Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00258/USCOURTS-caed-2_18-cr-00258-21/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Feng Li
Defendant
Zhen Shang Lin
Defendant
Heidi Phong
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff
Li Juan Wang
Defendant

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

ROGER YANG

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

HEIDI PHONG,

LI JUAN WANG,

ZHEN SHANG LIN, and

FENG LI.

 Defendants.

CASE NO. 2:18-CR-00258 MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: January 21, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

This case was set for status on January 21, 2021. The Court continued this case to February 4, 

2021. (Doc. 92). On May 13, 2020, this Court issued General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials 

in the Eastern District of California “until further notice.” Further, pursuant to General Order 611, this 

Court’s declaration of judicial emergency under 18 U.S.C. § 3174, and the Ninth Circuit Judicial 

Council’s Order of April 16, 2020 continuing this Court’s judicial emergency, this Court has allowed

district judges to continue all criminal matters to a date after May 2, 2021.

1

 This and previous General 

Orders, as well as the declarations of judicial emergency, were entered to address public health concerns 

related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders and declarations of emergency address the district-wide health 

1 A judge “may order case-by-case exceptions” at the discretion of that judge “or upon the 

request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order 

will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). 

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concern, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision 

“counteract[s] substantive openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record 

findings” in a particular case. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-therecord findings, there can be no exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such 

failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 

(9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit 

findings on the record “either orally or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 and the subsequent declaration of judicial 

emergency require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice continuances are excludable only if “the 

judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the ends of justice served by taking such 

action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless “the court sets forth, in the record of 

the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of 

such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders and declaration of judicial emergency exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address 

continuances stemming from pandemics, natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has 

discretion to order a continuance in such circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a twoweek ends-of-justice continuance following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 

764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. 

Id. at 767-68; see also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to 

exclude time following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated 

by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofCase 2:18-cr-00258-JAM Document 94 Filed 01/14/21 Page 2 of 5
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justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4). 2 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status hearing. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial 

continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 21, 2021. 

2. The Court continued the status hearing to February 4, 2021. After consultation, the 

parties now request to continue the status conference until April 22, 2021. The parties now move to 

exclude time between January 21, 2021, and April 22, 2021, under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) 

[Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes terabytes of data, chats that need translation, and voluminous records. All of this 

discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and 

copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to examine the evidence, and 

conduct their own investigation. The difficulties with interacting with the clients continue due to 

COVID restrictions.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

declarations of judicial emergency, and presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an 

ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in this case because two of the defendants are currently 

2 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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residing in New York. This, and the recent local spike in infections, has made travel to and from 

that area impossible, and made communications with defendants extremely difficult. 

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 21, 2021 to April 22, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: January 11, 2021 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ ROGER YANG

Dated: January 11, 2021

Dated: January 11, 2021

ROGER YANG

Assistant United States Attorney

/s/ Noa Oren

Noa Oren

Federal Public Defender

Attorney for Defendant Zhen Shang 

Lin

NOLAN BARTON & OLMOS LLP 

/s/ Daniel B. Olmos

Daniel B. Olmos

Attorney for Defendant Feng Li

Dated: January 11, 2021 /s/ J. PATRICK McCARTHY

J. PATRICK McCARTHY

Counsel for Defendant 

HEIDI PHONG

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: January 14, 2021

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