Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02935/USCOURTS-ca7-09-02935-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
William Edwards
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted April 14, 2010∗

 Decided April 19, 2010

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

No. 09-2935

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

WILLIAM EDWARDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 95 CR 508-5

Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.

Order

William Edwards is serving a sentence of life imprisonment for his role in the 

Gangster Disciples, a drug-distribution organization. We affirmed his conviction and 

sentence in 2001. See 246 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 2001).

In 2008 Edwards asked the judge to reduce his sentence in light of the Sentencing 

Commission’s decision to lower, with retroactive effect, the Guideline ranges for crackcocaine offenses. See 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2). The district court concluded, however, that 

Edwards is ineligible. The statute authorizes a judge to reduce the sentence only if the 

retroactive change in the Guidelines reduced the Commission’s recommended range. 

 

∗ This successive appeal has been submitted to the original panel under Operating Procedure 6(b). After 

examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See Fed. R. 

App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with 

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

Case: 09-2935 Document: 23 Filed: 04/19/2010 Pages: 2
No. 09-2935 Page 2

See generally United States v. Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. 

Hall, 582 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2009). The district court found when sentencing Edwards that 

his base offense is level 38, because his relevant conduct exceeded 150 kilograms of 

powder cocaine and 1.5 kilograms of crack. After the amendments to the Guidelines, it 

takes 4.5 kilograms of crack to support level 38; 1.5 kilograms leads to level 36. But the 

district judge concluded that, even under the revised Guidelines, Edwards’s relevant 

conduct still produces a level 38 sentence. First, the judge observed that 150 kilograms 

of powder cocaine by itself leads to a level 38 classification. The amendments did not 

change the treatment of powder cocaine. Second, the judge stated that Edwards is 

responsible for much more than 4.5 kilograms of crack cocaine. The presentence report 

concluded that Edwards’s organization distributed more than 1.5 kilograms of crack per 

day for many years. The only reason the figure 1.5 kilograms had been used earlier is 

that, until the recent amendments, 1.5 kilograms of crack put a drug offender in the 

highest possible base offense classification. Finally, the judge added, he would not 

reduce the sentence even if Edwards were eligible, given the severity of his criminal 

conduct.

Edwards contends on this appeal that he is entitled to a new hearing, and a fresh 

opportunity to present evidence, before the judge raises his relevant conduct from 1.5 

to 4.5 kilograms of crack. It may well be that a district judge should hold a hearing 

before making a new finding of fact, but Edwards overlooks the point that at his 

original sentencing the judge approved the PSR’s calculations. All the judge did in 

response to Edwards’s motion for a lower sentence was to emphasize this agreement, 

not to make a new finding. The only reason why anyone mentioned the 1.5 kilogram 

figure at the time of the original sentence was that greater amounts had no effect on the 

base offense level. What is more, the district judge did not find Edwards culpable for 

“only” 1.5 kilograms of crack; the judge found that his relevant conduct included at 

least 150 kilograms of powder cocaine. This means that his base offense level is 38 

without regard to the amount of crack for which he is responsible. The Sentencing 

Commission’s decision to increase the quantity of crack needed to place a person in 

level 38 thus had no effect on Edwards’s sentencing range, and because the retroactive 

change did not affect his range he is ineligible under §3582(c)(2), just as the district court 

concluded. See United States v. Lawrence, 535 F.3d 631, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2008).

To the extent that Edwards is contesting the calculation of his relevant conduct at his 

original sentencing, that subject is outside the scope of §3582(c)(2). The statute does not 

allow revival of an issue that could have been presented on the initial appeal. Eligibility 

for a reduction depends on how the retroactive amendment applies to Guidelines 

calculations already made.

Because Edwards is ineligible for any reduction, the issue before the the Supreme 

Court in Dillon v. United States, No. 09-6338 (argued Mar. 30, 2010), does not affect this 

appeal.

AFFIRMED

Case: 09-2935 Document: 23 Filed: 04/19/2010 Pages: 2