Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50477/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50477-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Martin Alcantara-Castillo
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARTIN ALCANTARA-CASTILLO,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50477

D.C. No.

3:11-cr-03876-

AJB-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Anthony J. Battaglia, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

December 4, 2013—Pasadena, California

Filed June 11, 2015

Before: Dorothy W. Nelson, Kim McLane Wardlaw,

and Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw;

Dissent by Judge Rawlinson

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2 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

Reversing a conviction for illegal reentry, the panel held

that the government’s improper cross-examination and

argument deprived the defendant of the fair trial guaranteed

by the Due Process Clause.

The panel held that error occurred when the prosecutor

implicitly and then explicitly asked the defendant to comment

on a Border Patrol agent’s veracity during cross-examination. 

The panel also held that, as the government conceded, the

government improperlyvouched for the Border Patrol agent’s

credibility by referring during its rebuttal argument to facts

not before the jury – that Border Patrol agents are “sworn to

uphold the law” – in a credibility showdown between the

Border Patrol agent and the defendant. 

The panel did not need to decide whether to apply

harmless error analysis because even under the more

restrictive plain error standard the combined misconduct

requires reversal. 

Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that the prosecutor’s

isolated question in response to the defendant’s spontaneous

challenge to the Border Patrol agent’s veracity during crossexamination does not rise to the level of plain error; that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a curative

instruction during the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, where

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 3

it granted the defendant’s motion to strike and instructed the

jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comment that the Border

Patrol agents were “sworn to uphold the law”; and that it is

highly unlikely that the prosecutor’s comment materially

affected the verdict.

COUNSEL

Paul A. Barr (argued), Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter,

Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate Section,

Criminal Division, and Kyle W. Hoffman (argued), Assistant

United States Attorney, San Diego, California, for PlaintiffAppellee.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Martin Alcantara-Castillo (Alcantara) appeals his jury

trial conviction for illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. Because the government’s improper crossexamination and argument deprived Alcantara of the fair trial

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause, we reverse.

I.

On June 26, 2011, Border Patrol Agent Aaron Hunter

responded to a report that a motion sensor had been activated

approximately seven miles east of the Tecate port of entry. 

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4 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

Searching the area, he found Alcantara lying next to an

abandoned cargo container approximately one mile north of

the Mexican border. Alcantara was carrying a backpack and

was very dirty. Agent Hunter approached Alcantara,

questioning him in Spanish. Alcantara admitted that he was

a “citizen of Mexico and that he did not have any documents

allowing him to be in the United States.”

Agent Hunter testified that as he escorted Alcantara

toward the highway where he had parked his patrol car,

Alcantara spontaneously began talking. According to Agent

Hunter, Alcantara volunteered that he had crossed the border

on foot the previous night with a group that had been chased

by border patrol agents on all-terrain vehicles. Alcantara said

he had become separated from the group and had decided to

turn around and return to Mexico. As Agent Hunter and

Alcantara returned to the highway, two other Border Patrol

agents joined them. They searched Alcantara, finding empty

bottles and food containers in his backpack.

On cross-examination, Agent Hunter acknowledged that

he did not personally search Alcantara’s backpack, that he did

not take an inventory of its contents, and that he could not

specifically identify what was inside. Agent Hunter also

testified that on the day of Alcantara’s arrest he provided

information about the arrest to another agent who prepared an

official report, after which Agent Hunter wrote a detailed

addendum to the report. Neither of those documents contain

any mention of Alcantara’s spontaneous admissions about

crossing the border with a group, being chased by border

patrol agents on all-terrain vehicles, and attempting to return

to Mexico. Nor could Agent Hunter recall that he told

anyone at all about these spontaneous statements until he met

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 5

with prosecutors in preparation for Alcantara’s trial seven

months after Alcantara’s arrest.

Border Patrol Agent Joseph Moore testified that the night

before Alcantara’s arrest, he was notified that a group of nine

aliens had been observed near the border. Four of the group

had been apprehended immediately, but five had fled. Agent

Moore searched the area and was able to apprehend four more

aliens, but he could not locate the ninth member of the group,

whose sex and identity were unknown.

Taking the witness stand, Alcantara testified that he had

unknowingly entered the United States during a period of

methamphetamine-induced psychosis. Border Patrol Agent

Luis Martinez, who interviewed Alcantara shortly after his

arrest, testified that pursuant to Border Patrol policy, he

immediately terminated that interview when Alcantara stated

that he was under the influence of methamphetamine. 

However, Agent Martinez did not observe anything in

Alcantara’s demeanor that led him to believe Alcantara was

under the influence of methamphetamine, although Alcantara

was hunched over during the interview.

Alcantara admitted that he had been addicted to

methamphetamine since 1995 and used the drug daily,

stopping only when he was incarcerated. On June 24, 2011,

while high on methamphetamine, he impulsively decided to

enter a rehabilitation program after talking with another

methamphetamine user about a friend who had died three

months earlier due to drug abuse. Alcantara went to a bus

depot in Tijuana, where he lived, early in the morning on

June 25, for the purpose of traveling to a drug rehabilitation

facility located in El Hongo, east of Tecate. Before boarding,

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6 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

however, he purchased some more methamphetamine near

the bus depot in Tijuana.

Upon his arrival in Tecate, Alcantara decided to visit a

friend who lived on the outskirts of the city to tell him that he

was going to check into a rehabilitation clinic, but he never

reached his friend’s home. While walking there along some

railroad tracks, he encountered two men in a railroad tunnel

with whom he began a conversation. Alcantara ended up

smoking methamphetamine with these men—a larger

quantity of methamphetamine than he had ever used before. 

Alcantara testified that he began to hallucinate, and that the

next thing he remembered was walking down a road, seeing

a small farm with some palm trees, picking up a bottle of

water, and lying down next to a container of some sort. 

Without objection, the defense introduced a photograph of the

railroad tunnel, and Alcantara showed the jury where he had

been walking, where the train tracks were, and where he

stumbled upon the two men.

Alcantara thought he was on the road that goes from

Tecate to Mexicali in Mexico. It was not until Agent Hunter

approached and he saw Agent Hunter’s uniform that he

realized he was in the United States. Alcantara

acknowledged that he told Agent Hunter he was from

Mexico, but did not remember saying anything else to him

except to ask for water.

Two additional witnesses testified for the defense. A

medical expert in addiction psychiatry who had interviewed

Alcantara opined that Alcantara was severely

methamphetamine dependent, based upon Alcantara’s

description of his methamphetamine use. He further testified

that people who use methamphetamine daily may suffer

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 7

hallucinations, paranoia, and disorientation as to time and

place, especially if they are also suffering from sleep

deprivation, dehydration, or extreme heat. A defense

investigator also testified that she had visited a drug

rehabilitation facility in El Hongo, along the highway from

Tecate to Mexicali, and had located a railroad tunnel near the

border in the eastern outskirts of Tecate. The defense also

introduced a photograph of a gap in the border fence near the

site of Alcantara’s arrest.

The jury found Alcantara guilty, and the district court

sentenced him to a forty-month term of imprisonment. 

Alcantara timely appealed.

II.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

Where the defendant has objected to alleged prosecutorial

misconduct at trial, we review for harmless error.1 We view

the challenged conduct “in the entire context of the trial,” and

reverse “only if it appears more probable than not that

prosecutorial misconduct materially affected the fairness of

the trial.” Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1082 (quoting Younger, 398 F.3d

at 1190). Where the defendant has not objected to the alleged

misconduct at trial, we review for plain error. We may

1

“Misconduct” is the term of art that we regularly use to describe

improper behavior by prosecutors that is inconsistent with the due process

requirements of a fair trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077,

1082 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 488 (2013); United States v.

Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 609–10, 613 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v.

Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1190 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Kerr,

981 F.2d 1050, 1051–52 (9th Cir. 1992). The use of this generic term

does not necessarily imply that the prosecutor intentionally broke the rules

or acted in bad faith.

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8 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

reverse if: (1) there was error; (2) it was plain; (3) it affected

the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) “viewed in the

context of the entire trial, the impropriety seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 568

(9th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d

1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2002)). When assessing the combined

prejudicial effect of multiple errors, only as to some of which

the defense registered a timely objection, we apply the plain

error standard. See United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d

1142, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 2005).

III.

A prosecutor “is the representative not of an ordinary

party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation

to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to

govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal

prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall

be done.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 

A “prosecutor’s job isn’t just to win, but to win fairly, staying

well within the rules.” United States v. Maloney, 755 F.3d

1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting United States

v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1993)).

A prosecutor must not ask defendants during crossexamination to comment on the truthfulness of other

witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Harrison, 585 F.3d

1155, 1158 (9th Cir. 2009); Combs, 379 F.3d at 572; United

States v. Sanchez 176 F.3d 1214, 1219–20 (9th Cir. 1999). 

This rule is “black letter law,” Harrison, 585 F.3d at 1158,

and it ensures that determinations of credibility remain within

the sole province of the jury. See Sanchez, 176 F.3d at

1219–20. Nor may prosecutors “vouch” for a witness by

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 9

offering their personal opinion of a witness’s testimony, or

suggesting that information exists outside the record that

verifies the witness’s truthfulness. See, e.g., Weatherspoon,

410 F.3d at 1146–48; Combs, 379 F.3d at 574–75; Sanchez,

176 F.3d at 1224. Vouching compromises the integrity of the

trial and denies the defendant due process because the

“prosecutor’s opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the

Government and may induce the jury to trust the

Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the

evidence.” United States v. Reyes, 577 F.3d 1069, 1077 (9th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Alcantara argues that the government engaged in

improper questioning or vouching on four occasions during

his trial. We conclude that there were two instances of

improper conduct.

A.

Error occurred when the prosecutor implicitly and then

explicitly asked Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s

veracity during cross-examination. Agent Hunter had

testified to certain “spontaneous” admissions made by

Alcantara, but Alcantara testified that he only asked Agent

Hunter for water and acknowledged his Mexican citizenship. 

Toward the end of the government’s cross-examination of

Alcantara, the prosecutor initiated the following exchange:

Q: Now, it’s your testimony you didn’t recall

any additional statements you made to the

Border Patrol Agent on the day of your

arrest for this case, correct?

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10 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

A: I don’t remember having told him

anything.

Q: You sat here throughout this trial, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you heard Border Patrol Agent

Hunter testify that you had told him about

coming in the day before with a group?

You’ve heard that, correct?

A: I don’t remember. I don’t remember.

Q: You were sitting right here yesterday.

A: Yes, but I don’t remember if he said that.

Q: You don’t remember him saying, and your

attorney repeatedly asking him, about

your statements: that you had crossed over

the day before and gone further north with

a group? You don’t remember that?

A: I don’t think so. I don’t think I crossed

with people. I wasn’t with people.

Q: That is not what I’m asking you. I’m

asking you if you remember Agent

Hunter, yesterday, telling the jury that you

had made the statement that you had told

him that you had crossed and gone further

north?

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 11

A: Agent Hunter, he can say whatever he

wants. He is saying I had a black sweater

the day of my arrest, that I had food in my

backpack, and there is nothing of that. 

That was all invented. All these things

were invented.

Q: Your testimony is that Agent Hunter is

inventing stories about you; is that

correct?

A: Where are my things?

Defense counsel objected to “this line of questioning as

vouching for Agent Hunter’s testimony.” The district court

erred by overruling this objection. But even if we view

counsel’s objection as untimely, it was plain error to permit

the prosecutor to ask, “Your testimony is that Agent Hunter

is inventing stories about you; is that correct?” We found

analogous questioning improper in Combs, 379 F.3d at 567,

572. There, a DEA agent testified that the defendant admitted

to manufacturing methamphetamine. Id. at 567. The

defendant testified that he never made such an admission, and

on cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the

defendant as follows:

Q: You told Special Agents Bailey and

Cory that you last manufactured

methamphetamine on or about August 5,

isn’t that correct?

A: I did not.

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Q: So Special Agent Bailey is making that

up?

A: I told you what happened. He said. I

didn’t say. He answered. I ended the

interview.

Q: So you are saying that Special Agent

Bailey is lying in his testimony?

Id. Just as the prosecutor asked the defendant in Combs if

Special Agent Bailey was “making that up” or “lying in his

testimony,” the prosecutor here asked Alcantara if Agent

Hunter was “inventing stories about you.” In Combs, we

concluded that the prosecutor’s questioning constituted plain

error. Id. at 572. See also Harrison, 585 F.3d at 1158

(finding error where the prosecutor asked the defendant if two

testifying police officers were lying); Sanchez, 176 F.3d at

1219–20 (finding error where the prosecutor forced the

defendant to call a U.S. marshal who testified a liar).

The dissent, assuming that plain error is the correct legal

standard, finds a “crucial distinction” between this case and

others because the prosecutor used the word “invent” instead

of the word “lie.” Dissent at 32–33. This distinction is not

meaningful, much less “crucial.” In the context we address,

to “lie” and to “invent” have identical meanings: to fabricate

information. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1062 (10th ed.

2014) (defining “lie” as “[a] false statement or other

indication that is made with knowledge of its falsity; an

untruthful communication intended to deceive”); Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary1188 (2002) (defining the

secondary meaning of the verb “invent” as “to think up or

imagine: concoct mentally: fabricate”); id. at 1305 (defining

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 13

the verb “lie” as “to make an untrue statement with intent to

deceive: tell a lie”); see also 8 Oxford English Dictionary 39

(2d ed. 1989) (defining the secondary meaning of the verb

“invent” as “[t]o devise something false or fictitious: to

fabricate, feign, ‘make up’”); id. at 905 (defining the verb

“lie” as “[t]o tell a lie or lies, to utter falsehood; to speak

falsely”). No matter which words are used to mean

“intentional deception,” the concept remains the same: it is

improper to compel the defendant “to comment on the

truthfulness of another witness.” Harrison, 585 F.3d at 1158.

The dissent’s reliance on United States v. Greer, 640 F.3d

1011 (9th Cir. 2011), is misplaced. We noted in Greer that

we had “not yet addressed whether it is improper for the

prosecutor to ask the defendant, as the prosecutor did in [that]

case, if a witness testified ‘inaccurately.’” Id. at 1023. We

distinguished that question from asking “whether a

government witness had been ‘less than candid’ during his

testimony.” Id., n.8. Reasoning that “[b]ecause we see no

difference between asking whether a witness was ‘lying’ or

being ‘less than candid,’” we held that the “less than candid”

question “was improper.” Id.

Here, the prosecutor did not ask whether the agent’s

testimony was inaccurate; he asked whether the agent was

“inventing stories” about Alcantara. Inaccuracy or mistake

can be achieved through inadvertence or other unintentional

error. Lying, making up, or inventing are all deliberate and

intentional falsehoods, like “being less than candid.” Do we

really want to narrow the prohibition against asking the

defendant to comment on the veracity of another agent to the

use of the word “lie?” Prosecutors could simply evade the

rule by asking whether another witness was “not telling the

truth,” fibbing, fabricating, making the story up, falsifying,

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14 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

committing perjury, being “less than candid,” or whether his

story was “cock and bull.”2 Surely the admonition against

asking a defendant to comment on a government witness’s

veracity is violated equally when any of these formulations is

used. The remaining questions to be asked on plain error

review should be answered by addressing the circumstances

of each case.

We also reject the government’s assertion that the

prosecutor was merely following up appropriately after

Alcantara “spontaneously attacked” Agent Hunter’s

credibility. In United States v. Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147 (9th

Cir. 2010), the government summarized the relevant

testimony of one of its witnesses and asked the defendant

whether he remembered the testimony. Id. at 1159. The

defendant responded, “That’s what her testimony was. That

is not true.” Id. We held that this response did not justify

further questioning of the defendant about the witness’s

credibility. Id. at 1160. Indeed, we found the government’s

argument that “the prosecution had no choice but to follow up

Moreland’s statement by asking whether [the witness] was

lying” to “make[] little sense.” Id. While the follow-up

questions about the witness’s credibility in Moreland were

more extensive than the single follow-up question here, the

principle nonetheless applies.

Moreover, Alcantara’s comments about Agent Hunter’s

testimony were not spontaneous, but were in fact induced by

the line of the prosecutor’s questioning, in which he pressed

Alcantara five times about Agent Hunter’s testimony before

2

“Tell a tale of cock and bull, / Of convincing detail full; / Tale

tremendous, / Heaven defend us! / What a tale of cock and bull!” W.S.

Gilbert, The Yeomen of the Guard, Act II (1888).

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 15

Alcantara responded that the Agent’s testimony as to the

black sweater, food in the backpack, and “[a]ll these things

were invented.” There is only one plausible explanation for

the prosecutor’s persistent effort to confirm that Alcantara

had heard Agent Hunter’s previous testimony: to induce

Alcantara to comment on whether that testimony was true.

And the prosecutor ultimately achieved the desired result:

Following Alcantara’s “[a]ll these things were invented”

testimony, the prosecutor immediately pounced with, “Your

testimony is that Agent Hunter is inventing stories about you;

is that correct?” Alcantara was once again forced to comment

on Agent Hunter’s veracity, and he did by asking the

prosecutor “Where are my things?,” as if to prove Agent

Hunter was lying when he testified as to the contents of

Alcantara’s backpack.

The government argues that the prosecutor might have

asked these questions to determine whether Agent Hunter’s

testimony had refreshed Alcantara’s recollection of his

statements on the day of his arrest. This explanation makes

little sense, however, as Alcantara had just testified on direct

that he did not recall making those statements, so it was

already evident that his memory had not been refreshed by

Agent Hunter’s testimony the day before. The natural and

sole purpose of asking Alcantara about Agent Hunter’s

testimony recounting Alcantara’s alleged statements—rather

than simply asking about the statements themselves—was to

induce Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s veracity. 

Whether Alcantara “remembered” Agent Hunter’s testimony

was of no import to the case; the prosecutor achieved what he

wanted when his questioning resulted in Alcantara’s

testimony that Agent Hunter had invented his story. Thus,

the prosecutor improperly created a scenario that forced

Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s veracity.

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B.

The prosecutor’s initial closing argument was not plainly

improper. The central theme of the government’s argument

was to compare Agent Hunter’s credibility with Alcantara’s

credibility. The prosecutor began his argument by stating:

“Credibility. This case is largely going to come down to the

issue of credibility.” He then compared the two key

witnesses’ competing narratives of events. “[I]f you believe

Border Patrol Agent Aaron Hunter,” the prosecutor argued,

then Alcantara confessed to having knowingly entered the

United States with a group. “If you believe the defendant’s

story,” by contrast, “then it would have been impossible” for

Alcantara to have confessed because he did not know he had

entered the United States. The prosecutor then argued that

“one of those two witnesses is not telling the truth.” 

Alcantara contends that this last statement amounted to

misconduct.

Because it was reasonable to infer from the evidence that

either Agent Hunter or Alcantara was lying, the challenged

statement was not plainly improper. Prosecutors must

generally avoid statements “to the effect that, if the defendant

is innocent, government agents must be lying.” Sanchez,

176 F.3d at 1224 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

However, the government must be given reasonable latitude

in closing argument, and in “a case that essentially reduces to

which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be reasonable

to infer, and hence to argue, that one of [the] two sides is

lying.” United States v. Wilkes, 662 F.3d 524, 541 (9th Cir.

2011) (quoting United States v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1445

(9th Cir. 1991)). For example, the government is allowed to

argue that “somebody is lying” when the government and

defense witnesses present wholly incompatible testimony

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 17

regarding who initiated a drug transaction. Molina, 934 F.2d

at 1445; see also Wilkes, 662 F.3d at 541 (finding no

impropriety in the government’s argument that “[y]ou can’t

believe both” the defendant and prosecution witnesses). This

case similarly reduces to which of two conflicting accounts

is true. Agent Hunter’s narrative and Alcantara’s narrative

cannot be reconciled, and “the inference is unavoidable” that

one of them was lying. Molina, 934 F.2d at 1445.

Nor did the prosecutor’s vouching for Agent Hunter’s

credibility rise to the level of plain error when he later

argued: “Agent Hunter’s testimony remained consistent. It

remained believable, and it remained logical.” This

ambiguous statement is reasonably understood in either of

two ways: as an impermissible assertion of the prosecutor’s

personal opinion that Agent Hunter’s testimony was

consistent, believable, and logical; or as a permissible

argument that the jury should find Agent Hunter’s testimony

consistent, believable, and logical. We have held that a

prosecutor’s summary of what “we know” about the evidence

does not constitute improper vouching when the surrounding

context suggests that, despite the personal language, the

prosecutor is drawing inferences from evidence in the record

rather than offering an opinion. Younger, 398 F.3d at

1190–91. Here, when the statement is viewed in context, the

prosecutor appears to be employing the language of the

district court’s jury instruction as to credibility to argue that

the jury should believe Agent Hunter based upon inferences

it could draw from the evidence. The challenged statement

was ambiguous, and it did not clearly “place[] the prestige of

the government behind a witness through personal assurances

of the witness’s veracity.” Id. at 1190 (quoting United States

v. Leon-Reyes, 177 F.3d 816, 822 (9th Cir. 1999)). It

therefore did not amount to plain error.

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18 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

C.

The government concedes that it improperly vouched for

Agent Hunter’s credibility when it began its rebuttal

argument by stating: “Ladies and gentlemen, this case boils

down to the credibility of a 15-year methamphetamine addict,

a man who has every incentive to lie, versus the testimony

and the evidence of Border Patrol agents who are sworn to

uphold the law.” There was no evidence in the record that

Border Patrol agents are “sworn to uphold the law.” As the

government appropriately concedes, the prosecutor vouched

for Agent Hunter’s credibility by referring to facts not before

the jury to convince it in this credibility showdown that Agent

Hunter was telling the truth, as he was sworn to do. See, e.g.,

Combs, 379 F.3d at 574; Sanchez, 176 F.3d at 1224–25. We

have previously made clear that a prosecutor may not argue

that “the existence of legal and professional repercussions”

for law enforcement officers serves to “ensure the credibility

of the officers’ testimony.” Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1146. 

That is precisely what the prosecutor did here.

IV.

While Alcantara timely objected to the prosecutor’s

improper rebuttal argument, and arguably timely objected to

the prosecutor’s improper cross-examination, we need not

decide whether to apply harmless error analysis here. Even

under the more restrictive plain error standard the combined

misconduct requires reversal. Id. at 1151.

Under the plain error standard, where prosecutorial

misconduct affects the defendant’s substantial rights and

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or reputation of

judicial proceedings, the misconduct is reversible error. See

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 19

Combs, 379 F.3d at 568. To determine whether the

misconduct affected the defendant’s substantial rights, we

“look to the substance of any curative instructions, and the

strength of the case against the defendant absent the

misconduct.” United States v. Sanchez, 659 F.3d 1252, 1257

(9th Cir. 2011). There is no bright-line rule for determining

whether reversal is appropriate. Rather, we may consider

various relevant factors, including the form and timing of the

misconduct, the extent to which the prosecutor asserted a

personal opinion or implied extra-record knowledge, the

importance of the testimony to which the improper conduct

related, and the specificity and timing of any curative

instruction. See Ruiz, 710 F.3d at 1085.

We have repeatedly reversed convictions for plain error

in cases in which “witness credibilitywas paramount” and the

prosecutor sought to bolster critical testimony through

improper conduct. Combs, 379 F.3d at 573 (quoting Geston,

299 F.3d at 1137); see also Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1151;

Kerr, 981 F.2d at 1054. There is no question that witness

credibility was paramount in this case. As the prosecutor

himself stated: “Credibility. This case is largely going to

come down to the issue of credibility.”

This particular credibility contest was made even closer

by the significant credibility problems of each of the

contestants. Alcantara’s drugged memory was spotty and

selective at best. He remembered some highly specific

details of his journey, such as the quantities of

methamphetamine he purchased en route, and filling up a

water bottle with dirty water near palm trees, while providing

inconsistent testimony about his prior use of

methamphetamine, among other subjects. And Alcantara’s

four prior convictions for illegal reentry, which he

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20 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

acknowledged during cross-examination, surely impaired his

credibility.

On the other hand, Agent Hunter’s testimony that

Alcantara spontaneously confessed to having knowingly

entered the United States was not particularly believable. 

Agent Hunter failed to make any contemporaneous record of

Alcantara’s alleged confession. The statements do not appear

in either the Border Patrol’s report or Agent Hunter’s own

“detailed” addendum. Nor did he tell anyone else about

Alcantara’s alleged statements for at least seven months

thereafter. It was not until Agent Hunter met with the

prosecutors in this case that he somehow managed to recall

and report Alcantara’s alleged spontaneous confession to the

elements of a § 1326 violation. Moreover, Agent Hunter’s

testimony that Alcantara had water bottles and empty food

containers in his backpack was vague, unconvincing, and

substantially undermined on cross-examination. On cross,

Agent Hunter admitted that he had not personally searched

Alcantara’s bag and was unable to recall the specific items it

may have contained, contrary to his direct testimony. There

was also no contemporaneous record or physical evidence of

the bag’s alleged contents.3

Although Alcantara was a poor witness, the defense at

least provided some corroboration of the essential details of

his exculpatory narrative. The El Hongo rehabilitation center

3 During cross-examination of the defense’s psychiatric expert, some

mention was made of a hospital record that indicated Alcantara had food

and water at some point. It was unclear who had provided this

information or when Alcantara had either possessed or been given the

food and water, and no mention was made of Alcantara’s backpack. The

record itself was not introduced into evidence.

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 21

and the abandoned railroad tunnel where Alcantara testified

he used methamphetamine actually existed. Evidence

showed a gap in the border fence near the location of

Alcantara’s arrest, which, Alcantara argued, allowed him to

enter the United States easily. And a psychiatric expert

provided unrebutted testimony that a habitual

methamphetamine user could suffer hallucinations and

disorientation as to time and place, especially if dehydrated

and exposed to extreme heat. While this jury did not believe

Alcantara, a jury in a trial unaffected by improper

prosecutorial conduct reasonably could have believed him

and concluded that he did not knowingly enter the United

States—or at least that the government failed to prove beyond

a reasonable doubt that he did so.

The government’s conduct of the trial illuminates the

closeness of the case and demonstrates that a conviction was

far from assured. The more junior of the two U.S. attorneys

handling the case, who was actually trying his first case,

handled almost the entire trial. He gave the opening

statement, examined Agent Hunter, cross-examined

Alcantara, and offered the government’s initial closing

argument. Then the more senior prosecutor stood up to argue

the government’s rebuttal. After reintroducing himself to the

jury, the senior prosecutor opened the rebuttal with the

improper statement comparing “the credibility of a 15-year

methamphetamine addict” to “the evidence of Border Patrol

agents who are sworn to uphold the law.”

The senior prosecutor had ample opportunity to consider

how to proceed in rebuttal. He chose to begin his remarks

with a comment that an experienced Assistant United States

Attorney would surely know approached, if not exceeded, the

bounds of propriety. That the supervising prosecutor at

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22 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

trial—who, unlike us, actually observed the critical testimony

and the jury’s response to the key witnesses—felt motivated

to take this risk suggests he may have had doubts about the

outcome. Indeed, this improper comment was not the only

way in which the senior prosecutor aggressively pushed the

limits of propriety in his rebuttal argument. The district court

sustained an objection to the prosecutor’s misstatement of the

evidence, and then spontaneously chided him for “trying to

get around” the objection when he attempted to restate the

point obliquely. The district court also admonished the

prosecutor twice during his remarks for going beyond the

proper scope of rebuttal, and then again after the jury had

retired for “overd[oing] the true meaning of close by having

a second bite of the apple.” That the government felt the

need to engage in these improper tactics only enforces just

how close the credibility contest was, further demonstrating

that the combined misconduct, the questioning about Agent

Hunter’s veracity and the improper rebuttal, was highly

prejudicial.

Defense counsel did timely object to the senior

prosecutor’s improper rebuttal argument, and the district

court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to

disregard the comment. We are not convinced, however, that

the trial court’s instruction sufficiently cured the error. Our

cases concerning prosecutorial vouching often require more

than a quick statement that “the jury will disregard” the

vouching to neutralize any prejudice. United States v.

Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir. 1990). In Simtob, for

instance, we found that the effect of vouching was not cured

even though the district court had instructed the jury to

disregard the comment and had provided relevant general jury

instructions on credibility. Id. In other cases, we have found

that “the manner in which [defense] objections were sustained

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 23

unfortunately did not deliver the required strong cautionary

message,” Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d at 1151, and we have

suggested that a “strongly worded curative instruction” may

be necessary to cure vouching, Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1258. 

See also Kerr, 981 F.2d at 1053 (examining the substance of

a curative instruction to determine whether vouching was

prejudicial). Here, a firmer and more specific curative

instruction would have been particularly appropriate. 

Because the government’s rebuttal was the last thing the jury

heard before beginning its deliberations, “the impact” of the

misconduct was “likely to be significant.” Sanchez, 659 F.3d

at 1259.

For these reasons, we conclude that the errors at trial

affected Alcantara’s substantial rights. It was fundamentally

unfair and prejudicial to Alcantara to compel him to impugn

the veracity of Agent Hunter’s critical, and possibly

determinative, testimony. Combs, 379 F.3d at 573. This

error was “compounded” by improper vouching that was not

fully remedied by the district court’s minimal curative

instruction. Id. at 574. As the government itself argued, the

jury was faced with a choice between believing Agent Hunter

or believing Alcantara. Both witnesses’ accounts of the

events in question were profoundly flawed, and given the

government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt, the jury plausibly could have acquitted Alcantara if the

trial had been untainted by prosecutorial misconduct. In light

of the senior prosecutor’s conduct in rebuttal argument, we

also conclude that the errors “seriously affect[ed]the fairness,

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24 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Ruiz,

710 F.3d at 1085 (quoting Sanchez, 659 F.3d at 1256).4

V.

By asking Alcantara to comment on the credibility of the

key witness against him, and then referring to evidence not

before the jury to bolster that witness’s testimony, the

government crossed the fine line separating the vigorous

pursuit of justice from the overzealous pursuit of victory. 

These improper tactics compromised the fairness of the trial. 

We reverse Alcantara’s conviction and remand for further

proceedings consistent with the demands of due process.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

4 Because we reverse on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, we need

not reach Alcantara’s argument that the jury instructions misstated the

law. We have, however, repeatedly upheld the use of the Ninth Circuit

model jury instruction on reasonable doubt. See, e.g., United States v.

Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v. Clayton,

108 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. MerazOlivera, 472 F. App’x 610, 612 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting the same

arguments Alcantara makes here).

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 25

RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. Martin Alcantara-Castillo

(Alcantara) challenges his conviction for being a deported

alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326. Alcantara contends that a new trial is warranted

because the government improperly compelled Alcantara to

challenge the veracity of a government witness during the

government’s cross-examination and impermissibly vouched

for government witnesses during closing arguments. The

majority agrees with Alcantara. I agree with the district

court.

I. BACKGROUND

Alcantara was charged with one count of being a deported

alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326.

A. Trial Testimony

Border Patrol Agent Aaron Hunter testified that, on June

26, 2011, he was informed that a motion sensor had been

triggered approximately seven miles east of the Tecate port

of entry. Agent Hunter described the area as “very

mountainous, rugged terrain” one mile north of the border.

According to Agent Hunter, he discovered Alcantara

lying on the ground in the area, alongside a cargo container. 

When questioned in Spanish, Alcantara responded that he

was a Mexican citizen and lacked any documents permitting

him to be in the United States. Agent Hunter arrested

Alcantara, who remained calm and submissive. Agent Hunter

opined that, if Alcantara had been under the influence of

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26 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

narcotics, Agent Hunter would have contacted the local

police for safety reasons. Based on his training, Agent

Hunter did not believe that Alcantara was under the influence

of narcotics because Alcantara “seemed fully aware of the

situation” and answered Agent Hunter’s questions

appropriately.

According to Agent Hunter, Alcantara spontaneously

informed Agent Hunter that he was part of a group of aliens

who had been chased by border patrol agents during the

previous night and that he was attempting to return to

Mexico.

During a subsequent search, border patrol agents other

than Agent Hunter found a backpack with empty bottles and

food containers, but no illegal narcotics or drug

paraphernalia. Agent Hunter related that Alcantara also

provided a false name to the agents.

On cross-examination, Agent Hunter acknowledged that

the arrest report did not include Alcantara’s statement that he

had been separated from a group of aliens entering the United

States. Agent Hunter also did not mention the statement to

his fellow agent, or when he drafted an addendum to the

report. Agent Hunter informed the government of

Alcantara’s statement when preparing for trial. Agent Hunter

explained that the statement was not in the report or

addendum because it was “not relevant to the arrest.” Rather,

the facts relevant to Alcantara’s arrest were Alcantara’s

presence in the United States; his statement that he was a

Mexican citizen; and the lack of documents permitting

Alcantara to enter or remain in the United States.

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 27

Border Patrol Agent Luis Martinez testified that, on June

26, 2011, he interviewed Alcantara. Agent Martinez

terminated the interview within one minute pursuant to

Border Patrol policies because Alcantara stated that he was

under the influence of methamphetamine. However, Agent

Martinez related that, based on his training, there were no

objective indications that Alcantara was under the influence

of “any mind-altering substance.”

According to Alcantara, he had been using

methamphetamine almost daily since 1995. He decided to

enter a rehabilitation clinic on June 24, 2011, the day before

his arrest in the United States, because one of his friends had

died of an overdose. Intending to enter a clinic near El

Hongo, Mexico, he left on a bus to Tecate on June 25, but

purchased methamphetamine prior to leaving. After arriving

in Tecate, Alcantara intended to go to the home of a friend. 

However, Alcantara met two men along the way in a tunnel

near a bridge and smoked methamphetamine with them, more

methamphetamine than he had ever smoked before.

Alcantara did not remember leaving the tunnel, and

awakened the next day on the side of the road, thinking he

was on the road between Tecate and Mexicali. According to

Alcantara, he was resting on a board next to a container when

he was approached by an individual in a uniform. Alcantara

informed the man in uniform that he was Mexican. Alcantara

did not remember saying anything more to the man.

Alcantara acknowledged that he had been convicted of

illegal reentry in 1995, 1997, 2002, and 2009. Alcantara also

conceded that he had lied during a prior arrest when he stated

that he had never used methamphetamine.

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The prosecutor asked Alcantara if he remembered Agent

Hunter’s testimony from the previous day concerning

statements made by Alcantara. Alcantara stated that he did

not remember Agent Hunter’s testimony. Alcantara also

responded:

Agent Hunter, he can say whatever he wants. 

He is saying I had a black sweater the day of

my arrest, that I had food in my backpack, and

there is nothing of that. That was all invented. 

All these things were invented.

The prosecutor subsequently inquired, “Your testimony is

that Agent Hunter is inventing stories about you; is that

correct?” When Alcantara responded, “[w]here are my

things,” the prosecutor asked, “do you remember him telling

that story?” After overruling the defense’s objection that the

government was vouching for Agent Hunter, the district court

stated there was “a confusion as to time. Did you hear the

story the agent told yesterday?” Alcantara finally responded,

“Yes, I did.”

Dr. Clark Smith, a specialist in psychiatry and addiction

psychiatry, testified that he interviewed Alcantara for three

hours and determined that Alcantara was methamphetaminedependent.

Lorena Garcia (Garcia), an investigator for the Federal

Defenders of San Diego, traveled to Mexico and visited the

rehabilitation clinic in El Hongo. Garcia related that the

clinic went by the acronym “CRREAD” and that it was

located to the east of Tecate. Garcia also located a tunnel “on

the outskirts of Tecate . . .”

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 29

B. Closing Arguments

During closing arguments, the prosecutor stated:

Credibility. This case is largely going to

come down to the issue of credibility. You

have heard two versions of the facts in this

case. Two witnesses: the defendant testifying

that he didn’t know what happened, that he

was blacked out; and the prosecution’s

witness, Border Patrol Agent Aaron Hunter,

who testified that the defendant calmly and

coherently told him how he had knowingly

entered the United States the day before, and

proceeded north with a group that had been

scouted by . . . border patrol agents on ATVs.

The prosecutor argued that the jury could not believe both

Agent Hunter’s testimony and Alcantara’s testimony and

“one of those two witnesses is not telling the truth.” Relying

on the credibility instruction provided by the district court,1

 

1

 The district court instructed the jury:

In deciding the facts in this case, you may have to

decide which testimony to believe and which testimony

not to believe. You may believe everything a witness

says, or part of it, or none of it. In considering the

testimony of any witness, you may take into account:

(1) the witness’s opportunity and ability to see or hear

or know the things testified to; (2) the witness’s

memory; (3) the witness’s manner while testifying;

(4) the witness’s interest in the outcome of the case, if

any; (5) the witness’s bias or prejudice, if any;

(6) whether other evidence contradicted the witness’s

testimony; (7) the reasonableness of the witness’s

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30 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

the prosecutor asserted that “Agent Hunter’s testimony

remained consistent. It remained believable, and it remained

logical.”

The prosecutor emphasized that Alcantara remembered

numerous events, such as smokingmethamphetamine, resting

at the container, and picking up a water bottle on the

roadside, but was unable to remember key facts concerning

his entry into the United States. The prosecutor argued that

Alcantara was not credible and had “every motive to lie . . .”

In rebuttal, the prosecutor reiterated that “this case boils

down to the credibility of a 15-year methamphetamine addict,

a man who has every incentive to lie, versus the testimony

and the evidence of border patrol agents who are sworn to

uphold the law.” The district court sustained the defense’s

objection and instructed the jury to disregard the

government’s comment. However, the district court denied

the defense’s request for a curative instruction that “law

enforcement officers are not entitled to any greater credibility

as compared to any other witness. . . .” The district court held

that the jury had been thoroughly instructed on the credibility

of witnesses and that a curative instruction was unwarranted

in light of the district court’s instruction for the jury to

disregard the comment.

testimony in light of all the evidence; and (8) any other

factors that bear on believability. The weight of the

evidence as to a fact does not necessarily depend on the

number of witnesses who testify. What is important is

how believable the witnesses were, and how much

weight you think their testimony deserves.

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 31

C. Conviction and Sentence

The jury found Alcantara guilty and the district court

sentenced Alcantara to forty months’ imprisonment. 

Alcantara filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

“We review alleged vouching for harmless error when . . .

the defendant objected at trial.” United States v. Stinson,

647 F.3d 1196, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011), as amended (citation

omitted). “We review for abuse of discretion a district

court’srulings on alleged prosecutorial misconduct, including

vouching.” Id. (citation omitted). We review claims of

misconduct for plain error when the defendant failed to

object. See United States v. Doss, 630 F.3d 1181, 1193 (9th

Cir. 2011), as amended. Denial of a requested curative

instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United

States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Prosecutor’s Cross-Examination

Because Alcantara did not object to the cross-examination

during trial, we review for plain error. See Doss, 630 F.3d at

1193. To be plain, an error must be so obvious that the judge

should be able to detect the error even in the absence of an

objection. See United States v. Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d 1092,

1098 (9th Cir. 2011). “Improper questioning was [not] an

organizational theme for the prosecutor’s entire crossexamination.” United States v. Harrison, 585 F.3d 1155,

1159 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended. Rather, Alcantara

spontaneouslychallengedAgentHunter’s testimonywhen the

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prosecutor merely inquired whether Alcantara remembered

that testimony. The prosecutor followed up by inquiring if it

was Alcantara’s “testimony . . . that Agent Hunter [was]

inventing stories about [him].” The prosecutor did not

otherwise compel Alcantara to comment on Agent Hunter’s

veracity. Cf. United States v. Geston, 299 F.3d 1130, 1135

(9th Cir. 2002) (asking five times whether the government

witness “would be lying” if his testimony contradicted that of

the witness).

The crucial distinction between this case and the cases

cited in the majority opinion is the absence of the word

“lying” in the questions posed by the prosecutor in this case. 

Use of that word appears to be the common denominator in

those cases holding that plain error occurred. See, e.g., 

Geston, 299 F.3d at 1134 (asking if the government witness

“would be lying”); United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572

(9th Cir. 2004) (questioning whether agent “was lying” in his

earlier testimony); Harrison, 585 F.3d at 1158 (inquiring if

witnesses were “swearing on oath to testify to the truth and

then lying”); United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1220

(9th Cir. 1999) (asking if the witness “would say [another

witness] was lying” when he testified); United States v.

Moreland, 622 F.3d 1147, 1159 (9th Cir. 2010) (“You heard

his testimony. . . . He’s lying?”) (emphases added).

The majority seeks to lessen the precedential effect of

these cases by resorting to dictionary definitions. See

Majority Opinion, p. 12–13. Yet, we resort to dictionary

definitions only when the meaning of language in a statute is

unclear, not to reword our precedent. See, e.g., San Jose

Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,

1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (“To determine the plain meaning of a

term undefined by a statute, resort to a dictionary is

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 33

permissible . . .”) (citation omitted). The fact remains that the

majority has cited no case where prosecutorial misconduct

was found based on an inquiry regarding “invention” of

testimony, particularly when that characterization was first

used by the testifying defendant. Without clear precedent on

this issue, it cannot be fairly said that the district court plainly

erred.

Indeed, the majority has not cited one case where there

was a determination of plain error in the absence of use of 

the word “lying” or some variant of “lie.” Yet, there are

cases in our precedent concluding that there was no plain

error when the prosecutor was accused of forcing the witness

to comment on veracity, but stopped short of using the Lword. See, e.g., United States v. Greer, 640 F.3d 1011, 1023

(9th Cir. 2011) (observing that “[a]lthough we have

repeatedly stated that a prosecutor may not ask the defendant

to comment on the veracity of another witness, we have

found improper prosecutorial questioning in only one

particular context: when the prosecutor specificallyasked the

defendant whether another witness was lying”) (citing

Harrison, Combs, Geston and Sanchez).

The majority argues that my reliance on Greer is

misplaced. See Majority Opinion, p. 13. I beg to differ. 

Greer states definitively the point that makes plain error

inapplicable to this case—“we have found improper

prosecutorial questioning in only one particular context: 

when the prosecutor specifically asked the defendant whether

another witness was lying.” 640 F.3d at 1023 (citations

omitted) (emphasis in the original). We declined to conclude

that there was plain error when the prosecutor asked whether

another witness testified “inaccurately” because neither the

Supreme Court nor our court had yet ruled on whether asking

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34 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

about “inaccurate” testimony was improper. Id. Similarly,

neither the Supreme Court nor this court has ruled that asking

about “invented” testimonyis improper, particularlywhen the

term is first used by the testifying defendant. Notably, this

case cites the exact cases cited by the majority, but

acknowledges that these cases concluding that questioning

was improper are limited to “one particular context: when the

prosecutor specifically asked the defendant whether another

witness was lying. . . .” Id. (emphasis in the original); see

also United States v. Wright, 625 F.3d 583, 612 (9th Cir.

2010) (holding that there was no plain error when the

prosecutor asked the defendant questions concerning a “rogue

agent” during “a fairly argumentative cross-examination in

order to poke holes in [the defendant’s] version of the facts”).

The facts of this case diverge substantially from those

relied upon by the majority. An initial and important

difference is that the first comment on the veracity of Agent

Hunter’s testimony came unprompted from Alcantara when

he stated that Agent Hunter had “invented things” about

Alcantara. Unlike in the cases where plain error occurred, the

prosecutor did not follow up by asking Alcantara if Agent

Hunter was lying when he testified. Rather, he used the same

word utilized by Alcantara to ask Alcantara: “Your

testimony is that Agent Hunter is inventing stories about you;

is that correct?”

There was nothing inappropriate about the prosecutor

asking Alcantara if he heard Agent Hunter’s testimony, and

the majority has cited no authority otherwise. Cf. Hoxsie v.

Kerby, 108 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a

claim of prosecutor misconduct where the attorney asked the

defendant if he had heard the testimony); see also Wright,

625 F.3d at 612 (“There was nothing improper about the

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 35

prosecutor’s” questions forcing the defendant to call the

investigating agent a “rogue agent”).

The majority intimates that its holding of plain error is

valid because the prosecutor “forced” Alcantara to comment

on Agent Hunter’s truthfulness. Majority Opinion, pp.

14–15. However, this contention lacks persuasive force

because we have expressly held that no plain error occurred

during a “fairlyargumentative cross-examination” that forced

a defendant to call an agent a “rogue agent.” See Wright,

625 F.3d at 612.

Finally, even if it was error for the district court to allow

the prosecutor to follow-up on Alcantara’s comment that

Agent Hunter “made up things,” “the error was not so clearcut, so obvious, a competent district judge should have been

able to avoid it without benefit of objection. . . .” Greer,

640 F.3d at 1023 (citation, alterations and internal quotation

marks omitted). In Greer, we concluded that “[b]ecause

neither the Supreme Court nor this court has yet ruled on the

propriety of the prosecutor’s questions in this case [whether

witnesses testified inaccurately], the district court did not

err.” Id. The same is true in this case. As mentioned, we

have limited our cases involving plain error to those where a

witness is asked if another witness is lying. See id. Neither

the United States Supreme Court nor this court has gone

further to impute plain error when the prosecutor asks if

another witness “made up things,” especially when the

defendant used the phrase first and the prosecutor merely

repeated the phrase in the form of a question. Because the

facts in this case differ so dramatically from those where

plain error occurred, I would hold that the trial judge was not

obligated to sua sponte object to the prosecutor’s questions to

Alcantara. See Matus-Zayas, 655 F.3d at 1098.

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36 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

B. The Prosecutor’s Closing Arguments

“Improper vouching consists of placing the prestige of the

government behind a witness through personal assurances of

the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that information not

presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony. . . .” 

United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

“[C]redibility is a matter to be decided by the jury.” Id. at

1082 (citation omitted). “To that end, prosecutors have been

admonished time and again to avoid statements to the effect

that, if the defendant is innocent, government agents must be

lying.” Id. at 1082–83 (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted). “It is also true, however, that the prosecution must

have reasonable latitude to fashion closing arguments. 

Inherent in this latitude is the freedom to argue reasonable

inferences based on the evidence. In a case that essentially

reduces to which of two conflicting stories is true, it may be

reasonable to infer, and hence to argue, that one of the two

sides is lying.” Id. (citations omitted).

Reversal of Alcantara’s conviction based on the

prosecutor’s closing arguments is not warranted given

Alcantara’s credibility problems and the evidence presented

at trial. Alcantara was found in the United States in an area

described as “very mountainous, rugged terrain” north of the

United States-Mexico border. The government presented

photographs to the jury evincing the rugged and mountainous

terrain through which Alcantara maintained that he blindly

and unconsciously wandered as he was under the influence of

methamphetamine. Despite Alcantara’s contention that he

was engaged in methamphetamine-induced wandering, Agent

Hunter testified that border patrol agents found empty food

containers and bottles in Alcantara’s backpack and that

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 37

Alcantara did not appear to be under the influence of

narcotics. Alcantara’s alleged statement to Agent Hunter that

Alcantara was separated from a group of aliens traveling to

the United States after being dispersed by border patrol

agents was consistent with Agent Joseph Moore’s testimony

concerning similar events that occurred that evening.

Alcantara also suffered from an extensively selective

memory. He testified in great detail about his decision to

enter a rehabilitation clinic on the day before his arrest; the

one thousand pesos he won at a casino “on Revolucion and

Third Street” after purchasing a fifty-peso ticket he used to

buy six balloons of methamphetamine on the night before

making his decision to seek rehabilitation; his purchase of

five bags of methamphetamine at the Hotel Nizan on the

same evening; his bus trip at five o’clock in the morning on

June 25th to Tecate; his purchase of two bags of

methamphetamine immediatelybefore his bus trip; his arrival

in Tecate at eight o’clock in the morning; his cab ride to “the

Andalucia neighborhood” to meet a friend, Juan, who had a

small home near Tecate with sheep; his consumption of two

balloons of methamphetamine with two men in a tunnel near

a bridge and railroad tracks; and his subsequent

methamphetamine purchase for seven hundred pesos. After

waking up the next day in the United States, Alcantara

remembered seeing “a small little farm that had some palm

trees”; picking up a water bottle from the side of the road;

cleaning a board on the ground next to a container so that he

could rest; being approached by an individual “dressed in

green”; asking Agent Hunter for water because Alcantara had

filled his water bottle “over . . . where the palm trees were at,

and the water was dirty”; and picking up a water bottle as he

was walking with Agent Hunter.

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38 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

Despite Alcantara’s detailed recollection of the former

events, Alcantara did not remember traveling through a

rugged and mountainous area into the United States, any

statement to Agent Hunter about his entry into the United

States, or even Agent Hunter’s trial testimony from the day

before until finally answering the district court’s question.

Moreover, Alcantara’s credibility was severely

undermined by his admissions that he had been convicted of

illegal reentry in 1995, 1997, 2002, and 2009. Notably,

Alcantara was arrested for illegal reentry on two occasions

after traveling into the United States from Tecate. Alcantara

also conceded that he lied during a prior arrest when he

falsely stated that he had never used methamphetamine.

Although the prosecutor did improperly vouch for

government witnesses by mentioning during rebuttal

argument that the border patrol agents were “sworn to uphold

the law,” the district court immediately sustained the defense

attorney’s objection, and instructed the jury to disregard the

comment, rendering any error harmless. See United States v.

Parks, 285 F.3d 1133, 1141 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that

improper statement was rendered harmless because the

district court “sustained [the defendant’s] objection . . . and

admonished the jury to disregard the statement”). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Alcantara’s

request for a curative instruction, as the district court properly

held that the jury had been fully instructed concerning the

credibility of government witnesses, and its prompt

instruction to disregard the isolated comment sufficiently

remedied any error. See United States v. Dorsey, 677 F.3d

944, 955 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court’s swift

response instructing the jury to disregard the improper

comment “prevented . . . [the] improper comment from

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 39

materially affecting the verdict”) (citation omitted); see also

United States v. Washington, 462 F.3d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir.

2006) (“A judge’s prompt corrective action in response to

improper comments usually is sufficient to cure any problems

arising from such improper comments. . . .”) (citations

omitted).

Considering Alcantara’s significant credibility problems,

the evidence presented at trial of his illegal presences in the

United States, and the curative instruction given by the trial

judge, Alcantara failed to demonstrate that “in the context of

the entire trial, it is more probable than not that [the

prosecutor’s comment] materially affected the verdict. . . .” 

Dorsey, 677 F.3d at 954 (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Stated another way, any error in vouching

for the witnesses was harmless. See id. at 955. Finally, there

was no abuse of discretion in denying the requested curative

instruction. See Skinner, 667 F.2d at 1310 (recognizing that

use of curative or limiting instructions is within the district

court’s discretion).

Our decision in United States v. Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d

1142 (9th Cir. 2005), does not compel a contrary result. In

that case, the prosecutor extensively vouched for government

witnesses. The prosecutor started out by describing a police

witness as “a credible officer.” Id. at 1146. Despite being

instructed not to vouch, the prosecutor went on to argue that

the police officers

had no reason to come in here and not tell you

the truth. I guess, if you believe . . . defense

counsel, they must have lied at the scene

there; they came into this court and they lied

to you; they lied to this judge; they lied to me;

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40 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

they lied to my agent . . . I guess they lied to

the dispatcher when they called it in. These

are officers that risk losin’ [sic] their jobs, risk

losin’ [sic] their pension, risk losin’ [sic] their

livelihood. And, on top of that if they come in

here and lie, I guess they’re riskin’ bein’ [sic]

prosecuted for perjury. . . .

Id.

The prosecutor used the “they lied” refrain six

consecutive times, and told the jury that the officers risked

losing their jobs, losing their pensions, losing their livelihood,

and being prosecuted for perjury. Id. In contrast, the

prosecutor in this case simply stated once that the agent was

sworn to uphold the law. Unlike in Weatherspoon, see id.,

the prosecutor in this case did not continue to vouch for the

agent after the court sustained the defense objection. 

Moreover, unlike in Weatherspoon, see id., the court in this

case gave a curative instruction. The two cases are so

different that Weatherspoon does not dictate the result in this

case. In Weatherspoon, we held that reversal of the

defendant’s conviction was warranted because the district

court’s approach

did not produce any meaningful alteration of

the prosecutor’s arguments, and the manner in

which such objections were sustained

unfortunately did not deliver the required

strong cautionary message . . .

Id. at 1151. We opined that

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UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO 41

[s]uch failures to correct the improper

statements at the time they were made cannot

be salvaged by the later generalized jury

instruction reminding jurors that a lawyer’s

statements during closing argument do not

constitute evidence. In short, the curative

instructions offered . . . did not neutralize the

harm of the improper statements because they

did not mention the specific statements of the

prosecutor and were not given immediately

after the damage was done.

Id. (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks

omitted). The district court in this case immediately

sustained the defense’s objection and instructed the jury to

disregard the isolated comment. Unlike in Weatherspoon,

Alcantara does not contend that the government continued to

improperly vouch for government witnesses after the district

court’s ruling. See Dorsey, 677 F.3d at 955 (noting that the

judge’s curative action prevented any improper comment

from “materially affecting the verdict”); see also Parks,

258 F.3d at 1141 (same).

IV. CONCLUSION

The prosecutor’s isolated question in response to

Alcantara’sspontaneous challenge to Agent Hunter’s veracity

during extensive cross-examination does not rise to the level

of plain error as reflected in our precedent.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying

a curative instruction during the prosecutor’s rebuttal

argument, as it granted Alcantara’s motion to strike and

instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s comment that

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42 UNITED STATES V. ALCANTARA-CASTILLO

the border patrol agents were “sworn to uphold the law.” 

Any prejudice stemming from the government’s comment

was cured by the district court’s instruction and no additional

curative instruction was required. In any event, in the context

of the entire trial, it is highly unlikely that the prosecutor’s

comment materially affected the verdict.

There is no such thing as a perfect trial, and district court

judges are not held to that standard. See Brown v. United

States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–32 (1973). Considering the trial in

its entirety, the proceedings were fundamentally fair, and on

that basis we should affirm this conviction. See id.; see also

United States v. Del Toro-Barboza, 673 F.3d 1136, 1150 (9th

Cir. 2012).

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