Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02539/USCOURTS-ca8-09-02539-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Sakrekov
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Western District of Arkansas. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-2539

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Western District of Arkansas.

John Sakrekov, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: March 31, 2010

Filed: April 29, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, COLLOTON, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

 In 2009, John Sakrekov conditionally pleaded guilty to being a felon in

possession of a firearm, and was sentenced to 37 months in prison. In this direct

criminal appeal, he challenges the district court’s1

 denial of his motion to suppress

evidence from an October 2007 search of his residence. On appeal, Sakrekov’s

counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), in which she argues that a pre-warrant sweep of Sakrekov’s

residence violated the Fourth Amendment; that a pre-warrant statement made by

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Sakrekov was involuntary because it was triggered by the illegal sweep, and because

Sakrekov was under the influence of methamphetamine; and that without the

statement and the items observed during the sweep, the affidavit submitted in support

of the search warrant for Sakrekov’s residence did not contain sufficient probable

cause. In a pro se supplemental brief, Sakrekov asserts that the search warrant should

not have been issued, and that his trial counsel should have presented certain

information at the hearing on the motion to suppress.

We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings underlying the

denial of the motion to suppress, and de novo the court’s legal conclusion that the

Fourth Amendment was not violated. See United States v. Bell, 480 F.3d 860, 863

(8th Cir. 2007). As to the protective sweep, we review for plain error the district

court’s determination that a sweep was permissible, because Sakrekov did not raise

that issue in his motion to suppress, and he conceded it at the motion hearing. See

United States v. Cardenas-Celestino, 510 F.3d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 2008) (this court has

not decided whether failure to raise suppression matter in timely pretrial motion

precludes plain error review; assuming without deciding that plain error review is

available). Based on the evidence presented at the motion hearing, we conclude that

the district court did not plainly err in determining that a protective sweep was

authorized in order to prevent the destruction of evidence pending the application for

the search warrant. Cf. United States v. Jansen, 470 F.3d 762, 764-65 (8th Cir. 2006)

(police officers are able to conduct protective sweep search pending application for

search warrant where there is risk that evidence will be destroyed; pre-warrant search

did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights where officer observed

marijuana pipe and “marijuana stem” in plain view, and concluded that he needed to

secure trailer before leaving to get warrant to make sure no one else was present and

to prevent destruction of drug evidence); see also Cardenas-Celestino, 510 F.3d at 833

(plain error must be one that is clear and obvious). Further, we conclude that the

scope of the protective sweep was not overly broad. See Jansen, 470 F.3d at 765

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(quick search limited to areas in which person could be hiding did not violate

defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights).

We also review for plain error Sakrekov’s claim that his statement was

involuntary because he was under the influence of methamphetamine, see CardenasCelestino, 510 F.3d at 833, and we conclude that the record does not supports that

claim, see United States v. Wright, 706 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)

(custodial statements are not per se involuntary because of intoxication; standard is

whether, by reason of intoxication or other factors, defendant’s will was overborne or

whether his statements were the product of rational intellect and free will). 

Further, because the protective sweep did not violate Sakrekov’s Fourth

Amendment rights, we conclude that there is no merit to his claims that his statement

was tainted, and that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. See

United States v. Terry, 305 F.3d 818, 822-23 (8th Cir. 2002) (this court reviews

determinations of probable cause de novo; describing circumstances where probable

cause exists). 

Finally, to the extent Sakrekov is arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective,

he should raise this argument in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. See United States v.

Cain, 134 F.3d 1345, 1352 (8th Cir. 1998).

Having reviewed the record independently under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issue for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm, and we

grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

______________________________

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