Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01545/USCOURTS-azd-2_08-cv-01545-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Israel Flores-Vasquez
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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 “Doc.#” refers to the docket number of filings in the civil case. “Crim. Doc.#”

refers to the docket number of filings in the criminal case.

WO SC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v.

Israel Flores-Vasquez, 

Defendant/Movant. 

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No. CV 08-1545-PHX-SMM (ECV)

No. CR 07-0647-PHX-SMM

ORDER

Movant Israel Flores-Vasquez, who is confined in the California City Correctional

Center in California City, California, filed a pro se Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc.# 5.)1

 The

Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

I. Procedural History

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Movant pled guilty to illegal reentry after deportation,

in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) as enhanced by § 1326(b)(2). The plea agreement

provided for a sentencing range of 10 to 125 months. On November 27, 2007, the Court

sentenced Movant to a 27-month term of imprisonment followed by three years on

supervised release.

Movant seeks a reduction of his sentence. He argues that his sentence poses an

extraordinary hardship on him and his family. He also argues that his Fifth and Fourteenth

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 In addition, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected Movant’s equal protection argument

in McLean v. Crabtree, 173 F.3d 1176, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 1999). 

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Amendment equal protection rights are being violated because as a deportable alien, he is

ineligible for a one-year sentence reduction for attending a drug treatment program during

incarceration and for early release to a half-way house.

II. Summary Dismissal

A district court must summarily dismiss a § 2255 application “[i]f it plainly appears

from the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving

party is not entitled to relief.” Rule 4(b), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the

United States District Courts. When this standard is satisfied, neither a hearing nor a

response from the government is required. See Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d 525, 526

(9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1982). In this case,

the record shows that summary dismissal under Rule 4(b) is warranted because Movant has

waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion.2

III. Waiver

Movant has waived challenges to his sentence. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

has found that there are “strict standards for waiver of constitutional rights.” United States

v. Gonzalez-Flores, 418 F.3d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 2005). It is impermissible to presume

waiver from a silent record, and the Court must indulge every reasonable presumption

against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. United States v. Hamilton, 391 F.3d

1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004). In this action, Movant’s waiver was clear, express, and

unequivocal.

Plea agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005). A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a

§ 2255 action challenging the length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431,

433 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1992). The only

claims that cannot be waived are claims that the waiver itself was involuntary or that

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ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver involuntary. See Washington v.

Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plea agreement that waives the

right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an

ineffective assistance of counsel claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver); Pruitt,

32 F.3d at 433 (expressing doubt that a plea agreement could waive a claim that counsel

erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular plea bargain); Abarca,

985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver forecloses a claim of ineffective

assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); see also Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4

(declining to decide whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the

voluntariness of the waiver). 

As part of his plea agreement, Movant made the following waiver:

Defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which the defendant could assert to the

information or indictment, or to the court’s entry of judgment against

defendant and imposition of sentence upon defendant providing the sentence

is consistent with this agreement. Defendant further waives: (1) any right to

appeal the court’s entry of judgment against defendant; (2) any right to appeal

the imposition of sentence upon defendant under Title 18, United States Code,

Section 3742 (sentence appeals); and (3) any right to collaterally attack

defendant’s conviction and sentence under Title 28, United States Code,

Section 2255, or any other collateral attack. Defendant acknowledges that

this waiver shall result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack

defendant might file challenging his conviction or sentence in this case.

(Crim. Doc.# 29 at 4-5) (emphasis added). Movant indicated in his plea agreement that he

had discussed the terms with his attorney, agreed to the terms and conditions, and entered

into the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 6-7, 8.)

Movant’s assertions in his § 2255 motion all pertain to sentencing and not to the

voluntariness of the waiver. Movant expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of

sentence and expressly waived the right to bring a § 2255 motion. The Court accepted his

plea as voluntarily made. Consequently, the Court finds that Movant waived the sentencing

issues raised in his § 2255 motion. Thus, the Court will summarily dismiss the motion.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc.# 5 in CV08-1545-PHX-SMM (ECV)) is denied and that the civil

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action opened in connection with this Motion (CV 08-1545-PHX-SMM (ECV)) is dismissed

with prejudice. The Clerk of Court will enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 29th day of September, 2008.

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