Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01111/USCOURTS-ca8-07-01111-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Clinical Reference Laboratory
Appellee
Globallab Solutions
Appellee
Andrea Newton
Appellant
Joseph D. Spataro
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-1111

___________

Andrea Newton, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

* Western District of Arkansas. 

Clinical Reference Laboratory, Inc., * 

A foreign corporation; Globallab *

Solutions, Inc. A foreign corporation; *

Joseph D. Spataro, an individual, *

 *

Appellees. * 

___________

Submitted: October 16, 2007

Filed: February 22, 2008

___________

Before MURPHY, MELLOY, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Andrea Newton sued a clinical laboratory, a medical review officer, and the

review officer’s employer, alleging negligent performance of a drug test mandated by

Newton’s employer. Newton claims that she lost her job because the defendants

negligently performed the drug test, and then notified her employer of a positive

result. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, on the ground that

Newton failed to submit a timely affidavit of an expert witness as required by

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Arkansas law. In view of an intervening statement of Arkansas law by the Supreme

Court of Arkansas, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

In June 2005, Newton was a resident of Arkansas and employed by the West

Siloam Springs Casino in Oklahoma. She alleges that the Casino selected her for a

random drug test, and collected an oral swab specimen. This specimen allegedly was

shipped to Clinical Reference Laboratory, which analyzed the specimen and reported

that it was positive for marijuana metabolite. The complaint alleges that CRL then

forwarded the test result to GlobalLab Solutions, Inc., for further review. GlobalLab

allegedly caused its employee Dr. Joseph D. Spataro, M.D., to serve as a “medical

review officer” with respect to Newton’s drug test. Spataro allegedly sought to speak

directly with Newton, left her a voice message, and then notified the Casino that

Newton had tested positive for marijuana metabolite. The complaint asserts that

Spataro eventually contacted Newton, who denied using marijuana, but that Spataro

rejected her denial and confirmed the positive test result. Newton claims that the

Casino, in reliance on the confirmed test result, terminated her employment.

Newton’s complaint alleges that the defendants acted negligently with respect to this

incident, and that their negligence caused injuries to Newton, including loss of

earnings and fringe benefits, damage to reputation, and emotional distress. 

The Arkansas Code provides that in any action for medical injury, when the

asserted medical negligence does not lie within the jury’s comprehension as a matter

of common knowledge, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit of an expert within thirty

days after the complaint is filed. Ark. Code §§ 16-114-206, 209(b), 209(c). This

affidavit must establish reasonable cause for filing an action for medical injury due

to negligence. Id. § 16-114-209(b)(1). The statute provides that if the affidavit is not

filed on time, then “the complaint shall be dismissed by the court.” Id. § 16-114-

209(b)(3)(B).

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The district court concluded that Newton’s lawsuit was a negligence action for

“medical injury,” and that an expert affidavit was required in a diversity case pursuant

to the doctrine of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). According to the time

period set by the Arkansas statute, the affidavit was due on September 18, 2006, but

Newton failed to submit one. She instead filed a transcript of a deposition of an expert

witness, and did so thirty-two days after the statutory deadline. On December 28,

2006, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, based on Newton’s failure to

comply with the affidavit requirement within thirty days after the filing of the

complaint, and the express language of § 16-114-209(b)(3)(B) directing dismissal.

After Newton filed her notice of appeal and her opening brief, the Supreme

Court of Arkansas decided Summerville v. Thrower, No. 06-501, 2007 WL 766319

(Ark. Mar. 15, 2007). The court in Summerville concluded that the thirty-day time

limit of § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) for filing an expert affidavit directly conflicted with

Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the commencement of

litigation. Rule 3 defines “the means by which complaints are filed and actions

commenced for a common law tort such as medical malpractice.” Weidrick v. Arnold,

835 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Ark. 1992). The state supreme court in Summerville ruled that

the requirement of § 16-114-209(b)(3), that an action be dismissed automatically if

a proper affidavit is not filed within thirty days after the filing of a complaint, was a

“procedural” rule that added a “legislative encumbrance to commencing a cause of

action” not found in Rule 3 of the civil rules. Summerville, 2007 WL 766319, at *5.

As such, the court held, the statutory provision must be stricken from the Code as

inconsistent with the rules of civil procedure and the state supreme court’s

constitutional authority to prescribe those rules. Id.

We conclude that the decision in Summerville requires reversal of the district

court’s judgment. The district court dismissed Newton’s action based specifically on

the “express language” of § 16-114-209(b)(3), which requires dismissal when an

adequate expert affidavit is not submitted within thirty days after the filing of a

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complaint. Summerville struck that provision as unconstitutional, so “it is treated as

if it had never been passed.” Land O’Frost, Inc. v. Pledger, 823 S.W.2d 887, 889

(Ark. 1992). Without the statutory timing requirement for a reasonable-cause

affidavit, the district court’s rationale for dismissing the complaint cannot stand.

The appellees contend that we should decline to apply Summerville because

Newton did not argue in the district court (or in her opening brief on appeal) that the

timing requirement of § 16-114-209(b)(3) was contrary to the Arkansas constitution.

Newton did contend in the district court that the timing requirement was a

“procedural” rule that should not be applied in federal court, but it is true that she did

not advance the precise contention accepted by the Supreme Court of Arkansas in

Summerville. Nonetheless, we may address arguments raised for the first time in a

reply brief on appeal where “the proper resolution is beyond doubt or when the

argument involves a purely legal issue in which no additional evidence or argument

would affect the outcome of the case.” Tarsney v. O’Keefe, 225 F.3d 929, 939 (8th

Cir. 2000); see United States v. Head, 340 F.3d 628, 630 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003)

(“Although we retain the authority to decline consideration of an issue raised for the

first time in a reply brief, we are not precluded from considering the issue.”) (citations

omitted); Ray v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 314 F.3d 482, 487 (10th Cir. 2002)

(“[A]n intervening change in the law permits appellate review of an issue not raised

below.”); In re Skywalkers, Inc., 49 F.3d 546, 548 n.4 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); see

generally Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976) (“Certainly there are

circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not

passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt, or where

injustice might otherwise result.”) (citations omitted) (internal quotation omitted).

Although Newton did not raise Summerville until her reply brief, the appellees

discussed the decision in their previously-filed briefs, and thus were not deprived of

an opportunity to be heard on the point.

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We believe this is an appropriate case in which to consider the intervening

Summerville decision. The district court dismissed this diversity case based solely on

a state statute that has been declared unconstitutional by the highest court of the State.

Proper resolution of the narrow issue concerning the timeliness of Newton’s

compliance with the affidavit requirement is now beyond doubt. We see no reason

to refuse to consider that the district court’s decision was premised on what is now an

outmoded understanding of Arkansas law. We therefore hold that the district court’s

decision is contrary to Summerville and must be reversed.

The appellees contend that even if Newton’s claim cannot be dismissed based

on the timing requirement of § 16-114-209(b)(3), the substance of the affidavit

requirement remains in effect, Summerville, 2007 WL 766319, at *5, and the

deposition transcript submitted by Newton is insufficient to serve as a reasonablecause affidavit. The district court’s decision, however, hinged on the timing

requirement of § 16-114-209(b)(3). Assuming that the affidavit requirement is

applicable to this case, and assuming that the deposition transcript was insufficient,

the district court did not rule that Newton’s failure to submit an affidavit by December

2006 violated any independent timing requirement of the district court in this case.

Discovery was not scheduled to close until August 27, 2007, and but for the

invocation of the thirty-day statutory limit, we see nothing in the record that would

have precluded Newton from later submitting an affidavit designed to comply with §

16-114-209(b)(1) and (2).

For these reasons, we reverse the district court’s judgment dismissing the case

with prejudice and remand for further proceedings. The appellees have raised several

alternative arguments for affirming the district court’s dismissal, but the district court

declined to reach those issues. We likewise decline to reach them and leave those

matters for the district court to consider in the first instance on remand, as may be

necessary.

______________________________

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