Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01263/USCOURTS-caDC-97-01263-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Communications Commission
Respondent
Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P.
Petitioner
United States of America
Respondent

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 3, 1998 Decided May 22, 1998

No. 97-1263

Time Warner Entertainment Co., L.P.,

Petitioner

v.

Federal Communications Commission and

United States of America,

Respondents

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

R. Bruce Beckner argued the cause for petitioner, with

whom Aaron I. Fleischman, Seth A. Davidson, and Jill K.

McClelland were on the briefs.

James M. Carr, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the cause for respondents, with whom Joel I.

Klein, Assistant Attorney General, United States Department

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of Justice, Robert B. Nicholson and Robert J. Wiggers, Attorneys, Christopher J. Wright, General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, and Daniel M. Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, were on the brief.

Before: Silberman, Randolph, and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Silberman.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by

Circuit Judge Randolph.

Silberman, Circuit Judge: Time Warner Entertainment

Company petitions for review of an order of the Federal

Communications Commission setting forth the manner in

which cable system operators may recoup external cost increases incurred between September 30, 1992 and the date

their system first became subject to rate regulation. The

Commission contends that because it had no opportunity to

pass on the issue, or to correct its error, section 405 of the

Communications Act bars our review. We grant the petition

in part and remand.

I.

The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified

in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.), directed the FCC to

regulate the rates that cable operators not subject to "effective competition," defined at 47 U.S.C. s 543(l)(1) (1994),

could charge their subscribers. The Commission designed a

scheme intended to ensure that any system not facing such

competition would nevertheless charge approximately the

same rates as if it were in a competitive market. Put simply,

a system operator's initial permitted rate either was its rate

in effect on September 30, 1992 reduced by a "competitive

differential" (the "full reduction rate"), or was calculated in

accordance with certain FCC formulas and worksheets without reference to rates in effect on September 30, 1992 (the

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"transition rate"). See 47 C.F.R. s 76.922(b) (1997). Most

systems, the Commission has said, employed the former rate.

See Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992: Rate Regulation, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Order on Remand), 11

F.C.C.R. 20206, p 22 (1996).

In Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151

(D.C. Cir. 1995), we considered consolidated petitions for

review of the FCC's orders implementing the Act. One of

the cable operators' complaints in that case (and the only one

relevant to Time Warner's instant petition) was that the FCC

unreasonably did not allow "cable operators to adjust their

rates to reflect external cost increases incurred during the

gap period." Id. at 173. "[E]xternal costs" were those

"effectively beyond the cable operator's control," including:

"(1) the retransmission consent fees cable operators pay to

broadcasters; (2) programming costs; (3) [state and local]

taxes; and (4) franchise fees and the costs associated with

other franchise requirements, including the provision of public, educational, and governmental-access programming." Id.

at 171; see also 47 C.F.R. s 76.922(f)(1) (1997). The "gap

period" refers to the time between September 30, 1992 and

the date a system became subject to rate regulation. An

operator's initial permissible rate, at least for those using the

full reduction rate, was derived from its rate in effect on

September 30, 1992, not the actual rate in effect on the date

each system became subject to regulation, "lest [the FCC]

build into the permitted initial rates any unwarranted rate

increases that cable operators took after passage of the 1992

Cable Act." Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 173. The Commission

did not permit operators to recoup any external cost increases incurred during the gap period; 1 only those incurred after

the date a system became subject to rate regulation could be

taken into account.2 The length of the gap varied among full

__________

1 The FCC's counsel, however, indicates that operators were

permitted to include one particular external cost increase--franchise fees--incurred during the gap period.

2 Our first Time Warner opinion did not address whether a

system operator which used a transition rate rather than a full

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reduction rate-based operators because they became subject

to rate regulation at different times, but was no shorter than

11 and no longer than 17 months long.

In Time Warner, we held that the Commission's "decision

to preclude a rate adjustment designed to recover changes in

external costs incurred during the gap period [was] arbitrary

and capricious," id. at 174, and "vacate[d] the rule insofar as

the FCC denied [cable operators] recovery of their gapperiod external cost increases." Id. at 178. In our view, the

FCC had offered "no reason to doubt that cable operators

incurred external costs during the gap period, yet under its

regulations they would never be able to recoup those costs

short of opting for cost-of-service regulation--which would be

akin to shooting a fly with a blunderbuss." Id. at 174.3 We

also thought the Commission's defense of its rule--that allowing recovery of the gap-period external cost increases would

be too administratively burdensome, both for the cable operators and the FCC--"completely unacceptable." Id.

Eighteen months after our decision, and without issuing a

proposed rule or seeking public comment on how to proceed,

the Commission issued an order in response to our remand.

See Order on Remand, WW 21-28. The order "permit[s] operators to adjust their current permissible rates to [the level]

the operators would currently be charging if they had been

__________

reduction rate was subject to the same external cost adjustment

problem, and the parties dispute the point. The FCC's counsel

argues that such an operator did not. Time Warner, however,

contends that an operator using the transition rate faced a slightly

different gap, one that began on April 1, 1993 instead of September

30, 1992, but likewise ended on the date the system first became

subject to rate regulation.

3 The rules permitted a system operator to opt into conventional cost-of-service regulation; we said, however, that "because a costof-service regulatory proceeding is expensive for the cable operator,

the FCC can be confident that an operator will not lightly choose

that option and it will indeed remain a limited exception to the

general rule." Time Warner, 56 F.3d at 170 (citation omitted).

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permitted to include increases in external costs occurring

between September 30, 1992 and their initial date of regulation." Id., p 25 (emphasis added). But the Order does not

allow cable operators to recover in future rates or otherwise

the difference between the rates they would have charged in

1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997, had they been allowed to account

for external cost increases incurred during the gap period,

and their allowable rates in those years. Time Warner did

not petition for reconsideration after the Commission issued

its Order on Remand; it instead sought review here. Petitioner claims that the FCC's order unreasonably denies operators the ability to recoup the revenue deficiency--which

Time Warner estimates at more than $14 million dollars--

they sustained during the four years, and that the order does

not comply with our mandate in the first Time Warner case.

It also contends that those operators which employ a transition rate are unreasonably denied the opportunity to take

advantage of the prospective relief afforded full reduction

rate-based operators.

II.

The Commission did not explain why its order permitted

cable operators to charge current rates as if the gap period

external cost increases had been included, but did not allow

them to recover their revenue deficiencies, other than to say

that "[t]he scope of relief requested is reflected in Time

Warner's Emergency Motion for Expedited Review (May 3,

1994 ...)" filed in this court before argument on the first

petition. Id., p 24 n.40. Petitioner had said in that motion

that "cable operators lose millions of dollars in revenue every

day. If they eventually succeed in persuading this Court to

rule in their favor, those losses cannot be recouped. Their

unrecoverable economic loss thus constitutes irreparable injury." The FCC construed that statement as a concession (or

waiver) that the cable operators were not even seeking to

recover their revenue loss.

Petitioner contends that it was absurd for the Commission

to have drawn a distinction between past revenue deficiencies

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attributable to unrecovered external cost increases and prospective rates predicated on, but not totally recovering, those

past external cost increases; its claim to the Commission

never made that distinction.4 Even worse, Time Warner

argues, the passage on which the FCC relied pertained solely

to the Commission's choice of a 17% "competitive differential," see supra at 2, not the gap period at all. The FCC's

counsel insists that it was "entirely understandable" for the

Commission to decide as it did because Time Warner never

indicated that it had "changed" its position in a submission to

the FCC after our remand, or in a petition for reconsideration. He contends that the other arguments Time Warner

raises in its petition--that it was unreasonable for the Commission not to provide a way for operators to recoup all their

revenue deficiencies, that the FCC's order treated full reduction rate-based operators more favorably than those using the

transition rate, and that the order did not comply with our

remand--were never presented to the Commission (presumably in a petition for reconsideration because it was not

foreseeable that the Commission would draw the remedial

distinction that it did). Petitioner therefore has not exhausted its administrative remedies and our review is foreclosed by

section 405(a) of the Communications Act. Time Warner's

primary response is that the issues it raises were directly

implicated in the reasoning of our prior decision and were

therefore covered in the remand order.

Section 405(a) is worded somewhat differently than the

normal exhaustion provision. It provides:

After an order, decision, report, or action has been made

or taken in any proceeding by the Commission ... any

party thereto, or any other person aggrieved or whose

interests are adversely affected thereby, may petition for

reconsideration ... and it shall be lawful for ... the

Commission ..., in its discretion, to grant such a reconsideration if sufficient reason therefor be made to appear.... The filing of a petition for reconsideration

__________

4 The dissent's formulation of the issue, assertedly not presented to the Commission, see Dissent at 1, is misstated.

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shall not be a condition precedent to judicial review of

any such order, decision, report, or action, except where

the party seeking such review ... (2) relies on questions

of fact or law upon which the Commission, or designated

authority within the Commission, has been afforded no

opportunity to pass.

47 U.S.C. s 405(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Although we

have said that this provision codifies the normal exhaustion

doctrine, see Washington Ass'n for Television and Children

v. FCC (WATCH), 712 F.2d 677, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the text

does not refer to the necessity of a party raising an argument

before the Commission--as does the typical exhaustion statute--but only that the Commission have an "opportunity to

pass" on a question of fact or law raised in the petition.5

In determining whether the Commission has had an opportunity to pass on a question, we have, to be sure, asked

whether a question was adequately presented to the Commission even if the Commission addressed the issue in some

fashion. Recently, for instance, in Bartholdi Cable Co. v.

FCC, 114 F.3d 274 (D.C. Cir. 1997), we held section 405 was

not satisfied because the party claiming the Commission

improperly rejected attorney-client and work-product privileges had not raised those claims before the Commission.

The FCC discussed the privileges in dicta, but we concluded

that because the issue was not "flagged" the Commission did

not have a fair opportunity to pass on it. Id. at 279-80.

Bartholdi Cable thus fits within the category of cases in

which we have said that even where an issue has been

"raised" before the Commission, if it is done in a less than

complete way, see Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 824

F.2d 1205, 1210 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (appellant "point[ed] out"

a circumstance, but did not make an argument); WATCH,

__________

5 Our dissenting colleague does not take account of this statutory distinction, and relies on "common law" exhaustion doctrine.

But judge made notions of "common law" always yield to statutes--

particularly in administrative law, see Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S.

137 (1993) and Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).

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712 F.2d at 681 (appellant "never explicitly" made its argument); Alianza Federal de Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d 732,

739 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (the "grist" of appellant's argument was

there, but "nothing was made of it"), or if the party seeking

review "seem[s] to abandon its argument ... by taking

inconsistent positions," Busse Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 87 F.3d

1456, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 1996), the Commission has not been

afforded a fair opportunity. Our reasoning reflects our experience as judges that unless an issue is squarely presented in

a case, any discussion of the question in the opinion (dicta) is

only a preliminary view and therefore not to be given precedential weight.

Because section 405 is worded as it is, however, it is not

necessary that the issue of fact or law be presented to the

Commission by the petitioner itself. "There is no requirement that [the Commission's opportunity to pass] be afforded

in any particular manner, or by any particular party." Office

of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,

465 F.2d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Indeed, in United Church

of Christ we held that since two dissenting Commissioners

had raised the "very argument pressed" before us, section

405 was not an impediment to review. Id. Nor have we

required that the precise issue be presented to the Commission in order to afford it a "fair opportunity." So long as the

issue is necessarily implicated by the argument made to the

Commission, section 405 does not bar our review. For example, in National Ass'n for Better Broadcasting v. FCC

(NABB), 830 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987), the appellant complained to the Commission that a television station had violated the Communication Act's advertising rules. The FCC

determined that the appellant's statutory claim was foreclosed by its 1974 policy statement interpreting the statutory

requirements. We allowed the appellant to argue that the

FCC's policy statement was contrary to the Act, although

that exact argument was never presented to the Commission.

We said that "the Commission not only understood that the

gravamen of NABB's grievance was that [the station] was

infringing [the Act], but the Commission actually purported

to dispose of that charge in its order." Id. at 274. And in

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MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 10 F.3d 842 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), MCI claimed that AT&T had violated a "reasonable charges" provision of the Act, and that it was therefore

entitled to damages. The Commission, however, determined

that its "IXC orders" barred damages. Because MCI never

addressed the proper interpretation of its IXC orders, the

FCC argued on appeal that it had been afforded no opportunity to pass on the question, so section 405 barred review. In

accordance with our NABB decision, we said that "MCI's

claim on review that the Commission decided [the] question

[of whether it was entitled to damages] by invoking an

authority inadequate to justify the decision does not itself

raise a novel question of law; it merely asks whether the

original question was correctly decided." Id. at 845.6

The Commission properly points to an apparently conflicting line of our cases in which we have been sticklers in

insisting that "a party must first present its concerns to the

Commission so that the agency is afforded an opportunity to

cure any defect" and that the FCC must be given "the

opportunity to ... correct any error" in its order as a

precursor to judicial review. See, e.g., Freeman Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1997). But

those are cases, as we explained, "where the challenge is

predicated upon a technical defect in a Commission decision

which could easily have been cured if called to the Commission's attention on reconsideration." NABB, 830 F.2d at 274

(emphasis added). It is in these "technical defect" or procedural oversight cases that we have made the statements

about giving the agency an opportunity to correct errors.

For example, in Rogers Radio Communication Services v.

FCC, 593 F.2d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the appellant contended

that the FCC failed, in violation of 47 U.S.C. s 309(a), to

articulate its finding that a rival cellular carrier would serve

the public interest, convenience, and necessity in granting the

rival's application; we determined that "[o]ne of the purposes

of [section 405] is to afford the Commission the initial opportunity to correct errors in its decision or the proceeding

__________

6 The dissent ignores these three cases.

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leading to decision." Id. at 1229. We said the same thing

where the petitioners claimed the FCC violated the APA by

failing to address comments in its rulemaking proceeding,

Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 906 F.2d 752, 755

(D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Petroleum Communications, Inc. v.

FCC, 22 F.3d 1164, 1169-71 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (FCC gave no

opportunity for notice and comment before promulgating

rule); City of Brookings Municipal Tel. Co. v. FCC, 822 F.2d

1153, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (APA and other procedural objections); American Radio Relay League v. FCC, 617 F.2d 875,

879 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (notice and comment procedures),

where a petitioner claimed the FCC ignored certain record

evidence, Freeman Eng'g, 103 F.3d at 182; see also Southern

Ind. Broad. v. FCC, 935 F.2d 1340, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1991)

(appellant claimed a deposition that the FCC reviewed was

not part of the record), and where an appellant claimed the

Commission erroneously ascribed a rival applicant's research

methods to it. Gencom Inc. v. FCC, 832 F.2d 171, 186-87

(D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Freeman Eng'g, 103 F.3d at 182

(petitioner was required to present its claim that the FCC

failed to explain why it treated a competitor's similar proposal

differently to give the FCC "an opportunity to cure any

defect"). But cf. Alabama Power Co. v. FCC, 773 F.2d 362,

368 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (argument that Commission used

"a wholly irrelevant percentage figure" to discount certain

costs did not need to be raised in a petition for reconsideration).

To sum up, in our section 405 cases we have asked whether

the issue that a petitioner brings to us was "flagged," or to

use a sports metaphor, "teed up," before the Commission.

But if petitioner complains of only a technical or procedural

mistake, such as an obvious violation of a specific APA

requirement, we have insisted that a party raise the precise

claim before the Commission--if necessary, in a motion for

reconsideration--because we assume the Commission simply

overlooked the requirement. In those instances, we are

concerned that the petitioner, by bringing the issue first to

us, is playing a game of "gotcha." If, however, a petitioner

makes a basic challenge to a Commission policy, but the

formulation of the issue presented to us was not precisely as

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presented to the Commission, we ask whether a reasonable

Commission necessarily would have seen the question raised

before us as part of the case presented to it.

We think it a close question here whether our remand itself

should be thought to have, at least, adequately presented to

the Commission the "issue" of whether petitioner was entitled

to fully recover the excluded gap period external cost increases. We never explicitly addressed the scope of the remedy,

but the logic of our opinion--that it was unreasonable for the

Commission to justify its refusal to permit cable operators to

recover gap external cost increases on administrative burden

grounds--applies equally to past losses and future ones. If

the Commission had relied on a new consideration, other than

the discredited administrative burden, that would be another

matter, but it did not; it offered no reasoning beyond its

"concession" rationale. Surely if the FCC had merely said

that "we do not wish to grant full relief, as the court's opinion

suggests we should, because it might prove politically unpopular" or, because "we do not like petitioner," it could not be

argued that a petition seeking review brought into question a

truly new issue of law. On the other hand, we have warned

that a party must be careful on remand to raise issues before

the Commission before they come back to us. See Illinois

Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254, 1264 n.12 (D.C. Cir.

1993).7

It is unnecessary for us to decide whether our remand put

the issue to the FCC, however. The Commission apparently

recognized that the rationale of our decision did not easily

support the distinction it wished to draw, and that petitioner's

supposed "concession" allowed it to avoid confronting the

problem. But there is no question that the Commission

expressly decided the concession issue--whether petitioner

was even seeking to recover its revenue deficiency. And, in

that regard, we agree with petitioner that the FCC's interpretation of petitioner's motion for expedition filed in this

court was a disingenuous gimmick used to avoid a principled

response to our remand. (Indeed, as we have noted, it

__________

7 Given the apparent tension in our cases, a prudent counsel

when in doubt should seek reconsideration before the Commission.

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appears that the Commission took Time Warner's statement

in its motion to expedite out of context.) The truth is that

parties often claim that drastic harm will occur when seeking

expedited consideration. But it is rather farfetched to interpret such predictions as consent to their imposition. In this

case, we suspect petitioner was reflecting a natural fear that

convincing the Commission to authorize cable operators to

fully recover their past losses from consumers was a chancy

proposition--at a minimum, that action is politically troublesome. It appears to us that by seizing upon Time Warner's

purported concession, the Commission avoided addressing the

scope of relief question in an unfair way. Cf. Illinois Public

Telecommunications Ass'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 565-66

(D.C. Cir. 1997) (rejecting FCC's argument that petitioner

had abandoned its argument because the FCC had selectively

quoted from petitioner's petition). We do not look sympathetically to the Commission playing "gotcha" either. The

Commission had an opportunity to pass on the question of

whether operators should be allowed to recover their revenue

deficiencies, but chose to duck--its failure to address the

point was not an accidental mistake.

Our view is different as to whether the Commission had a

fair opportunity to consider Time Warner's argument that the

Order on Remand unreasonably denied transition rate-based

operators any recovery of their gap period external cost

increases. Petitioner does not claim that it or any party ever

raised this argument to the Commission, arguing again that

our decision in the first case put this issue before the Commission. While that may have been true as to the scope of

relief argument, our opinion did not even recognize a distinction between full reduction rate-based and transition ratebased operators, so it can hardly be said that our opinion put

this second issue before the Commission. Indeed, our opinion only considered the problem as it affected the former

class of operators. Nor is this issue necessarily implicated by

petitioner's more general argument. As we noted above,

supra note 2, Commission's counsel explains that transition

rate-based operators' rates, set without reference to September 30, 1992, already reflect any external cost increases

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incurred during the gap period. Time Warner objects that

this is a "post-hoc explanation," and argues that transition

rate operators do have a gap, albeit a different one. But

counsel's explanation is legitimate and persuasive as to why

the Commission would not have thought this issue essential to

resolving petitioner's more general complaint. Unlike the

scope of relief question, we do not perceive that here the

Commission was trying to avoid a vexing problem. It simply

went unaddressed because the Commission apparently did

not understand that it was an issue. Time Warner therefore

should have raised it to the Commission in a petition for

reconsideration.

* * * *

We grant the petition with respect to the scope of relief

question. Because the Commission chose not to argue the

merits in the alternative, we have no choice but to vacate the

challenged portions of the order in so far as the Commission

has not allowed full reduction rate operators to recover their

revenue deficiencies. The remainder of the petition is denied.

So ordered.

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Randolph, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Time Warner's claim--that the Federal Communications Commission should have allowed it to recoup

external cost increases occurring during the so-called "gap"

period--should not have been considered by this court.

Not once during the administrative and judicial proceedings

leading up to this case did Time Warner make that claim, or a

single argument in support of it--not during the original

rulemaking, not in its first petition for review in this court,

not in its motion for expedited consideration, not in its briefs

in this court, not during the Commission's proceedings on

remand, and not in a petition for administrative reconsideration. Our opinion in Time Warner Entertainment Co. v.

FCC, 56 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. 1995), said nothing on the

subject, and for good reason. We usually do not pronounce

on questions no one has presented.

After we remanded the case, Time Warner could have

placed its claim and its supporting arguments before the

Commission. Time Warner surely knew of the rules allowing

this. See 47 C.F.R. s 1.1206 (1995). Yet during the ensuing

eighteen months, while the case remained pending before the

Commission, Time Warner chose to do nothing. We have

held time and again, in cases involving this and other administrative agencies, that if a party does not raise and argue an

issue before the agency, the court will not consider it. See,

e.g., the cases cited below. That "common law" or nonstatutory rule of exhaustion, a rule we also apply on appeals from

the district court, is enough to preclude Time Warner's claim

in this court. There is still another reason why we should not

consider the claim. Even after the Commission issued its

Order on Remand, Time Warner could have filed a motion for

reconsideration. Again, it chose to remain silent. Section

405 of the Communications Act therefore stands as an additional bar to judicial review of Time Warner's recoupment

claim. In the words of s 405, 47 U.S.C. s 405, the Commission had "no opportunity to pass" upon the "legal questions"

raised by arguments Time Warner is now making for the first

time in this court. Those legal arguments consist of analogies to Commission decisions dealing with the "Exchange

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Network Facilities for Interstate Access," to decisions of the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission allowing gas pipelines to impose retroactive surcharges, and so on. To state

the obvious, the Commission never had a chance to pass on

Time Warner's legal arguments concerning the agency's remedial discretion because Time Warner never presented

those arguments to the Commission. "It is," we recently

reiterated, "only through the adversarial process (or analogous circumstances) that the Commission is afforded such an

opportunity within the meaning of s 405." Bartholdi Cable

Co. v. FCC, 114 F.3d 274, 280 (D.C. Cir. 1997). We also

stressed that it is not up to the Commission to "sift pleadings

and documents" in an effort to predict what might have been

argued if the litigant had taken the trouble to present the

claim. Id. at 279; see also, e.g., Russian River Vintage

Broadcasting v. FCC, 5 F.3d 1518, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1993).1

__________

1 The majority is quite mistaken in supposing that s 405 ousts

the judicially-imposed requirement that parties present their claims

to the Commission before the agency decides the matter. Maj. op.

at 7 n.5. Section 405 deals only with petitions for agency reconsideration, which necessarily come after the Commission's decision.

To read s 405 as the majority does sub silentio is to render it

senseless: parties would be free to hide their contentions, to say

nothing while the proceedings wind their way to a final agency

decision, and then, only after the decision comes down, spring their

arguments on the Commission and march into court when the

Commission refuses to consider them. The courts of appeals do not

allow anything of the sort. New arguments--that is, arguments

that could have been made but were not--may not be raised in

petitions for rehearing.

Section 405 thus does not deal with the question whether, in

order to have claims considered on judicial review, parties must

present those claims to the Commission before it renders its rulemaking or adjudicatory decision. In light of this statutory gap, the

federal courts may fill it by insisting that if parties fail to raise their

claims prior to final agency action, those claims will not be considered on judicial review. McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144

(1992), made this very point, adopting Justice White's statement in

Patsy v. Board of Regents of Florida, 457 U.S. 496, 518 (1982)

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The majority refuses to follow this well-marked path. Instead, it heads up a blind alley searching for a distinction

between something called a "technical" defect and something

described as a "policy" difference. See maj. op. at 9-10. As

best I can make out, the majority thinks it has discovered a

trend: litigants trying to raise "technical" defects in court

without having raised them before the Commission will lose,

but litigants raising "policy" differences for the first time in

court, without having presented their arguments to the Commission, might just get away with it.2

So far as I can tell, this technical-policy trend winds up

playing no discernible role in the outcome. Still, a few words

about the majority's digression are in order. For starters,

the distinction lacks any coherent rationale. The majority

suggests that requiring a litigant to raise a procedural or

"technical" point with the agency may allow the agency to

correct its error before the case reaches the court. See maj.

op. at 9-10. This is true, but it is also true about "policy" or

"substantive" mistakes. Besides, as any student of administrative law knows, allowing an agency the chance to correct

its errors is only one of many reasons behind the raise-it-orwaive-it rule. For instance, the "exhaustion doctrine recognizes the notion, grounded in deference to Congress' delegation of authority to coordinate branches of Government, that

agencies, not the courts, ought to have primary responsibility

for the programs that Congress has charged them to administer." McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992); see,

e.g., McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 192-95 (1969).

"Exhaustion concerns," the Supreme Court added, "apply

with particular force when the action under review involves

exercise of the agency's discretionary power or when the

agency proceedings in question allow the agency to apply its

special expertise." McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 145. In its brief,

__________

tration,' ... and unless Congress directs otherwise, rightfully subject to crafting by judges." Here, Congress has not directed

otherwise.

2 The majority suggests that exhaustion is entirely controlled

by statute, see maj. op. at 7 n.5, and then contradicts itself by

proposing a technical-policy distinction found in no statute.

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Time Warner treats the Commission's authority to allow

recoupment as a matter of agency "discretion" and so the

Court's words in McCarthy should have had particular force

here. Of all things, remedial claims of the sort Time Warner

raises in this court ought to be at the top of the list of items a

litigant must first raise before the Commission.3

It is therefore hardly surprising that careful attention to

our decisions reveals that the majority's technical-policy line

does not exist. Take, for instance, Petroleum Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1994), a case in

which the petitioners claimed the Commission had failed to

give notice and an opportunity to comment before promulgating a rule--a mere "technical defect" according to the majority. See maj. op. at 10. The majority seems to have forgotten

the balance of the case. The Petroleum Communications

petitioners also argued that the rule had been applied in a

discriminatory fashion. See Petroleum Communications, 22

F.3d at 1171. Both claims were raised for the first time in

the petition for review. We refused to reach the merits of

either issue for "substantially the same reasons," namely that

"petitioners failed to exhaust their remedies ... by declining

to bring [the alleged error] first before the Commission." Id.

To take another recent case, Freeman Engineering Associates, Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1997), treated a

so-called "technical defect" (petitioner argued that the Commission failed to address certain record evidence) and an

__________

3 Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993), cited by the majority in

a footnote, see maj. op. at 7 n.5, has nothing to do with this case.

Darby interpreted s 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5

U.S.C. s 706(2)(A), to mean that an "an appeal to 'superior agency

authority' is a prerequisite to judicial review only when expressly

required by statute or when an agency rule requires appeal before

review and the administrative action is made inoperative pending

that review." 509 U.S. at 154. See Marine Mammal Conservancy,

Inc. v. Department of Agric., 134 F.3d 409, 411 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

No one is saying Time Warner should have, or could have, perfected

an intra-agency appeal--the Commission rendered the decision

under review and the Commission, of course, is the superior agency

authority.

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alleged substantive error (petitioner claimed the Commission

treated him different than other similarly situated applicants)

identically: the court held that both claims were waived

because petitioner failed to raise them first before the Commission. In Alianza Federal de Mercedes v. FCC, 539 F.2d

732, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1976), we held that the Commission had

not been given a "fair opportunity" to pass on petitioner's

argument, raised for the first time before this court, that a

television station's broadcast license should not have been

renewed because it offered a minimal amount of public interest programming devoted to minority community problems

where minorities comprised 40% of the market. In Washington Ass'n for Television & Children v. FCC, 712 F.2d 677,

680-81 (D.C. Cir. 1983), we held that s 405 precluded our

considering the challenge to the Commission's license renewals on the ground that the television stations had provided

inadequate weekday programming for children. In Illinois

Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254, 1264 n.12 (D.C.

Cir. 1993), we invoked the exhaustion doctrine to refuse to

pass on allegations that the Commission had been "impermissibly inconsistent." In Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co.

v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1205, 1210 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1989), we declined

to reach the merits of petitioners' last minute argument that

the Commission violated the First Amendment. Petitioners,

we held, could not "bypass statutory exhaustion requirements." Id. And in ASTV v. FCC, 46 F.3d 1173, 1177 (D.C.

Cir. 1995), we refused to consider ASTV's argument that

"wireless cable is a 'cable system' under the Act, because

ASTV failed to raise it before the Commission"--surely a

substantive, "policy" matter rather than what the majority

would treat as a mere "technical" peccadillo.

The majority ultimately comes to rest on grounds other

than its technical-policy dichotomy. The Commission loses

because it was playing something called "gotcha," it was

"unfair," its view of the matter was "farfetched," it relied on a

"disingenuous gimmick." Maj. op. at 11-12. All this excitement is directed at a footnote in the Commission's decision on

remand. The footnote quoted a Time Warner motion conceding that cable operators could not recoup the losses they were

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incurring even if "they ultimately succeed in persuading this

Court to rule in their favor," Memorandum of Law of Time

Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. in Support of Its

Emergency Motion for Expedited Consideration, at pp. 17-18.

That concession directly contradicts Time Warner's current

position. The Commission rightly took the statement in

context: Time Warner was referring to the effect of delaying

review of the entire "rate-regulation rulemaking." Id. at 17.

"The truth is," according to the majority, "that parties often

claim that drastic harm will occur when seeking expedited

consideration." Maj. op. at 12. Maybe so, but that misses

the point. If Time Warner believed that it was entitled to

recoup its losses, if the company thought the question was

still open despite what it told this court, it was incumbent

upon Time Warner to make its views known to the Commission. It had ample opportunity to do so, not only while the

matter was pending before the agency on remand, but also

after the Commission handed down its decision. Time Warner nevertheless remained mute.

Pure and simple, the majority has offered no good reason

for rejecting the Commission's determination not to decide a

legal claim Time Warner neither raised nor supported with

pertinent authorities. If "gotcha" and "disingenuous gimmick" are meant to embody a legal principle, I confess--the

principle eludes me. I therefore dissent from this portion of

the majority opinion.

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