Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05085/USCOURTS-ca13-15-05085-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Teresita A. Canuto
Appellant
United States
Appellee

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TERESITA A. CANUTO,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________ 

2015-5085

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal 

Claims in No. 1:15-cv-00410-CFL, Judge Charles F. 

Lettow. 

______________________ 

Decided: September 14, 2015

______________________ 

TERESITA A. CANUTO, Panorama City, CA, pro se. 

KRISTIN MCGRORY, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented 

by BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR.,

DEBORAH A. BYNUM. 

______________________ 

Case: 15-5085 Document: 11-2 Page: 1 Filed: 09/14/2015
 2 CANUTO v. US

Before DYK, TARANTO, and HUGHES, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Teresita Canuto appeals a decision by the Court of 

Federal Claims (the “Claims Court”), dismissing her 

claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Ms. Canuto works as a home health care nurse. She 

alleges that, in October 2014, she was working in a patient’s home when she was assaulted, on multiple occasions, by members of the United States Army and Navy. 

She does not specifically recall the alleged attacks. Rather, she claims to have noticed bruising and incisions on 

her legs and feet and therefore concluded she was sexually assaulted by the service members. She suggests that 

the attackers used an “inhalation agent that caused her to 

lose consciousness and mobility.” App. 3 (punctuation 

omitted).

Ms. Canuto did not inform the police, reasoning that 

“it would have been fruitless because she did not notice 

any pain after the assaults and therefore c[ould] not point 

out when and at what time these assaults happened.” Id.

(punctuation omitted). Nor is there any allegation that 

she informed anyone in the military of the alleged assaults. Instead, she filed suit in the Claims Court, premising jurisdiction on the Federal Tort Claims Act 

(“FTCA”), which is a statute allowing tort recovery 

against the United States for certain acts of its employees 

acting within the scope their employment. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1346(b). The Claims Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear her claim. Citing Ms. Canuto’s failure to 

administratively exhaust her claim prior to filing (a 

prerequisite to filing an FTCA claim, see 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2675(a)), the Claims Court dismissed the case rather 

than transferring it to a district court. 

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CANUTO v. US 3

On appeal, Ms. Canuto also raises a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

claim and alleges violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments. 

DISCUSSION

We review dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de novo. M. Marokapis Carpentry, Inc. v. United 

States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010). We review 

decisions by the Claims Court regarding whether to 

dismiss or transfer a case for abuse of discretion. Rick’s 

Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 

1342 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

Ms. Canuto has raised two sets of claims: a § 1983 

claim premised on violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments together with a separate claim for 

constitutional violations, and an FTCA claim. We find 

that the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Ms. 

Canuto’s FTCA and constitutional claims, and we dismiss 

Ms. Canuto’s § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted. 

The Claims Court has limited jurisdiction defined by 

statute. The Tucker Act grants jurisdiction to the Claims 

Court only “to render judgment upon any claim against 

the United States founded either upon the Constitution, 

or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive 

department, or upon any express or implied contract with 

the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1491(a)(1). In other words, the Claims Court can only 

hear cases against the United States for money damages, 

and cannot hear cases sounding in tort. 

Accordingly, the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to 

hear claims premised on violations of the Fourth and 

Fourteenth Amendments because neither the Fourth nor 

the Fourteenth amendment mandate money damages. 

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 4 CANUTO v. US

See Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 623 (Fed. Cir. 

1997) (Fourth Amendment does not mandate payment of 

money by the government and is therefore outside the 

jurisdiction of the Claims Court); LeBlanc v. United 

States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Fourteenth 

Amendment does not mandate payment of money by the 

government and is therefore outside the jurisdiction of the 

Claims Court). 

Similarly, the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 

Ms. Canuto’s FTCA claim for allegedly tortious conduct by 

the United States or its agents because it is specifically 

barred from hearing tort cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (no 

Tucker Act jurisdiction for claims arising in tort). District 

courts, not the Claims Court, have jurisdiction over FTCA 

claims “against the United States, for money damages . . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or 

death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission 

of any employee of the Government while acting within 

the scope of his office or employment.” See 28 U.S.C. § 

1346(b)(1). 

Further, the Claims Court did not abuse is discretion 

in deciding not to transfer Ms. Canuto’s case to a district 

court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Prior to filing an 

FTCA claim in the district court, a plaintiff must administratively exhaust the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (“[An 

FTCA action] shall not be instituted . . . unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate 

Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally 

denied by the agency in writing . . . .”). The Claims Court 

correctly determined that it should not transfer the case 

because Ms. Canuto failed to satisfy the jurisdictional 

requirement of exhausting her FTCA claim with the 

administrative agency prior to filing suit. There was no 

showing of exhaustion. 

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CANUTO v. US 5

Lastly, Ms. Canuto’s § 1983 claim must be dismissed 

for failure to state a claim because § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against the United States for actions of federal officials. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 (“Every person who, under color of any 

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State or Territory . . .”) (emphases added); Dist. Of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 424–25 (1973) (finding that 

“actions of the Federal Government and its officers are at 

least facially exempt” from § 1983 because they generally 

do not act under color of state law); United States v. City 

of Jackson, Miss., 318 F.2d 1, 8 (5th Cir. 1963) (“The 

United States is not a ‘person’ . . . under the Civil Rights 

Act.”). 

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.

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