Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01047/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01047-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Julien P. Champagne
Appellant
Denis McDonough
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

JULIEN P. CHAMPAGNE,

Claimant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2023-1047

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 21-1156, Judge Scott Laurer.

______________________

Decided: December 6, 2024

______________________

FALEN M. LAPONZINA, ADVOCATE Nonprofit 

Organization, Washington, DC, argued for claimantappellant. Also represented by KENNETH M. CARPENTER, 

Law Offices of Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS.

 AMANDA TANTUM, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. Also 

represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON,PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY,

LOREN MISHA PREHEIM; CHRISTINA LYNN GREGG, Y. KEN 

LEE, Office of General Counsel, United States Department 

of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 1 Filed: 12/06/2024
2 CHAMPAGNE v. MCDONOUGH

______________________

Before CHEN, HUGHES, and STARK, Circuit Judges.

STARK, Circuit Judge.

Julien P. Champagne appeals from the decision of the 

United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

(“Veterans Court”) affirming the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals’ (“Board”) denial of an effective date earlier than

July 14, 2003, for service connection for Mr. Champagne’s 

cerebellar degenerative disorder (“CDD”). Champagne v. 

McDonough, 2022 WL 2663589 (Vet. App. Jul. 11, 2022). 

We affirm.

I

Mr. Champagne served honorably on active duty in the 

United States Marine Corps from December 1953 to 

December 1956. In September 1987, he filed a “Veteran’s 

Application for Compensation or Pension,” using VA 

Form 21-526, with the United States Department of 

Veterans Affairs (“VA”) (“1987 Application”), seeking 

benefits relating to his CDD. App’x 21-24.1 A VA regional 

office (“RO”) construed the 1987 Application as an 

“application for pension benefits,” SApp’x 2, and awarded a 

“disability pension” in December 1987, App’x 29. 

In August 1999, Mr. Champagne filed a “Statement in 

Support of Claim,” requesting that the VA consider a claim 

for service connection disability compensation (“service 

connection compensation” or just simply “compensation”)

for a malaria condition, as well as any residual illnesses he

“obtained while in military service.” App’x 30. In a July 

1 “App’x” refers to the appendix attached to Mr. 

Champagne’s opening brief. “SApp’x” refers to the 

supplemental appendix attached to the government’s 

response brief.

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 2 Filed: 12/06/2024
2002 rating decision, the RO granted Mr. Champagne

service connection compensation for malaria at 0%, 

effective November 15, 2001, but did not grant 

compensation for any residual illnesses, including CDD. In 

July 2003, Mr. Champagne filed a notice of disagreement, 

contending that he had contracted malaria during service 

and that his CDD was caused by malaria. In April 2004,

the RO confirmed its July 2002 rating decision.

In February 2005, upon finding that Mr. Champagne 

had failed to timely appeal its earlier decisions, the RO 

construed one of Mr. Champagne’s filings as a new claim 

seeking a higher service connection compensation rating 

for malaria and also seeking a finding of compensation for 

CDD as a residual of or as secondary to malaria. After 

multiple proceedings between 2005 and 2013, Mr. 

Champagne was granted compensation for CDD at a 100%

rating, effective February 3, 2005. He challenged this

effective date and, in January 2018, the RO granted him 

an earlier effective date of July 14, 2003. 

The January 2018 rating decision explained that Mr. 

Champagne’s 1987 Application was “a claim for pension 

benefits” but added that “a claim for pension is also 

considered a claim for compensation benefits,” even though

“there was no evidence of record to suggest that [Mr. 

Champagne’s] disability was incurred in or caused by 

service.” App’x 41. Mr. Champagne appealed the July 14, 

2003 effective date to the Board, arguing he “should be 

compensated from 1987 instead.” App’x 44.

In October 2020, the Board issued a decision denying 

an effective date earlier than July 14, 2003. With respect 

to Mr. Champagne’s 1987 Application, the Board found 

that his application contained “no suggestion of an 

intention . . . to make a claim for service connected 

disability benefits [i.e., compensation] in addition to the 

non-service connected pension benefits.” App’x 61. “Under 

these circumstances,” the Board concluded, “there was no 

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4 CHAMPAGNE v. MCDONOUGH

requirement for [the] VA to consider the claim for pension 

as also one for compensation.” Id.

Mr. Champagne appealed the Board’s decision to the 

Veterans Court. On July 11, 2022, the Veterans Court 

affirmed the Board’s October 2020 decision. Citing its 

precedent, namely Stewart v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 15 

(1997), the Veterans Court determined that under 

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a), the “VA may consider a claim for 

pension to include a claim for compensation, but it is not 

required to do so.” App’x 5 (emphasis in original). 

According to the Veterans Court, then, the Board 

permissibly construed Mr. Champagne’s 1987 Application 

claim as not containing a claim for service connection 

compensation. The Veterans Court further concluded that 

it “need not determine” whether the RO had, in its January 

2018 rating decision, “made . . . a factual finding” that the 

1987 Application included a compensation claim because,

even if the RO had done so, “the Board would not be bound 

by that finding.” Id. at 7 & n.59.

Mr. Champagne timely appealed the Veterans Court’s 

decision to us.

II

Our jurisdiction to review judgments of the Veterans 

Court is limited. We may review the validity of a Veterans 

Court decision “on a rule of law or of any statute or 

regulation . . . or any interpretation thereof . . . that was 

relied on by” the Veterans Court. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

However, “[e]xcept to the extent that an appeal . . . 

presents a constitutional issue,” we may not review “a 

challenge to a factual determination” or “to a law or 

regulation as applied to the facts of a particular case.” 

Id. § 7292(d)(2).

“We review questions of statutory and regulatory 

interpretation de novo.” Cavaciuti v. McDonough, 75 F.4th 

1363, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2023). We “hold unlawful and set 

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 4 Filed: 12/06/2024
aside any regulation or any interpretation thereof” that we 

find to be “(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 

or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to 

constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in 

excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 

in violation of a statutory right; or (D) without observance 

of procedure required by law.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1).

III

Mr. Champagne raises two issues on appeal. First, he

contends that the Veterans Court misinterpreted 

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) as not requiring the VA to treat his 

1987 Application as both a claim for pension benefits

(“pension”) and also a claim for service connection

disability compensation. Second, as an alternative 

argument, he contends that the Veterans Court engaged in 

impermissible factfinding. We address each issue in turn.

A

Before reaching the merits, we first consider the 

government’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to review

Mr. Champagne’s appeal. The government argues that the 

Veterans Court did not interpret 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) but, 

instead, “simply applied section 3.151(a) to the facts, 

including the language of Mr. Champagne’s September 

1987 application.” Appellee’s Br. 15. We disagree.

In rejecting Mr. Champagne’s contention that his 1987 

Application must be treated as both a claim for pension and 

a claim for compensation, the Veterans Court, relying on 

its Stewart precedent, articulated its view that the 

language of § 3.151(a) “is permissive – not mandatory,” 

meaning that “VA may consider a claim for pension to 

include a claim for compensation, but it is not required to 

do so.” App’x 5 (emphasis in original). These statements 

show that the Veterans Court was elaborating on the 

meaning of, and thus interpreting, the regulation, not 

merely applying it to a particular factual scenario. See 

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6 CHAMPAGNE v. MCDONOUGH

Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en 

banc) (“[A]n interpretation of a statute or regulation occurs 

when its meaning is elaborated by the court.”). Thus, we 

do not dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

B

Mr. Champagne contends that a proper reading of 

38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) requires the VA to construe an 

application, such as his 1987 Application, as both a claim 

for a pension and a claim for compensation. 

Section 3.151(a) provides:

(a) General. A specific claim in the form[

2]

prescribed by the Secretary must be filed in 

order for benefits to be paid to any individual 

under the laws administered by VA. 

(38 U.S.C. 5101(a)). A claim by a veteran for 

compensation may be considered to be a claim 

for pension; and a claim by a veteran for 

pension may be considered to be a claim for 

compensation. The greater benefit will be 

awarded, unless the claimant specifically 

elects the lesser benefit.

2 The title of the form Mr. Champagne used,

“Veteran’s Application for Compensation or Pension,” is 

arguably ambiguous and, unfortunately, might be 

misunderstood as constituting an application for both

pension and compensation benefits, regardless of how the 

veteran completes the form. This appeal, however, does 

not call upon us to reach any conclusions about any 

particular form. Only the regulation is at issue, as Mr. 

Champagne’s counsel made clear at oral argument. See

Oral Arg. 10:15-12:28, available at https://oralarguments

.cafc.uscourts.gov/default.aspx?fl=23-1047_04042024.mp3.

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 6 Filed: 12/06/2024
38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a) (emphasis added).

In Mr. Champagne’s view, the two emphasized 

sentences mean that “both pension and service connection 

[compensation] should have been adjudicated to determine 

the greater benefit, and only after specific election by Mr. 

Champagne, should the lesser benefit have been awarded.” 

Appellant’s Br. 9. The government responds that the 

Veterans Court’s interpretation of the regulation is correct:

the VA may exercise its discretion to consider a claim for a 

pension to also be a claim for compensation, and vice versa, 

but the VA is not required to do so. We agree with the 

government.

“When construing a regulation, we begin with the 

regulatory language itself to determine its plain meaning.” 

Frazier v. McDonough, 66 F.4th 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2023) 

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We are 

also “required to carefully consider the text, structure, 

history, and purpose of a regulation when determining its 

meaning.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Starting with the language, § 3.151(a) states that “[a] 

claim by a veteran for compensation may be considered to 

be a claim for pension” (emphasis added). “May” is a 

permissive word, not a command. See, e.g., Ravin v. Wilkie, 

956 F.3d 1346, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The fact that [a 

statute] uses the term ‘may’ means the statute should not 

be read as mandatory.”); Andersen Consulting v. United 

States, 959 F.2d 929, 932 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“The use of the 

permissive ‘may’ instead of the mandatory ‘shall,’ 

authorizes the board to employ its discretion . . . .”). Thus, 

we “use common sense and presume that the word conveys 

some degree of discretion.” McBryde v. United States, 299 

F.3d 1357, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The plain language of 

§ 3.151(a), then, establishes that the VA is allowed, but not 

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 7 Filed: 12/06/2024
8 CHAMPAGNE v. MCDONOUGH

required, to consider a pension claim as a compensation 

claim, and vice versa.

3

Mr. Champagne attempts to show that “inferences that 

we may rationally draw from the structure and purpose” of 

the regulation somehow rebut the plain meaning of “may.” 

See McBryde, 299 F.3d at 1362. His effort fails. He relies 

primarily on the third sentence of the regulation: “[t]he 

greater benefit will be awarded, unless the claimant 

specifically elects the lesser benefit.” 38 C.F.R. § 3.151(a). 

Mr. Champagne argues that, in order to determine which 

benefit is greater, the VA must consider both pension and 

compensation claims; otherwise, it has no way of knowing 

which amount is greater. Hence, he continues, the VA must 

consider an application as seeking both types of benefits. 

We are not persuaded. Instead, we read the third 

sentence of the regulation as providing the rule of decision 

for those instances when the VA considers both types of 

benefits. The sentence does not tell the VA anything about 

when it must do so. Mr. Champagne’s contrary view would 

3 The Veterans Court has held that under certain 

circumstances – specifically, where “the record was replete 

with evidence showing that the veteran qualified for 

disability compensation,” giving the VA “notice that the 

[veteran] might be eligible for both” types of benefits – the 

VA’s statutory duty to assist, as set out in

38 U.S.C. § 5103A, may require the VA to consider a 

pension claim as a claim for both pension and 

compensation benefits. See Stewart, 10 Vet. App. at 18-19. 

Mr. Champagne does not argue that such circumstances 

are present here (and we might lack jurisdiction over such 

an argument if it were made). Nonetheless, nothing we 

have said here should be read as weakening the VA’s duty 

to assist or as precluding the possibility that the Veterans 

Court could find certain exercises of VA discretion under 

§ 3.151(a) could constitute an abuse of that discretion. 

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 8 Filed: 12/06/2024
effectively have us rewrite the plain language of § 3.151(a) 

from “may be considered” to “will be considered.” This we 

may not do. See Langdon v. McDonough, 1 F.4th 1008, 

1013 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (refusing to “rewrite the plain 

regulatory language”); see also Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 

558, 575 (2019) (“[A] court cannot wave the ambiguity flag 

just because it [finds a] regulation impenetrable on first 

read.”).

Mr. Champagne additionally points to the “specific[]

elect[ion]” language of the third sentence of § 3.151(a), 

which he contends “removes any discretion[] from the VA”

as to how it should “construe the application.” Appellant’s 

Br. 9. This argument, too, lacks merit. We do not see how 

the “specific[] elect[ion]” term limits the VA’s discretion –

as plainly set out in the second sentence of the regulation 

– to consider the veteran’s claim as one solely for pension 

or compensation benefits. This language, instead, simply 

functions to provide the veteran with the ability to choose 

which benefit he wishes to elect when the VA evaluates his 

claim for both pension and compensation. Nothing about 

the third sentence converts the discretionary “may” of the 

second sentence into a mandatory obligation of the VA. 

The overall regulatory scheme further supports our 

conclusion. For example, an adjacent regulation, which 

addresses claims for death benefits, reads:

A claim by a surviving spouse or child for 

compensation or dependency and indemnity 

compensation will also be considered to be a 

claim for death pension and accrued benefits, 

and a claim by a surviving spouse or child for 

death pension will be considered to be a claim 

for death compensation or dependency and 

indemnity compensation and accrued 

benefits.

38 C.F.R. § 3.152(b)(1) (emphasis added). The distinction 

between the use of “may” in § 3.151(a), with pension and 

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10 CHAMPAGNE v. MCDONOUGH

compensation claims, and “will” in § 3.152(b), with death 

claims, shows that if the VA intends to impose a 

requirement on itself, it does so with compulsory language. 

See generally Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) 

(“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one 

section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 

same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 

intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 

exclusion.”) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).

Finally, Mr. Champagne observes that “when 

interpreting veterans’ benefits statutes, any doubt is to be 

resolved in the veteran’s favor.” Appellant’s Br. 14 (citing 

Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). However, for 

the reasons discussed above, we find no “interpretive 

doubt” here. Although § 3.151(a) could have been written 

more clearly, its plain language and its context in the 

regulatory scheme as a whole unambiguously establish 

that the VA has discretion to determine that a veteran is 

solely seeking pension or compensation benefits. Thus, we 

have no basis to apply the pro-veteran canon of 

interpretation. See, e.g., Spicer v. Shinseki, 752 F.3d 1367, 

1371 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that lack of ambiguity means 

there is no “interpretive doubt” that could give rise to 

application of pro-veteran canon of interpretation).

For the foregoing reasons, the Veterans Court’s 

interpretation of § 3.151(a) is correct. The VA may, but is 

not required to, consider a claim for pension to also include 

a claim for compensation, and vice versa.

C

In the alternative, Mr. Champagne contends that the 

Veterans Court engaged in impermissible fact finding. It 

is not entirely clear what fact Mr. Champagne believes the 

Veterans Court found; he seems to principally take issue 

with a portion of the Veterans Court’s decision he describes 

as a finding that the RO’s January 2018 rating decision 

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 10 Filed: 12/06/2024
“made no factual findings” as to whether his 1987 

Application for pension was also considered a claim for 

compensation. Appellant’s Br. 17-18.

We do not see the Veterans Court as having engaged in 

fact finding, either in the portion of its opinion emphasized 

by Mr. Champagne or anywhere else. To the contrary, the 

Veterans Court expressly stated that it “need not 

determine whether the [RO] made . . . a finding” about 

which type of benefits Mr. Champagne sought in 1987,

App’x 7 n.59, because even if the RO had made such a 

finding, “the Board would not be bound by that finding,” 

App’x 7. Thus, the Veterans Court merely decided that any

findings in the RO’s January 2018 rating decision would

not have been dispositive because the Board determined for 

itself that Mr. Champagne’s 1987 Application did not 

include a claim for compensation.

4 We have no basis to 

reverse.

IV

We have considered Mr. Champagne’s remaining 

arguments and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, we 

affirm the Veterans Court’s decision.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

4 To the extent Mr. Champagne challenges the 

Board’s finding that his 1987 Application did not include a 

claim for service connection compensation, we do not have 

jurisdiction to review that factual determination. See

38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

Case: 23-1047 Document: 41 Page: 11 Filed: 12/06/2024