Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-13-02602/USCOURTS-ca6-13-02602-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Bureau of Health Care Michigan Department of Corrections
Appellee
Correctional Medical Services, Inc.
Appellee
John Doe

Carolynn DuBuc
Appellee
Andrew Jackson
Appellee
Michigan Department of Corrections
Appellee
George Pramstaller
Appellee
Mark Anthony Reed-Bey
Appellant
Richard D. Russell
Appellee
S. Vadlamudi
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0239n.06

No. 13-2602

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

MARK ANTHONY REED-BEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

GEORGE PRAMSTALLER; S. VADLAMUDI; 

RICHARD D. RUSSELL; BUREAU OF HEALTH 

CARE MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; CAROLYNN DUBUC; 

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS; ANDREW JACKSON; 

CORRECTIONAL MEDICAL SERVICES, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

JOHN DOE, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

 

Before: DAUGHTREY and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges; ECONOMUS, District Judge.*

DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Mark Anthony Reed-Bey, a Michigan state prisoner 

proceeding pro se, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his civil-rights complaint filed 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and moves for oral argument. This case has been referred to a 

panel of the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2)(C), which permits us 

 

*

The Honorable Peter C. Economus, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting 

by designation.

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 1
No. 13-2602

- 2 -

to dispense with oral argument when we conclude that it would not significantly aid the decision. 

Upon examination, we conclude that oral argument is not needed, and we deny Reed-Bey’s 

motion in this regard. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).

On September 12, 2005, Reed-Bey, while in the custody of the Michigan Department of 

Corrections (MDOC), injured his shoulder during a prison basketball game. Reed-Bey was 

examined at Detroit Receiving Hospital that evening by an emergency room physician who 

noted that one of the bones in Reed-Bey’s shoulder was visibly out of place. Upon his return to 

the prison facility, a nurse provided Reed-Bey with a seven-day prescription for Vicodin. 

Almost three months later, on December 1, prison officials finally sent Reed-Bey to an 

orthopedic specialist, who advised Reed-Bey that his shoulder required surgery. Prison officials 

did not approve his shoulder surgery until sometime after March 2006.

In March 2006, Reed-Bey sued the MDOC; Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS); 

the Bureau of Health Care Services (the BHCS); Andrew Jackson, the MCF Warden; George 

Pramstaller, former Chief Medical Officer for the MDOC; Richard Russell, former BHCS 

Administrator; Carolynn DuBuc, the MDOC Region III Health Care Administrator; Nurses 

Justina Nzums and Ruth Ingram; and Doctor Seetha Vadlamudi. Reed-Bey claimed that the 

defendants violated his rights by denying and delaying medical treatment for his shoulder injury. 

The district court sua sponte dismissed the complaint pursuant to the “total exhaustion rule.” We 

vacated the district court’s judgment in light of Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). Reed-Bey v. 

Pramstaller, No. 06-1812 (6th Cir. Apr. 25, 2007).

On remand, defendants CMS, the MDOC, Russell, Pramstaller, the BHCS, and 

Vadlamudi moved for summary judgment. A magistrate judge filed a report recommending that 

the district court grant these defendants’ motions and dismiss the complaint for failure to exhaust 

administrative remedies because Reed-Bey failed to name any of them in his initial grievance. 

Over Reed-Bey’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation 

and dismissed the complaint, after sua sponte dismissing Reed-Bey’s claims against defendants 

DuBuc, Jackson, and Ingram under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). We again vacated

the district court’s judgment. Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322 (6th Cir. 2010).

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 2
No. 13-2602

- 3 -

On remand, defendants CMS, Pramstaller, and Russell filed motions for summary 

judgment, to which Reed-Bey responded. The district court granted summary judgment in favor 

of these defendants, concluding, in part, that Reed-Bey (1) failed to identify a CMS policy or 

custom that caused a deprivation of his rights and (2) failed to identify an MDOC policy or 

custom subjecting Pramstaller and Russell to liability or that Pramstaller and Russell were 

personally involved in his medical treatment. 

Subsequently, defendants DuBuc, Jackson, and Vadlamudi moved for summary 

judgment. The magistrate judge filed a report recommending that the district court: (1) deny

Vadlamudi’s request for summary judgment and permit Reed-Bey’s Eighth Amendment claim 

against her to proceed to trial and (2) grant summary judgment in favor of defendants Jackson 

and DuBuc because Jackson was not personally involved in Reed-Bey’s medical treatment and 

DuBuc could not be held liable based solely on her response to Reed-Bey’s Step II grievance. 

Reed-Bey sought additional time to file objections, alleging that he had not received a copy of 

the report and recommendation. The district court denied Reed-Bey’s request, noting that the 

proof of service indicated that the report was mailed to his correct address. The district court 

also rejected Vadlamudi’s objections, denied her motion for summary judgment, and ordered that 

Reed-Bey’s Eighth Amendment claim against her should proceed to trial on the issue of whether 

she was liable for any delays and pain suffered by Reed-Bey in September and October 2005. 

The district court denied Vadlamudi’s second motion for summary judgment because that motion

asserted the same issues previously rejected. We affirmed. Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, No 12-

2041 (6th Cir. July 8, 2013).

In March 2012, Reed-Bey moved for a default judgment against defendants Nzums and 

Ingram, noting that the defendants had not responded to his complaint. The request was denied. 

Subsequently, Reed-Bey again filed two motions for a default judgment against defendants 

Nzums and Ingram. A magistrate judge filed a report concluding that default judgment was not 

warranted because the defendants in question had never received the complaint, despite the 

district court’s best attempts to have them served, and because there was no initial entry of 

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 3
No. 13-2602

- 4 -

default. Over Reed-Bey’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

recommendation. 

In July 2013, Reed-Bey filed a motion requesting the appointment of counsel, which the 

district court granted. In October 2013, the district court issued a protective order permitting 

Reed-Bey’s attorney to inspect certain documents listed in the order but directing that the 

documents not be released to Reed-Bey. Thereafter, the case proceeded to trial against 

Vadlamudi. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Vadlamudi, and the district court entered a 

final judgment. 

On appeal, Reed-Bey argues that the district court erred when it denied him a fair 

opportunity to litigate fully his Eighth Amendment claim, first, because it restricted the issues he 

could present against Vadlamudi at trial to her involvement in “pain management” in September 

and October 2005, thus prohibiting him from presenting evidence that she provided delayed 

treatment and failed to ensure that he received adequate follow-up treatment after his surgery; 

second, because it prevented him from objecting to the dismissal of defendants Jackson and 

DuBuc; and third, because it denied him adequate discovery, which would have allowed him to 

obtain information concerning a contract between CMS and the MDOC. He insists that the court 

should have granted his motion for default judgment against Nzums and Ingram because he 

provided the court with the defendants’ addresses and the United States Marshals Service failed 

to effectuate service on them. He next claims that the court should not have granted summary 

judgment in favor of CMS because it delayed his medical treatment by not timely responding to 

requests from the prison medical staff and by failing to carry out its duty to provide medical 

treatment to inmates and supervise prison medical staff, as required by its contract with the 

MDOC. He contends that the court also erred in granting summary judgment to Pramstaller and 

Russell because they were aware of his medical needs and failed to ensure that he received 

adequate medical treatment. Finally, he faults the court for granting summary judgment to 

DuBuc because she was involved in decisions concerning his medical treatment and failed to 

resolve his grievance concerning his treatment. 

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 4
No. 13-2602

- 5 -

After careful review, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining what

issues Reed-Bey could present at trial, specifically by issuing the pre-trial order that prohibited 

him from submitting to the jury the issue of whether he was denied adequate follow-up 

treatment. We reach this conclusion because Reed-Bey did not allege any facts in his complaint

to indicate that Vadlamudi was responsible for delaying or denying him treatment following his 

surgery. 

Nor did the district court violate Reed-Bey’s rights with respect to the dismissal of 

defendants Jackson and DuBuc. Reed-Bey argues that the district court erred when it denied his 

motion for an extension of time to file objections to the magistrate judge’s February 2012 report 

and recommendation with respect to the determination that defendants Jackson and DuBuc were 

not personally involved in Reed-Bey’s medical care. Reed-Bey claims that an extension should 

have been granted because he did not receive a copy of the report. However, as the district court 

properly noted, the proof of service included in the magistrate judge’s report established that it 

had been mailed to Reed-Bey’s correct address. 

Finally, the district court did not violate Reed-Bey’s rights based on the allegation that 

Reed-Bey was denied adequate discovery. Reed-Bey argues that, had he been granted adequate 

discovery, he would have been able to obtain evidence concerning a contract between CMS and 

the MDOC. Reed-Bey contends, for the first time on appeal, that he is a third-party beneficiary 

to such a contract. However, because he did not present this issue in the district court, it is 

forfeited, and we opt not to review it for the first time on appeal. See Vance v. Wade, 546 F.3d 

774, 781 (6th Cir. 2008). 

The district court properly denied Reed-Bey’s motion for default judgment against 

defendants Nzums and Ingram pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b), because ReedBey failed first to obtain an entry of default pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(a). 

See, e.g.. O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 352-53 (6th Cir. 2003). 

Nor did the district court err in dismissing Reed-Bey’s claims against Nzums and Ingram. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 4(m), a plaintiff must serve the summons and 

complaint upon each defendant within 120 days after the complaint is filed, unless the plaintiff 

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 5
No. 13-2602

- 6 -

demonstrates good cause for the failure. When a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the 

district court bears the responsibility for issuing the plaintiff’s process to a United States 

Marshal, who must effect service upon the defendants once the plaintiff has properly identified 

them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Byrd v. Stone, 94 F.3d at 217, 219 (6th

Cir. 1996). Thus, failure by the Marshals Service to carry out their duties may constitute good 

cause under Rule 4. See Byrd, 94 F.3d at 220. Nevertheless, an incarcerated plaintiff may not 

shirk all responsibility for seeing that the Marshals Service fulfils its duty to effectuate service. 

See id. Here, the record reflects that, after the district court ordered service of process on 

defendants Nzums and Ingram, the waiver of service was returned unexecuted on four separate 

occasions. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the plaintiff made an effort to discover 

or provide additional information about the whereabouts of Nzums and Ingram. We therefore 

cannot say that the dismissal was in error. 

We also conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to 

defendants CMS, Pramstaller, Russell, and DuBuc, based on de novo review. Dargie v. United 

States, 742 F.3d 243, 245 (6th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant 

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to prevail, the moving party must 

demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to at least one essential element 

on each of Plaintiff’s claims,” at which point the non-moving party “must present sufficient 

evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for him.” Jones v. Muskegon Cnty., 625 F.3d 

935, 940 (6th Cir. 2010). The court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. 

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

Reed-Bey alleged that CMS, a private corporation responsible for providing medical 

services at Michigan prisons, denied or delayed his treatment for his shoulder separation. 

However, a private corporation cannot be held liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat 

superior or vicarious liability. See Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 

1996). Rather, the plaintiff must establish a policy or custom that caused the constitutional 

violation. Ford v. Cnty. of Grand Traverse, 535 F.3d 483, 495 (6th Cir. 2008). In this case, 

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 6
No. 13-2602

- 7 -

Reed-Bey failed to identify any CMS policy or custom that resulted in the denial or delay of his 

medical treatment. Moreover, although Reed-Bey alleged that the prison medical staff acted on 

behalf of CMS, CMS argued that those individuals were employees of the MDOC, not CMS. 

Reed-Bey has presented no evidence to rebut CMS’s statement that prison staff are not employed 

by CMS. Finally, CMS presented evidence that it responded in a timely manner to Vadlamudi’s 

requests for a consultation with a specialist and for surgery, even though the approval of those 

requests was delayed at times, pending Vadlamudi’s submission of additional information 

concerning Reed-Bey’s condition. 

The district court also properly granted summary judgment to defendants Pramstaller and 

Russell. Reed-Bey argued that these defendants were liable for the delay in his medical 

treatment because they failed to act after being notified that he had been denied adequate medical 

treatment. He claims that, although these defendants denied being aware of his situation, he filed 

grievances and wrote a letter to the BHCS concerning his inadequate medical treatment, which 

should have provided Pramstaller and Russell with knowledge of the nature of his complaints. 

To establish personal liability under § 1983, it must be shown that the official acted to 

“cause[] the deprivation of a [federal] right.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); 

see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (explaining that, because there is no 

vicarious liability in § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each government defendant, 

“through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). Reed-Bey did not 

establish that Pramstaller and Russell were involved personally in either his medical care or the 

decision-making process concerning his medical care. In addition, Pramstaller and Russell are 

entitled to summary judgment on Reed-Bey’s official-capacity claims because he did not 

establish that his medical treatment was denied or delayed based on an MDOC policy or custom. 

See Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1245 (6th Cir. 1989).

Likewise, the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendant DuBuc. 

Reed-Bey argues that DuBuc should be liable for the delay in his medical treatment because she 

failed to resolve his complaints concerning his medical treatment during his Step II grievance. 

But DuBuc was not involved personally in the decisions concerning his medical treatment, and 

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 7
No. 13-2602

- 8 -

“[t]he ‘denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act’ by prison officials does not 

subject supervisors to liability under § 1983.” Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 

2008) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999)). 

For the reasons set out above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

 Case: 13-2602 Document: 30-1 Filed: 04/02/2015 Page: 8