Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03599/USCOURTS-ca8-14-03599-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Long
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-3599

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Jason Long

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of South Dakota - Pierre

____________

 Submitted: May 15, 2015

 Filed: August 14, 2015

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

____________

RILEY, Chief Judge.

Jason Long (Long) pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), after the

district court denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained by United States 1

The HonorableRoberto A. Lange, United States DistrictJudge for the District 1

of South Dakota, adopting in part the report and recommendation of the Honorable

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Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers when searching the store once operated by

Long. As permitted by his plea agreement, Long appeals this denial, maintaining the

officers’ searches were unconstitutional. Because we agree with the district court that

the officers’ actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment, we affirm.

2

I. BACKGROUND

Jason Long, a member of the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe, operated the “OC

Store” in Lower Brule, South Dakota, on the Lower Brule Sioux Reservation. The 3

OC Store appears to have been a one-time gas station converted into a convenience

and novelty store. The store was housed in a metal building with few exterior

windows; all of the windows facing the parking area are covered with metal grates. 

The store sold soda, coffee, some food, tobacco products, and an eclectic assortment

of other merchandise in addition to offering arcade games and movie rentals.

On July 28, 2012, at approximately 4:20 a.m., BIA Officer Shane Spargur

encountered three juveniles in Lower Brule who he suspected were violating the

tribe’s curfew. Officer Spargur noticed the juveniles had fireworks, which were

illegal to ignite other than during a three-day period for celebrating Independence

Day. Officer Spargur questioned the juveniles about the fireworks, and one “stated

that he just bought them down at the OC Store.” Officer Spargur then proceeded

approximately two blocksto the OC Store “to make contact with” Long about the sale

of the fireworks.

When Officer Spargur arrived at the store, he was “unsure” whether it “was

open or closed.” He did not see an open/closed sign nor any posted business hours. 

Mark A. Moreno, United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota.

28 U.S.C. § 1291 provides appellate jurisdiction.

2

The store is also know as “OC Novelties” and the old “Sioux Boys” store. 3

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An exterior street light in the parking lot and a flood light by the front door were on. 

Officer Spargur could hear loud music coming from inside. Although the store was

not “fully lit,” “[i]t was pretty well lit” such that Officer Spargur could see the store’s

interior and merchandise. At that point, Officer Spargur did not see any customers

or employees. Having never been to the store before, Officer Spargur was not sure

whether these facts indicated the store was open or closed. Officer Spargur ultimately

concluded the store was open because of the lights, music, unlocked doors, and the

juveniles’ report that they had “just” purchased fireworks there a few minutes before.

Officer Spargur entered the OC Store through two initial doors—both of which

were closed but unlocked—leading to a small entryway. He then stopped at a third

door, the main door, and “knock[ed] and announce[d] police a couple of times.” 

Although he thought the store was open, Officer Spargur testified he did the knock

and announce “because of the time and me working as a police officer not just

barging in and going in there . . . just gave the opportunity to someone -- for someone

to come to the door to answer it.” After receiving no response, Officer Spargur

opened the main door, which was also unlocked, and after observing an individual he

later learned was Long’s son inside, he entered the store. 

Officer Spargur then encountered another of Long’s sons, Freedom Long, in

the store’s concession area. Officer Spargur discussed the fireworks with Freedom. 

Freedomacknowledged the juveniles had been in the store, but he denied the children

had bought fireworks. Officer Spargur asked Freedom to retrieve Long, who was

sleeping in another room. Based on Freedom’s slurred speech and deliberate actions,

Officer Spargur believed Freedom was under the influence of some kind of drug. 

While Freedom was fetching Long, Officer Spargur noticed a small package on one

of the concession tablesthat, based on his experience and training, he “recognized . . .

as a package normally holding synthetic marijuana.” Once Long emerged from his

room, Officer Spargur briefly discussed the fireworks with him, reminded him not to

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sell fireworks after Independence Day, apologized for waking him, and then left the

store without seizing the suspicious package. 

After leaving the store, Officer Spargur began preparing an affidavit to obtain

a search warrant. Officer Spargur spoke with the police chief, conducted some

internet research to confirm the package he had seen was consistent with synthetic

marijuana, and then telephoned tribal judge Lorrie Miner. 

Judge Miner was at her home—approximately sixtymiles away—when Officer

Spargur called to have her “sign the search warrant telephonically.” Telephonic

warrants are not common in Lower Brule—Judge Miner had only considered two

telephonic requests for search warrants during her four-year tenure, and Officer

Spargur testified this is the only telephonic warrant he had ever obtained. Neither

party recorded the call, so precisely what was said is unknown, but Officer Spargur

testified he read Judge Miner the affidavit and “the meat” of his warrant application. 

Officer Spargurspecifically explained he read the thingsto be searched verbatim, but

Officer Spargur did not recall whether he had read the warrant itself to Judge Miner. 

At Long’s first suppression hearing, Judge Miner had a limited recollection of

her conversation with Officer Spargur. Judge Miner testified that during the

conversation she would have placed Officer Spargur under oath. Although she

recalled being “on the telephone for quite some time” and “Officer Spargur [giving

her] a detailed account as to what had occurred,” Judge Miner could not remember

whether Officer Spargur read the warrant itself. Judge Miner stated she believed she

would have had Officer Spargur read the warrant to her “so I know what I am saying

yes to.” Judge Miner further elaborated she “would have wanted a description of . . .

what they were searching for and where they needed to search” and she would have

asked questions if the information Officer Spargur provided was not specific enough

to support probable cause. At the end of the conversation, Judge Miner approved the

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warrant. Judge Miner testified she approved the warrant based solely on the

information Office Spargur provided by phone.

After Judge Miner approved the warrant, Officer Spargur assembled a team of

officers and searched the OC Store. The officers seized eighty grams of synthetic

marijuana in twenty-six packages like that initially seen by Officer Spargur. The

officers also searched a 1997 Chevy Blazer located in the OC Store parking lot. The

vehicle was registered to Nancy Big Eagle and Freedom Long, and it also contained

synthetic marijuana. Officer Spargur placed Long under arrest and interrogated him

at the station.

On August 6, 2012, BIA Officer Jason La Mons entered the OC Store with

Raelynn Her Many Horses and Joshua Brouse, the owner of the building housing the

OC Store, to investigate a reported burglary. Officer La Mons was familiar with the

store and had spoken to Vicki Her Many Horses—the prior owner and Long’s

aunt—“many times” in the preceding week. Vicki had informed Officer La Monsshe

and Long were having a “family dispute,” and “she did not want” Long in her

building. Upset about recent break-ins, Vicki told Officer La Mons she wanted the

police to investigate. Because of the break-ins, on August 4, 2012, Vicki sold the

building to Brouse, the “long term” boyfriend of Vicki’s daughter, Raelynn. 

Raelynn and Brouse took the officer inside the store and showed himitems that

had been moved. Once inside, Officer La Mons found a witness statement bearing

Long’s name, a hundred-dollar bill, and an open shipping box filled with

invoices—items that, according to Brouse and Raelynn, had not been in the building

before the break-in. La Mons collected these items as evidence of the suspected

burglary and then went to Long’s house to speak with Long. Long admitted entering

the OC Store, so Officer La Mons placed him under arrest. Long was again

interrogated at the station.

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Long later was charged with three drug offenses. Long filed a motion to

suppress the evidence obtained during the July 28 and August 6 searches and the

statements he made to the officers while in custody on both dates, claiming violations

of the Fourth Amendment and his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436

(1966). 

4

Themagistrate judge assigned to the case recommended excluding all evidence

obtained from the store on July 28, reasoning Officer Spargur’s initial entry into the

OC Store was unconstitutional. The magistrate judge recommended admitting the

remaining evidence, including the synthetic marijuana found in the Blazer. The

district court, adopting the magistrate’s recommendation in part, denied Long’s

motion to suppress in its entirety.

Long conditionally pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to

distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The district

court sentenced Long to time served plus three years of supervised release. Long’s

guilty plea preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress, which

Long now does.

II. DISCUSSION

“In an appeal from a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence,

this court reviews factual findings for clear error, and questions of constitutional law

de novo.” United States v. Douglas, 744 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 2012)). Long contends this

court should review the district court’s factual findings de novo because the district

court partially rejected the magistrate judge’s recommendation, and because the

On appeal, Long has abandoned his Miranda arguments and now claims only 4

that his statements must be excluded because they resulted from unconstitutional

searches. 

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district court did not conduct its own hearing or view any live testimony. Long cites

no legal authority supporting this contention, and our well-established precedent calls

for clear error review. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d 719, 731-33 (8th

Cir. 2015) (reviewing the trial court’s factual findings regarding a motion to suppress

for clear error when the trial court declined to adopt the magistrate judge’s report and

recommendation), petition for cert. filed (U.S. July 8, 2015) (No. 15-5137); United

States v. Hatcher, 275 F.3d 689, 690-92 (8th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (same).

A. July 28 Search

1. Initial Entry

Long claims Officer Spargur violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the

OC Store without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against

unreasonable searches and seizures” conducted by government officials, U.S. Const.

amend. IV, and under certain circumstances, we exclude evidence obtained in

violation of its strictures, see United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir.

2014). The critical issue here is “whether [Long] ha[d] ‘a constitutionally protected

reasonable expectation of privacy’” in the OC Store sufficient to trigger the Fourth

Amendment’s protections. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984)

(quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). 

Long “‘has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and that

the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one thatsociety is willing to accept.’

Whether [Long] had a subjective expectation of privacy is a question of fact,” which

this court reviews for clear error. United States v. Perry, 548 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir.

2008) (quoting United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)). 

Long enjoyed some expectation of privacy in the OC Store on July 28. See

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987) (“The Court long has recognized that

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is

applicable to commercial premises, as well as to private homes.”); Dow Chem. Co.

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v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (“Plainly a business establishment or an

industrial or commercial facility enjoys certain protections under the Fourth

Amendment.”). Even so, “[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . .

5

is different from, and indeed lessthan, a similar expectation in an individual’s home,” 

Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, and a business owner or operator does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the portions of a business open to the public, at least during

normal business hours. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985)

(“[R]espondent did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the

store where the public was invited to enter and to transact business. . . . The officer’s

action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally

exposed to all who frequent the place of business did not infringe a legitimate

expectation of privacy.”). When a commercial property is not open to the public, a

reasonable expectation of privacy may exist. See United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d

698, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he officers knew the business was closed. Commercial

establishments do not extend an implicit invitation to enter during non-business hours

or when there are no employees on the premises.”); cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S.

541, 545 (1967) (holding the state cannot punish a business owner for refusing to

authorize a warrantless administrative search of his commercial premises “not open

to the public”). 

Long maintains he clearly manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in 5

the OC Store because he also used part of the store as a dwelling. Although Long

was sleeping in a back room when Officer Spargur arrived and kept a number of

personal items in the back room, the district court found the OC Store was not Long’s

residence. That finding was not clearly erroneous, especially as to the front of the

store and concession area Officer Spargur entered—clearly a public sales area. See,

e.g., United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing

between the portions of a car dealership “open for business” and the locked back

rooms used as an employee’s residence). Indeed, the testimony shows Long had a

separate residence where Officer La Mons found and questioned him on August 6.

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Here, the parties dispute whether the store was open or closed when Officer

Spargur entered, and the facts plausibly could support either conclusion. The music,

lights, unlocked doors, type of convenience store, and the fact that one of the

juveniles claimed to have “just” bought fireworks at the store all suggested the OC

Store was open. The dim lights, the initial lack of visible employees or customers,

and the time of night suggested the store was closed.6

Ultimately, the burden to show a reasonable expectation of privacy is on Long. 

See Perry, 548 F.3d at 691. Yet Long presented no evidence of the store’s operating

hours, how the store typically looked when closed, or even that the store was in fact

closed when Officer Spargur entered. 

After reviewing the testimony, and noting the closeness of the question, the

district court concluded “Long . . . failed to establish by a preponderance of the

evidence that the OC Store was closed and thus that Long had a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the OC Store at the time of the entry.” “Absent a showing

of clear error it is not our role to second guess the district court’s factual

determinations.” Lowder v. United States, 831 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1987). Under

the circumstances existing at the time Officer Spargur entered the store, we cannot

say the district court clearly erred in determining Long failed to prove the store was

closed. See United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1173 (8th Cir. 2008)

(“[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice

between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). The district court thus did not err in

concluding Long had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public areas of the

Officer Spargur was not certain whether the store was open or closed,

6

knocking and announcing his presence twice. The Fourth Amendment requires

reasonableness, not certainty.

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OC Store where the evidence was left in plain view because the store was open to the

public when Officer Spargur entered. See Macon, 472 U.S. at 469.

2. Post-Warrant Search of the Store

Long challenges Officer Spargur’s subsequentsearch ofthe OC Store claiming

the telephonic warrant did not conform with tribal and federal law because, among

other things, the warrant itself was never read to Judge Miner and the telephone

conversation was not recorded. The district court refused to suppress evidence

obtained during the post-warrant search of the store however, concluding the goodfaith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), protected

Officer Spargur’s actions. We review the application of the good-faith exception de

novo. See United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2015). Assuming,

without deciding, the warrant was deficient, we agree with the district court that the

Leon good-faith exception applies. 

Under the good-faith exception, evidence is not excluded “‘when an officer

acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or

magistrate and acted within its scope,’ even if the warrant is subsequently

invalidated.” Cannon, 703 F.3d at 412 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). 

We have recognized four circumstances that preclude a finding of good

faith: “(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant

contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with

reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge;

(2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing

the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant isso lacking

in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence

entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient

that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.”

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Id. (quoting United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011)). In

evaluating a search under Leon, we “must look at the objectively ascertainable

question of whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the

search was illegal despite a judge’s issuance of the warrant.” Jackson, 784 F.3d at

1231. 

Long first claims Judge Miner’s personal biases led her to “wholly abandon[]

her judicial role.” In addition to being a tribal judge, Judge Miner was also a member

of a tribal judicial committee involved in promoting legislation that criminalized

synthetic marijuana on the reservation. Judge Miner also routinely included as a

condition of release for arrestees released on bond, “Defendant shall not enter OC

Novelties or any other business where synthetic marijuana orsynthetic stimulants are

sold, offered for sale or possessed.” Long thus claims Judge Miner was not a neutral

magistrate because she had “actively lobbied” for the passage of the resolution

outlawing synthetic marijuana and had already made “the determination that the OC

Store was selling synthetic drugs.” 

We have explained that a judge abandons her judicial role when she “does not

serve as a neutral and detached actor, but rather as a ‘rubber stamp for the police’ and

‘an adjunct law enforcement officer.’” United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 670

(8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914). Judge Miner testified at length about

her role on the judicial committee and her prior knowledge of Long and the OC Store. 

Based on this testimony, the district court concluded Judge Miner was not a strident

proponent of synthetic marijuana prosecution, nor was she biased against Long. The

district court also credited Judge Miner’s testimony, finding “she issued the warrant

solely on the information contained in the affidavit and not on a preconceived notion

of Long’s guilt,” and we will not disturb that credibility finding. See United States

v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8thCir. 2012) (explaining “‘credibility findings are

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well-nigh unreviewable’” on appeal (quoting United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692,

695 (8th Cir. 2001))).

We further agree with the district court that Judge Miner’s knowledge of and

involvement in the small tribal community is not the type of conduct that constitutes

abandoning her role as a neutral and detached magistrate. See United States v.

Heffington, 952 F.2d 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing “to disqualify small-town

judges on demand” merely because “judges and police officersin rural counties often

know more about the local criminal recidivists [than do] their more urban

colleagues”); see also, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir.

2004) (declaring a judge abandons her neutral role when she is so involved in the

issuance of a search warrant she “essentially becom[es] a police officer in a robe”).

Long also assertsJudge Miner “wholly abandoned her judicial role” by failing

to have Officer Spargur read her the full text of the search warrant. Assuming the

warrant was not read, this failure does not suggest Judge Miner “acted as a rubber

stamp” for law enforcement. United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 777 (8th Cir.

1992) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that a judge abandoned his judicial role

because the judge did not read the warrant and “failed to note both that the prosecutor

had not signed the warrant and that the warrant did not list the property to be seized”

(footnote omitted)). Here, Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and

affidavit—portions of which are reproduced in the warrant itself—and Judge Miner

testified she would have questioned Officer Spargur if the information he provided

was not sufficient. Long does not dispute that Judge Miner was given enough

information to establish probable cause to search, nor does he contend Judge Miner

or Officer Spargur acted in bad faith. Under these circumstances, any failure to have

Officer Spargur read the full text of the warrant was not a departure from Judge

Miner’s neutral judicial role. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is

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designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and

magistrates.”). 

Finally, Long asserts Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply because the

procedure used to obtain the warrant was so deficient no reasonable officer would

have relied on the warrant. Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and “the

meat” of the affidavit verbatim, giving Judge Miner enough information to establish

probable cause to search, and at the end of the long conversation Judge Miner

approved the warrant. Officer Spargur was reasonable in believing the warrant was

valid. See United States v. Stonerook, 134 F. App’x 982, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2005)

(unpublished per curiam) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence

obtained through a telephonic warrant and rejecting the defendant’s claim “that no

reasonable police officer could have relied in good faith on the validity of [a] search

warrant” issued in violation of state “law regarding telephonic search warrants”);

United States v. Hessman, 369 F.3d 1016, 1018, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying

the good-faith exception to a technically deficient warrant obtained by fax); United

States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 548, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to suppress

evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic warrant that had not met all requirements).

3. Post-Warrant Search of Blazer

Long also challengesthe officers’ search ofthe Blazer parked in the OC Store’s

public parking lot. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be

asserted vicariously.” United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 529 (8th Cir. 2004). 

“To mount a successful motion to suppress, an accused must first establish that he

personally has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the object that was searched.” 

United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2014). Long admits he did not

own the Blazer, and Long has provided no evidence suggesting he had any

constitutionally protected connection to the vehicle or its contents. See, e.g., United

States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (deciding a defendant who

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“neither owned nor drove the [searched vehicle] and was only an occasional

passenger therein” could not challenge the search of the vehicle). Long thus has

shown no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Blazer and cannot now contest the

search of the vehicle. See id. 

But Long proposes the officers violated his reasonable expectation of privacy

in searching the Blazer because the vehicle was parked in what he describes as his

business’s curtilage. We are not convinced. Cf. United States v. Reed, 733 F.2d 492,

501 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy

in the “open back parking lot” of his business). 

Long cites no authority for the proposition that a business owner has a

reasonable expectation of privacy in all the vehicles parked in his store’s public

parking lot. Thus, Long had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Blazer and

cannot challenge its search.

B. August 6 Search

Long further claims the August 6 search of the OC Store and the seizure of

Long’s property found there violated the Fourth Amendment. Although Officer

La Monssearched the store without a warrant, the district court concluded thissearch

was constitutional because Brouse, the property’s owner, consented to the search. 

“Consent to search, a valid exception to the [Fourth Amendment’s] warrant

requirement, may be given either by the suspect or by some other person who has

common authority over, orsufficient relationship to, the itemto be searched.” United

States v. James, 353 F.3d 606, 613 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). “‘Valid

third party consent can arise either through the third party’s actual authority or the

third party’s apparent authority.’” United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 554

(8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 716, modified, 499

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F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 2007)). “[W]hether [Brouse] had actual authority to consent is

a question of fact.” James, 353 F.3d at 613. The district court concluded because

“Long apparently was no longer a tenant” when Brouse purchased the building on

August 4, “Brouse as owner of the building had . . . actual . . . authority to permit

Officer La Mons’s entry and search.” Cf. Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___, ___,

134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014)(“It would be unreasonable—indeed, absurd—to require

police officers to obtain a warrant when the sole owner or occupant of a house or

apartment voluntarily consents to a search.”). The district court’s finding of actual

authority to consent was not clearly erroneous. See Douglas, 744 F.3d at 1068.

Long counters with a line of cases explaining officers cannot search a leased

premises with only the consent of the landlord, not that of the tenant. See, e.g.,

Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961). But that line of cases does not

help Long because, as noted by the district court, Long presented no evidence he had

a lease or was otherwise entitled to occupy or use the premises on August 6. 

Long further contends even if the initial entry on August 6 was constitutional,

the search and seizure of the shipping box violated the Fourth Amendment because

“Officer La Mons had specific knowledge that the personal property being searched

was inventory that belonged to Long.” Although Officer La Mons knew the box

belonged to Long, Brouse and Raelynn told Officer La Mons the box was not in the

store before the break-in, making the box possible evidence ofthe suspected burglary. 

Officer La Mons reasonably seized the box as evidence of a suspected burglary. 

7

Long also seeks to have post-Miranda statements he made to the police 7

suppressed because they were the product of what he considersto be illegal searches. 

Because we find the July 28 and August 6 searches constitutionally permissible,

Long’s subsequentstatements “need not be suppressed asfruit ofthe poisonous tree.” 

United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010). 

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III. CONCLUSION

We affirm.

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.

I concur with respect to the majority’s holding regarding the search of the 1997

Chevrolet Blazer and the August 6, 2012 search of the OC Store. But I dissent with

respect to the majority’s conclusion that the initial entry of the OC Store on July 28,

2012 did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,shall not be violated,

and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath

or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and

the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment “fundamentally protects a person

fromunreasonable searches.” United States v. McMullin, 576 F.3d 810, 814 (8thCir.

2009).

“To establish a Fourth Amendment violation, a defendant must show that he

had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched.” United States v.

Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010). Long bears the burden of establishing

“both a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation is objectively

reasonable.” United States v. Perry, 548 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting

United States v. McCaster, 193 F.2d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The burden placed upon Long is, at most, preponderance of the

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evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 n.14, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L.

Ed. 2d 242 (1974) (“[T]he controlling burden of proof atsuppression hearings should

impose no greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.”).

“Preponderance of the evidence means the greater weight of evidence.” Smith v.

United States, 726 F.2d 428, 430 (8th Cir. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To meet this standard, Long was required to show that “when weighed with [the

evidence] opposed to it, [evidence in favor of Long’s expectation of privacy had]

convincing force and [was] more probably true and accurate.” Id.

The facts presented at the suppression hearing plainly meet the preponderance

of the evidence standard showing that it was “more probably true and accurate” that 8

the OC Store was closed and, therefore, Long had a subjective expectation of 9

The majority points out that Long “presented no evidence” at the suppression 8

hearing. But a party does not fail to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard

simply because he or she does not provide the best evidence on an issue. See, e.g.,

United States v. Diaz, 685 F.2d 252, 255 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding the government’s

showing of consent was not fatally flawed by its failure to call an informant as a

witness because a police officer testified regarding consent); United States v. Soto,

988 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding the record at the suppression hearing

wassufficient to confer standing to challenge a search even though the defendant did

not testify regarding ownership of the vehicle); United States v. Hageman, No. 2:11-

CR-208-TC, 2011 WL 4403965, at *7 (D. Utah Sept. 21, 2011) (“[T]he fact that the

two Defendants did not testify is not necessarily dispositive of the issue” of whether

Defendants met their burden to establish standing to challenge a search).

If Long satisfies the subjective expectation of privacy standard by showing the

9

OC Store was closed, Long meets the objective standard because, as the Supreme

Court has held, “portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public

may only be compelled . . . within the framework of a warrant procedure.” See v.

City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967).

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privacy. In particular, the record shows: Officer Spargur arrived at the OC Store at

approximately 4:30 a.m.; the only exterior illuminated lights around the building were

a street light and a flood light for a security camera; there was an electric “Open” sign

in another part of the building which was not illuminated; Officer Spargur testified

that as he pulled into the parking lot there was no indication the “business[was] open

to the public”; all of the doors were closed, but unlocked; “most of the lights [inside

the OC Store] were off”; Officer Spargur did not see customers or employees inside

the OC Store; and, because he was unsure of whether the OC Store was open, Officer

Spargur knocked to announce his presence and received no answer. In light of these

established facts, the conclusion follows that by a clear preponderance of the

evidence the OC Store was closed. Thus, the district court clearly erred in finding

Long failed to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard.

The government asserts that, even if Long had a reasonable expectation of

privacy in the OC Store, the Leon good-faith exception applies. The ultimate

question under Leon is whether an officer “had an objectively reasonable basis to

believe [s/he was] complying with [applicable law] and the Fourth Amendment.”

United States v. Moore, 956 F.2d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 1992). If an officer’s pre-warrant

conduct is “clearly illegal,” the Leon good-faith exception does not apply. United

States v. O’Neal, 17 F.3d 239, 242-43 n.6 (8th Cir. 1994).

Like the magistrate judge in this case, I am “hard pressed to think of a situation

where society would be more likely to recognize [—and a police officer would more

easily see—] a business owner’s expectation of privacy.” (Appellant’s

Addendum 15). As admitted by Officer Spargur, when he approached the OC Store

nothing externally indicated the business was open to the public. Officer Spargur

also admitted that he continued to investigate—in spite of the OC Store externally

appearing closed—and, because he was unsure whether the business was open, felt

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obligated to knock and announce. Officer Spargur’s account of the initial search and

his actions in response to the appearance of the OC Store are not consistent with a

good faith belief that the OC Store was open to the public. Thus, under these facts,

as well as others highlighted above, Officer Spargur could not in good faith believe

that entry into the OC Store was permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 127

F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the Leon good-faith exception did not salvage

a warrantless entry by police because, under the facts known to police at the time of

the entry, “[n]o officer could in good faith believe . . . that the defendants consented

to the officers’ visual or physical access to the motel room” (alteration in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Further, Officer Spargur’s conduct was “clearly illegal” because Long

possessed an expectation of privacy in his business when it was closed to the public.

See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967)

(“[P]ortions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be

compelled . . . within the framework of a warrant procedure.”); O’Neal, 17 F.3d at

242-43 n.6 (holding that if pre-warrant conduct is “clearly illegal” the good-faith

exception does not apply and “evidence obtained under the resulting warrant should

be excluded”). To permit the application of the Leon good-faith exception in this

instance would undermine a purpose of the exclusionary rule—“to deter police

misconduct.” O’Neal, 17 F.3d at 243 n.6 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.

897, 916, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Thus, because the unwarranted search of the OC Store violated the Fourth

Amendment and is not salvaged by the Leon good-faith exception, I dissent and

would rule that the district court erred when it failed to suppress all evidence obtained

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as a result of the July 28, 2012 initial entry—including all evidence collected under

the July 28, 2012 search warrant.

______________________________

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