Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03014/USCOURTS-caDC-08-03014-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Bisong
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 11, 2011 Decided May 20, 2011

No. 08-3014

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

JOHN BISONG, ALSO KNOWN AS JOHN BISONG ATEM,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 02cr00242-01)

Lisa B. Wright, Assistant Federal Public Defender, argued

the cause for appellant. With her on the briefs was A. J.

Kramer, Federal Public Defender.

Stratton C. Strand, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Ronald C.

Machen Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Elizabeth

Trosman, and Steven J. Durham, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Before: ROGERS and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges, and

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: John Bisong, aka John Bisong

Atem, appeals his conviction by a jury of seven counts of bank

fraud and four counts of immigration fraud, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344

& 1546(a), whereby he filed hundreds of applications for labor

certification containing false representations that various shell

companies he controlled would employ his alien clients and he

reproduced counterfeit checks to draw on his clients’ banks

accounts involving hundreds of thousands of dollars. He

challenges the district court’s decision to allow him to represent

himself at trial, an alleged denial of his right to prepare his

defense, and various rulings made by the district court in

sentencing. Only the first requires extended discussion. 

Bisong contends that the district court erred in determining

that his waiver of his right to counsel under the Sixth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was unequivocal and

voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Specifically, he contends

that the district court, after initially denying his motion to

represent himself and appointing an assistant Federal Public

Defender (“AFPD”) to represent him for four months, was

required to inquire again whether his request to represent

himself was unequivocal despite the passage of time and to

repeat its prior admonishments on the dangers of self

representation in order to ensure that his decision to represent

himself, with standby counsel, was voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 

Although the district court might have been well advised to

inquire about Bisong’s waiver of counsel on the same day it

accepted the waiver, viewing the proceedings as a whole, we

conclude that the district court’s colloquy was constitutionally

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adequate to confirm that he voluntarily chose to represent

himself and did so knowingly and intelligently. 

Further, assuming there is a Sixth Amendment right to

prepare a pro se defense upon self-representation, Bisong fails

to show he was denied adequate access to business records

seized by law enforcement or that he was prejudiced in his

defense by limitations on access to those materials and other

government discovery. Documents were turned over by the

prosecutor to both his retained counsel and the AFPD who

remained as Bisong’s standby counsel at trial, Bisong advised

both counsel of the business records he sought, and the district

court afforded him time to review them. 

Finally, all but one of Bisong’s challenges to the

enhancements imposed by the district court in sentencing lack

merit, and as to that enhancement there was insufficient

evidence to show that Bisong was a leader under U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1. Accordingly, we affirm his

conviction and remand for resentencing.

I.

In a superseding indictment of September 25, 2002, Bisong

was charged with operating, from March 1999 to January 2002,

immigration fraud and check fraud schemes principally through

the American Immigration Agency (“AIA”), which offered

foreign nationals assistance in obtaining U.S. immigration

documents, such as I-551 forms (i.e., “green cards”). The

immigration fraud scheme involved filing 183 Applications for

Alien Employment Certification (i.e., ETA-750 forms) that

certified that the employer had sufficient funds to pay the alien

and would be able to place the alien on payroll on or before the

date of the alien’s proposed entrance into the United States. See

8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(3)(C), 1182(a)(5)(A). Bisong allegedly

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promised clients that for a fee he would obtain green cards for

them, within twelve months or their money would be refunded,

by finding employment for them. Instead of finding legitimate

employment, Bisong represented on the ETA-750 forms that his

clients would be employed at one of twelve companies

controlled by Bisong, knowing those companies lacked the

resources to hire all of the aliens and would not in fact hire

them. The bank fraud scheme involved Bisong stealing at least

$260,850 from AIA clients by creating on his computer

counterfeit checks made payable to AIA or one of his affiliated

companies, using information provided on the legitimate checks,

such as the routing number, and depositing the counterfeit

checks drawn on several banks and federal credit unions into the

AIA and affiliated accounts.

At his arraignment on June 17, 2002, Bisong was

represented by Assistant Federal Public Defender (“AFPD”)

David Bos. Bisong pleaded not guilty to the charges in the May

31, 2002 indictment and he remained in custody unable to make

bond. Retained counsel John Iweanoge entered his appearance

on July 9, 2002 and shortly thereafter moved for expedited

reconsideration of Bisong’s bond. Iweanoge filed a renewed

motion on September 19 when no action had been taken on his

prior motion and requested an immediate hearing. 

On October 30, 2002 Bisong wrote the first of three letters

to the district court judge. In that letter Bisong expressed

frustration over his representation and the pace of the

proceedings. He claimed that continuances had been sought by

both Bos and Iweanoge without his consent when he sought a

speedy trial. He also stated that he had been unable to pay 

retained counsel and “cannot expect [Iweanoge] to spend money

out of his own resources to do investigations on my case, gather

evidence and arrange for witnesses to come to this court to

testify.” He claimed to be placed at a “grave disadvantage”

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because of the volume of documents seized by the government,

noting that it would take a lawyer “a minimum of 30 full days of

hard work just to go through every paper [] seized, searching for

what I need, and a minimum of 100 days just to go through

every document stored in all the computers seized — assuming

he is an expert in computers.” He reported that Bos did not

devote time to his case and “always told [Bisong] that he had so

many other cases worse than [Bisong’s] and he had to give them

higher priority.” Bisong further claimed that “to be able to

defend [him] properly” an attorney would need to be familiar

with “not only criminal law, but also business and corporate

laws, immigration laws, labor laws, tax laws, international

affairs and cultures and citizenship issues” as well as “how to

reason and see things as leaders, businesspersons and people

with vision do,” and “must also have time to study and

understand all these issues pertaining to my situation.” 

Iweanoge, Bisong continued, “seem[ed] to be frustrated with

[the] case,” and Bisong stated that he was “losing [his] trust in

[Iweanoge’s] willingness to represent [his] best interest.” “I do

not know,” Bisong wrote, “why he has not yet withdrawn from

the case.” 

In a second letter of November 5, 2002, Bisong renewed his

request for reconsideration of his bond and asked that a trial date

be set for that month and that the District of Columbia detention

facility where he was housed be ordered to give him “full-time

access” to telephone, fax machine, email and library resources

as well as access to all evidence the government seized. Bisong

warned: “I may have to represent myself in the trial because I

cannot pay my lawyer.” In his view, “lawyers and public

defenders” would not “be able to invest such amount of time” as

necessary to defend his case. On November 12, 2002, Bisong

wrote the district court judge that he needed his “help and

immediate action.” Meanwhile, on November 7, 2002,

Iweanoge filed a motion to withdraw as counsel or alternatively

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to certify payment of counsel fees by the district court, citing the

lack of payment and counsel’s unavailability for trial after

December 20, 2002.

The district court held a hearing on the pending motions on

November 25, 2002. During this hearing, the district court

asked how Bisong wanted to proceed. First, regarding the status

of counsel, Iweanoge stated that “Bisong would like me to

continue to represent him if I’m going to be available to try to

the case,” but “wishes to be tried as soon as possible,” noting

that Bisong was presently “unable to pay [him] . . . to represent

him” and “has been unable to play [sic]” because he is

incarcerated and unable to make bond. Tr. 4–5 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

Iweanoge advised he would be available to try the case the

following week but had prior commitments in other district

courts starting December 18 and would be unavailable thereafter

until June 2003. Id. at 5–6. Regarding Bisong’s views,

Iweanoge stated that “if he’s going to continue to be

incarcerated, then [Bisong] would rather go to trial with another

lawyer even though I know that his correspondence with the

[district] court . . . is that he would rather proceed by himself,

but I’ve advised him and I believe he would be willing to have

another lawyer represent him.” Id. at 6–7. Upon consulting

with Bisong, Iweanoge advised that “he doesn’t want to be

represented by the public defender, that he would rather

represent himself if he’s not going to be released pending the

trial . . . when I’m going to be available.” Id. at 7. The district

court asked: “He wants to represent himself?” Iweanoge

answered “Yes, Your Honor.” The court: “He wants to be his

own lawyer?” Iweanoge answered “Yes, Your Honor.” 

The district court then addressed Bisong directly: “That’s a

course of action that is ill-advised in the extreme,” and noted

that “a person who represents [himself] has a fool for a client.”

Id. at 7. Continuing, the district court stated “I’m going to

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discourage you in the strongest possible terms from representing

yourself.” Id. at 8. The district court explained to Bisong:

The most sophisticated lawyers that practice in this

courthouse would have a hard time trying this case

because of the subtleties and because of the

complexities of the way the evidence, the documentary

evidence, the evidence that has susceptibility to

objections and so forth are shaped. . . . If you go to

trial [without counsel] . . . I [will] hold you to the same

rules as I hold any lawyer. I cannot favor you and not

favor the other side . . . . So you would have to do what

any person who represents a party before the court has

to do and that is come up to speed on everything that

you need to know in order to try a case. . . . So I want

to impress [upon] you [ ] the perils of trying to do

something which most good lawyers cannot do

themselves because [the court is] not going to change

the rules for you.

Id.

Second, after conferring with counsel for the parties to

identify a way in which Bisong could inform his counsel of the

documents he needed to see, the district court reaffirmed with

Iweanoge that “Bisong is not interested in having another

attorney anymore” and asked Bisong what he wanted to do

inasmuch as Iweanoge would be unable to try the case. Id. at

34. Bisong asked what would be the earliest trial date if he

represented himself, and the district court reviewed avenues it

would explore to find a way to proceed promptly. The district

court then repeated its advice to Bisong: “I cannot be more

emphatic when I say how incredibly unwise it would be for you

to try this case yourself,” id. at 36, and explained that selfrepresentation “is going to raise the likelihood of your

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conviction.” Id. Bisong responded that he had “spent so much

time in jail already” that he “really want[ed] to get this over

with.” Id. The district court inquired of the prosecutor what the

potential sentence could be. The prosecutor did not have the

“final calculation,” id., but stated, based on the plea offer, that

“it is a significant period of incarceration,” id. The district court

addressed Bisong:

I’ve been doing this for 22 years and I’m telling you it

is very unwise of you. Even if this were a simple civil

case, I would be very animated in discouraging you,

whichever side you’re on, not to do this. On the other

hand this is a serious criminal case and you’re facing

the potential of 70 to 87 months should you be

convicted and I told you — I’m assuming that you are

a very bright man. My comments have nothing to do

with your capabilities, your intellectual aptitude or

acumen. It has to do with the complexity of this case.

Id. at 37. 

Third, when Bisong responded that he was “relying on the

truth of the case,” id., the district court warned him that “to . . .

present the truth of the case, it takes skill. . . . [The government

has] a legion of evidence that [it] intends to present and that will

be what you are contending with.” Id. at 37–38. The district

court emphasized that Bisong’s “liberty interest [is] at risk,” and

that by “represent[ing] yourself . . . you have an array of rights

which you will be putting on the line,” for example, “decid[ing] 

whether you’re going to testify or not” and noting that “once

you get on the stand, you give up your Fifth Amendment

privilege.” Id. at 38. The district court continued:

So therefore it would be [a] very unfortunate outcome

for you, and I understand why you are in a hurry, to say

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you want to get it over with . . . because of your desire

to expedite things, to put yourself in grave risk when

waiting and having the benefit of counsel who can

screen and, as your attorney has done, . . . do[] a very

impressive job of covering all the bases and attacking

all the vulnerabilities in the government’s case and

demanding all the things that he, as your attorney,

believes you’re entitled to . . . . These are the kinds of

protection that you would be giving up if you decided

to represent yourself since you’re not an attorney.

Id. at 39. Bisong responded, “Your Honor, I probably have to

take the risk for the people who are suffering” because he was

detained. Id. The district court asked Bisong whether he

thought the “situation is going to improve if you are convicted

. . . and . . . sentenced,” warning that conviction was a “real

possibility based on what the government’s evidence shows so

far if what you’re going to use to meet that evidence is just your

own skills, rather than those of any attorney.” Id. at 39–40. 

Bisong responded, “if I have my things,” then he could prove

that the government’s allegations were untrue. Id. at 41. The

district court advised Iweanoge to talk with Bisong some more,

to help Bisong “understand what he’s asking the court to do,”

id., and Iweanoge said he would. Confirming with the

prosecutor that the trial would take approximately two weeks,

the district court inquired again if Bisong “wish[ed] to try this

case without the assistance of counsel.” Id. at 42. Bisong

responded, it was acceptable to give him “somebody to advise

[him]” or to allow him to “select another attorney” at court

expense. Id. Another option, Bisong suggested, was to release

him so he could work to pay for an attorney. Id. at 43. 

The matter of self-representation was not resolved at this

time, however. After explaining to Bisong how the attorneyappointment process worked, the district court stated that it was

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going to keep Iweanoge in the case “for the present,” id. at 44,

to explore the release-to-work option, ask the Federal Public

Defender to confer with Iweanoge, and hold an ascertainmentof-counsel conference the following week. Toward the end of

the November 25 hearing, AFPD Shawn Moore appeared in

response to a telephone call and advised the district court that

either he or Bos could take over representation, depending on

the trial date. Id. at 47–48. At the ascertainment-of-counsel

conference on December 11, 2002, Bisong, who had since

conferred with Moore, stated he “really appreciate[d] [the

district court’s] [m]aking the effort to try to represent my best

interest in this court but . . . I still feel that I have to represent

myself . . . [and] I would like Mr. Moore to assist me in the

process . . . .” Tr. 3 (Dec. 11, 2002). The district court

responded, “Very well. That is fine,” id. The district court

inquired whether Moore would be agreeable to act as standby

counsel for Bisong; Moore said he would.

The self-representation issue was effectively resolved at the

January 21, 2003 status conference. The district court granted

Iweanoge’s motion to withdraw and appointed AFPD Moore as

Bisong’s attorney, assuring Bisong that Moore was “an

extraordinary attorney.” Tr. 5 (Jan. 21, 2003). Addressing

Bisong’s concern that Moore might not have the time or the

background to handle his “complicated” case, id. at 9, the

district court told Bisong that “[i]f Mr. Moore doesn’t have the

time or the expertise in some given area, I am sure he will let me

know.” Id. at 10. Shortly thereafter Moore entered his

appearance and secured Bisong’s release into third-party

custody so Bisong could earn money to hire counsel, with the

district court commenting this was only possible due to the

“efforts of” Moore, who had “done everything that he [could]

possibly do and done it appropriately in getting the matter to this

stage.” Tr. 21 (Feb. 21, 2003). Due to an outstanding

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immigration detainer, however, Bisong was immediately taken

into custody and transferred to a facility in southern Virginia.

On April 29, 2003, the parties filed a joint pretrial

statement, styled as a statement by the United States and Bisong

“through his amicus counsel” Moore. Parties’ Joint Pretrial

Statement 1, 02-CR-242 (RMU), ECF No. 62. The statement

alerted the district court that “Bisong has stated his intention to

represent himself during th[e] trial” with Moore serving as

standby counsel. Appended to the joint statement was the

government’s motion in limine for an order governing pro se

conduct at trial, noting that the district court had “counseled

[Bisong] concerning the potential disadvantages and risks

associated with self-representation” but suggesting the district

court “should again question [Bisong] before the

commencement of []his trial to insure that [his] waiver of

counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” Government’s

Motion in Limine for Order Governing Conduct of Pro Se

Litigant at Trial 2 & n.2, 02-CR-242 (RMU), ECF No. 62.

At the pretrial conference on May 12, 2003, the district

court did not ask Bisong whether he still wished to represent

himself. Instead, in reviewing how the trial would proceed, the

district court asked Moore and Bisong what they proposed. 

Moore advised that he “believe[d] that Mr. Bisong still wishes

to represent himself” and that Bisong would present the opening

and closing statements and examine the witnesses. Tr. 4–5

(May 12, 2003). The district court asked Bisong whether he had

any problem reading or writing English, which Bisong

confirmed he did not. When the district court inquired whether

Bisong had read the standing order that would govern the

conduct of the trial, Moore stated he would get a copy of the

order to Bisong that day. In the meantime, the district court

reviewed the standing order with Bisong, stating: “First of all,

let me emphasize that you do have the right to represent yourself

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and you have Mr. Moore . . . to assist you in whatever way is

appropriate and necessary,” id. at 6, but “it is not an absolute

right . . . if I come to conclude that in the course of representing

yourself . . . you are deliberately engaging in any kind of

obstructionist conduct, or if you are misbehaving, or . . . doing

things that are contrary to . . . the standing order,” id. at 6. The

district court gave examples and continued reviewing the

standing order with Bisong, during which Bisong repeatedly

nodded or affirmatively indicated that he understood. The

district court then formally granted Bisong’s motion to represent

himself, finding “at th[is] juncture . . it [is] Mr. Bisong’s firm

decision . . . to represent himself with the assistance of counsel,

Mr. Shawn Moore.” Id. at 15–16. 

The issue of Bisong’s access to seized documents remained

unresolved. When the district court asked Bisong “is there

anything else that you want to alert the court to or request,” id.

at 20, Bisong stated that “[u]p to this date [he had] not yet had

access to most [of the] evidence.” Id. Moore advised the

district court that he would be returning to the U.S. attorney’s

office to retrieve documents at Bisong’s request but that the

boxes of evidence could not be made available to Bisong at the

southern Virginia facility. The district court, satisfied with

Moore’s assurance that he would retrieve documents and that

Bisong’s transfer, at Moore’s request, to a facility closer to the

district court, would make him “more at hand,” id. at 21,

confirmed with Moore that Bisong had explained what it is he

wished to see and Moore was prepared to look for what Bisong

had requested. The district court concluded “[t]hen we will

proceed with the commencement of trial on June 2nd.” Id.

On May 16, 2003, Bisong (through Moore) filed a motion

to continue the trial, explaining that he was also representing

himself in a pending immigration matter and wanted to take that

matter to an initial decision before turning to the criminal case. 

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The district court denied the motion. On May 27, 2003, Moore

moved to have Bisong immediately transferred to D.C. Jail in

view of his recent discovery that the Arlington County Jail

would not permit contact visits with out-of-state attorneys,

hindering his ability to share discovery with Bisong. The

district court granted the motion. The following day Bisong was

transferred to the Arlington County Jail but not to D.C. Jail until

June, 2, 2003, the first day of trial. On the morning trial was to

commence, Moore requested on Bisong’s behalf that the

presentation of evidence be continued for two days. The district

court decided to proceed with jury selection and start the

presentation of evidence the following day at 1:45 PM. Bisong

stated that he had “not yet gone through any of the discovery,”

Tr. 8 (June 2, 2003), although Moore had received three boxes

from the government, and that it was “very, very difficult” to tell

what he would need without checking the seized computers

where most of the files were stored. Id. at 8–9. In response,

Moore assured the district court that he had reviewed all the

available evidence and the prosecutor stated that he would assist

review and retrieval of the evidence. The district court advised

Bisong that he could have use of the courtroom to review

evidence. When at the end of trial the following day Bisong

expressed concern about his unfamiliarity with the evidence, the

district court pointed out that he would have Friday, when the

court was not in session, and the weekend for “additional

preparation,” Tr. 118 (June 3, 2003); see Tr. 170 (June 5, 2003). 

On June 4, 2003, Moore ensured that Bisong could bring a

binder of evidence to the D.C. Jail. On June 5, 2003, the district

court informed the Deputy U.S. Marshals that it was “absolutely

imperative” that Bisong take boxes of documents to the D.C. Jail

for review, Tr. 170 (June 5, 2003). 

Eight AIA clients testified at trial, none of whom had

received either green cards or their money back, and whose bank

accounts and routing numbers Bisong had used to generate

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counterfeit checks and withdraw money from their personal

accounts. Bisong testified in his defense that he had no criminal

knowledge or intent. See Tr. 53–148 (June 12, 2003); Tr. 2–70

(June 16, 2003). The jury found Bisong guilty as charged, of

seven counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; id.

§ 2, and four counts of immigration fraud in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1546(a); id. § 2. The district court sentenced Bisong to

188 months’ imprisonment, followed by five years’ supervised

release. Bisong appealed, and at the parties’ request this court

remanded for resentencing in view of United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005), without prejudice to his right to raise on

appeal from the resentencing any issues related to the original

judgment. United States v. Bisong, No. 04-3028 (Feb. 24,

2006). On remand the district court resentenced Bisong to 159

months’ incarceration followed by five years’ supervised

release.

II.

In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that in a criminal

prosecution the defendant has a constitutional right to proceed

without the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when

the defendant unequivocally elects to do so and where that

election is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 422 U.S. at

835–36. As in prior cases, see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.

506, 513–16 (1961); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,

317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

464–65 (1938), the Court placed responsibility on the trial court

to ensure this right by conducting a colloquy: “Although a

defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a

lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose

self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and

disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will

establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made

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with his eyes open.’” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams,

317 U.S. at 279).

This court first applied Faretta in United States v. Bailey,

675 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1982), a case Bisong urges provides

the rule of decision. We agree that Bailey provides significant 

guidance on the disposition of Bisong’s appeal but conclude that

it supports affirmance of his conviction. In that case the

defendant requested the district court to vacate the appointment

of counsel and, in response to questioning by the district court,

stated that he was “intellectually capable” of representing

himself, had studied some law while imprisoned, and generally

thought that self-representation would “enhance” his

“possibilities” of acquittal. Id. at 1298. Exercising its

supervisory authority, this court “enjoined upon the [d]istrict

[c]ourt the practice of making clear on the record the awareness

by defendants of the dangers and disadvantages of selfrepresentation as to which the Supreme Court in Faretta had

voiced concern.” Id. at 1300. The court reiterated this standard

in United States v. Klat, 156 F.3d 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

explaining, however, that the court in Bailey “did not find that

a failure to make such a finding clear on the record required

reversal where the record as a whole indicated that the

defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and

voluntary.” Id. at 1265. 

As in Bailey, it is clear from the record that Bisong

“consciously and emphatically wanted to represent himself.” 

675 F.2d at 1301. Bisong first advised the district court that he

might represent himself by letter of November 5, 2002. When

the subject of self-representation arose at the November 25,

2002 hearing, the district court urged Bisong to consider his

decision further, following a strong admonishment against such

a decision. At the December 11, 2002 ascertainment-of-counsel

conference, Bisong remained firm about representing himself

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while stating that he “appreciate[d]” the district court’s “effort

to try to represent [his] best interest.” Tr. 3 (Dec. 11, 2002). At

the January 21, 2003 status conference, even after the district

court described Moore as “an extraordinary attorney,” Tr. 5 (Jan.

21, 2003), and appointed Moore as Bisong’s counsel because it

had concluded Bisong was not “operating in his best behalf,” id.

at 6, Bisong confirmed that he still wanted to represent himself. 

Notwithstanding the fact that the district court did not ask

Bisong to restate his self-representation request at the May 12,

2003 pretrial conference, Bisong participated in that hearing,

responding affirmatively when asked if he understood what

would be expected of him acting pro se at trial. Bisong was

present when Moore represented that Bisong wished to represent

himself. When the district court invited Bisong to raise any

other issues, the only issue he raised concerned access to

discovery, indicating, as do his letters to the district court, that

he was comfortable expressing his concerns. It passes belief on

such a record that Bisong’s decision to represent himself was

anything but conscious and emphatic. Indeed, the parallels

between this record and that in Bailey supports a finding of an

unequivocal waiver. In Bailey this court concluded that

representation by counsel for several weeks prior to selfrepresentation supported a finding of intentional waiver. 675

F.2d at 1301. Moore represented Bisong for four months prior

to the pretrial conference and as standby counsel thereafter. 

Given Moore’s pretrial representation of Bisong and his active

participation during trial at Bisong’s request, it is not plausible

that Bisong viewed his decision to represent himself as

involuntary. 

To the extent Bisong maintains his decision to waive

counsel was not voluntary because he faced a “Hobson’s choice”

between accepting ineffective appointed counsel and

representing himself, the record belies his claim. In United

States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and in

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United States v. Hall, 610 F.3d 727 (D.C. Cir. 2010), the court

acknowledged that if a Faretta election appears grounded in

dissatisfaction with counsel, the district court must evaluate the

defendant’s objections to ensure that a waiver of counsel is

voluntary. 145 F.3d at 1392; see also Hall, 610 F.3d at 739. 

The only objection Bisong raised to Moore’s representation was

when he “wonder[ed]” aloud whether Moore would have the

time and legal background to represent him. Tr. 9–10 (Jan. 21,

2003). The district court addressed Bisong’s concern in several

ways: issuing orders for Bisong to be housed closer to the

district court so he could have access to discovery; assuring

Bisong that Moore was an “extraordinary attorney,” Tr. 5 (Jan.

21, 2003), based on the district court’s “fifteen or more years of

experience” with Moore, Tr. 17 (Feb. 21, 2003), thanking

Moore, in Bisong’s presence, for “providing what I believe is a

pristine and extraordinarily well styled and presented pretrial

statement,” Tr. 2 (May 12, 2003). That Bisong neither

contradicted these comments nor raised any objections to

Moore’s representation at the May 12, 2003 pretrial conference 

undermines a conclusion that Bisong viewed his choice as

involuntary because he considered Moore was not competent. 

Bisong’s complaints about Bos and Iweanoge, which form a

part of his argument on appeal, are not relevant; at the time the

district court granted Bisong’s Faretta motion on May 12, 2003,

Bisong’s choice was between Moore’s representation and selfrepresentation. 

Also as in Bailey, this court may “surmise, as presumably

did the [district] judge, that there was some method” in Bisong’s

insistence on representing himself. 675 F.2d at 1301. There, the

defense against an escape charge was based on the dangerous

and intolerable conditions at the jail in which the defendant was

held. This court concluded that the defendant was “surely

entitled to think that he could himself most effectively and

appealingly make those conditions known to the jury.” Id. So

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too here. Bisong was alleged to have used his own companies

in a complex scheme to defraud his clients. He held himself out

as director, corporate officer, or registered agent of various

business entities, and he had gone to some lengths to make them

appear legitimate, including registering them with the D.C.

Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, obtaining

employer identification numbers, and, for some, contracting for

virtual office space. However ill-advised his self-representation

decision may have been, for the reasons identified by the district

court, Bisong had reason to think he could most effectively

explain to the jury the operations of his companies and why he

thought his actions were lawful.

A further review of the record confirms that Bisong’s

decision to waive counsel was knowing and intelligent. In

United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the

district court had informed the defendants “in general terms of

the dangers of proceeding pro se,” including the “seriousness of

the charges,” a warning that the district court could not assist in

their defense, that defendants would have to conduct trial in

accord with the Federal Rules of Evidence and Criminal

Procedure, and that “it is a distinct handicap to be engaged in a

serious criminal matter without any legal training or background

and without the active assistance of a trained lawyer.” Id. at

599. Although the defendants challenged the district court’s

failure to discuss the especially complex nature of cases under

the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the

difficulties of preparing an unaided defense while incarcerated,

this court concluded the colloquy was a “model.” Id. Although

the nature of a constitutionally adequate colloquy will depend

upon the particular circumstances in an individual case, the

contours of the Brown colloquy are present here. The district

court warned Bisong in strong terms on several occasions about

the risks and difficulty of defending pro se against a criminal

prosecution, especially given the complexities of the evidence

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in his case. The district court also warned that it could not favor

either side at trial and that Bisong would have to abide by the

same rules as an attorney. The district court further emphasized

the seriousness of the charges by advising Bisong of the pitfalls

of his desire to get his trial “over with,” Tr. 36, 39 (Nov. 25,

2002), because others were suffering when conviction would

mean imprisonment, advising based on the government’s plea

offer that Bisong could be sentenced to more than 70 months’

imprisonment. 

Bisong nonetheless contends that the district court’s

colloquy was deficient to show his waiver of counsel was

knowing and intelligent for two reasons: First, several months

passed after the colloquy before his pro se request was granted

during which time circumstances had changed significantly and

warranted a new colloquy. Although Bisong had been

represented by Moore for four months, trial was to commence

a mere three weeks after his pro se request was granted. During

this time he had been confined outside of the District of

Columbia without personal access to his business records. 

Hence, he claims, any previously made waiver was no longer

knowing and intelligent. But, as suggested by Bailey, the Sixth

Amendment does not require a new colloquy to inform the

defendant of the risks and difficulties of pro se representation

where it is discernible in the record that the defendant was made

well aware of those risks and difficulties. Bisong knew at least

by the time of the pretrial conference that the trial would

commence on June 2 and that because of his incarceration in

Farmville he had not had personal access to all of his seized

materials. He also was aware of the efforts by the district court

to enable him to gain further personal access to the seized

materials and discovery. Under the circumstances, “[n]either

case law nor common sense supports the position that a trial

court must advise a defendant of each and every difficulty he

might encounter in a particular case.” Brown, 823 F.2d at 599. 

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During the November 25, 2002 hearing the district court

emphasized the seriousness of the charges, the difficulties of

self-representation, the complexity of the evidence, and the fact

that during trial the district court would not aid Bisong or relax

any rules. At the May 12, 2003 pretrial conference, the district

court addressed the access issue again, ensuring Bisong’s access

to discovery materials.

Second, Bisong points out, the original colloquy misstated

his potential sentence, which ultimately was 159 months’

imprisonment, not 70–87 months. In Hall, this court rejected

a Faretta challenge where the district court gave an estimate of

the sentence that turned out to be conservative, 610 F.3d at 741,

explaining that the purpose of informing the defendant of the

potential sentence is to impress upon him the fact that he is

facing serious charges, id. The district court’s advice to Bisong

reflected the prosecutor’s estimate based on a plea offer. Bisong

does not suggest his counsel never advised him of the maximum

sentence he could face if convicted of all charges and the record

makes clear that the district court’s colloquy made Bisong

sufficiently cognizant of the seriousness of the charges against

him to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel. 

Bisong’s reliance on United States v. Silkwood, 893 F.2d 245,

248–49 (10th Cir. 1989), is misplaced; there the defendant

requested to act pro se in sentencing and the district court not

only understated the potential effect of a sentencing

enhancement but neither inquired into the defendant’s

allegations of attorney ineffectiveness nor warned the defendant

of the pitfalls of self-representation. Id. 

Upon review of the entire record, we conclude for these

reasons that the district court’s colloquy with Bisong was

constitutionally adequate. It bears noting, however, that the

Farretta issue might never have afforded a basis for appeal had

the district court more closely hewed to the instruction in Bailey

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that district courts to make clear on the record the findings that

the defendant has “articulately and unmistakably” asserted his

Faretta rights, that the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and

intelligent, and that the defendant is “aware[ ] . . . of the dangers

and disadvantages of self-representation.” 675 F.2d at 1300. A

more detailed record of Faretta findings, particularly when

ruling on the self-representation request, would ensure the

protection of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and also

preserve a judgment where a defendant remains silent until

appeal.

III.

Bisong also contends that the district court denied him an

opportunity to review discovery and prepare his pro se defense,

citing United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995),

where the Ninth Circuit stated “the Sixth Amendment demands

that a pro se defendant who is incarcerated be afforded

reasonable access to ‘law books, witnesses, or other tools to

prepare a defense,’” although noting that “[t]he right of access

is not unlimited, but must be balanced against the legitimate

security needs or resource restraints of the prison.” Id. at 1491

(citation omitted). Bisong’s objection on appeal is that the

district court “kept counsel in the case until the eleventh hour

such that [he] had only six hours to review selected documents

before trial, and was never given access to the bulk of the

discovery material.” Appellant’s Br. 44 (capitalization omitted). 

As he sees it, his requests to the district court for personal access

to his business records and other discovery materials were for

naught. See id. at 45–46. 

The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]here is no

general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case.”

United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). It also

observed in Faretta that a pro se defendant “cannot thereafter

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complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a

denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’” 422 U.S. at 834 n.

46. Even assuming that pro se defendants have a Sixth

Amendment right to discovery in preparing their defense,

Bisong acknowledges that he must demonstrate prejudice in

order to prevail on this claim. Bisong has not shown prejudice.

Bisong points to his general statement in opening argument

that he had not had full access to seized records and to the

sentencing enhancement for perjury, and he suggests that until

he is afforded the “opportunity to look for exculpatory

evidence,” Reply Br. 18, he cannot provide specific examples of

prejudice and that to the extent a new trial turns on a showing of

prejudice a remand should be ordered. Id. at 19. His reliance on

his perjury enhancement, which he does not challenge on

appeal, is fanciful and reminds the court of a child who insists

to her parents that the fault for her lie is with the facts for failing

to comport with her statement. Even constitutional error would

not forgive perjury. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 425

U.S. 564, 576–78 (1976) (plurality op.); id. at 584–85, 607–08

(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring);

United States v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1977); United

States v. Bova, 350 F.3d 224, 227–28 (1st Cir. 2003); United

States v. Olmeda, 839 F.2d 1433, 1434–37 (11th Cir.1988). As

to a remand to allow personal review of materials, Bisong is not

appearing pro se on appeal and yet presents no excuse for failing

to identify any records that would indicate he was prejudiced in

preparing his defense, other than vague speculation that an openended review might produce exculpatory evidence. See United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 104, 112–13 (1976); United States

v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872 (1982). The record

reveals that his retained counsel and AFPD had access to the

seized records and discovery materials, and that although the

arrangements for Bisong to have personal access prior to trial

did not work out to the full extent ordered by the district court,

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the district court ensured that standby counsel had access and

was getting Bisong the records he requested prior to trial, and

later afforded Bisong more time for review. Not a perfect

scenario admittedly, but absent any showing of any prejudice,

Bisong’s contention fails.

IV.

The district court sentenced Bisong using a base offense

level of 6 and applied the following enhancements that he

challenges on appeal: (1) loss of over $200,000; (2) 50 or more

victims; (3) violation of an administrative order; (4) use of

sophisticated mean; and (5) occupying a leadership role in the

offense. Under the mandatory sentencing guidelines scheme,

Bisong was subject to a sentencing range of 188–235 months’

imprisonment; the district court imposed a sentence of 188

months. Upon resentencing in view of Booker, 543 U.S. 220,

the district court concluded it had inappropriately grouped the

bank fraud and immigration fraud and Bisong’s sentencing

range was therefore 135–168 months’ imprisonment; the district

court sentenced him to 159 months. This court “shall give due

deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to

the facts.” 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e); see United States v. Tann, 532

F.3d 868, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Due deference “presumably . . .

fall[s] somewhere between de novo and ‘clearly erroneous.’” 

United States v. Kim, 23 F.3d 513, 517 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Our

review of the district court’s findings of fact is for clear error. 

United States v. Brockenborrugh, 575 F.3d 726, 738 (D.C. Cir.

2009). 

 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. Bisong challenges the four-level

enhancement to his sentence on the ground that the district court

clearly erred in finding that he was an “organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was

otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1. The Guideline applies

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only where a “participant” is “criminally responsible for the

commission of the offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 3B1.1 cmt. 1. The “participant” must “commit[ ] all

of the elements of a statutory crime with the requisite mens rea.” 

United States v. Brodie, 524 F.3d 259, 271 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

(emphasis original) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

Although the participant need not be criminally responsible for

the same crime of which the supervising defendant was

convicted, the enhancement applies only where a participant, at

a minimum, is criminally responsible as an accessory. See id.

“[S]upervision of an unwitting individual cannot justify an

enhancement,” United States v. McCoy, 242 F.3d 399, 410 (D.C.

Cir. 2001), but where the participant has knowledge but

commits no actus reus justifying criminal responsibility the

supervision of such person similarly may not justify an

enhancement. 

The district court did not clearly err in applying this

enhancement to Bisong’s immigration fraud conviction. A

government investigator testified that AIA employees completed

applications knowing that the sponsoring companies were

fictitious and signed the names of AIA clients knowing that the

signatures were not authorized. 

With regard to the bank fraud scheme, however, the

evidence shows only that his office manager received telephone

calls from Bisong’s clients complaining about withdrawals from

their bank accounts, that a second employee resigned upon

learning that what “Bisong was doing was wrong and criminal,”

Tr. 35–36 (Mar. 22, 2004), and that a paralegal concluded that

Bisong was violating the law. There was no evidence the

paralegal knew of Bisong’s criminal responsibility for bank

fraud. At most the evidence shows that the paralegal may have

given “wishy washy answers,” Tr. 107–10 (June 3, 2003), to a

client complaining about an unauthorized withdrawal from her

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bank account. None of the evidence indicated that any

employee actually assisted Bisong in the bank fraud as such.

Although some employees were not unwitting because they may

have had some awareness of Bisong’s check fraud activity, there

is no evidence that they assisted it. 

United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1997), is

not to the contrary. Bapack was convicted of Medicare and

Medicaid fraud and there was evidence that nurses in her

employ falsified records, although only for purposes of District

of Columbia Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs

(“DCRA”) certification. The court concluded that a jury could

reasonably find, based on the nurses’ knowledge, that they were

“well aware that the falsified records would ultimately be

submitted to the Medicaid program.” Id. at 1326. The court

noted that the DCRA acts as an agent for the U.S. Department

of Health and Human Services regarding Medicare 

certifications and that the forged DCRA form may have

constituted Medicare fraud. Id. at 1326 & n.12. By contrast,

here there is no similar relationship between the activities of

employee-participants in the immigration fraud scheme and

Bisong’s bank fraud scheme; no reason, for instance, for them

to believe that the immigration fraud would result in check fraud

and no relationship between the government authorities to which

Bisong and his employees submitted falsified immigration forms

and the banks from which Bisong cashed counterfeit checks. 

The district court’s finding with respect to bank fraud that

Bisong was an “organizer or leader” under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1

was therefore clearly erroneous and a remand for resentencing

is required. See United States v. Mathis, 216 F.3d 18, 27 (D. C.

Cir. 2000). Bisong’s other challenges to the enhancements of

his sentence, however, are without merit.

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U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1): The district court found that the

bank fraud loss exceeded $200,000, which resulted in a twelvelevel enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(1). For sentencing, the loss

amount need only be a reasonable estimate of the loss based on

the available information. United States v. Bras, 483 F.3d 103,

112 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The evidence at trial showed that for the

eight victims who testified at trial: The checks bore unique

information on the signature line; none of the victims authorized

Bisong to create and deposit checks on their behalf; Bisong

deposited 65 batches of similarly unique computer-generated

checks in amounts totaling $267,881; the checks had been

generated and saved on Bisong’s laptop computer; and a

government investigator uncovered many more victims who had

not authorized the withdrawals from their bank accounts. 

Computer-generated checks were introduced into evidence at

trial for the accounts of 476 AIA clients. Bisong’s contention

that there was insufficient evidence to show the loss exceeded

$200,000 is meritless.

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) . The district court’s imposition

of a four-level enhancement based on Bisong’s defrauding 50 or

more victims is likewise not based on a clearly erroneous factual

finding. Section 2B1.1 defines a “victim” as “any person who

sustained any part of the actual loss,” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.

1, including “individuals, corporations, [and] companies,” id.

Bisong suggests there was no actual loss because any defrauded

AIA clients were reimbursed by their respective banks and those

banks were reimbursed by Bisong’s bank. An apt analogy is

identity theft where the victim is fully reimbursed by a third

party. Application Note 4(E) to a more recent edition of the

Guidines Manual states that a “victim” includes, in addition to

the definition in the Guidelines, “any individual whose means of

identification was used unlawfully or without authority.” U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.4(E) (Nov.

1, 2010). The Commission explained that “such an individual,

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even if fully reimbursed, must often spend significant time

resolving credit problems and related issues, and such lost time

may not be adequately accounted for in the loss calculations

under the guidelines.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, historical note (2009). 

Given that funds were drawn on the accounts of 476 clients at

more than 50 banks the district court did not clearly err in

inferring that over 50 people would have to devote substantial

time obtaining reimbursement, notwithstanding the fact that

eventually they would be made financially whole for the initial

loss. Cf. United States v. Gottfried, 58 F.3d 648, 652 (D.C. Cir.

1995). 

U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C) The district court imposed a

two-level enhancement based on Bisong’s “violation of any

prior, specific judicial or administrative order, injunction,

decree, or process.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(8)(C) (codified at

§ 2B1.1(b)(7) when Bisong was sentenced). In 1994 an

Administrative Law Judge, finding that Bisong was making

misrepresentations in advertising about his alien assistance

activities, ordered him to cease and desist from “engaging in

any unlawful trade practices in the District of Columbia.” On

appeal Bisong maintains that he was never informed of the order

and that the general prohibition against unlawful trade practices

was not “specific” within the meaning of the Guidelines. For

sentencing, the preponderance of evidence standard applies. 

United States v. Long, 328 F.3d 655, 670 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

The government, acknowledging a lack of evidence that

Bisong attended any but the first day of his 1994 administrative

hearing and that the order was mailed to him, maintains

Bisong’s “willful blindness” is to no avail because the evidence

showed that Bisong telephoned the judge to request a

rescheduled date and then failed to appear on that date. In

United States v. Alston-Graves, 435 F.3d 331, 341 (D.C. Cir.

2006), the court identified two predominant formulations of

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“willful blindness”: when a defendant “purposely contrived to

avoid learning all the facts,” or the defendant “was aware of a

high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously avoided

confirming that fact.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Given the

evidence that Bisong was aware of the proceedings, attended the

first day, sought and obtained a rescheduled date for continuance

of the hearing and then failed to show up, the district court could

reasonably infer, for it had observed that Bisong was an

intelligent man, that, based on a preponderance of the evidence,

Bisong realized the high probability that an order would issue;

he does not suggest he was unaware of the nature of the

complaint before the judge or of the evidence on which it was

based, only that he was unaware of the order. The order simply

told Bisong to “cease and desist from engaging in any unlawful

trade practices in the District of Columbia” (emphasis added),

something he was bound to know in any event. Bisong’s

suggestion now that the order was not “specific” also fails

because the addition of the word did not appear to affect the

substance of the Guideline: an order is a particular order. See

United States v. Howard, 350 F.3d 125, 126 (D.C. Cir. 2003).

 U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(9)(C) In finding that Bisong’s fraud

involved “sophisticated means,” and warranted a two-level

sentencing enhancement, the district court relied principally on

the existence of shell corporations, bank accounts, virtual offices

and false registration with D.C. government agencies. Bisong

renews the argument in his presentencing memorandum upon

remand that his bank fraud claims did not involve sophisticated

means and maintains on appeal that it was simply a “very basic”

type of theft. Appellant’s Br. 63. The Guidelines define

“sophisticated means” as “especially complex or especially

intricate offense conduct pertaining to the execution or

concealment of an offense” including “hiding assets or

transactions, or both, through the use of fictitious entities,

corporate shells, or offshore financial accounts.” U.S.

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SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt.8. Although

check fraud, Bisong maintains, “could be executed by virtually

anyone in possession of a check from a third party,” Appellant’s

Br. 63, the evidence showed that the same fraudulent

corporation used to entice victims into his immigration fraud

scheme became the depository for the bank fraud scheme and

that Bisong used computer software to create counterfeit checks

that appeared on their face to provide him with permission to

deposit funds without signature. The possession of “false

document-making implements” can constitute “sophisticated

means.” United States v. McCants, 554 F.3d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir.

2009). 

Accordingly, we affirm Bisong’s conviction of immigration

fraud and bank fraud, and we remand the case for resentencing

in view of clear error in applying U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 to the bank

fraud conviction.

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