Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02097/USCOURTS-caed-2_07-cv-02097-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melanie Bedwell
Defendant
Miles Bristow
Defendant
California Department of Consumer Affairs
Defendant
Steve Dakota
Defendant
Kevin Flanagan
Defendant
Russ Heimerich
Defendant
Glenn Mason
Defendant
Deborah Wells
Defendant
Lana Wilson-Combs
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

LANA WILSON-COMBS,

 NO. CIV. 07-2097 WBS DAD

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND STRIKE

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CONSUMER AFFAIRS; RUSS

HEIMERICH; STEVE DAKOTA; MILES

BRISTOW; GLENN MASON; KEVIN

FLANAGAN; DEBORAH WELLS; MELANIE

BEDWELL; and DOES 1 through 10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Plaintiff Lana Wilson-Combs filed this sexual

harassment and discrimination action against the California

Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) and current or former DCA

employees Melanie Bedwell, Miles Bristow, Steve Dakota, Kevin

Flanagan, Russ Heimerich, Glenn Mason, and Deborah Wells

(“defendants”). Defendants now move to dismiss plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted and to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive damages. 

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I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff began working for the DCA as an Assistant

Information Officer in October of 2000. (Compl. ¶ 21.) While

working at the DCA, plaintiff alleges that Heimerich, who is one

of plaintiff’s supervisors, Bristow, Flanagan, Mason, and other

co-workers sexually harassed her and continue to do so. (See id.

at ¶¶ 22-23 (detailing the alleged sexual harassment).) 

Plaintiff also alleges that Heimerich and other co-workers

harassed and discriminated against plaintiff, and continue to do

so, based on her race and gender. (See id. at ¶¶ 24-25

(detailing the alleged discrimination).) 

Plaintiff objected to the alleged harassment and

discrimination by informing Heimerich, Dakota, and other coworkers of her complaints, contacting law enforcement, filing a

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) on November 16, 2006, filing a formal complaint

with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the DCA on

November 11, 2007, filing a formal grievance with the DCA, and

submitting a “Government Claims Form” to the California Victim

Compensation and Government Claims Board. (Id. at ¶¶ 17-20.) 

Despite her objections, plaintiff alleges that Heimerich and

other DCA employees refused to remedy her concerns and decreased

her job responsibilities in retaliation. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.)

Plaintiff also alleges that Dakota vandalized her vehicle and

obstructed her movement within the office in retaliation for her

complaints. (Id. at ¶¶ 54-55, 57-58.)

On October 5, 2007, plaintiff initiated this lawsuit,

alleging claims for (1) state law discrimination, Cal. Gov’t Code

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3

§§ 11135, 12940 (Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA)), 19702

(Civil Service Act), against all defendants; (2) Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 against all defendants; (3) 42 U.S.C. §

1983 against the individual defendants only; (4) negligence

against the DCA only; and (5) property damage and assault and

battery against Dakota only. 

Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint with

prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because

(1) sovereign immunity bars all claims except plaintiff’s Title

VII claim against the DCA; (2) plaintiff failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies under FEHA and Title VII; (3) plaintiff

cannot assert FEHA and Title VII claims against the individual

defendants; and (4) plaintiff’s § 1983 claim inadequately rests

solely on her Title VII rights. Pursuant to Rule 12(f),

defendants also move to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive

damages. 

II. Discussion

On a motion to dismiss, the court must accept the

allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Davis v.

Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322

(1972). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff needs to

plead “only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct.

1955, 1974 (2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the

plaintiff fails to state a claim supportable by a cognizable

legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,

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1 The Supreme Court has read the word “another” out of

the phrase “of another State” in the Eleventh Amendment. See

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (“This language

expressly encompasses only suits brought against a State by

citizens of another State, but this Court long ago held that the

Amendment bars suits against a State by citizens of that same

State as well.”) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).

4

699 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

(1957), abrogated on other grounds by Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1968

(complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”). 

“However, the court is not required to accept legal conclusions

cast in the form of factual allegations if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v.

Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994).

A. State Law Discrimination Claims

1. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment precludes suits “in law or

equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States

by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any

Foreign State.”1 Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541

U.S. 440, 446 (2004). Eleventh Amendment immunity is not

absolute and will not bar a suit if the state has waived or

Congress has abrogated the state’s immunity. Seminole Tribe of

Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996). As a state agency,

the DCA is entitled to assert Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

Cornwell v. Cal. Bd. of Barbering & Cosmetology, 962 F. Supp.

1260, 1266 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Fla. Dep’t of Health &

Rehabilitative Servs. v. Fla. Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147

(1981)) (additional citations omitted). 

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The Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff’s FEHA and

California Government Code section 11135 claims against the DCA.

See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th

Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment bars [plaintiff’s] FEHA

claim in federal court.”); Greater L.A. Council on Deafness, Inc.

v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that

Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to section 11135 claims).

Plaintiff’s complaint also alleges violations of

California Government Code subsections 19702(a)-(b), which do not

establish new rights, but are simply “declaratory of existing

[discrimination] law.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 19702(a). Plaintiff

has not cited, nor is this court aware of, any authority

suggesting that California’s Eleventh Amendment immunity under

subsections 19702(a)-(b) is distinct from its immunity under FEHA

and the Civil Service Act. The DCA’s immunity under FEHA would

also be meaningless if plaintiff could pursue identical claims

under subsections 19702(a)-(b) because those subsections

reiterate only plaintiff’s rights under FEHA. The DCA,

therefore, is immune from any claims plaintiff has based on 

subsections 19702(a)-(b). 

Eleventh Amendment immunity also “bars suits for money

damages in federal court against . . . state officials acting in

their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted);

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101

(1984). The court will presume that plaintiff sued the

individual defendants in their individual capacities because,

under plaintiff’s state law discrimination claims, defendants can

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2 Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when the

complaint cannot be saved by an amendment. Eminence Capital,

L.L.C. v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). 

Unless the court indicates otherwise, any dismissal in this order

is without prejudice. 

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be liable for damages only in that capacity. Shoshone-Bannock

Tribes v. Fish & Game Comm’n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir.

1994). 

Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ motion to

dismiss, with prejudice,2 plaintiff’s state law discrimination

claims against the DCA. As to the individual defendants, the

court must deny defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law

discrimination claims based on sovereign immunity. 

2. FEHA Claims Against the Individual Defendants

a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

Before a plaintiff can pursue a FEHA claim, the

plaintiff must exhaust all administrative remedies and receive a

right to sue notice from the DFEH. Romano v. Rockwell Int’l,

Inc., 14 Cal. 4th 479, 492 (1996); see also Rojo v. Kliger, 52

Cal. 3d 65, 82-83 (1990) (“The rule is that where a right is

given and a remedy provided by statute, the remedy so provided

must ordinarily be pursued. The FEHA, moreover, by its terms

implies exhaustion is required, and we have so assumed.”)

(internal citations omitted). Exhaustion of administrative

remedies is a “‘jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the

courts,’” not a matter of judicial discretion. See, e.g.,

Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, 24 Cal. 4th 61, 70 (2000) (quoting

Abelleira v. Dist. Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 293 (1941)). 

Defendant concedes that plaintiff has sufficiently

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3 On June 13, 2007, the California Supreme Court granted

review of a case to decide the limited issue of “[w]hether an

individual may be held personally liable for retaliation under

[FEHA].” Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P’Ship, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d

1 (2007). Because the California Supreme Court has not yet

rendered a decision, this court will follow the precedent

allowing a plaintiff to bring a retaliation claim against an

individual. Vogel v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., No. 07-2275, 2008

WL 149234, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2008). 

Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff sufficiently

alleges FEHA retaliation claims. See Iwekaogwu v. City of Los

7

exhausted her administrative remedies and received a right to sue

notice from the DFEH. (Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’

Motion to Dismiss 3:2-3; Carlock Decl. Ex. A.) Accordingly, the

court must deny defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA

claims for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. 

b. Liability of Individuals Under FEHA

An individual cannot be held liable under FEHA for

discrimination claims because FEHA prohibits only an “employer”

from engaging in improper discrimination and such claims “arise

out of the performance of necessary personnel management duties.” 

Reno v. Baird, 18 Cal. 4th 640, 644 (1998). Plaintiff cannot,

therefore, assert FEHA discrimination claims against the

individual defendants. 

FEHA does, however, allow plaintiff to pursue

retaliation claims against the individual defendants. California

courts and the Ninth Circuit have held that, because the

retaliation provision of FEHA applies to “any person,” a

plaintiff can assert a retaliation claim against an individual. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(h); Walrath v. Sprinkel, 99 Cal. App. 4th

1237, 1242 (2002); Winarto v. Toshiba Am. Elecs. Components,

Inc., 274 F.3d 1276, 1288 (9th Cir. 2001).3

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Angeles, 75 Cal. App. 4th 803, 814 (1999) (quoting Flait v. N.

Am. Watch Corp., 3 Cal. App. 4th 467, 475 (1992)) (stating the

elements of a FEHA retaliation claim). While plaintiff

sufficiently alleges FEHA retaliation claims, she does so against

only Heimerich and Dakota. (Compl. ¶¶ 26(c)-(e), 30, 33.) 

8

FEHA also allows plaintiff to pursue harassment claims

against the individual defendants because it prohibits “‘an

employer . . . or any other person’ from harassing an employee.” 

Reno, 18 Cal. 4th at 644 (quoting Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(1))

(emphasis in original); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3)

(“An employee . . . is personally liable for any harassment

prohibited by this section that is perpetrated by the employee .

. . .”). Plaintiff sufficiently alleges harassment claims

against the individual defendants in paragraphs twenty-two

through twenty-five of her complaint, which plaintiff

incorporates by reference into her FEHA claims. (Compl. ¶ 45);

see Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 283

(2006) (discussing the elements of a harassment claim). 

Accordingly, this court must grant defendants’ motion

to dismiss, with prejudice, only plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination

claims against the individual defendants.

B. Title VII Claims

Similar to FEHA, a plaintiff must also exhaust all

administrative remedies prior to filing a Title VII claim. See

Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.

2003). With Title VII, “[t]he exhaustion requirement consists of

two elements: [1] ‘“the jurisdictional” non-waivable requirement

of presentment of the claim . . . (presentment); and (2) the

“waivable” requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies

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(exhaustion).’” Macy v. Dalton, 853 F. Supp. 350, 356-57 (E.D.

Cal. 1994) (citations omitted). 

“[T]he jurisdictional presentment requirement is met

when the employee/plaintiff presents her claims to the

employer/agency or an appropriate administrative review body such

as the [Merit Systems Protection Board] or EEOC.” Id. at 357

(citations omitted). Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination

with the EEOC on November 26, 2006, thereby satisfying the

jurisdictional presentment requirement. (Compl. 4:23-24.)

The exhaustion requirement is satisfied when the

plaintiff receives a right to sue notice from the EEOC. 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Wrighten v. Metro. Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d

1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff has not satisfied the

exhaustion requirement because the EEOC has not issued a right to

sue notice to plaintiff. (Compl. 4:26-28.) 

Unlike the presentment requirement, a plaintiff’s

failure to satisfy the exhaustion requirement is not necessarily

fatal to the plaintiff’s ability to assert a Title VII claim. 

Once a plaintiff has satisfied the jurisdictional presentment

requirement, the plaintiff may assert equitable excuses or

defenses to overcome the plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the

waivable exhaustion requirement. Macy, 853 F. Supp. at 357;

Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d 384, 387-88 (9th Cir.

1990) (holding that “equitable considerations may excuse a

claimant’s . . . failure to exhaust administrative remedies[]

when the EEOC improperly refuses to” do what a statute requires

of it). Plaintiff argues the court should equitably excuse her

failure to obtain a right to sue notice because § 2000e-5(f)(1)

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entitles her to a notice and the EEOC is wrongfully withholding

it.

Section 2000e-5(f)(1) “provides that if the EEOC has

neither filed a Title VII action nor entered into a conciliation

agreement to which the complainant is a party within 180 days

from the date the charge is filed, the complainant must be

notified that he or she may now bring a civil action.” Brown v.

Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726,

729 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Pursuant to § 2000e5(f)(1), plaintiff is entitled to a right to sue notice because

more than 180 days have passed since plaintiff filed her charge

with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)

Entitlement to a notice does not, however, allow a

plaintiff to initiate a lawsuit. Once a plaintiff is entitled to

a right to sue notice, the burden is on the plaintiff to request

the notice from the EEOC. Federal regulation section 1601.28

provides that, “[w]hen a person claiming to be aggrieved

requests, in writing, that a notice of right to sue be issued . .

. the Commission shall promptly issue such notice.” 29 C.F.R. §

1601.28 (2006). 

While this language does not explicitly require the

plaintiff to request a notice, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted

the 1977-equivalent to section 1601.28 to mean that “if, after

180 days, the EEOC has not acted on a charge, the EEOC

nevertheless will not issue a ‘Right to Sue Letter’ unless the

aggrieved party asks for one.” Kirk v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 578

F.2d 814, 819 n.17 (9th Cir. 1978); compare 29 C.F.R. §

1601.25(b) (1977) (“an aggrieved person may demand in writing

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that a [right to sue] notice issue . . . and the Commission shall

promptly issue a notice”) with 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (2006)

(“[w]hen a person claiming to be aggrieved requests, in writing,

that a notice of right to sue be issued . . . the Commission

shall promptly issue such notice”). 

In a letter dated September 7, 2007, plaintiff 

requested a right to sue notice from the EEOC (Carlock Decl. Ex.

B), and at oral argument, defendants consented to the court’s

consideration of that letter in deciding this motion. 

Plaintiff’s letter emphasizes that her “request for a notice of

right to sue letter is not a request that the EEOC discontinue

its investigation of the charge . . . .” (Id. (emphasis in

original).) In response to her letter, the EEOC informed

plaintiff that it would terminate its investigation if it issued

a right to sue notice to plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 5, 7.) 

If Title VII does not allow the EEOC to force plaintiff

to elect between a continued EEOC investigation or initiating a

lawsuit in federal court, this court could equitably excuse

plaintiff’s failure to obtain such a notice. See Carter v. Smith

Food King, 765 F.2d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[A plaintiff’s]

right to pursue civil action ‘is not to be prejudiced’ by the

EEOC’s failure to properly process a grievance after it has been

filed.”) (citations omitted).

Section 2000e-5(b) states that “[w]henever a charge is

filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved . . .

the Commission . . . shall make an investigation thereof.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (emphasis added). However, 29 C.F.R. §

1601.28(a)(3) provides that “[i]ssuance of a notice of right to

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sue shall terminate further proceeding of any charge that is not

a Commissioner charge unless [an applicable director] determines

at that time or at a later time that it would effectuate the

purpose of [T]itle VII or the ADA to further process the charge.” 

29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3); see also EEOC v. Duval Corp., 528 F.2d

945, 949 n.4 (10th Cir. 1976) (“‘[D]uplication of proceedings

should be avoided. The bill, therefore, contains a provision for

termination of Commission jurisdiction once a private action has

been filed . . . .’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 92-238, at 12

(1971))). 

Plaintiff does not argue that this court should not

defer to section 1601.28 or that the section is an unreasonable

interpretation. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); EEOC v. Commercial

Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 116 (1988) (“[T]he EEOC’s

interpretation of ambiguous language need only be reasonable to

be entitled to deference.”). Plaintiff’s desire to concurrently

pursue both remedies does not arise to an equitable excuse for

her failure to obtain a right to sue notice. 

Therefore, while plaintiff is entitled to a right to

sue notice upon requesting one, section 1601.28(a)(3) requires

plaintiff to elect between giving the EEOC the time it needs to

complete its investigation or ending the investigation and

pursuing her claim in federal court. If plaintiff pursues the

later option, a right to sue notice issued subsequent to this

order will not prevent plaintiff from amending her complaint to

re-assert her Title VII claims. See Edwards v. Occidental Chem.

Corp., 892 F.2d 1442, 1445 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990) (“A Title VII

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complainant may file an action prior to receiving her right to

sue letter, provided there is not evidence showing that the

premature filing precluded the state from performing its

administrative duties or that the defendant was prejudiced by

such filing.”) (citation omitted). 

Accordingly, as to her Title VII claim against the DCA,

the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss because of

plaintiff’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. As

to her Title VII claims against the individuals defendants, the

court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss, with prejudice,

because individuals cannot be liable under Title VII. Miller v.

Maxwell’s Int’l Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587-88 (9th Cir. 1993); (see

Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss 6:12-13 (conceding

this issue).)

 C. Section 1983 Claims

“Section 1983 does not create substantive rights; it

merely serves as the procedural device for enforcing substantive

provisions of the Constitution and federal statutes.” Crumpton

v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Chapman v.

Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)). To

prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “1) that the

defendant acted under color of state law, and 2) that the

defendant deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” Learned v. City of

Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 933 (9th Cir. 1988). 

While a plaintiff can seek relief under § 1983 and

Title VII, the plaintiff cannot rely exclusively on “rights

created by Title VII” to satisfy the second element of a § 1983

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claim. Id. (“Violation of rights created by Title VII cannot

form the basis of section 1983 claims.”) (citing Great Am. Fed.

Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979)); see also

Day v. Wayne County Bd. of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204 (6th

Cir. 1984) (“Title VII provides the exclusive remedy when the

only § 1983 cause of action is based on a violation of Title

VII.”).

In alleging her § 1983 claim, plaintiff quotes Title

VII and alleges that defendants violated plaintiff’s rights under

Title VII. (Compl. ¶¶ 37-41.) Plaintiff does not allege a

violation of rights that is independent of Title VII. 

Accordingly, this court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss

plaintiff’s § 1983 claim. 

D. Negligence Claim

Plaintiff’s claim for negligence is asserted against

only the DCA. As plaintiff concedes, (Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot.

to Dismiss 10:26-28), the Eleventh Amendment bars this claim. 

Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 446 (2004).

Accordingly, the court must grant defendants’ motion to dismiss,

with prejudice, plaintiff’s negligence claim against the DCA. 

E. Property Damage and Assault and Battery Claims

Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth causes of action allege

common law property damage and assault and battery claims against

only Dakota. The court will presume plaintiff sued Dakota in his

individual capacity. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes v. Fish & Game

Comm’n, Idaho, 42 F.3d 1278, 1285 (9th Cir. 1994). In his

individual capacity, Dakota can be liable for property damage and

assault and battery. See Cal. Gov’t Code § 820(a) (“Except as

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4 A plaintiff may also seek punitive damages under FEHA,

Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 211, 221

(1982); however, plaintiff did not allege that the individual

defendants’ conduct supporting her FEHA claims was oppressive,

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otherwise provided by statute (including Section 820.2), a public

employee is liable for injury caused by his act or omission to

the same extent as a private person.”). 

Accordingly, the court must deny defendants’ motion to

dismiss plaintiff’s property damage and assault and battery

claims against Dakota. 

F. Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

“Upon a motion made by a party . . . the court may

order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any

redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(f). A “motion to strike is appropriate to address

requested relief . . . which is not recoverable as a matter of

law.” Wilkerson v. Butler, 229 F.R.D. 166, 172 (E.D. Cal. 2005).

When ruling on a motion to strike, the court must view the

challenged pleadings in the light most favorable to the pleader. 

See Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro v. Lerner, 31 F.3d 924, 928 (9th

Cir. 1994). Motions to strike are disfavored and “should not be

granted unless it can be shown that no evidence in support of the

allegation would be admissible, or those issues could have no

possible bearing on the issues in the litigation.” Gay-Straight

Alliance Network v. Visalia Unified Sch. Dist., 262 F. Supp. 2d

1088, 1099 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

Plaintiff argues that her Title VII claims against all

defendants and intentional tort claims against Dakota entitle her

to seek punitive damages.4 Only the later claims can support

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plaintiff’s request for punitive damages because this court will

dismiss plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the individual

defendants and Title VII cannot support a claim for punitive

damages against the DCA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983a(b)(1)

(prohibiting recovery of punitive damages from a “government,

government agency or political subdivision”); Barefield v. Cal.

State Univ. Bakersfield, No. 05-633, 2006 WL 829122, at *7 (E.D.

Cal. May 28, 2006). 

A plaintiff can recover punitive damages for

intentional torts if the plaintiff proves, by clear and

convincing evidence, that “the defendant has been guilty of

oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal. Civ. Code § 3294; see also

Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1212 (2006)

(“[P]unitive damages . . . are typically awarded for intentional

torts such as assault and battery, . . . wrongful termination and

job discrimination.”). With regard to Dakota’s conduct

supporting plaintiff’s intentional tort claims against him,

plaintiff alleges that Dakota’s conduct “was oppressive,

fraudulent, and malicious.” (Compl. ¶¶ 55, 60.) 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), “[m]alice,

intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be

alleged generally.” The Ninth Circuit has explained that Rule

9(b) does not “require any particularity in connection with an

averment of intent, knowledge or condition of the mind.” Walling

v. Beverly Enters., 476 F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1973). 

Plaintiff’s general allegations, therefore, are sufficient to

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support plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against Dakota

for his alleged intentional torts. See Clark v. Allstate Ins.

Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (S.D. Cal. 2000) (“In federal

court, a plaintiff may include a ‘short and plain’ prayer for

punitive damages that relies entirely on unsupported and

conclusory averments of malice or fraudulent intent.”).

Accordingly, as to all claims except plaintiff’s

intentional tort claims against Dakota, this court must grant

defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive

damages.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that: 

(1) defendants’ motion to dismiss, with prejudice, 

plaintiff’s state law discrimination and negligence claims

against the DCA be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; 

(2) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s Title

VII claims against the DCA be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(3) defendants’ motion to dismiss, with prejudice, 

plaintiff’s FEHA discrimination and Title VII claims against the

individual defendants be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(4) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s FEHA 

retaliation and harassment claims and California Government Code

sections 11135 and 19702 claims against the individual defendants

be, and the same hereby is, DENIED;

(5) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s § 1983 

claims be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED;

(6) defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s property 

damage and assault and battery claims against Dakota be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED; and

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(7) defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’s request 

for punitive damages be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED as to

all claims except plaintiff’s intentional tort claims against

Dakota.

Plaintiff is given 45 days from the date of this order

to file an amended complaint consistent with this order.

DATED: January 25, 2008

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