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Parties Involved:
Phyllis C. Dawes
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PUBLISH 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

.FILED 

United States Court of A 

Tenth c· · ppeals ire.mt 

MAY 121989 

ROBERT L. HOECKER 

Clerk 

v. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Nos. 88-2348 

& 

88-2352 

DONALD W. DAWES and 

PHYLLIS C. DAWES, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 

(D.C. Nos. 88-10002-01 & 88-10002-02) 

Submitted on the briefs: 

Benjamin L. Burgess, Jr., United States Attorney, and Stephen K. 

Lester, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for 

Plaintiff-Appellee. 

Donald w. Dawes and Phyllis c. Dawes, prose. 

Before MOORE, TACHA, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel 

has determined unanimously that orala.r.gument would not materially 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 1 
assist the determination of these_appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 

34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The causes are therefore ordered 

submitted without oral argument. 

These are direct criminal appeals from the convictions of 

defendants (husband and wife) of three counts each of failure to 

file income tax returns for 1981 through 1983 in vioiation of 

26 U.S.C. § 7203. Following a jury trial, defendants were 

convicted on all counts; each was subsequently sentenced as 

follows: one year imprisonment (Count I), suspended sentences 

with five years probation (Counts II and III), fines totalling 

$60,000, and costs of prosecution in the amount of $3,200. 

The panel earlier stayed defendants' reporting date and 

directed the government to show cause why these convictions should 

not be reversed for noncompliance by the district court with the 

requirements of United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 

1987). In Padilla, we held that the trial judge must inform a pro 

se defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding 

without counsel in order for a waiver of counsel to be knowing and 

intelligent. Id. at 956-59. The government concedes that the 

district court did not ensure defendants' knowledge and 

understanding of the dangers of self-representation. 

However, this does not end our inquiry. In United States v. 

Gipson, 693 F.2d 109, 112 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 

1216 (1983), we concluded that notwithstanding the failure of the 

trial judge to ensure the defendant's full understanding of the 

consequences of waiving counsel, examination of the record 

revealed no reasonable_.possibility_Gipson would have been found 

2 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 2 
{ ~not guilty.had ha been-represented by counsel~~ We concluded that 

the error was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, citing 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). We have 

subsequently applied the harmless error test in reviewing a state 

conviction in which the defendant was not advised of the inherent 

difficulties of proceeding without counsel. Sanchez v. Mondragon, 

858 F.2d 1462, 1468 (10th Cir. 1988). 

The Daweses were advised of their right to counsel at their 

initial appearance before the magistrate. At the arraignment, the 

magistrate suggested that the defendants retain counsel and 

specifically advised them that although they could represent 

themselves, they could not be represented by a nonlawyer. 

The Daweses then retained counsel, but later filed a document 

entitled "disclaimer of actions of counsel," in which they made 

clear that their dissatisfaction with their attorneys stemmed from 

counsels' refusal to pursue issues the Daweses felt were 

important. This, along with their "notice of change of counsel," 

provides a clear expression of their intent to assume 

responsibility for and conduct their own defenses. 

As will be seen, the issues, also outlined in a letter of 

dismissal from the Daweses to their attorneys, are without 

defensible legal foundation. There is no right to counsel who 

will blindly follow a defendant's instructions. United States v. 

Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956. 

Thereafter, the Daweses filed numerous nontraditional, 

unconventional pleadings and 

11 specific.power.of attorney," 

motions, 

appointing 

3 

including a 

one Melvin 

purported 

White (a. 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 3 
.nonattorney- they -sought to have represent them) to exercise and 

perform all acts on their behalf in connection with the charges, 

including Mr. White's suffering the consequences of the Daweses' 

convictions. At the final status hearing before trial, defendants 

reiterated their intent to proceed prose unless they could "find 

competent counsel that can do what we want them to do." 

At the opening of trial, defendants again requested that 

Mr. White be allowed to be their "counsel," although he is not a 

member -Of the bar. The Daweses' theory was that they were 

entitled to counsel, and that they could "contract" with Mr. White 

to take their places in the proceeding. The court asked if their 

earlier statements that they would proceed with counsel if they 

could find competent counsel referred to their desire to have Mr. 

White as their counsel. Defendants replied yes. Thus, it is 

clear that defendants had no intention of retaining a licensed 

attorney to represent them; defendants wanted Mr. White and no one 

else to serve as their counsel. Given defendants' repeated 

insistence on Mr. White's serving as their counsel, it is clear 

that no inquiry or admonition by the district court as to the 

dangers of self-representation would have been availing. 

There is no absolute constitutional right to counsel of one's 

choice. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d at 956; United States 

v. Freeman, 816 F.2d 558, 564 (10th Cir. 1987)(citing cases); 

United States v. McConnell, 749 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1984); 

United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1502 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Nor does a defendant have a con~titutionally protected right to be 

represented.· by a. p_erson .. who is not admitted to the bar. United 

4 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 4 
States v. Nichols, 841 ;F.2d at· 1503 (10th Cir. 1988); United 

States v. Tedder, 787 F.2d 540, 543 (10th Cir~ 1986); United 

States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507, 517 n.l (10th Cir. 1979). 

Notwithstanding defendants' interpretation, ''counsel" refers to a 

person authorized to practice law. United States v. Brown, 600 

F.2d 248, 257 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979); 

United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198, 200 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. 

denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978). Defendants had no right to 

representation by Mr. White. 

Our examination of the record convinces us there is no 

reasonable possibility defendants would have been found not guilty 

had they been represented by counsel. United States v. Gipson, 

693 F.2d at 112. Thus, under the facts of these cases, 

noncompliance with the requirements of Padilla was harmless error, 

and, based on the evidence, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. at 24 (1967); Sanchez v. 

Mondragon, 858 F.2d at 1468. Briefly we review that evidence, 

bearing in mind that the government was obligated to prove 

defendants were (1) required to file a return, (2) failed to do 

so, and (3) the failure was willful. 26 u.s.c. § 7203. 

The government established that a search of the records at 

the IRS Service Center serving Kansas revealed no tax returns 

filed for defendants during the years in question. Through the 

Daweses' former accountant, the government also established that 

defendants had filed tax returns prepared by the accountant from 

1976 to 1980 and that an employee in the accountant's office had 

5 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 5 
.contacted defendants in sufficient time to.allo~ for preparation 

of their returns for 1981. 

Additional testimony established income to defendants for the 

years in 

dividends. 

question 

Bank 

transactions. 

from livestock sales, wheat 

records reflected substantial 

sales, and 

financial 

In addition, the Daweses participated in and received 

substantial low yield, deficiency, and storage payments through 

the Commodity Credit Corporation, which administers various 

payment programs under the 1985 farm bill. 

Finally, the IRS case agent summarized the total income 

figures for each year from the various sources, adding up to a 

gross income for each of the three years in question ranging from 

over $190,000 to over $258,000. The estimated tax liabilities for 

these years ranged from $20,000 to $50,000. 

The testimony of defendants' former accountant that in years 

prior to 1981 defendants had filed tax returns is proper evidence 

of willfulness in failing to file returns, United States v. 

Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1986), as is evidence of 

substantial gross income during the years in which defendants 

failed to file. Id. at 161-62. See also Uriited States v. Payne, 

800 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The focus of the Daweses' determination that they are not 

required to file tax returns is their position that they cannot, 

based on religious beliefs, sign the Form 1040 because of the 

requirement that the return be made under penalty of perjury. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 6 
.. This . declaration .. they claim is .. an .oath, which they say they are 

forbidden to take. 

This argument is totally unsupported by the law. The Supreme 

Court in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), reversed a 

district court determination that defendant, a member of the Old 

Order Amish, was entitled to decline to withhold social security 

taxes from its employees and to pay the employer's share of the 

taxes. Recognizing that Amish religious principles might be 

offended, id. at 257, the Court determined that not all burdens on 

religion are unconstitutional, id., and that because "the broad 

public interest in maintaining a sound tax system is of such high 

order, religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes 

affords no basis for resisting the tax." Id. at 260. As relevant 

to these cases, the requirement that the tax return be signed 

under penalty of perjury is not an unconstitutional restriction on 

defendants' rights to freedom of religion, Borgeson v. United 

States, 757 F.2d 1071, 1073 (10th Cir. 1985), or free speech 

Mosher v. IRS, 775 F.2d 1292, 1294-95 (5th Cir. 1985)(citing 

Borgeson), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1123 (1986); Hettig v. United 

States, 845 F.2d 794, 795 (8th Cir. 1988)(citing Mosher and 

Borgeson). 

Defendants' other major argument was that the United States 

District Court for the District of Kansas lacked jurisdiction over 

the charged offenses. This too is without merit. 

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, federal district courts have 

exclusive jurisdiction over "all offenses against the United 

States,'' including those crimes defined in Title 26 of the United 

7 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 7 
States Code. United States v •. Tedder, 787 F.2d at 542; United 

States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1986); United 

States v. Latham, 754 F.2d 747, 749 (7th Cir. 1985); United 

States v. Spurgeon, 671 F.2d 1198, 1199 (8th Cir. 1982). The 

Internal Revenue Code was validly enacted by Congress and is fully 

enforceable, United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d at 940; see also, 

Wheeler v. United States, 744 F.2d 292, 293 (2d Cir. 1984). Venue 

is proper in the district of taxpayers' residence. United States 

v. Garman, 748 F.2d 218, 220 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 

U.S. 1005 (1985); United States v. Grabinski, 727 F.2d 681, 684 

(8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d 524, 526 (5th 

Cir. 1981). See also 26 u.s.c. § 609l(b)(l)(A)(i). 

Defendants also claim that the charges should have been 

brought by indictment rather than information because failure to 

file tax returns is an infamous crime. The answer to this 

argument was concisely stated in United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 

1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1978): 

An offense is defined as an infamous crime if the 

punishment for the offense includes the possibility of 

incarceration in a penitentiary. Mackin v. United 

States, 117 U.S. 348, 6 s. Ct. 777, 29 L.Ed. 909 (1886). 

A defendant who is sentenced to a term of imprisonment 

of one year or less can be sent to a penitentiary only 

if he consents. 18 U.S.C. § 4083. Since the maximum 

sentence for failure to file a tax return is one year, 

26 u.s.c. § 7203, a person convicted for failure to file 

a return cannot be made to serve his sentence in a 

penitentiary. Thus, a charge of failure to file under 

§ 7203 does not hold a plaintiff to answer for an 

infamous crime and does not require an indictment. 

United States v. Pandilidis, 524 F.2d 644, 649 n. 7 (6th 

Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933, 96 S. Ct. 1146, 

47 L.Ed.2d. 340 (1976); United States v. Jordan, 508 

F.2d 750, 752-53 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 842, 

8 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 8 
96-S. Ct. 76, 46 L.Ed.2d. 62 (1975). Moreover, the fact 

that appellant here was sentenced to one year in prison 

on each count of the indictment does not convert the 

offense into an infamous crime. (Citation omitted.) 

See also United States v. Greenwood, 812 F.2d 632, 635 (10th Cir. 

1987); . United States v. Ellsworth, 738 F.2d 333, 334-35 (8th 

cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1042 (1984); United States v. 

Brewer, 681 F.2d 973, 974 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. 

Driscoll, 612 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Appellants argue that the prosecution was invalid because the 

information was not based on a determination of probable cause. 

However, a probable cause determination is not a prerequisite to 

the filing of an information itself. United States v. 

Birkenstock, 823 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (7th Cir. 1987); United States 

v. Millican, 600 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1979)(citing Gerstein v. 

Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 n.6 (1975)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 

(1980). No probable cause requirement attaches to the issuance of 

a summons. United States v. Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 

1986). Moreover, because appellants were convicted, any possible 

defect in either the failure to file an information (either 

verified or supported by affidavit) was cured. United States v. 

Millican, 600 F.2d at 277-78; cf. United States v. Saussy, 802 

F.2d 849, 851-52 (6th Cir. 1986)(no requirement in statutes or 

rules for verification of information; Millican does not require 

probable cause hearing in connection with prosecution by 

information, but merely suggests advisability of hearing), cert. 

denied, 480 U.S. 907 (1987). And, finally, defendants in this 

9 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 9 
case were.a£forded-a probable cause bearing prior to trial (Vol. 

IV). 

The contention that appellants are not taxpayers because they 

are ''free born, white, preamble, sovereign, natural, individual 

common law 'de jure' citizens of Kansas" is frivolous. 

Individuals are "persons" under the Internal Revenue Code and thus 

subject to 26 U.S.C. § 7203. United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 

at 937; see also United States v. Rice, 659 F.2d at 528. 

Equally without merit is appellants' reliance on Pollock v. 

Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (initial decision), 158 

U.S. 601 (decision on rehearing) (1895), as invalidating income 

tax absent apportionment. See Charczuk v. Commissioner, 771 F.2d 

471, 472-73 (10th Cir. 1985); (explaining Pollock and subsequent 

historical events); United States v. Stillhammer, 706 F.2d 1072, 

1077-78 (10th Cir. 1983)(sixteenth amendment passed to overrule 

Pollock); see also United States v. Lawson, 670 F.2d 923, 927 

(10th Cir. 1982). 

Finally, appellants claim their sentences constitute cruel 

and unusual punishment. We disagree. The sentences are within 

the maximum allowable by statute and are thus not subject to 

appellate review. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 

(1974); United States v. Hack, 782 F.2d 862, 870 (10th Cir.), 

cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986); United States v. O'Driscoll, 

761 F.2d 589, 597 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1020 

(1986); United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315, 1322 n. 19 (10th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979). In addition, the 

imposition of the costs of the prosecution is mandated by 26 

10 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 10 
u.s.c.- § 7203. United States v. Saussy, 802 F.2d at 855; United 

States v. Wyman, 724 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1984); United States 

v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 

U.S. 924 (1981). 

We have carefully considered all the appellants' other 

arguments and find the issues without merit. 

The judgments of the United States District Court for the 

District of Kansas are AFFIRMED. All outstanding motions and 

petitions are denied, and the stay entered January 5, 1989, is 

vacated. 

11 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 11 
ROBERT L. HOECKER 

CLEAK 

,niteh jhttes Qlourt of J\ppeafo 

TENTH CIRCUIT 

OFFICE OF THE CLERK 

C404 UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE 

DENVER, COLORADO 80294 

June 20, 1989 

TO: ALL RECIPIENTS OF THE CAPTIONED OPINION 

RE: Nos. 88-2348 & 88-2352 - USA vs. Dawes 

TELEPHONE 

(303) 844·31S7 

(FTSJ 564·3157 

Filed May 12, 1989 by Judge John P. Moore, Judge Deanell 

R. Tacha, and Judge Wade Brorby, per curiam. 

Attached is a new page six to be substituted for page six 

in the original opinion which was sent to you on May 12, 1989. 

RLH:pf:mt 

Enclosure 

cc: West Publishing Co. 

Mead Data Central 

Barclays Law Publishers 

Very truly yours, 

ROBERT~- HOECKER, Clerk 

. I · -~\'.l 

By: ,, tt1·,it.t(\ \//J ·l \. ·. \ ' . Patrick Fisher 

Chief Deputy Clerk 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 12 
contacted defendants in sufficient time to allow for preparation 

of their returns for 1981. 

Additional testimony established income to defendants for the 

years in 

dividends. 

question 

Bank 

transactions. 

from livestock sales, wheat 

records reflected substantial 

sales, and 

financial 

In addition, the Daweses participated in and received 

substantial low yield, deficiency, and storage payments through 

the Commodity Credit Corporation, which administers various 

payment programs under the farm bill then in effect. 

Finally, the IRS case agent summarized the total income 

figures for each year from the various sources, adding up to a 

gross income for each of the three years in question ranging from 

over $190,000 to over $258,000. The estimated tax liabilities for 

these years ranged from $20,000 to $50,000. 

The testimony of defendants' former accountant that in years 

prior to 1981 defendants had filed tax returns is proper evidence 

of willfulness in failing to file returns, United States v. 

Bohrer, 807 F.2d 159, 161 (10th Cir. 1986), as is evidence of 

substantial gross income during the years in which defendants 

failed to file. Id. at 161-62. See also United States v. Payne, 

800 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1986). 

The focus of the Daweses' determination that they are not 

required to file tax returns is their position that they cannot, 

based on religious beliefs, sign the Form 1040 because of the 

requirement that the return be made under penalty of perjury. 

6 

Appellate Case: 88-2352 Document: 01019963565 Date Filed: 05/12/1989 Page: 13