Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01647/USCOURTS-caed-2_03-cv-01647-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Gary Lee Foreshee
Petitioner
D. L. Runnels
Respondent

Document Text:

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARY LEE FORESHEE,

Petitioner, No. CIV S-03-1647 GEB EFB P

vs.

D. L. RUNNELS, Warden,

Respondent. FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

 /

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding in propria persona with an application for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a 2001 judgment of

conviction entered against him in the Shasta County Superior Court on charges of gross

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, and driving under the influence of alcohol and causing

great bodily injury. He seeks relief on the grounds that: (1) his right to due process was violated

by jury instruction error; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that he

had suffered a prior “strike” offense; and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 

Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the undersigned recommends

that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied.

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I. Procedural Background

On March 16, 2001, an amended information was filed in the Shasta County Superior

Court charging petitioner with second degree murder, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code § 187(a)

(count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, in violation of Cal. Pen. Code §

191.5(a) (count 2); felony driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs and causing injury, in

violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23153A (count 3); driving under the influence with a blood

alcohol content exceeding .08% and causing injury, in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23153(B)

(count 4); misdemeanor driving with a suspended or revoked driver’s license, in violation of Cal.

Veh. Code § 14601.5A (count 5); misdemeanor driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs,

in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23152A (count 6); and misdemeanor driving without a valid

driver’s license, in violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23152(a). Clerk’s Transcript on Appeal (CT) at

95-97. It was also alleged, as to counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, that petitioner had suffered a prior felony

within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law; as to count 2 that petitioner caused great

bodily injury and caused injury to more than one person, in violation of Cal. Veh. Code §§

23558 and 12022.7; and, as to count 6, that petitioner refused to complete a chemical test, in

violation of Cal. Veh. Code § 23577. Id. at 97-99.

Jury trial commenced on March 20, 2001. Id. at 110. On March 28, 2001, the trial court

granted a prosecution motion to dismiss count 5 and a defense motion to bifurcate trial on the

prior conviction allegations. Id. at 142, 143. On March 29, 2001, petitioner was found not

guilty on counts 1 and 6 and guilty on counts 2, 3, 4, and 7. Id. at 242- 50. The jury found the

special allegation pursuant to the Three Strikes Law to be not true and the special allegation of

great bodily injury to be true. Id. at 323. On July 20, 2001, the trial court granted a prosecution

motion to dismiss count 7 and sentenced petitioner to 21 years, 4 months in state prison. 

Answer, Ex. A at 1. 

On July 26, 2001, petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal in the California Court of

Appeal for the Third Appellate District. CT at 410-11. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in

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its entirety in a reasoned decision dated December 24, 2002. Answer, Ex. A. Petitioner

subsequently filed a petition for review, which was summarily denied by the California Supreme

Court in an order dated February 25, 2002. Answer, Ex. B. 

II. Factual Background

At approximately 7:15 a.m. on April 26, 2000, Catherine Colehour observed a truck

skidding into the parking lot of Ponderosa Pines Bar and Grill. Reporter’s Transcript on Appeal

(RT) at 90. The truck hit a phone connection box and decorative boulder, and traveled about 75

feet before stopping. Id. at 90, 93, 96. Colehour saw petitioner “pour” himself out of the truck,

“scuffle” with the passenger of the truck, and walk away. Id. at 92, 97. Petitioner appeared to be

“very intoxicated.” Id. at 97. She called 9-1-1. Id. at 97. 

Robert Allen, the owner of Ponderosa Pines Bar and Grill, heard a loud crashing noise

and ran to the front of the bar to see what had happened. Id. at 117. He saw two people walking

towards him from the pickup truck. Id. One of them was petitioner. Id. Petitioner appeared to

be intoxicated. Id. at 118. Petitioner apologized for the accident and stated that “he did it.” Id.

at 119.

At 11:25 p.m. on that same date, Charles Hinkel heard tires screeching, screaming, and

an explosion. Id. at 128. He ran out of his home and observed that a pickup truck had been in an

accident. Id. He saw the driver “slouched over” and unconscious, a female passenger in the

middle, and a body lying on the ground. Id. at 128-30.

Officer Kessinger arrived at the scene shortly after the accident. Id. at 179. He observed

that petitioner had been driving the pickup truck. Id. at 179-80. Earlier in the evening, Officer

Kessinger had responded to the collision at Ponderosa Pines Bar and Grill. Id. at 180. He

believed that petitioner was the driver in both accidents. Id. 

Petitioner’s blood was drawn at 12:40 a.m. on April 27, 2000. Id. at 167-68. His blood

alcohol level was 0.18 percent. Id. at 176. Petitioner’s blood sample also contained an abuse

level of methamphetamine. Id. at 152-55.

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III. Analysis

A. Standards for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Federal habeas corpus relief is not available for any claim decided on the merits in state

court proceedings unless the state court's adjudication of the claim:

 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

Under section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

United States Supreme Court precedents “if it ‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law

set forth in [Supreme Court] cases’, or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially

indistinguishable from a decision’” of the Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a different

result. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406

(2000)). 

Under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the

Supreme Court’s decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s

case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. A federal habeas court “may not issue the writ simply because

that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied

clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be

unreasonable.” Id. at 412; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (it is “not

enough that a federal habeas court, in its independent review of the legal question, is left with a

‘firm conviction’ that the state court was ‘erroneous.’”) 

The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court

judgment. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002). Where the state court reaches a

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 As read to the jury, the full instruction provided: “If you are not satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of the crime of which he is accused in Count 2, and

you unanimously so find, you may convict him of any lesser crime provided you are satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of that crime. [¶] You have been provided with

guilty and not guilty verdict forms for the crime charged in Count 2 and lesser crimes thereto. 

They are all on that one progressive verdict form that probably goes on for three pages. [¶] The

crime of gross vehicular manslaughter without alcohol is a lesser crime to that of gross vehicular

manslaughter while intoxicated. The crime of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated but

without gross negligence is a lesser crime to gross vehicular manslaughter without alcohol. The

crime of vehicular manslaughter without alcohol and without gross negligence is a lesser crime

to vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated but without gross negligence. The crime of driving

under the influence causing injury is a lesser crime to that of gross vehicular manslaughter while

intoxicated. The crime of driving with a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or more causing injury is a

lesser crime to that of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. [¶] Thus, you are to

determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime charged in Count 2 or of any

lesser crimes. In doing so, you have discretion to choose the order in which you evaluate each

crime and consider the evidence pertaining to it. You may find it to be productive to consider

and reach tentative conclusions on all charges and lesser crimes before reaching any final

verdicts. [¶] Before you return any final or formal verdict, you must be guided by the following: 

[¶] Number one, if you unanimously find a defendant guilty of the crime of which he is accused

in Count 2, your foreperson should sign and date the corresponding verdict form. All other

verdict forms as to Count 2 must be left unsigned; [¶] If you are unable to reach a unanimous

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decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal

habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is

available under section 2254(d). Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. Petitioner’s Claims

1. Jury Instruction Error

Petitioner’s first claim is that his right to due process was violated by a jury instruction

on “the lesser offenses of gross vehicular manslaughter.” Points and Authorities attached to

Petition (P&A) at 11. The California Court of Appeal explained the background to this claim as

follows:

Defendant claims the trial court erred by misinstructing the jury

with respect to lesser offenses to gross vehicular manslaughter. 

The instruction at issue was given after the jury asked about how it

should consider lesser charges if it could not agree unanimously on

a guilty verdict. The instruction was a modified version of

CALJIC No. 17.12, and it indicated a progression of lesser

offenses, a couple of which were described as lesser offenses to

other lesser offenses.1 Before the instruction was given, defendant

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verdict as to the crime of which the defendant is accused in Count 2, do not sign any verdict

forms as to Count 2 and report your disagreement to the Court; [¶] Three, the Court cannot

accept a guilty verdict on a lesser crime unless the jury also unanimously finds and returns a

signed verdict form of not guilty as to the greater crime; [¶] Four, if you unanimously agree and

find the defendant not guilty of the crime with which he is charged in Count 2 but cannot reach a

unanimous agreement as to the lesser crime, your foreperson should sign and date the not guilty

verdict form as to the charged crime and report your disagreement as to the lesser crimes to the

Court. [¶] These same principles apply in your consideration of whether the defendant is guilty

or not guilty of the crime of each – of each lesser crime.”

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asked the court to amend it to specify that the enumerated offenses

were simply lesser offenses to gross vehicular manslaughter. 

However, the trial court overruled counsel’s objection. In giving

the instruction, the court further emphasized the progression of the

lesser offenses on the verdict form.

The instruction included the following language: “The crime of

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated but without gross

negligence is a lesser crime to gross vehicular manslaughter with

alcohol.” Defendant claims the instruction was erroneous because

neither of the two offenses can be considered a lesser included

offense to the other. Indeed, each offense has a different element

not shared by the other; one requires intoxication and the other

requires gross negligence. 

Answer, Ex. A at 2-4. 

Petitioner argues that, at most, he is guilty of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. 

However, he claims that because of the way the challenged instruction was worded, the jury

would have been forced to find him guilty of a more serious charge. Petitioner explains: 

In short, there was considerable evidence by which the jury could

have convicted petitioner of the lesser offense of vehicular

manslaughter while intoxicated, but without gross negligence (§

192.subd.(c)(3)). However, the court’s version of CALJIC no.

17.12 would have prevented the jury from considering the

elements of that crime. Instead the jury would have reached a

dead-end in the “progression” by butting up against the instruction

of gross vehicular manslaughter without alcohol and would have

gone no further.

P&A at 18-19. Petitioner claims that the jury was forced to select a verdict that did not reflect

his actual culpability because it was unable to progress down the chain of lesser included

offenses to reach the appropriate verdict. He argues that “under the court’s erroneous

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instructions, the only available alternative for the jury was to convict petitioner of the greater

offense, of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.” Id. at 23.

This claim was rejected by the California Court of Appeal on petitioner’s direct appeal,

and by the California Supreme Court without comment on petition for review. The California

Court of Appeal explained its reasoning as follows:

It would perhaps have been preferable, under the circumstances, to

have simply indicated that both offenses were merely lesser

offenses to gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated.

But to the extent the instruction impacted the jury’s consideration

of the lesser-included offenses, reversal is not warranted unless

there is a reasonable probability defendant would have obtained a

more favorable result if not for the error. (See generally People v.

Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 149.) Defendant attempts to

demonstrate prejudice under this standard by arguing: “There is a

reasonable probability that the jury, heeding the court’s

instructions on the ‘progression’ of lesser crimes, went from gross

vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated to consideration of gross

vehicular manslaughter without alcohol. Because it was

undisputed that alcohol was involved, however, the jury would

have been ‘stuck’ at that barrier, and never ‘progressed’ further

down the sequence to consider the crime of vehicular manslaughter

while intoxicated without gross negligence.” We disagree.

The alleged “barrier” to the jury’s consideration of the instructions

is an entirely artificial construct with no basis in the record. Even

if the jury considered the lesser offenses in the order emphasized,

there is no reason to believe it would stop and return to considering

a greater offense simply because it discovered that an element of

the greater offense that was obviously proven was not necessary to

prove a particular lesser offense. Accordingly, any error did not

affect the jury’s consideration of all applicable lesser offenses.

Answer, Ex. A at 5. 

A challenge to jury instructions does not generally state a federal constitutional claim. 

See Middleton v. Cupp, 768 F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,

119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). However, a “claim of

error based upon a right not specifically guaranteed by the Constitution may nonetheless form a

ground for federal habeas corpus relief where its impact so infects the entire trial that the

resulting conviction violates the defendant’s right to due process.” Hines v. Enomoto, 658 F.2d

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667, 672 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Quigg v. Crist, 616 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1980)); See also Prantil

v. California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir. 1988) The analysis for determining whether a trial is

"so infected with unfairness" as to rise to the level of a due process violation is similar to the

analysis used in determining, under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993), whether

an error had "a substantial and injurious effect" on the outcome. See Sarausad v. Porter, 479

F.3d 671, 692 (9th Cir. 2007); Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001),

overruled on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 815, 828 n.11 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the challenged jury instruction rendered his trial

fundamentally unfair. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, there is no evidence the jurors believed

they could not consider certain offenses simply because they were listed in the instruction after

other offenses which did not apply to the facts of this case. On the contrary, the jury was

instructed that if they found petitioner not guilty of second degree murder, they could convict

him on “any” lesser crime if they were satisfied that he was guilty of that crime. The jurors were

also instructed that they had “discretion to choose the order in which you evaluate each crime”

and that they “may find it to be productive to consider and reach tentative conclusions on all

charges and lesser crimes before reaching any final verdicts.” This language is inconsistent with

petitioner’s argument that the jury was precluded from even considering a particular offense if

the offense listed above it in the instruction was inapplicable to the facts of this case. 

In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that

the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in a capital case is constitutional error if there

was evidence to support the instruction. However, the Supreme Court has not decided whether

this rationale also extends to non-capital cases. See Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 361-62

(1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting Beck is limited to capital cases); Turner v.

Marshall, 63 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Tolbert v. Page, 182

F.3d 677 (9th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit, like several other circuits, has declined to extend

Beck to find constitutional error arising from the failure to instruct on a lesser included offense in

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a non-capital case. See Solis v. Garcia, 219 F.3d 922, 929 (9th Cir. 2000); Bashor v. Risley, 730

F.2d 1228, 1240 (9th Cir.1984). See also Valles v. Lynaugh, 835 F.2d 126, 127 (5th Cir. 1988);

Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d 597, 602 (10th Cir. 1987); Perry v. Smith, 810 F.2d 1078, 1080

(11th Cir. 1987).

Petitioner acknowledges that there is no federal constitutional right to any particular jury

instructions on lesser included offenses in a non-capital case, but he argues that the instruction

given by the trial court violated his due process right to adequate instructions on his theory of

defense and his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. P&A at 18. These claims are meritless. 

Petitioner’s jury was instructed on every lesser included offense to gross vehicular manslaughter. 

Further, as discussed above, notwithstanding the way the offenses were listed in the

supplemental jury instruction, the jurors were informed that they could convict petitioner of any

of these lesser offenses and could deliberate the offenses in any order. Petitioner’s counsel

argued to the jury that petitioner could be found guilty of the lesser included offense of vehicular

manslaughter while intoxicated, but without gross negligence. RT at 280-87; Cf. Conde v.

Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1999) (the trial court violated defendant's right to counsel

and to present a defense by precluding his attorney from arguing his theory of the defense in

closing arguments); United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1372 (9th Cir. 1987) (failure to give

a requested instruction supporting defendant’s theory of the case is reversible error if the theory

is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence). The fact that petitioner’s jurors

did not accept petitioner’s defense does not mean that he was unable to present it. 

Under the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s constitutional rights were not violated

by the jury instruction on lesser included offenses. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

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2

 Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(18) defines as a “‘serious felony’ . . . [¶] . . .

any burglary of the first degree.”

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2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Petitioner’s next claim is that there was insufficient evidence that his 1990 Nevada

burglary qualified as a “strike” within the meaning of California’s Three Strikes Law. He

argues, first, that the offense of burglary under Nevada law does not include all of the elements

of burglary under California law. P&A at 29. He also argues that the trial court erred when it

relied on a probation report in a California case to determine whether petitioner’s Nevada

conviction qualified as a “serious felony” under California law. Id. at 34. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s claim in this regard,

reasoning as follows:

A prior conviction in another jurisdiction qualifies as a strike if it

was for an offense that: (1) is punishable by imprisonment in state

prison if committed in California; and (2) includes all the elements

of the particular felony as defined in Penal Code section 667.5,

subdivision (c), or Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c). 

(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2).) Here, the

Nevada burglary conviction qualified as a strike if it involved the

burglary of an inhabited dwelling, which is first degree burglary

under California law. (See Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, 1192.7, subd.

(c)(18).2

 The trial court could properly consider the entire record

of conviction in making this determination. (See People v.

Rodriguez (1998) 17 Cal.4th 253, 261-262.) However, if the

record did not disclose facts concerning the offense actually

committed, the court was required to presume the prior conviction

was for the least offense punishable under Nevada law. (See id. at

p. 262.)

To prove the strike, the People introduced several pertinent

documents, including the judgment of conviction showing

defendant’s conviction for burglary and a transcript of the hearing

at which defendant pleaded guilty to the offense. At the hearing,

defendant was informed that the prosecutor would be required to

prove that defendant “did willfully and unlawfully enter a certain

dwelling factually that was located in Reno, Washoe County,

Nevada [with] the intent to commit larceny.” Defendant’s plea

constituted an admission of guilt to the described offense.

Defendant claims the People failed to properly prove the prior

strike for two reasons. First, he points out that the offense was

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described as entry into a dwelling with intent to commit larceny. 

Although this ordinarily would suffice to prove burglary under

California law (see Pen. Code, § 459), defendant claims that under

Nevada law, larceny requires a lesser showing with respect to the

requisite intent.

Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. California law requires

an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his or her property

or to take the property temporarily but for an unreasonable time to

deprive the owner of a major part of its value or enjoyment. (See

People v. Avery (2002) 27 Cal.4th 49, 57-58.) But Nevada law

requires no less. The Nevada Supreme Court has long held that

larceny requires an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his

or her property. (See Grant v. State (Nev. 2001) 24 P.3d 761,

Harvey v. State (Nev. 1962) 375 P.2d 225, 226.)

Second, defendant claims the trial court erred to the extent it relied

on a probation report in a California case to conclude that

defendant entered an occupied dwelling under California law. 

Although the defense expressed some reservations about the

evidence, counsel failed to object when the prosecutor asked the

court to take “judicial notice” of it. And though defendant now

suggests that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object, we

disagree because the evidence was not necessary to prove the prior

strike. Accordingly, any error was not prejudicial. (Cf. People v.

Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 230-231 [finding no prejudicial error

where inadmissible hearsay used to prove prior conviction but

evidence was duplicative of valid evidence]; see also Strickland v.

Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674,

693, 698] [counsel not ineffective unless challenged conduct falls

below objective standard of reasonableness and there is a

reasonable probability of a different result if not for error].) We

explain.

As indicated at the Nevada plea canvass, defendant’s crime

involved entry into a “dwelling.” This description was sufficient

to show the crime involved an inhabited dwelling under California

law and that it was therefore first degree burglary. (See Pen. Code,

§§ 459, 460.) For purposes of the California statute, a dwelling is

inhabited if it is “currently being used for dwelling purposes,

whether occupied or not.” (Pen. Code, § 459, italics added.) Case

law confirms that “a house remains inhabited even if the burglary

occurs while the residents are away for an extended period of

time” if it is still being used for dwelling purposes. (People v.

Cardona (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 481, 483; see also People v.

Hernandez (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 438, 441-442 [whether the

residents are currently sleeping at dwelling is not necessarily

dispositive].) Nevada law likewise presupposes a dwelling is some

structure occupied by a resident or tenant, i.e., that it is being used

for dwelling purposes. Nevada law provides: “‘Dwelling house’

includes every building or structure which has been usually

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occupied by a person lodging therein at night, and whenever it is

so constructed as to consist of two or more parts or rooms

occupied or intended to be occupied, whether permanently or

temporarily, by different tenants separately by usually lodging

therein at night, or for any other separate purpose, each part shall

be deemed a separate dwelling house of the tenant occupying it.” 

(Nev. Rev. Stat., § 193.014, italics added.) When defendant

admitted in Nevada that he had entered a “dwelling,” we can

assume that meant a “dwelling” as defined by Nevada law, which

satisfies the definition of an “inhabited dwelling” under California

law defining first degree burglary.

Answer, Ex. A at 5-9. 

A writ of habeas corpus is not available for alleged error in the application of state law. 

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“We have stated many times that federal habeas

corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law. Today, we reemphasize that it is not the

province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law

questions”); Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir. 2006) (same). See also Beck v.

Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 554 (1962) (the Fourteenth Amendment does not assure uniformity

of judicial decisions . . . [or] immunity from judicial error . . . . Were it otherwise, every alleged

misapplication of state law would constitute a federal constitutional question). Further, state

courts “are the ultimate expositors of state law,” and reviewing courts are “bound by the state's

construction except when it appears that its interpretation is an obvious subterfuge to evade the

consideration of a federal issue.” Peltier v. Wright, 15 F.3d 860, 862 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting

Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691 (1975) (construing state court judgment)). See also

Melugin v. Hames, 38 F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) (Construing a state criminal statute

challenged on constitutional grounds and noting that “we accept a state court ruling on questions

of state law”); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1989) (deferring to state

court on questions of state law in construing a state criminal statute). 

Similarly, habeas corpus relief is unavailable for alleged errors in the interpretation or

application of state sentencing laws by either a state trial court or appellate court. Cacoperdo v.

Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[t]he decision whether to impose sentences

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concurrently or consecutively is a matter of state criminal procedure and is not within the

purview of federal habeas corpus); Hendricks v. Zenon, 993 F.2d 664, 674 (9th Cir. 1993). So

long as a state sentence “is not based on any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and

unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency, the penalties for violation of

state statutes are matters of state concern.” Makal v. State of Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th

Cir. 1976). The Ninth Circuit has specifically refused to consider on habeas review claims of

erroneous application of state sentencing law by state courts. See, e.g., Miller v. Vasquez, 868

F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that whether assault with a deadly weapon qualifies as a

"serious felony" under California's sentence enhancement provisions is a question of state

sentencing law and does not state a constitutional claim). 

The state court’s conclusion that petitioner’s Nevada conviction qualified as a “strike”

under California law did not result in a complete miscarriage of justice in this case, nor is it a

subterfuge to evade federal review. Further, petitioner has not pointed to any federal court

decision in support of his claim that the state court erroneously sentenced him pursuant to

California’s Three Strikes law. See Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1201-02 (9th Cir.

2002) (in determining in a habeas action whether out-of-state convictions were properly

considered in sentencing petitioner under California’s Three Strikes Law, the question is not

whether the California Supreme Court was correct but whether California's decision to affirm the

judgment of conviction was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law). Accordingly, the opinion of the California Court of Appeal rejecting

petitioner’s argument in this regard is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of,

clearly established federal law. Federal habeas corpus relief is unavailable to overturn this state

court decision on a claim involving only state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. 

3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Petitioner’s final claim is that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.

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The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel. The United States

Supreme Court set forth the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

petitioner must first show that, considering all the circumstances, counsel’s performance fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness. See, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. After a

petitioner identifies the acts or omissions that are alleged not to have been the result of

reasonable professional judgment, the court must determine whether, in light of all the

circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally

competent assistance. Id. at 690; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Second, a

petitioner must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 693-94. Prejudice is found where “there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at

694. A reasonable probability is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Id. See also Williams, 529 U.S. at 391-92; Laboa v. Calderon, 224 F.3d 972, 981

(9th Cir. 2000). A reviewing court “need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged

deficiencies . . . . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 

sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 955

(9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

In assessing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim “[t]here is a strong presumption

that counsel’s performance falls within the ‘wide range of professional assistance.’” Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). There is in

addition a strong presumption that counsel “exercised acceptable professional judgment in all

significant decisions made.” Hughes v. Borg, 898 F.2d 695, 702 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). However, that deference “is predicated on counsel’s performance

of sufficient investigation and preparation to make reasonably informed, reasonably sound

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judgments.” Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

i. Failure to Investigate

Petitioner argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to

properly investigate the condition of the highway where the accident occurred. P&A at 37-39. 

Petitioner provides evidence that, at the time of the accident, there was a small drop-off between

the highway and the shoulder of the road. Pet., Exs. A-E. Petitioner states that he “attempted to

steer the truck back onto the road as it drifted off, but because of the conditions of the road . . .

petitioner loss [sic] it and then the accident happen.” P&A at 39. Petitioner notes that Shellene

Martin, a passenger in his vehicle at the time of the accident, testified that he was not driving

erratically or speeding. See RT at 246. Petitioner also provides evidence that highway

construction activities after the accident eliminated this dangerous road condition and provided

for a smoother transition between the road and the highway. Pet., Exs. A - E. Petitioner faults

counsel for failing to interview witnesses at the construction company. P&A at 38. Petitioner

states that he asked his trial counsel to investigate the road conditions but that counsel failed to

do so. Id. at 37-38. 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice with respect to these claims. The evidence

at trial demonstrated that, more than an hour after the accident, petitioner’s blood alcohol content

was more than twice the legal limit. Under these circumstances, evidence that highway

conditions made it harder to get back on the road in the event a vehicle drifted onto the shoulder

would not have resulted in a different verdict. For this reason alone, trial counsel’s failure, if

any, to investigate highway conditions did not constitute ineffective assistance. In addition,

although petitioner states that “witnesses” at the construction company “were the bases of

important defense information,” he has failed to explain how their testimony would have helped

his defense. See United States v. Harden, 846 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1988) (no ineffective

assistance because of counsel’s failure to call a witness where, among other things, there was no

evidence in the record that the witness would testify); United States v. Berry, 814 F.2d 1406,

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1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (appellant failed to meet prejudice prong of ineffectiveness claim because

he offered no indication of what potential witnesses would have testified to or how their

testimony might have changed the outcome of the hearing). 

Given petitioner’s inability to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on federal

habeas review, this court cannot conclude that the California courts’ application of Strickland to

the facts of this case was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to

relief on this claim.

ii. Use of Probation Report to Prove “Strike”

Petitioner also argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he

withdrew his objection to the trial court’s use of the California probation report to demonstrate

that petitioner’s Nevada conviction constituted a first degree burglary under California law. 

However, as described above, evidence contained in the probation report was duplicative of

other evidence before the trier of fact. Accordingly, trial counsel’s failure, if any, to object to the

admission of the probation report did not result in prejudice. 

For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner’s

application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after

being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections

with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections

to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the

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specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

DATED: August 31, 2007.

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