Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-mc-80084/USCOURTS-cand-3_07-mc-80084-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michele Colella
Plaintiff
Denise Dussault
Plaintiff
The Republic of Argentina
Defendant

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MICHELE COLELLA AND DENISE

DUSSAULT,

Plaintiffs,

 v.

THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA,

Defendant. /

No. C 07-80084 WHA

ORDER GRANTING

DECLARATORY RELIEF

INTRODUCTION

In this post-judgment execution action, defendant Republic of Argentina seeks a

declaration that the Argentine presidential airplane is immune from execution. This order finds

that declaratory relief is warranted and that the airplane in question is not subject to execution. 

Accordingly, defendants’ motion is GRANTED.

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Michele Colella and Denise Dussault, citizens of Italy, are owners of bonds

issued by Argentina. Argentina defaulted on those bonds in December 2001 during a financial

crisis. In 2004, plaintiffs sued in the Southern District of New York to recover amounts due as

a result of the default. Argentina had previously waived sovereign immunity for failure to make

any payment of principal or interest on the bonds. On June 1, 2006, the New York court

entered judgment in the amount of $6,787,965.28 in favor of plaintiffs, representing the full face

amount of their bonds plus interest. Defendant Argentina did not appeal that judgment. To

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 1 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

date, Argentina has not made any payments on the judgment and has stated that it does not

intend to satisfy the judgment (Armstrong Decl. Exh. A; Gleizer Decl. ¶ 6).

On March 26, 2007, plaintiffs received information that a Boeing 757 airplane owned by

Argentina, with tail identification number T-01 — commonly referred to as “Tango Zero

One” — was to be in San Francisco for maintenance and other servicing (without any

diplomatic personnel) on March 27, 2007. Counsel for plaintiffs applied ex parte for a motion

for writ of execution on the airplane. The key fact — that Tango Zero One was coming to the

United States — was supported by a single declaration by Guillermo Gleizer, a New York

attorney who represents plaintiffs. Gleizer’s declaration stated, in relevant part: 

7. I recently learned that a Boeing 757200, Tail Number T-01

(the “Airplane”), owned by Argentina will be flying to the United

States for scheduled maintenance service at a United Services

Maintenance Center and that the pilots will receive training, also at

United Services. I am informed and believe and thereon allege that

United Services maintenance center in San Francisco is its largest

maintenance repair and overhaul center and that it conducts pilot

training at its facility in Denver. Based thereon, I believe that the

Airplane will be in San Francisco or Denver while it is in the

United States.

8. I was also informed that the Airplane on prior occasions has

been used to transport Argentinean President Nestor Kirchner, but

that on this particular flight the only persons on board the Airplane

will be two pilots. It is my understanding that the pilots will be

carrying a significant amount of cash with which to purchase fuel.

9. Upon information and belief, President Kirchner also flies

from time to time on Boeing 747s which are chartered to Argentina. 

The current Presidential fleet also includes two Fokker F28s, a

Learjet 60, a Rockwell Sabreliner, and several helicopters.

10. It is my understanding that Argentina has pre-paid United

Airlines and/or its affiliates, including without limitation, United

Services, for the service to be performed on the Airplane and for

training for the two pilots.

(Ex parte App. Exh. C).

After an ex parte hearing on March 27, the Court granted plaintiffs’ motion and issued a

writ of execution that expired at 4:00 p.m. on March 28. Plaintiffs were ordered to serve the

order and writ of execution on Argentina’s counsel to allow Argentina to move to modify or

vacate the writ. A hearing was set for March 29. 

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 2 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

On March 28, after receiving unconfirmed word from the United States Marshal that an

airplane matching the description of Tango Zero One was “coming in,” counsel for plaintiffs

requested that the Court extend the writ until March 29, 2007. The request was granted.

On March 29, counsel for both sides appeared for a hearing on Argentina’s motion to

vacate the writ of execution, Argentina having been notified of the proceedings. In its motion,

Argentina represented that the airplane at issue was not in the United States. Plaintiffs had no

evidence to the contrary. Based on Argentina’s representation, the Court vacated both previous

writs of execution. The Court allowed Argentina to file a “motion to quash or other appropriate

motion” to allow any remaining issues to be resolved. Argentina filed the instant “motion to

dismiss.”

ANALYSIS

1. PROCEDURAL POSTURE.

In the instant motion, Argentina seeks “dismissal” of the entire proceeding pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(b). Plaintiffs contend that this is an inappropriate vehicle

and that there is nothing to “dismiss” in this case. Central to Argentina’s motion, however, is a

request for a declaration that Tango Zero One is immune from execution under the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act and under international law. The substance of the procedural posture

of the instant motion is that of a counterclaim for declaratory relief by Argentina. The

mootness, ripeness, and standing issues, discussed below, are the same as those that would arise

in a declaratory relief action. Additionally, the facts as alleged in the ex parte motion are the

same facts upon which Argentina seeks relief in the instant motion. Accordingly, this order will

construe the present motion and record as a counterclaim by Argentina for declaratory relief. 

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(b) (“A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with federal

law, rules adopted [by the Supreme Court], and local rules of the district.”).

2. ARTICLE III REQUIREMENTS.

Plaintiffs contend that the instant motion does not meet the Article III requirements for a

live case or controversy. Plaintiffs raise ripeness, mootness, and standing challenges. “The

ripeness and mootness doctrines are based in part upon the Article III requirement that courts

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 3 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

decide only cases or controversies.” W. Oil and Gas Assoc. v. Sonoma County, 905 F.2d 1287,

1290 (9th Cir. 1990). “The ripeness inquiry asks ‘whether there yet is any need for the court to

act,’ while the mootness inquiry asks ‘whether there is anything left for the court to do.’” Ibid.

(citing Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, 3532.1 (2d ed. 1984)). 

Because of the unique factual situation presented here, both the possible unripeness and

mootness of the instant case are at issue.

A. Mootness.

A federal court has no authority to address moot issues. The Supreme Court has held:

A case is moot when the issues presented are no longer “live” or

the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome. The

underlying concern is that, when the challenged conduct ceases

such that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be

repeated, then it becomes impossible for the court to grant any

effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. In that case, any

opinion as to the legality of the challenged action would be

advisory.

City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (alterations, citations, and quotations

omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, a case “will not be deemed moot if there is a reasonable

likelihood that the parties will contest the same issues in a subsequent proceeding.” W. Oil and

Gas Assoc., 905 F.2d at 1290–91. In addition, a “heavy burden” of persuading the Court “that

the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party

asserting mootness.” Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222 (2000). 

This action is not moot. This order finds a reasonable likelihood that the parties will

contest the same issues raised in the ex parte application in a future proceeding. It is true that

the writ of execution the Court originally granted was subsequently vacated. Plaintiffs,

however, have expressed an intent to pursue a new writ if they learn that Tango Zero One is

scheduled to come to the United States for service (Popovic Decl. ¶ 2). Moreover, Argentina

claims that it wants to bring Tango Zero One to the United States for service. 

Argentina’s contention that it will eventually bring the aircraft to the United States for

servicing is reasonable and credible. Tango Zero One is an American-made Boeing aircraft. As

Luis Paris, Air Attaché to the Argentine Embassy in the United States, expresses in his

declaration, the United States is the only country in which some repairs or maintenance of

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 4 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

Tango Zero One can be performed (2d Supp. Paris Decl. ¶ 9). Additionally, Paris’s declaration

states that “[t]here are times when the only, or the best, facilities for repairs are located in the

United States and it would be impossible or unreasonably difficult to send Tango Zero One to a

third country instead” (id. at 10). While it is not absolutely certain that Tango Zero One will

come to the United States for servicing, plaintiffs have not overcome their “heavy burden” of

showing that the aircraft is not reasonably likely to do so. Both parties have a legally

cognizable interest in the declaratory relief sought by defendants. Plaintiffs incorrectly argue

that this case is moot. 

B. Ripeness.

Notwithstanding their mootness argument, plaintiffs also contend that any immunity

issues are also unripe for adjudication. The ripeness doctrine is “drawn both from Article III

limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.” 

Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dept. of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). Two factors must

be considered in a ripeness analysis: (1) the fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and

(2) the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99

(1977). This order holds that after consideration of the relevant factors, the issues on which

Argentina seeks a ruling are ripe for adjudication.

Argentina seeks a ruling on a live, concrete issue — whether bringing Tango Zero One

to the United States for service and maintenance fits within the “used for a commercial activity”

exception under the FSIA. Plaintiffs suggest that Argentina seeks a ruling based on

hypothetical facts. Not so. Argentina’s motion is based on the basic facts that plaintiffs

brought before the Court in the ex parte motion — that Tango Zero One was coming for service

and maintenance without the president or any other dignitary on board. Plaintiffs do not dispute

that the ex parte motion was ripe for adjudication when it was brought. That dispute — neither

hypothetical nor abstract — still needs to be resolved. Adjudication will “resolve a real and

substantial controversy admitting of specific releif through a decree of a conclusive character.” 

Earth Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 459 F.3d 954, 961–62 (9th Cir. 2006).

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 5 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Moreover, there will be undue hardship on Argentina if these questions are not decided. 

Leaving the instant issues open will create uncertainty whether Tango Zero One can be brought

into the United States without the prospect of seizure. This, in turn, would interfere with

Argentina’s ability to use the aircraft for all purposes, including undisputedly sovereign ones. It

is possible that by declining to issue a decision now — and effectively preventing Argentina

from bringing Tango Zero One to the United States for service and maintenance — the safety of

anyone flying on the aircraft, including the president, will be endangered. These are important

considerations that weigh strongly in favor of deciding these issues now.

C. Standing.

Plaintiffs briefly argue that Argentina has no Article III standing and that it has not

demonstrated that it has an “injury in fact” that is “(a) concrete and particularized; and (b)

actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Earth Island Ins., 459 F.3d at 960. 

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that there is nothing threatening Argentina’s airplane in any

specific or general way. As discussed above, however, the undisputed factual record here

establishes that plaintiffs have stated that they will seek a writ of execution if Argentina brings

the plane to the United States for service and maintenance. This ongoing threat to Argentina

constrains its ability to service the aircraft and is “concrete and particularized,” and not

“conjectural or hypothetical.” It is sufficient to confer standing on Argentina to seek

declaratory relief here.

3. IMMUNITY UNDER THE FSIA.

The FSIA provides procedures for obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign state

and “governs the extent to which a state’s property may be subject to attachment or execution.” 

Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 691 (2004). Under Section 1609 of the FSIA,

“the property in the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and

execution except as provided” in Sections 1610 and 1611 of the act. See 28 U.S.C. 1609. The

issue between the parties here is whether two specific exceptions apply — the “used for a

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 6 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

 The parties disagree whether plaintiffs or Argentina should carry the burden of proving or disproving

immunity. This order need not resolve the question because even assuming that Argentina has the burden of

proving Tango Zero One is immune from execution, it has carried that burden.

7

commercial activity” exception of Section 1610(a) and the “used in connection with a military

activity” exception of Section 1611(b)(2).1

A. Commercial-Activity Exception.

Section 1610(a) authorizes execution against property of a foreign state located in the

United States only if the property is “used for a commercial activity in the United States.” 28

U.S.C. 1610(a). Section 1610(a) states, in relevant part:

The property in the United States of a foreign state, as defined in

section 1603(a) of this chapter, used for a commercial activity in

the United States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of

execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court

of the United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act,

if — 

(1) the foreign state has waived its immunity from attachment in

aid of execution or from execution either explicitly or by

implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver the

foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the

terms of the waiver . . .

Argentina does not dispute plaintiffs’ invocation of this provision under Section 1610(a)(1)

because Argentina waived its immunity with regard to any action to execute on judgments

obtained against Argentina by bond holders (Ex parte App. Exh. A at 30, 52). The parties

disagree, however, whether Tango Zero One can be considered “used for a commercial activity”

while it is serviced and maintained in the United States. This order finds that Tango Zero One

is not used for a commercial activity when — as was alleged in the ex parte motion — it comes

to the United States for service and maintenance, even when that is the sole purpose of the entry

into the United States.

In Af-Cap Inc. v. Chevron Overseas (Congo) Ltd., 475 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2007),

the Ninth Circuit construed the term “used for” as it appears in Section 1610. The Ninth Circuit

agreed with the Fifth Circuit that “[t]he phrase ‘used for’ in § 1610(a) is not a mere syntactical

infelicity that permits courts to look beyond the ‘use’ of property, and instead try to find any

kind of nexus or connection to a commercial activity in the United States.” Af-Cap Inc., 475

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 7 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

F.3d at 1087 (quoting Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, (CBC) 309 F.3d

240, 254 (5th Cir. 2002)). The “used for a commercial purpose” exception of Section 1610(a) is

to be strictly construed; it is narrower than the language in Subsection (b), which permits

execution on “any property in the United States of an agency or instrumentality of a foreign

state engaged in commercial activity in the United States,” regardless of how the agency uses

the property. See Af-Cap, 475 F.3d at 1088–89. The Ninth Circuit concluded that property “is

‘used for a commercial activity in the United States’ when the property in question is put into

action, put into service, availed or employed for a commercial activity, not in connection with a

commercial activity or in relation to a commercial activity.” Id. at 1091; see also id. at 1089

(“‘[U]sed for a commercial activity’ in § 1610(a) and ‘in connection with a commercial

activity’ in § 1605(a)(2) are very different phrases. ‘Used for’ is ‘more specific’ and narrower

than ‘in connection with.’”). 

Here, Tango Zero One is employed for strictly non-commercial activities. It is only

used to transport the president of Argentina in the president’s official capacity, not his personal

capacity (Supp. Paris Decl. ¶ 3; 2d Supp. Paris Decl. ¶ 3). Defendants have offered no evidence

to rebut this fact. As the airplane that transports the president in the performance of his official

duties, Tango Zero One is not subject to execution under the FSIA. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit

has recognized in dicta: 

Consider an airplane owned by a foreign government and used

solely to shuttle a foreign head-of-state back and forth for official

visits. If the plane lands in the United States, it would not be

subject to attachment or execution. The plane is not “used for” any

commercial activity, in the U.S. or elsewhere. . . . [A] U.S. court

could never under the terms of the FSIA confiscate a plane used

solely to transport a foreign head-of-state on official business. 

Attaching the plane and selling it in execution of a judgment would

go too far in interrupting the public acts of a foreign state.

CBC, 309 F.3d at 253. So too here. Because Tango Zero One’s only use is to transport the

president, it is thus never “put into action, put into service, availed or employed” for a

commercial activity. Af-Cap, 475 F.3d at 1091. 

The core of plaintiffs’ ex parte motion — and their opposition to the instant motion — is

that Tango Zero One is “used for” various commercial and non-commercial activities, of which

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 8 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

transporting the president is only one non-commercial use. Plaintiffs concede that Tango Zero

One cannot be seized if it is carrying the president. According to plaintiffs, however, when

Tango Zero One is being flown to the United States solely for service and maintenance, that is a

“commercial activity” for purposes of the FSIA. Thus, in plaintiffs’ view, a distinction must be

drawn between the “nature” of an asset and the “purpose” of a specific activity. This is

incorrect. 

That the presidential airplane requires periodic service and maintenance does not mean

that it is being “used for” commercial activity. The airplane is still only “used for” transporting

the president. Service and maintenance do not convert the airplane into an implement used in

commerce any more than filling its tanks with jet fuel would be considered a commercial use. 

This order agrees with Argentina that the plane needs to be maintained and serviced, but it is

not “used for” maintenance and service, even when the president is not aboard. Af-Cap held

that “use” is “most sensibly read to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not

merely a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce.” Id. at 1088 (quoting Jones v.

United States, 529 U.S. 848, 855 (2000)). Accordingly, this order holds that to the extent that

servicing Tango Zero One has any connection to commerce, it is only a passing connection. 

Such servicing does not convert that employment into “use” for commercial activity. See AfCap, 475 F.3d at 1091 (holding that “determination [of whether property is used for a

commercial activity] will be made by considering the use of the property in question in a

straight-forward manner, with a proper appreciation of the fact that the further removed the

property is from the referenced commercial transaction, the less likely it is that the property was

used for that transaction.”). 

Under the Ninth Circuit’s clear pronouncement in Af-Cap, this order holds that Tango

Zero One is not subject to execution because it is not “used for a commercial activity.” 

Argentina has shown that the airplane is not used for anything other than transporting the

president. It is plain that servicing and maintenance must be performed on the airplane for it to

execute its sovereign functions safely. But such acts do not transform the “use” of the plane

into a commercial one.

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 9 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

B. Military-Property Exception.

The FSIA further provides for immunity of military property. Section 1611(b)(2)

provides that “the property of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment and from

execution if the property is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a military activity and

(A) is of a military character, or (B) is under the control of a military authority or defense

agency.” As has been noted, the military-property exception avoids “the possibility that a

foreign state might permit execution on military property of the United States abroad under a

reciprocal application of the act [FSIA].” All Am. Trading Corp. v. Cuartel General Fuerza

Aerea Guardia Nacional De Nicaragua, 818 F. Supp. 1552, 1556 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (quoting

H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487 at 31, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.. at 6630)).

This order holds that Tango Zero One “is, or is intended to be, used in connection with a

military activity” as it is “under the control of a military authority or defense agency.” 28

U.S.C. 1611(b)(2)(B). The president of Argentina, like the president of the United States, is the

Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Armed Forces. The president controls the armed forces,

is in charge of their organization and distribution, and may appoint high-ranking military

officers. Furthermore, the aircraft is maintained and operated by members of the Argentine Air

Force. When it is flown to foreign countries, it is manned by members of the Argentine Air

Force and remains under the supervision of members of the Argentine Air Force (2d Supp. Paris

Decl. ¶¶ 7–10; Supp. Paris. Decl. ¶ 6). These facts establish that Tango Zero One qualifies

under the military-property exception to the FSIA.

The same facts also establish that Tango Zero One “is of a military character.” 28

U.S.C. 1611(b)(2)(B). In All American Trading Corp., the district court found that two

Nicaraguan military aircraft that had been sent to the United States for repairs and upgrades

were protected by the military-property exemption. The court there observed:

The fact that the aircraft were being altered for more luxurious

accommodations does not render them nonmilitary. If this were

the case then Air Force One, and many other of the more luxurious

military planes used to transport military officials, would not

qualify as property used in military activity and of military

character. This Court does not believe that is what Congress

intended when enacting § 1611(b) as there is nothing in the history

of § 1611(b) that implies that military property cannot have more

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 10 of 11
United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28 2

 Plaintiffs’ objections to the second supplemental declaration of Paris are overruled. Plaintiffs’

request for discovery is denied.

11

accommodating configurations if it is used in military transport,

rather than in combat.

All Am. Trading Corp., 818 F. Supp. at 1555. As with Air Force One, Tango Zero One is solely

used to transport the president, the Commander-in-Chief of Argentina’s military. The

transportation of military officials qualifies property as being “of military character.” To hold

otherwise would frustrate foreign policy and open up the possibility “that a foreign state might

permit execution on military property of the United States abroad under a reciprocal application

of the act [FSIA].” Ibid. 

CONCLUSION

This order GRANTS Argentina’s motion for declaratory relief. Tango Zero One is

immune from execution by any federal court in the United States in aid of satisfying the civil

judgment in favor of plaintiffs so long as it is in this country under circumstances contemplated

by this order.2

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 29, 2007. WILLIAM ALSUP

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 3:07-mc-80084-WHA Document 41 Filed 05/29/07 Page 11 of 11