Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02831/USCOURTS-caed-2_12-cv-02831-5/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael Babcock
Respondent
Lonnie Oliver
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

LONNIE OLIVER,

Petitioner,

v.

MICHAEL BABCOCK, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 2:12-cv-2831 KJN P

ORDER

I. Introduction

Petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed a habeas corpus petition 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Both parties consented to proceed before the undersigned for all 

purposes. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Petitioner claims his constitutional rights were violated in 

connection with a prison disciplinary hearing, and that there was insufficient evidence to support 

the guilty finding. Petitioner seeks an order expunging the disciplinary hearing report. 

Pending before the court is respondent’s motion to dismiss. Respondent argues that this 

action should be dismissed because petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and 

contends that petitioner received all the process to which he was entitled, and that the decision 

was supported by some evidence. After carefully reviewing the record, the undersigned denies 

the petition for writ of habeas corpus and therefore need not address respondent’s motion to 

dismiss the petition based on petitioner’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

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II. Exhaustion of Remedies

In general, federal prisoners must exhaust their administrative remedies prior to the filing 

of a petition seeking relief pursuant to § 2241. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 

2004); Martinez v. Roberts, 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986). Under this exhaustion doctrine, 

“no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed 

remedy has been exhausted.” Laing, 370 F.3d at 998 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 

185, 193 (1969)). 

However, if a petitioner has not properly exhausted his claims, the district court in its 

discretion may either “excuse the faulty exhaustion and reach the merits, or require the petitioner 

to exhaust his administrative remedies before proceeding in court.” Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 

533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds, Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1995). 

Factors weighing in favor of requiring exhaustion include whether: (1) agency expertise makes 

agency consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) 

relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative 

scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes 

and to preclude the need for judicial review. Noriega-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 880-81 

(9th Cir. 2003) (citing Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1990)).

The undersigned is aware of the rationales requiring exhaustion. Nevertheless, the court 

excuses the exhaustion requirement in the circumstances of this case in order to reach the merits1

which, as noted, results in the denial of the petition in any event.

III. Motion to Dismiss

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Along with the motion, respondent 

submitted several exhibits, many of which are duplicates of those petitioner appended to the 

original petition. In the motion, respondent argues the merits of petitioner's claims. 

////

 

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 This denial obviates the need to address petitioner’s first claim that respondent interfered with 

petitioner’s First Amendment right to access the courts by failing to permit exhaustion. In light of 

the instant ruling on the merits of petitioner’s claims, he suffered no actual injury from the alleged 

interference.

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In dictum, the Supreme Court characterized as inappropriate a motion brought pursuant to 

Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in a habeas corpus proceeding. Browder v. 

Director, Ill. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 n.14 (1978). However, motions to dismiss 

under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254, are 

expressly authorized. White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989). Rule 4 allows a 

district court to dismiss a petition if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any 

exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court. . . .” Rule 4, 

Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. The Ninth Circuit has allowed a respondent to file a motion to 

dismiss in lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for a failure to exhaust state 

remedies or alleged violations of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 

F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to 

exhaust state remedies); White, 874 F.2d at 602-03 (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review 

motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F. Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 

(E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the court orders a 

response. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n.12.

Rule 7 permits the court to direct the parties to expand the record by submitting additional 

materials relating to the petition and to authenticate such materials, which may include 

documents, exhibits, affidavits, and answers under oath to written interrogatories propounded by 

the judge. Rule 7(a), (b), Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. One purpose of expanding the record 

is to enable the court to dispose of some habeas petitions that are not dismissed on the pleadings, 

but to do so without the time and expense required for an evidentiary hearing. Rule 7 Advisory 

Committee's Note, Fed. R. Governing § 2254 Cases. Here, respondent appended exhibits to the 

motion to dismiss which were not included with the petition. Accordingly, the court expands the 

record to include respondent’s exhibits. 

Review of the motion to dismiss and the opposition demonstrates that this action can be 

resolved on the merits based on application of the law. The expansion of the record permits 

summary disposition of the petition without a full evidentiary hearing. See Garcia v. Chavez, 

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2010 WL 3715514, *2 (E.D. Cal., Sept. 16, 2010)2(citation omitted) (28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition 

expanded to include document appended to motion to dismiss). In view of the absence of a 

material issue of fact concerning the authenticity or contents of the instant record, the court will 

consider the merits of the petition. Accordingly, the court construes the motion to dismiss to be 

an answer that responds to the petition. Conde- Rodriguez v. Adler, 2010 WL 2353522, *4 (E.D. 

Cal., June 9, 2010) (motion to dismiss construed as an answer).

3

 Thus, in resolving the instant 

action, the court considers the petition, the motion to dismiss, and petitioner's opposition.

IV. The Petition

Petitioner contends that his due process rights were violated during a prison disciplinary 

hearing held on December 7, 2011. Petitioner argues that his procedural and substantive due 

process rights were violated because the written notice of the charges incorrectly stated that the 

alleged assault occurred on August 19, 2011, thus violating the requirement that petitioner be 

served 24 hour advance written notice prior to the hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 9.) Petitioner also 

argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to present evidence at the hearing because 

he was not permitted to present the “Nice Vision Camera System” video beginning at 6:30 a.m. to 

7:20 a.m., that was taken on October 11, 2011, or to present Mr. Woodward’s medical reports. 

(ECF No. 1 at 12.) Petitioner contends his constitutional rights were violated because his staff 

representative Mr. French failed to provide assistance in preparing petitioner’s defense, and was 

biased toward plaintiff when Mr. French told petitioner that it was okay for white inmates to call 

black inmates “nigger.” (ECF No. 1 at 16.) Petitioner also contends Mr. French failed to watch 

the video. Finally, petitioner argues that his prison disciplinary conviction is not supported by 

“some evidence.” 

 

2

 The court in Garcia considered a state prisoner’s challenge to a disciplinary conviction under 28 

U.S.C. § 2254. Id. The court concluded that the expanded record demonstrated that the petitioner 

received all process of law he was due, and that the guilty finding of mutual combat was 

supported by some evidence. Id.

3

 In a § 2241 challenge similar to the instant one, the court in Conde-Rodriguez found that the 

prison disciplinary citing possession of a hazardous tool under § 108 was supported by some 

evidence based on the petitioner’s admission that he paid to use the cell phone, which 

strengthened the inference that petitioner had control over the instrument. Id.

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V. Legal Standards

A federal prisoner may seek a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Section 

2241 permits a federal prisoner to “challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's 

execution” by habeas review. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000). 

“Habeas corpus jurisdiction is available under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a prisoner's claims that he has 

been denied good time credits without due process of law.” Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 

1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). 

Federal prisoners have a statutory right to earn good-time credits that reduce the term of 

imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). Such credits may be revoked for committing certain 

prohibited acts while imprisoned. 28 C.F.R. § 541.3. Federal prisoners have certain due process 

rights in the disciplinary proceedings that may take away those credits. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 

418 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1974). However, in prison disciplinary proceedings, an inmate is not 

entitled to the full panoply of due process rights that apply to traditional criminal cases. Wolff, 

418 U.S. at 556. Rather, a prisoner's due process rights are limited by the “legitimate institutional 

needs” of the institution. Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1269. In the prison disciplinary context, due 

process requires that the prisoner receive: (1) written notice of the charges; (2) at least 24 hours 

between the time the prisoner receives written notice and the time of the hearing, so that the 

prisoner may prepare his defense; (3) a written statement by the fact finders of the evidence they 

rely on and reasons for taking disciplinary action; (4) the right of the prisoner to call witnesses 

and present documentary evidence in his defense, when permitting him to do so would not be 

unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals; and (5) legal assistance to the 

prisoner where the prisoner is illiterate or the issues presented are legally complex. Wolff, 418 

U.S. at 563-71. 

As to the merits of a disciplinary finding, due process requires that the decision be 

supported by “some evidence.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1984). The “some 

evidence” standard is “minimally stringent”; a decision must be upheld if there is any reliable 

evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the fact finder. Id. at 455-56. 

Determining whether a decision meets this standard on habeas review does not require a federal 

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court to reexamine the entire record, independently assess the credibility of witnesses, or re-weigh 

the evidence. Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1105 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled in part on 

other grounds, Sandin v. Connor,. 515 U.S. 472 (1995). However, the court must ascertain that 

the evidence has some indicia of reliability and, even if meager, “not so devoid of evidence that 

the findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Cato v. 

Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 457 (1985)).

VI. Analysis

A. Advance Written Notice

Petitioner is correct that the Notice of Discipline Hearing incorrectly referenced the date 

of offense as “8-19-11” rather than October 11, 2011. (ECF No. 1 at 59.) In his opposition, 

petitioner argues that 28 C.F.R. § 541.8 requires the hearing officer to “only conduct a hearing on 

a charge referred by U.D.C. in the 24 [hour] written notice form.” (ECF No. 33 at 3.) 

The Constitution only requires that inmates be afforded those protections mandated by 

Wolff at a prison disciplinary hearing; it does not require that prison officials comply with their 

own more generous procedures or time limitations. See Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 

(9th Cir. 1994) (prison regulations are designed to guide correctional officials, not confer rights 

on inmates), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. at 472. Under Wolff, the 

Constitution requires notice “to give the charged party a chance to marshal the facts in his defense 

and to clarify what the charges are, in fact.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. “At least a brief period of 

time after the notice, no less than 24 hours, should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the 

appearance.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564. 

In this case, petitioner was given advance written notice of the disciplinary charge brought 

against him. (ECF No. 1 at 61.) On October 11, 2011, petitioner was provided a copy of the 

Administrative Detention Order which stated that plaintiff was placed in the Special Housing Unit 

for Assault. (ECF No. 1 at 60.) The Incident Report, signed by petitioner on November 9, 2011, 

in section 14, states that the incident occurred on October 11, 2011, at 7:20 a.m., and that it was 

determined that petitioner assaulted inmate Woodward on October 11, 2011, at approximately 

7:20 a.m. (ECF No. 1 at 61.) Thus, despite the fact that the notice of hearing subsequently given 

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to plaintiff on November 11, 2011, incorrectly referenced the date of offense as “8-19-11” rather 

than October 11, 2011 (ECF No. 1 at 59), the advance written notice contained in the incident 

report was sufficient to comport with due process. Thus, the typographical error in the date of the 

incident set forth in the notice of hearing was harmless. As required under Wolff, the written 

incident report given to petitioner in advance of the hearing also set forth the evidence relied upon 

by prison officials and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken against him. (ECF No. 1 at 

61.) Petitioner received the incident report on November 9, 2011, and the hearing did not take 

place until December 7, 2011. Thus, petitioner was provided with the advance written notice 

required by Wolff, and provided more than sufficient time to prepare his defense.

Moreover, petitioner provided a copy of his written statement and exhibit list submitted to 

the hearing officer at the December 7, 2011 hearing, which demonstrates that petitioner was 

aware that the alleged assault occurred on October 11, 2011, and not August 19, 2011. (ECF No. 

1 at 46-67.) 

B. Right to Call Witnesses and Present Evidence

Petitioner contends he was denied the opportunity to present the “Nice Vision Camera 

System” video evidence from 6:30 a.m. to 7:20 a.m. on October 11, 2011, and the medical reports 

of the victim, and was denied the opportunity to question the alleged witnesses to the incident. 

(ECF No. 1 at 12-13.) Petitioner contends the video evidence would have shown that the victim 

sustained the scratch on his head during an earlier fight with the victim’s cellmate, rather than 

during the alleged altercation between petitioner and the victim, because petitioner claims the 

video does not show petitioner striking the victim in the face. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Respondent 

counters that the record reflects that the video and the medical record petitioner sought to have 

the hearing officer review were, in fact, considered. (ECF No. 27 at 12.) 

An inmate also has a right to a hearing at which he may “call witnesses and present 

documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous 

to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566; see also Ponte v. Real, 471 

U.S. 491, 495 (1985) (same). However, as a general rule, inmates “have no constitutional right to 

confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses” in prison disciplinary hearings. Ponte, 471 U.S. 

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at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1976) 

(same). 

Documents provided by petitioner confirm that petitioner was allowed to call witnesses. 

Inmates Gray and Ross provided written statements claiming that petitioner only exchanged 

words with the victim, not blows. (ECF No. 1 at 68.) The Discipline Hearing Officer Report 

provided by petitioner sets forth the evidence considered by the hearing officer, which included: 

petitioner’s written statement, the “Nice Vision Camera System” video of the alleged incident, 

which occurred at approximately 7:20 a.m., and petitioner’s “several pages of handwritten 

documents.” (ECF No. 1 at 70.) Plaintiff provided a copy of the written materials he submitted 

at the hearing. (ECF No. 1 at 46-67.) This document reflects that petitioner requested that the 

hearing officer review the “Nice Vision Camera System” video beginning at 6:30 a.m. to 7:20 

a.m. on October 11, 2011, and the photographs and medical reports of injuries to plaintiff and the 

victim. (ECF No. 1 at 62-64.) Thus, the documentary evidence provided by plaintiff refutes his 

claim that the hearing officer did not consider this evidence.4 

But even assuming, arguendo, that the hearing officer did not view the “Nice Vision 

Camera System” video for the time frame 6:30 to 7:20 a.m. on October 11, 2011, such failure 

does not violate petitioner’s due process rights because it was not exculpatory. Petitioner 

contends that the victim sustained the scratch on his forehead during an earlier altercation with his 

cellmate. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) However, the reporting employee observed the incident between 

petitioner and the victim on the “Nice Vision Camera System” video, and saw plaintiff grab the 

victim by the shoulders, shove the victim into cell #40, and strike the victim in the face.” (ECF 

No. 1 at 61.) In addition, the reporting employee stated that during the interview, plaintiff 

admitted grabbing the victim and shoving him into cell #40. (ECF No. 1 at 70.) The victim’s 

statement, included in plaintiff’s documents accompanying his statement in defense, stated that 

petitioner “tapped” the victim in the eye. (ECF No. 1 at 65.) The hearing officer noted that the 

victim’s injury assessment documented redness around the victim’s eye. (ECF No. 1 at 70.)

 

4

 Although petitioner did not provide a copy of the photographs or medical reports, respondent 

provided copies at ECF No. 29 at 74-79.

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The Discipline Hearing Officer Report confirms that “[a]ssaulting any person is an 

attempt or threat to do violence to another, or the non-consensual touching of another person.” 

(ECF No. 1 at 71.) Thus, whether or not petitioner struck the victim in the face, and whether or 

not the victim sustained the scratch on his forehead during the earlier altercation with his 

cellmate, the evidence adduced at the hearing supported the assaulting charge based on the 

allegation that petitioner grabbed the victim and pushed him into cell #40. Therefore, the “Nice 

Vision Camera System” video from earlier on October 11, 2011, was not exculpatory because the 

alleged injuries were not mutually exclusive. Moreover, the hearing officer was not required to 

personally review the “Nice Vision Camera System” video, as he could reasonably rely on the 

reporting employee’s statements. Alexander v. Schleder, 790 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (E.D. Cal. 

2011). 

In addition, the charge of assault does not require that the victim sustain an injury. (ECF 

No. 1 at 71.) Therefore, even if the hearing officer did not consider the victim’s medical report, it 

was of no consequence to the assault charge.

Accordingly, petitioner’s claims that he was not permitted to introduce evidence are 

refuted by the documents provided by petitioner, and are unavailing. Petitioner’s claim that he 

was not permitted to question witnesses to the incident is also unavailing because inmates have no 

constitutional right to confront or cross-examine adverse witnesses in a prison disciplinary 

hearing. See Ponte, 471 U.S. at 510 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Baxter, 425 U.S. at 322-

23.

C. Impartial Hearing Officer

Finally, petitioner makes no claim that the hearing officer was biased. Rather, petitioner 

now claims that his rights were violated because Lt. Warlick served as both the investigating 

officer and the reporting officer, allegedly in violation of 28 C.F.R. § 541.5(b), that Warlick was 

biased, and that the hearing officer should have found this rendered the proceedings unfair. (ECT 

No. 33 at 4-5.) 

Inmates are entitled to have their disciplinary charges heard by an impartial hearing 

tribunal. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570-71 (hearing tribunal must be “sufficiently impartial to 

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satisfy the Due Process Clause”). The Ninth Circuit has declared that a prison official who has 

participated in the case as an investigating or reviewing officer, or who has personal knowledge 

of the incident, is not sufficiently impartial to preside over the hearing. Clutchette v. Procunier, 

497 F.2d 809, 820 (9th Cir.1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613, rev'd on other grounds, Baxter, 425 

U.S. at 308; see also Wolff, 418 U.S. at 592 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“In my view due process 

is satisfied as long as no member of the disciplinary board has been involved in the investigation 

or prosecution of the particular case, or has had any other form of personal involvement in the 

case.”). The Code of Federal Regulations provides that “[i]n order to insure impartiality, the 

DHO may not be the reporting officer, investigating officer, or UDC member, or a witness to the 

incident, or play any significant part in having the charge(s) referred to the DHO.” 28 C.F.R. 

§ 541.16(b) (2010).

Here, petitioner does not claim that the hearing officer participated in the investigation, or 

served as the reporting officer. Moreover, petitioner concedes that no staff witnessed the October 

11, 2011 incident. (ECF No. 1 at 12.) Thus, Lt. Warlick’s role in reporting and investigating this 

incident was not tainted by any personal involvement in the alleged incident. The court has 

reviewed the Discipline Report and finds no evidence of bias or impartiality on the part of the 

hearing officer.

D. Staff Representative

Petitioner contends that he was denied the assistance of a staff representative because the 

staff representative failed to assist petitioner’s defense, and was biased toward petitioner. 

Petitioner contends he was entitled to such assistance based on his confinement in the SHU, 

relying on Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77, 81 (2nd Cir. 1998). (ECF No. 1 at 17.)

However, petitioner did not have a constitutional right to have a staff representative at his 

hearing. Petitioner is entitled to staff assistance if he is illiterate or “the complexity of the issue 

makes it unlikely that the inmate will be able to collect and present the evidence necessary for an 

adequate comprehension of the case.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. Petitioner does not allege that he 

is illiterate, and this incident did not involve a complex matter. 

////

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In any event, the documents provided by petitioner reflect that he was provided a staff 

representative who met with petitioner prior to the hearing (ECF No. 1 at 16), obtained a witness 

statement on behalf of petitioner (ECF No. 1 at 68), appeared at the December 7, 2011 hearing 

with petitioner (ECF No. 1 at 68), and told the hearing officer that the staff representative 

reviewed the video of the incident (ECF No. 1 at 16, 68). 

Insofar as petitioner’s complaints about the nature of the assistance the staff 

representative provided, because there is no right to assistance of counsel in a prison disciplinary 

proceeding, there is no such claim as ineffective assistance of counsel by an assisting staff 

member in that context. See Bostic, 884 F.2d at 1274, citing Baxter, 425 U.S. at 314-15. 

The documents provided by petitioner demonstrate that petitioner was afforded all the 

process due under the United States Constitution in connection with the disciplinary proceeding at 

issue. Thus, petitioner is not entitled to relief. 

E. “Some Evidence”

Petitioner contends that the decision was not supported by “some evidence,” primarily by 

re-arguing his procedural due process claims. (ECF No. 1 at 19-20; 22.)

The standard for reviewing prison disciplinary findings is set forth in Hill and is 

“minimally stringent.” Cato, 824 F.2d at 705. This court is not to re-weigh the evidence or make 

its own assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Id. at 455. Rather, “the relevant question 

is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the 

disciplinary board.” 472 U.S. at 455-56 (emphasis added). If there is any reliable evidence in the 

record to support the disciplinary findings, the “some evidence” standard is satisfied, and the 

decision must be upheld. Powell v. Gomez, 33 F.3d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1994); Toussaint, 801 F.2d 

at 1105; Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56.

Here, the Discipline Report reflects that the “Nice Vision Camera System” video showed 

plaintiff grab the victim by the shoulders and shove him into a cell. (ECF No. 1 at 70.) This 

evidence, standing alone, represents “some evidence” that petitioner assaulted the victim. In 

addition, petitioner put into evidence a statement by the victim that the victim provoked petitioner 

who “reacted” and “tapped” the victim in the eye. The victim’s statement bolsters the video 

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evidence. Finally, the Discipline Report reflects that “[d]uring mass interviews, several inmates 

identified and observed [plaintiff] assault [the victim].” (ECF No. 1 at 70.) Therefore, the video, 

the victim’s statement, as well as other inmate witnesses’ statements constitute “some evidence” 

that petitioner assaulted the victim. 

V. Conclusion

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Respondent’s motion to dismiss (ECF No. 27) is construed as an answer; and 

2. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is denied.5

Dated: January 2, 2014

/oliv2831.mtd.2241

 

5

 A certificate of appealability is not required for an appeal from the denial of a petition for writ 

of habeas corpus brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253; Harrison v. 

Ollison, 519 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2008).

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