Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05017/USCOURTS-cand-3_14-cv-05017-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Eric Arnold
Respondent
Cesar Rodelas
Petitioner

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CESAR RODELAS,

Plaintiff,

v.

ERIC ARNOLD,

Defendant.

Case No. 14-cv-05017-JST 

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR 

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 

DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY

Before the Court is the above-titled petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 

28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Petitioner Cesar Rodelas, challenging the validity of his state court sentence. 

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition, and Petitioner has filed a traverse. The Court will 

deny the petition.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 25, 2012, Petitioner pled no contest in Alameda County Superior Court to 

eleven felony changes and thirty-three misdemeanor charges, arising out of three separate

incidents of serious domestic violence incidents against his former girlfriend, and out of violations 

of a restraining order. Answer, Ex. 1 (“CT”) 419–26.1 The felony charges consisted of three 

counts of assault with a deadly weapon (Cal. Penal Code § 245(a)(1)); three counts of vandalism 

(Cal. Penal Code § 594), two counts of making criminal threats (Cal. Penal Code § 422); one 

count of kidnapping (Cal. Penal Code § 207(a)); one count of residential burglary (Cal. Penal 

Code § 459); and one count of corporal injury to a cohabitant (Cal. Penal Code § 273.5). CT 52–

62 and 419–26. The misdemeanor changes included one count of possession of a dirk or dagger 

 

1

In citing to the Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”), lodged as Exhibit 1 to the Answer, the Court refers to 

the page numbers provided on the upper right-hand corner of each page. 

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(Cal. Penal Code § 12020(a)(4)); and thirty-two counts of violating a restraining order (Cal. Penal 

Code § 166(a)(4)). CT 52–62. Petitioner also admitted as true enhancement allegations that he 

was armed with a firearm during the kidnapping and during one of the criminal threats, and that he 

committed the burglary and related vandalism while released on bail. CT 447–49. 

On December 15, 2012, the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twelve years in state prison. 

CT 473 and Answer, Ex. 2 (“RT”),2 Vol. 3 at 14–16.

Petitioner appealed his conviction. On June 27, 2013, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a 

Wende brief3in the California Court of Appeal, declining to raise any specific issues and asking 

the appellate court for an independent review of the record to determine whether there were any 

issues that would, if resolved favorably to Petitioner, result in reversal or modification of the 

judgment. See Answer, Ex. 4.4 Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), 

appellate counsel identified for the appellate court five potential issues that might merit briefing on 

appeal.5 On July 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief.6 People v. Rodelas, No. 

 

2

In citing to the Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”), lodged as Exhibit 2 to the Answer, the Court refers 

to the page numbers provided on the upper right-hand corner of each page.

3

In People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436 (1979), the California Supreme Court established a 

procedure that appointed appellate counsel must follow if she determines that an appeal would be 

frivolous. The United States Supreme Court approved this process in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 

259 (2000). The procedure requires counsel to

file[] a brief with the appellate court that summarizes the procedural and factual history of 

the case, with citations of the record. He also attests that he has reviewed the record, 

explained his evaluation of the case to his client, provided the client with a copy of the 

brief, and informed the client of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief. He further 

requests that the court independently examine the record for arguable issues.

528 U.S. at 265. In a Wende brief, counsel remains “silent on the merits of the case and expresses 

his availability to brief any issues on which the court might desire briefing.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 

4

In citing to exhibits to the Answer, outside of the Clerk’s Transcript and Reporter’s Transcript, 

the Court refers to the page numbers assigned by the Court’s Electronic Court Filing system which 

are located on the upper right-hand corner of each page. 

5

The five issues were: (1) whether the five-minute limitation on Petitioner’s personal statement 

was a denial of Petitioner’s right to allocution and a denial of Petitioner’s right to a fair sentencing 

hearing; (2) whether the trial court’s consideration of a letter from Doe’s father was an abuse of 

discretion; (3) whether an adequate statement of reasons was given by the trial court in support of 

the midterm sentence on the principal term; (4) whether Petitioner was subject to the on-bail 

enhancement attached to the burglary charge where the primary offense was initially charged as a 

misdemeanor; and (5) whether Petitioner was denied due process of law and fundamental fairness 

at the sentencing hearing. See Answer, Ex. 3 at 9–10.

6

In his supplemental brief, Petitioner raised three issues: (1) the time limitation on Petitioner’s 

personal statement violated his due process rights; (2) the trial court’s consideration of a letter 

from Doe’s father violated Petitioner’s due process rights; and (3) it was error to prosecute or 

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A137758, 2013 WL 4743470, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2013). The California Court of Appeal 

conducted its own independent review of the record and, on September 4, 2013, affirmed the 

judgment, finding that no arguable issues were presented for review. Rodelas, 2013 WL 4743470. 

On November 13, 2013, the California Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s 

petition for review. See Answer, Exh. 6.

On July 15, 2014, Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the Alameda County Superior 

Court, raising the same claims that he raises here. On September 12, 2014, the Superior Court 

denied the petition as untimely and, in the alternative, for failure to state a prima facie case for 

relief. See Answer, Exh. 7. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Court of 

Appeal, which was summarily denied on October 30, 2014. See id., Ex. 8. On November 7, 2014, 

Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily 

denied on March 25, 2015. See id., Exs. 9 and 10. 

On November 13, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for a writ of habeas 

corpus. See Docket No. 1. Petitioner alleges that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel by (1) failing to conduct a reasonable, thorough, and timely investigation prior to advising 

Petitioner to reject the initial plea offer, and (2) failing to inform Petitioner of his maximum 

sentence exposure. The Court stayed this action and held the petition in abeyance pending the 

resolution of the state court habeas proceedings. See Docket No. 4. On April 17, 2015, the Court 

lifted the stay and ordered Respondent to show cause why the petition should not be granted. See

Docket No. 6.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 

Petitioner’s felony charges arose from three separate incidents involving his former 

girlfriend, Jane Doe, whom Petitioner had dated for two years. CT 497.

The first incident occurred on June 11, 2011, at approximately 2:30 a.m., at Spankey’s 

Cocktails in Castro Valley. CT 497. At that time, Doe was at Spankey’s with a friend and an exboyfriend. CT 497, 520. Petitioner showed up and tried to enter the bar, but was stopped by the 

 

convict Petitioner because Doe had recanted her claims and declined to bring charges against 

Petitioner. Rodelas, 2013 WL 4743470, at *2.

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bouncer. CT 520. Petitioner became angry when he realized that Doe’s ex-boyfriend was with 

her. CT 497. Doe, her friend, and her ex-boyfriend left the bar, and drove away in Doe’s car. CT 

497, 520. Doe then felt “a total of three jolts to the rear end of her vehicle.” CT 497. She looked 

back and saw Petitioner bumping into her car with his GMC Yukon. CT 497. Petitioner hit her 

car with such force that her car’s headlight housing broke, and Doe nearly collided with other 

parked cars. CT 497. Petitioner then fled the scene. CT 497. Doe made a U-turn and returned to 

Spankey’s parking lot. CT 520. Police responded and took statements from Doe, her friend, and 

her ex-boyfriend. CT 497, 520. Doe informed the officers that both she and Petitioner had 

consumed alcohol prior to the incident. CT 497. There were no injuries sustained during this 

incident, and no one required medical attention. CT 497.

The second incident occurred on June 22, 2011. At approximately 6:35 p.m., Doe found 

Petitioner waiting for her in the parking lot of her job at the end of the workday. CT 520. 

Petitioner demanded that Doe get into his car. CT 520. Doe did not want to get into the car, but 

ultimately did because she did not want to cause a scene outside her job, and because she was 

frightened of Petitioner. CT 520. Petitioner eventually stopped at a gas station at approximately 

7:20 p.m. CT 497. The gas station convenience clerk overheard Petitioner and Doe arguing in the 

parking lot. CT 497. Doe then entered the convenience store looking upset, and asked the clerk to 

call her a taxi. CT 520. Petitioner followed Doe into the store and demanded that Doe get back 

into his car. CT 497, 520. He continued yelling and shouting at her, and threatened to kill both 

Doe and the clerk if Doe refused to get back into the car. CT 520. Doe refused to leave, 

prompting Petitioner to leave the store. CT 497. Fearing for her safety and Doe’s safety, the clerk 

remotely locked the store’s exterior doors to prevent Petitioner’s re-entry. CT 497, 521. 

Petitioner retrieved a gun from his car and returned to the store. CT 497, 521. Petitioner 

demanded to be let into the store while Doe and the clerk hid behind the front counter. CT 521. 

Petitioner then kicked the glass door, breaking the glass, and entered the store. CT 497, 521. 

Petitioner then grabbed Doe by her hair and dragged her over the broken glass and out of the store. 

CT 497, 521. Doe broke free in the parking lot, and refused to get into Petitioner’s car. CT 497, 

521. Petitioner finally left in his vehicle. CT 497. Oakland police officers arrived shortly 

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thereafter and took a statement from Doe and the clerk. CT 521. Doe suffered scrapes and cuts 

from being dragged over the broken glass. CT 521.

The third incident occurred on September 19, 2011, when Petitioner broke into Doe’s 

home. CT 521. Petitioner had previously lived in the home with Doe, but Doe had kicked him 

out two months prior. CT 521. That afternoon, Doe received a voicemail message from Petitioner 

while she was at work. CT 521. Petitioner stated that he was at her home and that he was going 

to burn it down. CT 521. Doe called the Hayward Police Department, who found Petitioner 

leaving the house as they arrived. CT 521. The police did not find a key to the house on 

Petitioner’s person. CT 521. In looking for a point of entry, the police found that the sliding glass 

back door to Doe’s home had been shattered. CT 521. The police also found Doe’s clothes tossed 

around the bedroom and covered in red wine vinegar. CT 521.

On September 28, 2011, Petitioner was taken into custody in relation to the above 

incidents. CT 497. At Petitioner’s bail hearing, a restraining order was issued that prohibited 

Petitioner from contacting Doe. CT 522. Between December 1, 2011 and December 17, 2011, in 

violation of the court order, Petitioner called and spoke to Doe thirty-two times. CT 522.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A petition for a writ of habeas corpus is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPAˮ). This Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

“in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that 

he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.ˮ 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a).

A district court may not grant a petition challenging a state conviction or sentence on the 

basis of a claim that was reviewed on the merits in state court unless the state court’s adjudication 

of the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United 

States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.ˮ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. 

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Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). A state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established 

Supreme Court precedent if it “applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the 

Supreme Court’s] cases,” or if it “confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from 

a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] 

precedent.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 405–06. “Under the ‘unreasonable application’ clause, a 

federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal 

principle from [the Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts 

of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply 

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision 

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must 

also be unreasonable.” Id. at 411. 

Section 2254(d)(1) restricts the source of clearly established law to the Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence. “[C]learly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” refers to “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions 

as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 412. “A federal court 

may not overrule a state court for simply holding a view different from its own, when the 

precedent from [the Supreme Court] is, at best, ambiguous.” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17

(2003).

The Supreme Court has vigorously and repeatedly affirmed that under AEDPA, there is a 

heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to state court decisions. See Hardy 

v. Cross, 132 S. Ct. 490, 491 (2011) (per curiam); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103–04 

(2011); Felkner v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam). As the Court explained: “[o]n 

federal habeas review, AEDPA ‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court 

rulings’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner, 562 

U.S. at 598 (citation omitted). With these principles in mind regarding the standard and limited 

scope of review in which this Court may engage in federal habeas proceedings, the Court

addresses Petitioner’s claims.

Petitioner raised the claims presented in the instant petition for the first time in his state 

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habeas petition. See Answer, Ex. 7. Both the California Court of Appeal and the California 

Supreme Court summarily denied Petitioner’s habeas petition. See Answer, Exs. 8 and 10. The 

Alameda County Superior Court was thus the highest court to have reviewed the claims in a 

reasoned decision, and it is this decision that this Court reviews herein. See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 

501 U.S. 797, 803–04 (1991) (state court decision to which Section 2254(d) applies is the “last 

reasoned decision” of the state court).

B. Procedural Default

Respondent claims that Petitioner’s claims were procedurally defaulted, thereby precluding 

federal habeas review. Petitioner argues that the procedural default should be excused because he 

has demonstrated “cause” pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 

A state prisoner generally may not raise a claim in federal habeas if he has defaulted on the 

claim “by violating a state procedural rule which would constitute adequate and independent 

grounds to bar direct review in the U.S. Supreme Court.” Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 

(9th Cir. 1994) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729–30, 750–51 (1991). The 

Alameda County Superior Court denied Petitioner’s claims as untimely and, in the alternative, for 

failure to state a prima facie case for relief.7 California’s timeliness rule is independent, Bennett v. 

Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 582–83 (9th Cir. 2003), and adequate, Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307,

321 (2011). Accordingly, the Court may only reach Petitioner’s claims if Petitioner can show

cause and prejudice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750.8

 

7

The superior court denied the habeas petition as follows:

Relief is denied as untimely. (See In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal. 4th 750–755; In re 

Sanders (1999) 21 Cal. 4th 697, 703; In re Robbins (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 770, 780 (Robbins); 

In re Sodersten (2007) 146 Cal. App. 4th 1163, 1221; In re Nuñez (2009) 173 Cal. App. 

4th 709, 724). Petitioner failed to show an absence of substantial delay and to demonstrate 

good cause for the substantial delay, or that his claim falls within any of the exceptions to 

the untimeliness bar. (Robbins, supra, 18 Cal. 4th at p. 780.)

Even if the claim was not procedurally barred, relief would have been denied for 

failure to state a prima facie case for relief.

Answer, Ex. 7.

8 A federal court may also consider a petitioner’s procedurally defaulted claims if the petitioner 

can demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. However, this 

exception is inapplicable here because Petitioner acknowledges his guilt. To show that a failure to 

consider the merits of a claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner 

must establish factual innocence. See Gandarela v. Johnson, 286 F.3d 1080, 1085–86 (9th Cir.

2002); Wildman v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 832, 842–43 (9th Cir. 2001). 

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In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the Supreme Court announced an equitable 

rule by which cause may be found for excusing a procedurally defaulted claim of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel in certain circumstances. Martinez provides a petitioner relief from a 

procedural default if the state petition (1) raised a “substantial claim of ineffective assistance at 

trial” (2) “in the initial-review collateral proceeding,” where (3) “there was no counsel or counsel 

in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. To establish cause under 

Martinez, a petitioner must establish that “his counsel in the state postconviction proceeding was 

ineffective under the standards of Strickland,” which requires the petitioner to establish “(a) postconviction counsel’s performance was deficient, and (b) there was a reasonable probability that, 

absent the deficient performance, the result of the post-conviction proceedings would have been 

different.” Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 377 (9th Cir. 2014), overruled on other grounds by

McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 829 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 

668, 687 (1984)). To establish prejudice under Martinez, a petitioner must establish that “his 

‘underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that 

the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.’” Id. (quoting Martinez, 132 S. Ct. 

at 1318). Because determining cause and prejudice necessarily requires reviewing the merits of 

the underlying ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court turns to the merits of Petitioner’s 

claims.

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Petitioner alleges that trial counsel Todd Bequette rendered ineffective assistance of 

counsel by (1) failing to conduct a reasonable, thorough, timely investigation prior to advising 

Petitioner to reject the four-year plea offer, and (2) failing to inform Petitioner of his maximum 

sentence exposure. 

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1. Factual Background9

On June 24, 2011, Petitioner was charged by complaint with three counts of assault with a 

deadly weapon and one count of vandalism, arising out of the June 11, 2011 incident. CT 1–2. 

On September 21, 2011, a separate information was filed charging Petitioner with two 

felony charges – first-degree residential burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 459; and vandalism with over 

$400 in damage, Cal. Penal Code § 594(a) – arising out of his September 19, 2011 entry into 

Doe’s home. CT 4–5. The information alleged that Petitioner had committed these crimes while 

he was released from custody on bail or on out on his own recognizance, Cal. Penal Code 

§12022.1. Id.

On September 28, 2011, Petitioner appeared for a bail hearing in Alameda County 

Superior Court. CT 7–11. At that time, Petitioner was represented by public defender Sam Yun. 

Id. During the bail hearing, the court also issued a restraining order prohibiting any contact 

between Petitioner and Doe, except through Petitioner’s lawyer. Id. at 9. The trial court explained 

 

9

In reviewing the reasonableness of the state court’s decision denying Petitioner’s ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim on the merits, the Court relies only on the record that was before the 

state court. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (holding that “review under § 

2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the 

merits”). Petitioner has requested that the Court consider evidence that was not presented to the 

state court, namely a second declaration from trial counsel that was filed with this Court on 

September 28, 2105. See Docket No. 13 at 4. Rule 7 of the Rules Governing § 2254 cases allows 

the district court to expand the record without holding an evidentiary hearing. Rules Governing § 

2254 Cases, Rule 7, 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 2254. However, in order to consider new evidence, two 

requirements must be met. First, the petitioner must show that he was diligent in his efforts to 

develop the evidence in state court. See Cooper-Smith v. Palmateer, 397 F.3d 1236, 1241 (9th 

Cir. 2005), overturned on other grounds by Daire v. Lattimore, 812 F.3d 766, 768 (9th Cir. 2016)

(diligence exception to the general rule against evidentiary hearings in § 2254(e) also applies to 

efforts to expand the record without an evidentiary hearing) (petitioner who, during state court 

proceedings, knew of the existence of the information that was the basis for later-prepared 

declarations from petitioner and petitioner’s doctor did not exercise diligence when petitioner did 

not present that information in state court and petitioner therefore could not expand the record in 

habeas proceedings under Rule 7). Second, the new evidence must not so fundamentally alter the 

legal claim already considered by the state courts’ as to render it unexhausted. Vasquez v. Hillery, 

474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986) (petitioner’s new evidence regarding brain damage did not 

fundamentally alter legal claim where petitioner had provided the state court with a 

neuropsychological expert’s initial analysis regarding his brain damage). Here, Petitioner has 

failed to show that he was diligent in developing this evidence before the state court. Trial 

counsel’s second declaration states that trial counsel recalls that the last plea offer received from 

the prosecutor prior to the preliminary hearing was four years in state prison. Docket No. 13 at 4. 

Petitioner was aware of this information during the state court proceedings and provides no 

explanation as to why he did not present this information in the state court proceedings.

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the restraining order to Petitioner: 

Mr. Rodelas, I’m going to issue a restraining order at this time. This prohibits any contact 

between you and [Doe]. So no contact by anyone but your lawyer. No contact through 

third parties. No contact in writing, by phone, by any means whatsoever. You are to stay 

at least 200 yards away from anyplace that she’s at. You’re not to own or possess any 

firearms. You’ll be given a copy of this [restraining] order. Read it over carefully. A 

copy of this will go to the police and a copy of this will go to her. Will you obey that 

order?

CT 9. In response to the court’s question, Petitioner responded, “Yes, your honor.” Id.

From October 2011 to December 5, 2012, Petitioner was represented by public defender 

Todd Bequette. Docket No. 9-10 at 67. On December 11, 2011, the prosecution filed an amended 

information that amended the first information (initially filed on June 24, 2011) to add charges of 

kidnapping, domestic violence, criminal threats, and vandalism, arising out of the June 22, 2011 

incident. CT 15–18. In total, the amended complaint charged Petitioner with nine felony counts. 

Id. Trial counsel calculated that the maximum exposure for these charges was approximately 28 

years in prison. Docket No. 9-10 at 78. 

On January 12, 2012, Petitioner was charged with an additional thirty-two counts of 

disobeying a court order, for his thirty-two contacts with Doe between December 1, 2011, and 

December 17, 2011, in violation of the restraining order. CT 19–27. These counts were added on 

to the amended information. At this point, this amended information charged Petitioner with 

crimes arising out of the June 11, 2011 incident; the June 22, 2011 incident; and the December 

2011 violations of the restraining order. Trial counsel calculated that Petitioner’s maximum 

exposure increased to sixty years with the additional thirty-two charges of disobeying a court 

order. Docket No. 9-10 at 78. Trial counsel does not recall whether, prior to the case being 

assigned to a trial court on or about April 24, 2012,10 he communicated to Petitioner that the 

maximum exposure had increased to sixty years with the addition of the thirty-two misdemeanor 

charges. Docket No. 9-10 at 78 and CT 282.

From February 21 to February 23, 2012, a preliminary hearing was held for the first 

 

10 According to the clerk’s minutes dated April 24, 2012, on that date, the parties agreed that the 

trial would start on May 14, 2012. CT 282. The trial court later agreed to continue the trial at trial 

counsel’s request. CT 295, 303, 311, 319, 327, 335, and 356.

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information, which charged Petitioner with crimes arising out of the June 11, 2011 incident; the 

June 22, 2011 incident; and the violations of the restraining order. CT 75–244. This preliminary 

hearing did not address the September 19, 2011 burglary. During the preliminary hearing, Doe 

acknowledged that she had been speaking with Petitioner while he was incarcerated and had 

spoken to him as recently as a couple weeks prior to this preliminary hearing. CT 125–26, 179–

81, 183.

On February 27, 2012, after the preliminary hearing, Petitioner was held to answer for the 

nine felonies and thirty-two misdemeanors arising out of the June 11, 2011 incident; the June 22, 

2011 incident; and the violations of the restraining order. CT 245.

On April 17, 2012, a preliminary hearing was held in Petitioner’s separate burglary case. 

CT 292. 

On April 24, 2012, a trial date of May 14, 2012 was set for the case involving the first 

information (nine felonies and thirty-two misdemeanors arising out of the June 11, 2011 incident; 

the June 22, 2011 incident, and the violations of the restraining order). CT 282. 

On May 4, 2012, Petitioner’s case arising out of the two June 2011 incidents and the 

violations of the restraining order was consolidated with the separately charged September 2011 

burglary case. CT 290, 2 RT at 3.

On May 11, 2012, trial counsel filed a motion to continue the jury trial, which was granted. 

CT 291–93, 295. In the declaration supporting the motion to continue, trial counsel stated that he 

needed additional time to prepare because he required more time to locate a witness to the kidding, 

and consult and possibly retain an expert witness regarding voice recognition expert. CT 293. 

Trial counsel stated he had been retained in the burglary case less than a week prior to filing the 

motion. 

Trial counsel did not obtain the September 28, 2011 transcript wherein the trial court 

issued the protective order until the first day of trial, which was on or about September 18, 2012. 

Docket No. 9-10 at 78–79 and CT 387. 

From January 2012 to April 17, 2012, Petitioner and the prosecutor were engaged in plea 

negotiations. Docket No. 9-10 at 67. During that time, the prosecutor offered Petitioner a plea 

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bargain of no less than four years. Id. Petitioner claims that, at that time, trial counsel had not 

informed Petitioner that he faced a maximum sentence of sixty years; that trial characterized the 

plea deal as “unreasonable;” and that trial counsel advised Petitioner to reject the plea deal. 

Docket No. 9-10 at 67 and 73. 

Prior to trial, Petitioner told trial counsel that he had not been given notice of the 

restraining order. Docket No. 9-10 at 78. 

On September 25, 2012, an amended information was filed that listed all the charges in the 

consolidated cases, and added an additional misdemeanor charge of being armed with a dirk or 

dagger during the September 19, 2011 burglary, Cal. Penal Code § 12020(a)(4). CT 52–74. That 

same day, Petitioner pled no contest to all the charges. CT 415–18 and 429–53. At the plea 

hearing, trial counsel stated: “[Petitioner] wishes to plead to the sheet essentially admitting every 

charge in the Information. He understands he will – that his sentence will be at the Court’s 

discretion. He understands the sentencing range is from probation to 60 years and four months in 

prison.” CT 428. Petitioner orally informed the trial court that trial counsel’s statement was 

accurate. Id.

The plea advisement and waiver form notified Petitioner that his maximum sentence 

exposure was sixty years and four months. CT 415. Petitioner waived his constitutional rights, 

including the right to appeal, and indicated that he had a “full opportunity to discuss with my 

attorney the facts of my case, the elements of the charged offense(s) and enhancement(s), and any 

defenses that I may have, my constitutional rights and waiver of those rights, and the 

consequences of my plea.” CT 416–17. At the plea hearing, Petitioner orally affirmed to the court 

that he had reviewed the plea advisement and waiver form with his attorney, that he understood 

the information contained in the form, and that he understood the consequences of his plea. CT 

432–35.

On December 5, 2012, the prosecutor recommended that Petitioner receive a sentence of 

fifteen years and four months. CT 523–25. That same day, the court sentenced Petitioner to 

twelve years in state prison. CT 479–84. For the misdemeanor charges of disobeying a court 

order, Petitioner was sentenced to one day in county jail for each court, to run concurrently with 

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the rest of his sentence. CT 484. Petitioner criticized his sentence as unfair and engaged the court 

in the following exchange:

Petitioner: I feel like [these crimes] didn’t merit me getting a [twelve year sentence].

Court: Okay. Well, I can understand it. All I can tell you, Mr. Rodelas, is that 

looking at this case, looking at the facts of this case and the circumstances 

of what was done and what you admitted to doing, the exposure that you 

were looking at, the discussions that we had, that I had with your attorney 

and with the district attorney in the case, and my evaluation of the situation 

that occurred on these three separate incidents, these — sort of these three 

separate, if you will, events, the involvement or the presence of a gun 

during one of them, the nature of the crimes, the fact that they continued on 

a sort of escalating basis. Obviously — I discussed with your attorney if we 

had a situation where this first set of events that occurred on June 11th was 

the extent of the entire situation, that would be one thing.

But things continued unfortunately to June 22nd, where another situation 

developed which involved much more serious offenses, kidnapping, as I 

said, the presence of a gun. The 273.5, the usury and the threats, obviously 

I think a reasonable person would view that as having — consider that as 

things escalating or stepping up.

And then three months later, another set of events occurs with another 

serious crime, a residential burglary, all against the same victim. So you 

have a pattern of conduct within six months that’s not good, that escalates 

in seriousness, that involves a weapon, that involves some very serious 

crimes.

So I’m not — I don’t — you know, unfortunately, depending on how you 

look at it, I don’t know you. I’m not passing judgment on you as a person. 

Obviously, as your attorney has commented and I read, you had a long 

stretch of time in your life where you did not get in trouble and didn’t 

commit serious acts like this. But unfortunately, in that six-month span in 

June of 2011, it appears that you did find yourself involved in committing a 

series of very serious offenses.

The discussions that we had, at least that I was privy to with your attorney 

and the district attorney, we all discussed potential sentences, potential 

issues related to sentencing. And I think that this resolution or 

determination of the case is within the bounds of those discussions.

Petitioner: I’ve been sentenced to something that I just — I believe is unfair. I mean, 

there’s people that actually kill people, you know, and get six-year 

sentences.

Court: Well, Mr. Rodelas, obviously we can sit down and look at every single case 

that comes through here. Every case is different. Every circumstance is 

different.

Petitioner: I had a problem. I had a drug and alcohol problem, and it would show that. 

You know, I made — I made some bad mistakes.

Court: Um-hmm.

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Petitioner: And now it’s — I have no chances. I have no more chance. I wish I had 

been allowed to read my whole letter.

Petitioner: Mr. Rodelas, I don’t — I don’t know that I can sit here and discuss with you 

all the different angles of your case. I think that Mr. Bequette has told me 

that you and he and you and your family have discussed obviously and

thought about this at great length. And there were decisions made with 

respect to the exposure and liability that you were looking at, and decisions 

that had to be made in the context of you being in a difficult situation and 

trying to make the best of a very, very difficult situation. 

I don’t suppose that it’s an easy predicament to find yourself in at all. But 

obviously if you were to proceed down a different path, you could find 

yourself looking at a more serious type of a situation or a more serious 

sentence.

The district attorney wanted you to be sentenced to a greater sentence than I 

imposed. Your attorney wanted me to sentence you to a lesser sentence 

than I imposed. The sentence that I arrived at was somewhere in the 

middle. 

. . .

Petitioner: Just one more thing before I finish.

Court: Um-hmm.

Petitioner: I know this is on the record. I pled to all these counts in the interests of 

justice. I pled to them and accept responsibility in the interest of justice to 

give everybody something that everyone can be at peace with. 

Court: Um-hmm.

Petitioner: What bound me to answer to all these charges were charges that I was told 

had no way of being — that I couldn’t contend with, charges that were 

brought against me not by the victim, but by the district attorney; charges 

that were only able to be brought against me because I was never served.

Court: You were never what?

Petitioner: I was never served a restraining order. So that’s all I want to say for the 

record.

3 RT 25–28.

On June 27, 2013, Petitioner’s appellate counsel filed a Wende brief in the California 

Court of Appeal, identifying five potential issues that might merit briefing. See Answer, Ex. 4. 

On July 26, 2013, Petitioner filed a supplemental brief, raising three additional issues. Rodelas, 

2013 WL 4743470, at *2. Neither appellate counsel nor Petitioner challenged either the validity 

of Petitioner’s guilty plea or the effectiveness of Petitioner’s trial counsel. The California Court of 

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Appeal conducted its own independent review of the record and, on September 4, 2013, affirmed 

the judgment, finding that no arguable issues were presented for review. Rodelas, 2013 WL 

4743470. In relevant part, the state appellate court held that Petitioner was “ably represented by 

counsel at all times.” Id. at *2. The state appellate court also noted that Petitioner was sentenced 

to the midterm or one third the midterm sentence for his felony offenses and for one day each on 

the misdemeanor counts, to be served concurrently, which was substantially less than the 

maximum which Petitioner was advised could be imposed. Id. at 2. 

Petitioner first raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in his state habeas 

petition to the Alameda County Superior Court, which the state court denied as untimely and 

therefore procedurally barred and, in the alternative, for failure to state a prima facie case for 

relief. See Answer, Ex. 7. Petitioner raised the same claims in his state habeas petitions to the 

California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court, but both courts summarily denied 

the petitions. See Answer, Exs. 8 and 10.

2. Standard of Review

Petitioner argues that the Alameda County Superior Court’s denial of his claims does not 

qualify as a merits denial, and that he is therefore entitled to a de novo review of his claims. 

Traverse at 14. However, the superior court made an alternative ruling on the merits, stating: 

“Even if the claim was not procedurally barred, relief would have been denied for failure to state a 

prima facie case for relief.” Answer, Ex. 7. The Ninth Circuit has recognized, in a post-Martinez

ruling, that “AEDPA deference applies to [a state court’s] alternative holding on the merits.” 

Clabourne, 745 F.3d at 383 (9th Cir. 2014). Accordingly, the Court applies the standards set forth 

in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) in reviewing the superior court’s denial of Petitioner’s claims.

3. Legal Standard

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is cognizable as a claim of denial of the Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel, which guarantees not only assistance, but effective assistance, of 

counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, petitioner must prove two elements. First, he must establish that counsel’s performance 

fell below an “objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 

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687–88. Second, he must establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance, i.e., 

that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

The Strickland framework for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims is 

considered to be “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 

United States” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) analysis. See Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 

(2011); Williams, 529 U.S. at 404–08. A “doubly” deferential judicial review is appropriate in 

analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel claims under § 2254. See Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1410–

11; Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (2011) (same); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 122 (2011) (same). 

The general rule of Strickland, i.e., to review a trial counsel’s effectiveness with great deference, 

gives the state courts greater leeway in reasonably applying that rule, which in turn “translates to a 

narrower range of decisions that are objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.” Cheney v. 

Washington, 614 F.3d 987, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 

(2004)). When § 2254(d) applies, “the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. 

The question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s 

deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105.

4. Failure to Investigate Claim

Petitioner argues that trial counsel’s failure to investigate whether Petitioner had been 

properly served with the restraining order prior to September 20, 2012 constituted ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Pet. at 15. Petitioner alleges that the necessary investigation required only 

a twenty-minute visit to the courthouse records department. Id. Petitioner alleges that after trial 

counsel conducted this minimal investigation, trial counsel concluded that it was unlikely that 

Petitioner would “beat” the charges related to violating the restraining order, and advised 

Petitioner to plea nolo contendere to all the charges. Id. at 16. Petitioner argues that if trial 

counsel had timely investigated whether the restraining order was properly served and informed 

Petitioner of the results of his investigation, Petitioner would have accepted the four-year plea deal 

that was offered between January 2012 to April 17, 2012. Id.

Respondent argues that there is no evidence, outside of Petitioner’s own declarations, that 

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trial counsel’s investigation of the case prior to April 17, 2012, was inadequate. Respondent 

argues that the record shows that trial counsel had a detailed understanding of the facts and issues 

in the case and was well prepared to represent Petitioner. Respondent further argues that trial 

counsel made a reasonable tactical decision not to investigate whether that the restraining order 

was not served on Petitioner. 

In addressing Petitioner’s failure-to-investigate claim, the Court keeps in mind the

heightened level of deference a federal habeas court must give to state court decisions, see

Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103–05; the requirement that “a determination of a factual issue made by a 

State court shall be presumed to be correct,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); and the petitioner’s burden

“of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence,” id. 

Trial counsel “has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 

decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. The 

Supreme Court has stated that the defendant’s own statements or actions are relevant in assessing 

whether trial counsel’s investigation was reasonable:

In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly 

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of 

deference to counsel’s judgments. The reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be 

determined or substantially influenced by the defendant’s own statements or actions. 

Counsel’s actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by 

the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what 

investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information. For example, 

when the facts that support a certain potential line of defense are generally known to 

counsel because of what the defendant has said, the need for further investigation may be 

considerably diminished or eliminated altogether. And when a defendant has given counsel 

reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations would be fruitless or even harmful, 

counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as 

unreasonable. In short, inquiry into counsel’s conversations with the defendant may be 

critical to a proper assessment of counsel’s investigation decisions, just as it may be critical 

to a proper assessment of counsel’s other litigation decisions. 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Accordingly, a decision not to investigate, when a petitioner has 

provided counsel with information that such investigation is unnecessary, is not outside the range 

of reasonable trial decisions and does not amount to prejudice. Cf. Cox v. Del Papa, 542 F.3d 

669, 682–83 (9th Cir. 2008) (counsel’s decision not to investigate or present additional evidence 

regarding defendant’s drug use not prejudicial where defendant had continuously and strenuously 

protested any suggestions that his behavior was the result of his drug use).

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Here, Petitioner’s claim is based on trial counsel’s alleged lack of knowledge that 

Petitioner was served with the restraining order in the case, but there is no evidence that trial 

counsel did not have this knowledge. In fact, the restraining order was properly served on 

Petitioner because he was present at the hearing in which the restraining order was issued. Cal. 

Family Code § 6384 (if a respondent named in a restraining order “has received actual notice of 

the existence and substance of the order through personal appearance in court to hear the terms of 

the order from the court,” “no additional proof of service is required for enforcement of the 

order.”). In his written declarations, counsel does not state that he was unaware that Petitioner had 

been served with the restraining order; that he himself believed that Petitioner had not been served 

with the restraining order; that he based any advice to Petitioner based on such a belief; or that he 

took any other action consistent with such a belief.11 To the contrary, trial counsel testifies that he 

knew that Petitioner faced a maximum exposure of 60 years, ECF No. 9-10 at 78, an estimate that 

necessarily included the charges for violation of a restraining order. Given that service of a 

restraining order is effective when issued in open court ‒ a fact likely to be known to experience 

criminal defense counsel ‒ that counsel “did not obtain the transcript of the court proceedings in 

which the order was made” is not by itself evidence of ineffective assistance. Simply claiming 

that trial counsel conducted an inadequate investigation without some evidence to support the 

assertion does not meet Strickland’s demanding standard. Royal v. Martel, No. C08-5628, 2010 

WL 3932075, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2010); see also Lobretto v. Sisto, No. 1:08-CV-00080-LJO, 

2013 WL 509160, at *25 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2013) (“Petitioner's burden is to show, by specific 

and discernible evidence, that his trial counsel—in this case, not in some abstract or hypothetical 

case—actually provided representation that fell below Strickland's reasonableness standard and 

thereby prejudiced Petitioner in the process, and that the state court's adjudication of that issue was 

objectively unreasonable.”). 

 

11 Trial counsel’s declaration states as follows on the subject: “Prior to trial, defendant claimed 

that he had not been given notice of the order not to communicate with the complaining witness, 

despite the existence of the order in the court file. I did not obtain the transcript of the court 

proceeding in which the order was made prior to the first day of trial.” ECF No. 9-10 at 78-79. 

The declaration does not address trial counsel’s knowledge of the true facts regarding service or 

the effect of any such knowledge on trial counsel’s actions. 

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Moreover, the record indicates that trial counsel’s preparation at the time the plea was 

offered (January 2012 to April 17, 2012) was within the broad range of reasonable competence. 

During the February 21–23, 2012 hearing, trial counsel demonstrated familiarity with the facts of 

the case, and aggressively cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. In cross-examining the gas 

station employee, he challenged her as to whether she could see Petitioner’s car given the layout 

of the gas station store. CT 98–99, 101. In cross-examining Doe, he elicited that she had felt 

pressured by the police into stating that Petitioner rear-ended her on June 11, 2011, CT 201; that 

she had been drinking with Petitioner prior to going to work on June 22, 2011, CT 202; that she 

was not afraid when she saw Petitioner at her work place on the evening of June 22, 2011, CT 

204; and that she exaggerated in her June 22, 2011 statement to the police because she wanted to 

get Petitioner in trouble, CT 209. These admissions undermined Doe’s credibility and cast doubt 

on the prosecution’s version of events. The record also indicates that trial counsel worked to 

locate witnesses to the events immediately preceding the kidnapping, CT 292; looked into 

retaining a voice recognition expert with respect to the charges that Petitioner violated the 

restraining order, CT 292; and investigated whether Doe had misappropriated Petitioner’s funds, 

in order to undermine Doe’s credibility as a witness, CT 344. 

Petitioner argues that his situation is similar to Rompillas v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005), 

where the Supreme Court found that trial counsel’s failure to examine the defendant’s conviction 

file fell below the level of reasonable performance. In Rompillas, trial counsel was aware that the 

prosecution intended to seek the death penalty by proving the defendant had a significant history 

of felony convictions. Rompillas, 545 U.S. at 383. The defendant’s prior conviction file was 

readily available at the courthouse where the defendant was to be tried; the prosecution warned 

trial counsel twice that he would be referring to the conviction file; and despite obtaining the 

conviction file on the eve of the sentencing hearing, Rompillas’ counsel only examined the 

victim’s testimony in the file. Id. at 383–85. The Supreme Court found that Rompillas’ counsel 

had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that reasonable assistance of counsel 

included obtaining information that the prosecution possessed and would use against the 

defendant. Id. at 387–90. Rompillas is inapplicable to Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner 

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deliberately failed to inform his counsel that he learned of the restraining order by being present in 

the court hearing when it was issued. Although this information was publicly available and easily 

accessed, trial counsel had been misled by Petitioner’s failure, whether intentional or 

unintentional, to inform trial counsel how he initially learned of the restraining order.

Finally, Petitioner has failed to show prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to obtain the 

transcript of the September 28, 2011 hearing at an earlier date, even assuming that trial counsel 

was otherwise unaware that the restraining order had been served. Petitioner alleges that if trial 

counsel had obtained the transcript of the September 28, 2011 hearing at an earlier date, trial 

counsel would have discovered and communicated to Petitioner that he was facing an additional 

thirty-two years for the charges that he violated the restraining order, and Petitioner would have 

then accepted the four-year plea offer. See Traverse at 12. The Court finds these arguments 

without merit. 

First, Petitioner has not provided clear and convincing evidence that trial counsel failed to 

communicate to him that he faced a maximum sentence exposure of sixty years prior to the 

expiration of the plea offer on April 17, 2012. He has only provided a declaration from trial 

counsel wherein trial counsel states that he has no recollection as to whether he communicated the 

maximum sentence exposure to Petitioner prior to the case being set for trial on April 24, 2012. 

Docket No. 9-10 at 78. Trial counsel’s declaration does not support Petitioner’s assertion that trial 

counsel did not communicate the maximum sentence exposure to him until after the plea offer had 

expired. At best, trial counsel’s declaration is simply unclear as to when the maximum exposure 

was communicated to Petitioner. 

Second, any mistake or failure-to-investigate by trial counsel whether Petitioner violated 

the restraining order did not affect Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner received a sentence of one day 

per count of violating the restraining order, to be served concurrently with the rest of his sentence. 

The bulk of Petitioner’s sentence was related to the other charges, and Petitioner does not dispute 

that trial counsel timely and accurately advised him as his maximum exposure for the other 

charges.

Finally, to establish prejudice from counsel’s advice to reject a plea offer, a petitioner must 

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show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, “the plea offer would have 

been presented to the court . . . , that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the 

conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the 

judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385

(2012). Petitioner has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court would 

have accepted a four-year plea offer. Petitioner argues that both prosecutors and courts prefer to 

conserve valuable resources by having defendants admit their crimes and receive more favorable 

terms through a plea agreement: 

[I]t is reasonable to suppose that Rodelas’ trial court would have accepted the four-year 

plea likely containing fewer and less serious charges, otherwise, the offer makes little 

sense. That the four-year deal was offered also indicates the district attorneys’ willingness 

to settle the matter. 

Traverse at 15. There is no evidence in the record that the four-year plea offer included dismissing 

the more serious charges. Without any evidence regarding the specifics of the four-year plea 

offer, it would also be reasonable to assume that the four-year plea offer was intended to only 

dispose of the charges arising out of the September 19, 2011 incident. Moreover, in the 

sentencing hearing, the court stressed that the escalating nature of the crimes required a sentence 

of fifteen years and four months. 3 RT 25–28. Without evidence that the plea offer included 

dismissing a number of the charges, Petitioner has failed to show a reasonable probability that the 

court would have accepted a four-year plea offer for the forty-four charges against Petitioner, 

arising out of an escalating series of serious crimes.

After thoroughly reviewing the record and “indulg[ing the] strong presumption that 

counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, Strickland, 

466 U.S. at 689, the Court finds that the state court’s denial of this claim was not contrary to, or an 

unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable 

determination of the facts. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his failure-to-investigate 

claim.

5. Failure to Advise Claim

Petitioner argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when (1) trial 

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counsel failed to inform Petitioner of his exposure to a sixty-year sentence prior to the case being 

set for trial, and (2) when trial counsel advised Petitioner to reject the four-year plea deal. 

Petitioner further alleges that if he had been informed that he faced a maximum sentence exposure 

of sixty years, he would have accepted the four-year plea deal that was offered between January 

2012 to April 17, 2012. 

Respondent argues that there is no evidence, outside of Petitioner’s own declarations, that 

Petitioner was extended a plea offer of four years or that trial counsel failed to timely 

communicate to Petitioner the maximum exposure for all charges. Respondent also argues that 

trial counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of criminal attorneys, and 

that Petitioner has failed to demonstrate prejudice. 

The decision whether or not to accept a plea offer is a critical stage of the prosecution at 

which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th 

Cir. 2002). Therefore, the two-part test of Strickland applies to counsel’s ineffective assistance in 

advising a defendant to accept or reject a plea offer. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57–58 

(1985); Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1051–53 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting attempt to limit Hill

to acceptance of plea offer). In plea situations, the first “inquiry is whether counsel’s advice was 

within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Turner, 281 F.3d at 

879 (internal quotations and citations omitted). “The second part, the prejudice inquiry, ‘focuses 

on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 

process.’” Id. In light of the complexity and uncertainties that attend plea bargaining, it is 

especially essential that the habeas court respect the latitude for counsel’s judgment that Strickland

requires. See Premo, 562 U.S. at 125, 126–28 (Ninth Circuit erred in concluding trial counsel 

engaged in deficient performance by not moving to exclude a confession before advising client to 

take a plea bargain early in the proceedings). In advising a defendant, “[c]ounsel cannot be 

required to accurately predict what the jury or court might find, but he can be required to give the 

defendant the tools he needs to make an intelligent decision.” Turner, 281 F.3d at 881 (counsel 

who advised defendant to reject offer of 15-years-to-life was not deficient where evidence showed 

that petitioner informed of potential death penalty at trial, and counsel had allowed petitioner to 

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think about offer overnight). Erroneous advice regarding the consequences of a guilty plea is 

insufficient to establish ineffective assistance; petitioner must establish a “‘gross 

mischaracterization of the likely outcome’ of a plea bargain ‘combined with . . . erroneous advice 

on the probable effects of going to trial.’” Sophanthavong v. Palmateer, 378 F.3d 859, 868 (9th 

Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1990)).

Petitioner cites nothing in the record supporting his allegations that trial counsel failed to 

communicate to him his maximum exposure prior to April 17, 2012, and that trial counsel advised 

him to reject the four-year plea offer. As discussed infra in Section C.4, trial counsel’s declaration 

is ambiguous at best as to when trial counsel communicated the sixty-year maximum exposure to 

Petitioner. Petitioner’s self-serving statements are insufficient to establish his allegations. See

Womack v. Del Papa, 497 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting ineffective assistance of 

counsel claim when “[o]ther than Womack’s own self-serving statement, there is no evidence” to 

support the claim); Turner, 281 F.3d at 881 (“‘[S]elf-serving statements by a defendant that his 

conviction was constitutionally infirm are insufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity 

accorded state convictions.’”). 

In addition, assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel failed to inform Petitioner 

that his maximum exposure was sixty years in prison; that trial counsel characterized the four-year 

plea offer as “unreasonable;” and that trial counsel advised Petitioner to reject the four-year plea 

offer, trial counsel’s inaccurate prediction of Petitioner’s ultimate sentence was not a “gross 

mischaracterization of the likely outcome.” Cf. Jones v. Woodford, Civil Case No. 03cv1463 

J(RBB), 2008 WL 505230 at *25 (S.D. Cal. February 25, 2008) (denying ineffective assistance 

claim and finding no “gross error” by counsel where trial counsel informed petitioner of maximum 

exposure of twenty-four years and told petitioner optimistically that his chances at trial were “50–

50,” petitioner rejected plea bargain of twelve years, then prosecution amended information and 

maximum exposure increased to thirty-seven years, and after trial he was sentenced to thirty-seven 

years).

Finally, as discussed infra in Section C.4, Petitioner has also failed to establish prejudice 

because he has failed to establish a reasonable probability that court would have accepted the fourCase 3:14-cv-05017-JST Document 15 Filed 08/01/16 Page 23 of 27
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year plea offer. 

Accordingly, the state court’s rejection of Petitioner’s failure-to-inform ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly 

established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See

Gentry v. Sinclair, 705 F.3d 884, 900 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because ‘counsel is strongly presumed to 

have rendered adequate assistance,’” it was not unreasonable for state court to reject petitioner’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim when petitioner provided no evidence to support the claim)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)); Sandgathe v. Maass, 314 F.3d 371, 379 (9th Cir. 2002) 

(affirming denial of ineffective assistance of counsel claim when petitioner presented no evidence 

in support of claim). Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on his failure-to-advise claim.

D. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims because the state court’s failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on his claims 

renders the state court’s factual determinations unreasonable, and because the state court 

overlooked or ignored evidence of highly probative value. In his petition, Petitioner seeks an 

evidentiary hearing regarding the following factual disputes: (1) counsel’s tactical decisions 

regarding the investigation he made and relied upon in advising Petitioner whether or not to accept 

the plea offer; and (2) whether counsel failed to inform Plaintiff of his maximum sentence 

exposure. Pet. at 14.

12

 

12 In his traverse, Petitioner requests that the evidentiary hearing address the following additional 

issues: (1) whether Petitioner was offered a four-year plea offer; (2) whether Petitioner would 

have accepted the four-year plea offer; (3) Respondent’s assertion that Petitioner claims that he did 

not violate the restraining order, and (4) whether trial counsel is entitled to a presumption of 

competence. Docket No. 14 at 25. In analyzing the merits of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims, the Court has presumed that Petitioner was offered a four-year plea offer, so there 

is no need for an evidentiary hearing on this issue. The second issue is not dispositive in

determining whether counsel was ineffective. As discussed infra, whether trial counsel was 

ineffective turns on whether the advice to reject the plea offer was unreasonable, and whether it 

caused Petitioner prejudice. Turner, 281 F.3d at 879. As to third issue, in analyzing the merits of 

Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court has presumed that Petitioner’s 

defense to the charges related to the restraining order was that he was not properly served with the 

restraining order and not that he did not make the calls to Doe. Accordingly, there is no need for 

an evidentiary hearing on this issue either. Finally, the fourth issue is a legal question and not 

properly the focus of an evidentiary hearing.

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Petitioner incorrectly argues an evidentiary hearing is compelled by the Ninth Circuit’s 

holding in Nunes v. Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2003) and Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992 

(9th Cir. 2004). In Nunes, the Ninth Circuit found that the state court had acted unreasonably in 

not holding an evidentiary hearing. Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1055 n.7. However, in both Nunes and 

two subsequent Ninth Circuit cases, Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, (9th Cir. 2004), and 

Hibbler v. Benedetti, 693 F.3d 1140, 1147 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit made clear that 

holding an evidentiary hearing is not a per se requirement for a state court to reasonably determine 

that a petitioner’s allegations are not credible or do not justify relief. Nunes, 350 F.3d at 1055; 

Lambert, 393 F.3d at 969 (Ninth Circuit specifically “declines to accept Lambert’s proposal to 

inject an ‘evidentiary hearing’ requirement as a pre-requisite to AEDPA deference”); Hibbler, 693 

F.3d at 1147 (“we have never held that a state court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve 

every disputed factual question; such a per se rule would be counter not only to the deference 

owed to state courts under AEDPA, but to Supreme Court precedent.”). In Taylor, the Ninth 

Circuit held that “where the state court should have made a finding of fact but neglected to do 

so . . . the state-court factual determination is perforce unreasonable and there is nothing to which 

the presumption of correctness [required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)] can attach.” Taylor, 366 F.3d 

at 1000–01. However, the Ninth Circuit also made clear in in Taylor that before a federal court 

could conclude that the state-court factual determinations were “perforce unreasonable,” the 

federal court must conclude that the state-court fact-finding process was either defective in some 

material way or non-existent. Id. at 1000. Petitioner alleges that the state court’s failure to hold 

an evidentiary hearing rendered the state court fact-finding process defective because the state 

court overlooked or ignored highly probative evidence. However, as the Court discussed supra, 

the evidence presented by Petitioner in the state-court proceeding did not demonstrate that trial 

counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, there is no basis for presuming that the state court’s denial 

of Petitioner’s claims does not deserve AEDPA deference, and that an evidentiary hearing is 

required. 

Moreover, Petitioner has not satisfied AEDPA’s requirements for an evidentiary hearing. 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) prohibits the Court from holding an evidentiary hearing on a claim where 

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the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in state court unless (1) the claim 

relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the 

Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or the claim relies on a factual predicate that 

could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the facts 

underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for 

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the 

underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). 

Petitioner argues that he is exempt from the requirements of Section 2254(e)(2) because he 

diligently sought an evidentiary hearing in state court. Traverse at 24. Petitioner is incorrect. 

Petitioner is correct that the Supreme Court has held that under Section 2254(e)(2), “[d]iligence 

will require in the usual case that the prisoner, at a minimum, seek an evidentiary hearing in state 

court in the manner prescribed by state law.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 437. However, making this

minimum effort does not necessarily satisfy the diligence requirement. In Williams, the Supreme 

Court found that petitioner had not been diligent in developing the facts related to his claim that 

nondisclosure of a psychiatric report was in contravention of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 

(1963) when the petitioner was aware of the existence and importance of the report during the 

state court proceeding, but failed to provide the report until the federal habeas proceedings. 

Williams, 529 U.S. at 437–40. The petitioner had sought an evidentiary hearing in state court, but 

had not raised his Brady claim in state court. Here, Petitioner failed to develop the factual basis of 

his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the state court proceeding. He could have, but did 

not, submit evidence attesting as to when trial counsel informed him of his maximum exposure; as 

to why trial counsel waited until the first day of trial to retrieve the transcript of the September 28, 

2011 hearing; and as to whether and why trial counsel advised him to reject the four-year plea 

deal. Instead, Petitioner submitted a declaration from trial counsel that is ambiguous at best. 

The Court finds that Petitioner was not diligent in developing the factual basis of his claim 

in state court, and he has not satisfied the requirements of Section 2254(e)(2). Accordingly, 

Petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

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E. Certificate of Appealability

The federal rules governing habeas cases brought by state prisoners require a district court 

that issues an order denying a habeas petition to either grant or deny therein a certificate of 

appealability. See Rules Governing § 2254 Case, Rule 11(a).

A judge shall grant a certificate of appealability “only if the applicant has made a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), and the 

certificate must indicate which issues satisfy this standard. Id. § 2253(c)(3). “Where a district 

court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing required to satisfy § 2253(c) 

is straightforward: [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district 

court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 

473, 484 (2000).

Here, Petitioner has not made such a showing, and, accordingly, a certificate of 

appealability will be denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 1, 2016

______________________________________

JON S. TIGAR

United States District Judge

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