Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05361/USCOURTS-cand-3_16-cv-05361-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marilyn Bartholomew
Plaintiff
Paul D. Epstein
Defendant
Robert B. Freedman
Defendant
Charles Triay
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

MARILYN BARTHOLOMEW,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHARLES TRIAY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 16-cv-05361-WHO 

ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION 

TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

AND DISMISSING CASE

Re: Dkt. No. 3

The in forma pauperis statute authorizes a plaintiff to file an action in federal court without 

prepayment of fees or security if the plaintiff submits an affidavit showing that he or she is unable 

to pay such fees. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). I have reviewed plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 

pauperis and I GRANT it. Dkt. No. 3. 

The in forma pauperis statute also requires me to dismiss a case if at any time I determine 

that the action (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be 

granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

I have reviewed Ms. Bartholomew’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) and find that all of the claims 

are barred as a matter of law by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As such, Bartholomew’s complaint 

fails to state any actionable claim and must be dismissed. 

There are only three defendants named in Bartholomew’s complaint: Judge Robert B. 

Freedman (of the Alameda County Superior Court), attorney Charles A. Triay, and attorney Paul 

D. Epstein. Complaint, ¶¶ 7-9. All of her claims against these defendants stem from rulings Judge 

Freedman made in two consolidated cases in Alameda County Superior Court. In, Bartholomew v. 

Triay, RG12615113 Alameda County Superior Court, Bartholomew sued Triay for breach of 

contract, breach of fiduciary duties, and professional negligence in connection with Triay’s 

representation of Bartholomew in probate proceedings. In Triay v. Bartholomew, RG12628652, 

Alameda County Superior Court, Triay countersued for breach of contract for failure to pay his 

legal fees in the same representation. The cases were consolidated for all purposes except trial. 

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After numerous discovery disputes, defendants Triay and Epstein moved for terminating 

sanctions in Bartholomew’s case. That motion was granted and a judgment of dismissal was 

entered in plaintiff’s case on August 13, 2013. Plaintiff appealed, and the dismissal was affirmed. 

See generally Bartholomew v. Triay, No. A139998, 2014 WL 3531015, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 

17, 2014), as modified on denial of reh'g (Aug. 11, 2014), review denied (Oct. 1, 2014). 

In Triay’s case, after numerous applications were made by plaintiff to disqualify Judge 

Freedman (which were stricken or denied), and despite plaintiff’s requests for continuances and 

assertion of her right to a jury trial, a bench trial was held on December 16 and 17, 2015. 

Judgment was entered, awarding Triay $15,873.07 in fees. Bartholomew appealed that decision to 

the appellate division of the Superior Court.1

In her complaint in this court, Bartholomew argues that the defendants conspired to award 

Triay $15,783.07 in fees from Bartholomew’s probate award. She complains of various actions 

Judge Freedman took in the cases including failing to disqualify himself, failing to give adequate 

notice of hearings, forcing her to give up her right to a jury trial, giving Triay and his law associate 

Epstein unfair procedural advantages, granting the motion for terminating sanctions, awarding 

Triay $15,783.07 in fees for his breach of contract claim, and failing to issue a written decision. 

Compl. ¶¶ 12-68. 

Based on these allegations she asserts that the defendants: (i) deprived her of due process 

and property in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (ii) conspired to obstruct 

justice and deny her due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(s); (iii) conspired to deprive her of her 

rights and privileges under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); (iv) negligently failed to prevent her harms in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986; (v) and violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 60-80. 

Because all of plaintiff’s claims are based upon the actions and rulings of Judge Freedman, 

they are barred as a matter of law by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Under that doctrine, a plaintiff 

cannot complain in federal court about decisions reached in state court. Instead, the plaintiff must 

 

1

 It appears that Judge Freedman’s decision was affirmed on August 18, 2016. See Register of 

Action, Triay v. Bartholomew, RG12628652, Alameda County Superior Court.

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pursue all appeals in state court and be bound by the final state court determination. See, e.g., 

Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 

federal district courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto

appeal from a state court judgment.”); see also Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 

(9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman barred claim that “would require the district court to determine 

that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). “This doctrine applies even when the 

challenge to the state court decision involves federal constitutional issues.” Worldwide Church of 

God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986). 

What plaintiff complains of here was how her case and the consolidated Triay case were 

handled by Judge Freedman and the ultimate decisions he made in those cases. Any challenge to 

Judge Freedman’s interim or final orders, as well as any challenge to his conduct of those 

proceedings, can only be addressed by appealing those orders and the final judgments through the 

California state court system. Plaintiff cannot avoid the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by alleging that 

the defendants conspired to deny her civil rights. Here, plaintiff’s alleged damage was the 

dismissal of her case and the award of $15,783.07 in fees to Triay, which were the direct result of 

the state court decisions. See, e.g., Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (“The 

alleged conspiracy is a fig leaf for taking aim at the state court’s own alleged errors. It is precisely 

this sort of horizontal review of state court decisions that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars.”). 

Therefore, plaintiff’s claims are barred as a matter of law and her complaint is 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 3, 2016 

______________________________________ 

WILLIAM H. ORRICK 

United States District Judge 

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