Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05124/USCOURTS-ca10-90-05124-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Steve Hargett
Appellee
Richard Eugene Harris
Appellant

Document Text:

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

lM\'!' 0 l 1992 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

RICHARD EUGENE HARRIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

STEVE HARGETT, Warden, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

No. 90-5124 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA 

(D.C. No. 90-C-183-B) 

Submitted on the briefs.••• 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT•••• 

Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges, and SAM00•••, District 

Judge . 

... The parties agree that oral argument is unnecessary and that 

the case may be submitted on the briefs. Fed. R. App. P . 34(f); 

10th Cir. R. 34.1.2 . The case , therefore , is ordered submitted 

without oral argument . 

.... This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except 

for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, 

res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

•••••Honorable David Sam, United States District Judge for the 

Di s t rict of Utah, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-5124 Document: 010110246239 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 1
Richard Eugene Harris appeals the denial of his petition for 

a writ of habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the 

District of Oklahoma. Mr. Harris claims that the application of 

sentencing guidelines which are in effect when a crime is committed, but are no longer in effect at the time of conviction and 

sentencing, violates constitutional guarantees of due process and 

equal protection. 

Following a jury trial from April 25 to 27, 1977, Mr. Harris 

was convicted of committing second degree murder. On May 6, 1977, 

the jury sentenced Mr. Harris to serve an indeterminate sentence of 

ten (10) years to life--which sentence was mandated by the law in 

effect at the time the crime was committed: 

Every person convicted of murder in the second degree 

shall be punished by imprisonment in the state Penitentiary for not less than 10 years nor more than life. The 

trial court shall set an indeterminate sentence in 

accordance with this section upon a finding of guilty by 

the jury of murder in the second degree. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 _§ 701.4 (West 1973). 

On July 24, 1976, prior to Mr. Harris' conviction and 

sentencing but after the murder had been committed, the foregoing 

statute was repealed and replaced by the following: 

A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo 

contendere to murder in the second degree shall be 

punished by imprisonment in a state penal institution for 

not less than ten (10) years nor more than life. 

Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 701.9(B) (West 1976). Thus an indeterminate sentence is no longer mandated by Oklahoma law. 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-5124 Document: 010110246239 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 2
The issue in this case is whether Mr. Harris' constitutional 

rights were violated by the jury's imposition of an indeterminate 

sentence pursuant to the law in effect at the time the crime was 

committed despite repeal of that law prior to conviction and 

sentencing. This court unanimously concludes that Mr. Harris was 

sentenced under the correct law which sentence is constitutional 

and affirms the district court's denial of habeas corpus. 

Petitioner first contends that his sentence violates Okla. 

Stat. tit. 57 § 353 (1981) which provides, in relevant part: 

The minimum term may be less than, but shall not be more 

than, one-third (1/3) of the maximum sentence imposed by 

the court. Provided, however, that the terms of this act 

shall not limit or alter the right to tri als in which a 

jury is used for the jury to assess the penalty of 

confinement and fix a minimum and maximum term of 

confinement, so long as the maximum confinement be not in 

excess of the maximum term of confinement provided by law 

for conviction of the offense. 

The foregoing statute is inapplicable at bar for two reasons. 

First, Mr. Harris was sentenced by a jury and the statute only 

outlines sentencing restrictions for the court. Second, this 

statute was not in effect at the time Mr. Harris was sentenced. 

Mr. Harris also alleges that the imposition of an indeterminate sentence is unconstitutional. However, the Oklahoma Court of 

Criminal Appeals has considered other constitutional challenges to 

the statute under which Mr. Harris was sentenced and has always 

upheld the constitutionality of the indeterminate sentencing 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-5124 Document: 010110246239 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 3
provision. Deason v. State, 576 P.2d 778, 783 (Okla. Crim. App. 

1978); Cook v. State, 557 P.2d 461, 463 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976). 

Finally, Mr. Harris contends that he should have been 

sentenced under the law which had gone into effect prior to his 

sentencing rather than the law in effect at the time he committed 

the crime. Mr. Harris fails to provide authority for this 

proposition, but instead suggests that the Oklahoma courts which 

have applied the penalty in effect at the time the defendant 

commits the crime have "blurred the distinction." Appellant's 

Reply Brief, p. 1. 

In Bowman v. State, 789 P.2d 631 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990), the 

court held that "the appropriate criminal penalty is the penalty in 

effect at the time defendant commits the crime." The court then 

observed that the statute defendant propounded as applicable did 

not go into effect until after defendant was convicted and 

sentenced. According to Petitioner, the reference to date of 

conviction and sentencing indicates that the court was actually 

looking to the time of conviction as determinative of the applicable law. Petitioner's argument is hypertechnical. The court's 

observation in no way negates its acknowledgment of the "well 

established rule of law" requiring imposition of the penalty in 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-5124 Document: 010110246239 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 4
effect when the crime was committed. Id. at 631, 1 see also Penn v. 

State, 13 Okla. Crim. 367, 164 P. 992, 993 (1917) ("The very minute 

this crime was committed the defendant became amenable to the law 

as it then existed.") 

The Court will not depart from the well-established rule of 

law applied by the court below. The judgment of the district court 

is AFFIRMED and Mr. Harris' petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is 

DENIED. 

David Sam 

District Judge 

1

Peti ti oner makes the same hypertechnical argument with respect 

to Pollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400, 402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) in 

which the court held that "statutes repealing penalties for 

offenses committed in this state operate prospectively and are 

applicable only to offenses committed after the statute became 

effective." Because the court went on to note that a statute which 

does not go into effect until after a defendant is convicted does 

not affect the penalty, petitioner suggests that the court confused 

the distinction and thus the case cannot stand for the proposition 

urged by appellee . The court's observation does not contradict its 

statement of the law. 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-5124 Document: 010110246239 Date Filed: 05/01/1992 Page: 5