Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-01310/USCOURTS-ca10-07-01310-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gregory C. Reed
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

GREGORY C. REED,

Movant.

No. 07-1310

(D.C. No. 07-cv-00770-REB-MJW)

ORDER

Filed October 5, 2007

Before LUCERO, MURPHY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.

Movant Gregory C. Reed, a Colorado state inmate proceeding pro se, has

filed a motion for remand. Reed filed a motion in the district court that

constituted an attempt to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 motion. 

The district court transferred the matter to this court because Reed had previously

filed a § 2254 petition, but had not obtained authorization from this court to file

another § 2254 petition, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). See Coleman v.

United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (directing district

courts to transfer unauthorized second or successive § 2254 motions to this court

in the interest of justice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631). Reed now moves this

court for an order remanding the matter to the district court, arguing that he does

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not need this court’s authorization to file his proposed § 2254 petition in the

district court. We deny the motion.

Reed was convicted in Colorado in 1989 of aggravated robbery and four

habitual criminal counts. He filed a § 2254 petition collaterally challenging that

conviction in 2002, which was denied by the district court. This court denied

Reed a certificate of appealability. Reed v. Atherton, No. 03-1013 (10th Cir.

July 16, 2003). In September 2006, Reed filed a second § 2254 petition in federal

district court, which was transferred to this court for authorization. We denied

Reed authorization to file that § 2254 motion in March 2007. The next month,

Reed filed the proposed § 2254 petition at issue in this motion for remand.

Reed’s proposed § 2254 seeks to challenge the district court’s denial of his

first § 2254 petition. The district court denied that petition in part because Reed

had procedurally defaulted several of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 

In his proposed § 2254 petition, Reed seeks to assert that the district court erred

in ruling that his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims were procedurally

defaulted, to argue that the district court should have held his petition in abeyance

while he pursued state remedies, and to reassert these ineffective-assistance

claims. He contends that authorization from this court is not required to file this

petition because the district court should not have ruled the claims in his first

§ 2254 petition were procedurally defaulted. He is mistaken.

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A post-judgment motion must be treated as a second or successive petition,

and be authorized for filing by a court of appeals under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(3)(A), if it asserts or reasserts a substantive claim to set aside a

petitioner’s criminal conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 530-31

(2005). Reed’s proposed motion clearly reasserts substantive challenges to his

1989 convictions. Authorization of Reed’s proposed § 2254 petition cannot,

however, be granted because he seeks to present the same ineffective-assistance

claims raised in his first § 2254 petition, and a court of appeals may not permit a

successive § 2254 petition unless it presents a claim that “was not presented” in a

prior § 2254 petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2); Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793,

796 (2007) (explaining that a circuit court “may authorize the filing of the second

or successive application only if it presents a claim not previously raised [and]

satisfies one of the two grounds articulated in § 2244(b)(2)”); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(b)(1) (providing that any claim presented in a successive petition that has

already been adjudicated in a previous petition must be dismissed). 

Construing his pro se motion liberally, Reed may be arguing that his

proposed § 2254 petition is not successive because the district court denied it on

procedural grounds and did not reach the merits. To the contrary, the denial of

claims in a § 2254 petition based on state procedural default grounds “constitutes

a disposition on the merits and thus renders a subsequent § 2254 petition or

§ 2255 motion ‘second or successive’ for purposes of the [Antiterrorism and

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Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)].” Carter v. United States, 150 F.3d 202,

206 (2d Cir. 1998) ( per curiam ); see Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053

(9th Cir. 2005) (same); cf. Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1995)

(concluding, pre-AEDPA, that denial of claim due to procedural default is a

determination on the merits in evaluating whether a second habeas petition is

successive). 

It also appears that Reed may also be arguing that his proposed § 2254

petition is not successive because his first petition was filed prior to enactment of

AEDPA in 1997. This is factually and legally incorrect: Reed’s first § 2254

petition was filed five years after enactment of AEDPA, and the procedural

circuit-court authorization requirements of § 2244(b)(3)(A) apply to all second or

successive habeas applications filed after AEDPA’s enactment. Daniels v. United

States, 254 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (10th Cir. 2001).

In summary, the district court correctly treated Reed’s proposed § 2254 as a

second or successive § 2254 petition, and Reed does not seek authorization to file

his petition, nor could such authorization be granted. The motion for remand is

DENIED, and the matter is TERMINATED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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