Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-arwd-6_19-cv-06073/USCOURTS-arwd-6_19-cv-06073-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wendy Kelly
Respondent
Lamar Daniel Ron Wilson
Petitioner

Document Text:

-1-

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

LAMAR DANIEL RON WILSON PETITIONER

v. Case No. 6:19-cv-06073 SOH-BAB

WENDY KELLY, Director, RESPONDENT

Arkansas Department of Correction 

MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, Lamar Daniel Ron Wilson (“Wilson”), filed a Petition for Writ of a Habeas 

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June 27, 2019. ECF No. 1. At the time the Petition was 

filed, Plaintiff was no longer incarcerated in the Arkansas Department of Correction (“ADC”) and 

was out on parole. The Petition was referred for findings of fact, conclusions of law and 

recommendations for the disposition of the case. Director Wendy Kelly (“Respondent”), filed a 

Response on August 5, 2019, arguing the Petition should be dismissed. ECF No. 10. On August 

26, 2019, Wilson filed a Reply. ECF No. 12. In response to this Court’s order (ECF No. 14) on 

January 24, 2020, Respondent filed a Supplement to her Response. (ECF No. 15). For the reasons 

set forth below, the Court recommends the Petition be DENIED and the case DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Wilson was charged in the Circuit Court of Garland County, Arkansas, with the rape of a 

victim who was under the age of 14. ECF No. 10-3. On August 10, 2015, Wilson was tried by a 

jury. ECF No. 12-1. Before the State rested its case, it moved to amend the criminal information 

to conform to the proof. ECF No. 10, p. 2. After all evidence was presented and prior to the case 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 1 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
2

being submitted to the jury, the trial court allowed the State to include jury instructions to include 

the offenses of second-degree sexual assault and sexual indecency with a minor as lesser offenses 

to the rape charge. ECF No. 12-1. Wilson’s trial attorney Dale Adams objected arguing these 

offenses were not lesser included offenses of rape. Id. The jury found Wilson not guilty of rape 

but convicted him of second-degree sexual assault and sexual indecency with a minor. ECF No. 

10-3, p. 2. The trial court set aside the verdict for sexual indecency with a child and allowed the 

jury to proceed with sentencing on the verdict for sexual assault in the second degree. Wilson was 

then sentenced to twenty years imprisonment, the maximum sentence on the sexual-assault 

conviction. Id. 

Because Wilson had been charged only with the crime of rape, Wilson’s attorney filed a 

motion for a new trial, arguing second-degree sexual assault was not a lesser-included offense of 

rape and the Court should set aside the verdict on the sexual assault charge. ECF No. 12-1. In its 

response, the State admitted the sexual assault charge was not a lesser included offense of rape but 

asked the court to enter the jury’s determination of guilt on the sexual-indecency charge. ECF No. 

10-3, p. 3.

On September 15, 2015, at the hearing on Wilson’s motion for a new trial Wilson’s attorney 

announced an agreement had been reached for Wilson to plead no contest to sexual indecency with 

a minor, and a plea and waiver was introduced which was signed by Wilson, his attorney, and the 

prosecutor. ECF No. 10-2, pp. 5-7. The prior sentence was vacated and based on the plea 

agreement, the trial court sentenced Wilson to six years imprisonment. A sentencing order was 

filed on October 5, 2015. Id. at pp. 1-4. 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 2 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
3

On October 8, 2015, Wilson filed a pro se motion to vacate the judgment, arguing he had 

never been charged with the offense of sexual indecency with a child and that no amendments to 

his charge had been made. ECF No. 1-4, pp. 6-8. The trial court denied Wilson’s motion, and 

Wilson filed a timely notice of appeal pro se. Id. at pp. 3-4. Wilson’s attorney filed a no-merit 

brief and motion to withdraw as his counsel. ECF No. 10-5. Wilson did not file pro se points for 

reversal, and the Arkansas Court of Appeals granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and 

affirmed Wilson’s conviction. ECF No. 1-4, pp. 2-8. 

On December 7, 2015, Wilson timely filed a Rule 37 petition in the trial court after the 

Arkansas Court of Appeals’ mandate arguing his trial counsel was ineffective as follows: (1) 

failing to object to “having the court hold Wilson for any other charge/offense due to the acquittal 

of the jury during Wilson’s jury trial”; (2) failing to investigate jurisdiction; (3) “violation of the 

Constitutional Due-Process Clause”; (4) “Judge Hearnsberger’s unfairness, Sixth Amend. 

Violation”; (5) failing to move to withdraw Wilson’s plea; and (6) “lack of jurisdiction by State’s 

violation of Due Process.” ECF No. 1-5, pp. 13-22. The trial court denied Wilson’s petition 

without a hearing and entered an order containing specific findings on each ground as alleged in 

the petition. ECF No. 1-5, pp. 6-12.

First, the trial court ruled Wilson had not been acquitted but was instead convicted of 

second-degree sexual assault and sexual indecency with a child. ECF No. 1-5, p. 10. Second, the 

court found Plaintiff’s attorney, Dale Adams, had not been ineffective for failing to challenge the 

trial court’s jurisdiction because the court had proper jurisdiction of the case and a jurisdictional 

challenge could have been made at trial or on direct appeal, and no objection had been made. Id. 

Third, the trial court ruled there had been no due-process violation because Wilson pleaded nolo 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 3 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
4

contendere to the amended charge of sexual indecency with a child and he had not raised a dueprocess argument on appeal. Fourth, the court ruled Wilson had not been “bullied, pushed, and 

hoodwinked” into entering his plea. Id. at p. 11. In addition, the court noted Wilson had stated in 

court he understood what he was doing and was satisfied with Mr. Adams’ representation. Id. 

Fifth, the court found Mr. Adams was not ineffective for failing to move to withdraw the nolo 

contendere plea because Wilson acting pro se, had unsuccessfully moved to vacate the judgment 

and did not challenge that ruling on appeal. Id. at p. 12. Sixth, the court found Wilson did not 

challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction or make a due-process argument on appeal. Id.

Plaintiff then filed a timely appeal with the Arkansas Court of Appeals. ECF No. 1-4, p. 

1. On August 29, 2018, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief.1

 ECF No. 10-9. First, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found some of Wilson’s

arguments were not preserved for review. Id. at p. 5. These arguments included: “a plea bad in 

part is bad for the whole”, “the rules of new trial do not permit new charges”, and “charges cannot 

be orally amended”. Id. The Court of Appeals then addressed each of Wilson’s preserved 

arguments on the merits and affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of those claims. 

II. THE INSTANT PETITION

On June 27, 2019, after Wilson had been released early on parole for his conviction for 

sexual indecency with a child, he filed the instant Petition alleging: (1) “double jeopardy”, (2) 

“lack of jurisdiction”, (3) “due process violation (14th Amendment/Ineffective Counsel)”, and (4) 

“sixth amendment violation”. ECF No. 1. He is seeking the following relief: “full reversal of 

1 On November 9, 2018, Wilson filed a belated petition for review by the Arkansas Supreme Court. The petition 

was denied on April 18, 2019. Wilson’s petition for reconsideration was denied on May 30, 2019. ECF Nos. 10-11, 

10-12, 10-13.

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 4 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
5

current conviction and sentence; absolute bar to relative prosecutions; and absolute destruction, or 

permanent seal, of all court, law enforcement, and applicable agencies, records relating to this 

matter...” Id. Respondent argues the Petition should be dismissed because: (1) “Wilson’s plea of 

nolo contendere rendered any claims of antecedent trial-error irrelevant and severely limits the 

claims he can rely on in pursuit of federal habeas relief; (2) Wilson’s claim for ineffective 

assistance of counsel is meritless; (3) Wilson’s jurisdictional challenge “does not raise a federal 

issue”; and (4) Wilson’s “freestanding double jeopardy, jurisdictional, and due-process claims are 

procedurally defaulted. ECF No. 10, p. 6. Respondent goes on to argue “to the extent the state 

court’s opinions are construed to have adjudicated Wilson’s freestanding claims on the merits, the 

adjudication of those claims are due deference under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).” Id. 

III. DISCUSSION

Based on the record, the Court finds it is not necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing 

in order to rule on Wilson’s Petition. “A federal court may dismiss a claim without an evidentiary 

hearing where the allegations are frivolous, where the allegations fail to state a constitutional claim, 

where the relevant facts are not in dispute, or where the dispute can be resolved on the basis of the 

record.” Urquhart v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1318-19 (8th Cir. 1984). The Court will first 

address the issue of whether Wilson’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

A. Procedural Default

A federal habeas petitioner must show he “has exhausted the remedies available in the 

courts of the State” as a precondition to seeking relief under the federal habeas statute. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(b)(1)(A). To meet this requirement, “state prisoners must give the state courts one full 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 5 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
6

opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s 

established appellate review process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999).

Wilson filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief under Rule 37 of the Arkansas 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. He then appealed the denial of this petition to the Arkansas Court 

of Appeals. In its opinion affirming the trial court’s denial of Wilson’s Rule 37 petition, the Court 

addressed the following arguments raised by Plaintiff, both in the context of his claims for 

ineffective assistance of counsel, and on the merits of these claims: double jeopardy, lack of 

jurisdiction, due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and the validity of his plea of nolo 

contendere to the offense of sexual indecency with a child. ECF No. 10-9. Each of these claims 

are set forth in the instant Petition even though they appear to be asserted in connection or as a 

part of Wilson’s claim of ineffective counsel. Accordingly, the Court finds Wilson properly 

exhausted his claims in accordance with the State’s appellate review process and therefore none 

of Wilson’s claims are procedurally defaulted.

B. Analysis of Wilson’s Claims on the Merits2 

Congress has prohibited federal courts from granting habeas corpus relief unless a state 

court’s adjudication of a constitutional claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 

Supreme Court of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1). The question is not whether a 

federal court believes the state court’s ruling was incorrect, but whether the decision by the state 

2 Respondent first argues “Wilson’s plea of nolo contendere constituted a waiver of the antecedent trial error on which 

all the claims for relief alleged here rely.” ECF No. 10, p. 7. Because the state courts addressed Plaintiff’s claims on 

the merits, the Court chooses not to address the waiver issue and will instead proceed to review Wilson’s claims on 

the merits See Nance v. Norris, 392 F.3d 284, 291 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that a habeas court may bypass a procedural 

issue and deny relief on the merits).

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 6 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
7

court was unreasonable – a substantially higher threshold. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 

(2000). The United States Supreme Court has made clear this standard is “difficult to meet,” 

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011), requiring “a state prisoner show that the state 

court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there 

was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id. at p. 103. A federal habeas court “will not lightly conclude that a 

state’s criminal justice system has experienced the ‘extreme malfunction[n]’ for which federal 

habeas relief is the remedy.” Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 20 (2013) (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 

104). 

1) Double Jeopardy

In his Petition Wilson argues he was subjected to double jeopardy and describes the factual

basis of his claim as follows:

Petitioner appeared for trial 10 August, 2015 for the sole charge of rape. No 

amendments/ other charges were filed prior to. However, sexual indecency with a 

child, and second degree sexual assault were entered as lesser-included. Sexual 

indecency was acquitted in favor of sentencing for 2nd degree sexual assault. Under 

Motion for New trial, 8-25-2015, it was shown that 2nd sexual assault is not a lesser 

included to rape. Neither is sexual indecency with a child. September 15, 2015 

Petitioner was recalled under same motion. Petitioner was then informed sexual 

assault was acquitted, then firmly instructed to accept renewed conviction of sexual 

indecency. 

ECF No. 1, p. 5.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals held Wilson’s nolo contendere plea to sexual indecency 

with a child was not a second conviction for the same offense because Wilson’s plea occurred after 

he had filed a motion for a new trial and then entered his plea to avoid being tried for the greater 

offense of second-degree sexual assault. ECF No. 10-9, p. 6. The Court of Appeals stated, “By 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 7 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
8

virtue of his plea, he stands convicted of only a single count of sexual misconduct with a child, 

and he is serving a six-year sentence for only that offense.” Id. at p. 7.

Wilson is not entitled to habeas relief because the state court’s decision is not the result of 

an unreasonable determination of fact or an unreasonable application of federal law. It is 

uncontested Wilson pleaded guilty to sexual indecency with a child after he filed his motion for a 

new trial alleging trial error. It is well established the double-jeopardy provision of the Fifth 

Amendment “does not preclude the government from retrying a defendant whose conviction is set 

aside because of an error in proceedings leading to conviction.” United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 

463, 465 (1964). Thus, the state court’s merit adjudication of Wilson’s double-jeopardy was 

reasonable and supported by the record and the law. Accordingly, I recommend Plaintiff’s claim

for habeas relief based on double jeopardy be dismissed.

2) Lack of Jurisdiction

Wilson claims the trial court did not have jurisdiction to accept and enter his nolo 

contendere plea for sexual indecency with a child. He specifically states:

Jury rendered verdict of not guilty to the charged allegation of rape, and guilty of 

sexual indecency with a child and 2nd sexual assault as lesser-included offenses. 

Neither are lesser-included. The court set aside the sexual indecency with a child 

for preferred sentencing on second degree sexual assault. The court again set aside 

this conviction and sentence, due to second degree sexual assault is not a lesserincluded to rape, then firmly encouraged Petitioner to accept renewed conviction 

for sexual indecency with a child. No charges, indictments, or amendments were 

filed at any time for second degree sexual assault or sexual indecency with a child. 

Nor was Petitioner served accordingly with any warrant supporting such. 

ECF No. 1, p. 7.

In rejecting Wilson’s lack of jurisdiction argument, the Court of Appeals relied on Birchett 

v. State, 303 Ark. 220 (1990) in which the court denied a petitioner’s request for habeas relief 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 8 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
9

under almost identical circumstances where the trial court permitted an erroneous instruction 

which resulted in his conviction of a different felony from the one charged. The court in Birchett 

held:

While the court may have erred at trial by granting appellant’s request to instruct 

the jury on hindering apprehension as a lesser included offense, this error would 

not take away the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant could have 

appealed the trial court’s ruling to determine whether the hindering apprehension 

instruction was erroneously given and reversible or whether he invited such error 

for which he could not complain. See Harris v. State, 295 Ark. 456, 748 S.W.2d 

666 (1988). In other words, if the trial court erred in its decision or proceeded 

irregularly within its assigned jurisdiction, as was the case here, the appellant’s 

remedy was by direct action in the erring court or by appeal. 

Id. at 221-22. Based on the reasoning in Birchett, the Court of Appeals held the trial court had 

jurisdiction over Wilson after it erred by instructing the jury of offenses that were not lesserincluded offenses of rape. The Court found because the trial court had jurisdiction to accept 

Wilson’s plea and to sentence him, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a frivolous 

objection to the court’s jurisdiction. ECF No. 10-9, p. 6.

Wilson’s claim the trial court did not have jurisdiction does not warrant federal habeas 

relief because “whether an indictment or criminal complaint is sufficient to confer jurisdiction on 

a state court is a question of state law.” Weisberg, 29 F.3d 1271, 1280 (8th Cir. 1994). “Thus, a 

federal habeas court must either defer to a state-court finding in the underlying case or apply state 

law to the underlying case in the first instance. Id. The Court finds the state court’s determination 

regarding jurisdiction was reasonable and is due deference by this Court. Accordingly, I 

recommend Wilson’s claim based on lack of jurisdiction be dismissed. 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 9 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
10

3) Due Process violation 

Wilson describes his third ground for relief as “due process violation (14th

Amendment/Ineffective Counsel”. He states the factual support for this claim as follows: “At no 

time was any valid charging instrument filed for sexual indecency with a child (acquitted 8-10-

2015), or second degree sexual assault (acquitted 9-15-2015), and properly served on Petitioner 

prior to trial, and/or preliminary hearing for new trial.” ECF No. 1, p. 8.

In affirming the trial court’s decision finding Plaintiff’s due process claim had no merit, 

the Arkansas Court of Appeals referred to numerous Arkansas Supreme Court cases holding a 

defendant seeking postconviction relief may not attack the validity of a guilty plea by arguing that 

the information charging him with an offense was defective unless it did not sufficiently apprise 

him of the charges against him. In addition, the Court of Appeals found the law was well settled 

that the State is entitled to amend an information at any time prior to the case being submitted to 

the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or degree of the offense charged or 

create unfair surprise. Flanagan v. State, 368 Ark. 143, 243 S.W.3d 866 (2006); DeAsis v. State, 

360 Ark. 286, 200 S.W.3d 911 (2005). 

The Court of Appeals also found the record established Wilson “pled guilty to sexual 

indecency with a child, an offense of which he was sufficiently apprised” and “to argue that at the 

time of his plea agreement the State had not amended the criminal information to include the 

charge is disingenuous.” ECF No. 10-9, p. 8. The Court of Appeals went on to state “because 

Wilson had been found not guilty of rape, the new trial he sought would have been a trial for 

second-degree sexual assault. When the trial court was going to grant the new trial, Wilson agreed 

to plead no contest to the lesser offense of sexual indecency with a child.” Id. Accordingly, the 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 10 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
11

Court of Appeals found “counsel’s failure to make a meritless objection or motion regarding due 

process did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals ‘decision was not unreasonable and is supported by the 

record and the law. Accordingly, I recommend Wilson’s due process claim be dismissed.

4) Sixth Amendment Violation

Wilson describes the factual support for his Sixth Amendment Violation as follows: 

“Judge Marcia Hearnsberger, then-Prosecutor Joseph Graham, and defense counsel Dale Adams 

denied Petitioner appropriate rights due to introductions of uncharged allegations, renewed 

conviction following acquittal for the same, and no tangible/extraneous evidences entered to 

support possible convictions.” The Court interprets Wilson’s claim as one for ineffective 

assistance of counsel and an attack on the validity of his nolo contendere plea for sexual indecency 

with a child.

A defendant who pleads guilty may challenge the voluntariness of the plea based on

ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-57 (1985). The test for 

determining the validity of a guilty plea is whether the plea is “a voluntary and intelligent choice 

among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.” Id. at 56. Declarations made on 

the record at the time of a plea carry a heavy presumption of truth. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 

63 (1977). While the defendant’s representations at the time of the plea are not “invariably 

insurmountable,” such representations, together with any representations made by the trial judge 

at the time of making the plea, “constitute a formidable barrier” to a later collateral attack, and the 

defendant’s “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” Id. at 73-

74. In addition, to show ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 11 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
12

petitioner must satisfy the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), by 

demonstrating unreasonably deficient performance on the part of counsel and resulting prejudice. 

Hill, 467 U.S. at 58.

The Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected Wilson’s argument that his counsel’s actions fell 

below the standard set forth in Strickland. Wilson argued his counsel “intentionally and knowingly 

supported the trial court by maliciously coercing him with false information into a criminal act of 

fraud against the State to maintain and acquire a fraudulent conviction.” ECF No. 10-9, p. 9. 

Wilson claimed his counsel did this by refusing to object to the pleas “as without subject-matter 

jurisdiction.” As a result, Wilson claimed this resulted in a due-process violation. The Court of 

Appeals reiterated its previous reasoning stating counsel is not required to make a meritless 

objection or motion and the argument the trial court was without subject-matter jurisdiction was 

negated by Birchett, supra. Id. at p. 10. 

The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and quoted the 

exchange between Wilson’s attorney, the trial court, and Wilson during the hearing on the motion 

for new trial and found Wilson: 

stated he understood his constitutional rights, that he wanted to plead no contest to 

sexual indecency with a child, and that no one forced him to enter the plea. Wilson 

signed the plea agreement and stated that he believed the State could prove that he 

committed sexual indecency with a child and that he was satisfied with his 

counsel’s ‘very effective’ representation of him. We hold that Wilson’s counsel’s 

performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 

supra. 

ECF No. 10-9 at p. 13. The state court record establishes Wilson’s decision to plead guilty was a 

voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternatives available to him. The decision was 

voluntary because Wilson affirmed to the trial court he had not been coerced in any way to make 

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 12 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>
13

the plea, and he acknowledged his understanding of the charges and the agreement he had reached 

with the State including his agreed upon sentence. The decision was also intelligent considering

the fact Wilson faced the prospect of a second trial after he had been convicted by a jury once 

before and the charge he would be tried on carried a much longer sentence than the offense for 

which he pled guilty. 

Accordingly, the Court agrees with the state courts’ decisions finding Wilson’s claim for 

ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his plea to be without merit. Accordingly, I 

recommend Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment Claim regarding ineffective assistance of counsel and 

entry of his plea be denied on the merits. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons set forth above, Wilson’s claims for habeas relief fail on the merits. 

Accordingly, it is recommended the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice. I further 

recommend no Certificate of Appealability issue in this matter.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation 

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file timely 

objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties are 

reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by the 

district court. See Thompson v. Nix, 897 F.2d 356, 357 (8th Cir. 1990).

DATED this 11th day of February 2020.

/s/ Barry A. Bryant 

HON. BARRY A. BRYANT

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 6:19-cv-06073-SOH Document 16 Filed 02/12/20 Page 13 of 13 PageID #: <pageID>