Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50585/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50585-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Agustin Camarena Hernandez
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

AGUSTIN CAMARENA HERNANDEZ,

AKA Hernandez Agustin Camarena,

Jr., AKA Agustin Hernandez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50585

D.C. No.

2:11-cr-00257-

ODW-1

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

January 5, 2015—Pasadena, California

Filed August 3, 2015

Before: Alex Kozinski, William A. Fletcher,

and John B. Owens, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge W. Fletcher

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2 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel remanded with an instruction to amend the

written judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of

the sentence, and otherwise affirmed the sentence, in a case

in which the defendant pled guilty to two counts of

possession of child pornography. 

The panel held that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B), which

provides for a five-level enhancement for offenders who

distribute child pornography “for the receipt, or expectation

of receipt, of a thing of value,” applies to a child pornography

distributor who anticipates receiving something of value in

return for his distribution, even in the absence of a specific

agreement providing for reciprocity. The panel held that on

the facts of this case, there is sufficient evidence that the

defendant expected that he would receive child pornography

in return for sharing his videos and images on a peer-to-peer

file-sharing network, and that the district court appropriately

applied the enhancement. 

The panel found that the district court did not

impermissibly rely on unreliable allegations that the

defendant abused his daughters when it determined his

sentence.

The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that in

determining his sentence the district court inappropriately

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 3

relied on a conclusion that the defendant was not “curable” or

“treatable.”

The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that the

district court improperly imposed an enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6), based on use of a computer to

distribute the child pornography, after having rejected that

enhancement on policy grounds. 

The panel rejected the defendant’s argument that the

sentence is substantively unreasonable.

COUNSEL

Gia Kim (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los

Angeles, California, for Defendant-Appellant.

Elizabeth Ryunsoo Yang (argued), Assistant United States

Attorney, Los Angeles, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

OPINION

W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

Agustin Camarena Hernandez used a peer-to-peer filesharing network to share and download child pornography. 

Hernandez shared some of his child pornography with two

undercover FBI Special Agents. After agents searched

Hernandez’s residence and confiscated his computer, they

discovered over 11,000 videos and images of child

pornography. Many involved girls under the age of twelve,

and some as young as nine months old.

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4 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

Hernandez pled guilty to two counts of possession of

child pornography. He was thereafter convicted in a bench

trial of two counts of distribution of child pornography. The

district court sentenced Hernandez to 262 months in prison

and lifetime supervised release. On appeal, Hernandez

challenges his sentence. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We affirm in

almost all respects.

I. Background

Hernandez amassed a large collection of over 11,000

child pornography videos and images, some of which he

shared using a GigaTribe account. GigaTribe is a peer-topeer file-sharing network that enables its users to share digital

files (image, video, or audio) with other users via the Internet. 

Under GigaTribe’s default setting, a user’s files are not

available to others. To make files available, a GigaTribe user

must affirmatively designate certain folders on his computer

as “shared” or “non-shared.” A GigaTribe user controls

access to “shared” files by inviting other users to join his

network of “friends,” or by accepting “friend” requests.

Hernandez’s GigaTribe username was “pthcforyou,”

which stood for “preteen hardcore for you.” Using his

account, Hernandez downloaded video and image files of

child pornography and made these files available to his

GigaTribe friends in a folder designated for sharing. 

Hernandez understood that the videos and images he

intentionally downloaded into his shared folder would be

available for viewing and downloading by other users.

Using his “pthcforyou” username, Hernandez “friended”

two GigaTribe users who were, in fact, undercover FBI

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 5

Special Agents. On December 13, 2009, a San Diego FBI

Agent accepted Hernandez’s friend request. The next day,

the agent searched Hernandez’s folder and saw files that

appeared to contain child pornography. The agent

downloaded 1 video and 36 images of suspected child

pornography. Two of the images showed girls who were at

most eight years old engaged in sexual conduct.

While the agent was downloading these files, Hernandez

sent him a message to complain that the agent was “leeching”

him by accessing his files and not providing files in return:

pthcforyou: hi

pthcforyou: Bell!!

pthcforyou: hi

pthcforyou: Bell!!

[Agent]: hi

pthcforyou: hey man were is ur files

[Agent]: sorry about that I try to keep

leechers out . . . will post some

now

pthcforyou: thx ur lecching me a lot

On October 13, 2010, an undercover FBI Special Agent

in Phoenix “friended” Hernandez. The Phoenix agent

downloaded 44 image files from Hernandez’s shared folder. 

These images included three depicting girls under the age of

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6 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

about eight engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including

oral sex and vaginal/anal penetration.

On February 8, 2011, agents searched Hernandez’s

residence and recovered a laptop computer and an external

hard drive. In an interview conducted on the day of the

search, Hernandez admitted that he used GigaTribe and that

his username was “pthcforyou,” that he owned and

exclusively used the laptop, that he downloaded child

pornography, and that child pornography would be found on

his laptop. Forensic analysis of the computer and external

hard drive showed that Hernandez possessed over 11,000

videos and images of child pornography. Many of these

videos and images involved girls under the age of twelve, and

some as young as nine months old.

The United States charged Hernandez with two counts of

possession of child pornography and two counts of

distribution of child pornography. Hernandez pled guilty to

both possession counts. In a bench trial on the distribution

charges, Hernandez contended that use of peer-to-peer

networks to share child pornography did not satisfy the

“distribution” requirement of the statute. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) (“[a]ny person who . . . knowingly receives

or distributes . . . any child pornography” shall be fined and

imprisoned not less than five years and not more than twenty

years). Relying on Hernandez’s “affirmative actions in

installing, inviting and accepting GigaTribe users to his

computer and allowing them to download child pornography

from his ‘shared’ folder,” the district court stated that it had

“little difficulty in concluding that [Hernandez] distributed

child pornography in the sense of having ‘delivered,’

‘transferred,’ ‘dispersed,’ or ‘dispensed’ it to others.” The

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 7

district court sentenced Hernandez to 262 months in prison

and lifetime supervised release.

On appeal, Hernandez challenges only his sentence.

II. Standard of Review

“Only a procedurally erroneous or substantively

unreasonable sentence will be set aside.” United States v.

Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). We “review

the district court’s interpretation of the SentencingGuidelines

de novo, its application of the Guidelines to the facts for

abuse of discretion, and its factual findings for clear error.” 

Id. “Assuming that the district court’s sentencing decision is

procedurally sound, we then consider the substantive

reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Id.

III. Discussion

Hernandez argues that the district court should not have

applied the five-level sentencing enhancement applicable to

offenders who distribute child pornography “for the receipt,

or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value.” U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). Hernandez further argues that the district

court made a number of procedural errors; that, as a

substantive matter, his sentence was too long; and that his

written sentence should be amended to conform to the

sentence pronounced orally. Finally, he asks, in the event of

a remand for resentencing, that we reassign to a different

district judge.

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8 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

A. “Expectation” Under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)

Hernandez was convicted of distribution of child

pornography in violation of § 2252A(a)(2)(A). A defendant

convicted under this provision is eligible for a sentencing

enhancement under § 2G2.2(b)(3) of the Sentencing

Guidelines. Section 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) instructs the district

court to impose a five-level enhancement “[i]f the offense

involved . . . [d]istribution for the receipt, or expectation of

receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain.” The

district court applied the five-level enhancement, concluding

that Hernandez had an “expectation” of receiving something

of value.

We agree with the district court and hold that

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) applies to a child pornography distributor

who anticipates receiving something of value in return for his

distribution, even in the absence of a specific agreement

providing for reciprocity. On the facts of this case, there is

sufficient evidence that Hernandez expected that he would

receive child pornography in return for sharing his videos and

images on GigaTribe.

We have not previously interpreted § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)’s

requirement that a distributor of child pornography expect to

receive a thing of value in return. But we do not write on a

blank slate. Every other circuit to consider this question,

except possibly the Eleventh Circuit, has agreed that “a

defendant expects to receive a thing of value under U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) when he distributes child pornography in

anticipation of, or while reasonably believing in the

possibility of, the receipt of a thing of value.” United States

v. Geiner, 498 F.3d 1104, 1110 (10th Cir. 2007). See also

United States v. Groce, 784 F.3d 291, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2015)

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 9

(finding that a defendant distributed child pornography for a

thing of value by knowingly using peer-to-peer file sharing

software and thereby agreeing “to distribute the child

pornography on his computer in exchange for additional child

pornography”); United States v. Whited, 539 F.3d 693, 699

(7th Cir. 2008) (“‘[E]xpectation of receipt’ under

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) does not require an explicit agreement or

precise bargain . . . . Distribution of child pornography in the

reasonable anticipation or reasonable belief of receiving a

thing of value is enough for the enhancement to apply.”);

United States v. Griffin, 482 F.3d 1008, 1012–13 (8th Cir.

2007) (applying § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) to a distributor who shared

child pornography on a peer-to-peer network, despite the

absence of any quid pro quo agreements); United States v.

Maneri, 353 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he provision

is implicated if the distributor expects — rather than just

hopes — to receive a thing of value . . . in return for

distributing child pornography.”); United States v. Vadnais,

667 F.3d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2012) (“There must be some

other evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that a

defendant reasonably believed that he would receive

something of value by making his child pornography files

available for distribution through a peer-to-peer network.”). 

But see United States v. Spriggs, 666 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th

Cir. 2012) (“Without evidence that [the distributor] and

another user conditioned their decisions to share their illicit

image collections on a return promise to share files, we

cannot conclude there was a transaction under which [the

distributor] expected to receive more pornography.”).

We agree with our sister circuits. The enhancement

applies to anyone who distributes child pornography “for the

receipt, or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value.” 

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added). As the Second

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10 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

Circuit noted, “the key word in this case is ‘expectation.’” 

Maneri, 353 F.3d at 169. Although there is no statutory

definition, expectation

has been defined as “the act or action of

looking forward: anticipation.” Webster’s

Third New International Dictionary 799

(1976); accord Black’s Law Dictionary 598

(7th ed. 1999). Accordingly, based on the

ordinary meaning of the word “expectation,”

[the] enhancement applies when a defendant

distributes child pornography in anticipation

of, or while reasonably believing in the

possibility of, the receipt of a thing of value.

Id. We agree. The enhancement applies to any offender who

anticipates getting a thing of value in return for distributing

child pornography, even in the absence of a quid pro quo

agreement. While the distributor’s behavior “might be

characterized by a specific agreement or understanding, it

need not embrace an agreement or understanding to give rise

to an ‘expectation’” within the meaning of § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). 

Id. at 170.

Despite what appears to be the plain meaning of

“expectation,” Hernandez relies on Application Note 1 to

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) to argue that the enhancement only applies

where there is a quid pro quo agreement between a child

pornography distributor and a recipient. Application Note 1

defines “[d]istribution for the receipt, or expectation of

receipt, of a thing of value, but not for pecuniary gain” as:

any transaction, including bartering or other

in-kind transaction, that is conducted for a

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 11

thing of value, but not for profit. “Thing of

value” means anything of valuable

consideration. For example, in a case

involving the bartering of child pornographic

material, the “thing of value” is the child

pornographic material received in exchange

for other child pornographic material bartered

in consideration for the material received.

(Emphasis added.)

Hernandez argues that the Application Note understands

“expectation” as requiring a return promise of valuable

consideration. The critical word in the Application Note is

“transaction.” For Hernandez’s argument to succeed, he must

persuade us that a “transaction” is limited to quid pro quo

agreements. That is, he must persuade us that “transaction”

does not include the action of a distributor who allows

another person to access his child pornography files when he

merely expects to receive something in return. The Second

Circuit rejected this argument in Maneri. The court held that

“a ‘transaction’ does not necessarily include a specific

agreement.” 353 F.3d at 169. The word also “includes a

‘communicative activity . . . involving two parties . . .

reciprocally affecting or influencing each other.’” Id.

(quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2425

(1986)) (omissions in original). We agree with the Second

Circuit that the concept of “affecting or influencing each

other” is a more inclusive concept than entering into a quid

pro quo agreement, and we conclude that it covers the

conduct in this case. Although the Application Note refers to

bartering and other in-kind transactions, these are “examples

of conduct to which [the subsection] applies” and are “not

determinative of the subsection’s full reach.” Id. at 170. 

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12 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

“The word ‘including’ before the examples indicates that any

transaction — so long as it involves the ‘expectation’ of the

‘receipt’ of a ‘thing of value’ — suffices to trigger the

subsection’s enhancement.” Id.

Sharing child pornographyfiles on a peer-to-peer network

does not in and of itself demonstrate that the distributor

expects he will get something of value in return. “Although

a defendant may share files on a file-sharing network with the

expectation of receiving other users’ files in return, this is not

necessarily true in every case.” Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1111

(emphasis added). An offender’s use of a peer-to-peer

sharing network may be considered, but it is insufficient,

standing alone, to demonstrate that an expectation existed. 

See, e.g., Vadnais, 667 F.3d at 1209 (“[S]imply using a peerto-peer program is not itself sufficient to trigger the five-level

enhancement.”); United States v. Durham, 618 F.3d 921, 931

(8th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have explicitly rejected anysuggestion

we automatically apply a distribution enhancement based

merely on a defendant’s use of a file-sharing program.

Rather, the enhancement must be decided on a case-by-case

basis depending on the facts at hand.” (internal citation

omitted)); Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1111 (“To apply the

enhancement to every defendant who shares files on a

peer-to-peer file-sharing network would be to disregard the

connection between distribution and ‘thing of value’ in the

provision’s requirement that ‘distribution [be] for the receipt,

or expectation of receipt, of a thing of value.’” (alteration in

original) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B))); cf. Groce,

784 F.3d at 295 (holding that “knowing use of peer-to-peer

file sharing software triggers § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B)”). The

sentencing judge must look for additional indications that the

offender had a genuine expectation that he would receive

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 13

something of value in return for distributing the child

pornography at issue.

In this case, there is specific evidence that Hernandez

shared his collection of child pornographywith an undercover

FBI agent based on his expectation that he would receive

child pornography in return. When the agent in San Diego

downloaded Hernandez’s files but did not reciprocate,

Hernandez complained that the agent was “leeching” him. 

The exchange makes clear Hernandez’s expectation that the

agent would reciprocate. When the agent wrote, “sorry about

that I try to keep leechers out . . . will post some now,”

Hernandez responded, “thx ur lecching me a lot.” We agree

with the district court’s factual finding that this exchange

demonstrated both Hernandez’s “intent to receive similar

images from those he is giving access to” and his efforts at

“policing” that goal. We conclude that this exchange is

sufficient to show that Hernandez had an expectation of

receiving something of value in return for allowing access to

his child pornography files, and that the district court

appropriately applied the five-level enhancement of

§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B).

B. Procedural Challenges

“It would be procedural error for a district court to fail to

calculate — or to calculate incorrectly — the Guidelines

range; . . . to choose a sentence based on clearly erroneous

facts; or to fail adequately to explain the sentence selected,

including any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United

States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). 

Similarly, a district court abuses its discretion whenever it

relies on materially false or unreliable information at

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14 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

sentencing. United States v. Hanna, 49 F.3d 572, 577 (9th

Cir. 1995).

1. Unreliable Information

Hernandez argues that the district court improperly relied

on unproven allegations that Hernandez sexually abused his

daughters when it determined the length of his sentence. 

Although it is a somewhat close question, we disagree that

the district court so relied.

Early in the sentencing hearing, the district judge

indicated to Hernandez’s counsel that if he looked at the

pornographic videos, as counsel was requesting, he would

impose a longer sentence. He stated, “[I]f you want me to

take a look at this material to see whether or not some of

these enhancements are warranted, I will do that. But if they

are what Isuspect they are, [a sentence at the] low end [of the

Guidelines range] is off the table because of his conduct with

his own child.” A short time later, the court appeared to

change its view about the relevance of any alleged sexual

conduct with that child, saying to Hernandez’s counsel:

All right. Listen, I agree with what you said

about the daughter. We have an allegation

made by her to authorities, but the authorities

have done nothing. So I agree with you. 

Based upon that, we can’t use that to

somehow enhance Mr. Hernandez’s

punishment.

Finally, at the end of the sentencing hearing, the court stated

that “there is evidence to suggest that Mr. Hernandez has

previously attempted to sexually abuse his own children,” but

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 15

then went on to say that “[h]e has, however, been removed

from the lives of his own children, and, thus, if he ever

presented or posed a threat to them, he no longer does so.” 

(Emphasis added.)

Although the district court recognized that there was

evidence “to suggest” that Hernandez had “previously

attempted to sexually abuse his own children,” it also stated

that it could not use a mere allegation of abuse “to somehow

enhance Mr. Hernandez’s punishment.” And the court made

clear, by using the word “if,” that the sexual abuse of

Hernandez’s children had not been established, and that, even

if Hernandez had posed a threat to them, he no longer did. 

We therefore find that the district court did not impermissibly

rely on the unreliable allegations that Hernandez abused his

daughters when it determined Hernandez’s sentence.

2. Incurable Condition

Hernandez argues that in determining his sentence the

district court relied on its personal belief that Hernandez

suffered from an incurable condition. We do not believe that

the district court inappropriately relied on a conclusion that

Hernandez was not “curable” or “treatable.”

During the sentencing hearing, the court stated, “I think

other children are at risk. I haven’t heard anyone tell me that

this stuff is curable.” The court also noted that Hernandez

had “an overwhelming collection of material. This wasn’t

one or two or a dozen or two or a hundred or two. He has got

really quite a serious condition, and I think lifetime

supervision is going to be appropriate.” Based on the nature

and quantity of child pornography found on Hernandez’s

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16 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

computer, the district court did not believe that Hernandez

could be treated:

The material that the court has been exposed

to for sometime now does suggest that this is

not a treatable condition. The best that can be

hoped for is that one will learn to control his

conduct, but I do believe that lifetime

supervision is appropriate in these cases,

particularly when we are dealing with a

condition that is as serious as Mr.

Hernandez’s is.

Despite these statements, this case is different from

United States v. Cossey, 632 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2011) (per

curiam), upon which Hernandez relies. In Cossey, the Second

Circuit reversed a sentence that depended on a district court’s

unsupported belief that possession of child pornography was

genetically determined. Two separate psychological reports

had concluded that the defendant was “at a low to moderate

risk to re-offend.” Id. at 87. The district court dismissed

these reports as “worthless,” stating “it did not ‘have a lot of

faith’” in the psychology and psychiatry professions; the

court proceeded to make its own predictions “as to the state

of the science of genetics ‘fifty years from now.’” Id. at

87–88. Based on its belief that proclivity to possess child

pornography was genetically determined, the court rejected

the conclusion reached in the two reports, stating, “You are

what you’re born with. And that’s the only explanation for

what I see here.” Id. at 87. The Second Circuit concluded

that it was “impermissible for the court to base its decision of

recidivism on its unsupported theory of genetics.” Id. at 88.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 17

We agree with the Second Circuit’s decision in Cossey,

but hold that it does not apply to the case now before us. 

Some of the district court’s comments in this case do suggest

that a desire to possess and distribute child pornography is not

curable. But the district court never said, as the district court

said in Cossey, that Hernandez would be unable to control his

behavior. Indeed, the district court said quite the opposite. 

As the passage from the sentencing hearing, quoted above,

makes clear, the district court accepted that it was possible for

someone like Hernandez to “learn to control his conduct,”

and he determined Hernandez’s sentence based on this view. 

There were also no psychological reports to indicate, as in

Cossey, that Hernandez was at low to moderate risk to reoffend. Instead, in this case, Hernandez possessed “an

overwhelming collection of material,” and even

acknowledged that he had fallen “into an addiction.” Finally,

unlike Cossey where the district court relied “nearly entirely”

on its unsupported predictions in sentencing,see id., here, the

district court’s sentencing decision depended on other,

substantial, case-specific evidence about Hernandez’s

addiction to child pornography. Given these differences, the

district court’s statements do not constitute reversible error.

3. Use of a Computer

Hernandez argues that the district court improperly

imposed a two-level enhancement based on his use of a

computer to distribute the child pornography. See U.S.S.G.

§ 2G2.2(b)(6) (“If the offense involved the use of a computer

. . . for the possession, transmission, receipt, or distribution of

the material, or for accessing with intent to view the material,

increase by 2 levels.”). Hernandez contends that the district

court imposed the enhancement even though it had already

rejected that enhancement on policy grounds.

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18 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

That is not how we read the record. The district court

mentioned § 2G2.2(b)(6) onlyto ensure that the computations

in the Pre-Sentence Report were accurate. After confirming

the computations, the court rejected the two-level computer

enhancement, saying to Hernandez’s counsel, “I agree with

you about the computer.” The court noted it was not “bound”

by the child pornography guidelines and that it enjoyed

“extensive discretion in terms of fashioning what it deems to

be a reasonable sentence.” In this case, the court “fashioned

what it deems to be a reasonable sentence. It just so happens

that it is within the guidelines.” The court did not rely on

§ 2G2.2(b)(6) after rejecting it, and did not provide an

inconsistent explanation of the sentence.

C. Substantive Challenge

“A substantively reasonable sentence is one that is

‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to accomplish

§ 3553(a)(2)’s sentencing goals.” United States v. Crowe,

563 F.3d 969, 977 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)). At sentencing, the district court must consider

seven factors:

(1) the nature and circumstances of the

offense and the history and characteristics of

the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence

imposed; (3) the kinds of sentences available;

(4) the kinds of sentences and the sentencing

range established by the Sentencing

Guidelines; (5) pertinent policy statements

issued by the Sentencing Commission; (6) the

need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

disparities among defendants who have

similar criminal records and have been found

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 19

guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to

provide restitution to victims.

Id. at 977 n.15 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).

The district court sentenced Hernandez to 262 months in

prison, a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines but longer

than the government had recommended. Hernandez argues

that his sentence is longer than necessary “to protect the

public from further crimes of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(C). As the district court found, Hernandez

admitted to having a “problem” and “deriv[ing] sexual

pleasure from these child pornographic images and videos. 

The sheer volume of Hernandez’s collection, approximately

11,000 images and videos supports a finding that Mr.

Hernandez has a sexual interest in children.” The district

court did not abuse its discretion in setting a sentence that

reflected this risk.

Hernandez points to shorter sentences that defendants

received in other child pornography cases, but those cases are

not comparable. Some of the defendants in those cases were

charged with possession or distribution of child pornography,

but not both. Hernandez also has not shown that these

defendants distributed child pornography in the expectation

of receiving something of value, or that they owned

collections of child pornography as large as his.

D. Discrepancy Between Oral and Written Sentence

Hernandez and the government agree that there are

discrepancies between the sentence that the district court

delivered orally and the sentence in the written judgment. 

They also agree the oral pronouncement controls. There are

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20 UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ

three discrepancies. First, the oral sentence requires

Hernandez, upon release, to participate in outpatient

substance abuse treatment and counseling. The written

judgment requires him, in addition, to participate in

“urinalysis, breath, and/or sweat patch testing,” and to

“abstain from using illicit drugs and alcohol during the period

of supervision.” Second, the oral sentence requires

Hernandez to pay a special assessment. The written judgment

requires him, in addition, to pay restitution. Third, the oral

sentence prohibits Hernandez, upon release, from living

anywhere with a “direct view” of school yards or places

primarily used by persons under the age of 18. The written

judgment instead prohibits him from living within two

thousand feet of any such place.

“When there is a discrepancy between an unambiguous

oral pronouncement of a sentence and the written judgment,

the oral pronouncement controls.” United States v. Fifield,

432 F.3d 1056, 1059 n.3 (9th Cir. 2005). As we have done in

the past, “[w]e remand so that the district court can make the

written judgment consistent with the oral pronouncement.” 

United States v. Hicks, 997 F.2d 594, 597 (9th Cir. 1993).

E. Reassignment

Because we remand only for the district court to make

ministerial changes to the judgment and we otherwise affirm,

Hernandez’s request for assignment to a different judge for

resentencing is moot.

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UNITED STATES V. HERNANDEZ 21

Conclusion

We REMAND with an instruction to amend the written

judgment to conform with the oral pronouncement of the

sentence. We otherwise AFFIRM.

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