Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14475/USCOURTS-ca11-14-14475-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Nikki Ballard
Appellant-Cross Appellee
Chattooga County
Appellee-Cross Appellant
Chattooga County Board of Tax Assessors
Appellee-Cross Appellant
Cindy Clark
Appellant-Cross Appellee

Document Text:

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-14475

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cv-00012-HLM

NIKKI BALLARD,

CINDY CLARK,

 Plaintiffs-Appellants

Cross Appellees,

versus

CHATTOOGA COUNTY BOARD OF TAX

ASSESSORS, CHATTOOGA COUNTY,

 Defendants-Appellees

Cross Appellants.

________________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

________________________

(July 7, 2015)

Before HULL, ANDERSON, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.

___________

* Honorable Jerome Farris, United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by 

designation.

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 1 of 15
2

PER CURIAM: 

This appeal raises two primary issues that have been resolved by two en 

banc decisions of this Court. The first issue requires that we decide whether two 

local governmental entities within the state of Georgia should be treated as a single 

“employer” for purposes of Title VII and the Family and Medical Leave Act 

(“FMLA”). This issue is controlled by our decision in Lyes v. City of Riviera 

Beach, Florida, 166 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The second issue 

requires that we decide whether the Board of Assessors of Chattooga County, 

Georgia (“Board”) is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity from plaintiffs’ 

§ 1983 claims. This issue is controlled by our decision in Manders v. Lee, 338 

F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

Because the issues in this case are clearly controlled by the above-mentioned 

en banc decisions of this Court, this opinion is written only for the benefit of the 

parties. We address each issue in turn. 

I. PLAINTIFFS’ TITLE VII AND FMLA CLAIMS

FAIL BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS’ “EMPLOYER” EMPLOYS

LESS THAN THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES REQUIRED

FOR APPLICATION OF TITLE VII OR FMLA

Because the relevant facts were set forth comprehensively in the magistrate 

judge’s Report and Recommendation (Docket 194) and in the district court’s Order 

(Docket 198), we refer to the facts only as appropriate in our application of the law 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 2 of 15
3

to the relevant facts. Both plaintiffs were employed by the Board, not by 

Chattooga County. The Board employs fewer than fifteen employees, the required 

number for applicability of Title VII, and far fewer than the requisite number for 

applicability of FMLA. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Board employed at least 

fifteen employees fails because the members of the Board itself are not employees. 

Rather, they are the employer. 

Plaintiffs can satisfy the numerosity requirement only if they could succeed 

in their argument that the Board and the County constitute a single “employer” for 

purposes of Title VII and FMLA.1

 However, plaintiffs’ argument fails because 

plaintiffs cannot satisfy the test set forth in Lyes.

 1 As a threshold matter, plaintiffs urge us to decline to entertain the merits of either the 

single employer numerosity issue or the Eleventh Amendment issue. They argue that the district 

court abused its discretion in allowing the Board to amend its pleadings after the magistrate 

judge raised these issues. After careful consideration of the briefs, the record, and full 

exploration at oral argument, we cannot conclude that there has been an abuse of discretion 

under the particular facts and circumstances here, where the issue raised by the parties is closely 

related to the issues raised by the magistrate judge; where the magistrate judge was led inevitably 

to the new, closely-related issues by the plaintiffs’ own position with respect to the issue raised 

by the parties; and where additional discovery was allowed and the new issues were fully briefed 

by the parties. The cases relied on by plaintiffs are distinguished from the instant case, not only 

by the foregoing facts, but also because the Board here is a public agency such that strong 

federalism and comity concerns counsel against ignoring the fact that the Georgia legislature has 

declared that such boards of tax assessors shall be separate entities and almost entirely 

independent of the respective county governments. Moreover, with respect to the numerosity 

issue, we note that it is an element of plaintiffs’ cause of action – not an affirmative defense –

and that it was pled only implicitly in plaintiffs’ complaint. And, with respect to the Eleventh 

Amendment immunity issue, plaintiffs never argued in the district court that the Board’s failure 

to assert it in its initial pleadings constituted a waiver. Indeed, even on appeal, the waiver 

argument was neither raised in a straightforward manner nor briefed. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 3 of 15
4

The Lyes opinion summarized the test as follows:

To summarize, we hold that in assessing whether multiple 

governmental entities are a single “employer” under Title VII, we 

begin with the presumption that governmental subdivisions 

denominated as separate and distinct under state law should not be 

aggregated for purposes of Title VII. That presumption may be 

rebutted by evidence establishing that a governmental entity was 

structured with the purpose of evading the breach of federal 

employment discrimination law. Absent an evasive purpose, the 

presumption against aggregating separate public entities will control 

the inquiry, unless it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly 

indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with 

respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment 

relationship that they should be counted together under Title VII.

The standard we adopt is not whether a fact finder reasonably could 

conclude the plaintiff has overcome the presumption. Instead, the 

standard is whether the fact finder reasonably could conclude the 

plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption. The adverb “clearly,” 

which derives from the federalism concerns we have discussed, is 

meant to be limiting. It is a thumb on the scale and sometimes it will 

be decisive because federalism concerns should sometimes be 

decisive.

166 F.3d at 1345. The Lyes opinion also set forth several factors that guide our 

determination of whether one entity “exerts or shares control over the fundamental 

aspects of the employment relationship of another entity to such a substantial 

 

As will be apparent from our discussion below, Georgia’s statutory scheme and case law 

reveals a clear intent that Georgia’s boards of tax assessors are separate from, and independent 

of, the respective local county governments. The boards of assessors are subject to extensive 

controls from the state level, but little to no control by the local county government, all in service 

of the State’s purpose to equalize statewide the valuation of real estate for ad valorem tax 

purposes. Strong federalism and comity concerns persuade us that we should not ignore this 

clear legislative intent of the State, as plaintiffs would have us do. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 4 of 15
5

extent that it clearly outweighs the presumption that the entities are distinct.” Id. 

The factors include: (1) interrelationship of operations and centralized control of 

labor operations; (2) the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or 

discharge; (3) the authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments; 

and (4) the obligation to pay or the duty to train the charging party. Id. The four 

listed factors are not intended to be all inclusive; rather, the analysis is based on the 

totality of the circumstances. Id.

Our analysis begins with the state law. As set forth both by the district court 

and the magistrate judge below, Georgia law clearly establishes the Board as a 

separate and independent entity. The obvious purpose of the state legislation was 

to equalize the assessment of property for ad valorem taxation statewide, and thus 

to subject the process to controls from the state level, independent of control by the 

local county-level government. Georgia’s statutory scheme and its case law make 

clear that it is the Board – not the County – that has “control over the fundamental 

aspects of the employment relationships” with respect to these plaintiffs. See id. 

Chambers v. Fulford, 495 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1998), holds:

O.C.G.A. § 48-5-260 establishes a comprehensive system for the 

administration and equalization of property taxes. The statute was 

enacted to 

Create, provide, and require a comprehensive system of the 

equalization of taxes on real property within this state by the 

establishment of uniform state-wide forms, records, and 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 5 of 15
6

procedures, and by the establishment of a competent full-time 

staff for each county of this state to:

(A) Assist the board of tax assessors of each county ...

Id. at (1). O.C.G.A. § 48-5-290 creates a county board of assessors 

for each county in the State . . . . O.C.G.A. § 48-5-262(c)(1) 

establishes the minimum tax appraiser staffing requirement for each 

county . . . . The rate of compensation payable to a staff appraiser is 

determined by the state revenue commissioner and payable from 

county funds. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-263(c).

. . .

[I]n all matters dealing with county tax appraisers it is the board of 

tax assessors and not the board of commissioners which acts as the 

“governmental board [which] has the authority to act for the county.” 

Spell v. Blalock, supra, at 462, 254 S.E.2d 842 (“[t]he authority to 

hire and fire appraisers . . . is not a power vested in the [county board 

of] commissioners.”). Because the power to hire and fire Powell as a 

tax appraiser rests with the Wheeler County Board of Tax Assessors, 

see id.; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-298(a), it follows that the authority to alter 

the duration of the employment contract remains with that body, not 

with the board of commissioners, which previously approved the 

contract.

495 S.E.2d at 8. 

From the foregoing recitation of Georgia law, it is clear that Georgia has 

established the Board as a separate entity, independent of the local county 

government, thus triggering the Lyes presumption. Pursuant to Lyes, that 

presumption can be rebutted only if “it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly 

indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control 

of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 6 of 15
7

counted together under Title VII.” 166 F.3d at 1345. Applying Lyes’s four 

guiding factors to the facts of this case as established by Georgia law, it is clear 

that the presumption is not rebutted. Rather, application of the factors 

overwhelmingly indicates that it is the Board – not the County – which has 

“control over the fundamental aspects of the employment relationships.” See id.

Chambers makes it clear that it is the Board – not the County – which has control 

of labor operations [Lyes factor number 1]; the authority to hire, transfer, promote, 

discipline or discharge [factor number 2]; and the authority to establish work 

schedules or direct work assignments [factor number 3]. See 495 S.E.2d at 8. 

With respect to factor number 4 – the obligation to pay or the duty to train the 

charging authority – the rate of compensation for each appraiser, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-

263(a)(1), and the training, id. § 48-5-268, are determined at the state level. While 

county funds comprise the major source of funding, at least the minimum level of 

funding is established, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-263(a)(1), and mandated, id. § 48-5-

263(c), at the state level. Thus, the four factors listed by Lyes overwhelmingly 

establish that it is the Board – not the County – that controls the fundamental 

aspects of the employment relationships.

Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is true that the County 

provides the building in which the tax appraisers work, maintains the building, 

provides payroll and human resources services, and other administrative services. 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 7 of 15
8

However, such administrative services are tangential to the “fundamental aspects 

of the employment relationships” and fall far short of creating a genuine issue of 

fact with respect to plaintiffs’ heavy burden to “clearly overcome the 

presumption.” See Lyes 166 F.3d at 1345.

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Title VII and FMLA claims fail for 

failure to satisfy the numerosity requirements of the respective statutes.2

II. PLAINTIFFS’ SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FAIL

BECAUSE THE BOARD OF ASSESSORS IS

ENTITLED TO ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY

Plaintiffs’ claims relate to alleged gender discrimination. We cannot address 

the merits of those claims because we agree with the district court that the Board is 

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. 

As we stated in Manders:

In Eleventh Amendment cases, this Court uses four factors to 

determine whether an entity is an “arm of the state” in carrying out a 

particular function: (1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what 

degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the 

entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments 

against the entity.

338 F.3d at 1309. In determining whether a defendant is an “arm of the state,” 

Manders directs us to focus on the particular function in which the defendant was 

 2 Although Lyes addressed only the single employer issue in the context of Title VII, 

plaintiffs make no argument indicating that the corresponding FMLA analysis should be 

different. Also, we summarily reject plaintiffs’ other arguments in support of their Title VII and 

FMLA claims. For example, their argument that the Board is a mere agent of the County is 

simply inconsistent with Georgia’s statutory scheme.

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 8 of 15
9

engaged when taking the actions out of which liability is alleged to arise. Id. at 

1308. The particular function at issue in this case involves the discipline and 

termination of plaintiffs who were either working as, or training for, appraiser 

positions. We address the Manders factors in turn. 3 

A. How Georgia law defines boards of assessors

As the above discussion indicates, Georgia law establishes the Board as a 

separate entity, independent of the local county government. Indeed, the creation of 

the boards of assessors by the state legislature was part of a state-level effort to 

equalize taxes on real property throughout the state. Georgia Code § 48-5-260, 

entitled “Purpose of Part” provides in relevant part:

It is the purpose and intent of this part to: 

(1) Create, provide, and require a comprehensive system for the 

equalization of taxes on real property within this state by the 

establishment of uniform state-wide forms, records, and procedures 

 3 Plaintiffs’ argument against Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case is that the Board 

is a division of the County and is acting for the County – not the State. For the first time in 

plaintiffs’ reply brief, they cite our recent decision in Lightfoot v. Henry County School District, 

771 F.3d 764 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that Georgia school districts are political subdivisions of 

the State like a municipality or county, thus holding that they are a division neither of the State 

nor the County, and accordingly are not an “arm of the state” entitled to Eleventh Amendment 

immunity). However, even in their reply brief, plaintiffs do not argue in a straightforward 

manner that the Board is an independent entity that is neither part of the State nor the County. 

As in Manders, we decline to address this very different issue which has not been briefed at all –

i.e., whether the Board is a separate entity and neither part of the State nor the County. 338 F.3d 

at 1328 n.54. We note, however, that Georgia’s boards of assessors have nothing comparable to 

the autonomy of the school district in Lightfoot, which had the authority to levy taxes, issue 

bonds, etc., and which was treated in the Georgia statutes as a political subdivision comparable 

to a municipality or county.

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 9 of 15
10

and by the establishment of a competent, full-time staff for each 

county of this state to:

(A) Assist the Board of Tax Assessors in each county in 

developing the proper information for setting tax assessments on 

property:

(B) Maintain the tax assessment records for each county; and 

(C) Provide for state-wide duties and qualification standards for 

such staffs; 

(2) Provide for the examination of county tax digests in order to 

determine whether property valuation is uniform between the 

counties. 

The Georgia statutory scheme obviously contemplates that its boards of 

assessors shall not only constitute a separate entity from the local county 

government, but the statutes reflect a clear intent that the boards of assessors shall 

be independent of the local county government. Georgia Code § 48-5-290 

provides that, although members of the boards of assessors are appointed by the 

county governing authority, no close relative of a county commissioner is eligible 

to serve as a member of a board of assessors. Moreover, once appointed, the local 

county government cannot change the length of the term of existing members of 

boards of assessors. Id. § 48-5-295(a). And a member of a county board of 

assessors may be removed only for cause after a hearing before a judge of the 

superior court of the county. Id. § 48-5-295(b). Finally, and significantly in light 

of our mandate to assess this Eleventh Amendment issue in light of the particular 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 10 of 15
11

function giving rise to plaintiffs’ claim, the independence of Georgia’s boards of 

assessors is reflected in the Georgia cases holding that local county governments

have no authority at all with respect to the discipline or termination of employees 

of the boards of assessors. See Chambers, 495 S.E.2d at 8.

We conclude that the first Manders factor weighs overwhelmingly in favor 

of Eleventh Amendment immunity for the Board. We turn now to the second 

factor.

B. Georgia statutes and case law vest control over Georgia’s boards of 

 assessors in the State, not in the local county government

The second Manders factor looks at where the state law vests control. With 

respect to the particular function at issue in this case, Georgia’s case law expressly 

provides that the local county government shall have no control at all over the 

discipline or termination of employees of the boards of assessors. See Chambers, 

495 S.E.2d at 8. Moreover, there is extensive state-level control over virtually 

every aspect of the work of Georgia’s boards of assessors. State law establishes 

the minimum number of appraisers (O.C.G.A. § 48-5-262); the qualifications, 

duties, and compensation thereof (Id. § 48-5-263); the training thereof (Id. § 48-5-

268); and the procedures to be followed (Id. § 48-5-269). Finally, and 

significantly, the end product of the work of Georgia’s boards of assessors has to 

be approved or disapproved at the state level. Id. § 48-5-304 (relating to the statelevel approval of the tax digests). 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 11 of 15
12

The state-level control in this case is all encompassing; by contrast, there is 

no control at all vested in the local county governments. This is especially true 

with respect to the particular function giving rise to plaintiffs’ claims; as noted, 

Chambers holds that local county governments have no authority at all with respect 

to the discipline or termination of the Board’s employees. 495 S.E.2d at 8. This 

control factor of Manders points more overwhelmingly toward Eleventh 

Amendment immunity than did this factor in Manders itself. We next address the 

third Manders factor.

C. Source of funds for the Board

The Georgia statutory scheme for funding its boards of tax assessors very 

closely parallels the funding scheme for sheriffs as described in Manders, 338 F.3d 

at 1323-24. Although the County “bears the major burden of funding[,]” the Board 

here, just as in Manders, is thus funded “because the State so mandates.” Id. at 

1323. State law determines the minimum number of appraisers for each county 

and sets their qualifications and duties. O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-262, 48-5-263(a)-(b). 

The “rate of compensation for each appraiser grade” is determined by the state 

revenue commissioner pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-263(a)(1), and O.C.G.A. § 48-

5-263(c) mandates that: “Staff appraisers shall be paid from county funds.” And 

as in Manders, “both state and county funds are involved[,]” 338 F.3d at 1324, 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 12 of 15
13

because a portion of the salary of these appraisers is paid by the State. O.C.G.A. §

48-5-267. 

Thus, for the same reasons that prevailed in Manders, the “state involvement 

is sufficient to tilt the third factor of the Eleventh Amendment analysis toward 

immunity.” See 338 F.3d at 1324. We turn next to the fourth Manders factor.

D. Source of funds that will pay any adverse judgment

As with the third factor, the situation of Georgia’s boards of assessors with 

respect to the issue of who will pay any adverse federal judgment is very similar to 

the situation that existed in Manders. There, Georgia law placed the legal liability 

for paying the adverse judgment on neither the County nor the State, and “Sheriff 

Peterson thus apparently would have to pay any adverse federal court judgment ... 

out of the budget of the Sheriff’s Office ... [which] would reduce his budget, and 

the practical reality is that Sheriff Peterson must recoup that money from 

somewhere ... [and thus] both county and state funds are implicated.” Manders, 

338 F.3d at 1327. The Manders court also noted that 

[n]ever has the Supreme Court required an actual drain on the state 

treasury . . . because the Eleventh Amendment is rooted in a 

recognition that the States . . . maintain certain attributes of 

sovereignty, and a purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to accord 

the States the respect owed them . . . and not to affront the dignity or 

integrity of a state by requiring a state to respond to lawsuits in federal 

courts. 

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 13 of 15
14

As in Manders, plaintiffs have pointed to no Georgia statute that makes a 

Georgia county liable for an adverse judgment against one of Georgia’s boards of 

assessors, and we are aware of no such statute. The Georgia Supreme Court in 

Wayne County Board of Commissioners v. Warren, 223 S.E.2d 133 (Ga. 1976), 

held that “[a] county is not liable to suit for any cause of action unless made so by 

statute.” Id. at 134 (quoting then O.C.G.A. § 23-1502, now codified at O.C.G.A. 

§ 36-1-4) (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither are we aware of any statute 

making the State liable for an adverse judgment against one of Georgia’s boards of 

assessors. 

Thus, again as in Manders, the Board itself “apparently would have to pay 

any adverse federal court judgment,” and the “practical reality” is precisely the 

same because “both county and state funds are implicated.” See 338 F.3d at 1327. 

Just as in Manders, in this case too, “[t]he State’s ‘integrity’ is not limited to who 

foots the bill, and, at a minimum, the liability-for-adverse-judgment factor does not 

defeat [the Board’s] immunity claim.” See id. at 1328. 

In summary, our application of the Manders factors to the facts of this case 

is as follows. With respect to factors one, three, and four, the relevant facts, as 

dictated by the statutory scheme, are virtually indistinguishable from those in 

Manders. And with respect to Manders’s second factor – what degree of control 

the State maintains over the entity – the facts of this case as dictated by the 

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 14 of 15
15

statutory scheme point more overwhelmingly toward Eleventh Amendment 

immunity than in Manders itself. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 

Manders controls and that the Board is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity 

from plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.4

III. CONCLUSION

Having rejected plaintiffs’ arguments with respect to the two primary issues 

on appeal, we also reject any other challenges by plaintiffs to the judgment of the 

district court without need for further discussion. We also reject as moot the 

Board’s arguments on cross-appeal. Accordingly, the judgment of the district 

court is

AFFIRMED.

 4 Plaintiffs argue for the first time on appeal that their complaint also sought reinstatement,

and this claim would survive Eleventh Amendment immunity. We decline to entertain this 

argument, which was not fairly presented to the district court. See Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. 

Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court has repeatedly held that an issue 

not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by 

this [C]ourt.” (internal quotation omitted)).

USCA11 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 15 of 15