Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03536/USCOURTS-ca8-09-03536-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
United States of America
Appellee
James William Young
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable John A. Jarvey, United States District Judge for the Southern

District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 09-3536

___________

United States of America, * 

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the Southern

* District of Iowa.

James William Young, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: April 14, 2010

Filed: July 19, 2010

___________

Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

___________

SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.

Following trial, a jury convicted James William Young of one count of

attempting to entice a minor to engage in sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

2422(b). The district court1

 sentenced Young to 160 months imprisonment, a $100

special assessment, and 10 years supervised release. Young appeals, challenging his

conviction, the refusal of his proffered jury instructions on abandonment and

entrapment, and his sentencing enhancements for misrepresentation of identity and

obstruction of justice. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual,

§§2G1.3(b)(2)(A), 3C1.1. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

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2

“The Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force involves investigating those

offenses that include production of child pornography, possession of, trading of, and

investigating individuals that utilize the Internet to have sexual contact with minor

persons.” (Detention Hr’g Tr. 2-3.)

3

“Grooming” is a term utilized by the Internet Crimes Against Children Task

Force which refers to “a way that subjects, adult subjects [converse] with persons on

the Internet that are under the age of 18. For example, . . . the subject might talk about

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I.

On November 4, 2008, at 3:50 p.m., Young, a 33-year-old married father of

three, entered an adult online chat room entitled “romance, adult,” on Yahoo! Instant

Messenger. Young utilized the screen name “Funminqc” and sent an instant message

to an individual with the screen name “Erj94e.” The person at “Erj94e” responded

and disclosed that her name was “Emily” and that she was a 14-year-old female.

Unbeknownst to Young, in reality “Emily” was undercover Dewitt, Iowa Police

Officer Shai Cruciani of the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force.2

Emily and Young chatted for approximately one hour. After Emily disclosed

that she disliked band, Young told Emily that he worked as an engineer for Alliant

Energy, although, in reality, he was a band director at a high school in Clinton, Iowa.

Young asked Emily if she had a boyfriend and she responded that she did not. Young

also told Emily that he was not married, discussed the possibility of a future meeting

and provided Emily with his cell phone number. Young sent Emily a picture of

himself, and Emily sent Young a photograph that had been digitally modified to

appear to be of a 14-year-old female. 

Young and Emily chatted online and exchanged emails on several occasions

between November 4 and November 13, 2008. During their discussions, Young

continued “grooming”3

 Emily by never indicating that he was a band director and

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things that the . . . person under age 18 would be interested in such as what they like

to do with their friends, where they like to eat, what they like to do for fun . . . . The

purpose of the grooming is to build a trusting relationship between the two parties.”

(Trial Tr. vol. II, 132.)

4

We have avoided making any edits that would alter the meaning of the

electronic communication; thus, the quoted language includes grammatical and

typographical errors.

-3-

discussing topics he knew would be of interest to her. As the chats progressed, they

became more sexually explicit in nature, including references to sexual acts the two

might perform with each other. Specifically, Young inquired if Emily had “ever done

oral . . . ever had a guy lick you?”4

 (Trial Tr. vol. II, 147.) When she responded “no,”

Young stated, “K, well may have to give you that experience.” (Id.)

Emily eventually agreed to meet Young in person. Emily told Young that she

had seen a Super 8 Motel close to Westbrook Park in DeWitt, Iowa. Young offered

to obtain a room at the Super 8. Young warned Emily to keep their relationship and

planned meeting private. Young specifically told Emily not to tell anyone because

“[he] would be locked up” for “being with a minor.” (Id. at 149.) 

During one of the final online conversations between Emily and Young, the

discussion progressed to include graphic details of an anticipated sexual encounter,

with Young indicating that he wanted to “kiss, touch, and lick” Emily and suggesting

that the two have sexual intercourse at the motel. (Id. at 155.) Young and Emily

exchanged emails to arrange the details of their meeting, which was to take place on

November 13, 2008. Emily suggested that Young pick her up at Westbrook Park, but

the two eventually decided that she would walk to the Super 8 Motel. Emily indicated

that she would be dressed in jeans and a pink coat. Young planned to arrive at

approximately 3:00 p.m., check into a room, and leave a note containing Emily’s

name and his room number on the windshield of his car. 

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Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

-4-

On November 13, 2008, Young used his personal credit card to reserve a room

at the Super 8 Motel in Dewitt, Iowa. Young then drove to the Super 8 followed by

several undercover police officers. Upon his arrival at the motel at approximately

3:10 p.m., he attempted to reserve a room at the front desk, however his credit card

was declined. Young told the motel clerk that he was going to withdraw cash and then

return. Young next drove to a U.S. Bank Automated Teller Machine (“ATM”), where

Young appeared to attempt a cash withdrawal. Young’s account, however, had

insufficient funds and Young called the Super 8 clerk and cancelled his reservation

due to his inability to secure any payment.

Young next drove to a middle school and high school near the Super 8. Young

traveled back and forth between the schools and motel several times and circled the

parking lots. Young eventually drove to Westbrook Park. Officer Tamii Gordy,

another undercover officer with the Dewitt Police Department, was standing in the

park dressed in jeans and a pink coat. When Young saw the undercover officer, he

began honking and yelling. Officers then arrested Young.

The officers gave Young his Miranda5

 warnings and Young agreed to an

interview. This interview occurred prior to Young’s discovery that “Emily” was not,

in fact, a 14-year-old female. During the interview, Young indicated that he had

“feelings that [he was] not proud of for the last 15 years” and that he had been online

chatting with a 14-year-old girl named Emily. (Id. at 169.) Young indicated that the

chat topics included, “sex once, playing cards, eating pizza, that they were supposed

to meet in the hotel room for four hours, possibly take a bath because she liked to take

baths, [and] they had talked about touching and kissing and oral.” (Id. at 137-38.)

When asked whether a sexual encounter would have occurred between himself and

Emily in the hotel room, Young responded that “he didn’t know if it would [have

been] 100 percent innocent while in the room.” (Id. at 138.) During the search

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incident to Young’s arrest, officers discovered a condom on Young’s person. After

obtaining a search warrant for Young’s car, officers recovered a note with the name

“Emily” written on it and a bottle of bubble bath. 

On December 12, 2008, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Young

with attempted enticement of a minor to engage in sexual activities, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 2422(b). At trial, several officers involved in the investigation testified about

surveillance videos at the Super 8 and electronic evidence they had obtained from

Young’s online chats with Emily. The government also introduced evidence of

sexually explicit online chats between Young and other females under the age of 18,

in some of which Young attempted to arrange meetings with other minors. 

Young pled not guilty and stated that he had been “tempted” by Emily, that his

online conversations were merely fantasies, and that he had not intended to go through

with the planned sexual encounter, but had traveled to the Super 8 out of concern for

Emily’s safety. Young testified that he had used a “maxed out credit card” because

he had never expected to obtain a room. (Trial Tr. vol. III, 317-18.) He also stated

that he had driven to the ATM to watch for Emily and not to withdraw money.

Finally, he testified that, after cancelling the reserved room, he had driven around in

search of Emily only to ensure that she was safe.

Young requested that the jury be instructed on his abandonment and entrapment

defenses. Young’s proffered abandonment instruction read: 

One of the issues in this case is whether the defendant abandoned his

attempt. If the defendant abandoned his attempt he must be found not

guilty. The government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant did not abandon his attempt. When the actor’s

conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt it is an affirmative

defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise

prevented its commission under the circumstances manifesting a

complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

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Section 9.05 does not contain a specific model instruction, however, the notes

to section 9.05 state: “[N]o general instruction is provided because each such

instruction must be drafted in accord with the particular issues of the case.” 8th Cir.

Model Jury Instructions § 9.05, Notes on Use (2007).

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Renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in

whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the

inception of the actor’s course of conduct, that increase the probability

of detection or apprehension or that make more difficult the

accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete

if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a

more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another by

similar objective or victim. 

(Appellant’s Br. Add. 8-9 (citing 8th Cir. Model Jury Instructions § 9.05 (2007);6

Model Penal Code § 5.01 (2001); United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir.

1988)).) Young’s proffered entrapment instruction stated: 

One of the issues in this case is whether the defendant was entrapped.

If the defendant was entrapped, he must be found not guilty. The

government has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that

the defendant was not entrapped. If the defendant before contact with

[the officers] did have an intent or disposition to commit the crime

charged . . . then he was not entrapped, even though [the officer]

provided a favorable opportunity to commit the crime or made

committing the crime easier or even participated in acts essential to the

crime. 

(Id. at 7 (quoting 8th Cir. Model Jury Instructions § 9.01 (2007)).) The district court

refused both instructions, finding that they were not supported by the evidence.

On April 15, 2009, a jury found Young guilty of enticement of a minor to

engage in illicit sexual activity. Young moved for a new trial, claiming that the

district court improperly refused his proposed abandonment and entrapment

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instructions. The district court denied the motion, stating that “the requested

[abandonment] instruction would have permitted the jury to acquit the defendant after

finding that he completed the crime” as Young “had already taken several substantial

steps, thereby completing the crime of attempt.” (District Ct. Order 6-7.) As to the

entrapment instruction, the court explained, “The defendant’s theory of entrapment

was not supported by the evidence presented at trial.” (Id. at 8.) 

At Young’s sentencing hearing, the district court increased Young’s offense

level by two for misrepresentation of identity, pursuant to USSG §2G1.3(b)(2)(A).

The court explained,

Here, it is not speculative to suggest that a child would be more alerted,

more hesitant to discuss and agree to sexual behavior with an adult if the

child knew that the person was a teacher . . . someone married with

children . . . someone who’s directly involved by their occupation or

avocation in serving and particularly protecting children. 

(Sentencing Hr’g Tr. 21.) The court also applied a two-level enhancement for

obstruction of justice, pursuant to USSG §3C1.1, stating, “I find by a preponderance

of the evidence that [Young’s] testimony [proclaiming his innocence] was

intentionally false.” (Id. at 21-22.) Based on these enhancements, Young’s advisory

Guidelines range was 151 to 188 months imprisonment. The district court sentenced

Young to 160 months imprisonment followed by 10 years of supervised release. 

II.

On appeal, Young challenges: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence in support of

his conviction; (2) the district court’s refusal of his proffered abandonment and

entrapment jury instructions; and (3) his sentence enhancements for misrepresentation

of identity and obstruction of justice. 

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Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) reads:

Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or

foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial

jurisdiction of the United States knowingly persuades, induces,

entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of

18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which

any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to

do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than

10 years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).

-8-

A.

Young first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming that he was

merely in the “preparation” stages of the crime and several steps remained before he

would have completed an attempt. We review the sufficiency of the evidence de

novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. United

States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809, 812 (8th Cir. 2009). The jury’s verdict will be

upheld if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable jury

to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

In order to convict a defendant for enticement of a minor to engage in sexual

activities,7

 the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant:

(1) “used a facility of interstate commerce, such as the internet or the telephone

system;” (2) “knowingly used the facility of interstate commerce with the intent to

persuade or entice a person to engage in illegal sexual activity;” and (3) “believed that

the person he sought to persuade or entice was under the age of eighteen.” See United

States v. Pierson, 544 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2431

(2009). “The elements of attempt are (1) intent to commit the predicate offense, and

(2) conduct that is a substantial step toward its commission.” United States v.

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Spurlock, 495 F.3d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Blue Bird, 372

F.3d 989, 993 (8th Cir. 2004)). An attempt exists when a defendant’s actions go

“beyond mere preparation; [are] necessary to the consummation of the crime; and . .

. strongly corroborate [the defendant’s] criminal intent to [commit the predicate

offense].” Id.

In attempted enticement of a minor cases, the defendant’s intent can be inferred

when the defendant has online conversations of a sexual nature with a minor. See

United States v. Patten, 397 F.3d 1100, 1102-03 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e have no

difficulty concluding that the transcripts of the Internet chats and the telephone

conversation are sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Patten

intended to persuade “Sarah” to engage in sexual activity.”). The evidence in the

record overwhelmingly supports Young’s intent. Young’s various internet chats with

Emily are consistent with his intent to entice her to meet him and engage in sexual

activities, as he engaged in several discussions with Emily which involved sex,

although he knew that Emily was only 14-years-old. See Patten, 397 F.3d at 1102-03.

The condom, note with the name “Emily,” and bottle of bubble bath discovered by

officers further support Young’s intent to engage in the crime as they were specifically

mentioned during the online conversations. Additionally, even after he had been

arrested, Young confessed to officers that he had planned a meeting with Emily on the

internet and indicated that he was not sure that “it would [have been] 100 percent

innocent while in the room.” (Trial Tr. vol. II, at 138.) 

Whether Young took a substantial step towards completion of the crime merits

a more detailed analysis. A substantial step generally exists when a defendant takes

actions “necessary to the consummation of the crime” that were of “such a nature that

a reasonable observer, viewing [the actions] in context could conclude . . . that [the

actions were] undertaken in accordance with a design to” commit the actual offense.

United States v. Mims, 812 F.2d 1068, 1077 (8th Cir. 1987) (quotation omitted).

Indeed, we have previously held that a defendant took substantial steps where he

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arranged to meet the minor at a certain time or place and traveled to the designated

meeting location. See United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 809 (8th Cir. 2009)

(finding that the defendant took a substantial step towards commission of the crime

when he drove “two hours to meet [the minor for a sexual liaison] while she was

purportedly home alone”); Patten, 397 F.3d at 1104 (“There is clear authority for the

government’s position that Patten’s act of driving to the arranged meeting place in

West Fargo was relevant evidence of a substantial step.”); United States v. Dickson,

149 F. App’x 543, 544 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (finding a substantial

step when the defendant “initiated the conversation with [a minor], tried to persuade

her to engage in sexual activity, arranged to meet her for that purpose, and was

waiting for her at the arranged time and place when he was arrested”).

Here, Young used his personal credit card to reserve the motel, traveled to the

motel, attempted to charge the room to his credit card upon arrival at the motel, and

drove to an ATM after his credit card was declined, all prior to cancelling the motel

room. Moreover, Young did not leave after cancelling the room; instead, he drove

around the area and eventually traveled to the park Emily had mentioned in a prior

online chat. All of these acts establish that Young took not just one, but several

substantial steps towards committing the crime of enticement of a minor under our

case law. See Myers, 575 F.3d at 809; Patten, 397 F.3d at 1104. We therefore

conclude that the evidence supports Young’s jury conviction for attempted enticement

of a minor as a reasonable jury could find Young guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

See Molsbarger, 551 F.3d at 812.

B.

Young next challenges the district court’s refusal of his proffered jury

instructions on the defenses of entrapment and abandonment. We review the district

court’s denial of a proffered legal defense de novo. See United States v. Buttrick, 432

F.3d 373, 376 (1st Cir. 2005) (“We review a properly preserved objection to the

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failure to give a requested jury instruction de novo.”); United States v. Benning, 248

F.3d 772, 775 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We review the district court’s denial of the defense

of entrapment by estoppel de novo, because it is a question of law.”); see also United

States v. Santiago-Godinez, 12 F.3d 722, 726 (7th Cir. 1993) (“The legal sufficiency

of a proffered defense is a question of law and therefore is reviewed de novo.”). “To

the extent that the district court’s legal conclusion regarding whether [Young’s]

defense theory accurately reflected the law was based on factual findings, we review

for clear error.” Benning, 248 F.3d at 775. We note that in United States v. Kendrick,

423 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2005), we reviewed the refusal of an entrapment instruction

for abuse of discretion. See id. at 807. However, in support of this standard of

review, Kendrick cites United States v. Williams, 109 F.3d 502 (8th Cir. 1997), which

noted, “[w]e review a district court’s formulation of jury instructions for an abuse of

discretion.” Id. at 508 (emphasis added). In Williams, the defendant did not argue

that his proffered legal defense had been denied, yet challenged the district court’s

submission of a modified instruction because it “was confusing and tended to

emphasize the government’s version of the facts.” Id. Therefore, although district

courts exercise wide discretion in formulating jury instructions, see id., when the

refusal of a proffered instruction simultaneously denies a legal defense, the correct

standard of review is de novo, see Benning, 248 F.3d at 775. Here, Young argues

that the district court erred in failing to permit him to submit his abandonment and

entrapment instructions to the jury. Therefore, the refusal of his jury instructions was,

in essence, the denial of Young’s defenses and a de novo review is proper. 

1. Abandonment Instruction

In his proposed abandonment instruction, Young cited the Model Penal Code,

in which the provisions concerning criminal attempt include references to the

affirmative defense of voluntary renunciation. See Model Penal Code § 5.01(4). The

code section provides that the defense applies only when the defendant:

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Young cites United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1988), in support

of his theory; however, Dworken is not binding on our court and, to a certain extent,

supports the case against Young. Through dicta, Dworken avoids the issue at hand

by “assuming arguendo that [the abandonment defense] might in some circumstances”

-12-

abandon[s] his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevent[s] its

commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary

renunciation of his criminal purpose . . . . [R]enunciation of criminal

purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by

circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor’s

course of conduct, that increase the probability of detection or

apprehension or that make more difficult the accomplishment of the

criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a

decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous

time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or

victim.

Id. The Model Penal Code lists two considerations for recognizing such a defense in

attempt crimes: (1) “renunciation of criminal purpose tends to negative

dangerousness,” and (2) “to provide actors with a motive for desisting from their

criminal designs, thereby diminishing the risk that the substantive crime will be

committed.” Model Penal Code § 5.01(4) cmt. 8 (Official Draft and Revised

Comments 1985).

This issue of whether a defendant is entitled to an abandonment defense once

an attempt has been completed, i.e., the defendant has the requisite intent and has

completed a substantial step towards the crime, is an issue of first impression in our

circuit. While we have stated, “[i]n an attempt case, abandonment precludes liability,”

United States v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000), we relied upon

United States v. Joyce, 693 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1982) in making that comment. Joyce,

however, involved abandonment of an attempt prior to the completion of the attempt.

Id. at 841. We hold today that a defendant cannot abandon an attempt once it has been

completed.8

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apply to the crime of attempt. 855 F.2d at 20. Instead of discussing the particular

circumstances in which an attempt crime might be abandoned, Dworken focused on

whether the abandonment itself was legally sufficient, a different topic than our issue

at hand. See id. at 20-22. Dworken further noted that, “[t]he theory of abandonment

is that certain behavior indicates a renunciation of criminal intent, such that the

dangerousness manifested by the criminal attempt is no longer viable.” Id. at 20.

Here, “the dangerousness manifested” by Young’s attempt was still viable because he

had completed the crime and had therefore not renounced his criminal intent. See id.

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We emphasize that all of our sister circuits that have faced this issue have either

held that a defendant cannot abandon a completed attempt or have alluded to such a

determination. See United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 410-11 (2d Cir. 2003)

(not formally addressing the issue but noting, “[t]he only other circuits that have

formally addressed the question have rejected the defense as a matter of federal law”);

United States v. Shelton, 30 F.3d 702, 706 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[W]ithdrawal,

abandonment and renunciation, however characterized, do not provide a defense to

an attempt crime.”); United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1974) (“A

voluntary abandonment of an attempt which has proceeded well beyond preparation

as here, will not bar a conviction for the attempt.”); United States v. Wales, 127 Fed.

App’x 424, 432 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (“[N]either this circuit nor any other

circuit to have addressed the issue has held that abandonment or renunciation may

constitute a defense to the completed crime of attempt.”). 

Specifically, in Shelton, the Sixth Circuit rejected the Model Penal Code’s

approach and held that “withdrawal, abandonment and renunciation, however

characterized, do not provide a defense to an attempt crime.” 30 F.3d at 706. The

court explained:

As noted, the attempt crime is complete with proof of intent together

with acts constituting a substantial step toward commission of the

substantive offense. When a defendant withdraws prior to forming the

necessary intent or taking a substantial step toward the commission of

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the offense, the essential elements of the crime cannot be proved. At this

point, the question whether a defendant has withdrawn is synonymous

with whether he has committed the offense. After a defendant has

evidenced the necessary intent and has committed an act constituting a

substantial step toward the commission of the offense, he has committed

the crime of attempt, and can withdraw only from the commission of the

substantive offense. We are not persuaded that the availability of a

withdrawal defense would provide an incentive or motive to desist from

the commission of an offense, especially since the success of the defense

presupposes a criminal trial at which the issue would be submitted to the

jury for decision. A remote chance of acquittal would appear to have an

even more remote chance of deterring conduct. We recognize, of course,

that attempt crimes pose unique issues. However, the interest of

defendants in not being convicted for mere thoughts, desires or motives

is adequately addressed by the government’s burden of proving that the

defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of the

substantive offense.

Id. (quotation omitted).

We have previously held that completed crimes, other than attempt, cannot be

abandoned. See United States v. Ball, 22 F.3d 197 (8th Cir. 1994). Specifically, in

Ball, defendants who had been convicted of entering a bank with intent to commit

robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), argued that the district court erred by

refusing “an instruction on a defense theory: that, even had the defendants entered the

bank with intent to commit a robbery, they subsequently abandoned or withdrew from

their intention when they left the bank without pointing a gun or announcing a

stick-up.” Id. at 199. We held that the abandonment defense did not apply because

the crime had been completed once the defendants entered the bank. Id.

Because our circuit has already determined that the abandonment defense: (1)

can apply to uncompleted attempt crimes, see Joyce, 693 F.2d at 841-42, and (2) has

been rejected as a defense to completed crimes other than attempt, see Ball, 22 F.3d

at 199, logically flowing from this analysis is the conclusion that, when a defendant

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has completed the crime of attempt; i.e., has the requisite intent and has taken a

substantial step towards completion of the crime, he cannot successfully abandon the

attempt because the crime itself has already been completed. We therefore adopt the

Sixth Circuit’s approach in Shelton, specifically reject the Model Penal Code

approach, and hold that the defense of abandonment is not warranted once a defendant

completes the crime of attempt. We acknowledge, that “[a]fter a defendant has

evidenced the necessary intent and has committed an act constituting a substantial step

toward the commission of the offense, he has committed the crime of attempt, and can

withdraw only from the commission of the substantive offense,” not the attempt of

such offense. Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706. 

As discussed above, Young completed his attempt because he had the requisite

intent and took a substantial step towards completion of the enticement crime, all

supported by the evidence discovered in his car, his travel to the hotel and attempt to

check in, and his search for Emily once he could not obtain the hotel room. Because

Young completed “the essential elements” of his attempt, Shelton, 30 F.3d at 706, he

cannot now claim that he abandoned that plan. We therefore conclude that the district

court committed no error in its decision to refuse Young’s proffered abandonment

instruction. 

2. Entrapment Instruction

Young also argues that the district court erred in refusing his proffered

entrapment instruction. Because it is an affirmative defense, entrapment is a question

of fact and generally decided by a jury. Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 807. However, a

defendant is entitled to an entrapment instruction only where “there is sufficient

evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.” Mathews v. United

States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988). “[A] valid entrapment defense has two related

elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack of predisposition on the

part of the defendant to engage in the criminal conduct.” Id. at 63. 

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Therefore, to warrant an entrapment instruction, a defendant must first present

evidence that the government induced the criminal conduct. See Jacobson v. United

States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992). Inducement exists when the government “implanted

the criminal design” in the defendant’s mind. United States v. Eldeeb, 20 F.3d 841,

843 (8th Cir. 1994). Some of the inducement factors relevant to enticement of a minor

to engage in a sexual activity include: “whether the government made the initial

contact; . . . whether the government introduced the topics of sex and meeting in

person; and the extent to which the government influenced [the defendant’s] behavior

by portraying [minors] as sexually precocious teenagers.” Myers, 575 F.3d at 806-07

(holding inducement did not occur when “the government did not threaten, coerce, or

psychologically manipulate” the defendant). 

Here, although the undercover officer posing as Emily alluded to sex in some

of the online chats, Young initially contacted Emily, and it was Young who initiated

the majority of sexual discussions, supporting the conclusion that he was not induced

by the government. In particular, Young was the one who brought up the topic of a

sexual encounter at the Super 8 Motel and who reserved a room. Additionally,

although Emily pretended to be receptive to Young’s sexual suggestions, and was

arguably portrayed as a “sexually precocious teenager[],” Myers, 575 F.3d at 806, the

government did not “implant[] the criminal design” in Young’s mind, Eldeeb, 20 F.3d

at 843, nor did it “threaten, coerce, or psychologically manipulate” him, Myers, 575

F.3d at 806. Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on

an entrapment defense. See Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 807 (“If the defendant exhibits any

predisposition to engage in the criminal conduct, the district court need not instruct

the jury on entrapment.” (quotation omitted)); see also United States v. Neal, 990 F.2d

355, 358 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A district court may refuse to submit an entrapment

instruction when the defendant exhibited a disposition to engage in the criminal

activity with which he was charged because if predisposition exists, then there is not

sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment.” (quotation

omitted)). 

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Moreover, even had Young established that the government induced his

criminal conduct, Young was predisposed to commit the crime. Once government

inducement is established by the defendant, the burden shifts to the government to

demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit

the crime. Kendrick, 423 F.3d at 807. The predisposition element “focuses upon

whether the defendant was an ‘unwary innocent’ or, instead, an ‘unwary criminal’

who ‘readily availed himself of the opportunity to perpetrate the crime.’” Myers, 575

F.3d at 805 (quoting Mathews, 485 U.S. at 63). Specifically, in Myers we found that

a defendant was predisposed to commit the crime of enticement of a minor to engage

in sexual activity where:

[The defendant] met [an undercover agent posing as a minor] in a

romance chat room and quickly learned that she was fourteen years old.

Nevertheless, he showed no reluctance to engage in sexually explicit

conversation and asked about her undergarments. [The defendant]

initiated the second chat—in which [an undercover agent posing as a

minor] first appeared under the pseudonym “Kim”—raised the subject

of a physical meeting, and steered the discussion toward sex. Kim

subsequently introduced the subject of her age on a number of occasions,

but [the defendant] did not appear to give the issue any serious

consideration.

Id. at 808. 

The evidence of Young’s numerous other internet chats, during which he

attempted to arrange meetings with minors for sexual encounters, clearly show his

predisposition to commit this crime. See id. Moreover, Young quickly responded to

Emily’s apparent willingness to engage in sexual activities and it did not take a great

deal of further effort from the undercover officers for Young to arrange the meeting.

See Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 550 (“Had the agents in this case simply offered petitioner

the opportunity to [commit the crime], and petitioner . . . had promptly availed himself

of this criminal opportunity, it is unlikely that his entrapment defense would have

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warranted a jury instruction.”); Myers, 575 F.3d at 805 (holding that “a ready response

to minimal inducement indicates criminal predisposition.”). Because Young has not

presented “sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find entrapment,”

the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Young’s entrapment

instruction. Mathews, 485 U.S. at 62.

C.

Young’s final arguments challenge the district court’s sentence enhancements

for misrepresentation of identity and obstruction of justice. “We review interpretation

of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and a district court’s application of the

Guidelines to the facts for clear error.” United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817,

820 (8th Cir. 2010).

1. Misrepresentation of Identity

The Guidelines instruct the district court to apply a two-level enhancement to

a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the offense involved the knowing misrepresentation

of a participant’s identity to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of,

a minor to engage in prohibited sexually conduct.” USSG §2G1.3(b)(2)(A). The

comments to section 2G1.3(b)(2)(A) clearly state that “[t]he misrepresentation to

which the enhancement . . . may apply includes misrepresentation of a participant’s

name, age, occupation, gender, or status as long as the misrepresentation was made

with the” requisite intent. Id. §2G1.3, comment. (n.3(A)) (emphasis added). 

Although we have not yet interpreted this exact sentencing provision, in

discussing a similar enhancement for misrepresenting identity in the context of a

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The Guidelines specifically state:

If, for the purpose of producing sexually explicit material or for

the purpose of transmitting such material live, the offense

involved . . . the knowing misrepresentation of a participant’s

identity to persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel

of, a minor to engage sexually explicit conduct . . . increase [the

Base Offense Level by] 2 levels.

USSG §2G2.1(b)(6)(A).

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conviction for possession of child pornography, USSG §2G2.1(b)(6)(A),9 we have

held that the enhancement is warranted when the misrepresentation is “instrumental

in getting the victims to engage in sexually explicit conduct.” United States v. Starr,

533 F.3d 985, 1002 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding an enhancement based on

misrepresentation of age was proper under USSG §2G2.1(b)(6)(A)). 

The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit that has interpreted section 2G1.3(b)(2)(A)

in detail. See United States v. Holt, 510 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2007). Holt held that a

defendant who misrepresented his age over a six-month period of time was subject to

the enhancement, because “[t]he district court reasonably could have concluded that

[the defendant] was misrepresenting his identity in a prolonged effort to groom what

he though was a thirteen-year-old girl for illicit sexual contact.” Id. at 1010-11.

Young argues that his misrepresentation was not meant to induce Emily because it

occurred over a shorter period than in Holt. However, the Guidelines do not make a

temporal distinction. Young told Emily that he worked as an engineer after Emily

stated that she disliked band. Young also told Emily that he was not married, although

in reality, he had a wife and three children. Therefore, the two-level enhancement for

misrepresentation of identity was appropriate. 

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2. Obstruction of Justice

A defendant’s sentence may be increased by two levels, 

[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the

investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of

conviction, and the obstructive conduct related to the defendant’s offense

of conviction and any relevant conduct; or a closely related offense. 

USSG §3C1.1.

We have repeatedly affirmed obstruction-of-justice enhancements,

despite the absence of specific findings on the elements of perjury, when

the evidence of the defendant’s willfulness was unequivocal and the

record left no doubt that the defendant’s false testimony at trial was not

the result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory. 

United States v. Vickers, 528 F.3d 1116, 1122 (8th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). 

Here, Young testified that he did not travel to the motel to commit the crime,

but that he merely traveled to the location to ensure that Emily arrived home safely.

He specifically stated that his online chats were merely a “fantasy” to see how much

Emily would discuss online. However, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates

otherwise. Young drove to the hotel, attempted to book a room, and drove around the

surrounding area when he did not see her. Additionally, a condom and bubble bath

were found in his car, indicating that he desired to engage in sexual conduct with

Emily. Moreover, his testimony directly contradicts his confession to police

subsequent to his arrest, where Young admitted that he had online chats with Emily,

that they had discussed topics of a sexual nature, and that they had planned a meeting

which may not have been “100 percent innocent.” (Trial Tr. vol. II, at 138.) As the

district court noted, Young’s false testimony was not a result of confusion or faulty

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memory, thus the false testimony constituted an obstruction of justice. Therefore,

Young’s two-level sentence enhancement, pursuant to USSG §3C1.1, was appropriate.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Young’s conviction and sentence. 

______________________________

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