Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01072/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Avid Technology, Inc.
Appellee
Harmonic, Inc.
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

HARMONIC INC.,

Appellant

v.

AVID TECHNOLOGY, INC.,

Appellee

______________________ 

2015-1072

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark 

Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in No. IPR2013-

00252. 

______________________ 

Decided: March 1, 2016

______________________ 

BORIS FELDMAN, Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati, 

PC, Palo Alto, CA, argued for appellant. Also represented 

by JAMES C. YOON; MICHAEL T. ROSATO, Seattle, WA; 

ROBIN L. BREWER, San Francisco, CA; GIDEON A. SCHOR, 

New York, NY; RICHARD TORCZON, Washington, DC.

 GREGORY A. CASTANIAS, Jones Day, Washington, DC, 

argued for appellee. Also represented by DAVID B.

COCHRAN, JOSEPH M. SAUER, Cleveland, OH; MATTHEW 

JOHNSON, Pittsburgh, PA.

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2 HARMONIC INC. v. AVID TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

 SCOTT WEIDENFELLER, Office of the Solicitor, United 

States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, 

argued for intervenor Michelle K. Lee. Also represented

by NATHAN K. KELLEY, STACY BETH MARGOLIES. 

______________________ 

Before CHEN, MAYER, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

STOLL, Circuit Judge. 

Harmonic Inc. filed an inter partes review (“IPR”) petition with the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“Board”) to 

review the patentability of Avid Technology, Inc.’s (“Avid”) U.S. Patent No. 5,495,291 (“the ’291 patent”). The 

Board instituted an IPR proceeding on a subset of the 

grounds in the petition and ultimately determined that 

the instituted ground did not render claims 11–16 of the 

’291 patent unpatentable. Harmonic appeals the Board’s 

final written decision, challenging both the Board’s patentability determination and its refusal to revisit 

grounds of unpatentability that it declined to institute as 

redundant to the instituted ground. For the reasons 

below, we affirm the Board’s confirmation of claims 11–16 

over the instituted ground and conclude that we do not 

have jurisdiction to review the Board’s institution decision.

BACKGROUND

I.

Avid is the assignee of the ’291 patent, issued February 27, 1996, and directed to a “system for decompressing 

consecutive streams of compressed video data to provide a 

continuous, uninterrupted decompressed video data 

output stream.” ’291 patent abstract. Many computers 

store video in a compressed form. One well-known compression format is MPEG. Instead of storing every video 

frame in full, MPEG stores only changes in one frame to 

the next. Before these compressed video files can be 

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played, they must first be decompressed to restore the 

video’s full content. Systems and methods to compress 

and decompress videos were well known in art at the time 

of the ’291 patent application’s filing. 

The ’291 patent discloses that these prior art systems 

and methods often generated several blank frames between first and second videos when playing multiple 

compressed videos back to back due to system latency. 

The patent explains that this latency resulted from having to wait for a decompression buffer to fill with enough 

frames of the second video file before decompression could

begin. The ’291 patent purports to teach a decompression 

system and method that allows play of compressed video 

streams one after the other without creating blank frames 

or a video-less gap when switching between the different 

streams. This result is achieved by using multiple decompression buffers. Figure 3 of the ’291 patent illustrates the preferred architecture. 

In this embodiment, input switch 105 accepts multiple 

compressed video streams. Under command of microcontroller 110, video data flows through input switch 105 to 

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either decompression circuit 120 or 130,1 which decompress the input video streams and place them within a 

buffer 125 or 135 from which output switch 115 reads to 

play video to a user. Microcontroller 110 instructs input 

switch 105 to alternate directing input video streams to 

decompression circuits 120 and 130. First, microcontroller 110 instructs input switch 105 to send video streams 

to decompression circuit 120. At a time before the circuit 

120 is predicted to finish decompressing, microcontroller 

110 directs input switch 105 to send a second input video 

stream to decompression circuit 130 so that decompression may begin there. Because decompression of the 

second video stream begins before decompression of the 

first stream completes, there is decompressed video data 

in buffer 135 from the second video stream awaiting 

output immediately upon output completion of the first 

decompressed video stream. As a result, a user experiences no blank frames due to system latency. 

The claims at issue in this appeal are dependent 

claims 11–16. Claim 9, from which claims 11–16 depend, 

and claim 11 recite: 

9. A video decompression system comprising:

a first switch coupled to at least two video data input lines, the first switch controlling the direction and rate of video data flow from the video 

data input lines;

at least two video data decompression arrays 

coupled to the first switch, the video data decompression arrays storing compressed video data, 

 

1 Decompression circuit 130 is erroneously labeled 

“30” in Figure 3.

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decompressing the stored compressed video data, 

and storing the decompressed video data;

a second switch coupled to the video data decompression arrays and to an output bus, the second switch directing output from the at least two 

video data decompression arrays to the output 

bus; and

a controller coupled to the first switch, the 

video data decompression arrays, and to the second switch for controlling the flow of video data 

through the system.

11. The system of claim 9 wherein the controller 

commands the first switch to provide video data to 

the first video data decompression array at a first 

rate and to provide video data to the remaining 

video data decompression arrays at a second rate 

a predefined period of time after the first video data array begins receiving the video data at the 

first rate.

’291 patent col. 7 ll. 4–32 (emphasis added). Pertinent to 

this appeal, claim 11 requires switching to provide video 

data to a second decompression array at a “predefined 

period of time” after the first video compression array 

receives data. Id. col. 7 ll. 27–32.

II.

Harmonic petitioned for IPR of the ’291 patent, alleging that, in view of seven different prior art grounds, all 

twenty of the patent’s claims were unpatentable as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or as obvious under 

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35 U.S.C. § 103.2 The Board instituted IPR on claims 1–

16 based on the obviousness ground of U.S. Patent No. 

5,159,447 (“Haskell”) combined with U.S. Patent No. 

5,508,940 (“Rossmere”). The Board did not institute

based on four other grounds in Harmonic’s petition directed at claims 1–16, calling them “redundant” of the 

instituted ground. In addition, the Board did not institute 

IPR on claims 17–20, disposing of the remaining two 

grounds.

The Haskell patent discloses a system for avoiding 

overflow and underflow of buffers during video encoding 

and decoding. As illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 below, 

Haskell’s device includes encoder system 100 and decoder

system 200, which are connected by a channel that runs 

from the encoder’s multiplexer to the decoder’s demultiplexer. 

 

2 The versions of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 that apply here are those in force preceding the changes made by 

the America Invents Act (“AIA”), given the effective filing 

dates of the claims of the ’291 patent. See Leahy–Smith 

America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 

293 (2011). 

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Encoder system 100 includes multiple encoder buffers 

106, and decoder system 200 includes multiple decoder 

buffers 205. Haskell’s encoder controls two aspects of the 

system to avoid buffer overflow and underflow: (1) the 

number of bits employed to encode each video frame; and 

(2) the bitrate of the channel connecting the encoder and 

decoder.

The Board’s final written decision concluded that 

claims 1–10 of the ’291 patent were unpatentable in view 

of Haskell combined with Rossmere. At the same time, 

the Board found claim 11—along with claims 12–16, 

which depend from claim 11—patentable over the instituted prior art ground. Particularly, the Board found that 

Haskell combined with Rossmere did not satisfy the 

“predefined period of time” limitation in claim 11, which it 

construed to mean “a prior defined period of time.” Harmonic, Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., IPR2013-00252, 2014 

WL 3422011, at *5, *13–14 (P.T.A.B. July 10, 2014) (Final 

Written Decision). 

Harmonic timely appealed to this court, and we have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and 

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35 U.S.C. § 141(c) to review the Board’s final written 

decision. 

DISCUSSION

On appeal, Harmonic argues that the Board erred in 

concluding that claim 11 (and claims 12–16, which depend 

from it) is patentable in light of the instituted prior art

ground. Harmonic also argues that the Board should 

have considered all prior art grounds in its petition, 

especially after finding claim 11 patentable in view of the 

instituted ground. We address each argument in turn.

I.

We first consider Harmonic’s argument that the 

Board erred in determining that claims 11–16 are patentable in light of Haskell combined with Rossmere. 

A patent claim is unpatentable as obvious “if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented 

and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a 

whole would have been obvious at the time the invention 

was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.” 

35 U.S.C. § 103. Obviousness under § 103 is a mixed 

question of law and fact. The Board’s ultimate determination on obviousness is a legal conclusion, which we 

review de novo. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 

1268, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing In re Baxter Int’l, Inc.,

678 F.3d 1357, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2012)), cert. granted sub 

nom., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, No. 15-446, 2016 

WL 205946 (U.S. January 15, 2016). We review the 

Board’s underlying factual findings, including what a 

reference teaches and differences between the prior art 

and the claims, for substantial evidence. Id. (citing 

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966)). 

In an IPR, the petitioner has the burden from the onset to show with particularity why the patent it challenges is unpatentable. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring 

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IPR petitions to identify “with particularity . . . the evidence that supports the grounds for the challenge to each 

claim”). Thus, it was Harmonic’s burden to explain to the 

Board how Haskell combined with Rossmere rendered the 

challenged claims unpatentable. With respect to claim 11 

of the ’291 patent, Harmonic did not do so.

Claim 11 requires that the system’s controller command the input switch to begin providing data to a second 

decompression array at a “predefined period of time” after 

a first decompression array begins receiving data. Harmonic argues that Haskell teaches this claim limitation, 

but puts forth very little evidence to support this contention. With no express teaching of this limitation in 

Haskell, Harmonic relies on several unsupported and 

inferential theories based on what Haskell does teach. 

First, Harmonic relies on the presence of a demultiplexer in Haskell together with the ability of its encoders 

to control the bit rate of bit-streams destined to its decoders. But Harmonic’s discussion of these features of 

Haskell is conclusory. Harmonic does not relate what 

appears to be generic multiplexing and bit rate adjustment to what is recited in claim 11. Specifically, Harmonic does not explain how Haskell’s control of bit rate

teaches the specific claim limitation of commanding the 

input switch to provide video data to a second decompression array a prior defined period of time after a first 

decompression array begins receiving data. Harmonic’s 

expert testimony in support of this theory is equally 

unavailing, adding nothing beyond the conclusory statements in Harmonic’s petition. 

Harmonic also emphasizes Haskell’s disclosure of a 

“predetermined system timing” in an attempt to satisfy 

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the “predefined period of time” limitation.3 But this 

disclosure relates to how Haskell passes video frames to a 

multiplexer bit-stream in groups, with time variables also 

periodically inserted into the bit-stream. Simply stating 

that Haskell discloses “predetermined system timing” 

does not satisfy Harmonic’s burden. Harmonic fails to 

explain how Haskell’s predetermined system timing 

discloses or suggests the specific timing required by claim 

11. Indeed, Harmonic’s expert offered no testimony on 

Haskell’s “predetermined system timing.” And Harmonic 

mentioned the feature to the Board only once in a single 

sentence without any elaboration. Harmonic Reply Br., 

Harmonic, Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. IPR2013-00252, at 

*13 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2013) (“Haskell explicitly discloses 

the use of predetermined system timing with regard to 

providing video data to decode buffers (205-1, 205-2, 205-

N).” (citing Haskell col. 13 ll. 7–54)). On appeal, Harmonic still has not sufficiently explained how Haskell’s predetermined system timing corresponds to the “predefined 

period of time” limitation in claim 11. 

On this record, we conclude that there is substantial 

evidence to support the Board’s finding that Haskell 

neither teaches nor suggests the “predefined period of 

time” limitation in claim 11. Therefore, we affirm the 

 

3 The parties devote much of their appeal briefs to 

addressing whether the Board erred by stating that 

Harmonic waived its argument based on Haskell’s “predetermined system timing” feature because it cited it for the 

first time in its Reply brief. Because the Board did actually address the “predetermined system timing” feature in 

its final written decision, however, we do not reach this 

waiver argument. See Final Written Decision, 2014 WL 

3422011, at *13. 

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Board’s confirmation of claim 11, and dependent claims 

12–16, as patentable over Haskell and Rossmere.

II.

We now turn to Harmonic’s second argument, which 

asserts that the Board, after concluding that the instituted ground did not render claims 11–16 unpatentable, 

erred by failing to consider the other prior art grounds in 

Harmonic’s IPR petition that were not instituted. 

In addition to the obviousness ground based on 

Haskell and Rossmere, Harmonic’s IPR petition included 

four other distinct grounds for unpatentability of claims 

1–16 of the ’291 patent. The Board denied institution on 

these remaining four grounds as “redundant”: 

Those grounds of unpatentability are redundant 

to the grounds of unpatentability on which we initiate an inter partes review. Accordingly, we do 

not authorize an inter partes review on the remaining grounds of unpatentability asserted by 

Harmonic against claims 1–16 of the ’291 patent.

Harmonic, Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., No. IPR2013-00252, 

2013 WL 8595955, at *19 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2013) (citing 

37 C.F.R. § 42.108(a)). Harmonic argues that in light of 

the Board’s conclusion in its final written decision that 

Haskell and Rossmere do not render claim 11 unpatentable, the Board was compelled to revisit the grounds it 

previously deemed redundant. 

Before we address the merits of Harmonic’s argument, we first must determine whether we have jurisdiction to review this question. See Arlington Indus., Inc. v. 

Bridgeport Fittings, Inc., 759 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 

2014) (“It is axiomatic that the initial inquiry in any 

appeal is whether the court to which appeal is taken has 

jurisdiction to hear the appeal.” (quoting Woodard v. Sage 

Prods., Inc., 818 F.2d 841, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc))). 

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A.

Congress established IPR proceedings as a means for 

challenging patentability before the United States Patent 

and Trademark Office (“PTO”). IPR proceedings involve 

two distinct phases: (1) the institution phase, beginning 

with the filing of an IPR petition and culminating in the 

decision of whether to institute an IPR proceeding (“institution decision”); and, if instituted, (2) the merits phase, 

beginning after the Board’s institution decision and 

culminating in the Board’s determination of patentability 

in light of the instituted ground(s) (“final written decision”). See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 

803 F.3d 652, 654–55 (Fed. Cir. 2015); St. Jude Med., 

Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373, 

1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 

We have jurisdiction to hear appeals from parties 

“dissatisfied with the final written decision” from the 

merits phase. 35 U.S.C. § 141(c). We do not, however,

have jurisdiction to review an institution decision. Under 

the title “No appeal,” 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) prescribes that a 

“determination by the Director whether to institute an 

inter partes review under this section shall be final and 

nonappealable.” 

Our cases have strictly applied the § 314(d) restriction. First, in St. Jude, we addressed whether we 

could review the Board’s decision to not institute an IPR 

proceeding. 749 F.3d at 1374. The Board had denied the 

underlying IPR petition on the ground that the petition 

was time-barred under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Id. at 1375. 

Recognizing that § 141(c) only authorizes our review of 

final written decisions and that § 314(d) constitutes a 

“broadly worded bar on appeal,” we held that we lack 

jurisdiction to review a decision to not institute an IPR 

proceeding. Id. at 1376; see also In re Dominion Dealer 

Sols., LLC., 749 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (denying 

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mandamus petition seeking review of Board decision not 

to institute IPR).

In Cuozzo, we considered whether we could review the 

PTO’s decision to institute an IPR proceeding. 793 F.3d

at 1274. The patent owner in Cuozzo, appealing after a 

final written decision had issued, argued that the PTO 

improperly instituted an IPR on certain claims because it 

relied on prior art that was not identified in the petition. 

Id. The patent owner argued that we had jurisdiction to 

review the institution decision because § 314(d), it asserted, does not completely preclude review of the institution

decision, but instead merely postpones review of the 

PTO’s authority until after issuance of the final written 

decision. We disagreed, holding that § 314(d) precludes 

our review of institution decisions, even when the challenge comes after a final written decision issues. Id.

In Versata Development Group Inc. v. SAP America

Inc., 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015), we addressed 

§ 314(d)’s counterpart in the post-grant review scheme, 

§ 324(e). Like § 314(d), § 324(e) states that the determination of whether to institute a post-grant review is final 

and non-appealable, and also applies in the context of 

covered business method (“CBM”) review. Leahy–Smith 

America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284, 

329–31 (2011) (“AIA § 18”). The patentee in Versata

argued that the Board’s unpatentability decision should 

not stand because the patent was not a CBM patent as 

defined in AIA § 18(d)(1). The PTO responded that the 

Board’s determination as to whether a patent qualifies as 

a CBM patent is an institution decision that we are 

barred from reviewing under § 324(e). We disagreed with 

the PTO. We held that § 324(e) did not preclude our 

review of the Board’s decision that the challenged patent 

was a “covered business method patent” because that 

question involved the Board’s “ultimate authority” to 

deem a patent unpatentable under the CBM review 

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proceedings. Versata, 793 F.3d 1319. We clarified that 

§ 324(e) does not preclude review of questions that go to 

whether the Board has violated a limit on its under § 18

to deem a patent unpatentable. Id. at 1320. 

In Achates, we examined whether we could review the 

PTO’s institution decision premised on IPR petitions that 

the patent owner argued contravened the timing requirements for filing a petition under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). 

803 F.3d at 653. We held that § 314(d) prohibited our 

review because the § 315(b) time bar “does not impact the 

Board’s authority” to deem a patent claim unpatentable, 

but, rather, “only bars particular petitioners from challenging the claim.” Id. at 657. Because the time bar is 

simply a procedural rule governing the proceedings, and 

does not itself give the Board the power to deem a patent

unpatentable, it is not a “defining characteristic” of the 

Board’s authority to deem a patent unpatentable that we 

are able to review. Id. at 657–68.

Most recently, in Synopsys Inc. v. Mentor Graphics 

Corp., __ F.3d __, 2016 WL 520236 (Fed. Cir. 2016), we 

considered a challenge under 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) to a final 

written decision that did not address every claim raised in 

an IPR petition following the Board’s decision to institute 

review for some, but not all, of the claims challenged in 

the petition. While we declined to review the merits of 

the Board’s partial institution decision, we did review the 

question of whether the Board is nevertheless required to 

address all claims raised in an IPR petition in its final 

written decision under § 318(a), which directs the Board 

to issue a final written decision with respect to “any 

patent claim challenged by the petitioner.” Synopsys, 

2016 WL 520236, at *3–4. We concluded that it is not, 

finding no statutory requirement that the Board address 

every claim raised in an IPR petition. Id. at *6. 

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B.

With this background in mind, we address whether 

we have jurisdiction here. Harmonic argues that the 

Board’s decision to not institute on certain prior art 

grounds it classified as “redundant” is not an institution 

decision. In support of its position, Harmonic points out 

that this case introduces facts not present in the cases 

discussed above. Here, acting on a single IPR petition, 

the Board instituted an IPR proceeding on one ground, 

but denied institution on others. According to Harmonic, 

the non-binary nature of the Board’s decision—i.e., instituting on some grounds, but not others—takes it out of 

the realm of an institution decision and into that of a case 

management decision, which Harmonic asserts we have 

jurisdiction to review for an abuse of discretion. 

We disagree. Our prior decisions hold that § 314(d) 

prohibits review of the decision to institute an IPR, Cuozzo, 778 F.3d at 1276, as well as the decision to deny 

institution of an IPR, St. Jude, 749 F.3d at 1375–76. A 

decision to institute on only a subset of the grounds identified in the petition is simply a combination of the two. 

Although Harmonic labors to categorize the Board’s

institution decision in this case as a different type of “case 

management decision,” it is no different than the circumstances squarely addressed in our prior decisions. The 

Board’s decision to institute on one prior art ground or 

another does not raise fundamental questions about the 

scope of its statutory authority to deem patents unpatentable; it is simply the Board’s exercise of its institution 

authority in a given case. Section 314(d) prohibits our 

review of such a decision.

Contrary to Harmonic’s suggestion, the Board’s reference to the non-instituted grounds as “redundant” also 

does not alter this conclusion. In its use of the term 

redundant, the Board suggested nothing more than that 

the claims addressed by the non-instituted grounds were 

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already addressed by the instituted ground. Indeed, the 

Board’s institution decision in this case first concluded 

that the Haskell and Rossmere combination provided 

Harmonic with a reasonable likelihood of success in 

showing that claims 1–16 of the ’291 patent are unpatentable. Only after reaching this conclusion did the institution decision label the other grounds targeting claims 1–

16 “redundant.” As the PTO correctly indicates in its 

intervenor’s brief, the Board did not determine that the 

prior art relied on in the non-instituted grounds was 

duplicative of that relied on in the instituted grounds. See 

PTO Br. 28. Rather, the most the Board implied was that 

the non-instituted grounds were redundant simply in the 

sense that they were directed to the same claims as the 

instituted grounds. For us to hold that by providing the 

public with a basis for its institution decision—

redundancy—rather than remaining silent, the Board

somehow triggered our appellate jurisdiction would 

violate both § 314(d) and our governing case law. 

Nor does the fact that the Board ultimately found 

claim 11 patentable over the instituted ground alter our 

conclusion that we may not review the Board’s institution 

decision, including its decision to not institute for redundancy reasons. As we explained before, IPR proceedings 

occur in two distinct phases: (1) an institution phase; and 

(2) a merits phase. See Achates, 803 F.3d at 654; St. Jude, 

749 F.3d at 1375–76. During the institution phase, the 

Board establishes parameters that confine the proceeding 

during the merits phase. See AIA Regulation Comments,

77 Fed. Reg. 48,680 at 48,689 (“Any claim or issue not 

included in the authorization for review is not part of the 

review.”). The PTAB’s institution decision included 

within the merits phase Haskell combined with Rossmere, 

but nothing more. The IPR proceeding was thus limited 

and did not include the non-instituted grounds. 

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Finally, our conclusion here is consistent with Synopsys because, in that case, the petitioner challenged the 

Board’s final written decision, not its decision to institute. 

Synopsys, 2016 WL 520236, at *3–4. As here, we recognized in Synopsys that “[t]he decision of the Board to 

institute inter partes review cannot be appealed.” Id. 

at *3. We determined, however, that we could review the 

question of whether the Board was required to address all 

claims raised in an IPR petition in its final written decision under § 318(a), which directs the Board to issue a 

final written decision with respect to “any patent claim 

challenged by the petitioner.” Id. at *4–6.

Under the IPR framework, Congress did not require 

that once the PTO institutes a proceeding, all grounds in 

the underlying petition must be considered. First of all, 

the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an 

IPR proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (stating that 

“[t]he Director may not authorize an inter partes review 

to be instituted unless the Director determines . . . there is 

a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail 

. . .” (emphases added)). Moreover, statute directs that 

the PTO “shall prescribe regulations” for both “setting 

forth the standards for the showing of sufficient grounds 

to institute a review under section 314(a)” and “establishing and governing inter partes review under this chapter

. . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2), (4). The AIA also requires the 

PTO to “consider the effect of any such regulation on the 

economy, the integrity of the patent system, the efficient 

administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office 

to timely complete proceedings . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 316(b).

The PTO adopted such regulations in 37 C.F.R. 

§ 42.108. Subsection (a) states that “[w]hen instituting 

inter partes review, the Board may authorize the review 

to proceed on . . . all or some of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim.” (emphasis added). Subsection (b) further provides that “[a]t any time prior to 

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institution of inter partes review, the Board may deny 

some or all grounds for unpatentability for some or all of 

the challenged claims.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.108(b) (emphasis 

added). Under the PTO’s regulations, grounds not instituted never become part of the merits phase of the IPR 

proceeding. See Changes to Implement Inter Partes 

Review Proceedings, Post-Grant Review Proceedings, and 

Transitional Program for Covered Business Method 

Patents, 77 Fed. Reg. 48,680, 48,689 (Aug. 14, 2012) (AIA 

Regulation Comments) (“Any claim or issue not included 

in the authorization for review is not part of the review.”). 

In light of 35 U.S.C. § 316, we have already satisfied 

ourselves that the PTO possessed authority to promulgate

37 C.F.R. § 42.108. Applying Chevron deference, we also 

consider whether the agency, in exercising its rulemaking 

authority to enact §42.108, reasonably interpreted § 316 

and the statutory provision for instituting IPR proceedings, § 314. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). We conclude that it 

did. As noted, § 316 directs the PTO to promulgate regulations that, in part, consider “the efficient administration 

of the Office, and the ability of the Office to timely complete proceedings.” 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). The PTO’s rationale for promulgating § 42.108 aligns with Congress’s 

guidance in § 316. In Synopsys, we held that the related 

and analogous § 42.108 provision permitting the Board to 

institute on a subset of claims challenged in a petition is 

“plainly an exercise” of the PTO’s rulemaking authority 

and “is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision governing the institution of inter partes review.” 

2016 WL 520236, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 10, 2016). The 

PTO explained that the regulation’s “convergence of 

issues for review streamlines the proceeding and aids in 

the efficient operation of the Office and the ability of the 

Office to complete the proceeding within the one-year

timeframe.” AIA Regulation Comments, 77 Fed. Reg. 

48,680 at 48,703. Our previous holding and the PTO’s 

Case: 15-1072 Document: 64-2 Page: 19 Filed: 03/01/2016
20 HARMONIC INC. v. AVID TECHNOLOGY, INC. 

rationale applies equally to the subset-of-grounds provision and reasonably effectuates the statute’s efficiency 

imperative. And, as we also noted, § 314 does not compel 

PTO to institute an IPR proceeding in any instance. 

Thus, we find the § 42.108 subset-of-grounds regulation to 

be reasonable and conclude that it is valid. And under 

that section, it is clear that the Board may choose to 

institute some grounds and not institute others as part of 

its comprehensive institution decision.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s determination that claims 11–16 of the ’291 patent are 

patentable in light of the instituted prior art ground and 

do not review the Board’s institution decision because we 

lack jurisdiction.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs. 

Case: 15-1072 Document: 64-2 Page: 20 Filed: 03/01/2016