Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-01783/USCOURTS-azd-4_10-cr-01783-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Michael William McKerlie
Defendant
USA
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1 The Motion to Suppress Statement remains pending.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Michael William McKerlie, 

Defendant. 

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CR 10-1783-TUC-FRZ (JCG)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendant Michael McKerlie faces charges of Distribution of Child Pornography and

Possession of Child Pornography. (Doc. 1.) The charges stem from an investigation initiated

by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after one of its agents identified the Defendant

as an individual allegedly sharing child pornography through the internet. Unbeknownst to

the FBI agent, another federal agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had

recently investigated the Defendant for the same offenses. No child pornography was

discovered by ICE agents during their search. When the FBI applied for a search warrant for

Defendant's residence, the Magistrate Judge was not informed of the fact of ICE's

investigation, including ICE's prior search of Defendant's house and computer.

Defendant brought a Motion to Suppress Evidence seized by the FBI in the execution

of its search warrant on the grounds that the magistrate judge would not have issued the

warrant, knowing that a prior search failed to produce any evidence of possession or

distribution of child pornography. (Doc. 15.) In his Motion, Defendant requested a Franks

hearing to determine if the FBI "knew or more importantly should have known of the

contemporaneous ICE investigation." (Id.) The Defendant also filed a Motion to Suppress

or Exclude Statement. (Doc. 16.)1

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 1 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

The Motion for Additional Disclosure sought three items: (1) a written summary of any

expert testimony to be used by the government in its case in chief; (2) reports relating to the

examination of the defendant's computer; and (3) the name of the AUSA who consulted with the ICE

agents. (Doc. 25.) Item 2 was resolved at the hearing. The request for disclosure of the AUSA's

identity is addressed in this Report. 

- 2 -

After the Motions were fully briefed, they were set for hearing on March 10, 2011.

Two days before the hearing, the Defendant moved to continue, stating that "additional time

was necessary to resolve legal issues in an attempt to simply [sic] the motions hearings" and

because of a possibility of resolving the case without the necessity of a hearing on the

motions. (Doc. 21.) The request for continuance was unopposed. The Magistrate granted

the request, vacated the hearing, and ordered that the parties contact chambers to reset the

hearing sufficiently before the trial date to allow time for a Report and Recommendation to

be prepared. (Doc. 23.) 

On March 28, 2011, the Defendant filed a Motion for Additional Disclosure, seeking

among other things, the name of the Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) who consulted

with the ICE agents regarding the "knock and talk" search at Defendant's home. (Doc. 25.)

At a hearing on April 13, 2011, the Defendant argued that what took place at the United

States Attorney's office is relevant to determine if that office was aware of the prior search

by ICE and, if not, why not. Both parties argued the disclosure issue in relation to the

Motion to Suppress Evidence. After the hearing, the Magistrate took the matter under

advisement.2

 

Determining whether the Defendant is entitled to disclosure of the AUSA's identity

requires consideration of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, as indicated by the parties at

argument. The issues are inextricably intertwined. To determine whether to grant the

Defendant's request for the disclosure, the Magistrate Judge must consider whether the

requested information is relevant to resolution of the Motion to Suppress. Thus, this Report

and Recommendation necessarily address both the Motion for Additional Disclosure and the

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. 

//

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 2 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 3 -

BACKGROUND

There is no dispute as to the following relevant facts. 

A. The ICE Investigation

ICE began investigating the Defendant in April 2007 and the investigation continued

for more than three years, ending on May 28, 2010. On April 15, 2009, ICE agents

interviewed Defendant at his home regarding information obtained by ICE indicating that,

in 2006 and 2007, Defendant had purchased subscriptions to child pornography websites

using his credit card. During the April 15, 2009 interview, Defendant denied any

involvement with child pornography. Defendant gave the ICE agents permission to examine

two computers that were in his possession. ICE Special Agent (SA) John Owen conducted

an on-site forensic examination of these two computers; the examination did not reveal any

child pornography images. Defendant also told the ICE agents during the interview that he

owned an additional laptop computer but had disposed of it approximately two weeks prior

to the April 15, 2009 interview. 

After the April 15, 2009 interview, an ICE Special Agent informed the Defendant's

supervisor that ICE had concluded its investigation. The supervisor told the ICE agent that

he had revealed the ICE investigation to the Defendant prior to ICE's April 15, 2009,

interview of Defendant and examination of the Defendant's computer at Defendant's house.

The ICE agent told the supervisor that this may have caused the Defendant to destroy

evidence. 

B. The FBI Investigation

On March 23, 2009, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Special Agent (SA)

Michelle Terwilliger, acting in an undercover capacity, was using the LimeWire peer to peer

file sharing application to identify individuals sharing child pornography over the internet.

SA Terwilliger allegedly connected with Defendant online and downloaded ten image files

from Defendant, all of which constituted child pornography. Subsequent investigation

identified the Defendant through internet service provider subscriber information, and it was

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 3 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 4 -

determined that Defendant was in Tucson, Arizona at the time the child pornography files

were made available for download. 

SA Terwilliger provided the information obtained from her online investigation to FBI

SA Eric Campbell. On August 3, 2009, SA Campbell obtained a search warrant for

Defendant’s residence from Magistrate Judge Charles R. Pyle. The search warrant was

executed by FBI agents on August 7, 2009. At the time of the search, agents seized

Defendant’s computer, a Gateway GM5472 desktop computer. The FBI subsequently

conducted a full forensic examination of Defendant’s computer hard disk drive; the

examination revealed 14 still image child pornography files depicting minors engaging in

sexually explicit conduct, including depictions of sadistic and masochistic conduct.

During the execution of the warrant, the Defendant told FBI agents that he had

previously been interviewed by ICE agents regarding child pornography. Prior to the August

7, 2009 interview with Defendant, the FBI agents were not aware of any investigation by ICE

involving Defendant. After learning of the ICE investigation from Defendant, SA Campbell

contacted the Tucson ICE office, which confirmed ICE’s previous investigation. 

AUSA Angela Woolridge was the attorney who authorized the FBI's application for

a search warrant regarding Defendant's premises and computer. She was not aware of the

prior ICE investigation of Defendant. After inquiry, Ms. Woolridge learned that a different

AUSA had been working with ICE on its investigation. No file had been opened because no

images of child pornography had been discovered in the on-site preview of Defendant’s

computer. Ms. Woolridge had not discussed the FBI investigation of Defendant with the

other AUSA prior to the FBI’s search warrant application. 

Defendant was indicted on July 21, 2010 for one count of Distribution of Child

Pornography and one count of Possession of Child Pornography.

ANALYSIS

A. Motion to Suppress Evidence

In his Motion to Suppress Evidence, Defendant challenges the admissibility of the

evidence obtained from his computer by the FBI on the ground that the search warrant

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 4 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 5 -

omitted the material information that ICE had previously searched Defendant's computers

and found no child pornography. Defendant asserts that had Magistrate Judge Pyle been

aware of the "totality" of the federal investigations and the previous examination of the

computer, he would not have found probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.

Defendant seeks a Franks hearing to demonstrate that the omitted information was material

to the probable cause determination. 

A defendant is entitled to challenge a search warrant "upon a substantial showing that

the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted facts required to prevent technically true

statements in the [search warrant] affidavit from being misleading." United States v.

Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1268, 1280 (9th Cir. 1988). Where a defendant makes a substantial

preliminary showing that a false statement “knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless

disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the

allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth

Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request.” Franks v. Delaware,

438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978). “In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or

reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and,

with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is

insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of

the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the

affidavit.” Id. There is a presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the

search warrant. Id. at 171.

1. Knowing and intentional or reckless omission

In the present case, Defendant has failed to make the substantial preliminary showing

that the affiant "knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth" omitted

facts required to prevent the statements in the affidavit from being misleading. There is no

indication that SA Campbell committed perjury or acted with reckless disregard for the truth

when he did not include the fact of ICE's prior examination of the computer in his application

for a search warrant of the same computer. In fact, Defendant does not contend that FBI SA

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 5 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

 To the extent Defendant intends to cite DeLeon for the proposition that a warrant may be

invalid where it fails to include information that an agent should have known, such an argument is

without merit. DeLeon and Franks require the omission to be intentional or reckless – either on the

part of the affiant or the agents who provided the information that formed the basis for the warrant.

- 6 -

Campbell knew about the ICE investigation or its earlier search of the Defendant's computer.

Defendant concedes as much when he suggests that the FBI “should have known” about the

ICE investigation or made some effort to determine whether other federal investigative

agencies were also investigating the Defendant for child pornography. 

Defendant cites United States v. DeLeon, 979 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1992), in support of

the proposition that SA Campbell's lack of knowledge about the ICE investigation is not

controlling. DeLeon, however, is factually inapplicable. In DeLeon, one investigating agent

knew exculpatory information and purposely withheld it from the agent whose affidavit

supported the warrant. The court concluded that police cannot insulate one officer's

deliberate misstatements or omissions merely by relaying it through an officer-affiant

personally ignorant of its falsity. In the present case, there is no evidence that any of the

agents involved in the FBI’s investigation knew about the ICE investigation. And as the

Court made clear in Franks, allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient

grounds from which to void a search warrant. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.3

In requesting the identity of the AUSA who worked with ICE during the first

investigation, Defendant seeks to extend the Franks disclosure obligation to attorneys

involved in search warrant applications. Defendant requests the name of the AUSA who was

aware of the ICE investigation to determine whether the AUSA who worked with ICE

communicated to the AUSA who approved the FBI search warrant, that ICE had previously

investigated Defendant and examined his computer; Defendant also seeks to determine from

the AUSA who worked with ICE, whether records in the United States Attorney's Office

would have disclosed the ICE investigation had such records been checked. 

Neither party cited to any case that specifically addresses the issue of whether an

AUSA's knowledge is imputed to an investigative agent who is the affiant applying for a

search warrant. The Court is not aware of any case on point although the case law clearly

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 6 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 7 -

does not permit the knowing omission of pertinent information by multiple agents involved

in the search warrant application process. Moreover, an AUSA owes, as does every

attorney, a duty of candor to the Court. AUSA Woolridge avowed to the Court that she had

not been told of the ICE search by another AUSA, had not discussed the FBI investigation

with that AUSA and that no file was opened in the U.S. Attorney's Office regarding the ICE

investigation. Defendant seeks the name of the AUSA supervising the ICE investigation to

challenge this avowal and presumably, to attempt to make a substantial showing of a reckless

and intentional omission.

The identity of the AUSA who oversaw the ICE investigation is not necessary to

determine the Defendant's right to a Franks hearing. As discussed in the following section,

even if AUSA Woolridge did know of the ICE investigation and even if she were required

to make that fact known in the warrant application presented to Magistrate Judge Pyle, the

search warrant application on its face, including the omitted information, would have

demonstrated probable cause for a second search of the Defendant's computer.

2. Materiality of omissions

"[I]n a case involving information omitted from an affidavit, the existence of probable

cause is determined 'by examining the affidavit as if the omitted information had been

included and inquiring if the affidavit would still have given rise to probable cause for the

warrant.'" United States v. Troxel, 564 F.Supp.2d 1235, 1247 (D. Kan. 2008), citing Wolford

v. Lasater, 78 F.3d 484, 489 (10th Cir. 1996). "Where an initial fruitless consent search

dissipates the probable cause that justified a warrant, new indicia of probable cause must

exist to repeat a search of the same premises pursuant to the warrant." United States v.

Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 932 (6th Cir. 1990). 

The Defendant alleges that Judge Pyle would not have issued the search warrant

knowing that ICE's on-site examination of the computer in April 2009 yielded no evidence

of children pornography. The FBI affidavit, however, provided a sufficient explanation as

to why an on-site examination such as the one conducted by ICE, could fail to locate child

pornography present on a computer and the affidavit provided probable cause for a more inCase 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 7 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

- 8 -

depth search of the same computer. The warrant described numerous ways that child

pornography is hidden on computers and the highly technical process and expertise required

to detect the pornography. The affidavit explained why a detailed off-site search was often

necessary to detect pornography. In one portion of the affidavit, the affiant stated: "Since

computer evidence is extremely vulnerable to tampering or destruction (both from external

sources or from destructive code embedded in the system as a 'booby trap' ), the controlled

environment of a laboratory is essential to its complete and accurate analysis." (Affidavit,

p. 7.) In another section, the affiant described how computer experts can recover during a

complete off-site forensic evaluation, deleted images, including images deleted years earlier:

It is also possible for computer experts to recover files or remnants of files

months after they have been downloaded onto a hard drive and later deleted

months or years later, but doing so requires a significant investment of time.

When a person "deletes" a file on a home computer, the data contained in the

file does not actually disappear; rather, that data remains on the hard drive

until it is overwritten by new data. Therefore, deleted files or remnants of

deleted files may reside in free space or slack space - that is, in space on the

hard drive that is not allocated to an active file or that is unused after a file has

been allocated to a set block of storage space - for long periods of time before

they are overwritten. Thus, the ability to retrieve residue of an electronic file

is time consuming . . . . [O]ff -site search and analysis . . also makes recovery

of illegal images of child pornography in the instant matter more likely given

the information provided infra. 

(Affidavit, p. 7.) 

Thus, in contrast to multiple searches of the same premises for contraband, a

preliminary search of a computer for images of child pornography may not dissipate

probable cause for a second, more-detailed search of the same computer. Special Agent

Campbell's affidavit demonstrates that, in light of the nature and complexity of computer

storage of images and data, probable cause existed for a full forensic off-site examination of

the Defendant's computer, even where an initial search was fruitless. ICE's prior search of

Defendant's computer did not negate the finding of probable cause to search the Defendant's

computer in August 2009. ICE's search was an-site preliminary search. There is no

indication that the search employed the forensic evaluation sought by the FBI. The FBI

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 8 of 9
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

The basis for the off-site search of the computer provided in the FBI application for warrant

proved to be true. According to the government, images of child pornography found on the

computer by the FBI pre-existed the ICE on-site preview. 

- 9 -

affidavit provided probable cause to repeat a search of the same computer off-site and in a

more detailed manner.4

3. Conclusion

Considering the omitted information - ICE's prior fruitless review of the Defendant's

computer - does not negate the finding of probable cause supporting the FBI’s application

for a search warrant for the Defendant's computer in August 2009. Therefore, a

determination of whether the prior search was known to AUSAs involved in the two

investigations and the disclosure of the identity of the AUSA involved in the ICE

investigation need not be decided. 

RECOMMENDATION

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that, after its independent review of the

record, the District Court: DENY Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. 15) and

DENY Defendant's request for disclosure of the identity of a certain AUSA. (Doc. 25.) 

The parties have fourteen (14) days to serve and file written objections to the Report

and Recommendation. The parties are advised that any objections should be filed with the

following caption: CR 10-1783-TUC-FRZ.

DATED this 7th day of July, 2011.

Case 4:10-cr-01783-FRZ-JR Document 30 Filed 07/07/11 Page 9 of 9