Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03144/USCOURTS-caDC-97-03144-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Furman Bridges
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 3, 1998 Decided May 18, 1999

No. 97-3144

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Furman Bridges,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 97cr00184-01)

Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was

A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Tony W. Miles,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Thomas P. Swanton, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown

and S. Elisa Poteat, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Sentelle, Henderson and Garland, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Defendant Furman Bridges pled

guilty to one count of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 1341. The district court departed upward from the sentence Bridges would otherwise have received under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G.") by increasing

his criminal history category from II to V. Bridges appeals

his sentence on two grounds. First, he contends that in

explaining why it chose Category V, the court erred by not

first pausing and explaining why Categories III and IV were

inadequate. Second, he contends that the departure was

unlawful because it was based on a consideration of prior

convictions that were not similar to mail fraud. In particular,

defendant argues that in determining the similarity of offenses, a sentencing court is limited to comparing their facial

elements and may not consider the conduct underlying any of

the offenses--even the offense for which the defendant is

currently being sentenced. For the reasons set forth below,

we reject defendant's contentions and affirm the judgment of

the district court.

I

Bridges was charged in a five-count information with using

the mail to execute a scheme to defraud "numerous businesses and credit card companies" between 1994 and 1996.

Appendix ("App.") at 4. Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Bridges pled guilty to one of the mail fraud counts charged in

the information. The mail element of the crime was satisfied

when Bridges mailed a check to "Frederick's of Hollywood"

for the purchase of certain unspecified merchandise. The

fraud element was satisfied because the check belonged to

Louis A. Robinson, Sr., rather than to Bridges, and because

Bridges forged Mr. Robinson's signature on the check. Unfortunately for Robinson, he had the same street address as

Bridges--except that Robinson's address was in the Northeast quadrant of Washington, D.C., while Bridges' was in the

Southeast. The Postal Service apparently misdelivered a box

of Robinson's checks to Bridges--who forged Robinson's

signature and sent a check off to California.

Although Bridges pled guilty to mailing a single forged

check, he accepted responsibility for a broader scheme, which

was exposed during the investigation and which constituted

part of the "relevant conduct" of his offense for purposes of

the Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3 (relevant

conduct). In addition to the check he forged and sent to

Frederick's of Hollywood, Bridges forged numerous other

checks belonging not only to Mr. Robinson, but also to his

wife, whose checks had been misdelivered to Bridges' address

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as well. Nor were the Robinsons the only victims of the

overall scheme. Bridges obtained (by an unspecified method)

checks that had been stolen from several other individuals,

and used them to purchase merchandise through the mail.

He also obtained a credit card stolen from a tourist, and

submitted a fraudulent application for another credit card in

the name of yet another innocent victim. Bridges used the

checks and credit cards to purchase a total of $26,597.42

worth of merchandise for himself and his girlfriend. Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") pp 4-14.

Under the Sentencing Guidelines, an offender's sentencing

range is generally determined by the intersection of his

offense level, which depends upon the characteristics of the

offense for which he was convicted, and his criminal history

category, which depends upon his prior criminal conduct.

Bridges' PSR, prepared for the district court by the U.S.

Probation Office, calculated his offense level as 10 (on a scale

of 1-43) and his criminal history category as II (on a scale of

I-VI). Id. pp 28, 35. The latter was based on Bridges' 1987

sentence for unauthorized use of an access device (a credit

card). In addition to that conviction, Bridges had five more

sentences on his record for offenses spanning the period

1966-75, including unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, forgery, petty larceny, unlawful possession of stolen property,

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and false pretenses. Those sentences were not counted in

the calculation of Bridges' criminal history category because

the Sentencing Guidelines limit the calculation to sentences

imposed within ten or fifteen years of the instant offense.

U.S.S.G. s 4A1.2(e).

Based on an offense level of 10 and a criminal history

category of II, the PSR calculated a guideline sentencing

range of 8 to 14 months imprisonment. PSR p 57. Under

U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3, p.s., however, a court may impose a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range

if the defendant's "criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit

other crimes." In this case, the PSR concluded that due to

the large number of uncounted prior convictions, "an upward

departure may be warranted" for just that reason. PSR p 70.

The Report noted that had Bridges' older convictions been

counted, his criminal history category would have been V

rather than II, and the resulting sentencing range would have

been 21 to 27 months. Id.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court accepted the

PSR's findings and recommendations, concluding that Criminal History Category II "significantly under represents the

seriousness of [the defendant's] criminal history or the likelihood that he will commit further crimes." Sentencing Tr. at

16. Quoting from the PSR, the court reviewed some of the

defendant's five prior convictions in support of that conclusion. Id. at 16-19. The court then departed upward by

placing the defendant in Category V and sentencing him to 24

months imprisonment, the mid-point of the enhanced range.

Id. at 19. The court's written Judgment stated that it

adopted the factual findings of the PSR, listed all of defendant's prior convictions, and indicated that those convictions

justified a departure to Category V under U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3.

App. at 18-24.

II

We review a district court's decision to depart from the

Guidelines under the unitary abuse of discretion standard set

forth in Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). Under

that standard, "substantial deference" is required "in most

cases." Id. at 98. We must uphold a district court's findings

of fact unless clearly erroneous, and must give due deference

to its application of the Guidelines to the facts. See Koon,

518 U.S. at 97 (citing 18 U.S.C. s 3742(e)); United States v.

Dozier, 162 F.3d 120, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1998). "A district court

by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an error of

law," however, and the "court of appeals need not defer to the

district court's resolution" of such legal issues. Koon, 518

U.S. at 100. Hence, our review of questions of law is de novo.

See United States v. Becraft, 117 F.3d 1450, 1451 (D.C. Cir.

1997).

Bridges does not dispute the appropriateness of some

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upward departure in his case, but contends that the sentencing court erred by departing from Category II to Category V

without expressly explaining why each intervening category

was inadequate--a process defendant styles as a "step-bystep methodology." Def. Br. at 13. Although the extent of a

departure is reviewable only for its reasonableness, see

Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992); 18

U.S.C. s 3742(e)(3), Bridges contends that the step-by-step

requirement is compelled by the text of U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3.

Because Bridges' contention is that the step-by-step methodology is required as a matter of law, we review the issue de

novo.

A

Guidelines s 4A1.3, which governs departures based on the

inadequacy of a defendant's criminal history category, states

in pertinent part:

In considering a departure under this provision, the

Commission intends that the court use, as a reference,

the guideline range for a defendant with a higher or

lower criminal history category, as applicable. For example, if the court concludes that the defendant's criminal history category of III significantly under-represents

the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history, and

that the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history

most closely resembles that of most defendants with

Criminal History Category IV, the court should look to

the guideline range specified for a defendant with Criminal History Category IV to guide its departure.

U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3, p.s. We do not read this text to mandate a

process of step-by-step consideration or explanation. The

first sentence requires the court to use as a reference the

guideline range for a defendant with a higher (or lower)

criminal history category; it does not say the court must use

the range of a defendant with the next higher category. It is

true that the example the Guideline provides is one in which a

court, finding Category III to be inadequate, is directed to

look to Category IV for guidance. But the text directs the

court to Category IV not because it is the next higher

category, but because, in the example, the seriousness of the

defendant's criminal history "most closely resembles" that of

most defendants in Category IV. The Guideline's requirement, then, is to look to the category that "most closely

resembles" the seriousness of defendant's criminal history,

rather than to perform any particular mental gymnastics in

the process of concluding which category that might be.

Our conclusion that the text of s 4A1.3 does not require a

step-by-step procedure for departing from one criminal history category to another is strengthened by the fact that the

same Guideline does expressly require such a procedure when

departing above the highest criminal history category. When

a court determines that not even Category VI adequately

reflects the defendant's past criminal conduct, there is no

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higher criminal history category to which it can refer: Category VI already yields the highest sentencing range for a

given offense level. In such circumstances, s 4A1.3 directs

the court to look instead to the "next" higher offense level,

until it finds one that yields a guideline range appropriate to

the case. Moreover, it expressly directs the court to undertake that task "incrementally":

Where the court determines that the extent and nature

of the defendant's criminal history, taken together, are

sufficient to warrant an upward departure from Criminal

History Category VI, the court should structure the

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departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing

table to the next higher offense level in Criminal History

Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate

to the case.

Id. (emphasis added). This plainly indicates that the Commission knew how to require step-by-step consideration when

it wanted to.1 The absence of any such direction to "structure ... incrementally" a departure within the existing criminal history categories confirms our view that such an approach is not required.

Of course, the statutes and Guidelines do impose some

limits on the decision-making process undertaken by the

sentencing court. As noted above, s 4A1.3 directs the court

to use "as a reference" the criminal history category that

"most closely resembles" the seriousness of the defendant's

criminal history. The statute further mandates that the court

state "the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence," as well as "the specific reason for the imposition of a

sentence different from that" prescribed by the Guidelines.

18 U.S.C. s 3553(c), (c)(2).2 But if the sentencing court has

done these things, we cannot find an abuse of discretion

simply because we would have preferred that it employ a

different procedural approach. See generally Williams, 503

U.S. at 205 ("[E]xcept to the extent specifically directed by

statute, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its

judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence.") (internal quotation omitted); cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (holding

that court may not impose procedural requirements on agen-

__________

1 We need not decide today whether the step-by-step methodology for departures above Category VI requires a court to discuss

each higher offense level seriatim, or whether it is satisfied if the

reasons for rejecting intervening levels are implicit in the level

ultimately chosen. See infra pp. 10-11 & note 6.

2 The statute also requires that the extent of the departure be

reasonable. 18 U.S.C. s 3742(e)(3).

cy decision-making that go beyond those of the Administrative Procedure Act).

The sentencing court satisfied the necessary requirements

in Bridges' case. The court's explanation makes clear that it

used Category V as a reference because it was the category

that most closely resembled the seriousness of Bridges' criminal history; it was the category Bridges would have been

assigned had his older prior convictions been counted in the

PSR's calculation. (As discussed in Part III below, it was

appropriate for the court to count those convictions in considering a departure.) Under those circumstances, a separate

explanation of the court's decision not to choose Categories

III and IV would have been superfluous. We see no reason,

and have no warrant, to overturn the district court simply

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because it did not go through the exercise of explaining the

rejection of choices implicit in the choice it did make.

B

Bridges points to two cases from this Circuit that he

contends support his step-by-step requirement. In the first,

United States v. Allen, 898 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the

district court had imposed a sentence above the range dictated by Criminal History Category VI without explaining

why Category VI itself was inadequate. Id. at 205. Although we vacated the sentence, we did not impose a stepby-step requirement for departures within the criminal history categories. Rather, we held that "the sentencing judge

must consider upward adjustment to a higher criminal history category before imposing a sentence that moves beyond

the Guidelines categories" altogether. Id. at 203 (emphasis

added). As noted above, departures beyond the criminal

history categories present different issues than departures

within the categories, and Allen is thus inapplicable to

Bridges' within-the-categories departure.3

__________

3 Guideline s 4A1.3's specific language, requiring a court to

"mov[e] incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher

offense level" when departing above the criminal history categories,

was not added until after Allen was decided. See U.S.S.G. App. C,

The second case cited by defendant, United States v.

Taylor, 937 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1991), did involve a withinthe-categories departure, from Category III to Category V.

And in remanding the sentence, we did state that "the district

court should have first explained why a departure of one level

would be inadequate." Id. at 683. We did not intend by that

statement, however, to impose a step-by-step methodology for

all criminal history departures. The problem in Taylor was

that the district court had left its rationale for the extent of

the departure wholly unexplained. Id. Our underlying concern was "that the district court's two-level departure may

have been inadvertent," and that it may have intended to

depart only one level. Id. Under those circumstances, an

explanation of why a one-level departure was inadequate was

the minimum necessary to assuage our concern that the court

had simply made a mistake in its calculations. Accordingly,

we limited our holding as follows: "The only point on which

we hold the district court erred is its unexplained, two-level

departure in [the defendant's] criminal history category." Id.

at 684 (emphasis added).

Bridges also seeks support in the decisions of other circuits. He first directs our attention to the Tenth Circuit's en

banc opinion in United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (10th

Cir. 1990). Jackson, however, is directly contrary to Bridges'

position. The court did hold, as we have above, that in

departing on the basis of criminal history a court should use a

higher category "as a reference." But it stressed that "[t]he

reference should not be mechanical. A district court need not

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exhaust in sequence each higher criminal history category.

Rather, the court may use any reasonable methodology

hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines...." 921 F.2d at 991

__________

amend. 460 (effective Nov. 1, 1992). Allen relied instead on the

language requiring the sentencing court to "use, as a reference, the

guideline range for a defendant with a higher ... criminal history

category." See 898 F.2d at 204 (quoting U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3, p.s.). In

that case, the sentencing court had departed above the criminal

history categories without referring to a higher category or explaining why departing to a higher category would have been inadequate.

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(internal quotation and citations omitted).4 To similar effect

is a First Circuit opinion cited by defendant, see United

States v. Ocasio, 914 F.2d 330, 336 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding

that sentencing judge must "offer a rationale for the degree

of departure," but "reject[ing] any bright-line rule that requires a sentencing judge ... to subrogate his or her residual

discretion to some explicit or external criteria"),5 as well as

the Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Tai, 41 F.3d

1170, 1178 n.7 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[Circuit precedent] does not

require that a district court consider and reject each intermediate criminal history category. The most that [precedent]

requires is an examination of 'the higher categories [to]

determine if the defendant closely resembles other defendants who belong in some other category.' ") (citation omitted).

A number of circuits do require a sentencing court to

consider higher criminal history categories sequentially, but

do not regard a failure to discuss intervening categories as

error so long as the basis for the court's final choice is clear

from the record.6 In practice, this approach will seldom if

__________

4 Bridges also cites the Tenth Circuit's opinion in United States

v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828 (10th Cir. 1995), but there, too, the court held

no more than what we have held above: that a sentencing court

must explain the "reasoning it utilized in selecting a particular

criminal history category in upwardly departing." Id. at 837. In

Okane, the sentencing court had departed from Category I to

Category III without "address[ing] the critical question of why ...

category III was a more appropriate category." Id. The Tenth

Circuit did not suggest that the sentencing court's error was its

failure to discuss Category II.

5 See also United States v. Aymelek, 926 F.2d 64, 70 (1st Cir.

1991) ("Nor should a sentencing court feel constrained to examine

the parameters of every [criminal history category] when departing

under section 4A1.3. Under those circumstances where a departure

is warranted, the emphasis should be on ascertaining a fair and

reasonable sentence, not on subscribing slavishly to a particular

formula.") (citation omitted).

6 See United States v. Boe, 117 F.3d 830, 833 (5th Cir. 1997)

(although "the district court should consider each intermediate

ever yield results different from our own. See United States

v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc)

("Ordinarily the district court's reasons for rejecting intermediate categories will clearly be implicit, if not explicit, in the

court's explanation for its departure from the category calculated under the guidelines and its explanation for the category it has chosen as appropriate."). That is particularly so

where, as here, the sentencing court simply selects the criminal history category that results from counting remote convictions as if they had occurred within the applicable time

period. See United States v. Maurice, 69 F.3d 1553, 1559

(11th Cir. 1995) ("[W]here a sentencing court selects a higher

criminal history category under s 4A1.3 by adding point

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tion of this calculation serves as an adequate explanation for

the inappropriateness of the intervening criminal history categories.") (citation omitted); United States v. Starr, 971 F.2d

357, 363 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that where court

considered remote prior convictions that if counted would

have put defendant in Category IV rather than II, the

rejection of Category III was "implicit[ ]" and "an explicit

statement of the reasons" was not required).

__________

criminal history category before arriving at the sentence it settles

upon[,]... the district court need not mechanically discuss each

intermediate criminal history category" where the "reasons for

rejecting the intermediate categories will clearly be implicit") (internal quotation omitted); United States v. Collins, 104 F.3d 143, 145

(8th Cir. 1997) ("Although the district court did not specifically

mention that it had considered each intermediate criminal history

category, its findings were adequate to explain and support the

departure in this particular case."); United States v. Maurice, 69

F.3d 1553, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoted in text below); United

States v. Harris, 44 F.3d 1206, 1212 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that

Circuit "does not require the district court to go through a ritualistic exercise in which it mechanically discusses each criminal history

category it rejects en route to the category that it selects," as long

as the "reasons for rejecting each lesser category [are] clear from

the record as a whole") (internal quotation and citation omitted);

United States v. Starr, 971 F.2d 357, 363 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1992)

(quoted in text below).

The strongest case the defendant cites in support of his

position is the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.

Tropiano, 50 F.3d 157, 162 (2d Cir. 1995), which, following

Circuit precedent, enforced a step-by-step requirement. In

doing so, however, the court noted that other Second Circuit

panels had "criticized this procedure as rigid and mechanistic." Id. at 162 (citing United States v. Thomas, 6 F.3d 960,

964-65 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Rodriguez, 968 F.2d

130, 140 (2d Cir. 1992)). Tropiano nonetheless adhered to

the requirement because it was "too late in the day in this

Circuit for a panel" to hold otherwise. Id. at 163.7

Fortunately, it is still early in the day in the District of

Columbia Circuit. In fact, it may not be too late even in the

Second Circuit. In a decision announced nine days after oral

argument in Bridges' case, the Second Circuit upheld a

district court's departure from Category II to Category IV

without pausing at Category III. In United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 1998), the court noted the defendant's complaint that the district court had violated "our

advice to 'pause at each category to consider whether that

category adequately reflects the seriousness of the defen-

__________

7 The Fourth Circuit announced a step-by-step requirement in

United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 884 (4th Cir. 1992)); see id.

at 890 (Luttig, J., dissenting). Although the Circuit has characterized the requirement as "the proper approach," it has also characterized it as "dicta." United States v. Walker, 112 F.3d 163, 166 n.8

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(4th Cir. 1997). In Walker, the Fourth Circuit held that a sentencing court "adequately considered" an intervening category, based on

the fact that it heard the government's argument against applying

it, notwithstanding that the court did not state its own reasons for

rejecting the category. Id. at 166. The Sixth Circuit has also

adopted a step-by-step requirement, although it has applied the

methodology inconsistently. Compare United States v. Medved,

905 F.2d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir. 1990) (affirming departure from

Category III to VI, on the rationale that uncounted criminal activity

would have made defendant a career offender subject to Category

VI, although district court did not expressly reject intervening

categories), with United States v. Schultz, 14 F.3d 1093, 1099-1101

(6th Cir. 1994) (vacating sentence in similar circumstances).

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dant's record.' " Id. at 100 (quoting Tropiano, 50 F.3d at

162). Notwithstanding the violation, the Second Circuit affirmed the sentence, stating that "so long as the reasons

supporting a departure are fully explained, a mechanistic,

step-by-step procedure is not required." Id. (internal quotation omitted). That is our view as well.

III

Bridges' second contention is that it was improper for the

sentencing court to base its departure on a consideration of

his five prior, remote-in-time convictions.8 Under the Guidelines, prior sentences imposed more than fifteen years (or, in

some circumstances, ten years) before the commencement of

the defendant's current offense are not counted in his criminal history score. U.S.S.G. s 4A1.2(e). However, "[i]f the

court finds that a sentence imposed outside this time period is

evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar, criminal conduct,

the court may consider this information in determining

whether an upward departure is warranted under s 4A1.3."

Id. s 4A1.2, comment. (n.8). Bridges contends that the five

offenses at issue here were neither similar to the instant

offense of mail fraud, nor evidence of serious dissimilar

__________

8 Bridges also asserts that the district court actually based its

departure on only three of his prior convictions, and that accordingly a category lower than V was required under any circumstances.

It is plain, however, that the court relied on all five of the prior

convictions. The court expressly referred to the PSR at the

sentencing hearing, Sentencing Tr. at 16, and the PSR in turn listed

all five, PSR pp 29-34. Although the court specifically mentioned

only three of the five convictions at the sentencing hearing, Sentencing Tr. at 16, that discussion was meant only to exemplify the

defendant's prior criminal history. See id. at 20 (stating that the

court was "considering the entire career of this man"). This was

confirmed by the court's written Judgment, which adopted the PSR

and expressly discussed all five convictions. See App. at 24. We

have considered and rejected the additional arguments raised by

defendant regarding the calculation and explanation of his sentence,

and conclude that they do not merit further discussion.

criminal conduct. As the government does not contest the

latter point, we turn to a consideration of the former. The

district court's determination of whether prior offenses are

similar to the instant offense is an application of the Guidelines to the facts, which we accord due deference and review

only for abuse of discretion.

The five convictions considered by the court were for: (1)

unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; (2) forgery; (3) petty

larceny; (4) unlawful possession of stolen property; and (5)

false pretenses. PSR pp 29-34. Bridges contends that we

should use a "categorical approach" in determining whether

offenses are similar, comparing the general characteristics of

the crimes rather than their particular facts. Def. Br. at 20.

Under this approach, defendant contemplates a comparison of

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both the names and elements of the offenses, but not of the

underlying conduct.

Even if we were to restrict district courts to a categorical

approach, we might still conclude that Bridges' past offenses

were similar to his present offense of mail fraud. Such a

conclusion is clear with respect to the false pretenses and

forgery offenses. Mail fraud may be proven by establishing,

as was expressly charged in Bridges' information, that defendant used the mail to execute a scheme for obtaining money

or property by means of "false or fraudulent pretenses." 18

U.S.C. s 1341; App. at 4 (Information p 3). Hence, if false

pretenses were a federal crime, it would be a lesser included

offense of mail fraud. As for forgery, both that crime and

mail fraud involve the central element of fraudulent intent,

compare D.C. Code s 22-1401 (1967) (forgery), and 18 U.S.C.

s 471 (forgery of obligations of the United States), with 18

U.S.C. s 1341 (mail fraud), and the same Part of the Sentencing Guidelines applies to both, see U.S.S.G. Ch.2, Part F

(applicable to offenses involving "Fraud and Deceit; Forgery"). These common elements are sufficient to establish

the similarity of the crimes.9 To require more would be to

__________

9 Cf. United States v. Jones, 948 F.2d 732, 736-37 (D.C. Cir.

1991) (holding that, under U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3(e), which permits upward departures based on "prior similar adult criminal conduct" not

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require that the crimes be the same rather than merely

similar.

The somewhat more difficult question is whether the remaining three prior offenses--unauthorized use of a motor

vehicle, petty larceny, and unlawful possession of stolen property--are in the same category as mail fraud. On the one

hand, the absence of an element of fraud or deceit in these

prior offenses might be said to render them different from

mail fraud.10 The Guidelines, for example, treat them under

different Parts. Compare U.S.S.G. Ch.2, Part B (covering

"offenses involving property," including "theft, embezzlement,

transactions in stolen goods, and simple property damage or

destruction"), with id. Ch.2, Part F (covering "offenses involving fraud or deceit"). On the other hand, all of the offenses

ultimately involve the wrongful obtaining and use of the

property of another, and it may not be an abuse of discretion

for a district court to conclude that treating such convictions

as a single category provides useful insight into the question

underlying a s 4A3.1 departure: namely, whether such convictions constitute "reliable information indicat[ing] that the

criminal history category does not adequately reflect the ...

likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes." Id.

Cf. Starr, 971 F.2d at 361 (indicating that uttering counterfeit

obligations may be similar to theft for purposes of s 4A1.3).

The District of Columbia, where all of defendant's crimes

were committed, now effectively treats the three prior offenses at issue here as similar to the crime of false pre-

__________

resulting in a criminal conviction, prior act of embezzlement was

"similar" to present offenses of credit card and wire fraud because

they all "involved fraud").

10 We are uncertain precisely which offense the PSR was

referring to in describing one of Bridges' offenses as "unlawful

possession of stolen property." Although the then-effective District

of Columbia Code did not contain an offense so named, neither

party raised this issue. The closest offense appears to have been

"receiving stolen goods." D.C. Code s 22-2205 (1967). That offense does include the element of "intent to defraud," see id., which

would justify a conclusion of similarity without further analysis.

tenses--which we already have concluded is itself similar to

the instant offense of mail fraud. In 1982, in an effort to

"remov[e] anachronistic and unnecessary technical statutory

and common law distinctions," Driver v. United States, 521

A.2d 254, 258 (D.C. 1987) (citation and quotation omitted), the

District created a single statute consolidating the various

forms of larceny, false pretenses and embezzlement into a

single offense called "theft." D.C. Code s 22-3811. The

new crime punishes one who "wrongfully obtains or uses the

property of another" with the requisite intent, D.C. Code

s 22-3811(b), and defines the just-quoted phrase as "(1)

[t]aking or exercising control over property; (2) making an

unauthorized use, disposition ... or possession of property;

or (3) obtaining property by trick, false pretense ... or

deception." D.C. Code s 22-3811(a); see also Galberth v.

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United States, 590 A.2d 990, 991 n.1 (D.C. 1991) (holding that

conviction for unauthorized use of vehicle merges with conviction for theft of same vehicle). Although the District's 1982

categorization is not binding on us, it offers logical support

for the conclusion that the crimes at issue belong in the same

category.

We need not, however, rest our conclusion of similarity on

the facial elements of the offenses. As the government notes,

if we look at the relevant conduct underlying the instant

offense, any doubt regarding the similarity of the offenses is

removed. The details of that relevant conduct are set forth

in Part I above, and are uncontested by the defendant. See

PSR pp 4-14. They constitute a scheme in which Bridges not

only made unauthorized use of checks that were misdelivered

to him, but also obtained, possessed and used "stolen checks

or credit cards belonging to five other persons." Def. Br. at

10; see also id. at 21 ("Mr. Bridges' mail fraud ... consisted

mainly of stolen blank checks sent through the mail....").

The scheme also involved elements of forgery, false pretenses

and fraud. Bridges does not seriously dispute that if these

underlying acts were considered, it would not be an abuse of

discretion to find that the instant offense and the five prior,

remote convictions are similar.

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Bridges contends, however, that a sentencing court may

not look behind the statutory elements of either the instant or

prior offenses. We have no need to consider whether a court

may look at conduct behind prior offenses, as examining the

conduct behind Bridges' instant offense is sufficient to resolve

the similarity question in this case.11 We review the legality

of undertaking such an examination de novo.

The relevant Guidelines commentary, portions of which

have already been recited, states as follows:

Applicable Time Period. Section 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e)

establishes the time period within which prior sentences

are counted. As used in s 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e), the term

"commencement of the instant offense" includes any

relevant conduct. See s 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). If

the court finds that a sentence imposed outside this time

period is evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar,

criminal conduct, the court may consider this information in determining whether an upward departure is

warranted under s 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category).

U.S.S.G. s 4A1.2, comment. (n.8) (emphasis added). Nothing

in the text of this commentary bars a court from looking

behind an offense to examine a defendant's conduct. Quite

the contrary, the language of the italicized sentence directs

the court to determine not whether the defendant's "offenses"

are similar but whether his "conduct" is. Moreover, the

preceding sentence directs that in determining whether a

prior offense is within the time period within which criminal

history is calculated, the court is to look to whether "any

relevant conduct" of the instant offense took place within that

period. An examination of the defendant's relevant conduct,

therefore, is perfectly consistent with the commentary's text.

__________

11 Were a court to examine the prior conduct here, it would

only confirm the conclusion of similarity. For example, the checks

at issue in Bridges' prior conviction for forgery were ones he had

stolen by breaking into a building. His prior conviction for false

pretenses grew out of his involvement in a check cashing ring. See

PSR pp 30, 33.

An examination of relevant conduct is also consistent with

the reason for the inquiry into similarity. The purpose of

that inquiry, the commentary states, is to "determin[e] whether an upward departure is warranted under s 4A1.3." Id.

Such a departure is warranted when "the criminal history

category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the

defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the

defendant will commit other crimes." Id. s 4A1.3 (emphasis

added). The accuracy of such a prediction about future

behavior can only be enhanced by permitting the court to

compare past offenses to exactly what it is the defendant has

just done, and not simply to the name or formal elements of

that crime. Cf. Taylor, 937 F.2d at 683 ("The nature of

present conduct is relevant ... to assess a tendency toward

recidivism."). A judge with such license is surely more likely

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to be able to discern a pattern in a defendant's behavior than

one who must peer with blinders on.12

Bridges contends that the Supreme Court's decision in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), bars a court

from determining similarity by looking into the facts behind

convictions. In Taylor, the defendant pled guilty to being a

felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.

s 922(g)(1). The government sought to enhance his sentence,

not as an upward departure under s 4A1.3, but rather under

a specific statutory provision, 18 U.S.C. s 924(e). That provision imposes a mandatory 15-year sentence on a felon-inpossession with three prior convictions for a "violent felony,"

defined as a crime that "has as an element the use ... or

threatened use of physical force" or is a specified type of

offense, including "burglary." The Court held that in determining whether prior offenses were burglaries, a court must

follow a "formal categorical approach, looking only to the

statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the

__________

12 Of course, this goes both ways. A judge who looks behind

the name of the instant offense may also be better able to determine that what appears on its face to represent a pattern is not one

at all, and thus that a departure is not warranted.

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particular facts underlying those convictions." 495 U.S. at

600.

Although Taylor mandates a categorical approach for enhancements under 18 U.S.C. s 924(e), the reasons for the

Court's conclusion counsel a different rule for departures

under U.S.S.G. ss 4A1.2, comment. (n.8) and 4A1.3. First,

the Court considered the language of s 924(e) which, it

emphasized, refers to " 'a person who ... has three prior

convictions' for--not a person who has committed--three

previous violent felonies." 495 U.S. at 600 (quoting 18 U.S.C.

s 924(e)(1)) (emphasis added). As the Court also noted,

s 924(e) "defines 'violent felony' as any crime ... that 'has as

an element'--not any crime that, in a particular case, involves--the use or threat of force." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.

s 924(e)(2)(B)(i)) (emphasis added). This language, the Court

said, implied that the term "burglary ... most likely refers to

the elements of the statute of conviction, not to the facts of

each defendant's conduct." Id. at 600-01 (quotation omitted).

As noted above, however, the language of the Sentencing

Guidelines is almost precisely the opposite: It uses the word

"conduct"--not "conviction" or "element." See U.S.S.G.

s 4A1.2, comment. (n.8).

Second, the Taylor Court looked to the legislative history

of s 924(e) which, it concluded, "shows that Congress generally took a categorical approach to predicate offenses." 495

U.S. at 601. "No one suggested," the Court noted, "that a

particular crime might sometimes count towards enhancement and sometimes not." Id. Here, again, the Sentencing

Guidelines and their commentary (there is no other "legislative history") counsel the opposite conclusion. Unlike enhancements under s 924(e), departures under s 4A1.3 are

discretionary rather than mandatory, and a particular crime

may well "sometimes count towards" a departure and sometimes not. A judge who finds that prior offenses are similar

under the Guidelines is not required to increase a defendant's

sentence, as is a judge who finds that prior offenses are

burglaries under s 924(e). Compare U.S.S.G. s 4A1.3 ("the

court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the

otherwise applicable guideline range") (emphasis added), with

18 U.S.C. s 924(e)(1) ("such a person shall be ... imprisoned

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not less than fifteen years") (emphasis added). Rather, a

judge who finds offenses similar under the Guidelines "may

consider this information," U.S.S.G. s 4A1.2, comment. (n.8),

in making the predictive judgment required for departures

under s 4A1.3. And as discussed above, an examination of

underlying conduct is quite consistent with the making of

such a judgment.

Finally, Taylor focused on the "practical difficulties and

potential unfairness of a factual approach" to determining

whether a defendant's prior crimes truly were "burglaries."

495 U.S. at 601. "In all cases where the Government alleges

that the defendant's actual conduct would fit the generic

definition of burglary," the Court noted, "the trial court would

have to determine what that conduct was." Id. Such a trialwithin-a-trial would, the Court feared, raise the unpleasant

and potentially unfair specter of retrying past crimes as part

of the sentencing of the instant offense, which would in turn

present a host of practical problems.13

But examining the relevant conduct behind a defendant's

instant offense does not add to the practical or equitable

problems involved in sentencing under the Guidelines. Even

when not contemplating a departure, a sentencing court must

determine the scope of such conduct in order to calculate the

guideline sentencing range. See U.S.S.G. s 1B1.3. A defendant has an opportunity to object to the PSR's characterization of his relevant conduct, and the Guidelines and Federal

Rules contain a procedure for resolving such disputes. See

U.S.S.G. s 6A1.3; Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b), (c). In this case,

Bridges did not object to the PSR's description of the conduct

underlying his mail fraud conviction, and there is thus neither

difficulty nor unfairness in using that conduct to determine

__________

13 See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601 ("Would the Government be

permitted to introduce the trial transcript before the sentencing

court, or if no transcript is available, present the testimony of

witnesses? Could the defense present witnesses of its own ... ?

Also, in cases where the defendant pleaded guilty, there often is no

record of the underlying facts.").

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whether his prior offenses are part of a pattern that indicates

the likelihood of recidivism.14

In sum, we conclude that a court may lawfully examine the

relevant conduct underlying a defendant's instant offense in

order to determine whether it is similar to his prior offenses.

Applying that rule in this case, we find no abuse of discretion

in the conclusion that Bridges' offenses were similar, and

hence no abuse of discretion in the sentencing court's upward

departure.

IV

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

__________

14 Bridges correctly points out that in United States v. Donaghe, 50 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit declined to

examine "the specific circumstances of this case" in concluding that

the defendant's instant crime of passport fraud was not similar to

his prior convictions for child molestation. Id. at 612. But the

government did not contend that the underlying facts of those

crimes were similar; it contended only that their motives were

similar because the passport fraud was committed to escape an

investigation into a new charge of child molestation. To resolve

Bridges' case, we need not decide whether similarity can be based

solely on motive. Compare Donaghe, supra, with United States v.

Dzielinski, 914 F.2d 98, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that instant

offense of bank robbery was similar to prior conviction for fraud

because robbery's motive was to repay victim of another of defendant's fraudulent schemes).

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