Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01210/USCOURTS-caed-1_09-cv-01210-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darrel G. Adams
Respondent
Freddie J. Grayson
Petitioner

Document Text:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

FREDDIE J. GRAYSON, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

)

DARREL G. ADAMS, )

)

Respondent. )

____________________________________)

1:09-cv-01210-JLT HC

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE

PETITION SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED 

FOR VIOLATION OF THE ONE-YEAR

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ORDER REQUIRING RESPONSE TO BE

FILED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A preliminary review of the Petition, however, reveals that the

petition may be untimely and should therefore be dismissed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Preliminary Review of Petition

Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition

if it “plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is

not entitled to relief in the district court . . . .” Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. 

The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 8 indicate that the court may dismiss a petition for writ of

habeas corpus, either on its own motion under Rule 4, pursuant to the respondent’s motion to

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In Houston v. Lack, the United States Supreme Court held that a pro se habeas petitioner's notice of appeal is

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deemed filed on the date of its submission to prison authorities for mailing, as opposed to the date of its receipt by the court

clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 166, 276, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2385 (1988). The rule is premised on the pro se prisoner's

mailing of legal documents through the conduit of "prison authorities whom he cannot control and whose interests might be

adverse to his." Miller v. Sumner, 921 F.2d 202, 203 (9 Cir. 1990); see, Houston, 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. at 2382. The th

Ninth Circuit has applied the “mailbox rule” to state and federal petitions in order to calculate the tolling provisions of the

AEDPA. Saffold v. Neland, 250 F.3d 1262, 1268-1269 (9 Cir. 2000), amended May 23, 2001, vacated and remanded on th

other grounds sub nom. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). The date the petition is signed may be considered the

earliest possible date an inmate could submit his petition to prison authorities for filing under the mailbox rule. Jenkins v.

Johnson, 330 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (9 cir. 2003). Accordingly, for all of Petitioner’s state petitions and for the instant federal th

petition, the Court will consider the date of signing of the petition (or the date of signing of the proof of service if no signature

appears on the petition) as the earliest possible filing date and the operative date of filing under the mailbox rule for

calculating the running of the statute of limitation. Petitioner signed the instant petition on July 8, 2009. (Doc. 1, p. 7). 

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dismiss, or after an answer to the petition has been filed. Herbst v. Cook, 260 F.3d 1039 (9th

Cir.2001).

The Ninth Circuit, in Herbst v. Cook, concluded that a district court may dismiss sua sponte a

habeas petition on statute of limitations grounds so long as the court provides the petitioner adequate

notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond. 260 F.3d at 1041-42. By this Order to

Show Cause, the Court is providing Petitioner with an opportunity to respond to the Court’s concern

regarding the timeliness of the petition prior to outright dismissal of the petition itself.

B. Limitation Period for Filing a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of

1996 (AEDPA). The AEDPA imposes various requirements on all petitions for writ of habeas

corpus filed after the date of its enactment. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 2063

(1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9 Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 586 th

(1997). The instant petition was filed on July 8, 2009, and thus, it is subject to the provisions of the 1

AEDPA. 

The AEDPA imposes a one year period of limitation on petitioners seeking to file a federal

petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). As amended, § 2244, subdivision (d)

reads: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas

corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The

limitation period shall run from the latest of –

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct

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review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by

State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if

the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by

the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented

could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or

other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall

not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. 

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

In most cases, the limitation period begins running on the date that the petitioner’s direct

review became final. Here, the Petitioner was convicted on October 13, 1997, in the Superior Court

for the County of Stanislaus. (Doc. 1, p. 1). Subsequently, Petitioner appealed his conviction, which

included filing a Petition for Review in the California Supreme Court that was denied by that court

on March 9, 1999, in case no. S076219. (Id., p. 2). Thus, direct review would have concluded on

June 7, 1999, when the ninety-day period for seeking review in the United States Supreme Court

expired. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983); Bowen v. Roe, 188 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th

Cir.1999); Smith v. Bowersox, 159 F.3d 345, 347 (8 Cir.1998). Petitioner would then have one th

year from the following day, June 8, 1999, or until June 7, 2000, absent applicable tolling, within

which to file his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. As discussed above, Petitioner did not

file the instant petition until July 8, 2009, over nine years after the one-year period would have

expired. Accordingly, unless Petitioner is entitled to some for of statutory or equitable tolling, the

petition is untimely and should be dismissed. 

Although Petitioner does not expressly address the issue of timeliness in his petition, the

Court infers that Petitioner believes his petition to be timely because his fourth claim for relief is

premised upon Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007). Petitioner would be

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Petitioner provides no explanation for why his other three claims were so tardily filed, and the Court will not 2

speculate on the reasons for such a delay.

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incorrect in such a belief. 

2

As indicated above, the one-year limitation period commences on the latest of one of the

four dates set forth in § 2244(d)(1). Normally, that date would be the date the petitioner’s conviction

became final. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the statute of limitations may also commence upon the

removal of an “impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States.” § 2244(d)(1)(B). The record does not suggest, and

Petitioner does not contend, that any such impediment ever existed or that it was subsequently

removed. Accordingly, that date is inapplicable.

Nor does § 2244(d)(1)(D) provide a later accrual date for the commencement of the statute of

limitations. Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), “[t]ime begins when the prisoner knows (or through diligence

could discover) the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their legal significance.” 

Hasan v. Galaza, 254 F.3d 1150, 1154, n. 3 (9 Cir. 2001); see United States v. Pollard, 416 F.3d 48, th

55 (D.D.C. 2005)(habeas petitioner’s alleged “ignorance of the law until an illuminating

conversation with an attorney or fellow prisoner” does not satisfy the requirements of section

2244(d)(1)(D)). Here, Petitioner plainly knew, or should have known, at the time of his original

sentencing by the trial court, the “important fact[s]” on which he would base his Cunningham claim,

i.e., that the sentence-enhancements used to extend his sentence were based in part upon facts not

submitted to a jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The running of the statute of limitations

does not await illuminating advice, legal research, or the issuance of judicial decisions that help

would-be petitioners to recognize the legal significance of particular predicate facts. See Pollard,

416 F.3d at 55.

Finally, § 2244(d)(1)(C) provides that the one-year period may commence from “the date on

which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral

review....” Presumably, Petitioner would implicitly contend that this date applies by virtue of the

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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000), held that other than the fact of a prior conviction, 3

any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond

a reasonable doubt.

Blakely held that the relevant statutory sentencing maximum is the maximum sentence a judge may impose soley 4

based on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict or admitted by defendant.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), in addressing the constitutionality of the federal 5

sentencing guidelines, held that if a fact necessarily results in a mandated higher sentence, the fact must be admitted by the

defendant or found by the jury.

See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1246 (9 Cir. 2005)(Apprendi not retroactive); U.S. v. Sanchez6 th

Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 671 (9 Cir. 2002)(same); Schardt v. Payne, 414 F.3d 1025, 1033-1038 (9 Cir. 2005)(Blakely not th th

retroactive); U.S. v. Cruz, 423 F.3d 1119 (9 Cir. 2005)(Booker not retroactive). th

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Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Cunningham that California’s Determinate Sentencing Law

(“DSL”) was unconstitutional.

Section 2244(d)(1)(C), however, is inapplicable to Cunningham because the United States

Supreme Court has not held that Cunningham constitutes both (1) a new rule and (2) a rule

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. To the contrary, the Ninth Circuit, in Butler v.

Curry, 528 F.3d 624, 633-639 (9 Cir. 2008), held that Cunningham did not announce a new rule. In th

Butler, the Ninth Circuit clarified that the Cunningham decision, striking down California's

determinate sentencing law, was compelled by Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), such

that the decision as to whether a petitioner's constitutional rights herein were violated rests, as a

threshold matter, on whether or not his conviction became final before Blakely, not Cunningham,

was decided. Citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), the Ninth Circuit

panel stated as follows:

Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker made "courts throughout the land" aware that sentencing 3 4 5

schemes that raise the maximum possible term based on facts not found by a jury violate the

constitutional rights of defendants. [Cunningham, supra,] at 306. No principles of comity or

federalism would be served by refusing to apply this rule to functionally indistinguishable

state sentencing schemes on collateral review. Cunningham thus did not announce a new rule

of constitutional law and may be applied retroactively on collateral review.

Butler, supra, at 639. (Emphasis supplied).

Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker have been determined to be new rules, but not retroactive on

collateral review, thereby not satisfying the second requirement. Cunningham has now been

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28 The Court has been unable to find a district court case that reaches a different conclusion than those cited herein. 7

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determined by the Ninth Circuit to apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, but is not a new

rule, thereby not satisfying the first requirement. Butler, 528 F.3d at 639. Hence, contrary to

Petitioner’s implicit contention, the alternative start date contained in subsection (C) for the one-year

limitation period in Petitioner’s case is not implicated by any of the applicable federal case law. 

Accordingly, the commencement of the statute of limitations here is governed by the “usual”

starting date contained in subsection (A). This conclusion is consistent with the great majority of

federal district courts in this circuit who have addressed this issue. E.g., Martinez v. Hedgepeth,

2008 WL 3154689, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008)(because Cunningham was not a new rule,

subsection C is inapplicable); Thomas v. Yates, 2008 WL 4177608, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 4,

2008)(same); Bell v. Adams, 2008 WL 4722564, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2008)(same); Collett v.

Salazar, 2008 WL 4601463, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008)(same); Taylor v. Vasquez, 2008 WL

23022, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2008)(same); Schuller v. Horel, 2008 WL 3914171, at *1 n.2

(C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2008)(same); Pimental v. Almager, 2008 WL 2757075, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 14,

2008)(same).7

As discussed above, using subsection (C) as the starting date inexorably leads to a conclusion

that the instant petition was filed nine years after the one-year period expired. Thus, unless

Petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling sufficient to account for the nine-year delay, the petition is

untimely and should be dismissed.

C. Tolling of the Limitation Period Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2)

Under the AEDPA, the statute of limitations is tolled during the time that a properly filed

application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending in state court. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2244(d)(2). A properly filed application is one that complies with the applicable laws and rules

governing filings, including the form of the application and time limitations. Artuz v. Bennett, 531

U.S. 4, 8, 121 S. Ct. 361 (2000). An application is pending during the time that ‘a California

petitioner completes a full round of [state] collateral review,” so long as there is no unreasonable

delay in the intervals between a lower court decision and the filing of a petition in a higher court. 

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Delhomme v. Ramirez, 340 F. 3d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other grounds as recognized

by Waldrip v. Hall, 548 F. 3d 729 (9th Cir. 2008)(per curium)(internal quotation marks and citations

omitted); see Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 193-194, 126 S. Ct. 846 (2006); see Carey v. Saffold,

536 U.S. 214, 220, 222-226, 122 S. Ct. 2134 (2002); see also, Nino v. Galaza, 183 F.3d 1003, 1006

(9th Cir. 1999). 

Nevertheless, there are circumstances and periods of time when no statutory tolling is

allowed. For example, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period of time between finality of an

appeal and the filing of an application for post-conviction or other collateral review in state court,

because no state court application is “pending” during that time. Nino, 183 F.3d at 1006-1007. 

Similarly, no statutory tolling is allowed for the period between finality of an appeal and the filing of

a federal petition. Id. at 1007. In addition, the limitation period is not tolled during the time that a

federal habeas petition is pending. Duncan v. Walker, 563 U.S. 167, 181-182, 121 S.Ct. 2120

(2001); see also, Fail v. Hubbard, 315 F. 3d 1059, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001)(as amended on December 16,

2002). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling where the limitation period has already

run prior to filing a state habeas petition. Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 2003)

(“section 2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the

state petition was filed.”); Jiminez v. White, 276 F. 3d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, a petitioner

is not entitled to continuous tolling when the petitioner’s later petition raises unrelated claims. See

Gaston v. Palmer, 447 F.3d 1165, 1166 (9th Cir. 2006). 

Here, Petitioner alleges that in July 2008 he filed a state habeas petition challenging the

legality of his sentence under Cunningham, that was denied on September 2, 2008. (Doc. 1, pp. 13;

34). Thereafter, Petitioner filed a habeas petition in the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate

District, on September 23, 2008, that was denied on October 3, 2008. (Id., p. 36). Finally, Petitioner

filed a habeas petition in the California Supreme Court on November 12, 2008, that was denied on

May 13, 2009. (Id., pp. 14; 39). 

Even assuming, without deciding, that these three state habeas petitions were “properly filed”

within the meaning of the AEDPA, thus entitling Petitioner to statutory tolling of the one-year period

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during the pendency of those proceedings, a petitioner is not entitled to tolling where, as here, the

limitations period has already run prior to filing the state habeas petition. Green v. White, 223 F.3d

1001, 1003 (9 Cir. 2000); Jiminez v. Rice, 276 F.3d 478 (9 Cir. 2001); see Webster v. Moore, 199 th th

F.3d 1256, 1259 (11 Cir. 2000)(same); Ferguson v. Palmateer, 321 F.3d 820 (9 Cir. 2003)(“section th th

2244(d) does not permit the reinitiation of the limitations period that has ended before the state

petition was filed.”); Jackson v. Dormire, 180 F.3d 919, 920 (8 Cir. 1999) (petitioner fails to th

exhaust claims raised in state habeas corpus filed after expiration of the one-year limitations period). 

As mentioned, the limitations period expired on June 7, 2000, more than eight years before Petitioner

filed his first state habeas petition. Accordingly, he cannot avail himself of the statutory tolling

provisions of the AEDPA. 

D. Equitable Tolling

The limitation period is subject to equitable tolling when “extraordinary circumstances

beyond a prisoner’s control make it impossible to file the petition on time.” Shannon v. Newland,

410 F. 3d 1083, 1089-1090 (9th Cir. 2005)(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When 

external forces, rather than a petitioner’s lack of diligence, account for the failure to file a timely

claim, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate.” Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d

1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears the burden of

establishing two elements: “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some

extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S. Ct.

1807 (2005). “[T]he threshold necessary to trigger equitable tolling under AEDPA is very high, lest

the exceptions swallow the rule.” Miranda v. Castro, 292 F. 3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2002)(citation

omitted). As a consequence, “equitable tolling is unavailable in most cases.” Miles, 187 F. 3d at

1107. 

Here, Petitioner has not alleged any entitlement to equitable tolling and, based on the record

now before the Court, the Court perceives no basis for equitable tolling. However, Petitioner will be

permitted to respond to the Order to Show Cause and to address the Court’s concern regarding the

timeliness of the petition. If Petitioner fails to provide satisfactory reasons for the apparent

untimeliness of the petition, the petition may be dismissed.

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 ORDER

Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS as follows: 

1. Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within thirty (30) days of the date of service

of this Order why the Petition should not be dismissed for violation of the one-year

statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). 

Petitioner is forewarned that his failure to comply with this order may result in a

Recommendation that the Petition be dismissed pursuant to Local Rule 11-110.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 5, 2010 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

9j7khi UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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