Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00331/USCOURTS-caed-2_24-cv-00331-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Cheryl Lynn Douglas
Plaintiff
Bryan Ezralow
Defendant
Marc Ezralow
Defendant
First Pointe Management Group LLC
Defendant
Andrew Grant Haymore
Plaintiff
Leslie Huffman
Defendant
Chris Robello
Defendant
The Ezralow Company LLC
Defendant
Stacy White
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHERYL LYNN DOUGLAS, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE EZRALOW COMPANY LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

No. 2:24-cv-0331-KJM-CKD (PS)

ORDER AND 

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiffs Cheryl Lynn Douglas and Andrew Grant Haymore proceed without counsel on a 

fee-paid complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs’ ex parte

motion for a preliminary injunction is before the court. (ECF No. 26.) This matter is suitable for 

decision without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). For the reasons set forth below, the 

motion should be denied. Accordingly, the court vacates the hearing set to take place on 

December 11, 2024. In addition, on the court’s own motion, the court grants plaintiffs an 

extension of time to respond to defendants’ amended motion to quash service filed on September 

25, 2024.

I. Background

Plaintiffs filed the complaint on January 29, 2024, naming as defendants The Ezralow 

Company LLC, First Pointe Management Group LLC, and five individuals alleged to be 

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employees of those defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs allege they entered into a rental lease 

agreement for a unit at the Montebello Apartments in May 2022 for a 2-bedroom 2-bathroom unit 

for $2398. (Id., ¶¶ 3, 4.)

After move-in, multiple terrifying and distressing events occurred and both plaintiffs lived 

in terror. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 4-11, 14.) Plaintiffs hear disturbances in other units through thin walls. 

(Id., ¶¶ 6-7.) In addition, their vehicles have been ransacked, homeless people cause disturbances

outside, violent outbursts occur almost weekly, and plaintiff Haymore witnessed a shooting while 

at the pool. (Id., ¶¶ 8-14.)

As time neared to renew the lease agreement in March of 2023, due to the frightening 

living conditions, and to enable plaintiffs to save money to leave, plaintiffs requested to alter their 

lease to the market value price advertised on Montebello’s website, $1800-1900 a month. (ECF 

No. 1, ¶ 12.) The property manager, Chris Robellow, told plaintiffs they could not have their 

pricing changed unless they moved all their belongings from one unit to another, even though 

plaintiff Douglass is a senior citizen and plaintiff Haymore is a disabled Veteran who suffers from 

congestive heart failure. (Id.) Needing to have shelter, plaintiffs renewed the lease agreement. 

(Id., ¶ 13.)

Plaintiffs allege the defendants’ actions constitute disability discrimination and that the 

lease constitutes “a form of age discrimination, financial exploitation of an elder, and elder abuse, 

among other predatory elements.” (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 15.) Plaintiffs allege they are being 

exploited because of their inability to alter their living situation and because the new, advertised 

price for “move ins” for same type of unit occupied by plaintiffs is more than $500 less per 

month. (Id., ¶¶ 15 & 17.)

Due to the Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment they have suffered, plaintiffs tried 

to negotiate a 6-month credit towards their rent due and were denied by Leslie Huffman and 

Stacy White. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiffs tried to negotiate three times, but Stacy White told 

plaintiff Haymore nothing could be done except to allow plaintiffs to quit the lease unpenalized, 

or plaintiffs could seek a legal remedy through the courts. (Id., ¶ 20.)

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Plaintiffs bring claims for housing discrimination (first cause of action); gross negligence 

(second cause of action); unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices (third cause of 

action); and intentional infliction of emotional distress (fourth cause of action). (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 

23-47.) Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief.

A return of service was filed on June 26, 2024. (ECF No. 7.) Upon plaintiffs’ request for 

entry of default as to all defendants, the Clerk of the Court entered default against two defendants: 

First Pointe Management Group LLC and Stacy White. (ECF No. 9.) The Clerk declined 

plaintiffs’ request for entry of default as to Bryan Ezralow, Marc Ezralow, Leslie Huffman, Chris 

Robello, and the Ezralow Company LLC.

On September 24, 2024, defendants Stacey White and First Pointe Management Group 

LLC filed an amended motion to set aside the Clerk’s entry of default. (ECF No. 14.) By the same 

amended motion, all defendants seek to quash summons. (Id.) Defendants served the amended 

motion to plaintiffs on November 6, 2024, and filed an amended proof of service on that day. 

(ECF No. 28.) Under the amended briefing schedule set by the court (ECF No. 25), plaintiffs’ 

opposition or statement of non-opposition was due within 21 days after proper service of the 

motion or the filing of the amended proof of service, whichever was later. (ECF No. 25.)

Acting sua sponte, the court now grants an extension of time for plaintiffs’ opposition to 

defendants’ amended motion to quash filed on September 24, 2024. Plaintiffs’ opposition or 

statement of opposition is due within 14 days after service of this order.

On November 1, 2024, plaintiffs filed the ex parte motion for a preliminary injunction

presently before the court. (ECF No. 26.)

II. Legal Standard

“A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on 

the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 

balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. 

Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Under another formulation of the test used 

in the Ninth Circuit, a likelihood of success is not an absolute requirement. Wild Rockies v. 

Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2011). Rather, the plaintiff shows serious questions are 

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raised and the balance of hardships tips in plaintiff’s favor. Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 

F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 2014). “Under any formulation of the test, plaintiff must demonstrate 

that there exists a significant threat of irreparable injury.” Oakland Tribune, Inc., v. Chronicle 

Pub. Co., Inc., 762 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9th Cir. 1985). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 

remedy [that] may be awarded only upon a clear showing that the movant is entitled to relief. 

Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.

Under the court’s local rules,

All motions for preliminary injunction shall be accompanied by (i) 

briefs on all relevant legal issues to be presented by the motion, (ii) 

affidavits in support of the motion, including affidavits on the 

question of irreparable injury, and (iii) a proposed order with a 

provision for a bond. See L.R. 230, 151.

Local Rule 231(d).

III. Discussion

Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction seeks a variety of relief including an order 

allowing them to withhold rent payments without accruing any debt and an order for the 

defendants not to retaliate. (ECF No. 26 at 14.) The motion is supported by a declaration of 

plaintiff Douglas who describes adverse effects from living at the Montebello apartments suffered 

by both plaintiffs, including financial, emotional, and mental pressure, and secondary trauma 

from acts of violence. (Id. at 8-9.) Plaintiffs have not shown entitlement to preliminary injunctive

relief.

First, plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is premature because there is 

presently a dispute over whether the court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant. The Clerk 

of the Court has entered default against First Pointe Management Group LLC and Stacy White, 

but both defendants have moved to set aside the entry of default for improper service. All 

defendants have moved to quash service. Plaintiffs have not yet filed their opposition or statement 

of non-opposition to the amended motion to quash service. The dispute regarding whether any 

defendant has been properly served with process under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure prevents the court from issuing preliminary injunctive relief. See Direct Mail 

Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688 (9th Cir. 1988) (“A federal 

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court does not have jurisdiction over a defendant unless the defendant has been served properly”); 

Zepeda v. U.S. I.N.S., 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A federal court may issue an 

injunction if it has personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the 

claim; it may not attempt to determine the rights of persons not before the court.”). The court can 

only enjoin parties over which it has power. Id.

Second, plaintiffs have not shown they are likely to suffer the type of irreparable harm

necessary for a preliminary injunction. See FDIC v. Garner, 125 F.3d 1272, 1279 (9th Cir. 1997) 

(the threat of injury “must be imminent, not remote or speculative”), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1020 

(1998). Plaintiffs’ vague allegations that they will continue to suffer harm and trauma from

distressing events related to their living situation does not demonstrate irreparable harm sufficient

for a preliminary injunction to issue. See id.; Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige, 844 F.2d 

668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to 

warrant granting a preliminary injunction.”). A plaintiff must do more than merely allege 

imminent harm; a plaintiff must demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to 

preliminary injunctive relief. Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 

634 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 1980).

Plaintiffs also do not argue they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. Their 

argument in the motion for a preliminary injunction appears directed, instead, toward the 

defendants’ delay in proper service of the amended motion to quash service and a court order 

which stated plaintiffs had failed to timely oppose the motion.1 Plaintiffs fail to furnish the court 

with legal authority showing any claim presented in the complaint is likely to succeed on the 

merits. Likelihood of success on the merits is the most important Winter factor, and it is relevant 

to the court’s evaluation of the other factors See Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 

2023). In light of plaintiffs’ failure to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of any claim, 

the court also does not find the balance of equities tips in plaintiffs’ favor or that an injunction is 

in the public interest.

1 The court has vacated this order. (See ECF No. 29.)

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IV. Conclusion, Order and Recommendation

The relevant factors weigh against issuing a preliminary injunction and there is presently a 

dispute over whether the court has personal jurisdiction over any defendant. Thus, the motion for 

a preliminary injunction should be denied.

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. Sua sponte, the court GRANTS an extension of time for plaintiffs to file their

opposition or statement of non-opposition to defendants’ amended motion to quash

service filed on September 24, 2024, and served to plaintiffs on November 6, 2024.

Plaintiffs’ opposition or statement of opposition is due within 14 days after service of 

this order.

2. The court VACATES the hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction set 

to take place on December 11, 2024.

In addition, IT IS RECOMMENDED that plaintiffs’ ex parte motion for a preliminary 

injunction (ECF No. 26) be denied.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 

assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days after 

being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections with 

the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to 

Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections within the 

specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 

F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: December 3, 2024

8, doug24cv0031.mpi.fr

_____________________________________

CAROLYN K. DELANEY

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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