Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cr-00165-13/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dezmaighne McClain
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

501 I Street, Suite 10-100

Sacramento, CA 95814

Telephone: (916) 554-2700

Facsimile: (916) 554-2900

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

DEZMAIGHNE MCCLAIN,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 2:19-CR-0165 MCE

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

ORDER

DATE: August 26, 2021

TIME: 10:00 a.m.

COURT: Hon. Morrison C. England, Jr.

BACKGROUND

This case is set for status conference on August 26, 2021. On May 13, 2020, this Court issued 

General Order 618, which suspends all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until further 

notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue matters, 

excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611 issued 

on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s discretion.” 

General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-by-case 

exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the request of 

counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order will 

impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and previous

General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

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emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-ofjustice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his 

findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable 

unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that 

the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public

and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-69; see 

also United States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time 

following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). 

The coronavirus poses a similar, albeit more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the prompt 

proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “nonexhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act 

continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” United States v. Olsen, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL 

1589359 at *7 (9th Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is 

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detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked 

speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a 

population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness 

of the charges a defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; 

(6) whether there is a reason to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; 

and (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. Id.

Although the Court has begun to schedule jury trials, only two criminal jury trials have 

concluded, and Sacramento remains in an area of “substantial spread,” as cases rise due to the 

prevalence of the delta variant. Moreover, even though trials have begun, they are not proceeding at 

their normal pace, as precautions are taken to limit the number of trials occurring in the building at any 

one time (e.g., the Clerk’s proposed plan is to hold only one trial per floor at a time). 

In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding 

excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7) 

(Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for the status conference. United 

States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial continuance must be 

“specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for the status conference on August 26, 2021. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until 

September 9, 2021, and to exclude time between August 26, 2021, and September 9, 2021, under 

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4]. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case 

includes investigative reports and related documents, electronic recordings, physical evidence,

and other items obtained during the investigation. All of this discovery has been either produced 

directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

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b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review 

the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to prepare 

potential pretrial motions and to otherwise prepare for trial if necessary.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into 

account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) In addition to the public health concerns cited by the General Orders and 

presented by the evolving COVID-19 pandemic, an ends-of-justice delay is particularly apt in 

this case because the defendant has not invoked speedy trial rights and does not appear to belong 

to a population that is particularly vulnerable to the coronavirus (and even if he did, the Jail is 

offering vaccinations to all inmates). 

f) As noted, the Court has begun to schedule a limited number of trials with several 

precautions designed to protect trial participants from possible infection with the coronavirus. 

For example, the Court plans to hold only one trial per floor at one time, thus limiting the 

number of trials that can be safely scheduled at any given time. Additionally, several judges are 

conducting voir dire in the ceremonial courtroom (which allows for participants to be seated at 

greater distances from one another) before moving the trial to smaller courtrooms, thereby 

limiting the number of trials that can start on the same day in any given week.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 26, 2021 to September 9, 

2021, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code 

T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on the basis 

of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best 

interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Dated: August 25, 2021 PHILLIP A. TALBERT

Acting United States Attorney

/s/ MICHELE BECKWITH

MICHELE BECKWITH

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: August 25, 2021 /s/ Mark Reichel

Mark Reichel

Counsel for Defendant 

DEZMAIGHNE MCCLAIN

ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: August 30, 2021

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