Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01449/USCOURTS-caDC-11-01449-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation
Petitioner
State of New Jersey
Intervenor for Respondent
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Respondent
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 2012 Decided February 19, 2013 

No. 11-1449 

SHIELDALLOY METALLURGICAL CORPORATION, 

PETITIONER

v. 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA, 

RESPONDENTS

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

INTERVENOR

On Petition for Review of an Order 

of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Matias F. Travieso-Diaz argued the cause for petitioner. 

With him on the briefs were Jay E. Silberg, Alison M. Crane, 

and Stephen L. Markus. 

Grace H. Kim, Senior Attorney, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, argued the cause for respondents. With her on 

the brief were Lane N. McFadden, Attorney, U.S. Department 

of Justice, and John F. Cordes, Jr., Solicitor, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 

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Andrew D. Reese, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the 

Attorney General for the State of New Jersey, argued the 

cause and filed the brief for intervenor. 

Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

WILLIAMS. 

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed 

by Circuit Judge ROGERS. 

WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. This case arises from 

our remand in Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC, 624 

F.3d 489 (D.C. Cir. 2010). It concerns, above all, an 

important question of public safety that demands great clarity 

and precision, neither of which the agency has supplied: 

What rules govern the means by which the owner of a 

licensed nuclear facility may decommission that facility and 

dispose of its radioactive materials? The Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission claims that it has taken a clear and consistent 

approach to answering this question. The clarity and 

consistency are not apparent to us. 

The order now under review, Shieldalloy Metallurgical 

Corp., CLI-11-12, 74 NRC ___ (Oct. 12, 2011) (“Order”), 

presents that issue and several others. All stem from the 

interaction between the NRC’s regular decommissioning 

process and a statutory provision (§ 2021 of the Atomic 

Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021) authorizing the NRC to 

transfer regulatory authority over classes of nuclear materials 

located within a state to the government of that state. Except 

as to the primary issue just highlighted—the Commission’s 

basic standards for decommissioning—we find no legal error 

in the Commission’s Order; as to that issue, however, our 

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inability to understand the key regulatory materials 

purportedly guiding the agency’s exercise of control over 

decommissioning requires another remand. 

* * * 

Petitioner Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation is an 

industrial company that manufactured metal alloys in 

Newfield, New Jersey between 1955 and 1998. Its 

manufacturing process generated radioactive byproducts, 

which the company held at the Newfield facility under license 

from the NRC. In the early 1990s, Shieldalloy began 

consulting with the NRC on the development of a proposal to 

decommission the facility and dispose of its radioactive 

materials on-site. It proposed that the disposal would be 

“restricted,” an NRC term of art requiring special conditions 

designed to minimize the risks to public health and safety. 

Restricted disposal is in contrast to “unrestricted,” under 

which remediation and reduction of radiation levels have 

proceeded to the point where there is no need for limits on 

public access to the disposal site. See 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003 

(definitions of “restricted area” and “unrestricted area”). 

These consultations stretched on for many years and 

culminated in a formal decommissioning plan, which 

Shieldalloy submitted to the agency in 2002. 

The NRC rejected the 2002 plan as technically deficient. 

After further consultations with NRC staff, Shieldalloy 

submitted a second, revised plan in 2005. The NRC rejected 

that plan, too, with comments. In 2006, Shieldalloy submitted 

a third plan, which responded to the NRC’s comments, as well 

as to NRC guidance on decommissioning of licensed facilities 

issued earlier in 2006. The NRC accepted this third plan for 

the purposes of technical review, but still sought further 

clarification from Shieldalloy on various aspects. In the 

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summer of 2009, Shieldalloy submitted a fourth plan that was 

responsive to these last inquiries. The agency never reviewed 

that document. 

In 2008, while the NRC was reviewing the 2006 plan, 

New Jersey applied for a transfer of regulatory authority over 

in-state nuclear materials, pursuant to § 2021 of the Act. The 

NRC made an initial determination that the transfer to New 

Jersey would satisfy § 2021(d)’s requirement that the state’s 

regulatory program be “compatible” with that of the NRC, 

and sought comments from the public. Shieldalloy filed a 

letter asserting incompatibility between the programs. To no 

avail: the agreement transferring authority to New Jersey went 

into effect in September 2009, barely a month after 

Shieldalloy submitted the fourth version of its 

decommissioning plan. Less than two weeks later, New 

Jersey informed Shieldalloy that its 2009 plan—which the 

NRC had forwarded to the state—did not meet the state’s 

remediation requirements. 

Fearing that New Jersey would require it to abandon its 

plans for on-site disposal and pursue a more expensive off-site 

alternative (again, in NRC parlance, “unrestricted”), 

Shieldalloy appealed to this court. We agreed with the 

company in part and remanded the case to the agency. See 

Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., 624 F.3d at 489. 

Specifically, we found that the NRC had not responded 

meaningfully to Shieldalloy’s invocation of criterion 25 of the 

Commission’s “Criteria Document:”1

 

 1

 Criteria for Guidance of State and NRC in Discontinuance of 

NRC Regulatory Authority and Assumption Thereof by States 

Through Agreement, 46 Fed. Reg. 7540 (Jan. 23, 1981), as 

amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 36,969 (July 16, 1981) and 48 Fed. Reg. 

33,376 (July 21, 1983). See Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 491 & n.1. 

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Existing NRC Licenses and Pending 

Applications. In effecting the discontinuance of 

jurisdiction, appropriate arrangements will be made . 

. . to ensure that there will be no interference with or 

interruption of . . . the processing of license 

applications, by reason of the transfer. 

46 Fed. Reg 7540, 7543 (Jan. 23, 1981). Shieldalloy had 

argued that as its license application had already been years in 

processing, transfer to New Jersey would clearly interrupt the 

process. See Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 493. Further, 

Shieldalloy had suggested that if the Commission wished to 

generally transfer authority over in-state nuclear materials to 

New Jersey, there was nothing to prevent it from reserving the 

Newfield facility from any such transfer. 

To this twofold claim, the NRC offered a twofold 

response. As to the risk of an interruption in seeming 

violation of criterion 25, it expressed confidence that there 

would be a “smooth transition” in the processing of pending 

licensing actions (including decommissioning applications) 

because New Jersey’s regulatory scheme recognized existing 

NRC licenses and would continue “any licensing actions that 

are in progress.” Id. at 494 (quotations removed). As to 

Shieldalloy’s preferred solution—excepting Newfield from 

the transfer—the NRC claimed that the legislative history of 

§ 2021 showed that Congress did not contemplate its allowing 

“concurrent regulatory authority over licensees.” 624 F.3d at 

493. We rejected both elements of the defense for reasons 

elaborated in our earlier opinion. Id. at 493-95. 

Shieldalloy’s initial suit raised a further claim, which we 

noted but did not address because Shieldalloy had not raised it 

sufficiently with the Commission. See 624 F.3d at 495-97. 

This other claim pertained to a cost-benefit analysis principle 

embedded in the NRC’s regulatory program called the 

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ALARA principle, which, as we explain more thoroughly 

below, refers to the requirement that residual radiation at a site 

be “as low as reasonably achievable.” 

The core of Shieldalloy’s ALARA claim was that the 

New Jersey decommissioning regime, unlike the NRC’s, 

requires exhumation and off-site disposal of radioactive 

materials even where that course of action would expose the 

public to higher doses of radiation than on-site disposal. 

Thus, Shieldalloy contended, “while New Jersey’s standards 

may be more stringent, they are actually less safe.” 624 F.3d 

at 496. And while a Commission policy statement, its 

Compatibility Guidance Document,2 allowed transfer where a 

state’s standards were “more stringent,” that allowance was 

subject to the proviso that the “more stringent requirements do 

not preclude or effectively preclude a practice in the national 

interest without an adequate public health and safety or 

environmental basis related to radiation protection.” 62 Fed. 

Reg. 46,517, 46,520/2. The same policy statement also 

affirmed the NRC’s mission as being to assure that civilian 

use of nuclear materials “is carried out with adequate 

protection of public health and safety.” Id. 46520/1; see also 

Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 496. Section 2021(d)(2) itself 

requires the state program to be “adequate to protect the 

public health and safety.” 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)(2). In light of 

these principles, we found that Shieldalloy’s depiction of the 

effects of transfer held out a “troubling prospect.” 624 F.3d at 

496. 

 2

 Statement of Principles and Policy for the Agreement State 

Program; Policy Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of 

Agreement State Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 46,517 (Sept. 3, 1997). 

See Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 491 & n.2. 

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On remand, the NRC afforded Shieldalloy a “fresh 

opportunity” to comment on the transfer agreement in order to 

“assure a full airing of the matter.” Order at 6-7. In its 

submission, Shieldalloy of course pursued the issues 

occasioning the remand, but it also pursued the contention that 

the New Jersey rules were more stringent but less safe. 

The NRC’s Order rejected Shieldalloy’s objections and 

reinstated the transfer agreement. Shieldalloy again petitions 

us for review. We find that, on its second attempt, the agency 

adequately addressed Shieldalloy’s claims arising out of 

criterion 25 and the parties’ conflicting interpretations of 

§ 2021. The NRC’s response to Shieldalloy’s ALARA claim, 

however, appears divorced from the authorities on which it 

purports to draw, and accordingly we vacate the Order and 

remand the case again for a more responsive analysis of that 

issue. 

* * * 

We begin with the question of concurrent federal and 

state jurisdiction under § 2021. On remand the NRC 

determined that § 2021 requires it to accept a state’s request 

for a partial transfer of regulatory authority if the request 

satisfies the conditions laid out in § 2021(d), but forbids the 

agency from proposing partial transfers either at the request of 

a regulated entity or on its own initiative. In other words, the 

NRC reads § 2021 as a grant of authority to accept or reject, 

but never to modify, a proposed transfer agreement. See 

Order at 8-20. 

Whether § 2021 straightjackets the NRC into treating 

state transfer applications on an “all or nothing” basis is 

reviewable under Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 

837 (1984), which means that, as Entergy Corp. v. 

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Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218 (2009), observed, a 

“reasonable agency interpretation prevails.” 

As we mentioned in our earlier opinion, there appears to 

be a contradiction between § 2021(b), which provides that the 

NRC “is authorized to enter into agreements . . . with respect 

to any one or more” classes of materials, and § 2021(d), 

which states that the agency “shall enter into an agreement” 

under § 2021(b) provided the conditions of compatibility, 

adequacy and certification are met. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b) & (d) 

(emphases added); see Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 495. The 

latter provision appears to state an imperative, whereas the 

former suggests some flexibility to negotiate which classes of 

materials will be governed by the transfer. 

In its Order, the Commission reconciles these two 

provisions by reading § 2021(b) as a “general grant of legal 

authority” to hand a state authority over designated nuclear 

materials, and § 2021(d)’s “shall” as mandating that transfer 

when the other statutory criteria are met. Order at 11-14. The 

Commission bolsters this reading with references to the 

legislative history suggesting a strong congressional 

determination to recognize the interests of states. Id. at 14-15. 

It also plausibly construes the “any one or more” language of 

§ 2012(b) as reflecting no more than an anticipation that 

agreements might cover fewer than all the three relevant 

categories of nuclear materials at a time. Id. at 16. The 

Commission also attributed its earlier approval of a transfer to 

Oklahoma of less than all the sites with materials of a specific 

class, see Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 493-94, to Oklahoma’s 

express unwillingness to assume authority over the specific 

materials, which the legislative history again suggested might 

be a sound basis for accepting a proposal of partial transfer. 

Order at 16-20. 

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In other words, the NRC saw § 2021 as conferring 

authority to accept but not request partial transfers. We can 

imagine contexts where this bright-line distinction would 

break down. Suppose, for example, the NRC rejected or made 

clear its intent to reject a proposed transfer agreement based 

solely on concerns about a single facility. Suppose the state 

then intuited that a partial proposal which excluded that 

facility would be a shoo-in and decided it was better not to 

throw the baby out with the bathwater? Would this not be an 

NRC-negotiated partial transfer in substance if not in name? 

But even taking into account this conceptual weakness, the 

Commission’s interpretive exercise appears reasonable and 

consistent with the statutory scheme. 

Shieldalloy argues that the permissive language found at 

§ 2021(c)(4) & (j) demonstrates Congress’s intent “for the 

NRC to retain flexibility in determining how to fashion and 

manage its agreement with a state.” Pet’r Br. 28. But both 

seem to cut in favor of the Commission’s view. 

Section 2021(j) gives the NRC discretion to suspend “all or 

part” of a transfer agreement in the event of an “emergency 

situation” or where the state has failed to live up to its 

responsibilities under an agreement. And § 2021(c)(4) 

concerns only situations where the agency has determined “by 

regulation or order” that the materials over which the state 

seeks regulatory authority pose such “hazards or potential 

hazards” that they must be disposed under NRC license. 42 

U.S.C. § 2021(c)(4). These very narrow provisions for special 

treatments tend to confirm the NRC’s view that it has no 

general authority to reject part of a state’s qualifying request 

for transfer. 

There remains Shieldalloy’s argument that the 

Commission violated criterion 25 by failing to ensure that 

there would be no interruption in the processing of license 

applications. Of course, once the Commission has precluded 

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its exercise of any discretion to cut part of a transfer out of a 

state’s request, the only remedy would be the seemingly 

drastic one of denying the request in full. 

Indeed, if one reads criterion 25 as Shieldalloy contends it 

should be read, then the NRC in fact should have rejected 

New Jersey’s application once it determined that a partial 

transfer was unavailable. The company argues, not 

unreasonably, that where a regulated entity has engaged in an 

extensive process of dialogue and collaboration with an 

agency in pursuit of specific licensing outcome, then a sudden 

relinquishment of regulatory authority to a different sovereign 

with a radically different regulatory framework necessarily 

constitutes “interference with or interruption of” the 

processing of its licensing application. 

We certainly sympathize with Shieldalloy’s frustration at 

having been jilted by the NRC after a decade of dogged 

courting. But under the extremely narrow standard by which 

we review an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, 

see, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 

512 (1994), we are constrained to accept the NRC’s argument 

that it has never read criterion 25 as anything other than a 

“purely administrative” provision requiring the orderly 

transfer of records from the agency to the transferee state. 

Order at 30; see generally id. at 28-34. Nothing in the text 

plainly forbids the NRC from proceeding with a transfer under 

§ 2021 even though a pending license application will meet a 

different fate under a state regulatory regime than it would 

under the federal equivalent.

* * * 

Shieldalloy’s ALARA argument concerns the operation 

of that principle in the context of a 1997 NRC final rule on the 

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decommissioning of licensed facilities, termed the License 

Termination Rule (“LTR”). 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1401-06. The 

LTR applies to a broad range of NRC licenses, including 

those required for the operation of nuclear reactors, the 

possession of spent fuel and byproduct radioactive materials, 

and the disposal and storage of high-level radioactive wastes. 

See id. § 20.1401 (stating that the LTR applies to the 

decommissioning of licensed facilities under 10 C.F.R. parts 

30 (byproduct material), 40 (source material), 50 (production 

and utilization facilities), 52 (nuclear power plants), 60 (highlevel radioactive waste), 61 (land disposal of radioactive 

waste), 63 (waste disposal in Yucca Mountain), 70 (special 

nuclear material) and 72 (spent fuel and other wastes)). 

Shieldalloy holds a part 40 license to possess source material 

containing uranium and thorium at the Newfield site. 

Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corporation, NRC.GOV, 

http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/ 

complex/shieldalloy-metallurgical-corporation-smc-.html.

Under the LTR, a site can be decommissioned for either 

unrestricted or restricted use. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1402-03; see 

also id. § 20.1003 (definition of “decommission”). Again, 

unrestricted use describes a site that has been remediated and 

at which radiation levels have been reduced to the point where 

there is no need to limit public access. Id. §§ 20.1003 

(definition of “unrestricted area”), 20.1402. Restricted sites 

are those that will be remediated to some point short of the 

conditions required for unrestricted use, but where public 

health and safety can be ensured through the establishment of 

adequate controls. Id. §§ 20.1003 (definition of “restricted 

area”), 20.1403. The regulations also put a ceiling on dose 

exposure in the event that the institutional controls are “no 

longer in effect,” id. § 20-1403(e), a ceiling higher than 

Shieldalloy’s estimate of the dose exposure in that event under 

its current decommissioning plan. See Order at 38-39. 

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Section 20.1402 of the LTR sets out the conditions under 

which a site will be released for unrestricted use on 

termination of a license. Section 20.1403 does the same for 

restricted release. Under § 20.1402, a licensee can pursue 

unrestricted release after reducing residual radiation at the site 

to “levels that are as low as reasonably achievable 

(ALARA),” and in any event no greater than 25 millirem 

(“mrem”). Id. § 20.1402.3 The prerequisites for restricted 

release under § 20.1403 are more elaborate, and require the 

licensee to arrange and set aside funds for “legally enforceable 

institutional controls” that will limit human exposure to no 

greater than 25 mrem. Id. §§ 20.1403(b)-(c). 

In addition to these technical instructions, the LTR 

requires a licensee seeking restricted release to make what the 

NRC calls (Order at 41) an initial showing of “eligibility” set 

out at § 20.1403(a): 

A site will be considered acceptable for license 

termination under restricted conditions if: 

(a) The licensee can demonstrate that further 

reductions in residual radioactivity necessary to 

comply with the provisions of § 20.1402 would result 

in net public or environmental harm or were not 

being made because the residual levels associated 

with restricted conditions are ALARA. 

Determination of the levels which are ALARA must 

take into account consideration of any detriments, 

such as traffic accidents, expected to potentially 

result from decontamination and waste disposal; 

 3

 All mrem references are to increments above background 

radiation. 

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Id. § 20.1403(a) (emphasis added). The NRC characterizes 

the “net public or environmental” harm test alluded to in 

§ 20.1403(a) as an “abbreviated” form of ALARA that takes 

into account only a subset of the costs involved in a full 

ALARA assessment. Order at 25-26; Resp. Br. 13-14 n.3, 59-

60 n.13. The parties have focused exclusively on the ALARA 

test, and so shall we. 

Shieldalloy argues that the NRC provides for an 

eligibility test for restricted release predicated on a 

comparative application of the ALARA principle. More 

specifically, its response to the Commission’s solicitation of 

views on remand argued that the Commission’s rules and 

interpretations allow a licensee to employ restricted release if 

it would result in a lower radiation exposure than unrestricted 

release (which necessarily involves a comparison of the two). 

Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) 712, 714-15; Pet’r Br. at 47. In other 

words, if we understand Shieldalloy correctly, the proper 

application of the emphasized language would entail a 

comparison between restricted and unrestricted release, and 

the former would win when it yielded lower risks than 

unrestricted. By contrast, Shieldalloy asserts, New Jersey 

does not contemplate any form of radiation dose comparison 

between restricted and unrestricted release, and may require 

unrestricted release even where restricted release would have 

been safer. On this analysis, and given the preferences for 

safety expressed in the statute, the Criteria Document and the 

Compatibility Guidance Document, Shieldalloy argues that 

the New Jersey rules are not “compatible” with NRC’s, as 

required by § 2021(d)(3). 

 In its Order and before us, the NRC rejects outright this 

reading of § 20.1403(a). It maintains that its regulations 

“neither explicitly nor implicitly require a comparison 

between the levels of protection afforded by the unrestricted 

and restricted decommissioning options.” Order at 37; see 

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also Resp. Br. at 57. It further declares that “unrestricted 

release and restricted release are simply not susceptible to 

being compared meaningfully,” Order at 37, because of the 

“uncertainties” associated with restricted release, id. 

As for ALARA, the agency states that the principle’s 

operation is confined to comparisons of different remediation 

options of the same class—that is, for comparing two 

unrestricted-release proposals, or two restricted-release 

proposals, but never for comparing a restricted release option 

with an unrestricted one. Order at 40-41. The purpose of 

what it views as the correct understanding of ALARA, the 

agency avows, is twofold: First, it serves as a tool for 

measuring the reductions in radiation levels that it will require 

below the maxima set out in §§ 20.1402-03 in cases where the 

benefits of such additional reductions do not exceed the costs. 

Id. 41. Second, through its incorporation into § 20.1403(a) it 

provides “a criterion to limit the use of restricted release.” Id. 

 With respect to the precise meaning of § 20.1403(a), the 

agency tells us that the provision requires unrestricted release, 

except where “remediation to the level of 25 mrem per year 

for unrestricted release [set forth in § 20.1402] would not be 

beneficial from a cost standpoint.” Resp. Br. at 55. The 

agency further asserts that the ALARA principle, as used in 

§ 20.1403(a), is the analytic prism for such a weighing of 

costs and benefits. Order at 25, 41. As explained in its brief, 

the NRC sees the role of ALARA in § 20.1403(a) as helping 

to ascertain whether even the highest radiation levels 

permissible for unrestricted release under § 20.1402 are 

attainable in a cost-beneficial manner. Resp. Br. at 59. 

 We are quite baffled by the NRC’s current interpretation 

of § 20.1403(a). The agency’s order and its brief do not quote 

from the provision or make any effort to engage with its text. 

Instead, they state in bald and conclusory fashion that the 

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regulation does not mean what Shieldalloy says it means. 

Unlike the NRC, we do not find the meaning of § 20.1403(a) 

self-evident. Rather, we think that its text neither precludes 

the reading given to the provision by Shieldalloy nor, at least 

without exegesis that is completely missing here, supports that 

proposed by the NRC. 

The first sentence of § 20.1403(a) provides that a licensee 

is eligible for restricted release if it can prove that the 

remedial measures required of unrestricted release “were not 

being made because the residual levels associated with 

restricted conditions are ALARA.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). 

Although the passive construction of this clause leaves us to 

guess who exactly is not making the residual reductions 

required for unrestricted release, we think that it can only be 

the licensee or its agents, since the licensee is ultimately 

responsible for satisfying the decommissioning requirements 

of the LTR. Thus § 20.1403(a) appears to stand for the 

proposition that a licensee is eligible for restricted release 

upon showing that it has performed an ALARA analysis of 

restricted release decommissioning options, and the results of 

that analysis have caused it not to pursue unrestricted release. 

The language of § 20.1403(a) is silent as to why an 

ALARA analysis of restricted release would cause a licensee 

not to pursue unrestricted release. If we accept the NRC’s 

assertion that ALARA cannot be used to compare restricted 

with unrestricted release, Order at 40-42, however, then the 

text yields a key meaning: under § 20.1403(a) a licensee can 

qualify for restricted release without having to make any 

showing about unrestricted release. In other words, assuming 

the NRC definition of ALARA, the availability of restricted 

release under § 20.1403 would appear to have nothing to do 

with whether unrestricted release can be attained in a costbeneficial manner, and everything to do with some property of 

restricted release. What that property of restricted release is 

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we cannot say, since the NRC’s explanation of the role of 

ALARA in § 20.1403(a) discusses only its application to 

unrestricted release, and makes no reference to restricted 

release. Id.; see also Resp. Br. at 13-15, 54-55, 59. 

Further, the understanding of § 20.1403(a) we have just 

sketched out (in which the critical language of § 20.1403(a) 

invites attention to some aspect of restricted release) jars with 

the NRC’s insistence that it “explicitly expressed a preference 

for unrestricted release in adopting” the LTR: the provision 

appears to permit restricted release irrespective of the merits 

of unrestricted release. Order at 39. The NRC is correct that 

it has repeatedly stated it holds that preference. See, e.g., 

Radiological Criteria for License Termination, 59 Fed. Reg. 

43,200, 43,216 (proposed August 22, 1994) (“The 

Commission expects the licensee to make every reasonable 

effort to reduce residual radioactivity to levels that will allow 

unrestricted release of the site.”); Radiological Criteria for 

License Termination, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,058, 39.069 (July 21, 

1997) (“The Commission continues to believe that 

unrestricted use is generally preferable for the reasons 

noted.”) But such words mean little if they are not reflected 

in the text of the rule and the Commission’s other regulatory 

pronouncements. 

 Of course, a reading of the emphasized language in the 

first sentence of § 20.1403(a) as conditioning eligibility for 

restricted release solely on some characteristic of restricted 

release (i.e., without the comparison with unrestricted release 

that Shieldalloy finds implied) seems in tension with second 

sentence of the provision, which states that the ALARA 

analysis referenced in the first sentence must account for 

“consideration of any detriments, such as traffic accidents, 

expected to potentially result from decontamination and waste 

disposal.” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). Traffic accidents related 

to waste disposal would seem to have little to do with 

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restricted release, which involves on-site disposal of 

radioactive materials. By contrast, traffic accidents are an 

important concern for licensees pursuing unrestricted release, 

which ordinarily requires transfer of radioactive materials to 

another location. Order at 37-38 (describing restricted and 

unrestricted release). Yet the first sentence of § 20.1403(a) 

speaks only of “restricted conditions” being ALARA. 

Other NRC regulations and statements pertaining to 

ALARA only deepen the confusion. 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003, 

which defines key terms used in NRC regulations pertaining 

to protection against radiation (which regulations include the 

LTR), defines ALARA as “making every reasonable effort” to 

cut radiation exposure “as far below the dose limits . . . as is 

practical,” with practicality further defined as an open-ended 

set of “societal and socioeconomic considerations.” 10 C.F.R. 

§ 20.1003. This definition seems to match the NRC’s claim 

that ALARA is a device for insisting on cost-beneficial 

radiation reductions below maximum dose limits (e.g., 25 

mrem for unrestricted release under § 20.1402), but appears 

completely alien to the NRC’s reading of § 20.1403(a), under 

which ALARA is used to assess the cost-efficiency of 

attaining radiation levels at those limits. See Resp. Br. at 59. 

Even harder to square with the NRC’s position are 

passages of an NRC policy statement called NUREG-1757, 

which the agency describes as a “comprehensive NRC 

guidance document” on license termination. Order 24; see 

“Consolidated Decommissioning Guidance,” NUREG-1757, 

Vol. 2 (Rev. 1, Sept. 2006) (“NUREG-1757”), available at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/ 

sr1757/. The document evinces a clear expectation that a 

licensee must compare unrestricted and restricted release in 

order to establish eligibility under § 20.1403(a). For example, 

Chapter 6 of NUREG-1757, entitled “ALARA Analyses,” 

contains the following paragraph: 

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18

Appendix N of this volume discusses five different 

possible benefits. . . . In most comparisons between 

alternatives in the same class (e.g., both alternatives 

result in unrestricted release), the only important 

benefit should be the collective dose averted. In 

comparisons between restricted and unrestricted 

release, the other benefits can become important. 

NUREG-1757 at 6-3 (emphasis added). 

Pursuing this cross-reference to Appendix N, we find 

the following passage pertaining to the “benefits” side of 

ALARA’s cost-benefit analysis: 

Regulatory Costs Avoided 

This benefit usually manifests in ALARA analyses of 

restricted release versus unrestricted release 

decommissioning goals. . . . When evaluating the 

ability of a licensee’s proposal for restricted release 

according to 10 CFR [§] 20.1403(a), avoiding these 

costs should be included in the benefits of the 

unrestricted release decommissioning alternative. 

These should not be included as costs related to the 

restricted release. 

Id. at N-6 (emphasis added). 

 These passages do not appear to be the product of 

inattentive drafting. NRC officials invoked the same concept 

in a letter they sent Shieldalloy after accepting of the 

company’s 2006 decommissioning plan for technical review. 

That letter, entitled “Request for Additional Information” 

(“RAI”), warned Shieldalloy that overestimating the cost of 

unrestricted release “would bias the net harm or ALARA 

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 18 of 44
19

comparison away from the unrestricted use option.” J.A. at 

393. 

These statements from NUREG-1757 and the RAI can 

reasonably be read to call for precisely the kind of 

comparative dose analysis that Shieldalloy claims is 

contemplated by § 20.1403(a). Yet the NRC waves off the 

statements as “additional technical information and guidance 

on the mechanics of properly performing the ALARA 

eligibility analysis” that should be “construed in context.” 

Resp. Br. at 61. Then, without any attempt at explaining what 

it is in the context that saps these words of their apparent 

meaning, the agency abruptly concludes that “[n]one of these 

NRC statements . . . supports Shieldalloy’s unprecedented 

comparative dose approach.” Id. at 63. As with its discussion 

of § 20.1403(a), the agency appears to believe that a mere 

declaration of the meaning of disputed text, unsupported by 

any analysis, satisfies our standards of review. 

Furthermore, if NUREG-1757 and the RAI mean what 

they appear to mean, the Order’s insistence that the choice 

between restricted and unrestricted dispositions can never turn 

on a direct comparison between the two would appear to be 

the sort of “swerve” from prior policy that requires 

explanation. Greater Boston Television v. FCC, 444 F.2d 

841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Alaska Professional 

Hunters Ass’n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Here, 

the NRC does not seem troubled by its prior inconsistent 

language, nor does it even “display awareness that it is

changing positions.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 

556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); cf. General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 

F.3d 1324, 1333-34 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding notice 

inadequate where “the regulations and policy statements are 

unclear, where the petitioner’s interpretation is reasonable, 

and where the agency itself struggles to provide a definitive 

reading of the regulatory requirements”); Yakima Valley 

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 19 of 44
20

Cablevision, Inc. v. FCC, 794 F.2d 737, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 

1986). This failure to grapple with the past is especially 

troubling given the Commission’s total silence on why the 

uncertainties involved in restricted/unrestricted comparisons 

(alluded to in the Order at 37) are categorically more 

impenetrable than those required for comparisons between 

different plans of restricted release, which the Commission 

views as entirely permissible. 

The NRC trots out the familiar proposition that deference 

to an agency’s interpretation of its own rule “is all the more 

warranted when, as here, the regulation concerns a complex 

and highly technical regulatory program.” Resp. Br. at 53 

(quoting St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Sebelius, 611 F.3d 900, 905 (D.C. 

Cir. 2010)). But where the agency writes an opaque and 

ambiguous rule and then by fiat proclaims its meaning without 

any effort to consider its text or dispel its mysteries, the 

agency’s insistence on deference is misplaced. “We cannot 

defer to what we cannot perceive.” Int’l Longshoremen’s 

Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 870 F.2d 733, 736 (D.C. Cir. 

1989). Hand-waving about complexity seems especially 

unsuitable where the text’s opacity is all of the agency’s 

choosing and it concerns a complex regulatory program with 

immense public safety implications. 

Our dissenting colleague echoes the Commission’s 

assertions in its Order and in its brief. See Dissent at 8-21. 

Thus she fully accepts the idea that § 20.1403(a), as a 

threshold criterion for use of a restricted release, is 

exclusively related to difficulties with accomplishing a 

satisfactory unrestricted release—despite the language in 

§ 20.1403(a) itself that directs our attention to restricted

conditions. Id. at 17-20. Like the Commission, our colleague 

fails to directly engage with the language of § 20.1403(a) in 

her defense of this reading. Further, the “exegesis” she points 

to in NUREG-1757, see id. at 18, is merely a mathematical 

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 20 of 44
21

formula used to determine the lowest cost-effective radiation 

levels afforded by a particular remedial approach, which 

hardly settles the meaning of § 20.1403(a) or precludes a 

reading calling for a comparative-dose analysis—if anything, 

the formula seems to facilitate such a comparison. 

Our colleague also suggests that the court has offered “its 

own interpretation of § 20.1403(a).” Dissent at 17. But far 

from substituting our “judgment for that of the agency,” 

Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 

463 U.S. 29, 43, (1983), we have merely done what courts are 

supposed to do with regulatory language—try to explore the 

validity of the agency’s interpretation. Deference does not 

preclude analysis. In the present case, our study of the text 

led to the conclusion that the Commission’s response to 

Shieldalloy lacked an apparent textual basis; but that finding 

of course does not obligate the NRC to accept Shieldalloy’s 

interpretation of § 20.1403(a). Rather, it requires only that the 

Commission explain itself in a way that rationally addresses 

the concerns we set out above. 

We note finally our dissenting colleague’s contention that 

Shieldalloy did not properly raise its ALARA claim before the 

Commission. Her conviction appears to turn on Shieldalloy’s 

failure to (1) engage in an extensive textual analysis of 

§ 20.1403(a); or (2) provide a “technical rationale” in support 

of its objections. Dissent at 4-7. As to the first, we think it 

unreasonable to expect Shieldalloy to have contested the 

Commission’s baffling interpretation of § 20.1403(a) before 

that interpretation made its debut in the Commission’s Order. 

Given the confusing wording of the provision and the more 

straightforward guidance found in NUREG-1757 and the RAI, 

we can hardly fault Shieldalloy for eschewing § 20.1403(a) in 

favor of an argument framed in terms of ALARA and the 

LTR. Of equal importance, our colleague ignores the 

extensive back-and-forth between Shieldalloy and the 

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22

Commission over the past decade, including the 

Commission’s review of Shieldalloy’s several 

decommissioning plans (cited by Shieldalloy in its comments 

to the agency, J.A. at 712 n.20), which spell out Shieldalloy’s 

understanding of the ALARA principle in considerable detail. 

See, e.g., Decommissioning Plan for the Newfield Facility 75-

92, 154, Report No. 94005/G-28247, Rev. 1 (2005), available 

at http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0531/ML053190220.pdf; 

see also Supplemental Appendix (“S.A.”) at 27-44, 120-22. 

In light of this regulatory history, we are surprised that our 

colleague so readily accepts the Commission’s claim that it 

had “largely to guess” at the nature of Shieldalloy’s 

objections. See Order at 35; Dissent at 4. 

As to Shieldalloy’s failure to provide a “technical 

rationale” (a term which neither the Commission nor our 

colleague has bothered to define), we do not see how that 

omission hamstrung the Commission’s ability to grasp 

objections based on the contention that the NRC rules and 

directives permitted a licensee to choose the least dangerous 

solution. As the Commission itself observed, its rejection of 

Shieldalloy’s ALARA claim turned on the company’s 

“fundamentally inaccurate understanding of our license 

termination requirements,” Order at 36, and not a flawed 

engineering analysis. Even assuming otherwise, the reams of 

technical data Shieldalloy submitted to the Commission in its 

decommissioning plans, see, e.g., S.A. at 3-127, certainly 

supplied whatever quantitative detail the Commission might 

have needed to appreciate Shieldalloy’s position. 

* * * 

For the reasons stated, we again find the NRC’s transfer 

of authority to New Jersey arbitrary and capricious. We 

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23

therefore grant Shieldalloy's petition, vacate the NRC's 

transfer of authority, and remand for proceedings consistent 

with this opinion. 

 So ordered. 

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 23 of 44
ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part. I join the court in deferring to the interpretation of the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission of its authority under the

Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021, to transfer jurisdiction

over Shieldalloy’s Newfield site to the State of New Jersey. As

the court explains, the NRC’s statutory reconciliation is

plausible, and also consistent with legislative history indicating

Congress’s desire to recognize states’ interests as well as the

NRC’s prior state transfer approvals, including to Oklahoma. 

Op. at 7–9. I also join the court in concluding that the NRC’s

interpretation of Criterion 25 of its guidance on state transfer

agreements is not arbitrary or capricious or contrary to law. Op.

at 9–10. 

To the extent the court concludes, however, that the NRC’s

transfer to New Jersey is arbitrary and capricious, and again

remands the case, I respectfully dissent. The court inexplicably

excuses Shieldalloy from two fundamental requirements: first,

to raise its challenges to agency action with the agency so it has

an opportunity to respond, and second, to state its challenges on

appeal in more than a skeletal way. Because Shieldalloy has

done neither, despite a remand, and because, in not deferring to

the NRC’s reasonable interpretation of its regulations, the court

has injected a textual analysis of its own, a second remand is

unwarranted. A review of the NRC’s analysis on remand

demonstrates, moreover, that it has offered a reasoned response

to Shieldalloy’s challenges, and I therefore would deny the

petition for review.

I.

In remanding the case to the NRC for a second time, the

court has concluded that the NRC’s response upon remand fails

for lack of clarity. Op. at 2. Indeed, the court cloaks its

disposition vacating the transfer of authority to New Jersey in

concern that the NRC has somehow jeopardized public safety. 

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 24 of 44
2

See id. Yet the administrative record before the court indicates

that any lack of clarity arises not from the NRC’s lack of

articulation, or evidence it has failed to protect public safety, but

from Shieldalloy’s repeated failure to set forth its arguments

with sufficient clarity so that the NRC could respond to them. 

When the court initially remanded the case to the NRC, it

noted that Shieldalloy had failed to raise in its comments to the

NRC that removal of Shieldalloy’s radioactive materials from

the Newfield site in New Jersey to a facility in Utah would result

in greater harms to public health and the environment than

onsite disposal. See Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp. v. NRC,

624 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The court then observed

that “the unacknowledged source of Shieldalloy’s criticisms

regarding ALARA [i.e., the As Low As Reasonably Achievable

principle], restricted use, and various standards for

decommissioning” might be the “odd” fact that the License

Termination Rule, 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1401-06, which prescribes

conditions for decommissioning licensed facilities, “does not

feature in the Criteria Document” that the NRC uses to assess

the compatibility of state and federal regulatory programs. Id.

at 496–97. The court today again recalls that in the first appeal

Shieldalloy raised a “claim pertain[ing] to a cost-benefit analysis

principle embedded in the NRC’s regulatory program called the

ALARA principle,” Op. at 5–6, but that the court did not address

it “because Shieldalloy had not raised it sufficiently with the

Commission.” Id. at 5. 

The court has long instructed what it reaffirmed in

ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. FERC, 487 F.3d 945 (D.C. Cir. 2007):

A party must first raise an issue with an agency

before seeking judicial review. This requirement

serves at least two purposes. It ensures “simple

fairness” to the agency and other affected litigants. 

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3

It also provides this Court with a record to

evaluate complex regulatory issues; after all, the

scope of judicial review under the APA would be

significantly expanded if courts were to adjudicate

administrative action without the benefit of a full

airing of the issues before the agency.

Id. at 962 (citations omitted); see also Advocates for Hwy. &

Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 429 F.3d 1136,

1148-50 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United Transp. Union v. Surface

Transp. Bd., 114 F.3d 1242, 1244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 

On remand from this court, the NRC “decided to examine

anew all of the issues surrounding transfer of the Newfield site

to New Jersey and afford Shieldalloy a fresh opportunity to

comment on New Jersey’s agreement-state application.” 

Shieldalloy Metallurgical Corp., CLI-11-12, 74 NRC –,

Memorandum and Order at 6–7 (Oct. 12, 2011) (“Mem.”). Both

Shieldalloy and New Jersey submitted new comments.

Thereafter, the NRC reinstated New Jersey’s authority to

regulate the Newfield site finding it “adequate” and

“compatible” with the NRC’s regulatory program “within the

meaning of section 274d and our implementing agreement-state

policies.” Id. at 20 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2021(d)).1

 Among other

things, the NRC described the regulatory framework, ALARA,

the License Termination Rule, and New Jersey’s license

1

 See Criteria for Guidance of States and NRC in

Discontinuance of NRC Regulatory Authority and Assumption Thereof

by States Through Agreement, 46 Fed. Reg. 7540 (Jan. 23, 1981), as

amended by 46 Fed. Reg. 36,969 (July 16, 1981) and 48 Fed. Reg.

33,376 (July 21, 1983); Statement of Principles and Policy for the

Agreement State Program; Policy Statement on Adequacy and

Compatibility of Agreement State Programs, 62 Fed. Reg. 46,517

(Sept. 3, 1997) (the latter, “1997 Policy Statement”). 

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4

termination program. See id. at 21–28. It recounted

Shieldalloy’s “misunderstandings regarding [the NRC’s]

regulatory approach to license termination and ALARA

principle,” id. at 42, before considering, “in the proper context,”

id., Shieldalloy’s position, “belatedly raised before the court but

not as a comment on the New Jersey agreement,” id. at 34, that

“New Jersey’s license termination regulations are not as

protective as [the NRC’s],” id. at 42. 

Further examination of the NRC’s response on remand is

discussed in Part II, infra. What is significant at this point is

Shieldalloy’s procedural default. On remand the NRC observed:

 Despite the open-ended opportunity we provided

in this remand proceeding for Shieldalloy to fully

articulate its position on this and other issues, it

has presented its “comparative dose” position, and

its related argument as to ALARA, in summary

and conclusory fashion, leaving us largely to

guess at the technical rationale and underlying

foundation for its position. This is unfortunate,

given the highly complex and technical nature of

our license termination regulations. While we

endeavor to respond fully to Shieldalloy’s

comparative dose and related ALARA argument

based on our understanding of them, we are

mindful of the admonition that “the dialogue

between administrative agencies and the public is

a two-way street.”

Id. at 35–36 (quoting Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.

Thomas, 849 F.2d 1516, 1520 (D.C. Cir. 1988)) (emphasis

added and quotation marks omitted). The record in this court

confirms that on remand Shieldalloy commented, in two short

paragraphs, without providing technical support, that New

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5

Jersey’s “[f]ailure to implement the ALARA standard would

allow New Jersey to reject the decommissioning option for the

Newfield Facility that would result in the lowest doses to the

public and the environment.” Response to NRC’s Jan. 3, 2011

Order at 15–16. It cited only 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003, which

defines ALARA. Id. at 15. 

The court today is in the same predicament as the NRC on

remand as a result of Shieldalloy’s conduct. The court states:

“In other words, if we understand Shieldalloy correctly, the

proper application of the emphasized language [in 10 C.F.R.

§ 20.1403(a)2] would entail a comparison between restricted and

unrestricted release, and the former would win when it yielded

lower risks than unrestricted.” Op. at 13 (emphasis added). The

record shows that on remand Shieldalloy never cited 10 C.F.R.

§ 20.1403(a), nor argued that the regulation, part of the License

Termination Rule, either requires a “comparative dose” analysis

or the NRC to approve a decommissioning option (either

unrestricted or restricted) based on the outcome of that analysis. 

2

 Section 20.1403(a) provides that “[a] site will be considered

acceptable for license termination under restricted conditions if:”

The licensee can demonstrate that further reductions in

residual radioactivity necessary to comply with the provisions

of § 20.1402 [standards for unrestricted release] would result

in net public or environmental harm or were not being made

because the residual levels associated with restricted

conditions are ALARA. Determination of the levels which

are ALARA must take into account consideration of any

detriments, such as traffic accidents, expected to potentially

result from decontamination and waste disposal.

10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (emphasis added).

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Even now, in this second appeal challenging the NRC’s

transfer of authority to New Jersey, it is at best doubtful that

Shieldalloy has properly presented the issues regarding

comparative dose and ALARA. In its opening brief, Shieldalloy

contends, in conclusory fashion, leaving the court to guess at its

rationale, that “there is a need to compare the radiological doses

that would result from the decommissioning of a facility under

unrestricted release and restricted release approaches and to

apply the ALARA principle to select the option that results in

the lowest doses.” Pet’r’s Br. 43. Although not referencing 10

C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) in its comments on remand, Shieldalloy

now contends, summarily, that the regulation requires a

comparison between the two decommissioning approaches. At

most it offers only a conclusory textual analysis of § 20.1403(a)

and never explains why the regulation requires the NRC to

approve one release option over another as a result of such an

analysis. In similar fashion, Shieldalloy has provided no

supporting technical rationale for its ALARA contention. This

court has instructed: “‘It is not enough merely to mention a

possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to

do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put

flesh on its bones.’” Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 200

n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see also Carducci v.

Regan, 714 F.2d 171, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

That aside, on appeal Shieldalloy points for the first time to

the NRC’s comprehensive guidance document on

decommissioning, NUREG-1757, and to NRC staff requests for

additional information purportedly in support of its comparative

dose/ALARA contention. Additionally, only in its reply brief

does Shieldalloy suggest that the NRC’s explanation of 

§ 20.1403(a) — as requiring a licensee to demonstrate that

remediation to the level of adequate protection to allow

unrestricted release without institutional controls would not be

cost-beneficial, see Resp’ts’ Br. at 55–56, 61 — “ignores the

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7

second half of 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) after the word ‘or’, that

calls for an ALARA analysis of the restricted release option.” 

Reply Br. 15–16. Ordinarily, the court will not address

arguments first raised in a reply brief. See United States v.

Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Students Against

Genocide v. Dep’t of State, 257 F.3d 828, 835 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 

For purposes of this court’s review, one problem is that

identified by the NRC on remand: Shieldalloy failed to provide

the NRC with a textual analysis of § 20.1403(a) or a basis for

concluding that the regulation calls for a comparative ALARA

analysis or requires the NRC to approve a decommissioning

option based on the outcome of that analysis. It also failed to

provide technical support for its claim – a significant failure

because § 20.1403(a) entails the use of ALARA, infra Part II.B. 

To that extent it has deprived the court of a record addressing

fully explicated and supported objections to the NRC’s transfer

order. Having had its comparative dose interpretation twice

rejected by the NRC, see Mem. at 35, much less the court’s

observation that Shieldalloy had “not raised [its cost-benefit

claim] sufficiently with the Commission,” Op. at 5 (citing 

Shieldalloy, 624 F.3d at 495–97), Shieldalloy had an obligation

on remand to fully present argument and data in response to the

NRC’s reactions to its approach. The second problem is that on

appeal Shieldalloy has not meaningfully cured these

deficiencies. So neither the court nor the NRC is clear about

Shieldalloy’s position (beyond opposing the transfer of authority

and the unrestricted release option as less safe) even though

Shieldalloy is a sophisticated corporate litigant that has had four

opportunities to present its arguments – twice before the NRC

and twice before this court, in addition to opportunities during

the decommissioning proceedings since the early 1990s. 

Against this backdrop, the court’s decision to vacate the transfer

order and remand the case again to the NRC is an unwarranted

“windfall” for Shieldalloy. 

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II.

All is not lost, however; or at least it should not be. 

“[E]ndeavor[ing] to respond fully to Shieldalloy’s comparative

dose and related ALARA argument based on [its] understanding

of them,” Mem. at 35–36, the NRC stated on remand:

“Shieldalloy apparently construes our license termination

regulations as calling for a licensee to compare doses of the

restricted-release and unrestricted-release decommissioning

options and to choose the option that affords the lowest dose.” 

Id. at 36 (emphasis added). On appeal, Shieldalloy does not

dispute this interpretation of its position and the NRC addressed

the issue comprehensively, providing a detailed and reasoned

explanation as to how ALARA is used in the license termination

regulations and why New Jersey’s program is compatible with

the federal decommissioning standards. Id. at 34–44. 

Upon reviewing the NRC’s response on remand,

Shieldalloy’s contentions on appeal fail to present grounds upon

which the court can conclude that the NRC failed to offer a

reasoned explanation of its complex regulatory scheme, see

Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994);

Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995), or

a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, see Auer v.

Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997), or that the transfer of

authority to New Jersey is arbitrary and capricious or contrary

to law, see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983); 5 U.S.C.

§ 706(2)(A). Our review is narrow, and the agency action being

challenged is entitled to a presumption of regularity, see Citizens

to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415

(1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430

U.S. 99 (1977). To appreciate the vacuous nature of

Shieldalloy’s challenge requires an overview of the NRC’s

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9

responses to Shieldalloy’s comparative dose and ALARA

assertions. 

First, the NRC explained that Shieldalloy’s apparent

argument “is a fundamentally inaccurate understanding of our

license termination requirements and appears to lie at the heart

of Shieldalloy’s claim that New Jersey’s program is not as

protective of the public health and safety as our program with

respect to the Newfield site.” Mem. at 36. The NRC noted,

citing a 44-page staff request, that “this very misunderstanding

. . . was the subject of a number of requests for additional

information by the staff on Shieldalloy’s 2006 decommissioning

plan.” Id. at 36 n.115. Stating its regulations “neither explicitly

nor implicitly require a comparison of the levels of protection

afforded by the unrestricted and restricted decommissioning

options,” the NRC pointed out that “the levels of protection of

unrestricted release and restricted release are simply not

susceptible to being compared meaningfully” because each

option has different methods and attendant risks. Id. at 37. 

Given the “inherent complexities and uncertainties associated

with restricted release,” the NRC’s stated preference is for

unrestricted release. Id. at 39. Moreover, the NRC found

Shieldalloy’s own dose projections show the difficulty of

meaningfully comparing doses.

Second, the NRC explained that the ALARA analysis in its

regulation on restricted release, 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a), does not

“compel the selection of one decommissioning option over

another,” id. at 43, but instead acts as an eligibility requirement

to screen out sites that should remediate to unrestricted release,

in furtherance of the NRC’s preference. Id. at 25–26, 39–43. 

Because, under its regulatory scheme, adequate protection of

health and safety is accomplished “through satisfaction of the

dose criteria and other conditions for [a] chosen

decommissioning option,” id. at 41, and New Jersey protects

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10

health and safety through a dose threshold that is more stringent

than the NRC’s, the NRC concluded that New Jersey’s program

is compatible with the federal regulatory scheme. I address each

of these aspects of the NRC’s analysis.

A.

The NRC provided a reasoned explanation as to why its

regulatory scheme does not envision a dose comparison between

restricted and unrestricted decommissioning options. See Mem.

at 36–39. The NRC explained that its “regulations neither

explicitly nor implicitly require a comparison of the levels of

protection afforded by the unrestricted and restricted

decommissioning options” “because the levels of protection of

unrestricted release and restricted release are simply not

susceptible to being compared meaningfully.” Id. at 37. In the

NRC’s view, dose comparison is not meaningful because

“[e]ach option uses significantly different methods to achieve

adequate protection and has significantly different risks and

uncertainties associated with it.” Id. 

The NRC elaborated that restricted release is “far more

complex and involves significantly greater uncertainties than

offsite disposal,” because it “relies on the sustained

effectiveness of institutional controls over a 1000-year

compliance period to restrict future access and use to meet the

25 mrem per year dose requirement.” Id. To wit: Engineering

controls must perform numerous complex functions; monitoring

and maintenance are required; sufficient long-term funding from

an independent third party is also required. Id. For this reason,

the NRC explained, its stated preference is for unrestricted

release. Id. at 39. “Unrestricted release requires the removal of

contamination onsite to the extent necessary to comply with the

dose criteria of 25 mrem per year and transportation of the

contaminated material to an isolated and regulated long-term

disposal site.” Id. at 37. Acknowledging that “[s]ome

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11

uncertainties are inherent in these activities,” id. at 37–38, the

NRC explained, however, that they “generally involve[] wellknown and quantifiable handling and associated radiological

impacts on workers and the public over a short time period (one

to two years),” id. at 38. Whereas, “dose estimates from

contaminated slag left onsite [under the restricted release option]

are subject to limitations in understanding the performance of a

disposal system and its institutional and engineering controls

over the course of the 1000-year compliance period.” Id. 

For restricted use, the NRC explained, § 20.1403(a)

provides a licensee with either of two cost-benefit approachesto

demonstrate its eligibility, see Mem. at 25–26, what the NRC

describes on appeal as either “a full cost-benefit analysis that

compares all potential benefits to all potential costs (the

‘ALARA’ analysis), or an abbreviated cost-benefit analysisthat

compares all potential benefitsto only a subset of potential costs

that excludes the out-of-pocket costs of soil removal,

transportation, and disposal (the ‘net public or environmental

harm’ analysis).” Resp’ts’ Br. 59; see infra Part II.B. No such

demonstration is required for unrestricted release, 10 C.F.R.

§ 20.1402.3 This contrast confirms the NRC’s interpretation of

3

 Section 20.1402 provides:

A site will be considered acceptable for unrestricted use if the

residual radioactivity that is distinguishable from background

radiation results in a TEDE [total effective dose equivalent]

to an average member of the critical group that does not

exceed 25 mrem . . . per year, including that from

groundwater sources of drinking water, and that the residual

radioactivity has been reduced to levels that are as low as

reasonably achievable (ALARA). Determination of the levels

which are ALARA must take into account consideration of

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 34 of 44
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itsregulations as not envisioning a dose comparison or thatsuch

a comparison dictates the choice of decommissioning method. 

While the NRC’s interpretation accounts for the contrasting text,

Shieldalloy’s position does not. Instead, in reply Shieldalloy

takes the anomalous position that, in order to protect public

safety, § 20.1403(a) requires the NRC to allow the

decommissioning option resulting in the lowest ALARAproduced dose level – but “only when the licensee seeks to

implement the restricted release option,” Reply Br. 19, not if it

seeks to pursue unrestricted release, because the NRC “will

allow th[at] option to be selected without further inquiry,” id. 

Shieldalloy ignores that the applicable dose threshold must be

met, in order to provide adequate protection to the public,

regardless of any ALARA analysis. Mem. at 40–41. 

The NRC also addressed Shieldalloy’s dose comparison

position on its own terms, pointing out its flawed factual

premise. The NRC found, first, that Shieldalloy’s statements —

that license termination using onsite disposal for the Newfield

site would result in lower doses to the public than offsite

disposal — “are inaccurate.” Id. at 34–35. Shieldalloy claimed

that this proposition had not been controverted, but the NRC

pointed out that insofar as Shieldalloy’s comparative dose

position was “reflected in its proposed 2005 decommissioning

plan,” that plan was rejected by NRC staff as not being in

compliance with the license termination regulations, and that the

NRC staff’s request for additional information on Shieldalloy’s

proposed 2006 plan likewise indicated rejection of Shieldalloy’s

comparison approach and identified related technical concerns. 

Id. at 35. 

any detriments, such as deaths from transportation accidents,

expected to potentially result from decontamination and waste

disposal.

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The NRC found, second, that “Shieldalloy’s own dose

estimates for the Newfield site reflect that it is meaningless to

compare the level of protection between unrestricted release and

restricted release.” Id. at 38 (emphasis added). Shieldalloy

asserted on remand that “terminating the license under restricted

conditions by the method described in the [2009

decommissioning plan] (i.e., isolating the materials onsite under

an appropriate cover) would result in doses to the

decommissioning workers and the general public that are lower

than those that would result from” decommissioning by

Shieldalloy’s proposed method of unrestricted release. 

Response to Order at 13. While acknowledging that

Shieldalloy’s 2009 “plan calculates an infinitesimally small

dose” for restricted release assuming all controls hold, the NRC

found that “when institutional controls are assumed to fail and

the engineered cover is assumed to degrade, Shieldalloy’s filing

shows that the dose estimate would be far greater, up to a

bounding dose of 86 mrem per year” and “well in excess of

Shieldalloy’s dose estimates for unrestricted release.” Mem. at

38–39. In other words, Shieldalloy’s “own dose estimates for

onsite disposal assuming the uncertainty and potential failure of

controls over the long term in actuality show a higher dose.” Id.

at 39. On appeal, Shieldalloy rejects the NRC’s interpretation

of its regulations, summarily asserting that dose comparisons are

possible and meaningful, see Reply Br. 19–20, but it does not

refute the NRC’s finding that by Shieldalloy’s own estimates,

were the cover to degrade, restricted release would expose the

public to a higher dose of radiation than is reflected in its

unrestricted release plan.

B.

The NRC reasonably explained how ALARA functions

under its decommissioning regulations. Noting that “Shieldalloy

has not set forth or explained the basis for its apparent position,”

the NRC concluded, “perhaps it is alluding to our ALARAUSCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 36 of 44
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based eligibility criterion for restricted release.” Mem. at 41

(emphasis added). Further noting “its submission is hardly

clear on this point,” the NRC concluded “Shieldalloy apparently

believes that our ALARA principle compels us to compare

decommissioning options and to allow a licensee to select the

lowest-dose option.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added). The NRC

responded: “This is a fundamental misconception of our

ALARA principle and appears to be the root of Shieldalloy’s

misunderstanding of our approach to license termination.” Id.

Indeed, the NRC explained that “the very premise of

Shieldalloy’s position on ALARA — that our license

termination rule requires a choice to be made between a higher

or lower dose option — is erroneous.” Id. 

First, the NRC explained that the ALARA principle, “either

as a general regulatory principle or as used in our license

termination rule, [does not] incorporate or call for any

comparative analysis of doses from restricted and unrestricted

release.” Id. at 40. Rather, under the rule, the NRC explained,

ALARA has two purposes in license termination: to reduce

doses as low as achievable below applicable dose limits (not to

“compar[e] between achievable doses”), and to provide a

criterion to limit the use of restricted release. Id. at 40–41. The

latter purpose, “effectively, to screen out sites that should be

removing contamination to achieve unrestricted use,” the NRC

continued, is achieved in section § 20.1403(a) through the use

of a cost-benefit analysis to determine initial eligibility for

restricted release. Id. at 41. This eligibility criterion “was

intended to support [the NRC’s] preference for the unrestrictedrelease decommissioning option.” Id. Licensees must act to

remediate their sites to the dose threshold in order to terminate

their licenses under either restricted or unrestricted release. Id.

at 24–26. If the threshold is met by limiting access to the site

and the ALARA analysis demonstrates that it would not be costbeneficial to remove radioactive materials below the dose

USCA Case #11-1449 Document #1421015 Filed: 02/19/2013 Page 37 of 44
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threshold so that institutional controls are not required, then the

site will be eligible for restricted release decommissioning; to

qualify for unrestricted release, a licensee would need to

undertake sufficient remediation or removal of radioactive

materials so access to the site need not be limited or controlled. 

Id. at 24–26, 37, 39, 41; see 10 C.F.R. § 20.1003. Thus, the

NRC explained:

The ALARA analysis for restricted-release

eligibility purposes does not and was never

intended to demonstrate whether one

decommissioning option affords greater protection

than another. In fact, because an ALARA analysis

focuses on dose reductions below what we have

determined to be necessary for adequate protection

of the public health and safety, that analysis does

not go to adequate protection at all. A licensee’s

demonstration of adequate protection is

accomplished, instead, through satisfaction of the

dose criteria and other conditions for its chosen

decommissioning option.

Id. at 41. Notably ALARA “does not compare or explicitly

analyze any ofthe uncertaintiesthat affect the level of protection

afforded by a particular disposal option.” Id. at 42.

Second, the NRC interpreted the ALARA test in

§ 20.1403(a) not to call for comparing doses between release

options, “[n]or [to] compel the selection of one

decommissioning option over another.” Id. at 43. In its opinion,

“the ALARA requirement is irrelevant to whether Shieldalloy

may pursue restricted release over unrestricted release in New

Jersey.” Id. Omission of an ALARA-based criterion for

restricted-release eligibility is, the NRC opined, “immaterial to

[the] adequacy or compatibility” of the New Jersey program

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because adequate protection is accomplished through the dose

threshold. Id. at 42. The NRC pointed out that New Jersey

“accomplishes th[e] same objective” as the federal scheme does

by the restricted-release eligibility criterion – namely, “to limit

the use of restricted release in license termination” – “by

adopting more stringent . . . as well as more conservative

criteria.” Id. at 42–43; see Radiological Criteria for License

Termination, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,058, 39,069 (July 21, 1997). The

NRC thus reasonably concluded that New Jersey’s license

termination program, which must meet only a Category C level

of compatibility,4 was adequate and compatible.

C.

Notwithstanding the NRC’s reasoned explanation of its

regulatory scheme and reasonable interpretation of its

regulations, including what ALARA is, the court concludes that

a remand is required, principally in light of its own textual

analysis of 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a). See Op. at 10–21. 

Referencing the NRC’s brief on appeal, the court states that it is

“baffled by the NRC’s current interpretation of § 20.1403(a)”

and that it “do[es] not find the meaning of § 20.1403(a) selfevident,” but rather concludes that § 20.1403(a) neither

precludes Shieldalloy’s reading “nor, at least without exegesis,”

supports the NRC’s interpretation. Op. at 14–15 (citing Resp’ts’

Br. 55, 59). 

4

 Pursuant to the 1997 Policy Statement, supra note 1,

Agreement States may adopt programs that provide a level of

protection that is “equivalent to, or greater than, the level provided by

the NRC program.” 62 Fed. Reg. at 46,524. Category C elements of

Agreement State programs are required “in order to avoid conflicts,

duplications, gaps, or other conditions that would jeopardize an

orderly pattern in the regulation of agreement material on a nationwide

basis.” Id.; see also Radiological Criteria, 62 Fed. Reg. at 39,079-80,

39,086. 

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Undeterred by Shieldalloy’s defaults, the court engages in

a textual interpretation of § 20.1403(a), Op. at 15–17, noting that

on appeal the NRC discussed ALARA’s role in § 20.1403(a) as

applying only to unrestricted release, not restricted release. Op.

at 16. Section § 20.1403(a) provides — following the “or” —

that a site is acceptable for license termination under restricted

release if “[t]he licensee can demonstrate that further reductions

in residual radioactivity necessary to comply with . . .

§ 20.1402 [unrestricted release] . . . were not being made

because the residual levels associated with restricted conditions

are ALARA.” (emphasis added); see supra note 2. In light of

the italicized text, the court concludes that “the availability of

restricted release under § 20.1403 would appear to have nothing

to do with whether unrestricted release can be attained in a costbeneficial manner, and everything to do with some property of

restricted release.” Op. at 15. Hence the court finds confusion

in the text, see id. at 14–17, implying that the final clause should

read unrestricted instead of restricted. 

Ordinarily the court will defer to an agency’s reasonable

interpretation of its regulations, see Auer, 519 U.S. 461–63, and

there is every reason to do so here where the complex regulatory

scheme draws on the NRC’s expertise. The court acknowledges

that its own interpretation of § 20.1403(a) “seems in tension

with [the] second sentence of the provision, which states that the

ALARA analysis referenced in the first sentence must account

for ‘consideration of any detriments, such as traffic accidents,

expected to potentially result from decontamination and waste

disposal.’” Op. at 16 (quoting § 20.1403(a)). That tension does

not exist under the NRC’s interpretation, whereby its regulations

“demand that licensees . . . demonstrate that remediation to the

level of 25 mrem per year for unrestricted release would not be

beneficial from a cost standpoint before allowing them to pursue

restricted-use (onsite) disposal.” Resp’ts’ Br. 55–56; see also

Mem. 25–26, 41. In other words, the licensee must meet the

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applicable dose threshold regardless of the ALARA analysis;

that analysis, however, may reveal that release of the site

without institutional controls (i.e., unrestricted release) is costbeneficial. This accords with the NRC’s interpretation that its

regulations do not imply dose comparisons, and instead only

§ 20.1403(a) sets an eligibility requirement because restricted

release “is far more complex and involves significantly greater

uncertainties than offsite disposal.” Mem. at 37. 

The NRC’s “comprehensive guidance document” on

decommissioning, id. at 24, supports the “exegesis” offered by

the NRC. In describing the equation to be used to calculate

doses that are ALARA, Appendix N states that “[t]he residual

radioactivity level that is ALARA is the concentration . . . at

which the benefit from removal equals the cost of removal.” 

NUREG-1757, Vol. 2, Appendix N at N-10 (Rev. 1, Sept. 2006). 

The calculation of these benefits includes collective doses

averted from a given action and the costs include the monetary

costs to the licensee. Id. at § 6.3 at 6–3 to 6–4. So understood

in light of NUREG-1757, the reference in § 20.1403(a) to a

licensee demonstrating that “further reductions . . . were not

being made because the . . . levels associated with restricted

conditions are ALARA” means that no further radioactive

materials can be cost-beneficially removed, washed away, or the

like so the site can be decommissioned under § 20.1402

(unrestricted release). See id. at N-1 to N-12; see also Mem. at

25–26, 41; Resp’ts’ Br. 55–56, 61. This understanding of

ALARA was embodied in the NRC staff requests to Shieldalloy

for additional information. See e.g., Request for Additional

Information on Shieldalloy’s 2006 proposed decommissioning

plan at 21 ¶ 31. That is, the “levels associated with restricted

conditions are ALARA,” 10 C.F.R. § 20.1403(a) (emphasis

added), when no more actions can be cost-beneficially taken to

meet the unrestricted use criteria.

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Consequently, the confusion the court identifies arising

from passages of other NRC regulations and statements is

dispelled. Op. 17–19 (citing the definition of ALARA,

NUREG-1757, and the staff Request for Additional

Information).5 In concluding these materials “can reasonably be

read to call for precisely the kind of comparative dose analysis

that Shieldalloy claims is contemplated by § 20.1403(a),” Op. at

19, the court engages in a recalibration of § 20.1403(a)’s

eligibility requirement. That is not the same as demonstrating

that the NRC’s interpretation is “baffling” or lacking needed

“exegesis,” much less unreasonable and not entitled to

deference. The suggestion of “prior inconsistent language,” id.

at 19, fails for the same reason. Because the interpretation of

§ 1403(a) depends on the use of ALARA, including the equation

set out in NUREG-1757, Shieldalloy’s cursory argument on

remand was inadequate, despite the court’s assertions to the

contrary, Op. at 22.

5

 Neither the passages in NUREG-1757 nor the staff Request

for Additional Information support Shieldalloy’s position that

§ 20.1403(a) requires a comparative dose analysis. Instead, those

passages relate to the required ALARA analysis of restricted release,

which when properly conducted, will reveal if additional remediation

to meet the requirements of unrestricted release is cost-beneficial. The

court’s conclusion that under the NRC’s view ALARA is used in

§ 20.1403(a) “to assess the cost-efficiency of attaining radiation levels

at those [dose] limits,” Op. at 17 (emphasis in original) overlooks that

the NRC has consistently stated that ALARA is used in § 20.1403(a)

to assess the cost-efficiency of remediating below the applicable dose

threshold for restricted release in order to meet the criteria for

unrestricted release. Mem. at 40–41; Resp’ts’ Br. 55–56. This

accords with the NUREG-1757 guidance in Appendix N at N-1 (“In

order to terminate a license, a licensee should demonstrate that the

dose criteria . . . have been met, and should demonstrate whether it

is feasible to further reduce the levels . . . below those necessary to

meet the dose criteria (i.e., to levels that are ALARA).”).

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Inexplicably the court protests a lack of textual analysis by

the NRC and the dissent, Op. at 14, 20, when, as discussed here,

in fact the NRC explained, based on the plain text, that

§ 20.1403(a) affords a licensee two alternative ways to

demonstrate its initial eligibility for restricted release. Mem. at

25–26. Further, it explained, licensees that do not demonstrate

either initial eligibility or satisfaction of the remaining criteria

of § 20.1403 “will not ‘be considered acceptable for license

termination under restricted conditions’” and so must prepare

their sites for unrestricted release, the NRC’s preferred

decommissioning option because of its far more well-known and

quantifiable radiological impacts. Id. at 26 (quoting § 20.1403);

see also id. at 37–43. What is more, by explaining the use and

function of ALARA in its license termination regulations, id. at

34–43, the NRC provided additional exposition of the text of

§ 20.1403(a), specifically what “restricted conditions are

ALARA” means. The court ignores that the formula and related

guidance in NUREG-1757, which is used to assess if a

remediation activity “is ALARA,” also elucidates the clause in

§ 20.1403(a) that the court finds “baffl[ing],” Op. at 14; see

supra note 2. And, in examining Shieldalloy’s own dose

estimates for decommissioning, the NRC demonstrated why the

text cannot reasonably be read to call for the dose comparison

envisioned by Shieldalloy.

Moreover, even assuming, for purposes of argument, that

the NRC’s interpretation of § 20.1403(a) as not contemplating

a comparative dose analysis is unreasonable, which it is not,

neither the court nor Shieldalloy offers a basis on which to

conclude that the NRC’s conclusion that the regulation does not

“compel the selection of one decommissioning option over

another,” Mem. at 43, based on the outcome of an ALARA

analysis, is unreasonable. Instead, as the NRC explained, a

licensee must meet the dose threshold regardless of the outcome

of the ALARA analysis. Id. at 39, 41, 43. So the NRC could

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reasonably conclude that the NRC’s program and New Jersey’s

program are not meaningfully different, let alone incompatible

in regard to safety and the use of ALARA in § 20.1403(a): the

New Jersey program is simply more stringent in using a 15

mrem instead of a 25 mrem threshold, which is permissible for

Category C elements. See supra note 4. 

In sum, the regulatory scheme administered by the NRC is

complex, and further explanation is welcome as a general

principle, but the issues raised by Shieldalloy have been

adequately addressed by the NRC. This is so even though,

because Shieldalloy never referred to § 20.1403(a) in comments

on remand, the NRC had no occasion to explain more than its

purpose and method, but see Op. at 14. Even on appeal

Shieldalloy did not make the textual argument in its opening

brief now provided by the court as the basis for another remand;

neither does it offer that analysis in its reply brief. Although the

court forswears that it is “substituting [its] judgment for that of

the agency,” Op. at 21 (citation and quotation marks omitted), it

clearly is substituting its own textual analysis for the bare

assertions by Shieldalloy, see Schneider, 412 F.3d at 200 n.1. 

These circumstances — namely, Shieldalloy’s default on

remand, the NRC’s reasonable explanation of its regulations on

remand, and the court’s acknowledgment that its reading of the

NRC’s brief and its own interpretation of § 20.1403(a) creates an

internal tension, Op. at 16–17 — present an odd basis for another

remand much less a determination that the NRC’s transfer order

is arbitrary and capricious.

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