Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00027/USCOURTS-caed-1_18-cr-00027-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
April Mills
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III

DAVID L. GAPPA

Assistant United States Attorneys

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

APRIL MILLS,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:18-CR-00027 DAD-BAM

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: June 16, 2020

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Dale A. Drozd

This case is set for change of plea on June 16, 2020. This Court issued General Orders 611-618

to address public health concerns related to COVID-19, including the temporary suspension of jury trials

and restrictions on access to court buildings.

Although the General Order addresses the district-wide health concerns, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. And moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id.

at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering and ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either 

orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

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and inexcusable—the General Order requires specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances 

are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of 

justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a 

speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets 

forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice 

served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in 

a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the hearing. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for change of plea on June 15, 2020, with speedy

trial time excluded between May 18, 2020 and June 15, 2020. The Court subsequently moved the 

hearing to June 16, 2020 at 10:00 a.m. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the plea hearing until August 17, 

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2020, and to exclude time between the date of this stipulation and August 17, 2020, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 

3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) and Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case

currently includes more than 10,000 pages of discovery, including investigative reports and 

related documents. This discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made 

available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time in preparation of this case. 

Defendant Mills and the government are currently finalizing plea negotiations. In connection 

with this process, defense counsel requested additional investigative information from the 

government. Counsel for the government has addressed defense counsel’s request. However, 

defense counsel needs additional time, in light of the current circumstances, to counsel her client 

regarding the proposed plea agreement. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions 

on meetings at counsel’s designated office space, defense counsel has been unable to meet with 

defendant in person to counsel her client regarding the government’s plea offer. The additional 

time would allow defense counsel to meet and communicate with her client regarding the 

government’s plea offer. The parties anticipate being able to ultimately resolve the matter and 

finalize and file the parties’ plea agreement for the Court’s consideration. The next earliest 

convenient date for the parties and the Court is August 17, 2020. Thus, the parties request that 

the current change of plea hearing being continued and reset to August 17, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. 

Thus, the requested continuance will conserve time and resources for the parties and the Court.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to and joins in the request for continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by General Orders 611-618

and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt 

in this case because counsel has been encouraged to telework and minimize personal contact to

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the greatest extent possible.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of the date of this stipulation to 

August 17, 2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 

3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by 

the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served 

by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: June 9, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III

HENRY Z. CARBAJAL III

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: June 9, 2020 /s/ CARRIE MCCREARY

CARRIE MCCREARY

Counsel for Defendant 

APRIL MILLS

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FINDINGS AND ORDER

The change of plea is continued from June 16, 2020 to August 17, 2020, at 10:00 a.m. before 

District Judge Dale A. Drozd. The time period of the date of this order to August 17, 2020, inclusive, is 

deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it 

results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis of the Court’s 

finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 10, 2020 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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