Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01739/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-01739-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Antonio Mason Delgado
Petitioner
People of the State of California
Respondent

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ANTONIO MASON DELGADO, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MARTIN BITER,1

Respondent. 

No. 2:14-cv-1739 GGH P 

ORDER 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.2 Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered against 

him on February 22, 2010 in the Yolo County Superior Court on charges of attempted murder, 

mayhem, second degree robbery, assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, 

conspiracy to commit a felony, and criminal street gang activity. (CT 546.) Petitioner seeks 

federal habeas relief on the following grounds: (1) the conviction was based on insufficient 

 

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 “The People of the State of California” was previously named as the respondent. Martin Biter is 

currently the warden of Kern Valley State Prison, where petitioner is incarcerated. “A petitioner 

for habeas corpus relief must name the state officer having custody of him or her as the 

respondent to the petition.” Stanley v. California Supreme Court, 21 F.3d 359, 360 (9th 

Cir.1994) (citing Rule 2(a), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254). Accordingly, the court substitutes Martin 

Biter as respondent. 

2

 This action is before the undersigned pursuant to the parties’ consent to proceed before a 

magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 

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evidence that petitioner intended to kill the victim; (2) there was insufficient evidence to prove 

the crimes were for the benefit of a gang; and (3) admission of prior bad character evidence 

violated due process. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, the 

undersigned will order that petitioner’s application for habeas corpus relief be denied. 

BACKGROUND 

 In its memorandum and opinion, which was certified for partial publication, striking the 

great bodily injury enhancement, correcting a typographical error in the abstract of judgment, but 

affirming petitioner’s judgment of conviction in all other respects on appeal, the California Court 

of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following factual summary: 

David Eid was driving on West Capitol Avenue in West 

Sacramento around 3:00 a.m. on January 21, 2009, when he saw 

three men engaged in what he thought was horseplay. As he drove 

by, however, it looked like it was getting excessive because one of 

the men was down on the ground and the others were hitting him. 

Eid looked in his rearview mirror and saw the two men viciously 

punching and kicking the man on the ground. One man was at the 

victim's feet and was kicking him in the lower body and crotch. The 

other man was at the victim's head, “doing more of the beating on 

the head” and “really working on him.” The men were kicking the 

victim and appeared to be enjoying it. 

Eid made a U-turn and drove back. The victim was not moving, 

appeared to be “out cold,” and the two men were hitting and 

kicking him around like a “rag doll.” It was “pretty brutal” and they 

were “giving it all they had.” The attack was not constant; the men 

would step back, then kick and hit the victim again. Eid gunned his 

engine and when the men saw that Eid was going to stop his truck, 

they took off running. Eid did not get a good look at their faces, but 

one man, who was wearing a baseball cap, had a look of defiance. 

Eid called 9–1–1 and told the dispatcher that the victim, later 

identified as Jacques Harpst, was “having a hard time breathing,” 

was “gurgling,” and was “not responsive.” Harpst's pockets were 

pulled out and Eid thought the two men “might have rolled him.” 

Officer Jack Hatton responded to the scene. Harpst was bleeding 

profusely from his mouth and nose, and both of his eyes were 

swollen to the size of golf balls. Harpst made gurgling sounds as he 

tried to breathe. Hatton suspected defendant, who lived a block 

away, was involved. A subsequent investigation proved that his 

suspicions were correct, and that defendant's accomplice was 

Michael Romero. 

Harpst, age 48, did not recall the beating but remembered waking 

up in the hospital and being there for several months. Harpst was in 

the neurosurgery intensive care unit at UC Davis Medical Center. 

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According to his brother Michael, Harpst was not “conscious” 

when Michael first came to visit him in the hospital, and Harpst had 

tubes down his throat. Michael remembered Harpst becoming 

“conscious” a couple weeks after the attack, when Harpst began 

moving his eyes and arms and began fighting to get out of his 

restraints. According to Michael, the beating altered Harpst's 

memory, hearing, sense of smell and ability to use a computer. 

Dr. David Shatz, a trauma surgeon, was one of the healthcare 

providers who treated Harpst. A trauma surgeon takes care of the 

most severely injured patients, and when certain criteria are met, 

paramedics take a patient directly to a trauma center rather than a 

standard emergency room. Dr. Shatz saw Harpst when he first 

arrived, and based on a review of Harpst's medical charts, Dr. Shatz 

testified that Harpst had facial fractures and “a depressed mental 

status.” 

Dr. Shatz described the Glasgow Coma Scale, which physicians use 

to grade degrees of brain impairment. The Glasgow Coma Scale 

takes into account three aspects: the ability to move, the ability to 

speak, and the ability to move one's eyes around. The worst score a 

person can have is one point in each of the three categories, a 

Glasgow Coma Scale score of 3. A person with a score of 3 is 

“totally comatose.” According to Dr. Shatz, a dead body would 

have a score of 3. The best possible score, the score for a normal 

healthy person, is a score of 15. A drunk person would likely score 

a 14. A score of 8 means the brain is severely injured and the 

person cannot protect his or her airway from aspirating vomit. 

Dr. Shatz said Harpst scored a 9 on the Glasgow Coma Scale, 

which reflected a severe brain injury. Because of the severe injury, 

doctors opted to intubate him to protect his airway. When the 

prosecutor asked Dr. Shatz if it was fair to say in laymen's terms 

that Harpst was comatose, the doctor replied, “I will stick with the 

scale.” Harpst remained on a ventilator for a few days, and was in 

the intensive care unit for a month. Dr. Shatz testified that Harpst 

was “conscious” during the month he was in the intensive care unit, 

but Harpst was unable to push the nursing button for assistance. 

Detective Warren Estrada interviewed defendant's girlfriend, 

Vanessa Ramos, and a recording of the interview was played for the 

jury. Ramos also testified at trial, although she was less 

forthcoming than in her interview with Estrada. Ramos identified 

Romero as the man who was with defendant when Harpst was 

beaten. She stated that defendant had been a member of the Red 

Nose Pittz, a Norteño gang, for a number of years. The Red Nose 

Pittz liked to jump people. In fact, defendant's brother was locked 

up for assaulting a light rail inspector. Ramos stated the gang will 

beat up whoever “talks shit to [th]em” or happens to walk by when 

the gang members are drunk. 

On the night in question, Ramos was with defendant, Romero and 

Erica Raya at Raya's apartment. Defendant was wearing a cap and a 

white jacket, and Romero had on a dark jacket. Defendant and 

Romero walked to Del Taco and returned about 1:00 a.m. They all 

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sat around talking and then the two men left to “bum a cigarette” 

off someone. Defendant and Romero returned around 2:00 or 3:00 

a.m. Romero was out of breath and immediately went into the 

bathroom because he had blood on his hands. He also had a tooth in 

his fist; Romero removed the tooth and put it in his wallet. 

Defendant told Ramos he asked a guy walking by for a cigarette 

and the guy “flipped out.” Romero said he ran up to the guy 

because he thought the guy was going to hit defendant. Ramos 

asked if defendant hit the guy, and defendant said “no,” but then 

said “yes.” Defendant said Romero kept hitting the guy. According 

to Ramos, Romero appeared “fucking happy that he hit the guy or 

something.” Ramos also said defendant told her he wanted a 

cigarette, but then wanted to see if the guy had any money. She told 

him it was “hella stupid” to rob people. Defendant asked Ramos to 

check if he had blood on his white jacket but she did not see any. 

According to Raya, when defendant and Romero returned to her 

apartment they said they had beaten a guy who reacted badly when 

defendant asked for a cigarette. They all spent the night at Raya's 

place, and later on that morning she heard defendant say they beat 

up the guy and robbed him. 

Detective Estrada interviewed defendant in February 2009, and a 

redacted recording of the interview was played for the jury. 

Initially, defendant denied hitting Harpst. But defendant eventually 

said he hit Harpst's neck or face once at the beginning of the 

altercation, and that Romero did most of the fighting. Defendant 

thought Romero probably believed Harpst was disrespecting him 

when Harpst “flipped out” about their request for a cigarette and 

then threw one at defendant. When Detective Estrada asked what 

defendant would do if someone disrespected him in front of his 

“homeboys,” defendant said, “You disrespect them back.” 

Defendant said rumors were going around about the fight, and 

people said the victim was dead or brain dead. 

Officer Anthony Herrera also interviewed defendant. Defendant 

told Officer Herrera the altercation started because the victim 

disrespected defendant by throwing cigarettes at him. Defendant 

said he hit Harpst a few times, but mainly in the leg area. According 

to defendant, Romero stomped on Harpst's head. 

Officer Herrera's main focus during the interview was on 

defendant's gang activity. Defendant belonged to the Red Nose Pittz 

and his gang friends called him Ryda because he was willing “to 

ride for the gang,” which meant to commit crimes for them. 

Defendant admitted that he and other gang members would beat up 

and rob people; it was part of being in the gang. During one of 

Officer Herrera's previous contacts with defendant, he told Officer 

Herrera they committed crimes to show the Broderick Boys that the 

Red Nose Pittz were worthy of being a Norteño in the Broderick 

area, and because they were tired of getting beaten up by the 

Broderick Boys. The Broderick Boys were the predominant gang in 

the West Sacramento area. 

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Officer Michael Duggins testified as a gang expert regarding 

Norteños in general, and the Red Nose Pittz in particular. The 

Norteños' principal activities are assault with great bodily injury, 

murder and robbery. The Red Nose Pittz and the Broderick Boys 

are both Norteño subsets, and their rivals are the Sureños. The Red 

Nose Pittz are from Citrus Heights, while the Broderick Boys' 

territory is West Sacramento. According to Officer Duggins, both 

defendant and Romero were active members of the Red Nose Pittz. 

Officer Duggins said that to get into a gang, it is not enough to 

associate with gang members; one has to engage in criminal activity 

that will benefit the gang. The use of force or fear creates respect 

with gang members. Gang members typically use monikers. A 

common one is Ryda, which means you are willing to ride along 

with the gang to party or commit crimes with them. Officer 

Duggins reviewed various photographs of defendant, Romero and 

other gang members throwing gang signs and wearing gang colors, 

and explained how they indicated their gang involvement. Officer 

Duggins had prior contacts with defendant in which defendant 

admitted he was a gang member. 

Officer Duggins opined that the beating and robbery of Harpst was 

committed in furtherance of the gang because (1) the gang member 

and gang gained a material benefit from whatever was taken from 

the victim, and (2) the gang member and gang achieved an increase 

in status. According to Officer Duggins, the crime increased 

defendant's status in the gang, and elevated the gang's status in the 

community via word of mouth. Officer Duggins testified that when 

he and fellow law enforcement officers were investigating the 

assault, many people had heard about the crime. Defendant and 

Romero were well-known gang members and these offenses 

elevated the gang's status. Ramos, defendant's girlfriend, told 

Officer Duggins that defendant had participated with other gang 

members in assaulting and robbing people to gain the gang's 

respect, and that they would brag about their escapades “to show 

that they had put in work for the gang.” 

(Res’t’s Lod. Doc. 1 at 3-8; 213 Cal.App.4th 660, 662-66, 153 Cal. Rptr.3d 260 (2013).) 

After petitioner’s judgment of conviction was affirmed except as outlined above by the 

California Court of Appeal, he filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. 

(Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 5.) The Supreme Court denied the petition without comment or citation on 

May 2, 2013. (Resp’t’s Lod. Doc. 6.) On July 23, 2014, petitioner filed the instant federal habeas 

petition in this court. 

DISCUSSION 

I. AEDPA Standards 

 The statutory limitations of federal courts’ power to issue habeas corpus relief for persons 

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in state custody is provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The text of § 2254(d) states: 

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 

custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 

granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits 

in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim- 

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the 

State court proceeding. 

 As a preliminary matter, the Supreme Court has recently held and reconfirmed “that § 

2254(d) does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have 

been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011). 

Rather, “when a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied 

relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence 

of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Id. at 784-785, citing Harris 

v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) (presumption of a merits determination when 

it is unclear whether a decision appearing to rest on federal grounds was decided on another 

basis). “The presumption may be overcome when there is reason to think some other explanation 

for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Id. at 785. 

 The Supreme Court has set forth the operative standard for federal habeas review of state 

court decisions under AEDPA as follows: “For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), ‘an unreasonable

application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Harrington, 

supra, 131 S. Ct. at 785, citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410, 120 S. Ct. 1495 (2000). 

“A state court’s determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at 786, 

citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004). 

Accordingly, “a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or ... 

could have supported[] the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible 

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fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the 

holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. “Evaluating whether a rule application was 

unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the rule, the more 

leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.’” Id. Emphasizing the 

stringency of this standard, which “stops short of imposing a complete bar of federal court 

relitigation of claims already rejected in state court proceedings[,]” the Supreme Court has 

cautioned that “even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion 

was unreasonable.” Id., citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003). 

 The undersigned also finds that the same deference is paid to the factual determinations of 

state courts. Under § 2254(d)(2), factual findings of the state courts are presumed to be correct 

subject only to a review of the record which demonstrates that the factual finding(s) “resulted in a 

decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the state court proceeding.” It makes no sense to interpret “unreasonable” in § 

2254(d)(2) in a manner different from that same word as it appears in § 2254(d)(1) – i.e., the 

factual error must be so apparent that “fairminded jurists” examining the same record could not 

abide by the state court factual determination. A petitioner must show clearly and convincingly 

that the factual determination is unreasonable. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S. Ct. 

969, 974 (2006). 

 The habeas corpus petitioner bears the burden of demonstrating the objectively 

unreasonable nature of the state court decision in light of controlling Supreme Court authority. 

Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 123 S. Ct. 357 (2002). Specifically, the petitioner “must 

show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in 

justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond 

any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, supra, 131 S. Ct. at 786-787. “Clearly 

established” law is law that has been “squarely addressed” by the United States Supreme Court. 

Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125, 128 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008). Thus, extrapolations of 

settled law to unique situations will not qualify as clearly established. See e.g., Carey v. 

Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76, 127 S. Ct. 649, 653-54 (2006) (established law not permitting state 

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sponsored practices to inject bias into a criminal proceeding by compelling a defendant to wear 

prison clothing or by unnecessary showing of uniformed guards does not qualify as clearly 

established law when spectators’ conduct is the alleged cause of bias injection). The established 

Supreme Court authority reviewed must be a pronouncement on constitutional principles, or other 

controlling federal law, as opposed to a pronouncement of statutes or rules binding only on 

federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9, 123 S. Ct. 362, 366 (2002). 

 When a state court decision on a petitioner’s claims rejects some claims but does not 

expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that 

the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 

1088, 1091 (2013). However, if the state courts have not adjudicated the merits of the federal 

issue, no AEDPA deference is given; the issue is reviewed de novo under general principles of 

federal law. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2012). 

The state courts need not have cited to federal authority, or even have indicated awareness 

of federal authority in arriving at their decision. Early, supra, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S. Ct. at 365. 

However, where the state courts have not addressed the constitutional issue in dispute in any 

reasoned opinion, the federal court will independently review the record in adjudication of that 

issue. “Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but 

rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is 

objectively unreasonable.” Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). 

II. Insufficient Evidence 

 A. Legal Standards 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against 

conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 

crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 

368 (1970). When a challenge is brought alleging insufficient evidence, federal habeas corpus 

relief is available if it is found that upon the record evidence adduced at trial, viewed in the light 

most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found “the essential 

elements of the crime” proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 

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319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Jackson established a two-step inquiry for 

considering a challenge to a conviction based on sufficiency of the evidence. U.S. v. Nevils, 598 

F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc). First, the court considers the evidence at trial in the 

light most favorable to the prosecution. Id., citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 

L.Ed.2d 560. “‘[W]hen faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting 

inferences,” a reviewing court ‘must presume-even if it does not affirmatively appear in the 

record-that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer 

to that resolution.’” Id., quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. 

“Second, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a 

reviewing court must determine whether this evidence, so viewed is adequate to allow ‘any 

rational trier of fact [to find] the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’“ Id., 

quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560. “At this second step, we must 

reverse the verdict if the evidence of innocence, or lack of evidence of guilt, is such that all 

rational fact finders would have to conclude that the evidence of guilt fails to establish every 

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. 

Superimposed on these already stringent insufficiency standards is the AEDPA 

requirement that even if a federal court were to initially find on its own that no reasonable jury 

should have arrived at its conclusion, the federal court must also determine that the state appellate 

court not have affirmed the verdict under the Jackson standard in the absence of an unreasonable 

determination. Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262 (9th Cir. 2005). 

 B. Sufficient Evidence of Intent to Kill 

 In his first claim, petitioner contends that there was “insufficient evidence of a planned 

intent to kill Harpst because it was the unjoined principal who escalated his conduct resulting in 

the serious injuries suffered by the victim in this case.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Petitioner claims that it 

was Michael Romero who was doing more of the beating around the victim’s head and torso, and 

that petitioner was not harming Harpst in any “vital bodily areas,” but was hitting him near the 

shin and ankles. (Id.) Respondent contends that this argument is faulty for two reasons, because 

the standard in McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133 (2010), is to collect all evidence in support 

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of judgment and view the jury’s explicit and implicit findings with deference, and because the 

state court found in the alternative that the evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner of 

attempted murder under a natural and probable consequence or aider and abettor theory, thus 

obviating the requirement of a specific intent to kill. 

 The California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that there was insufficient evidence 

of specific intent to kill, as set forth in the following portion of the opinion:

Defendant contends his conviction for attempted murder must be 

reversed because the evidence is insufficient to prove he harbored 

the specific intent to kill, or that he aided and abetted Romero in 

committing attempted murder. Defendant maintains he simply 

kicked Harpst in the lower half of his body, while Romero punched 

and kicked Harpst’s head; that the nature of defendant’s assault on 

Harpst does not support an inference that he intended to kill Harpst 

rather than simply hurt him; and that attempted murder is not a 

natural and probable consequence of any of the crimes he aided and 

abetted Romero in committing against Harpst. We disagree. 

In reviewing the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to 

support the verdict, we view the entire record in the light most 

favorable to the judgment, and presume in support of the verdict the 

existence of every fact a jury reasonably could have deduced from 

the evidence. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1156.) 

The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict if, so viewed, a 

rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime 

beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.Wilson (2006) 138 

Cal.App.4th 1197, 1201.) 

The specific intent to kill is a requisite element of attempted 

murder. (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739.) It is 

essentially the same as express malice, which requires a showing 

that the assailant either desires the victim’s death or knows to a 

substantial certainty that the result will occur. (Ibid.) There is 

rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s intent to kill; it “’must 

usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, 

including the defendant’s actions.’” (Id. at p. 741.) 

‘“A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty 

of not only the intended crime [target offense] but also of any other 

crime the perpetrator actually commits [nontarget offense] that is a 

natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter 

question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the 

additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably

foreseeable. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Liability under the natural and 

probable consequences doctrine ‘is measured by whether a 

reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have or should 

have known that the charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable 

consequence of the act aided and abetted.’ [Citation.]” (People v. 

Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 920.) 

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“‘[T]o be reasonably foreseeable “[t]he consequence need not have 

been a strong probability; a possible consequence which might 

reasonably have been contemplated is enough....” [Citation.]’ 

[Citation.] A reasonably foreseeable consequence is to be evaluated 

under all the factual circumstances of the individual case [citation] 

and is a factual issue to be resolved by the jury.” (People v. 

Medina, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 920.) 

Here, defendant and Romero viciously attacked Harpst for nothing 

more than feeling disrespected because he tossed a cigarette at 

defendant. While Romero wailed away at Harpst’s head, defendant 

kicked at Harpst’s legs and torso, thereby ensuring Harpst could not 

get up and escape from the assault.3 According to Eid, the two men 

were brutally kicking the victim around like a rag doll, “giving it all 

they had,” and they appeared to be enjoying it. Eid believed the 

men “weren’t horsing around because [Harpst] just wasn’t moving, 

and they were still beating on him pretty good.” Eid turned his 

truck around and drove back to intervene because, in his opinion, if 

he had not done so “they would have killed him.” The beating 

inflicted by Romero and defendant was so severe that Harpst 

suffered a significant brain injury, multiple facial fractures, his eyes 

were swollen to the size of golf balls, and blood was pouring from 

his mouth and nose. The nature of the attack and the severity of the 

injuries supports an inference that both men intended to kill Harpst. 

That Romero might have delivered the worst of the blows does not 

absolve defendant of liability for attempted murder. Defendant 

does not dispute that he knowingly and intentionally participated in 

the attack on Harpst, or that the evidence is sufficient to support his 

and Romero’s convictions for mayhem, and assault by means of 

force likely to cause great bodily injury. Thus, even if the evidence 

were not sufficient to support an inference that defendant intended 

to kill Harpst, the evidence demonstrates that defendant is guilty of 

attempted murder on an aiding and abetting theory. He 

intentionally assisted Romero in a vicious assault that was carried 

out in such a manner that a reasonable person would have foreseen 

that Romero was trying to kill Harpst; that is, attempted murder was 

a natural and probable consequence of the assault with great bodily 

injury. Rather than stopping when Romero escalated the attack 

against the helpless victim, defendant chose to pause, step back, and 

then continue kicking Harpst. Substantial evidence supports the 

verdict of attempted murder. 

(Res’t’s Lod. Doc.1 at 8-10.) 

 Petitioner’s claim is limited to challenging the attempted murder conviction on the basis 

 

3

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(1) Eid indicated one man was at Harpst’s head doing more of the beating on the head while the 

other attacker was at Harpst’s feet, and (2) when defendant and Romero returned to Raya’s 

apartment, Romero had a tooth in his fist and blood on his hands while defendant did not have 

blood on his white jacket. 

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of his lack of specific intent to kill. That conviction, however, was based also on the alternative 

theory of liability, aiding and abetting. The Court of Appeal specifically found that if the 

evidence of intent to kill was not sufficient, it was sufficient to find that petitioner aided and 

abetted Romero because a reasonable person would foresee that Romero was trying to kill Harpst 

and therefore his assault with great bodily injury would naturally and probably result in attempted 

murder. The undisputed facts are that petitioner participated in the beating, and although 

focusing on the victim’s legs, he was well aware of Delgado’s actions and that they reflected an 

intent to kill. Petitioner could have stopped, and in fact paused momentarily, but then continued 

the kicking. But for the bystander stopping the beating, the victim most likely would have died. 

A reasonable person could foresee this result, and petitioner does not dispute that he aided and 

abetted Romero. As petitioner does not contest this alternative theory, it stands. 

 In any event, there was also sufficient evidence of intent to kill on petitioner’s part. 

Petitioner kicked at the victim’s legs and feet, ensuring he could not escape, and while the victim 

was in a state of total submission, lying lifeless on the ground at the time witness Eid drove by. 

Petitioner was beating the victim “like a rag doll” and “giving it all they had,” according to the 

witness. Both petitioner and Romero “appeared to be enjoying it,” according to Eid. (RT. 291-

92.) Eid testified that if he had not stopped at the scene, “they would have killed him.” (RT. 

296.) The severity of Harpst’s injuries also supported intent to kill. (RT. 319-24.) 

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state court’s decision rejecting his 

insufficiency of the evidence claim in regard to specific intent to kill, was contrary to or an 

unreasonable application of federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts of 

this case. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief on this claim. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(d). 

C. Sufficient Evidence That Crimes Were Committed for Benefit of Criminal Street Gang 

 Petitioner’s second claim is that there was insufficient evidence that the crimes were gang 

related or benefitted the Red Nose Pittz or the Nortenos, because Officer Duggins, the 

prosecution’s gang expert, testified on cross-examination that he was not aware of anyone in the 

community who had heard of this incident, aside from Vanessa and Erica, which contradicted his 

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earlier testimony that police had talked to a lot of people who had heard about it.4 Petitioner also 

argues that during the crime, he and Romero were not wearing gang colors; they did not announce 

themselves as gang members by words or signs; they did not mention rival gangs, gang turf, or 

that the crime was payback for a crime committed against the Red Nose Pittz or Nortenos. 

Petitioner also points to Duggins’ testimony that petitioner, as a Red Nose Pitt, could not do 

criminal activity on Broderick Boy turf without their permission. 

In this regard, the California Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, reasoning as 

follows: 

Defendant next contends there is insufficient evidence that he 

committed the charged crimes for the benefit of a criminal street 

gang within the meaning of section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). 

“In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support an enhancement, we review the entire record in the light 

most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains 

substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, 

and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could find 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We 

presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could 

have reasonably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the 

circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal 

of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances 

might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. 

[Citation.] ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor 

reevaluates a witness’s credibility.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Albillar

(2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59-60 (Albillar).) 

Section 186.22, subdivision (b), does not criminalize mere gang 

membership, and not every crime committed by a gang member is 

gang related. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60; In re Frank S.

(2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1196.) The prosecution’s proof of 

defendant’s gang membership at the time of the offense does not, 

by itself, support the enhancement; the prosecution must also prove 

that (1) defendant committed the crime “’for the benefit of, at the 

direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang,’” and 

(2) defendant committed the crime with the specific intent to assist 

in any criminal conduct by gang members. (Albillar, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 59.) 

Defendant does not dispute that the second prong of the statute is 

met, because there is substantial evidence that he intended to and 

did commit the charged felonies with Romero, a known member of 

the Red Nose Pittz gang. Under the circumstances, the jury could 

 

4

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reputation in the gang. 

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fairly infer that defendant had the specific intent to promote, 

further, or assist Romero’s criminal conduct. (Albillar, supra, 51 

Cal.4th at p. 68.) 

But defendant challenges the evidence in support of the first prong. 

A crime can satisfy the first prong when it is committed in 

association with the gang, or when it is committed for the benefit of 

the gang. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 60.) Evidence that gang 

members acted in concert can provide substantial evidence the 

crime was committed in association with the gang (id. at pp. 60-63), 

and expert opinion is admissible as part of the evidentiary showing 

on how the crimes can benefit the gang (id. at pp. 63-64). For 

example, “[e]xpert opinion that particular criminal conduct 

benefited a gang by enhancing its reputation for viciousness can be 

sufficient to raise the inference that the conduct was ‘committed for 

the benefit of ... a[] criminal street gang’ within the meaning of 

section 186.22(b)(1). (See, e.g., People v. Vazquez (2009) 178 

Cal.App.4th 347, 354 [relying on expert opinion that the murder of 

a nongang member benefited the gang because ‘violent crimes ... 

elevate the status of the gang within the gang culture and intimidate 

neighborhood residents who are ... “fearful... that they may be the 

gang’s next victim...’”]; People v. Romero (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 

15, 19 [relying on expert opinion that ‘a shooting of any AfricanAmerican men would elevate the status of the shooters and their 

entire [Latino] gang’].)” (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 63.) 

Defendant argues that no rational trier of fact could find the crimes 

benefitted the Nortenos and/or the Red Nose Pittz gang. According 

to defendant, “the primary evidence here was the gang expert’s 

testimony, which was based on purely general principles and 

speculation, rather than on facts specific to this case.” Defendant 

believes the evidence shows nothing more than that he is a gang 

member, and that he committed the charged crimes with Romero 

for their own purposes. This is so, he argues, because the crimes 

were not committed against a rival gang member, and there is no 

evidence defendant and Romero yelled gang slogans or threw gang 

signs. Defendant’s argument is not persuasive. 

The evidence at trial disclosed that defendant and Romero were 

both members of the Red Nose Pittz gang, a Norteno subset. 

Officer Duggins testified that committing crimes elevates a 

member’s status within the gang, as well as the gang’s status in the 

community when the word gets out, and word does get out. He 

explained that the use of force or fear creates respect with gang 

members. When law enforcement investigated the crime, many 

people had heard about the assault on Harpst committed by wellknown Nortenos. Defendant even commented that he had heard 

rumors about the assault, including that the victim was dead or 

brain dead. 

Defendant told Officer Herrera that the Red Nose Pittz assaulted 

people to show the Broderick Boys that the Red Nose Pittz were 

worthy of being Nortenos in the Broderick area, and because they 

were tired of getting beaten up by the Broderick Boys. Ramos told 

the police the Red Nose Pittz liked to jump people and rob them in 

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order to gain respect from other Nortenos. According to Ramos, 

the gang will beat up anyone who “talks shit to [th]em.” Defendant 

told Officer Herrera and Detective Estrada that Romero and 

defendant assaulted Harpst after he disrespected them by throwing a 

cigarette at them. Defendant told Detective Estrada that when 

someone disrespects you in front of your “homeboy,” you 

disrespect them back. 

The evidence shows that defendant, in association with Romero, a 

fellow gang member assaulted Harpst because they felt disrespected 

by him, and when you are disrespected in front of a fellow gang 

member you have to respond. Their response was to assault and 

rob Harpst, the type of crimes their gang committed to gain the 

respect of the Broderick Boys. People in the community had heard 

about the attack and the serious injuries suffered by Harpst, all of 

which benefitted the gang’s status in the community. There is 

substantial evidence the crimes were gang related. 

Defendant counters that there was evidence an attack in the 

Broderick Boys’ territory could create problems for the Red Nose 

Pittz because the assault would increase police presence in the area, 

which the Broderick Boys would construe as disrespecting their 

territory. However, a finding supported by substantial evidence 

will not be set aside merely because the circumstances might also 

be reconciled with a contrary finding. (Albillar, supra, 51 Cal.4th 

at p.60.) Whether the attack on Harpst was gang related or personal 

was a question for the jury, which was appropriately instructed that 

there needed to be evidence beyond the gang expert’s opinion and 

the mere fact of defendant’s gang membership in order to return a 

true finding on the gang enhancement. The jury decided the crimes 

committed against Harpst were gang related, and substantial 

evidence supports its determination. 

(Res’t’s Lod. Doc.1 at 10-14.) 

In this case, petitioner received an enhanced sentence for criminal street gang activity 

pursuant to Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1), which imposes penalties for “any person who is convicted 

of a felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal 

street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang 

members....” People v. Albillar, 51 Cal.4th 47, 56 (2010). 

 Respondent contends that petitioner’s argument is limited to rehashing points already 

made on direct appeal and rejected by that court. Addressing petitioner’s points one at a time, it 

is true that Officer Estrada conceded on cross-examination that he did not see any gang signs 

exhibited at the scene where the victim was on January 21st. Nor did anyone in any of his 

interviews report seeing evidence of gang signs at the scene. (RT. 448-49.) 

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Nevertheless, the evidence as set forth by the court of appeals and in the record constitutes 

sufficient evidence that the crimes at issue were gang related. 

The Court of Appeals discussed the evidence which showed that “many people had heard 

about the assault on Harpst committed by well-known Nortenos. Defendant even commented that 

he had heard rumors about the assault, including that the victim was dead or brain dead.” (Res’t’s 

Lod. Doc. 1 at 12-13.) Furthermore, the transcript of record elaborates the evidence in support. 

Officer Duggins testified: “when we went out and we were looking for Mr. Delgado and Mr. 

Romero, we were talking to a lot of people, and a lot of people had heard about this crime, and 

that elevated their status....” (RT 721.) Petitioner claims that Officer Duggins admitted on crossexamination that he was not aware of anyone in the community who had heard of this incident 

from appellant other than Vanessa and Erica. (ECF No. 1 at 7.) (emphasis in original). That 

statement is taken out of context however. The full colloquy on this subject was as follows: 

 Q (by defendant’s attorney): You testified that out in the community there was quite a bit 

going around about this particular incident, the January 21st, 2009, incident? 

 A: Yes, ma’am. 

 Q: And isn’t it fair to say that a lot of that out in the community came from the police 

officers? 

 A: I don’t know if it’s fair to say. We didn’t cause that incident to happen. We were 

trying to find Mr. Delgado and Mr. Romero, and in the course of that we contacted a lot of 

people, and a lot of people we contacted had heard about that prior to us contacting them. 

 Q: Who had they heard it from? 

 A: People in their community, other people. 

 Q: Anything from Mr. Delgado? 

 A: Well, the night of Vanessa told us in an interview that he came back and was telling 

her about it. 

 Q: Other than Vanessa Ramos? 

 A: And Erica Raya. 

 Q: Other than what we’ve already heard? 

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 A: Not that I’m [a]ware of, no. 

 Q: So you’re not aware of any kind of bragging, other than what we’ve heard here, if you 

can consider that bragging? 

 A: No, ma’am. 

(RT. 751-52.) Taking this questioning in context, it is safe to infer that the officers heard about 

this crime from “a lot of people” and that the number amounts to more than just Ms. Ramos and 

Ms. Raya, which would be only a couple of people. It might be safe to infer that defendant, 

Romero, Ramos and/or Raya may have been responsible for word getting out to “a lot of people.” 

 Elsewhere, Officer Duggins testified as follows: 

 Q: Do you have any particular comments that were made to members of the gang that 

were bragging about the particular incident? 

 A: Not to the members of the Nortenos, but to members in the community. 

 Q: Specifically from Mr. Delgado? 

 A: Yes. 

 Q: Other than Ms. Ramos and Ms. Raya? 

 A: Other than them, no. 

(RT. 771.) Officer Duggins provided a source for the awareness in the community that this crime 

had been committed by petitioner, and that was petitioner himself, as well as Ms. Ramos and Ms. 

Raya. 

Moreover, Officer Herrera, the officer who interviewed petitioner after he was taken into 

custody, focused on gang questions, based on his training. (RT. 508-09.) He testified about a 

photo in which petitioner was throwing gang signs, (RT. 513), about petitioner’s gang nickname, 

(RT. 516), and that petitioner admitted he was with the Red Nose Pittz gang. (RT. 516). 

Petitioner conceded to this police officer that his gang related activities include beating and 

robbing people in order to garner respect with the Broderick Boys, the predominant West 

Sacramento gang. (RT. 517-18.) Petitioner told Officer Herrera that he and his fellow gang 

members would tell people they were committing crimes and spread the word so that the 

Broderick Boys would hear about it and think they were cool. (Id. at 518-19.) Officer Duggins’ 

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testimony, along with petitioner’s statements to Officer Herrera, support the bragging aspect of 

benefitting the gang, and also refutes petitioner’s contention that no one in the community had 

heard about the incident, especially since the goal of the beating was to make sure the Broderick 

Boys heard about it. 

Petitioner’s own account to Officer Herrera was that he started hitting the victim because 

the victim had disrespected him and that because Michael Romero, another gang member, was 

with him and would look down on petitioner if he did not do anything to react to the disrespect. 

(Id. at 525.) Officer Herrera also testified that he interviewed Ms. Ramos (RT. 547), and she told 

him that petitioner had been engaged in gang activity for a couple of months around the time of 

this incident, that he and Romero were doing these crimes to get respect from the Broderick Boys 

(RT. 550), and that on the night of the incident he told her they were “going to go look for 

somebody to rob or to roll” and/or beat up. (RT. 551). When they returned from the crimes, 

petitioner told Ms. Ramos that they had “robbed some guy and they punched, kicked, and 

stomped him and Romero pulled a tooth out of his – one of his knuckles.” (Id. at 551.) Petitioner 

admitted to Officer Herrera that the only crimes he admitted to committing were robbing and 

beating up people, that he did them as part of being a member of a criminal street gang, and had 

done so a few times. (Id. at 563-64.) 

This evidence fully supports the jury’s finding that petitioner engaged in the crimes for the 

benefit of a criminal street gang. The state courts’ denial of habeas relief with respect to 

petitioner’s insufficient evidence claim is not an objectively unreasonable application of Jackson 

and Winship to the facts of the case. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas 

relief with respect to this claim. 

III. Prior Bad Act Evidence 

 Petitioner’s last claim is that despite the court’s ruling that his prior misdemeanor arrest 

for assault would be excluded under Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1101(a) and 352, evidence came in 

through Detective Estrada’s testimony which referred to plaintiff’s history of assaults, and 

violated his due process rights. 

/ / / 

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The California Court of Appeal rejected the argument that prior bad act evidence violated 

petitioner’s due process rights, as set forth in the following portion of the opinion: 

Defendant maintains he was denied due process when evidence of a 

prior bad act was presented to the jury, despite the trial court’s prior 

ruling excluding the evidence. He argues the error was prejudicial 

because it diverted the jury’s attention from the reasonable doubts 

inherent in the prosecution’s case by portraying defendant as an 

antisocial individual of generally bad character. 

During the trial, defense counsel moved to prohibit the prosecution 

from introducing evidence of defendant’s prior misdemeanor 

behavior involving the assault of a “bum,” as well as the fact of 

defendant’s probationary status. Defense counsel sought to exclude 

specific portions of Ramos’s interview. The trial court ordered that 

the specified portions be redacted from the recording and transcript 

of the interview. The trial court added: “Let me make my position 

clear. [¶] I would bar testimony or evidence of the defendant’s 

prior misdemeanor behavior for an assault on some, what we’ll call, 

bum under [Evidence Code section] 1101 [,subdivision] (a) and 

under [Evidence Code section] 352.” 

Although the prosecutor redacted most of the statements from 

Ramos’s interview, one specified reference was missed. Detective 

Estrada mentioned defendant’s arrest for beating up a bum and 

asked Ramos if she knew of other incidents where defendant 

assaulted anyone. Ramos replied that she only knew about “[t]his 

one and the bum.” 

Thereafter, before the jury heard the recording of defendant’s 

pretrial interview, defense counsel objected to anything coming in 

that contravened the trial court’s prior ruling. Defense counsel 

singled out specific objectionable portions of the transcript of 

defendant’s interview. The trial court ordered certain redactions. 

But the transcript of defendant’s interview given to the jury (while 

it heard the recording of the interview) includes a reference by 

defendant to the fact he “almost [got] convicted of something like 

this before” and Detective Estrada’s response, “I know you have a 

history of this ....” 

Defendant’s claim of error is unavailing because it is inconceivable 

that he suffered any prejudice from the jury hearing the 

aforementioned portions of Ramos’s and defendant’s interviews. 

From other properly admitted evidence, the jury knew that 

defendant and his gang, in an effort to establish their worthiness as 

Nortenos, jumped or beat up people who dared to “talk[] shit to 

[t]hem.” More importantly, Eid testified he witnessed Harpst 

brutally beaten by two men, and defendant admitted that he, and 

fellow gang member Romero, assaulted Harpst over a tossed 

cigarette and perceived disrespect. But for Eid’s intervention, 

Harpst might not have survived. Under the circumstances, it is not 

reasonably probable that absent the alleged evidentiary errors the 

jury would have returned different verdicts on any of the charges. 

(People v. Cudijo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611.) In fact, the alleged 

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errors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. 

California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711].) 

(Res’t’s Lod. Doc.1 at 14-15.) 

 Respondent counters that not only were the state court’s reasons for denying relief 

reasonable as set forth, but more importantly there is no clearly established Supreme Court 

precedent requiring the state court to grant relief because admission of evidence violates due 

process. 

A federal writ of habeas corpus is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or 

application of state law. Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 131 S.Ct. 13, 16 (2010). Absent some 

federal constitutional violation, a violation of state law does not provide a basis for habeas relief. 

Id. A petitioner may not “transform a state-law issue into a federal one” merely by asserting a 

violation of the federal constitution. Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1997). 

Rather, petitioner must show that the decision of the California Court of Appeals “violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Little v. Crawford, 449 F.3d 1075, 1083 (9th 

Cir.2006) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991)). Accordingly, to the extent 

petitioner's due process claims are based on alleged violations of state law governing the 

admissibility of evidence, they should be rejected. 

A state court's evidentiary ruling, even if erroneous, (or erroneously not followed as in this 

case), is grounds for federal habeas relief only if it renders the state proceedings so fundamentally 

unfair as to violate due process. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir.2009); 

Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir.1991). 

Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit has observed: 

The Supreme Court has made very few rulings regarding the 

admission of evidence as a violation of due process. Although the 

Court has been clear that a writ should be issued when 

constitutional errors have rendered the trial fundamentally unfair 

(citation omitted), it has not yet made a clear ruling that admission 

of irrelevant or overtly prejudicial evidence constitutes a due 

process violation sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ. 

Holley, 568 F.3d at 1101. Therefore, “under AEDPA, even clearly erroneous admissions of 

evidence that render a trial fundamentally unfair may not permit the grant of federal habeas 

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corpus relief if not forbidden by ‘clearly established Federal law,’ as laid out by the Supreme 

Court.” Id. On the basis of these authorities, the state court's rejection of petitioner's due process 

claim here does not support federal habeas relief under AEDPA because the admission of 

evidence at trial regarding petitioner's prior assault on Miller did not violate any clearly 

established federal law. Id. 

Similarly, the United States Supreme Court “has never expressly held that it violates due 

process to admit other crimes evidence for the purpose of showing conduct in conformity 

therewith, or that it violates due process to admit other crimes evidence for other purposes 

without an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence to such purposes.” 

Garceau v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir.2001), overruled on other grounds by

Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 123 S.Ct. 1398, 155 L.Ed.2d 363 (2003). See also Alberni 

v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 863 (9th Cir.2006). In fact, the Supreme Court has expressly left 

open this question. See Estelle v. Mcguire, 502 U.S. at 75 n. 5 (“Because we need not reach the 

issue, we express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it 

permitted the use of ‘prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime”). See 

also Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that state court had not acted 

objectively unreasonably in determining that the propensity evidence introduced against the 

defendant did not violate his right to due process); Alberni, 458 F.3d at 863–67 (denying the 

petitioner's claim that the introduction of propensity evidence violated his due process rights 

under the Fourteenth Amendment because “the right [petitioner] asserts has not been clearly 

established by the Supreme Court, as required by AEDPA”); United States v. LeMay, 260 F.3d 

1018 (9th Cir.2001) (Fed.R.Evid. 414, permitting admission of evidence of similar crimes in child 

molestation cases, under which the test for balancing probative value and prejudicial effect 

remains applicable, does not violate the due process clause). In short, because the state court's 

rejection of petitioner's due process claim is not contrary to any United States Supreme Court 

precedent, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief with respect to this claim. 

Petitioner's claim would also fail under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent. That court 

has held that the admission of “other acts” evidence violates due process only if there were no 

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permissible inferences the factfinder could have drawn from the evidence. See McKinney v. 

Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir.1993) (question is “whether any inferences relevant to a fact 

of consequence may be drawn from each piece of the evidence, or whether they lead only to 

impermissible inferences about the defendant's character”); Jammal, 926 F.2d at 920 (“[e]vidence 

introduced by the prosecution will often raise more than one inference, some permissible, some 

not; we must rely on the jury to sort them out in light of the court's instructions”). See also 

LeMay, 260 F.3d at 1027 (evidence of prior similar crimes “will only sometimes violate the 

constitutional right to a fair trial, if it is of no relevance, or if its potential for prejudice far 

outweighs what little relevance it might have”). 

Here, as explained by the state appellate court, portions of the challenged evidence 

admitted despite the trial judge’s ruling excluding it, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

because the properly admitted evidence established that petitioner and his gang typically “jumped 

or beat up people who dared to “talk[] shit to [th]em” in order to “establish their worthiness as 

Nortenos.” The evidence of petitioner’s guilt was overwhelming. As pointed out by the state 

court of appeals, there was a direct eyewitness, Mr. Eid, who testified he saw Harpst being 

brutally beaten by two men. Defendant admitted that he and Romero, a fellow gang member, 

attacked the victim because they perceived his tossing them a cigarette signified disrespect. 

Harpst probably would not have lived if Eid did not intervene. As pointed out by the appellate 

court, it was not probable that the jury verdict would have been different had the alleged 

evidentiary errors not been made. Therefore, in light of the significant and substantial evidence 

of petitioner’s guilt, admission of the challenged evidence did not prejudice the result. 

Under these circumstances, any error in admitting evidence of petitioner's prior assault did 

not result in a due process violation. Nor did it have “a substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury's verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 

1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). See also Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 793–96, 121 S.Ct. 

1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). 

For all of the reasons set forth above, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the state 

court's decision rejecting his due process claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of 

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federal law, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts of this case. Accordingly, 

petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 

CONCLUSION 

For all of the foregoing reasons, the petition will be denied. Pursuant to Rule 11 of the 

Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, this court must issue or deny a certificate of 

appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant. A certificate of appealability 

may issue only “if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 

right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the reasons set forth in this order, a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right has not been made. 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Petitioner’s application for a writ of habeas corpus is denied; and 

2. This court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. 

Dated: March 27, 2015 

 /s/ Gregory G. Hollows 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

 

GGH:076/Delg1739.hc

Case 2:14-cv-01739-GGH Document 14 Filed 03/30/15 Page 23 of 23