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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Gerald W. Weaver II
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 6, 2001 Decided October 5, 2001

No. 00-3064

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Gerald W. Weaver II,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 92cr00453-01)

Gerald W. Weaver II argued the cause pro se.

Christopher S. Rhee, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein,

United States Attorney, and John R. Fisher and Thomas J.

Tourish, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, were on

brief.

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Before: Henderson, Randolph and Rogers, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: Gerald W.

Weaver filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2255 seeking

to have his guilty plea set aside on the ground that his former

lawyer, R. Kenneth Mundy, had had a conflict of interest.

The district court concluded that, while Mundy's simultaneous

representation of Weaver and of then U.S. Rep. Daniel D.

Rostenkowski, against whom Weaver was a potential witness,

created a conflict, Weaver had not shown the necessary

prejudice to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. See United States v. Weaver, 112 F. Supp. 2d 1

(D.D.C. 2000). We conclude that Weaver established both

the existence of a conflict and prejudice flowing therefrom.

We nonetheless affirm the district court's denial of Weaver's

petition because the prejudice was limited to the period

during which the conflict existed and therefore did not affect

Weaver's guilty plea which was entered more than a year

before the conflict arose.

I.

Weaver was an aide to U.S. Rep. Joseph P. Kolter from

1983-87. In 1992 Weaver was indicted on 22 counts, all but

one arising from his involvement in the House of Representatives Post Office scandal. On March 31, 1993 Weaver pleaded

guilty, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, to one count

each of obstruction of justice, conspiracy to distribute cocaine

and distribution of cocaine. The agreement provided that

Weaver would cooperate in the ongoing Post Office investigation and that

[i]f the United States Attorney determines [Weaver] has

provided substantial assistance in the investigation or

prosecution of other persons, the United States Attorney

may, in his discretion, file motions under title 18, United

States Code, Section 3553(e), and Rule 35(b), Federal

Rules of Criminal Procedure advising the District Court

of the assistance to law enforcement authorities.

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112 F. Supp. 2d at 2.1 Around the same time, Weaver

provided information to the government implicating Kolter,

Rostenkowski and Robert V. Rota, the House Postmaster.

After Rota pleaded guilty on July 19, 1993, Mundy wrote

the government asking if it had made a decision whether to

file a substantial assistance motion on Weaver's behalf and

requesting that, if not, the government consent to postpone

Weaver's surrender date. In a letter dated August 5, 1993

the government responded that Weaver's information did not

assist in obtaining Rota's plea and that he had not otherwise

substantially assisted in a prosecution but that the government would further evaluate the matter down the road.

__________

1 Section 3553(e) provides:

(e) Limited authority to impose a sentence below a statutory

minimum.--Upon motion of the Government, the court shall

have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a

defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such

sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines

and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission

pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.

18 U.S.C. s 3553(e). Rule 35(b) provides:

(b) Reduction of Sentence for Substantial Assistance. If the

Government so moves within one year after the sentence is

imposed, the court may reduce a sentence to reflect a defendant's subsequent substantial assistance in investigating or

prosecuting another person, in accordance with the guidelines

and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission

under 28 U.S.C. s 994. The court may consider a government

motion to reduce a sentence made one year or more after the

sentence is imposed if the defendant's substantial assistance

involves information or evidence not known by the defendant

until one year or more after sentence is imposed. In evaluating whether substantial assistance has been rendered, the court

may consider the defendant's pre-sentence assistance. In applying this subdivision, the court may reduce the sentence to a

level below that established by statute as a minimum sentence.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).

Rostenkowski was indicted on May 31, 1994 and on July 5,

1994 Mundy entered an appearance on his behalf. The

government contacted both Mundy and the district court

urging Mundy's disqualification from the Rostenkowski case

because his dual representation of Rostenkowski and of

Weaver, a potential witness against Rostenkowski, created a

conflict of interest. When Mundy refused to withdraw, the

government filed a formal motion on October 16, 1994 to

disqualify him. While the motion was pending, Weaver obtained new counsel who entered an appearance on November

29, 1994 and requested that the government file a substantial

assistance motion. The government did so and on December

21, 1994 the district court reduced Weaver's sentence to time

served but rejected Weaver's request to eliminate supervised

release. Mundy died on April 14, 1995 and in an order filed

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May 30, 1995 the district court dismissed as moot the government's motion to disqualify him.

On February 24, 1997 Weaver filed a section 2255 petition

to set aside his conviction based, inter alia, on Mundy's

conflict of interest. On August 11, 1997, with the government's consent, the district court stayed the remaining four

months of Weaver's supervised release. The district court

denied Weaver's petition in a memorandum opinion filed June

7, 2000.

II.

Weaver contends his guilty plea should be set aside because it was "tainted" by the conflict of interest created by

Mundy's simultaneous representation of both Weaver and

Rostenkowski.2 We agree with Weaver, as does the government, that a conflict adversely affected Mundy's representa-

__________

2 Weaver also seeks to void his plea on the ground that the initial

district judge, who recused herself, without explanation, on April 23,

1997, was in fact disqualified much earlier in the case. He has

offered no substantiation for his claim and has therefore failed to

"ma[k]e a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"

as required under 28 U.S.C. s 2253(c)(2). Accordingly, we deny his

motion for a certificate of appealability of this issue.

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tion. We nevertheless conclude, as the government maintains, that the conflict does not justify vacating his conviction.

In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), the United

States Supreme Court established that to make out a conflict

of interest claim a petitioner "must demonstrate that an

actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's

performance." 446 U.S. at 349. "A defendant who proves an

actual conflict of interest thus avoids the more stringent

requirement of proving that the lawyer's 'deficient performance prejudiced the defense,' Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), for

such prejudice is presumed, United States v. Farley, 72 F.3d

158, 166 (D.C. Cir. 1995)." United States v. Thomas, 114

F.3d 228, 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1033 (1997).

The defendant need only show "that a conflict of interest

actually affected the adequacy of his representation." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350. Weaver made such a showing below.

It is agreed that Mundy represented clients with conflicting

interests3: Weaver's interest lay in assisting the prosecution

of Rostenkowski, in the hope that the government would file a

substantial assistance motion, while Rostenkowski's interest

lay in thwarting his own prosecution and any part Weaver

might play in it. That the conflict adversely affected Mundy's

representation of Weaver is evident from Mundy's failure to

request a substantial assistance motion after Rostenkowski

was indicted and Mundy undertook to represent him. Under

these circumstances Mundy could not serve two masters and,

as long as he tried to do so, Weaver was deprived of effective

__________

3 The district court noted in its order that "there is some evidence

in the record to suggest that Mundy may have effectively terminated his relationship with Weaver prior to the entry of his appearance

in the Rostenkowski action." 112 F. Supp. 2d at 5 n.12. The

district court then stated: "[I]t is worth noting that there may

indeed be no conflict of interest in Weaver's case since Mundy may

have terminated his relationship with Weaver before he entered his

appearance for Rostenkowski." Id. On appeal, the government

has conceded that there was a conflict.

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counsel.4 This deprivation does not, however, justify setting

aside his plea or conviction.

To have a plea set aside on a section 2255 petition, the

petitioner "must show that the plea proceeding was tainted by

'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete

miscarriage of justice' or 'an omission inconsistent with the

rudimentary demands of fair procedure.' " Farley, 72 F.3d at

162 (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962)).

Weaver has not demonstrated that Mundy's post-sentencing

conflict in any way tainted his guilty plea. Mundy undertook

to represent Weaver only after Weaver had already pleaded

guilty and, to all appearances, he represented Weaver ably at

sentencing.5 It was not until a year after the sentencing (and

some 14 months after the guilty plea) that Mundy undertook

to represent Rostenkowski, giving rise to the conflict of

interest. The conflict is presumed to have prejudiced the

defendant in that Mundy failed while the conflict lasted, from

approximately July 5, 1995 to November 29, 1995, to request

a substantial assistance motion for Weaver.6 The remedy for

such prejudice, however, is not to set aside the plea, as

Weaver asks, but to adjust the sentence as if Mundy had

made a timely request. See United States v. Unger, 700 F.2d

445, 451-54 (8th Cir.) (remanding for resentencing on account

of conflict that adversely affected representation during sentencing but holding "plea should stand" because "there was

no conflict of interest that adversely affected [the defendant's]

__________

4 The government suggests that Weaver possessed no Sixth

Amendment right to effective counsel post-sentencing. Because the

government failed to so argue below, we need not decide the issue

here.

5 Mundy persuaded the district court to reduce Weaver's base

offense level by two points for acceptance of responsibility under

U.S.S.G. s 3E1.1, notwithstanding Weaver's plea to obstruction of

justice and contrary to the presentencing report's recommendation.

6 In finding that Weaver was not "adversely affected" by the

conflict, the district court incorrectly applied the Strickland requirement that prejudice be established rather than the Cuyler

presumption of prejudice.

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representation when she pleaded guilty"), cert. denied, 464

U.S. 934 (1983); see also Lopez v. Scully, 58 F.3d 38, 43 (2d

Cir. 1995) (sending case back to state court "solely for

resentencing" because of actual conflict of interest during

sentencing); United States v. Swartz, 975 F.2d 1042, 1050

(4th Cir. 1992) (sentence vacated and case "remanded for

resentencing" on account of conflict during sentencing). But

Weaver insisted at oral argument that he does not wish the

court to remand for resentencing but seeks only to have the

conviction set aside. Accordingly, because the conflict did not

prejudice Weaver's plea, there is no basis for setting aside the

judgment of conviction and the denial of the section 2255

petition is

Affirmed.

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