Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03785/USCOURTS-ca8-13-03785-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramona Dohman
Appellee
Troy K. Scheffler
Appellant
State of Minnesota
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-3785

___________________________

Troy K. Scheffler

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Ramona Dohman, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of Public Safety,

State of Minnesota; State of Minnesota

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendants - Appellees

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: October 9, 2014

 Filed: May 12, 2015 

____________

Before COLLOTON, BRIGHT, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Troy K. Scheffler brought suit alleging the Minnesota statutes and rules under

which he has repeatedly lost his driving privileges due to his several driving while

impaired (DWI) offenses violate the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). The

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district court1

 dismissed Scheffler’s complaint for failing to allege that he is a

qualified individual under the ADA. We affirm the dismissal. 

I.

Since 1994, Scheffler has been repeatedly arrested for DWI. In 1997, after his

third arrest, Scheffler’s driving privileges were cancelled subject to completion of a

one-year abstinence-only alcohol rehabilitation program. Scheffler successfully

completed the program, and in 1998, Scheffler was issued a driver’s license with the

restriction that he abstain from the use of alcohol. After a 1999 cancellation of his

driver’s license, Scheffler was required to complete a three-year alcohol rehabilitation

program. He again successfully completed the program and received a restricted

license in 2002. In 2010, Scheffler was yet again arrested for DWI. At the time he

filed his complaint, Scheffler had to either complete the six-year rehabilitation

program or submit to an Ignition Interlock Program in order to be issued a new

restricted driver’s licence. 

Scheffler brought this suit, claiming ADA violations based on perceived

alcoholism and seeking an injunction against the State requiring that his driving

privileges be restored without restrictions. The State moved to dismiss the complaint,

and the district court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that Scheffler had

failed to allege a disability under the ADA. 

II.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Retro Television Network, Inc. v. Luken

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota. 

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Commc’ns, LLC, 696 F.3d 766, 768 (8th Cir. 2012). In so doing, we construe the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

The ADA defines a disabled person as an individual with a physical or mental

impairment that substantially limits one or more of that person’s major life activities,

an individual who has a record of such an impairment, or an individual who is

regarded as having such an impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). “[M]ajor life

activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,

seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,

breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,”

as well as operations of major bodily functions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). This court

has previously recognized that alcoholism may qualify for disability under the ADA

when it limits a major life activity. See Miners v. Cargill Commc’ns, Inc., 113 F.3d

820, 823 (8th Cir. 1997). In his complaint, Scheffler failed to allege facts that would

support that he has a disability as defined by the ADA, and therefore the district court

correctly granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

Scheffler did not allege in his complaint nor does he assert on appeal that he

meets the first definition of being a disabled person due to alcoholism. That is, he

does not claim to actually be an alcoholic or that his alcoholism causes him to be

substantially limited in a major life activity. Instead, Scheffler argues his multiple

DWI convictions create a record of alcoholism under the second prong of the

disability definition. However, as the district court correctly found, “[d]riving while

intoxicated on multiple occasions does not, in and of itself, establish that [Scheffler]

is an alcoholic.” (Order at 9.) Additionally, there is no allegation in the complaint

that Scheffler has ever been diagnosed as an alcoholic, nor does the complaint allege

that Scheffler suffers from a substantial limitation to a major life activity due to

alcoholism. Accordingly, he has failed to allege that he is disabled under the second

prong of the ADA’s disability definition. 

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Attempting to qualify under the third prong of the ADA disability definition,

Scheffler claims the State regards him as being an alcoholic due to the restrictions the

State has imposed on his driving. Under this third prong, “[a]n individual meets the

requirement of ‘being regarded as having such an impairment’ if the individual

establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter

because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the

impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” See 42 U.S.C.

§ 12102(3). Again, as mentioned above, the fact that Scheffler has received several

DWI convictions does not mean that he is an alcoholic. Nor does the State, in

imposing restrictions on drivers who incur multiple DWI offenses, necessarily

perceive that person as being an alcoholic. Scheffler has alleged no other facts that

would support a claim that the State perceived him to be an alcoholic. Thus, Scheffler

has failed to allege that the State, by its actions, has regarded him has having an

impairment under the ADA. 

III.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Scheffler’s complaint

for failure to state a claim. 

______________________________

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