Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-24-01759/USCOURTS-ca8-24-01759-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

___________________________

No. 24-1759

___________________________ 

United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval, also known as Luis Manuel Zamora Briseno, also 

known as Pedro Esquivias

 Defendant - Appellant

____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern

____________ 

Submitted: December 18, 2024

Filed: December 23, 2024

[Unpublished] 

____________ 

Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

After pleading guilty to illegally reentering the United States and conspiring 

to distribute controlled substances, Roberto Esquivias-Sandoval received a 158-

month prison sentence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 

(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), (viii), (B)(vi), 846. An Anders brief suggests he should not have 

Appellate Case: 24-1759 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Entry ID: 5469060
-2- 

received a drug-premises enhancement or a lengthy sentence. See Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

We conclude otherwise. Evidence of drug sales at Esquivias-Sandoval’s 

home supported the finding that he “maintained a premises for the purposes of . . . 

distributing . . . controlled substance[s].” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12); see United 

States v. Armstrong, 60 F.4th 1151, 1169 (8th Cir. 2023); see also United States v. 

Sykes, 854 F.3d 457, 459, 461 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that a handful of sales, plus 

circumstantial evidence like cash and packaging materials, was enough). Then, 

based on that finding, the district court1 calculated the advisory range, selected a 

sentence, and explained its reasoning. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 

461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence for an 

abuse of discretion). In doing so, it sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing 

factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a 

clear error of judgment. See United States v. Noriega, 35 F.4th 643, 652 (8th Cir. 

2022) (stating that “reversal is not appropriate simply because the district court did 

not weigh the § 3553(a) factors as [the defendant] preferred”). 

We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other 

non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We 

accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission 

to withdraw.

______________________________

1

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa.

Appellate Case: 24-1759 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/23/2024 Entry ID: 5469060