Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01368/USCOURTS-caed-2_13-cv-01368-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
County of Yolo
Defendant
Robin Gonzalez
Plaintiff
Edward G. Prieto
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

ROBIN GONZALEZ, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

COUNTY OF YOLO; EDWARD G. 

PRIETO, an individual; and DOES 1 

through 50, inclusive, 

Defendants. 

No. 2:13–CV–01368–KJM–AC 

ORDER 

This matter is before the court on the motion by defendants County of Yolo and 

Edward Prieto (“defendants”) to strike plaintiff Robin Gonzalez’s August 29, 2014 declaration 

and motion for summary judgment. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 19. Plaintiff opposes both 

motions. ECF Nos. 21, 26. The court heard argument on the motions on September 26, 2014, 

with Manolo Olaso appearing on behalf of plaintiff and Cori Sarno appearing on behalf of 

defendants. The court DENIES defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to strike 

without prejudice.1

 

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 The court previously ordered the parties to include a certification with any motion that all meet 

and confer options had been exhausted prior to filing any motion in this case. ECF No. 18 at 4. 

Defendants did not comply with this instruction with respect to either of the motions now before 

the court. The court will not entertain motions in the future unless the certification requirement is 

met. 

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As a preliminary matter, the court grants defendants’ request for judicial notice of 

documents from plaintiff’s bankruptcy court case and other administrative proceedings. Fed. R. 

Evid. 201; Harris v. Cnty. of Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We may take 

judicial notice of undisputed matters of public record, including documents on file in federal or 

state courts.”) (internal quotations omitted). 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

On July 9, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint in this court alleging sexual harassment 

and discrimination in the workplace. Compl., ECF No. 1. Prior to filing her complaint, plaintiff 

submitted a tort claim to Yolo County on November 5, 2012 outlining her sexual harassment 

claims against defendant Prieto. Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 7 at 6, ECF No. 19-3. 

Plaintiff filed a sexual harassment complaint with the Equal Opportunity Employment 

Commission and the California Department of Fair Labor and Employment on January 14, 2013. 

Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 21-5. Plaintiff also filed a worker’s compensation claim for stress 

related to sexual harassment on February 23, 2013. Id. All of plaintiff’s claims arise from 

defendant Prieto’s alleged sexual harassment and conduct over a period of ten years from when 

plaintiff first applied for a job with the Yolo County Sheriff’s Department until November 27, 

2012. ECF No. 21 at 2. 

Approximately three and a half years prior to filing her first claim with Yolo 

County in 2012, plaintiff filed for bankruptcy on April 8, 2009. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff did 

not include any claim against defendants as a contingent or unliquidated claim in her schedule of 

assets. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 9. The bankruptcy court entered an order discharging plaintiff’s debt 

on July 28, 2014. Defs.’ Req. for Judicial Notice Ex. 6 at 1, ECF No. 19-3. 

Because plaintiff failed to include her claim against defendants on her list of 

assets, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel on August 13, 

2014. ECF No. 19. Plaintiff subsequently reopened her bankruptcy case and filed an amended 

schedule including this pending claim. Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff filed her opposition to the 

motion for summary judgment on August 29, 2014. ECF No. 21. 

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Defendants replied to plaintiff’s opposition on September 5, 2014, and also filed a 

motion to strike plaintiff’s declaration. ECF Nos. 22-1, 22. Defendants sought to strike 

plaintiff’s declaration as based on a subject that plaintiff previously claimed was protected by the 

attorney-client privilege. ECF No. 22 at 4. Defendants further contended that plaintiff’s 

declaration expressly contradicts her deposition and should be stricken as well under the sham 

affidavit doctrine. Id. As allowed by the court, plaintiff filed a surreply to the motion to strike on 

September 19, 2014. ECF No. 26. 

II. DISCUSSION 

Defendant asserts that plaintiff should be estopped from bringing her sexual 

harassment claim because she omitted the claim from her bankruptcy filing. ECF No. 19-1 at 3–

4. Plaintiff counters that the omission was an honest mistake and judicial estoppel does not 

apply. ECF No. 21 at 9–10. 

Generally in the bankruptcy context, if the plaintiff omits a pending lawsuit from 

the bankruptcy schedule, judicial estoppel bars the action. Ah Quin v. County of Kauai Dept. of 

Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 271 (9th Cir. 2013). Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked at 

the court’s discretion. Id. at 270. The Ninth Circuit considers three factors in determining 

whether to apply judicial estoppel. Id. First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent 

with its earlier position. Id. Second, a party must have induced a court to accept its earlier 

position. Id. Third, a party must have derived an unfair advantage or imposed an unfair 

detriment on the party seeking estoppel. Id. However, judicial estoppel does not apply if the 

court finds the omission was an inadvertent mistake. Id. at 276. 

Here, the application of judicial estoppel appears to depend on resolution of the 

factual question of how much plaintiff’s bankruptcy attorney assisted plaintiff with the 2009 

bankruptcy forms. This information will assist the court in determining whether the inadvertent 

mistake exception to judicial estoppel applies. 

The parties dispute the extent of assistance that plaintiff’s bankruptcy attorney 

provided in filling out the necessary forms. A brief colloquy at deposition and plaintiff’s 

declaration appear to be in tension. ECF No. 22 at 4 (stating that plaintiff’s deposition indicates 

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plaintiff filled out her bankruptcy forms herself and had a good understanding of them); but see 

Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 4 (“The attorney filled out the documents . . . . I reviewed the documents [and] 

signed the schedules . . . .”). When asked about the conversations with her bankruptcy attorney 

regarding the forms, plaintiff asserted her attorney-client privilege and did not answer the 

question; defendant did not press plaintiff or her counsel for clarification. Gonzalez Dep. at 

139:5–8, ECF No. 19-2. There is scant evidence available to answer the critical question here. 

Plaintiff has offered to waive the attorney-client privilege with respect to her 

discussions with her bankruptcy attorney regarding her bankruptcy filings. ECF No. 26 at 3. The 

scope of the attorney-client privilege is grounded in principles of fairness, Bittaker v. Woodford, 

331 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2003), and in light of plaintiff’s offer to waive the privilege, the court 

will allow further discovery for the narrow purpose of exploring the extent to which plaintiff’s 

bankruptcy attorney assisted plaintiff in filling out her bankruptcy forms. The discovery is 

limited to deposition questions of plaintiff and her attorney, with advance deposition subpoenas 

of documents. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 Defendants are permitted to further depose plaintiff for up to two hours and are 

also permitted to depose plaintiff’s bankruptcy attorney for up to four hours. 

 If this additional discovery cannot be completed by the current discovery deadline 

of October 27, 2014, the parties should inform the court and the court will consider an extension. 

 Defendants’ motion to strike and for summary judgment is denied without 

prejudice. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

DATED: October 9, 2014. 

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