Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00184/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-00184-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mission Bank
Defendant
Jan Richmond
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff Jan Richmond seeks to strike affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant Mission 

Bank. (Docs. 6-7.) Defendant filed its opposition to the motion on May 1, 2014 (Doc. 9), to which 

Plaintiff filed a reply on May 7, 2014 (Doc. 10). For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike 

is GRANTED.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint against Mission Bank on February 10, 2014. 

(Doc. 2.) Her complaint contains the following factual allegations: Plaintiff was employed by Mission 

Bank as an executive administrative assistant to the bank president and board secretary beginning July 

7, 2007. (Id. at 1.) In April 2011, Mission Bank implemented a plan for the Bank’s president to be 

replaced by A.J. Antongiovanni. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that once Antongiovanni became the bank 

president, Plaintiff was removed from her private office and given a cubical “notwithstanding the fact 

JAN RICHMOND, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

MISSION BANK,

Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:14-cv-00184 - AWI - JLT

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO 

STRIKE DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATIVE 

DEFENSES

(Doc. 6)

ORDER CONTINUING SCHEDULING 

CONFERENCE

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private offices were empty and available, and Plaintiff engaged in activities that required privacy and 

confidentiality.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that in December 2012, Antongiovanni hired an executive assistant “who is 

substantially younger than Plaintiff.” (Doc. 2 at 2.) Plaintiff asserts that the new executive assistant, 

“DL,” obtained a position that was not posted, despite Mission Bank’s “policy of posting within the 

bank all open and available employment positions.” (Id.) 

According to Plaintiff, she was asked to perform a background check on DL as a condition of 

her employment, including a credit check. (Doc. 2 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges, “DL’s credit history was 

such that it should have precluded her from being hired. In fact, another older employee was given a 

similar letter of hire subject to a background check at or around the same time, yet was precluded from 

hire due to a credit background which was better than the credit background of DL.” (Id.) Although 

Plaintiff found DL had credit problems, Antongiovanni hired DL on December 15, 2011.1(Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that DL “received a bonus of $2000 for the year even though defendant Mission’s 

policy was to only give bonuses to assistant vice presidents and above,”and DL was not in one of those 

positions. (Id. at 2-3.) Plaintiff asserts that “DL was given a private office based upon the excuse that 

she handled confidential matters.” (Id.) 

In 2013, Plaintiff’s responsibility of “handling all Human Resources functions” was taken from 

her. (Doc. 2 at 3.) In addition, although Plaintiff had acquired the title of a vice president, she “was 

excluded from a management seminar in May 2013,” and was the only vice president excluded. (Id.) 

Throughout 2013, Plaintiff’s responsibilities were reduced to “the point that she was ultimately only 

performing work relating to administrative functions for the board of directors.” (Id.) However, “[i]n 

the fall of 2013, D.L. began performing administrative functions for the board of directors.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts that it appeared “clear” that Mission Bank and Antongiovanni, “were pushing Plaintiff 

out of the bank as an employee.” (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that on or about September 3, 2013, she “met with Antongiovanni and advised 

him [that] she realized what was happening, indicated she felt like she and others were victims of age 

 

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The complaint is inconsistent as to the date D.L. was hired. (Doc. 2 at 2) In paragraph 6, it alleges D.L. was hired, “In 

December 2012.” Id. In paragraph 7, it alleges “D.L. was hired on 12/15/11.” Id.

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discrimination, and requested that the bank offer her a severance package.” (Doc. 2 at 3.) In response, 

“Antongiovanni instructed Plaintiff to go home.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff asserts she was later “contacted 

by Antongiovanni [a]nd told not to return to defendant Bank.” (Id. at 3-4.) Further, Plaintiff “was 

advised to attend a meeting where a severance would be discussed. (Id. at 4.) According to Plaintiff:

Said meeting occurred and Plaintiff indicated she rejected the severance offer and made 

a counteroffer. No agreement was reached between the parties as to a severance 

agreement. Because Plaintiff had been told by Antongiovanni not to return to the bank 

her employment had been terminated. Alternatively, Plaintiff’s employment was 

constructively terminated as her job duties had been taken away, she had been replaced 

by someone substantially younger, and her hours had been cut.

(Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff filed a claim with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, 

pursuant to California Government Code §12965(b) and FEHA. (Doc. 2 at 4.) In addition, she filed a 

claim with the EEOC, and received “right-to-sue” letters from both agencies. (Id.) Accordingly, 

Plaintiff initiated the action now pending before the Court, asserting Defendant is liable for: (1) 

wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (2) wrongful termination in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 

626; (3) wrongful termination in violation of FEHA, Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940; (4) failure to take all 

reasonable steps to prevent discrimination and retaliation; and (5) retaliation in violation of FEHA. 

(Doc. 2 at 5-12.)

On March 24, 2014, Defendant filed its answer to Plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 5) In the answer, 

Defendant denied most of the allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint and set forth its view of the matter. 

Id. at 6-8. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff was employed by the bank and that her job duties changed 

from time-to-time. Id. at 6. When her job duties changed, Plaintiff accepted the changes in writing. 

Id. Defendant admits that another employee took on some of Plaintiff’s job duties and was given an 

office despite that Plaintiff was required to remain situated in a cubicle. Id. at 6-7. Defendant explains 

that this was for an unnamed business reason. Id.

Defendant alleges Plaintiff became frustrated with the situation but did not speak to her 

supervisors or make a formal complaint about it. (Doc. 5 at 6) Instead, on or about August 28, 2013, 

Plaintiff met with A.J. Antongiovanni and told him she was resigning. Id. at 7. Defendant alleges that 

she had made a similar statement at some point in the past but had actually quit. Id. As a result of her 

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August 28, 2013 statement that she was resigning, she was sent home for the remainder of the day, with 

pay. Id. The next work day, Plaintiff provided her written resignation and demanded a severance 

package which totaled two years of pay and benefits. Id. In addition, she demanded that she receive 

unemployment benefits. Id. 

Along with the severance demand, Plaintiff reported for the first time that she felt she had been 

treated differently or discriminated against due to her age. (Doc. 5 at 6) In return, Defendant accepted 

the resignation and made a written offer of a severance package. Id. When Plaintiff disagreed with the 

terms of the severance package, Antongiovanni provided her a revised package. Id. Even still, Plaintiff 

rejected the revised severance offer and rebuffed further discussions on the topic. Id. Plaintiff did not 

rescind her resignation and never again returned to work. Id. After this, another person—not D.L.—

was hired to replace Plaintiff. Id.

Based upon these factual allegations, Defendant asserted seventeen affirmative defenses, and 

reserved “the right to amend th[e] Response as additional affirmative defenses become known and/or 

available to Defendant.” (Doc. 5 at 11.) 

II. Pleading Standards for Affirmative Defenses

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a party responding to a pleading to identify its 

defenses to each claim asserted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1). Further, responding parties are instructed to 

“state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfaction; assumption of risk; 

contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of consideration; fraud; illegality; injury by fellow 

servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and 

waiver.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). 

Notably, the parties disagree as to whether the affirmative defenses require only fair notice or 

are subject to a heightened pleading standard. Defendant argues that “[a]ll that is required is that the 

Answer state ‘in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.’” (Doc. 9 at 2, 

quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)). On the other hand, Plaintiff asserts the Court should apply the 

heightened “plausibility” standards articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), which would require Defendant to plead “enough 

facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” (Doc. 7 at 2, citing J & J Sports Prods. v. 

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Franco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25642 (E.D. Cal. 2011)). 

Though “courts are in disagreement as to whether the pleading standard articulated in Twombly

and Iqbal extends to the pleading of affirmative defenses,” this Court has determined that “affirmative 

defenses are subject to the heightened pleading standards announced in Twombly and Iqbal.” Dodson 

v. Strategic Rests. Acquisition Co. II, LLC, 289 F.R.D. 595, 599, 603 (E.D. Cal. 2013); see also J & J 

Sports Prods. v. Franco, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25642 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (adopting the heightened 

pleading standard). Accordingly, “[i]n pleading an affirmative defense, a party must give ‘fair notice of 

what the affirmative defense] is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 603 

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) see also Kohler v. Staples, 

291 F.R.D. 464, 469 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (finding that an affirmative defense “must at least give notice of 

the grounds upon which it rests”).

III. Motion to Strike

The Court may strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or 

scandalous matter” from a pleading, either on the Court’s own motion or by motion of a party. Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 12(f). A defense may be “insufficient” as a matter of pleading or as a matter of law. See 

Security People, Inc. v. Classic Woodworking, LLC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44641, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 

Mar. 4, 2005) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979); Kaiser Aluminum 

& Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1057 (5th Cir. 1982)). A defense is 

insufficiently pled if it fails to give “fair notice” of the defense, and is insufficient as a matter of law 

when there are no questions of fact or law, and the defense would not succeed under any circumstances. 

Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827; SEC v. Sands, 902 F. Supp. 1149, 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citations omitted). 

Further, a defense may be stricken as immaterial if it “has no essential or important relationship to the 

claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d 1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 

1993) (citations omitted), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 517 (1994); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).

The purpose of a motion to strike under Rule 12(f) “is to avoid the expenditure of time and 

money that must arise from litigating spurious issues.” Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d 

880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983). However, motions to strike affirmative defenses “are disfavored and 

infrequently granted.” (Neveau v. City of Fresno, 392 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1170 (E.D. Cal. 2005). The 

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Court “must view the pleading under attack in the light more favorable to the pleader.” Garcia ex rel. 

Marin v. Clovis Unified School Dist., 2009 WL 2982900, at *23 (E.D. Cal. Sept.14, 2009) (internal 

citation omitted). Even if a court strikes an affirmative defense, leave to amend should be freely given 

where the opposing party will not be prejudiced given the strong policy favoring resolution of cases “on 

the proofs rather than the pleadings.” Rennie & Laughlin, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 242 F.2d 208, 213 

(9th Cir. 1957); Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827.

Plaintiff seeks to strike the First, Second2, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, 

Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Sixteenth Affirmative Defenses. (Docs. 6-7.) In 

addition, Plaintiff seeks to strike factual allegations related to Plaintiff’s unemployment proceedings. 

(Doc. 7 at 2-3.) Defendant agrees that the Fifth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Affirmative Defenses are not 

proper and should be stricken without leave to amend. (Doc. 9 at 5-6.) In addition, Defendant agrees 

the factual allegations related to the unemployment proceedings may be stricken, and acknowledges the 

Sixth and Ninth Affirmative Defenses are insufficient as a matter of pleading. (Id.) Accordingly, the 

Court addresses only the disputed affirmative defenses.

IV. Discussion and Analysis

A. First Affirmative Defense: “Plaintiff’s complaint and each claim therein, fails to state 

facts sufficient to constitute a claim for relief against Defendant.” (Doc. 5 at 8.)

Plaintiff notes that this Court previously determined “such a defense to be subject to being 

stricken.” (Doc. 7 at 3) (citing Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alvarado, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125441 

(E.D. Cal. 2010)). On the other hand, Defendant argues that the defense is proper because: “Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) provides that the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted (Rule 12(b)(6)) may be raised ‘in any pleading allowed or ordered under Rule 7(a).’ 

Pleadings allowed by Rule 7(a) include answers.” (Doc. 9 at 3.)

Previously, this Court explained that proper “[a]ffirmative defenses plead matters extraneous to 

the plaintiff’s prima facie case, which deny plaintiff’s right to recover, even if the allegations of the 

complaint are true.” Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Main Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 262 (E.D. Cal. 

 

2 Although the Second Affirmative Defenses is not identified as challenged in the Notice of Motion, Plaintiff 

addresses this affirmative defense in the moving papers. (Doc. 6 at 1; Doc. 7 at 3.)

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1987) (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1980)). Although the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure provide that failure to state a claim may be identified in an answer3, numerous courts have 

determined this is not a proper affirmative defense because it is simply an assertion of a defect in the 

complaint. See, e.g., Powell v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 864 F. Supp. 2d 949, 962 (E.D. Cal. 2012)

(striking the affirmative defense where the defendant asserted the plaintiff “failed to allege ... the facts 

necessary to support his various claims” because failure to state a claim was an improper affirmative 

defense); Barnes v. AT&T Pension Benefit Plan, 718 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Failure 

to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in [the plaintiff’s] prima 

facie case”); Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Del. Partners, LLC, 291 F.R.D. 438, 442 (C.D. Cal. 2013) 

(“failure to state a claim is not an affirmative defense; it is a defect in a plaintiff’s claim”); see also 

Zivkovic v. S. California Edison Co., 302 F.3d 1080, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (“that [a] plaintiff has not 

met its burden of proof as to an element plaintiff is required to prove is not an affirmative defense”). 

Accordingly, Defendant’s first affirmative defense is STRICKEN.

B. Second Affirmative Defense (Consent): “Plaintiff’s claims are barred by Plaintiff’s 

consent to, and/or voluntary participation in, some or all of the acts or conduct alleged. 

Specifically, Plaintiff consented to changes to her job duties and voluntarily resigned 

her employment.” (Doc. 5 at 8.)

Defendant asserts that if Plaintiff consented to changes in her job duties, “those actions could 

not form the basis of a ‘constructive discharge.’” (Doc. 9 at 3.) According to Defendant, its “evidence 

will demonstrate that [Plaintiff] consented or specifically agreed (and in some instances requested) to 

the changes that she now uses to claim that she worked in a hostile environment.” (Id.) Importantly, 

however, Defendant has cited no legal authority for its position that consent is an affirmative defense 

to Plaintiff’s claims for wrongful termination, discrimination, and retaliation and the Court has not 

located any such authority. Though Plaintiff’s consent to changes in her assigned duties clearly 

undermines her claim that she suffered discrimination, it does not appear “consent” in this context is a 

proper affirmative defense to the claims presented as it addresses only a portion of the factual 

 

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The difficulty with Defendant’s rationale is that Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2) permits a defendant to wait to raise Plaintiff’s

failure to state a claim until trial. By definition, an affirmative defense must be raised in the answer or by motion or it is 

waived. Indeed, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) specifically excludes this topic from those that must be raised in

order to avoid a waiver.

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underpinnings for the claim of construction discharge and does not address the claim itself. Instead, in 

this context, it is more in line with the discussion above that the Plaintiff cannot meet her burden of 

proof. Therefore, it is STRICKEN.

C. Fourth Affirmative Defense (Failure to Exhaust Internal Remedies): “Plaintiff’s 

claims are barred, in whole or in part by Plaintiffs unreasonable failure to take 

advantage of preventative and/or corrective opportunities and by her unreasonable 

failure to exhaust other internal remedies that Defendant provided.” (Doc. 5 at 8.)

According to Defendant, “if Plaintiff perceived she was being treated differently because of her 

age she failed to make any internal complaints or raise the issue until after” the termination of her 

employment with Mission Bank. (Doc. 5 at 8.) Defendant asserts these allegations satisfy the notice

requirement, because [w]hat the internal processes consisted of, where it was found, and whether 

Plaintiff was aware of them, can be determined in discovery.” (Id.) On the other hand, Plaintiff asserts 

that further information must be plead, including the policy itself, its specific provisions, and what 

Plaintiff failed to do. (Doc. 10 at 2.) 

The Court notes the defense is subtitled, “Failure to Exhaust Internal Remedies” though the 

information contained within the defense seems to indicate that the defense is merely that Plaintiff 

never complained about the situation before she resigned. Thus, the description seems to be at odds 

with the subtitle. If the subtitle was eliminated, the Court would find that the factual allegations set 

forth are sufficient. However, with the subtitle, it is unclear exactly what internal remedies were 

available and what they required. Thus, Defendant has not provided a sufficient factual basis for the 

defense and, consequently, Defendant has failed to state “the grounds upon which [the affirmative 

defense] rests.” See Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 603; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the Fourth 

Affirmative Defense is STRICKEN with leave to amend.

D. Third, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses:

Good Faith Conduct, Reasonable Factor other than Age, Lawful Reasons for 

Termination, Business Necessity, and Actions Unrelated to Protected Status or Activity 

(Doc. 5 at 9-10.)

Plaintiff argues these affirmative defenses are not proper because “defendant merely denies 

that age was a factor.” (Doc. 7 at 4.) Plaintiff notes that this Court previously explained: “general 

denials of the allegations in the complaint or allegations that plaintiff cannot prove certain elements of 

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his claim are not affirmative defenses.” (Id., quoting Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alvarado, 2010 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125441 (E.D. Cal. 2010)). However, under FEHA courts employ a shifting burden 

to evaluate claims of retaliation and discrimination. Accordingly, once a plaintiff establishes a prima 

facie case, the employer must offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the actions. See Reeves 

v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000); Collings v. Longview Fibre Co., 63 

F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 1995); Smith v. Barton, 914 F.2d 1330, 1340 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, 

these defenses are relevant to the claims presented by Plaintiff.

Defendant asserts Mission Bank “changed Plaintiffs job duties for business reasons and not 

because of Plaintiffs age.” (Doc. 5 at 8.) In addition, Defendant alleges, “If Defendant’s actions are 

deemed a constructive termination, Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant was terminated for nonpretextual reasons other than the discrimination and/or retaliation alleged by Plaintiff.” (Id.) Further, 

Defendant alleges the bank “would have taken the same action even in the absence of Plaintiff’s 

affiliation with a protected class or engagement in alleged protected activity.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff 

contends the affirmative defenses are insufficiently plead because “[t]here is nothing set forth in the 

defense that gives fair notice to what defendant claims is the nondiscriminatory reason why it took the 

actions it did.” (Doc. 10 at 2.) 

Under the heightened pleading standard, “in order to adequately ‘state . . . its defenses to each 

claim asserted against it’ under Rule 8(b)(1), a party must allege ‘sufficient factual matter, accepted as 

true,’... to demonstrate that plaintiff lacks a right of recovery.” Dodson, 289 F.R.D. at 601 (quoting 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This Court has explained, “To hold otherwise would permit defendants to 

merely plead ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of’ an affirmative 

defense... and in so doing, undermine the rationale of Twombly and Iqbal.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555. Consequently, Defendant has the burden to state sufficient facts to support its 

conclusion that “there were legitimate reasons for Defendant’s actions other than Plaintiff’s age.” (See

Doc. 9 at 4.) 

The ambiguity of the pleading makes it unclear whether it is adequately supported by factual 

allegations. For example, there are clear factual allegations that Plaintiff chose to quit her job. 

However, Plaintiff’s separation from her employment is only one of the adverse employment actions 

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she alleges. If these defenses are directed only to her job separation, the factual allegations are 

sufficient assuming Defendant makes this clarification. However, if these defenses are intended also 

to address the other adverse employment actions, such as the change(s) in job duties and the move 

from the private office to the cubicle, there are no factual allegations to support these actions. The fact 

that Plaintiff “accepted” the duty changes is not equivalent to a determination that the motivation for 

the change in job duties was not discriminatory and the fact that Defendant alleges these actions were 

taken in good faith and for a legitimate business reason, does not translate these conclusions to 

adequate factual support.

Thus, as currently pleaded, the affirmative defenses identified above are not sufficiently 

supported by the factual allegations set forth in the answer. Accordingly, the Third, Seventh, Tenth, 

Eleventh, and Thirteenth Affirmative Defenses are STRICKEN with leave to amend.

E. Fourteenth Affirmative Defense (Limited by Scope of Administrative Complaint): 

“The Complaint and each cause of action alleged therein are barred to the extent that 

they exceed the scope of the applicable administrative complaint, if any, that Plaintiff 

filed with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing and/or the Equal 

Employment Opportunity Commission, and/or any other government agency, on which 

the complaint appears to be based.” (Doc. 5 at 10.)

Defendant asserts: “The claims for relief outlined in the complaint may be further fleshed out in 

discovery as the case proceeds. To the extent the claims move beyond Plaintiff’s administrative 

charges, Defendant may defend the claims for relief to the extent they go beyond the administrative 

charges.” (Doc. 9 at 6) (citing Shah v. Mt. Zion Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 642 F.2d 268, 271-72 (9th Cir. 

1981)). Plaintiff contends that “Defendant fails to provide any notice as to what the content of the 

EEOC or DFEH charges that make them inadequate for the current complaint.” (Doc. 7 at 7) 

Moreover, counsel admitted at the hearing that there is no current information which indicates 

Plaintiff’s case exceeds her administrative complaints. Thus, because there is no factual support for the 

Fourteenth Affirmative Defense, it is STRICKEN. However, in the event that the case develops in 

such a way as to implicate claims that exceed the administrative action, this order will not preclude 

Defendant from raising this issue. Indeed, if this occurs, the Court’s jurisdiction would likely not 

extend to those additional claims. Shah, at 272.

///

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V. Conclusion

Many of the affirmative defenses asserted by Defendant appear to be boilerplate defenses that 

fail to provide Plaintiff with fair notice. Rather, the affirmative defenses are legal conclusions and 

theories, without adequate factual support. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 

1. Plaintiff’s motion to strike is GRANTED;

2. The request to strike factual allegations related to Plaintiff’s unemployment 

proceedings is GRANTED without leave to amend;

3. The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth

Affirmative Defenses Defendant are STRICKEN with leave to amend;

4. The First, Second, Fifth, Twelfth and Sixteenth Affirmative Defenses are STRICKEN 

without leave to amend; and

5. Any amended answer SHALL be filed within 21 days of the date of service of this 

order;

6. To allow the pleadings to become settled, the Court CONTINUES the scheduling 

conference from May 27, 2014 to July 7, 2014 at 8:45.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 15, 2014 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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