Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00096/USCOURTS-caed-1_20-cr-00096-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Pedro Duran
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1 STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME 

PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

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MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

JUSTIN J. GILIO

Assistant United States Attorney

2500 Tulare Street, Suite 4401

Fresno, CA 93721

Telephone: (559) 497-4000

Facsimile: (559) 497-4099

Attorneys for Plaintiff

United States of America

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff,

 v.

PEDRO DURAN,

 Defendant.

CASE NO. 1:20-CR-00096-NONE-SKO

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE 

TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; 

FINDINGS AND ORDER

DATE: August 17, 2020

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

COURT: Hon. Sheila K. Oberto

This case is set for a status conference on August 17, 2020. This Court has issued a series of 

General Orders to address public health concerns related to COVID-19 and to suspend jury trials in the 

Eastern District of California.

Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has 

emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive 

openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case. 

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no 

exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). Id. at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. Id. at 

509; see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a 

judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally 

or in writing”).

Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which Zedner emphasizes as both mandatory 

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and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, and 617 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-justice 

continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that 

the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the 

defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable unless 

“the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that the 

ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and 

the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.

The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code 

T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics, 

natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such 

circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance 

following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. Furlow v. United States, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court 

recognized that the eruption made it impossible for the trial to proceed. Id. at 767-68; see also United 

States v. Correa, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing Furlow to exclude time following the 

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency). The coronavirus is posing a 

similar, albeit more enduring, barrier to the prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. 

In light of the societal context created by the foregoing, this Court should consider the following 

case-specific facts in finding excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-ofjustice exception, § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code T4).1

 If continued, this Court should designate a new date 

for the status conference. United States v. Lewis, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any 

pretrial continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and 

through defendant’s counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 17, 2020. 

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until 

 

1 The parties note that General Order 612 acknowledges that a district judge may make 

“additional findings to support the exclusion” at the judge’s discretion. General Order 612, ¶ 5 (E.D. 

Cal. March 18, 2020).

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November 16, 2020, and to exclude time between August 17, 2020, and November 16, 2020, under 

Local Code T4. 

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: 

a) The government has represented that discovery associated with this case includes 

investigative reports, numerous photographs and videos, hundreds of hours of recorded 

telephone conversations pursuant to wiretap order, cellular phone extractions, and large amounts 

of cellular telephone precise location data. This discovery has been either produced directly to 

counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time consult with their clients, conduct 

further investigation, review the voluminous discovery, prepare for a possible trial, and to 

continue to explore a potential resolution of the case.

c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested 

continuance would deny him/her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking 

into account the exercise of due diligence.

d) The government does not object to the continuance.

e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the 

case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the 

original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. 

f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, 

et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 17, 2020 to November 16, 

2020, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii), (iv) [Local 

Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant’s request on 

the basis of the Court’s finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the 

best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the 

Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial 

must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

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Dated: August 7, 2020 MCGREGOR W. SCOTT

United States Attorney

/s/ JUSTIN J. GILIO

JUSTIN J. GILIO

Assistant United States Attorney

Dated: August 7, 2020 /s/ Anthony P. Capozzi

Anthony P. Capozzi

Counsel for Defendant 

Pedro Duran

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2020 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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