Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50164/USCOURTS-ca9-09-50164-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eduardo Castro
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

No. 09-50164 Plaintiff-Appellee,

D.C. No.

v.  3:08-CR-00881-W-1

EDUARDO CASTRO,

OPINION Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Thomas J. Whelan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 13, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed March 26, 2010

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin, William C. Canby, Jr. and

Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Goodwin

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COUNSEL

Anthony E. Colombo, Jr., San Diego, California, for the

defendant-appellant.

Steve Miller, Assistant United States Attorney, San Diego,

California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

GOODWIN, Senior Circuit Judge:

Eduardo Castro, convicted of attempted reentry into the

United States after removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326,

appeals his forty-six month sentence. Castro’s sentence

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includes a sixteen-level increase in offense level for a prior

conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1),

which criminalizes lewd or lascivious acts on a child of 14 or

15 years by a person at least ten years older than the child.

Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). Castro argues that a conviction

under section 288(c)(1) does not constitute a “crime of violence” warranting a sixteen-level increase under United States

Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual “U.S.S.G.” § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2009). We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that a conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) categorically constitutes neither “sexual abuse of a minor” nor

“statutory rape” and therefore does not qualify as a crime of

violence warranting a sixteen-level increase. We therefore

vacate Castro’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 

Castro also argues that the district court imposed an unreasonable sentence and that it erred by increasing the statutory

maximum under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) because Castro’s prior

conviction was neither alleged in the indictment nor admitted

by him. Because we vacate Castro’s sentence, we do not

address whether the sentence was reasonable. Nor do we

reach his argument that the district court erred by increasing

the statutory maximum because, as Castro concedes, that

argument is foreclosed by precedent. See, e.g., United States

v. Garcia-Cardenas, 555 F.3d 1049, 1050 (9th Cir. 2009). 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 12, 2008, immigration and border patrol agents

arrested Castro while executing a search warrant at the home

of his ex-wife, who had been arrested two or three weeks earlier for smuggling illegal aliens into the United States. Castro,

a citizen of Mexico, had been deported in 2003 after pleading

guilty to committing lewd or lascivious acts on a child of 14

or 15 years, a felony, under California Penal Code section

288(c)(1). 

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On March 23, 2009, Castro pleaded guilty to being a

deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8

U.S.C. § 1326. At sentencing, the district court concluded that

Castro’s prior conviction under section 288(c)(1) constituted

“sexual abuse of a minor” and was therefore a crime of violence for purposes of sentencing enhancement. The court

found a base offense level of eight, U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a); a

sixteen-level increase based on a prior conviction for a crime

of violence, id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii); and a three-level

decrease for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1, and

sentenced Castro to forty-six months in prison and three years

of supervised release. Castro timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

[1] Castro contends that his prior conviction under California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) does not qualify as a crime

of violence warranting a sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). For a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for a base offense level of eight

and instruct that the offense level be increased by sixteen

levels “[i]f the defendant previously was deported . . . after

. . . a crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). For

purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines, “crime of violence”

includes, inter alia, “sexual abuse of a minor” and “statutory

rape.” Id. at cmt. n.1(B)(iii). We hold that section 288(c)(1)

is broader than the generic offenses of both statutory rape and

sexual abuse of a minor and that it therefore is not categorically a crime of violence. 

[2] To determine whether a conviction under section

288(c)(1) constitutes either “sexual abuse of a minor” or “statutory rape,” we apply the categorical approach set forth in

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). “Under

the categorical approach, we ‘compare the elements of the

statute of conviction with a federal definition of the crime to

determine whether conduct proscribed by the statute is

broader than the generic federal definition.’ ” Cerezo v.

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Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting

Quintero-Salazar v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 688, 692 (9th Cir.

2007)). “We do not examine the facts underlying the offense,

but ‘look only to the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the prior offense.’ ” Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey,

546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). 

[3] The statute of conviction, California Penal Code section 288(c)(1), criminalizes the conduct of “[a]ny person who

commits an act described in subdivision (a) with the intent

described in that subdivision, and the victim is a child of 14

or 15 years, and that person is at least 10 years older than the

child.” Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). Section 288(a), in turn,

applies to “[a]ny person who willfully and lewdly commits

any lewd or lascivious act . . . upon or with the body, or any

part or member thereof, of a child who is under the age of 14

years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying

the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or the

child.” Id. § 288(a). Section 288(c)(1) therefore contains the

following four elements: (1) willfully and lewdly; (2) committing any lewd or lascivious act; (3) on a child ages 14 or 15;

(4) with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the

lust, passions, or sexual desires of the defendant or the child;

and (5) the defendant must be at least ten years older than the

child. 

[4] Using the categorical approach, we first compare section 288(c)(1) to the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor.

“Sexual abuse of a minor” contains three elements: (1) sexual

conduct; (2) with a minor; (3) that constitutes abuse. United

States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 513 (9th Cir. 2009). We

define the first two elements—(1) sexual conduct; (2) with a

minor—by “ ‘employing the ordinary, contemporary, and

common meaning of the words that Congress used.’ ” United

States v. Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)

(quoting Zimmerman v. Oregon Dep’t of Justice, 170 F.3d

1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 1999)). A statute of conviction contains

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the third element, “abuse,” if it expressly prohibits conduct

that causes “ ‘physical or psychological harm’ in light of the

age of the victim in question.” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 513.

Sexual conduct with younger children is per se abusive. Id. at

514-15. Because “[t]he conduct reached by Section 288(a)

indisputably falls with the common, everyday meanings of the

words ‘sexual’ and ‘minor,’ ” Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d at

1147, and because it applies only to sexual conduct with

younger children, we have previously held that a conviction

under section 288(a) categorically constitutes “sexual abuse

of a minor” for purposes of sentencing enhancement. See id.;

Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 516. 

[5] Section 288(c)(1), however, is categorically broader

than the generic definition of “sexual abuse of a minor.”

Although it contains two elements of the generic crime—(1)

sexual conduct; (2) with a minor—it is broader than the

generic crime because it criminalizes conduct that does not

necessarily constitute abuse. Section 288(c)(1) does not

expressly include physical or psychological abuse as an element of the crime. Moreover, unlike section 288(a), which

applies only where the minor is younger than 14, section

288(c)(1) does not address conduct that is per se abusive. See

Pelayo-Garcia v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1010, 1015-16 (9th Cir.

2009) (concluding that sexual conduct with a 15-year-old

child is not per se abusive). Section 288(c)(1) is therefore

broader than the generic crime of sexual abuse of a minor. 

[6] We next compare section 288(c)(1) to the generic

crime of statutory rape. “Statutory rape,” as set forth by an en

banc panel in Estrada-Espinoza, contains four elements: “(1)

a mens rea level of knowingly; (2) a sexual act; (3) with a

minor between the ages of 12 and 16; and (4) an age difference of at least four years between the defendant and the minor.”

1

1Although Estrada-Espinoza addressed whether a statute of conviction

constituted an “aggravated felony” in the immigration context, 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(43), and the present case concerns whether the statute of conviction constitutes a “crime of violence” in the sentencing context, U.S.S.G.

§ 2L1.2, the analysis is the same. See Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013

n.1; Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 511-12. 

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546 F.3d at 1152. Although Estrada-Espinoza referred to

those elements, derived from 18 U.S.C. § 2243, as defining

“sexual abuse of a minor,” we subsequently clarified that the

Estrada-Espinoza definition “encompassed statutory rape

crimes only.” Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 514-15; accord

Pelayo-Garcia, 598 F.3d at 1013-14. As Medina-Villa noted,

reading the Estrada-Espinoza definition to define the universe

of crimes constituting “sexual abuse of a minor” would lead

to absurd results, because the Estrada-Espinoza definition

excludes crimes against children under 12; moreover, it would

“eliminate the need for the separate and independent example

of ‘statutory rape’ as a ‘crime of violence’ ” for purposes of

U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d at 515-16.

Estrada-Espinoza therefore defined generic statutory rape and

did not alter the existing definition of generic sexual abuse of

a minor.

Section 288(c)(1) is broader than the generic definition of

“statutory rape.” It contains three of the required four elements: it applies to minors within the generic crime’s designated age range; it requires an age difference greater than the

generic crime’s required four years; and it contains the mens

rea requirement because, in this context, a defendant cannot

act “willfully” without also acting “knowingly.” This is so

because the mens rea requirement of “knowingly” applies

only to the defendant’s act of engaging in a sexual act,

Pelayo-Garcia, 589 F.3d at 1013, and California Penal Code

section 7(1) defines “willfully” as implying “a purpose or

willingness to commit the act.” Cal. Penal Code § 7(1). A

defendant cannot logically have a purpose or willingness to

commit an act without knowing that he or she is engaging in

the act. Section 288(c)(1) therefore contains three elements of

the generic crime of statutory rape. 

[7] Section 288(c)(1), however, is categorically broader

than “statutory rape” because it is missing one element of the

generic crime, a “sexual act.” For purposes of the generic

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offense of statutory rape set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2243, “sexual

act” is defined as follows:

(A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the

penis and the anus, and for purposes of this subparagraph contact involving the penis occurs upon penetration, however slight;

(B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the

mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus;

(C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or

genital opening of another by a hand or finger or by

any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass,

degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any

person; or

(D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not

attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse,

humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the

sexual desire of any person. 

18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). Thus, for purposes of statutory rape,

“sexual act” requires, at a minimum, an intentional touching,

not through the clothing, of a minor’s genitalia. 

[8] Section 288(c)(1), however, contains no such requirement; it requires only a “lewd or lascivious” act. Lewd touching, for purposes of section 288, can occur through a victim’s

clothing and can involve any part of the victim’s body. People

v. Martinez, 903 P.2d 1037, 1042-43 (Cal. 1995). Moreover,

a lewd or lascivious act need not involve touching at all; a

defendant can violate section 288 by instructing a minor to

disrobe. People v. Mickle, 814 P.2d 290, 308-09 (Cal. 1991).

Because a defendant could be convicted under section

288(c)(1) even if the government failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that the conduct constituted a “sexual act,”

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section 288(c)(1) is broader than the generic crime of statutory rape. Therefore, because it constitutes neither “sexual

abuse of a minor” nor “statutory rape,” a conviction under

California Penal Code section 288(c)(1) does not categorically constitute a crime of violence for purposes of the

sixteen-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). 

Where, as here, the government has not asked us to apply

the modified categorical approach, we do not do so. See Latu

v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008). Because we

remand for resentencing on an open record, see United States

v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), the

district court has discretion to consider the modified categorical issue on remand. We retain jurisdiction to hear an appeal

after resentencing. 

VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing. 

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