Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02361/USCOURTS-azd-2_18-cv-02361-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USA
Respondent
Deborah Ann Weidenhamer
Petitioner

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“CRDoc.” refers to clerk docket entries in the criminal case, CR 16-1072–PHX-ROS.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Deborah Ann Weidenhamer, 

Movant/Defendant, 

vs.

United States of America, 

Respondent/Plaintiff. 

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No. CV 18-02361-PHX-ROS (MHB)

 (CR 16-01072-PHX-ROS)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

TO THE HONORABLE ROSLYN O. SILVER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

On July 26, 2018, Movant Deborah Ann Weidenhamer filed a Motion Under 28

U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody

(“2255 motion”). (Doc. 1.) On February 19, 2019, Respondent United States of America

filed a Response, and on April 8, 2019, Movant filed a Reply. (Docs. 9, 13.)

BACKGROUND

On September 6, 2016 Movant appeared in Court for an Initial Appearance and

Arraignment on an Information that was filed charging her with seven counts of bank fraud.

(CRDocs1

. 5, 8.) At that appearance, Movant was released on her own personal recognizance

with conditions, and then proceeded to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement she had

entered into with the government. The plea agreement provided that Movant plead guilty to

all counts of the Information, and that she stipulate to a U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 loss amount of

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$50,672,469.96. (CRDoc. 9.) The government agreed that “[i]n no event will the United

States recommend a sentence greater than the low end of the applicable Sentencing

Guidelines range,” and that it would recommend a reduction in Movant’s sentencing

guideline range for acceptance of responsibility, assuming Movant met the criteria. (Id.)

Movant admitted the following factual basis for her plea:

Deborah Ann Weidenhamer, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona, was the

owner and Chief Executive Officer of Auction Systems Auctioneers and

Appraisers, Inc., located at 951 West Watkins Street in Phoenix, Arizona. In

early 2015, Auction Systems Auctioneers and Appraisers, Inc., changed its

name to American Auction Company, Inc. (Auction Systems Auctioneers and

Appraisers, Inc., and American Auction Company, Inc., are collectively

referred to here as “American Auction.”) Weidenhamer, through American

Auction and other related entities, provided auction and appraisal services in

the United States and internationally.

Weidenhamer promoted American Auction as a successful, growing

company. In fact, American Auction had never turned a profit and lost money

each and every year since at least 2009.

To cover American Auction’s expenses and losses, Weidenhamer

obtained a bank loan. The initial loan, obtained around 2001, was

approximately $200,000. As Weidenhamer needed more money to cover the

increasing expenses and losses of her business, she either increased the amount

of the loan with her current lender or moved the loan to another lender that

would extend more credit to her. By 2005, the loan had increased to more than

$1,000,000. By 2008, the loan had increased to $10,000,000. By 2013, the

loan had increased to $35,000,000. Between 2008 and 2013, Weidenhamer

switched banks multiple times.

In the fall of 2013, Weidenhamer switched banks again. On or about

September 20, 2013, Weidenhamer, on behalf of American Auction, obtained

a $35,000,000 revolving loan from Johnson Bank (the “Loan”). (Johnson

Bank and Comerica Bank later agreed to be equal partners in the Loan and are

collectively referred to here as the “Lenders”).

On September 20, 2013, Weidenhamer signed a loan agreement and

various other agreements relating to the Loan. (The loan agreement and other

related agreements are collectively referred to here as the “Loan Documents”)

In the Loan Documents, Weidenhamer represented and warranted, among

other things, that:

• There was no fact known to Weidenhamer or American Auction that

materially and adversely affected the business, assets, or condition

(financial or otherwise) of American Auction which had not been

disclosed to the Lenders. (Loan Agreement § 4.7)

• The financial statements and financial data previously delivered to the

Lenders, relating to Weidenhamer and American Auction, were true,

correct, and complete in all material respects, and fairly presented the

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financial position of Weidenhamer and American Auction. (Loan

Agreement § 4.12)

Many of Weidenhamer’s representations and warranties in the Loan

Documents, including those listed immediately above, were false and

fraudulent. Weidenhamer intentionally hid the true financial condition of

American Auction from the Lenders in order to obtain the Loan.

Between May 14, 2014, and December 21, 2015, Weidenhamer and the

Lenders agreed to modify the terms of the Loan on six occasions. Three of

those modifications increased the amount of the Loan from $35,000,000 to

$55,000,000.

With each modification, Weidenhamer represented and warranted,

among other things, that there was no material adverse change in her financial

condition or the financial condition of American Auction and that all

representations and warranties in the Loan Documents were still accurate.

(Modification Agreements § 4.)

Many of Weidenhamer’s representations and warranties in the loan

modifications, including those listed immediately above, were false and

fraudulent. Weidenhamer continued to hide the true financial condition of

American Auction from the Lenders in order to modify and increase the

amount of the Loan.

On or about January 25, 2016, consistent with their rights under the

terms of the loan, the Lenders conducted a field audit of American Auction.

As part of the audit, the Lenders requested that Weidenhamer provide them

certain information and documents. Weidenhamer was not able to, and did

not, provide many of the documents requested by the Lenders. Weidenhamer

also did not provide any substantive response to any of the Lenders’ three

Notices of Default, which were delivered to her on February 2, February 8, and

February 11, 2016.

On February 11, 2016, the Lenders declared the Loan in default. At the time, the principle amount of the Loan was $52,443,703.06. After the Lenders

collected the funds in American Auction’s bank account at Johnson Bank and

applied them to the Loan, the principle amount of the Loan that was still

outstanding was $50,672,469.96.

After declaring the Loan in default, the Lenders discovered that

Weidenhamer had misrepresented American Auction’s financial condition and

that she had created and provided false and fraudulent financial statements and

financial data, including financial statements, bank statements, and accounts

receivable reports, to obtain the Loan and as part of her ongoing obligations

under the terms of the Loan to provide financial information.

 COUNTS ONE THROUGH SEVEN

Between about September 2013 and February 2016, Defendant Deborah Ann

Weidenhamer, individually and doing business under the entities described

above, knowingly executed and attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to

defraud Johnson Bank and Comerica Bank, financial institutions with accounts

insured by the FDIC, to obtain money or property under the custody and

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Movant was also represented by Anna Finn, an attorney with Mr. Stein’s firm who

entered her notice of appearance with the Court on June 15, 2017, prior to sentencing.

(CRDoc. 42.) Movant asserts that Ms. Finn was an intern, but clearly at the time she entered

her appearance with the Court, she was an attorney.

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control of Johnson Bank and Comerica Bank by means of materially false or

fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.

Weidenhamer engaged in this conduct, in the District of Arizona and

elsewhere, on or about the dates listed below, by making false and fraudulent

representations and warranties regarding American Auction’s financial

condition, and by presenting to Johnson Bank and Comerica Bank false and

fraudulent information and documents to obtain the Loan and to modify the

terms of the Loan. Weidenhamer made such representations and warranties,

and presented such information and documents, knowing them to be materially

false and fraudulent, and with the intent to defraud Johnson Bank and

Comerica Bank. [Table of seven loan and modification agreements set forth

in counts one through seven of the Information].

(CRDoc. 9.)

Movant’s plea agreement had been negotiated over several months prior to her

appearance in court. The victim banks had learned of Movant’s scheme in 2016, and

initiated receivership proceedings on February, 2016, eventually reporting it to the FBI.

(Doc. 9 at 7; CRDoc. 58, at 36-37.) Around the same time, Movant hired attorneys Lee Stein

and Anne Chapman, who, on February 17, 2017, contacted the United States Attorney’s

Office about resolving possible criminal charges. (Doc. 9 at 7; CRDoc. 58 at 57.) Movant

then met with the government prosecutors and made a full confession. (Id.) Movant also met

many times with her counsel and the receiver, and cooperated fully in the receivership. (Id.)

Movant even wrote a letter to the United States Attorney’s Attorney’s Office identifying, for

the banks’ benefit, what she perceived were weaknesses in their field audit system that made

them more vulnerable to fraud. (CRDoc. 58 at 58.) Pre-indictment negotiations continued,

during which Movant voluntary disclosed her crimes. (Id. 56-57.) Several months later

Movant pleaded guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. (CRDoc. 9.) Both counsel

representing Movant, Ms. Chapman and Mr. Stein appeared with Movant at the change of

plea proceeding.2

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During the plea colloquy, Movant was advised that, at any time during the

proceedings she could pause the proceedings if she needed to speak privately with her

attorney. (CRDoc. 63 at 3.) Movant was placed under oath, and thereafter swore, under

penalty of perjury, that she had read the plea agreement, had adequate time to talk with her

attorneys about any questions she had, and understood everything in her plea agreement. (Id.

at 4.) She confirmed that she was satisfied with her legal representation. (Id.) Movant was

advised, and confirmed she understood, that the maximum penalty for bank fraud was 30

years. (Id. at 6-7.) Movant confirmed that her guilty plea was voluntary and that no

promises had been made to her to get her to plead guilty. (Id.) The Court also explained the

sentencing guidelines to Movant, explained that they are not mandatory, and confirmed that

Movant understood that the sentencing judge was not bound by recommendation made by

the government concerning sentencing. (Id. at 12.) The Court reviewed with Movant the

government’s agreement to, in no event, recommend a sentence greater than the low end of

the guideline range. (Id. at 12.) The Court further explained:

What’s fair to tell you this afternoon is that there is no one in this room who

can tell you exactly what your sentence will be. And that is simply because

Judge Silver is the one who will be making that decision. She hasn’t made it

yet. So obviously no one can know. But I can say this for certain. If you

decide to plead guilty and Judge Silver accepts the plea agreement and the

sentence she imposes is permitted by the terms of the plea agreement, then you

will have to serve that sentence. You won’t be able to change your mind and

withdraw from the plea agreement or withdraw your plea of guilty if the

sentence is greater than you were hoping for or expected.

Movant confirmed that she understood this and did not have any questions about it. (Id. at

13.)

Movant then pleaded guilty and admitted the factual basis set forth in the plea

agreement agreeing with “each and every [word of it].” (CRDoc. 58 at 17-18.) At the end

of the proceeding, Movant indicated that she understood everything discussed and that she

did not have any questions. (Id. at 19.) The Court then signed a recommendation to the

sentencing judge that Movant’s guilty plea be accepted. (Id. at. 20.)

Prior to sentencing, Movant’s counsel filed a 25-page sentencing memorandum, with

54 exhibits attached, which consisted of 46 letters written in support of Movant as well as

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medical records. (CRDoc. 35, under seal.) In support of counsels’ request for a noncustodial sentence, counsel noted Movant’s acceptance of responsibility, her cooperation, her

lack of prior criminal conduct, her medical issues, her community involvement, and her

family and community support. With respect to Movant’s health, counsel noted that Movant

had experienced serious medical issues for more than 10 years, and that she had been

diagnosed with Lyme disease in 2009. Counsel went into great detail describing the effects

of the disease, including on the cerebral cortex and the consequent effect on executive

function, memory, planning, decision-making, and judgment, and attached a confirming letter

from Movant’s treating doctor, Dr. Franco NMD. Dr. Franco indicated that Movant was

diagnosed with Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease in 2009, and stated that, as of April 3, 2017,

many of her cognitive symptoms had resolved. Additionally, counsel stated that Lyme

disease is associated with a compromised immune system, and that Movant suffers from

other serious conditions related to that which, in the opinion of a treating provider, are

chronic and progressive, and that Movant’s health condition was not stable. Letters from

Movant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Groff, PhD, and a letter from Dr. Jeni Keilty, ND, were

also submitted in support of Movant’s claims about the status of her health.

Also submitted was a letter by Movant to Johnson Bank, taking responsibility for her

actions. Movant apologized for not responding right away to bank inquiries, explaining that

many lawyers had told her not to cooperate and to force the bank to piece together the fraud.

She explained that eventually she found her current legal team who “allow[ed] her to come

forward and cooperate.” (CRDoc. 35-1 at 8, under seal). Movant also stated she was truly

repentant, and felt shame, sorrow and remorse for her fraud. (Id.)

A Presentence Investigation Report was prepared, and, although Movant’s applicable

sentencing guideline range was determined to be 97-121 months, the report writer

recommended, based upon a downward variance, a sentence of 60 months on each count, to

run concurrent. The report writer also discussed Movant’s health issues, and referenced a

report he had received from a doctor treating Movant for her Lyme disease. Attached to the

Presentence Investigation Report was a victim impact letter submitted by one of the victim

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banks. The government filed a sentencing memorandum, and recommended a 7-year

sentence, a sentence 13-months less than the guideline range. (CRDoc. 46.) 

Movant appeared for sentencing on July 12, 2017. (CRDoc. 49.) Movant

acknowledged that the Presentence Investigation Report was accurate with the exception of

one paragraph suggesting she had not voluntarily disclosed the offense. (CRDoc. 58 at 36.)

 During the two and a half hour proceeding, Movant was giving the opportunity to allocate.

In her statement to the Court, Movant confessed to the fraud, described how the small lie

became the big lie, and admitted responsibility for her “terrible crime.” (Id. at 50-55.)

Movant expressed her satisfaction with her decision to come forward and cooperate with the

government, and that she would still elect to do the same. (Id. at 51-52.) Movant, her

counsel, and her husband also spoke about her health conditions. (Id. at 43, 50, 54, 59-61.)

At the conclusion of statements and arguments, the Court indicated it would grant a

small variance of 13 months from the low end of the guideline range, to 84 months, for the

reason that Movant had voluntarily disclosed her crimes and because of Movant’s illnesses.

(CRDoc. 58 at 79.) The sentences of 84 months on each count were ordered to run

concurrently. (Id.) The Court permitted Movant to self-surrender to prison, and granted

Movant’s request that the Court recommend placement at Federal Bureau of Prisons in

Phoenix. 

Movant now requests that the Court vacate her conviction and sentence, raising in her

2255 motion the following claims: 

(1) ineffective assistance of her “pretrial counsel,” Ms. Chapman, for failing

to (I) communicate with Movant about her case and their strategy to cooperate

with the government, (ii) conduct an adequate and independent pretrial

investigation in to the relationship between Movant’s offense and her health

condition, and (iii) negotiate a favorable plea agreement or review the plea

agreement with Movant;

(2) ineffective assistance of her “sentencing counsel,” Mr. Stein, for failing to

(i)properly represent her because he lacked in-depth knowledge of her case,

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(ii) object to certain details in the government’s description of her fraud at

sentencing, and (iii) object to her sentence being substantially unreasonable.

(Doc. 1 at 4-5.) The government responds by asserting that Movant’s 2255 motion should

be denied on the merits. (Doc. 9.)

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim for denial of the

Sixth Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective

assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The

benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel’s conduct so

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the proceeding cannot be

relied upon as having produced a just result. See id.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must satisfy a two

prong test, demonstrating: (1) deficient performance, such that counsel’s actions were outside

the wide range of professionally competent assistance, and (2) that Movant was prejudiced

by reason of counsel’s actions. See id. at 686-90. “Failure to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland test obviates the need to consider the other.” Rios v. Rocha, 299 F.3d 796, 805

(9th Cir. 2002). Indeed, it is unnecessary for a federal court considering a habeas ineffective

assistance claim to address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test if the petitioner cannot

establish incompetence under the first prong. See Siripongs v. Calderon, 133 F.3d 732, 737

(9th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was

deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as the result of the alleged

deficiencies. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697; Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1470 &

n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (approving district court’s refusal to consider whether counsel’s conduct

was deficient after determining that petitioner could not establish prejudice).

There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable assistance. See Strickland at 689-90. “A fair assessment of attorney performance

requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to

reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct

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from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. Review of counsel’s performance is

extremely limited. Acts or omissions that “might be considered sound trial strategy” do not

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. The prejudice component “focuses on the

question whether counsel’s deficient performance renders the result of the trial unreliable or

the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993).

A prisoner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim if “the motion and the

files and records of the case conclusively show that [the prisoner] is not entitled to relief.”

28 U.S.C. § 2255(b).

A. Claim One: ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel.

The government asserts that Claim One may be denied on prejudice grounds, as

Movant does not contend that, but for Ms. Chapman’s alleged ineffectiveness, Movant would

have insisted on going to trial. See, Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1995) (a defendant

“must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not

have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”). Movant does not dispute

the fact that the plea agreement offered her a sentence far less than she would have faced had

she gone to trial and been convicted. Movant was sentenced to 84 months, less than her

adjusted guideline range, and far less than her unadjusted, or without acceptance of

responsibility, guidelines range of 135-168 months. In fact, Movant concedes, in her 2255

petition, that she “would have still pled guilty,” and asks the Court to vacate her conviction

so that she can “plea[] anew.” (Doc. 2 at 24, 27.) Movant does not contest this point in her

Reply, simply re-iterating her assertion that she was not properly informed of her sentencing

exposure. (Doc. 13 at 4-5.) Movant does not demonstrate prejudice, and thus her claim of

ineffective assistance of pretrial counsel fails on the merits.

Movant’s claim fails, in any event, under the performance prong of Strickland.

Movant’s claim that her counsel failed to communicate with her, failed to conduct sufficient

investigation, failed to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement, and misrepresented the

government’s sentencing position, are belied by her own declaration during the plea

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Movant makes various claims that her attorneys had an improper relationship with

the Assistant United States Attorneys prosecuting the case. Her assertions are without

foundation, and contradicted by the affidavit of Mr. Stein. (Doc. 9-2 at 4 ¶6.)

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proceeding3

. She stated in open court, under oath, that she was satisfied with her attorneys’

representation. (CRDoc. 63 at 4.). Movant’s sworn statement carries a “strong presumption

of verity,” and “constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding.

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). “The subsequent presentation of conclusory

allegations unsupported by specifics is subject to summary dismissal, as are contentions that

in the face of the record are wholly incredible.” Id. Additionally, during Movant’s three

hour sentencing, she did not complain about her attorneys’ representation, and in fact,

implied that her attorneys were superior. (CRDoc. 58 at 51-52) (“And it was difficult for me

to find the team that I have right now that let me come forward and cooperate with the bank

and the receiver and the Government.”) Movant also did not disagree when the sentencing

judge complemented Movant’s attorney Mr. Stein. (Id. at 25, 77.)

With respect to Movant’s claim that her attorney did not communicate with her

adequately concerning the plea agreement, this claim is also belied by Movant’s answers

during her change of plea proceeding. She admitted, under oath, that she had “enough time

to talk with [her] lawyers about any questions [she] might have had,” that she had “read the

plea agreement before she signed it,” and that she understood everything that was in it.

(CRDoc. 63 at 4, 9.) She also confirmed that she understood the maximum sentence, how the

guidelines worked, the stipulations in the plea agreement, and that “no one in this room can

tell [her] exactly what [her] sentence will be.” (Id. at 6, 8, 12.) Additionally, Movant met

with her lawyers three times prior to her change of plea proceeding to go over the agreement

and the revisions. (Doc. 9-1 at 3 ¶6.) Movant also was given a copy of the draft presentence

investigation report, that contained the guideline calculations. (Id. at ¶8.) Movant’s bare

allegations that she was inadequately informed simply are not sufficient to overcome this

record.

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As to Movant’s claim that her attorney failed to conduct an adequate investigation into

whether her Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease played a role in her committing the offense, and

failed to argue her health circumstances adequately at sentencing, Movant’s counsel provided

extensive medical record to the presentence investigation writer and the Court. (CRDocs. 31,

45, under seal.) Movant’s attorney, Ms. Chapman, further avows that:

I reviewed voluminous information received from Ms. Weidenhamer regarding

Lyme disease and also performed additional independent research. Mr. Stein

and I discussed multiple potential Lyme disease experts with Ms.

Weidenhamer. We also reviewed several letters, results of medical testing,

medical reports, and medical records from multiple providers for Ms.

Weidenhamer. I also spoke with medical providers regarding Ms.

Weidenhamer. Our Sentencing Memorandum, filed under seal, included

reference to a variety of ailments including Ms. Weidenhamer’s diagnosis of

Lyme disease. The Memorandum attached reports from multiple medical

providers discussing the physical and psychological impact of her conditions.

These included letters or reports from Dr. Franco, Dr. Keilty, and Dr. Groff.

The Memorandum specifically included “The effects of Lyme disease on the

cerebral cortex and the consequent difficulties with executive function,

memory, planning, decision-making, and judgment have been well

documented.” The Memorandum also discussed recent MRI results and other

conditions. (Dkt.31).

(Doc. 9-1 at 4 ¶4.)

At sentencing, both Movant and her husband spoke extensively about her health

condition. (CRDoc. 58 at 43, 50, 54, 59, 61). Neither argued that her Neuropsychiatric Lyme

disease prevented her from forming the requisite intent to commit her crimes. Movant also

claims that her counsel failed to “present reports from the foremost Lyme disease expert that

suggested that Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease very well could have caused Weidenhamer to

commit her crime.” (Doc. 13 at 8-9.) Movant provides no such report, and even if she did,

it would be conjecture, and rebutted by Movant’s guilty plea, her admissions, and allocation.

Medical information provided at sentencing even suggested that Movant’s mental state

improved after she was diagnosed with Lyme disease in 2009, and that the treatment she

received likely improved her executive functioning. (CRDoc. 31, Exh. 2 at 2; Exh. 11 at 3-4.)

Movant fails to identify what additional investigation her attorneys should have done,

or that had they done additional investigation, they would have obtained the suggested

exculpatory evidence. She furthermore fails to establish that additional information regarding

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her Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease would have made a difference in the plea offer that she

was extended.

Movant next complains that her attorneys should have obtained a more favorable plea

agreement for her. Movant can not demonstrate, however, that a more favorable plea

agreement would have been available. Movant complains that her attorneys should have

argued against the sophisticated means sentencing enhancement. The 2-level enhancement

is applicable if the offense “involved sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally

engaged in or caused conduct constituting sophisticated means.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10).

The Commentary to § 2B1.1(b)(10) defines sophisticated means as “especially complex or

especially intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.”

cmt. n. 9. 

Movant’s attorney Mr. Stein did not object to the enhancement, but explains that, “[i]n

my view and based on my experience, arguing against the sentencing enhancement would not

have been credible and would have had no chance of success. This was a scheme that lasted

a decade in which Ms. Weidenhamer deceived two banks into loaning her $52 million by

repeatedly creating and presenting to the banks false documents she personally created that

purported to show that her business was far more successful than it actually was.

Furthermore, Ms. Weidenhamer created and maintained two sets of business records to further

conceal the fraud.” (Doc. 9-2 at 3-4.) Movant does not demonstrate that her attorneys were

ineffective in not objecting to the sentencing enhancement.

B. Claim Two: ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel.

Movant claims that her sentencing attorney was ineffective in not presenting evidence

of her Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease and how it may have influenced her criminal conduct,

and in not presenting the full scope of her cooperation. Movant however, does not

demonstrate the, but for her counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Movant must show that she would have

received a shorter sentence, but Movant already received a 13-month downward variance

from the sentencing guideline. And, the Court considered Movant’s cooperation and health

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in imposing a variance. (CRDocs. 51 at 4; 58 at 79.) Additionally, the Court had before it,

as stated previously, voluminous medical records, to include the opinion of Dr. Keilty, ND,

who opined that Movant’s medical condition was not stable, and Dr. Franco NMD, who

treated Movant for 8 years for Neuropsychiatric Lyme disease. (CRDoc. 31-1.)

Movant’s counsel filed a sentencing memorandum detailing Movant’s medical history,

and noted that Movant’s Lyme disease effects the cerebral cortex causing consequent

difficulties with executive functioning, memory, planning, decision-making and judgment.

(CRDoc. 31 at 9-11.) Movant’s attorney moved to continue the sentencing four times, in

order to give Movant more time to consult with medical experts. (CRDocs. 18, 22, 28, 29.)

Movant’s attorney also submitted 46 character reference letters on Movant’s behalf.

Additionally, Movant’s attorney argued persuasively at sentencing, and the Court

agreed with many of the points made. (CRDoc. 58 at 55-65; 76-77.) And, the Court varied

substantially below the minimum guideline sentence of 97 months to 84 months. Movant

complains that her attorney should have made other arguments or emphasized other evidence.

She asserts that he should have argued that the banks could have detected her fraud earlier,

and that Movant’s initial counsel’s advice prevented her from coming forward earlier. Neither

of these arguments necessarily would have advanced her cause, and may even have backfired.

Additionally, in response to the suggestion that attorney advise may have prevented Movant

from coming forward earlier, the Court was skeptical: “I really find it troubling that the

argument is made that she didn’t accept the suggestions of others; that you just sit back and

wait until the bank finds out. Frankly, that’s exactly what she did for 10 years.” (CRDoc. 58

at 77.) Movant simply fails to demonstrate that sentencing counsel was ineffective, and even

less so that the outcome would have been different had counsel presented additional

information regarding Movant’s cooperation or health.

Lastly, Movant claims that her attorney was ineffective because he did not object to

her sentence as being substantially unreasonable. Movant is essentially challenging the length

of her sentence, which she failed to raise on direct appeal. A motion made pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 2255 does not give defendants “repeated opportunities to overturn their convictions

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on grounds which could have been raised on direct appeal.” United States v. Dunham, 767

F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Joiner, 183 F.3d 635, 645 (7th Cir.

1999) (waiver of appeal bars right to raise ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on

“garden-variety attacks on his sentence [], in the guise of a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel.”); United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979) (Congress did not intend,

in enacting 2255, “to modify the basic distinction between direct review and collateral

review.”).

Additionally, even if Movant’s attorney was ineffective in not objecting to the

sentence, Movant does not demonstrate prejudice. Although the government stipulated in the

plea agreement not to recommend a sentence greater than the low end of the applicable

Sentencing Guideline Range, the government actually recommended a sentence 13 months

lower. Movant now asserts that her attorneys had some “secret” agreement with the

government. Yet this claim is belied by her own statements during the plea colloquy. In

response to the judge’s question, whether any unwritten promises had been made to her to get

her to plead guilty, Movant responded: “No, not at all.” (CRDoc. 63 at 8.) It is also belied

by the declaration of her attorney. (Doc. 9-2 at 5 ¶7.)

Furthermore, Movant received a below-guidelines sentence for a sophisticated fraud

offense that took place over seven years and resulted in a loss of over $50 million dollars.

The Court noted that this was a “massive fraud over a substantial period of time.” (CRDoc.

58 at 73.) The Court, after a 3 hour sentencing hearing, and after considering Movant’s

health, her cooperation, and the fact of the offense, did not impose a sentence within the 97-

121 month sentence, but varied downward to a sentence of 84 months. Movant does not

demonstrate that her counsel was ineffective, or that her sentence was unlawful.

CONCLUSION

Movant’s claims fail on the merits, and therefore Movant’s 2255 motion should be

denied and dismissed with prejudice. 

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IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Movant’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside,

or Correct Sentence Under 28 U.S.C. §2255, (CRDoc. 60; CVDoc. 1 at 1), be denied and

dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the Court deny a Certificate of

Appealability and leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal because Movant has not made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

This recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth

Circuit Court of Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, should not be filed until entry of the district court’s judgment. The

parties shall have fourteen days from the date of service of a copy of this recommendation

within which to file specific written objections with the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

Rules 72, 6(a), 6(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thereafter, the parties have fourteen

days within which to file a response to the objections. Pursuant to Rule 7.2, Local Rules of

Civil Procedure for the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, objections to

the Report and Recommendation may not exceed seventeen (17) pages in length. Failure

timely to file objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation may result

in the acceptance of the Report and Recommendation by the district court without further

review. See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Failure timely

to file objections to any factual determinations of the Magistrate Judge will be considered a

waiver of a party’s right to appellate review of the findings of fact in an order or judgment

entered pursuant to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. See Rule 72, Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure.

DATED this 23rd day of December, 2019.

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