Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00233/USCOURTS-caed-2_14-cv-00233-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Amber Leigh Holland
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

AMBER LEIGH HOLLAND,

Plaintiff,

v.

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner 

of Social Security,

Defendant.

No. 2:14-cv-0233 DAD

ORDER

This social security action was submitted to the court without oral argument for ruling on 

defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure, (“Rule”).1 

A district court may alter or amend its judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure. However, reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used 

sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Carroll v. Nakatani, 

342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 

§ 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). The Ninth Circuit has explained

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1

 Both parties have previously consented to Magistrate Judge jurisdiction in this action pursuant 

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). (See Dkt. Nos. 10 & 11.)

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There are four grounds upon which a Rule 59(e) motion may be 

granted: 1) the motion is “necessary to correct manifest errors of 

law or fact upon which the judgment is based;” 2) the moving party 

presents “newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence;” 3) 

the motion is necessary to ‘prevent manifest injustice;” or 4) there 

is an “intervening change in controlling law.” 

Turner v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad Co., 338 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1254 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1999)). A motion to amend 

judgment under Rule 59(e) “may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or 

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. 

v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n. 5 (2008) (quoting 11 C. Wright & A Miller, Federal Practice and 

Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-28 (2d ed. 1995)).

Here, the defendant asserts that she seeks to alter or amend the court’s order filed August 

28, 2015 to “correct manifest errors of law or fact upon which the judgment is based, and to 

prevent manifest injustice.” (Def.’s MTA (Dkt. No. 19) at 2.2) Specifically, defendant argues 

that “[e]ven if this Court found error in the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical evidence and 

Plaintiff’s credibility, under the Social Security Act, Supreme Court precedent, and Ninth Circuit 

law, remand for payment of benefits is an error of law.”3 (Id.) In this regard, defendant argues 

that this matter should have been remanded from further administrative proceedings. (Id. at 11.) 

That argument, however, is the same argument defendant raised in her September 17, 

2014 cross-motion for summary judgment, which this court denied. Therein, defendant argued 

that, should the court find that the ALJ committed a “reversible legal error,” the “proper remedy 

is a remand for further administrative proceedings.” (Def.’s MSJ (Dkt. No. 16) at 15.) As noted 

above, “Rule 59(e) may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present 

evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co. 

v. Lee Investments LLC, 551 F. Supp.2d 1069, 1080-81 (E.D. Cal. 2008). See also Milano v. 

 

2

 Page number citations such as this one are to the page number reflected on the court’s CM/ECF 

system and not to page numbers assigned by the parties.

3

 The “Commissioner has chosen to limit this motion to the remedy . . . .” (Def.’s MTA (Dkt. 

No. 19) at 2.)

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Carter, 599 Fed. Appx. 767, 768 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying Milano’s motion for reconsideration because Milano did not present newly discovered 

evidence, show that the district court committed clear error, or identify an intervening change in 

controlling law. Instead, Milano simply rehashed her previously-rejected arguments.”).4

Moreover, for the same reasons noted in the court’s August 28, 2015 order, the 

Commissioner’s argument is misplaced. A case may be remanded under the “credit-as-true” rule 

for an award of benefits where: 

(1) the record has been fully developed and further administrative 

proceedings would serve no useful purpose; (2) the ALJ has failed 

to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting evidence, whether 

claimant testimony or medical opinion; and (3) if the improperly 

discredited evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be 

required to find the claimant disabled on remand.

Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1020. Even where all the conditions for the “credit-as-true” rule are met, 

the court retains “flexibility to remand for further proceedings when the record as a whole creates 

serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the meaning of the Social 

Security Act.” Id. at 1021.

Here, the court’s August 28, 2015 order found that the record had been fully developed, 

that the ALJ failed to provide a legally sufficient reason for rejecting plaintiff’s own testimony 

and for rejecting the medical opinion offered by plaintiff’s treating neurologist, Dr. Chan. 

Moreover, the court also found that if the plaintiff’s testimony and the medical opinion offered by 

Dr. Chan were properly credited, the ALJ would be required to find plaintiff disabled on remand. 

In this regard, as noted in the August 28, 2015 order, it was the opinion of plaintiff’s 

treating neurologist that she would be absent from work, on average, three or four times per 

month. (Tr. at 32.) When asked at the August 22, 2012 administrative hearing a hypothetical that 

included that limitation the Vocational Expert testified that such a limitation “would eliminate all 

jobs in the national economy.” (Id. at 55.) 

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4

 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 

36-3(b).

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Accordingly, the court finds, again, that all the conditions for the “credit-as- true” rule 

have been met, there is not serious doubt as to whether the claimant is, in fact, disabled within the 

meaning of the Social Security Act and, therefore, it was appropriate to remand this matter with 

the direction to award benefits. See Mendoza v. Colvin, ___ Fed. Appx. ___, ___, 2015 WL 

6437337, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 23, 2015) (remanding for award of benefits where ALJ failed to 

provide legally sufficient reason for rejecting medical opinion, as well as plaintiff’s testimony, 

and vocational expert testified that individual with plaintiff’s physical limitations would be 

unable work); Behling v. Colvin, 603 Fed. Appx. 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Based on the 

vocational expert’s hearing testimony, who responded that a person with Behling’s limitations 

would be precluded from sustained work activity, there is substantial evidence to support a 

conclusion that further proceedings are not required to determine Behling’s RFC.”); Martinez v. 

Colvin, 585 Fed. Appx. 612, 613 (9th Cir. 2014) (“if Martinez’s testimony and Dr. Novak’s 

opinion were properly credited, Martinez would be considered disabled. We therefore reverse the 

decision of the district court and remand with instructions to remand to the ALJ for the 

calculation and award of benefits”); Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1022, n.28 (“Here, the ALJ and counsel 

posed questions to the VE that matched both Garrison’s testimony and the opinions of Wang, 

Anderson, and General, and in response the VE answered that a person with such an RFC would 

be unable to work. On that basis, we can conclude that Garrison is disabled without remanding 

for further proceedings to determine anew her RFC.”); Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 

278 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding for payment of benefits where the ALJ improperly 

rejected the testimony of the plaintiff’s examining physicians); Ghokassian v. Shalala, 41 F.3d 

1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994) (awarding benefits where the ALJ “improperly discounted the opinion 

of the treating physician”); cf. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 798 F.3d 749, 759 (9th Cir. 2015) 

(“Although medical reports of adequate pain control on medication do not foreclose the 

possibility that Brown-Hunter still needs to lie down as often and as unpredictably as she alleged, 

they do create a significant factual conflict in the record that should be resolved through further 

proceedings on an open record before a proper disability determination can be made by the ALJ 

in the first instance.”); Treichler v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1105 

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(9th Cir. 2014) (“Where . . . an ALJ makes a legal error, but the record is uncertain and 

ambiguous, the proper approach is to remand the case to the agency.”).5 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant’s

motion to alter or amend the judgment (Dkt. No. 19) is denied. 

Dated: October 29, 2015

DAD:6

Ddad1\orders.soc sec\holland0233.mtr.den.ord.docx

 

5

 See fn. 4, above.

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