Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01328/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01328-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Robert Anderson
Plaintiff
Greg Bowman
Defendant
City of Rio Vista
Defendant
Rio Vista Police Department
Defendant
Saxon Creed Motorcycle Club
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

ROBERT ANDERSON, an individual, 

and SAXON CREED MOTORCYCLE 

CLUB, an unincorporated 

association,

Plaintiffs,

v.

CITY OF RIO VISTA, RIO VISTA 

POLICE DEPARTMENT, CHIEF OF 

POLICE GREG BOWMAN, and DOES 1-

10 in their individual 

capacities, 

Defendants.

CIV. NO. 2:13-1328 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Robert Anderson is the president of plaintiff 

Saxon Creed Motorcycle Club (“Saxon Creed”), an unincorporated 

fraternal association. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5 (Docket No. 1).) On July 

7, 2012, Saxon Creed intended to host a day-long event at 

Blackwelders Park, a privately owned park in the City of Rio 

Vista. The event was to include a “pig roast, with live music, 

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dancing and dinner.” (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) Approximately one month 

before the anticipated event, a member of Saxon Creed applied for 

the necessary Temporary Use Permit (“TUP”) with the City of Rio 

Vista. (Id. ¶ 12.) 

Five days before the event, a notice from the Rio Vista 

Chief of Police, defendant Greg Bowman, informed Saxon Creed that 

its application for a TUP was denied. (Id. ¶ 14.) The notice 

indicated that the TUP was denied pursuant to Rio Vista Municipal 

Code section 17.44.020 and stated that the decision was based 

“primarily on the application provided to the [City], the lack of 

timeliness in submitted required documents, and in part based on 

false and/or misleading information provided . . . during the 

hearing.” (Id.) 

On July 2, 2013, plaintiffs initiated this action 

against Bowman, the City of Rio Vista, and the City of Rio Vista 

Police Department, alleging 1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim asserting 

a First Amendment facial challenge to Rio Vista Municipal Code 

section 17.44.020; 2) a § 1983 claim asserting that defendants’ 

denial of the TUP violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment right of 

association; and 3) a free speech claim under the California 

Constitution. Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint in 

its entirety for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). In their opposition to defendants’ motion, plaintiffs 

indicate that they voluntarily dismiss their third claim under 

the California Constitution, and thus the court will dismiss that 

claim. 

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II. Analysis

On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court 

must accept the allegations in the complaint as true and draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. 

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by

Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 

319, 322 (1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff 

needs to plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that 

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 570 (2007). This “plausibility standard,” however, “asks 

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

unlawfully,” and where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely 

consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the 

line between possibility and plausibility.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).

In relevant part, § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, 

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 

. . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any 

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation 

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by 

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or 

other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. While § 1983 is not itself a source of 

substantive rights, it provides a cause of action against any 

person who, under color of state law, deprives an individual of 

federal constitutional rights or limited federal statutory 

rights. Id.; Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989). 

Here, plaintiffs allege violations of their First Amendment 

rights. 

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“While the First Amendment does not in terms protect a 

‘right of association,’ [Supreme Court] cases have recognized 

that it embraces such a right in certain circumstances.” City of 

Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1989). In Stanglin, 

however, the Court “circumscribed the scope of associational 

liberties protected by the first amendment.” Conti v. City of 

Fremont, 919 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir. 1990). There, plaintiffs 

challenged a city ordinance that restricted admission to teenage 

dance halls to individuals between fourteen and eighteen years 

old. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 20. Plaintiffs argued, and the Court 

of Appeals had held, that the ordinance “violated the First 

Amendment right of persons between the ages of 14 and 18 to 

associate with persons outside that age group.” Id. 

The Court explained that First Amendment protection 

extends to “two different sorts of ‘freedom of association’”: 1) 

“‘choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human 

relationships’”; and 2) “‘a right to associate for the purpose of 

engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment--

speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the 

exercise of religion.’” Id. at 24 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. 

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984)). There was no claim in 

Stanglin, just as there is no claim in the present case, that any 

intimate human relationships are involved. 

Examining the latter category, Court in Stanglin

explained that, while the opportunities of “adults to dance with 

minors . . . might be described as ‘associational’ in common 

parlance, [] they simply do not involve the sort of expressive 

association that the First Amendment has been held to protect.” 

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Id. The Court clarified that the Constitution does not recognize 

“a generalized right of ‘social association’” and consequently 

held that plaintiffs did not have a cognizable claim under the 

First Amendment. Id. at 25. 

In rejecting the claim, the Stanglin Court emphasized 

that the teenagers who visited the dance halls were “not members 

of any organized association.” Id. at 24. Here, on the other 

hand, the Complaint alleges that Saxon Creed “is an 

unincorporated fraternal association.” (Compl. ¶ 5.) 

Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court made clear in Boy Scouts of 

America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), the existence of an 

organized association alone does not raise a claim to 

constitutional dimensions: 

To determine whether a group is protected by the First 

Amendment’s expressive associational right, we must 

determine whether the group engages in “expressive 

association.” The First Amendment’s protection of 

expressive association is not reserved for advocacy 

groups. But to come within its ambit, a group must 

engage in some form of expression, whether it be 

public or private.

Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 648 (emphasis added); see also

Salvation Army v. N.J. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 199 

(3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]here is no constitutional right to associate 

for a purpose that is not protected by the First Amendment.”). 

In Boy Scouts of America, the Court relied on the Boy Scouts’

mission statement, Scout Oath and Law, and efforts to instill its 

values on its members to conclude that the Boy Scouts “transmit a 

system of values” and therefore engage in expressive association 

subject to protection under the First Amendment. Boy Scouts of 

Am., 530 U.S. at 649-50. 

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Here, however, the Complaint alleges only that Saxon 

Creed “is an unincorporated fraternal association” and that the 

TUP “stated that the event was to be a pig roast, with live 

music, dancing, and dinner.” (Compl. ¶¶ 5, 13.) The Complaint 

lacks a single allegation even suggesting that Saxon Creed sought 

to hold the event in question in order to engage in some form of 

expressive association. To the contrary, the only plausible 

inference the court can draw from the allegations in the 

Complaint is that the event was intended to be a social gathering 

akin to the teenage dance halls in Stanglin and thus outside the 

parameters of the First Amendment. See Hudson v. City of Los 

Angeles, Civ. No. 06-942-DSF, 2006 WL 4729243, at *7 (C.D. Cal. 

Sept. 7, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s First Amendment claim based 

on an alleged right of association with motorcycle clubs because 

plaintiff failed to allege facts showing that the motorcycle 

clubs engaged in expressive activity); cf. Kohlman v. Village of 

Midlothian, 833 F. Supp. 2d 922, 939 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (concluding 

that there was a lack of a triable issue of fact with respect to 

whether the Hells Angels engaged in expressive activity that 

implicates the First Amendment). 

Accordingly, because the Complaint does not allege that 

Saxon Creed sought to engage in expressive association meriting 

protection under the First Amendment, plaintiffs lack a

cognizable § 1983 claim challenging defendants’ denial of the TUP 

and the court must dismiss that claim.1

 

1 Neither party addresses whether the fact that 

plaintiffs sought to hold their event at a private park affects

their First Amendment claim. The court need not examine this 

issue to resolve defendants’ motion to dismiss. 

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With respect to plaintiffs’ facial challenge, the 

Complaint fails to clearly articulate plaintiffs’ theory. In 

more of a haphazard fashion, the Complaint appears to toss around

constitutional buzzwords amid conclusory allegations to see what 

might stick. Although plaintiffs have titled their claim as one 

under the First Amendment, how plaintiffs’ allegations fit any

theory under the First Amendment is unclear, and their barebones

allegations suggest they might also be alleging violations of

rights under the due process or equal protection clauses.2 

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 

does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 

relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions . . . .”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (alteration in original) (citations 

omitted). 

Not only does the ambiguity surrounding the

constitutional underpinning of plaintiffs’ facial challenge 

preclude the court from assessing whether plaintiffs have a 

cognizable claim, it denies defendants of the fair notice Rule 8

requires. See id. (stating that allegations under Rule 8(a)(2) 

must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is 

and the grounds upon which it rests’” (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 

355 U.S. 41, 47, (1957) (omission in original))). Accordingly, 

 

2 For example, the Complaint alleges that the “terms of”

section 17.44.020 “are so vague that people of common 

intelligence must necessarily guess at their meaning and differ 

as to their application.” (Compl. ¶ 18.) A vagueness challenge 

“raises a due process, as opposed to First Amendment, claim.” 

Hunt v. City of Los Angeles, 638 F.3d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 2011). 

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because plaintiffs’ facial challenge is supported only by 

conclusory and illusory allegations, the court must grant 

defendants’ motion to dismiss that claim.

3

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiffs’ Complaint be, and the same hereby is, 

GRANTED.

Plaintiffs have twenty days from the date this Order is 

signed to file an amended complaint, if they can do so consistent 

with this Order. 

Dated: November 20, 2013

 

3 Because it is unnecessary for the court to examine 

section 17.44.020 to resolve defendants’ motion to dismiss, the 

court denies defendants’ request that the court take judicial 

notice of the Rio Vista Municipal Code as moot. The court also 

need not address defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the 

sufficiency of plaintiffs’ Monell claim against the City of Rio 

Vista and the Rio Vista Police Department, or Bowman’s assertion 

of qualified immunity.

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