Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00998/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00998-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Haws
Respondent
Douglas Jamison
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DOUGLAS JAMISON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

HAWS, )

)

Respondent. )

 )

1:09-CV-00998 LJO GSA HC

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

REGARDING RESPONDENT’S MOTION

TO DISMISS 

[Doc. #20]

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

BACKGROUND1

Petitioner is currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections pursuant to

a judgment of the Superior Court of California, County of Madera, following his conviction by plea

of no contest on December 17, 2004, to one count of grand theft (Cal. Penal Code § 487(a)) and one

count of taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Cal. Vehicle Code § 10851(a)). Petitioner

admitted to having suffered three prior strike convictions. On October 31, 2005, Petitioner was

sentenced to serve an aggregate indeterminate term of 50 years to life in state prison. 

Petitioner appealed the conviction to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate

This information is derived from the documents lodged by Respondent with his response.

1

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 1

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 1 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

District. On March 27, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the judgment. Petitioner then sought

review in the California Supreme Court. On June 13, 2007, the California Supreme Court denied

review.

On October 29, 2008 , Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court. The 2

petition was summarily denied on April 22, 2009.

On May 17, 2009 , Petitioner filed a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. 3

He filed an amended petition on July 23, 2009. On June 18, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to

dismiss the petition as being filed outside the one-year limitations period prescribed by 28

U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Petitioner filed an opposition on July 12, 2010. Respondent filed a reply on

July 23, 2010.

DISCUSSION

A. Procedural Grounds for Motion to Dismiss

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a

petition if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not

entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases.

The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if

the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the

state’s procedural rules. See, e.g., O’Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9 Cir. 1990) (using Rule th

4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874

F.2d 599, 602-03 (9 Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for th

state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). 

Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a response, and the Court

should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

In this case, Respondent's motion to dismiss is based on a violation of 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)'s

The petition is undated and does not contain a proof of service. Therefore, the mailbox rule cannot be applied.

2

Although the petition was filed in this Court on May 26, 2009, it contains a proof of service dated May 17, 2009.

3

Pursuant to the mailbox rule, the Court will deem the petition filed on May 17, 2009, the date Petitioner presumably handed

his petition to prison authorities for filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 2

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 2 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

one-year limitations period. Because Respondent's motion to dismiss is similar in procedural

standing to a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust state remedies or for state procedural default

and Respondent has not yet filed a formal answer, the Court will review Respondent’s motion to

dismiss pursuant to its authority under Rule 4. 

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (hereinafter “AEDPA”). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of

habeas corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059,

2063 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct.

th

586 (1997). 

In this case, the petition was filed on May 17, 2009, and therefore, it is subject to the

provisions of the AEDPA. The AEDPA imposes a one-year limitations period on petitioners seeking

to file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244,

subdivision (d) reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitations period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. In this case, the petition for review was denied by the California Supreme

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 3

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 3 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Court on June 13, 2007. Thus, direct review concluded on September 11, 2007, when the ninety

(90) day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court expired. Barefoot v. Estelle,

463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9 Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, th

159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). The statute of limitations commenced on the following day,

th

September 12, 2007, and expired one year later on September 11, 2008. Patterson v. Stewart, 251

F.3d 1243, 1246 (9 Cir.2001). Here, Petitioner delayed filing the instant petition until May 17, th

2009, exceeding the due date by 248 days. Absent any applicable tolling, the instant petition is

barred by the statute of limitations. 

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) states that the “time during which a properly filed application

for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is

pending shall not be counted toward” the one year limitation period. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). In

Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court held the statute of limitations is tolled where a petitioner is

properly pursuing post-conviction relief, and the period is tolled during the intervals between one

state court's disposition of a habeas petition and the filing of a habeas petition at the next level of the

state court system. 536 U.S. 214, 215 (2002); see also Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9 Cir. th

1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1846 (2000). Nevertheless, state petitions will only toll the one-year

statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(2) if the state court explicitly states that the post-conviction

petition was timely, or it was filed within a reasonable time under state law. Pace v. DiGuglielmo,

544 U.S. 408 (2005); Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006). If the state court states the petition was

untimely, “that [is] the end of the matter, regardless of whether it also addressed the merits of the

claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was “entangled” with the merits.” Carey, 536 U.S. at 226;

Pace, 544 U.S. at 414.

As previously stated, the statute of limitations began to run on September 12, 2007, and

expired on September 11, 2008. Petitioner did not file any post-conviction applications for collateral

relief in the state courts in that time frame. His first and only state habeas petition was filed in the

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 4

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 4 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

California Supreme Court after expiration of the limitations period on October 29, 2008. Since the 4

limitations period had already expired, he is not entitled to statutory tolling. Jiminez v. Rice, 276

F.3d 478, 482 (9 Cir.2001). th

Accordingly, the federal petition remains untimely.

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitations period is subject to equitable tolling if the petitioner demonstrates: “(1) that

he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his

way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran

Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990); Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. (Kelly), 163 F.3d 530, 541 (9 Cir. 1998), th

citing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9 Cir. 1996), cert denied, 522 U.S. th

814 (1997). Petitioner bears the burden of alleging facts that would give rise to tolling. Pace, 544

U.S. at 418; Smith v. Duncan, 297 F.3d 809 (9 Cir.2002); Hinton v. Pac. Enters., 5 F.3d 391, 395 th

(9th Cir.1993). 

In his opposition, Petitioner raises several arguments for equitable tolling. He claims he is a

“mentally ill state prisoner on psych. medications, . . . a layman at law, semi-literate, [and] dependent

upon other state prisoners” for assistance. He further contends prison authorities have obstructed his

assistant’s law library access. None of his arguments merit equitable tolling.

1. Mental Incompetence

Mental incompetency can, in certain circumstances, rise to the level of an “extraordinary

circumstance” beyond a petitioner’s control that warrants equitable tolling. Laws v. Lamarque, 351

F.3d 919, 923 (9 Cir.2003). However, the circumstances must be exceptional. See Rhodes v. th

Senkowski, 82 F.Supp.2d 160, 168-70, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); also U.S. v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 512

(4 Cir.2004) (“As a general matter, the federal courts will apply equitable tolling because of th

petitioner’s mental condition only in cases of profound mental incapacity”).

In the context of a defendant’s ability to stand trial or plead guilty, the term “competence”

has been defined to mean that the defendant had “a rational as well as factual understanding of the

Petitioner contends the petition is dated September 23, 2008. But even giving Petitioner the benefit of this date

4

under the mailbox rule, it was not filed within the limitations period and thus can have no tolling consequences.

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 5

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 5 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

proceedings against him.” Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1993); Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S.

402 (1960). “The focus of a competency inquiry is the defendant’s mental capacity; the question is

whether he has the ability to understand the proceedings.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. A

defendant is incompetent only if he “‘lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the

proceedings’ . . . .” Id., quoting, Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975). In Laws, the Ninth

Circuit signaled approval of the Godinez/Dusky standard of competence in evaluating a petitioner’s

claim of mental incompetence for equitable tolling purposes. 351 F.3d at 923.

In addition, mental incompetency alone is not a per se reason to grant equitable tolling. 

“Most mental illnesses are treatable, and with proper treatment many, if not most, sufferers are

capable of managing their own affairs.” Miller v. Runyon, 77 F.3d 189, 191 (7 Cir.1996). th

Petitioner must show that the alleged mental incompetence “in fact” caused him to fail to file a

timely habeas petition. Laws, 351 F.3d at 923. 

In this case, Petitioner makes only a vague claim of mental incompetence. He states that he

is mentally ill and takes psychotropic medications. He offers nothing in support of this claim. He

does not identify what illness he suffers from, let alone how the illness affected his capacity and

ability to understand his legal proceedings. He does not provide any specifics regarding his illness,

such as its onset, effect, and duration. He does not state that he has ever been adjudicated

incompetent, or that his illness has ever resulted in hospitalization. He offers no evidence in support

of the claim, such as psychological evaluations, medical reports or hospitalization records. He

provides no details on the alleged psychotropic medication, such as what it is, when he started

treatment, the duration, whether there are any side effects, and how the medication caused him to be

untimely. Petitioner’s vague and generalized allegation of mental incompetence is insufficient to

establish an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling. See generally Roberts v.

Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 695 (5 Cir.2003); Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1144-45 (10 Cir. th th

2001); Ross v. Hickman, 2001 WL 940911 (N.D. Cal. 2001). More importantly, Petitioner fails to

show how his alleged mental illness caused him to be untimely. Laws, 351 F.3d at 923; Nara v.

Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir.2001), overruled in part on other grounds in Carey v. Saffold, 536

U.S. 214 (2002). Even construing his claim of mental incompetence liberally, Petitioner completely

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 6

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 6 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

fails to make any showing that his alleged mental illness was an extraordinary circumstance

sufficient to justify equitable tolling.

2. Illiteracy and Lack of Legal Skill and Knowledge

Petitioner claims he is only semi-literate and has no training in the law. Ignorance of the law

and illiteracy are generally not extraordinary circumstances sufficient to justify equitable tolling.

Hughes v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 800 F.3d 905, 909 (9 Cir.1986); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 th

F.3d 1150, 1154 (9 Cir.2006); Shoemate v. Norris, 390 F.3d 595, 598 (8 Cir.2004); Marsh v. th th

Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10 Cir.2000). In this case, Petitioner does not state how his lack of th

knowledge and semi-literacy caused him to be untimely. Moreover, these conditions are shared by

many inmates and are not extraordinary.

3. Reliance on Fellow Inmate

Petitioner claims he relied on another inmate for assistance to his detriment. The reliance on

another inmate will generally not provide grounds for equitable tolling. See Chaffer v. Prosper, 592

F.3d 1046, 1049 (9 Cir.2010), citing United States v. Cicero, 214 F.3d 199, 204 (D.C. Cir.2000). In

th

this case, Petitioner’s reliance on another inmate was entirely voluntary and at his own peril.

 Petitioner further claims his inmate assistant was unable to access the law library at times. 

It follows that if reliance on another inmate for assistance is not an extraordinary circumstance, then 

any difficulties experienced by that assistant also cannot constitute an extraordinary circumstance.

Petitioner voluntarily relied on the assistant; he must assume the consequences of that reliance.

Additionally, Petitioner fails to state when the lockdowns and denials of law library access

experienced by the assistant occurred. He provides documentation showing prison lockdowns

occurred, but all of those incidents took place after the limitations period had expired; indeed, they

occurred after the federal petition was filed in this case. 

In sum, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and that

some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Pace, 544 U.S. at 418. Petitioner is not entitled to

equitable tolling, and the petition remains untimely. Respondent’s motion to dismiss should be

granted.

RECOMMENDATION

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 7

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 7 of 8
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that the motion to dismiss be

GRANTED and the habeas corpus petition be DISMISSED with prejudice for Petitioner’s failure to

comply with 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)’s one year limitation period.

This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Lawrence J. O’Neill,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. section 636 (b)(1)(B) and

Rule 304 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of

California. Within thirty (30) days after date of service of this Findings and Recommendation, any

party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document

should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to

the Objections shall be served and filed within fourteen (14) days after service of the Objections. 

The Finding and Recommendation will then be submitted to the District Court for review of the

Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure

to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the Order of the District

Court. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9 Cir. 1991). th

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: July 27, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

U.S. District Court

E. D. California cd 8

Case 1:09-cv-00998-LJO-GSA Document 28 Filed 07/27/10 Page 8 of 8