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Parties Involved:
Johnie D. Ford
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

.. FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

AUG 2 9 1990 

.ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v. 

JOHNIE D. FORD, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

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No. 89-3299 

(D.C. No. 89-20049-01) 

(D. Kan.) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before MCKAY and SETH, circuit Judges, and KANE, Senior District 

Judge** 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially 

assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 

3 4 (a) ; 10th Cir . R . 3 4 . 1. 9 . 

submitted without oral argument. 

The cause is therefore ordered 

*This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not 

be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for 

the purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the case, res 

judicata or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

**Honorable John L. Kane, Jr., United States Senior District Judge 

for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation. 

Appellate Case: 89-3299 Document: 010110041630 Date Filed: 08/29/1990 Page: 1 
Appellant Johnie Ford appeals his conviction and sentence for 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine and use of a firearm 

in a drug trafficking crime. He raises five issues in this appeal: 

( 1) whether the district court improperly denied his motion to 

suppress certain statements made to police officers before and 

after his arrest, ( 2) whether the court erred in admitting the 

expert testimony of a drug enforcement agent, (3) whether the court 

erred in admitting evidence of bad acts under Federal Rule of 

Evidence 404(b), (4) whether the enhancement of his sentence for 

obstruction of justice was unconstitutional or otherwise improper; 

and (5) whether he was denied a fair trial because there were no 

blacks on the jury. We affirm. 

On February 3, 1989, Kansas city, Kansas Police Department 

officers and agents with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 

Firearms (ATF) executed a search warrant at 1926 Springfield. Ford 

was detained in the rear of a second floor hallway where he was 

spotted by a swat team officer when he first made entry into the 

second floor of the apartment building. ATF Special Agent Robert 

Stumpenhaus encountered Ford immediately after the swat team made 

entry. Upon seeing Stumpenhaus, Ford immediately volunteered that 

he had a loaded gun down the hall in the apartment. At that point, 

Stumpenhaus advised Ford by reading off his Statement of Rights 

card. Stumpenhaus went further and told Ford specifically that he 

did not have to say anything if he did not want to. Ford told 

Stumpenhaus that he understood his rights. 

Ford and stumpenhaus stayed in the hallway during the time 

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that other officers were executing the search warrant in the 

apartment. They engaged in almost continuous dialogue, stumpenhaus 

asking Ford about the source and use of the gun and his knowledge 

and involvement in crack cocaine sales. Stumpenhaus and Ford 

continued this dialogue for between one-half hour to one and onehalf hours while the search proceeded. Ford remained in custody 

and was not free to leave during this time. 

Initially Ford denied any involvement or knowledge of crack 

cocaine sales. However, after officers advised Stumpenhaus that 

they had found crack cocaine in the apartment underneath an 

armchair, Stumpenhaus asked Ford if he was ready to tell the truth. 

Ford responded that he would tell the truth and then admitted that 

he was involved in selling crack cocaine for Jamaicans. He gave 

a full confession. In addition, officers recovered from the 

apartment Ford's gun, an Intratec . 9mm semiautomatic with an 

extension, a plastic bag containing a magazine and 34 rounds of 

ammunition, and his jacket and wallet. 

After the search was completed and Ford was arrested, agents 

took him to the ATF office. Special Agent McCauley, who had not 

participated in the first interview of Ford but who had overheard 

parts of it, asked Ford to reiterate what he had told Stumpenhaus. 

McCauley reminded him that he had had his rights read to him and 

that he did not have to say anything. Ford acknowledged to 

McCauley that he understood his rights and did want to talk. 

At trial, agents Stumpenhaus, McCauley and other agents on the 

search team testified as to the above events. In addition, DEA 

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Agent Larry Melton testified that, in his experience, crack cocaine 

dealers have common tools of trade such as beepers or mobile phones 

and small plastic baggies for the packaging of the substance. He 

also opined that, although the amount of crack cocaine seized from 

the apartment could arguably be a personal use amount, because of 

the way it was packaged, in fifty-five small individual baggies, 

it was meant for distribution. 

Robert Haywood, an informant, was also called to testify. He 

stated that in January, 1989, the month preceding the February 3, 

1989, search warrant, he had purchased crack cocaine from Ford at 

the same location, 1926 Springfield. He related that he had 

observed a Jamaican called Andrew deliver the crack cocaine to Ford 

in the kitchen of the apartment. Later, Haywood handed money to 

another individual in the apartment named Vincent who took the 

money into Ford and returned with the crack cocaine. Based on 

this, Haywood testified, Ford was handling and in control of the 

crack cocaine. 

Ford then took the stand. He recanted his confession, denied 

making the statements to Agents Stumpenhaus and McCauley and denied 

any knowledge or involvement in cocaine sales in the apartment. 

He stated he volunteered to the agents the fact that he had a gun 

in the rear apartment along with his jacket and wallet. He 

testified that the approximately $800 recovered from him in the 

initial arrest was the remainder of a profit sharing check he had 

received from a former employer in late 1988. He said the 

approximate $1,100 recovered when he was arrested on the indictment 

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in June, 1989, was part of his income tax refund. After 

deliberating, the jury found Ford guilty of both counts as charged. 

Ford first contends that the district court erred in denying 

his motion to suppress the statements he made to agents Stumpenhaus 

and McCauley. The standard of review for an issue involving an 

evidentiary matter is whether the trial court abused its discretion 

in admitting the challenged evidence. United States v. Zamora, 784 

F.2d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1986). 

Ford makes two arguments. First, he argues that Stumpenhaus 

should have re-advised him of his Miranda rights at the point when 

the crack cocaine was discovered in the apartment and before 

stumpenhaus asked him if he was then ready to tell the truth. He 

argues that since up to one and one-half hours had elapsed between 

the time they began talking and the time Stumpenhaus confronted him 

with their findings, any subsequent statements were not knowingly 

and voluntarily made. 

Miranda rights attach when a person is in custody, not 

necessarily when a formal arrest is made. Dunaway v. New York, 442 

U.S. 200 (1979). Here, Ford's freedom was significantly deprived 

from the point in time when he was first apprehended in the 

hallway, because thereafter law enforcement agents kept him in 

their custody and would not allow him to leave. 

Special Agent Stumpenhaus appropriately advised Ford before 

questioning him. Ford had volunteered that his gun was in the 

apartment down the hallway. At this point, stumpenhaus advised him 

of his rights and thereafter, all responses to Stumpenhaus• 

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questions were made with knowledge of those rights. Ford told 

Stumpenhaus that he understood his rights and that he did want to 

talk. 

stumpenhaus and Ford conversed continuously from when 

stumpenhaus first interrogated him to when Stumpenhaus confronted 

him with the fact that crack cocaine was found in the room. There 

was no need to re-advise Ford before questioning him about the 

crack in the room. Stumpenhaus had asked him about his knowledge 

about or involvement in crack cocaine sales during the half-hour 

to one and one-half hour interim. Al though a period of lapsed time 

between an advice of rights and an interview is one factor to be 

considered in determining whether the waiver of rights is voluntary 

and knowing, when the conversation or interview is virtually 

continuous, the lapse of time is of no consequence. See United 

States ex rel Espinoza v. Fairman, 813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987), 

cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1010 (1987). 

Ford next contends that, later on that evening when Special 

Agent McCauley interrogated Ford at the ATF office, Ford should 

have again been advised of his Miranda rights. As McCauley 

testified, however, before he questioned Ford that night he did not 

read the Miranda rights in full, but stated, "I was there when you 

had your rights read to you. Did you understand them?" Ford 

responded affirmatively. "Having those rights still in mind, do 

you understand you don't have to say anything? 11 Ford responded 

affirmatively. McCauley then asked Ford to relate to him in 

reiteration of what he had already told Stumpenhaus. 

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The requirement of advising persons whose freedom of movement 

is significantly curtailed of their rights delineated in the 

Miranda decision is not a mindless ritual or a shibboleth to be 

incanted before the doors of disclosure can be opened. We look to 

the substance of the event. Here, we find that Ford was advised 

and that he understood; his statements were voluntarily made and 

therefore admissible. 

Ford's second argument in this appeal is that Special Agent 

Melton's testimony should not have been admitted because he was not 

qualified as an expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. Melton 

testified that he was a criminal investigator for the Drug 

Enforcement Administration and had been a DEA agent for five years. 

He further testified that although the distribution and marketing 

of crack cocaine was a relatively new phenomenon, he had gained 

some experience in the investigation of crack cocaine. Experience 

gained by observation in the line of duty is sufficient to qualify 

one as a drug agent expert. See, ~, United States v. 

Patterson, 819 F.2d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987). 

Whether or not the expert is qualified is subject to the 

clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Thomas, 676 F.2d 531 

(11th Cir. 1982). Given Melton's experience as a criminal 

investigator for the DEA and his experience in the investigation 

and distribution of crack cocaine, the court was not clearly 

erroneous in qualifying him as an expert witness. 

Ford also contends that the substance of Melton's testimony 

should not have been admitted as it was more prejudicial to him 

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than probative. He argues that it is within the jury's lay 

experience as to what amounts of crack cocaine are for personal use 

and what amounts are for distribution. While such may be within 

the common knowledge of a crack user, we are not willing to assume 

that the average citizen would have any idea what a personal amount 

of crack cocaine would be as opposed to a distribution amount. 

Melton testified that personal use amounts can vary depending on 

a user's level of tolerance, but that even though agents seized a 

fairly small quantity of crack cocaine in this case, clearly it was 

was packaged for distribution on the street level. Melton further 

testified that although it would be conceivable that a crack user 

would purchase this much crack cocaine for his own personal use, 

because of the economy of scale, if someone buys a large amount of 

crack cocaine for personal use, he will not buy it in fifty-five 

small individual baggies, but will buy a large rock that has not 

been cut down into retail sizes. Melton further testified that 

crack cocaine dealers have tools of trade including guns, small 

baggies for packaging the substance, beepers and mobile phones. 

This type of testimony is admitted in drug trials to assist and aid 

the jury in understanding that which is assuredly esoteric. 

Ford next asserts that the government's Rule 404(b) evidence 

of Robert Haywood, a confidential informant, was confusing and 

contradictory and therefore more prejudicial than probative. Ford 

contends that Haywood's testimony was inconsistent and 

contradictory regarding how many people were present when Ford 

allegedly sold crack cocaine to him. Ford further argues that 

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Haywood was indefinite regarding when the sale took place and 

whether Ford in fact sold the crack, since Haywood did not pay the 

money to Ford. 

Haywood testified that he bought crack cocaine from Ford in 

January, the month preceding the February 3, 1989, search warrant. 

He did not recall the exact date but he was certain it was in 

January. Haywood was also certain that the transaction had taken 

place at 1926 Springfield in an upstairs apartment, the same 

building where Ford was apprehended on February 3, 1989. 

This evidence was clear, consistent and highly probative. The 

evidence was especially probative on the issue of intent, that is 

whether Ford intended to distribute the cocaine or whether it was 

for his own personal use. The fact that he had participated in the 

past in a distribution tended to show that the fifty-five bags of 

crack cocaine he possessed on February 3rd were also for 

distribution purposes. 

There was a clear, logical connection between this Rule 404(b) 

evidence and· the issues at trial. Evidence of a previous drug 

transaction involving the same type of substance at the same 

location and involving the same individuals as were present on the 

day of the search warrant is admissible. The trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence, and the connection 

between the Rule 404 (b) evidence and the instant crime were 

sufficient to pass the tests enunciated in United States v. 

Cummings, 798 F.2d 413, 418 (10th Cir. 1986), and United States v. 

Kendall, 766 F.2d 1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 

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U.S. 1081 (1986). 

In his fourth argument, Ford asserts that the United States 

Sentencing Commission Guidelines (Guidelines) provision for 

enhancement of sentence for obstruction of proceedings is 

unconstitutional and the court inappropriately applied the 

enhancement. The standard of review on appeal with respect to the 

Guidelines is that the appellant must show that the sentencing 

court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. United States v. 

Cain, 881 F.2d 980 (11th Cir. 1989). The court will give due 

deference to a district court's application of the Guidelines to 

the facts. United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 443-44 (1st Cir. 

1989) and United States v. Kirk, 894 F.2d 1162, 1163 (10th Cir. 

1990). The Guidelines, as promulgated, have passed constitutional 

muster. Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 

Ford contends that Section 3 Cl. 1 of the Guidelines, which 

allows for a two-level enhancement for an obstruction of 

proceedings, is unconstitutional because it violates his right to 

a fair trial and to present his defense at trial. He argues that 

he was placed in the quandary of deciding whether to testify and 

run the risk that the judge would not believe his testimony. While 

a defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense at 

trial, he has absolutely no constitutional right to testify 

untruthfully at his trial. There is no constitutional protection 

against an enhanced sentence under the Guidelines for obstruction 

of proceedings based on perjured testimony by a defendant. United 

States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. 

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filed, No. 90-5034 (June 27, 1990). Similarly, the obstruction of 

proceedings enhancement can constitutionally be applied against a 

defendant who threatens a prospective witness, as there is no first 

amendment right to make intimidating threats against government 

witnesses. United states v. Shoulberg, 895 F.2d 882, 886 (2d Cir. 

1990) . 

When a defendant goes further than merely denying guilt and 

in fact testifies falsely, the obstruction of proceedings 

enhancement constitutionally applies. United States v. Keys, 899 

F.2d at 988. Ford also went further than denying his guilt. He 

denied making a confession to the law enforcement officers, 

basically contradicting everything the ATF agents said regarding 

what he had told them. This went much further than a denial of 

guilt. He recanted his confession and contradicted everything he 

had previously told the law enforcement officers. 

Ford also contends that the obstruction enhancement violates 

due process because it is essentially the same as if he had been 

convicted of perjury, yet a perjury conviction requires proof of 

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, while the obstruction enhancement 

only requires proof by a preponderance of the evidence. This 

argument has been addressed before. In United States v. Frederick, 

897 F.2d 490, 491-93 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that the 

preponderance of evidence standard for sentencing enhancements does 

not violate due process. 

Ford further argues that the court's application of the 

obstruction enhancement under these facts was inappropriate. He 

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argues that he adequately explained the source of the cash found 

in his possession at each of his arrests, such that the court 

should not have found that he lied about the same. Ford testified 

that the $810 found on his person on February 3rd was not drug 

money but was money he received in December, 1988, from a profit 

sharing distribution. Yet he further testified that at the time 

he was only earning $75 a week while his wife was getting about 

$400 a month in federal aid to support two children. He added that 

a few days before February 3, he had purchased a $300 gun with 

cash. He claimed that when he was arrested in June, the $1,140 

found on his person was not drug proceeds, but was from a check he 

had cashed at a United Super from his income tax refund. He could 

not explain why he still had all this money given his lack of 

income and significant living expenses. He could not explain why 

he cashed the check at the United Super rather than cashing it 

through his own bank and further could not explain why he had so 

many small denomination bills. Given all this testimony, Ford's 

credibility was impeached and the court was not clearly erroneous 

in finding that he lied. 

Furthermore, Ford denied that he had made a confession to ATF 

agents and denied making the statements the agents testified to. 

Given that there were two agents who testified to the gist of 

Ford's confession, the court was not clearly erroneous in choosing 

to believe the agents rather than the defendant. A judge is not 

required to accept as gospel a defendant's self-serving testimony. 

The judge should resolve in favor of the defendant only those 

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., 

conflicts about which he has no firm conviction. 

In his fifth and final issue, Ford makes a number of 

allegations, none of which are supported by the record. He argues, 

sans record, that there were no blacks on the jury, and no blacks 

on the jury panel, although Kansas City, Kansas is about thirty per 

cent black. He fails to establish the composition of the entire 

jury panel. 

To establish a prima facia violation under Duren v. Missouri, 

439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979), the defendant must show: 1) that the 

community contains a distinct group; 2) that the distinct group 

was not fairly represented in the venire from which the jury was 

chosen; and 3) that the underrepresentation was due to the 

systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. 

Clearly, black people are a distinct group within the meaning 

of Duren. Peter v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 498 (1972). However, Ford 

does not show that blacks were not fairly represented in the venire 

from which the jury is chosen. He acknowledges that the venire 

comes from a number of counties other than the county in which 

Kansas City, Kansas, is located. However, he makes no showing of 

what the percentage of black population is in the counties from 

which the jury is pooled. He makes no showing of what the 

percentage of blacks was in the entire venire panel. He only 

states that there were no blacks on his particular jury. Such is 

an insufficient showing. See United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 

1509, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 

21, 23-24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984); united 

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, 

States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 649 (11th Cir. 1984). Finally, Ford 

has made absolutely no showing that if there was an 

underrepresentation it was due to any systematic exclusion of 

blacks in the jury selection process. A mere absence of blacks 

certainly does not prove systematic exclusion. Morgan v. United 

States, 696 F.2d 1239, 1240 (9th Cir. 1983). 1 

The judgment of conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

Entered for the Court 

John L. Kane, Jr. 

Senior District Judge 

1

Ford has filed a supplemental prose brief in which he raises 

three additional points, each of which is totally lacking in merit. 

He suggests the evidence was insufficient to establish constructive 

possession. We have examined the transcript and record and 

determine there is more than ample evidence to establish all 

constituent elements of both off ens es. He suggests the trial court 

erred in denying the motion to suppress his inculpatory statements, 

but we have addressed this contention sufficiently in the text of 

this opinion. His final assay is that the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying without an evidentiary hearing his motion for 

a new trial based upon the recantation of Robert Haywood. Even 

accepting the allegations in the motion for new trial as true, 

arguendo, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 

the motion. 

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