Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03145/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03145-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jonathon Dickey
Appellee
Ricardo Glover
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 22, 2016*

Decided August 17, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐3145

RICARDO GLOVER,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JONATHON DICKEY,

Defendant‐Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 14‐C‐0087

Lynn Adelman,

Judge.

O R D E R

Ricardo Glover, a Wisconsin inmate housed at Oshkosh Correctional Institution,

filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that Jonathan Dickey, a facility psychologist,

denied him equal protection by refusing him a spot in a treatment program for sex

offenders. Glover, describing himself as a “class of one,” alleges that Dickey’s decision

lacked a rational basis. The district court allowed this claim to proceed through

                                                 

* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐3145    Page 2

discovery before dismissing it on Dickey’s motion for summary judgment. We affirm the

dismissal.

Glover has an extensive litigation history relating to his state convictions. In 1990

he entered guilty pleas to first‐degree sexual assault and false imprisonment, WIS. STAT.

§§ 940,225(1), 940.30, and a plea of no contest to attempted first‐degree intentional

homicide, id. §§ 940.01, 939.32. He was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. In 1997 we

affirmed the denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus.

Glover v. McCaughtry, 132 F.3d 36 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished disposition). Since then

Glover has tried to attack his convictions collaterally at least nine times. See Glover v.

McCaughtry, No. 01‐1312 (7th Cir. May 7, 2001) (summarily affirming dismissal, for lack

of jurisdiction, of Glover’s second § 2254 petition); Glover v. McCaughtry, No. 01‐1924

(7th Cir. May 7, 2001) (dismissing without prejudice Glover’s first application under

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) for leave to file successive § 2254 petition); Glover v. Litscher,

No. 01‐2492 (7th Cir. Feb. 8, 2002) (denying application for certificate of appealability

from denial of third § 2254 petition); Glover v. Litscher, No. 01‐2886 (7th Cir. July 30, 2001)

(denying application under § 2244(b) to file successive § 2254 petition); Glover v.

McCaughtry, No. 01‐3664 (7th Cir. Oct. 30, 2001) (denying § 2244(b) application for

second time); Glover v. Smith, No. 07‐2523 (7th Cir. Oct. 22, 2007) (denying application for

certificate of appealability from order refusing to reconsider denial of initial § 2254

petition). Glover’s attacks primarily involve contentions that he is innocent and that the

state court lacked “subject‐matter jurisdiction” over his criminal case.   

In 2009, after Glover again had applied to this court under § 2244(b) for leave to

file a successive § 2254 petition, we warned him that further efforts to overturn his state

convictions would invite sanctions. In re Glover, No. 09‐1545 (7th Cir. Mar. 23, 2009)

(construing “petition for writ of mandamus” as application to file successive § 2254

petition). Glover then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, and the Supreme Court

dismissed that petition with the explanation that Glover had “repeatedly abused” the

judicial process and barred him from filing “any further petitions in noncriminal

matters” in that Court without prepaying the docketing fee. Glover v. Thurmer,

No. 09‐5383 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2009). Undeterred, Glover moved to recall the mandate from

our 1997 affirmance of the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We fined

Glover $100 for filing that frivolous submission and imposed a filing bar until the fine

was paid. Glover v. Smith, No. 95‐2304 (7th Cir. Dec. 12, 2011). Glover paid the fine eight

months later and promptly filed another application under § 2244(b). Glover v. Smith, No.

12‐3450 (7th Cir. Oct. 25, 2012) (denying application for certificate of appealability).

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Now in this civil‐rights action, Glover asserts that Dickey violated his right to

equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by refusing, without a rational

reason, to enroll him in a treatment program for sex offenders. Glover attached to his

complaint a letter that he wrote to Dickey requesting placement in the program. He also

attached a packet of information that he had sent to Dickey about his criminal case. That

packet contains trial transcripts, victim statements, and other evidentiary materials

which, Glover asserts, demonstrate that he’s innocent of all charges. Dickey’s response to

Glover’s letter, which also is attached to the complaint, explains that inmates who are

closest to completing their sentences are given priority for placement in the program and

that Glover’s scheduled release in 2019 was too far away. In his letter Dickey added that

he also takes into consideration whether the inmate had received the state Parole

Commission’s endorsement to participate in the program. Glover had gotten the

Commission’s endorsement in 2000, but Dickey explained in his letter that he would

prefer to have a recent endorsement, along with a statement from Glover saying that he

no longer disputed his conviction for sexual assault. This exchange of letters, Glover

asserts in his complaint, proves that Dickey singled him out for unfavorable treatment.

The district court screened Glover’s complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and allowed

him to proceed on a “class of one” equal‐protection claim. As soon as he got past

screening, however, Glover immediately filed a motion asking the court to

independently evaluate the lawfulness of his custody. Glover’s motion repeats the same

contention about the Wisconsin trial court lacking subject‐matter jurisdiction. The

district court denied this motion and, after discovery, granted summary judgment for

Dickey. A jury could not reasonably find that Dickey had run afoul of the Equal

Protection Clause, the court reasoned, because placement in the treatment program is

discretionary and Dickey had legitimate reasons to deny Glover a spot.

On appeal Glover challenges the grant of summary judgment for Dickey and also

several of the district court’s rulings on evidentiary and other matters. To the extent that

Dickey challenges the district court’s denial of his motion related to his underlying state

convictions, Glover cannot use § 1983 as a means of challenging his convictions. Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973); Simpson v. Nickel, 450 F.3d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 2006).

Moreover, we agree with the district court that Dickey is entitled to judgment in

his favor. “A class‐of‐one plaintiff must plead and prove that he was ‘intentionally

treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for

the difference in treatment.’” D.B. ex rel. Kurtis B. v. Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 685–86 (7th Cir.

2013) (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008)); see Vill. of

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Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). If the government official provides a

rational basis for the challenged action “that will be the end of the matter—animus or

no.” Fares Pawn, LLC v. Ind. Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 755 F.3d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 2014); see Miller

v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1121 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, Dickey has provided rational

reasons for his decision not to admit Glover into the sex‐offender treatment program.

Preference for placement in the program went to inmates with impending release dates,

and Glover was too far away from his mandatory release date—over seven years—to be

considered for a spot in the program. He also lacked a recent endorsement from the

Parole Commission, which suggests that an earlier release on parole was not anticipated.

We have reviewed the remainder of Gloverʹs arguments and none has merit. The

judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. We warn Glover that using civil‐rights

actions as a vehicle to bypass our previous denials of his post‐conviction petitions will

result in sanctions. In re City of Chicago, 500 F.3d 582, 585–86 (7th Cir. 2007), and Support

Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185, 186–87 (7th Cir. 1995).

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