Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02588/USCOURTS-ca10-88-02588-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George Earl Larson
Appellant
Robert Tansy
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED 

PUBLISH United Scates Court of Appeals 

Tenth Cir~i! · 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JdJ G 1 Q 1990 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

GEORGE EARL LARSON, ) 

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Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. No. 88-2588 

ROBERT TANSY, Warden, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO 

(D.C. No. CIV 83-0651 HB) 

Ann Steinmetz, Assistant Federal Defender, Albuquerque, New 

Mexico, for Petitioner-Appellant. 

Hal Stratton, Attorney General (Anthony Tupler, Assistant Attorney 

General, with him on the brief), Santa Fe, New Mexico, for 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Before McKAY and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and KANE, 1 District 

Judge. 

McKAY, Circuit Judge. 

1 Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., United States Senior District 

Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 88-2588 Document: 01019370334 Date Filed: 08/10/1990 Page: 1 
De~endant challenges his absence from the final portions of 

his trial including the jury instructions conference, jury 

instructions, closing arguments, and the rendering of the verdict. 

I. Facts 

On May 2, 1979, defendant was charged with criminal sexual 

penetration by a Bernalillo County, New Mexico, grand jury. 

Defendant pleaded not guilty. On June 28, 1979, defendant was 

found competent to stand trial. Prior to the competency hearing, 

defendant tried to commit suicide while out on bond. Defendant 

was subsequently admitted to the psychiatric ward of a local hospital. During the competency hearing and the trial itself, the 

trial judge ordered defendant to be kept in the hospital or the 

jail. After refusing defendant's counsel's request that defendant 

not be required to attend trial, the judge remarked that defendant 

was technically in the custody of the state. Thus, the court 

ordered the state to provide transportation for defendant to the 

trial. 

At the beginning of the trial, the judge asked defendant several questions concerning his competency. Defendant answered each 

question and satisfied the judge that he was still competent to 

stand trial. After this initial discussion, defendant spent the 

majority of the trial with his head on the table and he never 

talked to his counsel. On July 3, 1979, at the conclusion of all 

testimony, the judge told defendant's counsel that defendant could 

leave the courtroom if counsel would waive his presence. Counsel 

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agreed, and defendant was escorted back to the hospital. On the 

record, counsel said that defendant was voluntarily absenting himself from the proceedings. Defendant claims that he was never 

asked if he wanted to leave, nor did defendant authorize his 

counsel to waive defendant's presence. 

Defendant was absent from the remainder of his trial including the jury instruction conference, jury instructions, closing 

arguments, and the rendering of the verdict. The jury found 

defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to life imprisonment. 

After unsuccessfully filing a direct appeal and two state habeas 

corpus claims, defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in the 

United States district court. The district court rejected all of 

defendant's claims on February 20, 1985. On December 22, 1986, 

this court rejected all of defendant's claims except the present 

claim for exclusion from part of his trial. We remanded the 

exclusion claim to the district court. On remand, the magistrate 

and the district court again rejected defendant's exclusion claim. 

Defendant now appeals the district court's finding. 

II. Standard of Review 

This appeal presents three questions for review. First, did 

defendant have a constitutional right to be present during the 

phases of his trial from which he was absent? Second, did defendant waive his right to be present? Third, was the alleged error 

simply harmless error? We review each of these questions de novo. 

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Both parties agree that the question of whether defendant had 

a right to be present at trial is an issue of law and as such is 

subject to de novo review. In re Ruti-Sweetwater, Inc., 836 F.2d 

1263, 1266 (lOth Cir. 1988); United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 

1456, 1467 (lOth Cir. 1987), aff'd sub ngm. Bank of Nova Scotia v. 

United States, 108 S. Ct. 2369 (1988). The question of whether 

defendant waived his right to be present at trial involves 

application of the law to undisputed facts. The waiver issue fundamentally depends on whether the law allows defendant's attorney 

to waive his client's right without specific permission to do so. 

This is a question of law subject to de novo review. The harmless 

error issue is a mixed question of law and fact that we also 

review under the de novo standard. Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 

656, 659 (lOth Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 u.s. 1069 (1988). 

In conducting a de novo review, we make an independent determination of the issues. We give no special weight to the prior 

determination of the district court. Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow 

Indus., 847 F.2d 1458, 1464 (lOth Cir. 1988). 

III. Right to be Present Throughout Trial and Harmless Error 

In his brief, respondent concedes that defendant had a right 

to be present for the entire trial if that were his wish. However, later in his brief respondent seems to argue that defendant 

could not have assisted his attorney in the trial and thus had no 

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Appellate Case: 88-2588 Document: 01019370334 Date Filed: 08/10/1990 Page: 4 
right to be present throughout trial. We conclude that defendant . \. 

had a constitutional right to be present at the jury instructions, 

the closing statements, and the rendering of the verdict. 

The Supreme Court has recognized a due process right for a 

defendant to be present at his trial "whenever his presence has a 

relation, reasonably substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the charge." Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 

U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). The Supreme Court went on to explain that 

"the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the 

extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his 

absence, and to that extent only." Id. at 107-08. The Snyder 

Court also cautioned that due process does not require the defendant's presence "when [his] presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow." Id. at 106-07. The Supreme Court continues 

to apply the Snyder standards in more recent cases. See Kentucky 

v. Stincer, 482 u.s. 730, 745 (1987); United States v. Gagnon, 470 

u.s. 522, 526 (1985). 

We interpret respondent's concession in his brief to acknowledge that the parts of the trial from which defendant was excluded 

were important and that a defendant whose presence would not be 

useless would have a right to attend those portions. We have previously stated without qualification that a defendant had a constitutional right to be present at summations, jury instructions, 

and the return of the jury verdict. Burrell v. Aaron, 560 F.2d 

988, 989 (lOth Cir. 1977). Thus, we accept the concession that 

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defendant had a right to be present throughou~ his trial, unless 

his presence would be useless or the benefit a shadow. 

Initially, we hold that defendant was not deprived of due 

process by his absence from the jury instruction conference. The 

jury instruction conference traditionally encompasses purely legal 

issues and, as such, it will be a rare case where a defendant can 

establish that his presence was essential to his opportunity to 

present his defense. Typically, the jury instruction conference 

is attended only by the judge and counsel. Normally the parties 

are not present. In the instant appeal, petitioner's absence at 

the jury instruction conference did not violate due process. See 

Jones v. Dugger, 888 F.2d 1340, 1343 n.3 (11th Cir. 1989); United 

State v. Graves, 669 F.2d 964, 972 (5th Cir. 1982); Root v. 

Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1, 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 u.s. 866 

(1965). 

In contrast, we hold that defendant's presence in the courtroom during the instructing of the jury, closing arguments, and 

the rendering of the verdict would not have been useless. 

Respondent claims that because defendant had not participated in 

the trial or assisted his counsel prior to the jury instructions 

conference, defendant's presence would not have been of any benefit during the remainder of the trial. This argument conflicts 

with the trial court's conclusion that defendant was competent to 

stand trial. Since defendant was competent to stand trial, we 

must assume that he was capable of assisting counsel if he 

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desired. We cannot assume that because the defendant had not 

assisted counsel during the trial he would continue to be of no 

assistance. Thus, we hold that defendant's presence might have 

allowed him to provide assistance to his counsel. 

We also believe that defendant's mere presence, aside from 

any assistance defendant could have given to his counsel, would 

have been useful and would have provided more than a shadow of 

benefit. At least two circuit courts have held that a defendant 

was denied his due process right to be present throughout his 

trial when he was excluded from jury instructions in both cases 

and in one case the rendering of the verdict. United States v. 

Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1989); Wade v. United States, 441 

F.2d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In Fontanez, the defendant was 

excluded from part of the jury instructions. The Fontanez court 

held that defendant's exclusion "deprived [Fontanez] of the 'psychological function' of his presence on the jury during a crucial 

phase of his trial." Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 38. In Wade, the 

defendant was absent from part of the jury instructions and the 

rendering of the verdict. The Wade court held that this was not 

harmless error because there was a reasonable possibility of prejudice. 

[T]he Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to confront 

adverse witnesses--is in good part a constitutional recognition of a psychological influence. Though perhaps 

to a less degree, the same influence pertains to the 

right of confrontation of defendant and jury, aside from 

the usefulness the accused may be to his counsel. This 

is especially so when as here a deadlocked jury is reinstructed at some length, is later given an Allen charge, 

and subsequently renders its verdicts. Moreover, there 

is the reasonable possibility that the jury speculated 

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adversely to the defendant about his absence from the 

courtroom. 

Wade, 441 F.2d at 1050 (emphasis added). 

The Alaska Supreme Court explained the psychological impact 

of a defendant's absence when the jury returns its verdict in Lee 

v. State, 509 P.2d 1088 (1973). 

A substantial right was affected by Lee's being absent 

when the jury returned its verdict. Had he been present 

he could have insisted on a poll of the jury being 

taken. Lee was deprived of the right personally to confront the jury .... Lee's absence at the return of the 

verdict was significant. The psychological distinction 

between a general poll in his absence, and an individual 

poll requiring each juror to assume the burden of his 

decision and affirm it in the defendant's presence is 

not a minor one. 

Id. at 1094. 

Thus, on the issue of defendant's absence from jury instructions, closing arguments, and the rendition of the verdict, we 

hold that defendant was deprived of his due process right to exert 

a psychological influence upon the jury, completely aside from any 

assistance he might have provided to his counsel. We also agree 

with the Wade court that in this case "there is the reasonable 

possibility that the jury speculated adversely to the defendant 

about his absence from the courtroom." Wade, 441 F.2d at 1050. 

See also United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 128 (D.C. Cir. 

1987); Blackwell v. Brewer, 562 F.2d 596, 600 (8th Cir. 1977). 

Based on defendant's possible assistance to counsel and his 

missed opportunity to exert psychological influence on the jury, 

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we hold that defendant's absence from the courtroom at critical ·~ 

junctures in his trial violated his due process rights. Our holding also answers the harmless error issue. In reviewing a conviction for harmless error, "an otherwise valid conviction should not 

be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the 

whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Graham v. Wilson, 828 F.2d 656, 660 (lOth Cir. 

1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1069 (1988) (quoting Delaware v. Van 

Arsdall, 475 u.s. 673, 681 (1986)). In order to determine whether 

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, "we ask if the 

defendant's absence created 'any reasonable possibility of prejudice.'" United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 37 (2d Cir. 

1989). See also Wade v. United States, 441 F.2d 1046, 1050 (D.C. 

Cir. 1971). Because we hold that defendant might have assisted 

his counsel and defendant's mere presence could have exerted a 

psychological influence on the jury, we also hold that it was not 

harmless error to exclude defendant. There is a reasonable passibility of prejudice to defendant in that his absence precluded 

him from providing any assistance to his attorney and from exerting any psychological influence on the jury. 

IV. Waiver of Right to be Present 

The record indicates defendant's counsel, and not defendant, 

waived defendant's right of presence at trial. The trial court 

never directly addressed defendant concerning his counsel's request to conduct the remainder of the trial in defendant's 

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absence. We hold that defendant did not waive his right to be 

present. 

Several circuits have held that defense counsel cannot waive 

a defendant's right of presence at trial. Gordon, 829 F.2d at 

124-26 (defense counsel's request, as a tactical position, that 

jury voir dire take place in defendant's absence insufficient to 

waive defendant's right of presence); Proffitt v. Wainwright, 706 

F.2d 311, 312 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 u.s. 1002, 1003 

(1983) (court rejected argument defense counsel waived defendant's 

right to be present at competency hearing); Cross v. United 

States, 325 F.2d 629, 631-33 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (defense counsel's 

assertion defendant did not wish to attend trial insufficient to 

waive defendant's right of presence). 2 

Arguably, defendant's silent acquiescence to his removal from 

the courtroom waived his right to be present. However, we indulge 

every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and will not presume acquiescence in the loss of 

2 The two circuits that have allowed a defendant's counsel to 

waive his client's right of presence both involve counsel that at 

least communicated with their clients the need or possibility for 

attendance at trial. Wilson v. Harris, 595 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 

1979); United States v. Dunlap, 577 F.2d 867, 868 (4th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 439 u.s. 858 (1978). No such communication took 

place in this case. Even if defense counsel could have validly 

waived defendant's right to be present for the conclusion of his 

trial, where defense counsel did not consult with defendant 

concerning the waiver and did not obtain defendant's consent, the 

waiver will not be binding on defendant. See United States v. 

Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 

908 (1969). 

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such rights. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 u.s. 458, 464 (1938). 

Normally the court obtains a waiver of a defendant's presence at 

trial from the defendant personally, in open court, and on the 

record. Gordon, 829 F.2d at 125-26; Cross, 325 F.2d at 631-33. 

Although it may be possible to effectuate a waiver without a 

formalistic process, the facts of this case do not support a holding that this defendant waived his right to be present during the 

trial. 

This is not a case where a disruptive defendant waived his 

right to be present by ignoring the court's repeated admonitions. 

Nor is this a case where the defendant refuses to speak, thus requiring the court to orally enter a plea for the defendant. Our 

holding that defendant did not waive his right to be present is 

confined to the facts of this case. 

Several courts have held that a defendant in custody can 

never waive his right of presence because he does not have control 

over his presence or absence. See, Diaz v. United States, 223 

U.S. 442, 455 (1912); Fontanez, 878 F.2d at 36; Gordon, 829 F.2d 

at 125 n.7; United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1257 n.3 

(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974); Bustamante v. 

Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 273-74 (9th Cir. 1972). We recognize that 

there may be times when a defendant in custody could waive his 

right to be present. However, it is certainly more difficult to 

establish that a defendant in custody has waived his right to be 

present. 

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Although this defendant was not incarcerated at the time of 

his trial, he was in custody. Prior to his voluntary commitment 

to the hospital, defendant remained free on bond pending trial. 

At the close of the first day of the competency hearing, however, 

the court ruled that 

there's indication that [defendant is] moderately suicidal, and I think both the doctors agree on that, and 

as a further condition of his release, I'm not going to 

allow him to be released from Anna Kaseman Hospital. 

And if he is released from the hospital, we'll release 

him to the jail so there can be some assurances that 

he's not a danger to himself or do away to himself [sic] 

or cause harm to the witnesses or anybody else. 

Transcript, June 25, 1979, at 75. At the completion of the competency hearing, the trial court noted that defendant was 

voluntarily committed, and then the last time we were 

here, I orally ordered, although no written order followed it, that he not leave Anna Kaseman Hospital; that 

he remain there. And I think following that order, that 

technically he's in custody by my order, and I would be 

willing to sign an order directing the Bailiffs to make 

arrangements for transporting him from [the hospital] 

down here for the purpose of trial. 

Transcript, June 28, 1979, at 21. Because the record indicates 

that defendant was in fact in custody during the trial, we 

conclude that a stronger showing than made in this case is necessary to establish that he waived his presence at trial. 

v. Conclusion 

We AFFIRM the district court's order finding no constitutional error with regard to defendant's exclusion from the jury 

instructions conference. We REVERSE the order of the district 

court adopting the recommendation of the United States Magistrate 

with regard to defendant's involuntary exclusion from the instruc-

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tion of the jury, closing arguments, and the rendering of the verdict at defendant's trial. We order a new trial for defendant 

based on our finding of constitutional error in his first trial. 

AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. 

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