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Parties Involved:
Mario B. Taylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted March 18, 2016 

Decided March 21, 2016 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3657 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

MARIO B. TAYLOR, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 15-CR-30105-MJR 

Michael J. Reagan, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R 

Following a domestic disturbance, Mario Taylor was charged with one count of 

possessing a firearm as a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He pleaded guilty, and the district 

court sentenced him to 117 months’ imprisonment followed by 3 years’ supervised 

release. Taylor filed a notice of appeal, but the lawyer appointed to represent him has 

concluded that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 

386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Taylor has not responded to our invitation to comment on 

counsel’s motion and brief. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the 

case and addresses the issues that a case of this kind might be expected to involve. 

Because the analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, we limit our review to the 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-3657 Page 2 

subjects discussed by counsel. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014);

United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Taylor pleaded guilty without a plea agreement and was unable to agree with the 

government on a version of relevant facts. In the government’s view Taylor had been 

recalcitrant in discussing or negotiating its proposed stipulation of facts, and it therefore 

refused to move for an additional one-level reduction to Taylor’s offense level for 

acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). The probation office prepared a 

presentence report and calculated a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months (based on an 

offense level of 30 and a criminal history category of III), capped by a statutory 

maximum of 120 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2); U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a). 

Taylor objected in writing to the government’s decision, as recited in the PSR, to 

withhold a third-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). He cited commentary to the 

guideline that discourages the government from withholding the reduction based on 

interests not identified in § 3E1.1. Whether or not a defendant “refuses to negotiate” is 

not a factor listed in § 3E1.1, Taylor argued, and additional commentary clarifies, that a 

defendant need not agree to more conduct than necessary to support the crime of 

conviction in order to receive the initial two-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. nn.1(A), 6. At the sentencing hearing Taylor 

renewed his objection, stressing that penalizing a defendant for refusing to accept the 

government’s proposed facts would chill plea negotiations and that he had pleaded 

guilty quickly, thereby relieving the government of the need to expend resources to 

prepare for trial. 

The district judge denied Taylor’s request to order the government to move for a 

third-level reduction under § 3E1.1(b). The judge observed that the U.S. Attorney’s 

Office in the Southern District of Illinois did not have a history or pattern of withholding 

the third-level reduction and added that he would factor Taylor’s guilty plea into his 

consideration of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge decided 

upon a 117-month sentence, below the 120-month cap, because Taylor pleaded guilty “in 

a timely fashion” and “should get some consideration for that.” At the end of the 

hearing, the judge was asked if he would have imposed the same sentence had the 

third-level reduction been included. The judge responded, “Yes. Quite frankly, I gave 

him the point you didn’t but added some time because of the egregious nature of the 

history and this offense, so it would not have changed.” 

In his Anders brief counsel tells us that Taylor does not wish to challenge his 

guilty plea and thus appropriately forgoes discussing the voluntariness of the plea or the 

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No. 15-3657 Page 3 

adequacy of the plea colloquy. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 

2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002). 

Counsel considers whether Taylor could challenge the calculation of his 

guidelines range and proceeds to identify—and reject as frivolous—a potential claim 

that the district court erred by failing to order the government to move for a third-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility. But even if Taylor could show that the 

government impermissibly withheld the third-level reduction and that the court erred in 

refusing to order a motion for reduction, any error would be harmless. The court 

expressly stated that it would have imposed the same sentence with the three-level 

reduction. When a guidelines range is miscalculated, we have found harmless error 

where the sentencing court has unequivocally stated—as it did here—that it would have 

imposed the same sentence under a correct calculation of the guidelines. See United States 

v. Sanchez, 810 F.3d 494, 497 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hines-Flagg, 789 F.3d 751, 757 

(7th Cir. 2015). 

Counsel next considers two potential procedural challenges to the district court’s 

explanation of the sentence imposed. First, he considers whether Taylor could argue that 

the court failed to address all of his principal arguments in mitigation because the court 

did not discuss the environment Taylor grew up in. Although the district court did not 

explicitly address the effect Taylor’s environment had on him, it implicitly 

acknowledged his argument by discussing how dangerous the neighborhood was and 

concluding that his behavior contributed to the problem. See United States v. Davis, 

764 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2009). 

Second, counsel considers an argument that the district court did not adequately explain 

the sentence. But the court justified its 117-month sentence with regard to the § 3553 

sentencing factors: the court referred to Taylor’s extensive criminal history, including 

repeated incidents of violence against women, as well as the failure of previous 

sentences to deter Taylor from further criminal activity. Any argument that the court did 

not explain “the reason for imposing a sentence at a particular point” would be 

frivolous. See United States v. Washington, 739 F.3d 1080, 1081 (7th Cir. 2014) (internal 

citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Finally, counsel properly rejects as frivolous a potential challenge to the 

substantive reasonableness of Taylor’s sentence, which was below the calculated 

guidelines range. Even if Taylor had received a third-level reduction for acceptance of 

responsibility, his guidelines range would have been 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment, 

capped by the 120-month statutory maximum; 117 months then would be within the 

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guidelines range. Under either formulation, the sentence would be presumptively 

reasonable. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007); United States v. Martinez, 

650 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2011). Counsel has not identified a reason to disturb the 

presumption, nor can we. As discussed above, the district court considered the relevant 

sentencing factors. In particular, the court found that Taylor’s criminal history was 

underrepresented because many of Taylor’s convictions did not receive criminal history 

points, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a), and that a significant sentence was 

needed in order to deter Taylor from committing future crimes, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a)(2)(B). But the court also acknowledged that Taylor had pleaded guilty 

promptly and deserved some benefit for doing so. 

We conclude by observing that the standard conditions of supervised release 

imposed by the district court include some that we have criticized. See United States v. 

Wheeler, No. 15-2785, 2016 WL 762124, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016) (condition barring 

defendant from leaving judicial district); United States v. Henry, No. 14-3810, 2016 WL 

629992, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb. 17, 2016) (condition allowing probation officer to visit at 

defendant’s home “or elsewhere”); United States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 379 (7th Cir. 

2015) (condition that defendant notify probation officer of any change in residence or 

employment). But counsel has not identified a potential argument related to these 

conditions and Taylor did not respond to the Anders brief, so we have no reason to 

believe that he wishes to challenge them. See United States v. Bryant, 754 F.3d 443, 447 

(7th Cir. 2014). If Taylor later finds the conditions problematic in application, he can seek 

modification to the extent authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2). See United States v. Neal, 

810 F.3d 512, 516–20 (7th Cir. 2016). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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