Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03116/USCOURTS-caDC-04-03116-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Charles Harrison
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 14, 2006 Decided January 12, 2007

No. 04-3076

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

WALTER HENRY, III, A/K/A MONEY,

 A/K/A HENRY WALKER,

APPELLANT

No. 04-3116

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

CHARLES HARRISON,

 A/K/A BOOMIE,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 98cr00235-04)

(No. 98cr00235-05)

USCA Case #04-3116 Document #1016044 Filed: 01/12/2007 Page 1 of 23
2

William M. Kent argued the cause for appellants. Deborah

A. Persico, appointed by the court for appellant Charles

Harrison, was on the joint brief for the appellants.

Deborah Watson, Attorney, United States Department of

Justice, argued the cause for the appellee. Kenneth L. Wainstein,

United States Attorney at the time the brief was filed, was on

brief. Roy W. McLeese, III, Assistant United States Attorney,

entered an appearance.

Before: HENDERSON, GARLAND and KAVANAUGH, Circuit

Judges.

Opinion for the court filed PER CURIAM.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

Concurring opinion filed by Circuit Judge KAVANAUGH.

PER CURIAM:Having been resentenced on remand from this

court, Walter Henry and Charles Harrison again appeal their

convictions and sentences stemming from their participation in

a conspiracy to import and distribute heroin in the Washington,

D.C. and Baltimore, Maryland metropolitan areas. They appeal

their convictions on the ground that the trial court committed

three evidentiary errors: (1) it admitted expert testimony based

in part on testimonial hearsay in violation of Crawford v.

Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Claim One), (2) it admitted

expert testimony based on unreliable methodology (Claim Two)

and (3) it admitted the guilty plea of a non-testifying coconspirator (Claim Three). Henry and Harrison also argue that

they received ineffective assistance of counsel when their

appellate counsel failed to raise Claims Two and Three on direct

USCA Case #04-3116 Document #1016044 Filed: 01/12/2007 Page 2 of 23
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1

It remains unclear, even after oral argument, whether Henry and

Harrison ask us to review Claims Two and Three on the merits or to

decide whether failure to raise them on direct appeal constituted

ineffective assistance of counsel. See Appellants’ Br. at 35-36, 40. As

a result, we will address both. 

appeal.1 Finally, Henry and Harrison challenge their sentences

on the ground that the district court applied the United States

Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) in a mandatory fashion in

violation of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). For

the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Henry and

Harrison waived their evidentiary claims by failing to raise them

at trial or on direct appeal. Furthermore, Henry’s and Harrison’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be raised on

collateral review, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255, if at all. Consistent with

our holding in United States v. Ayers, 428 F.3d 312 (D.C. Cir.

2005), however, we will vacate the sentences and remand for

resentencing because we cannot say that the district court’s

Booker error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

I.

We set forth in detail the facts surrounding the heroin

conspiracy in United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir.

2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1018 (2004). Accordingly, we

mention only those matters required for an understanding of the

decision. On May 4, 1999, the Government charged Henry,

Harrison and other individuals with conspiracy to possess with

intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin. Nuri Lama,

the conspiracy’s ringleader, pleaded guilty and thereafter

testified as a witness against his co-conspirators at their October

20, 1999 trial. Although the jury convicted Henry of possession

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2

 The jury also failed to reach a verdict on the money laundering

conspiracy count against Harrison. Stover, 329 F.3d at 864. The

district court eventually dismissed that count. Id. 

with intent to distribute, it failed to reach a verdict on the drug

conspiracy count against Henry and Harrison.2 

 On September 11, 2000, Henry and Harrison were retried on

the drug conspiracy count. Because Lama had died between the

two trials, the prosecution introduced evidence at the second

trial that Lama had pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. The

prosecution also introduced the expert testimony of

Metropolitan Police Department Detective Tyrone Thomas who

testified about the meanings of various code words used by the

co-conspirators during telephone conversations intercepted by

the FBI. 

After a five-week trial, the jury convicted both Henry and

Harrison of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute one

kilogram or more of heroin. In determining Henry’s and

Harrison’s sentences under the then-mandatory Guidelines, the

district court utilized a formula derived from Detective

Thomas’s expert testimony to calculate the amount of heroin for

which Henry and Harrison were responsible. Based on its

calculations, the court found each responsible for 39.4 kilograms

of heroin, resulting in a base offense level of 38. The court then

added four levels for the leadership roles of both Henry and

Harrison in the conspiracy and two levels for possession of a

firearm for a total offense level of 44. Combined with Henry’s

and Harrison’s Criminal History Category of I, the Guidelines

mandated a sentence of life imprisonment for both and the court

sentenced them accordingly.

The co-conspirators, including Henry and Harrison, appealed

their convictions and sentences. In Stover, we affirmed Henry’s

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3

Henry’s resentencing hearing occurred on June 10, 2004, and

Harrison’s on July 21, 2004.

4

Henry cited Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and

Harrison cited Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), which the

Supreme Court decided after Henry’s hearing.

and Harrison’s convictions but concluded that the district court

had erroneously calculated the amount of heroin for which each

should be held responsible. Accordingly, we vacated their

sentences and remanded to the district court to recalculate the

drug quantity. Stover, 329 F.3d at 876. 

At their resentencing hearings,3

 both Henry and Harrison

argued that the Sixth Amendment prohibits judicial calculation

of drug amounts at sentencing.4

 The district court rejected their

argument and, based on its revised calculation of the drug

amounts, held both Henry and Harrison responsible for 27.3

kilograms of heroin. Again treating the Guidelines as

mandatory, the court set both base offense levels at 36. It then

added four levels for their managerial roles in the offense and

two levels for possession of a firearm for a total offense level of

42. Combined with their Criminal History Category of I,

Henry’s and Harrison’s Guidelines range was 360 months to life

imprisonment and the district court again sentenced them to life

imprisonment. Henry and Harrison filed timely notices of

appeal.

II.

We address separately Henry’s and Harrison’s evidentiary

challenges, their ineffective assistance of counsel claim and their

Booker challenge.

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A. Evidentiary Challenges

Although they failed to raise their evidentiary challenges at

trial or on direct appeal, Henry and Harrison argue that we

should nevertheless review them for plain error on this appeal

after the resentencing remand. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We

disagree.

It is well-settled that “where an argument could have been

raised on an initial appeal, it is inappropriate to consider that

argument on a second appeal following remand.” Nw. Ind. Tel.

Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citing Laffey v.

Nw. Airlines, Inc., 740 F.2d 1071, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1984));

see also United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 95-96 (2d Cir.

2001) (applying waiver to second appeal following resentencing

remand); cf. United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 849-50 (6th

Cir. 1997) (applying waiver at resentencing remand stage). The

“widely-accepted” bar promotes procedural efficiency and

prevents the “‘bizarre result’” that “‘a party who has chosen not

to argue a point on a first appeal should stand better as regards

the law of the case than one who had argued and lost.’” Nw.

Ind. Tel., 872 F.2d at 470 (quoting Laffey, 740 F.2d at 1089-90).

Although the “waiver principle is [not] an absolute preclusion to

appellate review,” Crocker v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 49 F.3d

735, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1995), we have stated that “discretion to

waive a waiver is normally exercised only in ‘exceptional

circumstances, where injustice might otherwise result,’” id. at

740 (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 710,

717 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). 

Henry and Harrison have not demonstrated “exceptional

circumstances” that excuse their failure to raise the evidentiary

challenges either at trial or on direct appeal. Regarding Claim

One—the allegedly erroneous admission of Thomas’s expert

testimony based in part on hearsay—Henry and Harrison argue

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5

We issued Stover on May 23, 2003. The Supreme Court decided

Crawford on March 8, 2004. 

6

Federal Rule of Evidence 703 provides in part: “If of a type

reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming

opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be

admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be

admitted.” (Emphasis added.) 

that the Crawford decision, which the Supreme Court issued

after their direct appeal,5 created a new legal rule that rendered

the testimony inadmissible. While we have suggested that an

intervening change in the law can constitute an “exceptional

circumstance[]” that justifies waiving waiver, see Crocker, 49

F.3d at 740, the Crawford decision did not effect such a change

with respect to the admissibility of Thomas’s expert testimony.

In Crawford, the Supreme Court altered the framework set forth

earlier in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), and held that the

Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment bars

“testimonial” hearsay statements unless the declarant is

unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity

to cross-examine him. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. Crawford,

however, did not involve expert witness testimony and thus did

not alter an expert witness’s ability to rely on (without repeating

to the jury) otherwise inadmissible evidence in formulating his

opinion under Federal Rule of Evidence 703.6

 In other words,

while the Supreme Court in Crawford altered Confrontation

Clause precedent, it said nothing about the Clause’s relation to

Federal Rule of Evidence 703. Because Crawford does not

represent an intervening change in the law regarding the

admissibility of Thomas’s expert testimony, no exceptional

circumstance exists and Henry’s and Harrison’s Claim One is

thus waived.

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With respect to Claims Two and Three, Henry and Harrison

appear to argue that we should address the merits in this appeal

because their original appellate counsel acted ineffectively in

failing to raise them on direct appeal. See Appellants’ Br. at 35-

36, 40. In particular, Henry and Harrison argue that the trial

court erroneously permitted Detective Thomas to testify about

the meanings of terms used by the co-conspirators in intercepted

telephone conversations and erroneously admitted evidence that

Lama pleaded guilty although Lama himself was unavailable to

testify. In order to reach the merits of Claims Two and Three

because counsel allegedly acted ineffectively, however, we

would first need to determine whether counsel acted

ineffectively. And because an ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim must ordinarily be made on collateral review, see

Part II.B infra, we decline to consider Henry’s and Harrison’s

original appellate counsel’s performance an exceptional

circumstance that justifies waiving waiver. Accordingly, we do

not reach the merits of Claims Two and Three.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Henry and Harrison argue that their original appellate

counsel acted ineffectively in failing to raise Claims Two and

Three on direct appeal. When a defendant raises an ineffective

assistance of trial counsel claim for the first time on direct

appeal, our “‘general practice is to remand the claim for an

evidentiary hearing.’” United States v. Moore, 394 F.3d 925,

931 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d

908, 909 (D.C. Cir. 2003)). Other circuits require the defendant

to pursue an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim in

collateral proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See, e.g., United

States v. Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1017 (4th Cir. 1994).

Nevertheless, an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim can

be resolved on direct appeal if the trial record conclusively

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shows that counsel did or did not perform effectively. See, e.g.,

Moore, 394 F.3d at 931; Quintero-Barraza, 78 F.3d at 1347;

Matzkin, 14 F.3d at 1017. 

The question here is whether we should similarly treat a

claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel raised in an

appeal following a resentencing remand. On the one hand, such

a claim is virtually unreviewable on direct appeal as appellate

counsel will hardly assert his own ineffectiveness. Cf. United

States v. Weaver, 281 F.3d 228, 234 (D.C. Cir. 2002)

(explaining that defendant can, with new counsel, raise

ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for first time on

direct appeal because “trial counsel cannot be expected to argue

his own ineffectiveness in a motion for a new trial”). Therefore,

if the trial record sufficed, we could decide a claim of ineffective

assistance of appellate counsel on appeal following a

resentencing remand. Cf. Nw. Ind. Tel., 872 F.2d at 470

(explaining that waiver applies “where an argument could have

been raised on an initial appeal” (emphasis added)); see also

Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d at 96 (deciding ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim on appeal after resentencing remand

because “the underlying challenge” was “sufficiently presented”

and “judicial efficiency would be served”). Unlike a claim of

ineffective trial counsel that can be made on direct appeal,

however, a claim of ineffective appellate counsel can be made

only if a “second” appeal occurs—for example, as a result of a

resentencing remand. In effect, a fortuity of the judicial

process—whether we decide to remand for resentencing—would

thus determine whether the defendant has an alternative to

collateral review in pursuing an ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel claim. Cf. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,

327-28 (1987) (applying new Supreme Court rule retroactively

in criminal case because it is “solely the fortuities of the judicial

process” that determine case Court chooses to hear first on

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plenary review). We believe a uniform procedure should apply

to all defendants with an ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel claim and therefore we will not consider such a claim on

appeal following remand for resentencing. Instead, a defendant

with such a claim must pursue it on collateral review pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 

C. Booker Claim

Finally, it is undisputed that the district court sentenced

Henry and Harrison by applying the Guidelines in a mandatory

fashion to increase his sentence beyond that which could have

been imposed based solely on the facts found by the jury which

is constitutional error under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.

220 (2005). See United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1182-

83 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the Government argues that

the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and thus a

resentencing remand is unnecessary. We disagree.

At their respective resentencing hearings, both Henry and

Harrison raised a Sixth Amendment objection to their sentences.

Accordingly, we review the sentences for harmless error under

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) (“Any error, defect,

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights

must be disregarded.”). That is, the Government must establish

“beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the sentence obtained.” United States v. Coumaris,

399 F.3d 343, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). 

The Government maintains that the district court’s

sentencing error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

because it imposed the maximum sentence in the Guidelines

range notwithstanding its discretion to impose a lower sentence.

That is, the district court decided to sentence Henry and

Harrison to life imprisonment under a then-mandatory

Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Relying

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on Tenth Circuit precedent, Appellee’s Br. at 47-48, the

Government contends that if a judge imposed the maximum

sentence within the then-mandatory Guidelines range, there is

no reason to believe he would change the sentence on remand.

See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th Cir.

2005) (sentence imposed at top of Guidelines range pre-Booker

constitutes harmless error because “[h]aving exercised his

limited discretion under the pre-Booker system to give [the

defendant] the highest permissible sentence, there is no reason

to think the judge would exercise his now-greater discretion to

reduce the sentence”); United States v. Waldroop, 431 F.3d 736,

743 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Riccardi for same proposition).

We do not believe that the pre-Booker imposition of a

sentence at the top of a Guidelines range by itself constitutes

harmless error. In United States v. Coles, we held that a Booker

error constitutes plain error if “there would have been a

materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had

the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post-Booker

sentencing regime.” 403 F.3d 764, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In so

holding, we recognized that “[t]here undoubtedly will be some

cases in which a reviewing court will be confident that a

defendant has suffered no prejudice,” id. at 769, and therefore

remand would be unnecessary. For example, if a district judge

imposed a sentence at the statutory maximum “‘and [said] that

if he could he would have imposed an even longer sentence,

there would be no basis for thinking that if he had known that

the sentencing guidelines [were] merely advisory he would have

given the defendant a lighter sentence.’” Id. (quoting United

States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005)). 

We also suggested in Coles, however, that the imposition of

a sentence at the top of a Guidelines range without “the judge’s

characterization of the sentence,” United States v. Tchibassa,

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452 F.3d 918, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2006), is “hardly conclusive,”

Coles, 403 F.3d at 769. We noted:

“A conscientious judge—one who took the guidelines

seriously whatever his private views—would pick a

sentence relative to the guideline range. If he thought

the defendant a more serious offender than an offender

at the bottom of the range, he would give him a higher

sentence even if he thought the entire range too high.”

Id. at 770 (quoting Paladino, 401 F.3d at 482). In other words,

a trial judge treating the Guidelines as mandatory might have

imposed the maximum sentence in a particular range not

necessarily because he believed the defendant deserved that

sentence but because he considered the defendant to be the most

serious type of offender in the range. And if this analysis

applies in the plain error context, where the burden of proving

prejudice is on the defendant, it applies a fortiori in the context

of constitutional harmless error, where the burden is on the

Government to establish no prejudice beyond a reasonable

doubt. Thus, we agree with our sister circuits that have held that

a sentence at the top of a Guidelines range is not, in itself,

enough to establish that a Booker error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. See United States v. Wood, 440 F.3d 255, 259

(5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Cain, 433 F.3d 1345, 1348

(11th Cir. 2005).

Here, unlike in Coles, the defendants raised Sixth

Amendment objections in the district court. Because we cannot

conclude that the district court would have sentenced Henry and

Harrison to life imprisonment irrespective of the mandatory

nature of the Guidelines, the Government has not established

that the error was harmless. We therefore vacate the sentences

and remand for resentencing. See United States v. Baugham,

449 F.3d 167, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown,

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449 F.3d 154, 159-60 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ayers, 428 F.3d at 315-

16. 

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Henry’s and Harrison’s

convictions but we vacate the sentences and remand the case to

the district court for resentencing under Booker and 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a).

So ordered. 

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*

Although we applied the plain error standard in Coles, 403 F.3d

at 767, the prejudice inquiry is the same under both the plain and

harmless error standards. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

734 (1993) (plain error inquiry “normally requires the same kind of

inquiry [as harmless error], with one important difference: It is the

defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of

persuasion with respect to prejudice”).

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 

I fully agree that we should affirm Henry’s and Harrison’s

convictions. I am less certain, however, that we should remand

for a second resentencing. 

A Booker error is prejudicial if “there would have been a

materially different result, more favorable to the defendant, had

the sentence been imposed in accordance with the post-Booker

sentencing regime.”* United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 767

(D.C. Cir. 2005). As Coles acknowledges, “[t]here undoubtedly

will be some cases in which a reviewing court will be confident

that a defendant has suffered no prejudice.” Id. at 769. In such

a case, “‘there would be no basis for thinking that if [the judge]

had known that the sentencing guidelines [were] merely

advisory he would have given the defendant a lighter sentence,’”

id. (quoting United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th

Cir. 2005)), and thus no reason exists to remand for

resentencing. 

While I agree that a sentence imposed at the top of a

Guidelines range does not without more constitute harmless

error, the record in this case reveals more. Although the trial

judge did not explicitly state that he would have imposed the

same sentences were the Guidelines not mandatory, he has twice

sentenced Henry and Harrison to the maximum sentence of life

imprisonment. He originally imposed the mandatory sentence

of life imprisonment. Upon remand for resentencing, the judge

again sentenced Henry and Harrison to life imprisonment after

calculating a lower Guidelines range of 360 months to life

imprisonment. Therefore, the judge not only rejected a lower

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sentence within a particular Guidelines range, he rejected a

lower sentence in a lower range. Indeed, a “conscientious

judge” who considered mandatory life imprisonment to be

excessive would necessarily impose a lighter sentence if a lower

mandatory range applied. See Coles, 403 F.3d at 770. Because

here the district judge chose not to impose a shorter sentence on

the first remand—even with a lower Guidelines range—I believe

there is no reason to think that he would reduce the sentence on

a second remand with no mandatory Guidelines range.

Furthermore, at least with respect to Harrison, the district

judge explained why the life sentence was appropriate. In

United States v. Tchibassa, under plain error review, we found

no prejudice where the district judge imposed the maximum

sentence within the Guidelines range and stated that the sentence

was “appropriate to serve as a warning to those who will kidnap

Americans abroad and entirely appropriate for the type of

actions that occurred here in depriving [the former hostage] not

only of his freedom for two months, but basically of his life.”

452 F.3d 918, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted)

(emphasis original). As we explained in Tchibassa: 

The judge’s strong and unambiguous approval of the

sentence imposed, based . . . on its deterrent effect and

its proportionality to the crime committed, makes us

confident that were the judge given the opportunity to

resentence Tchibassa . . . he would not impose a

sentence materially more favorable than the one he made

plain he considered “appropriate.”

Id. Similarly, the court stated at Harrison’s resentencing

hearing:

The Court finds that a sentence of life is appropriate in

this case in light of the defendant’s boasting of his

lifestyle and his lifestyle, and the need for deterrence

provides sufficient reason for the maximum penalty.

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Dealing in this amount of drugs should result in a

sentence of life imprisonment, in this Court’s view, and

that will provide . . . some deterrence in the community

if others were to understand that even though they’ve

never been arrested before, if they deal in this amount of

drugs they’re going away for the rest of their lives. 

7/21/04 Tr. 28-29 (emphasis added). Because the judge offered

a “strong and unambiguous approval of the sentence imposed”

upon Harrison, I think there is little, if any, reason to believe that

he would impose a sentence more favorable to Harrison were he

given the opportunity to resentence him. See Tchibassa, 452

F.3d at 930. 

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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, concurring: I join the Court’s

opinion and add this concurrence to note a few broader points

about the path of post-Booker jurisprudence in the federal

courts. 

To review: In Booker, a five-Justice majority of the

Supreme Court held that the United States Sentencing

Guidelines were unconstitutional under the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments to the extent that facts used to increase a criminal

sentence (beyond what the defendant otherwise could have

received) were not proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2005) (Stevens,

J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ.). The

logical upshot of this part of Booker (what is known as the

Booker constitutional opinion) is that the Constitution is

satisfied by a sentence in which sentencing facts are proved to

a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

In some tension with the Booker constitutional opinion,

however, a different five-Justice majority of the Booker Court

also held (in what is known as the Booker remedial opinion) that

the constitutional problem with the Guidelines is more readily

solved not by requiring sentencing facts to be proved to a jury

beyond a reasonable doubt, but instead by making the

Guidelines one factor in the district court’s sentencing decision,

along with other factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at

245-46, 260-61 (Breyer, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and

O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ.); cf. id. at 302 (Stevens,

J., dissenting in part, joined by Scalia and Souter, JJ.) (“[B]y

repealing the right to a determinate sentence that Congress

established in the SRA, the Court has effectively eliminated the

very constitutional right Apprendi sought to vindicate.”). The

Booker remedial opinion emphasized, however, that the

sentencing court still “must consult” the Guidelines and “take

them into account when sentencing.” Id. at 264. The Booker

remedial opinion also directed appellate courts to review district

court sentences for “reasonableness” – a term not defined, but

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2

which the Court stated would help “to avoid excessive

sentencing disparities while maintaining flexibility sufficient to

individualize sentences where necessary.” Id. at 264.

In light of the Booker remedial opinion and § 3553(a)’s

requirement that district courts “shall consider” the Guidelines,

as well as § 3553(a)’s express goal of avoiding unwarranted

sentencing disparities, this Court and other federal courts after

Booker have held that the Guidelines remain central to

sentencing. In part because the “reasonableness” of a sentence

is not self-defining and because the Booker remedial opinion

said that appellate review would help maintain uniformity,

appellate courts have relied on the Guidelines as the

predominant substantive standard against which to measure a

sentence’s reasonableness. Indeed, many courts of appeals,

including this one, have accorded a “presumption of

reasonableness” to within-Guidelines sentences. See United

States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2006); see

generally United States v. Buchanan, 449 F.3d 731, 735-41 (6th

Cir. 2006) (Sutton, J., concurring). And appeals courts have

found many below-Guidelines sentences to be “unreasonable.”

The post-Booker appellate jurisprudence in turn has exerted

further hydraulic pressure on district courts to rely heavily on

the Guidelines in sentencing criminal defendants. It thus may be

something of a misnomer to call the Guidelines “advisory” with

respect to current sentencing practices given that appeals courts

often assess the propriety of a district court sentence in part by

reference to the Guidelines. 

As we review what has happened since Booker, there is no

denying that the post-Booker system in substance closely

resembles the pre-Booker Guidelines system in constitutionally

relevant respects. See Michael W. McConnell, The Booker

Mess, 83 DENV. U.L.REV. 665, 678 (2006) (“All the things that

troubled Sixth Amendment purists about the pre-Booker

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Guidelines system are unchanged.”); see also Douglas A.

Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4

OHIO STATE J. CRIM. L. 37, 53 (2006); Douglas A. Berman,

Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal System,

43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 347-55 (2006). Four of the five Justices

who joined the Booker remedial opinion, including its author

Justice Breyer, did not find any constitutional problem with the

Guidelines to begin with. So it is understandable that the current

system as applied is not a major departure from the pre-Booker

Guidelines system. Cf. Booker, 543 U.S. at 312-13 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting in part) (stating that Booker remedial opinion may

convey message that “little has changed” from mandatory

Guidelines system and posing question: “Will appellate review

for ‘unreasonableness’ preserve de facto mandatory Guidelines

by discouraging district courts from sentencing outside

Guidelines ranges?”). 

To be sure, district and appeals courts now take some

additional and important procedural steps (as exemplified again

by today’s per curiam opinion). But the bottom line, at least as

a descriptive matter, is that the Guidelines determine the final

sentence in most cases. And notwithstanding the Booker

constitutional opinion, many key facts used to calculate the

sentence are still being determined by a judge under a

preponderance of the evidence standard, not by a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. The oddity of all this is perhaps best

highlighted by the fact that courts are still using acquitted

conduct to increase sentences beyond what the defendant

otherwise could have received – notwithstanding that five

Justices in the Booker constitutional opinion stated that the

Constitution requires that facts used to increase a sentence

beyond what the defendant otherwise could have received be

proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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In short, we appear to be back almost where we were

pre-Booker. And if that is so – and if the lower courts’ effort to

harmonize the competing goals of the Booker opinions has

become the jurisprudential equivalent of a dog chasing its tail –

it makes sense to examine how current sentencing practices

square not just with Booker but with underlying constitutional

principles. 

The disagreement in Booker (and in earlier cases such as

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Blakely v.

Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004)) represents the collision of two

starkly different conceptions of how the Fifth and Sixth

Amendments apply to criminal sentencing. 

The first conception of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,

which might be called the “deference-to-legislatures” model,

generally defers to legislatures in defining crimes and enacting

sentencing schemes. Under this interpretation, the Fifth and

Sixth Amendments generally require that a jury find the elements

of the crime (as defined by the legislature) beyond a reasonable

doubt. As to sentencing, this approach gives legislatures wide

discretion in crafting a mandatory or structured sentencing

system; or adopting an unstructured system in which each

sentencing judge possesses broad authority to assess a sentence

based on the individual background, facts, and circumstances of

the offense and offender; or choosing some approach in between.

See generally Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949);

McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.)

(opinion of the Court); Booker, 543 U.S. at 326-34 (Breyer, J.,

dissenting in part); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 314-26 (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting); id. at 326-28 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Proponents

of this approach argue that it has prevailed throughout most of

our history, as courts have generally respected and adhered to

legislative choices with respect to sentencing schemes. See

Booker, 543 U.S. at 327-28 (Breyer, J., dissenting in part). 

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The second conception of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,

which might be termed the “real-elements-of-the-offense”

model, rests on the constitutionally central role of the jury in the

criminal process. This approach begins with the idea that no

logical distinction exists between the elements of a crime and

so-called sentencing facts that are used to increase a sentence.

Because the Constitution requires that the Government prove the

elements of a crime to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the

Constitution also requires that the Government prove

substantively similar sentencing facts (such as carrying a weapon

during commission of a drug crime) to a jury beyond a

reasonable doubt. To do otherwise, this view contends, would be

to elevate form over substance and allow legislatures to evade

the constitutional requirement that the prosecutor prove the

elements of the crime to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt simply

by re-labeling elements of the crime as sentencing factors.

Under this jurisprudential approach, therefore, courts do not

defer to a legislative choice to label a fact as a sentencing factor

rather than an element of the crime. See Booker, 543 U.S. at

226-44 (Stevens, J., joined by Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and

Ginsburg, JJ.); Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 572-83

(2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498-99

(Scalia, J., concurring). 

There is an important qualification to this second approach,

however, which may explain some of the conceptual and

practical difficulty in this area. Despite requiring the jury to find

beyond a reasonable doubt the facts used to increase a sentence,

the adherents to the real-elements-of-the-offense approach allow

purely discretionary sentencing schemes whereby judges

“exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a

statutory range.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 233; see also Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 481. This concession creates an apparent anomaly:

After all, discretionary sentencing systems appear to pose an

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even greater concern that key facts used to increase a sentence

are found by judges – on the record or often silently – by a

preponderance of the evidence rather than by juries beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 548-49 (O’Connor,

J., dissenting) (“[O]ur approval of discretionary-sentencing

schemes, in which a defendant is not entitled to have a jury make

factual findings relevant to sentencing despite the effect those

findings have on the severity of the defendant’s sentence,

demonstrates that the defendant should have no right to demand

that a jury make the equivalent factual determinations under a

determinate-sentencing scheme.”); Kevin R. Reitz, The New

Sentencing Conundrum, 105 COLUM.L.REV.1082, 1119 (2005).

Because the Court has long upheld discretionary sentencing

schemes, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated for the Court in 1986

(before the Apprendi-Blakely-Booker cases): “We have some

difficulty fathoming why the due process calculus would change

simply because the legislature has seen fit to provide sentencing

courts with additional guidance.” McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92. 

Notwithstanding weighty arguments of the kind made by

Chief Justice Rehnquist, the adherents to the real-elements-ofthe-offense conception have maintained their approach – and

continued to accept discretionary sentencing schemes as a

constitutionally acceptable alternative. See Booker, 543 U.S. at

233. As a result, the real-elements-of-the-offense approach to

the Constitution seems to mean the following: Legislatures may

enact: (i) a discretionary sentencing scheme where the sentencing

judge has complete discretion to impose a sentence within the

legal range that applies to the crime found by the jury, and the

judge may determine the sentence based on the judge’s own

subsidiary factual determinations, other considerations, or no

stated rationale at all; or (ii) a mandatory sentencing scheme

where the sentencing judge has no discretion to make factual

determinations to increase a sentence. But legislatures, under

this real-elements-of-the-offense approach, may not enact an

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intermediate sentencing scheme where the sentencing judge has

structured discretion – in other words, where the sentencing

judge must make factual determinations (such as “Did the

defendant carry a gun during the drug transaction?”) in order to

increase a sentence.

How do post-Booker sentencing practices square with the

various constitutional approaches described above? 

If the deference-to-legislatures conception is correct, then

current federal sentencing practices, which largely mirror

pre-Booker practices, are obviously constitutionally permissible.

Indeed, if this conception is correct, then the Booker

constitutional opinion is incorrect and the Sentencing Guidelines

should apply as promulgated and made mandatory by Congress.

If the real-elements-of-the-offense approach is correct,

however, then current federal sentencing practices may be in

tension with the Constitution. That is because the current system

– in practice – works a lot like the pre-Booker system: District

judges are obliged to apply the Guidelines, and certain facts used

to increase a sentence (beyond what the defendant would have

received based on the offense of conviction) are found by the

judge, not by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

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