Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04891/USCOURTS-cand-4_04-cv-04891-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
R. E. Alaniz
Defendant
R. Betancourt
Defendant
I. Guerra
Defendant
W. J. Hill
Defendant
A. P. Kane
Defendant
S. Ortiz
Defendant
V. Pena
Defendant
D. Pherigo
Defendant
Timothy Peter Ralbovsky
Plaintiff
E. Da Rosa
Defendant
J. R. Solis
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

NOT FOR CITATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY PETER RALBOVSKY, 

Plaintiff,

 vs.

V. PENA; R. E. ALANIZ; R.

BETANCOURT; D. PHERIGO; I.

GUERRA; W. J. HILL; J. R. SOLIS; A.

P. KANE; S. ORTIZ; E. Da ROSA; and

DOES 1-50,

Defendants. /

No. C 04-4891 PJH (PR)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is a civil rights case filed pro se by a state prisoner. Defendants have moved

for summary judgment, plaintiff has opposed the motion, and defendants have filed a reply.

The motion is ready for decision. 

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff attempted to mail to the legislature and governor three parcels containing a

proposed bill requiring that prison disciplinary proceedings be tape-recorded. When some

or all of the outgoing parcels were blocked, he filed a grievance related to the obstruction of

his attempted mailing. He asserts that defendants violated his First Amendment rights by

not allowing the mailings, and retaliated against him for attempting to mail the parcels and

for his grievance.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show

that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Material facts are those which may

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affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 

A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury

to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The moving party for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Cattrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Nissan

Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Cos., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). When the moving

party has met this burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial. If the nonmoving party fails to produce enough evidence to

show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party wins. Id.

B. Analysis 

1. First Amendment claim

Plaintiff contends that the failure to mail out the three envelopes containing his

proposed bill violated his First Amendment rights. 

Prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. Witherow v. Paff,

52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A

prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner's First

Amendment rights as long as the regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The Turner standard

applies to regulations and practices concerning all correspondence between prisoners and

to regulations concerning incoming mail received by prisoners from non-prisoners. 

Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. In the case of outgoing correspondence from prisoners to

non-prisoners, however, an exception to the Turner standard applies. Because outgoing

correspondence from prisoners does not, by its very nature, pose a serious threat to

internal prison order and security, there must be a closer fit between any regulation or

practice affecting such correspondence and the purpose it purports to serve. Id. at 411-12. 

Censorship in such instances is justified only if (1) the regulation or practice in question

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1 It is unclear how plaintiff intended this to work; obviously the certificates of service

were on the outside of the sealed envelopes. Perhaps it was intended that the certificates

should be mailed separately. The court also notes that these were not filings, so far as

appears from the record, so there appears to have been no need for such certificates. If

plaintiff’s purpose was to obtain evidence that the packages were actually mailed, as

defendants point out that could have been better achieved by use of various mailing options,

such as certified mail. 

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furthers a legitimate penological interest, and (2) the limitation on First Amendment

freedoms is no greater than necessary to further the particular government interest

involved. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), overruled on other grounds,

Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1989); see, e.g., Witherow, 52 F.3d at 265-66

(regulation requiring visual inspection of outgoing mail from inmates to certain public

officials closely related to legitimate penological interest of preventing prisoners from

disseminating harmful or offensive materials and avoids unnecessary intrusion) (emphasis

added). This is not, however, a “least restrictive means” test. Id. at 265.

There is no genuine issue of material fact but that the three packages submitted for

mailing by plaintiff carried unsigned certificates of service which said what the contents

supposedly were.1

 Although plaintiff ridicules the contention, he has presented no

evidence which would generate a genuine issue of material fact as to defendant Alaniz’s

statement that she felt she could not sign a certificate saying what was in the sealed

packages without knowing what in fact was in them, and that because they were

confidential mail to public officials she could not open the envelopes. Alaniz also says that

it was mailroom policy not to sign certificates of service; plaintiff pounces upon this, saying

that there is no evidence of a written or formal policy. But Alaniz did not say that there was,

so there is no genuine issue of fact as to this point, and in any event it would not be

material; it really does not matter to this motion whether Alaniz was or was not following a

policy.

 It is perfectly evident that the mailroom employee’s refusal to sign a false

declaration serves a legitimate penological objective, that of maintaining a standard of

honesty among employees and not misleading courts or government officials who might be

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recipients of such a statement, and that refraining from dishonestly signing such

declarations is an action no greater than necessary to further the interest. That policy was

also furthered by not sending out the envelopes but instead attempting to return them to

plaintiff to allow him to decide what he wanted to do. 

Defendant Alaniz is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that she

violated his First Amendment rights. 

2. Retaliation

Plaintiff contends that defendant Guerra placed him in administrative segregation in

retaliation for his attempt to mail out the packages, and that defendant DaRosa approved

the placement, again in retaliation.

"Within the prison context, a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation entails five

basic elements: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an

inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled

the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably

advance a legitimate correctional goal." Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th

Cir. 2005) (footnote omitted). 

The prisoner bears the burden of pleading and proving absence of legitimate

correctional goals for the conduct of which he complains. Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802,

806 (9th Cir. 1995). At that point, the burden shifts to the prison official to show, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that the retaliatory action was narrowly tailored to serve a

legitimate penological purpose. Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 461-62 (9th Cir.

1995) (defendants had qualified immunity for their decision to transfer prisoner to preserve

internal order and discipline and maintain institutional security).

 Retaliation claims brought by prisoners must be evaluated in light of concerns over

"excessive judicial involvement in day-to-day prison management, which 'often squander[s]

judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.'" Pratt, 65 F.3d at 807 (quoting

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)). In particular, courts should "'afford

appropriate deference and flexibility' to prison officials in the evaluation of proffered

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2 In support of this contention, plaintiff cites to an exhibit filed in support of his

declaration, “exhibit D, pp 11-30.” Pl. P. & A. at 7, ¶ 2. The exhibit contains classification

documents and mostly the record of the disciplinary proceeding held against him in the wake

of the fight. His reference to such a broad page span, pages eleven through thirty, is

insufficient to alert the court to the portion of the record which he contends supports his

contention. See Orr v. Bank of America, 285 F.3d 764, 774-75 & n. 14 (9th Cir. 2002)

(summary judgment; court may disregard deposition or affidavit if plaintiff fails to cite to specific

page and paragraph) (citing Huey v. UPS, Inc., 165 F.3d 1084, 1085 (7th Cir. 1999) (“judges

need not paw over the files without assistance from the parties”)). 

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legitimate penological reasons for conduct alleged to be retaliatory." Id. (quoting Sandin,

515 U.S. at 482).

The following facts are undisputed except where indicated, in which case plaintiff’s

view has been adopted for purposes of this decision. About nine months after plaintiff had

unsuccessfully attempted to mail his packages, plaintiff and another prisoner got into a fight

on the yard. Defendants, based on the official reports, contend that plaintiff and his

opponent would not stop fighting even when ordered to by guards in the tower and when

other inmates tried to separate them, and that it was necessary to use pepper spray. 

Plaintiff contends, however, that they had stopped by the time guards arrived and that use

of pepper spray was “inadvertent or otherwise unnecessary.” Pl. P. & A. at 7.2

 Defendant

Guerra ordered his officers to identify the more aggressive of the fighters and put that

person in administrative segregation. Decl. Guerra ¶ 5. Instead, a Lieutenant approved

use of a “marriage chrono” and put both inmates in segregation Id. ¶ 6. A “marriage

chrono” is a procedure where inmates apologize to each other and agree in writing that

they will not do so again. Id. When Guerra found out about the marriage chrono he

disapproved it and ordered that plaintiff be held in administrative segregation. Id. He says

that he did this because of the seriousness of the fight and concern for the safety of plaintiff

and for the security of the institution if plaintiff were in general population. Id. ¶ 7. Although

plaintiff disputes this, he bases his disagreement on no more than the common use of

marriage chronos to resolve enemy issues and his claim that he and the other inmate were

not enemies. There is no evidence to support either contention, and in any event they

would not suffice to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Guerra’s action

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 Plaintiff’s citations to “Exhibits D, E, and F, inclusive, Pl.’s P. & A. at 18-19, are

grossly inadequate. Those exhibits consist of hundred of pages of documents. For the

reasons set out in footnote 2, above, these references are insufficient to generate an issue of

fact.

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was taken because she was retaliating against plaintiff for his exercise of his First

Amendment rights.

It is this placement in administrative segregation which plaintiff contends was the

retaliatory act by defendant Guerra. He has, however, completely failed to generate a

genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the placement served a legitimate

penological purpose – it is clear on the undisputed facts that it did. 

 Plaintiff also contends that defendant DaRosa retaliated against him by approving on

administrative review the lockup order by Guerra. There is absolutely no evidence that any

of the actions by DaRosa were motivated by a desire to retaliate.

For these reasons, summary judgment will be granted for defendants Guerra and

DaRosa on the retaliation claims.

Plaintiff also contends that he was retained in administrative segregation, as

opposed to being initially placed there, in retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment

rights. This claim is that defendants Hill, Solis, Kane, and Ortiz failed to overturn the

segregation decision of Guerra and DaRosa, and that Pherigo, Hill, Solis and Kane were

involved in other (unspecified) acts of retaliation. There is, once again, no indication that

the actions of these defendants were motivated by the long-past incident when plaintiff tried

to mail out his proposed legislation.3

 Their motion for summary judgment on this claim will

be granted.

3. Qualified immunity

The defense of qualified immunity protects "government officials . . . from liability for

civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of qualified immunity “‘provides ample

protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law;’”

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defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about the facts or about what the

law requires in any given situation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "Therefore, regardless of whether the

constitutional violation occurred, the [official] should prevail if the right asserted by the

plaintiff was not 'clearly established' or the [official] could have reasonably believed that his

particular conduct was lawful." Romero v. Kitsap County, 931 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir.

1991). Qualified immunity is particularly amenable to summary judgment adjudication. 

Martin v. City of Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2004).

A court considering a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the

plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right, then proceed to

determine if the right was “clearly established.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999);

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). The threshold question must be: Taken in the

light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's

conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201

“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,

there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S.

at 201. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on the allegations, the next

sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established. Id. This inquiry must be

undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. 

Id. at 202. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly

established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. If the law did not put the officer on notice that

his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is

appropriate. Id.

Even if the violated right is clearly established, qualified immunity shields an officer

from suit when he makes a decision that, even if constitutionally deficient, reasonably

misapprehends the law governing the circumstances he confronted. Brosseau v. Haugen,

543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205-06. If “the officer’s mistake as to what

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the law requires is reasonable . . . the officer is entitled to the immunity defense.” Id. at

205.

Plaintiff’s evidentiary allegations, as opposed to his conclusions such as that

defendants’ motives were retaliatory, are not sufficient, if proved, to show a violation of his

constitutional rights, the first step of the Saucier analysis. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 

Defendants therefore are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s claims for damages. 

4. Opposition

Plaintiff supported his opposition to the motion for summary judgment with a short

declaration supported by hundred of pages of copies of documents. The declaration says

only that the documents “have been maintained by myself for the entire time period

subsequent to their respective origins.” Pl. decl. at ¶ 3. This is not sufficient to

authenticate the documents, which mostly appear to have been generated by the prison. 

See Orr, 285 F.3d 764 at 773-778. Although the court concludes above that defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on the facts which are undisputed, and that the facts

which are disputed are not material, it concludes alternatively that as to disputed facts

plaintiff has failed to properly support his version, and that the version of defendants

requires that summary judgment be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion for summary judgment (document

number 23 on the docket) is GRANTED. The clerk shall close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 25, 2006. 

 PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON

United States District Judge

G:\PRO-SE\PJH\CR.04\RALBOVSKY891.SJ

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