Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00709/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-00709-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Donald Higgins
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DONALD HIGGINS, )

)

)

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner )

of Social Security, )

)

)

Defendant. )

 )

1:09-cv-00709 GSA

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S

SOCIAL SECURITY COMPLAINT

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Donald Higgins (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for

supplemental security income pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The matter is

currently before the Court on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to

the Honorable Gary S. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.1

///

///

Both parties consented to the jurisdiction of the United States Magistrate Judge. See Docs. 6 & 8.

1

1

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 1 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

FACTS AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS2

Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental security income in 1995. AR 35, 102. An 3

ALJ issued an adverse decision on September 25, 1996. AR 12, 42. During this proceeding, the 4

ALJ determined Plaintiff had a “residual functional capacity for light work with seizure

precautions.” AR 12.

Plaintiff re-filed his application for supplemental security income on or about June 7,

2005, alleging disability beginning August 1, 2002, due to physical impairments. AR 34. His

application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested a

hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). AR 29, 34-35. ALJ James P. Berry held a

hearing on May 15, 2007, and issued an order denying benefits on May 24, 2007. AR 12-19,

151-174. On February 27, 2009, the Appeals Council denied review. AR 3-5.

Hearing Testimony

ALJ Berry held a hearing on May 15, 2007, in Fresno, California. AR 151. Plaintiff was

represented by attorney Dennis Bromberg. Vocational Expert (“VE”) Jose Chaparro also

testified. AR 169-171. Plaintiff was born on November 5, 1955. AR 154. He was fifty one

years old at the time of the hearing. AR 154. Plaintiff is a high school graduate with some

college experience but he did not obtain a college degree. AR 155.

Plaintiff lives with his wife and eighteen year old son. AR 163. His wife is receiving

Social Security benefits and has diabetes. AR 163-164. His son is a high school graduate and

works part time. AR 164. 

///

References to the Administrative Record will be designated as “AR,” followed by the appropriate page

2

number.

The exact date Plaintiff initially filed his application for benefits is not clear from the record.

3

The principles of res judicata apply to administrative decisions and in order to overcome the presumption

4

of continuing non-disability arising from a prior ALJ’s finding of non-disability, plaintiff must prove “changed

circumstances” indicating a greater disability. Chavez v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1988). A change

circumstance includes a change in the claimant’s age category under 20 C.F.R. 404.1563 or 416.963, an increase in

the severity of the claimant’s impairment(s), the alleged existence of an impairment(s) not previously considered, or

a change in the criteria for determining disability. Acquiescence Ruling 97-4(9).

2

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 2 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Plaintiff’s daily activities involve maintaining the house, which includes doing the dishes,

sweeping, mopping, vacuuming, dusting, and polishing furniture. AR 164. He also acts as a

chauffeur to his wife because she cannot drive. AR 164. Plaintiff has to stop and rest while

doing certain chores; for example, Plaintiff can wash dishes for twenty minutes but then needs to

take a break. AR 164. Not all of the chores are performed every day. AR 164. The most time

Plaintiff spends on chores on a given day is two and a half hours, excluding breaks. AR 165. 

Plaintiff’s only recreational activity is playing cards with friends. AR 165. Plaintiff has no other

activities outside the home except visiting sisters, nephews and nieces on Mother’s Day, Father’s

Day, Thanksgiving and Christmas. AR 165. 

Plaintiff last worked as a self-employed landscaper from 2000 to 2003. AR 87, 155. His

clientele included private residences and commercial businesses. AR 168. His job duties

included taking care of lawns, mowing, edging, trimming, pruning, and weeding. AR 168.

Prior to that time, Plaintiff was a stay at home father, raising his son. AR 155-156. 

Plaintiff ceased his self-employment after having a heart attack. AR 156. Since that time,

Plaintiff suffers from twenty-four hour chest pain. AR 156-157. The pain gets worse when

Plaintiff performs tasks that causes his heart rate to increase such as cleaning the house. AR 157. 

 Plaintiff described the pain as “getting a thrust punch in [his] chest.” AR 157. Mental stress

also aggravates the pain; Plaintiff described the hearing with the ALJ to be “[u]ncomfortable.” 

AR 158.

Six months after his heart attack, Plaintiff attempted to work in landscaping for Bianci

Vineyards, but he was unable to keep up. AR 158. Whenever his heart rate would increase he

had to take a break, causing him to take twice as long to complete a job. AR 158. His

employment with Bianci Vineyards lasted roughly three months. AR 158. He claimed he could

not push a lawn mower or turn it like he used to. AR 166. His employers noticed and

recommended that he stop. AR 166. Plaintiff felt that his low energy levels and the chest pain

were his biggest problems. AR 166.

Plaintiff also suffers from a seizure disorder requiring him to take Phenobarbital and

Dilantin. AR 159. This last seizure occurred twelve years ago. AR 159. In response, Plaintiff’s

3

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 3 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

cardiologist told him to cut back on his smoking and not to engage in activities that required

physical exertion. AR 159. However, Plaintiff still smokes five cigarettes a day which is a

reduction from the two packs of cigarettes per day he previously smoked. AR 159-160.

Plaintiff also suffers from constant back pain which originates roughly an inch above his

waistline and travels straight up his back to the top of his neck. AR 160. It is a shooting pain

that is aggravated by “[a]ny lifting,” and any sudden movements. AR 161. Plaintiff had back

surgery in 1990. During this procedure, the surgeon filed off parts of swollen discs to relieve

pressure “on the nerve.” AR 163. However, Plaintiff claims the surgery was not helpful. AR

163. 

When asked how much he could lift without hurting himself, Plaintiff responded that he

could only lift a half gallon of milk. AR 161. Lifting an entire gallon required both hands, and

he could only carry it a short distance, such as from “the shelf to the basket.” AR 161. Plaintiff

stated he has difficulty raising his left arm. AR 167.

Plaintiff’s back pain is aggravated by cold and rainy weather which causes shooting pain

down his left leg into his left foot. AR 161. He also feels shooting pain down his leg when he

walks, or “overwalk[s].” AR 162. “Overwalking” is walking over half a mile. AR 162. When

Plaintiff walks, he usually takes a break halfway through. AR 167. 

Plaintiff is able to stand for approximately three hours in an eight hour period. AR 167. 

However, he experiences shooting pain in his legs after standing for more than fifteen to twenty

minutes. AR 162. He is able to sit without experiencing pain as long as he sits “all the way

back,” and does not lean forward all the way. AR 162. Plaintiff is able to sit for long periods as

a long as he puts pressure on his back. AR 162. The total amount of time Plaintiff can sit is four

hours. AR 167.

Plaintiff takes 800 milligrams of Ibuprofen three times a day to help with the back pain. 

AR 162. The Ibuprofen does not erase the pain completely, but “just slows it down.” AR 163. 

Plaintiff also takes 700 milligrams of aspirin every six hours for his heart and pain. AR 167. 

Other medications include Plavix, Lipitor, and Enemal in addition to the Phenobarbital and

Dilantin. AR 167. None of the medication Plaintiff takes gives him any side effects. AR 163.

4

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 4 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

VE Chaparro also testified at the hearing. AR 169. The VE indicated that Plaintiff’s past

job as an industrial/commercial groundskeeper was unskilled medium work. AR 169. ALJ Perry

asked the VE to consider a hypothetical worker of Plaintiff’s age, education, and past relevant

work with combinations of severe impairments and retention of a residual functional capacity to

occasionally lift and carry twenty pounds, and ten pounds frequently. AR 170. The worker

could also stand, walk, and sit for six hours. AR 170. In addition, the worker must avoid

exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. AR 170. When asked

whether this worker could perform the Plaintiff’s past work, VE Chaparro stated that he could

not. AR 170. However, he could perform other jobs within the national economy that required

light and unskilled work such as: cashier II; fast food worker; and office helper. AR 170. There

are 23,200, 33,500, 4,200 of those jobs, respectfully, in California; and 205,900, 384,600, and

32,900 of those jobs, respectively nationally. AR 170.

In a second hypothetical, the VE was asked to assume the same factors as the first

hypothetical, but to assume this worker could lift and carry approximately eight pounds. AR

170-171. The worker could also sit for four hours, stand for three, and walk approximately one

mile. AR 171. When asked whether this worker could perform the Plaintiff’s past relevant

work, VE Chaparro stated that he could not. AR 171. VE Chaparro opined this worker could

not perform any other job which exists in the national economy. AR 171.

In a third hypothetical, the VE was asked to assume the same factors as the previous

hypotheticals, but to assume this worker was limited to carrying ten pounds “occasionally and

frequently,” with no restrictions on sitting activities, and could stand or walk a total of two to

four hours out of an eight-hour work day. AR 171. When asked whether this worker could

perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work, the VE replied that he could not. AR 171. However,

other jobs within the national economy were available but they would be classified as sedentary

work. AR 171.

///

///

5

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 5 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Medical Record

Dr. Steven Stoltz

Dr. Steven Stoltz, MD, a Board Certified Physician of Internal Medicine for the

Department of Social Services, performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff on September

17, 2005. AR 118. Dr. Stoltz noted a history of seizures since the 1970's, with the last seizure

occurring approximately twelve years ago. AR 118. Approximately four years ago, the Plaintiff

was hospitalized at St. Agnes Medical Center for a possible heart attack. AR 118. An

angiogram was performed. AR 118. During the exam, Plaintiff stated he had constant twenty 5

four-hour chest pain as if lightly punched, but that he had not seen his heart specialist in two

years. AR 118. Dr. Stoltz noted that Plaintiff was taking only aspirin for his heart and no other

medication. AR 118.

Dr. Stoltz stated Plaintiff had a long history of back pain which radiates down into both

legs, and worsens when performing physical activities such as walking. Plaintiff does not take

medication for back pain and he had no follow-up since a failed surgery in 1988-1989. AR. 118-

119. Dr. Stoltz noted that Plaintiff smoked twenty cigarettes a day. AR 119.

The physical examination led Dr. Stoltz to conclude that Plaintiff was “healthy-appearing,

well-developed, well-nourished,” and in “no apparent distress.” AR 120. There were no

cardiovascular abnormalities such as irregular heart tones or murmurs. AR 121. When seated,

Dr. Stoltz stated Plaintiff complained of lower back pain “with radiation of pain with bilateral

knee extensions.” AR 121. In the supine position, Plaintiff also complained of bilateral back

pain. AR 121. While possessing slow range of motion, there were no restrictions. AR 121. 

Plaintiff’s gait was normal. AR 122. Dr. Stoltz diagnosed Plaintiff with seizure disorder,

possible coronary artery disease, and complaints of lower back pain. AR 122.

Dr. Stoltz also concluded that Plaintiff had good control of his seizures, and could operate

heavy machinery “very well,” as long as the proper medications were taken. AR 123. The

complaints of constant chest pain did not seem to be heart related, given that Plaintiff had not

Plaintiff may also have had angioplasty. The record is not clear in this regard. AR 118.

5

6

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 6 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

seen a cardiologist in several years and could be related to musculoskeletal and/or

gastrointestinal problems. AR 123. Dr. Stoltz recommended lifting and carrying limitations of

ten pounds occasionally or frequently. AR 123. Furthermore, Dr. Stoltz opined that Plaintiff did

not need sitting restrictions, but Plaintiff “could stand or walk at a total of two to four hours in a

normal eight hour workday.” AR 123.

Dr. Brian Ginsburg

On November 4, 2005, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Brian Ginsburg, a state agency nonexamining physician, who noted that Plaintiff could lift and/or carry twenty pounds occasionally,

lift and/or carry ten pounds frequently, stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight

hour work day, sit with normal breaks up to six hours, with no pushing or pulling restrictions. 

AR 125. Plaintiff could never climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes or scaffolds but there were no

postural limitations for balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching or crawling. AR 126. No other

limitations were identified, except Dr. Ginsburg’s recommendation that Plaintiff avoid

concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery and unprotected heights due to “usual

seizure precautions.” AR 127-128. Dr. Ginsburg also noted that his conclusions regarding

Plaintiff’s limitations were significantly different from Dr. Stoltz’s, and that Dr. Stoltz’s

conclusions were based on “[n]o new and material evidence.” AR 130. Accordingly, Dr.

Ginsburg’s Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) was based on the previous ALJ’s decision in

which it was determined Plaintiff could perform light work. AR 130, 133.

Dr. Eugene Huang

On December 22, 2005, Dr. Eugene Huang of the Comprehensive Pain Management

Center in Fresno, CA, wrote to referring physician, Dr. Husam Kaileh, regarding Plaintiff. AR

140. Dr. Huang noted Plaintiff’s medical history concerning his back pain, which stemmed from

carrying a very heavy object. AR 140. Dr. Huang noted that Plaintiff slept four hours a day,

smoked one pack of cigarettes per day, drank caffeinated beverages, but did not drink alcohol. 

AR 140. Plaintiff was taking seventy five milligrams of Plavix everyday for his prior heart

attack, Phenobarbital for his epilepsy three times a day, 100 milligrams of Phenytoin five times a

day for his seizure, ten milligrams of Lipitor once every night, five milligrams of Enalapril for

7

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 7 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

his heart once a day, ten milligrams of Cyclobenzaprine three times a day, and 800 milligrams of

Ibuprofen three times a day to help Plaintiff sleep. AR 140.

Dr. Huang noted that Plaintiff’s pain was nine out of ten on a visual analog scale and

Plaintiff “[was] in some discomfort.” AR 141. Dr. Huang also opined that Plaintiff’s range of

motion, rotation and lateral bending had decreased. AR 141. Plaintiff’s sensory in his lower

extremities also decreased as Plaintiff was unable to distinguish pinpricks, light touches, and

some temperature in his bilateral lower extremities. AR 141. Plaintiff stated he had been like

that for the previous two to three years. AR 141. Dr. Huang diagnosed Plaintiff with a history

of chronic lower back pain and lumbosacral radiculopathy. AR 141. Dr. Huang recommended

an urgent MRI of Plaintiff’s back to check for worsening compression on Plaintiff’s lower spine,

and possible epidural steroid injections. AR 141.

Plaintiff visited Dr. Huang a second time on March 28, 2006, who noted the MRI showed

deformities of the thoracic spine consistent with Scheuermann’s disease. AR 138. The MRI also

showed bulged discs. AR 138. Dr. Huang noted that Plaintiff’s pain was eight out of ten, that

Plaintiff had difficulty keeping his eyes open, and that he seemed slightly sedated. AR 138. Dr.

Huang noted a “somewhat worrisome” concern of Plaintiff’s “worsening pain and weakness of

his lower extremities,” and recommended a neurological consult, aqua therapy, and epidural

steroid injections. AR 139.

Plaintiff visited Dr. Huang a third time on May 10, 2006. AR 136. Dr. Huang noted

Plaintiff’s pain was eight out of ten. AR 136. While Plaintiff had been referred for injections

several times in the past, Plaintiff either did not attend the appointments or cancelled the

procedure. AR 136. Plaintiff complained of neck pain shooting down into his lumbar spine with

bilateral leg radiculopathy. AR 136. Dr. Huang recommended Plaintiff see a neurologist to

evaluate his neck and radiculopathy, and to rule out any type of central peripheral neuropathy. 

AR 136. Dr. Huang also suggested L4-L5 epidural steroid injections, and that Plaintiff increase

his Cymbalta to sixty milligrams at bedtime to improve Plaintiff’s radiculopathy. AR 136.

///

///

8

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 8 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

ALJ’s Findings

After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in a

substantial gainful activity since August 1, 2002, and had severe impairments including a seizure

disorder, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and ischemic heart disease. AR 14. However, the

impairments did not meet the listed impairments. AR 14.

ALJ Berry also found that Plaintiff had not overcome the presumption of continuing

nondisability by proving changed circumstances since the initial ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was

not disabled. AR 12. Although Plaintiff’s age changed on November 5, 2005, and the

presumption of nondisability was rebutted, the ALJ found Plaintiff had an RFC to perform light

work. AR 12. Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to occasionally lift and carry

up to twenty pounds, frequently lift and carry up to ten pounds, and sit, stand, and/or walk for six

hours while avoiding exposure to unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery. AR 15. 

Given this RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could not return to his past work; however, the ALJ

found Plaintiff could perform jobs that exist in the national economy including cashier II, fast

food Worker, and office helper. AR 18. Thus, Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social

Security Act. AR 19. 

SCOPE OF REVIEW

Congress has provided a limited scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision

to deny benefits under the Act. In reviewing findings of fact with respect to such determinations,

the Court must determine whether the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial

evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). Substantial evidence means “more than a mere scintilla,”

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), but less than a preponderance. Sorenson v.

Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119, n. 10 (9th Cir. 1975). It is “such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson, 402 U.S. at

401. The record as a whole must be considered, weighing both the evidence that supports and

the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s conclusion. Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993,

995 (9th Cir. 1985). In weighing the evidence and making findings, the Commissioner must

apply the proper legal standards. E.g., Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988). 

9

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 9 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

This Court must uphold the Commissioner’s determination that the claimant is not disabled if the

Secretary applied the proper legal standards, and if the Commissioner’s findings are supported by

substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health and Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th

Cir. 1987). 

 REVIEW

In order to qualify for benefits, a claimant must establish that he is unable to engage in

substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment which

has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42

U.S.C. § 1382c (a)(3)(A). A claimant must show that he has a physical or mental impairment of

such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age,

education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which

exists in the national economy. Quang Van Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 1456 (9th Cir. 1989). 

The burden is on the claimant to establish disability. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th

Cir. 1990).

In an effort to achieve uniformity of decisions, the Commissioner has promulgated

regulations which contain, inter alia, a five-step sequential disability evaluation process. 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (a)-(f), 416.920 (a)-(f). Applying this process in this case, the ALJ found

that Plaintiff: (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of his

disability; (2) has an impairment or a combination of impairments that is considered “severe”

based on the requirements in the Regulations (20 CFR § 416.920(c)); (3) does not have an

impairment or combination of impairments which meets or equals ones of the impairments set

forth in Appendix 1, Subpart P (20 CFR Part 404); (4) cannot perform his past relevant work as a

as groundskeeper or yard worker; yet (5) retained the RFC to perform a full range of light work. 

AR 14-18.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed improperly discredited Plaintiff’s testimony and that

the ALJ improperly rejected Dr. Stoltz’s opinion. (Doc. 11 at 2, 12). The Court addresses each

of these arguments below.

10

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 10 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

A. Plaintiff’s Credibility

Plaintiff argues the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing evidence reasons for

rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Doc. 11 at 8. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly

considered Plaintiff’s subjective complaints and properly determined Plaintiff was not credible. 

Doc. 12 at 4.

A two step analysis applies at the administrative level when considering a claimant's

credibility. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir.1996). First, the claimant must

produce objective medical evidence of an impairment that could reasonably be expected to

produce some degree of the symptom or pain alleged. Id. at 1281-82. If the claimant satisfies the

first step and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ may reject the claimant's testimony

regarding the severity of his symptoms only if he makes specific findings that include clear and

convincing reasons for doing so. Id. at 1281. The ALJ must “state which testimony is not

credible and what evidence suggests the complaints are not credible.” Mersman v. Halter, 161

F.Supp.2d 1078, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2001), quotations & citations omitted (“The lack of specific,

clear, and convincing reasons why Plaintiff's testimony is not credible renders it impossible for

[the] Court to determine whether the ALJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence”);

Social Security Ruling 96-7p (ALJ's decision “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to the

individual and to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the individual's

statements and reasons for that weight”).

An ALJ can consider many factors when assessing the claimant's credibility. See Light v.

Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). These factors include the claimant's

reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements concerning his symptoms, other

testimony by the claimant that appears less than candid, unexplained or inadequately explained

failure to seek treatment, failure to follow a prescribed course of treatment, claimant's daily

activities, claimant's work record, or the observations of treating and examining physicians.

Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284; Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 638 (2007).

///

///

11

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 11 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

In applying this analysis, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had severe impairments including a

seizure disorder, lumbar degenerative disc disease, and ischemic heart disease. AR 14. This

finding satisfies the first step of the credibility analysis. Smolen, 80 F. 3d at 1281-1282. 

With regard to the second step of the analysis, the ALJ noted the following:

To the extent [Plaintiff] alleges physical impairments which virtually render him

incapable of working, I do not find his testimony credible or supported by the

medical evidence of record. His seizure disorder is ‘stable.’ The claimant’s last

seizure occurred [twelve to thirteen] years ago. He does not have a valid driver’s

license, and drives. While he alleges frequent chest pains, the claimant does not

take nitroglycerin. I also note he is not undergoing any aggressive medical

treatment therefor, as you would expect given his subjective complaints. In fact,

there is very little follow up treatment related to his heart condition. I also note

[Plaintiff] has not been evaluated by a treadmill stress test, echocardiogram, or

electrocardiogram, etc., in reference to his complaints. Furthermore, there was a

2-year period where he had not followed up with his cardiologist, and he was only

taking aspirin at the time. Also diminishing [Plaintiff’s] credibility, [Plaintiff]

continues to smoke against medical advice. As to his back impairment, the

claimant is not being considered as a candidate for any additional surgery. On the

contrary, an MRI showed a mere disc bulge[,] and it does not appear he underwent

epidural steroid injection. Moreover, he is not receiving treatment consistent with

a chronic pain disorder such as the use of a TENS unit. Nor is he [undergoing]

physical therapy or other similar treatment. Furthermore, he is not taking

medication normally associated with severe pain. The claimant does not ambulate

with an assistive device. Further diminishing his credibility . . . [Plaintiff] does a

wide range of activities of daily living not consistent with his claim of total

disability including household chores, cooking, and driving. The claimant

described himself as a stay-at-home dad.” 

AR 17 (citations omitted). 

A review of the above reasons demonstrates that the ALJ gave clear and convincing

reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony. Medical impairments that can be controlled

effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of determining eligibility for

benefits. Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006). Here,

Plaintiff testified that his seizures were under control with medication, and he has not had a

seizure in over twelve years. AR 159. Dr. Stoltz concluded the same, as long as Plaintiff took

his medication, and it appears that Plaintiff has done so. AR 123, 159. Plaintiff’s compliance

with taking his medication is evidenced by the fact that he has a driver’s license and drives his

wife frequently. AR 159, 164. The seizures appear to be well within Plaintiff’s control and the

ALJ properly relied on this evidence to discredit the Plaintiff.

///

12

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 12 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Similarly, Plaintiff complains of twenty-four chest pain, comparing the feeling to “getting

a thrust punch in your chest,” as well as constant shooting pain in his back. AR 156-157. 

However, in response to this pain, Plaintiff only takes 800 milligrams of Ibuprofen three times a

day and 700 milligrams of Aspirin every six hours. AR 162-163,167. Pain medications 6

prescribed in the past were also limited to 600 milligrams of Ibuprofen. AR 142. Despite

Plaintiff’s alleged extreme pain, it had been two years since he last saw a heart specialist. AR

118, 123. And as the ALJ noted, Plaintiff failed to comply with the recommended epidural

steroid injections, nor has he undergone treatment consistent with a chronic pain disorder to treat

his back pain. AR 17, 118, 123, 136, 139. “Evidence of ‘conservative treatment’ is sufficient to

discount a claimant's testimony regarding the severity of an impairment.” Parra v. Astrue, 481

F.3d 742, 751 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F. 3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995));

Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F. 3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008) (ALJ properly inferred that the

claimant's pain was not as all-disabling as he reported in light of fact that the he did not seek an

aggressive treatment program); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F. 3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (subjective

pain complaints properly discredited where claimant complained of intense pain but only

received minimal and “conservative” treatment). 

Lastly, the ALJ properly concluded that Plaintiff’s wide range of daily activities

discredited his claims of total disability. AR 17. A claimant is not required to be completely

incapacitated to qualify for disability benefits; however, daily home activities are relevant

evidence to consider in a credibility analysis where such activities are transferable to the

workplace. Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9 Cir. 1989). For example, in Burch v. th

Barnhart, the claimant was able to care for her own personal needs, cook for herself, clean and

shop. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680 (9 Cir. 2005). The ALJ found her “quite th

functional.” Id. In Orteza v. Shalala, 50 F.3d 748 (9 Cir. 1994) (per curiam), the ALJ’s th

consideration of claimant’s “various household chores such as cooking, doing the dishes, going

to the store, visiting relatives and driving,” was proper. Orteza, 50 F.3d at 750. See also Morgan

Although Plaintiff makes brief reference to taking methadone, it is unclear whether it was being taken on

6

a regular basis. AR 138, 141.

13

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 13 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

v. Apfel, 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir.1999) (Claimant’s ability to fix meals, do laundry, work in

the yard, and occasionally care for his friend’s child was evidence of claimant's ability to work).

In this case, Plaintiff’s daily activities are transferable to the workplace because he is able

to provide for his own personal needs, and on occasion, those of his wife. AR 164-165. Plaintiff

testified that he is able to shop for groceries, wash dishes, sweep and mop floors, vacuum, dust,

and polish. AR 164. Plaintiff is also capable of visiting his friends to play cards, and visit family

members on holidays. AR 165, 166. Although Plaintiff testified that he could only do chores for

two and a half hours at a time, it appears that Plaintiff is “quite functional.” Burch v. Barnhart,

400 F.3d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). “If a claimant is able to perform household chores and other

activities that involve many of the same physical tasks as a particular type of job, it would not be

farfetched for an ALJ to conclude that the claimant’s pain does not prevent the claimant from

working.” Fair v. Bowen, 885 F.2d at 603. 

Although evidence supporting an ALJ's conclusions might also permit an interpretation

more favorable to the claimant, it is not the role of the Court to redetermine Plaintiff's credibility

de novo. If the ALJ's interpretation of evidence was rational, as is was here, the Court must

uphold the ALJ's decision where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

interpretation. Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ set forth sufficient reasons to discredit

Plaintiff's subjective complaints.

B. Rejection of Examining Physician Dr. Stoltz’s Opinion

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly dismissed Dr. Stoltz’s findings without

explanation, and instead relied on Dr. Ginsburg’s in support of his nondisability finding. (Doc.

11 at 12). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly ignored Stoltz’s limitations of

lifting and carrying ten pounds frequently and occasionally, and standing or walking two to four

hours in an eight hour day. Id. Instead, the ALJ favored Ginsburg’s assessment of lifting twenty

pounds occasionally, ten pounds frequently, and walking or standing for six hours per eight hour

day with normal breaks. AR 18. If the ALJ had adopted Dr. Stoltz’s opinion, Plaintiff would be

eligible for disability benefits.

///

14

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 14 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

As a preliminary matter, although Plaintiff’s brief inconsistently refers to Dr. Stoltz as a

treating and examining physician, the record is clear that Dr. Stoltz is an examining physician. 

(Compare Doc. 11 at pgs 6 and 10); AR 118. Dr. Ginsburg, on the other hand, is a nonexamining physician. AR 124-131. 

Medical opinions by examining and non-examining physicians are accorded different

weight. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830-31 (9 Cir. 1996). Opinions of examining th

physicians are given more weight than that given to a non-examining physician. If the ALJ

rejects an examining physician’s opinion in favor of a non-examining physician’s opinion, he

must provide specific, legitimate reasons based on substantial evidence in the record. See

Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9 Cir. 1995); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, th

752-53 (9 Cir. 1989). This can be done by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the th

facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings. 

Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d at 751. The ALJ cannot just set forth his conclusions, but must

give his own interpretations and explain why they, rather than the doctors, are correct. Embrey v.

Bowen, 849 F.2d 418, 421-22 (9 Cir. 1988). th

In this case, the ALJ rejected Dr. Stoltz’s opinion without providing specific and

legitimate reasons. AR 17. When adopting Dr. Ginsburg’s opinion, the ALJ’s merely stated, “as

for the opinion evidence, the Disability State Agency (DSA) consultants adopted the ALJ’s

decision that claimant had the residual functional capacity for light work with seizure precautions

. . . which is afforded significant weight.” AR 17. However, this was the only explanation given

for accepting Dr. Ginsburg’s conclusions and rejecting Dr. Stoltz’s findings. 

Defendant argues that the ALJ assigned proper weight to Dr. Stoltz’s opinion because Dr.

Ginsburg’s report stated there was no new and material evidence to support Stoltz’s conclusions. 

(Doc. 12 at 7). In addition, Defendant contends that Dr. Stoltz’s physical examination did not

support the limitations he assessed. Id. In particular, Dr. Stoltz’s found Plaintiff’s range of

motion was normal and that he had full motor strength, however, he opined that Plaintiff could

only lift only ten pounds and could stand or walk for two to four hours per day. Id. Although

these may have been reasons why the ALJ rejected Dr. Stoltz’s opinion, these conclusions were

15

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 15 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

not articulated by the ALJ. The Court may not speculate as to the ALJ’s findings or the basis of

the ALJ’s unexplained conclusions. Lewin v. Schweiker, 654 F.2d 631, 634-35 (9th Cir. 1981). 

A reviewing court cannot affirm an ALJ’s decision denying benefits on a ground not invoked by

the Commissioner. Stout v. Comm'r, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Pinto v.

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2001)). 

Here, the ALJ merely stated a conclusion that he afforded Dr. Ginsburg’s assessment

significant weight without giving a specific reasons for doing so. This is an insufficient reason

for rejecting an examining physician’s opinion. Finally, Dr. Ginsburg found that there was no

new and material evidence since Plaintiff’s prior hearing, and the previous ALJ’s findings should

be adopted. However, the initial ALJ’s decision is not contained in the record for this Court’s

review. Although ALJ Berry briefly references the first ALJ’s decision, the reasons for the first

ALJ’s determination were not articulated. Therefore, it is not possible for this Court to

adequately assess Dr. Ginsburg’s opinion and the medical evidence in this case.

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the case must be remanded for reevaluation of the medical evidence. In reconsidering the medical evidence, the ALJ may order

additional medical evaluations if necessary, and must give specific and legitimate reasons if he

rejects Dr. Stoltz’s opinion.

REMAND

Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the United States Code provides: “the court shall have the

power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying,

or reversing the decision of the Secretary, with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.”

In social security cases, the decision to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings or

simply to award benefits is within the discretion of the court. McAllister v. Sullivan, 888 F.2d

599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989). “If additional proceedings can remedy defects in the original

administrative proceedings, a social security case should be remanded. Where, however, a

rehearing would simply delay receipt of benefits, reversal and an award of benefits is

appropriate.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Varney v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv., 859

F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1988) (“Generally, we direct the award of benefits in cases where no

16

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 16 of 17
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

useful purpose would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record has

been thoroughly developed.”). Here, the Court finds that remand for further proceedings is

proper due to the ambiguity of the record and to allow the ALJ to properly review all of the

medical evidence as outlined above. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is not supported by

substantial evidence and is therefore REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the ALJ for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter

judgment in favor of Plaintiff Donald Higgins and against Defendant Michael J. Astrue,

Commissioner of Social Security.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: June 4, 2010 /s/ Gary S. Austin 

6i0kij UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

17

Case 1:09-cv-00709-GSA Document 15 Filed 06/07/10 Page 17 of 17