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Parties Involved:
Donner Technology, LLC
Appellant
Pro Stage Gear, LLC
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

DONNER TECHNOLOGY, LLC,

Appellant

v.

PRO STAGE GEAR, LLC,

Appellee

______________________

2020-1104

______________________

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2018-

00708.

______________________

Decided: November 9, 2020

______________________

SCOTT AMY, Thomas Horstemeyer LLP, Atlanta, GA,

for appellant. Also represented by ROBERT GRAVOIS,

WESLEY AUSTIN ROBERTS. 

 DOUGLAS JOHNSON, Miller & Martin PLLC, Chattanooga, TN, for appellee. Also represented by M. ELLIS 

LORD, ROBERT F. PARSLEY; PHARAN A. EVANS, Atlanta, GA. 

 ______________________

Before PROST, Chief Judge, DYK and HUGHES, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 DONNER TECHNOLOGY, LLC v. PRO STAGE GEAR, LLC

PROST, Chief Judge.

Donner Technology, LLC (“Donner”) petitioned for inter partes review (“IPR”) of U.S. Patent No. 6,459,023 (“the 

’023 patent”), challenging various claims as obvious under 

35 U.S.C. § 103. Donner’s petition set forth three grounds 

of unpatentability, all relying at least in part on the teachings of U.S. Patent No. 3,504,311 (“Mullen”). The Patent 

Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) rejected these challenges 

on the ground that Donner did not prove that Mullen is 

analogous art. Donner Tech., LLC v. Pro Stage Gear, LLC, 

No. IPR2018-00708, 2019 WL 4020204, at *10–11 

(P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2019) (“Decision”). Donner appealed. 

We vacate and remand.

BACKGROUND

I

Guitar effects pedals are electronic devices that affect 

the amplified sound of a guitar. These pedals are usually 

placed on a pedalboard and “are controlled by foot operation switches in order to leave the user’s hands free to play 

the instrument.” ’023 patent col. 1 ll. 35–38, 56–57.

Pro Stage Gear, LLC owns the ’023 patent. According 

to the ’023 patent, prior art pedalboards were essentially 

wooden boards to which guitar effects pedals were 

mounted. Id. at col. 1 ll. 56–61. If multiple guitar effects 

pedals were used, “they must be interconnected by cables 

to the original source of the sound to be altered, and then 

connected to the amplification system.” Id. at col. 1 ll. 42–

45. These cables were “inserted into the adapters on the 

guitar effects and arranged between the pedals on the 

board. The wooden board may be placed in a carrying case 

and the cables covered by foam so that the cables are not 

exposed.” Id. at col. 1 ll. 58–61. With such setups, it was 

difficult to change out or add new effects “because the foam 

must be removed to uncover the cable connections, the effect removed from the board, the cables repositioned for the 

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DONNER TECHNOLOGY, LLC v. PRO STAGE GEAR, LLC 3

new effect, the new effect positioned on the board, the cables rerouted, and the foam re-cut or replaced for the new 

effect.” Id. at col. 1 ll. 62–67. The ’023 patent explained 

that there was thus a need for “an improved pedal effects 

board which allows easy positioning and changing of the 

individual guitar effects while providing a confined and secure area for cable routing and placement.” Id. at col 2 ll. 

1–4. 

The ’023 patent describes a guitar effects pedalboard 

that purportedly solves these problems. Figure 7, reproduced below, shows a perspective view of example pedalboard 10. That example includes support structure 

members 30 and 32 and frame base 42, which elevates one 

side of pedalboard 10 from the stage floor. Pedalboard 10 

also includes effect mounting surface 12 for mounting guitar effects and cable connection openings 14, 16, and 18 to 

“allow for the cable 56 to pass beneath the effect mounting 

surface 12 for connection to the guitar effect 46 mounted on 

top of the effect mounting surface 12.” Id. at col. 3 

ll. 17–20. Figure 12, also reproduced below, shows an example pedalboard with eight attached guitar effects pedals. 

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II

Mullen relates to electrical relays. Mullen highlights 

that one “object of this invention is to provide an improved 

support for supporting one or more relay structures and for 

providing wiring-channel space for receiving wires that 

would be connected to the relay structures to connect the 

relay structures in various control circuits.” Mullen col. 1 

ll. 50–54. An embodiment of Mullen’s support is depicted 

in Figures 1 and 4 below. Donner contends that these Figures depict a structure that is analogous to the structure 

claimed by the ’023 patent and that includes surfaces for 

mounting relays, cable connection openings, and area for 

routing cables. E.g., Appellant’s Br. 14–17.

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III

In its IPR petition, Donner set forth three grounds it 

contends render various claims unpatentable as obvious. 

Each ground relies, at least in part, on the teachings of 

Mullen. The Board determined that Donner’s obviousness 

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challenge failed because Donner had not proven that Mullen is analogous art. Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *9–11.

Donner appealed. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A). 

DISCUSSION

“We review the [Board’s] factual findings for substantial evidence and its legal conclusions de novo.” Redline 

Detection, LLC v. Star Envirotech, Inc., 811 F.3d 435, 449 

(Fed. Cir. 2015). “Substantial evidence is something less 

than the weight of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla of evidence.” In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. 

Cir. 2000).

The Board “must make the necessary findings and 

have an adequate ‘evidentiary basis for its findings.’” In re 

NuVasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Sang Su Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. 

Cir. 2002)). In addition, the Board “must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its 

action including a rational connection between the facts 

found and the choice made.” Id. (quoting Motor Vehicle 

Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 

43 (1983)); see also Princeton Vanguard, LLC v. Frito-Lay 

N. Am., Inc., 786 F.3d 960, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (explaining 

that although the “Board is not required to discuss every 

piece of evidence,” it cannot “disregard [evidence] without 

explanation” or “short-cut its consideration of the factual 

record before it”). “This explanation enables the court to 

exercise its duty to review the [Board’s] decisions to assess 

whether those decisions are ‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse 

of discretion, or . . . unsupported by substantial evidence.’” 

NuVasive, 842 F.3d at 1382 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), 

(E)).

I

Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying 

facts. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc., 

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845 F.3d 1357, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017). These “factual inquiries” include “the scope and content of the prior art,” the 

“differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,” 

and “the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 

Here, the Board concluded that Donner’s obviousness 

challenges, which rely on the teachings of Mullen, failed 

because Donner had not shown that Mullen falls within the 

scope of the prior art. Donner argues that the Board erred 

in reaching that conclusion. We agree.

The scope of the prior art includes all analogous art. 

See, e.g., Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, 

Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re GPAC Inc., 

57 F.3d 1573, 1577–78 (Fed. Cir. 1995). “Two separate 

tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether 

the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the 

problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within 

the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference 

still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with 

which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 

381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Whether a reference 

is analogous art is an issue of fact. In re ICON Health & 

Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

It is undisputed that the ’023 patent and Mullen are 

not from the same field of endeavor. Therefore, the only 

question is whether Mullen is reasonably pertinent to one 

or more of the particular problems to which the ’023 patent

relates.

Although the dividing line between reasonable pertinence and less-than-reasonable pertinence is context dependent, it ultimately rests on the extent to which the 

reference of interest and the claimed invention relate to a 

similar problem or purpose. See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock 

Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that

prior art padlocks were analogous art because they “were 

clearly directed toward the same problem the inventor was 

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trying to solve in the” patent at issue); GPAC, 57 F.3d at

1578; In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 659 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (concluding that, where a “reference disclosure has the same 

purpose as the claimed invention, the reference relates to 

the same problem, and that fact supports use of that reference in an obviousness rejection”). Thus, when addressing 

whether a reference is analogous art with respect to a 

claimed invention under a reasonable-pertinence theory, 

the problems to which both relate must be identified and 

compared.

We conclude that the Board erred in its analysis of 

whether Mullen is analogous art. As an initial matter, the 

Board erroneously stated that Donner did “not put forth 

any argument or evidence to explain what would have compelled a pedalboard inventor in 1999 or 2000 to consider 

potential solutions arising from early 1970s-era relay technologies.” Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *9. To the contrary, Donner submitted detailed expert testimony 

relevant to the inquiry. See J.A. 1521. Donner also argued 

in its petition and reply that Mullen was analogous art, 

supporting that argument with expert testimony and evidence from both the ’023 patent and Mullen. E.g., J.A. 88–

91, 104–12, 447–50. Thus, Donner set forth both arguments and evidence that Mullen is analogous art. Given 

the Board’s mistaken assertion to the contrary, it is unclear 

whether the Board meaningfully considered all of Donner’s 

arguments and evidence. 

Moreover, even assuming that the Board did consider 

all relevant arguments and evidence, the Board also failed 

to properly identify and compare the purposes or problems 

to which Mullen and the ’023 patent relate.

For instance, the Board at one point stated that the 

“purpose of the ’023 patent” is “to mount guitar effects on a 

pedal board.” Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *9. But substantial evidence does not support that statement. As the 

’023 patent readily discloses, guitar effects had already 

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been mounted on a pedalboard. ’023 patent col. 1 ll. 56–61. 

Thus, that could not possibly be a relevant purpose of the 

invention. Indeed, with respect to the analogous art inquiry, the relevant purposes of an invention are those relating to solving a problem. See, e.g., Clay, 966 F.2d at 659.

In addition, the Board’s articulation of the purpose of 

or problem to be solved by the ’023 patent is so intertwined 

with the patent’s field of endeavor that it would effectively 

exclude consideration of any references outside that field. 

The problems to which the claimed invention and reference at issue relate must be identified and compared 

from the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in 

the art (“PHOSITA”). See, e.g., Sci. Plastic Prods., Inc. v. 

Biotage AB, 766 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“The 

analogous art inquiry is a factual one, requiring inquiry 

into the similarities of the problems and the closeness of 

the subject matter as viewed by a person of ordinary 

skill.”). Importantly, this analysis must be carried out from 

the vantage point of a PHOSITA who is considering turning to the teachings of references outside her field of endeavor. See Clay, 966 F.2d at 660 (concluding that a 

reference was not reasonably pertinent where a PHOSITA 

“would not reasonably have expected to solve the [relevant] 

problem . . . by considering” that reference). Such a 

PHOSITA—resigned to considering art outside her field of 

endeavor—would thus not identify the problems so narrowly so as to rule out all such art.1 The Board’s 

1 One exception that has been contemplated, but not 

solidified, by our case law is where the problem a reference 

solves is so specific to its particular field of endeavor that a 

PHOSITA could not possibly describe the problem the reference solves other than in a manner that rules out all art 

outside that field. See Sci. Plastic, 766 F.3d at 1360. Neither party contends, nor do we believe, that this is such a 

case. 

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characterization of the problem to which the claimed invention relates effectively collapses the field-of-endeavor and 

reasonable-pertinence inquiries and ignores that the reasonable-pertinence analysis must be carried out through 

the lens of a PHOSITA who is considering turning to art 

outside her field of endeavor.

Later in its decision, the Board mentioned “a problem

with cable routing and placement for effects pedal boards 

in 1999 or 2000.” Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *10. By 

this statement, it is unclear whether the Board attempted 

to articulate a second purpose of or problem addressed by 

the ’023 patent, whether it disavowed its originally articulated purpose, or whether it was merely acknowledging 

Donner’s position on the matter. In any event, the Board 

never meaningfully engaged with this articulation, compared this problem with any problems addressed by Mullen, or otherwise assessed whether Mullen was reasonably 

pertinent to this problem. Furthermore, it is unclear the 

extent to which the Board would have concluded that references outside the ’023 patent’s field of endeavor might 

reasonably pertain to this problem.

Nor did the Board ever identify the problems to which 

Mullen relates. Because the Board failed to identify and 

compare the problems to which the ’023 patent and Mullen 

relate, the Board failed to apply the proper standard.

The remainder of the Board’s analysis does not change 

our conclusion. For example, the Board identified a number of “significant differences between Mullen and the ’023 

patent.” Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *9–10. But a reference can be analogous art with respect to a patent even 

if there are significant differences between the two references. See, e.g., ICON, 496 F.3d at 1380 (concluding that 

“[a]nalogous art to Icon’s application,” which related to “a 

treadmill with a folding mechanism and a means for retaining that mechanism in the folded position,” included 

“any area describing hinges, springs, latches, 

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counterweights, or other similar mechanisms—such as the 

folding bed in” the prior art). Indeed, there will frequently 

be significant differences between a patent and a reference 

from a different field of endeavor. But it does not follow 

that such a reference is, for that reason alone, not reasonably pertinent to one or more problems to which the 

claimed invention relates. Importantly, the Board did not

attempt to explain how the differences it mentioned establish that the references were not directed to solving a similar problem.

The Board also explained that the relevant PHOSITA 

would have a “relatively low level” of skill and would have 

“had a poor understanding of Mullen’s relay technology.” 

Decision, 2019 WL 4020204, at *9–10. While the level of 

skill in the art is certainly relevant to this inquiry and will 

continue to remain relevant on remand, the Board’s findings are, standing alone, insufficient to determine whether 

Mullen is analogous art. The relevant question is whether 

a PHOSITA “would reasonably have consulted” the reference in solving the relevant problem. Heidelberger 

Druckmaschinen AG v. Hantscho Com. Prods., Inc., 21 F.3d 

1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1994). A PHOSITA might reasonably 

choose to consult a reference even if she would not understand every last detail of that reference, so long as she 

would understand the portions of the reference relevant to 

solving her problem well enough to glean useful information.2

2 For example, here Donner need not show that a 

PHOSITA would understand the entirety of Mullen for 

Mullen to qualify as analogous art. Rather, the question is 

whether a PHOSITA would understand the relevant teachings of Mullen—i.e., the improved support structure as depicted in Figures 1 and 4—sufficiently well to use those 

teachings to solve her problem.

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Furthermore, to the extent the Board relied on the differences in age between the ’023 patent and Mullen in concluding that a PHOSITA would not have turned to Mullen, 

the Board did not adequately explain how Mullen’s age relates to the problem Mullen solves or why a PHOSITA 

would not turn to Mullen’s teachings.

Accordingly, we conclude that the Board applied the 

wrong standard when assessing whether Mullen was analogous art. We end this portion of our analysis by noting 

that the Board itself acknowledged that there may be “pertinent similarities” between Mullen and the ’023 patent but 

concluded that those similarities, even if credited, did “not 

establish why [a PHOSITA] would have considered a reference from a different technology and time.” Decision, 2019 

WL 4020204, at *9. To the contrary, if the two references 

have “pertinent similarities” such that Mullen is reasonably pertinent to one or more of the problems to which the 

’023 patent pertains, then Mullen is analogous art.

II

Having concluded that the Board erred, we must now 

decide how to dispose of the appeal. Donner asks us to hold 

in the first instance that Mullen is analogous art because, 

in Donner’s view, substantial evidence supports that conclusion. But, in general, appellate courts can rule on an 

issue of fact in the first instance only where “no reasonable 

fact finder could find otherwise.” Fox Factory, Inc. v. 

SRAM, LLC, 944 F.3d 1366, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Although we conclude that the Board applied the wrong standard and might have failed to analyze certain arguments 

and evidence, we do not further hold that “no reasonable 

fact finder could conclude, under the proper standard,” that 

Mullen is not analogous art. Id. Accordingly, we leave this

factual issue for the Board to resolve on remand. 

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CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we 

vacate and remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to Donner.

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