Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00449/USCOURTS-caed-2_05-cr-00449-25/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sandeep Singh Sandhu
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

SANDEEP SINGH SANDHU, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Respondent. 

No. 2:05-cr-00449-KJM 

ORDER 

Sandeep Singh Sandhu petitions for a writ of error coram nobis asking the court to 

vacate his 2013 conviction because his trial attorney allegedly failed to advise him of the 

deportation consequences of his conviction. Pet., ECF No. 103. The petition is unopposed. On 

December 11, 2019, the court held a status conference on the matter. See ECF No. 111. Counsel 

Jo-Anna Nieves appeared telephonically for petitioner; Assistant United States Attorney Justin 

Lee appeared for the government.1

 For the reasons set forth below, the petition is GRANTED 

and petitioner’s conviction is VACATED. 

 

1

 At the December 11, 2019 status conference, the government advised the court that its 

failure to oppose the petition was an oversight. Nonetheless, the government conceded it is 

within the court’s discretion to construe the government’s failure to respond as non-opposition to 

the petition, while noting the court is not thereby relieved of the obligation to consider the petition 

on the merits. 

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I. BACKGROUND 

 On October 20, 2005, a federal grand jury indicted petitioner on two counts of 

knowingly and intentionally manufacturing at least 100 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(a)(1). Indictment, ECF No. 12. On October 27, 2005, a magistrate judge arraigned 

petitioner on both counts of the indictment, Arraignment Minutes, ECF No. 16, and on February 

6, 2012, petitioner pled guilty before this court to both counts, Plea Agreement, ECF No. 86; 

Change of Plea Minutes, ECF No. 81. On January 9, 2013, the court sentenced petitioner to a 

term of imprisonment of time served, 48 months supervised release, a $4,000 fine and a $200 

special assessment. Sent’g Minutes, ECF No. 95; Judgment and Commitment, ECF No. 98. 

Petitioner satisfied each of the sentencing conditions imposed by the court, earning early 

termination of his supervised release. See ECF No. 99 (order approving early discharge of 

supervised release). Petitioner also agreed to participate as a cooperative witness, but the cases 

that would have called for his cooperation settled prior to trial. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 19, ECF No. 103, 

at 9–11. 

Because petitioner is not a citizen of the United States, his conviction subjects him 

to deportation. Pet. at 2. Petitioner alleges he first became aware of these consequences when 

attempting to return to the United States in 2014, after a brief trip to Canada to participate in a 

marathon. Id. at 4. Upon his attempted return, federal border authorities temporarily detained 

him and confiscated his green card. Id. Since that time, petitioner has been subject to removal 

proceedings in immigration court, which current counsel represents will assuredly result in his 

eventual deportation. Thurmond Decl. ¶¶ 13–14, ECF No. 103, at 13–15 (reproducing email 

exchange with petitioner’s current immigration counsel Julian Sanchez). 

Petitioner contends his trial attorney in the criminal case before this court neither 

inquired nor investigated his immigration status, nor did counsel advise him of the adverse 

consequences his plea and conviction would have on his status in the United States. Id. at 2, 6; 

Sandhu Decl. ¶¶ 21–24. Petitioner says he did not seek the advice of a separate immigration 

attorney because he was unaware of the consequences of his conviction. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 23. If 

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he had been fully apprised of the consequences, petitioner asserts he would have held out for a 

plea deal protecting him against deportation or taken his case to trial. Id. ¶ 22. 

Petitioner came to the United States in 1981 with his parents and siblings, when he 

was eight years old; in 1990 he obtained status as a Lawful Permanent Resident. Id ¶¶ 1, 3. He 

has lived continuously in the United States since first arriving. Id. ¶ 5. He obtained his education 

in the United States and forged a successful career as a computer programmer during this time. 

Id. ¶¶ 8–9. Since his release from federal custody in 2013, he has assumed a lead role in 

managing and operating his family’s businesses in Berkeley and Antioch, California. Id. ¶ 10. 

Petitioner assumed this role because his ailing parents are unable to maintain the day-to-day 

operations of the family businesses. Id. ¶ 11. Moreover, due to their declining health, petitioner 

serves as caretaker to his parents; he avers they would not be able to live on their own without 

petitioner’s daily assistance. Id. ¶¶ 12–13. If deported, petitioner declares not only will he lose 

the life he has created in the United States, the only country he has called home since age eight, 

but petitioner’s parents will also lose their primary sources of support, including through the loss 

of their family businesses. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 26. 

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

“[T]he writ of error coram nobis is a highly unusual remedy, available only to 

correct grave injustices in a narrow range of cases where no more conventional remedy is 

applicable.” United States v. Chan, 792 F.3d 1151, 1153 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). “Specifically, ‘[t]he writ provides a remedy for those 

suffering from the lingering collateral consequences of an unconstitutional or unlawful conviction 

based on errors of fact’ and egregious legal errors.” Estate of McKinney By & Through 

McKinney v. United States, 71 F.3d 779, 781 (9th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (some internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). Unlike its counterpart 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides 

relief to a petitioner in custody, in the midst of serving his federal sentence, a writ of error coram 

nobis offers relief “when the petitioner has served his sentence and is no longer in custody.” Id. 

(citing Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994)). 

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A coram nobis petitioner bears the burden of showing he is entitled to relief. 

Chan, 792 F.3d at 1153. To do so, he must show: “(1) a more usual remedy is not available; 

(2) valid reasons exist for not attacking the conviction earlier; (3) adverse consequences exist 

from the conviction sufficient to satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III; and 

(4) the error is of the most fundamental character.” Estate of McKinney, 71 F.3d at 781–82 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

III. DISCUSSION 

Petitioner contends the circumstances of his conviction and impending inevitable 

deportation satisfy each element of the coram nobis test and therefore warrant relief. See 

generally Pet. As explained below, in analyzing the four prongs articulated in McKinney, the 

court finds petitioner satisfies his burden to justify granting coram nobis relief. 

A. More Usual Remedy Unavailable 

A petitioner satisfies this first prong “by establishing that he is not in custody and, 

as a result, not eligible for habeas relief or § 2255 relief.” United States v. Kwan, 407 F.3d 1005, 

1012 (9th Cir. 2005), opinion amended on reh’g, No. 03-50315, 2005 WL 1692492 (9th Cir. July 

21, 2005), and abrogated on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). Here, 

petitioner was sentenced on January 9, 2013, Sent’g Minutes, and released from federal custody 

that same day having served by that point the time the parties agreed upon, ECF No. 97 (order of 

release from custody pursuant to sentence of time served). Petitioner is no longer subject to 

federal supervision, having been granted early termination of supervised release. ECF No. 99 

(order approving early discharge of supervised release based on compliance with all rules and 

regulations of supervised release). Because petitioner is no longer in custody and his federal 

sentence has been completed for some time, coram nobis relief is the only remedy available to 

him. The first prong is satisfied. 

B. Reasons for Not Attacking Conviction Earlier 

There is no statute of limitations applicable to coram nobis relief, Telink, Inc. v. 

United States, 24 F.3d 42, 45 (9th Cir. 1994); however, a petitioner must still “provide valid or 

sound reasons explaining why [he] did not attack [his] sentence[] or conviction[] earlier,” Kwan, 

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407 F.3d at 1012. While there is no clear definition of what constitutes a “sound” reason, “courts 

have denied relief on this ground where the petitioner has delayed for no reason whatsoever, 

where the respondent demonstrates prejudice, or where the petitioner appears to be abusing the 

writ.” Id. at 1013. Coram nobis relief must be denied where a petitioner fails to show he 

exercised due diligence in filing his petition. United States v. Indelicato, No. CR-85-0078-EMC, 

2015 WL 5138565, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2015) (citing United States v. Riedl, 496 F.3d 1003, 

1007 (9th Cir. 2007)), aff’d, 677 F. App’x 428 (9th Cir. 2017). 

Here, petitioner asserts he first became aware of the deportation consequences of 

his conviction in 2014 when he was returning home from Vancouver, Canada after participating 

in a marathon. Pet. at 4. After being detained but then released on a notice to appear, he was then 

assigned an immigration court date in Seattle, Washington in 2015, after which he “worked 

diligently” to have his case transferred to the immigration court in San Francisco, California. Id. 

It was during this transfer process that petitioner first contacted immigration counsel at the office 

of Thipphavone Ark. Supp. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 113. While immigration counsel advised 

petitioner his matter was likely eligible for transfer to San Francisco, counsel also informed 

petitioner he could not represent him in immigration proceedings until the transfer was complete. 

Id.; Ark Decl. ¶ 7, ECF No. 112. On November 22, 2016, petitioner received notice his removal 

proceedings had been transferred to San Francisco and that his matter was set for hearing on July 

3, 2018. Supp. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 7. It was not until after the matter was transferred to San 

Francisco, petitioner secured immigration counsel and his July 3, 2018 hearing occurred that 

petitioner become aware of the possibility of seeking relief by way of coram nobis. Ark Decl. 

¶ 11. Shortly thereafter, on or about December 18, 2018, petitioner retained the counsel that has 

filed the instant petition, the Nieves Law Firm, requesting coram nobis relief. Supp. Sandhu 

Decl. ¶ 9. On May 17, 2019, after extensive research and investigation into petitioner’s case, 

petitioner’s counsel filed the instant petition on his behalf. Pet. at 4; Supp. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 10. 

Petitioner contends he had no reason to suspect he was subject to deportation prior to his 

encounter with immigration authorities in 2014, and the government is not prejudiced by the 

delay, if any, in his filing his petition here. Pet. at 5. 

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The court finds no disqualifying delay here. On the one hand, there was a roughly 

five-year delay between when petitioner first learned of his possible deportation from the federal 

authorities at the U.S.-Canadian border and when the petition was filed. On the other hand, 

petitioner did not learn of the possibility that he could seek coram nobis relief until he retained 

immigration counsel in 2018; it was the Law Offices of Thipphavone Ark, who, after his own 

investigation, advised petitioner of the potential availability of such relief. Id. at 4; see also Ark 

Decl. ¶¶ 6–16 (explaining timeline of petitioner’s immigration case and delay typical in 

immigration proceedings). Shortly thereafter, petitioner retained the Nieves Law Firm, who filed 

the instant petition within a reasonable period given the investigation the firm needed to conduct. 

Pet. at 4. This chronology is unlike the scenarios in which courts have found unjustified delay. 

See, e.g., Riedl, 496 F.3d at 1007 (finding delay where petitioner, inter alia, provided no 

explanation why she failed to seek relief prior to deportation); Maghe v. United States, 710 F.2d 

503, 503 (9th Cir. 1983) (providing no justification for 25-year delay in seeking post-conviction 

relief); Kroytor v. United States, No. 2:03-CR-00379-JAM-CKD-1, 2019 WL 1488740, at *5 

(E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2019) (finding seven years unreasonable delay, but where petitioner waited that 

period of time between first becoming aware of immigration consequences of his conviction and 

retaining legal counsel for purpose of investigating possible collateral relief), report and 

recommendation adopted, No. 2:03-CR-379 JAM-CKD, 2019 WL 2546930 (E.D. Cal. June 20, 

2019). Indeed, “[t]he law does not require [petitioner] to challenge his conviction at the earliest 

opportunity, it only requires [him] to have sound reasons for not doing so.” Kwan, 407 F.3d at 

1014. Here, petitioner’s reasons for delay are sound and uncontroverted. See Supp. Sandhu Decl. 

¶ 12 (“I actively pursued relief in my case as soon as I learned of the potential consequences and 

remedies—from hiring immigration counsel, requesting change of venue, hiring criminal counsel, 

and filing the writ.”); Ark Decl. ¶ 15 (“Mr. Sandhu did not delay in contacting our office nor was 

there a delay in requesting a change of venue or hiring post-conviction counsel subsequent to our 

identification of the issues with the criminal case.”), ¶¶ 6–14 (detailing timeline of petitioner’s 

efforts to obtain immigration counsel and noting, as born out by record here, “immigration courts 

[traditionally] have extensive waiting periods in between hearing dates”). 

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Moreover, there is no indication petitioner raises arguments here, for the first time, 

that could have been raised in any direct appeal. In Riedl, for example, the court found delay 

where, among the many flaws in her petition, petitioner conceded “she ‘could have possibly 

raised the . . . claims in the direct appeal to the Ninth Circuit or under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.’” Riedl, 

496 F.3d at 1006 (emphasis and alteration in original). Here, petitioner did not become aware of 

the potential deportation consequences of his conviction until 2014, one year after his conviction 

and sentencing, when stopped upon attempting to return from Canada. Pet. at 4; Supp. Sandhu 

Decl. ¶¶ 3–4. At that point, any appellate relief was no longer available, see Fed. R. App. P. 

4(b)(1)(A) (generally providing 14 days to appeal after entry of judgment), nor was § 2255 relief 

available in 2018 when he became aware of the possibility of seeking coram nobis relief, roughly 

five years after his release from custody and three years after his supervised release was 

terminated, see Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1012. 

In sum, there is nothing in the record to suggest petitioner did not exercise 

reasonable due diligence in pursuing coram nobis relief, is attempting to abuse the writ process or 

seeking to prejudice the government in any way. Petitioner provides sound reasons for not 

seeking relief sooner and so satisfies McKinney’s second prong. 

C. Adverse Consequences: Article III Standing 

To meet the constitutional minimum of Article III standing, a petitioner must 

show: (1) he suffered an “injury in fact,” which is the invasion of a “legally protected interest” 

that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”; 

(2) “there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of[,]” and 

(3) it must be “likely” that a favorable outcome will redress the injury. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 

504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (citations and quotations omitted). “In the immigration context, a 

sufficient case or controversy exists when a lawful resident’s immigration status is revoked and 

he becomes removeable.” United States v. Hirchedd, No. 2:99-CR-309-KJD, 2018 WL 6182052, 

at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 27, 2018) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1014), appeal 

dismissed, No. 18-17355, 2019 WL 2446994 (9th Cir. May 31, 2019). 

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Here, the threat of petitioner’s deportation satisfies Article III standing. Petitioner 

has been a Legal Permanent Resident in the United States for many years. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 3. 

Because his conviction conduct involved controlled substances and amounted to aggravated 

felonies, those offenses rendered him removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act 

(“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) and (a)(2)(B)(i). See Thurmond Decl. ¶ 14(c); Ark Decl. ¶¶ 3–5; see 

also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (setting forth deportation consequences of controlled substance 

conviction). If removed, petitioner will lose his status as a permanent resident. The threat of 

deportation looms as petitioner is currently in the midst of removal proceedings in immigration 

court, with his next hearing currently scheduled for January 31, 2020. Thurmond Decl. ¶ 14(e); 

Ark Decl. ¶ 14; Supp. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 11. A favorable outcome of his petition here will redress 

his injury as it will vacate his criminal conviction in its entirety. Hirabayashi v. United States, 

828 F.2d 591, 604 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he coram nobis writ allows a court to vacate its judgments 

. . . .”). 

For these reasons, petitioner satisfies the case or controversy requirement under 

Article III and the third coram nobis element is met. 

D. Error of Fundamental Character 

The “fundamental error requirement” can be satisfied where a petitioner shows he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, as he asserts here. Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1014. In 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court set forth the well-established 

two-part test to determine whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. First, petitioner 

must show that trial counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. at 687. Second, petitioner must 

show counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial to the outcome of his case. Id. Each of 

these prongs is addressed below. 

1. Deficient Performance 

Under the first Strickland prong, the court asks, “whether counsel’s representation 

‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). This “objective standard of reasonableness” is ‘linked to the 

practice and expectations of the legal community,” therefore the “measure of attorney 

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performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Id. When 

immigration issues are at play, professional norms require counsel to “advise her client regarding 

the risk of deportation.” Id. at 367. This standard exists because of the severity of the 

consequences: “The severity of deportation—the equivalent of banishment or exile—only 

underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of 

deportation.” Id. at 373–74 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

“[W]here the law is ‘succinct, clear, and explicit’ that the conviction renders 

removal virtually certain, counsel must advise his client that removal is a virtual certainty.” 

United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Padilla, 559 U.S. at 

368–69). “Where the immigration statute or controlling case law expressly identifies the crime of 

conviction as a ground for removal, ‘the deportation consequence is truly clear.’” Id. (quoting 

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369). In Rodriguez-Vega, for example, “the immigration statute expressly 

identifie[d] Rodriguez-Vega’s conviction as ground for removal[,]” therefore, the law was 

sufficiently clear and “counsel was required to advise [the defendant] that her conviction rendered 

her removal virtually certain, or words to that effect.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(N), 

1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)). The same was true in Padilla. See 559 U.S. at 368–69 (citing 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) and explaining “Padilla’s counsel could have easily determined that his plea 

would make him eligible for deportation simply from reading the text of the statute . . . .”). 

Here, as in Rodriguez-Vega and Padilla, the deportation consequences of 

petitioner’s controlled-substance-related conviction are made express in the applicable statutes. 

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (listing trafficking in controlled substance as “aggravated felony”); 

id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 

admission is deportable.”); id. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i) (“Any alien . . . convicted of a violation of . . . 

any law . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . is deportable.”); see also Thurmond Decl. 

¶ 14(c) (listing basis for deportation); Ark Decl. ¶¶ 4–5 (same). Therefore, it was trial counsel’s 

duty to explain to petitioner that his guilty plea, and subsequent conviction, made it a “virtual 

certainly” he would be deported. 

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Petitioner alleges his trial attorney “did not even so much as inquire as to his 

immigration status, let alone advise him of the possibility of deportation and exclusion.” Pet. at 

6. Petitioner avers he did not disclose his immigration status because he did not know it was 

relevant to the proceedings. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 17. He alleges that although the court did advise him 

during the plea colloquy that “a plea of guilty can affect citizenship status, resulting in denial of 

naturalization, deportation, or exclusion from this country,” Change of Plea Hr’g Tr. at 9:21–25, 

ECF No. 102, this generic advisement did not obviate counsel of the duty to warn him of the 

certainty of deportation caused by his guilty plea and conviction, Pet. at 7. Moreover, petitioner 

argues his affirmative response to the court’s advisement was akin to a mere unwitting nod in 

order to quickly resolve his case and not based on a fully informed decision after consultation 

with counsel; had he truly known the collateral consequences of his plea, he would have never 

agreed to the plea offer at all. Id.; see also Sandhu Decl. ¶ 22. 

 The factual record regarding trial counsel’s conduct consists of the declaration of 

coram nobis counsel Chelsie D’Malta Thurmond, attached to the petition, which details her 

efforts to contact trial counsel Johnny Griffin and inquire about his representation of petitioner 

with respect to the immigration issue. Thurmond Decl. ¶¶ 9–12. According to Ms. Thurmond, 

the Nieves Law Firm spoke with Mr. Griffin over the phone and he responded that petitioner and 

his family were more concerned with forfeiture consequences than any potential immigration 

consequences. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Griffin also believed petitioner had retained an immigration attorney 

during his case. Id. ¶ 11. Beyond these limited details, Mr. Griffin declined to offer further 

information regarding his representation of petitioner. Id. ¶ 12. Ms. Nieves herself confirmed the 

details of the Thurmond declaration at the December 11, 2019 status conference, where Ms. 

Nieves, appearing on petitioner’s behalf, represented that when her office spoke to Griffin, he 

understood forfeiture to be petitioner’s primary concern and believed petitioner had retained 

immigration counsel. Nieves further confirmed that Griffin was unresponsive to her attempts to 

gather further information. 

On the record before it, the court finds there is no reason to not accept the 

representations, however spare, by petitioner and his coram nobis counsel, Ms. Nieves and Ms. 

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Thurmond. Taken together, the representations support a finding that Mr. Griffin’s performance 

fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. In particular, Mr. Griffin’s statement that he 

believed petitioner had separate immigration counsel signals that he did not take any steps to 

advise petitioner regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Mr. Griffin’s statements, to 

the extent he responded in part to coram nobis’s counsel’s inquiry, are admissible under the 

residual exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). 

The residual exception provides that a hearsay statement that does not qualify for 

the exceptions provided by Rule 803 or 804 may nonetheless be admissible if: (1) “supported by 

sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after considering the totality of circumstances under 

which it was made and evidence, if any, corroborating the statement; and (2) it is more probative 

on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 

reasonable efforts.” Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). Advisory notes accompanying Rule 807’s 2019 

amendment advise that the court’s “focus for trustworthiness [must be] on circumstantial 

guarantees surrounding the making of the statement itself, as well as any independent evidence 

corroborating the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 807, adv. comm. note to 2019 amendment. 

Here, although the record is slim, sufficient corroborating evidence exists for the 

residual exception to apply. The absence of a sworn declaration from Griffin is entirely 

consistent with coram nobis counsel’s assertion that he refused to provide further information 

regarding his representation of petitioner in the underlying criminal matter. See Thurmond Decl. 

¶ 12. Here, the government has not opposed the petition, and petitioner has not requested a 

hearing or discovery to supplement the record; it is highly unlikely Mr. Griffin would willingly 

provide a declaration in support of the instant petition asserting his inadequate performance. Cf. 

Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 785 (noting lower court’s directive that the government file a 

declaration from petitioner’s trial counsel). Second, Mr. Griffin’s statements have been made a 

part of the record through the declaration of Thurmond, signed under penalty of perjury, and 

confirmed on the record in open court by Nieves at the December 11, 2019 status conference. 

Both Thurmond and Nieves are licensed attorneys bound by a professional duty to make only 

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well supported representations, and to not to make false or misleading statements to the court. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Cal. R. of Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(1). 

Having considered the totality of the circumstances in which Mr. Griffin made his 

statements to coram nobis counsel and the manner in which those statements are introduced here, 

the court finds the statements bear sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness as required by Rule of 

Evidence 807. The court finds the remaining requirements of Rule 807 also satisfied. Petitioner 

cannot reasonably, on his own, obtain or document additional responses from Mr. Griffin given 

his unwillingness to provide further information, see Fed. R. Evid. 807(a)(2), the government had 

ample notice of petitioner’s intent to rely on Mr. Griffin’s statements and yet did not object, see

Fed. R. Evid. 807(b), and the exceptions available under Rules 803 and 804 do not apply, see Fed. 

R. Evid. 807(a). 

Given petitioner’s own declaration and Mr. Griffin’s statements, which it may 

consider, the court finds the deportation consequences of petitioner’s plea were clear at the time 

petitioner pled guilty, Mr. Griffin had an affirmative duty to advise petitioner that a guilty plea 

would render his deportation “virtually certain,” and Mr. Griffin did not provide such an 

advisement. In this respect, Mr. Griffin’s performance fell below the objective standard of 

reasonableness required here and therefore was deficient. 

2. Prejudice 

To satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong, petitioner must demonstrate “there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 

would have been different.” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 788 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 

694). “A ‘reasonable probability’ is a standard of proof ‘sufficient to undermine confidence in 

the outcome’ and is ‘somewhat lower’ than a preponderance of the evidence.” Id. (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). “[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince 

the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances.” Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. “Where ineffective assistance leads a petitioner to 

accept a plea bargain, a different result means that ‘but for counsel’s errors, petitioner would 

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either have gone to trial or received a better plea bargain.’” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 788 

(quoting United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2004)). 

Petitioner avers that had he been properly advised of the ramifications of his plea, 

he would have attempted to negotiate a plea deal that avoided deportation consequences; if such a 

deal could not be reached, he would have gone to trial. Sandhu Decl. ¶ 22. In support of the 

proposition that a better plea deal could have been fashioned at the time, and is not merely a 

figment of the imagination engaged in hopeful hindsight, petitioner offers the position of his 

immigration counsel, that apart from pleading to a non-controlled substance offense, petitioner 

could have possibly avoided deportation if he had pled to a lesser misdemeanor offense that was 

not a trafficking offense or to an offense for possession of a small quantity of marijuana for 

personal use. Thurmond Decl. ¶ 14(f) (conveying advice from immigration counsel regarding 

alternative plea agreement possibilities). While these lesser offenses might still have subjected 

petitioner to removability, they might also have made him eligible to apply for cancellation of 

removal because they are not classified as aggravated felonies. Id. 

The court finds these assertions, however, are highly speculative and fail to 

establish that negotiating a more favorable plea was a reasonably probable option at the time 

petitioner pled guilty. “A petitioner may demonstrate that there existed a reasonable probability 

of negotiating a better plea by identifying cases indicating a willingness by the government to 

permit defendants charged with the same or a substantially similar crime to plead guilty to a nonremovable offense.” See Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 788. Petitioner makes no such showing 

here; he merely relies on the statements of immigration counsel that “[i]deally” he should have 

pled to an offense unrelated to a controlled substance and one that does not constitute an 

aggravated felony. Thurmond Decl. ¶ 14(f). 

Nonetheless, petitioner can still “demonstrate[] prejudice by showing a reasonable 

probability that, even in the absence of a more favorable plea agreement, []he would have gone to 

trial.” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 789. As the court in Rodriguez-Vega explains, “It is often 

reasonable for a non-citizen facing nearly automatic removal to turn down a plea and go to trial 

risking a longer prison term, rather than to plead guilty to an offense rendering h[is] removal 

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virtually certain.” Id.; Padilla, 559 U.S. at 368 (“Preserving the client’s right to remain in the 

United States may be more important to the client than any potential jail sentence.” (alteration 

and citation omitted)). 

Here, petitioner avers without equivocation that remaining in the United States is 

his paramount concern, and he would have expressed this concern more emphatically at the time 

he pled guilty had he known the removal consequences of his plea. Petitioner declares that if his 

“attorney would have told [him] of the [removal] consequences, [he] would not have plead to the 

charges. Instead, [he] would have . . . insisted on trial.” Sandhu Decl. ¶ 22. Petitioner “did not 

retain or consult an immigration attorney . . . because [he] was not aware that [his] plea could 

impact [his] immigration status.” Id. ¶ 23. His personal circumstances at the time of his plea and 

sentencing are consistent with his position that he placed a high priority on maintaining his lawful 

status in this country. As noted above, in 1981, at eight years old, he had come to the United 

States with his parents and two sisters; in 1986 he had obtained status as a Lawful Temporary 

Resident, and in 1990 he obtained Legal Permanent Resident status; he has lived in the United 

since his initial entry. Id. ¶¶ 1–5. Petitioner’s parents and one of his sisters are now residents in 

the United States, and he completed his primary and secondary education in the United States. Id. 

Since his release from custody in 2013, he has assumed the role of primary caretaker to his ailing 

parents and overseeing day-to-day operations of the family business, all located in the United 

States. Id. ¶¶ 6–13. Given these circumstances petitioner’s statements that “[t]he United States is 

the only home [he] ha[s] known since [he] was eight years old” and that “everything [] is here in 

the U.S.,” id. ¶ 26, do not read as hyperbole. Petitioner’s allegiance to his family and 

commitment to remaining in the United States, while at all relevant times unaware of the risk of 

deportation, are underscored by his unmitigated commitment to supporting his family even as 

these proceedings and the immigration matter remain pending. Petitioner has established that 

absent his trial counsel’s deficient performance there was a reasonable probability he would have 

taken his case to trial if he could not secure a plea deal that protected him against deportation. 

Other sister courts have reached the same conclusion on similar facts. In RoblesAdame v. United States, for instance, in considering the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in 

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reviewing a § 2255 petition, the court found the petitioner in that case had demonstrated prejudice 

by showing a reasonable probability of proceeding to trial despite a more favorable plea deal. 

No. 3:15-CR-01801-GPC-1, 2017 WL 2465017, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 7, 2017). In doing so, the 

court weighed the fact the petitioner was only twenty years old when “he pled guilty to an offense 

rendering his removal virtually certain[,]” that his “life [was] in the United States, not Mexico[,]” 

his family, including his girlfriend and child, resided in the United States, and he had attended 

middle school and high school in the United States. Id. These factors led the court to conclude 

“[p]etitioner had much to lose from removal and more incentive to reasonably risk going to trial.” 

Id. (citing Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 789 (“A young lawful permanent resident may rationally 

risk a far greater sentence for an opportunity to avoid lifetime separation from h[is] family and 

the country in which they reside.”)). 

Finally, the court may also find “prejudice where a non-citizen demonstrates 

clearly that []he placed a ‘particular emphasis’ on the immigration consequence of a plea in 

deciding whether or not to accept it.” Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 789 (quoting Kwan, 407 F.3d 

at 1017–18)). A petitioner’s inquiries regarding deportation consequences during plea 

discussions with counsel can demonstrate the “particular emphasis” contemplated by this test, see 

id. at 789–90 (citing Kwan, 407 F.3d at 1017), but the absence of evidence showing such focused 

discussions here is not fatal to petitioner’s case given that, as the court has found, counsel did not 

inform petitioner of the ramifications of his plea and petitioner was ignorant of the great risks of 

his deportation. Where a petitioner has an extensive personal history in, and substantial familial 

ties to, the United States, and counsel fails to advise him those ties are virtually certain to be 

severed upon entry of a guilty plea, petitioner should not be penalized retroactively for failing to 

inquire about the severity of a risk unknown to him. See id. (citing United States v. Akinsade, 686 

F.3d 248, 255 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We have . . . found prejudice where the defendant, whose counsel 

misinformed him of deportation consequences, had significant familial ties to the United States 

and thus would reasonably risk going to trial instead of pleading guilty and facing certain 

deportation.”) (alteration in Rodriguez-Vega)). This is particularly so when there is nothing in the 

record indicating petitioner should have been alert to the high risk of removal and his need to 

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express his concerns at that time. Compare Plea Agreement (containing no immigration 

provision), with Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 785 (involving plea agreement with provision 

entitled “Immigration Consequences”). In retrospect, petitioner’s traveling to Canada for a brief 

period, to participate in a marathon, also supports the conclusion that he had no awareness of the 

risks he faced; he could easily have avoided such a discretionary trip if he had known it might 

trigger deportation proceedings. In sum, that petitioner did not specifically inquire about the 

removal consequences of his plea does not undermine a finding of prejudice here. 

3. Summary 

Petitioner satisfies the two-part Strickland test by showing trial counsel’s 

performance was deficient, and but for that deficient performance petitioner would have 

proceeded to trial assuming he could not have obtained a better plea deal. Accordingly, the court 

finds the final element of the coram nobis test is satisfied because trial counsel’s error here was of 

a fundamental nature. 

E. Need for Evidentiary Hearing 

An evidentiary hearing is not warranted in this matter as the current record is 

sufficiently clear to support the court’s findings. The petition for coram nobis relief, declarations 

of both coram nobis counsel and immigration counsel, the statements of Mr. Griffin, counsel’s 

representations at the December 11, 2019 status conference and the supplemental briefing 

thereafter all create an expansive record sufficient to justify relief. Where the record provides 

sufficient justification for the court to reach a determination, an evidentiary hearing is not 

required. See Rodriguez-Vega, 797 F.3d at 792 (holding district court did not abuse discretion in 

failing to conduct evidentiary hearing because record provided adequate basis to decide 

ineffective performance and prejudice inquiries); see also United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 

573 (9th Cir. 1981) (coram nobis determination without hearing requires “files and records of the 

case [that] conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to [] relief”). This conclusion also 

takes account of the government’s failure to oppose the petition despite being ordered to do so. 

See ECF No. 106 (minute order directing government to respond to petition within fourteen 

days); ECF No. 107 (petitioner’s reply brief noting government’s failure to respond). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons discussed, the petitioner has satisfied his burden to obtain the 

coram nobis relief he seeks. Accordingly, the petition for writ of error coram nobis, ECF No. 

103, is GRANTED. Petitioner’s January 9, 2013 conviction is VACATED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: January 24, 2020. 

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