Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03052/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03052-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
JoAnn McCoy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 16, 2001 Decided February 22, 2002

No. 01-3052

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

JoAnn McCoy,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00082-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for the appellant. A. J. Kramer, Federal Public

Defender, was on brief.

Suzanne Grealy Curt, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein,

Acting United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed,

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and John R. Fisher and Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant

United States Attorneys, were on brief.

Before: Ginsburg, Chief Judge, Henderson, Circuit Judge,

and Williams, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Senior Circuit Judge Williams.

Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge: The appellant,

JoAnn McCoy, appeals the district court's May 9, 2001 judgment resentencing her to a 33-month prison term and ordering her to pay $542,781.89 in restitution and a $150 special

assessment. She offers two challenges to the district court's

judgment.

First, McCoy argues that the district court erred in refusing to consider a legal issue made "newly relevant" by this

court's remand for resentencing in United States v. McCoy,

242 F.3d 399 (D.C. Cir.) (McCoy I), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct.

166 (2001). Second, she challenges the $542,781.89 restitution

figure, contending that the district court erred in refusing to

reconsider that amount in light of her "current ability to pay."

Her contentions are without merit and we therefore affirm

the district court's May 9 resentencing judgment in both

respects.

I.

On September 22, 1998 a jury found McCoy guilty of

violating: 18 U.S.C. s 1014, by making false statements in a

loan application to a bank (Count One); 15 U.S.C. s 645, by

making the same false statements to the Small Business

Administration (Count Two); and 18 U.S.C. s 1623, by perjuring herself in a bankruptcy proceeding and in her subsequent criminal trial (Count Three).1

On June 3, 1999 the district court imposed prison terms of

37 months each on Counts One and Three and 24 months on

__________

1 For a complete account of McCoy's conduct supporting the

verdict against her, see McCoy I, 242 F.3d at 401-02.

Count Two, all to be served concurrently. The court also

ordered McCoy to pay $542,781.89 in restitution--at the rate

of $300 per month upon her release from incarceration--and

imposed a $150 special assessment.

McCoy appealed to this court, arguing that there was

insufficient evidence to support her perjury conviction,

McCoy I, 242 F.3d at 402-03, and disputing the district

court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines

(U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) "which collectively increased her

offense level from 6 to 21, thereby substantially increasing

her range of imprisonment." Id. at 403. McCoy asserted

that the district court erroneously imposed: (i) an eight-point

increase in the offense level of her false statement offenses

(Counts One and Two), pursuant to U.S.S.G. s 2F1.1(b)(1),

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for causing a loss of $200,000 to $350,000; (ii) a two-point

increase, pursuant to section 2F1.1(b)(2), for "more than

minimal planning" of her false statement offenses; (iii) a twopoint increase in her false statement offenses level, pursuant

to section 3C1.1, for "willfully obstruct[ing] or imped[ing] ...

the administration of justice"; (iv) a one-point increase in her

"combined offense level," pursuant to section 3D1.2, because

her perjury offense (Count Three) was not grouped with her

two false statement offenses; and (v) a two-point increase in

her false statement offenses level, pursuant to section

3B1.1(c), for her role as an "organizer, leader, manager, or

supervisor in [a] criminal activity." See McCoy I, 242 F.3d at

403. Although the district court had applied the same twopoint obstruction-of-justice adjustment to McCoy's perjury

offense level as it had to her false statement offenses level,

she challenged only the two-point addition to her false statement offenses level. And at no time did she challenge the

district court's order that she pay $542,781.89 in restitution.

On appeal, we found "no ground for McCoy's challenge to

her perjury conviction," McCoy I, 242 F.3d at 403, and we

rejected all of McCoy's sentencing challenges save one--her

contention that the district court improperly imposed a twopoint "managerial role" adjustment under section 3B1.1(c).

Id. at 410; see also id. at 404-10. McCoy had argued that

her employees were "unwitting participants" in her criminal

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acts and therefore she could not have been the "organizer,

leader, manager, or supervisor" in a "criminal activity." See

id. at 410. We agreed, holding that "supervision of an

unwitting individual cannot justify an enhancement under

U.S.S.G. s 3B1.1(c)." Id. Accordingly, we remanded for

resentencing "with instructions to resolve the ambiguities" we

had discovered "in the [district] court's application of U.S.S.G.

s 3B1.1." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. s 3742(f)(1) (mandating remand if sentence imposed results from incorrect application

of Guidelines)).

On remand, the Probation Office revised the Presentence

Report, eliminating the two-point upward adjustment for

McCoy's managerial role in the offense. Updated Presentence Report at 3. The change brought her combined offense

level down from 21 to 20--not from 21 to 19, as the arithmetic

might ordinarily produce. In McCoy's case, the Guidelines

impose a one-point upward "multi-group adjustment" if the

difference between her two offense levels is five to eight

points and a two-point multi-group adjustment if the difference is less--i.e., zero to four points.2 Compare Presentence

Report at 11 with Updated Presentence Report at 4. Under

section 3D1.4, McCoy's multi-group adjustment (be it one or

two) must be added to the higher of her two offense levels to

produce her "combined offense level." At sentencing,

__________

2 In the introduction to Chapter 3, Part D, the Guidelines explain

why a higher adjustment is warranted where a difference in offense

levels is lower, and vice-versa:

The rules in this Part seek to provide incremental punishment

for significant additional criminal conduct. The most serious

offense is used as a starting point. The other counts determine

how much to increase the offense level. The amount of the

additional punishment declines as the number of additional

offenses increases.

U.S.S.G. Manual, ch. 3, pt. D, introductory cmt. (2001); see United

States v. Valentine, 100 F.3d 1209, 1212 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that

the "principle of declining marginal punishment has been clearly

enunciated in the introduction to Chapter 3 of the Guidelines and is

implicit in the structure of s 3D1.4, among other provisions").

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McCoy's false statement offenses level was 20 and her perjury offense level was 14. See Presentence Report at 10-11.

Thus, the difference was six and section 3D1.4 called for a

one-point multi-group adjustment. Adding one point to the

higher level of the two resulted in a combined offense level of

21.3 See id. at 11. On remand, however, her false statement

offenses level dropped to 18 because the two-point managerial

role adjustment was eliminated. Updated Presentence Report at 3-4. Her perjury level remained at 14. See id. at 4.

Thus, the difference between the two offense levels was

reduced to four and section 3D1.4 called for a two-point multigroup adjustment. Adding two points to the higher level of

the two resulted in a combined offense level of 20.4 See id.

At the outset of the resentencing proceeding, the district

court correctly stated that in McCoy I we had remanded the

case "for resentencing without the two-level enhancement

that was improperly accorded to [McCoy's] sentence....

Thus, the only issue presently before [the district court] is the

adjustment of [McCoy's] sentence in accordance with the

mandate issued by the Court of Appeals." App. of Appellee,

Tab H, at 2 (Resentencing Tr.). The court declined to

consider any issue other than elimination of the two-point

managerial role adjustment because in McCoy I we "stated

very clearly what issue [the district court] should address on

remand." Id. at 4.

Nonetheless, McCoy argued that her perjury offense level

should be 12 rather than 14 because, at her original sentencing, the district court erroneously added a two-point obstruction-of-justice adjustment to that level under section 3C1.1.

She therefore insisted that the multi-group differential re-

__________

3 For McCoy--who is in "Criminal History Category I"--a combined offense level of 21 carries a sentencing range of 37-46

months' imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Manual ch. 5, pt. A (2001). It

bears repeating here that the district court originally sentenced

McCoy to the 37-month minimum.

4 For McCoy, a combined offense level of 20 carries a sentencing

range of 33-41 months' imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Manual ch. 5,

pt. A (2001).

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main at six (18 minus 12) and that her combined offense level

become 19 (18 plus one) instead of 20 (18 plus two).5 She also

protested that "[t]he McCoy family's current financial situation does not leave them any hope of paying a half-million

dollar restitution obligation." App. of Appellant at 26. In

place of the original $542,781.89 restitution order--which

itself mandated payment at a rate of $300 per month--she

argued that payment at a rate of $300 per month for 10-20

years (for a total of $36,000 to $72,000) "would be more

faithful to the statutory considerations and give [her] hope of

someday fully meeting her obligation." Id. at 27.

The district court resentenced McCoy on May 9, 2001 to

concurrent prison terms of 33 months each on Counts One

and Three and 24 months on Count Two, all to be served

concurrently. The court reassessed the same amount in

restitution, $542,781.89, and it reimposed the same $150 special assessment.

II.

McCoy raises two challenges to the district court's May 9,

2001 resentencing. In reviewing these challenges, we "accept

the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly

erroneous" and "give due deference to the district court's

application of the [G]uidelines to the facts." 18 U.S.C.

s 3742(e); see also McCoy I, 242 F.3d at 403-04. We review

issues of law de novo. See McCoy I, 242 F.3d at 404; United

States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

First, citing our decision in United States v. Whren, 111

F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1119 (1998),

McCoy contends that the district court erred at resentencing

by refusing to consider the "newly relevant" issue of whether,

at her original sentencing, the two-point obstruction-ofjustice upward adjustment was erroneously added to her

perjury offense level under section 3C1.1. Further, she

__________

5 A 19-point combined offense level, as McCoy pointed out, would

carry a sentencing range of 30-37 months' imprisonment. See App.

of Appellant at 25; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A (2001).

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argues that the obstruction adjustment was erroneously added, claiming that the "repetition at her criminal trial of

precisely the same testimony she was convicted of giving at

her bankruptcy trial does not amount to the sort of 'significant further obstruction' required to justify an obstruction

enhancement to a perjury conviction under Application Note

7" to section 3C1.1.6 Br. of Appellant at 13. Thus, she

argues that her perjury offense level should be reduced to 12,

that her multi-group adjustment should remain at one point

(the difference between 12 and 18 being six) and that her

combined offense level should be reduced to 19. For the

reasons discussed infra, we conclude that McCoy has waived

her right to challenge at resentencing the obstruction adjustment to her perjury offense level.7

In Whren, we held that

upon a resentencing occasioned by a remand, unless the

court of appeals expressly directs otherwise, the district

court may consider only such new arguments or new

facts as are made newly relevant by the court of appeals'

decision--whether by the reasoning or by the result.

Whren, 111 F.3d at 960. We rejected the de novo approach

adopted by our sister courts in the Second, Sixth, Eighth,

Ninth and Tenth Circuits, under which a "district court may,

upon remand, take any evidence and hear any argument that

it could have considered in the original sentencing proceeding." Id. at 959 (citing United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231,

1235 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145,

151 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 975 (1996); United States

v. Atehortva, 69 F.3d 679, 685 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517

U.S. 1249 (1996); United States v. Ponce, 51 F.3d 820, 826

__________

6 Application Note 7 to section 3C1.1 provides that an obstruction

adjustment "is not to be applied to the offense level for [perjury]

except if a significant further obstruction occurred during the

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction itself."

U.S.S.G. Manual s 3C1.1, cmt. n.7 (2001).

7 Accordingly, we need not address the underlying merits of

McCoy's Application Note 7 argument.

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(9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705

(8th Cir. 1992)). We adopted instead a "waiver" approach,

under which "a defendant may argue at resentencing that the

court of appeals' decision has breathed life into a previously

dormant issue, but he may not revive in the second round an

issue he allowed to die in the first." Id. at 960; see also

United States v. Ticcharelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.) (adopting Whren approach), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 850 (1999);

United States v. Marmolejo, 139 F.3d 528, 530-31 (5th Cir.)

(same), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056 (1998); United States v.

Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) (adopting waiver

approach similar to that of Whren). We found the waiver

approach preferable to de novo resentencing because:

De novo resentencing is in essence a license for the

parties to introduce issues, arguments, and evidence that

they should have introduced at the original sentencing

hearing. The alternative of requiring the parties to raise

all relevant issues at the original sentencing hearing

serves both equity and efficiency: Each party gets early

notice of the other's position, and the district court can

resolve all material issues early on--when the record is

fresh in mind--and in a single proceeding, thereby minimizing the scope of any second proceeding, i.e., should

the first result in a remand.

Whren, 111 F.3d at 959-60.

McCoy claims that our remand in McCoy I set off a chain

reaction that has "breathed life into" the obstruction issue.

While McCoy can show the two-point upward adjustment to

be relevant,8 Whren's holding declares that whether the obstruction issue is newly relevant turns upon whether or not

McCoy had reason to challenge the adjustment at her origi-

__________

8 The remand did indeed reduce McCoy's false statement offenses

level from 20 to 18. Thus, her perjury offense level of 14 came

within four points, causing the multi-group adjustment to increase

from one to two. The increase in the multi-group adjustment, in

turn, raised the combined offense level from 19 to 20 and the

increase in the combined offense level raised her minimum sentence

from 30 months to 33 months.

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nal sentencing. Whren, 111 F.3d at 960 ("A defendant

should not be held to have waived an issue if he did not have

a reason to raise it at his original sentencing; but neither

should a defendant be able to raise an issue for the first time

upon resentencing if he did have reason but failed nonetheless to raise it in the earlier proceeding."). McCoy argues

that she "had no reason to raise the obstruction issue until

this Court's decision led to an offense level correction that

suddenly rendered the obstruction issue material to her sentence." Br. of Appellant at 17. At oral argument, she

iterated that the only relevant obstruction adjustment at her

original sentencing was the two-point addition to the "controlling" false statement offenses level. She is mistaken.

McCoy had ample reason in the first round of proceedings

to challenge the two-point obstruction addition to her "noncontrolling" perjury offense level. Her false statement offenses level, before the first appeal and with the obstruction

adjustment (to which she objected at her original sentencing

and on appeal), was 20. See Presentence Report at 10-11.

Her perjury offense level, before the first appeal and with the

obstruction adjustment (to which she now objects for the first

time), was 14. See id. at 11. Contrary to McCoy's assertion,

the obstruction adjustment to the "non-controlling" perjury

offense level became "relevant" the very instant she challenged the obstruction addition to the false statement offenses level. Had she persuaded the sentencing judge (as, we

presume, was her purpose), McCoy's "controlling" false statement offenses level would have been reduced to 18, bringing

it within four points of her perjury offense level and increasing the multi-group adjustment by one for a combined offense

level of 20. She had just as much incentive to keep the gap

at six then as she did at resentencing. In short, McCoy's

Application Note 7 argument does not fall within the "newly

relevant" exception to Whren's general bar against new arguments at resentencing and it was therefore waived.

Second, McCoy contends that the district court erred in

refusing to reconsider the original $542,781.89 restitution

amount in light of her "current ability to pay." She correctly

observes that our decision in United States v. Rhodes, 145

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F.3d 1375 (D.C. Cir. 1998), permits a resentencing court to

consider facts that were unavailable or non-existent at the

original sentencing. Rhodes, 145 F.3d at 1377-78 ("[C]onsideration of post-initial sentencing events, in those rare circumstances in which such events may become relevant, neither

contravenes Whren's concern with ensuring that parties receive fair notice of their opponent's arguments at initial

sentencing nor undermines its goal that district courts 'resolve all material issues ... when the record is fresh in

mind.' " (quoting Whren, 111 F.3d at 960) (emphasis added)).

She asserts that her current ability to pay restitution is such

a fact. Her assertion is without support.

The financial situation in which McCoy now finds herself is

utterly irrelevant to the restitution challenge she purports to

mount. The district court's original $542,781.89 restitution

order was to be paid at the rate of $300 per month. See App.

of Appellant at 17. McCoy did not argue at resentencing,

and does not argue now, that she cannot make the $300

monthly payments. Instead, she claims that "given the losses

the family [has] suffered as a result of her offense conduct"

and the "significant monthly deficit that [is] being made up

with help from [her] extended family," she will not realistically "be able to pay more than the $300 per month the [c]ourt

had ordered at the initial sentencing." Br. of Appellant at 22

(emphasis added). She acknowledges that she has simply

"requested that the restitution obligation be reduced to between $36,000 and $72,000-which could be paid off at the rate

of the $300 per month ordered by the court in 10 to 20 years."

Id. If McCoy can afford to pay $300 per month currently--a

fact she does not dispute--she has no relevant ground to

object to the reimposition of a restitution order mandating

payment at precisely that rate.

McCoy resists this conclusion, arguing that "by ordering

minimum payments of only $300 per month, the resentencing

court was implicitly recognizing that [she] did not have the

ability to pay more and that it was unlikely she would ever be

able to pay the full amount. (It would take 150 years to pay

the full amount at a rate of $300 per month)." Id. at 24. The

possibility that McCoy will not be able to pay the full

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$542,781.89 balance during her lifetime is one that existed at

the time she was originally sentenced. In failing to protest

the restitution order at that time--and, subsequently, on

appeal in McCoy I--she waived the half-hearted objection she

now raises. We conclude, therefore, that the district court

properly declined to reconsider its original restitution order.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court's May 9, 2001

resentencing judgment is

Affirmed.

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Williams, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring in part and

dissenting in part: I agree with the panel's disposition of

McCoy's claim for reconsideration of the restitution element

of her sentence. I disagree, however, with its conclusion that

McCoy has waived her objection to the two-point obstruction

bump for the offense level on the perjury charge.

Sentencing nowadays proceeds under the United States

Sentencing Guidelines and involves complexities and contingencies not unlike those of the Internal Revenue Code. Just

as under the IRC an increase in income at certain levels will

reduce the benefit of a taxpayer's deductions, see 26 U.S.C.

s 68 (reducing allowable deductions by 3% of the excess of

adjusted gross income over applicable statutory threshold);

see also id. s 151(d)(3) (reducing personal exemption amount

by 2% for every $2,500 in income over applicable statutory

threshold), so under the Guidelines a decrease in the "offense

level" for the higher-scored of two related crimes may end up

changing the effect of the lower-scored crime, and more

particularly, change the impact of the offense level assigned

to the lesser crime. As a result, an issue that at one point

appears purely hypothetical may move into prominence once

adjustment is made elsewhere in the calculation.

This of course is what happened to McCoy. See Maj. Op.

at 4-6. On her initial sentencing the district court found her

offense level for the false statement charge to be 20 and for

perjury 14. Because the difference of six (20 minus 14) fell

between five and eight points, under s 3C1.1's provision for a

"multi-group adjustment" the perjury charge caused a onepoint upward bump in her combined score, which the district

court accordingly set at 21. If McCoy had at that point

argued for a reduction of her perjury offense level from 14 to

12, as she now does, she would rightly have been told it was

immaterial; the multi-group adjustment is the same for an

eight-point differential as for a six-point differential, and the

perjury conviction's only impact on the combined offense level

was via that "adjustment."

On her first appeal we saw merit in her claim that the

district court had perhaps given her an improper two-point

bump for her managerial role in the false-statement offense.

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Unsure as to the district court's understanding of the standard and as to its view of the facts, we remanded. United

States v. McCoy, 242 F.3d 399, 409-10 (D.C. Cir. 2001). On

remand, the district court in fact deleted the two-point "managerial" bump. With the false statement charge falling to an

offense level of 18, the gap between it and the perjury score

fell to four (18 minus 14). Following s 3C1.1, the district

raised the multi-group adjustment to two points, now producing a combined score of 20. With the reduction in the false

statement offense level, the issue McCoy now raises became

material: reducing the perjury offense level from 14 to 12

would restore the gap to six points and thus take the multigroup adjustment back down to one.

Accordingly, McCoy then put before the district court her

complaint that it had erroneously given her perjury charge a

two-point bump for "obstruction of justice." The district

court refused to entertain the claim because, in its view, the

only issue properly before it was the two-point "managerial"

bump in the false statement charge. Resentencing Hearing

Tr. at 13 (May 9, 2001). (Not exactly: it assumed that

modifying the multi-group adjustment was in order.) The

majority today holds that McCoy's argument against the

obstruction supplement in the perjury context is not "newly

relevant" and that McCoy waived it by failing to raise it

during the initial hearing and appeal. This seems to me both

an unsound reading of our decision in United States v.

Whren, 111 F.3d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1997), and likely to lead to

inefficient and needlessly complex sentencing challenges.

In Whren we held that

... upon a resentencing occasioned by a remand, unless

the court of appeals expressly directs otherwise, the

district court may consider only such new arguments or

new facts as are made newly relevant by the court of

appeals' decision--whether by the reasoning or by the

result.

Id. at 960 (emphasis added). We also said, "A defendant

should not be held to have waived an issue if he did not have

a reason to raise it at his original sentencing." Id.

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The present case exposes an ambiguity in Whren. As I

understand the majority, an initial appeal renders an issue

"newly relevant" if but only if the decision opens up an issue

that previously could not have been even potentially relevant.

Apart from issues injected by the court of appeals on its own

hook, and presumptively from out of left field (which we're

generally not supposed to do), I'm not sure what issues could

fall into this group--apart, obviously, from any "newly relevant" issues that the court of appeals explicitly tells the

district court to consider on remand.

The more natural reading, I think, would be that an issue is

"newly relevant" if it will, entirely as a result of changes

resulting from the first appeal, for the first time have an

actual impact on the sentence. The only circuit court to

adopt or even seriously consider Whren, the First Circuit in

United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 32-33 (1st Cir.

1999), so understands it. In the initial sentencing there, the

district court had fitted a large weight of "hashish oil" into

the guidelines system by treating each kilo of hashish oil as

the equivalent of 50 kilos of marijuana. The court of appeals

reversed, saying that the oil must be treated as equal to

marijuana. On remand, the defendant then raised an issue

about computation of the weight of the drugs' containers, an

issue that had been--because of the numbers in question--

irrelevant under the district court's initial (erroneous) treatment of hashish oil. The district court refused to hear the

claim, treating its omission from the first appeal as a waiver.

The court of appeals rejected the waiver theory, quoting

Whren at some length and reading it to allow the defendant

to raise his "container" issue in the second appeal, because he

had not had "sufficient incentive to raise the issue in the prior

proceedings." Id. at 33. Of course in this circuit, under the

panel's view, fear of this court's waiver doctrine would supply

an incentive, but the First Circuit plainly saw incentive as

depending on whether the issue could change the sentence

under the view taken by the district court on the other issues.

As no change was possible under those views, there was no

waiver. This strikes me as the sound and natural reading of

Whren.

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Besides draining the Whren exception of virtually all meaning, the panel view here imposes an undue burden on counsel

and will ultimately increase the burdens on the court. The

impact on defense counsel is plain. Counsel must, in the

initial appeal (and therefore, of course, at the initial district

court sentencing), consider every step of the presentence

report's reasoning, to determine whether any such step might

not conceivably have an adverse effect down the road if the

defendant won on any of its proposed changes--no matter

how immaterial the step may be on the view actually taken by

the report. And, of course, he or she must articulate and

argue these seemingly moot issues before the district court

and the court of appeals.

The court may suppose that the resulting burden will fall

only on counsel (though I do not know why a court should

disregard a waste of others' resources). But even from a

narrowly judicial perspective, the rule will generate needless

complexity, causing briefs to be cluttered with second-order

issues that are hypothetical and in many instances ultimately

irrelevant (in fact, as we shall see below, in most instances).

Cf. Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d 735, 740

(D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that appellees should not be forced

"to put forth every conceivable alternative ground for affirmance," and expressing serious concerns about increasing

"complexity and [the] scope of appeals"); cf. also Field v.

Mans, 157 F.3d 35, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1988); Exxon Chemical

Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 137 F.3d 1475, 1478-79, 1482

(Fed. Cir. 1998); Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115 F.3d 947,

954 (Fed. Cir. 1997). It might be consoling to think that

counsel will provide the court with a handy roadmap: for

example, "If the court agrees with point 2, then points 3 and 4

are irrelevant, and the court should proceed directly to point

5." Nothing in my experience on the bench supports the

notion that counsel will do so; rarely if ever do counsel even

bother to say, for example, "For reversal, appellant must

prevail on both arguments I and II."

While a number of circuits have adopted a rule of de novo

resentencing, see, e.g., United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d

145, 151 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Atehortva, 69 F.3d

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679, 685 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d

703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992), there is good reason not to go so far.

We said in Whren that such a rule "is in essence a license for

the parties to introduce issues ... that they should have

introduced at the original sentencing hearing." 111 F.3d at

959. Quite true. A better solution is to give Whren its most

obvious reading, as the First Circuit did in Ticchiarelli: allow

counsel to defer any second-order issue, i.e., any issue that

can come into play only if the defendant should secure victory

on a first-order issue. See also United States v. Parker, 101

F.3d 527, 528 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Only an issue arising out of the

correction of the sentence ordered by this court [can] be

raised in a subsequent appeal.").

Reversal rates may influence one's choice among the alternative readings of Whren. Multiple appeals from a single

case cost judicial (and lawyers') resources, but increments in

the complexity of single appeals also cost resources. If

district courts are seldom reversed, the broad (First Circuit)

reading of Whren makes sense. After all, if a litigant only

has a 10% chance of reversal on the first-order issue, there is

little reason to burden courts with second-order issues that

will become relevant only 10% of the time. In contrast, if

district courts are frequently reversed on first-order issues,

then there is more to be said for the narrow reading of

Whren, as the frequency of second-order issues becoming

relevant will concomitantly increase.

In fact it appears that reversal rates are low. According to

statistics kept by the Administrative Office for the United

States Courts, the reversal rate in this circuit is 12.9%

generally, and 12.1% in criminal cases. For all circuits

combined, the reversal rate is 9.5% generally, and only 6.3%

in criminal cases. See Judicial Business of the US Courts

102 tbl. B-5 (2000) (reporting rates for appeals terminated on

the merits for the 12-month period ending September 2000).1

__________

1 The reversal rates reported here are those shown in the Administrative Office's report. The statistics may be somewhat imprecise

for purposes of this analysis because cases need not be affirmed or

reversed, but can be disposed of in other ways. Nonetheless,

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Reversal rates for sentencing issues, of course, may be higher, but given the frequency of sentencing issues, a high

reversal rate on such issues would be reflected in high

average rates. Thus the data tend to support the broader

reading of Whren--allowing a defendant to raise on his or her

second appeal issues that were entirely hypothetical on the

first round.

I respectfully dissent from the court's disposition of

McCoy's perjury charge claim. As the majority finds that

claim waived, I do not reach the merits of the issue. Cf.

Daingerfield Island Protective Society v. Babbitt, 40 F.3d

442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting in part); cf.

also Boggs v. Rubin, 161 F.3d 37, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Rogers,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

__________

recalculating the rates to consider only cases that were either

affirmed or reversed yields similar numbers: for this circuit, 13.2%

generally and 14.6% in criminal cases; for all circuits, 9.9% generally and 7.1% in criminal cases. Statistics for earlier years yield

similar results. See Judicial Business of the US Courts 108 tbl.

B-15 (1999); Judicial Business of the US Courts 114 tbl. B-5

(1998).

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