Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02357/USCOURTS-cand-3_15-cv-02357-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brooks
Defendant
Tajai Calip
Plaintiff
M.E.I.C.
Defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAJAI CALIP,

Plaintiff,

v.

M.E.I.C., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 15-cv-02357-MEJ 

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED 

COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO 

AMEND

Re: Dkt. No. 13 

INTRODUCTION

On May 27, 2015, pro se Plaintiff Tajai Calip filed a Complaint against Defendants “Dr. 

Brooks” and his insurance company “M.E.I.C.” for the death of her infant daughter. Compl. at 1, 

Dkt. No. 1. She also filed an Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis.

1

 Dkt. No. 3. On August 

3, 2015, the Court granted Plaintiff‟s In Forma Pauperis Application but dismissed her Complaint 

with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 12 (“Order”). Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint on 

August 31, 2015. Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 13. For the following reasons, the Court DISMISSES

the Amended Complaint WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

BACKGROUND

In Plaintiff‟s original Complaint, she alleged Dr. Brooks instructed her to go to Alta Bates 

Hospital for the delivery of her baby, a nine-month, full-term daughter. Compl. at 1. Upon 

Plaintiff‟s arrival, Dr. Brooks was not present, and Plaintiff alleged she was “left in a room alone 

with a relative fighting for hours from very strong pains that increased after an I.V. by one of the 

[hospital] staffs that page[d] Dr. Brooks gave her.” Id. at 2. By the time Dr. Brooks arrived, 

Plaintiff‟s baby had died. Id. Plaintiff asserted claims against Dr. Brooks and his insurance 

 

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Plaintiff consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(c) on June 10, 2015. Dkt. No. 5. 

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company, M.E.I.C., for homicide and medical negligence. Id. at 1. Plaintiff‟s Complaint and In 

Forma Pauperis Application also contained reference to another lawsuit alleging the same claims 

against the same defendants in the Alameda County Superior Court. See id. at 2-3; see also Am. 

Appl. at 4 (referencing Calip v. M.E.I.C. & Dr. Brooks, Case No. RG11594419, Renee C. 

Davidson). 

In its Order dismissing Plaintiff‟s original Complaint, the Court noted that the Complaint 

“[wa]s often difficult to understand, with little detail about the exact actions of each of the named 

Defendants.” Order at 1. The Court further noted confusion over the status of Plaintiff‟s state 

court lawsuit, explaining how the Complaint “indicate[d] that Plaintiff appeared before a superior 

court judge for mediation but d[id] not explain the current status of that mediation.” Id. (citing

Compl. at 2-3). The Court also highlighted that the Complaint stated “the superior court „did not 

give her the court order she needed to collect on a statue [sic] case against the defendants.‟” Id. at 

2. The Court ultimately dismissed Plaintiff‟s Complaint with leave to amend after finding (1) she 

had not established the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over her claims; (2) her Complaint did 

not provide a short, plain statement showing she was entitled to relief as required by Federal Rule 

of Civil Procedure 8; and (3) Plaintiff‟s state court case appeared to prevent the Court from 

hearing the matter under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Order at 3-8. 

Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint, and from the Court‟s reading, Plaintiff now

alleges claims relating to “an overdose of an unknown drug that stopped [Plaintiff‟s] daughter‟s 

heartbeat.” Am. Compl. at 1. She alleges Dr. Brooks was negligent for “administering 

instructions about the drug over the phone to colleagues he worked with at Alta Bates hospital and 

not physically coming to take care of the matter himself.” Id. Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint 

also asserts claims for violations of her Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment 

rights. Id. at 3.

Plaintiff also discusses the mediation session, alleging that sometime before April 2012, 

the parties had a mediation session with “Judge Marshall Whitley,” of the Alameda County 

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Superior Court.2Id. at 2. But it is unclear why Plaintiff raises this mediation session or how it 

relates to her claims against Dr. Brooks or M.E.I.C. The Amended Complaint also states Plaintiff

“filed for a default of judgment,” while elsewhere she states she was “not being able to file her 

default of judgment” and still elsewhere that “default of judgment was delayed until July 3, 2012, 

when [Plaintiff] filed in Superior court[.]” Id. (errors in original). Again, it is unclear what 

happened with this default judgment and how it relates to Plaintiff‟s claims against Dr. Brooks and 

M.E.I.C. 

In any case, to better and more efficiently understand the events and actions taken in 

Plaintiff‟s state court lawsuit, the Court takes judicial notice of the docket and two orders filed in 

that action. See Fed. R. Evid. 201. The reviewed orders show that the Alameda Superior Court 

sustained a demurrer to Plaintiff‟s third amended complaint against M.E.I.C. without leave to 

amend and ultimately entered judgment in favor of M.E.I.C.; the court also entered judgment in 

favor of Dr. Brooks on January 8, 2013, because Plaintiff had not named him in her operative 

complaint, operating as a dismissal of her claims against him. See Alameda Superior Ct., Case 

No. RG11594419, Judgment, entered Jan. 8, 2013. It appears Plaintiff attempted to persuade the 

state court to overturn those judgments, but it is not evident that any of her efforts were successful. 

See id., Order Denying Motion to Vacate/Set Aside, entered Feb. 20, 2014 (noting judgment was 

entered in that matter on January 8, 2013). Nor does it appear that she appealed these judgments.

LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint filed by any person proceeding in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(a) is subject to a mandatory and sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if it is 

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary 

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. 

Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) 

(en banc). Section 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an in forma pauperis complaint 

 

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Plaintiff included the address of the Superior Court where she attended the mediation—1225 

Fallon Street, Oakland—which the Court takes judicial notice of as the “Rene C. Davidson 

Courthouse” in Oakland for the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda.

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make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing that the complaint be served by the 

United States Marshal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 4(c)(2). Lopez, 203 

F.3d at 1127; see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the 

language of § 1915(e) (2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Rule 12(b)(6)). As the United States 

Supreme Court has explained, “[the in forma pauperis statute] is designed largely to discourage 

the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits that paying 

litigants generally do not initiate because of the costs of bringing suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989). 

“Frivolousness” within the meaning of the in forma pauperis standard of 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(d) and failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) are distinct concepts. A complaint is 

“frivolous” when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Id. at 325 (definition of 

“frivolous . . . embraces not only the arguable legal conclusion, but also the fanciful factual 

allegation”). When determining whether to dismiss a complaint as “frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(i), the Court has “„the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint‟s factual 

allegations,‟” meaning that the Court “is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination 

based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the plaintiff‟s allegations.” 

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992) (quoting Nietzke, 490 U.S. at 327). Further, the 

Ninth Circuit has expressly held that frivolous litigation “is not limited to cases in which a legal 

claim is entirely without merit . . . . [A] person with a measured legitimate claim may cross the 

line into frivolous litigation by asserting facts that are grossly exaggerated or totally false.” 

Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2007). 

The Court may also dismiss a complaint sua sponte under Rule 12(b)(6). Sparling v. 

Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court 

must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 8(a)(2) 

requires that a complaint include a “short and plain statement” showing the plaintiff is entitled to 

relief. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 

accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

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544, 570 (2007). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but the plaintiff 

must “provide the „grounds‟ of his „entitle[ment]‟ to relief,” which “requires more than labels and 

conclusions,” and merely “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is 

insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts may consider only “the complaint, materials 

incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial 

notice.” Metzler Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir. 2008). The 

factual allegations pled in the complaint must be taken as true and reasonable inferences drawn 

from them must be construed in favor of the plaintiff. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 

337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the Court cannot assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts 

which [he or she] has not alleged.” Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of 

Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). “Nor is the court required to accept as true allegations that 

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. 

Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

When dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, the Ninth Circuit has “repeatedly held 

that a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was 

made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other 

facts.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 

U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). 

Unless it is clear that no amendment can cure the defects of a complaint, a pro se plaintiff 

proceeding in forma pauperis is entitled to notice and an opportunity to amend before dismissal. 

Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).

DISCUSSION 

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In its Order dismissing her original Complaint, the Court found Plaintiff had not 

established the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Order at 3. Plaintiff‟s 

Amended Complaint does not cure this issue. 

“„[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction‟ refers to „the courts‟ statutory or constitutional power to 

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adjudicate the case.‟” Pistor v. Garcia, 791 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reed 

Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161 (2010)). Specifically, the United States Constitution 

limits the power of federal courts to hearing cases involving (1) parties with “diversity of 

citizenship,” or (2) a federal question. U.S. Const., art. III § 2. 

Subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship exists when Plaintiff and all 

Defendants are citizens of differing states and “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value 

of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). “This statute[, 28 U.S.C. § 

1332(a),] and its predecessors have consistently been held to require complete diversity of 

citizenship.” Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978) (emphasis added).

“Complete diversity” of citizenship exists only when “each defendant is a citizen of a different 

[s]tate from each plaintiff.” Id. (emphasis in original); Dolch v. United Cal. Bank, 702 F.2d 178, 

181 (9th Cir. 1983) (same).

The Court previously found it did not have subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of 

citizenship because both Dr. Brooks and M.E.I.C. are residents of California. See Order at 4. 

Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint now asserts “Dr. Brooks relocated” and she “assumed that he was 

in another state perhaps maybe even another country.” Am. Compl. at 1-2. But even if the Court 

took this admitted assumption as true, there is still not complete diversity of citizenship among 

Plaintiff and all Defendants because both M.E.I.C. and Plaintiff are citizens of California. See

Dolch, 702 F.2d at 182 (having citizens of California on both sides of the dispute “destroyed 

diversity jurisdiction”). As such, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction based on 

diversity of citizenship. 

“Absent diversity of citizenship, federal-question jurisdiction is required” for the Court to 

have subject matter jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (footnote 

omitted). Federal-question jurisdiction exists with “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, 

laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federalquestion jurisdiction is governed by the „well-pleaded complaint rule,‟ which provides that federal 

jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff‟s properly 

pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392 (citation omitted).

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The Court previously found Plaintiff had not alleged facts showing it had subject matter 

jurisdiction based on a federal-question. Order at 4. Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint asserts the 

Court has federal-question jurisdiction because she seeks to bring various constitutional claims 

against the Defendants. Am. Compl. at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff appears to assert federal question 

jurisdiction based on Defendants‟ alleged violations of her Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and 

Tenth Amendment rights. Id. But there is a threshold problem with Plaintiff‟s constitutional 

claims; namely, she asserts these claims against two private actors—i.e., persons who are not 

government or state actors. “Individuals bringing actions against private parties for infringement 

of their constitutional rights . . . must show that the private parties‟ infringement somehow 

constitutes state action.” George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough, 91 F.3d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1996) 

(per curiam) (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The presumption is that a private 

actor‟s conduct is not state action. Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuym, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 

922 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1000 (2012). Nonetheless,

conduct of a private individual constitutes state action when there is 

. . . “such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action” 

that the individual‟s conduct “may be fairly treated as that of the 

State itself,” such as when the nominally private actor is “controlled 

by an agency of the State, when it has been delegated a public 

function by the State, when it is entwined with governmental 

policies, or when government is entwined in its management or 

control.”

Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted). Plaintiff alleges constitutional claims against a private individual and a 

private company without any allegations showing their conduct constituted state action. Without 

allegations demonstrating how and why Plaintiff may properly assert her constitutional claims

against these Defendants, Plaintiff has not shown the Court has subject matter jurisdiction on the

basis of a federal-question.

B. Plaintiff’s State Court Action

Even if Plaintiff could show the Court has subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity or 

a federal question, the Court may nevertheless be prevented from hearing this case to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks to appeal the judgments in her state court lawsuit.

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As noted in the Court‟s previous Order, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine instructs that 

“federal district courts are without jurisdiction to hear direct appeals from the judgments of state 

courts.” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir. 2012); see Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 

U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). “The doctrine bars a 

district court from exercising jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct 

appeal” and also “the „de facto equivalent‟ of such an appeal.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 777 (Noel v. 

Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003)). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under RookerFeldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a legal wrong allegedly 

committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Id. at 778 (citing 

Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163). 

If a plaintiff is “bring[ing] a forbidden de facto appeal” such that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine applies, the doctrine will also prohibit Plaintiff from litigating any issue that is 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court‟s judgment. Id. at 778-79. A claim is “inextricably 

intertwined” with a state court judgment “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the 

state court wrongly decided the issues before it,” i.e. “[w]here federal relief can only be predicated 

upon a conviction that the state court was wrong.” Id. at 779 (quotation omitted); see also Bianchi 

v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (providing that claims are “„inextricably 

intertwined‟ with the state court‟s decision” if “the adjudication of . . . [such] claims would 

undercut the state ruling”). That said, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “does not preclude a plaintiff 

from bringing an „independent claim‟ that, though similar or even identical to issues aired in state 

court, was not the subject of a previous judgment by the state court.” Cooper, 704 F.3d at 778 

(citation omitted); see also Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) 

(emphasizing that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is limited to cases “brought by state-court losers .

. . inviting district court review and rejection of the state court‟s judgments.” (internal quotation 

marks, alteration, and citation omitted)).

The Court previously noted that Rooker-Feldman may bar Plaintiff‟s claims in this Court 

to the extent she seeks relief from a judgment in her state court lawsuit. Plaintiff‟s Amended 

Complaint does not clarify the role her state court lawsuit has in the action before this Court. 

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Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint refers to this Court as a “higher court,” Am. Compl. at 4, which 

coupled with the fact that judgments were entered against her and in favor of Dr. Brooks and 

M.E.I.C. in her state court case suggests she views this action as an appeal from the state court‟s 

judgments. See Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The clearest 

case for dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff asserts as 

a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court 

judgment based on that decision.” (quotation and internal marks omitted)). Thus, to the extent 

Plaintiff seeks review of the state court‟s judgment(s) or seeks to bring claims that are 

“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment(s), the Court does not have subject matter 

jurisdiction to hear such claims, and Plaintiff may not seek such relief by appealing to this Court 

or any other federal district court. 

C. Pleading Standard

The Court‟s prior Order also found that Plaintiff‟s original Complaint did not state a 

cognizable claim for relief, see Order at 5, and once again, Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint does 

not fix this issue. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must provide “a short 

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

8(a)(2). As the Rule indicates, a plaintiff should state her claims with precision, simplicity, and 

succinctness. See Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 

2008). The purpose of this standard is to “give the defendant fair notice of [the claim] . . . and the 

grounds upon which it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Although a 

complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . [it] requires more than labels and 

conclusions.” Id. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the 

speculative level.” Id. The standard thus “calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation 

that discovery will reveal evidence” to support the plaintiff‟s claim for relief. Id. Although still 

subject to Rule 8(a)(2), pro se complaints “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation omitted).

While Plaintiff‟s Amended Complaint provides slightly more detail than her original 

Complaint, even under the liberal pleading standards for pro se plaintiffs, the basic facts 

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underlying her claims are still unclear. The events that transpired and specific details of 

Defendants‟ involvement are vague, and there are no facts about any actions M.E.I.C. took or how 

they harmed Plaintiff, or even which claims Plaintiff asserts against M.E.I.C. Nor does Plaintiff 

state when she was in the hospital and when her child passed away, without which the Court 

cannot determine whether Plaintiff brought her claims within the applicable statute of limitations 

period. Furthermore, as noted previously, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating why she

may bring her constitutional claims against the currently named Defendants who are private actors 

and presumptively not subject to constitutional claims unless she can show why their conduct 

should be considered state action. In sum, without a clearer presentation of the facts showing how 

Defendants harmed Plaintiff and why she is entitled to relief in this forum, the Court must dismiss 

this action for failing to state a claim under Rule 8.

CONCLUSION

Based on the above analysis, the Court DISMISSES the Amended Complaint WITH 

LEAVE TO AMEND. Any amended complaint must be filed by November 12, 2015 or the 

Clerk of Court will close the file in this matter.

If Plaintiff files a second amended complaint, it must (1) state the grounds for the Court‟s 

subject matter jurisdiction over this case and supporting facts; and (2) provide a concise statement 

identifying each Defendant and the specific action or actions the Defendant took, or failed to take, 

that allegedly caused her injuries. Plaintiff is informed that as a general rule, the amended 

complaint supersedes the original, and therefore, each claim and the involvement of each 

Defendant must be sufficiently alleged without reference to the earlier complaints. See Rockwell

Int’l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 473-74 (2007). Also, as previously noted, the Court 

does not have jurisdiction to hear appeals from a state court judgment. If Plaintiff seeks to appeal 

a state court‟s judgment, she must follow the proper appellate procedures of the California State 

Courts. Otherwise, to the extent Plaintiff brings an independent claim that was not the subject of 

the judgments by the state court, Plaintiff‟s second amended complaint should clarify this fact and 

why the events that took place in state court are relevant to her claims. 

The Court again advises Plaintiff that she may wish to seek assistance from the Legal Help 

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Center, a free service of the Volunteer Legal Services Program, by calling 415-782-8982, or by 

signing up for an appointment on the 15th Floor of the Federal Courthouse in San Francisco, 450 

Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. At the Legal Help Center, you may speak with 

an attorney who may provide basic legal help but not representation. More information is 

available online at: http://cand.uscourts.gov/helpcentersf. Plaintiff may also wish to obtain a copy 

of the district court‟s Handbook for Litigants Without a Lawyer. It provides instructions on how 

to proceed at every stage of your case, including discovery, motions, and trail. The handbook is 

available in person at the Clerk‟s Office and online at: http://cand.uscourts.gov/prosehandbook. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 15, 2015

______________________________________

MARIA-ELENA JAMES

United States Magistrate Judge

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