Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00869/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-00869-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Coalinga State Hospital
Defendant
Department of Corrections
Defendant
Fraisure Smith
Plaintiff
Solano County
Defendant
State of California
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FRAISURE SMITH,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

Defendants.

_____________________________________/

Case No. 1:13-cv-00869-AWI-SKO (PC)

SECOND SCREENING ORDER 

DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT, 

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, FOR FAILURE 

TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER SECTION 

1983

(Doc. 11)

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Second Screening Order

I. Background

Plaintiff Fraisure Smith, a civil detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 

civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on June 10, 2013. On April 18, 2014, the Court 

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint, with leave to amend for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 19, 2014. 

II. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen Plaintiff=s complaint and dismiss the case, in whole or in 

part, if the Court determines it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. '

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are 

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 

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conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 

(2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and 

courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 

F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Pro se litigants are entitled to have their pleadings liberally construed and to have any 

doubt resolved in their favor, Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121-23 (9th Cir. 2012); Hebbe 

v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), but Plaintiff=s claims must be facially plausible to 

survive screening, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer 

that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation 

marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer 

possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability 

falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks 

omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

III. Discussion

A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff is a civil detainee at Coalinga State Hospital (“CSH”) in Coalinga, California, and 

he brings this action for monetary damages against Audrey King, Executive Director, Department 

of State Hospitals; Pam Ahlin, former Executive Director, Department of State Hospitals; Robert 

Withrow, M.D., Executive Medical Director, Department of State Hospitals; Cliff Allenby, 

Executive Director, Department of State Hospitals; Steven Mayberg, former Director, Department 

of State Hospitals; Jeffrey A. Beard, Secretary, California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Solano County; James W. Firman; Kari Cordero; Corrine Cuppy; and 

Does 1-100 in their personal capacities.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mayberg “had” him transferred to CSH, which is 500 yards 

away from Pleasant Valley State Prison and is on state property under CDCR authority. (Doc. 11, 

Amend. Comp., court record p. 5.) Plaintiff alleges that the Secretary of CDCR, the Executive 

Directors of the Department of State Hospitals, and the Executive Directors of the Department of 

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State Hospitals at Coalinga must inform individuals in their custody of any situations which pose a 

serious health care problem and potentially affect one’s quality of life or cause serious injury or 

death.

Plaintiff alleges that when he was transferred to CSH, he was not informed about Valley 

Fever (Coccidioidomycosis), a sometimes fatal fungal disease which poses a serious health care 

concern. Plaintiff was neither informed of the dangers nor informed of preventative measures.

In November 2011, Plaintiff became ill and misdiagnosed with pneumonia. For four days, 

Plaintiff was treated for pneumonia and his condition worsened. Plaintiff was subsequently taken 

to Coalinga Regional Medical Center for emergency treatment. By that time, Plaintiff was 

fighting for his life, and his temperature at times reached 105 degrees. Plaintiff was treated for 

pneumonia and Valley Fever until tests could confirm or rule out a diagnosis. Ultimately, the 

University of California, Davis Medical Center diagnosed Plaintiff with Valley Fever based on 

sample sent to it.

Plaintiff alleges that in 2006, John Galgiani, M.D., provided a report to J. Clark Kelso 

stating that prison officials should be acting as if facing a situation where lives were at substantial 

risk and that the only reasonable public health decision was to cease placing prisoners in Pleasant 

Valley State Prison and Avenal State Prison. Plaintiff alleges that since the report was made 

available to the prison healthcare receiver (Kelso), “it is not a stretch of the imagination to 

assume” that the report was made available to CDCR’s Secretary and to all of the defendants since 

CSH is on state land. (Id., court record p. 8.) Despite this, Defendants failed to provide any 

information to newly arriving detainees on the dangers of the area and Valley Fever or on 

preventative measures.

B. Defendants Solano County, Firman, Cordero and Cuppy

Although Plaintiff names Solano County, Firman, Cordero and Cuppy as defendants, his 

amended complaint is devoid of any facts linking them to a violation of his constitutional or other 

federal rights, a deficiency previously identified in the first screening order. E.g., Monell v. Dep’t 

of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978); Waggy v. Spokane County Washington, 

594 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2010); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir 2009); Long 

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v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. 

Furthermore, Defendants Firman, Cordero, and Cuppy are or were employed at the Solano County 

Jail, and Plaintiff was previously placed on notice that venue for claims arising out of events in 

Solano County is proper in the Sacramento Division of the Eastern District of California.1 See 

Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 

1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991).

C. Valley Fever Claims

Plaintiff appears to be relying on two theories to demonstrate the violation of his 

constitutional rights by state officials: exposure to a dangerous condition without adequate 

warning and deficient medical care. 

1. Exposure to Dangerous Condition

As a civil detainee, Plaintiff is entitled to treatment more considerate than that afforded 

pretrial detainees or convicted criminals. Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931-32 (9th Cir. 2004). 

Plaintiff’s right to constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement is protected by the 

substantive component of the Due Process Clause. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315, 102 

S.Ct. 2452 (1982). 

A determination whether Plaintiff’s rights were violated requires “balancing of his liberty 

interests against the relevant state interests.” Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321. Plaintiff is “entitled to 

more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of 

confinement are designed to punish,” but the Constitution requires only that courts ensure that 

professional judgment was exercised. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321-22. A “decision, if made by a 

professional, is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the 

professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or 

standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a 

judgment.” Id. at 322-23; compare Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1243-44 

 

1 The Court takes judicial notice of case number 2:11-cv-00142-EFB Smith v. Solano County, in which Plaintiff sued 

James Firman, Kari Cordero, and Corrine Cuppy for violating his right to medical care while he was at the Solano 

County Jail. United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 876 n.1 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 

119 (9th Cir. 1980). 

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(9th Cir. 2010) (rejecting the Youngberg standard and applying the deliberate indifference 

standard to a pretrial detainee’s right to medical care, and noting that pretrial detainees, who are 

confined to ensure presence at trial, are not similarly situated to those civilly committed). The 

professional judgment standard is an objective standard and it equates “to that required in ordinary 

tort cases for a finding of conscious indifference amounting to gross negligence.” Ammons v. 

Washington Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 

S.Ct. 2379 (2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Under certain circumstances, exposure to Valley Fever may support a constitutional claim 

based on a dangerous condition theory. See Beagle v. Schwarzenegger, No. 1:14-cv-430-LJOSAB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107548 (E.D.Cal. Jul. 25, 2014). However, Plaintiff is suing 

Defendants in their individual capacities and he is required to allege facts linking their actions or 

omissions to a violation of his rights. E.g., Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 

2013); Lemire v. California Dep’t of Corr. and Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2013); 

Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 915-16 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Plaintiff’s allegations 

regarding Defendants’ involvement are speculative at best. As section 1983 does not permit 

respondeat superior, or vicarious, liability and Plaintiff’s claim must therefore be premised on 

Defendants’ personal involvement or other specific causal connection, speculative allegations do 

not suffice. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977; Lemire, 726 F.3d at 1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. 

In the interest of justice, however, the Court will permit Plaintiff one final opportunity to amend.

2. Medical Care

Plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoid of any allegations giving rise to a viable a claim

for relief arising out of the failure to provide proper medical care. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 

572 F.3d at 969. The fact that Plaintiff contracted Valley Fever and was initially misdiagnosed 

with pneumonia does not support a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See

Ammons, 648 F.3d at 1029. Furthermore, there is no causal connection between the named 

defendants and the medical care Plaintiff received. Crowley, 734 F.3d at 977; Lemire, 726 F.3d at

1074-75; Lacey, 693 F.3d at 915-16. 

///

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IV. Conclusion and Order

Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 

section 1983. The Court will provide Plaintiff with one final opportunity to file an amended 

complaint. Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 2012); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 

1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff’s second amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state 

what each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s federal rights and liability 

may not be imposed on supervisory personnel under the theory of mere respondeat superior, 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205-07 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 

132 S.Ct. 2101 (2012). Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations 

omitted). 

Finally, an amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, Lacey, 693 F.3d at 907

n.1, and it must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superceded pleading,” 

Local Rule 220. 

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is dismissed, with leave to amend, for failure to state 

a claim under section 1983;

2. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a civil rights complaint form;

3. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a

second amended complaint; and

4. If Plaintiff fails to file a second amended complaint in compliance with this order, 

this action will be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 9, 2014 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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