Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02010/USCOURTS-ca10-91-02010-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Ann King
Appellee
John Shanks
Appellant

Document Text:

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT OCT 3 0 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

JO ANN KING, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHN SHANKS, Acting Warden, 

Respondent-Appellant. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Clerk . 

) No. 91-2010 

) (D.C. No. 88-895 SC) 

) (D. N.M.) 

) 

) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and TACHA, Circuit Judges. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

Respondent appeals from the district court Order granting 

Petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, 28 u.s.c. 

S 2254, and vacating Petitioner's New Mexico conviction for armed 

robbery, after concluding that Petitioner was denied effective 

assistance of counsel. Petitioner asserted, inter alia, that she 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 1 
was denied effective assistance of counsel because her 

court-appointed attorney labored under a conflict of interest 

resulting from his joint representation of both Petitioner and her 

Codefendant. Petitioner asserts that defense counsel's joint 

representation prevented him from discovering a viable duress 

defense which could have been asserted on Petitioner's behalf. 

Although Petitioner did not raise this issue in her direct 

appeal, she did assert this claim in a pro se motion for 

post-conviction relief. Without conducting an evidentiary 

hearing, the state court considered Petitioner's claims on the 

merits, summarily ruling that Petitioner's claims lacked merit . 

The New Mexico Supreme Court denied an ensuing petition for 

certiorari. There are, therefore, no state court findings of fact 

r concerning the ineffectiveness claim to which we must accord a 

presumption of correctness. See 28 u.s.c. S 2254(d). See 

generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984)(state 

court's conclusion concerning existence of conflict of interest is 

mixed question of law and fact not entitled to S 2254(d)'s 

presumption of correctness). 

In response to Petitioner's S 2254 petition, the district 

court conducted a hearing upon the ineffective assistance claim 

and concluded Petitioner had been deprived of effective 

representation. This court will review the district court's 

findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Osborn v. 

Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 (10th Cir. 1988). The district 

court's determination that Petitioner's defense counsel was 

ineffective, however, because it is a mixed question of law and 

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Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 2 
fact, will be reviewed de novo. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. 

Upon careful review of the record, we affirm. 

The testimony of Petitioner, her Codefendant, and defense 

counsel adduced at the evidentiary hearing, indicated the 

following: Petitioner, along with her two sons, lived with her 

Codefendant, Jim Masci, in Las Cruces, New Mexico, for less than a 

year. II R. at 58. During the time frame surrounding the armed 

robbery, which occurred on June 17, 1984, Mr. Masci used drugs on 

a consistent basis. See id. at 62, 81-82. When he was in need of 

drugs, Mr. Masci became violent and abusive toward Petitioner. 

See id. at 58-62, 68-69, 81, 90-91. In order to remove herself 

and her sons from this violent environment, Petitioner, in April 

1984, took her sons and left Mr. Masci. Id. at 58. Petitioner 

and her children went to Ruidoso, New Mexico, id., where they 

stayed with a friend, Joanie Doughten, id. at 63. 

Mr. Masci caught up with Petitioner and her boys in Ruidoso. 

Id. at 58, 62. At that time, Mr. Masci ·was in a "frantic" state, 

being in need of drugs. Id. at 63. While at Ms. Doughten's, Mr. 

Masci physically threw Petitioner around, hit her, and threatened 

to kill her. Id. at 60, 90. He insisted Petitioner accompany him 

everywhere he went. Id. at 63-64. 

Petitioner, wishing to remove both Ms. Doughten's family 

and her own two boys from Mr. Masci's violence, took her two boys 

to the nearby cabin of another family friend. Id. at 63. 

Ms. Doughton's teenage son stayed with Petitioner's children at 

the cabin while Mr. Masci compelled Petitioner to accompany him in 

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Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 3 
y 

his attempts to obtain the prescription drug Percodan, id. at 64, 

82, which can be used as a substitute for heroin, id. at 82. 

Mr. Masci, who was in possession of a gun, decided to commit 

an armed robbery to get the money he needed for drugs. Id. at 

82-83. Petitioner tried to talk him out of this idea, stating 

there were other ways to get the money he needed. Id. at 83. 

Petitioner suggested they might borrow money from Ms. Doughten. 

Id. at 65, 83. 

To that end, the couple drove to the restaurant where Ms. 

Doughten worked. Id. at 65, 83. While Defendants were parked 

behind the restaurant waiting for Ms. Doughten to arrive for work, 

the four victims drove up to the restaurant to have dinner. Id. 

at 83. Since the victims had a "nice fancy car and they were at a 

fancy restaurant," Mr. Masci decided that it would be worthwhile 

to rob them. Id. at 83. When Mr. Masci told Petitioner that he 

intended to rob these people, however, Petitioner started to get 

out of the car, asserting she would have no part in a robbery. 

Id. at 67, 84. Mr. Masci, still in possession of the gun, id. at 

66, hit Petitioner across the face and pulled her back into the 

car, id. at 67, 69-70, 84. He then told her that he would take 

the victims, in their own car, to a secluded place and rob them. 

Id. at 67, 84. Petitioner was to follow at a safe distance and 

pick him up. Id. at 67, 84. 

As Mr. Masci outlined his plan, Petitioner made up her mind 

to drive away once he got out of the car. Id. at 67. At this 

point, however, Mr. Masci told Petitioner that if she "intended to 

screw him over," he would get to her children before she would. 

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Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 4 
Id. at 67; see also id. at 85 ("I remember exactly saying if she 

screwed me over, I would screw her over, I knew where the kids are 

at, there is no way she could get there before I could. I told 

her, 'You think about that before you decide to screw me over.'"). 

Petitioner asked Mr. Masci not to hurt the victims, to which he 

replied that he was going to do what he had to do to get the 

money. Id. at 84. 

Petitioner, now believing she had no choice but to go along 

with the robbery, offered an alternative plan. Because she feared 

that Mr. Masci, in his agitated state, would harm the victims, who 

were older, if they resisted, Petitioner suggested that she rob 

the victims while they were still in the restaurant parking lot. 

Id. at 67-68, 84. Mr. Masci agreed, but before giving Petitioner 

the gun he removed the bullets, id. at 68, 85, "because she was 

kind of upset with me anyway and I wasn't going to give her a gun 

with bullets in it because I had already threatened her and I had 

threatened her kids .... " Id. at 85. 

When the victims returned to their car, ~ id. at 18, 

Petitioner, holding the unloaded gun given to her by Mr. Masci, 

id. at 68, got in the car with the victims, id. at 70. Petitioner 

told the victims that she would not hurt them, that she was more 

afraid than they were. See id. at 24-25. Her jaw trembled so in 

fear that several of the victims asked if they could help her, id. 

at 25, to which Petitioner responded that no one could help her, 

id. at 25, 70. 

After taking the victims' money, Petitioner fled to the back 

of the restaurant, where Mr. Masci had remained, out of sight, 

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Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 5 
' 

/ 

during the whole ordeal. See id. at 18. Upon returning to the 

car, Petitioner handed the money over to Mr. Masci. Id. at 70. 

The police stopped the couple several hours later as they 

continued to drive around Ruidoso. See id. at 21, 25. When they 

were apprehended, Mr. Masci, not Petitioner, possessed the stolen 

money and the gun. 

Petitioner asserted and the trial court found that Petitioner 

had committed the armed robbery for which she was convicted 

because she was fearful that Mr. Masci would harm the victims and 

because Mr. Masci had threatened to harm Petitioner's children, 

after physically assaulting her. Petitioner's allegations, 

asserted with specificity and supported by the testimony presented 

at the evidentiary hearing, stated a viable duress defense which, 

if believed by the jury, would have relieved Petitioner of 

criminal liability for the armed robbery. See Esquibel v. State, 

576 P.2d 1129, 1132 (N.M. 1978); State v. Torres, 657 P.2d 1194, 

1195-97 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 

Petitioner further asserted that defense counsel failed to 

discover this viable defense because he did not consult with 

Petitioner separately, but rather always interviewed Defendants 

together. Petitioner did not inform defense counsel, in her 

Codefendant's presence, of the facts underlying the duress 

defense, in light of Defendants' violent relationship and the 

threats Mr. Masci had made against her children. Further facts 

adduced at the evidentiary hearing indicated that Petitioner's 

original defense attorney met with her 

approximately fifteen minutes two weeks after her 

6 

individually for 

arrest. II R. 

Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 6 
at 72-73. Their conversation focused primarily upon the 

well-being of Petitioner's two children. See id. After that 

meeting, either original defense counsel or subsequent trial 

counsel met with Defendants on two other occasions prior to trial. 

Id. at 72-74. During these meetings, both Defendants were present 

at all times. Id. at 15, 34, 73; see also id. at 15 ("They were a 

joint entity to me at that time." (testimony of trial counsel)). 

Even after the state trial court directed a verdict in favor of 

Mr. Masci and dismissed all charges against him at the close of 

the state's evidence, defense counsel did not consult with 

Petitioner separately concerning her defense. Id. at 38-39. 

Where, as here, a defendant raised no objection at trial to 

counsel's joint representation, "[a] defendant ... must 

demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 

his lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 

(1980). Once such a showing is made, prejudice will be presumed, 

and petitioner will be entitled to relief. Id. at 349-50. 

Under the specific facts of this unusual case, see United 

States v. Bowie, 892 F.2d 1494, 1500 (10th Cir. 1990)(because 

"actual conflict" and "adverse effect" are not self-defining 

terms, this court looked to context of specific case presented to 

define these terms), it became critical to the provision of 

constitutionally effective assistance for defense counsel to 

consult with Petitioner apart from her Codefendant. Defense 

counsel's failure to consult with Petitioner separately and 

independently from her Codefendant, under these circumstances, 

prevented counsel from giving Petitioner a reasonable opportunity 

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Appellate Case: 91-2010 Document: 010110093025 Date Filed: 10/30/1991 Page: 7 
to disclose those facts which might have indicated a viable 

defense and thus prevented counsel's discovery of the legitimate 

duress defense which could have been asserted on Petitioner's 

behalf. See United States v. Hall, 843 F.2d 408, 412 (10th Cir. 

1988)(important for defense counsel to consult with defendant so 

counsel can learn any facts that might afford defendant legitimate 

defense). Counsel's failure to consult with Petitioner was a 

direct result of his joint representation of Defendants. Under 

these circumstances, we conclude that an actual conflict of 

interest adversely affected defense counsel's performance. 

Having established that counsel labored under an actual 

conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 

349-50. The district court, therefore, did not err in granting 

Petitioner habeas relief. Cf. United States v. Geittmann, 733 

F.2d 1419, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1984)(conflict did not adversely 

affect counsel's performance where defendant failed to reveal 

information which would have indicated existence of actual 

conflict, after defense counsel made specific inquiry). The 

judgment of the United States District Court for the District of 

New Mexico is AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

Stephen H. Anderson 

Circuit Judge 

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