Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00594/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cr-00594-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vincent Rudy Ortiz
Defendant
Rodney Vincent Ortiz
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

RODNEY VINCENT ORTIZ, and

VINCENT RUDY ORTIZ

Defendant.

Case No. 15-cr-00594-RS-1 

ORDER DENYING RODNEY ORTIZ'S 

MOTION FOR A BILL OF

PARTICULARS AND GRANTING 

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 

COUNTS 4 AND 5

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Rodney Ortiz contends that the acts at issue in this case—the alleged murder of 

Daniel Colegrove and the attempted murder of Francis Colegrove and Roger Surber—are state 

crimes improperly dressed-up in a federal indictment.

1

 A grand jury has indicted Rodney and his 

son, Vincent Ortiz, 2for a variety of offenses flowing from the incident, including one count of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana and two counts of obstruction of justice. 

Rodney and Vincent have pleaded not guilty to all counts, and discovery has commenced. 

 

1 Although the alleged victims are members of the Hoopa tribe and residents of the Hoopa 

reservation, Congress has ceded its jurisdiction to prosecute crimes occurring on Native American 

lands in California. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (listing California as one of the states that “shall have 

jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in the areas of Indian country . . . to the 

same extent that such State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the 

State . . ., and the criminal laws of such State . . . shall have the same force and effect within such 

Indian country as they have elsewhere in the State”). 

2

To avoid confusion, this order refers to the defendants by their first names.

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 1 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

2

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Despite the many pages and boxes of discovery, Rodney insists the government has not 

provided adequate notice of the government’s theory of his participation in the alleged conspiracy. 

To remedy that problem, he seeks a bill of particulars with respect the drug-conspiracy charge. 

Although the discovery and indictment reveal little about the alleged drug conspiracy, Rodney is 

not at such a severe disadvantage to warrant granting his motion for a bill of particulars. Instead, 

the essence of his argument is that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction—a 

contention to be tested at trial.

Rodney and Vincent further contend3the indictment fails to disclose, as it must, which 

federal proceeding he obstructed or how there was a reasonable likelihood his alleged crimes 

would be reported to federal law enforcement officers. The absence of such essential facts in the 

indictment, they contend, renders it ineffective, and mandates dismissal of those counts. 4 As 

Counts 4 and 5 are materially defective as defendants insist and because a bill of particulars is not 

an available avenue to “cure” such defects, defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 5 must be 

granted.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 21, 2015, Daniel Colegrove, Francis Colegrove, and Roger Surber were shot on 

the Hoopa Indian reservation in Hoopa, California. Francis and Surber survived the incident; 

Daniel did not. Witnesses have identified Rodney Ortiz as the shooter. 

That same day, Humboldt County prosecutors charged Rodney and Vincent with murder, 

attempted murder, two counts of assault with a firearm, being a felon in possession of a firearm, 

and accessory after the fact. Nearly nine months later, a federal grand jury issued as six-count 

 

3 Vincent filed a joinder in the motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 5.

4 Rodney initially believed the government had mistakenly charged him with both murder to 

prevent attendance at an official proceeding, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(A), and communication about 

“a commission or possible commission of a federal offense” to a federal “law enforcement officer” 

or United States judge, id. § 1512(a)(1)(C). The indictment identifies only section 1512(a)(1)(C). 

Rodney therefore sought to strike as surplusage the portion of the two counts referring to “official 

proceedings.” In its responsive brief, however, the government made clear its intent to pursue 

both theories of liability, and therefore Rodney has withdrawn his motion to strike as surplusage.

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 2 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

3

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

indictment, charging Rodney and Vincent with the following offenses: (1) Conspiracy to Possess 

and Distribute with Intent to Distribute Marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); (2) 

Use/Possession of a Firearm During a Drug Trafficking Crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C § 924(c)

(Count 2); (3) Use/Possession of Firearm During a Drug Trafficking Crime Causing Murder, in 

violation of id. § 924(j) (Count 3); (4) Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice, in violation of id. § 1512(k)

(Count 4); (5) Obstruction of Justice, in violation of id. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (Count 5); and (6) 

Use/Possession of a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, in violation of id. § 

924(c) (Count 6). Vincent and Rodney maintain they are not guilty of the offenses charged.

To date, the government has provided Rodney with voluminous discovery: thirty-one CDs 

containing audio and video recordings, photos, redacted police reports, toxicology reports, the 

defendants’ statements, forensic reports, etc. The government claims the only materials, which 

have not been disclosed, do not yet need to be surrendered to Rodney under the Jenks Act.

Rodney’s counsel represents that she has combed through the discovery materials and 

unearthed extremely limited evidence of a conspiracy or obstruction and described those facts in 

support of this motion for a bill of particulars and to strike Counts 4 and 5 as described below. For 

its part, the government has not challenged counsel’s summary of the evidence.

Between March 13 and 15, 2015, Vincent Ortiz, Rodney’s son, exchanged text messages 

with a person known as “Critter” about a sale of Vincent’s truck. On March 13, Critter made the 

following offer for the truck: “[W]e could only come up with $800 cash . . . sorry its’ the best we 

can do, but the smoke all good. . . . so is 8 and the lb. good? Falk Decl. ¶ 6. Vincent initially 

refused the offer; however, the next day, Vincent contacted Critter again. Rodney does not have 

any information about the substance of that communication. Id. 

On March 18, Vincent sent Critter another text message: “the green was short 4 oz . . . I 

need to get a hold of 4 oz so I don’t get a bad rep.” Id. Critter responded, “no way I watch him 

way it. No way. It was not short if it is bring that and the money back and you can have truck but 

there is no way Im giving you 4 oz that was a pound.” Id. Not one of these text messages 

mentions Rodney. On March 18, Vincent sent a text message to Daniel Colegrove’s daughter, 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 3 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

4

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Dawn Colegrove, asking that she “shoot [him] a half 4 the pound your pops got,” and said, “im 

gonn give him cash 4 it back.” Id. ¶ 9.

The government has not disclosed any text messages to or from Rodney about the pound of 

marijuana. Nor has the government disclosed whether law enforcement officers recovered 

marijuana from any alleged victim or defendant. Id. ¶ 7. Rodney’s name appears only in police 

reports. According to one report, witnesses Ethel Reed and Roger Surber claim Rodney and 

Daniel Ortiz were arguing about “weed” at the time of the shooting. Id. ¶ 8. Colegrove yelled at 

Rodney about the fact that Vincent was “short” on a pound of weed. Id. In a different police 

report, Surber stated, “[Daniel Colegrove] started bad mouthing Vincent around town to other 

people saying ‘he was going to do this to him, or do that to him, if he didn’t pay.” Id. ¶ 10. 

Surber also told police that Rodney and Daniel Colegrove were in the trailer “arguing over the 

shortage of marijuana” and “how Colegrove always paid his debts.” Id.¶ 11. According to the 

report, Rodney told Daniel his “bad son” didn’t weigh the marijuana, and the two would need to 

settle the argument the “convict way.” Id.

In support of the two obstruction charges, the government has identified only one 

document to support its theory of Rodney’s culpability: Surber’s statement to the state police 

about Rodney’s actions after the shooting. Allegedly, Rodney attempted to flee the trailer after 

Daniel and Francis Colegrove had been shot. Vincent pushed Rodney back into the trailer and 

said, “No Dad, you have to do them all, you have to do them all.” Id. ¶ 12.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The core purpose of an indictment is to provide notice of the charges against the defendant. 

Notice must be clear and must, at the very least, “‘fairly inform[] a defendant of the charge against 

which he must defend’” such that he may plead, prepare a defense, ensure he is prosecuted on the 

basis of facts presented to the grand jury, protect against future prosecution, and inform the court 

of the facts alleged to evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 

549 U.S. 102, 108 (2007) (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 102, 117 (1974)); see also 

United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing Russell v. United States, 369 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 4 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

5

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

U.S. 749, 763, 768 n.15 (1962)). 

If an indictment lacks the requisite information to provide adequate notice of the charges 

against the defendant, district courts may order the government to submit a bill of particulars. 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(f). The decision to grant or deny a bill of particulars rests within the trial 

court’s discretion, and is appropriate when an indictment is ambiguous such that “a defendant 

requires clarification in order to prepare a defense.” United States v. Long, 706 F.2d 1044, 1054 

(9th Cir. 1983). “[A bill of particulars] is designed to apprise the defendant of the specific charges 

being presented to minimize danger of surprise at trial, to aid in preparation and to protect against 

double jeopardy.” Id. In other words, the purpose of a bill of particulars is to clarify ambiguities 

in an indictment, not to serve as a replacement for discovery requests. Id.; see also, United States 

v. Ryland, 806 F.2d 941, 942 (9th Cir. 1986) (“A defendant is not entitled to know all the evidence

the government intends to produce but only the theory of the government’s case.” (emphasis in 

orginal)); United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1180 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[F]ull discovery . . .

obviates the need for a bill of particulars.”).

Defendants may challenge the sufficiency of the pleadings by filing a motion to dismiss for 

failure to state a federal offense. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B)(v). When considering such a 

motion, district courts are “bound by the four corners of the indictment” and must presume the 

averments to be true. United States v. Lyle, 742 F.3d 434, 436 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Technical deficiencies in an indictment will not result in dismissal, however, an 

adequate indictment must still offer the procedural protections “a grand jury indictment was 

intended to confer[.]” Russell, 369 U.S. at 763. “The complete failure to charge an essential 

element of a crime, however, is by no means a mere technicality.” United States v. Du Bo, 186 

F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. 611, 613 (1881) (holding 

the omission of a necessary element of an offense is a “matter of substance, and not a defector 

imperfection in matter of form only”)). An indictment therefore must be dismissed if it “fails to 

ensure that [the defendant] was prosecuted only on the basis of facts presented to the grand jury.” 

Id. at 1179 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “[A] bill of particulars cannot save 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 5 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

6

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

an invalid indictment” because to do so would “allow the prosecutor, or the court, to make a 

subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the grand jury at the time they returned the 

indictment.” Russell, 369 U.S. at 770.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Bill of Particulars as to Count 1 (Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute 

Marijuana)

Rodney contends neither the indictment nor information produced during discovery enable 

him to defend against the charge that he conspired with Vincent to distribute and to possess with 

the intent to distribute marijuana. Count 1 of the indictment alleges:

From March 13, 2015 through March 21, 2015, in the Northern 

District of California, the defendants, RODNEY VINCENT ORTIZ 

AND VINCENT RUDY ORTIZ, and others known and unknown to 

the Grand Jury, knowingly and intentionally conspired to distribute 

and to possess with intent to distribute a Schedule I controlled 

substance, namely, marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 

and (b)(1)(D). All in violation of Title 21, United States Code 

Sections 846 and 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D).

Rodney argues the indictment suffers from very specific deficiencies: insufficient 

information about (1) the agreement he and Vincent allegedly made, and (2) the overt acts he 

supposedly took in furtherance of the agreement.5 In short, he seeks to understand better the 

government’s theory of his participation in the alleged conspiracy. 

“Conspiracy is an agreement to commit a crime, and the intent to commit the underlying 

offense.” United States v. Loveland, -- F.3d --, No. 13-30162, 2016 WL 3156308, at *2 (9th Cir. 

June 3, 2016) (citing United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001); 21 

U.S.C. § 846). “Although an agreement may be inferred from the defendant’s acts or from other 

circumstantial evidence, simple knowledge, approval of, or acquiescence in the object or purpose 

of a conspiracy without an intention and agreement to accomplish a specific illegal objective, is 

not sufficient.” United States v. Lennick, 18 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1994). 

 

5

For his part, Rodney acknowledges the government need not prove he took any overt acts in 

furtherance of a drug conspiracy.

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 6 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

To support his request, Rodney relies upon United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1297 

(9th Cir. 1979), where the Ninth Circuit reversed a conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to 

possess with intent to distribute marijuana because the indictment was insufficient. The 

indictment identified the date range of the alleged conspiracy (“beginning on or before July, 1975, 

and continuing thereafter until on or after October, 1975”) and the alleged co-conspirators. Id. at 

1295. Yet, the indictment was insufficient because it “fail[ed] to state any other facts or 

circumstances pertaining to the conspiracy or any overt acts done in furtherance thereof,” and, 

“[m]ore importantly, . . . fail[ed] to place the conspiracies within any time frame.” Id. at 1297. 

Absent these critical facts, the court concluded the indictment “fail[ed] to allege sufficient facts to 

facilitate the proper preparation of a defense and to ensure that the defendants were prosecuted on 

facts presented to the Grand Jury.” Id. 

Although the language of Count 1 is similar to that of the indictment in Cecil, there are two

critical difference between the two indictments. First, in the instant indictment the date range is 

not “open-ended in both directions.” Id. Second, the evidence produced so far, while limited, 

supplies Rodney with enough information to understand the government’s theory of the case. 

While the indictment is rather bare-bones, it provides the name of Rodney’s alleged co-conspirator 

(Vincent), a week-long date range of the alleged conspiracy (March 13, 2015 through March 21, 

2015), and the object of the conspiracy (to possess marijuana with intent to distribute it). Thus, 

the government has provided more information than is usually required. See United States v. 

Dicesare, 765 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985) (the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying a 

motion for a bill of particulars “(1) to obtain the names of any unknown coconspirators; (2) to 

determine the exact date on which the conspiracy allegedly began; and (3) to delineate all other 

overt acts that comprised the charged activity.” United States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897 (9th 

Cir. 1985). Moreover, as “the Government need not prove the commission of any overt acts in 

furtherance of the conspiracy” to convict Rodney of violating 21 U.S.C. §846, it need not include 

overt acts in the indictment. United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 15 (1994). Thus, the 

government is not obliged to identify overt acts taken in furtherance of a drug conspiracy. 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 7 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

8

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Nor must the government explicitly state there was an agreement to distribute drugs in 

addition to the averment that Rodney and Vincent conspired to do so. The existence of an 

agreement is baked into the definition of conspiracy: the government must always prove (1) an

agreement, and (2) the intent to commit the underlying offense. Loveland, 2016 WL 3156308, at 

*2. Thus, the word “conspiracy” as used in common parlance connotes both elements. See 

Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. at 107 (“[T]he word ‘attempt’ as used in common parlance connote[s] 

action rather than mere intent, but more importantly, as used in the law for centuries, it 

encompasses both the overt act and intent elements.”). Here, the use of the word “conspiracy,” 

and the identification of the date, place, and object of the conspiracy satisfy the two constitutional 

requirements of an indictment in this context. See id. at 108 (“In this case, the use of the word 

‘attempt,’ coupled with the specification of the time and place of respondent’s attempted illegal 

reentry, satisfied both [constitutional requirements for an indictment].”). At the end of the day, 

Rodney’s request for a bill of particulars boils down to a claim of evidence insufficiency. Such 

arguments are for trial. Accordingly, Rodney’s motion for a bill of particulars must be denied.

B. Motion to Dismiss Counts 4 and 5

Rodney and Vincent contend the averments in Counts 4 and 5 are fatally deficient because 

they do not offer a basis for the federal government to prosecute him for federal crimes. The 

government opted to charge the Ortizes with obstruction under two theories—that they

participated in a killing (1) to prevent testimony at a federal “official proceeding,” and/or (2) to 

prevent communication to a federal law enforcement officer.6 The indictment does not identify 

 

6 Count 4 of the indictment charges:

On March 21, 2015, in the Northern District of California, the defendants RODNEY VINCENT 

ORTIZ and VINCENT RUDY ORTIZ willfully and intentionally conspired and agreed together 

and with each other to kill another person with the intent to prevent the attendance and testimony 

of any person in an official proceeding and to prevent the communication by any person to a law 

enforcement officer and judge of the United States of information relating to the commission and 

possible commission of a Federal offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C). All in 

violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 1512(k).

Count 5 charges:

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 8 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

9

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

the impacted federal “official proceeding.” Nor does it claim the communication about the 

offense was reasonably likely to reach a federal law enforcement officer. The Ortizes argue these 

omissions render the indictment ineffective as far as notice of the charges, benefit of the grandjury right, and protection against subsequent prosecution on the same charges. The government 

believes the indictment need only track the statutory language, and identify the who, what, when, 

and where of the offenses. Although the indictment does not identify which official proceeding 

was allegedly obstructed, the government now asserts the proceeding affected was “a federal 

grand jury proceeding and a district court case”—presumably this criminal case. 

1. Obstruction of “Official Proceedings”

Section 1512(a)(1)(A) prohibits “kill[ing] or attempt[ing] to kill another person, with intent 

to . . . prevent the attendance or testimony of any person in an official proceeding.” 7 Congress has 

defined an “official proceeding” in pertinent part as follows:

(A) a proceeding before a judge or court of the United States, a 

United States magistrate judge, a bankruptcy judge, a judge of 

the United States Tax Court, a special trial judge of the Tax 

Court, a judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, or a 

Federal grand jury;

(B) a proceeding before the Congress;

(C) a proceeding before a Federal Government agency which is 

authorized by law . . . .

18 U.S.C. § 1515 (a)(1)(A)-(C). A person is guilty of obstruction if the official proceeding is 

pending, about to be instituted at the time of the obstructive act, or reasonably foreseeable. 18 

U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1); Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 707-08 (2005) (“It is . . 

 

On March 21, 2015, in the Northern District of California, the defendants RODNEY VINCENT 

ORTIZ and VINCENT RUDY ORTIZ, each aided and abetted by the other, knowingly and 

intentionally attempted to kill another person, namely Victim 3, with the intent to prevent the 

attendance and testimony of any person in an official proceeding and to prevent the 

communication by any person to a law enforcement officer and judge of the United States of 

information relating to the commission and possible commission of a Federal offense, in violation 

of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) and 2.

7

Subsection (k) criminalizes forming a conspiracy to commit any offense described in section 

1515. See id. § 1512(k).

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 9 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

10

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

. one thing to say that a proceeding ‘need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the 

offense,’ and quite another to say a proceeding need not even be foreseen.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 

1512(e)(1))). “[A] criminal investigation is not an “official proceeding” under the obstruction of 

justice statute.” United States v. Ermoian, 752 F.3d 1165, 1172 (9th Cir. 2013). 

Although indictments are typically sufficient when they “track[] the words of the statute,” 

United States v. Davis, 336 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

courts must evaluate their sufficiency with an eye to the broader purpose of an indictment: (1) to 

“inform[] the defendant of the charge against which he must defend”; and (2) to “enable[] him to 

plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense,” United States 

v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 (1980). Even when an indictment includes every element of the 

crime charged, it may be deficient if crucial facts are missing. See Russell, 369 U.S. at 770 

(“Where guilt depends so crucially upon such a specific identification of fact, our cases have 

uniformly held that an indictment must do more than simply repeat the language of a criminal 

statute.”). 

Some discussion of the facts underlying Russell is critical to understand when an 

indictment must provide additional facts even if the language of the count tracks that of the statute. 

In Russell, the government pursued charges against the defendant for failing to answer questions 

“pertinent to a question under inquiry” by a congressional entity. See id. at 751-52. The 

indictment did not identify “the subject under congressional subcommittee inquiry at the time the 

witness was interrogated.” Id. at 752. After trial and appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the 

convictions because the indictment failed to include essential information: “the subject which was 

under investigation at the time of the defendant’s alleged default or refusal to answer.” Id. at 754. 

A determination about the pertinency of the inquiry was of “crucial importance” because the 

refusal to answer a question was lawful unless the question was “pertinent to the matter under 

inquiry.” Id. at 755 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 758 (“The crucial 

importance of determining the issue of pertinency is reflected in many cases . . . .”). The vice of 

the indictments, the Court held, was that they failed sufficiently to apprise “the defendant of what 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 10 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

11

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

he must be prepared to meet” because “guilt depend[ed] so crucially upon such a specific 

identification of fact.” Id. at 764. Such a “cryptic” indictment “requires the defendant to go to 

trial with the chief issue undefined” and “gives the prosecution free hand on appeal to fill in the 

gaps of proof by surmise or conjecture.” Id. at 766. In addition, such enigmatic indictments 

enable prosecutors and the courts “to make a subsequent guess as to what was in the minds of the 

grand jury at the time they returned the indictment,” thereby depriving the defendant of the 

procedural benefits of the grand jury. Id. at 770.

Here, Counts 4 and 5 do not identify the official proceeding Rodney and Vincent allegedly 

conspired or acted to obstruct. The Ortizes therefore argue these omissions render Counts 4 and 5 

incurably defective because, as in Russell, the indictment fails to include facts of “crucial 

importance.” 

At least two courts have so found. In United States v. Murphy, 762 F.2d 1151, 1154-55

(1st Cir. 1985), the First Circuit reversed a conviction because the indictment failed to identify the 

official proceeding the defendants allegedly obstructed. The indictment “parrot[ed] the statute,” 

gave ‘the date of the alleged offense,” and asserted the defendants threatened “Richard Watson, a 

witness in an official proceeding.” Id. at 1153 (internal quotation marks omitted). It “did not 

identify any proceeding in which defendants were allegedly attempting to influence Watson’s 

testimony.” Id. at 1154. The court concluded the defendants could not adequately prepare their 

defense without any indication of which official proceeding they allegedly tried to influence, and 

therefore the indictment must be dismissed despite full discovery and a trial. See id. (“[I]t has 

long been settled law that an invalid indictment cannot be cured by a Bill of Particulars.” (citing 

Russell, 369 U.S. at 770)). 

Similarly, in United States v. Peterson, 544 F. Supp. 2d 1363, 1376–77 (M.D. Ga. 2008), a

district court dismissed an obstruction count from the indictment because the government failed to 

indicate which federal proceeding the defendant was charged with obstructing. The Peterson

court worried the open-ended indictment would permit the government to “secure a conviction 

based on the official proceeding that it thinks Defendant obstructed, rather than on the official 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 11 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

12

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

proceeding upon which the grand jury based its indictment,” and therefore violated the Fifth 

Amendment. Id. at 1377. 

Like the indictments at issue in Murphy and Peterson, the indictment here does not pass 

constitutional muster. Nothing in the indictment constrains the government from arguing Rodney 

intended to obstruct an investigation into his alleged conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the 

murder of Daniel Colegrove, or some other federal offense committed by some other person. Nor 

does the indictment provide any information about which official federal proceeding the grand 

jury had in mind when it returned the True Bill. The indictment thus offers little guidance about 

how to defend against the charge or any assurance the Ortizes could use the indictment to stave off 

future prosecutions in the event of acquittal. Accordingly, the Ortizes’ motion to dismiss those 

counts must be granted. See Russell, 369 U.S. at 770; Murphy, 762 F.2d at 1155; Petersen, 544 F. 

Supp. 2d at 1377.

2. Obstruction of a Federal Investigation

Section 1512(a)(1)(C) prohibits killing or attempting to kill a person with the intent to 

prevent any person from communicating to a federal law enforcement officer or judge 

“information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation 

of conditions of probation, parole, or release pending judicial proceedings . . . .” Thus, “in a 

prosecution the Government must prove (1) a killing or attempted killing, (2) committed with a 

particular intent, namely, an intent (a) to ‘prevent’ a ‘communication’ (b) about ‘the commission 

or possible commission of a Federal offense’ (c) to a federal ‘law enforcement officer or judge.’” 

Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668, 672 (2011). The government need not prove the defendant 

knew the judge or law enforcement officer was a federal employee. 18 U.S.C. §1512(g).

A killer does not commit a federal offense, however, if he takes a life to prevent a 

communication about a federal offense or possible federal offense “to law enforcement officers in 

general rather than to some specific law enforcement officer or set of officers which the defendant 

has in mind.” Id. (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 674 (“[T]he Government must show more 

than . . . the intent to prevent communications to law enforcement officers in general.”). The 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 12 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

13

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Supreme Court offered two reasons for this conclusion. First, the phrase “intent to prevent” 

suggests prevention is possible. See id. at 674-75 (“[O]ne cannot act with an ‘intent to prevent’ 

something that could not possibly have taken place regardless.” (emphasis in original)). Second, 

allowing proof of only “the broad indefinite intent . . . would bring within the scope of this statute 

many instances of witness tampering in purely state investigations and proceedings, thus 

extending the scope of this federal statute well beyond the primarily federal area that Congress had 

in mind.” Id. at 675. Instead, the government “must show a reasonable likelihood that, had, e.g., 

the victim communicated with law enforcement officers, at least one relevant communication 

would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer.” Id. at 677. The “likelihood of 

communication to a federal officer” must have been “more than remote, outlandish, or simply 

hypothetical.” Id. at 678. 

The question, then, is whether the likelihood of communication to a federal officer is an 

essential ingredient of the obstruction offense that must appear in the indictment. The Ortizes 

maintain it is because federal jurisdiction would not exist but for the involvement of federal law 

enforcement officers. The government insists Fowler established the quantum of proof required to 

convict a person for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C), but did not alter the requirements for an 

indictment. 

The Supreme Court’s holding stemmed from its interpretation of section 1512(a)(1)(C)’s 

text. See Fowler, 563 U.S. at 672 (“The question here is how [the statute’s] language applies 

when a defendant (1) kills a victim, (2) with an intent (a) to prevent a communication (b) about the 

commission or possible commission of a federal offense but (c) to law enforcement officers in 

general . . . .”). Thus, the government is correct in one respect—the Supreme Court did not create 

a new element of the federal obstruction statute. United States v. Hamilton, No. 1:15-CR-0240-

TCB, 2016 WL 1696136, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 28, 2016) (“Fowler did not introduce any new 

elements for a conviction under § 1512. Instead, the Supreme Court merely interpreted the 

already-present element of intent . . . .”). But see Fowler, 563 U.S. at 685 (Alito, J., dissenting) 

(“[T]he Court has effectively amended the statute by adding a new element.”). 

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 13 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

14

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

Nevertheless, the reasonable likelihood that there would be communication to federal law 

enforcement is an essential fact that must be in an indictment. First, such information is critical to 

establish federal jurisdiction. See id. at 677 (“[B]ecause of the frequent overlap between state and 

federal crimes, the use of a standard based on the word ‘possible’ would transform a federally 

oriented statute into a statute that would deal with crimes, investigations, and witness tampering, 

that as a practical matter, are purely state in nature.”). Second, as pleaded, the indictment does not 

guarantee the grand jury considered whether there was a reasonable likelihood of communication 

with federal law enforcement in the absence of such an averment in the indictment. 

Moreover, Counts 4 and 5 are constitutionally infirm for two additional reasons. They do 

not identify the federal law enforcement officer(s), judge(s), or even agency of law enforcement 

the communications might have reached. Nor do they specify which federal offense(s) or possible 

federal offense(s) communication would have been about. Absent that information, the Ortizes

cannot assess whether communication to those officers was reasonably likely or mount a defense. 

The omissions the Ortizes have identified are not trivial; the absence of such information 

handicaps the Ortizes’ ability to conduct investigation, to propound discovery requests, and to 

evaluate the strength of the evidence against them and whether it is sufficient to sustain a 

conviction.8 Because neither a bill of particulars, nor discovery, can cure these deficiencies, 

Counts 4 and 5 must be dismissed. See Russell, 369 U.S. at 770 (“[A] bill of particulars cannot 

save an invalid indictment. . . . [A]n indictment may not be amended except by resubmission to 

the grand jury . . . .); see also See Murphy, 762 F.2d at 1155; Petersen, 544 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.

 

8

The circuit courts have started articulating various formulations to help district courts evaluate 

the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Veliz, 800 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. 

denied, 136 S. Ct. 522 (2015) (affirming a conviction where the offenses were not “purely state in 

nature” because the defendant committed multiple crimes across multiple state lines); United 

States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 252 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To establish this reasonable likelihood, there 

must be evidence—not merely argument of the witness’s cooperation with law enforcement . . . . 

(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 497 (4th Cir. 

2012) (“[T]he federal nexus element of § 1512(a)(1)(C) may be inferred by the jury from the fact 

that the offense was federal in nature, plus additional appropriate evidence.” (internal quotation 

marks omitted)). The Ninth Circuit has not yet opined on the issue.

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 14 of 15
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS AND GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS 4 & 5

CASE NO. 15-cr-00594-RS-1

15

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

United States District Court

Northern District of California

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, Rodney Ortiz’s motion for a bill of particulars with respect to Count 1 must be 

denied. Defendants’ motion to dismiss indictment Counts 4 and 5 must be granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 11, 2016

______________________________________

RICHARD SEEBORG

United States District Judge

Case 3:15-cr-00594-RS Document 160 Filed 08/11/16 Page 15 of 15