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Parties Involved:
Yves Leandre
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 23, 1997 Decided January 13, 1998 

No. 96-3166

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

YVES LEANDRE, A/K/A JEAN-CLAUDE JEAN BAPTISTE,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Columbia 

(No. 96cr00238-03)

Carmen D. Hernandez, Assistant Federal Public Defender, 

argued the cause for appellant, with whom A.J. Kramer,

Federal Public Defender, was on the briefs. Amy Seidman,

Assistant Federal Public Defender, entered an appearance.

Joseline A. Peña, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee, with whom Mary Lou Leary, U.S. AttorUSCA Case #96-3166 Document #322420 Filed: 01/13/1998 Page 1 of 20
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ney, John R. Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown, and G. Bradley 

Weinsheimer, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, were on the brief.

Before: WILLIAMS, ROGERS and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: On appeal from his sentence for 

distribution, and aiding and abetting the distribution, of cocaine base, appellant Yves Leandre principally contends that 

the district court erred by failing to reduce his sentence 

based upon his diminished mental capacity. Although the 

United States Sentencing Guidelines do not include an explicit 

reduction for "diminished mental capacity," the policy statement contained in section 5K2.13 states that a court may 

reduce a sentence "to reflect the extent to which reduced 

mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense." 

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13, p.s. (1997) 

[hereinafter "U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines"]. The Sentencing 

Commission has thus acknowledged that a defendant's "diminished capacity" is a mitigating circumstance not adequately taken into account in formulating the Guidelines that would 

normally warrant a downward departure. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(b) (1988); U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s.; Koon v. United 

States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2044 (adopting the framework of 

United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)). 

The threshold question, however, is precisely what "contribution" is required of a defendant's "reduced mental capacity" 

before the court may depart from the Guidelines, and that is 

not an easy question to answer. The remaining questions are 

whether the district court misapplied the Guidelines or considered improper factors. We conclude that the district court 

did not misconceive the necessary causal relationship between 

a defendant's diminished capacity and his criminal conduct 

nor otherwise err in denying Leandre's request for a departure under section 5K2.13. Similarly unpersuasive are Leandre's challenges to the district court's failure to depart downward based upon his family circumstances under section 

5H1.6 and his status as a deportable alien. Accordingly, we 

affirm.

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I.

Yves Leandre pleaded guilty to the unlawful distribution 

and aiding and abetting the distribution of five grams or more 

of cocaine base.1 According to the presentence report, Leandre was accountable for a total of 123.21 grams of crack 

cocaine; he had participated in three separate sales of a total 

of 115.21 grams of drugs to undercover officers and nearly 8 

grams of cocaine base and related drug paraphernalia were 

found in his apartment. This placed him at a base offense 

level of 32 under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). 

The district court, without objection by the government, 

reduced Leandre's offense level to 29 because of his acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct. See U.S.S.G. 

§ 3E1.1(a), (b)(2). Leandre had also previously been convicted of two drug-related misdemeanors and a felony, for which 

he fell into criminal history category IV. See U.S.S.G. 

§§ 4A1.1, 4A1.2, 5A. The combination of these factors established a sentencing range of 121-151 months imprisonment. 

See U.S.S.G. § 5A. Prior to sentencing, Leandre sought to 

have his sentence reduced due to a variety of factors.2 Of 

relevance here, he sought a downward departure from the 

Guidelines' range because of his diminished mental capacity, 

noting in his memorandum in aid of sentencing his history of 

mental problems. He also requested departures based upon 

his responsibility to care for his two young children and the 

likelihood of his deportation as a result of his conviction. The 

__________

1

See 18 U.S.C. § 2(A) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), (b)(1)(B)(iii) 

(1988). "Cocaine base" is more commonly known as "crack cocaine." See United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1369 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997).

2

In addition to the departures addressed in the instant appeal, 

Leandre asserted that he was entitled to a downward adjustment 

under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 for his minor role in the drug offenses; 

under § 4A1.3 because the criminal history category overrepresents 

the seriousness of his prior crimes; under § 5K2.12 for coercion 

and duress; and, more generally, based on his "efforts to overcome 

[an] adverse environment," as well as a combination of all of these 

factors. Leandre does not challenge the denial of these departures 

on appeal.

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district court denied each request, but imposed the shortest 

term of incarceration within the applicable Guideline range: 

121 months imprisonment followed by four years of supervised release.

The scope of this court's review of a district court's decision 

not to depart from the Guidelines is limited but not insignificant. Because in deciding whether to depart "the district 

court must make a refined assessment of the many facts 

bearing on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and 

day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing," these courts 

have an "institutional advantage over appellate courts in 

making these sorts of determinations." Koon v. United 

States, 116 S. Ct. 2035, 2046-47 (1996) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3742 (1988)). Hence an appellate court's review of the 

denial of a downward departure is confined to determining 

whether there has been a mistake of law or an incorrect 

application of the Guidelines.3See United States v. Johnson,

49 F.3d 766, 768 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As this court explained in 

United States v. Sammoury, 74 F.3d 1341, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 

1996), "[i]f a district judge sticks to the [G]uideline range 

because [the judge] mistakenly believes he [or she] lacks 

authority to do otherwise, [the judge's] sentencing decision is 

reviewable on appeal." Factual findings relied upon by the 

district court in determining that a departure is not warranted are reviewed for clear error. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d); 

Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1344. "Even if a judge correctly 

understands his [or her] discretionary authority to depart 

downward when a particular mitigating circumstance exists, 

the judge may make a clearly erroneous factual finding that 

the circumstances do not exist." Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1344. 

But, if the district court correctly understood the Guidelines 

and the evidence, was aware of its authority to depart, and 

decided not to depart, there is no basis on which this court 

__________

3 We have no occasion to decide whether after Koon our review 

of a denial of a departure is for abuse of discretion, see Koon, 116 

S. Ct. at 2047-58, for even were that standard to apply it would not 

affect our disposition. See generally, Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. 

Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing nature of 

trial court discretion).

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can reverse the exercise of discretion because no error has 

occurred. Id. at 1343.

II.

The Guidelines do not expressly provide for a departure 

from the applicable sentencing range based on a defendant's 

diminished mental capacity. Congress, however, has allowed 

district courts to depart from the Guidelines to reflect "mitigating circumstances of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 

taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 

formulating the [G]uidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). In 

Chapter 5, Part K (Departures) of the Guidelines, the Sentencing Commission recognized certain factors that it had not 

taken fully into account, and listed in policy statements 

several encouraged or discouraged grounds for departures. 

See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, p.s.; Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045. The 

Commission identified a defendant's reduced mental capacity 

as one circumstance in which a departure would be encouraged. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13; Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044 

(adopting the framework of United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 

942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)). Such a disability, in the Commission's view, "would normally warrant a downward departure." 

Rivera, 994 F.2d at 947 (Breyer, C.J.) (citing U.S.S.G. 

§ 5K2.13, p.s.). Thus, under section 5K2.13 of the Guidelines, 

the district court may depart downward if a defendant: (1) 

has committed a non-violent offense, (2) while suffering from 

"significantly reduced mental capacity", (3) that was not 

caused by the voluntary use of other intoxicants, (4) where 

the defendant's mental incapacity "contributed to the commission of the offense," (5) so long as the defendant's criminal 

record does not indicate a need for imprisonment to protect 

public safety.4 U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s.; see also United 

States v. Cantu, 12 F.3d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir. 1993).

__________

4 Section 5K2.13 provides:

If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting 

from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower 

sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which 

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Leandre contends that the district court misconstrued the 

scope of its discretion to depart under section 5K2.13 by 

applying an overly-stringent standard for the fourth requirement. He maintains that the phrase "contributed to the 

commission of the offense" encompasses a far broader meaning than the district court appreciated when it focused on the 

absence of any "direct connection between [Leandre's] reduced mental capacity and the offense which was committed." 

Noting that the Sentencing Commission's policy statement 

only requires that a defendant's mental incapacity contribute 

to the commission of a crime, Leandre contends that the 

district court improperly applied a "but-for" test in determining his eligibility for the departure. By applying such a 

heightened standard, Leandre maintains, the district court 

evaluated the grounds for the departure as if Leandre were 

asserting an insanity defense under 18 U.S.C. § 17 (1988). In 

addition, Leandre contends, the district court failed to review 

the availability of the departure with a "view to lenity, as 

section 5K2.13 implicitly recommends" consistent with United 

States v. Chatman, 986 F.2d 1446, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The evidence before the district court at sentencing included a psychological report classifying Leandre as mildly mentally retarded, with an IQ of 66. The report, provided by 

Leandre, noted that he suffered from bouts of depression 

since early adolescence and has exhibited symptoms of "depressive psychosis." Further, the report revealed, while incarcerated for a previous conviction, Leandre had attempted 

suicide after experiencing hallucinations and hearing demeaning voices that convinced him that he was a failure. At times, 

the report continued, these voices also expressed paranoid 

delusions. After his release from prison, the voices continued 

and, according to the psychologist, may have even intensified. 

Nevertheless, Leandre received no psychiatric treatment or 

medication after his release. Observing that throughout his 

__________

reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the 

offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not 

indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public.

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s.

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life Leandre has repeatedly turned to drug use to cover over 

his depression and psychoses, the psychologist concluded that 

Leandre's addiction may have aggravated his conditions. 

Based upon this history, the psychologist further concluded 

that Leandre's decision to sell drugs was "partly" influenced 

by his psychiatric difficulties. The psychologist opined that 

Leandre's "ability to refrain from accepting the offer proposed to him was diminished by the recurrence of a serious 

depression with suicidal implications and the intensification of 

a psychotic underlayer in his psyche."

The district court found, notwithstanding the psychologist's 

causal conclusion, that Leandre had failed to establish "the 

collection of factors" necessary for a downward departure 

under section 5K2.13. Of concern to Leandre on appeal, the 

court stated that "there must be a direct connection between 

the reduced mental capacity and the offense which was 

committed." Relying on Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1345, the 

court emphasized that there must be a "causal connection" 

between the two, and resolved that Leandre had "not presented any persuasive demonstration of a real nexus or 

connection between this state of mind and the conduct constituting the crimes in this case." Largely adopting the position 

taken by the government in opposing Leandre's motion for 

departure,5the court observed that it did not take a great 

deal of intellectual sophistication either to sell drugs or to 

understand that doing so was unlawful, that Leandre had 

repeatedly chosen to resume his own drug use, and that his 

prior convictions put him on notice of the consequence of his 

actions. The district court was of the opinion that Leandre 

did not suffer from a "significantly reduced mental capacity," 

__________

5 The government had argued first, that given the uncomplicated nature of the crimes, Leandre, who had previously worked as a 

plumber and a cook, was more than capable of understanding what 

was required of him and was sufficiently savvy to participate in 

negotiations for the amount of drugs he was to supply, and second, 

that while Leandre's intellectual limitations may have made him 

more susceptible to the lure of the drug trade, he had failed to show 

that his mental infirmities contributed to the commission of the 

offense in any "real sense."

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as required by section 5K2.13 because his condition did not 

impede his ability to reason.

The meaning properly ascribed to the term "reduced mental capacity" and its precise application in addressing a departure request involve areas that are not without difficulty. 

Little substantive guidance has been provided by the Sentencing Commission, either in the language of the Guidelines 

themselves or in the commentary or application notes. See 

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Is the court to award a departure upon a 

showing of a nontrivial probability that the defendant's diminished capacity increased the likelihood of the crime? Put 

otherwise, is the court to depart when presented with evidence that a defendant suffers from diminished mental capacity that possibly contributed, but was not essential, to the 

commission of the crime? Neither the Sentencing Commission nor the courts have given a clear answer. But similar 

concerns were traditionally considered by sentencing judges 

prior to the promulgation of the Guidelines in mitigation of 

the punishment of legally sane defendants suffering from 

various mental infirmities. See generally Norval Morris, 

Madness and the Criminal Law 129-134, 142-44, 146-152 

(1982); Henry Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal 

Defense 209-10 (1954). This can be seen most clearly in the 

context of capital punishment where mental limitations and 

illnesses must be considered as mitigating factors when offered by the defendant. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 

U.S. 302, 317-29 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 

113-16 (1982). This court explained in Chatman, moreover, 

that leniency is appropriate because "two of the primary 

rationales for punishing an individual by incarcerationdesert and deterrencelose some of their relevance when applied to those with reduced mental capacity." Chatman, 986 

F.2d at 1452 (quoting United States v. Poff, 926 F.2d 588, 595 

(7th Cir. 1991) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)); see also Morris, 

supra, at 151-52.

The mitigation of sentences to reflect a defendant's reduced 

mental capacity is distinct from the conventional criminal law 

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defense of "diminished capacity." 6In its most commonly 

accepted formulation, "diminished capacity" refers to situations where a defendant's mental abnormality, although insufficient to exonerate the defendant on grounds of insanity, 

negates the element of mens rea required for conviction for 

the charged offense (i.e. an intent to kill, premeditation, etc.). 

See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998-1002 (D.C. 

Cir. 1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) cmt. 2 (1962). Consideration of a defendant's mental condition in sentencing, on 

the other hand, is appropriately viewed as an extension of the 

concept of "diminished (or partial) responsibility." See Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished 

Capacity, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 21 (1984); Andrew 

Brown, Limits on the Use of Diminished Capacity as a Basis 

for Departure, 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 193, 194 (1995). A 

defendant may not be considered fully responsible for a crime 

due to his mental condition: as one commentator has suggested, "[e]ven if the technical elements of an offense are satisfied, the defendant is less culpable and should be convicted of 

a lesser crime, or, at least, should be punished less severely." 

Morse, supra, at 20. While courts have generally refused to 

integrate the defense of partial responsibility into substantive 

criminal law, it has long been applied, at least implicitly, by 

judges during sentencing.7Id. at 27-28.

__________

6 The Sentencing Commission has included several conventional 

common law affirmative defenses as encouraged departures from 

the guidelines, such as coercion and duress, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12, 

and victim provocation, see U.S.S.G. § 5K2.10. These claims may 

not be sufficient to provide a full affirmative defense for acquittal, 

but they may be "morally salient under the guidelines." Robert 

Weisberg, Guideline Sentencing, Traditional Defenses, and the 

Evolution of Substantive Criminal Law Doctrine, 7 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 168, 168 (1995); see also U.S.S.G. § 5K2.12 (acknowledging 

that judge may depart for coercion or duress "not amounting to a 

complete defense.").

7

See Joshua Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law § 26.03 

at 325 (1987) ("The partial-responsibility variant of the diminished 

capacity defense is not a defense to most crimes in the United 

States. In some states it is a defense to murder."). For a general 

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Against this background it follows that the departure for 

"significantly reduced mental capacity" under section 5K2.13 

does not require a showing of insanity. Cf. United States v. 

Spedalieri, 910 F.2d 707, 711 (10th Cir. 1990). Neither does 

it require a defendant's diminished capacity to have prevented formation of the legally defined mental state associated 

with an offense. Nor must a defendant demonstrate that he 

or she is severely mentally retarded. The departure under 

section 5K2.13 applies to all crimes equally and may be 

considered by the sentencing judge even if the fact-finder has 

rejected a defense of insanity or diminished capacity. See 

Spedalieri, 910 F.2d at 711; United States v. Cheape, 889 

F.2d 477, 480-81 (3d Cir. 1989). As this court emphasized in 

vacating and remanding for resentencing in Chatman, the 

ultimate goal of section 5K2.13 "is to treat with lenity those 

individuals whose reduced mental capacity contributed to the 

offense." Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452 (internal quotation 

marks omitted).

Thus, as Leandre maintains, a defendant's reduced mental 

capacity need not be the necessary cause of the commission of 

his crime in order for him to be eligible for a downward 

departure under section 5K2.13. In other words, a defendant 

is not required to prove that he would not have committed the 

offense but for the existence of his mental infirmity. All of 

the circuits to have addressed the issue of causation have 

rejected a "but-for" test. See, e.g., United States v. Cantu, 12 

F.3d 1506, 1515 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Soliman,

954 F.2d 1012, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Glick,

946 F.2d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lauzon,

938 F.2d 326, 331 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Ruklick,

__________

discussion of the confusion between "diminished capacity" and 

"diminished responsibility," see Morse, supra, and Peter Aranella, 

The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 827 

(1977). Compare also Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 

U.S.C. § 17 (1988) (abolishing the affirmative defense of diminished 

responsibility in federal prosecutions), with United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693, 728-30 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that diminished 

capacity may still be used to negate mens rea).

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919 F.2d 95, 97 (8th Cir. 1990). See also United States v. 

Speight, 726 F. Supp. 861, 868 (D.D.C. 1989). The plain 

language of section 5K2.13, permitting departures, "to reflect 

the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to 

the commission of the offense," makes clear that the defendant's diminished capacity need be only a contributing factor. 

U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13; see also Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1515; Ruklick,

919 F.2d at 97-98. Yet, it is equally clear that a bare 

showing of reduced mental capacity, without more, is insufficient to authorize a court to depart. See United States v. 

Frazier, 979 F.2d 1227, 1230 (7th Cir. 1992). The belief that 

a defendant with diminished capacity is less culpable for a 

crime, and the conclusion that the rationales for punishment 

are reduced for such a defendant, may in theory suggest that 

a court should consider mitigating a sentence regardless of 

the mental deficiency's contribution to the crime. Leandre 

appeared to advance this view at oral argument by positing 

that section 5K2.13 should be understood as encouraging a 

downward departure in the case of a defendant possessing a 

diminished mental capacity as compared with an identically 

situated, but psychologically normal, defendant convicted of 

the same crime. But as Leandre readily admitted, the language of the policy statement rejects such a broad basis for 

departure by explicitly requiring that the defendant's reduced 

capacity "contribute to" the offense. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13, p.s. 

Absent some causal link, the sentencing judge would misapply 

the Guidelines by granting a departure. See id.; Sammoury,

74 F.3d at 1345.

Leandre's comparison of two hypothetical defendants, however, suggests a subtler interpretation of the requirements 

for a departure under section 5K2.13. Under this interpretation, once the district court finds that a defendant was 

suffering from a reduced mental capacity at the time of the 

criminal conduct, the court has discretion to depart so long as 

the departure is roughly commensurate with the extent to 

which the diminished capacity affected the crime. "Courts 

need not measure contribution against a minimum threshold 

before allowing a departure[;] ... [t]he proper focus is on 

matching the magnitude of the departure with the magnitude 

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of the contribution." Brown, supra, at 195. Presumably the 

magnitude would be zero if the district court found the 

contribution to be negligible, thus permitting no departure, 

but, in general, the court would be given a freer hand in 

departing from the Guidelines.

Other circuits examining the grounds for departures under 

section 5K2.13, have required an initial finding of causation 

before the district court can attempt to scale the punishment 

to the effects of the mental abnormality. For example, in 

Frazier the Seventh Circuit rejected the approach adopted by 

the sentencing judge who had assumed that there was a 

connection between the defendant's mental disorder and the 

crime committed, requiring instead specific findings of causation before allowing a departure. See Frazier, 979 F.2d at 

1230. Similarly in Cantu, the Ninth Circuit explained that 

causation actually comes into play twice in deciding whether 

to depart based on a defendant's diminished mental capacity: 

first, in deciding whether a defendant is eligible for a downward departure, and subsequently in determining the extent 

of any available departure. See Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1515.

In practice, this distinction may result more in a difference 

in emphasis than in any difference in substance. Whether a 

mentally infirm defendant whose reduced mental capacity did 

not contribute to his crime is per se ineligible for a departure, 

or is legally eligible but the extent of the departure must be 

nil, the result is the same. Under either view, the district 

court may not mitigate a sentence in the absence of some 

causal link. However, once some nexus is shown, to any 

degree, the district court may depart downwardly to reflect 

the extent of that contribution. See Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1515. 

While the defendant has the burden of showing "some" 

connection between his diminished capacity and his criminal 

conduct, see Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1345; Johnson, 49 F.3d at 

768, that burden may not be particularly heavy in view of the 

obligation to treat with lenity defendants who suffer from 

"significantly reduced mental capacity." See Chatman, 986 

F.2d at 1454; Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1511 ("The goal of the 

guideline is lenity toward defendants whose ability to make 

reasoned decisions is impaired.").

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Of course neither formulation clarifies what constitutes a 

"contribution" to an offense. Leandre's interpretation seems 

to assume that any reduction in mental capacity will "contribute" to an offense in the sense that there will always be a 

nontrivial probability that the defendant's mental capacity 

increased the likelihood of the crime. This contention is not 

directed at the relevant legal standard for a departure under 

section 5K2.13, however, but at the legitimacy of ever finding 

that there exists no causal connection between a defendant's 

reduced mental capacity and his crime. Such an assumption 

would effectively negate the requirement of causation entirely, and therefore, given the language of section 5K2.13, we 

cannot credit it. Cf. Frazier, 979 F.2d at 1230. Whether a 

defendant's reduced mental capacity "contributed to the commission of a crime" is an individualized factual determination 

to be made by a sentencing court in light of the entire record 

before it. Unlike the usually uniform sentencing structure 

mandated by the Guidelines, the court is called upon to 

consider the defendant's individual characteristics in exercising its discretion to depart. See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2044-45.

So understood, we conclude that the district court did not 

misapprehend its authority to depart from the Guidelines 

under section 5K2.13 by applying an overly stringent "butfor" test. The district court never considered the degree of 

causation necessary for a downward departure because it 

found that Leandre's reduced mental capacity did not contribute to his crime in any way. Leandre's reliance on the 

district court's initial statement at sentencing that "there 

must be a direct connection between the reduced mental 

capacity and the offense which was committed" as proof of an 

inappropriate standard8is misplaced. The statement merely 

__________

8 Leandre also contends that the district court's conclusion that 

his mental deficiency did not affect his perception of "the relationship between cause and effect, crime and consequence" indicates 

that the court actually applied the test for an insanity defense. 

This statement, however, addresses the separate issue of whether 

the defendant possessed a "significantly reduced mental capacity," 

not the extent to which any reduced capacity contributed to the 

crime. Furthermore, the phrase "cause and effect" cannot be 

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echoed the language of Johnson, where this court explained 

that a finding of a "direct connection" does not require the 

defendant's reduced mental capacity to be the sole cause of 

his conduct. See Johnson, 49 F.3d at 768. Moreover, the 

district court explained that it was relying on Sammoury in 

requiring "a causal connection between the reduced mental 

capacity and the offense." See Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1345. 

After reviewing the presentence report, the psychological 

evaluation, and Leandre's prior criminal record, the district 

court concluded that there was no "clear demonstration of a 

nexus between the so-called diminished capacity and the 

crimes before the Court today." The record thus shows that 

while the district court might well have reached a different 

conclusion about causation in light of the psychologist's report, the court understood that section 5K2.13 requires no 

more than that the defendant's reduced capacity be a contributing factor, to some degree, to his offense.

At the same time, when the district court conducts the 

factual inquiry required for an encouraged departure under 

section 5K2.13, Chatman makes clear that the court should 

proceed "with a view to lenity." Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1454. 

In that case the court vacated and remanded for resentencing 

in the absence of record evidence that the district court 

undertook its factual inquiry "with a view to lenity, as section 

5K2.13 implicitly requires." Id. The district court here did 

not refer to lenity in so many words, nor to the purposes of 

punishment discussed in Chatman. But, the court was aware 

of the Chatman analysis as it was presented in Leandre's 

memorandum in aid of sentencing. Significantly, for this 

purpose, the court imposed the sentence at the lowest end of 

the Guideline range.

__________

equated with a determination that Leandre did not know "right 

from wrong" as would be required for a showing of insanity. 

Rather it is an evaluation of the defendant's ability to reason in 

accordance with United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 (D.C. 

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997), and represents the 

court's response to the conclusions of Leandre's psychologist.

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The only remaining question is whether the district court's 

causal finding was clearly erroneous. In finding that Leandre's reduced mental capacity had not contributed to the 

offense, the district court considered the unsophisticated nature of the crime, the effect of Leandre's voluntary drug use 

on his conduct, and his criminal history. Although reliance 

on some of these factors in isolation might be problematic, 

viewed together, they support the district court's finding.

First, the nature of the offense. The district court properly emphasized the fact that "it really doesn't require a great 

amount of intellectual sophistication to sell drugs or to understand that it is unlawful." The mental acumen required for 

the planning, preparation, and execution of a crime is a logical 

starting place for examining the effects of a defendant's 

reduced capacity. While the particular mens rea required for 

conviction of the offense is not relevant to this assessment, 

the general level of intellectual sophistication associated with 

a crime is. Of course, the "intellectual sophistication of the 

crime" taken in isolation cannot be the end of the inquiry. 

Without suggesting that the more complicated the criminal 

conduct, the more likely the mental incapacity contributed to 

it, it is nevertheless clear that even the simplest, most 

mindless crime can be caused in part by a defendant's mental 

incapacity. A defendant, for example, could be driven by a 

compulsive mental disorder to commit a crime unthinkingly. 

Section 5K2.13, therefore, is not limited to particular classes 

of crime and may be considered for any offense, no matter 

how unsophisticated.

The level of intellectual sophistication required for a crime 

is only relevant when considered in relation to the type of 

mental abnormality suffered by the defendant. Here, the 

district court concluded that this factor belied any causal 

connection to the crime. The government's proffer of evidence in support of Leandre's plea showed that he was 

essentially a courier, bringing the drugs in response to instructions from a third person. There was evidence as well 

that Leandre participated in negotiations for the sale price of 

the drugs. Further, Leandre had been employed in the past, 

as both a plumber and a cook, despite his low IQ, depression, 

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and other mental afflictions. Although the district court 

might well have reached a different conclusion, see, e.g., 

Speight, 726 F. Supp. at 868 (ordering departure from sentence for the distribution of cocaine and possession of a 

firearm where the defendant was suffering from schizophrenia), especially in view of the psychologists' report, its contrary conclusion is supported by the evidence before it.

Second, voluntary drug use. The district court evaluated 

the effects of Leandre's drug use on his mental capacity and 

his conduct. Clearly, the relationship between a defendant's 

drug use and his conduct is relevant to an assessment of 

whether his reduced mental capacity was a cause of his 

offense. A departure under section 5K2.13 might remain 

available if a defendant's drug use contributed only in part to 

a crime, because his mental infirmity may have also played a 

role. Because a defendant's reduced mental capacity need 

not be the sole cause of the crime, both drug use and mental 

illness may contribute to the commission of an offense. See 

Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1514-15; Speight, 726 F.Supp at 868. But 

if drug use was an independently sufficient cause of a defendant's behavior, a court could conclude that his reduced 

mental capacity had not contributed to the crime. Furthermore, a departure under section 5K2.13 is unavailable where 

the reduced mental capacity itself "result[ed] from voluntary 

use of drugs or other intoxicants." U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. See 

Chatman, 986 F.2d at 1452.

In sentencing Leandre, the district court's evaluation of 

Leandre's drug use was confined to stating that "the drug use 

may indeed have had an effect on his behavior and his state of 

mind." The court did not indicate whether it had concluded 

that Leandre began to sell cocaine base in whole or in part 

because of his drug addiction. The psychologist's report, on 

the other hand, indicated that Leandre began selling drugs to 

others as a result of his efforts to buy them for his own use. 

The district court apparently accepted the psychologist's conclusion that Leandre's mental problems predated his drug use 

and were exacerbated by it. If the court had found that 

Leandre's reduced mental capacity was actually caused by his 

voluntary drug use, Leandre would have been ineligible to 

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receive a departure under section 5K2.13. See Chatman, 986 

F.2d at 1452. Instead, the court continued its inquiry into 

the nature and effect of Leandre's diminished capacity in 

light of his drug use. While it is doubtful that the court's 

finding of an absence of causation could be supported by 

Leandre's drug use alone, nevertheless, recognition of Leandre's drug use, as part of a broader range of relevant factors, 

was entirely appropriate.

Third, criminal history. In declining to grant a downward 

departure under section 5K2.13, the district court noted that 

Leandre had previously been convicted of attempted possession of PCP (phencyclidine), possession of cocaine, and armed 

robbery. This was a proper consideration for the purpose of 

determining whether Leandre suffered from a "significantly 

reduced mental capacity" under section 5K2.13.9 But it is 

unclear how a defendant's past crimes would be relevant to 

determining whether his mental illness contributed to the 

criminal conduct for which he is to be sentenced. The 

government argued that Leandre had failed to show evidence 

that he was suffering from any psychosis at the time of the 

current offense. It is unclear which way this cuts. If a 

defendant has committed the same crime in the past or 

engaged in a particular pattern of behavior, and did not suffer 

from the same mental illness, then a sentencing court might 

reasonably conclude that the defendant's current claim of 

reduced mental capacity did not contribute to the offense. 

Yet such an occurrence would probably be rare, and, in any 

event, is not Leandre's case. In general, section 5K2.13 is an 

offense specific departure. The Guidelines contemplate other 

departures, and to the extent that section 5K2.13 is an 

encouraged departure, see Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045; Rivera,

994 F.2d at 948, it follows that even if a defendant has 

committed crimes in the past, his punishment for the current 

__________

9 Leandre's criminal history would also be relevant to determining whether his incarceration was necessary to protect public 

safety, as an independent ground for denying him a departure 

under section 5K2.13. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13.

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criminal offense may still be mitigated due to his reduced 

mental capacity at the time of the current offense.

Given the uncertainty about how a district court is to 

determine whether a defendant's reduced mental capacity 

"contributed" to the commission of an offense, the district 

court cannot be faulted for exploring several alternative lines 

of analysis. Its consideration of the sophistication of Leandre's offense and the effects of his voluntary drug use were 

proper factors to be evaluated and support the court's ultimate conclusion that there was no causal nexus between 

Leandre's offense and his mental disabilities. Although the 

psychologist concluded that Leandre's decision to sell drugs 

was "influenced ... partly" by his "intellectual limitation and 

psychiatric illness," the district court was not bound to accept 

that conclusion. Cf. Sammoury, 74 F.3d at 1346. The government offered a contrary analysis that the court found 

persuasive. Based upon the record as a whole, the court 

considered the relevant evidence before it, including the 

psychologist's report and the appellant himself, and did not 

clearly err in finding that there was no contribution as would 

warrant a downward departure.

Leandre belatedly contends, however, that the district 

court misconceived the nature of Leandre's diminished capacity and the conditions that qualify as a "significantly reduced 

mental capacity" under section 5K2.13. In declining to depart under section 5K2.13, the court interpreted the departure as covering mental, psychological, and behavioral disorders that "diminish the defendant's ability to reason." The 

court doubted, however, that Leandre possessed a "mental 

deficiency that might not make apparent the relationship 

between cause and effect, crime and consequence." Leandre 

contends that the district court underestimated its authority 

to depart by focusing exclusively on Leandre's ability to 

reason, without considering any "volitional impairments" as 

suitable grounds for departure. He relies on United States v. 

McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 544-49 (3d Cir. 1997), in which the 

Third Circuit held that a person may suffer from a "reduced 

mental capacity" if he or she "knows what he [or she] is doing 

and that it is wrong but cannot control his [or her] behavior 

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to conform it to the law." This argument was never presented to the district court or even to this court until Leandre's 

reply brief, and we find no plain error. See United States v. 

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993); United States v. Saro, 24 

F.3d 283, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Foster, 988 

F.2d 206, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

The district court's observation that "reduced mental capacity" refers to a defendant's ability to reason was taken 

directly from United States v. Edwards, 98 F.3d 1364, 1371 

(D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1437 (1997). See 

also Cantu, 12 F.3d at 1512. No precedent exists in this 

circuit suggesting that a district court should consider "volitional impairments" under section 5K2.13, and McBroom was 

not decided until after Leandre was sentenced. See 

McBroom, 124 F.3d at 544-49. Given the absence of precedent and the "novelty of the issue," the district court's failure 

sua sponte to consider any "volitional" component of Leandre's mental infirmity was not plain error. United States v. 

Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

III.

Leandre's other claims of sentencing error require only 

brief discussion.

His contention that the district court erred by failing to 

reduce his sentence due to his extraordinary family circumstances under section 5H1.6 of the Guidelines is, given the 

limited scope of review of a denial of a departure request, 

fully met by United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462 (D.C. Cir.), 

cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 533 (1996). Leandre is a single father 

of two young children who might be placed in foster care if 

Leandre's brother refuses to take them into his home. Such 

evidence of a difficult family situation that will arise upon 

Leandre's incarceration is, unfortunately, no more extraordinary than that deemed by the Dyce court not to be sufficiently extraordinary for a departure. At best Leandre's situation 

is within the same range of extraordinary circumstances as 

those of the defendant in Dyce. See Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1466-

68. From the perspective of the defendants' children, the 

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result may be harsh but it is not so extraordinary a circumstance confronting sentencing judges. If, as this court concluded in Dyce, the district court erred in taking into account 

the desirability of breast feeding of a newborn by the defendant, see Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1467, then the district court's 

decision not to depart because Leandre cared for his two 

children falls within the range of permissible determinations 

available in the exercise of reasoned discretion.

Finally, Leandre's contention that the district court erred 

by failing to reduce his sentence because of his status as an 

alien is meritless. A downward departure from the Guidelines "may be appropriate where the defendant's status as a 

deportable alien is likely to cause a fortuitous increase in the 

severity of his sentence." United States v. Smith, 27 F.3d 

649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1994). But Leandre, assisted by able 

counsel, requested at sentencing only that the district court 

consider the increased likelihood of his deportation. In denying the articulated request, the district court concluded that 

"no departure is appropriate because of [Leandre's] status 

which has been placed at risk by his own criminal behavior." 

At no point did Leandre suggest that he might suffer more 

serious punishment as a result of his deportation. See Smith,

27 F.3d at 655. Hence, the district court cannot be faulted 

for failing sua sponte to also address whether his deportable 

status would affect the severity of his sentence. See Saro, 24 

F.3d at 286; cf. United States v. Soto, No. 97-3002, 1997 WL 

791661 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 30, 1997).

Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Leandre's request for 

downward departures from the Guidelines and the judgment 

of conviction.

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