Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03403/USCOURTS-ca7-15-03403-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Sylvester Purham
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 3, 2016*

Decided July 26, 2016

Before

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

ROBERT M. DOW, JR., District Judge**

No. 15-3403

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

SYLVESTER PURHAM,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 12-30019

Sue E. Myerscough,

Judge.

O R D E R

Sylvester Purham has filed a third direct appeal of his conviction and sentence for his 

participation in a crack-cocaine conspiracy. Purham’s appointed counsel believes that 

this successive appeal is frivolous and filed a motion to withdraw under Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant counsel’s Anders motion and dismiss this appeal.

 * After examining the briefs and record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus the 

appeal is submitted on the briefs and record. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

** Of the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 15-3403 Page 2

The background of this case is explained more fully in our opinion in Purham’s 

second appeal, see United States v. Purham (Purham II), 795 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 2015), but we 

offer a brief summary. Purham pled guilty, without a plea agreement, to the charge of 

conspiracy to distribute 280 grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841, 846. Purham later tried to withdraw his guilty plea, but the district court, after a 

hearing, denied the request. The court sentenced Purham to 360 months’ imprisonment 

and 10 years of supervised release.

In his first appeal, Purham challenged the district court’s relevant-conduct 

calculation and its imposition of a 4-level leadership enhancement. We reversed and 

remanded for resentencing, finding that the district court erred in including certain drug 

transactions as relevant conduct. See United States v. Purham (Purham I), 754 F.3d 411 (7th 

Cir. 2014). On remand, the district court sentenced Purham to 324 months’ 

imprisonment and 10 years of supervised release.

Purham again appealed. We rejected all of his challenges, except for his challenge to 

two conditions of supervised release. Purham II, 795 F.3d at 768. We ordered the 

following:

We AFFIRM the district court’s term of imprisonment. ... We VACATE, however, 

the community-service and gang-association conditions of supervised release 

discussed above. The sentence is AFFIRMED in every other respect. The case is 

REMANDED to the district court for limited proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.

On remand, the district court entered an order stating that it was “inclined to strike 

both conditions of supervised release.” The government agreed. The district court 

cancelled the resentencing hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 

32.1(c) because the relief sought was favorable to the defendant, did not extend the term 

of supervised release, and the government did not object. The court entered the 

judgment striking the two conditions. This appeal followed.

In her Anders brief, counsel first evaluates whether Purham could challenge the 

district court’s striking of the two conditions of supervised release without a hearing. 

Counsel properly recognizes that such a challenge would be frivolous. Our order in 

Purham II only vacated the two conditions the district court ultimately struck. The 

district court granted Purham the maximum relief available in light of our limited 

remand order by striking the two conditions. See United States v. Young, 66 F.3d 830 (7th 

Cir. 1995) (“[T]he ‘mandate rule’ requires the district court to adhere to our commands 

on remand.”). The district court’s decision to strike the conditions without a hearing was 

also proper. No hearing is required where the modification of a supervised-release 

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No. 15-3403 Page 3

condition is favorable to the defendant, does not extend the term of supervised release, 

and the government has not objected. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(2). All three circumstances 

were satisfied here.

Counsel’s Anders brief next evaluates whether Purham could raise any other 

challenges in this appeal. She properly concludes that raising any other challenges 

would be frivolous because they are waived. See United States v. Parker, 101 F.3d 527, 528 

(7th Cir. 1996) (“Only an issue arising out of the correction of the sentence ordered by 

this court could be raised in a subsequent appeal. Any issue not arising out of that 

correction could have been raised in the original appeal and was therefore waived by not 

being raised then.”). 

In response to counsel’s Anders brief, Purham identifies three issues he wishes to 

raise: that the district court erred in imposing a sentence of 324 months; that the district 

court did not give him notice of a variance at resentencing; and that the district court 

erred in accepting Purham’s guilty plea. The first two issues are squarely foreclosed by 

Purham II in which we affirmed the 324-month term of imprisonment. As for Purham’s 

claim of error in the district court’s acceptance of his guilty plea, the issue could have 

been raised in Purham I and is now waived.

Accordingly, counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw is GRANTED, and this appeal is 

DISMISSED. 

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