Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-07-03002/USCOURTS-ca6-07-03002-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Rajah Baylor
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206

File Name: 08a0090p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

RAJAH BAYLOR,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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No. 07-3002

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 06-00168—James S. Gwin, District Judge.

Submitted: February 7, 2008

Decided and Filed: February 26, 2008 

Before: SUHRHEINRICH, SUTTON, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: James M. Campbell, Akron, Ohio, for Appellant. Duncan T. Brown, ASSISTANT

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. 

GRIFFIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which SUTTON, J., joined.

SUHRHEINRICH, J. (p. 5), delivered a separate concurring opinion.

_________________

OPINION _________________

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Following a jury trial in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio, Rajah Baylor was convicted on one count of interfering with commerce

by robbery, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of using a firearm in

relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Baylor was

subsequently sentenced to a term of 140 months of imprisonment. He now appeals his convictions,

arguing that the requirement of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act is

unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598

(2000). Baylor argues further that, even assuming that the de minimis standard is appropriate, the

government failed to show that his activity had such an effect on interstate commerce. Finding each

of Baylor’s arguments to be devoid of merit, we affirm his convictions. 

1

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I.

On the evening of December 21, 2005, Little Caesar’s manager Tina Martin was in the

process of closing a Cleveland-area location of the chain pizza restaurant when a brick, thrown from

the outside, shattered the glass of the front door. A man dressed in all black, with a hooded

sweatshirt covering the top of his head and a mask covering his face, stepped forward and pointed

a .38 revolver at Martin, demanding that she open the store’s register. The man struck Martin on

the head and left with $538. Cleveland police officers later pulled over a vehicle driven by Baylor’s

accomplice, Kevin Oliver, and arrested Baylor and Oliver, finding a gun, masks, and gloves on the

floorboard of the vehicle. The police returned the suspects to the Little Caesar’s restaurant, where

Martin identified Baylor as her assailant. 

Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted Baylor of interfering with commerce by robbery

(Count One), in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and of using a firearm in relation

to a crime of violence (Count Two), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court

then sentenced Baylor to a term of 56 months of imprisonment on Count One and 84 months on

Count Two, to be served consecutively, for a total term of 140 months of imprisonment. 

II.

Baylor argues that in order to satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act, his activity

must have had more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Accordingly, Baylor contends

that our prior cases interpreting the Hobbs Act, which have held that a de minimis effect on interstate

commerce is sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, should be re-examined in light of the

Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison. In Morrison, the Court invalidated the civil remedy

provision of the Violence Against Women Act, holding that it did not regulate activity that

substantially affected interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 613. Five years earlier, in United States v.

Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), the Court held that Congress’s enactment of the Gun-Free School Zones

Act of 1990 exceeded the scope of its authority under the Commerce Clause, in that “possession of

a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity that might, through repetition

elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. See also

United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 485 n.1 (6th Cir. 2003) (summarizing the holdings of Lopez

and Morrison). 

We review Baylor’s argument de novo because it raises a question of law. United States v.

Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 455 (6th Cir. 1999). 

The Hobbs Act provides that “[w]hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects

commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion . .

. shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). In Smith, we reaffirmed our pre-Lopez

holdings that the government must prove only that a robbery had a de minimis effect on interstate

commerce in order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act. Surveying the weight

of authority from our sister circuits, we observed that:

All of the other circuits that have considered the issue have held that the de minimis

standard for Hobbs Act charges survived Lopez, although the Fifth Circuit has

recently granted a rehearing on this issue. See United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d

1460, 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 775 (2d Cir.

1998); United States v. Farrish, 122 F.3d 146, 147 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v.

Hickman, 151 F.3d 446, 456 (5th Cir. 1998), reh’g granted and op. vacated, 165

F.3d 1020 (5th Cir. 1999), [affirmed by 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc)];

United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Robinson, 119

F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1139 (1998); United States v.

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Nelson, 137 F.3d 1094, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Woodruff, 122 F.3d

1185 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Beydler, 120 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1997);

United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1224 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v.

Bruce, 78 F.3d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396,

398-99 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Paredes, 139 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 1998)

(Wellford, J., sitting by designation); United States v. Castleberry, 116 F.3d 1384,

1387 (11th Cir. 1997).

Smith, 182 F.3d at 456. We found persuasive the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Bolton that in Lopez, the Supreme Court “recognized that if a statute regulates an activity which, through repetition, in

aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the de minimis character of individual

instances arising under the statute is of no consequence,” id. (quoting Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399)

(internal citation and quotation omitted), and held that the “de minimis standard for the interstate

commerce effects of individual Hobbs Act violations survived Lopez.” Smith, 182 F.3d at 456.

Four years later, in Dupree, we addressed the same argument that Baylor now raises – that

Morrison requires the government to prove more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce

under the Hobbs Act. Dupree, 323 F.3d at 484-85. We rejected that claim, reaffirming our prior

holding in Smith that “the traditional de minimus standard for Hobbs Act violations” was appropriate

following Lopez and Morrison, so that “‘if a statute regulates an activity which, through repetition,

in [the] aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate commerce, the de minimus character of

individual instances arising under the statute is of no consequence.’” Dupree, 323 F.3d at 485

(quoting Smith, 182 F.3d at 456).

Most recently, we considered the de minimis standard’s applicability to the Hobbs Act in

United States v. Davis, 473 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2007). Specifically, in Davis, we rejected the

defendant’s argument that the de minimis standard is no longer applicable to the Hobbs Act after the

Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Davis, 473 F.3d at 682. As we

explained:

There is no reading of Raich that supports Davis’s contention that this Court cannot

continue to apply the de minimis standard to Hobbs Act cases, where, as here, the

extortion is directed at a business. The Hobbs Act, like the [Controlled Substances

Act at issue in Raich], regulates activities, which, in the aggregate, have a substantial

effect on interstate commerce. See United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th

Cir. 1995) (“In enacting the Hobbs Act, Congress determined that robbery and

extortion are activities which through repetition may have substantial detrimental

effects on interstate commerce.”) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.,

(1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1370); see also [United States v.]

Wang, 222 F.3d [234] at 238 [(6th Cir. 2000)] (“Lopez did not require realignment

of the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional nexus because individual instances arising under

the statute could, through repetition, have a substantial effect on interstate

commerce.”) (citing Smith, 182 F.3d at 456). Therefore, Raich permits, rather than

restricts, the continued application of the de minimis standard where the Hobbs Act

offense is directed at a business.

Davis, 473 F.3d at 683. We are bound by our prior published opinions in Smith, Dupree, and Davis, and must reject Baylor’s challenge to the de minimis standard. See Sixth Cir. R. 206(c); United

States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 452 (6th Cir. 2002).

Finally, we note that since Smith, which was published prior to Morrison, our sister circuits

have continued to apply the de minimis standard to the interstate commerce nexus under the Hobbs

Act in the wake of Morrison. See United States v. Griffin, 493 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2007); United

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States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 37 n.3 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Boyd, 480 F.3d 1178,

1179 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 306-07 (2d Cir. 2006); United States

v. Foster, 443 F.3d 978, 983 n.3 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 766 (3d Cir.

2005); United States v. McCormack, 371 F.3d 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543

U.S. 1098 (2005); United States v. Malone, 222 F.3d 1286, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 2000). It appears that

the Fifth Circuit is divided as to whether the aggregation principle may be applied to allow Hobbs

Act convictions where the impact on interstate commerce of individual robberies is minimal. See

United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376, 409-10 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (dividing equally on

aggregation principle, and therefore affirming defendant’s conviction).

III.

Although he does not identify this claim in his brief’s “Issues Presented For Review,” Baylor

also argues that the government did not offer sufficient evidence at trial to satisfy the de minimis

standard. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a) requires the appellant’s brief to contain, inter

alia, “a statement of the issues presented for review . . . .” See also, e.g., United States v. Winkle, 477 F.3d 407, 416 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007); Marks v. Newcourt Credit Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462

(6th Cir. 2003). Baylor’s brief on appeal identified only a single issue for review: “Whether the de

minimis threshold is constitutionally sufficient to fulfill the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs

Act?”

Assuming, without deciding, that Baylor has raised this issue properly for our review, his

argument is plainly without merit. At trial, the government offered the testimony of Joe Mestrovich,

the senior director of logistics and transportation services for Blue Line Food Service Distribution

(“Blue Line”). Mestrovich testified that Blue Line distributes food products for Little Caesar’s

restaurants, including the Cleveland location that was robbed by Baylor. He testified further that

the food products (cheeses, flours, sauces) traveled through interstate commerce to the Blue Line

warehouse in Columbus, Ohio, before they were shipped to the Little Caesar’s restaurant that Baylor

robbed. For example, Mestrovich stated that the flour used by the Cleveland Little Caesar’s

restaurant originated in Minnesota, the sauce from California, and the cheese from Wisconsin. This

testimony alone is sufficient to satisfy the de minimis standard. See United States v. Watkins, 509

F.3d 277, 281 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that de minimis standard is satisfied where defendant robbed

check-cashing business that drew checks on nationwide banks); Davis, 473 F.3d at 684 (finding de

minimis standard satisfied by extortion of a bar that purchased alcohol that had traveled in interstate

commerce); United States v. Brown, 959 F.2d 63, 68 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that de minimis

standard was satisfied where defendant attempted to rob a bar that purchased alcohol that had

traveled in interstate commerce). 

IV.

For the reasons stated, we affirm Baylor’s convictions. 

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No. 07-3002 United States v. Baylor Page 5

1

Notably, United States v. Dupree never directly addressed the holding from Morrison, but rather found it

sufficient to rely on United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452 (6th Cir. 1999), which was decided after Lopez but before

Morrison.

____________________

CONCURRENCE ____________________

SUHRHEINRICH, Circuit Judge, concurring. I concur because the majority’s decision is

consistent with the law of this Circuit and most other circuits, and is thus correct. However, I think

those decisions are inconsistent with the recent Supreme Court precedent, and more fundamentally,

the doctrine of federalism.

In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court held that to fall within the scope of the

Commerce Clause, the regulated activity must substantially affect interstate commerce. United

States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate

commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.”). In United States v. Morrison, the

Supreme Court expressly rejected an aggregation theory when regulating non economic activity.

The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the

instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always

been the province of the States. Indeed, we can think of no better example of the

police power, which the Founders denied the National Government and reposed in

the States, than the suppression of violent crime and vindication of its victims.

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (citations omitted). By continuing to allow a

de minimis standard for individual violations of the Hobbs Act, we are essentially nullifying the

“substantial effect” test of Lopez and Morrison. See United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 485 (6th

Cir. 2003) (holding that “the traditional de minimis standard for Hobbs Act violations survived

Lopez”).1

The effect of our Court’s rulings is that every local robbery of a business in the United States

is a federal crime. I acknowledge that the Supreme Court has held that Congress intended to include

within the scope of the Hobbs Act conduct that was already punishable under the state robbery and

extortion statutes. See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978). However, I cannot

believe that this is what the Founding Fathers intended. Moreover, I have harbored the hope that

the Supreme Court in Lopez was seeking to restore a proper state-federal balance that gives actual

meaning to the term federalism. I also hope that the Supreme Court will consider the issue of

whether the de minimis test survives Lopez and Morrison. 

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