Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01367/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01367-4/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Brian Duffy
Respondent
Melvin Ward
Petitioner

Document Text:

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MELVIN WARD,

Petitioner,

v.

BRIAN DUFFY, Warden,

Respondent.

No. 1:13-cv-01367-SKO HC

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT 

OF HABEAS CORPUS

(Doc. 1)

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,1 seeks relief from a conviction for threatening a 

correctional officer in violation of California Penal Code § 422. Petitioner was charged 

and convicted for a statement he made in the course of a counseling session, about 

which his psychologist was required to issue a warning pursuant to Tarasoff v. Regents 

of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 (1976). 

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Appellate Court Factual Statement

During a psychotherapy session, [Petitioner], an 

inmate with the California Department of Corrections, told 

 1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), both parties consented, in writing, to the jurisdiction of a United 

States Magistrate Judge to conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final 

judgment.

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 1 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

2

his psychotherapist, Mary Crawley, that he was going to 

kill a correctional officer. Crawley determined that Ward 

posed a serious danger of violence to the potential victim, 

so she issued a warning as required by Tarasoff v. Regents 

of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425 

(Tarasoff). The prosecutor utilized the information 

disclosed by Crawley to prosecute Ward for making a 

criminal threat in violation of Penal Code section 422.2

* * * * *

Crawley is a psychologist at Avenal State Prison, where 

she provides therapy to inmates. [Petitioner] was one of 

her patients. She was helping him with paranoia, coping 

skills and anger issues. A part of therapy includes 

allowing inmates to vent their anger, which often results in 

the use of vulgarity. Crawley attempts to bring out things 

that upset the inmate so that she can help him or her. Prior 

to the March 11, 2010 session, she had only met with 

[Petitioner] for one or two sessions.

On March 11, 2010, [Petitioner] was angry, agitated, and 

upset during his therapy session. [Petitioner] explained 

that he was upset because of prior experiences he had with 

correctional officers, specifically naming Sergeant Lucas.

[Petitioner] stated he had recently seen Lucas, and related 

an incident he had with Lucas in the past. As [Petitioner] 

talked about the past incident, he became more angry and 

upset. [Petitioner] made a general statement about taking 

out a correctional officer. Crawley then stopped the 

session, and verbally warned [Petitioner] that if he made 

specific threats the statements would not be confidential 

and would be reported to custody.3

 Despite the warning, 

[Petitioner] again referred to the past incident with Lucas 

and then stated "I will kill the fucking bastard if I get my 

chance—get my hands on him." Crawley believed 

[Petitioner] was serious when he made the threat. 

[Petitioner] never asked Crawley to communicate his 

statement to Lucas.

Crawley ended the session at this point and asked the 

correctional officers to take him out of the office.

The next morning, Crawley arrived at work at the same 

time as Sergeant Lucas. As they walked into the prison, 

 2 All statutory references [in this quotation] are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

3 The exact testimony was "I gave him a verbal warning that if he went further or made specific threats 

that those were reportable and that confidentiality would not hold." Crawley added "I don't believe I gave 

specific names. I did say it had to be reported to custody," and she "believe[d she] mentioned the 

captain." On cross-examination, when counsel attempted to confirm that Crawley did not tell [Petitioner] 

she would tell Lucas of the threat, Crawley testified "In thinking it through, I believe I did when I stopped 

the therapy."

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 2 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

3

she told Lucas she needed to speak with him regarding a 

possible threat. Later that morning, she completed a form 

that went into her notes and into [Petitioner's] therapy file. 

That afternoon, she met with Lucas and told him about the 

threat, and told him she would be issuing a "Tarasoff 

Warning" later that day. She prepared the document, and 

a copy was sent to the captain and Lucas, and one was 

placed in [Petitioner's] health record. The original was 

filed in records.

The prison system uses an Informed Consent for Medical 

Care form (form No. 7448). The form clarifies the 

psychologist-patient confidentiality principles. Doctor 

Wilkinson, a clinical psychologist who contracted with the 

state to provide services for a short time, filled out the 

form with [Petitioner], apparently in August 2009. 

Crawley did not fill out another form with [Petitioner], but 

she did verbally review the principles with him. On the 

form filled out by Wilkinson, a box was checked which 

stated that "It is my opinion that although the inmate 

meets criteria for inclusion in the mental health services 

delivery system, he may have difficulty understanding the 

risks and benefits of participation. Physicians treating this 

inmate patient should continue to clarify the limits of 

confidentiality."

At the time of trial, Correctional Sergeant Jeffery Lucas 

had been employed by the Department of Corrections for 

24 years. Lucas encountered [Petitioner] in 2005. Lucas 

was a yard sergeant when two correctional officers he 

supervised brought [Petitioner] to him because he was 

acting bizarre and very violent. Lucas brought [Petitioner] 

into a hallway and asked him to sit down in an attempt to 

calm him. [Petitioner] was handcuffed at the time. After 

[Petitioner] sat down, he attempted to lunge out of the 

chair at Lucas. Lucas put his hands straight out on 

[Petitioner's] chest to prevent him from assaulting him.

Lucas saw [Petitioner] approximately 20 times after this 

incident and before March 11, 2010. Like most of the 

other inmates, [Petitioner] was not restrained on any of 

those occasions.

On March 11, 2010, Lucas again saw [Petitioner]. This 

time [Petitioner] was about 30 feet away and apparently 

heading towards Crawley's office. No conversation 

occurred. Lucas gathered the officers he was supervising, 

as well as Crawley, and warned them to be careful with 

[Petitioner] because he had a violent behavior history.

The following day, Lucas walked through the gate with 

Crawley as they headed to work. Crawley said she needed 

to talk with Lucas later that day. Later, Crawley told 

Lucas the [Petitioner] said he would kill Lucas if 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 3 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

4

[Petitioner] got the chance. Lucas was concerned that 

[Petitioner] might carry out that threat.

[Petitioner] testified in his defense. [Petitioner] was 

seeing Crawley because he was diagnosed as bipolar with 

aggressive tendencies and anger problems. His 

involvement with Crawley was voluntary because he 

usually needed someone to whom he could talk, and he 

did not feel he could talk with anyone else.

He denied threatening Lucas during the March 11, 2010 

session with Crawley. He also denied that Crawley 

warned him that the psychiatrist-patient privilege would 

not apply under certain circumstances. [Petitioner] was 

agitated during the session because his parole date had 

been changed and he did not know why. That was the 

only reason he was agitated. Crawley did not terminate 

the session or tell him she was notifying authorities. The 

session ended when Crawley refused [Petitioner's] request 

to be moved to administrative segregation.

[Petitioner] had seen Lucas on the yard after the 2005 

incident, but had not spoken to him nor given him any 

thought.

The second amended information charged [Petitioner] 

with one count of making a criminal threat in violation of 

section 422. [Petitioner] also allegedly suffered (1) a prior 

"strike" conviction within the meaning of sections 667, 

subdivisions (b) though (i) and 1170.12, subdivisions (a) 

through (d), (2) a serious felony conviction within the 

meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1), and (3) seven 

prior convictions for which he had served a prison term 

within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b).

The jury found [Petitioner] guilty of the charged crime, 

and found all enhancements to be true. The trial court 

sentenced [Petitioner] to a total term of 18 years, which 

consisted of the aggravated term for the crime, plus five 

years for the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) prior 

conviction, and seven years for the section 667.5, 

subdivision (b) prior convictions.

People v. Ward, No. F062557 at **2-5 (Cal.Ct.App. Oct. 

30, 2012) (reproduced at Doc. 18-1 at 3-6).

B. Post-Trial Procedure

Petitioner filed a direct appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Appellate 

District on May 20, 2010, presenting the following issues:

1. Review should be granted to determine whether 

section 422 is properly construed as criminalizing words 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 4 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

5

uttered in therapy with the knowledge that they will 

trigger the therapist's duty under Tarasoff.

A. To afford due process, a conviction must be 

supported by evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of 

fact to find each element of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt.

B. Because the purpose of a psychotherapist's 

warning under Tarasoff is the protection of the person at 

risk, words communicated exclusively through such a 

warning should not violate section 422.

C. It is consistent with public policy to read section 

422 as not criminalizing a communication that occurs 

through a therapist's Tarasoff duty to warn.

D. To avoid unconstitutionality, section 422 should be 

construed as not criminalizing a communication in the 

specific context of a Tarasoff warning.

Petition for Review [LD 4].

The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, but modified the sentence, in a written 

opinion filed October 30, 2010. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review on 

February 13, 2013.4

On August 22, 2011, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 

California Superior Court for Kings County. He stated the following grounds for relief:

1. Conviction was obtained by altered documentation 

of writings recorded as confidential material. The 

prosecution knowingly allowed as evidence with malice.

2. Conviction obtained by the constitutional failure of 

the prosecutor to disclose to the defendant evidence 

favorable to the defendant.

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [LD 6].

The Superior Court denied the petition on October 19, 2011. On January 9, 

2012, Petitioner filed another petition for writ of habeas corpus in Kings County 

Superior Court. In this petition, he pleaded a single ground for relief: "Due process of 

///

 4 Because the California Supreme Court summarily denied review, the Court must "look through" the 

summary denial to the last reasoned decision, which is, in this case, the opinion of the California Court of 

Appeal, Fifth Appellate District. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803-06 (1991).

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 5 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

6

Penal Code 2932 and 5058 in accordance with the Calif. Rules and Regulations Title 

15." The Superior Court denied the petition on March 6, 2012.

On August 21, 2013, in this Court, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

II. Standard of Review

Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of 

the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 

(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme 

malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective 

Death Penalty ACT OF 1996 ("AEDPA"), a petitioner can prevail only if he can show that the 

state court's adjudication of his claim:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 

clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; 

or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 

light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 

529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000).

"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, 

subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 

U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 

As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly 

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 

538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the 

Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must 

then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 6 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

7

clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the 

result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court 

must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 

537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the 

state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme 

Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). 

"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its 

independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal 

law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that 

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' 

on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting 

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to 

satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's determination 

was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. 

III. Due Process: Insufficient Evidence

Petitioner contends that his right to due process was violated because the evidence 

presented was insufficient to prove each element of California Penal Code § 442.

A. Criminal Threat

California Penal Code § 442(a) provides:

Any person who willfully threatens to commit a crime 

which will result in death or great bodily injury to another 

person, with the specific intent that the statement, made 

verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic 

communication device, is to be taken as a threat, even if 

there is no intent of actually carrying it out, which, on its 

face and under the circumstances in which it is made, is so 

unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to 

convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and 

an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, and 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 7 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

8

thereby causes that person reasonably to be in sustained 

fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate 

family's safety, shall be punished by imprisonment in the 

county jail not to exceed one year, or by imprisonment in 

the state prison.

To prove violation of § 422, the prosecution must establish five elements: "(1) the 

defendant willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily 

injury to another person, (2) the defendant made the threat with the specific intent that the 

statement . . . [wa]s to be taken as a threat, even if there [wa]s no intent of actually carrying it 

out, (3) the threat—which may be made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic 

communication device—was on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . 

so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a 

gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat, (4) the threat actually 

caused the person threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or his or her 

immediate family's safety, and (5) the threatened person's fear was reasonabl[e] under the 

circumstances." People v. Toledo, 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-28 (2001) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

B. Standard for Review of Due Process Claim

To determine whether the evidence supporting a conviction is so insufficient that it 

violates the constitutional guarantee of due process of law, a court evaluating a habeas petition 

must carefully review the record to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found 

the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 

307, 319 (1979); Windham v. Merkle, 163 F.3d 1092, 1101 (9th Cir. 1998). It must consider the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, assuming that the trier of fact weighed 

the evidence, resolved conflicting evidence, and drew reasonable inferences from the facts in the 

manner that most supports the verdict. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 8 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

9

1008 (9th Cir. 1997). The relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis 

except guilt, but whether the trier of fact could reasonably have reached its verdict. United 

States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). 

C. Unexhausted Claim

The federal petition, prepared by Petitioner himself, presents a confused account of his 

argument that all five elements of § 422 were not supported by sufficient evidence. As 

supporting facts, Petitioner writes:

The evidence, a duty to warn, presented by Dr. Crawley 

on 3-11-10 was not the record. The duty to warn was 

typed the next day on 3-12-10. During the therapy session 

Dr. Crawley had a handwritten record of the events of the 

therapy session, that would or would not corroborate her 

statements of a threat to Sgt. J. Lucas. Sgt. J. Lucas was 

allowed to testify to the uncorroborated duty to warn as 

though it was the record. Defendant provided the record, 

which did not have a threat written on it.

Doc. 1 at 5.

Petitioner concedes that he did not raise this issue (the first ground of the federal habeas 

petition) in state court, explaining "Counsel at the time was unresponsive to the defendant[']s 

opinions or advice." Doc. 1 at 6. To the extent that Petitioner contends that his due process rights 

were violated because the written records did not corroborate Dr. Crawley's testimony, this claim 

is unexhausted.

A petitioner who is in state custody and wishes to collaterally challenge his conviction by 

a petition for writ of habeas corpus must exhaust state judicial remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 

The exhaustion doctrine is based on comity to the state court and gives the state court the initial 

opportunity to correct the state's alleged constitutional deprivations. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 

U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Buffalo v. Sunn, 854 F.2d 1158, 

1163 (9th Cir. 1988).

A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by providing the highest state court 

with a full and fair opportunity to consider each claim before presenting it to the federal court. 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 9 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10

Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 276 (1971); 

Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A federal court will find that the highest state 

court was given a full and fair opportunity to hear a claim if the petitioner has presented the 

highest state court with the claim's factual and legal basis. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365; Kenney v. 

Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8 (1992). The petitioner must also have specifically informed the 

state court that he was raising a federal constitutional claim. Duncan, 513 U.S. at 365-66; Lyons 

v. Crawford, 232 F.3d 666, 669 (9th Cir. 2000), amended, 247 F.3d 904 (2001); Hiivala v. Wood, 

195 F.3d 1098, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); Keating v. Hood, 133 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1998).

To the extent that the first claim presented is unexhausted, the Court must dismiss it. 28 

U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose, 455 U.S. at 521-22. In the second, third, and fourth grounds set forth 

in the federal petition, however, Petitioner addresses the due process grounds advanced in his 

direct appeal to the state courts.

D. Claim as Argued in State Court

Even if the Court considers the due process claim as it was argued in state court, Petitioner 

cannot prevail. On direct appeal, Petitioner's counsel presented three grounds in support of the 

argument that Petitioner's conviction violated his due process rights: (1) the warning that Crawley 

gave to Lucas could not constitute a violation of § 422 because the purpose of the communication 

was to warn Lucas of possible danger; (2) public policy prohibits a statement communicated 

through a therapist from being used to establish a violation of § 422; and (3) § 422 violates 

Petitioner's right to due process if communications between a patient and therapist form the 

ground for a criminal prosecution. The Court of Appeals rejected all three grounds. Petitioner 

repeats these three grounds as grounds two, three, and four of his federal petition.

1. Communication as Warning

In the federal petition, Petitioner contends only that the sole communication to Lucas was 

Crawley's Tarasoff warning—Petitioner never communicated directly with Lucas. This argument 

is unavailing under California law, which holds that § 422 does not require direct communication. 

///

///

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 10 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

11

Section 422 does not in terms apply only to threats made 

by the threatener personally to the victim nor is such a 

limitation reasonably inferrable from its language. The 

kind of threat contemplated by section 422 may as be 

readily conveyed by the threatener through a third party as 

personally to the intended victim. Where the threat is 

conveyed through a third party intermediary, the specific 

intent element of the statute is implicated. Thus, if the 

threatener intended the threat to be taken seriously by the 

victim, he must necessarily have intended it to be 

conveyed.

In re David L., 234 Cal.App.3d 1655, 1659 (1991).

In his more nuanced argument to the state Appellate Court (written by counsel), Petitioner 

reasoned that "a person who expresses a threat to a psychotherapist, only, and makes no other 

effort to communicate the threat, would and should have the expectation that precaution will be 

taken so that the threat is not carried out." Petition for Review by Fifth District Court of Appeal, 

LD 4 at 8. Put another way, knowing the therapist's duty to give a Tarasoff warning, a patient in 

therapy should confidently be able to express to his therapist his concern that he might hurt the 

target of his anger, knowing that precautions would be taken to prevent the threat from reaching 

fruition. Petition for Review by Fifth District Court of Appeal, LD 4 at 8. 

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument for two reasons. The first is factual: Petitioner 

did not testify that he had an expectation that any harm from his statement would be negligible 

because the Tarasoff warning would protect Sgt. Lucas. Instead, Petitioner testified that he never

made any threats against Lucas. The record supports this portion of the Court of Appeal's analysis.

In the course of his direct examination, Petitioner denied threatening Sergeant Lucas:

Q. Did you threaten Sergeant Lucas?

A. No, sir.

RT, vol. XIII at 1496.

The prosecutor probed further on cross-examination:

Q. During that session, did you ever say to Doctor 

Crawley that you would take out an officer?

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you ever say to her I'll get at a C.O.?

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 11 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

12

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you ever say to her during that session I want 

to hurt someone?

A. I said I wanted to hurt someone.

* * * * *

Q. Now during this March 11, 2010, session, did

Sergeant Lucas's name come up?

A. No, it did not.

Q. Did you mention anything during that session 

about any correctional officer placing hands on you?

A. Oh, yes, I did.

Q. Did you tell Doctor Crawley in that session who

that correctional officer was?

A. I told her—I told her the sergeant's name and it 

wasn't Lucas.

Q. What was the sergeant's name?

A. Sergeant Sanchez. I was in Soledad State Prison 

with him.

RT, vol. XIII at 1498-1499.

Petitioner reinforces the Appellate Court's conclusion in the traverse, reasserting his 

testimony that he never made a threat against Lucas and accusing Dr. Crawley of falsifying the 

therapy records. See Doc. 22 at 11-12 ("Petitioner presented exculpatory evidence that there was 

no threat communicated to the psychotherapist." All other documents in the prosecution['s] 

possession were made March 12, 2010. . . There was a few words changed in the record to falsify 

the doctor's report . . . There was no corroboration in these documents.") 

Nothing in the record supports Petitioner's assertion that he threatened Lucas knowing that 

Dr. Crawley would issue a Tarasoff warning and prevent Petitioner's threats from reaching 

fruition. In short, the Court of Appeals reasonably reached the conclusion that Petitioner's 

argument lacked factual support.

Second, the Court of Appeals stated that even if it accepted Petitioner's argument and 

concluded that he lacked intent to carry out the threat, it would still affirm Petitioner's conviction 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 12 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13

of violating § 422, which penalizes the making of the threat "even if there is no intent of actually 

carrying it out." Cal. Penal Code § 422(a). The Court of Appeals factually distinguished 

Petitioner's situation from that addressed in People v. Felix (92 Cal.App.4th 905 (2001)), on 

which Petitioner relied.

Petitioner argued that Felix held that a defendant's communication of a threat in the 

context of therapy was outside the type of communication reached by § 422. The court rejected 

Petitioner's interpretation. It first distinguished Petitioner's case, in which the evidence showed 

that Petitioner's threat was reported to Lucas, from Felix, in which witness accounts of the 

therapist's communication of the threat to the intended victim was not admitted into evidence:

Felix was convicted of several crimes, including violating 

section 422, related to his actions involving a former 

girlfriend. The evidence relevant to the criminal threat 

conviction consisted of testimony by a psychologist that 

Felix made several comments during a therapy session 

indicating that Felix intended to kill his former girlfriend. 

The psychologist testified that he called the former 

girlfriend, but the trial court sustained an objection when 

the prosecutor attempted to elicit evidence of what was 

said in the conversation. The former girlfriend was 

precluded from testifying about what the psychologist said 

to her in the phone conversation.

The appellate court concluded that the conviction was not 

supported by substantial evidence because the trial court 

"inexplicably . . . sustained Felix's objections to the 

content of the phone call between" the psychologist and 

the former girlfriend. (Felix, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 

912.) Because of the trial court's rulings, "there was no 

evidence that [the psychologist told the former girlfriend] 

the content of Felix's statements" (ibid.), thus precluding 

the People from presenting evidence that Felix's statement 

was communicated to the prior girlfriend.

Doc. 18-1 at 9.

The Court of Appeals also distinguished this case from Felix based on the absence of any 

evidence that Felix was aware that his psychologist was required to convey his threats, in 

contrast to Petitioner, whom Crawley warned of her responsibility under Tarasoff :

The appellate court also found there was insufficient 

evidence that Felix intended his statement be 

communicated to the former girlfriend. The prosecution 

argued that the statement was admissible pursuant to the 

rule in Tarasoff, but it failed to present any evidence that 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 13 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

14

Felix was aware of Tarasoff, or was aware the 

psychologist was obligated to convey his threats to his 

former girlfriend. (Felix, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.)

Ward's reliance on this case is misplaced because Crawley 

testified that she warned [Petitioner] before he threatened 

Lucas that if he made a specific threat the communication 

would not be privileged and she would have to warn the 

threatened individual. The jury could reasonably infer 

from this testimony that [Petitioner] knew, and intended, 

his threat would be communicated to Lucas.

Doc. 18-1 at 10.

In his petition for Supreme Court review and his federal habeas petition, however, 

Petitioner did no more that reassert his argument, relying on Felix. The Court disagrees and finds 

reasonable both the Court of Appeals' distinction of this case from Felix and its determination 

that Petitioner intended his statement to be taken as a threat.

2. Public Policy

As his third ground for relief, Petitioner contends that "[i]t is consistent with public 

policy to read Section 422 as not criminalizing a communication that occurs through a therapist's 

duty to warn." Doc. 1 at 8. In support of this claim, Petitioner argues that he never told Dr. 

Crawley to convey his threat to Sgt. Lucas and that Crawley conveyed the threat solely because 

California law required her to do so. 

Characterizing Petitioner's claim as "meritless," the Court of Appeals opined that (1) by 

creating an exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Evidence Code § 1024, the 

Legislature determined that, as a matter of public policy, the privilege must yield when a

therapist concludes that the patient is a danger to himself or others, and (2) by imposing on 

psychotherapists a duty to warn of a patient's danger to another, the California Supreme Court, in 

Tarasoff, determined that the necessity to avert danger to others outweighed the psychotherapistpatient privilege. Doc. 18-1 at 10-11. Acknowledging that its concern was not with a 

psychotherapist's duty to warn, the Court of Appeals explained that these actions of the 

California Legislature and the Supreme Court are evidence of their determination that a patient's 

right to confidentiality in therapy did not extend to situations in which a patient presents a danger 

to others. In the absence of privilege, the evidence can be used in any proceedings subject to the 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 14 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

15

rules of evidence, including the criminal prosecution of the declarant. See Menendez v. Superior 

Court, 3 Cal.4th 435, 449-53 (1992); People v. Wharton, 53 Cal.3d 522, 548-563 (1991); People 

v. Gomez, 134 Cal.App.3d 874, 880-82 (1982).

As discussed above, under the applicable standard of review, Petitioner bears the burden 

of establishing that the state court's decision is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable 

application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. See Baylor, 94 F.3d at 1325. Petitioner 

offers no explanation as to how his federal due process rights are violated by the California 

court's interpretation of the California Legislature's intent in enacting applicable California law 

(Tarasoff, California Civil Code § 43.92, and California Evidence Code § 1024). Petitioner's 

direct appeal, which addressed this issue as a matter of California state law, does not resolve the 

federal petition's deficiency.

"[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law." Estelle v. McGuire, 

502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (citations omitted). See also, e.g., Randolph v. California, 380 F.3d 

1133, 1147 (9th Cir. 2004) ("A violation of state evidence rules is insufficient to constitute a due 

process violation"); Jamal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We do not 

review questions of state evidence law"); Oxborrow v. Eikenberry, 877 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir. 

1989) ("[E]rrors of state law do not concern us unless they rise to the level of a constitutional 

violation"). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") imposes "a highly 

deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings," requiring "that state-court decisions be 

given the benefit of the doubt." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 

320, 333 n. 7 (1997). Petitioner may only seek habeas relief if the nature or duration of his 

imprisonment violates federal constitutional provisions. 

The Court declines to address this state-law question.

3. Criminalization of Communication in a Tarasoff Warning

For his fourth ground, Petitioner contends that construing § 422 to criminalize 

communication disclosed in a Tarasoff warning is unconstitutional. Petitioner neither explains 

the nature of the constitutional violation nor sets forth any applicable United States Supreme 

Court precedent. In support of this ground, Petitioner states simply, "[Petitioner] testified and 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 15 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

16

denied giving a threat to the victim Sgt. Lucas. [Petitioner] did not incriminate himself in any 

illegal activity." Doc. 1 at 10. Petitioner does not address ground four in his traverse.

As set forth in the federal petition, ground four is so vague and conclusory as to prevent 

meaningful examination by this Court. A federal court may summarily dismiss allegations in a 

petition that are vague, conclusory, patently frivolous or false, or palpably incredible. Hendricks v. 

Vasquez, 908 F.2d 490, 491 (9th Cir. 1990). 

Attempts to salvage Petitioner's contentions by resort to the state appeal prepared by his 

appellate counsel are not helpful. In arguing this ground before the California court, Petitioner, 

through his attorney, contended that Petitioner's 14th Amendment due process rights were 

violated by criminalizing Petitioner's communication with his psychologist. Petitioner's 

argument rested largely on the trial judge's efforts to discourage the prosecutor from prosecuting 

Petitioner. The trial judge characterized the prosecution as Kafka-esque, citing United States v. 

Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2003), and Felix, 92 Cal.App.4th at 905.

As discussed in ground two above, the California Court of Appeals distinguished 

Felix from Petitioner's case on its facts. In Chase, the federal prosecution of an 

individual who threatened FBI agents, the circuit court declined to create a federal 

dangerous patient exception to the testimonial privilege, such as that set forth in 

California Evidence Code § 1024. 340 F.3d at 979. Because the court did not analyze 

the constitutionality of a dangerous patient exception under either federal or state law, 

Chase is not helpful to Petitioner's federal habeas claim.

The balance of Petitioner's argument in his direct appeal merely argued the 

cruelty and absurdity of prosecuting Petitioner for a threat made in the course of a 

therapy session. Although the argument refers to a First Amendment right to voice a 

threat that is not communicated to the intended victim, no federal or California authority 

is offered to support the claim.

As was the case with ground three above, Petitioner has failed to bear his burden 

of demonstrating that the state court's decision is contrary to, or involves an 

///

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 16 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

17

unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. See Baylor, 94 

F.3d at 1325. As a result, the Court must deny this ground for a writ of habeas corpus.

IV. New Issues in Traverse

For the first time in his traverse, Petitioner asserts that the trial court's determination that 

Petitioner waived the psychotherapist-patient privilege violated the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 

Constitution. Petitioner also contends that (1) Dr. Crawley's testimony regarding the confidential 

disclosure form (1030 form) was false; (2) the prosecution failed to establish probable cause for 

Petitioner's conviction as required by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); (3) due process 

proscribes Petitioner's conviction based on perjured testimony; (4) the Court failed to determine 

whether Petitioner posed a serious danger of violence to the victims, as required by Mavroudis v. 

Superior Court, 102 Cal.App.3d 594 (1980); and (5) the police and prosecutor concealed 

significant exculpatory or impeaching evidence in the state's possession.

Petitioner raised these claims in his first state habeas petition, which the Kings County 

Superior Court denied on October 19, 2011. Petitioner never presented these claims to the 

California Court of Appeals or Supreme Court. As a result, the claims are not exhausted.

It is also improper to raise substantively new issues or claims in a traverse, and a court 

may decline to consider such matters. To raise new issues, a petitioner must obtain leave to file 

an amended petition or additional statement of grounds. Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 

504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994). Petitioner never sought such amendment.

Even if Petitioner had exhausted these claims, the Court would decline to address them

based on the lack of support for them in the record. 

V. Certificate of Appealability

A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a 

district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a 

certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:

///

///

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 17 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

18

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under 

section 2255 before a district judge, the final order shall 

be subject to review, on appeal, by the court of appeals for 

the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

(b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in 

a proceeding to test the validity of a warrant to remove to 

another district or place for commitment or trial a person 

charged with a criminal offense against the United States, 

or to test the validity of such person's detention pending 

removal proceedings.

(c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a 

certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to 

the court of appeals from—

(A) the final order in a habeas corpus 

proceeding in which the detention complained of arises 

out of process issued by a State court; or

(B) the final order in a proceeding under 

section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under 

paragraph (1) only if the applicant has made a substantial 

showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under 

paragraph (1) shall indicate which specific issues or issues 

satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

I

If a court denies a petitioner's petition, a certificate of appealability may issue only if the 

petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 

2253(c)(2). The petitioner must demonstrate "that jurists of reason could disagree with the 

district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 

presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 

327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the petitioner is not required to 

prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity 

or the existence of mere good faith on his or her part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court's 

determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or 

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 18 of 19
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

19

deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Petitioner has not made the required substantive

showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a 

certificate of appealability.

VI. Conclusion and Order

Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED;

2. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment for 

Respondent; and

3. The Court DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: September 11, 2015 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case 1:13-cv-01367-SKO Document 25 Filed 09/14/15 Page 19 of 19