Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05307/USCOURTS-caDC-07-05307-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denise Rodacker
Appellee
United States of America
Appellee
Michael F. Wasserman
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 7, 2008 Decided February 24, 2009

No. 07-5307

MICHAEL F. WASSERMAN,

APPELLANT

v.

DENISE RODACKER, UNITED STATES PARK POLICE OFFICER

AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 06cv01005)

Michael F. Wasserman, appearing pro se, argued the cause

and filed the briefs for appellant.

Marian L. Borum, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause

for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S.

Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant U.S. Attorney.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and RANDOLPH and

GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

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*Judge GARLAND concurs in Part I of the opinion on the

ground noted in subpart B, and concurs in Part II.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RANDOLPH.*

RANDOLPH, Circuit Judge: Michael F. Wasserman brought

tort and constitutional claims against a U.S. Park Police officer

who arrested him for walking his dogs without a leash and for

assaulting a police officer. The district court dismissed the tort

claims due to Wasserman’s failure to exhaust his administrative

remedies and granted summary judgment to the officer on the

constitutional claims. We affirm.

I.

Walking a dog on public property without a leash is a

criminal offense under District of Columbia Municipal

Regulation 24-900.3. On February 20, 2005, Wasserman was

walking his two dogs without leashes in Montrose Park, a public

park in northwest Washington, D.C. Denise Rodacker, a U.S.

Park Police Officer, observed Wasserman and began following

him. He started walking away quickly, at which point Rodacker

ordered him to stop and answer some questions. Wasserman

responded that he did not have to answer and continued walking.

Rodacker ran to catch up with him and placed her hand on his

left shoulder. She claims that Wasserman tried to pull himself

out of her grip, while he claims that he immediately stopped and

stood still. Rodacker then forced Wasserman’s arm behind his

back, handcuffed him, and placed him under arrest. 

 Rodacker took Wasserman to the Rock Creek Park Police

Substation, where he was charged with violating the dog leash

law and assaulting a police officer. Because the assault charge

was a felony, Wasserman was transported to the Metropolitan

Police Department central cell block and held there pending

presentment in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.

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D.D.C. Local Civ. R. 83.6(a) states: “An attorney eligible to

appear may enter an appearance in a civil action by signing any

pleading described in Rule 7(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or

by filing a written notice of entry of an appearance listing the

attorney’s correct address, telephone number and bar identification

number.”

He appeared before the court the following afternoon. The U.S.

Attorney’s Office dropped the assault charge. Wasserman was

arraigned on a charge of violating Regulation 24-900.3. He

agreed to post a $25 security in exchange for the prosecutor’s

entry of nolle prosequi on this remaining charge. 

On February 21, 2006, Wasserman filed suit in the Superior

Court of the District of Columbia alleging that Rodacker, acting

under color of law, violated his constitutional rights and

assaulted, battered, and falsely imprisoned him in violation of

the common law of the District of Columbia. The United States

substituted itself as a defendant against the common law tort

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) and removed the entire

case on Rodacker’s behalf to the United States District Court for

the District of Columbia. The district court denied Wasserman’s

motion to strike the substitution of the United States and his

motion to remand the case to Superior Court. The court granted

defendants’ motion to dismiss the tort claims pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a) because of Wasserman’s undisputed failure to

exhaust his administrative remedies. It then granted summary

judgment to Rodacker on the constitutional claims. 

Wasserman asserts that the district court erred in permitting

the removal of his claims from the Superior Court. He points

out that the attorneys who signed the Notice of Removal and

then filed it in district court had not properly entered an

appearance as attorneys for Rodacker.1

 Therefore, he contends,

Rodacker technically never filed a notice of removal. He further

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argues that the United States could not substitute itself as a

defendant and remove the case on its own behalf under 28

U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) because that provision does not apply to

cases originally filed in the local courts of the District of

Columbia. 

There is no dispute that Rodacker had the right to remove

this case in its entirety; 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) permits removal of

constitutional claims, and § 1442(a)(1) permits removal of

claims against an officer of the United States acting under color

of office. It is also clear that the notice of removal was filed on

behalf of both the United States and Rodacker. The notice

recites Rodacker’s grounds for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441

and § 1442 – grounds that could not apply to the United States.

It begins by stating: “Defendant respectfully notifies the Court

as follows” and then identifies Rodacker as the defendant. The

notice also states that Rodacker is a U.S. Park Police Officer.

All indications are that the United States Attorney and the two

Assistant United States Attorneys who signed the notice were

representing Rodacker; they cited 28 C.F.R. § 50.15, subsection

(a) of which authorizes government attorneys to represent a

federal employee in civil proceedings if the employee has acted

“within the scope of the employee’s employment.” The notice

might also have invoked the provision of the Westfall Act

imposing a duty on the Attorney General to “defend any civil

action or proceeding brought in any court against any employee

of the Government” for tort damages. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(c). 

Wasserman says that because the government attorneys did

not file a formal entry of appearance, there is no way of

knowing whether they were really speaking for Rodacker when

they removed the case. This is not a serious contention.

Rodacker did not object to the notice of removal; she never

complained about the representation the three government

attorneys provided her; and throughout the rest of the case, one

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Although an amended notice of removal would come long

after the 30-day deadline of 28 U.S.C. § 1446, that deadline is not

jurisdictional, and the district court would have discretion to allow the

amendment. See, e.g., Loftin v. Rush, 767 F.2d 800, 805 (11th Cir.

1985). 

of those attorneys continued to serve as her counsel. In the

district court, she opposed Wasserman’s motion to remand. Her

intention to remove the case is clear, her notice of removal was

timely and properly stated the basis for removal, and any

confusion over the identity of her attorney did not prejudice

Wasserman. To force her to file an amended notice would be

especially pointless.2 Cf. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75 &

n.9 (1976). The case reached completion in the district court

and the district court had jurisdiction over it. Even if there were

some minor procedural defect in removing the case, Supreme

Court precedent strongly disfavors upsetting the judgment.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75–77 (1996). 

In a tort case against a federal employee, the United States

will be substituted as the party defendant upon certification by

the Attorney General that the employee was “acting within the

scope of his employment at the time of the incident out of which

the claim arose.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). This provision applies

to “any civil action or proceeding commenced . . . in a United

States district court,” id. § 2679(d)(1), or “in a State court,” id.

§ 2679(d)(2). We have decided three cases in which we

indicated that 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) permitted the United States

to substitute itself for one of its employees in cases initially filed

in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Norman v.

United States, 467 F.3d 773 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Haddon v. United

States, 68 F.3d 1420 (D.C. Cir. 1995), abrogated on other

grounds by Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007); Kimbro v.

Velten, 30 F.3d 1501 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Haddon, for instance,

we stated with respect to an action begun in Superior Court that

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the lawsuit “was initially filed in state court . . ..” 68 F.3d at

1423.

In none of the three decisions just cited did we elaborate on

the reasons why the Superior Court was a State court under the

Westfall Act. The point must have seemed obvious. The central

purpose of the Act is to indemnify federal employees from tort

liability arising from acts committed within the scope of their

employment. Congress took this step in response to the

Supreme Court’s denial of absolute immunity in Westfall v.

Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988). See Westfall Act, Pub. L. No.

100-694, § 2, 102 Stat. 4563, 4563 (1988). The mere “prospect”

of tort “liability,” Congress found, would “seriously undermine

the morale and well being of Federal employees [and] impede

the ability of agencies to carry out their missions.” Id. § 2(a)(6).

A specific Congressional finding stated that the Act was meant

to remove “the threat of protracted personal tort litigation for the

entire Federal workforce.” Id. § 2(a)(5). Federal employees

performing official duties in the District of Columbia are

obviously a significant part of the “entire Federal workforce.” 

A.

There are two grounds supporting our earlier decisions,

either one of which permitted the United States to substitute

itself for Rodacker pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). The first

is that upon Rodacker’s timely removal of the case to federal

court, Wasserman’s action was “commenced . . . in a United

States district court.” While any case removed from a state

court necessarily originated outside of district court, its removal

creates a federal civil case (here, Case 06-cv-01005) with a

procedural beginning and end. Federal civil actions are typically

commenced when the plaintiff files his complaint in a district

court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 3 (“A civil action is commenced by

filing a complaint with the court.”). Wasserman did not re-file

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his complaint with the district court after removal and the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – which treat the District of

Columbia as a State, FED. R. CIV. P. 81(d)(2) – explicitly

provide that such a formality is unnecessary. FED. R. CIV. P.

81(c)(2). Thus the absence of re-filing does not alter our

analysis. According to the applicable rules of civil procedure,

Wasserman’s action commenced in the district court when

removal was effected and the complaint was received by the

clerk, see FED. R. CIV. P. 3, 5(d)(2). As such, 28 U.S.C.

§ 2679(d)(1) applies to this action, and it allows the United

States to replace Rodacker as the party defendant to the tort

claims against her. 

B.

In the alternative, the United States properly substituted

itself as a defendant because the Superior Court was a “State

court” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). There is

a longstanding legal tradition of interpreting “State” in various

federal statutes as encompassing the District of Columbia. The

Supreme Court long ago recognized that the word “State”

“sometimes . . . has the larger meaning of any separate political

community, including therein the District of Columbia and the

territories.” Talbott v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Silver Bow

County, 139 U.S. 438, 444 (1891). The Court has repeatedly

interpreted the term “State” to include the District of Columbia

when that interpretation reflects Congress’s intent, Hurd v.

Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); Talbott, 139 U.S. at 444

(collecting cases); see also Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S.

216, 228 (1934) (treating the District as a “State” under the Full

Faith & Credit Clause), and this court has followed suit, Madley

v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 278 F.3d 1306, 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2002);

Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 724 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see

also Norman, 467 F.3d at 774; Haddon, 68 F.3d at 1423;

Kimbro, 30 F.3d at 1505–06. In every case, context and the

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If anything, one of Wasserman’s examples actually cuts

against his argument. Congress explicitly defined “State court” to

include the D.C. Superior Court in the “Definitions” provision of the

federal removal statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1451. This definition technically

applies only to the chapter containing the general removal provisions

of the U.S. Code – the substitution and removal provision of § 2679

is located in a different chapter for which no definition of “State

court” is provided. We cannot fathom any plausible reason – nor does

Wasserman suggest one – why Congress would intentionally treat the

D.C. Superior Court as a State court under the general removal statutes

but not the Westfall Act. 

overall purpose of the federal statute must be considered. See,

e.g., District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973).

These decisions, coupled with the Westfall Act’s unambiguous

purpose – to protect the “entire Federal workforce,” Westfall

Act § 2(a)(6), from tort liability for official actions – compels

the conclusion that Congress intended “State court” in

§ 2679(d)(2) to include the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia. We can think of no policy reason, no logical reason,

no reason whatever why Congress would have intended

otherwise.

Wasserman lists other statutes in which Congress defined

“State court” to include the courts of the District of Columbia.

His point apparently is that when Congress wanted the District

to be considered a State, Congress said just that. This type of

argument is usually not a particularly strong one. See City of

Naples Airport Auth. v. FAA, 409 F.3d 431, 434 (D.C. Cir.

2005); Doris Day Animal League v. Veneman, 315 F.3d 297,

299 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Here it is especially weak because

Wasserman cannot explain why Congress would have wanted

cases begun against federal employees in the District of

Columbia local courts to be excluded from the Westfall Act.3

Of course matters would have been clearer if Congress had

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Wasserman counters that the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2402, which requires facts to be tried by a judge rather than

a jury, violates the Seventh Amendment. This argument is foreclosed

by a long line of Supreme Court decisions holding that the Seventh

Amendment’s right to trial by jury does not apply in actions against

the federal government. See, e.g., Osborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225, 252

(2007); Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 160 (1981); Glidden Co.

v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 572 (1962); Galloway v. United States, 319

U.S. 372, 388–89 (1943). 

included a definition of “State” or “State court.” But Congress’s

failure “to speak with clarity signifies only that there is room for

disagreement about the statute’s meaning.” City of Naples, 409

F.3d at 434 (quoting Doris Day Animal League, 315 F.3d at

299); see Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 878 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

II.

Having determined that Rodacker properly removed this

action to the district court and that the United States was

properly substituted as a defendant against Wasserman’s tort

claims, we proceed to the merits of the case. Upon substitution

of the United States as a party defendant, the Westfall Act

dictates that the action “shall proceed in the same manner as any

action against the United States filed pursuant to section 1346(b)

of this title and shall be subject to the limitations and exceptions

applicable to those actions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(4). Among

these limitations is the requirement that a plaintiff present his

claim to the appropriate federal agency and receive a denial of

the claim in writing before his tort action may proceed. 28

U.S.C. § 2675(a). Wasserman failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies, and the district court properly

dismissed his claim.4

 

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Probable cause is evaluated based on an objective standard.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). The fact that

Rodacker had probable cause is sufficient under the Fourth

Amendment even if Wasserman’s leash law violation was not actually

the basis for the arrest. See id.; United States v. Bookhardt, 277 F.3d

558, 564 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 

The district court (and the defendants) construed

Wasserman’s complaint to allege violations of the Fourth

Amendment that give rise to claims for damages under Bivens

v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). Wasserman alleged that Rodacker arrested

him without probable cause, used excessive force during his

arrest, and caused him to be detained for an unreasonable length

of time. The district court correctly granted summary judgment

to defendants on all of these Bivens claims. 

Wasserman now concedes that the police had probable

cause to arrest him, due to his violation of the District of

Columbia’s dog leash law.5

 As to the excessive force claim, an

officer’s motion for summary judgment is to be granted unless

“the excessiveness of the force is so apparent that no reasonable

officer could have believed in the lawfulness of his actions.”

Wardlaw v. Pickett, 1 F.3d 1297, 1303 (D.C. Cir. 1993). We

evaluate the reasonableness of Rodacker’s behavior based on

“the facts and circumstances of [the] particular case, including

the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an

immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and

whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

The inquiry is objective; the subjective intent of the officer

(which Wasserman alleges was malicious here) is irrelevant.

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). 

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 Taking the evidence before us in the light most favorable

to Wasserman, see, e.g., Arrington v. United States, 473 F.3d

329, 333 (D.C. Cir. 2006), we assume that Wasserman was not

moving or offering any resistance after Rodacker first touched

his left shoulder and that Rodacker forcefully pressed upwards

on Wasserman’s arm before handcuffing him, causing him pain.

Nonetheless, it was reasonable for Rodacker to apply force to

Wasserman’s arm to secure his compliance during arrest. Police

officers have authority to use “some degree of physical

coercion” when arresting a suspect, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396,

and Wasserman’s refusal to obey Rodacker’s order prior to his

arrest suggested that he might try to resist or escape.

Wasserman suffered no bruise or injury, which tends to confirm

that Rodacker did not use “more force than reasonably appeared

necessary” to secure Wasserman’s compliance. Scott v. District

of Columbia, 101 F.3d 748, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see Saucier v.

Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001), overruled on other grounds by

Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808 (2009); Wardlaw, 1 F.3d at

1304. In light of the facts and circumstances of the arrest,

Rodacker’s alleged use of force was not excessive. 

A person arrested without a warrant and detained is entitled

to a probable cause determination by a neutral magistrate within

a reasonable period of time. Forty-eight hours is presumptively

reasonable. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,

53–54, 56 (1991). Wasserman was arrested at approximately

8:00 AM on Sunday, February 20, 2005, and received a hearing

at approximately 3:00 PM the next day, well within the 48-hour

period. A detention of less than 48 hours may be unreasonable

if, for example, the probable cause hearing is intentionally

delayed out of “ill will, or delay for delay’s sake.” Riverside,

500 U.S. at 56. Wasserman does not attempt to show that

Rodacker delayed his hearing because of ill will or any other

malicious purpose. Instead, he claims that his detention was

unreasonable because it was premised on a charge of assault on

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a police officer that was later dropped by the U.S. Attorney’s

Office. We are sympathetic towards any citizen detained

overnight due to a police officer’s arguably overzealous

charging of offenses. Regardless, Wasserman’s claim must fail

because he does not allege that the length of his detention was

unreasonable. Wasserman’s arguments about the basis of his

detention are not material. As to his detention, all the Fourth

Amendment requires in this context is that he receive a hearing

within a reasonable time. In addition, the police may have

constitutionally detained Wasserman for up to 48 hours on the

ground of his uncontested misdemeanor offense. See Atwater v.

City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2001). 

Officer Rodacker properly removed this action to federal

court and the United States was properly substituted as a

defendant against Wasserman’s tort claims. The district court

correctly dismissed the tort claims due to Wasserman’s failure

to exhaust his administrative remedies and correctly granted

summary judgment to Rodacker on the constitutional claims. 

 

Affirmed. 

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