Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50294/USCOURTS-ca9-12-50294-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Salvador Reyes Vera
Appellant

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SALVADOR REYES VERA, AKA

Magic, AKA Albert Vera Reyes,

AKA Sas, AKA Salvador Vera,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50294

D.C. No.

8:08-cr-00280-

JVS-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ARMANDO REYES VERA, AKA

Mando, AKA Armando Vera,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 12-50366

D.C. No.

8:08-cr-00280-

JVS-2

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

James V. Selna, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 12, 2014—Pasadena, California

Filed October 22, 2014

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2 UNITED STATES V. VERA

Before: John T. Noonan, Jr., Kim McLane Wardlaw

and Raymond C. Fisher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Fisher

SUMMARY*

Criminal Law

The panel affirmed in part and vacated in part the district

court’s judgments, and remanded for further proceedings in

a case in which Salvador Reyes Vera and Armando Reyes

Vera were convicted of a drug conspiracy and use of a minor

to commit a drug trafficking offense.

Two case agents testified at the defendants’ joint trial, one

as a gang expert and the other as an expert in drug jargon who

translated wiretapped phone calls into drug quantities and

amounts. The panel affirmed the admission of the gang

testimony. But because the testimony interpreting the

recorded calls intermingled lay and expert opinion, the panel

held that the district court’s failure to explain the distinction

to the jury constituted plain error. The panel held that this

intermingling resulted in the admission of improper expert

and lay opinions, which also constituted plain error. Because

these errors affected the drug quantities found by the jury in

a special verdict, and therefore the mandatory minimum

sentences the defendants faced, the panel held that they

affected the defendants’ substantial rights and seriously

* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 3

affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. The panel

therefore vacated the drug quantity findings and the

defendants’ sentences. The panel affirmed the remainder of

the jury verdict.

The panel also addressed the appropriate remedy when

trial errors affect the jury’s drug quantity findings but not the

underlying conspiracy convictions. Because drug quantity is

not an element of the conspiracy offense, the panel did not

vacate the defendants’ conspiracy convictions. The panel

further held that, under these circumstances, the Double

JeopardyClause does not preclude retrial of the drug quantity

issue. The panel therefore vacated the special verdict only,

and remanded for proceedings. The panel wrote that on

remand the government may elect to retry the drug quantity

issue or may seek a resentencing based solely on the

defendants’ convictions.

COUNSEL

Gretchen Fusilier, Carlsbad, California, for DefendantAppellant Salvador Reyes Vera.

Thomas Paul Sleisenger, Los Angeles, California, for

Defendant-Appellant Armando Reyes Vera.

André Birotte Jr., United States Attorney, Robert E. Dugdale,

Chief, Criminal Division, Dennise D. Willett, Chief, Santa

Ana Branch Office, Michael Anthony Brown (argued),

Assistant United States Attorney, United States Attorney’s

Office, Santa Ana, California, for Plaintiff-Appellee United

States of America.

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4 UNITED STATES V. VERA

OPINION

FISHER, Circuit Judge:

This appeal requires us to revisit issues that arise when

law enforcement officers offer both expert and lay opinion

testimony interpreting the meaning of intercepted telephone

calls. We again emphasize that such expert opinions must

rest on reliable methodology; that such lay opinions may not

be supported by speculation or hearsay, or interpret

unambiguous, clear statements; and that the jury must be

instructed on how to appropriately evaluate each form of

testimony offered by the officer.

Defendants Salvador Reyes Vera and Armando Reyes

Vera appeal their convictions and sentences for drug

conspiracy and use of a minor to commit a drug trafficking

offense.1 Two case agents testified at the defendants’ joint

trial, one as a gang expert and the other as an expert in drug

jargon who translated wiretapped phone calls into drug

quantities and amounts. We affirm the admission of the gang

testimony but reach a different conclusion regarding the

testimony interpreting the recorded calls. Because that

testimony intermingled lay and expert opinion, the district

court’s failure to explain the distinction to the jury constituted

plain error. Additionally, this intermingling resulted in the

admission of improper expert and lay opinions, which also

constituted plain error. Because these errors affected the drug

quantities found by the jury in a special verdict, and therefore

the mandatoryminimum sentences the defendants faced, they

affected the defendants’ substantial rights and seriously

1 Following the practice adopted in the parties’ briefing, we refer to the

defendants by their first names, Salvador and Armando.

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 5

affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. 

Accordingly, we vacate the drug quantity findings and the

defendants’ sentences. We affirm the remainder of the jury

verdict.

We also address the appropriate remedy when trial errors

affect the jury’s drug quantity findings but not the underlying

conspiracy convictions. Because drug quantity is not an

element of the conspiracy offense, we need not vacate the

defendants’ conspiracy convictions. We further hold that,

under these circumstances, the Double Jeopardy Clause does

not preclude retrial of the drug quantity issue. We therefore

vacate the special verdict only, and remand for proceedings

consistent with this opinion. On remand, the government

may elect to retry the drug quantity issue or may seek a

resentencing based solely on the defendants’ convictions.2

I. Background

In 2007, acting on a tip from confidential informant

Gerardo Reyes, the Santa Ana Gang Task Force began

investigating drug trafficking in Bishop Manor, a highdensity apartment complex within the territory of the Minnie

Street Lopers gang. Reyes’ tip and the resulting investigation

brought the defendants to the task force’s attention. Based on

the tip, some initial surveillance and a few initial controlled

purchases, the agents believed that Salvador and Armando

were involved in the illegal distribution of several controlled

substances. To further the investigation, in May 2008, the

task force began wiretapping cell phones used by the

2 For the reasons given in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition,

we reject the defendants’ sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing

arguments.

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6 UNITED STATES V. VERA

defendants and their minor nephew, Ramon Vera, also known

as “Ojitos” or “Little Bear.” All told, the investigation

intercepted thousands of calls and, through contemporaneous

surveillance, corroborated certain aspects of the calls – for

example, who the speakers were and where they were

meeting. Reyes also completed a controlled purchase from

Armando of around 24 grams of heroin, the only physical

evidence of narcotics seized during the investigation.

The Vera brothers were arrested in October 2008 and

indicted a few months later, as were several co-defendants. 

In January 2012, a federal grand jury returned a three-count

superseding indictment against the defendants. Count 1

charged Salvador and Armando with conspiracy to distribute

and to possess with intent to distribute heroin, cocaine,

cocaine base and methamphetamine.3 Counts 2 and 3

charged Salvador (Count 2) and Armando (Count 3) with

using a minor to commit a drug trafficking offense. See

21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(2), 846, 861(a)(1).

The wiretapped phone calls were the government’s

primary evidence during the five-day trial; over 70 recorded

calls were either played for or read to the jury. Additionally,

the two case agents primarily responsible for the investigation

were called to testify. FBI Agent Daniel Lavis, the

government’s key witness, testified about the investigation,

the surveillance that was conducted, narcotics prices, how law

enforcement agents use confidential informants, Bishop

Manor and the surrounding area, how wiretaps are obtained

and how they work, phone technology, the phones that were

wiretapped in this case, the identity of participants in the

3 At trial, the methamphetamine allegations were withdrawn from the

jury’s consideration.

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 7

wiretapped calls and their relationships, and code words used

by the participants in the wiretapped calls. Lavis also opined

about the meanings of most of the recorded calls as they were

played or read, identifying voices and nicknames, and

interpreting the conversations as referring to specific

quantities of particular controlled substances. The other case

agent, Detective John Franks, testified about gang structure

and practices generally, the Minnie Street Lopers specifically,

and the inferences he drew about Salvador’s role within the

Lopers organization. Franks also testified about the

investigation and his observations while conducting

surveillance.

Reyes, the confidential informant, testified as well. He

gave details regarding the controlled purchase of heroin he

made from Armando and explained the structure of the

defendants’ drug dealing organization, from which he had

purchased drugs for many years and for which he had, at

times, acted as a lookout. He further explained that Salvador

was the highest ranking member of the Minnie Street Lopers

gang in the area. Reyes testified that Salvador maintained

control of narcotics trafficking in that area by giving only

certain dealers permission to sell narcotics. Anyone else

caught dealing would be “beat up.” Reyes testified that

Armando was Salvador’s “number two man” and handled

most sales, and that Salvador used his nephew and other

minors as drug runners.4

4 The remaining government witnesses gave very little substantive

testimony. These witnesses included three language specialists who had

translated the recorded calls from Spanish; a forensic chemist who

testified about the substance Reyes purchased from Armando; two police

officers who conducted surveillance and traffic stops; and a police officer

who cited Ramon for being out after curfew, confirming he was a minor.

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The defense did not call any witnesses or introduce any

evidence except a stipulation that a particular intercepted

phone call did not concern cocaine base, as Lavis had

testified, but actually concerned powder cocaine. The

defendants essentially conceded guilt on the conspiracy

count, focusing their closing arguments on the adequacy of

the government’s proof of drug type and quantity, and

characterizing the jury’s role as answering “an accounting

question.”

The jury found the defendants guilty on all counts and

issued a special verdict holding both defendants responsible

for 100 grams or more of heroin, 500 grams or more of

cocaine and 280 grams or more of cocaine base. Both

defendants were sentenced to the low end of their respective

guidelines ranges: 360 months’ imprisonment for Salvador

and 210 months’ imprisonment for Armando.

II. Franks’ Testimony

The defendants contend that Detective Franks’ testimony

as both a gang expert and a percipient witness to the events in

his investigation violated their Confrontation Clause rights

and Federal Rule of Evidence 403.5 We review the district

5 We reject the defendants’ argument that admitting this evidence

violated the Due Process Clause. The admission of evidence violates due

process only when “there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw

from the evidence” and that evidence is “of such quality as necessarily

prevents a fair trial.” Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th

Cir. 1991) (quoting Kealohapauole v. Shimoda, 800 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th

Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The gang testimony was

probative of Salvador’s control over drug transactions in Bishop Manor

in which he did not directly take part. Because Armando was Salvador’s

“number two man,” establishing that Salvador controlled the drug

trafficking organization allowed the jury to infer that Armando managed

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 9

court’s rulings on the Confrontation Clause de novo and on

Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gomez,

725 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Hankey,

203 F.3d 1160, 1166–67 (9th Cir. 2000). We hold that

admitting Franks’ gang testimony did not constitute

reversible error.

A. Confrontation Clause

The Supreme Court held in Crawford v. Washington,

541 U.S. 36 (2004), that a defendant’s Confrontation Clause

rights are violated by the admission of “testimonial

statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he

was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had . . . a prior

opportunity for cross-examination.” Id. at 53–54. 

Nevertheless, an expert witness may offer opinions based on

such inadmissible testimonial hearsay, as well as any other

form of inadmissible evidence, if “experts in the particular

field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in

forming an opinion on the subject.” Fed. R. Evid. 703. 

Moreover, the expert may disclose to the jury the

inadmissible evidence relied on in forming his opinion “if

[its] probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion

substantially outweighs [its] prejudicial effect.” Id.

Under these rules, there is generallyno Crawford problem

when an expert “appli[es] his training and experience to the

sources before him and reach[es] an independent judgment.”

Gomez, 725 F.3d at 1129 (quoting United States v. Johnson,

the daily activities of a larger operation, thus widening the scope of the

conspiracy. Additionally, Franks’ testimony on this point dovetailed with

Reyes’ testimony, thereby somewhat “rehabilitat[ing] (without vouching

for)” Reyes’ credibility, which had been thoroughly impeached. United

States v. Bighead, 128 F.3d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1997).

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587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009)). But an expert exceeds the

bounds of permissible expert testimony and violates a

defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights when he “is used as

little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial

hearsay, rather than as a true expert whose considered opinion

sheds light on some specialized factual situation.” Id.

(quoting Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635). Accordingly, the key

question for determiningwhether an expert has complied with

Crawford is the same as for evaluating expert opinion

generally: whether the expert has developed his opinion by

“applying his extensive experience and a reliable

methodology.” United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 54

(2d Cir. 2003).

The Second Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Mejia,

545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008), illustrates how case agent expert

testimony can violate a defendant’s Confrontation Clause

rights. The defendants in Mejia were members of the MS-13

gang who were being tried for racketeering and related

charges. See id. at 183. An agent qualified as a gang expert,

see id. at 193–94, identified custodial interrogations ofMS-13

members as at least a partial basis for his testimony “that MS13 taxed non-member drug dealers,” “that MS-13 treasury

funds were used to purchase narcotics and that MS-13

members used interstate telephone calls to coordinate

activities.” Id. at 199. This testimony was directly relevant

to several material issues in the case, including whether MS13 was an enterprise, had an effect on interstate or foreign

commerce or engaged in narcotics trafficking. See id. at 200.

The agent’s testimony violated the Confrontation Clause,

however, because he presented testimonial hearsay “in the

guise of an expert opinion,” id. at 199 (quoting United States

v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2007)), rather than

presenting the information to explain a bona fide expert

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 11

opinion. The Mejia court was “at a loss in understanding how

[the agent] might have ‘applied his expertise’ to these

statements before conveying them to the jury.” Id. Most

problematically, the agent’s drug tax testimony “was based

directly on statements made by an MS-13 member in custody

(during the course of this very investigation).” Id. (emphasis

omitted). To form his drug tax opinion, therefore, the agent

did not have to conduct a “synthesis of various source

materials” or apply any of “his extensive experience [or] a

reliable methodology.” Id. at 197 (quoting Dukagjini,

326 F.3d at 58) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,

the agent “communicated out-of-court testimonial statements

of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly

to the jury in the guise of an expert opinion.” Id. at 198

(quoting Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d at 72). The agent’s direct

repetition of testimonial hearsay about the drug tax

“impugn[ed] the legitimacy of all of his testimony,” leading

the court to suspect he had merely summarized an

investigation conducted by others, rather than applying his

expertise to draw his own conclusions. Id. at 199. The court

therefore held that the agent’s “reliance on and repetition of

out-of-court testimonial statements made by individuals

during the course of custodial interrogations violated [the

defendants’] rights under the Confrontation Clause of the

Sixth Amendment.” Id.

Here, Detective Franks testified both as a gang expert

witness and as a percipient witness regarding his observations

during the investigation. Specifically, he testified that Bishop

Manor fell within the territory of the Minnie Street Lopers

gang and that the gang maintained control over narcotics

sales within Bishop Manor and the surrounding areas by

requiring any non-member drug dealers in the area to pay a

tax. Because he knew from reviewing intercepted telephone

calls that Salvador did not pay taxes to anyone else in the

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12 UNITED STATES V. VERA

neighborhood, Franks concluded that Salvador was “one of

the leaders of the narcotics trade in Bishop Manor.” He also

testified about a recorded phone call between Salvador and a

friend that was played for the jury, opining that a rival gang

was trying to tax Salvador because they believed his friend

was selling drugs within their territory. Because the leader of

one neighborhood gang is generally the person who pays

taxes to the higher-ranking gang in another area, Franks

opined that Salvador was “[m]ore than likely the leader” of

the Minnie Street Lopers in Bishop Manor.

The defendants contend that Franks exceeded the bounds

of permissible expert testimony by “serving as a conduit for

admission of hearsay in violation of Crawford.” They argue

that by testifying that the Minnie Street Lopers controlled

narcotics trafficking within Bishop Manor and “were able to

force non-members dealing drugs there to pay a tax,” Franks

directly “imparted important testimonial facts gleaned from

his exposure to gang members and affiliates” without

applying any independent judgment. Id. We disagree and

hold that Franks’ testimony fell within the bounds of

permissible expert opinion.

First, Detective Franks applied his experience to his

observations to form expert opinions about the Minnie Street

Lopers and their tactics. Franks testified he had extensive

training about and experience with gangs, including some

formal classroom training, his time on the Santa Ana Gang

Task Force and his work at the Santa Ana Police Department

as a gang homicide investigator and gang suppression

detective. He was familiar with the Minnie Street Lopers

gang in particular from his contacts with members when he

worked as a deputy sheriff in the jail, when he patrolled the

area and when he transferred to the gang unit of the Santa

Ana Police Department. Unlike the gang expert in Mejia,

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 13

nothing in Franks’ testimony suggests that he was directly

repeatingwhat someone else told him about the Minnie Street

Lopers during this or any other investigation. Rather, his

testimony that gangs “control the narcotics trafficking in an

area” by maintaining control “of selling drugs to buyers” and

“of the money,” and by requiring “other drug dealers in that

area that are not part of that gang” to “pay what’s called a tax

to that gang,” distilled and synthesized what he had learned

through his experience. See Mejia, 545 F.3d at 197 (implying

that the “synthesis of various source materials” constitutes

permissible expert testimony).

More importantly, Franks did not impart this information

for its own sake, but to explain the basis for his expert

opinion that Salvador was “one of the leaders of the narcotics

trade in Bishop Manor.” He testified that he formed this

opinion by reviewing the wiretapped telephone calls, learning

that Salvador did not pay taxes to anybody in the

neighborhood and applying his knowledge and experience of

gang practices to deduce the significance of that information. 

He further applied this expertise to explain the meaning of a

recorded phone call between Salvador and a friend, Walter,

that was played for the jury. According to Franks, Walter

told Salvador in the call that members of a rival gang

believed Walter was “slinging for Salvador” within their

territory and were looking for Salvador to verify that he had

paid the required tax. Based on his knowledge that the leader

of a neighborhood gang is generally responsible for paying

taxes to a higher-ranking gang, Franks testified that the phone

call further supported his opinion that Salvador was in charge

of narcotics trafficking in Bishop Manor.

Franks’ expert opinion therefore was not merely

repackaged testimonial hearsay but was “an original product”

that could have been “tested through cross-examination,”

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14 UNITED STATES V. VERA

Gomez, 725 F.3d at 1129 (quoting Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635),

although the defendants declined to do so. Because Franks

“appl[ied] his training and experience to the sources before

him and reach[ed] an independent judgment,” his testimony

complied with Crawford and the Confrontation Clause. Id.

(quoting Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635).

B. Rule 403

The defendants further contend that the district court did

not balance the probative value of Franks’ testimony against

its unfair prejudice and that his testimony should have been

excluded on this basis as well. Assuming without deciding

that Franks’ testimony should have been excluded under Rule

403, we conclude that any error in admitting the testimony

was harmless. See United States v. Gonzalez-Flores,

418 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that for

nonconstitutional errors, we will not reverse when “it is more

probable than not that the error did not materially affect the

verdict” (quoting United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031,

1040 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

First, because Franks’ most damning testimony was

cumulative, its impact on the jury was limited. Before Franks

testified, the jury had already heard Reyes’ testimony that

Salvador was the highest-ranking member of the Minnie

Street Lopers, that Salvador controlled all narcotics

trafficking in Bishop Manor and that anyone who dealt drugs

without his permission would be physically assaulted. This

testimony was elicited without objection from the defense,

and its admission has not been challenged on appeal. 

Admittedly, corroboration from law enforcement carries

heavy weight, especially given that Reyes’ testimony had

been thoroughly impeached. Nevertheless, the jury had

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 15

already heard the most potentially inflammatory information

from other sources.

Second, as to the conspiracy count, Franks’ testimony

could not have influenced the verdict because the defendants

effectively conceded guilt. Armando’s attorney stated in

closing argument that “Armando Vera is not disputing that he

distributed narcotics[.] That’s a given.” Salvador’s attorney

added that he would not “talk[] at all about guilt or innocence

as to Count 1,” but only about “quantity and types of drugs

and whether the government met their burden of proof to

prove those quantities.”

Third, Franks’ testimony did not materially affect the

defendants’ convictions for use of a minor in Counts 2 and 3

and the special verdict on the drug quantities. The far more

specific testimony from Lavis and Reyes about the role of the

defendants’ minor nephew in the drug organization and the

extensive testimony from Lavis regarding drug type and

quantities overshadowed anything Franks may have

contributed.6

Finally, we note that in one respect, Franks’ gang

testimony prejudiced one of the two defendants, Armando. 

Because there was no evidence that Armando, as opposed to

Salvador, was a gang member, the gang testimony could have

6 For the same reasons, the district court did not commit reversible error

by failing to give, sua sponte, a limiting instruction regarding the purpose

of the gang testimony. See United States v. Teague, 722 F.3d 1187, 1192

(9th Cir. 2013) (noting that to satisfy plain error review, a defendant must

establish “that the error affected substantial rights,” meaning that it

“affected the outcome of the district court proceedings” (quoting United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)) (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

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influenced the jury to view Armando in an unfairly negative

light. See Kennedy v. Lockyer, 379 F.3d 1041, 1055 (9th Cir.

2004) (noting that “evidence relating to gang involvement

will almost always be prejudicial and will constitute

reversible error”). But under the unique circumstances of this

case, this possibility is not a reason to conclude that the

admission of Franks’ testimony was prejudicial error. Reyes

also testified extensively about Salvador’s gang ties and the

activities of the Minnie Street Lopers gang, and neither

defendant has challenged the admission of that testimony. 

Accordingly, Franks’ testimony was not in itself the cause of

any prejudice Armando may have suffered on that score. We

further note that Armando could have, but did not, request a

separate trial or even a limiting instruction to shield himself

from the effects of the gang-related evidence.

* * *

For these reasons, we hold the admission of Franks’ gang

expert testimony did not violate the defendants’

Confrontation Clause rights and did not constitute reversible

error under Rule 403.

III. Lavis’ Testimony

We next consider whether admitting Lavis’ testimony

interpreting the recorded telephone calls was reversible error. 

The defendants argue his testimony was improper because it

(1) impermissibly mixed lay and expert opinions; (2) served

as a conduit for testimonial hearsay in violation of Crawford,

541 U.S. 36; (3) was not the product of reliable principles and

methods; and (4) included impermissible lay opinions.

Although some of Lavis’ opinions about the meaning of

recorded phone calls were permissible, we agree with the

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 17

defendants that others were erroneouslyadmitted, and that the

district court’s failure to instruct the jury in how to evaluate

his testimony was plain error. After a careful review of the

record, we conclude these errors warrant reversal of the jury’s

drug quantity findings, but not the defendants’ convictions on

Counts 1 through 3. We consider the appropriate remedy in

Part IV, infra.

A. Legal Background

It is neither novel nor unusual for law enforcement

officers to interpret the meaning of phone calls recorded as

part of a narcotics investigation. Drug jargon is well

established as an appropriate subject for expert testimony and

investigating officers may testify as drug jargon experts who

interpret the meaning of code words used in recorded calls. 

See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 607 F.2d 237, 240 (9th Cir.

1979). Officers may testify about their interpretations of

“commonly used drug jargon” based solely on their training

and experience. See id.; see also United States v. FigueroaLopez, 125 F.3d 1241, 1244–45 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that

law enforcement officer testimony that certain terms

constituted code words for a drug deal was erroneously

admitted as lay opinion testimony, but the error was harmless

because the officer testified to facts supporting his

qualifications as an expert and the testimony was proper

expert opinion).

To interpret the meaning of coded language encountered

for the first time in the specific investigation at issue,

however, an officer’s qualifications, including his experience

with narcotics investigations and intercepted

communications, are relevant but not alone sufficient to

satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 702. See United States v.

Hermanek, 289 F.3d 1076, 1093 (9th Cir. 2002). Rather,

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Rule 702 requires district courts to assure that an expert’s

methods for interpreting the new terminology are both

reliable and adequately explained. See id. at 1094. “[V]ague

and generalized” explanations are not sufficient; rather, the

officer must explain how he applies his “knowledge to

interpret particular words and phrases used in particular

conversations.” Id. at 1094–95. For example, an agent may

permissibly apply his knowledge of the drug manufacturing

process to interpret words referring to that process or apply

his familiarity with a particular method for generating code

words to decode their meaning. See, e.g., United States v.

Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 923 (9th Cir. 2009) (approving expert

testimony interpreting terms the agent “knew to refer to the

reagent used in the PCP manufacturing process”); United

States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1013–14 & n.6 (9th Cir.

2006) (approving the agent’s explanation that he interpreted

“diznerty” as slang for “dirty” based on his familiarity with

a common speaking style that creates slang versions of

specific words by adding “e” or “ez”).

A law enforcement officer testifying as an expert in drug

jargon may also testify as a lay witness if he was involved in

the investigation. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d

893, 904 (9th Cir. 2007). Such dual capacity testimony raises

additional concerns, however: an agent’s status as an expert

could lend him unmerited credibility when testifying as a

percipient witness, cross-examination might be inhibited,

jurors could be confused and the agent might be more likely

to stray from reliable methodology and rely on hearsay. See

id. at 902–03 (citing United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45

(2d Cir. 2003)); see also United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415,

425 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Flores-De-Jesus,

569 F.3d 8, 21 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Conner,

537 F.3d 480, 488 (5th Cir. 2008).

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 19

Because these risks are reduced “[i]f jurors are aware of

the witness’s dual roles,” the jury must be instructed about

“what the attendant circumstances are in allowing a

government case agent to testify as an expert.” Freeman,

498 F.3d at 904; see also United States v. Martinez, 657 F.3d

811, 817 (9th Cir. 2001) (approving admission of hybrid

testimony when “the court instructed the jury three times on

the difference between percipient and expert testimony”);

United States v. Anchrum, 590 F.3d 795, 803–04 (9th Cir.

2009) (holding that the district court “avoided blurring the

distinction between [the case agent’s] distinct role as a lay

witness and his role as an expert witness” when it “clearly

separated [the agent’s] testimony into a first ‘phase’

consisting of his percipient observations, and a second

‘phase’ consisting of his credentials in the field of drug

trafficking and expert testimony regarding the modus

operandi of drug traffickers”). Direct and cross-examination

provide additional opportunities “to clarify in the eyes of the

jury the demarcation between lay and expert testimony

offered by the same witness.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904; see

also Martinez, 657 F.3d at 817 (noting that “[t]he government

was nearly always exact in specifying when it was asking for

[the agent’s] testimony as an expert” in affirming admission

of the agent’s hybrid testimony).

Finally, a law enforcement officer involved in the

investigation may offer lay opinions about the meaning of

intercepted phone calls, but those opinions are subject to the

requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Freeman,

498 F.3d at 904–05. Rule 701 requires lay opinion testimony

to be “(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;

(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony

or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within

the scope of Rule 702.” Accordingly, an officer may not

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20 UNITED STATES V. VERA

testify based on speculation, rely on hearsay or interpret

unambiguous, clear statements. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at

905. But he may interpret “ambiguous conversations based

upon his direct knowledge of the investigation,” including his

“direct perception of several hours of intercepted

conversations . . . and other facts he learned during the

investigation.” Id. at 904–05; see also United States v.

Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2014).

In sum, law enforcement officers may offer lay and expert

opinions about the meaning of intercepted phone calls, but the

foundation laid for those opinions must satisfyRules 701 and

702, respectively. Further, if a single officer offers both lay

and expert testimony, the jury must be informed of the fact

and significance of his dual roles.

B. Analysis

Applying these principles to this case, we hold it was

plain error not to instruct the jury on how to appropriately

evaluate Lavis’ opinions and to fail to require an adequately

specific foundation for those opinions. Together, these errors

undermine our overall confidence in the jury verdict in some

respects. If an appropriate foundation had been laid, the jury

would at least have had the information it needed to evaluate

Lavis’ opinions. If the jury had been instructed on how to

evaluate Lavis’ opinions, it would at least have known the

rules governing how much weight to give those opinions. 

The absence of both an adequately laid foundation and an

appropriate instruction, however,substantiallyheightened the

“risk that the jury [would] defer to the officer’s superior

knowledge of the case and past experiences with similar

crimes.” United States v. Hampton, 718 F.3d 978, 981–82

(D.C. Cir. 2013).

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 21

The defendants’ arguments for overturning their

convictions for these reasons are not well taken, however,

because the erroneously admitted testimony related most

fundamentally to the evidence of drug quantity. Moreover,

the defendants failed to object to Lavis’ interpretive

testimony generally and they failed to contemporaneously

object to the specific quantity opinions they belatedly

challenge on appeal. Whether the defendants’ decisions were

based on strategy or the result of oversight, they undermine

the defendants’ argument that the errors satisfy the plain error

standard, warranting reversal of their convictions, because

many of the problems could have been easily corrected had

they been timely brought to the district court’s attention.

Nonetheless, the ultimate responsibility for assuring the

reliability of expert testimony and for instructing the jury on

how to evaluate case agent dual role testimony rests with the

district court. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904. Particularly

when the district court indicated it would instruct the jury on

how to evaluate Lavis’ expert opinions, its failure to do so is

not excused by the absence of a request from the defendants. 

Moreover, as the proponent of Lavis’ testimony, the

government “bears the burden of laying the proper foundation

for [its] admission.” City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co.

of Cal., 46 F.3d 929, 937 (9th Cir. 1995). Some of the

responsibility must therefore be shouldered by the

prosecution as well.

These general defects led to specific flaws in Lavis’

testimony, mostly relating to the reliability of his

methodology, which affected several of his opinions

regarding specific drug quantities. Aside from the 24 grams

of heroin Reyes purchased from Armando, Lavis’ opinions

interpreting the wiretapped calls were the only evidence of

specific quantities at trial. Given the vital importance of

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22 UNITED STATES V. VERA

Lavis’ opinions to those drug quantity findings, and of those

findings to the defendants’ substantial sentences, the

foundational errors in Lavis’ opinions, combined with our

overall lack of confidence in the jury’s ability to

meaningfully evaluate his testimony, require us to vacate the

jury’s drug quantity findings. We affirm the remainder of the

jury verdict, however, because the defendants have not

established that their convictions were materially affected by

these or any other errors in the proceedings.

1. Procedural History

The history of how Lavis came to be the key government

witness on drug quantities is an important factor in our

analysis. The government proffered him as an expert witness

in its trial memorandum, filed the week before trial. The

memorandum explained Lavis would also be testifying as a

percipient witness about the investigation, specifically “the

wiretap, the recorded calls, surveillances, and interviews he

conducted,” and potentially “his familiarity with the

defendants.” This proffer adequately disclosed Lavis as a

witness who would be providing both lay and expert

testimony. Additionally, its description of his anticipated

expert testimony – that he would opine that the conspiracy

involved quantities above certain threshold amounts; that he

would interpret the meaning of certain words, code words and

phrases used in the intercepted calls; and that he would testify

as to the street values of narcotics, law enforcement

techniques, drug trafficking activities in general and at

Bishop Manor in particular – reasonably disclosed the

contours of that testimony.

What the proffer did not reveal was that Lavis’ testimony

on drug jargon and drug quantity would include interpreting

terminology he encountered for the first time in this

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 23

investigation and noncoded words (such as “that” or “one”)

used in particular contexts. As a consequence, the

government did not disclose the methodology he would

employ in doing so or, more generally, the foundation on

which those opinions would rest. The proffer of his expertise

rested solely on his general qualifications, training and

experience: his employment as an agent of the FBI and his six

years as a member of the Santa Ana Gang Task Force. The

testimony elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination to

support Lavis’ expert opinions similarly focused on his

general training and experience and his familiarity with this

investigation in particular without discussing any expert

methodology he would apply.

7 Up until Lavis actually began

offering his opinions about the meaning of the intercepted

calls, therefore, the defendants could have reasonably

assumed that his drug quantity testimony would be limited to

common code words for drugs that he learned through his

training and experience.

On the first day of trial, the defendants filed written

objections to Franks’ proffered gang expert testimony and to

two recorded phone calls the government intended to offer

into evidence, which also related to the gang issues. They

7 This testimony included that he had developed expertise in narcotics

trafficking organizations and techniques for investigating them during his

eight years of involvement in several wiretap investigations; that, during

that time, he had listened to many telephone calls between narcotics

traffickers; that, as to this investigation, he had reviewed all the calls the

government would introduce into evidence, as well as other intercepted

calls, primarily to identify the voices in the calls, as he could not

understand Spanish beyond a few code phrases used in narcotics

trafficking, and most of the calls were in Spanish; and that he had

familiarity with code words used by traffickers “[t]o avoid detection by

law enforcement” and confirmed that the defendants used code words

throughout the intercepted calls.

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explicitly disclaimed objecting “to portions of the notice

regarding . . . use of ‘code words,’ [and] the street value of

identified narcotics in the area at the time,” although they

reserved their “right to object depending upon the ultimate

foundation,” and their “right to object to any matters not

specifically identified in the notice.” They objected in a

footnote to any testimony of the form, “Defendant X is

legally responsible for participating in a conspiracy to

distribute Y amount of narcotics.” This objection was not

based on foundation under 701 or 702 but on mental state

under Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b). The defendants did

not raise any concerns about case agents testifying in both a

lay and expert capacity, nor did they request further

explanation of or the opportunity to explore Lavis’

methodology or the foundation for his opinions.

The defendants did argue that expert reliance on “out-ofcourt statements of individuals such as informants and

arrestees” constitutes “a repackaging of testimonial

statements” that is “inadmissible under the Confrontation

Clause.” When the district court heard oral argument on their

written objections before testimony began on the third day of

trial, the court acknowledged the defendants’ standing

Crawford objection, explaining their “Crawford position is

preserved,” but agreed with counsel’s suggestion that they

would contemporaneously object on all other issues.

On the merits of the defendants’ objection, the court

stated it would “be real tight on requiring compliance with

703,” and would not “let an expert walk in hearsay.” 

Significantly, the court further advised counsel that an expert

could testify “to sources that an expert in that particular field

could reasonably rely upon,” and that it would at that time

instruct the jury about “how they’re to treat the expert

testimony and distinguish between reliance on an opinion,

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 25

those facts not coming into evidence for the truth, as opposed

to the expert stating the bases for his opinion, consider what

he has said in terms of assessing opinion, not for the truth of

the statements.” No such instruction was ever given.

Aside from the standing Crawford objection, the defense

affirmatively acquiesced to the admission of Lavis’ drug

quantity opinions. Defense counsel did specifically raise

Lavis’ drug quantity testimony as an issue with the court,

characterizing that testimony as “critical to the case.” The

court explained Lavis would “have to have a percipient basis

for that testimony.” The government responded with an oral

proffer regarding the type of opinions Lavis was expected to

offer.8 This proffer should have put the defendants on notice

that Lavis would testify as to the meaning of, for example, the

term “one” as opposed to common drug jargon, and that his

opinions would be based in part “on the calls he has listened

to and his knowledge of the investigation.” Nevertheless, the

defense agreed that the government could proceed to elicit

Lavis’ testimony and stated that such testimony would not be

“per se, improper.” The defense did request – and was

granted – additional time to review the summary of Lavis’

drug quantity opinions.

 

8

 The government explained:

What I expect Special Agent Lavis to testify about is,

you know, for example, Exhibit 5. There is reference

to get one and cook it. He is going to opine that the

call, based on his review of all the calls, that that call is

about one ounce of crack cocaine. And he will opine

that there’s a series of calls on 5/13/08, all referencing

the attempt to get one ounce of crack cocaine; and that

is, he is going to opine based on the calls he has

listened to and his knowledge of the investigation and

the code words used in the calls.

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26 UNITED STATES V. VERA

Finally, during Lavis’ testimony itself, the defense rarely

objected to his opinions, and most of those objections were

cured by rephrasing the question. This underscores that many

of the problems the defendants identify on appeal could likely

have been averted through contemporaneous objections

before the district court.

2. Instructional Error

On this procedural record, we review the defendants’

Crawford argument de novo, see Gomez, 725 F.3d at 1125,

and their remaining arguments for plain error, see Fed. R.

Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730–36

(1993).

In light of our Circuit’s clearly expressed concerns about

case agents testifying in both lay and expert capacities, the

district court’s failure to give an instruction explaining Lavis’

dual roles was plain error. See Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904

(emphasizing “the necessity of making clear to the jury what

the attendant circumstances are in allowing a government

case agent to testify as an expert”). It is particularly plain

given the district court’s own statement that it would give an

instruction telling the jury how to evaluate Lavis’ expert

opinion testimony.

The absence of such an instruction prejudiced the

defendants by materially increasing the risk that the jury gave

Lavis’ testimony undue deference, a risk that is particularly

acute with respect to the issue of drug quantity, for which – 

aside from 24 grams of heroin – his opinions comprised the

sole evidence. Had the jury been instructed that the “facts”

on which Lavis based his expert opinions should not be

considered for their truth but only to assess the strength of his

opinions, the jury would have been better able to question for

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 27

itself the reliability of Lavis’ interpretations of wiretapped

conversations. Likewise, if the court had instructed the jury

that Lavis’ lay opinion testimony was “not based on

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge,” Fed. R.

Evid. 701(c), it would have deterred the jury from viewing

Lavis’ opinions as having the “imprimatur of scientific or

technical validity.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 903. This is

especially true as to Lavis’ opinions that speakers’ vague

references such as “that, “one” or “what we talked about

earlier” were linked to narcotics transactions.

Given the risk of undue deference from the jury, other

errors in the record that might be individually harmless

instead have a cumulative impact. For example, the

“helpfulness” requirement of Rules 701 and 702 prohibits a

witness from opining about the meaning of clear statements. 

See id. at 904–05 (“Although [an expert’s] interpretation of

ambiguous statements [is] permissible under Fed. R. Evid.

701, ‘the interpretation of clear statements is not permissible,

and is barred by the helpfulness requirement of both Fed. R.

Evid. 701 and Fed. R. Evid. 702.’” (quoting United States v.

Dicker, 853 F.2d 1103, 1109 (3d Cir. 1988))).

Nevertheless, Lavis was at times called upon to interpret

conversations that were well within the understanding of an

ordinary juror.9Individually, such opinions did not prejudice

the defendants – after all, they were impermissible because

9 For example, Lavis explained that “bad” and “no good” meant that the

product was of “poor quality” or “not good.” Similarly, he interpreted the

demand that a supplier “lower the price for you, fool, because tell her that

it is a little expensive, fool,” as meaning that “whatever she is selling it

for, Mr. Vera probably feels it’s a little more expensive than what he

wants to pay for it, so he’s trying to negotiate, maybe get the price

lowered.”

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28 UNITED STATES V. VERA

their meaning was already clear. Cumulatively, however,

theymay have encouraged the jury to defer to Lavis’ opinions

instead of listening to the calls and reaching an independent

judgment. See id. at 903 (stating that “unnecessarily

repetitive” testimony “may come dangerously close to

usurping the jury’s function”) (quoting Dukagjini, 326 F.3d

at 54). Particularly because the jury was uninformed about

how to appropriatelyevaluate Lavis’ opinion testimony, these

errors further erode our confidence in the jury’s verdict.

3. Specific Drug Quantity Problems

Having set forth our underlying concerns with the jury

verdict generally, we next focus on drug quantity, the issue

most seriously affected by the instructional error. Given the

sentencing structure of the Controlled Substances Act, which

imposes higher statutory sentencing ranges for offenses

involving quantities above certain threshold amounts, see

21 U.S.C. § 841(b), it is not surprising that drug quantity was

the primary issue the defendants contested at trial. Drug

quantity was such a critical issue that, in closing, the defense

variously characterized the jury’s role as akin to

“accounting,” “arithmetic” or “a tax audit.” Moreover, when

multiple substances are at issue, what quantity is attributed to

a particular drug type is also material because different

threshold amounts are required for different substances; the

highest statutory sentencing range, for example, requires an

offense involving 5 kilograms of cocaine but only 280 grams

of cocaine base. See id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)–(iii).

Accordingly, unreliable opinions attributing particular

quantities of particular substances to the defendants pose a

serious risk of prejudice to their substantial rights.

Careful review of the record shows that the general failure

to assure an adequate foundation for Lavis’ opinions resulted

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 29

in the admission of specific drug quantity opinions that did

not rest on reliable methods. Even though the defendants

forfeited the arguments they make on appeal by failing to

contemporaneously object to any of this specific testimony,

the district court plainly erred by allowing the admission of

such testimony in the face of its “continuing responsibility of

acting as the vigilant gatekeeper[] of expert testimony to

ensure that it is reliable.” Freeman, 498 F.3d at 904; see also

Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 53 (requiring “vigilance by the trial

court . . . when an expert, who is also the case agent, goes

beyond interpreting code words and summarizes his beliefs

about the defendant’s conduct based upon his knowledge of

the case”).

For example, an agent’s belief that the speaker is a

trafficker of a particular substance does not satisfyRule 702’s

requirement that expert opinions be based on reliable

methodology. See Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1096 (holding that

the agent’s interpretation of “cryptic language as referring to

cocaine simply because he believed appellants to be cocaine

traffickers” was “circular, subjective reasoning” that did “not

satisfy the Rule 702 reliability requirement”). Yet Lavis

relied on his belief that Manuel Duarte-Aguilera was a

cocaine base dealer who provided ounce quantities to

Salvador to interpret a reference to a “package of tortillas” as

“one ounce of cocaine base,” a substance that carries more

severe sentencing consequences than powder cocaine. The

flaw in this methodology was confirmed when the

government later admitted that Lavis’ assumption was

actually wrong. After the close of its case, the government

conceded by stipulation that this call actually “involved

powder cocaine, not cocaine base, and that Manuel DuarteAguilera distributed both powder cocaine and cocaine base.” 

Notwithstanding this stipulation, Lavis had relied on his

assumption that Duarte-Aguilera was an ounce distributor of

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30 UNITED STATES V. VERA

cocaine base as a partial reason to infer that several other

calls referred to ounce quantities of cocaine base. He

employed this same methodology to interpret additional calls

involving other individuals, testifying that Gloria Calderon

supplied ounce quantities of cocaine base, that Javier

Camacho supplied ounce quantities of cocaine base and that

Ruben Orejel was a heroin dealer.

At other times, Lavis used the quoted price to deduce

whether the conversations concerned cocaine powder or

cocaine base. For example, he twice testified that the term

“work” referred to cocaine base because the supplier quoted

a price consistent with an ounce of cocaine base. There is

nothing inherently unreliable about this methodology, but he

later testified that the price range for an ounce of cocaine base

and for powder cocaine is “roughly the same.” If the price

ranges for cocaine base and cocaine powder were roughly

equivalent, Lavis’ method for distinguishing them was not

reliable.

Finally, in one instance, Lavis’ opinion plainly rested on

nothing more than speculation. The jury heard this

conversation:

[Phone ringing]

ARMANDO: Hello?

FILIPP: Hey, what’s up man? Are you uh –

are you around right now?

ARMANDO: Yeah.

FILIPP: Alright, can I come – can I come by?

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 31

ARMANDO: Yeah.

FILIPP: Okay, I’ll be there in like ten

minutes.

ARMANDO: Alright.

FILIPP: Alright, bye.

[End of conversation]

As the defendants point out, “[n]either direct nor encoded

references were made that could be construed as a desire to

purchase narcotics.” Nevertheless, Lavis opined that, in this

call, Filipp “was contacting Armando to obtain two ounces of

heroin,” and that those two ounces would be “20 grams each,

so two would be 40 grams,” because that is what he “knew

[Filipp] to get in the investigation.” This opinion could not

have been “rationally based on the witness’s perception,”

Fed. R. Evid. 701(a), because Lavis’ knowledge that Filipp

had obtained 40 grams of heroin from Armando on other

occasions does not support the inference that this call – which

includes no inculpatory, ambiguous or coded statements –

was about his desire to do so again. Surveillance confirmed

that Filipp visited Bishop Manor after similar calls, but it is

pure speculation to equate a visit with the purchase of 40

grams of heroin, specifically. Such speculation is

inadmissible testimony whether characterized as lay opinion,

expert opinion or anything else, and its admission constituted

plain error.10

10 There is also reason to suspect that Lavis’ lay opinion at times rested

on testimonial hearsay, violating the defendants’ Confrontation Clause

rights under Crawford, although the record does not allow a conclusive

determination. Lavis frequently opined about the meaning of ambiguous

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32 UNITED STATES V. VERA

The government argues that this court’s recent decision in

United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2014),

requires a finding that Agent Lavis’ direct knowledge of the

investigation established sufficient foundation for the

admission of his testimony, including the conclusions about

drug quantity. But Gadson is distinguishable: it did not

involve a qualified expert slipping into lay opinion without a

proper jury instruction, nor did it involve such obvious flaws

in the foundation for the officer’s conclusions on specific

drug quantities.

* * *

Because the jury was not instructed on how to evaluate

Lavis’ dual role in giving his drug quantity opinions and

because the general failure to establish a foundation under

Rules 701 and 702 for those opinions led to the admission of

plainly erroneous drug quantity testimony, we hold the

defendants have established that plain errors affected the

jury’s drug quantity findings. The defendants’ lengthy

statements based on what he knew “about the investigation,” or “a number

of factors in the investigation.” But his knowledge “about the

investigation” included some sources that constitute testimonial hearsay

(interviews with informants) and others that do not (intercepted

conversations). Lavis’ lay opinions based on his knowledge of the

investigation therefore might have relied on and conveyed impermissible

testimonial hearsay. For example, he testified that a “piece” of heroin is

typically 25 grams, but that he knew “based on the investigation” that

Fillip, a customer of the defendants, used the term “piece” to mean 20

grams. Given that the recorded telephone calls available for our review

were almost never so specific about quantity, this testimony at least raises

a suspicion that Lavis’ testimony relied in part on interviews or

interrogations associated with the investigation, constituting testimonial

hearsay in violation of Crawford. Because we conclude that other errors

warrant vacating the drug quantity findings, however, we need not

conclusively resolve the issue.

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 33

sentences depended on those drug quantity findings, so the

errors seriously affected the fairness of the proceedings and

we exercise our discretion to correct them. See Olano,

507 U.S. at 735–36.

IV. Remedy

Having concluded that only the jury’s drug quantity

findings were affected by plain error, we turn to the question

of remedy. Because the special verdict included the jury’s

tainted drug quantity findings, we must vacate that portion of

the special verdict. Without those findings, the drug types

and quantities used to establish the defendants’ statutory

sentencing ranges under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) were not proven

beyond a reasonable doubt. Sentencing the defendants using

that statutory range therefore violated the Sixth Amendment. 

See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163 (2013)

(holding that “facts that increase mandatory minimum

sentences must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a

reasonable doubt”). Accordingly, we must also vacate the

defendants’ sentences.

We next confront what appears to be a question of first

impression in this circuit: What is the appropriate remedy

when a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt facts that

increase a defendant’s statutory sentencing range, but the

jury’s finding was affected by trial error? Specifically, we

consider whether we must (1) vacate the entire conspiracy

conviction and remand for a full retrial of Count 1; (2) vacate

only the drug quantity findings in the special verdict, deny the

government the option of retrying the drug quantity issue and

require resentencing based solely on the defendants’

convictions; or (3) vacate only the drug quantity findings in

the special verdict, but allow the government to resubmit the

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34 UNITED STATES V. VERA

drug quantity questions to a sentencing jury.

11

 We conclude

the last option is the appropriate procedure.

First, vacating the jury’s drug quantity findings does not

require us to vacate the conspiracy conviction itself. The

tainted drug quantity verdict does not affect the validity of the

underlying conspiracy conviction because drug quantity was

not an element of the charged conspiracy offense; rather, it

was the “functional equivalent of an element” that had to be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt for

the purposes of sentencing alone. United States v. Toliver,

351 F.3d 423, 430 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks

omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); cf. United States v.

Thomas, 355 F.3d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that

“drug type and quantity are not elements of the offense under

[21 U.S.C.] § 841”); United States v. Minore, 292 F.3d 1109,

1117 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that “a finding of drug quantity

is not necessary to convict [the defendant] of violating

[21 U.S.C. §] 841(a)”).

Second, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude

the government from retrying the drug quantity issue in this

case. The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial where

insufficient evidence supported a conviction, but not where,

as here, trial error affected the jury’s determination. See

Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988) (holding that the

government may retry a defendant who successfully

challenges his conviction based on “some error in the

proceedings leading to conviction”); Burks v. United States,

437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that the government may not

11 Following oral argument, we requested supplemental briefing on this

question.

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 35

retrya defendant when the prosecution introduces insufficient

evidence to support his initial conviction). Here, as set forth

in the concurrently filed memorandum disposition, sufficient

evidence supports the jury’s drug quantity findings, although

some of that evidence was improperly admitted. Thus, the

Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit retrial.

This conclusion is consistent with our previous case law

requiring resentencing within the lower statutory sentencing

range supported by a generic conviction. In the wake of

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), we decided

several cases where the defendants had been convicted of

generic controlled substance offenses, were sentenced based

on judicial determinations of drug type or quantity and

challenged those sentences as violative of their Sixth

Amendment rights under Apprendi. See id. at 490 (“Other

than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutorymaximum

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable

doubt.”). In such cases, we vacated the defendants’ sentences

and remanded for resentencing within the lower statutory

ranges applicable to their generic convictions – without

giving the government the opportunity to submit the drug

type and quantity questions to a jury. See, e.g., Thomas,

355 F.3d at 1202 (remanding with instructions to resentence

the defendant based on an unspecified quantity of cocaine

base when the defendant had admitted during the plea

colloquy that he knowingly possessed cocaine base with the

intent to distribute without admitting to a specific quantity);

United States v. Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700, 706 (9th Cir. 2003)

(remanding “with instructions to the district court to

resentence Banuelos subject to the maximum sentence

supported by the facts found by the fact-finder beyond a

reasonabledoubt”)(internal quotation marks omitted); United

States v. Velasco-Heredia, 319 F.3d 1080, 1086–87 (9th Cir.

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36 UNITED STATES V. VERA

2003) (holding that, having established that the defendant was

guilty of a conspiracy for an unspecified amount of

marijuana, double jeopardy barred the government from

proving the quantity of marijuana beyond a reasonable

doubt).

In those cases, however, the government did not attempt

to prove drug type or quantity beyond a reasonable doubt, but

instead relied on plea colloquys in Thomas and Banuelos, and

in Velasco-Heredia, on the facts found in a bench trial that

did not specify the quantity of drugs. Accordingly, there was

insufficient evidence – none – presented to a jury to support

a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of the facts increasing

the statutory range. The government had therefore effectively

forfeited “its opportunity to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that [the defendant] was responsible for [a particular quantity

of drugs].” Velasco-Heredia, 319 F.3d at 1086. Here, in

contrast, the government took full advantage of its

opportunity, and the jury found that the government met its

burden of proving certain drug quantities. The defendants

have now successfully challenged those findings, but only

“because of some error in the proceedings” that rendered the

proof invalid, not necessarily lacking. Lockhart, 488 U.S. at

38. The Double Jeopardy Clause therefore poses no bar to

retrying the drug quantity issue.

Third, vacating only the drug quantity findings in the

special verdict and affording the government an opportunity

to retry the issue accords with recent Supreme Court

authority. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court explained that

“[w]hen a finding of fact alters the legally prescribed

punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessarily forms a

constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the

jury.” 133 S. Ct. at 2162 (emphasis added); see also id.

(holding that “because the fact of brandishing aggravates the

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 37

legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes

an element of a separate, aggravated offense that must be

found by the jury” (emphasis added)); id. at 2162–63 (“The

essential point is that the aggravating fact produced a higher

range, which, in turn, conclusively indicates that the fact is an

element of a distinct and aggravated crime.” (emphasis

added)).

Alleyne suggests that facts increasing the statutory

sentencing range should be analogized to criminal statutes

increasing the punishment for individuals who commit

underlying predicate crimes in specific ways. See, e.g.,

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (providing that if, during and in relation

to the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking

crime, the defendant uses, carries or possesses a firearm in

furtherance of the predicate offense, the district court must

add a consecutive sentence to the punishment for the

predicate offense); 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (providing that when

a defendant, during and in relation to certain predicate

offenses, “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without

lawful authority, a means of identification of another person,”

the district court must generally impose a 2-year term of

imprisonment to run consecutive to the sentence for the

predicate offense). When a conviction for such an aggravated

offense is vacated for trial error, the government has an

opportunity to retry the defendant for the aggravating offense

alone. See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306,

1315 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming conviction on predicate drug

offense but vacating conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for

erroneous jury instructions and remanding “for a new trial or

resentencing”); United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212, 223

(1st Cir. 1996) (affirming conviction on predicate drug

offense, but vacating conviction of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and

remanding for a new trial). Our approach is consistent with

this analogy.

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38 UNITED STATES V. VERA

In concluding that only the drug quantity findings must be

vacated, we decline to follow the remedy adopted by the First

Circuit in United States v. Delgado-Marrero, 744 F.3d 167

(1st Cir. 2014), and the Fourth Circuit in United States v.

Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005). In those cases, the

district courts gave erroneous jury instructions regarding how

to calculate the drug quantities attributable to the defendants

as part of their conspiracy convictions. See DelgadoMarrero, 744 F.3d at 189; Collins, 415 F.3d at 314. The

errors invalidated the defendants’ sentences, but did not affect

their underlying conspiracy convictions. See DelgadoMarrero, 744 F.3d at 190; Collins, 415 F.3d at 314. Without

the special verdicts, the defendants were subject “to the

default statutory range of penalties under § 841(b)(1)(C),

regardless ofthe drug quantity involved.” Delgado-Marrero,

744 F.3d at 192; accord Collins, 415 F.3d at 315. But

because the error was instructional, “the Double Jeopardy

Clause d[id] not prohibit retrial.” Delgado-Marrero,

744 F.3d at 192. We agree with the First and Fourth Circuits’

analyses up to this point.

To remedy these errors, however, the First and Fourth

Circuits withheld judgment and gave the government a short

period to select one of two outcomes: (1) affirm the

conspiracy conviction and remand for resentencing under the

default penalty, or (2) vacate the conspiracy conviction and

remand for a new trial. See id. at 193; Collins, 415 F.3d at

315. In doing so, Delgado-Marrero and Collins imported a

remedy crafted for distinguishable cases to the circumstances

we confront here.

The Delgado-Marrero and Collinsremedywas originally,

and appropriately, adopted when (1) a defendant was

convicted of a conspiracy charge alleging multiple objects of

the conspiracy, at least one of which increased the statutory

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 39

sentencing range, (2) the jury did not specify which object

supported the conviction, but (3) the defendant was sentenced

using the increased statutory range determined through

judicial factfinding. See United States v. Rhynes, 196 F.3d

207, 237–40 (4th Cir. 1999), rev’d on other grounds 218 F.3d

310 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Garcia,

37 F.3d 1359, 1371 (9th Cir. 1994), receded from by United

States v. Jackson, 167 F.3d 1280 (9th Cir. 1999); United

States v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337, 340–41 (4th Cir. 1975). 

The government was allowed to choose between affirming

the convictions and resentencing the defendants based on the

conspiratorial object with the lowest statutory sentencing

range, or vacating the conspiracy convictions and remanding

for retrial with a special jury verdict. See Rhynes, 196 F.3d

at 239–40; Garcia, 37 F.3d at 1371; Quicksey, 525 F.2d at

341. Under such circumstances, retrial was possible only if

the conspiracy convictions were vacated. Because the

government must prove “the requisite intent to commit the

substantive crime,” United States v. McCaleb, 552 F.3d 1053,

1058 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Sullivan,

522 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2008)), the object of a conspiracy

is an essential element of a conspiracy offense. Cf. United

States v. Arlt, 252 F.3d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc)

(holding “that the specific offense designated as the object of

a conspiracy in a [18 U.S.C.] § 371 indictment does constitute

an element of the offense”); United States v. Alerta, 96 F.3d

1230, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 1996) (adopting a similar remedy

when the jury was not asked to decide whether the defendant

used a machine gun, as opposed to any other sort of gun,

during and in relation to his drug trafficking offense under

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because whether the firearm was fully

automatic “is an element of the crime”), overruled on other

grounds by Arlt, 252 F.3d 1032.

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40 UNITED STATES V. VERA

Here, in contrast, the tainted drug quantity findings were

not elements of the defendants’ conspiracy conviction, as

explained earlier. There is accordingly no reason to vacate

the entire conspiracy conviction, guilt for which the

defendants barely contested, if at all. If on remand the

government elects to retry the drug quantity issue, the district

court may empanel a sentencing jury. Sentencing juries and

other bifurcated proceedings are not unknown to the federal

criminal justice system. See, e.g., Jones v. United States,

527 U.S. 373, 376–77 (1999) (describing the “separate

sentencing hearing” required in capital cases, during which

the “sentencing jury” must determine whether the

government has established any of the statutory aggravating

factors necessary to support a death sentence); United States

v. Pena, 742 F.3d 508, 515 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that “the

question of guilt is often bifurcated from the question of

criminal forfeiture”).

By proceeding in this manner, we vacate only what was

affected by error: the jury’s drug quantity findings expressed

in the special verdict and the defendants’ sentences. On

remand, the government may elect to retry the drug quantity

issue before a sentencing jury, or it may request that the

district court resentence the defendants under the default

sentencing provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).12

12 In their supplemental briefing, the defendants contend that any

resentencing based on their convictions must proceed under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(3), the provision that applies to unspecified drug types, rather

than 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). We disagree. We required resentencing

under § 841(b)(3) in United States v. Hunt, 656 F.3d 906 (9th Cir. 2011),

because the defendant admitted during the plea colloquy that he intended

to possess and to distribute only an unspecified substance. See id. at

912–13, 916–17. Here, in contrast, the jury was instructed that it could

convict the defendants on the conspiracy count only by finding that “there

was an agreement between two or more persons to distribute heroin,

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UNITED STATES V. VERA 41

V. Conclusion

We vacate the defendants’ sentences and the special

verdict, and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion. We affirm the remainder of the defendants’

convictions.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND

REMANDED.

cocaine, or cocaine base.” By convicting the defendants on Count 1, the

jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that the conspiracy involved an

unspecified quantity of at least one of those three substances. 

Accordingly, the defendants’ conspiracy convictions, standing alone,

warrant sentencing under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C), which applies to

unspecified quantities of these three substances. See also 21 U.S.C. § 812

scheds. I(b)(10), II(a)(4).

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