Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30210/USCOURTS-ca9-15-30210-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lauro Aguilar-Canche
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

LAURO AGUILAR-CANCHE,

AKA Lauro AquillarCanche, AKA Lauro Ivan

Aquilar-Canche,

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 15-30209

15-30210

D.C. Nos.

2:08-cr-00130-RBL-1

3:06-cr-05351-RBL-7

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted July 7, 2016

Seattle, Washington

Filed August 29, 2016

Before: ANDREW J. KLEINFELD, M. MARGARET

McKEOWN, and MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 1 of 13
2 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming the district court’s denial of a motion pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for reduction of sentences in light

of Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 782, the panel held

that the consecutive nature of sentences is not modifiable

pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).

The panel wrote that the sentences, for which the district

court imposed the mandatory minimums at a consolidated

sentencing hearing, were not “based on” a subsequentlyamended Guideline range, and that the district court was not

authorized under § 3582(c)(2) to reconsider their consecutive

nature.

COUNSEL

Dennis Carrol (argued), Assistant Federal Public Defender,

Federal Public Defender’s Office, Seattle, Washington, for

Defendant-Appellant.

Helen J. Brunner (argued), First Assistant United States

Attorney; Annette L. Hayes, United States Attorney; United

States Attorney’s Office, Seattle, Washington; for PlaintiffAppellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 2 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 3

OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

In 2008, Lauro Aguilar-Canche pleaded guilty in two

separate federal drug distribution cases. The district court, in

a consolidated sentencing proceeding, imposed the mandatory

minimum sentence for each plea, and ordered that the

sentences be served consecutively. In 2015, Aguilar-Canche

moved for a reduction in sentence based on an amendment to

the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We affirm the

district court’s denial of that motion because the sentences

were not “based on” a subsequently-amended Guideline

range.

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In 2005, Aguilar-Canche was pulled over in Nebraska for

a traffic stop. During the stop, police searched his car and

discovered 620 grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine and 973 net grams of cocaine. He was

charged in the District of Nebraska with possession and intent

to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. The Nebraska

court released him on bond to the Western District of

Washington, with the requirement that he wear an electronic

ankle bracelet while he awaited trial. While he was on

supervised release in Washington, he was implicated in

another drug distribution investigation. Law enforcement in

Washington obtained a search warrant for Aguilar-Canche’s

residence, where they found him sleeping in a bedroom

containing 212.4 net grams of a substance containing

methamphetamine, 123.7 net grams of cocaine, ten cell

phones, a digital scale “used for weighing narcotics,” and

$3,178 in cash. At the time of his arrest, Aguilar-Canche was

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 3 of 13
4 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

still wearing the ankle bracelet that was a condition of his

Nebraska release. He was arrested and charged in the Western

District of Washington with conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, cocaine, and heroin, as well as possession

of methamphetamine and cocaine with intent to distribute.

The Nebraska case was transferred to the Western District of

Washington and the two cases were consolidated.

In the Nebraska case, Aguilar-Canche pleaded guilty to

one count of possession of methamphetamine and cocaine

with intent to distribute pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),

841(b)(1)(A). In the Washington case, he pleaded guilty to

one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to

distribute pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B).

As the district court noted, this plea deal was very much to

Aguilar-Canche’s potential benefit. The government agreed

to dismiss all of the other charges; the plea preserved his

eligibility for safety-value sentencing relief;1and the

consolidated nature of the plea “took off the table the

possibility that the government would obtain a conviction in

one case, and then use that conviction to enhance [his]

mandatory minimum in the other.” In both plea agreements,

the government offered no assurances as to the sentence

Aguilar-Canche might receive, and explicitly stated that the

district court would independently determine his sentence.

Aguilar-Canche was advised of the statutory minimum and

maximum sentences for both charges. The Nebraska charge

1 Aguilar-Canche did apply for safety-valve sentencing relief. The

government recommended against it on the grounds that his story

explaining away his involvement in drug distribution was “incredible,”

that he lied about being a gang member, and that he was involved in a

scheme to bribe a guard and smuggle contraband into the detention facility

while he was in custody. The district court ruled that he was not eligible

for safety-valve relief.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 4 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 5

carried a mandatoryminimum sentence of ten years in prison,

and a maximum sentence of life in prison. See 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A). The Washington charge carried a mandatory

minimum of five years in prison, and a maximum sentence of

forty years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).

Aguilar-Canche’s advisory Guideline range for the

combined offenses was 135 to 168 months in prison. With

mandatory minimum sentences of 120 months for the

Nebraska charge and 60 months for the Washington charge,

it is evident that if the sentences were to run concurrently, the

total prison time (120 months) would be below the Guideline

range, and if they were to run consecutively, the total prison

time (180 months) would be above the Guideline range. Thus,

the district court’s decision with regard to whether the

sentences would run concurrently or consecutively

determined whether Aguilar-Canche received a sentence

above or below the Guideline range.

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecution asked for a

“lengthy sentence” of 180 months. The prosecutor noted that

the court could divide the mandatoryminimum sentences “up

however [it] want[ed],” but argued that sentencing AguilarCanche to consecutive 120-month and 60-month sentences on

the Nebraska and Washington charges “ma[de] sense.” The

prosecutor noted that another option would be to sentence

“180 months on Nebraska,” which was still within the

statutory range, “and whatever you want” on the Washington

charges and run the two sentences concurrently, which would

reach the same result but with concurrently running

sentences. The district court determined that imposing

consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for each offense

would be “cleaner.”

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 5 of 13
6 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

Furthermore, the probation officer noted that an aboveGuideline sentence would be in the interest of justice and

would avoid a disproportionately low sentence. Specifically,

the drug quantities at issue in Nebraska alone yielded the

same Guideline level as the combined drug quantities in both

the Nebraska and Washington cases. To follow the Guideline

range, the officer argued, would “essentially . . . discount[]

the reoffend.”

The district court next considered the sentencing factors

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and concluded that an aggregate

sentence that was above the Guideline range was warranted.

It did not think Aguilar-Canche was “one of those good

people who simply made a mistake,” because he violated his

bond immediately “after telling the judge in Nebraska that

he’s going to straighten up and fly right.” The court also

noted that the offense was particularly serious because “[t]he

amount of meth involved in these offenses is stunning,” and

that it “really, really affects communities and individuals in

an adverse way.” Due to Aguilar-Canche’s “continuous

flaunting of the law,” the court sentenced Aguilar-Canche to

120 months on the Nebraska charge and 60 months on the

Washington charge, to be served consecutively.

Aguilar-Canche appealed both sentences, and we

affirmed. We held that the district court “conducted a wellreasoned and balanced analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, and the sentence imposed is substantively

reasonable.” United States v. Aguilar-Canche, 362 F. App’x

618 (9th Cir. 2010).2

2 After his direct appeal, Aguilar-Canche filed a habeas petition pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), alleging that the judge who oversaw his guilty plea

“improperly pressured him into pleading guilty” and that he received

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 6 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 7

In 2014, Aguilar-Canche filed a motion in the district

court, requesting that his sentences be modified to run

concurrently rather than consecutively. He invoked 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c)(2), which allows for a term of imprisonment to be

modified if it was “based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

The sentencing-range amendment that Aguilar-Canche relied

on in this motion was the amended U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2),

which, as the district court noted, “deals with how . . .

sentences imposed before the offense of conviction . . . are

dealt with in calculating a Defendant’s Criminal History

Category.” At the original sentencing, Aguilar-Canche had no

criminal history at all, so the amendment to U.S.S.G.

§ 4A1.2(a)(2) would not have affected his sentence. Because

the amendment to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) had “nothing to do

with determiningwhethersentences should run concurrent[ly]

or consecutive[ly] in the first instance,” the district court

denied the motion. In August 2014, we summarily affirmed

the district court’s order, concluding “that the questions

raised . . . are so insubstantial as to not require further

argument.” United States v. Aguilar-Canche, Nos. 14-30023,

14-30024 (Aug. 26, 2014).

In April 2015, Aguilar-Canche filed another motion for

modification pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on

another amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines. That

motion was based on Amendment 782, which amended the

drug-quantity table in U.S.S.G. § 2D.1.1. The amendment

reduced by two levels the offense levels assigned to drug

ineffective assistance of counsel. Aguilar-Canche v. United States, No.

C10-5100, 2010 WL 4063281, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 15, 2010). The

district court denied his habeas petition and denied a certificate of

appealability. Id. at *3.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 7 of 13
8 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

quantities that trigger statutory minimum standards, and is to

be applied retroactively. U.S.S.G. supp. app. C. Pursuant to

the amended Guideline, Aguilar-Canche’s offense level

would have been two levels lower than originally calculated.

The corresponding sentencing range would have been 120 to

135 months, not 135 to 160 months. Like the amendment to

U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2), the basis for Aguilar-Canche’s

previous motion for modification, Amendment 782 does not

address whether two sentences should run concurrently or

consecutively. The district court denied the motion, ruling

that “[n]othing in Amendment 782 compels the Court to

revisit its earlier sentence.” Aguilar-Canche then filed this

timely appeal.

ANALYSIS

As a general matter, a trial court “may not modify a term

of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3582(c); Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 824 (2010)

(“[A] judgment of conviction that includes [a sentence of

imprisonment] constitutes a final judgment and may not be

modified by a district court except in limited circumstances.”

(alterations in original, internal quotation marks omitted)).

The statute includes a few exceptions to this general rule. At

issue here is the one providing that a sentence may be

modified where the defendant “has been sentenced to a term

of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has

subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In such cases, the “court may reduce

the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set

forth in section 3553(a) to the extent they are applicable, if

such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” in

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10. Id. The statute therefore creates a two-

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 8 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 9

step inquiry. “A court must first determine that a reduction is

consistent with § 1B1.10 before it may consider whether the

authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part,

according to the factors set forth in § 3553(a).” Dillon,

560 U.S. at 826.

The Sentencing Guidelines policy statement provides that

“the court shall determine the amended guideline range that

would have been applicable to the defendant if the

amendment(s) to the guidelines . . . had been in effect at the

time the defendant was sentenced.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1).

“In making such determination, the court shall substitute only

the amendments . . . for the corresponding guideline

provisions that were applied when the defendant was

sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application

decisions unaffected.” Id.

Aguilar-Canche argues that his requested modification is

consistent with the policy statement because Amendment

782, if it had been in effect at the time he was sentenced,

would have yielded a lower Guideline range than the one

before the district court. Further, he reads the phrase “shall

leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected” to

mean that the district court can (and in fact, must) reconsider

all other, non-Guideline decisions that led to the sentence—in

this case, the decision that the sentences run consecutively.

The essence of Aguilar-Canche’s argument is that once a

Guideline range is lowered, it opens the door for the district

court to reconsider its entire sentence, except for “other

guideline application decisions” which are not directly

adjusted by the amendment. We reject this interpretation of

the statute and corresponding policy statement.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 9 of 13
10 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

Aguilar-Canche’s argument focuses exclusively on the

language in the policy statement that the district court “shall

leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.”

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b). It ignores the threshold statutory

requirement in § 3582(c)(2), which limits the exception to

situations where the defendant “has been sentenced to a term

of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has been

subsequently lowered.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis

added).

The Supreme Court has cautioned that the exception to

sentencing finality in § 3582(c)(2) is “narrow [in]scope,” and

is “intended to authorize only a limited adjustment to an

otherwise final sentence and not a plenary resentencing

proceeding.” Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826. By its terms,

§ 3582(c)(2) is only available to modify a sentence that was

“based on” a subsequently lowered Guideline range. The

Court has held that this narrow scope is consistent with the

policy statement. “[T]he policy statement seeks to isolate

whatever marginal effect the since-rejected Guideline had on

the defendant’s sentence.” Freeman v. United States,

564 U.S. 522, 530 (2011). “Working backward from this

purpose, § 3582(c) modification proceedings should be

available to permit the district court to revisit a prior sentence

to whatever extent the sentencing range in question was a

relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to

determine the sentence.” Id.

In this case, the since-rejected Guideline range of 135 to

168 months was not a relevant part of the analytic framework

the judge used to determine the sentence. In fact, the district

court applied the statutory minimum sentence to each charge,

not the Guideline range. While the Guideline ranges are

advisory, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005),

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 10 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 11

the statutory minimum and maximums are mandatory and

trump any Guideline range. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (“Where a

statutorily required minimum sentence is greater than the

maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily

required minimum sentence shall be the guideline

sentence.”); see Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515

(1998) (“[A] maximum sentence set by statute trumps a

higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines.”).

Aguilar-Canche is correct that the district court could

have exercised its discretion and ruled that the two

mandatory-minimum sentences run concurrently, for a total

of 120 months. That sentence would have been lower than the

Guideline range at the time of sentencing, and at the bottom

of the Guideline range after Amendment 782. He also

concedes that his motion is a request that “the trial court

reconsider the consecutive nature of the sentence in light of

the reduced guideline range.” However, the consecutive

nature of the sentence is unrelated to the “marginal effect the

since-rejected Guideline had on the defendant’s sentence.”

See Freeman, 564 U.S. at 530. It is theoretically possible, of

course, that if the district court in 2008 had been presented

with the lower Guideline range, the lower numbers might

have influenced it in some way to be more lenient when it

came to the consecutive nature of the sentence. But this is

entirely speculative. If we were to accept Aguilar-Canche’s

statutory argument, we would open the door to a “plenary

resentencing proceeding,” even where the connection

between the lowered Guideline range and the challenged

sentencing decision is tenuous. Cf. Dillon, 560 U.S. at 826.

We therefore hold that the district court was not authorized by

§ 3582(c)(2) to reconsider the consecutive nature of AguilarCanche’s sentences.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 11 of 13
12 UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE

Although the rulings of other circuits are not binding

upon us, we note that the reasoning underlying our holding is

substantially similar to the reasoning of the D.C. Circuit’s

opinion in United States v. Dunn, 631 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir.

2011). In Dunn, the defendant was convicted of both a drug

charge and second-degree murder. Id. at 1291. He was

sentenced in federal court to 121 months in prison for the

drug charge, which was “at the low end” of the Guideline

range, and 15 years to life in prison for the murder charge in

D.C. Superior Court. Id. at 1292. The two sentences were to

be served consecutively. Id. Sixteen years later, the

Sentencing Commission retroactively amended the

Guidelines on the drug charge, with a new Guideline range of

97 to 121 months. Id. The district court reduced the drug

sentence “to the statutory minimum of 120 months, but

concluded that it lacked authority to change the consecutive

nature of [Dunn’s] sentences.” Id. (citation omitted). The

D.C. Circuit affirmed, ruling that Dillon’s prohibition on

plenary resentencing “made clear that a court’s authority in

a sentence-reduction proceeding is strictly limited to

shortening the length of a prison term and does not extend to

collateral matters unrelated to the Guidelines change,” which

includes the consecutive nature of the sentences. Id. at 1293.

Aguilar-Canche attempts to distinguish Dunn on the basis

that it “involved an undischarged term of imprisonment for a

separate case in a separate court.” Dunn had been charged

with murder in D.C. Superior Court, and was on pre-trial

release when he was arrested on the federal drug offense.

Aguilar-Canche, by contrast, was charged with a drug offense

in the District of Nebraska and while on pre-trial release for

that offense, charged with a second drug offense in the

Western District of Washington. However, Aguilar-Canche

does not explain why this distinction should cause us to come

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 12 of 13
UNITED STATES V. AGUILAR-CANCHE 13

to a different interpretation of the statute. The crux of Dunn’s

holding (with which we agree) is that a court’s decision to run

sentences consecutively is unrelated to a subsequent

Guideline change, and is thus not modifiable pursuant to

§ 3582(c)(2).

Aguilar-Canche’s final argument is that the result here is

an absurd one, because the sentencing court could have

chosen to impose a sentence of 180 months for the Nebraska

charge and 0 months for the Washington charge to run

concurrently. If it had done so, Aguilar-Canche would have

an easier time using the amended Guideline range to

challenge the total length of his sentences pursuant to

§ 3582(c)(2). True, the district court might have taken this

option—but it did not. Moreover, we have held in a previous

appeal that the two sentences, including the ruling that they

run consecutively, were substantively reasonable. The

consecutive nature of the sentences is not modifiable

according to § 3582(c)(2) because it was not “based on” the

Guideline range, notwithstanding the fact that it might have

been if the district court had chosen to impose a different

sentence.

CONCLUSION

The district court’s denial of Aguilar-Canche’s motion for

reduction in sentence is AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-30210, 08/29/2016, ID: 10103600, DktEntry: 32-1, Page 13 of 13