Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03098/USCOURTS-cand-4_05-cv-03098-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Defendant
Honoria Castanon
Plaintiff

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

HONORIA CASTANON,

Plaintiff,

v.

JO ANNE B. BARNHART,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 05-03098 CW

ORDER DENYING

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AND GRANTING

PLAINTIFF'S

MOTION TO REMAND 

Plaintiff Honoria Castanon moves for summary judgment or for

remand on her claim that the Social Security Administration (SSA)

and Appeals council wrongly denied her Title II Disability Benefits

for the period April 16, 2001 to March 31, 2004. Defendant Jo Anne

B. Barnhart, in her capacity as Commissioner of the SSA, opposes

this motion and cross-moves for summary judgment. Having

considered all of the papers filed by the parties, the Court DENIES

the cross-motions for summary judgment and GRANTS Plaintiff's

motion to remand.

BACKGROUND

I. Procedural History

On September 13, 2001, Ms. Castanon filed her first

application for disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II

of the Social Security Act alleging that she became unable to work

on April 16, 2001 due to carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS) and residual

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 1 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

pain in her fingers and neck from past surgeries. On February 4,

2002, the SSA denied the application. Ms. Castanon did not appeal

the determination. 

On January 28, 2003, Ms. Castanon filed a second application

for DIB alleging disability due to the same impairments and the

same onset date of April 16, 2001. After being denied initially

and upon reconsideration by the SSA, Ms. Castanon requested a

hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) which was held on

May 24, 2004. On September 23, 2004, the ALJ granted Ms. Castanon

DIB as of April 1, 2004, the month in which she turned fifty-five,

but found that Ms. Castanon was not disabled prior to that date. 

On June 20, 2005, the Appeals Council declined Ms. Castanon's

request for review of the denial of benefits from April 16, 2001

through March 31, 2004. Ms. Castanon commenced this action for

judicial review pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Factual History

A. Plaintiff's Education and Work Experience

Ms. Castanon was born in Mexico on April 1, 1949 and testified

that she had completed the equivalent of a third grade education

there. (Administrative Record (AR) 316). However, on her

application for DIB, she reported that her highest education level

was the fourth and sixth grades. (AR 104, 121, 165, 280). Ms.

Castanon arrived in the United States in 1968 and attended one year

of school where she learned "a little bit of English." (Id. at

316-17). From November 28, 1971 until April 16, 2001, she was

employed as a bottling line attendant by the Beringer Wine Company

where she operated light machinery and performed custodial

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 2 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 3

services. (AR 318-19). From April 16, 1998 through April 15,

2001, she was also employed by the Napa County In Home Support

Services to provide in-home care for her disabled mother. (AR 92).

B. Plaintiff's Medical History

On April 16, 2001, while she was at work, Ms. Castanon noticed

pain and swelling in both forearms. (AR 225, 277). On April 18,

2001, Ms. Castanon was examined by Dr. Patricia K. Stagg who

ordered x-rays of Ms. Castanon's wrists and cervical spine. The xrays revealed no radiographic abnormalities of the wrists, but some

interbody fusion and swelling of prevertebral soft tissue. (AR

220). Ms. Castanon was referred to Dr. Alan Kimelmann who

performed a nerve conduction study which showed "[b]orderline right

median nerve mononeuropathy at the wrist consistent with borderline

carpal tunnel syndrome." (AR 181-2). On July 11, 2001 and August

22, 2001, Ms. Castanon underwent excision of a right dorsal wrist

ganglion cyst and a right carpal tunnel release procedure. (AR

218-9.) 

On November 26, 2001, in a report to Safeco Insurance Company,

Beringer's insurance carrier, Dr. Stagg diagnosed Ms. Castanon with

bilateral arm tendinitis, right ganglionic cyst, and right CTS, and

indicated that Ms. Castanon was precluded from repetitive forceful

grasping bilaterally, was unable to perform her past work as a

machine operator, and her disability status should be considered

"Permanent and Stationary." (AR 225-7). From early 2000 until

March, 2003, Ms. Castanon was also treated by Dr. Gary P. McCarthy. 

(AR 256). In a June 14, 2002 report to Safeco Insurance Company,

Dr. McCarthy wrote that Ms. Castanon is a "qualified injured worker

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 3 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 Residual functional capacity is the most an individual can

do despite his or her limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.

4

and can no longer work on the bottling line" (AR 258) due to

suffering from numbness, upper extremity pain, and neck pain. (AR

256). 

On December 16, 2001, at request of the SSA, Ms. Castanon was

examined by Dr. Jay Chun, a neurologist, who diagnosed her with,

among other things, neck pain and bilateral hand pain secondary to

CTS. (AR 241). Dr. Chun opined that Ms. Castanon could

occasionally lift and carry ten pounds depending on her hand pain,

was unrestricted with regard to sitting, standing and walking, but

that she suffered from moderate to severe limitations in handling,

feeling, grasping, and fingering due to CTS. (Id.) 

In January, 2002, SSA Medical Consultant Dr. C. Richard Dann

reviewed Ms. Castanon's medical records and concluded that she had

a residual functional capacity (RFC)1 to lift and carry twenty-five

pounds frequently, to lift and carry fifty pounds occasionally with

upper extremity limitations, and could sit and stand approximately

six hours in an eight hour workday. (AR 244). 

On June 26, 2003, at the request of the SSA, Dr. James M.

Talcott, an orthopedic surgeon, examined and evaluated Ms.

Castanon. (AR 259). Dr. Talcott diagnosed Ms. Castanon with

bilateral CTS, musculoskeletal low back pain, and post-op cervical

fusion. (AR 261). He also indicated, among other things, that Ms.

Castanon was "unable to work and is essentially debilitated" and

reported that she was precluded from repetitive use of her upper

extremities, was unable to do forceful gripping and grasping, could

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 4 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 5

sit, stand, and walk for up to four hours of an eight-hour workday,

and could lift in excess of twenty pounds. (AR 261). 

On July 11, 2003, Dr. Buenor D. Puplampu, a qualified medical

examiner, examined Ms. Castanon and diagnosed her with, among other

things, right CTS, right dorsal ganglion cyst, and bilateral upper

extremity tendinitis. (AR 283). Dr. Puplampu opined that because

Ms. Castanon has some "permanent partial disability with respect to

her repetitive strain injuries" that precludes "Repetitive Use of

Both Upper Extremities," she could not return to work, and was a

candidate for vocational rehabilitation. (Id. at 284). 

On July 30, 2003, Ms. Castanon's medical records were reviewed

for the SSA by Dr. M. Mehrkhast who determined that Ms. Castanon

had the following RFC: she could occasionally lift twenty pounds,

frequently lift ten pounds, and sit, stand, and walk for six hours,

but with no frequent gripping, grasping, typing, or fine

manipulation. (AR 264-6).

September 22, 2003 treatment notes from Dr. George Friedman,

who treated Ms. Castanon from September, 2002 through January,

2004, indicate that Ms. Castanon complained of feeling depressed. 

(AR 289-292). Dr. Friedman prescribed Paxil for the depression and

recommended physical therapy. (AR 288-91, 300). According to Dr.

Friedman's notes dated November 4, 2003, Ms. Castanon's depression

improved after taking Paxil. (AR 289).

C. 2003 Hearing

On May 24, 2004, a hearing was held before the ALJ at which

Ms. Castanon, who was represented by counsel, testified. (AR 19). 

A Spanish language interpreter translated for Ms. Castanon. (AR

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 5 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 6

19). A vocational expert (VE) also testified. Id. The ALJ posed

three hypothetical questions to the VE. The first hypothetical

assumed "someone of the claimant's age, education, and experience,

[with] the capacity for exertionally light work . . . with no

repetitive forceful grasping bilaterally." (AR at 333). The VE

responded that someone with this RFC could engage in Ms. Castanon's

past work as a bottling line attendant because he did not consider

a bottle of wine to be something that required forceful grasping. 

(AR at 334). The second hypothetical involved the same person but

with the additional limitations of only occasional reaching,

handling and fingering bilaterally. Id. The VE responded that the

past work as a bottling line attendant would be eliminated, but

listed jobs this hypothetical person could do such as Counter Clerk

(DOT code 249-366.010), Gate Guard (372-667.030), Usher (DOT code

344-677.014), and Children's Attendant (DOT code 349-677.018). (AR

334-7). 

In the third hypothetical, the ALJ asked whether these jobs

would be impacted by an individual's limited English ability. AR

at 338. The ALJ clarified that this person would be able to

communicate in English, but was not fluent in English. Id. The VE

responded that, when accounting for the language limitations, the

number of available jobs for photo counter clerk and gate guard

would be impacted, the usher job would be severely impacted, and

the child attendant job would be completely eliminated. (AR 338-

340).

D. 2003 ALJ Findings

 On September 23, 2004, the ALJ issued his decision in which

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 6 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2 To determine whether a claimant is disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Regulations

set out a five-step sequential process. Reddick v. Chater, 157

F.3d 715, 721 (9th Cir. 1998); Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391,

1395 (9th Cir. 1991); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (b)-(f). The burden of

proof is on the claimant in steps one through four. Sanchez v.

Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 812 F.2d 509, 511 (9th Cir. 1987). 

In step one, the claimant must show that she or he is not currently

engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). 

In step two, the claimant must show that he or she has a "medically

severe impairment or combination of impairments" that significantly

limits his or her ability to work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137,

140 (1987); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996);

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant does not, he or she is

not disabled. Otherwise, the process continues to step three for a

determination of whether the impairment meets or equals a "listed"

impairment which the regulations acknowledge to be so severe as to

preclude substantial gainful activity. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141;

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. If

this requirement is met, the claimant is conclusively presumed

disabled; if not, the evaluation proceeds to step four. At step

four, it must be determined whether the claimant can still perform

"past relevant work." Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform such work, he or she is

not disabled. If the claimant meets the burden of establishing an

inability to perform prior work, the burden of proof shifts to the

Commissioner for step five. At step five, the Commissioner must

show that the claimant can perform other substantial gainful work

that exists in the national economy. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 141; 20

C.F.R. § 1520(f).

7

he concluded that, based on Medical-Vocation Rule 202.02, Ms.

Castanon was disabled beginning on April 1, 2004 when she turned

fifty-five. However, based on Medical-Vocation Rule 202.10, he

determined that Ms. Castanon was not disabled from April 16, 2001

through March 31, 2004 when she was fifty through fifty-four years

old. (AR 26).

At step one of the sequential evaluation,2 the ALJ found that

Ms. Castanon had not engaged in any substantial gainful activity

since her alleged disability onset date of April 16, 2001. (AR

20). At step two, the ALJ found that Ms. Castanon suffered from

medically "severe" impairments including CTS of the right wrist,

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 7 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 Light work involves lifting no more than twenty pounds at a

time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to

ten pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a

job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or

standing, or when it involves sitting most of the time with some

pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered

capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, the

claimant must have the ability to do substantially all of these

activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Light work requires standing

or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately six hours of

8

bilateral tendinitis, obesity, and post cervical fusion. (AR 22). 

The ALJ found that Ms. Castanon's depression did not qualify as a

severe impairment because she did not receive treatment

specifically for depression, nor was it separately diagnosed as a

medical illness by any of her treating or examining physicians. (AR

22). 

At step four of the sequential analysis, the ALJ indicated

that he accorded more weight to the opinions of Ms. Castanon's

treating physicians than to the opinions of the examining and nonexamining physicians, but he did not accord them controlling weight

"because the sitting/standing/walking limitations given in Exhibit

8F [orthopedic consultant Dr. Talcott's opinion that Ms. Castanon

can sit, stand and walk four hours out of an eight hour day] were

too restrictive in light of the objective evidence; and the 10

pound maximum (Exhibit 4F) [neurologic consultant Dr. Chun's

opinion that Ms. Castanon can carry occasionally ten pounds] was

likewise too restrictive, whereas the estimate that claimant is

capable of medium work activity is too liberal. My RFC is a

compromise, over time, based on the actual objective evidence and

testimony." (AR 23). The ALJ concluded that Ms. Castanon has the

RFC to perform a light level of work activity3

 with manipulative

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 8 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

an eight-hour workday. SSR 83-10 at 5-6.

9

limitations allowing only occasional reaching, handling, and

fingering bilaterally. (AR 23, 25). Based on the testimony of the

VE, the ALJ found that Ms. Castanon lacked the RFC to perform the

requirements of her prior relevant work (PRW) as a bottling line

attendant. (AR 24).

At step five, the ALJ concluded that Ms. Castanon's claim that

she is illiterate in English is unfounded. (AR 23). For this

conclusion, the ALJ relied on the following evidence: (1) Ms.

Castanon resided in the United States for more than thirty years;

(2) she has been described or has described herself as having basic

English skills [May 16, 2003 Vocational Testing Report], having

limited English skills [Vocational Rehabilitation Progress Report

covering period April 4, 2003 through May 23, 2003], having the

ability to read and write English [Disability Report Application]

and speaking English pretty well [August 21, 2001 and December 5,

2002 Observations of SSA Phone Interviewer]; (3) a March 11, 2004

vocational testing report mentioned no language limitations, though

it did refer to various documents that are available in Spanish,

and reported that Ms. Castanon initiated and engaged in

interpersonal relations with others at the evaluation center with

no mention of language restrictions; and (4) Ms. Castanon answered

compound questions at the hearing prior to translation and even

corrected the English translation provided by the interpreter at

one point. The ALJ concluded that because Ms. Castanon's capacity

for the full range of light work was reduced by the additional

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 9 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 10

limitations of advanced age, marginal education, and unskilled work

background which narrowed the range of work she can perform, she

was disabled for "the period beginning April 1, 2004, the month

claimant attained age 55," based on Medical-Vocational Rule 202.02,

but she was not disabled prior to that date. (AR 24-5). 

LEGAL STANDARD

I. Overturning a Denial of Benefits 

A court cannot set aside a denial of benefits unless the ALJ's

findings are based upon legal error or are not supported by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1989); Martinez v.

Heckler, 807 F.2d 771, 772 (9th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence

is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.

389, 401 (1971); Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748, 749 (9th Cir.

1995). It is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 

Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). 

To determine whether substantial evidence exists to support

the ALJ's decision, a court reviews the record as a whole, not just

the evidence supporting the decision of the ALJ. Walker v.

Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1976). A court may not

affirm the ALJ's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of

supporting evidence. Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir.

1989). In short, a court must weigh the evidence that supports the

Commissioner's conclusions and that which does not. Martinez, 807

F.2d at 772. 

If there is substantial evidence to support the decision of

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 10 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 11

the ALJ, it is well-settled that the decision must be upheld even

when there is evidence on the other side, Hall v. Sec'y of Health,

Educ. & Welfare, 602 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1979), or when the

evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation,

Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984). If

supported by substantial evidence, the findings of the ALJ as to

any fact will be conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Vidal v. Harris,

637 F.2d 710, 712 (9th Cir. 1981). 

II. Establishing Disability Under the Social Security Act 

Under the Social Security Act, "disability" means: 

 inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by 

 reason of any medically determinable physical or mental 

 impairment which can be expected to result in death or which 

 has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period 

 of not less than twelve months. 

42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(1)(A). The impairment must be so severe that

the claimant "is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot 

 . . . engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work." 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). In addition, the impairment must result

"from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities

which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and

laboratory techniques." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 

DISCUSSION

I. ALJ's Assessment of Ms. Castanon's Education and Literacy 

Ms. Castanon appeals the ALJ's finding, based on MedicalVocational Guideline Rule 202.10, that she is a person with a

marginal education, as opposed to one who is illiterate in English. 

The Commissioner argues that the evidence in the record is

sufficient to sustain the ALJ's finding that Ms. Castanon has a

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 11 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 12

marginal education and is not illiterate, and thus was not disabled

between the ages of fifty and fifty-four.

A. Legal Standard

The Medical-Vocational Guidelines are administrative tools that

the Commissioner may use at step five of the disability evaluation. 

Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988). Based on

age, education, work experience, and “exertional capacity,” the

guidelines determine the employability of claimants with

“substantially uniform levels of impairment.” Id.; see also 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (Grids) Rule 202.00(c) provides

that a claimant who is limited to light work, is past the age of

fifty-five years old, and has a history of unskilled work

experience, is disabled. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2. Rule

202.00(d) provides that a claimant who possesses the same

characteristics as described in Rule 202.00(c), but who is between

the ages of fifty and fifty-four years old, and who is illiterate or

unable to communicate in English, is disabled. Id. The word "or"

in Rule 202.00(d) is to be construed as encompassing a person who is

illiterate in English or who is unable to communicate in English, or

both. Chavez v. Department of Health and Human Services, 103 F.3d

849, 852 (9th Cir. 1996); Silveira v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 1257, 1262

n.13 (9th Cir. 2000). Illiteracy is defined as "the inability to

read or write" in English. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(1) and (5). 

Generally, an illiterate person "cannot read or write a simple

message such as instructions or inventory lists, even though the

person can sign his or her name." Id. "The ability to communicate

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 12 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 13

in English" is defined as "the ability to speak, read, and

understand English." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(5).

Rule 202.10 provides that a claimant who is limited to light

work, is between the ages of fifty and fifty-four years old, has a

history of unskilled work experience, and whose education is

"[l]imited or less - [a]t least literate and able to communicate in

English," is not disabled. Id. 

B. Analysis

In order for the ALJ to have concluded that Grid Rule 202.00(d)

did not apply to Ms. Castanon, he would have had to find that she

was able to communicate in English and that she was literate in

English. To conclude that Ms. Castanon was literate in English, he

would have had to find that she could read and write simple

messages, such as instructions or inventory lists. The evidence

relied on by the ALJ arguably may have demonstrated that she was

able to speak and understand English, but it did not demonstrate

that she could read or write simple instructions in English. The

first vocational report cited by the ALJ, AR 141, stated that Ms.

Castanon could understand basic words and basic written materials in

English. However, it did not state that Ms. Castanon could write

basic instructions in English. Furthermore, this same report

indicated that the supervisor assigned to Ms Castanon was Spanishspeaking, that the instructions given to her were in Spanish and

that the job application she was given to fill out was in Spanish. 

AR 140-41. The second vocational report cited by the ALJ, AR 162,

indicated that Ms. Castanon is a very limited English speaker. 

These reports do not support the conclusion that Ms. Castanon can

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 13 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 14

read and write instructions and inventory lists in English. 

The third document relied upon by the ALJ, AR 97, is the SSA

Disability Report form, on which Ms. Castanon, or someone filling

the form out for her, checked a box indicating that she can read

English and that she can write more than her name in English. 

However, on the same form, Ms. Castanon did not check the box that

she could speak English, but checked the box indicating that she

spoke Spanish. The fact that these boxes were checked does not

establish that Ms. Castanon can read or write simple instructions or

inventory lists in English. The ALJ also relied on two reports of

an SSA interviewer who spoke to Ms. Castanon over the telephone, AR

95 and 113, who thought Ms. Castanon spoke English "pretty well." 

Although this evidence may establish that Ms. Castanon can speak and

understand English, it does not address her ability to read or write

in English. The last two items relied upon by the ALJ, the fact

that she was able to interact with other people at the vocational

rehabilitation center, and the fact that, at the hearing, she may

have understood a question in English before she heard the

translation, also does not address her ability to read and write in

English. 

Evidence in the record contradicts the ALJ's conclusion that

Ms. Castanon is literate in English. Two vocational evaluation

reports specify that Ms. Castanon "has some English comprehension,

but is not fluent in English," "has limited reading/writing skills

in English" (AR 164), and is a very limited English speaker (AR

162). A May 16, 2003 vocational testing report indicates that Ms.

Castanon was given an application form in Spanish that was

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 14 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 15

structured like a job application. (AR 140). The same report

indicated that although Ms. Castanon was able to understand basic

words in English, basic oral directions in English and basic written

materials in English, she was assigned a Spanish-speaking

supervisor, and the summary concluded that Ms. Castanon was not a

tenable candidate for vocational rehabilitation due, in part, to her

below average verbal skills in English. (AR at 141, 143). Another

vocational status report indicated that Ms. Castanon did not have

the English skill level to pass a school bus driving test. (AR at

161). Two physicians reported that they used Spanish language

interpreters when examining Ms. Castanon. (AR 251 ("Part of the

history was obtained using my rudimentary Spanish, and the remainder

of the history was done when the interpreter arrived late") and AR

277 ("Ms. Castanon is not fluent in English. Therefore, we had the

help of Mr. Estrada, who did the translation from Spanish to English

for this evaluation.").

The ALJ failed to address the evidence, cited above, that

indicated that Ms. Castanon had poor English skills. Finally,

although the record contains a substantial number of medical and

vocational forms filled out by hand (AR 97-106, 114-123, 124-129),

the ALJ failed to establish whether Ms. Castanon completed these

herself without assistance. 

 The Commissioner bears the burden of establishing that Ms.

Castanon is literate and the ALJ made no express finding that Ms.

Castanon could read and write in English. At present, there is

insufficient evidence in the record to determine whether or not Ms.

Castanon is literate in English. 

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 15 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 16

Accordingly, this issue is remanded to the Commissioner to

determine whether Ms. Castanon is literate, that is, that there is

substantial evidence that she can read and write at least simple

instructions or inventory lists in English.

II. ALJ's Identification of Other Substantial Gainful Work

Ms. Castanon argues that, at step five, the ALJ improperly

concluded that she could do other substantial work because he 

relied on jobs the VE identified which were beyond her skill level

based on the general education development (GED) requirements listed

in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). Ms. Castanon also

objects to being denied an opportunity to cross-examine the VE about

the GED requirements for each job he suggested. The Commissioner

contends that Ms. Castanon fails to refute that her past work as a

bottling line attendant demonstrates that she has the GED

requirements of the jobs suggested by the VE.

If a claimant shows that he or she cannot return to his or her

previous job, the burden of proof shifts to the government to show

that the clamant can do other kinds of work. Embrey v. Bowen, 849

F.2d 418, 422 (9th Cir. 1988). Without other reliable evidence of a

claimant's ability to perform specific jobs, the government must use

a vocational expert to meet that burden. Id. If the GED levels of

the VE's suggested jobs fail to comport with a claimant's noted

limitations and RFC, the ALJ must definitively explain this

deviation. Pinto v. Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001). 

The ALJ posed two hypotheticals to the vocational expert. Both

hypotheticals were based on Ms. Castanon's age, education, and past

work experience, and differed only in degree and frequency of manual

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 16 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4 According to Appendix C of the Dictionary of Occupational

Titles (DOT), the GED embraces those aspects of education (formal

and informal) which are required of the worker for satisfactory job

performance. The GED Scale is composed of three divisions: 

Reasoning Development (R), Mathematical Development (M), and

Language Development (L).

5 Appendix C of DOT indicates that R1 requires enough

commonsense understanding to carry out simple one- or two-step

instructions and the ability to deal with standardized situations

with occasional or no variables from these situations encountered

on the job. R2 requires enough commonsense understanding to carry

out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and an

ability to deal with problems involving a few concrete variables 

from standardized situations. R3 requires, among other things,

enough commonsense understanding to carry out instructions

furnished in written, oral, or diagrammatic form. L1 requires the

recognition of 2,500 (two or three syllable) words and a reading

rate of 95-120 words per minute. L2 requires, among other things,

a passive vocabulary of 5,000 to 6,000 words and a reading rate of

190-215 words per minute. M1 requires, among other things, the

ability to add and subtract two digit numbers, multiply and divide

by 10's and 100's by 2, 3, 4, and 5, perform the four basic

arithmetic operations with coins as part of a dollar, and perform

operations with units such as cup, pint, and quart; inch, foot, and

yard; and ounce and pound. M2 requires, among other things, the

ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide, compute ratios,

rates, and percentages; and draw and interpret bar graphs. Id. 

17

manipulation (AR 332). For his conclusion that Ms. Castanon was not

disabled prior to age fifty-five, the ALJ relied on the VE's

testimony that, even with the limitations in grasping and

manipulating, Ms. Castanon was eligible for jobs such as children's

attendant, usher, photo counter clerk, and gate guard. (AR 334-7). 

The GED requirements of Ms. Castanon's prior job as a bottling

line attendant are R1, M1, and L1.4 The GED requirements of the

VE's suggested jobs are higher: (1) photo counter clerk: R2, M2 and

L2; (2) gate guard: R3, M2 and L2; (3) usher: R2, M1, and L1; and

children's monitor: R2, M1 and L1.5

The ALJ did not make any findings regarding Ms. Castanon's

reasoning, mathematical or language abilities. Thus, there is no

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 17 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 18

determination of Ms. Castanon's reasoning capacity for detailed

written or oral instructions as required by R2 or whether her

passive vocabulary exceeds 5,000 English words or if she can read at

the estimated rate of 190-215 words per minute as required by L2. 

There is minimal evidence in the record of Ms. Castanon's

mathematical skills. During a May 5, 2003 Vocational Testing

evaluation, she was unable to perform on any math test because "she

didn't know any math" (AR 141). This evaluation also stated Ms.

Castanon had "no technical numerical skills," and "below average

clerical comprehension." However, a February 17, 2004 Vocational

Testing evaluation reported that Ms. Castanon successfully operated

a commercial electronic cash register, calculated multi-item

purchases, computed sales tax, and made accurate change. (AR 156). 

Nonetheless, there is no substantial evidence that Ms. Castanon can

"compute ratios, rates, and percentages; and draw and interpret bar

graphs" as required by M2. 

Furthermore, Plaintiff correctly points out that, at the

hearing before the ALJ, she was denied the opportunity to crossexamine the VE regarding the GED levels of the jobs he was

suggesting. See AR 344. 

The Commissioner's argument that the ALJ was not required to

make findings on the GED levels of the VE's suggested jobs because

they are comparable to Ms. Castanon's past work as a bottling line

attendant is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the requirements of

each suggested job are higher in at least one of the GED areas.

Because the ALJ failed to explain whether Ms. Castanon was

capable of performing the VE's suggested jobs, this issue is

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 18 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 19

remanded to the Commissioner. 

III. ALJ's Consideration of Depression

Ms. Castanon challenges the ALJ's step two determination that

her depression was not a "severe impairment" and argues that his

exclusion of it in his hypotheticals to the vocational expert

constitutes error. The Commissioner argues that Ms. Castanon

produced no evidence that her depression interfered with her ability

to work and therefore she has not satisfied her burden of proving

mental disability.

A severe mental impairment is one that significantly limits an

individual’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a)(2003). The determination at step two of

whether a mental impairment is severe is meant to identify at an

early stage those claimants whose medical impairments are so slight

that it is unlikely they would be found to be disabled even if their

age, education, and experience were taken into account. Bowen v.

Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140, 153 (1987). The ALJ has a duty to

develop the record fully and fairly, even when the claimant is

represented by counsel. Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1150

(9th Cir. 2001). This duty is heightened where the claimant may be

mentally ill. Id.

After reviewing Ms. Castanon's medical records, the ALJ

concluded that her depression was not a severe impairment because

she received no treatment specifically for depression and it was not

diagnosed as a medical illness by any of her treating or examining

physicians. (AR 22). 

Although the record shows that Dr. Friedman, one of Ms.

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 19 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 20

Castanon's treating physicians, treated Ms. Castanon for depression, 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Ms.

Castanon's depression was not severe. Dr. Friedman addressed

depression in his treatment notes dating from 2002 and 2003. (AR

286-300). On September 22, 2003, Dr. Friedman prescribed the

antidepressant Paxil. (AR 291). On November 4, 2003, his notes

indicate that Ms. Castanon's depression improved after treatment

with Paxil. (AR 289). 

Significantly, on the disability reports Ms. Castanon filled

out as part of her application for Social Security benefits, she did

not indicate depression as a condition that limited her ability to

work or required treatment (AR 98, 105, 115). Also, on a

Reconsideration Disability Report form, dated September 11, 2003,

Ms. Castanon did not indicate that depression was a physical or

mental condition. (AR 132). Two Vocational Testing Reports dated

May, 2003 and February, 2004 made no mention of depressive symptoms

and indicated that Ms. Castanon "appeared motivated with recognition

for good work performance," (AR 141), "demonstrated an even

disposition," (AR 156), along with "many worker traits, habits, and

behaviors associated with competitive employment" (AR 143) and was

"a cooperative individual who got along well with staff." (AR 143). 

There are only two mentions of depression in the record that

the Court could find, other than Dr. Friedman's notes. The first is

Ms. Castanon's indication, in a Daily Activities Questionnaire, that

she takes Paxil for "pain and stress." (AR 148). The second is on

an Extertional Daily Activities Questionnaire, dated May 13, 2003,

in which Ms. Castanon indicated she was depressed as a result of

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 20 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 21

over-dependence on family and being unable to stop the pain. (AR

129). 

 Based on all of the evidence, the ALJ's determination that Ms.

Castanon's depression was not a severe impairment because it did not

interfere with her ability to work is supported by substantial

evidence. 

Ms. Castanon cites Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453 (9th Cir.

2001) for the proposition that to the extent that the record is

ambiguous or inadequate, the ALJ has a duty to develop it. However,

here, the ALJ had no duty to develop the record because it was

neither ambiguous nor inadequate to allow for proper evaluation of

the evidence. Although the ALJ did not mention that Dr. Friedman

treated Ms. Castanon for depression with Paxil, Dr. Friedman's

follow-up note indicated that her depression improved with Paxil. 

Thus, the fact that Dr. Friedman prescribed Paxil is not evidence

that Ms. Castanon's depression limited her ability to engage in

basic work activities. Ms. Castanon's claim that the ALJ erred

regarding his determination that her depression was a severe

impairment is unavailing.

IV. ALJ's Consideration of Examining Physicians

Ms. Castanon argues that the ALJ, in determining her RFC,

improperly rejected the opinions of examining physicians Dr. Chun

and Dr. Talcott regarding her capacity for lifting and for standing

and sitting.

A. Legal Standard

 The Ninth Circuit distinguishes among the opinions of three

types of physicians: treating physicians, examining physicians, and

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 21 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 22

non-examining physicians. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th

Cir. 1996). "As a general rule, more weight should be given to the

opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do

not treat the claimant." Id. Where there are contradictions

between the opinions of the treating physician and others, the ALJ

must detail specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial

evidence to reject the opinion of the treating physician. Id. If

the treating physician's opinion is "brief, conclusory, and

inadequately supported by objective signs and laboratory findings,"

it is appropriate to reject it. Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947,

957 (9th Cir. 2002); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750, 754

(9th Cir. 1989). The examining doctor is entitled to less weight

than a treating doctor and more weight than a non-examining doctor,

but may still only be rejected for "specific and legitimate reasons

that are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Lester,

81 F.3d at 830-31. Also like the treating doctor, an uncontradicted

opinion of an examining doctor can only be rejected by providing

"clear and convincing reasons." Id. The reports of consulting,

non-examining physicians should be discounted and not treated as

substantial evidence when contradicted by other evidence. Pitzer v.

Sullivan, 908 F.2d 502, 506 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); Gallant v. Heckler,

753 F.2d 1450, 1454 (9th Cir. 1984). A medical opinion may be

contradicted by non-medical evidence such as testimony. Id. at 831. 

Although the ALJ may decide between conflicting evidence, he may not

simply substitute his own medical opinion for that reflected in the

evidence. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9th Cir. 1988);

Marcia v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 172, 177 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 22 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 23

B. Analysis

Ms. Castanon's treating physicians did not indicate any

limitations regarding lifting, sitting or standing. Dr. Chun, one

of Ms. Castanon's examining physicians, opined that Ms. Castanon was

capable of "occasionally lifting and carrying ten pounds." (AR

242). Dr. Chun also concluded that Ms. Castanon's ability to stand,

walk and sit was unrestricted. Id. Dr. Talcott, another examining

physician, indicated Ms. Castanon was able to lift in excess of

twenty pounds, but was only able to lift any amount on an

intermittent basis. (AR 261). Dr. Talcott also indicated that Ms.

Castanon could sit, stand, and walk for up to four hours of an

eight-hour workday. Id. Dr. Dann, a non-examining physician,

believed that Ms. Castanon was "capable of frequently lifting and

carrying twenty-five pounds, [and] occasionally lifting and carrying

fifty pounds with upper extremity limitations." (AR 244) Dr.

Mehrkhast, another non-examining physician, indicated that Ms.

Castanon could "occasionally lift twenty pounds [and] frequently

lift ten pounds." (AR 264-6). Drs. Dann and Mehrkhast indicated

that Ms. Castanon could sit and stand about six hours in an eighthour workday. (AR 244, 264).

1. Lifting Limitation

By concluding that Ms. Castanon was capable of light work, the

ALJ found that she could frequently lift and carry objects weighing

up to ten pounds and she could infrequently lift objects weighing up

to twenty pounds. The ALJ correctly found that the opinions of

Plaintiff's treating physicians, who did not provide any lifting

limitations, were more persuasive than the consultative and

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 23 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 24

examining physicians. Also, the ALJ correctly determined that the

treating sources' opinions were not determinative because all of the

examining and consultative physicians had opined that Plaintiff had

some lifting limitation. With the exception of Dr. Chun, all

examining and consulting physicians opined that Plaintiff could lift

more than twenty pounds. Therefore, the ALJ's conclusion that

Plaintiff could lift twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds

frequently was reasonable based on the medical records as a whole.

Ms. Castanon argues that, in determining her lifting RFC, the

ALJ adopted the opinion of the consultative physicians over the

opinions of the examining physicians. However, Ms. Castanon's

argument ignores the fact that her treating physicians did not

indicate any lifting restrictions for her. The ALJ, therefore, was

not only comparing the examining physicians' opinions with those of

the consultants; he was also comparing her treating physicians'

opinions with those of the other doctors and thus had to determine

what her RFC was from opinions ranging from no lifting limitations

to an opinion stating she could only lift ten pounds. Therefore,

the ALJ's opinion was a proper resolution of conflicting medical

opinions.

2. Sitting, Standing and Walking Limitations

Ms. Castanon does not respond to the Commissioner regarding the

ALJ's determination of her sitting, standing and walking RFC. 

Therefore, she may have conceded it. Nevertheless, the Court

concludes that the ALJ properly found that Ms. Castanon has no

sitting, standing or walking limitations.

Dr. Chun and both consulting physicians indicated that Ms.

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 24 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 25

Castanon could stand or walk six hours in an eight-hour workday. 

Only Dr. Talcott concluded that Ms. Castanon was limited in this

area. Ms. Castanon's treating physicians indicated no limitations

in this area. Thus, the ALJ's assessment that Ms. Castanon could

stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour day was a proper

resolution of conflicting medical opinions. 

IV. ALJ Failed to Conduct Proper RFC Determination

Ms. Castanon argues that the ALJ's reasons for his RFC, that it

was "a compromise, over time, based on the actual objective evidence

and testimony" falls short of the type of analysis the regulations

require. 

As discussed above, the ALJ properly determined Ms. Castanon's

RFC by resolving conflicting medical opinions. Therefore, this

claim is unavailing.

V. Remand for Reconsideration

Ms. Castanon asks the Court to reverse and award benefits or

remand for reconsideration. 

The Court has discretion to remand the case for further

administrative proceedings or to award payment of benefits. 

Swenson, 876 F.2d at 689. An award of benefits is appropriate where

no useful purpose would be served by further administrative

proceedings or when the record has been fully developed and there is

insufficient evidence to support the ALJ's conclusion. Rodriguez,

876 F.2d at 763. Where remand would only delay the receipt of

benefits, judgment for the plaintiff is appropriate. Id. However,

remand for further proceedings is appropriate where additional

proceedings could remedy defects. Id. 

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 25 of 26
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 26

At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ

determined that Ms. Castanon was not illiterate. In doing so, the

ALJ failed to establish with substantial evidence that Ms. Castanon

could read or write English. Furthermore, the ALJ did not explain

whether Ms. Castanon is able to perform the DOT requirements for the

jobs he indicated are available to her. Because the ALJ may be able

to remedy these deficiencies, remand is the proper remedy. 

The Court reverses the ALJ's decision and remands Plaintiff's

claim for further proceedings consistent with the Court's findings.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies both parties'

cross-motions for summary judgment, and grants Ms. Castanon's motion

to remand for further proceedings as instructed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 7/14/06

 

CLAUDIA WILKEN

United States District Judge

Case 4:05-cv-03098-CW Document 12 Filed 07/14/06 Page 26 of 26