Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01567/USCOURTS-ca13-16-01567-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Veterans Affairs
Respondent
Tomeka D. Lasure
Petitioner
Merit Systems Protection Board
Respondent

Document Text:

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

TOMEKA D. LASURE,

Petitioner

v.

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,

Respondent

______________________ 

2016-1567

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. CB-7121-15-0034-V-1. 

______________________ 

Decided: August 15, 2016

______________________ 

TOMEKA D. LASURE, Walla Walla, WA, pro se.

KATHERINE MICHELLE SMITH, Office of the General 

Counsel, Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, 

DC, for respondent. Also represented by BRYAN G.

POLISUK. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, CLEVENGER, and O’MALLEY, Circuit 

Judges.

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2 LASURE V. MSPB

PER CURIAM. 

Tomeka D. Lasure was a Pharmacy Technician for the 

Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) in Walla Walla, 

Washington. On October 31, 2014, Ms. Lasure was removed from service on charges of AWOL, failure to comply with instructions, and conduct unbecoming an agency 

employee. Ms. Lasure ultimately challenged her removal 

in an arbitration proceeding, contending that the VA’s 

removal was retaliation for protected union activity in 

violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). The arbitrator confirmed the VA’s decision. Ms. Lasure subsequently appealed the arbitrator’s decision to the Merit Systems 

Protection Board (“MSPB” or “the Board”). However, the 

Board dismissed her appeal without reaching the merits, 

finding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the arbitrator’s decision. See Lasure v. Department of Veterans 

Affairs, Docket No. CB-7121-15-0034-V-1 (Dec. 31, 2015). 

Ms. Lasure timely petitioned this court for review of the 

Board’s final decision. For the reasons stated below, we 

affirm. 

BACKGROUND

In January of 2014, Ms. Lasure became a Pharmacist 

Technician at a VA facility in Walla Walla, Washington, 

having transferred from a similar position in Cincinnati. 

A few months after taking the position in Walla Walla, 

Ms. Lasure also became president of the local chapter of 

her union, the Local 181. Beginning shortly thereafter, in 

April of 2014, Ms. Lasure and the management of the 

Walla Walla VA facility became embroiled in a series of 

escalating disputes over Ms. Lasure’s division of her time 

between her duties as a Pharmacist Technician and her 

duties as the Local 181 president. These disputes appear 

from the record to have eventually generated a great deal 

of personal animosity between Ms. Lasure and management, and resulted in escalating disciplinary actions 

against Ms. Lasure. The culmination of these events was 

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LASURE V. MSPB 3

Ms. Lasure’s removal from service on October 31, 2014, on 

charges of being away without leave (“AWOL”), failure to 

comply with instructions, and conduct unbecoming a VA 

employee. 

Ms. Lasure ultimately invoked the arbitration clause 

of the applicable collective bargaining agreement to 

appeal her removal. In front of the arbitrator, Ms. Lasure

argued that the VA had failed to prove any of the charges, 

and moreover argued that the disciplinary actions against 

her were motivated by “union animus,” i.e. were retaliation for her protected union activities in violation of 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). The arbitrator, however, upheld each 

of the charges as supported by sufficient evidence and 

further found no evidence that any of management’s 

actions were motivated by “union animus.”

Ms. Lasure timely filed an appeal of the arbitrator’s 

decision to the Board. As she had in front of the arbitrator, Ms. Lasure asserted to the Board that the VA had 

failed to proffer sufficient evidence to support the charges, 

and that the disciplinary actions taken against her were 

motivated by “union animus” in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 

2302(b)(9). However, the Board found that it lacked 

jurisdiction over Ms. Lasure’s claims. The Board held 

that it was permitted to review arbitration decisions 

where (in relevant part) there was a claim for discrimination in violation 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1). Because Ms. 

Lasure’s claims arose under § 2302(b)(9), the Board 

dismissed her appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Ms. Lasure timely appealed the Board’s dismissal for 

lack of jurisdiction to this court. We have jurisdiction 

over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9); see 

also Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 713 F.3d 1111, 1117 

(Fed. Cir. 2013) (holding that an appeal from the Board's 

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction properly belongs in this 

court). 

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4 LASURE V. MSPB

DISCUSSION

The scope of our review in an appeal from a Board decision is limited. We can only set aside the Board’s decision if it was “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 

discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 

obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or 

regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by 

substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); see Briggs v. 

Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 331 F.3d 1307, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

Whether the Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate a particular appeal is a question of law, which we review 

without deference. Kelley v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 241 F.3d 

1368, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). We are, however, bound by 

the Board's factual findings on which a jurisdictional 

determination is based unless those findings are not 

supported by substantial evidence. See Bolton v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

With respect to the Board’s jurisdiction to hear Ms. 

Lasure’s case, we understand Ms. Lasure to argue that in 

certain circumstances a claim for reprisal for filing a 

discrimination complaint can be recognized under 5 

U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) or 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9). See Informal 

Brief of Petitioner Continuation Pages at 2 (citing to 

Williams v. Social Security Administration, 101 M.S.P.R. 

587, ¶8 (2006)). We also understand Ms. Lasure to argue 

that such a situation applies here, where she alleges 

retaliation against her for filing various Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) claims pursuant to her duties 

as union president. Id. For the reasons explained below, 

we are not persuaded by Ms. Lasure’s argument and 

agree with the Board that they lacked jurisdiction to hear 

Mr. Lasure’s claim.

The Board’s jurisdiction is not plenary, but is limited 

to those matters over which it has been granted jurisdiction by law, rule or regulation. Johnston v. Merit Sys. 

Prot. Bd., 518 F.3d 905, 909 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, 5 

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LASURE V. MSPB 5

U.S.C. § 7121(d) states that “[a]n aggrieved employee 

affected by a prohibited personnel practice under section 

2302(b)(1) of this title which also falls under the coverage 

of the negotiated grievance procedure may raise the 

matter under a statutory procedure or the negotiated 

procedure, but not both.” The Board’s regulations interpreting this provision similarly cabin the Board’s jurisdiction over arbitration proceedings to review of claims for 

discrimination raised under § 2302(b)(1). See 5 C.F.R. § 

1201.155(a)(1) & (c). 

In practice then, the Board exercises jurisdiction over 

an arbitration decision only when (1) the subject matter of 

the grievance is one over which the Board has jurisdiction; (2) the appellant either (i) raised a claim of discrimination under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) with the arbitrator in 

connection with the underlying action, or (ii) raises a 

claim of discrimination in connection with the underlying 

action under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) for the first time with 

the Board if such allegations could not be raised in the 

negotiated grievance procedure; and (3) a final decision 

has been issued. See Jones v. Dep't of Energy, No. CB7121-13-0111-V-1, 2013 WL 6858180 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 31, 

2013), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 589 F. 

App'x 972 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The MSPB does not dispute 

that Ms. Lasure’s case met the first and third requirements. See Respondent’s Informal Brief at 6 n. 2. Thus, 

the only relevant question here is whether Ms. Lasure 

raised a 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) claim in front of the arbitrator or the Board.1

 

1 Because the collective bargaining agreement is 

not in the record, it is unclear whether Ms. Lasure would 

have been allowed to raise a 2302(b)(1) claim to the arbitrator. However, as we explain below, Ms. Lasure did not 

raise such a claim at either level, making the question of 

her ability to raise it to the arbitrator moot.

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6 LASURE V. MSPB

Under § 2303(b)(1), discrimination is prohibited on 

the basis of criteria in five enumerated subsections: (A) 

“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, as prohibited 

by [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16)],” (B) “age, as prohibited under

[29 U.S.C. §§ 631, 633a],” (C) “sex, as prohibited under [29 

U.S.C. § 206(d)],” (D) “handicapping condition, as prohibited under [29 U.S.C. § 791],” or (E) “marital status or 

political affiliation as prohibited under any law, rule, or 

regulation.” The Board determined that Ms. Lasure’s 

claim (in front of the Board and the arbitrator) did not 

allege any retaliation based on the criteria in § 2303(b)(1). 

Having thoroughly reviewed Ms. Lasure’s posthearing brief to the arbitrator (see Supplemental Appendix at 33-89), her request to the Board for review of the 

arbitrator’s decision (see id. at 90-134) and her Supplemental Response to the Board (see id. at 135-149), we 

agree with the Board. Ms. Lasure does not allege that the 

VA retaliated against her based on any of the categories 

of discrimination prohibited by § 2303(b)(1). On the 

record in front of us, we can find only generalized allegations of bias and harassment; nowhere did Ms. Lasure 

specifically claim that the VA discriminated against her 

on the basis of any protected category listed in § 

2303(b)(1). Nor did Ms. Lasure claim (or allege facts to 

support a claim) that the alleged retaliation for filing 

EEO grievances was motivated by any discrimination 

prohibited by any criteria listed in § 2303(b)(1). In other 

words, Ms. Lasure does not claim that she was retaliated 

against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national 

origin, age, handicapping condition, marital status or 

political affiliation, nor does she claim that any alleged 

retaliation for filing EEO grievances was motivated by 

animus towards one of those categories (either directed 

towards her or someone she was representing as part of 

her union duties). 

Instead, the Board found that Ms. Lasure alleged that 

the discrimination against her was motivated by “union 

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LASURE V. MSPB 7

animus,” i.e. that “the agency discriminated against her 

because of her participation in union activity” in violation 

of § 2302(b)(9). See Supplemental Appendix at 2. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 2302(b)(9) protects an employee from retaliation for 

exercising appeal, complaint, or grievance rights.2 As a 

general matter, the Board does not have jurisdiction over 

“unfair labor practice allegation[s] based on anti-union 

animus.” Bodinus v. Dep't of Treasury, 7 M.S.P.R. 536, 

542 (1981). However, “[p]erforming union-related duties, 

such as filing grievances and representing other employees in the grievance process, are protected activities under 

section 2302(b)(9).” See Alarid v. Dep't of Army, No. SF0752-14-0256-I-1, 2015 WL 4979637, ¶ 10 (M.S.P.B. Aug. 

21, 2015). We agree with the Board that, at best, Ms. 

Lasure’s claims fall under 2302(b)(9) to the extent she 

claims that the VA retaliated against her for filing grievances (for herself or on behalf of others) as part of her 

union duties. 

For example, in her post-hearing brief to the arbitrator Ms. Lasure explained at length how her union activi-

 

2 The text of the statute states that covered employees shall not “(9) take or fail to take, or threaten to 

take or fail to take, any personnel action against any 

employee or applicant for employment because of (A) the 

exercise of any appeal, complaint, or grievance right 

granted by any law, rule, or regulation (i) with regard to 

remedying a violation of paragraph (8); or (ii) other than 

with regard to remedying a violation of paragraph (8); (B) 

testifying for or otherwise lawfully assisting any individual in the exercise of any right referred to in subparagraph (A)(i) or (ii); (C) cooperating with or disclosing 

information to the Inspector General of an agency, or the 

Special Counsel, in accordance with applicable provisions 

of law; or (D) for refusing to obey an order that would 

require the individual to violate a law.”

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8 LASURE V. MSPB

ties were the reason for the alleged retaliation, including 

filing EEO grievances on behalf of herself and other 

employees. See Supplemental Appendix at 72 (arguing 

that management harassment was retaliation for serving 

grievances on behalf of the union and for alleged AWOL 

time when she was instructing new employees on how to 

join the union); id. at 73-74 (harassment was due to 

serving union grievance on behalf of another employee). 

In explaining what “protected activity” she engaged in, 

Ms. Lasure emphasized her status as the president of the 

Local 181 and her union duties, which included filing 

grievances for union members. See id. at 80. 

Her brief to the Board is no different. The emphasis 

is solely on Ms. Lasure’s claim that the VA was punishing 

her in retaliation for her union activities. See e.g. Supplemental Appendix at 100-123 (under the heading “Department of Veteran Affairs Union Animus Behavior,” 

alleging hostility of management towards the union as 

basis for retaliation). Ms. Lasure made clear to the Board 

that her claim for discriminatory retaliation was entirely 

related to her union activity: “The Agency did not bring 

her up on charges and fire her due to her job performance 

as a Pharmacy Technician; but they did use and threaten 

her Pharmacy Job and Federal Career as a platform to 

execute actions against her and fire her in response to her 

Union Activity.” Id. at 125. Indeed, it is significant that 

the only reference to § 2302(b)(1) in any of her briefs 

below is a recitation in her brief to the Board of the correct legal standard for the Board’s jurisdiction to review 

an arbitrator’s decision (a standard her case failed to 

meet). See id. at 132. Nowhere did Ms. Lasure allege that 

the retaliation was based on any status other than her 

position as a union president.

We therefore uphold the Board’s finding that Ms. 

Lasure did not allege any discriminatory action by VA 

management that is prohibited by § 2302(b)(1), and that 

her claims at best fall under § 2302(b)(9). Because the 

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LASURE V. MSPB 9

Board does not have jurisdiction to review an arbitration 

decision where only § 2302(b)(9) claims are raised, we 

affirm the Board’s dismissal of Ms. Lasure’s case.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No Costs. 

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