Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01077/USCOURTS-ca10-16-01077-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
James Faircloth
Appellant
Celia Schwartz
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JAMES FAIRCLOTH, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

CELIA SCHWARTZ, Legal Assistant for 

BVCF, in her official and individual 

capacities, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

No. 16-1077 

(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-02764-REB-KLM) 

(D. Colo.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before HARTZ, MURPHY, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

James Faircloth, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks damages under 42 

U.S.C. § 1983 from Celia Schwartz, a prison librarian at the Buena Vista Correctional 

Facility. He claims that she interfered with his access to the courts and retaliated against 

him for filing grievances against her, in violation of the First Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted 

Ms. Schwartz summary judgment after denying Mr. Faircloth’s motion for an extension 

 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously 

that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted 

without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under 

the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, 

however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 

32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

December 12, 2016

Elisabeth A. Shumaker 

Clerk of Court

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of time to conduct additional discovery. Mr. Faircloth appeals. Exercising jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

Mr. Faircloth’s brief on appeal is not a model of clarity. We construe it liberally, 

see Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005), but we 

will not construct legal theories for him, see id. (“[T]he court cannot take on the 

responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments.”). His brief 

appears to raise only one issue: whether the district court erred in denying his motion for 

an extension of time to conduct discovery before responding to Ms. Schwartz’s motion 

for summary judgment. The only action he wants from this court is a “[r]emand for 

further proceedings to allow opposition motion and affidavits and other materials to be 

proffered to the district court for proper and full review of the matters of the material 

facts in dispute for trial.” Aplt. Br. at 9. 

To address this challenge, we begin by summarizing the events leading to the 

grant of summary judgment. Ms. Schwartz filed her motion for summary judgment on 

January 25, 2016, more than three years after Mr. Faircloth filed his initial complaint and 

about seven weeks before trial was set to begin. Mr. Faircloth’s response was due on 

February 9. On that date he filed a pleading styled “Motion—For Extension of Time to 

Respond to Summary Judgment Motion Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(E), 56(F),” which contended 

that he needed more time to conduct necessary discovery. The district court denied the 

motion, saying that “[Mr. Faircloth] has had more than three years to litigate,” that the 

“record in this case, including the filings of Mr. Faircloth himself, demonstrate[s] that 

[he] long has had access to the information he needs,” and that “with trial just over a 

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month away, [he] must focus on this case so his claims can be resolved on the merits.” 

Dist. Ct. Order on Rule 56(d) Mot. (Dist. Ct. Order) at 3, App., Vol. 5 at 177. Even so, 

the court did not foreclose granting him relief. Its order said that “in his response to the 

motion for summary judgment, Mr. Faircloth properly may cite evidence he has not been 

able to obtain and to argue why such evidence may be relevant to his summary judgment 

response.” Id.

Mr. Faircloth did not take advantage of the offer and file a response to the motion 

for summary judgment. But the district court, recognizing his pro se status, treated his 

motion for an extension of time and an affidavit submitted by him as his response. In its 

order granting summary judgment it displayed even more tolerance by considering 

unsworn statements and hearsay in those documents. 

The law governing Mr. Faircloth’s motion requesting additional time to pursue 

discovery is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), which states: 

If a nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, 

it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition [to a motion for 

summary judgment], the court may: (1) defer considering the motion or 

deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take 

discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a Rule 56(d) 

motion. See F.D.I.C. v. Arciero, 741 F.3d 1111, 1116 (10th Cir. 2013). “We will not 

reverse unless the district court’s decision to deny discovery exceeded the bounds of the 

rationally available choices given the facts and the applicable law in the case at hand.” 

Id. (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). 

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 The district court’s response to Mr. Faircloth’s motion was eminently reasonable, 

and we see no abuse of discretion in the denial. On appeal Mr. Faircloth discusses the 

evidence he would like to obtain but he makes no effort to challenge the district court’s 

description of the procedural posture of the case. Nor does he acknowledge that the 

district court bent over backwards to assist him by offering to consider evidence that he 

was not able to obtain, so long as he made a showing of relevance, and by actually 

considering the unsworn statements and hearsay appearing in his motion for an extension 

of time and his affidavit. 

We also address one other matter that Mr. Faircloth may be raising in his opening 

brief in this court. His brief might be read as challenging the district court’s rejection of 

his claim that Ms. Schwartz was retaliating against him for his threat to file a grievance 

against her (uttered during an incident on October 10, 2012) when she submitted an 

alleged false report about the incident that led to disciplinary proceedings against him. 

The court’s opinion does not mention the threat to file a grievance, and the brief objects 

that “the complaint clearly stated that Faircloth was going to file a grievance and 

defendant Schwartz overheard it and while Faircloth was on his way to file the grievance 

she caused a false report to be filed.” Aplt. Br. at 3. 

This additional information would not, however, affect the propriety of the 

summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of 

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). The problem with the information referenced by Mr. Faircloth is that it is 

immaterial whether he threatened to file a grievance. To survive summary judgment on a 

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First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that the adverse action by the 

defendant was in response to constitutionally protected activity. See Mocek v. City of 

Albuquerque, 813 F.3d 912, 930 (10th Cir. 2015) (first element of retaliation claim is that 

plaintiff “was engaged in constitutionally protected activity” (internal quotation marks 

omitted)). And to prevail on a damage claim under § 1983, the showing that the activity 

was constitutionally protected must be supported by clearly established law. See

Mayfield v. Bethards, 826 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Qualified immunity 

protects government officials from suit for civil damages if their conduct does not violate 

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.”). Mr. Faircloth’s claim does not 

satisfy the latter requirement. “A right is clearly established in this circuit when a 

Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly established weight 

of authority from other courts shows that the right must be as the plaintiff maintains.” 

Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1194 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). But we are aware of no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion declaring that 

a threat to file a grievance is constitutionally protected activity. And there is certainly no 

consensus of other courts. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2009) 

(“[I]t seems implausible that a threat to file a grievance would itself constitute a First 

Amendment-protected grievance.”); Dawson v. Audet, No. 12-cv-00901-MSK-BNB, 

2014 WL 4947315, at *4 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2014) (reviewing pertinent caselaw). We 

will not reverse the judgment below based on Mr. Faircloth’s vague and undeveloped 

challenge to the merits of the court’s ruling. 

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We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. Mr. Faircloth’s motions to 

proceed in forma pauperis, to conduct a phone hearing, and to appoint counsel are 

DENIED. 

Entered for the Court 

Harris L Hartz 

Circuit Judge 

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