Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07225/USCOURTS-caDC-94-07225-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Air Line Pilots Association
Appellee
Federal Express Corporation
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 6, 1995 Decided October 20, 1995

No. 94-7225

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION,

APPELLANT

v.

AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 93cv02123)

Paul D. Jones argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Merrell B. Renaud entered an

appearance.

Jonathan A. Cohen argued the cause for appellee, with whom Marcus C. Migliore and Michael E.

Abram were on the brief.

Before: WALD, SILBERMAN and SENTELLE, Circuit Judges.

WALD, Circuit Judge: Appellant Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") seeks review of a

decision by the district court dismissing its suit for declaratory judgment against the Air Line Pilots

Association ("ALPA") due to lack of a case or controversy. In 1993, shortly after ALPA was

certified as the first-ever representative for pilots employed by FedEx and collective bargaining

negotiations were in progress, the companyunilaterallyimposed changesin certainwork rulessuch

as travel expenses and dress codeand extended a policy prohibiting FedEx pilotsfrom working on

flights flown exclusively within Canada. Arguing that under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45

U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988), it was permitted to implement these changes unilaterally because no

collective bargaining agreement was yet in effect, FedEx sought a declaratory judgment ofthat right.

ALPA argued it did not oppose the changes already implemented, and since FedEx had proposed no

future changes, there was no concrete legal dispute. The district court agreed with ALPA, finding

that the case was not justiciable in the absence of an actual controversy between the parties. Federal

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1Under Canadian law, intra-Canadian flights cannot be flown by American pilots working for

an airline, such as FedEx, which is based in the United States. Accordingly, the company had a

formal policy of having non-FedEx employees operate those flights. 

Express Corp. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, No. 93-2123 (D.D.C. Oct. 13, 1994). We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On June 14, 1993, ALPA was initially certified by the National Mediation Board as the

collective bargaining representative for pilots employed by FedEx. Prior to that time, FedEx pilots

were not represented by any labor organization. On the same day the certification was finalized,

August 13, 1993, ALPA filed a lawsuit against FedEx, seeking to force the company to "treat and

confer" with the union. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Federal Express Corp., No. 93-1669 (D.D.C.

1993). A few days later, FedEx agreed to meet with ALPA to initiate collective bargaining, and

ALPA voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit.

The parties did not begin actual negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement until late

August 1993, and in the interimFedEx began implementing several unilateral changesto its personnel

policies, such as its method for accounting for travel expenses, its dress code, and its procedures for

handling disputes. While negotiations were proceeding, FedEx also unilaterally extended a provision

of its rules, which otherwise would have expired on October 1, 1993, allowing the company to use

non-FedEx employees to perform intra-Canadian flights.1

The parties did not agree on FedEx'sright to unilaterallychange terms of employment. FedEx

believed that because there was no previous history of collective bargaining covering the FedEx

pilots, and no collective bargaining agreement wasin place, it was not required by the RLA to bargain

with ALPA before changing work rules. ALPA contended that FedEx was required to negotiate

before implementing any changes.

On September 30, 1993, following a series of discussions over the terms of an initial collective

bargaining agreement, Don Wilson, the principal negotiator for ALPA, sent a letter to FedEx

negotiator Donald Maliniak concerning the intra-Canadian flying policy. Wilson indicated that if

FedEx unilaterally extended the policy of using non-FedEx pilots, and thus failed to "comply with its

obligationsto negotiate ... asrequired by the RailwayLabor Act," ALPA would "take all appropriate

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2The Declaratory Judgment Act requires an "actual controversy." 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The

term "actual" is, however, one of emphasis, and not indicative of a different standard from Article

III as to what qualifies as a controversy. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240

(1937). 

action to remedy the Company's violations of the Act." 

On October 13, 1993, FedEx filed this suit, seeking a declaration that it could unilaterally

change terms and conditions of employment while collective bargaining negotiations were still in

progress. FedEx claimed there was an actual case or controversy over its right to make unilateral

changes during initial bargaining and that this fundamental legal uncertainty as to its rights and

obligations under theRLAwas preventing it fromeffectively conducting its operations. Even though

ALPA continued to maintain that FedEx was obliged to negotiate in good faith before changing any

terms or conditions of employment, it argued in its answer to FedEx's complaint that there was no

controversy because it had not objected to the substance of any of the changes already implemented

by FedEx, that FedEx was proposing no additional changes, and that the two parties were still

engaged in collective bargaining negotiations without impasse or deadlock. In a Memorandum Order

filed October 11, 1994, the district court granted ALPA's motion to dismiss for lack of case or

controversy, under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), finding that "[w]hile [ALPA] may have made threats of

bringing a lawsuit in the past, its motions to this Court do not reveal any plan on the part of [ALPA]

to bring future legal action against [FedEx]." Mem. Order at 8.

II. DISCUSSION

The federal courts are powerlessto decide anymatter unlessit involves a case or controversy.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The requirement of a case or controversy is no less strict when a party is

seeking a declaratory judgment than for any other relief. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363

(1943).2In order to meet this threshold requirement, there must be "a real and substantial

controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished

from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." Aetna Life Ins.

Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937). The Supreme Court has explained:

The difference between an abstract question and a "controversy" contemplated by the

Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of degree, and it would be difficult, if it

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3Where a district court denies declaratory judgment on discretionary, prudential grounds, the

courts will review for abuse of discretion. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct.

2137 (1995) (decision by district court to stay declaratory judgment action during pendency of

parallel state court proceedings); Jackson v. Culinary School of Washington, 59 F.3d 254, 255

(D.C. Cir. 1995). Here, the district court's decision suggests that the court relied almost

exclusively on non-discretionary grounds, so de novo review is appropriate. Under either

standard, however, we would reach the same result. 

4Patent holders will frequently brandish a "Damoclean threat," forcing potential infringers to

risk accruing huge monetary liability which renders them "helpless and immobile so long as the

patent holder refuse[s] to grasp the nettle and sue." Consequently, some courts seem inclined to

give a broad reading to "case or controversy" in order to allow potential infringers to "clear the

air" and get the matter resolved as early as possible. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 735. We do not

suggest "case or controversy" can be construed differently depending on the subject matter, but

we do point out that collective bargaining, rather than litigation, is the favored mode of settling

would be possible, to fashion a precise test for determining in every case whether

there is such a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts

alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy,

between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to

warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.

Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). The question of

whether this constitutional requirement has been met is subject to de novo review on appeal.3See

Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney Gen. of Virginia, 940 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1991).

FedEx argues that there was "sufficient immediacy and reality" in this matter by virtue of

ALPA's threats of litigation, and relies heavily on the letter in which ALPA said it would "take all

appropriate action to remedy the Company's violations of the Act." This letter, FedEx argues, when

viewed in light of other contemporaneous statements by ALPA that FedEx was legally required to

negotiate before implementing changes, gave it a "reasonable apprehension" of facing a lawsuit. See

Sherman Treaters, Ltd. v. Ahlbrandt, 607 F. Supp. 939, 943 (D.D.C.) (threat by patent holder's

licensee against potential patent infringer not sufficient to create controversy because licensee lacked

authority to sue to enforce patent), aff'd mem., 785 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1121 (1986); see also Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc. 846 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed.

Cir. 1988) (applying objective test of "reasonable apprehension" in patent case, but not requiring an

explicit threat to sue). While one might well question whether the same words or actions found

sufficient to evoke a "reasonable apprehension" of litigation between patent holders and potential

infringers produce the same apprehension in labor negotiators,4 we find that even under the most

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labor disputes, and the passage of time, rather than exacerbating the problem, frequently cools

tempers, and allows amicable resolution of disputes. 

5After this case was dismissed, ALPA did file a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District

of New Jersey, challenging a proposal by FedEx to open a base of operations in Subic Bay,

Philippines. ALPA v. Federal Express Corp., No. 2:95cv00430-MTB (D.N.J. filed Jan. 26,

1995). FedEx argues that this lawsuit belies ALPA's assertions that it did not object to changes

proposed by FedEx. However, it is not clear that ALPA was apprised of FedEx's plans to open a

base in Subic Bay at the time this suit was pending: ALPA claims that it learned of the possibility

of a foreign base only during discovery, and that FedEx did not formally announce the Subic Bay

base until more than two months after this case was dismissed. At any rate, the subsequent

lawsuit is not relevant to whether FedEx faced a threat of litigation at the time it filed this lawsuit. 

The question of justiciability must be decided on the facts in existence at the time the suit was

filed. See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736. Here, FedEx has not demonstrated that on the date of its

suit, ALPA knew of the Subic Bay plan, much less that FedEx reasonably feared a lawsuit

blocking it. 

charitable criteria laid down in these cases, FedEx has not shown that it had a reasonable

apprehension of litigation.

Labor disputes frequently inspire robust negotiations, where some degree of "posturing" by

the partiesisinevitable. See generally NLRB v. WPIX, Inc., 906 F.2d 898, 902 (2d Cir.) ("both sides

engaged in some exaggeration, posturing and dilatory tactics, as might be expected in labor

negotiations"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 921 (1990); United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 981

F.2d 861, 866 (6thCir. 1992) (statements "amounted to little more than posturing"). Hard bargaining

is encouraged by the RLA, among whose purposes is "to provide for the prompt and orderly

settlement of all disputes...." 45 U.S.C. § 151a. Employers and unions can be expected to take

aggressive bargaining positions and freely threaten dire consequences when they are rejected.

We do not believe ALPA'sstatement that it would "take all appropriate action," in the context

of the ongoing negotiations, could reasonably be viewed as a direct threat to file a lawsuit in the

immediate future.5 Other avenues of action, including an even tougher stance at the bargaining table

or a work stoppage, were potentially available to ALPA. Had there been a letter from ALPA's legal

department that specifically posed the threat of a lawsuit, a different situation might be presented.

But the letter here was not a communication from one legal counsel to anotherit was an exchange

between negotiators. It may be that in some circumstances, a threat to take "all appropriate action"

may be interpreted as including an imminent threat to sue, so as to render declaratory relief

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appropriate. But FedEx has not made out such a case here. Against the background of ongoing

negotiations, such a generalized and hedged statementphrased as a threat to take "all appropriate

action" (with no suggestion that legal action would be appropriate)does not create a case or

controversy.

III. CONCLUSION

The actions taken by ALPA were not sufficient to create a reasonable apprehension of

litigation by FedEx. Consequently, the district court's dismissal of the petition for declaratory

judgment for lack of a case or controversy is affirmed.

So ordered.

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