Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01085/USCOURTS-caDC-03-01085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Tarek H. Jifry
Petitioner
Maan H. Zarie
Petitioner

Document Text:

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

Federal Reporter or U.S.App.D.C. Reports. Users are requested to notify

the Clerk of any formal errors in order that corrections may be made

before the bound volumes go to press.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 30, 2004 Decided June 11, 2004

No. 03-1085

TAREK H. JIFRY AND MAAN H. ZARIE,

PETITIONERS

v.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS

Consolidated with Nos.

03-1143, 03-1144, 03-1282

On Petitions for Review of an Order of the

Federal Aviation Administration

Thomas J. Whalen argued the cause for petitioners. With

him on the briefs was Evelyn D. Sahr.

 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.

The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out

of time.

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 1 of 15
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Douglas N. Letter, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice,

argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief

were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney General, and E.

Roy Hawkens and Catherine Y. Hancock, Attorneys.

Before: ROGERS, TATEL and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: Petitions filed by two non-resident

alien pilots challenge certain aviation regulations adopted in

the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. From

the establishment of the Transportation Security Administration (‘‘TSA’’) in November 2001 to the promulgation of the

challenged regulations in January 2003, aviation security has

undergone a fundamental transformation. The pilots contend

that the new procedures resulting in the revocation of their

airman certificates issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (‘‘FAA’’) violated the Administrative Procedure Act

(‘‘APA’’) and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. Specifically, they contend

that the January 2003 regulations were unlawfully promulgated without notice and comment, that the revocations were not

supported by substantial evidence in the record, and that they

were denied meaningful notice of the evidence against them

and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

I.

Congress has delegated broad discretion to the Federal

Aviation Administration (‘‘FAA’’) to prescribe regulations and

standards for safety in air commerce and national security.

See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(5). The FAA may ‘‘at any time’’

reexamine the issuance of an airman certificate and issue an

order ‘‘modifying, suspending, or revoking’’ a certificate if the

Administrator determines that such action is required for

‘‘safety in air commerce’’ and ‘‘the public interest.’’ 49 U.S.C.

§§ 44709(a), (b). With regard to issuing airman certificates

to qualified individuals, Congress distinguished between citizens and aliens, conferring broad discretion to the FAA

regarding alien pilots. See id. § 44703(e). After the SeptemUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 2 of 15
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ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress established the

Transportation Security Administration (‘‘TSA’’) on November 19, 2001, and transferred much of the responsibility for

civil aviation security from the FAA to the TSA. See id.

§§ 114(d), (f).

This case concerns alien pilots only; citizens and resident

alien pilots have challenged the applicable regulations in

Coalition of Air Line Pilots Ass’ns. v. FAA, Nos. 03–1074

and 03–1076 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2004). The two pilots, Jifry

and Zarie, are citizens of Saudi Arabia who have used their

FAA certificates to pilot flights abroad, but have not operated

Saudi Arabian Airlines flights to the United States in the past

nine and four years, respectively. On August 14, 2002, the

TSA sent letters to the FAA requesting that Captain Jifry

and Captain Zarie have their airman certificates revoked,

stating that ‘‘[b]ased upon information available to us,’’ they

presented ‘‘a security risk to civil aviation or national security.’’ The FAA notified Jifry and Zarie by letters of August

20, 2002, that their airman certificates would be revoked

because the Acting Under Secretary of Transportation for

Security, pursuant 49 U.S.C. §§ 44709(b)(1)(A) and 46105(c),

had determined that they presented risks to aviation or

national security. The FAA revoked the pilots’ certificates,

see 49 U.S.C. § 44709(b), and the pilots appealed the revocations to the National Transportation Safety Board (‘‘NTSB’’).

Id. § 44709(d). An administrative law judge (‘‘ALJ’’) held a

telephonic pre-hearing conference on January 17, 2003, and

ordered that the FAA and the TSA provide a privilege log

and that depositions of key witnesses take place by midFebruary.

A week later, on January 24, 2003, the FAA dismissed the

revocation actions against Jifry and Zarie, and in conjunction

with the TSA, published, without notice and comment, new

regulations governing the suspension and revocation of airman certificates for security reasons. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.18,

49 C.F.R. § 1540.117. The new FAA regulation, 14 C.F.R.

§ 61.18, provides for automatic suspension by the FAA of

airman certificates upon written notification from the TSA

that the pilot poses a security threat and, therefore, is not

eligible to hold an airman certificate. The TSA simultaneousUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 3 of 15
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ly promulgated 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117, which establishes the

procedure by which the TSA initially and finally notifies nonresident aliens who hold or apply for FAA certificates that

they pose a security threat, and requires the TSA to notify

the FAA once the TSA has determined that a pilot is a

security threat. Upon finding that a pilot poses a ‘‘security

threat,’’ see 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(c), the TSA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence issues an Initial Notification of

Threat Assessment (‘‘Initial Notice’’) to the individual and

serves that determination upon the FAA. See id.

§ 1540.117(e). The FAA then suspends the pilot’s certificate.

See 14 C.F.R. § 61.18(b)(2). No later than 15 days after

service, the pilot may make a written request for copies of

releasable materials upon which the Initial Notice was based.

See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(e)(1) & (2). The TSA must respond

not later than 30 days after receiving the request, and the

pilot may submit a written reply within 15 days of receiving

the TSA’s response. See id. § 1540.117(e)(3) & (4). At that

point, the TSA Deputy Administrator must review the entire

record de novo to determine if the pilot poses a security risk.

Id. § 1540.117(f)(1). If the Deputy so determines, the TSA

serves a Final Notification of Threat Assessment (‘‘Final

Notice’’), id. § 1540.117(f)(2), and the FAA revokes the certificate. See 14 C.F.R. § 61.18(c)(2). The pilot may appeal the

certificate revocation to the NTSB. See 49 U.S.C.

§ 44709(d). Upon exhaustion of these administrative remedies, the pilot may seek review in the court of appeals, which

may review the case on the merits. See id. §§ 44709(f),

46110.

On January 24, 2003, the TSA also served an Initial Notice

of Threat Assessment designating Jifry and Zarie as security

threats, and the FAA suspended their certificates. The pilots

appealed the Initial Notice, and requested the materials upon

which the Initial Notice had been issued. The TSA provided

the releasable materials, but did not include the factual basis

for TSA’s determination, which was based on classified information. The pilots then appealed the suspension of their

certificates to the NTSB. The ALJ granted the TSA’s

motion for summary judgment, ruling that the only question

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 4 of 15
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was procedural – whether the pilots had been duly advised by

the TSA, in writing, that they posed a security threat, and

finding that they had. Upon the pilots’ appeals, the NTSB

affirmed the ALJ’s order in favor of the TSA. Jifry and

Zarie then filed replies to the TSA’s Initial Notice, stating

that the ‘‘lack of evidence and information about the basis for

the determination contained in the TSA’s response’’ made it

impossible for them to specifically rebut the TSA’s allegations, and denying that they were security threats. On May

8, 2003, the TSA Deputy Administrator, upon de novo review

of the administrative record, denied the pilots’ challenge to

the Initial Notice and issued a Final Notice based on finding

that Jifry and Zarie posed security threats. See 49 C.F.R.

§ 1540.117(c). The FAA then revoked the pilots’ airman

certificates. On August 13, 2003, the NTSB denied the pilots’

appeal of the revocation of their certificates for the same

reasons it had denied their challenges to the suspensions, and

affirmed the ALJ’s grant of summary judgment to the TSA

and the emergency orders of revocation.

II.

The pilots make three challenges to the revocations of their

FAA airman certificates: first, that the January 2003 regulations were unlawfully promulgated without notice and comment; second, that the revocations were not supported by

substantial evidence in the record; and third, that the procedures provided by the January 2003 regulations violated their

due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. We address each in turn.

Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act (‘‘APA’’)

requires an agency to publish a general notice of proposed

rulemaking and to afford an opportunity for interested persons to participate in the rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),

(c). The ‘‘good cause’’ exception, however, provides that

‘‘when the agency for good cause finds TTT that notice and

public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or

contrary to the public interest,’’ the agency need not engage

in notice and comment. Id. § 553(b)(3)(B). The pilots conUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 5 of 15
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tend that the regulations of January 2003 are invalid because

they were unlawfully promulgated without notice and comment, and there was no rational basis for eliminating the

right to a meaningful appeal before the NTSB. They maintain that the ‘‘good cause’’ exception does not apply because

notice and comment had not been ‘‘impracticable, unnecessary

or contrary to the public interest’’ inasmuch as the FAA

already had the authority to immediately suspend or revoke a

certificate upon finding that ‘‘safety in air commerce or air

transportation and the public interest’’ required such an

action. See 49 U.S.C. § 44709, amended by Pub. L. No. 108–

176, 117 Stat. 2490 (2003).

Contrary to the position of respondents TSA, FAA, and the

NTSB, the pilots’ APA challenges to the FAA regulation, 49

C.F.R. § 61.18, are not mooted by the enactment of the

Vision 100 – Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act (‘‘Act’’),

49 U.S.C. § 46111, on December 12, 2003. The Act provides

that the FAA Administrator ‘‘shall issue an order TTT suspending, or revoking any part of a certificate TTT if the

Administrator is notified by the Under Secretary for Border

Transportation Security of the Department of Homeland

Security that the holder of the certificate poses, or is suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to

airline or passenger safety.’’ 49 U.S.C. § 46111(a). The

respondents maintain that through § 46111, Congress approved the certificate-revocation process embodied in the

FAA regulation by expressly commanding the FAA to suspend or revoke certificates if requested by the TSA. The

respondents have not shown a lack of a live controversy,

however, because the effects of 14 C.F.R. § 61.18 remain very

real for non-resident alien pilots like Jifry and Zarie. The

FAA has applied this regulation against the two pilots, and it

remains in effect notwithstanding the Act. The pilots therefore retain ‘‘a legally cognizable interest in the outcome,’’

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969), of their APA

claims.

Generally, the ‘‘good cause’’ exception to notice and comment rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B), is to be ‘‘narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced.’’ TenUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 6 of 15
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nessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1144 (D.C.

Cir. 1992) (quoting New Jersey v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045

(D.C. Cir. 1980)). The exception excuses notice and comment

in emergency situations, Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v.

Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1981), or where delay

could result in serious harm. See Hawaii Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995). The

latter circumstance is applicable here in examining the TSA’s

determination that ‘‘[t]he use of notice and comment prior to

issuance of th[e] [January 2003 regulations] could delay the

ability of TSA and the FAA to take effective action to keep

persons found by TSA to pose a security threat from holding

an airman certificate,’’ and was ‘‘necessary to prevent a

possible imminent hazard to aircraft, persons, and property

within the United States.’’

The pilots contend that the ‘‘good cause’’ exception does not

apply because the FAA already had unlimited power to

revoke a certificate immediately if it believed an airman to be

a security risk, see 49 U.S.C. § 44709, and the TSA was

already authorized to make security assessments under 49

U.S.C. § 114(f). While true, the pilots fail to acknowledge

that at the time the challenged regulations were adopted, the

FAA’s power to suspend or revoke certificates was permissive

only. See 49 U.S.C. § 44709. Congress had not yet enacted

49 U.S.C. § 46111, which formalized the requirement that the

FAA shall suspend, modify, or revoke a certificate if notified

by the TSA that an individual posed a security risk. As the

respondents explain, the January 2003 regulations mandated

a ‘‘streamlined process’’ by which an individual’s pilot certificate would be automatically suspended or revoked by the

FAA upon notification by the TSA that a pilot posed a

security threat. The TSA and FAA deemed such regulations

necessary ‘‘in order to minimize security threats and potential

security vulnerabilities to the fullest extent possible.’’ Given

the respondents’ legitimate concern over the threat of further

terrorist acts involving aircraft in the aftermath of September

11, 2001, see Declaration of TSA Deputy Administrator Stephen McHale (hereinafter McHale Decl.) at 4, the agencies

had ‘‘good cause’’ for not offering advance public particUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 7 of 15
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ipation. See Utility Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA,

236 F.3d 749, 754–55 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

On the merits, the pilots’ APA challenge fails. The court’s

review of agency rulemaking is highly deferential, limited to

determining ‘‘whether the agency has considered the relevant

factors and articulated a ‘rational connection between the

facts found and the choice made.’ ’’ United States Air Tour

Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting

Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). In BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d

1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1999), the court observed that ‘‘[w]hen

TTT an agency is obliged to make policy judgments where no

factual certainties exist or where facts alone do not provide

the answer, [the reviewing court’s] role is more limited; we

require only that the agency so state and go on to identify the

considerations it found persuasive.’’

Contrary to the pilots’ position, the regulations are not

arbitrary and capricious for bearing no rational connection to

the problem identified by the FAA. It is self-evident that the

regulations are related to the TSA’s and FAA’s goals of

improving the safety of air travel. Nor is the court in a

position to second-guess the respondents’ judgment that imposing stricter procedures for coordinating security risks and

restricting individuals who pose security threats from holding

airman certificates was necessary to further that goal. See

BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d at 1221–22. Moreover, the

pilots’ contention that the risk posed by the certificate holders

alleged to be security threats was not remedied by providing

fewer procedural protections to the certification holders and

narrowing their right to NTSB review is to no avail because

49 U.S.C. § 46111 produces the same result. Section 46111

makes no provision for NTSB review even for citizens, and

the Conference Report states that non-resident aliens ‘‘have

the right to the appeal procedures that [TSA] has already

provided for them.’’ H.R. Conf. Rpt. 108–334 at 152 (2003).

In addition, § 46111(a) requires the FAA to respond automatically to TSA threat assessments, providing that the FAA

‘‘shall issue an order amending, modifying, suspending, or

revoking any part of a certificate issued under this title if the

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Administrator is notified by TTT the Department of Homeland

Security that the holder of the certificate poses, or is suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to

airline or passenger safety.’’ 49 U.S.C. § 46111(a). Accordingly, if these pilots retain any right to NTSB review at all, it

is no broader than the review for procedural regularity that

they have received, and they would therefore garner no

benefit from a remand. Indeed, an additional ground for

rejecting the pilots’ challenge to the promulgation of the FAA

regulation without notice and comment exists precisely because § 46111 now provides an express statutory authorization for the automatic revocation that was previously predicated on the regulations alone; even were the court to

invalidate the regulations for lack of notice and comment, the

statute would compel the FAA to honor the TSA’s notification

and take immediate action against the pilots’ certificates.

III.

The scope of the court’s review of the pilots’ challenges to

the TSA’s actions is limited to determining whether the

actions were ‘‘arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or

otherwise not in accordance with law.’’ 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

Under this standard, the court must consider whether those

actions were ‘‘based on a consideration of the relevant factors

and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.’’

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416

(1971) (overruled on other grounds). See Motor Veh. Mfrs.

Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43

(1983). The court must affirm the agency’s findings of fact if

they are supported by ‘‘substantial evidence’’ and there is a

‘‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice

made.’’ Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371

U.S. 156, 168 (1962). ‘‘Substantial evidence’’ is simply such

relevant evidence as a reasonable person might accept as

proof of a conclusion. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,

340 U.S. 474, 477 (1981) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 9 of 15
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In contending that the revocations of their airman certificates are unsupported by substantial evidence in the record,

the pilots do not challenge the definition of ‘‘security threat’’

under the TSA regulations. An individual poses a ‘‘security

threat’’ if the individual ‘‘is suspected of posing, or is known

to pose (1) A threat to transportation or national security; (2)

A threat to air piracy or terrorism; (3) A threat to airline or

passenger security; or (4) A threat to civil aviation security.’’

49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(c). Consistent with Camp v. Pitts, 411

U.S. 138, 143 (1973), where the Supreme Court stated that

when an agency official fails to adequately explain its decision, the agency should submit ‘‘either through affidavits or

testimony, such additional explanation of the reasons for the

agency decision as may prove necessary,’’ the affidavit of TSA

Deputy Administrator Stephen McHale provides an adequate

basis for the TSA’s determination that Jifry and Zarie each

posed a ‘‘security threat’’ within the meaning of § 1540.117(c).

The unsealed affidavit recounts that the Deputy Administrator affirmed the TSA’s determination on the basis of classified

intelligence reports, combined with reports from the intelligence community that aircraft would continue to be used as

weapons of terrorism, and consideration of ‘‘the ease with

which an individual may obtain access to aircraft in the

United States once he or she has a pilot license.’’ McHale

Decl. at 4. The Deputy Administrator attested that ‘‘because

it would be very difficult to avert harm once a terrorist had

control of an aircraft, I concluded that it was important to err

on the side of caution in determining whether [the two pilots]

TTT pose a security threatTTTT’’ Id. at 4–5.

Viewing as a whole the record evidence before the TSA,

including ex parte in camera review of the classified intelligence reports, we hold that there was substantial evidence to

support the TSA’s determination that the pilots were security

risks. While we reject the pilots’ contention that the court

apply a de novo standard of review, we have carefully reviewed the classified intelligence reports on which TSA relied.

The record is not lengthy and the basis for the TSA’s

conclusion is obvious. The court’s review is limited, moreover, to the administrative record that was before the TSA

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 10 of 15
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when it determined that the pilots were security risks. See 5

U.S.C. § 706; cf. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373

U.S. 709, 715 (1963). Hence, the pilots’ post-argument submission of May 3, 2004 is not properly before the court,

although we note that the information it contains was known

to the pilots in 2001 and could have, and still can be, submitted to the TSA.

The pilots’ motion to bar the respondents’ reliance on

classified information in this court is not well-taken. Even

assuming the respondents’ failure to provide notice of its

intention to rely on classified information on appeal until one

month after the pilots filed their opening brief prevented the

pilots from timely addressing the ‘‘classified information’’

question in their opening brief, the pilots’ motion fails on its

merits for several reasons. First, because the court reviewed

the information designated by the respondents as ‘‘classified,’’

the court is in a position to determine whether it was properly

classified without the Vaughn Index, see Vaughn v. Rosen,

484 F.2d 820, 826–28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), that the pilots urge be

obtained. Reliance on Vaughn is misplaced, in any event,

because that case involved the Freedom of Information Act

and presented a very different situation than that presented

here. Second, the court has inherent authority to review

classified material ex parte, in camera as part of its judicial

review function. See Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 822 & n.2

(D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Holy Land Found. v. for Relief &

Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Nat’l

Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192,

208–09 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The pilots’ focus on the TSA Deputy

Administrator’s reliance on ‘‘sensitive security information,’’

as defined by 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(s), 40119(b)(1), and 49 C.F.R.

Part 1520, and ‘‘law enforcement sensitive’’ information, see

McHale Decl. at 5, fares no better. Although 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.5(b) provides that a person has a ‘‘need to know

sensitive security information’’ when the information is necessary to represent an individual in a judicial or administrative

proceeding, § 1520.5(b)(5) applies only to individuals representing persons listed in § 1520.5(a), and the pilots are not

among the persons listed in subsection (a) who are required

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to restrict disclosure of and access to sensitive security

information to those with a ‘‘need to know.’’ See 49 C.F.R.

§ 1520.5(a).

IV.

The court reviews de novo the pilots’ challenge to the

constitutionality of the procedures under the January 2003

regulations. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,

435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978); Ramirez-Alejandre v. Ashcroft, 319

F.3d 365, 377 (9th Cir. 2003); Grace Towers Tenants Ass’n v.

Grace Housing Dev. Fund Co., 538 F.2d 491, 496 (2d Cir.

1976). They contend that the TSA and FAA procedures

violate the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution by depriving

the pilots of their property interest in their airman certificates without due process of law.

The Supreme Court has long held that non-resident aliens

who have insufficient contacts with the United States are not

entitled to Fifth Amendment protections. See Johnson v.

Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher,

189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,

369 (1886). See also United States v. Curtiss–Wright Export

Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); Pauling v. McElroy, 278

F.2d 252, 253 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Cf. United States v.

Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). Exceptions may

arise where aliens have come within the territory of the

United States and established ‘‘substantial connections’’ with

this country, Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271, or ‘‘accepted

some societal obligations.’’ Id. at 273. In such situations, the

Court has recognized that aliens may be accorded protections

under the Constitution. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–

12 (1982); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596

(1953); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.

481, 489 (1931). This court has applied these principles in a

series of cases concerning the designation of certain dissident

organizations as ‘‘foreign terrorist organization[s].’’ See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238,

1241 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (‘‘People’s Mojahedin II’’); Nat’l Council, 251 F.3d at 201; People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 12 of 15
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of State, 182 F.3d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (‘‘People’s Mojahedin I’’). See also 32 County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of

State, 292 F.3d 797, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In People’s Mojahedin I, 182 F.3d at 22, the court explained that ‘‘[a] foreign

entity without property or presence in this country has no

constitutional rights, under the due process clause or otherwise.’’ We need not decide whether or not Jifry and Zarie

are entitled to constitutional protections because, even assuming that they are, they have received all the process that they

are due under our precedent.

‘‘The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful

manner.’ ’’ Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)

(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).

Generally, in determining whether administrative procedures

are constitutionally adequate, courts weigh three factors:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the

official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and

the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s

interest, including the function involved and the fiscal

and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. The pilots’ interests at stake

here – their interest in possessing FAA airman certificates to

fly foreign aircraft outside of the United States – pales in

significance to the government’s security interests in preventing pilots from using civil aircraft as instruments of terror.

As the Supreme Court has noted, ‘‘It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than

the security of the Nation.’’ Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307

(1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500,

509 (1964)). Whatever the risk of erroneous deprivation, the

pilots had the opportunity to file a written reply to the TSA’s

initial determination and were afforded independent de novo

review of the entire administrative record by the Deputy

Administrator of the FAA, see 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(e)(4), (f),

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and ex parte, in camera judicial review of the record. In

light of the governmental interests at stake and the sensitive

security information, substitute procedural safeguards may be

impracticable, and in any event, are unnecessary under our

precedent.

In National Council, 251 F.3d at 208, the court concluded

that in designating organizations as foreign terrorist organizations under the Anti–Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the Secretary of State had to ‘‘afford to the entities

under consideration notice that the designation is impending,’’

id., and ‘‘the opportunity to present, at least in written form,

such evidence as those entities may be able to produce to

rebut the administrative record or otherwise negate the proposition that they are foreign terrorist organizations.’’ Id. at

209. In light of the Supreme Court’s instruction that ‘‘due

process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as

the particular situation demands,’’ Morrissey v. Brewer, 408

U.S. 471, 481 (1972), the court held that because of the extent

to which security concerns were implicated in that case, the

Secretary could upon ‘‘adequate showing to the court,’’ provide the requisite notice after the designation of the organization as a terrorist organization, and needed only to disclose

the unclassified portions of the record. National Council,

251 F.3d at 208. In People’s Mojahedin II, 327 F.3d at 1242–

43, another case involving the designation of terrorist organizations, the court underscored that it ‘‘had established in

[National Council] the process which is due under the circumstances of this sensitive matter of classified intelligence in

the effort to combat foreign terrorism,’’ and that ‘‘nothing

further is due.’’ Id. See also Holy Land, 333 F.3d at 163–64.

The TSA Assistant Administrator’s Initial Notices informed

the pilots that ‘‘[b]ased upon materials available to the [TSA],

which I have personally reviewed, I have determined that you

pose a security threat.’’ The pilots were afforded an opportunity to respond to the designation and both filed written

challenges to the TSA’s Initial Notice, along with affidavits

that they did not pose a threat to aviation or national security. See 49 C.F.R. § 1540.117(e)(4). These materials were

considered by the TSA Deputy Administrator when he conUSCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 14 of 15
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ducted a de novo review of the administrative record before

issuing the Final Notice. While the pilots protest that without knowledge of the specific evidence on which TSA relied,

they are unable to defend against the charge that they are

security risks, the court has rejected the same argument in

the terrorism listing cases. The due process protections

afforded to them parallel those provided under similar circumstances in National Council and People’s Mojahedin II,

and are sufficient to satisfy our case law.

Accordingly, we affirm the NTSB revocation order of August 13, 2003, and deny the petitions for review and the pilots’

motion to bar the respondents’ reliance on classified information.

USCA Case #03-1085 Document #828328 Filed: 06/11/2004 Page 15 of 15