Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01956/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01956-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cynthia Louise Hobbs
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1956

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Cynthia Louise Hobbs

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Des Moines

____________

 Submitted: September 21, 2016

 Filed: December 14, 2016

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MURPHY and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

A special condition of Cynthia Hobbs’s supervised release prohibits her from

“direct, indirect, or electronic contact” with her husband. Because the record does not

support thissweeping restriction on her important constitutionalright ofmarriage, we

vacate and remand for resentencing. 

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I. Background

In 2009, Hobbs and her husband were charged with aggravated identity theft

and conspiring to commit bank fraud. They pleaded guilty. Hobbs was sentenced to

56 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Her husband was

sentenced to 80 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. They were

ordered jointly to pay approximately $18,000 in restitution.

Hobbs entered supervision in November 2014. At first she did well. Then, in

January 2016, probation moved to revoke her supervised release, alleging four

violations of her release conditions. First, Hobbs moved from her registered address

without telling her probation officer. Second, she failed to submit to a required

urinalysis. Third, she left her job at McDonald’s without telling her probation officer.

(These first three violations happened in January 2016.) And fourth, Hobbs stopped

making restitution payments in August 2015, the month her husband was released. 

In April 2016, Hobbs appeared before the court and admitted the violations.

Noting Hobbs’s cooperation, the government asked that her release be modified

rather than revoked. The government also asked the court to impose a condition of

“no contact with her husband.” 

The hearing focused on the no-contact issue. The court expressed concern that

Hobbs’s violations were connected to her husband’s release. “My understanding from

speaking with the probation officer and reviewing the record,” said the court, “is that

Ms. Hobbs was doing very well on supervision when she was living independently

and Mr. Hobbs was still incarcerated.” “And then,” the court went on, “this contact

occurs with her spouse, and those positive steps forward cease and, in fact, she

absconds from supervision. That time line seems to the court to be instructive.” A

probation officer established Mr. Hobbs’s release date but did not establish that

Hobbs had had any contact with her husband since his release. 

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The court then outlined its revocation sentence: 30 days’ imprisonment and no

marital contact. The court emphasized the coincidence of Hobbs’s noncompliance

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and her husband’s release: “The court finds that the time line related to the release of

her co-defendant and the introduction, reintroduction of her spouse, Jack Hobbs, into

her home and her life . . . was one factor that appears to have contributed to the

violations that occurred here.” The court acknowledged the constitutional

implications of substantially restraining Hobbs’s marital liberties, but it considered

the restrictions reasonably necessary for the remaining three-and-a-half years of her

supervision. 

The court entered an order modifying Hobbs’s supervised release to include

this condition:

The defendant shall have no direct, indirect, or electronic contact with

codefendant and husband, Jack Hobbs, during her term of supervised

release. 

Hobbs asks us to vacate the condition. 

II. Discussion

“A sentencing judge is afforded wide discretion when imposing terms of

supervised release, and we review a decision to impose special terms of supervised

release for abuse of that discretion.” United States v. Crume, 422 F.3d 728, 732 (8th

Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Sentencing discretion is cabined by statute. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d). The applicable statute requires, as relevant here, two things. First, special

supervised-release conditions must reasonably relate to the nature and circumstances

ofthe offense, the defendant’s history and characteristics, deterring criminal conduct,

protecting the public, and promoting the defendant’s correctional needs. 18 U.S.C.

Hobbs does not challenge her imprisonment. 1

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§§ 3583(d)(1), 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D); Crume, 422 F.3d at 733. And second, the

conditions must not constrain the defendant’s liberty more than reasonably necessary

to deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and promote her correctional needs. 18

U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2), 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C); Crume 422 F.3d at 733. 

The sentencing court’s wide discretion notwithstanding, “we are particularly

reluctant to uphold sweeping restrictions on important constitutional rights.” Crume,

422 F.3d at 733. Currently, most sweeping restrictions seem to involve the Internet.

See, e.g., United States v. West, 829 F.3d 1013, 1020–21 (8th Cir. 2016) (ban on

creating websites overbroad); Crume, 422 F.3d at 733 (ban on Internet access

overbroad). Othersinvolve library access and the parent–child relationship. See, e.g.,

United States v. Bender, 566 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 2009) (library access); United

States v. Davis, 452 F.3d 991, 995 (8th Cir. 2006) (parent–child relationship). The

sweeping restriction in this case involves another important constitutional

right—marriage. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 

Because of the important constitutional interest at stake, Hobbs urges de novo

review, citing United States v. Kelly, 625 F.3d 516, 520 (8th Cir. 2010). Kelly states

that we review the constitutionality of a supervised-release condition de novo. Id.

Some cases have cited Kelly for this point. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 675

F.3d 1122, 1125 (8th Cir. 2012). Other cases, though, have addressed sweeping

restrictions under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See, e.g., Crume, 422 F.3d at

732–33. Because the condition here is an abuse of discretion, we do not decide

whether the stricter de novo standard might apply. 

Hobbs asks usto vacate the no-contact condition because it is unconstitutional

and because it violates the special-conditions statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), in two

ways: (1) it is not reasonably related to the sentencing goals, and (2) it deprives her

ofmore liberty than necessary to advance those goals. The government acknowledges

that a no-contact order between spouses is a sweeping restriction on an important

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constitutional right, but it argues that this record supports one. Upon review, we

conclude that this record does not support one.

The district court based its decision on “the time line related to the release of

[Hobbs’s] co-defendant and the introduction, reintroduction of her spouse, Jack

Hobbs, into her home and her life.” The hearing transcript is the only explanation of

the court’s decision. And the only record facts at the hearing were Hobbs’s admitted

violations and her husband’s release date, August 3, 2015. On that day, Hobbs made

her last restitution payment. Five months later, she moved, left her job, and failed to

provide a urinalysis, all without telling probation. But nothing in the record shows

that Hobbs’s husband influenced her to defy her release conditions. Her lawyer

attributed her failings to a tax-lien and holiday-induced drug relapse. He did mention

that the Hobbses were co-defendants in a pending state case, but he did not tell the

district court anything else about that case.

On this record, then, the timeline-based decision was “pure speculation or

assumption[].” Schaefer, 675 F.3d at 1124 (quoting United States v. Fenner, 600 F.3d

1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 2010)). The evidence did not justify effectively divorcing Hobbs

from her husband during supervision to achieve any valid sentencing purpose. 18

U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). United States v. Smith, on which the district court relied, is not

to the contrary. 436 F.3d 307 (1st Cir. 2006). Smith upheld a special condition

separating the defendant from his daughter after his efforts to contact her “produced

both a state court restraining order and a trespass notice.” Id. at 312. The rationale

was public protection. Id. That rationale simply does not apply here.

Nor are the government’s legal authorities controlling or persuasive. United

States v. Rodriguez upheld a special condition prohibiting the defendant from

contacting her husband without probation’s approval (a notably less restrictive

condition than a blanket no-contact order). 178 F. App’x 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2006). She

had committed her crimes—lying in a gun purchase—at her husband’s behest. Id. at

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158. The rationale wasreducing recidivism and protecting the public. Id.But nothing

here suggests that Hobbs’s husband induced her crimes. The presentence report

declaresthem“equally culpable.” The government’s other main case, State v. Tanner,

is closer. 727 S.E.2d 814 (W. Va. 2012). Tanner upheld a parole condition separating

a couple who made and used methamphetamine together. Id. at 816. The rationale

wasreducing recidivism. Id. at 821. Certainly the Hobbses were criminals in concert.

But the condition here was unrelated to the underlying offense, and the record does

not connect Hobbs’s violations to her husband’s release, apart from the timing of her

August 2015 violation. The evidence, then, is insufficient to support the restriction. 

“[T]he state is inserting itself into [Hobbs’s] marital relationship in an overly

broad way, and the condition thus involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is

reasonably necessary.” United States v. Chong, 217 F. App’x 637, 639 (9th Cir.

2007); see also United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 2010)

(vacating a condition barring contact with the defendant’s “life partner”). There is no

suggestion, either, that the district court considered more narrowly tailored

alternatives. It therefore abused its discretion. Because we vacate the condition under

§ 3583(d)(2), we do not consider whether it violates § 3583(d)(1) or is per se

unconstitutional.

Hobbs asks us to remand with a closed record. When the government has had

a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence, we follow “‘the traditional path’ of

limiting [it] to one bite at the apple.” United States v. Thomas, 630 F.3d 1055, 1057

(8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. King, 598 F.3d 1043, 1050 (8th Cir. 2010)).

The legal issue here was clear, and the government’s failure of proof is inexcusable.

United States v. Johnson, 710 F.3d 784, 790 (8th Cir. 2013). It moved to revoke

Hobbs’s release in late January 2016. The hearing wasin earlyApril. The government

had ample opportunity to build its case. The transcript indicates that the parties knew

the no-contact issue was coming. The district court had even researched it. “Because

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the government knew of its obligation and inexcusably failed to meet it, this case is

remanded without the opportunity to expand the record.” Id.

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we vacate the no-contact condition and remand for resentencing. 

______________________________

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