Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00146/USCOURTS-alnd-2_14-cv-00146-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Barry Moses
Plaintiff
State Farm Insurance
Defendant

Document Text:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

BARRY MOSES,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE FARM INSURANCE,

Defendant.

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

}

Case No.: 2:14-cv-00146-MHH

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

In this opinion, the Court considers defendant State Farm’s argument that 

plaintiff Barry Moses’s discrimination claims against the company are time-barred 

because Mr. Moses waited too long - more than 180 days - to file a discrimination 

charge with the EEOC. Mr. Moses’s discrimination charge concerns his 

contention that State Farm demoted him when he returned from medical leave. 

Mr. Moses filed his EEOC charge, at the earliest, on April 1, 2013. Mr. Moses 

contends that October 12, 2012 is the trigger date for the 180-day filing window. 

If he is correct, then he filed his EEOC charge on time. State Farm contends that 

either May 24, 2012 or September 12, 2012 is the trigger date; either date makes 

Mr. Moses’s EEOC charge untimely. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds 

FILED

 2015 Jan-29 AM 10:54

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 1 of 10
2

that State Farm has the better end of the argument. Therefore, the Court will grant 

State Farm’s summary judgment motion.

II. Standard of Review

“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is 

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as 

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). State Farm moves for summary judgment 

on the basis of an affirmative defense for which State Farm bears the burden of 

proof. “If the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, because, as a 

defendant, it is asserting an affirmative defense, it must establish that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact as to any element of that defense.” International 

Stamp Art, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Service, 456 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006)

(citing Martin v. Alamo Community College Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 

2003)). 

When considering a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the 

evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Hill v. 

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 510 Fed. Appx. 810, 813 (11th Cir. 2013). “The court need 

consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in the record.” 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3). For the purposes of summary judgment, courts are to 

review job discrimination claims no differently than any other kind of summary 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 2 of 10
3

judgment motions. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1025 (11th Cir. 

2000) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504 (1993)).

III. Factual and Procedural Background

Mr. Moses began working for State Farm in 2005. (Doc. 11-2, ¶ 2). After 

suffering a heart attack in early 2012, Mr. Moses took medical leave. (Doc. 11-2, ¶

3). At the time of the heart attack, Mr. Moses worked as a claim processer in 

Birmingham, Alabama. (Doc. 11, p. 2). While he was on leave, State Farm 

notified Mr. Moses that his paid medical leave would end on April 11, 2012 and 

that he could either return to work then or take unpaid medical leave. (Doc. 11-2, ¶ 

3). Mr. Moses chose to return to work. (Id.). 

Shortly after Mr. Moses returned to work, a doctor set work restrictions for 

Mr. Moses. (Doc. 11, p. 2). Mr. Moses advised State Farm of the restrictions. 

(Id.). State Farm’s ADA committee met and decided that while the restrictions 

were in place, Mr. Moses could not perform his job with or without reasonable 

accommodations. (Doc.9-1, p. 1 ¶ 5; Doc. 8, pp. 2–3). On May 24, 2012, Angela 

Palmer, a State Farm employee, notified Mr. Moses that State Farm’s ADA 

committee had determined he was no longer able to perform his essential job 

duties. (Doc. 11-2, ¶ 11). State Farm put Mr. Moses on leave while the company 

attempted to find a job that he could perform with his medical restrictions. (Doc.

9-1, ¶ 5).

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 3 of 10
4

On September 12, 2012, State Farm offered Mr. Moses a job in Atlanta.

1

 

(Doc. 9-1, ¶ 6). The job paid less than the job that Mr. Moses held before he 

suffered a heart attack, and the job required Mr. Moses to move from Birmingham 

to Atlanta. (Doc. 11-2, ¶ 17). Mr. Moses claims he was “advised that he would 

have to take a demotion to ‘P A 2’ from his current position as a ‘P A 3’ in Atlanta, 

Georgia, as well as, he was advised of the associated loss in pay and benefits from 

that demotion.” (Doc. 11, ¶ 5). Mr. Moses acknowledges that he told State Farm 

that he would take the job. (See Doc. 11, ¶¶ 5–6).

State Farm extended Mr. Moses’s medical leave through October 2012

because the company could not offer Mr. Moses training for his new position until 

then. (Doc. 9-1, ¶ 6). On October 12, 2012, Mr. Moses “was unable to report to 

the position in Atlanta[,] Georgia because it was a demotion [and] a decrease in 

pay and benefits[.]” (Doc. 11, ¶ 6). On either October 12, 2012 or October 15, 

2012, Mr. Moses effectively resigned from State Farm. (See Docs. 11, p. 3; 9-1, p. 

2).

Mr. Moses filled out an EEOC intake form on April 1, 2013 and faxed and 

mailed the form to the EEOC on April 3, 2013. (Doc. 11, ¶ 7; Doc. 11-1, pp. 1, 4). 

Mr. Moses checked Box 2 on the intake form, indicating that he “want[ed] to file a 

 

1

The parties seem to dispute when State Farm offered Mr. Moses a job in Atlanta. Mr. Moses 

claims that he received the offer sometime in August 2012, but the September 12 date is

advantageous to Mr. Moses. Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Moses,

the Court assumes that State Farm told Mr. Moses about the position in Atlanta on September 12, 

2012. 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 4 of 10
5

charge of discrimination, and [he] authorize[d] the EEOC to look into the 

discrimination [he] described [on the form].” (Doc. 11-1, p. 4). He filed his 

official charge of discrimination with the EEOC on May 9, 2013. (Doc. 9-1, p. 6).

Mr. Moses filed this lawsuit on January 24, 2014. He alleges that State 

Farm unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of disability, age, and 

sexual orientation. He asserts claims under the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII, 

respectively. (Doc. 1). State Farm seeks judgment as a matter of law on all of Mr. 

Moses’s claims on the basis of the statute of limitations. (Doc. 8). Both parties 

have submitted briefs regarding State Farm’s motion, and the Court heard oral 

argument from the parties. 

On this record, the Court considers State Farm’s motion for summary judgment. 

IV. Analysis

A plaintiff in a discrimination lawsuit must exhaust procedural remedies 

before filing suit. To exhaust procedural remedies, a plaintiff alleging 

discrimination under the ADA, ADEA, or Title VII must file a discrimination 

charge with the EEOC. Rizo v. Ala. Dep’t of Human Res., 228 Fed. Appx. 832, 

836 (11th Cir. 2007) (to litigate a claim for discrimination under Title VII, the 

ADA, or the ADEA, “a plaintiff must first exhaust his administrative remedies, 

beginning with the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.”). Because 

Alabama is a non-deferral state — meaning the state has no state agency equivalent 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 5 of 10
6

to the EEOC—a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180 days of the 

employer’s alleged discriminatory action. Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 

1263 (11th Cir. 2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (“A charge under this 

section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful 

employment practice occurred.”); Rizo, 228 Fed. Appx. at 836. “The limitations 

periods, while guaranteeing the protection of the civil rights laws to those who 

promptly assert their rights, also protect employers from the burden of defending 

claims arising from employment decisions that are long past.” Delaware State 

Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256–57 (1980). 

The parties dispute whether Mr. Moses filed his EEOC charge on time. To 

resolve State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, the Court must identify the 

date of the alleged discriminatory act that triggered the 180-day filing period and 

the date that Mr. Moses filed his EEOC charge. Mr. Moses contends that October 

12, 2012 and April 1, 2013 are the respective dates. If he is correct, then his EEOC 

charge was timely because he filed it 171 days after State Farm took the last 

adverse action against him. (Doc. 27, p. 12). State Farm argues that the last

adverse action against Mr. Moses occurred on either May 24, 2012 or September 

12, 2012 and that Mr. Moses filed his EEOC charge on May 9, 2013. (Doc. 8, p. 

5). Each party wins half of the argument, but State Farm prevails overall because 

Mr. Moses filed his EEOC charge more than 180 days after State Farm notified 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 6 of 10
7

Mr. Moses that he could return to work only if he moved to Atlanta and accepted a 

pay cut. 

A. Governing Dates

The 180-day EEOC filing clock starts when an employee receives 

unequivocal notice of an adverse employment decision. Stewart v. Booker T. 

Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 849 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Grayson v. K Mart 

Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1100 n.19 (11th Cir. 1996)). “[D]iscrete discriminatory acts 

are not actionable if time barred.” Bennett v. Chatham Cnty. Sheriff Dept., 315 

Fed. Appx. 152, 161 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 

Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002)). “A discrete retaliatory or discriminatory act 

‘occurred’ on the day that it ‘happened.’” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110.

Mr. Moses’s 180-day clock began ticking on September 12, 2012. On that 

date, Mr. Moses received unequivocal notice that because of his health restrictions, 

State Farm would not allow him to perform the job that he held before his heart 

attack. (Doc. 11, p. 2). On that date, Mr. Moses learned that State Farm planned 

to transfer him to Atlanta and to pay him less than he earned pre-heart attack. 

(Doc. 9-1, ¶ 6). Although State Farm scheduled the transfer for October 2012 to 

accommodate the company’s training schedule, the decision to transfer was 

complete on September 12, 2012, and State Farm communicated its decision to Mr. 

Moses on that date. Therefore, September 12, 2012 is the trigger date for the 180 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 7 of 10
8

day window for filing an EEOC charge. See Stewart, 232 F.3d at 849 (discussing 

the standard and holding that the filing period had not begun when an employee 

was informed that the employer might take action, contingent on future events).

As for the charge filing date, although Mr. Moses did not file his official 

charge with the EEOC until May 9, 2013, he completed an EEOC intake form on 

April 1, 2013 and appears to have sent the form to the EEOC by April 3, 2013. 

(See Docs. 9-1, p. 6; 11, p. 3; 11-1, p. 4). “[A]s a general matter an intake 

questionnaire is not intended to function as a charge[.] . . .” Pijnenburg v. West 

Ga. Health Sys., Inc., 255 F.3d 1304, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that no 

exceptional circumstances in the case warranted departure from the rule). The 

exception that proves the rule is this: an intake form may constitute a charge 

“when the circumstances of the case would convince a reasonable person that the 

charging party manifested her intent to activate the administrative process.” 

Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 270 F.3d 1314, 1321 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Clark 

v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 865 F.2d 1237, 1241 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that the 

informal intake questionnaire constituted the “charge date” for purposes of the 

180-day window). 

For purposes of State Farm’s motion, the Court gives Mr. Moses the benefit 

of the doubt and treats April 1, 2013, the date on his EEOC intake form, as the 

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 8 of 10
9

EEOC charge filing date.

2

 Even so, Mr. Moses’s charge is not timely because 201 

days elapsed between September 12, 2012, the date that State Farm announced its 

adverse decision, and April 1, 2013, the date that Mr. Moses completed an EEOC 

intake form.

B. Equitable Principles and the Procedural Bar 

To the extent that Mr. Moses seeks to toll the limitations period, he fails to 

persuade the Court that equitable tolling is warranted. Mr. Moses contends that the 

real issue is “whether the Complainant reasonably believed he was complying with 

the rules and filed his complaint within the statutory period based on that belief.” 

(Doc. 27, p. 3). This is incorrect. In discrimination lawsuits, “strict adherence to 

the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of 

evenhanded administration of the law.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 108 (quoting 

Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980)) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

“Equitable tolling is appropriate when a movant untimely files because of 

extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control and unavoidable even 

with diligence.” Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 

 

2 Ordinarily, the Court must consider three factors to determine whether an intake form activates 

the administrative process: “(1) the communication between the plaintiff and the EEOC; (2) the 

EEOC intake questionnaire form itself; and (3) the response by the EEOC to the completed 

questionnaire.” Bost v. Fed. Express Corp., 372 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004) (discussing 

Wilkerson). In this case, the Court does not need to make the analysis to decide State Farm’s 

summary judgment motion.

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 9 of 10
10

Sandvik v. United States, 177 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation 

marks omitted); see also Justice v. United States, 6 F.3d 1474, 1479 (11th Cir. 

1993) (offering the following examples of such circumstances: “when the 

defendant misleads [plaintiff] . . .”; “when [plaintiff] has no reasonable way of 

discovering the wrong . . .”; and “when [plaintiff] timely files a technically 

defective pleading . . .” (internal citations omitted)). “The plaintiff bears the 

burden of showing that such extraordinary circumstances exist.” Arce, 434 F.3d at 

1261 (citing Justice, 6 F.3d at 1479). Mr. Moses has not persuaded the Court that 

such extraordinary circumstances exist, and the Court declines to toll the 180-day 

limitations period.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS State Farm’s motion 

for summary judgment on all claims. The Court will enter a separate judgment.

DONE and ORDERED this January 29, 2015.

 _________________________________

 MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 2:14-cv-00146-MHH Document 31 Filed 01/29/15 Page 10 of 10