Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02289/USCOURTS-ca8-04-02289-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Mario Alberto Bueno
Appellee
United States of America
Appellant

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 ___________

 No. 04-2289

 ___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellant, *

*

v. *

*

Mario Alberto Bueno, *

*

Appellee. *

 ___________

Appeals from the United States

 No. 04-2338 District Court for the

 ___________ Western District of Missouri.

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

*

v. *

*

Mario Alberto Bueno, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: February 15, 2006

Filed: April 17, 2006

___________

Before WOLLMAN, FAGG, and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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We also grant Bueno’s motion to supplement the record.

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___________

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Mario Alberto Bueno pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute five

kilograms or more of powder cocaine. The district court reduced Bueno’s U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines offense level and granted a downward departure from the

guidelines, resulting in a sentence of eighteen months in prison and three years of

supervised release. The government appeals this sentence. Bueno cross-appeals,

arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in quashing

his subpoena duces tecum. We affirm on Bueno’s cross-appeal, and we vacate the

sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.1

I.

On January 9, 2001, Corporal Rex Scism and Trooper Kirk Davis (collectively,

officers) of the Missouri State Highway Patrol stopped Bueno for a traffic violation.

The officers had been traveling westbound on Interstate 70 in their patrol car and met

Bueno’s vehicle traveling eastbound on the same highway. Scism testified that he

observed that the vehicle did not have a front license plate and proceeded to stop the

vehicle. Scism approached the vehicle and advised Bueno that he had been stopped

because his vehicle was lacking license plates and because the officers could not

observe a temporary vehicle registration affixed to the vehicle. Scism asked Bueno

for his license and registration. Bueno handed over his license and pointed to the

temporary registration that was affixed to the vehicle’s windshield. The temporary

registration stated that the vehicle belonged to someone other than Bueno. 

After examining the temporary registration, Scism ordered Bueno to exit his

vehicle and wait in the patrol car while the officers checked on the license and

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Neither party argues on appeal that a different version of the guidelines should

apply in this case. Accordingly, we also apply the 2002 version of the guidelines in

our analysis.

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temporary registration and until they had completed the traffic stop. While Bueno

was waiting in the patrol car, Scism inquired about the owner of the vehicle and

Bueno’s destination. Bueno responded that the vehicle belonged to his brother and

that he was traveling from California to St. Louis, Missouri, where he would meet his

brother and they would purchase some cars to transport back to California.

After the officers completed checking Bueno’s license and registration, they

documented the warning that they gave to Bueno, returned his license and

registration, and told Bueno to have a safe trip. At that point, Bueno began to exit the

patrol car. Scism testified that he then asked Bueno for consent to search his vehicle

and that Bueno said “Sure, go ahead.” Davis’s testimony corroborates Scism’s

account. Bueno testified that Scism did not ask for consent to search, but instead

grabbed Bueno’s arm, put him on the hood of the vehicle, told him that he was going

to have to search the vehicle, and that Bueno raised his hand and said “Fine.” Upon

searching the vehicle, Scism found a false floor and an access door leading to a

compartment that was not standard for such a vehicle. Because this caused him to

suspect that Bueno was trafficking contraband, he placed Bueno in handcuffs. Scism

then returned to the vehicle and found 76.9 kilograms of cocaine inside the

compartment. He then read Bueno his rights and arrested him for drug trafficking.

Bueno pleaded guilty to possessing with intent to distribute five kilograms or

more of powder cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).

Sentencing took place on April 28, 2004. In accordance with the Presentence

Investigation Report (PSR), the district court applied the 2002 version of the

sentencing guidelines2

 and determined that Bueno’s base offense level was thirty-six

and that § 841(b)(1)(A) required a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years in

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prison. The district court further determined, however, that Bueno qualified for the

safety valve reduction pursuant to § 5C1.2 of the guidelines. The district court also

concluded that Bueno was entitled to a two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(6) and

a three-level reduction under §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b) for acceptance of responsibility.

This brought Bueno’s adjusted offense level to thirty-one, which provided for a

sentencing range of 108 to 135 months.

Bueno then argued that he was entitled to a minimal participant reduction under

§ 3B1.2. To buttress his claim that other participants were also involved in the

offense, Bueno offered evidence that the vehicle’s temporary registration was in

another’s name, that personal papers of another were found in the vehicle, and that

Bueno possessed driving directions to Chicago that were in another’s handwriting.

Bueno also explained that Carlos, a man whom he had asked for a loan, gave him the

job of driving the vehicle and that another participant met him at the airport to

provide him with the vehicle. Bueno further explained that he did not fully cooperate

with the police in identifying Carlos because he was afraid that Carlos would retaliate

against him.

Over the government’s objections, the district court granted Bueno’s request

for a minimal participant reduction. This lowered Bueno’s offense level to thirty

under § 2D1.1. Taking into account the two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(6), the

three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the four-level reduction for

minimal participation, the district court determined Bueno’s total offense level to be

twenty-one. This corresponded to a sentencing range of thirty-seven to forty-six

months.

Finally, Bueno argued that he was entitled to a downward departure for

aberrant behavior under § 5K2.20 and family ties and responsibilities under § 5H1.6,

as well as a general departure under § 5K2.0. Bueno argued that a departure was

warranted because this was his first offense, he was under great financial pressure

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when he committed the offense, his wife was suffering from lupus and rheumatoid

arthritis, and because, in his view, this was a case of exceptional circumstances. The

district court granted a downward departure for the reasons stated by Bueno and, as

set forth above, sentenced Bueno to eighteen months in prison and three years of

supervised release. This constituted a fifty-one percent departure from the bottom of

the guidelines range for an offense level of twenty-one and an eighty-three percent

departure from the bottom of the guidelines range for an offense level of thirty-one.

II.

In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court struck the statutory provisions

that made sentencing within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines mandatory. 543 U.S.

220 (2005). After Booker, a sentencing judge must still determine the proper

guidelines range and determine whether a traditional departure is appropriate under

the guidelines. United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2005). These

considerations result in a guidelines sentence. Id. at 1003. Once this guidelines

sentence is determined, the district court must then consider all of the factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether to impose the sentence

under the guidelines or a non-guidelines sentence. Id.

A.

The government argues that the district court erred in determining that Bueno

was entitled to a downward adjustment as a minimal participant under § 3B1.2 of the

guidelines. We review the district court’s determination for clear error. See United

States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1114 (8th Cir. 2006). We will affirm a district

court’s determination unless it is not supported by substantial evidence, it resulted

from an erroneous conception of the applicable law, or we firmly believe, after

reviewing the record, that a mistake has been made. United States v. Ramos-Torres,

187 F.3d 909, 915 (8th Cir. 1999). 

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Section 3B1.2 provides that a defendant’s role in an offense may be reduced

by four levels if the offense involved multiple participants and the defendant was

substantially less culpable than the average participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. nn.2

& 3. “The propriety of a downward adjustment is determined by comparing the acts

of each participant in relation to the relevant conduct for which the participant is held

accountable and by measuring each participant’s individual acts and relative

culpability against the elements of the offense.” Ramos-Torres, 187 F.3d at 915.

Congress intended the downward adjustment for a minimal participant to be used

infrequently, U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. n.4, and the defendant has the burden of proving

his eligibility for the decrease in the offense level, United States v. Carrazco, 91 F.3d

65, 67 (8th Cir. 1996). 

Bueno offered no evidence of the relative culpabilities of other participants in

the offense and therefore did not carry his burden of proving that he was eligible for

the reduction. Accordingly, the district court’s determination that Bueno was entitled

to a downward adjustment because of his minimal participation in the offense is not

supported by substantial evidence and was clearly erroneous.

B.

We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to grant a

downward departure from the appropriate guidelines range. United States v. Porter,

439 F.3d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Hawkman, 438 F.3d 879, 882 (8th

Cir. 2006). A district court may impose a sentence outside the range if it determines

that the circumstances of the case are so unusual that the case falls outside the

heartland of cases covered by the guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0, cmt.; United States

v. Rodriguez, 414 F.3d 837, 847-48 (8th Cir. 2005). The district court based its

downward departure on three grounds: (1) aberrant behavior under § 5K2.20, (2)

family ties and responsibilities under § 5H1.6, and (3) a general departure under §

5K2.0. We conclude that the departure was unwarranted. 

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To be entitled for a downward departure due to aberrant behavior under §

5K2.20, the offense must have been a single criminal occurrence or transaction that

was committed without significant planning, was of limited duration, and represented

a marked deviation by the defendant from an otherwise law-abiding life. U.S.S.G. §

5K2.20, cmt. n.1. The offense must have been more than something out of the

defendant’s character; it must have been a spontaneous and thoughtless act. United

States v. Weise, 89 F.3d 502, 507 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, a district court may not

grant an aberrant behavior departure if the offense of conviction was a serious drug

trafficking offense, which is any controlled substance offense under Title 21, other

than simple possession. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20 & cmt. n.1. Bueno’s offense was a

serious drug trafficking offense. See U.S.S.G. § 5K2.20, cmt. n.1. Furthermore,

Bueno’s offense required considerable planning on his part and was carried out over

a number of days. Accordingly, a downward departure on this ground was

unwarranted, and to the extent that the district court relied on this ground in granting

the departure, it abused its discretion.

Family ties and responsibilities may also be a ground for departure when

extraordinary circumstances are present such that the case lies outside the heartland

of cases covered by the guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6; U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; see also

United States v. Tobacco, 428 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.

Harrison, 970 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1992). This is a disfavored reason, however,

for granting a departure. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95 (1996). In United

States v. Haversat, we determined that such a departure was warranted because the

defendant’s wife suffered severe psychiatric problems that were potentially life

threatening and the defendant was an irreplaceable part of her treatment plan. 22 F.3d

790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Spero, 382 F.3d 803, 804-05 (8th

Cir. 2004). In United States v. VanHouten, however, we held that a departure based

on family ties and responsibilities was unwarranted when the defendant failed to

proffer evidence that his mother’s condition was life threatening or that his care was

a necessary part of her medical treatment. 307 F.3d 693, 698 (8th Cir. 2002). Bueno

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argues that extraordinary family circumstances are present in his case because his

wife is suffering from lupus and rheumatoid arthritis and he is her primary caregiver.

Bueno’s situation, however, is closer to that in VanHouten than in Haversat. Bueno

has offered little evidence that his wife’s situation is life threatening, and he has failed

to demonstrate that his care is a necessary part of her treatment. Bueno has thus not

established that the circumstances warrant a departure on this ground.

A district court may also grant a general downward departure pursuant to §

5K2.0 if it determines that a mitigating circumstance, either in kind or to a degree,

was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in

formulating the guidelines and the case falls outside the heartland of cases covered

by the guidelines. We see nothing in the circumstances that would justify a finding

that this case is other than the all too common situation in which a defendant agrees

to transport drugs for cash.

C.

Finally, we review the district court’s imposition of an eighteen-month

sentence for reasonableness. See, e.g., United States v. Hadash, 408 F.3d 1080, 1082-

84 (8th Cir. 2005). After Booker, the sentencing court must consider the factors

enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in imposing a sentence. See id. A sentence

within the guidelines range is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Lincoln,

413 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2005). An extraordinary variance from the sentencing

guidelines must be supported by extraordinary circumstances. United States v.

Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033 (8th Cir. 2005). 

In the present case, the circumstances are not so extraordinary that they warrant

an eighty-three percent departure from an offense level of thirty-one. An eighteenmonth sentence does not adequately reflect the seriousness of Bueno’s offense, afford

adequate deterrence, or adequately avoid sentencing disparities among similarly

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situated defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its

discretion in granting such a large departure and that the sentence imposed is

unreasonable.

III.

In his cross-appeal, Bueno contends that the district court erred in denying his

motion to suppress. We examine the factual findings underlying the district court’s

decision for clear error and review de novo the ultimate question of whether the

Fourth Amendment has been violated. United States v. Carter, 413 F.3d 712, 714

(8th Cir. 2005).

 First, and underlying each of his Fourth Amendment arguments, Bueno

contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that the officers were credible

witnesses. We generally defer to the district court on issues of credibility, however,

because the district court is in the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses.

See United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 735 (8th Cir. 2002). Having reviewed the

record, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that the

officers were credible witnesses and in believing their testimony over Bueno’s

testimony. 

Bueno next argues that because there was no reasonable suspicion for the

traffic stop, all evidence arising out of the stop should be suppressed as fruit of the

poisonous tree. He contends that the stop was based on a mistake of law and

therefore did not provide the requisite reasonable suspicion for the stop. We have

held, however, that neither mistake of law nor mistake of fact renders a traffic stop

illegal so long as the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the

circumstances. United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005). We

conclude that the officers’ actions were reasonable under these circumstances. We

credit the district court’s finding that the officers could not see the temporary

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registration affixed to the vehicle’s windshield until after they had stopped the

vehicle. Because a lack of license plates or a temporary registration would have

constituted a violation of state law, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle. 

Bueno also argues that the officers illegally ordered him out of his vehicle.

Once a vehicle has been stopped for a traffic violation, a police officer may order the

driver out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment, Pennsylvania v.

Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-12 (1977) (per curiam), and thus Bueno’s argument fails.

Likewise, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when the officers required

Bueno to remain in the patrol car during the stop. Once officers legitimately stop a

vehicle, they are entitled to conduct an investigation that is reasonably related in

scope to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. United States v.

Bloomfield, 40 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc). This includes asking the

driver for his license and registration, requesting him to sit in the patrol car, and

inquiring as to the driver’s destination and purpose. Id. Further, if a defendant is

detained incident to a traffic stop, the officer does not need reasonable suspicion to

continue the detention until the purpose of the traffic stop has been completed. See

United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2001). We agree with the

district court’s finding that the length of the traffic stop and the detention incident to

the stop was reasonable in relation to the circumstances of the case. 

Bueno further argues that the district court erred in determining that he

voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. As recounted above, Scism

testified that he asked Bueno for permission to search his vehicle and that Bueno

responded by stating “Sure, go ahead.” Davis testified to the same effect. We

conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding that Bueno consented to

the search. Bueno also argues that his limited ability to speak and understand English

and his limited experience with police officers made any consent that he may have

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given involuntary. Consent is voluntary if it is “an essentially free and unconstrained

choice by its maker.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). To

determine whether consent has been freely and voluntarily given, we consider the

totality of the circumstances. Id. at 227. Bueno’s claimed lack of proficiency in the

English language and his limited experience with police officers—at least to the

extent that it may reflect upon his knowledge of protections afforded to suspected

criminals—are relevant factors in determining whether his consent was voluntary.

See United States v. Chaidez, 906 F.2d 377, 381 (8th Cir. 1990). The record,

however, reveals that Bueno graduated from a high school in this country, is a longterm resident, and has three children who primarily speak English. Moreover, the

officers testified that they had no trouble understanding Bueno’s English. Further,

Bueno’s claimed lack of previous experience with police officers does not mandate

a finding that his consent was involuntary. Accordingly, the district court did not

clearly err in finding that Bueno had a sufficient command of the English language

to understand the officer’s request for consent to search his vehicle and that Bueno

voluntarily provided this consent. 

IV.

Finally, Bueno argues that he was deprived of a fair hearing because the district

court erroneously quashed his subpoena duces tecum. Bueno also argues that he was

denied a fair hearing because the court failed to order Scism to explain why he refuses

to use a tape recorder or forms to record defendants’ consents. Bueno fails to cite any

law supporting either of these claims, and we dismiss the latter as meritless.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to quash a

subpoena. United States v. Hardy, 224 F.3d 752, 756 (8th Cir. 2000); United States

v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 345 (5th Cir. 1992). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17

provides that a subpoena must be issued by a clerk of court, which is signed and

sealed by the clerk. In the present case, because the subpoena was not signed by the

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clerk, it did not comply with the requirements of Rule 17 and was not enforceable.

Moreover, the subpoena did not comply with the substantive requirements of Rule

17. The Supreme Court has made clear that subpoenas duces tecum are not meant to

serve as tools of discovery in criminal cases, but are instead means by which to

expedite the trial by providing a time and place prior to trial for the inspection of

subpoenaed materials. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 698-99 (1974). To

require production before trial, then, a moving party must show, among other things,

that the documents are evidentiary and relevant and that the application is made in

good faith and is not intended as a general fishing expedition. Id. at 699-700. As the

government points out, Bueno conceded that he did not know the precise nature of

the information sought by the subpoena. The subpoena failed to meet the specificity

requirements of Rule 17, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in quashing

it.

The district court’s judgment imposing a sentence of eighteen months in prison

and three years of supervised release is vacated, and the case is remanded for

resentencing in accordance with the opinion in Booker, 543 U.S. 220. The district

court’s orders denying Bueno’s motion to suppress and granting the government’s

motion to quash Bueno’s subpoena are affirmed.

______________________________

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