Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03074/USCOURTS-caDC-11-03074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Melvin Taplet Jr.
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 10, 2014 Decided January 20, 2015

No. 11-3074

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MELVIN TAPLET, JR.,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:08-cr-00338)

Allen H. Orenberg argued the cause for appellants. 

John Cummings, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the 

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C. 

Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Suzanne 

G. Curt, and Anthony Scarpelli, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: BROWN, Circuit Judge; WILLIAMS and 

GINSBURG, Senior Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.

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BROWN, Circuit Judge. Melvin Taplet Jr. was convicted 

of soliciting murder for hire using interstate commerce 

facilities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958. We affirm.

I

A

Danielle Buck did what most good friends do. When her 

friend and neighbor, Kimberly McLaughlin, began a romantic

liaison with Taplet and allowed him to move in, Buck noticed 

unhealthy changes in her friend’s demeanor. She encouraged 

her to end the relationship. 

Her friend listened. But while the relationship ended, 

Taplet’s rage toward Buck festered and grew. In August 2008, 

Taplet told his troubles to Jerome Thomas, a stranger he met

at a truck stop. Taplet explained how his relationship with

Buck’s friend had soured due to Buck’s interference, and how 

he wished he could “have something seriously done to her.”

Rather than brushing it off as bluster, Thomas responded that 

he could “take care” of Buck for $7,000 to $10,000. Taplet

was receptive and gave Thomas his cell phone number.

Unbeknown to Taplet, Thomas worked as a paid informant 

for the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). 

Taplet and Thomas discussed the murder-for-hire over 

the phone and in person. At one meeting, Taplet reaffirmed 

his desire to have Buck killed and provided Thomas with a 

piece of paper showing McLaughlin’s address in Maine, an 

apartment directly across the hall from Ms. Buck’s, and 

including the notation “Danielle.” A few days later, Thomas 

called Taplet’s cell phone and set up a meeting at a truck stop 

in Elkton, Maryland, where Taplet provided the name of a 

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secluded town near the Canadian border where Thomas could 

kill Buck and dispose of her body. He also provided a photo 

of Buck. 

Thomas, claiming to be a drug dealer, asked Taplet to

weld a hidden compartment into a car as partial payment for 

the murder-for-hire. Taplet met Thomas in Maryland. 

Following Thomas’s instructions, Taplet drove to the parking 

lot of Robert F. Kennedy Stadium in Washington, D.C., 

where ICE Special Agent Tony Rodriquez, posing as 

Thomas’s hitman partner, joined them. Taplet could not 

successfully complete the welding project in the parking lot, 

but the three of them still agreed Thomas and Rodriquez 

would murder Buck in exchange for future payment, while 

Taplet—needing an airtight alibi—was at work in West 

Virginia.

B

On February 3, 2009, the district court arraigned Taplet 

on one count of murder-for-hire. Three times prior to trial, 

Taplet moved to dismiss the indictment on Speedy Trial Act 

(“STA” or “Act”) grounds. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3161. 

Taplet, however, did not seek to dismiss the indictment on 

constitutional grounds. The district court denied Taplet’s 

speedy trial motions, and his trial began on February 14, 

2011.

Taplet moved for acquittal contending there was 

insufficient evidence of the interstate commerce requirement 

because the government had manufactured jurisdiction. Taplet 

also requested a special jury instruction on manufactured 

jurisdiction. The district court denied both and the jury found 

Taplet guilty.

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The district court determined Taplet’s recommended 

Sentencing Guideline range was 262 to 327 months, and then 

sentenced Taplet to ten years in prison, the statutory 

maximum for a murder-for-hire offense.

II

Taplet aims several animadversions at his conviction and 

sentence but only one comes close to hitting the mark: his 

claim under the Speedy Trial Act. The Court reviews a 

challenge under the STA de novo on questions of law and for 

clear error on questions of fact. See United States v. Rice, 746 

F.3d 1074, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

The Act establishes a general rule: if a court does not 

bring a defendant to trial within seventy days after indictment 

or arraignment, the court “shall” dismiss the indictment on 

“motion of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2). The Act, 

however, “exclude[s]” from its seventy-day limit certain 

periods of pretrial delay. Id. § 3161(h). The time a trial court 

takes to decide a “pretrial motion,” for example, does not 

count toward the seventy-day limit. Id. § 3161(h)(1)(D). If the 

court holds a hearing on a motion, the Act excludes the time 

between the filing of the motion and the conclusion of the 

hearing. United States v. Van Smith, 530 F.3d 967, 969 (D.C. 

Cir. 2008).

Not all motions filed pretrial count as a “pretrial motion” 

under the Act. In a series of cases, we have held that 

government evidentiary filings that invoke Federal Rules of 

Evidence 404(b) and 609, even if styled as “motions,” do not 

qualify as pretrial motions. E.g., United States v. Marshall, 

669 F.3d 288, 294–95 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that 

government’s motion to admit evidence of other crimes under 

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) was not a pretrial motion);

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Van Smith, 530 F.3d at 970–71 (holding that the 

government’s Federal Rule of Evidence 609 notice was not a 

pretrial motion); United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 444 

(D.C. Cir. 2007) (same). By contrast, when a defendant files 

an opposition to the government’s evidentiary filing, it counts 

as a pretrial motion. See Harris, 491 F.3d at 444.

Taplet’s STA clock began when he was arraigned on 

February 3, 2009. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). His trial did 

not begin until February 14, 2011. The question is whether 

seventy days of non-excludable time passed between those 

dates.

A

Two time periods were not excludable. The first ran 

from February 3, 2009 to March 25, 2009. The district court 

did not toll this time under any STA provision, and the 

government concedes that these fifty days were nonexcludable.

1 The second non-excludable period ran from 

September 11, 2009, when the government filed motions to 

admit evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 

609, until September 25, 2009, when Taplet opposed those 

motions. The government concedes, as it must, that the 

fourteen days after it filed its evidentiary motion were nonexcludable. See Harris, 491 F.3d at 444; Marshall, 669 F.3d 

at 294-95. Because the government conceded sixty-four days 

of non-excludable time at the outset, Taplet can establish a 

 1 Although the government “agree[d]” that this time period was 

non-excludable, it nevertheless argued that Taplet waived a portion 

of it because he failed to argue the period from February 3, 2009 to 

March 3, 2009 was excludable before the district court. See Brief 

for Appellee at 26, United States v. Taplet, No. 11-3074 (D.C. Cir. 

Mar. 12, 2014). We address the issue of waiver in Section II.C. 

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violation of the STA if he shows six additional days of nonexcludable time. But, the task is easier said than done.

B

Taplet contends both the ninety-three days between 

October 26, 2009 and January 27, 2010, and the twelve days

between May 14 and May 25, 2010, were non-excludable. As 

to the first, Taplet filed an opposition to the government’s 

motion to admit evidence on September 25, 2009, and the 

court held a hearing to decide the motion on May 18, 2010. 

The ninety-three days do not count against the speedy trial 

clock because the Act excludes the time “from the filing of 

the motion through the conclusion of the hearing” on the 

motion. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D); see Rice, 746 F.3d at 

1080. The second period from May 18th to 24th were 

excludable because Taplet filed a reconsideration motion on 

May 18, 2010, and the court denied that motion without a 

hearing on May 24, 2010. When a district court decides a 

pretrial motion without holding a hearing, up to thirty days 

may be excluded after the court receives the materials 

necessary to decide the motion. See 18 U.S.C. § 

3161(h)(1)(H) (providing for the exclusion of “delay 

reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty 

days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant 

is actually under advisement by the court”); Van Smith, 530 

F.3d at 969. Finally, May 25, 2010, is excludable because 

Taplet filed a motion to continue the trial on May 24, which 

the court granted after a hearing on May 25. See 18 U.S.C. §

3161(h)(1)(D). 

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C

Taplet further contends the twenty-eight days from 

January 18, 2011 to February 14, 2011 were non-excludable.2

But it is unclear whether Taplet can seek review of his STA 

claim if he failed to make proper and timely objections. 

In his first motion to dismiss, Taplet failed to allege that 

the twenty-eight days from February 3, 2009 to March 3, 

2009 were non-excludable. And although Taplet raised three 

separate STA objections, he failed to renew a motion to 

dismiss after January 18, 2011, thus failing to object to the 

twenty-eight-day continuance from January 18 to February 

14, 2011. The government argues that, on the basis of 18 

U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2), Taplet’s failure to properly identify and 

timely object constitutes a complete waiver of the STA’s 

protections. If, however, forfeiture rather than waiver applies, 

Taplet could at least seek plain error review.

We have not previously addressed whether a defendant’s 

failure to raise a particular period of non-excludable time in a 

motion to dismiss amounts to waiver or forfeiture. See United 

States v. Taylor, 497 F.3d 673, 676 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2007) 

(acknowledging the issue but declining to address it); 

Marshall, 669 F.3d at 295 (applying plain error review on a 

STA ineffective assistance of counsel claim without 

discussing any potential waiver). Section 3162(a)(2) states 

that the “[f]ailure of the defendant to move for dismissal prior 

 2 The government insists the time period between January 18 and 

February 14, 2011 was excludable because it filed a motion in 

limine to permit jurors to use transcripts of undercover recordings 

during its deliberations, and this motion was pending until the court 

decided it at trial. Because we find this time period waived, there is 

no need to address whether it was excludable.

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to trial ... shall constitute a waiver of the right to dismissal 

under this section.” But has a defendant who otherwise moves 

for dismissal without renewing prior STA claims failed to 

“move for dismissal prior to trial?” Has he relinquished the 

ability to challenge that particular time period on appeal?3

Recent precedent from three circuits suggests that the 

failure to raise specific non-excludable time periods in a 

motion to dismiss constitutes waiver. See United States v. 

Loughrin, 710 F.3d 1111, 1120–21 (10th Cir.) cert. granted

on different question, 134 S. Ct. 822 (2013), and aff’d, 134 S. 

Ct. 2384 (2014) (holding that waiver rather than forfeiture 

applies); United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir.) 

cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 264 (2013) (“To avoid a finding of 

waiver, therefore, a defendant must raise any potential STA 

violations before the district court in a motion to dismiss.”); 

United States v. O’Connor, 656 F.3d 630, 637-38 (7th Cir. 

2011) (suggesting waiver but ultimately applying plain error 

review). These circuits reasoned that since “spotting” STA 

violations is a role assigned to defendants, “it follows that any 

specific violation not raised in a motion to dismiss is waived.” 

O’Connor, 656 F.3d at 638 (citing Zedner v. United States, 

547 U.S. 489, 502–03 (2006)). Waiver, they concluded, was 

also appropriate for policy reasons, noting that plain error 

review “would force the court on a motion to dismiss for STA 

violation to consider every conceivable basis for challenging 

its orders of continuance and exclusions of time, for fear that 

 3 The legislative history largely repeats the statutory language and 

is agnostic on the particular question before us: “[a] defendant must 

move to dismiss the case prior to trial, entry of a plea of guilty or 

nolo contendere, or he waives the right of dismissal with prejudice 

on grounds that the requirements of this legislation were not met.” 

H.R. REP. NO. 93-1508, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7401, 

7416.

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the defendant would raise new arguments on appeal.” 

Loughrin, 710 F.3d at 1121.

On the other hand, finding waiver where the statute is 

less than explicit upsets the general rule of forfeiture 

employed in criminal cases. See United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 733–34 (1993) (explaining that errors affecting 

substantial rights may be considered even though they were 

not brought to the district court’s attention). It is certainly true 

that the Act puts the onus on the defendant to come forward 

with a STA challenge. But the same is true of most criminal 

rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions under our 

adversarial system. And waiver is rarely assumed absent an 

express colloquy or conduct so unequivocal its import could 

not be mistaken. Forfeiture is the normal rule. See FED. R.

CRIM. P. 52(b); United States v. Greer, 527 F. App’x 225, 229 

(3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, judgment vacated on other 

grounds, 134 S. Ct. 1875 (2014). 

We think there are good reasons to find waiver where a 

defendant has failed to identify particular exclusions of time 

or failed to renew an STA objection. To begin with, Section 

3162(a)(2) states that a “[f]ailure of the defendant to move for 

dismissal prior to trial” constitutes waiver. Implicit in the 

requirement that a defendant “move for dismissal” is the 

requirement that the defendant specify the reason for the

motion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 47(b) (“A motion must state the 

grounds on which it is based.”). When a defendant fails to 

specify the particular exclusions of time within his or her 

motion to dismiss, the defendant has failed to move for 

dismissal on that ground. And when a defendant fails to 

renew an objection after a period of non-excludable time has 

passed, the defendant has, in effect, not moved for dismissal 

at all. 

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By requiring defendants to notify district courts of any 

potential exclusions of time within their motions to dismiss

and requiring them to renew their motions, waiver also 

prevents “undue defense gamesmanship,” Zedner, 547 U.S. at 

502-03. The STA is different from most rights in that a 

meritorious STA claim, in theory, could often meet plain error 

review. Due to its mechanical nature, a meritorious STA 

claim will always be plain to a reviewing court and will 

always affect substantial rights. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 503 

n.5 (“[E]ven if a case is dismissed without prejudice, a 

defendant may derive some benefit.”).4 Defendants therefore 

have an incentive to withhold meritorious non-excludable 

time in their motions to dismiss on the chance that if their 

trials go badly, plain error review of an STA claim will act as 

a one-time reset button. Because this potential for a second 

bite of the apple is unusually attractive, the potential for 

gamesmanship is apparent. Section 3162(a)(2)’s waiver 

provision thus provides a strong incentive, forcing defendants 

to raise all non-excludable time periods in their motions to 

dismiss, which in turn allows district courts to dismiss 

indictments for STA violations before the court and the 

government devote substantial resources to trial and 

sentencing. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 507 n.6 (noting that the § 

3162(a)(2) requirement restricts defendant’s “ability to use 

such a motion for strategic purposes,” by, for example, 

waiting “to see how a trial is going (or how it comes out) 

before moving to dismiss.”). 

We follow our sister circuits in holding that defendants 

waive a period of non-excludable time if they fail to raise it in 

their motion to dismiss or fail to renew their STA claims prior 

 4 Of course, a defendant would still need to show the error affected

the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 732.

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to trial. And because Taplet failed to identify or renew 

objections to two potentially non-excludable periods of time, 

he cannot establish that the seventy-day limit was violated 

between his arraignment and trial. 

III

Taplet’s remaining claims challenging his conviction and 

sentence require far less discussion.

A

Taplet claims the delays in his case violated his 

constitutional right to a speedy trial, but because he did not 

advance the constitutional claim before the district court, we 

review only for plain error. See Rice, 746 F.3d at 1081. 

The district court did not commit an error, let alone one 

that was plain. Although a delay of more than two years is

“presumptively prejudicial,” Doggett v. United States, 505 

U.S. 647, 651–52 & n.1 (1992), longer delays have been 

deemed constitutionally acceptable, see United States v. 

Lopesierra-Gutierrez, 708 F.3d 193, 202–03 (D.C. Cir.) cert. 

denied, 134 S. Ct. 330 (2013) (finding no violation in case 

where the delay was “three-and-a-half years”). Taplet either 

joined in or requested many of the continuances, and he

waited fourteen months after his arraignment before filing a 

motion to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act. See Rice, 746 

F.3d at 1082 (holding that defendant’s assertion of his rights 

nearly a year after his arraignment “cuts decidedly” against

him). Taplet also failed to offer a concrete explanation on 

how the delays prejudiced his defense. See Barker v. Wingo, 

407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972) (employing multi-factor test that 

asks whether the defendant suffered prejudice from the 

delay). 

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B

Taplet next claims there was insufficient evidence of the 

interstate commerce element because, under United States v. 

Archer, 486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973), the government 

impermissibly manufactured jurisdiction when its confidential 

informant convinced Taplet to drive from Maryland into the 

District of Columbia.

The government’s proof showed Taplet had provided his 

cell phone number to Thomas, and they had several 

conversations over the phone in furtherance of the murderfor-hire scheme. That proof alone was sufficient evidence to 

show that Taplet used a facility of interstate commerce with 

the intent to commit a murder-for-hire. See United States v. 

Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 1999) (“It is well 

established that telephones, even when used intrastate, 

constitute instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”)

(emphasis in original); United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 

1180 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that telephones and cellular 

telephones are instrumentalities of interstate commerce).

Nor can Taplet prevail on his Archer manufactured 

jurisdiction defense. Taplet voluntarily crossed state lines in 

order to provide the government informant with welding 

services as payment for the murder-for-hire. Taplet “freely 

participate[d]” in the jurisdictional act, so he cannot now 

claim that the government manufactured jurisdiction. United 

States v. Peters, 952 F.2d 960, 963 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992).

C

Defense counsel requested a special jury instruction 

regarding the interstate element, stating that the jury should 

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consider only the actions Melvin Taplet took “alone and 

independent of the action(s) of, or assistance of the 

confidential informant or any other government agent in 

carrying out the scheme.” J.A. 622. But that was not the law. 

The murder-for-hire statute creates liability even for those 

who “use[ ] or cause[ ] another ... to use ... any facility of 

interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be 

committed.” 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) (emphasis added).

D

At the sentencing hearing, Taplet indulged in a discursive

allocution. For twenty minutes, he read from an “affidavit of 

truth,” rambled on about a number of alleged trial errors, and 

complained of a broad conspiracy against him. The district 

court instructed Taplet to limit his remarks to sentencing 

matters. When Taplet persisted in reading the affidavit, the 

court accepted the affidavit as part of the record and insisted 

that Taplet address only issues related to sentencing. Taplet 

finally obliged.

Taplet alleges the district court erred in prematurely

ending his allocution. Sentencing judges have discretion to 

end or redirect allocution where the defendant strays into 

matters unrelated to sentencing. See United States v. Alden, 

527 F.3d 653, 663 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Muniz, 1 

F.3d 1018, 1025 (10th Cir. 1993). The district court here did 

just that. The court heard Taplet read for twenty minutes from 

a prepared statement alleging numerous trial errors and an 

ominous conspiracy against him. The court eventually 

stopped Taplet and attempted to redirect his objections to 

those relevant to sentencing. When Taplet stubbornly 

continued reading his trial objections, the court offered to 

accept the affidavit as part of the record. When Taplet

persisted, the court stopped him and ordered him to “either 

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discuss the appropriate sentence or not.” J.A. 990. The district 

court did not abuse its discretion in finally saying enough is 

enough.

E

Taplet failed to raise a claim that his sentence was 

procedurally unreasonable, so we review for plain error. See 

United States v. Russell, 600 F.3d 631, 633–34 (D.C. Cir. 

2010). He contends the district court failed adequately to 

articulate its rationale for sentencing and placed inappropriate 

weight on the Sentencing Guideline range. 

Before announcing the sentence, the court noted the 

evidence against Taplet was overwhelming and Taplet failed 

to show any remorse. The court also announced that the 

sentence was necessary to protect the public; the sentence 

would serve to deter Taplet from repeating this conduct; and 

the sentence would deter others from seeking to hire third 

parties to commit murder. That explanation was sufficient.

The district court also did not place undue weight on the 

Guidelines. The court, for example, did not state that the 

Guidelines were legally binding. The court simply calculated 

that Taplet’s recommended Guideline range for the murderfor-hire offense was 262 to 327 months and then proceeded to 

sentence Taplet well below that range, albeit to the statutory 

maximum. 

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is

Affirmed.

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