Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01628/USCOURTS-ca10-88-01628-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andrew Bonin
Appellant
Richard Bonin
Appellant
Tour West, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

United Sc~te~ Ci>ur.t of Appeals 

'fenth Cfr:::uic 

PUBLISH FEB 2 J 1990 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Si.OBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

ANDREW BONIN; RICHARD BONIN, ) 

v. 

TOUR WEST, 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

) No.·88-1628 

) 

INC., ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. C84-0159G) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

D. David Lambert and Kevin J. Sutterfield, Howard, Lewis & 

Petersen, Provo, Utah, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Byron L. Stubbs, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before McKAY, SEYMOUR, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 1 
assist the determination of 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. 

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Plaintiffs-appellants appeal the 

March 16, 1988. Plaintiffs commenced 

district court's order of 

the underlying diversity 

action to recover damages for injuries they allegedly sustained in 

the course of a raft trip conducted by defendant-appellee guide 

company on the Snake River in Idaho. 

Plaintiffs' claims were tried to a jury which rendered a 

special verdict setting forth answers to specific questions of 

fact, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a), on June 17, 1987. 

Although the court did not enter judgment on the verdict, it 

instructed the parties to file any post-trial motions by 

June 22, 1987. Pursuant to the court's instructions, plaintiffs 

filed their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, 

alternatively, for new trial, on June 22, 1987. Plaintiffs 

contended therein that the jury's answers on the special verdict 

form were irreconcilably inconsistent and that a new trial was 

required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49. The court denied plaintiffs' 

motion on Oct~ber 13, 1987. 

On November 18, 1987, the clerk of the court entered judgment 

on the jury verdict. Plaintiffs then filed a timely motion for 

additur. On December 29, 1987, the court orally vacated the 

judgment entered by the clerk and directed defendant's counsel to 

submit a proposed form of judgment. On March 16, 1988, the court 

entered an order denying plaintiffs' motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, or, alternatively, for new trial, 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 2 
denying plaintiffs' motion for additur, and entering judgment in 

favor of defendant and against plaintiffs based on the jury 

verdict. 

Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the trial court erred in 

refusing to grant them a new trial in light of the jury's 

inconsistent answers. We review a trial court's ruling on a 

motion for new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. Patty 

Precision Prods. Co. v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 

1251 (10th Cir. 1988). "Under the abuse of discretion standard, a 

trial court's decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate 

court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made 

a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible 

choice in the circumstances." United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 

1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Although the trial court did not set forth its reasons for 

denying plaintiffs' motion for new trial in its order of 

March 16, 1988, it did so in its order of October 13, 1987. The 

district court concluded therein that the jury's negative answers 

to questions 1 and 2 on the special verdict form were not 

inconsistent with the jury's responses to questions 7 and 8 and, 

therefore, that a new trial was not necessary. 

The verdict form, with the jury's answers enclosed in 

quotation marks, provided as follows: 

1. Was the 

negligent in causing 

plaintiff Andrew Bonin? 

Yes 

defendant, Tour· West, 

the accident which 

No "X" 

3 

Inc., 

injured 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 3 
J 

2. Was the 

negligent in causing 

plaintiff Richard Bonin? 

Yes 

defendant, Tour 

the accident 

West, 

which 

No 11x11 

Inc., 

injured 

3. If you answered No. 1 above 

this question: Was the defendant's 

proximate cause of the damages alleged 

Andrew Bonin? 

yes, answer 

negligence a 

by plaintiff 

4. If 

this question: 

proximate cause 

Richard Bonin? 

Yes No 

you 

Was 

of 

answered No. 2 above yes, answer 

the defendant's negligence a 

the damages alleged by plaintiff 

Yes No 

5. Was plaintiff Andrew Bonin negligent in 

causing the accident which injured him? 

Yes 11x11 No 

6. Was plaintiff Richard Bonin negligent in 

causing the accident which injured him? 

·Yes "X" No 

7. With respect to the accident which caused 

the injuries to Andrew Bonin, assuming the negligence of 

all the parties to be 100%, what degree of negligence is 

attributed to: 

A. 

B. 

Defendant Tour West, Inc. 

Plaintiff Andrew Bonin 

Total 

11 10 11 % 

II 90 11 % 

100 % 

8. With respect to the accident which caused 

injuries to Richard Bonin,.assuming- the negligence of 

all of the parties to be 100%, what degree of negligence 

is attributed to: 

A. 

B. 

Defendant Tour West, Inc. 

Plaintiff Richard Bonin 

Total 

4 

II 5 II % 

11 95 11 % 

100 % 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 4 
9. If you 

this question: What 

the plaintiff Andrew 

alleged? 

answered No. 3 above yes, answer 

amount would adequately compensate 

Bonin for the special damages 

10. If you answered No. 3 above yes, answer 

this question: What amount would adequately compensate 

the plaintiff Andrew Bonin for general damages? 

11. · If you answered No. 4 above yes, answer 

this question: What amount would adequately compensate 

the plaintiff Richard Bonin for the special damages? 

12. If you answered No. 4 above yes, answer 

this question: What amount would adequately compensate 

the plaintiff Richard Bonin for general damages alleged? 

The district court, noting, its "constitutional duty to 

reconcile apparent inconsistencies in the jury's verdict if at all 

possible," Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 

F.2d 1416, 1431 (10th Cir.)(McKay, J., dissenting in part and 

concurring 

determined: 

in part), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1007 (1986), 

(T]he reference in the Special Verdict which attributes 

and apportions a small degree of negligence to defendant 

is not inconsistent with the definitive initial finding 

by the jury that defendant was not negligent "in causing 

the_ accident" which injured the plainti,f f s. It is clear 

from that response in the Special Verdict that the jury 

found that defendant Tour West, Inc. did not cause the 

injuries of either plaintiff. The evidence presented at 

trial supports such a finding. 

(Record Vol. I, Doc. 69 at 2-3.) In so holding, the court 

apparently was attempting to make a distinction between negligence 

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Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 5 
which caused the accident and negligence which caused plaintiffs' 

injuries. 

On appeal, defendant argues that we should recognize a 

similar distinction. Defendant contends that 

[w)hat the jury actually said when they answered 

questions 7 and 8 and not questions 9, 10, 11, and 12, 

was that the defendant Tour West was. slightly negligent 

with respect·to the cause of the accident, but that Tour 

we·st 's negligence was not the actual or proximate cause 

of any of the injuries complained of by plaintiffs. 

(Brief of Appellee at 6-7.) 

As a preliminary matter, defendant asserts that plaintiffs 

have waived their right to contest any inconsistencies in the 

jury's answers. Defendant argues that plaintiffs should have 

brought the alleged inconsistencies to the court's attention 

before the jury was discharged so that the court could have sent 

the jury back for further deliberations. Having failed to object 

before the jury was dismissed, defendant contends that plaintiffs 

waived their right to challenge any inconsistencies in the verdict 

in a motion for new trial or on appeal. In so arguing, defendant 

relies upon the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b) and cases 

construing that rule, including dicta in Diamond Shamrock, 791 

F.2d at 1423. (Brief of Appellee at 10-13.) 

Rule 49(b), concerning the submission to a jury of a general 

verdict coupled with written interrogatories, provides that when 

the jury's "answers are inconsistent with each other and one or 

more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment 

shall not be entered, but the court shall return the jury for 

further consideration of its answers and verdict or shall order a 

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Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 6 
new trial.'' Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b). A number of courts have held 

that when a jury renders a verdict in the form described in Rule 

49(b), a party must object to any inconsistencies in the verdict 

before the jury is discharged. If a party fails to object before 

the jury is discharged, he waives any future challenge to the 

inconsistency because his failure to make a timely objection 

deprives the court of the option of sending the jury back for 

further deliberations. See, ~, Stancill v. McKenzie Tank 

Lines, Inc., _497 F.2d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 1974); Ludwig v. Marion 

Laboratories, Inc., 465 F.2d 114, 118 (8th Cir. 1972). 

The court, here, did not submit a general verdict coupled 

with written interrogatories under Rule 49(b) to the jury. 

Rather, the court gave 

described in Rule _49(~). 

the jury a special verdict in the form 

Unlike Rule 49(b), Rule 49(a) does not 

contain a specific direction to send the jury back for further 

deliberations in the event of an •inconsistency in the jury's 

answers. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a). Therefore, Rule 49(a) does 

not require a party to object to the inconsistencies in a jury's 

answers to a special verdict before the jury is discharged in 

order to preserve his right to challenge the inconsistencies in a 

subsequent motion or on appeal. See Pierce v. Southern Pacific 

Transp. Co., 823 F.2d 1366, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987); Ladnier v. 

Murray, 769 F.2d 195, 198 n.3 (4th Cir. 1985); Malley-Duff & 

Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 145 (3d Cir.), 

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1072 (1984}; Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & 

Co., 674 F.2d 1037, 1040 (5th Cir. 1982); Mercer v. Long Mfg. 

N.C., Inc., 671 F.2d 946, 947-48 and n.l (5th Cir. 1982)(~ 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 7 
curiam on petition for reh'g en bane)_; but see Golub v. J.W. Gant 

& Assocs., 863 F.2d 1516, 1521 n.4 (11th Cir. 1989)("In this 

circuit, all challenges to the consistency of special verdicts 

must be raised before the jury is excused."). 

Turning to the merits of the appeal, we disagree with the 

district court's and defendant's attempted reconciliation of the 

jury's inconsistent answers. A reading of the entire special 

verdict form submitted to the jury here shows that the jury's 

answers are inconsistent and cannot be reconciled. The language 

of questions 1 and 2 ("accident which injured plaintiff") is too 

similar to the language of questions 7 and 8 ("accident which 

caused injuries to [plaintiff]") to hold that _the jury's answers 

to those questions distinguish between negligence that caused the 

accident. and negligence that caused the injuries. 

We also reject defendant's argument that the jury's answers 

to questions 3 through 12 on the special verdict form are merely 

"superfluous information" and should be disregarded. (Brief of 

Appellee at 6.) To disregard the jury's answers to all but 

questions 1 and 2 would be to treat those two questions as general 

verdicts. The jury was given a special verdict containing twelve 

questions of fact under Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a). The answers to 

those twelve questions must be read together to arrive at the 

appropriate judgment on the special verdict. 

When the answers to all the questions set forth in the 

special verdict are read together, the inconsistencies in the 

verdict are both apparent and irreconcilable. Therefore, a new 

trial must be ordered. See Tanno v. S.S. President Madison Ves, 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-1628 Document: 010110191428 Date Filed: 02/23/1990 Page: 8 
( 

830 F.2d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 1987); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. 

Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 866 (5th Cir. 1986); Ladnier v. Murray, 769 

F.2d at 198. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah is REVERSED and REMANDED for further 

proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 

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