Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02812/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02812-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Francisco Depaula Cardona-Silva
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

. PILEO 

Umted State, Court of Appeal 

Tenth Circuit 5 

JUL 171990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2812 

(U.S.D.C. No. 88-CR-0035G) 

(D. Utah) 

FRANCISCO DEPAULA CARDONA-SILVA, ) 

Defendant-Appellant. 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MOORE, SETH and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); Tenth Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Appointed counsel in this case has filed an Anders brief and 

seeks leave of court to withdraw from representing defendantappellant, Francisco Cardona-Silva, because after carefully 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

Appellate Case: 88-2812 Document: 010110038701 Date Filed: 07/17/1990 Page: 1 
examining the record and analyzing the issues he determined that 

the appeal was meritless. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738. 

Defendant and co-defendant, Lorenna Alexia Berrio, were 

charged with aiding and abetting with intent to possess and 

distribute approximately 13 kilograms of cocaine in violation of 

21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Defense counsel filed a 

motion to suppress evidence found during a warrantless search of 

the car defendant was driving. The court denied defendant's 

motion on the ground that he had no standing to challenge the 

search and that the stop was valid because it was based on consent 

and probable cause. At trial, defendant did not take the stand. 

At the close of the government's case defense counsel made a 

motion for acquittal which was denied. The jury acquitted 

Ms. Berrio, but found defendant guilty as charged. The court also 

denied defendant's motion to arrest the judgment. Defense counsel 

withdrew and present counsel was appointed for appeal. 

On March 2, 1987 defendant and Ms. Berrio were stopped in 

Utah by Trooper Bennett. Defendant is an alien from Colombia who 

speaks no English and Ms. Berrio is an English-speaking resident 

alien living in Chicago, Illinois. Trooper Bennett made the 

initial stop after observing defendant's peculiar driving pattern. 

Trooper Bennett approached the car and asked the defendant for his 

driver's license and registration. Ms. Berrio testified that 

since defendant spoke no English, she translated for him during 

this time. Defendant gave the police officer his Colombian 

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driver's license and passport, but was unable to produce the 

registration. 

While Trooper Bennett issued defendant a warning citation for 

impeding traffic, a registration check confirmed that the car was 

not stolen and was owned by "Antoneeieta Flores." Trooper Bennett 

questioned defendant about the car's ownership, to which he 

replied that he did not understand English. Trooper Bennett 

testified that Ms. Berrio told him that "her sister-in-law" owned 

the car and that she had permission to drive it. Rec. Vol. VI at 

1-64. 

Trooper Bennett noticed a Lysol can on the dashboard, some 

beer in the back seat and that the car had an almond smell 

associated with cocaine. He asked Ms. Berrio if he could look in 

the trunk to which she responded "sure'', took the keys from the 

ignition and opened the trunk. After finding the trunk normal, 

the officer requested and obtained Ms. Berrie's consent to search 

the car's interior. A search of the interior revealed 13 packages 

of cocaine secreted in an air vent. Defendant and Ms. Berrio were 

arrested. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that Anders requires us to 

conduct a full examination of the proceedings and determine 

"whether appointed counsel fully performed their duty to support 

their clients' appeal to the best of their ability'' and make the 

"critical determination of whether the appeal is indeed so 

frivolous that counsel should be permitted to withdraw." Penson 

v. Ohio, 57 U.S.L.W. 4020, 4021, 488 U.S. 75, (citing McCoy 

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v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 439). As Anders 

unambiguously provides, "if [the appellate court] finds any of the 

l egal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not 

frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the 

assistance of counsel to argue the appeal. Id. at 4022 (citing 

Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). We have previously entered an order to 

deny counsel's request to be relieved; however, we fully recognize 

his position. 

Counsel for defendant has identified several issues for 

review all of which he concludes are meritless. First, we address 

whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendant had no 

standing to challenge the warrantless search of the car and if so, 

whether that search was based on probable cause and conducted 

pursuant to valid consent. Defendant had the "burden of adducing 

facts at the suppression hearing indicating that his own rights 

were violated by the challenged search." United States v. Erwin, 

875 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir.) (citing United States v. Skowronski, 

827 F.2d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir.)). "Fourth Amendment rights are 

personal rights which, like some other constitutional rights, may 

not be vicariously asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 

165, 174. 

Whether the defendant has standing to challenge the 

warrantless search requires us to consider two factors: did the 

defendant manifest a subjective expectation of privacy in the area 

searched and is society prepared to recognize that expectation as 

objectively reasonable. Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270. At the 

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suppression hearing, there was conflicting testimony as to 

ownership of the car. The facts show that defendant and 

Ms. Berrio agreed to drive from Chicago to California and back to 

go to a baptism for defendant's nephew. Since they did not own a 

car, they borrowed a car for their trip. On the way back, 

however, the car engine blew up and unable to fix it they obtained 

a second car which was the car they were driving when stopped. 

Defendant testified that he was given permission to drive the 

second car to Chicago from his friend Rodrigo Orambo whom he had 

met in California. Rec. Vol. III at 93. The second car was 

delivered to defendant by some employees of Mr. Orambo. Rec. Vol. 

IV at 9. Defendant did not know Mr. Orambo's address or where in 

California he lived. Rec. Vol. III at 97-98. Ms. Berrio 

testified that the car belonged to defendant's sister-in-law. 

Rec. Vol. IX at 3-168. 

Under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143-44 n.12, the 

Supreme Court stated that "one who owns or lawfully possesses or 

controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate 

expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude." See 

also, United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir.). 

Neither defendant nor Ms. Berrio owned the car. Defendant's 

testimony at best raises the inference that he obtained permission 

from a third party, Mr. Orambo, to drive the car. Even if true, 

there was no evidence on where or from whom Mr. Orambo obtained 

the car to show that he had legitimate possession of the car. 

There was a complete absence of testimony showing whether the 

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defendant was authorized to drive or possess the car from the 

owner giving rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy. See 

Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270-272 (holding that the defendant had no 

standing to challenge the legality of a search of hidden 

compartment in rear of car where there was no evidence that he 

obtained lawful possession of the car from the owner). 

Furthermore, the record shows no other evidence demonstrating 

that defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy to confer 

standing. First, defendant did not claim that he owned the 

cocaine or secreted it away. See Erwin, 875 F.2d 268, 270-71. 

Moreover, it is well settled that the defendant's mere possession 

of the keys is not sufficient to confer a legitimate expectation 

of privacy. Id. at 271-72. Under these circumstances, we see no 

merit in the argument that the defendant had a legitimate 

expectation of privacy in the area searched or the car. Having 

found that defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of the 

car which resulted in the discovery of the cocaine, we need not 

reach the merits of the warrantless search. 

Counsel for defendant next urges that there is no merit to a 

claim that the trial court erred in denying his motion to arrest. 

We agree. Defense counsel's motion to arrest challenged the 

indictment on the ground that no principal offense was charged and 

second, that since Ms. Berrio was acquitted defendant could not be 

convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

An indictment must contain the elements of the offense and 

sufficiently apprise the defendant of what he must be prepared to 

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meet. United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436, 439 (10th Cir.). We 

review an indictment liberally where the defendant has not 

challenged the sufficiency of the indictment before trial. 

United States v. Phillips, 869 F.2d 1361, 1364-65 (10th Cir.). 

Defendant's indictment charged him as follows: 

"On or about March 2, 1988, in the Central 

Division of the District of Utah, 

FRANCISCO DEPAULA CARDONA-SILVA and 

LORENNA ALEXIA BERRIO 

aided and abetted by each other, did knowingly 

and intentionally possess with intent to 

distribute approximately thirteen (13) 

kilograms of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled 

substance within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 812; all in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 84l(a)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2." 

From the face of the indictment it is clear that defendant was 

charged under 21 U.S.C. § 84l(a)(l) of the principal offense. The 

indictment expressly charges that defendant "did knowingly and 

intentionally possess with intent to distribute approximately 

thirteen (13) kilograms of cocaine •. II It is inconceivable 

how this language could be interpreted otherwise. 

Second, defendant was convicted by the jury for the principal 

offense. One who has been indicted as a principal may be 

convicted on evidence showing that he merely aided and abetted the 

commission of the offense. See Smith, 838 F.2d 436; United States 

v. Walker, 621 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000. 

18 U.S.C. § 2 expressly states that it makes punishable "as a 

principal" one who aids and abets in the commission of the 

substantive offense. 

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The final issue counsel identifies in his Anders brief is 

whether Mr. Silva was denied his Sixth Amendment right to 

effective assistance of counsel. In order to find that the 

defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, it must be 

shown that counsel did not exercise "the skill, judgment and 

diligence of a reasonably competent defense attorney." 

United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir.) (citing 

United States v. Afflerbach, 754 F.2d 866, 870 (10th Cir.)). 

There is a strong presumption that counsel provided effective 

assistance of counsel and defendant has the burden of proof to 

overcome that presumption. Id. See United States v. Cronic, 466 

U.S. 648, 658. 

The Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to determine 

whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel. 

"A defendant must show: (1) 'that counsel's performance was 

deficient,' with reference to 'prevailing professional norms,' and 

(2) 'that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'" 

United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1472 (10th Cir.) (citing 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88). "The defendant 

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 

Counsel for appellant urges that he cannot argue in good 

faith that defense counsel's conduct was either deficient or 

prejudicial under Strickland. Turning to the first prong of 

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Strickland, that we review defense counsel's performance with 

considerable restraint: 

"Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance 

must be highly deferential. It is all too 

tempting for a defendant to second-guess 

counsel's assistance after conviction or 

adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a 

court, examining counsel's defense after it 

has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a 

particular act or omission of counsel was 

unreasonable." 

Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1472 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 

After reviewing the briefs and the record we agree that the 

evidence supports the conclusion that defense counsel's conduct 

was not deficient. The record reveals that defense counsel 

vigorously represented defendant both at the suppression hearing 

and at trial. The only suspect area is defense counsel's decision 

to not have the defendant testify on his own behalf. 

There is no doubt that the defendant has a right to testify 

in his own defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49. The right 

to testify is personal and can only be waived by the accused. 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.l. The decision not to 

testify should be made by the accused after full consultation with 

counsel. United States v. Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156, 1161 n.10 (10th 

Cir.). 

Here, defense counsel, Mr. Martinez, attested that he 

discussed with defendant his right to testify on "at least" three 

occasions and informed him that this right could be waived. 

Affidavit ,1 (2). Mr. Martinez further states that he informed 

defendant that "if he testified he would risk (a) cross-

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examination by the government and (b) admission of prior 

inconsistent impeachable statements made at a suppression hearing. 

Additionally, I told Mr. Silva that he would not make a credible 

witness or offer positive nonculmative [sic] testimony. Mr. Silva 

agreed and • . . waived his right to testify. 11 Id. at ,r ( 4) . In 

addition, the record reveals that defendant made no request to 

testify and did not object when counsel, in open court, stated 

that he would not take the stand. See Janoe, 720 F.2d 1156. 

We cannot say that defense counsel's decision was 

unreasonable given defendant's prior testimony and the strength of 

the government's case. See Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 811 (defense 

counsel's decision to not have petitioner testify was reasonable 

given the overwhelming amount of evidence against him). Defendant 

has no constitutional right to testify falsely. Nix v. Whiteside, 

475 U.S. 157, 171. At the suppression hearing, defendant's 

testimony was inconsistent and at times, simply unclear. He 

testified that he met Mr. Orambo by chance when leaving a 

department store in Los Angeles and was told by Mr. Orambo that he 

dedicated his life to cocaine. Mr. Orambo later took defendant to 

a room full of drugs. Rec. Vol. IV, at 5-7. In addition, 

defendant's testimony was directly contradicted by Ms. Berrio with 

respect to the crucial issue of ownership and permission to drive 

the second car. Ms. Berrio also testified that Mr. Silva invited 

her to travel to California for a baptism which never took place. 

Rec. Vol. IX, at 67, 82. 

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Second, there is no evidence that defense counsel's 

performance would have prejudiced defendant. The government's 

case was strong. It is very unlikely that defendant's version of 

the facts, as stated above, would have changed the outcome of this 

case. To the contrary, defendant's prior testimony would have 

been devastating and could not have been used to rebut the 

evidence against him. 

The instant appeal is meritless. The judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

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Entered for the Court 

Oliver Seth 

Circuit Judge 

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