Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01841/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01841-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bradshaw Bar Group, Inc.
Defendant
Charles Fite
Defendant
Bruce D. Fite
Defendant
Guy Jones
Plaintiff
The Rink
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GUY JONES,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRADSHAW BAR GROUP, INC. dba 

THE RINK; BRUCE D. FITE; 

CHARLES FITE; and DOES 1-10,

inclusive,

Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-1841-JAM-AC

ORDER DENYING FEES AND COSTS

Plaintiff Guy Jones (“Plaintiff”) sued Defendants Bradshaw

Bar Group, Inc., Bruce D. Fite, and Charles Fite (collectively,

“Defendants”) for architectural barriers at their entertainment

center and skating rink (“The Rink”) in violation of the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and California law. The

parties settled the case as described in a consent decree 

finalized in March 2015. Plaintiff now moves for fees and 

costs.1

1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without 

oral argument. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). The hearing was 

scheduled for November 4, 2015.

Case 2:14-cv-01841-JAM-AC Document 36 Filed 11/24/15 Page 1 of 4
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I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is disabled and uses a wheelchair for mobility.

Cabalo Decl. ¶ 2. He visited The Rink in February 2014 with his 

girlfriend to accompany her granddaughters to a skating lesson.

Rein Decl. Exh. 11 ¶¶ 12-13. He encountered barriers there in 

the parking lot, at the entrance, and inside the facility. See

generally Cabalo Decl. Exh. 1. He then returned multiple times 

over the next few months to accompany the girls to further 

lessons. Rein Decl. ¶ 5.

Plaintiff sued Defendants in August 2014 (Doc. #1). In

February 2015, the parties engaged in a successful settlement

conference. Cabalo Decl. ¶ 8. The resulting consent decree 

required Defendants to repair all barriers identified by 

Plaintiff’s expert and to pay Plaintiff $12,000 in damages. See

Consent Decree and Proposed Order (Doc. #20) ¶¶ 6-7. The Court 

adopted the consent decree on March 10, 2015 (Doc. #21).

Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on

September 23, 2015 (Doc. #22). Defendants oppose the motion 

(Doc. #27). Five days after Plaintiff filed his reply (Doc. 

#30), Defendants filed an “Objection to Plaintiff’s Reply” (Doc. 

#34) and Plaintiff responded one day later with a “Response to 

Defendants’ Objections” (Doc. #35). Because this Court did not 

authorize the filing of sur-replies in this case, the two 

documents filed after the reply are hereby stricken and the Court 

has not considered them.

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II. OPINION

A. Timeliness of Fee Motion

Defendants contend that the fee motion should be denied as 

untimely. Opp. at 2 (citing E.D. Cal. L.R. 293(a)). The Local 

Rules provide that “[m]otions for awards of attorneys’ fees to 

prevailing parties pursuant to statute shall be filed not later 

than twenty-eight (28) days after entry of final judgment.” E.D. 

Cal. L.R. 293(a). There is no dispute that Plaintiff filed this 

motion more than 28 days after the Court issued the Consent 

Decree and Order on March 10, 2015. Plaintiff in fact filed the 

motion more than six months after that Order. Nonetheless,

Plaintiff argues that the motion was timely, because a consent

decree is not a final judgment and the parties’ agreement in the 

consent decree permitted filing of this motion. Reply at 8.

The Court agrees with Defendants that a consent decree is a 

final judgment. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cty. Jail, 502 U.S. 

367, 391 (1992) (“[A] consent decree is a final judgment 

. . . .”); Knox v. Chiang, 2014 WL 1513892, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 

Apr. 16, 2014) (explaining that a judgment is “a decree and any 

order from which an appeal lies”) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a)).

The Court also finds no evidence that the parties stipulated to a 

late filing of this motion in the consent decree. The Court

interprets such an agreement “according to the objective intent 

of the parties.” Gallagher v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 2009 

WL 2781553, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2009) (citing Botefur v. 

City of Eagle Point, Or., 7 F.3d 152 (9th Cir. 1993)). The 

consent decree here covered “injunctive relief and damages only” 

and further stated that the “Parties have not reached any 

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agreement regarding Plaintiff’s claims for attorneys’ fees, 

litigation expenses, and costs. These matters will be the 

subject of future negotiation or litigation as necessary. The

Parties jointly stipulate and request that the Court not dismiss 

the case in its entirety as these issues remain unresolved.”

Consent Decree and Order ¶ 8 (emphasis in original). These

statements evidence an intent that the issue of attorneys’ fees

would be settled or litigated after the consent decree. But they 

do not show an intent to extend the deadline for filing a fee 

motion.

The Court therefore finds that the deadline for filing the 

motion was governed by Local Rule 293(a) and that the parties had 

not agreed to extend the deadline. Because Plaintiff has not 

offered any basis for the Court to excuse the delay, the Court 

concludes that the motion is untimely and denies the request for 

fees and costs.

III. ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 23, 2015

Case 2:14-cv-01841-JAM-AC Document 36 Filed 11/24/15 Page 4 of 4