Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01160/USCOURTS-caed-1_14-cv-01160-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Maria Antonia Perales
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARIA ANTONIA PERALES,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

Case No. 1:14-cv-01160-SAB

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF‟S SOCIAL 

SECURITY APPEAL

Plaintiff Maria Antonia Perales (“Plaintiff”) filed this action seeking judicial review of 

the final decision of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or 

“Commissioner”) denying Plaintiff‟s application for benefits under the Social Security Act. 

(ECF No. 1.) All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge 

for all purposes. (ECF Nos. 6, 8.)

Plaintiff applied for Social Security benefits due to impairments arising from bilateral 

carpal tunnel syndrome, polyarthralgias, and mild cervical degenerative disc disease. For the 

reasons set forth below, Plaintiff‟s appeal from the final decision of the Commissioner is denied.

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I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on December 27, 2010. (AR 

157.) Plaintiff‟s application was denied on June 2, 2011. (AR 84.) Plaintiff requested 

reconsideration on or around July 11, 2011. (AR 89.) Plaintiff‟s claim was denied on 

reconsideration on or around January 25, 2012. (AR 90.) Plaintiff requested a hearing on or 

around March 9, 2012. (AR 101.)

On December 10, 2012, a hearing took place before administrative law judge John Heyer

(“the ALJ”). (AR 54-72.) On January 25, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision finding 

Plaintiff to be not disabled. (AR 12-27.) Plaintiff requested a review of the ALJ‟s decision on or 

around March 25, 2013. (AR 11.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff‟s request for review on 

May 23, 2014. (AR 1.)

A. Plaintiff’s Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff was born on January 5, 1956. (AR 58.) Plaintiff has a driver‟s license and can 

drive. (AR 58.) As of the date of the hearing (December 10, 2012), Plaintiff last worked on 

September 28, 2012 doing sorting and packing. (AR 58.) Before her job as a sorter and packer, 

Plaintiff worked as an in-home care assistant from February to June of 2010. (AR 58-59.) Prior 

to then, Plaintiff worked at the Ball House Parking Shop for 10-20 years. (AR 59.)

Plaintiff stated that she cannot work because she received surgery on her hand in August 

2007, November 2007, and April 2008. (AR 60.) Plaintiff was told that she “couldn‟t do the 

same kind of job” after the surgery. (AR 60.) Plaintiff‟s doctor told Plaintiff she could work, 

but not doing the same things. (AR 60.)

Plaintiff estimates that the most she could lift would be a gallon of milk. (AR 60.) 

Plaintiff estimates that she could stand for two hours and walk for a little more than a half-hour. 

(AR 60.) Plaintiff stated that she could sit for about a half hour. (AR 61.)

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1 Citations to the Social Security Administrative Transcript will be designated as “AR” (administrative record). 

Page numbers will refer to the page numbers as stamped and indexed in the lodged transcript. (See ECF No. 11.)

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On a typical day, plaintiff puts the beds together, sweeps the house, cleans the kitchen 

and washes the dishes. (AR 61.) Plaintiff cleans the bathrooms, washes and dries the clothes, 

cleans up the yard, prepares everything to cook, and picks her son up at school. (AR 61.) 

Plaintiff goes grocery shopping, watches television and reads. (AR 61.) Plaintiff cannot wash 

all the dishes at once and has to take a break after about 15 minutes. (AR 64.)

Plaintiff takes Ibuprofen with Motrin for her pain. (AR 61-62.) It causes her to get dizzy 

and sleepy. (AR 62.) Plaintiff still suffers pain in her hands. (AR 64.) Plaintiff‟s pain is worse 

in her dominant right hand. (AR 64.) Plaintiff claimed that her pain level was ten out of ten, and 

the medication reduced it to six out of ten. (AR 66.) Plaintiff has to rest her hands for a total of 

three hours out of the day. (AR 66.) Plaintiff has trouble reaching for objects overhead and 

picking up small objects. (AR 66-67.) Plaintiff can button clothing but has problems with 

zippers. (AR 67.)

B. VE Testimony

Kelly Bartlett testified as the vocational expert (“the VE”) at the hearing before the ALJ 

on December 10, 2012. (AR 67.) The VE classified Plaintiff‟s past work as “sorter,” “packer,” 

and “companion.” (AR 67-68.) The VE presented the following first set of hypothetical 

limitations to the VE:

 Can lift 20 pounds;

 Can sit, stand, and walk for six hours in an eight hour day; and

 Cannot speak English, can speak Spanish.

(AR 68.) The VE testified that a person with such hypothetical limitations could perform 

Plaintiff‟s past work as a “companion” and as a “sorter.”

Plaintiff‟s attorney presented the following second set of hypothetical limitations to the 

VE:

 Can lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently;

 Only occasional bilateral hand control;

 Cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;

 Cannot crawl; and

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 Only occasional overhead reaching in the right upper extremity.

(AR 69.) The VE testified that a person with such hypothetical limitations could perform 

Plaintiff‟s past work as a companion but could not perform Plaintiff‟s past work as a sorter. (AR 

69.) The VE noted that, according to the classification in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, 

a person with such hypothetical limitations could not work as a companion, but the VE stated 

that Plaintiff was actually performing this work in 2011 and her personal knowledge of the 

“companion” job leads her to believe otherwise.

Plaintiff‟s attorney presented a third set of hypothetical limitations to the VE which was 

identical to the second, but with the added limitation that the person could only rarely use hand 

controls bilaterally. (AR 70-71.) The VE testified that such a person could not perform 

Plaintiff‟s past relevant work.

C. The ALJ’s Findings

The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

 Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through 

December 31, 2012;

 Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 3, 2007, the alleged 

onset date;

 Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome status 

post release, polyarthralgias, and mild cervical degenerative disc disease;

 Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or 

medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1;

 Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except she cannot speak English;

 Plaintiff is capable of performing past relevant work as a sorter and companion; and

 Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 

3, 2007, through the date of the ALJ‟s decision.

(AR 18-27.)

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II.

LEGAL STANDARDS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

DETERMINATIONS

An individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court “reviews the 

Commissioner‟s final decision for substantial evidence, and the Commissioner‟s decision will be 

disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Hill v. 

Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial evidence” means more than a 

scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is „such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.‟” Id. (quoting Richardson v. 

Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a 

whole and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill, 

698 F.3d at 1159 (quoting Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006)). 

However, it is not this Court‟s function to second guess the ALJ‟s conclusions and substitute the 

Court‟s judgment for the ALJ‟s. See Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005) 

(“Where evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ‟s 

conclusion that must be upheld.”)

III.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The only issue raised by Plaintiff in this appeal is whether the ALJ erred in determining 

that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work as a sorter and companion. Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ erred at step four of the sequential process in determining that Plaintiff could 

perform her past work as a sorter or work as a home care provider.

“At step four [of the five-step disability determination process], claimants have the 

burden of showing that they can no longer perform their past relevant work.” Pinto v. 

Massanari, 249 F.3d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e) and 416.920(e); 

Clem v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 328, 330 (9th Cir. 1990)).

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Although the burden of proof lies with the claimant at step four, 

the ALJ still has a duty to make the requisite factual findings to 

support his conclusion. [Citations.] This is done by looking at the 

“residual functional capacity and the physical and mental 

demands‟ of the claimant‟s past relevant work.” [Citations.] The 

claimant must be able to perform:

1. The actual functional demands and job duties of a particular 

past relevant job; or

2. The functional demands and job duties of the occupation as 

generally required by employers throughout the national economy.

[Citation.] This requires specific findings as to the claimant‟s 

residual functional capacity, the physical and mental demands of 

the past relevant work, and the relation of the residual functional 

capacity to the past work. [Citation.]

Based upon the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found that Plaintiff‟s past work included 

work as a packer, a sorter, and a caretaker/companion. The VE further found that Plaintiff could 

perform the duties of a sorter and a caretaker/companion even with the limitations found in 

Plaintiff‟s RFC (light work and cannot speak English).

Plaintiff argues that her past attempts to work cannot constitute “past relevant work” 

because her attempts to work did not rise to the level of “substantial gainful activity.” The Social 

Security Regulations define “past relevant work” as “work that you have done within the past 15 

years, that was substantial gainful activity, and that lasted long enough for you to learn to do it.” 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(1).

However, the facts support the ALJ‟s conclusion that Plaintiff‟s time as a sorter met the 

definition for “past relevant work,” including the requirement that it was “substantial gainful 

activity.” Plaintiff acknowledges that she worked as a sorter for nine months from July 2010 to 

March 2011. The records show that Plaintiff earned $7,006 from July 2010 to December 2010. 

Plaintiff earned $3,266 in the first quarter of 2011. Accordingly, Plaintiff earned a total of 

$10,272 during her nine month stint as a sorter. This qualifies as “substantial gainful activity,” 

as the Social Security Regulations state that earnings of $1,000 per month constitute “substantial 

gainful activity.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1574(b); POMS DI 10501.015B, table 2.

Plaintiff argues that her time working should be disregarded as a “trial work period.” 

Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592, the Social Security Regulations permit a claimant to test their 

ability to work while still being considered disabled. These provisions do not apply to Plaintiff, 

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as they only apply to persons who are already receiving disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1592(e) (“The trial work period begins with the month in which you become entitled to 

disability insurance benefits...”). Plaintiff also argues that work attempts up to six months can be 

disregarded as an unsuccessful work attempt. The facts showed that Plaintiff worked nine 

months from July 2010 to March 2011, making the six month unsuccessful work attempt 

provision inapplicable.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ and the VE improperly characterized Plaintiff‟s 

work prior to 2010 at Bolthouse Farms as a “sorter” job when it should have been considered a 

composite job consisting of attributes of both sorting and packing. Any error is harmless, as the 

ALJ relied upon Plaintiff‟s past relevant work from July 2010 to March 2011 in concluding that 

Plaintiff was not disabled, which Plaintiff described as a “sorter” job. (AR 170, 276.) Plaintiff 

argues that the Court cannot consider work performed from July 2010 to March 2011 in 

considering whether Plaintiff was disabled prior to July 2010. Plaintiff cites no authority for this 

proposition. There is no suggestion in the record that Plaintiff‟s condition had improved in 2010 

allowing her to work from July 2010 to March 2011. Accordingly, Plaintiff‟s ability to work 

during that time serves as substantial evidence that Plaintiff could have worked prior to 2010.

The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ‟s finding that Plaintiff could 

perform her past relevant work as a sorter. The Court need not address the ALJ‟s findings 

regarding Plaintiff‟s ability to perform her past relevant work as a caretaker/companion, as any 

error would be harmless in light of the finding that Plaintiff could work as a sorter.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ‟s decision was supported by 

substantial evidence.

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff‟s appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner is 

DENIED;

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2. JUDGMENT is entered in favor of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security 

and against Plaintiff Maria Antonia Perales; and

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 7, 2015 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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