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Parties Involved:
Terril Thomas
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted January 6, 2015

Decided January 13, 2015

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge

No. 14-2640

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

TERRIL THOMAS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of 

Illinois.

No. 13-CR-30209-MJR

Michael J. Reagan,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Terril Thomas pleaded guilty to distributing cocaine base, see 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1), and was sentenced as a career offender to 120 months’ imprisonment. The 

district court determined that Thomas was a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, 

because he was convicted in Illinois in 2008 of unlawfully possessing a controlled 

substance with intent to deliver, see 720 ILCS 570/407, and in 2011 of unlawfully 

delivering a controlled substance while located within 1,000 feet of a church, see id.

570/401. He filed a notice of appeal, but his attorney has concluded that the appeal is 

frivolous and moves to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

Thomas has not accepted our invitation to respond to counsel’s motion. See CIR. R. 51(b). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 14-2640 Page 2

Counsel has submitted a brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the 

issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in 

the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the subjects that counsel has 

discussed. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 

Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first informs us that Thomas does not wish to have his guilty plea set 

aside, and thus counsel appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or 

the adequacy of Thomas’s plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 

(7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).

Counsel considers whether Thomas could argue that the court erred in 

classifying as relevant conduct his possession of .5 grams of cocaine base that, Thomas 

had contended, was for his own personal use (raising his base offense level to 14 rather 

than 12, compare U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(13), with id. § 2D1.1(c)(14)). Based on the presentence 

report, the court held Thomas responsible for 1.5 grams of cocaine base—1 gram that he 

sold to a confidential informant and .5 grams that the police found during a search of his 

person (and which Thomas maintained was for his own use). Although drugs possessed 

for personal consumption may not be included in the relevant conduct analysis for 

distribution, see United States v. Sumner, 325 F.3d 884, 888 (7th Cir. 2003), counsel 

properly recognizes that this argument would be frivolous because, as a career offender,

Thomas’s sentence was based on the statutory maximum for his offense of conviction, 

not the drug-quantity provisions of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(3); United

States v. Redmond, 667 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2012). 

Counsel next considers whether Thomas could argue that his 120-month 

sentence—below his calculated guidelines range of 151 to 188 months—is substantively 

unreasonable because of his youth and lack of education. But a below guidelines 

sentence is presumed reasonable, see United States v. Lidell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir. 

2008); United States v. George, 403 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 2005), and we agree with counsel 

that the record presents no basis to set that presumption aside. The district court 

acknowledged Thomas’s personal characteristics, including his impoverished 

childhood, his lack of both education and job training, and his youth (age 25 at the time 

of his most recent conviction), see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), but deemed these 

considerations outweighed by the serious nature of his current drug offense and his 

extensive criminal history, see id. § 3553(a)(2)(A),(D). 

Counsel finally considers whether Thomas could challenge one of his conditions 

of supervised release—participation in “any program deemed appropriate to improve 

job readiness skills,” including a GED or Workforce Development Program. But we 

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agree with counsel that such an argument would be frivolous. Thomas forfeited any 

challenge to any of the special conditions by not contesting them at sentencing. 

See United States v. Ross, 475 F.3d 871, 873 (7th Cir. 2007). In any event job training and 

GED preparation are explicitly listed among the discretionary conditions that a court 

may impose, see 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(4) (district court may impose condition that 

defendant “pursue conscientiously a course of study or vocational training that will 

equip him for suitable employment”); United States v. McKissic, 428 F.3d 719, 725–26 (7th 

Cir. 2005), and this is not a case in which a supervised release directive to obtain a GED 

is unrelated to the offense, cf. United States v. Smith, 770 F.3d 653, 657 (7th Cir. 2014). 

Thus, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal. 

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