Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00282/USCOURTS-caed-1_05-cv-00282-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Garden City Boxing Club, Inc.
Plaintiff
Restaurante La Sierra
Defendant
Maria G. Rodriguez
Defendant

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GARDEN CITY BOXING CLUB, Inc., CASE NO. 1:05cv0282 AWI TAG

a California corporation, 

Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ON PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR 

v. DEFAULT JUDGMENT

MARIA G. RODRIGUEZ, (Docs. 11-14)

individually and doing business as

RESTAURANTE LA SIERRA,

Defendant.

 /

INTRODUCTION

In this action alleging unauthorized interception, receipt and broadcast of the June 5, 2004

Oscar De La Hoya v. Felix Sturm World Championship Fight Program (“the Program”), plaintiff

Garden City Boxing Club, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) seeks a $105,120 default judgment against defendant

Maria G. Rodriguez, individually and doing business as Restuarante La Sierra (“Defendant”). 

On July 12, 2005, Plaintiff filed a request for entry of default against Defendant, with

supporting papers. (Court Docs. 7 & 8). On July 25, 2005, default was entered against Defendant. 

(Court Doc. 9). On July 26, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment against Defendant,

with supporting papers. (Court Docs. 11-14). On September 6, 2005, the Court conducted a noticed

hearing on Plaintiff’s application for a default judgment. Attorney Thomas C. Riley appeared

telephonically on behalf of Plaintiff at the September 6, 2005 hearing; Defendant did not appear. 

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 The background recitation is derived from Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment and supporting papers and

this Court’s file.

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47 U.S.C. § 605, et seq., prohibits the unauthorized use of wire or radio communications, including

interception and broadcast of pirated cable or broadcast programming.

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47 U.S.C. § 553, et seq., prohibits the unauthorized interception or receipt, or assistance in the intercepting or

receiving, of cable service.

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As discussed below, this Court RECOMMENDS to grant Plaintiff a default judgment against

Defendant in the amount of $8,620.

BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff, a California corporation, is an international distributor of sports and entertainment

programming. Plaintiff, by contract, purchased the territorial rights to broadcast the Program and

thereafter entered into sublicensing agreements with various commercial entities throughout North

America, by which it granted limited public exhibition rights to these entities for the benefit and

entertainment of the patrons within its respective establishments (i.e., hotels, racetracks, casinos,

taverns, bars, restaurants, social clubs, etc.). 

The transmission of the Program was encrypted and made available only to Plaintiff’s

customers, commercial locations which paid Plaintiff the requisite closed-circuit license fees in order

to have authorization to view the broadcast of the Program.

On February 28, 2005, Plaintiff filed this action alleging that Defendant unlawfully

intercepted and intentionally broadcasted the Program at Defendant’s establishment for the purpose

of direct or indirect commercial advantage. (Court Doc. 1). In Count I of the complaint, Plaintiff 

alleges unauthorized publication or use of communications in violation of the Federal

Communications Act of 1934 (the “Communications Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 605, et seq.2 In Count II of

the complaint, Plaintiff alleges unauthorized interception, exhibition, publication, and divulgence of

the Program at the Defendant’s establishment, 47 U.S.C. § 553, et seq..3 In Count III of the

Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a common law claim of conversion. (Court Doc. 1). 

On June 8, 2005, Defendant was personally served with a summons and complaint. (Court

Docs. 6 & 8). On July 25, 2005, this Court’s clerk entered default against Defendant. (Court Doc.

9). Plaintiff seeks a default judgment against Defendant to award $100,000 in statutory damages

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under its first and second claims and to award $2,000 under its third claim. Plaintiff also seeks an

award of $3,120 in attorney’s fees and costs for a total judgment of at least $105,120. (Court Doc.

13).

DISCUSSION

Default Judgment Standard

A court (not clerk) default judgment is required when the claim is for an amount that is not

certain or capable of being made certain by computation. See F. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Generally, the

default entered by the clerk establishes the defendant’s liability:

Rule 55 gives the court considerable leeway as to what it may require to the entry of

a default judgment. “The general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations

of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages will be taken as true.”

(citations omitted). Geddes v. United Financial Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir.

1977).

Televideo Systems, Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-918 (9th Cir. 1987).

 A full scale evidentiary hearing on a default judgment is not required in every case. See,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); James v. Frame, 6 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1993). The amount of damages

may be fixed by affidavits or declarations. Transportes Aereos De Angola v. Jet Traders Invest.

Corp., 624 F.Supp. 264 (D. Del. 1985); see, Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1981). Where

by contract or statute, the plaintiff is entitled to “reasonable” attorney’s fees, the court upon default

judgment will determine the amount to be awarded. James, 6 F.3d at 311.

Granting default judgment is within a court’s sound discretion. Draper v. Coombs, 792 F.2d

915, 924 (9th Cir. 1986). Factors considered to determine whether to grant default judgment include:

1. The substantive merits of plaintiff’s claim;

2. The sufficiency of the complaint;

3. The amount of money at stake;

4. The possibility of dispute as to any material facts in the case;

5. Whether default resulted from excusable neglect; and

6. “The strong policy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the

merits.”

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-1472 (9th Cir. 1986).

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Upon the entry of default, the Court may accept the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s

complaint as true to assess liability. The complaint alleges that, with full knowledge that the

Program was not to be intercepted, received and exhibited by entities unauthorized to do so,

Defendant unlawfully published, divulged and exhibited the Program at the time of its transmission

at the address of her establishment for the purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage or

private financial gain. The complaint also alleges that Defendant, by unlawfully intercepting,

publishing, divulging and exhibiting the Program at the address of her establishment, tortiuously

obtained possession of the Program and wrongfully converted it to her own use and benefit. The

complaint is sufficiently plead, indicating the substantive merits of Plaintiff’s claims, i.e.,

unauthorized access and exhibition of the Program at Defendant’s establishment and wrongful

conversion. Defendant’s failure to contest this action in a timely manner demonstrates an absence of

a dispute as to material facts. There is no evidence the default resulted from excusable neglect

because the service of the complaint and default papers appear in order. Accordingly, the only issue

remaining is an award of damages, attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiff’s Federal Communications Claims

47 U.S.C. § 605 addresses unauthorized publication or use of wire or radio communications

and provides in pertinent part:

(a) . . . no person receiving, assisting in receiving . . . any interstate . . . communication

by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport,

effect or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission or

reception, (1) to any person other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney . . . . No

person having received any intercepted radio communication or having become

acquainted with the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such

communication (or any part thereof) knowing that such communication was

intercepted, shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect,

or meaning of such communication (or any part thereof) or use such communication

(or any information therein contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another

not entitled thereto.

. . .

(e)(3)(A) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a) of this section . . .

may bring a civil action in a United States district court or in any other court of

competent jurisdiction.

47 U.S.C. § 553 addresses unauthorized reception of cable service and provides in

pertinent part:

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(a)(1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or receiving any

communications service offered over a cable system, unless specifically authorized to

do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.

. . .

(c)(1) Any person aggrieved by any violation of subsection (a)(1) of this section may

bring a civil action in a United States district court or in any other court of competent

jurisdiction.

Plaintiff seeks $100,000 in damages under federal communications and cable statutes. 

(Court Doc. 13). 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) authorizes statutory damages “not less than $1,000

or more than $10,000, as the court considers just.” 47 U.S.C. §605(e)(3)(C)(ii) authorizes damages

up to $100,000 if the court finds the violation was willfully committed for commercial advantage or

private financial gain. Alternatively, if “the court finds that the violator was not aware and had no

reason to believe that his acts constituted violation of this section, the court in its discretion may

reduce the award of damages to a sum of not less than $250.” 47 U.S.C. §605(e)(C)(iii).

47 U.S.C. §553(c)(3)(A)(ii) authorizes statutory damages “of not less than $250 or more than

$10,000 as the court considers just,” and 47 U.S.C. §553(c)(3)(B) authorizes damages up to $50,000

if the court finds the violation was willfully committed for commercial advantage or private financial

gain. Alternatively, “where the court finds the violator was not aware and had no reason to believe

his acts constituted a violation of this section, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of

damages to a sum of not less than $100.” 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(3)(D).

Other federal district courts have addressed statutory damages for unauthorized interception

and exhibition of boxing matches. In Joe Hand Promotions v. Burg’s Lounge, 955 F.Supp. 42, 44

(E.D. Pa. 1997), the court addressed unauthorized showing of a boxing program and rejected

plaintiff’s request for $20,000 per defendant per unlawful exhibition:

We find this amount to be unwarranted in the absence of evidence suggesting

especially egregious circumstances . . . . We therefore exercise our discretion under

the statute to enter judgment against each of the default defendants for $1,000 pursuant

to §605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) and an additional $1,000 pursuant to §605(e)(3)(C)(ii).

(citations omitted.)

In Home Box Office v. Carlim, Inc., 838 F.Supp. 432, 435-436 (E.D. Mo. 1993), the court

awarded $3,000 in statutory damages under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(3)(B) and 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) for

defendant’s willful, unauthorized exhibition of a boxing program at its restaurant and bar by using a

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Plaintiff asserts that Defendants could only lawfully obtain the Program by contracting with Plaintiff for the

rights to exhibit the Program. Since this lawful approach was not taken, it is assumed that Defendants undertook

wrongful actions to intercept and/or receive and broadcast the Program. (Court Doc. 12, p. 3). Plaintiff gives examples

of such wrongful acts as follows: using an unauthorized decoder, obtaining cable service and illegally altering the cable

service to bring the Program’s signal into Defendants’ establishment, or moving a decoder from its authorized location

into the establishment. (Court Doc. 12, p. 3).

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decoder in its satellite system. In Home Box Office v. Gee-Co., Inc., 838 F.Supp. 436, 440 (E.D.

Mo. 1993), the same court awarded $5,000 in statutory damages for defendant’s willful,

unauthorized exhibition of a boxing program and knowing use for several years of a pirate decoder in

a satellite system at its sports café.

In Cablevision Systems Corp. v. 45 Midland Enterprises, Inc., 858 F.Supp. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y.

1994), the federal magistrate judge recommended (and the district court approved) damages in the

amount of $50 per patron for a tavern’s unauthorized exhibition of a boxing match for total of

$2,800. In Home Box Office v. Champs of New Haven, Inc., 837 F.Supp. 480, 484 (D. Conn. 1993),

the court rejected a request for maximum statutory damages for a bar’s unauthorized interception and

public exhibition of plaintiff’s satellite programming and awarded $10,000.

In the case at hand, there is little factual evidence regarding damages. Plaintiff presents an

investigator’s affidavit indicating that he paid no cover charge, that Defendant advertised the

exhibition of the Program on 8" x 11" handmade fliers placed on the inside and outside of the front

door and that between six and 12 patrons were in Defendant’s establishment during the exhibition of

the Program. (Court Doc. 14). Presumably, Defendant willfully pirated the Program for financial

incentive.4 However, there is no evidence demonstrating that Defendant made extra profits from the

pirated programming. As noted, other courts have not assessed maximum statutory damages for onetime, unauthorized showing of boxing programming or even repeated showings of pirated

programming. Based on the evidence before the Court, Plaintiff’s request for $100,000 in statutory

damages is excessive. The relatively few number of persons in the establishment indicate that

Defendant did not profit much from the exhibition of the Program. Accordingly, the Court finds

Plaintiff is entitled to damages in the amount of $5,000 under 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) and

553(c)(3)(A)(ii) and an additional damage award of $1,000 for Defendant’s willful commission

under 47 U.S.C. §§605(e)(3)(C)(ii) and 553(c)(3)(B).

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Elements of conversion, under California law, are: (1) ownership or right to possession of property; 

(2) wrongful disposition of that property right; and (3) monetary damages. G.S. Rasmussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying

Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992). 

6Damages for conversion must be based on the value of the property at the time of the conversion. Krueger v.

Bank of America, 145 Cal.App.3d 204, 215 (1983).

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Under 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C), the court may award a prevailing aggrieved party full costs,

including reasonable attorney’s fees. Under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii), the Court shall direct the

recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, to an aggrieved party who prevails. 

Plaintiff seeks $2,500 in attorney’s fees but has submitted no supporting documentation for the

calculation of such fees. (Court Doc. 13). Plaintiff also seeks $620 in costs for filing fee, service of

process, and investigation expenses, which seem appropriate. Plaintiff has demonstrated it is entitled

to recover its $620 costs and reasonable attorney’s fees. However, given the relatively minor activity

in the case, the Court is not satisfied Plaintiff is entitled to attorney’s fees in excess of $2,000.

Plaintiff’s Conversion Claim

Although Plaintiff alleges additional damages, in the amount of $2,000, for its common law

claim of conversion, Plaintiff failed to address this claim in its memorandum of points and

authorities in support of its application for default judgment (Court Doc. 12), failed to sufficiently

outline the elements of a California state law conversion claim,5 and failed to demonstrate the actual

value of the property which Defendants converted.6 Moreover, give the absence of evidence

suggesting especially egregious circumstances in this case, the Court finds any additional damages

beyond the amount statutorily assessed (see, supra) is unwarranted. Accordingly, the Court finds that

Plaintiff is entitled to no recovery on its claim for conversion.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the reasons discussed above, the Court RECOMMENDS granting Plaintiff a $8,620

default judgment against Defendant as follows:

1. $6,000 for federal statutory damages as follows:

a. $2,500 under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(i)(II);

b. $500 under 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(C)(ii) (willful commission);

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c. $2,500 under 47 U.S.C. §553(c)(3)(A)(ii); 

d. $500 under 47 U.S.C. §553(c)(3)(B) (willful commission); and

2. $2,620 for costs and attorney’s fees.

Total: $8,620.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the Honorable Anthony W. Ishii,

United States District Court Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule

72-304. Within ten (10) court days after service of these findings and recommendations on the

parties, any party may file written objections to these findings and recommendations with the Court

and serve a copy on all parties and the Magistrate Judge in compliance with Local Rule 72-304(b). 

Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and

Recommendations.” Responses to objections shall be served and filed within ten (10) court days

after service of the objections in compliance with Local Rule 72-304(d). A copy of the responses

must be served on the Magistrate Judge. The Court will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling,

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within

the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951

F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 7, 2005 /s/ Theresa A. Goldner 

j6eb3d UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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