Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01923/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01923-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jerry Bass
Appellee
Mary Bass
Not Party
Tony Dixon
Not Party
D. Scott Forrester
Appellee
Melissa Johnson
Appellant
Kimberly Rosa
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1923

___________

D. Scott Forrester, Conservator of the *

Estate of Jerry Bass; Jerry Bass, *

*

Appellees, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Mary Bass; Tony Dixon, *

*

Defendants, *

*

Kimberly Rosa; Melissa Johnson, *

*

Appellants. *

___________

Submitted: November 18, 2004

Filed: February 7, 2005

___________

Before RILEY, McMILLIAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges. 

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Mary Bass (Bass), with her live-in partner, cruelly tortured and starved her five

minor children. Two eight-year old sons, Larry and Gary, died from the abuse. D.

Scott Forrester (Forrester), as personal representative of the estates of Larry and Gary

Bass and as conservator of the estate of Jerry Bass, the surviving triplet, and Jerry

Bass (Jerry), individually, filed this civil rights and wrongful death action against

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Kimberly Rosa (Rosa) and Melissa Johnson (Johnson), two social workers employed

by the Missouri Department of Social Services (MDSS) Division of Family Services

(DFS). Forrester pled federal due process and state law claims, seeking damages

resulting from Rosa’s and Johnson’s alleged violations of Missouri’s child welfare

statutes.

Rosa and Johnson moved for summary judgment, asserting the affirmative

defenses of the public duty doctrine, official immunity, and qualified immunity. The

district court determined the public duty doctrine did not apply, but granted summary

judgment to Rosa and Johnson on the state law claims because Rosa and Johnson had

acted in their discretionary roles and, consequently, are officially immune from suit.

The district court denied Rosa and Johnson qualified immunity on the federal due

process claims. Rosa and Johnson appeal the denial of qualified immunity.

Concluding Forrester failed to plead viable federal due process claims, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Summary

In March 1995, DFS received the first of many hot line calls alleging Bass was

battering and starving her five children, Rodney, Catina, and triplets, Larry, Gary, and

Jerry. DFS investigated various abuse and neglect reports and visited the Bass home;

however, DFS never deemed the hot line reports warranted local law enforcement

notification or removal of the children from the home. On August 16, 1999, DFS

received a hot line call in Jefferson City, Missouri. The caller reported: (1) scratches

were seen on Larry’s chest; (2) Bass was starving her children as punishment; (3)

Bass had locked Rodney in the basement; (4) the children were searching through

trash cans for food; (5) all five children appeared dehydrated and malnourished with

sunken eyes and protruding ribs; and (6) the children were so weak they could not

drink from a glass without assistance. The hot line information was faxed

immediately to Kansas City, Missouri, where a DFS employee screened the

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James C. Harrison (Harrison), MDSS’s Assistant Deputy Director for Child

Services, testified a family assessment approach is selected for a “relatively mild or

moderate case of abuse and neglect, injuries are not severe, and may be [a] first-time

call[,] . . . and the report is not that serious but might have well been addressed

through an assessment in which we go in and, in addition to looking at risk and safety

of a child, look at the family service needs and how those service needs might be met

by Division or other community agencies.” 

2

Harrison testified “an investigation generally is a report that by virtue of the

allegations would constitute a criminal offense if they were true. These are generally

the serious reports; physical abuse and neglect, sexual abuse, generally . . . a crime

against a person.”

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information according to MDSS protocol and determined a family assessment and

services approach,1

 rather than an investigation,2 was warranted. 

Johnson was assigned to perform a family assessment that day on the Bass

family. Johnson went to the Bass home, where she met Bass’s live-in boyfriend,

Tony Dixon (Dixon) at the front gate. Dixon told Johnson Bass was working and the

children were not at home. Johnson told Dixon to have Bass call her. The following

day Bass called Johnson at work, and Johnson returned to the Bass home to perform

a family assessment. During her visit, Johnson talked to Bass, and interviewed three

of the children, Ronald, Catina, and Jerry. Johnson did not see or interview Larry and

Gary. Bass told Johnson that, due to their behavioral problems, Larry and Gary lived

with their natural father. The children also told Johnson that Larry and Gary were

living with their father. Dixon, however, told Johnson that Larry and Gary were out

of town visiting their grandparents. Johnson recognized the discrepancy and recorded

Dixon’s seemingly contradictory statement on the family assessment form. Johnson

also noted Bass “was to contact [Johnson] if Larry + Gary returned home.” At no

time did Johnson verify Larry’s and Gary’s whereabouts.

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Johnson spent an hour in the Bass home. She confined her visit to the living

room, which she observed to be very clean. Johnson smelled food cooking on the

kitchen stove. Bass denied ever punishing her children by locking them in the

basement or by withholding food from them. The children told Johnson that Bass

took good care of them. The children denied Bass withheld food, locked them in the

basement, or otherwise abused them. Bass attested that Johnson assured Bass she

would follow-up with another visit in two weeks. The family assessment form does

not indicate any intention to follow-up, nor did Johnson follow up with the family.

Following her home visit, Johnson determined no social services were needed,

and she concluded the Bass children were safe, despite never seeing Larry and Gary.

Johnson turned in her family assessment report without completing a mandatory

safety assessment. By a form letter dated September 7, 1999, Johnson informed Bass

DFS was not opening a case “because we agreed during our discussion that your

family is not in need of services.” Two weeks later, Johnson’s supervisor, Rosa,

reviewed the report and completed the safety assessment, thereby certifying the Bass

home was safe, without ever being in the Bass home or seeing the Bass children. 

Two months after DFS closed the Bass file, Bass forced Larry and Gary to

submerge their feet and lower legs into scalding bath water, causing severe burns. On

October 20, 1999, Kansas City police, fire, and emergency medical technicians

responded to a 911 call made from the Bass home. State v. Bass, 81 S.W.3d 595, 599

(Mo. Ct. App. 2002). Upon arrival, emergency personnel observed Bass kneeling on

the living room floor near Larry, who was lifeless, emaciated, and naked except for

a pair of socks. After paramedics declared Larry dead, they proceeded upstairs,

where they discovered Gary, emaciated and lying on a vomit-stained mattress. En

route to the emergency room, the paramedics removed Gary’s socks and discovered

third-degree burns on his feet and lower legs, several gangrene toes, and multiple

abrasions on his back. Despite intensive medical treatment, Gary died two days later.

Id. at 600.

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To ascertain their causes of death, autopsies were performed on the boys. At

death Larry measured 45 inches and weighed 31 pounds; Gary measured 47 inches

and weighed 32 pounds. Id. The autopsies revealed the boys died from starvation

and bacteria-infected thermal burns to their legs and feet. The autopsy reports

classified both deaths as homicides. Id.

The State of Missouri indicted Bass with two counts of second-degree murder,

four counts of armed criminal action, eight counts of child abuse, and two counts of

first-degree endangerment. Id. at 601. The state also indicted Dixon, who pled guilty

to child abuse and endangerment charges, and was sentenced to twenty years. A jury

convicted Bass of two counts of second-degree murder, four counts of armed criminal

action, and six counts of child abuse. The trial court sentenced Bass to eight

consecutive life sentences and to four additional term-of-year sentences. Id. The

Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Bass’s convictions. Id. at 616.

As a result of the prosecutions, authorities learned Bass and Dixon had

deceived Johnson about Larry’s and Gary’s whereabouts. On August 17, 1999, Larry

and Gary were not living with their natural father, nor were they visiting their

grandparents. Instead, sometime before Johnson arrived, Bass and Dixon locked

Larry and Gary in the basement, bound their hands and feet together with rope, and

gagged their mouths with socks. Bass and Dixon threatened the other three children

with starvation and beatings if they told Johnson the truth about their brothers’

treatment or their whereabouts. 

B. Procedural History

Following the criminal convictions, Forrester filed this lawsuit, contending

Johnson’s and Rosa’s noncompliance with mandatory state-created procedures

violated Larry’s and Gary’s federal due process rights as well as state law. Johnson

and Rosa moved for summary judgment, arguing they are entitled to qualified

immunity because Forrester cannot prove any violation of clearly established

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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.109.3 established procedures for the state’s child

protection system, and provided, in pertinent part, that DFS shall: 

(2) Forward the report to the appropriate division staff who shall

determine, through the use of protocols developed by the division,

whether an investigation or the family assessment and services approach

should be used to respond to the allegation. . . . The division may

investigate any report, but shall conduct an investigation involving

reports, which if true, would constitute violation of section 565.050,

[first-degree assault], . . . 568.030 [abandonment], 568.045

[endangerment in first degree], 568.050 [endangerment in second

degree], 568.060 [abuse], . . . or an attempt to commit any such crimes;

. . . ;

(4) Contact the appropriate law enforcement agency upon receipt of a

report of a violation of [the above statutes, inter alia]. . . , or an attempt

to commit any such crimes, and shall provide such agency with a

detailed description of the report received. . . . ;

(5) Cause a thorough investigation or family assessment and services

approach to be initiated within twenty-four hours of receipt of the report

from the division, . . . If the report indicates the child is in danger of

serious physical harm or threat to life, an investigation or family

assessment and services approach shall include direct observation of

the subject child within twenty-four hours of the receipt of the report;

. . . ;

(8) Provide services, in cases in which the family assessment and

services approach is used . . . ;

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constitutional rights. Johnson and Rosa further claim they owed no duty to Larry and

Gary because the boys were not in state custody.

 The district court analyzed the plain language of sections 210.1093

 and

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. . . .

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.109 (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).

4

Section 210.145, establishing a telephone hot line and central registry for child

abuse reports, in pertinent part, provided:

5. Upon receipt of a report, which, if true, would constitute violation of

section . . . 565.050 [first-degree assault], . . . , 568.030 [abandonment],

568.045 [endangerment in first degree], 568.050 [endangerment in

second degree], 568.060 [abuse], . . . or an attempt to commit any such

crimes, the local office shall contact the appropriate law enforcement

agency and provide such agency with a detailed description of the

report received. . . . [T]he local division office shall request the

assistance of the local law enforcement agency in . . . investigation of

the complaint . . . .

6. The local office of the division shall cause a thorough investigation

to be initiated immediately or no later than within twenty-four hours of

receipt of the report from the division, . . . [I]f the report indicates the

child is in danger of serious physical harm or threat to life, an

investigation shall include direct observation of the subject child within

twenty-four hours of the receipt of the report.

. . . .

10. Protective or preventive social services shall be provided by the

division to the family and subject child and to others in the home to

prevent abuse or neglect; to safeguard their health and welfare; and to

help preserve and stabilize the family whenever possible. . . .

. . . .

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.145 (1994) (emphasis added).

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210.1454 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and determined these statutes clearly

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establish certain rights for children and families who enter the Missouri social

services system through reports of abuse or neglect. The district court identified these

rights as being: “(1) The right to have reports of abuse investigated by division

employees, when the report indicates a possible violation of certain criminal laws, or

indicates that the child is in danger of physical harm or threat to life; (2) The right to

have the appropriate law enforcement agency contacted and provided a description

of the report, and to have division employees request the assistance of the local law

enforcement agency; and (3) The right to preventive and protective services to

prevent abuse or neglect.” Additionally, the district court determined these statutory

sections assign DFS employees the duties of updating the information system and

maintaining records, and observing directly, within twenty-four hours, a child

reported to be in danger of serious physical harm.

Flowing from these statutory duties, the district court reasoned the “plaintiffs

had a property interest in the rights conferred by [sections] 210.109 and 210.145,

specifically in the right to an investigation of the report that their mother was abusing

them, and the right to preventive and protective services provided by the state.” In

a footnote, the court noted Johnson and Rosa owed the plaintiffs the initial protective

service of contacting law enforcement and requesting their assistance in the

investigation of the case. 

In analyzing the substantive due process claims, the district court found the

“plaintiffs had a property interest in their right to a child abuse investigation, as well

as a liberty interest in bodily integrity and, naturally, a fundamental right to life.” The

court expounded:

Melissa Johnson should have known that proceeding to conduct a family

assessment of the Bass case despite knowing the report called for an

investigation would deprive plaintiffs of their clearly established right

to a child abuse investigation. . . . Melissa Johnson and Kimberly Rosa

should have known that making material omissions and false statements

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on the evaluation form and closing the Bass case prematurely would

deprive plaintiffs of clearly established rights to an investigation and to

preventive and protective services. Defendants therefore are not entitled

to qualified immunity on plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims.

The district court denied summary judgment on the federal due process claims,

but granted summary judgment on the state law claims because the defendants had

engaged in discretionary acts and were entitled to official immunity. Forrester does

not appeal the dismissal of his state law claims.

II. DISCUSSION

We must determine whether Johnson’s and Rosa’s failure to comply with

mandatory state-created procedures outlined in sections 210.109 and 210.145

constituted procedural and substantive due process violations protected under the

Fourteenth Amendment. For purposes of this appeal, we assume Johnson and Rosa

failed to perform their mandated statutory duties by not: (1) conducting an

investigation; (2) directly observing Larry and Gary Bass within twenty-four hours

of the hot line call; (3) contacting law enforcement, providing a detailed description

of the abuse report, and requesting law enforcement assistance with an investigation;

and (4) providing preventive and protective services.

Rosa and Johnson appeal the district court’s denial of summary judgment,

finding Rosa and Johnson are not protected by qualified immunity. Generally, we do

not have jurisdiction to decide an appeal arising from the denial of summary

judgment; however, under the collateral order doctrine, an order denying qualified

immunity is immediately appealable. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996);

Beck v. Wilson, 377 F.3d 884, 888-89 (8th Cir. 2004).

A. Qualified Immunity

We review de novo a denial of qualified immunity. McCoy v. City of

Monticello, 342 F.3d 842, 846 (8th Cir. 2003). Rosa and Johnson are entitled to

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qualified immunity unless their alleged conduct violated “clearly established statutory

or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person [in their positions] would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The law is clearly

established if it gives the defendant officials “fair warning” that their conduct violated

an individual’s rights when the officials acted. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739-40

(2002). 

In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), the Supreme Court framed the

threshold question: “Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the [officials’] conduct violated a constitutional

right?” “If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations

established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.

On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties’

submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly

established.” Id. “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right

is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable offic[ial] that [her]

conduct was unlawful in the situation [she] confronted.” Id. at 202. Officials do not

lose their qualified immunity because of a mistaken, yet reasonable belief, nor do

officials lose their immunity because of a reasonable mistake as to the legality of their

actions. Id. at 205-06; McCoy, 342 F.3d at 846. Guided by these principles, we now

proceed to analyze whether sections 210.109 and 210.145 of the Missouri statutes

create property or liberty interests protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.

 B. Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o

State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. Property interests protected by due process are

not created by the Constitution but, rather, “are created and their dimensions are

defined, by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985)

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(citation omitted). The Supreme Court has ruled “a State’s failure to protect an

individual against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due

Process Clause.” DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.

189, 197 (1989). 

Attempting to sidestep DeShaney, Forrester argued, and the district court

agreed, the due process claims in Count I are not based on the Due Process Clause,

but instead are based on Missouri’s child protection statutes that confer on abused

and neglected children an entitlement to receive investigative as well as preventive

and protective services. DeShaney expressly declined to consider whether the

relevant child protection statutes gave the plaintiff an “entitlement” to due process

protection. Id. at 195 n.2. As such, we agree DeShaney does not expressly control

the procedural due process claims.

Our analysis begins by examining first whether the child protection statutes at

issue confer any protected interests. Only if we find a protected interest do we

examine whether the deprivation of the protected interest was done in accordance

with due process. See Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989).

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972), the Supreme Court defined

a property interest as an interest “a person has already acquired in specific benefits.”

The Court explained that to have a property interest in a benefit, an individual

claiming the interest “must have more than an abstract need or desire . . . [or] a

unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement

to it.” Id. at 577. 

A state-created liberty interest arises when a state imposes “substantive

limitations on official discretion.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983).

We determine whether a state law creates an enforceable liberty interest by

“examin[ing] closely the language of the relevant statutes and regulations.”

Thompson, 490 U.S. at 461. “[T]he most common manner in which a State creates

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a liberty interest is by establishing ‘substantive predicates’ to govern official

decision-making, and, further, by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a

finding that the relevant criteria have been met.” Id. at 462 (citation omitted). The

Court also articulated a requirement that statutes and regulations must contain

“‘explicitly mandatory language,’ i.e., specific directives to the decisionmaker that

if the regulations’ substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must

follow, in order to create a liberty interest.” Id. at 463. “In sum, the use of ‘explicitly

mandatory language,’ in connection with the establishment of ‘specified substantive

predicates’ to limit discretion, forces a conclusion that the State has created a liberty

interest.” Id.

Sections 210.109 and 210.145 charged DFS personnel with the duties of

receiving reports of child abuse and neglect, and determining whether a family

assessment and services approach or an investigation should be employed to respond

to the report. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 210.109.3(1)-(2) (Supp. 1998). In cases in which

a child abuse report, if true, would constitute a crime or attempted crime against the

subject child or children, the statutes required DFS personnel to conduct an

investigation, contact the appropriate law enforcement agency, provide law

enforcement with a detailed report, and request its assistance. Id. §§ 210.109.3(3)-

(4); 210.145.5 (1994). The statutes also mandated that, within twenty-four hours of

receiving such a report, DFS personnel must initiate a thorough investigation,

including direct observation of any subject child or children reported to be in danger

of serious physical harm or threat of life. Id. §§ 210.109.3(5); 210.145.6.

Furthermore, the statutes required DFS personnel to provide protective and

preventive services to the subject child or children and to others in the home.

Id. §§ 210.109.3(8), (12), (16)-(17); 210.145.10-11. 

We have not considered previously whether these challenged Missouri child

protection statutes bestow upon reportedly abused children a property or liberty

interest in social services. We have, however, previously considered an identical

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issue in the context of a Minnesota child welfare statute and related procedural

regulations, and determined they neither “bestow . . . a property interest in social

services[,]” nor “create a constitutional liberty interest in due process.” Doe v.

Hennepin County, 858 F.2d 1325, 1328 (8th Cir. 1988); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d

1437, 1469 (8th Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478

(1991). The Minnesota statute at issue in both cases–section 626.556 of the

Minnesota Statutes–imposed a reporting duty on individuals with knowledge of child

abuse or neglect, and investigative and record-keeping duties on law enforcement

authorities and social service agencies that receive child abuse reports, as well as

duties on local welfare agencies to offer protective social services. See Myers, 810

F.2d at 1469 (citing Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.556 (West 1983 and Supp. 1987)).

In Myers, we concluded the Minnesota child welfare statute, at most,

“establishes guidelines to be followed as a matter of state law and neither confers nor

embodies any constitutionally-protected right.” Id. The following year, in Doe, we

noted that, although the plaintiffs “desired or even expected the social services set

forth in the Minnesota statute, they ha[d] no legitimate claim of entitlement.” Doe,

858 F.2d at 1328. We explained in Doe that in order to have a legitimate entitlement,

the benefit must be specific, i.e., clearly definable, and we provided several examples

of clearly definable benefits, including public assistance, social security income, and

unemployment benefits. Id. In contrast to these specific benefits, we explained the

provision of Minnesota’s statutorily defined “social services is qualified by the

considerable discretion placed in the hands of those who administer it.” Id. at 1329.

We also noted the “lack of specificity of the Minnesota statute.” Id.

The Minnesota statute examined in Doe and Myers is not identical to the

Missouri statutes relied upon here, and the facts in Doe and Myers, both of which

involved the emergency removal of children from parental custody following reported

child abuse, are converse to those before us. Nonetheless, we conclude the legal

reasoning employed in these earlier cases should apply. Similar to the Minnesota

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statute, sections 210.109 and 210.145 of the Missouri statutes codify procedures for

administering the state’s child protection system, the telephone hot line, and the

central registry. Sections 210.109 and 210.145 contain “explicit mandatory

language,” e.g., an investigation is required when a child abuse report, if true, would

constitute a crime or attempted crime against a child; notification of law enforcement,

with a request for assistance, and direct observation of the child within twenty-four

hours are also required under the same circumstances; and social services must be

provided to the child and family.

Despite explicit language requiring DFS officials to comply with certain

procedures, the statutes contain no substantive predicates expressly limiting the

discretion of DFS officials “by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding

that the relevant criteria have been met.” See Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462 (citation

omitted). The statutes do not mandate the particular substantive outcomes of required

investigations, law enforcement notification and intervention, direct observation of

subject children, and the provision of social services. See Mo. Rev. Stat.

§§ 210.109(3)-(5), (8), (12), (16)-(17) (Supp. 1998); 210.145.5-.6, .10-.11 (1994).

Nor do the statutes define mandatory social services, or dictate how, when, or for how

long these social services must be provided. Instead, the statutory language simply

mandates particular preliminary actions be undertaken and authorizes the provision

of social services, thereby leaving the particular substantive outcome in each case to

the sound discretion of trained social workers and law enforcement officers. See id.

We agree with the Second Circuit’s ruling that where an administrative process

does not require specific substantive outcomes, but merely authorizes and directs

particular actions and remedies, the administrative process does not create

“entitlements” subject to constitutional protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.

See Sealed v. Sealed, 332 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2003). Other circuits, analyzing

similarly drafted child welfare statutes, have reached this same conclusion. See Doe

v. Dist. of Columbia, 93 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (declaring “process alone

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5

Because the children were in state custody and the court determined the

mandatory statutory language–“shall authorize any employee of the department or

any law enforcement officer to remove the child . . . from such surroundings without

the consent of the child’s parent or guardian”–was ambiguous, the Second Circuit

certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court the question whether the mandatory “shall

authorize” language required emergency removal of the plaintiffs or only authorized

the Commissioner to seek emergency removal based on the exercise of discretionary

judgment. Id. at 59-60. The Missouri statutes relied upon in this case do not mandate

or otherwise authorize emergency removal by DFS or law enforcement officials of

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does not give rise to a protected substantive interest: by codifying procedures for

investigating child abuse and neglect reports, D.C. has not assumed a constitutional

obligation to protect children from such abuse and neglect”); Tony L. v. Childers, 71

F.3d 1182, 1186 (6th Cir. 1995) (ruling state-created procedural rights “only give

Plaintiffs an expectation that a certain procedure will be followed,” and declaring

“[a]n expectation that some sort of action will be taken is not enough. . . . [A] plaintiff

must have an expectation that a particular result will follow from a particular,

required action.”); Doe v. Milwaukee County, 903 F.2d 499, 503-04 (7th Cir. 1990)

(rejecting a procedural due process claim for failing to investigate child abuse,

finding no “entitlement” in such procedures, and ruling the “procedures themselves

are not ‘benefits’ within the meaning of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence”). 

Recently, in a case filed by children alleging abuse while in foster care, a

recognized exception under DeShaney, the Second Circuit ruled that “the detailed and

comprehensive procedures for investigating potential child abuse mandated by state

law[,] . . . standing alone, create no independent substantive entitlements, whose

deprivation might trigger application of the Due Process Clause.” Sealed, 332 F.3d

at 57. The Second Circuit reasoned that “‘[e]levating a state-mandated procedure to

the status of a constitutionally protected’ liberty or property interest, would make

process ‘an end in itself’ rather than a requirement whose ‘constitutional purpose is

to protect a substantive interest in which the individual has a claim of entitlement.’”

Id. at 57 n.5 (citation omitted).5

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children believed to be in imminent danger of physical harm.

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Thus, based on the plain statutory language and court precedent, we hold

sections 210.109 and 210.145 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which were in effect

in August 1999, did not create specific, constitutionally protected property or liberty

interests in state-created investigative, preventive, and protective social services.

Finding no protected interests, we need not decide what, if any, procedural process

was due.

C. Substantive Due Process

Forrester also claims the failure of Johnson and Rosa to comply with statecreated statutory procedures violated Larry’s and Gary’s substantive due process

rights to bodily integrity and their fundamental rights to life. While DeShaney does

not control Forrester’s procedural due process claims, DeShaney squarely forecloses

his substantive due process claims. Declaring a state has no general duty to protect

individuals from abuse committed by private actors, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, the

Supreme Court acknowledged a state may owe an affirmative duty to protect

individuals when they are placed in state custody, or when the state acts affirmatively

to create the danger to which the individuals become subject. See id. at 198-201;

Burton v. Richmond, 370 F.3d 723, 727 (8th Cir. 2004). As DFS never placed Larry

and Gary in state custody, the special custodial relationship theory does not apply.

Alternatively, Forrester advances a state-created danger theory, contending

Johnson’s and Rosa’s affirmative acts of jointly filing the Bass family assessment

report with material omissions and false representations rendered Larry and Gary, as

well as their siblings, more vulnerable to continued child abuse and ensured

preventive and protective social services would not be provided to the Bass family.

In Freeman v. Ferguson, 911 F.2d 52, 55 (8th Cir. 1990), we recognized the

DeShaney “analysis establishes the possibility that a constitutional duty to protect an

individual against private violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has

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taken affirmative action which increases the individual’s danger of, or vulnerability

to, such violence beyond the level it would have been at absent state action.” 

Forrester argues the filing of a false family assessment report and the failure

to follow state protective procedures increased Larry’s and Gary’s vulnerability to

continued abuse and deprived them and their family members of critical social

services. The record, however, simply does not substantiate the requisite causal

connection. The filing of the Bass family assessment report and other acts by

Johnson and Rosa were not affirmative acts of endangerment, which “created greater

risks to [the Bass children] than the ones to which [they were] originally exposed.”

 S.S. v. Mullen, 225 F.3d 960, 963 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Instead, as the majority

found in S.S., the state action here was effectively “the same as if [the state] had done

nothing.” Id. In DeShaney, the state once had taken temporary custody of the child;

even so, the Supreme Court reasoned: 

[W]hen [the State] returned [the boy] to his father’s custody, [the State]

placed him in no worse position than that in which he would have been

had [the State] not acted at all; the State does not become the permanent

guarantor of an individual’s safety by having once offered him shelter.

Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to

protect [the boy].

489 U.S. at 201. In this case, the State of Missouri never had custody of Larry and

Gary, and Johnson’s and Rosa’s actions, at most, left the Bass children in the same

perilous situation that existed on August 16, 1999, when DFS responded to the hot

line call. No constitutionally recognized causal nexus exists.

Even if Forrester could establish a sufficient causal connection between state

action and the ensuing private acts of violence, his substantive due process claims

still must fail because Forrester cannot demonstrate the requisite degree of offensive

conduct or deliberate disregard by Johnson and Rosa necessary to establish

substantive due process violations. “Before official conduct or inaction rises to the

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level of a substantive due process violation[,] it must be so egregious or outrageous

that it is conscience-shocking.” Burton, 370 F.3d at 729. The dreadful abuse

suffered by the Bass children was egregious. But private parties, not state actors,

inflicted the severe physical abuse that killed Larry and Gary. 

While we do not condone any official negligence contributing to this tragic

case, we conclude Johnson and Rosa did not engage in official conduct so egregious

or outrageous as to shock the contemporary conscience. See County of Sacramento

v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848 n.8 (1998). The record does not portray Johnson as an

apathetic or dilatory social worker who saw and ignored wanton child abuse. Based

upon what transpired inside the Bass home on August 17, 1999, Johnson’s failure to

conduct an investigation, to contact law enforcement, and to verify the whereabouts

of the boys, while erroneous, and maybe naive in retrospect, cannot be considered

conscience-shocking. Johnson took what she saw and what she heard at face value.

Only after the two young boys died did everyone realize Johnson had misjudged the

actors and the scene.

 Nor was Rosa’s supervisory conduct conscience-shocking. While Rosa should

not have filled in missing information on Johnson’s report and completed the safety

assessment without personal knowledge of the conditions inside the Bass home and

the well-being of each family member, her actions were neither egregious nor

outrageous. Rosa simply extrapolated from erroneous information contained in

Johnson’s report. The record contains no evidence that either Rosa or Johnson (1)

knew their representations were false, or (2) deliberately disregarded a known risk of

harm to the Bass children. 

This case manifests exceptionally depraved conduct by two private individuals.

Johnson’s and Rosa’s conduct, while arguably negligent, clearly does not descend to

this base level. The Supreme Court in DeShaney explained the emotional and

constitutional balancing as follows:

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Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy

in a case like this to find a way for [victims and their families] to receive

adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them. But

before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remember once again that

the harm was inflicted not by the State . . . , but by [the parent]. The

most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is that they

stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more

active role for them. In defense of them it must also be said that had

they moved too soon to take custody of the [child] away from the

[parent], they would likely have been met with charges of improperly

intruding into the parent-child relationship, charges based on the same

Due Process Clause that forms the basis for the present charge of failure

to provide adequate protection.

DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03. We conclude Forrester failed to plead viable

substantive due process claims. 

III. CONCLUSION

State courts, and not federal courts, are the appropriate forum to enforce state

child protection laws. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

106 (1984) (declaring “it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state

sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their

conduct to state law”). A federal court should not usurp state power by enforcing

state-created procedures that guarantee no substantive outcomes. 

Because Forrester cannot demonstrate the Missouri statutes establish a property

or liberty interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment and because Johnson’s

and Rosa’s conduct does not shock the contemporary conscience, Forrester has failed

to allege a violation of a clearly established due process right, and Rosa and Johnson

are entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse the denial of qualified immunity for

Rosa and Johnson and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

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