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Parties Involved:
John Hoffman
Appellee
Timothy Morris
Appellee
Adam Tope
Appellee
Joseph N. Ward II
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 9, 2016*

Decided November 10, 2016

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15‐2678

JOSEPH N. WARD II,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

JOHN HOFFMAN, et al.   

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 3:14‐cv‐00509‐MJR‐SCW

Michael J. Reagan,

Chief Judge.

O R D E R

Joseph Ward, an Illinois prisoner, brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

asserting that John Hoffman, a prison supervisor, used excessive force by choking him

until he lost consciousness while two onlooking guards failed to intervene. The district

court granted summary judgment for the officers, concluding that Ward failed to

exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1997e(a). We affirm.   

                                                 

* We have unanimously agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral

argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15‐2678    Page 2

On June 10, 2012, a heated argument between Ward and his cellmate at the

Menard Correctional Center prompted Lieutenant Hoffman and two officers, Timothy

Morris and Adam Tope, to respond and order both prisoners into handcuffs. At this

point, Ward’s report of the event diverges from Hoffman’s, but in reviewing the

materials at summary judgment we consider the facts in the light most favorable to

Ward, the non‐moving party. Huang v. Contʹl Cas. Co., 754 F.3d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 2014).

According to Ward, he complied with the handcuff order but then grew short of breath

and reached for his asthma inhaler. He was ordered by Hoffman to stop moving and to

walk to the front of his cell. Hoffman then entered the cell, pepper‐sprayed Ward, and

“manhandled” him until he lost consciousness. Ward was taken to the prison’s

healthcare unit, then to an outside hospital. There he was examined by physicians, who

recorded that his injury likely was caused by a chokehold.   

Three days later Ward awoke in the healthcare unit at Pontiac Correctional

Center, where he spent eight days under observation before being taken to a disciplinary

hearing held by an adjustment committee. The hearing was based on a disciplinary

report prepared by Hoffman, who accused Ward of disobeying his order and swinging

at him, prompting his use of pepper spray. The committee found Ward guilty of

disobeying an order and assaulting a staff member and recommended that Ward lose

one year of good‐conduct credit.     

Ward prepared three inmate grievances about the incident and subsequent

proceedings. In late June Ward filed his first grievance, complaining about procedures

relating to the disciplinary hearing, specifically the lack of notice, which, he believed,

prevented him from preparing a defense that would have included testimony from

another inmate who witnessed the incident. Relying on a hearing officer’s

recommendation, the facility’s chief administrative officer denied this grievance. In late

August, Ward filed a second grievance, which alleged for the first time that Hoffman

used excessive force during the cell extraction. The following month Ward filed a third

grievance that substantially repeated the allegations in the second grievance. None of

these three grievances named Morris or Tope, though Ward said in the second grievance

that he had trouble remembering the event and sought criminal investigations of “any

other staff who were witnesses.” Because Ward’s second and third grievances

complained about events at a facility other than the one where they were filed, these

grievances were forwarded to the Administrative Review Board, ILL. ADMIN. CODE

tit. 20, § 504.870. The Board considered all three grievances together, rejecting the first

because there was no evidence of procedural violations, and refusing to consider the

other two because more than 60 days had lapsed since the incident.      

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No. 15‐2678    Page 3

Ward then brought this suit under § 1983, asserting that Hoffman used excessive

force against him and that Morris and Tope failed to intervene. Ward asked the district

court three times to recruit counsel to represent him, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). The court

denied the first request because Ward did not demonstrate that he had contacted any

attorneys, and then it denied the remaining requests altogether because Ward appeared

competent to litigate the case, which had yet to proceed to discovery, because he had

“adequately expressed the factual and legal bases for his claims.”    

The defendants moved for summary judgment based on Ward’s failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies, and Ward asked the court to delay its ruling until

the defendants had produced requested documents and interrogatories. The court

denied Ward’s request because the summary‐judgment motion addressed only

exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the documents he sought about excessive

force were therefore irrelevant.   

The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment based

on Ward’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In Ward’s first grievance, the

district court noted, he complained only about the procedures used by the adjustment

committee, and did not mention excessive force or the defendants. As for the second and

third grievances, these did allege that Hoffman used excessive force, but Ward had not

filed them until more than 60 days after the incident, making them untimely under

Illinois law. The court also acknowledged that the second grievance did not mention

Tope or Morris.1   

On appeal Ward ignores the district court’s exhaustion analysis and generally

addresses only the substance of his excessive‐force claim. But all of his claims are

procedurally barred if, as the district court found, he failed to properly exhaust

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007);

Hernandez v. Dart, 814 F.3d 836, 841 (7th Cir. 2016). The PLRA requires a prisoner to file

grievances in compliance with the state’s grievance procedures. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 94 (2006); Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013); Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). Illinois law specifies that a prisoner’s grievances must

“contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offenderʹs complaint, including

what happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of . . . the

complaint.” ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 504.810(b). This information is necessary to

provide prison officials a fair opportunity to address the complaint. Maddox v. Love,

                                                 

1 Ward also neglected in his third grievance to name Tope or Morris.

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No. 15‐2678    Page 4

655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011). Additionally, a grievance is untimely if it is not filed

within 60 days of the problem giving rise to the grievance, see ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,

§ 504.810(a), subject to exceptions not present in this case. The district court here

correctly concluded that Ward failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies.

Although Ward filed three grievances, none satisfied Illinois’s exhaustion requirements.

His first did not mention excessive force or the defendants, and thus could not have put

administrators on notice of his claims, as required in Illinois, see Turley, 729 F.3d at 650,

and Ward filed his second and third grievances after Illinois’s 60‐day deadline without

proposing good cause for his untimeliness.

Next Ward contends that the district court erred by denying his request for extra

time to obtain discovery before responding to the summary‐judgment motion. It is true

that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) permits a district court to defer consideration

of summary‐judgment motion to allow the nonmovant to supplement his response with

discovery. Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 770 F.3d 618, 627–28 (7th Cir. 2014). But

the non‐movant must explain in an affidavit or declaration why he cannot adequately

respond to the summary‐judgment motion without further discovery, Kallal v. CIBA

Vision Corp., 779 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2015), and Ward did not provide any such

justification. And as the district court correctly observed, the requested discovery

materials pertained only to the merits of the case, and not the exhaustion issue that

undergirded the court’s summary judgment ruling. See Cent. States, Pension Fund v. Waste

Mgmt. of Mich., Inc., 674 F.3d 630, 637 (7th Cir. 2012).

Finally, Ward challenges the denial of his requests for counsel, maintaining that

he was indigent and lacked legal training. When deciding whether to recruit counsel,

district courts must ask: (1) has the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to retain counsel,

and if so, (2) does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate the case, given its difficulty?

Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 2014); Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 659 (7th Cir.

2007) (en banc). We will overturn a decision denying recruitment only if an error in this

analysis prejudiced the plaintiff. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 659. The district court properly

denied Ward’s requests, pointing out that his prior filings reflected his competence to

litigate the case. And in any event, given his failure to exhaust administrative remedies,

Ward cannot show that the assistance of a lawyer could have affected the outcome of

this case.   

AFFIRMED.

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