Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-11-30379/USCOURTS-ca9-11-30379-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Johnny Brown
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOHNNY BROWN, AKA Mickey,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 11-30379

D.C. No.

3:06-cr-000385-KI-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Oregon

Garr M. King, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

March 3, 2015—Portland, Oregon

Filed May 1, 2015

Before: Raymond C. Fisher, Richard A. Paez

and Sandra S. Ikuta, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

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2 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Affirming a criminal judgment, the panel held that courts

have discretion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) to proceed with

11 jurors after excusing a juror for good cause during

deliberations, even when alternates are available. 

The panel also held that the district court did not abuse its

discretion by proceeding with 11 jurors, where the jury had

deliberated for more than a day and had asked and received

answers to five substantive questions. The panel wrote that

if the court had seated an alternate, it would, under Fed. R.

Crim. P. 24(c)(3), have had to direct the jury to begin

deliberations anew, adding at least a day to the proceedings

and imposing on the jurors the difficult task of discarding any

conclusions they had already reached.

COUNSEL

Michael R. Levine (argued), Levine & McHenry LLC,

Portland, Oregon, for Defendant-Appellant.

S. Amanda Marshall, United States Attorney, District of

Oregon; Kelly A. Zusman (argued), Appellate Chief,

Assistant United States Attorney, Portland, Oregon, for

Plaintiff-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 3

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

After a five-day trial, a federal jury convicted Johnny

Brown of 14 counts of wire fraud, making false statements to

a financial institution and tax evasion. While the jury was

deliberating, one of the jurors became ill and asked to be

excused. Brown requested that the district court seat an

alternate juror rather than proceed with 11 jurors. The court

denied Brown’s request, excused the juror and directed the

11-person jury to continue its deliberations, citing Federal

Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3). Later that day, the jury

returned a guilty verdict.

Brown argues Rule 23(b)(3) does not authorize a court to

proceed with 11 jurors over a defense objection when

alternates are available. Alternatively, he argues the court

abused its discretion by proceeding with 11 jurors rather than

seating an alternate here, because the trial and deliberations

had been brief.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

affirm. We hold courts have discretion under Rule 23(b)(3)

to proceed with 11 jurors after excusing a juror for good

cause during deliberations, even when alternates are

available. We also hold the court did not abuse its discretion

by proceeding with 11 jurors. The jury had deliberated for

more than a day and had asked and received answers to five

substantive questions. If the court had seated an alternate, it

would have had to direct the jury to begin deliberations anew,

see Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3), adding at least a day to the

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4 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

proceedings and imposing on the jurors the difficult task of

discarding any conclusions they had already reached.1

BACKGROUND

Brown was charged with seven counts of wire fraud, six

counts of making false statements to a financial institution

and one count of tax evasion. The charges for wire fraud and

false statements to a financial institution arose from a scheme

through which Brown generated roughly $5 million in

fraudulent sales transactions by swiping 596 credit cards

belonging to 154 people through a credit card machine

provided to his business by U.S. Bank.

Brown pled not guilty and proceeded to a jury trial. The

court seated 12 jurors and two alternates. The trial lasted five

days. The government called 26 witnesses and introduced 80

exhibits. When the 12 jurors began deliberations, the court

allowed the two alternates to leave. The court, however, did

not discharge them:

At this point you will not go into the jury

room, but you continue to be alternates until

the jury is dismissed. So in the event that

something happened to one of the jurors and

they couldn’t continue, you would be called to

step in. Now, for that reason, you must

continue to follow the instructions I’ve given

you about not making any decision in the

case, not talking to anyone about the case. . . . 

Just continue to follow these instructions. We

1 We address Brown’s remaining arguments in a concurrently filed

memorandum disposition.

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 5

will advise you immediately if you are

needed, and we will advise you when the jury

reaches a verdict. If they reach a verdict,

we’ll advise you that you can be excused. So

at this point, you’re not discharged, but you

may leave, and we’ll call you if we need you.

During deliberations, the jury posed five substantive

questions to the court. The court convened the parties’

counsel by teleconference and prepared responses. After one

day of deliberations, a juror became ill and asked to be

excused. The next morning, the court informed the parties’

counsel of the issue and asked if they would stipulate to an

11-person jury under Rule 23(b)(2).2 The government

 

2

 Rule 23(b) states:

(1) In General. A jury consists of 12 persons unless

this rule provides otherwise.

(2) Stipulation for a Smaller Jury. At any time before

the verdict, the parties may, with the court’s approval,

stipulate in writing that:

(A) the jury may consist of fewer than 12 persons; or

(B) a jury of fewer than 12 persons may return a verdict

if the court finds it necessary to excuse a juror for good

cause after the trial begins.

(3) Court Order for a Jury of 11. After the jury has

retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11

persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation

by the parties, if the court finds good cause to excuse a

juror.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b).

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6 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

agreed, but the defense objected. The defense requested that

the court instead seat an alternate, arguing, “[i]t’s taken years

to get . . . to trial, and to add a day to deliberations for an

alternate to be brought up to . . . speed does not seem

particularly onerous to me.” The court disagreed, saying,

“[i]f we bring [the alternate jurors] back, we’ve got to run

them down, get them back, and the jury has to start over. . . . 

And we have 14 counts. And if this jury, for example, has

made decisions on any number of counts, let’s say 12 or 13

or whatever, that goes out the window and they’ve got to start

over with the alternate and have discussions and then vote on

it.”

The court then questioned the ill juror, and both parties

agreed she should be excused. The court excused the juror,

and then concluded, “based on the authority granted in Rule

23(b)(3) and based on the circumstances that we have on the

record, Iwill instruct the jury to continue deliberating with 11

and that all 11 members of the jury must agree on the

verdict.” Later that day, the 11-member jury returned a guilty

verdict on all 14 counts. Brown appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v.

Fort, 472 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007). We review for an

abuse of discretion a court’s decision to proceed with 11

jurors under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3). 

See United States v. Egbuniwe, 969 F.2d 757, 758, 760–61

(9th Cir. 1992).

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 7

DISCUSSION

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant’s

right to a jury trial. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,

149 (1968). It does not, however, guarantee a criminal

defendant’s right to a jury of 12 persons. See Williams v.

Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100–03 (1970). In 1946, however,

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23 went into effect,

guaranteeing12-person juriesin federal criminal trials, absent

a stipulation by the parties to a jury of fewer than 12 persons. 

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) (1946). Before Rule 23 was

adopted, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24 required

courts to discharge alternate jurors when the jury retired to

deliberate. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) (1946); United States

v. Mullins, 992 F.2d 1472, 1478 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting 2

Charles A. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 388 at

390 (1982)). Therefore, if a juror was excused during

deliberations and the parties did not stipulate to a jury of

fewer than 12 persons, the court was required to declare a

mistrial.

In 1983, Rule 23(b) was amended to provide district

courts discretion to proceed with 11 jurors after excusing a

juror for good cause during deliberations, even without a

stipulation by the parties. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3). The

purpose of this amendment was to provide courts an

alternative to declaring a mistrial, particularly after long

trials, when “the remedy of mistrial would necessitate a

second expenditure of substantial prosecution, defense and

court resources.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory

committee’s notes (1983 amendment).

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8 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

The 1983 advisory committee declined to amend Rule 24

to allow courts to retain alternates after deliberations have

begun, explaining:

[I]t is far better to permit the deliberations to

continue with a jury of 11 than to make a

substitution at that point. . . . Even were it

required that the jury “review” with the new

juror their prior deliberations or that the jury

upon substitution start deliberations anew, it

still seems likely that the continuing jurors

would be influenced by the earlier

deliberations and that the new juror would be

somewhat intimidated by the others by virtue

of being a newcomer to the deliberations.

Id.

Notwithstanding these concerns, Rule 24(c) was amended

in 1999 to give district courts discretion to retain alternates

after deliberations have begun. See Fed. R. Crim. P.

24(c)(3).3 This amendment was designed to provide courts an

 

3

 Rule 24(c) states:

(c) Alternate Jurors.

(1) In General. The court may impanel up to 6 alternate

jurors to replace any jurors who are unable to perform

or who are disqualified from performing their duties.

(2) Procedure.

(A) Alternate jurors must have the same qualifications

and be selected and sworn in the same manner as any

other juror.

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 9

additional alternative to declaring a mistrial after excusing a

juror during deliberations. The advisory committee did not

provide clear guidance for district courts when choosing

among these options. It said only:

Rule 23(b) provides that in some

circumstances a verdict may be returned by

eleven jurors. In addition, there may be cases

where it is better to retain the alternates when

the jury retires, insulate them from the

deliberation process, and have them available

should one or more vacancies occur in the

jury. That might be especially appropriate in

a long, costly, and complicated case. To that

end the Committee believed that the court

should have the discretion to decide whether

to retain or discharge the alternates at the time

the jury retires to deliberate and to use Rule

23(b) to proceed with eleven jurors or to

(B) Alternate jurors replace jurors in the same sequence

in which the alternates were selected. An alternate

juror who replaces a juror has the same authority as the

other jurors.

(3) Retaining Alternate Jurors. The court may retain

alternate jurors after the jury retires to deliberate. The

court must ensure that a retained alternate does not

discuss the case with anyone until that alternate

replaces a juror or is discharged. If an alternate

replaces a juror after deliberations have begun, the

court must instruct the jury to begin its deliberations

anew.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(1)–(3).

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10 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

substitute a juror or jurors with alternate

jurors who have not been discharged.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c) advisory committee’s notes (1999

amendment).

Thus, as currently constituted, the Rules provide courts

three options after excusing a juror for good cause during

deliberations: (1) declare a mistrial; (2) proceed with 11

jurors; or (3) seat an alternate. Brown contends Rule 23(b)

does not authorize the court to proceed with 11 jurors when

alternates are available. In the alternative, he argues even if

such authority exists, the court abused its discretion by

exercising it here. We reject both arguments.

I. District courts have discretion under Rule 23(b)(3) to

proceed with 11 jurors after excusing a juror for good

cause during deliberations, even when alternates are

available

We reject Brown’s contention that the Rules preclude a

court from proceeding with 11 jurors when alternates are

available. First and foremost, his interpretation finds no

support in the plain language of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3)

expressly authorizes a court to proceed with 11 jurors after a

juror is excused for good cause during deliberations, and

nothing in the language of Rule 23 or Rule 24 precludes a

court from exercising that authority when alternates are

available.

Second, the advisory committee’s notes to Rules 23 and

24 do not suggest otherwise. Brown relies on the 1983

advisory committee’s notes to Rule 23, which say Rule 23

was amended to allow for 11-juror verdicts to address the

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 11

“situation . . . in which, after the jury has retired to consider

its verdict and any alternate jurors have been discharged, one

of the jurors is seriously incapacitated or otherwise found to

be unable to continue service upon the jury.” Fed. R. Crim.

P. 23(b) advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment)

(emphasis added). Brown argues the notes show Rule 23(b)

was intended to apply only when alternate jurors have been

discharged.

When the advisory committee drafted this language in

1983, though, alternate jurors had to be discharged before

deliberations began. See Mullins, 992 F.2d at 1478. The

1983 notes, therefore, merely recognized that the amendment

to Rule 23(b) was intended to give courts an alternative to

declaring a mistrial. They did not suggest that, if a

subsequent rule change were to give courts the additional

alternative of retaining alternates during deliberations, courts

would have to seat available alternates rather than proceed

with 11 jurors. Furthermore, the 1999 advisory committee’s

notes to Rule 24(c) confirm that a court that has elected to

retain alternates “should have the discretion” to “use Rule

23(b) to proceed with eleven jurors or to substitute a juror or

jurors with alternate jurors who have not been discharged.” 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3) advisory committee’s notes (1999

amendment) (emphasis added).

Finally, two circuits that have addressed this question

have agreed that a court retains discretion to proceed with 11

jurors even when alternates are available. See United States

v. Hively, 437 F.3d 752, 766–67 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming

district court’s decision to proceed with 11 jurors rather than

seat an alternate); United States v. Levenite, 277 F.3d 454,

464–65 (4th Cir. 2002) (same).

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12 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

In light of the plain language of Rules 23 and 24, as well

as the advisory committee’s notes, we join these circuits and

hold a district court has discretion to proceed with 11 jurors

after excusing a juror during deliberations, even when

alternates are available.

II. The court did not abuse its discretion by proceeding

with 11 jurors

We also hold the district court permissibly exercised its

discretion by proceeding with 11 jurors after excusing a juror

for good cause, rather than seating an alternate. The jury had

deliberated for over a day following a five-day trial. The jury

had asked five substantive questions, and the court and parties

had spent significant time considering and responding to

them. The jury returned a verdict within a few hours after the

ill juror was excused. As the district court explained, the case

involved 14 counts, and after a day of deliberations the jury

might well have decided certain issues:

[I]f we call the alternates, they’ve got to start

over with whatever count they began with,

with these alternates, and go through a

process. So we’re talking about a fair amount

of time to bring – to get the alternates in and

to bring them up to date. . . . And we have 14

counts. And if this jury, for example, has

made decisions on any number of counts, let’s

say 12 or 13 or whatever, that goes out the

window and they’ve got to start over with the

alternate and have discussions and then vote

on it.

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 13

This was a reasonable assessment of the situation. If the

court had substituted an alternate, the jury would have been

required to begin deliberations anew, discarding the

substantial work it, the parties and the court had done. See

Hively, 437 F.3d at 766–67 (affirming an 11-juror verdict

when a juror was excused after a day and a half of

deliberations, explaining “[t]he case involved multiple counts

for the jury to consider, and the district court worried that the

original twelve jurors might have already decided factual

issues”); Levenite, 277 F.3d at 464–65 (affirming an 11-juror

verdict when a juror was excused after two days of

deliberations in a complex case involving several defendants

and counts).4

The jurors also would have had to attempt to disregard

any conclusions they had reached on any of the 14 counts at

issue. To be sure, Rule 24 requires courts to instruct juries to

begin deliberations anew, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(c)(3), and

we generally presume that juries follow a court’s instructions. 

See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000).5

4 Brown’s reliance on United States v. Tabacca, 924 F.2d 906, 914–15

(9th Cir. 1991), is misplaced. In Tabacca, the district court had excused

a juror and allowed an 11-juror verdict. On appeal, we did not address

whether the court abused its discretion by failing to seat an available

alternate. Indeed, because the trial occurred before the 1999 amendment

to Rule 24, the court was required to discharge alternates when

deliberations began. See Mullins, 992 F.2d at 1478. Instead, we held there

was an absence of “just cause” under Rule 23(b)(3) to excuse the juror,

because he likely would have been able to return after a one-day absence. 

Tabacca, 924 F.2d at 914–15. Here, Brown concedes there was good

cause to excuse the twelfth juror. Tabacca is inapposite.

5 Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction 7.12 recognizes at least

part of the challenge the jury faces in starting deliberations anew:

“Although starting over may seem frustrating, please do not let it

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14 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

Nonetheless, it has been widely recognized that jurors may

not be able to set aside their conclusions and that an alternate

may be intimidated, choosing to go along with other jurors’

views rather than exercise independent judgment. See, e.g.,

United States v. Lamb, 529 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1975)

(en banc) (“The inherent coercive effect upon an alternate

juror who joins a jury that has . . . already agreed that the

accused is guilty is substantial.”); Hively, 437 F.3d at 767

(“While [the court] could have instructed the jury to start its

deliberations anew after seating an alternate, the court was

concerned that thirteen jurors could potentially be involved in

deciding issues and that this would undermine the validity of

any verdict.”); Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s

notes (1983 amendment)(recognizing, even after receiving an

instruction to begin deliberations anew, jurors may be

“influenced by the earlier deliberations,” and the alternate

may be “somewhat intimidated by the others by virtue of

being a newcomer to the deliberations”).

We are not persuaded by Brown’s argument that, “[b]y

adopting” the amendment to Rule 24(c) that allows the

substitution of alternates during deliberations, “Congress also

rejected” these concerns. The 1999 advisory committee’s

notes to Rule 24(c) do not address the concerns the prior

committee had expressed in 1983. The rules appear simply

to give courts the discretion to weigh the concerns against

other issues presented in individual cases. The extent of the

discourage you. It is important that each juror have a full and fair

opportunity to explore his or her views and respond to the views of others

so that you may come to a unanimous verdict. All the previous

instructions given to you, including the unanimity requirement for a

verdict, remain in effect.” Ninth Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instruction

7.12.

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UNITED STATES V. BROWN 15

risks associated with seating an alternate juror will vary from

case to case. When deliberations have been extended, jurors

are more likely to have reached firm conclusions on certain

issues, and alternates may be at a greater risk of intimidation. 

When deliberations have been brief, those risks are likely

reduced.6

Here, the jury had deliberated for over a day in a complex

case involving 14 counts. Significantly, the jury had asked

and received answers to five substantive questions. 

Substituting an alternate likely would have imposed

substantial additional work on the jury, the parties and the

court. It also would have required the jurors to attempt to

clear their minds of any conclusions they had reached. The

court weighed these considerations and concluded that

“justice would best be served by proceeding with a jury of 11

individuals.” Under these circumstances, the district court

did not abuse its discretion.7

6

In cases occupying neither extreme, a district court’s decision either to

seat an alternate juror or to proceed with 11 jurors may not be an abuse of

discretion. We do not suggest the facts of this case required the district

court to chart a particular course, merely that the decision it made was not

“illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn

from the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir.

2009) (en banc).

7 Brown does not argue the district court abused its discretion by opting

to proceed with 11 jurors rather than declaring a mistrial. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 23(b) advisory committee’s notes (1983 amendment) (explaining

that when a “trial has been brief and not much would be lost by retrial, the

court might well conclude that the unusual step of allowing a jury verdict

by less than 12 jurors absent stipulation should not be taken,” and instead

declare a mistrial). We therefore do not address that issue.

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16 UNITED STATES V. BROWN

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the district court.

AFFIRMED.

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