Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01651/USCOURTS-caed-2_21-cv-01651-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rob Bonta
Defendant
Gavin Newsom
Defendant
Peace Ranch, LLC
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEACE RANCH LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

GAVIN NEWSOM, in his official 

capacity as Governor of the 

State of California; ROB 

BONTA, in his official 

capacity as Attorney General 

of the State of California; 

and DOES 1 through 20, 

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-01651-JAM-AC

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING 

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

In 2021, California enacted AB 978 which limited the amount 

mobilehome parks could increase rent for mobilehome sites. Peace 

Ranch, LLC (“Peace Ranch” or “Plaintiff”), the owner of two 

mobilehome parks, brought this action against Governor Gavin 

Newsom, Attorney General Rob Bonta, and 20 Doe defendants 

(“Defendants”) challenging AB 978. Compl., ECF No. 1. Shortly 

thereafter, Peace Ranch filed a Motion for Preliminary 

Injunction. Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 7. Defendants 

opposed this Motion. Opp’n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 13. 

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Plaintiff replied. Reply in Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 17. 

Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss, ECF 

No. 10. Plaintiff opposed this Motion. Opp’n to Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 14. Defendants replied. Reply in Mot. to 

Dismiss, ECF No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is granted, as Plaintiff’s have not 

demonstrated standing. The Motion for Preliminary Injunction is 

therefore denied as moot.1

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2019, Peace Ranch acquired Rancho La Paz, a 

mobilehome park in Orange County. Compl. ¶ 19. Rancho La Paz

consists of two legally distinct parks, as recognized by the 

California Department of Housing and Community Development. Id.

One of the parks is in Anaheim, the other in Fullerton. Id. The 

previous owners of Rancho La Paz had little to no debt on the 

property and limited annual property taxes. Id. ¶ 20. This 

allowed for the park to turn a stable profit even though rent 

spaces were over 40% below market rent. Id. When Peace Ranch 

acquired the property, the increase in property taxes meant this 

below market rent was no longer profitable. Id. Accordingly, 

Peace Ranch gave the mobilehome owners notice of a rent increase. 

Id. ¶ 21. This was met with controversy. Id. Peace Ranch 

subsequently rescinded the rent increase so that it could meet 

with the homeowners and city leaders in order to create an agreed 

1 These motions were determined to be suitable for decision 

without oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for December 14, 2021. 

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upon schedule for rent increases phased in over a period of 

years. Id. 

The rent increases were a subject of contention in both 

Anaheim and Fullerton. Id. ¶ 24. As such, a rent control 

ordinance for mobilehome parks was introduced in both cities. 

Id. However, neither passed. Id. The cities did get written 

commitments from Peach Ranch regarding the operations of the 

parks. Id. 

Since 2019, California state law limits the amount an owner 

of residential property can increase rent. Id. ¶ 28. However, 

mobilehome parks were expressly exempted. Id. In 2020, the 

Legislature passed AB 2782. Mot. to Dismiss at 2. The bill 

amended California law so that long-term mobilehome leases would 

no longer be exempt from local rent control. Id. (citing 2020 

Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 35 (A.B. 2782) (West)). In July 2021,

Governor Gavin Newsom signed AB 978 into law, which became 

effective January 1, 2022. Compl. ¶ 34. Among other things, AB 

978 created a separate cap for mobilehome owners who rent a site 

in a mobilehome park. Id. ¶ 35. Specifically, AB 978 prohibits 

any “qualified mobilehome park” from raising the gross rental 

rate for a park space more than 3% plus the percentage change in 

the cost of living, or 5%, whichever is lower. Id. 

AB 978 defines a “qualified mobilehome park” as “a 

mobilehome park, as defined in Section 798.4 [of the Civil Code], 

that is located within and governed by the jurisdictions of two 

or more incorporated cities.” Id. ¶ 36. Peace Ranch alleges, 

that the legislation was specifically meant to target Rancho La 

Paz. Id. Specifically, the author and sponsor of the bill, 

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Assemblymember Quirk-Silva represents Fullerton. Id. ¶¶ 32, 34. 

Peace Ranch alleges that after efforts to enact mobilehome park 

rent control in Fullerton failed, Assemblymember Quirk-Silva 

introduced AB 978. Id. ¶ 34. In limiting its application to 

mobilehome parks that were located within and governed by the 

jurisdictions of two or more cities, and with a stated intent of 

protecting mobilehome park tenants who reside in counties with 

certain populations, Peace Ranch alleges the law targeted only 

Rancho La Paz. Id. ¶¶ 36, 37, 38. The Government, though, 

points out that Peace Ranch does not allege any statutory 

provision so limiting AB 978’s application to parks within

counties with certain populations. Mot. to Dismiss at 4. Peace 

Ranch claims the bill’s sponsors relied on the mistaken 

assumption that Rancho La Paz was a single mobilehome park. 

Compl. ¶ 36. Accordingly, AB 978 does not actually apply to it. 

Id. ¶ 9.

Peace Ranch then brought this action against Governor 

Newsom, Attorney General Rob Bonta, and 20 Doe defendants 

contending AB 978 violates the Constitution’s prohibition on 

bills of attainder (claim one), the contracts clause (claim 

three), the equal protection clause (claim four), the due process 

clause (claim five), and the takings clause (claim six). See 

generally Compl. Additionally, Peace Ranch brought two 

challenges on state law grounds: California’s bar on special 

legislation (claim two) and its takings clause (claim seven). 

Id. Finally, it requests declaratory judgment that AB 978 does 

not apply to it at all (claim eight). Defendants move to dismiss 

all claims. Mot. to Dismiss. 

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II. OPINION

A. Judicial Notice 

Plaintiff requests the Court take judicial notice of seven 

exhibits: (1) a declaration of Jenny S. Lillge of Legislative 

Intent Service, Inc., authenticating the legislative history of 

AB 978; (2) Assembly Committee on Housing and Community 

Development’s analysis of AB 978 as amended April 21, 2021; 

(3) Assembly Committee on Housing and Community Development’s 

Background Information Request Form for AB 978; (4) AB 978 as 

amended on May 5, 2021; (5) Senate Judiciary Committee’s

analysis of AB 978 amended June 14, 2021; (6) AB 978 as amended 

on June 24, 2021; and (7) AB 978 as approved by the Governor and 

chaptered. Pl.’s Req. for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 15. 

The Court finds all exhibits, except the first, to be 

legislative history whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 

questioned and a proper subject for judicial notice. See Chaker 

v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1123 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). 

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for judicial 

notice of exhibits two through seven but denies Plaintiff’s 

request for the first exhibit. See Snyder v. Umum Life Ins. Co. 

of Am., No. CV 13-07522 BRO RZX, 2014 WL 7734715, at *5 (C.D. 

Cal. Oct. 28, 2014) (granting judicial notice for legislative 

history but not a declaration from an employee at Legislative 

Intent Services, Inc., as it is not a source generally known or 

whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned). 

B. Legal Standard 

A defendant may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of 

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Civil Procedure. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). If the plaintiff 

lacks standing under Article III of the United States 

Constitution, then the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, 

and the case must be dismissed. See Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 

F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011). Once a party has moved to 

dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 

12(b)(1), the opposing party bears the burden of establishing 

the court’s jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 

C. Analysis

Defendants first move to dismiss all claims against 

Governor Newsom and the state-law claims based on sovereign 

immunity. Mot. to Dismiss at 5-6. Peace Ranch does not oppose 

this. Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 10 n.2. Accordingly, the 

state-law claims, counts two, seven, and eight, as well as all 

claims against Governor Newsom are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

See Resnick v. Hyundai Motor Am., Inc., No. CV-1600593-BRO, 2017 

WL 1531192, at *22 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2017) (“Failure to oppose

an argument raised in a motion to dismiss constitutes waiver of 

that argument.”). 

1. Article III Standing

Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of 

federal courts to actual “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. 

Const. art. III, § 2. “One element of the case-or-controversy 

requirement is that plaintiffs must establish that they have 

standing to sue.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 

408 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To

establish standing “a plaintiff must show (1) [they have] 

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suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and 

particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 

hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 

challenged action of the defendant and (3) it is likely, as 

opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed 

by a favorable decision.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw 

Envt’l. Serv. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). “The 

plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the 

burden of establishing these elements.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 

578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “[A]t the pleading stage, the 

plaintiff must clearly allege facts demonstrating each element.” 

Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“A party facing prospective injury has standing to sue 

where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” 

Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 554 U.S. 724, 734 (2008). 

“[W]hen plaintiffs seek to establish standing to challenge a law 

or regulation that is not presently being enforced against them, 

they must demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct 

injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” 

LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1154 (9th Cir. 2000)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Plaintiff has 

failed to allege an injury in fact. AB 978 applies to 

mobilehome parks located within and governed by the 

jurisdictions of two or more incorporated cities. Compl. ¶ 9. 

However, Peace Ranch consists of two parks, one in Anaheim and 

one in Fullerton, with two different permits. Id. Accordingly, 

it has not alleged an “intention to engage in a course of 

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conduct [. . .] proscribed by a statute,” Susan B Anthony List 

v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014), nor a “realistic danger 

of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s 

operation or enforcement.” LSO, Ltd., 205 F.3d at 1154. 

Plaintiff, therefore, does not have standing. See Lopez v. 

Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 792 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding plaintiff 

failed to establish standing where the challenged policy did not 

apply to his past or intended future conduct). As such, 

Plaintiff’s remaining federal claims are dismissed WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. See Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 471 

F.3d 1100, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2006). 

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Preliminary Injunction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 7, 2022

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