Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01170/USCOURTS-azd-2_05-cv-01170-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jack Grossman
Plaintiff
Social Security Administration
Defendant

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Jack Grossman, 

Plaintiff, 

vs.

JoAnne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of

Social Security, 

Defendant. 

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No. 05-CV-1170-PHX-FJM

ORDER

I

On November 24, 2003, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a decision

denying Jack Grossman Social Security benefits. The Appeals Council of the Social Security

Administration subsequently denied Grossman's request for review. Grossman then filed this

action for review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have before us

Grossman's motion for summary judgment (doc. 7), defendant's response and cross-motion

for summary judgment (docs. 9 and 10), and Grossman's response in opposition to

defendant's cross-motion and reply in support of his motion (doc. 15).

"The Commissioner's decision to deny benefits will be overturned only if it is not

supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error." Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted). We conclude that the ALJ's

decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and is based on legal error. Accordingly,

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1

 Disability shall not be denied merely because a substance abuse problem is

"intertwined" with other mental impairments. Sousa, 143 F.3d at 1245. Instead, an ALJ

must find that the disability would not remain if the claimant stopped using the substance.

Id. The ALJ states that the substance abuse is "excessively intertwined" with Grossman's

medical impairments, but he nonetheless based his decision on the correct test.

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we grant Grossman's motion for summary judgment, deny defendant's motion for summary

judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

II

A

This dispute hinges on whether Grossman is "disabled" for purposes of Social

Security benefits. An individual is not "disabled" for these purposes "if alcoholism or drug

addiction would . . . be a contributing factor material to the Commissioner's determination

that the individual is disabled." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(C), 1382c(a)(3)(J). Substance abuse

is not a material factor if "an individual would still be found disabled if []he stopped using

alcohol or drugs." Sousa v. Callahan, 143 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1535(b)(1)). In making this determination, an ALJ must evaluate "which of [the

claimant's] current physical and mental limitations . . . would remain if [he] stopped using

drugs or alcohol and then determine whether any or all of [his] remaining limitations would

be disabling." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(2). "If the ALJ is unable to determine whether

substance use disorders are a contributing factor material to the claimant's otherwiseacknowledged disability, the claimant's burden has been met and an award of benefits must

follow." Brueggemann v. Barnhart, 348 F.3d 689, 693 (8th Cir. 2003).

The ALJ concluded that when Grossman "abuses substances . . . he could not sustain

work activity"; that "[w]hen he does not abuse substances, he can perform and sustain work

activity"; and therefore "[d]rug and [a]lcohol usage is a material factor which is excessively

intertwined in the claimant's medical impairments."1

 Tr. at 26. Grossman argues that this

conclusion is not based upon substantial evidence.

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The ALJ relied upon the report of psychologist Armando Bencomo. Tr. at 24-25. The

report is, inter alia, probative of the fact that Grossman abuses substances, and that he can

perform some work related tasks. Tr. at 351. It appears that the ALJ perceived Bencomo's

report as evidence of Grossman's capabilities absent substance abuse. Tr. at 24-25.

However, while the report examines Grossman's work related capabilities, it does not specify

that these are Grossman's abilities in the absence of substance abuse. To the contrary, the

report states that alcohol abuse may be active, tr. at 350, and the ALJ concluded that

Grossman was abusing substances at the time, tr. at 25. Therefore, while this evidence is

probative as to Grossman's capabilities, it does not show that substance abuse is material to

a disability finding.

The ALJ also relied upon the testimony of Dr. Edward Jasinski, the medical expert:

"Jasinski indicated in his testimony that, without [d]rugs and [a]lcohol, the claimant did not

meet or equal any listing." Tr. at 25. On the contrary, Jasinski testified, based upon the

treatment notes of Dr. Ivan McCrum, Grossman's treating psychiatrist, that drug and alcohol

usage is not a material factor in the determination. Tr. at 61. Jasinski appeared to disagree

with McCrum's treatment notes, and testified that in his opinion, "[d]rug and alcohol usage

is present," id., but he never testified that absent that presence, Grossman would not meet the

disability listing.

The ALJ also made references to the "medical record" and the "record overall." Tr.

at 25. However, except for McCrum's opinion, which the ALJ disregarded, the ALJ did not

identify any particular record that considers whether Grossman's mental limitations would

exist absent substance abuse. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the ALJ's decision

was not based upon substantial evidence.

B

Grossman receives a disability pension from the Veterans Administration ("VA").

The ALJ recognized that Grossman receives that pension, tr. at 23, but he did not consider

the VA's disability determination in reaching his conclusion, or offer reasons for disregarding

that determination. An ALJ must give "great weight" to a VA disability rating, unless he

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2

 Defendant sets forth several reasons for disregarding the VA determination, but we

review an agency's determination based upon the rationale articulated by the ALJ. See

Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S. Ct. 239, 246 (1962).

3

 McCrum entered another progress note on April 10, 2003 which states that "there

has been no evidence of active alcoholism or drug abuse" since January 10, 2003. Tr. at 442.

In his arguments, Grossman confuses this progress note with the progress notes upon which

the ALJ relied, which state that Grossman had consumed no alcohol since November 18,

2000.

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identifies "persuasive, specific, [and] valid reasons" for giving it lesser weight. McCartey

v. Massanari, 298 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002). The ALJ erred by failing to properly

consider the VA disability determination.2

C

The ALJ gave "little weight" to McCrum's opinions. Tr. at 25. Normally, great

weight should be given to a treating physician's opinion. Matney on Behalf of Matney v.

Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992). However, "[w]hen there is conflicting

medical evidence, the [ALJ] must determine credibility and resolve the conflict." Id. The

ALJ concluded that McCrum's opinions were not credible because they were premised on

incorrect information that is "inconsistent with the record." Tr. at 25. McCrum's progress

notes dated January 27, 2003 and April 10, 2003 state that Grossman had not consumed

alcohol since November 18, 2000.3

 Tr. 443-44. However, another progress note signed by

McCrum, also dated April 10, 2003, identifies symptoms of alcohol abuse and recommends

group therapy for alcohol abuse, tr. at 441-42; a VA progress note entered February 26, 2002

documents alcohol use within the previous two weeks, and drug abuse within the previous

month, tr. at 496-97; Grossman testified before the ALJ that he still consumed alcohol, tr. at

48; and Dr. Jasinski testified that "[d]rug and alcohol usage is present," tr. at 61. Grossman's

disability determination hinges substantially on the effect of his substance abuse, and at least

some of McCrum's statements with regard to substance use are inconsistent with the record

on the whole. Therefore, the ALJ reasonably gave "little weight" to McCrum's opinions.

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D

The ALJ did not consider the questionnaire completed by Judith Gill, Grossman's

sister, in which she commented on Grossman's capabilities, and stated that Grossman "[h]as

not been drinking for 2 years." Tr. at 196. An ALJ need not discuss evidence which is not

significant and probative. Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir.

2003) (citations omitted). The ALJ clearly supported his conclusion that Grossman's alcohol

consumption is ongoing. Gill's statement that Grossman had not been drinking for 2 years

undermines the probative value of her other statements. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in

disregarding Gill's discredited statements.

III

Grossman seeks remand for an award of benefits. "We may direct an award of

benefits where the record has been fully developed and where further administrative

proceedings would serve no useful purpose." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1292 (9th Cir.

1996). However, here, further administrative proceedings would be useful to unearth the

nature and effect of the VA disability determination, and to clarify whether or not Grossman's

disability would exist absent his substance abuse.

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED GRANTING plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment and REMANDING for additional evidence and findings consistent with this Order

under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) [immediate entry of judgment] (doc. 7).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED DENYING defendant's motion for summary

judgment (doc. 10).

DATED this 5th day of May, 2006.

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