Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03003/USCOURTS-caDC-15-03003-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Joseph Daniel Hallford
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 15, 2015 Decided March 4, 2016

No. 15-3003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLANT

v.

JOSEPH DANIEL HALLFORD,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:13-cr-00335-1)

David P. Saybolt, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellant. With him on the briefs were Ronald C. Machen,

Jr., U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, Elizabeth

Trosman, Elizabeth H. Danello, and Michael J. Friedman,

Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Jonathan S. Jeffress, Assistant Federal Public Defender,

argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was A.J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Before: BROWN and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

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Opinion for the Court filed by Senior Circuit Judge

RANDOLPH.

Opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part filed by

Circuit Judge WILKINS.

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge: A federal grand jury

indicted Joseph D. Hallford for firearms offenses. The United

States appeals the district court’s order, issued after an

evidentiary hearing, suppressing Hallford’s statements to agents

of the United States Secret Service, and barring the government

from introducing items – loaded firearms, an incendiary device,

a bullet-proof vest, military grade ammunition and other objects

– recovered from the car he illegally parked near the National

Mall.

There are two basic questions. Did the seizure and search

of Hallford’s car result from a violation of Hallford’s rights

under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause? And was

Hallford in custody within the meaning of Miranda v. Arizona,

384 U.S. 436 (1966), when the agents interviewed him without

giving Miranda warnings, thus rendering his statements

inadmissible?

I.

Hallford left Alabama in his father’s car and drove

overnight to the District of Columbia so that he could be on the

Mall the next afternoon, November 5, 2013, for the “Million

Mask March,” which turned out to be neither a march nor a

million (Hallford estimated that about 100 people attended). 

The participants gathered in front of the White House wearing

“Guy Fawkes” masks. Hallford, then 32 years old, arrived at the

gathering wearing such a mask and confronted officers of the

Secret Service, opening his coat to show that he was unarmed,

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and demanding “Shoot me! Shoot me!” There is no evidence

the officers responded to his provocation.

Later that day, Park Service Rangers encountered Hallford

at the Korean War Memorial, near the Lincoln Memorial. One

of the Park Rangers filled out a “sick person” report stating that

Hallford complained about missing his medication for

hemophilia, that he appeared weak and disoriented, that he had

driven to Washington from Alabama, and that he could not

remember where he had parked his car. Park Rangers called an

ambulance for him but when it arrived Hallford refused to get in,

“stating that he had been in this condition before and would be

alright.” Instead, Hallford took a cab to find his car and, when

he failed to locate it, he had the driver take him to the

emergency room at George Washington Hospital.

At the hospital, Hallford complained of bleeding as a result

of his hemophilia. He stated that he had driven to the District

from Alabama to participate in the “Million Mask March.” He

told staff members that “he wanted to be shot by the Secret

Service . . . so his parents could own the agency.” He threatened

to “bash the doctor’s head in” if the doctor did not give him pain

medication. He said that if he “didn’t have kids, [he] would

have already killed [him]self.” He also stated that “I would

rather not kill people, I would rather they suffer.” He said that

he wanted to “hurt the government.” Hospital personnel,

understandably concerned about his remarks, decided to transfer

Hallford to United Medical Center for an “involuntary psych

evaluation.” See D.C. CODE §§ 21-521 to -522. A doctor

explained to Hallford the “rationale and need for involuntary

admission.” In the meantime, a member of the hospital’s

security staff called the Secret Service Operations Center to

report that a man named Joseph Hallford had come to the

emergency room, that he was in physical pain and possibly

mentally disturbed, that he said he wanted the Secret Service to

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shoot him, that although he was unpredictable he tended to be

“very calm,” and that he was scheduled to be transferred to

another facility, the United Medical Center, an agency of the

D.C. government, for an “involuntary psych evaluation.”

The next day, November 6, around 3 p.m., the hospital

transferred Hallford to United Medical Center, a more secure

facility than George Washington Hospital. Before Hallford left,

hospital staff gave him pain medication and a while later he

reported that the pain in his leg had subsided. Also, one of the

nurses again explained to him the civil commitment order and

why it had been issued. Hallford “expressed understanding”

about the reasons for his temporary commitment.

Hallford’s car – parked in the vicinity of the Lincoln

Memorial – had been attracting the attention of the Park Service. 

An officer ticketed the car on November 5 for being illegally

parked. The next morning, November 6, another Park Service

officer placed an “abandoned vehicle” tag on the car,

designating it to be towed. Later that day, still another officer

ticketed the car again for a parking violation.

While Hallford was in transit to United Medical Center,

Secret Service agents Brian Fox and John Maher arrived at

George Washington Hospital to interview him. The agents were

members of a “protective intelligence squad” charged with

investigating unusual interest in Secret Service “protectees” –

such as the President and Vice President. Agent Fox had

conducted some 200 interviews, about half of which were of

people who had “mental health issues.” After learning that

Hallford had already been transferred, the agents remained at

George Washington Hospital to ask staff members about

Hallford’s statements, his behavior, and his medical condition. 

The agents then drove to United Medical Center. After they

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arrived they joined Hallford and several medical staff members. 

The group then proceeded to a doctor’s lounge.

Hallford took a seat at a table. The agents explained to him

that they were not there to arrest him and that he was not “in

trouble.” Before proceeding, the agents asked if they could

“speak to [him] about those statements” he made at George

Washington Hospital. Hallford said “yes.” (Agent Fox testified

that if Hallford had said “No” they would have left.) The agents

began the interview with general biographical questions, asking

Hallford for his address, date of birth, his marital status and

other personal information. Hallford told them he had been

arrested in Alabama for writing bad checks, that he had been

involuntarily committed before, and that he had abused

prescription drugs. The agents asked him about his statements

at George Washington Hospital. Hallford recounted what had

happened over the past two days and explained that he was

suffering from the effects of his hemophilia.

When the agents were satisfied that Hallford posed no threat

to any Secret Service protectee, they wound down the interview

with several routine questions from the Secret Service interview

form. One of the questions was whether Hallford owned

firearms. In response, Hallford said he had a .45 caliber

handgun, a 12-gauge shotgun, and two .22 caliber rifles. When

the agents asked where he had these firearms, Hallford said they

were in his home in Alabama. When they asked where in his

home, Hallford considered the question for a moment, possibly

up to a minute, and then admitted that the firearms were in the

car he had driven to the District of Columbia. Saying nothing,

Agent Fox stood up and walked out to make a telephone call. 

While he was doing so, Hallford volunteered to Agent Maher

that “there was other stuff in the vehicle that would look bad,”

such as a container of gasoline, bottles of propane and a

Molotov cocktail, or the makings of one. Hallford added that he

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kept the firearms for self-defense. The agents asked Hallford for

permission to search the car when, and if, they found it and to

review his medical records. Hallford refused both requests. The

agents then ended the interview.

The interview lasted less than an hour. At the suppression

hearing, Agent Fox testified that during the interview Hallford

“was calm. He was controlled. He was generally nice at times. 

He smiled. He – he, you know, made a few jokes here and

there.” Hallford was not handcuffed. He was not physically

restrained. When he mentioned that he had not eaten in days,1

a member of the hospital staff offered him chocolate. The

agents wore casual clothes, spoke in conversational tones, and

did not display their badges or weapons. They did not give

Hallford the standard Miranda warnings. They did not tell him

he was free to end the interview. The door to the doctor’s

lounge was frequently open. Doctors and hospital staff

members came and went during the interview. Outside the

lounge, the hallway doors were operated with key cards.

Later that evening, police located Hallford’s car on Ohio

Drive just south of Independence Avenue near the Lincoln

Memorial. The police searched the car and discovered

Hallford’s medication; a .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol; two

.22 caliber rifles; a 12-gauge shotgun; copious rounds of

ammunition, some of military grade; a bottle containing

matches, Q-tips coated with a black substance, an assortment of

1

 It is unclear if Hallford had eaten nothing before his interview.

The staff at George Washington Hospital reported that “Hallford ate

some, but not all, of the hospital-supplied meals . . . on November 5

and 6.” Hallford admitted that he was offered food but claims that he

refused it. He also claimed that he had not slept on the evening of

November 5 while he was at George Washington Hospital. However,

the hospital records indicated that he had periods of uninterrupted

sleep.

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metal pieces, a live round of ammunition and a rag protruding

from the bottle’s top; a five gallon cannister containing gasoline;

and a bulletproof vest. The firearms were loaded and operable. 

Later investigation disclosed that Hallford purchased them a

month earlier. The firearms were not registered in the District

of Columbia.

The next day, November 7, Dr. Dierich Kaiser, a United

Medical Center psychiatrist, evaluated and treated Hallford. Dr.

Kaiser diagnosed Hallford as having “schizoaffective disorder”2

based on Hallford’s unstable mood changes, paranoid delusions,

and self-destructive behavior. Dr. Kaiser prescribed various

medications and extended Hallford’s commitment. See D.C.

CODE §§ 21-522 to -523.

Based on Hallford’s statements and the items found in the

car, a judge issued an arrest warrant for him on November 8 and

police arrested him at United Medical Center.3

 Local police

informed him of his Miranda rights, which he refused to waive. 

2 See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 105-10 (5th ed. 2013).

3

 A Detention Memorandum by a magistrate judge indicated that

the government “obtained a search warrant for [Hallford’s] cell phone,

which contained pictures of an individual posing wearing a Guy

Fawkes mask with several firearms – including some of the weapons

recovered from [Hallford’s car]. The phone also contained a picture

of another individual in a Guy Fawkes mask photoshopped as looking

in the window of the Oval Office at President Obama with the text

‘05th November soon.’”

The magistrate judge concluded that Hallford “was prepared to

engage in violence, and the fact that he ultimately did not do so is

insufficient, given the level of planning and apparent focus on death,

to convince me that he does not pose a danger to the community. 

Indeed, I am concerned that he may pose a threat to the President.”

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A federal grand jury indicted him for two violations of federal

law and ten violations of District of Columbia law involving

unlawful possession and interstate transportation of unregistered

firearms, ammunition, and a destructive device. See 26 U.S.C.

§§ 5861(d), 5841, 5845(f), 5871; 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(4), 

924(a)(1)(B); D.C.CODE § 22-4504(a)(1), (a-1); D.C.CODE § 7-

2502.01(a); D.C. CODE § 7-2506.01.

Hallford moved to suppress his statements to Agents Fox

and Maher. He claimed that his statements “were made

involuntarily and in violation of Miranda.” He further argued

that, because his statements were involuntary, the physical

evidence found in his car “must be suppressed as fruit of the

poisonous tree.” In June 2014, the court held an evidentiary

hearing on the suppression motion. On December 16, 2014, the

district court granted Hallford’s motion to suppress both his

statements and the physical evidence. In an oral bench ruling,

the court found that the Secret Service agents violated Hallford’s

Miranda rights and that his statements were involuntary.4

 Two

4

 The court issued a written opinion on May 6, 2015, repeating its

oral findings and conclusions with a few embellishments. See United

States v. Hallford, 103 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015). The government

asks us to disregard the court’s written opinion because it was handed

down four months after the government noted its appeal and two

months after the government filed its opening brief in this court. The

filing of a non-frivolous notice of appeal divests the district court of

jurisdiction “over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” 

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)

(per curiam); see United States v. DeFries, 129 F.3d 1293, 1302 (D.C.

Cir. 1997) (per curiam). Some courts of appeals have made

exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., In re Mosley, 494 F.3d 1320, 1328

(11th Cir. 2007); In re Silberkraus, 336 F.3d 864, 869 (9th Cir. 2003),

but none of them fit a case in which the written opinion is issued

months after the appellant has filed its brief on appeal, as occurred

here and in United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 97-98 (1st Cir.

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days later, the court ordered Hallford – who was then in the D.C.

jail (see note 3 supra) – released on his own recognizance on

condition that he remain in Alabama pending any appeal the

government might bring.

II.

Before we get to the question whether Miranda required

suppression of Hallford’s statements to the Secret Service

agents, we will discuss whether the district court should have

suppressed the physical evidence found in Hallford’s car. 

Hallford’s statements to the agents add very little to the

government’s case.5

 The physical evidence is far more

significant. And the government has informed us that the

prosecution could proceed without Hallford’s statements if the

items seized from the car are admissible. Appellant Br. at 24

n.15.

2008). We therefore will disregard the written opinion, which adds

little to the district court’s oral explanation. Still, we do not entirely

foreclose the possibility that in some future case other circumstances

may warrant consideration of a district court’s post-appeal opinion.

5

 In a memorandum opposing Hallford’s suppression motion, the

government relied on Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984), to

argue that it would inevitably have discovered the car and its contents

even if Hallford had not made his statements to the agents: the car in

fact had already been discovered (by the Park Service); it had been

ticketed twice and was designated for towing; and once a car is

impounded, an inventory search is undertaken of the passenger

compartment and the trunk. At the suppression hearing, however, the

government declined to submit evidence in support of its inevitable

discovery argument and the parties apparently treated the issue as “off

the table.”

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The Supreme Court, adopting a position Judge Friendly

advocated long ago,6

 has determined that the fruit-of-thepoisonous-tree doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371

U.S. 471, 484-87 (1963), does not apply to statements taken in

violation of the Miranda rules. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.

298, 304-09 (1985); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 634

(2004) (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia, J.); id.

at 644-45 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by O’Connor, J.,

concurring in the judgment). As Justice Thomas explained in

Patane, 542 U.S. at 636, “the Miranda rule is a prophylactic

employed to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination

Clause. The Self-Incrimination Clause, however, is not

implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit

of a voluntary statement. Accordingly, there is no justification

for extending the Miranda rule to this context.”7

 It follows that

unless the agents, in violation of the Due Process Clause,

coerced Hallford into stating that his car contained a Molotov

cocktail and firearms (which may have accelerated the seizure

of the car and its contents), the items found in the car were

admissible. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 769 (2003)

(plurality opinion).8

6 See HENRY J. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in

BENCHMARKS 266, 279-82 (1967).

7

 The Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination

states that “No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to

be a witness against himself . . ..” U.S. CONST. amend. V.

8

 The plurality opinion in Patane, 542 U.S. at 640, quoted this

statement from Chavez (538 U.S. at 769): “those subjected to coercive

police interrogation have an automatic protection from the use of their

involuntary statements (or evidence derived from their statements) in

any subsequent criminal trial.”

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In determining whether the agents coerced Hallford into

making these incriminating statements, a court must consider

“the characteristics of the accused and the details of the

interrogation.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226

(1973).9 The ultimate question is whether Hallford’s “will” was

“overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically

impaired” as a result of the agents’ conduct. Id. at 225-26

(quoting Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 

The district court’s determination that the agents violated

Hallford’s Due Process rights rested on three critical findings of

fact. The government argues that each of these findings

constituted clear error. See United States v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354,

358 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

The first of these findings was, in the words of the district

court, that Hallford “was summoned by agents for an interview,

not asked if he would submit to an interview.” The record

shows otherwise. Before beginning the interview, Agent Fox

asked Hallford, “can we speak to you about [your] statements .

. .?” Hallford said “yes.” Hallford defends the district court’s

finding on the ground that his agreeing to let the agents “speak

to” him did not mean he consented to speak to them. Appellee

Br. at 31. This is clever but not cogent. Hallford must have

understood the agents to be requesting his permission to engage

in a conversation. Not only did the agents tell him they wanted

to “find out” about his statements, but also Hallford answered

9

 We hesitate to put this in terms of the “totality of the

circumstances,” a phrase that appears in some opinions dealing with

the sort of issues confronting us in this case. Sometimes these

opinions treat the “totality” phrase as if it were a “test,” which it is not.

The phrase itself is “non-descriptive.” United States v. Prandy-Binet,

5 F.3d 558, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (on pet. for reh’g). It tells us nothing

about which circumstances are even relevant (surely, not all

circumstances matter), and it reveals nothing about the probative value

of any particular circumstance.

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their questions. There was no evidence that the agents were

coercive or overbearing in asking his permission. The district

court’s finding was clearly erroneous.

The district court also found that the agents “did not know

and hadn’t even tried to find out [Hallford’s] mental and

physical well-being, notwithstanding the fact that they knew he

was suffering from a mental disorder, extreme anxiety, and

serious physical ailments.” The court added that the agents

“didn’t even attempt to appreciate the nature of his hemophilic

condition” and the “severe pain” he was experiencing. There is

evidence that Hallford was in pain when he took himself to the

George Washington Hospital emergency room on November 5,

but there is no evidence supporting the district court’s apparent

assumption that Hallford was still in pain, severe or otherwise,

by the time the agents interviewed him on the afternoon of

November 6 at United Medical Center. Before he was

transferred, staff at George Washington Hospital administered

pain medicine to him; thereafter, Hallford told the doctors and

nurses that the pain in his leg had subsided. So what evidentiary

support is there for the district court’s conclusion that the agents

failed to “appreciate” Hallford’s pain during the interview? We

see none. During his interview Hallford said nothing and

exhibited nothing that would support the court’s finding. All

indications are to the contrary. As to the court’s finding that the

agents were remiss in attempting to learn about Hallford’s

condition, there is abundant evidence to the contrary. The

agents did, in fact, ask and learn numerous details about

Hallford’s condition. After discovering that he had already been

transferred to United Medical Center, the agents stayed at

George Washington Hospital to ask staff members about

Hallford. The agents learned that when he arrived at the

emergency room his leg was bleeding, that he suffered from a

blood disorder, that he had abused antidepressants, that he had

expressed paranoid delusions about the government, and that the

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hospital staff determined that he should be involuntarily

committed because he appeared to pose a “danger to [himself]

or others . . ..”10 Later, at United Medical Center, the agents

observed Hallford's condition first hand. Far from “not

know[ing]” or “tr[ying] to find out [Hallford’s] mental and

physical well-being,” the agents diligently inquired into, and

learned a great deal about, both. The district court clearly erred

in its finding of fact.

Third, the district court found that the agents deceived

Hallford and “snooker[ed him] into an admission of gun

possession . . ..” Significant police deception may bear on

whether a statement or confession has been coerced, see Lynumn

v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963), but the agents here

engaged in neither deception nor trickery. When they began the

interview, the agents asked Hallford if he would answer

questions “about [his] statements” to the staff at George

Washington Hospital and “in reference to [those] statements . .

..” As the interview concluded, the agents followed Secret

Service protocol, asking generic questions they ask every

interviewee. One of the questions was about Hallford’s

ownership of firearms. This amounted to deception, according

to the district court. We do not see why. If the agents already

knew, or even just suspected, that Hallford’s car contained

firearms, there is no explaining why they did not put out an alert

to find his car before their interview even began. But there is no

10 District of Columbia law permits a “physician or qualified

psychologist . . . who has reason to believe that a person is mentally

ill and, because of the illness, is likely to injure himself or others if he

is not immediately detained,” to, “without a warrant, take the person

into custody, transport him to a public or private hospital . . . and make

application for his admission thereto for purposes of emergency

observation and diagnosis” for up to 48 hours. D.C. CODE § 21-521. 

Detention may be extended for up to an additional seven days by court

order. See id. at § 21-522 to -523. 

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evidence whatsoever that the agents believed, or had any reason

to believe, that Hallford owned firearms, much less that he had

any with him in the District. There is no evidentiary basis for

the district court’s clearly erroneous finding of deception and

trickery.

With these findings corrected, we cannot accept the district

court’s conclusion that Hallford’s statements about the items in

his car resulted from a “substantial element of coercive police

conduct.” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986). 

Hallford agreed to the interview. The agents did not pressure

him to do so in any way. The interview lasted less than an hour. 

The setting was not, as in Miranda for example, see 384 U.S. at

448-58, in a police-dominated atmosphere. The agents asked

straightforward questions in conversational tones, the hospital

staff offered him food, and, in general, the agents “treat[ed] him

nicely,” according to a defense-retained psychiatrist who

evaluated Hallford six months later. See United States v.

Hughes, 640 F.3d 428, 438 (1st Cir. 2011). The agents made no

threats or promises to Hallford and he was deprived of no

essentials. See Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602. The district court

mentioned that “the agents never did anything to dispel

[Hallford’s] belief . . . that the interview was required, and that

if he was going to leave that hospital, he would need their

blessing.” This of course assumes that Hallford had such a

belief, which the district court said may be “true or not.”11

Nothing the agents did or said would have caused Hallford to

entertain such a belief, if in fact he entertained it. And nothing

Hallford did or said suggested to the agents that he was thinking

11 Dr. John S. O’Brien II, a psychiatrist the defense retained to

evaluate Hallford six months after the interview, testified that in his

“opinion” Hallford thought the agents “were his ticket out [of United

Medical Center].” One wonders how this statement qualifies as a

medical diagnosis or a medical opinion. As stated in the text, the

district court did not accept Dr. O’Brien’s opinion as fact.

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they were his ticket out of the hospital.12 The agents were

generally aware of Hallford’s physical and mental condition

before they interviewed him. The district court stated that

Hallford arrived at George Washington Hospital in “severe

pain” but neglected to mention that there was no evidence he

was still in pain when the agents interviewed him a day later.

Hallford did have psychiatric problems. Even so, “a defendant’s

mental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official

coercion,” cannot “dispose of the inquiry into constitutional

‘voluntariness.’” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164. The federal

charges in this case related to the Molotov cocktail found in the

car, yet Hallford’s statement to the agents about this was

unsolicited. That is, Hallford volunteered the information when

no question was pending. And there is strong evidence that

Hallford’s will was not “overborne.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at

226. As the interview concluded, Hallford refused the agents’

request that he consent to a search of the car and he refused to

permit the agents to examine his medical records.

In short, we believe the government carried its burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Hallford’s

statements were voluntary within the meaning of the Due

Process Clause. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). 

12 All indications are that Hallford “perceive[d] this detention as

imposed only for purposes of a medical examination, not a police

interrogation.” Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 1987); see

also United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 629-32 (4th Cir. 2007). 

It was the decision of the George Washington medical staff to commit

him. A doctor, and later a nurse, explained this to him. He said he

understood. He was transported from George Washington Hospital to

United Medical Center by medical staff in an ambulance. In these

circumstances, it is hard to see why during the interview Hallford

would have had “reason to think that the listeners have official power

over him . . ..” Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1191 (2012)

(quoting Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)).

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It follows that the district court erred in suppressing physical

evidence derived from his statements.

IV.

This brings us to the district court’s finding that Hallford

was “in [Miranda] custody” when the agents interviewed him. 

Because we have rejected the critical factual underpinnings for

the district court’s Miranda finding, we do not believe the

record is sufficient for us to decide the issue. Determining

“whether a defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda”

is a “fact intensive” inquiry. United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d

1140, 1146 (10th Cir. 1998); see Thompson v. Keohane, 516

U.S. 99, 118 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Miranda

custody inquiry . . . requires . . . any number of fact-intensive,

close calls.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather than

attempting to weigh the evidence, we remand the case to the

district court to determine whether Hallford was in Miranda

custody. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 179 F. App’x 57, 58

(D.C. Cir. 2006) (remanding to consider whether a “[Miranda]

interrogation took place”).

The district court found that Hallford was “not asked if he

would submit to an interview” and then focused on the

conditions of Hallford’s involuntary commitment to conclude

that his “freedom of movement” was sufficiently “restrain[ed]”

to implicate Miranda. See Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181,

1189 (2012). As to the court’s factual finding, we have already

held that it was clearly erroneous. As to Hallford’s involuntary

commitment, this was “simply the first step in the analysis, not

the last.” Id. Not all mandatory hospitalizations are tantamount

to Miranda custody. See, e.g., Reinert v. Larkins, 379 F.3d 76,

86 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that a suspect was not in custody

even though he was interrogated in an ambulance and was

“never told that he was free to leave or free not to answer

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17

questions”); United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.

1985) (holding that a suspect was not in custody even though

“questioning . . . took place at the hospital” and he was “not free

to leave”). Indeed, “not all police questioning is coercive,” and

in many interrogations “there will be nothing that could fairly be

called compulsion . . ..” HENRY FRIENDLY, A Postscript on

Miranda, inBENCHMARKS at 274. On remand, the district court

should take care to answer “the additional question whether the

relevant environment present[ed] the same inherently coercive

pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in

Miranda.” Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1190.

V.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment suppressing the

physical evidence found in the car Hallford drove to the District

is reversed and case is remanded for the district court to

reconsider Miranda’s applicability.

So ordered.

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WILKINS, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring 

in part: I must depart from the Court’s opinion concluding 

that three of the District Court’s factual findings were clearly 

erroneous, but I agree that the Government has proven that 

Hallford’s statements were voluntary under the Fifth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

The Court’s opinion ably lays out the sequence of events 

that led to Hallford’s interaction with Secret Service Agents 

Fox and Maher (collectively “the agents”), and I need not 

repeat that background here. However, the Court’s focus 

solely on the evidence that undermines the District Court’s 

factual findings represents, in my respectful view, its failure 

to adhere to the deferential standard of review we employ 

when evaluating a District Court’s factual findings. After all, 

A trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to a 

presumption that they are correct, and we will 

displace them only if (1) the findings are 

“without substantial evidentiary support or . . . 

induced by an erroneous application of the 

law”; or if (2) “on the entire evidence [we are]

left with the definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed.”

United States v. Dillon, 738 F.3d 284, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 

(alteration in original) (quoting Cuddy v. Cameron, 762 F.2d 

119, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, “we may not 

reverse a trial court’s factual findings ‘even though convinced 

that had [we] been sitting as the trier of fact, [we] would have 

weighed the evidence differently.’” Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 

F.3d 416, 423 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). “In evaluating a 

challenge to a district court’s factual findings, ‘we do not 

weigh each piece of evidence in isolation, but consider all of 

the evidence taken as a whole.’” Id. at 424 (quoting Awad v. 

Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). Considering this 

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2

deferential standard of review, I cannot conclude that the 

District Court clearly erred in finding that the agents 

summoned Hallford for an interview, that the agents used 

deception in conducting their interview, or that the agents did 

not dispel Hallford’s belief that the interview was necessary 

for his release.

1

Take, for instance, the District Court’s finding that 

Hallford “was summoned by agents for an interview, not 

asked if he would submit to an interview.” A. 685.2

 

Considering all the evidence, taken as a whole, the District 

Court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. The majority relies 

on Agent Fox’s asking Hallford if the agents could speak to 

him about statements he made at George Washington Hospital 

(“GW”). Maj. Op. at 12. However, Agent Fox’s testimony 

also reveals that although United Medical Center (“UMC”)

personnel escorted Hallford to the interview, the personnel 

did so only upon the agents’ request:

Q. What did you do when you got to United 

Medical?

A. We parked out front. We walked in, again, 

to the visitors’ lounge, to the check-in desk, 

and identified ourselves to the clerk at the 

desk.

Q. What happened?

A. We identified ourselves. We explained why 

we were there. And they reached out to the 

security department.

 1 I concur with my colleagues that the District Court clearly erred in 

finding that the agents did not ascertain Hallford’s physical 

condition for the reasons stated in the majority opinion. See Maj. 

Op. at 12-13.

2 The use of “A.” throughout this opinion indicates citation to the 

Appendix for Appellant.

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3

Q. Did you ask to interview Mr. Hallford?

A. Yes.

Q. And did they indicate in any way that they 

were going to try to make that happen?

A. They told us that they would reach out to 

the security department and -- and that if we 

just waited there, that they would -- someone 

would be there to assist us.

A.196. Thereafter, UMC security officers escorted the agents 

to a secure area of the fourth floor of the hospital where they 

subsequently entered a hallway. Agent Fox explained their 

entry in this manner: “We went into the hallway and, as we 

went into the hallway, there was an open door in front of us, 

and a hospital staff person was standing there, and then in 

walked two or three hospital staff, along with Mr. Hallford.”

A. 197. The hallway was not patient accessible. 

Furthermore, Agent Fox’s testimony suggests that UMC 

personnel deferred to the agents because “[t]hey just looked at 

[the agents] and said . . . do you want to go in this room right 

here? And [the agents] just followed. [The agents] said, 

okay.” A. 197. Agent Fox was the last person to enter the 

interview room. There was no evidence regarding what 

language the UMC personnel used in escorting Hallford to the 

interview. Finally, Agent Fox never informed Hallford that 

he was free to leave or that he was free to terminate the 

interview. Taking all this evidence as a whole, I am not left 

with the “definite and firm conviction” that the District Court 

erred in concluding that the agents summoned Hallford for an 

interview. Dillon, 738 F.3d at 297 (quoting Cuddy, 762 F.2d 

at 124).

The District Court also found that Hallford “fell into [the 

agents’] trap,” A. 688, and that the agents “effectively 

snooker[ed] [him] into an admission of gun possession in the 

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4

District of Columbia, after satisfying themselves that he was 

no threat to anyone protected by the US Secret Service or any 

of its employees,” A. 692. The District Court concluded that 

the questions were “calculated to possibly result in a selfincriminating admission about gun ownership and the 

whereabouts of those guns.” A. 688. 

Agent Fox testified that the agents asked Hallford if they

could speak to him about the statements he made while at 

GW. The agents planned their questioning around a use of a 

standard form that touched on information of interest to the 

agents, including weapon ownership. As a result, near the 

end of the interview, the agents asked Hallford if he owned 

any weapons. The agents’ reliance on a standard form 

suggests that they knew in advance that they would ask 

questions of Hallford about topics other than the statements 

Hallford made at GW. Accordingly, there is substantial 

evidence to support the District Court’s finding that the agents 

used deception in questioning Hallford.

Additionally, the District Court also found there was “no 

question that the agents never did anything to dispel any 

belief on [Hallford’s] part that the interview was required, and 

that if he was going to leave that hospital, he would need their 

blessing.” A. 690. The majority appears to implicitly reject

this finding by dismissing its import, relying on the District 

Court’s equivocation about whether Hallford actually 

possessed this belief. See Maj. Op. at 15. However, the 

District Court heard testimony from Dr. John O’Brien, who 

was tendered without objection as an expert in the field of 

forensic psychiatry, and his expert report was admitted by the 

court. Dr. O’Brien testified that Hallford “was an individual 

who perceived that the Secret Service would help him get out 

of the hospital. Obviously he wanted to leave the next day 

himself.” A. 482. Dr. O’Brien also testified that Hallford

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5

“was significantly vulnerable to being seduced into speaking 

with him thinking that they were his ticket out,” particularly 

in light of “the recurrently and consistently documented 

psychiatric symptoms he was exhibiting, his physically 

debilitated state and the fact that he had not yet been afforded 

appropriate psychiatric treatment.” A. 482-83. Nothing in the 

record disputes Dr. O’Brien’s conclusion. The government 

did not object to Dr. O’Brien’s testimony at the time it was 

proffered, nor does the Government challenge whether

Hallford possessed this belief. There is no evidence in the 

record that the agents did anything to dispel such a belief.

Given the evidence as a whole, and the lack of any challenge 

by the Government, I cannot conclude that the District 

Court’s finding is clearly erroneous. 

Despite my conclusion that three of the District Court’s 

findings were not clearly erroneous, I agree with the Court

that Hallford’s statements were voluntary. Whether a 

confession is voluntary is a legal question we review de novo. 

United States v. Reed, 522 F.3d 354, 358 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 

The Government must prove that Hallford’s confession was 

voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. Lego v. 

Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). Although this is a close 

case, I believe the Government has done so here.

“A confession is inadmissible as a matter of due process 

if under the totality of the circumstances it was involuntarily 

obtained . . . .” Reed, 522 F.3d at 358-59 (quoting United 

States v. Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). 

“Voluntariness turns on whether the ‘defendant’s will was 

overborne’ when he gave his statement, and the test for this is 

whether the statement was a ‘product of an essentially free 

and unconstrained choice by its maker.’” United States v. 

Murdock, 667 F.3d 1302, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting 

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); 

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6

Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). A 

defendant’s mental condition is a relevant factor in 

determining whether a confession was voluntary, but “this 

fact does not justify a conclusion that a defendant’s mental 

condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official 

coercion, should ever dispose of the inquiry into 

constitutional ‘voluntariness.’” Colorado v. Connelly, 479 

U.S. 157, 164 (1986). Accordingly, “coercive police activity 

is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 

‘voluntary.’” Id. at 167. Coercive activity includes “trickery, 

psychological pressure, or mistreatment.” Withrow v. 

Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 708 (1993) (O’Connor, J., concurring 

in part and dissenting in part). Furthermore, whether Miranda

warnings were given is a relevant factor but “does not . . . 

dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.” Dickerson v. United 

States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000). “Determination of whether 

a statement is involuntary ‘requires more than a mere colormatching of cases.’ It requires careful evaluation of all the 

circumstances of the interrogation.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 

U.S. 385, 401 (1978) (quoting Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 

442 (1961)). Thus, we must consider “both the characteristics 

of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” 

Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (quoting Schneckcloth, 412 U.S. 

at 226). Relevant factors include “the defendant’s age and 

education, the length of detention, whether the defendant was 

advised of his rights, and the nature of the questioning.” 

Murdock, 667 F.3d at 1305-06 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 

at 226).

A review of our precedent prevents me from concluding 

that Hallford’s statements were involuntary. We have 

suggested that “egregious facts [are] necessary to establish 

that the statements . . . made during questioning [are]

involuntary.” United States v. Mohammed, 693 F.3d 192, 198 

(D.C. Cir. 2012). Statements made where the circumstances 

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7

are less than “egregious” are usually voluntary. For example, 

in United States v. Reed, we found a confession voluntary 

where the defendant claimed to be suffering withdrawal 

symptoms at the time of the interrogation and the police 

placed the defendant in a jumpsuit without any underwear. 

522 F.3d 354, 358-59 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Likewise, we found a 

Miranda waiver voluntary in United States v. Yunis, where 

the defendant was questioned over a period of four days, 

suffered from seasickness in a “hot and cramped detention 

room,” and lacked any familiarity with his Miranda rights 

prior to being informed and signing a written waiver. 859 

F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Berghuis v. Thompkins, the 

Supreme Court noted that there is nothing “inherently 

coercive” about an interrogation that lasts three hours while a 

defendant sits in a straight-backed chair to render involuntary 

statements given subsequent to a Miranda warning. 560 U.S. 

370, 387 (2010).

Similarly, where the Supreme Court has found statements 

involuntary, the circumstances surrounding the interrogation 

have been much worse than those here. In Mincey v. Arizona, 

the defendant was suffering “unbearable” pain from a gunshot 

wound while unable to speak because of a tube in his mouth; 

he also could not provide coherent answers to questions, and

he asked for a lawyer repeatedly over the course of a fourhour interrogation. 437 U.S. at 396-401. In Blackburn v. 

Alabama, the defendant endured an eight- to nine-hour 

interrogation in a small room surrounded by three police 

officers and “was insane and incompetent at the time he 

allegedly confessed.” 361 U.S. 199, 204, 207 (1960). 

Hallford’s circumstances do not come close to those of 

Mincey and Blackburn. Although Hallford was suffering 

from mental illness, he was interrogated in the company of 

doctors and nurses. His interview lasted less than an hour,

and the agents spoke to Hallford in conversational tones. 

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8

Hallford appeared calm and exhibited no signs of physical or 

emotional distress. He provided responsive answers to the 

agents’ questions. And the coercive conduct here does not 

suggest that the agents “threated or injured [Hallford] during 

the interrogation or that he was in any way fearful.” 

Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 386. “Indeed, even where 

interrogations of greater duration were held to be improper, 

they were accompanied . . . by other facts indicating coercion, 

such as an incapacitated and sedated suspect, sleep and food 

deprivation, and threats.” Id. at 387. While such 

circumstances may not be necessary to find a due process 

violation, there are no sufficiently analogous circumstances 

present here.

Certainly, the circumstances of this case give me pause, 

and although the voluntariness determination is “more than a 

mere color-matching of cases,” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 401

(citing Reck, 367 U.S. at 442), precedent must nonetheless 

guide our decision-making. This is a problem for Hallford, 

because notably absent from his brief are cases where courts 

found statements involuntary under sufficiently analogous 

facts. While some circumstances here weigh against the 

government’s claim that Hallford’s statements were 

voluntary, none evoke the kind of egregious conduct or 

governmental coercion that has led prior courts to find 

statements involuntary. The agents did not inform Hallford of 

his Miranda rights, but this failure is not outcome 

determinative. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444. Although the 

agents misled Hallford about the scope of their questioning, 

their misrepresentation was not the type of false promise of 

leniency that may render statements involuntary. See

Murdock, 667 F.3d at 1307. But cf. Colorado v. Spring, 479 

U.S. 564, 576-77, 577 n.8 (1987) (reserving the question of 

whether an affirmative misrepresentation about the scope of 

an interrogation would render a Miranda waiver involuntary). 

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9

The manner in which Hallford was brought to be questioned 

is also disconcerting – the hospital staff were acting at the will 

of the agents, there is no evidence that the staff asked Hallford

if he wished to meet the agents, and Hallford was suffering 

from mental illness – but his mental illness, “by itself and 

apart from its relation to official coercion” does not determine 

whether his statements were voluntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 

164. And while Hallford may have believed that the agents 

who arrived to question him about his prior statements would 

be able to help secure his release if only he would talk to 

them, there is no evidence in the record that the agents caused 

this belief, only that they benefited from it. 

Finally, and most tellingly, when the agents asked if they 

could search Hallford’s car and review his medical records, 

Hallford declined. As the government argues, Hallford’s 

refusal to consent to these searches undermines any 

suggestion that his will was “overborne” at the time he spoke 

with the agents. See United States v. Cooper, 499 F.2d 1060, 

1064 & n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (concluding statements were 

voluntary, in part, because defendant “exercised some of his 

rights by refusing to sign [a Miranda waiver] and by 

indicating he might decline to answer some questions”); see 

also United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 497 (4th Cir. 2006) 

(statements voluntary, in part, because defendant “freely 

answered some questions and declined to answer others); 

United States v. Graham, 982 F.2d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1992) 

(evidence “not reflective of an overborne will” when

defendant, during a search, “answered some questions” but 

“dodged questions about her identity” and “refused officers’ 

request to search her luggage”); cf. Yunis, 859 F.2d at 963 

(noting that courts “look to a defendant’s behavior to 

determine the extent of his distress” when determining 

whether statements are voluntary). Under the totality of the

circumstances, and in light of this precedent, I conclude that 

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10

the Government has met its burden to prove that Hallford’s 

statements were voluntary by a preponderance of the 

evidence.

However, given the majority’s conclusion that the 

District Court’s findings were clearly erroneous, I agree that 

we should remand the remaining Miranda question back to 

the District Court.

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