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Parties Involved:
Dairyland Insurance Company
Appellee
Vonda Kaye Griffin
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States C.ourc of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Cirruit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT AUG 15 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

VONDA KAYE GRIFFIN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

DAIRYLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a Wisconsin corporation, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

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No. 90-6048 

(D.C. No. CIV-89-1106-R) 

(W.D. Oklahoma) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY, MOORE, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined -unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 1 
Vonda Kaye Griffin sued Dairyland Insurance Company for 

tortious breach of the insurer's implied duty of good faith and 

fair dealing. The district court granted Dairyland's motion for 

summary judgment and denied Ms. Griffin's cross-motion. It also 

denied Ms. Griffin's motions for reconsideration and for a new 

trial. Ms. Griffin appeals these rulings. We affirm. 

After an automobile insurance policy which Dairyland issued 

to Ms. Griffin on December 3, 1987, expired in January 1988, 

Dairyland sent Ms. Griffin renewal offers for one, two, or three 

months of coverage. Each renewal offer stated, "NO GRACE PERIOD! 

IF PREMIUM IS NOT RECEIVED BY THE DUE DATE YOUR COVERAGE(S) WILL 

TERMINATE." Ms. Griffin chose to renew her policy on a monthly 

basis through January 1989, though with several lapses. One such 

lapse occurred after the coverage period ending October 23, 1988, 

because Ms. Griffin did not timely pay her premium. 

On November 5, 1988, Ms. Griffin was involved in an 

automobile accident. Within one day of the accident, she 

purchased a money order and remitted it to Dairyland in an 

envelope postmarked November 7, 1988, to pay for one month's 

insurance coverage. - Although Dairyland reinstated her coverage 

1 for one month beginning November 8, 1988, it denied Ms. Griffin's 

claim for damage to her car resulting from the accident on 

November 5. Dairyland asserted that Ms. Griffin was not insured 

on the day of the accident because her coverage had lapsed on 

October 23, 1988, and was not renewed until November 8, 1988. 

1Dairyland's 

postmark on 

payment. 

policy is to reinstate coverage one day after the 

the envelope in which the insured remits her premium 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 2 
Ms. Griffin then filed this suit, alleging that Dairyland's 

denial of coverage was a tortious breach of its duty to act in 

good faith and to deal fairly with the insured because her 

insurance contract was in force on the date of the accident. 

According to Ms. Griffin, the contract was effective either 

because Dairyland's agent had informed her when she initially 

purchased the policy on December 3, 1987, that the term of the 

policy would be six months with monthly payments or because her 

insurance verification card indicated that the term of her policy 

extended for four months from September 23, 1988. Ms. Griffin 

also alleged that Dairyland's denial of coverage, despite its 

representation on the insurance verification card that the policy 

was in effect, constituted bad faith per se and entitled her to 

summary judgment because this misrepresentation not only violated 

Oklahoma's Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act, Okla. Stat. Ann. 

tit. 36, §§ 1221-28 (West 1987), and Compulsory Insurance Law, 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, §§ 7-600 to 7-607 (West 1987), but also 

constituted perjury and constructive fraud. 

In granting Dairyland's motion for summary judgment, the 

district court rejected all of Ms. Griffin's contentions. It 

reasoned that Ms. Griffin could not succeed on her tort claim 

because she did not have a valid insurance contract with Dairyland 

at the time of the accident. The court found that even if 

Dairyland's agent had informed Ms. Griffin when she initially 

purchased the policy that it would be effective for six months, 

until May 3, 1988, the insurance contract required payment in 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 3 
advance as 

2 

a condition precedent to each renewal. In addition, 

the renewal offers which Dairyland sent Ms. Griffin after the 

expiration of each month's coverage expressly state that coverage 

would terminate if Ms. Griffin did not timely pay her premium. 

The court also found that Ms. Griffin could not rely on the 

four-month term noted on the insurance verification card to prove 

coverage because the card states on its face that it "IS NOT VALID 

UNLESS PREMIUMS ARE PAID." Oklahoma law, moreover, provides that 

an insurance verification card "shall not constitute nor be 

construed as any part of an insurance policy, renewal or binder." 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, § 7-601.l(C) (West 1987). The court 

concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Ms. Griffin's 

claims of criminal misconduct and that her allegations of 

Dairyland's statutory violations were conclusory. 

Ms. Griffin subsequently moved for reconsideration and for a 

new trial, asserting that a newly discovered receipt indicated 

that she had overpaid her premium for the period September 23, 

1988, to October 23, 1988, by an amount sufficient to extend her 

coverage on a pro rata basis through the date of the accident. 

The district court denied these motions because Ms. Griffin's 

counsel possessed the alleged newly discovered evidence eleven 

days before the court issued its order granting Dairyland's motion 

for summary judgment. 

2The insurance contract states in pertinent part: "When we 

consent to renew this policy, you must pay the renewal premium in 

advance. We will mail you a notice telling you when your premium 

must be paid. Your policy will expire if we don't receive the 

required payment by the renewal date." (emphasis in original). 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 4 
We conduct a de novo review of the district court's ruling on 

a motion for summary judgment. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 

Ins. Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir. 1988). If our review 

indicates that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that 

the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we 

will affirm the district court's granting summary judgment. 

Willner v. Budig, 848 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (10th Cir. 1988), cert. 

denied, U.S. , 109 S. Ct. 840 (1989). In this case, our 

review indicates that summary judgment is appropriate. 

Oklahoma law imposes on an insurer a duty to act in good 

faith and to deal fairly with its insured. Christian v. American 

Horne Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 904 (Okla. 1977). The insurer's 

duty arises from its contractual relationship with the insured. 

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Amick, 680 P.2d 362, 364 (Okla. 1984). The 

insurer, therefore, cannot be held liable in tort if the evidence 

establishes that no insurance contract exists. Id.; Scivally v. 

Time Ins. Co., 724 F.2d 101, 104 (10th Cir. 1983) (applying 

Oklahoma law). 

We agree with the district court that Ms. Griffin has failed 

to prove she had an effective insurance contract with Dairyland at 

the time of the accident. The express terms of the insurance 

policy and renewal offers undermine her allegations of 

misrepresentation by Dairyland's agent while the admonition on the 

insurance verification card renders conclusory her claim that the 

expiration date on the card misled her. Since we find no genuine 

issue concerning the existence of a contract of insurance at the 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 5 
time of the accident, we hold that Dairyland was entitled to 

summary judgment as a matter of law. 

Ms. Griffin also challenges the district court's denial of 

her motions for a new trial and for reconsideration based on newly 

discovered evidence. To succeed on this basis, the movant must 

demonstrate that the evidence was discovered after trial, that it 

could not have been discovered sooner through due diligence, and 

that it is likely to produce a new outcome. Branca v. Security 

Benefit Life Ins. Co., 789 F.2d 1511, 1512 (11th Cir. 1986). The 

district court found, and Ms. Griffin admits, that her attorney 

possessed the alleged newly discovered evidence eleven days before 

the district court issued its ruling on Dairyland's motion for 

summary judgment. Under these circumstances, we surely cannot 

find the abuse of discretion for which we review the district 

court's rulings. Patty Precision Prods., Co. v. Brown & Sharpe 

Mfg., Co., 846 F.2d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988); Republic 

Resources Corp. v. ISI Petroleum West Caddo Drilling Program 1981, 

836 F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1987). 

Ms. Griffin has moved, for the first time on appeal, for the 

certification of two questions to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: 

first, whether an insurer's issuance of an insurance 

identification card which violates certain state statutes 

constitutes a per se breach of the insurer's duty to act in good 

faith and deal fairly with the insured; second, whether the 

statement "VERIFICATION CARD IS NOT VALID UNLESS PREMIUMS ARE 

PAID" on the face of an insurance verification card has any effect 

on the rights of the parties. 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 6 
The decision to certify a question of state law to the state 

supreme court falls within the discretion of the federal court. 

Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974). State 

certification procedures guide the exercise of that discretion. 

Fischer v. Bar Harbor Banking and Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 7 n.2 

(1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied , U.S. __ , 109 S. Ct. 1135 

(1989). Oklahoma law provides that the Oklahoma Supreme Court may 

answer a question involving Oklahoma law certified to it by a 

federal court of appeals if the question may be dispositive of the 

action pending before the certifying court and if there is no 

apparent, controlling Oklahoma authority. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 

20, § 1602 (West 1987). Two additional principles guide the 

decision to certify: first, "one who chooses the federal courts 

in diversity actions is in a peculiarly poor position to seek 

certification." Cantwell v. University of Mass., 551 F.2d 879, 

880 (1st Cir. 1977) quoted in Tidler v. Eli Lilly and Co., 851 

F.2d 418, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Second, a litigant who moves for 

certification for the first time on appeal and after losing on the 

issue in the district court must demonstrate particularly 

compelling reasons in favor of certification. In re Complaint of 

McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Armijo v. Ex 

Cam, Inc., 843 F.2d 406, 407 (10th Cir. 1988); Fischer, 857 F.2d 

at 8. 

These guiding 

motion. She is in 

certification both 

principles require us to deny Ms. Griffin's 

a particularly poor position to request 

because she chose to litigate her diversity 

action in a federal forum and because she moves for certification 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 7 
for the first time on appeal after the district court ruled 

against her on this issue. We do not believe, moreover, that the 

questions to be certified would have any effect on the outcome of 

this case. Indeed, the questions themselves lead us to such a 

conclusion. 

Ms. Griffin has failed to allege any facts from which a court 

could conclude that Dairyland acted in bad faith per se by issuing 

the verification card with a four-month effective period despite 

the fact that the policy would terminate when Ms. Griffin failed 

to pay her premiums on time. The verification card complied with 

Oklahoma law. In fact, Oklahoma requires such cards to state the 

inclusive dates of liability coverage. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 47, 

§ 7-601.l(B)(6) (West 1987). The verification card which 

Dairyland issued, moreover, represents in clear language that it 

is not valid unless the insured has paid her premiums. It does 

not constitute bad faith on the part of the insurance company when 

an insured who has not timely paid her premiums shows the card to 

a law enforcement officer or to the victim of her negligence even 

if the insured believes that the card is valid despite her failure 

to pay her premiums. 

Ms. Griffin's second question for certification asks the 

effect on her cause of action of the statement on the insurance 

verification card that it "IS NOT VALID UNLESS PREMIUMS ARE PAID." 

This question of contract interpretation is one of fact which the 

district court has answered. It found that because Ms. Griffin 

did not pay her premium she could not rely on the insurance 

verification card to claim coverage under her insurance policy 

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Appellate Case: 90-6048 Document: 010110040887 Date Filed: 08/15/1990 Page: 8 
with Dairyland. We agree and conclude that the Oklahoma Supreme 

Court would not rule differently. Since the resolution of the 

first question would not affect the outcome of this suit and since 

the second question is one of fact, not law, we deny Ms. Griffin's 

motion for certification. 

We find no error in the district court's rulings and AFFIRM 

the district court's granting of Dairyland's motion for summary 

judgment. 

Entered for the Court 

John P. Moore 

Circuit Judge 

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