Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01513/USCOURTS-caed-1_13-cv-01513-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Kathy Mendoza-Powers
Respondent
Andy Delgado Rodriguez
Petitioner

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ANDY DELGADO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

KATHY MENDOZA-POWERS,

Respondent.

Case No. 1:13-cv-1513-AWI-SAB-HC

ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 

APPEALABILITY 

Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 

On January 13, 2014, the petition was dismissed as successive.1 (ECF No. 12). 

Petitioner appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on April 4, 2014, the appeal was 

denied. (ECF Nos. 14 & 17). On May 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion for relief from 

judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 60(b). (ECF No. 18). On October 29, 

2014, the Court denied Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment. (ECF No. 19). Petitioner 

filed a notice of appeal of the motion and the appeal was processed to the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. (ECF Nos. 20 & 21). On January 5, 2015, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to this 

Court for the limited purpose of granting or denying a certificate of appealability for the denial of 

Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 

 

1 A certificate of appealability was denied as to the order dismissing the petition.

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A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district 

court’s denial of his petition, and an appeal is only allowed in certain circumstances. Miller-El 

v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to 

issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides as follows:

 

(a) In a habeas corpus proceeding or a proceeding under section 2255 before a 

district judge, the final order shall be subject to review, on appeal, by the court 

of appeals for the circuit in which the proceeding is held.

 (b) There shall be no right of appeal from a final order in a proceeding to test the 

validity of a warrant to remove to another district or place for commitment or trial 

a person charged with a criminal offense against the United States, or to test the 

validity of such person’s detention pending removal proceedings.

 (c) (1) Unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an 

appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from–

 (A) the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the 

detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State 

court; or

 (B) the final order in a proceeding under section 2255.

 (2) A certificate of appealability may issue under paragraph (1) only if the 

applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.

 (3) The certificate of appealability under paragraph (1) shall indicate which 

specific issue or issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

If a court denies a petitioner’s petition, the court may only issue a certificate of 

appealability “if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of his 

constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve 

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000). While the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must 

demonstrate “something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on 

his . . . part.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.

Petitioner sought relief from the judgment because of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 

excusable neglect,” or “any other reason that justifies relief.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (6). 

Petitioner argued in his motion for relief that the Court did not consider and overlooked his 

assertions of cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default when it dismissed his petition. 

Although Petitioner argues that it was error for the Court to not specifically reference his 

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assertions of cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default in the Findings and 

Recommendation or the Order Adopting the Findings and Recommendation, Petitioner’s petition 

was not dismissed because of procedural default. Petitioner’s habeas petition was dismissed 

because it was a successive petition. 

The Court notes that Petitioner’s motion regarding cause and prejudice was dismissed by 

the Court on October 30, 2013. (ECF No. 6). The motion was dismissed because the Court 

found that it was premature for the Court to consider Petitioner’s claims regarding any cause and 

prejudice for any potential procedural default. Id. The Court advised Petitioner “that in the 

event procedural default bec[ame] an issue, he, as well as Respondent, [would] have a full 

opportunity for briefing.” Id.

As discussed in the Findings and Recommendation that was adopted by this Court, 

Section 2244 (b)(3)(A) provides: “Before a second or successive application permitted by this 

section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals 

for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application.” In other words, Petitioner 

must obtain leave from the Ninth Circuit before he can file a second or successive petition in 

district court. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 656-657 (1996). This Court must dismiss any 

second or successive petition unless the Court of Appeals has given Petitioner leave to file the 

petition because a district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a second or successive

petition. Pratt v. United States, 129 F.3d 54, 57 (1st Cir. 1997); Greenawalt v. Stewart, 105 F.3d 

1268, 1277 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 794 (1997); Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 

990, 991 (7th Cir. 1996). 

A second or successive petition for habeas corpus is not considered “successive” if the 

initial habeas petition was dismissed for a technical or procedural reason versus on the merits. 

See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-87 (2000) (holding that a second habeas petition is 

not successive if the initial habeas petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust); Stewart v. 

Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 643-45 (1998) (a second habeas petition is not successive if 

the claim raised in the first petition was dismissed by the district court as premature). 

The prior petition was dismissed as untimely and judgment was entered. A petition that 

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is dismissed as time-barred constitutes an adjudication on the merits for successive purposes. 

McNabb v. Yates, 576 F.3d 1028, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Quezada v. Smith, 624 F.3d 

514, 518 (2d Cir. 2010); Altman v. Benik, 337 F.3d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 2003). 

Petitioner previously sought habeas relief with respect to his conviction in Rodriguez v. 

Yates, Case No. 1:09-CV-00119-AWI-SMS-HC. That petition was dismissed with prejudice as 

time-barred. Petitioner appealed the dismissal to the Ninth Circuit, and the appeal was denied on 

June 16, 2011. Petitioner did not show that he had obtained authorization from the Ninth Circuit 

to file the instant petition. Because the prior petition was adjudicated “on the merits,” the instant 

petition is a “second or successive petition” under § 2244(b) that had to be dismissed to re-filing 

if Petitioner seeks and obtains approval in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to file a second or 

successive petition. 

In the present case, the Court finds that reasonable jurists would not find the Court’s 

denial of Petitioner’s motion for relief from judgment debatable, wrong, or deserving of 

encouragement to proceed further. 

Accordingly, the Court hereby DECLINES to issue a certificate of appealability. The 

Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this order on the Ninth Circuit Court of 

Appeals. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 11, 2015 

 SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

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