Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05277/USCOURTS-ca10-93-05277-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Debra Mae Ambler
Appellant
Barbara Ann Clay
Appellant
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation
Appellee
Susan Rohrbaugh
Appellant
The Celotex Corporation
Not Party

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

SUSAN ROHRBAUGH, BARBARA ANN CLAY, ) 

DEBRA MAE AMBLER, individually and ) 

as Personal Representatives of the ) 

Heirs and Estate of Dorothy Mae Palmer, ) 

deceased, ) 

) 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) 

) 

vs. ) 

) 

THE CELOTEX CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant, ) 

) 

and ) 

) 

OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

) 

FILED 

UDlted States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

MAY 0 3 i995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 93-5277 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 88-C-90-B) 

Paul F. Donsbach (and Brent M. Rosenthal of Baron & Budd, Dallas, 

Texas and Mark H. Iola and Randall L. Iola of Ungerman & Iola, 

Tulsa, Oklahoma, with him on the brief) for Plaintiffs-Appellants. 

Scott A. Law (Larry G. Cassil, Jr. with him on the brief) of 

Pierce, Couch, Hendrickson, Baysinger & Green, Oklahoma City, 

Oklahoma, for Defendant-Appellee. 

Before KELLY, BRIGHT, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.t 

KELLY, Circuit Judge. 

t Honorable Myron H. Bright, Senior United States Circuit 

Judge-Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-5277 Document: 01019287624 Date Filed: 05/03/1995 Page: 1 
Plaintiffs-Appellants Rohrbaugh, Clay, and Ambler appeal the 

district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DefendantAppellee Owens-Corning Fiberglas ("OCF"). Our jurisdiction arises 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. 

Background 

Plaintiffs filed a negligence and products liability action 

to recover for the alleged wrongful death of their mother, Dorothy 

Mae Palmer. Plaintiffs allege that Mrs. Palmer was exposed to 

asbestos dust when she washed the work clothes worn by her 

husband, this dust came from products manufactured by OCF, and 

the exposure caused Mrs. Palmer to develop mesothelioma, a tumor 

of the visceral or parietal pleura. Oklahoma law controls. 

A jury awarded $450,000 to Plaintiffs for the death of Mrs. 

Palmer. On appeal, we vacated the judgment and remanded for 

further proceedings in conformance with the opinion. Rohrbaugh v. 

Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 965 F.2d 844 (lOth Cir. 1992) 

("Rohrbaugh I"). Defendant OCF moved for summary judgment. 

Plaintiffs now appeal the grant of summary judgment, contending 

that the district court erred in applying the law of the case. 

Discussion 

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same legal standard used by the district court under Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). James v. Sears. Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997-98 

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Appellate Case: 93-5277 Document: 01019287624 Date Filed: 05/03/1995 Page: 2 
(lOth Cir. 1994). Summary judgment should be granted if "there is 

no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving 

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 56(c). We consider the "factual record and reasonable 

inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party 

opposing summary judgment." Blue Circle Cement, Inc. v. Board of 

County Comm'rs., 27 F.3d 1499, 1503 (lOth Cir. 1994). Summary 

judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party cannot adduce 

probative evidence on an element of its claim upon which it bears 

the burden of proof. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 

242, 247-50 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-27 

(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 

475 u.s. 574, 585-87 (1986). 

The law of the case doctrine provides "' [w]hen a court 

decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to 

govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.'" 

Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1553 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(quoting Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983)), cert. 

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1941 (1992). Thus when a case is appealed and 

remanded, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law 

of the case and ordinarily will be followed by both the trial 

court on remand and the appellate court in any subsequent appeal. 

United States v. Monsisvais, 946 F.2d 114, 116 (lOth Cir. 1991) 

(citing lB J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal 

Practice ,I 0.404[1], at 119 (2d ed. 1991)). This principle 

applies to all "issues previously decided, either explicitly or by 

necessary implication." Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l 

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Appellate Case: 93-5277 Document: 01019287624 Date Filed: 05/03/1995 Page: 3 
Ass'n, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (lOth Cir. 1993} (citations omitted}, 

cert. denied, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 2629 (U.S. Apr. 17, 1995}. 

Plaintiffs argue that they have not had the opportunity to 

litigate their case under the correct law. In order to maintain 

an action in manufacturer's products liability, Plaintiffs must 

prove that the product was the cause of the injury, that the 

defect existed in the product at the time the product left the 

Defendant's possession and control, and that the defect made the 

product unreasonably dangerous. Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 

521 P.2d 1353, 1363 (Okla. 1974}. The "unreasonably dangerous" 

prong of this test is not met here. Accordingly, summary judgment 

was appropriate. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-27. 

A product is unreasonably dangerous if it is "'dangerous to 

an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 

consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to 

the community as to its characteristics.'" Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 

1362-63 (quoting Restatement (Second} of Torts § 402A cmt. i 

(1965}}. An ordinary consumer is defined under Oklahoma law as 

"one who would be foreseeably expected to purchase the product 

involved." Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 765 P.2d 770, 774 

(Okla. 1988}. The failure of the manufacturer to properly warn 

the consumer of dangers associated with a product's use may also 

cause the product to be considered unreasonably dangerous when it 

is known or should be known that hazards exist. McKee v. Moore, 

648 P.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1982}. 

In Rohrbaugh I, however, we reviewed the trial evidence and 

held that the Defendant did not have a duty to warn Mrs. Palmer 

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Appellate Case: 93-5277 Document: 01019287624 Date Filed: 05/03/1995 Page: 4 
because she was "not a foreseeable purchaser or user of the 

product." Rohrbaugh, 965 F.2d at 846. Subsequently on remand, in 

response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs failed to 

produce any additional evidence to create an issue of fact 

concerning the lack of foreseeability. 

Additionally, in Rohrbaugh I we held that Plaintiffs had 

"produced no evidence that [Defendant] knew or should have known 

of the hazards associated with their product[]." Id. at 847. 

Specifically, we found that based on the evidence before the jury, 

it was unknown at the time of exposure that the particular type of 

asbestos associated with Defendant's product could cause 

mesothelioma. Id. Plaintiffs again failed to produce any 

additional evidence in response to the summary judgment motion to 

overcome the lack of evidence on the issue. Instead, Plaintiffs 

merely listed in summary fashion items of evidence previously 

admitted at trial. Aplt. App., doc. 4 at 6. 

Further, because Mrs. Palmer was not a foreseeable consumer, 

the negligence claim cannot be maintained. The threshold question 

in a negligence action is whether the defendant owed a duty to the 

plaintiff allegedly harmed: Wofford v. Eastern State Hosp., 795 

P.2d 516, 518 (Okla. 1990). The most important consideration in 

this determination is whether the plaintiff is foreseeably 

endangered by the defendant's conduct. Id. at 519. Because of 

our holding in Rohrbaugh I that Mrs. Palmer was not a foreseeable 

purchaser or user of the product manufactured by OCF and that 

Defendants "could not have foreseen that Mrs. Palmer would be 

exposed to their products in the manner in which she was[,]" the 

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threshold question of duty is not satisfied. Rohrbaugh, 965 F.2d 

at 846. In the absence of any additional evidence presented by 

Plaintifs, we follow the law of Rohrbaugh I. 

Plaintiffs argue, however, that the law of the case doctrine 

does not apply here because our holdings in Rohrbaugh I were 

dicta. Dicta are "statements and comments in an opinion 

concerning some rule of law or legal proposition not necessarily 

involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand." 

Black's Law Dictionary 454 (6th ed. 1990). To the contrary, the 

holdings at issue were essential to the determination of the first 

appeal because they provided the basis for declaring the jury 

instructions erroneous and vacating the judgment. Moreover, 

Plaintiffs have waived their right to challenge the correctness of 

the holdings in Rohrbaugh I by failing to seek review of that 

decision when they had the opportunity to do so. Capps v. 

Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353 (lOth Cir. 1993) (citing Williamsburg 

Wax Museum, Inc. v. Historic Figures, Inc., 810 F.2d 243, 250 

(D.C. Cir. 1987)). 

AFFIRMED. 

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