Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca4-06-05128/USCOURTS-ca4-06-05128-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
Ayande Yearwood
Appellant

Document Text:

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 06-5128

AYANDE YEARWOOD,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.

Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.

(1:05-cr-00105-RDB)

Argued: December 7, 2007

Decided: March 6, 2008

Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and

John Preston BAILEY, United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,

in which Judge Shedd and Judge Bailey joined. 

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Matthew McGavock Robinson, ROBINSON &

BRANDT, P.S.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Charles Joseph

Peters, Sr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

ON BRIEF: Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Baltimore,

Maryland, for Appellee.

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 1 of 12
OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge: 

Ayande Yearwood appeals his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (2000). Yearwood was initially charged with this conspiracy offense and a second

count of distribution of 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). A jury acquitted

Yearwood on the distribution count and hung on the conspiracy

offense, resulting in a mistrial on the conspiracy charge. In a second

trial, Yearwood was found guilty of conspiracy. 

Yearwood claims on appeal that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the

Fifth Amendment barred his retrial for conspiracy, because the retrial

required relitigation of "an issue of ultimate fact" already determined

by the jury in his first trial for the substantive crime of distribution.

A substantive crime and conspiracy to commit that crime are "separate offenses" for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, however,

because an agreement to do an act is distinct from the act itself.

United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 390 (1992). Largely because the

two offenses are distinct, Yearwood’s second trial did not require relitigation of "an issue of ultimate fact" that had already been determined in the first trial. See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232

(1994). Because there was substantial evidence from which a rational

jury could find Yearwood guilty of conspiracy, we affirm Yearwood’s

conviction.

I.

The indictment charges that on or about July 25, 2002, Ayande

Yearwood knowingly conspired to distribute and possess with intent

to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base. The conspiracy was

an outgrowth of the relationship between Yearwood and two other

individuals, Maurice Malone and Kevon Isaac. Yearwood had a longstanding social and business relationship with both men. Indeed, both

Malone and Isaac testified that they had known Yearwood since the

early 1990s. In 1992, Malone and Yearwood were charged and convicted together for possession with intent to distribute cocaine and

2 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 2 of 12
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Isaac also testified that between 1999

and 2001, he had purchased cocaine base from Yearwood on approximately twenty occasions. 

In January 2002, Isaac was arrested by the FBI and charged with

distribution of cocaine base. He pled guilty to the charge, and in the

hopes of receiving a reduced sentence, he agreed to cooperate with

the FBI as an informant. Isaac testified that after his arrest, he was

unable to obtain drugs from Yearwood because Yearwood was afraid

that Isaac might be working with law enforcement. Since Isaac could

not contact Yearwood directly about obtaining drugs, the FBI

instructed Isaac to contact "lower level drug traffickers," such as

Malone, who could get in touch with Yearwood. Malone was neither

working with the FBI nor aware that Isaac was cooperating with it.

At the FBI’s direction, Isaac called Malone numerous times in July

2002 about arranging the purchase of a large amount of cocaine base

from Yearwood. According to both Isaac’s and Malone’s testimony,

during one particular call on July 22, Isaac asked Malone whether he

had spoken to "Meloton" or "Militan" (nicknames of Yearwood’s)

about the "food" (a code word for cocaine base). Malone said that he

had spoken with Yearwood, and that Yearwood had said he wanted

"49" ($4900.00) for "seven" (seven ounces of cocaine base). 

Also during July 2002, the FBI installed a dialed number recorder

("DNR") on the landline telephone at Malone’s apartment which

allowed the FBI to see the numbers of incoming and outgoing calls

to Malone’s landline, as well as the dates and times of those calls.

DNR records indicated that between July 9 and July 31, 2002, numerous calls were made to and from Malone’s telephone and a cell phone

listed under a third party name but which, according to the government, actually belonged to Yearwood. Many of these calls occurred

on July 20, 21, 22, 23, and 25. One recorded call, made on July 23,

was a three-way call involving Yearwood, Malone, and Isaac. The

call began with just Isaac and Malone, but after Malone told Isaac that

he had not yet gotten the "food" from Yearwood, Isaac asked Malone

to connect Yearwood on a three-way call. After Yearwood was connected, Isaac began speaking with him. Yearwood immediately recognized Isaac’s voice. Isaac asked Yearwood whether he had a "CD

UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD 3

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 3 of 12
player" or any "CDs" (also code words for cocaine base); Yearwood

said that he did not and immediately hung up. 

Malone testified that shortly after the three-way call ended, Yearwood called to complain about Isaac being put on the three-way call,

and to tell Malone that he did not want Isaac to know he was

Malone’s supplier. That same day, July 23, 2002, Malone and Isaac

continued to discuss Malone’s plan to obtain seven ounces of cocaine

base from Yearwood. Because Yearwood did not want to deal with

Isaac, the two agreed not to tell Yearwood that the cocaine was for

Isaac. Malone also told Isaac that Yearwood would want all the

money up front. 

Based on these various conversations, the FBI instructed Isaac to

complete the cocaine purchase on July 25, 2002. On that day, FBI

agents set up surveillance at both Malone’s and Yearwood’s apartments at 4:00 p.m. At around 6:10 p.m., Detective Glen Hester videotaped Yearwood walking into Malone’s apartment. Malone testified

that Yearwood was carrying cocaine base in the waist area of his

pants. Yearwood was videotaped leaving Malone’s apartment about

three minutes later. 

After Yearwood left, Malone called Isaac and told him to "come

now." Isaac was then videotaped going into Malone’s apartment.

While Isaac was in Malone’s apartment, their conversation was

recorded by a body recorder Isaac was wearing. During that conversation, Malone said that Yearwood had only brought five ounces of

cocaine base, and the two agreed that Isaac would pay $3500 for it.

After paying for the cocaine base, Isaac left Malone’s apartment to

meet with FBI agents and to turn over the drugs and the remaining

money. After analyzing the drugs, the FBI determined them to be

cocaine base. 

Malone testified that he had arranged to give the money from the

drug sale to Yearwood at a later time. Between approximately 7:00

and 8:00 p.m., surveillance officers observed Yearwood’s car parked

at an auto repair shop about five miles from Malone’s Apartment.

Around 8:15 p.m., the FBI saw Malone leave his apartment on foot.

To avoid jeopardizing the ongoing investigation and to protect Isaac’s

4 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 4 of 12
identity as an informant, surveillance discontinued at that point, and

no arrests were made that day. 

In July 2004, Malone was arrested for distribution of cocaine base.

Malone pled guilty and agreed to testify for the government against

other drug dealers in hopes of obtaining a reduced sentence. In March

2005, likely based on evidence gathered against Yearwood by the FBI

and Malone’s statements that Yearwood was one of his sources for

the cocaine base he had sold in 2002, a federal grand jury returned

a two-count indictment against Yearwood. Yearwood was subsequently arrested in April 2005. 

Count One of the indictment charged Yearwood with conspiracy to

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of

cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Count

Two charged Yearwood with distribution as a principal or as an aider

and abettor of 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 

In the first trial, a jury found Yearwood not guilty on the distribution charge, and the court entered a judgment of acquittal as to that

count on December 5, 2005. However, the jury was unable to reach

a verdict as to the conspiracy charge, and the court declared a mistrial

as to that count. On April 28, 2006, after retrial on the conspiracy

charge, a second jury found Yearwood guilty of conspiracy. On May

5, 2006, Yearwood filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, which

was denied on May 17, 2006. 

Yearwood timely appealed. 

II.

Yearwood first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conspiracy conviction. In order to prove conspiracy to distribute and possess cocaine base with intent to distribute, the government

was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that: "(1) an

agreement" to distribute and "possess cocaine with intent to distribute

existed between two or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the

conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became

UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD 5

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 5 of 12
a part of this conspiracy." United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857

(en banc) (4th Cir. 1996). The gravamen of the crime "is an agreement to effectuate a criminal act." United States v. Laughman, 618

F.2d 1067, 1074 (4th Cir. 1980). 

Because a conspiracy is by nature "clandestine and covert," there

rarely is direct evidence of such an agreement. Burgos, 94 F.3d at

857. As such, a conspiracy is usually proven by circumstantial evidence. See, e.g., Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.10

(1975); Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. "Circumstantial evidence tending to

prove a conspiracy may consist of a defendant’s ‘relationship with

other members of the conspiracy, the length of this association, [the

defendant’s] attitude [and] conduct, and the nature of the conspiracy.’" Burgos, 94 F.3d at 858 (quoting United States v. Collazo, 732

F.2d 1200, 1205 (4th Cir. 1984)). Thus, a conspiracy "may be inferred

from a development and collocation of circumstances." Burgos, 94

F.3d at 858 (quotation omitted). 

Addressing Yearwood’s objections to the government’s case, there

was plainly sufficient evidence to prove that Yearwood entered into

an agreement with Malone and Isaac to distribute cocaine base.

Malone’s testimony is ample evidence that Yearwood and Malone

were partners in this common enterprise. And while this court has

held that even the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator may

be sufficient to support a guilty verdict for conspiracy, see United

States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1255 (4th Cir. 1993), Malone’s testimony is corroborated by Isaac’s testimony, the videotape of Yearwood visiting Malone at his apartment, the recorded telephone calls

among Isaac, Malone, and Yearwood, and DNR records showing a

large number of phone calls logged between Yearwood’s cell and

Malone’s landline. See id. at 1255 (a large number of telephone calls

between two alleged co-conspirators "supports the view that the two

were partners"). 

Yearwood, however, contends that this evidence at most establishes that he and Malone had a buyer-seller relationship, and that

such a relationship "does not provide the grounds for finding a conspiracy." See United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 485 (4th Cir.

1993). However, "evidence of a buy-sell transaction is at least relevant (i.e. probative) on the issue of whether a conspiratorial relation6 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 6 of 12
ship exists." Id. at 485 n.1. Further, evidence of such a relationship,

when combined with evidence of a substantial quantity of drugs —

as here — "would support a reasonable inference that the parties were

coconspirators." Id. Moreover, the amount of cocaine base and money

that Malone testified he had discussed with Yearwood (seven ounces

for $4900), and the amount of cocaine base and money involved in

the July 25 transaction (five ounces for $3500) far exceeded the

amounts involved in a simple buyer-seller transaction, and supports

an inference that Malone and Yearwood were distributing drugs

together. 

Further, Yearwood’s suggestion that he was only in the business of

distributing Caribbean music CDs is without merit. Isaac and Malone

each testified that they had purchased cocaine base, not music, from

Yearwood many times before. Moreover, FBI Special Agent

Sapilway testified that it is common for drug traffickers to use words

like "food" and "CDs" to mean drugs. Both Isaac and Malone testified

that "food," "CDs," and "CD Player" were code for cocaine base. This

was more than enough to support a rational jury finding that Yearwood was deep into the drug trade, and that when Yearwood offered

Malone "seven" for "49" over the telephone, he was referring to

cocaine base and dollar amounts, not to actual "food" or "CDs." 

Because a rational jury certainly could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Yearwood knowingly engaged in a conspiracy to

distribute and possess cocaine base with intent to distribute, we conclude that Yearwood’s conviction is supported by substantial evidence. 

III.

Yearwood contends that his retrial on the conspiracy count violated

his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment

because he had earlier been acquitted of the substantive crime of distribution of cocaine base. Double jeopardy bars a second prosecution

for the same offense after acquittal or after conviction. See, e.g., Dep’t

of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 769 n.1 (1994).

Moreover, the collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy bars

the "relitigation of adjudicated issues whether they emerge in trials

for the same or distinct offenses." United States v. Ruhbayan, 325

UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD 7

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 7 of 12
F.3d 197, 201 (4th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). We conclude that

double jeopardy poses no bar to Yearwood’s conviction.

A.

We must first determine whether the two offenses at issue here —

the substantive offense of distribution of cocaine base and conspiracy

to commit that offense — are the "same offense" such that retrial on

the conspiracy count was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The

Supreme Court has long held that two offenses are the "same" for

Double Jeopardy purposes if they cannot survive the "same-elements"

test. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993). The

"same-elements" test asks "whether each offense contains an element

not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution."

Id.

The two offenses here are not the same. A substantive crime and

conspiracy to commit that crime are "separate offenses" for purposes

of the Double Jeopardy Clause, even if they are based on the same

underlying incidents. Felix, 503 U.S. at 389-90; see also United States

v. Banks, 10 F.3d 1044, 1050 (4th Cir. 1993). Indeed, "conspiracy is

a distinct offense from the completed object of the conspiracy." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 778 (1985). This is because "the

agreement to do the act is distinct from the act itself." United States

v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 542 (1947). 

To prove distribution of cocaine base, the government had to show

that Yearwood, as a principal, (1) knowingly or intentionally (2) distributed (3) 50 grams of cocaine base, or that, as an aider and abettor,

he "knowingly associated himself with and participated in the criminal venture," here, distribution of cocaine base. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);

18 U.S.C. § 2; Burgos, 94 F.3d at 873. In contrast, to prove conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or

more of cocaine base, the government had to establish that "(1) an

agreement" to distribute and "possess cocaine with intent to distribute

existed between two or more persons; (2) the defendant knew of the

conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became

a part of this conspiracy." Burgos, 94 F.3d at 857. 

8 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 8 of 12
Yearwood suggests that an overlap exists between the "knowingly

associated himself with and participated in the criminal venture" element of aiding and abetting the substantive offense and the "knowingly and voluntarily became a part of th[e] conspiracy" element of

conspiracy. But the two are separate: the former involves participation

in the criminal act itself; the latter involves participation in an agreement to perform that act. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,

16 (1994) ("[T]he criminal agreement itself is the actus reus . . . .").

Felix makes clear that Yearwood’s retrial for conspiracy violates no

double jeopardy bar. 503 U.S. at 391. 

B.

Although the conspiracy retrial did not run afoul of the "sameelements" test, Yearwood contends that the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial on the conspiracy

count because it "required relitigation of factual issues already

resolved at the first trial." See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342,

347 (1990). 

Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate

fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, the issue

cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970). The Fourth Circuit

has not spoken precedentially on the precise issue of whether a retrial

on a conspiracy count after an acquittal on the underlying substantive

count runs afoul of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. However, we

find two decisions of our sister circuits instructive. Both the Fifth and

the Eleventh Circuits have addressed whether the collateral estoppel

doctrine applies to subsequent conspiracy prosecutions after an

acquittal on the substantive crime of possession with intent to distribute. Both courts concluded that collateral estoppel prohibited neither

the subsequent trial on the conspiracy charge nor the admission of

evidence related both to the acquitted charge and to the charge of conspiracy. See United States v. Gil, 142 F.3d 1398, 1401-02 (11th Cir.

1998); United States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1400-1402 (5th Cir.

1997). 

In Brackett, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision

to suppress, at a trial for conspiracy, evidence related to a possession

UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD 9

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 9 of 12
with intent to distribute offense for which the defendant was previously acquitted, on the grounds that "[a] general verdict of acquittal

merely indicates that the government has failed to convince the jury,

beyond a reasonable doubt, of at least one essential element of the

substantive offense; it does not ‘necessarily determine’ any facts at

issue in the conspiracy trial." 113 F.3d at 1400. And in Gil, the Eleventh Circuit also reversed the district court’s decision to suppress, in

a retrial for conspiracy, evidence related to the acquitted possession

with intent to distribute offense. The court noted that even if certain

facts are "necessarily determined" in the prior trial, if those facts do

not constitute "an essential element of the mistried count," that is,

they "do not constitute an ultimate issue regarding the mistried

count," then the government "not only may retry the mistried count

but also may introduce evidence relating to the acquitted count that

is relevant to the mistried count and otherwise satisfies the Federal

Rules of Evidence." 142 F.3d at 1401 (citing Dowling, 493 U.S. at

348-49 (permitting evidence related to a previously acquitted charge

when that evidence is admissible for a purpose that does not require

proof beyond a reasonable doubt)). 

Guided by these principles, we turn to Yearwood’s argument that

certain facts were "necessarily determined" in the first trial, and that

those facts constituted "ultimate issues" as to the mistried conspiracy

count. Specifically, Yearwood argues that because the jury in the first

trial determined that he did not commit, as a principal or as an aider

and abettor, the crime of distribution of cocaine base, the jury necessarily determined that Yearwood did not supply cocaine base to

Malone on July 25, 2002. According to Yearwood, the only evidence

of Yearwood’s participation in the conspiracy was evidence that he

had supplied the drugs to Malone. Therefore, not only was the government collaterally estopped, under the Double Jeopardy Clause,

from introducing evidence that Yearwood supplied drugs to Malone,

but also the government was barred from retrying him on the conspiracy count, since it required relitigation of an "essential" or "ultimate"

fact already resolved in Yearwood’s favor by the first jury. 

Yearwood, however, cannot meet his burden of establishing that

the first jury "necessarily determined" a factual issue "essential" to

proving an element of the conspiracy count. See Schiro, 510 U.S. at

232; Gil, 142 F.3d at 1401. To begin, discerning precisely what facts

10 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 10 of 12
were "necessarily determined" in a general jury verdict is no easy

task, and as such, "[c]ourts have always resisted inquiring into a

jury’s thought processes." United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67

(1984). Moreover, we need not attempt to divine the precise thoughts

of the first jury. Even if, as Yearwood contends, the first jury "necessarily determined" that Yearwood did not actually supply cocaine

base to Malone on July 25, 2002, given that a substantive and conspiracy offense involve separate elements, it is quite unlikely that a factual finding with respect to any particular act is "essential" to proving

the elements of conspiracy. 

This makes perfect sense. The Supreme Court has repeatedly

emphasized that, unless Congress expressly requires otherwise, a

finding of conspiracy does not hinge on the commission of any one

overt act, nor does it require commission of the object offense. See,

e.g., Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S. 209, 211, 218 (2005); Shabani, 513 U.S. at 11; see also 21 U.S.C. § 846. Indeed, a conspiratorial agreement is likely to be broader than one particular act. The

government presented substantial evidence to this effect — including

Malone’s testimony that he had agreed with Yearwood to obtain

drugs from Yearwood for distribution to others, and that he would

help Yearwood with his drug sales by negotiating with customers,

arranging the times and places for drug sales, and insulating Yearwood from customers; Malone’s testimony, corroborated by Isaac’s

testimony, that Yearwood offered to sell the sizeable quantity of

seven ounces of cocaine for $4900; and FBI Agent Sapilway’s testimony, corroborated by Malone’s and Isaac’s testimony, that the

words "CD" and "food" were code in the drug trade for cocaine base.

This evidence bears out the Supreme Court’s observation that the

crime of conspiracy involves a knowing agreement to conspire and

cannot be tied to any one act. While Yearwood claims the "offense

conduct" for both the substantive and conspiracy offenses was the

July 25 sale, a conspiracy most often signals a much broader enterprise than a single distributional event, and so it was here. 

Because the issue of whether Yearwood actually supplied cocaine

base to Malone on July 25, 2005 was not an "ultimate issue" as to the

conspiracy count, the government was not barred from introducing

UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD 11

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 11 of 12
evidence that was probative of the elements of conspiracy or from

retrying the conspiracy count.*

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

*Yearwood also argues that the district court abused its discretion by

admitting into evidence Yearwood’s 1992 conviction for possession with

intent to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. However, the contested piece of evidence was admitted not to prove Yearwood’s criminal disposition, but rather to prove Yearwood’s knowledge

and intent. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). The defendant’s knowledge and

intent are elements the government must establish to prove a conspiracy

to violate 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). See United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d

444, 448 (4th Cir. 1991). Yearwood put the question of his knowledge

and intent at issue at trial by arguing, among other things, that he was in

the legitimate business of selling CDs of Caribbean music, suggesting

that he did not have any intention of engaging in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion

under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in admitting the evidence. 

12 UNITED STATES v. YEARWOOD

Appeal: 06-5128 Doc: 45 Filed: 03/06/2008 Pg: 12 of 12