Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02074/USCOURTS-caed-2_06-cv-02074-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Folsom Cordova Unified School District
Defendant
Steve Howe
Defendant
Christine Travis
Plaintiff
Clifford Travis
Plaintiff

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CLIFFORD TRAVIS, and 2:06-cv-2074-MCE-EFB

CHRISTINE TRAVIS on behalf 

of their minor son, BRANDON 

TRAVIS, as his next friend,

Plaintiffs,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

FOLSOM CORDOVA UNIFIED SCHOOL 

DISTRICT, and STEVE HOWE,

Defendants.

----oo0oo----

Through the present action, Plaintiffs Clifford Travis and

Christine Travis (“Plaintiffs”) allege Defendants Folsom Cordova

Unified School District (“FCUSD”) and vice-Principal Steve Howe

of Folsom Middle School (“Defendants”) have discriminated against

Plaintiffs’ son, Brandon Travis, on the basis of his race in

violation of Title VI of the Civil Right Act of 1964 (“Title

VI”); 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and California Education Code section

220. 

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Plaintiffs allege that Brandon Travis was subjected to harsh and

disparate discipline that was motivated by Defendants’ desire to

treat members of the African-American race disparately from

members of other races.

Now before this Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants

also claim immunity from the instant suit pursuant to the

Eleventh Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. XI. For the reasons set

forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim

pursuant to Title VI is granted with leave to amend. Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

is granted without leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to California Education Code section

220 is granted with leave to amend. Lastly, Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is granted

without leave to amend.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Clifford Travis and Christine Travis brought this

action on behalf of their minor son Brandon Travis. Brandon

Travis was a student at Folsom Middle School, a subdivision of

Folsom Cordova Unified School District, during 2004 and 2005. 

Defendants are Folsom Cordova Unified School District and VicePrincipal Steve Howe of Folsom Middle School. 

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Plaintiffs are seeking general damages, special damages, an

injunction, and punitive damages for “harsh and disparate

discipline” they allege was imposed upon Brandon Travis by

Defendants because Brandon Travis is African-American. The

Complaint lacks factual allegations supporting Plaintiffs’ claims

for relief, stating only: 

Commencing on or about September, 2005 and continuing

thereafter, by and through its subdivision Folsom

Middle School, defendant Folsom Cordova Unified School

District discriminated against Brandon Travis in its

educational programs on the basis of his race – African

American – by imposing upon him discipline that was

disparate from the discipline it imposed upon other

students who were not of the African-American race for

the same or similar conduct which other students were

not African-American in race. This disparate treatment

was motivated by a desire on the part of Folsom Cordova

Unified School District, Folsom Middle School, and/or

its agents and employees, to treat members of the

African-American race disparately from others who were

not members of that race and thereby to discourage the

participation of members of the African-American race

in federally funded educational programs offered by

Folsom Middle School.”

 

Pl’s 1st Am. Compl. at 3. The Complaint contains no additional

information as to the dates the discrimination occurred, what

discipline Brandon Travis received, or what circumstances support

Plaintiffs’ contention that Brandon Travis was subjected to harsh

punishment because of his race.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under

Rule 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted

as true and construed in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party. 

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Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir.

1996). A complaint will not be dismissed for failure to state a

claim “‘unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of [his or] her claim that would

entitle [him or] her to relief.’” Yamaguchi v. Dep’t of the Air

Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Tel.

Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir. 1996)).

If the court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must

then decide whether to grant leave to amend. The Court should

"freely give[]" leave to amend when there is no "undue delay, bad

faith[,] dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue

prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of . . . the amendment,

[or] futility of the amendment. . . ." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a);

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Generally, leave to

amend is only denied when it is clear that the deficiencies of

the complaint cannot be cured by amendment. DeSoto v. Yellow

Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992).

ANALYSIS

1. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States

shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be

subjected to discrimination under any program or activity

receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.

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To state a claim for damages under Title VI, a plaintiff must

allege that: (1) the entity involved is engaging in racial

discrimination; and (2) the entity involved is receiving federal

financial assistance. Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health System Corp.

(9th Cir. 1994) 29 F.3d 1439, 1447, Overruled on other grounds by

Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir.

2001). Title VI creates a private civil remedy only for

instances of intentional discrimination. See Alexander v.

Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 280 (1985). However, it does address

unintentional discrimination through regulations that are

promulgated under Title VI but are not enforceable through a

private civil action. Id. at 280-81. Plaintiffs assert a claim

under Title VI against FCUSD and not Mr. Howe.

A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Defendants first assert Eleventh Amendment immunity from all

claims. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is not subject to

suit by its own citizens in federal court. U.S. Const. amend.

XI; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Congress can,

however, abrogate a state's immunity, or the state can waive it.

Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1985). 

In California, public school districts are “state agencies” for

Eleventh Amendment purposes. Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch.

Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (1992). However, Plaintiffs correctly point

out that Title VI validly abrogates state sovereign immunity. 

Alexander v. Underhill, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2006). 

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Accordingly, Defendants assertion of sovereign immunity fails as

to this claim.

B. Failure to State a Claim

Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint fails to

plead discrimination based upon race because Plaintiffs merely

contrast Brandon Travis’ treatment with students of other races,

and does not allege that other African-American students were

also treated disparately. From the allegations contained in the

Complaint, it is as likely that Brandon Travis was treated

dissimilarly from other African-American students as it is that

he was treated dissimilarly from students of other races. If

that is the case, there is no violation of Title VI because it

covers only racial discrimination. 

Plaintiffs argue that they have met Rule 8, which requires

only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,” with “sufficient allegations to

put defendants fairly on notice of the claims against them.”

McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

“The propriety of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule

8 does not depend on whether the complaint is wholly without

merit,” but instead simply hinges on whether each averment of a

pleading is simple, concise, and direct. McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 1996). 

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Dismissal for failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) may be proper even

if the factual elements of the cause of action are present but

are scattered throughout the complaint, because to survive

scrutiny under Rule 8 the allegations must be organized into a

“short and plain statement of the claim.” McHenry v. Renne, 84

F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a complaint should

set forth “who is being sued, for what relief, and on what

theory, with enough detail to guide discovery”). Although Rule 8

requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, “[t]he

court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the

form of factual allegations if those conclusions cannot

reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged.” Clegg v. Cult

Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994). 

In the instant case, the Complaint sets out allegations of

racial discrimination which do clarify who is being sued, for

what relief, and on what theory. However, the Complaint lacks

any factual support for its legal assertions. It lacks any

description of the allegedly discriminatory conduct; the number

of instances of discipline Brandon Travis is seeking compensation

for; or any basis for the conclusion that the discipline was

either discriminatory or motivated by racial bias. The Complaint

lacks sufficient factual detail to guide discovery, to put

Defendants on notice of the claims against them, or to permit

Defendants to prepare an answer. The legal conclusion that

Brandon Travis was subjected to “harsh and disparate discipline”

that was “motivated . . . by a desire to treat members of the

African-American race disparately” is not supported by any

factual allegations. Pl’s Compl. at 3.

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Because the Complaint lacks factual allegations to support

its legal conclusions and fails to allege racial discrimination,

the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim

under Title VI for failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Lastly, the Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend the

Complaint to include sufficient support for this claim to comply

with Rule 8 and state a claim for relief.

2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 provides in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law ... 

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To maintain a successful § 1983 action, a plaintiff must

establish the following two elements: (1) the conduct complained

of must have been committed by an individual acting under the

color of law; and (2) the conduct must have subjected the

plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional rights. Jones v.

Cmty. Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984). 

Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim is subsumed

by Title VI. Plaintiffs point out that the Ninth Circuit has not

yet ruled on the issue and urges the Court to follow other courts

that have found Title VI does not subsume a § 1983 claim within

its reach. Thus, the Court is called upon to decide whether 

Title VI serves to bar an action brought pursuant to § 1983.

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Title VI does not explicitly purport to limit § 1983 relief. 

However, congressional intent to foreclose such a remedy can

still be inferred from a statutory scheme. Middlesex County

Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20

(1981). “When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act

are sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate

congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under §

1983.” Id.

Courts are split as to whether Title VI subsumes § 1983

claims that fall within Title VI’s proscriptions. The Seventh

Circuit, the Western District of New York, and the District of

Nevada have found that Title VI is sufficiently comprehensive to

preclude a plaintiff from bypassing its enforcement mechanisms

through a § 1983 action. Boulahanis v. Bd. of Regents, 198 F.3d

633, 641 (7th Cir. 1999); Bayon v. State Univ. of N.Y. at

Buffalo, 2001 WL 135817, *3 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Alexander v.

Underhill, 416 F.Supp.2d 999, (D.Nev. 2006). Conversely, the

Third Circuit and the First Circuit have found that Title VI is

not sufficiently comprehensive. Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387,

402 (3d Cir. 1999) overruled on other grounds by Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Cousins v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of

Transp., 857 F.2d 37, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1988).

The Ninth Circuit has not decided the specific issue of 

whether § 1983 claims are subsumed by Title VI. However, the

Ninth Circuit has recognized the Supreme Court's Sea Clammers

doctrine when construing other federal statutes and has found

that statutes may preclude a § 1983 remedy if they are

sufficiently comprehensive. 

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See, e.g., Dittman v. Cal., 191 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 1999); Dep't

of Educ., State of Haw. v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.

1983).

In determining whether an act subsumes a § 1983 action, the 

court must determine whether Congress intended that act to 

supplant any remedy that would otherwise be available under § 

1983. Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 20. Such Congressional 

intent may be inferred when the statutory scheme is incompatible 

with individual enforcement under § 1983. City of Rancho Palos 

Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). The defendant bears 

the burden of demonstrating that Congress has withdrawn the § 

1983 remedy. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 

U.S. 103, 107 (1989).

Therefore, the Court must decide whether Title VI is

sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate congressional intent to

foreclose a § 1983 remedy. If Title VI is sufficiently

comprehensive, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs' §

1983 claim seeks to remedy conduct that is within the scope of

Title VI. Only § 1983 claims that are within the scope of a

comprehensive statutory scheme are subsumed by that scheme. See

Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1003 n. 7 (1984) superseded by

Education of the Handicapped Act, § 615(e)(4), as amended, 20

U.S.C. § 1415(e)(4).

Title VI's administrative scheme allows persons who believe

they were discriminated against to file a written complaint with

the responsible department official. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b). A

complaint that indicates noncompliance with Title VI triggers a

prompt investigation. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c). 

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If the investigation reveals a failure to comply with Title VI,

the department will take steps necessary to ensure compliance. 

34 C.F.R. §§ 100.7, 100.8, 100.9. Although these regulations do

not provide a monetary remedy for a complainant who was

discriminated against, the regulations do provide a process

designed to effectuate compliance with Title VI. A federally

funded entity that does not comply with Title VI may ultimately

lose its federal financial assistance. 34 C.F.R. § 100.8. In

addition to the administrative remedies, Title VI contains an

implied private cause of action through which individuals can

obtain both injunctive relief and damages. Alexander v.

Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279.

An additional consideration in determining whether a

particular statutory scheme should bar a § 1983 action is whether

the scheme provides a more restrictive private remedy for

statutory violations than would otherwise be available pursuant

to § 1983. Abrams, 544 U.S. at 120. A more restrictive remedy

provided by statute militates against recognition of a more

sweeping right under the general provisions of § 1983. Id. 

A Title VI plaintiff can only seek recovery from the

recipient of the federal funding. Shotz v. City of Plantation,

344 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (11th Cir. 2003). Thus, individuals may

not be held liable under Title VI. Id. Furthermore, a private

right of action is only available under Title VI for intentional

discrimination. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 280. Accordingly,

relief under Title VI is more restrictive than would otherwise be

available pursuant to § 1983.

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After examining the relevant case law and the statutory

scheme of Title VI, the Court concludes that Title VI is

sufficiently comprehensive to evince congressional intent to

foreclose a § 1983 remedy. Because Title VI offers an

administrative enforcement scheme; a narrower private right of

action; and damages that are more restrictive than those

available through § 1983, the Court finds that a remedy under §

1983 for conduct within the scope of Title VI would be

incompatible with Title VI. See Abrams, 544 U.S. at 120. 

Therefore, the Court finds that Title VI subsumes § 1983 claims

which fall within Title VI’s prohibitions. The authority to the

contrary cited by the Plaintiff is neither controlling nor

persuasive to this Court. 

As to the second inquiry, Plaintiffs’ Complaint seeks

redress for intentional racial discrimination by a state entity

that receives federal funds. Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim falls

squarely within Title VI and is thus subsumed by Title VI. 

Allowing Plaintiffs to plead around the detailed statutory scheme

created by Title VI by pleading a § 1983 claim against Mr. Howe

in his individual capacity would be inconsistent with Congress’

creation of restrictions on Title VI claims. Because the Court

finds that Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is subsumed by Title VI, it

is clear this claim cannot be cured by any amendment. 

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim

against Mr. Howe under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is granted without leave

to amend.

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3. California Education Code § 220

California Education Code section 220 provides in relevant

part, “[n]o person shall be subjected to discrimination on the

basis of sex, ethnic group identification, race, national origin,

religion, [or] color[.]” Plaintiffs’ Complaint does not assert

this claim against Mr. Howe. Defendant FCUSD again claims

Eleventh Amendment immunity from this claim and alternatively

alleges that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative

remedies as required by California’s Tort Claims Act(“CTCA”), in

any event.

As mentioned above, FCUSD is a state actor for Eleventh

Amendment purposes. In the absence of consent, a suit in federal

court in which a state or one of its agencies or departments is

named as a defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984). Plaintiffs have not directed the Court to any authority

which suggests there has been a waiver that would apply to

Plaintiffs’ claim under California law. Thus, the Eleventh

Amendment bars suit against FCUSD for this claim.

Defendants also point out that Plaintiffs have failed to

allege that they have complied with the requirements of the CTCA. 

Cal. Gov’t Code § 900 et seq. Plaintiffs assert that their claim

under California law is exempt from the requirements of the CTCA.

All Government liability in California is governed by

statute. Cal. Gov’t Code § 815. The CTCA sets forth both the

limited circumstances under which public entities may be sued in

California and the applicable procedural requirements. 

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Curtis T. v. County of L.A., 123 Cal. App. 4th 1405, 1414 (2004). 

All claims for money damages against local public entities in

California must be presented in accordance with the CTCA,

including its enumerated exceptions. Cal. Gov’t Code § 910. 

Plaintiffs claim does not fall within any of the statutory

exceptions provided in section 910. 

Because compliance with the CTCA is required, no suit may be

brought based upon Plaintiffs’ claim until it has been presented

and has been rejected in whole or in part. Cal. Gov’t Code. §

945.4. Plaintiffs must have presented this claim to the

appropriate governmental body within one year of the accrual of

the cause of action. Cal. Gov’t Code § 911.2. 

Plaintiffs argue that this claim is not subject to the

requirements of the CTCA because California Education Code

section 262.4 provides that “this chapter may be enforced through

a civil action.” Nothing in section 262.4 nor any legal

authority the Plaintiffs have produced, supports their contention

that section 262.4 automatically bypasses the clear requirements

of the CTCA, which expressly apply to every civil action against

a California governmental entity not expressly exempted.

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendant

FCUSD’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiffs’ claim under

California Education Code section 220 because: (1) Defendant

FCUSD is a state actor and is immune from suit in this Court

pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution and there has been no showing of a waiver; and (2) 

Plaintiffs have not alleged they have complied with the

requirements of the CTCA. 

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Plaintiffs are hereby granted leave to amend in order to cure the

foregoing defects.

4. Punitive Damages

Plaintiffs’s Complaint requests punitive damages and

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss expressly extends to all such

claims by Plaintiffs. Plaintiff’s claim against Mr. Howe

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is subsumed by Title VI and thus it

cannot form the basis for an award of punitive damages. This

leaves only Plaintiffs’ claims under Title VI and California law

as possible grounds for an award of punitive damages. 

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss correctly asserts that punitive

damages are not available under Title VI. Barnes v. Gorman, 536

U.S. 181, 189 (2002). Defendants also correctly asserts that

punitive damages are not available under California law against a

public entity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 818. Finally, the Court notes

that Plaintiffs failed to address this portion of Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss in their Opposition.

Because the Plaintiffs have no claim upon which an award of

punitive damages could be made it is clear that amendment would

be futile. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss punitive damages sought by Plaintiffs without leave to

amend.

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CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to

Title VI is granted with leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is granted

without leave to amend. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiffs’ claim pursuant to California Education Code section

220 is granted with leave to amend. Lastly, Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages is granted

without leave to amend. Plaintiffs are hereby granted twenty

(20) days following the date of this Order to file their proposed

Amended Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 20, 2007

_____________________________

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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