Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00020/USCOURTS-ca10-05-00020-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jennifer Chapel
Appellee
Mick Chapel
Appellee
David Brian Derringer
Appellant

Document Text:

* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. BAP

L.R. 8018-6(a).

FILED

U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

of the Tenth Circuit

September 6, 2005

Barbara A. Schermerhorn

Clerk NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT

IN RE DAVID BRIAN DERRINGER,

Debtor.

BAP No. NM-05-020

DAVID BRIAN DERRINGER,

Appellant,

Bankr. No. 13-04-17330-MA

 Chapter 13

v. ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

MICK CHAPEL and JENNIFER

CHAPEL,

Appellees.

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Mexico

Before MICHAEL, McNIFF, and THURMAN, Bankruptcy Judges.

MICHAEL, Bankruptcy Judge.

The parties did not request oral argument, and after examining the briefs

and appellate record, the Court has determined unanimously that oral argument

would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8012. The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

David Brian Derringer (“Derringer”) appeals an order denying his motion

for judicial notice, entered by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District

of New Mexico on February 2, 2005, and an order denying his motion for relief

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 1 of 10
1 We also deny Appellant’s Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Violations of Rule 8008 and 8008-1 by Chapels and Attorneys Joseph Manges and Stephen

Long with Violations of Due Process Against the Appellant in Violation of the

14th Amendment, filed April 12, 2005; and Appellant’s Motion to Strike Chapels’

Untimely Reply Brief Filed Without Leave of BAP Panel, filed June 15, 2005.

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under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, entered March 3, 2005. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.1

I. Background

In 1993, Susan Nevitt and her mother, Norma Nevitt (“Nevitts”), purchased

property along Harris Creek in Catron County, New Mexico (“Property”), which

was upstream from property owned by Appellees Mick and Jennifer Chapel

(“Chapels”). The Nevitts and Susan Nevitt’s husband, Derringer, constructed

dams on the Property, which diverted water from Harris Creek into ponds located

on the Property. In 1994, the Chapels brought suit against the Nevitts in New

Mexico state court, Catron County (“State Court”), seeking to establish the

seniority of their water rights and to enjoin the Nevitts from obstructing or

interfering with the free flow of Harris Creek or using water from Harris Creek. 

In 1995, before the case went to trial, Derringer acquired an interest in the

Property by a special warranty deed from the Nevitts to themselves and Derringer

as joint tenants; however, Derringer did not attempt to become a party to the case. 

In 1996, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the Chapels, and the State Court

entered judgment against the Nevitts and permanently enjoined them, and their

successors and assigns, from interfering with the Chapels’ water rights (“1996

Injunction”). The Nevitts appealed the judgment and injunction to the

New Mexico Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

In 2000, the Chapels sought to reopen the action against the Nevitts to

enforce the 1996 Injunction, which they claimed the Nevitts were violating. On

his motion and with the consent of the other parties, Derringer was joined as a

party-defendant. In 2001, the State Court issued a decision and judgment

concluding that (1) the Nevitts and Derringer had violated the 1996 Injunction;

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 2 of 10
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(2) the Chapels were entitled to a mandatory injunction requiring the Nevitts and

Derringer to remove any and all obstructions to the flow of water in Harris Creek;

and (3) the Chapels were entitled to a continuing injunction prohibiting the

Nevitts and Derringer from appropriating any water in Harris Creek until the

Chapels had received their appropriation each year (“2001 Judgment”). The

Nevitts and Derringer appealed the 2001 Judgment to the New Mexico Court of

Appeals, arguing that they had a superior claim to the water rights than did the

Chapels; that the State Court Judge was biased by his previous relationship with

the Chapels and should have recused; that the original proceedings were infirm

because Derringer was a necessary and indispensable party to them and the State

Court had no jurisdiction to proceed in Derringer’s absence; and that without

Derringer’s presence in the original proceedings, the 1996 Injunction was invalid. 

The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the 2001 Judgment.

In 2002, the Chapels again returned to State Court to enforce the 1996

injunction and the 2001 Judgment. Following a trial in 2003, at which Derringer

appeared but the Nevitts did not, the State Court awarded the Chapels

compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. The

State Court further ordered that Derringer and the Nevitts would be fined $100

per day for every day that they were in violation of the 1996 Injunction (“2003

Judgment”). Derringer and the Nevitts appealed the 2003 Judgment to the New

Mexico Court of Appeals, which affirmed. 

From 2002 to 2003, Derringer filed a series of lawsuits in the United States

District Court for the District of New Mexico (“Federal Court”). Defendants

included the Chapels; the State Court Judge; the Chapels’ attorney, Joseph

Manges (“Manges”), and his law firm; the Judges of the New Mexico Court of

Appeals; the New Mexico State Police; the Sheriff of Catron County; and the

New Mexico State Engineer. In each case, Derringer alleged violations of his

civil rights. He argued that the 1996 Injunction was invalid and not binding on

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 3 of 10
2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983).

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him. In each case, the Federal Court held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2

prevented the court from reviewing the 1996 Injunction, the 2001 Judgment, or

the 2003 Judgment. Derringer appealed several of the Federal Court orders to the

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

In 2004, the Chapels attempted to foreclose on the Property. In an attempt

to avoid a foreclosure, Derringer filed his Chapter 13 petition on October 6, 2004. 

On October 7, the Chapels’ attorney, Manges, mailed an amended notice of sale

to the State Court. The State Court file-stamped the amended notice of sale on

October 12, 2004. 

On October 18, 2004, Derringer filed in the bankruptcy court a “Motion to

Take Judicial Notice and Request for Relief, and Motion for Permanent

Restraining Order Against Mick Chapel, Jennifer Chapel, and Joseph Manges”

(“First Motion for Judicial Notice”), arguing that the Chapels and Manges had

willfully violated the automatic stay by mailing the amended notice of sale to the

State Court. On November 18, 2004, the bankruptcy court entered an order

denying the First Motion for Judicial Notice to the extent it sought injunctive or

equitable relief in the form of a permanent restraining order, holding that such

relief could be obtained only through an adversary proceeding.

On December 27, 2004, Derringer filed “Debtor David Derringer’s Motion

to Take Judicial Notice and Objection to Enforcement of Chapels’

Unconstitutional Claims of Debt” (“Second Motion for Judicial Notice”). In the

Second Motion for Judicial Notice, Derringer argued that the Chapels violated

New Mexico state law and deprived him of equal protection and due process. He

claimed that the 1996 Injunction and subsequent Judgments were invalid and not

binding on him, and he requested that the bankruptcy court (1) take judicial notice

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 4 of 10
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of his rights, privileges and immunities under the Constitution, 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981(a), and 42 U.S.C. § 1982; (2) take judicial notice of the violations of 18

U.S.C. § 241; (3) reconsider enforcement of the Chapels’ claims; (4) consider an

FBI investigation into the Chapels; and (5) consider the court’s duties under Code

of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D)(2).

On February 3, 2005, the bankruptcy court entered its order denying the

remainder of the First Motion for Judicial Notice and the Second Motion for

Judicial Notice. The bankruptcy court held that Derringer had not shown a willful

violation of the automatic stay by clear and convincing evidence. The bankruptcy

court further held that the Chapels’ judgments are final, enforceable judgments

that have res judicata effect, and even if res judicata were inapplicable, under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine the bankruptcy court had no authority to reconsider or

overrule final judgments entered by a state court. 

On February 11, 2005, Derringer filed a motion entitled “Debtor David

Derringer’s Timely Motion for a New Trial; Amendment of Order; and Relief

from Order; of the February 2, 2005, Order Denying Remainder of Debtor’s

Motion to Take Judicial Notice and Request for Relief, and Motion for Permanent

Restraining Order Against Mick Chapel, Jennifer Chapel, and Joseph Manges

Pursuant to F. R. Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 9023 and 9024 and the F. R. Civ. P.

Rules 59 and 60 and Pursuant to the 8th, 13th and 14th Amendment and Title 11

Section 362(A) in the ‘Interest of Justice’ with New Evidence to Prove Needed

Reversal of Decisions” (“Rule 59 Motion”). In the Rule 59 Motion, Derringer

argued that res judicata and Rooker-Feldman did not apply to him as he was not a

party to the original lawsuit against the Nevitts; the bankruptcy court lacked

jurisdiction to enforce the Chapels’ judgments because those judgments were

illegal; and the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to provide Derringer relief from

the Chapels’ judgments. The bankruptcy court denied the Rule 59 Motion by

order entered March 3, 2005. Derringer filed his notice of appeal on March 8,

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 5 of 10
3 See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).

4 Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 558 (1988); see Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8013.

5 Diviney v. Nationsbank of Tex., N.A. (In re Diviney), 225 B.R. 762, 769

(10th Cir. BAP 1998). See also In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 303 B.R. 299, 303

(D. Del. 2003).

6 Plotner v. AT&T Corp., 224 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2000) (application of res judicata is a question of law); Abboud v. Abboud (In re Abboud), 237 B.R.

777, 779 (10th Cir. BAP 1999) (application of Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a

question of law).

7 Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309, 1324 (10th Cir. 1997); Lopez v. Long (In re Long), 255 B.R. 241, 245 (10th Cir. BAP 2000).

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2005.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Derringer timely filed his notice of appeal of the order denying his Rule 59

Motion and the order denying his Second Motion to Take Judicial Notice, which

is a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).3

 The parties have consented to this

Court’s jurisdiction because they have not elected to have the appeal heard by the

United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.

“For purposes of standard of review, decisions by judges are traditionally

divided into three categories, denominated questions of law (reviewable de novo),

questions of fact (reviewable for clear error), and matters of discretion

(reviewable for ‘abuse of discretion’).”4

 Whether a party’s actions violated the

automatic stay is a question of law that is reviewed de novo; whether a party’s

violation of the automatic stay was willful is a question of fact that is reviewed

for clear error.5

 The applicability of the doctrines of res judicata and RookerFeldman is reviewed de novo.

6

 Finally, we review the denial of a motion under

Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 for an abuse of discretion.7

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 6 of 10
8 See Phillips v. Calhoun, 956 F.2d 949, 953-54 (10th Cir. 1992); Murrell v.

Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n.2 (10th Cir. 1994).

9 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (citing Cromwell v. County of

Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)).

10 Hoxworth v. Blinder, 74 F.3d 205, 208 (10th Cir. 1996); Satsky v.

Paramount Communications, Inc., 7 F.3d 1464, 1467 (10th Cir.1993).

11 Hoxworth, 74 F.3d at 208.

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III. Discussion

A. Violation of the Automatic Stay

The bankruptcy court held that Derringer had not shown by clear and

convincing evidence that Manges or the Chapels willfully violated the automatic

stay. Derringer makes no argument to the contrary. He has therefore waived this

issue,8

 and we will not review the bankruptcy court’s conclusion regarding

violation of the automatic stay.

B. Res Judicata and Rooker-Feldman

The bankruptcy court held that the doctrines of res judicata and RookerFeldman barred Derringer’s claims that the 1996 Injunction, 2001 Judgment, and

2003 Judgment were invalid or not binding on him. Derringer’s arguments to the

contrary are without merit.

“Under res judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes

the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been

raised in that action.”9

 The elements of res judicata are (1) a final judgment on

the merits in a prior action; (2) that the claims raised in the subsequent action are

identical to those decided in the prior action; and (3) that the prior action

involved the same parties or privies.10 This doctrine is intended to relieve parties

of burdensome multiple lawsuits, to prevent inconsistent decisions, and to

encourage reliance on adjudication.11

In this case, there have been several final State Court judgments, each

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 7 of 10
12 Derringer was a party to the 2001 Judgment and the 2003 Judgment. Derringer chose not to participate in the case underlying the 1996 Injunction;

however, his privies were participants, and the State Court subsequently

determined that the 1996 Injunction is binding on Derringer.

13 See Hoxworth, 74 F.3d at 208; Plotner, 224 F.3d at 1168-72 .

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concluding that the Chapels’ judgments are valid and binding on Derringer. The

claims raised in this appeal are identical to those decided in the prior State Court

actions. In each of the State Court actions, Derringer or his privy was a party.12

Res judicata therefore prevents Derringer from litigating issues that were or could

have been raised regarding the validity of the Chapels’ judgments.13

Additionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from

considering Derringer’s claims that the Chapels’ judgments are not valid. In a

recent appeal involving Derringer, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit held:

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes “a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of [a]

state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing

party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal

rights.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994). Thus, the doctrine “prohibits a lower federal court from considering

[both] claims actually decided by a state court and claims

‘inextricably intertwined’ with a prior state-court judgment.” 

Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 473 (10th Cir. 2002). This prohibition extends to decisions of the lower and intermediate

state courts, as well as the highest state court. Id. at 474-75.

Derringer’s claims against the Chapels challenge the propriety of the decisions made by [the State Court Judge] and the New

Mexico Court of Appeals. His claims were either directly decided by

one or both of those courts, or are inextricably intertwined with their

decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore precludes the federal court’s review of his claims.

Derringer attempts to avoid the doctrine’s preclusive effect by arguing that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his

claims in state court because he was not included in the proceedings

leading up to the original May 17, 1996 judgment and injunction. 

The record does not support Derringer’s contention that he has not

had an adequate opportunity to litigate his claims in the state court. 

Even if the record did support his claim, however, it would be to no

avail, because “Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or

‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether the

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 8 of 10
14 Derringer v. Chapel, 98 Fed. Appx. 728, 733-34 (10th Cir. April 12, 2004).

15 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 125 S.Ct. 1517, 1521

(2005) (“Plaintiffs in Rooker and Feldman had litigated and lost in state court. Their federal complaints, we observed, essentially invited federal courts of first

instance to review and reverse unfavorable state-court judgments. We declared

such suits out of bounds, i.e., properly dismissed for want of subject-matter

jurisdiction.”); see also Abboud, 237 B.R. at 779.

16 Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992) (“We treat Plaintiffs motion to reconsider as a motion to alter or amend

the judgment because the motion was filed within ten days after the district

court’s order granting summary judgment and dismissing the case was entered on

the docket.”). Rule 59 is made applicable to bankruptcy courts by Rule 9023 of

the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023.

17 Nat’l Metal Finishing Co., Inc. v. BarclaysAmerican/Commercial, Inc., 899

F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 781 F.2d

1260, 1268 (7th Cir. 1986); Voelkel v. Gen. Motors Corp., 846 F. Supp. 1482, 1483 (D. Kan.), aff’d without published opinion, 43 F.3d 1484 (10th Cir. 1994).

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state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and

fair opportunity to litigate [his] claims.” Id. at 478.14

As in that appeal to the Tenth Circuit, in this appeal Derringer makes the same

claims that either were directly decided by the State Court or are inextricably

intertwined with the State Court’s decisions. In order for Derringer to prevail, the

bankruptcy court would have to vacate or reverse the 1996 Injunction, the 2001

Judgment, and the 2003 Judgment. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the

court from doing so.15 The bankruptcy court’s order will therefore be affirmed.

C. Rule 59 Motion

A motion filed within ten days of entry of an order is considered a motion

to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.16 “Rule 59(e) does not allow the losing party to repeat old arguments

previously considered and rejected, or to raise new legal theories that should have

been raised earlier.”17 Having reviewed the Rule 59 Motion, we conclude that

Derringer did not raise any new issues that would qualify as grounds for altering

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 9 of 10
18 See In re Miller, 288 B.R. 879, 883 (10th Cir. BAP 2003).

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or amending the bankruptcy court’s order.18 The bankruptcy court therefore

properly denied the Rule 59 Motion.

IV. Conclusion

The bankruptcy court did not err. Its orders denying Derringer’s Motions

for Judicial Notice and Rule 59 Motion are AFFIRMED.

BAP Appeal No. 05-20 Docket No. 70 Filed: 09/06/2005 Page: 10 of 10