Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03271/USCOURTS-cand-3_04-cv-03271-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Patricia Cathey
Plaintiff
Larry Wayne Cathey
Interested Party

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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1

 Plaintiff Patricia Cathey passed away during the pendency of

this suit. Plaintiff's husband, Larry Wayne Cathey, filed a Motion

to Substitute for Deceased Plaintiff. The Court granted that

motion on August 2, 2005. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PATRICIA CATHEY,

Plaintiff,

 v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. 

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No. 04-03271-SC

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

DEFENDANT'S CROSSMOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Patricia Cathey1 ("Plaintiff" or "Claimant") has

moved for summary judgment on her action seeking review of the

Social Security Commissioner's final decision denying her claim

for Social Security disability benefits. In the alternative,

Plaintiff moves for remand. Defendant Jo Anne B. Barnhart

("Defendant" or "Commissioner") has cross-motioned for summary

judgment in her favor. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion and GRANTS Defendant's Motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

Claimant was granted a closed period of disability from

October 14, 1995 to March 1, 1997 for a back-related disability. 

Administrative Record ("A.R.") at 24. Claimant does not dispute
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that at the end of the initial period of disability she had

recuperated from her back problems and was ready to return to

work. Id. at 438-39. In October 1998, Claimant filed a second

application for disability benefits. Id. at 23. In her second

application, Claimant alleged that a July 1997 motor vehicle

accident caused her back problems to resurface more severely than

before the initial disability period. Id. at 24.

According to medical evidence, Claimant suffered from

"degenerative disc disease from the L3 through L5 levels, ... a

panic disorder with anxiety attacks and bunions with feet pain." 

Id. However, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") found the

anxiety disorder and the bunions to be "non-severe." Id. at 30.

He found the degenerative disc disease to be "severe" but not

supported by clinical or laboratory findings. Id. With respect

to Claimant's medical problems, the ALJ also found, "The

intensity, persistence and functionally limiting effects are not

fully credible." Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court may set aside the Commissioner’s decision if it is

based on an incorrect application of the law or is not supported

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial

evidence” is the relevant evidence which a reasonable person might

accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. 

Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). If the

evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Commissioner’s decision, this Court may not substitute its own

decision for the Commissioner’s decision. Id. at 720-21. 
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"[C]onflicts in the evidence are to be resolved by the

[Commissioner]." Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.

1987).

IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff states that there are three material issues now

before the Court: 1) whether the ALJ erred by rejecting the

treating physician's medical opinion of Claimant's work capacity;

2) whether the ALJ improperly applied his own medical

interpretation of the record; and 3) whether the ALJ failed to

apply Social Security Rulings regarding the weighing of a

treating physician's view. Plaintiff's Motion at 3. However,

these three issues are interrelated. The essence of Plaintiff's

argument is that the ALJ failed to give enough weight to the

reports and opinions of the treating physician, Dr. Scheetz. For

example, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly put more

weight on the opinion of the consultative examiner, that

Plaintiff could carry up to 40 pounds, rather than on the opinion

of the treating physician, that she was limited to less than ten

pounds. Plaintiff's Motion at 7. Or, Plaintiff alleges that

although the ALJ listed reasons for rejecting the opinion of the

treating physician, such reasons were based on "misreading of the

record, misstatements and misinterpretation." Id. at 9. For the

following reasons, the Court disagrees with this

characterization.

"Although a treating physician's opinion is generally

afforded the greatest weight in disability cases, it is not

binding on an ALJ with respect to the existence of an impairment
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or the ultimate determination of disability." Tonapetyan v.

Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001). "When there is a

conflict between the opinions of a treating physician and an

examining physician ... the ALJ may disregard the opinion of the

treating physician only if he sets forth specific and legitimate

reasons supported by substantial evidence in the record for doing

so." Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In the instant matter, the ALJ has largely credited the

medical evidence contained in the treatment records of Dr.

Scheetz. For example, the ALJ wrote, "Dr. Scheetz reported that

claimant responded well to medications and recommended that she

been [sic] seen on only an as needed basis ...," and concluded,

"I find that the evidence supports a capacity for light work." 

A.R. at 27. Similarly, the ALJ wrote, "Dr. Scheetz noted that

claimant was intolerant of sitting for long periods but was able

to sit on a short term basis," and concluded, "I find that a

sit/stand option at will is warranted." Id. It was only with

Dr. Scheetz' view of Claimant's functional capacity that the ALJ

differed. The ALJ did not agree with Dr. Scheetz' February 25,

2000 conclusions regarding Claimant's functional capacity. Id.

at 28 ("I do not, however, give his opinion of claimant's

functional capacity controlling weight.").

Rather than agreeing with Dr. Scheetz' opinion regarding

Claimant's functional capacity, the ALJ agreed with the opinion

of an examining physician, Dr. Steve McIntire. Dr. McIntire

stated in his report that Claimant retained an ability to perform

work activity. Id. When there is a conflict in the evidence
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"between the opinions of a treating physician and an examining

physician ... if the ALJ wishes to disregard the opinion of the

treating physician, he or she must make findings setting forth

specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based on

substantial evidence in the record." Sprague, 812 F.2d at 1230 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). "The ALJ can meet

this burden by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his

interpretation thereof, and making findings." Thomas v.

Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002). 

In the instant case, the ALJ found that "Dr. Scheetz'

narrative reports are insufficient to support his opinion." A.R.

at 28. The ALJ supported this statement with a variety of

reasons, including, 1) Dr. Scheetz' records noted Claimant's good

response to medication, 2) the records note muscle spasm on only

one occasion and no clinical findings to substantiate the

limitations, 3) there was no medical evidence given to support an

allegation of any disorder in the cervical spine, and 4) Claimant

was seen by Dr. Scheetz only on an "as needed" basis and was

prescribed medicine but did not undergo any pain management. Id.

The Court holds that these constitute specific, legitimate

reasons based on substantial evidence. Case law supports this

conclusion since appellate courts generally uphold an ALJ's

conclusions when specific reasons are listed in the ALJ's report. 

For example, in Connett v. Barnhart, the Ninth Circuit upheld an

ALJ's rejection of the opinion of the treating physician because

the physician's opinion of the claimant's residual function
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2 The Court emphasizes that it does not find that the reasons

given by the ALJs in Connett and Batson are similar to the reasons

give by the ALJ in the case at hand. Rather, the Court finds only

that the degree and number of specific, legitimate reasons are

similar. 

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capacity was not supported by the physician's own notes and was

inconsistent with other evaluators. 340 F.3d 871, 875-76 (9th

Cir. 2003). Similarly, in Batson v. Comm'r of Social Security,

the Ninth Circuit upheld an ALJ's rejection of a treating

physician's views because the physician's views were based on the

claimant's subjective descriptions and were contradicted by other

evidence. 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004). On the other

hand, in Sprague v. Bowen, the Ninth Circuit remanded a case

because the ALJ had merely alluded to some potential

inconsistencies between the views of the treating physician and

those of the examining physicians. 812 F.2d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.

1987). In the case at hand, because the ALJ stated a variety of

specific reasons why he was discounting the views of the treating

physician, the Court finds that the facts are more similar to

those in Connett and Batson than to those in Sprague.2 Therefore,

the Court holds that the ALJ has rejected the opinion of Dr.

Scheetz with specific, legitimate reasons supported by

substantial evidence.

Plaintiff's Motion lists nine statements by the ALJ which

Plaintiff asserts are contradicted by the record. Plaintiff's

Motion at 10-11. The Court has reviewed these statements and

finds that Plaintiff has merely raised examples in the record of

ambiguities. For example, Plaintiff criticizes the ALJ's
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statement that Dr. Scheetz noted Plaintiff's good response to

medications. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ's statement is

contradicted by Dr. Scheetz' records of October 8, 1997 in which

he wrote, "She has been taken [sic] Esgic, but finds this

unreliable. She has been taking Naprolen without relief." A.R.

at 394. However, Dr. Scheetz' subsequent records of November 26,

1997 state, "She is finding relief with Naprelan [sic] ... and

Vicodin ..." A.R. at 389. Then, at Claimant's hearing before

the ALJ, she indicated that the medications "take an edge off"

her symptoms but have side effects. Id. at 441. As a second

example, in response to the ALJ's statement that Claimant

"reported muscle spasm on only one occasion," Plaintiff alleges,

"A single report does not mean the pain was not there, nor that

the muscle spasm was not there." Plaintiff's Motion at 10. As a

third example, in response to the ALJ's statement that there was

no evidence that Dr. Scheetz treated Claimant for asthma,

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ was "[c]orrect as to treatment,

but not as to knowledge. Dr. Scheetz based his recommendation on

his knowledge that she had asthma and was taking three inhalers." 

Id. at 11.

These examples demonstrate that Plaintiff's list of nine

alleged contradictions between the ALJ's findings and the record

are really just a list of ambiguities and credibility issues. 

Such ambiguities and issues of credibility cannot be a basis for

remand or judgment in favor of Plaintiff--this Court's role is

not to second guess the ALJ. "The ALJ is responsible for

determining credibility and resolving conflicts in medical
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testimony and ambiguities." Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509

(9th Cir. 2001). Furthermore, as stated above, "[i]f the

evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing the

Secretary's conclusion, the court may not substitute its judgment

for that of the Secretary." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 720-21. 

Therefore, the Court holds that Plaintiff's list of nine

potential contradictions between the ALJ's findings and the

record do not constitute grounds for remand or judgment in favor

of Claimant.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds that the ALJ supported his findings with

specific, legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. 

Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment and GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 18 , 2005

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE