Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cr-00269-27/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brent Douglas Cole
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BRENT DOUGLAS COLE,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cr-00269-GEB

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S JULY 

2, 2015 MOTION*

On July 2, 2015, Defendant filed a “Motion in Arrest of 

Judgment,” in which he “moves th[e C]ourt to: 1.) set aside the 

verdict issued February 11, 2015; 2.) Declare an acquittal on all 

charges; 3.) Hold an evidentiary hearing to allow [D]efendant to 

present evidence and present unresolved issues; [and] 4.) take 

all other actions deemed appropriate by the Court.” (Def.’s Mot. 

Arrest J. 32:14-18, ECF No. 116.) Defendant also requests

“reversal and a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, 

pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (“Rule”)] 33.” 

(Id. at 20:19-23.) Defendant argues the following grounds justify 

the requested relief: ineffective assistance of counsel, lack of 

culpability under “the common law,” the “violation of due 

process,” a conspiracy against his rights, the “deprivation of 

rights,” “Defendant’s standing as a federal officer,” 

 

* This matter is suitable for decision without oral argument.

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“jurisdictional error,” the “knowing use of perjury to convict,” 

the “suppression of material evidence,” an invalid complaint, 

“prosecutorial misconduct,” and the “denial of a right to [a] 

common law proceeding.” (Id. at 3:16-23, 4:11-21, 5:1-5, 8:1, 

10:1, 12:1, 13:1-3, 14:18, 15:25, 16:1, 17:9, 17:9-15, 19:1, 

21:1, 23:1, 23:20-26, 24:1.)

The government opposes the motion, arguing it “is timebarred under both Rule 33 and Rule 34 because [Defendant] failed 

to file it within fourteen days of the jury’s verdict[,]” and 

“[t]here is no newly discovered evidence.” (Gov’t Resp. Mot. 

Arrest J. 7:27-28, ECF No. 132.)

Defendant replies that his motion is not time-barred, 

contending Rule 45(b) permits the Court to extend Rule 33 and 

Rule 34’s filing deadlines “because of excusable neglect.” 

(Def.’s Reply 6:2-16, ECF No. 143 (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b)(1)(B)).)

A defendant must “move to arrest judgment [under Rule 

34] within 14 days after the court accepts a verdict.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 34(b). Similarly, “[a]ny motion for a new trial [under 

Rule 33] grounded on any reason other than newly discovered 

evidence must be filed within 14 days after the verdict or 

finding of guilty.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33 (b)(2). However, a 

“motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence 

must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of 

guilty.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b)(1). 

“[I]n general, a defendant seeking a new trial on the 

basis of newly discovered evidence must show[, inter alia,] that 

‘the evidence relied on is, in fact, newly discovered, i.e., 

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discovered after the trial.’” United States v. McKinney, 952 F.2d 

333, 335 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Pitts v. United States, 263 

F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1959)); see United States v. Harrington, 

410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing “five-part test” a 

defendant must satisfy to prevail on a Rule 33 motion for new 

trial based on newly discovered evidence). Further, the defendant 

must “show that the evidence could not have been discovered with 

due diligence at a time early enough to form the basis for a 

timely motion at or before trial.” United States v. Conforte, 624 

F.2d 869, 879 (9th Cir. 1980). “[E]vidence is not ‘newly 

discovered’ when it was known or could have been known by the 

diligence of the defendant or his counsel.” United States v. 

Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 997 (3rd Cir. 1980) (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted); see also 3 Charles Alan Wright & 

Sarah N. Welling, Federal Practice & Procedure (4th ed. 2011) '

584 (“Whether sufficient diligence was used must ordinarily be 

determined from the composite knowledge and conduct of both the 

accused and his counsel.”). 

Here, Defendant argues the following evidence was newly 

discovered and justifies the granting of a new trial: the 

discovery of witness David Brett Tuter, who “heard the 

gunshots . . . a very short distance from the incident[;]” 

locating witness Chris Donegan who is “[a]nother witness . . .

present at the scene[, who] . . . spoke with the [Defendant;]” 

and the defense investigator’s interview of Michael Radon. 

(Def.’s Mot. Arrest J. 19:1-25, 29; id. App. C.) 

However, Defendant has not shown that this evidence was 

unknown to him or his counsel and/or that it could not have been 

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discovered with reasonable diligence, before trial. For example, 

Defendant indicates that David Tuter was referenced in discovery 

provided to defense counsel at Bates page number COLE 00429. (See

Def.’s Mot. Arrest J. 19:1-13.) And Defendant necessarily knew of 

Cris Donegan’s existence since Defendant states they spoke to 

each other shortly before the incident and that Mr. Donegan

witnessed the Defendant at the incident scene. (Id. at 19:17-25.)

Therefore, whether construed as motion for arrest of 

judgment under Rule 34 and/or a motion for new trial under Rule 

33, Defendant’s July 2, 2015 motion is untimely.

1

Further, Defendant has not shown that he failed to 

timely file the motion “because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. 

Crim. P. 45(b). Defendant merely references the rule; he has not 

shown that the standard is satisfied. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. 

v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (in the 

context of applying Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 

9006(b)(1), discussing factors to consider in “determining what 

sorts of neglect will be considered ‘excusable’”); see also

United States v. Jassal, 388 F. App’x 748, 450 (9th Cir. 2010) 

(indicating the Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. “excusable neglect” 

factors should be applied in determining whether a Rule 33 new 

trial motion was timely filed); Comm. for Idaho’s High Desert, 

Inc. v. Yost, 92 F.3d 814, 825 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (“While 

Pioneer involved Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), the Court’s analysis 

was based on the plain meaning of the phrase ‘excusable neglect’

 

1 Defendant’s July 2, 2015 motion is also untimely if construed as a Rule 

29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c)(1) (“A 

defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal . . . within 14 days after a 

guilty verdict or after the court discharges the jury, whichever is later.”). 

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and drew on its use in other procedural contexts, including Fed.

R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 45(b).”).

For the stated reasons, Defendant’s July 2, 2015 

“Motion in Arrest of Judgment,” (ECF No. 116), is DENIED.

Dated: August 25, 2015

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