Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00229/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-00229-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mainland Nursery
Defendant
Mainland Nursery, Inc.
Defendant
Alba Ponce
Plaintiff
Rayray Farm Labor Service, Inc.
Defendant
Audelia Soreque
Plaintiff
Lilia Uribe
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LILIA URIBE, ALBA PONCE,

AUDELIA SOREQUE, on behalf of

themselves and all others

similarly situated,

NO. CIV. 2-07-0229-FCD-DAD

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MAINLAND NURSERY, INC.,

MAINLAND NURSERY (FORM

UNKNOWN), and RAYRAY FARM

LABOR SERVICE, INC.,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

 This matter is before the court on defendant Mainland

Nursery, Inc.’s (“Mainland” or “defendant”) motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (the “complaint”) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose

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1 Because oral argument will not be of material

assistance, the court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. 

See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 78-230(h).

2 The following facts are primarily derived from

plaintiffs’ complaint filed April 10, 2007. (Pls.’ First Am.

Compl. (“FAC”) [Docket # 7], filed Apr. 10, 2007).

2

defendant’s motion. For the reasons set forth below,1

defendant’s motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND2

Plaintiffs Lilia Uribe (“Uribe”), Alba Ponce (“Ponce”), and

Audelia Soreque (“Soreque”) (collectively, “plaintiffs”) are

California residents living in San Joaquin County who were

employed by defendant Mainland until October 2006. (FAC ¶¶ 8-

10). Plaintiff allege that they are workers that are not exempt

from federal and state labor laws. (FAC ¶¶ 8-10; 18). Mainland

is a plant reseller with product ranging from 3" to 16" potted

plants. (Id. ¶ 12). Mainland buys plants wholesale from

original growers and resells to retailers that include

Albertson’s, Capital Nurseries, Food-4-Less, Holiday Quality

Foods, Home Depot, K-Mart, Long’s Drugs, Navlet’s Garden Centers,

Raley’s, Bel-Air Markets, Nob Hill Foods, Rite Aid, Safeway,

Smart Foods, Solari’s, Summerwinds, Target, and Wal-Mart. (Id.) 

Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of themselves and a

putative class on February 3, 2007, contending that defendants,

including defendant Mainland, have violated state wage and hour

laws by, inter alia, (1) failing to pay overtime, (2) requiring

plaintiffs to work “off-the-clock,” (3) failing to provide rest

periods or appropriate compensation, (4) failing to provide meal

periods or appropriate compensation, (5) failing to provide

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plaintiffs with accurate wage statements, (6) failing to maintain

accurate time-keeping records, (7) failing to provide complete

records to employees upon request, and (8) failing to reimburse

plaintiffs for expenses reasonably incurred on behalf of an

employer. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiffs allege that defendants were on

notice of the alleged violations, but that they intentionally

refused to rectify their unlawful practices. (Id. ¶ 19). 

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of the complaint

must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). The court is bound to give plaintiff the benefit of

every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded”

allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass'n v.

Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). Thus, the plaintiff

need not necessarily plead a particular fact if that fact is a

reasonable inference from facts properly alleged. See id. 

Nevertheless, it is inappropriate to assume that the

plaintiff “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the

defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not

been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v.

Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 

Moreover, the court “need not assume the truth of legal

conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” United

States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th

Cir. 1986).

Ultimately, the court may not dismiss a complaint in which

the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

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Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). Only where a plaintiff has not

“nudged [his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to

plausible,” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. “[A] court

may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent

with the allegations.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.

506, 514 (2002) (quoting Hudson v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

73 (1984)). 

In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the court may consider

only the complaint, any exhibits thereto, and matters which may

be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 

See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hospital, 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th

Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. Consumers Union of United

States, Inc., 12 F.Supp.2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

ANALYSIS

I. Fair Labor Standards Act

Plaintiffs allege that defendant Mainland violated the Fair

Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., by

failing to compensate plaintiffs for overtime for hours worked in

excess of 40 hours per week. (FAC ¶ 32). Mainland contends that

plaintiffs’ FLSA claim must be dismissed because the agricultural

exemption to FLSA overtime requirements applies and plaintiffs

have failed to allege that they performed non-exempt work.

The agricultural exemption to the FLSA provides, in relevant

part, that maximum hour requirements do not apply to “any

employee employed in agriculture.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(12) (West

2007). However, wholesalers of agricultural commodities are not

exempt from the FLSA. Adkins v. Mid-American Growers, Inc., 167

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F.3d 355, 357 (7th Cir 1999) (citing Wirtz v. Jackson & Perkins

Co., 312 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1963); Mitchell v. Huntsville

Wholesale Nurseries, Inc., 267 F.2d 286, 290-91 (5th Cir. 1959)).

Plaintiffs allege that Mainland is a “plant wholesaler

buying from original growers.” (FAC ¶ 12). Moreover, plaintiffs

allege that the plaintiffs and class employees are not exempt

from FLSA standards. (FAC ¶¶ 8-10; 18). A reasonable inference

to be drawn from these allegations is that plaintiffs, as

employees of a wholesaler of plants, perform work relating to the

sale of plants. There are no allegations to support defendant’s

assertion that plaintiffs perform work relating to growing plants

or other such work that would fall within the purview of FLSA’s

agricultural exemption. As such, at this stage of the

litigation, based upon the allegations in plaintiff complaint,

the court cannot find that the agricultural exemption to the FLSA

applies as a matter of law. Plaintiffs allege that they are nonexempt employees for a wholesaler of plants who have not been

paid applicable overtime wages under the FLSA. Viewing the

allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the

plaintiffs and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom,

plaintiffs have properly alleged a claim against defendant

Mainland for violations of the FLSA.

Mainland requests that the court consider extrinsic evidence

relating to the nature of its business that would demonstrate

that the agricultural exemption to the FLSA applies and

plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime compensation. However,

consideration of such evidence is inappropriate on a motion to

dismiss. Rather, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court

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3 Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to strike the

declaration of John H. Merrill is GRANTED. Nothing in this order

prevents defendant from raising these issues on a motion for

summary judgment where the court may properly consider evidence

submitted by the parties. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 56.

4 In its reply, Mainland asserts that it would agree to

bifurcated discovery and litigation of a Rule 56 motion on the

FLSA claim prior to discovery and litigation of plaintiffs’ state

law claims. (Def.’s Reply [Docket # 29], filed Dec. 7, 2007, at

2). Such a request should be included in the joint status report

for the court’s consideration regarding the pretrial scheduling

order. 

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must only look at and accept as true the allegations in the

complaint, construing all such allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322; Retail

Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 373 U.S. at 753 n.6. Therefore, defendant’s

factual assertions regarding the nature of their business are

irrelevant to the current motion before the court.3

Mainland also argues that plaintiffs have failed to show

that they are entitled to overtime wages under the FLSA. 

However, this argument misconstrues the nature of notice pleading

in federal court. Plaintiffs need only set forth a short and

plain statement of the claim sufficient to give a defendant fair

notice of the claim against it as well as the grounds upon which

the claim rests. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a); Twombly, 127 S.Ct. at

1965 n.3. Plaintiffs’ allegations satisfy this liberal standard. 

Therefore, defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ FLSA claims

is DENIED.4

II. Failure to Provide Meal and Rest Periods

In their fourth claim for relief, plaintiffs allege that

defendants failed to provide rest and meal periods or

compensation in lieu thereof in violation of California Labor

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5 None of the described occupations in definition of

“employed in an agricultural occupation” set forth in IWC Wage

Order No. 14-2001 addresses wholesalers of plants.

6 Because the court cannot determine whether IWC Wage

Order No. 14-2001 is the applicable wage order, the court need

not determine whether or not it mandates meal or rest periods.

7

Code § 226.7 and the applicable Wage Orders. Mainland contends

that this claim must be dismissed because the applicable

Industrial Welfare Commission (“IWC”) Wage Order does not mandate

meal or rest periods. Specifically, Mainland argues that it is a

grower of nursery stock and, as such, employees in such

operations are covered by IWC Wage Order No. 14-2001, which does

not require the provision of meal or rest periods. (Industrial

Welfare Commission Order No. 14-2001, Ex. B. to Def.’s Mot. to

Dismiss, filed Sept. 20, 2007, at 1)

Again, defendant’s argument for dismissal is predicated upon

a determination of fact that the court cannot make at this stage

in the litigation. Mainland contends that it is a “grower of

nursery stock.” However, plaintiffs allege in their complaint

that Mainland is a wholesaler of plants. Defendants do not

argue, nor is it clear from the face of IWC Wage Order No. 14-

2001, that IWC Wage Order 14-2001 applies to wholesalers of

plants.5 (Id. at 1). Therefore, at this stage of the

litigation, viewing the allegations in plaintiffs’ complaint as

true, the court cannot find that IWC Wage Order No. 14-2001

applies.6

 

Moreover, plaintiffs have alleged that “[t]he applicable

Wage Orders require that a meal break be provided during any

period of work of longer than 5 hours” and that they also provide

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“for a paid 10 minute break for every 4 hours of work.” (FAC ¶¶

54, 56). As such, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that

defendants failed to provide required meal and rest breaks in

violation of California Labor Code § 226.7 and the applicable

Wage Orders. Thus, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’

fourth claim for relief is DENIED. 

III. Breach of Contract

In their eighth claim for relief, plaintiffs allege that

defendants breached the written employment contracts entered into

with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs assert that all applicable sections

of the California Labor Code and Wage Orders are incorporated

into these written employment contracts and that defendants

breached these contracts by failing to comply with these terms

and conditions. (FAC ¶¶ 84-85). Plaintiffs also assert that the

terms of these contracts are written on the wage statements for

employees. (Id. ¶ 84). Mainland contends that this claim must

be dismissed because plaintiffs’ employment was at-will and thus,

defendant had the right to unilaterally reduce the rate of

compensation with or without good cause. Mainland also argues

this claim should be dismissed because defendant’s Labor Code

obligations arise from statute, not contract.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants entered into written

employment contracts with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also allege

that the applicable sections of the California Labor Code and

Wage Orders are incorporated into those contracts. Neither

plaintiffs nor defendant present copies of the alleged written

contracts or their terms. As such, the court cannot determine

the nature or terms of the contractual relationship between the

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parties, including whether or not plaintiffs were at will

employees. Again, viewing plaintiffs allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom as the court must on

a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a claim

for breach of contract. Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss

plaintiffs’ eighth claim for relief is DENIED. 

IV. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Finally, Mainland contends that the court should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367©

because plaintiffs’ state law claims raise novel and complex

issues of state law. Defendant assert that because nine of the

ten claims for relief brought by plaintiffs are for alleged

violations of state law, plaintiffs’ state law claims predominate

over their sole federal claim.

The exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims is appropriate where such claims “derive from a common

nucleus of operative fact” and are “such that [a plaintiff] would

ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial

proceeding.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725 (1966). However, a federal district court may, in its

discretion, decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

related claims if:

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of state

law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the

claim or claims over which the district court has

original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other

compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. § 1368 (West 2007).

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Plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims arise out of the

same common nucleus of operative facts, specifically their

employment relationship with defendant Mainland and their

compensation for such employment. As such, the court has

supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ state law claims. 

As to whether plaintiffs’ state law claims substantially

predominate, the court finds resolution of such issue at this

stage in the litigation premature. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. One

Diamond Electronics, Inc., No. C-06-6326, 2007 WL 2255295 at *2

(N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2007). Defendant has not “attempted to

address the nature or quantum of evidence necessary to establish

the state law claims, as opposed to the federal claims, or how

the evidence as to such respective claims may overlap.” Id.

With respect to defendant’s assertion that plaintiffs’ state

law claims involve novel and complex issues of first impression,

the court also finds that determination of this inquiry is

premature on the current motion to dismiss. Mainland’s arguments

regarding novel and complex state law issues are based primarily

on their assertions of the what the applicable law, Wage Orders,

and/or defenses are with respect to the claims brought by

plaintiffs. For example, Mainland contends that this court will

be faced with deciding whether Labor Code § 226.7 applies to

occupations under IWC Wage Order No. 14-2001. This contention

assumes that IWC Wage Order No. 14-2001 applies to plaintiffs’

claims, an assumption that cannot be made on a motion to dismiss

in light of plaintiffs’ allegations in their complaint. Thus, at

the stage of the litigation, the court cannot adequately

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7 The court’s holding that declining to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction on the current motion to dismiss would

be premature does not prevent defendant from raising this issue

at some future point in the course of this litigation.

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determine the complexity or novelty of the issues raised by

plaintiffs’ state law claims.7

 

Therefore, defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ state

law claims on the basis that the court should decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction is DENIED. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is

DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: December 11, 2007

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