Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01495/USCOURTS-ca7-24-01495-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Braun Thompson
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 20, 2024*

Decided December 4, 2024 

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge

JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge

No. 24-1495 

BRAUN THOMPSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 22-cv-59-NJR

Nancy J. Rosenstengel, 

Chief Judge. 

O R D E R

Braun Thompson, a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution at Marion, 

Illinois, sued the United States under the Federal Torts Claim Act, alleging that an 

employee of the Bureau of Prisons assaulted him. The district court entered summary 

* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and 

record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not 

significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1

Case: 24-1495 Document: 14 Filed: 12/04/2024 Pages: 4
No. 24-1495 Page 2 

judgment against Thompson because the undisputed evidence showed that he did not 

exhaust administrative remedies before suing. 

This suit arises out of an incident in January 2021. We describe the complaint’s 

allegations without endorsing their accuracy. Thompson approached the secure 

housing unit at Marion and asked to stay there to avoid exposure to COVID-19, but a 

guard told Thompson to return to his cell. As Thompson turned to walk away, he said 

that he was going to sue the guard. In response, the guard “charged” at him and “forcemarch[ed]” him to his cell. Because Thompson was moved without his crutch, the 

march caused him serious pain and exacerbated his medical condition. 

Thompson asserts that he wrote to the Department of Justice about these events. 

First, in January 2021, he emailed a hotline set up by the Department’s Office of the 

Inspector General. In March and May, he mailed complaints to the Attorney General. A 

few months later, in January 2022, he filed this suit. Only afterward, in September 2022, 

did Thompson mail a letter to the Bureau of Prisons demanding damages and other 

relief. He also mailed a copy of that letter to the Attorney General. 

Thompson invokes the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671–80 (the 

“Act”). The government moved for summary judgment on the ground that Thompson 

did not submit notice of a tort claim to the Bureau before he sued and thus did not

exhaust his administrative remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2675. It submitted 

declarations stating that neither the Department nor the Bureau had received an 

administrative complaint from Thompson. It also furnished postal tracking data 

showing that Thompson’s letters from March and May 2021 were never delivered and 

that Thompson did not properly address his post-suit letter to the Bureau. 

Thompson contended that the court should excuse his failure to complain to the 

Bureau because Marion barred his access to legal books, and the prisoner’s handbook 

was useless; thus, he could not learn what he needed to do. He acknowledged that the 

prison allows him access to computer-based legal research, but he asserted that he does 

not know how to use computers. He also argued that his mailings to the Department of 

Justice sufficed to put the government on notice of his claim. 

The district court ruled that Thompson had not exhausted his administrative

remedies in the manner required by § 2675 before he sued. It added that, although

unavailability of administrative remedies may excuse a failure to exhaust claims subject 

to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 642–44 

(2016), the exception does not apply to claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The 

Case: 24-1495 Document: 14 Filed: 12/04/2024 Pages: 4
No. 24-1495 Page 3 

court dismissed Thompson’s claim without prejudice. We treat its dismissal as final

because amendment could not cure the problem. Cf. Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1319 

(7th Cir. 2022) (addressing exhaustion under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e). 

On appeal, Thompson contends alternatively that he made sufficient efforts to 

exhaust his claim and that he is excused from exhausting because remedies were not 

“available.” As to the first argument, Thompson’s efforts did not properly exhaust his 

administrative remedies, and so the district court appropriately granted the 

government’s motion for summary judgment. Under the Act, “[a]n action shall not be 

instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages ... unless the 

claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his 

claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see 

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 111–13 (1993). The plaintiff must exhaust before 

filing suit, and, if he does not, the court must dismiss the case. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. 

Federal regulations spell out the steps a potential plaintiff must take before filing suit. 

28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a); see Chronis v. United States, 932 F.3d 544, 546–47 (7th Cir. 2019). 

Thompson did not follow the required procedures before “invocation of the 

judicial process,”: i.e., filing suit. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113. Before suing he needed to file a 

notice of claim with the Bureau of Prisons’ regional office. 28 C.F.R. §§ 14.2(b)(1), 543.31. 

But he communicated with the Bureau in September 2022, only after he sued the 

government. The only communications that preceded Thompson’s suit were his email 

to the Department of Justice’s hotline and his letters to the Attorney General. These 

efforts had no effect in terms of his exhaustion obligation. (Not only were they 

misdirected, but they did not contain the required information. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a); 

Chronis, 932 F.3d at 547 (7th Cir. 2019).) Therefore, dismissal of the tort claim was 

mandatory. 

McNeil teaches that Thompson’s status as a prisoner without a lawyer does not 

relax the statutory exhaustion requirement. This effectively precludes his argument that 

he was prevented from exhausting because he lacked access to legal books and did not 

know how to use computer-based research. The Act says nothing about “availability” of 

remedies, but even if there were some equitable exception to its exhaustion 

requirement—something we do not decide—Thompson does little more than describe 

the hardship of litigating pro se, and the Supreme Court has told us that this does not 

excuse non-exhaustion. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112–13. Nor does Thompson make a strong 

case that the government thwarted his ability to exhaust. He concedes that Marion 

provides prisoners with computers that can access the legal authorities that explain the 

Case: 24-1495 Document: 14 Filed: 12/04/2024 Pages: 4
No. 24-1495 Page 4 

exhaustion process, and, as this case progressed, he demonstrated his ability to make 

use of the available resources. He just fell short of doing so before filing his complaint.

Thompson presents several arguments about discovery and other procedural 

matters, but none is relevant given our conclusion that he filed suit too soon. Thompson 

also raises contentions that he did not present to the district court. He seeks a 

declaration that the Bureau violated what he calls his right to a print law library, and an 

injunction requiring the prison to establish a print library and provide him with 

counsel. These standalone claims were not before the district court; therefore, we will

not consider them. See Homoky v. Ogden, 816 F.3d 448, 454–55 (7th Cir. 2016). 

AFFIRMED

Case: 24-1495 Document: 14 Filed: 12/04/2024 Pages: 4