Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-16-71309/USCOURTS-ca9-16-71309-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William P. Barr
Respondent
Maria Jauregui-Cardenas
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA JAUREGUI-CARDENAS,

Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,

Respondent.

No. 16-71309 

Agency No.

A205-320-208 

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted November 15, 2019

Pasadena, California

Filed January 13, 2020

Before: Marsha S. Berzon and Paul J. Watford, Circuit 

Judges, and Robert H. Whaley,* District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Whaley;

Concurrence by Judge Berzon

* The Honorable Robert H. Whaley, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Washington, sitting by designation.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 1 of 12
2 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel granted Maria Jauregui-Cardenas’ petition for 

review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals 

concluding that she was ineligible for cancellation of 

removal due to her conviction for using false documents to 

conceal citizenship, in violation of California Penal Code 

(“CPC”) § 114, and reversed and remanded, holding that 

CPC § 114 is neither an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1101(43)(P) nor a crime involving moral turpitude. 

The panel observed that the necessary elements for 

conviction under CPC § 114 are: (1) the use; (2) of a false 

document; (3) to conceal citizenship or alien status; (4) with 

specific intent.

The panel held that CPC § 114 is not an aggravated 

felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(43)(P). The definition of an 

aggravated felony set out in § 1101(43)(P) incorporates an 

offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which, as relevant 

here, provides that “[w]hoever . . . uses . . . any such visa, 

permit, border crossing card, alien registration card, or other 

document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into 

or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the 

United States, knowing it to be . . . falsely made” shall be 

punished by law. The panel concluded that CPC § 114 is not 

a match to 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), explaining that, in contrast 

to the elements of the state statute, which allow for the use 

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 2 of 12
JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR 3

of any false document, the federal offense narrowly 

proscribes the use of specific, enumerated documents.

The panel also concluded CPC § 114 is not divisible, 

noting that there are no subsections or separate elements 

expressed in the statute that could be independently proven. 

Thus, the panel concluded that the application of the 

modified categorical approach would be improper, 

explaining that the inquiry ends here with the state statute of 

conviction being broader than its federal counterpart and 

thus, not a match for an aggravated felony.

The panel further held that CPC § 114 is not a CIMT. In 

so concluding, the panel observed that this court has defined 

a CIMT as an offense involving either fraud or base, vile, 

and depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience, and 

that a state conviction qualifies as a fraudulent CIMT when 

the intent to defraud is explicit in the statutory definition of 

the crime or implicit in the nature of the crime. Looking to 

CPC § 114, the panel noted that a violation occurs when a 

person has specific intent to use any false document to 

conceal his or her citizenship for any reason, and therefore, 

intent to defraud is not explicit in the definition. 

Considering whether the crime is inherently fraudulent, 

the panel observed that this court has held that intent to 

defraud is implicit in the nature of the crime when the 

individual makes false statements in order to procure 

something of value, either monetary or non-monetary. Here, 

the panel explained that CPC § 114 does not require that 

there be any specific benefit to any specific person—it 

permits conviction simply for the use of a document to show 

another that the holder is a legal resident, even where that 

representation does not incur any benefit to the defendant. 

Accordingly, the panel held that because CPC § 114 does not 

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 3 of 12
4 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

require fraudulent intent, it is overbroad, and therefore, not 

categorically a CIMT.

Concurring, Judge Berzon wrote that she concurred in 

the majority opinion in full, but wrote separately to reiterate 

her view that the phrase, “crime involving moral turpitude” 

is unconstitutionally vague. Observing that persistent efforts 

have failed to establish a standard of what a crime involving 

moral turpitude is, Judge Berzon wrote that it is time to 

revisit whether this phrase is unconstitutionally vague.

COUNSEL

Richard Flores Lemus (argued), Law Offices of Richard F. 

Lemus, Fullerton, California, for Petitioner. 

Yanal H. Yousef (argued), Trial Attorney, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, Civil Division, United States 

Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

OPINION

WHALEY, District Judge:

Maria Jauregui-Cardenas petitions for review of a final 

order of removal, arguing the Board of Immigration Appeals 

(“BIA”) erred in holding that she is an inadmissible alien 

who is not eligible for discretionary relief. The BIA 

concluded Jauregui-Cardenas is ineligible for cancellation of 

removal because her conviction for using false documents to 

conceal citizenship, in violation of California Penal Code 

(“CPC”) § 114, categorically qualifies as an aggravated 

felony and alternatively, a crime involving moral turpitude 

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 4 of 12
JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR 5

(“CIMT”). Because the BIA erred in concluding that a 

conviction under CPC § 114 qualifies as an aggravated 

felony and a CIMT, we grant Jauregui-Cardenas’ petition 

and remand for further consideration.1

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jauregui-Cardenas, a native of Mexico, has been living 

in the United States since 1992. In July 2013, JaureguiCardenas was convicted of using a false document to conceal 

citizenship, in violation of CPC § 114, and was sentenced to 

five years’ imprisonment. Shortly thereafter, the Department 

of Homeland Security issued Jauregui-Cardenas a Notice to 

Appear and initiated removal proceedings against her. 

Jauregui-Cardenas sought relief from removal in the form of 

an application for cancellation of removal, pursuant to 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

An immigration judge (“IJ”) concluded that JaureguiCardenas was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of 

removal because her state conviction was categorically an 

aggravated felony pursuant to the Immigration and 

Nationality Act (“INA”), § 1101(a)(43)(P). The IJ issued a 

written decision denying Jauregui-Cardenas’ request for 

relief and ordering that she be removed from the United 

States.

On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that 

Jauregui-Cardenas’ conviction under CPC § 114 constitutes 

a categorical aggravated felony. The BIA further concluded, 

sua sponte, that the statute of conviction also qualifies as a 

1 Because we hold that Jauregui-Cardenas’ conviction under CPC 

§ 114 is not an aggravated felony or a CIMT that would bar her from 

cancellation of removal, we need not and do not reach the continuance 

issue in this matter.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 5 of 12
6 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

categorical CIMT because it requires the use of a false 

document. Jauregui-Cardenas was declared ineligible for 

cancellation of removal and her appeal was dismissed. She 

now timely petitions for review.

Whether a conviction under CPC § 114 constitutes an 

aggravated felony or a CIMT for immigration purposes are 

novel issues before this court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review final orders of 

removal. See Galindo-Romero v. Holder, 640 F.3d 873, 877 

(9th Cir. 2011). The proper standard for reviewing 

immigration proceedings depends on the nature of the 

decision being reviewed. Viridiana v. Holder, 646 F.3d 

1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 2011). We review questions of law de 

novo, including whether a state statutory crime qualifies as 

an aggravated felony or a CIMT. See Roman-Suaste v. 

Holder, 766 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2014); see also

Cuevas-Gasper v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 

2005), abrogated in other part by Holder v. Martinez 

Gutierrez, 566 U.S. 583 (2011). Where, as here, the BIA 

“has reviewed the IJ’s decision and incorporated portions of 

it as its own, we treat the incorporated parts of the IJ’s 

decision as the BIA’s.” Monlina-Estrada v. INS, 293 F.3d 

1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). When concluding that a 

particular crime constitutes a predicate offense, if the BIA 

does not issue or rely on a published opinion we defer to its 

conclusion only to the extent that it has the “power to 

persuade.” See Nunez v. Holder, 594 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th 

Cir. 2010), superseded in other part by rule as recognized in 

Betansos v. Barr, 928 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal 

citation and quotation marks omitted).

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 6 of 12
JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR 7

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to the INA, certain noncitizens who are 

convicted of a predicate state offense are removable. 

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). In determining whether a conviction 

constitutes a disqualifying offense, such as an aggravated 

felony or a CIMT, courts apply the multi-step categorical 

approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 

599–602 (1990). See Hernandez-Cruz v. Holder, 651 F.3d 

1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2011). A state offense categorically 

qualifies as an aggravated felony or a CIMT when its 

elements, without any consideration of the facts underlying 

the individual case, are fully encompassed by the generic 

federal offense. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 191 

(2013). Thus, the first step of this approach is identifying the 

elements of the statute of conviction.

The second step involves comparing the elements of the 

statute of conviction to the generic federal definition to 

determine whether the statute of conviction is broader than 

the federal definition. See Ceron v. Holder, 747 F.3d 773, 

778 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A state statute is overbroad if 

“there is a ‘realistic probability’ of its application to conduct 

that falls beyond the scope of the generic federal offense.” 

Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 

2013) (quoting Nunez, 594 F.3d at 1129).

If the statute is overbroad, the third step requires 

determining whether the statute is divisible, thus warranting 

application of the modified categorical approach. See 

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263–65 (2013). 

Under Descamps, a divisible statute is one that “sets out one 

or more elements of the offense in the alternative—for 

example, stating that burglary involves entry into a building 

or an automobile.” Id. at 257. When a statute is indivisible, 

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 7 of 12
8 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

the inquiry ends and the overbroad statute cannot be used as 

a predicate offense. Id. at 265.

I

At issue on review is whether a conviction for a violation 

of CPC § 114 constitutes a predicate offense rendering 

Jauregui-Cardenas ineligible for discretionary relief from 

removal. Thus, our inquiry centers around the statutory 

language of CPC § 114, which provides as follows:

Any person who uses false documents to 

conceal his or her true citizenship or resident 

alien status is guilty of a felony, and shall be 

punished by imprisonment pursuant to 

subdivision (h) of Section 1170 for five years 

or by a fine of twenty-five thousand dollars 

($25,000).

In determining whether the California statute 

categorically qualifies as an aggravated felony, we employ 

the steps of the categorical approach. See supra at pp. 7–8. 

Based on the above, the necessary elements for conviction

under CPC § 114 are: (1) the use; (2) of a false document; 

(3) to conceal citizenship or alien status; (4) with specific 

intent. Having identified the elements of the statute of 

conviction, we then compare these elements with the 

relevant federal definition of an aggravated felony.2

18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) provides:

2 INA Section 1101provides, in relevant part:

(43) The term “aggravated felony” means—

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 8 of 12
JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR 9

Whoever . . . utters, uses, attempts to use, 

possesses, obtains, accepts, or receives any 

such visa, permit, border crossing card, alien 

registration receipt card, or other document 

prescribed by statute or regulation for entry 

into or as evidence of authorized stay or 

employment in the United States, knowing it 

to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely 

made, or to have been procured by means of 

any false claim or statement, or to have been 

otherwise procured by fraud or unlawfully 

obtained [shall be punished according to 

law].

In contrast to the elements in the state statute, which 

allow for the use of any false document, the federal offense 

narrowly proscribes only the use of the specific documents 

enumerated in § 1546(a). Thus, the California statute cannot 

be a match to the federal offense because it includes 

documents, such as fake drivers’ licenses, that are not 

enumerated in the description of the federal crime. See

United States v. Wei Lin, 738 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 

2013) (the fraudulent use of a driver’s license did not 

establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) because it is not 

the type of document enumerated in the statute); People v. 

Galvan, 2008 WL 4666423, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 

(defendant pleaded no contest to a CPC § 114 charge after 

(P) an offense (i) which either is falsely making, 

forging, counterfeiting, mutilating, or altering a 

passport or instrument in violation of section 1543 of 

title 18 or is described in section 1546(a) of such title 

(relating to document fraud) and (ii) for which the term 

of imprisonment is at least 12 months.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 9 of 12
10 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

admitting to obtaining “a fake DMV identification card in 

order to work”). The California statute is overbroad.

Further, the California statute is not divisible, as there are 

no subsections or separate elements expressed in the statute 

that could be independently proven. As such, application of 

the modified categorical approach would be improper. The 

inquiry ends with the state statute of conviction being 

broader than its federal counterpart and thus, not a match. 

Accordingly, we hold that CPC § 114 does not constitute an 

aggravated felony for purposes of eligibility for cancellation 

of removal.

II

In the alternative, the BIA concluded that a state 

conviction under CPC § 114 constitutes a CIMT. We 

disagree.3 In reaching our conclusion we again employ the 

categorical approach. See supra at pp. 7–8.

Having already determined the necessary elements for 

the statute of conviction, we begin by comparing these 

elements with the federal definition of a CIMT. Although the 

INA instructs that certain noncitizens who are convicted of 

a CIMT may not receive cancellation of removal pursuant to 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C), the INA does not provide a 

definition for the term “crime involving moral turpitude.” In 

the absence of a statutory definition, this court has defined a 

CIMT as an offense involving “either fraud or base, vile, and 

depraved conduct that shocks the public conscience.” Nunez, 

594 F.3d at 1131 (brackets and internal quotation marks 

3 In addition to arguing that CPC § 114 is not a CIMT under the 

categorical approach, Jauregui-Cardenas asserts that she was denied her 

due process right to be heard because that issue was never argued before 

the BIA or IJ. As we hold that CPC § 114 does not constitute a CIMT, 

we do not reach Jauregui-Cardenas’ due process argument.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 10 of 12
JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR 11

omitted). As relevant here, a state conviction qualifies as a 

fraudulent CIMT when the intent to defraud is explicit in the 

statutory definition of the crime or implicit in the nature of 

the crime. Blanco v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 714, 719 (9th Cir. 

2008).

Looking first to the state statute, the text of CPC § 114 

provides that a violation of the statute occurs when a person 

has specific intent to use any false document to conceal his 

or her citizenship for any reason. Intent to defraud is 

therefore not explicit in the statutory definition of the crime. 

Turning to whether the crime is inherently fraudulent, this 

court has held that “intent to defraud is implicit in the nature 

of the crime when the individual makes false statements in 

order to procure something of value, either monetary or nonmonetary.” Blanco, 518 F.3d at 719. However, where the 

purpose of deception is to obtain an intangible government 

benefit, there is no CIMT. Id. Further, “[w]hen the only 

‘benefit’ the individual obtains is to impede the enforcement 

of the law, the crime does not involve moral turpitude.” See

Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008) 

(citation omitted).

CPC § 114 does not require that there be any specific 

benefit to any specific person—it permits conviction simply 

for the use of a document to show another that the holder is 

a legal resident, even where that representation does not 

incur any benefit to the defendant. Thus, on its face, the 

California statute is overbroad. On that basis alone, it fails to 

qualify as a match with its federal counterpart and our 

inquiry is over.4 As such, we hold that because CPC § 114 

4 As previously noted, CPC § 114 is not divisible and thus, the 

modified categorical approach is not applicable. See supra at p. 10.

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 11 of 12
12 JAUREGUI-CARDENAS V. BARR

does not require fraudulent intent, it is not categorically a 

crime involving moral turpitude.

CONCLUSION 

A conviction under CPC § 114 it is not an aggravated 

felony or a crime involving moral turpitude under the INA. 

Thus, the BIA erred in holding that Jauregui-Cardenas’ state 

conviction precludes her from consideration for cancellation 

of removal.

Accordingly, the petition for review is GRANTED, the 

BIA’s decision is REVERSED, and the matter is

REMANDED to the agency for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion.

BERZON, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion in full. I write separately

to reiterate my view that the phrase “crime involving moral 

turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague. See Barbosa v. Barr, 

926 F.3d 1053, 1060–61 (9th Cir. 2019) (Berzon, J.,

concurring). The majority opinion provides yet another 

example of our “failed enterprise” to consistently determine

whether a crime involves moral turpitude when there is no 

“coherent criteria” as to what that phrase encompasses.

Islas-Veloz v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 1249, 1258–61 (9th Cir.

2019) (Fletcher, J., concurring). As “persistent efforts” have 

failed “to establish a standard” of what a “crime involving 

moral turpitude” is, it is time to revisit whether this phrase is

unconstitutionally vague. See Johnson v. United States, —

U.S. —, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015) (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted).

Case: 16-71309, 01/13/2020, ID: 11558960, DktEntry: 35-1, Page 12 of 12