Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-07308/USCOURTS-cand-3_17-cv-07308-2/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Armaspec, Inc.
Counter-claimant
J & K IP Assets, LLC
Counter-defendant

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

J & K IP ASSETS, LLC,

Plaintiff,

v.

ARMASPEC, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:17-cv-07308-WHO 

CLAIM CONSTRUCTION ORDER

Re: Dkt. No. 49

Plaintiff J & K IP Assets, LLC (“J&K”) brings this patent infringement action against 

defendant Armaspec, Inc. asserting that Armaspec’s Stealth Recoil Spring product infringes on 

J&K’s captured spring assembly patent. The parties ask me to construe only three terms of the 

single patent at issue in this case. My constructions are below. 

BACKGROUND

On August 12, 2014, the United States Patent and Trademark Office issued United States 

Patent Number 8,800,424 (“the ’424 Patent”), which is assigned to J&K. Opening Brief (“Op.”) 

Ex. A (“’424 Patent) [Dkt. No. 49-1]. On December 26, 2017, J&K filed a complaint in this Court 

asserting patent infringement against Armaspec. Dkt. No. 1. I have since granted Armaspec’s 

motion to dismiss the complaint, granted J&K’s motion to dismiss/strike Armaspec’s answer to 

the first amended complaint, and denied Armaspec’s motion to stay pending inter partes review. 

Dkt. Nos. 27, 34, 45. The parties briefed disputed claim terms from June 14 to July 5, and a 

combined tutorial and claim construction hearing took place on July 19, 2019. Dkt. No. 53. The 

parties expect an institution decision from the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB) later this 

month. Dkt. No. 52. 

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LEGAL STANDARD

Claim construction is a matter of law. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 

U.S. 370, 372 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

“Generally, a claim term is given its ordinary and customary meaning—the meaning that a term 

would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.” 

Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc., 822 F.3d 1312, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining the proper construction of a claim, a court 

begins with the intrinsic evidence of record, consisting of the claim language, the patent 

specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 

1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “A claim term used in multiple claims 

should be construed consistently . . . .” Inverness Med. Switzerland GmbH v. Princeton 

Biomeditech Corp., 309 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

“The appropriate starting point . . . is always with the language of the asserted claim itself.” 

Comark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “[T]he ordinary 

and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 

ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date 

of the patent application.” Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312. “There are only two exceptions to this 

general rule: 1) when a patentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicographer, or 2) when 

the patentee disavows the full scope of a claim term either in the specification or during 

prosecution.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Entm’t Am. LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 

Such redefinition or disavowal need not be express to be clear. Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City 

of New York v. Symantec Corp., 811 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 

Like a person of ordinary skill in the art, courts read terms in the context of the claim and 

of the entire patent, including the specification. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. The specification is 

“the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. “The 

construction that stays true to the claim language and most naturally aligns with the patent’s 

description of the invention will be, in the end, the correct construction.” Renishaw PLC v. 

Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1998). The court may also consider 

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the prosecution history of the patent, if in evidence. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980. In most situations, 

analysis of this intrinsic evidence alone will resolve claim construction disputes, Vitronics, 90 

F.3d at 1583; however, a court can further consult “trustworthy extrinsic evidence” to compare its 

construction to “widely held understandings in the pertinent technical field,” Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. 

Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 

DISCUSSION

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE TECHNOLOGY 

The ’424 Patent claims a captured spring assembly for a firearm. The key advancement of 

the invention is that it reduces the loud vibration noises that can result from firing a firearm. See 

’424 Patent 1:50–54 (noting that in some AR-15 rifles, the bold return spring rubs against the 

walls of the extension tube and results in “a loud and annoying buzzing sound that can exceed a 

second in duration after each round is fired”). This noise reduction is possible because of the 

guide rod, buffer, and shock absorber, which together control the spring’s movement during 

compression.

II. DISPUTED TERMS 

The parties dispute only three terms from the ’424 Patent. J&K argues that two of the 

three should have their ordinary and customary meaning and further criticizes Armaspec for 

departing from that view, which it expressed in its petition for inter partes review. Op. 1; see Shih 

Decl. Ex. A (IPR Petition) [Dkt. No. 39-2] 12–13 (referring only to the Phillips standard for 

ordinary and customary meaning and proposing no alternative constructions). Armaspec’s 

response brief does not address its reasons for deviating from its position before the PTAB. 

A. “internal limit element” 

Term J&K’s Proposal Armaspec’s Proposal 

“internal limit 

element”

Ordinary and customary meaning, which 

is a “limit element located internally” 

“A flange that protrudes 

inwardly from a surface.” 

This term can be found in claims 1 and 10. J&K argues that I need not construe this term 

because its meaning is clear and because the patent does not specify an alternate definition.1 Op. 

 

1 By contrast, the patent specification provides: “In the context of the specification, the terms 

‘rear’ and ‘rearward,’ and ‘front’ and ‘forward’ have the following definitions: ‘rear’ or ‘rearward’ 

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Brief 6. Armapsec argues that limit element “is not a common term with well-known meaning 

and will sound technical to a jury.” Resp. 5. It asserts that the ’424 Patent has only one 

embodiment, and the language and figure associated with that embodiment shows the “internal 

limit element” as a flange. Resp. 6; see ’424 Patent 2:29–32 (providing that “flange 36 protrudes 

inwardly from the [slider 38’s] interior surface [40] to define an aperture 94 and to limit forward 

movement of the bold return spring”); Figure 1B. J&K does not dispute that Armaspec accurately 

describes that embodiment. Instead it argues that Armaspec’s proposal lacks support in the claim 

language and is incompatible with a second embodiment described in the specification. 

I agree with J&K that this term needs no construction. Armapsec’s proposal injects 

confusion rather than clarify the term, and it imposes restrictions on scope that lack support in the 

claim language. The Federal Circuit has “expressly rejected the contention that if a patent 

describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be construed as being limited to 

that embodiment.”2 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005). This is so 

because the claims, not the embodiments, determine the scope of the patent grant and because 

people of ordinary skill in the art “rarely would confine their definitions of terms to the exact 

representations depicted in the embodiments.” Id. Armaspec does not support its proposal with 

the language from the claims themselves. Accordingly, I decline to construe the term with these 

limitations. “Internal limit element” will have its ordinary and customary meaning. 

B. “interior flange” 

Term J&K’s Proposal Armaspec’s Proposal 

“interior flange” Ordinary and customary meaning, 

which is a “flange located interiorly” 

“A flange that protrudes 

inwardly from a surface.” 

The parties dispute whether I should construe “interior” to mean “that protrudes inwardly 

from a surface.” As above, Armaspec’s proposal lacks support in the claim language and instead 

 

means in the direction away from the muzzle of the firearm while ‘front’ or ‘forward’ means it is 

in the direction towards the muzzle of the firearm.” ’424 Patent 5:22–26. 

2

J&K argues, and Armapsec disputes, that the patent describes a second embodiment. Op. 8–9; 

Resp. 6. I need not resolve this question because even assuming Armaspec is correct that the ’424 

Patent describes only one embodiment, I would not adopt its proposed construction. 

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comes from the specification.3 See Resp. 8. I will construe “interior flange” as having its ordinary 

and customary meaning. 

C. “buffer having a forward end” 

Term J&K’s Proposal Armaspec’s Proposal 

“buffer having a 

forward end” 

“A buffer with4an end that can be 

positioned towards the rifle’s 

muzzle.” 

“A buffer having a part of an 

area that is closer to the 

muzzle of the firearm.” 

The third disputed term can be found in claim 10, and it affects dependent claims 11 

through 14. The parties agree that the term should be construed and that the construction should 

account for the specification’s definition of “forward”: “in the direction towards the muzzle of the 

firearm.” ’424 Patent 5:25–26. 

Armaspec argues that “end” should be construed as “a part of an area.” I disagree. Jurors 

do not need help understanding the word, and Armaspec’s proposal injects confusion. The parties 

also dispute whether the term rifle or firearm should be used alongside the term muzzle. Claim 10 

indicates in the preamble that it claims “[a] buffer assembly for a rifle.” ’424 Patent 6:42. 

Armaspec presumably draws its proposal from the specification’s definition for “forward,” which 

describes the muzzle of the firearm. Id. 5:25–26. But it makes most sense to maintain consistency 

with the language of the claim where the term at issue can be found; accordingly, I will construe 

the term with the word rifle rather than firearm. 

The final dispute relates to the remaining language about the positioning of the buffer. 

J&K argues the buffer’s end can be positioned toward the muzzle while Armaspec contents that it 

is positioned closer to the muzzle. J&K first argues that Armaspec’s proposal would require the 

buffer to be placed within a firearm, whereas the claim language merely describes the intended use 

of the buffer as part of the technology. Op. 14. Armaspec counters that its proposal does not 

contain a requirement that the buffer be inside the firearm because “the firearm is already recited 

 

3 Even its grounding in the specification is weak. Armaspec argues that “the specification further 

defines interior as ‘protrudes inwardly from the surface.’” Resp. 8. But the full sentence in fact 

reads: “A flange 36 protrudes inwardly from the interior surface to define an aperture 94 and to 

limit forward movement of the bold return spring.” ’424 Patent 3:29–32. This language certainly 

does not serve to redefine interior, and it does not support Armaspec’s proposal. 

4

J&K consents to either “with” or “having.” 

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in the preamble.” Resp. 10. Second, J&K contends that the patent’s language does not support 

Armaspec’s injection of the words “closer to” because the patent uses the word “forward” to 

describe direction, rather than proximity. Op. 14. According to Armaspec, J&K improperly 

isolates “forward” and “end” whereas the term “forward end” should be read together. Resp. 10. 

The parties agree that the patent language does not require that the buffer be within the 

firearm. See Op. 14; Resp. 10. J&K’s proposal better reflects the absence of such a requirement. 

I also agree with J&K that Armaspec’s proposal of “closer to” improperly imposes a proximity 

requirement when the specification language defines “forward” in terms of orientation. 

Accordingly, I will construe the term “the buffer having a forward end” as “the buffer having an 

end toward the rifle’s muzzle.”5 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I will construe “internal limit element” and “interior flange” 

with their ordinary and customary meaning and “buffer having a forward end” as “buffer having 

an end toward the rifle’s muzzle.” 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 5, 2019

William H. Orrick

United States District Judge

 

5 When I proposed this construction at the hearing, neither party objected. 

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