Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03028/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03028-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert N. Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 21, 1998 Decided April 3, 

1998

No. 97-3028

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Robert N. Taylor,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 96cr00233-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer, Federal

Public Defender, was on the briefs. David A. Howard,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Rachel Adelman-Pierson, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued

the cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S.

Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R. Fisher and

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Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the

brief.

Before: Edwards, Chief Judge, Wald and Rogers, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Rogers.

Rogers, Circuit Judge: Appellant Robert N. Taylor appeals the denial of his pre-sentence motion to withdraw his

guilty plea to felony criminal contempt and wire fraud. He

contends that, despite the fact that his plea was entered

following the trial, the district court abused its discretion by

not holding an evidentiary hearing on claims that his trial

counsel had a conflict of interest that denied him the effective

assistance of counsel under Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335

(1980). Because Taylor's averments related to matters outside of the trial record and were sufficient to demonstrate, if

credited, that trial counsel had a conflict of interest that

adversely affected the adequacy of his representation, we

reverse and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.

I.

In the fall of 1995, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") filed a civil enforcement action against appellant, Robert N. Taylor, alleging that he had operated his

company, the Better Life Club of America, Inc., as a fraudulent Ponzi scheme. Thereafter, the district court issued both

a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

freezing all of Taylor's personal and corporate assets.1 The

instant appeal arises out of Taylor's prosecution for criminal

contempt for his alleged violation of these freeze orders.

The government pursued two contempt citations against

Taylor, one for criminal contempt arising out of a series of

bank transactions and a second for civil contempt arising out

of Taylor's refinancing of his home. The first effort began on

May 1, 1996, when the government filed a show cause applica-

__________

1 The orders were issued by different judges, but for simplicity,

we refer to all freeze orders as being issued "by the district court."

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tion for criminal contempt alleging that Taylor had violated

the freeze orders by engaging in more than two hundred

different banking transactions and by failing to disclose the

existence of several bank accounts. To avoid a jury trial, the

government asked the district court, and it agreed, to limit

any sentence to no more than six months imprisonment or a

fine of no more than $5,000, effectively charging Taylor with a

petty offense misdemeanor of criminal contempt. See 18

U.S.C. s 1(3) (1988); United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1,

4 (1993); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148-50 (1969).

The show cause hearing began on July 1, and was continued

until July 19, when the district court deferred its ruling until

July 22, pending ongoing plea negotiations.

While the criminal contempt proceeding was pending, the

SEC learned that Taylor and his girlfriend, who had been

brought into the civil enforcement action as a relief defendant, had refinanced their home and received a "cash out"

share of the refinancing. It subsequently initiated a civil

contempt proceeding, alleging that Taylor and his girlfriend

had violated the freeze orders. A hearing was held on July

17, 1996, before a different judge, who took the matter under

advisement.

Before either judge ruled in the criminal or civil contempt

proceedings, however, Taylor entered into a comprehensive

plea agreement with the government. The global agreement

encompassed not only the banking transactions underlying

the misdemeanor contempt proceedings, but also Taylor's

actions in securing the home refinancing. Taylor agreed to

plead guilty to wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. ss 2, 1343, for

several alleged misrepresentations he had made in his refinancing application,2 as well as to felony contempt, see 18

U.S.C. s 401(3), for both the refinancing and the bank transactions.3 Taylor faced a maximum possible sentence of five

__________

2 Taylor allegedly stated in his application that he was not

subject to any litigation and was earning $9,000 a month as a

financial advisor.

3 Taylor also waived his right to an indictment on the new

criminal charges, waived venue on the wire fraud charge, and

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years' imprisonment and a substantial fine on the wire fraud

charges, see 18 U.S.C. s 1343, in addition to three years of

supervised release and a requirement that he make full

restitution. The felony contempt charge carried an unspecified maximum sentence to be determined at the discretion of

the court. See 18 U.S.C. s 401. In exchange, the government agreed to withdraw its original misdemeanor criminal

contempt charges, request the SEC to dismiss its civil contempt application, and request concurrent sentences for contempt and wire fraud, with the former sentence no longer

than the latter. Additionally, the government agreed to

allocute for the maximum reduction of his sentence for acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing

Guidelines, forego the underlying securities fraud claim as

relevant conduct, and not to prosecute Taylor's girlfriend.

Pursuant to the agreement, Taylor pleaded guilty, following a

Rule 11 hearing, to wire fraud and felony criminal contempt

on July 22, 1996. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.

Prior to sentencing, Taylor wrote a letter to the district

court indicating that he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea

and request the appointment of new counsel. On the same

day, August 30, 1996, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea

on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. With

newly appointed counsel, Taylor filed a revised motion and a

supporting affidavit. Taylor's ineffectiveness allegations initially consisted of three general claims: erratic conduct,

economic coercion, and a conflict of interest.

As to the first, the record shows that during the course of

the securities fraud and misdemeanor contempt proceedings,

the district court repeatedly had expressed concern about the

adequacy of Taylor's representation. Trial counsel had failed

to appear for two hearings in the SEC proceeding and

exhibited other erratic behavior as a result of personal problems relating to substance abuse. Notwithstanding sugges-

__________

waived any double jeopardy claim with regard to the contempt

charges arising from the bank transactions. He further agreed to

disgorge the net proceeds from the home refinancing or provide

proof of his inability to do so.

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tions from the district court that he might wish to retain a

different lawyer, Taylor continually expressed satisfaction

with trial counsel.4 Nevertheless, in support of his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea, Taylor averred that trial counsel had

missed several meetings with him regarding the plea negotiations and been otherwise distracted or inattentive. Additionally, Taylor alleged that trial counsel had failed to explain

fourteen different provisions of the plea agreement prior to

his entry of his plea.

Taylor also claimed that trial counsel had "financially

coerced" him into pleading guilty because Taylor was unable

to meet counsel's "unrelenting" fee demands. Specifically,

Taylor alleged that in late June or early July of 1996, trial

counsel "asked for an additional $5,000 to proceed to trial,

and expressed a clear lack of interest in fighting [the] case

when [Taylor] advised him that he could not pay." Thereafter, counsel allegedly pressured Taylor to accept the government's plea offer.

Finally, Taylor alleged that trial counsel was unable to

render effective assistance due to a conflict of interest. In

his revised motion, Taylor focused on trial counsel's substance

abuse problems and claimed that trial counsel was "inclined

to divest himself" of any additional burdens to his recovery.

He also noted that trial counsel faced possible disciplinary

action by the bar as well as a contempt sanction from the

district court. Thus, Taylor claimed, trial counsel pressured

him into accepting the government's plea agreement in order

to dispose of the case as quickly as possible.

Trial counsel's affidavit, submitted with the government's

opposition to the motion to withdraw, painted a very different

picture of his relationship with Taylor. Trial counsel denied

any economic coercion and portrayed conscientious efforts on

__________

4 At one point, Taylor sought new counsel for the misdemeanor

contempt proceedings while retaining trial counsel in the civil case.

He then changed his mind and indicated that he wished to retain

trial counsel in the criminal matter but not the civil matter. The

district court would not allow the latter arrangement, and Taylor

subsequently agreed trial counsel could represent him in both cases.

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behalf of a client who was potentially facing multiple criminal

charges. Trial counsel acknowledged his advice that Taylor

pursue a global plea agreement with the government, and

described his repeated efforts, some successful, to obtain

more favorable terms.

When Taylor's motion to withdraw came before the district

court on December 9, 1996, the court observed that neither

the pleadings nor the affidavits suggested that Taylor had

any viable defense to the criminal contempt or wire fraud

charges. Taylor's new counsel then alerted the court, for the

first time, to a factual dispute over trial counsel's advice to

Taylor regarding the refinancing of his home.5 Trial counsel

stated in his affidavit that he had "specifically advised [Taylor] against [the refinancing] and told him that to refinance

the house would probably constitute the encumbrance of an

asset and would likely be in violation of the court ordered

asset freeze." Taylor disputed this statement, averring that

trial counsel had advised him to proceed with the refinancing.

Thus, new counsel argued, Taylor had an advice of counsel

defense to the contempt charges of which he had not been

informed. Further, new counsel urged that trial counsel

would have had a conflict of interest in presenting this

defense. Although this issue had not been previously briefed,

the district court continued the hearing to allow Taylor to file

"whatever he alleges his defense is."

In a supplemental affidavit Taylor averred that prior to

refinancing his home he had sought advice from trial counsel

and had been told, "Go ahead and do it. There is nothing in

the [freeze orders] which prevents you from refinancing your

home." According to Taylor, trial counsel had only cautioned

that the SEC would be upset and discussed the ambiguous

nature of the order.6 Taylor also submitted documents that

__________

5 New counsel explained to the district court that he had not

asserted this defense in the pleadings on the motion because he did

not think that the government had a right to be privy to the nature

of Taylor's defense should the case go to trial.

6 Taylor also referred to an inadvertent-conduct defense to the

wire fraud and claimed to have suggested potential defenses and

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he had sent to trial counsel indicating that at one point he did

not want to enter a guilty plea, but wanted to force the

government to prove its case, and that he had defenses

regarding several of the charges.

After further argument by counsel, the district court denied Taylor's motion without an evidentiary hearing. Based

upon Taylor's affidavits, the government's oppositions to withdrawal of the plea, trial counsel's affidavit, Taylor's sworn

statements at the Rule 11 hearing, and the court's knowledge

of the misdemeanor contempt proceedings, the district court

found that Taylor's claims of ineffective assistance were not

credible, and, alternatively, that even if Taylor's allegations

were true, he could not show that he had been prejudiced.

The court was unpersuaded by Taylor's change of heart about

trial counsel after repeatedly reaffirming his satisfaction with

counsel, and by the economic coercion claim since trial counsel had taken the case to trial and the plea was not entered

until after the trial had been completed. The court recalled

Taylor's statements under oath at the Rule 11 hearing that

his plea was voluntary and that he was satisfied with his trial

counsel. Regarding prejudice, the court observed that Taylor

"was never able to present a single viable defense to the

charges," not even at the plea withdrawal proceedings, after

taking months to prepare his collateral attack. Finally, the

court noted that Taylor "cannot present any convincing evidence that he might have faced better prospects at a verdict

than he did in his plea." The district court sentenced Taylor

to forty-one months imprisonment on each count, to run

concurrently, and ordered him to pay a special assessment of

$200 and to make restitution in the amount of $80,122.63.

II.

Withdrawal of a guilty plea prior to sentencing is to be

liberally granted, and permitted for "any fair and just reason." Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e); United States v. Ford, 993 F.2d

249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993). In reviewing the district court's

__________

witnesses for the misdemeanor contempt charge that trial counsel

failed to pursue.

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denial of a motion to withdraw, this court focuses on three

factors in order to determine whether there was an abuse of

discretion: (1) "whether the defendant has asserted a viable

claim of innocence"; (2) "whether the delay between the

guilty plea and the motion to withdraw has substantially

prejudiced the government's ability to prosecute the case;"

and (3) "whether the guilty plea was somehow tainted."

Ford, 993 F.2d at 251. The third factor is the "most important," and the standard for allowing withdrawal of a plea is

fairly lenient when the defendant can show that the plea was

entered unconstitutionally. Id. Here, the government does

not claim substantial prejudice under the second factor, and

Taylor's conflict of interest claim is directly related to his

contention that he has presented a viable claim of innocence,

at least for some of the charges against him. Hence, our

focus is on the third factor, for Taylor contends that his guilty

plea was tainted by the ineffective assistance of his trial

counsel and, consequently, he did not knowingly enter his

plea.

"A plea is not voluntary or intelligent," and therefore

unconstitutional, "if the advice given by defense counsel on

which the defendant relied in entering the plea falls below the

level of reasonable competence such that the defendant does

not receive effective assistance of counsel." United States v.

Loughery, 908 F.2d 1014, 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1990). To withdraw

a plea on this basis, a defendant must ordinarily satisfy the

two-pronged standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984), for violations of the Sixth Amendment guarantee. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-60 (1985);

United States v. Holland, 117 F.3d 589, 594 (D.C. Cir. 1997);

United States v. Horne, 987 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1993). A

defendant must therefore show first, that his counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" by

identifying specific "acts or omissions of counsel that are

alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional

judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 690. Second, a

defendant must demonstrate that the deficiencies in his representation were prejudicial to his defense. Id. at 692. He

"must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

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counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Taylor maintains, however, that his assertions of ineffectiveness fall within a "genre" of ineffective assistance claims

based upon a counsel's conflict of interest. United States v.

Bruce, 89 F.3d 886, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In Cuyler v.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-350 (1980), the Supreme Court

recognized that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to

effective assistance of counsel may be violated when an actual

conflict of interest adversely affects the adequacy of the

defendant's representation. See id. at 349-51. In that event,

prejudice will be presumed "if the defendant demonstrates

that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' " and

that the conflict "adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler, 446

U.S. at 350, 348); accord Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893. In order to

present a valid Cuyler claim, this court requires a defendant

to show that his counsel advanced his own, or another client's,

interest to the detriment of the defendant. See Bruce, 89

F.3d at 893. Counsel's action, moreover, must be knowing;

counsel who remains unaware of adverse interests among

clients does not have an "actual conflict." See United States

v. Gantt, No. 97-3053 (D.C. Cir.) (opinion forthcoming). "If

an attorney fails to make a legitimate argument because of

the attorney's conflicting interest ... then the Cuyler standard has been met." Bruce, 89 F.3d at 896 (emphasis in

original).

It is true that the court has generally been reluctant to

allow defendants to "force their ineffective assistance claims

into the 'actual conflict of interest' framework ... and thereby supplant the strict Strickland standard with the far more

lenient Cuyler test." United States v. Bruce, 89 F.3d 886,

893 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Leggett, 81 F.3d

220, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1996), and United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d

158, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). In Cuyler, the Supreme Court was

confronted with special problems of multiple representation:

two attorneys jointly represented three defendants. See

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 337. The record indicated that counsel

differed in their views about how one defendant's case should

be handled, and that there were ways in which proceeding on

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behalf of one defendant might have harmed another defendant. See id. at 338-340. Emphasizing that "the possibility

of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction," the

Court held that to demonstrate a violation of the Sixth

Amendment "a defendant must establish that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance."

Id. at 350. Under such circumstances, the Court determined

prejudice would then be presumed. Id. at 350. Subsequently, in Strickland, the Court reemphasized that "[p]rejudice is

presumed only if the defendant demonstrated that counsel

'actively represented conflicting interest' and that 'an actual

conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' " 466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348).

In the context of joint representation, this standard is more

easily satisfied because "when an attorney represents two

clients with opposing interests, the attorney cannot serve

both clients adequately.... [The attorney] 'must fail one or

do nothing and fail both.' " Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441,

447 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1270

(5th Cir. 1995)). But when other conflicts are alleged to have

impaired counsel's performance, the defendant's burden is to

show that counsel actually acted in a manner that adversely

affected his representation by doing something, or refraining

from doing something, that a non-conflicted counsel would not

have done. See United States v. Soldevila-Lopez, 17 F.3d

480, 486-87 (1st Cir. 1994).

In order for there to be an "actual conflict," an attorney

must be forced to make a choice advancing his own interest at

the expense of his client's. See Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893. An

ethical lapse is not the same as a conflict of interest, Bruce,

89 F.3d at 893-94, and a Cuyler conflict does not arise from

mere "friction between trial counsel and the court," Shark, 51

F.3d at 1076, or from a misunderstanding between a defendant and trial counsel on trial tactics. See United States v.

Leggett, 81 F.3d 220, 227 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Neither is a

hypothetical conflict having no effect on trial counsel's representation enough to come within Cuyler's reach and thus

avoid the need to show Strickland prejudice. See Cuyler, 446

U.S. at 350; Bucuvalas v. United States, 98 F.3d 652, 657 (1st

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Cir. 1996) (requiring more than some attenuated hypothesis

having little consequence to the adequacy of representation);

United States v. Gambino, 864 F.2d 1064, 1070 (3d Cir. 1988).

As a threshold matter, we find unpersuasive the government's contention that Taylor waived any right to contest his

trial counsel's deficient representation. Taylor's appeal relies

on events of which he was not then aware or that occurred

after he had assured the district court that he was satisfied

with his trial counsel. Throughout the course of the trial,

Taylor was aware of his trial counsel's personal difficulties

and professional lapses and was offered the opportunity to

change counsel by the court. On several occasions the district court warned Taylor that by allowing counsel to continue, Taylor would "waive any rights that [he] ha[d] to object to

his failure to properly represent [him] in the past or at

present or in the future because of his condition." Still he

decided to retain his trial counsel. Because a defendant can

entirely waive his or her right to counsel, see Johnson v.

Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938), and courts have recognized that a co-defendant can waive his or her right to

conflict-free counsel in agreeing to joint representation, see,

e.g., United States v. Rico, 51 F.3d 495, 509-512 (5th Cir.

1995), the government contends that Taylor could similarly

waive in advance all claims concerning the quality of his

representation. Taylor's response to the district court's repeated warnings, it maintains, constitutes such a general

waiver.

The court, however, must "indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the unimpaired assistance of

counsel." Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 361 (D.C.

Cir. 1965) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70

(1942)). Consequently, Taylor's averments of satisfaction are

properly viewed more narrowly than the government urges.

The court may assume for purposes of the instant appeal that

his expressions of satisfaction with his trial counsel's performance bar any claims arising from prior acts or omissions of

counsel of which Taylor reasonably could or should have

known. Furthermore, in light of the district court's warnUSCA Case #97-3028 Document #342755 Filed: 04/03/1998 Page 11 of 17
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ings, the court may assume that Taylor also knowingly and

voluntarily waived any future claims of ineffective assistance

based upon trial counsel's drug abuse, at least to the extent it

was known and understood by Taylor. But Taylor did not

indiscriminately waive his right to pursue ineffectiveness

claims on other grounds, such as those addressed here. Cf.

United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir.1992).

Taylor could not have foreseen trial counsel's conduct in plea

negotiations with the government and was unaware of trial

counsel's alleged conflicts when he affirmed the adequacy of

his representation. Cf. United States v. Raynor, No. 97-

0186, 1997 WL 800395, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 29, 1997). Even if

Taylor's statements were broadly construed to include his

present conflict of interest claims, they could not have formed

a valid waiver because he did not know of his possible advice

of counsel defense when he made them. See Johnson, 304

U.S. at 464.

Turning to the merits, Taylor contends on appeal that trial

counsel had three different conflicts, only one of which requires extended discussion. First, he maintains that trial

counsel was inclined to end the case as quickly as possible

because trial counsel risked being held in contempt if he did

not continue to satisfy the district court that he was complying with his drug treatment program. Standing alone this is

insufficient to show a conflict of interest inasmuch as the

court has previously observed that such a claim is meritless.7

See United States v. Shark, 51 F.3d 1072, 1075-76 (D.C. Cir.

1995). Because all attorneys potentially face contempt citations, no particular attorney can be considered ineffective due

to a concern that he or she might be so cited. See id. at

1076.

Second, Taylor maintains that trial counsel's personal financial interest also motivated him to dispose of the case

__________

7 Alternatively, as the government contends, Taylor has waived

his claim that counsel was conflicted because he performed under

the threat of a contempt sanction. Taylor knew about this when he

agreed to retain counsel and this claim arises out of counsel's

substance abuse problems.

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through a plea without regard for Taylor's interests. Yet,

this too, is unpersuasive for the reasons noted by the district

court, and because many defendants undoubtedly face similar

financial demands from their counsel. Although a "defendant's failure to pay fees may cause some divisiveness between attorney and client," courts generally presume that

counsel will subordinate his or her pecuniary interests and

honor his or her professional responsibility to a client.8 United States v. O'Neill, 118 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 728 (1998); United States v. Jeffers, 520

F.2d 1256, 1265 (7th Cir. 1975) (Stevens, J.). But cf. Daniels

v. United States, 54 F.3d 290, 294 (7th Cir. 1995). The

district court rejected Taylor's allegations of financial pressure as incredible in view of the fact that trial counsel had

completed the trial before Taylor pleaded guilty. Even if

Taylor's trial costs were not necessarily at an end because he

potentially faced felony contempt and wire fraud charges, his

affidavit focuses solely on the past, alleging that trial counsel

asked him for more money on several occasions, the last

being July 12. Trial counsel, however, continued to represent

Taylor at both the civil contempt hearing on July 17 and the

criminal contempt hearing on July 19 without incident. Taylor admits, moreover, that trial counsel never stated or otherwise threatened that he would cease his representation if

Taylor failed to pay more money. Viewed in combination

with Taylor's sworn statement at the Rule 11 hearing that he

had not been coerced, he fails to allege any credible "actual

conflict" with trial counsel. Cf. Gantt, No. 97-3023 (D.C. Cir.)

(opinion forthcoming).

Third, and more troubling, Taylor maintains that trial

counsel had a conflict of interest in presenting an advice of

__________

8 For this reason, at least one circuit has held that the nonpayment of legal fees does not constitute a Cuyler conflict and is

more properly analyzed under Strickland. See O'Neil, 118 F.3d at

72; United States v. Wright, 845 F. Supp. 1041, 1078 n.35 (D.N.J.,

aff'd 46 F.3d 1120 (3d Cir. 1994).

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counsel defense and therefore it was in counsel's personal

interest to bring the case to a prompt conclusion through a

global plea. Specifically, he maintains that his trial counsel

failed to advise him of a viable advice of counsel defense to

the charges of felony criminal contempt that, along with the

independent wire fraud charges, were a significant motivating

factor in his decision to accept the global plea agreement. He

asserts this failure was caused, in part, by trial counsel's

concern that informing him of his defense would reveal to his

client, the district court, and the prosecutors that trial counsel

had provided his client with clearly inaccurate legal advice.

Hence, Taylor contends, trial counsel's interest in avoiding an

advice of counsel defense was in competition with Taylor's

interest to be informed of all viable defenses to the charges

when making a decision whether to accept a plea offer.

Ordinarily, when a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty

plea on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel the

district court should hold an evidentiary hearing to determine

the merits of the defendant's claims. "An evidentiary hearing

is critical to [an] evaluation of most ineffective assistance of

counsel claims, because these frequently concern matters

outside the trial record, such as whether counsel properly

investigated the case, considered relevant legal theories, or

adequately prepared a defense." United States v. Cyrus, 890

F.2d 1245, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1989). On the other hand, some

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can be resolved on

the basis of the trial transcripts and pleadings alone. See

United States v. Fennell, 53 F.3d 1296, 1303-4 (D.C. Cir.

1995), modified on reh'g, 77 F.3d 510 (1996); United States v.

Pinkney, 543 F.2d 908, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1976). For example,

the alleged acts of deficient performance by counsel may have

occurred in the course of proceedings before the trial court,

thereby making a hearing unnecessary. Cf. Pinkney, 543

F.2d at 915. Or the motion may fail to allege sufficient facts

or circumstances "upon which the elements of constitutionally

deficient performance might properly be found." Id. at 916.

Summary disposition may also be appropriate where the

defendant has failed to present any affidavits or other evidentiary support for the naked assertions contained in his motion. See id. at 916-17. Furthermore, in challenging a guilty

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plea on the basis of ineffective assistance, the representations

of the defendant at the plea hearing as to the adequacy of

counsel and the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, see

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d), may "constitute a formidable barrier"

to his later refutations. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,

74 (1977). But that barrier, "although imposing, is not invariably insurmountable," and does not necessitate the summary

denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea. Id. Only if the

district court concludes that the defendant has not alleged

any cognizable claim for relief, or that the defendant's "conclusory allegations [are] unsupported by specifics," or that the

defendant's allegations "in the face of the record are wholly

incredible" may it summarily dismiss the motion. Id.

Taylor's Cuyler claim is premised on the fact that had he

not pleaded guilty, he could only have received a maximum

sentence of six months imprisonment for misdemeanor contempt and would then have faced charges for wire fraud and

felony contempt, based solely on the refinancing of his home.

Had he known of his advice of counsel defense to the refinancing contempt charges, there is a reasonable probability,

cf. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, that he would not have accepted the

global plea agreement in which he pled guilty to felony

contempt for both the bank transactions and the refinancing.

Instead, he might have accepted the district court's ruling on

misdemeanor contempt and attempted to defend against the

more serious felony contempt charges. It was, after all, as

trial counsel's affidavit confirms, the fear of future criminal

contempt and wire fraud prosecutions that had driven the

final plea negotiations.

To demonstrate the need for an evidentiary hearing, Taylor

focuses on the factual dispute over trial counsel's advice on

the refinancing. Because the home financing was not the

subject of the misdemeanor contempt trial, it was impossible

for the district court to determine from the trial record what

communications Taylor and trial counsel may have had regarding the home financing, much less for the district court to

evaluate trial counsel's explanation without the benefit of

cross-examination. Were the district court to determine,

after an evidentiary hearing, that Taylor's allegations are

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true, then trial counsel would have failed to advise him of an

advice of counsel defense that trial counsel's own affidavit

implies would have been a significant factor in Taylor's decision to accept the global plea agreement. Once Taylor's

averment regarding trial counsel's advice is credited, it is not

difficult to believe that trial counsel failed to provide Taylor

with this important information at least in part because to do

so would reveal to Taylor, the district court, and the prosecutor that trial counsel had provided his client with inaccurate

legal advice. So viewed, trial counsel's interest in avoiding an

advice of counsel defense was in competition with Taylor's

interest to be informed of all viable defenses to the charges

against him when making a decision whether to accept the

global plea offer. But see Farley, 72 F.3d at 166.9 In a real

sense, then, "[trial counsel] 'was required to make a choice

advancing his own interests to the detriment of his client's

interests.' " Bruce, 89 F.3d at 893 (citations omitted).

Having presented an "actual conflict" by affidavit and

otherwise sufficient, nonconclusory allegations about trial

counsel's advice and its relationship to his decision to plead

guilty, Taylor need only show that the conflict of interest

"adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 692 (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348). The

alleged conflict must have "had some negative effect upon his

defense (defined as 'an actual lapse in representation')."

Shark, 51 F.3d at 1075. In the instant case, trial counsel's

lapse was his very failure to apprise Taylor of a potential

defense that, if proved, could have provided a complete

defense to the felony contempt charges arising out of Taylor's

refinancing of his home.10 Cf. Gambino, 864 F.2d at 1070.

__________

9 Farley is distinguishable because the defendant's claim that

his counsel misadvised him was directly contradicted by the defendant's description of the advice to the district court. See Farley, 72

F.3d at 165 & n.6. Also, had he misunderstood the guilty plea for

any reason, the plea would have been involuntary and unconstitutional regardless of any advice his counsel may have given to him.

So viewed, there could be no conflict of interest.

10 The government does not contest the availability of an advice

of counsel defense for charges of criminal contempt. The district

court assumed that the defense was available in making its findings

and we presently have no need to address the issue.

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Notwithstanding the strong presumption that counsel "made

all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment," Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, trial counsel's

failure to inform his client about this defense clearly constituted deficient representation. Cf. Teague v. Scott, 60 F.3d

1167, 1170 (5th Cir. 1995). Taylor was entitled to make an

informed decision about whether to plead guilty or risk the

district court's judgment in the misdemeanor contempt trial

and defend against possible additional criminal charges. Cf.

United States v. Shepherd, 102 F.3d 558, 563 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Moreover, Taylor is not required to establish ultimate prejudice as defined by Strickland and Hill. Therefore, Taylor's

allegation that trial counsel had failed to inform of him of this

defense due to his conflict of interest presents a valid Cuyler

claim, even if trial counsel succeeded in obtaining for Taylor

what appears, on its face, to be a favorable plea agreement.

Accordingly, we reverse and remand the case to the district

court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Taylor's allegation that his trial counsel advised him that refinancing his home would not violate the freeze orders is

plausible, and if it is, to permit Taylor to withdraw his plea.

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