Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01203/USCOURTS-caed-1_12-cv-01203-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Timothy Robert Carrillo
Petitioner
Mike McDonald
Respondent

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of second degree murder (Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a)) for 

which he was sentenced to two indeterminate terms of fifteen years-to-life and discharging a firearm 

pursuant to Penal Code § 12022.53(d) for which he was sentenced to two indeterminate terms to 25-

years-to-life. (Id.) (Doc. 1, p. 2) 

Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (the “5th DCA”), 

which affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. (Lodged Document (“LD”) 11). Petitioner then filed a 

petition for review in the California Supreme Court that was summarily denied. (LD 12; 13). Petitioner 

filed a state habeas petition in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, raising the additional claims of 

newly discovered evidence of innocence and false evidence. (LD 14) The court denied the petition. 

(LD 18). The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s subsequent state habeas petition. (LD 19; 

TIMOTHY ROBERT CARRILLO,

 Petitioner,

v.

MIKE McDONALD, Warden,

Respondent.

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Case No.: 1:12-cv-01203-JLT

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF 

HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. 2)

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO 

ENTER JUDGMENT AND CLOSE FILE

ORDER DECLINING TO ISSUE CERTIFICATE 

OF APPEALABILITY

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20)

On July 23, 2012, Petitioner filed the instant petition, presenting seven claims for relief. (Doc. 

1). Respondent’s answer was filed on October 19, 2012. (Doc. 12). On November 6, 2012, Petitioner 

filed his Traverse. (Doc. 14). Respondent contends that a sub-argument in ground one is procedurally 

barred and that ground six is unexhausted. (Doc. 12, pp. 30; 44). 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court adopts the Statement of Facts in the 5th DCA’s unpublished decision1:

Introduction

This double homicide case arose from an abusive domestic relationship between Olivia 

Valdovinos and Pete Silverio Garcia in the city of Ceres. Valdovinos was a member of the 

extended Simmons family. Charles Simmons, Sr., and his wife, Carmen Simmons, have a 

“[v]ery large family.” Their children include their only son, Charles Simmons, Jr., and 

daughters, Elia Sharma, Margaret Janis, and Carmen Gutierrez, among others. Elia Sharma is 

the mother of appellant Timothy Carrillo and Shankar Sharma, a witness to the homicides. 

Margaret Janis is the mother of Olivia Valdovinos. Carmen Gutierrez is the mother of Raquel 

and Erica Baca and nine others. Appellant, Valdovinos, and the Bacas are first cousins. Their 

other first cousins include Andrea Charles and Angielita Ruiz.

Testimony of Olivia Valdovinos

In April 2007, Olivia Valdovinos lived at the Almond Terrace Apartments in Stanislaus County 

with her two children and her boyfriend, Pete Silverio Garcia. At 11:00 p.m. on April 14, 2007, 

Valdovinos and her cousin, Raquel Baca, took Baca's car and drove to some nightclubs in 

Modesto. Garcia remained at their apartment with his friend, Cary Lamond Thompson. During 

the course of the evening, Valdovinos told Baca that she and Garcia had a fight earlier in the 

evening. The fight concerned Garcia's faithfulness to Valdovinos and Garcia pulled her hair 

during the altercation. Valdovinos and Baca spent time together at the Timeless nightclub and 

then separated. When Valdovinos decided to leave the club, she drove Baca's car back to her 

apartment. She arrived home after 2:00 a.m.

At 3:00 a.m., Baca returned to the apartments to retrieve her car keys. Valdovinos and Garcia 

had gone to bed, but they got up and began talking with Baca. Baca was angry about Garcia's 

treatment of Valdovinos and told Garcia he needed to change his behavior. Baca insulted Garcia 

by calling him names. Valdovinos recognized that Baca was under the influence of alcohol. 

Garcia initially declined to pay attention to Baca, but he then responded by calling her names. 

Baca and Garcia cursed each other, and Baca ultimately hit Garcia in the face. Thompson finally 

got up to keep Baca from “getting in [Pete's] face.”

Valdovinos told Garcia and Baca to stop arguing, and she asked Baca to leave the apartment 

several times. Valdovinos was concerned that Baca was being too loud and that she might 

awaken the apartment manager. When Baca refused to leave, Valdovinos tried to get Garcia to 

return to their bedroom. Garcia resisted and told Baca, “‘This is going too far.’” Baca angrily 

replied, “‘Oh, you trying to hit me[?] You trying to hit me[?] You think you're bad?’” Baca then 

told Garcia, “‘Watch. I'm going to get my cousin Timmy over here.’”

 

1

The 5th DCA’s summary of the facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). 

Thus, the Court adopts the factual recitations set forth by the 5th DCA.

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Baca went to retrieve her shoes and Garcia told her, “‘Come on Raquel. This is dumb.... I'm a 

fat guy. You're a pimple face.’” At that point, Valdovinos thought the situation had calmed. 

However, Baca then gave Garcia an angry look as she walked out the door and said, “‘You'll be 

seeing my cousin and my brother.’” Baca departed, and Valdovinos and Garcia went to their 

bedroom. Thompson remained on the couch.

Sometime later, Valdovinos heard a knock on a window. Valdovinos was afraid Baca had sent 

some people over to the apartment, and Valdovinos did not want a scene. She and Garcia 

walked to the front door of the apartment. The television was still on in the living room. 

Valdovinos opened the front door and saw her cousin, the appellant, through the security screen 

door. She saw a few more people at the bottom of the stairs leading to the apartment. She asked 

appellant to leave, but he asked, “‘Where is Pete?’” Valdovinos repeatedly asked appellant to 

leave and yelled at one point, “‘Just leave. You're going to get me kicked out.’” Garcia 

eventually told appellant, “‘Man, Timmy, what?’”

Appellant fired a gun, and Valdovinos dropped to the ground. She saw Garcia shoot back at 

appellant and then heard a lot of firing. She stayed on the ground and yelled, “‘Stop, stop!’” The 

apartment became quiet and she saw Garcia standing but bleeding. He went toward the kitchen, 

lied down, told Valdovinos he loved her, and said, “‘Tell my mom I love her.’” When 

Valdovinos told Garcia he was going to be okay, he said that appellant shot him in the heart. 

Valdovinos immediately called 911. Police arrived a short time later, and Valdovinos claimed 

she was the one who shot appellant because she knew Garcia was not supposed to be in 

possession of a firearm. Valdovinos admitted a conviction for petty theft on June 8, 2004.

Testimony of Nancy Chavez

Nancy Chavez, landlord of the Almond Terrace Apartments, lived directly below the apartment 

of Valdovinos and Garcia. Chavez was awakened during the early morning hours of April 15, 

2007, by the sound of gunshots. Chavez looked outside her window and saw three large men. 

One of the men jumped from a second-floor stairwell to ground level. Chavez saw the trio leave 

out the Evans Road exit to the gated complex and she called 911. Chavez's roommate, Manuel 

Luna, heard four or five gunshots. He went upstairs and held a towel to Garcia's wound. Luna 

said Valdovinos appeared to be in complete shock, and Luna assisted her. Luna said he saw 

Thompson with his head lying on the couch and his feet placed toward the left of the couch.

Testimony of Sergeant Jose Berber

Ceres Police Sergeant Jose Berber arrived at the scene and found Garcia gasping for air and 

experiencing pain. Garcia walked toward Berber and fell to the ground on the landing outside 

the apartment. Valdovinos cradled Garcia in her arms. Sergeant Berber entered the apartment 

and found a plastic-gripped, white metal revolver in the doorway. Ceres Police Officer Brian 

Ferreira said a light was on inside the apartment.

Sergeant Berber gave Garcia CPR until paramedics arrived at the scene. Berber said Garcia was 

a large man who weighed more than 300 pounds. Sergeant Berber watched as Garcia expired 

and then asked Valdovinos who had shot him. She said, “‘It was my cousin. It was my cousin. I 

can't believe he did this.’” She told Berber her cousin's name was Timothy Carrillo and said that 

he and his brother had been at the apartment. At 4:00 a.m., appellant entered station one of the 

Ceres Fire Department and contacted paramedic Julian Bordona. Appellant had sustained two 

gunshot wounds but declined to identify himself to Bordona.

Testimony of Criminalist Jennai Lawson

Jennai Lawson, a criminalist with the California Department of Justice Crime Laboratory in 

Ripon, testified she discovered a bullet hole in the upper left portion of the security door on 

Valdovinos's apartment. She concluded the bullet hole had been made by someone firing inside 

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the door toward the exterior of the apartment. Lawson examined a Rossi revolver found in the 

entry to the Valdovinos/Garcia apartment at Almond Terrace. The revolver contained five 

expended cartridges, and Lawson believed one of the bullets from that firearm had been fired 

through the security door. Lawson traced the trajectory of a bullet fired by someone from 

outside the apartment. That bullet traveled through the left side of the front door. Cary 

Thompson's body was still in the apartment when Lawson arrived. Lawson determined a bullet 

passed through the apartment loveseat and hit Thompson in the chest. In Lawson's opinion, the 

person who shot the bullet stood very close to the front door or entry way or stood inside the 

apartment. Based on the wounds to Garcia and the bullets she saw at the scene, Lawson 

believed appellant fired at least four bullets.

Testimony of Dr. Robert D. Lawrence

Robert D. Lawrence, M.D., a forensic pathologist, testified he performed autopsies on both 

Thompson and Garcia. Dr. Lawrence found two gunshot wounds in Thompson's chest. One 

wound was located on the right side of the breast bone and the second wound was located 

further down on the right side. The first wound had an atypical entrance, with an abrasion collar 

suggesting that the bullet might have struck something before entering Thompson's body. Dr. 

Lawrence detected a piece of foam rubber inside the first bullet hole. Dr. Lawrence found no 

gunshot residue around either of the bullets, indicating the shots were not made a close range. 

Dr. Lawrence said Garcia sustained a single gunshot wound to his chest near the midline. Both 

victims died from shock and hemorrhage due to penetrating gunshot wounds to their chests. Dr. 

Lawrence said Thompson had a blood-alcohol level of 0.27 and methamphetamine in his blood. 

Dr. Lawrence said Garcia had a blood-alcohol level of 0.21.

Testimony of District Attorney Investigator Froilan Mariscal

Froilan Mariscal, an investigator with the Stanislaus County District Attorney's Office, said he 

assisted in the execution of a search warrant at appellant's residence on Don Pedro Road in 

Ceres. Mariscal found a loaded .38–caliber Smith & Wesson six-shot revolver inside a bag in a 

small closet. Mariscal gave the weapon to Detective Griebel of the Ceres Police Department.

Testimony of Criminalist Scott Bauer

Scott Bauer, a senior criminalist with the California Department of Justice Crime Laboratory, 

testified he examined three bullets removed from the bodies of the victims and one bullet 

removed from the crime scene. He determined the bullets were not fired from the Rossi revolver 

recovered by criminalist Lawson at the apartment. Bauer could not determine whether the 

bullets were fired from the Smith & Wesson revolver recovered at appellant's apartment. In fact, 

Bauer expressed the opinion that the bullets were most likely not fired from the Smith & 

Wesson. He explained, “[A]gain, I couldn't eliminate it or identify it but in my opinion most 

likely not.”

Defense Evidence

Appellant's Medical Report

On motion of the defense, the court admitted into evidence a three-page Doctor's Medical 

Center report, dated December 10, 2008, concerning appellant's physical condition.

Testimony of Raquel Baca

Raquel Baca testified that Olivia Valdovinos had sustained multiple injuries during the 18 

months she had dated Garcia. At 10:00 p.m. on April 14, 2007, Baca, Valdovinos, and Baca's 

cousin, Andrea Charles, went out together to some bars. Baca said she later returned to 

Valdovinos's apartment to retrieve her house and car keys. Baca said she had a clear view of 

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Valdovinos's apartment because she lived in apartment No. 6, downstairs from Valdovinos's 

unit.

When Baca reached Valdovinos's apartment, Garcia and Thompson were in the living room. 

Garcia offered Baca some pizza. Because Garcia was dressed in his boxer shorts, Valdovinos 

instructed him to go in the bedroom and put on some pants. When Garcia left the living room to 

dress, Valdovinos told Baca that he had just pulled her hair and hit her. Garcia then returned to 

the kitchen and Baca told him he should respect Valdovinos. Baca and Garcia got into a heated 

argument and struck one another in the face.

Baca was upset as she departed Valdovinos's apartment. She stopped at appellant's home, told 

him that Garcia had hit her, and also told him about Valdovinos's claims of abuse at the hands 

of Garcia. Baca stayed at appellant's home for about 30 minutes and then went back to her firstfloor apartment. At some point she heard appellant tell Valdovinos that he wanted to speak with 

Garcia. Appellant was standing by the window to the left of the front door of Garcia's 

apartment. Appellant told Valdovinos, “[I]f he [Garcia] wants to be hitting girls, he should 

come out and fight like a man.” Valdovinos told appellant to leave, the area in front of her 

apartment got quiet, and Valdovinos closed the security door to the apartment.

Baca next saw Garcia put his head outside the security door, come back inside, and then extend 

his arm out and start firing a handgun. Baca said Garcia fired at least four or five shots, and 

appellant leaned back against the wall and returned the fire inside the apartment. She testified 

she heard the gunshots fired by appellant but did not necessarily see any flashes from a weapon. 

Baca confirmed the last shots were fired by appellant. She saw appellant run down the stairwell. 

Baca then called 911 and reported the shooting. Baca heard Valdovinos yell, “‘Get an 

ambulance here.’” After seeing the police and paramedics arrive at the scene, Baca then left and 

went to her mother's home.

Testimony of Shankar Sharma

Appellant's half brother, Shankar Sharma, knew both Valdovinos and Garcia and noticed that 

Valdovinos sustained bruises to her face on several occasions during their relationship. During 

the early morning hours of April 15, 2007, Sharma was at appellant's home with appellant, 

cousin Robert Garcia, and friend Lorenzo Martinez. Sharma and the others were drinking beer 

when Raquel Baca arrived at appellant's home. Baca was crying, said Valdovinos and Garcia 

had gotten into an argument, and said that Garcia had hit and pulled the hair of Valdovinos and 

hit Baca herself. After Baca departed, appellant, Sharma, and the others present decided to go 

check on Valdovinos. The quartet proceeded to the Valdovinos's apartment in appellant's van. 

The gate to the complex was closed but unlocked.

Appellant knocked on the window to the right of the apartment door and Valdovinos answered. 

When appellant asked whether she was okay and whether Garcia was hitting her again, 

Valdovinos asked several times for appellant to leave the premises. Appellant eventually 

challenged Garcia to a fight, and Garcia opened the door and fired several shots at appellant. 

Sharma described Garcia's weapon as a silver revolver. Appellant produced a gun and returned 

the fire, sustaining a wound during the exchange. Sharma heard six or seven shots altogether. 

Appellant, Sharma, and their two companions returned to appellant's van and proceeded to the 

Ceres Fire Department to get medical care for appellant. Sharma said the gate to the apartment 

complex was open, so they were able to enter and depart without using a code. Sharma said 

Garcia had a reputation in the Sharma/Carrillo family for being a Norteno criminal street gang 

member who carried guns.

Testimony of Lorenzo Martinez

Lorenzo Martinez testified he was at appellant's home during the early morning hours of April 

15, 2007. Martinez, appellant, and several others were relaxing, drinking beer, and playing 

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video games. Raquel Baca arrived and spoke with appellant. She was crying and her face was 

red and puffy. Raquel said Pete Garcia slapped her in the face and made a red mark. She also 

said Garcia hit Valdovinos. She stayed five to eight minutes and then departed. Appellant, 

Martinez, and their two companions—Robert Lopez and Shankar Sharma—decided to go to 

Garcia's apartment and check on Valdovinos. Martinez understood the purpose of the visit was 

to have a fist fight with Garcia and stop him from hitting Valdovinos. The quartet drove 

appellant's vehicle to the Almond Terrace Apartments, entered through the unlocked gate, and 

walked to the front door of the second-floor apartment.

Appellant knocked on the kitchen window and the security door of the apartment. Valdovinos 

spoke through the door, and appellant asked whether she was all right. Appellant asked to speak 

with Garcia. Appellant said, “‘Come outside and fight a real man. Quit hitting on a girl.’” 

Garcia came to the door, spoke briefly with appellant, and said he would be right back. When 

Garcia returned, he opened the door, stepped outside, and fired several rounds at appellant. 

Appellant pulled out a gun and exchanged fire with Garcia. Appellant sustained a wound to his 

side and eventually obtained treatment at Memorial Medical Center. Robert Lopez, the nephew 

of Raquel Baca, confirmed Lorenzo Martinez's version of events. Lopez said he and Martinez 

drove appellant to the Ceres Fire Department and dropped him off there. They then drove back 

to appellant's home and parked the car there.

Testimony of Detective Mark Neri

Ceres Detective Mark Neri interviewed Raquel Baca on April 20, 2007, at the Ceres Police 

Department. Baca gave Neri a detailed chronology of events beginning with the 10:00 p.m. hour 

on Saturday, April 14, 2007. Baca described a confrontation with Garcia after she and 

Valdovinos had visited a number of nightclubs. Baca said she encouraged Garcia to show 

Valdovinos more respect, and Garcia became angry because she was telling him how to treat 

her cousin. During the recorded interview, Baca denied telling Garcia, “I'm going to get my 

cousin, Tim, to beat your ass.”

At trial, Baca said she did not give Detective Neri complete information during the interview 

because she omitted the fact that Sharma, Martinez, and Lopez were present when she visited 

appellant's home after the confrontation with Garcia. Detective Neri testified he conducted a 

tape-recorded interview with Valdovinos on the morning of April 15, 2007, at the Ceres police 

station. After Neri took that statement, he called Valdovinos back for another recorded 

statement. In the first statement, Valdovinos said Garcia was standing directly behind her in the 

apartment before shots were fired. In the second statement, Valdovinos said Garcia was 

standing to her left. In the second statement, Valdovinos claimed that Raquel Baca told Garcia 

as she departed their apartment, “[Y]ou will be seeing my cousin and my brother....”

Testimony of Andrea Charles

Andrea Charles, a cousin of appellant and Valdovinos, testified she lived with Valdovinos for 

three months beginning in December 2006. Charles saw Valdovinos with injuries on six or 

seven occasions. The injuries included black eyes and a “busted lip.” Charles knew Garcia as 

her cousin's boyfriend and knew he carried a gun. Charles spent part of the evening of April 14, 

2007, with Valdovinos and Baca but ended up spending the night with friends rather than 

returning to the Almond Terrace apartment.

Testimony of Angielita Ruiz

Angielita Ruiz, another cousin of appellant and Valdovinos, testified that Garcia and 

Valdovinos dated for about a year and one-half, and that Valdovinos sustained a busted lip, 

black eyes, and bruised arms on different occasions during that relationship. Ruiz saw appellant 

in possession of a gun “lots of times.” In January 2007, Ruiz stayed with Valdovinos and 

Garcia. Ruiz was awakened by the sound of Valdovinos screaming. She went to Valdovinos's 

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room and saw Garcia with a gun in his left hand. Garcia attempted to pick up Valdovinos with 

his right hand and throw her out a window. Ruiz intervened and Garcia pulled the gun out, 

cocked the trigger, and placed it at the side of her head. On another occasion in January 2007, 

Ruiz intervened when Garcia held a gun in one hand and hit Valdovinos's head with his other 

hand.

Testimony of Mary Helen Gomez

Mary Helen Gomez, an aunt of appellant and Valdovinos, testified that Valdovinos sustained 

black-and-blue eyes and a “busted” bottom lip at the hands of Garcia about four months before 

the events of April 14, 2007.

Testimony of Sanjuana Vasquez

Sanjuana Vasquez testified she resided in the apartment to the south (or left) of the apartment 

occupied by Valdovinos and Garcia. She heard the sound of rapid shots and an explosion 

coming from the latter apartment around 4:00 a.m. on April 15, 2007. She stood up and saw 

four men leaving the second floor apartment. One of the men jumped off the balcony. The four 

men departed in a northerly direction.

Testimony of Margaret E. Janis

Margaret E. Janis testified she was the mother of Olivia Valdovinos and the aunt of the 

appellant. Janis said she spoke to her daughter many times about the April 15 incident, and 

Valdovinos consistently said she did not know who fired first. Janis also said appellant acted as 

a protector of the females in their family and was not afraid of engaging in an altercation with 

someone who was abusing a female member of their family. Charles Cahoone, a private defense 

investigator, testified he interviewed Margaret Janis after the April 15 incident. According to 

Janis, Valdovinos knew that bullets were flying over her head but did not know who fired the 

first shot.

Testimony of Carmen Gutierrez

Carmen Gutierrez testified she was the mother of Raquel Baca and the aunt of appellant. 

Gutierrez said Baca came to her home during the early morning hours of April 15. Gutierrez 

was asleep at the time. When she awakened, Baca explained what had happened at the Almond 

Terrace Apartments. Gutierrez first went to the hospital and then went to Valdovinos's 

apartment. Gutierrez saw Valdovinos in a police car at the complex. Gutierrez asked Valdovinos

why she was in the police car, and Valdovinos said she told officers she had shot appellant. 

Valdovinos said she lied to protect Garcia, who had a pending case for shooting someone else. 

At some unspecified point in time, Valdovinos called Gutierrez from the Ceres Police 

Department to get a ride. Gutierrez picked her up and said she was “real upset” because she had 

learned that Garcia had passed away. According to Gutierrez, Valdovinos hated appellant 

because of what happened and wished that he had died also.

Testimony of Erica Baca

Erica Baca testified she was the sister of Raquel and the cousin of appellant and Valdovinos. 

According to Erica, Valdovinos told detectives that she shot appellant because Garcia was 

fighting a gun charge, and she did not want him to go to prison for 15 years. Valdovinos told 

Erica she did not know who fired the first shot at the apartment.

Testimony of Albanita Erebia

Albanita Erebia testified she visited with Valdovinos and Margaret Janis at the home of Erebia's 

aunt and uncle by marriage, Mr. and Mrs. Charles Simmons, Jr. The visit took place right after 

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the shooting in the early morning hours of April 15, 2007. Valdovinos said an argument 

occurred between her cousin and her husband and “after that everything happened so quickly 

and there were just bullets everywhere.” Valdovinos referred to Garcia as her husband and said 

he was dead. Erebia asked who shot first and Valdovinos said she did not know because “[i]t all 

happened so fast, and it was just bullets were everywhere.” Valdovinos also told Erebia that she 

dropped to the floor when the bullets were discharged.

Testimony of Charles Simmons, Jr.

Sacramento County resident Charles Simmons, Jr., testified he was the uncle of appellant, Erica 

and Raquel Baca, and Valdovinos. Simmons said he and other family members met twice with 

Valdovinos at his home. Albanita Erebia was present during the second such meeting. During 

each of those meetings, Simmons said family members “were upset because they had seen 

Olivia with “busted lips,” black eyes, and bruises and in some cases had witnessed the infliction 

of those injuries. Family members expressed to Simmons their concern that Valdovinos was 

being untruthful about the cause of her injuries. During these conversations, Valdovinos said 

she did not see who shot first at her apartment.

Valdovinos told her family members that she had said the same thing to police detectives. 

Simmons said Valdovinos had sustained very serious spousal abuse at the hands of her former 

husband, Condalario Valdovinos. The abuse required her to be hospitalized and to have her jaw 

wired shut. In March 2007, Valdovinos arrived at her grandparents' home in Modesto. She had 

“a busted lip” with hanging skin and a swollen cheek.

Valdovinos had a handgun in her purse on that occasion and she said she wanted to use it to 

shoot Garcia. Simmons retained possession of the gun for one week and then returned it to 

Valdovinos. Garcia ran away after breaking Valdovinos's jaw and was caught and arrested about 

a year later. Valdovinos married Garcia while he was in jail. Simmons confirmed that family 

members Andrea Charles and Angie Ruiz actually witnessed Garcia striking Valdovinos on at 

least one occasion. Simmons did not consider Valdovinos a truthful person because through the 

years she had denied being a victim of domestic abuse.

Testimony of Carmen D. Simmons

Carmen D. Simmons, grandmother of appellant and Valdovinos, said she and her husband, 

Charles Simmons, Sr., temporarily moved to the Sacramento home of their son, Charles 

Simmons, Jr., shortly after the shooting. Within a week of the shooting, Carmen Simmons, 

Charles Simmons, Sr., Charles Simmons, Jr., Margaret Janis, and Olivia Valdovinos all met at 

the home of Charles, Jr. and talked about the shooting. Carmen Simmons said Valdovinos did 

not remember who shot first.

Testimony of Dr. Linda Barnard

Linda Barnard, Ph.D., a licensed marriage and family therapist in private practice, testified 

“there were multiple generations of intimate partner battering” in Valdovinos's extended family. 

Dr. Barnard said Valdovinos had been the victim of serious intimate partner battering starting at 

the age of 15. Valdovinos's first husband beat her so badly that she had to have her face 

reconstructed. Her relationship with Pete Garcia resulted in serious injuries from domestic 

violence. Dr. Barnard testified that battered women have a tendency to minimize and deny the 

extent of violence the experience, particularly if they stay with their partner. Dr. Barnard also 

said that 75 to 80 percent of women who initially report domestic violence to law enforcement 

either recant or become uncooperative with authorities at some point in the process. Dr. Barnard 

said Valdovinos had a history of recanting, minimizing, or denying intimate partner battering 

and also said Valdovinos's statements to police after the shooting were the result of intimate 

partner battering, including her minimization of “any kind of involvement of domestic violence 

by Pete [Garcia].” Dr. Barnard considered Garcia a high-level batterer.

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Dr. Barnard testified that Charles Simmons, Jr., was the only male of his generation, and he 

acted as a protector of all of his sisters and intervened when they or their daughters were 

subjected to abuse. Simmons told Dr. Barnard that appellant assisted him in that role because 

appellant was “part of that older group of the next generation....” According to Barnard, 

Simmons said appellant “became the go-to guy for girls in his generation ... who came to him 

for help when boyfriends were hurting them or they were having problems and asked him to 

help or intervene so he took on that same role Uncle Charles had.” Dr. Barnard was aware that 

appellant had been convicted of a misdemeanor battery on his own spouse in 2003 and attended 

a 52–week batterer intervention program as a result. Simmons said the intervention program 

caused appellant to mature and make changes in his own life.

Testimony of Officer Gary Soria

California Highway Patrol Officer Gary Soria testified he went to a traffic stop north of 

Paradise Road on Martin Luther King Boulevard on August 29, 2003. Officer Soria assisted in a 

search of Pete Garcia, who sat in the right front seat of the detained vehicle. Soria located a 

loaded magazine for a weapon in Garcia's pants pocket.

Testimony of Officer Robert Gumm

Modesto Police Officer Robert Gumm testified he ejected Garcia from the X–Fest festival in 

downtown Modesto on the evening of July 23, 2005, because Garcia was making gestures for 

Westside, part of the Norteno criminal street gang.

Testimony of Deputy Paul Teso

Stanislaus County Deputy Sheriff Paul Teso testified that Garcia was a self-admitted member of 

the Norteno criminal street gang effective December 8, 2006.

Testimony of Olivia Valdovinos

Olivia Valdovinos testified that Pete Garcia never held a gun to her head, never attempted to 

push her out of a second-floor window, and never carried a gun in her purse to help Garcia 

avoid trouble. She said she carried a gun in her purse because she wanted to and denied that her 

uncle, Charles Simmons, Jr., took that gun away from her. Valdovinos said she did not know 

who fired first during the shooting at her apartment.

With respect to events after the shooting, Valdovinos admitted talking to her uncle, Charles, Jr., 

several times about getting some money from appellant's father as an apparent inducement for 

her not to testify against appellant. She said the first such conversation with her uncle occurred 

at her grandfather's house prior to trial. The second such conversation with her uncle took place 

over the telephone and the conversation was recorded. According to a transcript of the 

recording, Valdovinos said she had already spoken with appellant's father. During that same 

recorded telephone call with Charles, Jr., appellant agreed to take $15,000 down and an 

additional sum later. At trial, however, Valdovinos said she never followed through with the 

proposed inducement and also said she reported “the conversation” to the district attorney's 

office before trial.

Related Testimony of Charles Simmons, Jr.

Charles Simmons, Jr., testified he spoke with Valdovinos in Modesto on June 8, 2009, and she 

asked what did appellant's father “have for her not to show up.” Valdovinos did not mention a 

specific dollar amount but did mention that she had a pending $5,000 cleanup bill for her 

apartment. Valdovinos told Simmons she would not show up in court and testify in return for 

whatever appellant's father had.

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During a telephone call with Simmons, Valdovinos said she would take $15,000 up front as 

long as she received $5,000 later on. Investigator Charles Cahoone was present during 

Simmons's speakerphone conversation with Valdovinos. According to Cahoone, “Olivia asked 

if he [Simmons] had spoke[n] to big Tim [appellant's father], and she said if they were still 

willing to do it [pay her hush money], that she would not go to jail for not testifying because of 

the law against not testifying against relatives.”

Testimony of Erica Baca

Erica Baca testified that Valdovinos had spoken to her about Garcia putting a gun to her head 

and attempting to push her out of a window. Baca also said that she and Valdovinos had talked 

about the trial. According to Baca, “she [Valdovinos] told me if certain issues came up in court, 

she was going to lie about them.”

Testimony of Sergeant Craig Breckenridge

Modesto Police Sergeant Craig Breckenridge testified he arrested Garcia for being in possession 

of a loaded firearm on the evening of September 1, 2000. The arrest occurred during a traffic 

stop, and Garcia was seated in the rear passenger seat behind the driver. A fellow officer told 

Sergeant Breckenridge the location of the weapons. Garcia denied ownership, and the driver of 

the vehicle claimed that one of the weapons belonged to his cousin.

Rebuttal Evidence

Testimony of Shankar Sharma, Lorenzo Martinez, and Robert Lopez

Shankar Sharma testified he did not see what happened to appellant's gun after the shooting. 

Lorenzo Martinez testified he saw appellant fire the weapon but did not see it again after the 

shooting. Robert Lopez testified he never saw appellant with a gun and never saw him fire a 

weapon.

Testimony of Margaret Janis

Margaret Janis testified that she visited her daughter, Valdovinos, and Pete Garcia once or twice 

a week at the Almond Terrace Apartments. On one occasion, she saw Valdovinos with a black 

eye, but Valdovinos said she incurred the injury when she got into a fight at a club. Janis did not 

recall seeing her daughter with “a busted lip.” However, she did remember her daughter saying 

she had injured herself in bar fights on several occasions. Janis did not know that appellant had 

been convicted of a battery on his wife in 2003 or that he had grabbed his stepmother's neck and 

pulled her hair in December 2003.

Testimony of Defense Investigator Charles Cahoone

Defense investigator Charles Cahoone interviewed Sharma on January 7, 2009. Sharma told 

him he heard Garcia say, “Watch out,” open the security screen door, stick his right foot and 

hand out of the door, and hold a chrome revolver in his hand. Sharma told Cahoone that 

appellant then stepped in front of Sharma, and Garcia shot at appellant. Sharma saw a flash 

from the muzzle of a gun and ran toward the balcony railing. At the railing, Sharma looked back 

and saw appellant return shots into the apartment. Cahoone interviewed Lorenzo Martinez and

Robert Lopez that same date and Martinez and Lopez offered similar versions of the events 

surrounding the shooting.

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 1-11).

DISCUSSION

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I. Jurisdiction

Relief by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus extends to a person in custody pursuant to 

the judgment of a state court if the custody is in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 

United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 n. 

7 (2000). Petitioner asserts that he suffered violations of his rights as guaranteed by the United States 

Constitution. The challenged conviction arises out of the Stanislaus County Superior Court, which is 

located within the jurisdiction of this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 28 U.S.C.§ 2241(d). 

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 

(“AEDPA”), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed after its enactment. Lindh v. 

Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 586 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 (1997), overruled on other grounds by

Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (holding the AEDPA only applicable to cases filed after statute’s 

enactment). The instant petition was filed after the enactment of the AEDPA and is therefore governed 

by its provisions.

II. Legal Standard of Review

A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless the 

petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision that was 

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined 

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was based on an 

unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court 

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. 

at 412-413. 

A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if it applies a rule that 

contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts 

that is materially indistinguishable from a [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” 

Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141 (2005), citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406 (2000). 

In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___ , 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court 

explained that an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether 

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it is possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards set 

forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable application of 

federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 

1388, 1410-1411 (2011). Thus, a state prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court 

“must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 

possibility of fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-788. 

The second prong pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v. 

Woodford, 384 F.3d at 637, citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003). Under § 2254(d)(2), a 

federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the petitioner’s claims “resulted 

in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. at 520; Jeffries v. Wood, 114 

F.3d at 1500. A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable when it is “so clearly incorrect that it 

would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Id.; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 

(9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied, Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004).

To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to the 

last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). “[A]lthough we 

independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. 

Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). 

The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error had “a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 

507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)(holding that the Brecht

standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness). 

Furthermore, where a habeas petition governed by the AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel 

under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Strickland prejudice standard is applied and 

courts do not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 

911, 918 n. 7 (9th Cir. 2002); Musladin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 835 (9th Cir. 2009).

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III. Review of Petitioner’s Claims.

The instant petition itself alleges the following as grounds for relief: (1) use of CALCRIM No. 

3475 was erroneous; (2) use of a jury instruction regarding provocation of a fist fight was erroneous; 

(3) erroneous use of instruction regarding consciousness of guilt from flight; (4) reversible evidentiary 

error; (5) erroneous exclusion of evidence; (6) newly discovered evidence of innocence; and (7) 

ineffective assistance of counsel.

A. CALCRIM No. 3475

Petitioner first contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 

3475. This contention is without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Appellant contends the court eliminated his claim of right of self-defense and denied him due 

process by giving CALCRIM No. 3475 [right to eject trespasser from real property]. While we 

will address appellant's numerous primary and subsidiary contentions, we note the issues of 

trespass and defense of real property were not at the heart of this case. We further note that 

appellant's single-minded emphasis on the concept of trespass and the giving of CALCRIM No. 

3475 overlooks our responsibility to assess the correctness and adequacy of jury instructions by 

a consideration of the entire charge, rather than by reference to parts of an instruction or from a 

particular instruction. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 

Cal.4th 936, 963–964.)

A. Background

During the jury instruction conference, the court referred to CALCRIM No. 3475, which he 

described as dealing “with the right to eject a trespasser from real property.” The court said the 

instruction is normally used “when someone is charged with a crime that is ejecting someone 

from the property.” Defense counsel opposed the giving of CALCRIM No. 3475. Counsel 

acknowledged “[t]he right to use deadly force inside your home when somebody invades it....” 

However, he pointed out that appellant yelled at Garcia and did not move toward or open the 

apartment door. The prosecution maintained that appellant demanded a confrontation with 

Garcia. The prosecution conceded, “[T]hat may not now allow the enjoyment of firing the gun, 

but it may allow the response of saying I have a deadly weapon. Get out of here.” The court 

noted that CALCRIM No. 3475 did not specifically mention the use of deadly force. Rather, 

the instruction mentioned reasonable force and the court elected to give the instruction over 

defense objection.

B. The Instruction

At the apparent request of the prosecution, the court subsequently instructed the jury in 

CALCRIM No. 3475, as follows:

“A lawful occupant of a home may request that a trespasser leave the home. If the 

trespasser does not leave within a reasonable time and it appears to a reasonable person 

that the trespasser poses a threat to the home or the occupants, the lawful occupant may 

use reasonable force to make a trespasser leave. A reasonable force means the amount of 

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force that a reasonable person in the same situation would believe is necessary to make 

the trespasser leave.

“In deciding whether Pete Garcia used reasonable force, consider all the circumstances 

as they were known to him and appeared to him and consider whether a reasonable 

person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed.”

C. The Arguments of Counsel

During his opening argument, the prosecutor acknowledged that appellant and his companions 

gained access to the Almond Terrace Apartments through the pedestrian gate. The prosecutor 

pointed out that appellant's companions could not “decide if it was open, closed, or unlocked, 

but clearly they opened it up and got in” during the early morning hours of April 15, 2007. The 

prosecutor referred to appellant as a trespasser who went to Garcia's residence at 4:00 a.m. and 

noted “there's an instruction on the rights of someone who, you know, protect themselves [sic] 

against this kind of conduct.” In his responsive argument, defense counsel acknowledged that 

appellant called Garcia out but did not make any attempt to enter the apartment, even when the 

screen door was open. Defense counsel further acknowledged: “So wh[ile] you have the right 

to reject [a] trespasser, you don't have the right to use unreasonable force, and assaulting him 

with a deadly weapon is unreasonable force.” The prosecutor argued on rebuttal that Garcia and 

appellant were not similarly situated because one was a homeowner and the other was an 

intruder. He maintained Garcia was in his home, was threatened by appellant, and had the right 

of self-defense.

D. Appellant's Contention

Appellant broadly argues that CALCRIM No. 3475 labeled him a “trespasser,” justified Garcia's 

use of reasonable force to make appellant leave his residence, and eliminated appellant's 

“meritorious claim of self-defense, in violation of due process.”

Appellant goes on to argue, among other things, that (1) CALCRIM No. 3475 “was a burden 

shifting instruction in violation of due process;” (2) the inference that appellant was a trespasser 

was unfounded; (3) the evidence was “legally insufficient to establish that appellant was a 

trespasser, although it was enough to mislead the jury;” (4) the prosecutor's argument distorted 

the instruction, resulting in a denial of due process; and (5) the instruction misled the jury on the 

principles of self-defense in violation of appellant's right to due process.

E. Analysis

1. General Law of Instructional Error

If a trial court's instructional error violates the United States Constitution, the standard stated in 

Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, requires the People, in order to avoid reversal of 

the judgment, to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error ... did not contribute to the 

verdict obtained.” (See People v. Simon (1995) 9 Cal.4th 493, 506, fn. 11 (Simon).) But if a 

trial court's instructional error violates only California law, the standard is that stated in People 

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, which permits the People to avoid reversal unless “it is 

reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been 

reached in the absence of the error.” (Simon, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 506, fn. 11; see also People 

v. Mower (2002) 28 Cal.4th 457, 484.)

2. Validity of CALCRIM No. 3475 and Alleged Shifting of the Burden of Proof

CALCRIM No. 3475 does not specifically address or allocate the burden of proof. As to the 

burden of proof, the trial court initially instructed the jury in CALCRIM No. 103 [reasonable 

doubt]: “A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be [innocent]. This presumption requires 

that the People prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Whenever I tell you the 

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People must prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court 

went on to instruct the jury in CALCRIM No. 505 [justifiable homicide; self-defense or defense 

of another] in pertinent part as follows:

“The defendant is not guilty of murder or manslaughter if he was justified in killing 

someone in self-defense or defense of another. The defendant acted in lawful selfdefense or defense of another if:

“One, the defendant reasonably believed that he or someone else was in imminent 

danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury;

“Two, the defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of deadly force was 

necessary to defend against that danger;

“And, three, the defendant used no more force than reasonably necessary to defendant 

against that danger. [¶] ... [¶]

“The defendant's belief that he or someone else was threatened may be reasonable even 

if he relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and 

reasonably had believed the information was true. If you find that the defendant knew 

that Peter Silverio Garcia had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider 

that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were 

reasonable.

“A defendant is not required to retreat. He ... or she is entitled to stand his or her ground 

and defend himself or herself and if reasonably necessary pursue an assailant until the 

danger of death or great bodily injury has passed. This is so even if safety could have 

been achieved by retreating. Great bodily injury and significant or substantial injury, it is 

injury that is greater than minor or moderate harm.

“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was 

not justified. If they have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of 

murder or manslaughter.

“When the original aggressor is not guilty of a deadly attack but of simple assault or 

trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force. If the victim uses 

such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises.

“If, however, the counterassault be so sudden and perilous that no opportunities be given 

to decline or make known to his adversary of his willingness to decline or make known 

to the adversary of his willingness to decline to strike if he cannot retreat with safety, 

then the greater wrong of the deadly assault is upon the opponent, he would be justified 

in ... slaying forthwith in self-defense”

“In reviewing claims of instructional error, we look to whether the defendant has shown a 

reasonable likelihood that the jury, considering the instruction complained of in the context of 

the instructions as a whole and not in isolation, understood that instruction in a manner that 

violated his constitutional rights. [Citations.] We interpret the instructions so as to support the 

judgment if they are reasonably susceptible to such interpretation, and we presume jurors can 

understand and correlate all instructions given. [Citations.]” (People v. Vang (2009) 171 

Cal.App.4th 1120, 1129.) Here, references in CALCRIM No. 3475 to appellant's status as an 

alleged trespasser or Pete Garcia's alleged use of reasonable force were complemented and 

clarified by the principles of justifiable homicide and the relevant burden of proof as set forth in 

CALCRIM No. 505.

In asserting a shift in the burden of proof, appellant acknowledges People v. Watie (2002) 100 

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Cal.App.4th 866 (Watie), a factually similar case in which the Third Appellate District upheld 

the use of CALJIC Nos. 5.40 and 5.42, predecessor instructions to CALCRIM No. 3475. In 

Watie, the defendant's mother lived with his abusive stepfather, an ex-felon, and several 

stepsiblings. On May 5, 1999, the defendant's stepfather assaulted his mother during a fight at 

their home and she sustained a bloody face. The defendant saw his mother after the fight and he 

told her to call the police. She called 911 about an hour later and said the stepfather had no 

weapons in the house. A police officer responded to the scene and the defendant's mother told 

him she had been the victim of domestic violence. The mother did not go to the hospital or file 

charges against the stepfather. (Id. at p. 871–873.)

The defendant offered to pick up his stepsiblings. He put a gun in his back pocket, took two 

friends, and went to his mother's home. After a heated conversation, the stepfather challenged 

the defendant to a fight. The stepfather then went to the back of the house, and the defendant 

thought he was going to get the stepsiblings. The stepfather returned with what the defendant 

thought to be a rifle or shotgun and defendant shot him dead with the concealed handgun. 

Emergency personnel and police officers responding to the scene found a wooden object 

underneath the stepfather's body but no firearm. The defendant was charged with second degree 

murder with personal use of a firearm (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)) and discharging 

a firearm in an inhabited dwelling (§ 246). As to both substantive counts, the Sacramento 

County District Attorney charged the defendant with personal discharge of a firearm causing 

great bodily injury (§ 12022 .53, subd. (d)). A jury found him guilty of the lesser included 

offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192) and guilty of all of the charged offenses and 

allegations. (Watie, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 873–875.)

The defendant appealed contending the court erroneously gave CALJIC No. 5.40 [defense of 

property—ejection of trespasser] and No. 5.42 [resisting an intruder upon one's property]. He 

claimed the trial court erroneously failed to inform the jury that self-defense instructions applied 

to the section 246 charge, failed to explain the malice element required to convict for a violation 

of section 246, and failed to give a mistake-of-fact instruction to the jury. The Third District 

Court of Appeal rejected these contentions and affirmed. The defendant claimed CALJIC Nos. 

5.40 and 5.42 should not have been given to the jury because these instructions allowed jurors 

to presume the stepfather was acting in lawful defense of his property and effectively removed 

the defense of actual self-defense from the jury's consideration. (Watie, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 875–876.)

The Third District held the instructions were proper in light of the facts of the case. The 

justification of self-defense requires a double showing: that the defendant was actually in fear of 

his life or serious bodily injury and the conduct of the other party was such as to produce that 

state of mind in a reasonable person. Generally, if one makes a felonious assault upon another, 

or has created appearances justifying the other to launch a deadly counterattack in self-defense, 

the original assailant cannot slay his adversary in self-defense unless he or she has first, in good 

faith, declined further combat, and second, has fairly notified the adversary that he or she has 

abandoned the combat. In addition to the instructions that generally describe self-defense, the 

court instructed the jury on the defense of a dwelling, using CALJIC Nos. 5.40 and 5.42. The 

right of a victim to defend himself and his property is a relevant consideration in determining 

whether a defendant may prevail when he or she seeks to negate malice aforethought by 

asserting the affirmative defense of imperfect self-defense. (Watie, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 

pp. 877–879.)

In Watie, the jury was confronted with two questions: (1) whether the defendant's use of deadly 

force was justified as he confronted his stepfather on the front porch of the latter's home and (2) 

whether the defendant's unlawful conduct created circumstances that legally justified the 

stepfather's use of force. According to the Third District, if the stepfather had a right to use force 

to defend himself in his home, then the defendant had no right of self-defense, imperfect or 

otherwise. The trial court's instructions on the stepfather's rights and the defendant's right to turn 

to deadly force correctly stated the law. The Third District further noted that the jury apparently 

credited the defendant's claim of self-defense by finding the defendant guilty of the lesser 

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offense of voluntary manslaughter. To do so, the jury must have found that the defendant had, 

or regained, the right to defend himself notwithstanding his stepfather's right to defend his 

home. The Third District concluded the challenged instructions did not bear on the jury's 

verdicts. (Watie, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 878–879.)

Appellant claims Watie is inapplicable to the facts of this case because “the defendant in Watie

was properly deemed to be a trespasser” while in this case, “[a]ppellant was not a trespasser.” 

Our reading of Watie does not reveal any specific discussion of the crime or concept of trespass, 

although the Third District stated without citing to authority: “Moreover, defendant was guilty 

of trespass and was threatening [the stepfather] whether defendant was attempting to break into 

the house or not.”(Watie, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 879.) In fact, appellant ultimately 

concedes in his opening brief: “Although the subject was not discussed in the Watie opinion, the 

defendant was clearly deemed to be a trespasser....” Cases are not authority for propositions not 

considered. (People v. Nguyen (2000) 22 Cal.4th 872, 879.) Appellant's claim that the decision 

in Watie turned on the defendant's status as a trespasser at the home of his mother and stepfather 

is questionable. The use of CALCRIM No. 3475 in this case was consistent with the use of its 

predecessor instructions, CALJIC Nos. 5.40 and 5.42, in Watie.

Even if CALCRIM No. 3475 somehow implied that appellant was a trespasser at the Almond 

Terrace Apartments, CALCRIM No. 505 protected his due process rights by fully and fairly 

setting forth the concepts of lawful self-defense and defense of another.

2. Inference of Appellant as Trespasser

Appellant contends the inference that he was a trespasser was unfounded because there was no 

jury instruction defining the term “trespasser.” Neither CALCRIM No. 3475 nor former 

CALJIC No. 5.40, upon which appellant relies, sets forth a specific definition of the term 

“trespasser.” As respondent points out, a technical definition of “trespasser” was not required 

since appellant was not being prosecuted for trespass. In addition, the court instructed the jury in 

CALCRIM No. 200 that: “Words and phrases not specifically defined in these instructions are 

to be applied using their ordinary, everyday meanings.”

Appellant implies he was not a trespasser in common parlance because Almond Terrace resident

“Raquel [Baca] at least impliedly (if not explicitly) invited appellant to enter the apartment 

complex.” On direct examination during the People's case-in-chief, Valdovinos said Raquel and 

Garcia got into an argument at their apartment after Raquel returned from drinking. Garcia 

eventually told Raquel, “‘Come on, Raquel. This is going too far.’” According to Valdovinos, 

Raquel replied, “‘Oh, you trying to hit me? You trying to hit me? You think you're bad?... 

Watch. I'm going to get my cousin Timmy over here.’” On direct examination during the 

defense case, defense counsel specifically asked Raquel Baca, “Did you ask him [appellant] to 

go over to Olivia's apartment and beat up on Pete?” Baca replied, “No.” On direct examination 

during the defense case, defense counsel asked Shankar Sharma about the events leading to the 

shooting. Sharma said they arrived at Valdovinos's apartment and appellant knocked on the 

window. When Valdovinos answered the door, appellant asked, “‘Are you okay?’” Valdovinos 

responded, “‘Timmy, what are you doing here? Why are you [here]?’” When appellant asked 

whether Garcia was still hitting her, she replied, “‘No, just get out of here.’”

The totality of the testimony was conflicting, at best. Nevertheless, we do not consider 

instructions in isolation (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 677), but determine the 

correctness and sufficiency of the jury instructions by assessing the entirety of the charge 

(People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248). Even if CALCRIM No. 3475 implied 

that appellant was a trespasser, CALCRIM No. 505 protected his due process rights by fully and 

fairly setting forth the concepts of lawful self-defense and defense of another. Reversible error 

did not occur.

3. Evidence of Trespass as Misleading in Nature

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Appellant contends criminal trespass, as defined by Penal Code section 602 and following 

sections, does not apply to the common areas of an apartment complex. He further contends a 

standard definition of trespass, such as that set forth in CALCRIM No. 2932 [trespass: entry 

into dwelling (Pen.Code, § 602.5(a) & (b))], would have informed the jury of the technical 

requirements for trespass and would have allowed the jury to “properly determine[ ] that 

appellant was not a trespasser.”

In our view, appellant overemphasizes the brief reference to “trespasser” in CALCRIM No. 

3475 to the exclusion of other, properly given instructions. When reviewing purportedly 

ambiguous jury instructions, we ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood jurors applied the 

challenged instructions in a way that violated the Constitution. (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 

U.S. 62, 72; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 766.) In making this determination, we 

must keep in mind that instructions are not considered in isolation. Instead, whether instructions 

are correct and adequate is determined by consideration of the entire charge to the jury rather 

than by reference to parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction. (People v. Holt, 

supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 677; People v. Smithey, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 963–964.)

CALCRIM No. 3475 and its predecessor instructions (CALJIC Nos. 5.40 and 5.42) do not 

include a technical definition of the term “trespasser.” Appellant has not cited and we have been 

unable to find any specific case authority mandating such a definition as part of an instruction 

on the ejection of a trespasser in defense of property or characterizing the absence of such a 

definition as reversible error. Nor has appellant cited any authority permitting a defense of 

property instruction only when an individual on the premises has been adjudicated guilty of 

statutory trespass. Moreover, the court instructed the jury in CALCRIM No. 505 [justifiable 

homicide; self-defense or defense of another] and appellant expressly deems that instruction to 

be correct. CALCRIM No. 505 states in pertinent part: “When the original aggressor is not 

guilty of a deadly attack but of simple assault or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly 

or other excessive force. If the victim uses such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense 

arises.”(Italics added.)

Appellant fails to explain why or how the absence of a formal definition of “trespass” makes 

CALCRIM No. 3475 deficient while the absence of the same definition makes CALCRIM No. 

505 correct. Appellant's claim that CALCRIM No. 3475 was misleading is not supported by the 

record or the law and must be rejected.

4. Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct

In addition to claiming that CALCRIM No. 3475 was “fatally unclear on this record” due to the 

absence of a definition for “trespasser,” appellant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial 

misconduct by distorting CALCRIM No. 3475 in his closing argument. He argues on appeal:

“[I]n the present case, the prosecutor built on a jury instruction which might be proper in 

some circumstances, but which was misconstrued here. According to the prosecutor, 

once appellant appeared at Garcia's door to settle the dispute over the abuse of Olivia 

and Raquel, Pete Garcia had a right to pull out his handgun. Normally, this would trigger 

the defendant's right to self defense—‘The defendant reasonably believed that he or 

someone else was in imminent danger of being killed or suffering great bodily injury.’ 

But according to the prosecutor, that right to self-defense disappeared due to the 

defendant's asserted trespasser status.”

Appellant challenges the following portion of the prosecutor's argument at trial:

“Now, Timothy Carrillo and Pete Garcia were not similarly situated. One's the 

homeowner, one's the intruder. If you follow the scenario. For example, if Pete ... 

brandished first, showed Timothy that he was armed and Timothy then had his gun at 

the ready, Pete Garcia would be entitled to fire first. Why do I say that? Because he's in 

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his home, he's being threatened, he has the right at that point of self-defense. He has a 

right of self-defense because he knows that if he doesn't fire first, he'll be shot. That's a 

scenario where he can fire first, he can be justified in firing first, and there's no right of 

self-defense in that situation.

“Remember he's inviting him [to] take out that gun and to show it and whatever. That's 

why he's taunting him the whole time. Are you packing Pete? Are you packing? Well, 

are you packing? I'm ready for you if you are is the implication, and, of course, he was 

packing and he was ready for him.

“And I think it's misplaced the entire inquiry [sic ] if, and it's still not certain, that Pete 

did fire first, but under the circumstances, as the person who has the right to defend 

himself and this person is there to provoke a fight or quarrel, the jury instruction Mr. 

Spokes touched on: ‘The person does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes 

the fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.’[¶] It's precisely what 

he did in this case. This instruction, albeit real short, can't be any clearer.

“As I said, this fight didn't occur out in public or some parking lot or something like 

that. It occurred at the man's home with Olivia there, Cary Thompson there at 4:00 

o'clock in the morning with him goading him and continuing to goad Pete. Yes, if things 

could have worked out differently, wouldn't it be wonderful. Two people wouldn't be 

dead. Wouldn't it ha[ve] been wonderful if someone had suddenly slammed the door and 

bolted it. Who knows what may have happened but it didn't happen that way. It didn't 

happen that day. The responsibility for those deaths lies with Mr. Carrillo.”

“To constitute a violation of the federal Constitution, prosecutorial misconduct must ‘“so infect[ 

] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.”’

[Citations.] Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair 

is prosecutorial misconduct under state law only if it involves ‘“the use of deceptive or 

reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.”’” (People v. 

Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 108.) Appellant failed to object to the comments at the time of 

trial, an omission that ordinarily bars consideration of the claim on appeal. (People v. Medina

(1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 756; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 794.) Appellant has not 

supplied any plausible basis for his contention that an objection and admonition could not have 

cured any harm that assertedly flowed from the prosecutor's remarks, despite his broad claims 

that “[t]he fundamental error was in the jury instruction” and counsel's “argument built directly 

on the misleading nature of CALCRIM 3475.”

Appellant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct at argument must be rejected.

F. Conclusion

In evaluating the respective arguments of the parties, we are reminded that a single jury 

instruction regarding the right of a residential occupant to eject a trespasser is but an aspect of a 

greater issue in this case—the question of justifiable homicide and the role self-defense as 

between the deceased victim, Pete Garcia, and the surviving combatant, the appellant himself. 

Clearly, the court briefly instructed the jury in the right of an occupant to eject a trespasser from 

residential real property (CALCRIM No. 3475). However, appellant's challenge to this 

instruction overlooks other pertinent instructions given in this case.

For example, the court expressly instructed the jury: “Evidence of the defendant's character as a 

protector of female family members can by itself create a reasonable doubt.” (CALCRIM No. 

350). The court also instructed: “Where the original aggressor i[s] not guilty of a deadly attack, 

but of a simple assault or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force. 

If the victim uses such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises....” (CALCRIM No. 

505). The court further instructed on excusable homicide: accident (CALCRIM No. 510); 

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provocation: effect of degree of murder (CALCRIM No. 522); voluntary manslaughter: heat of 

passion—lesser included offense (CALCRIM No. 570); and voluntary manslaughter: imperfect 

self-defense (CALCRIM No. 571).

Moreover, the court expressly considered giving CALCRIM No. 3471 [right to self-defense: 

mutual combat or initial aggressor], which would have supplied appellant with another solid 

basis for self-defense. However, appellant's trial counsel objected to the instruction as 

inconsistent with the defense theory of the case and the evidence in the case.

Taking the instructions as a whole, and considering the arguments of the parties, we see no 

reasonable likelihood that the jurors interpreted CALCRIM No. 3475 to apply in a way that 

violated appellant's rights or his ability to present a defense. (See Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 

U.S. at p. 72 [applying “‘reasonable likelihood’” test to review of ambiguous instructions]; 

People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663 [same].)

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 11-20).

2. Federal Standard.

The issue of whether a jury instruction is a violation of state law is neither a federal question nor 

a proper subject for habeas corpus relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. ("We have stated many times that 

'federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.' "), quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 

764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-49 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“mere 

error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation, may not be corrected 

on federal habeas”). Indeed, federal courts are bound by state court rulings on questions of state law. 

Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 942 (1989). In addition, 

“the availability of a claim under state law does not of itself establish that a claim was available under 

the United States Constitution.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 239 (1990), quoting, Dugger v. 

Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 409 (1989). 

In reviewing an ambiguous instruction, the inquiry is not how reasonable jurors could or would 

have understood the instruction as a whole; rather, the court must inquire whether there is a “reasonable 

likelihood” that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution. 

See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 & n. 4; Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). However, a 

determination that there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in 

a way that violates the Constitution establishes only that an error has occurred. See Calderon v. 

Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998). If an error is found, the court also must determine the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict before granting habeas 

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relief. See id. at 146–47 (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)).

In determining whether instructional error warrants habeas relief, a habeas court must consider 

“‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates 

due process’ ... not merely whether ‘the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even universally 

condemned.’” Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 

141, 146-47 (1973)); California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 5 (1996) (challenge in habeas to the trial court’s 

jury instructions is reviewed under the standard in Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637--whether the error had a 

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.). The burden of 

demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on 

the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to 

establish plain error on direct appeal. Hanna v. Riveland, 87 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1996).

In a criminal case, an evidentiary device must not undermine the fact-finder’s responsibility at 

trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 

County Court of Ulster County, N. Y. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 

364 (1970). A permissive inference is one of the most common evidentiary devices, which allows, but 

does not require, the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic 

one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 

2224. “Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference 

and does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 

standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection 

permitted by the inference.” Id., 442 U.S. at 157, 99 S.Ct. at 2225; U.S. v. Warren, 25 F.3d 890, 897 

(9th Cir. 1994); Sterling v. Roe, 2002 WL 826807 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “A permissive inference violates 

the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense 

justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.” Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314-315 (1985). 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction 

except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 

he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court held: “the Constitution does not 

require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government’s burden of 

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proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions must correctly convey the concept of reasonable doubt 

to the jury.” Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (1994). This standard reduces the 

chance that an innocent person will be conviction. Winship, at 362. Winship does not require every 

fact upon which the jury relies be proven to a reasonable doubt. Many facts not proven to that standard 

may, collectively, allow the jury to infer an element of the crime is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 

To enforce Winship’s rule, judges must instruct juries that they cannot return a guilty verdict unless the 

government has met this burden. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 275, 278 (1972). A jury conviction 

based upon an impermissibly low quantum of proof violates the jury trial guarantee of the Sixth 

Amendment. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 278 (1993). A judge can violate a defendant’s rights 

by giving an instruction that undercuts the force of an otherwise proper beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

instruction. See, e.g., Cool, 409 U.S. at 102-103; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521 (1979).

When a jury instruction is susceptible to a reading that would render the verdict unconstitutional 

and another that would generate a proper verdict, the reviewing court considers the challenged 

instruction in light of the full jury charge and in the context of the entire trial. See Naughten, 414 U.S. 

at 145-147(consider charge as whole); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 675 (1975)(consider context 

of whole trial). The court must then decide whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury 

applied the challenged instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. A verdict 

remains valid if a jury instruction only tangentially undercut a proper beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 

instruction. Naughten, 414 U.S. at 149-150.

3. Analysis.

Petitioner raises the same state-law arguments here that were rejected by the Court of Appeal. 

He contends that instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3475 was erroneous because: (1) it shifted 

the burden of proof in violation of federal due process; (2) the inference that Petitioner was a trespasser 

was unfounded; (3) the evidence was “legally insufficient to establish that Petitioner was a trespasser, 

although it was enough to mislead the jury; (4) the prosecution’s argument distorted the instruction, 

resulting in a denial of due process; and (5) the instruction misled the jury on the principles of selfdefense in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights. 

While it is clearly-established federal law that “[t]he government must prove beyond a 

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reasonable doubt every element of a charged offense,” Victor, 511 U.S. at 5, the Court is unconvinced 

the alleged errors complained of by Petitioner lightened the prosecutor's burden in this case or 

improperly shifted a burden of proof to petitioner. In any criminal case, the prosecutor presents 

evidence to establish that the offense has been committed, and the defendant has the option to rebut that 

evidence to demonstrate that the evidence fails to establish the elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Here, the prosecutor presented evidence that Petitioner was trespassing and therefore 

his legal right to use force against the victim was limited, and the jury was instructed as to how to 

address that evidence under California law. Specifically, the testimony of Raquel Baca, Garcia’s 

girlfriend, established that she had not invited Petitioner and his friends over to start a fight with Baca, 

to defend her, or for any other such purpose. Since it is clear Garcia did not invite Petitioner, a juror 

could reasonably assume that Petitioner was a trespasser. Of course, the jurors could have rejected that 

testimony and concluded as well that Petitioner had been implicitly invited to Baca’s residence to 

protect her against Garcia. However, those factual issues were squarely within the province of the jury 

and CALCRIM 3475 did not, in any way, shift the burden of proof to Petitioner from the prosecution. 

An instruction that, as here, creates a permissive inference does not, ipso facto, shift the burden 

of proof, and will not violate due process unless it cannot be said “‘with substantial assurance’” that the 

inferred fact is “‘more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’” 

County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 167 & n. 28 (1979)(quoting Leary v. United 

States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)). Courts “determine the constitutionality of a permissive inference 

instruction on a case-by-case basis” by reviewing the record evidence to see if the court can say with 

substantial assurance that the inferred fact flows more probably than not from the facts proven in the 

particular case. See, e.g., Ulster County, 442 U.S. at 162-167 (finding instruction constitutional only 

after concluding that inference more probably than not flowed from specific facts proven to jury at 

trial).

In the Court’s view, the 5th DCA focused on the fundamental issue when it described the central 

question as “the question of justifiable homicide and the role of self-defense as between the deceased 

victim, Pete Garcia, and the surviving combatant, [Petitioner] himself.” The gravamen of Petitioner’s 

argument is that the challenged instruction diminished the viability of his claim of self-defense. 

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However, as the 5th DCA noted, the challenged instruction is not viewed in isolation, but rather as part 

of the overall jury charge. The state court noted the jury was specifically instructed that “Evidence of 

the [Petitioner’s] character as a protector of female family members can by itself create a reasonable 

doubt.” Also, the court instructed the jury that “Where the original aggressor i[s] not guilty of a deadly 

attack, but of a simple assault or trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force. 

If the victim uses such force, the aggressor’s right of self-defense arises....” Additional, the jury was 

instructed on excusable homicide through accident, provocation, the effect of degree of murder, 

voluntary manslaughter, heat of passion as a lesser included offense, and voluntary manslaughter 

(imperfect self-defense). Of course, the jury was given the normal instructions on burden of proof as 

well. 

Respondent notes that the jury was instructed that “[s]ome of these instructions may not apply 

depending on the finding about the facts in the case. Do not assume just because I give a particular 

instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts. After you decided what the facts are, follow

the instructions that you apply to the facts as you find them.” (Doc. 12, p. 36). This is entirely 

consistent with federal habeas law regarding jury instructions. See, e.g., Ulster, 442 U.S. at 157 

(“Because this permissive presumption leaves the trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and 

does not shift the burden of proof, it affects the application of the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard 

only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could make the connection 

permitted by the inference.” ); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314-315 (“A permissive inference 

violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common 

sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury.”). 

Here, as a whole, the instructions adequately instructed the jury regarding the burden of proof, 

the defense of self-defense, and the relation of that defense to the reasonable doubt instruction. It is 

specious to assert otherwise. The jury is presumed to have followed those instructions. Weeks v. 

Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000). Moreover, the jury was free to accept or reject the permissive 

inferences referenced above based upon its collective view of the evidence. That it reached a 

conclusion with which Petitioner disagrees is not, by itself, a basis for habeas relief. Accordingly, the 

state court decision is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 

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28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Hence, the claim will be denied.2

B. Use Of Instruction On Provocation

Petitioner next contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding provocation of 

a fist fight. This contention is also without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error by giving CALCRIM No. 3472

[right to self-defense; may not be contrived] under the circumstances of this case.

A. Background

At the September 15, 2009, jury instruction conference, the trial court mentioned CALCRIM 

No. 3472. Defense counsel opposed giving the instruction because he did not believe it fit the 

facts of appellant's case. Defense counsel acknowledged that, according to Valdovinos, 

appellant called Garcia to come outside of the apartment. However, counsel maintained there 

was no mutual combat and his client “certainly was not provoking a deadly fight.” The 

prosecutor argued appellant and his three companions went to Garcia's apartment “with the 

express purpose to fight him.” The prosecutor also noted that appellant knew that Garcia was 

“apt to resort to firearms” and appellant was “prepared and ready to meet that exigency.” In 

reply, defense counsel contended the intent to go to the apartment and engage in fisticuffs “is 

provoking a fight or a quarrel, but that's not inviting somebody to shoot you.” The court noted 

it was ultimately the People's burden to prove the killing was not in self-defense. While defense 

counsel agreed with that point, he asserted “if it's mutual combat, there's no self-defense 

involved. The way the instruction currently reads, it doesn't draw the line between fisticuffs and 

the use of deadly force. If you insert the word ‘deadly’ in front of the word ‘force,’ I would have 

no objection to the instruction.” Defense counsel further argued: “The issue is you can't go 

over and instigate a fight or a quarrel with the intent to use deadly force, claim self-defense and 

use deadly force.” After some additional argument, the court said it would give the instruction 

over defense objection and reminded the parties that it was “the People's burden of proof to 

prove that Mr. Carrillo had the intent to create an excuse to use force.” The court expressly 

permitted defense counsel to argue deadly force.

The court subsequently instructed the jury in CALCRIM No. 3472 as follows:

“The person does not have the right to use self-defense if he or she provokes a fight or 

quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force.”

 

2

Petitioner also contends that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by referencing the challenged instruction and thereby 

misled the jury. Respondent’s rejoinder is that the claim is procedurally barred because no contemporaneous objection was 

made by the defense. Here, given the Court’s conclusion that the instruction, when considered within the overall general 

charge to the jury, was justified, it is difficult to see how comments by the prosecution in closing argument about a justified 

instruction could possibly constitute misconduct. Nor, given the foregoing discussion, does the Court see how such 

comments could have so confounded the jury that it would rise to the level of a federal due process violation. The general 

jury charge provided a wide array of options other than the verdict that it ultimately reached. Many of those options would 

have resulted in a shorter sentence than Petitioner received. The heart of Petitioner’s argument seems to be not that the 

trial court erred in giving the jury these various options, but rather that the jurors eventually chose an option that carried the 

heaviest penal sanctions. However, if the jury was, as here, properly instructed, it is not the function of a federal habeas

court to insert its own judgment for that of the jurors who heard the case. Accordingly, the Court rejects any contention by 

Petitioner that the prosecution engaged in misconduct during closing argument.

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B. Closing Arguments

At closing argument, defense counsel characterized CALCRIM No. 3472 as “a little bit 

misleading.” Counsel conceded the appellant went to the apartment and challenged Pete Garcia 

to a fist fight and not a gun fight. Counsel advised the jurors: “[R]eading that instruction you 

probably should consider the question about whether or not he's going to use deadly force.” 

During his closing argument, the prosecutor characterized Garcia as a homeowner and appellant 

as an intruder. He maintained even if Garcia brandished a weapon first and appellant “had his 

gun at the ready,” Garcia was entitled to fire first because he was being threatened in his home 

and had a right of self-defense. The prosecutor reminded the jury that appellant taunted Garcia 

by saying, “Are you packing Pete? Are you packing? Well are you packing? I'm ready for you 

if you are is the implication, and, of course, he was packing and he was ready for him.” The 

prosecutor read the “provokes the fight or quarrel” language of CALCRIM No. 3472 and added, 

“It's precisely what he [appellant] did in this case.”

C. Analysis

Appellant offers a meandering, multifaceted attack on CALCRIM No. 3472. He first implies 

that CALCRIM No. 3472 is erroneous on its face. As we observed with respect to CALCRIM 

No. 3475 above, the parties have not cited and we have been unable to find any case authority 

invalidating or questioning the accuracy of expression of CALCRIM No. 3472. Absent such 

authority, we conclude that CALCRIM No. 3472 accurately stated the existing law and the trial 

court properly gave the instruction pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(e).

Appellant next contends that CALCRIM No. 3472 is defective because it does not set forth the 

principles embodied in former CALJIC No. 5.32, regarding the use of a deadly weapon in 

response to an assault with fists. He also contends CALCRIM No. 3472 shifted the burden of 

proof from the prosecution to the defense. We initially note that appellant cites to the wrong 

CALJIC instruction. Former CALJIC No. 5.31, not 5.32, stated:

“An assault with the fists does not justify the person being assaulted in using a deadly 

weapon in self-defense unless that person believes and a reasonable person in that same 

or similar circumstances would believe that the assault is likely to inflict great bodily 

injury upon [him][her].”

Appellant points out that Penal Code section 197, subdivision (e) is the source for the 

underlying principle of CALJIC No. 5.31—that an assault with less than deadly force does not 

allow a response with deadly force. He argues:

“By the terms of that statute, a person claiming self-defense must have a ‘reasonable 

ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and

imminent danger of such design being accomplished.’ The statute does not justify the 

use of deadly force in response to an assault with fists. In order to justify Pete Garcia's 

action in drawing his gun, the prosecution had to demonstrate that the defendant's 

actions amounted to the imminent commission of a felony or an attack to inflict great 

bodily injury—but not the initiation of a mere fist fight. [¶] ... [¶]

“Since no criminal defendant could properly claim self-defense in Garcia's position, the 

prosecution could not claim self-defense in his behalf. Therefore, to the extent the 

People's case relied on a claim of self-defense attributable to Pete Garcia, Garcia's use of 

deadly force could not be justified by a threat of non-deadly force by the defendant. 

CALCRIM [No.] 3472 should not have been applied to this record.” (Fn.omitted.)

As we previously observed, “a single instruction is not to be viewed in ‘artificial isolation’; 

instead, it must be evaluated ‘in the context of the overall charge.’ [Citations.]” (People v. 

Espinoza (1992) 3 Cal.4th 806, 823–824.) “What is crucial for present purposes is the meaning 

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that the instructions communicated to the jury. If that meaning was not objectionable, the 

instructions cannot be deemed erroneous. [Citation.]” (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 

801, italics omitted.)

Here, the court also instructed the jury in CALCRIM No. 505 [justifiable homicide: self-defense 

or defense of another], which stated in pertinent part:

“A defendant is not required to retreat. [H]e or she is entitled to stand his or her ground 

and defend himself or herself and if reasonably necessary pursue an assailant until the 

danger of death or great bodily injury has passed. This is so even if safety could have 

been achieved by retreating. Great bodily injury and significant or substantial injury, it is 

injury that is great than minor or moderate harm.

“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was 

not justified. If they have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of 

murder or manslaughter.

“When the original aggressor is not guilty of a deadly attack but of simple assault or 

trespass, the victim has no right to use deadly or other excessive force. If the victim uses 

such force, the aggressor's right of self-defense arises.

“If, however, the counterassault be so sudden and perilous that no opportunities be given 

to decline or make known to his adversary of his willingness to decline or make known 

to the adversary of his willingness to decline to strike if he cannot retreat with safety, 

then the greater wrong of the deadly assault is upon the opponent, he would be justified 

in ... slaying forthwith in self-defense.”

In view of the foregoing portions of CALCRIM No. 505, there was no reasonable likelihood the 

jury was misled as to the law of self-defense and justifiable homicide. The charge to the jury 

correctly stated the applicable law and there was no error.

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 20-22).

2. Federal Standard.

The same federal standard applies as in the first claim for relief. 

3. Analysis.

To the extent that Petitioner is contending that CALCRIM No. 3472 was erroneous and did not 

correctly state California law, such claims are, as mentioned previously, outside the scope of federal 

habeas courts since they are exclusively questions of state law and the state court’s determination that 

the instruction properly stated California law is binding on this court. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (“We 

have stated many times that ‘federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.’”), quoting

Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 348-349 (1993) 

(O’Connor, J., concurring)(“mere error of state law, one that does not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation, may not be corrected on federal habeas”).

To the extent that Petitioner maintains that the instruction wrongfully shifted the burden from 

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the prosecution to the defense, Petitioner is once again mistaken. Nothing in the instruction specifically 

refers to the burden of proof and, as was the case with CALCRIM No. 3475, the entire jury charge, 

taken as a whole, clearly and unequivocally instructed the jury regarding the prosecution’s burden of 

proof beyond a reasonable doubt as well as its burden to disprove self-defense. Also, as discussed 

above, the jurors were presented with a variety of options regarding the degree of criminal culpability 

Petitioner should bear for his conduct. The fact that the jurors ultimately chose the more severe degree 

of criminal culpability was the result of the jury’s deliberative choices among conflicting evidence, and 

not the result of a defective jury charge that confused or misled jurors in their deliberations. Under

such circumstances, the state court’s adjudication that the instruction did not violate Petitioner’s due 

process rights was not objectively unreasonable.

C. Instruction On Consciousness Of Guilt Resulting From Flight

Petitioner next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding consciousness of 

guilt resulting from flight. This contention too is without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

Appellant contends an instruction on consciousness of guilt from flight was unsupported by the 

evidence because appellant “left the scene in a hail of bullets, seriously wounded [and][h]e 

immediately sought assistance at a nearby fire station, which was next to the police 

department.”

A. Instructional Conference

At the reported jury instruction conference, the court raised CALRIM No. 372 and defense 

counsel asserted, “There was no flight.” Counsel maintained appellant left the scene because he 

was dying. The prosecutor acknowledged that appellant departed for a dual purpose but 

suggested it was a question for the jury. The court noted the objection of the defense but 

concluded it was appropriate to give the instruction. The court advised both counsel, “That's 

obviously something you can argue both of you in terms of whether Mr. Carrillo fled or not or 

was merely attempting to obtain or receive medical treatment....”

B. The Instruction Given to the Jury

The court instructed the jury in CALCRIM No. 372 [defendant's flight] as follows:

“If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may 

show that he was aware of his guilt. If you conclude the defendant fled, it is up to you to 

decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.”

C. Governing Law

Penal Code section 1127c provides:

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“In any criminal trial or proceeding where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied 

upon as tending to show guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows:

“The flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is 

accused of a crime that has been committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his 

guilt, but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in deciding his guilt or 

innocence. The weight to which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to 

determine.

“No further instruction on the subject of flight need be given.”

“This statute was enacted to abolish the common law rule that the jury could not be instructed 

on flight unless there was evidence defendant knew he had been accused.” (People v. Pensinger 

(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1243.) “A flight instruction is proper whenever evidence of the 

circumstances of defendant's departure from the crime scene or his usual environs, or of his 

escape from custody after arrest, logically permits an inference that his movement was 

motivated by guilty knowledge.” (People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal .3d 668, 694.)

D. Defense Counsel's Closing Argument

During argument, defense counsel cited to the instruction, pointed out it was up to the jury to 

decide the meaning and importance of appellant's conduct at the scene, and reminded the jurors

that evidence of flight by itself could not prove guilt. Counsel specifically argued to the jury:

“Well folks, when you've been shot three times.... And they took him [appellant] to the fire 

station. Where's the fire station? It's in the same building with the police department. If your 

flight is a sign of consciousness of guilt, what are you doing running to the police department?”

E. Analysis

Section 1127c requires that whenever evidence of flight is relied on to show guilt, the court 

must instruct that while flight is not sufficient to establish guilt, it is a fact which, if proved, the 

jury may consider. (People v. Williams (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 648, 651.) A flight instruction is 

proper where the evidence shows the defendant departed the scene under circumstances 

suggesting his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt. Flight requires neither the 

physical act of running nor the reaching of a far-away haven. Yet, flight manifestly does 

require a purpose to avoid being observed or arrested. Mere return to familiar environs from the 

scene of an alleged crime does not warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt. However, the 

circumstances of departure from the crime scene may sometimes do so. (People v. Bradford

(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1055; People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1182.)

To warrant the giving of CALCRIM No. 372, the prosecution need not provide that the 

defendant in fact fled, i.e., departed the scene to avoid arrest. Rather, the prosecution need only 

prove that a jury could find that defendant fled and permissibly infer a consciousness of guilt 

from the evidence. (People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 328 [construing CALJIC No. 2.52, 

predecessor instruction to CALCRIM No. 372].) Alternative explanations for flight conduct go 

to the weight of the evidence, which is a matter for the jury, and not the court, to decide. 

(People v. Rhodes (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1471, 1477.) CALCRIM No. 372 assumes neither 

the guilt of the defendant nor that flight occurred. (People v. Campos (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 

894, 900.) The Third District Court of Appeal recently upheld the constitutionality of 

CALCRIM No. 372. (People v. Paysinger (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 26, 30–31.) This court has 

held that CALCRIM No. 372 does not impermissibly presume the existence of a defendant's 

guilt or lower the prosecution's burden of proof. (People v. Hernandez Rios (2007) 151 

Cal.App.4th 1154, 1159.)

In this case, appellant left the Almond Terrace Apartments with his three friends immediately 

after the shooting occurred. The evidence did show that appellant sought medical attention after 

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the shooting and defense counsel pointed out that fact during argument. Even if we were to 

conclude the instruction should not have been given, any error would have been harmless. The 

instruction did not assume that flight was established. Rather, the instruction permitted the jury 

to make that factual determination and to decide what weight to accord it. (People v. Carter

(2005) 36 Cal.4th 1141182–1183.) Upon review, we must presume the jury followed the law as 

presented, and, if flight was not proven, that it was not considered in reaching a verdict. (People 

v. Sing Chan (1944) 64 Cal.App.2d 167, 173, disapproved on another ground in People v. 

Mathis (1965) 63 Cal.2d 416, 430.)

The giving of CALCRIM No. 372 did not amount to a miscarriage of justice under the facts and 

circumstances of this case.

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 22-24).

2. Federal Standard.

The same federal standard applies as with the previous two claims for relief.

3. Analysis.

Petitioner contends, in essence, that the jury instruction on consciousness of guilt from flight 

was not supported by evidence at trial because the evidence showed that Petitioner was not attempting 

flight but rather to seek medical attention for his wounds. However, as the 5th DCA noted, the issue is 

not whether the instruction was supported by sufficient evidence because the instruction assumed a 

hypothetical, as it were, which the jury was expressly instructed that it could find true or not, 

depending upon how the jury weighed the evidence. If the jurors found that Petitioner indeed had 

sought medical attention and was not attempting to flee, then they were instructed not to consider 

consciousness of guilt. On the other hand, if the jurors believed that Petitioner and his cohorts had 

fled the scene of the shooting and then later sought medical attention for Petitioner’s wounds, then 

could decide the “meaning and importance of that conduct” and, in doing so, they could consider 

consciousness of guilt. 

Petitioner argues, unpersuasively, that the instruction shifted the burden to Petitioner. 

However, nothing in the instruction expressly shifted the burden of proof, nor, indeed, required that 

the jurors even find that Petitioner fled the scene. On what Petitioner calls the question at the “heart of 

the case,” i.e., “whether the fatal confrontation was provoked by the [Petitioner] or by Pete Garcia,” 

the challenged instruction takes no position. It merely instructs the jurors that, should they find that 

Petitioner fled the scene, they may also infer consciousness of guilt. The state court reasonably found 

that, if error, the instruction was harmless. Similarly, this Court concludes that giving jurors the 

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option of finding that Petitioner fled or sought medical treatment was not prejudicial. Accordingly, 

any error was harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. 

D. Reversible Evidentiary Error

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed reversible evidentiary error when it permitted 

the introduction of evidence of a handgun found at Petitioner’s house that was not the murder weapon. 

This contention is likewise without merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

A. Background

On September 2, 2009, the court and counsel met outside the presence of the jury. The 

prosecutor mentioned that the Ceres Police Department had recovered a gun from appellant's 

home, and that a cartridge referred to by criminalist Lawson “could have come from that gun, 

but that it would be a stretch, but it's possible.” The prosecutor referenced a comparison of testfired bullets with bullets removed from the scene and from body of victim Thompson. The 

prosecutor specifically acknowledged: “Based on the agreement of general rifling 

characteristics combined with the absence of correspondence in microscopic detail, these bullets 

cannot be identified or eliminated as being fired in the Smith & Wesson revolver. However, 

based on differences in microscopic detail, they were most likely not fired from the Smith & 

Wesson revolver.” Defense counsel maintained the bullets at the scene “most likely [weren't] 

fired from that gun, so I think under [Evidence Code section 352,] prejudicial effect outweighed 

by zero evidence or zero relevance, since he eliminated it as being the firearm.” The court 

allowed the prosecutor to present evidence of the weapon and reminded defense counsel that he 

could interpose an objection at the time the prosecutor moved to admit the weapon into 

evidence. The court explained: “[T]here is some, although I grant a not real large possibility, 

but there is some probative evidence that this firearm could have been the same one, but then 

that still comes up with the problem as to how it ended up there [in appellant's residence].”

Criminalist Scott Bauer testified the bullets recovered from the scene and from Thompson's 

body were most likely not fired from the Smith & Wesson. He testified on direct examination: 

“From my examination of my test fire from the Smith & Wesson revolver, I saw no microscopic 

marks that looked similar to those bullets at all, and I would expect if it was fired from the same 

firearm, I would see at least some correspondence in those markings, but I didn't see any. But, 

again, I couldn't eliminate it or identify it but in my opinion most likely not.” On crossexamination, Bauer confirmed that in his opinion the test bullets were most likely not fired by 

the Smith & Wesson.

B. Governing Law

Evidence Code section 353 states:

“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based 

thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless:

“(a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the 

evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the 

objection or motion; and

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“(b) The court which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that 

the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground stated and that the error 

or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice.”

When the prosecution relies on evidence regarding a specific type of weapon, it is error to admit 

evidence that other weapons were found in defendant's possession. That is because such 

evidence tends to show not that defendant committed the crime, but only that he or she is the 

sort of person who carries deadly weapons. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1056.) 

In the instant case, law enforcement officers found a .38–caliber Smith & Wesson six-shot 

revolver inside a bag in appellant's closet sometime after the April 15, 2007, shooting. In the 

opinion of criminalist Scott Bauer, the bullets recovered from the bodies of Pete Garcia and 

Cary Thompson were most likely not fired from the gun recovered from appellant's closet. 

However, Bauer was unable to conclusively say that the Smith & Wesson did not fire the bullets

that struck Garcia and Thompson. The prosecutor frankly acknowledged these facts but 

nevertheless sought admission of the weapon because a cartridge referenced by criminalist 

Lawson “could have come from that gun, but that it would be a stretch, but it's possible.”

The jury was well aware that appellant discharged a firearm at Pete Garcia in the Almond 

Terrace Apartments during the early morning hours of April 15, 2007. However, evidence that 

the bullets came from the Smith & Wesson revolver found at appellant's home was minimal. 

Criminalist Scott Bauer testified that criminal Lawson recovered four discharged bullets at the 

scene. One of the four bullets was recovered from Garcia's body and two of the four were 

recovered from Thompson's body. Bauer determined the four bullets were not fired from the 

Rossi revolver recovered from the entry of the Valdovinos/Garcia apartment. As to the Smith & 

Wesson revolver, Bauer testified he “could not eliminate or identify the bullets as being fired 

from the revolver.” Bauer explained: “It's a fine line. The ... bullets that were recovered, they 

had some very good markings on them. From my examination of my test fire from the Smith & 

Wesson revolver, I saw no microscopic marks that looked similar to those bullets at all, and I 

would expect if it was fired from the same firearm, I would see at least some correspondence in 

those markings, but I didn't see any. But, again, I couldn't eliminate it or identify it but in my 

opinion most likely not.”

Bauer's testimony was tentative at best and the trial court conceded there was “a not real large 

possibility” that the Smith & Wesson revolver was the weapon that fired the bullets that killed 

Garcia and Thompson. Even if we assume the evidence should have been excluded on the 

ground stated (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (b)), that assumption does not end our inquiry. Reversal 

is required only when the errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Evid.Code, 

§ 353, subd. (b).) “[A] miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the court, after an 

examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, is of the opinion that it is reasonably 

probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the 

absence of the error.” (People v. Rains (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1165, 1170.) Prejudice is never 

presumed; it must be affirmatively demonstrated. (People v. Zunis (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 

Supp 1, 4.)

Appellant claims he was prejudiced because admission of the Smith & Wesson into evidence 

served only to demonstrate that he is the sort of person who hoards deadly weapons and has a 

propensity for violence. From the entirety of the evidence, the jury was well aware that (1) 

appellant engaged in an exchange of gunfire with Pete Garcia at the Almond Terrace 

Apartments; (2) Garcia and Thompson died from wounds sustained during that exchange; and 

(3) bullets removed from the bodies of Garcia and Thompson did not match the Rossi revolver 

which Garcia used at the scene. Appellant's presence and active participation in the gunfight 

were well-established by various witnesses. Given these facts and circumstances, we cannot 

say a miscarriage of justice occurred because appellant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable 

probability that a result more favorable to him would have occurred had evidence of the Smith 

& Wesson revolver been excluded.

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(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 24-25).

2. Federal Standard.

Initially, the Court notes that the Supreme Court has expressly left open the question of 

whether the admission of propensity evidence violates due process. See Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75, n. 5; 

see Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir.2002) (habeas relief not warranted unless due 

process violation clearly established by the Supreme Court); Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 

(9th Cir. 2001), reversed on other grounds, Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003)(the Supreme 

Court “has never expressly held that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for the 

purpose of showing conduct in conformity therewith....”). In this regard, in Holley v. Yarborough, 

568 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2009), the Ninth Circuit explained as follows:

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the admission of evidence as a 

violation of due process. Although the Court has been clear that a writ [of habeas corpus] 

should be issued when constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

[Citations], it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial 

evidence constitutes a due process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Hence, the state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s claim could not have been 

“contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established” United States Supreme Court 

authority, since no such “clearly established” Supreme Court authority exists. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Second, Petitioner’s claim would normally sound only in state law and, therefore, would not be 

cognizable in federal habeas proceedings. A federal habeas corpus court has no authority to review a 

state's application of its own laws, but rather must determine whether a prisoner's constitutional or other 

federal rights have been violated. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 885 (9th

Cir. 1990). Generally, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law, and is not reviewable in a 

federal habeas corpus proceeding. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67; Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1985). 

Nevertheless, there can be habeas relief for the admission of prejudicial evidence if the 

admission was fundamentally unfair and resulted in a denial of due process. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72; 

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Walters v. Maas, 45 F.3d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1995); Gordon 

v. Duran, 895 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir.1990). However, the failure to comply with state rules of evidence 

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alone is neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for granting federal habeas relief on due process 

grounds. Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-920 (9th Cir. 1991). Only if there are no 

permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission rise to the level of a 

due process violation. Id. at 920. 

3. Analysis.

First, Respondent correctly points out that no clearly established federal law exists regarding the 

admission of prejudicial evidence and, alternatively, that the admission of evidence is strictly an issue 

of state law. The Court agrees with both arguments. 

However, Petitioner also loses on the merits. Here, the state court concluded that, because the 

experts could not expressly rule out the weapon found at Petitioner’s residence as the murder weapon, it 

had some slight probative value. Petitioner has argued the probative value is so miniscule that it would 

necessarily be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Respondent, in turn, argues the evidence was 

“irrelevant” because the prosecution never linked the weapon to the murders. (Doc. 12, p. 47). 

Obviously, the weighing process required under Penal Code § 452 can be a difficult one where 

the probative value of the disputed evidence is, as here, not substantial. However, even assuming that 

the admission of the evidence was improper, it could not have amounted to a violation of Petitioner’s 

due process rights, i.e., its admission was not “fundamentally unfair.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72. This is 

so because, as the 5th DCA pointed out, the inference the defense contended could be prejudicially 

drawn from the admission of the weapon was that Petitioner was the type of person had kept in his 

possession a deadly weapon. Yet the jury had been presented with virtually undisputed evidence that 

Petitioner went to the victims’ residence and engaged in a shootout with one victim that resulted in the 

death of both victims. The evidence was also undisputed that the bullets that killed the unarmed second 

victim were not from the first victim’s gun. Thus, the only reasonable inference was those bullets came 

from Petitioner’s weapon. Because the jury already had overwhelming evidence that Petitioner was the 

type of person who not only possessed a deadly weapon, but aggressively used it to kill other 

individuals, admission of another, unrelated weapon found at his residence—a weapon that had only 

the most tenuous connection to the crimes at issue--could not and did not impact the jury’s verdict. 

Accordingly, even if admission of the weapon was error, it was harmless. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623. The 

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state court’s rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable under these circumstances. 

Accordingly, this claim is denied.

E. Exclusion Of Evidence

Petitioner further contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it erroneously 

excluded evidence of a prior conviction by Garcia. This contention lacks merit.

1. The 5th DCA’s Opinion.

The 5th DCA rejected Petitioner’s claim as follows:

A. Background

During trial, Carmen Gutierrez, Valdovinos's aunt, testified that her niece lied when she said she 

shot appellant. She said Valdovinos was trying to protect Pete Garcia “because he already had a 

case for shooting somebody else.” On September 8, 2009, shortly after Gutierrez's testimony, 

the court and counsel met outside the presence of the jury to discuss the admissibility of the 

criminal conviction records of appellant and Garcia. At one point in the discussion, defense 

asserted: “... I believe under [Evidence Code section] 1103(a)(1), that I should be able to bring 

in instances of specific conduct by ... Mr. Garcia, that tends to show that he acted in conformity 

with that character of always carrying guns and ... exhibiting assaultive behavior.” The 

prosecutor noted that several witnesses had already testified that Garcia had such a reputation 

“and suggested they were present in a room when he held a gun to Ms. Valdovinos' head and 

tried to push her out a window.”

After some discussion, the court noted the door had been opened as to specific instances of 

Garcia's conduct but was reluctant because such conduct did not result in convictions. The 

court observed, “[W]e'll have to decide how much of that evidence comes in.” Later in the 

discussion, the court suggested: “... I can take judicial notice of that conviction [of Garcia on

June 26, 2003] ... and we can state that he was convicted of a [Penal Code section] 243(e)(1), 

battery on a cohabitor and leave it at that. I think that would be the cleanest way to do it.” The 

prosecutor agreed with the court but defense counsel noted: “Although I intend to present some 

testimony concerning the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Garcia's felony conviction, 

I'll provide you with enough information for you to do a judicial notice of that conviction as 

well....” Defense counsel explained that he wanted to bring in an eyewitness to testify that 

Garcia shot someone in the back on an earlier occasion and that he reached a plea bargain in the 

earlier case. In response, the prosecutor argued such evidence was cumulative because the jury 

was aware from other evidence that Garcia had violent propensities and carried weapons. The 

prosecutor maintained: “... I don't think that under [Evidence Code section] 352 we should ... be 

in a position of trying Pete Garcia all over again for that crime.”

After a recess, the court examined the file in the 2002 assault case against Pete Garcia. The 

court noted the original complaint charged attempted murder by Garcia. Defense counsel 

maintained he could introduce evidence underlying Garcia's conviction because the language of 

Evidence Code section 1103 stated the prior conviction could be proven by acts. The 

prosecutor agreed with this legal point but questioned whether testimony about the acts would 

be reliable or whether such evidence should be admitted under Evidence Code section 352. The 

prosecutor stated: “... I think it is prejudicial under 352 and could open up a whole range of 

other people coming in, and then we're going to do a trial of trying the case of whether he was 

guilty of attempted murder.” At the conclusion of the proceedings on September 9, 2009, the 

court advised counsel he would read reports of the 2002 “event involving attempted murder 

charges which resulted in a [Penal Code section] 245 conviction against Mr. Garcia.”

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During a break in the proceedings of September 20, 2009, the court advised counsel he had 

reviewed police reports of Garcia's 2002 assault case. Defense counsel noted that a firearm was 

involved in the assault case. He suggested that one witness would testify that Garcia fired the 

weapon and another witness would testify that Garcia removed the firearm from his waistband 

and gave it to a third person to fire. He also maintained he had a right to present such evidence 

“to support the testimony of the [trial] witnesses that [Garcia] had a reputation for carrying a 

firearm.”

The court ultimately ruled:

“Under [Evidence Code section] 352 I'm not going to allow any testimony. The simple fact we 

would have a trial within a trial concerning whether Mr. Garcia was the one that had the gun or 

not. There's plenty of evidence of firearms, loaded firearms being around the house with Olivia, 

and obvious evidence that he did use the firearm in this particular case, so I don't think there's 

an issue about whether or not he would use a firearm because he obviously did in this case.”

At the conclusion of the evidence, the court informed the jury: “That Pete Silverio Garcia was 

convicted of felony assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury on October 16th of 

2002.”

B. Governing Law

Evidence Code section 354 states:

“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision based 

thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the court 

which passes upon the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion that the error or 

errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of justice and it appears of record that:

“(a) The substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to 

the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means;

“(b) The rulings of the court made compliance with subdivision (a) futile; or

“(c) The evidence was sought by questions asked during cross-examination or recrossexamination.”

The rule of Evidence Code section 354 is necessary because, among other things, the reviewing 

court must know the substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice. (People v. 

Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 580.) Under California law, it is the burden of the proponent 

of evidence to establish its relevance through an offer of proof or otherwise. An offer of proof 

should give the trial court an opportunity to change or clarify its ruling and in the event of 

appeal would provide the reviewing court with the means of determining error and assessing 

prejudice. To accomplish these purposes, an offer of proof must be specific and must set forth 

the actual evidence to be produced rather than merely the facts or issues to be addressed and 

argued. (People v. Schmies (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 38, 51, 53.)

Where discretionary power is vested in the trial court, the exercise of that discretion must not be 

disturbed on appeal except upon a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, 

capricious, or patently absurd manner resulting in a miscarriage of justice. (People v. Rodrigues 

(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124–1125.) A miscarriage of justice should be declared only when the 

reviewing court is convinced after an examination of the entire case, including the evidence, 

that it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the appellant would have been reached 

absent the error. (In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79 Cal.App.3d 725, 751.) Expressed another 

way, where a trial court's ruling does not constitute a refusal to allow defendant to present a 

defense, but merely rejected certain evidence concerning the defense, the ruling does not 

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constitute a violation of due process. In that situation, the appropriate standard of review is 

whether it is reasonably probable the admission of the evidence would have resulted in a verdict 

more favorable to defendant. (People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1317.)

C. Analysis

In the instant case, defense counsel introduced evidence to show that Pete Garcia had a 

reputation being a member of the Norteno criminal street gang and for carrying guns. Counsel 

further introduced evidence that Garcia was twice arrested in possession of loaded firearms. At 

the conclusion of the evidence, the court advised the jury that Garcia previously had been 

convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. The record clearly showed 

that Garcia fired a loaded gun at the Almond Terrace Apartments during the early morning 

hours of April 15, 2007. A trial judge is not bound to allow cumulative testimony upon the 

same point. (Douillard v. Woodd (1942) 20 Cal.2d 665, 669.) Had the court allowed the 

defense to show that Garcia previously shot another individual in the back, it is not reasonably 

probable that admission of such evidence would have resulted in a more favorable verdict.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the proffered evidence.

(Doc. 12, Ex. A, pp. 26-29).

2. Federal Standard.

 a. Confrontation Clause.

The right to confront witnesses, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, includes 

the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses to attack their general credibility or show their possible 

bias or self-interest in testifying. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231, 109 S.Ct. 480, 102 L.Ed.2d 

513 (1988); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678-79, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); 

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1973). A Confrontation Clause 

violation occurs where the defendant is prevented from investigating “a prototypical form of bias” if 

“[a] reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness'] credibility 

had respondent's counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross-examination”). Van 

Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680. However, “[t]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation 

Clause is concerned” and may impose limitations on cross-examination that are “reasonable” and are 

not “arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.” Id. at 679; Michigan v. 

Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151, 111 S.Ct. 1743, 114 L.Ed.2d 205 (1991). “The Confrontation Clause 

guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (quoting 

Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985) (per curiam)). A 

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defendant does not have a right to present irrelevant evidence. Wood v. State of Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544, 

1549 (9th Cir.1992). The determination of whether evidence is relevant rests in the discretion of the 

trial court. Id.

A two-part inquiry is appropriately used to determine whether a criminal defendant's Sixth 

Amendment rights were violated by the exclusion of evidence. Wood, at 1549-50. First, the court looks 

at whether the evidence was relevant. Id. at 1550. If the evidence is relevant, the court looks at whether 

“legitimate interests outweighed [the defendant's] interest in presenting the evidence.” Id. A Sixth 

Amendment violation will only be found if the trial court abused its discretion in making its evidentiary 

ruling. Id. A trial court does not abuse its discretion so long as the jury has “sufficient information” 

upon which to assess the credibility of witnesses. Wood, 957 F.2d at 1550.

The improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias is subject to a 

harmless-error analysis. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684; Bockting v. Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010, 1020 (9th 

Cir.2005) (“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis and thus may be 

excused depending on the state of the evidence at trial”). Thus, a petitioner is not entitled to relief 

unless he can establish that the trial court's error “had substantial and injurious effect or influence in 

determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). See also Forn v. 

Hornung, 343 F.3d 990, 999 (9th Cir.2003) (finding that a Confrontation Clause error did not have a 

“substantial and injurious” effect on the verdict and that the error was therefore harmless).

b. Due Process.

Petitioner argues the trial court's exclusion of defense impeachment evidence was prejudicial 

and resulted in a denial of his due process rights. He asserts that he sought to impeach potentially 

damaging evidence by introducing evidence that would show Pete Garcia had been previously 

convicted of assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury. However, the admission of 

evidence is an issue of state law. Simple errors of state law do not warrant federal habeas relief. Estelle, 

502 U.S. at 67. The ultimate question is whether the state proceedings satisfied due process. Holley, 

568 F.3d at 1101. “[T]he presence of absence of a state law violation is largely beside the point.” Id. 

Consequently, “[t]he admission of evidence does not provide a basis for habeas relief unless it rendered 

the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process.” Id. (citations omitted).

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3. Analysis.

Although, at first blush, Petitioner’s argument appears to raise serious constitutional concerns, 

further examination shows that Petitioner’s claim is not that he was not permitted to impeach Garcia, 

but that he was not permitted to impeach Garcia with one particular piece of evidence, i.e., Garcia’s 

prior conviction for assault. Petitioner was permitted, however, to present evidence to the jury that 

Garcia was a gang member with a reputation for carrying guns, that he had been arrested on two 

separate occasions for possession of loaded firearms, the had had held a gun to another person’s head, 

that he had shot Petitioner in this case, and that he had been convicted of assault with force likely to 

produce great bodily injury. Put simply, as the 5th DCA noted, the trial record “clearly showed” Garcia 

fired a loaded gun at Petitioner on the night of the incident and struck his target. The trial court rejected 

evidence by the defense of Garcia’s prior conviction impliedly on the grounds that it was cumulative. 

Given the substantial amount of impeachment evidence the defense was allowed to present, including 

the fact that Garcia had shot Petitioner on the night in question, it is difficult to see how the additional 

fact that he had been convicted previously of another assault with a firearm would have assisted the 

jury in weighing the evidence or would have been anything other than cumulative. As the state court 

concluded, presenting evidence that Garcia had shot another individual in the back would not, under 

these circumstances, “have resulted in a more favorable verdict” for Petitioner. Accordingly, the state 

court adjudication was not objectively unreasonable and, under Brecht, any error was harmless.

F. Newly Discovered Evidence Of Innocence

Petitioner next contends that newly discovered evidence of innocence requires granting habeas 

corpus relief. This contention has no merit.

1. The Superior Court Opinion.

After noting that Petitioner raised two grounds for relief in his state petition, i.e., the conviction 

was obtained by false evidence, and newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial, the Superior 

Court rejected Petitioner’s claims, reasoning as follows:

I. BACKGROUND

...

Both grounds of the petition are based on the Declaration of Olivia Valdovinos (Exhibit N to the 

petition). The statements made by Valdovinos in her declaration are partially evidentiary in 

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nature and partially explanatory and/or conclusory. For purposes of this order the factual 

statements that are relevant to petitioner’s claims are found in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the 

Valdovinos declaration.

The statements contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 differ from Valdovinos’ trial testimony to the 

extent that she now declares that she did not see a gun in Carrillo’s hand before shot(s) were 

fired and that Carrillo could not have fired first because Valdovinos did not see a gun in 

petitioner’s hand when the first shot was fired.

II. FALSE EVIDENCE ISSUE

For purposes of Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (b)(1), false evidence is substantially 

material or probative on the issue of guilt that was introduced against a defendant at trial. Falso 

evidence is substantially material or probative if it is of such significance that it may have 

affected the outcome in the sense that with reasonable certainty it could have affected the 

outcome. In other words, false evidence passes the indicated threshold if there is a reasonable 

probability that, had the false evidence not been introduced, the result would have been 

different. The requisite reasonable probability is such as undermines the reviewing court’s 

confidence in the outcome. It is dependent on the totality of circumstances and must be 

determined objectively. (In Re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal. 4th 535, 546.)

Based on an objective review of the totality of the circumstances, which includes all of the 

evidence received by the jury, including reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and the legal 

instructions that were given to the jury, this court concludes that had the alleged false evidence 

not been introduced at the trial that it is not reasonably probable that the outcome would have

been different. This court’s confidence in the outcome is not undermined. Petitioner argues 

that had “this false evidence not been introduced...a different outcome would have been almost 

certain.” This argument is based on petitioner’s belief that Valdovinos’ “false evidence” was 

the only evidence supporting the People’s case. Based on this court’s review of the record, this 

assertion ignores that nature and extent of all the other inculpatory evidence and the reasonable 

inferences that could have been permissibly drawn therefrom. When the alleged “false 

evidence” is placed in context with all of the other evidence presented to the jury, then a 

different outcome was not reasonably probable.

III. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE ISSUE

Carillo’s argument on this ground can be readily resolved. For Carrillo to prevail on this 

argument, he must present newly discovered evidence at which point he may introduce any 

evidence not presented at trial and which is not merely cumulative in relation to evidence which 

was presented at trial. (In Re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 420.) In the instant case the “newly 

discovered evidence” is the information contained in Valdovinos’ declaration, i.e., that the [sic] 

Carrillo was not holding a firearm when Valdovinos heard the first shot. That is clearly 

cumulative to evidence presented at trial. (See e.g., Baca testimony TT 261, lines 9-19; 

Martinex testimony, TT 331, lines 8-17; and Lopez testimony, TT 354, Lines 4-17.)

In as much as the “newly discovered evidence” is cumulative in nature it is not the basis upon 

which petitioner can seek relief as “newly discovered evidence.” This rule is consistent with the 

broader principles that a criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on habeas corpus on 

the basis of newly discovered evidence if such evidence casts fundamental doubt on the 

accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. At the guilt phase, such evidence, must undermine 

the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability. (In Re 

Lawley (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1231, 1239.) Herein, the newly discovered evidence does not 

undermine the entire prosecution case nor does it point unerringly to innocence or reduced 

culpability.

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(LD 18, pp. 1-3). 

2. Federal Standard.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The 

exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state and gives the state court the initial opportunity to 

correct the alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose 

v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988). 

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court with a 

full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. Duncan v. 

Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); Johnson v. Zenon, 88 

F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). In this instance, the highest state court would be the California Supreme 

Court. A federal court will find that the highest state court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear 

a claim if the petitioner has presented the highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. 

Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365 (legal basis); Kenney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992) (factual basis). 

Additionally, the petitioner must have specifically told the state court that he was raising a 

federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th 

Cir.2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir.1999); 

Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir.1998).

3. Analysis.

Respondent argues that Petitioner’s claims of false testimony and newly discovered evidence 

raise no federal issues and thus are not cognizable under § 2254. The Court agrees.

In the instant petition, Petitioner argues newly-discovered evidence constitutes grounds for 

habeas relief if the evidence bears upon the constitutional of the petitioner’s detention and if it is shown 

the new evidence “would probably have resulted in the defendant’s acquittal.” (Doc. 2, p. 55). 

Petitioner cites to California law permitting a prisoner to seek habeas relief where “[f]alse evidence that 

is substantially material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was introduced against [him] at 

any hearing or trial relating to his incarceration...,” citing Cal. Pen. Code § 1473(b)(1). (Id.). 

Respondent points out that these two inter-related claims were presented to the state courts, 

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including the California Supreme Court, only as violations of state law, i.e., as a violation of §

1473(b)(1), for false evidence, and § 1473.6(b), for newly discovered evidence. Nowhere in 

Petitioner’s state court papers does he present to the state court a federal question regarding either the 

newly discovered evidence or false evidence claims. (LD 14, pp. 17; 19; LD 19, pp. 39-42). 

In the Traverse, Petitioner does not attempt to rebut Respondent’s claim of lack of exhaustion. 

Rather, Petitioner argues tepidly that a “freestanding claim of actual innocence...will support a federal 

claim.” (Doc. 14, p. 19). However, what will “support” a federal claim and what may be the basis for a 

federal claim are quite different. Petitioner does not cite, and the Court is unaware of, any federal 

authority that a petitioner may maintain a free-standing claim of actual innocence based on newly 

discovered evidence. That being the case, the issues of false evidence and newly discovered evidence 

of innocence are questions of state law only, which are, as mentioned, not cognizable under federal 

habeas law. Since Petitioner has never presented these issues as federal constitutional violations, the

may not now be raised as federal claims because they are unexhausted. Put another way, as federal 

claims, they are unexhausted; as state claims, they are non-cognizable. For those reasons, the Court 

DENIES this claim for relief.

G. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel

Petitioner contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s 

argument that Petitioner was a trespasser and Garcia was entitled to fire first. (LD 19). This contention 

is without merit.

1. Standard of Review.

Petitioner first raised this issue in his state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. 

Since the California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition, there is no “reasoned decision” for 

this Court to review. When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to 

support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether 

habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2011); 

Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003); Greene v. Lambert, 288 F.3d 1081, 1089 (9th 

Cir.2002) (holding that when there is an adjudication on the merits but no reason for the decision, the 

court must review the complete record to determine whether resolution of the case constitutes an 

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unreasonable application of clearly established federal law); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th

Cir. 2000) (“Federal habeas review is not de novo when the state court does not supply reasoning for its 

decision, but an independent review of the record is required to determine whether the state court 

clearly erred in its application of controlling federal law.”). “[A]lthough we independently review the 

record, we still defer to the state court’s ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th

Cir. 2002). “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but 

rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively 

unreasonable.” Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner 

still has the burden of “showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 784. Accordingly, this Court will independently review the claim herein.

2. Federal Legal Standard For Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

Effective assistance of appellate counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective 

assistance of appellate counsel are reviewed according to Strickland's two-pronged test. Miller v. 

Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); 

see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75(1988) (holding that where a defendant has been actually or 

constructively denied the assistance of appellate counsel altogether, the Strickland standard does not 

apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is that Strickland does apply where counsel is present 

but ineffective). 

To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that appellate counsel’s 

deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional 

norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, Petitioner must establish he suffered prejudice in that 

there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would have 

prevailed on appeal. Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is a probability sufficient to undermine 

confidence in the outcome of the appeal. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what counsel could have done; 

rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable. Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 

1173 (9th Cir.1998). 

With the passage of the AEDPA, habeas relief may only be granted if the state-court decision 

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unreasonably applied this general Strickland standard for ineffective assistance. Knowles v. 

Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1419 (2009). Accordingly, the question “is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard “was incorrect but 

whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v. Landrigan, 

550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Knowles, 129 S.Ct. at 1420. In effect, the AEDPA standard is “doubly 

deferential” because it requires that it be shown not only that the state court determination was 

erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). 

Moreover, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to 

reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 

U.S. 652, 664 (2004)(“[E]valuating whether a rule application was unreasonable requires considering 

the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in 

case-by-case determinations”). 

Here, the state court identified the appropriate federal standard by applying Strickland. Thus, 

the only issue is whether the state court’s adjudication, i.e., that defense counsel’s representation was 

neither deficient nor prejudicial, was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. For 

the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that it was not. 

3. Analysis.

In his Traverse, Petitioner concedes Respondent’s argument that defense counsel could not have 

objected to the prosecutor’s arguments because it was based upon jury instructions that were already 

approved by the trial judge and given to the jurors. As Petitioner notes, the “prosecutor’s argument was 

squarely based on CALCRIM 3475, that suggested that the defendant was a trespasser and therefore 

could be ejected by ‘reasonable force,” up to and including the use of lethal force by Pete Garcia. 

(Doc. 14, p. 20). Petitioner also agrees, “[a] prosecution argument that merely sums up the trial court’s 

jury instructions cannot be objected to.” (Id.). 

Based upon Petitioner’s concession that trial counsel could not have objected to the prosecutor’s 

comments, no basis exists for a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make an objection to 

such comments. In making his concession, Petitioner emphasizes his claim that the instruction itself 

was erroneous and violated his constitutional rights, a claim previously addressed, and rejected, in this 

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Order. Accordingly, based upon its independent review of this claim, the Court concludes that it should 

be denied.

Moreover, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. A state prisoner seeking a 

writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court’s denial of his petition, and 

an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-336 

(2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 

U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a district judge, 

the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in 

which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the validity of a 

warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial a person charged with 

a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the validity of such person's detention 

pending removal proceedings.

(c)(1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be 

taken to the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention

complained of arises out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

(2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

(3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issue or 

issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denied a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability 

when a petitioner makes a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). To make a substantial showing, the petitioner must establish that “reasonable jurists could 

debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different 

manner or that the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’.” 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)).

In the present case, the Court finds that Petitioner has not made the required substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right to justify the issuance of a certificate of appealability. 

Reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal 

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habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Thus, the 

Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 2), is DENIED with prejudice;

2. The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment and close the file;

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2015 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:12-cv-01203-JLT Document 15 Filed 04/16/15 Page 46 of 46