Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-01311/USCOURTS-azd-2_04-cr-01311-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marco Antonio Gonzalez
Defendant
United States of America
Plaintiff

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Clerk's criminal case record number.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Marco Antonio Gonzalez, 

Petitioner, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Respondent. 

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No. CV 05-2722-PHX-SRB(CRP)

 CR 04-1311-PHX-SRB

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Pending before the Court is Petitioner Marco Antonio Gonzalez's pro se Motion to

Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

(CR Docket 26).1

 The Government has filed a Response. (CR Docket 34). Petitioner has not

filed a Reply. Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief on four bases:

1. He is entitled to a downward departure, post-conviction, pursuant to United

States Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.19, based on his rehabilitation

efforts;

2. His counsel was ineffective when he failed to seek a downward departure

based on United States Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.20, Aberrant

Behavior;

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3. His counsel was ineffective, misrepresenting the plea and misadvising 

Petitioner to take the plea;

4. The district court was unaware of its ability to depart downward based on

"Fast Track" and as such Petitioner is entitled to the downward departure.

Pursuant to the Rules of Practice of this Court, this matter was referred to Magistrate

Judge Pyle for a report and recommendation. For the following reasons, the Magistrate

Judge recommends that the District Court, after its independent review of the record, enter

an order denying the motion. 

Ordinarily, a court must conduct a hearing on a motion unless it "and the files and

records of the case conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief..." 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255. The motion, as well as the files and records, do conclusively establish that the

Defendant is not entitled to relief. See Shah v. United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir.

1989). Thus, no hearing is required to rule on the present Motion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On March 24, 2005, pursuant to a written plea agreement (CR Docket 23), Petitioner

pled guilty to Count 2 of the Indictment, Possession of a Firearm in Furtherance of a Drug

Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), a Class A felony offense. The

parties stipulated in the plea agreement, pursuant to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,

Rule 11(c)(1)(C), "Defendant's sentence of imprisonment shall be 60 months." (CR Docket

23, p.2). This was the only agreement regarding sentencing.

On June 6, 2005, the Court sentenced the Defendant to a term of 60 months

imprisonment on Count 2, followed by five years of supervised release. (CR Docket 22).

This sentence was consistent with the terms of the plea agreement. On September 7, 2005,

Petitioner filed the present § 2255 action. (CR Docket 26).

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DISCUSSION

Timeliness

Under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), a one year

period of limitations from the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final has

been imposed on the filing of motions for collateral relief by prisoners in federal custody. 28

U.S.C. § 2255. The Magistrate Judge finds that the Motion was timely filed. 

Waiver

Petitioner pled guilty. As part of his plea agreement, Petitioner made the following

waiver:

Defendant waives any and all motions, defenses, probable cause

determinations, and objections which Defendant could assert to

the Indictment or to the Court's entry of judgment against

Defendant and imposition of sentence upon Defendant,

providing the sentence is consistent with this agreement.

Defendant further waives: (1) any right to appeal the Court's

entry of judgment against Defendant; (2) any right to appeal the

imposition of sentence upon Defendant under Title 18, United

States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals; and (3) any right

to collaterally attack Defendant's conviction and sentence under

Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, or any other

collateral attack. Defendant acknowledges that this waiver shall

result in the dismissal of any appeal or collateral attack

Defendant might file challenging his conviction or sentence in

this case.

(CR Docket 23 at 4). Petitioner indicated in his plea that he discussed the terms with his

attorney, that he agreed to the terms and conditions, and that he entered into it voluntarily.

(Id. at7-9).

On March 22, 2005, the Court held a hearing and specifically addressed Petitioner's

waiver:

THE COURT: In your plea agreement you agreed to give up

another right, and that is your right to appeal. On page 3 at the

bottom, there's a section 4 that talks about your waiver of your

appeal rights.

When you waive your rights to appeal it means you've

given up your rights to appeal to a higher court, to collaterally

attack the validity of the conviction that will result from

pleading guilty, any right to appeal matters pertaining to the

government's prosecution of the case against you, and also your

right to appeal the sentence that will be imposed so long as your

sentence is consistent with the terms of your agreement.

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Included in Attachment 2 to Government's Response.

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Do you understand you've agreed to give up those appeal

rights as well?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Yes, I agree.

(Transcript of Change of Plea2

, p.11). Petitioner also indicated that he had an opportunity

to discuss the plea with his attorney and to discuss any questions that he had and that he was

entering into the plea voluntarily. (Id. at 11-13).

Plea agreements are contractual in nature and their plain language will generally be

enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v. Jeronimo,

398 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.2005). For example, a waiver of appellate rights is enforceable

if the language of the waiver encompasses the right to appeal on the grounds raised and the

waiver is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.

A defendant may waive the statutory right to bring a § 2255 action challenging the

length of his sentence. United States v. Pruitt, 32 F.3d 431, 433 (9th Cir.1994); United States

v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir.1992) cert. denied sub nom. Abarca-Espinoza v.

United States, 5008 U.S. 979 (1993). The only claims that cannot be waived are a claim that

the waiver itself was involuntary or that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver

involuntary. See Pruitt, 32 F.3d at 433 (expressing "doubt" that a plea agreement could waive

a claim that counsel erroneously induced a defendant to plead guilty or accept a particular

part of the plea bargain); Abarca, 985 F.2d at 1014 (expressly declining to hold that a waiver

forecloses a claim of ineffective assistance or involuntariness of the waiver); See also

Jeronimo, 398 F.3d at 1156 n.4 (Summarizing Pruitt and Abarca, but declining to decide

whether waiver of all statutory rights included claims implicating the voluntariness of the

waiver). 

Grounds One and Four are challenges to the length of sentence imposed by the Court

and as such were waived by Petitioner. (See CR Docket 23 at 3-4). Although, in Ground

Two, Petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective, the assertions underlying his contention

pertain to sentencing and not to voluntariness of the waiver. Thus Ground Two was also

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Government's Response, Attachment 2.

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waived by Petitioner. Petitioner expressly waived issues regarding the imposition of

sentence and expressly waived a § 2255 action. The Court accepted his plea as voluntarily

made. (See Transcript of Change of Plea3

, p.22-3); See United States v. Nunez, 223 F.3d 956,

959 (9th Cir.2000) (waiving appeal of sentencing issues also waives the right to argue on

appeal that counsel was ineffective at sentencing), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 921(2001).

Ground Three asserts ineffective assistance of counsel. In it Petitioner claims that his

counsel misrepresented the plea and misadvised him to enter into it. Because this ground

asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim which could render the waiver involuntary,

it must be addressed.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that

(1) his counsel's performance was deficient, and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the Defendant.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); James v. Borg, 24 F.3d 20, 26 (9th

Cir.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 935 (1994). To demonstrate deficient performance,

Petitioner must show that his counsel's representation fell "below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Counsel is "strongly presumed to have

rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable

professional judgment." Id. at 689-90. To establish prejudice, Petitioner must "show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.

Petitioner's claim is that his counsel was ineffective because he misrepresented and

misadvised the Petitioner about the plea. Petitioner indicates that he was induced to take the

plea because his counsel advised him that he was going to receive a 60 month sentence.

(Petition, p. 4). However, the plea agreement does specifically state under "Agreements

Regarding Sentencing" that the government and the Petitioner "stipulate that the following

is an appropriate disposition of this case: Defendant's sentence of imprisonment shall be 60

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months." (Response, Exhibit1, p.2). Furthermore, the Court imposed a sentence of 60

months as stipulated in the plea agreement. (CR Docket 22). Petitioner claims that he did not

receive the benefit that he bargained for and as such his plea was ill-advised. Petitioner has

failed to demonstrate what benefit he bargained for that he did not receive. Petitioner also

has failed to demonstrate in what way his counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness. Furthermore, having received the sentence stipulated to in the plea,

Petitioner has failed to show prejudice. As such, Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance

of counsel made in Ground Three fails.

CONCLUSION

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel

when he decided to enter his plea of guilty with the Court and as such Ground Three should

be dismissed. Grounds One, Two, and Four should be dismissed because Petitioner

expressly waived them in his change of plea.

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the District Court,

after its independent review of the record, enter an order denying the Motion to Vacate, Set

Aside or Correct Sentence (CR Docket 26).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), any party may serve and file written objections within

10 days of being served with a copy of this report and recommendation. If objections are not

timely filed, the party's right to de novo review may be waived. See United States v. ReynaTapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir.2003)(en banc), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 900 (2003). If

objections are filed, the parties should direct them to the District Court by using the

following case numbers: CV 05-2722-PHX-SRB; CR 04-1311-PHX-SRB.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2006.

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