Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15195/USCOURTS-ca9-13-15195-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
APWU National Labor Organization
Appellee
Rosemary Garity
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ROSEMARY GARITY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

APWU NATIONAL LABOR

ORGANIZATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 13-15195

D.C. No.

2:11-cv-01109-PMP-CWH

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Philip M. Pro, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 3, 2015

Pasadena, California

Filed July 5, 2016

Before: Jerome Farris, Jay S. Bybee,

and N. Randy Smith, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Bybee

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2 GARITY V. APWU

SUMMARY*

Labor Law

The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of

disability discrimination and retaliation claims brought

against a union under the Americans with Disabilities Act.

The district court held that the ADA claims were barred

by issue preclusion because of a ruling in a prior case that the

union had not breached its duty of fair representation. 

Agreeing with the Seventh Circuit, the panel held that a prima

facie claim of disability discrimination against a union does

not require a showing of a breach of the duty of fair

representation. Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claims were not

barred by issue preclusion. The panel also held that the ADA

complaint was not barred by claim preclusion. It remanded

the case to the district court for further proceedings.

COUNSEL

Matthew O’Brien (argued) and Justin Beck (argued),

Certified Law Students, Pepperdine University School of

Law, Malibu, California; Jeremy B. Rosen, Horvitz & Levy

LLP, Encino, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Michael R. Hall (argued) and Matthew A. Walker; Hall, Jaffe

& Clayton; Las Vegas, Nevada; for Defendant-Appellee.

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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GARITY V. APWU 3

OPINION

BYBEE, Circuit Judge:

Rosemary Garity, a clerk at the United States Postal

Service office in Pahrump, Nevada, suffers from a litany of

physical and emotional disabilities. Despite her willingness

to perform her job duties, Garity repeatedlycomplained to her

representatives at the American Postal Workers Union, AFLCIO (“APWU”) that postal service management refused to

accommodate her disabilities. Garity alleges that APWU,

rather than filing and processing her grievances, sided with

management, discriminating and retaliating against her

because of her disabilities.

Garity brought two complaints against APWU in federal

court, alleging a contractual breach of APWU’s duty of fair

representation in the first, and alleging a series of violations

of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”),

42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and Nevada state tort laws in the

second. After two different district court judges determined

that Garity’s complaints should proceed as independent

actions, one district court judge (Dawson, J.) dismissed

Garity’s first complaint, finding that, though APWU’s

behavior towards Garity may have been negligent, APWU’s

actions were not a breach of its duty of fair representation. In

light of this judgment, a second district court judge (Pro, J.)

tossed Garity’s second complaint, ruling that, because a prima

facie claim of disability discrimination against a union

necessarily required a showing of a breach of the duty of fair

representation, Garity’s ADA claims were barred by the issue

preclusion doctrine. Garity had failed to prove a required

element in her first complaint, the district court explained,

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4 GARITY V. APWU

and there was no need to re-litigate that element in her second

complaint.

The question before us is whether a prima facie claim for

disability discrimination against a union necessarily requires

a showing that the union breached its duty of fair

representation. If so, the district court’s application of the

issue preclusion bar was proper and Garity’s ADA claims

fail; if not, Garity’s ADA claims survive. We endorse the

Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Green v. American Federation

of Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604,

740 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2014), and hold that a prima facie

disability discrimination claim against a union does not

require that a plaintiff demonstrate that the union breached its

duty of fair representation. Accordingly, Garity’s ADA

claims are not barred by issue preclusion, and we reverse and

remand to the district court for further proceedings.

I

A. Facts

Garity began working as a clerk at the United States

Postal Service office in Pahrump, Nevada in 2008, and served

as the “shop steward” of Local #7156—the Pahrump affiliate

of the APWU—from 2009 to 2011.1 Garity describes herself

as “a disabled individual” suffering from a range of “physical

and mental impairments” that include “heel spurs, chest pain,

chronic fatigue, sleep disturbance, osteoporosis[,] myalgia,

1 Our description of the facts is largely derived from Garity’s complaint. 

We are to take these facts as true for the purposes of analyzing APWU’s

motion to dismiss. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556

(2007).

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GARITY V. APWU 5

muscle spasms and . . . cancer,” as well as “anxiety disorder,

major depressive disorder, [and] panic attacks.” Despite her

conditions, Garity asserts that she can “perform the essential

functions of many of the duties available” as long as Postal

Service management provides her with proper

accommodations.

In 2010, Debra Blankenship was appointed postmaster of

the Pahrump office. In response to perceived instances of

favoritism and disparate treatment observed under the new

leadership, Garity and other postal employees filed a hostile

work environment grievance. At around the same time, Kathi

Poulos was elected president of Local #7156, and Garity

alleges that, though Poulos acknowledged Garity’s grievance

as “valid,” she refused to process it. After Garity was unable

to attend a grievance meeting in Las Vegas in early 2011 due

to her disabilities, Poulos removed Garity from her shop

steward position and appointed herself to the position the next

day. As part of Poulos’s new duties as shop steward, she was

responsible for filing employment grievances raised byGarity

and other Local #7156 members with Postal Service

management.

In the months that followed, Garity forwarded a litany of

grievances to Poulos, alleging that management improperly

delayed the mail, sent her home early without pay, and

committed various acts of retaliation and harassment against

her. Garity informed Poulos that “the contract had been

violated” and reminded Poulos that it was her “job to

represent employees,” but alleged that Poulos “did not

investigate or file any of [her] grievances.” Because Poulos

“either wo[uld]n’t [file] or ha[d] agreed with management to

not file grievances,” Garity alleges in her complaint,

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6 GARITY V. APWU

“[m]anagement [was] well aware that they c[ould] do

anything they want[ed] to [her] with no repercussions.”

According to Garity, conditions in the Pahrump post

office continued to deteriorate throughout 2011. In January,

Garity asked Poulos to file a series of grievances stemming

from an adverse disciplinary action taken against her by

management, but Poulos refused, stating that she “alreadyhad

too many grievances” to process and choosing instead to

withdraw roughly a dozen of Garity’s previously filed

grievances. In February, the Pahrump office’s management

convened a meeting to discuss work assignments that

accommodated Garity’s disability, but rather than finding her

appropriate tasks, post office management simply cut

Garity’s work hours. Stonewalled by Poulos, Garity

approached an alternate APWU shop steward to see if he

would file her grievances, but fared no better. And after

Poulos refused to file additional grievances, withdrew others,

and failed to represent her in the proceedings on still others,

Garity filed Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

(“EEOC”) and National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)

complaints against her union for discrimination in February

and March.

In April of 2011, Garity alleges that she was suspended

for thirty days after an incident in which Garity refused to go

into a room alone with a male employee against whom she

had pending sexual harassment charges. An altercation with

Blankenship ensued, and Poulos was called to the office. 

Garity alleges that Poulos did not sufficiently defend her in a

three-page letter Poulos later wrote describing the incident,

and that the letter was in fact used to justify Garity’s

suspension. Garity complained about Local #7156’s actions

to the national APWU to no avail, and, after repeatedly

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GARITY V. APWU 7

requesting additional disability accommodations, Garity was

fired from her position on June 11, 2011.

B. Procedural History

In July 2011, Garity filed two separate complaints against

APWU in federal court.2 Her first complaint (“Complaint

One”) alleged that APWU breached its duty of fair

representation by violating provisions of its collective

bargaining agreement. Garity, acting pro se, styled these

claims as “breach of contract” claims. This complaint was

assigned to the Honorable Kent Dawson of the District of

Nevada.

Garity’s second complaint—the one at issue here—was

assigned to the Honorable Philip Pro of the District of Nevada

(“Complaint Two”). In this complaint, Garity pleaded claims

for disability discrimination under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and the ADA, Nevada state tort claims for

negligent retention and intentional infliction of emotional

distress, and claims for conspiracy to deprive her of rights

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986.

In August 2011, Garity filed a “Motion to Keep Cases

Separated as Originally Filed,” explaining that her “claims of

discrimination and the tort claims clearly involve different

questions of law from breach of contract/failure to represent,

breach of the APWU Constitution, . . . etc.” Five days later,

the APWU moved to consolidate Garity’s two complaints

into a single case, arguing that though “the legal claims

differ, the facts alleged [in the two complaints] are virtually

2 Garity’s complaints were originally filed against both APWU and

Local #7156. The latter is no longer a party to this litigation.

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8 GARITY V. APWU

identical.” In October 2011, in an unexplained order, Judge

Pro granted Garity’s motion and denied APWU’s motion. 

Three months later, Judge Dawson also denied APWU’s

motion, finding that the “Defendants have failed to show that

both complaints contain common questions of law or fact

sufficient to justify consolidating them.” Accordingly, both

claims proceeded independently.

1. Complaint One

After giving Garity a chance to amend her complaint,

JudgeDawson grantedAPWU’s motion to dismiss Complaint

One with prejudice on July 18, 2012. The court found that

Garity’s “claims [were] an amalgam of legal conclusions”

that did not support the proposition that “Defendants

breached their duty of fair representation.” The court

recognized that the union is afforded wide latitude to attend

to its internal business and found that Garity’s “factual

allegations” suggested “at worst negligence.” Garity

appealed the court’s decision in Complaint One to this court,

and we affirmed Judge Dawson’s dismissal order in a

unanimous memorandum disposition. Garity v. APWU-AFLCIO, 585 F. App’x 383 (9th Cir. 2014) (mem.). The Supreme

Court denied Garity’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Garity

v. APWU-AFL-CIO, 136 S. Ct. 71 (2015) (mem.).

2. Complaint Two

After Garity filed an amended complaint including

additional factual details, Judge Pro granted in part and

denied in part APWU’s motion to dismiss. Beginning with

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GARITY V. APWU 9

Garity’s ADA claims,3the district court found that Garity had

stated a claim for disability discrimination. The court

explained that Garity had adequately alleged that

APWU—“motivated, at least in part, by animus towards

[Garity]’s disabilities or requests for accommodation”—

“refused to file grievances and joined in [the Postal Service’s]

discriminatory practices,” triggering a series of adverse

employment actions. The district court also determined that

Garity had “pled sufficient facts” to support her retaliation

claim, noting that she had raised the inference of a “causal

link” between protected activity, like filing union grievances,

and her suspension and termination. The district court,

however, granted APWU’s motion to dismiss as to Garity’s

hostile work environment claim, noting that, though Garity

had demonstrated that “she subjectively found her work

environment hostile and abusive,” she had not shown that a

“reasonable person” would agree or that any “mental abuse,

harassment, or bullying” was “based on her disability.”

3 Garity’s amended complaint pleads her disability discrimination claims

as Title VII violations, but disability is not a protected class under that

statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (prohibiting discrimination by unions

based on “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). However, Garity

also references violations of the “ADA of 1990,” in her amended

complaint. “Because [Garity] appeared pro se in the district court, we [are

to] liberally construe [her] pleadings.” Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036,

1040 (9th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, as the district court did below, we will

treat Garity’s self-styled “Title VII” claims as discrimination claims under

the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (listing “labor organization[s]” as

covered entities under the ADA); see also § 12112(b) (outlining disability

discrimination claims under the ADA).

For clarity, we note that Garity alleged four theories of liability under

the ADA: disparate treatment (disability discrimination), failure to

accommodate, retaliation, and hostile work environment.

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10 GARITY V. APWU

A few months later, APWU took another crack at Garity’s

complaint in a new motion to dismiss. Pointing to our

decision in Beck v. United Food and Commercial Workers

Union, Local 99, 506 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007), APWU

argued that an element of a prima facie ADA claim against a

union is a “breach” of the “duty of fair representation,” and

because Judge Dawson previously dismissed Garity’s

contractual claims in Complaint One for failing to allege

preciselythat element, Complaint Twowas necessarilybarred

by the doctrine of issue preclusion.

Despite its earlier ruling, the district court reversed course

in a brief order dismissing Complaint Two in full. The court

found that Garity’s ADA claims “must be dismissed because

each requires [Garity] to prove the . . . breach of the duty of

fair representation,” a showing that Judge Dawson, analyzing

the same “nucleus of operative facts,” had previously

determined that Garity had not made. The court did not cite

any case law to support its formulation of the elements of a

prima facie ADA claim against a union, nor did it explain

why it had not discussed the breach element in its earlier

ruling sustaining Garity’s ADA claims.4

Garity timely appealed to this court. After one round of

briefing, the Appellate Commissioner appointed Garity pro

bono counsel, authorized replacement briefing, and

specifically noted that “[i]n addition to any other issues the

parties address in their briefs, they shall address the elements

of a Title VII claim against a union in light of subsequent

4 The district court also dismissed Garity’s tort claims under Nevada

law, as well as her federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. We

address those claims in an unpublished memorandum disposition filed

with this opinion.

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GARITY V. APWU 11

clarification in the law.” Order at 2, Garity v. APWU Nat’l

Labor Org., No. 13-15195 (9th Cir. Sept. 10, 2014), ECF No.

24. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II

“We review the district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss de novo.” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th

Cir. 2005). “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept

all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe

the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving

party.” Id. “Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment

can cure the defect, . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of

the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend

prior to dismissal of the action.” Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr.,

66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

We also review the district court’s ruling on issue

preclusion de novo. United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d

913, 919 (9th Cir. 2005).

III

Garity’s primary contention on appeal is that the district

court erred by dismissing her ADA claims against APWU on

issue preclusion grounds, or collateral estoppel. She asserts

that, because a disability discrimination claim against a union

does not require that a plaintiff demonstrate a breach of the

duty of fair representation by the union, her inability to make

such a showing on the contract claims in her first complaint

is not necessarily fatal to the ADA claims in her second

complaint. Before addressing Garity’s issue preclusion

argument, however, we begin by answering APWU’s

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12 GARITY V. APWU

assertion that Garity’s entire second complaint should be

barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.

A. Garity’s Second Complaint Is Not Barred by Claim

Preclusion

As a threshold matter, APWU argues that Garity’s second

complaint—the complaint at issue here—should have been

barred in its entirety by the doctrine of claim preclusion, or

res judicata. Because both of Garity’s complaints were

“predicated on discrimination and a general failure of the

APWU to represent [her],” APWU notes, “all of the grounds

in Garity’s Complaint [Two] could have been asserted in her

Complaint [One].” Appellee’s Br. 32. Put more simply,

APWU argues that because all of Garity’s causes of action

derive from the same factual foundation, she should not have

split them into two discrete complaints and should have

brought them in one consolidated action.5 We disagree.

“Claim preclusion ‘applies when there is (1) an identity

of claims; (2) a final judgment on the merits; and (3) identity

or privity between the parties.’” Cell Therapeutics, Inc. v.

Lash Grp. Inc., 586 F.3d 1204, 1212 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Stewart v. U.S. Bancorp, 297 F.3d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 2002)). 

5 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to “join, as

independent or alternative claims, as many claims as it has against an

opposing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a). Garity could have brought all of

her claims in a single complaint. But Rule 18 is “permissive”; it is the

doctrine of claim preclusion that “focuses on what a party ought to have

litigated in the first action.” Larry L. Teply & Ralph U. Whitten, Civil

Procedure 622, 962–63 (3d ed. 2004). The question, then, is whether

Garity was obligated to bring her claims in a single complaint because a

decision in one suit would preclude the assertions of her claims in the

second suit.

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GARITY V. APWU 13

Here, there is no dispute that the district court’s order

dismissing Complaint One on 12(b)(6) grounds was a final

judgment on the merits, see Stewart, 297 F.3d at 957, or that

the parties to each suit are identical. The application of the

claim preclusion doctrine, then, hinges on an analysis of

whether there is an identity—or equivalency—of claims

between Garity’s two complaints.

To determine if there is an “identity of claims,” we look

to four factors, “which we do not apply mechanistically”:

(1) whether the two suits arise out of the

same transactional nucleus of facts;

(2) whether rights or interests established in

the prior judgment would be destroyed or

impaired by prosecution of the second action;

(3) whether the two suits involve infringement

of the same right; and (4) whether

substantially the same evidence is presented

in the two actions.

Mpoyo v. Litton Electro-Optical Sys., 430 F.3d 985, 987 (9th

Cir. 2005). Though all four factors are considered,

“[r]eliance on the transactional nucleus element is especially

appropriate because the element is ‘outcome determinative.’” 

ProShipLine Inc. v.Aspen Infrastructures LTD, 609 F.3d 960,

968 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Mpoyo, 430 F.3d at 988). The

party asserting a claim preclusion argument “must carry the

burden of establishing all necessary elements.” Taylor v.

Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 907 (2008) (quoting 18 Wright &

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4405, at 83 (2d ed.

2002)). Here, that party is APWU.

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14 GARITY V. APWU

Though APWU can quickly check-off the “same

evidence” factor,

6

the other elements are not quite so clearcut. Turning to the first element, “[w]hether two suits arise

out of the ‘same transactional nucleus’ depends upon whether

they are related to the same set of facts and whether they

could conveniently be tried together.” ProShipLine, 609 F.3d

at 968 (emphasis in original) (second set of internal quotation

marks omitted). Here, two different district court judges

decided that Garity’s two complaints could not be

conveniently tried together. Indeed, as Judge Dawson

explained in denying APWU’s motion to consolidate, APWU

“failed to show that both complaints contain common

questions of law or fact sufficient to justify consolidating

them.” That said, district courts have “broad discretion” to

consolidate complaints, Inv’rs Research Co. v. U.S. Dist.

Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 877 F.2d 777, 777 (9th Cir.

1989); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (noting that a court

“may,” but is not required to, consolidate actions if they

“involve a common question of law or fact” (emphasis

added)), and a decision to refuse consolidation does not

necessarily bear on the applicability of the claim preclusion

doctrine. Additionally, there is no serious dispute that the

same nucleus of facts gave rise to both complaints—Garity

admitted as much by cutting and pasting her factual

allegations into both complaints. This element leans in favor

of APWU.

The “rights and interests” element strongly favors Garity. 

APWU has an obvious interest in avoiding successive

litigation over claims arising from the same set of facts, and

6 Garity lifted substantial portions of her factual claims from her first

complaint and inserted them directly into her second complaint. The

evidence presented is not just “substantially the same”—it is identical.

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GARITY V. APWU 15

the public has an interest in “avoiding inconsistent results and

preserving judicial economy.” Clements v. Airport Auth.,

69 F.3d 321, 330 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, however, the district

courts—both of them—found that judicial economywould be

served by keeping the cases separated and litigating them

independently. The question of whether Garity should be

forced to join her claims in a single suit was litigated and

decided against APWU. Two district courts independently

determined that Garity’s claims—her “rights and interests”—

in Complaint One were distinct from her “rights and

interests” in Complaint Two.

The “infringement of the same rights” element also favors

Garity. While our precedents do not offer a great deal of

clarification as to how this element should be analyzed, we

generally perform a basic matching exercise. See, e.g., Sidhu

v. Fletco Co., 279 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining

that “rights asserted in the two actions [we]re different”

because they involved infringement of different provisions of

a contract). Garity’s first complaint alleges infringement of

her rights under the contract APWU members have with their

union, while her second complaint alleges infringement of her

right to be free from unlawful discrimination based on her

disability. Put simply, the claims here do not match. One

complaint sounds in contract, the other in federal antidiscrimination laws and tort.

This four-factor test leaves us with something of a split

decision, but, on balance, the test leans hard in Garity’s

direction. The purpose of the claim preclusion doctrine is to

avoid successive litigation when all of a plaintiff’s claims

derive from a common factual core and can be efficiently and

effectively tried together. But implicit in the doctrine is the

assumption that the plaintiff actually had the chance to be

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16 GARITY V. APWU

heard on all of her claims in the first proceeding. Indeed, as

the Supreme Court has explained, “invocation of res judicata

or claim preclusion” requires that “the first adjudication

offer[ed] a full and fair opportunity to litigate.” Kremer v.

Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 & n.22 (1982).

Here, Garity was not offered a full and fair opportunity in

the proceedings concerning Complaint One to litigate the

claims she included in Complaint Two because Judges

Dawson and Pro kept the claims separate. It would be an

odd outcome indeed that by (twice) beating back APWU’s

motion to consolidate her complaints, Garity unwittingly

stepped on a claim preclusion landmine by litigating

Complaint One independently. After reading two district

court orders explicitly stating that her two complaints were

sufficiently distinct as to warrant keeping them separated, we

cannot reasonably expect that Garity, acting pro se, would

have the wherewithal to request that the court reverse its

order and consolidate her complaints in order to fend off the

claim preclusion bar. As the Second Restatement of

Judgments point out, there is a general exception to the claim

preclusion doctrine when the court “has expressly reserved

the plaintiff’s right to maintain the second action.”7

7 APWU references our unpublished decision in Ramos v. Apfel,

205 F.3d 1352 (9th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), for the

proposition that claim preclusion can still apply when district court judges

refuse to consolidate cases. First, this citation to pre-2007 unpublished

authority violates our rules, and we need not consider it. See 9th Cir. R.

36-3(c). Second, that case involved a litigant’s efforts to have precisely

the same ALJ ruling reviewed by two different district judges after a third

district judge did not catch that the litigant was seeking “duplicate

review.” That situation is in no way analogous to the instant case.

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GARITY V. APWU 17

Restatement (Second) Judgments § 26(1)(b). That is

precisely what happened here.

The “full and fair opportunity to litigate” requirement

operates as a safety valve to give courts some leeway in the

application of the claim preclusion doctrine. That leeway is

warranted here: Garity should not be faulted for relying on

the decisions of two district court judges mandating that her

complaints be kept separate. Garity is not attempting to take

a second bite at her first apple; she is requesting a first bite at

her second apple—an apple two district court judges told her

to keep in a separate basket. We reject APWU’s claim

preclusion argument, and hold that Garity’s second complaint

is not barred by the adverse judgment she received as to her

first complaint.

B. Garity’s Second Complaint Is Not Barred by Issue

Preclusion Because a Claim of Disability Discrimination

Against a Union Does Not Require a Showing of a Breach

of the Duty of Fair Representation

Even though we find that Garity’s second complaint

survives APWU’s claim preclusion challenge, before her

ADA causes of action in that complaint can be considered on

their merits, those claims must also survive APWU’s issue

preclusion challenge.

APWU also cites Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir.

1999). Yapp is also quite different from the case at bar. There, the

plaintiff (assisted by counsel) signed a settlement agreement with the

defendant to resolve his first complaint, aware that he might trigger a

claim preclusion issue as to his second complaint. Id. at 1229. As the

Tenth Circuit explained, “Yapp chose to forego a full and fair opportunity

to litigate [his second claim] in order to satisfy his immediate appetite” for

a settlement. Id. at 1230. Garity made no such choice here.

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18 GARITY V. APWU

APWU argues that a prima facie disability discrimination

claim against a union requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that

the union breached its duty of fair representation; because

Judge Dawson ruled that Garity had failed to make that

showing as to her breach of contract claims in Complaint

One, APWU asserts—and the district court held—that she is

barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion from relitigating

that precise issue in Complaint Two. In support of this

proposition, APWU directs us to our decision in Beck v.

United Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 99,

506 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2007), and argues that we have already

addressed the elements of a discrimination claim against a

union and have come down in its favor.

For her part, Garity argues that Beck leaves this question

open, and asks us to side with the Seventh Circuit’s recent

decision in Green v. American Federation of

Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604, 740 F.3d

1104 (7th Cir. 2014), where that circuit held that a breach of

the duty of fair representation was not part of a prima facie

Title VII discrimination claim against a union. Because,

Garity argues, the breach element litigated adversely to

Garity in Complaint One has no bearing on her ADA claims

in Complaint Two, issue preclusion does not apply.

8

8 There is no dispute that if Garity’s ADA claims require her to show

that APWU breached its duty of fair representation, she loses on issue

preclusion grounds. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, “bars

successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and

resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,

even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.” Taylor,

553 U.S. at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted). To determine if the

issue preclusion doctrine applies, we apply a three-prong test, asking if

“(1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical

to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended

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GARITY V. APWU 19

Garity gets the better of the argument. We agree that

Beck does not control our decision here, as it did not add a

“breach of the duty of fair representation” element to prima

facie claims under anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII

or the ADA. Nor do we think that such an element should be

included. As the Seventh Circuit’s persuasive decision in

Green explains, nothing in Title VII suggests that union

members must demonstrate a breach of the union’s

contractual duty to provide fair representation before stating

a claim for racial, religious, or gender discrimination under

Title VII. Green, 740 F.3d at 1105 (analyzing a prima facie

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)). And because we have

long analyzed anti-discrimination statutes like Title VII and

the ADA in parallel fashion, we hold that the Green court’s

analysis applies with equal force to union members with

disabilities seeking to challenge their union’s discriminatory

actions under the ADA.9 Accordingly, Garity’s ADA claims

with a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom [issue

preclusion] is asserted was a party or in privity with a party at the first

proceeding.” Paulo v. Holder, 669 F.3d 911, 917 (9thCir. 2011) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

Here, Judge Dawson specifically determined that Garity’s allegations

in Complaint One did “not support claims that [APWU] breached [its]

duty of fair representation,” and we affirmed that ruling, Garity, 585 F.

App’x 383. If a breach of the duty of fair representation is a necessary

element for Garity’s ADA claims in Complaint Two, Judge Dawson’s

earlier ruling on that element would have preclusive effect and Garity’s

ADA claims would fail.

9 We recognize that both Beck and Green addressed claims for Title VII

violations against unions rather than claims under the ADA as we have

here. See Beck, 506 F.3d at 876; Green, 740 F.3d at 1105. However, due

to the similarities in language and purpose between the two statutes, courts

around the country—unless they find a good reason to do otherwise—

generally use Title VII precedent to interpret ADA claims. See, e.g., T.B.

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20 GARITY V. APWU

in her second complaint are not barred by issue preclusion

because she need not prove a breach of the duty of fair

representation to make out a prima facie case of disability

discrimination.

ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 472–73

(9th Cir. 2015) (“We apply the Title VII burden-shifting framework, as

established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),

to retaliation claims under the ADA.”); Walsh v. Nev. Dep’t of Human

Res., 471 F.3d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The statutory scheme and

language of the ADA and Title VII are identical in many respects. . . .

Title I of the ADA invokes the same powers, remedies and procedures as

those set forth in Title VII.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Flowers

v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We

conclude that the language of Title VII and the ADA dictates a consistent

reading of the two statutes.”); Miranda v. Wis. Power & Light Co., 91

F.3d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[I]n analyzing claims under the ADA,

it is appropriate to borrow from our approach to the respective analog

under Title VII.”); cf. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 285–97

(2002) (outlining the similarities in the EEOC’s enforcement powers

under Title VII and the ADA, and using Title VII precedent to analyze

ADA claims). But see Brown v.City of Tucson, 336 F.3d 1181,

1188–91(9thCir. 2003) (declining to apply “Title VII’s burden-shifting or

hostile environment frameworks” to plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C.

§ 12203(b) because the Fair Housing Act served as a better textual

analog).

In light of this weight of authority, we do not believe that whether

discrimination by a union is based on the plaintiff’s race or gender or

whether it is based on the plaintiff’s disability makes a meaningful

difference to the analysis at hand. Indeed, both of the parties vigorously

argue that a Title VII decision should answer this ADA question (Green

for Garity, Beck for APWU). Accordingly, though our decision today

answers only the question before us—whether a prima facie disability

discrimination claim brought against a union under the ADA requires

proof that the union breached its duty of fair representation—our

reasoning is informed and supported by an analysis of the same question

in the Title VII context.

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GARITY V. APWU 21

1. Our decision in Beck did not hold that breach of the

duty of fair representation is an element in a Title VII

discrimination claim brought against a union

In Beck, we addressed a Title VII claim brought by

Cheryl Beck, an employee at a grocery store, against the

union that represented her. 506 F.3d at 877–78. In a

situation quite similar to this one, Beck argued that her

union’s refusal to arbitrate her grievances against the grocery

store was due to discrimination on the basis of her sex, a

violation of Title VII. Id. In addition to her discrimination

claim, Beck also brought an independent “duty of fair

representation claim” against her union. Id. at 878.

We first analyzed Beck’s breach of the duty of fair

representation claim. Noting that the “duty of fair

representation” is “imposed on labor organizations because

of their status as the exclusive bargaining representative for

all of the employees in a given bargaining unit,” id. at 879

(internal quotation marks omitted), we found that Beck’s

union “engaged in arbitrary conduct that substantially injured

a member,” a breach of the union’s legal and contractual

duties to its members, id. at 880–81.

Next, we moved to Beck’s Title VII claim. We began by

declaring that “[a] union violates Title VII if it deliberately

declines to pursue a member’s claim because of the member’s

gender.” Id. at 882. We also noted that the “standard burdenshifting framework established by the Supreme Court in

McDonnell Douglas, . . . applie[d] to a Title VII action

against a union,” and explained that “a union member can

make a prima facie claim of discrimination by introducing

evidence that the member ‘was singled out and treated less

favorably than others similarly situated on account of race or

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any other criterion impermissible under the statute.’” Id.

(quoting Gay v. Waiters’ & Dairy Lunchmen’s Union, Local

No. 30, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir. 1982)). Nowhere in our

extensive discussion of the background of Title VII law in a

union context did we discuss a “duty of fair representation”

element or cite to any cases that include the element as part

of a prima facie Title VII claim. See id. at 882–84.

It is not until we describe the district court’s analysis that

the first mention of an additional element is made. Noting

that the district court was “[r]elying on EEOC v. Reynolds

Metals Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539–40 (E.D. Va. 2002),”

we quoted the district court exactly:

[T]he district court stated, “To establish a

Title VII sex discrimination claim against a

union, an employee must show that: (1) the

employer violated the collective bargaining

agreement with respect to the employee;

(2) the union breached its duty of fair

representation by allowing the breach to go

unrepaired; and (3) there is some evidence of

gender animus among the union.”

Id. at 884. We also recognized the provenance of the threefactor test used by the district court, explaining that it was

“derived from a Seventh Circuit test for establishing a prima

facie case of discrimination, see Bugg v. Int’l Union of Allied

Indus. Workers of Am., 674 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1982),” and

noted that the Seventh Circuit’s Bugg test was “generally

consistent with the McDonnell Douglas framework.” Beck,

506 F.3d at 884.

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GARITY V. APWU 23

And that is the end of our analysis on the issue in Beck. 

We did not delve into whether the Bugg test was the

controlling test in our circuit, nor did we cite any of our cases

that apply the Seventh Circuit’s Bugg test.

10

In all other

respects, we considered the action for breach of the duty of

fair representation and the action for violation of Title VII

separately. See Beck, 506 F.3d at 886. If we were

establishing Bugg’s preeminence in this circuit, we would

have been more explicit about what we were doing; a covert

smuggling of a sister circuit’s test into our case law through

a reference to the district court’s citation of an out-of-circuit

district court case seems unlikely. The better reading of our

Beck decision is that we were explaining how the district

court reached its outcome, addressing out-of-circuit precedent

in an exploratory or academic fashion, and holding that,

because Beck had already proven a breach of the duty of fair

representation on a separate claim, whether or not that

element was included in the Title VII prima facie case had no

bearing on her ultimate success under that statute. We had no

need to parse the Seventh Circuit’s additional element

because, in Beck, the nature of the violation of the duty of fair

representation was also sufficient to prove a Title VII

violation under the traditional McDonnell Douglas

framework. See 506 F.3d at 884 (observing that the district

10 Nor could we have, because such cases simply do not exist. Aside

from Beck’s discussion of Bugg, the Seventh Circuit’s former test makes

an appearance in only one of our cases, an unpublished memorandum

disposition from 1994: Sanders v. Los Angeles Unified School District,

42 F.3d 1402 (9th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision). There we

stated that Bugg “set out a three-pronged test for establishing a prima facie

claim of discrimination against a union,” but we applied that test to the

plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 42 F.3d at *1. We then applied

a test derived from McDonnell Douglas, not Bugg, to the plaintiff’s Title

VII claim. Id. at *2.

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24 GARITY V. APWU

court had “held that the union’s ‘failure to repair the breach

[of the collective bargaining agreement] was due to a

discriminatory motivation based on plaintiff’s sex’”).

Our decision in Golden v. Local 55 of the International

Association of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980),

lends credence to our reading of Beck. There, Black

firefighters brought actions against their union for violation

of Title VII and breach of the duty of fair representation, and

we found that “[t]he same facts underl[ay] [both] the

firefighters’ Title VII . . . and ‘unfair representation’ claims.” 

Golden, 633 F.2d at 819. We found no evidence that the

union had breached its duty of fair representation, id. at

821–22; 823–24, yet we also gave a lengthy analysis of

plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, id. at 822–23. If “breach of the

duty of fair representation” was a necessary element of a Title

VII claim against a union, we would have had no need to

separately offer that Title VII analysis—once we established

that Local 55 did not breach the duty, the case would have

been over. Had Beck required proof of a breach of the duty

of fair representation before a plaintiff could bring a Title VII

action against a union, it would have added a new element to

the test set out in Golden, and thus undermined that decision. 

See also Pejic v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 840 F.2d 667,

671–74 (9th Cir. 1988) (treating separately Title VII and duty

of fair representation claims against a union).

Accordingly, we do not read Beck to require a plaintiff

bringing a Title VII discrimination claim—or, by analogy, an

ADA disability discrimination claim—against a union to

prove a breach of the union’s duty of fair representation in his

prima facie case, nor can we find any other circuit precedent

that requires as much. Rather, we take Beck at its word that

the key inquiry in a Title VII case against a union is whether

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GARITY V. APWU 25

the union “deliberately declines to pursue a member’s claim

because of” a protected classification. 506 F.3d at 882. As

such, we hold that Beck does not compel a different result

than we reach here.

2. The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Green

We think that the better rule is set out in the Seventh

Circuit’s recent decision in Green v. American Federation of

Teachers/Illinois Federation of Teachers Local 604, in which

that court rejected its prior analysis in Bugg and held that a

“claim against a labor organization under [Title VII] does not

depend on showing that . . . the union violated any state

statute or contract.” 740 F.3d at 1107. The court explained

that “the application of Title VII to employers does not

depend on a statute or contract outside of Title VII,” and that

“[n]othing in the text or genesis of Title VII suggests that

claims against labor organizations should be treated

differently.” Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). To support its

holding, the Green court looked to the text of the statute,

discussed the history and purpose of Title VII, and referred to

Supreme Court precedent setting forth the prima facie

elements of a Title VII claim. See id. at 1105–07.

First, Green noted that Congress explicitly applied Title

VII to unions by way of § 2000e-2(c). Id. at 1105–06; see

also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (“It shall be an unlawful

employment practice for a labor organization (1) to exclude

or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate

against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin . . . .”). The court explained that when

the law was enacted in 1964, “some states had laws

authorizing (even requiring) employers and unions to

discriminate against blacks,” and “[m]any unions had

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26 GARITY V. APWU

negotiated collective bargaining agreements” with racially

discriminatory elements. Green, 740 F.3d at 1105. A

“principal objective of the federal statute,” then, “was to

require labor organizations to disregard those statutes and

contracts and to end racial differences in treatment.” Id. at

1106.

With Title VII’s anti-discriminatory purpose front-ofmind, the Green court found that premising Title VII’s

applicability on whether a union had violated a contract or

statute in addition to committing a discriminatory act would

render the statute “pointless.” Id. The Green court set out the

problem succinctly:

Unless a contract, or some other statute, gave

the plaintiff an entitlement, Title VII would

do nothing. Yet if a union has, and violates,

such a duty, then a remedy may be had under

that statute or contract. Title VII would be

otiose, and claims of discrimination against

unions would be either unavailing or

unnecessary.

Id. Put differently, if a Title VII claim required a breach of

contract or a violation of some statutory duty, the plaintiff

could simply sue under the contract or statute, rendering Title

VIIsuperfluous. The court then observed that the suggestion

in its prior cases—includingBugg—that a plaintiff must show

a violation of the duty of fair representation in order to

sustain a Title VII action against a union “conflate[d] Title

VII with the elements of a hybrid breach-of-contract/duty-offair-representation claim against an employer and union

under 29 U.S.C. § 185.” Id. Disapproving Bugg, the court

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GARITY V. APWU 27

decided that “[t]his approach [did] not bear any evident

relation to Title VII,” and “withdr[e]w the language.” Id.

To bolster its holding, the Seventh Circuit highlighted

how absurd the union’s argument would be in other contexts. 

See id. at 1105. For example, if a Title VII claim relied on

breach of a contract, how could a prospective employee ever

bring a claim against a prospective employer for racially

biased hiring practices? Obviously no contract has been

formed between the two parties because the employee was

never hired, but Title VII certainly covers this interaction. 

Similarly, if an employer and employee have an at-will

employment contract, the employer has not violated the terms

of the contract by firing the employee on account of race. 

But again, there is no dispute that Title VII would provide the

employee relief. There is no reason, the Seventh Circuit

asserted, to treat claims against a union any differently. Id.

Next, the Green court pivoted to the text of Title VII and

the Supreme Court’s precedent setting forth the elements of

a prima facie Title VII claim. See id. at 1105–06. A reading

of the statutes “forbid[ding] discrimination by any labor

organization”11and “forbid[ding] retaliation against a person

11 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice

for a labor organization (1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or

otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race,

color, religion, sex, or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify

its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or

refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or

would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect

his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of

such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (3) to

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28 GARITY V. APWU

who has asserted rights under Title VII”

12

unearths no

mention of a contractual breach or statutory violation that

union members must prove. See Green, 740 F.3d at 1105. 

Nor does an analysis of McDonnell Douglas’s well-known

roadmap of a Title VII prima facie claim reveal such

requirement.13 Though the Seventh Circuit recognized that

“courts regularly have restated or modified the elements [of

a Title VII claim] to cover new situations” in the forty years

since the McDonnell Douglas decision, it noted that a court

is “not authorized to add to that framework in a way that

causes Title VII as administered to include elements missing

from Title VII as enacted.” Green, 740 F.3d at 1106–07. 

Demanding that a plaintiff show that “the union violated any

state statute or contract . . . cannot properly be added as part

of the prima facie case.” Id. at 1107. We agree.

cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an

individual in violation of this section.”)

12 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice

for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants

for employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management

committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,

including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any

individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member

thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any practice

made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he

has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”)

13

 411 U.S. at 802 (A Title VII plaintiff must show “(I) that he belongs

to a [protected class]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for

which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his

qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the

position remained open and the employer continued to seek applications

from persons of complainant’s qualifications.”).

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GARITY V. APWU 29

3. Green’s application to Garity’s ADA claims

We are persuaded by the Green court’s decision that a

Title VII claim against a union does not include an extratextual “breach of the duty of fair representation” element,

and see no reason why the Seventh Circuit’s analysis should

not apply with equal force to the ADA claim before us here. 

Like Title VII, the ADA was promulgated to combat

discrimination in the workplace,14

and indeed, the statute

notes that “unlike individuals who have experienced

discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin,

[or] religion”—the groups protected by Title VII—

“individuals who have experienced discrimination on the

basis of disability have often had no legal recourse to redress

such discrimination.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(4).15 Like Title VII,

the ADA includes labor organizations as a covered entity. 

Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) with 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2). 

Like Title VII, the ADA does not refer to any element that

applies only to claims brought by union members against

their unions. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (Title VII

discrimination) with 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (ADA

discrimination); also compare § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII

14 See George Rutherglen, Title VII as Precedent: Past and Prologue for

Future Legislation, 10 Stan. J. of C.R. & C.L. 159, 166–67 (2014)

(describing the ADA as a “descendant[] ofTitle VII” that made Title VII’s

“prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national

origin, color, and religion applicable to discrimination on the basis of . . .

disability”).

15 § 12101(4) also notes that “individuals who have experienced

discrimination on the basis of . . . age” have “legal recourse to redress

such discrimination.” Workplace discrimination on the basis of age was

addressed by the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,

29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.

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retaliation) with § 12203(a) (ADA retaliation). And, most

importantly, like the prima facie Title VII claim outlined by

the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie

ADA claims for disability discrimination and retaliation

developed in this circuit do not include a “breach of the duty

of fair representation” element.16

Just as the Seventh Circuit explained in Green, we are not

authorized to add another element to a prima facie claim

under the ADA, especially when the legislature and our court

have both already spoken so clearly on the issue. Nor would

we even if we could. If an ADA claim against a union

required that the plaintiff show a breach of contract—namely

that the union had breached its duty of fair representation to

its member—the plaintiff would have no need to sue under

the ADA, as she could simply sue for breach of contract. See

Green, 740 F.3d at 1106. It makes no sense to design a set of

prima facie elements that renders the underlying claim

unnecessary.

APWU’s argument to the contrary confuses the goals of

anti-discrimination laws, like Title VII and the ADA, with the

purposes of labor laws, like § 301 of the Labor Management

Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185, and the National

Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. APWU, quite

correctly, explains that federal labor laws impose upon unions

16 See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins., 237 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir.

2001) (“[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA

she must show that she: (1) is disabled; (2) is qualified; and (3) suffered

an adverse employment action because of her disability.”); see also Pardi

v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 389 F.3d 840, 849 (9thCir. 2004) (“To establish

a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, an employee must show

that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected activity; (2) suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.”).

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GARITY V. APWU 31

a “responsibility and duty of fair representation” to their

members. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S.

554, 563–65 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Because federal law affords unions a “wide range of

reasonableness” and “broad authority,” see id. at 563–64

(internal quotation marks omitted), this duty is breached only

by conduct that is “arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad

faith”—a rather deferential standard, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.

171, 190 (1967). And indeed that deferential standard

worked in APWU’s favor here: Garity lost her breach of the

duty of fair representation claim before the district court and

this court.

But anti-discrimination statutes like the ADA cannot be

read to parrot a cause of action that already exists under

federal labor laws. Title VII and the ADA were enacted

decades after those union-boosting laws and imposed

additional affirmative responsibilities on unions. Their

plaintiff-friendly pleading standards—essentially, to make

out a prima facie case under Title VII, the claimant need only

make a series of factual assertions before the burden shifts to

the defendant, see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802–03—make clear that the free hand unions have in other

labor matters does not extend to discrimination suits. Unions

are uniquely knowledgeable when it comes to collective

bargaining agreements and employment contracts, and the

law affords them some latitude when adjudicating disputes

arising from those contracts; there is no reason to grant them

the same deference when it comes to determining if unions

discriminated against their members on the basis of a

protected classification like disability. What the cases

demonstrate is that a plaintiff may have an easier path to

proving a Title VII or an ADA claim when she can also show

that the union has violated its duty of fair representation. See,

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32 GARITY V. APWU

e.g., Beck, 506 F.3d at 884–85. What this case also shows,

however, is that the converse is not necessarily true: A

plaintiff may still have a Title VII or an ADA claim even if

she can’t prove a violation of the labor laws.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order

dismissing Garity’s ADA claims on issue preclusion grounds,

and remand for further proceedings as to her discrimination

and retaliation claims.17 We do not pass on the merits of

these claims, but note that, prior to the district court’s issue

preclusion order, it had determined that Garity had proffered

sufficient evidence to survive APWU’s motion to dismiss.

IV

The judgment of the district court with respect to Garity’s

claims for disability discrimination and retaliation under the

ADA is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district

court for further proceedings. Considering our judgment in

this opinion and the accompanyingmemorandum disposition,

the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

17 Garity also argues that she has properly stated an ADA claim against

APWU for failure to accommodate her disabilities. See Allen v. Pac. Bell,

348 F.3d 1113, 1114 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Because we are unsure

if the district court passed on this claim in the first instance, we remand it

to the district court for further proceedings. We address the district court’s

dismissal of Garity’s ADA claim for hostile work environment in a

separate unpublished memorandum filed with this opinion.

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