Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04058/USCOURTS-arwd-4_05-cv-04058-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charity M. Price
Plaintiff
SSA
Defendant

Document Text:

AO72A

(Rev. 8/82)

Linda S. McMahon became the Social Security Commissioner on January 20, 2007. Pursuant to Rule 25(d)(1) of 1

 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Linda S. McMahon has been substituted for acting Commissioner Jo Anne

 B. Barnhart as the defendant in this suit.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

TEXARKANA DIVISION

CHARITY M. PRICE PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL NO. 05-4058

LINDA S. MCMAHON, Commissioner 1

Social Security Administration DEFENDANT

O R D E R 

Plaintiff Charity M. Price appealed the Commissioner's denial of benefits to this court.

On September 20, 2006, judgment was entered remanding plaintiff's case to the Commissioner

pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. # 14). Plaintiff now moves for an award

of $2,205.00 in attorney's fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. § 2412, the Equal Access to Justice Act

(hereinafter "EAJA"), requesting compensation for 14.70 hours of work before the court at an

hourly rate of $150.00. (Doc. # 15-17). The defendant has filed a response, expressing no

objection to this award. (Doc. #18).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), the court must award attorney's fees to a

prevailing social security claimant unless the Commissioner's position in denying benefits was

substantially justified. The burden is on the Commissioner to show substantial justification for

the government's denial of benefits. Jackson v. Bowen, 807 F.2d 127, 128 (8th Cir. 1986).

Under Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993), a social security claimant who obtains a

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sentence-four judgment reversing theCommissioner's denial of benefits and remanding the case

for further proceedings is a prevailing party. 

Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this matter. The Commissioner does not oppose the

award of a reasonable attorney'sfee under the EAJA, does not object to the hourly rate requested

by plaintiff’s counsel for attorney’s fees and does not dispute the number of hours expended by

counsel. (Doc. # 18). The court construes this lack of opposition to the award of a reasonable

fee as an admission that the government's decision to deny benefits was not "substantially

justified."

An award of attorney’s fees under the EAJA is appropriate even though at the conclusion

of the case, plaintiff’s attorney may be authorized to charge and collect a fee pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 406(b)(1). Recovery of attorney’s fees under both the EAJA and 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)

was specifically allowed when Congress amended the EAJA in 1985. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart,

535 U.S. 789, 796, 122 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 152 L.Ed.2d 996 (2002), citing Pub.L. 99-80, §

3, 99 Stat. 186 (1985). 

To permit a fee award under the EAJA, assuming, of course, that the necessary

standard is met, in addition to that allowed by the district court out of a

claimant’s past-due benefits does no more than reimburse the claimant for his or

her expenses and results in no windfall for the attorney.

Meyers v. Heckler, 625 F.Supp. 228, 231 (S.D.Ohio 1985). Furthermore, awarding fees under

both acts facilitates the purposes of the EAJA, which is to shift to the United States the

prevailing party’s litigation expenses incurred while contesting unreasonable government action.

Id. See also, Cornella v. Schweiker, 728 F.2d 978 (8th Cir.1984).

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In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the court will in each case consider the

following factors: time and labor required; the difficulty of questions involved; the skill required

to handle the problems presented; the attorney's experience, ability, and reputation; the benefits

resulting to the client from the services; the customary fee for similar services; the contingency

or certainty of compensation; the results obtained; and the amount involved. Allen v. Heckler,

588 F.Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). 

However, the EAJA is not designed to reimburse without limit. Pierce v. Underwood,

487 U.S. 552, 573 (1988). The district court is "in the best position to evaluate counsel’s

services and fee request, particularlywhen the court has had the opportunity to observe firsthand

counsel’s representation on the substantive aspects of the disability claim." Hickey v. Secretary

of HHS, 923 F.2d 585, 586 (8th Cir.1991), quoting Cotter v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 359, 361 (8th

Cir.1989). The court can determine the reasonableness and accuracy of a fee request, even in

the absence of an objection by the Commissioner. See Decker v. Sullivan, 976 F.2d 456, 459

(8th Cir.1992) ("Although the issue was not raised on appeal, fairness to the parties requires an

accurately calculated attorney’s fee award.").

The EAJA further requires an attorney seeking fees to submit "an itemized

statement...stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were

computed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). Attorneys seeking fees under federal fee-shifting

statutes such as the EAJA are required to present fee applications with "contemporaneous time

records of hours worked and rates claimed, plus a detailed description of the subject matter of

the work." Id. Where documentation isinadequate, the court may reduce the award accordingly.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). 

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The Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, passed on March 29, 1996,

amended the EAJA and increased the statutory ceiling for EAJA fee awards from $75.00 to

$125.00 per hour. See 28 U.S.C. § 2 412(d)(2)(A). 

Plaintiff requests attorney's fees under the EAJA at a rate of $150.00 an hour based on

an increase in the cost of living. Attorney's fees may not be awarded in excess of $125.00 per

hour- the maximum statutory rate under § 2412(d)(2)(A) - unless the court finds that an increase

in the cost of living or a special factor such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys

justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A). The decision to increase the hourly rate is not

automatic and remains at the discretion of the district court. McNulty v. Sullivan, 886 F.2d 1074

(8th Cir. 1989). In Johnson v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1990), the court stated that the

hourly rate may be increased when there is "uncontested proof of an increase in the cost of living

sufficient to justify hourly attorney's fees of more than $75.00 an hour," such as a copy of the

Consumer Price Index. Plaintiff's counsel has attached a summary of the Consumer Price Index

as an exhibit (Doc. # 16) and has presented evidence of an increase in the cost of living.

Therefore, the undersigned believes his argument for enhanced fees based on a cost of living

increase has merit. Accordingly, we find that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to an award at the rate

of $150.00 per hour.

We next address the number of hours plaintiff's counsel claims he spent working on this

case. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks 0.25 hour on August 23, 2005 (served summons via certified

mail), from which we deduct 0.25 hour; 0.40 hour on September 20, 2005 (drafted affidavits of

service and letter to district court clerk. Forwarded to clerk for appropriate filing), from which

we deduct 0.30 hour; and 0.30 hour on November 22, 2005 (forwarded plaintiff’s brief to district

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court for filing), from which we deduct 0.30 hour. Accordingly, 0.85 hour must be deducted

from the total compensable time sought by counsel. 

Accordingly, we find that counsel is entitled to compensation under the EAJA for: 13.85

(14.70-0.85) hours for attorney’s fees, at the rate of $150.00 per hour, for a total attorney's fee

award of $2,077.50. This amount should be paid in addition to, and not out of, any past due

benefits which plaintiff may be awarded in the future.

The parties are reminded that the award herein under the EAJA will be taken into account

at such time as a reasonable fee is determined pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406, in order to prevent

double recovery by counsel for the plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14 day of February 2007. th

/s/ J. Marschewski 

HON. JAMES R. MARSCHEWSKI

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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