Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01219/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01219-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Harsco Corporation
Appellee
Andy Keating
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Susan Webber Wright, Chief Judge, United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1219

___________

Andy Keating, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Arkansas.

Harsco Corporation, also known as *

Heckett Slag Products, also known as * [UNPUBLISHED]

Heckett Multiserve, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: September 15, 2004

Filed: September 20, 2004 

___________

Before WOLLMAN, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Andy Keating appeals the district court’s1

 adverse grant of summary judgment

in his Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) lawsuit. Keating sued

Harsco Corporation (Harsco) after he was terminated at age 53 as part of a reduction

in force (RIF). Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm. See Evers v. Alliant

Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2001) (standard of review; elements

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of disparate-impact claim); Doerhoff v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 171 F.3d 1177,

1180 (8th Cir. 1999) (elements of age-discrimination case in RIF context). 

We conclude that Keating failed to satisfy the fourth element of an agediscrimination RIF case, because he did not produce some added evidence showing

that age was a factor in his termination. We agree with the district court that the

supervisors’ consideration of employee versatility was not inconsistent with Harsco’s

RIF policy, and even if the emphasis on versatility was a violation of policy,

Keating’s evidence did not link any such violation to age discrimination. Cf. EEOC

v. Tex. Instruments Inc., 100 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (5th Cir. 1996) (conscious departure

from company’s seniority-protection policy for RIF did not create inference of age

discrimination where there was no clear nexus to discrimination). Further, erroneous

assessments of Keating’s versatility or of his capabilities in general do not show that

the decision to terminate him as part of the RIF was age-based. See Evers, 241 F.3d

at 957 (it is not unlawful for company to make personnel decisions based on

erroneous evaluations); Brown v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 113 F.3d 139, 142 (8th

Cir. 1997) (in RIF context, record of positive performance reviews is generally not

persuasive evidence of age bias as even capable employees are released during

downsizing). 

As to disparate impact, Keating presented nothing below (nor does he now)

showing that the four day-crew employees who were terminated as part of the RIF

should be considered separately from the other seven employees terminated during

the RIF. Cf. Evers, 241 F.3d at 958 (to defeat summary judgment, plaintiff must

present affirmative evidence rather than simply contend jury might disbelieve

defendants’ evidence); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950-51

(8th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider disparate-impact claim on behalf of subgroup

of persons age 55 or older; if such claim were cognizable, plaintiff could bring it even

when statistical evidence indicated RIF criteria had favorable impact upon entire

protected group of employees age 40 and older). Harsco’s unrebutted statistical

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information supported the district court’s conclusion that there was no jury question

on whether the RIF had caused Keating to be terminated based on his age. See id. at

952 (important statistic to consider in RIF context is difference between percentage

of older employees in work force before and after RIF). 

Finally, even assuming a younger and less senior employee assumed most of

Keating’s duties after the RIF, this is not enough to defeat summary judgment where

there was no other evidence showing age was a factor in the RIF termination

decisions. Cf. Fast v. S. Union Co., 149 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 1998) (hiring of 33-

year-old to assume many of same job duties as plaintiff was not alone sufficient for

prima facie case in RIF context). Keating’s remaining arguments provide no basis

for reversal. See Hitt v. Harsco Corp., 356 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2004) (only

disputes over facts possibly affecting outcome of suit under governing law will

properly preclude entry of summary judgment). 

The judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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