Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-17-03792/USCOURTS-ca3-17-03792-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Marquise Bell
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

______________

No: 17-3792

______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

MARQUISE BELL,

 Appellant

______________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES 

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

(D.C. Crim. Nos. 2-16-cr-00441-001 & 2-17-cr-00087-001)

District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno

______________

Argued September 25, 2018

______________

Before: AMBRO, CHAGARES, and GREENAWAY, JR., 

Circuit Judges.

(Opinion Filed: January 7, 2020)

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______________

OPINION

______________

George H. Newman [ARGUED]

George H. Newman & Associates 

100 South Broad Street 

Suite 2126 

Philadelphia, PA 19110

Attorney for Appellant

William M. McSwain, United States Attorney

Robert A. Zauzmer, Chief of Appeals

Bernadette A. McKeon [ARGUED]

Yvonne O. Osirim

Office of the United States Attorney 

615 Chestnut Street 

Suite 1250 

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Attorneys for Appellee

GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.

Marquise Bell challenges two enhancements to his 

sentence for robbing a Metro PCS store – one for the use of a 

dangerous weapon and the other for physically restraining the 

victim. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 

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District Court’s application of the enhancement for use of a 

dangerous weapon, reverse its application for physically 

restraining the victim, and remand for resentencing. 

I. Background

On September 15, 2015, Bell and Samuel Robinson

entered a Metro PCS store located at 4229 North Broad Street, 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Both men wore stockings over 

their faces to obscure their identities. Bell carried a weapon 

resembling a firearm. Upon entering the store, Bell physically 

confronted a store employee, by grabbing the employee’s neck, 

pointing the weapon at his neck, and throwing the employee to 

the ground. Bell then began to remove cash from the register. 

The employee attempted to stop the theft by grabbing Bell’s 

arm, causing Bell to strike the employee with the weapon. The 

blow caused a piece of the weapon to break off, at which time 

the employee realized the firearm was fake. The firearm Bell 

carried was, in reality, a plastic gun. The employee then stood 

up and attempted to stop the robbery. There was a struggle

during which Bell pushed the employee away, allowing him 

and Robinson to flee the store with approximately $1,000.00

in cash. 

During the sentencing hearing, Bell’s counsel read a 

statement from the employee describing the incident:

“I grabbed his arm. He hit me with the gun. 

That’s when I knew it was fake. It was plastic. 

It broke and part of it fell over here (pointing to 

the floor) behind the register. That’s when I saw 

the piece on the floor. I got up again, to fight him, 

but he grabbed the money from the register and 

ran out the door.”

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(App. A50-51.) 

During his flight, Bell dropped his hat, which was 

seized by the Philadelphia Police and preserved for DNA 

testing. Approximately one year later, the police obtained a 

warrant for Bell’s DNA. When FBI agents, Task Force 

officers, and Philadelphia Police Officers went to Bell’s 

residence to execute the warrant, they found Bell hiding on the 

roof outside his bedroom window. Near Bell, the officers saw 

a plastic bag, from which a cardboard box marked 

“Winchester” protruded. The bag contained multiple rounds 

of various types, calibers, and makes of ammunition. 

Bell was indicted in two separate one count indictments

– one for being a felon in possession of ammunition in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and the second for Hobbs Act 

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He pled guilty to 

both indictments. 

At sentencing, the District Court, over Bell’s counsel’s 

objections, imposed a two-level enhancement for physical 

restraint pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and a fourlevel enhancement for use of a dangerous weapon, pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D).

1

 After a three-level reduction for 

 

1 Counsel also sought to have the offenses grouped in 

order to eliminate an additional one level enhancement. In 

addition, counsel sought a reduction for Bell’s minor role in 

the offense. The District Court rejected both of these 

arguments. Bell does not challenge either of those decisions 

on appeal. 

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acceptance of responsibility, the District Court concluded that 

Bell had an offense level of 24 and a criminal history category 

of IV, resulting in a sentencing range of 77 to 96 months. After 

considering the § 3553 factors, the Court imposed a sentence 

of 86 months of incarceration, followed by three years of 

supervised release. This timely appeal followed. 

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of 

review to use in this case. Citing no cases, Bell asserts that we 

should apply de novo review to his challenges to the 

application of the sentencing enhancements. Relying on 

United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012), the 

government posits that we should review for clear error. This

misconstrues our holding in Richards. 

As we stated in United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 

570 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), “this Court will continue to 

review factual findings relevant to the Guidelines for clear 

error and to exercise plenary review over a district court’s 

interpretation of the Guidelines.” We did just that in Richards;

we were not required to interpret the Guidelines because the 

appellant did “not quarrel with the District Court’s articulation 

of what it means to be a government official in a high-level 

decision-making or sensitive position, for the District Court 

used the definition of the enhancement exactly as it is recited 

in the Guidelines.” Richards, 674 F.3d at 218. Instead, the 

appellant “disagree[d] with the District Court’s conclusion that 

the facts regarding his employment fit within the Guidelines 

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definition of a government official in a high-level decisionmaking or sensitive position.” Id. We, therefore, applied clear 

error review to the District Court’s factual findings. 

Despite the government’s assertion that we are currently 

faced with a situation similar to that in Richards, we are not. 

Bell has not contested the facts of his offense. Instead, he 

challenges the District Court’s interpretation and application of 

two provisions of the Guidelines.2 We will review the District 

 

2

In concluding that we should review the District 

Court’s decision for clear error, our dissenting colleague 

focuses on the factual nature of the application of the 

Guideline, but fails to acknowledge that we have not, prior to 

today’s decision, provided a comprehensive interpretation of 

the physical restraint enhancement that a district court could 

then apply. The fatal flaw in the dissent’s interpretation of 

Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), emanates from a 

lack of appreciation for the distinction the Supreme Court is 

drawing. Here, as recognized in Buford, we are considering “a 

generally recurring, purely legal matter, such as interpreting a 

set of legal words, say, those of an individual guideline, in 

order to determine their basic intent.” Id. at 65. We are not 

addressing an issue that “is bounded by[ ] case-specific 

detailed factual circumstances [where] the fact-bound nature of 

the decision limits the value of appellate court precedent, 

which may provide only minimal help when other courts 

consider other procedural circumstances, other state systems, 

and other crimes.” Id.at 65-66. Just last year, we, as an en 

banc court, applied these principles when we exercised plenary 

review over the interpretation of a specific guideline. United 

States v. Douglas, 885 F.3d 124, 129 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc). 

We are now interpreting the meaning of sections 

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Court’s determinations de novo. See United States v. Paul, 904 

F.3d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 2018) (“[T]he issue on this appeal is not 

the factual question of what happened to the store employee; it 

is the legal question whether the physical restraint 

enhancement applies to the undisputed facts . . . .”); United 

States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he 

pertinent facts . . . are not disputed. . . . The question is whether 

the physical restraint enhancement applies to those facts, an 

issue that ‘turns primarily on the legal interpretation of a 

guideline term.’” (quoting United States v. Stroud, 893 F.2d 

504, 507 (2d Cir. 1990)).

III. Analysis

On appeal, Bell raises two challenges to his sentence. 

The first – whether he physically restrained the victim –

requires us to review sections 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 1B1.1 of the 

Sentencing Guidelines in order to discern what conduct the 

Sentencing Commission sought to encompass in the definition 

of “physically restrained.” The second – whether Bell used a 

dangerous weapon – presents a less challenging analysis in 

light of our clear precedent on this issue.

A. Physically restrained

Consideration of the enhancement for physical restraint 

involves two sections of the Sentencing Guidelines. Section 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B) provides that “if any person was physically 

restrained to facilitate commission of the offense [of robbery] 

or to facilitate escape,” the sentencing calculation should be 

 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 1B1.1, before applying that meaning to the 

present case. 

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increased by two levels. “Physically restrained” is defined in 

the application notes to § 1B1.1 as “mean[ing] the forcible 

restraint of the victim such as by being tied, bound, or locked 

up.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(K)

(U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2016) [hereinafter “U.S.S.G.”].

3

 

Looking only at the language used in the definition, it 

would appear clear that Bell did not physically restrain the 

store employee because he did not tie up, bind, or lock up the 

employee. However, we, along with many of our sister 

circuits, have held that the three examples provided in the 

definition of physically restrained are not an exhaustive list, 

but rather only examples of the types of conduct that fall within 

the meaning of the term. United States v. Copenhaver, 185 

F.3d 178, 180 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Cases have generally held that 

‘physical restraint’ is not limited to the examples listed in the 

guidelines.”). See, e.g., United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 

(1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. 

 

3 At the time of Bell’s sentencing in 2017, the term 

“physically restrained” was defined in Application Note 1(K) 

of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. As a result of revisions 

made to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines in 2018, the definition 

of “physically restrained” now appears in Application Note 

1(L). This change does not affect our case. See Dorsey v. 

United States, 567 U.S. 260, 275 (2012) (“The Sentencing 

Commission has . . . instructed sentencing judges to ‘use the 

Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is 

sentenced,’ regardless of when the defendant committed the 

offense, unless doing so ‘would violate the ex post facto 

clause.’” (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11)). 

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Cir. 2000); United States v. Anglin, 169 F.3d 154, 164 (2d Cir. 

1999); United States v. Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 461 (5th Cir. 

1998); United States v. Thompson, 109 F.3d 639, 641 (9th Cir. 

1997); United States v. Stokley, 881 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 

1989). 

Since our decision in Copenhaver, we have not had the 

occasion to speak precedentially on the parameters of what it 

means to be physically restrained, as defined in the Guidelines. 

Copenhaver involved the defendant, during the course of a 

robbery, forcing the victim from one room into another and 

then “put[ting] him in the fireplace and plac[ing] the fire screen 

across it.” Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 179 (quoting the 

appendix). While we discussed, in dicta, factors other circuits 

had considered when imposing the enhancement for physically 

restraining a victim, we were not required to adopt any specific 

test to be used in interpreting this Guideline since 

[w]e need not choose in this case between the 

position of [United States v.] Thompson[, 109 

F.3d 639 (9th Cir. 1997),] that forcing some 

action at the point of a gun constitutes physical 

restraint under the Guideline and that in [United 

States v.] Anglin[, 169 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 1999),] 

holding to the contrary. Here, Copenhaver did 

more than merely order Helwig to stand still, 

kneel or lie down. He not only forced him into 

another office but put him into the fireplace and 

placed the fire screen across it, thereby confining 

his victim in a manner comparable to the 

example given in Anglin of ‘locking up’ the 

victim.

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Id. at182. We are now faced with a less clear situation that 

requires us to determine what factors to consider when 

determining if a defendant physically restrained a victim. 

Unlike our Court, over the past twenty years, other 

circuits have reviewed the meaning and application of the 

physically restrained enhancement. Turning to those cases, we 

discern five broad factors that the other circuits have used to 

evaluate whether the enhancement should be applied and that 

we, after consideration, adopt here. Those factors are 

1. Use of physical force;

2. Exerting control over the victim;

3. Providing the victim with no alternative 

but compliance;

4. Focusing on the victim for some period of 

time; and

5. Placement in a confined space.

We emphasize that courts should balance these factors 

in deciding whether to impose the enhancement; no single 

factor is necessarily dispositive. 

1. Use of physical force

Several circuits have commented on the relevance of the 

term “physical” in the definition of physically restrained. As 

the D.C. Circuit succinctly stated, “[t]he required restraint 

must, as the language plainly recites, be physical.” United 

States v. Drew, 200 F.3d 871, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2000). That Court 

further observed that “the phrase ‘being tied, bound, or locked 

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up’ indicates that physical restraint requires the defendant 

either to restrain the victim through bodily contact or to confine 

the victim in some way.” Id. In reaching this conclusion, the 

D.C. Circuit relied upon the Second Circuit’s reasoning in

Anglin. Id. (noting that “[t]he most pertinent definition of 

‘physical’ is ‘of the body as opposed to the mind, as, physical 

exercise.’” (quoting Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164)). 

In Anglin, the Second Circuit relied on “the plain 

meaning of words” to support its conclusion that the physical 

restraint enhancement requires the use of physical force.

Anglin, 169 F.3d at 164. Observing that “‘physical’ is an 

adjective which modifies (and hence limits) the noun 

‘restraint,’” the Second Circuit reasoned that “if § 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B) said only that the enhancement would apply ‘if 

any person was restrained,’ the courts would become involved 

in mental, moral, philosophical, even theological 

considerations, in addition to physical ones. No, the restraint 

must be ‘physical.’” Id. 

The Fifth Circuit has adopted the Second Circuit’s 

reasoning – it too requires the use of physical, rather than 

mental or moral, force in order to apply the enhancement. 

United States v. Garcia, 857 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2017). 

There, the Fifth Circuit concluded that although “we have little 

doubt that at least one of the employees felt restrained when 

the barrel of a gun touched the back of his neck, . . . this 

employee and his coworkers were not subjected to the type of 

physical restraint that victims experience when they are tied, 

bound, or locked up.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the need “for 

something that tells us on which side of the line that divides 

psychological coercion from physical restraint a given case 

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falls.” United States v. Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 875 (7th Cir. 

2019). Specifically, that Court sought to resolve “the question 

whether the physical-restraint enhancement can be applied to 

situations in which an armed defendant simply orders his 

victims not to move and does not otherwise immobilize them 

through measures such as those outlined in the commentary to 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.” Id. at 874. In that context – where a 

defendant points a gun at a victim – the Seventh Circuit 

observed that 

the victim’s reaction does not determine whether 

there is or is not physical restraint. If the 

defendant waves a gun around and barks out a 

command to stay still and the victim obeys, it 

makes no sense to say that the recipient of the 

order was physically restrained. Whatever 

restraint occurred came about from the way the 

victim decided to respond to the order. She 

might obey; she might ignore it; or she might 

attempt to flee. Her physical response to the 

defendant’s attempt to coerce, however, is not 

something that logically belongs within the 

scope of the physical-restraint guideline.

Id. at 876. Ultimately, the Court “align[ed] [itself] with the 

circuits that have found that more than pointing a gun at 

someone and ordering that person not to move is necessary for 

the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B).” Id. at 877. 

We discern a common thread in these cases regarding 

the meaning of “physical” in the definition of physical 

restraint: the need for the restraint to be something more than 

a psychological restraint. We agree that we should consider 

the plain meaning of the word “physical” in the definition set 

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forth in § 1B1.1, and we therefore adopt the requirement that 

the restraint involve some physical aspect. 

2. Exerting control over the victim 

Continuing our focus on the plain language of the 

Guidelines, we turn to the second word in the phrase: 

“restrained.” Anglin, once again, provides us with guidance on 

this point. Citing Webster’s Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary, 

the Second Circuit examined the definition of “the verb 

‘restrain,’ whose first definition is ‘to hold back; to check; to 

hold from action, proceeding, or advancing, either by physical 

or moral force, or by any interposing obstacle.’” Anglin, 169 

F.3d at 164 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Webster’s Deluxe 

Unabridged Dictionary (1979) at 1544). Similarly, the Ninth 

Circuit has turned to the dictionary in an effort to discern the 

meaning of the enhancement. United States v. Foppe, 993 F.2d 

1444, 1452 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The dictionary defines ‘restraint’

as (1) the act of holding back from some activity or (2) by 

means of force, an act that checks free activity or otherwise 

controls.” (citing Webster’s Third New International 

Dictionary 1937 (1986))). The Fourth Circuit has also 

recognized that the enhancement requires some form of 

restraint, stating “[t]he intended scope of the USSG 

§ 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) enhancement is to punish a defendant who 

deprives a person of his physical movement.” United States v. 

Dimache, 665 F.3d 603, 609 (4th Cir. 2011).

We agree that, in order to impose the enhancement, a 

defendant should be deemed to have engaged in actions that 

restrict a victim’s freedom of movement in some manner. 

Requiring a restriction of a victim’s freedom of movement is 

consistent not only with the dictionary definition of restraint, 

but also with the examples of “being tied, bound or locked up”

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provided in the Guidelines. All three of those examples restrict 

a victim’s freedom of movement. While tying and binding a 

victim require touching the person, it is possible to lock 

someone up without touching them. In addition, a defendant 

could direct one victim to tie up another victim, an action that 

would not require the defendant to touch the victim, but would 

clearly fall within the specific examples set forth in the 

Guidelines. We therefore reiterate our statement in 

Copenhaver that “[n]o actual touching is required to effect 

physical restraint.” 185 F.3d at 182. 

3. Providing the victim with no alternative but 

compliance

As we observed in Copenhaver, application of the 

enhancement for “physically restrained” is appropriate “when 

the defendant ‘creates circumstances allowing the persons no 

alternative but compliance.’” Id. at 180 (quoting United States 

v. Kirtley, 986 F.2d 285, 286 (8th Cir. 1993)). The Second, 

Seventh,4 Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have all similarly 

recognized that providing a victim with no alternative but 

 

4 Earlier this year, the Seventh Circuit noted that some 

of its cases had extended the concept of “no alternative to 

compliance” from physical into psychological restraints. 

Herman, 930 F.3d at 876-77. In light of that concern, the Court 

noted that “[t]o the extent that those earlier cases allow for the 

application of the ‘physical restraint’ enhancement based 

solely on psychological coercion—including the coercion of 

being held at gun point—we hereby disapprove those 

holdings.” Id. at 877.

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compliance plays a role in determining whether to apply the 

enhancement. 

For example, in United States v. Rosario, 7 F.3d 319 (2d 

Cir. 1993), the Second Circuit affirmed application of the 

enhancement because the defendant, “[b]y standing on his 

victim’s throat while committing the robbery, . . . facilitated 

the commission of the offense in that the victim ‘could do 

nothing about [his] situation because of the physical restraint.’” 

7 F.3d at 321 (quoting United States v. Doubet, 969 F.2d 341, 

347 (7th Cir. 1992) abrogated on other grounds by United 

States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87(1993)).

In United States v. Victor, the Eleventh Circuit noted 

that the enhancement is applicable when the defendant’s 

conduct “ensure[s] the victims’ compliance and effectively 

prevent[s] them from leaving.” 719 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 

2013) (quoting United States v. Jones, 32 F.3d 1512, 1518–19 

(11th Cir. 1994)). The court in Victor concluded that by 

threatening the victim with what the victim believed was a gun 

and thereby preventing the victim from escaping, the defendant 

physically restrained her within the meaning of the 

enhancement. Id. (mentioning that the victim was “forced to 

comply”). 

In Kirtley, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although 

the defendant himself did not bind the victims, he ordered them 

to bind themselves at gun point and therefore, because the 

victims had “no alternative but to obey,” the defendant 

physically restrained them. 986 F.2d at 286 (“a defendant 

physically restrains persons if the defendant creates 

circumstances allowing the persons no alternative but 

compliance.”). Similarly, in United States v. Lee, the Eighth 

Circuit affirmed application of the sentencing enhancement on 

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the ground that the defendant physically restrained the victim 

by striking her with a gun, thereby “creat[ing] circumstances 

allowing the [woman] no alternative but compliance.” 570 

F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kirtley, 986 F.2d at 286)

(alteration in original); see also United States v. Schau, 1 F.3d 

729, 730 (8th Cir. 1993) (concluding that application of the 

enhancement was warranted where the defendant ordered the 

victims into an unlocked vault from which they could easily 

have freed themselves on the ground that the victims were 

forced to comply). 

We agree that, in order to impose the enhancement for 

physical restraint, a defendant’s actions should leave a victim 

with no alternative but compliance.5 While we commented on 

this factor in dicta in Copenhaver, we now formally adopt it as 

a factor to consider when imposing the enhancement. 

 

5

In Herman, the Seventh Circuit observed that “[t]he 

phrase ‘operation of circumstances that permit no alternative 

to compliance’ could be understood to cover purely 

psychological coercion.” Herman, 930 F.3d at 876. As we 

have already stated, we believe that physical, not 

psychological, restraint is required in order to impose the 

enhancement. Our inclusion of a victim having no alternative 

but compliance as a factor to consider in the physical restraint 

analysis does not erase the need for the restraint to be physical, 

nor does it open the door for psychological restraints to be 

considered. 

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4. Focusing on the victim for some period of time

The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have recognized a need 

to consider the duration of the restraint in imposing the 

enhancement. The Fourth Circuit distinguished between 

situations where the victims were “confined to a room for some 

time” or “held and threatened for a long enough period to 

accomplish the cash withdrawal,” and the brief amount of time 

the defendant held his victim during the stabbing at issue in the 

case before it. United States v. Mikalajunas, 936 F.2d 153, 156 

(4th Cir. 1991). The Court concluded that “the examples of 

physical restraint in the guidelines, while not all inclusive, 

imply that the guidelines intend an enhancement for something 

other than a brief holding as part of a stabbing.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Similarly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that “in 

determining whether the physical restraint enhancement was 

properly applied we should examine the nature and duration of 

the restraint.” United States v. Khleang, 3 F. App’x 672, 675

(10th Cir. 2001).6 

The consideration of duration of the physical restraint 

echoes the requirement for “sustained focus on the restrained 

person that lasts long enough for the robber to direct the victim 

into a room or order the victim to walk somewhere” identified 

by the Ninth Circuit. United States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 

1118 (9th Cir. 2001). The Court further opined that “[i]t is 

therefore likely that Congress meant for something more than 

briefly pointing a gun at a victim and commanding her once to 

get down to constitute physical restraint, given that nearly all 

 

6 The Tenth Circuit allows citation to unpublished 

opinions as persuasive, but not precedential, authority. 10th

Cir. R. 32.1. 

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armed bank robberies will presumably involve such acts.” Id. 

at 1118–19; see also United States v. Albritton, 622 F.3d 1104, 

1107–08 (9th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the sustained focus 

requirement was met where the defendant directed the victim 

around the premises and followed right behind her with a gun 

in his hand). 

We note that the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. 

Coleman, rejected the “sustained focus” standard that was 

articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Parker. 664 F.3d 1047, 1050 

(6th Cir. 2012) (“No other circuit has adopted Parker’s view, 

and our reading aligns with those circuits that read the text 

more broadly.”). However, the Sixth Circuit noted that even if 

it did adopt Parker’s “sustained focus” requirement, the 

defendant’s conduct would still warrant imposition of the 

enhancement because, by forcing the victim to go to a different 

place and stay there, the defendant’s focus lasted long enough 

to satisfy Parker’s sustained focus standard. Id. at 1050–51.

We agree with those courts that have identified a 

durational requirement in order to impose the enhancement. 

As the Fourth Circuit aptly noted, all of the examples of 

physical restraint listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 – being tied, 

bound, or locked up – imply more than a momentary restraint. 

As such, we shall include duration of the restraint as a factor in 

our analysis determining application of the enhancement.7 

 

7 Our dissenting colleague believes that “the physical 

restraint need only last long enough ‘to facilitate the 

commission of the offense or facilitate escape.’” Dissent at 11

(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B)). He finds that the few 

seconds the employee was on the ground facilitated the 

commission of the robbery because “Bell was able to grab 

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5. Placement in a confined space

In Copenhaver, we examined this concept and 

concluded that “[i]t is the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or 

confining the victim in a space or with a barrier, actual or 

threatened, that constitutes the action meriting enhancement of 

the offense level.” 185 F.3d at 183. The inclusion of this factor 

is helpful to our jurisprudence. We include it here to formalize 

its relevance in determining the appropriate application of the 

enhancement. 

In sum, we conclude that, in order to impose the 

enhancement for physical restraint, a district court should 

determine if the defendant’s actions involved the use of 

physical force that limited the victim’s freedom of movement, 

 

money out of the cash register after shoving the employee to 

the ground.” Id. We simply cannot agree that the few seconds 

during which the employee was on the floor allowed Bell to 

commit the robbery in the same way being tied, bound, or 

locked up would. The examples provided in the Guidelines 

imply the restraint has to last for some period of time greater 

than a few seconds. 

If we were to use the Dissent’s standard of the restraint 

lasting only long enough to facilitate the commission of the 

offense or facilitate escape, then we would be compelled to 

impose the enhancement based on Bell pushing the employee 

away during their struggle since that push was physical and it 

allowed Bell to escape. We simply cannot agree that such a 

brief encounter is what the Guidelines contemplate. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 19 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
20

with a sustained focus on the victim for some period of time 

which provided the victim with no alternative but compliance. 

No single factor is dispositive nor does any factor carry more 

weight than any other factor; rather, district courts should 

balance all of these factors. Further, as stated in Section 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the restraint must be imposed “to facilitate

commission of the offense [of robbery] or to facilitate escape.”

The Parties’ Arguments

With these factors in mind, we turn to the parties’

arguments.

Relying on Anglin and Rosario, Bell argues that “more 

than a mere threat is required to establish physical restraint.” 

Appellant’s Br. 10. He asserts, in conclusory fashion, that 

“pushing someone to the floor, and threatening them with what 

apparently is a toy gun is not inherently ‘physical restraint.’” 

Appellant’s Br. 12. Bell, in his reply brief, posits that if the 

enhancement is applied here, “then arguably all robberies 

justify the 2-level enhancement.” Reply Br. 1. 

On the other hand, the government engages in a 

thorough discussion of the cases interpreting physical restraint, 

concluding that “[h]olding the weapon to the victim’s neck and 

throwing him to the floor achieved the same objective as 

various other forms of physical restraint – namely, it confined 

the victim to the floor, permitting the defendant to access the 

cash register and steal cash.” Appellee’s Br. 22. The 

government notes that Bell’s conduct encompassed more than 

simply pointing a gun at a victim since “Bell used direct 

physical contact to put the victim on the floor and attempt to 

confine him to that space.” Appellee’s Br. 23. The 

government also emphasizes that Bell “did not simply brandish 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 20 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
21

the fake gun, but placed the gun to the victim’s neck and threw 

him on the ground, and then struck the victim with the gun in 

an effort to keep the victim from intervening.” Id. Analogizing 

to the fact in Copenhaver that the fire screen placed across the 

fireplace was removable, the government claims that the fact 

“the victim persisted in his efforts to thwart the robbery once 

he realized the firearm was fake is of no moment.” Id. Rather, 

the important fact, in the government’s view, “was the act of 

forcing the victim to the ground and attempting to hold him 

there.” Id. 

Despite the government’s efforts to demonstrate Bell 

physically restrained his victim, we disagree. While grabbing 

the victim by the neck and forcing him to the floor satisfies the 

requirement that the force be physical, we cannot say that the 

victim was left with no alternative but compliance (a point the 

government never addresses) since the victim twice attempted 

to thwart the robbery.8 Further, the physical restraint was quite 

 

8 While the Dissent observes “that the focus is ‘on the 

action of the defendant, not on the reaction of the victim,’” 

Dissent at 10 (quoting Herman, 930 F.3d at 876), we are not 

focusing on the employee’s reaction. Rather, we are 

considering the result of Bell’s action of grabbing the 

employee’s neck and shoving him to the floor. Since the 

employee was clearly able to move, as evidenced by his 

attempt to thwart the robbery, we cannot say he was restrained. 

Further, in commenting that “the enhancement aims to punish 

the act of physical restraint, successful or not,” Dissent at 9, the 

Dissent misstates our precedent in Copenhaver. Nowhere in 

Copenhaver do we state that only an attempt at physically 

restraining a victim will suffice to impose the enhancement, 

nor do the Guidelines indicate that attempted restraint is a basis 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 21 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
22

limited in time. It could not have taken more than a few 

seconds for Bell to grab the victim’s neck and shove him to the 

floor. Thus, there was no sustained focus on the victim. 

Instead, based on the victim’s description of the incident, the 

entire interaction between him and Bell seems to have taken 

only seconds from start to finish. Looking at the totality of the 

circumstances, we cannot conclude that Bell physically 

restrained his victim sufficiently to invoke application of the 

enhancement. If we apply the enhancement here, then any 

crime that involves a chance encounter with a victim with any 

physical dimension would require application of the 

enhancement. 

B. Use of a dangerous weapon

Bell argues that he “brandished,” rather than “otherwise used” 

a dangerous weapon under Application Notes 1(C) and 1(I) to 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, and that he therefore should not be subject 

to the four-level use of a dangerous weapon enhancement of 

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). 

The Sentencing Guidelines define the above terms as follows:

“Brandished” with reference to a dangerous 

weapon (including a firearm) means that all or 

part of the weapon was displayed, or the 

presence of the weapon was otherwise made 

 

for imposing the enhancement. In Copenhaver, we 

acknowledged, based on the flimsy nature of the fireplace 

screen, that a barrier enclosing a victim could be “actual or 

threatened,” 185 F.3d at 183, but we did not extend that 

concept to conclude the physical restraint need not succeed. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 22 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
23

known to another person, in order to intimidate 

that person, regardless of whether the weapon 

was directly visible to that person. Accordingly, 

although the dangerous weapon does not have to 

be directly visible, the weapon must be present.

“Otherwise used” with reference to a dangerous 

weapon (including a firearm) means that the 

conduct did not amount to the discharge of a 

firearm but was more than brandishing, 

displaying, or possessing a firearm or other 

dangerous weapon.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. 1(C) & 1(I).

We established a distinction between brandishing and 

otherwise using a weapon in United States v. Johnson, 199 

F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. 

LaFortune, 192 F.3d 157, 161-62 (1st Cir. 1999) (alterations 

in original)):

[A] person may “brandish” a weapon to “advise”

those concerned that he possesses the general 

ability to do violence, and that violence is 

imminently or immediately available . . . . 

Altering this general display of weaponry by [for 

instance] specifically leveling a cocked firearm 

at the head or body of a bank teller or customer, 

ordering them to move or be quiet according to 

one’s direction, is a cessation of “brandishing” 

and the commencement of “otherwise used.”

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24

Bell pointed a weapon at the store employee’s neck, ordered 

him to the ground, and then struck him with the weapon. This 

behavior clearly goes beyond the parameters we set in Johnson

for determining the limits of brandishing a weapon. 199 F.3d 

at 127. 

Furthermore, in United States v. Orr, 312 F.3d 141, 145

(3d Cir. 2002), we stated that “[n]either the guidelines nor the 

caselaw requires infliction of the violent physical contact . . . 

or a verbalized threat to harm the victim in order to constitute 

‘otherwise used.’” We held in Orr that “pointing a gun at the 

head of the assistant manager and ordering her to empty money 

into a garbage bag was a ‘specific threat’ directed at her and 

was precisely the type of conduct which satisfies the ‘otherwise 

used’ requirement.” Id. If “otherwise using” a weapon does 

not require even physical contact or a specific verbal threat of 

harm, it does not follow that actually striking someone with a 

weapon would not constitute use.

Bell argues that his actions do not constitute otherwise 

using a firearm under Johnson because the firearm he used was 

fake. This argument is inapposite. The Sentencing Guidelines 

allow for a four-level increase if a dangerous weapon was 

otherwise used. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D). The Guidelines 

then define an object as a dangerous weapon if it is 

(i) an instrument capable of inflicting death or 

serious bodily injury; or (ii) an object that is not 

an instrument capable of inflicting death or 

serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles 

such an instrument; or (II) the defendant used the 

object in a manner that created the impression 

that the object was such an instrument (e.g.[,] a 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 24 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
25

defendant wrapped a hand in a towel during a 

bank robbery to create the appearance of a gun).

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(D). In Orr, we held that this 

definition applies to § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D): “Application Note 1(d) 

of § 1B1.1 clearly instructs that objects that appear to be 

dangerous weapons shall be considered dangerous weapons for 

purposes of § 2B3.1.” 312 F.3d at 144. 

Bell carried a toy gun, which he pointed at the victim’s 

neck. Bell then forced the employee to the floor and ultimately 

struck him with the weapon. The victim did not realize that the 

firearm was fake until after he was struck with it. These factors 

indicate that Bell’s actions meet our standards for otherwise 

using a dangerous weapon. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 25 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
26

IV. Conclusion

In sum, we will affirm the District Court’s imposition 

of the enhancement for otherwise using a dangerous weapon, 

reverse the imposition of the enhancement for physically 

restraining the victim, and remand for resentencing, consistent 

with this opinion. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 26 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
United States v. Bell 

No. 17-3792 

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part. 

I write separately because I believe that the proper 

standard of review regarding application of the two United 

States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) 

enhancements at issue is clear error, not de novo, as my learned 

colleagues hold. Further, although I ultimately agree with the 

majority regarding the application of the enhancement for use 

of a dangerous weapon, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D), I disagree 

with its disposition of Bell’s appeal on the physical restraint 

enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). 

I. 

 In United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007), 

our en banc Court held that we “review factual findings 

relevant to the Guidelines for clear error and . . . exercise 

plenary review over a district court’s interpretation of the 

Guidelines.” Id. at 570. But Bell does not challenge the 

sentencing court’s factual findings or its interpretation of the 

Guidelines. He challenges instead its determination that two 

of the Guidelines enhancements apply to his case. And Grier 

did not provide the standard pertinent to reviewing the 

application of an enhancement. 

 Bell contends that de novo review is appropriate, while 

the Government contends that we should review for clear error, 

citing our decision in United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 

(3d Cir. 2012). My colleagues quickly distinguish Richards, 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 27 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
2 

the holding of which they believe the Government has 

misconstrued. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion. 

Before delving into a discussion of Richards, I address 

two notable authorities cited in that opinion. First, we cited 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(e), which sets forth principles to be applied by 

courts of appeals in reviewing sentences. Richards, 674 F.3d 

at 219 n.2. The statute provides that courts of appeals “shall 

give due deference to the district court’s application of the 

guidelines to the facts.” § 3742(e). 

 

Second, we cited the Supreme Court’s unanimous 

decision in Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59 (2001), which 

in turn, relied upon § 3742(e). Richards, 674 F.3d at 219–20 

& n.2. That case involved review of whether Buford’s prior 

convictions were “related” under the Guidelines and whether 

the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit erred in reviewing 

a district court’s sentence under a deferential clear error 

standard of review. Buford, 532 U.S. at 60–61; see also United 

States v. Buford, 201 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 

U.S. 59 (2001). Acknowledging the command of § 3742(e), 

the Supreme Court framed the question as “what kind of 

‘deference’ is ‘due’” to district courts applying the Guidelines 

to facts. 532 U.S. at 63. The Court noted that the answer to 

that question “depends on the nature of the question 

presented.” Id. (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 

98 (1996)). It distinguished between “a generally recurring, 

purely legal matter, such as interpreting a set of legal words . . 

. readily resolved by reference to general legal principles and 

standards alone,” and a question that “grows out of, and is 

bounded by, case-specific detailed factual circumstances.” Id. 

at 65. The Court held that the latter type of question — one of 

a “fact-bound nature” — required deference when reviewing 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 28 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
3 

the district court’s application of a Guideline. Id. at 66. 

Deferential review of a fact-bound application by a district 

court was appropriate, the Court reasoned, because of the 

“institutional advantages enjoyed by the district court,” id. at 

64, including “the comparatively greater expertise of the 

District Court,” id. at 66, resulting from the volume of 

sentencings trial judges conduct. In addition, the Court 

reasoned that “the fact-bound nature of the decision limits the 

value of appellate court precedent, which may provide only 

minimal help when other courts consider other . . . 

circumstances.” Id. at 65–66. The Court concluded that the 

question before it was fact bound and that “the appellate court 

was right to review this trial court decision deferentially rather 

than de novo.” Id. at 64, 66.1

 

In Richards, we were asked to review an application of 

U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2(b)(3), an enhancement that increases an 

offense level when the crime involves a “public official in a 

high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” 674 F.3d at 

217 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2C1.2(b)(3)). The defendant argued 

that application of the enhancement necessarily “involve[d] an 

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines,” warranting de 

 1

 Even before the Supreme Court’s decision in Buford, 

we held in United States v. Ortiz that where application of a 

Guideline was “essentially factual,” we would employ a clearly 

erroneous standard of review. 878 F.2d 125, 126 (3d Cir. 

1989) (quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 

1202 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). In Ortiz, “we conclude[d] that 

the question of a defendant’s aggravating role . . . is ‘essentially 

factual’” and determined that we would “reverse the district 

court in th[at] case only if its conclusion [were] clearly 

erroneous.” Id. at 127. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 29 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
4 

novo review. Id. at 218. We determined instead — relying 

upon Buford — that clear error review was appropriate.2 We 

reached this determination because Richards was not 

challenging “the District Court’s articulation of what it means 

to be a government official in a high-level decision-making or 

sensitive position, for the District Court used the definition of 

the enhancement exactly as it is recited in the Guidelines,” but 

rather its “conclusion that the facts . . . fit within the Guidelines 

definition of a government official in a high-level decisionmaking or sensitive position.” Id. We then held that when 

“sentencing adjustments require a district court to closely 

examine a set of facts and determine whether they fit within 

the definition of the adjustment before deciding whether to 

apply the adjustment, we should review that decision for clear 

error only.” Id. at 222. For instance, we concluded, “where, 

as here, the particular Guideline in question sets forth a 

predominantly fact-driven test,” we review for clear error. Id. 

at 223; see also United States v. Huynh, 884 F.3d 160, 165 (3d 

Cir. 2018) (holding that “[w]e . . . review the District Court’s 

application of the relocation enhancement for clear error” 

because the question “is, at bottom, ‘a strictly factual test, such 

that once the test is stated[,] no legal reasoning is necessary to 

the resolution of the issue’” (alteration in original) (quoting 

Richards, 674 F.3d at 221)). 

 

Here, we too “consider a district court’s application of 

the Guidelines to a specific set of facts.” Richards, 674 F.3d at 

 2

 We recognized in Richards that although the Supreme 

Court excised certain parts of § 3742(e) in United States v. 

Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), that statute “still call[s] for ‘due 

deference’ to be given to a district court’s application of the 

Guidelines to the facts.” Richards, 674 F.3d at 219 n.2. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 30 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
5 

219. Because application of either enhancement here 

“require[d] [the] district court to closely examine” the facts of 

Bell’s case “and determine whether they fit within the 

definition[s] of the adjustment[s] before deciding . . . to apply 

the[m], we should review th[ose] decision[s] for clear error 

only.” Id. at 222. Indeed, the majority’s recitation of a “factdriven test” to determine whether the physical restraint 

enhancement applies compels clear error review. Id. at 223. 

 

 My colleagues distinguish Richards by noting that “Bell 

has not contested the facts of his offense” and that Bell is only 

challenging the “interpretation and application of two 

provisions of the Guidelines.” Maj. Op. 6. But Richards did 

not contest the facts of his offense, either — instead, he, like 

Bell, challenged the district court’s application or fit of the 

enhancement to those undisputed facts. Richards, 674 F.3d at 

218; see also United States v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277, 279 (3d Cir. 

2013) (determining that clear error was the proper standard to 

review application of U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3) where “there 

[wa]s no dispute over the factual determinations but the issue 

is whether the agreed-upon set of facts fit within the 

enhancement requirements”). Further, Buford also argued that 

no deference was appropriate where the district court was 

simply “applying a Sentencing Guidelines term to undisputed 

facts.” Buford, 532 U.S. at 64. The Supreme Court did not 

credit this argument and held, as described above, that it was 

the “fact-bound nature” of the district court’s application of a 

Guideline that compelled deferential review of the application. 

Id. at 66. As a result, whether the facts are disputed or 

undisputed is immaterial to the type of deference we give to a 

district court’s application of a Guidelines enhancement. 

 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 31 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
6 

I respectfully dissent because I believe that the District 

Court’s application of the enhancements in this case should be 

reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. 

II. 

 Applying the clear error standard of review that I 

believe is appropriate in this matter, I now consider Bell’s 

challenges to the application of sections 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) and 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B) of the Guidelines. 

 

A. 

 The majority notes that this Court has not considered 

the parameters of “physical restraint” in a precedential opinion 

since United States v. Copenhaver, 185 F.3d 178 (3d Cir. 

1999). In that case, we declined “to adopt any specific test to 

be used in interpreting” U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), as the facts 

of that case supported application of the enhancement in any 

event. Maj. Op. 9. 

 

 I do not necessarily fault my colleagues for desiring to 

set forth a clearer standard regarding the application of 

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). But I believe that this case can be 

decided using the plain text of the enhancement and our current 

jurisprudence. Using those sources, I believe that the District 

Court was correct to apply the physical restraint enhancement. 

And I reach that same conclusion even after considering the 

factors laid out by the majority. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 32 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
7 

1. 

The language of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B) and 

Copenhaver dictate that application of the enhancement in this 

matter was proper. As noted by the majority, Bell’s offense 

level may be increased by two levels pursuant to the 

enhancement “if any person was physically restrained to 

facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). “Physical[] restrain[t]” as defined 

by the Guidelines, is “the forcible restraint of the victim such 

as by being tied, bound, or locked up.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 

n.1(K).3

 In Copenhaver, we held that application of the 

enhancement was warranted where a robber forced a victim 

from one room to another, eventually having him get into a 

fireplace and placing a screen across it. 185 F.3d at 182. The 

robber also repeatedly threatened the victim throughout the 

encounter and earlier displayed what appeared to be a gun. Id. 

After considering the conclusions that our sister appellate 

courts reached in other cases challenging the enhancement’s 

application, we concluded that the defendant’s actions 

warranted application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Id. at 

181–82. We explained that the defendant’s action of forcing 

the victim into a fireplace in another room behind a screen 

confined the victim, similar to “lock[ing] [him] up,” id. at 182 

(first alteration in original); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 

n.1(K), and that his placement of the screen “sign[aled] his 

intention to impede” the victim’s interference with the crime, 

Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 182. We also explained that the 

defendant’s display of a weapon, repeated threats, and 

placement of the screen left the victim no alternative but to 

 3

 Like the majority, I cite to the Guidelines as they 

existed when Bell was sentenced. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 33 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
8 

comply with the demand that he get into the fireplace and 

remain there. Id. 

The same is true here. When Bell grabbed the employee 

by the neck, pointed a gun at his neck, and then shoved him to 

the floor before Bell began extracting money from the cash 

register, he used physical force to facilitate the commission of 

his crime and attempted to confine the employee to the floor. 

When the employee tried to stop Bell, Bell struck him with the 

weapon. Bell’s use of force against the employee, like the 

screen in Copenhaver, both served as an attempt to keep the 

employee confined to the floor and signaled his intention to 

impede the employee’s interference with the crime. 

 

That the employee was not deterred by Bell’s actions 

does not, in my view, prove that Bell’s conduct lacked 

Copenhaver’s “no alternative but compliance” factor. We 

should not permit “a victim’s boldness [to] lessen[] a 

criminal’s culpability.” United States v. Smith, 767 F.3d 187, 

191 (3d Cir. 2014); see also id. at 188, 190 (upholding 

application of the abduction enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 

2B3.1(b)(4)(A), even though the victim “disregarded some of 

[the defendant’s] commands and ultimately escaped”). Indeed, 

we suggested as much in Copenhaver, explaining that the 

screen’s feebleness “d[id] not negate physical restraint” 

because “[i]t is the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining 

the victim in a space or with a barrier, actual or threatened, that 

constitutes the action meriting enhancement of the offense 

level.” 185 F.3d at 182–83 (emphases added). 

At bottom, my reading of the enhancement, our 

precedent, and the record leads me to conclude that the District 

Court did not clearly err in enhancing Bell’s sentence by two 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 34 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
9 

levels pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). To that end, I 

would affirm the District Court’s imposition of the 

enhancement. 

2. 

 I express no opinion on the appropriateness of the 

factors adopted by the majority to be balanced by sentencing 

courts when determining whether the physical restraint 

enhancement should be applied. But assuming that these 

factors set forth an appropriate standard by which to assess 

potential applications of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), I 

nonetheless would conclude that application of the 

enhancement was warranted in this case. 

Applying its new test, the majority concludes that Bell’s 

conduct does not amount to physical restraint. It determines 

that although Bell used physical force against the employee 

when Bell grabbed his neck and shoved him to the floor (factor 

(1)), the employee was not “left with no alternative but 

compliance . . . since [he] twice attempted to thwart the 

robbery” (factor (3)), and “there was no sustained focus on the 

victim” (factor (4)), as “the entire interaction . . . seems to have 

taken only seconds from start to finish.” Maj. Op. 21–22. 

I must disagree with the majority’s conclusions as to the 

third and fourth factors, as well as its balancing of all of the 

factors. As explained above, the employee’s attempts to 

interfere with the robbery should not preclude satisfaction of 

the no-alternative-but-compliance factor here because the 

enhancement aims to punish the act of physical restraint, 

successful or not. See Copenhaver, 185 F.3d at 182–83 (“It is 

the perpetrator’s act of enclosing or confining the victim . . . , 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 35 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
10 

actual or threatened, that constitutes the action meriting 

enhancement of the offense level.”); see also United States v. 

Herman, 930 F.3d 872, 876 (7th Cir. 2019) (noting, in a case 

holding that psychological coercion is insufficient to warrant 

application of U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4)(B), the “more general 

point” relayed by “the cases that have found physical restraint” 

is that the focus is “on the action of the defendant, not on the 

reaction of the victim,” and explaining that “the victim’s 

reaction does not determine whether there is or is not physical 

restraint”). 

I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion regarding 

its fourth factor, assessing the duration of the restraint. 

Although I refrain from commenting on the propriety of 

adopting this factor — that is, whether the majority was correct 

to adopt the narrow view of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit in the circuit split on this issue — I believe that Bell’s 

conduct also satisfies this factor. The majority concludes that 

it does not in part because “[i]t could not have taken more than 

a few seconds for Bell to grab the victim’s neck and shove him 

to the floor,” and therefore, “there was no sustained focus on 

the victim.” Maj. Op. 22.4

 But that was not the extent of Bell’s 

conduct — he also struck the employee when the employee 

attempted to interfere with the robbery. In any event, it likely 

also took only moments for the robber in United States v. 

Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1048, 1050 (6th Cir. 2012), to order 

a bank employee at gunpoint to exit his “office adjacent to the 

bank lobby . . . and sit on the floor in the lobby,” yet the Court 

 4

 The record does not reveal how long the restraint 

lasted. Bell claims it was “brief,” Reply Br. 3, or “very brief,” 

Bell Br. 8, while the Government suggests that “the restraint 

may have been short-lived,” Gov’t Br. 23. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 36 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
11 

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that such conduct 

would satisfy the “sustained focus” standard adopted by the 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.5

 In my view, the 

physical restraint need only last long enough “to facilitate 

commission of the offense or to facilitate escape.” U.S.S.G. § 

2B3.1(b)(4)(B). Here, it did the former, as Bell was able to 

grab money out of the cash register after shoving the employee 

to the ground. 

 

On balance, the factors in the majority’s newly 

proffered test weigh in favor of finding that Bell physically 

restrained the employee. As the majority recognizes, he used 

physical force against the employee. Next, Bell in fact 

restrained the employee — or “restrict[ed] [his] freedom of 

movement in some manner,” Maj. Op. 13 — when Bell 

grabbed him, pointed a gun at him, shoved him to the floor, 

and then hit him when he tried to interfere with the robbery. 

See United States v. Ossai, 485 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) 

(concluding that a “large and powerful” robber’s placement of 

a gun and “his hand on the victim’s neck and shoulder to force 

him into a kneeling position, especially while stating that ‘I do 

not want to hurt you,’ unquestionably qualifies as a ‘physical 

 5

 It appears to me that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 

Circuit’s “sustained focus” standard might apply only when the 

conduct relied upon to prove physical restraint consists solely 

of issuing orders to victims at gunpoint rather than some sort 

of bodily contact with the victim, as here. See, e.g., United 

States v. Parker, 241 F.3d 1114, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2001) 

(concluding, with “little doubt,” that “grabb[ing] a teller by her 

hair and pull[ing] her up from the floor . . . constitute[s] 

physical restraint,” but ordering a teller at gunpoint to get on 

the floor does not, absent a sustained focus on the teller). 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 37 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
12 

restraint’ under any reasonable connotation of that term,” as it 

“diminish[ed] [his] freedom of movement and ability to resist 

or escape”). Finally, the employee was restrained for enough 

time that Bell was able to steal $1,000 from the cash register. 

That this duration of time is adequate under the majority’s test 

would appear to be supported by a decision relied upon and 

quoted by the majority distinguishing a case where the victim 

was, as here, “held and threatened for a long enough period to 

accomplish the cash withdrawal.” Maj. Op. 17 (quoting United 

States v. Mikalajunas, 936 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1991)). 

Based on this record, and reviewing this appeal using the 

majority’s new framework, I cannot conclude that the District 

Court clearly erred when it applied the physical restraint 

enhancement to Bell’s conduct and would therefore affirm 

application of that enhancement.6

B. 

 I concur with the majority’s disposition of Bell’s appeal 

concerning application of the otherwise-use-of-a-dangerousweapon enhancement. I only note that I would reach this same 

conclusion on a clear error review of the District Court’s 

sentence, as the record reveals that Bell was armed with a toy 

gun, which appeared to the employee to be a real gun until a 

part of it broke off, and that Bell pointed the gun at the 

employee’s neck, shoved him to the ground, and later struck 

him with the gun.7

 

 6

 I would reach this same conclusion on a de novo 

review of the record. 

7

 If the standard by which we review this issue were, 

indeed, de novo, I would concur with the majority’s conclusion 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 38 Date Filed: 01/09/2020
13 

III. 

 For the above reasons, I respectfully concur in part and 

dissent in part. 

 

(and its reasoning therefore) that U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) 

applies to Bell’s conduct. 

Case: 17-3792 Document: 80 Page: 39 Date Filed: 01/09/2020