Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-xr-90225/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-xr-90225-15/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mark Fainaru-Wada
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Lance Williams
Defendant

Document Text:

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1 The amicus brief was filed by ABC, Inc., American Society of Newspaper

Editors, The Associated Press, The Bakersfield Californian, Belo Corp., Cable News

Network LP, LLLP, California Newspaper Publishers Association, CBS Broadcasting, Inc.,

Dow Jones & Company, Inc., DR Partners d/b/a Stephens Media Group, The E.W. Scripps

Company, Freedom Communications, Inc., Gannett Co., Inc., Los Angeles Times, The New

York Times Company, Newspaper Association of America, Newsweek, Inc., The Oregonian,

The Radio-Television News Directors Association, The Reporters Committee for Freedom of

the Press, Reuters America LLC, The San-Diego Union Tribune, the Society of Professional

Journalists, Time Inc., and The Washington Post Company.

2 The parties’ pleadings include the motion to quash and memorandum of law

in support of thereof, three volumes of affidavits and exhibits in support of the motion, the

Government’s memorandum of law in opposition, the declaration of Brian Hershman in

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

IN RE GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS TO

MARK FAINARU-WADA and LANCE

WILLIAMS

 /

No. CR 06-90225 JSW

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

QUASH SUBPOENAS

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of the motion to quash

subpoenas filed by Mark Fainaru-Wada (“Fainaru-Wada”) and Lance Williams (“Williams”)

(collectively “Movants”). Having considered the parties’ pleadings, the brief filed by Amicus

Curiae,1 relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court

HEREBY DENIES the motion to quash.2

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support of the Government’s opposition, Movants’ reply, the Declaration of Eve Burton in

support of the reply, the Government’s sur-reply, the publicly filed exhibit to the sur-reply,

the Declaration of Brian Hershman in support of the sur-reply and an exhibit thereto, which

were submitted ex parte and in camera, and Movant’s response to the Government’s surreply.

3 Movants have been employed by the Chronicle as investigative reporters for

approximately six years. (Affidavit of Mark Fainaru-Wada (“Fainaru-Wada Aff.”), ¶¶ 1, 3;

Affidavit of Lance Williams (“Williams Aff.”), ¶¶ 1-3.) Fainaru-Wada has worked as a

journalist for more than twenty years. Williams has worked as journalist for more than thirty

years. (Fainaru-Wada Aff., ¶ 3; Williams Aff., ¶ 3.)

2

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a series of articles published in the San Francisco Chronicle (the

“Chronicle”), authored by movants Mark Fainaru-Wada (“Fainaru-Wada”) and Lance Williams

(“Williams”) (collectively “Movants”). The articles relate to the Bay Area Laboratory CoOperative (“BALCO”), its principals, and two of its distributors (the “BALCO defendants”),

and the Government’s investigation into the distribution of steroids and performance enhancing

drugs to a number of prominent athletes. (See generally, Affidavit of Jonathan R. Donnellan

(“Donnellan Aff.”), Exs. 1-11, 26-30, 32.)3 Movants began reporting on the BALCO

investigation in or around October 2003. (Donnellan Aff., Ex. 1.)

 On February 12, 2004, the BALCO defendants were indicted and charged with, inter

alia, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute anabolic steroids, and

possession with intent to distribute anabolic steroids and the aiding and abetting thereof. (Id.,

Ex. 16.) On February 27, 2004, Judge Illston, the presiding judge in the BALCO case, held a

trial setting conference. At that conference, the Government turned over approximately 2,000

pages of grand jury transcripts on the condition that the transcripts would be subject to a

protective order. (Declaration of Brian D. Hershman (“Hershman Decl.”), Ex. A at 5:18-6:20.) 

On March 8, 2004, Judge Illston approved the Stipulated Protective Order (the “Protective

Order”) submitted by the parties. Under the terms of that Protective Order, the parties were

precluded from disseminating to the press any “Sealed Material,” the definition of which

specifically included grand jury transcripts. (Donnellan Aff., Ex. 23 (Protective Order, ¶¶ 1.a, 2,

3).) The Protective Order provided that a violation “may be punishable by contempt of court,

whatever other sanction the Court deems just, and/or any other sanctions which are legally

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4 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(6), for example, provides that

“[r]ecords, orders, and subpoenas relating to grand jury proceedings must be kept under seal

to the extent and as long as necessary to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of a matter

occurring before a grand jury.” A knowing violation of Rule 6 “may be punished by

contempt of court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(7).

3

available.” (Id., ¶ 7.) The grand jury transcripts also would have been subject to the secrecy

provisions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e).4 

On June 23, 2004, the Chronicle published articles, authored by Movants, reporting on

and quoting testimony given to the grand jury during the course of the BALCO investigation. 

(Donnellan Aff., Exs. 26-27.) In July 2004, the parties in the BALCO case submitted

declarations to Judge Illston regarding their handling of the grand jury transcripts. (Hershman

Decl., Ex. AA.) According to Movants, in the summer and fall of 2004, the Government asked

them to disclose voluntarily “confidential source information and material related to [their]

investigation of BALCO.” (See Fainaru-Wada Aff., ¶ 10; Williams Aff., ¶ 12.) Movants

declined to do so. (Id.) 

On December 2 and 3, 2004, Movants again authored and published articles reporting on

and quoting grand jury testimony from the BALCO investigation. (Donnellan Aff., Exs. 28-30.) 

Movants attest that they used confidential sources, as they have done during the course of their

careers, to write each of the articles in which they disclosed grand jury testimony. Movants also

attest to the important part they believe confidential sources play in their roles as journalists. 

(Fainaru-Wada Aff., ¶¶ 5-7; Williams Aff., ¶¶ 5-9.) 

On December 3, 2004, Judge Illston issued a notice to the parties that the matter of the

leaks of grand jury transcripts had been referred to the United States Department of Justice “for

investigation, either internally or if necessary through independent counsel, to determine the

source of the disclosures.” (Donnellan Aff., Ex. 75.)

On April 19, 2006, in the course of that investigation, the Government issued subpoenas

requiring Movants to appear before the grand jury and to produce documents regarding the

source of the grand jury transcripts disclosed in the articles. (Id., Exs. 77, 78.) According to

Movants, they received these subpoenas on or about May 5, 2006. (Fainaru-Wada Aff., ¶ 10;

Williams Aff., ¶ 12.) Movants filed the instant motion to quash on May 31, 2006. 

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4

In addition to the facts recounted by the Court above, Movants submit affidavits from a

number of journalists who also attest to the important role that confidential sources play in their

news coverage. (See Affidavits of Carl Bernstein and Jack Nelson.) Movants further submit

affidavits from parents whose children have committed suicide apparently as a result of steroid

usage. (See Affidavits of Denise A. Garibaldi, Ph.D. and Donald Hooton.) Finally, Movants

submit numerous articles, transcripts from televisions shows, and legislation that has been

introduced and passed regarding steroid usage, to demonstrate the response to their articles and

to demonstrate that the articles heightened public interest and awareness of the issue of steroid

use and abuse. (See, e.g., Donnellan Aff., Exs. 13-15, 24-25, 33-73; see also Affidavits of

Roger Blake, Congressman John E. Sweeney, Francis Vincent, Jr., and Gary Wadler, M.D.) 

The Government, in turn, submits evidence regarding its investigation into the leaks and its

efforts to obtain this information from sources other than the Movants. (Hershman Decl., Ex.

EE-GG; Hershman Reply Declaration, Ex. 1.)

The Court does not intend to discount any of this evidence by not addressing it more

specifically in this Order and has considered it carefully in reaching its conclusions. However, it

intends its analysis to focus on the legal issue presented - namely whether or not Movants are

entitled to withhold the identity or identities of their confidential source or sources. Additional

facts necessary to the analysis are set forth in the remainder of this Order. 

ANALYSIS

At the outset, the Court reiterates its views, as expressed at the hearing, that both parties’

arguments raise important policy considerations and concerns. On one side is the role that

members of the press play in bringing issues to the forefront of public attention, which may lead

to changes in policy or the law. 

The First Amendment protections for the press embodied in [the First]

Amendment are designed to “preserve an untrammeled press as a vital

source of public information,” Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233,

250 (1936), ensuring that the press “could bare the secrets of government

and inform the people,” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.

713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). As the Supreme Court

recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964),

there is “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on

public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”

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United States v. Libby, 432 F. Supp. 2d 26, 43 (D.D.C. 2006). Indeed, the Supreme Court has

noted that “the free press has been a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in

governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally

informing the citizenry of public events and occurrences ... .” Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539

(1965). Without question, confidential sources often are essential in assisting the press in that

task. However, the “the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the

press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes of general applicability.”

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).

On the other side is the role that the grand jury, and its concomitant rules of secrecy, play

in our criminal justice system. The grand jury 

is an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of determining

whether or not a crime has been committed. Unlike this Court, whose

jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or controversy, the grand jury

“can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or

even just because it wants assurance that it is not.” The function of the

grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its

investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that

none has occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory

function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush. “A grand jury

investigation ‘is not fully carried out until every available clue has been

run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a

crime has been committed.’” 

United States v. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

However, “[t]he investigatory powers of the grand jury are nevertheless not unlimited. ... Grand

juries are not licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions, nor may they select targets of

investigation out of malice or an intent to harass.” Id. (citations omitted).

The Court finds itself bound by the law governing this case to subordinate Movants’

interests to the interests of the grand jury. Further, on the facts presented, even if a federal

common law reporter’s privilege existed, the Court concludes that the Government has satisfied

its burden to overcome the assertion of any such privilege. 

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5 Of the four cases, Farr is the most analogous to the factual circumstances

presented by this case. In Farr, a trial court issued an order precluding the parties from

disseminating certain information to the public, ostensibly to protect the defendants’ right to

a fair trial. Farr, a reporter, obtained and published information that was covered by the

order. Farr, 522 F.2d at 466. After the criminal trial had concluded, the trial court ordered

Farr to divulge his source and when Farr refused, held him in contempt. 

Movants in this case argue, with respect to the balancing test they advocate, that

because the BALCO criminal case has concluded, there is no real need for disclosure of their

source or sources. In Farr, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Farr’s federal

habeas petition, concluding that any First Amendment protection Farr could have been

afforded was outweighed by “the power of the court to enforce its duty and obligation

relative to the guarantee of due process to the defendants in the on-going trial,”

notwithstanding the fact that the trial had concluded by the time Farr was ordered to disclose

his source. See Farr, 522 F.3d at 469. Thus, although it does not involve a grand jury

proceeding, Farr supports the Court’s conclusion that Movants are not privileged under the

First Amendment from disclosing their source or sources.

6

 A. The Movants Cannot Rely on a First Amendment Reporter’s Privilege to Resist the

Subpoenas.

Movants argue that the Court should quash the subpoenas because “it is well-established

within this Circuit that the First Amendment provides reporters with a qualified reporter’s

privilege.” (Mot. at 31.) The Court finds the cases on which Movants rely for this proposition,

Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Shoen II”), Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir.

1993), United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1976), and Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d

464 (9th Cir. 1975), to be inapposite because those cases do not involve grand jury proceedings.5

See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Scarce), 5 F.3d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing Farr

and noting that the Farr court “balanced the conflicting interests raised by that case where the

societal interest was different in order to determine the existence of a privilege, but did so only

because that case - unlike Branzburg or the present case - did not involve testimony before a

grand jury”) (hereinafter “Scarce”). 

Rather, the holdings of Branzburg and Scarce, are controlling and require the Court to

reject Movants’ assertion of a First Amendment reporter’s privilege. In Branzburg, the

Supreme Court consolidated four cases for decision in which reporters, like Movants in this

case, were called upon to testify before grand juries to provide information about persons or

groups to whom they had promised confidentiality. Each of the reporters urged the Supreme

Court to adopt a qualified privilege grounded in the First Amendment. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at

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680. The Supreme Court’s response was succinct: “We are asked to create another [privilege]

by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens

do not enjoy. This we decline to do.” Id. at 689. 

This Court cannot conclude that this statement does not mean exactly what it says,

namely that “the First Amendment does not provide a news gatherer a privilege to refuse to

testify before a federal grand jury regarding information received in confidence.” Scarce, 5 F.3d

at 400; see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“Neither does the First

Amendment relieve a newspaper reporter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a

grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation, even though the

reporter might be required to reveal a confidential source.”) (citing Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665). 

To date, the Supreme Court has not overruled Branzburg. Thus, the Court is bound by that

opinion, and it is not the only court to reach this conclusion. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.

Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3130645 at *11-12 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2006) (“Gonzales”); In re

Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145-1149 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In re Special

Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding Branzburg precluded recognition of

First Amendment reporter’s privilege “even though we are dealing with a special prosecutor

rather than a grand jury”); In re Special Counsel Investigation, 332 F. Supp. 2d 26, 27-32

(D.D.C. 2004); Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236, 237-38 (9th Cir. 1975) (“The holding of

Branzburg ... is that the first amendment does not afford a reporter a privilege to refuse to testify

before a federal grand jury as to information received in confidence.”) 

This Court believes Branzburg’s holding is clear. However, Justice Powell, who joined

in the majority opinion, issued a separate concurrence “to emphasize what seems ... to be the

limited nature of the Court’s holding.” Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).

If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being

conducted in good faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the

newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and

tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some

other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source

relationship without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have

access to the court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective

order may be entered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged

on its facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the

press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with

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6 The import of Justice Powell’s concurrence has generated much debate among

the federal courts. See New York Times Co. v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d 457, 485-86

(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing the varied characterizations of opinion and holdings), vacated

and remanded by Gonazales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3130645. The Ninth Circuit’s views on

the opinion have not been entirely consistent. Compare Scarce, 5 F.3d at 400 (“It is

important to note that Justice White’s opinion is not a plurality opinion.”) (emphasis in

original), with Farr v. Pritchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (stating that “Justice Powell was needed

to obtain a plurality”). The Court concludes that any conflict between Farr and Scarce can

be reconciled by the fact that, in each case, the courts suggest that Branzburg should be

interpreted to hold that, with respect to a grand jury investigation conducted in good faith,

any limited First Amendment privilege a reporter may hold will be subordinate to the grand

jury’s right to discover information pertinent to that investigation. See Scarce, 5 F.3d at 401;

Farr, 522 F.2d at 467-68.

8

respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and

societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and

traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).6 The Ninth Circuit has state that, when “[r]ead together

with the majority opinion,” Justice Powell’s concurrence

must be understood to mean that where a grand jury inquiry is not

conducted in good faith, or where the inquiry does not involve a

legitimate need of law enforcement, or has only a remote and tenuous

relationship to the subject of the investigation then, the balance of

interests struck by the Branzburg majority may not be controlling. The

balancing of interests suggested by Justice Powell is in the limited

circumstances he mentioned, where there is, in effect, an abuse of the

grand jury function.

Scarce, 5 F.3d at 401. 

Here, Movants have neither argued nor demonstrated to the satisfaction of this Court

that there has been any abuse of the grand jury process. First, there is no suggestion that the

grand jury investigation into the leaks of the BALCO grand jury transcripts is being conducted

in anything other than good faith. Second, as noted above, although Movants characterize this

case as involving mere contempt, the Government has satisfied this Court that the grand jury is

inquiring into matters that involve a legitimate need of law enforcement. Third, in light of the

fact that Movants are the persons to whom the transcripts in question were leaked, the request

for the information has neither a remote nor tenuous connection to the investigation. Rather,

this information is central to the determination of whether the leaker(s) may or may not have

committed perjury, may or may not have sought to obstruct justice, may or may not have

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In Jaffee, interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 501, the Supreme Court

recognized a federal common law privilege for communications between psychotherapists

and their patients as well as a privilege for communications between social workers and their

clients. See Jaffee, 501 U.S. at 15-16. 

9

violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), and may or may not have violated the

provisions of the Protective Order.

Although Movants also argue that Scarce is not controlling because it involved a

“scholar’s privilege,” Scarce himself analogized that privilege to a reporter’s privilege. Scarce,

5 F.3d at 398. Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected his claim of privilege based on its view that if

a reporter held no such privilege, neither would a scholar. Id. at 400 (noting that the Supreme

Court in Branzburg “concluded ... that the First Amendment does not provide a news gatherer a

privilege to refuse to testify before a federal grand jury regarding information received in

confidence” and that the “circumstances of the present case fall squarely within those of

Branzburg”). The Court finds the circumstances of the present case also fall squarely within

the circumstances contemplated by Branzburg and Scarce and concludes that the First

Amendment does not provide Movants with a basis to refuse to appear before the grand jury to

answer questions and produce documents or objects requested in the subpoena. See Branzburg,

408 U.S. at 707-08; Scarce, 5 F.3d at 402. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to quash to the extent it rests on the

assertion of a reporter’s privilege grounded in the First Amendment.

B. The Movants Cannot Rely on A Common Law Reporter’s Privilege to Resist the

Subpoenas.

Movants claim that “[w]hatever the law was in 1972 when Branzburg was decided, in

the 34 years since Branzburg, much has changed.” (Mot. at 19.) Accordingly, they urge the

Court to apply three factors identified by the Supreme Court in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1

(1996), which they contend support the recognition of a common law reporter’s privilege under

Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (“Rule 501”).7 Those three factors are (1) whether important

private and public interests would be served by recognition of the privilege; (2) whether the

evidentiary cost of recognizing the privilege is likely to be modest; and (3) whether similar

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protections are afforded by the states, either through legislation or the common law. See Jaffee,

518 U.S. at 10-15. According to the Movants’ argument, “[t]here is now an overwhelming

consensus in this country that a reporter’s privilege exists and must be given effect.” (Mot. at

19.)

Movants are correct that a large number of states have recognized a reporter’s privilege. 

However, federal courts generally have been reluctant to follow the lead of the states, in the

context of grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006 WL 3130645 at *7

(stating that “[i]t is unnecessary ... for us to rule on whether such a privilege exists under Rule

501” because “any such privilege would be a qualified one ... [and] would be overcome as a

matter of law on these facts”); In re Miller, 438 F.3d at 1150 (“The Court is not of one mind on

the existence of a common law privilege. Judge Sentelle would hold there is no such common

law privilege[.] ... Judge Tatel would hold that there is such a common law privilege. Judge

Henderson believes that we need not, and therefore should not, reach that question. However,

all believe that if there is any such privilege, it is not absolute and may be overcome by an

appropriate showing,” and “that if such a privilege applies here, it has been overcome.”); In re

Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d at 44 (reading Branzburg to “flatly reject[] any notion of a

general-purpose reporter’s privilege for confidential sources, whether by virtue of the First

Amendment or of a newly hewn common law privilege”); and In re Special Counsel

Investigation., 332 F. Supp. 2d at 32 (construing Branzburg to reject First Amendment and

common law reporter’s privilege in the grand jury context, and rejecting recognition of

privilege under Rule 501). The exceptions appear to be In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 367

(W.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d by equally divided court 963 F.2d 567 (3rd Cir. 1992) (en banc)

(recognizing qualified reporter’s privilege under Rule 501 and concluding that government had

not met its burden to overcome privilege) and New York Times v. Gonzales, 382 F. Supp. 2d

457, 492-508 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (recognizing privilege under Rule 501), however, as noted, the

latter opinion was subsequently vacated by the Second Circuit. Gonzales, __ F.3d __, 2006

WL 3130645 at *7.

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Again, Scarce provides guidance to the Court with respect to the Ninth Circuit’s views,

and in that case the court rejected Scarce’s argument that the scholar’s privilege should be

recognized under Rule 501. Id. at 402-03. In its analysis of the issue, the court cited to one of

its earlier decisions, Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1975) (“Lewis II”), and to

Branzburg and concluded that “[i]t would be difficult to argue for a common law reporter’s

privilege to withhold confidential information from a federal grand jury in the face of this

recent and authoritative statement that the general common law rejects such a privilege.” Id.

(quoting Lewis II, 517 F.2d at 238). 

The Scarce court also acknowledged that some of its sister circuits had recognized a

reporter’s qualified privilege under the common law, but it distinguished those cases on the

ground that they “did not involve grand jury inquiries.” Id. at 403. The court also declined to

follow In re Williams, supra, “on the ground that it directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s

holding in Branzburg.” Id. Finally, the court stated that it did not read Rule 501 to “sanction[]

the creation of privileges by federal courts in contradiction of the Supreme Court’s mandate.” 

Id. at 403 n.3. Thus, noting that “Branzburg cast doubt on our ability to recognize a news

gathering privilege in the grand jury context as a matter of common law,” the court concluded

that “[w]e are no more inclined to undermine the specific mandate of Branzburg now, than we

were when we” decided Lewis II. Id. at 402-03.

Although Scarce pre-dates Jaffee, and although the legal landscape within the states

indeed may have changed since Branzburg was decided, the Ninth Circuit’s position on the

issue appears clear to this Court: unless and until the Supreme Court states that a common law

reporter’s privilege exists, or unless Congress enacts such a privilege, Branzburg’s mandate is

binding. Accordingly, the Court declines Movants’ invitation to apply the Jaffee factors and

recognize a common law reporter’s privilege under Rule 501. However, even if a reporter’s

privilege exists or should be recognized under the federal common law, the Court concludes

that it would be overcome on the facts of this case. 

Movants argue that in balancing the interests at stake here, the Court should begin with

the standard adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Shoen II, 48 F.3d at 417 (requiring civil litigant

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8 Movants do not object to the Court considering Hershman reply declaration on

an ex parte basis. See, e.g., Miller, 438 F.3d at 1150-51 (rejecting argument that

consideration of ex parte submission from the government violated appellants’ due process

rights).

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seeking non-confidential information to establish that the material requested is “(1) unavailable

despite exhaustion of all reasonable alternative sources; (2) noncumulative; and (3) clearly

relevant to an important issue in the case”). Movants also, however, ask the Court to engage in

the balancing test articulated by Judge Tatel in the Miller case and to weigh “the public interest

in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm the leak caused, against the public interest in

newsgathering, measured by the leaked information’s value.” (Mot. at 38 (quoting Miller, 438

F.3d 1175 (Tatel, J., concurring).) The Court, however, reads the Supreme Court’s opinion in

Branzburg to counsel against relying on the type of balancing test advocated by Judge Tatel,

which would require a court to make 

a value judgment that a legislature had declined to make, since in each

case the criminal law involved would represent a considered judgment,

not constitutionally suspect, of what conduct is liable to criminal

prosecution. The task of judges, like other officials outside the legislative

branch, is not to make the law but to uphold it in accordance with their

oaths.

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 706. The Court finds this reasoning to be equally applicable to a

balancing test that would require it to place greater value on the reporting of certain news

stories over others and, thus, declines to do so.

Therefore, applying only the Shoen II test, the Court is satisfied that the Government

has established that it has exhausted all reasonable alternatives to discover the source of the

leak absent Movants’ testimony and production of documents. Before the grand jury in this

case was even convened, the parties in the BALCO case submitted declarations to Judge Illston

documenting their handling of the grand jury materials, and the Government has submitted

waivers obtained from its employees as well as other materials tending to show they have

exhausted all reasonable alternatives to obtain this information. (See Hershman Decl., Exs. 

AA, FF, GG and Hershman Reply Decl., Ex. 1.)8 The Court also concludes that the

Government has established that the testimony would not be cumulative in that it would appear

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to be the only first-hand evidence of the identity or identities of the source or sources. Finally,

the Court concludes that the Government has established that the testimony and documents

requested by the grand jury are relevant to an important issue in the investigation. Indeed, they

are the central to that investigation. 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to quash to the extent it rests upon the

assertion of a common law reporter’s privilege. 

C. Compliance With The Subpoenas Would Not Be Unreasonable or Oppressive.

Movants’ final argument in support of their motion to quash the subpoenas is grounded

in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17, which “confers discretion on the district court to

quash a grand jury subpoena if compliance would be ‘unreasonable or oppressive.’” See In re

Grand Jury Subpoena to Nancy Bergeson, 425 F.3d 1221, 1224 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Bergeson”);

Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c)(2). “[A] grand jury subpoena issued through normal channels is

presumed to be reasonable,” and Movants bear the burden of establishing that compliance

would be unreasonable or oppressive. R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 301. Movants argue that the

subpoenas interfere with “the press’ ability to fulfill its core First Amendment function of

informing the public on matters of public concern ... [and] are destructive of the reporter’s

confidential source relationships,” which in turn impinges on their livelihood. (Mot. at 47.) 

Thus, Movants again ask the Court to determine that, in the absence of a privilege, the interests

in maintaining the free flow of information outweigh any interests the grand jury may have in

obtaining the information requested.

Movants rely on Bergeson, a case involving an attorney called to testify before a grand

jury about information she provided to her client. The district court concluded that the

information was not privileged, but nonetheless quashed the subpoena because it found that if

she testified, the relationship with her client would be destroyed. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit

concluded that a court must evaluate a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena under Rule 17(c)

on a case by case basis. 425 F.3d at 1227. Thus, the court stated that a “defendant is not

automatically entitled to an order quashing such a subpoena merely because the government

cannot show that no other source of testimony exists and that there is a compelling need for it

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9 Movants also assert that the Court should grant the motion because under

Department of Justice Guidelines, subpoenas like those at issue here should be issued only in

exigent circumstances. (Mot. at 44, citing 28 C.F.R. 50.10(f)(4) and U.S. Attorneys’ Manual,

title 9, Section 13.400.). The Court DENIES the motion on this basis because those

regulations do not provide Movants with any enforceable rights. Moreover, to the extent

compliance bears on the question of whether the subpoenas are unreasonable or oppressive,

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to obtain an indictment.” Id. Yet, “[t]he government is not automatically entitled to subpoena

a lawyer to testify against his client merely because the Constitution does not prohibit it and the

material is not privileged.” Id. Noting that a district court may consider such factors as

whether the information is available from other sources and whether compliance would likely

destroy the attorney-client relationship, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in quashing the subpoena. See Bergeson, 425 F.3d at 1225-26. 

Here, Movants assert that their “professional standing and ability to continue their work

– indeed, their livelihood – rests on their ability to live up to their promises to whistleblowers,” and, thus, argue that compliance with the subpoena would be oppressive because it

would destroy “a confidential relationship by forcing reporters to testify about their sources.” 

(Mot. at 50.) Movants do not contend that any particular source relationship will be destroyed. 

In Bergeson, however, there was a specific and particular relationship that was threatened, i.e.

the relationship between Bergeson and her client as a defendant. Movants’ generalized

assertions therefore do not comport with Bergeson’s teaching that a court must look at the facts

of each particular case and do not satisfy their burden of showing compliance in this case is

unreasonable or oppressive. Further, to the extent the Court may consider the need for

Movants’ testimony, because the grand jury is entitled to “inquire into all information that

might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself

that none has occurred,” R. Enterprises, 498 U.S. at 297 (citations omitted), for the reasons set

forth above in Section B, the Court finds that Movants have not established that compliance

would be unreasonable or oppressive. Accordingly, notwithstanding the First Amendment

interests that are implicated in this case, Movants have not met their burden to show that the

subpoenas should be quashed pursuant to Rule 17(c)(2). 

Accordingly, the motion to quash is DENIED on this basis as well.9 

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obtain authorization for the issuance of the subpoenas.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth in this Order, the motion to quash the subpoenas is DENIED. 

Movants are HEREBY ORDERED to appear before the grand jury at a date and time to be

determined by the Government to answer questions posed to them and to produce all

documents or objects requested in the subpoenas. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 15, 2006 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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