Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01947/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-01947-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Frederic Jouhet
Counter Claimant
MacuHealth Distribution, Inc.
Counter Claimant
Raquel Meira Davis
Counter Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

RAQUEL MEIRA DAVIS, an 

individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

MACUHEALTH DISTRIBUTION, INC.; 

FREDERIC JOUHET, an individual; 

and DOES 1-10, inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-01947 WBS KJN 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

MOTION TO DISMISS, STAY OR 

TRANSFER

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Raquel Meira Davis brought this action 

against her former employer, MacuHealth Distribution, Inc. 

(“MacuHealth”) and MacuHealth’s CEO, Frederic Jouhet, alleging, 

inter alia, claims for wrongful termination and sexual harassment

under California state law and federal law. (Compl. (Docket No. 

1).) Before the court now is defendants’ motion to dismiss, stay 

or transfer pursuant to the first-to-file rule, or in the 

alternative, transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Docket 

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No. 16.)

I. Background

MacuHealth is a limited partnership registered and 

headquartered in Michigan. (Compl. ¶ 1.) It manufactures and 

sells supplements that allegedly preserve and improve one’s 

vision. (Id. ¶ 10.) On June 22, 2015, plaintiff joined the 

company as a sales representative, covering California, Nevada, 

and Hawaii. (Id. ¶ 13.) As part of her employment, she signed 

an agreement that contained a forum selection clause providing 

federal and state courts in Michigan would have “jurisdiction . . 

. with respect to any action or proceeding arising out of or 

relating to” her employment. (Docket No. 16-3, Ex. A.) 

Plaintiff alleges that, throughout the duration of her 

employment, she was sexually harassed by Frederic Jouhet, 

MacuHealth’s CEO. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-24.) She repeatedly denied his 

advances, but the harassment continued. (Id. ¶¶ 28-30, 44, 47.) 

In May 2017, plaintiff’s supervisor told her Jouhet was unhappy 

with her and had threatened to terminate her employment despite 

her excellent performance reviews. (Id. ¶¶ 37, 55.) Over the 

next few years, plaintiff was denied customary raises and 

allowances despite her success, until she felt she was forced to 

resign in August 2018. (Id. ¶¶ 56-60, 65-68, 74.) 

Before filing this lawsuit, plaintiff filed a complaint 

against each defendant with the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) and the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and obtained right to sue 

letters. (Id. ¶ 86.) Shortly after obtaining these letters, 

plaintiff’s counsel wrote to the defendants in July 2019 to 

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inform them of Davis’s intent to file suit in California. (Decl. 

of Zainah Alfi (“Alfi Decl.”) ¶ 2 (Docket No. 17-2).) After 

proceeding through unproductive alternative dispute resolution 

negotiations, plaintiff’s counsel again wrote to defendants in 

September 2019 to inform them they would be filing suit on

September 20, 2019. (Id. ¶¶ 8-10.) On September 19, 2019, 

defendants filed a case in Oakland County Circuit Court in 

Michigan, alleging plaintiff had misappropriated confidential 

information in violation of her employment agreement (the 

“Michigan action”). (Docket No. 17-3.) Plaintiff then filed 

this case on September 24, alleging unlawful harassment and 

failure to prevent harassment in violation of California’s Fair 

Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, et 

seq.; unlawful retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); wrongful termination in 

violation of public policy; breach of contract; and waiting time 

penalties pursuant to California Labor Code § 203. (See Compl.) 

On November 12, 2019, plaintiff removed the Michigan 

action to the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Michigan. She subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 

or transfer to this court, contesting the validity of her 

employment agreement’s forum selection clause and the court’s 

personal jurisdiction over her. (Docket No. 16-4.) 

On March 6, 2020, Judge Sean Cox of the Eastern 

District of Michigan denied plaintiff’s motion in its entirety. 

(Docket No. 16-6.) Judge Cox found Davis had failed to overcome 

the “presumptive validity” of her employment agreement’s forum 

selection clause and it was therefore enforceable. (Id. at 4-5.) 

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Additionally, Judge Cox denied her request under 28 U.S.C. § 

1404(a) to transfer the action to this court, finding the forum 

selection clause and public interest favored keeping the case in 

Michigan. (Id. at 7.) 

Davis filed an answer in the Michigan action and 

brought counterclaims nearly identical to those alleged in the 

California action on March 16, 2020. (Docket No. 16-7.) 

Similarly, defendants brought counterclaims in the California 

case that were nearly identical to those they alleged in the 

Michigan action. (Docket No. 6.) Defendants now move to 

dismiss, stay or transfer the California action pursuant to the 

first-to-file rule, or in the alternative, transfer pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Mot. (Docket No. 16).) 

II. Discussion 

The first to file rule is “a judicially created 

doctrine of federal comity, which applies when two cases 

involving substantially similar issues and parties have been 

filed in different districts.” In re Bozic, 888 F.3d 1048, 1051 

(9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

“Under that rule, the second district court has the discretion to 

transfer, stay, or dismiss the second case in the interest of 

efficiency and judicial economy.” Id. at 1051-52 (internal 

quotations and citation omitted). To determine whether to apply 

the rule, a district court will consider three factors: 

“chronology of the lawsuits, similarity of the parties, and 

similarity of the issues.” Kohn Law Grp., Inc. v. Auto Parts 

Mfg. Miss., Inc., 787 F.3d 1237, 1240 (9th Cir. 2015). Even if 

the rule applies, a district court has discretion to refrain from 

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applying the rule in the presence of “bad faith, anticipatory 

suit, and forum shopping.” Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prod., 

Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 628 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). A 

court may also decline to apply the rule when the balance of 

convenience weighs in favor of the later-filed action. Id.

The parties do not dispute that the first two factors 

of the first-to-file rule are satisfied in this case. The 

Michigan action was indisputably filed first, on September 19, 

while the California action was not filed until September 24. 

(Mot. at 4; Opp’n at 6 (Docket No. 17).) This satisfies the 

first factor. Additionally, the parties agree that the second 

factor is satisfied, because the parties in both actions are the 

same. (Mot. at 7; Opp’n at 7.) 

However, the parties dispute whether the issues in both 

actions are sufficiently similar to satisfy the first-to-file 

rule’s third factor. “To determine whether two suits involve 

substantially similar issues, we look at whether there is 

‘substantial overlap’ between the two suits.” Kohn Law Grp., 787 

F.3d at 1241. The issues in the suits “need not be identical, 

only substantially similar.” Id. at 1240.

Plaintiff claims the California and Michigan actions 

are not substantially similar because the California case 

concerns plaintiff’s sexual harassment and retaliation claims 

while the Michigan action involves her alleged misappropriation 

of confidential information. (Opp’n at 7.) Plaintiff argues 

there would be “no meaningful overlap in discovery” and the 

injunctive relief sought in the Michigan case distinguishes it 

from the monetary relief she requests in the California case. 

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(Id.) 

Despite some differences, the actions mirror each other 

in all material respects. In the Michigan action, defendants 

here (plaintiffs there) sued Davis for breach of contract, unfair 

competition, and unjust enrichment. (Docket No. 17-3.) She then 

counterclaimed, alleging the same causes of action she brought in 

the California action against defendants, albeit including two 

additional claims under Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights 

Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. (Docket No. 16-7.) Similarly, in the 

California action, defendants brought counterclaims identical to 

their causes of action in the Michigan action, although they 

included additional claims for conversion and violations of

California’s Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 3426, 

California Penal Code § 502, and California Business & 

Professions Code § 17200. (Docket No. 6.) The “substantial 

overlap” between these two suits satisfies the third and final 

factor of the first-to-file rule. See Kohn Law Grp., 787 F.3d at 

1241. 

Moreover, “the interest of efficiency and judicial 

economy” would not be served by allowing this action to continue 

in this court because it would effectively permit the same 

dispute to be adjudicated by two different federal courts. See

In re Bozic, 888 F.3d at 1051-52. Plaintiff argues that the 

“hypothetical judgments in either [the California or Michigan] 

case would be unrelated and would not impact the other case.” 

(Opp’n at 8.) However, with the introduction of each parties’

counterclaims intertwining the substantive and factual issues of 

the independent actions, that cannot be the case. Accordingly, 

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the first-to-file rule must apply to “avoid the embarrassment of 

conflicting judgments” that could otherwise result. See Church 

of Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 749 (9th Cir. 

1979). 

In a last effort, plaintiff argues that even if the 

first-to-file rule applies, equitable exceptions exist to keep 

the case before this court. (Opp’n at 9.) Plaintiff primarily 

argues that the “anticipatory suit” exception applies. (Id.) “A 

suit is ‘anticipatory’ for the purposes of being an exception to 

the first-to-file rule if the plaintiff in the first-filed action 

filed suit on receipt of specific, concrete indications that a 

suit by the defendant was imminent.” Intersearch Worldwide, Ltd. 

v. Intersearch Grp., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 2d 949, 960 (N.D. Cal. 

2008) (citations omitted). However, “a letter which suggests the 

possibility of legal action . . . in order to encourage or 

further a dialogue, is not a specific, imminent threat of legal 

action.” Id. Consequently, courts normally find a suit is 

anticipatory only in a narrow set of circumstances, such as when 

a declaratory action has been filed to declare a party’s rights 

before litigation proceeds. See Xoxide, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,

448 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 2006). 

Here, plaintiff’s letter to defendants warning them of 

their intent to pursue legal action, (See Alfi Decl. ¶ 8), does 

not rise to the level of an “anticipatory suit.” Instead, 

defendants pursued an independent action in Michigan and sought

injunctive and monetary relief against Davis for her alleged 

misappropriation of confidential information, rather than a 

judicial determination that the harassment did not happen or was 

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not actionable. (Docket No. 17-3.) Accordingly, the 

anticipatory suit exception does not preclude the application of 

the first-to-file rule. 

Plaintiff also argues that convenience weighs in favor 

of proceeding in this court. A court may decline to apply the 

first-to-file rule when the balance of convenience weighs in 

favor of the later-filed action. Alltrade, 946 F.2d at 628. To 

determine convenience, courts consider the location of witnesses 

and evidence, the lack of connection to the forum, and the degree 

of calendar congestion in the court, among other factors. Ward 

v. Follett Corp., 158 F.R.D. 645, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 

Plaintiff represents that the relevant witnesses reside 

all over the country. (Opp’n at 13.) But plaintiff concedes 

“[n]early every witness would have to travel to a trial 

regardless of whether it proceeds in Michigan or California.” 

(Id. (emphasis added).) Similarly, plaintiff concedes the 

discovery will likely be all electronic, meaning it could happen 

anywhere. (Opp’n at 12-13.) This consideration has no bearing 

either way. Plaintiff then argues she resides in Sacramento, 

with “no connection to Michigan as a forum.” (Id.) But 

regardless of her lack of connection to Michigan, plaintiff

consented to Michigan as the forum for all disputes arising 

between her and her employer in her employee agreement. (Docket 

No. 16-3, Ex. A.) Furthermore, MacuHealth is a Michigan 

corporation and Jouhet is a Michigan resident. (Compl. ¶¶ 1-2.) 

These facts seemingly favor allowing the action to proceed in 

Michigan. 

The most persuasive consideration, however, is the 

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relative congestion of the court. As Judge Cox noted in his 

order, the Eastern District of Michigan “is less congested than 

the proposed federal court in California.” (Docket No. 16-6.) 

Plaintiff argues that litigating in the Eastern District of 

Michigan “does not necessarily ensure a more efficient process” 

because of its closure until July 2 due to COVID-19. However, in 

light of the public response to COVID-19 this court is also

closed to the public and has suspended jury trials “until further 

notice.” (Opp’n at 13); See General Order No. 618 (May 13, 

2020). Accordingly, the convenience considerations weigh in 

favor of transferring this case to the Eastern District of 

Michigan.

For the foregoing reasons, the court finds no 

exceptions to the first-to-file rule apply, and it will transfer 

the case to the Eastern District of Michigan pursuant to the 

first-to-file rule.1

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this action be, and the same

hereby is, TRANSFERRED to the United States District Court for 

the Eastern District of Michigan. 

Dated: May 28, 2020

 

1 Because the action is transferred under the first-tofile rule, the court need not address defendants’ argument that 

transfer is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

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