Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01398/USCOURTS-ca8-16-01398-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Juan L. Long
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 16-1398

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Juan L. Long

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City

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 Submitted: September 23, 2016

 Filed: December 8, 2016

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Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

In 2012, Juan L. Long pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. 

He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. 

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In 2016, the district court revoked his supervised release, imposing a sentence of 24 1

months followed by a year of supervised release. Long appeals, asserting

insufficiency of the evidence and an abuse of discretion in denying a continuance. 

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

Long’s original conviction followed his arrest for driving while intoxicated. 

The district court varied below the guideline range because Long said he had changed

and would not drive around with weapons while drinking. Conditions of supervised

release included not possessing alcohol or firearms, unlawfully using controlled

substances, or committing another crime.

Just over a month into Long’s supervised release, a police officer stopped a van

registered to Long for multiple traffic violations. The driver initially gave the officer

a false name. Long was the only passenger. The officer noticed an open can of beer

“on the floor . . . toward the passenger side.”

After arresting the driver for giving a false name, the officer arrested Long for

an open-container violation. The officer searched the vehicle, finding an additional

open can of beer “directly next to the passenger seat on the left side of the seat” and

a gun under the passenger seat. The passenger seat was enclosed on both sides. The

gun was accessible only from behind the seat or from the front, where a piece of

carpet hung down “like a curtain over the front of the seat.”

The Honorable Greg Kays, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the

1

Western District of Missouri.

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The district court held a revocation hearing to determine whether Long had

violated the terms of supervised release by possessing alcohol and a firearm, and by

using cocaine—for which he tested positive. 

At the hearing, Long moved for a continuance because he had developed

Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus and undergone emergency head surgery

six weeks earlier. With his head still bandaged from the surgery, he testified that he

was still having headaches and not getting pain medication. According to defense

counsel, Long was having difficulty thinking and had previously been planning to

testify on the merits. 

The district court denied the continuance and found that Long had violated the

conditions of supervised release by possessing a firearm, possessing alcohol, and

using cocaine. The most serious violation (grade B), combined with his criminal

history, gave a guideline range of six-to-twelve months. The district court noted its

previous leniency based on Long’s promise of change, and his similar conduct the

month after release. The court sentenced himto the statutorymaximumof 24 months,

followed by a year of supervised release.

II.

A district court may “revoke supervised release if the government proves by

a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition ofsupervised

release.” United States v. Boyd, 792 F.3d 916, 919 (8th Cir. 2015). This court

reviews for abuse of discretion a revocation of supervised release, and for clear error

“subsidiary factfinding as to whether or not a violation occurred.” Id. A revocation

isreversed only if this court has “a definite and firm conviction that the District Court

was mistaken.” Id.

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A.

Long disputes the sufficiency of the evidence that he possessed a firearm. In

revocation proceedings, a court finds facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.

A court need not apply the usual rules of evidence and may consider “material that

would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.” United States v. Zentgraf,

20 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1994), quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489

(1972).

Under the terms of supervised release, Long was prohibited from possessing

a firearm. A firearm may be possessed constructively, meaning an individual,

“though lacking [ ] physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control

over the object.” Henderson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015).

To constructively possess the gun, Long must have known it waslocated under

his seat. He argues there was no evidence of his knowledge because a piece of carpet

covered the area where the gun was located and the officer did not see him move

toward the area under his seat in order to conceal the gun. He contends that because

the officer did not know the extent of the driver’s control of the van, Long jointly

occupied the van, and thus “there must be some additional nexus linking the

defendant to the contraband.” United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1168 (8th Cir.

2014). 

Long invokes a Tenth Circuit case, holding, “Mere dominion or control over”

a jointly occupied place is, by itself, “insufficient to establish constructive

possession.” United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1994). There,

another individual concealed her gunsin a piece offurniture—owned by her—located

in a jointly occupied area of the defendant’s house without his knowledge and

contrary to his instructions. Id. at 546. 

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Here, Long’s asserted “mere presence as a passenger” was not the only

evidence of Long’s knowledge. Long owned the van, and the gun was much more

accessible to him than the driver. The district court was also aware, from its own

prior sentencing, that he had been caught drinking and driving with a gun.

Though the officer noticed no furtivemovement, thisis at best neutral evidence

of an absence of knowledge. The lack of furtive movement and the fabric obscuring

the gun are consistent with an attempt to avoid being caught with the gun by hiding

it and not calling attention to its location. 

Since Long owned the vehicle, was sitting above the gun, and had a history of

similar behavior, the district court did not clearly err in finding constructive

possession of the gun.

B.

Long believesthat the denial of his motion for continuance prevented himfrom

presenting an adequate defense. A district court has broad discretion on requests for

continuances, which “generally are not favored and should be granted only when the

party requesting one has shown a compelling reason.” United States v. Vesey, 330

F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2003). This court reverses a denial of continuance only if

the district court abused its discretion and the moving party was prejudiced. United

States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 821 (8th Cir. 2014).

According to Long, because he had emergency head surgery and was still

suffering headaches and effects on his cognitive abilities, he could not participate in

his own defense or potentially testify. However, Long was able to understand and

respond to the court’s questioning about his medical treatment. Long described the

circumstances and timing of his surgery six weeks earlier. Asked whether the surgery

affected his ability to think, he said he was having headaches and the prison would

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not supply pain medication. Though defense counsel asserted that Long’s headaches

affected his ability to participate in his defense and testify, at no point did Long

himself state that his headaches prevented him from adequately participating.

Long argues that the district court was predisposed to disbelieve him, citing as

evidence the court’s description of the need to place Long under oath about the

details of his medical treatment. Addressing the reliability of the medical

information, the district court stated that it would take as true any facts that defense

counsel, as an officer of the court, knew first-hand. However, the district court did

not give the same credence to Long’s second-hand statements, giving unsworn

information “the weight that it deserves.” This does not demonstrate a predisposition. 

In fact, immediately before Long was placed under oath, the district court stated: “I

don’t know if I’m going to continue this.” Rather than close-mindedness, the district

court’s comments demonstrate emphasis on the reliability of sworn testimony.

At the hearing, Long demonstrated an ability to understand and respond

appropriately to the court’s questioning, and to articulate hismedical issues, including

the details and timing of his treatment. The district court did not question the facts

of the treatment, but still did not “believe that you are suffering so much you can’t

participate in this hearing.” Long fails to show he was unable to participate in his

own defense and thus does not present a compelling reason for a continuance. Vesey,

330 F.3d at 1072. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

continuance.

* * * * * * *

The judgment is affirmed.

______________________________

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