Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-03-50470/USCOURTS-ca9-03-50470-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ernest Wayne
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 03-50300

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-01-00959-SVW01 FREDERICK JAMES STAVES,

Defendant-Appellant. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 03-50470

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  CR-01-00959-SVW14 ERNEST WAYNE,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 6, 2004—Pasadena, California

Filed September 9, 2004

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, David R. Hansen,* and

Johnnie B. Rawlinson, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Betty Binns Fletcher

*Honorable David R. Hansen, Senior United States Circuit Judge for

the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation. 

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COUNSEL

William S. Harris, South Pasadena, California, for the

defendants-appellants. Judith Rochlin, Los Angeles, California, was on the brief for defendant-appellant Wayne. 

Timothy J. Searight, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles,

California, for the plaintiff-appellee. With him on the briefs

was Tracy L. Wilkison, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles,

California. 

OPINION

B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: 

Defendants-Appellants Frederick James Staves (“Staves”)

and Ernest Wayne (“Wayne”),1 who conditionally pled guilty

to federal drug trafficking offenses, appeal the denial of their

motions to suppress evidence obtained through wiretapping.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

These appeals arise out of a lengthy investigation by the

federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other law

enforcement agencies of a large-scale cocaine trafficking

operation affiliated with the “Santana Block Crips” in Compton, California. Investigators believe that Staves was the

leader of the gang and the drug trafficking operation. 

Police arrested Wayne on February 1, 2001, after intercepted telephone conversations and investigators’ surveillance

of a suspected drug “stash house” led police to believe that a

drug transaction had occurred. A kilogram of cocaine was

1These appeals were consolidated with Ronald Hamilton’s appeal.

Hamilton’s appeal will be addressed in a separate disposition. 

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found in the trunk of the vehicle in which Wayne left the

house. Staves was arrested on September 6, 2001, after a warrant was issued for his arrest. A grand jury returned a 34-

count indictment against Staves, Wayne, and 24 other people

for various drug-trafficking related offenses. 

Staves filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained from

the interception of communications from several telephone

lines used by Staves, or in the alternative to order a hearing

under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). District

Judge Audrey Collins issued the order authorizing the first

wiretap on July 11, 2000. After District Judge Stephen V.

Wilson denied the motion to suppress, Staves filed a “renewed” motion to suppress wiretap evidence or to order a

Franks hearing, which the district court orally denied. Wayne

joined both motions. 

Staves and Wayne then conditionally pled guilty, respectively, to conspiracy to possess and distribute more than five

kilograms of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute

more than 500 grams of narcotics. Both Staves and Wayne

reserved the right to appeal the denial of the motions to suppress. The district court sentenced Staves to 240 months in

prison, followed by a ten-year term of supervised release. It

sentenced Wayne to 188 months in prison, with four years of

supervised release. Staves and Wayne timely filed appeals to

this court. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether an application for a wiretap

order is supported by a full and complete statement of the

facts in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). United

States v. Blackmon, 273 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2001). If

it was, we review the issuing judge’s decision that the wiretap

was necessary for an abuse of discretion. Id. We review the

district court’s denial of a Franks hearing de novo, and we

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review underlying factual findings for clear error. United

States v. Shryock, 342 F.3d 948, 975 (9th Cir. 2003).

III. DISCUSSION

A. First Motion to Suppress 

1. Necessity

[1] Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, prohibits electronic

surveillance of criminal suspects unless law enforcement officials comply with specified privacy safeguards. Of relevance

to this appeal, the wiretap application must include “a full and

complete statement as to whether or not other investigative

procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably

appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.” Id. § 2518(1)(c). The issuing judge must determine

whether there is probable cause and if the wiretap is necessary

because normal investigative procedures, employed in good

faith, have failed, would likely be ineffective, or are too dangerous. Id. § 2518(3)(c); Shryock, 342 F.3d at 975. 

Staves argues2 that the wiretap application did not demonstrate necessity for a wiretap. Staves contends that investigators could have infiltrated his drug trafficking conspiracy by

providing confidential informant one (“CS1”) with “cloned”

or “burnout” cellular telephones3 to sell to Staves for use in

2Wayne joins Staves’s argument in full, so all discussion of Staves’s

argument applies to Wayne as well. For simplicity, much of the discussion

refers only to Staves. 

3Cloned cellphones are programmed to use the telephone number of an

existing account, operating much like an extension of a traditional telephone line. See United States v. Cabrera, 172 F.3d 1287, 1289 n.1 (11th

Cir. 1999). Burnout cellphones are stolen cellphones, which are used until

the existing user closes her account. Both are difficult to trace because

calls are recorded to the original account. Because the analysis is the same

for cloned and burnout cellular telephones, hereafter we use “cloned cellphones” to refer to both. 

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the conspiracy, which investigators could have monitored.

Although Title III applies to cellular telephones, Bartnicki v.

Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 524 (2001), Staves argues that Title III

does not require a court order to record conversations on

cloned cellphones because use of an illegal cellphone constitutes consent to its monitoring. Although CS1 was in prison

at the time the wiretap was authorized, Staves argues that

investigators could have released or furloughed him to cooperate. 

Although it appears that no court has addressed squarely

the legality of monitoring cloned cellphones without a court

order, we have applied Title III’s requirements to a court

order authorizing monitoring of cloned cellphones. See United

States v. Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1087 (9th Cir. 2002)

(stating that the statute permits “roving wiretaps,” which are

“an appropriate tool to investigate individuals . . . who use

cloned cellular phone numbers . . . to avoid detection”); see

also United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 32-33

(1st Cir. 2003) (applying Title III’s necessity requirement

where investigators obtained a wiretap order for a cloned cellphone). 

[2] Title III permits interception of a conversation if “one

of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to

such interception.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(C). Generally, consent must be express, but consent may be implied where there

are “surrounding circumstances indicating that the defendant

knowingly agreed to the surveillance.” United States v. Van

Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting United

States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir. 1987)) (brackets

and internal quotation marks omitted). Staves argues that use

of a cloned cellphone constitutes consent to its monitoring

because monitoring is a foreseeable harm of using an illegal

cellphone. Assuming arguendo that this is true, foreseeability

of monitoring is insufficient to infer consent. Rather, the circumstances must indicate that a party to the communication

knew that interception was likely and agreed to the monitorUNITED STATES v. STAVES 13177

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ing. See Van Poyck, 77 F.3d at 292 (inferring knowing agreement to monitoring of prison telephone conversations where

the defendant received several warnings of the monitoring). 

[3] The “necessity requirement exists in order to limit the

use of wiretaps.” United States v. Bennett, 219 F.3d 1117,

1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Commito, 918 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir.

1990)). “Congress was concerned lest overzealous law

enforcement officers rely excessively upon such techniques in

lieu of less intrusive investigative procedures.” United States

v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 503 (9th Cir. 1973). Therefore, Title

III was enacted to address the “grave threat to the privacy of

every American that is posed by modern techniques of electronic surveillance.” Id. (citation omitted). Title III protects a

privacy right to be free of intrusive monitoring by law

enforcement officials, balancing that right with legitimate law

enforcement needs. Permitting wiretapping of cloned cellphones without a court order would undermine Title III’s protections because law enforcement officials could supply

informants with monitored, cloned cellphones rather than

undertaking the preliminary investigation and providing the

detailed application required to receive a wiretap order. 

[4] Accordingly, we conclude that Title III prohibits monitoring cloned cellphones without a court order. Because

Staves’s proposed investigative technique is illegal, the omission of the strategy from the wiretap application does not render the wiretap application incomplete or detract from the

finding of necessity. 

Agent Waldeck’s 49-page affidavit provides a thorough

and convincing explanation of the need for wiretap evidence

to uncover the full scope of the conspiracy. Before applying

for a wiretap order, investigators obtained information from

confidential informants and admitted gang members; recorded

telephone conversations between Staves and a confidential

informant with the informant’s consent; conducted a con13178 UNITED STATES v. STAVES

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trolled purchase of cocaine; conducted surveillance of

Staves’s residence, pager business, and stash house; obtained

pen registers and “trap and trace devices,” which indicated an

inordinately large volume of calls made and received; and

investigated Staves’s finances and tax records for evidence of

money laundering. Nonetheless, investigators were unable to

uncover the full scope of the conspiracy with traditional

investigative techniques because the organization used sophisticated counter-surveillance strategies; trash searches were

impossible because trash was not left where police could

retrieve it at any of the locations under surveillance; CS1 was

in prison and unavailable to assist; confidential informant two

was unwilling to cooperate further; introducing an undercover

agent likely would have been dangerous or impossible

because Staves would have been suspicious of anyone new;

toll analysis of telephone calls was of limited use; and warrants to search the locations under surveillance likely would

not reveal the full scope of the conspiracy. Therefore, Waldeck concluded that wiretap evidence was necessary to obtain

direct evidence of the entire scope of the conspiracy. 

[5] Investigators conducted a lengthy and thorough investigation before applying for a wiretap order. Law enforcement

officials need not exhaust every conceivable investigative

technique before seeking a wiretap order. United States v.

McGuire, 307 F.3d 1192, 1196-97 (9th Cir. 2002); Bennett,

219 F.3d at 1122. We conclude that the wiretap application

contains a full and complete statement in compliance with 18

U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), and the issuing judge did not abuse her

discretion in concluding that the wiretap was necessary. 

2. Franks Hearing 

[6] A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing if he makes

a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was

deliberately or recklessly included in an affidavit submitted in

support of a wiretap order, and the false statement was material to the district court’s finding of necessity. Bennett, 219

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F.3d at 1124. False statements are material if the wiretap

application purged of the false statements would not support

findings of probable cause and necessity. Bennett, 219 F.3d at

1124; United States v. Ippolito, 774 F.2d 1482, 1485 (9th Cir.

1985).

[7] Staves’s first motion to suppress requested a Franks

hearing to test the statement that CS1 was unavailable to

cooperate in the investigation and because the wiretapping

application omitted his cloned cellphone strategy. With

respect to CS1’s availability, Staves did not allege that CS1

was not in prison, but rather argued that the DEA could have

arranged CS1’s furlough or release for cooperation. Because

the necessity requirement does not “mandate[ ] that the government organize the release of jailed informants before a

wiretap will be authorized,” United States v. Canales-Gomez,

358 F.3d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 2004), the affidavit’s statement

that CS1 was unavailable because he was in prison is not false

or misleading. The wiretap application’s omission of Staves’s

creative but illegal investigative strategy is not a false statement for Franks purposes because the omission is not misleading. See United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781 (9th

Cir. 1985) (holding that “deliberate or reckless omissions of

facts that tend to mislead” are false statements for Franks purposes). Because the motion to suppress does not identify any

false statement in the wiretap affidavit, the district court properly denied a Franks hearing.

B. “Renewed” Motion to Suppress Wiretap Evidence

Staves’s second motion to suppress, with a request for a

Franks hearing, argues that Staves discovered the identity of

CS1 and that person “was not privy to the details of Staves’s

narcotics trafficking activities.” Therefore, Staves argues that

CS1 lied to investigators and his lies were incorporated into

the wiretap affidavit. Staves argues that the wiretap application purged of the false information does not support a finding

of probable cause. Because the renewed motion challenges

the truth of information in the wiretap application, a Franks

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hearing ordinarily would be necessary for Staves to prove his

allegations, so we turn to whether the district court erred in

denying a Franks hearing on the second motion to suppress.

[8] The motion does not allege that the affiant, Agent Waldeck, acted deliberately or recklessly in incorporating any

false information into the affidavit. A Franks motion must

challenge the veracity of the affiant. See United States v. Perdomo, 800 F.2d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that “under

Franks . . . the veracity of only the affiant must be challenged”); United States v. Kiser, 716 F.2d 1268, 1271 (9th

Cir. 1983) (“The offer of proof [for a Franks hearing] must

challenge the veracity of the affiant, not that of his informant.”). Allegations that the affiant negligently or innocently

included false information are insufficient to require a Franks

hearing. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Because Staves did not

identify any false statement deliberately or recklessly

included in the wiretap application, we conclude that the district court properly denied a Franks hearing on the renewed

motion.4

IV. CONCLUSION

The wiretap application contains a full and complete statement of the facts supporting the wiretap application, and the

issuing judge did not abuse her discretion in concluding that

a wiretap order was necessary to uncover the full scope of the

drug trafficking conspiracy. The district court properly denied

Franks hearings on the motions to suppress. Accordingly, the

district court’s denial of Staves’s and Wayne’s motions to

suppress wiretap evidence is 

AFFIRMED. 

4Moreover, the wiretap application purged of the allegedly false statements from CS1 supports findings of probable cause and necessity. As

described above, the law enforcement officials conducted an extensive

investigation before applying for a wiretap order. Much of the information

from CS1 to which Staves objects was confirmed by another confidential

informant. 

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