Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03033/USCOURTS-caDC-01-03033-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Leon A. Samuel
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 14, 2002 Decided August 6, 2002

Nos. 01-3032 & 01-3033

United States of America,

Appellee

v.

Leon A. Samuel,

Appellant

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00070-01)

(No. 99cr00335-01)

Mary M. Petras, appointed by the court, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

John K. Han, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With him on the brief were Kenneth L. Wainstein, U.S. Attorney at the time the brief was filed, John R.

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Fisher, Mary-Patrice Brown, and Thomas C. Black, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: Sentelle, Rogers, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: The sentence imposed by the

district court in this case included an upward adjustment

because the defendant, Leon Samuel, committed an offense

while on release for another crime. Samuel contends that

this sentencing enhancement violated the rule, announced by

the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, that "any fact

that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Samuel argues

that his sentence contravenes Apprendi because the fact that

he was on release at the time of the second crime was neither

proved to a jury nor specified in his plea agreement. We

reject this argument and affirm the judgment of the district

court.

I

On January 22, 1998, Samuel attempted to sell crack cocaine to an undercover agent of the Drug Enforcement

Administration. He was arrested and charged with conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute 50

grams or more of cocaine base, a violation of 21 U.S.C. s 846.

Samuel pled guilty to that offense on March 26, 1998, and was

released pending sentencing by the district court. While on

release, Samuel was again arrested on a narcotics charge.

This time, the arrest followed an investigation by the Customs Service. On September 1, 1999, Samuel was taken into

custody and subsequently indicted for possessing with intent

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine, a violation of 21

U.S.C. s 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)(iii). On July 18, 2000, Samuel pled guilty to that charge as well.

On February 22, 2001, the district court sentenced Samuel

for both crimes. Although the maximum statutory sentence

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for a person convicted of a drug crime involving 50 grams or

more of cocaine base is life imprisonment,1 the court's application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines2 resulted in a

lower sentence. Based solely on the weight of the drugs

involved and certain applicable adjustments, Samuel's guidelines offense level would have been 31. This, together with

his criminal history category of I, would have yielded a

guideline sentencing range of 108-135 months. See U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") ch. 5, pt. A.

However, because Samuel committed his second offense while

on release pending sentencing, Guideline s 2J1.7 ("Commission of Offense While on Release") dictated a three-level

increase in his offense level, which resulted in a range of 151-

188 months. The government recommended, and the court

imposed, a sentence at the bottom of that range: concurrent

terms of 151 months for each of his two convictions. Following the instruction of s 2J1.7, cmt. n.2, the court apportioned

that total sentence as follows: 108 months for the drug

crimes, plus an additional 43 months attributable to the

enhancement for committing an offense while on release.3

__________

1 See 21 U.S.C. ss 846, 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A)(iii). These provisions also provide for a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years.

However, the district court found that Samuel met the criteria of 18

U.S.C. s 3553(f), which permits a court in specified circumstances

to "impose a sentence pursuant to [the applicable guidelines] without regard to any statutory minimum sentence." See also U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual ("U.S.S.G.") s 5C1.2(a).

2 The district court used the 1998 edition of the United States

Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which is the edition to which we

refer in this opinion.

3 Note 2 of Guideline s 2J1.7 states that the sentencing court

"should divide the sentence on the judgment form between the

sentence attributable to the underlying offense and the sentence

attributable to the enhancement." U.S.S.G. s 2J1.7, cmt. n.2. The

court must, however, "ensure that the 'total punishment' (i.e., the

sentence for the offense committed while on release plus the

sentence enhancement under 18 U.S.C. s 3147) is in accord with the

guideline range for the offense committed while on release, as

adjusted by the enhancement in this section." Id.

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At his sentencing hearing, Samuel unsuccessfully objected

to the 43-month enhancement on the ground that it was

barred by the Supreme Court's decision in Apprendi. Samuel raises the Apprendi claim again on appeal. Because he

made the appropriate objection in the district court, we

review that claim under the harmless error standard of

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). To reverse a

conviction under that standard, "there must be (1) error, (2)

that 'affect[s] substantial rights'--i.e., that is prejudicial."

United States v. Perkins, 161 F.3d 66, 72 (D.C. Cir. 1998)

(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 734). We

consider the first question, whether the district court committed constitutional error in enhancing Samuel's sentence, de

novo. See United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749, 757 (D.C.

Cir. 1998); United States v. Sanchez, 269 F.3d 1250, 1272

(11th Cir. 2001).4

II

In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held:

"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.... [I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature

to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase

the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed." 530 U.S. at 490 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2432 (2002).

This court and the other courts of appeals have held that

Apprendi's rule does not apply to offense characteristics that

enhance a defendant's sentence under the Sentencing Guide-

__________

4 In addition to his Apprendi argument, Samuel argued in the

district court and reasserts here that, pursuant to U.S.S.G. s 3B1.2,

his offense level should have been reduced by two levels because he

was only a minor participant in the second offense. As we have

previously said, "[t]he application of section 3B1.2 is inherently factbound and largely committed to the discretion of the trial judge."

United States v. Caballero, 936 F.2d 1292, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

We have examined Samuel's arguments and the record evidence

and discern no abuse of discretion by the district court.

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lines, but that do not increase the sentence above the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction. See United States

v. Webb, 255 F.3d 890, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v.

Fields, 251 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (collecting

other circuits' cases); In re Sealed Case, 246 F.3d 696, 698-99

(D.C. Cir. 2001).5 Samuel does not dispute that view and,

just last month, the Supreme Court confirmed it. See Harris

v. United States, 122 S. Ct. at 2406, 2420 (2002); id. at 2415,

2418-19 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.); id. at 2420-21

(Breyer, J., concurring).

Samuel contends, however, that s 2J1.7 is unlike other

Sentencing Guidelines enhancements because it does not independently increase a defendant's offense level, but rather

does so only by reference to the violation of another statutory

provision: 18 U.S.C. s 3147. Guideline s 2J1.7 states:

If an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. s 3147 applies, add 3

levels to the offense level for the offense committed while

on release as if this section were a specific offense

characteristic contained in the offense guideline for the

offense committed while on release.

Section 3147, in turn, provides:

A person convicted of an offense while released under

this chapter shall be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed for the offense to--

(1) a term of imprisonment of not more than ten years

if the offense is a felony....

18 U.S.C. s 3147. Samuel contends that, because s 2J1.7

applies only "[i]f an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. s 3147

applies," a district court may not apply the three-level enhancement without first finding that the defendant violated 18

U.S.C. s 3147. Such a finding, he insists, requires either a

jury verdict or an express plea to having committed the

offense while on release--neither of which occurred here.

__________

5 See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 481 ("We should be clear that

nothing in this history suggests that it is impermissible for judges

to exercise discretion--taking into consideration various factors

relating both to offense and offender--in imposing a judgment

within the range prescribed by statute.").

Samuel further contends that, as a result of the court's

application of s 2J1.7, he was sentenced to 43 months more

than he would have been sentenced on the drug crimes to

which he did plead, and exposed to a penalty of up to 10 years

more than the statutory maximum for those crimes. All of

this, he argues, violates the rule of Apprendi.

In response to Samuel's contentions, the government first

asserts that 18 U.S.C. s 3147 is not an offense at all, but

merely a sentencing provision that applies to convictions for

other offenses. We are not so sure. Although we have found

no reported case in which the government charged a defendant with a violation of 18 U.S.C. s 3147, that section is not

dissimilar in structure to 18 U.S.C. s 924(c), a provision that

is often charged as a separate offense.6 Moreover, the legisUSCA Case #01-3033 Document #693912 Filed: 08/06/2002 Page 5 of 11
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lative history of s 3147 is ambiguous as to whether the

section authorizes an independent criminal offense.7

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6 18 U.S.C. s 924(c)(1)(A)(i) states:

... [A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of

violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a

firearm ... shall, in addition to the punishment for such

crime of violence or drug trafficking crime--

(I) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than

5 years....

7 The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 initially enacted

a version of s 3147 like that now in force, except that it provided for

"a term of imprisonment of not less than two years and not more

than ten years if the offense is a felony." Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit.

II, s 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976, 1983 (emphasis added). Congress

simultaneously provided, however, that s 3147 would be amended

by deleting the italicized phrase upon implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, ss 222(g), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2028-29,

2031-32. The Senate Report states that this amendment "eliminat[es] the mandatory nature of the penalties in favor of utilizing

sentencing guidelines." S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 186 (1983). Although the Sentencing Commission interprets this language as

indicating that "18 U.S.C. s 3147 is an enhancement provision,

rather than an offense," U.S.S.G. s 2J1.7, cmt. n.1; see id. at cmt.

background, the language could as easily be read as authorizing a

But whether or not Samuel could have been separately

charged and convicted under 18 U.S.C. s 3147, the fact is that

he was not. Both the indictment and the judgment refer only

to the narcotics offenses to which Samuel pled guilty. Hence,

Samuel's record does not reflect a conviction for a crime to

which he neither pled nor was convicted. Instead, the district

court merely sentenced him under the Sentencing Guidelines

for the narcotics offenses to which he did plead, considering

the fact that Samuel committed an offense while on release

just as the court would have considered any other specific

offense characteristic that adjusts an offense level upward.

See U.S.S.G. ch. 2, introductory cmt. (noting that "[e]ach

offense has a corresponding base offense level and may have

one or more specific offense characteristics that adjust the

offense level upward or downward").8

Samuel argues that Guideline s 2J1.7 is not an ordinary

sentencing enhancement. Rather, because it applies only "[i]f

an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. s 3147 applies," Samuel

contends that a predicate for a s 2J1.7 enhancement is a

conviction for violating s 3147. But that view ignores the

balance of the language of s 2J1.7, which directs the court to

"add 3 levels to the offense level for the offense committed

while on release as if this section were a specific offense

characteristic contained in the offense guideline for the offense committed while on release." U.S.S.G. s 2J1.7 (emphasis added). Moreover, Samuel's position is contrary to the

view of the Sentencing Commission, which treats "18 U.S.C.

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fense," and explains that Guideline s 2J1.7 merely "provides

a specific offense characteristic to increase the offense level

for the offense committed while on release." U.S.S.G.

s 2J1.7, cmt. n.1. The Sentencing Commission's interpretation of its own guideline is binding on this court, unless that

interpretation violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or

__________

separate offense, the penalty for which is determined by the guidelines without reference to the previous two-year mandatory minimum.

8 See, e.g., U.S.S.G. s 2D1.1(b)(1) (listing possession of a firearm

as a specific offense characteristic, and increasing the offense level

for drug offenses if the defendant possessed a firearm).

is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the

guideline. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).

None of those caveats applies.9

The fact that the offense characteristic at issue here--

committing the offense while on release for another crime--is

specified by statute does not disturb our conclusion. See

Harris, 122 S. Ct. at 2419 (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.)

("The judge may select any sentence within the range, based

on facts not alleged in the indictment or proved to the jury--

even if those facts are specified by the legislature, and even if

they persuade the judge to choose a much higher sentence

than he or she otherwise would have imposed." (emphasis

added)); see id. at 2420 (Breyer, J., concurring).10 Nor does

it matter that the offense characteristic may also be treated

as an independent crime.11 To the contrary, many of the

offense characteristics that enhance offense levels under the

guidelines may be charged as separate crimes.12 In Sealed

__________

9 Although the Commission's interpretation of Guideline s 2J1.7

is binding on us, its view of whether 18 U.S.C. s 3147 may be

charged as an independent crime is not. However, as discussed

above, we do not need to decide whether s 3147 could be charged

as an independent offense in order to decide this case. See supra

note 7 and accompanying text.

10 See also 28 U.S.C. s 994(h) (directing the Sentencing Commission to assure that the guidelines include terms of imprisonment "at

or near the maximum term authorized" for categories of defendants

specified in the statute); Federal Criminal Code and Rules 1283-

97 (West 2002) (collecting session laws that, inter alia, direct the

Sentencing Commission to include specified sentencing enhancements in the guidelines).

11 Cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 397 (1995) (holding

that when uncharged conduct is used to arrive "at a sentence within

the statutorily authorized punishment range," the defendant "is

punished, for double jeopardy purposes, only for the offense of

which the defendant is convicted," notwithstanding that the uncharged conduct may also constitute a distinct offense).

12 Compare, e.g., U.S.S.G. s 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) (increasing the offense

level for an aggravated assault if a firearm was used), with 18

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Case, for example, the defendant pled guilty to unlawful

possession of a firearm, and the district court enhanced the

sentence (under U.S.S.G. s 2K2.1(b)) after finding that the

defendant had threatened to shoot someone with that firearm.

246 F.3d at 697-98. Although we noted that the threat was

"a separate felony," we nonetheless held Apprendi inapplicable to the enhancement of the underlying offense. Id.

Finally, contrary to Samuel's contention, the district court's

application of s 2J1.7 neither increased his sentence above

the statutory maximum for the drug offenses to which he pled

guilty, nor exposed him to the possibility of such an increase.

The former point is obvious, as Samuel's actual sentence of

108 months was considerably lower than the statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment applicable to each drug

offense. The latter point is equally obvious, as application of

Guideline s 2J1.7 could not have exposed Samuel to a sentence greater than life in prison, as there is no greater

sentence (other than capital punishment) in the federal system.13 Thus, the impact of s 2J1.7 was limited to determin-

__________

U.S.C. s 924(c)(1)(A) (making it unlawful to use or carry a firearm

during and in relation to a crime of violence); U.S.S.G. s 2B3.1(4),

(5) (increasing the offense level for robbery if kidnapping or carjacking was involved), with 18 U.S.C. s 1201 (defining the offense of

kidnapping), and id. s 2119 (defining the offense of carjacking);

U.S.S.G. s 3A1.2(b) (increasing the offense level for any offense if

the defendant assaulted a law enforcement officer during the offense), with 18 U.S.C. s 111 (making it an offense to assault a

government officer); U.S.S.G. s 3B1.1 (increasing the offense level

for any offense if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a

criminal activity that involved five or more participants), with 18

U.S.C. s 371 (criminalizing conspiracy to commit any offense

against the United States); U.S.S.G. s 3C1.1 (increasing the offense

level for any offense if the defendant obstructed justice during the

course of the prosecution of the offense), with 18 U.S.C. s 1512(b)

(making it an offense to obstruct official proceedings).

13 Samuel contends that, as a consequence of 18 U.S.C. s 3147, he

was exposed to a sentence of life plus 10 years, rather than merely

to the statutory maximum of life. However, because Congress has

abolished parole for federal prisoners, see Sentencing Reform Act

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ing where, within that statutory maximum, Samuel should be

sentenced.

Moreover, this limit upon s 2J1.7 applies not only to defendants like Samuel, whose underlying offenses carry maximum

sentences of life, but also to defendants whose offenses of

conviction carry substantially lower statutory maxima. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a court may impose a sentence

anywhere within the applicable guideline range, "provided

that the sentence ... is not greater than the statutorily

authorized maximum sentence." U.S.S.G. s 5G1.1; see

Fields, 251 F.3d at 1046. The government contends, and we

agree, that this limit applies even though 18 U.S.C. s 3147(1)

states that a person convicted of an offense while on release

"shall be sentenced, in addition to the sentence prescribed

for the offense to ... a term of imprisonment of not more

than ten years" (emphasis added). Where a defendant has

not been separately convicted of an offense under s 3147, but

instead has merely had his offense level increased under

Guideline s 2J1.7, the Sentencing Guidelines decree that the

maximum term to which he may be sentenced is the maximum authorized for the underlying offense. See U.S.S.G.

s 5G1.1; see also id. s 2J1.7, cmt. background ("This guideline is drafted to enable the court to determine and implement a combined 'total punishment' consistent with the overall structure of the guidelines...."). Accordingly, application

of s 2J1.7 can neither increase a defendant's sentence above

the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction, nor

expose him to the possibility of such an increase.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district

court did not commit Apprendi error when it enhanced

Samuel's sentence because he committed the second of his

narcotics offenses while he was on release for the first. In

__________

s 218, 98 Stat. at 2027, neither we nor the government can discern

any difference between a sentence of life and a sentence of life plus

10 years--even if some trial judges have included such sentences in

their judgments. Nor does Samuel suggest any difference, other

than to speculate that someday Congress may pass a statute that

differentiates between the two.

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reaching that conclusion, we note that we are in accord with

the other circuits that have addressed the question. See

United States v. Randall, 287 F.3d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2002);

United States v. Ellis, 241 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 2001);

see also United States v. Parolin, 239 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir.

2001) (on review for plain error).

We further note that, even if the enhancement of Samuel's

sentence were error under Apprendi, it would at most be

harmless error and hence not grounds for reversal. First,

because Samuel's actual sentence fell below the statutory

maximum for his drug trafficking offenses, Samuel was not

prejudiced by the alleged Apprendi error. See Webb, 255

F.3d at 898. Second, because Samuel did not and could not

contest the fact that he was on release at the time he

committed his second offense,14 his failure to plead to that

point expressly was likewise harmless, even if the fact that he

was on release were properly regarded as the equivalent of

an offense element. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,

19 (1999) (holding that the failure to submit an element to the

jury was harmless because the "defendant did not, and apparently could not, bring forth facts contesting the omitted

element").

III

Leon Samuel asks this court to hold that, when the government seeks to enhance a defendant's sentence for an offense

because he committed it while on release for an earlier crime,

that circumstance is functionally an element and must either

be proved to a jury or pled to by the defendant. Such a

ruling in Samuel's favor would grant him only a theoretical

__________

14 According to his plea, Samuel committed the second offense on

September 1, 1999. The district court's records reflect both that he

was released pending sentencing for the first offense on March 26,

1998, and that sentencing on that offense had not been completed

on September 1, 1999. Moreover, although Samuel's attorney

argued at sentencing that these facts had to be found by a jury, she

conceded that "the record is abundantly clear that he was on

release" at the time of the second offense. 2/16/01 Tr. at 21.

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victory, as the evidence is incontrovertible that he was on

release at the time of his second offense. See supra note 14.

It could, however, be deeply damaging to other defendants,

because if the existence of that circumstance were the equivalent of an element, the government would be permitted--

indeed required--to put before the jury facts that are unrelated to the underlying crime and normally regarded as quite

prejudicial. See United States v. Crowder, 141 F.3d 1202,

1203 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that a defendant cannot preclude the government from introducing evidence establishing

an element of an offense by stipulating to that element).

Apprendi does not require us to impose such a burden

either on the government or on those it accuses of crimes.

Because Guideline s 2J1.7 does no more than direct the court

to the applicable sentencing range within the statutory maximum set by Congress, the fact that the defendant was on

release at the time of the offense may be found by the court

without recourse to a jury verdict or plea. The district court

therefore committed no error in sentencing Samuel, and the

judgment of that court is

Affirmed.

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