Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01434/USCOURTS-ca10-93-01434-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee
Appellee
Federal Election Commission
Appellant
Douglas Jones
Appellee

Document Text:

F ILED " PUBLISH -s....t States cou.rt of At,eal'> 

\J...- Tent\\ Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 2, 3 1995 

TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHEll. 

Clerk 

FEDERAL ELECTION·COMMISSION, ) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

v. 

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant/ 

Appellee/Cross-Appellant, · 

COLORADO REPUBLICAN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN 

COMMITTEE, DOUGLAS JONES, 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Defendants/Counter-Claimants/ ) 

Appellants/Cross-Appellees. ) 

Nos. 93-1433 

& 93-1434 

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the District of Colorado 

(D.C. No. 89-N-1159) 

Jan Witold Baran (Thomas w. Kirby, Carol A. Laham and Lee E. Goodman, also of Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Washington, D.C., with him on 

the briefs) for the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee 

and Douglas L. Jones. 

Richard B. Bader, Associate General Counsel (Lawrence M. Noble, 

General Counsel, and Rita A. Reimer, Attorney, also of Federal 

Election Commission, Washington, D.C., with him on the briefs) for 

the Federal Election Commission. 

Before HENRY and LOGAN, Circuit Judges, and REED, District Judge.* 

* The Honorable Edward C. Reed, Jr., Senior United States 

District Judge, United States District Court for the District of 

Nevada, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 93-1434 Document: 01019279875 Date Filed: 06/23/1995 Page: 1 
LOGAN, Circuit Judg~. 

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) appeals from the dismissal on the merits of its underlying suit filed against the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee and its treasurer, 

Douglas L. Jones (collectively the Committee) alleging violations 

of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 u.s.c. 

§§ 431-442. The Committee cross-appeals from the dismissal as 

moot of its counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the 

FECA expenditure limitations. We hold that the Committee expenditures at issue did violate the coordinated expenditure limitation in 2 u.s.c. § 441a(d) (3). We also reach the constitutional 

issue and hold that § 441a(d) (3) does not violate the Committee's 

First Amendment rights. 

This action stems from the 1986 United States senatorial campaign in Colorado, and pre-election spending by the Committee. In 

January 1986, then-Congressman Timothy E. Wirth had registered 

with the FEC as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for the 

u.s. Senate. Several months later, but before either political 

party had nominated senatorial candidates, the Committee spent 

$15,000 for a radio advertisement directed at Wirth's announced 

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candidacy ("Wirth Facts #1").1 This spending prompted the Colorado Democratic Party's administrative complaint with the FEC 

alleging that it was an "expenditure in connection with" the general election campaign of a candidate for federal office in violation of the spending limits set out in FECA § 441a(d) (3). 

The FEC made a probable cause determination that the Committee violated the FECA. When the parties were unable to reach a 

settlement the FEC filed suit. The FEC alleged that the Committee 

failed to report the amount spent on the anti-Wirth publicity as 

an "expenditure in connection with" the general election campaign, 

in violation of FECA §§ 434(b) (4) (H) (iv), 434(b) (6) (B) (iv), and 

441a(f). The Committee counterclaimed, alleging that the FECA was 

an unconstitutional infringement on its First Amendment rights. 

In ruling on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, the 

district court dismissed the underlying action after finding no 

1 Wirth Facts #1 read: 

Paid for by the Colorado Republican State Central Committee. 

Here in Colorado we're used to politicians who let you 

know where they stand, and I thought we could count on 

Tim Wirth to do the same. But the last few weeks have 

been a real eye-opener. I just saw some ads where Tim 

Wirth said he's for a strong defense and a balanced budget. But according to his record, Tim Wirth voted 

against every major new weapon system in the last five 

years. And he voted against the balanced budget amendment. 

Tim Wirth has a right to run for the Senate, but he 

doesn't have a right to change the facts. 

I Jt. App. 95-96. 

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FECA violation, and dismissed the counterclaim as mooted by its 

merits ruling. These appeals followed. 

I 

We first address whether the district court correctly coneluded that the Committee did not violate the FECA. We review de 

novo a district court's grant of summary judgment using the same 

legal standards as the district court. Clark v. Haas Group, Inc., 

953 F.2d 1235, 1237 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. ct. 98 

(1992). 

A 

The FECA regulates contributions made to federal candidates 

and political parties, and expenditures made by persons and 

political committees. It also imposes recordkeeping and reporting 

requirements. The Committee acknowledges that it is subject to 

the FECA as a federally registered committee of the Colorado 

Republican Party. 

The statute limits monetary contributions and expenditures by 

state and national political party committees as follows: 

(d) Expenditures by national committee, State committee, or subordinate committee of State committee in 

connection with general election campaign of candidates 

for Federal office 

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law with 

respect to limitations on expenditures or limitations on 

contributions, the national committee of a political 

party and a State committee of a political party, 

including any subordinate committee of a state committee, may make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal office, 

subject to the limitations contained in paragraphs {2) 

and {3) of this subsection. 

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(3) The national committee of a political party, or 

a State committee of a political party, including any 

subordinate committee of a State committee, may not make 

any expenditure in connection with the general election 

campaign of a candidate for Federal office in a State 

who is affiliated with such party which exceeds--

(A) in the case of a candidate for election 

to the office of Senator, or of Representative 

from a state which is entitled to only one 

Representative, the greater of--

(i) 2 cents multiplied by the voting age 

population of the State (as certified under 

subsection (e) of this section); or 

(ii) $20,000. 

2 u.s.c. § 441a(d) (1) and (3). A state political party committee 

may assign to a designated agent (including a national party committee) the right to make the expenditures the state party could 

have made. See FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 

454 u.s. 27, 41-43 (1981) (DSCC). Here the Committee expended 

funds on the anti-Wirth publicity after assigning to the National 

Republican Senatorial Committee the authority to make all of the 

expenditures--$103,248--it was allowed under § 441a(d) (3) for the 

1986 u.s. Senate election. See I Jt. App. 4, 14; II id. 473. The 

Committee did not report the $15,000 anti-Wirth publicity expense 

under 2 u.s.c. § 434(b) (4) (H) (iv),2 instead characterizing it as 

2 2 u.s.c. § 434(b) (4) (H) (iv) reads in part: 

(b) Contents of reports 

Each report under this section shall disclose--

(4) for the reporting period and the calendar year, 

the total amount of all disbursements, and all disbursements in the following categories: 

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an expense for "Voter Information to Colorado Voters--Advertising." II App. 4 78, ~~ A. The narrow issue is whether the antiWirth publicity expense was an "expenditure in connection with the 

general election campaign" pursuant to § 441a(d) (3) and should 

have been reported accordingly. If so, the Committee exceeded the 

§ 441a(d) (3) monetary ceiling. 

As relevant here, the FECA addresses two types of campaign 

expenditures: independent and coordinated.3 A coordinated expenditure is one made "in cooperation with or with the consent of a 

candidate, his agents, or an authorized committee of the candidate." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 u.s. 1, 47 n.53 (1976). See also 11 

C.F.R. § 110.7(b) (4). Because political parties are considered 

Continued from previous page 

(H) for any political committee other than an 

authorized committee--

(i) contributions made to other political 

committees; 

(ii) loans made by the reporting committees; 

(iii) independent expenditures; 

(iv) expenditures made under section 

441a(d) of this title; and 

(v) any other disbursements. 

3 An independent expenditure is "made without cooperation or 

consultation with any candidate, or any authorized committee or 

agent of such candidate, and which is not made in concert with, or 

at the request or suggestion of, any candidate, or any authorized 

committee or agent of such candidate." 2 u.s.c. § 431(17); see 

also§ 441a(a) (7) (A)-(B). 

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incapable of making independent expenditures, the district court 

correctly found that the anti-Wirth publicity expense was a coerdinated expenditure. See DSCC, 454 U.S. at 29 n.l. If that 

spending was an "expenditure[] in connection with" the campaign it 

was subject to the monetary limitations at § 44la(d). Id. The 

district court concluded that the Committee's coordinated expenditure on the anti-Wirth publicity was not made in connection with 

the l986 Colorado senatorial campaign, and therefore was not subject to the § 44la(d) (3) limits. 

B 

The FECA does not clearly manifest the meaning Congress 

intended to attach to the "expenditures in connection with" language in§ 44la(d) (3). Acknowledging that there were no controlling or persuasive cases interpreting that section, the district 

court relied upon FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 

238 (l986) (MCFL), and its interpretation of FECA § 44lb. Section 

44lb4 restricts the contributions and expenditures of national 

4 2 u.s.c. § 44lb provides in relevant part as follows: 

(a) It is unlawful for any national bank, or any 

corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election to any political office, or in 

connection with any primary election or political 

convention or caucus held to select candidates for any 

political office, or for any corporation whatever, or 

any labor organization, to make a contribution or 

expenditure in connection with any election at which 

presidential and vice presidential electors or a Senator 

or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident 

Commissioner to, Congress are to be voted for, or in 

connection with any primary election or political 

convention or caucus held to select candidates for any 

of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, 

political committee, or other person knowingly to accept 

Continued to next page 

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banks, corporations, or labor organizations. The Supreme Court in 

MCFL considered whether Massachusetts citizens for Life, Inc., a 

nonprofit, nonstock corporation, by financing a newsletter urging 

voter support for identified pro-life candidates, violated the 

"independent spending" limitations in § 441b. Id. at 241. Interpreting the term "expenditure in connection with any election" the 

Court held that the expenditure "must constitute 'express advoContinued from previous page 

or receive any contribution prohibited by this section, 

or any officer or any director of any corporation or any 

national bank or any officer of any labor organization 

to consent to any contribution or expenditure by the 

corporation, national bank, or labor organization, as 

the case may be, prohibited by this section. 

(b) (2) For purposes of this section and section 

79.l(h) of Title 15, the term "contribution or 

expenditure" shall include any direct or indirect 

payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift 

of money, or any services, or anything of value (except 

a loan of money by a national or State bank made in 

accordance with the applicable banking laws and 

regulations and in the ordinary course of business) to 

any candidate, campaign committee, or political party or 

organization, in connection with any election to any of 

the offices referred to in this section, but shall not 

include (A) communications by a corporation to its 

stockholders and executive or administrative personnel 

and their families or by a labor organization to its 

members and their families on any subject; 

(B) nonpartisan registration and get-out-the-vote 

campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stockholders and 

executive or administrative personnel and their 

families, or by a labor organization aimed at its 

members and their families; and (C) the establishment, 

administration, and solicitation of contributions to.a 

separate segregated fund to be utilized for political 

purposes by a corporation, labor organization, 

membership organization, cooperative, or corporation 

without capital stock. 

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Appellate Case: 93-1434 Document: 01019279875 Date Filed: 06/23/1995 Page: 8 
cacy' in order to be subject to the prohibition of § 441b." Id. 

at 249. 

MCFL relied upon the Buckley opinion's interpretation of a 

limitation on independent expenditures "relative to" a clearly 

identifiable candidate. To avoid invalidating on vagueness 

grounds what was then FECA § 608(e) (1), the Buckley Court held the 

term encompassed only "expenditures for communications that in 

express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office." Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44. The 

opinion clarified in a footnote that this construction would 

restrict the application to "communications containing express 

words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as 'vote for,' 

'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,' 'Smith for Congress,' 

'vote against,' 'defeat,' 'reject."' Id. n.52. MCFL adopted the 

same definition, referencing the same footnote, for purposes of 

§ 441b's independent spending limitation. 479 u.s. at 249. 

The district court, noting the identity of the "expenditures 

in connection with" language in§ 441b and in§ 443a(d) (3), concluded that the anti-Wirth publicity was not express advocacy and 

therefore not governed by the § 441a(d) (3) limitations .. The district court relied in part on a common law rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different sections of the 

same statute generally should be given the same meaning. However, 

the Supreme Court has also stated that "the presumption readily 

yields to the controlling force of the circumstance that words, 

though in the same act, are found in such dissimilar connections 

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Appellate Case: 93-1434 Document: 01019279875 Date Filed: 06/23/1995 Page: 9 
as to warrant the conclusion that they were employed in the different parts of the act with different intent." Helvering v. 

stockholms Enskilde Bank, 293 u.s. 84, 87 (1934). 

Further, we cannot overlook a significant distinction between 

Buckley and MCFL and the instant case. The Buckley opinion distinguished between independent expenditures--regulated by then 

FECA § 608(e) (1)--and coordinated expenditures. The Buckley opinion unequivocally stated that controlled or coordinated expenditures are treated as "contributions rather than expenditures" 

under the FECA.5 424 u.s. at 46-47 & n.53. Although Buckley 

found the ceiling on independent expenditures failed to serve substantial enough gov.~rnment interests to be constitutional, it ~'!!if 

reached the opposite conclusion as to the limitations on expenditures by national or state political parties. Id. at 55-59 & n.67 

("Does 18 u.s.c. § 608(f) (1970 ed., Supp. IV) violate [constitutional] rights, in that it limits the expenditures of national or 

state committees of political parties in connection with general 

election campaigns for federal office? Answer: NO, as to the 

Fifth Amendment challenge advanced by appellants."). Buckley 

accepted the FECA's treatment of expenditures by national and 

state committees of political parties as contributions, as have 

subsequent opinions of the Supreme Court. See oscc, 454 u.s. 27, 

29 n.1 (1981) ("Party committees are considered incapable of making 'independent' expenditures in connection with the campaigns of 

5 Coordinated expenditures are treated as campaign contributions 

that must be reported pursuant to § 441a(a) (7) (B) (i). 

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Appellate Case: 93-1434 Document: 01019279875 Date Filed: 06/23/1995 Page: 10 
their party's candidates. The Commission has, by regulation, forbidden such 'independent' expenditures by the national and state 

party committees."). Similarly, MCFL made the same distinction 

when interpreting the meaning of independent expenditure limits in 

§ 441b. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259-60. 

Subsequent amendments to the FECA include "expressly advocating" into the definition of independent expenditures. See 2 

u.s.c. § 431(17). Coordinated expenditures of political parties, 

however, are not defined in this manner. See id. § 431(9) (B) (ix); 

cf. id. § 431(8) (B) (v), (x), (xii) (what is not a contribution). 

This is some evidence of congressional intent that the phrases are 

not intended to have the same meaning. 

The distinction between independent expenditures and political party expenditures that are deemed to be contributions, and 

their different treatment by the Supreme Court, negates the necessity that "expenditures in connection with" be construed identically in different sections of the FECA. However, the meaning of 

"expenditures in connection with" is not perfectly clear, else the 

Court in MCFL would not have had to cabin its meaning under 

§ 441(b) in the manner it did. The question then becomes whether 

we must construe the phrase as narrowly as the Supreme Court did 

in MCFL in order to uphold its validity. 

c 

The FEC has issued advisory opinions interpreting the "expenditures in connection with" phrase in § 441a(d) (3) in a manner 

different than that adopted by the district court and urged upon 

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us by the Committee. we believe this is an appropriate circumstance in which to follow the Supreme Court's admonishment that 

"if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's 

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." 

Chevron, U.S.A.; Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 

U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (footnote omitted); see also DSCC, 454 U.S. 

at 37 (the FEC, a bipartisan body, is "precisely the type of 

agency to which deference should presumptively be afforded") .6 

FEC Advisory Opinion 1984-15 addressed questions raised by 

the Republican Party regarding spending for a series of television 

ads denigrating the potential Democratic presidential candidates, 

relating to an upcoming election. The FEC responded to a specific 

question whether such spending was within the limitations of 

§ 441a(d). 

These advertisements effectively advocate the defeat of 

a clearly identified candidate in connection with that 

election and thus have the purpose of influencing the 

outcome of the general election for President of the 

United States. See generally Advisory Opinion 1978-46. 

Therefore, expenditures for these advertisements benefit 

the eventual Republican presidential candidate and are 

made with respect to the presidential general election 

and in connection with the presidential general election 

campaign. 

6 We note that one of the reasons the Buckley opinion gave for 

its "express advocacy" restrictive interpretation of§ 608(e) (1)'s 

"relative to" language was that most who were subject to the statute's criminal sanctions had no right to obtain an advisory opinion of the FEC. See 424 u.s. at 40 n.47. It noted that only candidates, federal office holders and political committees had that 

right. Id. Section 441a(d), at issue before us, applies only to 

political committees; thus all to whom it applies can secure advisory opinions from the FEC. 

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A.O. 1984-15, Fed. Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH} ,I 5766 (May 31, 

1984) (footnote omitted). The opinion then concluded that the 

spending in question was a coordinated expenditure subject to the 

limitations in§ 441a(d) (2). 

Advisory Opinion 1985-14 responded to questions from a Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee regarding proposed publicity focusing on a number of congressmen, not all with announced 

opposition candidates. A.O. 1985-14, Fed. Elec. Campaign Fin. 

Guide (CCH) ,I 5819 (May 30, 1985). The opinion endorsed Advisory 

Opinion 1984-15 with its construction of § 441a(d) as regulating 

expenditures that "both (1) depicted a clearly identified candidate and (2) conveyed an electioneering message."? 

The FEC has "primary and substantial responsibility for 

administering and enforcing" the FECA. Buckley, 424 u.s. at 109. 

The FEC argues that its construction of § 441a(d) as regulating 

political committee expenditures depicting a clearly identified 

candidate and conveying an electioneering message is a reasonable 

one to which we must defer. Viewing the party expenditures as 

contributions, as we must, we agree. 

"[T]he primary interest served by the Act is the prevention 

of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real 

or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on 

7 Advisory Opinion 1978-46 appears more restrictive; it can be 

read to adopt the express advocacy position. A.O. 1978-46, Fed. 

Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) ,I 5348 (Sept. 5, 1978). But even 

if the more recent decisions represent a change in position by the 

FEC we must still give the current view deference if the current 

construction is reasonable. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 176, 186-

87 (1991). 

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candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office." 

DSCC, 454 U.S. at 41. The Supreme Court cases have distinguished 

between the potential for corruption that attaches to contributions and coordinated expenditures, and those that might develop 

from independent expenditures, finding less inherent risk in the 

latter. our analysis, therefore, with respect to controls on 

coordinated expenditures and contributions under § 441a is different than that required for § 441b. 

Section § 441a(d) addresses the concern that large contributors to political parties will exert undue influence on a candidate if elected to office. The monetary ceiling on coordinated 

expenditures by political organizations diminishes the potential 

of such undue influence but preserves the important role of 

political parties. See DSCC, 454 u.s. at 41. In contrast, the 

purpose behind § 441b is to prevent corporate and labor expenditures from effectively acting as "political war chests" on behalf 

of candidates, because these organizations could use funds 

"amassed in the economic marketplace . [for] unfair advantage 

in the political marketplace." MCFL, 479 u.s. at 257. The FECA 

thus provides different regulations tailored to different perceived evils.8 Independent expenditures are theoretically unlimited but such expenditures in excess of low limits must be 

reported, along with identification of those who contributed more 

than $200. Contribution limits still apply. Giving deference to 

8 We have already discussed how subsequent FECA amendments have 

adopted the "express advocacy" criteria to differentiate between 

independent and coordinated expenditures. 

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the FEC's interpretation, we hold that § 441a(d) (3) applies to 

coordinated spending that involves a clearly identified candidate 

and an electioneering message, without regard to whether that roessage constitutes express advocacy. 

D 

The Committee does not seriously contest that the anti-Wirth 

publicity was directed at a clearly identified candidate. "Wirth 

Facts #1 11 referenced Wirth's senatorial aspirations and challenged 

his personal integrity and campaign statements in the context of 

the current election.9 Wirth was not yet the Democratic nominee, 

but the FECA regulates coordinated expenditures made before the 

primary election. A.O. 1984-15, Fed. Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide 

(CCH) 1r 5766. The Committee's objective to elect the eventual 

Republican candidate is not diminished because a Democratic nominee has not emerged. See Buckley, 424 u.s. at 79 (major purpose 

of expenditures by candidates and political committees "is the 

nomination or election of a candidate") . · 

We next consider whether "Wirth Facts #1 11 contained an electioneering message.10 Advisory Opinion 1984-15 examined proposed 

9 See also 2 u.s.c. § 431(18) which reads: 

The term "clearly identified" means that--

(A) the name of the candidate involved appears; 

(B) a photograph or drawing of the candidate 

appears; or 

(C) the identity of the candidate is apparent by 

unambiguous reference. 

10 We agree with the district court that the message in "Wirth 

Facts #1" would not constitute express advocacy within the narrow 

definition of Buckley and MCFL. It lacks the express words "vote 

for" or "vote against," or words of similar import, although it 

Continued to next page 

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television advertising by the Republican National Committee that 

would "question or challenge the candidate's statements, position, 

or record." The FEC concluded that the 

clear import and purpose of these proposed advertisements is to diminish support for any Democratic Party 

presidential nominee and to garner support for whoever 

may be the eventual Republican Party nominee. These 

advertisements relate primarily, if not solely, to the 

office of President of the United States and seek to 

influence a voter's choice between the Republican Party 

presidential candidate and any Democratic Party nominee 

in such a way as to favor the choice of the Republican 

candidate. . . . These advertisements effectively advocate the defeat of a clearly identified candidate in 

connection with that election and thus have the purpose 

of influencing the outcome of the general election for 

President of the United States. Therefore, expenditures 

for these advertisements benefit the eventual Republican 

presidential candidate and are made with respect to the 

presidential general election and in connection with the 

presidential general election campaign. 

A.O. 1984-15, Fed. Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) ,! 5766 (citation and footnotes omitted). The next year, the FEC relied upon 

that construction in rendering Advisory Opinion 1985-14 to the 

Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee stating that "[e]lectioneering messages include statements 'designed to urge the publie to elect a certain candidate or party.'" A.O. 1985-14, Fed. 

Elec. Campaign Fin. Guide (CCH) ,! 5819 (quoting United States v. 

United Auto Workers, 352 u.s. 567, 587 (1957)). 

Any reasonable reading of "Wirth Facts #1," which included 

the notation of Republican Party sponsorship, would leave the 

reader (or listener) with the impression that the Republican Party 

Continued from previous page 

comes close when the ad suggests that an identified candidate distorted his voting record. 

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sought to "diminish" public support for Wirth and "garner support" 

for the unnamed Republican nominee. "Wirth Facts #1 11 unquestionably contained an electioneering message. We conclude that the 

anti-Wirth publicity was an "expenditure in connection with" the 

1986 Colorado senatorial election because it named both a clearly 

identifiable candidate and contained an electioneering message. 

The Committee, therefore, violated the FECA by making a 

§ 441a(d) (3) expenditure after delegating to the National Republican Senatorial Committee the authority to spend all of the Committee's available funding for the 1986 Colorado Senate race. 

II 

We next consider the Committee's constitutional challenges to 

the FECA. The Committee asserts that the monetary caps in 

§ 441a(d) (3) violate its First Amendment guarantees of freedom of 

speech and association. The Committee focuses on the alleged 

absence of a compelling governmental interest served by the 

restrictions in § 441a(d) (3) and also asserts that the statute 

discriminates based upon content. The FEC's position is that 

Buckley and later cases endorse distinctions between independent 

expenditures and contributions, and that other FECA contribution 

ceilings have consistently been upheld as constitutional by the 

Supreme Court. We agree with the FEC that § 441a(d) (3) is a permissible burden on speech and association. 

The primary purpose of the contribution and expenditure caps 

in the FECA are to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. Buckley 424 u.s. at 25-26. The FECA starts from the 

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premise that political committees may make only minimal expenditures in connection with campaigns, § 441a(a) (dollar limits on 

contributions), then creates one exception at § 441a(d) (3) (coerdinated expenditure limits for certain political committees made 

in connection with federal election campaigns). DSCC, 454 u.s. at 

28-29 n.1; 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(b); see also 2 u.s.c. § 431(14)-(16). 

This exception allows for greater monetary support by political 

parties than would otherwise be permitted by § 441a(a). The coordinated expenditures permitted by § 441a(d) (3) are treated for 

purposes of reporting and monetary limitations as contributions 

from the political committee to the candidate, § 441a(7) (B) (i); 

see also § 434(b) (4) (H) (iv), and fall within the contribution 

ceilings contained in§ 441a(a). See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46; FEC 

v. National Political Action Committee, 470 u.s. 480, 492 (1985) 

(NCPAC) . 

The same reasoning the Supreme Court used to uphold the constitutionality of other contribution limitations applies when analyzing the constitutionality of limits on coordinated expenditures 

by political committees.11 The opportunity for abuse is greater 

11 We acknowledge that Buckley upheld then 18 u.s.c. § 608(f) as 

constitutional when challenged as discriminatory under the Fifth 

Amendment, and not the First Amendment, which is the basis for the 

Committee's constitutional challenge here. Buckley, 424 u.s. at 

59 n.67. However, MCFL adopted much of the reasoning in Buckley 

in analyzing the First Amendment challenges to § 441b. We do not, 

therefore, discount the importance of Buckley in the context of 

our First Amendment analysis. 

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when the contributions (or in the instant case, coordinated expenditures) derive from sources inherently aligned with the candidate, rather than with independent expenditures. See Buckley, 424 

u.s. at 26-27; NCPAC, 470 u.s. at 497. The Committee, stressing 

the benefits of party discipline and the broad interests of party 

success, argues that the dangers of domination of candidates by 

large individual donors do not apply to party expenditures. But 

party expenditures, particularly pre-primary, often are controlled 

by incumbent officeholders. We cannot say the dangers of domination that underlay the Supreme Court's acceptance of the constitutionality of contribution limits are not present in political party expenditures. The members of Congress who enacted this law 

were surviving veterans of the election campaign process, and all 

were members of organized political parties. They should be considered uniquely qualified to evaluate the risk of actual corruption or appearance of corruption from large coordinated expenditures by political parties. This case is, therefore, ideally 

postured for deference to the congressional will. 

The Supreme Court has endorsed the government's interest in 

curtailing large campaign contributions as legitimate. In addition to preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, 

these restrictions "equalize the relative ability of all citizens 

to affect the outcome of elections," Buckley, 424 u.s. at 26, and 

to a degree cap campaign costs and increase accessibility to our 

political system. Id. The Court has distinguished between 

restrictions on contributions and restrictions on independent 

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expenditures and then invalidated spending restrictions while 

upholding contribution limits. Id. at 58-59. 

By treating coordinated expenditures as contributions, the 

FECA effectively precludes political committees from literally or 

in appearance, "secur[ing] a political quid pro guo from current 

and potential office holders." Id. at 26-27. Contribution limits 

regulate the quantity of political speech, but do not foreclose 

speech or political association. We do not see this monetary cap 

as content based; it is rather a consequence of the funding 

source. We uphold as constitutional, against the Committee's 

First Amendment challenge, the spending limits in§ 441a(d) (3). 

We REVERSE and REMAND with instructions that the district 

court enter judgment in favor of the FEC, and for a determination 

under 2 u.s.c. § 437g(a) (6) of the appropriate civil penalty. 

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