Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00093/USCOURTS-alsd-1_16-cv-00093-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Deloris N. Brown
Plaintiff
Utilities Board, City of Daphne, Ala
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

DELORIS N. BROWN,

Plaintiff,

:

:

:

:

vs. : CIVIL ACTION 16-093-KD-M

:

UTILITIES BOARD, CITY OF 

DAPHNE, ALABAMA,

Defendant.

:

:

:

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Currently before this Court are two motions: 

Defendant, Utilities Board, City of Daphne’s (hereinafter 

“Daphne Utilities” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss and/or 

in the Alternative, Motion to Strike Jury Demand and 

Memorandum in Support thereof (docs. 7 and 8) and 

Plaintiff, Deloris Brown’s, Motion for the Court to Extend 

Time For Service of Process Out-Of-Time (hereinafter 

“Motion to Extend”). (Doc. 13). These motions, under 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) and (6), were

referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 72.2(c)(4), and are now before 

the Court. Plaintiff has filed a response to Defendant’s 

motion (doc. 12) to which Defendant has replied1 (doc. 15). 

																																																							 1 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Reply in support thereof 

additionally include its argument in opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion 

to Extend. 

Case 1:16-cv-00093-KD-M Document 16 Filed 08/22/16 Page 1 of 11
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After careful consideration of the record, Plaintiff’s 

Motion for the Court to Extend Time For Service of Process 

Out-Of-Time (Doc. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s time to 

serve Plaintiff is extended until June 27, 2016, which 

service has been completed. As a result, Defendant’s 

Motion to Dismiss for failure to timely serve is MOOT. 

With regard to Defendant’s Motion, in the Alternative, to 

Strike the Jury Demand, it is recommended that the motion 

be granted and that the jury demand articulated by 

Plaintiff be stricken from the pleadings with her claims to 

proceed to a non-jury trial. 

DISCUSSION

I. Motion To Extend Time

Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendant on 

February 29, 2016, pursuant to the Title VII of the Civil 

Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. (Doc. 1).

The Clerk of Court for this Court prepared the summons to 

be issued to Defendant on March 1, 2016. (Doc. 3). On 

June 17, 2016, Plaintiff was ordered to show cause by June 

27, 2016, as to why she had failed to file notice with the 

court of the results of service of process efforts within 

forty-five (45) days of filing of the complaint as required 

by Civil Local Rule 4.3. (Doc. 4). On June 27, 2016,

Plaintiff filed a response apologizing for the delay and 

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indicating that Plaintiff had overlooked the deadline to 

file the notice as a result of a particularly hectic 

litigation schedule. (Doc. 5). Plaintiff additionally 

indicated in her response that she had, in fact, served 

Defendant on that same date. (Id.)

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(m) provides as follows:

“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the 

complaint is filed, the court-on motion or on its own 

after notice to the plaintiff-must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that 

service be made within a specified time. But if the 

plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court 

must extend the time for service for an appropriate 

period...”

(emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit has held 

“that Rule 4(m) grants discretion to the district court to 

extend the time for service of process even in the absence 

of a showing of good cause.” See Horenkamp v. Van Winkle 

And Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 1129 (11th Cir. 2005). In such an 

absence, “the district court must still consider whether 

any other circumstances warrant an extension of time based 

on the facts of the case. Only after considering whether 

any such factors exist may the district court exercise its 

discretion and either dismiss the case without prejudice or 

direct that service be effected within a specified time.” 

Lepone-Dempsey v. Carroll County Com'rs, 76 F.3d 1277, 1282 

(11th Cir. 2007). There is no dispute that Plaintiff 

served Defendant on June 27, 2016, more than 90 days after 

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the filing of her Complaint. (Doc. 6). However, it is 

also undisputed that Plaintiff provided an explanation as 

to her delay in service and served Defendant prior to the 

Motion to Dismiss being filed. Further, any dismissal 

would be without prejudice and Defendant has not asserted 

that any prejudice would result should the Court not 

dismiss this action. Based on the facts of this action and 

because this Court may exercise discretion in extending the 

time for service, this Court accepts Plaintiff’s 

explanation provided in her Motion to Extend.2 As a result, 

Plaintiff’s Motion for the Court to Extend Time for Service 

of Process Out-of Time (Doc. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s 

time to serve Plaintiff is extended until June 27, 2016, 

which service has been completed. Defendant’s Motion to 

Dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to timely serve 

Defendant, is MOOT. 

II. Motion to Strike Jury Demand

Defendant requested, in the alternative, that 

Plaintiff’s request for a jury demand be stricken because 

Plaintiff executed a “Waiver of Right to Trial by Jury” on 

November 18, 2013. The waiver at issue was part of an 

acknowledgment of receipt of a revised employee handbook. 

																																																							 2 The discrepancy pointed out by Defendant as to the incorrect 

calculation of days in Plaintiff’s motion is noted; however, based on 

the reasoning herein, the same does not warrant denial of Plaintiff’s 

motion.

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The page signed by Plaintiff contained the Daphne Utilities 

logo and was entitled “Acknowledgement and Waiver of Right 

to Trial By Jury” and contained the following language:

I UNDERSTAND THAT UNDER FEDERAL AND STATE LAW I MAY 

HAVE A RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN THE EVENT OF A 

DISPUTE BETWEEN MYSELF AND DAPHNE UTILITIES. HOWEVER, 

I ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT IN THE EVENT I SEEK THE 

INVOLVEMENT OF A COURT OF LAW, I EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY 

AND ALL RIGHTS TO A TRIAL BY JURY. INSTEAD, I AGREE 

THAT IF I PURSUE LEGAL ACTION IN A COURT OF COMPETENT 

JURISDICTION, ANY AND ALL MATTERS RELATED TO MY 

EMPLOYMENT WILL BE RESOLVED BY A JUDGE. 

(Doc. 7 at 4). Both the heading and the waiver language was 

bolded.

“The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh 

Amendment to the Constitution ... is preserved to the 

parties inviolate.” Rule 38(a), Fed.R.Civ.P. However, 

the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[a] party may validly 

waive its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial so long 

as the waiver is knowing and voluntary. Bakrac, Inc., et 

al. v. Villager Franchise Sys., Inc., 164 Fed.Appx. 820, 

823 (11th Cir.2006) (citing to Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 

1, 4-5, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246-47, 16 L.Ed.2d 314 (1966); 

Leasing Service Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 833 (4th Cir. 

1986). “In making this assessment, courts consider the 

conspicuousness of the waiver provision, the parties' 

relative bargaining power, the sophistication of the party 

challenging the waiver, and whether the terms of the 

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contract were negotiable.” Bakrac, 164 Fed.Appx. 820, 823

(citations omitted). “In this consideration, it is not 

whether any particular number of factors have been 

satisfied, but whether, ‘in light of all of the 

circumstances, the Court finds the waiver to be 

unconscionable, contrary to public policy, or simply 

unfair.’” Allyn v. Western United Life Ass. Co., 347 

F.Supp. 2d 1246, 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2004).

In the present action, the parties agree as to the 

proper standard for determining whether a party has waived 

a jury demand. (Doc. 8 at 3-4; Doc. 12 at 1). The only 

dispute is whether Plaintiff was given adequate 

consideration for her waiver and whether she waived her 

right “knowingly and willingly”. (Doc. 12 at 1-2). More 

specifically, Plaintiff contends that, because she was an 

existing employee when she was asked to sign the waiver,

she was not given any consideration and that because she

was under investigation when the waiver was presented, she 

did not sign the waiver “voluntarily”.3 (Doc. 12 at 1-3).

																																																							 3 Plaintiff does not seem to dispute that she signed the waiver 

“knowingly”. Nevertheless, the record reflects that Plaintiff is a 

college graduate who was employed with Defendant for almost eighteen 

years at the time she signed the waiver. It is also apparent that the 

jury waiver paragraph is written clearly, in all capital letters and 

bolded, such that the average person could understand its implications. 

No special education or expertise would have been needed to understand 

this provision. As a result, there is no indication that Plaintiff’s 

waiver was not done “knowingly.”

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As to whether Plaintiff was given adequate 

consideration for her waiver, Plaintiff argues that, unlike 

those cases cited by Defendant wherein new employment was 

the consideration for the waiver, Plaintiff was not a new 

hire (she was an employee of eighteen years) and, thus, was 

not given any consideration for her signature. (Doc. 12 at 

1). This argument, however, is unavailing. In the present 

action, Plaintiff was given continued employment in 

exchange for her waiver and this Court finds no substantive 

distinction between an “offer” of employment as in the case 

of a new hire or “continued” employment, in Plaintiff’s 

case. 

Plaintiff additionally contends her waiver was not 

done voluntarily because it was presented to her following 

her being disciplined, during an investigation of her 

handling of an employee grievance, following her alleging 

retaliation, and on the brink of termination, which 

Plaintiff contends was anticipated when the waiver was 

presented to her for her signature. (Doc. 12 at 2-3). 

Plaintiff does not offer any case law to support her 

position, but states that the facts “suggest very strongly 

that there was nothing voluntary about [Plaintiff’s] 

signature on the waiver form or certainly no negotiated

terms or equal bargaining power.” (Id.) 

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“[A] term in a contract waiving a party's right to a 

jury trial is not unenforceable even though one party to a 

contract is a large corporation and the other party is 

simply an individual who is in need of the corporation's 

services.” Collins v. Countrywide Home Loans, 680 

F.Supp.2d 1287, 1295 (M.D. Fla. 2010). (citing to Milsap 

v. Cornerstone Residential Management, Inc., 2007 WL 965590 

(S.D.Fla. March 28, 2007) (a single mother with two small 

children in need of housing could have walked away from an 

apartment lease containing a jury trial waiver if she found 

the lease terms unacceptable). Additionally, “[t]he mere 

fact that an employee signs an employment agreement 

containing a jury trial waiver in a ‘take it or leave it’ 

situation does not make the waiver unenforceable or 

unconscionable.” Winiarski v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 2008 WL 

1930484 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2008). Assuming termination 

would have resulted if Plaintiff did not sign the waiver in 

the present action, Plaintiff still had the option to walk 

away from her employ if she found the terms of the waiver 

unacceptable. Further, there are no facts to suggest a 

lack of bargaining power or inability to negotiate terms in 

the instant case because Plaintiff has not asserted that 

she was not given a chance to negotiate the terms of the 

waiver or that she attempted to negotiate the terms and was 

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unsuccessful. Rather, the facts suggest that Plaintiff did 

not seek to negotiate the terms, which is insufficient to 

invalidate the waiver. See Stevens v. Wyndham Vacation 

Ownership, Inc., 2015 WL 1932285 (M.D. Florida April 28, 

2015) (citing to See Parris v. Wyndham Vacation Resorts, 

Inc., 2013 WL 1296231 (D.Haw. Mar. 28, 2013) (declining to 

find that a waiver provision was not negotiable when the 

record evidence indicated only that the plaintiff had 

failed to negotiate).

Lastly, Plaintiff’s argument that she did not 

voluntarily waive her right to a jury trial based on the 

circumstances occurring at the time the waiver was 

presented are undermined by the evidence that Plaintiff had 

previously signed an almost identical waiver in 2010 (Doc. 

15-1), prior to the occurrence of all the events she now 

relies on to invalidate her waiver. Considering the above, 

this Court does not believe Plaintiff’s waiver should be 

invalidated and recommends Defendant’s Alternative Motion 

to Strike be granted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons herein above, Plaintiff’s Motion for 

the Court to Extend Time For Service of Process Out-Of-Time 

(Doc. 13) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s time to serve Plaintiff 

is extended until June 27, 2016, which service has been 

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completed. As a result, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for

failure to timely serve is MOOT. With regard to 

Defendant’s Motion, in the Alternative, to Strike the Jury 

Demand, it is recommended that the motion be granted and 

that the jury demand articulated by Plaintiff be stricken

from the pleadings with her claims to proceed to a non-jury 

trial.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO FILE OBJECTIONS

A copy of this report and recommendation shall be 

served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any 

party who objects to this recommendation or anything in it 

must, within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of 

this document, file specific written objections with the 

Clerk of this Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 

FED.R.CIV.P. 72(b); S.D. ALA. L.R. 72(c). The parties should 

note that under Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, “[a] party 

failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or 

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in 

accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) 

waives the right to challenge on appeal the district 

court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal 

conclusions if the party was informed of the time period 

for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to 

object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the 

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court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in 

the interests of justice.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1. In order to 

be specific, an objection must identify the specific

finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state 

the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the 

Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation where the 

disputed determination is found. An objection that merely 

incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before 

the Magistrate Judge is not specific. 

 DONE this 22nd day of August, 2016. 

s/BERT W. MILLING, JR.

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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