Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-15-02014/USCOURTS-ca10-15-02014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melanie Milasinovich
Petitioner

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

In re:

MELANIE MILASINOVICH,

Petitioner.

No. 15-2014

(D.C. No. 1:14-CV-00575-MCA-KK)

(D. N.M.)

ORDER

Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, KELLY and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

Pro se petitioner Melanie Milasinovich seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the 

district judge to recuse herself from Ms. Milasinovich’s pending district court case. 

Late last year, we dismissed a mandamus petition as not ripe for review 

because the district judge had not ruled on Ms. Milasinovich’s “Motion for 

Peremptory Challenge to Excuse,” which we construed as a recusal motion. See In re 

Milasinovich, No. 14-2210, at 1 (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 2014) (unpublished order). On 

January 8, 2015, the judge denied the motion. Ms. Milasinovich now has filed a 

number of documents indicating that she wishes to challenge that denial.1

 It is 

unclear from her documents, however, what arguments she wishes to raise. 

 1 Docket No. 140 is the denial order. Docket No. 139, which Ms. Milasinovich 

also identifies, was filed in error and was superseded by No. 140. Ms. Milasinovich 

asserts that No. 140 “lacks necessary particulars to support a valid order,” meaning

“a valid signature and seal.” “Sealed Exhibit B” at 3. But there is nothing to indicate 

that No. 140 is irregular and not a valid court order. 

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

February 17, 2015

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court

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“[M]andamus is an appropriate vehicle by which to challenge a district court’s 

denial of a recusal motion.” Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 350 (10th Cir. 1995) 

(per curiam). “Mandamus is available only upon a showing of a clear and 

indisputable right to relief. A petitioner seeking mandamus relief must demonstrate a 

clear abuse of discretion, or conduct by the district court amounting to a usurpation 

of judicial authority.” Id. (citation omitted). “The test [for recusal under 28 U.S.C. 

§ 455(a)] in this circuit is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant 

facts, would harbor doubts about the judge’s impartiality.” United States v. Cooley, 

1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Nichols, 

71 F.3d at 350-51 (applying Cooley standard in mandamus action). 

In her recusal motion, Ms. Milasinovich complained that the district judge 

often has ruled in favor of banks in property or foreclosure cases removed to federal 

court. She concluded that the judge is prejudiced against her. But allegations 

founded on “[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, [and] 

opinion” ordinarily do not require recusal, nor do “prior rulings in the proceeding, or 

another proceeding, solely because they were adverse.” Cooley, 1 F.3d at 993-94; 

see also Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone 

almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). No reasonable 

person, faced with the allegations in Ms. Milasinovich’s motion, would harbor doubts 

about the district judge’s impartiality. Accordingly, Ms. Milasinovich has failed to 

show a clear and indisputable right to relief. 

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The motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees is 

denied. The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied.

Entered for the Court

ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk

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No. 15-2014, In re Milasinovich

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

This is a frivolous appeal, not deserving a merits discussion. The panel has 

belatedly denied the request to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees, to 

what end I am unsure. Payment of filing and docketing fees is required in every 

case; only prepayment may be excused. Once a merits decision is entered 

prepayment of fees is a moot issue. Full payment of all fees should have been 

required in the first instance. Failing timely payment the appeal should have been 

dismissed for failure to prosecute.

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