Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02151/USCOURTS-caed-2_15-cv-02151-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Richard Baland
Defendant
Robert Davis
Defendant
Kevin Kish
Defendant
Julie Su
Defendant
United Indian Health Services, Inc.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES, 

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

JULIE SU, Labor Commissioner, 

California Division of Labor Standards 

Enforcement; KEVIN KISH, Director of 

the California Department of Fair 

Employment and Housing; RICHARD 

BALAND; and ROBERT DAVIS,

Defendants.

No. 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN

ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendants Richard Baland and Robert Davis’s 

(“Defendants”) Motion for Sanctions. (ECF No. 31.) Plaintiff United Indian Health Services, 

Inc. (“Plaintiff”) has filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion. (ECF No. 32.) The Defendants 

have filed a reply. (ECF No. 33.) The Court has carefully considered the arguments raised by the 

parties. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions is hereby DENIED.

/ / /

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 35 Filed 11/22/16 Page 1 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff claims to be a “tribal organization” as defined in 25 U.S.C. § 450b(1) that 

“enjoys common law sovereign immunity.” (ECF No. 12 at ¶ 1.) Two California state agencies, 

the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (“DLSE”) and the Department of Fair Employment 

and Housing (“DFEH” and, together with DLSE, the “Agencies”) began investigating alleged 

California labor and employment law violations by Plaintiff after complaints by Defendants, 

former employees of Plaintiff. (ECF No. 12 at ¶¶ 9–13, 19.) Believing it was not subject to the 

jurisdiction of the Agencies, Plaintiff was unwilling to participate in these investigations. (See 

ECF No. 12 at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff filed this action seeking, in part, a declaration of its sovereign 

immunity and an injunction against Defendants as well as the heads of each of the Agencies in 

order to prohibit the investigations. (ECF No. 12 at 11.) On February 23, 2016, this Court 

dismissed the amended complaint for lack of a justiciable case or controversy under Article III of 

the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 29.) Defendants filed this instant motion seeking 

sanctions. (ECF No. 31.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”) provides, in relevant part:

(b) By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other 

paper ... an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best 

of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an 

inquiry reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being 

presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause 

unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation; (2) 

the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 

modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 

[and] (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 

specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after 

a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.... 

If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 

determines that Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may 

impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party 

that violated the rule....

Rule 11 “is designed to deter attorneys and unrepresented parties from violating their 

certification that any pleading, motion or other paper presented to the court is supported by an 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 35 Filed 11/22/16 Page 2 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

objectively reasonable legal and factual basis; no showing of bad faith or subjective intent is 

required.” Truesdell v. S. Cal. Permanente Med. Grp., 209 F.R.D. 169, 173–74 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 

Rather, Rule 11 is governed by an objective standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Conn v. CSO 

Borjorquez, 967 F.2d 1418, 1421 (9th Cir. 1992). “The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter 

baseless filings.” United States ex rel. Robinson Rancheria Citizens Council v. Borneo, Inc., 971 

F.2d 244, 254 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990)). 

Thus, where a party “pursues causes of action for which there is no legal basis whatsoever,” 

sanctions may be warranted. Bhambra v. True, No. 09-cv-4685-CRB, 2010 WL 1758895, at *3 

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2010).

When evaluating whether a complaint is frivolous or without evidentiary support, the 

court “must conduct a two-prong inquiry to determine (1) whether the complaint is legally or 

factually baseless from an objective perspective, and (2) if the attorney has conducted a 

reasonable and competent inquiry before signing and filing it.” Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 

1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Under the plain language of 

the rule, when one party files a motion for sanctions, the court must determine whether any 

provisions of subdivision (b) have been violated.” Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1389 (9th 

Cir. 1994). “If Rule 11(b) was violated, the court ‘may’ impose sanctions.” Maxwell v. Deutsche 

Bank Nat’l Trust Co., No. 13-cv-03957, 2014 WL 296873, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2014).

III. ANALYSIS

The crux of Defendants’ sanctions motion is that Plaintiff’s preference for a federal forum 

to litigate the issue of Plaintiff’s alleged sovereign immunity constitutes a sanctionable, “abusive” 

litigation tactic. (See ECF No. 31-1 at 1–2, 7; ECF No. 33 at 1–3, 7.) The Court cannot agree, 

particularly given the state of the law prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bodi v. Shingle 

Springs Band of Miwok Indians, 832 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2016). Moreover, the Court declines 

Defendants’ implicit invitation to rule on the merits of Plaintiff’s sovereign immunity argument. 

(See ECF No. 31-1 at 1–5, 7; ECF No. 33 at 1, 6–7.) Where, as here, a federal court concludes 

that a plaintiff has not satisfied the elements of Article III standing, that court has no authority to 

decide the case on the merits. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2013). The Court 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 35 Filed 11/22/16 Page 3 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

will not do so under the guise of a motion for sanctions.

Plaintiff explained that it filed this action in federal court because it feared its nonparticipation in the Agencies’ investigations and related proceedings could lead to a default 

finding of liability in a state tribunal that could only be challenged by waiving its alleged 

sovereign immunity. (See ECF No. 12 at ¶ 18.) In Bodi, the Ninth Circuit explained there was a 

lack of clarity about the extent to which an Indian tribe could waive its immunity by litigation 

conduct. Bodi, 832 F.3d at 1014, 1017–20. In particular, Bodi resolved a split among district 

courts in the Ninth Circuit by concluding a tribe’s removal of an action from state court did not 

constitute a waiver of its sovereign immunity. Id. at 1014. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis

demonstrated the difficult choice a party wishing to assert a tribal immunity defense would have

faced prior to its decision — a federal forum and waiving its sovereign immunity. Id. at 1022. 

The Ninth Circuit detailed why an attorney representing such a party might reasonably “race to 

the courthouse” seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in hopes of preserving a federal forum to 

litigate its sovereign immunity defense. Id. at 1023.

Due to the uncertainty that existed pre-Bodi, Plaintiff found itself in the unenviable 

position described by the Ninth Circuit when it filed the instant case. (See ECF No. 12.) The 

solution proposed by Defendants is that Plaintiff should have proceeded before the “labor court” 

and, if Plaintiff lost, appealed to the Superior Court of Humboldt County. (ECF No. 31-1 at 5.) 

Apparently, Defendants’ viewed this as the only proper, non-abusive choice a decent attorney in 

the shoes of Plaintiff’s attorney could make. (See ECF No. 31-1 at 3.) The Court disagrees. As 

the Ninth Circuit explained, because “[t]ribal immunity is a matter of federal law,” parties 

wishing to assert it “may wish to avail themselves, when possible of the experience, solicitude 

and hope of uniformity that a federal forum offers.” Id. at 1023 (internal quotation marks 

omitted). This is particularly the case as “state courts have long been at least perceived as 

‘inhospitable to Indian rights.’” Id. 

Simply put, the law regarding waiver of tribal sovereign immunity can be complex. It was 

more so when this case was filed in October 2015, as Bodi had yet to be decided. (See ECF No. 

12.) This Court is not inclined to sanction an attorney for racing to the federal courthouse where 

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 35 Filed 11/22/16 Page 4 of 5
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

it was unsettled whether that attorney’s failure to do so would negatively impact his client.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 21, 2016

Case 2:15-cv-02151-TLN-KJN Document 35 Filed 11/22/16 Page 5 of 5