Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02346/USCOURTS-ca8-14-02346-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
American Chemistry Council
Appellant
Erco Worldwide
Appellant
PVS Chemicals
Appellant
Soo Line Railroad
Appellee
The Chlorine Institute, Inc.
Appellant
The Fertilizer Institute
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 14-2346

___________________________

The Chlorine Institute, Inc.; The American Chemistry Council; The Fertilizer

Institute; Erco Worldwide; PVS Chemicals

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiffs - Appellants

v.

Soo Line Railroad, doing business as Canadian Pacific Railway Company

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

____________

 Submitted: February 12, 2015

 Filed: July 2, 2015

____________

Before BYE, BEAM, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

____________

BYE, Circuit Judge.

The Chlorine Institute, Inc., the American Chemistry Council, the Fertilizer

Institute, Erco Worldwide, and PVS Chemicals (collectively "Appellants") filed this

suit seeking to enjoin Soo Line Railroad, d/b/a Canadian Pacific Railway Company

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("CP") from imposing a requirement that any toxic inhalation hazard ("TIH")

1

materials transported on CP's railways be transported in normalized steel rail cars.

2

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the district court held the Surface

3

TransportationBoard ("STB") should address whether CP'srequirement isreasonable

in the first instance, denied the request for injunctive relief, and dismissed the suit

without prejudice. We affirm.

I

In 2009, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

("PHMSA") of the Department of Transportation ("DOT")—the agency tasked with

regulating the transportation of hazardousmaterials—finalized extensive amendments

to the regulations for the transportation of TIH materials. See Hazardous Materials:

Improving the Safety of Railroad Tank Car Transportation of Hazardous Materials,

74 Fed. Reg. 1770 (Jan. 13, 2009) (codified in 49 C.F.R. pts. 171-174 & 179). The

regulations included substantial background information regarding the safety issues

concerning the transportation of hazardous materials and prior train derailments

leading to tragic harms.

The amendments explained there was a "need to enhance the crashworthiness

protection of railroad tank cars" because "although rail transportation of hazardous

materials is a safe method for moving large quantities of hazardous materials over

In the industry, "poison inhalation hazard" and "toxic inhalation hazard" are 1

interchangeable terms.

Normalization produces steel with more ductile properties at lower

2

temperatures. As such, non-normalized steel train cars are more prone to brittle

fractures than normalized steel cars at the same temperature.

The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, United States District Judge for the District 3

of Minnesota.

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long distances, rail tank cars used to contain these materials have not been designed

to withstand the force of high-speed derailments and collisions." Id. The

amendments specifically noted several high-profile train derailments involving TIH

materials, including the CP derailment in Minot, North Dakota, in 2002, and

4

explained that the failure of the tank cars in a derailment often leads "to fatalities,

injuries, evacuations, and property and environmental damage." Id. at 1771. As a

result of these incidents and concerns, the PHMSA initiated a strategy to improve the

safety of transporting hazardous materials via rail tank cars by addressing "(1) [t]ank

car design and manufacturing; (2) railroad operational issues such as human factors,

track conditions and maintenance, wayside hazardous detectors, signals and train

control systems; and (3) improved planning and training for emergency response." 

Id. In the proposed regulations, the agency proposed improving "tank-head and shell

puncture-resistance standards" in the following way:

The enhanced standards proposed to require tank carsthat transport PIH

materials in the United States to be designed and manufactured with a

shell puncture-resistance system capable of withstanding impact at 25

mph and with a tank-head puncture resistance system capable of

withstanding impact at 30 mph. To ensure timely replacement of the

PIH tank car fleet, we proposed an eight-year implementation schedule,

contemplating design, development, and manufacturing ramp-up in the

first two years, replacement of 50% of the fleet within the next three

years, and replacement of the remaining 50% of the fleet in the

following three years. As part of thisimplementation plan, we proposed

the expedited replacement oftank cars used for the transportation of PIH

materials manufactured before 1989 with non-normalized steel head or

shell construction.

Id. at 1772-73.

As explained in the amendments, the 2002 derailment in Minot, North Dakota, 4

involved a CP train and resulted "in the catastrophic release of anhydrous ammonia,

leading to one death and 11 serious injuries." 74 Fed. Reg. at 1772.

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Commentators to the proposed regulations, however, expressed numerous

concerns including the feasibility of the existing technology to accomplish the

resistance goals and the proposed eight-year implementation period as

"overly-aggressive and not realistic." Id. at 1773-76. Furthermore, as particularly

relevant to this case, "[w]ith regard to the proposed rule's requirement that all PIH

tank cars constructed of non-normalized steel in the head or shell be replaced within

five years . . . , several commentators note[d] the PIH shipping industry's voluntary

efforts already underway to phase out these tank cars." Id. at 1777. Based on these

concerns, the agency explained it was not going to force the retirement of such cars:

We also are modifying our proposal for phasing out cars constructed

prior to 1989 with non-normalized steel in the head or shell. Although

we continue to believe that an accelerated phase out of these cars is

justified, we recognize the voluntary efforts already underway by many

fleet owners to phase out these cars, in many cases on schedules more

aggressive than the five-year deadline proposed in the NPRM. Rather

than imposing a fixed deadline, this rule requires rail car owners that

elect to retire or remove rail tank cars from PIH service, other than

because of damage to the cars, to prioritize the retirement or removal of

pre-1989 non-normalized steel cars.

Id. at 1777-78. In other words, the rule "does not implement the proposed expedited

replacement requirementfor PIH tank cars" but instead "requires that tank car owners

prioritize retirement or replacement of pre-1989 non-normalized steel cars when

retiring or removing cars from PIH materials service." Id. at 1785 (emphasis added). 

However, the PHMSA recognized, in passing the regulations, that "the standards set

forth . . . shall apply . . . pending the development and commercialization of more

stringent performance standards." Id. at 1771 (emphasis added).

On April 14, 2014, CP put into effect its Item 55 of Tariff 8 which requires TIH

materials transported on CP's railways to be shipped in normalized steel tank cars. 

The change was intended to increase safety and reduce the likelihood of a TIH

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materials spill in the event of a derailment. An executive from CP provided an

affidavit explaining the potential drastic consequences of a TIH spill and CP's

business reasons for pursuing a safer method of transport. The affidavit cites the

derailment in Minot and explains that it was one of the driving forces behind the

change.

After receiving notice about CP's intended requirement, Appellants filed this

suit and brought claims against CP under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act

("HMTA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128, and under 49 U.S.C. § 11101, which codifies

the common-carrier obligations for rail carriers. The next day, Appellants filed a

motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 27, 2014, after a hearing on the

merits of the motion, the district court issued its order holding, under the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction, the STB should address the raised issue in the first instance,

dismissing the suit without prejudice, and denying the request for injunctive relief

after balancing the relevant factors.

II

On appeal, Appellants argue (1) there was no reason to defer to the expertise

of the STB under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction because the question of whether

CP has impermissibly expanded on the regulations promulgated by the DOT is a legal

question; (2) even if the district court properly applied the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction, itshould have stayed the action rather than dismiss it; and (3) the district

court erred in denying the preliminary injunction, even if the matter is referred to the

STB. We address each issue in turn.

A

Before addressing the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, we

must first consider our standard for reviewing a district court order applying the

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doctrine. There appearsto be disagreement between our sister courts on whether such

review is de novo or for an abuse of discretion, with the majority applying a

deferential standard. Compare Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis Inc., 592 F. App'x 131,

133 (3d Cir. 2014); Envtl. Tech. Council v. Sierra Club, 98 F.3d 774, 789 (4th Cir.

1996); Wagner & Brown v. ANR Pipeline Co., 837 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1988);

Reid v. Johnson & Johnson, 780 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2015); S. Utah Wilderness

Alliance v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 425 F.3d 735, 750 (10th Cir. 2005); Boyes v.

Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d 1260, 1266 n.13 (11th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Tel. Coop.

Ass'n v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 244 F.3d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 2001), with Ellis v.

Tribune Television Co., 443 F.3d 71, 83 n.14 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Consol. Rail

Corp. v. Grand Trunk W. R.R Co., No. 13-2269, 2015 WL 1727306, at *5 (6th Cir.

Apr. 15, 2015).

On two prior occasions we avoided deciding the issue. See Access Telecomms.

v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1998) ("Without deciding the

standard-of-review question, . . . we accept the parties' invitation to review the

primary jurisdiction issue de novo."); DeBruce Grain, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,

149 F.3d 787, 790 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) ("This court has not definitively stated the

standard of review for the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Since

the district court can be affirmed under de novo review, it is not necessary to consider

the possible application of the clearly erroneous standard." (internal citation

omitted)). In a subsequent decision, we stated "[t]his court appears to review primary

jurisdiction de novo" but gave no analysis and made no express holding on the proper

standard for review. United States v. Henderson, 416 F.3d 686, 691 (8th Cir. 2005)

(emphasis added). In a more recent decision, we reviewed the issue of primary

jurisdiction de novo but once again provided no analysis on the issue and made no

reference to the disagreement among our sister courts. See United States v. Rice, 605

F.3d 473, 475 (8th Cir. 2010). Because the district court in Rice never had the

opportunity to address the question of primary jurisdiction, and we found the doctrine

to be inapplicable to that specific criminal case, we did not address the government's

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argument that the issue should be reviewed for plain error. Appellants argue that

Rice resolved the issue and controls here. We do not believe the Court in Rice

intended to resolve a two-decade old circuit split without any analysis or without

addressing this Court's prior hesitation to do so on two occasions. We think the better

reading of the statement in Rice is that the Court simply reviewed the issue in that

specific case de novo (it could not have done otherwise). Since we believe the district

court in this case reached the correct conclusion even under a de novo review, we

need not now decide the standard of review issue.

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to claims "properly cognizable in

court that contain some issue within the special competence of an administrative

agency." Reiter v. Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993). "Under the doctrine of primary

jurisdiction a court may leave an issue for agency determination when it involves the

special expertise of the agency and would impact the uniformity of the regulated

field." DeBruce Grain, 149 F.3d at 789. "No fixed formula exists for applying the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In every case the question is whether the reasons for

the existence of the doctrine are present and whether the purposes it serves will be

aided by its application in the particular litigation." United States v. W. Pac. R.R.

Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).

5

Appellants argue CP cannot, as a matter of law, override the requirements set

forth by the PHMSA, which is a question of law that does not raise any issue within

the STB's special expertise. They believe "[t]he DOT has exclusive jurisdiction

regarding the specifications of the design, materials and construction of rail tank cars

used to transport all hazardous materials in commerce." As such, "no circumstances

exist that would allow the STB to overrule the DOT's edict that TIH materials can be

Neither party disputes both the district court and the STB have jurisdiction to 5

address Appellants' § 11101 claim. See Pejepscot Indus. Park, Inc. v. Me. Cent. R.R.

Co., 215 F.3d 195, 197 (1st Cir. 2000).

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transported in non-normalized steel rail cars safely and securely." According to

Appellants, "[t]o permit otherwise would allow the STB to collaterally attack the

DOT's exclusive jurisdiction and subject the DOT regulationsto an STB veto power." 

The district court correctly found Appellants' arguments lacking.

Generally, a railway carrier is required to provide transport upon a reasonable

request. See 49 U.S.C. § 11101(a) ("A rail carrier providing transportation orservice

subject to the jurisdiction of the Board under this part shall provide the transportation

or service on reasonable request."). As such, a railway carrier cannot outright refuse

to transport TIH materials. See Riffin v. Surface Transp. Bd., 733 F.3d 340, 346-48

(D.C. Cir. 2013); see also Radioactive Materials, M.-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co., 357

I.C.C. 458, 464 (1977) ("Moreover, a carrier may not assert before this Commission

that, as a general proposition, shipments meeting DOT and NRC requirements are too

hazardous to transport. Such an assertion would amount to a collateral attack on the

regulations of DOT and NRC. Any attacks on the regulations of DOT or NRC should

be brought before those agencies." (citation omitted)). The question presented in this

case, however, is not whether a carrier may refuse to transport TIH materials outright,

but whether it may require criteria beyond those stated in the DOT regulations.

Although we have not had occasion to address this issue, two of our sister

courts have concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC")—the

predecessor agency to the STB —has authority to review the imposition of 6

requirements by carriers and railroads beyond those promulgated by the DOT in its

regulations. In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 646

F.2d 642, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1981), the court held the ICC had the authority and

jurisdiction to review the railroads' imposition of additional rates for the

"In 1995, Congress enacted the ICC Termination Act (ICCTA), which 6

abolished the 108-year-old Interstate Commerce Commission and substantially

deregulated the rail and motor carrier industries." Pejepscot Indus., 215 F.3d at 197. 

"In the ICC's place, the ICCTA established the [STB] within the [DOT]." Id.

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transportation of radioactive materials. In that case, the railroads sought to impose

additional tariffs premised on the use of "special train service" ("STS") for the

transportation of the dangerous materials. Id. at 644-45. The ICC held the tariffs

were "unreasonably high" because the railroads failed to show the use of special

trains was reasonable: "based on the evidence at hand, the special train requirement

is wasteful transportation and an unreasonable practice in violation of Section

10701(a) of the act." Id. at 645. In affirming the ICC, the court considered and

addressed the varying argumentsregarding the scope of the railroad, the ICC, and the

DOT's authority and jurisdiction to impose regulations and requirements for the

transportation of such materials. The railroads argued the ICC "lack[ed] authority to

second-guess the railroads' 'rational judgment' on an 'operational' issue such as the

need for STS." Id. at 646. The shippers argued the DOT had exclusive jurisdiction

over the issue. Id. The ICC argued it "properly considered all available safety

evidence to determine whether tariffs covering the cost of STS were reasonable." Id. 

The court explained that the ICC should "defer[] to the expertise and primary

jurisdiction of the [Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)] and DOT both in

determining which particular measures are reasonably required to produce the

necessary level of safety, and in deciding whether any particular safety measure will

likely produce benefits commensurate with its cost . . ." but nevertheless held the

"railroads may indeed seek to prove the reasonableness of additional safety

measures." Id. at 650 (emphasis added). The court found the "safety regulations

promulgated by DOT and NRC are entitled to be considered by the ICC as

embodying prima facie the appropriate balance between safety and nuclear

development," but did not exclude the possibility the railroads could satisfy their

burden of showing the additional requirements were reasonable. Id. at 651.

The Sixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion: a carrier "cannot refuse to haul

any materials which meet (DOT and NRC) standards, but it may seek approval of a

stricter practice which is shown to be just and reasonable." Akron, Canton &

YoungstownR.R. Co. v. Interstate CommerceComm'n, 611 F.2d 1162, 1169 (6thCir.

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1979) (emphasis added). "[W]hile DOT and NRC have exclusive authority to

promulgate Industry-wide standards for the carriage ofradioactive materials, the ICC

may allow Individual carriersto make more (but not less) stringent rules for their own

carriage of hazardous materials." Id. at 1170. The STB has also suggested carriers

may impose additional requirements. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co.–Petition for

Declaratory Order, STB Fin. Docket No. 35219, 2009 WL 1630587, at *2 (S.T.B.

June 11, 2009) ("[C]arriers are not precluded from seeking imposition of stricter

safety standards . . . .").

Appellants have not cited us to any authority supporting their position and fail

to meaningfully distinguish the prior case law. Their reliance on Louisville &

Nashville Railroad Co. v. F.W. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U.S. 70 (1912) is entirely

misplaced. In Louisville, the Supreme Court held the question of whether a railroad

could refuse to transport intoxicating liquors, which were prohibited by state law, did

not need to be presented to the ICC because there were no questions of fact to decide. 

Id. at 84. However, the Court was merely analyzing the legal question of whether a

railroad could outright refuse (not reasonably limit) its transportation obligations

pursuant to federal law based on a state law. Id. at 82. Furthermore, the Court

specifically distinguished the case from one that would involve "the reasonableness

of a rate[, which] . . . is primarily [a question] of administrative character, and the

propriety of a prior resort to the Commission to obtain a ruling upon the question of

reasonableness." Id. at 84. Here, we do not deal with an outright refusal to transport

or with issues of competing state and federal regulations. While we recognize

Appellants' argument that the STB's decision on this issue may have an impact on

uniformity between railway carriers, the concern is better raised to the STB. 

Accordingly, we find the STB has the authority and jurisdiction to consider whether

a carrier may impose a reasonable requirement beyond the minimum regulations set

by the PHMSA.

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Since we find CP's restrictions are not barred as a matter of law, we consider

whether the question of reasonableness of the restrictionsshould be addressed by the

district court or the STB. We believe the STB is better positioned to address the

issue.

Determining whether any given transportation request is "reasonable" is no

easy task. "Congress did not further elucidate the requisites of the common carrier

obligations, leaving to the Commission and the courts the task of clarifying, on a

case-by-case basis, a more precise definition of 'reasonable request' . . . ." Nat'l Grain

& Feed Ass'n v. United States, 5 F.3d 306, 310 (8th Cir. 1993). Determining whether

a request is reasonable is a complex, fact-intensive inquiry that requires knowledge

and consideration of the industry at issue. The task is usually best left to the

STB—the agencymost experienced in evaluating the particular circumstances of each

case. See Granite State Concrete Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 417 F.3d 85, 92 (1st Cir.

2005) ("The STB has been given broad discretion to conduct case-by-case factspecific inquiries to give meaning to these terms, which are not self-defining, in the

wide variety of factual circumstances encountered."). And in other cases where the

central issue was reasonableness, this Court and others have applied the doctrine of

primary jurisdiction to defer claims to the STB. See, e.g., DeBruce Grain, 149 F.3d

at 789-90 ("The question of the reasonableness of a railroad's response to a shortage

of cars [was] . . . one best left for agency resolution due to the need for specialized

expertise and uniform national treatment."); Pejepscot Indus., 215 F.3d at 205

(holding referral to the STB under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was

appropriate for a claim that the defendants unlawfully refused to provide service on

reasonable request).

The decisions discussed above not only demonstrate that the STB can consider

requirements beyond the DOT regulations but also that the STB will usually be best

equipped to determine if such additional requirements are "reasonable." Like the

ICC, "promoting safe rail transportation is one of the [STB's] statutory

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responsibilities." Consol. Rail Corp., 646 F.2d at 648. No one would dispute that

"[t]he railroads have a responsibility to protect their employees, their property and the

public from harmful radiation" or other potentially toxic materials. Id. (quoting the

ICC). It is the PHMSA's responsibility to balance the safety and economic concerns

in the railroad industry and promulgate applicable regulations. When it comes to

determining if any requirements beyond those regulations are reasonable, the STB,

with its expertise in the industry, is better equipped than federal courts to address

fact-intensive questions of whether a particular safety requirement beyond the

regulations is consistent with the regulations and national policy.

Determining the issue in this case will likely involve consideration of the

benefits offered by the requirement, the impact it will have on the industry, and the

technical comparison between normalized and non-normalized steel cars. Given the

complex economic and technical concerns raised by the entities objecting to the

requirement of normalized steel cars in the consideration of the regulations, referral

of this issue to the STB is appropriate. See id. at 650 ("The ICC therefore properly

defers to the expertise and primary jurisdiction of the NRC and DOT both in

determining which particular measures are reasonably required to produce the

necessary level of safety, and in deciding whether any particular safety measure will

likely produce benefits commensurate with its cost and will be economical."

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted)); Akron, 611 F.2d at 1170 ("[T]he ICC may

allow Individual carriers to make more (but not less) stringent rules for their own

carriage of hazardous materials." (emphasis added)). Additionally, unlike the district

7

Appellants filed an unopposed motion to supplement the record before this 7

Court with the petition (a matter of public record) by the Association of American

Railroads to the PHMSA to mandate the phase out of non-normalized steel train cars

for transporting TIH materials by no later than December 31, 2016. Appellants'

motion is granted. We have considered the petition, which asserts that transporting

TIH materials in non-normalized steel cars "poses an unnecessary risk to the general

public" and that many shippers have already voluntarily retired such cars. Its detailed

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court, the STB can solicit comments from all interested parties and the DOT to

address the issue from a more uniform perspective rather than merely the dispute

between the parties in this case. Moreover, a resolution by the STB would promote

uniformity in the question of "reasonableness" rather than the potential of separate

district courts reaching inconsistent resolutions in each individual case.

As in DeBruce Grain, "[a]ssessing the reasonableness. . . [of the requirements]

in this case . . . would involve issues related to national rail policy, and a judicial

ruling could affect rail transportation throughout the country." 149 F.3d at 789. The

analysis will require "'an informed evaluation of the economics [and] technology of

the regulated industry,' which supports the invocation of primary jurisdiction." Id.

(quoting Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 305 (1976)). Therefore, we

find the district court correctly applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and

appropriately referred the issue to the STB.

B

Once a district court decides to refer an issue or claim to an administrative

agency under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it may either dismiss or stay the

action. We review its decision on the issue for an abuse of discretion. See Reiter,

507 U.S. at 268-69 (holding district court has discretion "either to retain jurisdiction

or . . . to dismiss the case"). Appellants offer nothing beyond conclusory arguments

and fall far short of demonstrating the without-prejudice dismissal was an abuse of

discretion.

discussion of the capabilities and differences between normalized and nonnormalized steel cars further reaffirms the complexity and technical nature of the

question before the Court.

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We believe the district court properly dismissed the action without prejudice. 

Staying the matter may have been appropriate if the district court was referring only

a specific factual question to the expertise of the STB that was part of a claim, which

would ultimately be decided by the district court. In this instance, the STB's

resolution of the referred issue will likely dispose of the entire case. Moreover,

Appellants offer no reason why they have suffered any prejudice based on the

dismissal. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the

action without prejudice. See DeBruce Grain, 149 F.3d at 790 (finding "[d]ismissal

without prejudice was appropriate since it did not disadvantage DeBruce" and the

STB's decision could be appealed to this Court).

C

In considering the denial of a motion for a temporary restraining order and

preliminary injunction, we "review the district court's factual findings for clear error,

its legal conclusions de novo, and its exercise of equitable judgment for abuse of

discretion." Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown's, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 316 (8th Cir.

2009). "An abuse of discretion occurs where the district court fails to consider an

important factor, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or

commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors." Id.

Appellants argue that even if the issue should be resolved by the STB rather

than the district court, the district court erred in not granting injunctive relief to

prohibit CP from imposing its requirement until after the STB has decided the issue.

In considering whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the district court must

consider four factors: "(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state

of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will

inflict on other parties []; (3) the probability that [the] movant will succeed on the

merits; and (4) the public interest." Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d

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109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). "The burden is on the movant to establish the

need for a preliminary injunction . . . ." DISH Network Serv. L.L.C. v. Laducer, 725

F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). We find no error

in the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction.

1 – Likelihood of Success

The primary argument for success advanced by Appellants is that CP cannot

impose requirements beyond the regulations promulgated by the DOT. Because we

have already rejected this argument, we consider whether Appellants are likely to

convince the STB the requirement CP seeks to impose is unreasonable.

The presumption that the DOT has appropriately balanced the safety and

economic policy reasons in promulgating adequate regulations favors Appellants. 

See Consol. Rail Corp., 646 F.2d at 652 ("[T]he safety regulations promulgated by

DOT and NRC are entitled to be considered by the ICC as embodying prima facie the

appropriate balance between safety and nuclear development."). CP may rebut the

presumption, for example, by showing

DOT and NRC did not intend to establish comprehensive regulations to

assure safe transportation of radioactive materials, but rather hoped that

other agencies or private industry would substantially supplement their

regulations; or else it might be shown that the regulations were drafted

without any knowledge of the [relevant requirement]; or that the

railroads lacked any meaningful opportunity to present the [relevant

requirement] to DOT or NRC; or that some unusual or special

conditions. . . made imposition of [the relevant requirement] reasonable

in their case.

Id. at 651. Here, the change of the PHMSA's position between the proposed and

promulgated rules in 2009 suggests that the agency may have intended to apply the

regulations as the minimum for safety standards. CP argues that several indications

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support such an inference. For instance, the agency repeatedly explained in its notice

that it "continue[d] to believe that an accelerated phase out of these cars is justified,"

demonstrating it still believed there were safety reasons to require normalized steel

cars. Moreover, it specifically noted "the voluntary efforts already underway by

many fleet owners to phase out these cars, in many cases on schedules more

aggressive than the five-year deadline proposed in the NPRM" as evidence for not

mandating but merely prioritizing the retirement of such cars. Thus, CP asserts the

agency continued to believe normalized steel cars were safer but found it unnecessary

to impose stringent time lines since it appeared that the industry was voluntarily

moving in that direction. These are at least plausible reasons to rebut the prima facie

balance.

At this time, on the record before us, it is difficult to make an accurate

prediction on the likely outcome before the STB. Indeed, this is precisely why

referral to the STB was appropriate. For all of the reasons already discussed above,

thistask is best determined by the STB based on its expertise. Therefore, we find this

factor does not favor either side.

2 – Threat of Irreparable Harm

"Irreparable harmoccurs when a party has no adequate remedy at law, typically

because its injuries cannot be fully compensated through an award of damages." Gen.

Motors, 563 F.3d at 319. "[L]oss of consumer goodwill can be irreparable harm," id.,

however, "[e]conomic loss, on its own, is not an irreparable injury so long as the

losses can be recovered." DISH Network, 725 F.3d at 882. "[T]he absence of

irreparable injury is by itself sufficient to defeat a motion for a preliminary

injunction." Id.

Appellants argue they would suffer irreparable harm if required to ship TIH

materials in normalized steel cars because they "will be forced to forego transporting

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their product and receivers will be prevented from obtaining those products." 

Condensed, their argument is that the requirement will cease the shipment of TIH

materials. But the only shipper who provided record evidence stated that only 31 of

its 100 leased cars will not meet the requirement. Thus, at least sixty-nine percent of

business for this shipper should remain unchanged. Appellants also submitted an

affidavit estimating that twenty-one percent of the chlorine train cars in North

America—responsible for twenty percent of chlorine shipments in North

America—are non-normalized steel cars. This is a far cry from their assertion that no

one will ship any products or that they will become unavailable. Additionally, CP

introduced evidence that "approximately 95% of the TIH-lading cars on CP'srailroad

were constructed after 1989"—such that they would be made of normalized

steel—and that "in the last five years, the amount of TIH lading moved by rail has

decreased by 17%."

The district court found Appellants offered "remarkably little evidence" that

the requirement would make it impossible to move TIH materials through the rail. 

Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., No. 14-CV-1029 (PJS/SER), 2014 WL

2195180, at *6 (D. Minn. May 27, 2014). It noted Appellants failed to explain why

they could not obtain a sufficient supply of normalized steel cars, particularly since

these have been the standard since 1989 and should have been gradually replacing

older cars, as dictated in the 2009 regulations. Id. The court also discredited their

arguments because they failed to "give any indication that they have even attempted

to find alternative ways to meet their needs for normalized-steel cars, much less

explained their efforts and their success or lack of success." Id. In summary,

Appellants failed to introduce sufficient probative evidence that they could not

overcome any effective reduction in the eligible fleet by obtaining other tank carsthat

meet the requirement or shipping the cargo through other means. Moreover, we do

not find record evidence that the shippers were at full capacity and using all of their

fleet all the time. As such, even a reduced number of cars may be able to fully

accommodate their shipping needs. Even assuming, however, that the shippers were

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using all available train cars at all times, the evidence showed the reduction would not

be particularly significant and the cargo could be moved by alternative means.

Appellants' assertion that "[a] rail car shortage . . . will inevitably result sooner

rather than later" is too speculative. See, e.g., Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson,

725 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013) ("In order to demonstrate irreparable harm, a party

must show that the harm is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a

clear and present need for equitable relief." (internal quotation marks omitted));

S.J.W. ex rel Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir.

2012) ("Speculative harm does not support a preliminary injunction."). Merely

demonstrating the "possibility of harm" is not enough. See Roudachevski v. AllAmerican Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 (8th Cir. 2011). Appellants also assert

that if CP is permitted to enforce this requirement, other railways may adopt it as

well; but even if true, Appellants have failed to show it would result in irreparable

harm. Finally, the district court properly recognized that any increase in costs or

reduction in business as a result of requiring normalized steel cars would simply be

compensable economic harm and does not constitute irreparable harm.

Accordingly, we find no likelihood of irreparable harm and this factor favors

the denial of an injunction.

3 – Balance of Harms and Public Interest

Appellants argue CP is unlikely to suffer any harm if the injunction is granted

because it merely returns the parties to their status quo prior to the effective date of

the Tariff. However, they ignore the prior significant and devastating train

derailments that have continued to occur in the past decade which initially prompted

the discussions of mandating, more than six years ago, what CP now seeks to require. 

Requiring CP to transport TIH materials on its railways in contravention to a safety

measure it voluntarily imposed, believing it to be necessary, could result in

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devastating harm to both CP and the public should there be another derailment. CP

and the public both have interests in minimizing the risk and catastrophic effect of

any potential derailments by providing for the safest possible transport of TIH

materials. Since we do not agree with Appellants that CP's requirement would

amount to a national crisis for an adequate water supply or fertilizer for crops, any

minimum reduction in the ability to transport TIH materials by rail does not outweigh

the real concerns which prompted CP to implement the requirement.

We find these two factors also favor denying injunctive relief. Accordingly,

we hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants' request

for injunctive relief.

III

For the reasons above, the district court's order is affirmed in all respects.

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