Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ared-4_14-cv-00682/USCOURTS-ared-4_14-cv-00682-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Castrellon
Plaintiff
Sheila Sharp
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS 

WESTERN DIVISION 

ERIC CASTRELLON PETITIONER 

 

VS. 4:14-CV-00682 SWW-JTR 

SHEILA SHARP, Director, 

Arkansas Department of 

Community Correction RESPONDENT 

 

 

RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

The following Recommended Disposition (“Recommendation”) has been 

sent to United States District Judge Susan Webber Wright. You may file written 

objections to all or part of this Recommendation. If you do so, those objections 

must: (1) specifically explain the factual and/or legal basis for your objection; and 

(2) be received by the Clerk of this Court within fourteen (14) days of the entry of 

this Recommendation. The failure to timely file objections may result in waiver of 

the right to appeal questions of fact. 

 

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I. Background

Pending before the Court is a 28 U.S.C § 2254 Petition for a Writ of Habeas 

Corpus filed by Petitioner, Eric Castrellon (“Castrellon”).1

 Before addressing 

Castrellon’s habeas claims, the Court will review the procedural history of the case 

in state court. 

On August 22, 2012, Castrellon was convicted of one count of seconddegree sexual assault. The jury recommended a sentence of five years’ probation. 

The court accepted the jury’s recommendation, but required Castrellon to serve 

sixty (60) days in jail.2

 

On August 29, 2012, Castrellon appealed his conviction to the Arkansas 

Court of Appeals where he argued, through counsel,3

 that the trial court erred by: 

(1) denying his motion for directed verdict; and (2) denying him access to the 

victim’s mental health counseling records. On June 19, 2013, the Court affirmed. 

Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 408 (2013). Among other things, the Court 

concluded that the victim’s testimony alone was sufficient to sustain Castrellon’s 

convictions: 

The victim in this case, twelve-year-old H.C., testified at trial 

that Castrellon was an old family friend of her father’s, as well as her 

pastor. On the night of the events in question, H.C. spent the night 

with Castrellon's children, A.C. and J.C., who were her friends. The 

 1

 Doc. 1. 2

 Doc. 13, Exh A (sealed). 

3

 Castrellon was represented by Jeff Rosenzweig at trial and on direct appeal. Mr. 

Rosenzweig is also representing Castrellon in this federal habeas action. 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 2 of 18
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girls all went to sleep in A.C.'s bunk bed. At some point during the 

night, H.C. stated that she woke up, opened her eyes, and saw 

Castrellon. She felt him “rubbing on [her] vaginal region” over her 

clothes. H.C. said she did not know how long the rubbing had been 

going on before she opened her eyes, but it stopped after she woke up. 

Castrellon's wife testified that, on the night in question, she 

asked Castrellon to go into the girls' bedroom and check to see if their 

five-year-old daughter had wet the bed. She said that she did not tell 

Castrellon that they had company that night. Castrellon also testified 

that he had no idea that H.C. was in the house that night. He 

subsequently stated, however, that he came home late that night and 

recognized that his wife was tired because she had “the four kids, plus 

H.C.” that day. 

Castrellon testified that he went in the bedroom to check 

whether the five-year-old had wet the bed. He said that he “just felt 

around to see if [he] could feel wetness,” but then he saw a “bigger 

leg” and realized that H.C. was in his daughter's bed. He thought H.C. 

was asleep, so he left the room and did not say anything to anyone 

because it would have been “awkward.” Castrellon denied knowing 

who he was touching at the time. He noted that he had been around 

H.C. many times after that, and her behavior did not lead him to think 

that she was afraid of him or that he had done anything to her. 

 

. . . 

The jury in this case chose to believe H.C. Her testimony, 

standing alone, constituted substantial evidence to sustain Castrellon’s 

conviction. 

Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. App. at **3-4. 

On July 5, 2013, Castrellon filed a petition for rehearing with the Arkansas 

Court of Appeals4

 and a petition for review with the Arkansas Supreme Court. 5 

 4

 Doc. 10-5. 5

 Doc. 10-7. 

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On August 21, 2013, the Arkansas Court of Appeal denied Castrellon’s petition for 

rehearing.6

 On September 5, 2013, the Arkansas Supreme Court denied 

Castrellon’s petition for review.7

 Castrellon did not seek post-conviction relief 

under Rule 37 of the Ark. Rules of Criminal Procedure.8

 

On November 25, 2014, Castrellon filed the current § 2254 petition. He 

contends that: (1) his due process rights were violated by the trial court’s refusal to 

grant him access to all of H.C.’s mental health counseling records, which might

have contained exculpatory impeachment evidence; (2) the state appellate court’s 

ruling that he failed to preserve his Ark. R. Evid. 510 waiver argument should not 

be construed as an independent and adequate state decision sufficient to bar federal 

review; and (3) if he is deemed to have procedurally defaulted his Ark. R. Evid. 

510 waiver argument, then his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 

failing to preserve that issue. 

Respondent argues that: (1) the Arkansas appellate courts’ rejection of 

Castrellon’s federal due process argument is consistent with United States 

Supreme Court precedent and is entitled to deference; (2) the Arkansas appellate 

courts’ decision that Castrellon failed to preserve his Ark. R. Evid. 510 waiver 

argument is an independent and adequate construction of state law that prevents 

 6

 Doc. 10-6. 7

 Doc. 10-8. 8

 Castrellon contends a Rule 37 petition was not an option, since he was not “in 

custody.” Respondent does not dispute this contention. 

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this Court from considering the merits of that issue; and (3) Castrellon cannot 

establish that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective so as to excuse his 

procedural default of the Ark. R. Evid. 510 waiver argument. 

For the reasons discussed below, Court recommends that Castrellon’s 

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus be denied and that the case be dismissed, with 

prejudice. 

II. Discussion 

A. The Evidentiary Rulings Giving Rise To Castrellon’s 

Claims for Habeas Relief 

Castrellon contends that his due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment were violated when he was denied access to evidence “which would 

have potentially impeached” the victim’s trial testimony.9

 His constitutional 

challenge is rooted in evidentiary rulings made before and during his trial. 

Specifically, Castrellon contends that the trial court committed constitutional error: 

(1) in denying him access to all of the victim’s mental health counseling records 

for treatment she received after Castrellon’s sexual assault; 10 and (2) in rejecting 

 9

 Doc. 1 at p. 15. 

10 In making this pretrial ruling, the court applied the following sub-parts of Arkansas 

Rule of Evidence 503: 

(b) General Rule of Privilege. A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose 

and to prevent any other person from disclosing his medical records or 

confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or 

treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition, . . . among 

himself, physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in 

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his attorney’s argument at trial that the victim waived any privilege created under 

Ark. R. Evid. 503 by testifying on direct that she had suffered from depression 

since the assault.11 The Court will now review the specific trial court rulings that 

Castrellon seeks to challenge. 

First, on April 24, 2012, the trial court conducted a pre-trial hearing on the 

discoverability of the victim’s mental health counseling records.12 After hearing 

testimony from the victim’s parents and Castrellon’s wife, the trial court ruled that 

 

the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or 

psychotherapist, including members of the patient’s family. 

. . . 

(d) Exceptions: 

. . . 

(3) Condition and element of claim or defense. 

(A) There is no privilege under this rule as to medical records or 

communications relevant to an issue of the physical, mental or emotional 

condition of the patient in any proceeding in which he or she relies upon 

the condition as an element of his or her claim or defense, . . . 

In his habeas Petition, Castrellon asserts that the trial court’s “rulings” to deny him access 

to these records “was an unreasonable application” of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 

(1987). See Doc. 1 at p. 16 (“[T]he Arkansas courts’ decision to withhold access to the victim’s 

counseling records was an unreasonable application of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, . . .”). In making 

that argument, Castrellon does not distinguish between the trial court’s pretrial and trial rulings. 

Accordingly, this Court construes Castrellon’s Petition as challenging both the trial court’s pretrial and trial rulings. 

11 In making this waiver argument, Castrellon’s attorney relies on Arkansas Rule of 

Evidence 510, which states: 

A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure 

waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege 

voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the 

privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is 

privileged. 

12 Doc. 13, Exh. J at pp. 139-200 (Hearing, April 24, 2012) (sealed). Castrellon 

requested the Court to allow him to review “medical, pharmaceutical and counseling records.” 

Id. at p. 144. However, the only such records that are at issue are the victim’s counseling 

records. There is no dispute that those counseling records qualify as “medical records” for which 

Ark. R. Evid. 503 creates a privilege. 

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certain counseling records, related to the victim’s treatment before Castrellon’s 

sexual assault, were potentially relevant and had to be turned over to his attorney. 

However, the trial court denied Castrellon’s attorney access to the victim’s 

counseling records for the treatment she received after the alleged assault. 

Castrellon’s attorney then requested the trial court to make an in camera

review of the withheld counseling records to determine if they contained any 

exculpatory evidence.13 The trial court agreed to the request and, after conducting 

an in camera review of the post-assault counseling records, it informed the parties 

that there was nothing “in the records that would be considered exculpatory.”14 

Castrellon acknowledges in his Petition that: (1) he was “given access to 

some [of the victim’s counseling] records; (2) he was able to cross examine the 

victim and her parents about allegations of behavioral changes as a result of the 

alleged abuse; and (3) he was able to elicit on cross-examination that the victim 

was on Adderall before the alleged abuse.”15 However, because he was not 

allowed to make his own independent review of all the victim’s post-assault 

 13 During the pre-trial hearing, Castrellon’s counsel noted that he had “no problem with 

the proposition that a decision on whether something is privileged or not may be done incamera.” Doc. 13, Exh. J at p. 140 (sealed). 

14 The Arkansas Court of Appeals noted the trial court’s explicit finding that nothing “in 

the records [could] . . . be considered exculpatory or Brady material.” Castrellon v. State, 2013 

Ark. App. 408 at *1; see also Doc. 13, Exh. J at pp. 189-194 (sealed). Because there was 

nothing exculpatory in those counseling records and the prosecutor did not have access to those 

records, there is nothing to support a Brady claim in this case. 

15 Doc. 1 at p. 3. During the pre-trial hearing, the victim’s mother testified that her 

daughter was placed on Adderall to address problems at school. Doc. 13, Exh. J at pp. 178-179 

(sealed). 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 7 of 18
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counseling records, he “was unable to meet the assertions of counseling and 

depression that the accuser and the prosecutor gratuitously inserted into the trial.”16 

Second, during trial, the prosecutor asked the victim, on redirect, how she 

coped with what had happened to her, and she responded: “I’ve gone to see 

various counselors, and I’ve, I’ve had – I’ve suffered from depression since.”17 

Castrellon’s counsel objected and renewed his motion for access to the counseling 

records that were the subject of the Court’s in camera review.18 The Court denied 

the motion and also denied the request for a mistrial or a limiting instruction.19 

 16 Doc. 1 at p. 3. 

17 Doc. 13, Exh. J, at p. 283 (sealed). 

18 The transcript of the colloquy between defense counsel and the trial court reads: 

Mr. Rosenzweig: Your Honor, may I approach? 

The Court: You may. 

[Discussion outside the presence of the jury] 

Mr. Rosenzweig: She’s talking about things. Apparently there are records 

that we don’t have. She’s talking about various counselors and stuff that we don’t 

have that may have been provided to you and not provided to us. 

The Court: They weren’t provided to me. Counseling records of a 

victim after the incident aren’t admissible. 

Mr. Rosenzweig: Well, Your Honor, she was talking about a diagnosis. 

Mr. Duncan: Can we keep our voices down? 

Mr. Rosenzweig: She was talking about a diagnosis. If she’s asserting a 

diagnosis of depression, that’s something I would submit that - - - 

The Court: That was contained in the records that I reviewed. 

Mr. Rosenzweig: It was? 

The Court: Yes. 

Mr. Rosenzweig: Okay. Well, Your Honor, our position is we are entitled to 

them, and, I, you know, we don’t know what records you reviewed, but I would 

ask that they be unsealed at this time so I can look at them. 

The Court: That’ll be denied. 

Mr. Rosenzweig: Okay. Note my objections, Your Honor. Note my 

objections, Your Honor. 

I would ask that the jury be instructed - - My position is, is that the bell cannot be 

unrung with regard to a claim of depression, and I would ask for a mistrial. And 

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When the victim’s mother was called to testify, the court granted 

Castrellon’s objection to the prosecutor making any further inquiry into postassault behavioral changes.20

B. Analysis of Castrellon’s Habeas Claims 

1. Castrellon’s Due Process Rights Were Not Violated 

By the Trial Court’s Rulings Denying His Counsel 

Access to the Victim’s Post-Assault Counseling 

Records. 

 

Castrellon argued on direct appeal, based on Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 

U.S. 39 (1987) and other state law precedent, that the trial court’s rulings denying 

his attorney access to the victim’s post-assault counseling records violated his due 

 

without waiving that, assuming you deny that, it would be my position that the 

jury be admonished to disregard the claim of depression. 

The Court: Your request for a mistrial is denied. Your request for a 

limiting instruction is denied. 

Doc. 13, Exh. J at pp. 283-285 (sealed). 

19 Id. 20 Castrellon speculates that this ruling shows “that the circuit court sensed that its 

[earlier] decision was wrong.” Doc. 1 at 7 (quoting from Appellant’s brief). The relevant 

portion of the trial transcript reads as follows: 

Prosecutor: Okay. After that time period that morning in 2008, at home 

with you did you notice any specific changes in your daughter? 

Mr. Rosenzweig: Your Honor, may I approach? 

The Court: You may. 

[Outside the presence of the jury] 

Mr. Rosenzweig: If I’m getting up on all these issues about behavior, I would 

like to just have a continuing objection to this and a continuing motion to unseal 

the records that we talked about before so I don’t have to get up and object every 

time there’s an attempt to elicit this testimony. 

The Court: That’s granted, and I’ll put the prosecutor on notice. Those 

records are sealed. If you stomp all over my ruling, I’m going to unseal those 

records and let him go at ‘em. And if we have to grant a mistrial in order to do 

that because you’ve decided to delve in an area where I’ve sealed some records, 

you’re going to suffer the consequences of a mistrial. Are we clear? 

Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir. 

Doc. 13, Exh. J at pp. 292-293 (sealed). 

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process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Arkansas Court of Appeals 

rejected this argument. First, it found that, “because the trial court conducted an in 

camera review to see if the allegedly privileged materials contained any 

exculpatory evidence,” Castrellon “received the relief afforded by Ritchie.” 

Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. at *6. Second, the Court rejected Castrellon’s 

contention that “he was entitled to review the allegedly privileged information 

himself.” Id. 

According to Castrellon, “the Arkansas courts’ decision to withhold access 

to the records was an unreasonable application” of Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 

supra.

21 Instead of offering any legal authority to support that proposition, he 

makes the novel argument that he needs to see those records in order to finalize his 

argument and demonstrate the constitutional violation.22 On its face, this argument 

requests this Court to allow Castrellon to conduct a fishing expedition into the 

privileged medical records of the minor victim of his sexual assault even though he 

has already been accorded the full constitutional protection authorized by the Court 

in Ritchie, i.e., the trial court reviewed those records, in camera, and concluded 

there was nothing in them that Castrellon was entitled to use at trial. 

 21 Doc. 1 at p. 16. 

22 In a separate Order, filed contemporaneously with this Recommended Disposition, the 

undersigned United States Magistrate Judge has denied Castrellon’s request for access to the 

sealed records. 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 10 of 18
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The Arkansas Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the Ritchie decision is 

entitled to deference. The applicable standard of review imposes an onerous 

burden on Castrellon. A federal court will not grant habeas relief unless a state 

court's decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established federal law” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of 

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established 

federal law if it reaches a conclusion opposite that of the United States Supreme 

Court on a question of law, or reaches a decision contrary to the United States 

Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 

362, 405 (2000). A state court decision involves an “unreasonable application” of 

federal law when it identifies the correct legal rule, but unreasonably applies it to 

the facts. Id. at 407. “A state court's application of clearly established federal law 

must be objectively unreasonable, not merely incorrect, to warrant the granting of a 

writ of habeas corpus.” Jackson v. Norris, 651 F.3d 923, 925 (8th Cir. 2011). 

Castrellon’s burden is to “show that the state court’s ruling on the claim 

being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 

error . . . beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Burt v. Titlow, 134 

S. Ct. 16 (2013) (internal quotations omitted). The Court concludes that Castrellon 

has failed to make that showing. 

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The Arkansas Court of Appeals disposed of the issue Castrellon is now 

raising in one paragraph: 

On appeal, Castrellon first urges that, under Pennsylvania v. 

Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S. Ct. 989, 94 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1987), he was 

entitled to an in camera review of the allegedly privileged information 

to determine whether the materials contained any exculpatory 

evidence. The circuit court here conducted the in camera review 

afforded by Ritchie. Castrellon appears to contend that he was entitled 

to review the allegedly privileged information himself. His argument, 

however, misapprehends the holding of Ritchie. In Ritchie, the 

Supreme Court held that a “defendant's right to discover exculpatory 

evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search 

through the [State's] files.” 480 U.S. at 59. Rather, a defendant’s 

“interest (as well as that of the [State]) in ensuring a fair trial can be 

protected fully by requiring that the [privileged] files be submitted 

only to the trial court for an in camera review.” Id. at 60. Castrellon 

received the relief afforded by Ritchie, and we therefore find no error. 

Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. App. 408, 6, 428 S.W.3d 607, 611-612. 

This is a fair application of Ritchie, which held that a criminal defendants’ 

due process right to a fair trial required that the victim’s therapy records be subject 

to the trial court’s in camera review, but rejected the argument that defense 

counsel was entitled to review those records.23 

In Johnson v. Norris, 537 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2008), the Court rejected a 

similar habeas claim made by an Arkansas habeas petitioner. Unlike the 

Pennsylvania statute before the Court in Ritchie, the Eighth Circuit noted that 

 23 Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 60 (“Ritchie’s interest . . . in ensuring a fair trial can be protected 

fully by requiring that the CYS files be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review.”). 

The Ritchie Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s ruling that Ritchie’s attorney was 

“entitled to review the entire file to search for any useful evidence.” Id. at 46.

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Arkansas’s psychotherapist-patient privilege is “waivable only by the person who 

is entitled to assert it,” while the Pennsylvania statute “contemplated some use of 

agency records in judicial proceedings, and provided that information would be 

disclosed when directed by court order.”24 This led the Court in Johnson to make 

the following observation:25 

Although Davis [v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)] and Ritchie establish 

that at least in some circumstances, an accused’s constitutional rights 

are paramount to a State’s interest in protecting confidential 

information, those decisions do not establish a specific legal rule that 

answers whether a State’s psychotherapist-patient privilege must yield 

to an accused’s desire to use confidential information in defense of a 

criminal case. . . . Given the absence of direct guidance from the 

Supreme Court in this area, the decisions of the Arkansas courts to 

enforce the psychotherapist-patient privilege under these 

circumstances were within the range of reasonableness permitted by 

AEDPA.26

See also Batey v. Haas, United States District Court, Case No. 05-CV-73699, 2013 

WL 1810762, *10 (E.D. Michigan April 30, 2013) (“there is no clearly established 

federal law that answers whether a state’s psychotherapist-patient privilege must 

yield to a criminal defendant's desire to use such confidential information in 

defense of a criminal case”). 

In this case, the trial court conducted a pretrial in camera review of the 

victim’s post-assault counseling records, which is precisely what the Court in 

 24 Johnson v. Norris, 537 F.3d at 846. 

25 Id. 26 Id. at 846-847. 

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Ritchie held was constitutionally required. Castrellon has failed to provide any 

legal authority to support his position that the Fourteenth Amendment entitles him

to conduct his own independent review of his victim’s post-assault mental health 

counseling records (all of which are privileged under Ark. R. Evid. 503). He also 

has failed to explain how the Arkansas Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Ritchie, 

as its basis for rejecting his due process claim, is “an unreasonable application of . . 

. clearly established federal law.”27 

Finally, out of an abundance of caution, this Court ordered Respondent to 

provide it with a copy of the mental health counseling records in question so that it 

could conduct its own in camera review of those documents.28 On November 16, 

2016, those counseling records were submitted to the Court, under seal.29

After carefully reviewing those records, this Court can find nothing in them 

that is exculpatory or that fairly could have been used in cross-examining the 

victim. Accordingly, there is nothing in those records “that probably would have 

changed the outcome of [Castrellon’s] trial” or that is “material to the fairness of 

the trial.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 39, 58, 60. By conducting this second in camera

review, Castrellon has now received, if anything, an overly expansive 

interpretation of Ritchie and Johnson. 

 27 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). 

28 Doc. 14. 29 Doc. 18 (sealed). 

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2. Standing Alone, the Alleged Evidentiary Errors 

Committed By the State Courts Do Not Rise to the 

Level of a Cognizable Federal Constitutional 

Violation. 

On direct appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals rejected Castrellon’s 

arguments that the trial court erred in: (1) finding that the victim’s counseling 

records were privileged under Ark. R. Evid. 503(b); and (2) ruling that the victim’s 

testimony about her post-assault depression did not constitute a waiver of the 

privilege to keep those records confidential under Ark. R. Civ. 510.30 The Court 

found that Castrellon’s Rule 503(b) argument was barred by prior Arkansas 

Supreme Court rulings,31 and declined to consider his Rule 510 argument because 

“Castrellon neither raised his Rule 510 waiver argument nor obtained a ruling on it 

before the circuit court.”32 

Castrellon contends that the Arkansas Court of Appeal’s holding that his 

Rule 510 argument was not preserved for appellate review should not be 

considered an adequate state bar precluding federal habeas relief. Respondent 

argues that: (1) because the Arkansas Court of Appeals fully and adequately 

rejected Castrellon’s Rule 510 argument, based on the long and well-established 

 30 Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. App. at **6-7. 

31 Id. at **6-8. See also Johnson v. State, 342 Ark. 186, 195 (2007) (Ark. R. Evid. 

503(d)(3)(A) “clearly anticipates that the privilege is inapplicable only as to a party to a 

proceeding who brings his or her own physical, mental, or emotional condition into issue.”) 

(emphasis in original); State v. K.B., 2010 Ark. 228 at *8 (holding that the victim of the crime 

being prosecuted is not a party to the criminal proceeding and does not have a claim). 

32 Castrellon v. State, 2013 Ark. App. at *8. 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 15 of 18
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state law which required him to preserve his objection with the trial court, this 

Court is barred from considering the merits of that state law issue in a federal 

habeas action; and (2) Castrellon has procedurally defaulted the issue by failing to 

raise his Fourteenth Amendment due process claim in state court. 

The Court agrees with both of Respondent’s arguments and concludes that: 

(1) Castrellon has procedurally defaulted his Rule 510 argument; (2) the Court, in 

any case, is barred from considering the merits of that issue because it involves a 

question of state law that was fully and adequately resolved by the Arkansas Court 

of Appeals. See, e.g., Bell v. Norris, 586 F.3d 624, 633 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting 

Arkansas’s “well-established and regularly applied rule” obligating appellants to 

obtain a trial ruling in order to preserve an issue for appellate review and citing 

cases).33 

3. Castrellon’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 

Argument is Without Merit. 

In the alternative, Castrellon argues that, if his Rule 510 argument is held to 

be procedurally defaulted, then his counsel was ineffective for “not intoning the 

magic words required by the Arkansas appellate courts.”34 He argues that 

 33 Castrellon cannot transform this question of state evidentiary law into a federal 

constitutional issue by asserting for the first time in this habeas action that it violated his due 

process rights. As Respondent correctly points out, Castrellon failed to fairly present his Ark. R. 

Evid. 510 “waiver argument” as a federal due process claim either in the trial court or on direct 

appeal. Doc. 10 at pp. 3-5. 

34 Doc. 1 at p. 16. 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 16 of 18
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prejudice may be demonstrated by the same evidence entitling him to substantive 

relief. 

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court articulated a 

two-part test for determining if a criminal defendant's counsel has been 

constitutionally ineffective: First, the attorney's conduct must fall below “an 

objective standard of reasonableness”; and, Second, the attorney’s deficient 

performance must prejudice the defendant. Id. at 687-88. A defendant is 

prejudiced if “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

at 694. If a prisoner fails “to establish either Strickland prong [it] is fatal to an 

ineffective-assistance claim.” Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 498 (8th Cir. 

2011). 

Assuming, arguendo, that Castrellon’s counsel was constitutionally 

ineffective for not raising and preserving the Rule 510 evidentiary issue, the Court 

concludes that no prejudice occurred. Based on the state trial court’s in camera

review of the victim’s post-assault counseling records (which is consistent with 

this Court’s own in camera review of those documents), there is simply no factual 

basis from which any court could conclude that there is a “reasonable probability” 

the jury’s verdict would have been different if those records had been made 

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 17 of 18
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available to Castrellon’s counsel before his cross-examination of the victim and 

other witnesses. 

III. Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that all of Castrellon’s 

habeas claims either fail on the merits or are procedurally defaulted. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT the Petition for a Writ of 

Habeas Corpus be DENIED and this habeas case be DISMISSED, WITH 

PREJUDICE. 

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT a Certificate of Appealability 

be DENIED pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

Dated this 20th day of December, 2016. 

 

 

____________________________________ 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 4:14-cv-00682-SWW Document 20 Filed 12/20/16 Page 18 of 18