Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01796/USCOURTS-caed-1_16-cv-01796-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Delano Union School District
Defendant
R.F.
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

R.F., a minor, by his Guardian Ad Litem, Sean 

Frankel,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

Delano Union School District,

 Defendant.

1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 

(Doc. 5)

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff R.F., a minor, brings this action against Defendant Delano Union School District under 

the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Plaintiff seeks a Temporary Restraining 

Order (“TRO”)1and an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction compelling Defendant to 

provide behavioral and educational services consistent with Plaintiff’s most recent implemented

Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) developed while he attended the Torrance Unified School 

District (“Torrance”). Defendant objects, arguing that Plaintiff has not made a sufficient showing to 

merit a TRO. For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff’s motion for a TRO is DENIED. 

II. JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff asks that the Court take judicial notice of excerpts of the administrative record related to 

his due process hearing request and stay-put motion filed at the Office of Administrative Hearings 

 

1

Plaintiff initially filed this motion ex parte. Doc. 5 at 1. The Court determined that its decision making would be aided by 

the filing of an opposition, and permitted Defendant to file any such opposition. Doc. 7. 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 1 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

2

(“OAH”). Doc. 5-2 at 1. Those portions were attached to the motion for TRO as Exhibits A through J. 

Defendant did not object to judicial notice, and cited to the administrative record excerpts as offered by 

Plaintiff. See, e.g., Doc. 10 at 6 (citing to Exhibits C and F to Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice). 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b)(2), the Court may take judicial notice of an administrative 

record as facts not subject to a reasonable dispute because they can be accurately and readily determined 

from a source whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 

119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of . . . the records of an inferior court.”). The 

Court therefore grants Plaintiff’s request and hereby takes judicial notice of the submitted documents. 

III. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, who is 12 years old, has an intellectual disability, autism, and a speech and language 

disorder. Doc. 5-1 at 5. Plaintiff’s education goals and behavioral intervention plan address the 

following behaviors:

Hand and object mouthing of substances, including non-edible objects; 

disruptions including throwing items, elopement, flopping down on the 

floor, hitting, reaching inside his pants, spitting, and grabbing with force 

the clothing of others.

Id. Plaintiff has had an IEP since September 7, 2007. Id. While Plaintiff was attending school at 

Torrance, his mother passed away. Id. Plaintiff’s father decided to move Plaintiff to Delano, where 

Plaintiff’s grandmother and uncle live and can provide additional childcare support; Doc. 5-7 at 2 

(Declaration of Sean Frankel). Id. Plaintiff’s last IEPs, which were agreed upon and implemented 

before he left Torrance, were dated May 5 and June 3, 2016. Id. These IEPs provided Plaintiff with a 

1:1 aide for 1950 minutes per week and with supervision for 720 minutes per month from a Board 

Certified Behavior Analyst (“BCBA”). Id. Both the aide and the BCBA came from a certified nonpublic agency. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff enrolled in Delano Union School District on June 17, 2016. Id. Defendant held IEP 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 2 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

3

meetings on July 13 and August 5, 2016. Id. Defendant’s proposed IEP reduced Plaintiff’s BCBA 

supervision to 60 minutes per month and eliminated the 1:1 aide entirely. Id. Defendant’s proposed 

BCBA supervision would not be provided by a certified non-public agency. Id. The IEP offered by 

Defendant was a 30-day interim plan, at the close of which Defendant intended to either adopt the 

Torrance IEP or to prepare a new IEP. Doc. 10 at 2. Plaintiff’s family argued that the reduction in 

services would harm Plaintiff, and asked that Defendant continue to provide the services previously in 

place. Doc. 5-1 at 6. After rejecting Defendant’s proposed IEP, Plaintiff re-enrolled at Torrance. Doc. 

10 at 2. Plaintiff has attended Calle Mayor School in Torrance since the start of the 2016-2017 school 

year four days per week. Doc. 5-5 at 7 (Declaration of Jason Kashwer); Doc. 10 at 8. Plaintiff lives 

with his grandmother in Delano Thursday through Sunday. Doc. 5-7 at 2-3. Plaintiff’s father intends 

that Plaintiff live with the relative and attend school in Delano full time as soon as Defendant provides 

services similar to those outlined in the Torrance IEP. Id.

Plaintiff filed for a due process hearing with the OAH on October 13, 2016. Doc. 5-1 at 6. The 

due process hearing is scheduled to begin on February 21, 2017. Doc. 1 at 7. Plaintiff filed a motion 

for stay-put on October 26, 2016, which the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) denied on November 

11. Doc. 5-1 at 6. The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s reliance on T.B. v. San Diego Unified School District, 

785 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2015), to support the proposition that the stay-put provision applies, was 

mistaken as T.B. is factually distinguishable from this matter. Doc. 5-11 at 2 (ALJ Decision). 

Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff otherwise cited no persuasive authority in support of his 

position, while Defendant’s position was consistent with the federal Department of Education’s decision 

not to address stay-put in the context of inter-year transfers in its 2006 regulations. Id. at 3. The ALJ 

therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to stay-put. Id. 

On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed with this Court a complaint seeking declaratory and 

injunctive relief from the stay-put decision. Doc. 1. On November 29, 2016, Plaintiff filed the instant

motion. Doc. 5. On December 6, 2016, Defendant filed its opposition. Doc. 10. On that same day, the 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 3 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

4

Court issued an order granting Plaintiff leave to file a reply. Doc. 11. Plaintiff filed his reply on 

December 12, 2016. Doc. 12. On December 15, 2016, Defendant filed a motion seeking permission to 

file additional evidence in support of its opposition, or, in the alternative, seeking oral argument. Doc. 

13.2 

Plaintiff seeks an injunction compelling Defendant to provide him with 1950 minutes per week 

of 1:1 aide services and 720 minutes per month of BCBA supervision by a non-public agency. Doc. 5 at 

2. Plaintiff also requests an order compelling Defendant to implement his last agreed to and 

implemented IEP. Id. 

IV. STANDARD OF DECISION

The IDEA provides federal funds to help state and local agencies educate children with 

disabilities while conditioning the funds on compliance with specific goals and procedures, primarily the 

obligation to provide a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”). 20 U.S.C. § 1412; Board of Educ. 

of Hendrik Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179-80 (1982) (describing the genesis and 

primary provisions of IDEA). Under the IDEA, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision 

made [by the hearings officer] . . . shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the 

complaint presented . . .which action may be brought . . . in a district court of the United States.” 20 

U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A). Among the procedures mandated by IDEA is the development of a written IEP 

for each child with a disability. 20 U.S.C. § 1401. The IEP is crafted to meet the unique needs of each 

child with a disability by a team that includes a representative of the local educational agency, the 

child’s teacher and parents, and, when appropriate, the child. 20 U.S.C § 1414(a)(5).

The stay-put provision of the IDEA mandates that, while a due process challenge is pending, a 

student is entitled to remain in his or her “then-current educational placement” unless the parents and the 

 

2 Defendant seeks to introduce the declaration of Wendy Terrazas. Doc. 12 at 3. Since Plaintiff’s motion for TRO is denied 

by this order, Defendant’s motion is moot. 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 4 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

5

state or local education agency otherwise agree. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). A stay-put order issued at the 

administrative level is a collateral order subject to interlocutory appeal. A.D. ex rel. L.D. v. Hawaii 

Dept. of Educ., 727 F.3d 911, 913 (2013). The term “then-current educational placement” is not defined 

in the IDEA itself or in its legislative history. N.D. ex rel. Parents Acting as Guardians Ad Litem v. 

Haw. Dep’t of Educ., 600 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted “thencurrent educational placement” to mean “the placement set forth in the child’s last implemented IEP.” 

L.M. ex rel. Sam M. v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 556 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 2009). “Although the 

statute refers to ‘educational placement,’ not to ‘IEP,’ the purpose of an IEP is to embody the services 

and educational placement or placements that are planned for the child.” N.E. ex rel. C.E. v. Seattle Sch. 

Dist., ___F.3d___, Case No. 15-35910, 2016 WL 6803049, at *3 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016). When the 

child’s last implemented IEP cannot be implemented due to a change in circumstances, stay-put requires

that the student receive a placement that, as closely as possible, replicates the last placement. Van Scoy

ex rel. Van Scoy v. San Luis Coastal Unified Sch. Dist., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

The IDEA and its enabling regulations are silent as to whether a child who transfers to a new 

district between school years is entitled to stay-put. According to federal Department of Education 

regulations, “[a]t the beginning of each school year, each public agency must have in effect, for each 

child with a disability within its jurisdiction, an IEP.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(a). If a child transfers to and 

enrolls in a new different public agency within a state during a school year, the new public agency “must 

provide FAPE to the child (including services comparable to those described in the child’s IEP from the 

previous public agency)” until the new public agency adopts the child’s prior IEP or “develops, adopts, 

and implements a new IEP.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(e). When a child relocates to a new public agency in 

a different state, the new public agency must provide a FAPE, including services comparable to those 

described in the child’s prior IEP, until the public agency can conduct an initial evaluation to determine 

if the child is a child with a disability and determine the educational needs of the child, and create an

IEP if necessary. 34 C.F.R. § 300.323(f). The Comments to the Department of Education’s 2006 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 5 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

6

regulations state that the evaluation of a child who transfers to a school in another state is considered an 

initial evaluation made pursuant to 34 C.F.R. §§300.304 through 306, so stay-put does not apply. 71 

Fed. Reg. 46,682 (2006); see 34 C.F.R. § 300.301 (defining an initial evaluation). In comparison, when 

a child transfers between public agencies within a state, no initial evaluation is required. See 34 C.F.R. 

300.323(e). When promulgating the 2006 regulations, the Department of Education declined to clarify 

whether stay put applies to a child who transfers to a different public agency in a state between school 

years. 71 Fed. Reg. 46,682 (2006).

V. ANALYSIS

A. Mootness

The question of mootness is a jurisdictional matter, and “a federal court always has jurisdiction 

to determine its own jurisdiction.” U.S. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 (2002). Because the question of 

mootness is jurisdictional, it can be raised at any time by any party. Even in IDEA cases, where 

plaintiffs are particularly vulnerable, a party may raise facts rendering a case moot at any point, even if 

those facts were not raised during administrative proceedings. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 

(1988) (finding that a student’s claim for relief under the Education of the Handicapped Act, IDEA’s 

precursor, was mooted by a fact raised for the first time on appeal). “[A] case is moot when the issues 

presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Powell v. 

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969). The question in deciding a mootness issue is “not whether the 

precise relief sought at the time the application for an injunction was filed is still available.” Sea-Land 

Serv., Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, 939 F.2d 866, 870 (9th Cir. 1991)

(quoting Northwest Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1244-45 (9th Cir. 1988)). Rather, “[t]he 

question is whether there can be any effective relief.” Sea-Land Serv., 939 F.2d at 1244-45.

Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff is attending school in Torrance and receiving the 

services set forth in Plaintiff’s Torrance IEP, the request for a TRO is moot. Doc. 10 at 6, 7. Plaintiff 

responds that he need not remain in an inappropriate placement or sacrifice his hoped for remedy of 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 6 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

7

attending school in Delano Union School District with the full services which he believes are 

appropriate pending resolution of his claim against Defendant. Doc. 12 at 4-5. 

There has been no specific description of Plaintiff’s current status at Torrance, but Plaintiff 

appears to be currently receiving the services set forth in his most recent Torrance IEP. He is not, 

however, receiving those services in Delano Union School District, the school district in which 

Plaintiff’s parent intends for him to attend school. Furthermore, he is only attending school four days 

per week, and is living with his grandmother from Thursday to Sunday. The purpose of stay-put is to 

prevent harm to a special needs student while a dispute regarding his or her education is ongoing. N.D., 

600 F.3d at 1111. Plaintiff remains enrolled in Delano Union School District, and intends to live fulltime within that district. Doc. 12 at 5-6. He is subjected to the present harm of missing one day per 

week of instruction, as well as the burden of commuting between Torrance and Delano. This is a live 

controversy. The fact that Plaintiff chooses to make the commute rather than remain out of school is 

immaterial to the question of mootness. Plaintiff need not choose between a potentially inappropriate 

placement and sacrificing his hope of attending school in Delano. See Sch. Comm. Of the Town of 

Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372-73 (1985) (the Education of the Handicapped Act, a 

precursor to IDEA, was not intended to cut off relief to a parent who moves a student from an 

unacceptable placement to a preferable one during the pendency of litigation). Therefore, since a live 

controversy exists as to whether stay-put entitles Plaintiff to receive behavioral and educational services 

from Defendant comparable to those listed in his Torrance IEP, this matter is not moot. 

B. Temporary Restraining Order

The standard for injunctive relief in an IDEA stay-put case is the “traditional preliminary 

injunction analysis.”3 Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 287 F.3d 1176, 1180 

 

3

Plaintiff briefly states that the standard requirements for a preliminary injunction or TRO need not be satisfied because the

stay-put for which IDEA provides is equivalent to injunctive relief. Doc. 5-1 at 8-9. This standard applies when a Plaintiff 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 7 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

8

(9th Cir. 2002). The standard for issuing a TRO is identical to that of a preliminary injunction. NML 

Capital, Ltd. v. Spaceport Sys. Int’l, L.P., 788 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2011). In order to 

merit a TRO, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he or she is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) he or she 

is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in 

his or her favor; and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Winter v. Nat Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 555 

U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The Ninth Circuit follows a version of the “sliding scale” approach to preliminary 

injunctions which it has labeled the “serious questions” test. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 

632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). Under the serious questions test, a strong showing of hardship to 

the plaintiff might “offset a lesser showing of likelihood of success on the merits” so long as serious 

questions are raised as to the merits, there is a likelihood of irreparable injury, and the injunction is in 

the public interest. Id. at 1134-35. A TRO or preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and is 

never awarded as a matter of right but only “upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such 

relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. A TRO is “an extraordinary and drastic remedy.” Mazurek v. 

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (citation omitted). It is granted only if there is a true 

emergency which requires “preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm.” Granny Goose 

 

makes a motion for stay-put directly with a reviewing court. See Joshua A. ex rel Jorge A. v. Rocklin Unified Sch. Dist., 559 

F.3d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009). The Ninth Circuit has explained that, when the motion presented to the district court “is for 

a preliminary injunction that affects a stay-put invocation, not the stay-put invocation itself” the four-factor preliminary 

injunction test applies. N.D., 600 F.3d at 1112. There has been some inconsistency in determining when to apply the 

familiar four-factor test and when an automatic preliminary injunction is required. See, e.g., D.G. ex rel. P.G. v. San Diego 

Unified Sch. Dist., 132 F. Supp. 3d 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (finding that a student was entitled to an automatic preliminary 

injunction when appealing an ALJ’s denial of stay-put). Given the Ninth Circuit’s explanation in N.D., the fact that both 

parties applied the four-factor test, and the procedural posture here wherein Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief following the 

denial of stay-put by the ALJ, the Court applies the four-factor analysis here. This is without prejudice to further briefing on 

this issue in connection with future motions practice. 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 8 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

9

Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. Of Teamsters and Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). 

The Court addresses each of the four Winter factors in turn.

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

Plaintiff argues that he is likely to succeed on the merits because stay-put applies and Plaintiff’s 

“then-current educational placement” is his most recently implemented Torrance IEP. Doc. 5-1 at 9-10. 

He contends that, when a student transfers from one school district to another within the same state 

between school years, and a dispute arises with the new district regarding the student’s IEP, the IEP 

which was in effect at the student’s previous school is the then-current educational placement for the 

purposes of stay-put. Id. at 10-11. IDEA’s assurance that a school district cannot alter an IEP over the 

parents’ objection would be undermined if the prior IEP did not remain in effect for students transferring 

between school years, Plaintiff asserts. Id. at 12-13. Plaintiff argues that the Ninth Circuit’s recent 

decision in N.E. ex rel. C.E. v. Seattle School District, __F.3d__, No. 15-35910, 2016 WL 6803049 (9th 

Cir. Nov. 17, 2016), controls and mandates a result in his favor. Doc. 5-1 at 11-12.

N.E. involved a request for stay-put made on behalf of a disabled student who transferred 

districts within a state between the end of one school year and the start of another. In his original 

district, the student had an IEP consisting of two parts. One part continued through the end of the school 

year in which the IEP was made, while the other would start at the beginning of the next school year. 

Before the school year began, the new district offered the student an IEP that was similar to the second 

part of his prior IEP. The student’s parents objected to the new IEP, and sought stay-put for the student 

to be placed in a program similar to the first part of his previous IEP, contending that the first part of the 

IEP was the student’s “then-current educational placement.” While acknowledging the artificiality of 

referring to a then-current placement between school years, the Ninth Circuit noted that is has 

consistently “interpreted ‘current educational placement’ to mean ‘the placement set forth in the child’s 

last implemented IEP.’” N.E., 2016 WL at *3. In N.E., the last implemented IEP was the two-part 

program instituted at the student’s prior school. Id. The two-stage IEP was the intended setting in 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 9 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

10

which the student would begin the next school year, and the IEP had been implemented during the prior 

school year. Id. at 4. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the two part IEP created at the student’s 

original school was the student’s current educational placement at the time he sought stay-put. 

Defendant argues that N.E. is distinguishable from the facts in this case. Defendant mistakenly 

states that the court in N.E. “determined that the student’s stay-put placement was the placement adopted 

by the new school district.” Doc. 10 at 7. In fact, while the stay-put placement the Ninth Circuit found 

to be proper was “similar to the one embodied in stage two” of the previous IEP, N.E., 2016 WL at *2, 

and the plaintiff in that case did “not argue that [the proposed IEP] differed meaningfully from the 

second stage,” id. at *2 n. 3, the court explicitly found that “[s]tage two of the [earlier] IEP . . . was [the 

student’s] stay-put placement.” Id. at *4. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis centered on determining which 

part of the earlier IEP was the student’s then-current placement, not whether the IEP offered by the 

defendant in that case was the proper placement. The similarity between the second stage of the earlier 

IEP and the later IEP was not a factor in the decision. Defendant’s argument that N.E. is inapplicable is 

not convincing.

Taking into account the rationale in N.E., which was issued subsequent to the ALJ’s decision in 

this matter, it is likely that Plaintiff will prevail on the merits. The current educational placement of a 

student with a disability is the placement set forth in the student’s last implemented IEP. The only IEP 

which was implemented at the time Plaintiff filed his due process hearing request and stay-put motion 

was the Torrance IEP. Under Defendant’s argument, an IEP which was never implemented would be 

Plaintiff’s current educational placement. Furthermore, the silence as to the effects of a student

changing districts between school years in the federal Department of Education’s regulations does not 

demand the inference that the Department intended to exempt such students from the protections of stayput. Also, the Department’s explanation that stay-put does not apply for students who move from state 

to state does not suggest that the same rule applies for intra-state transfers. The Department may have 

valid reasons for distinguishing an inter-state transfer from an intra-state transfer, including the 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 10 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

11

differences between educational standards and systems among the states. The Court declines to read 

into the Department’s silence an intention to limit the essential protections of stay-put. 

Defendant also argues that, since Plaintiff is currently residing with his father in Torrance, that is 

where he must attend school, and it is Torrance who is responsible for providing Plaintiff with a FAPE. 

Doc. 10 at 7. The State of California provides that “[n]otwithstanding [California Education Code § 

48200], a pupil complies with the residency requirements for school attendance in a school district, if he 

or she is . . . [a] pupil who lives in the home of a caregiving adult that is located within the boundaries of 

that school district.” Cal. Educ. § 48204(a)(5). Plaintiff’s father asserts that Plaintiff intended to live 

with a caregiving relative who resided in within Delano Union School District, and provided copies of 

affidavits to that effect. Doc. 5-7 at 2-3. He also asserted that Plaintiff stays with those relatives three 

days out of the week, and intends to live there full time if Defendant provides acceptable services. Id. at 

3. Moreover, Defendant has not made any assertion that Plaintiff is not enrolled in Delano Union

School District. Defendant has not made a convincing showing that it has no responsibility to provide a 

FAPE for Plaintiff. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff likely to succeed on the 

merits. 

2. Irreparable Harm

Plaintiff contends that, if he is not provided with services comparable to those enumerated in his 

Torrance IEP, he will suffer irreparable harm. Doc. 5-1 at 14. He relies on the declaration of Dr. 

Shabani, who opines that the services offered by Defendant are insufficient given Plaintiff’s disabilities 

and would result in regression and harm and be highly detrimental to him. Doc. 5-1 at 14; Doc. 5-3 at 9-

11. He also argues that attending school in Torrance and living part of the week in Delano is a major 

burden on his family. Doc. 12 at 9. Plaintiff’s father works full-time, and Plaintiff requires constant 

adult supervision due to his disabilities. Id. at 8. Plaintiff’s relatives in Delano provide assistance, but 

the weekly driving between Torrance and Delano and constant change are difficult for Plaintiff. Id. at 9.

Defendant argues that, because Plaintiff is attending school in Torrance and is receiving the 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 11 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

12

services and placement in his last implemented IEP, Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm if not 

granted a TRO. Doc. 10 at 8. Even to the extent that Plaintiff is missing out on some services while 

shuttling back and forth between Delano and Torrance, Defendant contends the harm is not irreparable 

and could be remedied by compensatory services and education. Id. Defendant also argues that Dr. 

Shabani’s declaration was conclusory. Doc. 10 at 8. Finally, Defendant contends that, since Plaintiff 

has never attended school in Delano Union School District, and re-enrolled at Torrance of his own 

volition, any harm suffered by Plaintiff is voluntary and speculative. Id. at 8-9.

Dr. Shabani’s declaration, while not a full expert report, is far from conclusory. Dr. Shabani 

notes that he first met Plaintiff in April 2014, when Plaintiff was referred to Dr. Shabani’s firm, the 

Shabani Institute, for assessments. Doc. 5-3 at 7. The Shabani Institute was contracted by Torrance 

Union School District to provide services to Plaintiff under terms of his IEP, and Dr. Shabani personally 

participated in Plaintiff’s May 5, 2016, IEP meeting which created Plaintiff’s last Torrance IEP. Id. 

Even though Dr. Shabani did not go into detail as to precisely how the contemplated reduction in 

services would harm Plaintiff, he provided sufficient concrete explanation to justify his opinion. His 

assertion that the reduced services in the IEP proposed by Defendant would likely injure Plaintiff is 

convincing.

However, the scenario Dr. Shabani considered is not what is before the Court at this point in 

time. Dr. Shabani’s opinion was based on the premise that Plaintiff would be receiving the services set 

forth in Defendant’s IEP. He did not consider or address whether Plaintiff’s current situation, in which 

he is receiving four days per week of instruction and services in Torrance and is being driven to Delano 

to spend the remaining three days each week, is likely to cause harm. The situation has changed since 

Dr. Shabani offered his opinion in this matter, and consequently the opinion holds less weight.

Plaintiff is receiving the majority of the services contemplated in his IEP and is attending school. 

He is missing one day each week, and given the hardship to both Plaintiff and his family involved in his 

weekly commute, the situation does not appear sustainable. It is, however, stable. The purpose of a 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 12 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

13

TRO is to maintain the status quo and prevent any further deterioration until such time as a more 

considered decision can be made. Granny Goose Foods, 415 U.S. at 439. The parties and the Court 

could speculate as to whether Plaintiff might be harmed by the constant changes in his surroundings, but 

absent a statement from a childcare expert or some other substantial evidence, Plaintiff has not made the 

“clear showing” of irreparable harm required for the extraordinary remedy of prospective relief. Winter, 

555 U.S. at 22 (citing Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972). Similarly, compensatory services and education may 

or may not suffice to make Plaintiff whole for any harm he suffers while attending school four days per 

week, but the Court has no evidence on which to base a conclusion. As Plaintiff is receiving substantial 

services, and has not provided any particular evidence as to how he will fare under the current 

circumstances, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not likely to suffer irreparable harm if not granted a TRO. 

3. Balance of Equities

Defendant argues that Plaintiff brought his due process complaint and this motion with unclean

hands, alleging that Plaintiff has incorrectly represented that he is a resident of Kern County, California 

and is a student in Delano Union School District. Doc. 10 at 9. Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has 

either made misleading representations about his residency or has engaged in gamesmanship, and that 

the balance of equities does not tip in Plaintiff’s favor. Plaintiff contests Defendant’s position, and 

states that, contrary to Defendant’s arguments, Plaintiff and his family have not sought to “rig” his 

enrollment and have been open and frank with Defendant about Plaintiff’s enrollment and residency. 

Doc. 12 at 10-11. 

Reviewing the administrative record, it is apparent that Defendant was aware that Plaintiff 

intended to live with relatives in Delano rather than his father at the time of the first IEP meeting 

between Plaintiff and Defendant on July 13, 2016. See Doc. 5-3 at 62 (listing Manuel Agbalog and 

Romeo Agblaog as Plaintiff’s parent or guardian). Defendant also received caregiver authorization 

affidavits before the school year began from Plaintiff’s grandmother and uncle, who both lived in 

Delano. Doc. 5-7 at 4-7. Moreover, Plaintiff included in his due process complaint, filed October 12, 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 13 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

14

2016, a statement that “[f]earing for [Plaintiff’s] safety the family enrolled [him] in school elsewhere 

until their dispute could be resolved through due process.” Doc. 5-12 at 5. There is no argument that 

Plaintiff is not a resident within Delano Union School District, and he apparently remains enrolled in the 

district. Defendant had ample notice that Plaintiff was relocating to Delano in order to receive 

additional support from family members. Defendant was also made aware at least by the date of the due 

process complaint that Plaintiff was enrolled at and attending another school. The evidence of 

“gamesmanship” is limited to the fact that Plaintiff is receiving an education elsewhere for the time 

being rather than remaining in Delano. On this slim rationale, there is no basis on which to conclude 

that Plaintiff seeks this equitable relief with unclean hands. 

As discussed, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s family are currently undergoing hardship as they shuttle 

Plaintiff between Delano and Torrance. Moreover, for so long as the current situation continues, 

Plaintiff will miss one day per week of school in addition to undergoing the hardship of his commute 

and dual residency. For these reasons, the Court finds that the balance of equities favors Plaintiff. 

Nonetheless, due to the voluntary actions of Plaintiff’s father, the nature of the harm is not the type of 

emergency which would justify use of the extraordinary remedy of a TRO.

4. Public Interest

Plaintiff contends that the interest of the public lies in protecting disabled children from changing 

educational circumstances. Doc. 5-1 at 15. He argues that case law, and the Congressional decision to 

provide for an automatic stay in the IDEA, recognizes the risk of premature changes in a student’s 

placement. Id.; Doc. 12 at 12. While it acknowledges the importance of the stay-put provision, 

Defendant argues that, since Plaintiff is enrolled at a Torrance school, the public interest in avoiding 

unnecessary burdens on schools is not served here by a TRO. Doc. 10 at 9-10. 

Plaintiff has the stronger argument. The public interest in protecting the limited budgets of 

school districts does not outweigh the public’s interest in seeing that disabled children are educated. 

The choice to enact the stay-put provision in the IDEA “evidences Congress’s sense that there is a 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 14 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

15

heightened risk of irreparable harm inherent in the premature removal of a disabled child to a potentially 

inappropriate educational setting.” Joshua A., 559 F.3d at 1040. This consideration applies here even 

though Plaintiff is enrolled in school and receiving services. Parents should not have to face a choice 

“between leaving their children in an education setting which potentially fails to meet minimum legal 

standards, and placing the child in private school at their own cost.” Id. While Plaintiff’s father did not 

appear to have considered private school in Delano as an option, he was faced with a substantially 

similar choice between the potentially adequate services offered by Defendant and the burdensome 

prospect of splitting Plaintiff’s time between Torrance and Delano in order to obtain the education and 

services Plaintiff needs. Additionally, courts have found the public interest to not favor a stay-put 

injunction primarily in cases where a district-wide policy change is at issue rather than the impact of a 

single student requiring additional services. See, e.g., N.D., 600 F.3d at 1113 (holding that the district 

court properly found that the public interest did not particularly favor disabled students where the 

district faced the potentially increased class sizes as a result of layoffs if it did not reduce the school 

week by one day). Considering the policy considerations which underlie Congress’s enactment of the 

IDEA and inclusion of the stay-put provision, and the relatively minor potential disruption to Defendant 

of providing services to Plaintiff, the Court finds that the public interest weighs in favor of injunctive 

relief. 

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

While Plaintiff has shown that he is likely to prevail on the merits, and that both the balance of 

equities and the public interest weigh in his favor, he has not shown that, under the circumstances as the

Court understands them to be, Plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a TRO at 

this time. The Court recognizes the irony of this situation. Had Plaintiff’s father not begun voluntarily 

shuttling his child to some classes in Torrance, and kept Plaintiff out of school and living in Delano full 

time, a TRO would likely be warranted. Plaintiff, however, has not, at this time, made the clear showing 

of likely irreparable harm which would necessitate the extraordinary remedy of a TRO under either the 

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 15 of 16
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

16

Winter test or the Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” evaluation. Consequently, Plaintiff’s motion for a 

temporary restraining order is DENIED. 

However, on the present record, the Court believes it is imperative to set this matter up for a full 

hearing on Plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction. The Court recognizes that the current state of 

affairs is a significant hardship on Plaintiff. The parties are therefore directed to meet and confer 

regarding a schedule for further briefing on the request for a preliminary injunction. On or before noon 

on Wednesday, December 21, 2016, the parties shall submit to the court a schedule for further briefing 

and declare whether they intend to submit the matter on the papers or request a hearing. If a hearing is 

requested, the parties shall additionally propose three mutually agreeable dates for the hearing. The 

parties may communicate the above information to the Court informally by calling chambers at 559-

499-5680.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 19, 2016 /s/ Lawrence J. O’Neill _____ 

UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 1:16-cv-01796-LJO-JLT Document 14 Filed 12/19/16 Page 16 of 16