Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-03-04224/USCOURTS-ca10-03-04224-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick Bush
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

APR 26 2005 

PATRICK FISHER 

Clerk 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plain ti ff-Appellee, 

V. No. 03-4224 

PATRICK BUSH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of Utah 

(D.C. No. 2:01-CR-739-01-TS) 

Ronald J. Yengich (Peter D. Goodall with him on the briefs) of Yengich, Rich & 

Xaiz, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant. 

Diana Hagen, Assistant United States Attorney (Paul M. Warner, United States 

Attorney), District of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Before SEYMOUR, BRISCOE and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 

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A jury convicted Patrick Bush on five counts of distribution of cocaine or 

cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. The district court 

sentenced him to 188 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised 

release. On appeal, Mr. Bush contends ( 1) the district court erred by admitting 

the lay opinion testimony of Detective Dale Bench identifying Mr. Bush's voice; 

(2) the evidence supporting identification of Mr. Bush on three counts was 

insufficient; (3) the court improperly considered an uncounseled conviction in 

calculating his sentence; and ( 4) the court violated the Sixth Amendment by 

basing his sentence on drug quantity amounts that were not found by the jury. We 

affirm. 

I. 

From October 2000 until February 2001, Detective Dale Bench participated 

in an undercover narcotics investigation in Salt Lake City, Utah. Posing as drug 

dealer Jason Black, Detective Bench conducted various drug transactions, 

including several purchases arranged via telephone conversations with a man 

named "J.R." Some, but not all, of the conversations were recorded. During the 

course of the operation, Detective Bench also purchased drugs directly from the 

defendant, Mr. Bush. At trial, Detective Bench testified and identified the voice 

of J .R. as belonging to Mr. Bush. Mr. Bush contests the identification, alleging 

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he merely participated in the drug transactions as J.R. 's "runner." 

Detective Bench's identification of J .R. as Mr. Bush was based on the 

following events. On October 5, 2000, Detective Bench placed a call to a pager 

in an attempt to contact Tommy Carter, a drug dealer who went by the nickname 

"T.C." The detective had purchased cocaine from T.C. earlier that day and had 

inadvertently underpaid him by fifty dollars. A man identified as J.R. returned 

the detective's page, and stated that because he was T.C. 's supplier, the fifty 

doIIars was owed to him. J .R. informed Detective Bench that he remembered 

him, describing the truck the undercover officer drove when he conducted the 

drug transaction with T.C. earlier that day. 

On October 11, Detective Bench contacted J.R., offering to pay him the 

fifty dollars he owed. J .R. asked Detective Bench if he would like to purchase 

any drugs but the detective declined the offer. Later that day, the detective again 

paged J.R. and asked to meet to talk about business. J.R. suggested meeting at a 

bar but the pair did not make further plans at that time. 

On October 26, Detective Bench paged J .R. but received a return caII from 

a person whose voice he did not recognize. The caller asked, "Somebody page 

Pat?" Detective Bench replied, "I'm trying to get ahold of J.R." The caIIer gave 

the phone to J.R., who agreed to sell the detective an ounce of crack cocaine for 

$800. The detective and J.R. arranged to meet at a bar to complete the 

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transaction. 

Detective Bench paged J.R. again that evening when he arrived at the bar 

according to plan. J .R. returned the call to report he would take a little longer 

than expected. An hour later, J.R. phoned Detective Bench, asserting he was 

outside the bar and wanted to meet by the detective's truck. When Detective 

Bench walked out to his vehicle, he noticed the man he later identified as Mr. 

Bush. Mr. Bush was standing by a white Ford Escort the detective recognized 

from the October 5 drug purchase. As Detective Bench walked by, Mr. Bush said 

"hi" and then entered the bar. Mr. Bush stayed in the bar very briefly and upon 

exiting instructed Detective Bench to follow him in his truck. 

The detective followed Mr. Bush, who drove the Escort, and his passenger, 

Oscar Castaneda, until they pulled over to a curb. Mr. Bush and Mr. Castaneda 

then exited the Escort. Mr. Castaneda climbed into Detective Bench's truck and 

sold him 21.9 grams of crack cocaine, while Mr. Bush stood between the two 

vehicles acting as a lookout. During the transaction, Detective Bench asked Mr. 

Castaneda where J.R. was. The government concedes that, at the time, the officer 

was unaware J.R was a pseudonym for Mr. Bush. 

On November 16, Detective Bench paged J.R. to order two ounces of crack 

cocaine. J.R. informed the detective he would need an hour to "cook it up," i.e., 

convert it from powder to crack cocaine, and then he would send one of his 

runners to a bar to complete the transaction. Almost two hours later, Mr. 

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Castaneda called Detective Bench, who was at the bar, and told him to meet 

outside by the detective's truck. Detective Bench met Mr. Castaneda outside as 

instructed and both men got into the truck. After receiving the bag of crack from 

Mr. Castaneda, Detective Bench weighed the drugs and discovered the order was 

short by eight grams. Mr. Castaneda called J.R. about the problem on Detective 

Bench's cell phone and J.R. explained to the detective that the cocaine had lost 

weight during the conversion process. After J.R. promised to provide Detective 

Bench the missing eight grams on a later date, Detective Bench paid Mr. 

Castaneda $1600. 

The following day, Detective Bench paged J.R. and requested the 

outstanding eight grams of crack cocaine. J .R. stated it would take time to make 

the drug, he wanted to wait until dark to do business, and he did not have anyone 

available to meet the detective at the time. A few days later, Detective Bench 

contacted J.R., who assured the undercover officer he had not forgotten about the 

eight grams. Although the detective instructed J .R. he would phone him the next 

day, the two did not speak again for nearly two months. The detective next 

contacted J.R. on January 11, 2001, and spoke to him about the outstanding eight 

grams of crack cocaine as well as his prospects of purchasing another ounce. 

Several phone conversations took place but a deal was never made. 

On January 24, Detective Bench phoned J .R. to order an ounce of crack 

cocame. J.R. told the detective he would meet him at a mall. When Detective 

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Bench arrived at the mall, J.R. called to say he was still preparing the drugs. 

Shortly thereafter, J.R. called the detective to determine where he was parked. 

Detec1tive Bench informed J .R. where he was located, and Mr. Bush showed up 

outside the detective's vehicle. Mr. Bush climbed into Detective Bench's truck 

and asked him to move the vehicle to another area of the mall. After the detective 

satisfied that request, Mr. Bush handed him 25. 7 grams of powder cocaine and 

said he had not had enough time to convert the drug to crack. When questioned 

by Detective Bench about this discrepancy, Mr. Bush reminded the detective of an 

earlier conversation they had had in which he told the detective that due to time 

constraints he would have to do the conversion himself. The detective paid Mr. 

Bush $800 and asked again about the outstanding eight grams of crack cocaine. 

Mr. Bush confirmed he would deliver the crack but said it would take some time. 

On January 29, J.R. called Detective Bench and offered to sell him powder 

or crack cocaine at $650 per ounce if he was willing to purchase two or more 

ounces. On February 1, Detective Bench phoned J.R. and agreed to buy three 

ounces of crack cocaine. Later the same day, Mr. Castaneda called the detective 

to arrange a meeting at a grocery store. Detective Bench testified that, during that 

particular conversation, he could hear J .R. in the background instructing Mr. 

Castaneda. 

J.R. phoned Detective Bench while the officer was en route to the purchase 

location and stated that because the crack cocaine had lost weight during 

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conversion, he would sell it for $600 per ounce. Detective Bench paged J.R. 

when he arrived at the grocery store, and J.R. told him that he was sending 

someone else to make the sale. Detective Bench observed Mr. Castaneda arrive 

and conduct what appeared to be another drug transaction in the parking lot. 

After completing that transaction, Mr. Castaneda entered the detective's truck and 

handed Detective Bench 50.2 grams of crack cocaine. Detective Bench weighed 

the drugs and told Mr. Castaneda he was an ounce short. Mr. Castaneda insisted 

Detective Bench speak to J.R. on a cell phone and the sale was subsequently 

completed for$ I 300. 

Shortly after the transaction, someone called Detective Bench and asked, 

"Who's this?" Detective Bench replied, "Who's this?" to which the caller 

responded, "Pat." Detective Bench recognized the voice as J .R.' s. J .R. 

proceeded to complain that he had lost money on the deal that day and should 

have charged $750 per ounce. Detective Bench called back a few minutes later to 

complain that he had lost money as well, referring to the outstanding eight grams 

of crack cocaine. J.R. suggested that they call it even. The detective and J.R. 

contacted each other on four more occasions, including a final conversation which 

took place on February 15, 200 I, but they never made another deal. 

Mr. Bush was arrested on December 12, 200 I. When Mr. Bush recognized 

Detective Bench at the scene of the arrest, he referred to him by his undercover 

name - Jason - and said, "I can't believe you are arresting me for something I did 

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in the past." Special Agent Jeanine DiGuiseppi was present during the arrest and 

overheard Mr. Bush's commentary. 

As a result of the various drug transactions, Mr. Bush was indicted on five 

counts of distribution of cocaine or cocaine base ( crack cocaine), and aiding and 

abetting the same, all in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Three of 

the counts on the superseding indictment named threshold drug quantities, with 

Count V charging the most: distribution of 50 grams or more of a mixture 

containing cocaine base. At trial, the parties stipulated that Mr. Castaneda, who 

did not testify, told a defense investigator that J.R. was not Mr. Bush. Mr. 

Castaneda would not disclose J.R. 's true identity. Mr. Bush was convicted on all 

five counts. 

After adding one point for a prior uncontested misdemeanor conviction, the 

district court determined that Mr. Bush's criminal history category was III. Based 

on a total offense level of 34 and this criminal history category, Mr. Bush's 

guidelines range was 188 to 235 months. The district court sentenced Mr. Bush at 

the bottom of that range to 188 months imprisonment followed by 60 months of 

supervised release. 

II. 

Mr. Bush contends the district court improperly admitted, under Federal 

Rules of Evidence 602, 701, and 901, Detective Bench's testimony that the voice 

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of J.R. belonged to Mr. Bush. In particular, Mr. Bush claims that (1) Detective 

Bench's testimony was inadmissible lay opinion, and (2) could not be used to lay 

a foundation for the admission of the recorded telephone conversations between 

the detective and J.R. The government maintains Detective Bench had sufficient 

personal contact with Mr. Bush to make a voice identification and that any 

challenge regarding the detective's personal knowledge of Mr. Bush's voice 

should go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. It also 

argues the court properly admitted the detective's testimony to establish a 

foundation for the admission of the recorded conversations between Detective 

Bench and J .R. 

We review a district court's determinations regarding admission of 

evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 559 

(10th Cir. 2002). "We will not disturb an evidentiary ruling absent a distinct 

showing that it was based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous 

conclusion of law or manifests a clear error in judgment." Id. ( citations omitted). 

We first address Mr. Bush's claim that Detective Bench's testimony was 

inadmissible lay testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. Pursuant to Rule 

701, a witness who is not an expert may offer opinion testimony only when it is 

(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a clear. 

understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in 

issue, and ( c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 

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FED. R. Evrn. 701. Thus, Rule 701 permits the admission of lay opinion 

testimony provided that it meets two criteria: a rational basis in perception and 

helpfulness. 1 

"The perception requirement stems from F.R.E. 602 which requires a lay 

witness to have first-hand knowledge of the events he is testifying about so as to 

present only the most accurate information to the finder of fact." United States v. 

Hoffner, 777 F.2d 1423, 1425 (10th Cir. 1985). 2 When addressing the 

admissibility of lay identification testimony, courts have been liberal in 

determining the extent of perception required to satisfy the first requirement of 

Rule 701. Courts have likewise preferred to leave to juries any assessment of the 

weight to be given to such testimony when there exist questions regarding the 

quantity or quality of perception. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 688 F .2d 

1121, 1125 (7th Cir. 1982) (witness permitted to offer lay opinion identifying 

defendant although only met defendant once); see also United States v. 

1

No argument has been raised that Detective Bench's testimony regarding 

his identification of Mr. Bush's voice falls within the scope of Rule 702. 

2

Mr. Bush raises a Rule 602 concern due to the alleged lack of personal 

knowledge on the part of Detective Bench regarding Mr. Bush's voice. Since 

Rule 701 includes within it the standard for Rule 602, our Rule 701 analysis 

resolves Mr. Bush's 602 argument to his detriment. See 29 CHARLES ALAN 

WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE 

§ 6254 ( 1997) (hereinafter WRIGHT & GOLD) ("The requirement that lay opinion 

be based on the perception of the witness imports into Rule 701 the personal 

knowledge standard of Rule 602. "). 

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Henderson, 68 F.3d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Instead of any particular amount 

of sustained contact, we require a lay witness to have sufficient contact with the 

defendant to achieve a level of familiarity that renders the lay opinion helpful."). 

Moreover, the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 701 state that inadequacies of 

the admitted testimony can be highlighted through the adversarial process: 

The rule assumes that the natural characteristics of the adversary system 

will generally lead to an acceptable result, since the detailed account carries 

more conviction than the broad assertion, and a lawyer can be expected to 

display his witness to the best advantage. If he fails to do so, crossexamination and argument will point up the weakness. 

FED. R. Evrn. 701, Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules. 

Detective Bench spoke with Mr. Bush three times in person - when he met 

Mr. Bush at the bar on October 26, when Mr. Bush personally sold the detective 

cocaine in the mall parking lot on January 24, and when Mr. Bush was arrested on 

December 12. While two of those conversations involved rather abbreviated 

opportunities for Detective Bench to hear Mr. Bush's voice, the drug sale on 

January 24 included a longer and more substantial conversation. In fact, 

Detective Bench conversed with Mr. Bush both on the phone and in person on 

January 24. By that date, the detective was quite familiar with J .R. 's voice, 

having spoken with him numerous times over the phone. Indeed, when defense 

counsel raised the voice identification objection at trial, Detective Bench testified 

he "had several face-to-face and probably ten or 12, approximately, telephone 

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calls or more" with defendant. 3 Aple. Supp. App. at 33. He also testified that he 

was able to recognize Mr. Bush's voice. 

On the basis of the detective's three face-to-face conversations with Mr. 

Bush, the numerous phone exchanges with J.R., and testimony that he could 

recognize Mr. Bush's voice, the district court permitted admission of Detective 

Bench's testimony over the defense's objection. We find no fault with the court's 

determination that the threshold perception needed to permit the admission of the 

lay opinion testimony was satisfied. The jury had the opportunity to consider any 

cross examination testimony and adverse evidence put forth by defense counsel, 

such as the stipulation that Mr. Castaneda said J.R. was not Mr. Bush. And Mr. 

Bush was entitled to argue to the jury that the detective had inadequate contact 

with him and therefore was simply wrong in his identification, or that other 

3

Mr. Bush specifically objected that although Detective Bench may have 

had over ten substantive telephone conversations with J .R., the detective had 

insufficient contact with Mr. Bush in person to identify him as J.R. Detective 

Bench met Mr. Bush for the first time on October 26, 2000, during a drug 

purchase where Detective Bench testified that Mr. Bush said "hi" to him, "told me 

to follow him," and "kept telling us to hurry up." Aple. Supp. App. at 60, 62. 

Although the drug sale itself was recorded, these brief interactions apparently 

were not and the jury therefore did not hear these exchanges. On January 24, 

2001, Detective Bench met Mr. Bush a second time in person. The detective and 

Mr. Bush had a conversation of about 16 sentences, some of them consisting of 

only one word. This conversation was recorded and played for the jury. Finally, 

Detective Bench testified he heard Mr. Bush speak on December 12, 2001, at the 

time of his arrest, when he called Detective Bench by his undercover name -

Jason - and said, "I can't believe you are arresting me for something I did in the 

past." Id. at 148. No recording of this conversation was presented to the jury and 

Mr. Bush did not testify at trial. 

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evidence undermined the credibility of the detective's identification testimony. 

Second, and in connection with Rule 701 's helpfulness prong, we do not 

agree with Mr. Bush that the jury was in as good a position as Detective Bench to 

identify whether Mr. Bush and J.R. were the same person. In this regard, and 

despite his Rule 901 challenge to the entry of the audio tapes, see our discussion 

infra, Mr. Bush contends that because the jury heard audio recordings of both 

individuals' voices, Detective Bench's testimony was not helpful to the jury as 

required by Rule 70 I (b ). We disagree. As detailed above, Detective Bench spoke 

with Mr. Bush in person on three occasions and had the direct opportunity to 

become familiar with his voice and to compare it to the voice of J.R. The jury 

was never able to hear Mr. Bush's voice in person because he exercised his right 

not to testify. Moreover, the jury was only able to hear audio recordings of one of 

the three face-to-face conversations between Mr. Bush and Detective Bench and 

to listen to some of the telephone calls between the detective and J.R., because 

not all of the calls between the two men were recorded. 

In arguing that opinion testimony should not be permitted where the jury is 

in as good a position to make the identification as the lay witness, Mr. Bush relies 

on United States v. LaPierre, 998 F.2d 1460 (9th Cir. 1993). LaPierre is 

distinguishable from the instant case, if not inapposite. In LaPierre, a police 

officer investigating bank robberies allegedly committed by the defendant 

identified him in bank surveillance photographs. Id. at 1465. The Ninth Circuit 

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held that because the jury could view the photographs and identify the perpetrator, 

the officer's testimony "ran the risk of invading the province of the jury and 

unfairly prejudicing" the defendant. Id. Based in part on this reasoning, the court 

discouraged the use of lay opinion identification testimony. Id. We are not 

convinced that LaPierre applies here or furthers Mr. Bush's argument in any 

manner. 

In LaPierre, the testifying officer, like the jury members, had never seen 

the defendant in person before the trial. Id. In essence then, the officer's 

identification of the defendant was no different from what the jury members 

themselves were required to do in comparing the-surveillance photographs to the 

defendant in the courtroom. As a result, the court concluded the officer's overall 

level of familiarity with the defendant's appearance fell short of the standard of 

helpfulness required by Rule 701. Id. By contrast, Detective Bench conducted 

face-to-face conversations with Mr. Bush on at least three occasions and engaged 

in several phone conversations with J.R. The jury was denied an opportunity to 

engage in any comparison of Mr. Bush's voice to that of J.R. because Mr. Bush 

exercised his right not to testify at trial and only limited recordings were available 

from the phone conversations. Detective Bench's testimony was therefore helpful 

because it assisted the jury in determining a fact issue that was otherwise 

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hampered by Mr. Bush's constitutionally protected silence at trial. 4 The district 

court's ruling regarding the admissibility of Detective Bench's lay opinion 

testimony was not an abuse of discretion. 

Mr. Bush also argues that Rule 901, which requires authentication or 

identification to establish a foundation for evidence as a precursor to admitting 

audio recordings, was not satisfied when the district court admitted audio 

recordings of Detective Bench's conversations with J.R. Rule 901 expressly 

permits the use of lay opinion testimony to form a foundation for a voice 

identification of a defendant: 

(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification 

as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient 

to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 

(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, 

the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming 

with the requirements of this rule: ... 

(5) Voice identification. Identification of a voice, whether heard 

firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or 

recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under 

circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker. 

4

Commentators have also noted that the LaPierre court's cautiousness 

about invading the jury's role is not in accord with the modern understanding of 

lay opinion testimony. 29 WRIGHT & GOLD§ 6252 (also critiquing United States 

v. Brmvn, 540 F .2d 1048, 1054 (10th Cir. 1976), where we said "the test of 

admissibility is often predicated upon the proposition that opinion evidence 

cannot usurp the functions of the jury"); see also FED. R. Evrn. 701 Advisory 

Committee Note ("necessity as a standard for permitting opinions and conclusions 

has proved too elusive and too unadaptable to particular situations for purposes of 

satisfactory judicial administration"). 

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FED. R. Evrn. 901 (emphasis added). 5 Similar to Rule 701 's perception 

requirement, voice identification testimony is permissible under Rule 901 where 

there exists "any basis for identifying the voice," "[leaving] all questions of 

weight and credibility for the jury." United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 

1335 (10th Cir. 1979). 

Such voice identification need only rise to the level of minimal familiarity. 

See, e.g., United States v. Axselle, 604 F .2d 1330, 1338 (10th Cir. 1979) ( drug 

enforcement agent's identification of defendant's recorded voice was sufficient 

where agent heard his voice once during phone call and then identified the voice 

as that of the defendant after hearing him speak at a court hearing thirty days 

later); see also United States v. Plunk, 153 F .3d 1011, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1998) 

(Rule 901 (b )( 5) sets "low threshold" for voice identifications and only requires 

that witness be "minimally familiar" with voice to identify it), overruled on other 

grounds by United States v. Hankey, 203 F.3d 1160, 1169 n.7 (9th Cir. 2000); 

5 Mr. Bush further argues the government should have been required to 

identify J .R. through the provisions in Rule 901 (b )( 6): 

Telephone conversations. Telephone conversations, by evidence that a 

call was made to the number assigned at the time by the telephone company 

to a particular person or business, if (A) in the case of a person, 

circumstances, including self-identification, show the person answering to 

be the one called .... 

The examples set forth in Rule 901 (b) are merely meant to be illustrative, and the 

district court is not bound to follow one measure over another. We have 

previously upheld identifications based on telephone calls under the principles set 

forth in Rule 90l(b)(5). See United States v. Axselle, 604 F.2d 1330, 1338 (10th 

Cir. 1979). 

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United States v. Cerone, 830 F.2d 938, 949 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Any person may 

identify a speaker's voice if he has heard the voice at any time .... Minimal 

familiarity is sufficient for admissibility purposes."). Once minimal familiarity is 

satisfied, it is for the jury to assess any issues regarding the extent of the witness' 

familiarity with the voice. Detective Bench's testimony that he recognized Mr. 

Bush's voice as J.R.'s based on three face-to-face conversations and various 

exchanges via telephone is more than adequate to authenticate Mr. Bush's voice 

as that of J.R. for purposes of admissibility in conformance with Rule 901. All 

the rule requires is that the identifier, Detective Bench, have heard the voice of 

the alleged speaker, Mr. Bush, "at any time." FED. R. Evrn. 901(b)(5). This 

standard has easily been met. 

In conclusion, our review of the record convinces us that Detective Bench's 

testimony was admissible under Rule 70 I, and also met the minimal threshold of 

familiarity under 90 I to permit admission of the audiotapes. As a result, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Detective Bench's opinion 

testimony either for identification evidence or to lay a foundation for the 

admission of the voice recordings. 

III. 

Mr. Bush next argues there was insufficient evidence to support his 

convictions on Counts I, III, and V. We review challenges to the sufficiency of 

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the evidence de nova. United States v. Lu:::cano-Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 842-43 

(10th Cir. 1999). "[W]e ask only whether taking the evidence-both direct and 

circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom-in 

the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. McKissick, 204 

F .3d 1282, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000) ( quotation and citation omitted). The jury, as 

fact finder, has discretion to resolve all conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence, 

and draw inferences from the basic facts. United States v. Nieto, 60 F.3d 1464, 

1469(10thCir.1995). 

Mr. Bush claims that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the government, no jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he and J.R. 

are the same person. We are not persuaded. The voice identification testimony 

coupled with strong circumstantial evidence supporting those identifications was 

sufficiient for a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Bush was J.R. 

The government presented testimony from two witnesses who identified 

Mr. Bush as J.R. In addition to the testimony of Detective Bench, case agent 

Jeanine DiGuiseppi, who heard Mr. Bush speak in person at his arrest on 

December 12, identified Mr. Bush as J.R. after listening to audio recordings of 

the conversations between the Detective Bench and J.R. As discussed above, the 

credibility of the detective and case agent and the weight afforded their testimony 

was an issue for the jury. Watson, 594 F.2d at 1335. 

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The government also presented strong circumstantial identity evidence 

supporting the jury's conclusion that Mr. Bush was J.R. Detective Bench arrived 

at the mall parking lot for the January 24 drug transaction and received a call 

from J.R., who stated he was at the mall and wanted to locate the detective's 

vehicle. After Detective Bench reported where he was parked, Mr. Bush arrived 

and climbed in the detective's truck, suggesting that Mr. Bush was the individual 

who had been speaking to the detective on the phone. 

The content of the conversation between Mr. Bush and Detective Bench 

during the drug sale on that day further suggests Mr. Bush is J.R. Detective 

Bench remarked that the drugs resembled powder cocaine rather than the crack 

cocaine the detective had requested. In response, Mr. Bush said, "That's what it 

is man, remember I told you you gotta cook it 'cause I ain't had time. You told 

me to hurry up." Aple. Supp. App. at 147. The only individual Detective Bench 

had spoken to concerning the drug transaction was J .R. Similarly, Detective 

Bench and J .R. had conversed via phone several times concerning the eight grams 

of crack J.R. owed the detective from an earlier sale. During the January 24 drug 

sale, Detective Bench and Mr. Bush directly spoke about the eight grams: 

Bench: You getting me a, a quarter? 

[J.R.]: Naw, man ... . 

Bench: You forgot? .. . 

[J.R.]: J, I'll get it to you, it'll just take a little bit. 

Bench: I know you 're good for it man. 

Aplt. App. at 14 7. The content of this conversation provided support for the jury 

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to find that Mr. Bush was the person calling himself J.R. who had been arranging 

drug deals with Detective Bench. Moreover, on February 1, 2001, J.R. called 

Detec1tive Bench to complain that he had lost money on the January 24 drug deal. 

When the detective answered the call, J .R. said "Who's this?" to which Detective 

Bench responded, "Who's this?" J.R. replied, "Pat." Aplt. Supp. App. at 135. 

This conversation, in which J.R. identified himself as Pat, i.e. Mr. Bush, provides 

further support that Mr. Bush and J.R. are the same person. 

The government points to other conversations providing circumstantial 

evidence of identity. On October 26, 2000, Detective Bench paged J.R. and the 

person who returned the call asked, "Somebody page Pat?" Aplt. App. at 131. 6 

After Detective Bench answered that he had paged J.R., J.R. got on the telephone. 

Mr. Bush claims this evidence demonstrates Mr. Bush answered the phone, and 

then handed the phone to a different person - specifically, J.R. Conversely, the 

government argues that the person who returned the call was not Mr. Bush 

because the individual asked "Somebody page Pat?" rather than "Somebody page 

me?" In other words, the third-party reference to "Pat" suggests that the person 

who returned the call was not Mr. Bush. 

Also on October 26, J.R. told Detective Bench he would meet him at a bar. 

After Detective Bench arrived at the bar, J.R. called and told him to go out to the 

6

Detective Bench testified that he did not recognize this person's voice and 

it was not J.R. 

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parking lot and they would meet there. When the detective went outside, Mr. 

Bush was standing there, waiting. This evidence supports the argument that J.R. 

is simply a pseudonym for Mr. Bush. 

Reasonable inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence, viewed in a 

light most favorable to the government, corroborate Detective Bench's and Agent 

DiGuiseppi's lay opinion testimony regarding the identity of J.R. Given the 

strength of the direct and circumstantial identity evidence, we easily conclude a 

reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bush was J.R and 

thereby guilty on Counts I, III, and V. 

IV. 

Mr. Bush also contends the district court committed error at sentencing by 

assessing one criminal history point for a prior uncounseled misdemeanor 

conviction. He maintains that he was unaware of his right to counsel when he 

pied guilty to the misdemeanor and that the government failed to prove he waived 

his Sixth Amendment right. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(c), this prior 

conviction resulted in an increase of Mr. Bush's criminal history category from II 

to I II and an increase in his sentencing range from 168 to 210 months to 188 to 

235 months imprisonment. The government neither disputes that Mr. Bush had 

the right to counsel in the prior case, nor that he was unrepresented. It argues 

instead that the burden was on Mr. Bush to show his right to counsel was not 

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waived, and that Mr. Bush failed to satisfy that burden. Thus, in order to resolve 

this controversy, we must determine who possessed the burden to prove or 

disprove waiver. 

On appeal, we normally review a district court's interpretation and 

application of the sentencing guidelines de nova, and its factual findings for clear 

error. United States v. Cruz-Alcala, 338 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 2003). 

Because Mr. Bush did not raise this objection below, however, we review for 

plain error. In order to satisfy the plain error test, Mr. Bush must establish there 

is error, that is plain, and affects substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 535 

U.S. 625, 631 (2002). If these conditions are met, we may then exercise our 

discretion to notice the forfeited error if "the error seriously affect[ s] the fairness, 

integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Id. at 631-32 (internal 

quotations omitted). 

Mr. Bush had a right to counsel for the prior misdemeanor conviction, for 

which he received a suspended term of imprisonment. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 

407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 657-58 

(2002). But the right to counsel can be waived. Cruz-Alcala, 338 F.3d at 1197. 

We have clearly held that once the government establishes the existence of a prior 

conviction, it becomes the defendant's burden to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the conviction was unconstitutional. Id.; United States v. Windle, 

74 F.3d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996). This is so because a "presumption of 

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regularity" attaches to final judgments even when questions of waivers of 

constitutional rights are raised. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992). In CruzAlcala, we concluded that "[t]o overcome this presumption, a defendant may not 

simply point to a silent or ambiguous record, but must come forward with 

affirmative evidence establishing that the prior convictions were obtained in 

violation of the Constitution." 338 F.3d at 1197; see also United States v Wicks, 

995 F.2d 964, 977-78 (10th Cir. 1993). 7 

Mr. Bush has not met his burden to overcome the presumption of regularity. 

Records of his prior conviction were apparently destroyed. Although in a 

footnote in his brief he "denies that he waived counsel in the prior state 

proceedings and declares that he was not made aware that he had a right to 

counsel," aplt. hr. at 3 8 n. 7, he did not submit an affidavit to that effect. See 

7

1n his attempt to argue otherwise, Mr. Bush relies on Strachan v. Army 

Clemency & Parole Bd., 151 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 1998). There, we held a 

"defendant enjoys a presumption that he was denied his right to counsel, and that 

his conviction is therefore void" where the record of conviction fails to show 

representation by counsel or proper waiver of that right. Id. at 1311 ( citing 

Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967)). As we noted in United States v. 

Cruz-Alcala, 338 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2003), however, Strachan failed to 

follow earlier circuit precedent on this point and the earlier precedent governs. 

Moreover, in Parke v. Raley, the Supreme Court limited its decision in Burgett by 

noting that at the time of the previous conviction at issue in Burgett, a state 

criminal defendant's federal right to counsel had not yet been established. 506 

U.S. 20, 31 (1992) (citing Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-15). While it was therefore 

previously reasonable to presume from a silent record that there had been no 

waiver of counsel, the Court observed that it was no longer reasonable to so 

presume. Id. 

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Wicks, 995 F.2d at 978 ("At a minimum, ... a defendant pointing to a silent or 

missing record of a prior plea proceeding must begin by also submitting an 

affidavit or its equivalent asserting that the defendant's plea was in fact not 

voluntary or was lacking the necessary understanding, and specifying in detail the 

factuall support for such assertion."). Whether Mr. Bush waived counsel was a 

factuali matter he was required to establish at sentencing. When a factual issue is 

not raised below, there is no record on which to base our review. See United 

States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991), overruled on other 

grounds by Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993). For this reason, we hold 

generally that "questions of fact capable of resolution by the district court upon 

proper objection at sentencing can never constitute plain error." Id. at 1518 

(quoting United States v. Lopez, 923 F.2d 47, 50 (5th Cir. 1991)). 

In sum, there was no error here, much less plain error. The district court 

correctly assessed Mr. Bush's criminal history points. 

V. 

Finally, Mr. Bush maintains the district court violated his Sixth Amendment 

right to a jury trial by imposing a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by 

jury findings alone. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005); 

Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2536 (2004). Specifically, he claims the 

court unconstitutionally increased his sentence when it found, by a preponderance 

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of the evidence, that his offenses involved at least 1000 kilograms but less than 

3000 kilograms of marijuana equivalent, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 ( c )( 4 ). 

In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied the rule it expressed in Apprendi v. 

New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to Washington state's determinate sentencing 

regime. See Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536. Subsequent to briefing in the instant 

appeal, the Court extended Apprendi and Blakely to the Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines, holding that the Sixth Amendment requires "[a]ny fact ( other than a 

prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the 

maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict 

must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 

doubt." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. To remedy the Sixth Amendment violation 

inherent in the guidelines, the Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(l), 

which required sentencing courts to impose a sentence within the applicable 

guidelines range, subject to departures in limited cases. Id. at 764-65. As a 

result, the guidelines are now advisory in all cases. Id. at 757. 

The Court expressly stated that its "interpretation of the Sentencing Act" 

must be applied "to all cases on direct review." Id. at 769. Thus, we evaluate 

Mr. Bush's sentence in light of the Court's holding in Booker. Because Mr. Bush 

did not raise his Sixth Amendment argument in the district court, however, we 

review for plain error. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b ); see also United States v. Dazey, 

No. 03-6187, 2005 WL 846227, at *19 (10th Cir. Apr. 13, 2005). 

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Although Mr. Bush's indictment did not charge a total amount of drugs, 

three out of five counts did allege threshold levels of drug quantity. Counts II 

and III each alleged that five grams or more of cocaine base were involved in 

those offenses, while count V alleged that fifty grams or more of cocaine base 

were involved in that offense. As a result, the jury necessarily had to find that 

Mr. Bush's offenses involved a total amount of 60 grams of cocaine base when it 

convicted him. The marijuana equivalent of 60 grams of cocaine base is 1200 

kilograms, resulting in a base offense level of 32. See U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c)(4) 

(base offense level for distribution of a controlled substance is determined by the 

type and quantity of the substance; level is 32 if offense involved at least 1000 

but less than 3000 kilograms of marijuana). The presentence report determined 

based on relevant conduct that Mr. Bush distributed the equivalent of 213 7 .30 

kilograms of marijuana, resulting in the same base offense level of 32. 

Consequently, the judicially determined quantity of drugs did not result in "a 

sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established by ... a jury 

verdict." Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756. Hence, there was no Sixth Amendment 

violation. 8 See United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, No. 04-2045, 2005 WL 807008, 

8

The court also added a two-point adjustment to Mr. Bush's offense level 

due to his role in the offense. See U.S.S.G. § 3B 1.1 (increase offense by two 

levels if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in a 

criminal activity). Mr. Bush does not assert on appeal that this adjustment 

violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Even if he had raised this argument, 

(continued ... ) 

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at *2-3 (10th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005). 

For the aforementioned reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Bush's convictions and 

sentence. 

8

( ... continued) 

however, it would fail because ( 1) the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Mr. Bush was J.R. and (2) it was undisputed at trial that J.R. employed drug 

"runners," thus acting as a leader, manager, or supervisor in the drug distribution 

offenses. 

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