Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02835/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-02835-8/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eduardo Blumwald
Defendant
Marina Large
Plaintiff
Regents of the University of California
Defendant

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARINA LARGE, No. 2:08-cv-02835-MCE-DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF

CALIFORNIA and EDUARDO

BLUMWALD,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

In the present action, Plaintiff Marina Large (“Plaintiff”)

sues Defendants Regents of the University of California and

Eduardo Blumwald (“Defendants”) for sexual harassment and

assault, as well as violations of federal statutes. Plaintiff

now claims that as a result of the alleged abuse, she suffers

from posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”).

The Pretrial Scheduling Order currently in place, last

modified on August 18, 2011, lists April 6, 2012 as the last day

to designate supplemental expert witnesses. (Aug. 18, 2011

Order, ECF No. 21 at 1.)

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Presently before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Modify

Scheduling Order and Motion to Compel Mental Examination of

Plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, the Motions are

GRANTED.1

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her lawsuit on October 20, 2008, alleging,

inter alia, sexual harassment, assault, and intentional

infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) while working as a

graduate student in Defendant Blumwald’s laboratory at UC Davis

from 2003 to 2008. (Opposition (“Opp.”), ECF 53-2, Ex. 1, Pl.’s

Compl. at 3-5.) In a February 2010 deposition, when asked if she

had been diagnosed with any mental condition, Defendant

responded, “One of the therapists did talk to me about a

condition. Yes.” (Burkett Decl., ECF No. 50-1, Ex. A, Pl.’s

Dep. at 425: 13-14.) She confirmed that the condition that she

had spoken about was posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). 

(Id. at 425: 16.) Plaintiff then stated that she had not been

given any psychological tests, been prescribed any medications,

nor received any additional treatment for medical, physical, or

mental issues. (Id. at 425-26.)

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 1

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

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In documents provided to Defendants in June 2010 by

Community Health Awareness Council (“CHAC”), located in the San

Francisco Bay Area, where Plaintiff received counseling in

December 2008, an Initial Treatment Plan states: “DSM IV

DIAGNOSIS: AXIS I: 309.81 PTSD.” (Opp. Ex. 3, CHAC Report at

10.) The Psychotherapy Notes from the same date say that they

“Discussed PTSD type reactions to abuse situation...” (Id. at

14.) The records indicated that Plaintiff had seen a therapist

only four times in December of 2008 and January of 2009. CHAC

subsequently “terminated” Plaintiff for failure to return to

therapy after she cancelled four appointments. Plaintiff

accordingly had received no treatment directed to any PTSD issues

during the year prior to her February 2010 deposition.

Although Plaintiff’s 2010 deposition testimony indicated she

was not being treated for PTSD, given the length of time that had

elapsed since that deposition, Defendants propounded follow-up

interrogatories in early 2012 in order to ensure their

information was up to date. In responses to those

interrogatories, served on February 10, 2012, Plaintiff claims

that she was diagnosed with PTSD by two doctors in Seattle, WA:

Dr. Corey Fagan and Dr. Gwyneth McConnell. (Burkett Decl., Ex. C,

Def.’s Response to Interrogatory 28.) Plaintiff thereafter, on

March 2, 2012, disclosed both of those doctors as expert

witnesses expected to testify regarding her PTSD. (Mar. 2, 2012

Disclosure, ECF No. 41 at 2.)

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On February 23, 2012, in the wake of this new information

concerning Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis, Defendants requested that

Plaintiff stipulate to an independent medical examination

(“IME”). (Burkett Decl., Ex. D at 37.) Plaintiff suggested they

agree that the mental examination report would be complete by

April 6, and Defendants’ expert would be produced for deposition

up to April 27. (Id. at 39.) On March 15, Plaintiff’s counsel

responded that Plaintiff would not stipulate to an IME because

Defendants “were on notice of such condition [the alleged PTSD

diagnosis] at that time [February 2010], and your rationale that

you just learned of this condition is inaccurate.” (Burkett

Decl., Ex. G, at 46.) Defendants moved to compel the mental

examination, and on March 30, 2012, the assigned Magistrate Judge

denied the motion as untimely in light of the April 6, 2012

discovery deadline. (Burkett Decl. at 6.) The Magistrate Judge

did not rule on the merits of the motion to compel a mental

examination. (March 30, 2012 Order, ECF No. 48 at 2.)

Plaintiff contends that Defendants seek an unfair litigating

advantage by asking for the medical examination too close to the

court ordered deadline, and that using due diligence, they should

have requested it earlier. (Opp. at 4-5.) Defendants contend

that the facts of the case changed such that it became necessary

to request the examination in February, and that Plaintiff now

seeks to use unacceptable delaying tactics to her advantage.

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Moreover, Plaintiff asserts that even if there is good cause

to change the PTSO, and compel a medical examination, Defendants’

examination demand should fail because Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 35(a)(2)(B) requires that the motion to compel a mental

examination must specify “the person or persons who will perform

[the examination.]” (Opp. at 12.) Defendants’ motion does name

Dr. George Woods as the neurophsychiatrist who will conduct a

clinical evaluation, but says that Dr. Woods may recommend a

referral to Dr. Dale Watson to perform psychological testing. 

(Id.) Plaintiff also contends that the ten hours of mental

examinations sought by Defendants is excessive. (Id. at 12-13.)

Finally, Defendants claim that on March 30, 2012, Plaintiff

served Defendants with a revised report from their expert CPA

Robert Stephenson. (Motion to Dismiss (“MTD”), ECF No. 49 at 3.) 

The revised report includes new information and substantially

changes Stephenson’s valuation of economic damages. (Id.) The

first report only analyzed what Plaintiff would have earned in

“alternative employment,” while the second report analyzed what

Plaintiff would have earned if she had obtained a masters degree

and began teaching at a community college. (Reply, ECF No. 55 at

8.) Further, Stephenson’s deposition was then taken on April 2,

2012, only four days before Defendants’ supplemental/rebuttal

expert disclosures were due, on April 6, 2012. Defendants seek

more time to consult with their potential rebuttal expert witness

regarding the new information.

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STANDARD

Generally, the Court is required to enter a pretrial

scheduling order within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The scheduling order “controls the

subsequent course of the action” unless modified by the Court. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e). Orders entered before the final pretrial

conference may be modified upon a showing of “good cause,” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 16(b), but orders “following a final pretrial

conference shall be modified only to prevent manifest injustice.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); see also Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations,

975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, because no final

pretrial conference has yet been conducted, the “good cause”

standard applies.

Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily considers the

diligence of the party seeking the amendment. Johnson v. Mammoth

Recreations, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). The district

court may modify the pretrial schedule “if it cannot reasonably

be met despite the diligence of the party seeking the extension.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment);

Id. Moreover, carelessness is not compatible with a finding of

diligence and offers no reason for a grant of relief. Id.

Although the existence or degree of prejudice to the party

opposing the modification might supply additional reasons to deny

a motion, the focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s

reasons for seeking modification. If that party was not

diligent, the inquiry should end. Id.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35 provides that “The

court...may order a party whose mental or physical condition...

is in controversy to submit to a physical or mental examination

by a suitably licensed...examiner. Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(a)(1). 

The order may be made “only on motion for good cause...” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 35(a)(2)(A). The Supreme Court has ruled that to obtain

a court order for an IME, the party seeking the exam must show

that “the mental or physical condition” of the party who is to be

examined “is in controversy,” and that there is “good cause” for

the examination. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 117

(1964). These requirements “are not met by mere conclusory

allegations of the pleadings - nor by mere relevance to the case

- but require an affirmative showing by the movant that each

condition as to which the examination is sought is really and

genuinely in controversy and that good cause exists for ordering

each particular examination.” Id. at 118. The Schlagenhauf

Court concluded that Rule 35 “requires discriminating application

by the trial judge, who must decide as an initial matter in every

case, whether the party requesting a mental or physical

examination...has adequately demonstrated the existence of the

Rule’s requirements of ‘in controversy’ and ‘good cause,’ which

requirements...are necessarily related.” Id. at 118-19.

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While the Ninth Circuit has not ruled directly on this

point, many courts have followed the rule that:

Courts will order plaintiffs to undergo mental

examinations where the cases involve, in addition to a

claim of emotional distress, one or more of the

following: 1) a cause of action for intentional or

negligent infliction of emotional distress; 2) an

allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury

or disorder; 3) a claim of unusually severe emotional

distress; 4) plaintiff’s offer of expert testimony to

support a claim of emotional distress; and/or

5) plaintiff’s concession that his or her mental

condition is “in controversy” within the meaning of

Rule 35(a). Turner v. Imperial Stores, 161 F.R.D. 89,

95 (S.D. Cal. 1995).

ANALYSIS

A. The Defendant’s Motion to Compel Mental Examination Is

Proper Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 35.

1. Plaintiff’s Mental Condition Is “In Controversy,”

And Defendants Have Demonstrated “Good Cause” To

Order An Independent Medical Examination.

Plaintiff claims to be suffering from PTSD, a “specific

mental or psychiatric injury or disorder,” and plans to call

expert witnesses to testify to that effect. In addition,

Plaintiff does not contest the fact that her mental condition is

now “in controversy” within the meaning of Rule 35(a).

Defendants have good cause to ask the Court to order an IME

because Plaintiff seeks damages based on her claim that she has

been diagnosed with PTSD. She plans to call expert witnesses to

testify to that effect. Once again, Plaintiff does not contest

the fact that Defendants have good cause to compel an IME. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Defendants have satisfied the

requirements of Rule 35 for obtaining a mental examination. 

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Because the deadline for conducting discovery in the form of that

examination has passed, the Court must now consider whether

Defendants have demonstrated the requisite “good cause” to obtain

an IME at a later date.

B. Good Cause Exists To Modify The Pretrial Scheduling

Order Pursuant to Federal Rule of Procedure 16(b)(4).

Defendants contend that they asked for Plaintiff’s

stipulation to an IME in a timely manner, and that Plaintiff

simply ignored this request. As discussed above, Defendants

learned on February 10 of Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis, and

requested an IME on February 23. Defendants suggested a schedule

that would substantially conform to the scheduling order already

in effect. Plaintiff chose not to respond to this request until

March 15, at which time Plaintiff simply said that Defendants

should have requested the IME at an earlier date. Defendants

argue that Plaintiff should not be allowed to “benefit from her

own delay by asserting a lack of time under the current discovery

cut-off.” (MTD, ECF No. 49-1 at 2.) Defendants add that before

learning of Plaintiff’s PTSD diagnosis in February 2012, they had

no reason to request an IME. (Id. at 3.) 

Plaintiff argues that in exercising proper diligence,

Defendants should have requested an IME earlier, and therefore

should not be entitled to a modification of the PTSO. Plaintiff

contends that even before her latest PTSD diagnosis, Defendants

had known of a PTSD diagnosis nearly two years earlier, and

“chose to sit on the information,” demonstrating a lack of

diligence. (Opp. at 4.)

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Plaintiff mistakenly implies that meeting some of the Turner

requirements at an earlier point in the discovery process

necessarily demonstrates that Defendants were dilatory in not

requesting an IME earlier. Specifically, Plaintiff points out

that she had a claim for IIED, had described severe emotional

distress in her Complaint, and had at least some documentation

regarding a PTSD diagnosis made in late 2008 or early 2009. This

is more than enough to meet the requirements laid out in Turner,

as enumerated above. Defendants, however, point out that

Plaintiff did not have a clear and unambiguous PTSD diagnosis,

claimed no specific mental condition, was receiving no treatment

at the time of her deposition in February 2010, and had received

no treatment for about a year beforehand. Based on this

information, the defense submits it would have been neither

necessary nor prudent to seek a mental examination in 2010. 

Although PTSD had been mentioned in some of the discovery

documents, given the lack of any ongoing treatment, it was not

clearly in controversy, and thus there was not “good cause” to

ask for a mental evaluation to determine the existence of that

particular mental disorder or condition. See Turner, 161 F.R.D.

at 92. As Defendants point out, requesting an IME in a condition

that by all indications had abated could in fact have given new

life to a claim that appeared not to be at issue. There is no

reason that Defendants’ decision not to seek an IME in 2010

should preclude them from doing so when new facts came to light.

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Further, Defendants did not make their IME request so late

that it would give them an “unfair advantage” as Plaintiff claims

in her Opposition. The request was sent to Plaintiff on

February 23, 2012; shortly after disclosure of the new PTSD

diagnosis, and well before the April 6, 2012 deadline laid out in

the PTSO. Because Defendants were diligent in requesting an IME

before the PTSO deadline, it is appropriate for the Court to

modify the PTSO pursuant to Rule 16(b)(4).

As to Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the psychologist who

will be performing the testing, and the duration of the proposed

examinations, the Court finds that Defendants’ requests are

reasonable and satisfy the requirements of Rule 35. Defendants

list Dr. George Woods as the neurophsychiatrist who will be

conducting a clinical evaluation. He typically refers patients

to a psychologist for a psychological examination to aid in his

evaluation. Defendants have listed a proposed psychologist,

Dr. Dale Watson, and outlined the testing that the psychologist

typically carries out. Dr. Woods will be submitting the final

report, and will be made available for deposition. The

Defendants have sufficiently identified the professionals who

will carry out the IME, and there is no need for additional

specificity regarding the psychologist because he will not be

called as an expert witness. Regarding the duration of the

proposed medical examination, Plaintiff fails to provide an

adequate reason to limit the examination to two (2) hours.

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Regarding Defendants’ request for more time to consult with

expert witnesses regarding the new information in Plaintiff’s

revised CPA report, the Court finds that request reasonable. The

revised amount for damages is based on a new analysis which could

reasonably require expert testimony to adequately address. 

Defendants request more time in order to locate an expert to

address this more specific claim. Since Defendants received the

revised CPA report at such a late date, and since they have

exercised reasonable diligence in addressing Plaintiff’s damage

claims, the Court finds that there is good cause to modify the

scheduling order.

CONCLUSION

The Court finds that there is good cause to modify the PTSO,

and that the Motion to Compel Mental Examination is justified, so

Defendants’ Motions seeking said relief (ECF No. 49) are GRANTED. 

Plaintiff shall make herself available for mental examination

within thirty (30) days of the date this Order is electronically

filed. Defendants shall disclose results of the mental

examination report within three (3) weeks after the examination

is completed. Dr. Woods shall be produced for deposition up to

three (3) weeks after the report is disclosed. Defendants shall

also be given the opportunity to retain an expert witness to

address Plaintiff’s new claims regarding her career prospects. 

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Should Plaintiff choose to retain an expert, that expert’s

identity must be disclosed within thirty (30) days of the date

this Order is electronically filed. Trial in this matter remains

set for December 3, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 21, 2012

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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