Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08072/USCOURTS-ca10-90-08072-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Allan King
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JEFFREY ALLAN KING, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

TENTH· CIRCUIT 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

FILED 

U{litcd States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

JUN 1 ~ 1991 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

No. 90-8072 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 

(D.C. No. CR-89-134-lB) 

David A. Kubichek, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard A. 

Stacy, United States Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming with him on the 

brief), Casper, Wyoming, attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Laurence P. Van Court, Cheyenne Wyoming, attorney for DefendantAppellant. 

Before HOLLONAY, BARRETT and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges. 

BARRETT, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 1 
Jeffrey Allan King (King) appeals his jury convictions of 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled 

substance, unlawful use of a communication facility to facilitate 

the commission of a felony, aiding and abetting in the distribution of a controlled substance, and carrying and using a firearm 

during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation 

of 21 u.s.c. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), 843(b) and 18 u.s.c. §§ 2 and 

924(c). 

King, Francis G. Stallings (Stallings), Lisa Buttars 

(Buttars), and others were charged in a four-count indictment 

following an investigation into a cocaine and marijuana 

distribution organization. Stallings, Buttars, and one Rhonda 

Shankle became cooperating witnesses for the government. A brief 

summary of the relevant evidence follows. 

Stallings began a cocaine and marijuana distribution business 

in 1987. Thereafter, until May, 1989, he would travel from his 

home in Boulder, Wyoming to Arizona, New Mexico, and other areas 

to purchase cocaine and marijuana for redistribution in Wyoming. 

In late 1987 or early 1988, Stallings entered into an agreement 

with Buttars whereby Buttars would sell cocaine and marijuana for 

Stallings and retain fifty per cent of the profits for her 

services. 

In June, 1988, Buttars began selling cocaine and marijuana to 

King on a relatively regular basis. On one occasion, Buttars 

confided to King that Stallings was becoming frustrated with his 

Phoenix marijuana sources. When King indicated that he could 

possibly assist Stallings in obtaining marijuana, Buttars arranged 

-2-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 2 
for King to meet 

grandmother's house. 

related that his 

with Stallings in mid-October 1988, at her 

After a brief meeting during which King 

friends and contacts 

marijuana and that supplies were abundant, 

Shankle drove to Walsenburg, Colorado. 

in Colorado cultivated 

King, Stallings, and 

Once in Walsenburg, Stallings dropped King off at a house 

belonging to "Rick and Beverly." Stallings and King later picked 

up King's friend "Tony" and drove into the country where Stallings 

was able to purchase a pound and a half of high grade marijuana 

at two separate locations. The next day Stallings, Shankle and 

King drove to Commerce City, Colorado, where King introduced 

Stallings to an individual named "Tom." Tom thereafter introduced 

Stallings and King to another individual also named "Tom" who sold 

Stallings two pounds of marijuana. 

After the parties returned to Wyoming, King continued to 

purchase cocaine and marijuana from Buttars. In early April, 

1989, King also accompanied Buttars on a trip to Boysen State 

Park during which Buttars delivered a quarter pound of marijuana 

to a Michael Leder. 

During his trial, King presented a pro se motion to have his 

defense counsel removed. In support of his motion King alleged, 

inter alia, failure of counsel to subpoena certain important 

defense witnesses and bias of the court. The court denied the 

motion. King was convicted on all four counts. King's motions 

for judgment of acquittal on Count III (aiding and abetting in 

the distribution of a controlled substance) at the conclusion of 

the government's case-in-chief and after trial were denied. 

-3-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 3 
On appeal, King 

assistance of counsel 

contends that he was denied effective 

and that the evidence was insufficient to 

convict him on Count III. 

I. 

King contends that he was denied his right to effective 

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel refused to 

contact, interview, or subpoena two important defense witnesses, 

Rick and Beverly Martinez. 

King notes that two of the overt acts allegedly in 

furtherance of the conspiracy charged in Count I dealt with his 

trip with Stallings and Shankle to Walsenburg, Colorado. During 

the trial, Stallings testified that King accompanied Shankle and 

himself to Colorado to introduce them to some potential drug 

sources. King subsequently testified that he went with Stallings 

and Shankle to Colorado to help purchase well drilling equipment 

for Stalling's business. King argues that under such 

circumstances, the testimony of the Martinezes "might" have been 

determinative as to whether he was a member of a conspiracy to 

obtain and distribute marijuana and cocaine and that his trial 

counsel's failure to contact and subpoena them gave rise to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The government responds that King's contentions are 

frivolous. The government points out that King failed to provide 

counsel with the Martinezes' names, addresses, and phone number 

prior to trial and that King testified during cross examination 

that he did not know their last name. The government further 

-4-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 4 
notes that it is doubtful that either Rick or Beverly would have 

agreed to testify on behalf of King even if subpoenaed when, as 

here, King testified that Rick and Beverly freely used marijuana 

supplied by Rick, that it was Rick who purchased the marijuana for 

delivery to Stallings and Shankle, and that it was Rick "who set 

it up" so he (King) could contact "Tom" in Commerce City. 

The government also points out that during King's pro se 

motion hearing, King's counsel stated: 

Your Honor, I'd like to point out one thing. Early on 

in this matter I asked Mr. King to provide me with the 

names and addresses and phone numbers of individuals who 

could assist in providing his defense. They were never 

forthcoming. Any defense was based upon materials, and 

as I learned from the case from DCI discovery 

investigation reports that I received. 

(R., Vol. VI at 11). 

The "proper standard for attorney performance is that of 

reasonably effective assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 

u.s. 668, 687 (1984). To establish ineffective assistance of 

counsel sufficient to warrant reversal of a conviction, the 

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and 

that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id.; United 

States v. Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1518-19 (lOth Cir. 1990). 

In determining whether a defendant has been afforded 

effective assistance of counsel, the adequacy or reasonableness of 

an attorney's action is necessarily conditioned by the defendant's 

own action or inaction. United States v. Miller, 907 F.2d 994, 998 

(lOth Cir. 1990). An attorney's failure to investigate "cannot be 

charged as a claim of 'ineffective assistance of counsel' when the 

essential and foundational information required to trigger such an 

-5-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 5 
investigation is withheld from the defendant's attorney by the 

defendant himself." Id. at 999. 

Inasmuch as King failed to provide his trial counsel with 

the names, addresses, and telephone number of people who could 

assist in developing his defense, we hold that counsel's failure to 

interview or subpoena the Martinezes did not give rise to 

ineffective assistance of counsel. As the court observed under 

similar circumstances in United States ex rel Kleba v. McGinnis, 

796 F.2d 947, 958 (7th Cir. 1986): 

Kleba failed to inform his counsel of 'Candy' [an 

undisclosed witness] until the day of his trial and the 

record fails to disclose whether prior to trial Kleba 

ever provided Brody [Kleba's counsel] with a description 

of Candy or even stated her approximate age. Further .. [Kleba] was unable to provide his attorney with the 

proper full name or address of 'Candy' ... a potential 

witness. Thus, Kleba rather than Brody was responsible 

for Candy not being located prior to trial, and we 

refuse to use hindsight to 'second guess [Brody's] 

legitimate tactical decision[ ]' not to search for a 

potential witness that his client never informed him of 

prior to trial. . a witness whose true name and 

address were not known even by the defendant Kleba. We 

conclude that Brody's failure to investigate the 

whereabouts of 'Candy' neither prejudiced Kleba's 

defense nor constituted deficient performance of Brody 

as defense counsel. 

II. 

King contends that there was insufficient evidence to support 

his conviction under Count III and that the district court erred 

in denying his motions for acquittal. 

King argues that the "sum and total" of the government's 

evidence concerning Count III came from telephone taps and the 

testimony of Buttars and Michael Leder. King points out that 

although the telephone taps indicated that Buttars intended to 

-6-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 6 
deliver some marijuana to Leder, his (King's) name was not 

mentioned in conjunction with the transaction and the telephone 

taps reflected only his personal conversations with Buttars. 

King contends that Leder's testimony did not establish his 

(King's) participation in the offense inasmuch as Leder's testimony 

was limited to verifying that the transaction between he and 

Buttars took place in Leder's car. Leder testified further that: 

he observed someone in Buttars' car; he had no knowledge who was 

in Buttars' car; Buttars did not inform him who was in her car; he 

really did not pay much attention to the person in Buttars' car; 

and he did not know King. 

King further points out that although Buttars testified that 

he accompanied her when she drove to the vicinity of Boysen 

Reservoir to meet with Leder, she did not testify that he 

participated in the sale to Leder. Rather, Buttars testified only 

that she drove to the scene of the transaction, exited her car 

and joined Leder in his car where she completed the transaction 

with Leder, and that she and King thereafter left the scene. 

It is King's contention that although he was present at the 

scene during the course of the transaction, he had no knowledge of 

the transaction, and did not, in any manner, take part in the 

delivery. Under such circumstances, according to King, the government failed to present sufficient evidence upon which he could be 

convicted as an aider and abettor as charged in Count III. 

In response, the government, while acknowledging that "the 

evidence does not show that the Defendant took any active part in 

the transaction" (Brief of Appellee at 25), argues that a jury 

-7-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 7 
could have reasonably inferred that King's presence served as a 

precaution safeguarding the personal security of Buttars and that 

King's presence afforded Buttars "an extra set of eyes and ears" to 

provide surveillance with respect to the possible appearance of law 

enforcement officials during the transaction. According to the 

government, when these factors are considered, and when all the 

evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, 

King's Count III conviction should be affirmed. We disagree. 

In reviewing the trial court's denial of a defendant's motion 

of acquittal, we must view the evidence and the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 

government to decide whether there was sufficient evidence from 

which the jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt. United States v. Russell, 905 F.2d 1450, 1452 (lOth Cir.), 

cert. denied, ___ u.s. ___ (1990). Count III charged: 

On or about April 9, 1989, in the District of 

Wyoming, Lisa Buttars did knowingly, intentionally, and 

unlawfully distribute and deliver approximately onefourth (1/4) pound of marijuana, a Schedule I Controlled 

Substance, and JEFFREY ALLAN KING, Defendant herein, did 

knowingly aid and abet Lisa Buttars in the commission of 

said offense; 

In violation of 21 u.s.c. § 84l(a)(l) and 18 u.s.c. 

§ 2. 

(R., Vol. I, Tab 1 at 8). 

In United States v. Zamora, 784 F.2d 1025, 1031 (lOth Cir. 

1986), we set forth the government's burden in an aiding and 

abetting case: 

The government's burden on the aiding and abetting 

of a criminal offense is to show that the defendant 

'willfully associated himself in some positive way with 

-8-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 8 
the criminal venture by showing that he has joined the 

enterprise as something he wishes to bring about and by 

seeking to make it succeed by some action on his part.' 

United States v. Taylor, 612 F.2d 1272, 1275 (lOth Cir. 

1980). Under the Taylor case there must be a showing 

that defendant knowingly associated herself in some way 

with the criminal venture. 

Applying these standards to the facts herein, we hold that 

the district court erred in denying King's motions for acquittal 

on Count III. 

The evidence relative to Count III established that: King 

was aware of Buttars' drug distribution activities; King had 

personally purchased drugs from Buttars; King knew that Buttars 

might be selling drugs to Leder on the day in question; King 

accompanied Buttars during the trip to meet with Leder; Buttars 

exited her car and entered Leder's car; and King remained in 

Buttars' car. 

Neither Buttars or Leder testified that King participated in 

the transaction in any manner or that he shared in the proceeds 

paid by Leder to Buttars. Moreover, the government failed to 

establish, save through speculation, that King "willfully associated himself in some positive way with the criminal venture," 

that he "joined the enterprise," or that he sought "to make it 

succeed by some action on his part." United States v. Taylor, 

supra. See also, United States v. Smith, 838 F.2d 436, 441 (lOth 

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 u.s. 1036 (1989) ("To aid and abet 

one must share in the intent to commit the offense, as well as 

participate in some manner to assist its commission"); United 

States v. Espinosa, 771 F.2d 1382 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 

u.s. 1023 (1985) (To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a 

-9-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 9 
defendant must 

participated in 

have 

it 

associated 

as something 

himself with the venture, 

he wished to bring about and 

sought by his action to make the venture succeed); United States 

v. Sacks, 620 F.2d 239 (lOth Cir. 1980) (Evidence showing only 

mere presence at the scene of the crime and knowledge that a crime 

is being committed is not sufficient to prove aiding and 

abetting). 

King's convictions on Counts I, II and IV are AFFIRMED. 

King's conviction on Count III is REVERSED and REMANDED for entry 

of a judgment of acquittal. The cause is further REMANDED for 

resentencing. 

-10-

Appellate Case: 90-8072 Document: 01019297973 Date Filed: 06/12/1991 Page: 10