Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02048/USCOURTS-ca10-07-02048-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Dion Lamy
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

April 1, 2008

Elisabeth A. Shumaker

Clerk of Court PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.

DION LAMY,

Defendant–Appellant.

No. 07-2048

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Mexico 

(D.C. No. CR-04-1677-JB)

John F. Moon Samore, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the Defendant–Appellant.

David N. Williams, Assistant United States Attorney, (Larry Gomez, United

States Attorney, with him on the brief) Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the

Plaintiff–Appellee.

Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

LUCERO, Circuit Judge.

Dion Lamy appeals his jury conviction on three counts of aggravated sexual

abuse in Indian country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1153, and 2242(2)(B). 

Lamy contends that the district court improperly admitted a statement he gave to

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FBI agents; that the court abused its discretion in denying a motion for new trial

based on prejudicial comments by a government witness; and that the United

States failed to prove that Lamy’s crime occurred in Indian country, an element of

his crimes of conviction. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we

AFFIRM.

I

Lamy, a member of the Zuni tribe, was indicted for a sexual assault that

occurred in June, 2002 after a high school graduation party in Zuni, New Mexico. 

Lamy, 18 years old at the time of the assault, left the party with four other men: 

Aaron Cheama, Donovan Jones Neha, Marcus Tsethlakai, and Daryl Dickson. 

Accompanying the men were two young women: R.D., a 17-year-old

acquaintance, and Kathy, Dickson’s girlfriend. R.D. was drunk and under the

influence of both cocaine and marijuana. Lamy, who had not been drinking,

drove the group to the home of Sherry Shebola. When they arrived, some

members of the group carried R.D. inside, and placed her on a couch where she

passed out. At trial, R.D. denied any memory of events at the Shebola house until

she awoke the next morning.

Cheama and Tsethlakai were able to testify as to what occurred while R.D.

was unconscious. We have carefully reviewed this testimony and see no useful

purpose in exploring the sordid details. Briefly, Cheama testified that Lamy

penetrated the victim’s vagina with an object; both witnesses testified that Lamy

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beat the victim while Neha engaged in sexual intercourse with her; and Tsethlakai

testified that he saw Lamy engage in sexual intercourse with her the following

morning, while she remained unconscious.

When R.D. awoke the following day, each of the five men save Neha were

gone. Shebola remained in the house and communicated certain events to R.D.

that led R.D. to conclude that she had been raped. A brief conversation between

R.D. and Neha followed. After an altercation with Shebola and yet another

woman, R.D. ran from the house to a nearby hospital. A hospital aide transported

R.D. to her home. R.D. immediately told her family of her suspicions, leading

her mother to refer the matter to police and return her daughter to the hospital. At

the hospital, a test for sexual trauma was administered.

On July 22, 2002, FBI Agents Marcus McCaskill and Steve Chambers

interviewed Lamy twice in connection with these events. McCaskill knew Lamy,

having spoken with him on two prior occasions in the process of investigating

unrelated crimes. McCaskill and Chambers began the first July 22 interview

shortly before 10:00 a.m. in the living room of the house where Lamy lived with

his mother. Before questioning Lamy, the agents presented a form that contained

a waiver of Miranda rights. McCaskill testified that the agents also orally

explained Lamy’s rights to him, although the agents did not read the form

verbatim. They told Lamy that he was not in custody and that they did not intend

to arrest him. Lamy signed the form. During the ensuing interview, Lamy

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admitted that he penetrated the victim with an object, but he denied engaging in

sexual intercourse with her. He committed this statement to writing.

After interviewing Neha, Dickson, Cheama, and Tsethlakai, the agents

returned to Lamy’s home. Lamy agreed to accompany the agents outdoors, and

sat in the front passenger seat of the agents’ parked vehicle as they questioned

him. The agents did not further advise Lamy of his rights on this occasion. 

Based on what they had learned from the intervening interviews, the agents

asked Lamy specific questions about his role in the events. Lamy admitted to

beating the victim and having sexual intercourse with her. Lamy then wrote and

signed a second statement, stating: 

I Dion Lamy is goind to tall you the truth about wunt happed to that

girl at frist I did not tall all the truth becouse I was cared to tall but

the thing I did was sbaeet her wath by baet and have six wath her

brent her har and touch her parvant part that is obout all the thing’s I

did to her I am so sorry

On August 25, 2004, Lamy, Neha, and Cheama were indicted for assault

and sexual assault. Tsethlakai and Dickson were juveniles at the time of the

crime and were indicted separately. In return for a lesser charge, Cheama

cooperated with the government, leaving Lamy and Neha as the sole defendants in

a seven-count superceding indictment filed on February 25, 2005. 

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1

 Counts Four and Five, alleging that Lamy committed assault by striking,

beating, wounding, and setting R.D.’s pubic hair on fire in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2, 113(a)(4), and 1153 were dismissed on the government’s motion. Counts

Six and Seven, charging sexual contact in violation of §§ 2, 1153, and 2244(a)(2),

were dismissed by the trial court because the indictment failed to state that the

victim was incapacitated, an element of § 2244(a)(2).

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Both were tried in a consolidated trial. Four of seven counts in the

indictment were dismissed, and the three remaining counts were sent to the jury.1

Counts One and Two alleged that both Lamy and Neha committed a sexual act

with an unconscious victim, and that each aided and abetted the other, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1153, and 2242(2)(B). Count Three alleged that Lamy

penetrated the victim’s vagina with an object and Neha aided and abetted him in

doing so, in violation of §§ 2, 1153, and 2242(2)(B). These incidents were

alleged to have occurred in Indian country, making them federal crimes under the

Indian Major Crimes Act. See § 1153(a).

Before trial, Lamy moved to suppress his oral and written statements on the

ground that they were involuntary. During the ensuing suppression hearing, an

expert witness who had examined Lamy testified that Lamy was easily confused

and inclined to acquiesce to others’ conclusions. According to the expert, Lamy

read at a second-grade level, ranked in the lowest percentile of his age group in

reading comprehension, and was “functionally illiterate.” The expert concluded

that Lamy, an “F” student who dropped out of school after the eighth grade, was

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not mentally retarded, but that his “ability to integrate information [was] at the

retarded level.” 

At the hearing, Agent McCaskill testified that Lamy appeared to understand

him at all times, and that they had no communication problems. McCaskill was

unaware that Lamy was a poor student. Lamy’s mother testified that she was

present in the house during the first interview. She heard no inappropriate noise,

such as raised voices. She also confirmed that Lamy did not appear to have been

crying after his return from the second interview. 

On the testimony recounted above, the district court denied the suppression

motion and a later motion for reconsideration. The case proceeded to trial, at

which typewritten transcripts of both written statements, as well as testimony

about Lamy’s oral admissions, were admitted into evidence.

On close of trial, both Lamy and Neha were convicted of the three counts. 

Lamy sought a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on

the admission of his oral and written statements and on several prejudicial

statements volunteered by McCaskill during his trial testimony. Lamy also

moved for a judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29,

alleging that the government failed to prove an element of the crime, namely, that

it occurred in Indian country. The court denied both motions. Lamy appeals.

II

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2

 Lamy does not appear to have raised the Miranda argument before the

district court. We would normally review the denial of his suppression motion in

such circumstances for plain error. United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352

F.3d 1325, 1328 (10th Cir. 2003). The government, however, concedes in its

brief that we should review the denial de novo. Because Lamy’s claim fails even

under de novo review, we do not decide whether plain error review should apply

under these circumstances.

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Lamy contends that the district court erred in denying the motion to

suppress the written and oral statements that he made during the two interviews. 

He contends that his limited cognitive capabilities prevented him from giving

truly voluntary statements, and that the admission of these statements accordingly

violated his due process rights. Lamy also argues that he was unable to

intelligently waive his legal rights, and thus the agents’ questioning violated

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

In considering the denial of a suppression motion, we review factual

findings for clear error, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government. United States v. Thompson, 354 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Because Lamy has not provided a transcript of McCaskill’s or his mother’s

testimony at the suppression hearing, we necessarily accept the district court’s

factual findings and credibility determinations on point. See Fed. R. App. P.

10(b)(2); United States v. Verduzco-Martinez, 186 F.3d 1208, 1215-16 (10th Cir.

1999). Legal determinations, including whether a statement was voluntary and

whether a defendant was in custody, are reviewed de novo.2

 United States v.

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Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998) (voluntariness); United States v.

Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998) (custody). 

A

We begin by considering Lamy’s due process argument. A statement is

involuntary in violation of due process if “a defendant’s will was overborne by

the circumstances surrounding” his confession. Dickerson v. United States, 530

U.S. 433, 434 (2000) (quotation omitted). Though relevant, a defendant’s mere

subjective lack of understanding or volition does not give rise to a constitutional

violation. “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate” to a

constitutionally involuntary confession. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167

(1986). Accordingly, our ultimate inquiry is whether the officers took “unfair

advantage of [the] defendant’s traits or the surrounding circumstances.” United

States v. Guerro, 983 F.2d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir. 1993). Factors relevant to this

determination include: 

(1) the age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; (2) the

length of detention; (3) the length and nature of the questioning; (4)

whether the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights; and

(5) whether the defendant was subjected to physical punishment.

United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 966 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).

Focusing on the first factor, Lamy directs us to his lack of intelligence and

education. Expert testimony at his suppression hearing indicated that he was

functionally illiterate, reading at a second-grade level, that he flunked out of

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school after the eighth grade, and that he was psychologically inclined to

acquiesce to authority figures. On the other hand, McCaskill testified that he had

no difficulty communicating with Lamy throughout the two interviews and that

Lamy appeared to understand what was happening. Moreover, the fact that Lamy

had been interviewed by McCaskill previously indicates that Lamy had some

experience with, and understanding of, police questioning. See id. In sum,

although the record reveals that Lamy’s intelligence is below average, it also

shows that he was capable of understanding the agents’ questions and assessing

the risks of answering or declining to answer those questions.

As for the remaining factors, Lamy’s first interview with the agents was

conducted in the kitchen of his home and lasted less than an hour. His mother

was in the house throughout the entirety of the interview and occasionally entered

the living area where the interview was taking place. The officers never raised

their voices. Lamy alleges no physical punishment, nor any coercive conduct by

the agents during this interview. The short length of detention and questioning,

nonthreatening nature of questioning, and lack of any physical punishment all

indicate that Lamy’s statements were not coerced. 

Considering the fourth factor, the agents advised Lamy of his constitutional

rights immediately before the first interview began. They did not merely hand

Lamy a written statement of his rights; McCaskill explained Lamy’s rights to him

orally before Lamy signed the waiver form. The officers also told Lamy

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 Lamy also stresses that the interview was not recorded. Although the

failure to record might be probative of the credibility of McCaskill’s description

of the events, we must of course defer to the district court’s determination that

McCaskill’s testimony was credible. Erving L., 147 F.3d at 1246.

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explicitly that he was not in custody and that they did not intend to arrest him. 

We perceive no aspect of this interview which indicates that the agents “took

unfair advantage” of Lamy’s traits or coerced his statements. Guerro, 983 F.2d at

1004. We conclude that the district court correctly rejected Lamy’s due process

argument regarding the first interview.

Similarly, the facts surrounding the second interview show no indication

that the agents overwhelmed Lamy’s will. Lamy points to one feature of the

questioning which he considers coercive: He was questioned in the officers’

vehicle.3

 However, Lamy was not taken to the vehicle by force; he agreed to

accompany the agents and answer additional questions. Lamy’s mother noticed

no untoward behavior on his part upon his return. Although the agents did not

read Lamy his rights a second time before the brief afternoon interview, he had

been adequately advised several hours earlier, and McCaskill informed Lamy

before the afternoon interview that “the things that we told him before were the

same.”

Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district

court that Lamy’s written and oral statements in this interview were not

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4

 In this regard, we note that McCaskill may have had some understanding

of Lamy’s general intelligence and abilities due to his prior interviews with

Lamy. He specifically testified that he was unaware, however, of Lamy’s poor

school performance. As we conclude above, we see no evidence that McCaskill

took advantage of any knowledge he had regarding Lamy’s traits.

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improperly adduced. Accordingly, denial of Lamy’s suppression motion on due

process grounds stands.

B

In the alternative, Lamy argues that the agents’ questioning violated

Miranda v. Arizona, because he was incapable of waiving his Fifth Amendment

rights due to his low intelligence. Miranda’s protections, however, apply only

when an individual is subjected to “custodial interrogation.” United States v.

Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000). Given our conclusion that Lamy

was not in custody, the premise of the argument fails.

Our decision that Lamy was not in custody for Miranda purposes flows

from our seminal inquiry: “whether a reasonable person in [Lamy’s] position

would have understood [his] freedom of action to have been restricted to a degree

consistent with formal arrest.” United States v. Revels, 510 F.3d 1269, 1275

(10th Cir. 2007). The standard is an objective one; unlike the due process

inquiry, particular characteristics of the defendant are relevant only “to the extent

that they may have been known to the officer and influenced his conduct.”4

United States v. Little, 18 F.3d 1499, 1505 (10th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (quotation

omitted). In conducting this fact-intensive inquiry, relevant factors include: 

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“(1) whether the circumstances demonstrated a police-dominated atmosphere;

(2) whether the nature and length of the officers’ questioning was accusatory or

coercive; and (3) whether the police made [Lamy] aware that [he] was free to

refrain from answering questions, or to otherwise end the interview.” Revels, 510

F.3d at 1275. 

Lamy’s initial interview was conducted by two officers in a common area

of his home, during which his mother came and went from the room. Under our

precedents, this does not constitute a police-dominated atmosphere. See Erving

L., 147 F.3d at 1247 (holding that an adolescent suspect interviewed by

plainclothes officers in his living room with his parents present was not in

custody); cf. Revels, 510 F.3d at 1275 (holding that questioning in a defendant’s

home was custodial when seven officers entered forcibly, handcuffed the

occupants, and questioned the defendant in a rear bedroom). As for the “nature or

length” of questioning, the interview lasted for about an hour and, as noted, there

was no indication that the questioning was unusually confrontational. The agents

informed Lamy that he did not have to answer questions and that he could

terminate the interview at any time. In these circumstances, a reasonable person

in Lamy’s position would hardly have felt the requisite level of constraint.

The second interview took place in the agents’ car, which was parked

outside Lamy’s house, and Lamy sat in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. 

Although the vehicle belonged to the agents, location alone does not compel the

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conclusion that a defendant is in custody, so long as his freedom was not curtailed

to a degree similar to arrest. See, e.g., California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125

(1983) (“Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes

place in the station house . . . .” (quotation omitted)); United States v. Boucher,

909 F.2d 1170, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Miranda warnings are not imposed because

the questioning is conducted in a certain place, i.e., a patrol car . . . .”). In this

case, Lamy was asked, not ordered, to accompany the agents to the vehicle. He

did so of his own volition. This voluntary decision to accompany police argues

against police domination. Cf. Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1122, 1123 (holding that a

stationhouse interrogation was noncustodial where the suspect “voluntarily agreed

to accompany police to the stationhouse, although the police specifically told

[him] that he was not under arrest”). Moreover, the record does not suggest that

Lamy was ever handcuffed, and his position in the passenger seat of the vehicle

suggests a lack of arrest. See United States v. Plumman, 409 F.3d 919, 924 (8th

Cir. 2005) (holding that a suspect was not in custody during questioning in an FBI

agent’s vehicle where he was seated in the front seat and informed that he would

not be arrested); United States v. Scheets, 188 F.3d 829, 842 (7th Cir. 1999)

(holding that a suspect was not in custody while he sat in the front seat of a police

car). Cf. United States v. Henley, 984 F.2d 1040, 1042 (9th Cir. 1993) (“It is fair

to say that someone who is being questioned by an FBI agent while sitting

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handcuffed in the back of a police car is, indeed, not free to leave.” (emphasis

added)). 

The second and third factors identified above also indicate that the

afternoon questioning was noncustodial. Nothing in the record indicates that the

agents threatened or aggressively questioned Lamy during the quarter-hour

interview. At the beginning of the interview, the agents reiterated to Lamy that

he would not be arrested that day regardless of how he answered their questions,

and told him that the warnings he had been given that morning remained in effect. 

Thus, Lamy remained aware that he was free to leave or refuse to answer

questions. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Lamy’s

freedom of action was not curtailed to a degree similar to formal arrest, and thus

Lamy was not in custody during the second interview.

Because Lamy was not subjected to custodial interrogation, the agents did

not improperly question him, regardless of whether he had waived his Miranda

rights. We conclude that the district court was correct to deny suppression on this

ground as well.

III

Our next considerations of error are McCaskill’s comments during trial. 

Lamy contends that these remarks were so prejudicial as to violate his Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial, and that the district court should have ordered a

new trial. Lamy objects to three statements. The first occurred during direct

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 The court instructed the jury as follows: 

There has been evidence that Donovan Neha gave one or more

statements to the investigating authorities in this case. You may

consider any such statement of defendant Donovan Neha only in

deciding the charges against him, and not in deciding the charges

against his codefendant Dion Lamy. . . . You may not consider any

such statement in any way when you are deciding if the Government

has proven its case against the codefendant Dion Lamy.

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examination when the prosecutor asked McCaskill how he became involved in the

Lamy investigation. McCaskill responded: 

I was not the primary agent in the case . . . . I had met with [Lamy]

on prior occasions, and my partner, Steve Chambers, knew about that

contact, and we both thought it would be a good idea for me to go

down and do some of the interviews with him, given that I knew

[Lamy] from previous occasions.

Lamy’s counsel did not object to this testimony when it was made, although it

was referenced in counsel’s objection to McCaskill’s second contested statement. 

McCaskill was asked to authenticate a copy of a written statement produced

by Neha during his interview with the agents. The statement contained several

redactions. McCaskill commented that “[t]here were a few words that do not

appear in this particular version of it because of legal things that have gone on

in—in this case.” At that point, Lamy objected and moved for a mistrial on the

ground that this statement, combined with McCaskill’s previous statement about

prior contact with Lamy, incurably prejudiced him. The court gave a curative

instruction,5

 allowed the prosecutor to lead McCaskill through the remainder of

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his testimony to avoid any further prejudicial statements, and denied admission of

Neha’s written statement into evidence.

The third contested statement arose when, in describing the agents’ first

interview with Lamy, McCaskill stated that Lamy’s mother “knew why we were

talking to him. She understood.” Lamy’s counsel immediately objected that

Lamy’s mother’s knowledge was outside McCaskill’s personal knowledge. See

Fed. R. Evid. 602. The court instructed the jury to “disregard that at this present

time, about what the mother knew.” Lamy argues that the combined prejudice

from McCaskill’s three statements was so severe that he was denied a fair trial,

and that the district court’s denial of a new trial constituted an abuse of its

discretion.

1

With regard to McCaskill’s first statement, Lamy argues that it prejudiced

him by implying that he has a criminal past, evidence of which is generally

inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). Because a “timely

objection, accompanied by a statement of the specific ground of the objection,

must be made when evidence is offered at trial to preserve the question for

appeal,” and none was made, we review this claim only for plain error. United

States v. Norman T., 129 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Fed. R. Evid.

103(a)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b). Plain error is “(1) error, (2) that is plain, (3)

which affects substantial rights, and (4) which seriously affects the fairness,

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integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Romero,

491 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2007). “For an error to have affected substantial

rights, the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of

the district court proceedings.” Id. at 1179 (quotation omitted). 

Lamy’s argument fails on the third prong of this analysis, because in light

of the overlapping and detailed evidence supporting Lamy’s conviction on each

count, McCaskill’s vague suggestion that Lamy had prior contact with the FBI

was only marginally prejudicial. Both Cheama and Tsethlakai testified that they

saw Lamy beat the victim while Neha engaged in sexual intercourse with her. 

Tsethlakai testified that he saw Lamy have sexual intercourse with the victim the

following morning, and Cheama testified that Lamy penetrated the victim with an

object. Lamy admitted to each of these allegations in his interviews with the

agents and his statements were admitted at trial. Given the weight of this

evidence, Lamy fails to show that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. 

See, e.g., United States v. Avalos, 500 F.3d 972, 975-76 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding

that even if the district court erred in admitting a defendant’s statement that he

sold drugs in the past, “such error was harmless given the weight of the

Government’s case”).

2

Because Lamy timely objected to each of McCaskill’s later statements, we

review the district court’s denial of Lamy’s motion for a new trial for an abuse of

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discretion. United States v. Gwathney, 465 F.3d 1133, 1144 (10th Cir. 2006). 

Denial of a new trial “is an abuse of discretion only if it is arbitrary, capricious,

whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). District courts

view motions for new trials with disfavor, United States v. Quintanilla, 193 F.3d

1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1999), granting a new trial only if compelled by “the

interest of justice,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. In determining whether a new trial is

required after a witness offers improper information, we consider “(1) whether the

prosecutor acted in bad faith, (2) whether the district court limited the effect of

the improper statement through its instructions to the jury, and (3) whether the

improper remark was inconsequential in light of the other evidence of the

defendant’s guilt.” United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir.

2004). 

Under the first factor, Lamy admits that the prosecutor did not act in bad

faith, as “the record indicates that the remarks were volunteered” by McCaskill,

rather than deliberately elicited by the government. As for the second factor, the

district court gave curative instructions addressing each of these statements in

response to Lamy’s objections. “We presume that jurors will follow clear

instructions to disregard evidence ‘unless there is an overwhelming probability

that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong

likelihood that the effect of the evidence would be devastating to the defendant.’” 

United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Greer

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6

 Much of the government’s brief addresses an argument, raised in Lamy’s

motions for mistrial and new trial, that Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998),

requires a new trial. See id. at 192 (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires

that a codefendant confession admitted into evidence at a joint trial must be

redacted so as to leave no hint that the confession originally referenced the

defendant). Because Lamy himself has not raised this argument on appeal, we do

not address it.

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v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987)). On these standards we can discern no

reason why a jury might have found it unusually difficult to disregard

McCaskill’s volunteered comments. 

This leaves the third factor. Lamy argues that McCaskill’s comment

regarding redactions in Neha’s statement prejudiced him because it gave the jury

“the impression the trial court had tied the hands of noble law enforcement

officers” by keeping incriminating evidence from the jury’s consideration, and

that the statement about his mother prejudiced him by suggesting that he spoke

with the agents voluntarily. At oral argument, Lamy’s counsel also suggested that

although Neha’s statement did not in fact mention Lamy, the jury might have

inferred that it was Lamy’s name which was redacted from the statement.6

 Any

improper effect McCaskill’s intimations may have had on the jury, however, pales

in comparison to the total weight of the government’s evidence on each count, as

described above. We conclude that the Meridyth factors are not met.

3

Lamy urges that the district court’s decision to allow leading questions as a

mechanism to avoid future improper comments by McCaskill prejudiced him by

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7

 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, district judges have discretion to

allow leading questions. See Fed. R. Evid. 611(c) (“Leading questions should not

be used on the direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to

develop the witness’ testimony.”); United States v. Olivo, 69 F.3d 1057, 1065

(10th Cir. 1995). Lamy does not argue that the district court abused its discretion

under Rule 611(c), but only that the results of the decision added to the

cumulative prejudice against him.

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allowing the prosecutor to shape McCaskill’s testimony.7 Lamy does not identify

any examples of prejudicial leading, however. Our review of the record fails to

disclose any such incidents, let alone cumulative prejudice.

While we do not condone these remarks, it is clear that the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Lamy’s motion for a new trial. We affirm that

denial. 

IV

We now consider Lamy’s contention that the United States did not prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that his crimes occurred in Indian country, as required

by 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence

de novo, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the government. 

United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007). We “affirm[]

the district court unless no reasonable jury, when presented with the evidence

introduced at trial together with the reasonable inferences therefrom, could find

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1200 (quotation omitted). 

Lamy does not contest the government’s proof that the Shebola house was

located within the borders of the Zuni reservation at the time of trial in November

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8

 Lamy argues that the government was required to prove that the Shebola

house was not located on a non-Indian-owned “checkerboard” area within the

reservation. He is mistaken. Such areas are defined as Indian country if they are

within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a); see also

Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Yazzie, 909 F.2d 1387, 1422 (10th Cir.

1990).

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2005. He urges, however, that the government failed to prove that the house was

so located on June 15 and 16, 2002, when Lamy’s crimes allegedly took place. 

Because reservation boundaries can and do change, Lamy argues that the jury

could not simply assume that a location currently within the boundaries of the

reservation was necessarily within those boundaries in the past.8

Indian country situs assuredly is an essential element of crimes under

§ 1153. See United States v. Anderson, 391 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2004)

(explaining that § 1153 is an “[e]nclave law . . . in which the situs of the offense

is an element of the crime”). It must therefore be proven by the prosecution

beyond a reasonable doubt. Indian country by definition includes “all land within

the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States

Government.” United States v. Burch, 169 F.3d 666, 669 (10th Cir. 1999)

(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)). 

At trial, Dancy Simplicio, an expert witness who had worked in the Zuni

realty office since before 2002, testified for the government regarding the location

of the Shebola house. Simplicio began by recounting the history of the

reservation, and explained that its boundaries have been increased periodically by

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9

 Lamy’s opening brief makes a conclusory assertion that lay witnesses are

not competent to testify to the location of reservation boundaries. However, the

only case he cites in support of this proposition, United States v. ValadezGallegos, 162 F.3d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998), does not address the competence

of lay witnesses. Because Lamy fails to support this assertion with “reasoned

argument,” it is forfeited on appeal. See United States v. Beckstead, 500 F.3d

1154, 1165 (10th Cir. 2007).

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executive order. Simplicio did not specifically address whether any boundary

changes had occurred after 2002. When Simplicio was asked to locate the

Shebola house on an aerial photograph and on a map of the reservation, the dates

of the photograph and map were not discussed. According to Simplicio, the house

was “[d]efinitely more than a mile” within the reservation’s exterior boundary.

Several lay witnesses confirmed the location of the house during the course

of their testimony about the events on the night of the assault.9

 As an example,

victim advocate Lasha Peyketewa testified that she went to the home of Sherry

Shebola on June 16, 2002. She was then asked whether that house “is” within the

Zuni reservation, and she responded affirmatively. Later, Peyketewa was shown

an aerial photograph of the Shebola house, and again confirmed that it “is” on the

reservation. She was then asked whether she found Shebola there “on the 16th of

June.” Although the questions about the house’s location were phrased in the

present tense, they were asked and answered in the context of the crime,

indicating that Peyketewa’s mind was focused on the circumstances existing at

that time. Peyketewa testified that prior to working as a victim advocate, she was

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10 This case is easily distinguishable from United States v. Romero, 136

F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1998). In Romero, we held that in the absence of testimony

about the victims’ non-Indian status, a jury could not infer that status from the

victims’ “names, appearance, speech, and testimony that they did not grow up on

the Nambe Pueblo,” because these characteristics have no necessary relationship

to “the complex legal definition of Indian status.” Id. at 1274. By contrast, this

jury heard direct testimony about the house’s legal status within the reservation,

and was asked to infer only that this status had not changed since the time of the

crime. 

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a patrol officer with the Zuni Police Department, a job that the jury could

reasonably conclude required familiarity with the boundaries of the reservation.

Similarly, both Cheama and R.D. testified that they have lived on the Zuni

reservation for their whole lives and that the house “is” within the reservation. 

From this testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that the house was within

reservation boundaries at all times within the knowledge of these witnesses.10

We conclude that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the

evidence gives rise to an inference sufficient for a reasonable jury to find beyond

a reasonable doubt that the Shebola house was within the borders of the Zuni

reservation on June 15 and 16, 2002.

V

AFFIRMED.

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