Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00983/USCOURTS-almd-3_06-cv-00983-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jeffrey Barron
Plaintiff
Amhad Rashad Ranson
Defendant
Werner Enterprises, Inc.
Defendant

Document Text:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, EASTERN DIVISION

JEFFREY BARRON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v. ) 3:06cv983-MHT

) (WO) 

WERNER ENTERPRISES, INC., )

and AMHAD RASHAD RANSON, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This lawsuit, which was removed from state to federal

court based on diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction, see

28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, is now before the court on

plaintiff Jeffrey Barron’s motion to remand pursuant to

the “voluntary-involuntary” rule. For the reasons

outlined below, the court finds that the voluntaryinvoluntary rule applies, and thus this action should be

remanded to state court.

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I. BACKGROUND

The events leading up to this order are

chronologically as follows:

July 8, 2005: Barron was injured in a three-car

accident in which he and defendants William Lewis Jennings

and Amhad Rashad Ranson were the drivers.

June 19, 2006: Barron filed this lawsuit in an

Alabama state court charging Jennings and Ranson with

negligence and wantonness. He also named the Chambers

County Commission and Werner Enterprises, Inc. as

defendants, alleging that they were employers of Jennings

and Ranson, respectively, at the time of the accident. He

named Jennings as a defendant in both his official

capacity (as a Deputy Sheriff of Chambers County) and

individual capacity. 

July 25, 2006: Both Jennings and the commission filed

motions to dismiss. In support of his motion, Jennings

argued that he was absolutely immune from this lawsuit.

In support of its motion, the commission argued that

deputy sheriffs are employees of the state, and not the

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county in which the serve. Barron opposed Jennings’s

motion to the extent he had sued Jennings in his

individual capacity; he did not oppose the commission’s

motion.

October 25, 2006: The state trial court granted both

dismissal motions. 

October 31, 2006: Because the two non-diverse

defendants, Jennings and the commission, had been

dismissed, Werner removed this case to federal court based

on complete diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction between

Barron and the two remaining defendants. Barron is a

citizen of Alabama while Werner is a citizen solely of

Nebraska, and Ranson, who had not been served at the time,

is a citizen of Louisiana.

November 3, 2006: This federal court issued an order

asking the parties to show cause as to why this case

should not be remanded to state court based on the

voluntary-involuntary rule.

November 7, 2006: Barron filed a motion in the state

trial court asking that court to reconsider its order

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1. In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions

of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the

(continued...)

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dismissing Jennings in his individual capacity. In

support of the motion, Barron asked that he be allowed to

amend his state-court complaint to allege his claims

against Jennings in more detail.

November 20, 2006: Barron filed a motion in federal

court asking that this case be remanded back to state

court based on the voluntary-involuntary rule.

II. DISCUSSION

Under the “voluntary-involuntary” rule, a case can be

removed under diversity jurisdiction if the “resident

defendant was dismissed from the case by the voluntary act

of the plaintiff, but if the dismissal was the result of

either the defendant’s or the court’s action against the

wish of the plaintiff, the case could not be removed.”

Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir.

1967).1

 Behind the rule is a notion of finality that is

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1. (...continued)

close of business on September 30, 1981.

2. Barron agrees that because he did not oppose the

dismissal of the Chambers County Commission, its

dismissal was voluntary.

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essential to “prevent removal to a federal court when the

nondiverse party was eliminated by a state court order that

might be reversed on appeal.” 14 Wright, Miller & Cooper,

§ 3723. See also Weems v. Louis Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545

(5th Cir. 1967). Relying on this rule, Barron contends

that his case cannot be removed because Jennings was

dismissed as the result of state-court action against

Barron’s wish.2

Werner responds with the decision of the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals in Insinga v. LaBella, 845 F.2d

249 (11th Cir. 1988). There, the appellate court held

that, even though the dismissal of the defendant was

against the wish of the plaintiff, the voluntaryinvoluntary rule did not apply and the case was properly

removed where the dismissal was based on jurisdiction,

which included a dismissal based on the claimed sovereign

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immunity of the defendant. 845 F.2d at 254. It would

appear that Insinga should control here and thus this case

should not be remanded, for Jennings was dismissed for a

jurisdictional reason, that is, based on sovereign

immunity. See Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, ___ So. 2d

___, ___, 2006 WL 1304902, *2 (Ala. May 12,2006) (“When an

action is one against the State or a State agency, § 14 [of

the Alabama Constitution] wholly removes subject-matter

jurisdiction from the courts.”). However, a more detailed

analysis of the Insinga decision indicates that the holding

of the case clearly does not apply here.

In Insinga, the case was removed from state to federal

court after the time for appeal from a summary judgment,

granting in favor of a resident defendant based on

sovereign immunity, had run, and thus the judgment was

final. The Eleventh Circuit held that the voluntaryinvoluntary rule did not apply and upheld the removal. The

appellate court carefully wrote that, “while finality in

the state court as to all resident defendants may be a

necessary condition to support removal, it is not a

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sufficient prerequisite nor is it synonymous with

voluntariness.” 845 F.2d at 252. Thus, in Insinga, the

fact that the resident defendant had been dismissed and the

fact that that dismissal had become final in state court

(that is, the time for appeal had run, with the result that

the plaintiff had thereby acquiesced to the dismissal) was

not enough. Relying on a Supreme Court case where the

voluntary-involuntary rule was applied even though the

dismissal of the defendant had become final, Lathrop, Shea

& Henwood Co. v. Interior Constr. & Improvement Co., 215

U.S. 246 (1909), the Eleventh Circuit said that finality

was not enough; there had to be more. Insinga, 845 F.2d

at 252. Thus, absent finality, the voluntary-involuntary

rule is dispositive.

The Eleventh Circuit said this additional

determinative factor was whether the dismissal of the

resident defendant against the plaintiff’s wish was

jurisdictional or was based on the merits. Id. at 254.

If jurisdictional, the presence of the dismissed defendant

was more akin to ‘fraudulent joinder’ and the voluntaryCase 3:06-cv-00983-MHT-VPM Document 15 Filed 11/28/06 Page 7 of 10
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involuntary rule did not apply; if on the merits, the

voluntary-involuntary rule applied. Id. 

Critical to the Insinga’s court discussion was, as

stated, that, “while finality in the state court as to all

resident defendants may be a necessary condition to support

removal, it is not a sufficient prerequisite.” 845 F.2d

at 254 (emphasis added). The court was looking at, and

most importantly talking about, only those circumstances

where finality was present; it was saying that finality

alone was not enough. With the statement, it was not

saying that finality was not necessary; to the contrary,

it was saying that state-court finality is a “necessary

condition” but not the only condition. 

Indeed, this understanding is consistent with the

critical comment in Insinga that, “In most of the instances

in which the Supreme Court has employed the

voluntary-involuntary rule, it appears that the elimination

of the resident defendants was not final at the time the

issue of the propriety of removal was considered because

the state appellate process as to those defendants was not

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complete. ” 845 F.2d at 252-253 (citing American Car &

Foundry Co. v. Kettelhake, 236 U.S. 311 (1915); Kansas City

Suburban Belt Ry. v. Herman, 187 U.S. 63 (1902); Whitcomb

v. Smithson, 175 U.S. 635 (1900)).

Here, this court is presented with the converse of

that that was presented in Insinga: a situation where the

dismissal of the resident defendant was not final. Only

if the dismissal of Jennings had been made final before

removal would the Insinga question (whether that dismissal

was jurisdictional or based on the merits) be critical and

have to be answered. Because the dismissal of Jennings was

not final, the voluntary-involuntary rule applies and this

case must be remanded.

Werner cannot, with removal, cut off Barron’s proper

right to ask the state trial court to reconsider Jennings’s

dismissal and, failing in that effort, to ask the state

appellate courts, including the Alabama Supreme Court, to

review the action of the trial court. In short, Werner

cannot, by itself, foreclose any state appellate review of

the state trial court’s action.

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Accordingly, because this court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction, it is the ORDER, JUDGMENT, and DECREE of the

court that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), plaintiff

Jeffrey Barron’s motion to remand (doc. no. 11) is granted

and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court of Chambers

County, Alabama.

The clerk of the court is DIRECTED to take appropriate

steps to effect the remand.

DONE, this the 28th day of November, 2006.

 /s/ Myron H. Thompson 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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