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Parties Involved:
Billy Slaydon
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-30295

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

BILLY SLAYDON,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 2:08-CR-172-1

Before DeMOSS, PRADO, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Billy Slaydon pleaded guilty to one count of production of child

pornography and to one count of possession of child pornography. Slaydon was

sentenced to a 30-year sentence of imprisonment on the production count and to

a consecutive 10-year term of imprisonment on the possession count. The

district court ordered that Slaydon’s federal sentence would run consecutively

to any sentence imposed in state court. 

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

January 11, 2010

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

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No. 09-30295

2

Slaydon raises a number of procedural challenges to his sentencing. In

view of statements made by Victim #1, and evidence presented by Dr. Thomas

Griffin regarding the age of Victim #1 in pornographic images, Slaydon has not

shown that the district court clearly erred in finding that his offense as to Victim

#1 involved a minor who had not attained the age of 12 years. See United States

v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). To the extent that Slaydon

contends that a letter prepared by Dr. Griffin concerning the age of Victim #1

should not have been considered because it was inadmissible and because he had

no opportunity to cross examine Dr. Griffin, Slaydon has not shown error. See

United States v. Ramirez, 271 F.3d 611, 613 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.

Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1999).

Slaydon contends that the application of a two-level enhancement under

U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) and a four-level enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(4)

constituted impermissible double counting. In view of the definitions of “sexual

act” and “sexual contact” applicable under § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A), we disagree with

Slaydon’s assertion that where § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) applies, the enhancement under

§ 2G2.1(b)(4) must also apply. See § 2G2.1, comment (n.2); United States v.

Lyckman, 235 F.3d 234, 240 (5th Cir. 2000). Further, “[d]ouble counting is

prohibited only if the particular guidelines at issue specifically forbid it.” United

States v. Hawkins, 69 F.3d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1995). Slaydon has not pointed to

any guideline provision that forbids application of both a two-level enhancement

under § 2G2.1(b)(2)(A) and a four-level enhancement under § 2G2.1(b)(4).

It was not error for the district court to consider conduct charged in a

count that was dismissed in determining Slaydon’s offense level. See United

States v. Wall, 180 F.3d 641, 643-45 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Vital, 68

F.3d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 1995). We likewise find no error in the district court’s

application of the grouping rules of the Sentencing Guidelines. See § 2G2.1,

comment (n.5) (stating that “multiple counts involving the exploitation of

different minors are not to be grouped together under § 3D1.2 (Groups of Closely

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No. 09-30295

3

Related Counts).”). It was not error for the district court to add two levels to the

higher offense level applicable to Victim #1 to arrive at a combined offense level

of 46. See § 3D1.4(a). Nor did the district court err in ordering that the 10-year

sentence on the possession count would run consecutively to the 30-year

sentence on the production count. See § 5G1.2(d).

Slaydon’s challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence is unavailing. 

The district court stated explicitly that it had taken into account the Sentencing

Guidelines and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 in determining Slaydon’s

sentence. The district court also considered the fact that Slaydon was abused as

a child, but it determined that his history of being a victim of abuse was

overwhelmed by the crimes Slaydon had committed. The district court

adequately explained its reasons for the sentence imposed on Slaydon. See

United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005). The sentence of

imprisonment imposed by the district court was within the advisory guideline

range and thus enjoys a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness, which

Slaydon has failed to overcome. See United States v. Alonzo, 435 F.3d 551, 554

(5th Cir. 2006).

Finally, Slaydon argues that the district court erred in ordering his federal

sentence of imprisonment to run consecutively to any sentence he might receive

in state court. Slaydon’s argument is foreclosed by United States v. Brown, 920

F.2d 1212, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds, United States

v. Candia, 454 F.3d 468, 472-73 (5th Cir. 2006). In Brown, this court held that

a district court may order a federal sentence to run consecutively to a state

sentence that has not yet been imposed. Brown, 920 F.2d at 1217. Brown is the

law of this circuit and one panel of this court may not overrule the decision of a

prior panel in the absence of en banc consideration or a superseding Supreme

Court decision. See United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 n.34 (5th Cir.

2002). 

AFFIRMED.

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