Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05070/USCOURTS-caDC-99-05070-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Regina Byrd
Appellant
Janet Reno
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued May 12, 1999 Decided June 22, 1999

No. 99-5070

Regina Byrd,

Appellant

v.

Janet Reno,

In her capacity as United States Attorney General,

Appellee

On Consideration of Motions for Stay Pending Appeal and

to Dismiss or for Summary Affirmance

(No. 96cv02375)

Regina Byrd, appearing pro se, argued the cause and filed

the motions for stay.

David T. Smorodin, Assistant United States Attorney,

argued the cause for the appellee. Wilma A. Lewis, United

States Attorney, and R. Craig Lawrence, Assistant United

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States Attorney, were on the motion to dismiss and responses.

Before: Ginsburg, Sentelle and Henderson, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed Per Curiam.

Per Curiam: Regina Byrd, an attorney at the Department

of Justice's Office of Immigration Litigation, appeals the

district court's order holding her in civil contempt for failing

to turn over audiotapes of her conversations with supervisors

and a co-worker. The contempt order arises out of Byrd's

ongoing employment discrimination suit against the Attorney

General in which Byrd alleges she was discriminated against

on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ss 2000e et seq. For the

reasons set forth below, we dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction.

I.

Since 1994 Byrd has been employed as an attorney at the

Department of Justice's Office of Immigration Litigation. On

October 15, 1996 Byrd filed a complaint in district court

alleging that officials at the Office of Immigration Litigation

discriminated against her on the basis of her race. In the

course of the litigation Byrd claimed that during her employment she had secretly tape-recorded telephone conversations

with supervisors and a co-worker. During discovery proceedings the government sought access to the tapes but Byrd

refused to produce them, invoking attorney work-product

privilege. On March 18, 1998 the magistrate judge granted

the government's motion to compel production of the tapes.

On June 4, 1998 the district court affirmed the magistrate

judge's order, determining that the tapes were not protected

as attorney work-product because Byrd's unethical conduct in

secretly taping the conversations vitiated the privilege. The

district court ordered Byrd to produce the tapes by June 10,

1998. This court dismissed Byrd's interlocutory appeal of the

June 4 order for lack of jurisdiction. See Byrd v. Reno, No.

98-5230, 1998 WL 545432 (July 17, 1998).

On March 9, 1999 after Byrd repeatedly failed to comply

with orders to turn over the tapes despite warnings that she

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would be held in contempt if she failed to do so, the district

court ordered her to produce the tapes by March 10. The

court again warned that noncompliance would result in a

finding of contempt and the imposition of daily fines. Byrd

did not produce the tapes and the district court issued an

order on March 15, 1999 holding her in contempt and assessing a daily fine of $100 until the tapes are turned over. Byrd

appealed and filed an emergency motion for a stay pending

appeal. The government moves to dismiss on the ground

that this court lacks jurisdiction over the district court's

order.

II.

Our jurisdiction over this appeal depends upon the continuing validity of the rule that a civil contempt order against a

party in a pending proceeding is not appealable as a final

order under 28 U.S.C. s 1291. We recently observed that

our case law has generated an apparent conflict on this issue

but concluded "there is substantial doubt whether, if squarely

presented with the issue, we would deem such a civil contempt order appealable." See In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d

1059, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (Sealed Case).

We are now presented with the issue and, as suggested in

Sealed Case, hold that such an order is not appealable by a

party.

We observed in Sealed Case that "a civil contempt order

issued against a party is typically deemed interlocutory and

thus not appealable under 28 U.S.C. s 1291." 151 F.3d at

1064. The rule is well-entrenched in Supreme Court case law

and the law of this circuit. See Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S.

105, 107 (1936); Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,

204 U.S. 599 (1907); International Ass'n of Machinists &

Aerospace Workers v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 849 F.2d 1481,

1484 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Duell v. Duell, 178 F.2d 683, 687 (D.C.

Cir. 1949) (describing rule as "thoroughly settled"). At least

one circuit has held that the rule encompasses contempt

orders enforcing discovery orders. See In re Joint Eastern

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& Southern Districts Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d 755, 764-65 (7th

Cir. 1994).

As noted in Sealed Case, dicta in some of our recent cases

have cast doubt on the continuing validity of the Doyle and

Fox rule in this circuit. For example, we have stated that a

party seeking interlocutory review of a discovery order must

disobey the order and be cited for contempt and that "[h]e

may then appeal the contempt order, which is considered

final, and argue that the discovery order was flawed." In re

Sealed Case, 141 F.3d 337, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Sealed Case

I). Similar language appears in In re Minister Papandreou,

139 F.3d 247, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and In re Kessler, 100 F.3d

1015, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

We explained the apparent conflict, however, in Sealed

Case. The dicta in Papandreou, Kessler and Sealed Case I

relied upon a footnote in Church of Scientology v. United

States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 (1992), which states: "A party that

seeks to present an objection to a discovery order immediately to a court of appeals must refuse compliance, be held in

contempt, and then appeal the contempt order." As we noted

in Sealed Case, however, it is implausible that the Supreme

Court intended to overrule, in a dictum (appearing in a

footnote), its Fox and Doyle decisions. See Sealed Case, 151

F.3d at 1064. Moreover, the Supreme Court's footnote relied

upon an earlier case, United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530

(1971), in which the court did not need to distinguish between

civil and criminal contempt because that case involved the

recipient of a grand jury subpoena and it was well-settled

that a non-party to a proceeding can obtain immediate review

of a civil contempt order. See Lamb v. Kramer, 285 U.S. 217,

221 (1932); see also In re Sealed Case, 827 F.2d 776, 777 (D.C.

Cir. 1987) (person held in civil contempt for violating grand

jury subpoena can obtain immediate review per Ryan); In re

Ryan, 538 F.2d 435, 437 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (non-party compelled to give testimony not entitled to immediate review

unless first disobeys and is held in contempt); cf. Kemp v.

Gay, 947 F.2d 1493, 1495-97 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (involving

subpoena directed to non-party); Office of Thrift Supervision,

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United States Dep't of Treasury v. Dobbs, 931 F.2d 956, 957

(D.C. Cir. 1991). In addition, several circuits have applied

the Doyle and Fox rule even after Church of Scientology.

See, e.g., Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 106 F.3d 165,

167 (7th Cir. 1997); Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1188 (1997); Consumers Gas

& Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 84 F.3d 367, 370 (10th

Cir. 1996); Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456,

461 (3d Cir. 1996); Pro-Choice Network of Western New York

v. Walker, 994 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1993).

Byrd, however, argues that Doyle and Fox were long-ago

overruled by Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 322 (1940),

in which the Court held that an order denying a motion to

quash a grand jury subpoena is not a final order. See id. at

324-30. As it did in Ryan, the Court refused to allow an

immediate appeal until the witness disobeyed the grand jury

subpoena and was held in contempt, although it did not

distinguish between civil and criminal contempt. Byrd argues that this rule, making all contempt orders immediately

reviewable, traces back to Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194

U.S. 324 (1904), and that it, and not the rule set out in Doyle

and Fox, applies to a contempt order entered against a party

in an ongoing proceeding. We think it clear that Bessette

established no such rule; indeed, Doyle expressly relies upon

Bessette to establish the rule that precludes a party from

obtaining immediate review of a civil contempt order. See

204 U.S. at 603. Her argument that Cobbledick established

the rule, however, is not so easily rejected.

Not since 1939 has the Court cited either Doyle or Fox in a

majority opinion for the proposition that a party cannot

appeal a civil contempt order until entry of final judgment.

See McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S. 61, 62 (1939). The

year after deciding Cobbledick, the Court, without commenting upon its jurisdiction, permitted an interlocutory appeal of

a civil contempt order entered against a party for violation of

a discovery order. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1

(1941). And as Byrd points out, nearly 20 years after

McCrone, the Court explicitly stated, albeit in a dictum, that

the Government "might of course have tested the[ ] validity

[of discovery orders] in other ways, for example, by the route

of civil contempt." United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,

356 U.S. 677, 680 (1958).

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Moreover, Byrd notes that the Supreme Court has applied

Cobbledick and Ryan to appeals of contempt orders issued for

disobeying discovery orders, even though both cases involved

grand jury subpoenas. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v.

Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 377 (1981); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,

480 U.S. 39, 50 n.8 (1987). These cases, again in dicta, do not

distinguish between civil and criminal contempt in discussing

whether a party who disobeys a discovery order and is held in

contempt may obtain immediate review. Most recently, and

not in a dictum, the Court grounded the right of a non-party

to appeal an adjudication of contempt for violating a discovery

order not in Lamb v. Cramer, which is part of the Doyle-Fox

line of cases, but in Cobbledick and Ryan. See United States

Catholic Conference v. Abortion Rights Mobilization, Inc.,

487 U.S. 72, 76 (1988).

Finally, Byrd argues that our lack of precision regarding

the immediate appealability of a civil contempt order predates

both Church of Scientology and International Association of

Machinists. In National Right to Work Legal Defense v.

Richey, 510 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1975), we refused to grant

mandamus to review a discovery order because the "holding

in Ryan indicates ... [that] the order may be challenged

through disobedience." Id. at 1245. Admittedly, in Richey

we also noted that in NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 539 (1963),

a case upon which the petitioners in Richey attempted to rely,

the NAACP "was repeatedly willing to subject itself to the

risk of either criminal conviction or criminal contempt in

order to challenge various orders compelling it to disclose its

membership lists." 510 F.2d at 1246. Yet we did not specify

whether we were merely distinguishing Button or stating the

requirements of the Doyle-Fox rule.

Against this backdrop it is not implausible to argue not

only that Cobbledick overruled Doyle and Fox but also that

Richey, not International Association of Machinists, is the

law in this circuit. Of course, no other circuit has reached the

former conclusion. See In re Licht & Semonoff, 796 F.2d 564,

568 (1st Cir. 1986); United States v. Johnson, 801 F.2d 597,

599 (2d Cir. 1986); Thermice Corp. v. Vistron Corp., 832 F.2d

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248, 251 (3d Cir. 1987); Brummer v. Board of Adjustment of

Ashville, 91 F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1990) (table); In re Grand

Jury Subpoena, 926 F.2d 1423, 1429 (5th Cir. 1991); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Hudson, 97 F.3d 1452 (6th Cir. 1996)

(table); Powers v. Chicago Transit Auth., 846 F.2d 1139 (7th

Cir. 1988); Omaha Indem. Co. v. Wining, 949 F.2d 235, 238

(8th Cir. 1991): Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 655 (9th Cir.

1996); Consumers Gas & Oil, Inc. v. Farmland Indus., Inc.,

84 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir. 1996); Howard Johnson Co. v.

Khimani, 892 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1990). And at least

one circuit has explicitly described Cobbledick and Ryan as

applying only to a civil contempt order entered against a nonparty. See United States v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 666

F.2d 364, 367 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982).

In the end, Byrd's argument must be rejected. The Supreme Court has never expressly overruled Doyle or Fox by

holding that a party may obtain interlocutory review of a civil

contempt order. Until it does so, Doyle and Fox remain good

law that this court must apply.

For these reasons, we hold that the traditional rule still

applies: a civil contempt order against a party in a pending

proceeding is not appealable as a final order under 28 U.S.C.

s 1291. This appeal fits squarely within that rule. Byrd is a

party in an ongoing proceeding. Moreover, the district

court's order involves civil rather than criminal contempt

because it is designed to compel compliance with a court

order rather than to punish for an earlier offense. See

International Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829 (1994) (per diem fine imposed for each

day contemnor fails to comply with affirmative court order is

civil in nature). Accordingly, the district court's contempt

order is not appealable as a final order.*

__________

* Because our holding may be inconsistent with circuit dicta, this

opinion has been circulated to and approved by the entire court and

thus constitutes the law of the circuit. See Irons v. Diamond, 670

F.2d 265, 268 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

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In Byrd's previous appeal of the June 4, 1998 order directing her to turn over the tapes, we held that her challenge to

the discovery order does not fall within the collateral order

doctrine set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949), because the order "will be

reviewable upon entry of a final judgment." Byrd v. Reno,

No. 98-5230, l998 WL 545432, at *1 (July 1, 1998). In this

appeal, she does not argue that the civil contempt order alters

our analysis under Cohen.

Finally, even if the appeal were construed as a petition for

a writ of mandamus, we would deny it. The remedy of

mandamus is reserved for extraordinary circumstances in

which the petitioner demonstrates that his right to issuance of

the writ is clear and indisputable and that no other adequate

means to obtain relief exist. See Sealed Case, 151 F.3d at

1063. As previously noted, both the discovery and the contempt orders will be reviewable after entry of final judgment.

See id. at 1063 n.4 (criteria for collateral order doctrine

similar to criteria for writ of mandamus). Moreover, Byrd

has not met her burden of demonstrating that her right to

mandamus is clear and indisputable because it is far from

clear that the district court erred. See Chapman & Cole v.

Itel Container Int'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 686 (5th Cir. 1989)

(attorney's clandestine recording of conversations vitiates the

work-product privilege).

We conclude that this court lacks jurisdiction over the

district court's contempt order and accordingly grant the

government's motion to dismiss the appeal. Byrd's motion to

stay the order is therefore moot. To the extent the appeal

may be construed as a mandamus petition, the petition is

denied.

So ordered.

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