Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02839/USCOURTS-caed-2_09-cv-02839-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center
Defendant
Willie Weaver
Plaintiff

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 Plaintiff is only allowed to proceed in forma pauperis under the imminent danger 1

exception of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Case No. CIV S-09-2164 JAM DAD. As discussed

herein, plaintiff’s complaint can be liberally construed as alleging that he was “under imminent

danger of serious physical injury” when he filed this action. See, e.g., Andrews v. Cervantes, 493

F.3d 1047, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the court will allow plaintiff to proceed 

without pre-paying the filing fee for this action. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WILLIE WEAVER,

Plaintiff, No. CIV S-09-2839 MCE DAD P

vs.

RIO CONSUMNES 

CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.,

Defendants. ORDER

 /

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 and has filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. 

This proceeding was referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in accordance with Local Rule

302 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has submitted an in forma pauperis application that

makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, plaintiff will be granted leave

to proceed in forma pauperis.1

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Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. See

28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a) & 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff has been without funds for six months and is

currently without funds. Accordingly, the court will not assess an initial partial filing fee. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff will be obligated to make monthly payments of twenty percent of

the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments shall

be collected and forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the

amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b)(2).

SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief

against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised

claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2).

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47

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(1957)). However, in order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must

contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic,

550 U.S. at 555. In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as true the

allegations of the complaint in question, Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425 U.S.

738, 740 (1976), construe the pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and resolve all

doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969).

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at

law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 

42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

(1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the

actions of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named

defendant holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed

constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862

(9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory

allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not

sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

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PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

In the present case, plaintiff has not identified any specific individuals as

defendants. Rather, plaintiff has merely listed Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center Captain,

Lieutenant, Sergeant, and Correctional Officers as the defendants in this action. In his brief

complaint, plaintiff appears to allege that, on September 9, 2009, he was in the day room with an

inmate who had previously attacked him. Plaintiff appears to claim that continuing to house him

on the same tier with this other inmate constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of

the Eighth Amendment. In terms of relief, plaintiff requests monetary damages. (Compl. at 11.)

DISCUSSION

The allegations in plaintiff’s complaint are so vague and conclusory that the court

is unable to determine whether the current action is frivolous or fails to state a claim for relief. 

The complaint does not contain a short and plain statement as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). 

Although the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, a complaint must give fair notice to

the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and succinctly. 

Jones v. Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must allege

with at least some degree of particularity overt acts which defendants engaged in that support his

claims. Id. Because plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), the complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an

amended complaint. 

In any amended complaint he elects to file, plaintiff must identify the defendants

in the caption of his pleading and name them with their position and place of employment in the

section of the form designated for that purpose. In his original complaint, plaintiff has not

identified any defendants by name. Plaintiff is advised that the court cannot order service of a

complaint on defendants not actually identified by name in his amended complaint. 

In addition, in any amended complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the

conditions complained of resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s federal constitutional or statutory

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rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The amended complaint must allege

in specific terms how each named defendant was involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s rights. 

There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or

connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423

U.S. 362 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588

F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil

rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

Insofar as plaintiff is attempting to assert and Eighth Amendment claim, he is

advised that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” 

U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” constitutes cruel and

unusual punishment prohibited by the United States Constitution. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.

312, 319 (1986). See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977); Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976). However, neither accident nor negligence constitutes cruel and unusual

punishment, as “[i]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith, that

characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Whitley,

475 U.S. at 319.

What is needed to show unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain “varies

according to the nature of the alleged constitutional violation.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.

1, 5 (1992) (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320). To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim the

plaintiff must allege facts showing that objectively he suffered a “sufficiently serious”

deprivation. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1991). The

plaintiff must also allege facts showing that subjectively each defendant had a culpable state of

mind in allowing or causing the plaintiff’s deprivation to occur. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994).

If plaintiff is attempting to assert a failure to protect claim under the Eighth

Amendment, he is advised that “prison officials have a duty . . . to protect prisoners from

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violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. “Being violently assaulted in

prison is simply not ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offense against

society.’” Id. at 834. Prison officials do not, however, incur constitutional liability for every

injury suffered by a prisoner at the hands of another prisoner. Id. A prison official violates the

Eighth Amendment “only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and

disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847. 

Plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff’s November 10, 2009 application to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc.

No. 4) is granted.

2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 

The fee shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.

3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.

4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an

amended complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice; the amended complaint must bear the

docket number assigned to this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint”; failure to file an

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amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

be dismissed without prejudice.

5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff the court’s form for filing a

civil rights action.

6. Plaintiff’s November 19, 2009 motion for a court order requiring prison

officials to complete his in forma pauperis application (Doc. No. 8) is denied as unnecessary.

DATED: February 10, 2010.

DAD:9

weav2839.14a

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