Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01178/USCOURTS-ca8-04-01178-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Maurice E. Patterson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Stephen N. Limbaugh, United States District Judge for the

Eastern District of Missouri.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-1178

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Eastern District of Missouri.

Maurice E. Patterson, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 14, 2004

Filed: May 13, 2005

___________

Before BYE, BOWMAN, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Maurice E. Patterson was convicted by a jury of being a felon in possession of

a firearm or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). After

determining that Patterson previously had been convicted of three violent felonies,

see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000), and was thus an armed career criminal under section

4B1.4 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the District Court1

 sentenced

Patterson to 188 months' imprisonment. Patterson appeals his conviction, arguing (1)

that the evidence at trial was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain the conviction

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 1 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
2

Patterson does not dispute that he has previously been convicted of a felony

or that the firearm and cartridges introduced at trial had been in interstate commerce.

Patterson only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding that he

possessed a gun. We note, however, that Patterson's conviction could also be

supported by a finding that he possessed ammunition. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1)

(2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court

of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . [to] possess

in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . ."). 

-2-

and (2) that the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction on reasonable doubt given at

trial is unconstitutional. Patterson also challenges the constitutionality of his

sentence, arguing (1) that it was premised in part on facts not found by the jury

beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) that it was imposed under a mandatory sentencing

guidelines scheme. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm Patterson's conviction

and sentence.

I.

In challenging his conviction, Patterson first argues that the evidence

introduced at trial was insufficient to establish that he possessed a gun. We review

the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to sustain a conviction de novo, viewing all

evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accepting all reasonable

inferences that could support the jury's verdict. United States v. Chapman, 356 F.3d

843, 847 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 336 F.3d 692, 694, 695

(8th Cir. 2003). We reverse only if no reasonable fact-finder could have found

Patterson guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Brown, 346 F.3d 808,

813 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Caldwell, 292 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 2002). 

The evidence at trial was more than sufficient to support Patterson's conviction

for possessing a firearm or ammunition.2

 Lakeshaua Hanks testified that while she

and her mother were waiting to be served at a restaurant in Jennings, Missouri,

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 2 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
-3-

Patterson, who was dating Hanks's mother, approached Hanks and attempted to hand

her what appeared to be a gun. Hanks refused to take the gun. Hanks testified that

the restaurant cashier saw Patterson's attempt to give Hanks the gun and began to

scream. The cashier, Shanell Howard, testified that she had seen a man attempt to

hand a gun to a woman in the restaurant. Howard later identified a man who police

had arrested outside the restaurant as the man who she had seen with the gun. Officer

Dennis Oglesby testified that Patterson was the man who Howard identified. Officer

Oglesby further testified that when he arrived at the restaurant in response to a report

that a gun had been brandished, he noticed Patterson standing next to a trash can

outside the restaurant doors. After obtaining a description of the suspect from

Howard, Officer Oglesby and Officer Gary Hemby, who had also arrived at the

restaurant, went outside and saw Patterson standing in the parking lot. Patterson met

the description given by Howard, and the officers detained him. Officer Hemby

testified that he searched Patterson and found two .22 caliber long rifle cartridges in

Patterson's pocket. Each officer also testified that Officer Oglesby recovered a .22

caliber semi-automatic handgun from the trash can outside the restaurant doors.

Finally, St. Louis County firearm and toolmark examiner William George testified

that he examined the gun and the cartridges and determined that the cartridges were

the appropriate ammunition for the gun. The members of the jury were free to

attribute whatever weight they chose to the testimony of these five witnesses. See

United States v. Martinez, 958 F.2d 217, 218 (8th Cir. 1992). Because this testimony

could easily lead a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Patterson

possessed a gun and ammunition, the District Court properly denied Patterson's

motion for judgment of acquittal.

Patterson next argues that the Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction on

reasonable doubt given at trial violated his due process rights because it is ambiguous

and lowers the government's burden of proof. Specifically, Patterson challenges the

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 3 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
3

The Eighth Circuit Model Jury Instruction on reasonable doubt states:

A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense,

and not the mere possibility of innocence. A reasonable doubt is the

kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof

beyond a reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a

convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely

and act upon it. However, proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not

mean proof beyond all possible doubt.

Eighth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions – Criminal, Instruction 3.11 (2003).

-4-

"mere possibility of innocence" language of the instruction.3

 This Court has upheld

the constitutionality of this language in a number of cases making the same claim that

Patterson makes now. See, e.g., United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004); United States v. Rosso, 179 F.3d 1102,

1104 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Simms, 18 F.3d 588, 593 (8th Cir. 1994);

United States v. Harris, 974 F.2d 84, 85 (8th Cir. 1992). We are bound by this

precedent and therefore hold that the instruction was proper. See Foster, 344 F.3d at

802; United States v. Olness, 9 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.

1205 (1994).

II.

Patterson's challenges to his sentence are based on the Supreme Court's recent

decision in United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). Because Patterson failed

to make any sentencing objections in the District Court, we review his Booker claims

for plain error under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See

United States v. Pirani, No. 03-2871, slip op. at 6 (8th Cir. April 29, 2005) (en banc).

Plain error review is governed by the four-part test set forth in United States v. Olano,

507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993): 

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 4 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
-5-

before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there

must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.

If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may exercise its

discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.

Id. at 7 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997)). The burden

is on Patterson to prove plain error. Id. at 8. "Appellate review under the plain-error

doctrine, of course, is circumscribed and we exercise our power under Rule 52(b)

sparingly." Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 389 (1999).

Patterson first argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the

District Court based his sentence, in part, on prior convictions that were not charged

in the indictment or found by a jury. Patterson argues that the Supreme Court's

decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), ruling that a

prior conviction is a sentencing factor for the court rather than a fact issue for the

jury, has been undermined by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). To the contrary, the Supreme Court

reaffirmed the Almendarez-Torres principle in Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756, noting that

the fact of "a prior conviction" need not be admitted by the defendant or proved to a

jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Shepard v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 1254,

1264 (2005) (Thomas J., concurring) (noting that the Court has not reconsidered its

decision in Almendarez-Torres). Patterson also argues that categorizing a prior

conviction as a "violent felony" requires a factual finding beyond simply finding a

prior conviction. But we previously have rejected the argument that the nature of a

prior conviction is to be treated differently from the fact of a prior conviction. United

States v. Kempis-Bonola, 287 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 914

(2002); United States v. Davis, 260 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534

U.S. 1107 (2002). Once the sentencing court determines that a prior conviction

exists, the characterization of that conviction as a violent felony is a legal matter for

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
-6-

the court. United States v. Marcussen, 403 F.3d 982, 984 (8th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665, 667 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005). The District Court did not

commit a Sixth Amendment violation, let alone plain error, when it sentenced

Patterson as an armed career criminal based on his prior convictions for violent

felonies. 

As his second ground for appealing his sentence, Patterson asserts that the

District Court committed plain error in sentencing him under a mandatory guidelines

scheme. As Patterson notes, the Supreme Court in Booker held that the mandatory

nature of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ran afoul of the Sixth Amendment

insofar as a sentencing judge, based on certain facts found by the judge, was required

to impose a more severe sentence than could have been imposed based on facts found

by the jury or admitted by the defendant. 125 S. Ct. at 749. Because of Booker's

further holding that the constitutional parts of the guidelines could not be saved by

severing them from the parts that cannot be mandatorily applied without violating the

Sixth Amendment, the Court declared the entirety of the guidelines "effectively

advisory." Id. at 757. The effect of this remedy is a guidelines system in which

sentencing judges continue to "take account of the Guidelines together with other

sentencing goals" enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 764. 

Patterson argues that the District Court's application of the guidelines as

mandatory "violates the Booker remedy of 'advisory' guidelines." Supp. Br. of

Appellant at 7. As in Pirani, it is undisputed in this case that the first two Olano

factors are satisfied: "The district court (understandably) committed Booker error by

applying the Guidelines as mandatory, and the error is plain, that is, clear or obvious,

at this time." Pirani, slip op. at 8. To prove the third Olano factor, however,

Patterson has the burden of demonstrating, based on the appellate record as a whole,

that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for Booker error, [he] would have

received a more favorable sentence under an advisory guidelines regime." Id. at 12.

This is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. 

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541
-7-

In an attempt to meet this heavy burden, Patterson notes that the District Court

imposed a sentence at the bottom of the armed-career-criminal guidelines range. But

our Court has deemed sentencing at the bottom of the range "insufficient, without

more, to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the court would have imposed a

lesser sentence absent the Booker error." Id. Patterson also points to the District

Court's statements at the sentencing hearing that "the legislative branch of

government is severally [sic] tying the hands of the judicial system, right or wrong"

by implementing a mandatory criminal sentencing scheme and that "it is a little bit

unfair" to base an enhancement on Patterson's "aged convictions" that occurred prior

to 1987. Tr. at 304, 305. We note, however, that the District Court stated, in the

same discussion, that "Congress cannot be faulted terribly in a situation like we have

here because . . . one of [the prior convictions involved] a sawed-off shotgun which

to me is a very, very serious problem," while another prior conviction was for

burglary of a residence in which Patterson assaulted the victim. Id. at 304. In these

circumstances, involving serious offenses, we cannot say there is a reasonable

probability that the District Court would have imposed a more favorable sentence but

for the Booker error.

 Because Patterson has not met his burden of showing a reasonable probability

of prejudice, our inquiry ends and we do not reach the fourth Olano factor. See

Pirani, slip op. at 13. Patterson's sentence is upheld.

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 04-1178 Page: 7 Date Filed: 05/13/2005 Entry ID: 1902541