Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-19-10051/USCOURTS-ca5-19-10051-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Edgar Becerra-Sandoval
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10051

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

EDGAR BECERRA-SANDOVAL, also known as Edgar Beceria-Sandoval,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:18-CR-46-1

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, STEWART, and ENGELHARDT, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Edgar Becerra-Sandoval pleaded guilty to illegal reentry after 

deportation and was sentenced to 71 months of imprisonment and three years 

of supervised release. Becerra-Sandoval argues on appeal that the district 

court failed to comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), and 

thus violated his right to due process, when it failed to sua sponte continue the

sentencing hearing after he stated in open court that he had not reviewed the 

presentence report (PSR) with defense counsel. Instead, the district judge

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 14, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-10051

2

relied on defense counsel’s countervailing statements that he had twice 

reviewed the PSR with Becerra-Sandoval. 

Citing the dissent to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Tate, 

516 F.3d 459, 472–73 (6th Cir. 2008) (Moore, J., dissenting), involving a similar 

factual scenario, Becerra-Sandoval argues that he preserved this issue for 

review when he informed the district court at sentencing that he had not 

reviewed the PSR. However, his statements at sentencing were not sufficiently 

specific to preserve his argument on appeal that the district court failed to 

comply with Rule 32(i)(1)(A) by not sua sponte recessing the sentencing 

hearing. See United States v. Nesmith, 866 F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 2017); 

United States v. Chavez-Hernandez, 671 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2012). 

Accordingly, plain-error review applies. To show plain error, BecerraSandoval must show a forfeited error that is clear or obvious and that affects 

his substantial rights. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If 

he makes such a showing, this court has the discretion to correct the error, and 

that discretion “ought to be exercised only if the error seriously affects the 

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted).

Becerra-Sandoval has not provided any controlling authority showing 

that differing responses from the defendant and defense counsel regarding 

review of the PSR require the district court to sua sponte recess the sentencing 

hearing to allow the defendant to review the PSR, rather than making a 

credibility determination.1 Cf. United States v. Esparza-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 

272, 274 (5th Cir. 2001) (declining to “interpret Rule 32 as creating an absolute 

requirement that the district court specifically ask a defendant whether he has 

 

1 Nevertheless, we note that when confronted with conflicting responses, allowing a 

brief recess would avoid unnecessary challenges and facilitate unquestioned fairness in the 

sentencing procedure.

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No. 19-10051

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read the [PSR]” and instead allows the district court to “draw reasonable 

inferences from court documents, the defendant’s statements, and counsel’s 

statements to determine whether the defendant has been given an opportunity 

to read the PSR with his counsel”). Accordingly, he has not demonstrated any 

error that was clear or obvious. See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135; United States v. 

Garcia-Rodriguez, 415 F.3d 452, 455–56 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Moreover, despite having ample time between the sentencing hearing 

and the filing of his appellate brief, he does not provide any facts or arguments 

explaining what objections he would have made if given the opportunity to 

review the PSR or how those objections would have affected the outcome of the 

district court proceedings. Accordingly, he has not shown that his substantial 

rights were affected by the district court’s failure to sua sponte recess the case. 

See Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135. 

In light of the foregoing, Becerra-Sandoval has not demonstrated that 

the district court committed plain error by failing to sua sponte recess the 

sentencing hearing. See id. Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is 

AFFIRMED.2

 

2 Even if we were to conclude that Becerra-Sandoval sufficiently articulated his 

objection at sentencing and assume that the district court failed to adequately comply with 

Rule 32(i)(1)(A), we would reach the same result because the error was harmless in this case.

“[A]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights” is 

harmless and “must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); see also Esparza-Gonzalez, 268 

F.3d at 274 (recognizing that noncompliance with the verification requirement of Rule 32 

does not require automatic reversal absent a showing of prejudice); United States v. Soltero, 

510 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “if it is clear that no prejudice resulted from a 

court’s failure to comply with the letter of Rule 32(i)(1)(A), the error is harmless, and 

resentencing is unnecessary”). The substantial-rights analysis is the same under both 

harmless error and plain error review, with the “important” distinction that the government 

bears the burden of proving harmless error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734–

35 (1993). Given the absence of any apparent errors in the PSR—either reflected in the

record or raised in the appellant’s brief—that would have impacted the sentence, we find that 

the government has met its burden of showing that Becerra-Sandoval was not prejudiced by 

the sentencing judge’s alleged failure to verify that he had an opportunity to read and discuss 

the PSR with his attorney. As the government emphasizes, Becerra-Sandoval has not 

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identified any factual inaccuracies in the PSR that he was prevented from disputing, nor does 

he allege that a disputed fact or legal conclusion, if successfully challenged, would have 

resulted in him receiving a lesser sentence. A brief recess would not have changed the district 

court’s sentence that it explicitly imposed to address the objectives of punishment and 

deterrence. Thus, because Becerra-Sandoval’s substantial rights were not affected, any

violation of Rule 32(i)(1)(A) was harmless and does not warrant resentencing. See United 

States v. Strother, 387 F. App’x 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Sarabia-Villanta, 

234 F.3d 706, 706 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Maldonado, 58 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 1995).

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