Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04646/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-04646-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
CIGNA Health and Life Insurance Company
Defendant
CIGNA Healthcare of California, Inc.
Defendant
Cigna Health Corporation
Defendant
Jeffrey E. Fleming
Plaintiff
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Management Company, Inc.
Defendant
Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.
Defendant

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JEFFREY E. FLEMING,

Plaintiff,

v.

CIGNA HEALTH CORPORATION, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-04646-EMC 

ORDER DISCHARGING ORDER TO 

SHOW CAUSE AND GRANTING 

MOTION TO DISMISS

Docket Nos. 30, 34

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 7, 2015 Plaintiff Jeffrey Fleming commenced the instant action against 

Defendants Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company, Cigna Healthcare of California, Inc., 

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Management Company, Inc., Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, 

and John/Jane Does 1-100. Docket No. 1. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 17, 

2016, which was denied as moot after the Court adopted Judge Westmore’s report and 

recommendation to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, 

with leave to amend. Docket No. 27. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on April 6, 

2016, which Defendants again moved to dismiss. Docket Nos. 29 (First Amended Complaint) 

(FAC), 30 (Mot.). After Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’ motion, this Court entered an 

Order to Show Cause, to which Plaintiff responded on May 26, 2016. Docket Nos. 34, 36.

The Court has reviewed Plaintiffs’ response to the Order to Show Cause and is satisfied 

that the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court therefore discharges the 

order to show cause. However, for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

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II. BACKGROUND

This complaint arises out of Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendants refused to comply with 

the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) and a number of federal antidiscrimination statutes (42 U.S.C. 2000a-1, a-2, a-3(a), and bb-1(c)). FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges 

that he demanded medical records from Defendants after they admitted an unidentified doctor had 

billed them for blood. Id. Plaintiff claims that after stating he was a Jehovah’s Witness, 

Defendants refused to give copies of his medical records to him, another unidentified doctor, and 

HHR.1 Id. Defendants then allegedly came up with “every possible reason or objective to not 

provide them, to the point of when [sic] [Plaintiff] was sent to go through the same people again 

and they just stopped answering the numbers . . . .” Id. Plaintiff now demands: the immediate 

release of all actions billed to Cigna Health Insurance since August 20, 2008, enforcement of 42 

U.S.C. 2000h (intervention by the Attorney General), and ten million dollars ($10,000,000) for 

mental anguish. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants challenge the entirety of Plaintiff’s complaint and move for either dismissal 

with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, for 

dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). Mot. at 3. This Court dismisses with prejudice 

Plaintiff’s HIPAA claims, along with all claims against Starwood Hotels & Resorts Management 

Company, Inc. and Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend 

with respect to his civil rights claims against Cigna Health and Life Insurance Company and Cigna 

Healthcare of California, Inc. 

A. Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to file a motion to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted.” In order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must meet the 

Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standard, which requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing 

that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This standard requires “that the pleading . . . give[ ] the 

 

1

It is unclear who HHR refers to; the Court presumes Plaintiff is referring to the Department of 

Health and Human Resources.

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opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim.” Immigrant Assistance 

Project of Los Angeles Cty. Fed’n of Labor (AFL-CIO) v. I.N.S., 306 F.3d 842, 865 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(emphasis added). 

Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s FAC failed to give them the requisite notice 

because it neither identified the elements of any of the alleged claims, nor the specific conduct 

attributable to each defendant. Mot. at 5. Defendants argue that with lack of notice they “remain 

in the dark” with respect to claims alleged against them and the factual basis for such claims. Id.

This Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard. 

In his complaint, Plaintiff lists all six defendants on page two and never again makes specific 

reference to each. Instead, Plaintiff refers to them collectively as “Defendants” throughout the rest 

of the complaint. FAC ¶ 1. Plaintiff also provides a list of statutes, annotated with colloquial 

versions of their titles (i.e., 2000a-2 (depravation)), id. at ¶ 6, but never identifies the necessary 

factual basis for each cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 

The absence of any facts linking specific defendants to specific statutory violations does not 

provide the notice Rule 8(a) is designed to afford defendants. It is true that courts liberally 

construe pro se complaints, but even under the most liberal interpretation, the court “may not 

supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. Of Regents of Univ. 

of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 

199 (9th Cir. 1995) (explaining that although pro se pleadings are construed liberally, even pro se 

“pleadings must meet some minimum threshold in providing a defendant with notice of what it is 

that it allegedly did wrong”).

Plaintiff’s complaint is even more problematic with respect to his allegations against 

Starwood Hotels & Resorts Management Company, Inc. and Starwood Hotels & Resorts 

Worldwide, Inc. because Plaintiff provides no plausible basis for these defendants’ connection to 

the alleged grievances. Plaintiff claims that the association between his alleged grievance and the 

hotel chain is “Starwood Hotels is self insured and has Cigna handle its portfolio, which makes 

Starwood responsible for Cigna’s actions.” In short, Plaintiff is suggesting that Starwood is liable 

under a theory of vicarious liability. However, vicarious liability only applies to particular legal 

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relationships: generally, parent/child, employer/employee, etc. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 

Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). There is no authority that portfolio-holder/portfolio-owner is a legal 

relationship to which vicarious liability applies, and Plaintiff pleads no facts to otherwise suggest 

that the Starwood defendants had any connection to the challenged conduct. For that reason, the 

Court will dismiss with prejudice the Starwood defendants.

If Plaintiff files a Second Amended Complaint against the remaining Defendants, he must: 

(1) identify the legal and factual basis for each cause of action, (2) identify which cause of action 

is brought against which Defendant, and (3) provide a specific statement of how each Defendant 

engaged in the conduct that is the basis for the claims asserted against that Defendant. Failure to 

comply with this requirement will be grounds for dismissal with prejudice.2

B. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Untenable as a Matter of Law

Wholly apart from the inadequacies in pleading, dismissal is warranted because his claims 

are problematic as a matter of law. Plaintiff’s complaint has two main categories of claims: 

violations of HIPAA and various civil rights statutes. FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff’s HIPAA claims are 

legally invalid and are therefore dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff’s civil rights claims are legally 

untenable as currently pled, but Plaintiff is granted leave to amend for a chance to show that 

Defendants assumed the role of “state actors” in their allegedly unlawful conduct.

1. HIPPA Claims

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “refused to comply with Federal HIPAA laws regarding 

 

2

In its order adopting Judge Westmore’s report and recommendation, the Court required Plaintiff 

to satisfy these three requirements. Docket No. 27. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s failure to 

comply with the Court’s order is grounds for dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to Rule 41(b). 

Mot. at 7-8. The Court declines to dismiss with prejudice on this ground. Dismissal is a harsh 

penalty and should only be imposed in extreme circumstances. Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 

1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986). To determine whether to dismiss a claim for failure to comply with a 

court order, courts weigh five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 

litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants; (4) the 

availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on 

their merits. E.g., Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002).

Here, the factors do not favor dismissal with prejudice, as Defendants urge. In particular, 

Defendants will not be prejudiced by lack of notice if Plaintiff includes the information being 

required by the Court in a Second Amended Complaint. Further, the public policy favoring 

disposition of a case on its merits supports dismissal without prejudice, particularly when Plaintiff 

is pro se.

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the release of Plaintiff’s medical records. Id. Notwithstanding the insufficient detail in this 

accusation, Plaintiff’s claim is invalid for the simple reason that private actors may not bring 

HIPAA claims. Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 488 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007); 

see 65 Fed.Reg. 82601 (Dec. 28, 2000). Plaintiff himself acknowledged this in his Response to 

the Order to Show Cause. Docket No. 36 (“I never stated that the HIPPA [sic] laws involved 

relief/compensation to me . . .”). Plaintiff’s HIPAA claim has no valid legal basis and therefore 

must be dismissed with prejudice.

2. Civil Rights Claims

Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants violated various provisions of the Civil Rights Act, 

namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1, a-2, a-3(a), bb-1(c). FAC ¶ 6. Plaintiff begins with 42 U.S.C. § 

2000a-1, which states in pertinent part “[a]ll persons shall be entitled to be free, at any 

establishment or place, from discrimination or segregation of any kind on the ground of . . . 

religion . . . if such discrimination or segregation is or purports to be required by any law, statute, 

ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof” 

(emphasis added). This statute protects citizens from discrimination by the state, not by other 

private citizens. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Chair, No. 1:12-CV-00260-LJO, 2012 WL 843784 at *4 

(E.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2012) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for Title II violations because a bus 

company and its owner were private actors); Acuna v. Fireside Thrift Co., Inc., No. CV-05-3876-

PHX, 2006 WL 1312528 at *9 (D. Ariz. May 11, 2006) (holding that state action is a requisite 

element of the Civil Right Act). 

Admittedly, private entities have the ability to “become” state actors through their 

activities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(d) (“Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is supported 

by State action . . . if such discrimination is carried on under color of any law, statute, ordinance, 

or regulation; or . . . under color of any custom usage required or enforced by the officials of the 

State or political subdivision thereof”). See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 

715 (1961) (holding that the State had “so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence 

with [the coffee shop] that it must be recognized as a joint participant” in their discriminatory 

practices).

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Here, however, Plaintiff provides no evidence or allegation that any Defendants have 

become state actors. Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1, as currently pled, is legally 

untenable. Each additional civil rights claim that Plaintiff attempts to bring is dependent on a 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1, and so, by extension, they are also legally untenable. Plaintiff’s 

civil rights claims are dismissed with leave to file an amended complaint containing plausible 

evidence that Defendants are state actors. However, if Plaintiff wishes to assert this theory, the 

amended complaint must allege sufficient factual information in support.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Because this is only the First 

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend except the HIPAA claims, and those 

against Starwood Hotels & Resorts Management Company, Inc. and Starwood Hotels & Resorts 

Worldwide, Inc. These claims are dismissed with prejudice. As to all other claims, any amended 

complaint should be filed within 60 days from the date of this order. Plaintiff is forewarned that 

no further amendments will be permitted.

This order disposes of Docket Nos. 30 and 34.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 23, 2016

______________________________________

EDWARD M. CHEN

United States District Judge

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