E. Lawlor was on brief.

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant United States Attorney, 

argued the cause for the appellee. Ronald C. Machen, Jr., 

United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Chrisellen R. 

Kolb and James Stephen Sweeney, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, were on brief. Mary B. McCord, Assistant United 

States Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Larry 

Brinson-Scott appeals his conviction and sentence on one 

count of possession of powder cocaine with intent to 

distribute. He contends that the arresting police officers 

violated his right against self-incrimination; that he was

deprived of effective assistance of counsel; and that the 

district court failed to comply with certain procedural

requirements at sentencing. Rejecting all three challenges, we 

affirm both his conviction and his sentence. 

I

Following the arrest of Jonathan Cayol for unlawful 

possession of a firearm, approximately twelve officers of the 

District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) 

executed a search warrant at Cayol’s apartment to search for

other weapons. Brinson-Scott, Cayol’s brother, was the 

apartment’s only occupant when the officers arrived. After 

entering the apartment, the officers handcuffed Brinson-Scott 

and ordered him to sit in a chair in the living room. They

explained to Brinson-Scott that he was not under arrest and 

was being handcuffed and detained only to ensure their safety 

during the search of the apartment. Two officers stood guard 

over Brinson-Scott while others conducted the search.

Shortly after the search began, one of the officers asked 

Brinson-Scott which of the two bedrooms in the apartment 

belonged to him. Brinson-Scott replied that “he was in the 

room to the right” but “made a head nod to the left.”

Suppression Hr’g Tr. 38, United States v. Brinson-Scott, No. 

08-145 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2008). The officers proceeded to 

search both rooms. In the left bedroom, they discovered 59.3 

grams of powder cocaine in a jacket in the bedroom closet, 

some of Brinson-Scott’s personal papers and effects and some

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ten-to-twenty items of large-sized men’s clothing. In the right 

bedroom, they found $2,512 in cash in a size-54 men’s suit 

jacket in the closet and a protective face mask under the bed.

The police also discovered two plates containing cocaine base

residue in the living room; more than two hundred small 

plastic bags of the kind often used to package individual 

portions of cocaine base for distribution in the kitchen and in 

the hall closet; and Brinson-Scott’s key to the apartment on a 

table near the kitchen.

Near the end of the search, one of the officers noticed 

that Brinson-Scott was sitting awkwardly in his chair. The 

officer ordered Brinson-Scott to stand, at which point the 

previously cooperative Brinson-Scott became upset. He 

thrashed about, shouted at the officers and kicked a video 

game console across the room. The officers searched the 

chair and discovered a 170.2-gram rock of cocaine base

stuffed into the seat cushion. When they discovered the drugs 

in the seat cushion, Brinson-Scott first disclaimed ownership 

of the drugs but then exclaimed: “You don’t know what it’s 

like to grow up in this neighborhood. What else are we 

supposed to do?” Trial Tr. 59, United States v. Brinson-Scott,

No. 08-145 (D.D.C. Nov. 4, 2008) (Trial Tr. 11/4/08) (a 

statement we hereinafter refer to as his “confession”). Shortly 

thereafter, the officers placed Brinson-Scott under arrest. At 

that point, an officer again asked Brinson-Scott which 

bedroom was his. He replied that he “stay[ed] in the right 

bedroom, but . . . [ke]pt some of [his] stuff in the left.” 

Suppression Hr’g Tr. 44. At no point during the execution of 

the search warrant did the police administer the warnings first 

announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

A federal grand jury indicted Brinson-Scott on one count

of possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of 

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Count I), and one count of possessing with 

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intent to distribute powder cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (Count II). Before trial, Brinson-Scott 

moved to suppress the physical evidence seized from the 

apartment as well as the statements he made while 

handcuffed. After a hearing, the district court denied the 

motion as to the physical evidence and Brinson-Scott’s

statement, his accompanying head nod and his confession but 

suppressed as the product of custodial interrogation conducted 

without Miranda warnings his post-arrest statement that he 

stayed in the right bedroom but kept some of his things in the

left bedroom. At trial, the jury found Brinson-Scott guilty on 

Count II but failed to reach a verdict as to Count I. The 

district court declared a mistrial on Count I and sentenced 

Brinson-Scott to 140 months’ imprisonment. He timely 

appealed. During the pendency of his appeal, Brinson-Scott’s

appellate counsel moved to remand to district court to 

adjudicate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. We 

remanded and the district court subsequently denied his claim. 

United States v. Brinson-Scott, 840 F. Supp. 2d 305 (D.D.C. 

2012). 

II

A.

Brinson-Scott argues that his statement indicating that he 

stayed in the right bed room and his simultaneous head nod to 

the left were products of un-Mirandized custodial 

interrogation and therefore inadmissible at trial.1

 As an initial 

 1 At oral argument, Brinson-Scott’s counsel attempted to press

a Fifth Amendment challenge to the admission of his confession. 

Because he did not make that argument in his briefs, he has

forfeited it. United States v. Sutherland, 486 F.3d 1355, 1360 (D.C. 

Cir. 2007) (“Because [an] argument was raised for the first time at 

oral argument, it is forfeited.”). 

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matter, the parties disagree about whether we can review the

challenge. Whereas Brinson-Scott contends that the challenge 

is properly before us, the Government argues that, because

Brinson-Scott conceded at the suppression hearing that he was 

not in custody, any error was invited and unreviewable. The 

Government’s position is without record support. BrinsonScott expressly argued in his suppression motion—something

the Government failed to mention in its brief—that he was in

custody. Def’s Mot. to Suppress Physical Evidence and 

Statements 6–7, United States v. Brinson-Scott, No. 08-145 

(D.D.C. June 27, 2008). Nothing that Brinson-Scott’s counsel 

said during the suppression hearing could even remotely be

construed as a disavowal of the argument and we caution the 

Government to familiarize itself more carefully with the 

record so that it does not make an unsupported argument.

Brinson-Scott’s Fifth Amendment claim being properly 

before us, “we examine the district court’s legal conclusions

de novo, but apply a clearly erroneous standard to its 

underlying findings of fact.” United States v. West, 458 F.3d 

1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted).

The MPD’s detention of Brinson-Scott during the search 

of the apartment was undoubtedly lawful under the Fourth 

Amendment. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)

(police have “authority to detain the occupants of the 

premises while a proper search is conducted”); see also 

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98 (2005) (“An officer’s 

authority to detain incident to a search is categorical; it does 

not depend on the quantum of proof justifying detention or the 

extent of the intrusion to be imposed by the seizure.” 

(quotation marks omitted)). The issue in dispute is whether 

that lawful detention also constitutes custody within the 

meaning of Miranda. The parties focus their arguments on 

the significance of the handcuffs, an issue about which some 

of our sister circuits have reached opposing conclusions.

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Compare United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d 1105, 1109–10 

(4th Cir. 1995) (handcuffing suspect does not necessarily 

elevate Terry detention to Miranda custody), and United 

States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1292 (9th Cir. 1982) 

(defendant placed in handcuffs and then questioned during 

Terry stop was not in Miranda custody), with United States v. 

Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 957–58 (8th Cir.) (Summers detainee

was in Miranda custody where defendant was handcuffed, 

patted down and not told he did not have to answer 

questions), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 379 (2012), and United 

States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 676 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] 

reasonable person finding himself placed in handcuffs by the 

police would ordinarily conclude . . . that he was restrained to 

a degree normally associated with formal arrest and, 

therefore, in custody.”). Instead of tramping through this 

constitutional thicket, we will take the alternate route

provided us by the facts. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley 

Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 

(“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question 

although properly presented by the record, if there is also 

present some other ground upon which the case may be 

disposed of.”).

Brinson-Scott’s statement and head nod could be used to 

establish either or both of two incriminating facts: (1) a link 

between Brinson-Scott and the left bedroom, or (2) a link 

between Brinson-Scott and the apartment itself. But even 

setting aside his statement and head nod, the police recovered 

overwhelming evidence linking Brinson-Scott to both the left 

bedroom and the apartment. In their initial search of the left 

bedroom, the officers recovered a motor vehicle title in 

Brinson-Scott’s name; a citation for a traffic infraction issued 

to Brinson-Scott; an identification card in Brinson-Scott’s 

name; and mail addressed to Brinson-Scott. After his arrest, 

Brinson-Scott informed the police that his inhaler was in the 

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left bedroom and an MPD officer found it there. Moreover, 

the officers discovered in the closet of the left bedroom ten to 

twenty items of “very large sized clothing,” including the 

jacket in which the powder cocaine was discovered. Trial Tr. 

20, 29–30, United States v. Brinson-Scott, No. 08-145 

(D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2008). This last evidence is highly relevant 

because Brinson-Scott is a large man—six feet, three inches 

tall and 260 pounds—whereas Cayol is “considerably smaller 

both . . . in height and in weight.” Trial Tr. 11/4/2008, at 60. 

In addition to the evidence linking Brinson-Scott to the left 

bedroom and thus to the apartment itself, the apartment lease 

agreement—seized from the apartment complex’s leasing 

office—listed Brinson-Scott as a lessee with Cayol. The 

police also recovered from a table near the kitchen BrinsonScott’s key to the apartment and used it to secure the 

apartment after completing the search.

The Congress has instructed us to disregard harmless 

error in criminal appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52(a). “Error is harmless if it appears ‘beyond a reasonable 

doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 

verdict obtained.’ ” United States v. Green, 254 F.3d 167, 170 

(D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 

18, 24 (1967)); see also Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 

750, 764–65 (1946). We have explained that

[i]n determining whether an error is harmless, the 

court measures the harm in terms of whether the error 

had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury’s verdict, not merely whether the 

record evidence [would be] sufficient absent the error 

to warrant a verdict of guilt. Consequently, an 

evidentiary error is harmless if . . . the case is not 

close.

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United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (per 

curiam) (quotation marks omitted; alterations in original). 

Even assuming the admission of Brinson-Scott’s 

statement and head nod was error, the error was harmless

because the evidence, in the aggregate, links Brinson-Scott to 

the left bedroom and the apartment beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Indeed, we have previously so concluded under 

similar circumstances. In United States v. Gaston, the police 

executed a search warrant at a row house and detained and 

handcuffed its adult occupants. 357 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir.

2004). Without giving the Miranda warnings, they asked the 

defendant for his current address and the defendant gave the

row house as his address. Id. at 81–82. The police discovered 

contraband there and the Government introduced the 

defendant’s statement at trial. Id. 80–81. We concluded that 

the admission of the statement, even if erroneous, was 

harmless because “the government introduced ample other 

evidence”—a dry-cleaning ticket, utility bills and an income 

tax return—linking the defendant to the row house. Id. at 82–

83. Here, the Government has presented similar evidence—a 

motor vehicle title, an identification card, a traffic citation, 

mail, clothing, a key, an inhaler and a lease—directly tying

Brinson-Scott to the apartment. See United States v. Dykes, 

406 F.3d 717, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (defendant’s name on 

lease and his personal papers at searched premises is “ample 

evidence that [the defendant] lived in” those premises). 

Moreover, the Government mentioned Brinson-Scott’s 

statement and head nod only in passing during its closing 

argument, instead relying primarily—and with good reason—

on the physical evidence linking him to the apartment. See 

United States v. Harris, 515 F.3d 1307, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(error harmless where “the government made only one 

glancing reference to” erroneously admitted evidence during 

closing argument); see also United States v. Williams, 212 

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F.3d 1305, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (lone allusion in closing 

argument to erroneously admitted evidence insufficient to 

make error other than harmless). In light of the Government’s 

other evidence establishing the relevant incriminating facts, 

the assumed error had neither a “substantial [nor] injurious 

effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” United 

States v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 43, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2000). We 

therefore reject Brinson-Scott’s Fifth Amendment challenge.

B.

Brinson-Scott next claims that he was denied effective 

assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 

At the suppression hearing, two MPD officers testified that 

Brinson-Scott confessed spontaneously, that is, not in 

response to any questioning. Based on that evidence, the 

district court declined to suppress the confession. At trial, a 

different officer testified that Brinson-Scott uttered his 

confession “during his conversation back and forth.” Trial Tr. 

42–43, United States v. Brinson-Scott, No. 08-145 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 6, 2008). Brinson-Scott argues that the trial testimony 

“contradicted that of [the officers at the suppression hearing] 

who testified that the statements were spontaneous,” Br. of 

Appellant 23, and contends that his trial counsel’s failure to 

renew the suppression motion in light of this evidence was a 

denial of effective assistance.

Our sister circuits have settled on the de novo standard of 

review of an ineffective assistance claim. See United States v. 

McDade, 699 F.3d 499, 506 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing 

cases). We, however, “have thus far expressly declined to fix 

the appropriate standard, not having been confronted with a 

case in which the standard made a difference.” United States 

v. Toms, 396 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Roberts, J.). In 

this case, we “persist in our agnosticism on the appropriate 

standard of review” because, under either the abuse of 

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discretion or de novo standard of review, we affirm the 

district court’s denial. Id. 

Included in the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of counsel 

is the requirement that counsel meet a threshold level of 

effectiveness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

686 (1984). To establish that the threshold has not been met, 

“a defendant must show both deficient performance and 

prejudice.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). 

“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task,” 

Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010), and 

“[f]ailure to make the required showing of either deficient 

performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness 

claim.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. The Supreme Court has 

counseled that “[i]f it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness 

claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we 

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Id. at 

697. We follow that course here and conclude that BrinsonScott’s counsel’s decision not to renew the suppression 

motion at trial, even if deficient, did not prejudice BrinsonScott’s defense. 

“With respect to prejudice, a challenger must 

demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” 

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). At bottom, defense counsel’s 

error must have been “so serious as to deprive the defendant 

of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 687. 

Brinson-Scott made his confession immediately 

following the discovery of the cocaine base. As far as he 

knew, the cocaine base was the only incriminating evidence 

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the police had uncovered because they had not yet informed

him of the seizure of the powder cocaine. The only 

reasonable interpretation of his confession, therefore, is that it 

was directed to the cocaine base. He would hardly have 

confessed to possessing drugs he did not know had been 

discovered. But the jury failed to convict Brinson-Scott on

the cocaine base count (Count I). If confessing to the 

distribution of cocaine base was insufficient to convince the 

jury to convict him on Count I, his confession likely played 

no part in the jury’s decision to convict him on Count II—the 

powder cocaine count. We agree with the district court’s 

conclusion that the jury’s failure to convict Brinson-Scott of

the crime to which he confessed strongly suggests that it gave 

the confession no weight as to the count on which it did 

convict. See Brinson-Scott, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 309–10. 

A closer case might give us pause. But the Government’s

other evidence against Brinson-Scott was very strong. It

included powder cocaine packaged in individual bags seized 

from a jacket in the left bedroom closet, see United States v. 

Johnson, 592 F.3d 164, 168 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“It is a fair 

inference that a defendant exercises constructive possession 

over contraband found in a room he personally occupies.”); 

thousands of dollars in cash seized from a size-54 men’s suit 

jacket in the other bedroom, see United States v. Young, 609 

F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (“The large amount of cash 

found in [the defendant]’s possession . . . is additional 

circumstantial evidence of his involvement in narcotics

distribution.” (quotation marks omitted; bracketed material 

added)); and a protective face mask and small plastic bags

seized elsewhere in the apartment, both associated with drug 

preparation and distribution. Moreover, Brinson-Scott had

very recently pleaded guilty to a similar offense in D.C. 

Superior Court. Thus, even without the confession, the drugs 

and drug paraphernalia seized from the apartment establish 

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his culpability. See United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 

1007 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Common experience suggests that 

drug dealers must mix and measure the merchandise, protect 

it from competitors, and conceal evidence of their trade—

such as drugs, drug paraphernalia, weapons, written records, 

and cash—in secure locations. For the vast majority of drug 

dealers, the most convenient location to secure items is the 

home.”). 

In light of all of the evidence, even if Brinson-Scott’s 

counsel’s failure to renew the suppression motion was 

deficient under Strickland, Brinson-Scott cannot possibly 

show a “substantial, not just conceivable, likelihood of a 

different result.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 

(2011) (quotation marks omitted). Because “the strength of 

the [G]overnment’s evidence against [Brinson-Scott] would

remain virtually unchanged” had the district court suppressed 

the confession, our confidence in the result of his trial is

unshaken and, accordingly, we affirm the district court’s

denial of his Sixth Amendment claim. United States v. 

Weaver, 234 F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986).

C.

Finally, Brinson-Scott raises a procedural challenge to his 

sentence. “Given the broad substantive discretion afforded to 

district courts in sentencing, there are concomitant procedural 

requirements they must follow.” In re Sealed Case, 527 F.3d 

188, 191 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The Sentencing Reform Act of 

1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq., lays out three procedural 

requirements. First, “a district court should begin all 

sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable 

Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 

(2007). Second, “after giving both parties an opportunity to 

argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the 

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district judge should then consider all of the . . . factors [set

out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7)] to determine whether they 

support the sentence requested by a party.” Id. at 49–50. In so 

doing, the sentencing judge “must make an individualized 

assessment based on the facts presented.” Id. at 50. Finally, 

“[a]fter settling on the appropriate sentence, he must 

adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for 

meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of 

fair sentencing.” Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c).

Brinson-Scott argues that the district court failed to take 

both the second and the third steps, to wit, it “failed to make 

individualized findings to support the sentence,” Br. of 

Appellant 11, and “gave no explanation at all” for the 

sentence it imposed, Reply Br. 23. Although we ordinarily 

review procedural challenges for abuse of discretion, we 

review Brinson-Scott’s challenges for plain error because, 

even when given the opportunity, he failed to object to the 

sentencing court’s statement of reasons. United States v. 

Locke, 664 F.3d 353, 357 (D.C. Cir. 2011); see also FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(b). Plain error review is highly circumscribed:

[B]efore an appellate court can correct an error not 

raised at [sentencing], there must be (1) “error,” (2) 

that is “plain,” and (3) that “affects substantial rights.” 

If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may

then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error, 

but only if (4) the error “seriously affects the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997) 

(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)) 

(alterations, quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 

United States v. Watson, 476 F.3d 1020, 1023–24 (D.C. Cir. 

2007). 

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Brinson-Scott rests his entire argument on the district 

court’s terse statement: “[F]or reasons that I will not discuss, I 

believe that the sentence that the Court is imposing is 

appropriate under the circumstances.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 28,

United States v. Brinson-Scott, No. 08-145 (D.D.C. Jan. 30, 

2009). We agree that the statement, read in isolation, 

supports his argument that the district court failed to explain 

the sentence. But words wrenched from their context can be

used to support nearly any proposition. For this reason, we 

review the whole record to determine whether the district 

court satisfied the procedural requirements of the Sentencing 

Reform Act. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 

(1985) (“[W]hen addressing plain error, a reviewing court 

cannot properly evaluate a case except by viewing such a 

claim against the entire record.”). 

Although the district court must state its reasons for 

imposing a particular sentence, “[t]he appropriateness of 

brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to 

say, depends upon circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Where, as here, the district judge 

pronounces a within-Guidelines sentence—140 months, at the 

lower end of the Guidelines range—little explanation is 

required: 

[W]hen a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines 

to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily 

require lengthy explanation. Circumstances may well 

make clear that the judge rests his decision upon the 

Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines 

sentence is a proper sentence . . . in the typical case, 

and that the judge has found that the case before him 

is typical. Unless a party contests the Guidelines 

sentence generally under § 3553(a)—that is, argues 

that the Guidelines reflect an unsound judgment, or, 

for example, that they do not generally treat certain 

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defendant characteristics in the proper way—or argues 

for departure, the judge normally need say no more.

Id. at 356–57.

Brinson-Scott raised two arguments at sentencing. First, 

he argued that, although the court properly took account of 

unconvicted conduct—possessing with intent to distribute

cocaine base—in calculating the sentence, he maintained that

the 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio set forth in the Guidelines 

was unfair and so he asked the court to substitute a 20-to-1 

ratio in its stead. Second, he argued that his personal 

circumstances—his difficult upbringing, his role as a faithful 

parent, some higher-level education, extended periods of 

employment—weighed in favor of a below-Guidelines 

sentence. He also requested vocational training and drug 

counseling. 

The district court rejected both arguments and explained 

its reasoning. First, it noted that the Guidelines already 

reflected a two-point reduction to account for the significant 

crack-to-powder cocaine disparity and so it declined to reduce 

the ratio any further. Second, it emphasized Brinson-Scott’s 

role in the drug trade: 

I mean, that’s—that’s the bottom line, that he is a 

significant drug dealer, characterized by the 

prosecutor as a mid-level drug dealer.

I must tell you that in my consideration as to what 

is appropriate, yes, indeed, I do take it into 

consideration where in the drug distribution hierarchy 

the defendant before me is.

Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 24. Third, the district court noted that 

Brinson-Scott refused to take responsibility for his crimes 

despite “very, very strong” evidence of his guilt. Id. at 27. 

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Finally, the district court explained that Brinson-Scott’s 

recalcitrance and recidivism merited a within-Guidelines 

sentence. See id. at 27 (“I don’t think, frankly, Mr. BrinsonScott, anything that I might say would register with you.”); id.

at 28–29 (“I can tell you, sir, that one of the things that I 

considered is the fact that you, in fact, have come before 

judges before charged with the same thing, distributing 

cocaine. But . . . you have continued to break the law.”). The

court also ordered that Brinson-Scott receive 500 hours of 

drug abuse counseling. 

In light of the court’s explanation of its reasoning, 

Brinson-Scott’s contention that it failed to comply with 

section 3553(c) is without merit. Granted, the district court’s 

explanation did not invoke any of the section 3553(a) factors 

by name. But we do not require that it do so. Sentencing, 

after all, is not a game of Simon Says. We require simply that 

the court’s “discussion of appellant’s sentence ‘sound[] in the 

terms of § 3553(a), and the court’s references manifest an 

understanding of its statutory responsibility.’ ” United States 

v. Staton, 626 F.3d 584, 585 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) 

(quoting United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1186 (D.C. 

Cir. 2005)). The court’s consideration of Brinson-Scott’s role

in the drug-distribution hierarchy, his refusal to take 

responsibility for his crimes and his lengthy history of drug 

dealing track the section 3553(a) factors, particularly “the 

nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and 

“the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the 

seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 

to provide just punishment for the offense,” id.

§ 3553(a)(2)(A). The district court’s grant of Brinson-Scott’s 

request for 500 hours of drug abuse counseling further reflects 

its consideration of “the need . . . to provide the defendant 

with needed . . . medical care.” Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 

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Moreover, the district court’s consideration of Brinson-Scott’s 

particular role in the drug trade, of his recalcitrance and of his 

recidivism represents precisely the sort of “individualized 

assessment based on the facts presented” which the 

Sentencing Reform Act requires. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 

Although the district court’s explanation did not include

each section 3553(a) factor, it “need not consider every 

§ 3553(a) factor in every case.” Sealed Case, 527 F.3d at 191. 

A sentencing court satisfies the requirements of the 

Sentencing Reform Act so long as it considers the section 

3553(a) factors implicated by the defendant’s arguments. 

Simpson, 430 F.3d at 1187 (“When a defendant has not 

asserted the import of a particular § 3553(a) factor, nothing in 

the statute requires the court to explain sua sponte why it did 

not find that factor relevant to its discretionary decision.”). 

Here, the court did precisely that. Before pronouncing the

within-Guidelines sentence, it considered Brinson-Scott’s 

arguments for a below-Guidelines sentence and rejected them, 

explaining its reasoning sufficiently. The Sentencing Reform 

Act requires no more. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–57. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s 

judgments.

So ordered.

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