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Parties Involved:
Terry Louis Lee
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, I 

I 

Plaintiff ··Appellee, I 

I 

v. I No. 94-4199 

I 

TERRY LOUIS LEE, I 

I 

Defendant-Appellant. I 

lF'ILJE D 

United States Court ol Appc0:;, 

Te:~th Circuit 

JAN 111996 

PATRICK FISHER 

C1er:r 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 

(D.C. No. 94-CR-961 

Submitted on the briefs:* 

Edward K. Brass, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Scott M. Matheson, Jr., United States Attorney, and Richard G. 

MacDougall, Assistant United States AttorneY, District of Utah, 

Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

* The parties have agreed that this case may be submitted 

for decision on the briefs. ~Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); lOth Cir. 

R. 34.1.2. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this 

panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not 

materially assist the determination of this appeal. ~Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); lOth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 

ordered submitted without oral argument. 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 1 
Before EBEL and McKAY, Circuit Judges, and COOK, District 

Judge. •• 

McKay, Circuit Judge. 

Deputy Phil Barney of the Sevier County Sheriff's Office was 

operating a stationary radar on Interstate 70 at the Sigurd, 

Utah, interchange at' approximately 7 a.m. on June 23, 1993. He 

wa-s positioned facing westbound in the center of the median. 

Deputy Barney observed a white Buick traveling eastbound and 

straddling the lane marker as it approached. The vehicle was 

directly in the center of the center line and straddled it for 

about- 100 to 150 feet (or for about one second) before it 

proceeded into the outside lane of traffic. Deputy Barney 

observed that the driver of the a~tomobile was African-American 

and that the car had a California license plate. He then 

immediately turned his vehicle around and pursued the AfricanAmerican driving the Buick with out-of-state license plates. 

· ** Honorable H. Dale Cook, Senior United States District 

Judge for the Northern District of OklahomaJ sitting by 

designation. 

2 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 2 
Deputy BarneY testified that straddling the line was not 

clearly a violation of the law, except for possibly being an 

improper lane change for failure to signal. 1 He did, however, 

consider this conduct to be indicative of a sleepy or intoxicated 

driver. His purported concern was that the driver of the Buick 

with out-of-state license plates might be sleepy or intoxicated. 

Deputy Barney saw no further driving irregularities as he pursued 

and pulled over the driver of the Buick. 2 

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6 .. 69 provides in relevant part: 

(1) (a) A person may not turn a vehicle 

or move right or left upon a roadway or 

change lanes until the movement can be· made 

with reasonable safety and an appropriate 

signal has been given. 

(b) A signal of intention to turn right 

or left or to change lanes shall be given 

continuously for at least the last three 

seconds preceding the beginoing of the turn 

or change. 

{Emphasis added) . It is possible that Deputy Barney did not 

observe Mr. Lee legally signal his intent to change lanes under 

§ 41-6-69 because Deputy Barney did not see Mr. Lee's vehicle 

until it was in the middle of its lane change. 

2 Deputy Barney's patrol cruiser was equipped with a video 

camera which was activated when he turned on his roller lights. 

He also wore a microphone which recorded the audio. The audiovideo equipment recorded the stop and subs~quent encounter 

between Deputy Barney and the Defendants. The version of the 

{continued ... ) 

3 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 3 
As he approached the vehicle, Deputy Barney testified that 

he noticed that two African-American people were seated in the 

front of the Buick. According to the video, he arrived at the 

driver-side car window at 7:08:30 a.m. He asked the driver of 

the car, Appellant Terry Louis Lee, for his driver's license and 

the vehicle registration. Deputy Barney testified that he 

initially smelled alcohol emanating from the car, but he did not 

ask Mr. Lee whether he had been drinking. He did ask, however, 

whether they (Mr. Lee and the passenger in the car, Mr. Gregory 

Lacy) had been driving all night. Mr. Lee responded that they 

had no_t been driving all night, but had stopped at a rest stop. 

Mr. Lee presented Deputy Barney with his California driver's 

license, but was unable produce the registration. Deputy Barney 

then asked if the vehicle was leased. Mr. Lacy responded 

affirmatively. Deputy Barney then asked if they had the lease 

agreement. Mr. Lacy responded that he did not. Deputy Barney 

asked to whom the vehicle was leased,. and Mr. Lacy responded that 

2 ( ••• continued) 

videotape admitted into evidence begins at 7:08a.m. with Officer 

Barney's patrol car pulled behind the Defendant's vehicle on the 

side of the road. 

4 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 4 
it was leased to himself and his wife. Deputy Barney asked if he 

had a yearly lease. Mr. Lacy responded he had a monthly lease. 

Deputy Barney then asked Mr. Lacy for identification. Mr. 

Lee asked Deputy Barney why he had pulled them over. Deputy 

Barney replied that they were straddling the line and he thought 

that they might be going to sleep. Mr. Lacy then stated that he 

had the lease agreem8nt in the trunk. Mr. Lee and Mr. Lacy then 

proceeded to exit the vehicle and open the trunk. 

While retaining Mr. Lee's driver's license, Deputy Barney 

asked where they were traveling to. Mr. Lacy stated that they 

were going to Denver. He then presented to Deputy Barney a 

California identification card and prior lease agreements from 

Enterprise Leasing. Also, Mr. Lacy was not carrying a driver's 

license, and there was some question as to whether he had been 

driving. Mr. Lee stated that they had not been trading off, but 

they had stopped to rest. 

Deputy Barney testified that, at this point, he was certain 

that the smell of alcohol came from Mr. Lacy. He then asked both 

Mr. Lee. and Mr. Lacy if they consumed any alcohol, and they 

5 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 5 
replied "no.'' Then Mr. Lacy appeared to indicate that he had but 

that he had been sleeping and not driving. 

Deputy Barney returned to his patrol car and ran computer 

checks on the vehicle and on Mr. Lee and Mr. Lacy at 7:13 a.m. 

The video tape is blank for more than ten minutes from 7:14:04 

a.m. to 7:24:45 a.m. The tape stops with Officer Barney calling 

in for the computer Check, and it resumes with Mr. Lacy 

approaching Officer Barney as he is sitting in the patrol car and 

writing out a warning citation for improperly changing lanes. 

Officer Barney testified that the check indicated that the 

vehicle was not reported stolen and was owned by Enterprise 

Leasing. The background checks revealed criminal records for 

both Mr. Lacy and Mr. Lee. 

As Deputy Barney finished writing the warning citation for 

improperly changing lanes, Mr. Lacy approached the patrol car and 

asked Deputy Barney where the nearest rest stop was located. 

Deputy Barney told him that the next town was nearby. Mr. Lacy 

provided a detailed account of his travel plans and his history 

of, and reasons for, renting cars from Enterprise. He said they 

were going to Colorado to meet his sister, and they were going 

6 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 6 
together to' visit their mother in Oklahoma. He explained that he 

was having problems with his own car and that he had rented the 

Buick to have a larger car for his trip. He said Mr. Lee had 

drunk too much coffee and that he had been snoozing while Mr. Lee 

was driving. 

Then, suddenly at 7:27:10 a.m., Deputy Barney asked Mr. Lacy 

if they were carryin9 any firearms. He responded that they were 

not. Deputy Barney then asked if they were carrying any 

narcotics. Again, Mr. Lacy replied that they were not. At 

7:27:20 a.m.--more than nineteen minutes into the "brief" Terry 

detention--Deputy Barney asked if he could search the car. 

Apparently taken aback by the question, Mr. Lacy replied, ''Sir?" 

Again Deputy Barney asked, 11May I search your car?" Mr. Lacy 

gave him permission. 

Deputy Barney returned to the Buick with Mr. Lacy. As they 

walked to the car, he asked Mr. Lacy if he had ever been 

arrested. Mr. Lacy admitted that he had been previously 

arrested. At the car, Deputy Barney asked Mr. Lee to step out of 

the car. Then Deputy Barney returned the rental documents and 

identification card to Mr. Lacy, and he handed Mr. Lee his 

7 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 7 
driver's license and the warning citation. At 7:28:30 a.m., a 

back-up officer, State Trooper Billen, arrived. 

Deputy Barney had Messrs. Lee and Lacy move to the rear of 

the Buick where he asked Trooper Hillen to watch them. Deputy 

Barney then proceeded to lean into the front driver-side of the 

Buick. At 7:29:24 a.m., the tape ends with Deputy Barney 

emerging from the vehicle and moving toward the back of the 

vehicle. 

Deputy Barney testified that he searched and found nothing 

under the driver's seat. He then reached under the front 

passenger seat and retrieved a shaving kit. He unzipped the kit 

and found a large clear plastic bag containing a substantial 

amount of crack cocaine on top of other items. Both Messrs. Lee 

and Lacy were placed under arrest. 

Codefendants Lee and Lacy were indicted for possession of 

more than fifty grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. 

Both Defendants filed a motion seeking to suppress the evidence 

seized from the vehicle. After a hearing, a magistrate judge 

recommended denying the Defendants' motion to suppress, which was 

8 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 8 
adopted by the district court. Defendant Lee pled guilty to 

possession of five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 844, while preserving his right to challenge on 

appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. Defendant Lee has 

been sentenced to ninety-six months imprisonment to be followed 

by three years of supervised release. 

Appellant raise's three issues on appeal: (1) whether the 

traffic stop was merely a pretext to conduct a search of the 

defendants' vehicle; (2) whether the traffic stop was not 

justified at its inception and was not reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances surrounding the stop; and (3) whether 

defendant's consent was the fruit of an illegal detention. 

''[T]he ultimate determination of reasonableness under the 

Fourth Amendment is a question of law which we review de novo." 

United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874 1 876 (lOth Cir. 1994). 

·under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), a law enforcement 

officer is permitted to make a limited "seizure" of an individual 

suspected of criminal activity il the officer has "specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with reasonable 

inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." 

9 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 9 
We review Terry stop encounters in a step-by-step manner because 

what may begin as a routine traffic stop will often escalate into 

probable cause for a search or a search pursuant to a consensual 

encounter. We examine each stage of the encounter to ensure that 

the government had the required amount of reasonable suspicion, 

probable cause, or consent to support the search. 

Pursuant to Terry, we make a dual inquiry in determining the 

reasonableness of an investigative detention. 392 U.S. at 20. 

First, we are supposed to examine "whether the officer's action 

was justified at its inception." I.s.L.. While the stop in this 

case appears to be clearly pretextual, our inquiry into the 

officer's justification is severely limited by our recent 

decision in United States y. Botero-Ospina, 1995 WL 723102 (lOth 

Cir. 1995) (en bane). Under BQtero-Ospina, "[o]ur sole inquiry 

is whether this particular officer had reasonable suspicion that 

this particular motorist violated 1 any one of the multitude of 

applicable traffic and equipment regulations' of the 

jurisdiction." .lQ......_ at *3 (quoting Delaware v. Px;ouse, 440 U.S. 

648, 661 (1979)). The facts in this case are almost identical to 

Botero-Ospina. In each case, Deputy Barney had pulled over a 

non-Anglo motorist for crossing over the center line. As in 

10 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 10 
Bote~o Ospina, Deputy Barney found that straddling the lane 

marker constituted an adequate basis to investigate for 

impairment of the driver due to sleepiness or intoxication. 3 

Thus, Deputy Barney's purported concern- that the Defendant with 

out-of-state license plates might be sleepy or intoxicated 

because he had changed lanes is sufficient to justify the stop 

under Botero-Ospina. 

Our second inquiry under Ter~ is whether the officer 1 s 

action ''was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

which justified the interference in the first place. 11 Terry, 392 

U.S. at 20. The Supreme Court has instructed that an 

investigative detention must ''last no longer than is necessary to 

effectuate the purpose of the stop,'' and '' [t] he scope of the 

detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying 

justification. 11 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 

3 Driving under the influence of alcohol is a violation of 

Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. In Botero-Ospina we state, 

''Straddling the lane is a violation of Utah law." ,ld.._ at * 14 

n. 5 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 41··6-61). Contra State y. Bello, 

871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denieq, 883 P.2d 1359 

(Utah 1994) (noting that § 41-6-61 "requires only that a vehicle 

remain entirely in a single lane 'a.s nearly as practical', and 

holding that an investigatory stop by Deputy Barney was· illegal). 

11 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 11 
In this case, the scope of Defendant Lee's detention was not 

carefully tailored to Deputy Barney's purported concern that the 

Defendant was drivini while sleepy or intoxicated. Deputy Barney 

asked for Mr. Lee's driver's license and vehicle registration. 

Deputy Barney stated that he initially smelled alcohol emanating 

from the car, although he did not ask Mr. Lee whether he had been 

drinking. Deputy Barney asked whether the Defendants had driven 

through the night, and Mr. Lee responded that they had stopped at 

a rest stop. Mr. Lee produced a valid driver's license, and Mr. 

Lacy explained he did not have his lease agreement. Deputy 

Barney determined that the car was not reported stolen and that 

it was owned by Enterprise Leasing Company. Mr. Lacy provided 

enough documentation to reasonably show that he and Mr. Lee were 

entitled to operate the car. Deputy Barney determined that the 

smell of alcohol was from Mr. Lacy and not from Mr. Lee. As 

Deputy Barney completed the warning citation, Mr. Lacy also 

provided a sound explanation of his travel plans. Deputy Barney 

then questioned Mr. Lacy about guns and drugs, and he asked Mr. 

Lacy for permission to search the car. 

We have repeatedly stated, " 1When the driver has produced a 

valid license and proof that he is entitled to operate the car, 

12 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 12 
he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subject 

to further delay by police for additional questioning.'" United 

States y. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (lOth Cir. 1994) (quoting 

United States y. Gonzalez Lerma, 14 F.3d 1479, 1483 (lOth Cir.), 

~ert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1862 (1994)). Deputy Barney's questions 

about firearms and drugs were unrelated to his underlying 

justification for the detention, which was to determine if the 

Defendant was driving while impaired. After determining that Mr. 

Lee was capable of driving, Deputy Barney should have terminated 

the encounter and permitted him and Mr. Lacy to go on their way. 

After having his suspicions allayed, Deputy Barney could not 

further detain Defendants or search Defendants unless he had 

probable cause or their consent. The supreme Court has 

explained: 

[W]hen an officer's observations lead him reasonably to 

suspect that a particular vehicle may [be involved in 

criminal activity], he may stop the car briefly and 

investigate the circumstances that provoke suspicion. 

As in Terry, the stop and inquiry must be "reasonably 

related in scope to the justification for their 

initiation." 392 U.S., at 29. , .. [H]e may ask them 

to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further 

detention or search must be based on consent or 

probable cause. 

United States y. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-82 (1975). 

13 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 13 
The next step, then, is whether, under the totality of the 

circumstances, Deputy Barney had probable cause to further detain 

and search Defendants·. Deputy Barney, however, lacked \\specific 

and articulable facts" to "reasonably warrant" shifting the focus 

of his intrusion from the traffic stop to guns and drugs. Terry, 

392 U.S. at 21. 

The government argues that Deputy Barney had an appropriate 

factual basis supporting probable cause for two reasons: (1 I the 

Defendants were attempting to divert attention from the passenger 

compartment of the car by going to the trunk of the car to get 

Mr. Lacy's past rental agreements; and (2) the Defendants' 

extensive criminal histories gave rise to a concern that they 

possessed weapons. Appellee's Br. at 8. The first factual basis 

cited by the government is inappropriate and nonsensical because 

the Defendants' conduct in going to the trunk was innocuous; they 

went to the trunk for the purpose of obtaining past rental 

agreements, which in fact were in the trunk. The Defendants' 

intent in going to the trunk was to satisfy Deputy Barney's 

inquiry into their right to operate the vehicle. Some facts must 

be outrightly dismissed as so innocent or susceptible to varying 

interpretations as to be innocuous. ~Reidy. Georgia, 448 

14 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 14 
U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (conduct that "describe[s] a very large 

category of presumably innocent travelers" is insufficient to 

constitute a reasonable suspicion) . The Defendants' conduct in 

obtaining prior lease agreements from the trunk to show they were 

entitled to operate the rental car is so innocent as to be 

innocuous. 

Both Defendants' have extensive criminal histories, but 

''knowledge of a person's prior criminal involvement (to say 

nothing of a mere arrest) is alone insufficient to give rise to 

the requisite reasonable suspicion" to justify a shift in 

investigatory intrusion from the traffic stop to a firearms or 

drugs investigation. United States y. Sgndoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 

(lOth Cir. 1994). We explained in Sandoyal: 

If the law were otherwise:' any person with any 

sort of criminal record--or even worse, a person with 

arrests but no convictions--could be subjected to a 

Terry-type investigative stop by a law €nforcement 

officer at any time without the need for any other 

justification at all. Any such rule would clearly run 

counter to the requirement of a reasonable suspicion, 

and of the need that such stops be justified in light 

of a balancing of the competing interests at stake. 

~at 543. The facts relied upon by the government are 

insufficient to create the probable cause necessary to justify 

Deputy Barney's search in this case. 

15 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 15 
Finally, the government asserts that Deputy Barney's search 

was valid because he obtained consent from the Defendants. 

Appellee's Br. at 9-10. We have consistently held "that an 

encounter initiated by a traffic stop may not be deemed 

consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to 

him." United States y. Gonzalez -Lerma, 14 F. 3d 1479, 14 83 {lOth 

Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S, Ct. 1862 {1994); accord United States 

y. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (lOth Cir. 1995); United States y. 

Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 817 (lOth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 

u.s. 1093 (1992), In this case, Deputy Barney possessed Mr. 

Lee's driver's license and Mr. Lacy's identification card and 

rental documents at the time he asked permission to search the 

vehicle. Therefore, Deputy Barney's request to search the car 

was not a consensual encounter because the Defendants ''would not 

reasonably have felt free to leave or otherwise terminate the 

encounter" with Deputy Barney because their documents had not 

been returned. Lambert, 46 F.3d at 1068. 

Deputy Barney exceeded the scope of the Terry stop, and he 

seized the crack cocaine in this case without probable cause or 

the consent of the Defendants. Accordingly, the crack cocaine 

evidence is tainted fruit of an unlawful search and cannot be 

16 

Appellate Case: 94-4199 Document: 01019280392 Date Filed: 01/11/1996 Page: 16 
used by the government in prosecuting Mr. Lee. The judgment of 

the district court in adopting the magistrate judge's 

recommendation is, therefore, reversed, and Mr. Lee shall be 

permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. 

REVERSED and REMANDED. 

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