Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04426/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-04426-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Symantec Corporation
Counter-defendant
Zscaler, Inc.
Counter-claimant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SYMANTEC CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

v.

ZSCALER, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 17-cv-04426-JST 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 

STRIKE AND MOTION TO DISMISS

Re: ECF Nos. 149, 155

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Symantec Corporation filed this case alleging patent infringement against 

Defendant Zscaler, Inc. ECF No. 1. Symantec alleges that Zscaler infringed the claims of seven 

patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,279,113 (“the ’113 patent”), 7,203,959 (“the ’959 patent”), 7,246,227 

(“the ’227 patent”), 7,392,543 (“the ’543 patent”), 7,735,116 (“the ’116 patent”), 8,181,036 (“the 

’036 patent”), and 8,661,498 (“the ’498 patent”). Id. at 3-4. Before the Court is Zscaler’s motion 

to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as to two full patents, and one claim of 

a third patent. ECF No. 142. Specifically, Zscaler seeks to dismiss Symantec’s patent 

infringement claims for the ’959 patent, the ’227 patent, and Claim 5 of the ’116 patent because 

the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. ECF No. 149 at 2. Id. at 2. Also before 

the Court is Symantec’s motion to strike the portion of Zscaler’s motion to dismiss which argues 

for dismissal of Claim 5 of the ’116 patent because Zscaler failed to comply with Rule 12(g) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed to disclose this ground in its invalidity contentions. 

ECF No. 155. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to strike, and GRANTS 

the remaining portions of the motion to dismiss. 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 1 of 18
2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Symantec develops and sells security assistance products and other internet tools. 

ECF No. 18 at 5. Symantec initially offered only security products which resided on a client’s 

computer, but then as technology developed, Symantec offered cloud-based security. ECF No. 10 

at 5. Defendant Zscaler, a competitor, is “an information security startup” which developed a 

“cloud-based network-security platform.” Id. 

Symantec originally filed this case in the District of Delaware on December 12, 2016. 

ECF No. 1. Zscaler quickly filed both a motion to dismiss under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and a motion to 

transfer venue. ECF Nos. 9, 11. The Delaware court heard argument on the motion to dismiss. 

ECF No. 24. The parties exchanged discovery, including several sets of interrogatories, 

subpoenas and requests for production of documents. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 25, 60, 62. The District 

of Delaware then granted the motion to transfer, and transferred the case to this Court. ECF No. 

67.1 Symantec filed a First Amended Complaint. ECF No. 139. Zscaler then filed the present 

motion to dismiss in lieu of answering that complaint. ECF No. 149. 

III. SYMANTEC’S MOTION TO STRIKE

Before turning to the motion to dismiss, the Court must first address Symantec’s motion to 

strike that motion. ECF No. 155. Symantec’s motion is directed at Zscaler’s motion to dismiss 

Claim 5 of the ‘116 patent (“Claim 5”). Symantec argues that (1) Rule 12(g)(2) prohibits Zscaler 

from raising its § 101 defense for Claim 5 in its second Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because 

the defense was not raised in its first motion, and (2) Zscaler’s new invalidity theory is “barred” 

because Zscaler failed to disclose the theory in its invalidity contentions.

As just noted, Zscaler filed a motion to dismiss Symantec’s original complaint. That 

motion did not make a § 101 argument regarding Claim 5. Before the Court could adjudicate

Zscaler’s first motion, however, Symantec filed an amended complaint which asserts only Claim 5 

from the ’116 patent, in an effort to avoid Zscaler’s ’116 patent invalidity contentions. ECF No. 

161 at 6. This Court – without considering or needing to consider this history – vacated Zscaler’s 

 

1

This Court then related the present case to a later-filed case between the same parties involving a 

number of other patents, Case No. 17-cv-4414. 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 2 of 18
3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

first motion to dismiss as moot. ECF No. 155 at 9; ECF No. 138. Zscaler then filed the present, 

second motion to dismiss, which argues that Claim 5 should be dismissed as invalid. ECF No. 

149. 

Symantec argues that the Court should strike the portion of Zscaler’s motion to dismiss 

regarding Claim 5 because Zscaler failed to challenge Claim 5 in its first motion to dismiss as 

required by Rule 12(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 153 at 23. That rule 

provides:

Limitation on Further Motions. Except as provided in Rule 12(h)(2) or (3), a party 

that makes a motion under this rule must not make another motion under this rule 

raising a defense or objection that was available to the party but omitted from its 

earlier motion.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). Zscaler responds that the Court should nonetheless consider its Claim 5 

argument because it would “help[] promote the goals set forth in Rule 1, i.e. to ‘secure the just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.’ ECF No. 161 at 8 (citing 

In re Apple Iphone Antitrust Litig., 846 F.3d 313, 318 (9th Cir. 2017)). Moreover, it argues, the 

pending motion is “the first motion to dismiss by Zscaler to be considered on the merits by the 

Court,” not a second motion prohibited by Rule 12(g)(2). ECF No. 161 at 8. 

The plain text of Rule 12(g) prohibits a party from filing a second motion to dismiss on a 

ground that was available but omitted from an earlier motion to dismiss. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g)(2). 

Accordingly, other courts in this district have concluded that a defendant who filed a motion to 

dismiss may not file a second motion to dismiss asserting defenses that could have been asserted 

in the first motion. Romo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 15-CV-03708-EMC, 2016 WL 

3523779, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 28, 2016) (“Newly asserted argument . . . which [a defendant] 

failed to assert in its prior Rule 12(b)(6) motion, may not properly be considered.”); Northstar Fin. 

Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 135 F. Supp. 3d 1059, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“To 

summarize, under Rule 12(g)(2) and Rule 12(h)(2), a party that seeks to assert a defense that was 

available but omitted from an earlier Rule 12 motion can only do so in a pleading, a Rule 12(c) 

motion, or at trial.”); Fed. Agr. Mortg. Corp. v. It’s A Jungle Out There, Inc., No. C 03-3721 

VRW, 2005 WL 3325051, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2005) (citing Wright & Miller, 5D Federal 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 3 of 18
4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Practice & Procedure § 1388, at 491-92 (3d ed 2004) 2).

 However, the Ninth Circuit recently announced a more flexible and efficiency-oriented 

view of a district court’s ability to review arguments offered for the first time in a second motion 

to dismiss. Affirming Judge Gonzalez Rogers’s decision to hear an argument in a motion to 

dismiss that could have been brought in an earlier motion, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Rule 

12(g) should be read in light of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure’s policy favoring “just, 

speedy, and inexpensive determination” of actions. In re Apple, 846 F.3d at 318. The court noted 

that had the district court not considered the argument at that time, defendant would simply have 

waited until later in the litigation to file a different motion, thereby delaying resolution of the 

proceeding with no corresponding benefit. Id. at 320. Accordingly, that court concluded that the 

district court did not err, because the defendant’s motion did not “appear to have been filed for any 

strategically abusive purpose” and considering the motion “materially expedited the district 

court’s disposition of the case.” Id. 3; see also Application of Rule 12(g)—In General, 5C Fed. 

Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1385 (3d ed.) (“On the other hand, in a limited number of cases the district 

court has exercised its discretion to permit a second preliminary motion to present a Rule 12(b)(6) 

defense, although it was technically improper to do so.”). Other courts in this district have also 

considered second motions to dismiss raising new arguments where doing so would serve the 

interests of judicial economy. Evans v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club, LLC, 231 F. Supp. 3d 

342, 351 (N.D. Cal. 2017); Cover v. Windsor Surry Co., No. 14-CV-05262-WHO, 2016 WL 

520991, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2016) (“But judicial economy favors proceeding with the 

motion on its merits despite its technical deficiencies.”); Amaretto Ranch Breedables, LLC v. 

Ozimals, Inc., No. 10-cv-05696-CRB, 2011 WL 2690437, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2011). 

 

2

The updated provision provides “a party is only required to consolidate Rule 12 defenses and 

objections that are then available to the party. A party is not precluded from making a second 

motion based on a defense that he or she did not have reasonable notice of at the time that party 

first filed a motion to dismiss or on a defense that became available only after a motion had been 

made under Rule 12.” § 1388 Application of Rule 12(g)—Limited to Motions That Are “Then 

Available”, 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1388 (3d ed.).

3

Perhaps recognizing an incongruity between its holding and the text of Rule 12, the Ninth Circuit 

characterized its approval of the district court’s order as finding a lack of harmless error. In re 

Apple, 846 F.3d at 320. Nonetheless, the Court’s commendatory language makes Apple a 

roadmap for other cases. 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 4 of 18
5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Here, the Court likewise concludes that a more flexible approach should govern, and that Rule 

12(g) does not bar the Court’s consideration of Zscaler’s Claim 5 argument. 

However, there is a more fundamental hurdle to this Court’s review of Zscaler’s Claim 5 

argument: Zscaler failed to raise the argument in its invalidity contentions. As required by local 

rule, Zscaler served its invalidity contentions on Symantec on November 17, 2017. ECF No. 155-

1. Patent L.R. 3-3 required that Zscaler’s “[i]nvalidity contentions . . . contain . . . [a]ny ground of 

invalidity based on 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Patent L.R. 3-3. Zscaler’s Patent L.R. 3-3(d) disclosure did 

not contain any 35 U.S.C. § 101 invalidity ground for Claim 5 of the ’116 Patent. ECF No. 155-1 

at 3-4. Ex. 1 at 52-53. 

Because Zscaler had not disclosed invalidity contentions for Claim 5 at the time it filed its 

motion to dismiss, it had no right to seek dismissal on this ground. Good Tech. Corp. v. 

Mobileiron, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-05826-PSG, 2015 WL 3866019, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2015)

(“Maybe things would be different if at some point MobileIron had sought leave to amend its 

invalidity contentions.”) (declining to consider motion for judgment on the pleadings as to 

unserved invalidity contentions). To hold otherwise would undermine the policies behind the 

Court’s patent local rules, as well as the more general rule that “any invalidity theories not 

disclosed pursuant to Local Rule 3–3 are barred . . . from presentation at trial.” MediaTek Inc. v. 

Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., No. 11-CV-5341 YGR, 2014 WL 690161, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 

21, 2014); see also Radware, Ltd. v. F5 Networks, Inc., 147 F. Supp. 3d 974, 982 (N.D. Cal. 

2015). Accordingly, the motion to strike is granted.4 

IV. ZSCALER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

A. Legal Standard

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate . . . where the complaint 

 

4

Zscaler is currently seeking good cause to amend its validity contentions from Magistrate Judge 

James, to whom this Court referred discovery. ECF No. 165. Patent Local Rule 3-6 provides for 

amendment of invalidity contentions “only by order of the Court upon a timely showing of good 

cause.” Judge James will determine the matter in the first instance. If Zscaler is granted good 

cause to amend its invalidity contentions, it may raise its Claim 5 argument in its answer or 

otherwise. 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 5 of 18
6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 

Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). “[A]ll allegations 

of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 

party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). “While a complaint 

. . . does not need detailed factual allegations, [it] requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In other words, a pleading must allege “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.

“Section 101 of the Patent Act defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection. It 

provides: ‘Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or 

composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 

subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.’” Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 

S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 101). Implied in this provision is the wellestablished principle that “abstract ideas are not patentable.” Id. (quoting Assoc. for Molecular 

Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013)). However, “an invention is not 

rendered ineligible for patent simply because it involves an abstract concept.” Id. After all, “[a]t 

some level, ‘all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural

phenomena, or abstract ideas.’” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 

566 U.S. 66, 71 (2012)). Therefore, courts must distinguish between patents that claim abstract 

ideas, on the one hand, and patents “that claim patent-eligible applications of those concepts,” on 

the other hand. Id. at 2355.

To draw this distinction, courts engage in a two-step analysis. In step one, courts

determine whether the claims at issue are “directed to an abstract idea.” Id. at 2356-57. Courts 

look to whether claims are “directed to a specific improvement” or “to a specific implementation 

of a solution to a problem.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1338, 1339 (Fed. 

Cir. 2016). The relevant inquiry is “whether the claims in the patent focus on a specific means or 

method, or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the abstract idea and merely 

invokes generic process and machinery.” Clarilogic, Inc. v. FormFree Holdings Corp., 681 F. 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 6 of 18
7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Appx. 950, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “The purely functional nature of the claim confirms that it is 

directed to an abstract idea, not a concrete embodiment of that idea.” Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC 

v. Amazon.com Inc., 838 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2016). A claim that could be performed by a 

human, excising generic computer implemented steps, is likely abstract. Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. Alstom S.A., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC 

v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Papst Licensing GmbH & Co. KG v. 

Xilinx Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 1069, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (“[A]utomation of a process using a 

computer is [ ] insufficient to save the asserted claims from abstractness.”). 

The same principle applies to claims that “only contain generalized software components 

arranged to implement an abstract concept on a computer.” Id. at 1345. Specifically to software

patents, the Federal Circuit clarified that claims related to receiving and categorizing data are 

abstract. See Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Circ. 2016) 

(“[W]e have treated collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which 

does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract ideas.”). 

If the court concludes in step one that the claims are directed to an abstract issue, the court 

must then “consider the elements of each claim both individually and as an ordered combination” 

to determine “whether it contains an inventive concept sufficient to transform the claimed abstract 

idea into a patent-eligible application.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355, 2357 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72-73, 78-79). In doing so, the court is essentially asking 

“whether the claims [ ] do more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea 

. . . .” Id. at 2359; see also Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 

1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding no inventive concept where “the claims ‘add’ only generic 

computer components such as an ‘interface,’ ‘network,’ and ‘database’”). In step two, courts 

consider the claims in light of the specification. Amdocs (Israel) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 

841 F.3d 1288, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing cases). The Supreme Court explained that “[s]tating 

an abstract idea ‘while adding the words “apply it” ’ is not enough for patent eligibility.” Alice, 

134 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1294). “Nor is limiting the use of an abstract 

idea ‘to a particular technological environment.’” Id. (quoting In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 957 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 7 of 18
8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

(Fed. Cir. 2008)).

Because “[v]irtually every invention could be described at a high level in a few words,” 

courts addressing invalidity under Alice “must scrutinize reductive descriptions with great care.” 

24/7 Customer, Inc. v. LivePerson, Inc., No. 15-CV-02897-JST, 2017 WL 2311272, at *15 (N.D. 

Cal. May 25, 2017) (quoting Verint Sys. Inc. v. Red Box Recorders Ltd., No. 14-CV-5403 (KBF), 

2016 WL 7156768, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2016)). Furthermore, courts perform “several sanity 

checks when assessing whether a patent or claim is patent eligible.” Finjan, Inc. v. Sophos, Inc., 

244 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1054–55 (N.D. Cal. 2017). For example, “courts consider whether a claim 

is so abstract that it would ‘pre-empt use of [the claimed] approach in all fields, and would 

effectively grant a monopoly over an abstract idea.’” Id. Additionally, “courts may ask whether 

the ‘claims [] are so result-focused, so functional, as to effectively cover any solution to an 

identified problem.’” Id.

A district court may find a patent invalid under Section 101 at the pleading stage via a 

motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), including before claim 

construction. See buySAFE, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 2013–1575, 2014 WL 4337771 (Fed. Cir. 

Sept. 3, 2014); Open Text S.A. v. Alfresco Software Ltd., No. 13-CV-04843-JD, 2014 WL 

4684429, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2014) (collecting cases).

B. DISCUSSION

1. The ’959 Patent

The ’959 patent is titled “Stream Scanning through Network Proxy Servers” and covers the 

concept of “selectively passing forward file contents that have previously been scanned for the 

presence of malicious code.” ECF No. 1-1 at 33. According to Symantec, the patent “is generally 

directed to reducing the latency in malicious code detection for computers.” ECF No. 139 ¶ 51.

The patent manages file scanning by scanning a partial segment, or chunk, of that file to see if it 

matches chunks found to be safe in the past, rather than scanning the entire file, in order to reduce 

the load on the scanner at any given time. ECF No. 153 at 5. The patent utilizes hashes to 

identify each chunk. Hashes of safe chunks uncovered in this process are added to the table of 

comparators. The patent speeds up the scanning process by avoiding the full scan of a file when 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 8 of 18
9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

possible. Symantec asserts claims 4, 13, 17, 18, and 21 of the patent. Zscaler argues that Claim 

17 is representative, and Symantec does not challenge this assertion. ECF Nos. 149 at 13; ECF 

No. 153 at 7. Claim 17 recites:

A computer-readable medium containing computer code instructions 

for managing transmission of a requested computer file from a 

remote host to a client, the computer code comprising instructions 

for:

receiving a chunk of the requested computer file from the remote 

host;

generating a hash of the chunk of the requested computer file;

comparing the hash of the chunk of the requested computer file to a 

hash of a chunk of a previously downloaded computer file; and

transmitting the chunk of the requested file to the client when the 

hash of the chunk of the requested computer file is identical to the 

hash of the chunk of the previously downloaded computer file.

A figure in the patent visually depicts the above claim:

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 9 of 18
10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

ECF No. 1-1 at 24.

Zscaler argues that the patent is an abstract concept, because it covers simply “comparing 

currently received content with prior content,” which does not require a computer. Zscaler 

analogizes the process envisioned by this patent to a food inspector who examines part of a 

shipment and either rejects the whole shipment or examines more boxes if the first part was 

suspicious. ECF No. 149 at 12-15. Symantec argues that the patent is not abstract because it 

claims a technical improvement by reducing latency through passing forward file contents that 

have been previously scanned for malicious code. ECF No. 153 at 8. According to Symantec, the 

patent improves upon the prior art which “required fully downloading a file and scanning it before 

beginning to transmit it.” Id. at 9. 

In Finjan, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1062, another court in this district concluded at step one that 

a very similar patent was abstract. The patent at issue, the ’844 patent, detailed a “system in 

which an ‘inspector’ analyzes particular elements of Downloadables to assess whether they 

contain suspicious code or operations.” Id. “The inspector then generates a Downloadable 

security profile (‘DSP’)—detailing the suspicious operations of the Downloadable, and then links 

this DSP to the Downloadable.” Id. The court compared the patent to “the way a . . . clerk in a 

mailroom may perform conceptually similar tasks,” and concluded that the patent was abstract 

because “the asserted claims themselves only list the abstract ideas of receiving data, extracting 

information from that received data, then storing that information.” Id. at 1059. 

The patent is also much like a patent determined to be abstract in Intellectual Ventures I 

LLC v. Erie Indemnity Co., 200 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568, 574 (W.D. Pa. 2016). The patent in that 

case claimed “(1) selecting a file; (2) generating a unique value corresponding to the file; (3) 

comparing that unique value to a bunch of previously generated values that correspond to different 

types of illicit files; and (4) marking the file for deletion or other treatment if its assigned value 

matches a known one.” Id. That court concluded that the patent was directed to the abstract idea 

of identifying and categorizing files based on a set of predetermined criteria. Id. at 574. 

Finally, the patent is similar to a patent which claimed “receiving information related to a 

file (an identifier) from a querying computer, characterizing the file based on the identifier and 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 10 of 18
11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

other stored identifiers, and communicating a result of the characterization back to a querying 

computer,” found invalid in Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 100 F. Supp. 3d 371 

(D. Del. 2015). Id. at 383; see also Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 

1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We agree with the district court that receiving e-mail (and other 

data file) identifiers, characterizing e-mail based on the identifiers, and communicating the 

characterization—in other words, filtering files/e-mail—is an abstract idea.”). 

For the same reasons, the ‘959 patent is also abstract. As compared to those patents, this 

patent operates by scanning segments of a file, rather than the full file, and adds new identifiers or 

hashes to its table of comparators. Breaking a large task into smaller chunks and adding 

previously unknown chunks to a database, however, do not make the patent non-abstract. 

Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 1318 (“A claim that could be performed by a human, excising 

generic computer implemented steps, is likely abstract.”). As the Finjan court explained, “this 

process is similar to how a human might process potentially suspicious mail—for example, a mail 

inspector might analyze a threatening letter, make a note explaining the particularly suspicious 

elements of the letter, and link this note to details about the sender. The inspector could then refer 

to the note in the future when receiving additional mail from the same address.” Finjan, 244 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1063. Thus, the Court concludes that at step one the patent claims an abstract concept. 

As to step two, Zscaler argues that the claims are not inventive because they are merely 

“generic computer functions arranged in a conventional manner.” ECF No. 149 at 16-17. Zscaler 

argues that that “nothing in the claims or specification limits them to specific implementations.” 

Id. at 17. Symantec argues that the specification shows an inventive concept, because the patent 

technologically improves upon existing approaches which required fully downloading a file for

scanning. ECF No. 153 at 16. 

Finjan concluded that the ’844 patent at issue there – to which this Court has already 

drawn a comparison – was inventive. 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1065 (“The ’844 patent’s specific 

applications to scanning and analyzing Downloadables, and non-conventional use of a remote 

inspector to perform scanning and linking of a security profile before the Downloadable is made 

available to web clients, represent an ‘inventive concept’ because the patent describes a ‘specific 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 11 of 18
12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

technical solution beyond simply using generic computer concepts in a conventional way.’”). The 

’844 patent operates in a similar manner to the ’959 patent, at least when described in general 

terms. Both patents claim a system whereby a file or downloadable comes in, and a program 

assigns a hash identifier or security profile to that file or downloadable, compares it to known files 

or downloadables in a database, and adds unknown security profiles or hash identifiers to a

database. Finjan, 244 F. Supp. at 1064-65. 

However, there are important points of difference between the patents. First, the patent in 

Finjan was significantly more detailed in terms of how these general functions were accomplished 

than is the ’959 patent. Id. Moreover, the ’844 patent in Finjan addressed downloadables, rather 

than the generic files at issue in this patent. A downloadable is “an executable application 

program, which is downloaded from a source computer and run on the destination computer.” 

Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Examples of 

downloadables include Java applets, JavaScript, and plugins. Finjan, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1059, 

1062. The ’844 patent was the first to address virus scanning for downloadables. Id. at 1064 

(“[A]t the time of its invention, malware security programs were not configured to recognize 

viruses attached to or configured as Downloadables.”). By contrast, the ’959 patent addresses 

only generic files. ECF No. 1-1 at 30. 

Additionally, the ’844 patent utilized a more complex and specific scanning method. The 

’844 patent’s “‘behavior-based’ virus scan . . . is distinguished from traditional, ‘code-matching’

virus scans,” like the scans claimed in the ’959 patent, “that are limited to recognizing the 

presence of previously-identified viruses.” Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1059. “This process is innovative 

because it allows a malware detection program to detect new viruses, previously unknown files 

that contain suspicious operations, rather than identifying only known viruses.” Finjan, 244 F. 

Supp. 3d at 1061. By contrast, the ’959 patent scans by matching files hashes to “identical”

previously known file hashes. ECF No. 1-1 at 35. 

As a final contrast, the ’844 patent in Finjan relied on a security profile to identify nonmalicious and/or previously scanned downlodables, which is a profile made up of specific 

“potentially suspicious computer operations,” or characteristics. Finjan, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1064–

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 12 of 18
13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

65. By contrast, the ’959 patent relies upon hashes for this process. ECF No. 1-1 at 35. Hashes, 

also called hash functions, values, or algorithms, are commonplace mathematical algorithms 

which “use contents of the file to generate a comparatively small-size identifier for the file.” Pers. 

Web Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., 848 F.3d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2017); see also Unwired Planet, 

LLC v. Apple Inc., 829 F.3d 1353, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Federal Circuit has concluded that 

hashes are generic and basic mathematical or algorithmic functions that do not make a patent 

inventive. Intellectual Ventures I,100 F. Supp. 3d at 371, aff’d Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 

1307. By comparing hashes that are “identical,” rather than security characteristics which might 

differ between security profiles, the ’959 patent is less inventive. ECF No. 1-1 at 35. 

Adding up these differences, and examining the claims individually and collectively in 

light of the specification, the Court concludes that the ’959 patent is not inventive. As to each of 

the above-described metrics, the patent is significantly less inventive than the ’844 patent 

described in Finjan. Although the ’959 patent claims an improvement from the prior art because it 

reduces latency in scanning by scanning in chunks rather than a full file, this is not an inventive

concept, and the ordered combination of the limitations does not provide additional inventive 

concepts. The concept of breaking a large item into smaller chunks is generic as it is performed by 

humans without the assistance of a computer regularly. Finjan, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1063. Even 

viewing the patent in the light most favorable to Symantec, as the Court must, the Court concludes 

that it is both abstract and non-inventive, and therefore invalid. Finjan, 244 F. Supp. at 1043. 5 

2. The ’227 Patent

The ’227 patent generally covers the concept of fulfilling data stream requests in parallel 

when possible, which Symantec argues increases latency and decreases the memory load in a 

cache. ECF No. 18 at 5; ECF No. 139 ¶ 61 (alleging in the complaint that the patent “reduc[es] 

latency in scanning for undesirable content by making data available to scanners in parallel”). The 

 

5

Symantec argues that as to all three patents, there is a factual dispute around inventiveness, so 

validity cannot be resolved on a motion to dismiss, citing Berkheimer v. HP Inc., No. 2017-1437, 

2018 WL 774096, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 2018). ECF No. 153 at 16, 22, 29. However, “not 

every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts material to the 

§ 101 inquiry,” and the Court resolves the motion as a matter of law based on Symantec’s own 

descriptions of the patent. Berkheimer, 2018 WL 774096, at *6.

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 13 of 18
14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

patent makes data available to some scanners one at a time, in a particular order, when they

modify the data, but all at once to scanners that merely read the data. ECF No. 149 at 20. 

Symantec asserts claims 1, 4, 8, 43, and 45 of the ’227 patent. ECF No. 149 at 20. Zscaler argues 

that Claim 43 is representative:

A computer readable medium containing a computer program product for 

efficiently scanning stream based data, the computer program product comprising:

program code for receiving data from a stream;

program code for storing a copy of received data;

program code for informing each of a plurality of scanners that received data is

available for scanning;

program code for receiving requests from scanners to scan received data;

program code for fulfilling received requests in parallel, by making a stored copy of

received data available to each scanner that requests to scan that received data;

and program code for maintaining a record of fulfilled requests.

Symantec argues that Zscaler has not established that Claim 43 is representative, because Claims 1 

and 43 recite different solutions and have different scope. ECF No. 15 at 16. Claim 1 recites:

A computer implemented method of efficiently scanning steam 

based data, the method comprising:

a stream manager receiving data from a stream;

the stream manager making received data serially available to a 

plurality of modify scanners in a specific order, such that data is 

made available to a next modify scanner after it has been released 

by a previous modify scanner;

the stream manager making received data available in parallel to a 

plurality of read-only scanners;

the stream manger, responsive to data having been released by 

each modify scanner of the plurality and by each read-only scanner 

of the plurality, transmitting released data to a destination.

ECF No. 1-1 at 54. The Court need not resolve whether Claim 43 or Claim 1 is representative, 

because even utilizing Claim 1 as the representative claim, the Court concludes the patent is 

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 14 of 18
15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

invalid. The patent is also well depicted in the following figure:

ECF No. 1-1 at 48. 

For step one, Zscaler argues that the ’227 patent is abstract because it merely makes “data 

available to multiple reviewers all at once or one at a time.” ECF No. 149 at 20. Zscaler 

analogizes the patent to the way multiple lawyers on a case sometimes prepare legal briefs: one 

lawyer might send a draft of the brief for review to three other lawyers all at the same time, or she 

might send it sequentially so that each may edit the brief in turn. ECF No. 149 at 21-22. So 

stated, the patent simply performs a human process of reviewing in turn, or all at once, on a 

computer. Id. Symantec counters that the patent improves upon serial scanning because it makes 

data available in parallel to read-only scanners, and serially to editing scanners, which both keeps 

the cache small and avoids serial scanning when possible to speed up the process. ECF No. 157 at 

17. 

The Court concludes that the patent is abstract. The claims simply “recite the what of the 

invention,” by describing making some data available in parallel, where that is the desired result,

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 15 of 18
16

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

“but none of the how that is necessary to turn the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.” 

24/7 Customer, 2017 WL 2311272, at *6; see also Clarilogic, 681 F. Appx. at 954 (Fed. Cir. 

2017). In Intellectual Ventures, the Federal Circuit found a similar patent abstract under similar 

reasoning. The patent at issue received file identifiers, characterized the file based on that 

identifier, and communicated that characterization. Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 1313. The 

court concluded that “filtering files/email—is an abstract idea.” Id. So too here, the claims 

merely filter data either serially to modifiers, or all at once to readers, and so too here, the Court 

concludes the patent claims an abstract concept. ECF No. 1-1 at 54. 

As to step two, Zscaler argues that the claims and specification do not provide any 

inventive concept. ECF No. 149 at 23-24. Symantec argues that the patent provides a 

technological solution by making data available in parallel and minimizing cache size. ECF No. 

153 at 22.6 The Court agrees that the patent is not inventive. 

First, scanning in and of itself does not make a claim inventive. Content Extraction & 

Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 

Intellectual Ventures I, 838 F.3d at 1319. Second, examining the limitations, individually and 

collectively, does not persuade the Court that the patent claims an inventive concept. One claim, 

for example, describes that when a cache which holds data before sending it to the serial or 

parallel processors, reaches a certain volume, it moves data from short term storage to long term 

storage. ECF No. 1-1 at 52. This claim is very similar to a claim involved in Fairwarning IP, 

LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016), where the Federal Circuit 

concluded that a rule which asked whether data was “in excess of a specific volume,” was a rule 

“that humans in analogous situations . . . have [applied] for decades, if not centuries,” so the claim 

was non-inventive. 

Moreover, the steps of the ’227 patent can occur in any order, and can take place on any 

hardware or software. ECF No. 1-1 at 52, 54. “[S]imply appending generic computer 

functionality to lend speed or efficiency to the performance of an otherwise abstract concept does 

 

6

Symantec also concedes that the ’227 patent is not even directed to virus scanning in particular. 

ECF No. 153 at 21.

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 16 of 18
17

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

not meaningfully limit claim scope for purposes of patent eligibility.” CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice 

Corp., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) aff’d Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2347. Like 

the patent found invalid in Fairwarning, 839 F.3d at 1094, the patent’s use of a generic computer 

or computer program, such as the compressor/decompressor, is the only improvement in the 

technological process. See also id. at 1095 (“While the claimed system and method certainly 

purport to accelerate the process . . . the speed increase comes from the capabilities of a generalpurpose computer, rather than the patented method itself.”). In sum, the limitations and their 

ordered combination “merely graft generic computer components onto otherwise-ineligible

method claims.” Id. at 1096. Each claim of the patent is easily boiled down to a system which 

passes files sequentially to modifying scanners, and all at once to read only scanners. The claims 

and their limitations do nothing to “differentiate [this] process from ordinary mental processes,” 

and they are therefore not inventive. Id. at 1096-97. Moreover, the patent does not even appear to 

claim any particular improvement on the prior art. Id.; Bascom Global Internet Servs, Inc. v. 

AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that when assessing 

inventiveness, the court should look at the ordered combinations of limitations individually and 

collectively and compare the collective claims to the prior art). The Court concludes the patent is 

not inventive and therefore invalid. 

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

\\\

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 17 of 18
18

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

CONCLUSION

Symantec’s motion to strike is GRANTED and the Court strikes the portion of Zscaler’s 

brief regarding Claim 5. Otherwise, Zscaler’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The motion to 

dismiss is granted with prejudice. Papst Licensing GmbH, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 1095 (“Because the 

asserted claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter, a defect which cannot be cured 

through amendment of a complaint, Plaintiff's claims for infringement are dismissed with 

prejudice.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. QuantifiCare Inc., No. 17-CV03061-LHK, 2017 WL 6497629, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 2017) (granting with prejudice Alice 

motion to dismiss). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 23, 2018

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

Case 3:17-cv-04426-JST Document 173 Filed 03/23/18 Page 18 of 18