Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02423/USCOURTS-ca3-18-02423-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Arthur Johnson
Appellant
Superintendent Fayette SCI
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 18-2423

_____________

ARTHUR JOHNSON,

Appellant

v.

SUPERINTENDENT FAYETTE SCI

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 2-16-cv-04661)

District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller

Argued September 17, 2019

Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: February 7, 2020)

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Craig M. Cooley [ARGUED]

COOLEY LAW OFFICE

1308 Plumdale Court

Pittsburgh, PA 15239

Counsel for Appellant 

Jennifer O. Andress [ARGUED]

Assistant District Attorney

Max C. Kaufman

Supervisor, Federal Litigation 

Nancy Winkelman

Supervisor, Law Division

Lawrence S. Krasner

District Attorney

3 South Penn Square

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellee 

____________

O P I N I O N

____________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 

Although we generally rely on jurors to follow a court’s

instructions, we cannot expect the superhuman from them. 

Under certain circumstances, jurors cannot practically be 

expected to follow instructions, no matter how clear or explicit. 

The classic example arises during a joint criminal trial, in 

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which one defendant has confessed to the crime and the 

confession implicates his co-defendant. The confession is 

admitted into evidence, and the jury is instructed to ignore the 

confession as evidence against the co-defendant. This asks the 

impossible of our jurors. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 

123 (1968), the Supreme Court held that in these circumstances 

we cannot rely on a juror’s ability to put such an inculpatory 

statement out of their minds. Therefore, its admission violates 

the non-confessing co-defendant’s rights under the 

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and requires a 

new trial if he has been prejudiced by such damaging evidence.

More than fifty years after Bruton, despite intervening court 

opinions decrying this situation, courts still confront this 

problem.

Here, petitioner Arthur Johnson and his co-defendant, 

Tyrone Wright, were charged with the murder of Donnie 

Skipworth, who was shot multiple times while dealing drugs in 

North Philadelphia. Prior to trial, co-defendant Wright 

confessed to his involvement in the crime. Wright’s 

confession also implicated Johnson by identifying him as the 

shooter. The prosecution introduced Wright’s confession 

during trial, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” 

in an attempt to avoid a Sixth Amendment Confrontation 

Clause violation. However, repeated missteps and mistakes 

made it increasingly clear to the jury that Johnson was indeed 

“the other guy.” The trial court instructed the jury to ignore 

Wright’s confession when considering Johnson’s culpability, 

but a question from the jury indicated that they were having 

great difficulty doing so. Johnson was convicted of firstdegree murder after six days of deliberation. 

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Johnson appealed his conviction to the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court, which ruled that there was no Bruton violation 

since the substitution of “the other guy,” along with the trial 

court’s instruction, was adequate to protect Johnson’s Sixth 

Amendment rights under the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s

precedent in Commonwealth v. Travers, 768 A.2d 845 (Pa. 

2001). After the state court proceedings concluded, Johnson 

sought habeas relief in the District Court. The District Court 

concluded that a Bruton violation had occurred and that the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling to the contrary was an 

unreasonable application of federal law. However, the District 

Court denied habeas relief because it concluded that the Bruton

error was harmless. For the reasons that follow, we will 

reverse the District Court’s judgment and grant Johnson’s 

petition for habeas relief.1

 

1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, 

and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. 

Our review over the District Court’s denial of Johnson’s 

habeas petition is plenary because the District Court did not 

hold an evidentiary hearing. See Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 

105, 113 (3d Cir. 2009). 

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I. SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION2

We will first discuss Bruton and the legal principles at 

play, and then apply those principles in the context of this case. 

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees 

a criminal defendant’s right to be “confronted with the 

witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. This includes 

the ability to cross-examine witnesses. See Pointer v. 

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404, 406–07 (1965). When a nontestifying co-defendant’s statement is introduced, it is in effect 

the testimony of a witness who cannot be cross-examined. 

Three Supreme Court cases—Bruton; Richardson v. 

Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987); and Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 

185 (1998)—establish the relevant controlling precedent. We 

discuss each in turn.

In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 

right to confrontation is violated when a non-testifying codefendant’s confession is introduced in a joint trial, and that 

confession implicates the other defendant. The Court held that 

even when the trial court clearly instructs the jury not to 

consider the statement against the non-confessing defendant, it 

 

2 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)–(e), requires that we “afford 

considerable deference to state courts’ legal and factual 

determinations.” Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 391–92 

(3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). As a general matter, we

apply AEDPA deference to the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s 

analysis under Bruton unless the decision was “contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 

Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

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“cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute 

for petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination.” 391 

U.S. at 137. When such “powerfully incriminating 

extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused 

side-by-side with the defendant, are deliberately spread before 

the jury in a joint trial,” practically speaking, it is as though 

“there had been no instruction at all.” Id. at 135–36, 137. In

this context, “the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow 

instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital 

to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the 

jury system cannot be ignored.” Id. at 135.

The Supreme Court clarified Bruton’s reach in 

Richardson, holding that no constitutional violation exists 

where a confession is redacted to eliminate “not only the 

defendant’s name, but any reference to his or her existence.” 

481 U.S. at 211. In those cases, a limiting instruction “may 

well be successful” since there is not the “overwhelming 

probability” that the jury will be unable to disregard the 

inculpatory confession against the defendant. Id. at 208. The 

Richardson Court expressed “no opinion” on whether a 

confession is admissible when a defendant’s name is replaced 

with a “symbol or neutral pronoun.” Id. at 211 n.5. The 

Supreme Court refined the acceptable parameters of a redacted 

confession in Gray, holding that redactions cannot be so 

ineffectual that they actually could signal to the jury that the 

co-defendant’s name was deleted. Such obvious redactions are 

“similar enough to Bruton’s unredacted confessions as to 

warrant the same legal results.” 523 U.S. at 195.

While using a neutral pronoun may satisfy Bruton in 

some circumstances, we have clearly stated that courts should 

not apply a bright-line rule that such use will never violate

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Bruton. Bruton and its progeny require courts to take a holistic 

approach when considering redacted confessions, by viewing 

the redaction in the context of the entire record. See 

Washington v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 801 F.3d 160, 167 (3d 

Cir. 2015) (“It is not enough to say that because there were 

redactions of [the defendants’] names that the rules 

from Bruton and Gray do not apply.”); United States v. 

Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 573 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he nature of 

the linkage between the redacted statement and the other 

evidence in the record is vitally important in determining 

whether a defendant’s Confrontation Clause right has been 

violated.”). 

Here, Johnson and Wright were on trial together. The 

prosecution alleged that Wright drove the getaway car and 

Johnson and Abbas Parker approached Donnie Skipworth and 

opened fire. Abbas Parker (“Baz”) was not on trial.3

 The trial 

court permitted Detective James Burns, who took Wright’s 

confession, to read it to the jury over defense counsel’s 

objections, substituting Johnson’s name with “the other guy” 

or another neutral pronoun, as italicized below: 

Wright: I was driving down Master Street 

and I seen some guy. He was 

walking down Master right by 

Newkirk. He flagged us down and 

I pulled over. Then he opened up 

my side door and was standing 

there talking to us. He said that he

seen Donnie up on Thompson 

 

3 The record does not contain any information regarding any 

prosecution of Abbas Parker. 

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Street and he was going to go up 

and talk to him. Baz was like, I’m 

a walk up with you. Baz got out of 

the van and spoke with him and 

then he says to me, yoh, meet us 

around on 28th and Thompson 

Street. Then he and Baz walked up 

Newkirk Street and I pulled off. I 

drove up Dover Street to Jefferson 

and then down 28th Street and 

pulled over at Thompson, across 

the street from the firehouse. I shut 

the engine off and waited. I was 

probably there for a minute or two 

when I heard the gunshots coming 

from around the corner 

. . . . I seen Baz come running 

around the corner. He jumps in the 

van and starts yelling, we out, we 

out, we out, pull off. I pulled off 

and drove down 28th Street. 

. . . 

Burns: Did Baz tell you that he shot 

Donnie?

Wright: No. He had a gun, but all he said 

was that the other guy shot Donnie. 

. . . 

Burns: Did you know if the other guy had 

a gun that night? 

Wright: Yeah. I seen him with it right 

before the shooting down on 

Master Street. When I pulled up to 

him on Master, he was standing at 

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my sliding door and had his hands 

up on the roof of the van talking. 

He had the gun stuck in his pants 

and I could see it. It was a black 

semi auto with lines on the back of 

the grip, like grooves cut in the 

back of the grip. He always has 

that gun. . . . 

Burns: Do you know why the other guy

wanted to talk to Donnie?

Wright: No, but I found out the next day. . 

. . The whole neighborhood was 

talking about it. Everyone was 

saying that the other guy shot the 

boy over Donnie killing some boy 

named Nel two years ago on 

Newkirk Street. Nel was supposed 

to be his boy. 

A. 454–55. 

This situation is eerily reminiscent of the fact pattern in

Vazquez v. Wilson, 550 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2008). There, the

confessing co-defendant informed police that there were only 

two possible shooters: the non-confessing co-defendant and a 

third person not on trial. During trial, the two co-conspirators’

names were replaced with “my boy” and “the other guy.” Id. 

at 274. However, since the third person was not on trial and 

the prosecution argued the non-confessing defendant “fired the 

fatal shot,” we held that the jury was “almost certain” to 

identify the non-confessing defendant as the shooter. Id. at 

281. Like Vazquez, here, Wright’s confession identified Abbas 

Parker and an unnamed participant, and since Abbas Parker 

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was not on trial, the confession “sharply incriminated” 

Johnson, the only other person on trial. United States v. 

Richards, 241 F.3d 335, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) (interpreting Gray

and finding a Bruton error where the co-defendant’s confession 

referred to three people involved in the crime and the nonconfessing co-defendant was “only other person involved in 

the case”). 

The limited participants in this case made it obvious to 

a juror who “need only lift his eyes to [Johnson], sitting at 

counsel table,” to determine that he was “the other 

guy,” i.e. the shooter. Gray, 523 U.S. at 193; see also Eley v. 

Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 860–61 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding a 

Bruton violation where the non-testifying co-defendant’s 

confession “implicated exactly three people in the crimes and 

exactly three defendants appeared at the joint trial”); cf.

Priester v. Vaughn, 382 F.3d 394, 401 (3d Cir. 2004)

(substituting “the other guy” did not implicate the defendant 

because at least fifteen people were involved in the crime). 

Here, Wright’s confession left little doubt that the only other 

accused sitting at the table with Wright was “the other guy.” 

Johnson’s identity as the “other guy” was also explicitly

revealed both at the beginning and the end of trial. During 

opening statements, Wright’s attorney informed the jury that 

“Wright . . . writes down something to the effect of, oh, yes, I 

know that Arthur and Abbas went there to shoot Donnie 

Skipworth.” A. 326.4

 Johnson was again identified during 

 

4 Objections to this outburst produced only confusing follow up 

in an attempt to undo the harm. Indeed, in Vazquez, we 

expressed concern that “[o]nce the prosecutor made it clear to 

the jury that [the confessing co-defendant] had identified [the 

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closing arguments, when the prosecutor told the jury, 

“[Wright] tells you in his very own statement. He tells you that 

he knows that Art is going to go around—excuse me—he 

knows Abbas . . . .” A. 536.

If there was any doubt about Johnson’s identity as the 

shooter, after six days of deliberation, the jury sent a note to 

the trial judge:

Your Honor,

We the jurors have a question about your 

instruction regarding Tyrone Wright’s statement. 

You had instructed us that Tyrone Wright’s 

statement may only be used against Tyrone 

Wright and not against Arthur Johnson. We also 

recall the Commonwealth saying that we are not 

being asked to turn off our common sense. We 

would like to confirm that in order to comply 

with your instruction, we must not make any 

inferences stemming from the statement, or use 

the statement to help draw a more complete 

picture of the alleged crime in our minds when 

considering the case against Arthur Johnson. Our 

understanding is that our instruction is to push 

the statement from our minds and pretend it 

 

non-confessing co-defendant] as the shooter the situation was 

no different than it would have been if [the confessing codefendant’s] unredacted statement directly implicating [the 

non-confessing co-defendant] as the shooter had been admitted 

into evidence or used from the outset of the case.” Vazquez, 

550 F.3d at 283 n.14.

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never existed when we are considering the case 

against Arthur Johnson. Is this correct?

A. 555. The judge responded to the question by reinstructing

the jurors that they could not consider Wright’s statement 

against Johnson. Reply Br. 6. 

The jury knew all too well that Johnson was the other 

guy. There is no doubt that there was a clear violation under 

Bruton of Johnson’s Sixth Amendment rights and that the

Pennsylvania Superior Court’s ruling was an unreasonable 

application of Bruton, Richardson, and Gray. The jury was 

told that Johnson was the other guy on two separate occasions

during the trial: before the jury even heard the evidence and 

before the jury went into deliberations. After these 

identifications, any attempts to conceal Johnson’s identity 

were futile; the cat was already out of the bag. This is a clear 

Bruton violation and we could end our analysis there. 

As the above analysis shows, Wright’s redacted 

confession alone would have violated Bruton and the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court should have so found. Instead, 

the Superior Court found the substitution of the “other guy” 

equivalent to the use of a neutral pronoun and clearly erred 

when, focusing only on the confession, it concluded that under

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s precedent in Travers, 768 

A.2d at 851 (holding that no Bruton violation existed where the 

redacted confession substituted the non-confessing codefendant’s name with a neutral pronoun), there was no Bruton

violation. The Superior Court wrote the following: 

The [Travers] Court concluded that the use of a 

neutral pronoun was [an] acceptable means of 

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alleviating the Sixth Amendment problem 

because it is “not an obvious alteration at all” as 

compared to an obvious deletion of the 

defendant’s name with nothing to take its place. 

In the instant matter, the Commonwealth 

introduced Wright’s confession referring to 

Johnson as “some other guy,” “some guy,” 

“him,” “he,” or “the other guy.” The trial court 

twice instructed the jury that Wright’s 

confession was not admissible against Johnson, 

once before the statement’s admission and once 

during the jury charge. Thus, the facts of the 

instant matter are precisely in line with Travers. 

Since Johnson’s argument runs counter to 

binding Supreme Court precedent, it fails. 

A. 205 (citations omitted). The Superior Court’s analysis is 

devoid of any substantive discussion of the redacted confession 

within the context of the five-day trial. We agree with the 

District Court that the Superior Court’s determination was an 

unreasonable application of federal law. 

II. PREJUDICE ANALYSIS

Having concluded that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 

unreasonably applied federal law, we will next assess whether

the Bruton error had a “substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict”—i.e., if it requires 

reversal. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)

(citation omitted). Brecht requires a finding of “actual 

prejudice,” which is “more than a reasonable possibility that 

the error was harmful.” Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197–

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98 (2016) (citation omitted). But reviewing courts need not be

certain that a Bruton error affected the jury, and indeed, the 

Supreme Court has “acknowledge[d] the impossibility” of such 

a determination. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135. Habeas relief must 

be granted whenever there is “grave doubt” as to the 

harmlessness of the error. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 

436 (1995). In assessing grave doubt, the Supreme Court has 

cautioned “that the uncertain judge should treat the error, not 

as if it were harmless, but as if it affected the verdict.” Id. at 

435. If the matter is “so evenly balanced” that we are in 

“virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of the error,” we must 

resolve that balance in favor of the petitioner. Id. 

The Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts to 

consider a “host of factors” in their harmlessness analysis, 

including:

the importance of the witness’[s] testimony in 

the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony 

was cumulative, the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the 

testimony of the witness on material points, the 

extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, 

and, of course, the overall strength of the 

prosecution’s case.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986).5 In 

framing our analysis, our role is not to question whether the 

 

5 We have previously applied these factors in assessing the 

harmlessness of a Bruton error under AEDPA, reviewing for 

whether a state court unreasonably applied Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See Johnson v. Lamas, 850 

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evidence could support a guilty verdict, but “rather, even so,

whether the error itself had substantial influence.” Kotteakos 

v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946); see also O’Neal, 

513 U.S. at 436–37. “If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the 

conviction cannot stand.” Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765.

The District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 

hearing, so our review of its harmlessness determination is 

plenary. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 113. Since the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court denied relief without addressing harmlessness, 

we conduct our harmless error review de novo. See Collins v. 

Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 544 (3d Cir. 

2014); Appel v. Horn, 250 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001); cf. Fry 

v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119 (2007) (“[W]hen a state court 

determines that a constitutional violation is harmless, a federal 

court may not award habeas relief under § 2254 unless the 

harmlessness determination itself was unreasonable.”) 

(emphasis in original). Under this lens, we will review the trial

evidence in detail. 

A. Properly Admitted Evidence

At around midnight on May 4, 2008, Donnie Skipworth 

was shot multiple times on the 1300 block of Newkirk Street 

in North Philadelphia. The Commonwealth charged Johnson 

and Wright with murder based on witness statements and 

forensic evidence. The trial began on January 28, 2010, and 

the testimony unfolded over five days. 

 

F.3d 119, 133 (3d Cir. 2017). We find these factors for 

assessing harmlessness equally applicable

when Brecht provides our standard of review.

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The jury knew that Johnson was “the other guy” in 

Wright’s confession before the prosecution even began its 

case-in-chief. During opening statements, Wright’s attorney 

told the jury that Wright said Johnson and Abbas Parker went 

to Newkirk Street to shoot Donnie Skipworth. Immediately 

afterwards, the prosecution called its first witness, Aaron 

Taylor. 

Taylor grew up in North Philadelphia on the 1500 block 

of Newkirk Street. He had known Johnson and Donnie for a 

few years while growing up in the neighborhood, however at 

the time of trial, Taylor had not lived there for over ten years. 

One month after the shooting, Taylor was arrested on drug 

charges and taken into police custody. Taylor was later 

transported to the homicide unit, where he was interviewed by 

Detective George Fetters about the circumstances surrounding 

Donnie’s death. Taylor then signed a police statement

implicating Johnson in the shooting. The statement included 

the following: 

Look, I was down there on Newkirk like one or 

two weeks after Donnie was killed and I heard 

this young boy, Art, talking about how he did it, 

he killed Donnie, and how nobody had to worry 

about what [Donnie] had done to Darnell. See, 

Artie is supposed to be cousins somehow with 

Darnell and he said he would get Donnie for 

what he did to his cousin, Darnell. 

A. 334. Taylor “guessed” as to the purported conflict between 

Donnie and Darnell, supplying a motive for Johnson to seek 

retribution for Darnell’s murder:

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The word was that Donnie got [Darnell] killed. 

This was about one and a half to two years ago 

on the same block. See, they was selling drugs 

together out there, and I guess that Darnell got 

big headed and Donnie didn’t like it. So the 

word was that he (Donnie) had somebody kill 

Darnell. I guess it was over the money that they 

were making out there. You see, Donnie was 

always the pretty boy type and Darnell was the 

muscle, and I guess they just got in each other’s 

way. 

A. 333. At trial, Taylor unequivocally denied his entire 

statement to the police and testified that he was “forced 

into a statement.” A. 330. Taylor said he knew nothing 

about Darnell’s death and never overheard Johnson say 

that he killed Donnie out of revenge for killing Darnell. 

In fact, at the time of the statement, Taylor said he had 

moved away from the neighborhood and had not 

seen Johnson in years. 

The prosecution next called Detective Fetters, who 

testified about his interview with Taylor. Fetters said that in 

June 2008, Taylor voluntarily approached the police, stating 

that he had information about Donnie’s death. Fetters said that 

Taylor was cooperative during the interview, and that Taylor

had voluntarily signed his police statement. Fetters never 

asked Taylor why he was providing the statement, but 

suspected that Taylor did so under the belief that he would 

receive help on his pending drug charges. 

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To provide further context for Taylor’s police 

statement, the prosecution next called Detective Theodore 

Hagan, the homicide detective who investigated Darnell’s 

murder in 2005. However, Hagan’s testimony contradicted 

Taylor’s account of Johnson’s motive for killing Donnie. Not 

only did Hagan say Donnie was never implicated in Darnell’s 

murder, he also said that Donnie had actually helped the police 

identify Darnell’s shooter. After Darnell’s death, Donnie

voluntarily approached the police to provide an eyewitness 

statement, which then helped police identify and arrest the 

shooter, Eric Weedon. Eric Weedon pled guilty to shooting 

Darnell. Hagan also said that Donnie would have been called 

to testify as an eyewitness to Darnell’s murder had the case 

gone to trial.

The prosecution also called two firefighters, Fire 

Lieutenant Benny Hutchins and Firefighter Terence Banks, 

who were on duty at a nearby station the night of the shooting. 

The station, Engine Company 34, is located on the corner of 

28th Street and Thompson Street, about one block away from 

the shooting. The two firefighters’ testimony mirrored each 

other. Hutchins and Banks both testified that, a few minutes 

after midnight on May 4, 2008, they heard multiple gunshots 

from a nearby location and noticed a minivan idling in front of 

the station on the southwest corner of 28th Street and 

Thompson Street. Shortly after hearing the gunshots, Hutchins 

and Banks observed a man walking east on Thompson Street, 

away from Newkirk Street. The man crossed Thompson Street 

onto 28th Street and entered the passenger side of the minivan. 

The minivan immediately left.

Hutchins testified that the man was holding a firearm in 

his right hand. Banks also testified that the man appeared to 

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be holding a firearm. Hutchins described the man as having a 

“slender build” and Banks described him as “thin.” A. 382, 

392. They both confirmed that Johnson was neither thin nor 

slender, implying that Johnson was not the man they saw the 

night of the shooting. 

Within one minute of the shooting, Hutchins and Banks 

arrived at the scene, and gave first aid to Donnie Skipworth, 

who was lying on the sidewalk about thirty or forty feet away 

from the fire station. Hutchins testified that he was the first 

one on the scene. Throughout this time, Hutchins did not see

anyone else walking away from Newkirk Street. 

After the firefighters’ testimony, the prosecution called 

its only eyewitness, the victim’s brother, Dion Skipworth. 

Dion testified that on the night of May 4, 2008, he was selling 

drugs with his brother Donnie and their two cousins on the 

1300 block of Newkirk Street. Dion and Donnie routinely sold 

drugs on Newkirk Street and that night was no exception. After 

selling drugs for about six hours, Dion said he saw Johnson 

walking towards them from the 1200 block of Newkirk Street. 

Dion and Johnson had grown up in the same neighborhood and 

were friends prior to the shooting. That night, Dion assumed

that Johnson would simply walk past them because he 

“[f]igured he was going through nothing, so whatever reason 

to think anything else.” A. 402. According to Dion, Johnson 

walked directly up to Donnie and shot him. Dion testified that 

Johnson was by himself when he walked up and began 

shooting. He also said that he had no knowledge that Parker or 

Wright were involved with the shooting. 

After the shooting started, Dion testified that he and his 

cousins fled, running north on Newkirk Street to his cousin’s 

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nearby home. Returning to the scene five to ten minutes later, 

Dion saw Donnie lying on the ground with bullet holes through 

his jeans and jacket. In direct contradiction to Hutchins’ 

testimony, Dion said that he was the first person on the scene 

and there were no firemen there. Dion testified:

Q: Well, paramedics are already out there. The 

 whole neighborhood is out by that time, aren’t 

 they?

A: Not really.

Q: So you mean to tell me the firemen aren’t 

 there when you come back ten minutes later?

A: No.

. . . 

Q: So you were the first person there before any 

 police came on the scene?

A: Yes. 

A. 413. 

Dion also offered background information on the 

dynamics between himself and other individuals in the 

neighborhood. Dion said that Parker, Wright, and Johnson 

were close friends and spent nearly every day together prior to 

the shooting. Dion said that he was related to Parker through 

marriage and had known Parker his entire life. Dion had also 

been friends with Wright for years throughout middle and high 

school. Dion further testified that there had been no animosity 

or conflict between Donnie and Johnson. Dion testified as 

follows:

Q: You never had any problem, you and your 

 brother, with [Johnson] over in the

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21

 neighborhood, did you?

 A: No. 

 Q: Or any business, did you?

 A: No.

A. 409. He later continued:

Q: You were asked if you knew any reason why 

 Arthur would shoot your brother and you said 

 no; is that correct?

A: Correct.

Q: There was nothing about no retaliation about

 any kind of murder, was 

 there?

A: No. 

A. 413. He again confirmed that there were no issues 

with Johnson:

Q: And there is no drama going on between

 Arthur and the Skipworths or anything else?

A: No. 

A. 417. Thus, Taylor’s statement regarding Johnson’s motive 

for killing Donnie was questionable. 

Dion’s testimony was impeached several times. First, 

Dion did not approach law enforcement until three months 

after the shooting, explaining that he did so out of fear because 

“snitches get killed” in his neighborhood. A. 405. However, 

cross-examination revealed that his reasons for delay were

inconsistent. At trial, Dion testified that he did not come to the 

police because he was going to kill Johnson himself, yet at the 

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22

preliminary hearing, Dion said he needed time to cope with his 

loss. 

Second, Dion was impeached with testimony via 

stipulation from Officer Victoria Lozada, the responding 

officer to the scene on the night of the shooting. Dion testified 

that none of the responding officers questioned him that night. 

However, Officer Lozada reported the opposite. In an 

interview with the homicide unit the morning after the 

shooting, Officer Lozada said, “I spoke to Dion Skipworth. He 

identified himself as the victim’s brother. He had told me that 

he had seen his brother at the scene and he gave me all the 

identifiers concerning the victim. He also stated that he did not 

see the shooting, nor was he with him.” A. 511–12. 

Third, Dion denied previously speaking with Detective 

Burns, the officer who interviewed him at length about the 

shooting when Dion came into the station. However, Burns 

told a different story. Burns testified that he had previously 

interviewed Dion in 2006 for a different homicide 

investigation. He said that Dion was cooperative during the 

initial 2006 interview but refused to cooperate with police once 

that case went to trial. Dion repeatedly denied his involvement 

in the 2006 homicide investigation.

The prosecution did not call any other witnesses to 

corroborate Dion’s testimony. Dion testified that his two 

cousins, Jermaine and Larry, were present during the shooting, 

and stood next to Donnie as Johnson walked up and shot him. 

However, the prosecution did not call Jermaine or Larry to 

testify. Dion also said that the day after the shooting, he told

his brother, Doug, and the rest of his cousins that he saw 

Johnson shoot and kill Donnie. Again, the prosecution did not 

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23

call any of those people to corroborate Dion’s testimony. The 

prosecution argues that other testimony introduced at trial 

corroborated Dion’s testimony, however we find this 

testimony vague and inconclusive.6

The prosecution presented no physical evidence that 

directly implicated Johnson in the shooting. At the close of 

trial, the jury was instructed and then proceeded to deliberate

for six days. 

B. Strength of the Evidence

We next evaluate the strength of the prosecution’s 

evidence against Johnson. The Commonwealth argues that 

Wright’s confession could not have affected the jury because 

it was cumulative of other overwhelming evidence. We find 

this argument unavailing, as the prosecution’s two key 

witnesses were substantially impeached and their testimony 

was contradicted through other witness testimony. Far from 

duplicative, Wright’s confession served to improperly 

corroborate their less-than-credible testimony, making it more 

 6 The medical examiner, Dr. Samuel Gulino, testified that a 

total of seven bullets entered Donnie’s body, in addition to a 

graze wound and several shrapnel wounds. The wounds 

showed no evidence of close-range firing. Ballistics expert 

Kenneth Lay testified that the cartridge cases collected from 

the scene indicated that they were fired from either a Glock or 

Smith & Wesson Sigma type pistol. Three bullets were 

removed from Donnie’s body, but the evidence was 

inconclusive as to whether there were bullets fired from a 

revolver and a Glock, or possibly also a third gun.

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24

likely that the jury would set aside their doubts in favor of a

conviction. 

i. Eyewitness Testimony 

Although Dion Skipworth’s eyewitness testimony

would present strong inculpatory evidence on its own, his 

testimony suffered from significant credibility issues which we 

cannot overlook. The Commonwealth argues that Dion’s 

three-month delay stemmed from a fear of being targeted in his 

neighborhood, however this does not address the other 

substantial flaws in his testimony, including its inconsistency 

with his prior statements and conflict with the accounts of 

Detective Burns and Officer Lozada. 

Dion’s account of the shooting was also called into 

question. The firefighters’ testimony suggested that there was 

a second shooter: the thin man holding a gun who fled the scene

and entered a white minivan. We know from Wright’s 

confession that the thin man was Abbas Parker, who was with 

Johnson during the shooting, and that Wright was the person 

driving the minivan. Yet Dion’s account of the shooting placed 

only Johnson at the scene, and Dion alleges that he had no 

knowledge of Parker’s involvement, to whom Dion is related 

through marriage. The prosecution’s theory that there were 

two shooters—Parker firing a revolver and Johnson firing a 

Glock—contradicted Dion’s description of Johnson alone 

casually walking and opening fire at Donnie. And Dion did 

not see the firemen who were clearly at the scene after the 

shooting. Lastly, the Commonwealth did not call any other 

witnesses to corroborate Dion’s account of the shooting, 

including Dion’s two cousins who, according to Dion, were 

standing next to Donnie when Johnson began shooting, or the 

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25

other family members whom Dion purportedly told that 

Johnson was the shooter the day after the shooting. 

ii. Evidence of Motive 

The Commonwealth relies heavily on Taylor’s police 

statement as having shown Johnson’s motive, and erroneously 

avers that Dion “testified about the history of animosity 

between Johnson and Donnie.” Gov. Br. 27. To the contrary, 

Taylor’s statement is not only unsupported by other record 

evidence, but also directly contradicted by other witnesses’ 

testimony. Dion testified multiple times that there was no 

underlying conflict between Donnie and Johnson. Detective 

Hagan testified that Donnie actually helped arrest and convict 

Darnell’s shooter, Eric Weedon, and provided valuable 

eyewitness information to the police. These contradictions, 

combined with Taylor’s vehement denial of his police 

statement and incentive to lie to receive favorable treatment on 

his pending drug charges, could easily lead a jury to dismiss 

Taylor’s statement as the result of neighborhood gossip. 

The lack of overwhelming evidence against Johnson 

and the substantial flaws with the prosecution’s key witnesses 

leave us in grave doubt about the harmlessness of the error. In 

Washington, we held that an improperly admitted confession 

created actual prejudice where the non-testifying codefendant’s confession, the source of the Bruton error, and a 

testifying co-conspirator both identified the defendant as the 

driver, but the testimony suffered from “significant credibility 

problems.” 801 F.3d at 171. We held that the confession, 

when “viewed in tandem” with the witness’s “less-thancredible statement,” had a “corroborative effect” that likely 

affected the jury’s verdict. Id. Similarly, we find that Wright’s 

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26

confession gave significant weight to Dion’s testimony that 

Johnson was the shooter and validated Taylor’s dubious police 

statement.

7

 This corroboration undercut Johnson’s effort to 

raise doubts about their less-than-credible testimony, and 

likely caused the jury to give it increased weight during 

deliberations. 

iii. Comparison to Our Prior Case Law 

We disagree with the Commonwealth’s argument that 

our prior cases compel a harmless error finding here. The 

Commonwealth relies heavily on Johnson v. Lamas, 850 F.3d 

119 (3d Cir. 2017), but there the prosecution presented two 

eyewitnesses whose identifications corroborated each other.

We also applied a different standard of review in Lamas. 

There, we applied AEDPA deference to the state court’s ruling,

and ultimately determined that the error was harmless “even if 

we might decide the case differently were we to undertake de 

novo review.” Id. at 134. Here we review the undecided issue 

of harmless error de novo, and the record shows that Dion and 

Taylor contradicted each other with respect to Johnson’s 

motive. 

We also do not find, as we did in Bond v. Beard, that the 

prosecution presented “such extensive evidence of [the 

petitioner’s] guilt that the error could not have had a substantial 

and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 

verdict.” 539 F.3d 256, 276 (3d Cir. 2008). In Bond, we held 

that the error “added little to this compelling evidence against 

 

7 As in Washington, we are also cognizant of Wright’s 

“inherent incentive to minimize his own culpability as a 

participant in the events he described.” 801 F.3d at 171.

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27

[the petitioner]” where the prosecution presented two 

eyewitnesses and the defendant had confessed to the police. Id. 

Here, Johnson never confessed to the crime, the 

Commonwealth’s sole eyewitness had substantial flaws, other 

witnesses painted a picture different from that portrayed by 

Dion, and the jury deliberations suggest that this was a close 

case. Indeed, “most of the ‘overwhelming’ evidence the State 

points to concerns the [crime] itself,” Adamson v. Cathel, 633 

F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2011), and how Donnie was shot, rather 

than evidence of who shot him. A far cry from the

overwhelming evidence against the defendant presented in 

Bond, we do not find that the evidence rendered Wright’s 

confession “of little moment.” Adamson, 633 F.3d at 261.

C. Jury Deliberations

The jury deliberated for six full days before returning a

verdict against Johnson. On the first day of deliberations, the 

jury requested a copy of Wright’s confession, which the trial 

judge denied. On the third day, the jury reached a verdict as to 

Wright, however were unable to do the same for Johnson. The 

jury wrote the following note to the trial judge: 

At this point, we the jurors have reached a 

unanimous verdict with regard to the charges 

against Tyrone Wright. After considerable 

deliberation, we have been unable to reach a 

unanimous verdict on the charges against Arthur 

Johnson. We respectfully request any 

suggestions or guidance you can provide us at

this time. 

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28

A. 554. After three additional days of deliberation, the jury 

sent its final note, seeking clarification as to whether they could 

consider Wright’s confession against Johnson, which we 

quoted above. The jury returned its verdict convicting Johnson 

of first-degree murder that same day. 

The Commonwealth argues that its overwhelming 

evidence against Johnson rendered Wright’s confession of 

minimal value during deliberations. We find this argument 

unconvincing. The evidence was not overwhelming and, 

indeed, could be said to be in conflict and at least confusing. 

We join our sister circuits in holding that the length of jury 

deliberations may be one consideration in assessing the 

strength of the prosecution’s case.

8 Here, we find the 

deliberation period considerable, particularly since it lasted 

 

8 See Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 335 (1st Cir. 2005) (“The 

length of jury deliberations can be one factor in determining 

how close the jury viewed the case to be.”); Dyas v. Poole, 317 

F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he evidence against [the 

petitioner] was not overwhelming, a fact reflected in the length 

of the jury’s deliberations.”); United States v. Bubar, 567 F.2d 

192, 202 (2d Cir. 1977) (considering the length of jury 

deliberations to assess strength of the case); Dallago v. United 

States, 427 F.2d 546, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (“[O]ne would 

expect that if the evidence of guilt was overwhelming the jury 

would have succumbed much sooner.”); Osborne v. United 

States, 351 F.2d 111, 118 (8th Cir. 1965) (“The fact that the 

jury deliberated some sixteen hours, covering two full working 

days . . . lends credence to the view that the case was a close 

and a difficult one.”).

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longer than the trial itself.9 This, coupled with the jury’s 

request for “guidance” as to the charges against Johnson on the 

third day, is a strong indication this case was a close call for 

the jury. 

The Commonwealth argues that the jury’s final note is 

evidence that it did not consider Wright’s statement “at all” 

against Johnson, since the note “expressly indicates that the 

jury adhered to the trial court’s instruction.” Gov. Br. 34. 

While we agree that the note supports that the jury understood

its instruction, Bruton plainly forbids any inference that the 

jury was able to follow it. The contents of the note, which 

suggest that the jurors believed they must “turn off [their] 

common sense” in order to “pretend [Wright’s statement] 

never existed,” A. 555, epitomizes the sort of “mental 

gymnastic[s]” that Bruton cautioned against, 391 U.S. at 132 

n.8. The note—which the jury sent on their sixth and final day 

of deliberations—suggests that Wright’s confession infected 

deliberations and further evinces a lack of overwhelming 

evidence. 

 

9 Although we do not set a minimum threshold, here we note 

that six days of deliberation is particularly significant, when 

compared to other cases addressing this issue. See, e.g., 

Thomas v. Chappell, 678 F.3d 1086, 1093 (9th Cir. 

2012) (nearly five days of jury deliberations); Dugas, 428 F.3d 

at 335 (three days); Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825, 829 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (two days); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 

938 (9th Cir. 2001) (nearly two days at the penalty 

phase); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 968 (9th Cir. 

2001) (over two days); Bubar, 567 F.2d at 202 (three days); 

Dallago, 427 F.2d at 559 (five days); Osborne, 351 F.2d at 118 

(two days).

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Faced with a lack of overwhelming inculpatory 

evidence against Johnson, and significant credibility issues 

with the prosecution’s key witnesses, the jury struggled for six 

days to reach a unanimous verdict against Johnson. The jury 

sought guidance from the trial judge and grappled with what to 

do about Wright’s inculpatory confession, which they could 

not unhear. As the evidence balanced on a knife’s edge before 

the jury, we believe that Wright’s confession “unfairly 

infect[ed]” jury deliberations. Adamson, 633 F.3d at 261. 

Wright’s confession, when viewed in tandem with Dion and 

Taylor’s less-than-credible testimony, eliminated the space for 

reasonable doubt in the jurors’ minds. In such situations, it is

incumbent upon courts to protect defendants against the 

devastating effects of these egregious errors. Indeed, “[i]t was 

against such threats to a fair trial that the Confrontation Clause 

was directed.” Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136. Accordingly, Johnson 

is entitled to habeas relief.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we will reverse the order of the 

District Court and remand the case to that court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. The District Court 

should grant Johnson’s habeas petition and order that the state 

authorities free Johnson from custody unless he is retried 

within a time fixed by the District Court.

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