Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03081/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03081-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mohammad Hassan Hammoude
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

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Argued January 6, 1995 Decided March 17, 1995

No. 91-3081

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MOHAMMAD HASSAN HAMMOUDE,

APPELLANT

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 90cr253)

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Sandra G. Roland, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on

the briefs was A.J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Lilly Ann Sanchez, Assistant United States Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the

brief were Eric H. Holder, Jr., United States Attorney, Roy W. McLeese, III, John R. Fisher and

Craig S. Iscoe, Assistant United States Attorneys.

Before: BUCKLEY, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.

Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.

TATEL, Circuit Judge: Mohammad Hassan Hammoude was arrested after purchasing several

custom-made rubber stampsthat could be used to make copies of United States nonimmigrant visas.

Officers of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who arrested him, also confiscated a piece

of paper on which was smeared an image of the stamps. On the basis of this and other evidence

presented at trial, a jury convicted Hammoude of two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(5),

which bars the possession of instruments that can be used to make false "identification documents,"

and on two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a), which criminalizes various forms of fraud in

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connection with the reproduction of visas. We reverse Hammoude's convictions under section 1028,

holding that a visa is not an identification document, and also reverse one of the section 1546(a)

convictions because no reasonable juror could conclude that Hammoude had created a "counterfeit"

visa. We sustain Hammoude's conviction on the second section 1546(a) count because the admission

of certain evidencehis only point of appeal applicable to that convictionwas not plain error.

I.

The heart of Hammoude's appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence introduced

at trial, and we thus consider that evidence in the light most favorable to the government. United

States v. Teffera, 985 F.2d 1082, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1993). So understood, the evidence tells us the

following.

On January 12, 1990, Hammoude and hisfather entered the Baumgarten Company, a vendor

of rubber stamps in Washington, D.C. Hammoude asked the company's owner, Melvin "Buddy"

Gusdorf, if Gusdorf could make a stamp that would reproduce a nonimmigrant United States visa.

As a sample, Hammoude showed Gusdorf a Jordanian passport that belonged to his sister-in-law,

directing his attention to a nonimmigrant visa printed inside.

The visa, issued by the United States consulate in Kuwait, is a multicolored image made of

seven horizontal bands of different colored ink, beginning at the top inhe visaincluding the serial

numberwas necessarily unique to the person to whom it was issued.

Gusdorf concluded that the best way to reproduce the visa would be to make seven different

stamps, one for each differently-colored strip of the visa. These stamps could then be inked with

different colors, and the impressions aligned on a piece of paper to create the multicolored copy.

Hammoude approved this approach, but requested that Gusdorf omit from the rubber stamps the

original visa's handwritten features, date of issue, and serial number. He ordered a separate number

stamp to supply new serial numbers, and also ordered a date stamp, which he asked Gusdorf to

rearrange to conform to the "day, month, year" form of the date on the visa. On the order form,

Hammoude gave his name as "Abbas Ayood," and provided a false address and phone number.

Gusdorf kept the passport to use as a master for the stamps.

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Unfortunately for Hammoude, Gusdorf was a past chair of his trade association's Fraudulent

Marking Device Committee. Gusdorf's company had also worked for federal agencies on several

occasions, so he knew that Hammoude could not reproduce visas without official authorization.

Gusdorf contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which instructed him to fill

Hammoude's order and assigned investigators to the case.

On January 19th, Hammoude returned to Gusdorf's shop to pick up the stamps. According

to Gusdorf, he and Hammoude attempted to create a finished copy of a visa by aligning the images

from the seven inked stamps. Gusdorf guessed that they completed two or three full impressions,

although he was not certain, and the impressions were not recovered. Although somewhat frustrated

with the difficulty of aligning the images, Hammoude left the store with the stamps, colored ink pads,

and date and number stamps. Gusdorf was unable to contact the I.N.S. agent staking out the store

when Hammoude left, so the agent could not positively identify him as the suspect. Although the

agent did questionHammoude brieflyas he left the storeapparentlyHammoude matched Gusdorf's

original description enough to raise suspicionsthe agent allowed him to leave.

Hammoude's brush with the law did not deter him. Later that day, still frustrated with his

inability to align the seven stamps, Hammoude called Gusdorf and asked him to make a single stamp

of the entire visa. Gusdorf agreed, and told him to return in three days.

On January 22nd, Hammoude returned to the store to pick up the new stamp. He had the old

stamps with him, but they were in a curiousform: In an attempt to align the images, Hammoude had

pulled the raised plastic piece off each stamp's wooden base and arranged them, with glue, onto a

piece of paper. The result was a single "composite" stamp which was an approximationalbeit a

poor oneof the one-piece visa stamp that Hammoude was picking up that day. We provide a

photograph of this composite stamp in Appendix B. To carry this somewhat inky composite stamp,

Hammoude had folded the backing paper over it, leaving a faint image of the stamp on the paper,

which we reproduce to the right of the stamp at Appendix B.

As Hammoude left the store this time, an I.N.S. agent arrested him, confiscating the new

stamp, the ink pads, the date and nu in a pamphlet that he was creating for Arabic visitors to the

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United States. He testified that he did not give Gusdorf his real name because overseas organizations

could trace him and kill him "because they can call me a puppet, since I have [become an] American

citizen." He also claimed that he glued the seven stamps to the paper in order to render them

"useless" after discovering that their production might have been illegal.

A jury returned guilty verdicts under all four counts. Hammoude was sentenced to four

months in prison, four months of house arrest, three months' supervised release, and $200 in fines.

He has already served the prison term. The district court suspended the house arrest pending this

appeal.

II.

Hammoude was charged with two violations ofsection 1028 because he allegedly possessed

"a document-making implement"rubber stamps"with the intent such document-making

implement will be used in the production of a false identification document." 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(5)

(1988). Hammoude's primary argument on appeal is that a visa is not an "identification document"

as defined under the statute and, thus, that there wasinsufficient evidence to convict him of violating

18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(5). We review his convictions de novo to determine "whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, "any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Teffera, 985 F.2d at 1085 (quoting

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

We must first address the government's assertion, presented only in a footnote, that

Hammoude has waived this statutory argument by failing clearly to raise it in either of his motions

for a judgment of acquittalone at the close of the government's case, and one at the close of the

trial. We disagree. Hammoude's second motion for acquittal was broadly stated, without specific

grounds, and was therefore sufficient to preserve the full range of challenges, whether stated or

unstated, to the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 299 (1994). Moreover, the heart of Hammoude's appeal is that, under

any conceivable interpretation of the facts, he could not have violated section 1028. Whether his

appeal is framed as a due process claim, a failure to award a judgment of acquittal, or otherwise, we

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must reverse the conviction if Hammoude's actions were not a violation of the statute. See United

States v. Baxley, 982 F.2d 1265, 1268 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that argument that defendant was not

"in custody" at time of escape, asrequired by statute, was not waived by failure to raise in motion for

judgment of acquittal).

Our examination of the merits of Hammoude's appeal begins with the statutory definition of

"identification document." According to section 1028(d)(1), an "identification document" is "a

document made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government ... which, when

completed with information concerning a particular individual, is of a type intended or commonly

accepted for the purpose of identification of individuals." The House Report accompanying what

became section 1028 demonstratFederal or State government entity." Id.

We have notfound, nor have the parties cited, anyreported decisionsinvolving the application

of section 1028 to visas. In fact, only two published circuit court decisions, both by the Fourth

Circuit, have applied the definition of "identification documents" under section 1028, and they

involved SocialSecuritycards and FormI-94Arrival-DepartureRecords, whichthe courts concluded

were "identification documents" within the meaning of the statute. See United States v. Pahlavani,

802 F.2d 1505 (4th Cir. 1986) (I-94 forms); United States v. Quinteros, 769 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.

1985) (Social Security cards). In the Quinteros case, the court relied on testimony that Social

Security cards were "commonly accepted" as identification documents. An employee of the Social

Security Administration testified that the Administration often issued cards for older persons to use

as identification for cashing checks. She also testified that because the cards were so often used for

identification, the government removed a notice from the back of the cards that had stated that they

were "Not for Identification Purposes." In all, the court concluded, there was a "common

understanding that Social Security cards are identification documents." 769 F.2d at 970.

In Pahlavani, the court found a similar "common understanding" that immigration papers

known as FormI-94 Arrival-DepartureRecords were identification documents, noting that theywere

regularlyused to identifyan immigrantseeking employment or public benefits. The court emphasized

that the papers bore an individual's name, passport number, U.S. and foreign addresses, date of birth,

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and other informationthe very type of information, according to the legislative history, that is

contained in an "identification document" as defined under the statute. 802 F.2d at 1506 (citing H.R.

Rep. No. 802, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982)); see also 769 F.2d at 970.

In contrast to the Fourth Circuit cases, the government in this case provided no evidence

reasonably sufficient to persuade anyone that a visa is "intended or commonly accepted" as an

identification document. We cannot comprehend the bare assertion in the government's brief that "a

visa provides equivalent if not more identification information than a Social Security card." At least

a Social Security card associates the bearer with a "unique number"; a visa associates an individual's

name with no unique information.

The little evidence that the government presented on this point does not support its argument

that a visa is an identification document within the meaning of section 1028. John Caulfield, Jr.,

Deputy Director of Fraud Prevention Programs at the State Department, testified that "[a] visa is a

document which identifies someone as eligible to come to the United States." When asked by the

government whether it was "fair to say that the visa itselfidentifiesthe passport bearer as a party that

has been issued that visa," Caulfield answered, "Yes, right. It identifies the bearer of the passport as

eligible to travel to the United States." None of this testimony, however, establishes that a visa is

"intended or commonly accepted" as identificationi.e., that it actually ental body that served any

purpose specific to the individual could be considered an "identification document," including tax

documents, notices of jury duty, and unemployment checks. Absent more explicit language from

Congress, we read the statute to cover only those documents that are "intended or commonly

accepted" for the identification of individuals as themselves, and decline to expand its meaning to

cover documents that merely identify individuals as eligible for some benefit or subject to some

liability.

The government relies on the legislative history to argue that since visas are used by customs

officials in their "certain circle," they are "identification documents." See H.R. Rep. No. 802, 97th

Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1982). But as we note above, the government presented no evidenceand we

do not see how it could havethat customs officials use a visa to identify an individual. A visa is not

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designed to assure a customs officer or anyone else that the bearer of the visa is the individual it

names. Even customs officials must look to the passport, with its name, address, photograph, and

other identifying information, to verify that the bearer is the individual he or she claims to be.

Finally, the government presented evidence of a black market for visas, and claims that, as in

Pahlavani and Quinteros, the presence of a black market supports its argument that they are

intrinsically valuable as identification. See 808 F.2d at 1506; 769 F.2d at 970. The Pahlavani and

Quinteros courts, however, concluded that presence of a black market merely reinforced their

conclusions that the documents at issue were "identification documents." The existence of a black

market means no more than that a visa has value, and adds nothing to our inquiry.

We hold that no reasonable jury could conclude that a nonimmigrant visa is an identification

document as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1). We thus reverse Hammoude's convictions under

the first and second counts of the indictment, which charged him with a violation of section 1028.

III.

Hammoude next challengesthe sufficiency of the evidence convicting him on the third count

for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (1988), which includes at least two different theories of criminal

liability. In the first paragraph, the statute provides for a "counterfeit" theory, establishing penalties

for anyone who "knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any ... nonimmigrant visa."

The second paragraph provides, in part, for an "impression" theory of liability for anyone who,

without authorization, "knowingly ... makes any ... impression in the likeness of any ... nonimmigrant

visa." The third and fourth counts of the indictment used both the counterfeit and impression

language in charging Hammoude with violating the statute on or about January 19th and 22nd,

respectively.

In defending the convictions, the government points out that Hammoude made many

"impressions" of visas; at the very least, the rubber stamps might be considered impressions, as might

the photocopies Gusdorf made in preparing those stamps. The government also argues that the faint

smear on the folded-over paper is an impression. These multiple impressions on multiple days were

morety of the third count as stated in the indictmentwe might agree with the government and

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uphold the conviction on an impression theory. But that is not what happened. At trial and in the

verdict forms, the government pursued the third count solely on the counterfeit theory. Indeed, at

the close of the trial, although Hammoude's attorney requested that the jury verdict form simply

restate the language of the indictment, the prosecutor asked that the jury be presented with much

more specific questions. In particular, the government expressly stated that although both the

impression and the counterfeit theories were possible under the third count, it was "onlycharging [the

counterfeit offense] and not both," and did not want to confuse the jury by presenting it with general

language, or even language outlining both theories. The trial court sided with the government, and

the jury verdict form on the third count read as follows:

Count Three

[A.] As to Count Three, knowingly counterfeiting or falsely making a

nonimmigrant visa by use of a multiple-piece rubber stamp within the premises of the

Baumgarten Company of Washington, how do you find the defendant?

_____ Guilty _____ Not Guilty

[B.] As to Count Three, knowingly counterfeiting or falsely making a

nonimmigrant visa by use of a multiple-piece rubber stamp glued to a piece of paper,

how do you find the defendant?

_____ Guilty _____ Not Guilty

The jury marked "Not Guilty" for the first question and "Guilty" for the second. The court gave it

no opportunity to find Hammoude "guilty" of a violation under 1546(a) on any theory other than the

counterfeit theory presented in the jury verdict form. Absent such an opportunity, we cannot, as the

government argues, presume that the juryrelied onan alternative "impression" theoryofliabilitywhen

it checked the "guilty" box in the second question. By giving the jury a special verdict only, the

government tied itsand ourhands. We therefore review Hammoude's conviction on the third

count only to determine whether any reasonable juror could have concluded that Hammoude was

guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of "counterfeiting or falsely making a nonimmigrant visa by use

of a multiple-piece rubber stamp glued to a piece of paper."

To pass as a counterfeit, an image must bear such a likeness to the original as "is calculated

to deceive an honest,sensible and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing with

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a person supposed to be upright and honest." United States v. Gomes, 969 F.2d 1290, 1293 (1st Cir.

1992) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Hammoude argues, and the government does not

really contest, that, using this standard, no evidence exists to prove that he created a counterfeit "by

use of a multiple-piece rubber stamp glued to a piece of paper." The image of the composite stamp

on the folded-over paper, reproduced at Appendix B, is far too smeared and faint for any individual

to think it an actual visa. This is especially true since it is not printed in a passport, which, as the

government's witness testified, is necessary for a valid visa in all but a few instances.

Even if the impression of the composite stamp had transferred perfectly, it would have been

far from since they had no identifying features printed onto them).

For all these reasons, the composite stamp did not createand could not have createda

sufficiently exact replica to have been a "counterfeit." Because the jury verdict form effectively

prevented the jury from finding Hammoude guilty on any alternative set of facts, we reverse

Hammoude's conviction under the third count.

IV.

Because we have reversed his conviction on the first three counts, Hammoude's final point

of appeal relates only to the fourth counthis conviction for making an impression of a visa in

violation ofsection 1546(a). He argues that the trial court committed plain error by admitting a letter

from his brother to a Kuwaiti colleague of his brother's, which included a postscript stating that if the

colleague wanted a visa, he should send a "copy of his passport and photographs" to Hammoude's

brother. The government's use of this letter, Hammoude claims, was an impermissible attempt to

prove guilt by association. It was also prejudicial, he claims, because it discredited his testimony

regarding his intent to use the stamps only to produce sample visas in a tourist pamphlet.

Because Hammoude did not object to the admission ofthe letter at trial, we review the district

court's decision to admit it for plain error. We reverse only if the admission of the letter was clear

error under established law of the circuit and significant enough to prejudice the jury. See United

States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993); United States v. Mitchell, 996 F.2d 419, 422 (D.C.

Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has warned that we should reverse a conviction only if the error

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"seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings." See Olano,

113 S. Ct. at 1779 (citation and quotation marks omitted).

We need not address the question of clear error because we find that Hammoude has not

proven that he was prejudiced by the admission of the letter, let alone that it "seriously affected" the

fairness of the proceedings. Overwhelming evidence, such as the order forms for the stamps, the

photocopy that Gusdorf made at Hammoude's direction, and the stamps themselves, supports the

jury's verdict that Hammoude created an "impression" of a visa in violation ofsection 1546(a). Even

if the jury had ignored the letter and believed Hammoude's defense, he still would have reproduced

a visa without authorization, and stillwould have violated the statute. The admission of the letter into

evidence was thus not plain error.

V.

Because a visa is not an identification document, and because the composite stamp could not

have created an image ofsufficient precision to be a counterfeit, we reverse Hammoude's convictions

on the first three counts and remand for resentencing. The admission of the letter was not plain error,

so we sustain Hammoude's 1546(a) conviction under the fourth count of creating an unauthorized

impression of a visa.

So ordered.

Appendix A

(VOID stamp added by the court)

Appendix B

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