Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-19-12541/USCOURTS-ca11-19-12541-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Manuel Hernandez-Urieta
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-12541

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cr-00008-JDW-PRL-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

MANUEL HERNANDEZ-URIETA,

a.k.a. Manuel Hernandez,

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(February 6, 2020)

Before MARTIN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Manuel Hernandez-Urieta appeals his 24-month sentence for illegal reentry 

into the United States, arguing that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. We 

disagree and affirm.

I.

Hernandez-Urieta, a citizen of Mexico who had been deported from this 

country—multiple times—in 2006, was found in Florida in December 2018. He 

entered a guilty plea to illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 

U.S.C. § 1326(a). Hernandez-Urieta had two prior convictions for entering the 

United States illegally in 2006, and he had been caught attempting to enter the 

United States illegally on three other occasions (also in 2006), although he was not 

prosecuted for those entries. He also had three prior convictions for driving under 

the influence (“DUI”) in 2000, which offenses involved leaving the scene of an 

accident, resisting arrest, and providing a false name to police. After his third DUI 

offense, Hernandez-Urieta reportedly violated his probation by absconding without 

paying costs or complying with the other terms of his release.

Because Hernandez-Urieta’s previous illegal-entry and DUI offenses 

occurred more than 10 years before his 2018 offense, they were not counted when 

determining his criminal history category for sentencing purposes. At sentencing, 

the district court calculated Hernandez-Urieta’s Sentencing Guidelines range as 0–

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6 months’ imprisonment, based on his offense level (6) and criminal history 

category (I). The district court determined that the Guidelines range was 

“completely unreasonable” given Hernandez-Urieta’s past removals and 

prosecutions for illegal entry and sentenced him to the maximum statutory term of 

24 months’ imprisonment followed by one year of supervised release. The court 

explained that Hernandez-Urieta posed a danger to the public based on his multiple 

prior DUI offenses, leaving the scene of an accident, failure to appear in court, and 

providing a false name to law enforcement. The court acknowledged the 

application of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and found that a 

sentence of 24 months appropriately reflected the seriousness of the offense, 

promoted respect for the law, acted as a deterrent, and protected the public.

II.

On appeal, Hernandez-Urieta argues that his 24-month sentence is 

substantively unreasonable because it is four times greater than the advisory 

Sentencing Guidelines range, and because the district court unreasonably relied on 

Hernandez-Urieta’s unscored criminal history. We review the substantive 

reasonableness of a sentence for an abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the 

sentence is within or outside the Guidelines range. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007). In evaluating the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we 

consider “the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance 

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from the Guidelines range.” Id. We will vacate a sentence as substantively 

unreasonable only if we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors 

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 

2010) (en banc) (citation omitted). 

A district court must select a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than 

necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, 

provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and efficiently 

provide the defendant with needed education or correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a). In determining the appropriate sentence, the district court must also 

consider “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 

characteristics of the defendant;” (2) “the kinds of sentences available;” (3) the 

applicable Sentencing Guidelines range; (4) pertinent policy statements of the 

Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid sentencing disparities among 

similarly situated defendants; and (6) any need for restitution to victims. Id. “A 

district court abuses its considerable discretion and imposes a substantively 

unreasonable sentence only when it ‘(1) fails to afford consideration to relevant 

factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper 

or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the 

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proper factors.’” United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 

2015) (quoting Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189)).

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the statutory 

maximum sentence, given Hernandez-Urieta’s history of repeated illegal entries 

and deportations, as well as his history of driving under the influence while in this 

country. The district court adequately explained its upward variance by noting that 

the Guidelines range did not account for this history and that the maximum 

sentence of 24 months’ imprisonment was necessary to serve the statutory 

purposes of sentencing. We cannot assume that an upward variance from the 

Guidelines range renders the sentence unreasonable, but must give due deference 

to the district court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

And to the extent that the district court relied heavily on one sentencing factor—

Hernandez-Urieta’s history and characteristics and the circumstances of his 

offense—in determining the appropriate sentence, it was within the court’s 

discretion to do so. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1254; United States v. Clay, 

483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Hernandez-Urieta’s conviction and sentence 

are therefore

AFFIRMED.

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