Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02411/USCOURTS-ca8-06-02411-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Patrick Timothy McMorrow
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Daniel L. Hovland, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 06-2411

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of North Dakota.

Patrick Timothy McMorrow, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: November 16, 2006

Filed: December 27, 2006

___________

Before RILEY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

___________

RILEY, Circuit Judge.

Patrick Timothy McMorrow (McMorrow) was convicted of mailing threatening

communications, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c); extortion, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 876(b); and threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2). The district court1

 sentenced McMorrow to 140 months’

imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. On appeal, we affirmed his conviction,

but reversed and remanded for resentencing pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543

U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. McMorrow, 434 F.3d 1116, 1118 (8th Cir.

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 1 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
-2-

2006) (McMorrow I). On remand, the district court sentenced McMorrow to 360

months’ imprisonment and 3 years’ supervised release. McMorrow appeals. Finding

no error, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

McMorrow mailed several letters from the North Dakota State Penitentiary

(penitentiary) in late August 2003, less than three months before McMorrow’s

scheduled release. In letters to the federal district court in Bismarck, North Dakota;

the city of Fargo, North Dakota; the Governor of North Dakota; and the President of

the United States, McMorrow proclaimed “a formal declaration of war on the city of

Fargo” based on alleged violations of his constitutional rights. McMorrow demanded

reimbursement for these alleged violations, additional training for Fargo police

officers, and a review board to address complaints with the Fargo Police Department.

McMorrow vowed to wage war against the city of Fargo if his demands were not met

by a date coinciding with his scheduled release. He threatened violence and the use

of bombs, requesting citizens of Fargo “move out or take there [sic] chances.” In

McMorrow’s letter to the Governor, he asked any prisoners of war be housed at the

penitentiary because McMorrow did “not have the capabilities to hold them on [his]

own” and the use of such facilities “would cut down on the number of deaths since

[he] would be able to allow some individuals to surrender.” In his letters to both the

Governor and the President, McMorrow advised all state and federal employees be

moved from Fargo before commencement of the war given he was unable to guarantee

their safety.

During an interview with federal agents, McMorrow admitted sending the

letters, identified how he would obtain and build explosives, and advised he would

make smaller-sized bombs for ease of delivery and would store the bombs outside the

Fargo area. He also referred to military manuals he had received during his United

States Marine Corps service and noted his intent to use the Internet to aid in the

manufacture of nitroglycerin. McMorrow identified his targets as anyone within the

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 2 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
2

The district court sentenced McMorrow to concurrent sentences of 120 months

for mailing threatening communications, 140 months for extortion, and 140 months

for threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

-3-

city of Fargo, noting his own family could be killed and declaring he was willing to

die if necessary.

A jury later convicted McMorrow of mailing threatening communications,

extortion, and threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction. Following

McMorrow’s convictions, a presentence investigation report (PSR) was prepared,

which indicated McMorrow was a “career offender” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Based

on a total offense level of 37 and criminal history category VI, the resulting

Guidelines range was 360 months’ to life imprisonment. Neither McMorrow nor the

government objected to this range. The district court then granted McMorrow’s

motion for downward departure, reasoning: (1) McMorrow suffered from psychiatric

problems and personality disorders, which hindered his ability to make reasonable

decisions; (2) McMorrow lacked serious intent to harm anyone; (3) few people took

McMorrow’s letters seriously; (4) there was uncertainty pending Booker regarding the

constitutionality of the Guidelines; and (5) a thirty-year sentence was unreasonable.

Accordingly, the district court sentenced McMorrow to 140 months’ imprisonment

and 3 years’ supervised release.2

In McMorrow I, we affirmed McMorrow’s convictions, but found Booker

entitled him to a remand for resentencing. McMorrow, 434 F.3d at 1118. In doing

so, we reviewed the district court’s decision to depart downward and concluded none

of the district court’s stated reasons provided a permissible ground for departure. Id.

at 1118-20. Because we remanded in light of Booker, we declined to address the

government’s argument on the reasonableness of McMorrow’s sentence under 18

U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 1120.

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 3 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
3

The district court resentenced McMorrow to concurrent sentences of 120

months for mailing threatening communications, 240 months for extortion, and 360

months for threatening the use of a weapon of mass destruction.

-4-

On remand, in the absence of any objections to the PSR, the district court again

adopted the PSR’s factual findings and advisory Guidelines sentencing range

calculation of 360 months’ to life imprisonment. During the resentencing hearing, the

district court recognized its discretion to depart downward and to impose a nonGuidelines sentence. The district court noted its reasons previously given in support

of its downward departures were wholly rejected by this court on appeal, a holding the

district court felt “bound to adhere to.” After noting its consideration of the factors

set forth in § 3553(a) and finding no extraordinary circumstances to justify a variance,

the district court sentenced McMorrow to 360 months’ imprisonment and 3 years’

supervised release.3

 The district court’s sentencing memorandum, issued the day after

McMorrow’s resentencing hearing, also discussed the court’s reasons for imposing

the 360-month sentence. McMorrow now appeals, arguing his sentence is

unreasonable.

II. DISCUSSION

“We review for abuse of discretion the reasonableness of the sentence imposed

by the district court.” United States v. Walker, 439 F.3d 890, 892 (8th Cir. 2006). A

sentence may be unreasonable if the district court failed to consider a relevant factor

that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight to an improper

or irrelevant factor, or considered only appropriate factors but nevertheless erred by

imposing a sentence outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the

case. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.

276 (2005). 

McMorrow first contends the district court erred by imposing a sentence greater

than necessary to satisfy the purposes of § 3553(a)(2). We disagree. McMorrow, a

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 4 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
-5-

career offender, has an extensive criminal history, which includes shoplifting, arson,

disorderly conduct, terrorizing another human being, forcible rape, multiple violations

of protection orders, and resisting arrest. McMorrow also has been arrested for

driving under the influence, theft, criminal coercion, domestic violence assault, and

additional protection order violations. Our review of McMorrow’s criminal

background reflects McMorrow’s acknowledgment he is “resistant to authority” and

indicates previous attempts to deter McMorrow from future criminal conduct have

proven unsuccessful. In his most recent offense, McMorrow repeatedly threatened the

city of Fargo and government officials with violence and the use of bombs if his

demands were not met on or before a date coinciding with his release from prison.

While McMorrow argues his incarceration made it impossible for him to carry out the

threats, his release from prison was a mere two to three months away. During

McMorrow’s interview with federal agents, McMorrow fully admitted making the

threats, explained what weapons would be used and how he would carry out the

attack, and declared he was willing to die if necessary. On these facts, we cannot say

the district court abused its discretion by imposing a 360-month sentence.

McMorrow next argues the district court erred by failing either to consider the

§ 3553(a) factors or to state the reasons for its imposition of the sentence with

sufficient particularity to enable this court to perform a meaningful reasonableness

review. Again, we disagree. At the time of sentencing, the district court must state

in open court the reasons for its imposition of the sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). The

district court, however, is not required to rehearse categorically each of the § 3553(a)

factors, so long as it is clear from the record the factors were considered. United

States v. Dieken, 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 163 (2006).

During the resentencing hearing, the district court noted its consideration of the

§ 3553(a) factors and further indicated a sentencing memorandum detailing the court’s

reasoning would follow shortly thereafter. The sentencing memorandum set forth the

§ 3553(a) factors, discussed the court’s reasons for granting a downward departure in

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 5 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
-6-

McMorrow’s first sentencing, and determined those reasons could properly be

classified as the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and

characteristics of the defendant, and the seriousness of the offense. Recognizing this

court’s previous rejection of those reasons in concluding they were not entitled to

significant weight or were not supported by the evidence, the district court

acknowledged its obligation to follow McMorrow I. 

The district court then stated it was adopting and incorporating by reference the

arguments set forth in the government’s sentencing memorandum as additional

support for the 360-month sentence. The government’s sentencing memorandum, in

turn, devoted significant attention to the § 3553(a) factors, discussing in detail the

nature and circumstances of McMorrow’s offense, the seriousness of the offense

conduct, the need to protect the public, McMorrow’s violent criminal history, and the

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among similarly-situated defendants.

Our review of the record convinces us the district court carefully considered the

§ 3553(a) factors and created a clear record to allow us to conduct a meaningful

reasonableness review. See, e.g., Walker, 439 F.3d at 892 (holding the district court’s

acknowledgment that it was required to, and in fact did, consider the § 3553(a) factors

was sufficient, despite the district court’s failure to discuss each factor in detail). The

district court’s expressed reasoning is thorough and well-reasoned.

Contrary to McMorrow’s assertions, we do not agree the district court believed

McMorrow I required the district court to sentence McMorrow within the advisory

sentencing Guidelines range. McMorrow I only rejected the district court’s stated

reasons for a downward departure; it did not, however, prohibit the district court from

granting a downward variance if the court believed such a variance was warranted

based on its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. In sentencing McMorrow, the

district court properly followed Haack’s three-step procedure by (1) determining the

appropriate Guidelines range, (2) deciding whether a traditional departure was

warranted, and (3) then considering the § 3553(a) factors in deciding whether to

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 6 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029
-7-

impose a non-Guidelines sentence. See Haack, 403 F.3d at 1002-03. While the

district court expressed some reservations about the harshness of McMorrow’s 360-

month sentence, the court ultimately concluded the sentence was reasonable and

McMorrow was not entitled to a departure or a variance. We agree, and thus find

(1) no abuse of discretion by the district court, and (2) the sentence is not

unreasonable.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

______________________________

Appellate Case: 06-2411 Page: 7 Date Filed: 12/27/2006 Entry ID: 3263029