Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04287/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-04287-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ernesto Abordo Espinosa
Petitioner
Bob Horel
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERNESTO ABORDO ESPINOSA,

Petitioner,

 v.

BOB HOREL, Warden,

Respondent. /

No. C 06-4287 MJJ

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Before the Court is Petitioner Ernesto Abordo Espinosa’s (“Petitioner” or “Espinosa”)

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Docket No. 1.) 

Petitioner is currently incarcerated at the California State Prison, Solano, in Vacaville, California. 

The Court ordered Respondent to show cause as to why the Petition should not be granted on the

basis of Petitioner’s cognizable claims. Respondent filed an answer accompanied by a

memorandum and exhibits contending that the Petition should be denied. Petitioner timely filed a

traverse. The matter is submitted. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s writ of

habeas corpus.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This matter concerns Petitioner’s conviction for the second degree murder of his wife,

Carmen Silayan (“Silayan”). The following facts are set forth in the California Court of Appeal’s

opinion and are undisputed by both parties. (See Resp.’s Exh. C.) 

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I. The Shooting

In the early morning hours of October 1, 1999, a Daly City Police Department dispatcher

received a 911 call from Espinosa. Espinosa told the dispatcher, “I just shot my wife” and that she

had “been bugging” him. When asked whether he shot his wife on accident or on purpose, Espinosa

replied, “I lost it.” He said he “lost count” of how many times he shot her, and explained his wife

had been “nagging” him the whole month.

After paramedics and the police arrived at Espinosa’s apartment, they found Silayan’s

deceased body, and two guns-a .38 caliber five-shot revolver on the couch with five empty

cartridges, and a fully-loaded .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol under the pillow in the bedroom. 

They also seized two videotapes belonging to Espinosa entitled “Deadly Effects: What Bullets Do to

Bodies” and “How to Shoot Fast and Accurate.” At the police station, Espinosa gave a videotaped

statement in which he admitted shooting his wife.

During the hours before the shooting, Espinosa’s downstairs neighbor, Cathy Scott (“Scott”),

heard arguing and scuffling from above. She heard two loud booms, and then Silayan saying

loudly, “Why don’t you just kill me. Go ahead and kill me, Ernie.” Scott described Silayan’s tone

of voice as resigned, “like I give up.” Scott then heard another four to six booms, which she then

recognized as gunshots. Silence followed, and the police arrived about 30 minutes later.

Scott testified that, during the latter part of 1999, she heard Espinosa and Silayan arguing

three or four times a week. Silayan told Scott she was having marital problems because Espinosa

was having an affair with Silayan’s niece.

II. The Autopsy

The doctor who performed the autopsy on Silayan’s body concluded the cause of death was

five gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. Four of the entrance wounds were to the back, and

one was in the area of the right breast. One of the wounds exhibited stippling, indicating the shot

was fired within a couple of feet from the body. The entrance wound to the chest indicated

“shoring” at the exit point, suggesting Silayan’s body had been against a hard surface such as the

floor when the bullet entered it. Silayan’s arms also had some bruises which were consistent with

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“defense wounds,” i.e., those sustained when a person being attacked attempts to ward off the blows. 

The doctor did not find any chronic injuries indicative of previous physical abuse.

III. Expert Testimony

A weapons expert called by the prosecution testified that with the recoil from firing the gun

used, Espinosa would have had to re-position and re-aim the gun after each shot in order to fire

another round. The expert also testified that firing four or five bullets with this gun into even a

nearby person would require concentration and effort.

The defense called a crime scene reconstruction expert who gave his opinion that the “logical

progression” of the five gunshots was as follows: first a shot to the front, followed by a shot to the

side, and finally three shots to Silayan’s back as she turned and fell rapidly. He believed Silayan

was face down on the floor when at least one of the shots was fired. His opinion was that all of the

shots could have been fired within four to five seconds of each other.

IV. Espinosa’s Testimony

Espinosa, 53 years old at the time of trial, married Silayan in 1991. They both worked at a

hospital where he was a computer technician and she was a nursing assistant. Before that job,

Espinosa had been a security officer and was certified to carry a firearm. He described himself as a

gun enthusiast and said he purchased videos on shooting to broaden his knowledge.

In January of 1999, Silayan went to the Philippines to bury her mother. When she returned,

Espinosa noticed “a complete transformation.” Silayan began to accuse Espinosa of having an affair

with Silayan’s niece, which both he and the niece denied. Silayan tried to check up on Espinosa by

showing up at his work and hiding in his car. Several times she woke him up in the middle of the

night to confront him about the affair. She threatened to call the police and tell them that Espinosa

had hit her. During a tirade about the affair, Silayan threw the telephone at Espinosa.

About three hours before Silayan’s death, she started accusing Espinosa again. She flicked

the lights of their home on and off; she and Espinosa swore at each other. Espinosa described her

accusations during this episode as “excessive” and more frequent than usual.

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 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript of Petitioner’s direct appeal, SC047151A. Copies of the transcript of

Petitioner’s trial were filed with the Court as Respondent’s Exhibit B.

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Espinosa urged Silayan to settle down, but she went into the bedroom and returned with two

guns, the .45 and the .38. Espinosa testified he kept these guns for self-defense. Espinosa asked her

to put the guns back, but she set them on the couch where Espinosa was sitting. Espinosa returned

them to the bedroom. Silayan screamed at Espinosa to bring the guns back, and said he did not have

the guts to shoot her. She said she was going to call the police and report he had hit her, which

Espinosa testified was not true. Silayan again got the .38 and waived it at Espinosa. She said, “Why

don’t you kill me now?” and shouted he did not “have the balls” to shoot her. Silayan put the gun on

Espinosa’s thigh. Espinosa was enraged. He stood up and started firing. He heard Silayan whimper

after he fired the first shot. While he fired, Silayan, who had been facing him, stepped back, turned

around and fell down. He kept firing, pulling the trigger even after he had spent all the bullets in the

gun. He fired all of the shots consecutively and in a matter of seconds.

Espinosa testified Silayan’s taunting caused him finally to lose it. Espinosa said he shot her

because he “just wanted her to stop.” His shooting was “like an eruption.” When Espinosa realized

what he had done, he called 911.

Espinosa said he never struck Silayan before 1999. He said he slapped Silayan in April of

1999 after she charged him, jumped him, scratched him, and kicked him. In July of 1999, Silayan

and Espinosa shoved each other, and then he dialed 911 because he thought she was “going out of

control again.” According to Espinosa, both of these incidents began because Espinosa was trying

to leave the house and get away from Silayan’s “incessant accusations.”

V. Trial

Petitioner at all times pleaded not guilty and the case went to trial. The jury found Petitioner

guilty of the second degree murder of Silayan and found that Petitioner had discharged a firearm

within the meaning of California Penal Code § 12022.53(d). On May 2, 2003, the San Mateo

County Superior Court (“State Trial Court”) sentenced Petitioner to 40 years to life in state prison. 

(Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”)1 at 711-12.) 

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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Following the trial in this matter, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. (RT at 716.) On April

25, 2005, the California Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner’s conviction in an unpublished

decision. (Resp.’s Exh. C at 1.) On July 13, 2005 the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s

petition for review. (Resp.’s Exh. D, E.) Petitioner has exhausted his state remedies as to the

claims herein presented and the petition is timely. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court will entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “[o]n behalf of a person in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). 

However, this Court may not grant a petition with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the

merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States[.]” Id. § 2254(d)(1).

 The “contrary to” and “unreasonable application”clauses of § 2254(d)(1) have independent

meaning. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). A state court’s decision is contrary to

federal law if it “failed to apply the correct controlling authority from the Supreme Court.” Avila v.

Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Shackleford v. Hubbard, 234 F.3d 1072, 1077

(2000); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–07; LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 667–68 (9th Cir.

2000). If a state court directly contravenes a Supreme Court decision on a question of law, or if it

reaches a conclusion that contradicts a Supreme Court decision with materially indistinguishable

facts, it is contrary to federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. 

A federal court making the “unreasonable application” inquiry in a habeas case should ask

whether the state court’s application of clearly established federal law was “objectively

unreasonable.” Id. at 409. The “objectively unreasonable” standard does not equate to “clear error”

because “[t]hese two standards . . . are not the same. The gloss of clear error fails to give proper

deference to state courts by conflating error (even clear error) with unreasonableness.” Lockyer v.

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) (citation omitted). This standard of review, however, does not

relieve a federal court from its duty to examine and analyze the state court’s application of federal

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law.

In determining whether the state court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable

application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court looks to the decision of the highest

state court to address the merits of a petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie, 217 F.3d at

669 n. 7. If constitutional error is found, habeas relief is warranted only if the error had a

“‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Penry v. Johnson,

532 U.S. 782, 795 (2001) (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993)).

DISCUSSION

Petitioner asserts two claims as grounds for habeas relief: (1) that the admission of testimony

pertaining to his prior acts of domestic violence violated his due process rights under the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments; and (2) that the admission of Silayan’s out of court statements violated

Crawford and Petitioner’s right to cross examine witnesses. The California Court of Appeal held

that: (1) the admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence did not violate Petitioner’s due

process rights and; (2) the error in admitting Silayan’s hearsay statement into evidence was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. The California Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for review. 

This Court must now determine whether the Court of Appeal’s adjudication resulted in a decision

that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law and

whether any such error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.

I. Petitioner’s Due Process Rights

Petitioner contends that the State Trial Court violated his due process rights by admitting

evidence of his prior acts of domestic violence pursuant to California Evidence Code § 1109 (“§

1109”). (Pet.’s Writ at 3.) Petitioner argues both that § 1109 is contrary to federal law and that the

State Trial Court unreasonably applied § 1109 to his case. The Court takes each argument in turn.

A. California Evidence Code § 1109 is Not Contrary To Federal Law.

Petitioner’s facial challenge to § 1109 requires the Court to determine if the state courts’

adjudication of the issue was contrary to federal law. In this analysis, a federal habeas court may

grant the writ only if the provision violates federal law, either by infringing upon a specific federal

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 Cal. Evid. Code § 1101(a) provides: “Except as provided in this section and in Sections 1102, 1103, 1108, and

1109, evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of

reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her conduct

on a specified occasion.”

3 Cal. Evid. Code § 1109(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that, subject to exceptions, “in a criminal action in which

the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of other

domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”

4 Cal. Evid. Code § 352 provides: “The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is

substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create

substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.”

5 FRE 413 provides, in relevant part, “[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of sexual

assault, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be

considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.” 

FRE 414 provides, in relevant part, “[i]n a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an offense of child

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constitutional or statutory provision or by depriving the defendant of the fundamentally fair trial

guaranteed by due process. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984); Middleton v. Cupp, 768

F.2d 1083, 1085 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (1986); Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926

F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). 

As a general rule, California Evidence Code § 1101 (“§ 1101”) contains a broad proscription

against the admission of evidence of a person’s character or conduct to prove a defendant’s general

criminal disposition to commit a charged crime.2 However, under § 1109, the prosecution may, in

any “criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence,”

introduce evidence of the defendant’s commission of other acts of domestic violence.3

 Admission of

this evidence is subject to the court’s discretion to exclude it, pursuant to California Evidence Code

§ 352 (“§ 352”), if the probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by the risk of

prejudice, an undue consumption of time, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.4

At the outset, the Court notes that neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Ninth

Circuit have ruled on whether § 1109 violates due process. In fact, federal circuit courts have held

that similar federal evidentiary rules, Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414 (“FRE 413 and 414”

respectively) do not offend due process. Under FRE 413 and 414, evidence of the defendant’s

“commission of another offense or offenses” of sexual assault or child molestation is admissible, and

“may be considered for its bearing on any matter which is relevant.” Fed. R. of Evid. §§ 413, 414.5

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molestation, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and

may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”

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 FRE 403 provides, “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste

of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”

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The Ninth Circuit has held that FRE 414 is constitutional and does not violate due process because,

inter alia, the prejudicial versus probative balancing of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 (“FRE 403”)

“safeguards the right to a fair trial.”6 United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 1018, 1026, 1031 (9th Cir.

2001). Other circuits have come to similar conclusions regarding FRE 413 and 414. See United

States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting due process challenge to FRE

413); United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 883 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting due process challenge

to FRE 414); United States v. Mound, 149 F.3d 799, 801 (8th Cir. 1998) (same). These holdings are

relevant here given the similarity between the exceptions set forth in § 1109 and FRE 413 and 414,

and the balancing required under both California Evidence Code § 352 and FRE 403.

In addition, the analysis annunciated in the federal cases discussed above is echoed by the

California Court of Appeal when repeatedly upholding § 1109 against due process attacks. See e.g.,

People v. Escobar, 82 Cal. App. 4th 1085, 1093-96 (2000) (rejecting a due process challenge to §

1109); People v. Brown, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1324, 1331-34 (2000) (same). Like the Ninth Circuit in

LeMay, the California Court of Appeal has held that the trial courts’ discretion to exclude evidence

if it is more prejudicial than probative, under § 352, provides a “safeguard [that] should ensure that

section 1109 does not violate the due process clause.” See Escobar, 82 Cal. App. 4th at 1095; see

also People v. Jennings, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1301, 1310 (2000) (holding that § 1109 does not offend

due process so long as the court weighs the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its probative

value). 

In sum, the state courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s facial attack on § 1109 was not contrary to

federal law. First, there is no federal law finding that § 1109, or an analogous federal provision,

violates due process. In addition, the federal circuit courts have upheld similar federal evidentiary

provisions. Furthermore, § 352, like FRE 403, provides a safeguard that protects against violations

of due process. Thus, the state courts’ holding that § 1109 does not offend due process was not

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contrary to federal law. 

B. The State Court Did Not Unreasonably Apply § 1109.

Petitioner also argues that the state court unreasonably applied § 1109 when it admitted

evidence of two prior incidents of domestic violence. (Pet. at 10.) Petitioner claims that the

evidence of prior domestic violence incidents were prejudicial and had no relevance to the charges

in the murder case apart from supporting the inference that Petitioner was by propensity a probable

perpetrator of the crime. The Court disagrees. 

The Supreme Court has held that a “federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must be

objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76 (citations and quotations omitted). Here,

Petitioner claims that the state courts failed to appropriately balance the prejudicial versus the

probative nature of the evidence under § 352 and thus failed to properly safeguard Petitioner’s due

process rights. The Court therefore reviews the record to determine if the state courts’ application of

§ 352 was objectively unreasonable.

The contested evidence includes two discrete acts of domestic violence between Petitioner

and his wife. First, the State Trial Court admitted evidence that, on April 23, 1999, Officer Robert

Hyink (“Hyink”) spoke to Silayan at the Daly City Police Station. (RT at 720.) According to

Hyink, Silayan told him that she had been involved in a verbal argument with Petitioner, and that he

grabbed her by the throat. (RT at 721.) Hyink further testified that Silayan told him that she did not

want the police to contact Petitioner, and that she was moving to the Philippines. (RT at 722-723.) 

Hyink noted no injuries on Silayan. (RT at 728.)

Second, the State Trial Court admitted evidence that, on July 17, 1999, Officer Harrison

(“Harrison”) responded to Petitioner and Silayan’s apartment on a call of a domestic violence

disturbance. (RT at 851-53.) Petitioner told Harrison that there had been a verbal argument, and

that he had pushed Silayan once, and that she had pushed him as well. (RT at 856, 875.) Silayan

refused to talk to Harrison, and after Harrison saw no signs of an altercation, he left the apartment. 

(RT at 854-57.) In his report, Harrison categorized the incident as a “mutual disturbance,” and he

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was unable to determine who was the suspect, who was the victim, or even if a crime had occurred. 

(RT at 873, 891-92.) Harrison testified that the police department had a policy of aggressively

pursuing even minor domestic violence reports, because they could result in “very bad situations,”

including homicide. (RT at 902-03.)

Prior to the commencement of jury selection, the State Trial Court heard Petitioner’s motion

in limine to exclude evidence of prior domestic violence committed by Petitioner against his wife. 

(RT at 54-60.) The prosecutor sought to admit this evidence pursuant to § 1109. Petitioner objected

to admission of this evidence on the ground that it violated his federal constitutional right to due

process and a fair trial. (RT at 148.) The prosecution argued that this evidence was relevant to rebut

the defense’s evidence that went to Silayan’s state of mind, suggesting that she was provoked her

husband. Furthermore, the prosecution argued that this evidence demonstrated a pattern of domestic

violence. The State Trial Court ruled that evidence of the two incidents were admissible pursuant to

California Evidence Code §§ 1109, 1220 (hearsay exception for party admission), 1250, 1251

(hearsay exception for state of mind), and 1370 (hearsay exception for threats of physical injury). 

The Court of Appeal analyzed the State Trial Court’s admission of this evidence under § 352

to determine if, as Petitioner argued, it was more prejudicial than probative and should have been

excluded. Upon review, the Court of Appeal held that the State Trial Court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting this evidence. (Resp. Exh. C at 8.) The Court of Appeal first held that the

evidence was relevant because Petitioner put Silayan’s state of mind at issue by arguing that

Silayan’s incessant nagging about Petitioner’s affair with her niece provoked Petitioner to shoot her. 

Consequently, the Court of Appeal held that evidence of domestic violence before Silayan’s death

was relevant to show that the shooting was a culmination of a pattern of fighting and abuse and did

not occur in the heat of passion. 

The Court of Appeal further concluded that the incidents were not overly prejudicial and

were significantly less “egregious than the charged offense, and posed no danger of confusing the

jury.” (Resp. Exh. C at 8.) The Court of Appeal noted that the incidents of domestic abuse

presented by the contested evidence were not shocking in their violence and in fact included some

evidence that there was both parties were at fault for the altercation. (See id.) Moreover, the Court

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noted that the risk of prejudice was slight given that Petitioner testified regarding both incidents and

his recall of the facts were much as the police officer witness testified. (See id.) As the Court of

Appeal noted, Petitioner admitted, during his trial testimony, that the July 1999 incident of mutual

pushing occurred much as the police officer witness testified, and that he in fact was the one who

made the 911 call. Petitioner also admitted slapping Silayan during the April 1999 incident, and

explained that she had attacked him first. 

Upon review, the Court finds that it was not unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that

the contested evidence was relevant. Nor was it unreasonable for the Court of Appeal to find that

the contested evidence was not overly prejudicial, given that Petitioner admitted to shooting his wife

in court and Petitioner admitted to the two prior domestic violence incidents. Thus, in light of the

totality of the evidence presented in this case, the weight of the challenged evidence was minor in

comparison to the other evidence and the potential prejudice resulting from admission of the prior

acts of domestic violence did not so outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

Therefore, the Court of Appeal’s holding that the potential prejudice from the admitted

evidence did not substantially outweigh the probative value was not an unreasonable application of

law. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on this claim. 

II. Petitioner’s Rights under Crawford and the Right to Cross Examine Witnesses 

Petitioner contends that the admission, at trial, of Officer Hyink’s testimony regarding

Silayan’s April 1999 domestic abuse report violated his constitutional rights under the Confrontation

Clause. (Pet. at 11.) When presented with this issue, the Court of Appeal held that the admission of

this testimonial hearsay evidence did violate the Confrontation Clause, but affirmed the State Trial

Court after holding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court reviews the

Court of Appeal’s holding to determine if it was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of,

Supreme Court precedent. 

A. The State Court’s Application of Federal Law Was Neither Contrary To, Nor an

Unreasonable Application of, Federal Law.

The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 

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U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal confrontation right applies to the states through the Fourteenth

Amendment. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). After the trial in this case, the United

States Supreme Court decided Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2006), which held that the

Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at

trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross

examination.” 541 U.S. at 53-54. There are various formulations of what constitutes a testimonial

statement. Id. at 51. A definition relevant to this case, and one that qualifies under “any conceivable

definition of testimonial” is a “recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured police

questioning” that “declarant[s] would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially.” Id.

On direct review, Crawford error is reviewed for harmless error. United States v. Nielsen,

371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004). Under this standard “the court must be able to declare a belief

that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). 

While the Chapman standard remains applicable to criminal convictions challenged on direct appeal,

the Supreme Court has adopted a less strict standard for federal habeas corpus. See Brecht, 507 U.S.

at 637-38. A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief unless the trial error “‘had substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Id. at 637 (quoting Kotteakos v.

United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). In other words, state prisoners seeking federal habeas

relief may obtain plenary review of constitutional claims of trial error, but are not entitled to habeas

relief unless the error resulted in “actual prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted).

If the state court disposed of a constitutional error as harmless under an appropriate standard

of review, federal courts must, for purposes of application of the “unreasonable application” clause

of § 2254(d)(1), first determine whether the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively

unreasonable. See Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 2004). If the federal court

determines that the state court’s harmless error analysis was objectively unreasonable, and thus an

unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, the federal court then proceeds to the

Brecht analysis. Id. at 877. 

Here, in a written motion filed prior to trial, Petitioner objected, on the basis of the

Confrontation Clause, to the admission of Officer Hyink’s testimony that Silayan told him that

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 Cal. Evid. Code § 1370 allows statements describing physical injury if all of the following conditions are met:

(1) the statement purports to describe the infliction or threat of physical injury upon the declarant; (2) the declarant is

unavailable as a witness; (3) the statement was made at or near the time of the infliction or threat of physical injury; (4) the

statement was made under circumstances that would indicate its trustworthiness; and (5) the statement was made in writing

or made to a law enforcement official (among other possibilities). Cal. Evid. Code, § 1370(a).

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Petitioner pushed her and grabbed her by the neck on April 23, 1999. (Pet. at 4.) The State Trial

Court ruled that the hearsay statement of Silayan was admissible under California Evidence Code §§

1370 and 1109, and found that admission of the statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause.7

(Id.) The State Trial Court then permitted Hyink to testify that Silayan told him that she had been

involved in a verbal argument with Petitioner, and that he grabbed her by the throat. (RT at 21.) 

Hyink further testified that Silayan told him the same day that she did not want the police to contact

Petitioner, and that she was moving to the Philippines. (RT at 722-23.)

Upon review, the Court of Appeal found that Silayan’s statement was testimonial under

Crawford because it was “knowingly given in response to structured police questioning” and a

declarant in her circumstances would have reasonably expected her statements to be “used

prosecutorially.” (Resp. Exh. C at 11 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51).) The Court of Appeal

further held that Petitioner had no opportunity to cross examine Silayan regarding her statement to

Officer Hyink before her death. Therefore, the Court of Appeal found that admission of this

testimonial evidence was an error. The Court of Appeal next analyzed the Crawford error under the

Chapman standard, and found that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Resp. Exh. C at 11-

13). 

The Court finds, therefore, that the Court of Appeal applied the appropriate standard, the

Chapman standard, to determine that the error was harmless. See Nielsen, 371 F.3d at 581

(“Confrontation Clause violations are subject to harmless error analysis, because ‘the Constitution

entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.’) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall,

475 U.S. 673, 680-81 (1986)). This Court, therefore, reviews the Court of Appeal’s harmless error

analysis to determine if it was objectively unreasonable. See Medina, 386 F.3d at 878. 

The Court of Appeal held that the Crawford error was harmless because of the overwhelming

evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. Specifically, the Court of Appeal noted that:

[t]he only incriminating evidence that would have been excluded by not admitting

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Officer Hyink’s testimony was the statement that Espinosa had grabbed Silayan by

her neck, with no apparent lasting injury to Silayan. Even without this testimony, the

jury heard Espinosa’s admissions that he slapped and pushed his wife in April and

July 1999. One of Silayan’s co-workers gave similar testimony - that Silayan had

said Espinosa had slapped her hard enough to make her fall onto a nearby couch. 

Moreover, the evidence of domestic abuse cut both ways in this case - there was also

evidence of Silayan scratching, kicking, and pushing Espinosa when he tried to get

away from “incessant accusations,” and evidence that Silayan’s attacks on Espinosa

precipitated his pushing and slapping her. Ultimately, Espinosa’s counsel relied on

this evidence during her closing argument to show this was a ‘classic heat of passion’

case where Espinosa shot Silayan because she provoked him with her ‘obsessive’ and

‘crazy’ behavior which included her physical attacks on him.

(Resp. Exh. C at 12.) In addition, the Court of Appeal noted that there was evidence, including

Petitioner’s own testimony, showing that Espinosa shot Silayan five times because Silayan had

nagged and taunted him. (Id.) The Court of Appeal viewed this evidence as supporting the

conclusion that the jury found a basis for their verdict of second degree murder independent of the

admissions of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence challenged in this petition. (Id.) 

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal considered Petitioner’s argument that reliance by the prosecutor in

closing argument on erroneously admitted evidence supports a finding of Chapman prejudice. (See

id.) The Court of Appeal found this argument unavailing because the prosecutor only referred to

evidence of domestic abuse during his rebuttal and after defense counsel relied on this evidence in

her closing argument to support a provocation theory. Finally, the Court of Appeal considered

Petitioner’s argument that the length of the jury deliberations suggested that the case was close. The

Court of Appeal held that the jury did not ask for clarification about the specific evidence in

question and, even if they jury thought the case was close, there is no indication the jury thought so

because of the challenged domestic violence evidence. In sum, therefore, the Court of Appeal

held that the overwhelming evidence of Espinosa’s guilt, aside from the improperly admitted

statements, satisfied the Crawford test. 

The analysis engaged in by the Court of Appeal was objectively reasonable. The Ninth

Circuit has held that it was reasonable for the relevant California court to find that overwhelming

evidence of guilt, even after the contested evidence was excluded, proved the error harmless beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 2005). Similarly,

here, the Court of Appeal engaged in an analysis of the evidence absent the constitutional error and

found that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. The Court of Appeal weighed the evidence in

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the record and considered Petitioner’s contentions. Despite Petitioner’s contention that Hyink’s

statement formed the core of the prosecution’s argument, the Court of Appeal offers the reasonable

conclusion that there was overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt by way of his own testimony

and other evidence.

Petitioner argues, however, that the Court of Appeal erred in applying Chapman because it

asked “whether the jury would have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Espinosa was guilty

of second degree murder even without Officer Hyink’s testimony.” (Id. at 11.) Petitioner argues

that this is the wrong application of Chapman given the Supreme Court’s explanation that the

Chapman inquiry “is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would

surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely

unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1980). 

On this point the Court finds that while the Court of Appeal may have imprecisely stated the

Chapman test, making it appear to be closer to the test rejected in Sullivan, the Court of Appeal’s

application was not unreasonable. The above-quoted language in Sullivan was written by the

Supreme Court in order to distinguish between the types of cases for which harmless review is

applicable, and those for which it is not. See id. at 280. Specifically, the Court cautioned against

making hypothetical determinations regarding whether the same verdict would have been rendered

when the verdict itself was premised on a constitutionally deficient reasonable-doubt instruction. 

See id. at 277. Here, however, there is no debate as to whether the harmless error standard applies,

thus the distinction drawn in Sullivan is inapplicable. In addition, the Court of Appeal, when

applying the harmless error standard, engaged in an analysis of whether the jury would have reached

the same actual verdict beyond a reasonable doubt absent the constitutional error. See id. This is the

same standard that the Supreme Court annunciated in Sullivan when it explained that the proper

inquiry is whether “the jury’s actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt would surely not

have been different absent the constitutional error.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

Therefore, there is nothing about the Court of Appeal’s analysis that would lead this Court to

find that the analysis was objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on

this claim.

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B. The Court Need Not Reach the Issue of Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights.

Respondent argues that Espinosa forfeited his right to confront Silayan by killing her. As the

Crawford court explained, “the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes

confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.” See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,

158-59 (1879); see also Davis v. Indiana, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006). In Reynolds, the Supreme

Court explained:

The Constitution gives the accused the right to a trial at which he should be

confronted with the witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by his own

wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if competent evidence is admitted to

supply the place of that which he has kept away. The Constitution does not

guarantee an accused person against the legitimate consequences of his own

wrongful act. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses

against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on

his privilege.

Reynolds 98 U.S. at 158. “The rule has its foundation in the maxim that no one shall be permitted to

take advantage of his own wrong; and, consequently, if there has not been, in legal contemplation, a

wrong committed, the way has not been opened for the introduction of the testimony.” Id. at 159.

The Court of Appeal determined that it did not need to reach this issue because of the

conclusion, under Chapman, that the admission of the evidence in dispute did not mandate reversal. 

Similarly, this Court finds that it does not have to reach this issue because the Court of Appeal’s

harmless error analysis was not unreasonable.

C. Conclusion

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeal’s decision that any error by the State Trial

Court was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application

of, federal law within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, habeas relief is not warranted on

this claim. 

//

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//

//

//

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES this petition for a writ of habeas. The Clerk of

the Court is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 25, 2008 

MARTIN J. JENKINS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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