Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01147/USCOURTS-caDC-08-01147-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Labor
Respondent
International Union, United Mine Workers of America
Petitioner
Mine Safety and Health Administration
Respondent
National Mining Association
Intervenor for Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued December 12, 2008 Decided February 10, 2009 

No. 08-1147 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, 

PETITIONER

v. 

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH 

ADMINISTRATION, 

RESPONDENTS

NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, 

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Federal Mine 

Safety & Health Administration 

Judith Rivlin argued the cause for petitioner. With her on 

the briefs was Grant Crandall. 

Edward Waldman, Attorney, Mine Safety & Health 

Administration, argued the cause for respondents. With him 

on the brief was W. Christian Schumann, Counsel. Robin A. 

Rosenbluth, Attorney, entered an appearance. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 1 of 9
2

Henry Chajet and Harold P. Quinn were on the brief for 

intervenor.

Before: GINSBURG and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge: In 2006, Congress 

passed the MINER Act with the purpose of improving mine 

safety. Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493. Section 4 of the 

Act requires the Secretary of Labor to issue certain regulations 

concerning mine rescue teams. 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2). The 

petitioner, United Mine Workers of America, challenges 

several provisions of the final rule that the Mine Safety and 

Health Administration (“MSHA”) issued pursuant to Section 

4. 73 Fed. Reg. 7636/1 (Feb. 8, 2008). We hold that the final 

rule is inconsistent with the Act in three respects. It allows 

certain rescue teams to meet the requirements by training at 

small mines annually rather than semi-annually, and allows 

state employees on mine rescue teams to fulfill their 

obligations with participation in only one mine rescue contest 

per year and, even then, with service merely as a contest 

judge. The statute permits none of these. We therefore grant 

the petition with respect to those portions of the rule, and deny 

it in all other respects. 

* * * 

The union’s first argument concerns the Act’s “small 

mines provision.” 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(B)(iv). Among 

other things, this provision requires that the regulations 

provide “(iv) [t]hat the operator of each underground coal 

mine with 36 or less employees shall — . . . (II) make 

available two certified mine rescue teams whose members — 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 2 of 9
3

. . . (cc) participate at least semi-annually in mine rescue 

training at the underground coal mine covered by the mine 

rescue team.” Id. § 825(e)(2)(B)(iv)(II)(cc). This is an 

unambiguous requirement that each small mine must provide 

two certified mine rescue teams that train at that mine “at least 

semi-annually.” MSHA’s final rule, however, allows two 

types of rescue teams—mine-site and state-sponsored teams—

to train at small mines only once a year. 30 C.F.R. 

§ 49.20(b)(1), (b)(4). (The rule requires semi-annual training 

for “contract” and “composite” teams. Id. § 49.20(b)(2), 

(b)(3).) 

MSHA’s only argument in defense of its apparent 

violation of the statutory text is a creative but fruitless one. It 

focuses on the last of the requirements imposed on the rescue 

teams operating at small mines, which states that they must be 

“comprised of individuals with a minimum of 3 years . . . 

experience that shall have occurred within the 10-year period 

preceding their employment on the contract mine rescue 

team.” 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(B)(iv)(II)(ff). From this 

provision it generates a three-step justification: (1) This last 

requirement can only be met by contract teams; (2) because 

the word “and” connects this requirement with the other five, 

they must be read conjunctively, so that “all listed criteria 

must be fulfilled,” Respondent’s Br. at 19; (3) therefore “one 

can read the statutory language to mean that the six criteria 

apply to members only of contract rescue teams.” Id. 

Assuming arguendo that MSHA’s first two steps are 

reasonable, the third does not follow. The logical implication 

of the first two steps is simply that only contract teams could 

meet the requirements. This would not undercut the language 

requiring that each team must train at the mine at least semiannually. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 3 of 9
4

* * * 

Section 4 of the MINER Act also requires rescue teams 

serving both large and small mines to participate in two local 

mine rescue contests each year. 30 U.S.C. 

§§ 825(e)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)(BB), (iv)(II)(bb). The union 

challenges four aspects of MSHA’s implementation of this 

requirement. 

First, the union argues that the final rule violates the 

requirement by allowing mine rescue team members who are 

state employees with certain job duties to “substitute their 

regular job experience for 50 percent of the training 

requirements,” (i.e., for one of the two contests each year). 30 

C.F.R. § 49.11 (table). In allowing some team members to 

participate in only one contest per year, the final rule once 

again directly contravenes explicit statutory language. In its 

brief, MSHA does not even attempt to argue that the final rule 

constitutes a plausible interpretation of the statute. It argues 

instead that the experience of the state employees “is, at the 

least, the functional equivalent of the training they would gain 

in participating in one mine rescue team contest.” 

Respondent’s Br. at 34. The statute, however, requires two 

mine contests, not their functional equivalent. 

The union’s second argument presents a closer question. 

It suggests that MSHA also erred by allowing state employees 

to fulfill the rescue contest requirement by judging a contest, 

rather than participating in it as a contestant. 73 Fed. Reg. 

7643/2-3. As a purely linguistic matter, it might not seem 

unreasonable to say that a contest judge “participated” in a 

contest. But in this particular context, we are convinced that 

MSHA’s interpretation is unreasonable. This conclusion 

follows from MSHA’s own understanding of the rescue 

contest requirement—an understanding we believe is 

compelled by the statute. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 4 of 9
5

In its analysis of the proposed rule, MSHA described 

mine rescue contests as “opportunit[ies] to test the team 

member’s level of knowledge and skill under simulated mine 

emergency conditions.” 72 Fed. Reg. 51326/3. It noted that 

the experience of “being timed, observed, and judged provides 

a measure of stress” and that “[t]he ability to make correct 

decisions quickly, while under stress and wearing breathing 

apparatus, is a vital skill for each mine rescue team member to 

develop.” Id. The same themes appeared in the analysis of 

the final rule. Rescue contests “sharpen skills” and “provide[] 

individuals with practical, hands-on experience.” 73 Fed. 

Reg. 7641/1. MSHA describes the role of judges in terms that 

focus on their contributions to the teams’ experience. The 

contest judges “evaluate teams and provide a written 

evaluation and score after each contest,” determining whether 

each team “demonstrates acceptable skills to be certified,” 

thereby allowing the team to “learn from constructive 

feedback and their experiences during contests.” Id. at 

7641/2. In addition, MSHA used the fact that rescue teams 

would receive objective evaluation in mine contests to argue 

that its approach satisfied the Act’s certification requirements. 

Id. at 7643/1; see also 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(B)(ii). In 

explicitly demanding experiential education, Congress can 

hardly have had in mind the relatively cerebral, hands-off 

activity of evaluation, no matter how instructive. 

Accordingly, MSHA’s conclusion that one can participate in a 

mine contest by judging is at odds with the statutory language. 

The union’s remaining challenges to MSHA’s 

implementation of the rescue contest requirement are without 

merit. The first is the claim that MSHA improperly classifies 

Mine Emergency Response Development (“MERD”) 

exercises as mine rescue contests. The union has not 

identified, however, any feature of a mine rescue contest that 

such an exercise would lack. In a compliance guide for the 

rescue team regulations, see U.S. Department of Labor, Mine 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 5 of 9
6

Safety and Health Administration, Mine Rescue Teams; Final 

Rule: Questions and Answers, 9-11 (Apr. 2008), the Secretary 

has paraphrased the regulatory requirements for regular mine 

contests as seven criteria, and has promulgated the identical

criteria for MERD exercises. These requirements include the 

use of MSHA-recognized rules; a minimum of three teams 

competing; one or more problems with a determined winner; 

and evaluation by judges. Id. The union points to no feature 

of the governing regulation, 30 C.F.R. § 49.60, that is not 

replicated for MERD exercises. MSHA’s interpretation is 

clearly reasonable. 

The union further objects to MSHA’s provision that a 

contest “[h]as one or more problems conducted on one or 

more days.” Id. § 49.60(a)(4). According to the union, this 

means that a single two-day contest could meet the two 

contest requirement. Petitioner’s Br. at 23. But nothing in the 

statute precludes a rule allowing two contests’ being held on 

consecutive days. It is reasonable for MSHA to allow for that 

possibility, provided that each of the contests meets all of the 

statutory requirements. 

* * * 

The union also challenges MSHA’s implementation of 

the Act’s certification and training requirements. Both of 

these challenges fail. With respect to certification, the Act 

requires MSHA to “establish, and update every 5 years 

thereafter, criteria to certify the qualifications of mine rescue 

teams.” 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(B)(ii). The union claims that 

MSHA violated those instructions by vesting the certification 

obligation in mine operators, rather than handling certification 

itself. 30 C.F.R. § 49.50(a). But the Act merely requires 

MSHA to establish the certification criteria; it does not 

specify who is to determine whether particular mine rescue 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 6 of 9
7

teams have met the criteria. MSHA’s choice was reasonable, 

and consistent with Congress’s statement that mine operators 

“have the primary responsibility to prevent the existence of 

[unsafe and unhealthful] conditions and practices” at their 

mines. 30 U.S.C. § 801(e). 

In its reply brief, the union attempts to morph this claim 

into an argument regarding the adequacy of the certification 

criteria themselves. But it has forfeited that distinct argument 

by failing to advance it in its opening brief. Carducci v. 

Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 

The union’s argument concerning the on-site training 

requirement is equally unavailing. The MINER Act requires 

mine rescue teams to train at the underground coal mine 

covered by the team; the frequency of the training varies by 

type of team. 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(B)(iii)(I)(bb)(CC), 

(II)(bb)(BB), (II)(bb)(CC)(aaa), (iv)(II)(cc). In implementing 

these provisions, MSHA required that “a portion of the 

training must be conducted underground,” 30 C.F.R. 

§ 49.20(d), but declined to specify any minimum time to be 

spent underground. 73 Fed. Reg. 7641/1. The union contends 

that this decision is arbitrary and capricious. But the statute 

does not speak to how much time has to be spent 

underground, and MSHA sensibly observed that “the amount 

of time required to familiarize teams with a particular mine 

will vary” and that “teams may need more time to become 

familiar with complex mines and newer team members may 

require more time to achieve this familiarity.” Id. In light of 

these considerations, MSHA decided not to impose a set 

minimum of underground time at each mine. Id. We see 

nothing arbitrary or capricious about this reasoning. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 7 of 9
8

* * * 

Finally, the union notes that the MINER Act requires the 

regulations to be “finalized and in effect” within 18 months of 

the Act’s enactment, 30 U.S.C. § 825(e)(2)(A), which means 

they were to be in place by December 2007. In fact, MSHA 

issued the final rule only in February 2008, with staggered 

implementation provisions that delayed full compliance until 

February 2009. 73 Fed. Reg. 7636/1. Now, as a result of our 

remand, MSHA will have to take further action. The union, 

anticipating at least some measure of substantive victory, 

urges us, in light of “the statutory timetable showing that 

Congress intended speedy action, and the Agency’s initial 

failure to meet its mandated schedule,” Petitioner’s Br. at 32-

33, to impose a scheduling order and to retain jurisdiction. 

See Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 

79-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 

We know of no case, however, where a court has taken an 

agency’s failure to meet a statutory deadline (itself not 

automatically indicative of unreasonable delay, see id. at 80) 

as a springboard for imposing time limits on a remand. The 

final rule, though delayed, has now been issued; the 

modifications required by this opinion, obviously, have not 

yet been delayed. We have no reason to assume that MSHA 

will not proceed expeditiously. We therefore decline to 

impose a scheduling order or to retain jurisdiction. 

* * * 

In sum, the final rule violates the Act by allowing certain 

teams to train at their mines annually rather than semiannually, and by allowing certain state employees to substitute 

their job duties for one of the two required rescue contests and 

to meet the contest requirement by serving as a judge. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 8 of 9
9

Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the rule and remand 

to MSHA for further consideration. We deny the petition in 

all other respects. 

So ordered. 

USCA Case #08-1147 Document #1164081 Filed: 02/10/2009 Page 9 of 9