Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02112/USCOURTS-ca10-86-02112-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edward Charles Cleveland
Appellant
Kathleen Cleveland
Appellant
Piper Aircraft Corporation
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT NOV 1 D ·1ggg 

ROBERT L 1-IO'I:~'rKER 

EDWARD CHARLES CLEVELAND, by and ) 

through the Conservator of his ) 

Estate, KATHLEEN CLEVELAND; and ) 

KATHLEEN CLEVELAND, Individually, ) 

) . 

Plaintiffs-Appellants ) 

and Cross-Appellees, ) 

) 

-vs- ) 

) 

PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION, ) 

a corporation, ) 

) 

Defendant-Appel lee ) 

and Cross-Appellant. ) 

.... . • .J'-" A. 

Clerk 

Nos .. 86-2112 

86-2265 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D. C. No. CIV 85-0062 M) 

Daniel c. Cathcart of Magana, Cathcart, McCarthy & Pierry, Los 

Angeles, California ·(Richard E. Ransom of Richard E. Ransom, P. A. , 

Albuquerqu~, New Mexico, with him on the brief), for PlaintiffAppellant and Cross-Appellee. 

David K. Watkiss of Watkiss & Campbell, Salt Lake city, Utah (Tracy 

H. Fowler of Watkiss & Campbell and w. R. Logan of Civerolo, Hansen 

& Wolf, P.A., Albuquerque, New Mexico, with him on the brief), for 

Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant. 

Before SEYMOUR and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and RUSSELL, District 

Judge.* 

RUSSELL, District Judge. 

*Honorable David L. Russell, District Judge, United states District 

Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 1 
This case arises from a bizarre set of facts. on July 8, 

1983, Edward Charles Cleveland attempted to take off from MidValley Airport, Los Lunas, New Mexico, in a Piper Super cub Model 

PA-18-150 aircraft, towing a glider attached to the aircraft's tail 

with a rope. Mr. Cleveland was piloting the aircraft from the rear 

seat and was secured by a seat belt but not a shoulder harness. 

The front pilot's seat had been removed the evening before at the 

direction of Mr. Cleveland and Robert Mudtl, the glider pilot and 

an F.A.A. certified mechanic, and a camera and camera mount had 

been attached to the base of the removed front seat. This was done 

because it was Cleveland's intent to film the glider in flight for 

a television commercial. Stephen Marks, a cinematographer, was in 

the front of the aircraft facing rearward, seated on two by fours 

fitted with a furniture pad and secured with a seat belt. During 

take-off the plane collided head-on with a van which had been 

parked at the end of the runway. Shortly before impact, the tail 

of the plane rose off the ground, and the glider became airborne. 

Mr. Mudd, the glider pilot, saw the van on the runway and released 

the tow rope, allowing the glider to sail over the collision. 

At the time of the accident, the Super Cub aircraft was owned 

by Etchison "Greg" Lill. Mr. Lill employed Mr. Cleveland as a 

glider tow pilot at Valley High Soaring, which operated glider 

planes at the Mid-Valley Airport. Mr. Lill and Mr. Cleveland were 

involved in a dispute with John Wood, the owner of the airport, 

concerning the glider operation's compliance with FAA rules and 

regulations. Two days prior to the accident, Mr. Wood had stopped 

2 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 2 
Mr. Cleveland on the taxiway by turning his van crosswise in front 

of Mr. Cleveland's aircraft. He warned Mr. Cleveland that he was 

not going to fly from the airport if he did not comply with the 

rules and regulations. The day before the accident, Mr. Wood had 

called the FAA, notified them that he was closing the airport and 

blocked the north end of the runway and taxiway of the airport 

during daylight hours with blocks, a box and several parked 

vehicles. A court hearing concerning Valley High Soaring' s 

operations at Mid-Valley Airport had been scheduled for 9:00 a.m. 

on the day of the accident. Mr. Cleveland was aware that the 

airport had been closed the day before the accident and was aware 

of the scheduled hearing. When Mr. Wood awoke on the day of the 

accident, he saw activity and lights at the north end of the 

airport. He then drove his van onto the south end of the runway 

and parked it in the center of the runway, facing north, leaving 

its headlights on. Shortly thereafter, the aircraft struck the van 

head on. The fuselage of the plane broke in two upon impact. Mr. 

Cleveland's head struck the camera resulting in serious head and 

brain injuries. 

Mr. Cleveland's wife, the conservator of his estate, brought 

this diversity action against Piper Aircraft Corporation, which 

manufactured and sold the Super Cub aircraft in 1970, claiming in 

negligence and strict liability that the airplane had inadequate 

rear seat pre-flight visibility, which caused the collision, and 

lacked a rear seat harness, which caused the injuries. Mrs. 

3 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 3 
Cleveland's individual claim for loss of consortium was dismissed. 1 

Plaintiff filed a motion in limine to exclude "cause of crash 

evidence" as irrelevant to his "second collision" crashworthiness 

case, which motion was denied. Plaintiff also filed a motion for 

certification to the New Mexico Supreme Court of the question of 

whether evidence of the cause of the initial crash is admissible 

in a "second collision" crashworthiness case which is limited to 

damages from enhanced injuries caused by the second impact only. 

Plaintiff stated in his motion that he would pursue only the claim 

for damages from enhanced injuries in the second collision if 

evidence of causation was limited to that relevant to cause of the 

enhanced injuries and the apportionment of fault concurring in 

their cause. This motion was also denied: Plaintiff's action then 

proceeded to trial based on two theories of design negligence under 

New Mexico law - inadequate forward visibility from the rear 

pilot's seat during take-off and lack of a shoulder harness for the 

rear pilot's seat. 

Following a five-day jury trial, the case was submitted to the 

jury on a special verdict form. Defendant objected to the special 

verdict form inasmuch as Question No. 7B, directed to the second 

collision or crashworthiness claim, only permitted the jury to 

compare Piper's negligence in failing to provide a rear seat 

harness to the negligence of Cleveland, and did not permit the jury 

1

Although Mrs. Cleveland, as the conservator of her husband's 

estate, remained the real party Plaintiff in this action, for the 

sake of simplicity we will hereinafter refer to Edward Charles 

Cleveland as the Plaintiff. 

4 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 4 
to compare therewith the negligence of non-parties whose negligence 

was the proximate cause of Plaintiff's crashworthiness injuries. 

The objection was overruled. The jury found that Piper was 

negligent in the design, manufacture and/or sale of the aircraft 

without adequate forward vision from the rear seat; that this 

negligence (referred to at trial and herein as "design negligence," 

as distinguished from what was referred to at trial and will be 

. referred to herein as "crashworthiness design negligence," i.e., 

the lack of a rear seat shoulder harness) was "a proximate cause 

of injuries and damages to plaintiff Ed Cleveland"; that Piper was 

also negligent in not installing a rear seat shoulder harness at 

the time of sale of the aircraft or was negligent in not later 

fitting the plane with a rear seat shoulder harness; that this 

"crashworthiness design negligence" was' a proximate cause of 

injuries and damages to Cleveland; and that 100% of Cleveland's 

injuries were attributable to crashworthiness or lack of a shoulder 

harness. R. Vol. I at Tab 108. 2 The jury found that Cleveland's 

2

The special verdict of the jury reads as follows: 

We, the Jury. unanimously agree to the following answers to 

the following Interrogatories. 

1. Under what has been called the design negligence claim, 

was the defendant Piper Aircraft Corporation negligent in the 

design, manufacture and/or sale of the aircraft without adequate 

forward vision from the rear seat? Yes x No 

(If the answer to No. 1 is "No", you are to skip No. 2 and answer 

No. ·3. ) 

2. Was the design negligence a proximate cause of injuries 

and damages to plaintiff Ed Cleveland? Yes X No 

3. Under what has been called the crashworthiness claim, was 

defendant Piper Aircraft Corporation negligent in not installing 

a rear seat shoulder harness at the time of sale of the aircraft 

or was it negligent in not later fitting the plane with a rear seat 

shoulder harness? Yes _X_ No 

5 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 5 
total damages caused by design negligence due to inadequate forward 

(If the answer to No. 1 or 2 is "no", and the answer to No. 3 is 

also "no", then your foreman shall sign this verdict for the 

defendant and against the plaintiff, and you will all return to 

open court • ) 

4. Was the crashworthiness negligence of defendant Piper 

Aircraft corporation a proximate cause of injuries and damages to 

plaintiff Ed Cleveland? Yes X No __ 

(If the answer to No. 4 is "yes", you are to answer the 

remaining qu~stions on this verdict form. When you have agreed 

upon each of your answers, your foreman shall sign this verdict, 

and you will all return to open court. 

If the answer to No. 1 or 2 is "No", and the answer to No. 4 is 

also "No", then your foreman shall sign this verdict for the 

defendant and against the plaintiff, and you will all return to 

open court. ) 

5. What percentage, if any, of Ed Cleveland's injuries do 

you attribute to crashworthiness (lack of shoulder harness)? 

100% 

6. In accordance with the damage instruction, we find the 

total amount of damages caused by design negligence due to 

inadequate forward vision and by lack of crashworthiness due to 

lack of rear shoulder harness to be$ 2,soo,000. (Enter the total 

amount of damages without any reduction for any negligence of 

anyone.) 

7. Compare the negligence of the following persons and find 

a percentage for each. The total of the percentages must equal 

100%, but the percentage for any one or more of the persons named 

may be zero if you find that such person was not negligent or that 

any negligence on the part of such person was not a proximate cause 

of damage. 

A. Under what has been called the design negligence claim 

(inadequate forward vision): 

Edward Charles Cleveland 

Piper Aircraft Corporation 

John "Jack" Wood 

Robert Mudd 

42.5% 

41.7% 

0 

Total 100% 

B. Under what has been called the crashworthiness design 

negligence claim (lack of shoulder harness in rear seat): 

Edward Charles Cleveland 8.4% 

Piper Aircraft Corporation 91.6% 

Total 100% 

6 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 6 
vision and by crashworthiness negligence due to lack of a rear 

shoulder harness were $2,500,000. 3 The jury compared the following 

persons' and entity's negligence as to- the design negligence or 

inadequate forward visibility claim and assigned these percentages 

of negligence to them: Cleveland, 42.5%; Piper, 41.7%; Wood, 0%; 

Mudd, 15.8%. 4 With respect to the crashworthiness claim, the jury 

compared the negligence of Cleveland and Piper only, finding that 

Cleveland's negligence accounted for 8. 4% of the damages and 

Piper's accounted for 91.6% of the damages for this claim. 5 The 

trial court thereafter entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff 

Edward Charles Cleveland and against Defendant Piper Aircraft 

Corporation in the amount of $1,042,500 plus post-judgment interest 

and costs. R. Vol. I at Tab 111. The court apparently arrived at 

the amount of the judgment by multiplying the percentage of 

negligent fault attributed to Piper on the design defect or forward 

vision claim, only, times the total amount of damages the jury 

found Plaintiff sustained as a result of the accident and the lack 

of crashworthiness of the aircraft. On the same day, Plaintiff 

filed a motion to enter judgment on proportionate liability for 

crashworthiness design negligence in the amount of $2,290,000, a 

figure arrived at by multiplying Piper's 91.6% comparative 

negligence times the total amount of damages, $2,500,000, since the 

3

See note 2, supra. 

4

Id~ 

5

Id. 

7 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 7 
jury·determined that 100% of the damages were attributable to the 

lack of a shoulder harness. 

Thereafter Defendant moved alternatively for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. As grounds for its 

motion, Defendant asserted the absence of any proof of negligence 

in design and of proximate cause and that the accident and 

Plaintiff's conduct were unforeseeable as a matter of law. The 

district court denied these motions. 

Plaintiff appeals to this Court, asserting as the sole basis 

for error the district court's failure to enter judgment on the 

crashworthiness claim rather than on the forward visibility claim. 

Defendant Piper cross appeals, asserting that the district court 

erred in denying its motions for · a directed verdict and for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict because 1) •Plaintiff's 

evidence of crashworthiness design negligence did not meet New 

Mexico's standard of proof for design negligence - a showing of 

deviation from laws, regulations or industry standards; 2) 

Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish that any design negligence 

proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries; 3) Plaintiff's conduct was 

unforeseeable as a matter of law; and 4) the conduct of Plaintiff 

and of Mr. Wood were independent intervening causes as a matter of 

law. Defendant also asserts that the district court should have 

ordered a new trial and committed reversible error because it 

rejected a standard New Mexico special verdict form, employing 

instead one which did not permit the jury to compare the negligence 

of all persons or entities, including non~parties, which 

8 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 8 
proximately caused Plain~iff's injuries, and which was inconsistent 

with the court's pretrial rulings and misleading. 

I. 

In his sole argument supporting his appeal, Plaintiff asserts 

that because the jury found by special verdict that 100% of 

Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the lack of a shoulder harness, 

see R. Vol. I at Tab 108, Question No. 5, the district court erred 

by entering judgment on the design negligence claim for inadequate 

forward visibility rather than on the crashworthiness design 

negligence claim predicated on the l~ck of a rear seat shoulder 

harness. 

We agree with Plaintiff that the district court's judgment was 

inconsistent with the jury's finding that 100% of Plaintiff's 

injuries were attributable to lack of crashworthiness. However, 

in determining whether the judgment entered was the proper one to 

enter on the jury's special verdict, our inquiry may not focus on 

one of the jury's findings to the exclusion of all of its other 

findings. By special verdict the jury also found that both the 

design negligence ( lack of forward visibility) and the 

crashworthiness design negligence (lack of a rear seat shoulder 

harness) were proximate causes "of injuries and damages to 

plaintiff Ed Cleveland." R. Vol. I at Tab 108, Question Nos. 2 

and 4. The jury's finding that the design negligence of Defendant 

was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages is 

facially inconsistent with its finding that 100% of Plaintiff's 

injuries are attributable to crashworthiness design negligence. 

9 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 9 
Th~s, Plaintiff'~ appeal necessarily encompasses a determination 

of whether the special verdict answers are reconcilable with each 

other and with the entire case, including the pleadings, the 

evidence and the instructions, see Harvey by Harvey v. General 

Motors Corp., 873 F.2d 1343, 1348 (10th Cir. 1989), and if so, 

whether the special verdict answers are reconcilable in a manner 

which would warrant entry of judgment for Plaintiff on the 

crashworthiness design negligence claim rather than on the 

negligence design claim. If the verdicts are inconsistent as a 

matter of law, we must remand the case for a new trial. See, ~, 

Moss v. The City of Colorado Springs, 871 F.2d 112, 114 (10th cir. 

198~). If the verdict answers are reconcilable but not in a manner 

warranting entry of judgment on the· crashworthiness design 

negligence claim, the judgment must be affirmed unless other errors 

preclude affirmance. If the verdict answers are reconcilable in 

a manner warranting entry of judgment on the crashworthiness design 

negligence claim, we must remand to the district court with 

directions to enter judgment thereon. If the verdict answers are 

reconcilable in a manner warranting entry of judgment on the 

crashworthiness design negligence claim, but the special verdict 

form did not, for example, permit the jury to compare the . negligence of all of those whose negligence may have caused or 

contributed in causing injuries Plaintiff received in the "second 

collision" or as a result of the lack of a rear seat shoulder 

harness, then we must vacate the judgment and remand this case to 

the district court for a new trial. 

10 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 10 
Plaintiff does not suggest how the apparent inconsistent 

findings in the special verdict can be harmonized. His argument 

assumes that the answers warrant, or may be reconciled in a manner 

warranting, entry of judgment for Plaintiff on the crashworthiness 

design negligence claim and, accurately anticipating Defendant's 

responsive argument, is directed to the issue of whether, under New 

Mexico law, those whose negligence was a proximate cause of the 

"initial collision" are legally responsible for "second collision" 

injuries as well. Plaintiff asserts that the jury's conclusion 

that 100% of Mr. Cleveland's injuries were proximately caused by 

the lack of a rear seat shoulder harness "means that but for the 

lack of a rear seat shoulder harness Mr. Cleveland would not have 

been injured in the head-on collision, ~egardless of its cause." 

Brief of Appellant Cleveland at p. 5. While this is true, 

Plaintiff argues therefrom that the converse is also therefore 

true, i.e., that "no causal link exists between any negligence 

causing the initial impact and Mr. Cleveland's catastrophic 

injuries resulting solely from the 'second collision.'" Id. at p. 

10. Relying on Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 

P.2d 779, 787 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. quashed 101 N.M. 555, 685 P.2d 

963 (1984), citing Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 738 (3rd Cir. 

1976), Plaintiff asserts that those responsible for the "initial 

collision" are not concurrent tortfeasors with those responsible 

for the "second collision." Plaintiff then implies that the 

negligence of those who are not concurrent tortfeasors should not 

. be compared under New Mexico's pure comparative negligence 

11 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 11 
jurisprudence, in which joint and several liability of concurrent 

tortfeasors has been eliminated·, see Bartlett v •. New Mexico Welding 

Supply. Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646· P.2d 579 {Ct. App. 1982), cert. 

denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 {1982). Rather, Plaintiff 

suggests that those responsible for the initial and second 

collisions are in fact successive tortfeasors. Plaintiff posits 

that the negligence of the former need not be compared to the 

negligence of the latter because "New Mexico has never abolished 

joint and several liability for successive tortfeasors. 11 Brief of 

Appellant Cleveland at p. 9. 

Defendant in response initially asserts that the district 

court properly applied New Mexico comparative negligence law in 

deciding that the initial accident and·crashworthiness injuries 

were inseparable as far as apportionment was concerned. However, 

Defendant does not explain and it is incomprehensible to this Court 

how the conclusion that the initial accident and crashworthiness 

injuries were indivisible in any way supports the propriety of 

either the special verdict form, which required division of 

injuries and apportionment of damages and comparison of negligence 

separately among those responsible for the "initial collision" and 

among those responsible for the "second collision," or entry of the 

judgment which was entered. The remainder of Defendant's argument 

in response to Plaintiff's appeal is more . cogent. Defendant 

apparently agrees with Plaintiff that a manufacturer whose 

negligence causes "second collision" or crashworthiness injuries 

. and-a person whose negligence causes the "initial collision" are 

12 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 12 
not concurrent tortfeasors but are successive tortfeasors. 

However, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff's position that the 

negligence of the initial tortfeasors should not be compared to the 

negligence of the tortfeasors responsible for the second collision 

is directly contrary to Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726; to most 

cases from other jurisdictions addressing comparative apportionment 

in crashworthiness cases; and to the goal of equitable loss 

allocation embodied in New Mexico law of comparative negligence 

adopted in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) and 

extended in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 

152, 646 P.2d 579 and Marchese v. Warner Communications, Inc., 100 

N.M. 313, 670 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 100 N.M. 259, 

669 P.2d 735 (1983). 

Because we conclude that New Mexico law requires that the jury 

compare the negligence of those responsible for the "initial 

collision" with the negligence of those responsible for "second 

collision" or crashworthiness injuries, requiring that we vacate 

the judgment entered and remand this case for a new trial, we find 

it unnecessary to determine whether the special verdict findings 

may be harmonized. 

In Duran v .. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d 779, 

the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted a crashworthiness doctrine6 

which limits crashworthiness liability to those circumstances in 

which a plaintiff can prove that a vehicle's lack of 

6

The New Mexico Supreme Court has not to date addressed the 

issue of crashworthiness liability. 

13 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 13 
crashworthiness due to a manufacturer's negligence either enhanced 

injuries which the Plaintiff would have otherwise sustained in the 

accident if no crashworthiness negligence had occurred, or caused 

the ultimate injury. 688 P.2d at 781-82. In adopting its crashworthiness doctrine, the New Mexico Court of Appeals appropriated 

the standard of proof as to proximate cause employed in Huddell v. 

Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3rd Cir. 1976). This standard of proof of 

crashworthiness causation requires a plaintiff, as part of his 

prima facie case of crashworthiness liability, to prove 1) that the 

design caused injuries over and above those which otherwise would 

have been sustained, absent the defect; and 2) the degree of 

"enhancement," of injuries by "•proof of what injuries, if any. 

would have resulted had the alternative, safer design been used.'" 

Duran v. General Motors Corp., 688 P.2d at 787, quoting Huddell v. 

Levin, 537 F.2d at 737 (emphasis added). 7 A plaintiff does not 

satisfy the second aspect of his causation burden by leaving the 

degree of enhancement to the jury's surmise and speculation; 

rather, "'the plaintiff must offer some method of establishing the 

extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design. 1 " 

Id., quoting Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d at 738. 

New ~exico•s particular version of crashworthiness liability 

with its attendant burden of proximate cause, as we perceive it, 

7

Huddell v. Levin was a crashworthiness case predicated on New 

Jersey strict liability. There, the Third Circuit employed strict 

liability terms and concepts in describing a plaintiff's burden of 

proof. The New Mexico Court of Appeals in Duran adopted 

crashworthiness liability predicated on negligence, only. 

14 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 14 
necessarily precludes a cause of action for crashworthiness 

liability based upon an indivisible injury. In other words, the 

concept of an "indivisible injury" has no place in New Mexico's 

crashworthiness doctrine. Compare with,~, Fox v. Ford Motor 

Co., 575 F.2d 774, 787 (10th Cir. 1978); Lee v. Volkswagen of 

America. Inc. , 688 P. 2d 1283, 1287 (Okla. 1984) . New Mexico's 

adoption of the Huddell standard of proof for proximate- cause to 

establish drashworthiness liability requires that a plaintiff meet 

a burden of apportionment, i.e., of establishing that his 

crashworthiness injuries are divisible from those which would have 

been sustained as a result of the accident, absent the alleged 

crashworthiness defect; his failure to meet this burden is fatal 

to his crashworthiness claim. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d at 

739. Accord Hebenstreit v. Atchison. Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 

65 N.M. 301, 336 P.2d 1057, 1061 (1959) (to establish liability for 

aggravation or exacerbation of pre-existing injury, the plaintiff 

has the burden of proving with reasonable certainty the extent of 

the aggravation and failure of such proof is fatal to claim) (cited 

in Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N. M. 742, 688 P.2d at 787). 

The district court correctly incorporated the concepts of 

divisibility and apportionment in the special verdict form, which 

required that the jury make a finding as to what percentage of 

Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the lack of a rear seat 

shoulder harness and permitted the jury to find those whose 

negligence caused or contributed to the crashworthiness injuries 

liable only for those enhanced injuries and not for any injuries 

15 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 15 
sustained solely as a. result of the "initial collision." 8 This 

disposes of Defendant's argument that the district court correctly 

concluded that Plaintiff's injuries were indivisible and that this 

conclusion somehow supports the court's entry of judgment based· 

upon the percentage of Defendant's negligence in causing the 

initial collision, i.e. on the forward visibility or the design 

negligence claim. 

If no other issues were raised by Plaintiff's appeal and the 

facially inconsistent verdicts could be reconciled, we would thus 

be required to enter judgment or direct the district court to enter 

judgment for the Plaintiff based upon the jury's determination of 

the percentage of Defendant Piper's comparative negligence on the 

8

This statement assumes that there was evidence from which a 

jury could find that Plaintiff probably would have sustained some 

injury or injuries solely as a result of the "initial collision," 

i.e., as a result of the accident, absent the alleged 

crashworthiness negligence. 

We refer to injuries resulting from or caused by the "initial 

collision" as a shorthand method of referring to those injuries 

which a plaintiff would have received in an accident in the absence 

of crashworthiness negligence, see Duran v. General Motors Corp., 

688 P.2d at 786-87. Similarly, we refer to injuries resulting from 

or caused by the "second collision," i.e. the "crashworthiness 

injuries," to denote enhanced injuries attributable to 

crashworthiness negligence, see id. In using this shorthand, we 

do not mean to in any way suggest that "crashworthiness, 11 "second 

collision" or "enhanced injury" liability (which terms the New 

Mexico Court of Appeals employs synonymously, see id. at 782) in 

New Mexico is dependant on a showing of separate, discrete impacts 

or collisions. Under New Mexico law, a single impact may produce 

both "initial collision" and "second collision" or crashworthiness 

injuries. This is true even if the plaintiff suffers but a single 

injury, provided that · the plaintiff can show that absent the 

crashworthiness negligence, either the injury would have been less 

severe and the degree of severity attributable to the 

crashworthiness negligence, or that he would not have been injured 

at all. 

16 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 16 
crashworthiness design negligence claim, since the jury found that 

100% of Plaintiff's injuries and damages were attributable to the 

airplane's lack of crashworthiness (lack of a rear shoulder 

harness). However, as both Plaintiff and Defendant apparently 

recognize, whether this Court may enter such a judgment as the 

correct judgment to be entered on the special verdict, or may 

direct the district court to enter such a judgment, depends upon 

the nature of the relationship under New Mexico law between the 

original tortfeasors, i.e. , those · whose negligence caused the 

"initial coll is ion," and the crashworthiness tortfeasors, i.e. , 

those whose negligence caused the "second collision" or the 

enhanced "crashworthiness" injuries, and the correct application 

of New Mexico comparative negligence law·to that relationship. To 

support entry of judgment based on Piper's comparative negligence 

on the crashworthiness claim in accordance with the jury's answer 

to question 7B of the special verdict, which did not permit the 

jury to compare the negligence of the original tortfeasors with 

that of the crashworthiness tortfeasors, and in an attempt to 

justify the propriety of comparing the negligence only among the 

crashworthiness tortfeasors, Plaintiff argues as follows: 1) This 

is a "second collision" or "crashworthiness" case, not an enhanced 

injury case; 2) The original tortfeasors and crashworthiness 

tortfeasors are not concurrent tortfeasors; and 3) The original and 

crashworthiness tortfeasors are successive tortfeasors. Defendant 

on the other hand asserts that while the relationship between the 

original and crashworthiness tortfeasors is not that of concurrent 

17 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 17 
tortfeasors for all accident results, their relationship is that 

of concurrent tortfeasors as to the enhanced injury, for purposes 

of comparative causation. See Combined Answer and Cross Appeal 

Brief of Appellee Cross-Appellant, Piper Aircraft Corporation, at 

pp. 20-21. We examine these arguments in turn. 

Plaintiff distinguishes between this case and an "enhanced 

injury" case because the jury found that 100% of Mr. Cleveland's 

injuries and damages were attributable to the lack of 

crashworthiness. Plaintiff· infers from this finding that the 

negligence of those causing the "second collision" was the sole 

cause of all of Plaintiff's injuries and damages and that those 

whose negligence caused the "initial collision" are not responsible 

for, had no causal role in and are not also legal or proximate 

causes of any of Plaintiff's injuries and damages. There are 

numerous problems with this argument. First, it ignores the fact 

that the jury also found that the design negligence was a proximate 

cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages, see R. Vol. I at Tab 

108, Question No. 2, and that the negligence of Plaintiff and 

Robert Mudd were also proximate causes of Plaintiff's injuries and 

damages. See id. at Question No. 7A. Secondly, under New Mexico 

law the terms "crashworthiness," "second collision" and "enhanced 

injury," when used to describe a theory of liability, are 

synonymous. See Duran v. General Motors Corp., 101 N.M. 742, 688 

P.2d at 782. All refer to liability based on either "enhanced or 

additional injuries" caused by a negligent failure to protect 

against injury in the event of a collision. See id. at 787 

18 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 18 
·(emphasis added). Under New Mexico law, an enhanced injury is· any 

injury "over and above the damage or injury that probably would 

have occurred as a result of the impact or collision- absent the 

defect." Id. at 786, quoting Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 

F.2d 495, 503 (8th cir. 1968), which necessarily includes not only 

any aggravation or enhancement of an injury which was or would have 

been sustained in the initial collision, absent the manifestation 

of any crashworthiness negligence, but also any "new" or 

"different" injury which was not and would not have been sustained 

in the initial collision absent the manifestation of any 

crashworthiness negligence. See id. at 787 ("crashworthiness 

liability is based only on enhanced or additional injuries"). 

Thus, even when a plaintiff's claim is· that he would not have 

received any injuries as a result of the "initial collision" absent 

the existence of crashworthiness negligence, as here, New Mexico 

courts refer to the plaintiff's claim as one for enhanced injury. 

Of course, we recognize that Plaintiff's argument is not fully 

answered by pointing out that New Mexico law envisions that all 

crashworthiness liability claims are claims for enhanced injuries 

and that "enhanced injuries" include new and different injuries. 

But even if the jury's finding that 100% of the Plaintiff's 

injuries are "attributable" to crashworthiness design negligence 

represents an implicit finding that Plaintiff would not have 

received any injuries as a result of. the "initial collision, 11 

absent the manifestation of crashworthiness negligence, it does not 

necessarily follow, as Plaintiff suggests, that the negligence of 

19 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 19 
the original tortfeasors is not also a proximate cause of the 

crashworthiness injuries. 9 In other words, the converse does not 

necessarily follow. See Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa 

Fe, 107 N. M. 268, 755 P.2d 606, 607 (Ct. App. 1987), writ 

dismissed, 107 N. M. 308, 756 P.2d 1203 (1988). 

Plaintiff suggests that because the Duran court, citing 

Huddell, stated that "the concurrent tortfeasor concept is not 

applicable" to crashworthiness liability, 688 P. 2d at 787, the 

negligence of the "original tortfeasors" is not considered a 

proximate cause of crashworthiness injuries and/or the negligence 

of the original tortfeasors need not be compared with the 

negligence of the "crashworthiness tortfeasors" 10 under New Mexico 

law. Because the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Duran cited 

Huddell as authority for its statement, we discern its meaning by 

9

In this respect, the jury's findings that the negligence of 

certain alleged original tortfeasors - Piper and Mudd - was a 

proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries and damages, despite 

its finding that 100% of Plaintiff's injuries and damages were 

attributable to crashworthiness negligence, was prescient and fully 

supportable by New Mexico law of proximate cause. 

10we use the term "original tortfeasors" to refer to those 

persons or entities whose negligence causes or concurs in causing 

a collision in which a potential plaintiff receives injuries. We 

employ the term "crashworthiness tortfeasors" to refer to those 

persons or entities whose negligent failure to protect a potential 

plaintiff from injuries in a collision causes or concurs in causing 

a potential plaintiff to sustain injuries he would not otherwise 

have sustained in the collision, absent such negligence. 

20 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 20 
referring to the Huddell court's discussion of concurrent 

tortfeasors: 11 

It is well, indeed necessary, to emphasize the 

fundamental point of departure·between our approach and 

that proffered by the concurrence. We do not perceive 

the analysis of "second collision." or "enhanced injury" 

cases to track the legal lore surrounding concurrent 

tortfeasor actions which, in the concurrence's 

formulation, "have combined contemporaneously to cause 

the injuries." Concurring opinion, post, at 744 

(Emphasis added.) "Second collision" cases do not 

implicate "clearly established double fault" for the same 

occurrence. Clearly, if the theoretical underpinnings 

for liability in this case are to be given effect, Levin 

[the original tortfeasor] may be held liable for all 

injuries, but General Motors [the crashworthiness 

tortfeasor] may only be held liable for "enhanced 

injuries." Analogies to concurrent actions combining to 

cause a single impact are simply not applicable where, 

as here, one party is sued on a fault theory for the 

collision and the other party is sued on the theory of 

strict liability for the second collision." A second 

source of disagreement between us and Judge Rosenn is the 

latter's assumption that "[a] failure in apportionment 

must then needs excuse both wrongdoers." Ibid. at 744. 

The burden of apportionment applies only to plaintiff's 

claim against General Motors. Should plaintiff fail to 

meet her burden on this claim, the brute fact is that the 

negligent driver would not escape liability on the same 

ground. Traditional negligence concepts determine the 

case against Levin and the extent of his liability. 

Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d at 738-39 

(bracketed identification added). 

We are persuaded by the foregoing discussion in Huddell that 

the New Mexico court's statement that the concurrent tortfeasor 

11The following statement by the Court in Huddell was prompted 

at least in part by the concurring judge's opinion that death is 

. indivisible and that those whose negligence concurs in causing such 

injury are concurrent tortfeasors who, rather than a plaintiff, 

should have the burden of apportionment, if apportionment is 

possible, or of otherwise limiting their liability by proving their 

nonculpability. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d at 744-747 (Rosenn, 

J., concurring). 

21 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 21 
concept is not applicable to crashworthiness liability simply means 

that a crashworthiness tortfeasor is not a concurrent tortfeasor 

with an original tortfeasor as to injuries which would h.ave been 

sustained as a result of the initial collision, absent 

crashworthiness negligence, but that an original tortfeasor, whose 

negligence may be deemed to have proximately caused all of the 

injuries, is or at least may be a concurrent tortfeasor with a 

crashworthiness tortfeasor as to the enhanced injuries. Any doubts 

we might otherwise have that this was the New Mexico Court of 

Appeals' intent or that the relationship of the original and 

crashworthiness tortfeasors described in Huddell would be altered 

by New Mexico law are resolved by our observation that this is 

fully consistent with New Mexico law on.the relationship between 

a tortfeasor whose negligence produces an initial injury and 

another tortfeasor whose negligence aggravates or enhances the 

original injury and New Mexico law on proximate cause. See 

Martinez v. First National Bank of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d 

606 (defendant physician should not be liable in malpractice for 

plaintiff's original injury, but damages should be apportioned 

among those negligently contributing to the malpractice injury, 

including an absent original tortfeasor, if their negligence was 

a proximate cause of the injury, citing Comment b, Restatement 

(Second) of Torts § 879 ( 1979) ; a negligent non-party original 

tortfeasor may be liable for the additional harm caused the victim 

by a physician negligently treating the victim if negligent 

treatment is the foreseeable result of the original injury); Vaca 

22 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 22 
v. Whitaker, 86 N.M. 79, 519 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Ct. App. 1974) (where 

the judgment against the original tortfeasor covers all injuries 

sustained by the plaintiff, including those attributable to the 

negligence of a physician in treating the injured person, 

satisfaction of that judgment bars the plaintiff from recovering 

the same damages in a subsequent suit against the physician). 

The relationship between original and crashworthiness 

tortfeasors as to all accident results may properly be described 

as that of successive tortfeasors. See Martinez v. First National 

Bank of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 268,. 755 P.2d at 608. Accord, W. 

Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 

§ 52, p. 352 (5th ed. 1984); Comment c on subsection (1), 

Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 433A (1979)". Their relationship, 

however, is that of a particular type of successive tortfeasors, 

that in which the original tortfeasors may be liable for all of the 

injuries received and thus may be concurrent tortfeasors or jointly 

and severally liable with the crashworthiness tortfeasors as to the 

enhanced injuries only. See id. But regardless of the terminology 

employed to describe the relationship between the original 

tortfeasors and crashworthiness tortfeasors, it is clear that under 

New Mexico law of proximate cause, ·both the original tortfeasors 

and the crashworthiness tortfeasors may be liable for the secondcollision or enhanced injuries. See Martinez v. First National 

Bank of Santa Fe, 107 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d at 607-10; Vaca v. 

Whitaker, 86 N.M. 79, 519 P.2d at 318-19. See generally LeBlanc 

v. Northern Colfax County Hospital, 100 N.M. 494, 672 P.2d 667 (Ct. 

23 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 23 
App. 1983); N.M. Stat. Ann., U.J.I.-Civ. 3.8 & 3.9 (Repl. Pamp. 

1980). 

The final issue we must address in determining whether 

judgment may properly be entered on the crashworthiness claim based 

on the jury's finding of Defendant Piper's percentage of 

comparative negligence for crashworthiness injuries, assuming again 

that the special verdict findings are reconcilable, is how New 

Mexico law of comparative negligence applies to original and 

crashworthiness tortfeasors with respect to the enhanced injuries 

for which they may both be, liable as concurrent tortfeasors. 

New Mexico has adopted a system of "pure" comparative 

negligence. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). 

The purpose of this doctrine is 

to accomplish (1) apportionment of fault 

between or among negligent parties whose 

negligence proximately causes any part of a 

loss or injury; and (2) apportionment of the 

total damages resulting from such loss or 

injury in proportion to the fault of each 

party. 

Id. at 1240. 

Thus, the doctrine contemplates that percentages of comparative 

negligence of those whose negligence proximately causes a 

plaintiff's injuries will be determined by the jury and that 

"apportionment of damages" will flow from that determination. In 

Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply. Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 

579 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1982), 

the New Mexico Supreme Court made it clear that joint and several 

liability for concurrent tortfeasors was not to be retained under 

24 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 24 
New Mexico's pure comparative negligence system, which requires 

that the fault or negligence of all concurrent tortfeasors be 

apportioned. 646 P.2d 585. In the New Mexico court's opinion, 

apportionment of causation among concurrent tortfeasors is 

_accomplished as a necessary consequence of a jury's apportionment 

of fault or negligence under a pure comparative negligence system. 

See id. The logical extension of Bartlett to the case before this 

Court is that as to that portion of damages for which the original 

tortf easors and the crashworthiness tortf easors are concurrent 

tortfeasors, i.e. damages attributable to the enhanced injuries, 

only, the negligence of all of the tortfeasors, and of the 

Plaintiff, must be compared. This is consistent both with New 

Mexico law of proximate cause, see above,. and with the goal of New 

Mexico comparative negligence law, that of achieving "apportionment 

of fault between or among negligent parties whose negligence 

proximately caused any part of a loss or injury." Scott v. Rizzo, 

96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d at 1240, quoted in Bartlett v. New Mexico 

Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d at 586. 

We are satisfied that the New Mexico Supreme Court would hold 

that common sense in the fair application of its pure comparative 

negligence system mandates that the negligence of all parties, 

including original tortfeasors and crashworthiness tortfeasors, 

which proximately causes enhanced injuries in a crashworthiness.or 

"second collision" case must be compared. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 

N.M. 682, 634 P.2d at 1240. See also Martinez v. First National 

25 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 25 
Bank of Santa Fe, 1.07 N.M. 268, 755 P.2d at 607-10; Bartlett v. New 

Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579. 

II. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's evidence of 

Defendant's failure to exercise due care by not fitting the Super 

Cub with a rear seat shoulder harness did not meet the standard of 

proof mandated by Duran v. General Motors Corp. for crashworthiness 

liability because Plaintiff's evidence assertedly consisted solely 

of expert opinion testimony, unsupported by any laws, regulations 

or industry standards. Defendant asserts that for this reason, the 

district court erred in denying Defendant's motions for a directed 

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. However, as 

Plaintiff points out, Defendant did not make this· argument in the 

district court to support either its motion for a directed verdict, 

see R. Vol. IV (Tr. Vol. 3) at pp. 608-11 & R. Supp. Vol. I (Tr. 

Vol. 5) at p. 835, or its alternative motion for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, see R. Vo~. I at 

Tab 114. Failure to move for a directed verdict on this ground 

precludes Defendant from challenging the district court's denial 

of its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on such basis now, and further 

precludes Defendant from challenging the sufficiency of the 

evidence of crashworthiness negligence on appeal. 

Emerson Electric Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1455-56 

See Karns v. 

( 10th Cir. 

1987) (failure to renew motion for directed verdict at the close of 

all of the evidence bars consideration of a motion for judgment 

26 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 26 
notwithstanding the verdict and appellate review; grounds not 

raised in a motion for a directed verdict may not be asserted in 

a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or on appeal). 

Accord, Cabrales v. County of.Los Angeles, 864 F.2d 1454, 1459 (~th 

Cir. 1988) (failure to move for a directed verdict at the close of 

all of the evidence bars a party from questioning the sufficiency 

of the evidence both before the district court and on appeal except 

where such plain error is apparent on the face of the record that 

failure to review would result in manifest injustice); Ayers v. 

Norfolk Livestock Market. Inc., 696 F.2d 555, 558 (8th Cir. 

1982) (same, but no plain error doctrine recognized) ; Rawls v. 

Daughters of Charity of st~ Vincent DePaul. Inc., 491 F.2d 141, 147 

(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032, ·95 S. Ct. 513, 42 L.Ed.2d 

307 (1974). Even if this issue had been properly preserved for 

appeal, Plaintiff's evidence of Federal Aeronautics Association 

[sic] and National Transportation Safety Board design guidelines, 

see R. Vol. IV (Tr. Vol. 3) at p. 465, satisfies the Duran 

requirement that crashworthiness negligence be established by proof 

of noncompliance with extrajudicial standards or'guidelines. See 

Duran v. General Motors Corporation, 101 N.M. 742, 688 P.2d at 783-

84. 

III. 

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's evidence of proximate 

causation on his crashworthiness claim is legally insufficient 

under Duran because Plaintiff's evidence failed to establish 1) 

that Plaintiff would have received the same injury had the front 

27 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 27 
seat not been removed, i.e., Plaintiff failed to eliminate his 

product modification as a cause of his injury, and 2) what injuries 

Plaintiff would have sustained if he had been wearing a shoulder 

harness, i.e. , in the · absence of the alleged crashworthiness 

negligence. 

We find no requirement in Duran that a crashworthiness 

plaintiff eliminate product modification as a proximate cause of 

crashworthiness injuries. Duran speaks only to the nature of the 

evidence necessary to show that crashworthiness negligence was a 

proximate cause of injuries over and above those that would have 

occurred as a result of the collision, absent the crashworthiness 

negligence. Nor do we find any requirement under New Mexico 

negligence law that a plaintiff present evidence to eliminate 

product modification or his own negligence as a proximate cause of 

his injuries. Moreover, in this case, the jury was permitted to 

consider whether Plaintiff's modification of the aircraft was 

negligent and whether such negligence was a proximate cause of his 

crashworthiness injuries and to compare such negligence, if any, 

to Defendant Piper's crashworthiness negligence, if any, which was 

a proximate cause of Plaintiff's crashworthiness injuries. See R. 

Vol. I at Tab 104 (Court's Jury Instructions), Nos. 3, 13 &'20 and 

R. Vol. I at Tab 108 (Verdict). 

As the district court correctly concluded, see R. Vol. I at 

Tab 124, Plaintiff's evidence amply supports the reasonable 

inference that Plaintiff would have sustained no injuries in the 

absence of the alleged crashworthiness design negligence, that is, 

28 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 28 
that if he had been wearing a shoulder harness Plaintiff would not 

have been injured, and that this is true regardless of whether the 

front seat or the camera and camera mount were located to the fore 

of Plaintiff during the accident. Both of Plaintiff's expert 

witnesses, Dr. Richard Snyder and Dr. Norman Horton, testified that 

if Plaintiff had been wearing a shoulder harness, he would not have 

struck the camera. R. Vol. IV (Tr. Vol. 3), at p. 472 & 574. Both 

experts also testified that had the Plaintiff been restrained by 

a shoulder harness, he would not have struck the front seat either, 

had it been there. Id. at p. 508-11 & p. 568. Dr. Snyder 

testified that the camera was located in essentially the same 

position or even ~lightly to the fore of where the back of the 

. front seat would have been had the front seat not been removed, 

relative to the position of the Plaintiff. Id. at 511. This 

evidence was corroborated by the testimony of Robert Mudd, see R. 

Vol. II (Tr. Vol.·I) at p. 63, who participated in installing the 

camera mount and camera. Id. at p. 4~. since the only significant 

injury that ~laintiff received in the accident was a massive head 

injury, see R. Vol. I, p. 103, it is reasonably inferable from 

Plaintiff's evidence that Plaintiff would have received no injury 

had he been wearing a shoulder harness. 12 Thus, there was evidence 

uDefendant also challenges Dr. Snyder's competence to give 

certain opinion evidence but because this challenge is predicated 

on the erroneous supposition that Plaintiff was required to prove 

that he would have received the same injuries had the front seat 

rather than the camera and its mount been located in front of him, 

we need not separately address this issue. 

29 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 29 
from which the jury- could properly find that Plaintiff would have 

received no injuries if he had been wearing a shoulder harness. 

The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's 

motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict on the issue of proximate causatio~ of crashworthiness 

injuries. 

IV. 

Defendant contends that the district court should have 

granted its motion for a directed verdict or its motion for 

judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiff's evidence 

failed to establish any negligent design defect which caused the 

collision. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff I s own evidence 

established that the limitation on forward visibility from the rear 

seat was obvious and readily compensated for by following a 

standard piloting technique of makings-turns prior to take-off, 

a practice-Plaintiff himself employed prior to attaching the glider 

to the Super Cub. Defendant then implies that it was Plaintiff's 

negligence, in attaching the glider, which caused any inadequacy 

in forward visibility and the collision as a matter of law. 

Defendant's argument is without merit. 

The jury could have readily concluded that Plaintiff was 

negligent in attempting to fly the aircraft from the rear seat 

while towing a glider an,d that Plaintiff's negligence was a 

proximate cause of the collision, and apparently did, inasmuch as 

it found that Plaintiff was 42.5% comparatively negligent on the 

forward visibility claim. But the negligence of two or more 

30 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 30 
persons may concur or combine in causing injury. Moreover, under 

New Mexico law, a plaintiff's assumption of risk is not a complete 

defense but is conduct which is properly the subject of comparative 

.causation. See N.M. Stat. Ann.,. U.J.I.-Civ. 14-12 (Repl. Pamp. 

1980). Accord, Proctor v. Waxler, 84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d 644, 646-

47 (1972). Cf. Marchese v. Warner Communications. Inc., 100 N.M. 

313,670 P.2d 113, 116-18; Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d at 

1240 (a plaintiff's misconduct or negligence in voluntarily and 

unreasonably encountering a known danger is not a complete defense 

to a products liability claim but is properly the subject of 

determining the plaintiff's comparative fault). Thus, evidence 

that Plaintiff's own negligence was a cause of the lack of forward 

visibility is not dispositive of the propriety of the district 

court's denial of the directed verdict and JNOV motions on the 

design negligence causation issue. 13 Rather, in reviewing the 

propriety of the district court's rulings on these motions, we 

must determine whether there is evidence from which a jury could 

properly find in favor of Plaintiff on this issue. See, e.g .. , 

Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d 609, 912-13 (10th Cir. 

1984) (motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict); Martin v. 

Unit Rig & Equipment Co., 715 F.'2d 1434, 1438 (10th Cir. 

1983) (motion for directed verdict). In making this determination, 

13Plaintiff contends that this issue is moot because the jury 

found that 100% of Plaintiff's injuries were attributable to the 

plane's lack of crashworthiness. Because we have concluded that 

the judgment herein must be vacated and the case remanded for a new 

trial, this issue is not moot. 

31 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 31 
we must view the evidence most favorably to the Plaintiff and give 

him the benefit of all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. We 

may not weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of the 

witnesses or substitute ou:r: judgment for that of the jury. See id. 

We will reverse a district court's denial of a motion for a 

directed verdict or of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict only when the evidence and all of the inferences to be 

drawn therefrom point but one way and so conclusively favor of the 

moving party that reasonable persons could not find in favor of the 

non-moving party. See Farmers Insurance Co. v. Hubbard, 896 F.2d 

565, __ (10th Cir. 1989) (motion for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1547 

(10th Cir. 1988) (same); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Palermo, 

815 F.2d 1329, 1335 (10th Cir. 1987) (motions for directed verdict 

and for judgment notwi~hstanding the verdict); E.E.O.C. v. 

University of Oklahoma, 774 F.2d 999, 1001-02 (10th Cir. 1985), 

cert. denied, 475 u.s. 1120, 106 s:ct. 1637, 90 L.Ed.2d 183 

{1986)(motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict; Hurd v. 

American Hoist and Derrick co., 734 F.~d 495, 498-99 (10th Cir. 

1984) (both motions). 

Viewing the evidence·most favorably to the Plaintiff and 

giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we cannot say 

that the evidence points but one way, and tha~ a reasonable jury 

could not properly find that considering all of the circumstances 

the risk of injury was foreseeable and would have been avoided by 

a reasonably prudent manufacturer, that Plaintiff's manner of use 

32 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 32 
of the~aircraft was foreseeable, and that Defendant's failure to 

use ordinary care to design the aircraft to avoid the risk of 

injury was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries. 14 See 

Steinberg v. Coda Roberson Construction Co., 79 N.M. 123, 440 P.2d 

798, 799 {1968); R. Vol~ I at Tab 104 {Court's Jury Instructions), 

Nos. 4-9 & 11-13. The record contains substantial evidence that 

the design of the Super Cub significantly impairs forward 

visibility from the rear seat during take-off and that aircraft 

collisions with objects on the ground occur with regularity. The 

jury could have reasonably concluded that an ordinarily prudent 

manufacturer could reasonably expect that a pilot might fail or be 

unable to make s-turns to compensate for the lack of forward 

visibility despite awareness of the danger. See Proctor v. Waxler, 

84 N.M. 361, 503 P.2d at 646-47; R. Vol. I at Tab 104 (Court's Jury 

Instructions), No. 12 (N.M. Stat. Ann., U.J.I.-Civ. 14.12 (Repl. 

Pamp. 1980)) (duty to use ordinary care to prevent an unreasonably 

dangero~s condition exists even if such condition would be obvious 

to the user, if the party creating such risk could reasonably 

anticipate that the user would fail to protect himself). The 

district court did not err in denying the motions for a directed 

verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict predicated on 

a failure of proof that design negligence was a proximate cause of 

the collision. 

14See our discussion of proximate cause supra at section I. 

33 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 33 
v. 

Defendant also contends that the district court erred in 

not granting its motion for a directed verdict or for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the particular 

accident scenar;io and Plaintiff's misuse of the aircraft were 

unforeseeable as a matter of·law and therefore, that Defendant had 

no duty to guard against such risks. Defendant argues that to 

require an airplane manufacturer to avoid the risks of what 

Defendant describes as a "dangerous combination of misconduct') by 

the Plaintiff would make it an insurer against pilots' intentional 

risk-taking and misuse, contrary to New Mexico law, citing Daniell 

v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D.N.M. 1984) and Van de 

Valde v. Volvo of America Corp., 100 N.M. 457, 744 P.2d 930 (Ct. 

App. 1987). Assuming that Defendant had a duty to guard against 

such risks, however, Defendant argues that its negligence was not 

established because Plaintiff failed to produce any evidence of 

what a reasonably prudent manufacturer could have done to have 

protected Plaintiff from the dangers created by Plaintiff's 

modification and operation of the aircraft. These arguments are 

without merit. 

New Mex1co law does not require that the "precise hazard 

or exact consequences which were encountered" be . foreseeable. 

Ortega v. Texas-New Mexico Railway Co., 70 N.M. 58, 62, 370 P.2d 

201, 203 (1962); Harless v. Ewing, 80 N.M. 149, 151, 452 P.2d 483, 

485 (Ct. App. 1969). There was ample evidence at trial from which 

a jury could properly find that the risk of collision with an 

34 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 34 
object on the runway and the Plaintiff's conduct were "objectively 

reasonable to expect," Van de Valde v. Volvo of America Corp., 106 

N.M. 457, 744 P.2d 930, 932 (Ct. App. 1987), quoting Mata v. Clark 

Eguip~ent Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 418, 15 Ill. Dec. 980, 374 N.E.2d 

763, 766 (1978) and thus foreseeable. This evidence included 

evidence that every year many aircraft collisions with objects on 

the ground occur, see R. Vol. IV (Tr. Vol. 3) at pp. 550 & 569; 

evidence of Piper's Super Cub design, which permitted the plane to 

be flown from the rear seat and provided a large trapezoidal window 

for photography, see id. at pp. 534 & 551; Piper's owner's 

handbook's advice that rear seat operation of the craft is 

feasible, id. at p. 539, that the front seat could be removed 

entirely, id., and that for photography from the aircraft, its 

right door and window could be opened during flight, id. at 551; 

Piper's flight manual's advice on the maximum allowable weight in 

the baggage compartment during rear seat flight, id. at pp. 542-

43; the lack of· any information in Piper's handbook or flight 

manual concerning s-turns or forward visibility during take-off for 

a rear-seat pilot,. id. at pp. 549-50; and evidence of the civil 

Aeronautics Administration's advice to Piper to placard its 

aircraft ·

11 solo from front seat only." Id. at pp. 544-46. 

The district court was correct in concluding that a plaintiff 

is not required to offer proof of benefit from an alternate design 

in order to establish design negligence. See R. Vol. I at Tab 114 

(Memorandum Opinion and Order) at p. 2. All that was required was 

that the Plaintiff present evidence from which a jury could 

35 

Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 35 
conclude that the risk of injury would have been avoided by a. 

reasonably prudent person in the position of the manufacturer. See 

N.M. Stat. Ann., U.J.I.-CIV. 14-4 (Repl. Pamp. 1980); Steinberg v. 

Coda Roberson Construction co., 79 N.M. 123, 124, 440 P.2d 798 

(1968). The jury could reasonably conclude from evidence 

concerning the lack of forward visibility from the rear seat of the 

tail dragger craft and the risk of accidents due to runway 

obstructions that a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have 

designed the craft in a manner to avoid runway accidents resulting 

from such visibility limitation. Plaintiff's evidence of at least 

two alternate designs by which Defendant could have avoided the 

risk, see R. Vol. IV (Tr. Vol. 3) at pp. 555-56 & 584-85, while 

not critical, was simply additional evidence from which the jury 

could conclude that a reasonably prudent manufacturer could have 

and would have avoided the risks in question. The district court 

properly rejected Defendant's directed verdict and JNOV motions 

predicated upon the asserted unforeseeability of the accident and 

the Plaintiff's conduct and on the asserted lack of proof of an 

alternate d~sign. 

VI. 

Defendant recasts previous arguments concerning whether 

design negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and whether 

Plaintiff's modification of and use of the aircraft were 

unforeseeable to finally urge that both the Plaintiff's conduct and 

the deliberate obstruction of the runway by Mr. Wood, or a 

combination thereof, were independent intervening causes as a 

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Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 36 
matter of law. What we have already said concerning the issue of 

foreseeability disposes of this argument. There was evidence from 

which a jury could reasonably conclude that both Plaintiff's 

conduct and an obstruction on the runway were foreseeable. If an 

intervening act or cause is one which is reasonably foreseeable, 

the intervening act does not break the chain of causation and the 

original tortfeasor's negligence remains a proximate cause of the 

injury which finally results. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 

285 P.2d 507, 514-15 (1955); N.M. Stat. Ann., U.J.I.-Civ. 3.8 & 3.9 

(Repl. Pamp. 1980). See also Achin v. Begg Tire Center, 694 F.2d 

226, 228-29 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying New Mexico law) (independent 

intervening cause is one which could. not have reasonably been 

foreseen or one which the defendant had no reason to anticipate 

under the particular circumstances). 

VII. 

In a final contention in its cross appeal, Defendant 

asserts that the district court erred in denying its motion for a 

new trial because the district court erred in rejecting a standard 

New Mexico special verdict form proposed by Defendant in favor of 

one that was inconsistent with the court's ruling on the 

indivisibility of Plaintiff's injury and improperly did not permit 

the jury to compare together the negligence of all persons which 

caused the "initial collision" and that of all persons which caused 

the enhanced injuries, only. In addition, Defendant contends that 

questions in the special verdict form asking the jury to compare 

the negligence of non-parties and of Plaintiff to that of Defendant 

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on the "design negligence claim" and to compare Plaintiff's and 

Defendant's negligence under the "crashworthiness design negligence 

claim" were confusing. 

Defendant did not move for a new trial on this basis. 

Indeed, as the district court properly found, Defendant cited no 

grounds for its new trial motion. R. Vol. I Tab 124 (Memorandum 

Opinion and Order) at p. 5. Hence, no issue is presented for our 

review by virtue of the district court's denial of the new trial 

motion. 

In its reply brief Defendant argues that the asserted 

errors in the special verdict form to which Defendant made 

objection at trial may nevertheless be raised on appeal, even if 

they were not the subject of a new trial-motion, citing Hansen v. 

Vidal, 237 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1957) and 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, 

Federal Practice and Procedure § 2540 (1971). With respect to 

aspects of the special verdict form to which no objections were 

made by Defendant at trial, Defendant suggests that we may review 

the special verdict form under the limited exception which permits 

us to review instructions to which proper objection was not made 

if they are "patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial," Aspen 

Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 

{10th Cir. 1984), aff'd 472 U.S. 585, 105 s.ct. 2847, 86 L. Ed.2d 

467 (1985), quoting Brown v. McGraw-Edison Co., 736 F.2d at 614 n. 

6 (quoting Moe v. Avions Marcel Dessault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d . 917, 924 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853, 105 s.ct. 176, 83 

L.Ed.2d 110 (1984)), or for "plain error if it was a 'generating 

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Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 38 
factor which culminated in a verdict not warranted under the law. ' " 

Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d at 1516 

n. 6, quoting Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service. Inc., 716 F.2d 

1322, 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 958, 104 s. 

Ct. 2170, 80 L.Ed.2d 553 (1984). 

We agree with Defendant that its objection to the form 

of the special verdict employed by the district court preserved for 

our review any errors therein which were the bases for Defendant's 

objection, even though such asserted errors were not made the bases 

of a motion for a new trial or for judgment notwithstanding the 

verdict. See Hansen v. Vidal, 237 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1956) ~ See 

generally 9 c. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 

§ 2540 at p. 611. 

Defendant objected to question 7B in the special verdict 

form on the ground that it did not allow for the comparison of "the 

fault of any non-party and party" on the crashworthiness claim. 

R. Supp. Vol. I (Tr. Vol. 5) at p. 835. By way of further 

explanation, Defendant directed the Court to the special verdict 

form which it prepared and offered (R. Vol. I at Tab 105). Id. 

Defendant's proposed special verdict form would have permitted the 

jury to compare the negligence of the following persons which the 

jury found· was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damages: 

Defendant, Plaintiff, John "Jack" Wood, Robert Mudd, Etchison Greg 

Lill, Arnold Lerner, and Stephen Marks. R. Vol. I at Tab 105, No. 

4. Plaintiff contends that Defendant's objection to question 7B 

did · not specify what non-parties should have been included. 

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Plaintiff further seems to suggest that Defendant's reference to 

its own proposed verdict form either did not provide the necessary 

identification of non-parties or instead actually raised an 

objection to the Court I s separation of the "design negligence 

claim," for inadequate forward visibility and comparisons of 

negligence on that claim, from the "crashworthiness design 

negligence claim" for lack of a shoulder harness and comparisons 

of negligence on that claim, since the special verdict form 

proposed by Defendant did not separate these claims. We disagree. 

As should be obvious from what we have said in connection 

with Plaintiff's appeal, see section I, supra, the trial court 

should have permitted the jury to determine whether the negligence 

of original tortfeasors was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's 

enhanced injuries, and to compare the negligence of any original 

tortfeasors found to be a proximate cause of the enhanced injuries 

to the negligence of any crashworthiness tortfeasors and of the 

Plaintiff which was found to have proximately caused Plaintiff's 

enhanced injuries. The special verdict form was erroneous and 

contrary to New Mexico law because it did not permit the jury to 

do so. As we have already indicated, our remand of this case to 

the district court for a new trial is necessary on this basis. 

· Defendant argues on appeal that the district court erroneously 

rejected Defendant's proffered special verdict form, based upon New 

Mexico's Uniform Standard Jury Instructions - civil 22.20, for one 

which assertedly improperly separated the forward visibility issue 

from the restraint system issue and which was misleading because 

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it asked the jury to make comparisons of parties' and non-parties' 

negligence on Plaintiff's "design negligence claim ( inadequate 

forward vision)" and on Plaintiff's "crashworthiness design claim 

(lack of shoulder harness in rear seat). 11 Defendant did not object 

to the special verdict form on these grounds. 

Ordinarily, we will not consider on appeal an asserted 

error in the form of a Rule 49 (a) special verdict unless an 

objection to the special verdict form on that ground was made at 

trial. See ,Golub v. J. W. Gant & Associates, 863 F.2d 1516, 1521 

(11th Cir. 1989) (interrogatories); Frensley V. National Fire 

Insurance Company of Hartford, 856 F.2d 1199, 1203 (8th cir. 

1988) (interrogatories); J. c. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Trailways Bus 

System. Inc., 689 F.2d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1982) (interrogatories); 

Charles Stores, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 490 F.2d 64, 67-68 

(5th Cir. 1974) (interrogatories or special verdict); Clegg v. 

Hardware Mutual Casualty Co., 264 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 

1959) (special verdict or interrogatories); Filipek v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 258 F.2d 734, 736 (2nd Cir. 1958), cert. 

denied, 359 U.S. 927, 79 s.ct. 605, 3 L.Ed.2d 629 

(1959) (interrogatories); Huse v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 

227 F.2d 425, 430 (7th Cir. 1955) (special verdict). Assuming 

without deciding that we could review the form of the special 

verdict employed for plain or "fundamental error," see Golub v. J. 

W. Grant & Associates, 863 F.2d at 1521 n. 6; Dunn v. ove Skou 

Rederi A/S, 45 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Pa. 1968), just as we may review 

"patently plainly and prejudicial" instructions to which no 

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Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 41 
objection is made, Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing 

Co., 738 F.2d at 1516, our determination that the judgment herein 

must be vacated and the case remanded for a new trial renders such 

review unnecessary and any error and prejudice suffered by 

Defendant moot. 

Because this case must be retried, however, we offer the 

following guidance to the district court. If again the evidence 

is uncontroverted that Plaintiff would have suffered no injuries 

as a. result of the collision, absent the lack of a shoulder 

harness, then no issue is presented for the jury to determine what 

injuries and damages were proximately caused by the negligence of 

the. original tortfeasors, absent the negligence of those which 

proximately caused the lack of a rear seat shoulder harness, and 

the special verdict form should not include questions directed to 

this issue. Rather, the special verdict form should permit the 

jury to determine which of the parties and non-parties (whether 

"original tortfeasors" or "crashworthiness tortfeasors") were 

negligent; whether the negligence of each of such parties and nonparties was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury and damages; 

the amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff; and to compare 

the negligence of each party and non-party (whether "original 

tortfeasors" or "crashworthiness tortfeasors") found to be the 

proximate cause of the Plaintiff's injuries and damages. If, on 

the other hand, there is evidence from which a jury could properly 

find that Plaintiff would have sustained some injury or the same 

injury in the collision, absent.any crashworthiness negligence or 

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Appellate Case: 86-2112 Document: 010110089139 Date Filed: 11/15/1989 Page: 42 
negligence which caused.the lack of a.rear seat shoulder harness 

(i.e., that Plaintiff would have sustained some or the same injury 

if he had been wearing a shoulder harness), the district court 

should avoid possible jury confusion which may be created by using 

the terms "design negligence claim" and "crashworthiness design 

negligence," and asking the jury to compare various persons' 

negligence on claims so described. Any special verdict or 

interrogatories should focus instead on the negligence of any 

parties or non-parties which proximately caused injuries which the 

jury finds Plaintiff would have sustained if Plaintiff had been 

wearing a shoulder harness and a comparison of such negligence ; 

and on the negligence. of any parties or non-parties which 

proximately caused injuries to Plaintiff over and above those which 

Plaintiff would have sustained as a result of the collision, if he 

had been wearing a shoulder harness, and a comparison of such 

negligence. 

For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the United 

States District Court for the District of New Mexico is VACATED 

and the case is REMANDED to the district court for a new trial. 

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