Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04076/USCOURTS-ca10-90-04076-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Alma Kay Atwood
Appellant
Union Pacific Railroad Company
Appellee

Document Text:

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

TENTH CIRCUIT Tenth Circuit 

MAY 2 0 1991 

ALMA KAY ATWOOD, ) ROBERT L. HOECKER 

) Clerk Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

) 

v. ) No. 90-4076 

) ( D. C. No. 87 C-lll0G) 

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, ) ( D. Utah) 

) 

Defendant-Appellee. ) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT* 

Before TACHA and SETH, Circuit Judges, and BRATTON, District 

Judge.** 

Plaintiff-appellant Alma Kay Atwood appeals a jury verdict in 

his favor in an action against defendant-appellee Union Pacific 

Railroad Company for liability under the Federal Employer's 

Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (FELA or Act). On appeal, 

Atwood alleges the district court erred by: (1) instructing the 

jury on the issue of contributory negligence, (2) refusing to 

instruct the jury on the unavailability under FELA of the defense 

of assumption of the risk, (3) failing to instruct the jury 

properly on the central issues of the case, and (4) admitting into 

evidence Atwood's unsworn statement and sending it into the jury 

* This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall 

not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, 

except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of the law of 

the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R. 

36.3. 

** The Honorable Howard c. Bratton, Senior United States 

District Judge for the District of New Mexico, sitting by 

designation. 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 1 
room. Atwood also argues there was evidence of future lost wages 

and the jury's failure to award those damages requires a new 

trial. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 u.s.c. § 1291 and 

affirm. 

Contributory Negligence 

Atwood contends the jury should not have been instructed on 

the issue of contributory negligence. A defendant in a FELA 

action is entitled to a contributory negligence instruction if 

there is any evidence to support that theory. Gish Y..!.. CSX 

Transp., Inc., 890 F.2d 989, 992 (7th Cir. 1989); Wise Y..!.. Union 

Pac. R.R., 815 F.2d 55, 57 (8th Cir. 1987). Here, there was 

evidence presented from which the jury could reasonably conclude 

Atwood did not exercise due care. Atwood himself testified he had 

reported several weeks before the accident that the switch was 

stiff and needed lubrication. The foreman testified that 

switchmen in Atwood's position are required by company safety 

rules to make general inspections of switches before operating 

them. Visual inspection of this switch, he stated, would have 

shown it was dry and required oiling. He further testified that 

when a switchman knows a switch is stiff, he must exercise "extra 

caution." 

Atwood's testimony indicated he did not inspect the switch 

and did not use a two-step repositioning technique of switching, 

which the foreman testified is required by the safety rules to 

avoid unsafe and awkward body positioning while switching. Atwood 

also testified he continued throw the switch five or six times 

after noticing the stiffness of the switch and feeling pain in his 

2 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 2 
back during the first switch. Based on evidence in the record, we 

hold Union Pacific was entitled to have the theory of contributory 

negligence submitted in a jury instruction. 

Atwood argues evidence of violation of a Federal Railroad 

Administration Regulation (FRA) should have barred submission of 

the issue of contributory negligence from the jury. Section 53 of 

Title 45 provides: "[N]o ... employee who may be injured ... 

shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in 

any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute 

enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury 

... of such employee." 45 u.s.c. § 53. The FRA regulation 

allegedly violated in this case is section 213.135(e), which 

states: "Each switch stand and connecting rod must be securely 

fastened and operable without excessive lost motion." 

A district court's refusal to instruct a jury that proof that 

a railroad violated a safety regulation prohibits reduction of an 

award of damages for contributory negligence can be prejudicial 

error. Eckert Y..!.. Aliquippa~ S.R.R., 828 F.2d 183, 186 (3d Cir. 

1987); ~ also Pratico~ Portland Terminal Co., 783 F.2d 255, 

267-68 (1st Cir. 1985). However, when a plaintiff fails to submit 

a jury instruction to this effect or fails to object at trial to 

an instruction on contributory negligence for this reason, we 

apply on appeal the "plain error and prejudice" rule. According 

to Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "No party may 

assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction 

unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to 

consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to 

3 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 3 
and the grounds of the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. A party 

claiming fundamental error within the reach of Rule 51 has a heavy 

burden of demonstrating manifest injustice. Clegg Y....!... Conk, 507 

F.2d 1351, 1362 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 

(1975). 

Here, Atwood did not request a jury instruction that a 

finding of violation of an FRA regulation bars contributory 

negligence. Nor did Atwood present evidence at trial the switch 

stand and connecting rod were not securely fastened or operable 

only with "excessive lost motion." In fact, FRA regulation 

213.135(e) was admitted by judicial notice and was not discussed 

at trial by any plaintiff's witness. Further, evidence in the 

record shows the switch was not defective but rather "improperly 

maintained." Because the jury could have found the condition of 

the switch did not violate the FRA regulation and no evidence was 

presented to the contrary, we hold the lack of a jury instruction 

on this issue did not result in manifest injustice. 

Assumption of the Risk 

Atwood contends the district court erred by refusing to 

instruct the jury regarding the unavailability of assumption of 

the risk as a defense in an FELA action. Assumption of the risk 

is an affirmative defense that must be plead or forfeited 

according to Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 

Where the "defense" of assumption of the risk has been neither 

pleaded nor argued, instructing the jury regarding the statutory 

elimination of that defense serves only to obscure the issues in 

the case. Caska Y....!... Elgin,~~~~, 361 F.2d 748, 751 (7th 

4 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 4 
Cir. 1966) (citing Tiller Y.!.. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 

54, 58 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Although giving an 

unrequested assumption of the risk instruction in a FELA action 

may not be reversible error, courts generally have disapproved 

such an instruction in FELA actions. Clark Y.!.. Burlington~ 

Inc., 726 F.2d 448, 452 (8th Cir. 1984); see also,~, Heater Y.!.. 

Chesapeake~~ R.R., 497 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974); Clark Y.!.. Pennsylvania R.R., 328 F.2d 

591, 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1006 (1964). Here, 

Union Pacific did not plead or argue the defense of assumption of 

the risk. Therefore, we hold the district court did not err by 

refusing to instruct the jury that assumption of the risk is not a 

defense under FELA. 

Form of the~ Instructions 

Atwood also contends the district court failed to instruct 

the jury properly on the central issues of the case. When 

reviewing jury instructions, we examine the record as a whole to 

determine whether the instructions state the governing law and 

provide the jury with ample understanding of the issues and 

applicable standards. Big Horn Coal Co. Y.!.. Commonwealth Edison 

Co., 852 F.2d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir. 1988). An error in jury 

instructions mandates reversal only when the error is prejudicial 

based on a review of the record as a whole. Id. at 1271 n.19. A 

district court has wide discretion to select his own words and 

instruct the jury in his own style. Bass Y.!.. International Broth. 

of Boilermakers, 630 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (5th Cir. 1980). 

5 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 5 
1. Instruction No. 15: Expert Testimony 

Atwood contends he was unfairly prejudiced when the court 

instructed the jury that experts can testify on the basis of 

hypothetical questions. However, the governing law clearly allows 

experts to testify based on hypothetical questions. See,~, 

Teen-Ed, Inc. Y....!.. Kimball Int'l, Inc. 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 

1980). Based on the record as a whole, we cannot say this 

instruction does not correctly summarize the applicable law. 

Further, the hypotheticals the defense counsel used on crossexamination challenged only the amount, not the propriety, of 

damages for future economic loss. Because the jury failed to 

award any damages for future wages, Atwood could not have been 

prejudiced by this instruction. 

2. Instruction Nos.~~ J..2.L and 36: Contributory Negligence 

Atwood contends the court committed reversible error by 

giving four instructions regarding contributory negligence because 

they unduly emphasized the defendant's theories. We find no merit 

in this argument. The record indicates Union Pacific presented 

evidence of contributory negligence and thus was entitled to jury 

instructions regarding that theory. Further, the instructions 

correctly summarize the law regarding contributory negligence in a 

FELA action. See,~, Gish, 890 F.2d at 991-92 (providing 

general explanation of contributory negligence in FELA actions); 

Birchem Y....!.. Burlington N.R.R., 812 F.2d 1047, 1049 (8th Cir. 1987) 

(same); Teets Y....!.. Chicago,~~ S.R.R., 238 F.2d 223, 227 (7th Cir. 

1956) (where evidence presented that plaintiff violated railroad 

operation rule, no error in providing jury instruction regarding 

6 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 6 
possible violation and its proximate causation of plaintiff's 

injury); Page Y..!.. St. Louis~~, 349 F.2d 820, 822 & n.3, 824 

(5th Cir. 1965) (instruction explaining proximate causation in 

terms of slight negligence appropriate for contributory negligence 

instruction). We hold the district court did not err in 

instructing the jury as it did on contributory negligence. 

3. Instruction No. 36: Plaintiff's Negligence as 

Sole Cause of Injury 

Atwood asserts it is reversible error for the district court 

to have given a "sole cause" instruction because the jury would be 

confused that a plaintiff's contributory negligence can bar the 

defendant's liability under FELA. However, the "sole cause" jury 

instruction given here conforms to model instructions cited by the 

Supreme Court. See Carter Y..!.. Atlanta~ St. A.B. ~, 338 U.S. 

430, 435-36 (1949). Further, there was no prejudice to Atwood 

from jury confusion on this issue because the jury found Atwood 

contributorily negligent and still awarded him damages. 

4. Instruction No. 40: Standard of Proof for Damages 

Atwood contests that instruction no. 40 confused the jury 

regarding the standard of proof for damages. However, this 

instruction correctly summarizes the law regarding the standard of 

proof for awarding damages. We find no merit in Atwood's argument 

that the instruction regarding the standard of proof -- the 

preponderance of the evidence -- is confused by the phrase 

"evidence that plaintiff in fact sustained future damages." We 

hold there was no error in instruction no. 40. 

7 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 7 
5. Instruction No. 42: Reduction of Past Wage Loss 

for State and Federal Taxes 

Atwood contends the court committed reversible error by 

instructing the jury that past earnings should be calculated on 

the basis of after-tax earnings. In Liepelt Y...!... Norfolk kW.~, 

444 U.S. 490, 491 (1980), the Supreme Court held it was reversible 

error for the district court to refuse to instruct the jury the 

damages award would not be subject to income taxes. As the Court 

noted, the Internal Revenue Code provides a damage award received 

on account of personal injuries is not taxable income. See 26 

u.s.c. § 104(a)(2). Because after-tax income provides the only 

realistic measure of an employee's earnings ability, the Court 

pointed out, income tax is a relevant factor in calculating a 

plaintiff's loss. Id. at 493-94. Although Liepelt does not 

require a district court to instruct a jury that past wages should 

be reduced for state and federal taxes, the Supreme Court stated 

that giving such an instruction "can do no harm." Id. at 498. 

Therefore, we hold instruction no. 42 summarized the applicable 

law and did not prejudice Atwood. 

6. Instruction No. 47: Duty to Mitigate Damages 

Atwood argues the district court erred by instructing the 

jury regarding mitigation as it did in instruction 47. A 

defendant is entitled to an instruction regarding his theory of 

the case, including the possibility of mitigation, if there is 

evidence on the record to support it. See Trejo Y...!... Denver k 

R.G.W.R.R., 568 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1977). The record shows 

there was evidence relating to mitigation of damages. We hold the 

8 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 8 
court did not err in instructing the jury as it did in instruction 

no. 47. 

Further, Atwood did not request a jury instruction stating 

the burden is on the defendant to prove mitigation by a 

preponderance of the evidence. Because Atwood did not object at 

trial to instruction no. 47 on this basis, he is subject to the 

plain error rule. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 51. Considering the fact 

the district court instructed the jury generally that the burden 

is on the defendant to prove every element by a preponderance of 

the evidence, we must conclude manifest injustice did not result 

from instruction no. 47. 

Admitting Plaintiff's Transcribed Statement 

Atwood further argues his transcribed statement should have 

not been admitted and sent into the jury room during jury 

deliberation. In reviewing the evidentiary rulings of a district 

court, we reverse only for an abuse of discretion. United States 

~ Alexander, 849 F.2d 1293, 1301 (10th Cir. 1988); Bannister~ 

Town of Noble, 812 F.2d 1265 (10th Cir. 1987). Any error arising 

from a district court's decision to admit evidence is subject to a 

harmless error analysis. United States~ Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 

1132 (9th Cir. 1989). 

Prior statements of a party-opponent are admissible under 

Rule 801(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as nonhearsay when 

they are offered against that party. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 

Relevant evidence may be excluded under Rule 403 if its probative 

value outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed. R. Evid. 

403. 

9 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 9 
Here, Atwood's transcribed statements were admitted against 

him. Therefore, they are admissions of a party opponent and 

should not be excluded as hearsay. We find no merit in Atwood's 

argument the district court should have limited admission of these 

statements to the purpose of impeachment. Further, the record 

shows the transcribed statements contained probative evidence 

relating to Atwood's actions before, during, and after throwing 

the switch; his medical treatment; work history; and lifestyle. 

Assuming the truth of Atwood's contention that "none of that 

information was inconsistent with his trial testimony," no 

prejudice would be involved in submitting these statements to the 

jury. Because any error that might have arisen from the admission 

of Atwood's transcribed statements is harmless, we hold the 

district court did not abuse its discretion. 

Jury's Failure to Award Future Lost Wages 

Atwood finally contends there was evidence of future lost 

wages and the jury's failure to award those damages requires a new 

trial. A motion for a new trial is properly granted only when the 

verdict is "clearly and decidedly or overwhelmingly" against the 

weight of the evidence." Locke Y.!.. Atchison,~~ S.F ~, 309 

F.2d 811, 817 (10th Cir. 1962). We review a district court's 

decision on a new trial motion only for abuse of discretion. 

Patty Precision Prods. Co. Y.!.. Brown~ Sharpe Mfg. Co., 846 F.2d 

1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1988). 

Here, the record shows there was ample evidence supporting 

the jury's verdict that Atwood's alleged future wage loss was not 

a result of Union Pacific's negligence. Atwood testified that he 

10 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 10 
felt he "pulled a muscle or something minor" the day of his 

accident. He worked a full day, went deer hunting that weekend, 

and continued to work full time for a month following the accident 

before seeking medical treatment. Despite the "jab" Atwood felt 

in his back when he first threw the switch the day of the 

accident, he testified he threw the switch five or six more times 

that day. 

Further, Atwood only was disqualified by his doctor from 

performing heavy work that requires lifting, twisting, and 

turning. Atwood's vocational rehabilitation expert testified that 

Atwood has an above average ability to learn and good mechanical 

abilities. She also testified Atwood did not appear motivated to 

find alternative employment or retrain in an another vocation. At 

the time of trial, Atwood was not employed. Because we cannot 

conclude from the record the evidence was overwhelmingly against 

the verdict, we hold the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in denying Atwood's motion for a new trial. 

11 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Deanell Reece Tacha 

Circuit Judge 

Appellate Case: 90-4076 Document: 010110106549 Date Filed: 05/20/1991 Page: 11