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Parties Involved:
Miklos A. Molnar
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-1326

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Western

* District of Arkansas.

*

Miklos A. Molnar, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: September 21, 2009

Filed: January 12, 2010

___________

Before MELLOY, BEAM, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

Miklos Molnar appeals his sentence following his plea of guilty to

embezzlement. Though his calculated guideline range was ten to sixteen months, the

district court varied upward and sentenced Molnar to sixty-months' imprisonment

followed by two years of supervised release. We reverse and remand for resentencing.

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As we understand the record, Molnar was never accused of embezzling this

particular sum of money.

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I. BACKGROUND

Since 1987, Molnar worked as a police officer in Van Buren, Arkansas. In

August 2000, Molnar joined the Drug Enforcement Administration Task Force. In

this capacity, Molnar had access to seized drug funds, and he was in charge of the Van

Buren Police Department evidence room–one of only three people with a key to this

room. Molnar testified at the sentencing hearing that at some point in 2006, he used

money from the evidence room to pay personal bills. Initially, he tried to repay the

money with his own funds. However, the scheme eventually "got out of control" and

he began using one sum of seized money to pay back other seized funds. This process

occurred over a two-year period.

A local prosecutor became suspicious when he noticed that Molnar deposited

a $1,000 check for "drug buy" money into his personal account. When confronted by

the Chief of Police about this, Molnar explained that he had used his personal funds

for "drug buy" money and was simply reimbursing himself for the $1,000. The Chief

told him not to make this practice a habit because it did not look good.1

 The

prosecutor had also complained that Molnar was slow to return $19,000 in funds that

a state court ordered were to be returned to a party from whom the funds were

confiscated. When the Chief inquired about this situation, Molnar indicated that he

could produce the $19,000. However, when the Chief ordered him to go to the

evidence room and produce the money, Molnar acknowledged that he could not and

admitted to taking seized money from the evidence room for personal use. Molnar

pleaded guilty to embezzlement and paid full restitution to the police department.

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During sentencing, the following colloquy took place between the district court

and the Van Buren Police Chief, discussing the nature of the funds in the evidence

room:

THE COURT: Are some of those funds then used to say purchase

drugs or for undercover type activity?

 A: No. The Van Buren Police Department itself does not

do that, Your Honor. It's something that would, if that

money was going to be converted to that use, we would

give it to Marc McCune, the prosecutor's office, and let

him in turn distribute that through drug buy money or

however he wanted to do that. 

THE COURT: But these funds would not be drug–couldn't be classified

then as potential drug buy money?

 A: No. It had not reached that far yet.

THE COURT: But that could have been the use for these funds at some

point?

 A: It could have been; yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that is done from time to time by your department?

Do you use these funds or similar funds to purchase– 

 A: The Van Buren Police Department itself does not have

a so-called drug buy fund. Individual officers, narcotic

officers are responsible for drug buy money that they

receive from Marc McCune, the Prosecuting Attorney.

The city itself does not have [a] so-called drug buy fund

account; no.

Later, when Molnar was on the witness stand, the district court similarly

questioned him about the issue.

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THE COURT: Could any of funds that you admittedly embezzled,

$50,997, could that have been used for drug buy money

in any sense?

 A: It could have been converted by the prosecutor's office

to that, Your Honor, once it's turned over to them.

THE COURT: But if the money is not there, you would have difficulty

in turning anything over, would you not?

 A: Yes, sir.

Prior to pronouncing sentence, the district court sustained Molnar's two

objections to the presentence investigation report (PSIR), reiterated that he had

previously notified the parties of his possible intent to impose either an upward

departure or variance, and set forth the statutory penalties for the offense. The court

found that Molnar's offense level was twelve but added two levels for violation of the

fiduciary trust relationship. Molnar's criminal history category was one and the

advisory guideline range was ten to sixteen months. After taking one last round of

argument from counsel, the court noted it had reviewed the sentencing factors

reflected in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and announced that it would sentence Molnar to a

term of sixty-months' imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. The

court found that Molnar's crime violated the public trust in law enforcement, stating

that "[l]awbreaking by a high-ranking police officer promotes disrespect for the law

and must be addressed at this sentencing." The district court also stated it was

concerned that "some of these funds that were used and utilized were not available to

the DEA where those funds could have been used to purchase drugs from drug

dealers, so I think your activities have significantly impaired multiple drug prevention

work." Immediately following this statement, the court asked Molnar's counsel

whether he had any objections to the court's stated intentions beyond what had already

been raised, and counsel replied that he did not have any further objections.

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II. DISCUSSION

Molnar argues that the district court committed a procedural sentencing error

by relying on clearly erroneous factual findings with regard to Molnar's actions

significantly impairing department drug prevention work, i.e., the inability of the

department to use seized funds for "drug buy" money due to Molnar's actions.

Because Molnar did not object to this alleged error before the district court, we review

for plain error. United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009). To

establish plain error, Molnar must prove that (1) there was error, (2) the error was

plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725, 732 (1993). An error affects a substantial right if the error was prejudicial.

Id. at 734. In the sentencing context, an error is prejudicial only if the defendant

proves a reasonable probability that he would have received a lighter sentence but for

the error. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 552 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

However, a fourth Olano factor dictates that we will exercise our discretion to correct

such an error only if the error "seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public

reputation of judicial proceedings." Olano, 507 U.S. at 732 (alteration in original)

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

We find that the district court's assertion that Molnar's actions hindered drug

task force agents from having adequate "drug buy" money was inaccurate and,

therefore, was error. And, we find that this error was plain because there was no

evidence that undercover drug task force work was actually impaired. Instead, the

record showed that Molnar originally became the target of suspicion after the

prosecutor noticed he had deposited a $1,000 check for "drug buy" money into his

personal account, but Molnar was never accused of embezzling this particular sum of

money. With regard to the $19,000 in confiscated funds, while perhaps Molnar's

actions delayed the individual with rights to the $19,000 from reclaiming his seized

cash in a timely manner, there was no evidence that drug task force agents confronted

similar problems.

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Furthermore, the error was plain under clearly established Arkansas law, which

would not have allowed drug task force officers to walk into the evidence room, take

cash, and use the cash to make controlled drug buys. As the Arkansas Court of

Appeals noted in State v. Hammame, 282 S.W.3d 278, 281 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008), the

process is more complex than that. Instead, a prosecuting attorney must initiate

forfeiture proceedings that do not in any way involve the seizing agency. Id.; Ark.

Code Ann. § 5-64-505(e),(f),(h),(i). In fact, the seizing agency has no claim to the

property unless and until it is ordered forfeited by the court, and even at that point,

where the money is distributed is statutorily conditioned. Hammame, 282 S.W.3d at

281. Finally, "known owners or interest holders are entitled to seized property if it is

not forfeited." Id. (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-64-505(g)(3)(C), (g)(5)(A)(iii)(b)).

Accordingly, the seized money being stored in the evidence room certainly

could not have been the direct source for "drug buy" money–i.e., a DEA agent could

not simply walk into the evidence room, take money, and use it for a drug buy.

Furthermore, under the facts of this case, the seized money could not have been an

indirect source for "drug buy" money because there is no evidence that the court

ordered money forfeited, that forfeited money was designated for use as "drug buy"

money, but then the money was unavailable for use. There was simply no testimony

or other evidence that drug task force agents were "significantly impaired" in their

abilities to perform drug prevention work due to Molnar's actions. Accordingly, the

district court's reference to "drug buy" money to justify a substantial upward variance

to Molnar's sentence was plain error.

The next question is whether this error affected Molnar's substantial rights,

which in this context means whether Molnar can prove he would have received a

lighter sentence absent the error. Having carefully reviewed the sentencing transcript,

we find that Molnar can meet this burden. The district court seemed especially

interested in the idea that drug task force agents were hampered in their duties due to

money missing from the Van Buren Police Department evidence room. The district

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The district court commented on the defendant's special duty as a police officer

not to violate the public trust. We fully agree with the court that this is a very

important point. We note, however, that Molnar had already received a two-level role

enhancement as part of his sentencing calculation because he was in a position of

public trust. PSIR ¶ 20.

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court questioned two witnesses about the issue at the sentencing hearing, and

reiterated this concern when pronouncing Molnar's sentence. Though the district court

did mention one other factor2

 in its decision to vary upward, we find that given the

extent of the variance, there is a reasonable probability that had the district court not

plainly erred in considering the facts relating to "drug buy" money, it would not have

varied upward to the extent–275%–that it did.

Finally, we consider the fourth Olano factor and find that leaving the error

uncorrected would result in a miscarriage of justice substantially affecting the fairness,

integrity or public reputation of the proceedings. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. On

numerous past occasions where a defendant has met his burden of proving that there

is a reasonable probability he would have received a lighter sentence absent plain

error, we have exercised our discretion under the fourth factor and vacated the

sentence. E.g., United States v. Nahia, 437 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that

we felt "compelled" to follow circuit precedent and vacate for resentencing when

defendant had met the first three Olano factors, even without a more stringent analysis

of the fourth factor). Accordingly, we follow circuit precedent and vacate Molnar's

sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein we reverse the sentence and remand to the district

court for resentencing.

______________________________

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