Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00495/USCOURTS-almd-3_11-cv-00495-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alabama Department of Public Safety
Defendant
Sherry Anne Bailey-Potts
Plaintiff

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

SHERRY ANNE BAILEY-POTTS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:11cv495-MHT

) (WO) 

ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF )

PUBLIC SAFETY, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION

Plaintiff Sherry Anne Bailey-Potts (“Bailey-Potts”)

brings this lawsuit against defendant Alabama Department

of Public Safety (“DPS”), claiming that DPS discriminated

against her because of her race when it failed to promote

her to the position of Driver License Examiner II.

Bailey-Potts asserts this claim pursuant to Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C.

§§ 1981a, 2000e to 2000e-17) (“Title VII”) and the Civil

Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981) (“§ 1981”).

Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 (federal

question) and 1343 (civil rights).

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DPS moves for summary judgment. For the reasons that

follow, the motion will be granted.

I. SUMMARY-JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that

party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND

Bailey-Potts, an African-American female, has been a

Driver License Examiner I since September 2000. She works

in the DPS Phenix City office. Lieutenant Craig Ledyard,

an African-American male, was the district commander for

the office.

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In May 2010, Bailey-Potts received a notice that she

was on a list of eligible candidates for promotion to

Driver License Examiner II, a supervisory position. She

confirmed her interest in this position. At the time, she

was listed in “Band 1" and ranked first on the register of

eligible candidates. Ala. Hiring List (Doc. No. 22-4) at

2.

The Alabama State Personnel Department website

provides the following explanation for “banded scoring”:

“One important purpose of testing is to

identify the differences in test scores

that reflect real differences among

candidates. Banded scoring is a

statistical procedure for grouping test

scores that statistically are not

meaningfully different from one another.

In banded scoring, bands are set

objectively and mathematically. The

people in a band are similar to each

other in that statistically there is no

meaningful difference in their scores.”

Ala. Website (Doc. No. 22-5) at 7.

In August 2010, Bailey-Potts received an email

confirming her interest in the promotion and, in late

October 2010, was informed she would be interviewed for

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the promotion. The only other applicant for the position

was Debra Wingate, a white female. Wingate had served as

a Driver License Examiner I since May 2007 and was in

“Band 2" and was ranked third amongst eligible candidates.

Ala. Hiring List (Doc. No. 22-4) at 2. 

Throughout 2010, DPS utilized a three-person panel for

promotions. In this case, both Bailey-Potts and Wingate

were interviewed by Terry Tate (white), Guy Rush (white),

and Ledyard (black). Ledyard substituted for a white

panelist who was sick. The interviews were conducted by

asking the applicants how they would respond to a series

of eight scenarios. The panel split two to one, with Tate

and Rush voting for Wingate and Ledyard voting for BaileyPotts.

In November 2010, Ledyard called Bailey-Potts to

inform her that she was not promoted. During the call, he

told her that he was furious and that he had voted for

her. The apparent disagreement on the panel was over the

way Bailey-Potts and Wingate approached their jobs.

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Bailey-Potts tended to believe that the “customer could be

wrong” about his or her complaint; by contrast, Wingate

sought to appease the customer quickly and believed that

many customer-service problems stemmed from the state

employee. DPS also contends that Wingate’s answers were

more detailed and that she was more likely to investigate

a matter before taking adverse action against a customer

or employee.

Bailey-Potts alleges that, in early 2011, a co-worker

informed her that DPS did not “want anybody else black” in

a supervisory position. Bailey-Potts’s Opposition Brief

(Doc. No. 21) at 9. Bailey-Potts states in her brief that

this statement was made by Ledyard, the supervisor who

dissented during the hiring panel. Id. But, as DPS

points out, Bailey-Potts’s deposition makes clear that it

was another employee, Sergeant Jessie Williams, who made

the comment. Bailey-Potts Deposition (Doc. No. 22-2) at

5-6 (“Q: Sherry, you were asked about what caused you to

think that they were looking for a white instead of an

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*In her opposition to DPS’s motion to strike,

Bailey-Potts acknowledged that Williams, not Ledyard,

made this comment. 

6

African/American in the Opelika office. Was there any

other reason that you didn’t give that made you think

that? A: Well, after I had discussed it with Sergeant

Williams–-and, of course, I didn’t say very much to

anybody what I had done-–he was just of the consensus–-he

said they just didn’t want anybody else black. There was

enough of us.”) (emphasis added).*

 Significantly, Williams

was not on the hiring panel, though he had recommended

Bailey-Potts for promotion.

Bailey-Potts also contends that DPS failed to abide by

an “affirmative-action” policy known as the “Rule of Ten.”

She states that the Rule of Ten prohibits DPS from passing

over a qualified minority candidate in favor of a white

applicant in a lower band. According to the Alabama State

Personnel Department’s website, however, the “Rule of Ten”

refers to “the certification of the top ten eligible job

candidates (including the names of those with tied scores)

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to the requesting agency.” Ala. Website (Doc. No. 22-5)

at 7. The rule provides that: “When a hiring agency

requests a register from the State Personnel Department,

the Rule of Ten is utilized to provide them with a list of

the most qualified (highest scoring) candidates. If more

than one vacancy is being filled, the name of one

additional eligible candidate will be certified to fill

each additional vacancy.” Id. The State of Alabama’s

website makes no mention of an affirmative-action

component to the Rule of Ten; rather, the rule functions

as a cap on the number of applicants that the hiring

agency may consider.

III. DISCUSSION

Both Title VII and § 1981 “have the same requirements

of proof and use the same analytical framework.” Standard

v. A.B.E.L. Services, Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.

1998). This case, therefore, is governed by the familiar

burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

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Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas

framework, an employee has the initial burden of

establishing a prima-facie case of unlawful employment

discrimination by a preponderance of evidence. Id. at

802. 

If the employkee establishes a prima-facie case, the

burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the

presumption by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The employer has a

burden of production, not of persuasion, and thus need not

convince the court that the reason advanced actually

motivated its action. Id.

Once the employer satisfies this burden, “the

presumption of discrimination is eliminated and the

[employee] has the opportunity to come forward with

evidence, including the previously produced evidence

establishing the prima facie case, sufficient to permit a

reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given

by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse

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employment decision.” Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d

1012, 1024 (11th Cir. 2000). In other words, an employee

must show that an employer's proffered explanation is a

mere pretext for discriminatory conduct.

DPS contends that Bailey-Potts has failed to meet her

burden at the first and third stages of the McDonnell

Douglas framework. 

Bailey-Potts may establish a prima-facie case of

failure to promote by establishing that: (1) she is a

member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified and

applied for the position; (3) she suffered an adverseemployment action; and (4) an equally or less qualified

employee who was not a member of the protected class was

promoted. Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519,

1539 n.11 (11th Cir. 1997). Here, it is undisputed that

Bailey-Potts satisfies the first three factors.

DPS contends that Wingate was a more qualified

candidate and, therefore, Bailey-Potts cannot establish

her prima-facie case. DPS notes that two of the panel

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members rated Wingate more qualified because of her

answers to their questions; hence, the panel promoted

Wingate. 

Bailey-Potts responds that she was ranked higher than

Wingate prior to the interview, scoring in Band 1 and

placing first in the list of eligible applicants.

Additionally, Bailey-Potts had approximately a decade of

experience compared to Wingate’s three-and-a-half years.

“[T]he question whether the plaintiff in a

disparate-treatment discrimination suit actually made out

a prima facie case is almost always irrelevant when the

district court considers an employer's motion for summary

judgment or judgment as a matter of law.” Brady v. Office

of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 492 (D.C. Cir. 2008);

see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,

510–11 (1993) (“If ... the defendant has succeeded in

carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas

framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer

relevant. ... The presumption, having fulfilled its role

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of forcing the defendant to come forward with some

response, simply drops out of the picture.”); Shuford v.

Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 978 F.Supp. 1008, 1017 (M.D.

Ala. 1997) (Thompson, J.) (“However, where, as in this

case, the court has sufficient evidence to determine

whether an employee has been a victim of discrimination,

the court need not go through the McDonnell Douglas

burden-shifting process and should instead reach the

ultimate issue of discrimination.”). Under the McDonnell

Douglas framework, the burden at the first two steps is

light for both the plaintiff and the defendant-employer.

See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253 (1981) (“The burden of establishing a prima facie case

of disparate treatment is not onerous.”); Perryman v.

Johnson Products Co., Inc., 698 F.2d 1138, 1143 (11th Cir.

1983) (noting that “the defendant's burden of rebuttal is

exceedingly light”).

In most cases, the real question lies in whether the

employer’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason is

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pretextual. Given this reality in a “Title VII

disparate-treatment suit where an employee has suffered an

adverse employment action and an employer has asserted a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the decision,

the district court need not ... decide whether the

plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case under

McDonnell Douglas. Rather, in considering an employer's

motion for summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law

in those circumstances, the district court must resolve

one central question: Has the employee produced sufficient

evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's

asserted non-discriminatory reason was not the actual

reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated

against the employee on the basis of race ... ?” Brady,

520 F.3d at 494. It is to this question that the court

now turns. 

As discussed above, DPS submits that its legitimate

non-discriminatory reasons for promoting Wingate were her

interview answers were more complete and she displayed an

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attitude toward customer-service and other employees that

was more in accordance with the supervisory role of a

Driver License Examiner II. As such, DPS has satisfied

its burden of production, and the court thus turns to the

ultimate issue of race discrimination.

There must be “a strong showing of a disparity in

qualifications in order for an inference of discrimination

to arise.” Denney v. City of Albany, 247 F.3d 1172, 1187

(11th Cir. 2001). An employer “may not establish that an

employer's proffered reason is pretextual merely by

questioning the wisdom of the employer's reasons.” Combs,

106 F.3d at 1543. 

Bailey-Potts contends that DPS’s rationales are a

pretext for two reasons. First, Bailey-Potts points to

her co-worker’s comment that the DPS “didn’t want anybody

else black” as direct evidence of discrimination; but, as

explained above and contrary to Bailey-Potts’s brief, this

statement was not made by a member of the hiring committee

but rather by a co-worker who had recommended Bailey-Potts

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for promotion. “[R]emarks by non-decisionmakers or

remarks unrelated to the decisionmaking process itself are

not direct evidence of discrimination.” Standard, 161

F.3d at 1330. Bailey-Potts also implies that Ledyard

feared retaliation and, therefore, failed to condemn the

hiring panel’s decision during his deposition; but, as

Ledyard’s deposition makes clear, he felt uncomfortable

discussing hiring practices in law-enforcement positions

and that his unease in making comments was “not

necessarily with Wingate and Potts.” Ledyard Deposition

(Doc. No. 22-10) at 12.

Second, Bailey-Potts argues that DPS deviated from

established practice in using interview panels. BaileyPotts further notes that the panel split along racial

lines and that the subjective-interview process improperly

trumped her higher ranking. But, as Chief Examiner Guy

Rush’s affidavit explains, interview panels were used for

several promotions in 2010. Additionally, the real

dispute on the hiring panel was over how a supervisor

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should interact with subordinates and the public. “[T]he

fact that an employer based a hiring or promotion decision

on purely subjective criteria will rarely, if ever, prove

pretext under Title VII.” Denney, 247 F.3d at 1185.

There is no evidence that DPS’s implementation of an

interview panel for Bailey-Potts’s hiring was either

aberrational or a ruse for discriminatory intent.

Bailey-Potts also argues that the Rule of Ten was not

followed. There is no evidence to support this

contention; moreover, the rule is not an affirmativeaction policy. See Ala. Website (Doc. No. 22-5) at 7.

Once again, Bailey-Potts’s deposition cuts against her

brief by explaining that the banded-score policy replaced

an older version of the rule, which was an affirmativeaction policy. Bailey-Potts Deposition (Doc. No. 22-2) at

13-14. Indeed, it appears that Bailey-Pott's counsel is

confusing the Rule of Ten with a court-imposed “no-bypass

rule,” dating back to 1970, which prohibited Alabama state

officials from bypassing a higher-ranked African-American

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applicant in favor of a lower-ranked white applicant. In

2006, this court terminated the Alabama's use of the nobypass rule. United States v. Flowers, 444 F. Supp. 2d

1192 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (Thompson, J.).

Bailey-Potts and Wingate were both on the Alabama

Personnel Department’s certification of eligible

candidates for the promotion and were the only two

applicants for this promotion. While Bailey-Potts had

more experience and was ranked first before the interview,

the three-member panel concluded that Wingate was the more

qualified candidate because of her answers to the

interview questions. Bailey-Potts has failed to introduce

sufficient evidence to raise a genuine dispute of material

fact that DPS’s proffered explanations are a pretext for

racial discrimination.

* * *

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An appropriate summary judgment in favor of DPS and

against Bailey-Potts will be entered.

DONE, this the 21st day of February, 2012.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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