Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03603/USCOURTS-cand-3_09-cv-03603-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Arago
Plaintiff
Michael J. Astrue
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY ARAGO,

Plaintiff,

v.

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner,

Social Security Administration,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

No. C-09-3603 EMC

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

(Docket Nos. 17, 20)

In March 2007, Plaintiff Gary Arago filed for disability insurance and Supplemental Security

Income (“SSI”) benefits. Mr. Arago has exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his

claim of disability. This Court has jurisdiction for judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

Mr. Arago has moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a remand for additional

proceedings. The Commissioner has cross-moved for summary judgment. Having considered the

parties’ briefs and accompanying submissions, the Court hereby DENIES Mr. Arago’s motion for

summary judgment and GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion.

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

 In March 2007, Mr. Arago filed for disability insurance and SSI benefits, alleging disability

as of January 1, 2005, due to a heart attack. See AR 99-114 (applications). Mr. Arago’s

applications were initially denied on June 22, 2007, see AR 58-61 (notice of disapproved claims),

and again on reconsideration on September 28, 2007. See AR 64-69 (notice of reconsideration). 

Mr. Arago then sought an administrative hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). See

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AR 71 (request for hearing by ALJ). A hearing was held before an ALJ on March 2, 2009. See AR

21 et seq. (ALJ hearing transcript).

On March 26, 2009, the ALJ held that Mr. Arago was not disabled under the Social Security

Act. The ALJ evaluated Mr. Arago’s claim of disability using the five-step sequential evaluation

process for disability required under federal regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. 

Step one disqualifies claimants who are engaged in substantial gainful

activity from being considered disabled under the regulations. Step

two disqualifies those claimants who do not have one or more severe

impairments that significantly limit their physical or mental ability to

conduct basic work activities. Step three automatically labels as

disabled those claimants whose impairment or impairments meet the

duration requirement and are listed or equal to those listed in a given

appendix. Benefits are awarded at step three if claimants are disabled. 

Step four disqualifies those remaining claimants whose impairments

do not prevent them from doing past relevant work considering the

claimant’s age, education, and work experience together with the

claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), or what the claimant

can do despite impairments. Step five disqualifies those claimants

whose impairments do not prevent them from doing other work, but at

this last step the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the

government. Claimants not disqualified by step five are eligible for

benefits.

Celaya v. Halter, 332 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003).

At step one, the ALJ found that Mr. Arago had not engaged in substantial gainful activity

since January 1, 2005, the alleged onset date. See AR 51 (ALJ decision). At step two, the ALJ

determined that Mr. Arago suffered from “coronary artery disease post heart attack and stent

placement.” AR 51. With respect to step three, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Arago did not have an

impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed

impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Mr. Arago had argued that he met the

requirements of Section 4.04C (ischemic heart disease), but the ALJ disagreed because there was no

evidence that Mr. Arago’s heart disease “[r]esult[ed] in ‘very serious limitations in the ability to

independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living.’” AR 52 (quoting Section

4.04C(2)). As for step four, the ALJ held that Mr. Arago had the physical residual functional

capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work as defined by the regulations, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b),

416.967(b), except that Mr. Arago was able to lift twenty pounds and could sit, stand, and walk in

some combination for at least six hours in an eight-hour day. The ALJ stated that this RFC was

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supported by (1) an examination performed by Dr. Clark E. Gable, a non-treating physician; (2) the

findings of the non-treating, non-examining physicians with the state agency; and (3) the medical

records from his treating physicians at San Francisco General Hospital (“SFGH”). See AR 52-53

(ALJ decision). Although this RFC prevented Mr. Arago from doing his past relevant work as a pet

store manager, see AR 54, the ALJ ultimately concluded – at step five – that Mr. Arago was not

disabled because, based on his age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that

existed in significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. See AR 55-56.

Thereafter, Mr. Arago sought review of the ALJ decision but his request for review was

denied by the Appeals Council on July 16, 2009. See AR 1-3 (notice of Appeals Council action). 

This petition ensued.

II. DISCUSSION

A court

may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits when the ALJ’s

findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial

evidence in the record as a whole. Substantial evidence means more

than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion. A court review[s] the administrative record as a whole to

determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. .

. . [W]here the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation, the ALJ’s decision must be affirmed. 

Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the instant case, Mr. Arago argues that the ALJ’s decision was erroneous for three

reasons: (1) because the ALJ incorrectly concluded at step three that Mr. Arago did not meet the

requirements of Section 4.04C; (2) because, at step four, the ALJ improperly credited the opinion of

Dr. Gable, a nontreating examining physician; and (3) because, at steps four and five, the ALJ

improperly concluded that Mr. Arago was able to lift twenty pounds. Each of these contentions is

addressed below.

A. Section 4.04C Requirements

As noted above, at step three, an ALJ must consider whether a claimant has an impairment or

combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Celaya, 332 F.3d at 1180. In the instant case, Mr.

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Arago argues that his impairment met the impairment listed in Section 4.04C (ischemic heart

disease). Section 4.04C provides as follows:

4.04 Ischemic heart disease, with symptoms due to myocardial

ischemia, as described in 4.00E3-4.00E7, while on a regimen of

prescribed treatment (see 4.00B3 if there is no regimen of prescribed

treatment), with one of the following:

. . . .

C. Coronary artery disease, demonstrated by angiography (obtained

independent of Social Security disability evaluation) or other

appropriate medically acceptable imaging, and in the absence of a

timely exercise tolerance test or a timely normal drug-induced stress

test, an MC [i.e., medical consultant], preferably one experienced in

the care of patients with cardiovascular disease, has concluded that

performance of exercise tolerance testing would present a significant

risk to the individual, with both 1 and 2:

1. Angiographic evidence showing:

a. 50 percent or more narrowing of a nonbypassed left

main coronary artery; or

b. 70 percent or more narrowing of another nonbypassed

coronary artery; or

c. 50 percent or more narrowing involving a long (greater

than 1 cm) segment of a nonbypassed coronary artery;

or

d. 50 percent or more narrowing of at least two

nonbypassed coronary arteries; or

e. 70 percent or more narrowing of a bypass graft vessel;

and

2. Resulting in very serious limitations in the ability to

independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily

living.

20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 4.04C. 

In the instant case, the ALJ found that Mr. Arago did not meet this listing because Section

4.04C “clearly requires not only the stated angiographic evidence of the disease . . . but also that

there be clear evidence that the claimant’s heart disease results in ‘very serious limitations in the

ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily living.’” AR 52 (ALJ

decision). According to the ALJ, there was no evidence to support the latter: “The medical record

does not show any very serious limitations and the claimant’s own testimony regarding his ADLs

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[i.e., activities of daily living] and physical capabilities completely belies the argument of his

representative.” AR 52.

The Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion is supported by substantial evidence in the record

as a whole. As the ALJ pointed out, the medical record does not suggest any “very serious

limitations,” as required by Section 4.04C(2). For example, in February 2005, approximately a

month after the precipitating incident that led to his hospitalization, Mr. Arago told one of his

treating physicians that he had not had any additional pain and that he “continue[d] to be very

active.” AR 207 (medical record, dated 2/1/2005). Seven months later, medical records reflected

that Mr. Arago was experiencing no fatigue and he could “walk for about a mile without any DOE,”

AR 209 (medical record, dated 9/23/2005), i.e., dyspnea on exertion, which is “[s]hortness of breath

which occurs with effort, often a sign of heart failure or ischemia.” 

http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/dyspnea+on+exertion (last visited on 5/11/2010).

A year after the precipitating incident, Mr. Arago did complain of fatigue, see AR 211

(medical record, dated 2/10/2006), but several months later, medical records indicated that the issue

of fatigue was resolved. See AR 214 (medical record, dated 10/2/2006). Medical records also

reflected that Mr. Arago was doing well and could walk for about a mile without any DOE. See AR

213-14 (medical record, dated 10/2/2006). One of his treating physicians noted that Mr. Arago’s

coronary artery disease was stable. See AR 232 (medical record, dated 10/2/2006).

In February 2007, i.e., shortly before he applied for benefits, Mr. Arago reported to a treating

doctor that he was chest pain free. See AR 230 (medical record, dated 2/20/2007). Medical records

from that time also indicated that the coronary artery disease was stable and medically managed. 

See AR 215 (medical record, dated 2/25/2007). In subsequent months, Mr. Arago told treating

physicians that he felt “fine” and “good” and denied any signs and symptoms of, e.g., chest pain or

other aches and pains. AR 203 (medical record, dated 7/20/2007); AR 245 (medical record, dated

10/12/2007). Medical records from October 2007 and May and December 2008 reiterated that Mr.

Arago’s coronary artery disease was stable, medically managed, and/or asymptomatic. See AR 246

(medical record, dated 10/23/2007); AR 247 (medical record, dated 5/6/2008); AR 254 (medical

record, dated 12/10/2008).

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Contrary to what Mr. Arago argues, his testimony before the ALJ was largely consistent with

the medical records discussed above. For example, Mr. Arago testified that he generally tries to

walk six or eight blocks a day for exercise and even stated, “If it’s flat I could walk a mile.” AR 28

(ALJ hearing transcript). In addition, Mr. Arago noted that he was able to help do chores around the

house – e.g., cleaning, washing the dishes, grocery shopping, vacuuming. See AR 28-30. That Mr.

Arago also stated that he would take rest periods after walking or doing chores and that he would

need to take breaks if he were walking up a hill, see AR 30, 31, 34, is not enough to establish “very

serious limitations in the ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities of daily

living.” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 4.04C (emphasis added). Furthermore,

any claim that such limitations were very serious is problematic given the positive self-reporting that

Mr. Arago made to his treating physicians. See Miller v. Astrue, No. H-07-3230, 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 5745, at *10 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2009) (noting that, “[t]hough Miller presented evidence that

she suffered from fatigue and anginal discomfort, other record evidence tended to show that these

symptoms did not result in a marked limitation of physical activity” – e.g., “[a] nuclear cardiology

report . . . found that Miller was able to exercise on a treadmill for seven minutes”).

Because the ALJ’s step three finding was supported by substantial evidence – i.e., both the

medical records and Mr. Arago’s testimony – the Court finds no error here. See Hale v. Secretary of

Health & Hum. Servs., 816 F.2d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1987) (indicating that “‘lack of evidence

indicating the existence of all the requirements of [an appendix listing] provides substantial evidence

to support the Secretary’s finding that the claimant did not meet the Listing’”).

B. Opinion of Dr. Gable

Mr. Arago argues that, even if the ALJ made no error with respect to step three, the ALJ

made an error at steps four and five by relying heavily on the opinion of Dr. Gable, a non-treating

examining physician, in determining Mr. Arago’s RFC. Mr. Arago asserts that it was improper for

the ALJ to give “substantial weight” to Dr. Gable’s opinion, AR 52 (ALJ decision), because (1) Dr.

Gable was not a treating physician; (2) Dr. Gable was not a cardiologist; (3) Dr. Gable failed to have

Mr. Arago do an exercise tolerance test (“ETT”); and (4) under the Social Security regulations, any

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consultative examination should have been done by a treating physician. None of these arguments is

availing.

That Dr. Gable was only an examining physician, and not a treating physician, is not

dispositive. It is true that, “[a]s a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a

treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant.” Lester v. Chater, 81

F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has emphasized that “to reject the

opinion of a treating physician ‘in favor of a conflicting opinion of an examining physician[,]’ an

ALJ . . . must ‘make [] findings setting forth specific, legitimate reasons for doing so that are based

on substantial evidence in the record.’” Valentine v. Commissioner Social Security Administration,

574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Lester, 81 F.3d at 830 (noting that “‘clear and

convincing’ reasons are required to reject the treating doctor’s ultimate conclusions”). But, as the

Commissioner points out, here there is no opinion of a treating physician that is in conflict with Dr.

Gable’s opinion. In other words, the above burden is not triggered because there is no conflict with

a treating physician’s opinion. In fact, the medical records, as described above, repeatedly stated

that Mr. Arago’s coronary artery disease was stable and medically managed. 

Similarly, that Dr. Gable was not a cardiologist is not dispositive. The record reflects that

Dr. Gable was a M.D., see AR 196 (evaluation by Dr. Gable), and therefore an acceptable medical

source under the Social Security regulations whose opinion may be relied upon by the

Commissioner in determining whether Mr. Arago had a medically determinable impairment. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1), 416.913(a)(1) (providing that “[w]e need evidence from acceptable

medical sources to establish whether you have a medically determinable impairment(s)” and

defining “acceptable medical sources” as, inter alia, “[l]icensed physicians (medical or osteopathic

doctors)”). Although, per the regulations, more weight is generally afforded “to the opinion of a

specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source

who is not a specialist,” id. §§ 404.1527(d)(5), 416.927(d)(5), that does not negate the credit that is

due to Dr. Gable’s opinion, especially where, as here, there is no opinion from a specialist in conflict

with that of Dr. Gable. 

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As for Mr. Arago’s contention that Dr. Gable’s evaluation was flawed because he failed to

have Mr. Arago undergo an ETT (exercise tolerance test), that assertion is without merit. Mr. Arago

argues that an ETT is required under the regulations unless it would present a significant risk to the

claimant. But Mr. Arago has misconstrued what the regulations require.

Mr. Arago’s argument appears to be premised on Section 4.00C(7)(a) of 20 C.F.R. Part 404,

Subpart P, Appendix 1, which provides: “Before we purchase an exercise test, an MC [i.e., medical

consultant], preferably one with experience in the care of patients with cardiovascular disease, must

review the pertinent history, physical examinations, and laboratory tests that we have to determine

whether the test would present a significant risk to you or if there is some other medical reason not

to purchase the test (see 4.00C8).” 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Section 4.00C(7)(a). 

Mr. Arago ignores the preceding statement in Section 4.00(C)(6)(b) which states that “[w]e will not

purchase an exercise test when we can make our determination or decision based on the evidence we

already have.” Id., Section 4.00C(6)(b) (emphasis added). In the instant case, Mr. Arago has made

no showing that an ETT was necessary. There was insufficient evidence, for instance, in the record

for the Commissioner to make a determination or decision about whether the appendix listing was

met. Based on the Court’s review of the record, the evidence in the possession of the Social

Security Administration -- i.e., the medical records from Mr. Arago’s treating physicians --

uniformly indicated that Mr. Arago’s medical impairment was under control and therefore an ETT

was not needed in order to do the step three analysis.

This leaves Mr. Arago’s final contention that, under the Social Security regulations, the

consultative examination should have been performed by one of his treating physicians rather than a

non-treating doctor such as Dr. Gable. Mr. Arago points to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519h and 416.919h

which provide as follows:

When in our judgment your treating source is qualified, equipped, and

willing to perform the additional examination or tests for the fee

schedule payment, and generally furnishes complete and timely

reports, your treating source will be the preferred source to do the

purchased examination. Even if only a supplemental test is required,

your treating source is ordinarily the preferred source.

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1519h, 416.919h.

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In response, the Commissioner argues that there can be no error here because nothing in the

regulations mandates that a consultative examination be performed by a treating physician. Some

courts have so held. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Astrue, No. 08-3618 SECTION “A” (3), 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 124281, at *29 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2009) (finding no error when agency failed to ask for

consultative exam from treating physician; noting that consultative examination by treating

physician may be preferred option but “[t]erms like ‘generally,’ ‘ordinarily’ and ‘in our judgment’

limit the regulations’ reach and provide that such procedures are neither mandatory nor ordered in

every single case”); Prater v. Astrue, No. 08-177-GWU, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73611, at *16 (E.D.

Ky. Aug. 19, 2009) (finding no reversible error even though ALJ did not choose treating physician

for consultative examination; noting that regulation “does not mandate that the treating source

perform the consultative examination” and that regulation gives discretion to ALJ “in deciding

whether to utilize the services of the treating physician”).

While the Court agrees that nothing about the regulations is mandatory in nature, it is not

convinced that a failure to have a treating physician conduct the consultative examination may never

be the basis for a reversal or remand. In Harris v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-3374 (JG), 2009 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 3757 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2009), for example, the court concluded that the ALJ did not

adequately develop the record because it did not obtain information about the plaintiff’s ability to

work from her treating psychiatrist. The court emphasized that the Social Security regulations 

are not agnostic as to the source of the evidence needed to assemble an

appropriate record; instead, they direct the SSA to seek the

information it requires from the claimant’s “own medical sources,”

and resort to consultative examinations only after “every reasonable

effort” to obtain evidence from the claimant’s sources has failed. 

Even when the agency determines that a consult is required, the

claimant’s “treating source” is the “preferred source” of the

consultation.

Thus, to the extent the Commission required the information

provided by [a non-treating, examining physician and a non-treating,

non-examining physician] to reach a conclusion regarding [the

plaintiff’s] claim of disability, the regulations required that the ALJ

first attempt to obtain this information from [the treating psychiatrist]. 

There’s no doubt that the ALJ’s need for a Mental Residual Functional

Capacity assessment was great; she explicitly accorded “significant

weight” to the one provided by [the non-treating, nonexamining

physician]. In fairness to [the plaintiff], and as required by the

regulations, she should not have done so without first asking [the

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 Based on the administrative record, it appears that Mr. Arago sought treatment for his heart

condition only at SFGH.

2 See AR 209-10 (medical record, dated 9/23/2005); AR 211-12 (medical record, dated

2/10/2006); AR 213-14 (medical record, dated 10/2/2006); AR 215 (medical record, dated 2/25/2007);

AR 246 (medical record, dated 10/23/2007); AR 247 (medical record, dated 5/6/2008).

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treating psychiatrist] to provide one as well. However, there is no

indication that she tried to do so, or determined that [the psychiatrist]

was unqualified or unwilling to supply such information.

Id. at *11-12.

The instant case, however, is distinguishable from Harris. First, unlike the situation in

Harris, it is not even clear which treating physician Mr. Arago believes should have been asked to

do a consultative examination. For the most part, each doctor who treated Mr. Arago at SFGH1

 saw

him only a handful of times; thus, these doctors were not any or much better equipped to perform a

consultative examination than a nontreating source. While one SFGH physician, Dr. Castro, does

appear to have seen Mr. Arago six times,2 this was over the course of approximately three years. In

Harris, the plaintiff was also treated over the course of three years but the treatment was provided

on a much more frequent and regular basis. See Harris, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3757, at *3-4

(referring to monthly treatment for at least the period June 2005 to April 2007).

Second, and more important, in Harris, the failure to obtain information from the treating

psychiatrist was especially problematic because the medical records from the treating psychiatrist

indicated that the mental impairment suffered by the plaintiff was not stable or medically managed. 

For instance, the psychiatrist gave the plaintiff a Global Assessment of Functioning (“GAF”) score

of 50, indicating a serious impairment to psychological functioning. See id. at *3-4. Also, although

the psychiatrist discussed improvement in the plaintiff’s condition, he noted that she was still having

episodes of anxiety and even panic attacks. See id. at *4. Finally, on a scale of

excellent/good/fair/poor, the psychiatrist rated the plaintiff’ mental health and work ability as only

fair. See id. Thus, the information from the treating physician was likely to have substantive

probative value, and its absence was likely prejudicial.

The situation in the instant case is materially different. As discussed above, the medical

records for Mr. Arago indicate that his heart condition was stable and medically managed. Nothing

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in the medical records suggest that Mr. Arago had any limitations because of his physical

impairment. Even the complaint of fatigue articulated by Mr. Arago in February 2006 was deemed

resolved in October of the same year. See AR 211 (medical record, dated 2/10/2006); AR 214

(medical record, 10/2/2006). Accordingly, even if the ALJ had erred in not having one of Mr.

Arago’s treating physicians perform the consultative exam, there is no indication that the error was

prejudicial. See Stout v. Commissioner, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (acknowledging that

“harmless error applies in the Social Security context”). 

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, the Court rejects Mr. Arago’s contention that the

ALJ’s reliance on the opinion of Dr. Gable was improper.

C. Ability to Lift Twenty Pounds

Finally, Mr. Arago challenges the ALJ’s finding that he was able to lift twenty pounds,

which was part of the ALJ’s determination that Mr. Arago could perform light work. See AR 52

(ALJ decision); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b) (stating that “[l]ight work involves

lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to

10 pounds”). Contrary to what Mr. Arago contends, there is substantial evidence to support this

finding. Most notably, there is the medical opinion of Dr. Gable, see AR 196 (concluding that Mr.

Arago “could lift 20 pounds frequently and 40 pounds occasionally”). There was also the medical

opinion of another physician (nontreating and nonexamining). See AR 199 (concluding that Mr.

Arago could occasionally lift 20 pounds and frequently lift 10 pounds). Finally, even Mr. Arago’s

own testimony at the ALJ hearing supported the finding. At the hearing, the ALJ specifically asked

Mr. Arago: “How much weight do you think you can lift?” AR 29 (ALJ hearing). Mr. Arago

responded: “Well, I don’t think I want to push it but if I had to I could probably lift 20 pounds but I

wouldn’t want to do more than that and I wouldn’t want to do that unless it was some real bad

reason to move it.” AR 29.

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 The Court also notes that the regulations themselves do not contain any requirements about

lifting 20 pounds (as opposed to 10 pounds) with any level of frequency. The regulations simply

provide: “Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying

of objects weighing up to 10 pounds.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b).

While the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) does make reference to “[e]xerting up to

20 pounds of force occasionally” in defining light work, see DOT, Appendix C, Part IV (available at

http://www.oalj.dol.gov/libdot.htm (last visited 4/21/2010)), Mr. Arago has cited no authority stating

that the DOT is controlling on the definition of light work. Even if the DOT were controlling, the

complete definition of light work is “[e]xerting up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or up to 10

pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force constantly (Constantly: activity or

condition exists 2/3 or more of the time) to move objects.” Id. (emphasis added). The use of the

disjunctive “or” is significant.

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To the extent Mr. Arago argues that the above testimony shows that he was not able to lift 20

pounds with any degree of frequency, the Court does not agree.3

 Just because Mr. Arago would not

want to lift 20 pounds does not mean that he was unable to do so, including on an occasional basis. 

The Court acknowledges that, later during the hearing, when his attorney was questioning the

vocational expert, Mr. Arago interjected that he could not lift 20 pounds on an occasional basis. See

AR 39. But this assertion is questionable given his earlier testimony, and, in fact, the ALJ

specifically found that Mr. Arago’s statements regarding his limitations were not completely

credible. See AR 53 (ALJ decision). In his motion, Mr. Arago has made no express challenge to the

ALJ’s credibility finding.

Even if the Court were to view Mr. Arago’s motion as containing a challenge to the ALJ’s

credibility finding, the Court would find no error as to that finding. See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d

586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that “the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s testimony about the

severity of the symptoms if [the ALJ] gives specific, clear and convincing reasons for the

rejection”). As noted above, the medical opinions provided by nontreating physicians indicated that

Mr. Arago’s claimed limitations regarding lifting were not supported, and Mr. Arago was selfreporting to his treating physicians that he was doing well.

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III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court rejects the arguments made by Mr. Arago and

therefore DENIES his motion for summary judgment and GRANTS the Commissioner’s crossmotion.

The Clerk of the Court is instructed to enter judgment in accordance with this opinion and

close the file in this case.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 17 and 20.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 13, 2010

_________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN

United States Magistrate Judge

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