Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50025/USCOURTS-ca5-09-50025-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alberto Ceja
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-50025

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

ALBERTO CEJA,

Defendant - Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:08-CR-55-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Alberto Ceja appeals his jury-trial conviction for conspiracy to distribute

cocaine and methamphetamine and for possession with intent to distribute at

1

least 50 grams of meth and aiding and abetting. Before getting to the merits,

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we must address Ceja’s motions to supplement the record with juror

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

July 15, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 & 846. 1

 21 U.S.C. § 841; 18 U.S.C. § 2. 2

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No. 09-50025

questionaries and with notes between the jury and judge.

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Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e)(2)(C) grants us authority to

supplement the record with “anything material to either party” that has been

“omitted from or misstated in the record by error or accident.” Ceja urges that

the juror questionnaires were erroneously omitted from the record, and he needs

to evaluate them for his Batson claim of race-based peremptory challenges. We

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DENY the request, because Ceja cannot show the documents to be “material.”

He has, in fact, waived his Batson claim. We have held that “a defendant waives

objection to a peremptory challenge by failing to dispute the prosecutor’s

explanations.” Ceja questioned the prosecution’s striking of a man and a

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woman venireperson, each a minority. The prosecution explained it struck the

woman for falling asleep and the man for working a similar job as the defendant.

The prosecution, of its own initiative and by way of comparative analysis, noted

four other venirepersons (presumably not minorities) struck for the same workrelated reason. Ceja did not challenge these race-neutral explanations,

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Although Ceja moved the district court for these documents, he did so after filing his 3

notice of appeal – so the district court did not have jurisdiction to grant the request. See

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (“The filing of a notice of

appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance – it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals

and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the

appeal.”).

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 4

United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1127 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. 5

Rudas, 905 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1990) (“Once the Government has offered reasons for its

peremptory challenges, defense counsel must expressly indicate an intention to pursue the

Batson claim.”)); see also United States v. Brent, 300 F. App’x 267, 270, 272 (5th Cir. 2008)

(unpublished) (explaining that the defendant waived his Batson claim because he “objected to

the government’s peremptory strike but did not challenge the prosecution’s race-neutral

explanation”). Though the caselaw contains some contradiction, Arce’s waiver rule may not

apply in capital cases, see Fields v. Thaler, 588 F.3d 270, 276 & n.3 (5th Cir. 2009) (noting the

inconsistency), but this is not a capital case.

See Voir Dire Proceedings (Sealed), Supp. R. at 61–62 (“Nothing further, Judge.”). 6

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No. 09-50025

appearing to acquiesce in them.

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The jury notes here are similarly immaterial. The government concedes

that a defendant has the right to be notified when the court receives

communications from the jury so that he can be afforded the opportunity to be

heard. The record reflects that the jury sent three notes to the judge, and the

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parties agree it is unclear whether the defendant ever knew about the notes.

This court, in the interest of judicial economy, has looked at the sealed jury

notes, which: (1) ask for a smoke break; (2) request lunch; and (3) inform the

judge they have reached a verdict. None of these communications plausibly

affect Ceja’s appeal, so we DENY the request to supplement. We also DENY as

moot Ceja’s alternative motion to file supplemental briefing.

Moving to the substance of Ceja’s appeal, he argues that – after he did not

testify at trial – the district court erred in failing to give a no adverse inference

instruction to the jury. Ceja concedes that plain-error review applies. “A

criminal defendant has a Fifth Amendment right for a judge, upon the

defendant’s request, to instruct a jury not to make any adverse inferences based

on the defendant’s election not to testify.” Ceja did not request the instruction,

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See Arce, 997 F.2d at 1127. We note that even if Ceja had not waived his Batson 7

claim,the full voir dire proceeding contained in the appellate record supports the prosecution’s

race-neutral explanations and Ceja did not before this court brief his Batson claim’s merits.

See United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 293 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating the rule 8

and noting this court must review for harmless error).

United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d 903, 909 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Carter v. Kentucky,

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450 U.S. 288, 300 (1981)) (emphasis supplied); see also Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 350

(5th Cir. 1999) (“Upon request of a defendant, a trial court shall instruct jurors that they may

not draw any adverse inference from a defendant’s failure to testify . . . .” (emphasis supplied));

United States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“As the Carter Court itself clarified,

‘a criminal trial judge must give a ‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by

a defendant to do so.’” (quoting Carter, 450 U.S. at 300) (emphasis in original)). The Supreme

Court has long interpreted Carter to require the no adverse inference instruction only when

the defendant requests it. See, e.g., Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 67 (2000) (“The

defendant’s right to hold the prosecution to proving its case without his assistance is not to be

impaired by the jury’s counting the defendant’s silence at trial against him – and upon request

the court must instruct the jury to that effect.”); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 349 (1984)

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so it is hard to see how he could show any error to be “plain.” In any event, he

cannot meet plain-error review’s third prong, which “requires the defendant to

show that the error ‘affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.’”

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In United States v. Percel, this court refused to find plain error where the

district judge gave the wrong no adverse inference jury instruction, because

“there [wa]s not a reasonable likelihood that the jury would have applied the

judge’s erroneous oral instructions unconstitutionally.” Key to the court’s

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analysis was that the district judge had given the proper instruction during voir

dire. In United States v. Flores, this court concluded that the district court’s

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failure spontaneously to give the no adverse inference instruction did not affect

the defendant’s substantial rights, based in part on the overwhelming evidence

against him. United States v. Ramirez came out the same way.

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The district judge here gave the proper instruction several times at voir

dire and – immediately before reading the final instructions – explained to the

jury that for hundreds of years juries have not been allowed to consider the fact

that the defendant did not testify. The evidence against Ceja was overwhelming,

including half-a-dozen witnesses consistently describing how Ceja ran a drug

distribution ring. In short, we are not persuaded that the district court’s

omission resulted in a “substantial and injurious effect or influence in

(“Carter holds that if asked to do so the trial court must tell the jury not to draw the

impermissible inference.”). Additionally, this court has held that the district judge must

instruct the jury when the prosecution comments on the defendant’s silence. See United States

v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 325 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, Ceja never requested the instruction

and the prosecution never commented on his silence.

United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 284 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Puckett v. United 10

States, 129 S. Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009)).

See 553 F.3d at 909–10. 11

See id.

12

See 63 F.3d at 1375–76. 13

See 810 F.2d 1338, 1343–44 (5th Cir. 1987).

14

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No. 09-50025

determining the verdict.”

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The district court committed no reversible error. AFFIRMED.

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004) (quotation marks and 15

alteration omitted).

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