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Parties Involved:
Kelo L. King
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 12, 2001 Decided July 3, 2001

No. 00-3023

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Kelo L. King,

Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 99cr00311-01)

Beverly G. Dyer, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A.

J. Kramer, Federal Public Defender. Sandra G. Roland and

Valencia R. Rainey, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,

entered appearances.

Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the briefs were Wilma A.

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Lewis, U.S. Attorney at the time the briefs were filed, John

R. Fisher, Marian L. Borum and Jacqueline BussiereBurke, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge Henderson.

Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: Kelo King challenges his conviction and sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted

felon. See 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1). King argues that (1) his

conviction was based upon evidence improperly admitted at

trial and (2) his sentence was unlawful in light of Apprendi v.

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). We affirm King's conviction

because, although the district court erred in admitting some

of the challenged evidence, the errors were harmless. We

also affirm King's sentence because it is fully consistent with

Apprendi.

I. Background

While driving in the District of Columbia, King had the

misfortune of being spotted by two officers of the United

States Park Police who both recognized him and noticed that

the BMW he was driving bore Virginia license plates but did

not have the inspection sticker required by Virginia law. See

Va. Code Ann. s 46.2-1163; Russell v. United States, 687 A.2d

213, 215 (D.C. 1997) (unlawful to operate Virginia vehicle in

District of Columbia without valid Virginia inspection sticker,

per D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, s 602.7). After stopping King

the officers determined that his Virginia tags had been issued

for a Ford registered to one Johnny Boston, which was the

name on the license and registration that King produced at

the officers' request. Subsequently, while one of the officers

was speaking with King, the other, looking through the

passenger window, noticed a gun wedged into the back of the

sunroof.

King was arrested and charged with being a felon in

possession of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. s 922(g)(1). He was

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also cited for four motor vehicle violations: driving an unregistered vehicle, proffering a false driver's license, driving

without a valid license, and lacking an inspection sticker. In

securing King's vehicle following his arrest, police found in

the trunk a sheathed knife with a nine-inch notched blade.

The district court denied King's motions in limine to exclude from evidence the knife, the license and registration

King had produced during the traffic stop, and the Virginia

tags. At trial, King called as his only witness Lakiesha

Boulware, who testified that she and an acquaintance called

"D" had borrowed the BMW from King earlier on the day he

was arrested, and that "D" had placed his gun in the sunroof

of the car and forgotten it there. The jury convicted King

and the district court sentenced him to ten years in prison.

In calculating his sentence, the court enhanced the base

offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines because King

had two prior convictions and because the firearm was stolen.

II. Analysis

King appeals both the denial of his motions in limine and

the enhancement of his sentence.

A. Admission of evidence

Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the

admission of evidence regarding "crimes, wrongs, or acts,"

other than those charged, for the sole purpose of impugning

the character of the accused. See United States v. Bowie, 232

F.3d 923, 927, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2000). Such evidence may be

admitted under Rule 404(b), however, to "pro[ve] ... motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or

absence of mistake or accident." See also Bowie, 232 F.3d at

930. Evidence that is admissible under Rule 404 may nonetheless be excluded under Rule 403 "if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,

confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury." We review

the district court's application of these Rules for abuse of

discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18,

25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

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King argues that having a legal, albeit vicious-looking, knife

in one's trunk is relevant to one's knowledge of an illegal gun

in the passenger compartment only if a person who owns such

a knife might be thought the sort of person who would also

have a gun; the knife is therefore inadmissible under Rule

404(b), or in the alternative, unduly prejudicial and therefore

inadmissible under Rule 403. The district court disagreed

and admitted the knife into evidence because it thought the

knife "tends to prove knowing unlawful possession [of the

gun]." Upon appeal the Government maintains the knife is

relevant to King's "knowledge and intent" regarding the

firearm.

Although the Government did not at trial justify admission

of the knife on the grounds of knowledge and intent, we

reject King's claim that the Government is barred from

asserting those justifications here. The district court admitted the evidence upon those very grounds, and the Government has the right to defend its ruling. Cf. Blum v. Bacon,

457 U.S. 132, 137 n.5 (1982) ("It is well accepted ... [that] an

appellee may rely upon any matter appearing in the record in

support of the judgment below").

On the merits, however, we find the district court's admission of the knife to be an abuse of its discretion. To be sure,

in cases where a defendant is charged with unlawful possession of something, evidence that he possessed the same or

similar things at other times is often quite relevant to his

knowledge and intent with regard to the crime charged. See

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) ("In the

Rule 404(b) context, similar act evidence is relevant only if

the jury can reasonably conclude that the act occurred and

that the defendant was the actor"). For example, the courts

of appeals have upheld the district court's exercise of discretion to admit evidence that a defendant charged with unlawful

possession of firearms had previously possessed the same

weapons, United States v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir.

1994); United States v. Davis, 792 F.2d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir.

1986), or that the defendant simultaneously possessed other

firearms for which he was not charged, United States v.

Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1992). The courts of

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appeals have also held it within the discretion of the district

court to admit evidence regarding similar acts of possession

that suggest "repetitive involvement in the same kind of

criminal activity" even if they do not involve the same objects.

United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1988)

(evidence of subsequent possession of firearms relevant to

earlier possession of same); see also Bowie, 232 F.3d at 930

(evidence of earlier possession of counterfeit notes relevant to

later possession of similar notes); United States v. Gomez,

927 F.2d 1530, 1534 (11th Cir. 1991) (evidence of earlier

conviction for possession of firearms relevant to new charge

of same because it tends to rebut defense that possession was

"mere accident or coincidence"); cf. United States v. Brooks,

670 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1982) (marijuana found with

cocaine relevant to defendant's knowledge and intent in possessing the cocaine).

The Government, citing several of these precedents, argues

that whether King possessed a knife, which may after all be

used as a weapon, is therefore probative of whether he

knowingly possessed the gun in the same vehicle. We disagree. Unlike a gun, possession of which is unlawful for

innocents and felons alike in the District of Columbia, even a

felon may lawfully possess a knife; a knife with a notched

blade has licit and nonviolent uses, as in hunting and fishing;

and stored in the locked trunk of King's car, the knife was out

of his reach while he was in passenger compartment where

the gun was found. We do not think learning that there was

a knife locked in the defendant's trunk could have affected

the jury's view of whether he knew about the gun in the

sunroof unless the jurors reasoned that someone who has one

object that could be used as a weapon is more likely to have

another that is an undoubted weapon, the gun -- which is

precisely the sort of reasoning that Rule 404(b) is meant to

obviate.* Compare, e.g., People of Territory of Guam v.

__________

* Our concurring colleague suggests that whether the knife is a

weapon is a question of fact properly left to the jury. See Concurring Op. at 2 n.*. So to hold would eviscerate Rule 404(b) by

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Shymanovitz, 157 F.3d 1154, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 1998) (possession of lawful erotic literature inadmissible under Rule 404(b)

because irrelevant to whether defendant engaged in unlawful

sexual conduct with minors).

Nonetheless, we do not disturb King's conviction because

admission of the knife into evidence was a harmless error.

See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 216 F.3d 1162, 1166 n.4

(D.C. Cir. 2000) ("[N]onconstitutional error is harmless if it

did not have 'substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury's verdict' ") (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). The knife was at most

tangential to the Government's case -- that King had stashed

a gun within easy reach in the passenger compartment of his

car -- and the prosecution treated it accordingly. Although

the prosecutor asked both arresting officers to describe and

identify the knife for the jury, and to recount its placement

into the chain of custody, she made at most one substantive

reference to the knife, an ambiguous comment in her closing

statement that King claims, and we will assume, related to

the knife. In these circumstances we are fully confident that

the jury's assessment of the basic facts was not "substantial[ly] and injurious[ly]" affected by its knowledge of the

knife in the trunk. Nor could the knife have had a substantial effect upon the jury's refusal to credit the testimony of

King's friend, Ms. Boulware. Knife or no, a reasonable jury

could not seriously entertain the tale of the elusive "D,"

whose first and last names Boulware denied knowing. According to Boulware, this D had driven his own fully functional automobile to meet King, borrowed King's car to run an

errand, and stashed in its sunroof a stolen and loaded firearm

__________

sible as long as the jury was instructed to disregard the evidence if

it determines the evidence is relevant only to the defendant's

character. Rule 404(b) takes a different approach: it requires the

judge to screen evidence in order to avoid exposing the jury to

matters that bear only upon the defendant's character. Contrary to

our colleague's suggestion, the protection of Rule 404(b) supplements the promise of Rule 403 that evidence the "probative value

[of which] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice [or] confusion of the issues" will be excluded.

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which, his errand accomplished, he then absentmindedly left

behind.

King also argues that the evidence of his motor vehicle

violations admitted by the district court is irrelevant to his

knowledge or intent under Rule 404 and prejudicial under

Rule 403. This claim is somewhat broader than the one King

made at trial, where he limited his objection to admission of

"the Virginia driver's license in the name of Johnny Boston,

Virginia vehicle registration for a BMW, [and] Virginia tags."

As to the narrower objection, the Government correctly

argues that the license, registration, and tags are admissible

under Rule 404(b) because they "ma[ke] a material contribution to the strength of the inference that appellant had a

possessory interest in the car and knowingly possessed its

contents": the license, which bears King's photograph, connects him to the name "Johnny Boston," and the registration

and tags in turn connect Johnny Boston to the BMW. King

points out that the registration in the name of Boston rather

than King might "contradict, rather than confirm" the Government's theory that King owned the car; but, again as the

Government notes, evidence may be both relevant and susceptible to conflicting interpretations. We also reject King's

contention that the license, registration, and tags are irrelevant because the Government "relied exclusively on Mr.

King's statement that the car was his"; as we have recently

had occasion to point out, "evidence of other ... [bad] acts is

admissible to corroborate evidence that itself has a legitimate

non-propensity purpose." Bowie, 232 F.3d at 933. Finally,

we reject King's claim that the probative value of the three

items was "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice," Fed. R. Evid. 403. The likelihood that a jury

would conclude from King's noncompliance with the motor

vehicle code that he has a general propensity to commit bad

acts, much less a propensity to carry a gun, is, to say the

least, remote.

King's broader objection before this court embraces the

admission into evidence of his traffic citations for lacking a

valid driver's license and a Virginia vehicle inspection sticker.

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Because King did not object to the admission of this evidence

at trial, we review its admission only for plain error; and

because neither citation could possibly have led the jury

materially to change its view of the firearms charge against

him, we conclude that their admission did not affect King's

"substantial rights." See, e.g., United States v. Breedlove, 204

F.3d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (no plain error if defendant's

"substantial rights" unaffected).

B. Calculation of sentence

In calculating King's sentence, the district court enhanced

the applicable Guidelines range based upon facts it found by a

preponderance of the evidence to be true but that had not

been submitted to the jury. It then imposed a sentence of

120 months in prison, the maximum allowable for a violation

of 18 U.S.C. s 922(g). See id. s 924(a)(2). We reject King's

argument that the district court's reliance upon facts not

found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury violates Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). As we recently

held, Apprendi does not constrain the district court's adherence to the Guidelines "when the resulting sentence," as in

this case, "remains within the statutory maximum." In re

Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 698 (2001); accord United States

v. Fields, No. 99-3138, slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. June 12, 2001).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, King's conviction and sentence

are

Affirmed.

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Karen LeCraft Henderson, Circuit Judge, concurring:

While I concur in the affirmance of King's conviction and

sentence, I do not agree the district court committed any

error, harmless or otherwise, in admitting the knife.

The majority recognizes that "in cases where a defendant is

charged with unlawful possession of something, evidence that

he possessed the same or similar things at other times is

often quite relevant to his knowledge and intent with regard

to the crime charged." Maj. Op. at 4. Moreover, the majority acknowledges that "courts of appeals have ... held it

within the discretion of the district court to admit evidence

regarding similar acts of possession that suggest 'repetitive

involvement in the same kind of criminal activity' even if they

do not involve the same objects." Maj. Op. at 4-5 (quoting

United States v. Lego, 855 F.2d 542, 546 (8th Cir. 1988), and

citing cases). Nevertheless, the majority concludes that the

district court abused its discretion in admitting the knife

because the knife was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The

majority emphasizes two points in finding error: first, the

knife may or may not be a weapon and second, if a weapon, it

is a legal one. Maj. Op. at 5. I believe the first point is

wrong and the second irrelevant.

The knife found in the trunk of King's car has a nine-inch

blade, see Trial Tr. at 157, and the blade includes four large

barbs. See Appendix to Concurring Opinion. The dictionary

describes a knife barb as "a sharp projection extending

backwards ... preventing easy extraction from a wound."

Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English

Language Unabridged 174 (1981). One of the arresting

officers described the knife as "kind of like something out of

prehistoric." Trial Tr. at 129. It is quintessentially a weapon

and, as the majority notes, a "vicious-looking" one at that.

Maj. Op. at 4.

The fact that a defendant is found in possession of two

weapons makes it less likely that his possession of either is

unknowing. Introduction of the second, albeit legally possessed, weapon into evidence, therefore, allows the jury to

draw an inference that is not prohibited by Rule 404(b). We

have consistently held that Rule 404(b) allows the admission

of "other acts" to show, inter alia, knowledge or absence of

accident. See, e.g., United States v. Bowie, 232 F.3d 923, 930

(D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202,

1206 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1149

(1999).

But the majority stresses that "a knife with a notched

blade has many licit and indeed nonviolent uses." Maj. Op. at

5. This is true but, here, irrelevant. A gun too may have

licit and nonviolent uses-e.g., skeet or other target shooting.

But this case does not turn on whether "a" knife has a use

other than as a weapon but whether the knife found in King's

possession has such a use. In my view, the majority incorrectly characterizes the reason for the knife's inadmissibility,

stating that the jury would have had to improperly reason

that "someone who has one object that could be used as a

weapon is more likely to have another that is an undoubted

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weapon." Maj. Op. at 6 (emphasis added). Instead, the jury

was allowed, correctly, to consider whether someone in whose

possession one "undoubted" weapon is found is more likely to

know of a second "undoubted" weapon found in his possession.*

Finally, it is well established that the district court's decision to admit evidence, reviewed under the abuse of discretion

standard, see Stevenson v. District of Columbia Metro. Police

Dep't, 248 F.3d 1187, 1190 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing United

States v. Clarke, 24 F.3d 257, 267 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); United

States v. Williams, 212 F.3d 1305, 1308-09 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 121 S. Ct. 666 (2000); United States v. Smart, 98 F.3d

__________

* In any event, assuming arguendo the knife could reasonably be

described as something other than a weapon, the issue of the knife

qua weapon would be for the jury to decide. In other words,

whether or not the knife is a weapon the possession of which tends

to make more probable the knowing possession of the second

weapon is a question of fact. On the other hand, a different object

found in King's car trunk which could be used as a weapon (say, a

tire iron) might be excludible under Rule 403 (jury confusion).

Allowing the jury to decide whether or not the knife is a weapon

would not, as the majority supposes, "eviscerate Rule 404(b) ... ,"

Maj. Op. at 5 n.*, because the jury would disregard the knife not "if

it determines [it] is relevant only as to the defendant's character,"

id., but only if it determines it is not a weapon.

1379, 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Salamanca, 990 F.2d 629, 637 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 928

(1993)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1128 (1996), is "entitled to

'much deference' on review." United States v. Ramsey, 165

F.3d 980, 984 n.3 (D.C. Cir.) (quoting United States v. Lewis,

693 F.2d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 894

(1999). In view of the highly deferential standard, I cannot

agree the district court abused its discretion in admitting the

knife.

CADC-W-01-122,SIZE-1 PAGE,TYPE-PDI

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