Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06045/USCOURTS-ca8-04-06045-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eveleth Mines
Not Party
State of Minnesota
Appellee
United Taconite
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 04-6045/04-6048 MN

_____________

In re: Eveleth Mines, L.L.C., *

d/b/a Evtac Mining, L.L.C. *

*

Debtor. *

 * 

United Taconite, L.L.C. * Appeal from the United States

* Bankruptcy Court for the District

Appellant - Cross-Appellee * of Minnesota

 * 

v. *

*

*

State of Minnesota, *

Department of Revenue, *

*

Appellee - Cross-Appellant *

_____________

Submitted: December 1, 2004

Filed: December 23, 2004

_____________

Before, SCHERMER, FEDERMAN, and MAHONEY, Bankruptcy Judges.

_____________

FEDERMAN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Appellant United Taconite, L.L.C. (United) filed a motion to enforce a sale

order approving a sale of virtually all of the assets of debtor Eveleth Mines, L.L.C.

(Eveleth). United appeals the order of the bankruptcy court denying it that relief.

Appellee the Department of Revenue for the State of Minnesota (MDOR) crossAppellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
1

On May 15, 2003, Thunderbird Mining Company also filed for Chapter 11 relief.

The cases are being jointly administered. 

2

Appellant’s Appendix, Ex. B, Sale Order at ¶ F(viii), pg. 9-10.

2

appeals on the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the

order in response to United’s motion. We find that the Tax Injunction Act barred the

bankruptcy court from exercising jurisdiction. We, therefore, remand with

instructions that the bankruptcy court abstain.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 1, 2003, Eveleth, a mining company engaged in the production of

taconite, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.1

 On May 16, 2003, all mining

operations ceased. On October 29, 2003, the bankruptcy court established bid

procedures for the sale of substantially all of Eveleth’s assets. On November 7, 2003,

Eveleth and United filed the Asset Purchase Agreement (the Agreement) with the

bankruptcy court. On November 26, 2003, after notice and a hearing, the court

entered an order that, in part, approved the sale of all or substantially all of Eveleth’s

assets free and clear of interests (the Sale Order). More specifically, the Sale Order

provided as follows: 

The Buyer shall not assume, and shall be deemed not to have assumed,

. . . (viii) any taconite production tax attributable to taconite ore or iron

sulfides mined by Debtor, to the mining of such taconite ore or iron

sulfides by Debtor, or to the iron ore concentrate produced by Debtor

that has been or may in the future be assessed by a Taxing authority for

any period pursuant to Minn Stat. §§ 298.24-298.27.2

 

On December 3, 2003, Eveleth and United closed the sale. United agreed to pay cash

in the amount of $3 million and to assume approximately $40 million in liabilities.

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
3

Appellant’s Appendix, pg. 1.

4

Hoffman v. Bullmore (In re Nat’l Warranty Insurance Risk Retention Group), 384

F.3d 959, 962 (8th Cir. 2004).

5

In re Hechinger Investment Co. of Delaware, Inc., 335 F.3d 243, 249 (3rd Cir. 2003).

3

United began production immediately upon closing the sale, and produced 78,162

tons of taconite prior to January 1, 2004. 

On January 30, 2004, United completed its 2003 Minnesota Taconite

Production Tax Forms and filed them with MDOR. On February 13, 2004, MDOR

notified United that it must pay the sum of $335,921 for its portion of the 2003

Taconite Production Tax. 

On February 17, 2004, United, by motion, asked the bankruptcy court to enter

an order “specifically enjoining forever . . . any action to collect from [United] any

tax attributable to or calculated based, in whole or part, on [the] Debtor’s operations.

. . .”3

 On March 17, 2004, the court held a hearing at which MDOR raised the issue

of subject matter jurisdiction. The court offered the parties an opportunity to brief that

issue and took the matter under advisement. On July 30, 2004, the court found that

it had jurisdiction to interpret the Sale Order, and that the Tax Injunction Act did not

bar it from exercising that jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the court went on to hold that

United is not entitled to an order directing the state courts as to how its tax liability

should be determined. United appeals the portion of the decision denying its motion

to enforce the Sale Order, and MDOR appeals the portion finding that the court had

jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The question of subject matter jurisdiction is subject to de novo review.4

 When

subject matter jurisdiction is at issue, we are required to reach the jurisdictional

question before turning to the merits.5

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
6

Minn. Stat. Ann. § 298.24 (2002).

7

Id. at § 298.25.

8

Id. at § 298.24(1)(d).

4

DISCUSSION

We begin with a brief description of how MDOR assesses the Taconite

Production Tax. Minnesota imposes a tax on “taconite . . . and upon the mining and

quarrying thereof, and upon the production of iron ore concentrate therefrom, and

upon the concentrate so produced.”6

 Each taconite producing facility is assessed this

tax in lieu of property taxes.7

 The total taconite tax for any given year is calculated

by using a three-year average of the total production at a facility.8

 The averaging

method is used to stabilize the tax receipts. 

United objected to the averaging method. It claims it purchased the assets of

Eveleth free and clear of any production tax calculated on Eveleth’s production. It

claims that it began production on December 3, 2003, therefore, the average

production for the years 2001 and 2002, for purposes of the three-year average,

should be zero. Based on United’s argument, MDOR should have assessed it the sum

of $54,792 as Taconite Production Tax for 2003, not $335,921. It arrived at this

calculation by assuming its average production for 2003 was 26,054 tons (the 78,162

tons produced in 2003 by United after the closing plus zero tons for 2001 and 2002

equals average tonnage of 26,054). The per-ton tax is $2.103 resulting in a liability

of $54,792. This same method of calculation, using zero production for 2002 and only

United’s production for 2003 would have a significant impact on United’s tax bills

for 2004 and 2005 as well. United argues that MDOR’s formula would exceed the

proper tax owed under its interpretation of the Sale Order by more than $5.4 million

over the relevant three-year period. 

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
9

28 U.S.C. § 1334(a) and (b).

5

MDOR argued in a post-trial brief that the bankruptcy court did not have

subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the Sale Order because this is a dispute between

two non-debtor parties that has no impact on the bankruptcy estate. Alternatively,

MDOR claims that, even if the bankruptcy court retained jurisdiction to interpret its

own order, the Tax Injunction Act barred it from exercising that jurisdiction. 

We begin with the jurisdictional issues. Bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction flows

from 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which vests jurisdiction in the district courts, and 28 U.S.C.

§ 157(a), which authorizes district courts to refer bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy

court. Section 1334 reads in relevant part as follows:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district court

shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.

(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive

jurisdiction on a court or courts other than the district courts, the district

courts shall have original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil

proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under

title 11.9

Section 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) reads as follows:

(a) Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11

and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related

to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the

district. 

Both sides agree that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the Sale

Order. Since section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) specifically authorizes

the court to approve sales of a debtor’s property, such orders come within the court’s

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
1028 U.S.C. § 1334(b). See also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(N).

11Koehler v. Grant (In re Grant), 213 B.R. 567, 569 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997) (holding

that a court retains jurisdiction, after the case is closed, to enter contempt sanction for

violation of a previous order). See also, Williams v. Citifinancial Mortgage Co. ( In

re Williams), 256 B.R. 885, 892 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001).

12317 B.R. 260 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).

13Id. at 269.

1428 U.S.C. § 1341.

6

jurisdiction over “all civil proceedings arising under title 11 . . . .”10 The crux of

United’s jurisdictional argument is that since the court had jurisdiction to enter the

Sale Order, it must also have jurisdiction to interpret and enforce that order. There is

ample precedent for this position, including our own.11 In NWL Holding, Inc. v. Eden

Center (In re Ames Department Stores, Inc.),

12 the court had entered an order

assigning debtor’s leasehold interest, and a dispute later arose between the debtor’s

assignee and the landlord over interpretation of the terms of the lease. Although the

debtor was not involved in the dispute, and not affected by the outcome, the

bankruptcy court found it had jurisdiction, holding that a proceeding “arises in” a

bankruptcy case when it involves efforts to “implement, gain the fruits of, and to

enforce an order of the bankruptcy court.”13 Since United’s motion to enforce the

Sale Order arose in a proceeding under title 11, and since United seeks to gain the

fruits of enforcement of that Order, we conclude that the bankruptcy court correctly

determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the motion. There are, however, limits

to the court’s power to exercise that jurisdiction.

The Tax Injunction Act provides that a district court, or a bankruptcy court by

referral, “shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of

any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the

courts of such state.”14 The Tax Injunction Act does not mention jurisdiction, because

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
15Bank of New England Old Colony, N.A. v. Clark, 796 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. R.I.

1992), affirmed, 986 F.2d 600 (1st Cir. 1993).

16Id. at 637 (emphasis eliminated).

17Id.

18That section provides that “the issuance, transfer, or exchange of a security, or the

making or delivery of an instrument of transfer under a plan confirmed under section

1129 of this title, may not be taxed under any law imposing a stamp tax or similar

tax.” 11 U.S.C. § 1146(c).

7

it is a rule of abstention.15 As the court in Clark explains, when “courts have said that

the Tax Injunction Act deprives a federal court of jurisdiction to hear state tax

matters, they were using jurisdiction for shorthand for power or authority to grant

relief.”16 The court goes on to distinguish the subtle difference between lack of

jurisdiction to decide a matter, and lack of power to grant relief: 

When a court lacks power to grant relief, the effect is the same as if the

court lacked jurisdiction, and vice versa. But a court may possess

jurisdiction while lacking the authority to use it. Jurisdiction is a

prerequisite to, not the equivalent of, a court’s authority to grant relief.17

Thus, the issue is not whether the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to enforce

the Sale Order, but whether it should have abstained from exercising that jurisdiction

because the Tax Injunction Act requires deference to state tax procedures. 

United contends that the Tax Injunction Act is not applicable because

numerous provisions of the Code authorize bankruptcy courts to routinely adjudicate

the rights of state taxing authorities. For example, United points out that section

1146(c) of the Code specifically grants authority to bankruptcy courts to prevent the

imposition of certain state mortgage registration taxes.18 In State of Florida,

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
19___ F.3d ___, 2004 WL 2711888 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2004).

20Id. at *2-3.

21Id. at *4-5.

8

Department of Revenue v. T.H. Orlando Ltd, et al (In re T.H. Orlando, Ltd.),

19 the

debtor owned three hotels threatened by foreclosure when it filed for Chapter 11

relief. One lender agreed to satisfy the mortgage for a reduced amount provided

Kissimmee Lodge, Ltd. (Kissimmee), a hotel adjacent to debtor’s hotels, would also

refinance its mortgage with the same lender. Kissimmee agreed, and under that

arrangement the court confirmed debtor’s Plan of Reorganization.20 That plan, as

authorized by section 1146 of the Code, provided that the recording of the refinancing

documents would not be subject to Florida’s mortgage registration tax. After the plan

was consummated the Florida Department of Revenue (FDOR) assessed a stamp tax

and an intangible tax against Kissimmee in conjunction with the refinancing.

Kissimmee paid the tax and then filed suit in state court seeking declaratory relief.

FDOR removed the proceeding to the bankruptcy court. On appeal, the court held that

“the adjudication of substantive entitlements created by bankruptcy law falls squarely

within the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts.”21 In confirming the plan the

court had granted Kissimmee, the nondebtor, an exemption from state tax, which

section 1146(c) specifically authorizes the bankruptcy court to grant. Thus, the

bankruptcy court had the specific authority to enter its order, and the more general

Tax Injunction Act did bar it from enforcing that order. No such specific authority

exists here. 

United next argues that section 505(a) of the Code grants the bankruptcy court

jurisdiction to determine the amount of the tax MDOR can impose on a nondebtor.

Section 505(a) does permit the bankruptcy court to determine the amount of tax

assessed:

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
2211 U.S.C. § 505(a).

23United States v. Huckabee Auto Co. (In re Huckabee Auto Co.), 783 F.2d 1546,

1549 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that the “jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts

encompasses determinations of the tax liabilities of debtors who file petitions for

relief under the bankruptcy laws. It does not, however, extend to the separate

liabilities of taxpayers who are not debtors under the Bankruptcy Code”).

24Id. See also State of Florida, Department of Revenue v. T.H. Orlando Ltd, et al (In re T.H.

Orlando, Ltd.), 2004 WL 2711888 * 3 (11th Cir. Nov. 30, 2004) (where the court

distinguished between the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction to decide whether a nondebtor is entitled to an exemption for a stamp tax or similar tax, which is specifically

provided for by the Code, and the lack of jurisdiction to decide a non-debtor’s

liability for employment taxes, which is not specifically provided for by the Code).

25Huckabee Auto Co., 783 F.2d @ 1549.

2611 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).

9

(a)(1)Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the court

may determine the amount of legality of any tax, any fine or penalty

relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously

assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested before and

adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent

jurisdiction.22

That power, however, is limited to the tax liabilities of debtors.23 Thus, section

505(a) does not encompass the adjudication of United’s tax liability.24 Indeed, the

court in In re Huckabee Auto Co., found that the adjudication of a third party’s tax

liability falls outside a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction, even if imposition of the tax

liability would adversely affect the debtor’s reorganization,25 which is not the case

here. 

United cites several other Code sections as examples of provisions that enable

bankruptcy courts to interfere in the state tax process. These include the imposition

of an automatic stay on taxing authorities,26 the granting of a higher priority to certain

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
2711 U.S.C. § 507(a).

2811 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1).

2911 U.S.C. § 524.

30254 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2001).

31Id. at 1148.

32See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f).

10

creditors than is accorded to tax claims,27 the determination that tax claims are

dischargeable,28 and the issuance of injunctions to prevent state courts from collecting

discharged tax debts.29 As with 1146(c) and 505(a), however, none of these

provisions is applicable here.

The blending of the Tax Injunction Act and the Code was considered by the

Ninth Circuit in Goldberg v. Ellett (In re Ellett).

30 There, a Chapter 13 debtor sought

a declaratory judgment that his prepetition state tax debt had been discharged in his

bankruptcy case, as well as an injunction prohibiting the state from collecting such

tax. In holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to enter the injunction

against the state, the Circuit Court held that “the general dictates of the [Tax

Injunction] Act do not defeat the specific powers Congress has bestowed on the

federal courts under the Bankruptcy Code.”31 United argues that section 363(f) of the

Code, which authorizes the court to approve sales of a debtor’s assets, can be used to

defeat the provisions of the Tax Injunction Act. We disagree, since nothing in that

section provides for a specific grant of jurisdiction to determine the tax liability of a

nondebtor.32

United’s motion is captioned as a motion to enforce the bankruptcy court’s Sale

Order. Nonetheless, in order to accord United the relief it sought, the bankruptcy

court would have been forced to order MDOR to restrain the manner in which it

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
33Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522, 101 S. Ct. 1221, 1234, 67 L. Ed.

2d 464 (1981).

34California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411, 102 S. Ct. 2498, 2509, 73

L. Ed. 2d 93 (1982).

35Hawaiian Telephone Co. v. State Dept. of Labor and Indus. Relations, 691 F.2d 905,

112 (9th Cir. 1982).

36Amos v. Glynn County Board of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2003)

(citing California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 413, 102 S. Ct. at 2510)).

37Id.

38Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514, 101 S. Ct. 1221, 1230, 67 L. Ed.

2d 464 (1981).

11

assessed and collected United’s Taconite Production Tax. Thus, the substance of the

relief sought triggers the Tax Injunction Act. The Tax Injunction Act is “a vehicle to

limit drastically federal district court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a

[state] concern as the collection of taxes.”33 Once the Tax Injunction Act is triggered,

the federal court may only exercise its jurisdiction if it finds that a plain, speedy and

efficient remedy cannot be had in the state court. Here, the bankruptcy court so found,

so we now turn to the basis for that determination. 

As the bankruptcy court recognized, application of the Tax Injunction Act turns

on the procedural safeguards provided by the state courts.34 A state court remedy is

plain, speedy, and efficient, within the meaning of the statute, if it provides a taxpayer

with a full hearing and a judicial determination at which it may raise any and all

constitutional objections to the tax.35 The phrase “plain, speedy, and efficient” must

be narrowly construed.36 The burden rests on the taxpayer, here United, to show facts

sufficient to overcome the restraint of the Tax Injunction Act.37 A state law remedy

is plain, speedy, and efficient if it provides for an appeal from the determinations of

the state agency by any dissatisfied party.38 The bankruptcy court held that

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
39Ashton v. Cory, 780 F.2d 816, 821 (9th Cir. 1986).

40Lawrence E. Miller v. Kemira (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 910 F.2d 784, 789 (11th

Cir. 1990).

41Minn. Stat. Ann. § 271.01, subd. 5 (2002).

42Wilson v. Comm’r of Revenue, 619 N.W.2d 194, 199 (Minn. 2000); Erie Mining Co.

v. Comm’r of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d , 261 264 (Minn. 1984). 

43Minn. Stat. Ann. § 484.01 (2002).

12

Minnesota’s system for reviewing tax assessments is not plain, speedy, and efficient,

concluding that there is uncertainty as to whether the Minnesota courts would

appropriately consider the impact of the Sale Order on the determination of United’s

tax liability. In so holding, the court also noted that the matter was already before it,

and so it could rule more quickly than the state court. But, the state remedy need only

be ‘“plain, speedy and efficient,”’ it need not be plainer, speedier and more efficient

than an alternative forum.”39 And judicial economy does not itself justify federal

jurisdiction.40 We, therefore, must consider whether the bankruptcy court correctly

found that Minnesota could not provide United with a plain, speedy, and efficient tax

assessment process that is capable of adequately considering the impact of the Sale

Order.

Minnesota’s Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear “all questions of law and fact

arising under the tax law of Minnesota.”41 If a constitutional issue is raised, the Tax

Court must first transfer that issue to the state district court, which may decide the

issue or refer it back to the Tax Court for decision. 42 This process is called the “Erie

Transfer Procedure.” Pursuant to the Erie Transfer Procedure, the Tax Court transfers

a case raising a constitutional issue to the state district court, a court of general

jurisdiction.43 The district court may retain the case, or may return it to the Tax Court.

After such a transfer, the Tax Court acquires the general jurisdiction of the district

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
44Wilson, 619 N.W.2d at 199: Erie, 343 N.W.2d at 264.

45McCannel, et al v. Hennepin County (In re McCannel), 301 N.W.2d 910, 919

(Minn. 1980).

46Minn. Stat. Ann. § 271.10, subd. 1 (2002).

4728 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

48Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 517, 101 S. Ct. 1221, 1231, 67 L. Ed.

2d 464 (1981) (quoting Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 625-626, 66 S. Ct.

445, 449, 90 L. Ed 358 (1946).

49450 U.S. at 510, 101 S. Ct. at 1228.

13

court to decide issues beyond its original jurisdiction.44 There is, therefore, a

procedure in Minnesota to assure that both the Tax Court and the district court have

jurisdiction to decide all issues raised.

Decisions of the Tax Court are accorded the same finality and deference as

those of the state district courts.45 A taxpayer may obtain review of a decision of the

Tax Court, as a matter of right, by the Minnesota Supreme Court, without first

seeking review by the Minnesota Court of Appeals.46 And, ultimately, any federal

question presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court is subject to review by the United

States Supreme Court.47

United points out that the United States Supreme Court has held that

“uncertainty surrounding a state-court remedy lifts the [Tax Injunction Act] bar to

federal-court jurisdiction.”48 In Rosewell, the court held that an Illinois remedy, which

required owners contesting their property taxes to pay such taxes under protest and,

if successful, to obtain a refund without interest in two years is, nevertheless, a plain,

speedy, and efficient remedy. The taxpayer had contended that the state’s assessment

procedure deprived her of equal protection and due process secured by the Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution.49 In holding that the Illinois procedure

Appellate Case: 04-6045 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/23/2004 Entry ID: 1848089 
50450 U.S. at 517, 101 S. Ct. at 1231.

51326 U.S. 620, 66 S. Ct. 445 (1946).

52326 U.S. at 625-26, 66 S. Ct. at 449.

53Reply Brief of United at pg. 9.

14

was plain, speedy, and efficient, the Court noted that under the Illinois procedure,

there was no question that the state court would hear and decide any federal claim.50

By contrast, in Hillsborough v.Cromwell,

51 the Court had held that protection of

federal rights was uncertain because the State Board of Tax Appeals had no right to

pass on constitutional questions, the allowance of a writ of certiorari to the Board

from the New Jersey Supreme Court was only discretionary, and the refusal of a writ

was not judicially reviewable by the Court of Error and Appeals.52 United, however,

bears the burden of proving that the Minnesota procedure is not plain, speedy, and

efficient. United does not argue that it would be prohibited from asking the state court

to consider the Sale Order in making its determination. Instead, United argues that it

is “anything but certain whether Minnesota courts will give proper deference to the

effect of the § 363 sale and the specific terms of the sale order at issue. . . . “53 A

taxpayer’s lack of confidence in the state court process is not, however, the standard

to be applied. We find that the bankruptcy court incorrectly held that the Minnesota

tax appeal procedures are not plain, speedy, and efficient. We conclude, therefore,

that the Tax Injunction Act bars the bankruptcy court from granting the relief sought

by United.

We remand with instructions for the bankruptcy court to enter an order

abstaining in favor of the Minnesota courts.

 ___________________

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