Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02063/USCOURTS-ca7-15-02063-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Nikolay Zyapkov
Petitioner

Document Text:

In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2063

NIKOLAY ZYAPKOV,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General of the United States,

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals.

No. A088‐671‐259

____________________

ARGUED DECEMBER 16, 2015 — DECIDED MARCH 29, 2016

____________________

Before MANION, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. Nikolay Zyapkov, a Bulgarian cit‐

izen, applied to become a lawful permanent resident based

on his marriage to a U.S. citizen. An immigration judge de‐

nied that application in a decision upheld by the Board of

Immigration Appeals. Zyapkov petitions for review of the

Board’s decision, but we conclude that his challenges to that

decision are without merit.

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I. Background

Zyapkov entered the United States in 2002 with a six‐

month visitor’s visa. His daughter and ex‐wife had come to

the United States two years earlier, and both eventually ob‐

tained citizenship through the “diversity lottery,” which al‐

lows randomly selected entrants from countries with low

immigration rates to apply for permanent residency.

See, generally, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c); Nyaga v. Ashcroft, 323 F.3d

906, 907–09 (11th Cir. 2003). Three months after Zyapkov’s

arrival, he married Juanita Gregory, a U.S. citizen.

From that point Zyapkov’s efforts to remain in the

United States became tangled, as both Gregory and later his

daughter (after becoming a citizen in February 2010) filed

Form I‐130 petitions on his behalf. An approved I‐

130 petition would have verified Zyapkov to be an

immediate relative of Gregory or his daughter, see 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a)(1)(A)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1), and

thus allowed him to apply for permanent residency using a

Form I‐485, see 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). Gregory’s I‐130 petition

was still pending in 2008 when the Department of

Homeland Security served Zyapkov with a Notice to Appear

in removal proceedings accusing him of overstaying his

visitor’s visa and working as a long‐haul truck driver

without authorization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B),

(a)(1)(C)(i). Soon after that, Gregory’s I‐130 petition was

denied by United States Citizenship and Immigration

Services (“USCIS”) because that agency’s investigators had

concluded that Gregory’s marriage to Zyapkov was a sham

intended to gain him immigration benefits.

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See id. § 1154(c)(2). Later, though, in September 2010, USCIS

approved the daughter’s I‐130 petition.

USCIS’s finding of marriage fraud relied heavily on its

conclusion that Gregory was in a relationship, and sharing

an apartment, with another woman while purportedly mar‐

ried to Zyapkov. Neighbors, as well as the woman’s brother,

had confirmed the relationship to investigators, and the

names of both women were on the mailbox at the apartment.

Gregory also had contradicted herself about her marital sta‐

tus, first telling USCIS investigators that she and Zyapkov

were separated and later saying in a written statement that

the couple remained married but she stayed with the other

woman when Zyapkov was on the road. Investigators had

visited the address on Gregory’s state‐issued identification

card, where an owner of the house claimed that he was let‐

ting Zyapkov and Gregory live for free in several rooms be‐

cause they were poor. Yet a neighbor who was shown pho‐

tographs identified the woman seen at the house with Zyap‐

kov as his ex‐wife, not Gregory. And the investigators had

noted that the rooms purportedly made available to Zyap‐

kov and Gregory were being renovated and appeared to be

unoccupied, e.g., the refrigerator and kitchen cabinets were

empty, as were the bedroom closets.

After USCIS denied Gregory’s I‐130 petition, Zyapkov

sought a continuance of the removal proceedings in order to

challenge that decision. His daughter’s I‐130 petition had not

yet been granted, and without an approved I‐130 petition he

could not take the next step of applying to adjust his status

to permanent resident. More significantly, the finding of

marriage fraud, if left unchallenged, would make Zyapkov

statutorily inadmissible, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), and

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thus ineligible for permanent residency whether or not his

daughter’s I‐130 petition should be approved.

The immigration judge (“IJ”) denied the requested con‐

tinuance and ordered Zyapkov removed. The Board dis‐

missed his appeal in August 2010, which, by leaving the

finding of marriage fraud undisturbed, might appear to

have ended the matter. But the following month, with his

daughter’s approved I‐130 petition now in hand, Zyapkov

asked the Board to reopen the removal proceedings and also

filed a Form I‐485 seeking to adjust his status to permanent

resident. In December 2010 the Board granted the motion to

reopen and instructed the IJ to determine Zyapkov’s “statu‐

tory eligibility and discretionary worthiness” to remain in

the United States. The Board reasoned that the daughter’s

approved I‐130 petition appeared to make Zyapkov eligible

for adjustment of status, though it said nothing about the

finding of marriage fraud or the resulting bar to admissibil‐

ity.

On remand the IJ conducted five hearings from Decem‐

ber 2010 to January 2013 on Zyapkov’s application for ad‐

justment of status. In opposing that application, the gov‐

ernment relied on USCIS’s conclusion that Zyapkov had

tried to gain immigration benefits by entering into a sham

marriage with Gregory. Zyapkov countered with his own

testimony that the marriage was genuine. Gregory is not a

lesbian, he insisted, nor had they ever been separated. They

lived together, Zyapkov explained, although working as a

truck driver takes him out of town for long stretches. He and

Gregory share bank accounts and credit cards, said Zyap‐

kov, though mostly they pay for expenses in cash.

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Gregory also testified, but she contradicted Zyapkov. She

said they were separated from 2006 to 2008. She also ex‐

plained that, when they first had met, she and Zyapkov

communicated by using a computer to translate between

English and Bulgarian. Because of his job, though, she some‐

times would see him only two or three times a month. She

denied being in a lesbian relationship.  

Zyapkov’s daughter was available to testify, but instead

his lawyer proffered that the daughter stood by her I‐130

petition. The IJ questioned, though, how USCIS could have

granted the daughter’s petition, except unwittingly, after

denying Gregory’s I‐130 petition because of marriage fraud.  

The IJ denied Zyapkov’s application to adjust his status

to permanent resident and also denied relief from removal.

The IJ first pointed out the inconsistencies in Zyapkov’s and

Gregory’s accounts about where they had lived and whether

they had separated. The IJ acknowledged Zyapkov’s asser‐

tion that these inconsistencies could be explained by his fre‐

quent work‐related absences, but the IJ found that explana‐

tion neither “convincing” nor “persuasive.” The IJ opined

that Zyapkov had not explained “how he supports his wife

and even where he keeps his income from his business” be‐

cause the couple’s joint accounts showed minimal deposits.

Based on the evidence, the IJ agreed with USCIS’s finding

that Gregory’s marriage to Zyapkov was a sham. And that

sham marriage coupled with Zyapkov’s false testimony, the

IJ reasoned, meant that Zyapkov was inadmissible under

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) and therefore ineligible to adjust his status.1

 

1 Although Zyapkov was not charged in the Notice to Appear with fraud

under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i), the IJ could rely on fraud as a ground of inad‐

missibility, and thus ineligibility to adjust status, because the question of

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As an alternative basis for denying relief, the IJ concluded

that Zyapkov did not merit a favorable exercise of discretion

even if eligible.

Zyapkov, through counsel, appealed the IJ’s decision but

did not submit a brief. His notice of appeal to the Board says

only that the IJ did not “adequately consider the basis” for

adjustment of status because, in his view, the IJ put too

much weight on his marriage and “unfairly punished” him

for “an allegation of prior marriage fraud, without the exam‐

ination of any of the Government’s witnesses who claimed

knowledge of an alleged fraud.”

The Board dismissed the appeal, giving this explanation:

We will assume for purposes of the appeal that

the Immigration Judge erred in finding mar‐

riage fraud pursuant to section 204(c) of the

Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c), and in deeming the re‐

spondent inadmissible under section

212(a)(6)(C)(i) of the Act [8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)], and we will assume for pur‐

poses of the appeal that the respondent is stat‐

utorily eligible to adjust his status under sec‐

tion 245(a) of the Act [8 U.S.C. § 1255(a)]. We

agree, however, with the Immigration Judge’s

denial of the respondent’s applications for both

adjustment of status and voluntary departure

in the exercise of discretion.

 

Zyapkov’s removability—which he conceded because he overstayed his

visitor’s visa as charged in the NTA—is separate from his burden to

prove eligibility for an adjustment of status. See Matovski v. Gonzales, 492

F.3d 722, 737–39 (6th Cir. 2007).

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No. 15‐2063 7

The Board noted that it “weigh[ed] heavily against” Zyap‐

kov “that his marriage has been deemed not bona fide” and

concluded that he had “not presented sufficient positive eq‐

uities” to outweigh that finding.

II. Analysis

Zyapkov has petitioned for review, and the parties are in

agreement that we review the IJ’s decision as supplemented

by the Board. See Pawlowska v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1138, 1141

(7th Cir. 2010); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 561 (7th Cir.

2005). On that understanding, we conclude that the Board,

although skipping without explanation the question of

Zyapkov’s eligibility to adjust status, left intact the IJ’s

finding of inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)). The

parties’ positions are vague but appear to be in line with our

reading of the Board’s decision: The government says that

the Board simply assumed that Zyapkov was eligible for

adjustment of status, while Zyapkov directly challenges the

IJ’s finding of ineligibility. We start with that question.

A. Zyapkov was ineligible for adjustment of status.

Section 1255(a) of Title 8 provides that an alien is eligible

to seek adjustment of status only if admissible into the United

States, but Zyapkov’s misrepresentations about his marriage

would have made him inadmissible under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).

Only after an alien has established eligibility to adjust his

status does an IJ have discretion to grant that relief. Munoz‐

Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 977–78 (7th Cir. 2013); Kimani v.

Holder, 695 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2012). The question of ad‐

missibility is important for Zyapkov, not only as it relates to

his present eligibility to adjust his status, but also because a

determination of inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) will

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permanently bar Zyapkov from readmission to the United

States. See Nguyen v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 853, 855 (8th Cir.

2008); Singh v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 400, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2006);

Ymeri v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2004).  

In most circumstances, it might be appropriate to bypass

the question of admissibility—as the Board seems to have

done here—and address only whether the IJ committed legal

or constitutional error in exercising discretion to deny ad‐

justment of status. See Jankovic v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 265, 266

(7th Cir. 2016); Darif v. Holder, 739 F.3d 329, 337 (7th Cir.

2014); Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 2006).

But given the permanent bar to admission we address Zyap‐

kov’s argument that his marriage to Gregory was not fraud‐

ulent. See I.N.S. v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 26–27 (1976); Patel

v. I.N.S., 811 F.2d 377, 381 (7th Cir. 1987); Kirong v. Mukasey,

529 F.3d 800, 803 (8th Cir. 2008). And the IJ’s finding that

Zyapkov is statutorily ineligible for adjustment is fully re‐

viewable. See Hussain v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir.

2008); Parlak v. Holder, 578 F.3d 457, 462–63 (6th Cir. 2009).

Zyapkov argues that the IJ failed to make an independent

determination based on the record and, instead, accepted the

government’s version of events while ignoring his evidence

that the marriage was bona fide. We disagree. The IJ permis‐

sibly accepted USCIS’s denial of Gregory’s I‐130 petition as

evidence that the couple’s marriage was fraudulent.

See Antia‐Perea v. Holder, 768 F.3d 647, 656–58 (7th Cir. 2014)

(explaining that to be admissible evidence must be at least

probative and reliable); Pouhova v. Holder, 726 F.3d 1007,

1011 (7th Cir. 2013); Malave v. Holder, 610 F.3d 483, 487 (7th

Cir. 2010). What’s more, the results of USCIS’s investigation

was not the only evidence before the IJ: Both Zyapkov and

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Gregory testified, and the IJ pointed out that they could not

agree about where they had lived and whether they had

separated. Zyapkov ignores that the IJ found him not credi‐

ble, and concluded that prolonged absences because of his

work as a truck driver did not explain these inconsistencies,

and further that Zyapkov had not explained how he sup‐

ports his wife financially or where he deposits his income.

Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that

Zyapkov committed marriage fraud. See Surganova v. Holder,

612 F.3d 901, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that finding

of marriage fraud must be supported by record evidence

that is reasonable, substantial, and probative); Vladimirov v.

Lynch, 805 F.3d 955, 960–62 (10th Cir. 2015) (denying petition

for review where substantial evidence of marriage fraud in‐

cluded inconsistent statements about relationship).

B. The IJ committed no legal error in denying adjust‐

ment of status.

Since Zyapkov is inadmissible, he is ineligible for ad‐

justment of status. But even assuming eligibility, as the

Board did, there was no legal or constitutional error in the

IJ’s exercise of discretion. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),

(a)(2)(D); Sokolov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 566, 569–70 (7th

Cir. 2006); Mele v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 30, 31–33 (1st Cir. 2015).

Zyakpkov argues that he was denied due process because, in

his view, the IJ “accorded an over‐abundance of weight to

the Government’s claims based on an alleged on‐sight inves‐

tigation.”

But there is no due process right to discretionary relief.

Instead we review the legal sufficiency of the removal pro‐

ceeding. See Darif, 739 F.3d at 335–36; Delgado v. Holder,

674 F.3d 759, 765–66 (7th Cir. 2012). Zyapkov contends that

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the proceeding was inadequate because the government did

not call the investigators to testify about their determination

that he committed marriage fraud. Thus, he says, he didn’t

have opportunity to cross‐examine the investigators and re‐

fute their conclusion. Yet Zyapkov was free to, but did not,

seek approval from the IJ to subpoena the investigators him‐

self. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b)(1), (2).

And he points to no regulation requiring the government to

call its investigators to testify. The burden was on Zyapkov

to prove himself admissible and eligible for discretionary

relief, as well as to present positive equities that would war‐

rant a favorable exercise of discretion. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1240.8(d); Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 (4th Cir. 2014)

(alien carries burden for showing admissibility and eligibil‐

ity); Matovski, 492 F.3d at 739 (alien carries burden of pre‐

senting positive equities). Zyapkov had multiple opportuni‐

ties over two years to present evidence of his truthfulness—

including six hearings before the IJ—but his evidence and

testimony were unconvincing. See Ortiz‐Estrada v. Holder, 757

F.3d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 2014) (explaining that alien challeng‐

ing legality of removal hearing must show he was denied a

reasonable opportunity to present evidence and that he was

prejudiced); Apouviepseakoda v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 881, 885

(7th Cir. 2007) (same).  

Accordingly, we DENY the petition for review.

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