Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02311/USCOURTS-ca10-89-02311-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Houston
Appellant
Eloy Mondragon
Appellee

Document Text:

.. 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

JAMES HOUSTON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

FI LED 

United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

AUG 1 rl 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

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) 

) 

) 

) 

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) 

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) 

No. 89-2311 

ELOY MONDRAGON, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

(D.C. No. 88-96-JC) 

(District of New Mexico) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * 

Before McKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a). 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Mr. Houston filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus following his state conviction for possession with intent to distribute morphine and for conspiracy. Petitioner raised seven possible 

errors that led to his conviction. The district court adopted the 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 89-2311 Document: 010110041012 Date Filed: 08/17/1990 Page: 1 
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magistrate's first recommendation of dismissal of grounds 1, 2, 3, 

4, and 7 as without merit. Later, the district court adopted the 

magistrate's second recommendation rejecting petitioner's two 

remaining claims. Petitioner appeals the district court's disposition of all of his claims. We affirm the district court's 

rejection of petitioner's entire petition. 

Petitioner's first claim is that there was insufficient evidence for a conviction. In this circuit, "[t]he evidence--both 

direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom--is sufficient if, when taken in the light 

most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. 

Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1531 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 

1128 (1986). We hold that the evidence in this case easily meets 

this sufficiency standard for both crimes. Police observed petitioner handing a tin foil packet that tested positive for opiates 

to his codefendant, who in turn handed it to an apparent customer. 

Petitioner also went through the motions of a large drug sale 

until he was told the deal was off. Finally, petitioner threw 

morphine from the window of a car he was riding in during a police 

chase. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, the evidence clearly supports a reasonable jury finding of possession with intent to distribute morphine. 

The conspiracy conviction is somewhat closer, because an 

agreement was not directly shown. However, it is not necessary to 

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prove a formal agreement. An agreement may be inferred from the 

facts. See United States v. Austin, 786 F.2d 986, 987-88 (10th 

Cir. 1986); United States v. Dumas, 688 F.2d 84, 86 (10th Cir. 

1982). An agreement can easily be inferred from petitioner's concerted activities with his codefendant. Thus, a reasonable jury 

could find petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; and we 

hold there was sufficient evidence. 

Petitioner next contends that the prosecutor's comments and 

the comments of the trial judge combined to deny petitioner a fair 

trial and violated due process. The prosecutor and the judge 

stated that the defense had the same subpoena powers as the state 

and could have called two witnesses that the state failed to call. 

The prosecutor told the jury to consider petitioner's codefendant's testimony versus that of the police officers, and that there 

was more morphine out on the road that was not recovered. 

We hold that the prosecutor's and judge's comments regarding 

the subpoena power were a correct statement of New Mexico law. 

N.M. Const. art. II, S 14. In addition, these comments did not 

shift the burden of proof. See State v. Ennis, 99 N.M. 117, 654 

P.2d 570, 572-73 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 148, 655 P.2d 

160 (1982); State v. Vallejos, 98 N.M. 798, 653 P.2d 174, 176-77 

(Ct. App.), cert. denied, 99 N.M. 47, 653 P.2d 878 (1982); United 

States v. Merryman, 630 F.2d 780, 788-89 (10th Cir. 1980). Thus, 

these comments did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to 

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make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. See 

Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). 

With regard to the comments concerning codefendant Capps ' 

testimony that have been interpreted as comments on witness credibility, we hold that the comments were permissible comments on 

issues raised by the evidence. When the evidence raises the issue 

of credibility, the prosecutor may comment on the issue, so long 

as the comment does not amount to a personal opinion. See United 

States v. Lotspeich, 796 F.2d 1268, 1271-72 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Finally, we hold that the prosecutor's comment regarding the 

amount of morphine on the road is a permissible inference from the 

evidence. When petitioner threw morphine from the window of a 

moving car, a fair inference could be drawn that the powder would 

dissipate and the police would not be able to recover it all. 

Thus, the prosecutor's comment did not infect the trial with 

unfairness. 

Petitioner's final challenge to the district court's order 

alleges that the five claims summarily dismissed were dismissed in 

error. Having reviewed the magistrate's recommendation and the 

parties' briefs, we conclude that the district court correctly 

adopted the magistrate's recommendation that the five claims be 

dismissed. Petitioner has pointed to no new authority contrary to 

that cited by the magistrate in his recommendation. Thus, we find 

the cases cited by the magistrate controlling, and we affirm the 

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district court's dismissal for the reasons stated by the magistrate. 

The dismissal of petitioner's claims is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith. 

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Entered for the Court 

Monroe G. McKay 

Circuit Judge 

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