Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02863/USCOURTS-cand-3_05-cv-02863-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Monterey
Defendant
Dean Flippo
Defendant
Murat Ozgur
Defendant
Carol Reed
Defendant
Walter L. Wagner
Plaintiff

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1 At the time of the events complained of, Mr. Flippo, Ms. Reed, and Mr. Ozgur were

members of the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office. (Br. at 1.)

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WALTER L. WAGNER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

DEAN FLIPPO; CAROL REED;

MURAT OZGUR; and

THE COUNTY OF MONTEREY,

Defendants.

 /

No. C 05-02863 JSW

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

Now before the Court is the motion by defendants Dean Flippo, Carol Reed, Murat Ozgur,1

and the County of Monterey (collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss plaintiff Walter L. Wagner’s

complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court finds this matter

suitable for disposition without oral argument. Civil L.R. 7-1(b). Having carefully reviewed the

parties’ papers, considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause

appearing, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff brings a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Defendants for their

alleged wrongful prosecution of him in Monterey Superior Court for criminal contempt of a court

order. (Compl. at ¶ 14.) Defendants prosecuted Plaintiff pursuant to California Penal Code

§ 166(a)(4), which defines contempt of court as the willful disobedience of the written terms of a
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2 Background facts regarding Plaintiff’s harassment of Ms. Morton are drawn primarily

from an unpublished 2003 California Court of Appeal opinion affirming the grant of an injunction

against Plaintiff pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 527.6. Morton, 2003 WL

21456517, at *1. The Section 527.6 injunction entered against Plaintiff (as distinguished from the

1977 permanent injunction at issue in this case) requires him to stay at least 100 yards away from

Ms. Morton’s place of work. Id. at *2. Section 527.6 allows a person who has been harassed to

seek a temporary restraining order and an injunction prohibiting harassment. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §

527.6. The statute was passed to provide quick relief to harassment victims threatened with great or

irreparable injury. Grant v. Clampitt, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997). 

2

lawfully-issued court order and classifies the crime as a misdemeanor. (Compl. at ¶ 6.) The

prosecution commenced on November 20, 2001. (Compl. at ¶ 6.) According to Defendants,

Plaintiff disobeyed the terms of a 1977 permanent injunction when he made several attempts to

contact Ms. Gail Morton in Monterey on November 9 and 10, 2001. (Br. at 1-2.) The permanent

injunction prohibited Plaintiff from harassing Ms. Morton by telephone, in writing, or by walking,

riding, or driving past her home. Morton v. Wagner, No. H024187, 2003 WL 21456517, at *2 (Cal.

Ct. App. June 24, 2003).2 

Plaintiff and Ms. Morton met as first-year students at McGeorge Law School. Id. at *1. 

Plaintiff pursued Ms. Morton in an erratic and persistent fashion. Id. He lurked in the hallway of

her apartment building, jumped out of bushes at her, and delivered all manner of objects to her by

placing them in and around her car. Id. He sought court orders to prohibit Ms. Morton from living

with men over the age of 14 and to require her to read books on sexual reproduction. Id. He was

found on campus wearing a wig and carrying a knife. Id. As a result of his threatening behavior, the

law school provided Ms. Morton with a 24-hour security guard to protect her until she completed the

bar exam in 1978. Id. During this period, Ms. Morton filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff for intentional

infliction of emotional distress; she sought a temporary and permanent injunction to restrain Plaintiff

from contacting her. Id. at *2. The lawsuit resulted in the 1977 injunction which Defendants used

to prosecute Plaintiff. Id. 

Plaintiff made continued attempts to contact Ms. Morton both at her work and last-known

home addresses even after the 1977 permanent injunction issued. Id. Plaintiff kept Ms. Morton’s

parents’ home in Santa Clara County under surveillance; he sent letters to their home. Id. He

attended Ms. Morton’s courtroom appearances and inquired about her at the Santa Clara County

Superior Court. Id. Once in 1999, Plaintiff followed Ms. Morton out of the Santa Clara County
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28 3 Plaintiff admits to the truth of the facts underlying Defendants’ criminal complaint

against him. (Compl. at ¶ 8.) 

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courthouse as she walked to her car. Id.

The events that led Defendants to prosecute Plaintiff occurred on November 9 and 10, 2001. 

(Compl. at ¶ 2.) On the morning of November 9, 2001, Ms. Morton appeared in the Santa Clara

County courthouse on client business. Morton, 2003 WL 21456517, at *2. She overheard a man

asking one of the bailiffs if he knew of an attorney named Gail Morton; when she looked over, she

recognized Plaintiff as the inquirer. Id. Plaintiff later drove down to Monterey, the city where Ms.

Morton resides, and appeared at Ms. Morton’s parents’ home. Id. He identified himself as

“Zahaenya Wagner” and asked to contact Ms. Morton. Id. That evening, Plaintiff telephoned Ms.

Morton’s father and left a telephone number where he could be reached. (Compl. at ¶ 2; Opp. Br. at

3.) The next day, before leaving Monterey, Plaintiff left his business card at a shop adjacent to Ms.

Morton’s workplace, and asked the shopkeeper to deliver the card to Ms. Morton in order to make

sure she received it.3 (Id.) 

Ms. Morton, frightened by Plaintiff’s appearance in Monterey, contacted the Pacific Grove

and Monterey Police Departments on November 10, 2001, and provided each with a copy of the

1977 injunction. Morton, 2003 WL 21456517, at *2. When she saw Plaintiff leaving the area later

in the day, she notified the police of his presence. Id. The police arrested Plaintiff on his way to the

San Francisco airport. (Opp. Br. at 4.) At the time of his arrest, Plaintiff was in possession of

several knives and a list containing the names of all of Ms. Morton’s coworkers. (Id.) 

After Plaintiff’s arrest, Defendants commenced a criminal prosecution against him. (Compl.

at ¶ 6.) Plaintiff, in his defense, argued that the 1977 permanent injunction had been voided by a

mutual release entered into by Plaintiff and Ms. Morton in 1981. (Compl. at ¶ 11; Br. at 1.) The

1981 civil action arose out of an injurious newspaper article, and in the mutual release, Ms. Morton

agreed to “dismiss forthwith, with prejudice, any action pending,” and “to not make derogatory,

untruthful, or unfriendly remarks” about Plaintiff. (Br. at 1.) Defendants’ case against Plaintiff was

dismissed with prejudice on July 14, 2004 by Judge Maldonado of the Monterey County Appellate

Division of the Superior Court of California. (Compl. at ¶ 7.) Judge Maldonado found that the 1977
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permanent injunction had been dissolved by the prior release agreement and that Plaintiff should

instead have been charged under California stalker statutes. (Br. at 2.)

After Defendants’ case was dismissed on appeal, Plaintiff initiated this suit, claiming that

“defendants’ actions of wrongful prosecution were a violation of both State and Federal Statutes . . .

and in particular, defendants actions [sic] were a violation of Section 1983.” (Compl. at ¶ 14.) 

Plaintiff alleges that the wrongful prosecution consisted of: filing a criminal complaint “based upon

[the] wholly innocent activity of Plaintiff” (Compl. at ¶¶ 6, 10); failure to research the law (Compl.

at ¶ 11); and continuing to prosecute Plaintiff after it should have been apparent that the 1977

injunction was no longer valid. (Id.) In response, Defendants argue that they are absolutely immune

from suit for the prosecutorial conduct Plaintiff alleges violated his constitutional rights, and seek to

dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

ANALYSIS

I. Legal Standard on a Motion to Dismiss.

A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the

pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss should not be

granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts supporting his or

her claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Thus, dismissal is proper “only if it is

clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the

allegations.” Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The complaint is construed in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint are

taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The court, however, is not

required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, if those conclusions

cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752,

754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
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II. Defendants are Absolutely Immune from Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim.

A. Defendants Assistant District Attorneys Flippo, Reed, and Ozgur Are Immune.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim based on the defense of absolute

prosecutorial immunity from suit. (Br. at 2.) Absolute or “quasi-judicial” immunity protects a

prosecutor from civil, monetary liability for injuries that arise out of the prosecutor’s execution of

duties that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v.

Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). The immunity is quasi-judicial because it protects prosecutors

when they make discretionary judgments, similar to those made by a judge, on the basis of evidence

presented to them. Id. at 423 n.20. Judges are accorded an absolute immunity for “acts committed

within their judicial jurisdiction” because it serves the public interest to have judges who are at

liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. Id. at 418-

19 n.13 (internal citations omitted). Similarly, in the prosecutorial context, absolute immunity:

(1) allows prosecutors to “focus their energies on prosecuting rather than defending lawsuits;” 

(2) enables prosecutors to “exercise independent judgment in deciding which suits to bring and

conducting them in court;” (3) preserves “the criminal justice system’s function of determining guilt

or innocence by ensuring that triers of fact are not denied relevant (although sometimes conflicting)

evidence because of prosecutors’ fear of suit;” and (4) ensures fairness to defendants “by enabling

judges to make rulings in their favor without the subconscious knowledge that such ruling could

subject the prosecutor to liability.” Id.

Prosecutors who seek absolute immunity bear the burden of proof. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons,

509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993). Prosecutors enjoy a presumption of qualified rather than absolute

immunity. Id. at 268; Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Absolute immunity only applies to a prosecutor’s

“special functions,” i.e. those functions closely associated with the prosecutor’s duties as an

advocate for the State. Id. The inquiry into which functions are prosecutorial and thus immune

focuses on the nature of the function performed rather than the identity of the actor who performed

it. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269. Nor should any weight be given to prosecutorial intent in the

immunity inquiry. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The issue is

not the harm that the conduct may have caused, but the nature of the conduct for which immunity is
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claimed. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271. So long as the prosecutor is acting in his role as an advocate for

the State, his actions are protected, even if his actions are malicious or dishonest. Imbler, 424 U.S.

at 428. 

It is well-established that a prosecutor is absolutely immune for initiating a prosecution and

presenting the State’s case. Id. at 431. In addition, a prosecutor is absolutely immune when:

deciding whether or not to prosecute, Roe v. City and County of San Francisco, 109 F.3d 578, 583

(9th Cir. 1997); preparing and filing an information and a motion for an arrest warrant, Kalina v.

Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129 (1997); preparing for trial, Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1028-29

(9th Cir. 2003); and appearing in court to argue a motion, Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 492 (1991). 

A prosecutor’s immunized duties will involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution

and acts apart from the courtroom. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.33. 

Moreover, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from claims that the prosecutor failed to

investigate the accusations against a defendant before filing charges; for the knowing use of false

testimony at trial; and for deciding not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material. See Broam,

320 F.3d at 1029-1030 (internal citations omitted) (summarizing several circuit court opinions

upholding absolute prosecutorial immunity in cases where a prosecutor was sued for deliberately

withholding exculpatory evidence or using perjured testimony); see also Marlowe v. Coakley, 404

F.2d 70, 70 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that absolute immunity barred appellant’s Section 1983 claims

against district attorney and his assistants for knowingly and willfully presenting perjured testimony

to a grand jury); Atkins v. Lanning, 556 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding a district attorney

was absolutely immune for his failure to verify that the proper person was named in the indictment). 

Even though a prosecutor’s decision not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material before or

during trial, or after a conviction, violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights, such conduct is

nevertheless entitled to absolute immunity. See id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 97

(1963)). “To be sure, this immunity does leave the genuinely wronged defendant without civil

redress against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives him of liberty, but the

alternative of qualifying a prosecutor’s immunity would disserve the broader public interest.” 

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427. 
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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights when

they filed a criminal complaint, failed to research the law, and continued to prosecute Plaintiff in

spite of evidence that the 1977 injunction had been voided. Although Plaintiff later states in his

opposition to the motion to dismiss that he was not suing “defendants for having initiated a

prosecution,” but “because . . . they continued to maintain their prosecution, even after dismissal of

the action by the Monterey County judge.” (Opp. Br. at 6.) The inconsistency in Plaintiff’s

allegations does not alter the analysis, as all of Defendants’ conduct which Plaintiff alleges violated

his constitutional rights, was squarely within a prosecutor’s duties to initiate a prosecution and to

present the State’s case. 

Defendants’ decision to continue litigating despite adverse facts raised during the trial, and

after an adverse decision from the trial court were discretionary judgments made by Defendants

based on the evidence before them. Defendants’ decision to prosecute Plaintiff is absolutely

immune because it was essential to Defendants’ execution of their duties as advocates for the State. 

See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424 (“A prosecutor is duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in

deciding which suits to bring and in conducting them in court.”). Likewise, researching or failing to

research the legal and factual claims raised by Plaintiff during his criminal trial were protected

prosecutorial functions. See Broam, 320 F.3d at 1030. 

Although Plaintiff in his Case Management Statement argues that Defendants were acting

“beyond the scope of [their] litigation-related duties” in an investigative or administrative capacity,

the facts alleged in his complaint do not support this contention. (Case Management Statement at

9.) A police officer investigating a crime or an office administrator assisting with the case would

not have been responsible for filing the criminal complaint, flushing out the validity of a defense

presented during a criminal trial, or for the decision to appeal an adverse trial court decision. Each

of Defendants’ alleged actions about which Plaintiff complains were intimately associated with the

judicial process, and therefore, cannot create a basis for Section 1983 liability. See Imbler, 424 U.S.

at 431. The Section 1983 claim against assistant district attorneys Flippo, Reed, and Ozgur is

accordingly dismissed. The individual defendants are dismissed with prejudice because any further

amendment would be futile. Plaintiff cannot set forth any facts that would establish Defendants’
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liability for prosecuting Plaintiff.

B. Plaintiff Has Failed to State a Monell Claim Against Defendant County of

Monterey.

Plaintiff also names the County of Monterey as a defendant in the complaint caption. Absent

from the complaint, however, are any specific allegations regarding how the County of Monterey

deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional rights such that they could be subjected to suit under Section

1983. Although Plaintiff’s Case Management Statement contains legal analysis regarding why

“counties are not shielded by immunity,” this section of the statement fails to contain any factual

allegations pertaining to the County sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. (Case Management

Statement at 10.) 

To the extent that Plaintiff advances a theory that the County is liable pursuant to the actions

of members of its District Attorney’s Office, a municipality cannot be found liable under Section

1983 on a respondeat superior theory. See Monell v. N.Y. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Municipal liability can be imposed only for injuries inflicted pursuant to an official

governmental policy or custom. Id. at 690-94. A county can be found liable when execution of a

county policy, whether made by its lawmakers or those whose acts can be said to represent official

policy or custom of the county, inflicts the injury. Id. at 694. While a single decision may satisfy

Monell’s municipal policy requirement, that decision must have been made by one of the

municipality’s authorized decisionmakers, i.e. by an official who “possesses final authority to

establish municipal policy with respect to the challenged action.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

475 U.S. 469, 479-81 (1986). 

To hold a local government liable for an official’s conduct, a plaintiff must first establish that

the official (1) had final policymaking authority concerning the action alleged to have caused the

particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue and (2) was the policymaker for the local

governing body for purposes of the particular act. McMillian v. Monroe County Alabama, 520 U.S.

781, 785 (1997). The Court in McMillian instructed courts to look to state law to determine whether

an official is the policymaker for the local government or the state for purposes of a particular act. 

Id. at 786. Applying the test set forth by the Supreme Court in McMillian, the Ninth Circuit has held
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that in California, a district attorney acts as a state official and not a county official when he decides

to proceed with a criminal prosecution. Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir.

2000). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim against the County here fails because the State, and not the

County, was the actor. See id. at 1031. Plaintiff cannot amend his complaint to name the State as a

defendant because states are not persons within the meaning of Section 1983. See Will v. Michigan

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against

the County is dismissed with prejudice. 

 To the extent Plaintiff alleges a state law claim against the County under the California Tort

Claims Act, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this claim in the absence

of a federal question claim. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss with

prejudice. The Clerk is directed to close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: November 8, 2005 

JEFFREY S. WHITE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE