Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00816/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-00816-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Doe
Plaintiff
Asha George
Defendant
Kamala D. Harris
Defendant
Sempervirens Mental Health Facility
Defendant
Chris Starets-Foote
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN DOE,

Plaintiff,

v.

SEMPERVIRENS MENTAL HEALTH 

FACILITY, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 14-cv-00816-JD 

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

Re: Dkt. No. 48

This is a civil rights action arising out of plaintiff John Doe’s attempt to purchase a rifle in 

2012. Plaintiff alleges that he was unable to buy the firearm because a county mental health 

facility had incorrectly reported a prior treatment stay to the California Department of Justice 

(“DOJ”). Plaintiff also alleges that when he tried to fix the reporting error, the hospital and its 

employees refused to do what was needed, in a conscious and deliberate effort to deprive him of 

his constitutional right under the Second Amendment to keep and bear arms.

The Court previously granted plaintiff the right to proceed pseudonymously, Dkt. No. 28, 

and plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Kamala D. Harris, who had been sued in her official capacity as 

the Attorney General for the State of California and the head of the DOJ. Dkt. No. 44. The 

remaining defendants are Sempervirens Mental Health Facility (“Sempervirens”), which is an 

agency of the County of Humboldt, and two of its administrator employees: Drs. Asha George 

and Chris Starets-Foote. All three defendants ask the Court to grant summary judgment in their 

favor pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court grants the motion.

BACKGROUND

As the undisputed facts establish, plaintiff was hospitalized at Sempervirens for a brief

period in mid-1999. Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 4-5. Sempervirens reported to the California DOJ that plaintiff 

was hospitalized involuntarily under California Welfare & Institutions Code Section 5250. Id. ¶ 5. 

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That section permits “[t]he professional staff of the agency or facility providing evaluation 

services” to certify a person “for not more than 14 days of intensive treatment related to the mental 

health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism,” if, among other things, the staff “has 

analyzed the person’s condition and has found the person is, as a result of a mental health disorder 

or impairment by chronic alcoholism, a danger to others, or to himself or herself, or gravely 

disabled.” Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code § 5250(a). A person so certified has the right to 

receive a “certification review hearing, to be held within four days of the date on which the person

is certified . . . , to determine whether or not probable cause exists to detain the person for

intensive treatment related to the mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.” Id. 

§ 5254. Plaintiff never received a certification review hearing. 

Plaintiff contends that his hospital stay should have been reported under Section 5150 

instead of Section 5250. Section 5150 permits peace officers, persons designated by a county and 

others to, “upon probable cause, take, or cause to be taken, [a] person into custody for a period of 

up to 72 hours for assessment, evaluation, and crisis intervention, or placement for evaluation and 

treatment in a facility designated by the county . . . .” The parties do not dispute that, as a matter 

of federal law, persons who are hospitalized under Section 5150 are subject to a 5-year ban on the 

purchase of firearms, while those who are hospitalized under Section 5250 face a lifetime ban. 

Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 4-5.

Plaintiff says that he first discovered the Section 5250 reporting error when he was unable 

to complete a purchase of a small caliber “.22 rifle” in early 2012. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. He was denied the 

purchase on the ground of a purported lifetime ban. He then engaged in efforts to get 

Sempervirens to correct his record with the DOJ, beginning with a call to Sempervirens’ records 

department. In his own words, plaintiff states that he was “surprised and happy” when 

Sempervirens promptly and on its own initiative faxed to the DOJ a correction form, 

“indicating plaintiff was hospitalized in 1999 under Section 5150” and not Section 5250. Id. 

¶¶ 10-13; Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 13. Plaintiff was later informed, however, that the DOJ had requested “a 

follow-up letter from Sempervirens’ director, Dr. George, explaining the 12-year lapse in 

correcting the mistaken 1999 report” before it would actually correct plaintiff’s record. Dkt. No. 1

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¶ 14. Plaintiff had several phone calls with Dr. George, Dr. Starets-Foote and other Sempervirens 

personnel, some of which took on an angry and contentious tone. In one call, Dr. Starets-Foote 

informed plaintiff that “Sempervirens would ‘never’ provide the requested letter to the DOJ,” id. 

¶ 16, and that she “does not care about” plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 44.

It is undisputed, however, that in May 2012, Dr. George did send a letter to the DOJ which 

stated:

Based upon review of the existing records, [plaintiff] was placed on 

a 5250 [on] June 26, 1999. He was placed on a voluntary status [on]

June 29, 1999 and subsequently discharged on July 1, 1999. The 

notice of Welfare Institution Code 5250, 14 day hold, was sent to 

Department of Justice on June 26, 1999.

Please note [plaintiff] did not have a Certification Review Hearing. 

If you have any questions, I can be reached at . . . .

Dkt. No. 48-1, Ex. C. The DOJ apparently did not consider this letter to be sufficient and did not 

correct plaintiff’s record after receiving it. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 24. 

On August 4, 2014, about six months after plaintiff filed this lawsuit, Dr. George sent 

another letter to the DOJ. This second letter stated:

Please allow this letter to provide further clarification as to the 

reporting on June 26, 1999, of a Welfare and Institution Code 

§ 5250 hold of [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] was held on a Welfare and 

Institution Code § 5150 hold commencing June 23, 1999, and this 

was properly reported on that date.

Staff certified [plaintiff] for a further hold on June 26, 1999, 

pursuant to Welfare and Institution Code § 5250 and, as was the 

understanding of facility staff as to the practice at that time, a report 

was made of this. [Plaintiff] agreed to voluntary commitment prior 

to expiration of the four day time frame within which a hearing must 

be held and thus, no certification hearing occurred. It is my 

understanding under current guidelines, [plaintiff] would not be 

classified under Welfare and Institution Code § 5250 for reporting 

purposes because no hearing occurred and the period of time that he 

was held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code § 5250, based on 

staff certification would not be reportable.

In other words, the hospitalization commencing June 26, 1999, 

would no longer be reportable or classified as pursuant to Welfare 

and Institution Code § 5250 because no certification hearing was 

held.

Please advise if anything further is needed to correct your records.

Dkt. No. 48-1, Ex. D. Plaintiff acknowledges the sufficiency of this second letter and expressly 

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concedes that “defendants have finally, in late 2014, provided the California Department of Justice 

what it required of the Defendants to correct Sempervirens’ error(s).” Dkt. No. 50 at 4.

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges these four claims for relief: (1) for violations of 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983; (2) for declaratory relief under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060; (3) for 

equitable relief under California law; and (4) for a writ of mandamus under California law. Dkt. 

No. 1 ¶¶ 38-59. Defendants seek summary judgment on all four claims, asserting that “there is no 

triable issue of material fact as to any claim against any defendant.” Dkt. No. 48 at 1. 

DISCUSSION

Defendants bring their motion under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 

No. 48. Under that rule, a “party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or 

defense -- or the part of each claim or defense -- on which summary judgment is sought. The 

Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

Under the well-established case law governing summary judgment motions, a dispute is 

genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict” for either party. 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the 

outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. at 248-49. To determine whether a genuine 

dispute as to any material fact exists, a court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party and draw “all justifiable inferences” in that party’s favor. Id. at 255. A 

principal purpose of summary judgment “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported

claims.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). 

The moving party must initially establish the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, 

which it can do by “‘showing’ -- that is, pointing out to the district court -- that there is an absence 

of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. It is then the nonmoving party’s 

burden to go beyond the pleadings and identify specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. 

Id. at 323-34. “A scintilla of evidence or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly 

probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact.” Addisu v. Fred Meyer, 198 F.3d 

1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000). Only genuine disputes -- where the evidence is such that a reasonable 

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jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party -- over facts that might affect the outcome of 

the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. See 

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

In determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment, it is not the Court’s task “to 

scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 

(9th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Rather, it is entitled to rely on the nonmoving party to 

“identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Id.

I. SECTION 1983 CLAIM

Plaintiff’s primary claim -- and his only federal claim -- is his first claim for relief for 

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That section provides that “[e]very person who, under color of 

any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be 

subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” In our 

Circuit, “[t]o sustain an action under § 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) that the conduct complained 

of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that the conduct deprived 

the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right.” Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 

1214 (9th Cir. 1988). While a municipality is a “person” for § 1983 purposes under the landmark 

holding in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), it cannot 

be held liable solely because it employed a tortfeasor. Rather, a municipality may only be held 

liable “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury.” Los Angeles 

County, Cal. v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 452 (2010) (internal quotation marks and emphasis 

omitted).

Significantly, “the Supreme Court has held that mere negligence or lack of due care by 

state officials does not trigger the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore does not 

state a claim under § 1983.” Wood, 851 F.2d at 1214 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 

330-32 (1986) and Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986)). “[G]ross negligence, 

recklessness, or ‘deliberate indifference,’” on the other hand, have been found to support a § 1983 

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claim. Id. (citing, inter alia, Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 793, 795-97 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 

banc)). 

Defendants contend that there is no constitutional violation because neither Dr. George nor 

Dr. Starets-Foote “acted with intent nor deliberate indifference to deprive plaintiff of any 

constitutional right.” Dkt. No. 48 at 9. Plaintiff responds that, when viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to him, “there can be no doubt that the deliberate indifference of the two named 

defendants deprived plaintiff on a continuing basis of his right to keep and bear arms.” Dkt. 

No. 50 at 13. 

But even viewing the evidence in favor of the non-moving plaintiff, as the Court must, the 

record shows that Drs. George and Starets-Foote acted negligently at worst; they did not act with 

deliberate indifference. The critical undisputed fact is that Dr. George sent a letter to the DOJ in 

May 2012 that is not distinguishable in any material way from the letter she sent in August 2014, 

which plaintiff concedes was absolutely in line with respect for his constitutional rights. It may be 

that the DOJ reacted differently to the two letters, but the DOJ is no longer a defendant in this case 

nor is its response determinative of whether the remaining defendants have engaged in § 1983 

violations against plaintiff. Plaintiff himself says that he finds the 2014 letter to be “substantially 

more detailed than the 2012 version and it states unambiguously that the originally reported 

§ 5250 commitment never occurred and never could have occurred because I had not ever had a 

certification hearing.” Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 141. But the important fact here is that the 2012 letter, too, 

says plainly, “Please note [plaintiff] did not have a Certification Review Hearing.” Dkt. No. 48-1, 

Ex. C (emphasis added). 

The May 2012 letter also explained that (1) plaintiff was “placed on a 5250 [hold on] June 

26, 1989,” but (2) this status was changed to “voluntary status [on] June 29, 1999,” and 

(3) plaintiff “did not have a Certification Review Hearing.” Dkt. No. 48-1, Ex. C. The August 

2014 letter simply spells out the conclusions that necessarily follow from the facts stated in the 

May 2012 letter: “It is my understanding under current guidelines, [plaintiff] would not be 

classified under Welfare and Institution Code §5250 for reporting purposes because no hearing 

occurred and the period of time that he was held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code § 5250, 

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based on staff certification would not be reportable.” Id., Ex. D. Because the DOJ is no longer a 

defendant, the Court expresses no opinion on what the DOJ should or should not have done. But 

this much is clear: defendants communicated the same essential facts in May 2012 as they did in 

August 2014. They did not withhold the key facts that were necessary for making a correction to 

plaintiff’s DOJ record relating to his hospitalization at Sempervirens in 1999, and these actions do 

not support a finding that defendants were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s constitutional 

rights.

Plaintiff himself does not attack the August 2014 letter, and to the contrary, acknowledges 

its sufficiency. It cannot be, then, that defendants displayed a “deliberate indifference” to 

plaintiff’s constitutional rights by sending a substantively identical version of that letter fifteen 

months earlier. Though it may be that the August 2014 letter makes more explicit the conclusions 

the DOJ should have drawn from the May 2012 letter, any failures in that regard can only be 

characterized as negligence, at worst, and cannot support a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff has also alleged 

that Dr. Starets-Foote in particular made express statements that she “does not care about 

[plaintiff’s constitutional] rights,” Dkt. No. 52 ¶ 44, and other statements to that effect, but those 

words, too, undoubtedly spoken in the heat of an argumentative conversation, show a lack of due 

care at most. That Dr. Starets-Foote stated that she does not care about plaintiff’s Second 

Amendment rights certainly is not sufficient support for a § 1983 claim against her. What matters 

here is that the actions that were actually taken by the defendants were to send two letters to the 

DOJ, one in May 2012 and the other in August 2014, both of which are virtually identical in 

essential substance, and the latter of which plaintiff expressly concedes was what made the 

difference for restoring plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

On this record, the Court finds as a matter of law that defendants Drs. George and StaretsFoote did not undermine or sabotage plaintiff’s ability to purchase a firearm either intentionally or 

with deliberate indifference to his constitutional rights. Rather, while they may have made some 

statements to plaintiff in the heat of the moment that were angry and left him feeling attacked, the 

actual actions taken by defendants were in keeping with setting the record straight so that plaintiff 

would not be kept from being able to exercise his constitutional rights. Consequently, on 

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plaintiff’s § 1983 claim, the Court finds summary judgment warranted for all three remaining 

defendants.1 

II. STATE LAW CLAIMS

This is a case in which the parties are not diverse, and plaintiff stakes his right to be in 

federal court on the basis of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, while invoking “the court’s supplemental 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367” over his remaining state law claims. Dkt. No. 1 ¶ 30. But 

having found it appropriate to grant summary judgment for defendants on the single federal claim 

in this case (the only claim over which the Court has original jurisdiction), the Court declines to 

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s remaining state law claims pursuant to 28 

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Although the case is not at an early stage, the state law claims have barely 

been litigated, let alone mentioned. They certainly have not been litigated to any degree that 

would make the Court’s declination of supplemental jurisdiction over them unfair or inefficient. 

The Court consequently finds it appropriate to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims without 

prejudice. See Freeman v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) 

(“Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction ‘should be . . . without prejudice so that a plaintiff may 

reassert his claims in a competent court.’”).

CONCLUSION

The Court grants summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff’s first claim under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk 

is directed to enter a judgment that is consistent with this order and close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 13, 2015 ________________________

JAMES DONATO

United States District Judge

 

1

Plaintiff has made no independent allegations against the County of Humboldt with respect to 

any “policy or custom” apart from the actions taken by Drs. George and Starets-Foote, and 

because the Court finds no injury to plaintiff’s constitutional rights in any event, the Court finds 

judgment for the county to be appropriate without a separate analysis under Monell, 436 U.S. 658. 

Similarly, because the Court finds summary judgment to be warranted on the § 1983 claim due to 

a lack of triable issue going to any conduct that deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional 

right, the Court finds it unnecessary to reach the statute of limitations issues that have been briefed

by the parties.

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