Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-02785/USCOURTS-alnd-4_03-cv-02785-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
M&H Valve Company
Defendant
Wilbert Price
Plaintiff

Document Text:

1

 Most of the facts and arguments relevant to the present motions were addressed in the

March 9, 2005 Memorandum Opinion. Those facts and arguments have not been repeated here. 

2

 M&H Valve instituted the supervisory training program in July 2003 as part of a

conciliation agreement with the E.E.O.C. Price took the Test of Adult Basic Education

(“TABE”), the entrance exam for the program, twice. Each time he failed to test at a tenth-grade

level, as required for entrance into the program. 

1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

MIDDLE DIVISION

WILBERT PRICE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CV-03-PT-2785-M

)

M&H VALVE COMPANY, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause comes on to be heard upon defendant M&H Valve Company’s (“M&H Valve”)

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on June 28, 2004, and Supplemental Motion for Summary

Judgment, filed on February 4, 2005.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The court has already largely addressed these motions in its March 9, 2005 Memorandum

Opinion in this action.1 In that document, the court summarized the claims of Wilbert Price

(“Price”), the plaintiff, as follows:

(1) M&H Valve discriminated against Price by failing to promote him to the

position of CNC Supervisor and instead awarding the position to Chuck Yeager in

October 2000; (2) M&H Valve’s entrance exam for its supervisory training

program, which Price failed, has a disparate impact on black employees;2 and (3)

M&H Valve retaliated against Price when it failed to discipline Wayne Gill after

FILED

 2005 Mar-30 AM 10:53

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

N.D. OF ALABAMA

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 1 of 19
3

 Although M&H Valve Personnel Manager Roger Baldwin (“Baldwin”) testified that he

believed Nance was hired as a Machine Shop supervisor in 2000 or 2001, (Baldwin Depo., pp.

19-20), Dean Nance (“Nance”) testified that he was hired on August 23, 1999, (Nance Depo., p.

28). The decision makers regarding the hiring of Nance were: (1) Baldwin; (2) Machine Shop

Supervisor Mike Fulmer (“Fulmer”); (3) Plant Manager Richard Duncan or Plant Manager Alvin

Samples; and (4) Vice President and General Manager David Green or Vice President and

General Manager Thomas Walton. (Baldwin Depo., pp. 20-21). 

4

 Other than M&H Valve’s supervisory training program, Price has not identified any

particular training opportunity which was offered to other employees but not to him. 

2

he allegedly made “racial slurs.” 

. . . (4) M&H Valve discriminated against Price by failing to promote him to the

position of Machine Shop supervisor awarded to Dean Nance in 2000-2001;3

 (5)

M&H Valve failed to offer Price training opportunities that were made available

to other, similarly-situated non-African-American employees;4

 (6) M&H Valve

retaliated against Price by promoting less experienced African-Americans instead

of him; (7) M&H Valve retaliated against Price in that he and other AfricanAmerican, but not Caucasian, employees were questioned by M&H Valve’s

attorney regarding their beliefs that M&H Valve participated in racial

discrimination; and (8) M&H Valve subjected Price to discrimination by failing to

remedy the use of racial slurs against him by other employees.

 

(some footnotes omitted). In accordance with the reasons given in the March 9, 2005

Memorandum Opinion, defendant’s motions will be granted in regards to claims (1), (3), (6), (7)

and (8) above. In reference to the three remaining claims, the Memorandum Opinion indicated

as follows:

(2) and (5) As to the discriminatory impact and training claims, the court orders as

follows: 

Within ten days the parties will further address these claims, including, but not

restricted to, addressing the law and facts in the record as to: (a) Who has the

burden to establish that the test does or does not have a discriminatory impact on

African-Americans? What must be proved? How? (b) What percentage of

whites who have taken the test passed? What percentage of African-Americans

who have taken the test passed? (c) Has the E.E.O.C. approved the test? (d) Does

the same test apply to all supervisory positions? Appropriately so? (e) What

evidence is there of training offered to whites and not African-Americans before

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 2 of 19
3

the testing procedure was established? Any data on relative numbers? (f) Other?

(4) As to the Nance position, the court orders as follows. 

Within ten days, the parties will further address this claim, including, but not

restricted to, addressing the following: Was discrimination regarding this position

alleged in an E.E.O.C. charge? What evidence is there in the record as to the date

of hire of Nance into the position? If there is no such evidence, the parties shall

provide a copy of records maintained in the regular course of business which

establish the date. 

On March 23, 2005, the parties responded to the March 9, 2005 Memorandum Opinion. 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summaryjudgmentmaybe granted based upon facts developed through pleadings,discovery,

and supplemental affidavits, etc., if together, they show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment bears

the initial burden of explaining the basis of his motion. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. “It is never

enough [for the movant] simply to state that the non-moving party could not meet their burden at

trial.” Mullins v. Crowell, 228 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation omitted). The nonmoving party then bears the burden of pointing to specific facts demonstrating that there is a genuine

issue of fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. The non-moving party “must either point to

evidence in the record or present additional evidence ‘sufficient to withstand a directed verdict

motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.’” Hammer v. Slater, 20 F.3d 1137, 1141

(11th Cir. 1994) (quotation omitted). Summary judgment is required where the non-moving party

merely repeats its conclusory allegations, unsupported by evidence showing an issue for trial. Comer

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 3 of 19
5

 This section summarizes the arguments made by the parties and does not necessarily

reflect the conclusions reached by the court. 

6

 Price’s E.E.O.C. charge alleged only race discrimination and stated as follows:

On or about February 10, 2001, and on a continuing basis, the above-named

employer has denied me the opportunity to apply for a position as a supervisor. I

have been employed by the employer since November 1972, and my current

position is core maker in the Foundry Department.

Although I have objected to the employer’s continuous failure to advertise vacant

supervisory positions, I have been given no reason for the employer’s failure to

announce supervisory vacancies, or its failure to promote Blacks to supervisory

positions. The employer’s position is that no discrimination has occurred, but no

explanation is given.

4

v. City of Palm Bay, 265 F.3d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). 

Summary judgment will not be granted until a reasonable time has been allowed for

discovery. Comer, 265 F.3d at 1192. Moreover, “[w]hen deciding whether summary judgment is

appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn therefrom are reviewed in a light

most favorable to the non-moving party.” Korman v. HBC Florida, Inc., 182 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th

Cir. 1999). Finally, the trial court must resolve all reasonable doubts in favor of the non-moving

party, although it need not resolve all doubts in a similar fashion. Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp.,

907 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990).

ARGUMENTS5

I. Defendant’s Response.

A. Plaintiff’s Claim Relating to the Hiring of Dean Nance.

1. Plaintiff’s E.E.O.C. Charge Did Not Include a Claim Relating to

Nance’s Hiring as a Supervisor.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s E.E.O.C. charge,6 which was filed on May 1, 2001, did

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 4 of 19
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my race (Black) in violation

of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. White employees who

have less seniority and experience are promoted over comparably qualified Black

employees.

I believe the employer’s practice of failing to announce vacancies for supervisory

positions, and its practice of selecting White employees for supervisory positions,

while failing to provide equal opportunity for Black employees to seek

advancement discriminates against Blacks as a class with respect to promotion. 

Black employees are also subjected to racial harassment in the form of racial slurs,

jokes, and differences in treatment. The employer is aware of these actions and

has taken no action to correct the racially derogatory slurs by its managers. 

5

not contain any allegations relating to M&H Valve’s decision to hire Nance as a supervisor in its

Machine Shop on August 23, 1999. Instead, defendant points out, plaintiff alleged in his

E.E.O.C. charge that M&H Valve denied him an opportunity to apply for supervisor positions

beginning on or about February 10, 2001. Defendant asserts that plaintiff later clarified in his

deposition that the February 2001 hiring he referenced in his E.E.O.C. charge was that of

William “Dud” Watson, a supervisor in the Electric Melt Department, not Nance. (Price Depo.,

pp. 123-26). According to defendant, plaintiff never mentioned Nance in his deposition. 

Moreover, defendant contends, even if plaintiff had asserted a discrimination claim in his

E.E.O.C. charge relating to Nance’s hiring, such a claim would relate to an employment decision

that took place approximately 537 days before he filed a charge, well outside of the 180-day

window for such claims under Title VII. Clearly, defendant concludes, plaintiff’s claims related

to the hiring of Nance were not part of his E.E.O.C. charge, and plaintiff cannot, for this reason

alone, assert such claims under Title VII. See Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 589 n.8

(11th Cir. 1994) (stating, “[a] plaintiff's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the E.E.O.C.

investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination”). 

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 5 of 19
7

 Defendant notes that plaintiff has asserted that Nance was hired in 2000 or 2001 based

on Baldwin’s estimate during his April 14, 2004 deposition in this case. According to defendant,

to the extent that plaintiff continues to argue that Nance was hired in 2000 or 2001, such a claim

is clearly and conclusively defeated by the undisputed evidence that Nance was actually hired on

August 23, 1999. 

8

 In addition to this claim being time barred, defendant contends it is also entitled to

summary judgment on this claim for substantive reasons. Specifically, defendant asserts,

plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that he was as qualified or more qualified for the

supervisory position than Nance, who, according to defendant, had worked as a supervisor at

Goodyear for many years before being hired by M&H Valve.

6

2. Evidence Regarding the Date of Nance’s Hire.

Defendant draws the court’s attention to a document, entitled “Authorization to Hire

Salaried Employee” and dated August 12 and 13, 1999. The document indicates that Nance was

hired to start work on August 23, 1999.7 Because this employment decision was made more than

two (or four) years before plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on October 10, 2003, defendant

concludes, his failure-to-promote claims arising from the hiring of Nance are clearly time-barred

under both Title VII and Section 1981.8

B. Summary Judgment of Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact/Failure to Train Claims.

Defendant maintains that plaintiff is precluded from asserting his disparage impact claim

relating to M&H Valve’s supervisory training program under either Title VII or Section 1981. 

1. Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact Claim Under Title VII.

Defendant argues that plaintiff’s disparate impact claim under Title VII is defective

because he did not assert the claim in his May 1, 2001 E.E.O.C. charge. Plaintiff’s E.E.O.C.

charge, defendant notes, did not contain any claim that M&H Valve failed to provide him with

any type of training provided to white employees. Furthermore, defendant contends, plaintiff

could not have asserted such a claim in his charge because M&H Valve’s supervisory training

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 6 of 19
9

 Even without this precedent precluding a disparate impact claim under Section 1981,

defendant maintains it would still be entitled to summary judgment on such a claim here. 

Specifically, defendant argues, plaintiff has not and cannot meet his prima facie burden for

7

program was initiated in 2003, more than a year after plaintiff filed his charge. Defendant also

notes that the program was instituted as part of M&H Valve’s conciliation agreement with the

E.E.O.C. arising from the charges filed by plaintiff and other employees. Because plaintiff has

not filed a charge of discrimination relating to M&H Valve’s supervisory training program,

defendant asserts, he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to such a claim. 

Accordingly, defendant argues, it is entitled to summary judgment as to any such claim under

Title VII. 

2. Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact Claim Under Section 1981.

Defendant also contends that it is entitled to summary judgment with regard to any

disparate impact claim under Section 1981, as disparate impact claims do not exist under the

statute. Defendant argues that Section 1981 “only provides a cause of action for claims involving

intentional discrimination.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 723 (11th Cir. 2004). See

also General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) (stating,

“[w]e conclude, therefore, that § 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be violated only by

purposeful discrimination”); Brown v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc, 939 F.2d 946, 949 (11th

Cir. 1991) (stating, “Section 1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination”). Defendant

argues, “[a] showing of disparate impact through a neutral practice is insufficient to prove a §

1981 violation because proof of discriminatory intent is essential. Accordingly, only direct or

inferential modes of proving intentional discrimination are available to the § 1981 plaintiff.” 

Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999).9

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 7 of 19
showing disparate impact discrimination in connection with the TABE entrance examination to

M&H Valve’s supervisory training program. According to defendant, plaintiff has failed to show

a “significant statistical disparity among members of different racial groups” as required for a

prima facie case. Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 724 (11th Cir. 2004). 

10 Defendant notes that the burden-shifting framework for disparate impact claims is

derived from the text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).

8

3. Plaintiff’s Failure-to-Train Claim. 

According to defendant, other than the supervisory training program, plaintiff has failed

to identify any training that he was denied but that was given to white employees. Therefore,

defendant concludes, it is entitled to summary judgment with regard to plaintiff’s failure to train

claim.

C. Information Relating to Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact/Failure to Train Claims.

1. Who Has the Burden to Establish That the Test Does or Does Not

Have a Discriminatory Impact on African-Americans? What Must Be

Proved? How? 

According to defendant, plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that M&H Valve’s use

of the TABE test to screen applicants for its supervisory training program has a discriminatory

disparate impact against African-American employees. Defendant argues that plaintiff’s initial

burden is to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by showing that: “(1)

there is a significant statistical disparity among members of different racial groups; (2) there is a

specific, facially-neutral employment policy or practice; and (3) there is a causal nexus between

the specific policy or practice and the statistical disparity.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d

695, 724 (11th Cir. 2004).10 With regard to the first element of this prima facie case, defendant

contends, “plaintiff must offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the

practice in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 8 of 19
9

their membership in a protected group.” Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977,

977 (1988).

If plaintiff can make out a prima facie case, defendant maintains, then the burden shifts to

M&H Valve to establish that the practice serves a legitimate, non-discriminatory business

objective. E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1275 (11th Cir. 2000). Finally,

defendant asserts, if it meets its burden in the second stage, plaintiff must prove that an

alternative, non-discriminatory practice would have served M&H Valve’s stated objective

equally as well. Id.

According to defendant, plaintiff has fallen well short of establishing a prima facie case

of disparate impact discrimination relating to the TABE test because he has failed to provide the

court with a statistical analysis as required under Watson. Moreover, defendant argues, even if

plaintiff could make the required statistical showing that the TABE test has a disparate impact,

M&H Valve has shown that its testing policy serves a legitimate, non-discriminatory business

objective. Defendant points to Baldwin’s testimony that, based on M&H Valve’s management’s

knowledge of the requirements of the supervisory positions, the company determined that a

tenth-grade equivalency on the TABE would be a satisfactory level at which to begin the training

program. (Baldwin Supp. Decl. ¶ 6). Baldwin further stated that the company’s management

believed that the tenth-grade testing requirement would allow a diversity of candidates to enter

the program, while eliminating candidates who lacked the educational skills to complete the

intense nine-month program, the cost of which was approximately $24,000 per student for the 15

students who enrolled. (Id.)

Defendant maintains that plaintiff has not and cannot prove that an alternative to the

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 9 of 19
10

tenth-grade testing requirement would have served M&H Valve’s stated purpose as well. In fact,

defendant asserts, plaintiff has not even attempted to suggest an alternative practice, much less

show that such a practice would satisfy M&H Valve’s stated objectives. Defendant notes that

plaintiff’s highest test score placed him at the fifth-grade level, and that dropping the testing

requirement to this level would not serve its objectives. Clearly, defendant argues, it could not

be expected to pay to train someone in a rigorous academic setting who cannot test better than an

average fifth-grader. 

2. What Percentage of Whites Who Have Taken the Test Passed? What

Percentage of African-Americans Who Have Taken the Test Passed?

Defendant highlights the testimony of Raymond P. McClay (“McClay”), Personnel

Manager for M&H Valve in Anniston, Alabama. McClay testified that, as of March 22, 2005,

79% of the white M&H Valve employees who have taken the TABE have scored at a tenth-grade

level or higher. (McClay Decl. ¶ 4). Of the African-Americans who took the test, 38% have

scored at a tenth-grade level or higher. (Id.) According to McClay, of all the employees who

have taken the TABE test, plaintiff has scored the lowest, testing at the 3.8 and 5.0 grade levels

on his two attempts. (Id.)

3. Has the E.E.O.C. Approved the Test?

Defendant contends that the E.E.O.C. was provided with a description of the supervisory

training program before it was implemented. However, according to defendant, the E.E.O.C. did

not expressly approve or disapprove of the testing requirement. 

4. Does the Same Test Apply to All Supervisory Positions? 

Appropriately So?

Defendant states that the test does not apply to all supervisory positions. To the contrary,

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 10 of 19
11

defendant asserts, passing the M&H Valve supervisory training program is not a prerequisite to

receiving a promotion to a supervisory position at the company. Moreover, defendant

acknowledges, there is no requirement that an applicant for a supervisory position pass the test

used to select applicants for the program. Defendant points to Baldwin’s testimony that the

purpose of the program is to allow interested and qualified employees the opportunity to enhance

the skills necessary for advancement. (Baldwin Supp. Decl. ¶ 4). According to defendant, the

mere fact that an employee has completed the program does not entitled that employee to become

a supervisor. Similarly, the fact that an employee has not participated in the program does not

preclude that employee from becoming a supervisor if he or she is the most qualified applicant

for the position. 

5. What Evidence Is There of Training Offered to Whites and Not

African-Americans Before this Testing Procedure Was Established. 

Any Data on the Relative Numbers?

Defendant maintains that plaintiff has failed to identify any training that was denied to

him, other than the supervisory training program. According to defendant, plaintiff has not

developed, through discovery or otherwise, any evidence regarding the training provided to other

employees at M&H Valve, whether white or black. 

II. Plaintiff’s Response. 

A. Plaintiff’s Disparate Impact/Failure to Train Claims.

1. Who Has the Burden to Establish That the Test Does or Does Not

Have a Discriminatory Impact on African Americans? What Must Be

Proved? How? 

Plaintiff acknowledges that, to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact

discrimination, he must prove that defendant uses a particular employment practice that causes

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 11 of 19
12

the disparate impact on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 

2. What Percentage of Whites Who Have Taken the Test Passed? What

Percentage of African-Americans Who Have Taken the Test Passed?

Plaintiff highlights the following deposition testimony of Baldwin concerning M&H

Valve’s supervisory training program:

Q: How many M&H employees are currently taking part in the schooling?

A: Eight.

Q: Are any of those eight African American?

A: No.

(Baldwin Depo., p. 43). 

Q: How come there’s only eight in it?

A: Because the others didn’t either decide to attend, dropped out, for

whatever reason weren’t able to complete the course material.

Q: Did it start with 15?

A: My recollection is that it did start with 15.

Q: Where any of the seven who ended up not making it this far for whatever

reason African American employees?

A: Yes.

Q: How many?

A: Two. 

(Id. at pp. 48-49). Plaintiff asserts that he does not know how many employees took the TABE

or what percentage of African-American employees passed the test. 

Plaintiff acknowledges the same burden shifting framework for establishing a

discriminate impact claim as discussed above. Plaintiff notes Baldwin testified that he was

involved in developing the testing curriculum:

Q: Did you develop the testing criteria?

A: What do you mean?

Q: Well, in deciding to test for math comprehension, spelling comprehension,

language and reading comprehension?

A: Yes.

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 12 of 19
13

(Baldwin Depo., p. 45). According to plaintiff, Baldwin could not give a legitimate businessrelated reason for the testing requirement:

Q: . . . Did M&H or any of the other folks, the consultants, the school,

undertake any kind of studies or review any kind of research to, let’s say,

start with the testing criteria to determine if the testing criteria had a

reasonable relationship to the job that was to be filled, the supervisory job

to be filled?

A: I don’t know. I don’t know of any studies or research that was done into

that.

Q: What about with regards to the development of the curriculum? Was there

any research that was reviewed or studies done to determine whether or

not the curriculum had a reasonable relationship to the supervisory

position?

A: I don’t know of any studies or research that was done in that, other than

basically the consultant and us talking with the schools to determine that

does the time management course have application to a supervisor? And it

seemed fairly easy to make the leap that it did. 

(Id. at p. 50). 

3. Has the E.E.O.C. Approved the Test?

Plaintiff highlights Baldwin’s following testimony:

Q: Did the curriculum have to be approved by the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission?

A: I don’t believe it did, but I believe we sent them a copy of it.

(Baldwin Depo., p. 43). 

According to plaintiff, the E.E.O.C. has developed a detailed set of guidelines setting

forth the agency’s application of disparate impact analysis to written tests and other employee

selection procedures. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1, et seq. Plaintiff notes that 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15

requires documentation of impact and validity evidence from employers with more than 100

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 13 of 19
11 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15A begins with:

Required information. Users of selection procedures other than those users

complying with section 15A(1) [employers with 100 or fewer employees] below

should maintain and have available for each job information on adverse impact of

the selection process for that job and, where it is determined a selection process

has an adverse impact, evidence of validity as set forth below. . . .

14

employees like M&H Valve.11 Under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15B, plaintiff points out, “[r]eports of

criterion-related validity for a selection procedure should include the following information:” (1)

users, locations, and dates of study; (2) “[a]n explicit definition of the purpose(s) of the study and

the circumstances in which the study was conducted”; (3) job analysis or review of job

information; (4) job titles and codes; (5) criterion measures; (6) descriptions of how the research

sample was identified and selected; (7) descriptions of selection procedures; (8) methods used in

analyzing data; (9) the selection procedures investigated and available evidence of their impact;

and (10) the methods considered for use of the selection procedure and available evidence of

their impact. Further, under 29 C.F.R. § 1607.15B, employers should (11) “maintain records

showing all pertinent information about individual sample members and raters where they are

used, in studies involving the validation of selection procedures,” and include in the reports (12)

“[t]he name, mailing address, and telephone number of the person who may be contacted for

further information about the validity study,” and (13) a description of “the steps taken to assure

the accuracy and completeness of the collection, analysis, and report of data and results.”

Plaintiff maintains that Baldwin’s testimony shows that M&H Valve did not perform a

validation study regarding the selection process for the company’s supervisory training program

or regarding the program itself. Further, plaintiff contends, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.9 provides that

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 14 of 19
15

there is no assumption of validity with regards to tests or other selection procedures. 

4. Does the Same Test Apply to All Supervisory Positions? 

Appropriately So?

Plaintiff draws the court’s attention to the following testimony of Baldwin:

Q: And I understand it, that prior to October 2002 – or let’s say prior to the

implementation of the conciliation agreement, there was no written criteria

utilized by M&H for selecting a supervisor?

A: That’s correct.

Q: How did the process change after implementation of the conciliation

agreement?

A: It changed primarily in the fact that we posted supervisory openings for

employees within the department, within the plant to indicate their interest

on.

Q: Were there any other changes other than that?

A: We implemented a school for individuals who might be interested in– or

who were interested or would be interested in attending a supervisory

course. And we did the same in terms of the posting for leadman.

(Baldwin Depo., pp. 39-40). 

5. What Evidence Is There of Training Offered to Whites and Not

African-Americans Before this Testing Procedure Was Established. 

Any Data on the Relative Numbers?

Plaintiff highlights the following statement made by Baldwin regarding this issue:

Q: Before that conciliation agreement was implemented by M&H, tell me, how did M&H

select a supervisor internally and promote from within?

A: The line management would have had input into – well, would have input into that in

suggesting employees, qualified employees for that particular job. 

(Baldwin Depo., p. 37). 

Plaintiff argues that, given the subjective nature of M&H Valve’s selection process, it is

highly doubtful that any documentation was maintained on the relative numbers of employees

offered training. Plaintiff points out that the only training he received in his 31 years of

employment with M&H Valve was a four-year apprenticeship in the 1980's. (Price Depo., pp.

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 15 of 19
12 In further support of his argument that defendant refused training to African-American

employees, plaintiff has produced E.E.O.C. Charge questionnaires for himself and four other

African-American employees of defendant. 

16

92-94). 

Plaintiff points to an incident described in the affidavit testimony of Jerry Summerlin, an

M&H Valve employee, as an example of M&H Valve’s alleged practice of denying training to

African-Americans. Summerlin testified that, in January 2001, he told his supervisor, Chuck

Yeager, that he wished to be trained on the company’s “Robot MX60 MA50 machines.” 

(Summerlin Affid.). Approximately eight weeks later, Summerlin had not received such

training, and he again approached Yeager. (Id.) Yeager informed Summerlin that department

manager Mike Fulmer would not allow Summerlin to undergo the training. (Id.) However,

Summerlin testified, five employees, all white, were allowed to train on these machines. (Id.)

12

B. Plaintiff’s Failure to Promote Claim Regarding the Position Awarded to

Nance. 

Plaintiff acknowledges that his E.E.O.C. Charge does not mention any specific positions

about which he was complaining of a failure to promote. Plaintiff highlights the language of the

charge. See supra. Regarding the date of hire for Nance, plaintiff draws the court’s attention to

Baldwin’s testimony that he could not remember if Nance was hired during 2000 or 2001. 

(Baldwin Depo., pp. 19-20). 

CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT

As to the Nance promotion claim, in the absence of an acknowledgement by the plaintiff

that Nance’s hire date was August 23, 1999 and that, thus, any such claim is time barred, the

court will deny the motion as to that claim and sever the statute of limitations issue and set that

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 16 of 19
17

issue for trial. 

Since there has been no E.E.O.C. charge filed with respect to discriminatory impact as to

supervisory training or training in general, any purported Title VII claim(s) as to training will be

dismissed. 

Further, § 1981 does not provide a basis for a discriminatory impact claim. In General

Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), the Supreme Court

examined the legislative history of § 1981 and stated:

Our conclusion that § 1981 reaches only purposeful discrimination is supported by

one final observation about its legislative history. As noted earlier, the origins of

the law can be traced to both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Enforcement

Act of 1870. Both of these laws, in turn, were legislative cousins of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The 1866 Act represented Congress' first attempt to ensure equal

rights for the freedmen following the formal abolition of slavery effected by the

Thirteenth Amendment. As such, it constituted an initial blueprint of the

Fourteenth Amendment, which Congress proposed in part as a means of

"incorporat[ing] the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law

of the land." Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S., at 32, 68 S.Ct., at 851. The 1870 Act,

which contained the language that now appears in § 1981, was enacted as a means

of enforcing the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the close

connection between these Acts and the Amendment, it would be incongruous to

construe the principal object of their successor, § 1981, in a manner markedly

different from that of the Amendment itself. 

With respect to the latter, "official action will not be held unconstitutional solely

because it results in a racially disproportionate impact," Arlington Heights v.

Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-265, 97 S.Ct. 555, 562-563,

50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). "[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse

impact upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection

Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose." Personnel

Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292, 60

L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48

L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). The same Congress that proposed the Fourteenth

Amendment also passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the ratification of that

Amendment paved the way for the Enforcement Act of 1870. These measures

were all products of the same milieu and were directed against the same evils.

Although Congress might have charted a different course in enacting the

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 17 of 19
18

predecessors to § 1981 than it did in proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, we

have found no convincing evidence that it did so.

We conclude, therefore, that § 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be

violated only by purposeful discrimination.

458 U.S. at 389-91 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 

In Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit stated:

As we have observed, the plaintiffs claimed racial discrimination under three

distinct Title VII theories: pattern and practice discrimination, disparate treatment

discrimination, and disparate impact discrimination. See [E.E.O.C. v.]Joe's Stone

Crab, [Inc.] 220 F.3d [1263,] 1273 [(11th Cir. 2000)]. The first two theories

require the plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent; the third does not. Id. The

plaintiffs also assert claims under Section 1981, which, unlike Title VII, only

provides a cause of action for claims involving intentional discrimination. Gen.

Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391, 102 S.Ct. 3141,

3150, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982); Brown [v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.], 939

F.2d [946,] 949 [(11th Cir. 1991)].

390 F.3d at 723 (emphasis added).

To state a claim under a disparate impact theory, in contrast, a plaintiff need not

establish that he suffered intentional discrimination. Rather, "disparate impact

theory prohibits neutral employment practices which, while non-discriminatory on

their face, visit an adverse, disproportionate impact on a statutorily-protected

group." [Joe's Stone Crab, 220 F.3d ] at 1274. We have noted that the disparate

impact theory is "a doctrinal surrogate for eliminating unprovable acts of

intentional discrimination hidden innocuously behind facially-neutral policies or

practices." Id.

Id. at 724 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

In Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468 (11th Cir. 1999), the Eleventh Circuit

further stated:

Section 1981 prohibits intentional race discrimination in the making and

enforcement of public and private contracts, including employment contracts. See,

e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-460, 95 S.Ct. 1716,

1720, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975) (holding unequivocally that § 1981 protects against

racial discrimination in private employment). Section 1981 liability must be

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 18 of 19
19

founded on purposeful discrimination. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.

Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389, 102 S.Ct. 3141, 3149, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982);

Lincoln v. Board of Regents of Univ. System of Ga., 697 F.2d 928, 935 n. 6 (11th

Cir.1983).

A showing of disparate impact through a neutral practice is insufficient to prove a

§ 1981 violation because proof of discriminatory intent is essential. See General

Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 388, 102 S.Ct. at 3149 (recognizing that the

drafters of § 1981 were not concerned with practices that were facially neutral);

Lincoln, 697 F.2d at 935 n. 6. Accordingly, only direct or inferential modes of

proving intentional discrimination are available to the § 1981 plaintiff. See Larkin

v. Pullman-Standard Div., Pullman, Inc., 854 F.2d 1549, 1561 (11th Cir.1988),

overruled on other grounds by Swint v. Pullman-Standard, Inc., 493 U.S. 929,

110 S.Ct. 316, 107 L.Ed.2d 307 (1989) (where plaintiff proceeded on a theory of

disparate impact, plaintiff is limited to Title VII and cannot seek the broader §

1981 remedies and longer liability period). Cf. Stallworth v. Shuler, 777 F.2d

1431, 1433 (11th Cir.1985) (where plaintiff claims only disparate treatment under

both Title VII and § 1981, courts may analyze claims together).

168 F.3d at 472 (emphasis added). 

This 30th of March, 2005.

 

 ROBERT B. PROPST

 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case 4:03-cv-02785-RBP Document 27 Filed 03/30/05 Page 19 of 19