Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01930/USCOURTS-ca13-15-01930-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor
Not party
Firstbeat Technologies Oy
Not party
Polar Electro Oy
Appellant
Suunto Oy
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

POLAR ELECTRO OY,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SUUNTO OY,

Defendant-Appellee

AMER SPORTS WINTER & OUTDOOR, DBA 

SUUNTO USA, FIRSTBEAT TECHNOLOGIES OY,

Defendants

______________________ 

2015-1930

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

District of Delaware in No. 1:11-cv-01100-GMS, Judge 

Gregory M. Sleet.

______________________ 

Decided: July 20, 2016

______________________ 

JOHN P. MORAN, Holland & Knight, LLP, Washington, 

DC, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by 

ANTHONY J. FUGA, Chicago, IL.

JEFFERY A. KEY, Key & Associates, Chicago, IL, argued for defendant-appellee. 

______________________ 

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2 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

Before NEWMAN, LOURIE, and CHEN, Circuit Judges.

LOURIE, Circuit Judge. 

Polar Electro Oy (“Polar”) appeals from the decision of 

the United States District Court for the District of Delaware granting Suunto Oy’s (“Suunto”) motion to dismiss 

for lack of personal jurisdiction. See Polar Electro Oy v. 

Suunto Oy, No. 11-1100, 2015 WL 2248439 (D. Del. May 

12, 2015). Because the district court erred in determining

that Suunto lacked sufficient minimum contacts with 

Delaware to support specific jurisdiction, we vacate and 

remand. 

BACKGROUND

Polar, a Finnish company based in Finland, owns U.S. 

Patents 5,611,346 and 6,537,227, directed to a method 

and apparatus for measuring heart rates during physical 

exercise and athletic performance. Polar sued Suunto, 

Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor (“ASWO”), and Firstbeat 

Technologies Oy (“Firstbeat”) in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, alleging that the 

defendants infringed its patents, directly and indirectly, 

through the manufacture, use, sale, offer for sale, and 

importation of certain Suunto products.

Suunto is a Finnish company with a principal place of 

business and manufacturing facilities in Finland. ASWO 

is a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in Utah. Suunto and ASWO are sister companies, 

ultimately owned by the same parent company. ASWO

distributes Suunto’s products in the United States pursuant to a distribution agreement. J.A. 352–66. Under that 

agreement, Suunto is responsible for supplying the products from Finland and for providing “outbound logistics 

services.” J.A. 358.

As the supplier, Suunto is obligated to ship its products to addresses specified by ASWO. Id. According to 

Polar, the accused Suunto products are shipped via a 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 3

standard ordering process from Finland to the United 

States, which comprises: (1) Suunto receiving an order for 

a product; (2) Suunto packaging that order at its factory 

in Finland; (3) Suunto then placing the packaged product

on its shipping dock for a third-party shipper to pick up; 

and (4) the third-party shipper delivering the order to an 

address provided by ASWO, such as the address of a U.S. 

retailer. Appellant’s Br. 8.* ASWO pays for shipping, and 

title to the goods passes from Suunto to ASWO at

Suunto’s shipping dock in Finland. At least ninety-four 

accused products have been shipped from Finland to 

retailers in Delaware using that standard ordering process. J.A. 293–94. At least three retail stores in Delaware sell the accused Suunto products.

Suunto also owns the website, www.suunto.com/us. 

Customers can use the “Dealer Locator” feature on that

website to locate retailers in Delaware that sell Suunto 

products. ASWO maintains that feature, however. In 

addition, customers can order Suunto products on the 

Suunto website. ASWO fulfills such online orders via an 

e-commerce platform that ASWO owns. At least eight 

online sales have been made in Delaware. J.A. 293–94. 

In the district court, Suunto filed a motion to dismiss

the complaint against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

The district court held Suunto’s motion in abeyance while 

the parties conducted jurisdictional discovery. After the 

completion of jurisdictional discovery, Suunto renewed its 

 

* The parties designated certain information in 

their merits briefs as confidential, but later informed the 

court that “the information in the merits briefs may be 

discussed at argument and included in any opinion.” 

Polar Electro Oy v. Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor, No. 

15-1930, ECF No. 50 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 29, 2016). Other 

materials designated as confidential in the joint appendix 

remain sealed. Id.

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4 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

motion, which the district court granted without an 

evidentiary hearing. Polar, 2015 WL 2248439, at *1.

The district court first considered whether exercising 

jurisdiction over Suunto would be proper under the Delaware long arm statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(c). 

The court found that the specific-jurisdiction provisions, 

§ 3104(c)(1) and (c)(3), were not met because Suunto did 

not directly sell the accused products in Delaware. Polar, 

2015 WL 2248439, at *3. Nevertheless, the court found

the long arm statute satisfied under a “dual jurisdiction” 

theory, as articulated by the Delaware Superior Court in 

Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150, 1157–58 (Del. 

Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 707 A.2d 765 (Del. 1998), with the 

partial satisfaction of § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4). Polar, 2015 

WL 2248439, at *4. The court found that Polar demonstrated Suunto’s “intent to serve the Delaware market”; 

and that “this intent result[ed] in the introduction of the 

product into the market and . . . [the] cause of action 

ar[ose] from injuries caused by that product.” Id. The 

court noted that under the Delaware dual-jurisdiction 

law, an intent to serve the U.S. market is sufficient to 

establish an intent to serve the Delaware market. Id.

(citing Power Integrations, Inc. v. BCD Semiconductor 

Corp., 547 F. Supp. 2d 365, 373 (D. Del. 2008)). The court 

thus found that Polar proved the intent element based on 

Suunto’s relationship with its U.S. distributor, ASWO. 

The district court next considered whether exercising 

jurisdiction over Suunto comports with due process. The 

court relied on J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 

564 U.S. 873 (2011), and concluded that Suunto did not 

have sufficient contacts with Delaware to support specific 

jurisdiction. Polar, 2015 WL 2248439, at *5–6. The court 

found that Suunto sold its products through ASWO in the 

United States, and that the record only indicated that 

Suunto had a general intent to serve the U.S. market at 

large, without any particular focus on Delaware. Although ASWO’s dealings with Delaware retailers and 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 5

customers were foreseeable, the court reasoned, there was

not “something more” in Suunto’s activities directed 

toward Delaware beyond placing its products into the 

stream of commerce. Id. at *5. The court also noted that 

it was ASWO who maintained the “Dealer Locator” feature on Suunto’s website, that the website listed Delaware along with other states, and that the limited online 

orders were fulfilled by ASWO, not Suunto. Id. The court

thus reasoned that those facts did not show “special” 

attention to Delaware by Suunto. Id. The court therefore 

concluded that due process considerations prevented its 

exercise of jurisdiction over Suunto.

Accordingly, the district court dismissed the complaint against Suunto for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

ASWO and Firstbeat remained in the suit. Polar moved 

for entry of final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 54(b). The district court granted the motion 

and entered final judgment in favor of Suunto and against 

Polar. Polar timely appealed to this court. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

DISCUSSION

In a patent case, we review a district court’s determination of personal jurisdiction without deference, applying Federal Circuit law to jurisdictional issues that are 

“intimately involved with the substance of the patent 

laws.” Grober v. Mako Prods., Inc., 686 F.3d 1335, 1345 

(Fed. Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). We review any factual findings underlying the 

jurisdictional determination for clear error. Id.

In a case such as this, a plaintiff need only make a 

prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction where, as 

here, the parties conducted jurisdictional discovery, the 

jurisdictional facts are in dispute, and the district court 

determined personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary 

hearing. Celgard, LLC v. SK Innovation Co., 792 F.3d 

1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under that prima facie 

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6 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

standard, the court must resolve all factual disputes in 

the plaintiff’s favor. Id.

Determining whether personal jurisdiction over an 

out-of-state defendant is proper entails a two-part inquiry. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 340 F.3d 1344, 

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003). First, a district court analyzes and 

applies the long arm statute of the state in which it sits to 

determine whether personal jurisdiction is proper under 

the statute. Id. Second, the court determines whether 

exercising jurisdiction over the defendant in the forum 

state comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 

Constitution. Id. Here, because the district court’s dismissal of Suunto is premised on its determination that 

due process considerations prevented its exercise of 

jurisdiction, we consider the due process inquiry first. 

I. Due Process

Due process requires that the defendant have sufficient “minimum contacts” with the forum state, “such that 

the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Personal jurisdiction 

has two forms: specific and general. AFTG-TG, LLC v. 

Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 

2012). General jurisdiction is not at issue here. 

We apply a three-prong test to determine whether 

specific jurisdiction exists: “(1) whether the defendant 

purposefully directed activities at residents of the forum; 

(2) whether the claim arises out of or relates to those 

activities; and (3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Nuance Commc’ns, Inc. v. 

ABBYY Software House, 626 F.3d 1222, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 

2010) (citing Akro Corp. v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1545–46 

(Fed. Cir. 1995)). The first two prongs correspond to the 

“minimum contacts” prong of the International Shoe

analysis, and the third prong corresponds to the “fair play 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 7

and substantial justice” prong of the analysis. Elecs. for 

Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1350. The plaintiff bears the burden 

of establishing minimum contacts, and upon that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the 

exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable. Id. 

Polar asserts a stream-of-commerce theory of personal 

jurisdiction over Suunto, but the precise requirements of 

the stream-of-commerce theory remain unsettled. In 

Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 

Solano County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987), the Supreme Court 

was evenly divided over whether the mere awareness of a 

nonresident defendant that its products would foreseeably 

reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constitutes minimum contacts with the forum. Justice 

O’Connor, joined by three justices, opined that mere 

foreseeability or awareness is insufficient, and that there

must be some additional conduct of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state. Justice 

O’Connor wrote: 

The “substantial connection” between the defendant and the forum State necessary for a finding of 

minimum contacts must come about by an action 

of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 

forum State. The placement of a product into the 

stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of 

the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State. Additional conduct of the defendant 

may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the 

market in the forum State . . . . But a defendant’s 

awareness that the stream of commerce may or 

will sweep the product into the forum State does 

not convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed 

toward the forum State. 

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (citations omitted).

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8 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices, disagreed with the O’Connor plurality. To those justices, 

mere foreseeability or awareness of the defendant that its 

product would wind up in the forum state is sufficient. 

Justice Brennan explained:

As long as a participant in [the stream-ofcommerce] process is aware that the final product 

is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.

. . . A defendant who has placed goods in the 

stream of commerce benefits economically from 

the retail sale of the final product in the forum 

State, and indirectly benefits from the State’s 

laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue regardless of whether 

that participant directly conducts business in the 

forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward that State.

Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring 

in the judgment).

The Supreme Court revisited the stream-of-commerce 

issue in McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873 (2011), but the Court

again did not announce a majority opinion on this issue. 

Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality of four justices, 

emphasized that personal jurisdiction “depends on purposeful availment.” 564 U.S. at 885; id. at 880 (“As a 

general rule, the sovereign’s exercise of power requires 

some act by which the defendant ‘purposefully avails 

itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 

forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of 

its laws.’” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 

(1958)). He explained that the principal inquiry is 

“whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention 

to submit to the power of a sovereign,” that “[t]he defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said to have 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 9

targeted the forum,” and that “it is not enough that the 

defendant might have predicted that its goods will reach 

the forum State.” Id. at 882. Justice Kennedy further

opined that although the facts in McIntyre “may reveal an 

intent to serve the U.S. market, . . . they do not show that 

[the defendant] purposefully availed itself of the [forum 

state’s] market.” Id. at 886.

Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately and declined to join Justice Kennedy’s plurality 

opinion. He declined to “announce a rule of broad applicability” because McIntyre did not present issues of 

“modern-day consequences” not anticipated by the Court’s 

earlier precedents. Id. at 887 (Breyer, J., concurring in 

the judgment). Justice Breyer instead stated that “the 

outcome of this case is determined by our precedents,” id., 

and that he “would not go further,” id. at 890.

Because McIntyre did not produce a majority opinion, 

we have held that we must follow its narrowest holding, 

which is what “can be distilled from Justice Breyer’s 

concurrence—that the law remains the same after McIntyre.” AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 1363 (citing Marks v. United 

States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Thus, we must follow 

our existing precedent. In Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal 

Sovereign Corp., 21 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994), this 

court declined to decide which of Justice O’Connor’s and 

Justice Brennan’s tests should be adopted because the 

outcome of that appeal would be the same under either 

test. Subsequent panels have followed that approach, as

the resolution of the cases thus far has not required us to 

“take a side on the Asahi divide.” AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 

1364; see also Celgard, 792 F.3d at 1382; Commissariat a 

L’Energie Atomique v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., 395 

F.3d 1315, 1322 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Viam Corp. v. 

Iowa Export-Import Trading Co., 84 F.3d 424, 428 (Fed. 

Cir. 1996). Here, we likewise decline to decide which 

version of the stream-of-commerce theory should apply

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10 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

because, as indicated infra, the result would be the same

under all articulations of the stream-of-commerce test. 

Polar argues that the district court erred in concluding that Suunto did not have sufficient contacts with 

Delaware. According to Polar, (1) Suunto entered into a 

distribution agreement with ASWO to sell its products in 

the United States, including Delaware; (2) Suunto packaged and shipped at least ninety-four accused products to 

Delaware retailers; (3) Suunto owns a website, which 

makes the accused products available to Delaware consumers and lists retail stores in Delaware that carry 

those products; (4) there have been eight online sales of 

the accused products to Delaware consumers through 

Suunto’s website; and (5) Suunto has ongoing warranty 

and data privacy obligations to its Delaware customers. 

Polar contends that those activities, individually and 

collectively, establish that Suunto had the required minimum contacts with Delaware. 

Suunto responds that it did not purposefully direct its 

activities or products at Delaware, and that it merely 

placed its products into the stream of commerce from 

Finland. Suunto argues that Polar improperly attributes 

the acts of ASWO to Suunto without a showing of control, 

agency, or alter ego. Suunto maintains that it entered 

into an arms-length agreement with ASWO, pursuant to 

which ASWO purchases products from Suunto, takes title 

in Finland, and pays for and directs shipments to the 

United States. Suunto also maintains that it does not 

control marketing, distribution, or sales in the United 

States, and has not visited Delaware to market the accused products. Suunto also argues that online sales in 

Delaware are few and have been made exclusively by 

ASWO; that ASWO maintains the Dealer Locator feature

on Suunto’s website; and that ASWO is responsible for

repairing and replacing products under warranty in the 

United States. Suunto emphasizes that Polar failed to 

show that Suunto specifically directed sales to Delaware. 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 11

We agree with Polar that Suunto has sufficient contacts with Delaware to sustain specific jurisdiction. The 

record shows that Suunto’s actions satisfy the more 

stringent tests articulated by Justice O’Connor in Asahi

and by Justice Kennedy in McIntyre, as well as the more 

flexible test articulated by Justice Brennan. Specifically, 

Suunto purposefully shipped at least ninety-four accused 

products to Delaware retailers, fully expecting that its 

products would then be sold in Delaware as a result of its 

activities. It thus can be said that Suunto’s actions are 

purposefully directed to Delaware, indicating an intent 

and purpose to serve not only the U.S. market generally, 

but also the Delaware market specifically. 

The record shows that Suunto entered into a distribution agreement with ASWO, its sister company, to market 

and distribute Suunto products in the United States. 

Under that agreement, Suunto is obligated to supply its 

products from Finland and provide outbound logistic 

services, including “incoming order administration, preparing export documents, invoicing the order, picking and 

packing the ordered goods and coordinating the freight to 

the destination specified by” ASWO. Appellant’s Br. 28 

(citing J.A. 358). Suunto has shipped at least ninety-four 

accused products to Delaware retailers via that standard 

ordering process. Although ASWO provided the destination addresses, took title to the goods in Finland, and 

directed and paid for shipping, it was Suunto, not ASWO, 

who physically fulfilled the orders, packaged the products, 

and prepared the shipments in Finland. Suunto admits 

as much. Oral Argument at 14:28–16:32, Polar Electro Oy 

v. Amer Sports Winter & Outdoor, No. 15-1930 (Fed. Cir. 

May 2, 2016). Through its own conduct, Suunto purposefully availed itself of the Delaware market.

This is not a case where a small manufacturer sells its 

products to an independent distributor, who then distributes the products to consumers across the nation. 

Suunto did not simply place its products in the stream of 

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12 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

commerce, with the products fortuitously reaching Delaware as a result of the unilateral effort of ASWO. Rather, 

“acting in consort” with ASWO, Suunto deliberately and 

purposefully shipped the accused products to Delaware

retailers. Beverly Hills Fan, 21 F.3d at 1566. Suunto’s 

active participation in supplying and shipping the accused 

products to Delaware thus constitutes purposeful availment.

Moreover, it is undisputed that this patent infringement action arises out of and relates to Suunto’s purposeful shipping of the accused products to Delaware. Polar 

therefore has made a prima facie showing of minimum 

contacts under all articulations of the stream-of-commerce 

test. Because Suunto’s purposeful shipping adequately 

supports minimum contacts, we need not decide whether 

the other facts argued by Polar, namely, Suunto’s website, 

the eight online sales, and the warranty and data privacy 

obligations, constitute purposeful availment by Suunto. 

Upon a showing of purposeful minimum contacts, due 

process also requires a showing that “assertion of personal jurisdiction is reasonable and fair.” Nuance, 626 F.3d 

at 1231. Suunto bears the burden to prove unreasonableness. Elecs. for Imaging, 340 F.3d at 1350. In rare circumstances, a defendant may defeat the exercise of personal jurisdiction by “present[ing] a compelling case that 

the presence of some other considerations would render 

jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); see also Beverly Hills Fan, 

21 F.3d at 1568. Here, however, the district court did not 

decide the reasonableness prong because it dismissed the 

case against Suunto for lack of minimum contacts. On 

appeal, neither party briefed this issue. Rather than 

deciding this issue in the first instance, we remand for the 

district court to determine whether exercising jurisdiction 

over Suunto would be reasonable and fair.

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 13

Accordingly, because we conclude that Suunto has 

sufficient minimum contacts with Delaware, we vacate

the district court’s determination that it lacked personal 

jurisdiction over Suunto and remand for the district court 

to determine whether exercising jurisdiction over Suunto 

would be reasonable and fair. 

II. Delaware Long Arm Statute

We next consider whether the district court correctly 

determined that exercising jurisdiction over Suunto would 

be proper under the Delaware long arm statute, Del. Code 

Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(c), which provides, in relevant part: 

(c) As to a cause of action brought by any person 

arising from any of the acts enumerated in this 

section, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction 

over any nonresident, or a personal representative, who in person or through an agent: 

(1) Transacts any business or performs any 

character of work or service in the State; [or]

. . .

(4) Causes tortious injury in the State or outside of the State by an act or omission outside 

the State if the person regularly does or solicits 

business, engages in any other persistent 

course of conduct in the State or derives substantial revenue from services, or things used 

or consumed in the State . . . .

Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3104(c) (West 2016). 

The district court determined that personal jurisdiction exists over Suunto under a dual jurisdiction theory. 

The dual jurisdiction theory is based on at least partial 

satisfaction of § 3104(c)(1) and (c)(4). It was first articulated by the Delaware Superior Court in a stream-ofcommerce case in 1997. Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 

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14 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

1150 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997), aff’d, 707 A.2d 765 (Del. 

1998). 

Suunto argues that the district court erred in finding 

that the Delaware long arm statute was satisfied. According to Suunto, the dual jurisdiction theory is based on 

§ 3104(c)(4), which requires a showing of general jurisdiction. Suunto argues that Polar failed to establish general 

jurisdiction and thus cannot rely on the dual jurisdiction 

theory. Polar responds that the district court correctly

applied Delaware’s dual jurisdiction theory and correctly 

found that Suunto’s activities satisfy the long arm statute

under that theory. Polar also responds that the dual 

jurisdiction theory as articulated in Boone does not require a showing of general jurisdiction.

We agree with Polar that the district court correctly 

applied the dual jurisdiction theory in this case. It may 

seem counterintuitive that the dual jurisdiction theory 

does not demand the full satisfaction of any individual 

subsection of the Delaware long arm statute. But to date, 

no Delaware state court has rejected that theory. Indeed, 

the Delaware Supreme Court has had opportunities to 

reject the theory, but has declined to do so. See Graphics 

Props. Holdings, Inc. v. ASUS Comput. Int’l, 70 F. Supp. 

3d 654, 661 (D. Del. 2014) (collecting cases). The district 

courts in Delaware have applied the dual jurisdiction 

theory in several patent cases. See, e.g., Robert Bosch 

LLC v. Alberee Prods., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 3d 665, 672–76 

(D. Del. 2014); Graphics Props., 70 F. Supp. 3d at 659–62; 

Intellectual Ventures I LLC, v. Ricoh Co., 67 F. Supp. 3d 

656, 660–61 (D. Del. 2014); Belden Techs., Inc. v. LS 

Corp., 829 F. Supp. 2d 260, 267–68 (D. Del. 2010); Power

Integrations, 547 F. Supp. 2d at 370–74. But see Round 

Rock Research LLC v. ASUSTeK Comput. Inc., 967 F. 

Supp. 2d 969, 975–78 (D. Del. 2013). Although the Boone

decision is not binding on this court or the district court, 

we conclude that the district court did not err in applying 

the dual jurisdiction theory in this case. 

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POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY 15

We also agree with Polar that the dual jurisdiction 

theory as articulated in Boone does not require a showing 

of general jurisdiction. The Boone court opined that a 

stream-of-commerce case often “does not fit neatly into 

any section of § 3104,” 724 A.2d at 1157, that § 3104(c)(4) 

“has been deemed a general jurisdiction provision,” id. at 

1155, and that the stream-of-commerce theory “rests on a 

specific rather than general jurisdiction rationale,” id. at 

1156. The reasoning of the Boone court indicates that the 

dual jurisdiction theory does not require a showing of 

general jurisdiction or the full satisfaction of § 3104(c)(4). 

Rather, under Boone, a plaintiff must show that (1) “there 

is an intent or purpose on the part of the [defendant] to 

serve the Delaware market,” and (2) that “intent or purpose . . . results in the introduction of the product to 

[Delaware] and plaintiff’s cause of action arises from 

injuries caused by that product.” Id. at 1158.

Here, Suunto’s activities demonstrated its intent to 

serve the Delaware market. As indicated supra, the 

record here demonstrates an intent to serve not only the 

U.S. national market generally, but also the Delaware 

market specifically. Moreover, it is undisputed that the 

accused products have been sold in Delaware as a result

of Suunto’s intent to serve the Delaware market. Accordingly, the district court correctly determined that personal 

jurisdiction over Suunto is proper under the Delaware 

long arm statute.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Suunto’s remaining arguments 

but find them to be unpersuasive. For the foregoing 

reasons, we vacate the district court’s determination that 

it lacked personal jurisdiction over Suunto and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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16 POLAR ELECTRO OY v. SUUNTO OY

COSTS

Costs to Polar.

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