Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca2-18-01770/USCOURTS-ca2-18-01770-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Canty

David Ojeda
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee USA

Document Text:

18‐1770‐cr

United States v. Ojeda

1

In the

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Second Circuit    

AUGUST TERM 2019

No.  18‐1770‐cr

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v.

DAVID OJEDA,

Defendant‐Appellant,

TIMOTHY CANTY,

Defendant.

   

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York

   

SUBMITTED: OCTOBER 30, 2019

DECIDED: FEBRUARY 24, 2020

   

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United States v. Ojeda

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Before: CABRANES and RAGGI, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN, District

Judge.

*

________________

On appeal from a judgment of conviction entered in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Carter, J.),

following defendant David Ojeda’s guilty plea to (1) being a felon in

possession of a firearm, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and (2) obstructing

justice, see id. § 1512(c)(1), defendant challenges his 15‐year prison

sentence on the felon‐in‐possession count.    Ojeda argues that this

sentence, the minimum mandated by the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”) for persons with three or more prior convictions for violent

felony and/or serious drug offenses, see id. § 924(e)(1), is unwarranted

for two reasons:  (1) his prior conviction for New York first‐degree

robbery is not for a violent felony because the crime’s elements do not

categorically require the use of physical force as defined in Curtis

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010); and (2) ACCA’s definition

of a state “serious drug offense” is too vague to encompass his state

attempted drug crimes of conviction in light of Samuel Johnson v.

United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).    Ojeda’s reliance on the cited

Supreme Court precedents is misplaced, and his arguments are

defeated by this court’s decisions in United States v. Thrower, 914 F.3d

770 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 305 (2019); and United States v.

Wallace, 937 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2019).  

AFFIRMED.

   

* Judge Edward R. Korman, of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

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         Devin McLaughlin, Langrock Sperry &

Wool, LLP, Middlebury, Vermont, for

Defendant‐Appellant.

Eli J. Mark, Daniel B. Tehrani, Assistant

United States Attorneys, for Geoffrey S.

Berman, United States Attorney for the

Southern District of New York, New York,

New York, for Appellee.

                                     

REENA RAGGI, Circuit Judge:

Defendant David Ojeda appeals from a judgment of conviction

entered on June 7, 2018,  in the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Andrew L. Carter, Jr., Judge),

following his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm,

see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and to obstructing justice, see id. § 1512(c)(1).  

Ojeda challenges only that part of the judgment sentencing him to 15

years’ incarceration on the felon‐in‐possession count.  That sentence

is the minimum mandated by the Armed Career Criminal Act

(“ACCA”) for § 922(g) violators who have three or more convictions

for a “violent felony” and/or “serious drug offense.”  Id. § 924(e)(1).  

The district court determined that ACCA applied in Ojeda’s case

based on three prior New York State convictions:  in 2007, for first‐

degree robbery, see N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15; in 1998, for attempted

sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, see id. § 220.39; and

again in 1998, for attempted possession of a controlled substance with

intent to sell in the third degree, see id. § 220.16(1).  On appeal, Ojeda

submits that none of these convictions qualifies as an ACCA

predicate.   He argues here, as he did before the district court, that

Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), compels the

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conclusion that ACCA’s definition of a state “serious drug offense,”

see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), is too vague to be applied

constitutionally to his New York attempted drug crimes. For the first

time on appeal, Ojeda further argues that Curtis Johnson v. United

States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010), compels the conclusion that New York first‐

degree robbery is not a categorical “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(2)(B)(i).

For reasons explained herein, we conclude that Ojeda’s reliance

on the cited Supreme Court precedents is misplaced, and that his

arguments are, in fact, defeated by this court’s recent decisions in

United States v. Thrower, 914 F.3d 770 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.

305 (2019), and United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2019).  

Identifying no error in Ojeda’s felon‐in‐possession sentence, we

affirm the judgment of conviction in all respects.

BACKGROUND

I. The Crimes of Conviction

The facts pertaining to Ojeda’s felon‐in‐possession and

obstruction crimes are quickly stated.

On November 25, 2014, in the vicinity of Madison Avenue and

East 111th Street in Manhattan, Ojeda brandished a 9‐millimeter

pistol while threatening a person with whom he was having an

argument.    The pistol was stolen, but Ojeda was prohibited from

possessing it in any event by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) because he had

previously been convicted of multiple felony crimes.    Indeed, the

Indictment charging Ojeda with violating § 922(g)(1) advised him that

any sentence forthat crime would be subject to the 15‐year mandatory

minimum stated in ACCA because his prior New York first‐degree

robbery conviction was for a “violent felony,” and his two prior

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attempted controlled substance convictions were for “serious drug

offense[s].”

Following Ojeda’s federal arrest for being a felon in possession

of a firearm, he enlisted his mother to obstruct justice by having her

use false pretenses to retrieve his cellular phone from police custody

and then delete potentially incriminating evidence from that phone.

II. Sentencing

On October 22, 2015, Ojeda pleaded guilty to both the felon‐in‐

possession and obstruction charges.    The Probation Department’s

Presentence Report calculated Ojeda’s Sentencing Guidelines offense

level as 30, which, with a criminal history category of VI, yielded an

advisory sentencing range of 168–210 months’ imprisonment.   The

Department reported that if, based on Ojeda’s prior record of

convictions, the district court were to identify him as an Armed

Career Criminal, ACCA mandated a minimum sentence of 180

months, or 15 years, for the felon‐in‐possession crime.  ACCA states

in pertinent part that,   

a person who violates section 922(g) . . . and has three

previous convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious

drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different

from one another, . . . shall be . . . imprisoned not less

than fifteen years.

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

ACCA defines “violent felony” to include any crime having a

force element, as well as certain enumerated crimes:  

“[V]iolent felony” means any crime [that, when

committed by an adult, is] punishable by imprisonment

for a term exceeding one year, [and]  

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(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person

of another; or

(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of

explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that

presents a serious potential risk of physical injury

to another . . . .

Id. § 924(e)(2)(B).   

It defines “serious drug offense” by reference to both federal

and state law as either,

(i) an offense underthe Controlled Substances Act (21

U.S.C. 801 et seq.), [and other specified provisions

of federal law], for which a maximum term of

imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by

law, or

(ii) an offense under State law, involving

manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with

intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled

substance (as defined in . . . 21 U.S.C. 802), for

which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten

years or more is prescribed by law . . . .

Id. § 924(e)(2)(A).

Preliminary to deciding whether Ojeda was subject to an

ACCA sentence for his § 922(g)(1) crime, the district court ordered

briefing as to whether attempted controlled substance crimes qualify

as serious drug offenses under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), specifically, whether

this court’s holding in United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2003),

which supports that conclusion, remains good law after Samuel

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (holding ACCA’s

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) residual clause definition of violent felony void for

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vagueness).    Upon review of the parties’ filings, the district court

concluded that Ojeda’s attempted controlled substance crimes do

qualify as serious drug offenses.  Based on that finding, and in the

absence of any challenge to Ojeda’s first‐degree robbery conviction

being a violent felony, the district court sentenced Ojeda to the ACCA

mandated minimum 15‐year term on the felon‐in‐possession count,

with a concurrent 60‐month, or five‐year, term on the obstruction

count.

Ojeda timely filed this appeal.      

DISCUSSION

Whether Ojeda’s prior New York State crimes of conviction

qualify as ACCA predicates presents two questions of law that we

review de novo:  (1) whether first‐degree robbery is a “violent felony”

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i);1 and (2) whether attempted drug sale

in the third degree or attempted drug possession (with intent to sell)

in the third degree is a “serious drug offense” under § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii).  

See United States v. Bordeaux, 886 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 2018).  Because

Ojeda did not raise the first question in the district court, however,

our de novo review of that matter is limited to plain error.  See United

States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (requiring “that (1) there is

an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to

reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial

rights . . . ; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or

public reputation of judicial proceedings” (brackets omitted) (internal

1 Because robbery is not among the crimes enumerated as violent felonies

in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), we here consider whether Ojeda’s first‐degree

robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony only under ACCA’s

elements clause, see id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).   

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quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279, 288–

89 (2d Cir. 2017).  For the reasons explained herein, we conclude that

the district court committed no error—plain or otherwise—in

identifying Ojeda’s prior convictions, both for robbery and attempted

controlled substance trafficking, as ACCA predicates.

I. New York First‐Degree Robbery Is a Categorical “Violent

Felony” as Defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)

A defendant’s prior conviction can be found to be for a “violent

felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) only if it “has as an element

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another.”  In Curtis Johnson v. United States, the Supreme

Court construed “physical force” to mean “violent force—that is, force

capable of causing physical pain or injury to another.”  559 U.S. at 140

(emphasis in original).    Last term, in Stokeling v. United States, the

Court clarified that this force standard “does not require any

particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used will

cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality.”  139 S. Ct. 544, 554

(2019).  Applying that standard to the Florida robbery statute at issue

in Stokeling, the Court concluded that the crime was a violent felony

under ACCA’s elements clause.  See id. at 554–55.

This court has long recognized New York robbery—in any

degree—to be a violent crime under the elements clause of ACCA and

other federal laws.  See Stuckey v. United States, 878 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir.

2017) (holding New York first‐degree robbery convictions to be for

violent felonies under ACCA elements clause); see also United States v.

Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d 155, 164–66 & n.45 (2d Cir. 2018) (holding New

York “robbery in any degree is a crime of violence under the ‘force

clause’” applicable to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, and declining to overturn

earlier ruling to same effect dating from 1992).    In urging us to

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conclude otherwise here, Ojeda suggests that these cases are wrongly

decided or, at least, that Stuckey should be cabined to recognize New

York first‐degree robbery as a categorical violent felony only in the

two particular aggravating circumstances there proved, i.e., when

robbery is committed using or threatening the immediate use of a

dangerous instrument, see N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(3), or displaying

what appears to be a firearm, see id. § 160.15(4). These arguments are

defeated by our recent decision in United States v. Thrower, 914 F.3d

770.   

In Thrower, this court ruled that New York robbery, even in the

third degree—which proscribes “forcibly steal[ing] property”

without any aggravating circumstances, N.Y. Penal Law § 160.05—is

a categorical violent felony under ACCA.  United States v. Thrower, 914

F.3d at 776.   Thus, “[b]y extension,” so too is “robbery in the first

degree” without regard to the particular aggravating circumstances

proved.  Id.  Thrower’s holding controls this panel unless and until

reversed by the Supreme Court or this court en banc.  See United States

v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d Cir. 2009).  

Even if we were not so bound, however, we would reject

Ojeda’s argument that his New York first‐degree robbery conviction

is not for a violent felony.  To explain, New York defines first‐degree

robbery by reference to two elements.    The first requires forcible

stealing; the second, an aggravating circumstance:        

A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree [A] when

he forcibly steals property and [B] when, in the course of

the commission of the crime or of immediate flight

therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:

1. Causes serious physical injury to any person who is

not a participant in the crime; or

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2. Is armed with a deadly weapon; or

3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous

instrument; or

4. Displays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle,

shotgun, machine gun or other firearm . . . .

N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15.

Ojeda argues that it is possible to commit New York first‐

degree robbery without the use, attempted use, or threatened use, of

physical force as defined in Curtis Johnson because, under the second

aggravating circumstance, a robber might arm himself with a

concealed deadly weapon that is never discharged, displayed, or even

referenced during the robbery.2  To demonstrate that the first‐degree

robbery statute has, in fact, been applied in this way, Ojeda cites to a

footnote in People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d 400, 407 n.2, 429 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413

n.2 (1980).    See United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 2018)

(“[T]here must be a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility,

that the statute at issue could be applied to conduct that does not

2 Although the police arrest report indicates that Ojeda threatened his

robbery victim by displaying a handgun, the record does not clearly

indicate what aggravating factor was pleaded or proved to support Ojeda’s

first‐degree robbery conviction.  Thus, Ojeda argues that his case does not

admit modified categorical review as in Stuckey v. United States, 878 F.3d at

67, where it was clear that the defendant stood convicted based on the third

and fourth aggravating factors.  He submits that his case must be viewed

by the minimum conduct necessary to prove any of the four aggravating

factors.  See United States v. Jones, 878 F.3d 10, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that,

when the record does not support a modified categorical approach, “[w]e

instead look to ‘the least of [the] acts’ proscribed by the statute” (alteration

in original) (quoting Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. at 137)).  Even

when we do so, however, Ojeda’s ACCA sentencing challenge fails for

reasons explained in text.

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constitute a [violent felony].” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

At the outset, we note that the circumstances Ojeda posits were

not at issue in Pena.  There, a robber armed with a concealed knife

verbally threatened to “shoot” his victim.   People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d at

405–06, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 412.    Despite the disconnect between the

weapon and the threat, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the

totality of evidence sufficient to establish the third aggravating factor

for first‐degree robbery, i.e., using or threatening the immediate use

of a dangerous instrument.  See id. at 406–09, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 412–14.  

Even assuming, however, that Pena supports Ojeda’s construction of

the second statutory aggravator not to require the use or threatened

use of physical force,3 that does not show that New York first‐degree

3 The cited footnote draws a distinction between § 160.15 and its

predecessor statute, explaining,

[The] predecessor statute was far less precise, specifying as an

aggravating circumstance that the perpetrator was “armed

with a dangerous weapon” (Penal Law of 1909, § 2124, subd.

1); it permitted the prosecution for first degree robbery

whether the culprit openly menaced the victim with a

shotgun or, without issuing any threat to use it, merely had,

let us say, a penknife in his pocket.  The more subtle grading

scheme introduced by the revised Penal Law somewhat

mitigated this problem.  Thus, only one who commits robbery

while carrying a “deadly weapon” upon his person is now

guilty of robbery in the first degree.  However, if he does not

carry a weapon classified as “deadly” but instead a more

broadly defined “dangerous instrument” the statute now

requires a showing not merely of possession but of “use” or

threatened “immediate use[,”] on the theory that it was the

employment of such an instrumentality that was significant.   

People v. Pena, 50 N.Y.2d at 407 n.2, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 413 n.2 (emphasis in

original) (citations omitted).  

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robbery can be committed without such force.  

The flaw in Ojeda’s reasoning is his singular focus on the

aggravating element of first‐degree robbery while completely

ignoring the foundational element being aggravated, i.e., forcible

stealing.  That element, as this court has recognized, must be proved

for every degree of robbery in New York.  See United States v. Thrower,

914 F.3d at 776; United States v. Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d at 166; Stuckey

v. United States, 878 F.3d at 70.    And that element categorically

requires the use of physical force.       

This is evident from New York’s definition of “forcible

stealing”:   

when, in the course of committing a larceny, [a person]

uses or threatens the immediate use of physical force upon

another person for the purpose of:  

1. Preventing or overcoming resistance to the taking of

the property or to the retention thereof immediately

after the taking; or  

2. Compelling the owner of such property or another

person to deliver up the property or to engage in

other conduct which aids in the commission of the

larceny.

N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00 (emphasis added).  This language “matches

ACCA’s definition of a ‘violent felony.’”  United States v. Thrower, 914

F.3d at 777; see United States v. Pereira‐Gomez, 903 F.3d at 165 (holding,

by reference to New York’s definition of “forcible stealing,” that “[b]y

its plain language, . . . New York’s robbery statute includes as an

element the use of violent force”).  This is hardly surprising.  New

York’s definition of “forcible stealing” “is modeled on the common

law definition of robbery,” which requires “the amount of force

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necessary to overcome a victim’s resistance.”  United States v. Thrower,

914 F.3d at 775 (quoting Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. at 555).  

And, as the Supreme Court has explained, “the term ‘physical force’

in ACCA encompasses the degree of force necessary to commit

common‐law robbery.”   Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. at 555.  

Curtis Johnson recognized as much when, in defining physical force, it

relied on a definition that “specifically encompassed robbery: [f]orce

consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed against a robbery

victim.”    Id. at 553 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original)

(internal quotation marks omitted).    Thus, when in Stokeling the

Supreme Court recognized Florida robbery as a violent felony, it

explained that “ACCA encompasses the degree of force necessary to

commit common‐law robbery, and . . . Florida robbery requires that

same degree of ‘force.’”  Id. at 555.

The same reasoning informs this court’s decisions in Thrower,

Pereira‐Gomez, and Stuckey recognizing a physical‐force element in

any degree of New York robbery.  We reiterate that conclusion here.  

Even if, as Ojeda argues, it is possible to satisfy the aggravating

element of first‐degree robbery through circumstances that do not

themselves require the use or threatened use of physical force, it is not

possible to satisfy the forcible taking element of New York robbery

without physical force as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis

Johnson and Stokeling.   

Thus, the district court, far from committing plain error, correctly

concluded that Ojeda’s 2007 New York first‐degree robbery

conviction was for a violent felony as defined in ACCA’s elements

clause.

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II. Ojeda’s Attempted Controlled Substance Crimes Are

“Serious Drug Offenses” as Defined in 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)

ACCA defines “serious drug offense” to include those state law

crimes “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with

intent to manufacture or distribute, a [federally recognized]

controlled substance” punishable by a maximum prison term of ten

years or more.  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added).  Ojeda

argues that the highlighted word “involving” is too vague to alert

average persons to what conduct might constitute a serious drug

offense beyond the actual manufacture, distribution, or possession

(with intent to manufacture or distribute) of controlled substances.  

Specifically, he argues that the word is too vague to encompass the

New York attempted drug sale and possession with intent to sell

crimes for which he was convicted in 1998.   

Ojeda acknowledges that this court ruled to the contrary in

United States v. King, 325 F.3d 110, 115 (2d Cir. 2003).    There, we

expressly recognized New York attempted possession of a controlled

substance with intent to sell as a serious drug offense under ACCA.4  

He  nevertheless maintains that King must be reconsidered in light of

4 Every other circuit to address the issue since King has agreed.  See United

States v. Daniels, 915 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding ACCA’s definition

of serious drug offense encompasses Pennsylvania attempt and accomplice

liability crimes); United States v. Coleman, 700 F.3d 329, 339 (8th Cir. 2012)

(holding attempted sale of controlled substance involves distributing or

possessing with intent to distribute so as to qualify as serious drug offense

under ACCA); United States v. Williams, 488 F.3d 1004, 1008–09 (D.C. Cir.

2007) (holding attempted distribution of cocaine qualifies as serious drug

offense under ACCA); United States v. Winbush, 407 F.3d 703, 705–08 (5th

Cir. 2005) (holding Louisiana attempted possession of cocaine with intent

to distribute qualifies as serious drug offense under ACCA).

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Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551.  The Supreme Court

there held another definitional provision of ACCA, specifically,

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual clause definition of violent felony,

unconstitutionally vague.    Ojeda submits that just as the phrase

“conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury” in

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) “fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the

conduct it punishes,” id. at 2556 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352, 357–58 (1983)), so the phrase “involving manufacturing,

distributing, or possessing” in § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) suffers from the same

defect.   

The argument is defeated by this court’s post‐Samuel Johnson

decision in United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130.    There, we cited

approvingly to King’s recognition that the word “involving” has

“expansive connotations,” which signal § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s reach

“beyond the precise offenses of distributing, manufacturing, or

possessing” drugs.  Id. at 142.  We concluded therefrom that just as an

attempt to possess a controlled substance (the crime of conviction in

King) “involves possessing a controlled substance, so too does an

attempt to sell—or to offer or agree to sell—a controlled substance

involve distributing a controlled substance.”  Id. at 142–43 (alterations

and ellipses omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Thus, such

attempt crimes qualify as serious drug offenses under ACCA.  See id.

at 144.   

We recognize that, in reaching this conclusion, Wallace did not

specifically discuss Samuel Johnson.    The omission is irrelevant,

however, because nothing in Samuel Johnson warrants a different

conclusion.   

The word identified as unconstitutionally vague in Samuel

Johnson is not “involving” but “risk.”  The Supreme Court concluded

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that the latter word as used in the residual clause of ACCA’s violent

felony definition left “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk

posed by a crime,” particularly “a judicially imagined ‘ordinary case’

of a crime.”    Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. at 2557

(emphasis added).  Further, it left “uncertainty about how much risk it

takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”  Id. at 2558 (emphasis

added).    Such uncertainties do not arise with respect to the word

“involving.”5    Although we have recognized that word to have

“expansive connotations,” allowing § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) to reach beyond

substantive manufacturing, distribution, and possession drug crimes,

United States v. King, 325 F.3d at 113, that does not mean that it is

boundless, much less unconstitutionally vague.   Indeed, when the

word is given its ordinary meaning, it focuses attention on the

elements of a drug crime, not on some hypothetical “ordinary case.”  

To explain, in Biocad JSC v. Hoffman‐La Roche, 942 F.3d 88 (2d

Cir. 2019), this court construed the word “involving” as used in the

Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 6a (stating

that Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or

5 At least one other circuit has held, in a precedential opinion, that Samuel

Johnson did not invalidate—implicitly or otherwise—the definition of the

word “involving” in the context of a serious drug offense.  See United States

v. Cain, 877 F.3d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 2017) (holding that Samuel Johnson

“addressed the residual clause under the violent‐felonies portion of the

ACCA” and did not “expressly or implicitly overrule” earlier decisions

describing word “involving” in “serious‐drug‐offense portion” of ACCA

(internal quotation marks omitted)).    Other circuits have held in non‐

precedential summary orders that Samuel Johnson did not implicitly

invalidate other ACCA definitions.  See, e.g., United States v. Hunter, 749 F.

App’x 811, 813 (11th Cir. 2018) (summary order); United States v.

Washington, 726 F. App’x 483, 484 (6th Cir. 2018) (summary order); United

States v. Cilla, 712 F. App’x 880, 884 (11th Cir. 2017) (summary order); United

States v. Collazo, 672 F. App’x 796, 797 (10th Cir. 2016) (summary order).  

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commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign

nations” (emphasis added)).   While acknowledging the “expansive

connotations” of “involving,” Biocad JSC v. Hoffman‐La Roche, 942 F.3d

at 97 (quoting United States v. King, 325 F.3d at 113), we observed that

the “most common meaning” of the word “is including (or having) as

a necessary feature, accompaniment, or consequence,” and concluded

that 15 U.S.C. § 6a used the word in that sense, id. at 96 (citing OXFORD

ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) and AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE

DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1997) definitions of “involve”).   

Applying that “common meaning” here, we conclude that the

“necessary features” of a crime are its elements.    Indeed, that

conclusion appears dictated by Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478

(2012).  The Supreme Court there ruled that determining whether tax

crimes “involve fraud or deceit,” so as to constitute aggravated

felonies subjecting convicted aliens to deportation, requires “a

categorical approach” that depends on whether “the elements of the

offenses” establish that the crimes involve fraud or deceit.  Id. at 483

(concluding that fraud and deceit are elements both of knowingly and

willfully making false tax returns and knowingly and willfully aiding

in the making of such returns).

In considering whether the elements of Ojeda’s attempted drug

crimes are “manufacturing, distributing, or possessing” controlled

substances, we begin by recognizing that a crime’s elements serve to

give notice of both the actus reus proscribed by a particular crime and

the mens rea required for culpability.    Where manufacture,

distribution, or possession of a controlled substance is a crime’s actus

reus element, the crime will generally be substantive.    Where

manufacture, distribution, or possession defines the mens rea element,

the crime may also be inchoate, as in the case of attempt or conspiracy.  

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In the latter circumstance as well as the former, however, the element

serves fair notice on ordinary persons that the crime necessarily

“involv[es] manufacturing, distributing, or possessing” a controlled

substance so as to constitute a serious drug offense under ACCA.  18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see Kolender v. Lawson, 461

U.S. at 357–58 (discussing “fair notice” necessary to avoid

unconstitutional vagueness).6  

The conclusion that “involving” reasonably identifies inchoate

as well as substantive drug crimes is only bolstered by 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(i).   Congress there defines “serious drug offense” by

reference to federal law, including any “offense under the Controlled

Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.).”  That federal law proscribes

not only the substantive manufacture, distribution, and possession of

controlled substances, but also related attempts and conspiracies to

manufacture, distribute, or possess controlled substances.    See 21

U.S.C. § 846.    Further, it prescribes identical punishments for

substantive and inchoate manufacture, distribution, or possession

crimes, signaling Congress’s view that they are equally serious drug

offenses.  See id.  From this statutory structure, we conclude that in

identifying state offenses qualifying as serious drug offenses in 18

U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), Congress used the word “involving” to

6 Indeed, the significance of a mensrea element in providing notice is evident

in a case presently before the Supreme Court.  See Shular v. United States,

No. 18‐662 (argued Jan. 21, 2020).   Defendant there argues that his state

substantive drug conviction for selling a controlled substance does not

“involve” distribution—and therefore is not a serious drug offense—

because the law under which he was convicted does not require proof of

knowledge as to the substance’s illicit nature.    We need not await the

outcome of that case because Ojeda’s attempt crimes of conviction clearly

require such knowledge.  See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00, 220.16(1), 220.39

(discussed infra at 19–20).

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reference both substantive crimes of actual manufacture, distribution,

and possession, and inchoate attempt or conspiracy crimes of

intended manufacture, distribution, and possession.  See United States

v. Daniels, 915 F.3d at 157 (“There was no reason for Congress to add

specific language regarding attempt crimes because it had already

included the term ‘involving’—a term that . . . clearly encompasses

attempts.”).

There can be no question that the mens rea element of Ojeda’s

attempt crimes of conviction required proof that he specifically

intended (1) to distribute (indeed, to sell) what he knew was a

controlled substance, and (2) to possess what he knew was a

controlled substance with intent to distribute it.  New York law states

that a person is guilty of third‐degree criminal sale of a controlled

substance “when he knowingly and unlawfully sells . . . a [controlled

substance].”  N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) (emphasis added).  A person

is guilty of third‐degree criminal possession of a controlled substance

“when he knowingly and unlawfully possesses . . . a [controlled

substance] with intent to sell it.”  Id. § 220.16(1) (emphasis added).  A

person is guilty of attempt to commit either of these crimes “when,

with intent to commit [the] crime, he engages in conduct which tends to

effect the commission of such crime.”  Id. § 110.00 (emphasis added);

see also People v. Acosta, 80 N.Y.2d 665, 670, 593 N.Y.S.2d 978, 981

(1993).   In New York, “a person can be convicted of an attempt to

commit an offense only if it is proven that he came ‘very near’ or

‘dangerously near’ to successfully completing the intended crime.”  

United States v. King, 325 F.3d at 114 (quoting People v. Acosta, 80

N.Y.2d at 670, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 981, and collecting other New York

cases to same effect).  Where a defendant, such as Ojeda, is thus found

to have intended to sell, or to have possessed with intent to sell, what

he knew were controlled substances and, indeed, to have come

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dangerously near to achieving that  intended objective, he can hardly

claim to have lacked fair notice that his conviction was for a crime

“involving” the distribution of a controlled substance.   

Thus, we reject Ojeda’s vagueness challenge to 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), and we conclude that the district court correctly

identified his 1998 convictions to be for two serious drug offenses.  

With prior convictions for two serious drug offenses and for a violent

felony, Ojeda had to be sentenced for his § 922(g)(1) crime to a

mandatory minimum term of 15 years’ imprisonment pursuant to

ACCA.

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we conclude as follows:

(1) First‐degree robbery, like every degree of robbery under

New York law, is a violent felony as defined in ACCA, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because the forcible‐takings element common to

New York robbery in every degree requires the use or threatened use

of physical force as defined by the Supreme Court in Curtis Johnson v.

United States, 559 U.S. 133, and Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544.  

This court has previously so recognized in United States v. Thrower,

914 F.3d at 770, and Stuckey v. United States, 878 F.3d 62, and in a

Sentencing Guidelines context in United States v. Pereira‐Gomez, 903

F.3d 155.    Ojeda cannot urge otherwise by focusing only on the

aggravating element of first‐degree robbery, while ignoring the

forcible‐takings element.

(2) Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, which

invalidated ACCA’s residual clause definition of violent felony as

unconstitutionally vague, does not undermine this court’s

precedents, both before and after Samuel Johnson,    recognizing

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attempted drug sales or attempted drug possession with intent to sell

in violation of New York law as serious drug offenses under ACCA.  

See United States v. Thrower, 914 F.3d 770; United States v. King, 325 F.3d

110.    Whether a crime’s actus reus element proscribes actual

manufacture, distribution, or possession of a controlled substance, or

a crime’s mens rea element requires intent knowingly to engage in

such conduct, a person is given fair notice that the crime involves

manufacture, distribution, or possession and, thus, qualifies as a

serious drug offense under ACCA.

(3) The district court correctly followed controlling precedent

in identifying defendant’s two prior New York State drug

convictions, one for attempted drug sale and the other for attempted

drug possession with intent to sell, as serious drug offenses under

ACCA.   Further, in light of those two drug convictions, as well as

defendant’s conviction for the violent felony of New York first‐degree

robbery, the district court correctly sentenced defendant to the ACCA

mandated minimum term of 15 years’ incarceration on the § 922(g)(1)

felon‐in‐possession count of conviction in this case.  

Accordingly, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED.

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