Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03183/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03183-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kyle W. Miller
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted February 22, 2016 

Decided February 23, 2016 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 15-3183 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

KYLE W. MILLER, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 4:14-CR-40088-SMY 

Staci M. Yandle, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Kyle Miller pleaded guilty in 2014 to stealing bank funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 656 and was sentenced to time served plus 5 years’ supervised release. One year into 

his term of supervision, the government sought revocation, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), (g), 

alleging that Miller had violated the conditions of his release by using (and thus 

possessing) alcohol and illegal drugs, being late with monthly supervision reports, lying 

to his probation officer, and failing to make restitution payments. After Miller admitted 

the allegations, the district court revoked his supervised release and imposed 4 months’ 

reimprisonment to be followed by another 48 months’ supervised release. Miller waived 

oral pronouncement of the conditions of that release and also acknowledged that he did 

not object to the wording of the conditions as proposed in advance by the probation 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

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No. 15-3183 Page 2 

officer. Miller filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed attorney asserts that the appeal 

is frivolous and seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 

We note that there isn’t a constitutional right to counsel in revocation proceedings 

when, as here, the defendant admits violating the conditions of his supervision and 

neither challenges the appropriateness of revocation nor asserts substantial and complex 

grounds in mitigation. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973); United States v. 

Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 

930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus the Anders safeguards do not govern our review of 

counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 554–55 (1987); 

Eskridge, 445 F.3d at 933. Nevertheless, we invited Miller to comment on counsel’s 

motion, but he has not responded. See CIR. R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a brief that 

explains the nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this 

kind might be expected to involve. The analysis in the brief appears to be thorough, so 

we focus our review on the subjects that counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 

F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996). 

Counsel first notes that Miller does not want to challenge the revocation of his 

supervision, and thus the lawyer properly refrains from discussing whether Miller’s 

admissions to the charged violations were knowing and voluntary. See United States v. 

Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–72 

(7th Cir. 2002). Counsel further advises that he reviewed the district court’s application 

of the sentencing guidelines and did not identify even a potential claim of error. 

Counsel does consider whether Miller could claim that the district court wrongly 

concluded that a term of imprisonment was required by statute because of his 

possession of a controlled substance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(1). (Although Miller was 

released from prison after this appeal was filed, an appellate claim about the term of 

reimprisonment would not be moot because he remains on supervised release. 

See United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001).) Counsel points to a line in 

§ 3583(d), which he reads as creating an exception to automatic reimprisonment for drug 

possession depending on the “availability of appropriate substance abuse treatment 

programs, or an individual’s current or past participation in such programs.” But that 

proposed argument would be frivolous because counsel misreads § 3583(d). What the 

provision actually says is that treatment programs must be considered for a person who 

“fails a drug test,” id., and yet Miller’s supervision was not being revoked for failing a 

drug test. He was accused of possessing a controlled substance, and the district court was 

required to impose a term of imprisonment upon finding that allegation to be true. 

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No. 15-3183 Page 3 

See United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 403–04 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hondras, 296 

F.3d 601, 602 (7th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. DuPriest, 794 F.3d 881, 882 (7th Cir. 

2015) (explaining that revocation and reimprisonment are mandatory under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(g)(2) for person pleading guilty to possessing a firearm after felony conviction). 

Counsel next discusses, but rightly rejects as frivolous, an argument that the new 

term of supervised release is unlawful or plainly unreasonable. The 4-year term of 

supervised release is below the statutory maximum of 5 years less the 4-month term of 

reimprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 656; 3559(a)(2); 3583(b)(1), (h). And the district court 

applied the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), taking into account Miller’s history of 

substance abuse and mental-health problems, his repeated failure to comply with the 

terms of his supervision, and the need to deter him from future misconduct. See id.

§ 3583(c). The added condition that Miller serve the first six months of his term of 

supervised release with location monitoring is not inappropriate, Miller’s counsel rightly 

concludes, in light of the district court’s observation that Miller had been more 

compliant with the terms of his supervision while on location monitoring in the past and 

that location monitoring would help him reintegrate into society upon his release. We 

would not find the new term supervised release to be plainly unreasonable. See Jones, 774 

F.3d at 404; United States v. Neal, 512 F.3d 427, 438 (7th Cir. 2008). 

Counsel’s motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 

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