Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01890/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01890-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Dominic Marcel Maltais
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, United States District Judge for the District

of North Dakota.

 United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1890

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of North Dakota.

Joseph Dominic Marcel Maltais, *

 *

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: April 7, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 

Joseph Dominic Marcel Maltais appeals the district court’s1

 denial of his

motion to suppress evidence seized during a search of his truck and trailer. See

United States v. Maltais, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D.N.D. 2003). Maltais entered a

conditional plea of guilty to possession with intent to distribute 50 kilograms or more

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Although the district court’s opinion is not entirely clear about which

testimony it credited concerning the initial interaction between Danley and Maltais,

it is evident that the court believed at least a good portion of Danley’s version,

because it relied upon Danley’s testimony in reaching its legal conclusion.

Specifically, the district court relied on Danley’s testimony that Maltais said he had

traveled to the location over a route that Danley knew did not exist, and that Maltais

was found approximately six miles from a paved road. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1087-88.

Danley testified that Maltais claimed to have backed into his location from a paved

road. Id. at 1081.

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of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 841(b)(1)(C), and was

sentenced to a term of 30 months’ imprisonment. We affirm.

I.

Senior Border Patrol Agent Robert Danley, performing border patrol duties in

a marked border patrol vehicle, encountered Maltais approximately 500 yards south

of the Canadian border in rural North Dakota at approximately 1:00 a.m. on August

8, 2003. Maltais was sitting in the driver’s seat of his truck, which was parked facing

south by the side of a gravel road. The truck was towing a camper trailer, and both

vehicles displayed Manitoba license plates. Prior to this encounter, Danley knew that

a local farmer had reported seeing a truck and trailer of similar description driving in

the area in the early morning hours.

Agent Danley stopped and requested license checks on the truck and trailer.

Shortly thereafter, Maltais approached Danley’s vehicle and asked whether there was

as problem. The parties agree that Danley inquired about Maltais’s immigration

status and his most recent entry to the United States, but there is a dispute about

precisely what was said. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82. All agree that Danley did not

believe Maltais’s statements about his recent travels, and that the encounter ended

when Danley told Maltais to return to his trailer and stay there.2

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During this time, Senior Patrol Agent Bernard Olson heard the radio traffic and

recognized the license plate numbers called in by Danley. Olson contacted Danley

by radio and informed him that Maltais’s vehicle was suspected of involvement in

contraband smuggling. When Maltais’s vehicle and trailer had undergone inspection

at the Dunseith, North Dakota, Port of Entry around June 10, 2003, inspectors

discovered hidden compartments in the floorboards of the trailer. Olson knew of the

discovery and knew that Maltais’s vehicle and trailer matched the description of the

suspected smuggling vehicle. Olson asked Danley to detain Maltais until he could

get there to pursue the investigation further. Danley then approached Maltais and

instructed him to step out of the truck. Danley frisked Maltais and placed him in the

back of the Border Patrol vehicle. 

Olson contacted Special Agent Chris Guyer in Minot to let him know that

Danley had stopped Maltais with the truck and trailer. As a result of previous

intelligence reports and investigations, Guyer suspected that Maltais was a member

of an international drug-smuggling group called the “Tetz Organization,” which the

Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency

believed to be smuggling marijuana and currency into North Dakota from Manitoba.

Guyer also knew that Maltais had been stopped at the Dunseith port of entry on June

10 with the same vehicles observed by Danley.

Olson was approximately 100 miles from the scene when he first spoke to

Danley. At approximately 1:30 a.m., Olson contacted Bureau of Indian Affairs

Officer Stacy LaRocque seeking canine assistance at Danley’s location. LaRocque

went to the police station, spoke with the K-9 handler, Officer Robert Hulett, and

arranged to bring Hulett and a dog to the scene. LaRocque and Hulett obtained

approval from the lead officer to provide such assistance at approximately 2:00 a.m..

They drove to the scene from Belcourt, North Dakota, which was over sixty miles

from Danley’s location.

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After arriving at the scene, according to testimony about which the district

court made no findings, the officers searched the area around the truck, in part

because Olson was concerned that Maltais’s companion from his earlier border

crossing was not yet accounted for and could pose a threat. (Tr. 171). Agents Olson

and Guyer then briefed all present on the situation, including the information they

possessed regarding Maltais and the smuggling operation in which he was suspected

of participating. (Tr. 172, 199-200). Olson and the other agents also contacted local

law enforcement officials in an attempt to ascertain the proper local procedures and

authority to conduct a dog sniff. (Tr. 126-27). In response to LaRocque’s request,

the officers then repositioned their vehicles to light the truck and camper more

brightly. (Tr. 172-73).

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Between 2:40 and 3:10 a.m., Guyer, Olson, LaRocque, and Hulett arrived at the

scene. Olson identified Maltais as the same individual he had encountered during the

inspection of the truck trailer at the Dunseith Port of Entry. At approximately 3:15

a.m., Olson asked Maltais for consent to search the truck and trailer. Maltais

declined.3

Around 3:30 a.m. to 3:35 a.m., Hulett’s drug-detecting dog swept the truck and

trailer. The dog alerted to contraband at the rear of the trailer and twice near the

trailer’s side door. At this point, officers conducted a quick protective search of the

trailer and saw several open black duffel bags containing plastic vacuum-sealed bags

filled with a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana. Danley read

Maltais his Miranda rights at approximately 3:55 a.m. Shortly thereafter, Maltais and

the vehicles were taken to the Bottineau Border Patrol Station.

Later that day, Border Patrol agents executed a federal search warrant on the

truck and the trailer. The search revealed three hidden compartments in the

floorboards, which contained vacuum-sealed bags filled with marijuana. In total,

225.7 pounds of marijuana were seized. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.

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Maltais was charged with one count of possession with intent to distribute a

controlled substance. The district court denied his motion to suppress, concluding

that the agents had reasonable suspicion to detain Maltais pending further

investigation, and that the scope and duration of the detention did not violate the

Fourth Amendment. The court remarked that “[i]t would have been extremely poor

police work and incompetence to have done nothing and to have failed to take any

steps to detain Maltais to further investigate the matter.” 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.

Maltais entered a conditional plea of guilty, and this appeal followed.

II.

Maltais first argues that he and his vehicles were seized in violation of the

Fourth Amendment because the officers did not have sufficient grounds to justify his

detention before they located the marijuana. It is well established, of course, that a

law enforcement officer may detain a person for investigation without probable cause

to arrest if the officer “has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that

criminal activity ‘may be afoot.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). “Whether the particular facts known

to the officer amount to an objective and particularized basis for a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity is determined in light of the totality of the

circumstances.” United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334 (8th Cir. 1994). The

district court’s determination that “reasonable suspicion” existed is a matter that we

review de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996).

Maltais correctly observes that general assertions of suspicion are not sufficient

to justify detention. For example, “[a] report that a particular car is ‘suspicious’

simply does not indicate whether its occupants may be engaged in criminal activity.”

Thompson v. Reuting, 968 F.2d 756, 760 (8th Cir. 1992). Maltais asserts that because

the various behaviors that aroused Danley’s suspicion were innocent, and because

some of the intelligence upon which Danley relied was not based on Danley’s

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personal observations, there was no reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing based on

articulable facts at the time of the investigative detention.

We disagree with Maltais that a reasonable suspicion may not be based in

whole or in part on hearsay information. The Supreme Court long ago rejected the

contention that reasonable cause for a temporary detention “can only be based on the

officer’s personal observations, rather than on information supplied by another

person.” Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). In particular, “an officer may

rely on information provided by other officers and all the information known to a

team of officers involved in the investigation to provide justification for a stop.”

United States v. Ortiz-Monroy, 332 F.3d 525, 529 (8th Cir. 2003).

After reviewing Danley’s encounter with Maltais, including the information

that Danley received from fellow officers, the district court concluded that:

Agent Danley had far more than just a citizen’s report of a “suspicious

vehicle.” Even before Maltais approached Agent Danley during the

early morning hours on August 8, 2003, in remote northern North

Dakota, Agent Danley specifically knew that (1) a truck and trailer

matching the vehicles at the side of the road had gone through an

inspection at the Dunseith, North Dakota, Port of Entry on June 10,

2003; (2) the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection Inspectors found

several hidden compartments in Maltais’ trailer commonly associated

with drug trafficking operations; (3) a truck and trailer matching this

description were reported by a local farmer to be driving in this area in

the early morning hours; (4) Agent Danley had been provided with

background information concerning Maltais and the suspected drug ring

originating in Canada or on the west coast; (5) roads in this area cross

the United States and Canadian border where there are no designated

ports of entry and these roads can be easily driven by almost any

vehicle; (6) the truck and trailer had Canadian license plates; and (7) the

location was within 500 yards of the United States and Canadian border.

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295 F. Supp. 2d at 1086. We agree with the district court that based on this

“constellation of facts,” any law enforcement officer “would have reasonably

concluded that Maltais may have been up to no good,” and that the agents had “an

articulable, reasonable suspicion that Maltais was likely engaged in criminal activity.”

Id. 

We think United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129 (8th Cir. 1998), upon which

Maltais relies, is plainly distinguishable. In Beck, our court said “it is impossible for

a combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious

conglomeration unless there are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Id. at

1137 (internal quotations omitted). Beck rejected the government’s argument that

reasonable suspicion existed to detain the driver of an automobile after a routine

traffic stop, where the officer observed only that the driver was operating a rental car

from California (a “drug source state”), there were fast food wrappers on the floor of

the car, there was no visible luggage, and the driver was nervous. Id. at 1132. 

Maltais, by contrast, was not involved in a routine traffic stop. His vehicle was

parked in a remote location close to the Canadian border in the dead of night. Even

assuming that such behavior is innocent, the agents had concrete reasons for

suspicion. See United States v. Chhunn, 11 F.3d 107, 110 (8th Cir. 1993) (“To decide

whether the police met the reasonable-suspicion standard, we look to all the

circumstances and the collective knowledge of the officers involved in the stop.”).

They knew that the vehicle had hidden compartments, that such compartments were

frequently used in drug trafficking, that intelligence information suggested Maltais

was involved in a drug smuggling ring, that drug smugglers operated in the area, and

that vehicles of similar description had been sighted in the area earlier that night. “In

forming a basis for suspicion, officers may ‘draw on their own experience and

specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative

information available to them.’” Ortiz-Monroy, 332 F.3d at 529 (quoting United

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Danley and his colleagues properly took

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some facts which might individually be innocent and viewed them in context and in

light of experience to find that the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a

reasonable suspicion. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (holding that although any one of

several factors was “not by itself proof of any illegal conduct” and was “quite

consistent with innocent travel,” taken together they amounted to reasonable

suspicion.); United States v. White, 42 F.3d 457, 460 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Although there

is a possible innocent explanation for each of the factors, as a totality they created a

reasonable suspicion justifying further investigation reasonable in scope.”).

III.

Maltais also argues that even if the initial stop was lawful, he was unreasonably

detained and subject to a de facto arrest when he was held for almost three hours

before arrest, including at least 90 minutes in Danley’s patrol car. An investigative

detention may turn into an arrest if it “lasts for an unreasonably long time or if

officers use unreasonable force.” United States v. Navarrette-Barron, 192 F.3d 786,

790 (8th Cir. 1999). During an investigative stop, officers should “employ the least

intrusive means of detention and investigation, in terms of scope and duration, that

are reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose” of the temporary seizure. Id. The

means used to effect the seizure must be objectively reasonable in light of the facts

and circumstances confronting the officers. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97

(1989).

We do not believe the manner of detention – seating Maltais in Danley’s patrol

vehicle – was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Danley’s reasonable

suspicion gave him authority to detain Maltais while he verified or dispelled his

suspicion. See United States v. Dickson, 58 F.3d 1258, 1263 (8th Cir. 1995). During

the course of conducting his investigation, Danley was authorized to “take such steps

as were reasonably necessary to protect [his] personal safety and to maintain the

status quo during the course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235

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Maltais also asserts that he suffered humiliation when Danley would not

permit him to exit the patrol vehicle for 40 minutes after Maltais announced that he

needed to urinate. See United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 545 (8th Cir. 1988)

(stating that in addition to length of detention, “an individual’s privacy interest is also

measured by the degree of fear and humiliation that the police conduct engenders”).

The district court made no findings on this point, and the officers testified that as

soon as a second agent arrived on the scene, Maltais was given several opportunities

to urinate, but did not relieve himself on any of those occasions. (Tr. 38, 121-22, 125,

170). We have reviewed Maltais’s affidavit submitted to the district court, and there

is no allegation that he suffered real pain or serious discomfort while waiting for an

opportunity to urinate. Cf. Muehler v. Mena, 2005 WL 645221, at *6 (U.S. Mar. 22,

2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring). We deem it unnecessary to remand for additional

findings regarding Maltais’s credibility, because even accepting his assertion that he

was not permitted to leave the patrol car to urinate when he wished to do so, we

believe that Danley’s actions were reasonably related to the need for officer safety

and prevention of flight while unassisted at a remote location in the middle of the

night.

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(1985). Danley had reasonable grounds to suspect that Maltais was a member of a

drug smuggling ring, which made him potentially dangerous, and the Canadian border

was a short jog away, making flight a distinct possibility. The two men were alone

in a remote area in the middle of the night. Under those circumstances, it was

objectively reasonable for Danley to detain Maltais in his patrol car until assistance

arrived, at which time he could complete his initial investigation and determine

whether a formal arrest was warranted.4

Maltais argues that the length of the detention was unreasonable and exceeded

the permissible scope of a Terry stop. A detention may become a de facto arrest if it

lasts for an unreasonably long time, but there is no rigid time limit on an investigatory

detention. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). In determining

whether a period of time is excessive, we must consider the “law enforcement

purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate

those purposes.” Id.

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We have held that a one-hour detention upon reasonable suspicion to wait for

a drug dog was reasonable. United States v. Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir.

1994) (en banc). In Bloomfield, we explained that 

[w]hen police need the assistance of a drug dog in roadside Terry stops,

it will in general take time to obtain one; local government police forces

and the state highway patrol cannot be expected to have drug dogs

immediately available to all officers in the field at all times. Courts

must consider the law enforcement purposes to be served by the stop as

well as the time reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. 

Id. (internal quotation omitted). In White, we similarly held that it was reasonable for

an officer to detain a truck for an hour and twenty minutes while awaiting the arrival

of a drug dog. We observed that the officer acted diligently to obtain the dog and that

the delay was caused only by the remote location of the closest available dog. 42

F.3d at 460. Cf. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542-44

(1985) (16-hour investigative detention of suspected “alimentary canal” drug

smuggler at international border was not unreasonable).

Here, the district court found that Danley detained Maltais in the back of his

patrol car for somewhere between 90 minutes and two hours, and that Maltais was

detained for approximately two hours and 55 minutes before he was finally arrested.

295 F.Supp.2d at 1089. In finding that this detention was reasonable, the district

court emphasized the circumstances: “It is of critical importance to note the time and

the location where Maltais was found. This was in a very remote and isolated rural

area in northern North Dakota, just 500 yards from the Canadian border, at

approximately 1:00 a.m. in the morning.” Id. at 1090 (emphasis in original). The

difficulty in obtaining a drug dog, discussed in Bloomfield, was particularly acute

under these circumstances.

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See, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10 (90-minute detention of suitcase

unreasonable where officers could have taken steps in advance to minimize the length

of the delay); United States v. Codd, 956 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11th Cir. 1992) (two and

a half-hour detention of suspect who was taken to a police station and had her purse

searched without probable cause was unreasonable); United States v. Scales, 903 F.2d

765, 769 (10th Cir. 1990) (seven-hour seizure of suitcase unreasonable, especially

given that officers did not make every effort to minimize the length of the delay);

United States v. Cagle, 849 F.2d 924, 927 (5th Cir. 1988) (90-minute detention of

suitcase unreasonable where it interfered with owner’s travel plans and officers did

not employ the most diligent and least intrusive investigatory techniques).

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“In assessing the effect of the length of the detention, we take into account

whether the police diligently pursue their investigation.” Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685

(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)). The district court’s

factual finding on that point clearly supports the reasonableness of the action by law

enforcement: “There is no evidence that any of the law enforcement officers were

dilatory in their investigation or that there was any unnecessary delay.” 295 F. Supp.

2d at 1090. While Danley “maintained the status quo and stabilized the situation until

additional officers and a drug dog could arrive at the scene,” id. at 1089, Olson

rushed to the remote location from 100 miles away. Olson contacted numerous other

law enforcement officers while en route; his communication included a request to

LaRocque for the assistance of a drug detecting dog. Id. at 1090. The length of time

required to mobilize law enforcement support and bring it to the scene was

attributable to the early morning hour and the remote location of Maltais and his

vehicles.

While a detention of this length would be unreasonable under different

circumstances,5

 the unusual situation here made it impractical for the law enforcement

agents to respond any sooner than they did. The officers acted with diligence and

pursued the quickest and least intrusive means of investigation reasonably available

to confirm or dispel their well-founded suspicions that Maltais was engaged in drug

trafficking. “The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks the

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precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his

shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape.” Adams, 407 U.S. at

145. To hold Agent Danley’s actions unconstitutional would require law enforcement

officials, at considerable public expense, to maintain specialized personnel and

equipment at remote locations at all hours of the day and night, or to forgo the timely

investigation of serious offenses as to which they have reasonable, articulable

suspicion based on alert and cooperative police work. We do not believe the

constitutional prohibition of “unreasonable” seizures dictates such a result. We

therefore hold that the length of detention was reasonable under the circumstances,

and that Maltais was not subjected to an arrest without probable cause.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

______________________________

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