Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02288/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02288-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Tall Tree Administrators
Defendant
Laura Turnbow
Plaintiff

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1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LAURA TURNBOW, No. 2:09-cv-02288-MCE-EFB

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TALL TREE ADMINISTRATORS LLC;

and DOES 1-100, inclusive,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through this action Plaintiff Laura Turnbow (“Plaintiff”)

sought damages for the denial of medical benefits under an

Employee Benefit Plan administered by Defendant Tall Tree

Administrators, LLC (“Defendant”) subject to the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

(“ERISA”). On March 17, 2010, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed

her suit. Presently before the Court is a motion by Defendant

seeking an award of attorney’s fees and costs incurred in

defending against this action. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendant’s motion is denied.

Case 2:09-cv-02288-MCE -EFB Document 29 Filed 07/23/10 Page 1 of 5
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 The factual assertions in this section are based on the 1

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint unless otherwise specified.

2

BACKGROUND1

This dispute arises from an automobile accident in which

Plaintiff sustained personal injuries. At the time of the

accident, Plaintiff believed she was insured for health benefits

as a “significant other” through her partner’s employer-funded

benefits plan administered by Defendant. 

Following Plaintiff’s injuries, Defendant authorized her

treatment of insurance but subsequently refused to cover her

costs based upon a belief that Plaintiff was not an eligible plan

participant. Plaintiff alleges that she was at all times a

dependant of a covered plan member, paid premiums on the plan,

and, as such, was wrongfully denied coverage of her medical

expenses. Plaintiff subsequently filed suit.

On November 13, 2009, the Court granted, with leave to

amend, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on the

grounds that Plaintiff’s claims were preempted by ERISA and

Plaintiff was thereby required to follow administrative

procedures. Plaintiff elected to file a First Amended Complaint,

which Defendant again moved to dismiss on the grounds that

Plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. 

Plaintiff countered that she had yet to be provided a written

notice of denial as necessary for her to commence to the remedial

process. The Court ruled in Defendant’s favor, noting that in

light of the circumstances parties might still be able to resolve

their dispute through internal procedures. 

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3

The Court granted the motion to dismiss with leave to amend, and

mandated that parties file a joint status report within fortyfive days. 

However, on March 17, 2010, Plaintiff instead chose to

voluntarily dismiss her suit. Defendant’s Motion followed

seeking attorney’s fees and costs.

STANDARD

ERISA allows for recovery of attorney’s fees and costs in

actions arising out of plans subject to ERISA provisions.

Specifically it provides that “[i]n any action under this

subchapter...by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the

court in its discretion may allow reasonable attorney’s fee and

costs of action to either party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).

 In the Ninth Circuit, the discretionary decision to award

fees under ERISA has traditionally been governed by the five

factors set forth in Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446,

453 (9th Cir. 1980). Those factors are: (1) the degree of the

opposing parties’ culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of

the opposing parties to satisfy an award of fees; (3) whether an

award of fees against the opposing parties would deter others

from acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties

requesting fees sought to benefit all participants and

beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal

question regarding ERISA; and (5) the relative merits of the

parties’ positions. Id. 

///

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4

ANALYSIS

Defendant’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees centers on the notion

that Plaintiff’s Complaint at all times failed to exhaust

administrative remedies, and accordingly Defendant should be

compensated for defending against a jurisdictionally defective

suit. However, in applying the Hummell factors the Court finds

that an award of attorney’s fees is not warranted in this case.

Namely, nothing in the case history reflects culpability or bad

faith on the part of Plaintiff. Nor can it be said that the

“relative merits” of Defendant’s position far outweighed that of

Plaintiff.

Rather, the resolution of the Motions to Dismiss brought by

Defendant in the course of this action hinged on two separate

legal questions. First, this Court was called to determine

whether California Health and Safety Code § 1317.8 superceded

ERISA mandates when pre-approval of medical care was provided. 

The Court held that under the circumstances it did not. (Docket

No. 10) Subsequently, the Court was required to answer whether

an exception to the exhaustion requirements of ERISA was

applicable to Plaintiff’s suit. The Court held that no such

exception applied. (Docket No. 22)

This is hardly a matter in which Plaintiff has vexatiously

litigated her claims in the face of a clear defect. Rather, the

parties’ dispute has invoked a number of substantial legal

issues. Where an action is brought in good faith and presents

legitimate legal claims, award of attorney’s fees and costs is

inappropriate. 

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 Because oral argument will not be of material assistance, 2

the Court orders this matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal.

Local Rule 230(g). 

5

See Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. Charles Minor Equip.

Rental, Inc., 766 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th. Cir. 1985). Such is the

case here.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion For Attorney’s Fees and

Costs (Docket No. 25) is DENIED.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2010

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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