Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01350/USCOURTS-cand-3_19-cv-01350-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Hayward
Defendant
Hayward Police Department
Defendant
Polar
Defendant
B. Tong
Defendant
Bobbie Allen Woods
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BOBBIE ALLEN WOODS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF HAYWARD, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01350-JCS 

ORDER REGARDING MOTION TO 

DISMISS FIRST AMENDED 

COMPLAINT

Re: Dkt. No. 53

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Bobbie Allen Woods, pro se, brought this action against Defendants the City of 

Hayward, the Hayward Police Department, Hayward Police Officer B. Tong, and Hayward Police 

Sergeant Polar1 asserting claims based on a police search of Woods’s home pursuant to a warrant. 

On a previous motion to dismiss Woods’s original complaint, the Court allowed Woods’s claim 

under the Americans with Disabilities Act to proceed, but dismissed his remaining claims, largely 

with leave to amend. Woods filed an amended complaint and Defendants move once again to 

dismiss. The Court held a hearing on February 28, 2020. For the reasons discussed below,

Defendants’ motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. If Woods wishes to file a second 

amend complaint to pursue the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim dismissed by this 

order, he may do so no later than April 3, 2020.2

1 There is some indication in Defendants’ filings that the defendant named as “Polar” in Woods’s 

pleadings might be “Ruben Pola.” See, e.g., dkt. 22 (magistrate judge consent form). All parties 

appear to agree that the correct defendants have responded to the complaint, however, and the 

discrepancy is not relevant to the outcome of the present motion. For consistency with Woods’s 

allegations, which are generally taken as true at this stage of the case, this order uses the name 

“Polar.” No offense is intended if that name is not correct.

2 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge for all 

purposes pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).

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II. BACKGROUND

A. Previous Order

Woods’s original complaint included the following claims: (1) unreasonable seizure of 

Woods’s person in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) unreasonable 

search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) racial discrimination in 

violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 

(4) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 

Act (“ADA”); (5) negligence; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (7) invasion of 

privacy.

The Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Woods’s unreasonable seizure claim 

because Woods did not allege that, once he was removed from his home, Defendants intentionally 

acquired “physical control” such that a reasonable person in Woods’s position would not feel free 

to leave. Order Re Mot. to Dismiss (“MTD Order,” dkt. 35)3 at 5–6 (citation omitted). The Court 

dismissed Woods’s unreasonable search claim because he relied primarily on a case addressing 

unreasonable seizures, and because even “[a]ssuming for the sake of argument that an excessive 

show of force during a search pursuant to a valid warrant might in some circumstances establish a 

constitutionally unreasonable search without constituting a seizure,” Woods failed to allege facts 

supporting a conclusion that this particular search was unreasonable Id. at 6–7. The Court 

dismissed Woods’s equal protection claim because he failed to allege facts (as opposed to mere 

conclusory assertions) supporting a conclusion that he was treated differently based on his race. 

Id. at 7–8. The Court allowed Woods’s ADA claim to proceed against the City of Hayward and 

the Hayward Police Department, but dismissed that claim against the individual defendants with 

prejudice, because “[t]he ADA does not . . . provide a cause of action against individual 

defendants in their individual capacities.” Id. at 9–11. Finally, the Court dismissed Woods’s state 

law claims for failure to allege compliance with California’s government claims procedure. Id. at 

3 Woods v. City of Hayward, No. 19-cv-01350-JCS, 2019 WL 5789256 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2019). Citations herein to the Court’s previous order refer to page numbers of the version filed in the 

Court’s ECF docket.

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11–12. 

The Court granted Woods leave to amend all of his dismissed claims except for the ADA 

claims against individual defendants. In considering whether leave to amend was appropriate, the 

Court rejected an argument that local police departments cannot be sued under § 1983, noting that 

the Ninth Circuit has held to the contrary. Id. at 8–9 (citing, e.g., Shaw v. State of Cal. Dep’t of 

Alcoholic Beverage Control, 788 F.2d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1986)).

B. Allegations of the First Amended Complaint

The allegations of Woods’s first amended complaint are similar to his original complaint, 

with additions intended to address the concerns of the Court’s previous order. Because the factual 

allegations of a complaint are generally taken as true at the pleading stage, this section recites the 

allegations of Woods’s first amended complaint as if true. Nothing in this order should be taken 

as resolving any issue of fact that might be disputed at a later stage of the case

Woods is a seventy-year-old African American man with muscular dystrophy and a 

disability as a result of his service in the United States Air Force during the Vietnam War era. 1st 

Am. Compl. (“FAC,” dkt. 47) ¶¶ 9, 46. Woods has used a wheelchair since his retirement from 

the United States Postal Service in 2009. Id. ¶ 9. Woods rents two rooms of his home in Hayward 

to Nashi Mixon-Alexander and her five– and fourteen-year-old sons, all of whom are also African 

American. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Mixon-Alexander serves as Woods’s caregiver through a home aide 

program. Id. ¶ 12. The complaint suggests that her fourteen-year-old son has had some degree of 

history with the juvenile justice system, although Woods and Mixon-Alexander “were not 

complicit with his activities in any manner.” See id. ¶ 26 (alleging that Woods and MixonAlexander “were actively involved with Ms. Mixon-Alexander’s 14-year-old child’s Probation 

Officers, the Hayward Police Department, the Juvenile District Attorney Office and Hayward 

Unified School District officials to monitor his behavioral issues”). Woods alleges that the 

Hayward Police Department and its officers knew or should have known of his disability based on 

his history of working with Hayward law enforcement authorities in the context of MixonAlexander’s son’s “behavioral issues.” See id. ¶¶ 26–27.

On March 15, 2018, Woods awoke to a voice over a loudspeaker advising that Woods’s 

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home was surrounded and that all residents must leave the house with their hands raised. Id. ¶ 13. 

After the command was repeated several times, Woods heard the sound of an explosion. Id. 

“[E]xtremely frightened,” Woods attempted to leave his bed, but struggled due to his disability 

and injured his neck and elbow in the process. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. 

As Woods, Mixon-Alexander, and her older son approached the door of the house, police 

officers addressed each of the four residents of the home by name and ordered them to exit the 

house with their hands over their heads, despite neighbors shouting to the police officers that the 

youngest son was only five years old. Id. ¶ 16. Mixon-Alexander and her older son exited first, 

while Woods and his neighbors yelled to police that he could not raise his hands because he was 

disabled. Id. ¶ 17. After the police shined a light on Woods, they allowed him to wheel himself 

out of the house without raising his hands, but aimed rifles at his head as he did so. Id. MixonAlexander’s younger son remained sleeping in his bed, and Woods, Mixon-Alexander, and 

neighbors pleaded with police to allow them to go get him in order to avoid any risk that he would 

be shot by police searching the home, but the police did not allow them to do so. Id. ¶ 18.

When Woods left the house, he was “directed . . . by armed Hayward police officers to 

drive his wheelchair half a block up the street, and then . . . ordered to ‘park right there,’” where 

he was “guarded by two officers who had visible guns in their gun-belts.” Id. ¶ 19. Woods “was 

shivering cold because he only had on a light night shirt, and his muscular dystrophy makes him 

especially sensitive to cold temperatures” and causes cramps and pain. Id.

When Woods requested a jacket or blanket, and to be allowed to wait in his home, the 

police did not let him return to his home, but after about half an hour, the police provided him with 

“a yellow body tarp bag” to use as a blanket. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. The body bag, as well as the sound of 

the explosion that preceded the search, triggered the post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) that 

Woods had developed as a result of his experience in the Vietnam War. Id. ¶¶ 21–22. 

Mixon-Alexander was allowed back into the house to get her younger son and change her 

clothes around 6:07 AM, approximately twenty-five minutes after the first loudspeaker 

announcements, and Woods was allowed to return to the front room of the house nearly forty 

minutes after that, around 6:44 AM. Id. ¶ 24. The police officers left the house around 6:58 AM. 

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Id. Police officers denied Woods’s repeated requests to speak with the supervising officers until 

the search was finished and the officers were preparing to leave, at which point Defendants Tong 

and Polar identified themselves as having supervised the operation. Id. ¶ 23.

The search was conducted pursuant to a warrant that was issued eight days earlier, on 

March 7, 2019. Id. ¶ 28. Although “[t]he warrant was for the search and seizure of [the] 14 year 

old who resided in one room in the home,” the search “was performed of the entire house,” and 

“[p]ersonal and proprietary items in [Woods’s] bedroom and office were examined and removed.” 

Id. ¶¶ 41–42. Woods contends that there was sufficient time between the issuance of the warrant 

and its execution for Defendants to have determined that the occupants of the house were not a 

threat and did not require the show of force used in the search. Id. ¶ 28. Woods also characterizes 

the police officers as “disrespectful for not considering [his] disability, [his] age, and the age of the 

children, as well as searching female renter Ms. Mixon-Alexander by male officers while female 

officers were available on the scene.” Id. ¶ 25. Woods describes the use of force in the search as 

“excessive,” and states his “belie[f] that if [he] were a white veteran with the same profile the 

warrant would not have been conducted” in the same manner. Id. ¶¶ 28–29. Woods “filed a 

government claim with the City of Hayward on August 17, 2018, which was denied on September 

25, 2018.” Id. ¶ 30.

Woods’s complaint includes the following claims: (1) unreasonable seizure of Woods’s 

person in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, FAC ¶¶ 32–37; 

(2) unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, FAC ¶¶ 38–

44; (3) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act, against only the City of Hayward and the Hayward Police Department, id. ¶¶ 45–

50; (5) negligence, id. ¶¶ 51–55; (6) intentional infliction of emotional distress, id. ¶¶ 56–61; and 

(7) invasion of privacy, id. ¶¶ 62–68. Woods no longer brings an ADA claim against the 

individual defendants, and also omits the equal protection claim that appeared in his original 

complaint.

C. Parties’ Arguments

Defendants contend that Woods’s unreasonable seizure claim should be dismissed because 

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he has not sufficiently alleged that a reasonable person in his position would not have felt free to 

leave, and because even if Woods was seized, Defendants had a categorical right to detain him as

because he was a resident of a home that was being searched pursuant to a valid warrant. Mot. 

(dkt. 53) at 3–4. Defendants argue that the unreasonable search claim should be dismissed 

because the search was conducted pursuant to a valid warrant and Woods has not alleged 

sufficient facts regarding the nature of the warrant to indicate that the show of force during the 

search was excessive. Id. at 4–5. In the alternative, Defendants argue that these claims should be 

dismissed as to Defendants Tong and Polar based on qualified immunity, and as to the City of 

Hayward and the Hayward Police Department for failure to meet the requirements of Monell v. 

Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Mot. at 5–7. Defendants also contend that 

the Hayward Police Department should be dismissed as a defendant because it is redundant to the 

City of Hayward. Id. at 6.

Despite this Court’s previous order allowing Woods’s ADA claim to proceed against the 

City of Hayward and the Hayward Police Department based on substantially identical allegations, 

see MTD Order at 9–11, Defendants now present a new argument that this claim should be 

dismissed for failure to establish deliberate indifference. Mot. at 7–9.

Defendants argue without citation to authority that all of Woods’s state law claims must be 

dismissed for failure to show an unreasonable search or seizure. Id. at 9. Addressing the claims 

individually, Defendants argue that Woods has not alleged facts showing a duty of care for his 

negligence claim, has not alleged intentional or reckless conduct to support his claim for 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and provides only conclusory assertions and “no legal 

basis” for his invasion of privacy claim. Id. at 9–10. Defendants contend that Woods has not 

alleged personal involvement in any common law tort by Tong or Polar, and that he has not 

identified a statutory basis for his claims against the City of Hayward and the Hayward Police 

Department as required by section 815 of the California Government Code. Id. at 10–11.

Woods argues that his allegations are sufficient, but requests leave to amend again if the 

Court determines otherwise. See generally Opp’n (dkt. 54).

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III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted 

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint.” N. Star Int’l v. Ariz. Corp. 

Comm’n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). Generally, a claimant’s burden at the pleading stage 

is relatively light. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a “pleading which 

sets forth a claim for relief . . . shall contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court takes “all allegations of 

material fact as true and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” 

Parks Sch. of Bus. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). Dismissal may be based on a 

lack of a cognizable legal theory or on the absence of facts that would support a valid theory. 

Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A pleading must “contain 

either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain 

recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 562 (2007) 

(citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 1984)). “A pleading 

that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action 

will not do.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

“[C]ourts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “Nor does a 

complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, the claim must be “‘plausible on its 

face,’” meaning that the claimant must plead sufficient factual allegations to “allow the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Pro se pleadings are generally liberally construed and held to a less stringent standard. See 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Even post-Iqbal, courts must still liberally construe 

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pro se filings. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 2010). As the Ninth Circuit explained in 

Hebbe, “while the standard is higher, our obligation remains, where the petitioner is pro se, 

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the 

benefit of any doubt.” Id. at 342. Nevertheless, the Court may not “supply essential elements of 

the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 

268 (9th Cir. 1982).

If the Court dismisses a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), it should “grant leave to amend 

even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could 

not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th 

Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In general, courts “should 

freely give leave when justice so requires.” Id. Further, when it dismisses the complaint of a pro 

se litigant with leave to amend, “‘the district court must provide the litigant with notice of the 

deficiencies in his complaint in order to ensure that the litigant uses the opportunity to amend 

effectively.’” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 

963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992)). “‘Without the benefit of a statement of deficiencies, the pro 

se litigant will likely repeat previous errors.’” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 

624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987)).

B. Claims Against the Hayward Police Department

Defendants are correct that courts have in some cases dismissed individual department 

defendants as redundant where the municipalities of which they are a part are also named as 

defendants. Here, although it seems likely as a matter of common experience that the Hayward 

Police Department is merely an agency of the City of Hayward, there is no evidence or other basis 

in the record to reach that conclusion as a matter of law. It is also not clear that dismissing as 

redundant claims against the Hayward Police Department, while allowing claims against the City 

of Hayward to proceed, would have any practical effect on the case. The Court therefore declines 

to do so, but encourages the parties to discuss whether they can reach a stipulation on this issue.

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C. Claims Under § 1983

1. Entity Liability

In order to establish liability under § 1983 for governmental entities rather than individual 

defendants based on Monell, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a 

constitutional right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that 

this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and, (4) that the 

policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40, 130 

F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in 

original); see also Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681-682 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on 

other grounds by Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Municipal liability for a 

constitutional violation “only attaches where (1) the alleged constitutional tort resulted from a 

municipality’s custom, policy, or practice; (2) the tortfeasor was an official ‘whose acts fairly 

represent official policy such that the challenged action constituted official policy’; (3) an official 

with policymaking authority ratified the tortfeasor’s actions; or (4) the municipality failed to 

adequately train the tortfeasors.” Inmam v. Anderson, 294 F. Supp. 3d 907, 921 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 

(citations omitted). 

Woods asserts municipal liability based solely on ratification, specifically the City of 

Hayward “respond[ing] to [Woods’s] complaint by expressly approving of the officers’ conduct 

and finding no violations of city policy.” FAC ¶ 44. Woods does not address this issue in his 

opposition brief. The Ninth Circuit has addressed “ratification” in the context of a Monell claim 

as follows:

Municipalities cannot be held liable under a traditional respondeat 

superior theory. Rather, they may be held liable only when “action 

pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a 

constitutional tort.” [Monell, 436 U.S.] at 691.

Haugen’s complaint did not allege, and he has not argued to us on 

appeal, that Brosseau was acting pursuant to any pre-existing policy 

when she shot him. Rather, he contends that the city and the police 

department are at fault because they failed to discipline Brosseau after 

the shooting. Haugen cannot, of course, argue that the municipality’s 

later action (or inaction) caused the earlier shooting. Haugen argues

instead that the city and police department should be held liable 

because they “ratified” Brosseau’s decision to use deadly force.

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The ratification doctrine, asserted as a basis for municipal liability, 

originated in St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988). There, a 

plurality of the Supreme Court stated that “if the authorized 

policymakers approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, 

their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because 

their decision is final.” Id. at 127. But the sentence from Praprotnik

must be read in context. The Court held in Praprotnik that to establish 

municipal liability, a plaintiff must “prove[] the existence of an 

unconstitutional municipal policy.” Id. at 128. A single decision by a 

municipal policymaker “may be sufficient to trigger section 1983 

liability under Monell, even though the decision is not intended to 

govern future situations,” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 

(9th Cir. 1992) (citing Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 

480–81 (1986)), but the plaintiff must show that the triggering 

decision was the product of a “conscious, affirmative choice” to ratify 

the conduct in question. Gillette, 979 F.2d at 1347. In the present case, 

Haugen has made no such showing.

Although some municipal pronouncements ratifying a subordinate’s 

action could be tantamount to the announcement or confirmation of a 

policy for purposes of Monell, here there are no facts in the record 

that suggest that the single failure to discipline Haugen rises to the 

level of such a ratification. See, e.g., Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 

373, 382 (1st Cir. 1989) (refusing to hold that the “failure of a police 

department to discipline in a specific instance is an adequate basis for 

municipal liability under Monell”).

Haugen v. Brosseau, 351 F.3d 372, 393 (9th Cir. 2003). “Praprotnik requires that a policymaker 

approve a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it before the policymaker will be deemed to 

have ratified the subordinate’s discretionary decision.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1348 

(9th Cir. 1992). 

Woods, apparently abandoning his Monell claim in his opposition brief, cites no authority 

for the proposition that mere denial of a government claim for compensation constitutes 

ratification sufficient to subject a government entity to liability under § 1983, and this Court 

declines to so hold. To hold such a denial sufficient “would simply smuggle respondeat superior

liability into section 1983,” in contravention of Ninth Circuit precedent. See id. at 1348. At the 

hearing, Woods identified no other facts that he could allege to support Monell liability. Woods’s 

§ 1983 claims against the City of Hayward and the Hayward Police Department are therefore 

DISMISSED without further leave to amend at this time, but without prejudice to Woods filing a 

motion for leave to reassert them if, at a later stage of the case, he becomes aware of facts 

supporting a policy, practice, or ratification sufficient to assert such claims.

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2. Individual Liability

a. Unreasonable Search Claim

Woods acknowledges in his complaint that the search of his property was conducted 

pursuant to a warrant. See FAC ¶¶ 26–28, 41–43. Qualified immunity protects government 

officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their 

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable 

person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “A police officer 

generally has qualified immunity for conducting [even] an unconstitutional search if he is acting 

on the basis of a facially valid warrant.” Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1991)

(citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344 n.6 (1986)). There is no indication that the warrant 

was facially invalid such that “no reasonably competent officer would have concluded that a 

warrant should issue.” See id. at 1140 (citing Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 n.9). Defendants Tong and 

Polar are therefore entitled to qualified immunity to the extent that the scope of the search was 

consistent with that authorized by the warrant.4

Woods’s first amended complaint includes only a limited description of the scope of the 

search warrant, stating that it “was for the search and seizure of [the] 14 year old who resided in 

one room in the home” and “did not mention [Woods] as subject of the warrant.” FAC ¶ 42. 

Although courts generally take a plaintiff’s allegations as true in evaluating a motion to dismiss 

under Rule 12(b)(6), courts need not do so where an allegation is contradicted by material properly 

subject to judicial notice. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 

Defendants have now filed the warrant itself in response to the Court’s request at the hearing that 

they do so. See Agarwal Decl. (dkts. 58 (under seal), 60 (public version redacted to comply with 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2)). The warrant is subject to judicial notice as incorporated by reference by 

4 The Court’s previous order noted that even assuming for the sake of argument that an excessive 

show of force in conducting a search might in some circumstances constitute an unreasonable 

search in violation of the Fourth Amendment, Woods had not alleged sufficient facts regarding the 

basis for the search warrant to determine whether an early morning raid by a SWAT team was 

reasonable. See MTD Order at 6–7. To the extent that Woods’s unreasonable search claim is 

based on the show of force rather than the extent of the search, that deficiency remains. 

Regardless, the Court remains unaware of any authority holding a search to be unreasonable and in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment based on a show of force.

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Woods’s complaint. See United States v. Richie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Even if a 

document is not attached to a complaint, it may be incorporated by reference into a complaint if 

the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the basis of the plaintiff’s 

claim.”). On its face, the warrant lists Woods’s as address as among the “Place(s) to be searched,” 

with no restriction on the areas within the house to be searched. See Agarwal Decl. Ex. 1. The 

Court therefore concludes that Defendants conducted the search pursuant to a facially valid 

warrant and are thus entitled to dismissal of Woods’s claim for unlawful search at least based on 

qualified immunity. See Barlow, 943 F.2d at 1139. Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to this 

claim, which is DISMISSED with prejudice.

b. Unreasonable Seizure Claim

As noted in the Court’s previous order, a seizure “in the constitutional sense . . . occurs 

when there is a restraint on liberty to the degree that a reasonable person would not feel free to 

leave.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 334 F.3d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 2003). “Violation of 

the Fourth Amendment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.” Brower v. County 

of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989). The Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable 

seizures requires as a “general rule” that “seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if based on probable cause 

to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 

(2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court previously held that Woods had not sufficiently alleged that he was seized, and 

Defendants argue that his amended complaint fails for the same reason. See MTD Order at 5–6; 

Mot. at 3. Woods’s present complaint includes new allegations relevant to this issue: that after 

leaving his house, police directed him to a particular location and told him to “park right here,” 

and that after he did so, he was “guarded by two officers who had visible guns.” FAC ¶ 19. 

Defendants’ assertion that the officers merely “would not let him back into his home,” Mot. at 3 

(emphasis omitted), goes beyond the allegations of Woods’s complaint. At the pleading stage, it 

is reasonable to infer that a reasonable person ordered to leave his home with rifles pointed at his 

head, instructed to “park” his wheelchair at a particular location, and thereafter “guarded” by 

armed police officers would not feel free to leave. Defendants cite no authority for their 

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suggestion that Woods’s failure to affirmatively ask if he could leave is fatal to his claim. See

Mot. at 3. The Court concludes that Woods has now sufficiently alleged a seizure.

The next question is whether the seizure was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth 

Amendment. The Supreme Court has held that Fourth Amendment allows “officers executing a 

search warrant ‘to detain the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted,’”

without need for “particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a 

specific danger to the officers.” Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186, 193 (2013) (quoting 

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981)). 

The Supreme Court recognized in Summers that “special circumstances, or possibly a 

prolonged detention, might” render detention during a valid search pursuant to a warrant 

unconstitutional “in an unusual case,” 452 U.S. at 705 n.21, and the Ninth Circuit has applied that 

exception to reverse the results of a bench trial and hold unconstitutional officers’ conduct in 

“removing a gravely ill and semi-naked man from his sickbed without providing any clothing or 

covering, and then . . . forcing him to remain sitting handcuffed in his living room for two hours 

rather than returning him to his bed within a reasonable time after the search of his room was 

completed,” Franklin v. Foxworth, 31 F.3d 873, 876–77 (9th Cir. 1994). In that case, the officers 

“cuffed [the plaintiff’s] hands behind his back, carried him into the living room, and placed him on 

a couch, with his genitals exposed,” and “[n]o effort was made to obtain clothing or any covering 

for him.” Id. at 875. The Ninth Circuit explained its reasoning, in part, as follows:

A detention conducted in connection with a search may be 

unreasonable if it is unnecessarily painful, degrading, or prolonged, 

or if it involves an undue invasion of privacy. Detentions, particularly 

lengthy detentions, of the elderly, or of children, or of individuals 

suffering from a serious illness or disability raise additional concerns. 

Of course, the presence of any of these factors in an individual case 

does not establish that the detention is unreasonable per se. Rather, 

these factors, along with the Graham elements and any other 

circumstances relevant to an individual case, must be assessed in their 

totality.

[. . .]

None of the officers had any reason to believe, on the basis of the 

information they had prior to the search or their observations once in 

the house, that Curry had committed a crime, or that he was armed. 

In fact, the officers were not even aware that Curry lived in the house 

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prior to executing the warrant. It should also have been clear to them 

that Curry was not a gang member. Finally, it should have been 

obvious to the officers that Curry presented little risk of danger to 

them, that he presented absolutely no risk of flight, and that it was 

highly unlikely that he could interfere with their search in any way.

[. . .]

We emphasize that it is not the fact that there was a more reasonable 

alternative available that leads us to our conclusion. It is the fact that 

the officers conducted the detention of Curry in a wholly 

unreasonable manner—a manner that wantonly and callously 

subjected an obviously ill and incapacitated person to entirely 

unnecessary and unjustifiable degradation and suffering. Even had 

Curry been thought to have been guilty of criminal behavior, we 

would be required to reject such conduct on the part of individuals 

sworn to uphold the law. Given the circumstances of this case, the 

violation was egregious and the injuries substantial.

Id. at 876–78.

The circumstances here are in at least some respects not so extreme, in that Woods was 

capable of moving himself in a wheelchair rather than needing to be carried, and there is no 

indication that he was unclothed to the extent that his genitals were exposed. On the other hand, 

like the plaintiff in Franklin, Woods alleges that he was not suspected of wrongdoing and that 

officers were aware of his disability. Moreover, Woods alleges that he is elderly, and being 

required to remain outside in the cold with only light clothing could perhaps be considered a 

greater imposition than being held in one’s living room in the presence of strangers, particularly 

for an individual whose disability renders him particularly susceptible to cold.

Under Ninth Circuit precedent, it is clearly established law that “[d]etentions . . . of the 

elderly . . . or of individuals suffering from a serious . . . disability raise additional concerns,” 

particularly where individuals not suspected of wrongdoing are detained while a search is 

conducted pursuant to a warrant, and that detaining such individuals “in a wholly unreasonable 

manner” with “no justification” violates the Fourth Amendment. See Franklin, 31 F.3d at 876, 

877, 878. On a full factual record, there might well be justifications for Woods’s treatment during 

the search, and this order should not be construed as prejudging the facts of the case. Based on the 

allegations of Woods’s complaint, however, no justification is apparent why Defendants—who 

allegedly had two officers available to “guard” Woods on the curb, and did not suspect Woods of 

wrongdoing—could not have detained Woods under supervision inside the house while the search 

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was conducted, or obtained a jacket from the house for Woods, rather than keeping Woods on the 

curb in light clothing for around half an hour before giving him a tarp or body bag for warmth. 

Defendants’ motion to dismiss this claim against Tong and Polar is DENIED.5

D. ADA Claim

Defendants move to dismiss Woods’s ADA claim on the basis that he has not alleged 

deliberate indifference, citing Judge Beeler’s decision in Sweiha v. County of Alameda, No. 19-cv03098-LB, 2019 WL 4848227 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019), dismissing an ADA claim for failure to 

provide psychiatric treatment to an arrestee until a week after his arrest. See Mot. at 7–9; Reply at 

7.

The Court previously held that Woods’s substantially identical allegations with respect to 

this claim in his original complaint were sufficient to proceed against the Hayward Police 

Department and the City of Hayward. MTD Order at 9–10. Defendants’ present arguments 

effectively ask the Court to reconsider that order, without filing a motion for leave to file a motion 

for reconsideration as required by Civil Local Rule 7-9(a). There is no reason why Defendants 

could not have raised arguments based on failure to show deliberate indifference in the context of 

their motion to dismiss the original complaint, rather than arguing solely and unsuccessfully that 

the ADA does not require police officers to provide reasonable accommodations of disability in 

the context of a search and that waiting inside during a search is not a cognizable accommodation. 

Regardless, under the circumstances of this case, the question of whether Defendants 

demonstrated deliberate indifference to Woods’s disability is an issue of fact not amenable to 

resolution on the pleadings. Woods plausibly alleges that Defendants knew of his disability and

did not suspect him of wrongdoing, that Woods informed Defendants that his muscular dystrophy 

was exacerbated by cold and requested an accommodation of being allowed to wait indoors, and 

that Defendants refused that accommodation and provided no alternative accommodation except 

5 The warrant and supporting affidavit submitted after the hearing indicate that Mixon-Alexander’s 

son was suspected of armed robbery, but do not suggest that Woods was suspected of a crime or 

that Defendants otherwise had reason to believe that Woods was dangerous or might destroy 

evidence. See Agarwal Decl. Exs. 1, 2. The reasonableness of the manner of Woods’s detention 

under those circumstances is not amenable to resolution on the pleadings.

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for giving a Woods “a yellow body tarp bag” around thirty minutes after he was removed from the 

home. Contrary to Defendants’ arguments, neither providing the body bag after half an hour nor 

“allowing [Woods] to wheel himself out without raising his hands” establishes a reasonable 

accommodation or a lack of deliberate indifference as a matter of law. The motion to dismiss this 

claim is DENIED.

E. State Law Claims

As a starting point, Defendants provide no authority or explanation for their argument that 

Woods’s state law claims—for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and 

invasion of privacy—“rely on [his] federal claims for unlawful search and seizure, as pled.” See

Mot. at 9. Accordingly, even if the Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Woods’s § 1983 

claims, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the state law claims warrant dismissal 

on that basis. See Cohen v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 819 F.3d 476, 481 (D.C. Cir. 2016) 

(noting consensus among federal courts that “Federal Rule 12(b)(6) places th[e] burden [of 

persuasion] on the moving party”).

Defendants also argue that Woods has not identified a statutory basis for the City of 

Hayward or the Hayward Police Department’s liability under state law as required by Government

Code section 815. Mot. at 10–11. That section provides that “[e]xcept as provided by statute ... 

[a] public entity is not liable for any injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of 

the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” Cal. Gov't Code § 815. The Court’s 

previous order noted that section 815 would not likely be a barrier to liability in this case, because 

section 815.2 of the Government Code “provides that a public entity may be held liable for the 

conduct of its employees within the scope of their duties to the same extent as those employees 

can be held liable, and section 820 . . . provides that public employees may be held liable to the 

same extent as private citizens.” MTD Order at 12. Woods cites those statutes in his opposition 

brief, Opp’n at 8, but Defendants argue that his claims must be dismissed because he did not 

include those statutes in his amended complaint, Reply at 8–9. Defendants are incorrect. The 

Supreme Court has held that the federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a 

complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. 

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City of Shelby, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). Woods’s complaint is generally based on 

factual allegations of conduct by Hayward police officers, and two of his claims under state law 

specifically asserts that it is based on the conduct of “employees of Defendant City of Hayward.” 

See FAC ¶¶ 53, 58. To the extent those officers could be held liable under state law, the City of 

Hayward and the Hayward Police Department can also be liable, regardless of whether Woods 

specifically cited particular California statutes or used the words “vicarious liability.” 

As for the individual defendants Tong and Polar, Defendants contend that Woods has not 

alleged their “‘individual’ participation” in any tort. Mot. at 10 (citing Brown v. City of Fresno, 

No. 1:18-cv-01428-AWI-SKO, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6609 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2019)). Woods 

alleges that Tong and Polar identified themselves as the officers responsible for supervising the 

operation in which Woods’s home was searched and Woods was allegedly detained on the 

sidewalk. In this Court’s view, it is reasonable to infer at the pleading stage that the conduct on 

which Woods’s claims rest is sufficiently related to the manner in which the operation was 

planned and conducted to find the supervising officers more involved than mere “membership in a 

group.” Cf. Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002). This case is not like Brown, 

where, at least as summarized by the court, the plaintiff failed to allege any connection between 

his claims and several of the defendants except that they were police officers in the jurisdiction 

where the plaintiff was arrested and purportedly subjected to excessive force. See 2019 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 6609, at *5–10. 

The Court turns to Woods’s individual claims under California law.

1. Negligence

With respect to Woods’s negligence claim, Defendants argue in their motion only that 

Woods includes “no allegations as to Defendants’ legal duty to use due care or the breach of that 

duty so as to adequately plead negligence.” Mot. at 10. “A plaintiff in any negligence suit must 

demonstrate ‘a legal duty to use due care, a breach of such legal duty, and [that] the breach [is] the 

proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.’” Kesner v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 5th 1132, 1142 

(2016) (quoting Beacon Residential Community Assn. v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill LLP, 59 

Cal. 4th 568, 573 (2014)).

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Defendants cite Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1103 (1991), for the need 

to allege facts showing a duty. That case involved the unusual circumstance of a plaintiff who had 

not yet been conceived at the time of the defendant’s conduct, where there was no “special 

relationship” as in previous cases recognizing claims for preconception negligence in certain 

narrow circumstances. See Hegyes, 234 Cal. App. 3d at 1110. This, in contrast, is a more 

straightforward case of a plaintiff affected by Defendants’ intentional acts directed toward him—

specifically, removing him from his home and allegedly detaining him on the sidewalk to conduct 

a search. Defendants’ duty arises from the basic duty of care codified at section 1714 of the 

California Civil Code, that “[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her willful 

acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the 

management of his or her property or person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1714; see also Kesner, 1 Cal. 5th 

at 1142 (“California law establishes the general duty of each person to exercise, in his or her 

activities, reasonable care for the safety of others.” (citation omitted)). “[I]n the absence of a 

statutory provision establishing an exception to the general rule of Civil Code section 1714, courts 

should create one only where clearly supported by public policy.” Kesner, 1 Cal. 5th at 1143

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants have not suggested that any such 

exception applies here.

As for the question of whether Defendants breached their duty of care, Woods has alleged 

that Defendants Tong and Polar supervised a raid in which Woods, not suspected of wrongdoing, 

was detained outside in the early morning cold in light clothing despite Defendants’ knowledge 

that Wood had a disability exacerbated by cold. It is of course possible that some of those that 

facts might prove to be incorrect, or that other facts outside of the complaint might reveal 

justifications for Defendant’s conduct. Taking Woods’s allegations as true, however, Woods has 

alleged sufficient facts to support a conclusion that he was harmed by Defendant’s failure to use 

ordinary care. Defendant’s motion is DENIED as to Woods’s negligence claim.

2. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants argue that Woods has not stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 

distress because “there are no allegations that amount to either intentional or reckless conduct by 

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Defendants that was intended to inflict severe emotional distress on [Woods].” Mot. at 10. Under 

California law:

A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists 

when there is “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant 

with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability 

of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or 

extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of 

the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” A 

defendant’s conduct is “outrageous” when it is so “extreme as to 

exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” 

And the defendant's conduct must be “intended to inflict injury or 

engaged in with the realization that injury will result.”

[. . .]

With respect to the requirement that the plaintiff show severe 

emotional distress, this court has set a high bar. “Severe emotional 

distress means emotional distress of such substantial quality or 

enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society 

should be expected to endure it.”

Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050–51 (2009) (quoting Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 

6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993)) (final alteration in original; internal citations omitted without 

ellipses). 

Woods’s present complaint does not allege Defendants’ actual intent to injure him, or 

actual knowledge that severe emotional distress would result. The Court therefore DISMISSES 

this claim with leave to amend. The Court does not reach the question of whether Woods has 

sufficiently alleged conduct by Defendants “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 

tolerated in a civilized community” or that he experienced “emotional distress of such substantial

quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to 

endure it.” See id. If Woods chooses to amend to pursue this claim, he should include all facts 

within his knowledge that support those elements.

3. Invasion of Privacy

Defendants treat Woods’s claim for “invasion of privacy” as a claim for “intrusion into a 

private place,” and acknowledge that California law recognizes such a claim. See Mot. at 10 

(citing Shulman v Grp. W Productions, Inc., 18 Cal. 4th 200, 230–31 (1998)). The California 

Supreme Court has held that an “action for intrusion has two elements: (1) intrusion into a private 

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place, conversation or matter, (2) in a manner highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Shulman, 

18 Cal 4th at 231. Defendants’ only argument on this point is that Woods “simply recites the legal 

elements” of this claim, Mot. at 10, and that he failed to provide legal authority for the claim in his 

opposition brief, Reply at 8. The Court nevertheless concludes that a valid search warrant 

provides a complete defense to a claim for invasion of privacy, and DISMISSES this claim with 

prejudice. 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motion is GRANTED as to: (1) Woods’s 

claims for unreasonable search and invasion of privacy, which are dismissed with prejudice; 

(2) Wood’s claim for unreasonable seizure against the City of Hayward and the Hayward Police 

Department under Monell, which is dismissed without leave to amend at the time but without 

prejudice to seeking such leave if warranted it a later date; and (3) Woods’s claim for intentional 

infliction of emotional distress, which is dismissed with leave to further amend. The motion is 

DENIED as to Woods’s claim for unreasonable seized against the individual defendants, his claim 

under the ADA, and his claim for negligence.

If Woods wishes to pursue his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, he may 

file a third amended complaint no later than April 3, 2020. Any changes to his allegations must be 

limited to addressing the defects in that claim, unless Woods seeks and obtains leave of the Court 

to amend as to other issues.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 13, 2020

______________________________________

JOSEPH C. SPERO

Chief Magistrate Judge

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