Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04438/USCOURTS-ca8-05-04438-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Castural Thompson
Appellee
Wal-Mart Stores
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District

of Minnesota, sitting by designation. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-4438

___________

Castural Thompson, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 29, 2006

Filed: December 27, 2006

___________

Before RILEY and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges, and KYLE,1

 District Judge.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) appeals the district court’s denial of its claim

for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and for costs under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(d)(1). We vacate the judgment for attorney fees and costs, and remand

to the district court for further proceedings. 

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2

We hold only that the record before us is not entirely consistent and do not

reach the merits of the whether Wal-Mart, as the prevailing defendant, is entitled to

attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See generally Dillon v. Brown County,

Neb., 380 F.3d 360, 365 (8th Cir. 2004) (“A prevailing defendant may recover fees

if the plaintiff’s suit was ‘frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.’” (quoting Marquart

-2-

I. BACKGROUND

Castural Thompson (Thompson) filed a complaint alleging Wal-Mart

discriminated against him based on his race in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. After

a four-day bench trial, the district court concluded Thompson had not established a

prima facie case of racial discrimination. The district court ordered each party to bear

its own attorney fees and costs. Wal-Mart appeals. 

II. DISCUSSION

We review de novo the legal issues related to the award of attorney fees and

costs and review for abuse of discretion the actual award of attorney fees and costs.

See Cody v. Hillard, 304 F.3d 767, 772 (8th Cir. 2002); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84

F.3d 292, 294 (8th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 

A. Attorney Fees

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides “the court, in its discretion, may allow the

prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” In the trial order, the district court

stated, “nothing in the testimony or evidence presented at trial would lead a reasonable

factfinder to believe that any conflict [with Thompson’s supervisor] existed due to

[Thompson’s] race.” In the order denying Wal-Mart’s claim for attorney fees,

however, the district court stated, “a fact-finder, based upon the circumstances, timing,

and actions of Wal-Mart executives, could well have concluded [Thompson] was

subject to racial discrimination.” Absent any further explanation of the circumstances,

timing, and actions of Wal-Mart executives, the district court’s reason for denying

Wal-Mart’s claim for attorney fees appears to be internally inconsistent with its

conclusion Thompson failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.2

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v. Lodge 837, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 26 F.3d 842, 852 (8th

Cir. 1994))). 

-3-

Therefore, due to the apparent internal inconsistency, we vacate the attorney fees

denial and remand for further consideration. Subsalve USA Corp. v. Watson Mfg.,

Inc., 462 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2006). 

B. Costs

Rule 54(d)(1) provides “costs other than attorneys’ fees shall be allowed as of

course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs.” “A prevailing party

is presumptively entitled to recover all of its costs.” In re Derailment Cases, 417 F.3d

840, 844 (8th Cir. 2005). To rebut the presumption that the prevailing party is entitled

to recover all of its costs, the district court must provide a rationale for denying the

prevailing party’s claim for costs. Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus., Co., 126 F.3d

926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997); accord Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Tropical Shipping &

Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 987, 1012 (11th Cir. 2001); Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators

v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 591 (9th Cir. 2000) (“A district court must ‘specify

reasons’ for its refusal to award costs.” (citation omitted)); Cantrell v. Int’l Bhd. of

Elec. Workers, Local 2021, 69 F.3d 456, 459 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, the district court

never articulated its specific reasons for denying Wal-Mart’s claim for costs. The

district court concluded its denial of fees and costs “is fair to both Wal-Mart and

[Thompson].” A general statement of fairness is insufficient, without more, to rebut

the Rule 54(d)(1) presumption for an award of costs to the prevailing party.

Therefore, the district court erred by refusing to award costs to the prevailing party

without providing a more precise rationale for doing so. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we vacate the denial of Wal-Mart’s claim for attorney

fees and costs, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

______________________________

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