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Parties Involved:
Johns-Manville Sales Corporation
Petitioner
National Labor Relations Board
Respondent

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

JOHNS-MANVILLE SALES CORPORATION, ) 

Petitioner, 

. Ptt:eb 

Uflued Starts Court of A ppoals 

•r enth Circuit 

JUN 2 G 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 88-2134 

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 

BOARD, 

Respondent. 

APPEAL FROM ~HE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 

(Case Nos. 32-CA-4012, 32-CA-4377) 

William J. Rodgers, Piper & Marbury, Washington D.C. (Thomas G. 

Olp, Ross & Hardies, Washington, D.C., with him on the brief), 

Attorneys for Petitioner. 

David A. Fleischer, Supervisory Attorney (Howard E. Perlstein, 

Rosemary M. Collyer, General Counsel, Robert E. Allen, Jr., Associate General Counsel, and Aileen A. Armstrong, Deputy Associate 

General Counsel, with him on the brief), National Labor Relations 

Board, Washington, D.C., Attorneys for Respondent. 

Before McKay, MOORE, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 1 
,/ 

Johns-Manville Sales Corporation ("Manville") petitions for 

review of a decision of the National Labor Relations Board (the 

''Board") finding that Manville violated Sections 8(a)(l) and 

8(a)(5) of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 u.s.c. 

§ 158(a). The Board concluded that Manville withdrew its recognition of a previously certified union without reasonable grounds to 

doubt the union's majority status. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 

289 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (June 27, 1988). 1 The Board seeks enforcement 

of its order. 

Background 

The Machinists District Lodge 115, Local Lodge 1549 (''Union") 

became the bargaining representative of the production and 

maintenance employees at Manville's Stockton, California pipe 

manufacturing plant in 1958. On April 12, 1981, the latest 

contract between Manville and the Union expired and the Stockton 

employees went out on strike. Manville quickly hired permanent 

replacements and continued to operate the facility. By May 10, 

1981, the employee pool consisted of roughly 509 employees: 230 

strikers, 267 replacements, and 12 others 2 who crossed the picket 

lines. 

Throughout its duration, the strike was permeated by intolerable levels of violence and hostility toward the non-striking 

workers and replacement job applicants. The Board itself 

1 An additional charge levelled against Manville concerned a 

demand for vacation pay on behalf of certain unit employees. This 

charge was dismissed by the Board and is not before us on appeal. 

2 The remaining twelve workers. consisted of union members who 

refused to honor the strike and employees who were previously laid 

off but were recalled after the strike began. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 2 
characterized the situation as follows: 

During the first 4--5 months of the strike, strikers 

harassed job applicants and new employees as they 

crossed the picket line; strikers temporarily blocked 

their cars, shouted at them, made obscene gestures, and 

called them 'scabs.' In addition, a dummy with the word 

'scab' on its chest was hanged by its neck near the 

plant entrance. At least 70 cars owned by employees 

sustained some combination of smashed windows, slashed 

tires, or body damage. Most of this vandalism occurred 

while the cars were parked on the [employer's] premises. 

The· home of one employee was burglarized, the word 

'scab' written on the wall, and furniture stolen. 

[Manville] paid employees over $20,000 in compensation 

for damages related to the strike. 

Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 40, slip op. at 6. Additional 

undisputed evidence indicates that strikers assaulted applicants 

for replacement positions by throwing objects such as steel balls 

at them, that one former striker who returned tq work reported his 

home had been "shotgunned," and that strikers constantly yelled 

thinly veiled threats at applicants and replacements, such as ''I 

know where you live." Manville offered proof of over 110 reported 

incidents of violence and property damage known by it to have been 

directed at replacements. 3 The evidence reveals that at least 

some violent incidents occurred with the knowledge and participation of Union officials. 

After repeated negotiating sessions between Manville and the 

Union, the job status of the replacements became the only real 

point of contention preventing the parties from reaching an accord. The Union offered to accept Manville's earlier proposal on 

3 Although the ALJ rejected Manville's offer of proof, the 

Board's decision expressly notes that the additional proof would 

be inadequate, in any case, to alter its conclusions. JohnsManville, slip op. at 11 n.8. The Board obviously considered this 

evidence and rejected it; we are therefore free to consider it as 

well. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 3 
the sola condition that the replacements be fired in adequate 

numbers to accommodate returning strikers who would resume their 

-previous positions with seniority intact. Manville rejected this 

offer and informed the replacements of the Union's demand. 

In a period of less than a week, from April 30 to May 5, 

1981, the replacements gathered 211 signatures, more than the 

number of signatures necessary to force an election, on a 

decertification petition which they filed with the Board. 4 At 

every new employee orientation meeting, replacements openly asked 

their supervisors how they could depose the Union. 5 Supervisors 

reported "overwhelming sentiment" among the replacements opposing 

the Union. Manville identified 13 employees whose names did not 

appear on the decertification petition who had stated in conversations with their supervisors that they did not want the Union as 

their bargaining representative. Seven returning strikers, four 

of whom had not signed the petition, tendered their resignations 

from the Uniono 6 

At a hearing before the Board on August 26, 1981 concerning 

the decertification petition, Manville informed.the Union that it 

would "decline to recognize [the Union] until and unless they are 

4 Seven of the 211 signatures were eventually found to be 

illegible and could not be authenticated. 

5 Although thirty to forty such questions were asked in 

meetings before the assembled employees, supervisors could not 

identify which specific employees raised the questions. 

6 The Board disregarded these resignations because only one 

employee expressly cited opposition to the Union as the reason for 

resigning, and that employee had also signed the petition. Two of 

the resigning employees signed the decertification petition but 

did not list union dissatisfaction as their motivation for leaving 

the Union. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 4 
certified in-an NLRB proceeding." The Board.-eventually scheduled 

a decertification election for November 1981 but the election was 

never -held due to the Union's intervening charges of unfair labor 

practices which form the basis for this case. 7 

The essence of the Union's allegation, and the gist of the 

Board's decision is that Manville had no legal grounds to generally withdraw recognition from the Union when it did. Both sides 

concede that under the Board's regulatory framework in effect at 

the time, Manville was correct in refusing to engage in further 

contract negotiations with the Union once the decertification 

petition had been filed. See Johns-Manville, 289-N.L.R.B. No. 40, 

slip op. at 8 (citing Telautograph Corporation, 199 NLRB 892 

(1972), rev'd prospectively, Dresser Industries, Inc., 264 NLRB 

1088 (1982)); Brief for NLRB at 9. 8 However, the Board found that 

Manville also withdrew recognition and refused to deal with the 

Union on matters unrelated to contract negotiation, thereby 

violating the Act. 9 Manville petitions this court for review of 

7 In effect, an election which would have determined quickly 

and decisively the Union's actual majority status or lack thereof 

has been. delayed almost nine years in order for an ALJ, the NLRB, 

and now this court to deliberate as to whether the Union,enjoyed 

such status, and if so, whether Manville had reason to doubt it. 

8 The Board noted that its decision in Dresser Industries, 264 

N.L.R.B. 1088 (1982) overruled Telautograph, but that Dresser has 

been applied prospectively only. Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 

40, slip op. at 8 n.5. 

9 The Board found that the filing of a decertification petition 

did not excuse Manville from continuing to deal with the Union on 

matters of contract administration. Specifically, the Board found 

that Manville refused to provide employee medical information 

requested by the Union pursuant to state OSHA regulations, and 

failed to reply in any way to a demand by the Union on behalf of 

the unit employees for vacation pay allegedly accrued in 1981. 

[footnote continued ••• ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 5 
the Board's decision, contending-that the withdrawal-~as legally 

justified under the circumstances. 

Discussion 

Manville's conduct in withdrawing recognition from the Union 

was justified if, at the time of withdrawal, either "(l) the union 

did not in fact enjoy majority support, or (2) [Manville] had a 

'good faith' doubt, founded on a sufficient objective basis, of 

the union's majority support." NLRB v. Curtin Matheson 

Scientific, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. 4407, 4408 (U.S. April 17, 1990) 

(No. 88-1685) (second emphasis added) (quoting Station KKHI, 284 

N.L.R.B. 1339 (1987), enf'd, 891 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1989}); see 

NLRB v. King Radio Corp., 510 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir. 1975). 

Good faith doubt is the ground invoked here. 

To avail itself of the good faith doubt defense, an employer . ' 

must produce "'some objective evidence to substantiate his doubt 

of continuing majority status. 1111° Curtin Matheson, 58 U.S.L.W. 

[ ... footnote continued] 

Manville attacks the conclusion of the Board, contending that it 

had no duty under the Act to provide the requested information or 

to respond to the demands concerning vacation pay. Because we 

base our decision on different grounds, we do not reach Manville's 

contentions in this regard. 

10 Manville initially argued that it was entitled to question 

the Union's majority support based solely on the fact that striker 

replacements constituted a majority of the unit employees. The 

Supreme Court has recently upheld the Board in rejecting this 

approach, grounded as it is on a strictly legal presumption that 

striker replacements oppose the union. Curtin Matheson, 58 

u.s.L.W. at 4412-13. Thus Manville cannot base its good faith 

doubt of the Union's majority on the mere numerical superiority of 

replacements. We emphasize, however, that the facts before the 

Court in Curtin Matheson were very different from the facts in 

this case. The Court was careful to document the lack of any 

strike-related violence or threats, and the absence of any demand 

that replacements be discharged. Id. at 4409. Likewise, no 

-[footnote continued ..• ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 6 
at 4411 (quoting Curtin Matheson.Scientific, Inc. v. NLRB, 859 

F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1988) (Williams, J., dissenting)); see 

NLRB v. King, 510 F.2d at 1156-(employer "must show a rational 

basis in fact for [its] doubt"). Whether the evidence 

demonstrates a sufficient basis to doubt the union's status must 

be determined in light of the totality of the circumstances in 

each case. See Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 1339, 1344 (1987) 

(Board will determine strike replacements' union sentiments on a 

case-by-case basis); Celanese Corp. of Arn., 95 N.L.R.B. at 673 

("By its very nature, the issue of whether an employer has 

questioned a union's majority in good faith cannot be resolved by 

resort to any simple formula. It can only be answered in the. 

light of the totality of all the circumstances involved in a 

particular case."). 

In this case the Board articulated then misapplied these 

principles. It erred in two related ways. The Board impermissibly limited the means by which the employer could establish 

"good faith doubt", by essentially requiring proof of express 

anti-union statements by each individual worker comprising a 

majority of the bargaining unit. And, the Board did not weigh the 

cumulative effect of all the evidence; that is, it did not evaluate good faith doubt under the totality of the circumstances. 

[ .•. footnote continued] 

decertification petition had been filed by the replacements in 

Curtin. 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 7 
Express Statements by-Employees. 

Thirty percent of the employees in a bargaining unit can 

-·force an election by signing a decertification petition. See, 

~' Skyline Corp. v. NLRB, 613 F.2d 1328 (5th Cir. 1980). 

Within a few days replacement workers at Manville gathered 211 

signatures on such a petition, far exceeding the minimum number 

required. In its good faith doubt analysis, the Board became preoccupied with the fact that 211 (less 7 signatures which were illegible} did not constitute an absolute majority (around 254) of 

the bargaining unit, and that Manville proved individual antiunion statements by only a dozen or so additional specifically 

identified employees -- still short of an absolute majority. 

Although the board went through the motions of evaluating separate 

factors present_in the circumstances of this strike, its preoccupation with a head count requirement is evident. It stated 

that it 

will review each case on its facts considering whether 

the employer has proferred evidence of employees' 

expressed desires to repudiate the union sufficient to 

overcome the overall presumption of continuing union 

majority. 

Turning to the facts here, the record falls short 

of supporting the Respondent's affirmative defense in 

that it establishes only that prior to August 26 the 

Respondent was aware that, at most, 217 employees out of 

a combined total of approximately 509 strike replacements, returning strikers, and strikers had repudiated 

the union. 

Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 40, slip op. at 9-10 (emphasis 

added). 

Thus, in evaluating the effect of violence by strikers 

aga-inst non-strikers, the Board first down-played the violence, 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 8 
without drawing any conclusion as to whether or not it constituted 

"some . evidence" of union non-support, Curtin Matheson, 58 

U.S.L.W. at 4411, then said 

More importantly given the crucial significance of the 

Respondent's decision to withdraw recognition, we note 

that the Respondent here had available other, more reliable factors, including the list for the decertification 

petition and the statements from identified employees, 

which could have indicated more tangibly majority 

employee dissatisfaction with the union .. 

Johns-Manville, 289 N.L.R.B. No. 40, slip op. at 11-12 (emphasis 

added). 

Referring directly to the Board's opinion in this case, Chief 

Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in Curtin, 58 U.S.L.W. 

at 4413, remarked that "some recent decisions suggest that [the 

Board] now requires an employer to show that individual employees 

have 'expressed desires' to repudiate the incumbent union in order 

to establish a reasonable doubt of the union's majority status." 

Our reading of the Board's decision in this case convinces us 

that, as a practical matter, the Board did impose such a requirement, or at least limited its consideration of the evidence 

because of the importance it attached to such a view. We are 

equally convinced that there is no legal support for that position. In fact, it is inconsistent with the statement of governing 

principles which the Board recited and purported to rely upon in 

this case, all of which are set forth above; and it is inconsistent with the rule in this circuit. 11 See N.L.R.B. v. King, 510 

11 The Board's approach in this case effectively eliminated 

Manville's hiring of replacement workers as a factor to be 

considered in conjunction with other factors such as violence 

directed against the replacements or union demands that the 

[footnote continued. 

-9-

. . ] 

Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 9 
F.2d at 1156. 

Furthermore, by requiring direct proof of employee dis~ 

-satisfaction, the Board limits th~availability of the good faith 

doubt defense to instances where dissatisfied employees come 

forward and identify themselves in sufficient numbers to 

constitute an absolute majority. Such an approach leaves little 

if anything of the good faith doubt rule, effectively collapsing 

it into the proof in fact rule. 12 See Station KKHI, 284 N.L.R.B. 

at 1344-45; Celanese Corp. of Am., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951). 

Finally, such a requirement would be nearly impossible to 

satisfy in view of the Board's rules which prevent the employer 

from polling its employees unless it first establishes a good 

faith doubt of majority status. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated: 

l ... footnote continued] 

replacements be fired, which was the case here. That is 

tantamount to presuming that the replacement workers favor the 

union, and permitting the presumption to be rebutted only by 

express statements of individual workers. See Station KKHI, 284 

N.L.R.B. at 1344 ("We can find no basis for presuming that strike 

replacements ••• favor union representation."). In this regard, 

we note in passing Justice Scalia's reasoning that "'replacement 

workers are capable of looking past the strike in considering 

whether or not they desire representation by the union' ... in 

the same way that a man who is offered one million dollars to jump 

off a cliff is capable of looking past the probable consequences 

of his [landing] •••• " Curtin Matheson, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4417 

(Scalia, J., dissenting). 

12 The Supreme Court "has never held that the Board is required 

by statute to recognize the good-faith doubt defense, and the 

Board's power to eliminate that defense remains an open question." 

Curtin Matheson, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 

Just as in Curtin Matheson, the Board in this case does not 

purport to eliminate the good faith doubt defense; therefore, we 

do not address the Board's power to do so. See id. at 4414 n.2 

(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("'[I]f an agencyglosses over or 

swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the 

line from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute.'") (quoting 

Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 444 F.2d 841, 852 

(1970); cer:t. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (.1971)). 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 10 
It-appears that .another of the Board's rules prevents 

the employer from polling its employees unless it first 

establishes a good-faith doubt of majority status. See 

Texas Petrochemicals Corp., 296 N.L.R.B. No. 136 (1989) 

( sl-ip op., at 10) ( the standard for employer polling is 

the same as the standard for withdrawal of recognition). 

I have considerable doubt whether the Board may insist 

that good-faith doubt be determined only on the basis of 

sentiments of individual employees, and at the same time 

bar the employer from using what might be the only effective means of determining those sentiments. 

Curtin Matheson, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4413-14 (concurring opinion). 

Echoing that same sentiment, Justice Blackman in his dissent in 

Curtin stated: 

I am also troubled by the fact, noted in the CHIEF 

JUSTICE'S concurring opinion ••. , that while the Board 

appears to require that good-faith doubt be established 

by express avowals of individual employees, other Board 

policies make it practically impossible for the employer 

to amass direct evidence of its workers' views. 

We conclude that the Board erred as a matter of law in its 

reliance in this case, at least partially, upon a requirement that 

good-faith doubt must be established by the express statements of 

individual workers. 

Totality of the Circumstances. 

Although the Board purported to assess several separate factors advanced by Manville as evidence supporting its good-faith 

doubt of majority union support, it did not give full weight to 

the evidence because of its emphasis upon express statements by 

individual employees; and, the Board failed entirely to assess the 

cumulative weight of all of the factors under a totality of the 

circumstances standard. 

Responding to Manville's contentions, the Board acknowledged 

- ···at least- six J'objective faetors" ·which tended to infer non-

-11-

-=-, 

Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 11 
.majority union support. These factors included: the hiring of 

replacement workers; pervasive strike violence; the 

-decertification petition containing 211 signatures; numerous comments by replacements to plant management disparaging the union 

and rejecting union representation; union resignations by 7 nonstrikers; the Union's sole remaining contract demand for striker 

reinstatement and discharge of replacements; and the Union's lack 

of attempts to organize the replacements. 13 However the Board 

made no assessment of the combined effect of these factors. 14 

13 Although the Board noted Manville's duty to refrain from 

bargaining with the Union pending the upcoming decertification 

election, it did not consider the impact of the scheduled election 

on the total circumstances surrounding Manville's withdrawal of 

recognition. 

14 It is settled, with respect to some of the individual 

factors, that Manville could not presume a lack of majority 

support from those individual facts alone. See,~, Curtin 

Matheson Scientific, Inc., 58 U.S.L.W. at 4411-13 (no presumption 

from mere hiring of replacements). It may be that non-striking 

employees may in fact support the union in some situations. See 

generally w & W Steel Co. v. NLRB, 599 F.2d 934, 941 (10th cir:-

1979) (McKay, J., dissenting): 

Reasons for not joining in a strike other than because 

of displeasure with a union are numerous. An employee 

might not participate in a strike because he fears loss 

of employment or loss of wages, or because he does not 

believe a particular strike is appropriate; he might 

nonetheless favor the union's representation. 

But see also, id. at 941 n.3 (McKay, J., dissenting): 

[T]he Board may [not] have it both ways on this point . ••• [E]vidence of majority participation in a strike 

does not in the least indicate majority support for the 

union. Reasons for striking are as multifaceted as 

reasons for not striking. An employee may oppose 

continued representation by a particular union, but 

nonetheless go on strike as a result of intimidation or 

social pressure, or because he happens to agree with the 

goals a strike is designed to achieve. 

[footnote continued ..• ] 

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Appellate Case: 88-2134 Document: 01019880151 Date Filed: 06/26/1990 Page: 12 
Moreover, the Board identifies n~ evidence whatsoever which shows 

union support among .the non-strikers and, in fact, no such 

evidence was offered at the hearing. 

Under the totality of the specific circumstances of this 

case, we conclude that the evidence can only support one conclusion: Manville had sufficient objective evidence before it to 

doubt, in good faith, that the Union continued to enjoy majority 

support. Cf. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 567 F.2d 945, 

947-49 (10th Cir. 1977). 

Conclusion 

For the reasons set out above, the Board's decision in this 

case is not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a 

whole. Lear Siegler, Inc. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d 1573, 1575 (10th Cir. 

1989). Manville was legally justified, based on the objective 

manifestations of lack of majority support, in withdrawing 

recognition from the Union. Accordingly, we refuse to enforce the 

Board's order. 

ENFORCEMENT DENIED 

[ ••• footnote continued] 

Nevertheless, it strains reason to ignore the increasingly 

convincing inference which arises when all of these individual 

factors are simultaneously present. 

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