Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04118/USCOURTS-ca8-06-04118-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Benjamin J. Larue
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-4118

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

 v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Missouri.

Benjamin J. Larue, also known as * [UNPUBLISHED]

hardhornyguy24, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: February 14, 2007

 Filed: February 23, 2007

___________

Before WOLLMAN, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

We granted the government’s motion for an expedited appeal from the district

court’s refusal to order appellee, Benjamin J. Larue, to be detained following his

conviction by a jury on charges of attempting to entice a minor to engage in unlawful

sexual activity, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), and traveling in interstate

commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual activity, a violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2423(b), both of which are crimes of violence within the meaning of 18

U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(C). We reverse and remand with

directions.

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Briefly, the conduct giving rise to his convictions commenced in June 2004,

when Larue, a resident of Gardner, Kansas, chatted on the Internet with a person that

he thought was a 14-year-old girl living in Kansas City, Missouri. Larue in fact was

speaking with an undercover Platte County, Missouri, sheriff’s detective. Larue

suggested that the two should engage in various forms of sexual activity, acts, if they

had been carried out, would have constituted second-degree sodomy and seconddegree rape under Missouri law.

After a second conversation the following day, and following the “girl’s”

driving instructions, Larue drove approximately thirty miles to the designated location

in Missouri.

At the conclusion of a one-day trial, Larue was convicted of the abovedescribed federal offenses on November 13, 2006. After the jury was discharged, the

district court engaged in a colloquy with the prosecutor and defense counsel regarding

the question of Larue’s post-conviction detention. Apparently agreeing with the

government that the convictions involved crimes of violence, the district court ordered

that Larue continue to remain free on bond pending sentencing, listing as reasons the

fact that Larue had complied with the terms of his pretrial release, that he had no

criminal record, that he was paying support for his two young children, that he was

taking mental-health medication, that he had ongoing employment, and that the nature

of his offenses might cause him to be subjected to violence while in jail or other

detention facility. The district court also noted the lengthy delays in preparing

presentence investigation reports and the crowded jail conditions. Finally, the district

court voiced its apparent disapproval of the government’s investigative targeting of

would-be child sexual exploiters.

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The relevant statute provides as follows:

(2) The judicial officer shall order that a person who has been

found guilty of [a crime of violence] and is awaiting imposition or

execution of sentence be detained unless – 

(A)(i) the judicial officer finds there is a substantial likelihood

that a motion for acquittal or new trial will be granted; or

(ii) an attorney for the Government has recommended that no

sentence of imprisonment be imposed on the person[.]

18 U.S.C. § 3143(a)(2)(A)(i) & (ii).

The district court did not find that a substantial likelihood existed that a motion

for acquittal or new trial would be granted. Nor did the government recommend that

no sentence of imprisonment be imposed upon Larue. Accordingly, the only possible

avenue of post-trial release would be the showing of the existence of “exceptional

reasons why [Larue’s] detention would not be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 3145(c).

As we did in United States v. Brown, 368 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 2004), we

conclude that the reasons advanced by Larue and relied upon by the district court,

whether considered singly or in combination, do not constitute “exceptional reasons”

within the meaning of § 3145(c). Larue’s compliance with the terms of his pretrial

release, his lack of a criminal record, his payment of child support, and his ongoing

employment are commendable, but they are not “clearly out of the ordinary,

uncommon, or rare.” Brown, 368 F.3d at 993 (quoting United States v. Koon, 6 F.3d

561, 563 (9th Cir. 1993) (Rymer, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

Likewise, the record reflects neither the nature of the medication Larue is taking nor

his need therefor. As for the offense-related violence that Larue might be subjected

to in confinement, we, like the court in Brown, fail to see how Larue’s case is clearly

out of the ordinary, uncommon, or rare when compared to any other defendant

committed of a sexual exploitation of children offense.

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In a word, then, we conclude that the district court erred in ordering that Larue

remain free on bond pending sentencing. Accordingly, the order is reversed, and the

case is remanded to the district court with directions to enter an order that Larue be

taken into custody immediately. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

______________________________

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