Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05300/USCOURTS-caDC-04-05300-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Billy G. Asemani
Petitioner
Jeffrey T. Green
Appointed Amicus Curiae for Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 24, 2006 Decided July 7, 2006

No. 04-5300

IN RE: BILLY G. ASEMANI

PETITIONER

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus

(No. 04cv00485)

Jeffrey T. Green, appointed by the court, argued the cause as

amicus curiae for the petitioner.

Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the respondent. Kenneth L. Wainstein,

United States Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant

United States Attorney, were on brief.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and SENTELLE and

HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Appellant

Ghafour “Billy” Asemani, born in Iran, currently in prison and

scheduled to be deported from this country pursuant to a

removal order entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA), petitions for a writ of mandamus seeking to undo the

district court’s transfer of his habeas corpus petition for relief

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1

See Asemani v. Ridge, No. 03-CV-6833 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2004);

Asemani v. Ridge, No. 3-CV-04-0135 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2004);

Asemani v. DHS, No. 04-CV-00485 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 23, 2004),

Supplemental App. to Amicus for Appellant’s Br. (SA) 1; Asemani v.

BICE, No. 05-CV-00987 (D. Md. filed Apr. 11, 2005), R. Material

Submitted by Resp’t (R.), Tab 15.

2

An immigration judge found Asemani went to Iran to avoid

prosecution on the fraud charges. SA 17.

from the BIA’s removal order to the Middle District of

Pennsylvania. For the following reasons, we conclude that we

are without jurisdiction to consider Asemani’s petition and,

accordingly, dismiss the petition. 

I.

Asemani has filed habeas petitions challenging his detention

and impending removal by the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) in four different district courts, creating a

procedural tangle.1

 Asemani entered the United States on a

student visa, married a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in

1991, registered for selective service the same year and gained

LPR status himself in 1994. He filed a declaration of intent to

apply for U.S. citizenship in April 1996 and an initial

application for naturalization in August 1997 but completed

neither. In October 1999 Asemani was indicted on twelve

counts of criminal health-care fraud for practicing dentistry

without a license. After his indictment he went to Iran.2 Upon

his return to the U.S. in October 2000, he pleaded guilty to

eleven counts and was sentenced to thirty months’ imprisonment

in May 2001. While Asemani was in federal custody, the

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3

BICE was formerly the Immigration and Naturalization Service

(INS). It is now part of DHS and has since been renamed U.S.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

4

FSIA provides that “a foreign state shall not be immune from the

jurisdiction of courts of the United States” from suits “in which money

damages are sought” for “personal injury or death that was caused by

an act of torture” unless, inter alia, “neither the claimant nor the victim

was a national of the United States (as that term is defined in section

101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act) when the act upon

which the claim is based occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(ii).

The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “national of the United

States” as either a United States citizen or “a person who, though not

a citizen of the United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United

States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).

Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (BICE)3

instituted removal proceedings against him in Philadelphia,

charging him as an alien deportable under the Immigration and

Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), for

having committed crimes involving moral turpitude within ten

years of acquiring LPR status. Supplemental App. to Amicus

for Appellant’s Br. (SA) 15.

In September 2001 Asemani filed suit against Iran under the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602

et seq., alleging that, while in that country, he was tortured and

falsely detained by Iranian government officials because of his

religious beliefs. Asemani v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 266 F.

Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2003). Only United States nationals can

bring an action against a foreign government for such conduct

under the FSIA.4

 The district court, reviewing Asemani’s length

of residence in the U.S., his registration for selective service and

his incomplete applications for U.S. citizenship, determined he

was a U.S. national and therefore had standing to bring a claim

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5

8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) allows “any person who is within the United

States claim[ing] a right or privilege as a national of the United States

and is denied such right or privilege by any department or independent

agency, or official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a national of

the United States” to bring an action for a declaratory judgment under

28 U.S.C. § 2201 “against the head of such department or independent

agency for a judgment declaring him to be a national of the United

States.”

6

Because DHS took custody of Asemani, his immigration case was

transferred from Philadelphia, where it was proceeding while he was

in prison for health care fraud, to York, Pennsylvania. See SA 15,

17–18. 

under the FSIA. Id. at 27. The district court, however,

specifically denied without prejudice Asemani’s motion for a

judicial declaration of nationality under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) and

28 U.S.C. § 2201.5

 See id. (“[P]laintiff has demonstrated his

permanent allegiance to the United States sufficient to constitute

him a ‘national’ within the meaning of the FSIA. . . . That is all

that this Court must decide at this time for purposes of the

current case.”) (emphasis added). 

After the district court’s determination, Asemani, whom

DHS had taken into custody, moved to terminate the removal

proceedings based on the district court’s determination that he

was a U.S. national, arguing BICE could not remove him

because he was not subject to its jurisdiction.6

 On September 5,

2003 an immigration judge agreed, granting his motion and

ordering his release from DHS custody. SA 18. DHS appealed

the immigration judge’s determination, SA 21, and on December

12, 2003 the BIA reversed and vacated the immigration judge’s

decision, concluding that the district court’s determination as to

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7

Section 236 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides that

“[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any foreign alien who

is deportable” for, inter alia, having been “convicted of a crime

involving moral turpitude committed within . . . 10 years in the case

of an alien provided lawful permanent resident status.” 8 U.S.C. §§

1226(c), 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

8

A writ of habeas corpus must be “directed to the person having

custody of the person detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.

Asemani’s status as a national applied only to the FSIA. SA 23-

28. 

On March 23, 2004, while the immigration proceedings were

ongoing and before a final order of removal issued, Asemani

filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the D.C. district

court. SA 01. He argued that DHS had unlawfully detained him

under section 236 of the INA, claiming that section 236 applied

only to “foreign ‘aliens.’ ” SA 02. Because he was not an alien,

Asemani argued, his continued confinement was unlawful.7

 In

response the government filed a motion to transfer the case to

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. U.S.’s Mot. to Transfer

Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, R. Material Submitted by Resp’t

(R.) Tab 5. Transfer was warranted, DHS claimed, because

Asemani was incarcerated in the Eastern District of

Pennsylvania and therefore the D.C. district court lacked

jurisdiction over his custodian.8

 Id. at 2 (citing In re Tripati, 836

F.2d 1406, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“A habeas petition may be

adjudicated only in the district in which [petitioner’s] immediate

custodian, his warden, is located.”)). Meanwhile, on June 1,

2004, the U.S. Immigration Court in York, Pennsylvania ordered

Asemani’s removal from the United States. R. Tab 8. 

On July 16, 2004 the district court granted DHS’s motion to

transfer Asemani’s habeas corpus case to the Eastern District of

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9

When he filed his petition, Asemani was incarcerated at a

correctional facility in Carbon County, Pennsylvania, located in the

Middle District of Pennsylvania. He was subsequently transferred to

Berks County, Pennsylvania, located in the Eastern District. R. Tab

6. 

Pennsylvania. Asemani v. DHS, No. 04-CV-00485 (D.D.C. July

16, 2004), reprinted at R. Tab 6. In so doing, the court noted

that the general rule “that the proper respondent in federal

habeas cases is the petitioner’s warden” compelled transfer to

the federal judicial district in which Asemani was confined at

the time he filed his habeas petition. Id. at 2. On August 18

Asemani filed a “Motion for Leave of Court to Reveal a

Significant Procedural Defect in the Court’s July 16, 2004

Transfer Order,” which alleged that the July 16 order was

flawed because at the time he filed his petition he was being

held in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. R. Tab 7. In an

August 18, 2004 order the district court amended its July 16,

2004 transfer order, ordering the case transferred to the Middle

District of Pennsylvania.9

 Order on Pending Mots. and Am.

Transfer Order, R. Tab 1. Pursuant to its amended transfer order

the district court electronically transferred the case to the Middle

District of Pennsylvania on August 26. The day after the

electronic transfer, on August 27, the district court received and

docketed a “notice of appeal in the form of an emergency

petition for a supervisory writ of mandamus,” in which Asemani

stated his intent to contest the transfer order via a petition for

writ of mandamus. On the same day, August 27, this court

received and docketed Asemani’s petition for a writ of

mandamus. Emergency Pet. for Supervisory Writ of Mandamus

Pursuant to All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (mandamus

petition). In his petition Asemani claimed that the DHS

Secretary was the proper respondent because DHS dictated the

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conditions of his confinement and that the district court erred in

transferring his case. Id. at 3. On September 16, Asemani filed

an emergency motion with this court, asking us to order the

district court to “retrieve” its transfer order. Emergency Mot. to

Compel the Court Below to Reverse its Premature Electronic

Transfer of the Case, R. Tab 3. (Emergency Motion). He

challenged the validity of the electronic transfer “given the fact

that it stands in violation of the Court’s twenty-day automatic

abeyance rule.” R. Tab 3 at 3–4 (citing Starnes v. McGuire, 512

F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1974)). By order dated October 19, 2005,

this court referred Asemani’s filings to a merits panel,

instructing the parties to address, inter alia, the issues raised in

Asemani’s mandamus petition and in his Emergency Motion. 

II.

A petitioner seeking mandamus must show his “right to

issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable” and that “no other

adequate means to attain the relief exist[s].” In re: Sealed Case,

151 F.3d 1059, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted).

Before considering whether mandamus relief is appropriate,

however, we must be certain of our jurisdiction. See In re:

Executive Office of the President, 215 F.3d 20, 25 (D.C. Cir.

2000) (dismissing mandamus petition because jurisdiction

lacking). Because Asemani’s habeas petition was correctly

transferred to the Middle District of Pennsylvania, we are

without jurisdiction over his petition for mandamus relief.

In In re Sosa, 712 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1983), Ramon Sosa

petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel vacatur of the

district court’s order transferring his underlying case to the

Western District of Oklahoma. On March 11, 1983 the district

court ordered Sosa to show cause why his complaint should not

be transferred and ordered the transfer to the Oklahoma district

court one week later; on April 25 the record was physically

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transferred by court order. Sosa filed his petition for mandamus

relief six weeks thereafter. We dismissed the petition for lack

of jurisdiction because the “physical transfer of the original

papers” in the case to a permissible transferee forum deprived us

of jurisdiction to review the transfer. Id. at 1480. Sosa sought

vacatur of the D.C. district court order of transfer but only the

Oklahoma transferee court had jurisdiction once the transfer was

effected. Id.; see also Starnes, 512 F.2d at 924 (“[P]hysical

transfer of the original papers in a case to a permissible

transferee forum deprives the transferor circuit of jurisdiction to

review the transfer.”). Here the district court transferred

Asemani’s habeas petition to the Middle District of

Pennsylvania on August 26, see Order, Asemani v. DHS, No. 04-

CV-00485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2004), R. 10, the day before we

docketed his mandamus petition on August 27, see U.S. Court

of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Docket Sheet No. 04-5300, R.

Tab 4, which deprives us of jurisdiction to review the transfer.

The Sosa rule is subject to one exception. In In re Briscoe,

976 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1992), we noted that where there was

a “substantial issue whether the district court had power to order

the transfer, we will not consider the clerk’s compliance with the

order as destroying our jurisdiction.” Id. at 1427 (internal

quotation omitted). Seeking to come within the Briscoe

exception, Asemani makes two arguments that the district court

was without authority to transfer his case; neither has merit.

Asemani’s first argument—that the district court was without

authority to transfer because, under Rule 4(c)(1) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Asemani’s notice of appeal is

considered filed on the date it is placed in the prison mail system

rather than the postmark date—is waived because it was made

for the first time in his reply brief. See Rollins Envtl. Servs. v.

EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Issues may not

be raised for the first time in a reply brief.”). His second

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argument—that the district court’s transfer failed to comply with

the procedural rule set out in Starnes, 512 F.2d at 934-35,

recommending a twenty-day delay between the transfer order

and the physical transfer of a prisoner’s case—was included in

his September 16, 2004 Emergency Motion but not in his

mandamus petition. See Emergency Motion, R. Tab 3, at 3–4.

Even if we read Asemani’s pro se pleadings liberally and

consider the Starnes argument as part of his petition for

mandamus relief, however, it does not raise a “substantial issue”

regarding the district court’s transfer power. The Starnes rule

was adopted in order to “allow the [transferring] judge to

consider any late-arriving briefs in opposition to the transfer

which may have been delayed by inefficiencies in the [prison]

mail services.” Starnes, 512 F.2d at 934-35; see also Briscoe,

976 F.2d at 1427 (transfer before Starnes twenty-day period runs

“ordinarily would deprive [the court] of jurisdiction”) (emphasis

added); cf. In re Nine Mile Ltd., 673 F.2d 242, 243 (8th Cir.

1982) (mandamus relief granted to petitioner in diversity case

seeking review of transfer because transfer effected on same day

as transfer order; “physical transfer of the file should be delayed

for a period of time after entry of the transfer order so that

review may be sought in the transferor circuit”) (citing Starnes).

Although only eight days elapsed between the electronic transfer

of Asemani’s case on August 26 and the amended transfer order

of August 18, the original transfer order was entered on July 16,

2004—forty-one days before the case was electronically

transferred. In other words, the district court had plenty of time

to consider a brief in opposition to the transfer. In fact it

considered just such a submission, namely, Asemani’s motion

to amend the transfer order to name “an appropriate transferee

court.” See R. Tab 7 at 5. It stretches the Starnes rule beyond

its limit to allow a petitioner like Asemani, the author of more

than a dozen pro se filings in this case, to claim he was not

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10Asemani challenges the electronic transfer of his case; in fact, at

the time of oral argument before us the district court’s docket sheet did

not indicate a physical transfer of Asemani’s paper file. See Asemani

v. DHS, 04-CV-00485, Docket Sheet, 8/26/04 (showing electronic

transfer to Middle District of Pennsylvania). Asemani’s mandamus

petition does not challenge the completeness of the transfer, however,

but instead the legitimacy of a completed transfer. See Drabik v.

Murphy, 246 F.2d 408, 409 (2d Cir. 1957) (where plaintiff served

motion on defendant “after the papers had been lodged in the office of

the clerk of the District Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana . . . . the District Court for the Southern District of New

York had already lost all jurisdiction over the action because the

transfer was then complete”) (emphasis added). 

given enough time to respond to or seek review of the transfer

order.10 

For the foregoing reasons, Asemani’s petition is dismissed.

So ordered.

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