Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01259/USCOURTS-caed-1_19-cv-01259-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ramon A. Barajas-Quijada
Defendant
Culichi Sushi and Mariscos
Defendant
G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC
Plaintiff
Gustavo Garcia, Jr.
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC seeks the entry of default judgment against Ramon A. 

Barajas-Quijada and Gustavo Garcia, Jr, individually and doing business as Culichi Sushi and 

Mariscos. (Doc. 11) Defendants have not opposed this motion. The Court found the matter suitable 

for decision without an oral hearing, and the matter was taken under submission pursuant to Local Rule 

230(g). For the following reasons, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment be 

GRANTED IN PART, in the modified amount of $13,100.

I. Procedural History

G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC asserts the company possessed the exclusive rights to the 

nationwide commercial distribution of “Saul ‘Canelo’ Alvarez v. Gennady ‘GGG’ Golovkin II 

Championship Fight Program,” (“the Program”) televised on September 15, 2018. (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶ 20) 

G & G CLOSED CIRCUIT EVENTS, LLC,

 Plaintiff,

v.

RAMON A. BARAJAS-QUIJADA and

GUSTAVO GARCIA, JR., individually and 

doing business as CULICHI SUSHI AND 

MARISCOS,

Defendants.

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Case No.: 1:19-cv-01259 - AWI JLT

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 

FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT

(Doc. 11)

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However, Plaintiff contends Defendants broadcast the Program at Culichi Sushi and Mariscos without 

paying the requisite fee. (Id., ¶¶ 16-17) Defendants were served with the summons and complaint filed 

on September 10, 2019 (Docs. 6-7) but failed to respond within the time prescribed by the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. Upon application of Plaintiff, default was entered on October 30, 2019. 

(Docs. 8-9)

II. Legal Standards Governing Entry of Default Judgment

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the entry of default judgment. After default is 

entered because “a party against whom a judgment for relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise 

defend,” the party seeking relief may apply to the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)-

(b). Upon the entry of default, well-pleaded factual allegations regarding liability are taken as true, but 

allegations regarding the amount of damages must be proven. Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 22 

(1944); see also Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1977). In addition, 

“necessary facts not contained in the pleadings, and claims which are legally insufficient, are not 

established by default.” Cripps v. Life Ins. Co. of North Am., 980 F.2d 1261, 1267 (9th Cir. 1992) 

(citing Danning v. Lavine, 572 F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978)). 

Entry of default judgment is within the discretion of the Court. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 

1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). The entry of default “does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a courtordered judgment. Pepsico, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F.Supp.2d 1172, 1174 (C.D. Cal 2002), accord 

Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit determined: 

Factors which may be considered by courts in exercising discretion as to the entry of a 

default judgment include: (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of 

plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money 

at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) 

whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). As a general rule, the issuance of default 

judgment is disfavored. Id. at 1472.

III. Plaintiff’s Factual Allegations

The Court accepts Plaintiff’s factual assertions because default has been entered against 

Defendants. See Pope, 323 U.S. at 22. Plaintiff alleges that by contract, it was granted exclusive 

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domestic commercial distribution rights to the Program and, pursuant to that contract, “entered into 

subsequent sublicensing agreements with various commercial entities throughout North America” to 

broadcast the Program within their establishments, such as “hotels, racetracks, casinos, bars, taverns, 

restaurants, [and] social clubs.” (Doc. 1 at 5, ¶¶ 20-21)

Plaintiff alleges the Program was broadcast at Culichi Sushi and Mariscos without the purchase 

of a proper sublicense from Plaintiff. (Doc. 1 at 5-6, ¶ 23) Plaintiff asserts Defendants were each 

“owner, and/or operator, and/or licensee, and/or permittee, and/or person in charge, and/or an 

individual with dominion, control, oversight and management of the commercial establishment doing 

business as Culichi Sushi and Mariscos operating at 3017 Wilson Road, Bakersfield, California 93304.” 

(Id. at 3, ¶¶ 7, 9) 

For this act, Plaintiff alleged violations of 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605, conversion, and a 

violation of the California Business and Professions Code. (See generally Doc. 1 at 5-11) In the

application for default judgment, Plaintiff requests damages for the violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605 and 

conversion. (See Doc. 11-1) Therefore, the Court will address only these claims.

IV. Discussion and Analysis

Applying the factors articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Eitel, the Court finds the factors weigh 

in favor of granting Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. 

A. Prejudice to Plaintiff

The first factor considers whether the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if default judgment is not 

entered, and potential prejudice to the plaintiff weighs in favor of granting a default judgment. See 

Pepsico, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. Generally, where default has been entered against a defendant, 

a plaintiff has no other means by which to recover damages. Id.; Moroccanoil, Inc. v. Allstate Beauty 

Prods., 847 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200-01 (C.D. Cal. 2012). Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff would be 

prejudiced if default judgment is not granted.

B. Merits of Plaintiff’s claims and the sufficiency of the complaint

Given the kinship of these factors, the Court considers the merits of Plaintiff’s substantive 

claims and the sufficiency of the complaint together. See Premier Pool Mgmt. Corp. v. Lusk, 2012 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 63350, at *13 (E.D. Cal. May 4, 2012). The Ninth Circuit has suggested that, when 

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combined, the factors require a plaintiff to “state a claim on which the plaintiff may recover.” Pepsico, 

Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. Notably, a “defendant is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded 

or to admit conclusions of law.” DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh, 503 F.3d 847, 854 (9th Cir. 2007).

1. Claim arising under 47 U.S.C. § 605

The Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”) “prohibits the unauthorized 

receipt and use of radio communications for one’s ‘own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled 

thereto.’” DirecTV, Inc. v. Webb, 545 F.3d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(a)). In 

pertinent part, the Communications Act provides, “No person not being authorized by the sender shall 

intercept any radio communication and divulge or publish the ... contents ... of such intercepted 

communication to any person.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). Thus, Plaintiff must establish it was the party 

aggrieved by Defendants’ actions. 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A). Plaintiff must also show Defendants

intercepted a wire or radio program and published it without permission. 47 U.S.C. § 605(a). 

a. Party aggrieved

Under the Communications Act, a “person aggrieved” includes a party “with proprietary rights 

in the intercepted communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or retail distributors of satellite 

cable programming.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6). In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that G & G Closed 

Circuit Events, LLC held the exclusive, nationwide commercial distribution rights to the Program. 

(Doc. 1 at 5) In support of this assertion, Nicholas Gagliardi, President of G & G Closed Circuit Events

produced the Closed Circuit Television License Agreement between Plaintiff and Golden Boy 

Promotions, LLC, granting Plaintiff “the exclusive license to exhibit . . . [the] live simultaneous HBOPPV telecast” of the Program. (Doc. 11-4 at 8) Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff was the party 

aggrieved within the meaning of Section 605. 

b. Interception and publication of the Program

Plaintiff acknowledges it cannot be certain of the method of interception used to obtain the 

Program for the broadcast at Culichi Sushi and Mariscos. (See Doc. 11-1 at 8-9) Similarly, in Joe 

Hand Prod. v. Behari, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37277 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2013), the plaintiff was 

unable to identify the nature of the transmission. This Court observed: “Plaintiff’s inability to allege 

the precise nature of the intercepted transmission in this case ...raises a question regarding the scope of 

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47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and the sufficiency of plaintiff’s claim under that provision.” Id., 2013 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 37277 at *7. Nevertheless, Plaintiff provided evidence that Defendants broadcast the Program 

in their establishment, because an investigator witnessed the Program broadcast at Culichi Sushi and 

Mariscos. (Doc. 11-3) 

Because Plaintiff was a party aggrieved, and Defendants intercepted the Program and published 

it without permission, Plaintiff has established the elements of a claim under the Communications Act.

2. Conversion

As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, conversion has three elements under California Law: 

“ownership or right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.” 

G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Services, Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992); see 

also Greka Integrated, Inc. v. Lowrey, 133 Cal.App.4th 1572, 1581 (2005) (“elements of a conversion 

are the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion; the 

defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and damages”). Previously, 

this Court determined the possession of “a right to distribute programming” constitutes ownership of 

properly for purposes of conversion. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pahnke, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189-90 (E.D. 

Cal. 2005) (citing Don King Prods./ Kingsvision v. Lovato, 911 F.Supp. 429, 423 (N.D. Cal. 1995)). 

Therefore, to state a claim for conversion, Plaintiff is required to possess the exclusive ownership of, or 

the exclusive right to license, the broadcasting of the Program. 

Given that Plaintiff established it held the distribution rights, the company held a “right to 

possession of property.” Further, Plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to support a finding that Defendants

engaged in signal piracy by broadcasting the Program without a sublicense. The investigator estimated 

the capacity of Culichi Sushi and Mariscos was “approximately 100 people,” and he counted 54 to 58 

people at the establishment. (Doc. 11-3 at 2) The rate sheet indicates a sublicense cost $2,800.00 for 

an establishment with the capacity up to 100 persons. (Doc. 11-4 at 22) Consequently, Plaintiff has 

established damages in the amount of $2,800.00, and states a claim for conversion against Defendants.

C. Sum of money at stake

In considering this factor, the Court “must consider the amount of money at stake in relation to 

the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1176. Plaintiff seeks $2,800 

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in compensatory damages for Defendants’ tortuous conversion of Plaintiff’s property. Plaintiff also 

requests statutory damages totaling $33,600 for the violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605. (See Doc. 11 at 3)

Given the amount of money at stake, this factor could weigh against the entry of default 

judgment. See, e.g., Moore v. Cisneros, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177044, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 

2023) (“[d]efault judgment is disfavored when a large sum of money is involved”). However, as this 

Court previously observed, “the statutes involved contemplate such an award under certain 

circumstances,” and authorize awards up to $110,000. See G & G Closed Events, LLC v. Shahen, 2012 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58723, at *18 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2012). Thus, this factor does not weigh against 

Plaintiff’s request for default judgment.

D. Possibility of dispute concerning material facts

There is little possibility of dispute concerning material facts because (1) based on the entry of 

default, the Court accepts allegations in the Complaint as true and (2) though properly served, 

Defendants failed to appear. See Pepsico, Inc., 238 F.Supp.2d at 1177; see also Elektra Entm’t Group,

Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (“Because all allegations in a well-pleaded 

complaint are taken as true after the court clerk enters default judgment, there is no likelihood that any 

genuine issue of material fact exists”). Therefore, this factor does not weigh against default judgment.

E. Whether default was due to excusable neglect

Generally, the Court will consider whether Defendants’ failure to answer is due to excusable 

neglect. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. Here, Defendants were served with the Summons and Complaint, 

as well as the motion for default judgment. (See Doc. 11-1 at 19) Given these facts, it is unlikely that 

Defendants’ actions were the result of excusable neglect. Shanghai Automation Instrument Co., Ltd. v. 

Kuei, 194 F.Supp.2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect because the defendants 

“were properly served with the Complaint, the notice of entry of default, as well as the papers in 

support of the instant motion”). Accordingly, this factor does not weigh against default judgment.

F. Policy disfavoring default judgment

As noted above, default judgments are disfavored because “[c]ases should be decided on their 

merits whenever reasonably possible.” Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. The policy underlying the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits does not weigh against default judgment 

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because Defendants’ failure to appear before the Court and defend in this action makes a decision on 

the merits impractical.

V. Damages

Under the Communications Act, a party aggrieved may recover actual damages or statutory 

damages “not less than $1,000 or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. § 605(e) 

(3)(C)(i)(II). When the Court determines a violation was “committed willfully and for the purposes of 

direct or indirect commercial advantage or private financial gain,” a court may award enhanced 

damages by increasing the awarded damages up to $100,000.00 for each violation. 47 U.S.C. § 

605(e)(3)(C)(ii). The Court has “wide discretion” to determine the proper amount of damages to be 

awarded. DirecTV Inc. v. Le, 267 Fed. App’x 636 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

A. Statutory damages

The Court may consider a number of factors in its determination of the amount of damages, 

including any promotional advertising by the defendant, the capacity of the establishment, the number 

of patrons present at the time of the broadcast, the imposition of a cover charge, the number and size of 

the televisions used for the broadcast, and whether a premium was charged on food or drink. J & J 

Sports Productions v. Sorondo, 2011 WL 3917391, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (citing Kingvision 

Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).

Hector Cardenas, Plaintiff’s investigator, attached an advertisement for the Program broadcast 

Culichi Sushi and Mariscos, which stated: Join us this Saturday for Canelo vs. GGG2 fight. $10 event 

charge. Live music, Mexican party after the fight to celebrate Mexican Independence Day!!!” (Doc. 11-

3 at 4) Mr. Cardenas indicated he paid the $10 to enter, and observed five televisions that ranged in 

size from 32 inches to 50 inches. (Id. at 2) He stated that he observed the fight, but did not clarify if 

the fight was on one television or all five. (See id.) Mr. Cardenas estimated the capacity of the 

restaurant was 100 people, and he counted the number of patrons three times, finding 54, 56, and 58 

people were present. (Id.) Given these factors, the Court finds an award of $5,600—which is twice the

cost of a proper sublicense —is appropriate.1

 

1 Courts in this district have found that the statutory maximum is not an appropriate award for a first-time offender 

and in the absence of aggravating factors. See, e.g., Joe Hand Promotions v. Brown, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119435 (E.D. 

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B. Enhanced damages

Although Plaintiff asserts a right to enhanced damages, allegations regarding the amount of 

damages must be well-plead and supported by factual allegations. See Pope, 323 U.S. at 22; Geddes, 

559 F.2d at 560. “The mere assertion that Defendant acted willfully is insufficient to justify enhanced 

damages.” Sorondo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99951, at *10 (quoting Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. 

Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). Here, Plaintiff alleged: “Said unauthorized 

interception, reception, publication, exhibition, divulgence, display, and/or exhibition by the each of the

Defendants was done willfully and for purposes of direct and/or indirect commercial advantage and/or 

private financial gain.” (Doc. 1 at 6, ¶ 24) Importantly, there are no factual allegations in the 

complaint to support the legal conclusion that Defendants’ actions were willful or for the purpose of 

financial gain. Previously, the Court explained:

To adequately state a claim against a defendant, a plaintiff must set forth the legal and 

factual basis for his or her claim. Detailed factual allegations are not required, but 

“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by mere 

conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009), 

citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While factual 

allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 

plaintiff must set forth “the grounds of his entitlement to relief,” which “requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In its complaint, Plaintiff simply alleged a legal conclusion: “Said unauthorized 

interception, reception, publication, exhibition, divulgence, display, and/or exhibition by 

each of the Defendant [sic] was done willfully and for purposes of direct and/or indirect 

commercial advantage and/or private financial gain.”

Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Hathcock, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101208, at *2-3 (E.D Cal. July 20, 

2012). Consequently, the Court found Plaintiff “failed to allege facts establishing the grounds of 

entitlement to enhanced damages.” Id. at *3. 

Despite the pleading flaws of the Complaint, Plaintiff has submitted evidence to support the 

contention that enhanced damages are appropriate, “including the advertising and cover charge.” (See

Doc. 11-1 at 14) Previously, this Court observed that “[a]n award of enhanced damages is appropriate 

 

Cal. Oct. 27, 2010) (awarding $4,000 in damages where the program was broadcast on six 60-inch televisions, and there was 

no premium for food or drink); J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Morales, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30942 (E.D. Cal. March 

8, 2012) (awarding $4,400 in statutory damages where the sublicense cost $2,200 for the broadcast that the defendants 

displayed on three televisions, ranging in size up to 54”); J & J Sports Productions v. Sorondo, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

99951 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (awarding $3,600 in statutory damages, an amount two times the cost of a sublicense).

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where the defendant imposes a cover charge or admission fee.” J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Mendoza, 

2015 WL 5009000, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2015); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Burleson, 

2011 WL 4905631, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2011) (awarding $3,000 in enhanced damages where 

patrons were told they could either pay a [$5] cover charge to watch the fight or order a plate of ‘all you 

can eat wings for $11.99’”). Because Defendants both advertised the fight at Culichi Sushi and 

Mariscos and a $10 cover charge was required, the Court finds enhanced damages are appropriate. 

However, there is no information from the investigator regarding where the advertisement was posted 

or its size. In addition, the advertising related to both the fight and live music following the broadcast, 

in celebration of Mexican Independence Day. Further, the investigator’s headcounts revealed that the 

number of patrons was just over half the capacity of the establishment, which indicates the Program 

produced minimal financial gain, if any. In light of these facts, the Court finds $7,500 in enhanced 

damages is appropriate. See Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. v. Lan Thu Tran, No. C-05-05017, 2006 

WL 2691431, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Sept.20, 2006) (awarding $5,000 in enhanced damages under section 

605 where a $10 cover charge was imposed).

C. Damages for conversion

Finally, because Plaintiff chose to receive statutory damages rather than actual damages under 

the Communications Act, damages for conversion are subsumed into the total award of $13,100. See, 

e.g., J & J Sports Prods. v. Carranza, 2015 WL 12681674 at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2015) (finding 

“[damages awarded under section 605 sufficiently compensate Plaintiff” and declining to award 

additional damages for conversion); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Behari, 2013 WL 1129311, n.2 (E.D. 

Cal. Mar. 18, 2013) (explaining damages conversion would not be awarded “because the recommended 

statutory damages will sufficiently compensate plaintiff such that an award for conversion damages 

would be duplicative”); J &J Sports Productions v. Mannor, 2011 WL 1135356, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

28, 2011) (declining to award damages for conversion because “plaintiff has been sufficiently 

compensated through the federal statutory scheme” where the award total was $3,200 and the cost of

the proper license was $2,200); J & J Sports Productions v. Bachman, 2010 WL 11575444, at *6 (E.D. 

Cal. May 7, 2010) (declining conversion damages because statutory damages in the amount of $10,000

“sufficiently compensate[d]” the plaintiff where the cost of the proper license was $2,200).

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VI. Findings and Recommendations

The Eitel factors weigh in favor of granting default judgment, and the entry of default judgment 

is within the discretion of the Court. See Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092. However, the damages requested 

are disproportionate to Defendants’ actions. Importantly, when determining the amount of damages to 

be awarded for signal piracy, “the principle of proportionality governs.” Backman, 102 F.Supp.2d at 

1198. Under this principle, “distributors should not be overcompensated and statutory awards should 

be proportional to the violation.” Id. 

Accordingly, the Court recommends the award of $13,100 for Defendants’ wrongful acts. This 

amount both compensates Plaintiff for the wrongful act and is a suitable deterrent against future acts of 

piracy. See Kingvision Pay-Per-View v. Lake Alice Bar, 168 F.3d 347, 350 (9th Cir. 1999) (observing a 

lower statutory award may deter while not destroying a business). 

Based upon the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. Plaintiff’s application for default judgment (Doc. 11) be GRANTED IN PART AND 

DENIED IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

A. Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages for the violation of the Communications 

Act be GRANTED in the amount of $5,600;

B. Plaintiff’s request for enhanced damages be GRANTED in the amount of 

$7,500;

C. Plaintiff’s request for damages for the tort of conversion be DENIED; 

2. Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC and against 

Defendants Ramon A. Barajas- Quijada and Gustavo Garcia, Jr., individually and doing 

business Culichi Sushi and Mariscos; and

3. Plaintiff be directed to file any application for attorney’s fees pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 

605 no later than fourteen days from the entry of judgment.

These Findings and Recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local 

Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within fourteen

days of the date of service of these Findings and Recommendations, any party may file written 

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objections with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s 

Findings and Recommendations.” The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 

(9th Cir. 1991); Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 834 (9th Cir. 2014).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 7, 2020 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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