Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03337/USCOURTS-ca10-94-03337-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brandon J. Smith
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH FILED'-

unlted States Court of Al)ptt!l 

Ttnth Circuit 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

BRANDON J. SMITH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

AUG 1 7 1995 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

No. 94-3337 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. No. 93-CR-10092) 

Michael G. Christensen, Assistant United States Attorney (Randall 

K. Rathbun, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), 

Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Jack Focht (Kenneth G. Gale on the brief), of Focht, Hughey & 

Calvert, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Before TACHA and HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judges, and ELLISON, District 

Judge.* 

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge. 

*The Honorable James 0. Ellison, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 94-3337 Document: 01019279749 Date Filed: 08/17/1995 Page: 1 
Defendant-appellant Brandon J. Smith was convicted on one 

·count of possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and on one count of using or 

carrying firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking 

crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. A charge of 

conspiracy to possess cocaine base with intent to distribute was 

dismissed by the court at the close of the prosecution's case. 

Defendant was sentenced to 63 months' incarceration on the cocaine 

charge and to 60 months' incarceration on the weapons charge, to 

run consecutively. A $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment 

were also imposed. Defendant brings this direct appeal. 

I 

Defendant was arrested during the execution of a search 

warrant for his residence. The search warrant was issued by a 

state judge on the basis of an affidavit describing how a 

"controlled buy" of cocaine had been effected from defendant at 

his residence within the previous 72 hours. The controlled buy 

had been set up based on a tip from a confidential informant and 

had been effected by the informant. I R. Doc. 45. 

The affidavit in support of the application for the search 

warrant contained no information regarding the credibility of the 

confidential informant other than what might be inferred from the 

fact that the buy had been completed based on his original tip. 

The informant had reported that the seller of the cocaine, then 

identified only as "Quick,"1 had stated that he had more cocaine 

1 

In his trial testimony, defendant acknowledged that he was 

(Footnote continued on next page) 

2 

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available at his residence. The affidavit said that based on this 

incident and the affiant's experience as a police officer, which 

was not described with any specificity, it was likely that the 

residence contained, in addition to cocaine, 11 items used as 

cutting agents, paraphernalia, packaging material, scales, 

11 and so forth. Id. 

The warrant was executed by the Wichita Police Department on 

October 4, 1993, at about 9:13p.m., one day after it had been 

issued. In a hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, 

evidence was presented concerning the entry and search. Three 

witnesses were called by the defense, all of whom had been present 

at the time. These witnesses testified that they heard nothing 

until the police simultaneously broke in the back door and broke 

the kitchen window. II R. Doc. 115 at 9-13, 53-54, 74-75. 

Defendant's evidence was that the doorbell could be heard in any 

room in the house and similarly a knock on either the front or 

back door could be heard from anywhere in the house. None of the 

witnesses heard either a knock or any announcement by the 

officers. 

The lead detective on the search team testified on behalf of 

the government at the suppression hearing. His testimony was that 

eight or nine officers participated in the search, they began 

yelling 11 Police, search warrant 11 as they approached the house, and 

on trying the back door, they found it locked. The police heard a 

number of footsteps inside but none seemed to be coming to the 

(Footnote continued) : 

known by the nickname 11 Little Quick 11 or just 11 Quick. 11 No evidence 

regarding the controlled buy was introduced at the trial, however. 

3 

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door, so they used a battering ram to break it in. The detective 

did not know if anyone rang the doorbell and doubted that the 

officer at the back door knocked before using the ram to enter 

forcibly. 

Ten adults and one infant were in the house when the police 

entered. Three pistols and a sawed-off shotgun were found in the 

house. The defendant later admitted that the pistols were his and 

said they were legally registered in his name. One loaded pistol 

was found in plain view on a dresser in the bedroom in which 

defendant, his girlfriend and her infant were when the search 

began. The loaded shotgun was on the floor in this room. In the 

same room the police also found ammunition, several small bags of 

marijuana, packaging material, a digital scale, and a pager. 

Cocaine was found in two other rooms. 

The occupants were subjected to pat-downs initially. Then 

the defendant consented to a search of his person. Three small 

bags of crack and some $600 in cash were found on defendant. A 

very small "rock" of crack and some marijuana were found in a 

search of Mr. Smith's co-defendant, David Vernon. At trial 

defendant and his girlfriend denied that the police had found the 

three bags of cocaine in his pockets. Defendant said that the 

cash had been given to him by his father to help with ordinary 

bills, something his father did regularly. 

After his arrest defendant agreed to be questioned. He 

admitted ownership of the three pistols and said that he acquired 

the guns because he was living in the territory of a gang called 

the VLBs and had been threatened by them several times. Defendant 

4 

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also said that the drugs had been delivered to his house just 

before the raid by members of the VLBs who had demanded that he 

sell drugs for them since he was living in their territory. 

Defendant's similar testimony at trial was the basis for a 

coercion or duress defense asserted by defendant. 

Additional facts will be set out below as necessary for 

discussion of the issues raised. 

II 

Defendant first challenges the district court's denial of his 

motion to suppress evidence based on alleged insufficiencies in 

the affidavit supporting the search warrant and on the alleged 

overbreadth of the warrant. 

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we accept 

the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous. United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 968 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 482 (1993). We view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the ruling below. Id. In determining 

whether a search warrant was supported by probable cause, 

considerable deference is given to the initial determination, 

unless the affidavit provides no substantial basis for probable 

cause. United States v. $149,442.43, 965 F.2d 868, 872 (lOth Cir. 

1992). The ultimate question whether Fourth Amendment rights have 

been violated is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Wicks, 995 

F.2d at 969. 

A 

Defendant challenges the affidavit supporting the search 

warrant on several grounds. First, he argues that the information 

5 

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was stale, the controlled buy having been completed about 72 hours 

before the search warrant was sought. Defendant acknowledges that 

the determination of timeliness depends not merely on the passage 

of time but on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of 

the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized. United 

States v. Snow, 919 F.2d 1458, 1460 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

Defendant says that unlike in Snow, here there was no ongoing 

investigation and no reason to think the drug dealing was 

continuing. Although it is true that in the instant case there 

was no ongoing investigation and no specific evidence that Smith's 

drug-dealing activities had been continuing for an extended 

period, we think that the mere passage of 72 hours did not make 

the information stale. In determining whether probable cause has 

been established to justify the issuance of a search warrant, we 

apply a common-sense standard. Wicks, 995 F.2d at 972. From the 

successful completion of the controlled buy, and the evidence that 

defendant had additional amounts of cocaine in his residence at 

the time of the informant's purchase, it was reasonable to infer 

that evidence of drug dealing could still be found. We hold that 

Smith's staleness argument is without merit. 

B 

Second, defendant argues that the information from the 

informant was uncorroborated. He contrasts the facts in this case 

with those in United States v. $149.442.43, supra, which also 

involved a search warrant issued after a controlled buy had been 

completed. In that case, the supporting affidavit additionally 

stated that the informant had provided accurate information in the 

6 

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past, and the police had also obtained independent corroborating 

evidence, including a second reliable informant. 

In our view the additional information supporting the 

informant's credibility in that case, while certainly bolstering 

the showing of probable cause, was not critical. The standard 

for determining the credibility of an informant is the totality of 

the circumstances, and we have held that when the reliability of 

an informant has been corroborated by extrinsic information, it is 

unnecessary to otherwise establish the informant's credibility. 

United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 457 (lOth Cir. 1992). 

We therefore hold that the successful completion of the controlled 

buy, as specifically described in the supporting affidavit here, 

was sufficient to establish the reliability of the informant. 

c 

Next, defendant argues that the warrant was overly broad, 

noting that the only basis for the allegation that evidence other 

than cocaine was likely to be found was the affiant's experience 

as a police officer. This was insufficient, defendant argues, 

because the affiant did not say how long he had been a police 

officer or whether he had any experience at all in drug cases, in 

contrast to the type of statements that have been found sufficient 

in other cases. 

Under the Fourth Amendment, two requirements are established 

for search warrants: probable cause supported by an oath or 

affirmation, and a particular description of the place, persons 

and things to be searched for and seized. Wicks, 995 F.2d at 972. 

Viewing defendant's contention in this light, we perceive that 

7 

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this argument is actually focused on lack of probable cause to 

support the conclusion that items of the type described would 

likely be found. Defendant actually makes no contention that the 

descriptions were overly general or vague. In light of our 

holdings in cases such as Wicks; United States v. Sullivan, 919 

F.2d 1403, 1424 & n.31 (lOth Cir. 1990); and United States v. 

Harris, 903 F.2d 770, 774-75 (lOth Cir. 1990), we believe that any 

such argument clearly would be unavailing. 

The government responds to this contention with a circular 

argument. Its response is that the officer's experience in drug 

cases can be inferred from his description of the items to be 

seized. The government also notes that all of the items listed 

were actually found in the search. This reasoning approaches an 

argument that the validity of the warrant may be determined from 

the results of its execution a wholly untenable bootstrapping 

position. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987) 

(" [T]he discovery of contraband cannot validate a warrant invalid 

when issued .... "). 

Notwithstanding the government's failure to counter 

defendant's argument convincingly, we are not persuaded that the 

warrant was deficient. Unquestionably it would be sounder 

practice for the police officer to describe the basis for the 

conclusion that items described in a search warrant are reasonably 

likely to be found based on the evidence supporting the 

application for the warrant. In several cases we have relied on 

officers' statements regarding their experience and training in 

drug cases to rebuff challenges to search warrants. See, e.g., 

8 

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Sullivan, 919 F.2d at 1423; United States v. $149.442.43, 965 

F.2d at 872, 874. Nevertheless, we do not doubt that the state 

judge could reasonably infer from the fact that Smith had sold 

cocaine from his residence within the previous 72 hours that items 

such as those listed could reasonably be expected to be found on 

the premises. Hence we hold that defendant has failed to show 

error in the denial of his motion to suppress, based on the 

claimed deficiencies in the warrant and supporting affidavit. 

III 

Defendant contends further that the evidence should have been 

suppressed because the manner of execution of the warrant violated 

the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the "knock and announce" 

requirement is mandated by the Fourth Amendment and was not 

adhered to in this case. On this issue we ordered supplemental 

briefs in light of the recent decision in Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 

S. Ct. 1914 (1995), and they have been considered. 

In Wilson, the Court granted certiorari to consider the 

limited question whether the common law knock and announce 

principle "forms a part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 

inquiry." Id. at 1916. In holding that the knock and announce 

principle is included within the Fourth Amendment reasonableness 

inquiry, the Court said that 

although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be 

constitutionally defective if police officers enter 

without prior announcement, law enforcement interests 

may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced 

entry. 

Id. at 1919. However, the Court specifically declined to reach 

any issues regarding the balancing of valid law enforcement 

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interests with the Fourth Amendment rights enjoyed by the public, 

instead leaving "to the lower courts the task of determining the 

circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment." Id. 

Although the principle is commonly referred to as "knock and 

announce," the Court's holding in Wilson requires only an 

announcement. Similarly the federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, 

imposes only the requirement that the officer give "notice of his 

authority and purpose." Although the statute is not applicable to 

the search here by city police pursuant to a search warrant issued 

by a state court, we have noted that the statute is "grounded" in 

the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Ruminer, 786 F.2d 381, 383 

(lOth Cir. 1986); see United States v. Baker, 638 F.2d 198, 202 

and n.7 (lOth Cir. 1980). We have carefully reviewed Wilson and 

find nothing therein that suggests that our decisions under § 3109 

infringe upon rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. 

Consequently, we think it clear that our cases under § 3109 can 

provide valid guidance on the constitutional claim defendant 

makes. See United States v. Gatewood, 1995 WL 449571 at *4, n.2 

(6th Cir. Aug. 1, 1995) (Jones, J., dissenting). We thus proceed 

to analyze this issue in light of the facts as determined by the 

district court and our previous rulings on the Fourth Amendment's 

requirements. 

Defendant contends that the officers gave no notice of their 

presence before entering and that no time was given for the 

residents to admit the officers voluntarily. 

is not supported by the facts as found by 

10 

Defendant's argument 

the district court, 

Appellate Case: 94-3337 Document: 01019279749 Date Filed: 08/17/1995 Page: 10 
which findings must be accepted unless they are clearly erroneous. 

Defendant does not specifically contend that the findings are 

clearly erroneous, nor could such a contention be convincing since 

the court based the findings on credibility determinations after 

hearing the evidence of both parties. The district judge 

expressly found that the defendant's witnesses were not credible 

and that the police officer's testimony was. That testimony 

established that the officers did announce their presence. 

Specifically Officer Fettke, who was the officer in charge of 

the operation, testified that an unlocked screen door to the back 

porch was first opened; beginning at that time, if not before, 

several of the officers "began hollering 'Wichita Police 

Department, search warrant'" and continued to do so as the inner 

door was found to be locked, the battering ram was swung, and the 

entry was made. II R. at 94. During the interval between 

reaching the door and forcing it open, which Fettke estimated to 

be probably 45 seconds in duration, id. at 110, the officers heard 

"many footsteps" in the house "like stirring or running or trying 

to do other things inside the house." Id. at 96. The district 

court found, based on the testimony, that "the noises Detective 

Fettke heard coming from within the house were consistent with 

activities other than an occupant innocently approaching the 

door." I R. Doc. 60 at 9. 

In his supplemental brief at 3, defendant argues that the 

officers "did not knock, ring the door bell, or take any other 

action which can even remotely be interpreted as requesting 

admittance." We do not agree. To the contrary we think that the 

11 

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average citizen would understand the officers' statements as a 

command to open the door. We think, then, that this case, like 

United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

turns on the issue whether the officers were constructively 

refused admittance and so were justified in entering the home 

forcibly.2 In Knapp, we held that the officers were justified in 

concluding that the defendant was refusing to admit them 

voluntarily when they received no response after an interval of 

ten to twelve seconds. Similarly we conclude that in this case 

the officers were constructively refused admittance and that the 

forcible entry was therefore justified. 

In his supplemental brief, defendant attempts to distinguish 

Knapp by stating that in the instant case the announcement and the 

forced entry occurred simultaneously. Although we do not have the 

benefit of specific trial court findings on this point, the court 

did expressly determine that the officer's testimony was credible. 

That testimony included a statement that an interval of "probably 

45 seconds" elapsed from the time that the officers had tried the 

door and found it locked until the door was struck with the 

battering ram. II R. Doc. 115 at 110. Several officers had been 

loudly announcing their presence from the time that they first 

approached the house until the entry began. 

2 

If we were to decide this issue in Smith's favor, however, 

that would not end the matter. We would then have to determine 

whether exigent circumstances justified the forcible entry. We 

feel that the police announced their presence and purpose, and 

that they were constructively denied admission; therefore, we do 

not reach any other issue. 

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Viewing the record most favorably to the ruling below, we 

find no constitutional violation. See Knapp, 1 F.3d at 1030-31; 

Ruminer, 786 F.2d at 383-84 (collecting cases on the validity of 

entries made after brief time intervals from the announcement of 

the officers' presence and upholding a search conducted where 

officers waited five to ten seconds before entering) . 

IV 

Over defense objections, the government was allowed to 

introduce in evidence three photographs of the defendant which had 

been seized during the search. These photos were admitted during 

cross-examination of defendant by the prosecutor, the court having 

ruled at the beginning of the trial that the pictures could not be 

used during the government's case-in-chief. Exhibit 15A shows the 

defendant alone, sitting with several firearms on his lap.3 

Exhibit 15B shows defendant posed with five of his friends, and 

each person in the photo is holding a gun. Exhibit 15D shows 

defendant and three other persons; defendant and one of the other 

persons shown are making hand signals which defendant admitted 

were "gang signs." In this photo defendant is wearing a shirt 

with the letters "CMG" on it. He testified that this stood for 

"Cash Money Gangsters," a group with which he associated and which 

"call they [sic] self a gang" but which he said was not like other 

gangs that "go out and do stuff," at least to his knowledge. He 

denied being a member of this group. 

3 

Good reproductions of the exhibits appear in Appellant's 

Addendum A to his Brief on Appeal. 

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Defendant contends that the district judge erred in admitting 

the photos in evidence, contending that the photos had no 

probative value whatsoever and that they served to inflame the 

jury, thus prejudicing his defense unfairly. Although not cited 

by defendant in his brief, this argument is clearly based on 

Fed. R. Evid. 402 and 403. The government contends that the 

photos were probative as impeachment, citing the district court's 

rationale that the evidence of gang affiliation bore directly on 

Smith's credibility because he had denied being a gang member, and 

that the photos depicting Smith with the collection of firearms 

were relevant to the credibility of his testimony that he 

possessed the guns only for protection from the VLB gang. 

We review the district court's rulings on admission of 

evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403 for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Harrison, 942 F.2d 751, 759 (lOth Cir. 1991). We find 

that these photos had probative value for impeachment purposes. 

We do not think that the ruling on unfair prejudice was an abuse 

of discretion, especially considering that the jury had already 

heard testimony about the presence of numerous firearms in the 

house at the time of the raid, including loaded weapons in the 

room occupied by defendant where an infant was also present. The 

trial court showed appropriate caution in hearing the arguments on 

these exhibits, in restricting the government to using the 

exhibits only for impeachment, and in instructing the jury about 

the limited relevance of the photos immediately after their 

admission. We find no abuse of discretion in the ruling. 

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v 

Defendant maintains that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the jury's verdict of guilty on the charge of using or 

carrying firearms in connection with a drug trafficking offense. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the proof, we must determine 

whether there is sufficient substantial evidence, direct and 

circumstantial, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn 

therefrom, which when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

verdict would permit a reasonable jury to find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sullivan, 919 

F.2d 1403, 1431 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

The applicable statute provides in relevant part: 

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of 

violence or drug trafficking crime . for which he 

may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses 

or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the 

punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug 

trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five 

years . . . . 

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Defendant acknowledges that we have held 

that a defendant "uses" a firearm for purposes of the statute when 

the firearm is readily accessible, is an integral part of the 

criminal undertaking, and increases the likelihood that the 

criminal undertaking would succeed. United States v. Hall, 20 

F.3d 1084, 1088-89 (lOth Cir. 1994). He concedes that the 

firearms were readily accessible but contends that the government 

failed to prove the remaining elements. 

Citing Hall, defendant says that to establish the necessary 

nexus between the drug trafficking offense and the firearms, the 

government must prove more than simply the presence of a firearm 

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in a house containing drugs, drug paraphernalia and cash. Brief 

of Appellant at 25. Hall did hold, 20 F.3d at 1089, that mere 

proof that a weapon was present in a defendant's residence was 

insufficient to prove he had ready access to the firearm. 

However, we have held that it is permissible for the jury to infer 

from the proximity of the weapon to drugs that the weapon was used 

in furtherance of a drug trafficking enterprise where the proof 

connected the defendant to the vehicle or dwelling involved. 

United States v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 

United States v. Hager, 969 

1493, 

F. 2d 

1495 

883, 

(lOth Cir. 1993); 

889 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 437 (1992); United States v. Parrish, 

925 F.2d 1293, 1298 (lOth Cir. 1991). Thus, we must determine 

whether the evidence in this case would support the inference of 

guilt, consistent with the premise that something more than the 

mere presence of the weapons in the same house in which the drugs 

were found is required. 

We believe that sufficient evidence to support the inference 

that the weapons were used in furtherance of drug activities was 

presented. Unlike Hall, where the gun was in an upstairs closet 

removed from the evidence of drug dealing, here the weapons all 

were in close proximity to the drugs. In several cases we have 

found proximity to be sufficient to support jury inferences that 

the weapons were used in connection with the drug offense. See, 

~, Hager, 969 F.2d 883 (gun found in boot in the room in which 

drugs were found); see also Hall, 20 F.2d at 1088-89 (noting 

numerous cases turning on proximity of guns and drugs). Moreover, 

here the evidence included an admission by the defendant that the 

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guns were used to protect drug trafficking. Trial Exhibit 16 

(tape recorded statement given by defendant after his arrest and 

after waiver of his Miranda rights) . 

To counter this evidence, defendant argues two points. He 

relies on the fact that the officers who executed the search 

warrant testified that no one was holding or using the weapons 

when they entered. We find Smith's reliance on this undisputed 

fact to be unpersuasive. The statute does not require the 

government to prove that the defendant brandished, displayed, or 

fired the weapons. United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d at 888. 

Instead, we have held that "the evidence must prove that the 

defendant intended the weapon to be available for use during the 

drug transaction." United States v. Connor, 972 F.2d 1172, 1174 

(lOth Cir. 1992). We have held that the government satisfies this 

standard if its proves that 

The circumstances surrounding the presence of a 

firearm in a place where drug transactions take place 

suggest that it was strategically located so as to be 

quickly and easily available for use during such 

transaction[s]. 

Id. (quoting United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250, 254 

(2d Cir. 1988)). We hold that the government's evidence was 

sufficient under this standard, consistent with cases such as 

those cited in Hall, 20 F.3d at 1088-89. 

Defendant also points to his testimony that he kept the guns 

only because of the threats made by the VLBs. Defendant argues 

that his statement after his arrest that the guns were used for 

protection of the drugs (which the jury heard because the entire 

tape of the post-arrest interview was played at trial) was not a 

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voluntary statement but the product of the detective's leading 

question, as shown by his correcting statement made immediately 

after that statement. 

This argument simply ignores the fact that defendant's 

credibility was properly left for the jury to decide. Obviously, 

the jury could properly decide that Smith's original statement was 

true and that his attempt to withdraw and explain the statement 

was not. Therefore, Smith's testimony of another motive to 

explain his gun possession is plainly insufficient to require 

reversal. 

It is reasonable, we think, if an operable firearm is 

found in close proximity to a room or rooms in which 

drug distribution, processing, or storage occurs, for 

the factfinder to conclude that the defendant knew the 

gun was there and intended it to be available for use in 

connection with the predicate offense. Indeed, so long 

as one purpose in situating the weapon nearby was to 

protect the narcotics enterprise. that need not have 

been defendant's sole purpose. In sum, even if a 

firearm is not instantly available or exclusively 

dedicated to the narcotics trade, a sufficient nexus may 

exist to support a finding that it was "used" during and 

in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 

Hager, 969 at 889 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 

Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 998 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 

u.s. 936 (1991)). 

Therefore, we find no error in the district court's denial of 

defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal respecting the 

firearms charge. 

VI 

Defendant next argues that his conviction should be reversed 

because the district judge refused to instruct the jury on his 

theory of defense -- that he was in possession of the cocaine only 

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because he feared that his life was in danger due to the threats 

by the VLBs and their demands that he sell drugs. 

We review jury instructions as a whole under the de novo 

standard. It is reversible error for the trial court to refuse to 

instruct the jury adequately on any theory of the defense 

supported by the law and the evidence. United States v. Scafe, 

822 F.2d 928, 932 (lOth Cir. 1987). "Whether a defendant has made 

a threshold showing as to each element of the duress defense is a 

question of law and is reviewed de novo." United States v. 

Williams, 791 F.2d 1383, 1388 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. 

Sears v. United States, 479 U.S. 869 (1986). In conducting this 

review we must give full credence to defendant's testimony, id., 

and we note that the district court in this case correctly did so. 

IV R. 555-59. 

To be entitled to an instruction on coercion the defendant 

must show: an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury; 

a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and no 

reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. United 

States v. Merchant, 992 F.2d 1091, 1096 (lOth Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (lOth Cir. 1990). In the 

instant case, the district court refused to instruct on the 

coercion defense, finding that defendant had failed to offer proof 

of no opportunity to escape. It is fundamental that the 

defendant's evidence must be sufficient as to all elements of any 

affirmative defense for him to be entitled to a jury instruction 

on the theory. Accordingly, in Merchant and Scott we upheld the 

district courts' refusals to instruct on the defense of coercion 

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when the defendants' evidence failed to establish the absence of 

any reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm. 

Defendant argues that the district court's decision 

constituted an impermissible ruling on a genuine issue of fact. 

Defendant introduced evidence of threats by the VLBs which began 

several months before his arrest and continued to the actual day 

of the arrest. According to defendant's testimony, the VLBs 

considered the area in which he was living to be their territory 

and had warned him that he should leave. Later, they had told him 

that if did not leave, he would have to sell drugs for them. He 

said that the gang had threatened him directly and also suggested 

that his young child might be harmed if he did not do as they 

directed. Besides these verbal threats, defendant testified that 

on one occasion a shot was fired from a passing car while he and a 

friend were standing outside his home. His companion fired back 

at the car. Also, about five days prior to his arrest, defendant 

was accosted by some VLBs, and one of them pulled out a knife and 

cut Smith's finger. Smith went to a hospital emergency room to 

have the cut sutured but lied about what caused the injury because 

he did not want to be involved with the police at that time. 

Defendant further testified that on the day of his arrest, 

some of the gang members had come to his house and repeated the 

threats. They also told him to meet them later that day at a 

liquor store and to bring with him his scales. Smith went to the 

liquor store and met some of the VLBs as they had told him to do. 

He also delivered his scales to them as requested. He testified 

that at that meeting he was told that some of the gang members 

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would come to his house that afternoon. Significantly, Smith 

testified that at that time he expected the VLBs would be bringing 

drugs with them which they would expect him to sell for them. 

Defendant was not at his home when the gang members came, but 

another witness said one of these men was carrying a sack and went 

into defendant's bedroom. Defendant further testified that he 

returned home some time later and went directly to bed, and thus 

did not know that the drugs had been delivered until the police 

found drugs during the search. 

Defendant's theory was that he had no opportunity to avoid 

the illegal conduct and escape the threats because the police 

arrived as soon as he learned the drugs had been delivered. He 

contends that he had never agreed to sell drugs for the gang and 

cites his testimony at trial that he would have called the police 

as soon as he discovered that the drugs had actually been 

delivered but that he had no chance to do so under the 

circumstances. Until the drugs had been delivered, he maintains, 

there was no certain harm from which he needed to escape. 

Although we disagree with the conclusion which defendant 

draws from this evidence, we note that each of the facts cited 

above is supported by evidence at the trial. However, we find 

critical the one fact which defendant omits from his review of the 

evidence -- his admission that he was expecting the VLBs to 

deliver drugs to his residence just as he claimed they did. 

Defendant offers no reasonable explanation for his failure to 

contact the authorities in time to prevent his being forced to 

break the law. We hold that, as in Scott, defendant had a 

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"reasonable legal alternative to undertaking the acts" but failed 

"to avail himself of the readily accessible alternative of 

contacting law enforcement officials . " 901 F.2d at 874. 

In essence defendant's argument comes down to this: that he 

was being threatened with great harm if he did not perform an 

illegal act, but he was justified in not seeking to escape from 

this coercion until he had actually been compelled to do the act 

(i.e., to possess the cocaine). Under our precedents, however, it 

is clear that the coercion defense can not be so liberally 

applied. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490, 493 (lOth Cir. 

1935) ("One who has full opportunity to avoid the act without 

danger cannot invoke the doctrine of coercion and is not 

entitled to an instruction submitting that question to the 

jury.") ; cf. United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279 

(lOth Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 924 (1981) (similar 

holding with respect to defense of necessity) .4 Thus, we hold 

that one who, like Smith, has a reasonable opportunity to avoid 

both the danger and the illegal conduct at a time when, by his own 

admission, he considered that the object of the coercion his 

compelled commission of a crime -- was imminent, must take the 

4 

Defendant cites United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 

1541 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988), which stated 

that an instruction should be given where there is "some 

foundation in the evidenc~ [for a defense] , even though the 

evidence may be weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful 

credibility." Nevertheless, we note that our holdings in cases 

like Scott, Merchant, Lewis, and Shannon are representative of a 

widely prevailing judicial view. See Lewis, 628 F.2d at 1279 

(citing United States v. The Diana, 7 Wall. (74 U.S.) 354 (1869); 

see also J. Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying 

the Excuse and Searching For Its Proper Limits, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 

1331, 1331-32 (1989). 

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opportunity to avoid the situation. If he does not, he cannot say 

that he was forced against his will to violate the law.S 

In sum, we agree with the district court that Smith's 

evidence, even when given full credence, was insufficient to 

entitle him to an instruction on his theory of coercion or duress. 

His evidence made no showing or explanation why he did not seek 

the assistance of the police to extricate himself from the alleged 

dilemma. 

VII 

Finally, defendant maintains that the provisions of the 

Sentencing Guidelines which treat crack cocaine much more harshly 

than cocaine in powder form are unconstitutional because of their 

impact on African-Americans. He concedes that this argument was 

rejected in United States v. Thurmond, 7 F.3d 947, 951-53 

(lOth Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1311 (1994), but asks 

that this ruling be reconsidered and rejected. This panel, 

however, cannot overrule the court's existing precedent absent 

en bane reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision by the 

Supreme Court. In re Smith, 10 F.3d 723, 724 (lOth Cir. 1993), 

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 53 (1994). 

5 

At trial, Smith asserted that he had not notified the police 

of the earlier threats by the VLBs nor of the incident in which 

his finger had been cut by one of the gang members because of his 

belief that the police would not respond to such problems. 

Although Smith does not make this argument on appeal, we note the 

similarity between Smith's testimony on this point and that of the 

defendant in Scott, which we found to be "nothing more than an 

amorphous belief . . . that police would not act . [which] was 

neither substantiated by the evidence nor defined as to its scope 

and coverage." 901 F.2d at 874. Thus, this argument would be 

unavailing in any event. 

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Accordingly, the judgment and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

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