Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02525/USCOURTS-cand-3_13-cv-02525-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
H Lackner
Respondent
Vincent Soto Marquez
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT SOTO MARQUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

H. LACKNER,

Respondent.

Case No. 13-cv-02525-JD 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

This is a habeas corpus case filed pro se by a state prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

The Court ordered respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted. Respondent 

filed an answer and a memorandum of points and authorities in support of it, and lodged exhibits

with the Court. Petitioner filed a traverse. The petition is denied.

BACKGROUND

A jury found petitioner guilty of residential burglary and receiving stolen property. People 

v. Marquez, No. H033995, 2012 WL 1200950, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. April 10, 2012). It also found 

that petitioner had three prior strike convictions and five prior felony convictions for which he had 

served prison terms. Id. He was sentenced to 44 years to life in state prison. Id. The California 

Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment on appeal. Id. The California Supreme Court denied a 

petition for review. Resp. Exs. 12, 13. Petitioner‟s habeas petitions to the Santa Cruz County 

Superior Court, California Court of Appeal, and California Supreme Court were also denied. 

Resp. Exs. 14, 15; Pet. Exs. U, V, X.

The California Court of Appeal summarized the facts of the crime as follows:

At around 11:00 a.m., on May 9, 2008, Alejandra Sanchez was 

alone watching TV in the bedroom of her home on Highway 129 in 

a rural area of Watsonville. She heard a knock on the front door. 

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When she looked out a window, she saw a stranger whom she later 

identified as defendant. She immediately checked the back door to 

see that it was locked. She then peered out a bathroom window and 

saw defendant and another man and a woman walking down her 

driveway toward the back of the house. She later identified the

other man as Ruben Tavera and the woman as S.J. The three people 

came onto her back deck, and one of the men approached the screen 

door. Mrs. Sanchez thought she saw a third man and then heard the 

noise of someone trying to pry open a window screen in the kitchen. 

When she heard the screeching sound of the window being pried 

open, she fled to the bedroom and locked the door. She called her 

husband and then 911. Before police arrived, someone tried to open 

her bedroom door, and she heard doors slamming and voices and 

footsteps inside the house.

About nine minutes after Mrs. Sanchez called 911, Santa Cruz 

County Deputy Sheriff Brian Erbe arrived at the scene. He saw two 

men, whom he later identified as Ruben Tavera and defendant, 

walking toward him on the driveway and ordered them to stop. 

Tavera complied, but defendant fled toward the back of the house 

and disappeared. Several seconds later, he reappeared on the other 

side of the house, ran toward a fence, and tossed something into a 

field. Defendant then disappeared behind the house. At trial, 

Deputy Erbe was absolutely certain that defendant was the person he 

had seen flee and toss something into the field.

Around the time defendant disappeared from Deputy Erbe‟s sight, 

Officer Brian Fulgoni of the Watsonville Police Department was 

driving on a dirt road alongside a field behind the house. He saw a 

man who matched the description of the fleeing suspect. He got out 

of his car, chased after him, and ordered him to stop. The man, 

whom he later identified as defendant, complied and was arrested.

Deputy Erbe took custody of defendant and brought him to Mrs. 

Sanchez, who identified him as the person she had seen knocking on 

her door. Later, Tavera and S.J. were brought to her, and she 

identified them. In the field where Deputy Erbe had seen defendant 

toss something, he found 11 pieces of jewelry and a jewelry box. 

Marisela Rocha, who lived with Mrs. Sanchez, identified these items 

as hers and said that she had kept them in her bedroom.

About an hour after the burglary, the police stopped a car near the 

scene. Tavera's sister was driving it, and S.J. was a passenger. At 

trial, S.J. admitted that she knew defendant and Tavera. She said 

that they had picked her up that morning, driven to the house, and 

walked toward it. However, she said that she was the one who had 

knocked on the door. She denied that she entered the house or 

walked toward the back. She said that when no one answered the 

door, she called Tavera's sister, who came and picked her up. She 

could not recall what defendant and Tavera did after that, although 

defendant said he was there to look for a job in the fields.

At trial, to prove intent, the prosecutor introduced evidence that in 

1991, defendant was convicted of residential burglary. Monterey 

County Deputy Sheriff Roy Martinez testified that on July 8, 1991, 

he arrived at an apartment building where a burglary was reportedly 

in progress. The building was surrounded by a wood fence and 

abutted land through which ran an irrigation canal. Deputy Martinez 

entered one of the units and found a broken window in a back 

bedroom and glass on the floor. He saw a man, later identified as 

defendant, outside the window walking on a levee and carrying a 

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box. A woman there said that earlier she had seen that man in her 

apartment. Deputy Martinez pursued and arrested him. The box 

contained a VCR. Shoe prints outside the broken window matched 

defendant‟s shoes, and there was evidence that someone had 

crawled under a fence surrounding the property.

Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *1-2 (footnote omitted).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The first 

prong applies both to questions of law and to mixed questions of law and fact, Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000), while the second prong applies to decisions based on factual 

determinations, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).

A state court decision is “contrary to” Supreme Court authority, that is, falls under the first 

clause of § 2254(d)(1), only if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by 

[the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the 

Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-13. 

A state court decision is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court authority, falling under 

the second clause of § 2254(d)(1), if it correctly identifies the governing legal principle from the 

Supreme Court's decisions but “unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's 

case.” Id. at 413. The federal court on habeas review may not issue the writ “simply because that 

court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly 

established federal law erroneously or incorrectly.” Id. at 411. Rather, the application must be 

“objectively unreasonable” to support granting the writ. Id. at 409.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), a state court decision “based on a factual determination will 

not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence 

presented in the state-court proceeding.” See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; see also Torres v. 

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Prunty, 223 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, in conducting its analysis, the federal 

court must presume the correctness of the state court's factual findings, and the petitioner bears the 

burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The state court decision to which § 2254(d) applies is the "last reasoned decision" of the 

state court. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-04 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 

1085, 1091-92 (9th Cir. 2005). When there is no reasoned opinion from the highest state court to 

consider the petitioner‟s claims, the court looks to the last reasoned opinion. See Nunnemaker at 

801-06; Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1079 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000).

DISCUSSION

As grounds for federal habeas relief, petitioner asserts that: (1) the removal of Hispanic 

jurors violated his rights under the Equal Protection Clause; (2) the trial court erroneously 

admitted evidence of his prior residential burglary; (3) the victim‟s identification of petitioner was 

tainted by suggestive remarks by the trial court; (4) the trial court‟s denial of his motion to 

substitute counsel led to his request for self-representation, both of which resulted in a violation of 

his Sixth Amendment rights; (5) his right to due process was violated because the trial judge was 

not fair and impartial; (6) he did not receive effective assistance of counsel on appeal; and (7) 

cumulative error.

I. JURY SELECTION

Petitioner argues that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights by exercising her 

peremptory challenges to remove three prospective Hispanic jurors.

Legal Standard

The use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defense to exclude 

cognizable groups from a jury may violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Georgia v. 

McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55-56 (1992). The Supreme Court has held that the Equal Protection 

Clause forbids the challenging of potential jurors solely on account of their race. See Batson v. 

Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 1 Batson permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory 

 

1 The California counterpart to Batson is People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258 (1978).

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challenges under a three-step process:

First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor exercised 

peremptory challenges on the basis of race “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives 

rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. 

Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to 

articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Id. at 97; Wade v. Terhune, 

202 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2000). 

Finally, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of 

proving purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98; Wade, 202 F.3d at 1195. To fulfill its 

duty, “the trial court must evaluate the prosecutor‟s proffered reasons and credibility under „the 

totality of the relevant facts,‟ using all the available tools including its own observations and the 

assistance of counsel.” Mitleider v. Hall, 391 F.3d 1039, 1047 (9th Cir. 2004); Lewis v. Lewis, 

321 F.3d 824, 831 (9th Cir. 2003). “As part of its evaluation of the prosecutor‟s reasoning, the 

court must conduct a comparative juror analysis . . .,” particularly when the state court declined to 

do so. Jamerson v. Runnels, 713 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 2013). Then the court should 

“reevaluate the ultimate state decision in light of this comparative analysis and any other evidence 

tending to show purposeful discrimination to decide whether the state was unreasonable in finding 

the prosecutor‟s race-neutral justifications to be genuine.” Id. at 1225. 

In evaluating the race neutrality explanation, the court must keep in mind that proof of 

discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 

See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355-62 (1991) (no discriminatory intent where Latino 

jurors dismissed because of possible difficulty in accepting translator‟s rendition of Spanish 

language testimony). It should also keep in mind that a finding of discriminatory intent turns 

largely on the trial court‟s evaluation of the prosecutor‟s credibility. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 

333, 340-41 (2006); Lewis, 321 F.3d at 830. Because determinations of credibility and demeanor 

of the prosecutor and jurors lie “peculiarly within [the] trial judge‟s province,” the trial court‟s 

ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent is entitled to great deference and must be sustained 

unless clearly erroneous. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 476-82 (2008) (quoting Wainwright 

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v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)); see Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011) (per 

curiam) (reversing Ninth Circuit‟s “inexplicable” and “unexplained” finding that proffered raceneutral explanations for peremptory strikes were insufficient to outweigh evidence of purposeful 

discrimination).

Background

The California Court of Appeal set forth the relevant background:

The prosecutor challenged three prospective jurors with Hispanic 

surnames: Mr. R., Mr. S., and Ms. G.

1. Mr. R.

During voir dire, the court explained that a defendant is presumed 

innocent, does not have to present any evidence, and can simply rely 

on the prosecutor‟s failure to prove guilt. The court asked 

prospective jurors if they had a problem with that. Mr. R. initially 

said, “I think that if he wants to be claimed innocent, he should at 

least produce something that he‟s innocent.” Later, however, he 

said that if the law says a defendant does not have to, then he would 

not require it.

The court also explained that circumstantial evidence does not 

directly prove a fact but is an equally reliable method of proof. As 

an example, the court stated that if the question is whether a person 

had been swimming, and a witness testified that he saw the person 

standing in a dripping wet bathing suit, and wet footprints led from 

the pool to the person, the testimony would constitute circumstantial 

evidence that the person had been swimming. The court asked if 

jurors could follow instructions about circumstantial evidence.

Mr. R. said, “I think so but I'm still questioning the fact that I-that 

example you see a guy wet out on a swimming pool; that doesn‟t 

imply right there that he was swimming. What if he just came out of 

the shower or something like that? You know, that‟s what I was 

thinking.”

Noting this response, the prosecutor asked Mr. R. if he could simply 

listen to the evidence and refrain from speculating. He responded, 

“I think. I‟m naturally curious. I mean, when something brings, 

you know, you got to question it, but I think I can manage that.”

The prosecutor explained that some questions might not be 

answered, and although one might be curious, he or she must keep 

that separate. Mr. R. thought he could do so. The prosecutor said 

now was the time to decide rather than during trial. Mr. R. said, 

“[I]t‟s just like if he says a statement and then you think about it and 

the question about the-where the crime was committed, I‟m also 

thinking about it right now.” He continued, “It‟s close. So I don't 

really know. I can‟t really answer that right now.” The prosecutor 

asked Mr. R. where he lived. Mr. R. said he lived on Lincoln where 

it crosses Riverside Road (Highway 129) in Watsonville. He said he 

usually takes walks all the way out Highway 129, but he did not 

know the specific address where the crime occurred. Mr. R. had 

initially said that if he were selected as a juror, he did not know 

whether he would walk by the scene or be able to set aside his 

knowledge of the area because “[i]t‟s pretty curious right now.” 

However, he later said that he would not go by the scene.

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2. Mr. S.

During voir dire, prospective jurors were asked whether they had 

had any bad experiences with law enforcement that would affect 

their view of an officer‟s credibility at trial. Mr. S. explained, “I‟ve 

had a bad past history with gangs and drugs. So, I mean, I mean, 

I‟m on the other side of positive thinking now but back in the days I 

did have a lot of hatred stories with the law.” He recognized another 

deputy district attorney in the courtroom but could not recall 

whether she had prosecuted him. He reiterated that he had been 

“really lost in gangs at that time.” Now that he had been clean and 

sober and away from gangs for some time, he could put his previous 

negative feelings aside.

3. Ms. G.

During voir dire, the court asked prospective alternate jurors 

whether there was any reason they might not be able to be impartial. 

Ms. G. said that she knew the District Attorney Bob Lee because he 

had prosecuted her nephew, who had been sent to prison for 15 

years. However, she said she would not hold it against the 

prosecutor in this case. The prosecutor noted that Ms. G. had taken 

some time to answer whether she would hold against her what her 

boss, District Attorney Bob Lee, had done to her nephew. Ms. G. 

responded, “The reason is you base-they sent my nephew for 15 

years in prison. They let him out for six months then resend him 

again for another two years. So I‟m against that. You know, why 

did they send him for another two years when he already paid for 15 

years and the judge was ready to let him go, but the District 

Attorney, that was again not Bob Lee, the one-the defender, he was 

the one against my nephew. He said need to pay another five years 

more.” She then said she was not “against Bob Lee” and would not 

hold feelings for or against defendant or the prosecutor.

C. The Batson-Wheeler Motion

After the prosecutor challenged Ms. G., defendant claimed the 

prosecutor had “systematically removed all Hispanics from the . . . 

jury.”

The court noted that the prosecutor had not challenged Ms. A., a 

Hispanic woman, who had already been sworn in as a juror. For this 

reason, the court found that defendant had failed to make a prima 

facie showing of purposeful discrimination.

Later, because Ms. A. had previously informed the court that she 

had just been burglarized and could not concentrate or be an 

effective juror, the court, on its own motion, excused her.

In response and because her use of challenges might end up before 

an appellate court, the prosecutor volunteered to explain why she 

had challenged the three Hispanic jurors. She said that Mr. R. lived 

near the scene of the crime and said he would try not to walk by it. 

Given his response to the court‟s circumstantial evidence example, 

the prosecutor categorized him as a person “who thinks too much.” 

Concerning Mr. S., the prosecutor cited his extensive history with 

law enforcement and noted that he had tattoos on his hands. She did 

not believe that he could fairly judge the credibility of law 

enforcement officers. Concerning Ms. G., the prosecutor noted that 

she was very close to her nephew who had been imprisoned, and she 

had attended a hearing only nine months before. The prosecutor felt 

that she was too close to that proceeding on the side of the criminal 

defense.

Defendant challenged the prosecutor‟s reasons. He asserted that Mr. 

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R. lived miles from the scene of the crime. He asserted that Mr. S. 

did not have an arrest history, and it was common to have tattoos. 

And as to Ms. G., he noted that she said she considered District 

Attorney Bob Lee a friend.

The court rejected defendant‟s arguments. It again found that he 

had not made a prima facie showing. It also found that the 

prosecutor had provided valid, neutral, and nondiscriminatory 

reasons for excluding the three prospective jurors.

Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *3-4.

Analysis

The California Court of Appeal denied this claim:

Concerning Mr. R., voir dire revealed that he initially thought that a 

defendant should have to present some evidence to show his 

innocence. However, if the law did not require it, then he could 

follow the law. Mr. R. also said that he was naturally curious and 

questioned things when they are brought up. His response to the 

court‟s circumstantial evidence example reflected a tendency to 

speculate. However, he said that he could manage not to speculate 

despite his curiosity. Finally, Mr. R. said he lived in Watsonville 

and took walks out Highway 129. At first, he did not know whether 

he would visit the scene, but he later said he would not even think of 

doing so.

Given this voir dire, a prosecutor reasonably could think that Mr. R. 

might be a potentially problematic juror because he was too 

imaginative, free-thinking, and curious, and a person whose personal 

views of the law were not always correct. A prosecutor could 

further question whether Mr. R., despite his assertions to the 

contrary, could and would follow instructions that seemed to go 

against the grain of his own legal instincts, not speculate about 

missing evidence, and resist his curiosity about the scene of the 

crime.

Concerning Mr. S., voir dire revealed that he had an extensive 

history with drugs and gangs, he had tattoos, and he admitted having 

had “a lot of hatred stories with the law.” Notwithstanding Mr. S.‟s 

assertions about being clean, sober, and law-abiding for many years, 

a prosecutor reasonably could decide against seating any juror with 

an extensive history of unlawful drug-related activity and gang 

participation and who had once had strong, negative feelings toward 

law enforcement. 

Concerning Ms. G, voir dire revealed that she was close to her 

nephew and upset that he had been prosecuted, imprisoned, released, 

and recently reimprisoned. A prosecutor reasonably could view 

these circumstances as potent emotional reasons for Ms. G. to 

harbor anti-prosecutorial and anti-law enforcement feelings. 

Although Ms. G. said she would not hold what had happened to her 

nephew against the prosecutor, a prosecutor could question whether 

she could and would be able to do so and for that reason not want 

her on the jury. 

In sum, the record before us “suggests grounds upon which the 

prosecutor might reasonably have challenged the jurors in question.”

Defendant argues that where, as here, a prosecutor excuses all or a 

significant majority of Hispanic prospective jurors, it is always 

reasonable to infer an improper group-based purpose and thereby 

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make a prima facie showing.

However, as noted, a prosecutor‟s dismissals cannot be viewed in 

isolation but must be considered in light of the entire voir dire. 

Thus, in Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pages 901-903, the Supreme 

Court concluded that the dismissal of all four Hispanic prospective 

jurors did not constitute a prima facie showing because the record 

suggested reasonable race-neutral reasons for each dismissal. 

Similarly, in Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pages 187-188, the Supreme 

Court concluded that the dismissal of two of four African-American 

prospective jurors did not constitute a prima facie showing because 

the record revealed plausible reasons to remove both jurors.

Here too, voir dire revealed reasonable, neutral grounds to excuse 

the three Hispanic jurors. Moreover, as the court observed, the 

prosecutor did not exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse Ms. 

A., who was also Hispanic. Under the circumstances, we agree with 

the trial court‟s conclusion that defendant failed to make a prima 

facie showing of improper discrimination. FN3

FN3. Defendant argues that because the court “solicited” the 

prosecutor‟s reasons for excusing the three prospective 

jurors, the issue of whether he satisfied his initial burden of 

making a prima facie case is now moot. We disagree. The 

trial court found that defendant had failed to make a prima 

facie showing. It did not “solicit” the prosecutor's reasons; 

rather, to make the record complete for purposes of appeal, 

the prosecutor volunteered her reasons. Thereafter, the court 

reiterated that defendant had not made a prima facie 

showing. It then added that the prosecutor‟s stated reasons 

were valid.

In any event, the reasons that the prosecutor provided track 

those which, as discussed above, a prosecutor reasonably and 

properly could have relied on to dismiss the jurors. Neither 

defendant‟s tortured argument that it was not plausible for 

the prosecutor to think that Mr. R. might visit the scene nor 

his argument that having tattoos is meaningless convince us 

that the prosecutor‟s stated reasons were invalid or that those 

reasons were a pretext for excusing most of the Hispanic 

prospective jurors. Moreover, defendant does not argue that 

the prosecutor‟s reason for excusing Ms. G. was either 

invalid or pretextual.

Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *5-6 (citations omitted).

While the trial court did not initially find that petitioner had made out a prima facie case of 

discrimination, the prosecutor still provided race-neutral reasons for dismissing these jurors and 

the trial court found that the reasons were valid. Augmented Reporter‟s Transcript (“ART”) at 

1815. Similarly, the California Court of Appeal found that petitioner had failed to make a prima 

facie showing of improper discrimination at the first step of the Batson analysis, but still noted that 

the prosecutor‟s reasons were valid and not pretextual. Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *6 n.3. 

While the trial court and California Court of Appeal only informally reached the third step of the 

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Batson analysis, this Court will look to the third step and conduct a comparative juror analysis and 

as discussed below it is clear there was no constitutional violation and there were proper raceneutral reasons for excusing these jurors. 2

 

When the trial court was providing the initial general instructions to the prospective jurors, 

Mr. R. answered several questions that caused concern regarding his ability to follow court 

instructions regarding the law. He initially questioned petitioner‟s Fifth Amendment protections 

and suggested that a defendant should produce some evidence and also questioned the trial court‟s 

explanation of circumstantial evidence. ART at 1559, 1588. Mr. R. was also evasive when he 

was told that he could not travel to the crime scene, stating, “I don‟t know. It‟s pretty curious 

right now.” ART at 1602. While he later stated he would not view the crime scene, all of Mr. R‟s 

answers suggested difficulty in following the law and the court‟s instructions. The prosecutor 

presented these arguments to the trial court, and they are race-neutral reasons for dismissing Mr. 

R. There is no indication that the prosecutor‟s answers were pretextual, rather there were concerns 

about this juror‟s ability to follow court instructions and the law. 

Mr. S. stated that he had a prior history with gangs and drugs and at one point had, “a lot of 

hatred stories with the law.” ART at 1633. While it is unclear if Mr. S. had a criminal history and 

whether he had been prosecuted by the same office prosecuting the instant case, he did state that

he recognized an assistant district attorney who was in the courtroom, although he could not 

remember if she had prosecuted him. ART at 1644. The prosecutor‟s exercising of a peremptory 

challenge against this juror was not a Batson violation. See, e.g., Cook v. LaMarque, 593 F.3d 

810, 820-21 (9th Cir. 2010) (prior negative experiences with law enforcement sufficient raceneutral explanation to withstand Batson challenge); Messiah v. Duncan, 435 F.3d 186, 201 (2d 

Cir. 2006) (prosecutor could reasonably have believed that juror who had been prosecuted by his 

office and who had relatives in prison would be unduly sympathetic to defendant and hostile to the 

 

2 Because the California Court of Appeal used the appropriate standard, the opinion is 

entitled to AEDPA deference. See Johnson v. Finn, 665 F.3d 1063, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 2011). 

Regardless, petitioner would not be entitled to relief under a lesser standard.

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prosecutor). As noted in the state court opinion, Ms. G. also had prior negative experiences with 

law enforcement including the prosecution of her nephew, his fifteen-year prison sentence, and his 

later re-incarceration. Dismissing Ms. G. for these reasons was not a constitutional violation. See 

Cook, 593 F.3d at 820-21; Messiah, 435 F.3d at 201. 

Reviewing the entirety of the voir dire also demonstrates that the prosecutor excused other 

jurors, who were not Hispanic, for the same reasons as the above jurors. Ms. M. was excused and 

had stated that she had negative experiences with the Santa Clara County District Attorney‟s 

Office related to a prosecution of her ex-husband for child molestation. ART at 1788-89, 1807. 

The prosecutor also used a peremptory challenge against Mr. A. who described a wrongful arrest 

that led to negative experiences with police officers. ART at 1801-02. Mr. A. was excused, even 

though he stated he would follow court instructions regarding the credibility of witnesses. ART at 

1808. Another non-Hispanic prospective juror, Mr. L., stated he had negative experiences with 

law enforcement and, with respect to an assistant district attorney who had previously been sitting 

in the courtroom, “I have never been on trial but the woman who was sitting here with the DA, the 

only reason I wasn‟t on a trial because she kicked me off.” ART at 1658, 1662. This juror was 

excused. ART at 1665.

As noted in the state court opinion, the prosecutor did not exercise a peremptory challenge 

against juror Ms. A., who was Hispanic. Ms. A. was a nurse for a school district and her husband 

was a social worker. ART at 1654. While Ms. A. was Hispanic, she did not have negative 

feelings towards law enforcement or relatives who had been prosecuted as was the case with Mr. 

S. and Ms. G. Nor did Ms. A. answer any questions that would indicate a possible difficulty in 

following the law or court instructions, as was the case with Mr. R. 

Petitioner has failed to show purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor, and a 

comparative juror analysis shows that there were sufficient race-neutral reasons for dismissing the 

three Hispanic jurors and the reasons were not pretextual. Moreover, the prosecutor did not 

excuse a fourth Hispanic juror, and while that juror was later excused it was not due to the 

prosecutor. For all these reasons, this claim is denied.

II. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE

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Petitioner next contends that the admission of evidence regarding a prior residential 

burglary violated due process.

Legal Standard

The admission of evidence is not subject to federal habeas review unless a specific 

constitutional guarantee is violated or the error is of such magnitude that the result is a denial of 

the fundamentally fair trial guaranteed by due process. See Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1031 

(9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court “has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant 

or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of 

the writ.” Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that trial court‟s 

admission of irrelevant pornographic materials was “fundamentally unfair” under Ninth Circuit 

precedent but not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law 

under § 2254(d)). 

Failure to comply with state rules of evidence is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis 

for granting federal habeas relief on due process grounds. See Henry, 197 F.3d at 1031; Jammal v. 

Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991). The due process inquiry in federal habeas 

review is whether the admission of evidence was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the 

trial fundamentally unfair. Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995).

The United States Supreme Court has left open the question of whether admission of 

propensity evidence violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991). Based 

on the Supreme Court‟s reservation of this issue as an “open question,” the Ninth Circuit has held 

that a petitioner‟s due process right concerning the admission of propensity evidence is not clearly 

established as required by AEDPA. Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2006); 

see, e.g., Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008) (because the Supreme Court 

expressly reserved the question of whether using evidence of prior crimes to show propensity for 

criminal activity could ever violate due process, state court‟s rejection of claim did not 

unreasonably apply clearly established federal law).

Analysis

A sheriff‟s deputy testified regarding petitioner‟s arrest and conviction related to a 1991 

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residential burglary. Petitioner argued on appeal that his prior conviction was too remote and too 

dissimilar to have any probative value. Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *7. The California Court 

of Appeal noted that petitioner was sentenced to 30 years for the 1991 conviction that was later 

reduced to 25 years. After his release he was convicted of felonies in 2005 and 2006 and 

committed the instant offense in 2008. Id. The California Court of Appeal then set forth the 

relevant state law and in a lengthy opinion denied the claim finding that the prior conviction was 

not too remote, there were similarities in the crimes, his intent to commit a crime was at issue, and 

the evidence was not inflammatory. Id. at 7-10.

Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because there is no clearly established Supreme 

Court authority that introducing evidence of prior crimes to show propensity for criminal activity 

violates due process. Petitioner can only obtain relief by demonstrating that the admission of the 

prior crime was arbitrary or so prejudicial that it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair. He has 

failed to meet this high burden. The California Court of Appeal noted that the prior conviction 

was not too remote and that there were many similarities in the crimes. These were not 

unreasonable determinations. Nor did the admission of this evidence render the trial 

fundamentally unfair. There was overwhelming evidence implicating petitioner in the crime. The 

evidence established that someone had entered the victim‟s house and taken property. Petitioner 

was identified by the victim and by the police officers, arrested near the scene, and observed 

discarding the property that was taken. Petitioner is unable to show that the trial was 

fundamentally unfair as a result of the admission of his prior crime, thus the claim is denied.

III. IDENTIFICATION

Petitioner next argues that his due process rights were violated and the victim‟s in-court 

identification was tainted because the trial court referred to him by name at the start of the victim‟s 

testimony.

Legal Standard

A pretrial identification procedure violates due process only when it was “so 

impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 

misidentification.” Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968). Evaluating whether a 

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pretrial identification has been irreparably tainted by a suggestive procedure requires a two-part 

analysis. United States v. Love, 746 F.2d 477, 478 (9th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). The Court must 

first determine whether the challenged procedure was impermissibly suggestive. Neil v. Biggers, 

409 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1972). If not, the Constitution has not been offended. See United States v. 

Bagley, 772 F.2d 482, 493 (9th Cir. 1985) (as amended) (holding that court “need not reach” 

question of reliability if challenged procedure not impermissibly suggestive). If the process was 

impermissibly suggestive, the Court must then examine the totality of circumstances to determine 

whether the witness‟s identification was nonetheless reliable. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 

114 (1977). “[T]he factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification 

include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness‟

degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness‟ prior description of the criminal, the level of 

certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the 

crime and the confrontation.” Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200. Only if the identification was not 

reliable must it be excluded from evidence. See Bagley, 772 F.2d at 492.

Analysis

Petitioner does not allege any violations with the pretrial identification procedure by 

police. He argues that the trial court inadvertently violated his due process rights when the victim, 

Mrs. Sanchez, arrived to testify at trial. As noted above, petitioner was representing himself at 

trial. When the victim arrived in the courtroom, she was called to the witness stand by the 

prosecutor. Reporter‟s Transcript (“RT”) at 813. The trial court stated to Mrs. Sanchez that the 

prosecutor, “is going to ask you some questions. Then Mr. Marquez [petitioner] if he has any will 

have the opportunity to question you as well.” RT at 814. Petitioner argues that by identifying 

him by name, the trial court suggested that he was the perpetrator. Other than stating Mr. Marquez 

could question her, there is no indication that the trial court identified Mr. Marquez as the 

perpetrator.

The California Court of Appeal set forth the state law regarding identifications and denied 

this claim:

Defendant concedes that the court‟s comment was inadvertent. 

Nevertheless, he claims that it undermined his defense, part of 

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which was that Mrs. Sanchez misidentified him at the scene of the 

crime. He argues that by identifying him “by name,” the court 

effectively “informed Sanchez that he was the person on trial who 

[sic] she previously identified in connection with the incident, so she 

knew that when asked she should identify him.”

. . . 

Here, when Mrs. Sanchez was called to the stand, Ms. Dunlap was 

at her table, and defendant at his. Although it was unnecessary for 

the court to refer to defendant by name, it did so only to explain to 

Mrs. Sanchez what was going to happen and who would be asking 

her questions. Nothing the court said suggested that either Ms. 

Dunlap or defendant would ask her to identify the perpetrator and 

whether she saw that person in court. Nor did the court‟s comment 

identify defendant as the Mr. Marquez who was on trial for 

allegedly burglarizing her home. For all Mrs. Sanchez might have 

known, the person who might be asking her questions simply shared 

the same name as the perpetrator.

As a potentially unduly suggestive identification procedure, the 

court‟s explanatory comment pales compared with a single-person 

show up at the scene of a recent crime where the defendant is 

handcuffed. And yet even that procedure is not automatically 

deemed unfair or automatically suggestive. [Citations omitted.]

Finally, even if we considered the court‟s comment to be unduly 

suggestive, we would not find a violation of due process. As noted, 

defendant must also show that Mrs. Sanchez‟s later in-court 

identification was unreliable under the totality of circumstances.

The record reveals that Mrs. Sanchez saw defendant during daylight 

hours twice at her house from relatively close distances, first 

knocking at her front door and then later during an in-field 

identification shortly after he was arrested. She showed no 

hesitation in identifying him or the other two persons she had seen 

with him. Moreover, it is undisputed that defendant was around her 

house at the time of the burglary. These circumstances establish that 

at trial, Mrs. Sanchez had substantial and reliable grounds to reidentify defendant, and those grounds were wholly independent of 

the court's brief and unrelated reference to the name of the man 

sitting at the table. [Citation omitted.]

Defendant argues that the court‟s suggestive identification was 

“problematic” because of inconsistencies in Mrs. Sanchez's

description of the perpetrator‟s clothing and the existence of facial 

hair. Although such inconsistencies are a factor to consider in 

determining whether Mrs. Sanchez's in-court identification was 

unreliable, they are not determinative. Thus, defendant fails to 

demonstrate that the court‟s reference to his name constituted an 

unduly suggestive identification procedure or that as a result of the 

court‟s comment, Mrs. Sanchez‟s in-court identification was so 

unreliable as to violate defendant's right to due process.

Marquez, 2012 WL 1200950, at *10-12.

The state court‟s denial of this claim was not an unreasonable application of Supreme 

Court authority. There is no indication that the trial court‟s mentioning of the name of the person 

who would question the witness impermissibly suggested that this was the individual that the 

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witness should identify as the perpetrator. Petitioner has failed to show that because he was 

identified as the person who would question the witness this somehow implicated him as the 

person who burglarized her house.

Even assuming that the trial court‟s statement was unduly suggestive, petitioner has failed 

to show that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the victim‟s observations of petitioner 

on the day of the crime made the in-court identification unreliable. She observed petitioner 

commit the crime during daylight at a close distance. The state court‟s denial was not 

unreasonable and this claim is denied. 

IV. MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL

Petitioner next asserts that the trial court‟s denial of his second motion to substitute 

counsel led to his request for self-representation, both of which resulted in a violation of the Sixth 

Amendment.

Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance of 

counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The benchmark for judging any 

claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel‟s conduct so undermined the proper functioning 

of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

In order to prevail on a Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness of counsel claim, petitioner must 

establish two things. First, he must establish that counsel‟s performance was deficient, i.e., that it 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel‟s 

deficient performance, i.e., that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

The denial of a motion to substitute counsel implicates a defendant‟s Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel and is properly considered in federal habeas. Bland v. Calif. Dep’t of Corr., 20 

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F.3d 1469, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 

(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit has held that when a defendant voices a seemingly 

substantial complaint about counsel, the trial judge should make a thorough inquiry into the 

reasons for the defendant's dissatisfaction. Bland at 1475-76. The inquiry need only be as 

comprehensive as the circumstances reasonably would permit, however. King v. Rowland, 977 

F.2d 1354, 1357 (9th Cir. 1992). 

Regardless of whether the state court failed to rule on the motion to substitute counsel or 

denied the motion, the ultimate inquiry in a federal habeas proceeding is whether the petitioner‟s 

Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. Schell, 218 F.3d at 1024-25 (overruling earlier 

circuit precedent that had stated that habeas court‟s inquiry was whether the state court‟s denial of 

the motion was an abuse of discretion). That is, the habeas court considers whether the trial 

court‟s denial of or failure to rule on the motion “actually violated [petitioner‟s] constitutional 

rights in that the conflict between [petitioner] and his attorney had become so great that it resulted 

in a total lack of communication or other significant impediment that resulted in turn in an 

attorney-client relationship that fell short of that required by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 1026.

Background

On August 14, 2008, petitioner filed a motion to substitute counsel pursuant to People v. 

Marsden, 2 Cal. 3d 118 (1970). Clerk‟s Transcript (“CT”) at 92-100. The trial court granted the 

motion and appointed new counsel. Id. at 101-03. Three months later, on November 13, 2008, 

petitioner filed a second Marsden motion seeking to relieve the newly appointed counsel. Id. at

111. However, petitioner withdrew the Marsden motion after a hearing. Id.; ART at 9. The next 

day, November 14, 2008, petitioner made a motion to represent himself pursuant to Faretta v. 

California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). ART at 3-5. The trial court informed petitioner of the risks of 

representing himself and relieved counsel. Id. Petitioner later signed a written waiver and 

represented himself at trial. CT at 306-07. 

Analysis

Petitioner argues he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel because his first 

attorney was deficient and the replacement attorney had not been prepared for trial, leading 

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petitioner to the poor decision to represent himself when his second motion to substitute counsel 

was denied. He asserts that the lack of competent counsel, and the denial of his second Marsden

motion, violated his constitutional rights. He also states that he did not withdraw the second 

Marsden motion, rather the trial court denied the motion and this denial also violated his 

constitutional rights.

This claim was raised in a state habeas petition with the Santa Cruz County Superior 

Court. Resp. Ex. 14. The Superior Court denied the claim as procedurally defaulted and also 

looked to the merits and found that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie case and that he 

failed to demonstrate prejudice. Pet. Ex. U. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the 

petition. Pet. Ex. X. Respondent argues that this claim should be denied as procedurally 

defaulted. Regardless, the Court will still look to the merits. Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 

524-25 (1997) (in the interests of judicial economy, federal courts may address an allegedly 

defaulted habeas claim on the merits if the issue on the claim‟s merits is clear).3

To the extent petitioner argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel from the two 

appointed attorneys, the claim is denied. The trial court granted petitioner‟s first Marsden motion 

and appointed him a new attorney. Petitioner filed the second Marsden motion because his new 

attorney filed a motion to continue to have more time to obtain an expert on identification for trial. 

Pet. at 34. Petitioner objected to the continuance so the attorney withdrew it. Id. Petitioner 

argues that the attorney was not ready for trial and had not properly prepared. Though, the 

attorney had only been appointed a few months before and it was petitioner who objected to a 

continuance. Even if counsel had been deficient, petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

Petitioner‟s argument that he was prejudiced by representing himself is meritless because he was 

informed of the risks of self-representation, he stated that he understood the risks, and he also 

signed a waiver.4

 

3 The remaining three claims were raised in the same state habeas petitions and were also denied 

as procedurally defaulted and on the merits. The Court will look to the merits of all of these 

claims below.

4 There is no indication that petitioner‟s self-representation was inadequate. Petitioner states that 

he hired an investigator, called twenty witnesses to testify including an expert on witness 

identification and an expert criminologist. Pet. at 40; CT at 298.

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Petitioner also argues that the trial court erred in denying the second Marsden motion. 

While there is no transcript of the hearing, the trial court minutes indicate that petitioner withdrew 

the motion. CT at 111. The next day the trial court transcripts reflect the trial court stating that 

petitioner made a Marsden motion and then withdrew the motion, and petitioner was present and 

did not object to the characterization of the facts. ART at 9. Because the trial court did not deny 

the motion, there was no error.

Even assuming the trial court did deny the Marsden motion, petitioner is still not entitled 

to habeas relief. The trial court had already granted a Marsden motion, three months prior, and 

did not err in denying the second Marsden motion, so soon after. Petitioner argues that his 

attorney was not adequately prepared for trial, yet it was petitioner who objected to a continuance. 

A criminal defendant who cannot afford to retain counsel has no right to counsel of his own 

choosing. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). Nor is he entitled to an attorney 

who likes and feels comfortable with him. See United States v. Schaff, 948 F.2d 501, 505 (9th Cir. 

1991). The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a “meaningful relationship” between an accused 

and his counsel; it only guarantees effective representation of counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 

1, 14 (1983). Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that assuming his second Marsden motion was 

denied, that the denial resulted in a violation of his rights. For all these reasons petitioner has not 

shown a violation of the Sixth Amendment.

V. JUDICIAL BIAS

Petitioner contends that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial judge when the trial 

judge ruled adversely against petitioner regarding security procedures because the trial judge knew 

the prosecutor‟s husband.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to a fair and impartial 

judge. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955). A “biased decisionmaker [is] 

constitutionally unacceptable.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). A claim of judicial 

misconduct by a state judge in the context of federal habeas review does not simply require that 

the federal court determine whether the state judge committed judicial misconduct; rather, the 

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question is whether the state judge‟s behavior “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair as to 

violate federal due process under the United States Constitution.” Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 

734, 740 (9th Cir. 1995).

A federal court must be convinced that a particular influence, “under a realistic appraisal of 

psychological tendencies and human weakness,” poses “such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment 

that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately 

implemented.” Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47. Federal habeas relief is therefore limited to those 

instances where there is proof of actual bias, or of a possible temptation so severe that one might 

presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased. See Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 31 

F.3d 1363, 1380 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Thus even where a judge had formerly served as a 

prosecutor, made decisions in a prior case involving the defendant and subsequently ruled on the 

admissibility of evidence concerning the prior case as a judge, habeas relief is unavailable absent a 

showing of actual bias or of an actual, substantial incentive to be biased. See id. at 1377-80. 

Similarly, proof that there was contact between the judge and the prosecutor does not merit habeas 

relief; only proof of an improper contact, e.g., an ex parte contact where the prosecutor is acting as 

an advocate for the government, does merit relief. See McKenzie v. McCormick, 27 F.3d 1415,

1419-20 (9th Cir. 1994) overruled on other grounds; see also Greenway v. Schriro, 653 F.3d 790, 

806-07 (9th Cir. 2011) (state trial court judge‟s “brief tangential employment relationship” with 

member of victims‟ family found insufficient to raise a judicial bias claim).

Background

Because petitioner was representing himself, the trial court stated the following regarding 

security procedures:

What I have worked out with court security is the following: 

Because of the fact that you‟re going to need to be able to move 

around, because of the fact that you‟re going to need to be able to 

come [to] sidebar, we‟re going to have an extra bailiff posted, and 

that‟s the only additional shackle that we‟re going to have.

RT at 255. The prosecutor asked if the bailiff would be present when they approached sidebar and 

the trial court responded that it would be “taken care of.” RT at 256. When the prosecutor asked 

if petitioner would have his legs shackled, the trial court stated, “no.” Id. Later, the prosecutor 

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stated:

And I again am concerned for my safety. He is a lifer. If he‟s 

convicted of this, the least amount of time he could do is 40 years to 

life. I know this Court knows that and a couple of witnesses from 

now, evidence being put on the stand, you know, tempers get flared; 

[petitioner] is not an attorney. He‟s not an officer of the court. He 

has chosen to represent himself. This is not like every other case 

that we do around here. Judge, I have concerns for my safety. 

RT at 778-79. Petitioner again objected to any procedure that highlighted his custodial status. RT 

at 779. To address the concerns of both parties, the trial court ruled that it would allow speaking 

objections during trial, and sidebar issues would take place outside the presence of the jury. Id.

Once trial began, petitioner informed the trial court that the ruling regarding sidebars was 

no longer satisfactory. He stated, “It‟s not working for me, Your Honor. If she has to have a cop 

over my shoulder, I would rather have that and a sidebar than not be able to approach during 

cross-examination of a witness.” RT at 1019. The trial court replied that it would honor 

petitioner‟s request. Id.

Before the trial ended, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss based on prosecutorial 

misconduct. CT at 363-66. When a hearing was held on the motion, petitioner raised an 

additional ground regarding bias on the part of the trial judge. The trial stated the following before 

petitioner‟s motion was heard:

[O]n April 23, 2008, I testified pursuant to a subpoena in a state bar 

trial involving the husband of [the prosecutor]. I was under a 

subpoena. And I gave testimony regarding legal work that he had 

done. And I didn‟t bring this up because I didn‟t see it as an issue 

that affected my ability to be fair and impartial in this case 

whatsoever. This case does not involve [the prosecutor‟s] husband. 

He has no connection to it.

However, after considering it overnight, I‟ve decided to disclose it. 

However, based on the statements that were made yesterday, I think 

[petitioner] stated that I‟ve conducted this trial in a fair and 

professional manner. But I decided to disclose it. Apparently –

now, is there something you wish to state with respect to that?

RT at 1503.

Petitioner read into the record the state bar decision which stated in part, “[t]wo judges of 

the Santa Cruz County Superior Court credibly testified as to Respondent‟s good character and 

superior legal abilities.” RT at 1504. Petitioner argued the he should have been notified that the 

trial judge was one of the judges. RT at 1505. The trial judge responded that he testified pursuant 

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to a subpoena regarding the prosecutor‟s husband, and that it had no bearing on his ability to be 

fair and impartial during the trial. RT at 1506. Petitioner argues that the trial judge‟s bias was 

demonstrated in his ruling on the security issues based on the judge‟s knowledge of the 

prosecutor‟s husband.

Analysis 

Petitioner has not shown that his trial was rendered so fundamentally unfair as to violate 

federal due process. Even if the trial judge was biased based on testifying pursuant to a subpoena 

at the prosecutor‟s husband‟s hearing, petitioner has not shown how the trial judge ruled against 

him or conducted the trial in a biased manner. The only example he offers is the ruling regarding 

the security arrangement for trial. Yet, to avoid the jury seeing a bailiff follow petitioner around 

the courtroom during trial, the judge stated sidebars would occur outside the presence of the jury 

and the parties would remain seated. The trial judge also did not force petitioner to be shackled. 

It was only when petitioner objected to the sidebar practice and stated he would prefer the 

presence of a bailiff at sidebars, did the judge enact the bailiff procedure. Petitioner has not shown 

any improper conduct, let alone bias that was so pervasive that it resulted in an unfair trial. This 

claim is denied.

VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL

Petitioner alleges that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the transcripts 

from the second Marsden hearing and failing to raise claims of Marsden error, judicial bias, and 

cumulative error.

Legal Standard

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the 

effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal as of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-

405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to the 

standard set out in Strickland. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000); Moormann v. 

Ryan, 628 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2010); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel‟s conduct so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as 

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having produced a just result. Strickland, at 686. 

Analysis

The Court has already found that the claims involving the Marsden error and judicial bias 

lacked merit; therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. As will be 

discussed below, the claim of cumulative error is also meritless. Nor is petitioner entitled to relief 

for appellate counsel failing to obtain the transcripts of the Marsden hearing. Petitioner includes a 

letter from appellate counsel who states that perhaps he should have requested the transcripts, but 

the standard for gaining a reversal on a denial of a Marsden motion is very difficult and, “it never 

occurred to me to connect the Faretta and the Marsden, and consider that you ended up 

representing yourself because your attorney‟s work was so substandard, rather than because you 

decided that you wanted to represent yourself.” Pet. at 77-79.

Even assuming that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to obtain the transcripts, 

petitioner has failed to show prejudice. Petitioner has not described what occurred in the Marsden

hearing that would support his claim, assuming that the trial court minutes and transcripts from the 

following day that reflect petitioner withdrew the Marsden motion are incorrect. His conclusory

argument that the transcripts would provide habeas relief is insufficient. See James v. Borg, 24 

F.3d 20, 26 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Conclusory allegations which are not supported by a statement of 

specific facts do not warrant habeas relief.”) This claim is denied.

VII. CUMULATIVE ERROR 

Petitioner contends that the cumulative error arising from the Marsden, judicial bias and 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims entitles him to habeas relief.

Legal Standard

In some cases, although no single trial error is sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal, 

the cumulative effect of several errors may still prejudice a defendant so much that his conviction 

must be overturned. See Alcala v. Woodford, 334 F.3d 862, 893-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (reversing 

conviction where multiple constitutional errors hindered defendant‟s efforts to challenge every 

important element of proof offered by prosecution).

Cumulative error is more likely to be found prejudicial when the government‟s case is 

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weak. See, e.g., Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other 

grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 829 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the only 

substantial evidence implicating the defendant was the uncorroborated testimony of a person who 

had both a motive and an opportunity to commit the crime). However, where there is no single 

constitutional error existing, nothing can accumulate to the level of a constitutional violation. See 

Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011). Similarly, there can be no cumulative error 

when there has not been more than one error. United States v. Solorio, 669 F.3d 943, 956 (9th Cir. 

2012).

Analysis 

This Court has not found any constitutional errors let alone multiple errors that 

cumulatively would allow for reversal. See Hayes, 632 F.3d at 524. Moreover, there was 

overwhelming evidence implicating petitioner in the burglary of the victim‟s residence. This 

claim is denied.

VIII. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, petitioner has made no showing warranting a certificate and so none is granted.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. A Certificate 

of Appealability is DENIED. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 29, 2015

______________________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

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Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VINCENT SOTO MARQUEZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

H LACKNER,

Defendant.

Case No. 13-cv-02525-JD 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. 

District Court, Northern District of California.

That on July 29, 2015, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing 

said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by 

depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery 

receptacle located in the Clerk's office.

Vincent Soto Marquez

H-31079

5150 Obyrnes Ferry Rd

Jamestown, CA 95327 

Dated: July 29, 2015

Richard W. Wieking

Clerk, United States District Court

By:________________________

LISA R. CLARK, Deputy Clerk to the 

Honorable JAMES DONATO

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