Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03521/USCOURTS-ca8-05-03521-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jason Paul Annis
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern

District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 05-3521

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

Jason Paul Annis, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 20, 2006

Filed: May 8, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, HANSEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Jason Paul Annis pled guilty to manufacturing and attempting to manufacture

methamphetamine, and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court1

sentenced him within the advisory Guidelines range to 235 months. He appeals,

arguing the district court erred in determining the drug quantity, finding he possessed

a firearm in connection with another felony, and denying an acceptance-ofresponsibility reduction. He also asserts the sentence is unreasonable. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, this court affirms.

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I.

On July 29, 2004, police officers arrived at the house of Heather Annis,

suspecting it contained a methamphetamine lab. After she consented, police searched

the garage and found Annis, her brother, injecting himself with meth. He scuffled

with police while being arrested, but afterward did not appear to be injured. An

officer read Annis his Miranda rights while in the patrol car. He admitted that the

meth items in the garage were his. At the police station, he was involved in another

altercation with an officer. He suffered "a minimally displaced fracture of his orbit

and a facial bone," was taken to a local hospital, and treated with an ice pack and

Tylenol. 

Two days later, Annis phoned his sister, asking her to contact Officer Phil

Fordyce. She called Fordyce, telling him Annis was in pain and wanted to speak with

him. Fordyce called the jail, informed them Annis was in pain, and set up an

interview time. Arriving at the jail, Fordyce advised Annis of his Miranda rights

again. Fordyce interviewed him about the details of his meth production. Annis

answered the questions, admitting to estimates of the quantities of meth he

manufactured, but never mentioning he was in pain. At the end of the interview,

Fordyce typed a report in Annis's presence, had him read it on the computer screen,

and then had him read the printed version. After reading and reviewing the interview

report, Annis signed it in the presence of a witness.

Annis pled guilty to manufacturing and attempting to manufacture

methamphetamine, and to being a felon in possession of a firearm. After calculating

the Guidelines range to be 235 to 293 months, the district court sentenced him to 235

months in prison.

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II.

A.

First, Annis claims his signed statement cannot be used to determine the

quantity of meth he manufactured because he did not voluntarily or knowingly waive

his Miranda rights. Because the district court essentially conducted a suppression

hearing during the sentencing proceeding, this court reviews its fact finding for clear

error and its application of law to those facts de novo. See United States v. Jones, 275

F.3d 673, 678–79 (8th Cir. 2001). This court "will affirm the district court's denial of

a motion to suppress evidence unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, based

on an erroneous interpretation of applicable law, or, based on the entire record, it is

clear a mistake was made." Id. 

A defendant's statement of drug quantity may be used to determine his base

offense level under the advisory Guidelines. See United States v. Ingles, 408 F.3d

405, 409 (8th Cir. 2005). However, it may be used only if the defendant knowingly

and voluntarily waived her Miranda rights. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600,

608 n.1 (2004); United States v. Black Bear, 422 F.3d 658, 663 (8th Cir. 2005). "A

waiver is 'knowing and intelligent' where it is made with full awareness of both the

nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of abandoning the right, and

a waiver is 'voluntary' where the court can determine that the waiver was a product of

the suspect's free and deliberate choice, and not the product of intimidation, coercion,

or deception." Thai v. Mapes, 412 F.3d 970, 977 (8th Cir. 2005). A statement is not

voluntary if the totality of the circumstances shows the defendant's will was

overborne. See United States v. Glauning, 211 F.3d 1085, 1087 (8th Cir. 2000). 

In this case, there is no evidence Annis unknowingly and involuntarily waived

his Miranda rights. He initiated contact with Fordyce, through his sister, asking for

a meeting. He was read his rights at least twice – once in the patrol car and once right

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before Fordyce interviewed him at the jail. During the interview, he answered

Fordyce's questions, admitting the quantity of meth he manufactured. Fordyce typed

his report on a word processor in Annis's presence, and Annis read and reviewed it on

the computer screen. Fordyce then printed out the report, which Annis again read,

reviewed, and signed. Although he had ample opportunity, Annis neither objected to

the report's contents, including his meth-quantity statement, nor told Fordyce he was

in any pain. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 608–09 ("[M]aintaining that a statement is

involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires

unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a

valid waiver."), citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984).

Annis, however, asserts he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his rights

because he thought Fordyce "was there to help him regarding his pain." He claims the

pain from his injuries, combined with meth withdrawal, made it impossible for him

to voluntarily and knowingly waive his rights at the time of the interview. He also

argues that, separate from his waiver argument, these factors made his statement

involuntary. This court, though, has declined to adopt a per se rule of involuntariness

founded solely on intoxication. See United States v. Makes Room, 49 F.3d 410, 415

(8th Cir. 1995). Instead, "the test is whether these mental impairments caused the

defendant's will to be overborne." United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th

Cir. 1990). Annis provided no evidence that his pain and meth withdrawal caused his

will to be overborne. To the contrary, the government proved that during the

interview Annis answered questions reasonably, even reading and reviewing his

statements twice and signing the report. He did not appear to be in any pain or

suffering from withdrawal, and did not complain to Fordyce. See id. (explaining that

because defendant talked coherently and did not appear to be intoxicated, there was

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Annis also argues that the Fifth Amendment requires the government at

sentencing to prove his relevant conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has

already stated that, at sentencing, the government has the burden to prove drug

quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Ziesman, 409

F.3d 941, 955 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Black Bear, 422 F.3d at 663 (same standard

applies in determining whether Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary). As

explained, the district court applied the correct standard.

Additionally, Annis asserts that the district court should not have relied on the

testimony of two other government witnesses because they are not credible.

Credibility assessments are for the fact-finder. See United States v. Tensley, 334 F.3d

790, 795 (8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1245 (8th Cir. 1997)

("An appellate court is 'not in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses .

. . .'"). Here, the record supports the district court's determination. See United States

v. Buford, 108 F.3d 151, 155 (8th Cir. 1997).

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no error). There is no evidence of police coercion overbearing his will. Thus, his

waiver, as well as his statement, were both knowing and voluntary.2

B.

Next, Annis argues his sentence should not have been enhanced for possession

of a firearm used in connection with manufacturing meth. This court reviews a district

court's finding that a defendant possessed a dangerous weapon during a drug offense

for clear error. See United States v. Lopez, 416 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2005).

"Generally, the weapon enhancement is applicable 'if the gun is found in the

same location where drugs or drug paraphernalia were stored, or where part of the

conspiracy took place.'" United States v. Perez-Guerrero, 334 F.3d 778, 784 (8th Cir.

2003), quoting United States v. Braggs, 317 F.3d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 2003). The

district court found, and Annis admits, that he kept a sawed-off rifle at his home,

where police also found evidence of meth manufacturing. Witnesses saw the gun

"assembled and leaning against the wall in the living room," as well as being cleaned

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and painted by Annis. See United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir.

2006) (witnesses saw defendant with gun). This evidence supports the district court's

determination that he possessed a weapon in connection with a drug-related offense.

However, Annis claims his sentence should not have been adjusted under

U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) because the gun was missing both the clip and the bolt. The

Guidelines state: "If a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed,

increase by 2 levels." U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(b)(1) (2004).

The Guidelines further state:

"Dangerous weapon" means (i) an instrument capable of inflicting death or

serious bodily injury; or (ii) an object that is not an instrument capable of

inflicting death or serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles such an

instrument; or (II) the defendant used the object in a manner that created the

impression that the object was such an instrument . . . .

Id. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(D). Additionally, "'Firearm' means (i) any weapon (including

a starter gun) which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a

projectile by the action of an explosive . . . ." Id. cmt. n.1(G). 

In this case, the district court stated that Annis could easily "make the rifle

operational in just a few seconds by putting the bolt in." The same can be said for the

clip. Thus, the gun qualifies as a firearm under the Guidelines. See United States v.

Mullins, No. 05-2420, 2006 WL 1132344, at *2 (8th Cir. May 1, 2006) (expert

testimony established starter gun may readily be converted); United States v.

Christmann, 193 F.3d 1023, 1024 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The definition turns on what the

weapon is designed to do, not on whether it is capable of doing its job at the particular

moment that the crime was committed."). Even partially disassembled, the gun is still

a dangerous weapon because it not only closely resembles such an instrument, but also

was used in a manner that created the impression it was a working gun. Cf.

Christmann, 193 F.3d at 1024–25 (explaining firearm definition turns on what

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Annis also challenges the district court's § 2K2.1(b)(5) adjustment for use or

possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. Because his

sentence for manufacturing and attempting to manufacture meth was the greater of the

two, this court does not need to address this claim.

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weapon was designed to do "because the bank employees had no way of knowing that

the gun was unloaded, and, in fact, the robbers manifestly intended the bank

employees to believe that the gun was loaded."). Therefore, the district court did not

clearly err in applying § 2D1.1(b)(1).3

C.

Third, Annis claims he should have received a downward adjustment for

acceptance of responsibility. "A district court's factual determination on whether a

defendant has demonstrated acceptance of responsibility is entitled to great deference

and should be reversed only if it is so clearly erroneous as to be without foundation."

United States v. Card, 390 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2004), quoting United States v.

Nguyen, 339 F.3d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 2003). 

Annis argues that under § 3E1.1 of the Guidelines, he only has to admit the

conduct comprising the offense of conviction (in this case, manufacturing and

attempting to manufacture meth), but does not have to admit any relevant conduct

beyond the offense, by which he means the quantity of meth manufactured. The

district court found that he had "not accepted personal responsibility for his criminal

behavior" because "his challenge to his own statement of drug quantities . . . is

inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility." The court made clear that the basis

of the denial was Annis's "challenge to the reliability of those statements, not the

voluntariness of them." 

Although stating that he is simply putting the government to its burden of proof,

this is not a case where a defendant remained silent as to relevant conduct. See U.S.

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Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1, cmt. n.1(a) ("A defendant may remain

silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting

his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection."). Instead, he contested his

earlier statement regarding meth quantity as unreliable. Moreover, the Guidelines

state that entry of a guilty plea and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any

additional relevant conduct "will constitute significant evidence of acceptance of

responsibility." Id. cmt. n.3. "However, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct

of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance of responsibility. A

defendant who enters a guilty plea is not entitled to an adjustment under this section

as a matter of right." Id. 

In this case, the district court found Annis falsely denied or frivolously

contested his relevant conduct. He asserted his earlier statement was unreliable, and

refused to admit to any quantity of meth. His conduct in challenging the reliability of

his statement is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility and outweighs the

decision to plead guilty – his lone act of cooperation. See id. There is no clear error.

Because he does not qualify for downward adjustment under § 3E1.1(a), he is not

eligible under § 3E1.1(b).

D.

Finally, Annis states his sentence is unreasonable because the district court

failed to apply the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). This court reviews the

reasonableness of a defendant's sentence for abuse of discretion. See United States

v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir. 2005). 

The district court calculated the Guidelines range to be 235 to 293 months,

sentencing him to 235 months in prison. A sentence within the Guidelines range, as

here, is presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Lincoln, 413 F.3d 716, 717

(8th Cir. 2005). Also, at the sentencing hearing the district court expressly considered

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the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Swehla, 442 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir.

2006). Annis's real argument is that the court did not apply these factors correctly,

otherwise he would have received a lesser sentence. But, the record reflects the

district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him within the Guidelines

range.

III.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

______________________________

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