Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05390/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05390-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Bus Association
Appellant
Rodney E. Slater
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 8, 2000 Decided November 14, 2000

No. 99-5390

American Bus Association,

Appellant

v.

Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation,

Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cv02351)

Richard A. Allen argued the cause for appellant. With

him on the briefs were Richard P. Schweitzer, Craig M.

Cibak and Jol A. Silversmith.

Sandra Wien Simon, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General,

Marleigh D. Dover, Attorney, Nancy E. McFadden, General

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Counsel, U.S. Department of Transportation, and Paul M.

Geier, Assistant General Counsel.

Before: Williams, Sentelle and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

Sentelle, Circuit Judge: American Bus Association

("ABA") appeals from a District Court judgment upholding a

Department of Transportation ("DOT") rule that implements

portions of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or

"Act"), 42 U.S.C. s 12101 et seq. (1994). Appellant challenges

those portions of the rule that authorize the imposition of

money damages against bus companies that fail to comply

with the ADA. Appellant claims that the remedies enumerated in the ADA are exclusive, and may not be supplemented

with a money-damages scheme. It also alleges that DOT

violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C.

s 551 et seq. (1994), because it provided neither notice that it

was considering authorizing monetary relief nor opportunity

for the public to comment.

We conclude that DOT lacked the statutory authority to

impose money damages on bus companies. Congress has

given the agency no authority to establish remedies in addition to those that are specified in the ADA. Because we hold

that DOT exceeded the scope of its authority, we need not

reach Appellant's notice-and-comment claim.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

Title III of the ADA generally requires operators of public

accommodations, including common carriers, to make their

services accessible to disabled persons. See 42 U.S.C.

ss 12181-88 (1994). Toward that end, the ADA instructs the

Secretary of Transportation--which post is presently held by

Appellee Rodney E. Slater--to promulgate rules concerning

the accessibility of over-the-road buses ("OTRBs"), which are

large motorcoaches designed for travel between cities. See

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id. s 12186(a). On September 6, 1991, DOT issued a set of

interim rules governing OTRB accessibility. These rules

required bus companies to provide boarding assistance to

disabled passengers, and permitted operators to require passengers who needed such assistance to provide them with 48

hours of advance notice. DOT did not, at the time, oblige

operators to equip their OTRBs with wheelchair lifts, nor did

it require operators to pay money damages to disabled persons whose travel plans were frustrated. See Transportation

for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 45,584, 45,640

(1991).

In 1993, DOT issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking in which the agency identified the OTRB-accessibility

issues it hoped to resolve. Among DOT's concerns were

whether all OTRB routes should have accessibility requirements, and whether disabled passengers' needs could be

accommodated by an "on-call" system under which they could

request an accessible OTRB in advance. See Transportation

for Individuals with Disabilities; Accessibility of Over-theRoad Buses, 58 Fed. Reg. 52,735, 52,738-39 (1993). The

public more than complied with the agency's request for

comments: hundreds were submitted, mostly from disabled

persons' advocacy groups and organizations representing the

bus industry.

On March 25, 1998, DOT published a notice of proposed

rulemaking ("NPRM") that proposed requiring all fixed-route

OTRBs (regularly scheduled buses, such as Greyhound) to

install wheelchair lifts, and obliging charter/tour OTRBs to

provide lift-equipped buses to passengers who request them

48 hours in advance. The NPRM made no mention of the

possibility of money damages, or any other scheme to compensate disabled passengers whose travel plans were frustrated by an inaccessible OTRB. See Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 14,560-71 (1998).

After considering the over 400 comments submitted in

response to its NPRM, the agency issued its final rule on

September 28, 1998. Several commentators had urged DOT

to promulgate an "on-call," or reservation-based, rule, under

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which all OTRB operators (and not just charter/tour operators) would be required to provide wheelchair-accessible buses to passengers who gave 48-hours advance notice of their

need. See, e.g., Comments of Coach USA, Inc. at 19-21. The

agency rejected that alternative. Its final rule essentially

imposed the obligations proposed in the NPRM--requiring

fixed-route OTRB operators to equip their entire fleets with

wheelchair lifts--with the additional requirement that bus

companies pay "compensation" to disabled passengers when

they fail to provide them with accessible service. A bus

operator will be assessed a $300 fine for its first violation,

$400 for its second, and so on in $100 increments up to $700

for its fifth and all subsequent infractions. See Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 51,670,

51,692 (1998) (codified at 49 C.F.R. s 37.199 (2000)).

B. The District Court decision

Two days after the final rule was promulgated, September

30, 1998, Appellant American Bus Association filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of

Columbia. ABA, an organization representing the bus industry, alleged, among other things, that DOT had no statutory

authority to implement the money-damages scheme, that the

agency had not provided adequate notice that it intended to

adopt a remedies provision, and that the rule violated the

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. s 4321 et seq.

(1994).

On the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the

District Court rejected each of ABA's contentions. The court

found that the agency had provided adequate notice that it

was considering a money-damages provision. While the

NPRM may not expressly have mentioned the possibility of

money damages, the remedies scheme was the "logical outgrowth" of the agency's often-expressed concern that bus

companies would fail to provide accessible service to disabled

passengers. See American Bus Ass'n v. Slater, No. 98-2351,

Mem. Op. at 22-23 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 1999) ("Mem. Op.")

(citing, inter alia, United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d

1189, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Where the change between the

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proposed and final rule is important, the question for the

court is whether the final rule is a 'logical outgrowth' of the

rulemaking proceeding.")). Indeed, the court reasoned, ABA

had actual notice that DOT was considering a damages

provision, as its own submitted comment expressly endorsed

a proposal that disappointed passengers should be permitted

to seek monetary relief. See id. at 25-26.

ABA's argument that the agency exceeded its statutory

authority by imposing money damages fared no better. The

District Court cited the Supreme Court's pronouncement

that, if an authorizing "statute is silent or ambiguous," courts

must uphold "a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 844

(1984). Such an ambiguity, the court reasoned, exists here:

"The plain language [of the ADA] indicates that Congress did

not explicitly forbid the Secretary from including a compensation mechanism in the OTRB accessibility regulations."

Mem. Op. at 28. Because of the ADA's silence on the

availability of money damages--because "[a] gap exists in this

enabling statute," id.--the court concluded that Chevron

obliged it to defer to DOT's reasonable interpretation.

Nor was the District Court persuaded by ABA's argument

that the agency's money-damages scheme is foreclosed by

APA s 558(b), which establishes that "[a] sanction may not be

imposed ... except within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized by law." 5 U.S.C. s 558(b) (1994). The

court conceded that DOT had authorized sanctions, but it

reasoned that they were not penal sanctions. Because the

sanctions were designed to remedy the injuries suffered by

disabled persons whose travel needs were not accommodated,

and because the fines would be paid directly to the disappointed passengers, "this court concludes that the provision is

a regulatory sanction with a remedial purpose and not a

penalty." Mem. Op. at 27. The court therefore entered

summary judgment in favor of the agency's Secretary.

This appeal followed. ABA no longer contests DOT's

decision to require that OTRB companies equip their buses

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with wheelchair lifts, and only its money-damages and noticeand-comment claims are before this Court.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Chevron and ADA s 12188

The principal issue in this case is whether DOT had the

statutory authority to adopt a rule imposing money damages

on bus companies that fail to provide accessible service to

disabled passengers. Because, DOT proposes, this case involves a dispute as to whether that rule is in fact authorized

by the statute it purports to implement, it is governed by the

familiar two-step analysis announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.

v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984). "First, always," the reviewing court must consider

"whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." An affirmative answer "is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect

to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at

842-43. If, on the other hand, "the statute is silent or

ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the court must

uphold "a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 843, 844.

Applying Chevron to this case, we conclude that Congress

unambiguously intended to preclude DOT from authorizing

money damages. The ADA's carefully crafted remedies

scheme reveals the legislature's intent that the statute's

enumerated remedies were to be exclusive, and consequent

intent to deny agencies the power to authorize supplementary

monetary relief. The relevant portion of the ADA establishes

that:

The remedies and procedures set forth in section

2000a-3(a) of this title are the remedies and procedures

this subchapter provides to any person who is being

subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in

violation of this subchapter or who has reasonable

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grounds for believing that such person is about to be

subjected to discrimination in violation of section 12183 of

this title.

42 U.S.C. s 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added).

By preceding the words "remedies and procedures" with

the definite article "the," as opposed to the more general "a"

or "an," Congress made clear that it understood

s 2000a-3(a)'s remedies to be exclusive. Indeed, "[i]t is a

rule of law well established that the definite article 'the'

particularizes the subject which it precedes. It is a word of

limitation as opposed to the indefinite or generalizing force of

'a' or 'an.' " Brooks v. Zabka, 450 P.2d 653, 655 (Colo. 1969)

(en banc); see also Black's Law Dictionary 1477 (6th ed.

1990) ("In construing statute, definite article 'the' particularizes the subject which it precedes and is word of limitation as

opposed to indefinite or generalizing force 'a' or 'an'."). If

Congress had intended those remedies not to be exclusive, it

would have provided that the relief available to an ADA

plaintiff "includes" the 2000a-3(a) remedies.

The remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. 2000a-3(a)--which is

part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act--do not include money

damages. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S.

400, 402 (1968) ("When a plaintiff brings an action under that

Title, he cannot recover damages."). Instead, as that subsection's caption ("Civil actions for injunctive relief") indicates, a

party may invoke s 2000a-3(a) only in an effort to obtain

"preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or

temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order." 42

U.S.C. s 2000a-3(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, a

s 2000a-3(a) plaintiff primarily seeks not redress of his own

injury, but to vindicate the policy of the United States

government. See Newman, 390 U.S. at 402 ("If he obtains an

injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a

'private attorney general,' vindicating a policy that Congress

considered of the highest priority.").

DOT additionally attempts to locate its authority to impose

fines in the ADA's specification that the Attorney General

may bring a civil action for money damages against OTRB

operators that fail to provide accessible service. See 42

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U.S.C. s 12188(b) (1994). "Congress contemplated," the

agency submits, "that some type of compensation might be

paid from an operator to a disappointed rider." Appellee's

brief at 54. Not only does the civil-action provision not assist

DOT's claim that the ADA empowers it to authorize monetary

relief, it actually undermines it. Congress did indeed contemplate that money damages would be available--but it also

specified the precise conditions under which they could be

paid. The monetary relief must be (1) awarded by a court (2)

in a civil action (3) that was brought by the Attorney General.

By specifying the circumstances under which monetary relief

will be available, Congress evinced its intent that damages

would be available in no others. See Transamerica Mortgage

Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979) (recognizing

that "it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that

where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy or

remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it").

DOT's rule satisfies none of those three conditions. First,

the agency itself, not an Article III court, presumably would

levy fines against OTRB companies. Second, and as a consequence, the fines would not be assessed in a civil action.

Finally, DOT makes monetary relief available even absent the

participation of the Attorney General. In fact, the agency is

somewhat, and perhaps deliberately, vague as to how it will

enforce its sanctions: The parties dispute whether a disappointed passenger would hold a judicially cognizable right to

compensation. Compare Appellant's brief at 25 n.16, 26 n.17,

with Appellee's brief at 54-55 n.10. And at one point in its

briefs--though not, crucially, in the rule itself--the agency

claims that the Attorney General would be responsible for

enforcement. See Appellee's brief at 54-55 n.10. But it is

difficult to see how that could be the case, since DOT's rule

describes the compensation procedure as involving "a sum

sent directly to the passenger whose travel plans were disrupted," and indeed states that "[n]o administrative procedure"--or, presumably, judicial procedure--"is needed."

Transportation for Individuals with Disabilities, 63 Fed. Reg.

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51,670, 51,687 (1998) (emphasis added).1

We conclude, therefore, that Congress has not granted

DOT the power to impose money damages on bus companies

that fail to provide accessible service to disabled passengers.

We need not evaluate the reasonableness of the agency's rule

under Chevron's second step, since we are bound in the first

instance to "give effect" to Congress's "unambiguously expressed intent." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.

B. APA s 558(b)

Our conclusion that DOT lacks the authority to authorize

money damages is confirmed by the Administrative Procedure Act, s 558(b) of which establishes that "[a] sanction may

not be imposed or a substantive rule or order issued except

within jurisdiction delegated to the agency and as authorized

by law." 5 U.S.C. s 558(b) (1994). There is no dispute in

this case that DOT's fines are sanctions; the District Court

held as much, and the agency does not appear to challenge

that finding. Instead, the District Court apparently concluded that s 558(b) requires express grants of statutory authority, not for all sanctions, but only for the ones that can be

characterized as "penal." And, the court submitted, the

OTRB rules do not impose a "penalty" inasmuch as they

impose "a regulatory sanction with a remedial purpose."

Memorandum Opinion at 27.

That conclusion is likely erroneous for two reasons. First,

s 558(b) requires statutory authority for all sanctions, not

merely those that can be characterized as penal. Second,

DOT's compensation rule does, in fact, impose penalties that

go beyond simple compensation. DOT's efforts to distinguish

simple sanctions (which, it submits, may be imposed without

an express authorization) from punitive sanctions (which may

not) rest on the following syllogism:

__________

1 If the Secretary intends to assert that by means of his rule he

can channel the choices of the Attorney General and the courts

within the ADA remedy structure, he points to nothing suggesting

such authority.

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(1) Section 558(b) permits agencies to impose nonpunitive sanctions, even in the absence of express

statutory authority.

(2) DOT's sanctions are non-punitive.

(3) Therefore, DOT could impose the sanctions absent

express statutory authority.

The problem with the syllogism is that its major premise is

flawed. Section 558(b) does not distinguish on its face between punitive sanctions and ordinary sanctions. It speaks of

"sanctions," period, and provides no basis for supposing that

one type may be imposed without statutory authorization, but

that other types may not. Nor does DOT cite any cases that

distinguish between punitive and ordinary sanctions. It simply moves from its conclusion that its rule imposes a sanction

to drawing a distinction between the two types, and omits the

necessary middle step of explaining why that distinction has

any legal significance.

Nor is the syllogism's minor premise--that the agency's

sanctions are non-punitive--persuasive. The amounts which

bus companies will be made to pay are not a function of a

would-be passenger's injury, but of the number of times the

company has violated the ADA in the past. The fines begin

at $300, for an OTRB operator's first offense, and escalate in

increments of $100 up to $700, for an operator's fifth and all

subsequent offenses. See Transportation for Individuals with

Disabilities, 63 Fed. Reg. 51,670, 51,692 (1998) (codified at 49

C.F.R. s 37.199 (2000)). There is no connection between the

fine imposed and the injury suffered. The fines are unrelated

to the out-of-pocket expenses--which might include lodging,

meals, and alternative transportation--a disappointed passenger could be expected to pay. Instead, the agency is concerned principally with punishing noncomplying OTRB operators.

To be sure, the agency's sanctions may have several objectives, one of which is to punish and another of which is to

remedy disabled persons' injuries. But this Court regards as

a penalty any sanction that "goes beyond remedying the

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damage caused to the harmed parties by the defendant's

action." Johnson v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

(emphasis added). In other words, a sanction is a penalty

even if only one of its various objectives is to punish wrongful

conduct; that is, if it "serv[es] in part to punish." Austin v.

United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (emphasis added).

Beyond cavil, DOT's sanctions are at least in part designed to

punish, which is why the damages an OTRB operator must

pay turn on the number of violations it has committed and not

the extent of the disappointed passenger's injury.

Nor are we persuaded by DOT's attempt to circumvent

s 558(b)'s directive by claiming that agencies possess a limited, but inherent, power to impose sanctions. DOT cites both

Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979), and

Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452 (D.C. Cir. 1994), for the

proposition that an agency's general power to protect the

integrity of its administrative processes entails an inherent

sanctioning power. Both cases are easily dismissed or distinguished.

Touche Ross concerned a Securities and Exchange Commission rule that enabled the SEC to discipline attorneys by

refusing to allow them to practice before it. The Second

Circuit concluded that an agency has a limited power to

impose sanctions that are not expressly authorized by statute,

but only ones designed to "protect the integrity of its own

processes." Touche Ross, 609 F.2d at 582. The Commission's disciplinary rule did not apply to the primary conduct

of regulated entities, but was simply designed to "ensure that

those professionals, on whom the Commission relies heavily in

the performance of its statutory duties, perform their tasks

diligently and with a reasonable degree of competence." Id.

The SEC's housekeeping-type rule is quite unlike the rule

promulgated by DOT here, which penalizes regulated parties

for violations of their statutory duties. The agency's authorization of monetary relief is not designed to "protect the

integrity of its own processes," but to encourage OTRB

companies to modify their primary conduct.

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DOT's reliance on our own decision in Checkosky is even

more easily dismissed. The portion of Checkosky on which

the agency relies did not command a majority of this Court

but is, instead, the separate opinion of a single Judge. See

Appellee's brief at 55 (citing Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 455

(separate opinion of Silberman, J.)). And even if the Checkosky opinion did bind us, it would be distinguishable on the

same grounds as Touche Ross: Like Touche Ross, that case

concerned the SEC's authority to promulgate an internal

disciplinary rule. DOT's inherent sanctioning power extends

only to "protect[ing] the integrity of the agency's administrative processes," Checkosky, 23 F.3d at 455 (separate opinion

of Silberman, J.), and not to modifying regulated parties'

primary conduct.

We conclude, therefore, that DOT lacked the statutory

authority to require OTRB companies to pay money damages

to the disabled passengers whom they fail to accommodate.

Congress could not speak more clearly than it has in the text

of the APA: "a sanction may not be imposed or a substantive

rule or order issued except within jurisdiction delegated to

the agency and as authorized by law." 5 U.S.C. s 558(b).

C. Notice-and-comment

ABA additionally claims that DOT violated the APA by

failing to provide it with adequate notice that it was considering, and with the opportunity to comment on, its moneydamages rule. See 5 U.S.C. s 553(b), (c) (1994). Because we

hold that DOT had no authority to promulgate that rule in

the first instance, the Court finds it unnecessary to take up

ABA's notice-and-comment claim. The agency has exceeded

the scope of the authority delegated to it by Congress, and it

matters not that they adhered to the APA's procedural

requirements in doing so.

III. CONCLUSION

Congress has not conferred on DOT the power to authorize

money damages against OTRB companies that fail to comply

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with the ADA. We therefore reverse the District Court's

grant of summary judgment in favor of the agency's Secretary.

It is so ordered.

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Sentelle, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write separately to

express my view that the Court need not reach the second

step of Chevron for a more fundamental reason; namely, that

the ADA contains no ambiguity that could trigger that analysis. DOT proposes as the statute's deference-triggering ambiguity the fact that the statute does not expressly state that

the remedies detailed in s 12188 are to be "exclusive." In

essence, the agency's position--and the District Court's holding--is that the absence of a statutory grant of power is itself

an ambiguity that calls for Chevron deference. See, e.g.,

Mem. Op. at 28 ("The plain language [of the ADA] indicates

that Congress did not explicitly forbid the Secretary from

including a compensation mechanism in the OTRB accessibility regulations."); Appellee's brief at 43 (proposing that the

"first step of the Chevron analysis ... can be resolved quickly

here" because Congress "neither required nor prohibited the

Secretary from promulgating a compensation provision" and

because "Congress did not place any specific limitations on

the contents of the OTRB rules"). An agency, DOT submits,

is free to impose any otherwise-reasonable rule that Congress has not expressly prohibited.

I would conclude that the second step of Chevron is not

even implicated in this case. Chevron step two applies only

when a statute contains an ambiguity. But Congress's failure

to grant an agency a given power is not an ambiguity as to

whether that power has, in fact, been granted. On the

contrary, and as this Court persistently has recognized, a

statutory silence on the granting of a power is a denial of

that power to the agency. See, e.g., Backcountry Against

Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting

EPA's argument "that, since section 6945(c) is silent as to its

application to Indian tribes, the statute is 'ambiguous' ");

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("We

refuse, once again, to presume a delegation of power merely

because Congress has not expressly withheld such power.");

see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990)

("A 'gap' is not created in a statutory scheme merely because

a statute does not restate the truism that States may not preempt federal law.").

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This Court, while sitting en banc, has already disposed of

DOT's argument that the judiciary must afford Chevron

deference to an agency's interpretation of a statutory silence.

"To suggest," we reasoned,

that Chevron step two is implicated any time a statute

does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed

administrative power (i.e. when the statute is not written

in "thou shalt not" terms), is both flatly unfaithful to the

principles of administrative law outlined above, and refuted by precedent.... Were courts to presume a delegation of power absent an express withholding of such

power, agencies would enjoy virtually limitless hegemony, a result plainly out of keeping with Chevron and quite

likely with the Constitution as well.

Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd.,

29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted). The ADA is not ambiguous on

whether it grants DOT the power to authorize money damages against non-complying bus companies. The statute simply does not grant it that power.

The proposition that statutory silences are not Chevrontriggering ambiguities follows from the very nature of administrative agencies. Agencies have no inherent powers. They

instead are creatures of statute, and may act only because,

and only to the extent that, Congress affirmatively has delegated them the power to act. See Louisiana Pub. Serv.

Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) ("[A]n agency

literally has no power to act ... unless and until Congress

confers power upon it."); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,

29 F.3d at 670 ("Agencies owe their capacity to act to the

delegation of authority, either express or implied, from the

legislature.").

Hence if Congress wishes to deny an agency a given power,

it need not expressly restrict the agency; it is enough for

Congress simply to decline to delegate power. In the same

way, a statute that is completely silent on the question of

whether it confers a power does not vest the agency with the

discretion to determine the scope of that power. See Natural

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Resources Defense Council v. Reilly, 983 F.2d 259, 266 (D.C.

Cir. 1993) (" '[I]t is only legislative intent to delegate such

authority that entitles an agency to advance its own statutory

construction for review under the deferential second prong of

Chevron.' " (quoting Kansas City v. Dep't of Housing &

Urban Dev., 923 F.2d 188, 191-92 (D.C. Cir. 1991))). In order

for there to be an ambiguous grant of power, there must be a

grant of power in the first instance. There is none here.

Moreover, accepting DOT's contention--that a statutory

silence empowers it to promulgate any rules that Congress

has not expressly forbidden--would vest agencies with nearplenary authority. Agencies would become the nation's principal lawmakers. After all, it is the norm for statutes to be

silent on whether they grant various powers to agencies. The

ADA is silent on whether DOT has the power to oblige bus

companies to give disabled persons free passage. It is also

silent on whether DOT has the power to require that bus

companies transport disabled passengers in their own individual buses. If we were to accept DOT's view, we would be

obliged to conclude that Congress somehow, if only ambiguously, has authorized the agency to adopt both of those rules,

and consequently would be bound to afford them Chevron

deference. We would not, of course, be obliged to rubberstamp an agency's interpretation of those, or any other,

statutory silences; any such interpretation would still have to

satisfy the reasonableness test of Chevron step two. See

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (requiring courts to uphold only "a

reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an

agency"). But it makes a mockery of Chevron to suggest

that its second prong is even implicated by Congress's failure

to deny a power to an agency.

The agency's position--that that which is not forbidden is

permitted--turns the basic assumption of the American system of government on its head. Our Constitution permits the

national government to exercise only those powers affirmatively granted to it by the people of the several states. See,

e.g., U.S. Const. amend. X; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.

(4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged

by all to be one of enumerated powers"); Marbury v. MadiUSCA Case #99-5390 Document #556356 Filed: 11/14/2000 Page 16 of 17
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son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) ("The powers of the

legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may

not be mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written.").

The Constitution's presumption is that a power not expressly

conferred on the federal government has been denied to it.

The same principle informs Congress's delegations of power

to administrative agencies. Unless Congress delegates authority to an agency, the agency is without power to act.

And, it goes without saying, courts need not defer to an

agency's interpretation, reasonable or otherwise, of a nonexistent grant of power.

USCA Case #99-5390 Document #556356 Filed: 11/14/2000 Page 17 of 17