Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01771/USCOURTS-caed-2_08-cv-01771-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marco Polo Cuervo
Plaintiff
Jose Luis Mejia
Defendant

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARCO POLO CUERVO,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-08-1771 LKK DAD PS

vs.

JOSE LUIS MEJIA, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Defendant.

 /

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se with an action alleging a contract dispute. Plaintiff

asserts jurisdiction grounded on diversity. The matter has been referred to a United States

Magistrate Judge in accordance with Local Rule 72-302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of California residing in Bakersfield,

California, and that defendant is a citizen of the District of Columbia. Plaintiff further alleges

that the parties entered into a contract in Los Angeles in 1987; defendant pledged property as

collateral securing the debt owed by defendant to plaintiff; the parties’ agreement was recorded

in Kern County; defendant defaulted on his obligations; plaintiff exercised remedies available to

him under Texas state law; and plaintiff and defendant agreed to transfer and did reconvey some

of the collateral to plaintiff in partial satisfaction of defendant’s obligations. Plaintiff claims that

defendant is now asserting possession of certain property that was transferred to plaintiff.

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The statute governing venue in diversity actions provides that

[a] civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of

citizenship may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought

only in (1) a judicial district where any defendant resides, if all

defendants reside in the same State, (2) a judicial district in which

a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the

action is situated, or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant is

subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is

commenced, if there is no district in which the action may

otherwise be brought.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(a). In the present case, the Eastern District of California is not a judicial

district where any defendant resides, where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claim occurred, where a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is

situated, or where defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction when the action was

commenced. Venue in the Eastern District of California is therefore improper.

When a plaintiff files an action in a district where venue is not proper, the district

court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or

division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). Because there is no basis

for venue in the Eastern District of California, this action must be dismissed or transferred.

Although plaintiff alleges that the parties’ agreement was recorded in Kern

County, California, it appears that the specific property at issue is located in Texas. There are

four judicial districts in Texas, each of which includes seven divisions. Plaintiff’s complaint

alleges that the defendant is a citizen of the District of Columbia, but plaintiff has not alleged

facts concerning defendant’s current residence. The undersigned does not find that the interest of

justice requires transfer of this action to the Fresno Division of this court, to the district court for

the District of Columbia, or to one of the 28 courts encompassed by the four judicial districts in

Texas. See King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1992) (affirming refusal to transfer

an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1406); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 705

F.2d 1515, 1523 (9th Cir. 1983) (affirming district court’s refusal to transfer federal defendants’

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claims rather than dismiss them). See also Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir.

1986) (holding that a district court may raise the issue of defective venue sua sponte and dismiss

the action, as long as the defendants have not already waived objections to venue). This action

should be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new action in one of the districts where

venue is proper.

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed without

prejudice because venue is not proper in the United States District Court for the Eastern District

of California.

These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States

District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

ten (10) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file any

written objections with the court. A document containing objections should be titled “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 4, 2008.

DAD:kw

Ddad1\orders.prose\cuervo1771.f&r.venue

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