Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00557/USCOURTS-caed-1_23-cv-00557-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Negre Analyn
Defendant
Wani J. Kose
Plaintiff
H. Siez
Defendant
Melisa Walker
Defendant

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

WANI J. KOSE,

Plaintiff,

v.

H. SIEZ, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 1:23-cv-00557-CDB

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO 

DISMISS CERTAIN CLAIMS

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

Clerk of the Court to Assign District Judge

Plaintiff Wani J. Kose is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights 

action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a 

governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 

The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the complaint is frivolous or malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The Court should dismiss a complaint if 

it lacks a cognizable legal theory or fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal 

theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990).

//

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II. PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) 

“Rule 8(a)’s simplified pleading standard applies to all civil actions, with limited 

exceptions.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). A complaint must contain 

“a short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the 

plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512 (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted). 

Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a 

cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must 

set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim that is plausible on its face.’” 

Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Factual allegations are accepted as true, but legal 

conclusions are not. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 

The Court construes pleadings of pro se prisoners liberally and affords them the benefit of 

any doubt. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). However, “the 

liberal pleading standard . . . applies only to a plaintiff’s factual allegations,” not his legal 

theories. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). Furthermore, “a liberal interpretation 

of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially 

pled,” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal 

quotation marks & citation omitted), and courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted 

inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks & citation omitted). The “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully” is not 

sufficient to state a cognizable claim, and “facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s 

liability” fall short. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted). 

B. Linkage and Causation

Section 1983 provides a cause of action for the violation of constitutional or other federal 

rights by persons acting under color of state law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 

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section 1983, a plaintiff must show a causal connection or link between the actions of the 

defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff. See Rizzo v. Goode, 

423 U.S. 362, 373-75 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects’ another to the 

deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative 

act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legal required 

to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 

743 (9th Cir. 1978) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s Complaint 

Plaintiff’s complaint names Correctional Officer H. Siez, and Registered Nurses Negre 

Analyn1and Melisa Walker, all employed at North Kern State Prison, as Defendants. (Doc. 1 at 

1-2.) Plaintiff sues Defendants in their individual and official capacities. (See Doc. 1 at 23 

[handwritten page with “’1-A’” entered at the bottom].) By way of relief, Plaintiff seeks a 

declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, and any other relief the Court deems 

proper. (Id. at 22.)

Because Plaintiff’s complaint provides supporting factual allegations as to each claim 

asserted, the factual allegations will be addressed separately in the same manner. 

B. Plaintiff’s Claims

Claim I: Eighth Amendment Threat to Safety

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff contends that on July 14, 2020, he was “monitored at TTA”2after being found 

unconscious in his cell. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff states he was taken to TTA “with no shoes on.” 

(Id.) Defendant H. Siez was the medical transport officer on the morning shift and noticed 

Plaintiff’s “condition was not well” and inquired of Plaintiff whether he was able to walk. (Id.) 

1 Plaintiff’s complaint alternates between identifying this defendant by her first name and her last name. 

For the sake of continuity, the Court will refer to Defendant Negre Analyn by her surname.

2 According to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “TTA” is a Triage and 

Treatment Area. See https://www.cdcr.ca.gov (last visited June 27, 2023).

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Plaintiff advised Siez he did not wish to walk because he “was still dizzy and [had] bare feet.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff contends he had to walk after “attempting to get a wheelchair from RN Negre 

Analyn and RN Melisa Walker.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends it was “torture stepping on rocks and 

gravel [stabbing his] feet.” (Id.) Siez noticed Plaintiff stumbling and stated, “Now that’s messed 

up how the nurses were acting.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Siez told him he “should write it up” and 

that Plaintiff “looked just like” Siez’s son. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Siez advised him “that 

watching how the nurses didn’t want to help made him think about what if [Plaintiff] was his 

son.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff asserts Siez decided to use a golf cart to prevent Plaintiff from suffering further. 

(Doc. 1 at 4.) The golf cart was “a cart that was a two seater with a mini truck like flat bed in the 

back.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts there “was no way to transform that flat bed into a seat,” that there 

were no rails or seat belts, and that his feet touched the ground while sitting on the low cart. (Id.) 

As Plaintiff sat back on the cart far enough to rest his feet on the ground because standing and 

walking had made him drowsy, Siez “[fiddled] with the trash on the seats.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

contends that after moving trash from the driver’s seat to the passenger’s seat, Siez reversed the 

cart without any warning. (Id.) Plaintiff did not hear “an engine come on.” (Id.) Plaintiff states 

Siez “never even told [him] we were traveling in this cart otherwise [Plaintiff] would have asked 

to sit some place safe.” (Id.) He asserts as the cart reversed, it changed direction quickly and 

jerked his body. (Id.) Plaintiff contends as the cart “went quickly forward from reverse,” it tossed 

Plaintiff off the flat bed. (Id.) Plaintiff fell off the back of the cart but prevented his head from 

slamming into the concrete. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff used his left hand to brace his fall; he contends his 

“shoulder made a sound that was like rubbing rocks make and pain shot up” his left shoulder. 

(Id.) He contends his shoulder popped “in and out leaving [him] injured.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff states he could not move his shoulder without serious pain. (Doc. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff 

contends Defendant Analyn “kept being ruff” after Siez returned Plaintiff to TTA. (Id.) Analyn

stated to Plaintiff “‘Your [sic] back that fast.’” (Id.) Plaintiff “told her to stop trying to move [his] 

shoulder because it hurts everytime she does.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends Analyn refused his request 

for a sling, “along with RN Walker.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Siez was provided with a wheelchair 

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“this time” and escorted Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff contends as they were heading to A yard, Siez 

told Plaintiff “about how the nurses were not being fair and how the treatment was not usual 

never has he seen someone get denied a wheelchair when being barefeet and dizzy.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

asserts Siez told Plaintiff he was trying to help because he saw Plaintiff suffering while walking. 

(Id.) Plaintiff states he is “not saying H. Siez had an intent to hurt [him] but he knew that cart 

would not be safe and [Plaintiff is] sure he thought about putting [Plaintiff] in the front seat.” (Id. 

at 6.) Plaintiff contends Siez “acted with the understanding that it was a dangerous situation.” 

(Id.) Analyn and Walker made “it hard on” Siez because they did not do “their job in a reasonable 

manner, but Siez knew better.” (Id.) Siez knew Plaintiff was dizzy and failed in his obligation to 

take reasonable measures to guarantee Plaintiff’s safety. (Id.) Plaintiff contends a reasonable 

person would know it was not safe to put a sick person on the flat bed of a moving cart without 

seat belts or railings. (Id.) Plaintiff further contends Siez “did things the easy way,” rather than 

clearing a place for Plaintiff in the seat at the front of the cart. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts Siez could 

also have “gotten a real medical cart” as an alternative. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered injuries that 

continue to cause him pain and suffering. (Id.)

Applicable Legal Standards & Analysis

The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and 

from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 

2006). The unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain violates the Cruel and Unusual 

Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992) 

(citations omitted). Although prison conditions may be restrictive and harsh, prison officials must 

provide prisoners with food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. 

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832-33 (1994) (quotations omitted). 

Prison officials have a duty “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of 

inmates, which has been interpreted to include a duty to protect prisoners.” Labatad v. 

Corrections Corp. of America, 714 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

832-33 & Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2005)). To establish a violation of 

this duty, a prisoner must “show that the officials acted with deliberate indifference to threat of 

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serious harm or injury to an inmate.” Id. (citing Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 

1187 (9th Cir. 2002)).

A failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment requires a showing that “the 

official [knew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate ... safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

837. “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a question of 

fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence, 

... and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very 

fact that the risk was obvious.” Id. at 842 (citations omitted). The duty to protect a prisoner from 

serious harm requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety and 

well-being of the prisoner. Id. at 832-33; Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998). As 

“only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment,” plaintiff 

must allege facts showing the defendant acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson

v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal quotations marks, emphasis, & citations omitted). 

Liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly alleged an Eighth Amendment 

threat to safety/failure to protect claim against Defendant Siez. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged 

Siez knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff when Siez opted to transport 

Plaintiff while sitting in the flatbed of a cart, when a passenger seat reasonably was available, in 

the absence of safety restraints and operating the cart in such a manner, knowing Plaintiff was 

dizzy and unwell following an earlier episode of unconsciousness, causing Plaintiff to fall from 

the moving cart and suffer serious injuries. 

Notably however, Plaintiff may not pursue his claims for monetary damages against 

Defendant Siez in his official capacity. “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages 

in federal court against a state, its agencies, and state officials in their official capacities.” 

Aholelei v. Dep’t. of Pub. Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). 

However, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking damages against state officials in 

their personal capacities. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 30 (1991); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 

491 (9th Cir. 2003). Nor does it bar suits for injunctive relief brought against state officials in 

their official capacities. Austin v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 939 F.2d 676, 680 n.2 (9th Cir. 1991). 

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Thus, Plaintiff may only proceed in this action for monetary damages against Defendant Siez in 

his individual capacity.

Claims II & III: Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious 

Medical Needs

Factual Allegations3

Plaintiff asserts that on July 19, 2020, after being found unconscious in his cell and 

transported to medical. (Doc. 1 at 8.) He was not wearing shoes. (Id.) After regaining “some 

consciousness,” he was placed in a wheelchair and transported to TTA for monitoring by 

Defendants Analyn and Walker. (Id.) He advised Analyn and Walker that he had been drugged by 

an inmate and couldn’t remember much of what had occurred. (Id.) Analyn stated to Plaintiff, 

“You probably smoked something.” (Id.) Plaintiff told Analyn he did not smoke and that 

“[indecipherable] put something in” his drink. (Id.) Plaintiff states he felt like his life was in 

danger and he did not know why someone would drug him. (Id.) Plaintiff believes it was an 

attempt on his life and contends his “body was presenting signs that [he] was raped.” (Id.) He 

contends neither Analyn nor Walker cared he had been raped or why he had been drugged; both 

ignored it and “never even had [his] blood tested.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends Defendant Analyn was “very upset” Plaintiff was “brought back to TTA 

on a Saturday,” stating he could have been monitored on A-yard and that Plaintiff was “just going 

to go back and smoke that shit and come back.” (Doc. 1 at 9.) Plaintiff asserts “there was nothing 

that said” he had smoked anything; he was distressed by Analyn’s comments because he was in 

“a real crisis!! Medical Emergency!” (Id.) Plaintiff contends he was drugged, does not remember 

much of anything and his body felt as if he was raped. (Id.) He asserts Analyn was 

unprofessional. (Id.) After 30 to 45 minutes he was discharged by Analyn and Walker before he 

felt well. (Id.) Walker told him he would be fine if he just rested. (Id.) He told Walker he had no 

problem going back to his cell, but that he was still feeling dizzy. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he told 

both Analyn and Walker he was “still feeling sick and unstable, because they were rushing [him] 

out of the clinic and he was dizzy and bare feet.” (Id.) Analyn and Walker were aware Plaintiff 

3 The factual allegations for Claims II and III are the same. (Doc. 1 at 8-14 to Doc. 1 at 15-21.) The Court 

presumes Plaintiff intended one claim against Defendant Analyn and another against Defendant Walker.

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did not have shoes and that he was not well enough to walk a half mile in bare feet while dizzy. 

(Id.) Plaintiff contends it was “a form of torture to force someone to walk 1⁄2 mile bare feet a [sic] 

dizzy, it safe to say the intent seem clear.” (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiff states that after he tried to explain to Analyn and Walker why he needed 

a wheelchair, both “failed to understand the basic humanistic values when looking down and 

noticing my barefeet and thinking about my condition being dizzy still.” (Doc. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff 

contends Walker walked away from him as he “begged for her help and compassion.” (Id.) After 

a final plea to Analyn, she stated “I told you its my ‘chill Saturday,’” then Analyn said 

“something about a work feud they have with the A-yard medical because they never bring back 

the wheel chairs when an inmate is sent with one.” (Id.) Analyn stated it was too far to be walking 

to A-yard to pick up a wheelchair. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he tried to speak with Defendant Siez 

about it, but Siez told him to “write it up as a complaint.” (Id.) Plaintiff asserts he told Analyn he 

would be writing both Analyn and Walker up; Analyn showed Plaintiff her name tag and stated, 

“Don’t spell my name wrong.” (Id.) As Plaintiff walked out, Siez made comments about 

Plaintiff’s medical treatment and resemblance to his own son “dark skin and hair stile [sic] (dread 

locks).” (Id.) Plaintiff contends he suffered while walking on gravel and small rocks, was 

“walking like a drunk,” and was drowsy. (Id. at 10-11.) Plaintiff states he later injured his 

shoulder and back “not even 50 ft from TTA,” referring to the cart incident. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff 

contends his injuries are attributable to Analyn and Walker for refusing to assist him. (Id.) He 

contends after his fall they “magicly went to find a wheel chair to make sure” he was safe. (Id.) 

Further, Plaintiff contends Analyn and Walker ignored his condition the first time they refused 

him a wheelchair and failed to send him to x-ray after he fell injuring his shoulder. (Id.) They also 

failed to provide him with a sling, downplayed his pain level and his injury and “barely even” 

checked him properly. (Id.) Analyn stated Plaintiff was exaggerating the pain level, telling 

Plaintiff she saw him catch himself and that it could have been worse. (Id.) 

Plaintiff contends Analyn and Walker were deliberately indifferent despite knowing he 

was dizzy and in bare feet. (Doc. 1 at 12.) He further contends Analyn and Walker “acted with a 

sufficient culpable state of mind” and that he suffered for nearly eighteen months. (Id.) He 

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contends his back still bothers him and his shoulder “still pops out if” he moves wrong in his 

sleep. (Id.) He contends the risk of harm was obvious and both Analyn and Walker subjected him 

to a substantial risk of physical harm “by giving [him] less then the dignity of men.” (Id.) Plaintiff 

asserts “no one took [his] pain serious” and he developed “extra suffering with frozen shoulder,” 

having to keep his arm steady to avoid pain. (Id.) Plaintiff contends Analyn and Walker “never 

took the obligation they had to take reasonable measures to guarantee” his safety, he was not 

treated “with the Eighth Amendment in [] mind,” and that both defendants “did what was easy 

instead of what was reasonable.” (Id. at 13) He states if Analyn and Walker would have provided 

a wheelchair in the first instance he would have avoided the subsequent injury. (Id.) He repeats 

his assertions he was ignored, and that Defendants did not care because it was Saturday. (Id.) 

Applicable Legal Standards & Analysis

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment if they are “deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to [a 

prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “A medical need 

is serious if failure to treat it will result in ‘“significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton 

infliction of pain.”’” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1081-82 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Jett v. 

Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 

(9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th 

Cir. 1997) (en banc)). 

To maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on medical care in prison, a plaintiff must 

first “show a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 

could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Second, 

the plaintiff must show the defendants’ response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” 

Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 

(quotation marks omitted)). 

As to the first prong, indications of a serious medical need “include the existence of an 

injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or 

treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily 

activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 

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1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation & internal quotation marks omitted); accord Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 

1122; Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Examples of serious medical needs 

include ‘[t]he existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and 

worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an 

individual’s daily activities; or the existence of chronic and substantial pain”). 

As to the second prong, deliberate indifference is “a state of mind more blameworthy than 

negligence” and “requires ‘more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests or 

safety.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). 

Deliberate indifference is shown where a prison official “knows that inmates face a substantial 

risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” 

Id. at 847. In medical cases, this requires showing: (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a 

prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference. Wilhelm, 680 

F.3d at 1122 (quoting Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). “A prisoner need not show his harm was 

substantial; however, such would provide additional support for the inmate’s claim that the 

defendant was deliberately indifferent to his needs.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096, citing McGuckin, 974 

F.2d at 1060. 

Deliberate indifference is a high legal standard. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1060 

(9th Cir. 2004). “Under this standard, the prison official must not only ‘be aware of the facts from 

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person 

‘must also draw the inference.’” Id. at 1057 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). “‘If a prison 

official should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the official has not violated the 

Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.’” Id. (quoting Gibson v. County of Washoe, 

Nevada, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002)).

To prevail on a deliberate-indifference claim, a plaintiff must also show that harm resulted 

from a defendant’s wrongful conduct. Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122; see also Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; 

Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 746 (9th Cir. 2002) (prisoner alleging deliberate indifference 

based on delay in treatment must show delay led to further injury). 

Here, liberally construing the complaint, Plaintiff has plausibly stated deliberate 

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indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants Analyn and Walker. This is so 

because Plaintiff has asserted a serious medical need—being found unconscious in his cell, 

reporting being drugged and raped and continuing to feel dizzy and suffering a later fall that 

injured his back and shoulder—thus meeting the first prong of the deliberate indifference test. 

Further, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a failure to respond by Analyn and Walker where both 

were aware Plaintiff had been found unconscious in his cell and was to be monitored, that 

Plaintiff alleged he had been drugged and raped, and continued to feel dizzy and unwell, and that 

after a subsequent fall, Plaintiff reported pain in his left shoulder. He also asserts he was denied a 

wheelchair, a sling, and an x-ray. Further, Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged harm by 

contending he suffers from chronic back pain, a loss of range of motion, a shoulder injury that 

continues to cause pain and suffering, and an inability to perform daily activities. These alleged 

facts meet the second prong of the deliberate indifference test. 

Nevertheless, as explained above concerning the claim against Defendant Siez, Plaintiff 

may not pursue his claims for monetary damages against Defendants Analyn and Walker in their 

official capacities. Aholelei, 488 F.3d at 1147. Plaintiff may only proceed in this action for 

monetary damages against Defendants Analyn and Walker in their individual capacities. Hafer, 

502 U.S. at 30; Porter, 319 F.3d at 491. 

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to randomly assign a district judge to this action. 

Further, and for the reasons given above, the Court finds Plaintiff has stated a cognizable 

Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim against Defendant Siez and cognizable Eighth 

Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims against Defendants Analyn 

and Walker, in their individual capacities. Therefore, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that:

1. This action PROCEED on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim 

against Defendant Siez, and his deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims 

against Defendants Analyn and Walker, in their individual capacities only; and

2. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Siez, Analyn and Walker, in their official 

capacities, be DISMISSED. 

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These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the district judge assigned to this

case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within 14 days of the date of service of these Findings 

and Recommendations, a party may file written objections with the Court. The document should 

be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file 

objections within the specified time may result in waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. 

Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th 

Cir. 1991)).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 27, 2023 ___________________ _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:23-cv-00557-KES-CDB Document 12 Filed 06/27/23 Page 12 of 12