Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01751/USCOURTS-ca8-15-01751-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Andre Cole
Appellee
Donald P. Roper
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 15-1751

___________________________

Andre Cole

lllllllllllllllllllllPetitioner - Appellee

v.

Donald P. Roper

lllllllllllllllllllllRespondent - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis

____________

 Submitted: April 14, 2015

 Filed: April 14, 2015

____________

Before BYE, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

On March 23, 2015, Andre Cole, a Missouri prisoner subject to a sentence of

death scheduled to be carried out April 14, 2015, filed in the Missouri Supreme Court

a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming he was incompetent to be executed

under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S.

930 (2007). In support of his petition in Missouri state court, Cole submitted a report

by Dr. William S. Logan, a forensic psychiatrist, who interviewed him for

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two-and-one-half hours. Dr. Logan concluded that Cole's mental state prevented him

from comprehending or forming a rational understanding of the reason for the

execution to which he has been sentenced. Cole also submitted the affidavits of his

current and former counsel who state that Cole's mental condition has deteriorated

over the last four years and that he suffers from auditory hallucinations.

In response, the state submitted the record of a routine wellness check

conducted by Dr. Alwyn Whitehead, a psychologist employed by Corizon Medical

Services. The wellness check was conducted at Cole's cell door. Dr. Whitehead

reported that Cole denied "any hallucinatory experiences and there were no overt

symptoms of severe depression, mania, or psychosis." Dr. Whitehead conducted the

entire wellness check in fifteen minutes. The state also submitted recordings and

transcripts fromfour telephone calls made by Cole to unknown persons wherein Cole

discussed various topics, including execution issuesin other states, that he was placed

on "pre-execution" status, the execution drugs, and his opinion that the prosecutor’s

story that he stabbed the victim while he had a gun did not make sense. Cole then

filed a supplemental report fromDr. Logan responding to the state'ssubmissions, and

Dr. Logan concluded that nothing filed by the state altered his original conclusions

regarding Cole's mental state. 

Because a petition for writ of habeas corpus is an original action in Missouri,

the Missouri Supreme Court served as the fact-finder for Cole's competency

challenge. Mo. S. Ct. Rule 84.22 and 91.01. The court analyzed Cole's claim within

the framework of Ford and Panetti, specifically noting the presumption of

competency afforded to a prisoner who has previously been judged competent to

stand trial, which can only be overcome by a substantial threshold showing of

insanity. Ford, 477 U.S. at 426. The Missouri Supreme Court also found that unlike

the petitioners in both Ford and Panetti, Cole was afforded the opportunity to offer

his own expert opinion and attorney affidavitsin support of his claims. Accordingly,

the court found that "even assuming Mr. Cole's evidence makes a substantial showing

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of incompetency, he has received all process to which he is entitled under Ford and

Panetti." Missouri ex rel. Cole v. Griffith, No. SC94880, Maj. Slip Op. 16 (Mo. April

9, 2015). The court went on to thoroughly review Cole's and the state's proffered

evidence and found thatCole rationally understood his death sentence and the reasons

for it. Id. at 16-22.

Cole filed the current supplemental petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254, along with a motion for stay of execution. The district court

concluded that the Missouri Supreme Court unreasonably applied Ford and Panetti

by not "refer[ring] the matter to a qualified fact-finder for a fair hearing at which each

ofthe parties could present evidence relevant toCole's competency." Cole v. Griffith,

No. 4:05CV131, Slip. Op. at 11 (E.D. Mo. April 13, 2015). Curiously, the district

court suggests that if the Missouri Supreme Court had done far less and explicitly

found that Cole had not made a threshold showing of incompetency, its reasoning

would have passed constitutional muster. Id. at 11-12. Accordingly, the district court

granted Cole's motion for a stay of execution. The state appeals.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court cannot grant habeasrelief on any claim

that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the decision was "contrary to

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). "Under

§ 2254(d)(1)'s 'unreasonable application' clause . . . a federal habeas court may not

issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that

the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously

or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 411 (2000). Thus, "[a] state court decision may be incorrect,

yet still not unreasonable, and we will grant relief only if the state court decision is

both incorrect and unreasonable." Cole v. Roper, 623 F.3d 1193, 1187 (8th Cir.

2010). Because the Missouri Supreme Court's decision does not fit within any of

these exceptions, it is entitled to deference and Cole is not entitled to relief. 

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Panetti instructs that "'a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less

formal than a trial.'" Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427)

(Powell, J., concurring)). The "basic requirements" of due process include "an

opportunity to submit 'evidence and argument from the prisoner's counsel, including

expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State's own psychiatric

examination.'" Id. at 950 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427); see also Panetti, 551 U.S.

at 951 ("[The state court] failed to provide petitioner with an adequate opportunity

to submit expert evidence in response to the report filed by the court-appointed

experts."); Ford, 477 U.S. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that the

determination of sanity "appear[ed] to have been made solely on the basis of the

examinations performed by state-appointed psychiatrists").

Even if the state court incorrectly decided the due process issue, it was not an

unreasonable application of Ford or Panetti to reach the merits of Cole's

incompetency claim without a more formal hearing. Because it is an original

proceeding, the Missouri Supreme Court initially evaluated Cole's motion and then

sequentially, asthe finder of fact and concluder of law under Missouri's habeasrules,

examined the record and determined that Cole remained competent. Cole submitted

Dr. Logan's expert opinion, and Dr. Logan had a chance to respond to the state's

evidence. In addition, Cole's counsel presented written arguments about Dr. Logan's

opinion. The Missouri Supreme Court's determination that this constituted all of the

hearing and/or process required by Panetti and Ford does not violate § 2254(d). In

fact, Cole received far more process than the petitioners in Ford and Panetti, and the

specific procedural deficiencies present in those cases are not present here. Without

more direction from the Supreme Court about the contours of due process in this

context, we cannot say that the Supreme Court of Missouri unreasonably applied Ford

or Panetti. 

Furthermore, a federal court is bound by the state court'sfactual findings unless

the state court made a "decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of

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the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C.

§2254(d)(2). Factual determinations made by state courts are presumed correct and

the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing

evidence. Nicklasson v. Roper, 491 F.3d 830, 834 (8th Cir. 2007); see also

§2254(e)(1). A factual determination is not unreasonable "merely because the federal

habeas court would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance." Wood

v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010). The existence of some contrary evidence in the

record does not suffice to show that the state court's factual determination was

unreasonable. Id. at 302-03.

The Missouri Supreme Court did not make an unreasonable determination of

facts in light of the evidence presented to it. Because Cole has previously been

determined competent to stand trial, he faced a presumption of competency. Ford,

477 U.S. at 426. The Missouri Supreme Court's finding that Cole's proffered

evidence did not rebut the presumption of competency is itself presumed to be

correct. And Cole has not presented clear and convincing evidence to the contrary

in his federal habeas proceeding, especially in light of the state's proffer of Cole's

recorded telephone conversations. The Missouri Supreme Court reasonably

determined that Cole rationally understood his death sentence and the reasons for it

as demonstrated, among other things, by a recorded conversation asrecently as March

9, 2015. In this conversation, he discussed the issues with execution drug protocols

in other states, the issues with his own murder trial, and his faith in God that "this

thing will turn around." Missouri ex rel. Cole v. Griffith, No. SC94880, Maj. Slip

Op. at 19.

Because the Missouri Supreme Court's adjudication of Cole's competency

claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable determination of, Supreme Court

precedent, and because it did not involve an unreasonable determination of the facts

in light of the evidence presented to it, we reverse the district court and vacate the

court's stay of execution.

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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge, concurring, with whom Judge Beam joins.

I concur in Judge Beam’s opinion for the court. I write separately to add the

following observations.

By erroneously concluding that the Supreme Court of Missouri unreasonably

applied Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551

U.S. 930 (2007), the district court abused its discretion in granting a stay of

execution. See Middleton v. Roper, 759 F.3d 833, 835 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). 

In order for Cole to be entitled to relief, the Supreme Court of Missouri’s adjudication

must have (1) “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In considering whether a state court

unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law, our court has explained that

“[a] state court decision may be incorrect, yetstill not unreasonable, and we will grant

relief only if the state court decision is both incorrect and unreasonable.” Cole v.

Roper, 623 F.3d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 2010).

“Under Ford, once a prisoner makesthe requisite preliminary showing that his

current mental state would bar his execution, the Eighth Amendment . . . entitles him

to an adjudication to determine his condition.” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934-35. 

However, “a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal than a

trial.” Id. at 949 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment)). Panetti instructs that the “basic requirements” of due

process include “an opportunity to submit ‘evidence and argument from prisoner’s

counsel, including expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State’s own

psychiatric examination.’” Id. at 950 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J.,

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concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). The processes employed in

Panetti and Ford ran afoul of these basic requirements.

Both Panetti and Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford left open the question

of whether, in an appropriate case, additional procedures beyond the “basic

requirements” of due process may be constitutionally required. Panetti, 551 U.S. at

952; Ford, 477 U.S. at 426-27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment). However, Justice Powell remarked that “ordinary adversarial

procedures—complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral argument by

counsel—are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound, consistent

judgments as to a defendant’s sanity.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring

in part and concurring in the judgment). And the Panetti Court reiterated Justice

Powell’s statement from Ford that “a State ‘should have substantial leeway to

determine what process best balances the various interests at stake’ once it has met

the ‘basic requirements’ required by due process.” 551 U.S. at 949-50 (quoting Ford,

477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

It was not an unreasonable application of Ford and Panetti for the Supreme

Court of Missouri to reach the merits of Cole’s competency claim on the basis of

Cole’s submissions, the state’s response, and Cole’s reply. The Supreme Court of

Missouri noted that, when Cole filed his state petition, “he submitted his counsel’s

argument and his own evidence, including expert psychiatric evidence.” Moreover,

after the state responded with argument and evidence of its own, “Mr. Cole had the

further opportunity to respond to the state’s evidence with his counsel’s argument and

evidence.” In particular, Dr. Logan, a psychiatrist who had examined Cole, offered

further opinions about Cole’s competency in response to the state’s evidence. 

Furthermore, at this time, Cole also submitted a report prepared in 2002 by Dr.

Michael Stacy, a psychologist who examined him, as well as the affidavit of another

attorney. In light of Cole’s two opportunities to present evidence and arguments, it

was not an unreasonable application of Ford and Panetti to conclude, as the state

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court did, that “Mr. Cole has not been deprived of an opportunity to be heard.” As 1

the Panetti Court explained, the “basic requirements” of due process include “an

opportunity to submit ‘evidence and argument from the prisoner’s counsel, including

expert psychiatric evidence that may differ from the State’s [evidence].’” 551 U.S.

at 950 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment)). Cole twice had such an opportunity.

In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court opined that Panetti “made

clear that an actual hearing, which must include notice and the opportunity to present

evidence in addition to that of the ‘threshold showing,’ wasrequired.” In Panetti, the

petitioner initially submitted a “letter and a declaration from two individuals, a

psychologist and a law professor, who had interviewed [him] while on death row.” 

551 U.S. at 938. The state trial court then appointed two experts, who opined that

Panetti was competent to be executed. Id. at 939-40. The court subsequently issued

an order finding Panetti competent that “implied that its determination of petitioner’s

competency was made solely on the basis of the examinations performed by the

psychiatrists it had appointed.” Id. at 951. In response to this process, the Panetti

court reasoned as follows: “After a prisoner has made the requisite threshold

Although, as the dissent notes, Justice Powell’s opinion in Ford and the

1

Panetti Court stated that a “fair hearing” isrequired, these decisions do not define the

parameters of such a hearing. Rather, they only clearly establish that (1) something

more than the processes provided there are constitutionally required and (2) a

constitutionally acceptable hearing “may be far less formal than a trial.” See Ford,

477 U.S. at 424, 426-27 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the

judgment); Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949-52. Neither Ford nor Panetti clearly establishes

that providing Cole two opportunities to present evidence and argument, as the

Supreme Court of Missouri did, is constitutionally inadequate. See Ford, 477 U.S.

at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[O]rdinary

adversarial procedures—complete with live testimony, cross-examination, and oral

argument by counsel—are not necessarily the best means of arriving at sound,

consistent judgments as to a defendant’s sanity.”).

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showing, Ford requires, at a minimum, that a court allow a prisoner’s counsel the

opportunity to make an adequate response to evidence solicited by the state court.” 

Id. at 952 (emphasis added).

Cole makes much of the two-step nature of this process—in particular, the

Panetti Court’s statement that a petitioner’s opportunity to be heard comes “[a]fter”

he makes a threshold showing. Id. However, it was not unreasonable to refuse Cole

a third opportunity to present evidence and arguments. See Cole, 623 F.3d at 1187

(“A state court decision may be incorrect, yetstill not unreasonable, and we will grant

relief only if the state court decision is both incorrect and unreasonable.”). Panetti

does not clearly establish that a petitioner is entitled to an opportunity to present

evidence and argument even if he already has had two such chances. As the Panetti

Court emphasized, a state “‘should have substantial leeway to determine what process

best balances the various interests at stake’ once it has met the ‘basic requirements’

required by due process.” 551 U.S. at 949-50 (quoting Ford, 477 U.S. at 427

(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (emphasis added). 

In light of the “substantial leeway” left to the states, I cannot say that the Supreme

Court of Missouri’s refusal to give Cole a third opportunity to present evidence and

argument “involved an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law,

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

Moreover, I note that affording a petitioner the opportunity to be heard avoids a

process that “invites arbitrariness and error by preventing the affected parties from

offering contrary medical evidence or even from explaining the inadequacies of the

State’s examinations.” Ford, 477 U.S. at 424 (Powell, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment). Because Cole offered his own evidence and argument

and responded to the state’s submissions, such a concern is not present here.2

Cole suggests that he would have offered further evidence of his incompetency

2

had he been afforded another opportunity to present evidence. However, Cole’s brief

does not identify this evidence beyond speculating that he could have obtained “other

expert analyses.” Moreover, Cole had strong incentives to put forth his best evidence

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In addition, it was a reasonable application of Ford and Panetti not to grant

Cole additional procedures beyond the basic requirements of due process. It is true

that the Panetti Court and Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford left open the

possibility that further process could be constitutionally required in an appropriate

case. However, declining to extend Ford and Panetti to require additional process,

as the state court did, does not an unreasonable application make. See White v.

Woodall, 572 U.S. ---,134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014) (“Section 2254(d)(1) provides a

remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s

precedent; it does not require a state court to extend that precedent or license federal

courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”). Ford and Panetti do not clearly

establish that additional process is required.

BYE, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

The proceedings before this Court and before the Supreme Court of Missouri

which led to the instant habeas petition pertain to the question of whether Andre Cole

is entitled to a hearing to determine his competency—not whether he is competent. 

A majority of the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded Cole was not entitled to a

hearing to determine his competency to be executed—even assuming he made the

required threshold showing for the necessity of such a hearing—because it

determined he was competent. In doing so, the court reached a decision that was

contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law and

made an unreasonable determination of the facts presented before it. Accordingly,

I would affirm the district court’s decision to grant Cole’s petition for writ of habeas

corpus and stay his execution while the appeal proceeds.

Because we review petitions for writ of habeas corpus under standards set forth

in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Edwards

in his first two submissions before the Supreme Court of Missouri.

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v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 453 (2012), Cole is entitled to relief if he demonstrates the

adjudication by the Supreme Court of Missouri "resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal

law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). I believe Cole satisfies both prongs.

I

"[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of

death upon a prisoner who is insane." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10

(1986). Justice Powell’s concurrence in Ford sets forth the clearly-established

minimal means Missouri must provide for determining Cole’s competency before it

can execute him. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 949 (2007). Under this

minimal test, a state "may require a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely

to trigger the hearing process" to determine the individual's competency. Ford, 477

at 426. "Once a prisoner seeking a stay of execution has made 'a substantial threshold

showing of insanity,' the protection afforded by procedural due process includes a

'fair hearing' in accord with fundamental fairness." Panetti, 551 U.S. at 949 (quoting

Ford, 477 U.S. at 426). The Supreme Court's decisions in Ford and Panetti clearly

established a sequential process for determining an individual's competency: (1)

whether the individual presented sufficient evidence to trigger the need for a hearing;

and (2) based on the evidence presented at such a later hearing, whether the

individual is competent to be executed. Here, the Supreme Court of Missouri

afforded Cole no hearing, even though it assumed he presented sufficient evidence

to trigger the requirement for a hearing. Instead, the court sua sponte evaluated the

evidence presented in the record thus far and found Cole competent. It is undisputed

Cole received no hearing in this case. The mere opportunity to file a brief before an

appellate court as part of a writ proceeding cannot meet the definition of a "fair

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hearing," however that may be defined, particularly without notice that it would be

the final opportunity to show competency.

Although the Supreme Court of Missouri properly identified Ford and Panetti

as the standard by which to determine Cole's competency, it ignored their mandate

to provide him with a "fair hearing." The majority of the court held that "[e]ven

assuming Mr. Cole made a substantial threshold showing of insanity, he is not

entitled to any further process under Ford and Panetti because he has been afforded

the opportunity to submit argument and evidence." The court cited no 3

authority—and I have found none—for its novel approach of merging the sequential

steps of determining the threshold for the necessity of a hearing and the individual's

competency. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Missouri's own precedent provides that

once Cole met the substantial threshold showing, he was "entitled to a full hearing

to determine his competence." Middleton v. Russell, 435 S.W.3d 83, 84 (Mo. 2014)

(emphasis added). The majority attempts to justify this approach by suggesting the

Supreme Court of Missouri applied the steps sequentially but in one fell swoop. The

requirement of sequential steps does not exist to provide a mere opportunity for

additional reflection on the evidence presented at the threshold showing. It exists to

allow an individual to marshal all evidence available to him to propel him not only

past the minimal standard of a threshold showing but on the ultimate issue of his

competency. The process employed in this case thwarts that exact purpose by

prematurely adjudicating Cole’s competency on the more limited record of a

Missouri argues the Supreme Court of Missouri also held that Cole failed to

3

make a substantial threshold of incompetence. The court's opinion made no such

finding. To the extent Missouri attempts to create ambiguity in the opinion by

quoting one sentence out of context, I find the argument entirely unpersuasive. 

Plainly, the Supreme Court of Missouri knows how to make such an explicit finding. 

See Clayton v. Griffith, No. SC 94841, 2015 WL 1442957, at *1 (Mo. Mar. 14,

2015); Middleton v. Russell, 435 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Mo. 2014). It did not do so here,

and its opinion cannot be reasonably read as doing so implicitly.

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threshold showing. In the civil context, it would be the equivalent of denying

summary judgment but entering judgment in favor of that party based on an

evaluation of the evidence.

The process employed in this case is particularly egregious because until the

Supreme Court of Missouri's unprecedented decision, Cole had no reason to believe

he was required to marshal all evidence supporting his lack of competency under the

expedited route of a petition for habeasrelief. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Missouri

has stated Cole could expect a "full hearing to determine his competence." 

Middleton, 435 S.W.3d at 84. In his petition, Cole identified specific additional

evidence, including testimony from other expert witnessesregarding his mental state

and testimony from fellow inmatesto corroborate Cole's change in behavior in recent

months, that he would introduce at a full competency hearing, and would have

attempted to introduce in his petition had he known he would be required to show the

full merits of his competency rather than just a threshold showing. To deny Cole the

opportunity to present such evidence after finding he is entitled to a hearing does not

comport with the specific mandate of Ford and Panetti requiring a two-step

determination or their guiding principle. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 414 (Marshall, J.)

("[A]ny procedure that precludesthe prisoner or his counsel frompresenting material

relevant to his sanity or bars consideration of that material by the factfinder is

necessarily inadequate."); id. at 424 (Powell, J. concurring in part and concurring in

the judgment) ("[F]undamental fairness is the hallmark of the procedural protections

afforded by the Due Process Clause."). Given that this determination involves the

"especial concern . . . that execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable of

penalties," id. at 411, I find no persuasive reason to rush to a determination on an

incomplete record after an individual has made the threshold showing.

Under Missouri's latest approach, Cole is unlikely to ever receive a "fair

hearing." If Cole presents too little evidence to support his claim that he is not

competent, he will fail to meet the required threshold showing and will not receive

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a hearing. If Cole presents sufficient evidence, the court would simply proceed to

weighing the evidence, and once again, Cole is left without a fair hearing. Missouri

appears to suggest that Cole's opportunity to present evidence and argument in the

context of a writ proceeding to satisfy his initial threshold is sufficient to constitute

a "fair hearing" on the merits of Cole’s incompetency claim. But no authority holds

as such, and there is no plausible way to read Ford and Panetti as permitting such a

short-circuited evaluation of the complex question of Cole's competency. "[T]he

competency determination depends substantially on expert analysis in a discipline

fraught with 'subtleties and nuances.'" Ford, 477 U.S. at 426. The appropriate means

of deciding credibility and factual determinations—particularly given the

consequences of executing Cole unconstitutionally—is an evidentiary hearing. Cf.,

Franco v. United States, 762 F.3d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that the district

court abused its discretion in finding one affidavit more credible than the other

without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing).

As three members of the Supreme Court of Missouri aptly recognized, the

majority’s novel approach in this case was “completely improper and unprecedented.” 

I agree.

II

Unlike its prior decisions in similar cases, the Supreme Court of Missouri

assumed Cole met the substantial threshold required to entitle him to a hearing. I

agree that there is no basis to find he has not.

Missouri urges this Court, however, to nevertheless make this complex and

evidence-heavy finding, despite the Supreme Court of Missouri's refusal to do

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so—most likely because they did not believe it could be made. First, the rule of

4

alternative affirmance Missouri urges usto apply in this case does not apply when the

decision is a "conspicuous misapplication of Supreme Court precedent that makesthe

state court's decision contrary to clearly established law." Williams v. Roper, 695

F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, Missouri

offers only a conclusory assertion that the threshold has not been met, and I believe

they have waived the argument. Cubillos v. Holder, 565 F.3d 1054, 1058 n.7 (8th

Cir. 2009) (noting undeveloped arguments are generally deemed waived). Third,

while I believe it is unnecessary to reach the issue, Cole has presented ample evidence

to satisfy the threshold showing.

In Panetti, the United States Supreme Court clarified Ford's competency and

substantial threshold showing standards. Considering delusions suffered by Panetti,

the Supreme Court concluded:

The principles set forth in Ford are put at risk by a rule that deems

delusions relevant only with respect to the State's announced reason for

a punishment or the fact of an imminent execution as opposed to the real

interests the State seeks to vindicate. We likewise find no support

elsewhere in Ford, including in its discussions of the common law and

the state standards, for the proposition that a prisoner is automatically

foreclosed from demonstrating incompetency once a court has found he

can identify the stated reason for his execution. A prisoner's awareness

of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational

understanding of it. Ford does not foreclose inquiry into the latter.

* * *

The Supreme Court of Missouri offered no reason for sharply departing from

4

its prior casesfinding the individualfailed to make the substantial threshold showing,

but the most plausible reason for why it assumed the threshold was satisfied is that

there was no basis to hold otherwise in this case.

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It istherefore error to derive from Ford, and the substantive standard for

incompetency its opinion broadly identify, a strict test for competency

that treats delusional beliefs as irrelevant once the prisoner is aware the

State has identified the link between his crime and the punishment to be

inflicted.

551 U.S. at 959-960. Cole presented sufficient evidence to meet this threshold

showing.

First, Cole presented the opinion of forensic psychiatrist William S. Logan,

M.D., who after evaluating Cole on February 20, 2015, concluded that Cole "lack[ed]

the capacity to understand the nature and purpose of the punishment about to be

imposed upon him or matters in extenuation, arguments for executive clemency or

reasons why the sentence should not be carried out." In his report, Dr. Logan noted

that Cole could not sleep because of continuous "supernatural" voices in his head,

which talk to him, argue with him, and threaten him. Although Cole was able to

"recall the historical elements of his case" during his interview with Dr. Logan, Cole

became disorganized and "digressed to talking about his emotional state." Based on

his psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Logan concluded that Cole is "depressed with

prominent symptoms of psychosis which adversely affect his comprehension and

understanding" and that Cole's "hallucinations have compromised his understanding

to the point he has gross delusions which prevent him from comprehending or

forming a rational understanding of the reason for the execution to which he has been

sentenced."

Second, Cole submitted affidavits from two of his attorneys and one former

attorney explaining Cole's mental health has deteriorated since 2011 and especially

in the past year. Although his "impaired mental state is not always apparent from a

brief or casual conversation," he "abruptly jumps from one topic to another,"

complains of voices in his head, and acts in a paranoid and agitated manner. 

According to the voices in Cole's head, he will be discharged from prison at age 65

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to go on disability and live with his mother. On their most recent visit with Cole, the

attorneys observed Cole talking to them in code, "changing in mid-sentence from

normal speech to whispering or mouthing his words and making agitated hand

gestures," looking fromside to side when voices appeared to be talking to him. These

sworn affidavitsfromindividuals who closely interact with Cole strongly corroborate

the medical findings of Dr. Logan.

The Supreme Court of Missouri offered no reason for why this evidence does

not demonstrate the required threshold showing. Although the court discredited the

evidence, it did so under the rubric of evaluating the merits of Cole's

competence—not merely whether a threshold showing had been made. I do not

believe any of its reasons for doing so demonstrate Cole's failure to meet the

threshold showing.

The Supreme Court of Missouri did not have any other expert evaluations of

Cole's mental state or testimony from individuals with whom he interacts on a

5

frequent basis. Instead, in finding Cole competent to be executed, the court primarily

relied on transcripts of several of Cole's recorded telephone conversations. Even if

the court could have properly considered the evidence in the threshold analysis, I do

not believe it lessened Cole's substantial evidence of incompetence. It was

unreasonable for the court to discount the expert testimony of a licensed psychiatrist

without any record evidence of Cole's current state of mind. The court's own

perceptions and inferences from snippets of telephone conversations in which Cole

exhibited concern for his mother's well-being, for example, cannot be a substitute for

a qualified expert's analysis of Cole's current mental state.

No one argues, and I do not believe, Dr. Whitehead’s quick “wellness check”

5

through Cole’s cell door can be considered a sufficient mental health evaluation.

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The court also placed emphasis on the fact that Cole was found competent at

the time of his trial. Although Cole is presumed to be competent, his mental health

status at the time of his trial is minimally relevant for determining his mental health

almost 15 years later. See Panetti, 551 U.S. at 934 ("Prior findings of competency do

not foreclose a prisoner from proving he isincompetent to be executed because of his

present mental condition."). Furthermore, there is evidence in the record that Cole

suffered from mental health issues such as major depression around the time of his

trial.

The court also discredited Dr. Logan's testimony based on a finding in a prior

proceeding that Dr. Logan was not credible. Yet, the court cited no authority for the

6

notion that experts become disposable after their first unfavorable credibility finding. 

The basis for discrediting Dr. Logan's opinionsin a prior proceeding does not provide

a sufficient reason alone to discredit the specific opinions he formed in this case.

In sum, I do not believe that the court could reasonably discount the expert

opinion of a medical professional and the testimony of the two people who most

closely interact with him, without any credible evidence, at the threshold proceeding

to determine if Cole is even entitled to a hearing. Because Cole met the substantial

threshold showing, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Thompson v. Bell,

580 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2009) ("The evidence Thompson submitted was

undoubtedly a 'substantial threshold showing,' and therefore an evidentiary hearing

should have been held.").

It is notable that the determination of Dr. Logan's credibility in Cole’s post6

trial proceeding came after an evidentiary hearing.

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III

For these reasons, I would grant Cole's petition for writ of habeas corpus and

stay his execution pending the resolution of this issue.

 

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