Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06209/USCOURTS-ca10-90-06209-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Eugene Tyler
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT FEB 1 31991 

~OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

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90-6209 

v. 

MICHAEL EUGENE TYLER, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C. No. CR-89-254-A) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Michael Eugene Tyler appeals his conviction for conspiring to 

rob Hartland Federal Savings and Loan in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 

in violation of 18 u.s.c. § 371, and aiding and abetting in robbing Hartland, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and 2. The 

sole ground for his appeal is that he was not brought to trial 

within 70 days as required by 18 u.s.c. § 3161, after giving full 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppal. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6209 Document: 010110099961 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 1 
allowance to the periods of time excludable under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 316l(h). We Affirm. 

The essential dates are not in dispute. Tyler was charged on 

November 15, 1989 and brought to trial on March 12, 1990. In the 

interim, Tyler's original court appointed counsel withdrew and was 

replaced by another attorney retained by Tyler. The second 

attorney died while the case was pending and new counsel was 

appointed on January 24, 1990. On January 29, 1990, Tyler's new 

counsel moved for a continuance in order to prepare for trial. 

The continuance was granted for obvious reasons, although those 

reasons were not stated by the court on the record. 

On appeal Tyler focuses on the fact that no delay caused by a 

continuance at the request of the defendant shall be excludable 

from the required 70-day period "unless the court sets forth, in 

the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons 

for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial." 18 u.s.c. § 316l(h)(8)(A). Tyler 

contends that the court did not enter the required findings on the 

record; therefore, the period consumed by the continuance 

requested by Tyler's attorney may not be excluded for speedy trial 

act purposes. 

We need not address that issue. As the government points 

out, on December 1, 1989, Tyler's counsel filed a number of motions, including a motion in limine which remained pending until 

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Appellate Case: 90-6209 Document: 010110099961 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 2 
the time of trial. As the district court expressly noted when it 

was considering Tyler's speedy trial act motion: "[t]hat type of 

exclusion does not expire until such time as the motion could be 

decided. And that [the motion in limine] is, in my view, a motion 

that is impossible to decide until trial because the only conceivable use of the evidence would be for impeachment, and that 

requires a balancing, taking into account the evidence produced at 

trial." Reporter's Transcript of Defendant's Motion Under Speedy 

Trial Act, Friday, March 16, 1990, at page 6. Under 18 u.s.c. 

§ 3161(h)(l)(F) "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from 

the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, 

or other prompt disposition of, such motion" is excludable. We 

have recently so held. United States v. Tranakos, 911 F.2d 1422, 

1426-1427 (10th Cir. 1990). And, as we pointed out in Tranakos, 

the exclusion is automatic. Id. The express finding of the 

district court, quoted above, that the motion in limine was not 

under advisement, and there was no hearing on Tyler's motion in 

limine until the time of trial, precludes the application of the 

30-day period under§ 3161(h)(l)(J), relating to motions actually 

under advisement by the court. 

We note that Tyler has filed no reply brief contesting the 

government's argument, calculation of time period, or conclusion 

with respect to the pending motion in limine, and the excludability of the time relating thereto. Since we agree with the 

government that the period from December 1, 1989 to March 12, 1990 

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Appellate Case: 90-6209 Document: 010110099961 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 3 
. ..... . 

is excludable from the 70-day time period mandated by§ 3161, we 

hold that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated. 

AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court: 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-6209 Document: 010110099961 Date Filed: 02/13/1991 Page: 4