Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02201/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02201-9/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
FAS, LLC
Defendant
GranCare, LLC
Defendant
Price J. Hall
Plaintiff
Mariner Health Care Management Company
Defendant
Mariner Health Care, Inc.
Defendant
Remy Rhodes
Defendant
Vale Healthcare Center
Defendant

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Defendants contend plaintiff’s motion is not properly before the Court because

plaintiff “lacks the capacity to bring his motion.” (See Def.’s Opp. at 4:20.) Even assuming,

arguendo, defendants are correct, the Court has an “independent obligation” to raise and

address any defects in subject matter jurisdiction. See Matao Yokeno v. Sawako

Sekiguchi, 754 F.3d 649, 652 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the Court considers the

propriety of its exercise of jurisdiction over the above-captioned case, irrespective of

plaintiff’s competency to raise the matter. 

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PRICE J. HALL,

Plaintiff,

 v.

GRANCARE, LLC dba VALE HEALTHCARE

CENTER; MARINER HEALTH CARE

MANAGEMENT COMPANY; MARINER

HEALTH CARE, INC.; FAS, LLC; REMY

RHODES, and DOES 100,

Defendants. /

No. 15-2201 MMC

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

REMAND; DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

REQUEST FOR COSTS AND FEES

Before the Court is plaintiff Price J. Hall’s Motion to Remand, filed August 20, 2015,

by which filing plaintiff seeks an order remanding the above-titled action to state court on

the ground this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.1

 Defendants GranCare, LLC, d/b/a

Vale Healthcare Center (“Vale”), Mariner Health Care Management Company, and Mariner

Health Care, Inc. have filed opposition, to which plaintiff has replied. Having read and

considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as

Case 3:15-cv-02201-MMC Document 66 Filed 10/08/15 Page 1 of 5
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By order filed September 28, 2015, the Court found the matter appropriate for

decision on the parties’ respective written submissions, vacated the hearing scheduled for

October 2, 2015, and took the matter under submission.

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For the same reason, defendants asserted the consent of FAS and Rhodes was not

needed in order to remove the action. (See Notice of Removal ¶ 4.)

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Defendants contend plaintiff “waived his challenge to the amended removal,” by

failing to oppose defendants’ motion for leave to file their amended notice. (See Def.’s

Opp. at 2:6-9.) The Court disagrees. “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for

challenging removal.” See Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir.

2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (setting forth procedure for challenging removal). The

parties cannot confer jurisdiction by either stipulation or waiver, see Guzman-Andrade v.

Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005), and, indeed, a party may challenge the

court’s jurisdiction “at any time, even after trial and the entry of judgment,” see Oregon v.

Legal Services Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

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follows.2

BACKGROUND

On February 23, 2015, plaintiff filed the instant action in California state court,

naming Vale, Mariner Health Care Management Company, Mariner Health Care, Facility

Administrative Services, LLC (“FAS”), and Remy Rhodes (“Rhodes”) as defendants. In the

complaint, plaintiff alleges he did not receive proper care while residing at Vale, and

alleges, as against all said defendants, three state law causes of action: Elder Abuse and

Neglect, Violation of the Patient Bill of Rights, and Negligence.

On May 15, 2015, all named defendants other than FAS and Rhodes filed a Notice

of Removal, in which they asserted the Court had diversity jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

claims. In particular, said defendants asserted the amount in controversy exceeded

$75,000, plaintiff was a citizen of California, all defendants other than FAS and Rhodes

were not citizens of California, and the California citizenship of FAS and Rhodes should be

disregarded as, according to defendants, FAS and Rhodes had been fraudulently joined for

the sole purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction. (See Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 10-11.)3

On June 11, 2015, plaintiff filed his initial Motion to Remand, arguing FAS and Rhodes

were not fraudulently joined. 

Thereafter, on June 26, 2015, defendants filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended

Notice of Removal, which plaintiff did not oppose.4 The Court granted leave to amend (see

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On July 15, 2015, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against FAS. 

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Order, filed July 20, 2015), and, on July 22, 2015, all defendants remaining as of that date

joined in the filing of an Amended Notice of Removal (see Am. Notice of Removal ¶ 4).5

 

In the Amended Notice of Removal, defendants, in lieu of asserting fraudulent

joinder, proceed on the ground that the Court has diversity jurisdiction because, after the

first Notice of Removal was filed, plaintiff changed his domicile to Texas, a state in which

none of the defendants resides. (See Am. Notice of Removal.) Thereafter, as defendants

had abandoned their fraudulent joinder argument, the Court denied as moot plaintiff’s first

Motion to Remand, which was based exclusively on the argument that FAS and Rhodes

were not fraudulently joined (see Order, filed July 28, 2015), after which, as noted, plaintiff

filed the instant Motion to Remand, addressing the Amended Notice of Removal.

DISCUSSION

A. Remand

A civil action is only removable if it falls within the original jurisdiction of the district

courts of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The district courts have original

jurisdiction over any civil action wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and in

which the parties are completely diverse, i.e., no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as

any defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a); see also Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S.

185, 187 (1990) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806)). 

“[T]he core principle of federal removal jurisdiction on the basis of diversity” is that “it is

determined (and must exist) as of the time the complaint is filed and removal is effected.” 

See Strotek Corp. v. Air Transport Ass’n of America, 300 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002). 

Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating removal is proper. See Moore-Thomas v.

Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009).

Here, defendants do not dispute that plaintiff and two of the defendants, FAS and

Rhodes, were citizens of California on February 23, 2015, the date on which plaintiff filed

his complaint in state court, as well as on May 15, 2015, the date on which defendants

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removed the case to federal court. 

According to defendants’ Amended Notice of Removal, diversity jurisdiction

nonetheless exists because plaintiff, as of June 8, 2015, became a citizen of Texas,

whereas no defendant is a citizen of Texas. Plaintiff does not dispute defendants’ showing

that he moved to Texas, but, rather, argues that his change in residence is irrelevant

because it occurred after the complaint was filed.

In support of their argument that plaintiff’s recent change of domicile creates

diversity jurisdiction, defendants cite to Hanson v. Equilon Enterprises LLC, 2014 WL

2897422 (N.D. Cal. 2014), which in turn cites to DeBry v. Transamerica Corp., 601 F.2d

480 (10th Cir. 1979), wherein the Tenth Circuit held a plaintiff’s change in citizenship after

the filing of the complaint is a “special condition justifying removal.” See id. at 487. 

Defendants’ reliance on any such exception to the time-of-filing rule is, however, unavailing,

as DeBry predates Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, LP, 541 U.S. 567 (2004). 

In Grupo Dataflux, the Supreme Court considered the question “whether a party’s

post-filing change in citizenship can cure a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction that existed at

the time of the filing in an action premised upon diversity of citizenship,” id. at 568, and held

the post-filing change in citizenship by the plaintiff therein did not create diversity

jurisdiction. See id. at 575 (recognizing removal based on post-filing dismissal of nondiverse party as only exception to time-of-filing rule; rejecting “purported cure” arising “not

from a change in the parties to the action, but from a change in the citizenship of a

continuing party”). In so holding, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its long-standing rule that

“jurisdiction depending on the condition of the party is governed by that condition, as it was

at the commencement of the suit.” Id. at 574, 580, 582 (noting “the facts determining

jurisdiction are subject to change” and the “stability provided by our time-tested rule weighs

heavily against the approval of any new deviation”).

Accordingly, the Court finds defendants have failed to show diversity jurisdiction

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In so ruling, the Court has not relied on any document listed in plaintiff’s Request for

Judicial Notice, and, consequently, has not addressed that request herein. Additionally,

given the Court’s lack of jurisdiction over the above-titled action, the Court has not ruled on

plaintiff’s Petition for Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem. 

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exists, and, consequently, will grant plaintiff’s motion to remand.6

B. Fees

In addition to seeking an order remanding the action, plaintiff seeks an award of

attorney’s fees and costs. “An order remanding the case may require payment of just costs

and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” See

28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). “[A]bsent unusual circumstances,” however, “attorney’s fees should

not be awarded when the removing party has an objectively reasonable basis for removal.” 

See Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Here, plaintiff has not

brought to the Court’s attention any “unusual circumstances” that would compel an award

of fees and costs and has not made any attempt to show, nor does the Court find,

defendants’ reliance on the DeBry exception was objectively unreasonable. 

Accordingly, the Court denies plaintiff’s request for costs and attorney's fees

incurred in connection with the removal.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is hereby GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as follows:

1. To the extent the motion seeks an order remanding the action, the motion is

GRANTED, and the above-titled action is hereby REMANDED to the Superior Court of

California, in and for the County of Contra Costa.

2. To the extent the motion seeks an award of fees and costs incurred in connection

with the removal, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 8, 2015 

MAXINE M. CHESNEY

United States District Judge

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