Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03156/USCOURTS-caDC-03-03156-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio N. Tabron
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 1, 2005 Decided February 10, 2006

No. 03-3156

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTONIO N. TABRON, A/K/A FAT CAT,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 01cr00396-08)

Jonathan S. Zucker, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the brief for appellant.

John P. Mannarino, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L.

Wainstein, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Assistant U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, and Roy W. McLeese III

and Stephen J. Pfleger, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: RANDOLPH, TATEL, and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

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TATEL, Circuit Judge: Although appellant pled guilty to

conspiracy to distribute marijuana, cocaine, and crack, he

objected to a two-level sentencing enhancement based on the

weapons possession of alleged co-conspirators. The district

court nonetheless imposed the two-level “gun bump” because it

found that appellant must have known that other individuals

with whom he had been indicted regularly used guns. In doing

so, however, the district court made no explicit finding as to the

scope of appellant’s conspiratorial agreement. Because our case

law requires such findings before defendants are held

accountable for the conduct of alleged co-conspirators, we

vacate the gun bump and remand for reconsideration.

I.

In November 2001, a grand jury indicted sixteen

individuals, including appellant Antonio Tabron—also known

as Fat Cat—charging them with various drug-related crimes. A

little more than a year later, Tabron pled guilty to conspiracy to

sell illegal drugs and, in his proffer, accepted responsibility for

the conspiracy’s distribution of 1.5 kilograms of crack.

One individual charged in the indictment, Abdur Mahdi,

declined to plead guilty and was eventually convicted of, among

other things, first-degree murder, conspiracy to distribute drugs,

and various racketeering offenses. During Mahdi’s lengthy trial,

other charged individuals testified that Mahdi led a major drug

gang that regularly used guns. Several implicated Tabron as a

member of the Mahdi gang, and one, Joseph Hooker, testified

that Tabron had supplied an AK-47 to a gang member.

After Mahdi’s trial and in preparation for Tabron’s

sentencing hearing, a parole officer prepared a presentence

report concluding that, under the sentencing guidelines, Tabron

should be incarcerated for between 262 and 327 months. In

making this calculation, the parole officer added two levels to

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Tabron’s base offense level because “a firearm[] was possessed”

in the course of the conspiracy. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2000). Without this “gun bump,”

Tabron would have received between 210 and 262 months of

prison time. As part of Tabron’s plea agreement, however, the

government asked the court to impose a sentence between 84

and 90 months, well below the guidelines’ minimum.

Tabron’s attorney objected to the presentence report,

explaining that it “describe[s] generally the violent conduct of

the co-defendants and involve[s] conduct in which Mr. Tabron

played no role, was not charged and which cannot be attributed

to him at sentencing.” Presentence Investigation Report 21

(addendum). Although recognizing that the gun bump would

“have no effect on” Tabron’s length of imprisonment, defense

counsel pointed out that Tabron’s “security classification and

designation by the Bureau of Prisons [would] likely [be]

adversely affected” if the district court attributed the weapons

possession to him. Id. at 22.

In response, the district court asked whether Tabron was

attempting to disclaim responsibility for the Mahdi gang’s

rampant weapons possession. Tabron’s counsel replied that

while Tabron had participated in a conspiracy, he “contest[ed]

whether or not the use of guns and violence was within the

scope of his conspiratorial agreement and base[d] that on his

lack of involvement in any of that.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 14,

Dec. 8, 2003. Tabron, his counsel insisted, was merely a fringe

operator who, though aware of the Mahdi gang, had never joined

it and had only conspired on the side to buy and sell drugs with

Hooker, a member of the gang.

The government made two points in support of imposing

the gun bump. First, it claimed that “when you got a large drug

conspiracy . . . the Court . . . can make those individualized

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findings for this defendant about the reasonable foreseeability of

weapons.” Id. at 10. Second, it pointed to Hooker’s testimony

that Tabron gave an AK-47 to a member of Mahdi’s gang. The

government concluded, “either under reasonable foreseeability

or the testimony that puts a gun in his hands, we think the Court

can impose the two points.” Id.

Though recognizing that it could have avoided the issue

entirely, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B) (permitting a court to

“determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter

will not affect sentencing, or because the court will not consider

the matter in sentencing”), the district court rejected Tabron’s

argument. Even assuming that Tabron never possessed the AK47, the court reasoned, he should have foreseen that his coconspirators would have guns: “[I]t is hard to conceive of

anyone not understanding what was going on out there as people

were shooting at each other.” Hr’g Tr. 17. The court therefore

adopted the presentence report’s findings in full and sentenced

Tabron to 90 months in prison.

Because the gun bump renders Tabron ineligible for early

release under Bureau of Prisons regulations, see 28 C.F.R.

§ 550.58(a)(1)(vi)(B), he now appeals the district court’s

adoption of the presentence report’s findings with respect to the

weapons enhancement.

II.

At least until recently, “where . . . the relevant conduct issue

involves not only a factual question, but the district court’s

application of the guidelines to the facts, the proper standard [of

review] is due deference—one between clear error and de novo

review.” United States v. Mellen, 393 F.3d 175, 183 (D.C. Cir.

2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our cases, however,

drew this standard from a provision of the sentencing guidelines

that the Supreme Court excised from the Sentencing Act in

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United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 764-65 (2005) (excising

18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)). Tabron urges us to heed Booker’s

instruction to fill the gap left by the excision by applying a

“reasonableness” standard. Id. at 765-68. For its part, the

government contends that where, as here, the challenged district

court decision has no effect on the length of a defendant’s

sentence, Booker leaves the pre-existing standard undisturbed.

We need not settle the matter here because Tabron’s lone

argument is that, in ascribing the weapons possession to him as

relevant conduct, the district court erred as a matter of law.

Whether we give due deference to the district court’s decision

(the statutory standard) or review it for reasonableness (the

Booker standard), we may unquestionably set it aside if it rests

on legal error. See Mellen, 393 F.3d at 186 (reversing on due

deference review for legal error); see also United States v. Doe,

398 F.3d 1254, 1257 n.5 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Because we

conclude that the district court erred as a matter of law . . . we

need not address any further impact of Booker on appellate

review.”).

Turning to the merits of Tabron’s appeal, we begin with

“the well-settled principle of conspiracy law that someone who

jointly undertakes a criminal activity with others is accountable

for their reasonably foreseeable conduct in furtherance of the

joint undertaking.” United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283, 288

(D.C. Cir. 1994). In attributing co-conspirators’ acts to a

criminal defendant, however, district courts must take great care:

as Judge Friendly observed, “[a]lthough it is usual and often

necessary in conspiracy cases for the agreement to be proved by

inference from acts, the gist of the offense remains the

agreement, and it is therefore essential to determine what kind

of agreement or understanding existed as to each defendant.”

United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir. 1964). To

that end, we have established a “strict procedural mandate” that

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requires district courts to make explicit findings as to the scope

of a defendant’s conspiratorial agreement before holding him

responsible for a co-conspirator’s reasonably foreseeable acts.

United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1995)

(per curiam). Absolute conformity with this mandate is critical,

else we risk holding defendants accountable for crimes

committed in furtherance of conspiracies they never joined.

Tabron argues that “[t]he District Court’s determination was

unreasonable because it assumed that Mr. Tabron’s agreement

was coextensive with the conspiracy as a whole.” Appellant’s

Br. 8. For support, Tabron relies on United States v. Childress,

in which the district court had attributed the weapons possession

of alleged co-conspirators to several defendants based solely on

a finding that the co-conspirators’ gun possession was

reasonably foreseeable. Childress, 58 F.3d at 724-26. Because

the district court had never made “individualized findings about

whether the scope of each appellant’s agreement encompassed

the use of guns,” however, we vacated the sentences. Id. at 726.

According to Tabron, precisely the same thing happened here:

instead of finding that Tabron participated in the broader

conspiracy with Mahdi, the district court simply determined that

the Mahdi gang’s use of guns was reasonably foreseeable.

The government seeks to distinguish Childress on the

ground that “the district court made specific findings as to the

scope of [Tabron’s] conspiratorial agreement.” Appellee’s Br.

14. Tellingly, however, the government points to nothing in the

sentencing hearing to support this statement. Nor could it. Our

own careful review of the transcript reveals that, as in Childress,

the district court made no finding whatsoever with respect to the

scope of Tabron’s conspiratorial agreement. The court never

even mentioned the phrase.

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Instead, the district court concentrated on whether Tabron

should have foreseen that members of the Mahdi gang would

use guns in the course of their criminal enterprise. Consider two

characteristic examples. In the first, the district court reasoned:

I have certainly ample evidence to believe he was fully

aware of this beef going on with [a rival] and what was

happening with his co-conspirators and their use of

weapons. 

. . . There is plenty before me to say that he . . . may

not have wanted to use guns himself, but to say under

relevant conduct that it was reasonably foreseeable with

respect to the conspiracy he joined, these guys did

nothing without guns.

It was a constant activity. . . . [I]t would sort of

stretch credulity to say he was in this conspiracy and he

really . . . couldn’t reasonably foresee the use of the guns

in the conspiracy that he was a part of is a little bit

difficult to accept.

Hr’g Tr. 13-14. Likewise, explaining its adoption of the

allegedly objectionable portions of the presentence report, the

court stated:

[Tabron] was . . . frequently involved in many drug

sales, and he was the person who basically because he

was shot [at] triggered an open warfare, and to say that

it wasn’t reasonably foreseeable, he’s part of a group

where the use of weapons was common, if not on a daily

basis people were carrying weapons, it was close to

daily.

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The numbers of weapons that were introduced here,

it would stretch credulity to think that Mr. Tabron could

be part of this conspiracy and not understand that it was

reasonably foreseeable to protect the drugs, to protect

the profit, and to protect the turf that guns would be

used. Therefore, I think the only fair inference from the

incredible amount of evidence this Court has sat through

is that whether or not he ever picked up a gun himself,

he was in a conspiracy knowing full well either through

absolute willful blindness which is also not—doesn’t

excuse him, or actual knowledge.

Either way, the Court would find that he is

accountable for the use of—possession of weapons. It’s

not use but possession of the—it is hard to conceive of

anyone not understanding what was going on out there

as people were shooting at each other. So I’m not going

to accept the dispute with the two point enhancement.

Id. at 16-17. In both excerpts—and throughout the rest of the

hearing—the district court addressed the foreseeability question

in some detail, but never determined the precise contours of the

conspiracy Tabron joined. Without more, the district court’s

findings on foreseeability cannot pass for a finding as to the

scope of Tabron’s conspiratorial agreement: “The extent of a

defendant’s vicarious liability under conspiracy law is always

determined by the scope of his agreement with his

co-conspirators. Mere foreseeability is not enough . . . .” Saro,

24 F.3d at 288 (emphasis added). 

The government attempts to stretch the district court’s use

of the phrases “with respect to the conspiracy he joined,” “he’s

part of a group,” “part of this conspiracy,” and “in a conspiracy”

into judicial findings. The most that can be said about such

stray statements, however, is that they reflect the court’s

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assumption that Tabron joined the core of the Mahdi drug

conspiracy. Such an assumption is not enough, however: “Even

where the evidence likely supports the conclusion that there was

a single conspiratorial agreement joined by all the defendants,

the district court at sentencing must spell out in some detail the

evidentiary basis for this conclusion.” Childress, 58 F.3d at

722; see also Saro, 24 F.3d at 288-89 (rejecting the adoption of

a presentence report that assumed that a defendant was

“automatically responsible” for other conspirators’ crimes

(emphasis omitted)).

The district court, moreover, may not avoid its

responsibility to “spell out” explicit findings by reasoning, as the

court did here, that Tabron can be held responsible for the

Mahdi gang’s crimes because he pled guilty to a conspiracy and

“[t]here is only one conspiracy in this case.” Hr’g Tr. 14. As

we held in United States v. Mellen, a decision issued after the

district court sentenced Tabron:

Where the record is unclear as to whether the crimes at

issue constitute a single or multiple conspiracies, the

sentencing court cannot assume the former and thereby

obviate its duty to determine the scope of each

defendant’s agreement. What is more, even when there

is but a single conspiracy, and there [is] sufficient

evidence against each of the [defendants] to conclude

that she or he agreed to further the purposes of this

single conspiracy, we still require the sentencing court to

determine the scope of each defendant’s agreement.

Mellen, 393 F.3d at 184 (alterations in original) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Childress, 58

F.3d at 722 (same). The reason for this solicitude is obvious: a

single loosely affiliated criminal enterprise may consist of a

dense network of agreements. Tabron may therefore

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appropriately object that the conspiracy he pled guilty to joining

may not have been coterminous with the conspiracy his coconspirators joined. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 710 (“Even if, for

instance, there exists a core, single chain conspiracy, certain

players may have performed activities wholly unrelated to the

aims of the conspiracy. In addition, some courts have been

reluctant to conclude that the chain conspiracy construct can

automatically bind all participants in a drug distribution

enterprise into a single agreement . . . when there are no

indications of interdependence between the various

participants.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

If, as Tabron claims, he functioned only as a fringe operator

with a side agreement to sell drugs with co-conspirators

(perhaps including Hooker) who never possessed weapons in

furtherance of that side conspiracy, then the Mahdi gang’s

rampant gun possession would have no bearing on Tabron’s

sentence.

We are unpersuaded by the government’s effort to

distinguish Mellen. That case involved the conspiracy

conviction of the husband of a government employee who stole

upwards of $360,000 worth of electronic equipment from the

Department of Education. Mellen, 393 F.3d at 178-80. At

sentencing, the district court found the husband responsible for

the theft of all equipment that passed through the couple’s home

on the theory that he “knew of his wife’s involvement” in the

scheme, at least to that degree. Id. at 180. We rejected this

approach, reasoning that “[t]he fact that he knew what she was

doing does not mean he agreed to it,” id. at 185, and remanded

to the sentencing court to determine the scope of the husband’s

conspiratorial agreement, id. at 186.

The government contends that Mellen differs from this case

because

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[h]ere, by contrast, [Tabron] agreed to participate in the

ongoing distribution of drugs with his co-conspirators,

and the evidence showed that firearms and violence

played an essential role in furtherance of this effort.

[Tabron] agreed to join this conspiracy with full

knowledge of this, and so was properly held accountable

for the firearms.

Appellee’s Br. 21. But just like Tabron, the defendant in Mellen

was guilty of conspiring to commit a crime (stealing from the

government). Just like Tabron, the defendant in Mellen knew

that the unlawful activity (his wife’s theft of electronic

equipment) “played an essential role in furtherance of this

effort.” And just like Tabron, the defendant in Mellen “agreed

to join [that] conspiracy with full knowledge” of the unlawful

activity. Because we vacated in Mellen, so too must we vacate

here; foreseeability is just not enough.

To be sure, the government recounts a litany of suggestive

evidence from Abdur Mahdi’s trial, including testimony that

Tabron operated as a member of the drug gang and provided an

AK-47 to one of Mahdi’s relatives, see id. at 13-14, some of

which might well justify imposing the gun bump. But to satisfy

this circuit’s “strict procedural mandate,” the district court must

link that evidence to a specific finding as to the contours of

Tabron’s conspiratorial agreement before it can attribute any coconspirators’ acts to him. See Childress, 58 F.3d at 722.

Because the district court failed to do so, we vacate the gun

bump, and because both parties agree that a ruling in Tabron’s

favor will not affect the term of his sentence, we remand solely

on the question of the appropriateness of the two-level

enhancement.

So ordered.

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