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Parties Involved:
Mark Joel Anthony
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-appellee, 

v. 

MARK JOEL ANTHONY, 

Defendant-appellant. 

ORDER AN.D JUDGMENT* 

No. 88-2700 

(N. D. Oklahoma) 

(D.C . No . 88-CR-32-B) 

Before*~ALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY, District 

Judge. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Defendant-appellant Mark Joel Anthony was convicted of 

possessing two unregistered firearms, in violation of 26 U.S.C. 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

** The Honorable John . E. Conway, of the United States District 

Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2700 Document: 01019961673 Date Filed: 01/25/1990 Page: 1 
§ 586l(d), 1 and possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial 

number, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 586l(h). The trial judge 

sentenced defendant to a prison term of four months and twenty 

days, with credit for time served as a pretrial detainee, plus 

three years of supervised release. 

Defendant raises the following three issues on appeal: 

(1) whether the district court erred in admitting evidence 

concerning other traffic offenses in which defendant had been 

involved; (2) whether comments made by the prosecutor during the 

course of defendant's trial rendered the trial unfair; and 

(3) whether the government presented sufficient evidence to 

support defendant's convictions. We reject defendant's arguments 

on appeal and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. 

Facts 

During the early morning hours of February 27, 1988, while on 

routine patrol in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Tulsa Police Officer George 

Grimm noticed a 1972 brown-and-yellow, four-door Oldsmobile 

Cutlass with tail lights that were not functioning. Officer Grimm 

also testified that the Cutlass had no rear window. He attempted 

to stop the car, but the driver of th~ vehicle accelerated. 

Officer Grimm followed the car to an area between houses located 

1 Section 586l(d) prohibits a person from "receiv[ing) or 

possess[ing) a firearm which is not registered to him in the 

National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record." 26 u.s.c. 

§ 586l(d). ''Firearm" is defined to include "a shotgun having a 

barrel or barrels of less than 18 inches in length" and "a weapon 

made from a shotgun if such weapon as modified has an overall 

length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less than 

18 inches in length." 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2700 Document: 01019961673 Date Filed: 01/25/1990 Page: 2 
at 229 and 233 East 52nd Place North, where both the driver and 

passenger exited the vehicle and ran int~ the darkness. As the 

driver ran from the vehicle, he allegedly turned and looked at 

Officer Grimm for approximately four seconds. Based on that foursecond observation, Grimm determined that defendant was the 

driver. Officer Grimm allegedly began to chase the driver and 

passenger but stopped short of running into the darkness between 

the two houses. 

Tulsa Police Officer John Martin arrived within seconds after 

the driver and passenger ran from the car. Martin found three 

• firearms inside the brown-and-yellow Cutlass in ~lain view: a 

Winchester, model 1200, .20-gauge pump shotgun with the barrel 

sawed off; a full-length J.C. Higgins .12-gauge shotgun; and a 

Mossberg, model 395K, .12-gauge, bolt-action shotgun with the 

barrel sawed off. The three guns were loaded, with shells in the 

chambers and the safety clips disengaged. The serial number of 

the Winchester shotgun had been obliterated. 

Officer Grimm's testimony identifying defendant as the driver 

of the brown-and-yellow Cutlass was bolstered by the fact that 

Grimm and other Tulsa police officers had previously encountered 

defendant and were therefore familiar with him. Two of the 

previous encounters were particularly significant. The first 

encounter occurred on February 20, 1988, when Officer Carl Small 

stopped defendant and detained him for approximately 25 minutes. 

Officer Small testified that defendant was driving the same brownand-yellow Cutlass without functioning tail lights and with no 

rear window. 

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The second encounter occurred on the evening of February 25, 

1988, when Officer Grimm stopped defendant and arrested him for a 

traffic violation. Defendant was driving a 1976 white-and-red, 

two-door Oldsmobile Cutlass. Officer Grimm transported defendant 

to the police station to fill out an arrest report, which included 

defendant's date of birth, height, weight, social security number, 

and other personal · information. He spent a total of approximately 

50 minutes with defendant. 

Before the trial began, opposing counsel met with the trial 

judge, and it was agreed that the police officers testifying on 

behalf of the government would not mention the fact that defendant 

had previously been arrested. Thus, at trial, Officer Grimm 

testified only that he had stopped defendant on the evening of 

February 25; that he had a discussion with defendant about where 

he lived, worked, and attended school; that he had defendant 

accompany him to the police station "to complete an information 

report" which included various items concerning defendant's 

personal history (Tr. II at 35); that defendant told Grimm that 

his home address was 229 East 52nd Place North; and that he spent 

a total of approximately 50 minutes with defendant. 

Discussion 

-I. Admissibility of Prior-Acts Evidence 

Defendant argues that the trial court improperly admitted the 

testimony of Officers Grimm and Small concerning their previous 

encounters with defendant. We believe that the testimony was 

properly admitted under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Rule 404(b) 

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provides: 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, 

however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof 

of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 

knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 

(Emphasis added.) 

"In a review of the evidentiary rulings of a trial court, 

this court may not reverse in the absence of an abuse of 

discretion." United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1366 (10th 

Cir.) (reviewing trial court's admission of evidence pursuant to 

Rule 404(b)) , . cert. denied, 467 i:J.s. 1255 (1984). Our review of 

the record convinces us that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion. A key issue in this case was the identity of the 

driver of the brown-and-yellow Cutlass that Officer Grimm · stopped 

on the morning of February 27, 1988. The testimony that Officer 

Grimm spent approximately 50 minutes with defendant on the night 

of February 25 and the testimony that Officer Small had stopped 

defendant on February 20 while he was driving the brown-and-yellow 

Cutlass were highly relevant to the identification of the driver 

of the brown-and-yellow Cutlass on February 27. 

The district court took sufficient action to minimize the 

prejudicial effect of the evidence of defendant's prior contact 

with Tulsa Police officers. The district court did not permit the 

government to discuss extraneous details concerning the reasons 

that Officer Grimm and Officer Small had stopped defendant on __ 

February 20 an~ February 25. Tr. II at 8-13. Moreover, the court 

admonished the jury that the defendant "was not on trial here for 

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any events occurring on February the 25th, whatever the officer 

stopped him for at that time or whatever he was talking to him 

about down at the police station." Tr. II at 37. Therefore, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the 

testimony. 

II. The Prosecutor's Comments 

Defendant also argues that the Assistant United States 

Attorney prosecuting this case made several improper comments 

during the course of the trial. Defendant contends that the 

·prosecutor, in her opening statement, "stated, in the form of 

testimony, that the Defendant was positively identifie~ [as the 

driver of the brown-and-yellow Cutlass]." Appellant's Brief-in~ 

Chief at 7. Defendant further argues that the prosecutor made 

several improper remarks during her closing argument. In 

reviewing defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct, "[w]e 

must .first examine whether the prosecutor's conduct was in fact 

improper, and if so, then determine whether such conduct requires 

reversal, or whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt~" 

United States v. Martinez-Nava, 838 F.2d 411, 416 (10th Cir~ 

1988). 

During her opening statement, the prosecutor remarked that 

Officer Grimm "positively identif[ied]" defendant as the driver of 

the brown-and-yellow Cutlass. Tr. II at 18. That remark was not 

improper. "The proper function of the Ql:}ening statement of the 

prosecutor is limited to a discussion of the evidence which he 

intends to introduce and believes in good faith is admissible and 

Appellate Case: 88-2700 Document: 01019961673 Date Filed: 01/25/1990 Page: 6 
available." Grimaldi v. United siates, 606 F.2d 332, 339 (1st 

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 u.s. 971 (1979); see also 3 w. LaFave & 

J. Israel, Criminal Procedure§ 23.3(a), at 12 (1984); ABA 

Standards for Criminal Justice, standard 3-5.5 (1980). The 

prosecutor's remark concerning Officer Grimm's positive 

identification of defendant was substantiated by Grimm during his 

testimony at trial. Tr. II at 54-55. Therefore, the remark was 

not improper. 

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor made several 

improper remarks during her closing argument. In particular, 

defendant complains about the prosecutor's statement that the 

testimony of the defense witnesses was "full of holes.'' Tr. II at 

177. Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's remarks that 

the defense witnesses had "a motive to lie for the defendant" 

because they are related to him and did not want to see him 

convicted, Tr. II at 177-78, and that the jury shouldn't permit 

Shirley Leroy, one of the defense witnesses, to ''fool" them. Tr. 

II at 179. In addition, defendant argues that the prosecutor 

"stated during closing argument that her own witnesses were 

credible while the Defendant's witnesses were not." Defendant's 

Brief-in-Chief at 8 (citing Tr. II at 197-99). 

We cannot conclude that any of the statements complained of 

were improper. A prosecutor may not personally vouch for the 

credibility of government witnesses or attack the credibility of 

defense witnesses . . See United States v. Ainesworth, 716 F.2d 769, 

771 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Carleo, 576 F.2d 846, 852 

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850 (1978). Here, however, 

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the prosecutor argued on the basis of the evidence introduced at 

trial, not on the basis of her unsubstantiated personal beliefs. 

Therefore, none of those remarks were improper. 2 

Defendant also argues that the prosecutor improperly stated 

that, prior to this trial, Officer Gr~mm had testified ohly one 

time for sixty seconds. Defendant's Brief-in-Chief at 7 (citing 

Tr. II at 196). The prosecutor's statement concerning the number 

of times that Officer Grimm had been a witness was made in 

response to defense counsel's remark, in his closing argument, 

that Grimm and the other officers testifying against defendant 

were veteran witnesses whose experience resulted in testimony that 

"sound[ed] better," but was perhaps le~s trustworthy, than the 

testimony of the defense witnesses. Tr. II at 186. 

A prosecutor is permitted "considerable latitude'' in 

responding to an argument raised by defense counsel. Sanchez v. 

Heggie, 531 F.2d 964, 967 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849 

(1976); see also United States v. Dickey; 736 F.2d 571, 596 (10th 

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1188 (1985); United States v. 

Bishop, 534 F.2d 214, 220 {10th Cir. 1976). However, a prosecutor 

may not refer to facts not in evidence in support of his argument. 

See United State v. Ainesworth, 716 F.2d 769, 771 (10th Cir. 

1983); United States v. Latimer, 511 F.2d 498, 503 (10th Cir. 

1975); see also 3 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure 

2 Defendant also argues that, during her closing argument, the 

prosecutor "'testified' that certain things had been done to the 

guns in question and that the Defendant possessed them." 

Defendant's Brief-in-Chief at 7 (citing Tr. II at 171-72). 

However, the prosecutor's remarks referred to by defendant were 

based on evidence introduced at trial. Therefore, we reject 

defendant's argument. 

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§ 23.5, at 33 (1984). Because no evidence had been introduced to 

establish Grimm's experience as a witness, the prosecutor's 

statement was improper. The fact that the prosecutor was merely 

responding to the earlier remarks of defense counsel, which also 

had no basis in the record, does not alter our conclusion. See 

United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979} ("[w]e 

can give no comfort to the proposition that unprofessional conduct 

upon the part of defense counsel opens the door to similar conduct 

by the government counsel"} (quoting United Stat~s v. Ludwig, 508 

F.2d 140, 143 (10th Cir. 1974)). 

However, reversal is not warranted because we conclude that 

the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The number 

of times Grimm had previously testified as a witness is 

irrelevant. Despite the contrary suggestions of defense counsel, 

even if Grimm had previously testified on numerous occasions, 

knowledge of that fact would not properly be used by the jury to 

assess his credibility .. Therefore, we find no reversible error. 

III. The Sufficiency of the Evidence 

Defendant argues that "there simply was not enough credible 

evidence" to support his convictions. Defendant's Brief-in-Chief 

at 9. "Evidence is considered sufficient to support a criminal 

conviction if, when viewed in the light most favorable to the 

government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 

beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Culpepper, 834 F.2d 

879, 881 (10th Cir. 1987} (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

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, 

307, 318-19 (1979)). Our review of the record convinces us that 

there was sufficient evidence. 

Firearms expert Richard Raska testified at trial that the 

serial number of the Winchester shotgun found in the brown-andyellow Cutlass had been obliterated. Tr; II at 92. Raska also 

stated that the barrel length of the Winchester shotgun was less 

than 14 inches and that the overall length was just over 26 

inches. Tr. II at 95-96. He further testified that the Mossberg 

shotgun had a barreL length of less than 13 inches. Tr. II at 97. 

In addition, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Special 

Agent David Roberts testified that defendant had no firearms 

registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and 

Transfer Record. Tr. II at 103. In light of that expert 

testimony, as well as the testimony of Officer Martin describing 

the firearms and the identification testimony of Officers Grimm 

and Small linking defendant to the illegal firearms, we conclude 

that a reasonable jury could find defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt. 

In sum, we conclude that the trial court acted properly in 

permitting Officers Grimm and Small to testify about their 

previous encounters with defendant. We also conclude that none of 

the prosecutor's remarks constituted reversible error and that the 

evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions. 

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,. 

Therefore, the district court's judgment is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

David M. Ebel 

Circuit Judge 

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