Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-08-74212/USCOURTS-ca9-08-74212-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Loretta E. Lynch
Respondent
Pavittar Singh
Petitioner

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAVITTAR SINGH,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney

General,

Respondent.

No. 08-74212

Agency No.

A098-501-520

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 7, 2014*

San Francisco California

Filed September 21, 2015

Before: Sidney R. Thomas, Chief Judge, and Diarmuid F.

O’Scannlain and M. Margaret McKeown, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge O’Scannlain

Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Chief Judge

Thomas

* The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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2 SINGH V. LYNCH

SUMMARY**

Immigration

The panel denied a petition for review of the Board of

Immigration Appeals’ denial of asylum, withholding of

removal and Convention Against Torture protection on

adverse credibility grounds.

The panel held that the REAL ID Act permits background

documents to serve as the sole basis for an adverse credibility

determination. The panel explained that the immigration

judge permissibly relied on record evidence, including an

Amnesty International report, indicating that the armed Sikh

militancy in India ended in the 1990s, to conclude that

petitioner’s claim of being attacked by Sikh militants in 2005

and 2006 was not plausible.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Chief Judge

Thomas agreed with the majority that under the REAL ID

Act, an IJ’s adverse credibility determination may be

supported exclusively by background evidence in the record,

but he dissented from the majority’s decision to uphold the

agency’s adverse credibility determination, because the

agencymischaracterized the background evidence and did not

consider the totality of the circumstances.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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SINGH V. LYNCH 3

COUNSEL

Monica Ganjoo, Ganjoo Law Offices, San Francisco, CA,

filed the brief for petitioner.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of

Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, filed the brief for

the respondent. With him on the brief were Stephen J. Flynn,

Assistant Director, and Janette L. Allen, Attorney, U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Immigration Litigation,

Washington, DC.

OPINION

O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge:

We must decide, in this asylum case under the REAL ID

Act, whether an Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility

determination may be supported exclusively by background

evidence in the record.

I

Pavittar Singh, a native and citizen of India, entered the

United States on or about January 4, 2007, as a nonimmigrant

visitor, with authorization to remain in the United States for

six months. However, on April 19, 2007, the Department of

Homeland Security served Singh with a Notice to Appear,

charging him as removable for failure to comply with the

conditions of his nonimmigrant status. Specifically, Singh

was charged as non-compliant because he was employed for

wages at a convenience store without authorization of

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Singh then

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sought relief from removal by applying for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention

Against Torture (“CAT”).

A

In due course, Singh appeared before an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) and testified that he had suffered persecution on

account of his membership in the Nirankari sect of the Sikh

faith. He asserted that on January 16, 1998, terrorists entered

his family’s shop in India, derided his Nirankari beliefs, and

demanded money. Additionally, Singh testified that after he

reported this incident, the police refused to investigate and

instead accused him of harboring Sikh separatists. Singh

claimed he suffered additional police harassment when, on

January 19, 2005, he was arrested, accused of harboring

terrorists at his wedding, and beaten while in custody. Singh

also claimed that on October 16, 2006, he was yet again

accosted by “Sikh terrorists,” who took his property and

threatened to kill him if he supported the Nirankari mission. 

He testified that a few days later the police again arrested

him, accused him of supporting “Sikh terrorists,” and beat

him.

B

However, the IJfound Singh’s testimony not credible and

denied his applications for relief. While acknowledging that

Singh testified consistently, the IJ relied on background

evidence in the record to conclude that his testimony was

implausible. The IJ noted that an Amnesty International

report submitted by Singh not only failed to “support his

claim that the armed opposition continues to operate,” but

also, by showing that armed militants were no longer active,

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SINGH V. LYNCH 5

undermined his allegation that such militants recently

attacked him. The IJ also found the reports submitted by the

Government further suggested that militant activity had

“ended years ago.” Thus, she found, Singh’s claim that he

was attacked by Sikh militants in 2005 and 2006 was not

plausible.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed

Singh’s appeal from the IJ’s decision, agreeing with her that

his “account is implausible because the documentary

evidence demonstrates that the armed opposition in Punjab

ended in the 1990’s.” Noting that the BIA must defer to IJ

credibility findings “unless they are clearly erroneous” and

that “[i]mplausible testimony can support an adverse

credibility finding,” the Board agreed with the IJ’s finding

that Singh was not credible.

II

The only issue presented on appeal is whether the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination was supported by

substantial evidence.

A

The standard of review of BIA determinations is well

settled. As we have explained, “[w]hen the BIA conducts its

own review of the evidence and law rather than adopting the

IJ’s decision, our review ‘is limited to the BIA’s decision,

except to the extent that the IJ’s opinion is expressly

adopted.’” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir.

2010) (quoting Hosseini v. Gonzalez, 471 F.3d 953, 957 (9th

Cir. 2006)). However, “when, as here, the BIA’s ‘phrasing

seems in part to suggest that it did conduct an independent

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review of the record,’ but the BIA’s analysis on the relevant

issues is confined to a ‘simple statement of a conclusion,’ we

‘also look to the IJ’s oral decision as a guide to what lay

behind the BIA’s conclusion.’” Id. (quotingAvetova-Elisseva

v. I.N.S., 213 F.3d 1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)).

Credibility determinations are findings of fact, which are

“conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th

Cir. 2011); Singh-Kaur v. I.N.S., 183 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (9th

Cir. 1999). Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, our task “is to determine

whether there is substantial evidence to support the BIA’s

finding, not to substitute an analysis of which side in the

factual dispute we find more persuasive.” Molina-Morales v.

I.N.S., 237 F.3d 1048, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Marcu

v. I.N.S., 147 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1998)). Thus, a

credibility determination will only be reversed if “the

evidence not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but

compels it.” Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1087 (quoting I.N.S. v.

Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992)) (alterations in

original).

Singh concedes that because he filed his application after

May 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act governs the determination

of his credibility. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1039.

B

Singh asserts that the adverse credibility determination is

not supported by substantial evidence, because under the

REAL ID Act his specific testimony cannot be discredited

solely by reliance on background documents. Whether the

REAL ID Act permits such background documents to serve

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SINGH V. LYNCH 7

as the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding appears to

be a question of first impression. However, it is easily

resolved by the clear language of the Act itself, which

forecloses Singh’s argument.

1

The two cases Singh relies on for support—Zheng v.

Ashcroft, 397 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2005), and Singh v.

Gonzales, 439 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other

grounds by Maldonado v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1155, 1163–64 

(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc)—are pre-REAL ID Act cases that

do not consider the Act’s significant restriction of appellate

review of credibility determinations.1See Bingxu Jin v.

Holder, 748 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The REAL ID

Act ‘significantly restricted’ appellate review of adverse

credibility findings,” and “‘only the most extraordinary

1

Indeed, some of our cases hold that background evidence can support

adverse credibility determinations even in pre-REAL ID Act cases. 

Admittedly, Singh is correct that Singh and Zheng hold that “[w]hile an IJ

may use a Department of State Report to discredit a generalized statement

about a country, it may not be used to discredit specific testimony

regarding a petitioner’s experience.” Singh, 439 F.3d at 1110 (citing

Zheng, 397 F.3d at 1143–44).

However, other pre-REAL ID Act precedent has addressed this

question and concluded that country reports are an acceptable basis for

implausibility determinations. In Jibril v. Gonzales, we stated that “a

finding made by an IJthat a petitioner’s testimony is implausible given the

evidence in a Country Report or other objective evidence in the record is

accorded deference.” 423 F.3d 1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis

added); see also Jie Cui v. Holder, 712 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 2013)

(citing Jibril for the proposition that “testimony that is implausible in light

of the background evidence can support an adverse credibility

determination” (emphasis added)); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 743

(9th Cir. 2007) (same).

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circumstances will justify overturning an adverse credibility

determination.’” (quoting Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1041));

Jibril, 423 F.3d at 1138 n.1; Kaur v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d

1061, 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165–68 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam)

(explaining that the “REAL ID Act freed an IJ” from the

various requirements courts of appeals imposed on credibility

determinations).

2

Moreover, the REAL ID Act explicitly allows the BIA

and IJ to base their credibility determinations on background

evidence in the record. “Considering the totality of the

circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of fact may

base a credibility determination on,” among other things, “the

inherent plausibility of [Singh’s] account” and “the

consistency of [Singh’s] statements with other evidence of

record (including the reports of the Department of State on

country conditions) . . . without regard to whether an

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of

[Singh’s] claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); cf. Angov v.

Lynch, 788 F.3d 893, 904 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that this

Court and the BIA permissibly rely upon State Department

country reports “all the time” (citing 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii))).

The IJ thus acted within the confines of the REAL ID Act

by considering the totality of the circumstances and basing

her credibility determination on the inherent implausibility of

Singh’s account and its inconsistency with record evidence,

including the Amnesty International report. The IJ

considered evidence submitted bySingh and the Government

and found such evidence did “not support [Singh’s] claim that

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SINGH V. LYNCH 9

the armed opposition continues to operate.” She noted that

the Amnesty International report affirmatively indicated that

the armed Sikh militancy ended in the 1990s. Ultimately,

based on Singh’s testimony and the documents submitted by

both Singh and the Government, the IJ found implausible

Singh’s account that he was attacked by Sikh militants. The

BIA similarly concluded that Singh’s account was rendered

implausible by the documentary evidence that “demonstrates

that the armed opposition in Punjab ended in the 1990’s.”2

Given the language of the REAL ID Act, the IJ’s finding

and the BIA’s conclusion of implausibility based on record

evidence is permissible.3

2 The BIA based its plausibility finding on two separate factors: (1) the

lack of militant activity in the Punjab region after the mid-1990s; and

(2) the Indian government’s focus on high-level activists, as opposed to

lower-profile or inactive Sikh members such as Singh. The dissent

focuses on the second factor.

We offer two points in response. First, because record evidence

supported the IJ and BIA on the first finding, the second factor is not

dispositive. See Rizk, 629 F.3d at 1087 (quoting Wang v. I.N.S., 352 F.3d

1250, 1259 (9th Cir. 2003)). Second, while the dissent cites experts who

indicated that even low-level activists were in danger, other background

evidence indicated that “several experts have suggested that only those

considered by police to be high-profile militants are at risk.” Because

there is evidence to support either conclusion, we cannot say that the

record compels the conclusion that inactive Sikh members were under

police threat. See id. (quoting Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1).

3 Though unmentioned by the parties, the Eleventh Circuit has

considered the question of whether adverse credibility determinations can

be based solely on background evidence and determined that they cannot,

contrary to our conclusion here. In Xiu Ying Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,

712 F.3d 486 (11th Cir. 2013), a case interpreting the REAL ID Act, the

court concluded that an IJ cannot rely solely on country reports in making

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C

Our precedent also forecloses Singh’s argument that the

BIA’s decision was based on speculation.

Though Singh is correct that an adverse credibility

determination cannot be based on complete speculation and

conjecture, here the IJ and BIA supported the determination

with specific citations to record evidence. See Part II.A.,

supra; see also Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042 (requiring “that

the IJ state explicitly the factors supporting his or her adverse

credibility determination” and avoid “[b]oilerplate opinions”

that “are devoid of statements that evidence an individualized

review of the petitioner’s contentions and circumstances”

a credibility determination, absent a finding as to “demeanor, the

consistency of [the petitioner’s] statements, or some other individualized

reason for questioning her credibility.” Id at 496.

However, the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is unpersuasive because

it fails to account for the specific language of the REAL ID Act. The Xiu

Ying Wu panel concluded it could not give State Department reports

“dispositive power” because doing so would “vitiate the individualized

determination” required in adverse credibility decisions. Id. Yet, as noted

above, the REAL ID Act indeed gives such reports “dispositive power”;

that is the unavoidable effect of allowing a “trier of fact” to “base a

credibility determination” on the consistency of an applicant’s claims

“with other evidence of record (including the reports of the Department of

State on country conditions) . . . without regard to whether [such]

inconsistency . . . goes to the heart of the applicants claim.” 8 U.S.C.

§1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

Further, while Xiu Ying Wu claims that using record evidence as

grounds for finding lack of credibility “would vitiate the individualized

determination” of petitioners’ claims, 712 F.3d at 496, such concern is

unfounded in light of our decision in Shrestha. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at

1042.

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(quoting Castillo v. I.N.S., 951 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir.

1991)); cf. Yan Xia Zhu v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1034, 1039–40

(9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that an IJ’s implausibility

determination was impermissible when based on the IJ’s pure

speculation, rather than any record evidence).

Further, the BIA did not violate our command that its

“analysis must be reasonable as a whole,” that its decision

must be based on more than “utterly ‘trivial inconsistencies,’”

and that it “give ‘specific and cogent reasons supporting [its]

adverse credibility determination.’” Bingxu Jin, 748 F.3d at

965 (quoting Shrestha, 748 F.3d at 1042).

Here, the BIA explicitly discussed Singh’s testimony

regarding the alleged attacks by terrorists and harassment by

the police and explained why it found that such specific

testimony was undermined by the evidence in the record. 

Thus, it sufficiently noted the factors supporting the IJ’s

finding, and evidenced its individualized review of Singh’s

case.

Pursuant to our precedent, we are satisfied that the

adverse credibility determination was properly explained and

supported by substantial evidence.

III

The BIA correctly concluded that because Singh failed to

qualify for asylum, he necessarily fails to satisfy the more

stringent standard for withholding of removal. See AlvarezSantos v. I.N.S., 332 F.3d 1245, 1255 (9th Cir. 2003).

Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s conclusion

that it was not “more likely than not” that Singh would be

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12 SINGH V. LYNCH

tortured if he were removed to India. We do not permit an IJ

to use “a negative credibility determination in the asylum

context to wash over the [CAT] claim[,] especially when the

prior adverse credibility determination is not necessarily

significant” to the torture claim. Kamalthas v. I.N.S.,

251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mansour v.

I.N.S., 230 F.3d 902, 908 (7th Cir. 2000)). However, when a

petitioner’s “claims under the [CAT] are based on the same

statements . . . that the BIA determined to be not credible” in

the asylum context, the agency may rely upon the same

credibility determination in denying both the asylum and

CAT claims. Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1157 (9th

Cir. 2003).

In this case, Singh’s claim under the CAT is based on the

same statements he made regarding his claims for asylum and

withholding of removal. Thus, it was proper for the IJ and

the BIA to rely on the same adverse credibility determination

in denying all of his claims.

IV

Accordingly, Singh’s petition for review is DENIED.

THOMAS, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in

part:

I agree with the majority that under the REAL ID Act, an

Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility determination may

be supported exclusively by background evidence in the

record. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s

decision to uphold the agency’s adverse credibility

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SINGH V. LYNCH 13

determination. The IJ and BIA mischaracterized the

background evidence and did not “consider the totality of the

circumstances” as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). 

I would grant Singh’s petition for review.

I

I agree with the majority that under the Real ID Act, a

petitioner’s specific testimony may be discredited solely by

background evidence in the record. However, an IJ is still

required to consider the totality of the circumstances and to

make an individualized credibility determination that rests on

“specific and cogent reasons.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);

Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1042 (“The REAL ID Act did not strip

us of our ability to rely on the institutional tools that we have

developed, such as the requirement that an agency provide

specific and cogent reasons supporting an adverse credibility

determination, to aid our review.”). As a result, it is a rare

case that an IJ is able to rest an adverse credibility

determination on background evidence alone without

violating the other requirements imposed by

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) and by controlling precedent. Indeed,

this case offers a useful illustration of the perils of relying too

heavily on broad generalizations contained in static country

reports when refuting an asylum applicant’s specific

testimony.

II

Turning to the specifics of this case, substantial evidence

does not support the agency’s adverse credibility

determination. The background evidence in the record does

not discredit Singh’s testimony that he was detained and

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beaten by the police in 2005 and 2006 and targeted by four

men dressed as Sikh militants in 2006.

The IJ and BIA suggest that Singh’s testimony that he

was detained and interrogated by the Punjab police is not

credible because this background evidence indicates the

Indian government is concerned only with arresting

high-level Sikh militants. This is not an accurate

characterization of the record. A 2003 Bureau of Citizenship

and Immigration Services report submitted into evidence by

the government provides that while some experts believe the

Punjab police will track down only high-profile suspects who

have relocated to another province in India, others believe

that “any Sikh who has been implicated in political militancy

would be at risk anywhere in India.” This report indicates

that it remains an open question whether the police in Punjab

are concerned only with high-profile suspects.

Moreover, the same report corroborates Singh’s

testimony. It cites an expert on religious militancy who noted

that while “Punjab police no longer systematically persecute

Sikhs simply for holding [pro-Sikh independence] views . . .

individual Sikhs are ‘probably targeted’ at times by local

police because of their actual or suspected [pro-Sikh

independence] advocacy, even though high-level officials no

longer see such views as a threat.” The expert further noted

that “[t]here is still widespread harassment of anyone who

expresses separatist sympathies” and that reports of police

detention and physical abuse “seemed plausible given

conditions in Punjab.”

The IJ and BIA further suggest that Singh’s testimony

that he was harassed by Sikh militants in 2006 is not credible

because the background evidence in the record indicates that

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SINGH V. LYNCH 15

Sikh militant activity ended in the 1990s. The background

evidence does indicate that widespread, organized activity by

militant Sikhs ended in the 1990s. But it is still plausible that

Singh was harassed by former Sikh militants who

independently engage in criminal activity and who continue

to rob and terrorize the population. Singh testified that he

was robbed by four men dressed like Sikh terrorists who

warned him to stop supporting the Nirankari sect. This

testimony is not necessarily inconsistent with reports that the

majority of armed opposition groups in Punjab are no longer

active.

Even if armed resistance is no longer widespread and proindependence Sikhs are no longer the primary targets of

police brutality in Punjab, it is not implausible that at least

some former militants continue to engage in violent criminal

behavior and at least some Sikhs continue to be harassed by

the police for their perceived affiliation with the resistance

movement. Indeed, it is arguably more implausible

that—after more than a decade of conflict—the militants

would suddenly cease all criminal activity and the police

would cease all persecution of Sikh activists.

The IJ and BIA “cherry-pick[ed] solely facts favoring an

adverse credibility determination while ignoring facts that

undermine[d] that result.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d

1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2010). As a result, the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination is not supported by substantial

evidence.

For these reasons, I concur in part and dissent in part.

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