Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00591/USCOURTS-caed-2_19-cv-00591-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
USAA Federal Savings Bank
Defendant
USAA Savings Bank
Defendant
Charles Wright
Plaintiff
Vanessa Wright
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

----oo0oo----

VANESSA WRIGHT,

Plaintiff,

v.

USAA SAVINGS BANK; USAA FEDERAL 

SAVINGS BANK,

Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-00591 WBS CKD

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: 

CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 

JUDGMENT

----oo0oo----

Charles Wright filed this action against defendants 

USAA Savings Bank (“USAA SB”) and USAA Federal Savings Bank 

(“USAA FSB”) alleging that defendants auto-dialed calls to 

plaintiff’s cellphone without his consent in violation of the 

Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et 

seq., and the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(“Rosenthal Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1788, et seq. Before the 

court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 

(Docket Nos. 36 & 37.)

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I. Factual Background

Mr. Wright applied for, and was approved for, at least 

one credit card with USAA Savings Bank. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s 

Statement of Undisputed Facts (“SUF”) at 1:6-10 (Docket No. 44-

1).) In Mr. Wright’s application for the credit card account, he 

listed his cellular telephone number. (Id. at 1:11-13.) In 

2018, Mr. Wright developed terminal cancer. (Id. at 1:14.) Mr. 

Wright’s wife, Vanessa Wright, quit her full-time job to care for 

Mr. Wright. (Id. at 1:14-15.) As a result, neither Mr. Wright 

nor Ms. Wright could make further payments on the USAA Savings 

Bank credit card account. (Id. at 1:15-17.) 

From July 16, 2018 through January 30, 2019, USAA FSB, 

the servicer of the USAA SB account, called the number Mr. Wright 

provided in his application in an attempt to contact Mr. Wright 

regarding the account. (Pls.’ Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 22.) To 

contact Mr. Wright, USAA FSB used the Aspect Dialing System. 

(Id. ¶ 23.) The Aspect Dialing System is a predictive dialer 

that does not have, and is not capable of using, a random or 

sequential number generator for dialing telephone numbers to be 

called. (Id.; Dep. of Michelle Deneen at 44:12-25 (Docket No. 

36-1).)

In response to those calls, plaintiff sought legal 

representation to address the financial issues facing his 

household. (Defs.’ Resp. to Pl.’s SUF at 1:19-21.) Plaintiff’s 

counsel prepared a letter of representation and of revocation of 

consent to call Mr. Wright. (Id. at 1:22-24.) Counsel then 

mailed the letter to USAA SB’s headquarters at 3773 Howard Hughes 

Parkway, Suite 190N, Las Vegas, NV 89169 (“Las Vegas address”). 

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(Docket No. 36-1.) 

USAA SB and USAA FSB, however, never provided the Las 

Vegas address as an address to send account correspondence. 

(Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 12, 16.) Instead, after Mr. Wright 

opened the account, and every month for the next 18 years, USAA 

FSB sent Mr. Wright an account statement with 10750 McDermott 

Fwy, San Antonio, Texas 78288 (“San Antonio address”) as the 

return address. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.) Every statement—-over 200 in 

total—-was from, and contained, this address. (Id. ¶ 9). Every 

statement also listed the San Antonio address for making account 

payments. (Id. ¶ 10.) After Mr. Wright’s account became 

delinquent, and in addition to the monthly statements, USAA FSB 

began to send payment reminders to Mr. Wright. (Id. ¶ 14.) Like 

the monthly statements, every payment reminder contained the San 

Antonio address as the return address. (Id. ¶ 15.) 

Further, both the monthly statements and the payment 

reminder letters referred Mr. Wright to USAA’s website, USAA.com, 

for additional information regarding his account. (Decl. of 

Michelle Deneen (“Deenan Decl”) ¶ 20 (Docket No. 39-1); Defs.’ 

Mot. Summ. J., Exs. A-2, A-3 (Docket Nos. 39-3, 39-4).) USAA’s 

website contains a “Contact Us” page, with specific mailing 

addresses for its various business lines, including its bank. 

(Deneen Decl. ¶ 21.) The website listed USAA Federal Savings 

Bank’s mailing address as the San Antonio address and did not 

list the Las Vegas address anywhere on the website. (Deneen 

Decl. ¶¶ 23-24; Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J., Ex. A-4 (Docket No. 39-5); 

Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 20.)

Although there is no evidence that USAA provides the 

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Las Vegas address to any of its members for sending account 

correspondence, USAA SB does receive mail at its Las Vegas 

headquarters. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶ 21.) The Las Vegas 

address, however, is a large corporate office building at which 

USAA SB is only one tenant. (Id. ¶ 25.) Only five to six 

employees work for USAA SB at that address. (Id. ¶ 26.) The Las 

Vegas address has a front desk not owned or controlled by USAA 

SB. (Id. ¶ 30.) Because USAA SB does not sign for, and cannot 

control the receipt of, correspondence at the Las Vegas address, 

USAA SB never provides the Las Vegas address to its members for 

purposes of sending account correspondence. (Id. ¶ 32.) 

In the event that correspondence does reach USAA SB at 

the Las Vegas address, the correspondence is transmitted to USAA 

FSB’s headquarters at the San Antonio address. (Id. ¶ 28.) Such 

an event is infrequent, however, because USAA SB receives 

approximately only six pieces of mail per month at the Las Vegas 

address. (Id.) By contrast, USAA FSB receives approximately 

1.8 million pieces of mail per month at the San Antonio address. 

(Id. ¶ 29.) 

Mr. Wright’s October 2018 letter was sent via certified 

mail and the USPS confirmation notice associated with the letter 

verifies that the letter was “delivered to the front desk, 

reception area, or mail room . . . in LAS VEGAS NV 89169.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D at 1 (Docket No. 36-3).) Defendants 

contend that they did not sign for any certified mail and that 

they have no record of ever receiving the letter. (Pl.’s Resp. 

to Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 33-34.) Accordingly, the notice of revocation 

of consent to call Mr. Wright was not processed or otherwise 

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applied to Mr. Wright’s account. (Id. ¶ 34.)

After defendants continued calling, plaintiff filed 

this suit alleging the following causes of action: (1) violation 

of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Cal. Civ. 

Code §1788, et seq.; and (2) violation of the Telephone Consumer 

Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. (First Amended 

Complaint (Docket No. 16).) Mr. Wright passed shortly after 

filing suit, and this court granted Ms. Wright’s motion to 

substitute plaintiff. (Docket No. 24). 

II. Telephone Consumer Protection Act Claim (Count Two)

“[T]he TCPA forbids calls placed using an automated 

telephone dialing system [(“ATDS”)]” without “the prior express 

consent of the called party.” Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 

1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)). A 

defendant’s “willful and knowing” violation of the statute 

entitles a plaintiff to treble damages. 47 U.S.C. § (b)(3). 

Plaintiff argues that defendants called plaintiff without his 

consent because plaintiff revoked his consent via the October 

2018 letter, and that because defendants were on notice that the 

communication was unsolicited plaintiff is entitled to treble 

damages. Defendants on the other hand argue that the device used 

to contact plaintiff does not constitute an ATDS under the 

statute and that, even if it does, plaintiff did not effectively 

revoke consent to be called.

A. Whether the Aspect Dialing System Is An ATDS

Since the enactment of the TCPA in 1991, the definition 

of ATDS has remained the same: “equipment which has the capacity 

—-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a 

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random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such 

numbers.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 

904 F.3d 1041, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 2018). 

Between 2003 and 2015, the Federal Communications 

Commission (“FCC”) issued a series of rulings to determine 

whether predictive dialers, such as the Aspect Dialing System, 

which do not “dial[] a random or sequential block of numbers,” 

but rather “automatically dial[] a list of numbers that had been 

preprogrammed and stored in the dialer” constitute automated 

telephone dialing systems under the statute. Rules & Regulations 

Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 

14,014, 14,017, 14,022 (2003) (“2003 Order”); Marks, 904 F.3d at

1045.

In its 2012 Order, the FCC reasoned that the statutory 

definition of ATDS “covers any equipment that has the specified 

capacity to generate numbers and dial them without human 

intervention regardless of whether the numbers called are 

randomly or sequentially generated or come from calling lists.” 

Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 

1991, 27 FCC Rcd. 15,391, 15,392 n.5 (2012). In 2015, however, 

the FCC endorsed the opposite view that a device “would not meet 

the definition of an ATDS unless it had the capacity to dial 

random or sequential numbers.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 1046 (citing 

Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 

1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7691, 7971-72 (2015) (“2015 Declaratory 

Ruling”)). 

In response to the uncertainty following the FCC’s 2015 

Declaratory Ruling, “a large number of regulated entities 

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challenged the FCC’s definition of an ATDS.” Marks, 904 F.3d at 

1046. The petitions were consolidated in the D.C. Circuit. See

Consolidated Order, ACA Int’l v. FCC, 885 F.3d 687 (D.C. Cir. 

2018). Concluding that the FCC cannot, “consistent with reasoned 

decision-making, espouse both competing interpretations [of ATDS] 

in the same order,” the court “set aside the Commission’s 

treatment of those matters.” Id. at 703.

After the D.C. Circuit issued its opinion in ACA 

International, the Ninth Circuit addressed the definition of ATDS 

in Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2018). 

After establishing that “the FCC’s prior orders on [the 

definition of ATDS] are no longer binding,” the Marks court 

concluded that “the statutory definition of ATDS is not limited 

to devices with the capacity to call numbers produced by a 

‘random or sequential number generator,’ but also includes 

devices with the capacity to dial stored numbers automatically.” 

Id. at 1049-50.

Because under Marks a device that has the capacity to 

“store numbers to be called . . . and to dial such numbers” is an 

ATDS, id., and because it is undisputed that the Aspect Dialing 

System calls, without human intervention, a list of stored phone 

numbers identified by USAA’s loss mitigation algorithm (Deneen

Decl. at 43:6-23, 44:19-25), defendants’ Aspect Dialing System is 

an ATDS. 

Defendants argue that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 

Marks is not controlling. Specifically, defendants contend that

the D.C. Circuit’s decision in ACA International invalidated only 

the FCC’s 2003, 2012, and 2015 Orders. (Defs.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 

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10.) As a result, the FCC’s 1992 and 1995 Orders, which conclude 

that to be an ATDS the system must itself generate numbers “in a 

random or sequential fashion,” control here. In Re Rules & 

Regulations Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 7 F.C.C. Rcd. 8752, 

8769 ¶ 47 (1992) (“1992 Order”); see In Re Rules and Regulations 

Implementing the TCPA of 1991, 10 FCC Rcd. 12391, ¶ 19 (1995) 

(“1995 Order”). Because the Aspect Dialing System does not 

generate numbers randomly or sequentially, defendants contend 

that the system at issue is not an ATDS under the statute. 

This court is bound by Marks. Defendants’ proposition

to the contrary is unpersuasive. First, the FCC did not consider 

the question of whether an autodialer constituted an ATDS under 

the TCPA until 2003. See 2003 Order ¶ 130; Marks, 904 F.3d at 

1045 (describing how growing FCC concern with autodialers 

“warranted modifications to the existing rules” in 2003). 

Assuming defendants’ contention that every FCC order prior to 

2003 still stands is correct, no FCC guidance on autodialers 

would bind this court. 

Second, defendants’ interpretation of ACA International

is incorrect. The D.C. Circuit did not discretely vacate just

the FCC’s 2003, 2012, and 2015 orders. Instead, the ACA 

International court broadly “invalidated the FCC’s interpretation 

of the two key questions raised by the statutory definition of an 

ATDS, namely: ‘(i) when does a device have the “capacity” to 

perform the two enumerated functions; and (ii) what precisely are 

those functions?’” Marks, 904 F. 3d at 1047 (citing ACA Int’l, 

885 F.3d at 695). Notably, the ACA International court made no 

reference to the 1992 and 1995 Orders and their continuing 

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validity. Because the D.C. Circuit “set aside the Commission’s 

treatment” of what “functions a device must perform to qualify as 

an autodialer,” ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 703, defendants’ 

proposition that the ACA International court left in place any 

FCC orders describing those functions is untenable. 

Third, the Ninth Circuit’s subsequent decision in 

Duguid v. Facebook, Inc., 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019), 

“confirms that Marks is the law” in this circuit. Lamkin v. 

Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 2:18-CV-03071-WBS-KJN, 2019 

WL 4670829, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019). The Duguid court 

reiterated that ACA International “wipe[d] the definitional slate 

clean,” requiring the Ninth Circuit to “beg[in] anew to consider 

the definition of ATDS under the TCPA.” Id. at 1150 (quoting 

Marks, 904 F.3d at 1041). The Marks court “clarif[ied] any 

ambiguity” regarding what functions an ATDS must have and “[t]hat 

definition governs.” Id.

Accordingly, because under Marks a device that has the 

capacity to “store numbers to be called . . . and to dial such 

numbers” is an ATDS, 904 F.3d at 1052, and because it is 

undisputed that the Aspect Dialing System calls stored phone 

numbers, this court finds that defendants’ Aspect Dialing System 

is an ATDS. 

B. Whether Mr. Wright Effectively Revoked His Consent

Under the TCPA, “consumers may revoke consent through 

any reasonable means,” “using any reasonable method including 

orally or in writing.” 2015 FCC Order, ¶¶ 55, 64. “A caller may 

not limit the manner in which revocation may occur.” Id. ¶ 47. 

When assessing whether a particular means of revocation used by a 

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consumer was reasonable, courts look to the “totality of the 

facts and circumstances surrounding that specific situation, 

including, for example, whether the consumer had a reasonable 

expectation that he or she could effectively communicate his or 

her request for revocation to the caller in that circumstance, 

and whether the caller could have implemented mechanisms to 

effectuate a requested revocation without incurring undue 

burdens.” 2015 Order ¶ 64 n.233; ACA Int’l, 885 F.3d at 709 (“In 

assessing whether a revocation request meets the ‘reasonable 

means’ standard, the Commission said it would consider ‘the 

totality of the facts and circumstances.’”); Silver v. 

Pennsylvania Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, No. 14-CV-00652-PJH, 

2020 WL 607054, at *16 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2020). 

Under the facts presented here, no reasonable trier of 

fact could find that plaintiff used reasonable means to revoke 

consent. Defendants never made the Las Vegas address known to 

customers, nor did they communicate to its customers that the Las 

Vegas address was an appropriate destination for customers’ 

account-related inquiries.1 Mr. Wright received over 200 

statements and monthly payment reminders from the San Antonio 

address. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 9, 15.) Each of those 

documents listed the San Antonio address as the correct address 

for account-related correspondence. (Id. ¶ 10.) Further, each 

of those documents listed USAA’s webpage as a resource, which 

also listed the San Antonio address as the appropriate mailing 

1 Although the Las Vegas address is the address of USAA 

SB headquarters, a cursory Google search for “USAA SB 

headquarters” still points to the San Antonio address.

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address. (Deenan Decl. ¶ 20.) Given defendants’ consistent 

communications with plaintiff over the course of 18 years, no 

reasonable juror could find that plaintiff had a reasonable 

expectation that he could effectively communicate his request to 

revoke his consent at the Las Vegas address.

Moreover, plaintiff cannot establish that defendants 

received the revocation letter. Defendants have no record of 

receiving the notice. (Id. ¶¶ 33-34.) The USPS confirmation 

notice confirms only that the letter was “delivered to the front 

desk, reception area, or mail room . . . in LAS VEGAS NV 89169.” 

(Pl.’s Mot. Summ. J., Ex. D at 1.) Not only does the 

confirmation notice not list the complete address, but also, the 

notice confirms receipt only by the front desk. Plaintiff does 

not dispute that USAA SB does not own or control the front desk, 

or that USAA SB does not sign for, and cannot control the receipt 

of, correspondence at the Las Vegas address. (Pl.’s Resp. to 

Defs.’ SUF ¶¶ 30, 32.) Indeed, defendants’ lack of control over 

the front desk is one of the reasons USAA SB never provides the 

Las Vegas address to its members. (Id. ¶ 32.) There is 

accordingly insufficient evidence to support a finding that 

defendants received the letter.

Moreover, based upon the court’s colloquy with counsel 

at oral argument, it clearly appears that the choice to send the 

letter to Las Vegas arose not from a genuine expectation that 

defendants would process Las Vegas correspondence, but rather 

from an attempt by counsel simply to create a record for 

litigation. The court notes that it was plaintiff’s counsel –-

not plaintiff -- who chose to mail the letter to the Las Vegas 

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address. With over 90 TCPA cases filed by plaintiff’s attorney

in the Eastern District of California, he should have known how 

to effectively contact a lender. Indeed, counsel has filed suit 

for a violation of the TCPA against USAA SB before. See, e.g., 

Aycock v. USAA Savings Bank, No. 2:18-cv-00626-JAM-EFB (Filed 

March 22, 2018). In Aycock, plaintiff’s counsel similarly argued 

that plaintiff had revoked consent to be called via a letter 

drafted by plaintiff’s counsel. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20 (Case No. 2:18-

cv-00626-JAM-EFB, Docket No. 1).) By August 2018, the parties in 

Aycock had filed a Joint Status Report wherein defendant stated 

that “Plaintiff did not effectively revoke consent.” (Joint 

Status Report at 1 (Case No. 2:18-cv-00626-JAM-EFB, Docket No. 

9).) By the time plaintiff’s counsel sent the letter at issue in 

this case, counsel was on notice that his method of revocation 

may present some issues and admitted as much during oral 

argument. It therefore strikes the court as disingenuous for 

counsel to argue that he sent the letter to Las Vegas to revoke 

his client’s consent, and not simply to set defendant up for this 

litigation.2

Considering that the choice of address appears to be a

part of plaintiff counsel’s legal strategy and not a regular 

2 Plaintiff’s counsel argues that defendants constantly 

hide behind different entities when responding to litigation. 

(Pl.’s Opp’n at 4.) Specifically, plaintiff argues that when 

plaintiff sues one of the defendants, the sued defendant will 

argue that the appropriate party is the other defendant. Even if 

true, service of process and appropriate revocation of consent 

are two different issues. Further, plaintiff here sued both 

defendants, so the tactic plaintiff describes was not at play 

here. If defendant was unsure of which address was correct, and 

actually intended the calls to stop, there is no explanation of

why counsel would not send a revocation letter to both addresses.

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consumer’s contact with a lender, and that USAA SB has previously 

objected to counsel’s notice method, the court concludes that a 

reasonable person, after receiving hundreds of notices pointing 

to San Antonio, could not have expected to effectively revoke 

consent by contacting a corporate building in Las Vegas. Because 

plaintiff did not effectively revoke his consent, the court will 

grant defendants’ motion for summary judgement. 

III. Rosenthal Act Claim (Count One)

To establish a violation of the Rosenthal Act, 

plaintiff must prove: (1) the plaintiff is a “debtor”; (2) the 

debt at issue is a “consumer debt”; (3) the defendant is a “debt 

collector”; and (4) that the defendant violated one of the 

liability provisions of the Rosenthal Act. Long v. Nationwide 

Legal File & Serve, Inc., No. 12-CV-03578, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

132971, *56-57 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2013). Defendants dispute 

only prong four.

Here, plaintiff alleges that the calls made to Mr. 

Wright after October 15, 2018 violated Section 1788.14(c) of the 

Rosenthal Act, which prohibits communicating “with the debtor 

with regard to the consumer debt, when the debt collector has 

been previously notified in writing by the debtor’s attorney that 

the debtor is represented by such attorney . . . .” Cal. Civ. 

Code § 1788.14(c). To show that defendants violated Section 

1788.14(c), plaintiff must establish that defendants had “actual 

knowledge” that Mr. Wright was represented by an attorney. Munoz 

v. Cal. Bus. Bureau, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-01345-BAM, 2016 WL 

6517655, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2016). 

For the reasons above, the court finds as a matter of 

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law that defendants either did not receive or did not process the 

letter and therefore did not have actual knowledge that plaintiff 

was represented by an attorney. Accordingly, the court will 

grant defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s 

Rosenthal Act claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for 

summary judgment (Docket No. 37) be, and the same hereby is, 

GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment (Docket No. 36) be, and the same hereby is, 

DENIED.

Dated: May 21, 2020

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