Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03101/USCOURTS-ca13-15-03101-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Department of Defense
Respondent
Office of Personnel Management
Respondent
Ross Vassallo
Petitioner

Document Text:

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

ROSS VASSALLO,

Petitioner

v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent

______________________ 

2015-3101

______________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. PH-3330-13-0049-R-1.

______________________ 

Decided: August 14, 2015

______________________ 

 ROSS VASSALLO, Easton, CT, pro se.

 ALBERT S. IAROSSI, Commercial Litigation Branch, 

Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, 

Washington, DC, for respondent. Also represented by 

BENJAMIN C. MIZER, ROBERT E. KIRSCHMAN, JR., ALLISON 

KIDD-MILLER. 

______________________ 

Before PROST, Chief Judge, WALLACH and TARANTO,

Circuit Judges.

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2 VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 

WALLACH, Circuit Judge. 

Petitioner Ross Vassallo appeals the decision of the 

Merit Systems Protection Board (“the Board”) denying his 

request for corrective action. See Vassallo v. Dep’t of Def., 

PH-3330-13-0049-R-1 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 15, 2015) (Resp’t’s 

App. 50–55). Mr. Vassallo, a veteran, sought corrective 

action from the Board after he applied for a position at 

the Department of Defense (“DOD”), and the Office of 

Personnel Management (“OPM”) determined that the 

DOD was not required to afford him veterans employment 

preferences under the Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998 (“VEOA”). The central question in this 

appeal is whether OPM’s regulation permissibly fills a 

gap in the governing statute. The Board found that it did. 

The court affirms.

BACKGROUND

I. Legal Framework

“Federal agencies generally use two types of selection 

to fill vacancies: (1) the open ‘competitive examination’ 

process and (2) the ‘merit promotion’ process.” Joseph v. 

Fed. Trade Comm’n, 505 F.3d 1380, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 

(citation omitted). “The merit promotion process is used 

when the position is to be filled by an employee of the 

agency or by an applicant from outside the agency who 

has ‘status’ in the competitive service.” Id. at 1382 (citations omitted).

In 1998, Congress passed the VEOA to ensure that 

veterans receive due consideration when they apply for 

vacant positions available through the merit promotion 

process. See generally Veterans Employment Opportunities Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-339, 112 Stat. 3182 

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 3, 5, 10, 

28, 31, 38, and 49 U.S.C.). In relevant part, Congress 

provided veterans “may not be denied the opportunity to 

compete for vacant positions for which the agency making 

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VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 3

the announcement will accept applications from individuals outside its own workforce under merit promotion 

procedures.” 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) (2012). The statute 

does not define “agency.” To fill this gap, Congress provided that “[OPM] shall prescribe regulations necessary 

for the administration of this subsection.” Id. § 3304(f)(5).

OPM promulgated such regulations in Title 5 of the 

Code of Federal Regulations. The regulations parrot the 

statutory mandate, explaining that eligible veterans “may 

compete for vacancies under merit promotion when an 

agency accepts applications from individuals outside its 

own workforce” and, if selected, veterans “will be given 

career or career conditional appointments under 

§ 315.611 of this chapter.” 5 C.F.R. § 335.106 (2012). The 

regulations define “agency” as “an executive agency as 

defined in 5 U.S.C. [§] 105.” 5 C.F.R. § 315.611(b). The 

statutory provision cited by the regulations defines “executive agency” as “an Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent establishment.” 

5 U.S.C. § 105. An executive department includes, among 

others, the DOD. 5 U.S.C. § 101.

II. Facts and Proceedings

The Defense Contract Management Agency 

(“DCMA”), a sub-agency within the DOD, employed Mr. 

Vassallo as a computer engineer in 2012. That summer, 

DCMA announced a vacancy for the position of Lead 

Interdisciplinary Engineer. The announcement stated 

that only certain individuals could apply for the position, 

namely “[c]urrent [DCMA]” employees or “[c]urrent 

[DOD] [e]mployee[s] with the Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics . . . [w]orkforce who are outside of the Military Components.” Resp’t’s App. 7. Mr. Vassallo submitted an application, but DCMA rejected it on the basis that

he failed to submit the requisite forms. 

Mr. Vassallo subsequently sought corrective action 

from the Board. In these circumstances, the Board auCase: 15-3101 Document: 15-2 Page: 3 Filed: 08/14/2015
4 VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 

thority to grant corrective action falls under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3330a(d), which provides for review of a qualified veteran’s allegation that an agency has violated 5 U.S.C.

§ 3304(f)(1). Mr. Vassallo’s claim to the Board, therefore, 

depends on whether 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) applies to the 

hiring process about which he complains. Errors in the 

handling of Mr. Vassallo’s application are outside the 

Board’s authority unless 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) applies.

He did not succeed in his efforts. Before an administrative judge, Mr. Vassallo alleged that DCMA violated 

5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) because DCMA was the relevant 

agency making the announcement and the post invited 

applications from non-DCMA employees. As an initial 

matter, the administrative judge held that DCMA erred 

in rejecting Mr. Vassallo’s application because he had, in 

fact, submitted the correct forms. Nevertheless, the 

administrative judge found that Mr. Vassallo did not 

demonstrate that DCMA violated the statute. The administrative judge held that “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) 

meant the DOD, not DCMA. Resp’t’s App. 11–12. The 

administrative judge relied upon OPM’s “VetGuide,” 

which explains that “agency” under the VEOA means 

“parent agency, i.e., Treasury, not the Internal Revenue 

Service, and the [DOD], not Department of the Army.” Id.

at 12. Because DCMA accepted applications only from 

DOD employees, the administrative judge held that 

DCMA did not accept applications from outside the DOD 

workforce and, consequently, denied Mr. Vassallo’s request for corrective action. Id. Mr. Vassallo subsequently 

appealed to the full Board.

After initially reversing the administrative judge, the 

Board reconsidered its decision and rejected Mr. Vassallo’s request for corrective action. The Board rejected 

OPM’s argument that “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) 

unambiguously borrows from the definition of “Executive 

agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 105, finding instead that “[t]he 

unmodified term ‘agency’ is not defined in 5 U.S.C. 

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VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 5

§§ 101–105.” Id. at 54. The Board next observed that 

OPM permissibly filled this gap with the regulatory 

definition provided in 5 C.F.R. § 315.611(b). According to 

the Board, OPM’s decision to define “the word ‘agency’ in 

5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) to mean ‘Executive agency’ as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 105 is a permissible construction of the 

statute.” Id. at 54–55. The Board concluded that DCMA 

was not required to give Mr. Vassallo an opportunity to 

compete under 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) because the DOD—

the agency making the announcement—did not accept 

applications from outside its own workforce. Id. at 55. 

Accordingly, the Board denied Mr. Vassallo’s request for 

corrective action. 

Mr. Vassallo appeals. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9) (2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

This court’s “scope of . . . review of [B]oard decisions is 

limited to whether they are (1) arbitrary, capricious, an 

abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 

law; (2) obtained without procedures required by law, 

rule, or regulation having been followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” Forest v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 

47 F.3d 409, 410 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) 

(1988)). Petitioner bears the burden of establishing error 

in the Board’s decision. Harris v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 142 F.3d 1463, 1467 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court 

reviews the Board’s legal determinations de novo. 

Welshans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 550 F.3d 1100, 1102 (Fed. 

Cir. 2008).

We review an agency’s statutory interpretation using 

the two-pronged framework established by Chevron, 

U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 

(1984). The first prong requires the court to assess 

“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise

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6 VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 

question at issue”; if so, the court “must give effect to the 

unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842–

43. If the statute does not answer the specific question, 

meaning that it is “silent or ambiguous,” then the court 

must discern whether the agency provided “a permissible 

construction of the statute.” Id. at 843; Wilder v. Merit 

Sys. Prot. Bd., 675 F.3d 1319, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012). “If 

Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, 

there is an express delegation of authority to the agency 

to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. “Such legislative 

regulations are given controlling weight unless they are 

arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844 (footnote omitted).

II. The Board Properly Afforded Controlling Weight to 

OPM’s Regulation

Mr. Vassallo argues that the OPM regulation contradicts the plain terms of the statute and otherwise unreasonably undermines the purpose of the VEOA. The 

government counters that the Board erred because the 

statute is unambiguous and that, alternatively, the Board 

correctly deferred to OPM’s regulation. The Board 

properly deferred to OPM’s regulation.

A. The Statute is Ambiguous

The government contends that the Board “was not required to defer to OPM’s regulation[] because the plain 

language of the statute makes clear that DOD is ‘the 

agency’ for purposes of the VEOA.” Resp’t Br. 9–10. 

Because 5 U.S.C. § 105 defines “executive agency” to cover 

“executive departments,” not the executive departments’ 

subcomponents, the government argues that “the use of 

the word ‘agency’” in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) “to mean ‘Executive Agency’ follows naturally when examining the 

statutory scheme as a whole.” Id. at 11.

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VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 7

The statutory scheme does not answer the precise 

question, i.e., whether “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) 

means “executive agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 105. Section 105 

of Title 5 of the United States Code provides that “[f]or 

purposes of [5 U.S.C.], ‘Executive agency’ means Executive department . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 105. In turn, § 101 of 

the same title explains that the term “Executive departments” includes, among others, the DOD. 5 U.S.C. § 101. 

The Board correctly observed that “[t]he unmodified term 

‘agency’ is not defined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 101–105.” Resp’t’s 

App. 54; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 101 (where “agency” does not 

appear), 102 (same), 103 (same), 104 (same), 105 (where 

“executive” modifies “agency”). Indeed, neither “executive” nor “department” appears in 5 U.S.C. § 3304, still 

less do they appear in subsection (f) of that provision. As 

a result, we cannot say that Congress unambiguously 

intended to equate “agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) with 

“executive agency” in 5 U.S.C. § 105. In view of this 

ambiguity, the Board properly proceeded to the second 

step under Chevron. 

B. OPM’s Regulation Governs 

Mr. Vassallo raises a series of statistics-based arguments about the alleged universe of civil and military 

employees in federal service.1 Mr. Vassallo argues that 

these statistics demonstrate that 5 C.F.R. § 315.611(b)

unreasonably expands the pool of potential workers from 

which the DOD may hire and, as a consequence, limits 

the benefits that Congress intended for the VEOA to 

provide to veterans.

1 Mr. Vassallo offered virtually none of the statistics that he discusses in his brief to the Board. Because 

the court disposes of his appeal on other grounds, we need 

not address the appropriateness vel non of judicial notice.

 

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8 VASSALLO v. DEP’T OF DEF. 

Statistics alone, however, do not govern this court’s 

analysis of OPM’s regulation; rather, we must discern 

whether the regulation “[is] arbitrary, capricious, or 

manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 

844. As previously stated, OPM’s regulation defines

“agency” as “an executive agency as defined in 5 U.S.C. 

[§] 105.” 5 C.F.R. § 315.611(b). As explained above, 

“executive agency” encompasses “executive departments,” 

which include the DOD but not its subcomponents, such 

as DCMA. 5 U.S.C. §§ 101, 105. The Board observed that 

“[t]here can be no doubt that interpreting the word ‘agency’ in 5 U.S.C. § 3304(f)(1) to mean ‘Executive agency’ as 

defined in 5 U.S.C. § 105 is a permissible construction of 

the statute.” Resp’t’s App. 54–55. The court agrees, 

particularly given that Congress expressly directed OPM 

to “elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” and that those regulations warrant “controlling 

weight.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44; see 5 U.S.C. 

§ 3304(f)(5) (“[OPM] shall prescribe regulations necessary 

for the administration of this subsection”). An agency 

regulation that adopts as its own a relevant definition 

from the governing statutory scheme does not “manifestly 

contra[dict]” the statute. Cf. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board is

AFFIRMED

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs.

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