Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05009/USCOURTS-caDC-02-05009-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Lloyd Shaffer
Appellant
Ann M. Veneman
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued January 23, 2003 Decided April 22, 2003

No. 02-5009

LLOYD SHAFFER,

APPELLANT

v.

ANN M. VENEMAN, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(cv01729)

Mona Lyons argued the cause and filed the briefs for

appellant.

Catherine Y. Hancock, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief

were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General at

the time the brief was filed, Wilma A. Lewis, U.S. Attorney

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #02-5009 Document #745065 Filed: 04/22/2003 Page 1 of 7
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at the time the brief was filed, and Robert M. Loeb, Attorney,

U.S. Department of Justice.

Before: GINSBURG, Chief Judge, and ROGERS and TATEL,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge GINSBURG.

GINSBURG, Chief Judge: Lloyd Shaffer appeals the decision

of the district court dismissing his case for want of jurisdiction. The district court held that Shaffer’s claim, which was

based upon a settlement agreement he made with the United

States Department of Agriculture bringing to an end both his

individual case and his participation in a class-action lawsuit

against the USDA, was a contract claim in excess of $10,000,

and was therefore, under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1491(a)(1), within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of

Federal Claims. We affirm.

I. Background

Lloyd Shaffer is a Mississippi farmer who has received

assistance from the USDA during much of the past thirty

years. In 1997 he filed in the district court a race discrimination claim against the USDA regarding loan applications he

made in 1992 and 1997. Shaffer later joined as a named

plaintiff in a class action lawsuit in the same court, covering

essentially the same issues, Pigford et al. v. Glickman, Civil

Action No. 97–1978 (D.D.C.). The class alleged that the

USDA discriminated against black farmers in violation of the

Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691–

1691f, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 701–706. In 1998 Shaffer and others settled their individual claims with the USDA; as a condition of the resulting

Agreement Shaffer opted out of the Pigford suit. In return

the USDA agreed, among other things, to ‘‘[f]orgive/release/cancel all [his] outstanding indebtedness to the Farm

Service Agency;’’ to provide ‘‘priority financial and technical

assistance for those USDA programs for which the Shaffers

apply;’’ and to pay Shaffer a sum of money.

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When the USDA later denied Shaffer’s Year 2000 loan

application, he moved in district court for an order enforcing

the Agreement. The court denied the motion on the ground

that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter because Shaffer

had opted out of the Pigford class action and the Agreement

did not provide for the court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over his individual case.

Shaffer then filed a new complaint, alleging various breaches of the Agreement by the USDA. The district court ruled

that it did not have jurisdiction over the new case because the

Tucker Act grants to the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction

over claims founded upon ‘‘any express or implied contract

with the United States.’’ 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). The district

court ruled that the Agreement was a ‘‘contract’’ within the

meaning of the Tucker Act, and added,

[I]nvocation of the APA does not save the plaintiff’s

claims because the APA does not apply to requests for

money damages, and is not applicable to declaratory and

injunctive relief when another statute prohibits such

relief from being sought in a particular court, as in the

instant case. Additionally, to the extent that one would

argue that this Court does have jurisdiction, the plaintiff

has failed [to] establish standing to sue under the APA

because he has not identified an independent statutory

basis for relief, and has only based alleged authority on

the Settlement Agreement over which the Court does not

have jurisdiction.

The district court dismissed the case without prejudice.

II. Analysis

Shaffer argues that notwithstanding the Tucker Act, the

district court has subject matter jurisdiction over his case

pursuant both to the ECOA and to the APA. In the alternative he argues that the district court may exercise ancillary

jurisdiction over a dispute arising out of the Agreement.

The lower federal courts have only such jurisdiction as the

Constitution and the Congress grant them. See Kokkonen v.

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Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).

There appears to be no doubt that the Court of Federal

Claims could entertain this case under the Tucker Act, for the

purpose of which a settlement agreement is considered a

contract. See United States v. ITT Cont’l Baking Co., 420

U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (settlement agreement should ‘‘be construed for enforcement purposes basically as a contract’’);

Kasarsky v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 296 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed.

Cir. 2002); Massie v. United States, 166 F.3d 1184, 1189

(Fed. Cir. 1999); Village of Kaktovik v. Watt, 689 F.2d 222,

232 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1982). That the Court of Federal Claims

has jurisdiction does not necessarily mean, however, that its

jurisdiction is exclusive. We thus turn to Shaffer’s arguments in favor of concurrent jurisdiction in the district court.

A. Subject matter jurisdiction

Shaffer first argues that the district court has subject

matter jurisdiction because the Agreement settled claims

arising under the ECOA and the APA. Here Shaffer relies

upon Board of Trustees of Hotel and Restaurant Employees

Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, 97 F.3d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1996), for

the proposition that a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a settlement agreement that resolves a statutory

claim within the jurisdiction of that court. We do not read

Madison Hotel so broadly. In that case we held that the

district court had subject matter jurisdiction over a settlement agreement that resolved claims arising under the

ERISA statute because ‘‘enforcement of the settlement

agreement TTT will almost inevitably require construction and

application of specific ERISA provisions which define the

scope of the employer’s contribution obligations and the

Funds’ legal entitlements on default.’’ Id. at 1485. The

settlement agreement incorporated several provisions of the

ERISA statute such that:

[A]n action to redress a breach of the settlement agreement directly implicates the Funds’ rights to seek enforcement of the Hotel’s obligation to make ‘‘contributions in accordance with the terms and conditions of [a

multiemployer] plan TTT’’ under section 515 of ERISA, 29

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U.S.C. § 1145 (1994), and of the Hotel’s obligation to pay

the additional amounts in interest, liquidated damages,

audit and attorneys’ fees, costs or any other additional

amounts, as provided for under paragraph 3 of the

settlement agreement and under section 502(g)(2) of

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (1994). Because, furthermore, the ERISA statute provides exclusive jurisdiction

to enforce its provisions in federal courts, the district

court here had federal jurisdiction to enforce the ERISA

rights embodied in the settlement agreement.

Id. at 1485–86. Unlike the settlement agreement in Madison

Hotel, which ‘‘referred to and reserved the Funds’ right to

pursue their rights to remedies enumerated and defined in

the ERISA law itself,’’ 97 F.3d at 1485, the Agreement here

does not incorporate any part of either the ECOA or the

APA; it merely settles the ECOA and the APA claims in

return for certain specified consideration. Indeed, Shaffer is

unable to point to a single provision of either the ECOA or

the APA that a court would have to interpret in order to

resolve this case. Shaffer’s claims involve only straightforward contract issues, such as whether the Government failed

to pay him monies due and whether the denial of Shaffer’s

Year 2000 loan violated the Agreement. Therefore, even if

the district court would have subject matter jurisdiction over

the enforcement of a settlement agreement with the United

States the interpretation of which would require it to analyze

the statute upon which the plaintiff’s claim was based, Shaffer’s claims would not come within that jurisdiction.

Shaffer’s argument for subject matter jurisdiction under

the APA fails for another reason. ‘‘[T]his Court and others

have interpreted the Tucker Act as providing the exclusive

remedy for contract claims against the government, at least

vis a vis the APA.’’ Transohio Sav. Bank v. Dir., Office of

Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1992). See

International Engineering Co., Division of A–T–O, Inc. v.

Richardson, 512 F.2d 573, 577–81 (D.C. Cir. 1975); North

Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1484–86 (9th Cir.

1985).

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B. Ancillary Jurisdiction

Shaffer next argues that the district court may exercise

ancillary jurisdiction over his claims. The Supreme Court in

Kokkonen recognized two purposes for which a court may

assert ancillary jurisdiction: (1) ‘‘to permit disposition by a

single court of claims that are, in varying respects and

degrees, factually interdependent,’’ 511 U.S. at 379, and (2)

‘‘to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage

its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its

decrees.’’ Id. at 380. The first head clearly does not apply

here. In explicating the second head the Court stated (at

381):

The situation would be quite different if the parties’

obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement

agreement had been made part of the order of dismissal–

either by separate provision (such as a provision ‘‘retaining jurisdiction’’ over the settlement agreement) or by

incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement in

the order. In that event, a breach of the agreement

would be a violation of the order, and ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement would therefore exist.

In short, a party that wants the court to retain jurisdiction

over its settlement agreement should request that the district

court do so in its order of dismissal. Shaffer did not take this

simple precaution.

Shaffer nonetheless invokes Reed v. United States, 891

F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1990), a pre-Kokkonen case, for the

proposition that a court may enforce a settlement agreement

without incorporating that agreement into an order. In Reed,

however, the United States announced its intent not to honor

the settlement agreement before the court dismissed the

case; the court of appeals held that the district court correctly exercised its jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the

settlement agreement because the case, although settled, was

still pending. Id. at 880. Not so here. The district court

was therefore correct in concluding it could not exercise

ancillary jurisdiction over this case.

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III. Conclusion

The district court had neither subject matter jurisdiction

nor ancillary jurisdiction over Shaffer’s claim, founded, as it

is, solely upon a contract with the United States. The

judgment of the district court dismissing the case is, accordingly,

Affirmed.

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