Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01553/USCOURTS-ca7-14-01553-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Booker T. Rogers
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-1553

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

BOOKER T. ROGERS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:12-cr-00107-JTM-APR-1 — James T. Moody, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2014 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 5, 2015

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

SYKES, Circuit Judge. Booker Rogers has a long criminal 

record that includes two West Virginia convictions for 

sexually abusing his daughter and stepdaughter. As a sex 

offender, he is required by the Sex Offender Registration and 

Notification Act (“SORNA”) to register in each state in 

which he resides, is employed, or is a student. 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 16911(1), 16913. In 2011 he moved from West Virginia to 

Indiana and failed to register there. A few months later his 

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18-year-old daughter, Jane Doe, reported to police in West 

Lafayette, Indiana, that Rogers was sexually abusing her. 

Rogers pleaded guilty to traveling in interstate commerce 

and failing to register as a sex offender in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 2250. The district judge applied a six-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for 

committing a sex offense—incest against Jane Doe—while in 

failure-to-register status. The judge also refused to award 

credit for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 because 

Rogers falsely denied this relevant conduct. Rogers challenges these sentencing decisions.

The failure-to-register guideline incorporates by reference the definition of the term “sex offense” found in 

42 U.S.C. § 16911(5). This case requires us to decide whether 

a categorical or fact-based approach applies to classifying 

sex offenses under this statute. We conclude that the threshold definition of “sex offense” found in § 16911(5)(A)(i) 

requires a categorical approach—an inquiry limited to the 

elements of the offense—but the exception in subsection (5)(C) calls for an examination of the specific facts of the 

offense conduct. The district court conducted just this sort of 

analysis. Because the court properly applied the § 2A3.5 

enhancement and properly declined to award § 3E1.1 credit, 

we affirm.

I. Background

In 2000 Rogers was convicted in West Virginia of seconddegree sexual abuse of his 14-year-old stepdaughter. In 2008 

he was convicted of third-degree sexual assault of his 6-yearold daughter. (Rogers has two biological daughters, Jane 

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Doe and the victim of the 2008 offense.) The convictions 

triggered sex-offender registration duties under SORNA and 

state law. Rogers failed to register twice while living in West 

Virginia; he was fined and placed on community supervision for these violations.

In November 2011 Rogers moved to Indiana and failed to 

register in his new state of residence. Indiana authorities 

were alerted to his presence in February 2012, when his

oldest daughter, Jane Doe, then age 18, reported to West 

Lafayette police that Rogers was sexually abusing her.

Rogers was indicted for traveling in interstate commerce 

and failing to register as a sex offender. See § 2250. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement. To calculate the guidelines sentencing range, the probation department recommended that the court apply a six-level enhancement under 

§ 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for committing a sex offense while in failure-to-register status; namely, the Indiana crime of incest 

against Jane Doe. Rogers objected and denied ever having 

any sexual contact with his 18-year-old daughter. 

At the sentencing hearing, Jane Doe testified that Rogers

is her biological father, but his parental rights were terminated when she was very young. He lived with the family 

for only about a year and a half, when she was between the 

ages of 11 and 12 years old and the family was living in West 

Virginia. During this time, Rogers sexually abused her. She 

testified that the abuse began with various forms of sexual 

contact (he told her it was a game called “boyfriend and 

girlfriend”), but escalated to oral and anal penetration, 

which he forced on her by threatening to whip her with a 

belt. Because these whippings were “very, very painful,” she 

did not resist. 

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Jane Doe and her mother and siblings eventually moved 

away from West Virginia, first to Kansas and then to Indiana. In November 2011 Rogers moved to Indiana and briefly 

lived with the family again. By this time Jane Doe was 18.

The sexual abuse soon resumed and included oral and 

vaginal intercourse. Jane Doe testified that she did not want 

to engage in this sexual activity with Rogers, nor did she 

consent to it. Although Rogers never used force and she

never explicitly told her father “no,” she said she felt like she 

had no choice because “the consequences of trying to fight 

back were going to be worse.” She remembered the belt 

whippings, and she also feared that if she reported the 

abuse, she would not have a place to live or a relationship 

with her mother.

The judge found Jane Doe “very credible” and concluded 

that Rogers had committed the Indiana offense of incest. He 

also found that the incestuous relationship was “not consensual at all,” or alternatively, if it was consensual, Jane Doe 

was under Rogers’s custodial authority at the time. (We’ll 

explain the relevance of these two findings later.) Accordingly, the judge accepted the probation department’s recommendation and applied the six-level enhancement under 

§ 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for committing a sex offense while in failure-to-register status. The judge also denied the three-level 

reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1 

because Rogers had falsely denied relevant conduct—the 

incestuous relationship with Jane Doe. 

Rogers’s total offense level was 22, which when combined 

with his criminal history category VI yielded a guidelines

sentencing range of 84 to 105 months’ incarceration. The 

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judge imposed a sentence at the top of the range—

105 months—followed by 20 years of supervised release.

II. Discussion

Rogers challenges the district court’s application of the 

guidelines enhancement under § 2A3.5(b)(1)(A) for committing a sex offense while in failure-to-report status. This

guideline directs the sentencing court to increase the base

offense level by six levels “[i]f, while in failure to register 

status, the defendant committed ... a sex offense against 

someone other than a minor.” § 2A3.5(b)(1)(A). Application 

note 1 to § 2A3.5 states that “‘[s]ex offense’ has the meaning 

given that term in 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5).” 

Under the cross-referenced statutory definition, the term 

“sex offense” is broadly defined as “a criminal offense that 

has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with 

another.” § 16911(5)(A)(i). As relevant here, the definition 

also contains an exception:

An offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this 

subchapter if the victim was an adult, unless 

the adult was under the custodial authority of 

the offender at the time of the offense, or if the 

victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the 

victim.

§ 16911(5)(C).

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The judge found that Rogers committed the Indiana offense of incest while in failure-to-report status. Indiana’s 

incest statute reads in relevant part: 

A person eighteen (18) years of age or older 

who engages in sexual intercourse or other 

sexual conduct ... with another person, when 

the person knows that the other person is related to the person biologically as a parent, 

child, grandparent, grandchild, sibling, aunt, 

uncle, niece, or nephew, commits incest, a 

Level 5 felony.

IND. CODE § 35-46-1-3(a). The judge easily concluded that 

this crime falls within the broad definition of sex offense in

§ 16911(5)(A)(i): It’s a “criminal offense” (a “Level 5 felony”),

and it has as an “element” a “sexual act or sexual contact 

with another” (the Indiana statute requires an act of sexual 

intercourse or other sexual conduct with another person).

Rogers zeroes in on the exception found in § 16911(5)(C). 

As we’ve noted, the exception provides that “[a]n offense 

involving consensual conduct is not a sex offense ... if the victim 

was an adult, unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time of the offense,” or the 

victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not 

more than four years older. § 16911(5)(C) (emphasis added). 

Rogers urges us to apply a categorical approach to the 

exception and limit our inquiry to the elements of the 

Indiana incest statute rather than the facts of his conduct. 

Because the exception excludes offenses involving consensual sexual conduct between adults (unless the victim was 

under the offender’s custodial control or the age differential 

was present), the Indiana incest offense doesn’t qualify 

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because nonconsent is not an element. Or so his argument 

goes.

The “elements-centric” categorical approach is an established method of evaluating whether prior convictions count 

for purposes of some sentence-enhancement statutes, most 

notably the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. 

924(e). See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287

(2013) (explaining the rationale for the categorical approach 

in the context of the ACCA). This approach applies when the 

statute in question speaks in categorical or elements-based 

terms rather than “circumstance specific” terms. Nijhawan v. 

Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009); see also Taylor v. United States, 

495 U.S. 575, 588 (1990) (adopting the categorical approach 

to the ACCA because “Congress intended that the enhancement provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified elements”).

For example, as the Supreme Court has “long recognized,” the “ACCA increases the sentence of a defendant

who has three ‘previous convictions’ for a violent felony—

not a defendant who has thrice committed such a crime.” 

Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287 (quoting § 924(e)(1)). “That 

language shows ... that ‘Congress intended the sentencing 

court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been 

convicted of crimes falling within certain categories, and not 

to the facts underlying the prior convictions.’” Id. (quoting 

Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).

Based on the statutory language, it’s clear that a categorical approach applies to the threshold definition of the term 

“sex offense” in § 16911(5)(A)(i); the use of the word “element” suggests as much. (Recall that under the threshold 

definition, a “sex offense” is “a criminal offense that has an 

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element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.” § 16911(5)(A)(i).)

The exception in § 16911(5)(C) is phrased much differently. The exception uses fact-specific language, strongly suggesting that a conduct-based inquiry applies. First, the 

exception applies to an “offense involving consensual sexual 

conduct.” § 16911(5)(C) (emphasis added). The word “involving” implies a noncategorical, fact-based inquiry. Second, and even more tellingly, the exception contains a string 

of fact-based qualifiers: “if the victim was an adult,” “unless 

the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at 

the time of the offense,” “if the victim was at least 13 years old

and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the 

victim.” Id. (emphases added). This language doesn’t refer to

elements of the offense; it refers to specific facts of the offense. The categorical approach does not apply to the exception.

The Fifth Circuit reads § 16911(5)(C) the same way we 

do. See United States v. Gonzalez-Medina, 757 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. 

2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1529 (2015). Gonzalez-Medina 

raised the question whether a categorical or fact-based 

approach applies to the age-differential determination in 

§ 16911(5)(C). Id. at 428. The Fifth Circuit began by contrasting the language of § 16911(5)(A)(i), the broad threshold 

definition of the term “sex offense,” with the language of the 

exception in § 16911(5)(C). The “focus on the ‘element[s]’ of 

the predicate offense [in § 16911(5)(A)(i)] strongly suggests 

that a categorical approach applies” to the threshold definition. Id. at 430. “In contrast, the (5)(C) exception excludes 

from the definition of ‘sex offense’ an offense ‘involving

consensual sexual conduct ... if the victim was at least 

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13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years 

older than the victim.’” Id. (quoting § 16911(5)(C)). The court

concluded that “[t]he exception’s reference to conduct, rather 

than elements, is consistent with a circumstance-specific 

analysis.” Id. (citing United States v. Byun, 539 F.3d 982, 992 

(9th Cir. 2008)).

In short, although the basic definition of “sex offense” in 

§ 16911(5)(A)(i) requires a categorical, elements-based 

inquiry, the exception in § 16911(5)(C) is not similarly limited. Whether the exception applies depends on several factbased inquiries: Was the victim an adult? If so, was the 

sexual conduct consensual? Was the victim under the custodial authority of the offender at the time? Was the specified 

age differential present?

Here, there’s no dispute that the Indiana incest offense

meets the threshold definition of sex offense in 

§ 16911(5)(A)(i) as a categorical matter. Whether the exception applies depends on the underlying facts and circumstances—most prominently, whether Jane Doe consented to 

the sexual conduct. The judge found that she did not.

Rogers’s fallback argument is to challenge the judge’s factual finding on consent. This is a nonstarter. We review the 

sentencing court’s factual findings for clear error, giving

special deference to the court’s determination of witness 

credibility, “which can virtually never be clear error.” United 

States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 2010). Jane Doe 

testified that she did not consent to any sexual acts with her 

father. Though Rogers did not use force, he had done so in 

the past. And even without this history, we’ve observed that

an incest victim is “likely to comply with the sexual request 

by or action of her father out of fear stemming from the 

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belief that physical consequences will flow from noncompliance.” United States v. Martinez-Carillo, 250 F.3d 1101, 1106 

(7th Cir. 2001). Jane Doe also testified that she was afraid of

jeopardizing her familial and financial situation. The judge 

credited her testimony and found that the incestuous relationship was “not consensual at all.” That finding was not 

clear error.1

Finally, Rogers challenges the judge’s refusal to award

acceptance-of-responsibility credit under § 3E1.1. The judge 

withheld credit because Rogers falsely denied the incestuous 

relationship with Jane Doe. Rogers recognizes that the 

court’s rulings on the § 2A3.5 enhancement and the § 3E1.1 

reduction are linked. Because the first was sound, so was the 

second.

AFFIRMED.

 1 Rogers also contests the judge’s factual finding that he had custodial 

authority over Jane Doe at the time of the incestuous relationship. We do 

not need to address this argument. The judge found that Jane Doe did 

not consent to the sexual acts; because that finding is not clearly erroneous, the exception in § 16911(5)(C) for consensual sexual conduct 

between adults does not apply.

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