Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01950/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01950-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roy Johnson
Appellant
Novozymes A/S
Cross-Appellant
Novozymes North America, Inc.
Cross-Appellant
U.S. Water Services, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

U.S. WATER SERVICES, INC., ROY JOHNSON,

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

NOVOZYMES A/S, NOVOZYMES NORTH AMERICA,

INC.,

Defendants-Cross-Appellants

______________________ 

2015-1950, 2015-1967

______________________ 

Appeals from the United States District Court for the 

Western District of Wisconsin in No. 3:13-cv-00864-JDP, 

Judge James D. Peterson.

______________________ 

Decided: December 15, 2016

______________________ 

MICHELLE MARIE UMBERGER, Perkins Coie, LLP, Madison, WI, argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by JOHN SINGLETON SKILTON, AUTUMN N. NERO, DAVID 

J. HARTH, BRANDON MICHAEL LEWIS; COLIN GENE

SANDERCOCK, Washington, DC.

DAVID KEITH TELLEKSON, Fenwick & West LLP, Seattle, WA, argued for defendants-cross-appellants. Also 

represented by EWA M. DAVISON, PHILLIP DECKER,

ELIZABETH B. HAGAN; VIRGINIA KAY DEMARCHI, MICHAEL 

C. SAUNDERS, II, Mountain View, CA.

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2 U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S

______________________ 

Before WALLACH, HUGHES, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

U.S. Water Services, Inc. and Roy Johnson (together, 

“U.S. Water”) sued Novozymes A/S and Novozymes North 

America, Inc. (together, “Novozymes”) in the U.S. District 

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin (“District 

Court”), alleging indirect infringement of U.S. Patent Nos. 

8,415,137 (“the ’137 patent”) and 8,609,399 (“the ’399 

patent”) (together, “the Patents-in-Suit”). Novozymes 

counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement, invalidity, and inequitable conduct. The parties 

later filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The 

District Court granted Novozymes’s Motion in part, 

finding claims 1, 6, and 12–13 of the ’137 patent and 

claims 1–2, 5–12, 16–22, 25, 28–32, and 34–35 of the ’399 

patent (collectively, “the Asserted Claims”) invalid as 

inherently anticipated by various prior art references. 

U.S. Water Servs., Inc. v. Novozymes A/S, 120 F. Supp. 3d 

861, 868–82 (W.D. Wis. 2015). However, the District 

Court denied Novozymes’s Motion as to inequitable conduct by U.S. Water. Id. at 882–83. 

U.S. Water appeals the District Court’s anticipation

finding. Novozymes cross-appeals the District Court’s 

finding of no inequitable conduct. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). We vacate-inpart, affirm-in-part, and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

BACKGROUND

I. The Relevant Patents

The technology at issue relates to the production of 

ethyl alcohol (i.e., ethanol) from a milled grain. Ethanol 

production yields an insoluble byproduct that deposits on, 

or “fouls,” the processing equipment. See, e.g., ’399 patent 

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U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S 3

col. 1 ll. 34–38; J.A. 1376–90 (Confidential Material). The 

Patents-in-Suit disclose methods for reducing or preventing fouling. See ’399 patent col. 3 ll. 21–24; ’137 patent 

col. 1 ll. 50−53. 

The Patents-in-Suit share a common specification and 

are related to one another as continuations of the application that also led to U.S. Patent No. 8,039,244 (“the ’244 

patent”) (collectively, “the Patent Family”).1 J.A. 135, 

144. The Patent Family generally claims methods of 

reducing fouling through the use of phytase.2 

Each patent discloses the addition of the enzyme 

phytase at various points in the ethanol production process. For example, the ’244 patent is entitled “Reducing 

Insoluble Deposit Formation in Ethanol Production” and 

discloses the addition of phytase after fermentation has 

finished. See ’244 patent col. 12 ll. 9–13 (reciting “adding 

phytase to . . . thin stillage, backset, or [a] mixture thereof 

containing phytic acid or salts of phytic acid under conditions suitable for converting the insoluble phytic acid or 

phytic acid salts to soluble products”); id. col. 1 ll. 65–67 

(“In an embodiment, the present method includes adding 

an enzyme with phytase activity to the ethanol-processing 

fluids after fermentation . . . .”). The ’399 patent is enti-

 

1 A continuing patent application is “an application

filed subsequently to another application, while the prior 

application is pending, disclosing all or a substantial part 

of the subject-matter of the prior application and containing claims to subject-matter common to both applications, 

both applications being filed by the same inventor or his 

legal representative.” In re Febrey, 135 F.2d 751, 757 

(CCPA 1943) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

2 “Phytase is an enzyme known to be capable of 

breaking down the phytic acid found in plant material.” 

’399 patent col. 5 ll. 39–40.

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4 U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S

tled “Reducing Insoluble Deposit Formation in Ethanol 

Production” and the ’137 patent is entitled “Preventing 

Phytate Salt Deposition in Polar Solvent Systems.” The 

patents’ claims disclose the introduction of phytase into 

the production process under certain conditions, but they 

do not disclose precisely when the phytase should be 

added and under what conditions. See, e.g., ’399 patent 

col. 12 ll. 44–48 (reciting “providing . . . phytase in the 

ethanol processing fluid” to reduce “the formation of 

insoluble deposits of phytic acid and/or salts of phytic 

acid”); ’137 patent col. 12 ll. 33–38 (reciting “adding 

phytase to an ethanol processing fluid . . . under conditions suitable for converting the insoluble phytic acid or 

phytic acid salts to soluble products”). But see id. col. 1 ll. 

58−60 (“The method can include: adding an agent to the 

ethanol-processing fluids after fermentation . . . .” (emphasis added)).

II. The Prior Art

The District Court found that either International 

Publication No. WO 01/62947 A1 (“Veit”), J.A. 1580–610, 

or U.S. Patent No. 5,756,714 (“Antrim”) inherently anticipated the Asserted Claims. U.S. Water, 120 F. Supp. 3d 

at 878–82. Veit is entitled “Fermentation with a Phytase” 

and explains that ethanol production from whole grains 

involves four steps: (1) milling, (2) liquefaction,3

(3) saccharification,4 and (4) fermentation. Veit p. 2 

ll. 24–29. Veit discloses that adding phytase during the 

 

3 Liquefaction is the process of breaking down (i.e., 

hydrolyzing) the milled grain material into sugars. “The 

hydrolysis may be carried out . . . enzymatically by alphaamylase treatment [e.g., phytase].” Veit p. 3 ll. 9–11. 

4 Saccharification is a process for “produc[ing] low 

molecular sugars . . . [extracted during liquefaction] that 

can be metabolized by yeast [after further hydrolysis].” 

Veit. p. 3 ll. 28–30.

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saccharification and fermentation stages of ethanol production can result in “increases [in] the fermentation and 

ethanol yields.” Id. p. 5 l. 29; see id. p. 1 ll. 7–8, p. 2 ll. 

15–19, p. 8 ll. 4–11 (further describing the process for 

adding phytase at either step). Antrim is entitled “Method for Liquefying Starch” and discloses a method for 

liquefying corn starch that “relates to the removal, and/or 

inactivation of an enzyme inhibiting composition from a 

granular starch prior to or during liquefaction.” Antrim 

col. 1 ll. 14–16. The enzyme inhibiting composition is 

“comprise[d of] a form of phytate” that “acts to inhibit 

[alpha]-amylase hydrolysis of a starch solution during low 

pH liquefaction.” Id. col. 5 ll. 30–36. Antrim is directed 

at a more efficient liquefaction process through the use of 

enzymes. See id. col. 4 ll. 6–21 (summarizing the objectives of the invention). 

DISCUSSION

U.S. Water argues that the District Court erred in 

granting summary judgment of invalidity based on inherent anticipation because the District Court expressly 

acknowledged the existence of a disputed material fact. 

Novozymes challenges the District Court’s inequitable 

conduct finding. After discussing the applicable standard 

of review, we address these arguments in turn. 

I. Standard of Review 

This court reviews the grant of summary judgment 

under the law of the regional circuit in which the district 

court sits. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Elan 

Pharm., Inc., 786 F.3d 892, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The 

Seventh Circuit reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Greer v. Bd. of Educ., 267 F.3d 

723, 726 (7th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper 

only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986). A 

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genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a 

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 

party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 

(1986). 

II. Anticipation

U.S. Water argues that the District Court erred in 

granting summary judgment based on a finding that the 

Patents-in-Suit are inherently anticipated by Veit and

Antrim. That is so, U.S. Water contends, because the 

District Court acknowledged the existence of a genuine 

dispute as to a material fact. Appellants’ Br. 35. We 

agree with U.S. Water. 

A. Legal Framework

Although “the anticipation inquiry first demands a 

proper claim construction,” Trintec Indus., Inc. v. TopU.S.A. Corp., 295 F.3d 1292, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002), claim 

construction is not an issue in this case, see Appellants’

Br. 29–52. Thus, we begin with the prior art. A reference 

is anticipatory under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)5 if “the 

prior art reference . . . disclose[s] each and every feature 

of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.” 

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 471 F.3d 

1369, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). 

Even if a prior art reference does not explicitly disclose all features of the claimed invention, we have found 

that the reference inherently may do so. See Schering 

Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1377 (Fed. 

 

5 In passing the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 

(“AIA”), Congress amended § 102. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 

§ 3(b), 125 Stat. 284, 285–87 (2011). However, because 

the applications that led to the Patents-in-Suit were filed 

before March 16, 2013, the pre-AIA § 102(b) applies. See 

id. § 3(n)(1), 125 Stat. at 293.

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Cir. 2003). “[A]nticipation by inherent disclosure is 

appropriate only when the [single prior art] reference 

discloses prior art that must necessarily include the 

unstated limitation.” Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood 

Servs., Inc., 290 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citation 

omitted). “Inherency, however, may not be established by

probabilities or possibilities. The mere fact that a certain 

thing may result from a given set of circumstances is not 

sufficient.” Cont’l Can Co. USA, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 948 

F.2d 1264, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted). Rather, “[t]he inherent 

result must inevitably result from the disclosed 

steps . . . .” In re Montgomery, 677 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. 

Cir. 2012). 

B. The District Court’s Finding

The District Court analyzed the Asserted Claims of 

the Patents-in-Suit and found seven common elements 

shared by these claims. U.S. Water Servs., 120 F. Supp. 

3d at 868. After comparing these common elements with 

the disclosures in Veit and Antrim, the District Court

concluded that “[t]he evidence of record show[ed] beyond 

genuine dispute that the expressly disclosed elements, 

one through six, [were] disclosed in Veit and Antrim.” Id.

at 872; see id. at 868. As to the last element, “thereby 

reducing the formation of insoluble deposits,” the District 

Court determined that “the critical issue” was whether 

Veit or Antrim inherently disclosed “adding phytase for 

the purpose of reducing deposits.” Id. at 872. 

In addressing this issue, the District Court explained 

that “the critical facts that are relevant to the court’s 

anticipation analysis are not in dispute.” Id. at 881. In 

particular, the District Court observed that “[t]he 

[P]atents-in-[S]uit describe a method for using phytase in 

terms of ranges for dosage, temperature, and pH; Veit and 

Antrim disclose the same method, using overlapping and 

often narrower ranges.” Id. On this basis, the District 

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Court determined that “summary judgment [was] appropriate because the evidence of record establishe[d] that 

deposit reduction [was] a natural result of the methods for 

adding phytase during ethanol production that Veit and 

Antrim disclose.” Id. at 878. The District Court added 

that, although “Veit and Antrim do not expressly identify 

the benefit that U.S. Water’s patents identify, they nevertheless inherently disclose that benefit.” Id. at 879. 

Thus, the District Court determined either Veit or Antrim 

inherently disclose element seven.

C. A Genuine Dispute as to a Material Fact Bars Summary Judgment Based on Inherent Anticipation

We must determine whether the District Court overlooked a genuine dispute about a material fact—whether 

the reduction of “insoluble deposits of phytic acid or salts 

of phytic acids” as recited in the Asserted Claims was

inherent in either Veit or Antrim through the use of 

phytase. In reaching this conclusion, “we must view the 

evidence and draw all inferences in a way most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Bombard v. Fort Wayne Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation 

omitted). 

The District Court correctly identified that “[t]he issue on which this case ultimately turns is whether Veit 

[or] Antrim inherently disclose using phytase to reduce 

deposits in ethanol production machinery.” U.S. Water 

Servs., 120 F. Supp. 3d at 878. However, it erred in 

finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

the Patents-in-Suit are inherently anticipated because 

“the prior art discloses the conditions that will necessarily 

result in phytase reducing deposits.” Id. at 879. The 

District Court erred in deeming irrelevant the fact that

“U.S. Water . . . adduced evidence[, including expert 

testimony,] . . . that practicing Veit and Antrim will not 

always result in deposit reduction.” Id. The District 

Court recognized this was conflicting evidence that went 

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U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S 9

to the core of an inherent anticipation analysis, but concluded this evidence did not preclude summary judgment. 

Id. at 879. By disregarding this evidence, the District 

Court improperly made credibility determinations and 

weighed conflicting evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 

255 (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the 

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from 

the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] 

he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment . . . .”). 

We find that the record evidence demonstrates that 

“there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party 

for a jury to return a verdict for that party,” id. at 249

(citation omitted), and that summary judgment was 

therefore inappropriate. Specifically, the testimony of 

U.S. Water’s experts (i.e., Eric Dorn, Dr. George Reed, 

and Rodney Simms) demonstrates that there is a dispute

as to whether adding phytase in the manner disclosed in 

Antrim or Veit will necessarily lead to a reduction of 

insoluble organometallic salt deposits as claimed in the 

Patents-in-Suit. For example, these experts testified that 

there are numerous factors affecting the ultimate reduction of insoluble organometallic salt deposits. See J.A. 

760 (Dr. Reed stating that “[n]umerous factors can impact 

the ability of phytases to convert phytic acid to its hydrolysis products during ethanol processing”), 854 (Mr. Dorn 

stating that “if the treatment specifics and process conditions are not correct, no process fouling reduction may be 

observed in the plant” and that, if “the phytase dosage is 

reduced below its critical dosage value or a process condition or parameter is changed and not corrected for appropriately,” the fouling can reappear as if no phytase had 

been added), 855 (Mr. Dorn also stating that “one can 

remove a large majority of the phytate and not have any 

measureable effect on the rate of process fouling”), and 

1025 (Mr. Simms stating that “one can employ phytase 

enzyme according to Antrim . . . and Veit in ways that 

could sufficiently affect the phytic acid and phytates 

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10 U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S

present to improve liquefaction and fermentation, but 

which would be insufficient to have any effect on the 

formation of deposits . . . .”). The testimony from U.S. 

Water’s experts demonstrates that a genuine dispute as to 

a material fact remained and that, consequently, the 

District Court improperly granted summary judgment on 

inherent anticipation. 

III. Inequitable Conduct

Novozymes argues that the District Court erred in 

granting summary judgment of no inequitable conduct. 

See Cross-Appellants’ Br. 56–68. In particular, Novozymes contends that the District Court failed to recognize 

a genuine dispute as to a fact material to the inequitable 

conduct inquiry. Id. at 63–68. We disagree.

A. Legal Framework

“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent 

infringement that, if proved, bars enforcement of a patent.” Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 

F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). A finding of 

inequitable conduct as to “any single claim renders the 

entire patent unenforceable” and may “render unenforceable other related patents and applications in the same 

technology family.” Id. at 1288 (internal quotation marks 

and citations omitted). “Inequitable conduct occurs when 

a patentee breaches his or her duty to the [U.S. Patent 

and Trademark Office (‘USPTO’)] of candor, good faith, 

and honesty.” Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 

1181, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted); see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2015) (explaining that a party appearing before the USPTO has “a duty 

to disclose . . . all information known to that individual to 

be material to patentability”). 

“A party seeking to prove inequitable conduct must 

show . . . that the patent applicant made misrepresentations or omissions material to patentability, that he did so 

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with the specific intent to mislead or deceive the 

[US]PTO, and that deceptive intent was the single most 

reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.” 

Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Alps S., LLC, 813 F.3d 1350, 

1357 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “To prove the 

element of materiality, a party claiming inequitable 

conduct ordinarily must show that the patentee withheld 

or misrepresented information that, in the absence of the 

withholding or misrepresentation, would have prevented 

a patent claim from issuing.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “Specific intent to commit 

acts constituting inequitable conduct may be inferred 

from indirect and circumstantial evidence[,] . . . [b]ut 

deceptive intent must be the single most reasonable 

inference drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 1358 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted).

B. Relevant Facts

Novozymes bases its inequitable conduct charge on 

representations made by U.S. Water about the application 

that led to the ’244 patent and, thus, the Patent Family. 

Specifically, following the examiner’s rejection of certain 

claims in the application as obvious over certain prior art

such as Veit, U.S. Water amended the proposed claims in 

the application to change the stage at which phytase was 

added. See J.A. 2222–30 (Amendments to the Claims), 

2309–17 (further Amendments to the Claims). U.S. 

Water narrowed its claims to add phytase specifically to 

“the thin stillage, backset, or mixture thereof.” J.A. 

2222−26. As a result, U.S. Water argued the amended 

claims overcame Veit, where “phytase is added before 

fermentation” to “release nutrients so that yeast are more 

efficient at fermentation.” J.A. 2228, 2229. The ’244 

patent subsequently issued in October 2011 with the 

amended claim language. J.A. 1344. 

Around the same time, U.S. Water was involved in litigation against ChemTreat, Inc. (“ChemTreat”) for unreCase: 15-1950 Document: 72-2 Page: 11 Filed: 12/15/2016
12 U.S. WATER SERVS., INC. v. NOVOZYMES A/S

lated claims. See, e.g., J.A. 4888−902 (Complaint, Order, 

and Joint Motion for Dismissal). As part of the litigation,

ChemTreat moved for summary judgment of noninfringement of the ’244 patent, arguing that the ’244 

patent’s claims were limited to adding phytase after 

fermentation while ChemTreat instructed its customers to 

add phytase during fermentation. See J.A. 2941. U.S. 

Water argued that adding phytase during fermentation 

was equivalent to adding phytase to the backset, i.e., the 

post-fermentation fluid, because it is recycled back into 

fermentation. See J.A. 2941; see also J.A. 3285 (Declaration). During a hearing, the presiding judge questioned 

U.S. Water about the seemingly contradictory statements 

it had made to the court in the Declaration and those it 

made to the USPTO during prosecution of the ’244 patent. 

See J.A. 2962 (The court: “It seemed to me that 

you . . . repeatedly and very clearly kept saying our process isn’t about adding phytase at the fermentation 

stage.”), 2964 (similar), 2966 (similar). The court ultimately found that ChemTreat did not infringe the ’244 

patent because it taught its customers to add phytase 

before or during fermentation. J.A. 4898. 

While the litigation with ChemTreat remained ongoing and after the court identified the apparent discrepancy, U.S. Water amended the continuation application that 

led to the ’137 patent. This amendment canceled all 

pending claims and replaced them with new claims. J.A. 

2540–53 (Amendment dated July 20, 2012). The new 

claims broadly required “adding phytase to an ethanol 

processing fluid in the plant.” J.A. 2541, 2545. The 

amended claims also identified the differences with claim 

1 of the ’244 patent, which sought to narrow the claimed 

subject matter. See J.A. 2545. 

A third-party later identified this purported distinction to the USPTO during the prosecution of the ’399 

patent. See J.A. 5046–68, 5399–404. In particular, the 

third-party asserted that the claims of the ’399 patent 

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were not limited by where the phytase was added. See 

J.A. 5051–52 (“The claims in the present application [i.e., 

the application that led to the ’399 patent] recite adding 

phytase to ethanol processing fluids with no further 

limitation to the type of fluid to which the phytase is 

added.”). The examiner noted in the file history that she

reviewed the third-party’s submission along with Veit and 

other prior art references. See J.A. 5399–404. 

C. The District Court Did Not Err in Finding a Lack of 

Materiality

The District Court determined that Novozymes failed 

to demonstrate a genuine dispute over either materiality 

or intent, and that the law did not require a finding of 

inequitable conduct. U.S. Water Servs., 120 F. Supp. 3d 

at 883. As to materiality, the District Court determined 

that “Novozymes falls short of establishing the but-for 

materiality” of the information disclosed in the 

ChemTreat litigation. Id. Specifically, the District Court 

observed that the amendment of the continuation application that led to the ’137 patent “set out the amended claim 

with differences with claim 1 of the ’244 patent highlighted,” such that it “would have been amply clear to the 

examiner that the patentees were seeking a claim that 

was broader in the sense that the after-fermentation 

limitation was removed.” Id. Furthermore, the District 

Court determined that “th[e] third-party submission 

provides one more reason that the examiner knew she 

had to evaluate the allowability of the broader claims over 

the prior art, particularly Veit . . . .” Id. 

Novozymes argues that “[t]here is at least a genuine 

issue of fact that the ChemTreat litigation documents 

withheld by U.S. Water from the [USPTO] are material.” 

Cross-Appellants’ Br. 63 (emphasis omitted). Novozymes 

contends that the Patents-in-Suit would not have issued 

had the examiner been aware of these documents and 

disclosures. Id. at 64–65.

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There is no genuine dispute about this material fact. 

The record contains no suggestion that, but-for the disclosures made during the ChemTreat litigation, the examiner would not have issued the Patents-in-Suit. Instead, 

the record shows that the examiner was aware of the 

differences between the pending claims of the Patents-inSuit and the ’244 patent, whether as discussed in U.S. 

Water’s Declaration or the third-party’s submission. See 

J.A. 5399–404. The examiner reviewed the third-party’s 

submission and the relevant prior art, see J.A. 5399–404, 

but found that the evidence did not affect the ultimate 

patentability determination. U.S. Water did not withhold 

or misrepresent information to the USPTO. See Fiskars, 

Inc. v. Hunt Mfg. Co., 221 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 

2000) (“An applicant is not required to tell the [US]PTO 

twice about the same prior art, on pain of loss of the 

patent for inequitable conduct.”). 

Finally, Novozymes also contests the District Court’s 

finding of no intent to deceive the USPTO. CrossAppellants’ Br. 66–68. However, because we find no error 

in the District Court’s determination under the materiality prong of the inequitable conduct analysis, we need not 

address intent. See Ohio Willow Wood, 813 F.3d at 1357 

(explaining that a party alleging inequitable conduct must 

prove materiality and intent); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 

1290 (same). 

CONCLUSION

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments 

and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, the decision of 

the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin is 

VACATED–IN-PART, AFFIRMED-IN-PART, AND 

REMANDED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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