Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01957/USCOURTS-ca8-06-01957-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David Allen Amos
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-1957

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Eastern

* District of Missouri.

David Allen Amos, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: October 19, 2006

Filed: October 24, 2006

___________

Before MELLOY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

At his first appearance on June 27, 2005, David Allen Amos pled not guilty to

methamphetamine-related offenses. On August 22, the day trial was scheduled, Amos

was granted a continuance until November 14. On that date, Amos was granted yet

another continuance. On December 8, Amos moved to dismiss the indictment, citing

violations of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. The next day, Amos pled

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The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Judge, United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

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guilty. On January 25, 2006, the district court1

 denied his motion to dismiss under the

Act. Amos appeals.

The Act requires that the trial of a defendant who pleads not guilty "commence

within seventy days from the filing date (and making public) of the information or

indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the

court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs." 18 U.S.C. §

3161(c)(1). If the defendant is not tried within this period, the indictment shall be

dismissed, on defendant's motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2).

The seventy-day clock is tolled during a continuance "if the judge granted such

continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." 18

U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A). The reasons for the ends-of-justice findings shall be set forth

in the record of the case, either orally or in writing. Id. The Act does not state a

deadline for setting forth the findings or the reasons.

In this case, the clock began on June 27 and stopped on December 9, a period

of 166 days. The parties agree that 21 of these days are excludable. At issue is the

84-day continuance, from August 22 to November 14. If these 84 days are

excludable, then the district court correctly denied the motion.

Five months after granting the continuance at issue, the district judge entered

her findings and reasons that the continuance served the ends of justice, when ruling

on Amos's 3162(a)(2) motion to dismiss. Amos argues that this violated the Act. In

her memorandum and order, the district judge cited United States v. Clifford, 664 F.2d

1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 1981) ("While a court generally should make the findings

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required by section 3161(h)(8)(A) at the time it grants the continuance, the Speedy

Trial Act does not require the court to make a contemporaneous record."), and United

States v. Stackhouse, 183 F.3d 900, 901 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Contemporaneity is not

required, however, and a subsequent articulation [of an ends-of-justice finding]

suffices.").

Amos contends that Clifford and Stackhouse approve detailing the reasons for

the ends-of-justice findings after the continuance is granted, but do not allow the

findings themselves to be added to the record at a later time. This technical argument

was refuted by the Supreme Court of the United States just last term: "Although the

Act is clear that the findings must be made, if only in the judge's mind, before granting

the continuance . . . the Act is ambiguous on precisely when those findings must be

'se[t] forth, in the record of the case.' However this ambiguity is resolved, at the very

least the Act implies that those findings must be put on the record by the time a district

court rules on a defendant's motion to dismiss under § 3162(a)(2)." Zedner v. United

States, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1989 (2006).

This court holds that the ends-of-justice findings and the supporting reasons

may be entered on the record, as happened here, when the district court rules on

defendant's 3162(a)(2) motion to dismiss.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

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