Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00800/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00800-7/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Oakland
Defendant
Steve Lovell
Defendant
Ronald Ross
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RONALD ROSS,

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF OAKLAND, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00800-MEJ 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 74

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ronald Ross brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case against Defendants City of 

Oakland (the “City”) and Sergeant Steven Lovell (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Lovell 

maliciously prosecuted him and failed to turn over exculpatory evidence leading to Ross‟s 

conviction for attempted murder. The Alameda Superior Court subsequently granted Ross habeas 

relief and overturned his conviction. Now pending before the Court is Defendants‟ Motion for

Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 74. Ross filed an Opposition (Dkt. No. 104), and Defendants filed 

a Reply (Dkt. No. 106). The Court held a hearing on this matter on July 2, 2015. Dkt. No. 112. 

Having considered the parties‟ positions, the relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, 

the Court GRANTS Defendants‟ Motion for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise indicated:

A. Factual Background

On the evening of April 15, 2006, Oakland Police Department (“OPD”) officers responded 

to the shooting of Renardo Williams in Campbell Village, Oakland, California. Consolidated 

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Undisputed Facts (“CUF”)1#1, Dkt. No. 106-1. On April 17, 2006, Sergeant Steven Lovell was 

assigned to investigate the shooting. Id. #2. Lovell reviewed the OPD Crime Report for the 

shooting and the information collected from the scene. Id. #3. His initial case review revealed 

that the only information that officers could get from Williams before he was taken to the hospital 

was that he was shot in front of his home. Id. #4. 

Lovell also learned that the only people who gave the officers substantive information 

about what took place following the shooting were Marie Abner and an Oakland Housing 

Authority officer. Id. #6. He learned that Marie Abner informed police that while she was inside 

902 Campbell Village, she heard a knock on the door of 900 Campbell Village and then a gunshot. 

Id. #7. When she went outside, she saw that Williams had been shot. Id. Williams told her that 

he did not know who shot him. Id. Lovell also learned that the Oakland Housing Authority 

officer informed police that on April 14, 2006, the day before the shooting, a woman named

Nikisha Stuart had reported that the man who lived at 900 Campbell Village had a dispute with her 

teenage son, Steven Embrey, Jr. Id. #8.

Based on the information from the Oakland Housing Authority officer, Lovell ran Steven 

Embrey, Jr.‟s name through the “LRMS” database, a police tool that matches names, addresses, 

and crime reports. Id. #10. The LRMS search revealed that Steven and Ross used to live at the 

same address, 2817 Filbert Street, Oakland, California, and that Ross‟s address at the time of the 

shooting was across the street from Campbell Village. Id. #11. Lovell put together a six-person 

photo line-up, which included Ross‟s photograph. Id. #12.

On April 18, 2006, Lovell and Lieutenant Steven Nowak met with Williams at the hospital. 

Id. #13. While there, Lovell took a tape-recorded statement from Williams about the dispute on 

the day before the shooting, the shooting itself, and Williams‟s description of the shooter. Id. #21. 

Williams informed Lovell that he had a dispute with Stuart and Embrey in Campbell Village on 

the day before the shooting. Id. #14. According to Williams, he confronted Embrey because 

 

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The CUF, prepared by Defendants, consolidates their Statement of Material Facts, Dkt. No. 73, 

with Plaintiff‟s responses and his Statement of Material Facts in Dispute, Dkt. No. 104-1. For 

clarity, the Court refers to this document rather than the parties‟ individual statements and 

identifies disputed facts where necessary. 

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Embrey hit Williams‟s daughter; afterwards, Williams had an exchange with Embrey‟s mother, 

Stuart. Id. Williams informed Lovell that just before the shooting, he was at 900 Campbell 

Village Court and heard a knock at the door. Id. #15. Williams informed Lovell that when he 

answered, he saw Embrey and two men; one of the men asked Embrey, “is that him?” and when 

Embrey nodded, one of the men shot Williams in the chest. Id. 

Before showing Williams the photo line-up, Lovell had Williams describe the man who 

shot him. Id. #16. Then, Lovell admonished Williams as follows:

YOU WILL BE ASKED TO LOOK AT SEVERAL 

PHOTOGRAPHS. THE FACT THAT THE PHOTOGRAPHS 

ARE SHOWN TO YOU SHOULD NOT INFLUENCE YOUR 

JUDGMENT. THE PHOTOGRAPHS MAY OR MAY NOT 

INCLUDE THE PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PERSON WHO 

COMMITTED THE CRIME. YOU ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO 

IDENTIFY ANYONE. IT IS JUST AS IMPORTANT TO FREE 

INNOCENT PERSONS FROM SUSPICION AS TO IDENTIFY 

GUILTY PARTIES. PLEASE TAKE YOUR TIME AND LOOK 

AT EACH OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS BEFORE ATTEMPTING 

TO IDENTIFY ANYONE. KEEP IN MIND THAT HAIR 

STYLES ARE EASILY CHANGED, AS ARE BEARDS AND 

MUSTACHES. PHOTOGRAPHS DO NOT ALWAYS DEPICT 

THE TRUE COMPLEXION OF A SUBJECT; THEY CAN BE 

DARKER OR LIGHTER.

PLEASE DO NOT DISCUSS THE CASE WITH OTHER 

WITNESSES NOR INDICATE IN ANY WAY WHETHER YOU 

HAVE IDENTIFIED SOMEONE. 

Id. #17. Williams acknowledged that he understood the admonition that Lovell gave him. Id. #18. 

The following facts are disputed. According to Defendants, at the hospital, Williams 

reviewed the photo line-up and identified Ross as the man who shot him. Lovell Decl. ¶ 18 & Ex. 

C; Nowak Decl. ¶ 7. Defendants provided the document that Williams signed with the admonition 

above as well as Williams‟s signature next to the photograph of Ross, thus identifying Ross as the 

shooter. See Lovell Decl., Ex. C, Dkt. No. 83. Ross, however, relying on a Declaration Williams 

wrote on October 13, 2011 around the time of Ross‟s habeas proceedings, asserts that Williams 

initially told Lovell that he did not recognize any of the suspects in the photos. Pl.‟s Stmnt. of 

Material Facts at 1 (citing Williams Decl., Ex. A, Dkt. No. 104-4). Based on Williams‟s

Declaration, Ross also states that Lovell “silently indicated and or instructed Williams to identify 

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[Ross] as the person who shot him.” Id. at 2 (citing Williams Decl.). Ross further asserts that 

Williams informed Lovell that none of the suspects in the photo line-up was the person who shot 

him. Id. (citing Williams Decl.). Williams wrote in his Declaration that he only identified Ross as 

a favor to Lovell. Id. at 3 (citing Williams Decl.). 

Following the meeting with Williams at the hospital, on April 19, 2006, Lovell met with 

Travis Abner and his mother at a location away from Campbell Village. CUF #22. Abner‟s 

mother had contacted the OPD stating that he had information about the shooting. Id. #21. At the 

meeting, Abner informed Lovell that the day before shooting, he saw Embrey injure Williams‟s 

daughter and then saw Williams and Embrey get into a dispute. Id. #23. Abner informed Lovell 

that just before the shooting, he and Williams were playing videogames when there was a knock at 

the door. Id. #24. Williams answered, and Abner went to see what was going on. Id. ##24, 25. 

Abner saw Embrey and another man at the door. Id. #25. Abner informed Lovell that Abner and 

the man who shot Williams looked at one another just before the man shot Williams. Id. #26. 

Before showing Abner an unmarked copy of the photo line-up that Lovell showed Williams, 

Lovell gave Abner the same admonishment he gave Williams. Id. #27. Abner acknowledged he 

understood the admonition and proceeded to identify Ross as the shooter. Id. ##28, 29. Lovell 

took a tape-recorded statement capturing the information that Abner provided regarding the 

incident that took place on the day before the shooting, Abner‟s opportunity to see the shooter, and 

Abner‟s identification of Ross. Id. #30.

Lovell attempted to locate Embrey, including going to his mother‟s home, running 

Embrey‟s name through another database, and instructing the Oakland Housing Authority to stop 

Embrey if he was seen. Id. #34. He also tried more than once to meet with Stuart and left his 

business card with Stuart at her home. Id. #35. 

On April 26, 2006, police arrested Ross in the Campbell Village neighborhood. Id. #37. 

That same day, Lovell executed a search warrant on Ross‟s mother‟s home. Id. #38. The next 

day, on April 27, 2006, Lovell interviewed Ross at the police station. Id. #39. Ross informed 

Lovell that in around 1997, Ross‟s mother and Stuart lived in adjoining units on Filbert Street, and 

Ross stayed with his mother. Id. #40. Ross‟s mother and Stuart spoke daily, and Stuart‟s children 

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spent time with Ross‟s mother. Id. Ross told Lovell that he was at his mother‟s home across the 

street from Campbell Village when the shooting occurred. Id. #41. Ross also informed Lovell 

that he had seen Williams around Campbell Village before the shooting. Id. #42. Lovell also took 

a statement from Ross‟s mother. Id. #43. 

On April 28, 2006, the District Attorney‟s Office filed an information charging Ross with 

attempted murder. Id. #44. Prosecutors independently reviewed the crime report, witness 

statements, and physical evidence, including reviewing the photo line-ups to ensure that they were 

not misleading or unduly suggestive. Id. ##45, 46. Prosecutors independently met with Williams 

before the preliminary hearing. Id. #47. They independently determined that there was sufficient 

cause to maintain the action against Ross. Id. #48. Lovell never pressured the prosecutors in any 

way to prosecute Ross. Id. #49. 

In August 2006, there was a preliminary hearing. Id. #50. Williams was the only witness 

who was called to testify. Id. At the preliminary hearing, Williams identified Ross in court as the 

shooter. Id. #51. After screening for probable cause at the preliminary hearing, the court held that 

there was sufficient cause to hold Ross to answer for attempted murder charges. Id. #52. 

Prosecutors independently interviewed Embrey and Travis Abner before trial. Id. ##53, 54. 

At trial, Williams repeatedly identified Ross in court at the shooter. Id. #55. He testified, 

“you can‟t forget somebody who looked you in the face and shot you.” Id. #56. Abner and 

Embrey also identified Ross in court as the shooter. Id. ##57, 58. Meanwhile, Ross testified that 

he was “positive” that during the shooting he was at his mother‟s house watching the NBA 

playoffs. Id. #59. This alibi was a significant part of Ross‟s defense. Id. #60. Ross was 

impeached with the fact that the NBA playoffs had not started when the shooting happened; they 

began one week later. Id. #61. 

Ross was convicted for attempted murder, but the Alameda County Superior Court 

subsequently vacated his conviction on February 20, 2013 based on the sole ground that Nikisha 

Stuart lied at Ross‟s Trial. Id. #62; see Pereda Decl., Ex. S, Dkt. No. 99 (Alameda Superior 

Court‟s Order Granting Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus). 

//

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B. Procedural Background

Ross filed this lawsuit on February 21, 2014, alleging a malicious prosecution claim and a 

Brady violation claim against the City of Oakland and various Doe officers. Dkt. No. 1. His 

original complaint discusses Williams‟s Declaration and the same facts contained within that 

Declaration. See id. Ross has filed various iterations of his complaint while this suit has been 

pending, and on January 7, 2015, the Court granted the parties‟ stipulation providing Ross with 

leave to amend to add Lovell as a named Defendant. Dkt. No. 66. Ross filed the operative Fourth 

Amended Complaint on January 20, 2015. Dkt. Nos. 67-68. 

Defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on May 13, 2015. While 

Defendants raise a number of arguments, they primarily contend that Ross lacks evidence to 

support his claims against them. Mot. at 11, 13. They assert that the only evidence Ross has 

against Lovell is Williams‟s Declaration, and it is not competent evidence for consideration at 

summary judgment, because (1) at trial, the Declaration itself would be inadmissible, and (2) Ross

has not shown that Williams will be available to testify to the contents of his Declaration at trial. 

Id. 13-15. As such, they argue that Ross cannot support his malicious prosecution and Brady 

claims. Ross‟s Opposition relies heavily on Williams‟s Declaration, arguing that the Declaration 

itself is admissible even if Williams is unable to testify. Opp‟n at 6-7

2

. 

Additionally, Ross‟s counsel requests more time to conduct discovery to oppose 

Defendants‟ Motion. See Rule 56(f) Goff Decl., Dkt. No. 104-3. Specifically, Ross now seeks

more time to locate and depose Williams, as well as to conduct further discovery about Lovell and 

the City of Oakland‟s training procedures. Id. Defendants oppose Ross‟s request, attaching an 

email from Ross‟s counsel on April 22, 2015 stating that he “decided not to depose Lovell or file 

any interrogatories.” Pereda Suppl. Decl., Ex. V, Dkt. No. 106-3. Defendants also argue that 

Ross has long known the importance of Williams‟s testimony to his case, and “[t]he time has long 

passed to procure [Williams].” Reply at 7. 

The Court ordered Ross to submit a declaration describing his efforts to locate Williams 

 

2

Plaintiff‟s Opposition did not provide page numbers, but ECF imprints each page with a page 

number, so the Court refers to the ECF page numbers in this Order. 

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and what leads remain to locating him. Dkt. No. 108. Ross responded with a declaration by his 

counsel, as well as his own declaration that essentially repeats his counsel‟s declaration. Dkt. Nos. 

109 (Goff Decl.); 110 (Ross Decl.). Ross‟s attorney hired “numerous individuals at various times 

who reside in the area of Oakland where Williams was last known to have resided” to locate 

Williams (or to “at least keep an eye out for him”), but he states that these efforts have been 

unsuccessful. Goff Decl. ¶ 4. He also states that “an investigator was retained to locate the 

whereabouts of Mr. Williams on or around the time period that the Defendant requested for 

Williams to be produced for discovery purposes,” but this too was unsuccessful. Id. ¶ 6. Ross‟s 

counsel also conducted searches on Google and Facebook, as well as searches on the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation website and Alameda County‟s inmate database, but 

could not locate Williams. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. He identified the following remaining leads: (1) recent 

information from people in Williams‟s last known neighborhood that they “heard of Williams 

recently being in Oakland,” and that, based on this information, Ross‟s counsel intends to hire 

another private investigator; and (2) Ross‟s counsel was in the process of purchasing a “LexisNexis Search” software program to locate Williams. Id. ¶¶ 10-12. 

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate 

that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment 

bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits that 

demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 

317, 323 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is 

sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must 

affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving 

party. Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where 

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by 

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pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving 

party‟s case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then set forth specific 

facts showing that there is some genuine issue for trial in order to defeat the motion. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 

2004). However, it is not the task of the Court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of 

triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court “rel[ies] on the 

nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary 

judgment.” Id.; see also Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). 

Thus, “[t]he district court need not examine the entire file for evidence establishing a genuine 

issue of fact, where the evidence is not set forth in the opposing papers with adequate references 

so that it could conveniently be found.” Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 

(9th Cir. 2001). If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotations omitted).

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

A. Rule 56(d) Request for Further Discovery

Ross‟s counsel filed a declaration pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), in 

which he requests additional time to conduct further discovery to respond to Defendants‟ Motion 

for Summary Judgment. It appears that Ross intended to make such a request under Rule 56(d) 

but mistakenly made the request under subsection (f), the former provision that allowed a party to 

seek additional discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee‟s note (subdivision (d) of 

Rule 56 “carries forward without substantial change the provisions of former subdivision (f).”).

“Rule 56(d) „was designed to ensure that a nonmoving party will not be forced to defend a 

summary judgment motion without having an opportunity to marshal supporting evidence.‟” 

Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Rogers 

v. Home Shopping Network, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 973, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1999)); see also Burlington 

N. Santa Fe R. Co. v. Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of Fort Peck Reservation, 323 F.3d 767, 773 

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(9th Cir. 2003) (Rule 56(d) “provides a device for litigants to avoid summary judgment when they 

have not had sufficient time to develop affirmative evidence.” (quotation omitted)). It thus 

provides that the court may deny or continue a motion for summary judgment “[i]f a nonmovant

shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to 

justify its opposition[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).

To seek relief under Rule 56(d), the requesting party must show (1) it has set forth in 

affidavit form the specific facts it hopes to elicit from further discovery, (2) the facts sought exist 

and (3) the sought-after facts are essential to oppose summary judgment. Family Home & Fin. 

Ctr., Inc. v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 525 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2008). “The burden is on 

the party seeking additional discovery to proffer sufficient facts to show that the evidence sought 

exists, and that it would prevent summary judgment.” Chance v. Pac-Tel Teletrac Inc., 242 F.3d 

1151, 1161 n.6 (9th Cir. 2001). Failure to comply with these requirements “is a proper ground for 

denying discovery and proceeding to summary judgment.” Family Home, 525 F.3d at 827 

(quotations omitted). 

Finally, this rule requires discovery only “where the non-moving party has not had the 

opportunity to discover information that is essential to its opposition.” Metabolife Int‟l, Inc. v. 

Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 846 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 n.5). A moving 

party is not entitled to additional discovery under Rule 56(d) “if it fails diligently to pursue 

discovery before summary judgment.” Mackey v. Pioneer Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 524 (9th Cir.

1989) (citations omitted). “[T]he district court does not abuse its discretion by denying further 

discovery if the movant has failed diligently to pursue discovery in the past.” Conkle v. Jeong, 73 

F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation omitted). Finally, the “mere hope that further 

evidence may develop prior to trial is an insufficient basis” for a continuance under Rule 56(d).

Neely v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 584 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1978).

In his request to conduct further discovery, Ross asserts the following:

The Plaintiff needs to conduct further efforts to locate Renardo 

Williams for purposes of deposing Mr. Williams who testimony is 

significant in this case. 

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The Plaintiff needs to conduct discovery of the Defendant (Lovell) 

police officer personnel because his credibility is significant in this 

case. 

The Plaintiff needs to conduct discovery of the City of Oakland 

regarding its training procedures because whether their training 

procedures are adequate or not will be significant to this case. 

Rule 56(f) Goff Decl. ¶¶ 2-4. Ross does not provide any further indication as to what specific 

facts he hopes to illicit from his proposed additional discovery. 

Defendants reject the notion that additional discovery is warranted. Reply at 6-7. The 

Court agrees. First, Ross has provided no indication about why he did not conduct the discovery 

he now proposes during the pendency of this case, and in particular, the last six months from when 

the Court set its Case Management Scheduling Order to when dispositive motions were due (see

Dkt. No. 60). Ross never requested an extension of time to conduct further discovery, nor did he 

file any motions to compel discovery. Second, although Ross only named Lovell as a Defendant 

to this case in his Fourth Amended Complaint on January 20, 2015 (Dkt. Nos. 67-68), he knew 

about Williams‟s Declaration since at least the time when he filed this action, and Williams‟s

Declaration explicitly names Lovell. Ross does not explain why he waited to name Lovell or why 

he delayed in conducting discovery about Lovell during the months after Ross named him before 

the close of discovery. Defendants further contend that they offered to make Lovell available for 

deposition even after the close of discovery but indicate that Ross declined. See Reply at 7 (citing 

Pereda Suppl. Decl., Ex. V). 

Third, Ross has known about the importance of Williams‟s testimony since the inception 

of this case. Ross‟s initial Complaint specifically cites Williams‟s Declaration and relies heavily 

on the facts extracted from the Declaration, which shows that even early in this case Ross

recognized the significance of Williams‟s testimony. See Compl. ¶¶ 4-6, 12-13, 15, Dkt. No. 1. 

Ross does not explain why he has waited to procure discovery from Williams or about Williams 

until now. And while Ross and his counsel indicate that some efforts were made to locate 

Williams, their Declarations are vague about who they specifically hired to locate Williams and 

how those people went about locating Williams. Furthermore, the fact that Ross waited until after 

the deadline for dispositive motions to seek more time to locate Williams reflects a lack of 

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diligence. Ross could have sought the Court‟s assistance at any time before this point, and he 

provides no justification for his delay communicating with the Court and Defendants about his 

difficulty locating Williams and his need for more discovery. 

Fourth, Ross named the City of Oakland in his initial Complaint and raised Monell-based 

claims against the City by his second amended Complaint (see Second Am. Compl., Dkt. Nos. 18-

19), but nonetheless has apparently failed to conduct any discovery about the City‟s practices and 

procedures to be able to support his claims against it. 

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no indication that Ross diligently pursued discovery 

in the past. See Hauser v. Farrell, 14 F.3d 1338, 1340-41 (9th Cir. 1994) (denial of Rule 56(f) 

motion proper in light of failure to depose witness within 27 months of filing suit) overruled on 

other grounds by Cent. Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994); Mackey, 867 F.2d 

at 524 (a Rule 56(d) movant “cannot complain if it fails diligently to pursue discovery before 

summary judgment.”); Freeman, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 1078 (“where plaintiffs failed to exercise due 

diligence, filed an untimely request, or failed to explain why discovery was not conducted, Rule 

56(d) discovery requests may be denied.”); see also Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 

F.3d 1018, 1027 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The use of orders establishing a firm discovery cutoff date is 

commonplace, and has impacts generally helpful to the orderly progress of litigation, so that the 

enforcement of such an order should come as a surprise to no one.”).

Finally, Ross has not demonstrated that other reasons prevented him from procuring the 

discovery he needed. For instance, there is no indication that Defendants stonewalled him in 

discovery by, for example, refusing to produce deponents, documents, and other evidence 

necessary to support his claims. See Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 921 (9th 

Cir. 1996) (recognizing that outstanding discovery requests may be cause for deferring summary 

judgment until discovery is complete). Additionally, if a party files a summary judgment motion 

early in the litigation “before [the other] party has had any realistic opportunity to pursue 

discovery relating to its theory of the case, district courts should grant any Rule 56[d] motion 

fairly freely.” Burlington, 323 F.3d at 773 (citation omitted). But here Defendants did not file 

their summary judgment motion early in the litigation, but rather in full accordance with the 

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Court‟s Case Management Schedule. As noted, Ross did not seek an extension of time to conduct 

further discovery before now, and there is no suggestion that Ross has not had a realistic 

opportunity to pursue needed discovery. Lastly, Ross is represented by counsel, rather than 

proceeding pro se. See Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 930 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[S]ummary judgment 

is disfavored where relevant evidence remains to be discovered, particularly in cases involving 

confined pro se plaintiffs.” (citation omitted)). 

Without more, the Court cannot find that Ross diligently pursued discovery or has 

otherwise shown sufficient cause for extending discovery at this time. Accordingly, the Court 

denies Ross‟s Rule 56(d) request for further discovery.

B. Admissibility of Williams’s Declaration

Ross‟s sole proffered evidence as to Lovell is Williams‟s Declaration, recanting his 

identification of Ross as the shooter. Defendants argue that it should not be considered on 

summary judgment as the document itself is inadmissible evidence and there is no indication that 

Williams will testify to the contents of his Declaration at trial. Williams‟s Declaration is 

approximately two pages long and states in pertinent part:

After the shooting, I identified Ronald W. Ross as the shooter. I 

gave a statement saying that he was the shooter, and I also testified 

in court saying that he was the shooter. But that was not correct. 

Ronald W. Ross was not the shooter. I feel confident about this. 

[¶5] 

I always thought that the shooter was Steven Embrey Jr.‟s father. 

[¶6] 

I identified Ronald W. Ross as the shooter because the investigating 

officer, Sgt. Steve Lovell asked me to, and I owed him a favor. . . . 

When he first showed the [photo line-up of six different pictures] to 

me, I did not identify any of the men in the photographs as the 

shooter. Then, Sgt. Lovell silently indicated to me that I should pick 

photograph number four. So, I picked the photograph that Sgt. 

Lovell indicated I should pick. When Sgt. Lovell recorded my 

statement, he did not record the part of the conversation when I did 

not identify anyone in the lineup. He tape recorded the part of our 

conversation that occurred after he had indicated to me which 

photograph I should pick (number four). [¶7] 

I later testified that the man in photograph number four was the 

shooter, but that was not true. [¶8] 

Even though I testified against Ronald W. Ross at trial, the reason I 

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am now saying that he was not the shooter is that he wasn‟t—he is 

innocent—and I have spent the last several years living with the 

regret of having testified against an innocent man. [¶12]. 

Williams Decl. 

There are three key problems with this evidence: (1) the declaration itself is hearsay; (2)

there is no indication that Williams will be available to testify at trial; and (3) the statements are 

vague and lack foundation. Defendants also assert that Williams has subsequently renounced his 

statements above, stating in a more recent interview with persons from the Alameda County‟s 

District Attorney‟s Office that he still believed Ross to be the shooter. Pereda Decl., Ex. U, Dkt. 

No. 101. Ross admits that he has been unable to locate Williams and states that for the purposes 

of Defendants‟ summary judgment motion, “Williams appears to be unavailable.” Goff Decl. ¶¶ 

2-5; 9; Ross Decl. ¶¶ 2-5, 9. 

Under Rule 56, at the summary judgment stage, parties must set out facts they will be able 

to prove at trial. “At the summary judgment stage, [courts] do not focus on the admissibility of 

the evidence‟s form. . . . [but] instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v. 

Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hile the evidence 

presented at the summary judgment stage does not yet need to be in a form that would be 

admissible at trial, the proponent must set out facts that it will be able to prove through admissible 

evidence.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted). 

Accordingly, “[t]o survive summary judgment, a party does not necessarily have to produce 

evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, as long as the party satisfies the requirements 

of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 56.” Block v. City of Los Angeles, 253 F.3d 410, 418-19 (9th 

Cir. 2001); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (a party need not “produce evidence in a form that would be 

admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“A 

supporting or opposing affidavit must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be 

admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.”).

Having carefully reviewed Williams‟s Declaration, the Court cannot find that it would be 

admissible at trial. First, and most importantly, the portions of the Declaration on which Ross

relies—namely, that Lovell “silently indicated” to Williams to identify Ross as the shooter and 

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that Williams did not at first identify any of the persons in the photo line-up—lack foundation. 

There is no description about how Williams knew Lovell allegedly wanted him to identify Ross‟s 

photo other than the statement that Lovell “silently indicated” this to Williams. From the 

description in Williams‟s Declaration, there is no evidence that Lovell made any actual verbal 

communication or gesture or other motion, and for all the Court can deduce from this Declaration, 

Williams might be saying that Lovell telepathically sent him this message. Without any 

foundation about how Williams understood this purported silent indication to mean what he took it 

to mean, the Court cannot appropriately put such evidence before a jury. The same is true for 

Williams‟s statement hat he identified Ross because he owed Lovell a favor—there is no 

foundation for Williams‟s and Lovell‟s pre-existing relationship or why Williams believed he 

owed Lovell a favor. 

The other key portion of the Declaration on which Ross relies is Williams‟s statement that 

he did not identify anyone in the photo line-up at first and that Lovell did not record the part of the 

conversation where Williams did not identify anyone. As Defendants point out, although 

Williams refers to the fact that he never identified anyone in the photo line-up in various portions 

of his Declaration, he never explicitly states that he told Lovell that he did not recognize or 

identify any of the people in the photo line-up. While Williams refers to a part of the 

“conversation” that was not recorded, without any foundation about what Williams explicitly told 

Lovell in that part of the conversation, the Court would be asking a jury to speculate that Williams 

actually made some statement to Lovell and that statement was actually capable of being recorded. 

While the Court is mindful of its role in not making determinations that are properly 

reserved for the jury, it also plays an important gate-keeping function in not inappropriately 

considering evidence that lacks foundation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (a declaration used at

summary judgment motion must “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence”). The Court 

ordered supplemental briefing about Ross‟s attempts to locate Williams to assess whether Ross

may be able to produce Williams to testify to the contents of his Declaration, but having reviewed 

Ross‟s supplemental declaration and his efforts to find Williams, Ross has not shown that he can 

locate Williams, nor has he provided any other evidence providing the necessary foundation for 

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Williams‟s statements on which Ross relies. While Ross‟s counsel asserts that he “will” retain a 

private investigator to locate Williams (see Goff Decl. ¶ 12), this assertion is insufficient at this 

stage in the case. Since at least the inception of this lawsuit, Ross has known the importance of 

Williams‟s testimony, but more than a year and a half have passed since he filed this suit and there 

is little evidence that he has made any meaningful effort to verify or explore the statements in 

Williams‟s Declaration during that time. As there is no foundation for any of Williams‟s

statements identified above, and Defendants have never had the opportunity to cross-examine 

Williams, such evidence is not properly admissible at trial. Accordingly, without any showing 

that Ross will be able to provide such a foundation at trial, the Court will not consider these 

statements at summary judgment.

Finally, as Defendants point out, Williams‟s Declaration as a whole is hearsay. See Fed. 

R. Evid. 801(c). And while Ross argues that Williams‟s Declaration falls into an exception to the 

hearsay rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) as a statement against interest, the Court 

does not find that exception well-supported in these circumstances. Rule 804(b)(3) provides an 

exception to the hearsay rule if (1) the declarant is unavailable, and (2) “a reasonable person in the 

declarant‟s position would have made [the statement] only if the person believed it to be true 

because, when made, it was so contrary to the declarant‟s proprietary or pecuniary interest or had 

so great a tendency to invalidate the declarant‟s claim against someone else or to expose the 

declarant to civil or criminal liability[.]” Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)(A). 

Assuming that Williams is unavailable, Ross argues that Williams‟s Declaration meets this

test because by admitting that he lied at Ross‟s criminal trial, Williams also admitted that he 

committed perjury. Opp‟n 7-8. There are two problems with this argument. First, to the extent 

Ross is trying to admit Williams‟s Declaration in its entirety because some statements in the 

Declaration may be against Williams‟s interest, the Supreme Court has held that “the most faithful 

reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, 

even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory.” Williamson v. 

United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01 (1994). Accordingly, only the self-inculpatory statements of 

Williams‟s Declaration are arguably admissible, while the rest of his statements are still hearsay. 

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But second, the Court does not find that the circumstances of this case support the 

admission of Williams‟s arguably self-inculpatory statements where they inculpate Lovell. The 

text of Rule 804(b)(3) is significant in this respect, because the context of Williams‟s statements 

diminishes the notion that a reasonable person in Williams‟s position would have only made these 

statements if he believed them to be true. Williams‟s Declaration does not acknowledge that he is 

aware of the potential criminal consequences for recanting his former trial testimony, nor is there 

any indication that his statements were in fact “so contrary” to his interests that he would not have 

made the statements unless they were true. Rather, the opposite could be the case here. William‟s 

statements do not merely inculpate him for potential perjury, but actually shift the blame to Lovell, 

indicating that Lovell induced Williams to lie. The Court cannot say that a reasonable person in 

Williams‟s position would have only made these statements inculpating Lovell if the statements 

were true—Williams might well have thought that he was saving himself from blame rather than 

putting himself at any risk of criminal liability. In a sense, accusing Lovell of misconduct appears 

to excuse Williams‟s false testimony. The record is not adequately developed to conclusively 

determine Williams‟s motivation in making these statements, but without more, the Court cannot 

find that his statements are “so contrary” to his interests such that Rule 804(b)(3) is applicable. 

Ross has provided no other viable arguments for why Williams‟s Declaration is admissible 

on its own. While he makes arguments about the state of mind exception and the statement by a 

party opponent exception, these arguments do not support the admissibility of Williams‟s

Declaration but rather deal only with the hearsay statements within the hearsay document itself. In 

other words, before Ross can support the internal hearsay statements, he must show that the 

Declaration itself is capable of admission. He has not done so. 

In light of the foregoing, the Court cannot find this document to be competent summary 

judgment evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not consider Williams‟s Declaration in its 

analysis.

DISCUSSION

In his Opposition, Ross states that “[t]here are two causes of action that the Plaintiff has 

brought in this case against the Defendant Steve Lovell and against the City of Oakland under 

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Monell for failure to adequately train. The two causes of action are Malicious Prosecution and 

Brady Rule Violation.” Opp‟n at 5. The Court first considers Ross‟s claims against Lovell and 

then his claims against the City. 

A. Claims Against Lovell

Ross brings claims against Lovell under § 1983 for malicious prosecution and a Brady

violation. Section 1983 provides a remedy for constitutional violations by persons acting under 

the color of state law. It provides, in relevant part: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 

custom, or usage, of any State . . . . subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . . to the deprivation of 

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in 

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 

(1994) (quotation and internal marks omitted). To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must 

show: (1) the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution; (2) 

by a person acting under the color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

Malicious prosecution actions are not limited to suits against prosecutors and may be 

pursued against other persons who have wrongfully caused charges to be filed. Awabdy v. City of 

Adelanto, 368 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004); Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 

1126-27 (9th Cir. 2002). Likewise, in the Ninth Circuit, individual police officers may be held

liable for their Brady violations under § 1983 if the officers act “with deliberate indifference to or 

reckless disregard for an accused‟s rights or for the truth in withholding evidence from 

prosecutors.” Tennison v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 570 F.3d 1078, 1088 (9th Cir. 2009); 

Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 939 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Brady requires both prosecutors and police 

investigators to disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.”). The Court first considers 

Ross‟s malicious prosecution claim, and second, his Brady violation claim.

1. Malicious Prosecution

To prevail on his malicious prosecution claim, Ross must show that Lovell prosecuted him 

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with malice and without probable cause and that he did so for the purpose of denying Ross a 

specific constitutional right. Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012). 

Among other things, Lovell argues Ross cannot prove probable cause because Alameda 

County District Attorneys independently evaluated the case against Ross before initiating criminal 

charges. Mot. at 22. “A prosecutor‟s independent judgment may break the chain of causation 

between the unconstitutional actions of other officials and the harm suffered by a constitutional 

tort plaintiff.” Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008); see also McSherry v. 

City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2009). “Put in traditional tort terms, the 

prosecutor‟s independent decision can be a superseding or intervening cause of a constitutional 

tort plaintiff‟s injury, precluding suit against the officials who made an arrest or procured a 

prosecution.” Id. (quoting Beck, 527 F.3d at 862).

In support of their Motion, Defendants submitted the Declaration of Alameda County 

Deputy District Attorney Ken Kingsbury, who handled the preliminary hearing in Ross‟s criminal 

trial. Kingsbury Decl., Dkt. No. 75. Kingsbury states that “[i]n maintaining [Ross‟s criminal 

case] and preparing for the preliminary hearing, I independently reviewed the evidence and 

investigation in this matter.” Id. ¶ 6. He explains that these efforts included “interviewing 

Renardo Williams before the preliminary hearing; reviewing the photo line-ups to ensure that they 

were not misleading or suggestive; reviewing the crime report and witness statements; reviewing 

the physical evidence; and ensuring that there was sufficient cause to maintain the action.” Id. He 

states that he has “no knowledge that Steven Lovell withheld or fabricated any evidence in this 

matter.” Id. ¶ 7. 

Defendants also provided the Declaration of Alameda County Deputy District Attorney 

Kevin Wong, in which Wong likewise states that he independently reviewed the evidence and 

investigated the case against Ross. Wong Decl. ¶ 9, Dkt. No. 79. His investigation and review 

included interviewing witnesses, including Williams, Travis Abner, and Steven Embrey before 

trial. Id. It also included reviewing all available crime reports, witness statements, and physical 

evidence. Id. According to Wong, Lovell never pressured him or, to his knowledge, anyone else 

in the District Attorney‟s Office to prosecute Ross. Id. ¶ 11. He states that he has no knowledge 

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that Lovell withheld or fabricated any evidence. Id. ¶ 10.

Ross provides no evidence contradicting the prosecutors‟ attestations that they

independently investigated the evidence against Ross. In fact, Ross agreed that it was undisputed 

that “Prosecutors independently determined that there was sufficient case to maintain the action 

against Ross” and that “Lovell never pressured the prosecutors in any way to prosecute Ross.” 

See Pl.‟s Stmnt. of Material Facts at 2; CUF ##48-49. Furthermore, the evidence presented 

indicates that Lovell disclosed potentially contradictory evidence to prosecutors, including writing 

in his police report that Williams had told him the shooter was bald, despite Ross‟s picture from 

the line-up showing him with hair. Lovell Decl. ¶¶ 20-21. This indicates that Lovell did not 

manipulate the evidence before the prosecutors but actually exposed a basis for which the 

prosecutors might have questioned Williams‟s identification of Ross as the shooter. Ross has 

provided no specific facts showing that Lovell‟s actions prevented the prosecutors from exercising 

their independent judgment in deciding whether to charge and prosecute Ross. Finally, to support 

this claim, Ross relies exclusively on Williams‟s Declaration, and without this document, Ross has 

no evidence to show a genuine dispute of material fact on this claim for trial. Given Defendants‟ 

evidence that the prosecutors exercised independent judgment and that Ross does not have

evidence to dispute the Defendants‟ proof, the Court finds that this breaks the chain of causation 

between Lovell‟s alleged malicious prosecution and the harm suffered by Ross. See McSherry, 

584 F.3d at 1137. Without facts showing that Ross can meet the elements of his malicious 

prosecution claim, Ross cannot maintain this cause of action against Lovell.

2. Brady Violation Claim

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held “that the suppression by the prosecution of 

evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 

U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Accordingly, Brady requires both prosecutors and police investigators to 

disclose exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants. Almada, 640 F.3d at 939 (citing Tennison, 

570 F.3d at 1087 (allowing § 1983 claim against police inspector for Brady violation)). 

A Brady claim has three elements: “First, there must be evidence that is favorable to the 

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defense, either because it is exculpatory or impeaching. Second, the government must have 

willfully or inadvertently failed to produce the evidence. Third, the suppression must have 

prejudiced the defendant.” Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1012 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Strickler v. 

Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999)). “Any evidence that would tend to call the government‟s 

case into doubt is favorable for Brady purposes.” Id. at 1013. It includes both “exculpatory and 

impeachment material that is relevant either to guilt or punishment.” Id. at 1012 (citation 

omitted). 

Ross‟s only evidence to support his Brady claim is Williams‟s Declaration. See Opp‟n at 

15. However, as the Court has found Williams‟s Declaration inadmissible, and there is no 

indication that Williams will be available to testify to the contents of his Declaration at trial, Ross

has no evidence to support his Brady claim. Thus, he cannot show that conflicting facts create a 

genuine dispute for trial about whether Lovell failed to produce exculpatory or impeaching 

evidence. Nor can Ross show that Lovell‟s actions prejudiced Ross at his criminal trial. 

Accordingly, Ross cannot maintain his Brady claim against Lovell. 

B. Claims Against the City

To impose liability against a municipal entity for a constitutional violation under § 1983, a 

plaintiff must show that an official‟s action that caused the plaintiff‟s injury was pursuant “to 

official municipal policy of some nature.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 

(1978). 

First, Ross has not shown that an official‟s action caused him injury. As noted above, his

claims against Lovell for malicious prosecution and a Brady violation fail for lack of support. 

Second, Ross has not demonstrated that his alleged constitutional deprivation was the product of 

the City‟s policy or custom. His only evidence that such a policy or custom exists is a Wikipedia 

article concerning a prior case, Allen. et al. v. City of Oakland, et. al., No. 00-4599-TEH (N.D. 

Cal.), where the City settled with plaintiffs through a consent decree in 2003 over allegations that 

four officers allegedly kidnapped, planted evidence, and beat citizens, while the Oakland Police 

Department either allegedly encouraged or turned a blind eye to this misconduct. See Opp‟n at 

16-17; Goff Decl., Ex. B (Wikipedia article), Dkt. No. 104-5. Even assuming this document is 

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competent evidence for the Court‟s review, it does not show the existence of a municipal policy or 

practice to maliciously prosecute or to withhold exculpatory evidence. While Ross argues that the 

consent decree3shows a “long-standing and pervasive pattern of Oakland Police Department 

officers misusing their authority by falsely arresting people and fabricating evidence,” neither 

false arrest nor fabrication of evidence is a claim in this case. See Opp‟n at 5 (stating that the only 

two causes of action are “Malicious Prosecution” and “Brady Rule Violation” and specifically 

renouncing any false evidence claim). Ross‟s claim against the City thus fails on both prongs of 

the Monell test. See, e.g., McSherry, 584 F.3d at 1147 (“Because McSherry has no case against 

the officers, and because he tenders no facts . . . of a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, 

decision, custom, usage, or practice of either the City of Long Beach or the Long Beach Police 

Department that caused his injury, . . . his Monell claim also fails as a matter of law.” (citations 

omitted)). Accordingly, the City‟s Motion for Summary Judgment on Ross‟s Monell claim is 

GRANTED.

CONCLUSION

Based on the analysis above, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants‟ Motion for 

Summary Judgment. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 14, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

 

3

Plaintiff did not provide a copy of that consent decree or any other documents filed in the Allen

case.

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