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Parties Involved:
Reginald Anderson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10619

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

REGINALD ANDERSON, 

a.k.a. Red, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 4:19-cr-00183-RSB-CLR-1

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10619

____________________

Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Reginald Anderson was convicted of three counts of distribution of methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 

after selling it three times to confidential informants working for 

the Drug Enforcement Administration. 

The conduct and evidence underlying Anderson’s convictions are straightforward, so we do not recite in detail the factual 

or procedural background of this case. Instead, relevant here, a 

grand jury indicted Anderson on three counts of drug distribution 

based on three drug transactions—one per count—that he made 

with the confidential informants. The first two transactions took 

place the morning and afternoon of June 5, 2018. The third occurred on June 12, 2018. A jury convicted Anderson of all three 

counts after seeing exhibits collected from each transaction, that 

DEA chemists confirmed were methamphetamine; after hearing 

the confidential informants testify about each transaction; and after 

seeing audio-video recordings and transcripts of the last two transactions.

On appeal, Anderson does not challenge any of the evidence

above. Instead, he first challenges the district court’s decision to 

permit a DEA agent to testify as an expert and offer testimony that 

he argues was improper on several grounds. Second, he challenges 

the district court’s denial of his motion for mistrial after 

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government witnesses implied that he was involved in prior drug 

transactions outside this case. Third, he argues that his convictions 

should be reversed because the government committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument and the district court 

failed to take curative action after that misconduct. Fourth, he argues that these errors cumulatively warrant a reversal of his convictions. For the reasons below, each challenge fails, and we affirm.

I.

We begin with Anderson’s challenges to a DEA agent’s testimony. At trial, the government called Robert Livingston, a DEA 

agent who worked with the confidential informants to set up the 

transactions underlying Anderson’s drug distribution convictions.

On appeal, Anderson contends that the district court should not 

have permitted Livingston to (1) testify as an expert and (2) provide 

testimony that Anderson alleges is hearsay, improper identification 

testimony, and testimony violating the Confrontation Clause. 

Three standards of review apply. First, we review a district 

court’s “evidentiary rulings on the admission of expert witness testimony for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 

1085, 1106 (11th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Similarly, we review “a 

district court’s decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence and 

testimony for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Hawkins, 934 

F.3d 1251, 1264 (11th Cir. 2019). A district court has considerable 

leeway in its evidentiary rulings, see United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 

1323, 1330 (11th Cir. 2018), and abuses its discretion when it “applies an incorrect legal standard or makes findings of fact that are 

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clearly erroneous.” United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1041 (11th 

Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). Importantly, an abuse of discretion will not 

warrant reversal “unless the objecting party has shown a substantial prejudicial effect from the ruling.” Barton, 909 F.3d at 1330–31 

(cleaned up). “Substantial prejudice goes to the outcome of the 

trial,” and “where an error had no substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted.” Id. at 1331 (cleaned up). 

Second, if a defendant fails to preserve an issue below, we

review the issue for plain error. See Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1264. “To 

establish plain error, a defendant must show (1) error; (2) that is 

plain; (3) that affects his substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Lewis, 40 F.4th 1229, 1246 (11th Cir. 2022). To

establish that an error affected his substantial rights—the third 

prong of the plain error test—a defendant must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, a different outcome would 

have occurred.” United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255, 

1267 (11th Cir. 2018). 

Third, we review de novo whether testimony violates the 

Confrontation Clause. United States v. Kent, 93 F.4th 1213, 1217 

(11th Cir. 2024). With these three standards in mind, we address—

and reject—Anderson’s arguments on Livingston’s testimony. 

A.

We first address Anderson’s argument that the court should 

not have permitted Livingston to testify as an expert. At trial, the 

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government sought to qualify Livingston as an expert in “drug trafficking and distribution.” Anderson objected that Livingston would 

be unable to provide information not already “within the ken of 

the jury.” The district court overruled the objection and permitted

Livingston to testify as an expert. In so doing, the court did not 

abuse its discretion. 

“Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits expert testimony if 

specialized knowledge will help the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” United States v. Garcia, 447 

F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). And a witness can be 

qualified as an expert, based on his knowledge, skill, experience, 

training, or education. See id. at 1335.

Here, Livingston was qualified to testify as an expert in drug 

trafficking and distribution, and his testimony was helpful to the 

jury. Livingston had extensive experience, training, and knowledge 

in drug operations: he was a DEA agent for over 20 years, received 

training in drug code and surveillance methods, and conducted 

dozens if not hundreds of narcotics investigations. See id. at 1332, 

1335 (district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting a witness to testify as an expert in drug distribution when the witness 

was a DEA agent for several years, received training on the operation of drug organizations, and was involved in at least 50 drug investigations). And Livingston’s testimony—which covered controlled purchases and the meanings of code terms used in drug 

trades—helped the jury understand the drug distribution evidence 

underlying Anderson’s convictions. See Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1261

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(we have “repeatedly” held that “narcotics agents may testify as experts to help juries understand the drug business, codes, and jargon”); Garcia, 447 F.3d at 1334 (the “operations of narcotics dealers 

are a proper subject for expert testimony under Rule 702” (cleaned 

up)).

Anderson argues that Livingston’s testimony was unhelpful 

to the jury because “any reasonable juror would have understood” 

the terms that Livingston interpreted—terms Anderson suggests 

are “ordinary English.” See Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1256, 1264–65 (it 

was improper for a DEA agent “to ‘interpret’ uncoded, ordinary 

language”). But Livingston interpreted drug code—e.g., he testified 

that “sevens” meant seven grams of a drug, “whole” meant a whole 

ounce of a drug, and “fronted” meant dealing a quantity of drugs 

to a customer who would pay later. And we have “affirmed the 

admission of expert testimony by law enforcement officers interpreting drug codes and jargon,” United States v. Holt, 777 F.3d 1234, 

1265 (11th Cir. 2015), including words similar to the ones here, see,

e.g., id. at 1252, 1265 (district court did not err in allowing agent to 

provide expert testimony on drug code, including that “‘228’ referred to 228 grams”). 

Citing our decision in Hawkins, Anderson also argues that 

the district court abused its discretion by permitting Livingston’s 

“indiscriminate merging of fact testimony with expert testimony.”

934 F.3d at 1266. Anderson contends that Livingston testified as an 

expert even on factual matters on which he lacked special expertise, 

thus conferring an unwarranted “aura of special reliability” around 

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Livingston’s factual testimony. This fact-expert merging substantially prejudiced him, he argues, because his defense “relied exclusively” on challenging the credibility of prosecution witnesses, and 

Livingston bolstered their credibility by testifying as an expert on 

“every critical fact.” 

But even assuming without deciding that Anderson preserved this challenge and that the district court erred, Anderson has 

failed to demonstrate that any error caused him substantial prejudice. See Barton, 909 F.3d at 1330–31. The evidence of Anderson’s 

guilt—even if not bolstered by Livingston’s status as an expert—

was overwhelming. First, substances collected from all three of Anderson’s transactions were published to the jury as Exhibits 1, 5, 

and 12, and DEA chemists testified that these substances were 

methamphetamine. Second, the two confidential informants—

D.W. and E.M.—both testified on how all three transactions took 

place. Third, the jury heard audio-video recordings and read transcript excerpts of the last two transactions, all of which were published to the jury during E.M.’s testimony. So, even if the district 

court erred by permitting Anderson to mix fact and expert testimony without enough demarcation, that error lacks the prejudice 

to warrant reversal. See Barton, 909 F.3d at 1331 (“where an error 

had no substantial influence on the outcome, and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports the verdict, reversal is not warranted” (cleaned up)). 

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B.

Next, Anderson argues that Livingston’s testimony violated 

rules against hearsay and improper identification and violated the 

Confrontation Clause. Specifically, Anderson challenges Livingston’s testimony: (1) on D.W.’s history with drugs; (2) on D.W.’s

relationship with E.M.; (3) on information that E.M. shared with

Livingston about Anderson; (4) on Anderson’s three transactions 

underlying his charges; (5) on conversations that E.M. had with Anderson when a particular photograph of them was taken; (6) identifying Anderson as the man in photographs shown to the jury at 

trial; (7) on Anderson’s giving of his phone number to E.M. during 

the first transaction; and (8) that two exhibits published to the 

jury—Exhibits 1 and 5—were methamphetamine. Anderson contends that this testimony was hearsay, improper identification testimony, testimony violating the Confrontation Clause, or some 

combination of these categories.

But again, Anderson’s contentions fail because no error 

caused him substantial prejudice. See Barton, 909 F.3d at 1330–31.

First, Anderson has failed to explain how D.W.’s history with drugs 

or his relationship with E.M. even contributed to the jury’s verdict 

on Anderson’s conduct. Second, even had the jury not heard Livingston’s testimony on the eight matters above, it would have learned

about most of them through D.W.’s or E.M.’s testimony. They testified about D.W.’s drug history, his relationship with E.M., information or material related to Anderson that E.M. shared with Livingston, and that Anderson had given E.M. his number and she 

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then shared it with Livingston. Likewise, DEA chemists testified 

that the exhibits were methamphetamine, and there were audiovideo recordings of two of the drug transactions. Third, as explained above, the unchallenged testimony from the DEA chemists, D.W., and E.M., as well as the audio-video recordings and transcripts published to the jury, overwhelmingly supported Anderson’s convictions. See Barton, 909 F.3d at 1331. 

Finally, we reject Anderson’s contention that the court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause by permitting Livingston to testify on the matters above. “[T]he Sixth Amendment 

does not prohibit the admission of an out-of-court statement when 

the declarant testifies at trial to the same statement.” Garcia, 447 

F.3d at 1329. Here, even assuming that Livingston was recounting 

information he learned from others—specifically, as Anderson’s appellate brief mentions, “[D.W., E.M.], and the [DEA] chemists”—

those “declarants” testified at trial on most of the above matters

and were all subject to cross-examination. And, partly because of 

their testimony, the evidence against Anderson was overwhelming 

even apart from Livingston’s challenged testimony.

II.

We next address the district court’s denial of Anderson’s motion for mistrial after three government witnesses indicated that he 

had been involved in other transactions.

At trial, Livingston, D.W., and E.M. all indicated that Anderson had engaged in prior drug transactions not at issue in this case. 

After Livingston mentioned that D.W. had engaged in a 

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transaction with “another informant,” Anderson objected; the 

court then struck Livingston’s testimony and instructed the jury to 

not consider testimony “regarding any other transactions other 

than the three that are at issue in this case.” Later, D.W. testified 

that he “had another transaction” with Anderson “in another case”; 

Anderson then moved for a mistrial. The court denied that motion, 

but struck that piece of D.W.’s testimony and gave a curative instruction directing the jury to not consider it but instead to consider 

only the “testimony about the transactions that are alleged in this 

case.” At the end of D.W.’s testimony, the court instructed the jury 

again to “[d]isregard any testimony about any other alleged interactions” “outside of the three alleged interactions charged in this 

case.” Next, E.M. mentioned that Anderson had “given [methamphetamine] to [her] before.” And the government, when questioning her, suggested that she would be familiar with drug slang 

“based on [her] former dealings with [Anderson].” Anderson did 

not object below to these parts of E.M.’s testimony. 

On appeal, Anderson argues that the district court should 

have granted his motion for mistrial because the government failed 

to give notice before Livingston, D.W., and E.M. testified on the 

prior transactions. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). 

We ordinarily review a district court’s decision not to grant 

a mistrial for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Emmanuel, 565 

F.3d 1324, 1334 (11th Cir. 2009), but review only for plain error issues not preserved below, see Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1264. 

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“A defendant is entitled to a mistrial only if he shows substantial prejudice, meaning that it is reasonably probable that, but 

for the alleged error, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1138 (11th Cir. 

2020). “We make this determination in the context of the entire 

trial and in light of any curative instruction.” United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007). “When the district court 

gives a curative instruction, we presume that the jury followed it.” 

Gallardo, 977 F.3d at 1138. If the district court issued a curative instruction, we reverse only “if the evidence is so highly prejudicial 

as to be incurable.” United States v. Melgen, 967 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th 

Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). And, “when the record contains sufficient 

independent evidence of guilt, any error was harmless.” Newsome, 

475 F.3d at 1227.

Here, Anderson has failed to establish the substantial prejudice needed for a mistrial. See Gallardo, 977 F.3d at 1138. Livingston 

and D.W. did not discuss in detail the other transactions, and immediately after they referenced those transactions, the district 

court struck their comments and instructed the jury to consider 

only the drug transactions at issue in this case. After D.W. left the 

stand, the court gave another curative instruction to the same effect. We presume the jury followed the court’s curative instructions and disregarded the stricken testimony. See id.; United States 

v. Oscar, 877 F.3d 1270, 1283–84 (11th Cir. 2017) (district court’s 

strong curative instructions cured any alleged prejudice after the 

prosecution implied that a defendant had been involved in a death

separate from his charged offenses). And, other unchallenged 

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evidence—which, again, included testimony from D.W. and E.M.

describing the transactions at issue, testimony from DEA chemists 

identifying methamphetamine collected from those transactions, 

and audio-video recordings of the last two transactions—was “sufficient independent evidence” of Anderson’s guilt. Newsome, 475 

F.3d at 1227.

Anderson compares this case to United States v. Harriston, 

where we vacated a defendant’s conspiracy convictions because 

the government introduced evidence of a prior unrelated murder 

conviction. See 329 F.3d 779, 786–89 (11th Cir. 2003). But Harriston 

is distinguishable. There, the evidence of the defendant’s guilt was 

not overwhelming, the government asked questions that exposed 

a prior guilty plea to murder, and we reversed the court’s partial 

denial of a mistrial in part because of the “seriousness” of the prior

murder conviction. See id. Here, the evidence was overwhelming, 

and Livingston and D.W. referred to a prior transaction that lacks 

the same prejudice as does a prior murder.

As to the parts of E.M.’s testimony suggesting prior drug

transactions, Anderson did not preserve the issue below, so we review his challenge on plain error. See Hawkins, 934 F.3d at 1264. 

Even if we assume that the district court plainly erred in permitting 

E.M. (and the government, in its questions) to indicate that Anderson had engaged in drug transactions not at issue in this case, Anderson’s challenge fails. Again, plain error requires that Anderson 

demonstrate a “reasonable probability that, but for the error, a different outcome would have occurred.” See Garcia, 906 F.3d at 1267. 

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Given the overwhelming evidence of Anderson’s guilt, as explained above, it is not reasonably probable that the trial outcome 

would have differed even if the jury had not heard E.M.’s or the 

government’s passing references to prior transactions.

III.

Next, Anderson argues that his convictions should be reversed because the government committed prosecutorial misconduct when presenting its closing argument and the district court 

failed to “take any curative action” after that misconduct. In his 

view, the government committed prosecutorial misconduct when 

it suggested that he was to blame for damage done by drug distributors to the community and that the jurors were victims of Anderson’s conduct and responsible for the health of their community.

See generally United States v. Beasley, 2 F.3d 1551, 1559–60 (prosecution’s closing argument comments that referred to the “war on 

drugs,” that appealed to “the conscience of the community,” and 

that were “calculated to inflame,” were improper (cleaned up)).

We generally review de novo a claim of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments. United States v. Sosa, 777 F.3d 

1279, 1294 (11th Cir. 2015). “To establish prosecutorial misconduct, (1) the remarks must be improper, and (2) the remarks must 

prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”

Id. (cleaned up). A defendant’s substantial rights are prejudicially 

affected when it is reasonably probable that, but for the remarks, 

the trial outcome would have been different. Id. “When the record 

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contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.” Id. (cleaned up).

Here, Anderson’s prosecutorial-misconduct challenge fails, 

because he has not established the prejudice necessary to demonstrate prosecutorial misconduct. Even if we assume that the prosecutor’s comments were improper, the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that statements and arguments made by the attorneys were not evidence to be considered. See United States v. Al 

Jaberi, 97 F.4th 1310, 1328 (11th Cir. 2024) (“Because the statements 

of counsel are not evidence, the district court may rectify improper 

prosecutorial statements by instructing the jury that only the evidence in the case is to be considered.” (cleaned up)). And, as explained above, the other evidence against Anderson—witness testimony, recordings of the last two transactions, and drugs collected 

from all three transactions—was overwhelming. See Sosa, 777 F.3d 

at 1294. Because Anderson has not established prosecutorial misconduct, we do not address his argument that the district court 

erred by declining to take curative action following prosecutorial 

misconduct. Ultimately, the government’s comments at closing argument do not justify a reversal of Anderson’s convictions.

IV.

Lastly, Anderson argues that his convictions should be reversed because of the cumulative effect of his alleged errors. He 

contends that the trial consisted of only “one day of substantive evidence,” and that in a single day the government presented 

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inadmissible expert testimony, prior bad act testimony, and improper closing arguments. 

We review de novo the cumulative impact of trial errors. 

United States v. Pendergrass, 995 F.3d 858, 881 (11th Cir. 2021). “The 

cumulative-error doctrine calls for reversal of a conviction if, in total, the non-reversible errors result in a denial of the constitutional 

right to a fair trial.” Id. “No cumulative error exists where a criminal defendant cannot establish that the combined errors affected 

his substantial rights,” and those rights are not affected if “properly 

admitted evidence sufficiently established” the defendant’s guilt.

Id. (cleaned up). Here, the assumed errors, even when combined,

did not affect Anderson’s substantial rights given that his convictions were supported—as explained above—by overwhelming evidence unchallenged on appeal. 

V.

The district court is AFFIRMED.

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