Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02800/USCOURTS-azd-2_06-cv-02800-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Phillip Crawford
Respondent
Eudis Montalvan
Petitioner

Document Text:

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WO JKM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Eudis Montalvan, 

Petitioner,

vs.

Phillip Crawford, 

Respondent.

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No. CV 06-2800-PHX-SMM (HCE)

ORDER

Petitioner Eudis Montalvan (A29-389-997), who is confined in the Immigration

Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of habeas

Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondent has filed a Response in Opposition to

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Petitioner has not filed a reply. The Court will dismiss

the Petition.

I. Background

Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba who was paroled into the United States in

1991. In 1993, Petitioner was convicted of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and

aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2. In 1994, Petitioner’s immigration parole

was terminated and he was placed in exclusion proceedings. On January 13, 1995, an

immigration judge found that Petitioner was excludable and denied Petitioner’s application

for asylum. The immigration judge, however, granted Petitioner’s application for

withholding of deportation and Petitioner was thereafter released from immigration custody.

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In 1997, Petitioner was convicted of robbery, kidnaping with a weapon and

aggravated battery in a Florida state court. In 1999, Petitioner was convicted of battery by

a prisoner in a Nevada state court. On September 27, 2006, the Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) filed a motion to reopen Petitioner’s exclusion proceedings and to terminate

the order withholding removal. On November 22, 2006, an immigration judge granted the

DHS’s motion to reopen, terminated Petitioner’s withholding of removal, entered an order

finding Petitioner excludable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I)

and directed that he be deported to Cuba. Petitioner waived his right to appeal to the Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) from that order.

In his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on November 21, 2006, Petitioner

alleged that he has been subject to a deportation order since 1993. He further alleges that he

has been in DHS custody since June 22, 2006, and that the DHS has been unable to obtain

travel documents to effect his deportation to Cuba. Relying on Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.

678, 701 (2001), and Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005), Petitioner argues that his postremoval order detention for more than six months is not lawful. 

Respondent contends that since less than 90 days have elapsed since Petitioner’s

deportation order became final, he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

1231(a)(2).

II. Discussion

A. Jurisdiction

The REAL ID Act of 2005 does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction because the Act

was “not intended to ‘preclude habeas review over challenges to detention that are

independent of challenges to removal orders.’” Hernandez v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 42, 42-43

(1st Cir. 2005) (quoting H.R. Cong. Rep. No. 109-72, at 2873 (2005)); See also Nadarajah

v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006) (“By its terms, the jurisdiction-stripping

provision [of the REAL ID Act] does not apply to federal habeas corpus petitions that do not

involve final orders of removal.”). Because Petitioner challenges only his detention, and not

the merits of his removal order, the Court retains jurisdiction.

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B. Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)

The apprehension, detention and release of aliens in pending administrative removal

proceedings is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226. After the administrative removal proceedings

have been completed, the rules governing the detention and release of the alien shifts to 8

U.S.C. § 1231. Section § 1231(a)(1) provides in relevant part:

(a) Detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed

 (1) Removal period

(A) In general

Except as otherwise provided in this section, when an alien is ordered

removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States

within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as the “removal period”).

(B) Beginning of period

The removal period begins on the latest of the following:

 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of

the removal of the alien, the date of the court's final order.

 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process),

the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.

8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). Petitioner did not seek judicial review of the removal order and he was

detained under an immigration process. The removal period therefore began for him on the

date his removal order became administratively final. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).

Petitioner’s removal order became administratively final on November 22, 2006, when he

waived his right to appeal the removal order to the BIA. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii). 

Following the entry of an administratively final order of removal, an alien is subject

to mandatory detention during the 90-day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). If he

cannot be removed within the 90-day removal period, the alien may be granted supervised

release or may be further detained, subject to administrative review. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).

Under § 1231(a)(6), an alien who is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182 “may be detained

beyond the removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). But when there is no significant

likelihood that a foreign government will accept the alien’s return in the reasonably

foreseeable future, the Government may not detain the alien for more than the presumptively

reasonable period of six months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. In Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S.

371 (2005), the Supreme Court extended the holding in Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens. 

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As previously noted, the removal period for Petitioner began on November 22, 2006.

Since less than 90 days have elapsed, Petitioner is still subject to mandatory detention under

§ 1231(a)(2). “[T]he Zadvydas due process analysis does not extend to § 1231(a)(2)”

because “the danger to which the Zadvydas Court responded – the danger of ‘indefinite,

perhaps permanent’ civil confinement – does not exist when the government is holding an

alien under § 1231(a)(2), a provision authorizing detention for 90 days only.” Khotesouvan

v. Morones, 386 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699). In

Khotesouvan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that “an alien

ordered removed . . . cannot raise a colorable claim for release under the Due Process Clause

of the Fifth Amendment until at least 90 days of detention have passed.” Id. at 1299.

Accordingly, a district court should dismiss a habeas corpus challenge to detention if the

petition was filed during the 90-day removal period. Id. at 1301 (“Because the petitioners

filed their habeas petitions during the 90-day removal period, the district court correctly

dismissed the petitions.”). Because Petitioner’s detention falls within the 90-day removal

period, during which he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1231(a)(2), the Petition

must be dismissed.

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied and this

action is dismissed. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.

DATED this 18th day of January, 2007.

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