Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-03010/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-03010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ferdinand Reynolds
Plaintiff
Jennifer P. Shaffer
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

FERDINAND REYNOLDS, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

JENNIFER P. SHAFFER, 

Defendant. 

No. 2:14-cv-3010-EFB P 

ORDER GRANTING IFP AND DISMISSING 

ACTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915A 

Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983.1 In addition to filing a complaint, he seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

I. Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis 

Plaintiff’s application makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). 

Accordingly, by separate order, the court directs the agency having custody of plaintiff to collect 

and forward the appropriate monthly payments for the filing fee as set forth in 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(b)(1) and (2). 

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 This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1) and is before the undersigned pursuant to plaintiff’s consent. See E.D. Cal. Local 

Rules, Appx. A, at (k)(4). 

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II. Screening Requirement and Standards 

 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 

redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion 

of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which 

relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such 

relief.” Id. § 1915A(b). 

 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) 

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and 

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the 

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 

While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8, 

its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 

 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked 

assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 

action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of 

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. 

 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility. 

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a 

claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. 

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). 

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III. Screening Order 

 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to § 1915A and finds it must be 

dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he received his first and only parole suitability hearing on March 

11, 2009. Apparently, the Board did not find plaintiff suitable for parole and deferred his next 

hearing by fifteen years pursuant to Proposition 9, also known as Marsy’s Law. Allegedly, the 

Board in 2014 admitted to miscalculating plaintiff’s minimum eligible parole date. Plaintiff 

claims that the corrected date would have entitled plaintiff to a parole suitability hearing as early 

as September 2008, when the maximum deferral period would have only been two years (as 

opposed to fifteen under Marsy’s Law). 

Plaintiff names as the sole defendant Jennifer P. Shaffer, the Executive Chair of the 

California Parole Board. He seeks one million dollars for each year that he has been incarcerated 

beyond his minimum eligible parole date. 

As discussed below, plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to state a claim for monetary 

damages against defendant in either her official or individual capacity. Moreover, any claim for 

equitable relief would be barred by either Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), or the pending 

class action in Gilman v. Davis, No. Civ. S-05-830-LKK-GGH. 

The Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff’s claims for damages against defendant in her 

official capacity. Claims for damages against the state, its agencies or its officers for actions 

performed in their official capacities are barred under the Eleventh Amendment, unless the state 

waives its immunity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); see also Will v. Michigan 

Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (neither a state nor its officials acting in their 

official capacities are persons under § 1983). Section 1983 does not abrogate the states’ Eleventh 

Amendment immunity from suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1979). 

 Defendant is also immune from damages in her individual capacity. Parole board officials 

are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions to “grant, deny, or revoke parole,” 

which are “functionally comparable to tasks performed by judges.” Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 

1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 1191 (“[A]n official who 

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adjudicates parole decisions is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for those decisions, and actions 

integral to those decisions.”). 

 Plaintiff claims he has been “unlawfully” confined beyond his minimum eligible parole 

date. To the extent he believes he is entitled to release from custody on this basis, or similar 

equitable relief, his claim would be barred by Heck. As a general rule, a challenge in federal 

court to the fact of conviction or the length of confinement must be raised in a petition for writ of 

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 

Where success in a section 1983 action would implicitly question the validity of confinement or 

its duration, the plaintiff must first show that the underlying conviction was reversed on direct 

appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or questioned by the 

grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994); Muhammad v. 

Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004). Plaintiff’s failure to do so in the instant case precludes him 

from collaterally challenging the duration of his confinement in this civil rights action. 

Additionally, plaintiff may not bring an individual suit seeking equitable relief within the 

same subject matter of the class action in Gilman. Gilman is a class action challenging 

Proposition 9 as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. The class in Gilman is comprised of 

California state prisoners who: (i) have been sentenced to a term that includes life for an offense 

that occurred before November 4, 2008; (ii) are serving sentences that include the possibility of 

parole; (iii) are eligible for parole; and (iv) have been denied parole on one or more occasions. 

Gilman v. Davis, No. Civ. S-05-830-LKK-GGH, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21614 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 

4, 2009), aff’d 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 11319 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010); Gilman, 2011 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 105363 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 22, 2011) (order amending definition of certified class). The 

Gilman plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to cure the alleged violations. Gilman, 

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21614, at *7. 

 A plaintiff who is a member of a class action for equitable relief from prison conditions 

may not maintain a separate, individual suit for equitable relief involving the same subject matter 

of the class action. See Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892-93 (9th Cir. 1979); see also McNeil 

v. Guthrie, 945 F.2d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Individual suits for injunctive and equitable 

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relief from alleged unconstitutional prison conditions cannot be brought where there is an existing 

class action.”); Gillespie v. Crawford, 858 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (“To 

allow individual suits would interfere with the orderly administration of the class action and risk 

inconsistent adjudications.”). 

Accepting plaintiff’s allegations as true, he is a member of the Gilman class and his 

complaint involves the same subject matter as the class action. As a member of the Gilman class, 

plaintiff must bring any “[c]laims for equitable relief . . . through the class representative until the 

class action is over or the consent decree is modified.” McNeil, 945 F.2d at 1166; Frost v. 

Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 359 (9th Cir. 1999) (inmate must bring equitable claims related to class 

action through class counsel); Crawford, 599 F.2d at 892-93. See also Rodgers v. Swarthout, No. 

Civ. S. 10-0581 JAM GGH P, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87013 (E.D. Cal. Aug 24, 2010) (striking 

petitioner’s claims regarding Marsy’s Law and parole eligibility, without prejudice to resolution 

in the Gilman class action). 

Because plaintiff seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief 

and because a request for equitable relief would be futile, this action must be dismissed without 

leave to amend. See Silva v. Di Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1105 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Dismissal of a 

pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is absolutely clear that the 

deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment.” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)); Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] district court should grant 

leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 

pleading could not be cured by the allegation of other facts.”). 

IV. Summary of Order 

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 

1. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3) is granted. 

2. Plaintiff shall pay the statutory filing fee of $350. All payments shall be collected in 

accordance with the notice to the Director of the California Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith. 

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 3. The complaint is dismissed and the Clerk is directed to close this case. 

DATED: April 28, 2015. 

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