Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04166/USCOURTS-cand-4_14-cv-04166-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Echano
Defendant
Gideon
Defendant
Hensel
Defendant
Toney Alfonso Johnson
Plaintiff
Robinson
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TONEY ALFONSO JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

CORRECTIONAL OFFICER ECHANO, 

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-04166-YGR (PR)

ORDER OF SERVICE

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff, a state prisoner, has filed a pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

stemming from a May 24, 2014 incident at the Maguire Correctional Facility (“MCF”), where he 

was formerly incarcerated. He alleges that Defendants MCF Correctional Officers Echano and 

Robinson used excessive force against him, and that Defendant MCF Deputy Sheriff Hensel did 

nothing to intervene. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant MCF Nurse Gideon denied Plaintiff xrays after the incident. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages.

Plaintiff has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which will be granted in 

a separate written Order. 

Venue is proper because the events giving rise to the claim are alleged to have occurred at 

MCF which is located in this judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims 

that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek 

monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se

pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th 

Cir. 1988). 

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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements, 

namely that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and 

(2) the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. 

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

II. LEGAL CLAIMS

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Robinson and Echano used excessive force against him,

Defendant Hensel did not intervene during the assault, and that Defendant Gideon did not properly 

treat his injuries.

When a pretrial detainee challenges conditions of his confinement, the proper inquiry is 

whether the conditions amount to punishment in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). The Due Process 

Clause protects a post-arraignment pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts 

to punishment. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n. 10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 

U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)); see also Gibson v. County of Washoe, Nev., 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (9th 

Cir. 2002). The Ninth Circuit has stated the factors a court should consider in resolving a due 

process claim alleging excessive force. White v. Roper, 901 F.2d 1501, 1507 (9th Cir. 1990). 

These factors are (1) the need for the application of force, (2) the relationship between the need 

and the amount of force that was used, (3) the extent of the injury inflicted, and (4) whether force 

was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and restore discipline. Id.

Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s 

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.1 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); 

McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds, WMX 

Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133, 1136 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). A determination of 

“deliberate indifference” involves an examination of two elements: the seriousness of the 

prisoner’s medical need and the nature of the defendant’s response to that need. Id. at 1059. 

 

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Even though pretrial detainees’ claims arise under the Due Process Clause, the Eighth 

Amendment serves as a benchmark for evaluating those claims. See Carnell v. Grimm, 74 F.3d 

977, 979 (9th Cir. 1996) (Eighth Amendment guarantees provide minimum standard of care for 

pretrial detainees).

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A “serious” medical need exists if the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in 

further significant injury or the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. The existence of 

an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain are examples of indications that a 

prisoner has a “serious” need for medical treatment. Id. at 1059-60. 

A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she knows that a prisoner faces a 

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate 

it. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The prison official must not only “be aware of 

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,” but 

he “must also draw the inference.” Id. If a prison official should have been aware of the risk, but 

was not, then the official has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk. 

Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002). “A difference of opinion 

between a prisoner-patient and prison medical authorities regarding treatment does not give rise to 

a [section] 1983 claim.” Franklin v. Oregon, 662 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981).

Plaintiff alleges that on May 29, 2014, he was subjected to excessive force by Defendants 

Robinson and Echano. Dkt. 1 at 3, 3-6.

2

 Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that on the date of the 

incident, Defendant Echano had searched Plaintiff’s cell earlier that day and confiscated four of 

his “hemorrhoidal suppositories.” Id. at 5. Defendants Echano, Robinson and Hensel then 

returned to Plaintiff’s cell at around 9:45 pm to “search [it] for a box of hemorrhoidal 

suppositories” and confiscate it because there was a suspicion that Plaintiff was “hoarding them.” 

Id. at 3, 5. Plaintiff argued that the suppositories were given to him by the physician “as treatment 

for his serious hemorrhoidal condition.” Id. at 5. Defendant Robinson directed Plaintiff to “get 

against the wall to be handcuffed.” Id. Before he could respond, Plaintiff claims that Defendant 

Robinson “rushed directly up to Plaintiff and with closed fists and full force hit Plaintiff in the 

nose (causing a two inch scare [sic]) and punch[ed] Plaintiff in the head area . . . .” Id. at 6. 

 

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Page number citations refer to those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management 

filing system and not those assigned by Plaintiff.

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Plaintiff claims that while he was being assaulted by Defendant Robison, Defendant Echano 

“simultaneously was punching [him] in his rib-cage on the lower left-side . . . .” Id. During the 

entire incident, Defendant Hensel stood at the cell door and watched the assault for 

“approximately ten minutes.” Id.

Plaintiff claims that he suffered injuries as a result of the assault, and on June 3, 2014, he 

was escorted to the medical department for x-rays of “his left shoulder and rib cage on the lower 

left side.” Id. at 7. When asked by the x-ray technician if he was supposed to take an x-ray of 

Plaintiff’s “rib cage on the lower left side,” Defendant Gideon responded, “no.” Id. Plaintiff 

claims that Defendant Gideon’s actions denied Plaintiff “meaningful medical treatment and 

prolonged [his] pain [and] suffering.” Id.

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s complaint states a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim 

of excessive force claim against Defendants Robinson and Echano, and against Defendant Hensel 

for failing to intervene, as well as a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Gideon.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff states a cognizable Fourteenth Amendment claim for the use of excessive 

force against Defendants Robinson, Echano and Hensel, as well as claim for deliberate 

indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs against Defendant Gideon.

2. The Clerk of the Court shall mail a Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of 

Service of Summons, two copies of the Waiver of Service of Summons, a copy of the complaint 

and all attachments thereto (dkt. 1) and a copy of this Order to the following Defendants: MCF 

Correctional Officers Echano and Robinson; MCF Deputy Sheriff Hensel; and MCF Nurse 

Gideon. The Clerk shall also mail a copy of the complaint and a copy of this Order to the San 

Mateo County Counsel’s Office. Additionally, the Clerk shall mail a copy of this Order to 

Plaintiff.

3. Defendants are cautioned that Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 

requires them to cooperate in saving unnecessary costs of service of the summons and complaint. 

Pursuant to Rule 4, if Defendants, after being notified of this action and asked by the Court, on 

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behalf of Plaintiff, to waive service of the summons, fail to do so, Defendants will be required to 

bear the cost of such service unless good cause be shown for the failure to sign and return the 

waiver form. If service is waived, this action will proceed as if Defendants had been served on the 

date that the waiver is filed, except that pursuant to Rule 12(a)(1)(B), Defendants will not be 

required to serve and file an answer before sixty (60) days from the date on which the request for 

waiver was sent. (This allows a longer time to respond than would be required if formal service of 

summons is necessary.) Defendants are asked to read the statement set forth at the foot of the 

waiver form that more completely describes the duties of the parties with regard to waiver of 

service of the summons. If service is waived after the date provided in the Notice but before 

Defendants have been personally served, the Answer shall be due sixty (60) days from the date on 

which the request for waiver was sent or twenty (20) days from the date the waiver form is filed, 

whichever is later. 

4. Defendants shall answer the complaint in accordance with the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure. The following briefing schedule shall govern dispositive motions in this action:

a. No later than sixty (60) days from the date their answer is due, Defendants

shall file a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. The motion must be 

supported by adequate factual documentation, must conform in all respects to Federal Rule of 

Civil Procedure 56, and must include as exhibits all records and incident reports stemming from 

the events at issue. A motion for summary judgment also must be accompanied by a Rand3notice 

so that Plaintiff will have fair, timely and adequate notice of what is required of him in order to 

oppose the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (notice requirement set out 

in Rand must be served concurrently with motion for summary judgment). A motion to dismiss 

for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies must be accompanied by a similar notice. 

However, the Court notes that under the new law of the circuit, in the rare event that a failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint, Defendants may move for dismissal under Rule 

12(b)(6) as opposed to the previous practice of moving under an unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion. 

 

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Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998).

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Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014) (overruling Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 

1119 (9th Cir. 2003), which held that failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under 

the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), should be raised by a defendant as an 

unenumerated Rule 12(b) motion). Otherwise if a failure to exhaust is not clear on the face of the 

complaint, Defendants must produce evidence proving failure to exhaust in a motion for summary 

judgment under Rule 56. Id. If undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to 

Plaintiff shows a failure to exhaust, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56. 

Id. But if material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied and the district judge 

rather than a jury should determine the facts in a preliminary proceeding. Id. at 1168.

If Defendants are of the opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, 

Defendants shall so inform the Court prior to the date the summary judgment motion is due. All 

papers filed with the Court shall be promptly served on Plaintiff.

b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the dispositive motion shall be filed with the Court 

and served on Defendants no later than twenty-eight (28) days after the date on which 

Defendants’ motion is filed. 

c. Plaintiff is advised that a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56 of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. Rule 56 tells you what you 

must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must 

be granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact—that is, if there is no real dispute about 

any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party who asked for summary judgment is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 

makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn 

testimony), you cannot simply rely on what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out 

specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or authenticated documents, 

as provided in Rule 56(c), that contradicts the facts shown in the defendant’s declarations and 

documents and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. If you do not submit 

your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if appropriate, may be entered against you. 

If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand, 154 

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F.3d at 962-63.

Plaintiff also is advised that—in the rare event that Defendants argue that the failure to 

exhaust is clear on the face of the complaint—a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust available 

administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) will, if granted, end your case, albeit without 

prejudice. To avoid dismissal, you have the right to present any evidence to show that you did 

exhaust your available administrative remedies before coming to federal court. Such evidence 

may include: (1) declarations, which are statements signed under penalty of perjury by you or 

others who have personal knowledge of relevant matters; (2) authenticated documents—

documents accompanied by a declaration showing where they came from and why they are 

authentic, or other sworn papers such as answers to interrogatories or depositions; (3) statements 

in your complaint insofar as they were made under penalty of perjury and they show that you have 

personal knowledge of the matters state therein. As mentioned above, in considering a motion to 

dismiss for failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6) or failure to exhaust in a summary judgment 

motion under Rule 56, the district judge may hold a preliminary proceeding and decide disputed 

issues of fact with regard to this portion of the case. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1168.

(The notices above do not excuse Defendants’ obligation to serve similar notices again 

concurrently with motions to dismiss for failure to exhaust available administrative remedies and 

motions for summary judgment. Woods, 684 F.3d at 935.)

d. Defendants shall file a reply brief no later than fourteen (14) days after the 

date Plaintiff’s opposition is filed.

e. The motion shall be deemed submitted as of the date the reply brief is due. 

No hearing will be held on the motion unless the Court so orders at a later date.

5. Discovery may be taken in this action in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure. Leave of the Court pursuant to Rule 30(a)(2) is hereby granted to Defendants to 

depose Plaintiff and any other necessary witnesses confined in prison.

6. All communications by Plaintiff with the Court must be served on Defendants or 

Defendants’ counsel, once counsel has been designated, by mailing a true copy of the document to 

them.

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7. It is Plaintiff’s responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the Court 

informed of any change of address and must comply with the Court’s orders in a timely fashion. 

Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 

while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 

address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The Court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 

directed to the pro se party by the Court has been returned to the Court as not deliverable, and 

(2) the Court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 

se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 

8. Extensions of time are not favored, though reasonable extensions will be granted. 

Any motion for an extension of time must be filed no later than fourteen (14) days prior to the 

deadline sought to be extended.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated:

______________________________________

YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS

United States District Judge

April 15, 2015

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