Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01381/USCOURTS-caDC-98-01381-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Environmental Protection Agency
Respondent
National Mining Association
Petitioner

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 25, 1999 Decided April 21, 2000

No. 98-1368

Association of Battery Recyclers, Inc., et al.,

Petitioners

v.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and

Carol M. Browner, Administrator,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

Respondents

Consolidated with

Nos. 98-1381, 98-1392 & 98-1394

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Environmental Protection Agency

Donald J. Patterson, Jr. argued the cause for petitioners

on the RCRA classification issues. With him on the joint

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briefs were Harold P. Quinn, Jr., Roderick T. Dwyer, Karl S.

Bourdeau, Michael W. Steinberg, Joshua D. Sarnoff, David

F. Zoll, Ronald A. Shipley, William R. Weissman and Steven

J. Groseclose. Michael B. Wigmore and Robert N. Steinwurtzel entered appearances.

William R. Weissman argued the cause for petitioners on

the LDR treatment standards issues. With him on the briefs

was Steven J. Groseclose.

Michele L. Walter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

and Steven Silverman, Attorney, Office of General Counsel,

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, argued the causes for

respondents. With them on the brief was Cecilia Kim, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice.

David R. Case argued the cause for intervenors Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Technology Council

and National Mining Association. With him on the brief were

Karen Florini, Donald J. Patterson, Jr., Harold P. Quinn,

Jr., and Roderick T. Dwyer.

Before: Silberman, Ginsburg, and Randolph, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge Ginsburg.

Opinion dissenting in part by Circuit Judge Randolph.

Randolph, Circuit Judge: These are consolidated petitions

for judicial review of Environmental Protection Agency regulations promulgated on May 26, 1998, under the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), Pub. L.

No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795. The regulations--known collectively as the "Land Disposal Restrictions Phase IV" Rule--

deal with residual or secondary materials generated in mining

and mineral processing operations and EPA's classification of

these materials as "solid waste"; with the treatment standards for a specific category of hazardous waste; and with

EPA's test for determining whether certain wastes are hazardous. Our opinion is in three parts. The first part decides

whether EPA properly defined "solid waste." We are unanimous that it did not. The second part decides, again unanimously, that EPA's treatment standards for a particular

category of hazardous waste are lawful. The third part,

written by Judge Ginsburg and joined by Judge Silberman,

decides that EPA's test for determining toxicity is valid for

certain wastes but not for others. I disagree with their

conclusion for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion.

I. Definition of Solid Waste

Two petitioners--the National Mining Association and the

American Iron and Steel Institute--and an intervenor-the

Chemical Manufacturers Association--challenge the portion

of EPA's Phase IV Rule defining a "solid waste" in terms of

how materials "generated and reclaimed within the primary

mineral processing industry" are stored. 40 C.F.R.

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s 261.2(e)(iii). The question is of substantial importance to

these petitioners because, together, they represent most of

the nation's producers of coal, metals, and industrial and

agricultural minerals; two thirds of the nation's steel production; and more than ninety percent of the nation's productive

capacity of basic industrial chemicals.

RCRA defines "solid waste" as "any garbage, refuse,

sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment

plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded

material...." 42 U.S.C. s 6903(27). Solid wastes are "considered hazardous if they possess one of four characteristics

(ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity) or if EPA

lists them as hazardous following a rulemaking." Columbia

Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914, 915 (D.C. Cir.

1998) (citing 42 U.S.C. s 6921(a), 40 C.F.R. pt. 261). Disposal

of hazardous waste is forbidden unless the waste is treated to

reduce its hazardous constituents or stored in a manner

ensuring that the hazardous constituents will not migrate

from the disposal unit. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. s 6924(g)(5),

(m)).

To understand the contentions of the parties, it will be

helpful to outline the current solid waste classification system

(most of which predates the Phase IV Rule and is not being

challenged). EPA's general regulation defining "solid waste"

begins by repeating a portion of the statutory definition: "a

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solid waste is any discarded material." 40 C.F.R.

s 261.2(a)(1). It then defines "discarded material" to mean

"any material which is Abandoned ... or Recycled, as explained in paragraph (c) of this section...." Id.

s 261.2(a)(2). Paragraph (c) identifies four situations in

which "recycled" materials will be considered "solid waste":

when the materials are "used in a manner constituting disposal"; when the materials are "burn[ed] for energy recovery";

when the materials are "reclaimed"; and when the materials

are "accumulated speculatively." 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(c)(1)-(4).

The Phase IV Rule revised only the reclamation provision.

Before the revision, EPA classified reclaimed spent materials

and scrap metal as solid waste. See 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(c)(3) &

tbl.1 (1996). Reclaimed sludges and by-products were classified as solid waste only if they had been specifically listed in

40 C.F.R. pt. 261 as a hazardous waste following an EPA

rulemaking. See 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(c)(3) & tbl.1 (1996). Reclaimed sludges and by-products exhibiting a characteristic of

hazardous waste, but not specifically listed as hazardous

wastes, were not classified as solid waste. See id. This

classification system applied without regard to the industry

that produced the materials.

The Phase IV Rule purported to take materials reclaimed

by the mineral processing industry outside this framework

and to subject these secondary materials to a new test for

determining whether they constituted "solid waste." See 40

C.F.R. s 261.2(c)(3) & tbl.1. We say "purported" because it

is not clear to us that EPA accomplished its objective. The

relevant part of the new recycling-reclamation provision

reads:

Materials [listed in a table] are not solid wastes when

reclaimed (except as provided under 40 CFR

261.4(a)(17)).[1]

__________

1 The final rule published in the Federal Register incorrectly

cited s 261.4(a)(15). See 63 Fed. Reg. 28,556, 28,636 (1998). EPA

later corrected its mistake. See 64 Fed. Reg. 25,408, 25,408 (1999).

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Id. The new s 261.4(a)(17) gave a so-called "conditional

exclusion": if the provision's criteria were met, reclaimed

mineral processing secondary materials would not be classified as solid waste. We have trouble making sense of these

two provisions. The first provision (s 261.2(c)(3)) broadly

describes what is not a solid waste, unless it complies with the

other provision. But the other provision--s 261.4(a)(17)--is

an exclusion, and the consequence of not complying with the

provision is, of course, loss of exclusion. In other words, read

together, the provisions seem to say that something is not a

solid waste unless it is not excluded from being a solid waste.

Lewis Carroll would be proud. But petitioners make nothing

of the point and we shall therefore assume that if secondary

material of this sort--derived from mineral processing--does

not meet the conditions specified in s 261.4(a)(17), EPA will

consider the material "solid waste" potentially subject to full

RCRA Subtitle C regulation.

As to the conditions set forth in s 261.4(a)(17), EPA's

dividing line between "waste" and nonwaste is the manner of

storage. If the mineral processor stores secondary material

destined for recycling in tanks, containers, buildings, or on

properly maintained pads, the materials are not considered

"solid waste." See id. s 261.4(a)(17)(iii), (iv). Given our

assumption (and that of the parties), if by-products and

sludges exhibiting a characteristic of hazardous waste are not

stored in such a manner prior to being recycled, they may be

regulated as hazardous "waste."

How long the materials are stored is of no consequence

according to the regulation. See Fed. Reg. 28,556, 28,582-83

(1998). They could be placed on the ground for only a few

minutes before being put back into the production process,

yet they would still be subject to RCRA if not stored in

accord with s 261.4(a)(17). Petitioners say this rule extends

EPA's authority far beyond the statute. They ask how

secondary material held for recycling in production could

possibly qualify as "waste" when the statute defines "waste"

as "discarded materials"? 42 U.S.C. s 6903(27).

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The question is not a new one. It was asked and answered

in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) ("AMC I"). The court began by referring to the

"ordinary, plain-English meaning" of "discarded"--" 'disposed

of,' 'thrown away,' or 'abandoned.' " Id. at 1184. Secondary

materials destined for recycling are obviously not of that sort.

Rather than throwing these materials away, the producer

saves them; rather than abandoning them, the producer

reuses them. After examining the structure and history of

RCRA, see id. at 1184-92, the AMC I court concluded:

"Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent

that 'solid waste' (and therefore EPA's regulatory authority)

be limited to materials that are 'discarded' by virtue of being

disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away." Id. at 1190. The

court therefore set aside an EPA rule regulating secondary

"materials reused within an ongoing industrial process," id. at

1182, because the materials were "neither disposed of nor

abandoned," id. at 1193.

The holding in AMC I thus appears to answer the question

we have before us. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. vs. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The

Supreme Court has a rule: "Once we have determined a

statute's clear meaning, we adhere to that determination

under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency's

later interpretation of the statute against our prior determination of the statute's meaning." Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc.

v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 536-37 (1992). We

too follow stare decisis. The complication, for an administrative agency, of conflicting interpretations of the same statute

from different circuits is not present. The D.C. Circuit is the

exclusive venue for pre-enforcement judicial review of RCRA

regulations. See 42 U.S.C. s 6976(a)(1). And so, our interpretation of RCRA binds not only this court but also EPA.

EPA nevertheless insists that RCRA may be applied to

materials that are not disposed of, abandoned, or thrown

away, but are destined for reuse in an on-going industrial

process. The argument is that AMC I was a narrow decision,

and that "subsequent judicial opinions have sharply limited

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the scope of AMC I." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580. These later

decisions, according to EPA, absolutely bar the agency from

treating secondary materials as "discarded" (42 U.S.C.

s 6903(27)) if and only if "reclamation is continuous in the

sense that there is no interdiction in time--i.e. materials

moving from one step of a recovery process to another

without a break in the process, as for storage." 63 Fed. Reg.

at 28,581. We believe EPA misapprehends the law of the

circuit.

As to AMC I, EPA supports its interpretation of the

decision on the basis that the court twice used the phrase

"immediate reuse":

Here, Congress defined "solid waste" as "discarded material." The ordinary, plain-English meaning of the word

"discarded" is "disposed of," "thrown away" or "abandoned." Encompassing materials retained for immediate

reuse within the scope of "discarded" strains, to say the

least, the everyday usage of that term.

* * *

The question we face, then, is whether ... Congress was

using the term "discarded" in its ordinary sense--"disposed of" or "abandoned"--or whether Congress was

using it in a much more open-ended way, so as to

encompass materials no longer useful in their original

capacity though destined for immediate reuse in another

phase of the industry's ongoing production process.

824 F.2d at 1183-84, 1185. EPA reads, or rather misreads,

these passages to mean that it may treat secondary materials

as "discarded" whenever they leave the production process

and are stored for any length of time.

For one thing, "the language of an opinion is not always to

be parsed as though we were dealing with language of a

statute," Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)--

an admonition the AMC I court itself repeated. See 824 F.2d

at 1183 n.6 (quoting Reiter, 442 U.S. at 341); see also St.

Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) ("[W]e

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think it generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court

are not at issue, to dissect the sentences of the United States

Reports as though they were the United States Code."). Yet

EPA treats "immediate reuse" as if these were statutory

terms in need of a regulatory definition. See, e.g., 63 Fed.

Reg. at 28,582-83. EPA supplies the definition: immediate

reuse is "continuous recirculation of secondary materials back

into recovery processes without prior storage" unless the

storage for later recycling complies with the conditions EPA

sets forth in the new s 261.4(a)(17) of its regulations. 63

Fed. Reg. at 28,580-83. Of course, this thoroughly ignores

the AMC I court's holding that, under RCRA, material must

be thrown away or abandoned before EPA may consider it to

be "waste." As we have said, material stored for recycling is

plainly not in that category.

For another thing, in the two passages quoted above, the

word "immediate" cannot mean what EPA thinks. The court

wrote of secondary material "retained"--held for a time--and

"destined"--denoting the future--for "immediate reuse."

This more than suggests that the court had in mind materials

that were being held or stored for later recycling or reuse.

EPA assumes, without saying why, that when the AMC I

court wrote "immediate" in these sentences it meant "at

once." But the word "immediate" has another common

meaning--"direct," as in "my immediate superior" or "the

immediate cause of the accident." It is clear to us that this is

what the AMC I court intended. It is clear because retaining

signifies holding onto, keeping, storing. And so retaining, on

the one hand, and reusing at once, on the other hand, sounds

like a physical impossibility. It is clear because the AMC I

court stressed, again and again, that it was interpreting

"discarded" to mean what it ordinarily means. To say that

when something is saved it is thrown away is an extraordinary distortion of the English language. Yet that is where

EPA's definition leads. It is also clear that the AMC I court

intended "direct" when it wrote "immediate" because EPA

never even argued that materials sent back into the production process, with no intermediate storage, were "waste."

EPA never made the argument because its rule at the time

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did not consider such secondary materials to be discarded

(and thus "solid waste" under RCRA). EPA's AMC I brief

stated: "when secondary materials are recycled by being

returned directly (without undergoing significant reprocessing) for use as feedstock to the process which generated

them, the activity often is like an on-going production process.

Secondary materials being recycled in this way--referred to

as a 'closed-loop' process--therefore are not defined as solid

wastes." Brief for Respondent at 11 (citing 40 C.F.R.

s 261.2(e)(iii)(1986)), AMC I.

That the "immediate reuse" phrase was not mentioned in

the critical portions of the AMC I opinion containing the

court's holding is still another reason for rejecting EPA's

position. The court stated: "In sum, our analysis of the

statute reveals clear Congressional intent to extend EPA's

authority only to materials that are truly discarded, disposed

of, thrown away, or abandoned," 824 F.2d at 1190; and

"[t]hese materials have not yet become part of the waste

disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial

reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the generating

industry itself," id. at 1186 (italics in original); and "we are

persuaded that by regulating in-process secondary materials,

EPA has acted in contravention of Congress' intent," id. at

1193. Nothing here about saved materials being transformed

into discarded materials unless they are placed back into the

production process forthwith.

Still further, the AMC I court thought that EPA's final rule

illegally regulated the following: "valuable metal-bearing and

mineral-bearing dusts are often released in processing a

particular metal. The mining facility typically recaptures,

recycles, and reuses these dusts, frequently in production

processes different from the one from which the dusts were

originally emitted." Id. at 1181. The court must have been

referring to the following illustration provided in the mining

industry's brief:

If, for example, "an emission control dust from a primary

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tion process but instead to on-site "cadmium recovery

operations," it is classified as solid waste.

Brief for Petitioner American Mining Congress at 20 (citing

50 Fed. Reg. 614, 640 (1985)), AMC I. In this example, the

dust is not placed back into the production process at once,

and yet the AMC I court held that EPA had no authority to

regulate the dust as solid waste because it had not been

thrown away or otherwise discarded. To state the matter

more generally, the court in AMC I set aside EPA's rule

because secondary materials which are treated prior to recycling cannot be considered discarded if they are "reused

within an ongoing industrial process." 824 F. 2d at 1182.2

We have written enough to explain why we disagree with

EPA's reading of AMC I and why the Phase IV Rule

contradicts that decision. Later cases in this court do not

limit AMC I, as EPA supposes. American Petroleum Institute v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) ("API"), was, as

__________

2 An example from the rulemaking record in this case illustrates

how temporary storage can be a necessary phase of reclaiming

mineral processing secondary material. The Cyprus Amax Minerals Company commented on EPA's proposed 48 hour rule, which

would have defined any such secondary material stored for more

than 48 hours as solid waste, see 62 Fed. Reg. 26,041, 26,051

(1997)--a more limited assertion of authority than the current rule,

which requires no minimum time period of storage. See Comments

of Cyprus Amax Minerals Company: Land Disposal Restrictions

Phase IV, at J.A. 839. At its Miami smelter, Cyprus recycles

reverts, a mixture of "converter slag and matte which has frozen to

the wall and bottom of a transfer ladle." Id. at 864. To accomplish

this, the reverts must be removed from the production process.

"This frozen layer of material (reverts) is physically knocked loose

from the ladle once it reaches a thickness that significantly reduces

the ladle transfer capacity. The freshly removed revert's temperature may still be as much as 1800-1900øF, and the large mass of

material will require many hours to cool sufficiently to allow equipment to move it to the crushing and sizing operations. The reverts

inventory is constantly in process of being reused." Id. The

inventory is not always equal to demand, so some reverts, after the

crushing and sizing, remain in that area before reentering the

furnaces. See id.

EPA acknowledged in the Phase IV rulemaking, at "the end

of the [jurisdictional] continuum ... where EPA's authority

is most certain." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580. In that case, the

Natural Resources Defense Council challenged EPA's decision not to regulate K061 slag. It was "undisputed" that

K061, an individually listed, zinc-bearing hazardous waste

generated from air pollution control equipment in steel industry electric furnaces, see 906 F.2d at 734, was "a 'solid waste'

when it le[ft] the electric furnace in which it [was] produced."

Id. at 740. But EPA, citing AMC I, disavowed authority over

K061 after it had been transported to a metals reclamation

facility. Hence, slag produced when K061 went through a

smelting furnace at the reclamation facility was not automatically classified as a solid waste.3 See id. at 738-39; 53 Fed.

Reg. 11,742, 11,753 (1988).

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The court rejected EPA's view that AMC I precluded

classifying K061 slag as solid waste. The material was sent

to reclamation facilities not as part of an " 'ongoing manufacturing or industrial process' within 'the generating industry,'

but as part of a mandatory waste treatment plan prescribed

by EPA." 906 F.2d at 741. API thus involved the taking of

solid waste from the steel industry and reclaiming it within

another industry, typically primary zinc smelting or some

other type of secondary metal recovery. See 53 Fed. Reg. at

11,752. The API decision is entirely consistent with AMC I.

In fact the AMC I court recognized EPA's authority over

comparable secondary materials: "Oil recyclers typically collect discarded used oils, distill them, and sell the resulting

material for use as fuel in boilers. Regulation of those activities is likewise consistent with an everyday reading of the

term 'discarded.' It is only when EPA attempts to extend

the scope of that provision to include the recycling of undiscarded oils at petroleum refineries that conflict occurs." 824

F.2d at 1187 n.14, cited in API, 906 F.2d at 741 n.16.

__________

3 Under the "derived from" rule, "once EPA determines that a

particular substance is a hazardous waste, the agency continues to

treat as a hazardous waste any product 'derived from' that substance in the course of waste treatment." 906 F.2d at 738 (citing 40

C.F.R. s 261.3(c)(2)).

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American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C.

Cir. 1990) ("AMC II"), the other case featured in EPA's

argument, did not disturb AMC I's interpretation of "discarded." Industry groups contested EPA's authority to regulate

three specifically listed hazardous wastes--K064 (acid plant

blowdown sludge from primary copper production); K065

(surface impoundment solids from primary lead smelting);

and K066 (wastewater treatment sludge from primary zinc

production). See 907 F.2d at 1183, 1185. The court explained that copper, lead and zinc smelting operations "produce large volumes of wastewater that the smelting company

must treat before discharging it. Many smelting operations

use surface impoundments to collect, treat, and dispose of the

wastewater." Id. at 1185-86. Solids in the wastewater settle. Petitioners claimed that the resulting sludge "may at

some time in the future be reclaimed" and therefore could not

be considered solid waste because they had not discarded it.

Id. at 1186. The key word in the passage just quoted is

"may." Could EPA consider this secondary material--material that may in the future be reclaimed--to be discarded?

The AMC II court thought the answer to this "precise

question" was not clear from RCRA and so it deferred to

EPA's interpretation. Id.

EPA regulates the speculative accumulation of secondary

materials through 40 C.F.R. s 261.2(c)(4), a provision not

challenged in this case, and not challenged in AMC II. This

regulation, in itself, supported EPA's viewing the three types

of sludge in AMC II as waste. EPA, however, dismissed the

language in the AMC II opinion indicating that the court had

before it speculative accumulation. According to EPA, AMC

II did not involve speculative accumulation because each

sludge "was actually recycled 100 percent, not stored with the

expectation of recycling. 50 FR at 40292, 40296; Brief of

Petitioner American Mining Congress in AMC II (filed March

30, 1990) pp. 18, 29." 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,581. EPA is flatly

wrong about this. As to K064 (acid plant blowdown sludge

from primary copper production), only 31 percent was eventually recycled throughout the industry, as the AMC II petitioners conceded. See 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,296; Final Brief of

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Consolidated Petitioners at 26, AMC II. As to K066 (wastewater treatment sludge from primary zinc production), recycling totaled 69 percent nationwide. See 50 Fed. Reg. at

40,296; Final Brief of Consolidated Petitioners at 13 n.15,

AMC II. As to K066 (surface impoundment solids from

primary lead smelting), EPA reported 100 percent recycling

in the past but--and the "but" is critical--lead smelting

plants were now storing this material for years and "due to

declining lead demands, there is a strong potential that these

sludges may not be recycled." 50 Fed. Reg. at 40,297.

Even if we credited EPA's mistaken notion about AMC II,

the court's decision there was not at odds with AMC I. The

best authority for this is EPA itself. In defense of its listing

of the materials in AMC II, the agency argued that it had

acted consistently with AMC I's holding that "discarded," as

used in RCRA, carries its ordinary, everyday meaning.4

Here is the heart of EPA's argument in AMC II:

The record demonstrates that the sludges in question

are managed in wastewater treatment surface impoundments, which are within the definition of solid waste.

Moreover, the sludges exhibit sufficient elements of discard to be solid wastes, even if they may be, in part, later

reclaimed.

* * *

EPA acted consistently with AMC in assessing whether each specific sludge at issue here was, considering all

facts and indicia, discarded....

Wastewater treatment surface impoundments are not

part of an ongoing, continuous primary smelting production process. The impoundments receive process wastewater, from which sludges settle or precipitate out.

__________

4 RCRA jurisdiction over these types of sludge may have existed

even without resort to the "discarded material" term in the solid

waste definition. Congress defined solid waste to include "any ...

sludge from a waste treatment plant," 42 U.S.C. s 6903(27), a point

EPA made in its AMC II brief. See Brief for Respondent at 15,

AMC II.

Brief for Respondent at 12, 19-20 (footnotes omitted), AMC

II. The AMC II court agreed with this argument: "Nothing

in AMC prevents the agency from treating as 'discarded' the

wastes at issue in this case, which are managed in land

disposal units that are part of waste treatment systems." 907

F.2d at 1186 (italics in original). The point of AMC II, and

for that matter API, is that once material qualifies as "solid

waste,"5 something derived from it retains that designation

even if it might be reclaimed and reused at some future time.

In contrast, the Phase IV Rule seeks to regulate materials

that are not a by-product of solid waste, but a direct byproduct of industrial processes.

EPA thinks that in light of API and AMC II, "discarded" is

now ambiguous and thus we should defer to its interpretation.

To accept EPA's contention would be to conclude that two

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later panels of this court overruled the decision in AMC I that

"discarded" was not ambiguous. See AMC I, 824 F.2d at

1193. We think nothing of the sort occurred. A term may be

ambiguous as applied to some situations, but not as applied to

others. The AMC II court said as much: nothing in RCRA

"shows the term 'discarded' to be any less ambiguous regarding sludges stored in surface impoundments than it was

regarding the materials at issue in API." 907 F.2d at 1186.6

__________

5 The "solid waste" to which we refer is the wastewater. Under

RCRA a "solid" waste may be liquid. See 42 U.S.C. s 6903(27).

6 It is true that the AMC II court quoted the "immediate reuse"

language from AMC I we mentioned earlier. It is also true that the

AMC II court quoted a good deal more of AMC I, for instance:

"We held [in AMC I] that the agency could not treat such materials

as solid wastes, because they 'have not yet become part of the waste

disposal problem; rather, they are destined for beneficial reuse or

recycling in a continuous process by the generating industry itself.'

[824 F.2d at 1186]." 907 F.2d at 1186 (italics in original). While

the AMC II court said that AMC I "concerned only materials that

are 'destined for immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's

ongoing production process,' " id. (quoting 824 F.2d at 1185, and

adding italics), we have already explained why the italicized language cannot carry the meaning EPA ascribes to it. See pp. 6-10,

supra.

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Some mineral processing secondary materials covered under the Phase IV Rule may not proceed directly to an

ongoing recycling process and may be analogous to the sludge

in AMC II. The parties have presented this aspect of the

case in broad abstraction, providing little detail about the

many processes throughout the industry that generate residual material of the sort EPA is attempting to regulate under

RCRA.7 At this stage, all we can say with certainty is that at

least some of the secondary material EPA seeks to regulate

as solid waste is destined for reuse as part of a continuous

industrial process and thus is not abandoned or thrown away.

Once again, "by regulating in-process secondary materials,

EPA has acted in contravention of Congress' intent," 824

F.2d at 1193, because it has based its regulation on an

improper interpretation of "discarded" and an incorrect reading of our AMC I decision.

II. Alternative Treatment Standards

A.

Once it is determined that materials are hazardous waste

and thus subject to RCRA, EPA is required to take several

steps, one of which is to promulgate regulations prohibiting

land disposal of certain hazardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C.

s 6924(d), (e) & (g). If a waste falls under this disposal

restriction, it cannot be disposed of "unless the waste is

treated so as to minimize the short-term and long-term

threats to human health and the environment posed by toxic

and hazardous constituents ... or unless the EPA finds that

no migration of hazardous constituents from the facility will

occur after disposal." Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.

EPA, 976 F.2d 2, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (citing 42 U.S.C. s 6924

(g)(5), (m)). We are concerned in this portion of the opinion

__________

7 The Phase IV Rule encompasses recycling activities in "all

primary mineral processing sectors" of which EPA has identified at

least 41. 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,580 (citing EPA, Identification and

Description of Mineral Processing Sectors and Waste Streams

(1996)).

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with the first option--the land disposal restriction ("LDR")

treatment standards.

EPA originally promulgated technology-based LDR treatment standards, see Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v.

EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 361-66 (D.C. Cir. 1989), usually examining the available treatment data and requiring use of the

"best demonstrated available technology" ("BDAT"), see 61

Fed. Reg. 18,780, 18,807 (1996). Beginning in 1991, see 56

Fed. Reg. 55,160, 55,172-77 (1991),8 EPA began to rethink

whether BDAT standards should apply to all soils containing

hazardous wastes. While continuing to believe that BDAT

standards are best for newly-generated wastes, the agency

doubted that this was also true for wastes generated during

remediation of contaminated soils. See 61 Fed. Reg. 18,780,

18,808 (1996). BDAT standards "create an incentive to generate less of the affected waste in the first instance." Id.

This incentive is what EPA desires in the context of newlygenerated wastes, but in the remediation context it serves as

a barrier to desirable cleanup efforts. See id.

EPA thus proposed, and promulgated in the rule before us,

alternative treatment standards for soils. Rather than requiring BDAT, the alternative standards allow any treatment

that results in a ninety percent reduction in the concentration

of hazardous constituents, unless the ninety percent reduction

would result in a concentration less than ten times the

Universal Treatment Standard (based on BDAT) for that

constituent. See 40 C.F.R. s 268.49(c)(1). In that case, the

concentrations can be reduced only to ten times the Universal

Treatment Standard. See id. s 268.49(c)(1)(C).

__________

8 This first mention of alternative standards was during part of

the Phase II LDR rulemaking. See 56 Fed. Reg. 55,160, 55,172-77

(1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 48,092, 48,122-33 (1993). The development of

the alternative standards continued in the Hazardous Waste Identification Rule for Contaminated Media, see 61 Fed. Reg. 18,780,

18,783-85, 18,803-13 (1996) and in the Phase IV rule currently

before this court, see 63 Fed. Reg. 28,556, 28,571-52, 28,609-10

(1998).

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The final rule applies solely to soils that are placed "into a

land disposal unit." See id. s 268.49(a). Four industry

groups representing electric and gas utilities challenge the

regulation because it departed from the proposed rules, which

petitioners contend applied to any "land disposal" of soils.

The practical effect of this difference is that the alternative

standards do not apply to soils that are recycled into products

placed on land. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,609. These petitioners prefer the proposed rule because in their efforts to clean

up manufactured gas plant sites, they often recycle contaminated soils into asphalt, brick, or cement--products that are

placed on land. Petitioners voice procedural objections to the

final rule, claiming it violated the notice and comment provisions of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. s 533, and the public participation requirements of RCRA, see 42 U.S.C. s 6974(b)(1).

They also argue that the final rule should be set aside as

"arbitrary and capricious." See 5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A).

B.

There is a jurisdictional hurdle to get over. Intervenors

Environmental Defense Fund and Environmental Technology

Council, but not EPA, question whether we may hear petitioners' challenge to the Phase IV Rule for something it did

not do--that is, its failure to apply the alternative treatment

standards to soils that are recycled into products placed on

land. RCRA gives this court jurisdiction over "a petition for

review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any

regulation...." 42 U.S.C. s 6976(a)(1). Our court lacks

jurisdiction under this provision to hear petitions complaining

that the "EPA should have promulgated a rule which, up until

now, it has not promulgated." United Technologies Corp. v.

EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 720-21 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. EPA, 861 F.2d 277, 287

(D.C. Cir. 1988). In United Technologies, a petitioner challenged an EPA regulation because it did not promulgate

groundwater monitoring regulations for solid (but not hazardous) waste management units. See 821 F.2d at 721. EPA

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had not yet acted either to adopt or to reject proposed

regulations. See id.

In the Phase IV final rule, however, EPA acted. It "studied carefully" whether to apply alternative LDR standards to

soils that are recycled into products placed on land. 63 Fed.

Reg. at 28,575. While the new regulations do not apply to

soils that are recycled into products placed on land, the

jurisdictional provision does not limit review to the actual

regulations. It allows for review "of action of the Administrator in promulgating any regulation," 42 U.S.C.

s 6976(a)(1) (italics added). When EPA considers and rejects

a proposed regulation it has acted. Unlike the United Technologies situation, there are standards by which to judge

EPA's action because the agency selected what, in its view, is

the "appropriate method of ascertaining compliance with statutory and regulatory norms." 821 F.2d at 721.

C.

The Administrative Procedure Act requires that a "[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the

Federal Register" and "[t]he notice shall include ... either

the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description

of the subjects and issues involved." 5 U.S.C. s 553(b).9

This notice then allows interested persons to comment on the

proposed rules. See id. s 553(c). EPA published notices of

proposed rulemaking on alternative LDR standards for soil in

1991, 1993, and 1996. See 56 Fed. Reg. 55,160, 55,172-77

(1991); 58 Fed. Reg. 48,092 (1993); 61 Fed. Reg. at 18,813.

Affected industries thus had numerous opportunities to comment about whether the alternative LDR standards should, or

__________

9 Petitioners also rely on the public participation provisions of

RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. s 6974(b)(1). They note, however, that the

APA provides "greater specificity" of notice requirements, see Brief

of Petitioners Edison Electric Institute et al. on LDR Treatment

Standard Issues at 14, and support their argument only with

reference to APA case law. They do not explain how the RCRA

provision creates additional notice requirements relevant to this

petition.

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should not, apply to their processes. Petitioners did just

that. But they now contend that they were not given proper

notice of the final rule, which, as discussed above, applied

only to soils placed in land disposal units.

Petitioners are correct that the final Phase IV Rule is not

exactly the same as the proposed rules. But notice requirements do not require that the final rule be an exact replication of the proposed rule. If that rigidity were required, the

purpose of notice and comment--to allow an agency to reconsider, and sometimes change, its proposal based on the comments of affected persons--would be undermined. Agencies

would either refuse to make changes in response to comments

or be forced into perpetual cycles of new notice and comment

periods. Recognizing this, we hold that notice and comment

requirements are met when an agency issues rules "that do

not exactly coincide with the proposed rule so long as the

final rule is the 'logical outgrowth' of the proposed rule."

Fertilizer Inst. v. EPA, 935 F.2d 1303, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

"[T]he key focus is on whether the purposes of notice and

comment have been adequately served.... [A] final rule will

be deemed to be the logical outgrowth of a proposed rule if a

new round of notice and comment would not provide commenters with 'their first occasion to offer new and different

criticisms which the agency might find convincing.' " Id.

(quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Marshall, 647

F.2d 1189, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting BASF Wyandotte

Corp. v. Costle, 598 F.2d 637, 642 (1st Cir. 1979))).

The Phase IV final rule on alternative LDR treatment

standards is a logical outgrowth of the proposed rules. EPA

proposed allowing alternative standards for remediated soils.

The proposal was just that--a proposal. One would logically

conclude that EPA could have ended up allowing alternative

standards for all soils as the proposal suggested, for no soils,

or--as it turned out--for some soils. Petitioners submitted

comments on why remediation activities involving soils recycled into products placed on land should be subject to the

alternative standards. EPA responded to those comments.

Petitioners say that they "would have submitted comments

demonstrating that utility companies have engaged in such

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recycling under regulatory oversight...." Brief of Petitioner Edison Electric et al. on LDR Treatment Standard Issues

at 21. They think this would have been convincing because

"[w]hat ultimately seemed to be dispositive was EPA's belief

that recycling is not subject to regulatory supervision." Id.

(citing 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,610). Not so. In 1996, EPA

suggested that it might limit the alternative treatment standards to remediation activities subject to regulatory oversight: "[S]hould the Agency adopt soil treatment standards

that are adjusted to account for the lack of State or Agency

oversight over how they are administered?" See 61 Fed.

Reg. at 18,813. This notified affected persons that they

should submit information discussing the regulatory oversight

of any remediation activities at issue.

The short of the matter is that petitioners have identified

no relevant information they might have supplied had they

anticipated EPA's final rule. We therefore hold that EPA

complied with the notice and comment requirements.

D.

This brings us to the arbitrary and capricious challenge.

EPA concluded that soils recycled into products placed on

land should continue to be treated with the "best treatment

available" because these products "can be placed virtually

anywhere, compounding potential release mechanisms, exposure pathways, and human and environmental receptors." 63

Fed. Reg. at 28,610. The agency stressed the "uncertainties

posed by this method of land disposal" in refusing to apply

the alternative LDR standards. See id. at 28,609-10.

Petitioners claim this "uncertainty" is not a rational basis

for agency decisionmaking and that EPA did not adequately

support its environmental concerns with recycled soils placed

on land. There is nothing to this. EPA decided not to apply

alternative standards unless it was certain the new standards

would result in safe disposal. "[N]othing [in RCRA] requires

the Administrator to determine that a method of land disposal

is not safe before prohibiting it. Rather, the statute commands the Administrator to promulgate prohibitory regulaUSCA Case #98-1381 Document #512053 Filed: 04/21/2000 Page 20 of 32
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tions unless he has made an affirmative determination of

safety." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

907 F.2d 1146, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1990). EPA applies a similar

presumption in granting variances from treatment standards.

See 40 C.F.R. s 268.44. EPA also sufficiently supported its

view that environmental risks exist when soils are recycled

into products placed on land. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,610

(citing 53 Fed. Reg. at 31,197-98); J.A. 2131-32. It engaged

in reasoned decisionmaking in finding that contaminated soils

placed on the ground as asphalt or cement pose greater

environmental risks than similar soils placed in land disposal

units.

* * *

EPA must define "solid waste" in accordance with this

opinion. The parenthetical--"(except as provided under 40

CFR 261.4(a)(17))"--to the second sentence of 40 C.F.R.

s 261.2(c)(3), through which EPA purportedly expanded its

regulation of mineral processing secondary materials, is

therefore set aside.

The petitions challenging the alternative treatment standards for soils are denied.

So ordered.

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Ginsburg, Circuit Judge: A solid waste not specifically

listed as "hazardous" by the EPA is nonetheless deemed

"hazardous" if it exhibits one or more of four characteristics:

ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity. 40 C.F.R.

ss 261.20, 261.21, 261.22, 261.23 & 261.24. In order to determine whether a solid waste is toxic, the EPA has adopted a

test called the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure

(TCLP). 40 C.F.R. s 261.24. The EPA created the TCLP,

and its predecessor the Extraction Procedure (EP), as part of

its response to the command of the Congress to "promulgate

regulations identifying the characteristics of hazardous

waste." 42 U.S.C. s 6921(b)(1); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 21,653

(describing evolution of EP and TCLP). Because the Congress had defined hazardous waste to include any solid waste

that may "pose a substantial present or potential hazard to

human health or the environment when improperly treated,

stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed,"

42 U.S.C. s 6903(5)(B), the EPA set out to design a test that

would determine whether a solid waste would pose a risk to

human health or the environment if it was mismanaged. See

55 Fed. Reg. 11,806/1. Rejecting as impractical an approach

in which the test for toxicity would vary depending upon the

manner in which a waste was actually disposed of, see 55 Fed.

Reg. 11,807, the EPA instead decided to adopt a test designed

to simulate the disposal practice that is the most dangerous to

human health and the environment and yet still plausible.

See id. Although the EPA included in the TCLP several

refinements the EP lacked, both tests model essentially the

same worst-case mismanagement scenario. See 51 Fed. Reg.

21,653; Edison Electric Institute v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438, 442

(D.C. Cir. 1993).

That scenario assumes the "co-disposal of toxic wastes in an

actively decomposing municipal landfill which overlies a

groundwater aquifer," 45 Fed. Reg. 33,110/3; this hypothetical landfill is composed of "5 percent industrial solid waste

and 95 percent municipal waste," 51 Fed. Reg. 21,653/3; the

toxic waste leaches unattenuated to the groundwater strata,

see 45 Fed. Reg. 33,111/2; and the closest well for drinking

water is 500 feet down gradient from the landfill. See id.

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In order to conduct the TCLP, the EPA first determines

the composition of the waste sample. If the sample contains

less than 0.5% dry solid matter, called the "solid phase," then

the waste is filtered; the liquid passing through the filter is

considered the TCLP extract and is analyzed to determine

the concentrations of various chemicals. See Office of Solid

Waste, EPA, Method 1311, in Test Methods for Evaluating Solid Waste, Physical/Chemical Methods, ss 2.1, 7.3.15,

7.3.16 (3d ed. 1998) (EPA Publication SW-846). After applying a dilution and attenuation factor to simulate the diminution in concentration "expected to occur between the point of

leachate generation and the point of human or environmental

exposure," Edison Electric, 2 F.3d at 441, the EPA determines whether any of the resulting concentrations of certain

chemicals are equal to or greater than the concentrations

listed in 40 C.F.R. s 261.24, tbl. 1. If they are, then the

waste is considered toxic and, consequently, hazardous. 40

C.F.R. s 261.24(a).

If the waste contains more than 0.5% solid phase, then the

solid phase is separated from the "liquid phase," see EPA

Publication SW-846 at s 2.2, if any, and reduced to particle

size in order to simulate the various processes that break

down large solids in a landfill. See id. at s 7.1.3; Edison

Electric, 2 F.3d at 444. An "extraction fluid" is then mixed

with the solid phase and the resulting leachate, called the

"liquid extract," is filtered through a glass fiber filter. EPA

Publication SW-846 at ss 2.2, 7.1.4. The liquid phase and

the liquid extract, treated collectively as the TCLP extract,

are then analyzed to determine the concentration of various

chemicals, see id. at s 2.3; again, the dilution and attenuation

factor is applied and the resulting concentrations compared

with those listed in the table at 40 C.F.R. s 261.24.

In Edison Electric we held that the EPA's decision to use

one test based upon a single, hypothetical mismanagement

scenario was authorized under a permissible construction of

the RCRA and entitled to our deference pursuant to Chevron

U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).

See Edison Electric, 2 F.3d at 446. Applying the Administrative Procedure Act, however, we rejected as arbitrary and

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capricious the EPA's attempt to apply the TCLP to mineral

processing wastes in general and in particular to those mineral processing wastes known as manufactured gas plant (MGP)

waste. See id. at 446-47. Specifically, we held that although

the "EPA need not demonstrate that mineral wastes [including MGP waste] are typically or commonly deposited in

[municipal solid waste] landfills ... the Agency must at least

provide some factual support for its conclusion that such a

mismanagement scenario is plausible." Id. at 446. The EPA

could alternatively justify the application of the TCLP to

mineral processing and MGP wastes if it could demonstrate

"on the record that [these] wastes were exposed to conditions

similar to those simulated by the TCLP." Id. at 447. Recently, we reaffirmed our holding that the EPA must demonstrate a rational relationship between the hypothetical mismanagement scenario underlying the TCLP and the actual

way in which the wastes tested by the TCLP are discarded.

See Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d 914

(1998).

In the Phase IV Rule the EPA once again has used the

TCLP as the test for determining the toxicity of mineral

processing wastes, including MGP waste. See 63 Fed. Reg.

28,574, 28,599. The National Mining Association, the American Iron and Steel Institute, the Edison Electric Institute,

and the Chemical Manufacturers Association (collectively the

Associations) argue that the EPA has failed to demonstrate

that the mismanagement scenario underlying the TCLP bears

a rational relationship to the way in which mineral processing

and MGP wastes are disposed of in fact; they therefore ask

this court once again to strike down the EPA's application of

the TCLP to these wastes as arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, the Associations argue that the EPA failed to consider or to respond to significant comments the Associations

submitted suggesting the use of both the TCLP and another

test, known as the Synthetic Precipitation Leaching Procedure (SPLP). Although we hold that the EPA has justified

its use of the TCLP alone to determine the toxicity of mineral

processing wastes generally, and that the EPA did respond to

the Associations' comments, we nonetheless find that the

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EPA has failed to justify application of the TCLP to MGP

waste. Accordingly, we grant the petition for review in part

and vacate the Phase IV Rule insofar as it provides for use of

the TCLP to determine whether MGP waste exhibits the

characteristic of toxicity.

A. Mineral Processing Wastes (Other than MGP waste)

Paralleling our holding in Edison Electric, the EPA attempts to justify its application of the TCLP to mineral

processing wastes on two grounds: (1) It is likely that

mineral processing wastes have been disposed of in municipal

landfills; and (2) mineral processing wastes have been "exposed to conditions similar to those simulated by the TCLP."

Because we find that evidence in the record supports the first

proposition, we do not address the EPA's alternative justification.

In response to this court's remand in Edison Electric, the

EPA prepared a document entitled Applicability of the

[TCLP] to Mineral Processing Wastes. There the EPA collected an impressive amount of evidence that mineral processing wastes may have been disposed of as hypothesized in the

mismanagement scenario modeled by the TCLP. First, the

EPA catalogued evidence that many facilities generating mineral processing wastes are located near population centers

with municipal landfills and that a substantial portion of

mineral processing facilities generate mineral processing

wastes in quantities small enough to be deposited in a municipal landfill. Second, the EPA collected 14 cases of either

"likely," "possible," or "potential" disposal of mineral processing wastes in municipal landfills. In one of the two "likely"

cases an eyewitness saw waste taken from A&W Smelters

and Refiners, a mineral processing facility, being dumped in a

municipal landfill. In the other "likely" case, a landfill located on an abandoned "strip mine" was closed after having

accepted industrial wastes without a permit; an unidentified

slag was among the laundry list of wastes found at the site.

In the "possible" cases, "materials such as 'slag,' 'dusts,' and

'ash' [were disposed of] in various landfills"; the materials

involved are not precisely described and because "these

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wastes often become indistinguishable from the soil and debris in municipal landfills," it is difficult to determine whether

mineral processing wastes were actually involved. The "potential" cases typically "involve mineral processing and municipal solid wastes being disposed of in close proximity to

each other (e.g., in two separate on-site disposal areas)."

Finally, the EPA collected ten instances in which mineral

processing wastes had been stored at mineral processing

facilities along with materials commonly found in municipal

landfills. For example, one facility had a landfill on site that

contained 98% plant trash and two percent "spent catalyst,"

while another facility operated a landfill on site composed of

90% plant trash and 10% "mercury contaminated soil."

The Associations argue that this evidence is insufficient to

meet the standard announced in Edison Electric, although

they do not dispute the facts concerning the location of

mineral processing facilities and the volume of waste they

produce. Rather, the Associations maintain that all the

EPA's evidence does not establish that mineral processing

wastes are plausibly disposed of in the manner modeled by

the TCLP. For example, they claim that there is no evidence

that the material the eyewitness saw moved from A&W

Smelters and Refiners originated at that facility or, alternatively, that the material was subject to regulation under the

RCRA as hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. s 6921(b)(3)(A)(ii)

(Bevill exclusion, as implemented by EPA, exempts from

regulation under Subtitle C of RCRA solid wastes from

extraction and beneficiation of ores and minerals and 20

mineral processing wastes); Solite Corp. v. EPA, 952 F.2d

473, 479 n.4, 481-82 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Finally, the

Associations contend that the EPA's examples of landfills

located at mineral processing facilities are inadequate because

most of those sites did not contain the mixture of 95%

municipal waste and 5% industrial waste that the TCLP

simulates and the two sites that did have a similar ratio did

not contain mineral processing wastes.

We hold that the evidence the EPA has marshaled in

support of applying the TCLP to mineral processing wastes is

sufficient to meet the standard announced in Edison Electric.

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In that case we did not demand that the EPA demonstrate

that the TCLP exactly reflects actual disposal practices, but

only that the mismanagement scenario underlying the TCLP

bears some "rational relationship" to those practices. See

Edison Electric, 2 F.3d at 446. Therefore, to the extent the

Associations seek to exploit factual uncertainties in the EPA's

account--such as whether the waste the eyewitness saw

taken from A&W was actually a mineral processing waste

subject to Subtitle C of the RCRA--we can agree that the

evidence is not conclusive and nonetheless hold that it is

sufficient to make application of the TCLP "rational" or

"plausible." Especially with respect to on-site landfills, the

Associations' objections amount to nothing more than repeated observations that the EPA's evidence about actual

disposal does not precisely match the conditions the agency

models in the TCLP. Such complaints are of little moment,

for they merely point up an inherent feature of the TCLP,

and indeed of any model. As we have previously explained,

because "a model is meant to simplify reality in order to

make it tractable," it is no criticism of a model "[t]hat [it]

does not fit every application perfectly." Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. EPA, 28 F.3d 1259, 1264 (1994).

B. MGP Waste

The Associations also argue that the EPA has not justified

applying the TCLP to MGP waste because the MGP industry

stopped producing waste about 40 years ago and there is no

evidence that MGP waste is currently being disposed of in

municipal landfills. In response, the EPA makes two points.

First, the EPA notes that, prior to the demise of the MGP

industry, MGP waste was deposited in landfills and at industry facilities, many of which are currently being remediated.

Second, the EPA argues that some of the MGP waste from

the sites being remediated could be sent to municipal landfills, as evidenced by the following passage in a handbook

issued by the Edison Electric Institute advising utilities on

how to clean up contaminated sites:

Landfilling is the most common and simplest of the

disposal methods. If the wastes are hazardous then they

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must be disposed of in a properly licensed secure landfill.

The nearest such landfill may be hundreds of miles from

the site, which results in high transportation costs. If

the wastes are non-hazardous, disposal may be at a local

commercial municipal landfill. It is therefore important

to determine if the wastes are hazardous or nonhazardous both for different transportation costs and for

the extreme difference in disposal costs, with secure

landfill costs being much higher.

On the basis of this publication, the EPA concludes that "the

utilities' own characterization of its disposal practices demonstrates that MGP wastes that do not display the toxicity

characteristic are commonly disposed in municipal solid waste

landfills, evidently because it is cheaper to do so."

The Associations contend that because the EPA has not

provided any evidence indicating that any remediation waste

has ever found its way into any municipal landfill--or is for

some particular reason likely to do so--the agency has failed

to carry its burden, as set out in Edison Electric, of "provid[ing] some factual support for its conclusion that such a

mismanagement scenario is plausible." Although the Associations do not dispute that there are many sites, including

municipal landfills, that contain MGP waste, they point out

that the EPA has not provided any evidence linking the waste

at those sites to waste generated during the remediation of

sites contaminated with MGP. Further, the Associations

argue that the handbook issued by the Edison Electric Institute simply canvasses the available options for waste disposal

without advocating any practice and without indicating that

remediation wastes were or should be deposited in municipal

landfills. Indeed, the handbook specifically warns against

disposing of hazardous MGP waste in a municipal landfill. As

the Associations see it, the EPA's evidence establishes, at

most, that it is possible for MGP waste from a remediation

site to be deposited in a municipal landfill.

As we have said, the EPA must show that the mismanagement scenario the TCLP simulates bears "some rational

relationship" to how wastes subject to that test are actually

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managed. See Edison Electric, 2 F.3d at 446. Here, the

EPA has demonstrated the possibility that MGP waste from

remediation sites could be disposed of in a municipal landfill,

but has not produced a shred of evidence indicating that has

happened or is likely to happen. Upon the current record,

therefore, we must conclude that the EPA has not justified its

application of the TCLP to MGP waste.

Judge Randolph, post, expresses dismay that the Court

rejects the EPA's application of the TCLP to MGP waste--

for which he would find there is at least some record support--while approving the agency's application of the TCLP

to the other "350 or so wastes in this rulemaking for which

the agency uses TCLP," Diss. op. at 1, and about which the

record is silent. Suffice to say, we do not require the EPA to

present evidence justifying application of the TCLP to any

other specific mineral processing waste because no party

challenges the TCLP with respect to any other specific waste.

The Associations have pointed out that MGP waste differs

in one very real respect from other mineral processing

wastes: MGP waste is no longer produced and therefore will

not be disposed of in municipal landfills unless that happens

in the course of a remediation effort. Evidence that mineral

processing wastes that are still being produced have been

disposed of in municipal landfills offers no support for the

different proposition that MGP waste from a remediation

effort has been or will be so disposed.

Furthermore, the incomplete and vague evidence in the

record relating to MGP waste is far less persuasive than the

evidence the EPA produced for mineral processing wastes

generally. For instance, even in the two examples singled

out by Judge Randolph--by far the strongest in the record--

there is no evidence that the "coal tar, kerosene, and other

wastes typically produced at MGP sites," Diss. op. at 2, and

found at the landfills actually originate from an MGP site at

all, let alone evidence that they came to the landfill from a

remediation effort. Nor, contrary to Judge Randolph's suggestion, see Diss. op. at 2, does evidence that the MGP

industry disposed of its waste in municipal landfills--when

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that industry was actively producing waste--support the inference that remediation waste containing MGP waste will

now be deposited in landfills. For these reasons, we do not

think the EPA's evidence supporting application of the TCLP

to mineral processing wastes justifies its application to MGP

waste.

C. Significant Comments

The Associations also argue that the EPA failed to consider

and respond to their comments suggesting the use of both the

SPLP and the TCLP to determine toxicity. This argument is

without merit. During the rulemaking, the EPA responded

to the Associations' comments by highlighting evidence that

the SPLP is no more accurate than the TCLP and by

reiterating its decision to use a single test to determine

toxicity instead of using different tests depending upon how

the waste is actually managed. The EPA therefore adequately considered and responded to the Associations's comments.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons we grant the petition for review

in part and vacate the Phase IV Rule insofar as it provides

for the use of the TCLP to determine whether MGP waste

exhibits the characteristic of toxicity.

So ordered.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: I respectfully

dissent from Judge Ginsburg's conclusion, for himself and

Judge Silberman, that EPA failed to justify "its application of

TCLP to MGP wastes." Maj. op. at 22.

Edison Electric Institute v. EPA, 2 F.3d 438, 446 (D.C. Cir.

1993), and Columbia Falls Aluminum Co. v. EPA, 139 F.3d

914, 922-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998), require EPA to show a rational

relationship between its chosen toxicity test--TCLP--and the

wastes to which the test is applied. (TCLP simulates what

would occur if waste were dumped in a landfill.) The case

before us involves the application of TCLP to 358 different

types of mineral processing wastes generated by 41 different

sectors of the mineral processing industry. Has EPA satisfied the "rational relationship" test with respect to all 358

types of waste? Yes, my colleagues decide, because there are

2 cases of "likely" disposal of mineral processing wastes in

municipal landfills and 12 such "possible" cases. Quite obviously, this "proof" says nothing whatever about hundreds of

types of waste thrown off by this industry. The majority's

inference must be that if some types of mineral processing

waste may be dumped in a landfill, it is plausible to suppose

that all types may wind up there.

I have no quarrel with this reasoning, although I wish it

had been made more explicit. But I cannot comprehend why

the reasoning does not apply equally to one other type of

mineral processing waste--"manufactured gas plant" (MGP)

waste. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 28,574; Edison Elec., 2 F.3d at

443, 446-47 (treating MGP waste no differently than other

mineral processing wastes). Put another way, why is it that

of the 350 or so wastes in this rulemaking for which the

agency uses TCLP, my colleagues reach in and pluck out this

one--MGP--to place under the judicial microscope? Odder

still, the record contains more support for using the test on

MGP wastes than for using it on the hundreds of other

unnamed mineral processing wastes, which the court sustains.

My colleagues share EPA's conjecture that because mineral

processing operations are often located near urban areas,

their wastes are likely to be disposed in municipal landfills.

See maj. op. at 25. But MGP plants too were located in such

spots, producing gas for municipalities. While EPA identified

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only 14 examples of "likely" or "possible" landfill disposal for

all 358 mineral processing wastes, the agency listed 14 examples of codisposal for MGP wastes alone. See Office of Solid

Waste, EPA, Applicability of the Toxicity Characteristic

Leaching Procedure to Mineral Processing Wastes at 14

(1998). The record is a bit hazy regarding some of these

instances. For two of them, though, there is sufficient evidence to make it likely that MGP waste was disposed in

municipal landfills. In both the New Lyme (Ohio) Landfill,

see id. app. D, and the Schilling Landfill in Ironton, Ohio, see

id., there were significant concentrations of coal tar, kerosene, and other wastes typically produced at MGP sites.

The majority's concern seems to be that these two examples did not involve "remediation waste," that is, waste from

clean up operations after the MGP plants ceased functioning.

Maj. op. at 27-28. How can my colleagues know that? No

findings to this effect appear in the record. Besides, I believe

they are mistaken. The New Lyme landfill, for example, did

not begin operation until 1969, see Applicability of the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure to Mineral Processing

Wastes app. D, yet MGPs "stopped producing waste about 40

years ago," maj. op. at 27; see also Petitioners' Reply Brief

on RCRA Classification Issues at 17 (stating that MGP

industry defunct for 40 years). If not from remediation, how

did this MPG waste wind up in the landfill? At any rate, the

same factors that led to disposing of MPG waste in landfills in

the past--proximity to landfills, size of the waste, cost--are

with us today and should have been enough to sustain EPA's

rule.

I again ask why the special judicial treatment of MGP

waste? Of the other 350 or so types of mineral processing

wastes, how many of these are (1) from abandoned plants; (2)

near city dumps; and (3) have in the past wound up in those

dumps? The majority does not say because it does not know.

Yet it sustains application of TCLP to these wastes, for which

there is no evidence, and strikes down TCLP for manufactured gas plant wastes, despite abundant evidence showing a

rational relationship. I therefore dissent.

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