Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01377/USCOURTS-ca13-23-01377-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Denis McDonough
Appellee
Deborah Rodenhizer
Appellant
Thomas Rodenhizer
Not party

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________

THOMAS RODENHIZER,

Claimant

DEBORAH RODENHIZER,

Movant-Appellant

v.

DENIS MCDONOUGH, SECRETARY OF 

VETERANS AFFAIRS,

Respondent-Appellee

______________________

2023-1377

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims in No. 19-4740, Judge Joseph L. Falvey, 

Jr.

______________________

Decided: December 30, 2024

______________________

KENNETH M. CARPENTER, Carpenter Chartered, Topeka, KS, argued for movant-appellant. Also represented by 

KENNETH DOJAQUEZ.

 BRENDAN DAVID JORDAN, Commercial Litigation 

Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of 

Justice, Washington, DC, argued for respondent-appellee. 

Also represented by BRIAN M. BOYNTON, ELIZABETH MARIE 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 1 Filed: 12/30/2024
2 RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH

HOSFORD, PATRICIA M. MCCARTHY; Y. KEN LEE, SAMANTHA 

ANN SYVERSON, Office of General Counsel, United States 

Department of Veterans Affairs, Washington, DC.

 ______________________

Before DYK, TARANTO, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.

DYK, Circuit Judge.

Thomas Rodenhizer, a United States Army veteran, 

sought an earlier effective date for veteran benefits. The 

Board of Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”) denied an earlier 

effective date. Mr. Rodenhizer appealed to the United 

States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans 

Court”). Mr. Rodenhizer died while his appeal was pending. Mr. Rodenhizer’s mother, Deborah Rodenhizer, 

moved to be substituted in her son’s place. The Veterans 

Court denied the motion to substitute, vacated the 

Board’s decision, and dismissed Mr. Rodenhizer’s appeal, 

concluding that Ms. Rodenhizer had not established her 

right to the benefits. We vacate and remand with instructions to hold the appeal and motion to substitute in abeyance pending the outcome of proceedings before the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) to determine 

Ms. Rodenhizer’s eligibility. 

BACKGROUND

This case raises the question of the procedures to be 

followed when a veteran dies while his or her case is 

pending in the Veterans Court and a successor seeks to 

claim accrued benefits. In March 2019, the Board awarded Mr. Rodenhizer an effective date of June 8, 2016, for a 

total disability rating based on individual unemployability. Mr. Rodenhizer appealed the Board’s decision to the 

Veterans Court, arguing that he was entitled to an earlier 

effective date. Mr. Rodenhizer died in September 2020

while the appeal was pending before the Veterans Court.

As discussed in detail below, substitution for a deceased party in the Veterans Court is governed by the 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 2 Filed: 12/30/2024
RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH 3

Veterans Court’s Rules of Practice and Procedure Rule 43. 

Eligibility to claim accrued benefits upon a veteran’s 

death is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 5121. The Veterans 

Court ordered Mr. Rodenhizer’s counsel to show cause 

why the Board’s effective date decision should not be 

vacated, and Mr. Rodenhizer’s appeal dismissed, because 

Mr. Rodenhizer had died. Mr. Rodenhizer’s counsel 

explained that Ms. Rodenhizer, Mr. Rodenhizer’s mother, 

had sought to be substituted in Mr. Rodenhizer’s place by 

filing a completed VA Form 21P-0847, entitled “Request 

for Substitution of Claimant Upon Death of Claimant,” 

with the VA. 

In May 2021, the Veterans Court ordered that 

Ms. Rodenhizer file a formal substitution motion with the 

Veterans Court. The Veterans Court also ordered the 

Secretary of Veterans Affairs to:

file a response (1) informing the [Veterans] Court 

as to the current status of [Ms. Rodenhizer’s] formal or informal claim for accrued benefits, including any VA determination as to whether she is a 

person who would be eligible to receive accrued 

benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a), and any disposition of the claim; and . . . (2) advising the [Veterans] Court as to . . . whether there is any reason 

to believe that [she] fails to qualify . . . [to] be eligible to receive accrued benefits. 

J.A. 9. 

In response to the Veterans Court’s order, in June

2021, Ms. Rodenhizer filed in the Veterans Court a motion to substitute herself as the appellant in her son’s 

pending appeal pursuant to Rule 43 of the Veterans Court 

Rules of Practice and Procedure. Ms. Rodenhizer argued

that she was “an appropriate person to be substituted as 

appellant under [Veterans Court] Rule 43(b) as the individual who . . . bore the costs of the funeral expenses of 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 3 Filed: 12/30/2024
4 RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH

Thomas Rodenhizer . . . under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(6).” 

J.A. 31. 

In response to the Veterans Court’s order, the Secretary informed the Veterans Court that the VA had not 

received an application for accrued benefits from 

Ms. Rodenhizer as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5121(c) and 

that, as a result, it had made no determination about her

eligibility as an accrued-benefits claimant. 

The Veterans Court denied Ms. Rodenhizer’s motion 

to substitute, vacated the Board’s March 2019 decision,

and dismissed the appeal. The Veterans Court relied on 

its decision in Breedlove v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 7 (2010)

(per curiam order), in determining that it had “no basis to 

find that [Ms. Rodenhizer] is an eligible accrued-benefits 

claimant, which is a prerequisite for her to be substituted 

before [the Veterans] Court.” J.A. 3. This was so because 

“there is no evidence that Ms. Rodenhizer requested a 

determination of accrued-benefits eligibility from VA 

within one year of the veteran’s death,” as required by 38 

U.S.C. § 5121(c), and “there [is no] evidence that 

VA . . . made a determination about her eligibility to 

receive accrued benefits.”1 Id. The court noted that it 

“cannot make the factual determination of a person’s 

accrued-benefits eligibility” in the first instance. Id.

(citing Breedlove, 24 Vet. App. at 20–21). The Veterans 

1 In a parallel proceeding that is now pending before the Veterans Court, the Board acknowledged that 

“[Ms. Rodenhizer] filed her claim within one year of 

[Mr. Rodenhizer’s] death in September 2020,” as required 

by the statute, though the Board found she was not 

eligible to be considered a substitute party on other 

grounds. Copy of BVA Decision at 3, Rodenhizer v. 

McDonough, No. 24-7589 (Vet. App. Nov. 18, 2024). 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 4 Filed: 12/30/2024
RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH 5

Court explained that it was “vacating the Board’s adverse 

decision on [Ms. Rodenhizer’s] son’s claim, which in turn 

would allow her to pursue accrued benefits before VA 

should the Board deem her eligible to do so.” Id. 

Ms. Rodenhizer timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a). 

DISCUSSION

Our jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans 

Court is limited to reviewing legal questions, including 

“the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). We review legal 

determinations de novo. Hanser v. McDonough, 56 F.4th 

967, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2022). “We may not, however, review 

(1) ‘a challenge to a factual determination’ or (2) ‘a challenge to a law or regulation as applied to the facts of a 

particular case,’ unless the challenge presents a constitutional issue.” Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2)). 

I 

We begin with an overview of the relevant statutes as 

they pertain to the merits of the case. Section 5121A of 

Title 38 of the U.S. Code permits “a living person . . . eligible to receive accrued benefits due to [a] 

claimant under [38 U.S.C. §] 5121(a)” to request to be 

substituted as the claimant if the claimant dies while his 

or her claim for benefits is pending before the VA. 38 

U.S.C. § 5121A(a)(1). Section 5121A only applies to cases 

pending before the VA. See Merritt v. Wilkie, 965 F.3d 

1357, 1360 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (noting that “38 U.S.C. 

§ 5121A . . . provides for substitution in VA proceedings”); 

Smith through Hicks v. McDonough, 112 F.4th 1357, 1361 

(Fed. Cir. 2024) (“[W]e have acknowledged that § 5121A 

governs proceedings at the VA level.”). At the time of 

Mr. Rodenhizer’s death, his case was pending before the 

Veterans Court, not the VA, so § 5121A was inapplicable. 

At the same time, we agree with the Veterans Court, see

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 5 Filed: 12/30/2024
6 RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH

Breedlove, 24 Vet. App. at 18–21, that the policies animating § 5121A should guide us in determining issues of 

substitution in this related context. 

When a veteran dies while his or her case is pending 

before the Veterans Court, substitution is governed by 

Veterans Court Rule 43. That rule provides that in such 

a situation, “the personal representative of the deceased 

party’s estate or any other appropriate person may, to the 

extent permitted by law, be substituted as a party on 

motion by such person.” U.S. VET. APP. R. 43(a)(2). There 

is no dispute that Mr. Rodenhizer died while his appeal 

was pending before the Veterans Court and that 

Ms. Rodenhizer filed a motion to be substituted for 

Mr. Rodenhizer on appeal. There is, however, a question 

as to whether Ms. Rodenhizer is an “appropriate person” 

that is eligible to be substituted under Rule 43(a)(2). A

person may be an “appropriate person”—i.e., eligible—to 

be substituted only if two statutory conditions are satisfied. 

First, the successor “must . . . file[] [an application for 

accrued benefits] within one year after the date of death 

[of the veteran beneficiary].” 38 U.S.C. § 5121(c).2 

Second, a successor seeking accrued benefits must fall 

within the list of eligible individuals under § 5121(a) and 

establish he or she is entitled to priority among those 

individuals. Section 5121(a) enumerates the categories of 

persons who are able to recover “accrued benefits” that 

were “due and unpaid” at the time of a veteran’s death. 

2 In general, “a specific claim in the form prescribed 

by the Secretary [of the VA] . . . must be filed in order for 

benefits to be paid or furnished to any individual under 

the laws administered by the Secretary.” Id.

§ 5101(a)(1)(A). 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 6 Filed: 12/30/2024
RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH 7

The statute then delineates the order of preference in 

paying out such benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(1)–(6). 

As relevant to this appeal, § 5121(a)(6) allows qualified 

persons to recover accrued benefits to the extent “necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of last 

sickness and burial.” 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(6). 

The determination of eligibility is not made in the 

first instance by the Veterans Court unless eligibility 

presents only a legal question, see Smith, 112 F.4th at 

1361, or eligibility is conceded by the Secretary, Breedlove, 24 Vet. App. at 20–21.3 If eligibility presents fact 

issues, “[t]he Court must first obtain from the Secretary a 

determination as to whether a particular movant is an 

eligible accrued-benefits claimant.” Breedlove, 24 Vet. 

App. at 20–21; see Smith, 112 F.4th at 1361–62; Merritt, 

965 F.3d at 1360–61. This is so because the Veterans 

Court lacks jurisdiction to find facts de novo. See Tadlock 

v. McDonough, 5 F.4th 1327, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir. 2021) 

(explaining that “Congress expressly limited the Veterans 

3 We have acknowledged that the Veterans Court 

can decide whether substitution is appropriate without an 

eligibility determination from the VA when a would-be 

substitute is ineligible as a matter of law and that determination does not present any undecided factual issues. 

See Smith, 112 F.4th at 1361 (explaining that under 

Breedlove, “the Veterans Court may evaluate whether 

substitution is appropriate in the first instance when the 

issue presents purely legal questions.” (citing Gabrielli v. 

McDonough, No. 2022-1505, 2024 WL 2968937, at *2 & 

n.3 (Fed. Cir. June 13, 2024) (nonprecedential)); Breedlove, 24 Vet. App. at 13. So, too, if eligibility is “conceded 

by the Secretary on appeal,” no fact finding is required. 

Breedlove, 24 Vet. App. at 20–21.

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 7 Filed: 12/30/2024
8 RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH

Court’s jurisdiction to exclude de novo fact-finding” (citing 

38 U.S.C.§ 7261(c)); see also Smith, 112 F.4th at 1362. 

II

Thus, in order to establish her right to be substituted

(her eligibility), Ms. Rodenhizer was required to establish

that she filed the required application within one year of 

Mr. Rodenhizer’s death pursuant to § 5121(c) and that she 

was an eligible accrued-benefits claimant under § 5121(a). 

A

As to the first question, the issue is whether 

Ms. Rodenhizer’s filing of VA Form 21P-0847 is such a 

filing. The Veterans Court expressly reserved this question, see J.A. 3, and it appears to be at issue in the parallel proceeding.4 

As to the second question, Ms. Rodenhizer endeavors 

to establish her entitlement to Mr. Rodenhizer’s claim by

showing she is “the person who bore the expense of 

[Mr. Rodenhizer’s] last sickness and burial.” 38 U.S.C. 

4 The government admits that “at the time Ms. Rodenhizer filed her VA Form 21P-0847 (Request for Substitution of Claimant Upon Death of Claimant) with [the]

VA, the Veterans Benefits Administration Adjudication 

Procedures Manual . . . included [that form] in a list of 

applications upon which a claim for accrued benefits may 

be filed.” Respondent-Appellee’s Br. at 9 n.2 (first citing 

J.A. 1, 61; and then citing J.A. 62). It appears that the 

Board in the parallel proceeding has already concluded 

that Ms. Rodenhizer’s filing constituted a timely filing of 

such a claim. The Board stated, “[Ms. Rodenhizer] filed 

her claim within one year of [Mr. Rodenhizer’s] death in 

September 2020.” Copy of BVA Decision at 3, Rodenhizer 

v. McDonough, No. 24-7589 (Vet. App. Nov. 18, 2024). 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 8 Filed: 12/30/2024
RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH 9

§ 5121(a)(6); J.A. 31.5 She must also establish she is 

entitled to priority among potential claimants. See 38 

U.S.C. § 5121(a)(1)–(6). These are not legal questions, nor 

is this a situation in which the Secretary has conceded 

eligibility. Thus, whether Ms. Rodenhizer is an eligible 

claimant is a fact question the Veterans Court was without jurisdiction to decide in the first instance, and it must 

be resolved in the pending VA proceeding. 

B

At oral argument, Ms. Rodenhizer’s counsel appeared

to agree that there is a factual question as to her eligibility as an accrued-benefits claimant, but Ms. Rodenhizer

contends that the Veterans Court erred in denying the 

motion to substitute and dismissing Mr. Rodenhizer’s case 

before a final decision was made in the parallel VA proceeding relating to her eligibility as an accrued-benefits 

claimant. She had earlier sought such a stay in the 

Veterans Court. See J.A. 58–59. We agree that the 

Veterans Court erred. 

Two considerations support Ms. Rodenhizer’s view. 

First, under the Veterans Court decision in this case, if 

5 In the parallel proceeding, the Board found that 

Ms. Rodenhizer “has not alleged or submitted evidence 

that she was the dependent parent of [Mr. Rodenhizer]

eligible for substitution under 38 U.S.C. § 5121(a)(2)(C).” 

Copy of BVA Decision at 3, Rodenhizer v. McDonough, No. 

24-7589 (Vet. App. Nov. 18, 2024). In the present case, 

however, Ms. Rodenhizer clarified to the Veterans Court 

that she sought substitution as the “person who bore the 

expense of last sickness and burial” under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 5121(a)(6), not as Mr. Rodenhizer’s dependent parent 

under § 5121(a)(2)(C). See J.A. 44. 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 9 Filed: 12/30/2024
10 RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH

Ms. Rodenhizer receives in her parallel action a final 

determination that she is an eligible accrued-benefits 

claimant, because of the refusal to allow substitution in 

the Veterans Court, she would have to restart merits

proceedings relating to the accrued benefits due to her son

rather than continuing in his place.6 But Mr. Rodenhizer 

already invested time in pursuing those benefits. Requiring Ms. Rodenhizer to start over would be contrary to the 

principles of expediency, fairness, and efficiency served by 

this statutory scheme as recognized in connection with 

the related procedures of § 5121A. See Reeves v. Shinseki, 

682 F.3d 988, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (explaining that after 

the enactment of § 5121A, “there is no continuing justification for refusing to allow an appropriate accruedbenefits claimant to be substituted for a veteran who dies 

while his appeal is pending before this court”); cf. H.R.

REP. NO. 110–789, at 17 (2008) (Committee on Veterans’ 

Affairs report on bill leading to § 5121A explaining that 

“[a]llowing substitution [in VA proceedings] prevents 

unnecessary reworking of the same claim . . . and saves 

families from facing unnecessary administrative hurdles.”). There is no prejudice to the VA in staying the 

parallel proceeding in the Veterans Court pending the 

eligibility determination. Quite the contrary, the VA’s 

interests are served by determining eligibility in the 

current case, rather than in a new proceeding. 

Second, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 

43, similar to Veterans Court Rule 43, courts have approved the stay of proceedings pending a determination as 

to who is the “personal representative” of a deceased 

party. See Ward v. Edgeton, 59 F.3d 652, 653 (7th Cir. 

1995) (concluding state’s motion to dismiss decedent’s 

6 It is not clear on the record before us exactly what 

starting over in the merits proceedings would entail. 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 10 Filed: 12/30/2024
RODENHIZER v. MCDONOUGH 11

appeal was premature where decedent’s representatives 

were undetermined and had yet to file a motion to substitute); Mallick v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 814 F.2d 674, 

675–76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (delaying the briefing schedule in 

appeal where parties moved for substitution in district 

court). We think a similar approach is required at the 

Veterans Court. Here, the Veterans Court should have 

paused the proceedings in Mr. Rodenhizer’s appeal awaiting the result of the parallel eligibility proceeding. 

In sum, we hold that when there is a fact question as 

to eligibility, the Veterans Court should stay action on a 

motion to substitute in the original claimant’s case and 

stay the determination of whether the case should be 

dismissed pending a final determination on eligibility in 

the VA proceeding.7 The continuation of such a stay may 

be appropriately conditioned on the claimant’s prompt 

action in the parallel proceeding to obtain a determination on eligibility. 

CONCLUSION

We vacate the Veterans Court’s judgment and remand 

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

VACATED AND REMANDED

COSTS

Costs to movant-appellant. 

7 Similar procedures shall govern under Federal 

Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(a) if the claimant dies 

while the case is pending in our court. 

Case: 23-1377 Document: 49 Page: 11 Filed: 12/30/2024