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Parties Involved:
William M. McCavey
Appellant
Debra Elaine McCavey-Barnett
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-13292

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-03687-RWS

WILLIAM M. MCCAVEY, 

Trustee of the McCavey Family Trust 

U/D/T 12/15/1999, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

DEBRA ELAINE MCCAVEY-BARNETT, 

as Trustee and in her individual capacity, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(October 21, 2015)

Before TJOFLAT, HULL, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

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Plaintiff-Appellant William McCavey appeals the sua sponte dismissal of his 

pro se diversity action alleging Georgia law claims of breach of fiduciary duty and 

breach of trust against his ex-wife, Debra McCavey-Barnett, with whom he was 

co-trustees of an inter vivos family trust. The district court dismissed McCavey’s 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the domestic relations 

exception to diversity jurisdiction. After review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

In 1990, while Plaintiff McCavey and Defendant McCavey-Barnett were 

married, they purchased a home in Johns Creek, Georgia (“the Johns Creek 

property”) with funds McCavey had inherited. The couple executed a quick-claim 

deed transferring the Johns Creek property to a trust of which they were cotrustees. In 1999, after the couple had children, they deeded the property to a 

successor trust, the McCavey Family Trust (“the trust”). The couples’ four 

children were the beneficiaries of the trust, and the couple served as co-trustees. 

In 2010, McCavey-Barnett filed for divorce in Georgia and then sought and 

obtained an order from the state court adding the trust as a party. Following a jury 

trial, McCavey-Barnett was awarded the marital residence, which was the Johns 

Creek property, and the Georgia state court ordered McCavey to sign a deed 

transferring title of the Johns Creek property from the trust to McCavey-Barnett.

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McCavey initially refused to sign the deed and was jailed in contempt until he 

complied with the Georgia state court’s order. 

In 2013, Plaintiff McCavey, a citizen of Pennsylvania, filed the instant 

diversity action against Defendant McCavey-Barnett, a citizen of Georgia, in 

federal district court. McCavey alleged Georgia law claims of breach of trust and 

breach of fiduciary duty in connection with the transfer of the Johns Creek 

property from the trust to McCavey-Barnett. McCavey’s complaint alleged, inter 

alia, that: (1) McCavey-Barnett had added the trust as a party in the divorce 

proceedings “to attack the [trust] property for her own benefi[t]”; (2) “[t]here was 

no verdict against the Trust, nor was any requested”; (3) “[t]he final divorce decree 

. . . erroneously included the Trust, although the jury verdict was silent [as] to the 

Trust property”; and (4) because the state court incarcerated him for 21 days “until 

he was forced under duress to the signing of the deed,” the transfer of the property 

was “invalid.” Among other remedies, McCavey sought to remove McCaveyBarnett as trustee and to obtain an order directing her to repay the value of the 

Johns Creek property to the trust. 

McCavey-Barnett moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that 

the claims were barred by res judicata. The district court instead dismissed the 

complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because, even though the parties 

were diverse as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the domestic relations exception 

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to diversity jurisdiction applied. The district court found it lacked jurisdiction 

because any relief in federal court would necessarily require the district court to 

review the propriety of the Georgia state court’s division of property in the divorce 

decree. Noting that the trust was made a party to the divorce proceedings and that 

the trust property was divided pursuant to the divorce decree, the district court 

concluded that ordering McCavey-Barnett to repay the value of the Johns Creek 

property into the trust would “involve[ ] issues arising out of conflict over a 

divorce decree.” (internal quotation marks omitted). McCavey appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

“Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 is subject to a judicially 

created exemption for domestic relations and probate cases.” Rash v. Rash, 173 

F.3d 1376, 1380 (11th Cir. 1999). The exemption applies to “cases involving 

divorce . . . and enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state 

court modification.” Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1992) 

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 

689, 701-02, 112 S. Ct. 2206, 2214 (1992) (explaining that the exception was 

intended to keep federal courts from hearing cases that “seek the granting or 

modification of a divorce or alimony decree”).

Nonetheless, “the exception is narrowly confined; it is not an absolute rule, 

but rather the question is whether the court in its discretion should abstain.” Rash, 

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173 F.3d at 1380. A district court should abstain from cases in which the 

following policies are present: (1) there is a strong state interest in domestic 

relations; (2) the state courts can competently settle the family dispute; (3) the state 

continues to supervise the decrees; and (4) federal dockets are congested. Wall v. 

Stone, 135 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 

368, 370 (11th Cir. 1988)). “Not every case involving a dispute between present or 

former spouses, however, falls within the domestic relations exception,” and a 

federal court “should sift through the claims of the complaint to determine the true 

character of the dispute to be adjudicated,” while keeping the policies favoring 

abstention in mind. Kirby v. Mellenger, 830 F.2d 176, 178 (11th Cir. 1987)

(quotation marks omitted). This Court has concluded that a district court properly 

dismissed under the domestic relations exception a claim for child support 

arrearages that would have required the district court “to decide the propriety of” 

the state court’s order purging those arrearages. See Ingram, 866 F.3d at 370. 1

In this case, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed 

McCavey’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Although McCavey insists that his 

suit concerns only trust and contract law and that a review of the state court’s

divorce decree is unnecessary, the relief he seeks ultimately requires the federal 

 

1

We review de novo dismissal of an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 

Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006). Abstention under the domestic 

relations exception, however, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Stone, 135 F.3d at 1441.

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court to consider the propriety of the divorce decree’s division of the trust 

property. This we cannot do. See Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370. Indeed, federal courts 

will not review or modify a state court divorce order even when the plaintiff 

couches the claims in other terms. See McLaughlin v. Cotner, 193 F.3d 410, 412-

13 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that the wife’s breach of contract action in 

connection with the disposition of marital property, namely a separation agreement

to sell the marital home that was incorporated into the divorce decree, fell under 

the exception). Thus, because McCavey seeks to have a federal court review the 

division of marital property as determined in his divorce proceedings, such review 

falls within the domestic relations exception, and the district court properly 

determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under that rule. 

AFFIRMED.

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