Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07101/USCOURTS-caDC-11-07101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer US LLP
Appellee
Brian King
Appellee
Jan Paulsson
Appellee
RSM Production Corporation
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 10, 2012 Decided June 22, 2012

No. 11-7101

RSM PRODUCTION CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER US LLP, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:10-cv-00457)

Daniel L. Abrams argued the cause for appellant. With him

on the briefs was Kelly Hebron. 

David W. Ogden argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the brief were Andrew B. Weissman, Joshua M. Salzman, and

Christina Manfredi McKinley. 

Before: ROGERS and BROWN, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

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ROGERS, Circuit Judge: RSM Production Corporation

(“RSM”) appeals the dismissal of its complaint, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), against the law firm

Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer U.S. LLP, and two of its

partners, Jan Paulsson and Brian King (hereinafter

“Freshfields”). RSM alleged that Freshfields, through its

representation of the nation of Grenada in international

arbitration, conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), in an

effort to prevent RSM from obtaining an exclusive license for

offshore oil and gas exploration and development in Grenada. 

See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).1

 The district court ruled that RSM’s

lawsuit was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because of

its prior lawsuit in the Southern District of New York regarding

the same licensing effort. On appeal, RSM contends Freshfields

was not in privity with the New York defendants and that RSM

was not required to add Freshfields as a party to that litigation

on pain of res judicata. Freshfields challenges those arguments

and presents alternative grounds for affirmance, upon de novo

review, which RSM maintains lack merit. We affirm on the

alternative ground that RSM’s complaint failed to state a claim

of RICO conspiracy against Freshfields.2

1

 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) provides, in relevant part:

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a

violation of [18 U.S.C.] section 1962 . . . may sue therefor in

any appropriate United States district court and shall recover

threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,

including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .

2

 RSM’s suggestion that the court should not reach this

question because there was a pending motion to amend the complaint

at the time of its dismissal, see Reply Br. at 15, lacks merit. RSM

neither exercised its authority to amend its complaint as of right

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1), nor filed “[a]

USCA Case #11-7101 Document #1380259 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 2 of 15
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I.

Treating the allegations in the complaint as true, as required

upon review of a motion to dismiss, see Atherton v. Dist. of

Columbia Office of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 677 (D.C. Cir.

2009), shows the following:

 - In 1996, RSM, a Texas corporation whose chief executive

officer is Jack Grynberg, entered into an exclusive agreement

with the nation of Grenada that “was to have resulted in an oil

and natural gas hydrocarbon exploration, development and

production license being issued as a matter of routine

performance by Grenada to RSM.” Compl. ¶ 10. The

agreement provided that the license application was to be filed

within ninety days of the agreement’s execution, subject, as

relevant, to a force majeure clause. See Agreement Between the

Gov’t of Grenada & RSM Prod. Corp. (“Agreement”), arts. 3.1,

24, Ex. A to Compl. 

- A few months after the Agreement was executed, Gregory

Bowen, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minster of Energy of

Grenada, Compl. ¶ 5, told Grynberg that “he expected

significant bribe payments from RSM and Grynberg in order for

RSM and Grynberg to do business in Grenada,” id. ¶ 12. RSM

motion for leave to file an amended [complaint] . . . accompanied by

an original of the proposed pleading as amended,” D.C. DIST. CT.

LOCAL CIV. R. 7(i). A “bare request in an opposition to a motion to

dismiss” is insufficient. Confederate Mem’l Ass’n, Inc. v. Hines, 995

F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Therefore, at the time of dismissal,

RSM had no basis for calling upon the district court’s discretion under

Rule 15(a)(2). Furthermore, this court may affirm a district court on

grounds other than those found by the district court. See Kaemmerling

v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Razzoli v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 230 F.3d 371, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See further Novak v.

World Bank, 703 F.2d 1305, 1309 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

USCA Case #11-7101 Document #1380259 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 3 of 15
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and Grynberg refused to pay, and Bowen thereafter “obstructed,

harassed and intimidated RSM and Grynberg in their efforts to

explore, develop and produce Grenada’s vast oil and natural gas

resources.” Id. 

 - Also shortly after the Agreement was executed, RSM,

with Grenada’s consent, invoked the force majeure clause in

view of ongoing boundary-water disputes between Grenada and

some of its neighbors. Id. ¶ 18. Over the course of the next

eight years, RSM made substantial expenditures to collect

exploration data in reliance on the exclusive licensing

Agreement. Id. ¶ 19. Also during this time, Lev Model formed

Global Petroleum Group, a Grenadian company, in December

2003, to “acquire rights to explore, develop and produce the

Grenadian offshore areas believed to contain . . . vast[

]recoverable reserves of petroleum.” Id. ¶¶ 14, 17. Model and

his company acted as agents for others to bribe Grenadian

officials in order to acquire these offshore rights. Id. ¶ 17. 

Then, in January 2004, RSM informed Grenada “that sufficient

progress had been made [in resolving the boundary disputes] to

allow it to proceed and that it was in the process of revoking the

force majeure.” Id. ¶ 20.

- On April 14, 2004, RSM submitted its license application

to Grenada. Id. ¶ 21. Initially Grenada raised “frivolous

concerns” about the lack of financial assurances. Id. ¶ 22. 

Earlier that year a Grenadian official, who reported to Bowen,

had informed Global Petroleum’s directors (including Model)

“that Grenada was ‘in a situation’ with RSM” and “not in a

position to enter any agreements concerning [its] offshore

petroleum assets until the ‘situation’ with RSM was resolved.” 

Id. ¶ 23. By letter of April 27, 2004, Bowen advised RSM that

its license application was untimely, id., which RSM disputed,

id. ¶¶ 24, 29. Bowen rejected RSM’s efforts to settle the dispute

amicably. Id. ¶¶ 25–27.

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- On or about August 31, 2004, RSM invoked Article 26 of

the Agreement by filing a request for arbitration with the

International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes

(“the ICSID”). Id. ¶ 29. Grenada engaged Freshfields as its

arbitration counsel. Id. ¶ 13. Global Petroleum and Model (and

affiliated entities) paid the legal costs of Grenada’s arbitration,

which amounted to millions of dollars. Id. ¶¶ 44–46. In 2009,

an ICSID panel ruled that RSM’s license submission had been

untimely, and RSM appealed. Id. ¶ 29.3

Meanwhile, on October 31, 2006, RSM sued Global

Petroleum, Model, Bowen, and others (including BP, p.l.c. and

TNK-BP Ltd., but not Freshfields) in the Southern District of

New York, alleging tortious interference with contract and with

prospective business advantages and civil conspiracy to commit

tortious interference. While that case was pending, and just

prior to national elections in July 2008, Grenada granted the

exploration and development license to Global Petroleum. Id.

¶ 49. The New York complaint was dismissed in 2009, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (6), and the

dismissal was affirmed on appeal. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman,

3

 On March 13, 2009, the ICSID arbitration panel found that

Grenada had not breached its contractual obligation to grant a license

to RSM because the Agreement had either lapsed on March 28, 2004,

when the ninety-day period in Article 3.1 expired and RSM had failed

to apply for a license, or terminated upon RSM’s receipt of a July 5,

2005 letter from the chief legal officer in the Government of Grenada

referencing RSM’s breach by untimely filing and stating that in view

of RSM’s filing for arbitration, “there is no realistic prospect of an

amicable resolution” under Article 26.1. See ICSID Arbitration

Award at ¶¶ 207, 393, 503, Ex. A to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s

Compl. On April 28, 2011, an ICSID review committee discontinued

the appellate proceedings and ordered RSM to pay Grenada’s

appellate costs. ICSID Annulment Proceeding at 20, Ex. A to Defs.’

Notice of Supplemental Authority.

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643 F. Supp. 2d 382, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 387 F. App’x

72, 75 (2d Cir. 2010) (unpublished). 

Prior to the affirmance, RSM filed the current complaint

against Freshfields on March 17, 2010, alleging it was part of 

a conspiracy to bribe Grenadian officials and deny RSM its

offshore licensing rights. Specifically, Freshfields “knowingly

agreed to perform services of a kind which have facilitated the

activities of those who are operating the Enterprise . . . in an

illegal manner.” Compl. ¶ 56. The Enterprise consisted of

Global Petroleum, Model, Bowen, and others who were

associated “for the common purpose of enriching Bowen and

other high-level Grenadian officials” by “obtaining rights to

receive an exclusive [offshore] exploration license” in Grenada,

and “defeat[ing] RSM’s claim to the very same, exclusive

exploration license.” Id. ¶ 57. The conspiracy had a secondary

aim of “conceal[ing] the scheme, since it was and is necessary

to avoid detection in order to secure and later retain the license.”

Id. Freshfields, in turn, “by knowingly participating in and

benefi[t]ting from the legal fees arising out of the conspiracy,

. . . participated in and benefitted from a racketeering

enterprise.” Id. ¶ 62. RSM sought damages in excess of $500

million, costs, attorney’s fees, and threefold damages.

Freshfields moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6), on four

independent grounds: res judicata; immunity under the ICSID

Convention, arts. 21, 22, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17

U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090 (entered into force Oct. 14,

1966); statute of limitations; and, failure to allege facts

sufficient to state a RICO claim. The district court dismissed the

complaint as barred by res judicata in view of the New York

lawsuit. RSM Prod. Corp. v. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer

U.S. LLP, 800 F. Supp. 2d 182, 194 (D.D.C. 2011). RSM

appeals, and our review of the dismissal is de novo, see Jones v.

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Horne, 634 F.3d 588, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Atherton, 567 F.3d

at 681; Ibrahim v. Dist. of Columbia, 463 F.3d 3, 7 (D.C. Cir.

2006). 

II. 

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) provides that it is “unlawful for any

person to conspire” to violate a substantive RICO provision. 

See Compl. ¶ 56. To state a § 1962(d) conspiracy, the complaint

must allege that (1) two or more people agreed to commit a

subsection (c)4

 offense, and (2) a defendant agreed to further that

endeavor. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65 (1997). 

A defendant need not agree to be the one to commit the

predicate acts. See id. at 65–66 (citing ALI MODEL PENAL

CODE). Nor must a defendant “participate in the operation or

management of [the] enterprise in order to be liable for

conspiracy.” United States v. Wilson, 605 F.3d 985, 1019 (D.C.

Cir. 2010). “[I]t suffices that [the defendant] adopt the goal of

furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.” Salinas, 522

U.S. at 65; see also Brouwer v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co.,

199 F.3d 961, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). Salinas is illustrative. That

case involved a scheme in which a federal prisoner housed in a

county jail paid the sheriff a fixed monthly rate ($6,000) and a

per visit fee ($1,000) for “contact visits” in which he was left

4

 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) provides that it is:

unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any

enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect,

interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate,

directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s

affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection

of unlawful debt.

18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185

(1993); Compl. ¶¶ 57–59.

USCA Case #11-7101 Document #1380259 Filed: 06/22/2012 Page 7 of 15
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alone with certain women. 522 U.S. at 55. When the sheriff

was unavailable, Salinas, “the chief deputy responsible for

managing the jail and supervising custody of the prisoners,”

arranged for the “contact visits” to continue; in return he

received “a pair of designer watches and a pickup truck,” id.,

thereby demonstrating “that Salinas knew about and agreed to

facilitate the scheme,” which was sufficient to convict under

§ 1962(d), id. at 66.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, [RSM’s] complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a

claim to relief [under § 1962(d)] that is plausible on its face.’ ” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The facts alleged

must “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[F]acts that

are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” and

demonstrate only a possibility, but not the plausibility, of relief

fail to satisfy this standard. Id. RSM’s allegations of

Freshfields’ alleged conspiratorial RICO conduct fall short of

this standard. The complaint alleges essentially six facts

regarding Freshfields’ knowledge. None individually or taken

together supports a plausible inference that in agreeing to

represent Grenada in international arbitration proceedings,

Freshfields knew of the bribery-racketeering conspiracy and

agreed to foster its goals. 

The complaint alleges:

1. Upon agreeing in 2004 to represent Grenada in

international arbitration, Freshfields was on notice that its client

“had a reputation for corruption and bribery.” Compl. ¶ 50. 

Such knowledge has no bearing on the contractual defense

presented by Freshfields on behalf of Grenada during the

arbitration proceedings.

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2. “On information and belief,” another law firm had

declined to represent Grenada after becoming “aware of [the]

fact that either Grenada did not have funds adequate to pay [its]

bills, or that the arbitration was being funded by a corrupt

[e]nterprise,” id. ¶ 30, and “Freshfields was [] aware . . . that

[the other firm] had turned down the representation,” id. ¶ 50. 

Another law firm’s decision to decline representation, or a

client’s tainted reputation, is insufficient to show § 1962(d)

liability; any other conclusion would preclude an attorney from

representing a client alleged to have violated RICO without

incurring personal RICO liability even absent evidence of

knowledge of the bribery-racketeering conspiracy or of an

agreement to further a § 1962(c) offense. 

3. Freshfields was on notice that Model “was a

convicted felon,” Compl. ¶ 50, and that Model and Global

Petroleum (and affiliated entities) were financing Grenada’s

legal defense at arbitration, id. ¶¶ 44–46, 50. Such general

allegations fall short of supporting a plausible inference that

Freshfields was aware of an ongoing bribery-racketeering

conspiracy between Grenada and Global Petroleum (and its

affiliates) to defeat RSM’s attempt to obtain an offshore license. 

To the contrary, such facts are consistent with a normal business

practice in which an interested party — such as Global

Petroleum — funds another entity’s legal representation. The

Model Rules of Professional Conduct indicate that third-party

funding is neither unusual nor per se impermissible, see ABA

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f) (2011); D.C.DIST.

CT. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.15(a) (2012), even if the third-party has

a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation, see MODEL

RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7. RSM cites no authority to

the contrary. 

4. Freshfields knew its “retainer was being paid

through [the] corrupt relationship,” Compl. ¶ 50, and violated

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laws of the nations in which it is located by failing to report its

arbitration-fee income as “corrupt money,” id. ¶ 51. For

example, in the United Kingdom, “as soon as a lawyer . . .

discovers or suspects anything in the proceedings that may

facilitate the acquisition, retention, use or control of ‘criminal

property,’ the lawyer must immediately notify the National

Criminal Intelligence Service of his belief.” Id. The complaint,

however, does not allege that the funds used to pay Freshfields

for its legal services were ill-gotten gains subject to forfeiture or

reporting. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’

MANUAL § 9–120.103 (May 2010).5 Nor does the complaint

identify any “criminal property” in Freshfields’ control or

possession. The court need not accept conclusions of law —

“corrupt money” — as true for purposes of a motion to dismiss. 

See Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir.

2004); see also Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398

(2d Cir. 2006).

5. In 2007, “public reports” confirmed that Model and

another Global Petroleum director had bribed Grenadian

officials, thereby putting Freshfields on notice of the briberyracketeering conspiracy. See Compl. ¶ 50.6

 This conclusion

5 Available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/

foia_reading_room/usam/title9/120mcrm.htm (last visited June 11,

2012). 

6

 The public nature of other “reports” is unclear. The

complaint refers to: (1) a conversation in which a Global Petroleum

director told Grynberg that Global Petroleum “ ‘own[ed]’ the

Government of Grenada,” Compl. ¶ 37; (2) a conversation in which a

Grenadian “Ambassador at Large” informed Grynberg that affiliates

of Global Petroleum had bribed Grenadian officials in order to

“develop the vast petroleum reserves believed to exist in the offshore

Grenadian territory,” id. ¶ 42; and, (3) two declarations dated

November and December 2007 by individuals attesting that agents of

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assumes facts not alleged. An April 2007 article published by

“Forbes” identified Grenada as “one of the best places for

embezzled money”; a May 2007 “S&P ratings research

comment” mentioned “the ‘widespread perception of corruption

in the higher echelons of power’ in Grenada’s th[e]n-existing

government”; and a sentencing memorandum described “a

Ponzi-scheme run out of a Grenadian [b]ank.” Id. ¶ 34. 

Bowen’s June 2007 arbitration testimony acknowledged “that

Global Petroleum and Grenada had entered into” a funding

agreement under which Global Petroleum financed Grenada’s

defense at arbitration. Id. ¶ 44. These allegations are

insufficient to establish a plausible inference that Freshfields

was aware of anything corrupt relevant to its provision of legal

services other than accusations made by and on behalf of Global

Petroleum’s litigation adversary and general reports of public

corruption in Grenada. 

6. “[U]pon learning facts suggesting that the source of

its income for legal services was also responsible for bribing

Grenadian officials for the purpose of obtaining lucrative license

rights in Grenada, [Freshfields] could not continue the

representation, since the entire representation was and is adverse

to its client, Grenada.” Id. ¶ 52. Further, “representation in the

face of a transparent conflict of interest is indicative of

[Freshfields’] conscious decision to join the conspiracy, and . . .

facilitate the goals of the [RICO] [e]nterprise . . . and

conspiracy.” Id. “[T]he court is ‘not bound to accept as true a

Global Petroleum bribed Grenadian officials, id. ¶¶ 41, 47. Both

Grynberg conversations and one of the declarations appear to be

public only because RSM referenced the conversations and attached

the declaration to its amended complaint in the New York lawsuit, see

Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 50, 55, RSM Prod. Corp. v. Fridman (No.

06-cv-11512) (Feb. 25, 2008). No allegation indicates how

Freshfields would have known of the second declaration.

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legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ ” Mountain

States Legal Found. v. Bush, 306 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir.

2002) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986));

see also In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d

Cir. 2007). 

Taken together, these allegations fail to establish the

requisite link for § 1962(d) liability between Freshfields and the

bribery-racketeering conspiracy. First, representing Grenada in

arbitration by presenting its defense that RSM’s license

application was untimely under the parties’ Agreement, qua

defense, presents no adversity or conflict of interests as would

either inform Freshfields of the bribery-racketeering conspiracy

or plausibly show its agreement to present a legal defense was

an agreement to further acts of racketeering. 

Second, the payment of Freshfields’ legal fees by sources

seeking the valuable Grenadian offshore license is insufficient

to show Freshfields was part of the bribery-racketeering

conspiracy. Even when considered in light of the 2007 reports

about Grenada and alleged legal malpractice by Freshfields, the

source of the fees does not support a plausible inference that

Freshfields “was aware of the essential nature and scope of the

[RICO] enterprise,” Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 (9th

Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Muskovsky, 863 F.2d 1319,

1324 (7th Cir. 1988)), much less that it “kn[ew] of and agreed

to the overall objective of the RICO offense,” United States v.

Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2005). The chronology

works against RSM. According to the complaint, Freshfields

did not begin its representation of Grenada until well after

Grenada had denied RSM’s license application as untimely and

RSM had filed for arbitration. Grenada, represented by

Freshfields, defended the denial in the arbitration. Given the

success of this defense and its seemingly innocuous, contractual

nature, see Compl. ¶ 29; ICSID Arbitration Award at ¶¶ 342–95,

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it is implausible to infer that the 2007 reports would have alerted

Freshfields to a bribery-racketeering conspiracy to deny RSM’s

license application three years earlier. A more plausible

inference is that Freshfields would have suspected that the

alleged bribes were made in an effort to secure future licensing

rights, not to prompt Grenada’s contractually-based denial of

RSM’s license application. That Freshfields continued to

represent Grenada in arbitration after the 2007 publications does

not alter the analysis. Because RSM failed to “nudge[] [its]

claim[]” that Freshfields knew of the RICO conspiracy or any

pattern of racketeering activity “across the line from conceivable

to plausible,” its “complaint must be dismissed,” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570. See also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951; Baumer, 8 F.3d

at 1346.

Third, the allegations fail to support a plausible inference

that Freshfields agreed to join or acted to foster the briberyracketeering conspiracy. The complaint does not allege that

Freshfields itself committed any of the predicate acts. See

Compl. ¶¶ 58, 62. Rather, the complaint alleges that Freshfields,

“by knowingly participating in and benefit[t]ing from the legal

fees arising out of the conspiracy, . . . participated in and

benefitted from a racketeering enterprise,” id. ¶ 62. In other

words, to support the necessary inference that Freshfields agreed

to further the conspiracy, RSM relies solely on the allegations

regarding Freshfields’ knowledge of the bribery-racketeering

conspiracy and its legal representation of Grenada and payment

therefor. Although alleged co-conspirators (i.e., Global

Petroleum and Model) provided the funding for Grenada’s

arbitration defense, it is implausible to infer that therefore

Freshfields’ provision of legal services at arbitration was

intended to further the criminal endeavor. To the contrary,

Freshfields’ representation of Grenada in the international

arbitration proceedings is “more likely explained by,” Iqbal, 129

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S. Ct. at 1950, its normal business practice of providing legal

services for and representing clients in arbitration. 

In sum, the allegations of the complaint target Freshfields’

services as attorneys, nothing more. As such, Freshfields’

conduct in representing Grenada at arbitration is readily

distinguishable from instances in which attorneys have been

held liable under RICO § 1962(c) and (d) for performing, under

the guise of providing legal services, illegal acts, such as

devising a fraudulent scheme to manipulate the bankruptcy

process, see Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1350–51 (8th

Cir. 1997), or facilitating illegal investments, see United States

v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).7

 Unlike in

Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66, on which RSM relies, the complaint

alleges no conduct by Freshfields beyond the provision of

normal legal services in arbitration and so fails to support a

reasonable inference that Freshfields “agree[d] to assist others

in the commission of unlawful acts,” Reply Br. at 24. As

explained in Twombly, allegations that a defendant acted in ways

consistent with a conspiratorial agreement, but also equally well

7

 The circuit courts of appeals have declined to extend RICO

liability under § 1962(c) to an attorney’s provision of routine legal

services. See Walter v. Drayson, 538 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 (9th Cir.

2008); Handeen, 112 F.3d at 1348–49 (8th Cir.); Azrielli v. Cohen

Law Offices, 21 F.3d 512, 521 (2d Cir. 1994); Baumer, 8 F.3d at 1344

(9th Cir.); Nolte v. Pearson, 994 F.2d 1311, 1317 (8th Cir. 1993); cf.

Reves, 507 U.S. at 182–83, 185–86. The Eighth Circuit observed in

Handeen that although “[a]n attorney’s license is not an invitation to

engage in racketeering” and neither Reves nor the RICO statute

exempts professionals as a class, “[i]t is a good thing, we are sure, that

we find it extremely difficult to fathom any scenario in which an

attorney might expose himself to RICO liability by offering

conventional advice to a client or performing ordinary legal tasks (that

is, by acting like an attorney).” Handeen, 112 F.3d at 1349. 

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explained by legitimate economic incentives, do “not suffice . . .

to show illegality.” 550 U.S. at 556–57; see also id. at 554. So

too, unsupported conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be

assumed true,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951, and dismissal is proper

when a conspiracy allegation “d[oes] not plausibly suggest an

illicit accord because it [i]s not only compatible with, but indeed

[i]s more likely explained by, lawful, unchoreographed freemarket behavior,” id. at 1950; see also Am. Dental Ass’n v.

Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1295 (11th Cir. 2010).

Accordingly, because RSM failed to allege facts sufficient

to support a plausible inference that Freshfields knew of and

agreed to further the bribery-racketeering conspiracy, the

complaint fails to state a claim against Freshfields for RICO

civil conspiracy under § 1962(d) and was properly dismissed

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and we affirm.

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