Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01618/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01618-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harold W. Clarke
Appellant
Lawrence E. Lupien
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1618

___________

Lawrence E. Lupien, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska.

Harold W. Clarke, Director of the *

Nebraska Department of Correctional *

Services, *

*

Appellant. *

__________

Submitted: December 13, 2004

Filed: March 31, 2005

___________

Before WOLLMAN, LAY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge. 

Harold W. Clarke, Director of the Nebraska Department of Correctional

Services (“DCS”), appeals an order of the district court granting habeas corpus relief

to Lawrence Lupien. The DCS argues that the district court erroneously based its

grant of habeas relief on an interpretation of Nebraska law that is in direct conflict

with the Nebraska Court of Appeals’ determination of the same issue. We agree, and

therefore reverse.

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Section 29-2204 has since been amended to reinstate indeterminate sentencing

by operation of law. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204 (2004); State v. Urbano, 589

N.W.2d 144, 158 (Neb. 1999). This amendment is not at issue in this case because

it did not take effect until July 1, 1998, well after Lupien’s sentencing, and its

provisions have not been applied retroactively. See Johnson, 603 N.W.2d at 377-78.

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I. 

On August 13, 1997, Lupien pled nolo contendere in Nebraska state court to

delivery of marijuana and conspiracy to deliver marijuana. [Red 6, Appellee’s App.

4, 9] Under Nebraska law, these crimes are classified as Class III felonies and carry

punishments of between one and twenty years in prison. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-416

(delivery), -202(4) (conspiracy), -105 (classification of penalties). Lupien was

sentenced on October 7, 1997, to a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment for each

offense of conviction, but the parties dispute whether the judge also imposed a

different minimum term of imprisonment.

At the time of Lupien’s sentencing, Nebraska used a bifurcated sentencing

regime, under which prisoners subject to so-called “indeterminate sentences” were

eligible for parole, while those subject to “determinate sentences” were not eligible

for parole. 1998 Neb. Att’y Gen. Op. 98013, 1998 WL 65250, at *3 (Feb. 17, 1998).

Indeterminate sentences under Nebraska’s system were those in which the court

imposed different minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment. State v. Wilson,

546 N.W.2d 323, 332 (Neb. Ct. App. 1996). Determinate sentences, by contrast, were

those in which the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment were the same, see

Johnson v. Clarke, 603 N.W.2d 373, 377 (Neb. 1999), or in which the sentencing

court stated only one term of imprisonment. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2204(1)(a) (Reissue

1995);1

 Johnson, 603 N.W.2d at 377.

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The sentencing court later corrected its references to Count II, which should

have been to Count III.

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In sentencing Lupien, the state district judge made the following statements:

On Count I, you’re sentenced to ten years in the Nebraska Penal

and Correctional Complex and on Count II,2

 you’re sentenced to 10

years in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. Count II to be

served consecutive to Count I.

. . . .

Now, the law requires me to tell you what that means. The

mandatory minimum amount of time that is to be served on a ten-year

sentence is six years on two of them, that would be 12 years total time

with good time statutory credit, and you will also receive whatever time

you have served previous to this date in connection with these matters

as a credit. Your parole eligibility will be in six years.

The Order of Commitment issued after Lupien’s sentencing provided that Lupien was

to “be imprisoned in the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex for a term of 10

years” on each count. Lupien did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

Lupien was sentenced under Nebraska’s “truth in sentencing” law, which the

Nebraska legislature enacted in 1993. See Johnson, 603 N.W.2d at 377. At the time

of Lupien’s sentencing, DCS apparently was uncertain whether prisoners subject to

determinate sentences were eligible for parole; the department sought guidance from

the Office of the Nebraska Attorney General on the issue in 1998. The Attorney

General then issued an opinion that a defendant serving a determinate sentence was

ineligible for parole. See 1998 WL 65250, at *3.

Nine days later, the DCS published a memorandum informing prisoners subject

to determinate sentences of their ineligibility for parole. See State v. Lupien, No. AAppellate Case: 04-1618 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/31/2005 Entry ID: 1885857 
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00-025, 2001 WL 485420, at *3 (Neb. Ct. App. May 8, 2001) (unpublished opinion)

(“Lupien”). On the same day, the Nebraska Board of Parole (“Board”) informed

Lupien that he would be eligible for parole in August 1998. Id. On August 3, 1999,

the Board retracted its earlier statement, notifying Lupien that it had deferred review

of his parole until August 19, 2007, the first date of Lupien’s eligibility for release

pursuant to the DCS memorandum. See id.

After receiving the Board’s retraction, Lupien brought a motion for postconviction relief in state court, alleging that he was illegally sentenced under

Nebraska law, and in violation of ex post facto principles. The state district court

denied relief, and the Nebraska Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Lupien’s

arguments that the sentencing court had implicitly imposed a minimum term of

imprisonment (thus making his sentence indeterminate) when the court made

statements concerning Lupien’s parole eligibility. Id. at *3. The state appellate court

reviewed the sentencing court’s pronouncements and concluded that “when the court

imposed only one term of years, namely 10 years for each conviction, Lupien’s

sentence was determinate.” Id. at *5. The court determined that the balance of the

sentencing court’s oral statement, regarding time for parole eligibility, “was not part

of the sentence imposed.” Id. at *6.

Having concluded that Lupien’s sentence was determinate, the court of appeals

decided that he was not subject to an ex post facto application of the law. Because

determinate sentences were permitted under Nebraska law at the time of Lupien’s

sentencing, the court held that he “was sentenced pursuant to the sentencing statutes

then in effect and ex post facto principles are not implicated.” Id. at *7.

Lupien then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his habeas petition, Lupien alleged that his sentence

had been imposed in violation of state law. The district court granted relief on a

different theory. The court concluded that because the Nebraska sentencing court

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stated that “[t]he mandatory minimum amount of time to be served on a ten-year

sentence is six years on two of them,” the sentencing court had “articulated a

minimum term,” and thus imposed an indeterminate sentence. (Add. at 6). The

district court concluded that the sentencing court’s written order, which merely stated

a term of imprisonment of “10 years” on each count with no minimum term, was

inconsistent with the sentence announced orally in court. The district court reasoned

that under Nebraska law, a sentence announced in open court controls over a

subsequent written order or judgment, so that Lupien’s sentence must be considered

indeterminate. The court then held that because “the legal effect of the sentence as

pronounced in open court by the sentencing judge conflicts with the subsequent

execution of that sentence by [Lupien’s] custodian, DCS,” the Director of DCS

“thereby violated ex post facto principles.” (Add. at 14). On this basis, the court

granted a writ of habeas corpus and declared void any order or memorandum that

construed Lupien’s minimum prison term as 10 years.

II. 

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), habeas corpus relief is appropriate with respect to

state prisoners only if a state court’s adjudication of the prisoner’s claim “resulted in

a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”

or if such an adjudication “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). State court factual findings are “presumed to be

correct,” and this presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.

Id. § 2254(e)(1). We review the facts underlying a district court’s grant of habeas

relief for clear error, and its legal determinations de novo. Colvin v. Taylor, 324 F.3d

583, 586 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 851 (2003).

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The Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution prohibit, inter alia, “[e]very law

that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed

to the crime, when committed.” Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612 (2003)

(quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)); see also Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S.

433, 441 & n.13 (1997). Lupien argues that DCS’s treatment of his sentence as

determinate rather than as indeterminate retrospectively increased the punishment

imposed by the state court judge and thereby violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The

DCS maintains that Lupien’s sentence was determinate all along, and that the

Nebraska Court of Appeals authoritatively decided this question in considering

Lupien’s post-conviction motion. See Lupien, 2001 WL 485420, at *6. The parties

do not dispute that if Lupien’s sentence as pronounced by the sentencing judge was

determinate, then he was never eligible for parole, and the Ex Post Facto Clause is

not implicated by the Order of Commitment and DCS’s subsequent actions.

Determinations of state law made by a state court are binding on a federal court

in habeas proceedings. Bounds v. Delo, 151 F.3d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir. 1998);

Williamson v. Jones, 936 F.2d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 1991). We may not review

questions of state law that have been decided by a state court, “even under the

deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Lee v. Gammon, 222 F.3d 441, 443 (8th

Cir. 2000). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “it is not the province of a federal

habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions. In

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction

violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire,

502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Johnston v. Luebbers, 288 F.3d 1048, 1056 (8th

Cir. 2002). 

In this case, the Nebraska Court of Appeals held that Lupien’s sentence was

determinate, and that legal conclusion is binding in these federal habeas proceedings.

In Lupien’s post-conviction proceeding, the state court of appeals quoted the remarks

of the state court judge in sentencing Lupien, 2001 WL 485420, at *1, and

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characterized the judge’s comments regarding a minimum amount of time to be

served as “statements regarding parole eligibility.” Id. at *6. The court observed that

it previously had interpreted the language of section 29-2204 to mean that a

sentencing court’s “‘statement regarding time for parole eligibility was not part of the

sentence.’” Id. (quoting State v. Glover, 535 N.W.2d 724, 727 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995)).

The court then held that because “the sentencing court’s statement regarding time for

parole eligibility was not part of the sentence imposed, it does not render the sentence

invalid.” Id. The court specifically addressed the question of determinacy, holding

that “when the court imposed only one term of years, namely 10 years for each

conviction, Lupien’s sentence was determinate.” Id. at *5. This express resolution

of the nature of Lupien’s sentence stands in irreconcilable conflict with the district

court’s conclusion that Lupien “received an indeterminate sentence on October 17,

1997.” (Add. at 6).

Lupien contended at oral argument that the determinacy or indeterminacy of

his sentence was a mixed question of fact and state law that may be re-examined in

a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Even if a determination concerning the nature

of Lupien’s sentence could be characterized as a “mixed” question of law and fact,

however, it would not be subject to review by a federal court. As the Supreme Court

explained in an analogous situation with respect to a state death penalty statute,

“[e]ven if a determination under Arizona’s narrowing construction could be

characterized as a ‘mixed’ question of law and fact, any such determination would

nevertheless remain a question of state law, errors of which are not cognizable in

federal habeas proceedings.” Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 782-83 (1990) (internal

citation omitted). 

A “factual issue,” of course, would be susceptible to limited review in this

habeas proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But the asserted question of fact

identified by Lupien – whether the “plain statement” of the sentencing court that

Lupien would serve a “mandatory minimum” of six years meant that Lupien’s

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sentence was indeterminate – is not a “factual issue” within the meaning of § 2254(e).

That section, which was formerly codified at § 2254(d), applies to “basic, primary,

or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility

of their narrators,” and to certain other issues where resolution “depends heavily on

the trial court’s appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor.” Thompson v.

Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 110-11 (1995) (internal quotations omitted). There is no

dispute in this case about historical facts or matters that turn on appraisal of witness

credibility or demeanor. The words spoken and written by the sentencing court are

undisputed, and the only point of dispute is the legal effect of the judge’s words. That

is a question of state law on which the decision of the Nebraska Court of Appeals is

dispositive. 

As a matter of state law decided by the Nebraska courts, Lupien received a

determinate sentence on October 17, 1997. Under Nebraska law in effect at that time,

the determinate sentence made him ineligible for parole. Thus, the subsequent state

actions treating his sentence as one for which parole is unavailable did not

retroactively increase the punishment for Lupien’s crimes. Without such an increase

in punishment, there was no violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the

district court’s order granting a writ of habeas corpus is reversed, and the case is

remanded for entry of an order denying Lupien’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

______________________________

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