Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566/USCOURTS-caed-2_20-cv-01566-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kim Erb
Defendant
David French
Defendant
Marty Heath
Defendant
John Murray
Defendant
Ernie Peters
Defendant
Deborah Stampfli
Plaintiff
Steve J. Stump
Defendant
Susanville Sanitary District
Defendant

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

DEBORAH STAMPFLI, an individual,

Plaintiff,

v.

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a 

political subdivision of the 

State of California, STEVE J. 

STUMP, in his individual and 

official capacities, ERNIE 

PETERS, in his individual and 

official capacities, DAVID 

FRENCH, in his individual and 

official capacities, KIM ERB, in 

his individual and official 

capacities, MARTY HEATH, in his 

individual and official 

capacities, DOES I-V, inclusive, 

BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V, 

and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES, 

inclusive,,

Defendant.

No. 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, 

STEVEN J. STUMP, JOHN MURRAY, 

ERNIE PETERS, DAVID FRENCH, 

KIM ERB, AND MARTY HEATH’S 

MOTION TO DISMISS

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Deborah Stampfli (“plaintiff”) brought this 

action against the Susanville Sanitary District (“District”), 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 1 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

Steve J. Stump, John Murray, Ernie Peters, David French, Kim Erb, 

Marty Heath, Black & White Corporations I-V, Able and Baker 

Companies, and Does 1-5 inclusive, for breach of express 

contract, breach of implied-in-fact contract, promissory 

estoppel, violation of district laws, policies, and procedure, 

deprivation of federal and state procedural due process rights, 

conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of procedural due process rights, 

and failure to produce public records. 

Defendants now move to dismiss the Second Amended 

Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)(6) 

for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

(“Mot. to Dismiss” (Docket No. 42).)

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was hired as treasurer by the District in 

2005. (See 2d. Am. Compl. (“SAC”) at ¶ 90 (Docket No. 38.)) At 

the time of her hiring, plaintiff was informed that she would be 

a member of Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3 and that she 

would be entitled to the benefits and protections of the 

agreements between the union and the District, including the 

right to continued employment and termination only for good cause 

and after the satisfaction of procedural requirements. (See id.) 

From 2005 to 2013, plaintiff performed her assigned duties and a 

host of additional duties typically performed by supervisory 

personnel, and consistently received high performance 

evaluations. (See id. at ¶ 91.) 

By October 2013, plaintiff was performing many 

management and administrative functions but, because she was a 

union member, she could not participate in confidential meetings 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 2 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

of the District’s Board of Directors (“the board”). (See id. at 

¶ 94.) Her inability to participate in these meetings was 

inconvenient because the board frequently had to stop meetings or 

delay them to obtain information possessed only by plaintiff. 

(See id.) Because of these difficulties, the board proposed the 

creation of a new management level position with the District 

entitled “Office Administrator” which would allow plaintiff to 

participate in confidential board meetings but would require her 

to relinquish her union membership. (See id.) 

When plaintiff was offered this new position, she 

declined it because she did not wish to lose the job security 

offered by her union affiliation. (See id. at ¶ 96.) In 

response to her concerns, plaintiff was advised by the General 

Manager and the District’s general counsel that although she 

could not remain a union member, she would not become an at-will 

employee and would be afforded all the job security rights and 

benefits available to union members. (See id. at ¶ 98.) 

Plaintiff was promised that her employment with the District 

would only be terminated for cause and in accordance with 

established Skelly procedures.1 (See id.) Because of these 

representations, plaintiff relinquished her position as treasurer 

and accepted the new position of Office Administrator. (See id.

at ¶ 99.) 

1 The term Skelly procedures refers to the California 

Supreme Court case Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d 194 

(1975). In Skelly, the California Supreme Court held that a 

permanent public employee’s property rights (i.e. their vested 

right to continued employment) cannot be taken away by an 

employer without first being afforded certain procedural 

safeguards. See id. at 215. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 3 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

During 2016, plaintiff performed many duties typically 

performed by the General Manager. (See id. at ¶ 104.) By 

October 2017, the General Manager recommended to the board that 

plaintiff be provided a 20% salary increase to account for the 

additional duties she performed and that she receive the 

additional title of Assistant General Manager. (See id. at ¶ 

109.) During an October 2017 board meeting, the board stated 

that plaintiff’s additional duties would likely be temporary 

until such time as a new general manager had obtained sufficient 

experience. (See id. at ¶ 112.) Plaintiff was fully aware that 

there might come a time when the new General Manager no longer 

needed her assistance in performing the duties and functions of 

General Manager, and was led to believe that if this change 

occurred, she would be relieved of any additional Assistant 

General Manager duties, but would continue to perform all the 

functions she previously performed as Office Administrator. (See

id. at ¶ 114.) Plaintiff was never told that her position as 

Office Administrator had somehow been converted to a position 

terminable at will or that she could summarily be deprived of her 

permanent position of Office Administrator. (See id.) However, 

the board approved the recommended change and prepared a new job 

description which stated that the plaintiff would work in 

conjunction with the District’s General Manager. (See id. at ¶ 

113.) 

While the aforementioned events were unfolding, a 

nearby local utility district discovered that its General Manager 

had embezzled money from the district. (See id. at ¶ 116.) The 

members of the District’s board wished to ensure that the 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 4 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

District not be victimized in the same fashion. (See id.) 

Plaintiff was specifically instructed to keep the board apprised 

of any changes which might impair the security of the District’s 

financial accounting services. (See id.) 

In March 2018, the District hired defendant Steve Stump 

to the position of probationary General Manager, and he relied 

heavily on plaintiff for matters pertaining to administrative 

operations. (See id. at ¶ 118.) Following the completion of 

General Manager Stump’s probationary period, he became 

increasingly hesitant to work in conjunction with the plaintiff. 

(See id. at ¶ 122.) As part of his efforts to strip plaintiff of 

any perceived co-equal authority she may have had with him, he 

unilaterally amended plaintiff’s job description to eliminate the 

requirements that she work “in conjunction with” the General 

Manager. (See id. at ¶ 123.) 

In April 2019, General Manager Stump wanted plaintiff 

to shift funds from various accounts to allow for the purchase of 

a portable generator. (See id. at ¶¶ 125–26.) Given plaintiff’s 

instructions from several board members regarding the financial 

affairs of the District, she requested that General Manager Stump

delay this purchase until after a new budget for 2020 was created 

or seek approval from the board for the purchase. (See id.) 

This infuriated him because he believed plaintiff was refusing to 

acknowledge his authority over her. (See id.) 

General Manager Stump realized that plaintiff was in 

control of the District’s finances because certain computer 

programs which controlled the District’s finances were only on 

the accounting department’s computers. (See id. at ¶ 130.) On 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 5 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

or about January 8, 2020, General Manager Stump directed 

plaintiff to have these computer programs placed on his personal 

office computer. (See id.) By placing these programs on his

computer, he would be able to transfer funds between accounts, 

make payments out of accounts, adjust customer accounts, or 

manipulate billings. (See id. at ¶ 131.) Because of the 

instructions she had received from board members, plaintiff told 

General Manager Stump that she wished to meet with certain board 

members to determine whether it was necessary for such highly 

sensitive programs to be placed on his computer. (See id. at ¶ 

132.) 

General Manager Stump responded to this by telling 

plaintiff to “get out” and informing her that she was on unpaid 

administrative leave. (See id. at ¶ 133.) Prior to this action, 

General Manager Stump had never informed plaintiff that her 

refusal to comply with his request would result in disciplinary 

action. (See id.) On January 14, 2020, plaintiff was informed 

by General Manager Stump that her administrative leave would be 

paid, but not why she was placed on leave in the first place. 

(See id. at ¶ 135.) On March 6, 2020, General Manager Stump 

informed plaintiff that her “at-will” employment as Office 

Administrator/Assistant General Manager was no longer needed and 

would end as of March 6, 2020. (See id. at ¶ 136.) At the time 

of her termination, plaintiff had accrued 128 hours of earned 

sick leave and 8 hours of personal leave. (See id. at ¶ 137.) 

Prior to her termination, the plaintiff had never received notice 

of the reason for her administrative leave nor was she ever 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 6 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

afforded an opportunity to be heard. (See id. at ¶ 138.)2

II. Discussion

The relevant inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is whether, 

accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing 

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint 

has stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “The 

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ 

but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant 

has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 

(2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. Although legal conclusions “can provide the framework of a 

complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Id.

at 679. 

III. Federal Claims

A. Procedural Due Process 

Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action alleges that she was 

deprived of procedural due process rights under the United States

Constitution. She contends that she had a constitutionally 

protected property interest in continued employment which was 

violated by General Manager Stump, the individual members of the 

board, and the District itself when she was terminated without 

good cause and denied the pre- and post- termination procedures 

duly enacted and adopted by the District. (See SAC at ¶¶ 240–

2 Although both plaintiff and defendants submitted 

extrinsic evidence to the court, after conferring with the court 

at the hearing on June 14, 2021, the parties agreed that the 

extrinsic evidence should not be taken into consideration. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 7 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

61.)

1. Claims Against General Manager Stump 

Plaintiff asserts that General Manager Stump violated 

her procedural due process rights under the United States 

Constitution when he terminated her without cause and without 

following policies duly enacted and adopted by the District. 

(See SAC at ¶ 240–260.) To state a claim for a violation of § 

1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a violation of rights 

protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute; (2) 

proximately caused by a “person”; (3) who was acting under color 

of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th 

Cir. 1991). 

“The requirements of procedural due process apply only 

to the deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Board of 

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). State law defines 

what is and what is not property. See Dorr v. Butte Cnty., 795 

F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Under California law, a 

“permanent employee,” dismissible only for cause, has “a property 

interest in his continued employment which is protected by due 

process.” Skelly, 15 Cal.3d 194, 207–08 (1975). While “a 

probationary (or nontenured) civil service employee, at least 

ordinarily, may be dismissed without a hearing or judicially 

cognizable good cause, an employee who has completed her 

probationary period ordinarily has a legitimate claim of 

entitlement to continued public employment.” See Dorr, 795 F.2d 

at 876. (internal citations omitted). 

Plaintiff has alleged that she was a permanent employee 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 8 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

and had completed any probationary period associated with her 

position. (See SAC at ¶ 115.) Plaintiff has identified policies 

promulgated by the District, such as Resolution 04.06 enacted in 

July 2004, which states that “individuals shall only be 

disciplined for just cause.” (See id. at ¶ 77). Plaintiff also 

points to District Ordinance No. 17, enacted in March 1976, which 

states that the “District Manager shall have the right, for due 

cause. . . to dismiss. . . or suspend without pay for thirty 

calendar days any permanent employee.” (See id. at ¶ 70.) 

Ordinance No. 17 further provides that “notice of such action 

must be in writing and served personally on such employee and . . 

. shall specify the penalty and contain a statement of the reason 

or reasons therefore.” (See id.) Plaintiff has therefore 

adequately alleged that she was a permanent employee dismissible 

only for cause and had a property interest in her continued 

employment protected by due process.

Defendants apparently do not dispute that plaintiff’s 

termination was proximately caused by General Manager Stump or 

that he was acting under color of state law. Plaintiff has 

alleged that it was General Manager Stump who placed her on 

administrative leave, (see SAC at ¶¶ 133–135), and terminated her 

on March 6, 2020. (See SAC at ¶ 136.) This suffices to allege 

that General Manager Stump’s action was the proximate cause of 

her alleged injury at this stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff 

has also identified Ordinance No. 17, which states that the 

District Manager (here, General Manager Stump) “shall have the 

right, for due cause, . . . to dismiss. . . any permanent 

employee.” (See SAC at ¶ 70.) The Supreme Court has held that 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 9 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

“generally, a public employee acts under color of state law while 

acting in his official capacity or while exercising his 

responsibilities pursuant to state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 

U.S. 42, 50 (1988). Plaintiff has accordingly also adequately 

alleged that General Manager Stump was acting under color of 

state law when he terminated her without pre- or post-termination 

proceedings. 

Defendants alternatively argue that General Manager 

Stump is entitled to qualified immunity in his individual 

capacity because a reasonable officer in his position would have 

believed that it was acceptable to terminate an at-will employee 

employed by the District. (See Mot. to Dismiss at 8-12.) The

doctrine of qualified immunity “protects government officials 

‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does 

not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson 

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)(citing Harlow v. 

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). However, “[d]etermining 

claims of qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage 

raises special problems for legal decision making.” See Keates 

v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit 

has opined that “[i]f the operative complaint contains even one 

allegation of a harmful act that would constitute a violation of 

a clearly established constitutional right, then plaintiffs are 

entitled to go forward with their claims.” See id. at 1235. 

As discussed above, plaintiff has adequately alleged 

that she was a permanent employee, dismissible only for cause, 

with “a property interest in [her] continued employment which is 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 10 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

protected by due process.” Skelly, 15 Cal.3d at 207–08. The 

right to procedural due process for tenured public employees who 

are dismissible only for cause is well-established under federal 

law. See Bd. of Regents of State College v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 

(1972); see Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876. Defendants’ argument assumes 

that plaintiff was an at-will employee, or, at the least, that it 

would have been reasonable for an officer in General Manager 

Stump’s position to believe that plaintiff was an at-will 

employee. Such an assumption runs counter to the allegations in 

plaintiff’s complaint, however. See Enesco Corp. v. 

Price/Costco, Inc., 146 F.3d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating 

that all allegations of material fact are taken as true and 

construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party).

Therefore, the court concludes that General Manager Stump is not 

entitled to qualified immunity at this stage. 

Accordingly, the court will deny defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 as against General Manager Stump. 

2. Claims Against Individual Board Members

Plaintiff next asserts that the individual board 

members violated plaintiff’s procedural due process rights under 

the United States Constitution when they terminated her without 

cause and without following pre- and post- termination procedures 

duly enacted and adopted by the District. (See SAC at ¶¶ 240–

260.) She further alleges that if the board members did not 

actually vote to terminate her without cause, they “authorized, 

approved, knowingly acquiesced in, and/or ratified” the actions 

of the other defendants who deprived plaintiff of her 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 11 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

constitutional rights and did not intervene to protect her from 

unconstitutional acts. (See id. at ¶¶ 12-30.)

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is completely 

devoid of any facts demonstrating that the board, or any 

individual board member, played any role in her termination, or 

even ratified her termination after it occurred. Plaintiff 

candidly states in her opposition that “[s]he does not know what 

role the board played in the decision [to terminate her].” (See

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 27.) (Docket No. 44.) While she 

states that she “fully believes that Mr. Stump had gained the 

approval of the Board before he terminated the plaintiff’s 

employment,” (see id.), her mere belief, absent any facts to 

support it, does not suffice. 

The closed session meetings that plaintiff points the 

court to in which the board discussed the “significant exposure 

to litigation” prior to her termination similarly do not provide 

any facts to support her allegation that the board played a role 

in terminating her or that the board ratified the decision to 

terminate her. (See SAC at ¶¶ 49–58.) Nor do these sessions 

indicate that the individual board members or the Board “refused 

the plaintiff’s request for pre- and post- termination due 

process.” (See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 42.) The only thing 

that these agendas indicate is that the board was concerned about 

potential litigation from plaintiff and had closed session 

meetings to discuss this with counsel. In short, plaintiff has 

not adequately alleged facts to demonstrate that the board played 

any role in her termination or the decision to deny her 

procedural due process rights to a pre- and post- termination 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 12 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

hearing. 

Plaintiff additionally contends that the individual 

board members may be held liable for their failure to take 

remedial steps after the alleged deprivation of her procedural 

due process rights, even if they did not affirmatively vote to 

terminate her or deny her procedural due process rights. (See

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 41.) Plaintiff argues that the 

failure to “take any remedial steps after the violations can 

indicate a deliberate choice and establish an independent basis 

for liability.” (See id. (citing McKay v. City of Hayward, 949 

F. Supp. 2d 971, 986 (N.D. Cal. 2013)); see also Gomez v. Vernon, 

255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a “turn-a-blind 

eye approach does not insulate the Department”).) 

However, as the court stated in its previous order, 

(see Docket No. 34 at 8.), neither plaintiff, defendants, nor 

this court have identified any binding precedent supporting a 

duty to intercede outside of the law enforcement context. The 

cases cited by plaintiff are distinguishable because those cases 

both dealt with the law enforcement and prison context, 

respectively, and were concerned with municipal or departmental 

liability for failing to take remedial steps after violations, 

not the liability of defendants acting in their individual 

capacities. Plaintiffs contend that Monteilh v. County of Los 

Angeles, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1093 (C.D. Cal. 2011) only stands 

for the limited proposition that the “Constitution does not 

require all public employees to intercede, outside their own 

bureaucratic hierarchies, on behalf of persons whose rights are 

in jeopardy.” However, plaintiff has not identified any binding 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 13 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

case which affirmatively requires public employees, outside of 

the law enforcement context, to intercede on behalf of persons 

whose rights are in jeopardy even within their own bureaucratic 

hierarchies. In the absence of such binding precedent, the court 

finds that plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated that the 

individual board members had a duty to intervene to protect 

plaintiff from a violation of her procedural due process rights. 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion to 

dismiss this claim as to the individual board members. 

3. Claims Against the District

Plaintiff alleges that the District is liable for the 

violation of plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. (See SAC 

at ¶¶ 244–247); (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 32–39.) Because 42 U.S.C. § 

1983 does not provide for vicarious liability, local governments 

“may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by 

its employees or agents.” Monell v. Department of Social 

Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) 

“Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or 

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 

acts may be fairly said to represent official policy, inflicts 

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 

§ 1983.” Id. 

The Supreme Court has held that “municipal liability 

may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers 

under appropriate circumstances.” See Pembaur v. City of 

Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986). However, “[t]he fact that 

a particular official, even a policymaking official, has 

discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 14 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an 

exercise of that discretion.” See id. at 482. “The official 

must also be responsible for establishing final governmental 

policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be 

held liable.” See id. at 482–483. The Supreme Court has made 

clear that “municipal liability under § 1983 attaches where, and 

only where, a deliberate choice to follow a course of action is 

made from among various alternatives by the official or officials 

responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the 

subject matter in question.” See id. at 483. Whether a 

particular official has final policy-making authority is a 

question of state law. See City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 

U.S. 112, 123–24 (1988). 

Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that General Manager 

Stump is a policy maker for the District and therefore his 

actions constitute official policy. (See SAC at ¶¶ 10, 33–34.)3 

She has also alleged that General Manager Stump terminated her 

and placed her on administrative leave. (See SAC at ¶¶ 133–36). 

Therefore, the court must determine whether General Manager Stump 

has “final policymaking authority” under state law, such that his 

action in allegedly terminating plaintiff without procedural due 

process protections constituted official district policy. See

Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 480-81. Although plaintiff has not stated 

3 As the court has articulated above, plaintiff has 

failed to plead facts regarding the individual board members or 

the board as a whole which indicate that the board played any 

role in her termination or the decision to allegedly deprive her 

of pre - and post- termination procedural due process, or that it 

ratified the decision to terminate her. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 15 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

that General Manager Stump had “final policymaking authority”,

she has alleged that he was delegated the authority to act on 

behalf of the District with regard to the decisions to hire, 

fire, and discipline employees and with regard to the process by 

which employees were disciplined or terminated. (See SAC at ¶¶ 

33–34.) However, plaintiff also cites to California Health & 

Safety Code § 6497 in her opposition which provides that “the 

sanitary board may make rules to carry out the purposes of this 

section, and for examinations, appointments, promotions, and 

removals, and may from time to time make changes in existing 

rules.” (See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 36.); see Cal. Health 

& Safety Code § 6497.

The court concludes that plaintiff has not adequately 

alleged that General Manager Stump was a final policymaker for 

the District in the area of employment such that the District can

be liable for his decision to terminate her. In Gillette v. 

Delmore, 979 F. 2d 1342, 1350 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit 

concluded that a Fire Chief’s discretionary authority to hire and 

fire employees was insufficient to establish a basis for 

municipal liability because he was not responsible for 

establishing the city’s employment policy; rather, the city 

charter granted such authority to the City Manager and City 

Council. See id. The Gillette court accordingly held that the 

Fire Chief was not a final policymaker and his decision could not 

be attributed to the city. See id. Similarly, while General 

Manager Stump may have had the discretion to terminate the 

plaintiff, like the Fire Chief in Gillette, he does not appear to 

have been responsible for establishing the District’s employment 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 16 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

or promotional policies. Rather, the state policy that plaintiff 

identified indicates that it is the District’s board, rather than 

General Manager Stump, that is responsible for establishing the 

District’s employment policies. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 

6497. Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to indicate

that the board took any role in either ratifying Mr. Stump’s 

decision, affirmatively voting to terminate plaintiff, or denying 

plaintiff procedural due process rights. Therefore, the court 

must conclude that, as in Gillette, General Manager Stump was not 

a final policy maker and his decision to terminate plaintiff 

cannot be attributed to the District. 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion to 

dismiss plaintiff’s procedural due process claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 as against the Susanville Sanitary District.

B. Conspiracy to Deprive Procedural Due Process

Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action alleges that the 

District, individual board members, and General Manager Stump 

engaged in a conspiracy with the intent of depriving plaintiff of 

her procedural due process rights protected under the federal 

constitution. (See SAC at ¶¶ 262–270.) However, “conspiracy is 

not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” See Lacey v. 

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012)(internal 

citations omitted). While conspiracy allegations have sometimes 

been used by plaintiffs to “draw in private parties who would 

otherwise not be susceptible to a § 1983 action because of the 

state action doctrine or to aid in proving claims against 

otherwise tenuously connected parties in a complex case” (see

id.), plaintiff may not bootstrap a § 1983 claim into a separate 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 17 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

cause of action for conspiracy simply by alleging that two or 

more persons combined to commit the action.4 Plaintiff has cited 

no legal authority whatsoever to support her claim of conspiracy 

in her opposition. (See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 51–52.) 

Accordingly, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss 

this claim.5

V. State Law Claims

A. Violation of District Law, Policy, and Procedure 

Plaintiff has styled her fourth cause of action as 

“Violation of District Law, Policy, and Procedure.” (See SAC at 

¶¶ 207–239.) Plaintiff argues she did so because defendants 

argued in their previous motion to dismiss that “the only basis 

4 Plaintiff has never given any indication that she seeks 

to bring a cause of action for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. 

Despite being asked by the court to identify the statute or 

common law doctrine that she claims authorizes her cause of 

action, plaintiff has failed to do so again in her Second Amended 

Complaint. 

5 The court notes that plaintiff has sued both General 

Manager Stump and the individual members of the Susanville 

Sanitary Board of Directors in their official and individual 

capacities. (See generally SAC.) Individual capacity suits seek 

to impose personal liability upon a government official for 

actions he takes under color of state law. See Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237–38 (1974). Official capacity suits, in 

contrast, “generally represent only another way of pleading an 

action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n. 55. As long as the government entity 

receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated 

as a suit against the entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 

159, 166 (1985)(internal citations omitted). Because the court 

has concluded that the District is not liable for either of 

plaintiff’s federal claims, the court will also dismiss the 

federal claims against all defendants in their official 

capacities. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 18 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

on which a public employee can complain about termination is that 

the employer violated its own laws in carrying out the 

termination.” (See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 52.) Leaving 

aside the obvious point that it is unwise to base a cause of 

action in a complaint solely on an argument made by defendants in 

their motion to dismiss, plaintiff has not pointed to any common 

law doctrine or statute which provides a cause of action for an 

alleged violation of the District’s law, policy, and procedure. 

It appears to the court that plaintiff is already arguing that 

the District violated is laws, policies, and procedures through 

her procedural due process claims. Although the court might 

conceivably be able to identify a cause of action or common law 

doctrine that would permit plaintiff to proceed on this theory

apart from her procedural due process claim, the court should not 

be required to expend hours of time performing the legal research 

to do so. Instead, the court will dismiss this cause of action 

for failure to adequately state a claim under Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and grant plaintiff leave to amend. 

B. Government Claims Act 

The District is alleged to be a “public utility 

district” and the named defendants are alleged to be either 

District Board Members or its public employees. (See SAC at ¶¶ 

4–5, 9–37.) Under the Government Claims Act, a “public entity” 

includes districts, public agencies, and any other political 

subdivision or political corporation in the state. See Cal. 

Gov’t. Code § 811.2. The District was formed pursuant to the 

Sanitary District Act of 1923, found at California Health and 

Safety Code § 6400, et. seq. (See SAC at ¶¶ 4–5.) The 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 19 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

20

Government Claims Act applies to sanitary districts and therefore 

applies to the Susanville Sanitary District. See Ambrosini v. 

Alisal Sanitary Dist., 154 Cal. App. 2d 720, 723 (1st Dist. 1957) 

(holding that tort liability rules applicable to municipal 

corporations are applicable to sanitary districts).

The Government Claims Act establishes certain 

conditions precedent to the filing of a lawsuit against a public 

entity for money or damages. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 900 et seq. 

In order to comply with the Government Claims Act, a plaintiff 

who files an administrative claim with a public entity must 

either receive a notice of the claim’s rejection or give the 

entity 45 days to respond to the claim prior to the filing of any 

lawsuit, after which the entity’s inaction is deemed a rejection. 

See Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 912.4, 945.4. The failure to timely 

present a claim to the public entity bars the claimant from 

filing a lawsuit against that public entity. See J.J. v. City of 

San Diego, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 1219 (4th Dist. 2014).6 A

plaintiff’s complaint must plead facts demonstrating or excusing 

compliance with the claims presentation requirements of the 

California Government Claims Act to survive a motion to dismiss. 

See State of California v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1239 

(2004). Absent some exception or legal excuse, plaintiff’s 

6 The failure to timely present a claim to the public 

entity also bars the claimant from filing a lawsuit against that 

entity’s public employee for an act or omission that occurred in 

the scope of employment. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 950.2. The 

failure to present a claim under the Government Claims Act also 

bars allegations of “ultra vires” employment termination. See

Colodney v. Cnty. of Riverside, Case No. EDCV 12-00427-VAP (SPx), 

2013 WL 12200649, at *6–7, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2013), aff’d, 651 

F.App’x 609 (9th Cir. 2016). 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 20 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

21

failure to present a public entity claim under the Government 

Claims Act to the District prior to filing suit accordingly 

constitutes a defect to each of plaintiff’s state law causes of 

action seeking damages. 

1. Injunctive and Declaratory Relief 

Plaintiff first argues that she need not comply with 

the presentation requirements for claims for money or damages 

because her claim is primarily one for declaratory and/or 

injunctive relief. (See SAC at ¶ 2.); (see Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. 

to Dismiss at 57.) In Eureka Teachers Ass’n v. Board of 

Education, 202 Cal. App. 3d 469, 475 (1st Dist. 1998), the court 

held that the claims presentation requirement under the 

Government Claims Act is inapplicable in “actions which seek 

injunctive or declaratory relief and certain actions in mandamus. 

. . and where money is an incident thereto.” Id. at 475. 

However, the rule exempting compliance with claims presentation 

requirements for injunctive or declaratory relief is inapplicable 

where a petition for extraordinary relief is merely incidental or 

ancillary to a prayer for damages. See Loehr v. Ventura Cmty. 

Coll. Dist., 147 Cal. App.3d 1071, 1081 (2nd Dist. 1983). 

 Plaintiff states that “the primary purpose of this 

action is to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief in the form 

of an injunction returning the plaintiff to her former position, 

and an order compelling the defendants to comply with the laws, 

policies and contracts of the District . . .” (See SAC at ¶ 2.) 

Plaintiff states that her prayer for monetary damages, such as 

back pay, and employment benefits are merely incidental to her 

claims for equitable relief. (See id.) However, a fair reading 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 21 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

22

of the Second Amended Complaint does not support such an 

interpretation.

Having reviewed plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, 

the court cannot conclude that plaintiff’s prayer for damages is 

“clearly incidental to her claim for injunctive and declaratory 

relief.” See Eureka Teachers, 202 Cal. App.3d at 475. Instead, 

it appears that plaintiff is simply trying to bypass the 

Government Claims Act through creative pleading. Plaintiff 

pleads in the alternative in each of her first six causes of 

action that if she “is not reinstated to her employment with the 

District, she will be entitled to an award of her lost future 

earnings and benefits.” (See SAC at ¶¶ 175, 192, 205, 238, 260, 

269.) In plaintiff’s fifth and sixth cause of action for 

procedural due process violations and conspiracy to violate 

procedural due process, which are brought under both the federal 

and state constitutions, she claims that she is entitled to 

damages in excess of $100,000 for “emotional distress, anxiety, 

humiliation, and embarrassment.” (See SAC at ¶ 253.) She also 

seeks exemplary damages in excess of $100,000.000. (See id. at ¶ 

254.)7 Plaintiff additionally seeks “general and compensatory 

damages in sums to be proved at trial”, “special damages in sums 

to be proved at trial”, and “exemplary damages in sums to be 

proved at trial.” (See SAC at ¶ 285.) Accordingly, plaintiff 

has not alleged sufficient facts to show that she is exempt from 

7 Plaintiff has never specified whether these damages are 

pursuant to her federal causes of action, which are not subject 

to the Government Claims Act, or her state causes of action. 

Instead, plaintiff has simply lumped her federal and state law 

claims together in one cause of action. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 22 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

23

compliance from the Government Claims Act on the grounds that the 

monetary damages sought are merely incidental to declaratory or 

injunctive relief. Having concluded that plaintiff was compelled 

to file a timely demand with the District as a pre-requisite to 

initiating her lawsuit, the court must next determine whether 

there was satisfactory compliance with the Government Claims Act. 

2. Actual Compliance with Government Claims Act

Plaintiff argues that she has actually complied with 

the Government Claims Act “by way of various written 

communications to the District through its General Managers, as 

well as written and oral communications to the defendants’ 

retained legal counsel, Kevin A. Flautt.” (See SAC at ¶ 38.) 

Plaintiff contends that these communications include: (1) a 

letter dated January 16, 2020 from plaintiff’s counsel Thomas 

Beko to General Manager Stump; (2) a letter dated February 5, 

2020, from Thomas Beko to defendants’ counsel Mr. Flautt, (3) a 

letter dated March 30, 2020 from Thomas Beko to the defendants’ 

counsel; (4) a series of voicemail messages between Thomas Beko 

and defendants’ counsel, including three calls in February 2020; 

(5) a series of telephone conversations between Thomas Beko and 

defendants’ counsel, including two calls in February 2020; (6) a 

series of email communications between Thomas Beko and 

defendants’ counsel, including four between February 14, 2020 and 

March 5, 2020; and (6) a series of correspondence between Thomas 

Beko and defendants’ counsel, including those sent by defendants’

counsel on January 30, 2020 and April 6, 2020. (See id.) 8

8 The Government Claims Act requires that a written claim 

be presented to the public entity. See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 945.4. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 23 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

24

As a preliminary matter, the court doubts that a series 

of letters, most of which were sent to defendants’ counsel, can 

constitute a claim under the Government Claims Act. Defendants’ 

counsel is not the proper recipient of a claim under the 

Government Claims Act. Rather, the Government Claims Act 

instructs that “a claim. . . shall be presented to a local public 

entity by either . . . delivering it to the clerk, secretary, or 

auditor thereof” or “mailing it to the clerk, secretary, auditor, 

or to the governing body at its principal office.” See Cal. 

Gov’t. Code § 915(a)(1–2.) 

It is also questionable whether a series of letters can 

ever constitute a claim within the meaning of the Government 

Claims Act. This is because “[i]t would be difficult for the 

public entity to identify whether a particular letter were a 

claim and which letter triggered its obligation to accept or deny 

a claim if a series of correspondence could be considered 

collectively to constitute a claim.” Dilts v. Cantua Elementary 

School Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d 27, 35 (5th Dist. 1987). “If an 

agency was unable to determine whether a claim had been filed or 

when the claim had been filed, it would be equally difficult for 

the court to determine which statute of limitation applied or 

when the statute of limitation began to run.” See id. The 

procedures prescribed by the Government Claims Act “envisioned 

the filing of a single claim with the public entity so that the 

public entity may investigate the claim, consider settlement and 

It goes without saying that oral communications are not a written 

claim. See Wilhite v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:11-CV-1692 AWI 

JLT, 2012 WL 273088, at * 7 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2012). 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 24 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

25

formally approve or reject a claim.” See id. 

Nevertheless, without the ability to view the letters 

that plaintiff contends constituted actual compliance with the 

Government Claims Act, the court cannot determine whether those 

letters comply with the required elements of a claim under the 

Government Claims Act. 

Plaintiff alternatively argues that she has actually 

complied with the Government Claims Act through “supplemental 

claims” presented to the District on September 2, 2020 and March 

31, 2021. (See SAC at ¶¶ 41–42.) These claims were filed after 

plaintiff initially filed this suit in August 2020 and after 

defendants filed their first motion to dismiss their first motion 

to dismiss on September 1, 2020. (See Docket No. 12.) Plaintiff 

emphasizes that the time limits within which to submit a claim to 

the District were tolled by way of a State of Emergency declared 

by the Governor of California on March 4, 2020 and supplemental 

orders thereto and that the time within which to submit a claim 

has not expired. (See id. at ¶¶ 43–44.) 

Despite plaintiff’s arguments, the court must conclude

that these “supplemental” government claims, delivered after the 

filing of plaintiff’s complaint, do not establish compliance with 

the Government Claims Act even though the statute of limitations 

for plaintiff to file a claim with the District had not yet run. 

Timely claims presentation is not merely a procedural 

requirement, but a condition precedent to the claimant’s ability 

to maintain an action against the public entity. See Le Mere v. 

Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 35 Cal. App. 5th 237, 246 (2nd 

Dist. 2019). Plaintiff has not cited, nor is the court aware of 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 25 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

26

any cases permitting a plaintiff to “cure” her failure to file a 

pre-lawsuit claim by filing a post-lawsuit claim. See Le Mere., 

35 Cal. App. 5th at 244 (2nd Dist. 2019). A judge in this 

district has even held that a plaintiff’s failure to present a 

government claim prior to filing the lawsuit was fatal to his 

state law claims, despite the fact that the plaintiff filed a 

claim with the government entity only one day after filing the 

lawsuit and even though plaintiff in that case had a meritorious 

argument that the submission deadline for his claim had not 

expired. See McDaniel v. Diaz, Case No. 1:20-cv-00856-NONE-SAB, 

2020 WL 7425348, *28 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2020). This is because 

the purpose of the Government Claims Act is not to “prevent 

surprise [but rather] is to provide the public entity sufficient 

information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to 

settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. . 

.” See J. J., 233 Cal. App. 4th at 1219. As the court noted

in Le Mere, “[f]iling a government claim while simultaneously 

attempting to prosecute a cause of action based on that claim. . 

. does not satisfy the purpose of the Government Claims Act. . .” 

See Le Mere, 35 Cal. App. 5th at 248.9

Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff has not 

adequately alleged facts demonstrating compliance with the 

9 Plaintiff’s argument that the District was “fully aware 

of plaintiff’s claims and allegations” is inapposite. (See Pl.’s 

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 55–56.) “[I]t is well-settled that 

claims statutes must be satisfied even in the face of the public 

entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the 

claims. Such knowledge, standing alone, constitutes neither 

substantial compliance nor a basis for estoppel.” See J.J., 223 

Cal. App. 4th at 1219 (internal citations omitted). 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 26 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

27

Government Claims Act. 

3. Notice Provisions of Government Claims Act 

Plaintiff next contends that the defendants “never 

provided notice to the plaintiff or her retained representatives 

that her claims were defective or deficient in any way” and 

argues that their failure to provide such notice waives the 

defendants’ right to assert any defense based upon the Government 

Claims Act. (See Compl. at ¶ 59.) However, California 

Government Code § 911 states that no notice regarding the 

insufficiency of a claim “need be given and no waiver shall 

result when the claim as presented fails to state either an 

address to which the person presenting the claim desires notices 

to be sent or an address of the claimant.” See Cal. Gov’t. Code 

§ 911. Because plaintiff has not attached the letters that she 

contends constitute her compliance with the Government Claims Act 

to her complaint, the court cannot determine whether the 

Susanville Sanitary District was obligated to provide plaintiff 

with notice that her claim was defective or deficient in any way. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has not adequately alleged that the 

Susanville Sanitary District was obligated to provide her notice 

as to the deficiency of her claims and that the District has 

waived any defense as to the sufficiency of plaintiff’s claim 

under the Government Claims Act. 

4. Estoppel 

Plaintiff next argues that defendants should be 

estopped from asserting the defense that plaintiff did not comply 

with the Government Claims Act because they “failed to produce 

records in compliance with the California Public Records Act as a 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 27 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

28

means by which to prevent the plaintiff from asserting claims.” 

(See SAC at ¶ 60.) “A public agency is subject to estoppel from 

the assertion of either the time limits for filing tort claims, 

or the statute of limitations on a cause of action.” See Jordan 

v. City of Sacramento, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1487, 1496 (3d Dist. 

2007). “The doctrine of equitable estoppel is based on the 

theory that a party who by his declarations or conduct misleads 

another to his prejudice should be estopped from obtaining the 

benefits of his misconduct.” See Kleinecke v. Montecito Water 

Dist., 147 Cal. App. 3d 240, 245 (2nd Dist. 1983) (internal 

citations omitted). “To establish estoppel as an element of a 

suit, the elements of estoppel must be especially pleaded in the 

complaint with sufficient accuracy to disclose facts relied 

upon.” See Chalmers v. County of Los Angeles, 175 Cal. App. 3d 

461, 467 (2nd Dist. 1985). In order to assert equitable 

estoppel, the following four elements must be present: 

(1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of 

the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct be 

acted on, or must so act that the party asserting 

had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) 

the party asserting estoppel must be ignorant of 

the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely 

upon the conduct to his injury. 

See Sofranek v. Cnty. of Merced, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1238, 1247 

(5th Dist. 2007). California courts have previously found that 

there is no estoppel where the complaint “contains no facts about 

being misled or detrimental reliance.” See Chalmers, 175 Cal. 

App. 4th at 467. 

Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint contains no facts 

about being misled or detrimental reliance, as is required to 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 28 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

establish estoppel as an element of a suit. See Chalmers, 175 

Cal. App. 3d at 467. Moreover, despite plaintiff’s contention 

that she was unable to file a government claim because of 

defendants’ alleged failure to produce certain public documents, 

she also notes that “a presented claim need only include the 

claimant’s name and address, names of public employees involved, 

and a description of the incident, including the date, place, and 

proclaimed damages.” See Wormuth v. Lammersville Union Sch. 

Dist., 305 F. Supp. 3d 1108, 1128 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (Mueller, J.). 

It is inconceivable that plaintiff lacked this very basic factual 

information or that she could only have gotten this information 

from the public records allegedly not produced by the District. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to adequately plead that 

estoppel applies here. 10

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s failure to 

allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claims 

presentation requirement of the Government Claims Act bars all 

10 Plaintiff also contends that she need not submit her 

contract-based claims to the District under the Government Claims 

Act because (1) the district’s personnel policies and its 

memorandum of understanding include a claim procedure which 

govern this matter exclusively; (2) her claims for wages, salary, 

and fees are exempted from the presentation requirements of the 

Government Claims Act; and (3) she substantially complied with 

the Government Claims Act’s presentation requirements. (See Pl’s 

Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 60-78.) Plaintiff did not assert 

these excuses from compliance with the Government Claims Act in 

her Second Amended Complaint, and the California Supreme Court 

has held that plaintiff must “allege facts demonstrating or 

excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement” 

within the complaint itself. See State of Cal., 32 Cal. 4th at 

1239. Accordingly, the court will not consider these arguments 

at present but will give plaintiff leave to amend to allege the 

facts to support these arguments in the next iteration of her 

complaint. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 29 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

30

her state law causes of action apart from her claim under the 

California Public Records Act.

C. California Public Records Act

Plaintiff also contends that defendants have violated 

the California Public Records Act (“CPRA”), Cal. Gov’t. Code § 

6250, et seq. (See SAC at ¶¶ 271–285.) The CPRA states that 

“except with respect to public records exempt from disclosure by 

express provisions of law, each state or local agency, upon a 

request for a copy of records that reasonably describes an 

identifiable record or records, shall make the records promptly 

available to any person. . .” See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 6253(b). 

The term “public records” includes “any writing containing 

information relating to the conduct of the public’s business 

prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency.” 

Cal. Gov’t. Code § 6252(e). Section 6253(c) provides that the

“agency, upon request for a copy of records, shall, within 10 

days from receipt of the request, determine whether the request, 

in whole or in part, seeks copies of disclosable public records 

in the possession of the agency and shall promptly notify the 

person making the request of the determination and the reasons 

therefor.” See Cal. Gov’t. Code § 6253(c). 

Section 6258 of the CPRA provides that “[a]ny person 

may institute proceedings for injunctive or declarative relief or 

writ of mandate in any court of competent jurisdiction to enforce 

his or her right to inspect or to receive a copy of any public 

record or class of public records under this chapter.” See id. 

In order to prevail on such a petition under the CPRA, the 

plaintiff must establish that the files requested (1) qualify as 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 30 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

31

“public records” and (2) were in the possession of the District. 

See Consolidated Irrigation Dist. v. Superior Court, 205 Cal. 

App. 4th 697, 709 (5th Dist. 2012.) “The CPRA generally presumes 

that all documents maintained by a public entity are subject to 

disclosure to any member of the public, unless a statutory 

exemption applies, or the catchall exemption, 6255, is satisfied 

(when public interest served by nondisclosure of records clearly 

outweighs the public interest in disclosure).” See Sander v. 

Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 5th 651, (1st Dist. 2018). If it 

appears from the plaintiff’s verified petition that “certain 

public records are being improperly withheld from a member of the 

public,” the court shall order the officer or person charged with 

withholding the records to disclose the public record or show 

cause why he or she should not do so. See Galbiso v. Public 

Utility Dist., 167 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1084 (5th Dist. 2008). 

Defendants argue that plaintiff has not reasonably 

identified what records were requested and which records have 

still not been produced in her Second Amended Complaint. (See

Mot. to Dismiss at 47.) The court agrees. Plaintiff attached to 

her complaint a letter from her counsel on May 20, 2020 to 

defendants’ counsel, Kevin Flautt, requesting certain categories 

of public records. (See SAC at Ex. 2.) Plaintiff also attached 

Mr. Flautt’s response on May 29, 2020, which provided anticipated 

deadlines for when plaintiff could expect the production of 

certain documents, ranging from June 29, 2020 to September 29, 

2020. (See id.) The letter also stated that certain documents 

might be exempt from disclosure pursuant to the CPRA and would 

not be produced. (See id.) However, it is unclear to the court, 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 31 of 32
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

32

based on the letters attached to the Second Amended Complaint, 

what documents defendants have already produced pursuant to 

plaintiff’s CPRA request and what documents have not. 

Accordingly, plaintiff has not adequately stated a claim for 

violation of the California Public Rights Act, and this cause of 

action will be dismissed with leave to amend.11 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to 

dismiss (Docket No. 42) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED as to 

plaintiff’s fifth cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 

deprivation of procedural due process as against defendant Steve 

J. Stump. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion to 

dismiss be, and the same hereby is GRANTED as against all 

defendants other than defendant Stump on plaintiff’s fifth cause 

of action and as against all defendants on plaintiff’s first, 

second, third, fourth, sixth, and seventh causes of action.

Plaintiff has twenty days from the date this Order is 

signed to file an amended complaint, if she can do so consistent 

with this Order. 

Dated: June 16, 2021

11 In addition to complying with the requirements to state 

a claim under the CPRA, plaintiff is instructed to explicitly 

detail the categories of public records and particular public 

documents sought that have not yet been produced by defendants. 

Defendants will then have an opportunity to either produce the 

requested public documents, or explain why they believe that the 

documents which have been identified as responsive to the 

plaintiff’s CPRA request fall within one of the exemptions from 

disclosure within the CPRA. 

Case 2:20-cv-01566-WBS-DMC Document 48 Filed 06/16/21 Page 32 of 32