Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02632/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02632-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kane
Respondent
Fidel Morales Mendez
Petitioner

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At the time of the decision, the Board was called the California Board of Prison Terms.

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FIDEL MORALES MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

A.P. KANE, 

Respondent. 

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No. C 05-2632 MJJ (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner, a California prisoner incarcerated at the California State Prison, San

Quentin, filed the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254, challenging a 2002 decision by the California Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”)1

 finding

him unsuitable for parole, and a 2004 Board decision to postpone his parole suitability hearing for a

year. Respondent has filed an answer, and petitioner has filed a traverse.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and use of

a firearm in 1992. He was sentenced to a term of fifteen years to life in state prison for the murder,

plus three consecutive years for the assault charge, and three concurrent years for the firearm

enhancement. In 2004, when petitioner had served approximately 12 years in prison, the Board

found him unsuitable for parole. In unsuccessful habeas petitions filed in all three levels of the state

courts, petitioner claimed that the Board’s granting his request for postponement violated his

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constitutional rights.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgement of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a); Rose v. Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). Under AEDPA, this Court may grant a

petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was “adjudicated on

the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established United States Supreme Court

precedent “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases,

‘or if it confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme

Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme Court precedent. Early v. Packer,

537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06). Under the “unreasonable application”

clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court

may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. 

Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. A federal habeas court may also

grant the writ if it concludes that the state court's adjudication of the claim “resulted in a

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence

presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Rice v. Collins, 126 S. Ct.

969, 975 (2006). 

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This claim is set forth in the conclusion of the petition for review to the California Supreme

Court, which petitioner attaches as an exhibit to the instant petition and to which he cites as setting

forth the grounds for habeas relief he seeks in this court. (Petition at 6, Ex. I at 6.)

3

Respondent argues that the Ninth Circuit is wrong in finding Hill’s “some evidence”

requirement applicable to parole denials. This Court, of course, has no discretion to disregard or

overrule applicable decisions from the Ninth Circuit.

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B. Analysis of Claim

Petitioner claims that the Board’s decision violated his right to due process because

the decision was not based on “some evidence”.2

 A parole board's decision satisfies the

requirements of due process if “some evidence” supports the decision. Sass v. California

Board of Prison Terms, 461 F.3d 1123, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 2006) (adopting some evidence

standard for disciplinary hearings outlined in Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454-55

(1985)); see also Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2007).3

 The standard of “some

evidence” is met if there was some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative

tribunal could be deduced. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. An examination of the entire record is

not required nor is an independent assessment of the credibility of witnesses or weighing of

the evidence. Id. The relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that

could support the conclusion reached by the [administrative] board. See id. Additionally,

the evidence underlying the Board’s decision must have some indicia of reliability. 

McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 904 (9th Cir. 2002).

In assessing whether or not there is “some evidence” supporting the Board’s denial of

parole, this Court must consider the regulations which guide the Board in making its parole

suitability determinations. California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 2402(a) states

that “[t]he panel shall first determine whether the life prisoner is suitable for release on

parole. Regardless of the length of time served, a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for

and denied parole if in the judgment of the panel the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk

of danger to society if released from prison.” The regulations direct the Board to consider

“all relevant, reliable information available.” Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(b). Further,

they list sets of circumstances tending to indicate whether or not an inmate is suitable for

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The matrix provides three choices of suggested base terms for several categories of crimes: for

second degree murders, the matrix of base terms ranges from the low of 15, 16, or 17 years, to a high

of 19, 20 or 21 years, depending on certain facts of the crime. Id. at § 2403. One axis of the matrix

concerns the relationship between murderer and victim and the other axis of the matrix concerns the

circumstances of the murder. The choices on the axis for the relationship of murderer and victim are

“participating victim,” “prior relationship,” “no prior relationship,” and “threat to public order or

murder for hire.” The choices on the axis for the circumstances of the murder are “indirect,” “direct or

victim contribution,” “severe trauma,” or “torture.” Each of the choices are further defined in the

matrix. See 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2403(c). 

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parole. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2402(c)-(d). 

The circumstances tending to show an inmate’s unsuitability are: (1) the commitment

offense was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner;” (2) previous

record of violence; (3) unstable social history; (4) sadistic sexual offenses; (5) psychological

factors such as a “lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the offense;” and (6)

prison misconduct. 15 Cal. Code of Regs. § 2402(c). The circumstances tending to show

suitability are: (1) no juvenile record; (2) stable social history; (3) signs of remorse; (4)

commitment offense was committed as a result of stress which built up over time; (5)

Battered Woman Syndrome; (6) lack of criminal history; (7) age is such that it reduces the

possibility of recidivism; (8) plans for future including development of marketable skills; and

(9) institutional activities that indicate ability to function within the law. 15 Cal. Code of

Regs. § 2402(d). These circumstances are meant to serve as “general guidelines,” giving the

Board latitude in the weighing of the importance of the combination of factors present in

each particular case. Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 2404(c). Once the prisoner has been

found suitable for parole, the regulations set forth a matrix to set a base term. 15 Cal. Code

Regs. § 2403(a).4

The California Supreme Court has found that the foregoing statutory scheme places

individual suitability for parole above a prisoner’s expectancy in early setting of a fixed date

designed to ensure term uniformity. In re Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th 1061, 1070-71 (2005).

While subdivision (a) of section 3041 states that indeterminate life (i.e., lifemaximum) sentences should “normally” receive “uniform” parole dates for

similar crimes, subdivision (b) provides that this policy applies “unless [the

Board] determines” that a release date cannot presently be set because the

particular offender’s crime and/or criminal history raises “public safety” concerns requiring further indefinite incarceration. (Italics added.) Nothing in

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In his third claim, petitioner asserts his right to due process was violated because the Board did

not apply the matrix under California Penal Code § 3041(a) prior to determining whether he presented

a continuing public danger under § 3041(b). As discussed above, Rosenkrantz explicitly held that such

an application of § 3041 was proper as a matter of state law, a holding binding on this Court. As the

Board’s application of § 3041(b) prior to § 3041(a) did not violate state law, it certainly did not violate

any state law interest that might be protected by due process. 

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the statute states or suggests that the Board must evaluate the case under

standards of term uniformity before exercising its authority to deny a parole

date on the grounds the particular offender’s criminality presents a continuing

public danger.

Id. at 1070 (emphasis, brackets, and parentheses as in original). In sum, “the Board,

exercising its traditional broad discretion, may protect public safety in each discrete case by

considering the dangerous implications of a life-maximum prisoner’s crime individually.” 

Id. at 1071. The California Supreme Court's determination of state law is binding in this

federal habeas action. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 629 (1988).5

Here, the Board denied parole on the basis of petitioner’s commitment offense, his

prior criminal and social history, his behavior in prison, and his parole plans. 

(I) Commitment Offense

Under state law, the Board may consider the gravity of the commitment offense in

assessing an inmate’s suitability for parole. Cal. Penal Code § 3041(b); 15 Cal. Code Regs, §

2402(c)(1). The factors to be considered in determining whether the offense was committed

in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner,” so as to indicate unsuitability are

whether: (1) “multiple victims were attacked, injured or killed in the same or separate

incidents;” (2) the offense was committed in “ a dispassionate and calculated manner, such

as an execution-style murder;” (3) “the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or

after the offense;” (4) the offense was committed in a manner demonstrating “an

exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering;” and (5) “the motive for the crime is

explicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id. 

The California Supreme Court also has determined that the facts of the crime can

alone support a sentence longer than the statutory minimum even if everything else about the 

prisoner is laudable. “While the board must point to factors beyond the minimum elements

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The Board read the factual background from the California Court of Appeal’s decision in

petitioner’s case. 

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of the crime for which the inmate was committed, it need engage in no further comparative

analysis before concluding that the particular facts of the offense make it unsafe, at that time,

to fix a date for the prisoner’s release.” Dannenberg, 34 Cal. 4th at 1071; see also In re

Rosenkrantz, 29 Cal. 4th 616, 682-83 (2002) (“The nature of the prisoner’s offense, alone,

can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole” but might violate due process “where no

circumstances of the offense reasonably could be considered more aggravated or violent than

the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for that offense.”). Moreover, the federal

constitutional guarantee of due process does not preclude the parole board from relying on

unchanging factors such as the circumstances of the commitment offense or the parole

applicant's pre-offense behavior in determining parole suitability. Sass, 491 F.3d at 1129

(commitment offenses in combination with prior offenses provided some evidence to support

denial of parole at subsequent parole consideration hearing); Irons, 479 F.3d at 660, 665

(finding commitment offense and prior offenses amounted to some evidence to deny parole).

The Board recited the facts of petitioner’s offense as follows:6

[B]etween 7 and 8 p.m. on March 5th, 1990 Santa Maria []police officers Larry

Davis [] and Paul Flores [] arrived at the Santa Maria apartment of Salvador

Garcia [] in response to a call regarding a disturbance. They found Manuel

Castro [] who appeared terrified. Castro had bruises and welts and was

bleeding from the head. In the apartment Davis found Garcia lying on the floor

bleeding. Garcia subsequently died from two gunshot wounds to the head. He

had also suffered an injury to his arm caused by some blunt object with a pretty

rigid right angle to it. The rifle used in the shooting was not found. Based on

statements Garcia made to paramedics Flores arrested Castro and took him to a

hospital for treatment of his wounds. Flores advised Castro of his constitutional

rights, which Castro waived. Castro told the officers he had been visiting

Garcia from - - when Jose Luis Mendes, Salvador Enriquez [] and Appellant

entered. Enriquez attacked Castro while the other two attacked Garcia. Castro

state that Appellant brought the rifle and that Mendez picked it up when

Appellant dropped it as he fought with Castro. Mendez then shot Garcia. 

Enriquez said they would shoot Castro also but the other two assailants had

already left. Enriquez then struck Castro with a pipe. After Enriquez left

Castro called for help and went out on the balcony where the officers found

him. Flores, who spoke fluent English, later assisted detective Greg Ross in

obtaining a further statement from Castro. Castro told Ross essentially the

same facts he told Flores. He said that Appellant carried a .22 caliber rifle into

the apartment and struck Garcia with it. He did not state that Appellant was

absent during the fight. On March 6th, 1990 detective William Marquez met

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with Castor who provided substantially the same facts. Castro told Marquez

that Appellant brought the rifle and struck Garcia with the butt of the gun. 

Appellant told Mendez to pick up the gun when it dropped and Mendez did so,

then shot Garcia. 

(Resp. Ex. 2 at 12-13.) 

According to the probation report, petitioner’s accomplices were his uncle and his

cousin, and one of the victims was a roommate who had quarreled with petitioner’s cousin. 

(Resp. Ex. 5 at 4.) The victims were seated in the living room watching television when they

were attacked, and although petitioner initially became involved to help his cousin, petitioner

led the attack insofar as he was the first person inside the victim’s house, he carried the

firearm, and initially attacked Garcia with the butt of the rifle. (Resp. Ex. 4.) Petitioner was

ultimately arrested in Colorado over a year later in response to a domestic disturbance. (Id.) 

On the day of the offense, petitioner and his cousin had spoken to the police about problems

with his cousin’s roommates, and they were told to return to the station in two days. (Id.)

Petitioner had a recent conviction for driving under the influence, and prior arrests for a separate

incident of driving under the influence and for a domestic disturbance. At the Board hearing,

petitioner maintained his innocence and denied involvement in the crime. (Resp. Ex. 5 at 13-14.) 

The foregoing facts of the offense provided sufficient evidence that the murder was carried

out in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner” under 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 2402(c)(1). In

this case, petitioner and two others ganged up on two victims who were passively watching

television, beat them, and murdered Garcia. Moreover, there was evidence that the crime was

calculated in advance. Lastly petitioner’s motive, to assist his cousin in avenging a dispute with his

roommate, was very trivial in relation to the offense of murder. Under these circumstances, there is

“some evidence” that the commitment offense met the factors set forth in the state’s regulations for

indicating that the murder was committed in an “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner” such

that petitioner was not suitable for parole.

The Court notes the concern expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Biggs v. Terhune that “over

time” the Board’s “continued reliance in the future on an unchanging factor, the circumstance of the

offense and conduct prior to imprisonment” would “raise serious questions involving his liberty

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In prison he suffered paranoia and suicidal ideation. (Resp. Ex. 5 at 3-5.)

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interest in parole.” 334 F.3d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit has recently criticized this

statement as beyond the scope of the dispute before the court: "Under AEDPA it is not our function

to speculate about how future parole hearings could proceed." Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129. In any event,

the challenged parole denial here took place after petitioner had served only 12 years in state prison,

which, like the petitioners in Sass and Irons, was less than the sentence’s minimum term of 15 years

and therefore does not yet implicate the concerns raised in Biggs. See, e.g., Irons, 479 F.3d at 661

(upholding reliance upon commitment offense to deny parole at fifth parole hearing after petitioner

had served 16 years in prison, which was less than the minimum term); Sass, 461 F.3d at 1129

(same, for second and third parole hearings after petitioner had served 11 and 12 years in prison). 

(ii) Additional Factors

There was additional evidence in support of other statutory factors indicating unsuitability

for parole. While in prison, petitioner had not sufficiently participated in self-help programs, he had

insufficient residential plans for after parole, had shown no remorse, and a psychological report

indicated that he had some mental health concerns7 and had not accepted responsibility for the

offense or explored its causes. (Resp. Ex. 8, Ex. 2 at 20-24, Ex. 5 at 30-31. See 15 Cal. Code Regs.

§§ 2402(c)(3),(5),(6) &(d)(2),(3),(8),(9).

Under the circumstances, there was “some evidence” that Petitioner was unsuitable for

parole under the factors set forth in California’s statutes and regulations for determining parole

suitability. Consequently, the Board’s decision did not violate Petitioner’s right to due process, and

the state court opinions upholding the Board’s denial of parole are neither “contrary to” or an

“unreasonable application of “clearly established Federal law.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Further, the

Board’s decision was not based on “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” because there was “some evidence” in the record

to support the finding of Petitioner’s unsuitability for parole. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. 

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The Clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: 12/05/07

 MARTIN J. JENKINS

United States District Judge

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