Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00260/USCOURTS-azd-4_16-cv-00260-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Wynona Mixon
Plaintiff
United States Bureau of Prisons
Defendant

Document Text:

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 

Wynona Mixon, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

United States Bureau of Prisons, 

Defendant. 

No. CV-16-00260-TUC-DCB (BGM) 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

 Currently pending before the Court is the Government’s Motion to Dismiss 

Complaint (Doc. 12). Plaintiff filed his opposition (Doc. 13), and the Government 

replied (Doc. 16). As such, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication. 

 Pursuant to Rules 72.1 and 72.2 of the Local Rules of Civil Procedure, this matter 

was referred to Magistrate Judge Macdonald for Report and Recommendation. On 

December 5, 2016, oral argument was held before the Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald. 

Minute Entry 12/5/2016 (Doc. 20). The matter is ripe for review. The Magistrate Judge 

recommends that the District Court grant the Government’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 12). 

 . . . 

 . . . 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 1 of 11
- 2 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

 Plaintiff Wynona Mixon is one of several named defendants in Goins v. Apker, et 

al., USDC Case No. CV-13-00295-TUC-JGZ. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 2. The Goins matter 

arose out of a series of events that occurred at BOP’s Tucson Federal Penitentiary 

(“USP–Tucson”) in August 2011. Id. 

 Ms. Mixon was employed as a case manager at USP–Tucson during the period of 

July 8, 2011 through August 12, 2011. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 8. Inmate Christopher 

Goins arrived at the facility on July 8, 2011. Id. Ms. Mixon was assigned as his case 

manager and interacted with him a few times during this time. Id. In 2013, Goins 

commenced a civil suit against Ms. Mixon and several other BOP employees claiming 

civil damages for their actions within the scope of their employment during his 

incarceration. Id. at ¶ 9. “Goins accuses Ms. Mixon of ‘rape[] and sexual[] assault’ and 

the other five defendants of failing to prevent Ms. Mixon’s abuse of Goins.” Def.’s Mot. 

to Dismiss Compl. (Doc. 12) at 2 n.2. Upon receipt of the civil claim in 2014, Ms. Mixon 

tendered the defense to BOP. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 10. BOP declined to accept defense. 

Id. BOP is, however, defending the other five defendants in the Goins matter. Def.’s 

Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (Doc. 12) at 2. Ms. Mixon again sought representation after her 

February 9, 2016 acquittal of all criminal charges related to the Goins incident. Compl 

(Doc. 1) at ¶ 10. BOP again denied her request. Id.

 Plaintiff brought the instant case seeking declaratory judgment to determine 

whether Ms. Mixon is entitled to have legal representation paid for by BOP in the Goins

case pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 50.15. Compl. (Doc. 1) at ¶ 6. Plaintiff relies on Section 703 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 2 of 11
- 3 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) for review of BOP’s refusal to provide 

and/or pay for representation. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff further alleges a violation of her 

procedural Due Process rights. Id. at ¶ 12. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 A complaint is to contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that 

the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. While Rule 8 does not 

demand detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 

1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of 

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; Pareto v. Fed. 

Deposit Ins. Corp., 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (“conclusory allegations of law and 

unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.”). 

 Dismissal is appropriate where a plaintiff has failed to “state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted.” Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 

929 (2007)). Further, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 

for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability 

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 3 of 11
- 4 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted). 

 “When ruling on a motion to dismiss, [the Court must] accept all factual 

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable 

to the nonmoving party.” Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los 

Angeles, 648 F.3d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 

1072 (9th Cir. 2005)). “The court draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff.” Id. (citing Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution, 513 F.3d 1038, 1043 

n.2 (9th Cir. 2008)). This Court is not required, however, to accept conclusory 

statements as a factual basis. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 

S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Mann v. City of Tucson, 782 F.2d 790, 793 

(9th Cir. 1986) (“Although we must, in general, accept the facts alleged in the complaint 

as true, wholly vague and conclusory allegations are not sufficient to withstand a motion 

to dismiss.”). 

III. ANALYSIS 

 The Government seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint “[b]ecause Plaintiff has 

no property interest in representation by the Department of Justice, and because 

representation denials are unreviewable matters committed to agency discretion[.]” 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (Doc. 12) at 2. As such, the Government urges that 

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id.

A. Due Process 

 As an initial matter, the Government asserts that “Plaintiff has no property interest 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 4 of 11
- 5 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

in individual-capacity federal representation[,]” and therefore may not seek injunctive 

relief to reverse its discretionary decision to deny her request. Def.’s MTD (Doc. 12) at 

3.

 The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that “[p]rocess is not an 

end in itself[,] [i]ts constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the 

individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.” Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 

250, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1748, 74 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983) (citations omitted). Thus, “[t]he State 

[or an agency] may choose to require procedures for reasons other than protection against 

deprivation of substantive rights, . . . but in making that choice the State does not create 

an independent substantive right.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Town of Castle Rock, 

Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 771, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2812, 162 L.Ed.2d 658 (2005) 

(“Property cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation.” (Souter, J., 

concurring)). 

 “[T]he conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer 

thereof is a party, or is interested . . . is reserved to officers of the Department of 

Justice[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 516. Section 517, 28 U.S.C., provides for representation of 

federal employees by DOJ. Section 50.15, 28 C.F.R., gives guidance to DOJ as to 

whether representation may be provided to an employee. Section 50.15 states, in relevant 

part, that “[u]nder the procedures set forth below, a federal employee . . . may be 

provided representation in civil, criminal and Congressional proceedings in which he is 

sued, subpoenaed, or charged in his individual capacity . . . when the actions for which 

representation is requested reasonably appear to have been performed with in the scope 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 5 of 11
- 6 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

of the employee’s employment and the Attorney General or his designee determines that 

providing representation would otherwise be in the interest of the United States.” 28 

C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (emphasis added). The language of § 50.15 is permissive. Moreover, 

“[f]ederal employees are . . . provided with legal counsel in order to protect the interests 

of the Government, not the individual interests of the employee.” Ryan v. United States, 

227 Ct. Cl. 711, 713–14 (1981) (emphasis in original). As the Ryan court observed, 

“[t]he Justice Department clearly has no obligation to a particular employee[.]” Id. at 

714. 

 Here, Plaintiff cannot establish a property interest. “[A] benefit is not a protected 

entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.” Town of 

Castle Rock, Colo., 545 U.S. at 756, 125 S. Ct. at 2803. The decision to provide 

representation is at the discretion of the Department of Justice. See Ryan, 227 Ct. Cl. at 

714. Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that the rule is permissive. Def.’s Response (Doc. 

13) at 3. Moreover, the presence of a procedure for providing individuals legal 

representation, does not create a property interest or entitlement to such representation. 

See Olim, 461 U.S. at 250, 103 S. Ct. at 1748. Because the entitlement that Plaintiff 

seeks is granted or denied solely at the Department of Justice’s discretion, Plaintiff does 

not possess a property interest for purposes of due process.1

 1

 Plaintiff asserts that because the Government has elected to defend her co-defendants, 

its decision equates to a decision to defend the entire case. See Def.’s Response (Doc. 13) at 3. 

This argument is without merit. The plain language of 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 suggests this is an 

individualized, not legal case by legal case, decision. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(b)(2) 

(“Representation is not available to a federal employee whenever . . . [i]t is otherwise determined 

by the Department that it is not in the interest of the United States to provide representation to 

the employee.” (emphasis added)). 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 6 of 11
- 7 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

B. Judicial Review

 The Government asserts that the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) does not 

apply to Plaintiff’s claim, and dismissal is proper. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Compl. (Doc. 

12) at 5–6. Plaintiff argues that because the Department of Justice agreed to represent 

five (5) of the defendants in the underlying matter, it must also provide representation for 

her. See Response (Doc. 13) at 3–4. 

 The APA provides that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency 

action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a 

relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA does 

not apply, however, (1) when “statutes preclude judicial review;” or (2) “agency action 

[that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2). The Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has described these two circumstances as follows: 

The first of these circumstances is that in which a court would have no 

meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of 

discretion and there thus is no law to apply. . . . The second such 

circumstance is that in which the agency’s action requires a complicated 

balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within [the agency’s] 

expertise, including the prioritization of agency resources, likelihood of 

success in fulfilling the agency’s statutory mandate, and compatibility with 

the agency’s overall policies. 

Center for Policy Analysis on Trade and Health v. Office of the United States Trade, 540 

F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted) (brackets in original). 

“[R]eview is not to be had in those rare circumstances where the relevant statute is drawn 

so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s 

exercise of discretion.” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 191, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2030–31, 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 7 of 11
- 8 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

124 L.Ed.2d 101 (1993) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “A determination of 

whether agency action is subject to judicial review under § 701 of the APA is a 

jurisdictional issue.” Turner v. Schultz, 187 F.Supp.2d 1288, 1291 (D. Colo. 2002) 

(citations omitted). As such, “before any review at all may be had, a party must first 

clear the hurdle of § 701(a).” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828, 105 S. Ct. 1649, 

1654, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). 

 The Department of Justice may decline representation if “[i]t is otherwise 

determined by the Department that it is not in the interest of the United States to provide 

representation to the employee.” 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(b)(2). Moreover, “the Attorney 

General has long possessed the power to decide whether to provide counsel for a federal 

employee.” Falkowski v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n (Falkowski II), 783 

F.2d 252, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1986). “Congress gave DoJ broad discretionary authority to 

provide federal employees with private counsel.” Falkowski v. Equal Employment 

Opportunity Comm’n (Falkowski I), 764 F.2d 907, 911 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The 

Department of Justice “is far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 

variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831–32, 

105 S. Ct. at 1656. Similar to the decision in Chaney not to enforce the statute, such 

ordering applies with equal force to the decision to provide a federal employee with 

private counsel. See Falkowski I, 764 F.2d at 911. 

 Here, Plaintiff cannot “clear the hurdle of § 701(a).” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828, 

105 S. Ct. at 1654. Because DOJ’s decision regarding representation is wholly within its 

discretion, there can be no judicial review under the APA. See Payne v. Elie, 2012 WL 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 8 of 11
- 9 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

748285, *1 (D. Ariz. 2012). Plaintiff’s argument that review can be had pursuant to 5 

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) of the APA fails to recognize that § 701(a) is a gateway through 

which she cannot pass. 

 Furthermore, Plaintiff’s comparison to Hall v. Clinton, 285 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 

2002), is without merit. The Clinton court reiterated “that the DOJ’s decision not to 

provide legal representation under section 517 was unreviewable.” Clinton, 285 F.3d at 

79 (citing Falkowski I, 764 F.2d at 911). Plaintiff, however, relies on the Clinton court’s 

refusal “to extend Heckler to the DOJ’s affirmative decision to represent [Appellee 

Clinton].” Plaintiff argues that DOJ’s decision to represent the other five (5) defendants 

in the Goins matter represents an affirmative decision entitling her to judicial review. As 

discussed in Section III.A. n.1, supra, the plain language of the C.F.R. indicates that 

DOJ’s decisions regarding providing counsel are individualized decisions. Plaintiff is not 

entitled to judicial review pursuant to the APA. 

C. Equal Protection

 To the extent that Plaintiff asserts an equal protection claim in her response, such a 

claim must fail. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 

that no state shall “deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws.” U.S. Const., Amend. XIV § 1. “The Equal Protection Clause . . . applies strict 

scrutiny if the aggrieved party is a member of a protected or suspect class, or otherwise 

suffers the unequal burdening of a fundamental right.” United States v. Juvenile Male, 

670 F.3d 999, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012). 

 Here, as discussed in Section III.A., supra, Plaintiff cannot establish the 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 9 of 11
- 10 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

entitlement to a fundamental right. Furthermore, she asserts that she was treated 

dissimilarly from her co-defendants in the Goins matter, but fails to present any evidence 

as to her protected class. As such, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim should be denied. 

D. Leave to Amend 

 The Government seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend. 

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 12). “Dismissal without leave to amend is improper unless 

it is clear, upon de novo review, that the complaint could not be saved by any 

amendment.” Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations 

omitted). Here, the Court finds that there is no set of facts that could cure the 

deficiencies found in Plaintiff’s Complaint, and dismissal should be without leave to 

amend.

IV. CONCLUSION 

 Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a 

constitutional property interest entitling her to due process protection. Furthermore, in 

light of DOJ’s discretion regarding the refusal to provide legal representation for a 

federal employee, Plaintiff cannot “clear the hurdle of § 701(a)” and is not entitled to 

judicial review under the APA. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828, 105 S. Ct. at 1654. Finally, 

Plaintiff has failed to present a cognizable equal protection claim.

V. RECOMMENDATION

 For the reasons delineated above, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 10 of 11
- 11 - 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

7 

8 

9 

10 

11 

12 

13 

14 

15 

16 

17 

18 

19 

20 

21 

22 

23 

24 

25 

26 

27 

28 

District Judge enter an order GRANTING the Government’s Government’s Motion to 

Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 12) without leave to amend. 

 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, any party may serve and file written objections within fourteen (14) days after 

being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. A party may respond to 

another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If objections are not timely filed, they may be deemed waived. If 

objections are filed, the parties should use the following case number: CV-16-0260-

TUC-DCB. 

 Dated this 27th day of January, 2017. 

Honorable Bruce G. Macdonald

United States Magistrate Judge 

Case 4:16-cv-00260-DCB-BGM Document 21 Filed 01/27/17 Page 11 of 11