Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03737/USCOURTS-ca8-04-03737-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
David T. Mark
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 04-3737

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the 

* District of Nebraska. 

David T. Mark, * 

*

Appellant. * 

___________

Submitted: June 23, 2005

Filed: October 4, 2005

___________

Before ARNOLD, McMILLIAN, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

David T. Mark pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), and was sentenced to a term of 30 months’

imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release with special

conditions. Mark appeals his sentence, arguing that the district court erred in

rejecting his motion for downward departure from the sentencing guidelines and

abused its discretion by assigning certain conditions of supervised release. We find

no error in the term of imprisonment imposed by the district court. Because we find

the record insufficient to uphold one special condition of supervised release

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concerning access to the Internet, however, we remand the case for further

proceedings.

I.

Mark’s sole argument regarding the length of his incarceration relates to the

calculation of the appropriate sentencing range under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, a range that is now advisory under the decision in United States v.

Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). The district court calculated a sentencing range of 27

to 33 months’ imprisonment, based on the applicable offense level and criminal

history, (S. Tr. at 29-30), but Mark argued that his “involuntary intoxication,”

resulting from psychotropic medication that he took to treat a bipolar condition, was

a mitigating circumstance that the Sentencing Commission did not adequately take

into consideration when it formulated the guidelines. He asserted that his prescription

for the drug was tripled before the commission of his offense, and that the higher

dosage pushed him into a state of mania that made it impossible for him to control his

addiction.

The district court ruled that it was not permitted to consider a departure based

on Mark’s use of medication, because his involuntary intoxication claim amounted

to an assertion of “diminished capacity,” and a federal statute enacted in 2003

specifically prohibited departures based on “diminished capacity” in child

pornography cases. See Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(b), 117 Stat. 650, 669 (2003);

USSG § 5K2.13. The court explained that “Congress’ mandate to me precludes that

defense, because it still fits in the category of diminished capacity because frankly

someone’s mental illness, or someone’s involuntary intoxication, are both

unintentional,” and that “Congress has precluded me from downwardly departing for

diminished capacity for any basis.” (S. Tr. at 54-55). 

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Mark argues on appeal that the district court erred in refusing to entertain his

motion for downward departure because “involuntary intoxication” differs from

diminished capacity, and involuntary intoxication is therefore still available as a basis

for departure from the guidelines in an appropriate case. Reviewing the district

court’s interpretation and application of the guidelines de novo, United States v.

Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2005), we hold that the district court properly

concluded that Mark’s proposed departure was forbidden. 

Section 5K2.13 provides that a downward departure may be warranted if “(1)

the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced

mental capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed

substantially to the commission of the offense.” The Sentencing Commission has

defined “significantly reduced mental capacity” to mean that “the defendant, although

convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) understand the wrongfulness of

the behavior comprising the offense or to exercise the power of reason; or (B) control

behavior that the defendant knows is wrongful.” USSG § 5K2.13, comment. (n.1).

The guidelines explicitly disallow such a departure where the defendant has been

convicted of an offense involving child pornography. USSG § 5K2.13.

Mark concedes that if the “state of mania” that allegedly contributed to his

offense were caused by bipolar disorder, then it would constitute “diminished

capacity” on which a departure may not be based. (S. Tr. at 45). He asserts, however,

that because the alleged “state of mania” was caused by medication (which he says

was improperly prescribed), he is eligible for a departure. 

We agree with the district court that Mark, in seeking to distinguish his claim

of “involuntary intoxication” from a claim of “diminished capacity,” has invited us

to join in “dancing on the head of a pin,” and we reject the proffered distinction. The

policy statement on “diminished capacity” focuses not on the cause of the defendant’s

diminished capacity, but on the defendant’s ultimate mental state – that is, whether

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he in fact had a “significantly impaired ability” to understand the wrongfulness of his

behavior or to exercise the power of reason, regardless of the cause. The policy

statement implicitly confirms that “involuntary intoxication” is within the scope of

“diminished capacity” when it directs that a court may not depart when the

defendant’s reduced mental capacity “was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or

other intoxicants.” USSG § 5K2.13 (emphasis added). Conversely, with respect to

offenses not categorically excluded by the 2003 statute, a court may depart pursuant

to § 5K2.13 when a defendant’s reduced mental capacity is caused by involuntary use

of drugs. When Congress did away with the departure in child pornography cases,

however, it prohibited the sort of reduction sought by Mark.

The district court, applying the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines, properly

sentenced Mark within the guideline range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment. Mark

has not argued on appeal that the district court’s imposition of sentence constituted

plain error warranting relief under Booker and United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543

(8th Cir. 2005) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July 27, 2005) (No. 05-5547).

Therefore, we affirm that portion of the judgment imposing a term of 30 months’

imprisonment.

II.

Mark also argues that the special supervised release conditions imposed by the

district court are inconsistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The statute provides, inter

alia, that a district court may order a condition of supervised release beyond those

listed in § 3583, provided that such a condition is reasonably related to the sentencing

factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), involves no greater deprivation of liberty than

is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), and is consistent with

any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. Among the

purposes set forth in § 3553(a) are deterrence, protection of the public, and effective

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provision, in the most effective manner, of needed educational or vocational training,

medical care, or other correctional treatment to the defendant.

A.

The first special condition about which Mark complains requires that he have

no contact with, or reside with, any children under 18 years of age, including his own

children, unless approved in advance and in writing by the probation office. Mark

asserts that there is nothing in the record indicating that he is a danger to his own or

other children and that this condition is “simply too great a restriction on the

Defendant’s liberty to be allowed.” (Appellant’s Br. at 13). He further argues that

the condition improperly delegated a judicial function to the probation office by

allowing a probation officer to determine whether he has contact with his children.

Mark explained at sentencing that he would prefer a condition that he must

follow any and all orders with respect to his children from the District Court of

Douglas County, Nebraska, in which he was engaged in relevant litigation. His

counsel explained that “What I don’t want to see, Judge, is the probation office all of

a sudden double guessing the District Court of Douglas County, Nebraska, or its

orders, and Mr. Mark finding himself at odds as to what to do.” (S. Tr. at 57). The

condition ultimately imposed required the probation office to consult with treatment

providers and act “consistent with the orders of the Douglas County District Court or

the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County.” (S. Tr. at 72). The district court

clarified that “once the Douglas County District Court, the Separate Juvenile Court,

makes a decision with respect to contact, then that will be the controlling document,

but the court is not giving up its jurisdiction as well, because I don’t know how long

the county court might have jurisdiction.” (Id.).

In essence, the district court gave Mark what he requested: the probation office

was instructed to follow the lead of the county court insofar as Mark’s visitation

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rights were concerned. Requiring Mark to obtain prior approval is a reasonable

mechanism to promote compliance and to ensure that Mark’s contact with minors is

reasonably limited to appropriate situations. Mark has a history of violating

conditions of release (he was on probation for a previous child pornography

conviction when he committed the instant offense), and the record reflects that during

his youth, Mark engaged in sexual exploration with a female family member who was

a minor. (PSR ¶ 104). Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in imposing the condition.

Mark’s argument that the district court impermissibly delegated the judicial

function to the probation office is also unconvincing. In United States v. Kent, 209

F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), on which Mark relies, we held that where a court

“explicitly stated it hoped it would not be ‘riding herd’ in the probation officer’s

decision to require Kent to undergo psychiatric treatment,” the condition imposed was

inconsistent with both Article III and U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b), because it was “entirely

possible that Kent’s probation officer, as opposed to the court, would retain and

exercise ultimate responsibility over the situation.” 209 F.3d at 1079. In this case,

there is no such broad delegation. The district court provided ample guidance to the

probation office by directing it to condition approval of Mark’s contact with children

on the decisions of the county court, and there is no indication that the court

delegated ultimate responsibility over the situation to the probation officer.

B.

Mark next contends that two special conditions of supervised release,

numbered 8 and 9, which prohibit him from using or having access to any online

computer programs, and from using or possessing a computer, except under

supervised work conditions and on a computer with no Internet connection, are “far

too broad and involves too great a restriction on [Mark’s] liberty than is reasonably

related to any rehabilitation nor to serve the ends of protecting the public.”

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(Appellant’s Br. at 15). Mark points out that he “is a computer consultant who earns

his livelihood through the use of computers,” and argues that the restrictions imposed

would have a severe detrimental effect on his ability to hold a job and earn a living.

(Id.). He argues that less restrictive alternatives exist that could satisfy the needs of

the sentencing court. According to Mark, the district court could have addressed its

concerns by ordering him to install filtering software that would block access to

sexually-oriented websites and to permit the probation office unannounced access to

verify that the software was functioning properly. This approach, in Mark’s view,

would allow him to make use of the Internet for employment purposes, but preclude

him from abusing access. 

Given Mark’s repeated offenses of viewing child pornography over the

Internet, a complete ban on Internet access is reasonably related to the statutory

purposes of deterring criminal conduct and protecting the public from further crimes

of the defendant. The more difficult question is whether the condition is overbroad

– that is, whether it involves a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably

necessary” under the circumstances. On plain error review, we have upheld narrower

bans on Internet access in cases involving offenders who committed crimes more

serious than simple possession of child pornography. In United States v. Fields, 324

F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2003), we discerned no abuse of discretion (and thus, a fortiori,

no plain error) in a condition that barred a defendant from having Internet access at

his home, where the offense of conviction involved running a child pornography

website for profit, and the defendant pointed to no specific negative impact on his

educational or vocational training that would result from the condition. Similarly, in

United States v. Ristine, 335 F.3d 692, 695-96 (8th Cir. 2003), we found no plain

error where the district court barred the defendant from having Internet service at his

residence, noting again that the defendant exchanged images with other Internet

users, and thus “did more than merely possess child pornography.” Id. at 696.

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We observed in Fields, however, that “[a]ppellate courts have overturned

conditions seen as overly restrictive, especially in cases involving simple possession

of child pornography.” 324 F.3d at 1027. And in United States v. Crume, No. 04-

3181, 2005 WL 2124103 (8th Cir. Sep. 6, 2005), we recently held, in the case of a

defendant whose criminal conduct involved only possession of child pornography,

that a broad ban on access to computers and the Internet (without written consent of

a probation officer) was not reasonably necessary. We concluded that the district

court could “impose a more narrowly-tailored restriction on Mr. Crume’s computer

use through a prohibition on accessing certain categories of websites and Internet

content and can sufficiently ensure his compliance with this condition through some

combination of random searches and software that filters objectionable material.” Id.

at * 4.

Our decision in Crume is consistent with such opinions as United States v.

Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002), where the Second Circuit vacated a complete

ban on Internet access, noting that “[c]omputers and Internet access have become

virtually indispensable in the modern world of communications and information

gathering,” id. at 126, and United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386 (3d Cir. 2003),

which held with respect to a defendant convicted of possessing child pornography

that “[t]here is no need to cut off Freeman’s access to email or benign internet usage

when a more focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can be

enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on Freeman’s hard drive or

removable disks.” Id. at 392. The court in Freeman distinguished a case in which

it upheld a complete ban on Internet use by noting that the defendant in the previous

case “used the internet to contact young children and solicit inappropriate sexual

contact with them” – a use that was “harmful to the victims contacted and more

difficult to trace than simply using the internet to view pornographic web sites.” Id.;

see also United States v. Holm, 326 F.3d 872, 877-78 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that

a prohibition on Internet access failed to satisfy § 3583(d)(2), because “such a ban

renders modern life – in which, for example, the government strongly encourages

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taxpayers to file their returns electronically, where more and more commerce is

conducted on-line, and where vast amounts of government information are

communicated via website – exceptionally difficult,” and the defendant had a long

history of working in computerized telecommunications, such that the special

condition “could affect his future productivity and jeopardize his rehabilitation in

violation of the command of § 3583(d).”); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199,

1206-07 & n.8 (10th Cir. 2001) (cautioning against an across-the-board prohibition

on Internet access, which would bar a defendant “from using a computer at a library

to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online,” and

explaining that filtering software, although not “completely effective” in 2001, might

provide a reasonable method of preventing the defendant from viewing illegal content

while allowing him to use the Internet legitimately).

As Crume and the decisions from other circuits illustrate, a complete ban on

Internet access is difficult to justify as a least restrictive means of satisfying the

statutory objectives of supervised release in the case of a defendant whose criminal

conduct involved simple possession of child pornography. At a minimum, such a

condition should be imposed only on a record that permits a thorough evaluation of

other alternatives that might be sufficient to serve the statutory purposes of protecting

the public and deterring future crimes. In this case, we believe the record is not

sufficient to demonstrate that the complete prohibition on Internet access is

reasonably necessary. The potential efficacy of a filtering program, for example, has

not been explored. Whether such a program would likely be effective in preventing

Mark from accessing illegal content cannot be judged on this record. Nor does the

record show why the district court apparently believed that restrictions on time and

place of Internet access, combined with regular monitoring and inspections by the

probation office, would be inadequate to protect the public and deter future

violations. See Crume, 2005 WL 2124103, at *4; cf. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126-27.

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We reserve judgment on whether a complete ban on Internet access, in some

case of a defendant involved in possessing child pornography, may be reasonably

necessary within the meaning of § 3583(d)(2), particularly if a defendant is

incorrigible and other alternatives are thoroughly considered but reasonably found to

be ineffective. In this case, however, we conclude that the record is insufficiently

developed to justify the condition, both with respect to evidence concerning potential

alternatives and an explanation from the district court as to why less restrictive

alternatives are inadequate.

* * *

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the special conditions of supervised

release prohibiting access to any online computer programs, and prohibiting the use

or possession of a computer with Internet access, and remand the case for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

 ______________________________

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