Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca5-15-11026/USCOURTS-ca5-15-11026-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Darius Lashun Springer
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-11026

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

DARIUS LASHUN SPRINGER,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 3:14-CR-170-1

Before JONES, WIENER, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Darius Lashun Springer was indicted for 

possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone. The district court denied his 

pretrial motion to suppress the evidence on the basis that Springer voluntarily 

consented to the search of his duffel bag. Pursuant to a plea agreement, 

Springer pleaded guilty to the indictment and was sentenced below the 

advisory guidelines range to 36 months of imprisonment and two years of 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

July 20, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 15-11026 Document: 00513600911 Page: 1 Date Filed: 07/20/2016
No. 15-11026

2

supervised release. Per the agreement, Springer reserved his right to appeal 

the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, Springer 

argues that the district court clearly erred in denying his motion because his 

consent was the result of police coercion.

“The voluntariness of consent is a question of fact to be determined from 

a totality of the circumstances” and is reviewed for clear error. United States 

v. Solis, 299 F.3d 420, 436 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). We analyze the following six factors to determine whether 

consent to a search was voluntarily given:

(1) the voluntariness of the defendant’s custodial status; (2) the 

presence of coercive police procedures; (3) the extent and level of 

the defendant’s cooperation with the police; (4) the defendant’s 

awareness of his right to refuse to consent; (5) the defendant’s 

education and intelligence; and (6) the defendant’s belief that no 

incriminating evidence will be found.

Id. at 436 & n.21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). No single 

factor is dispositive. Id. at 436. “Where the judge bases a finding of consent 

on the oral testimony at a suppression hearing, the clearly erroneous standard 

is particularly strong since the judge had the opportunity to observe the 

demeanor of the witnesses.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that 

Springer voluntarily consented to the search of his bag because there was no 

evidence of police coercion and Springer was given two opportunities to refuse 

consent. A weighing of the pertinent factors supports the district court’s

determination that Springer voluntarily consented to the search of his duffel 

bag. See Solis, 299 F.3d at 436 & n.21; United States v. Tompkins, 130 F.3d 

117, 121-22 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is 

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 15-11026 Document: 00513600911 Page: 2 Date Filed: 07/20/2016