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Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Norman Williams
Appellant

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 9, 2003 Decided December 12, 2003

No. 03–3009

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

NORMAN WILLIAMS,

APPELLANT

–————

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(02cr00113–01)

–————

Nicholas H. Cobbs, appointed by the court, argued the

cause and filed the briefs for appellant.

Chrisellen R. Kolb, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the

cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Roscoe C.

Howard, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and John R. Fisher, Roy W.

McLeese, III, and Alyse Graham, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Before: SENTELLE, RANDOLPH, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Pursuant to an agreement with

the government, Norman Williams pled guilty to the charge

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-3009 Document #791024 Filed: 12/12/2003 Page 1 of 4
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of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(2). The district court identified U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) as the relevant

Guideline for determining Williams’ base offense level. The

court placed this at 24 because Williams had two prior felony

convictions in the District of Columbia for — in the words of

§ 2K2.1(a)(2) — a ‘‘crime of violence.’’ One of the convictions

was for burglary, the other for attempted burglary. The

issue presented on appeal is whether Williams’ sentence of 86

months’ imprisonment should be set aside on the ground that

attempted burglary is not a ‘‘crime of violence’’ within the

meaning of § 2K2.1(a)(2) — or more accurately, whether the

district court committed plain error in finding that it was.

Williams claims that plain error is the wrong standard in

light of the presentence report. He believes the report

reflects a sufficient objection to using the attempted burglary

conviction to increase his base offense level. The presentence

report is under seal, as are the portions of the briefs discussing its contents. We therefore cannot give details about what

the presentence report contains. It is enough to point out

that under Rule 51(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal

Procedure, ‘‘a party may preserve a claim of error by informing the court — when the court ruling or order is made or

sought — of the action the party wishes the court to take, or

the party’s objection to the court’s action and the grounds for

that objection.’’ The relevant time for objection is thus at the

time of the court’s sentencing decision, not at the presentence

stage when the probation office is conducting its investigation

and preparing the report. At sentencing, Williams’ counsel

stated that he had no corrections to offer regarding the facts

recited in the report (other than a typographical error), and

neither he nor the prosecutor voiced any objection to the

court’s setting of the base offense level (other than on a

matter not relevant here). Plain error is therefore the correct standard of review. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b); United

States v. Washington, 115 F.3d 1008, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

According to Application Note 5 to § 2K2.1 of the Guidelines, ‘‘crime of violence’’ is defined by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)

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and its Application Note 1. Section 4B1.2 specifies that a

crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment

qualifies as a ‘‘crime of violence’’ if one of two conditions is

met. The crime must have (1) ‘‘as an element the use,

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person of another,’’ or (2) the crime is ‘‘burglary of a dwelling,

arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise

involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of

physical injury to another.’’ U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) & (2).

Application Note 1 states that ‘‘crimes of violence’’ include

‘‘the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and attempting to commit such offenses.’’

On the face of it, attempted burglary thus falls within the

definition of ‘‘crime of violence’’: burglary is such a crime

and, Application Note 1 tells us, attempts to commit a crime

of violence are also such crimes. Such commentary is ‘‘authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal

statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading

of,’’ the guideline it interprets. Stinson v. United States, 508

U.S. 36, 38 (1993).

All of this is fairly straightforward. Williams’ counterargument is more involved: § 4B1.2(a)(1) specifically includes

crimes having as an element the ‘‘attempted use’’ of physical

force; § 4B1.2(a)(2) identifies certain offenses as ‘‘crimes of

violence’’ but does not mention attempts to commit those

crimes; therefore, the drafters did not intend to include

attempts to commit the listed crimes as ‘‘crimes of violence’’;

it follows that Application Note 1 is inconsistent with

§ 4B1.2(a). Williams adds that some courts of appeals, interpreting ‘‘crimes of violence’’ as used in the Armed Career

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) — which has language identical to § 4B1.2(a) — have ruled that attempted

burglary is not such a crime. United States v. Weekley, 24

F.3d 1125, 1127 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Martinez,

954 F.2d 1050, 1053–54 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.

Strahl, 958 F.2d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1992). Other courts of

appeals interpreting this statute have decided that attempted

burglary is covered. United States v. Bureau, 52 F.3d 584,

591 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Andrello, 9 F.3d 247,

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249–50 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam); United States v. O’Brien,

972 F.2d 47, 51 (3d Cir. 1992).

Whatever one might say about the merits of Williams’

argument, it certainly does not leap from the text of the

Guideline and the commentary. We could hardly expect the

district court to come up with it sua sponte. Still less could

we expect the court to hold that the commentary conflicted

with the Guideline when a moment’s research would have

shown that four other courts of appeals have upheld Application Note 1’s reading of § 4B1.2 that attempted burglary is a

‘‘crime of violence.’’ See United States v. Claiborne, 132 F.3d

253, 256 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sandles, 80 F.3d

1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Carpenter, 11

F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jackson, 986

F.2d 312, 313 (9th Cir. 1993). If what occurred here was an

error, a subject on which we express no view, it was far from

an obvious one, and thus was not ‘‘plain’’ under FED. R. CRIM.

P. 52(b). See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734

(1993).

Affirmed.

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