Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03139/USCOURTS-cand-3_06-cv-03139-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vachon Anderson
Petitioner
Tom Carey
Respondent

Document Text:

United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

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United States District Court

For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VACHON ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

 v

TOM CAREY, Warden,

Respondent.

 /

No C 06-3139 VRW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §

2254 following his conviction by a Santa Clara County superior court

jury for second-degree robbery and being an ex-felon in possession

of a firearm. The jury also found that petitioner personally used a

firearm during the robbery and petitioner admitted three prison

priors. On April 16, 2004, petitioner was sentenced to 17 years in

state prison.

On February 25, 2005, the California Court of Appeal

affirmed the judgment of the trial court and, on May 11, 2005, the

California Supreme Court denied review. 

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United States District Court

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On May 10, 2006, petitioner filed the instant petition

under § 2254. On September 1, 2006, this court found petitioner’s

claims were cognizable under § 2254 when liberally construed and

ordered respondent to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should

not be granted. Respondent has filed an answer to the order to show

cause and petitioner has filed a traverse. 

I

The California Court of Appeal summarized the factual

background of the case as follows: 

This case involves the armed robbery of a

Blockbuster Video store in San Jose. In

September 2003, Vanessa Villagrana was working

when defendant entered the store. Defendant

browsed the store, and eventually approached the

cash register with movies he wished to buy. Ms.

Villagrana attempted to process the sale, but

had a problem calculating the price on the

register, so she asked another cashier, Jennifer

Salazar to help her.

 Defendant purchased four DVD movies with

cash, and Ms. Salazar gave him 57 cents in

change. Just as the transaction was complete,

and Ms. Salazar was in the process of closing

the cash drawer on the register, defendant told

Ms. Salazar to put the money in the bag. Ms.

Salazar believed defendant meant his 57 cents in

change, so she closed the cash drawer.

 Defendant told Ms. Salazar to open the

drawer again, but Ms. Salazar did not comply.

Defendant then pulled a gun partially out of his

right pants pocket exposing the handle and a

small portion of the barrel. Ms. Salazar focused

on the gun, and believing that it was real, she

opened the cash drawer and removed approximately

$ 200 in bills.

 Ms. Salazar did not immediately hand the

money over to defendant, but stood there for a

moment. Ms. Villagrana saw Ms. Salazar back away

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3

 from the register and tilt her head in defendant's

direction. 

 Defendant then pulled the gun almost completely

out of his pocket and leaned toward Ms. Salazar.

Both Ms. Salazar and Ms. Villagrana could see the

gun. Ms. Salazar then gave Ms. Villagrana the money.

Defendant took the money, along with his DVD's and

57 cents in change and left the store.

 A call was made to 911, and officers arrived at

the store within two minutes. A San Jose police

officer went to the area near the store and saw

defendant walking down the sidewalk and asked to

speak with him. Defendant kept walking past the

officer and stopped behind a tree. Defendant then

walked out from behind the tree, and the officer

again asked if he could speak to defendant. The

officer then pat searched defendant for weapons.

During the process of the search, the officer found

$296.57 in defendant's pocket. The officer searched

behind the tree where defendant had been, and found

four DVD's that matched the titles on the receipt

for defendant's purchase in the Blockbuster Video

store. Defendant's fingerprints were found on the

DVD's.

 With the assistance of a San Jose Police

Department bloodhound, the officers were able to

determine defendant's route from the Blockbuster

Video store to where the DVD's were found. The route

was searched, as well as the dumpsters located along

the route, but no gun was ever found.

 After defendant was detained, Ms. Salazar and

Ms. Villagrana were separately driven to the scene

where defendant was being detained. Ms. Salazar told

the officer that it was a "very strong maybe" that

defendant was the robber, but she was unable to

positively identify him. Ms. Villagrana told the

officer that defendant was not the robber, and that

the robber was older than defendant and had no

facial hair.

 At the preliminary hearing in this case, Ms.

Salazar, Ms. Villagrana and a customer in the store

during the incident, Georgia Gonzales identified

defendant as the robber. 

 Defendant presented no evidence at trial.

 Defendant was charged by information with

second-degree robbery, with an additional allegation

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of personal use of a firearm (1. Pen. Code, §§

211-212.5, subd. (c), 12022.53, subd. (b)), and being

a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, §

12021, subd. (a)(1)). The information also alleged

that defendant had suffered three prior prison terms.

( § 667.5, subd. (b)). Defendant pleaded not guilty

to both charges and denied the special allegations.

 After trial, the jury convicted defendant of

both charges and found additional enhancements true.

Defendant was sentenced to the upper term of five

years for the robbery, and an additional 10 years for

the personal use of a firearm enhancement. The court

imposed a concurrent term of two years for the

ex-felon in possession of a firearm conviction and an

additional two years for two of the prison priors,

dismissing the third prison prior in the interests of

justice.

People v Anderson, No H027348, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 1677, at **

2-7 (Cal Ct App Feb 25, 2005). 

II

A federal writ of habeas corpus may not be granted with

respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court unless the state court’s adjudication of the claim: “(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the

State court proceeding.” 28 USC § 2254(d).

“Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court

may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law

or if the state court decides a case differently than [the] Court

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has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v

Taylor, 529 US 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable

application’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle

from [the] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that principle

to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id at 413.

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply

because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the

relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal

law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also

be unreasonable.” Id at 411. A federal habeas court making the

“unreasonable application” inquiry should ask whether the state

court’s application of clearly established federal law was

“objectively unreasonable.” Id at 409. 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal

law under 28 USC § 2254(d) is in the holdings (as opposed to the

dicta) of the Supreme Court as of the time of the state court

decision. Id at 412; Clark v Murphy, 331 F3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir

2003). While circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for purposes

of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court's

holdings are binding on the state courts and only those holdings

need be “reasonably” applied. Id. 

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III

Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief based on two

claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s

finding that petitioner possessed a real firearm; and (2) trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to request a limiting instruction

related to evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction, and failing to

object to prosecution statements about the prior conviction during

closing argument.

A

Petitioner claims that there was insufficient evidence to

support the jury’s finding that petitioner possessed a real firearm. 

Petitioner argues that the only evidence of a firearm was the

testimony by Ms Salazar and Ms Villagrana, and that their statements

did not have enough certainty to prove the gun was real beyond a

reasonable doubt.

A federal court reviewing collaterally a state court

conviction does not determine whether it is satisfied that the

evidence was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Payne v Borg,

982 F2d 335, 338 (9th Cir 1992). Rather, the relevant inquiry on

review of a constitutional challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is "whether, after viewing

the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v Virginia, 443 US

307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The reviewing court "faced

with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting

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inferences must presume – even if it does not affirmatively appear

on the record – that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts

in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Id

at 326.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

insufficient evidence claim because it found substantial evidence

that petitioner possessed a real firearm.

In this case, there was substantial evidence

from which a reasonable trier of fact could have

concluded that defendant was armed with a real gun.

Ms. Salazar testified that although she had never

touched a gun, she had seen guns in films and on

television, and the gun defendant was holding looked

real. Additionally, Ms. Villagrana testified that

she had seen real guns before, and she believed the

gun defendant was holding was real. Circumstantial

evidence is sufficient to show the character of the

weapon used. (People v. Green (1985) 166 Cal. App.

3d 514, 517, 212 Cal. Rptr. 451.)

Furthermore, California courts have often held

that a defendant's statements and behavior while

making an armed threat against a victim may warrant

a jury's finding that a weapon was loaded. (People

v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 12-13.) Here, we

believe this reasoning extends to whether or not the

defendant used a "real gun" as opposed to a toy.

Here, defendant revealed a gun to Ms. Salazar, and

when she hesitated to hand over the cash from the

cash register, defendant displayed more of the gun,

causing Ms. Salazar to give him the cash. From this

the jury could have inferred that the gun was real. 

Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention

that there was insufficient evidence that the gun

was a real firearm.

People v Anderson, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 1677, at ** 9-10. A

review of the record shows that the court's denial was not an

objectively unreasonable application of the Jackson standard. See

28 USC § 2254(d).

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8

The testimony of Ms Salazar and Ms Villagrana was

sufficient evidence to lead a rational trier of fact to find that

the gun was a real firearm beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson,

443 US at 319. Ms Salazar stated three times during her testimony

that the gun appeared to be metal, not plastic. RT 99, 131, 133. 

Ms Salazar was initially unsure if the gun was real or not, so she

focused her attention on it and decided it was probably real. Id at

92. Ms Villagrana also testified that the gun looked real to her. 

Id at 174.

In addition, the fact that petitioner disposed of the gun

quickly is circumstantial evidence that the gun was a real firearm. 

It seems less likely that petitioner would have disposed of a toy or

replica gun. And, as the California Court of Appeal noted,

petitioner’s actions during the robbery also were circumstantial

evidence that the gun was real. See People v Anderson, 2005 Cal App

Unpub LEXIS 1677, at **9-10. Viewing all of this evidence together,

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there is little

doubt that a rational juror could have believed that possession of a

firearm was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 US

at 319.

Petitioner argues that Ms Salazar and Ms Villagrana were

not sure if the gun was real. He points to Ms Salazar’s statement

that “I thought maybe the gun wasn’t real,” RT 92, and a statement

on cross examination that she couldn’t say whether the gun was metal

or plastic, id at 133. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not,

however, require absolute certainty. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient for proof beyond reasonable doubt. See Walters v Maass,

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45 F3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir 1995) (circumstantial evidence and

inferences drawn from that evidence may be sufficient to sustain a

conviction).

Taken in its entirety, Ms Salazar’s testimony could lead a

rational trier to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun

was real. When Ms Salazar said “I thought maybe the gun wasn’t

real,” she was describing her first reaction to seeing the gun. RT

92. Ms Salazar also testified that she looked at the gun again, to

see if it was real or not, and decided that it looked real. Id at

92. She said that nothing made her think it wasn’t real, she just

wanted to determine if it was real or not. Id. On habeas review, a

federal court evaluating the evidence should take into consideration

all of the evidence presented at trial. LaMere v Slaughter, 458 F3d

878, 882 (9th Cir 2006). The entirety of Ms Salazar’s testimony,

together with the other circumstantial evidence, could lead a

rational juror to determine the gun was real beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Jackson, 443 US at 319.

In sum, it cannot be said that, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no “rational trier

of fact” could have found it beyond a reasonable doubt that

petitioner was armed with a real firearm. See id. The state

court's rejection of petitioner’s claim was not contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme

Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d); Juan H v Allen, 408 F3d 1262, 1274

(9th Cir 2005). Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief

on this claim. 

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B

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance

of trial counsel because counsel did not request a limiting

instruction specific to petitioner’s prior conviction and did not

object to a statement made by the prosecutor about the prior

conviction during closing argument.

In order to prevail on an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, petitioner must establish two things. First, he must

establish that counsel's performance was deficient, i e, that it

fell below an "objective standard of reasonableness" under

prevailing professional norms. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668,

687-88 (1984). Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be

highly deferential, and a court must indulge a strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. Id at 689. Second, he must establish that

he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, i e, that

"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id at 694. A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id.

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

ineffective assistance of counsel claims because it viewed counsel’s

decisions as reasonable tactical choices.

We regard a decision whether to request an

instruction limiting the use to which potentially

adverse evidence may be put as essentially

tactical. Although ideally a well-crafted limiting

instruction should assure that the jury will use

evidence only for the purposes for which it is

admissible, in the real world of trial practice

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such an instruction will often tend to highlight

the adverse evidence without providing an

offsetting assurance that the jury will follow the

instruction * * * A decision not to seek such an

instruction would have been rational in the

circumstances of record here.

* * * Like the circumstances discussed above

regarding counsel’s decision not to request a

specific limiting instruction when the prior

conviction was admitted, we find the decision not

to object or request a limiting instruction during

the prosecution's rebuttal was also a tactical

decision. Specifically, counsel may not have

objected in order to keep the jury focused on the

actual testimony of the eyewitnesses regarding

their observations of the gun. As such, we will not

second-guess trial counsel's reasonable tactical

decision. (People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166,

1209.)

People v Anderson, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 1677, at ** 12-13.

1

Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance

of trial counsel when his counsel failed to request a limiting

instruction related to evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction for

sale of heroin. The court admitted petitioner’s previous conviction

for the purpose of count two of the information, being a felon in

possession of a firearm. At the end of the trial, the court gave

the jury CALJIC No. 2.09, a general instruction on the limited use

of evidence. Petitioner argues the jury should have been given

CALJIC No. 2.50, which is specific to “other crimes” evidence.

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

first basis for ineffective assistance of counsel was not contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

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Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d). 

A difference of opinion as to trial tactics does not

constitute denial of effective assistance. See United States v

Mayo, 646 F2d 369, 375 (9th Cir 1981). Tactical decisions in

particular deserve deference when they are based on strategic

considerations and are reasonable under the circumstances. See

Sanders v Ratelle, 21 F3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir 1994). Whether the

decision was reasonable is a question of law considered under 28 USC

§ 2254(d)(1). Edwards v LaMarque, 475 F3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir

2007). 

The record shows that defense counsel considered asking

for CALJIC No. 2.50 or some other additional limiting instruction,

but chose not to do so. After the prior conviction had come into

evidence, Judge Danner discussed the jury instructions with counsel

in chambers. Judge Danner then described the conversation on the

record, outside the presence of the jury:

We had discussed in chambers giving an

instruction with respect to the jury’s ability to

consider the evidence concerning the defendant’s

prior conviction which is an element of count two

for only that purpose. And I believe it was the

conclusion of counsel as not appropriate or

necessary to give any further instruction on this

subject.

RT 456. Defense counsel responded by saying “That’s correct, your

Honor.” Id at 456. The California Court of Appeal reasonably

determined that counsel’s decision was tactical.

The California Court of Appeal also reasonably concluded

that counsel’s decision was reasonable under the circumstances. 

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Defense counsel may not have wanted to emphasize the prior

conviction. A limiting instruction specific to the prior conviction

could have highlighted it in the mind of the jury, without providing

any assurance that the instruction would be followed. Because there

was a sound strategic reason for not requesting an additional

limiting instruction, the state court reasonably concluded that

counsel’s decision did not fall below an objective standard of

reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. See Strickland,

46 US at 687-88.

Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the California Court

of Appeal considered the absence of any limiting instruction

regarding the prior conviction. At the end of the trial, the court

read CALJIC No. 2.09 to the jury:

Certain evidence was admitted for a limited

purpose. At the time this evidence was admitted

you were instructed that it could not be considered

by you for any other purpose other than the limited

purpose for which it was admitted. Do not consider

this evidence for any purpose except the limited

purpose for which it was admitted.

RT 462. The record does not show that any limiting instruction was

given at the time the evidence of the prior conviction was admitted,

as contemplated in CALJIC No. 2.09.

While CALJIC No. 2.09 appears incomplete without a

specific limiting instruction at the time the evidence of the prior

conviction was admitted, counsel’s decision not to request CALJIC

No. 2.50 or any other limiting instruction at the end of trial is

not a basis for ineffective assistance. Petitioner has not shown

prejudice as a result of counsel’s decision not to request any

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additional limiting instruction. In view of the evidence presented

at trial, it simply cannot be said that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s failure to request a limiting

instruction as to the prior conviction, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. See Strickland, 466 US at 694. 

The prosecution introduced substantial evidence in support

of the first charge of second-degree robbery. Ms Salazar and Ms

Villagrana testified that petitioner was the person who robbed the

store. A customer who witnessed the robbery also testified and

identified petitioner. Petitioner was arrested near the store a few

minutes after the robbery. Police found DVD’s nearby with his

fingerprints on them that matched the DVD’s purchased during the

robbery. Petitioner had $296.57 in his pocket when he was arrested;

the Blockbuster manager testified that approximately $297.91 was

missing from the register after the robbery. In light of the

substantial evidence as to the robbery charge, there is no

reasonable probability that the verdict on the robbery charge would

have been different had counsel requested an additional limiting

instruction related to petitioner’s prior conviction. Id.

In support of the additional allegation that petitioner

used a firearm during the robbery, the prosecution introduced the

testimony of the two clerks who saw the gun. Ms Salazar and Ms

Villagrana both testified that they believed the gun was real. Ms

Salazar testified that she took a second look at the gun,

specifically to determine if it was real or not, and decided that it

was. In light of the testimony from two independent and

corroborating witnesses as to the firearm enhancement, there is no

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1

 Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not apply to

petitioner’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The

prosecution was required to introduce evidence of petitioner’s prior conviction in

order to prove that he was a felon. Counsel could not have requested a limiting

instruction in relation to this charge because the evidence was admitted

specifically to prove it. 

15

reasonable probability that the outcome on the firearm enhancement

allegation would have been different, had counsel requested an

additional limiting instruction related to petitioner’s prior

conviction. Id.

In sum, there was substantial evidence introduced at trial

that petitioner committed the robbery and personally used a real

firearm.1

 The court is satisfied that confidence in the outcome of

the proceedings is not undermined by counsel’s decision not to

request an additional limiting instruction. Id.

Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

first basis for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state

court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

2

Petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective for failing

to object to a statement made by the prosecutor about the prior

conviction during closing argument. The prosecutor told the jury

that because petitioner was a heroin dealer, it was more likely the

gun used during the robbery was a real firearm. Petitioner claims

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this was an improper argument and his counsel should have made an

objection. 

The California Court of Appeal rejected petitioner’s

second basis for ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground

that counsel’s decision not to object was reasonable under the

circumstances. People v Anderson, 2005 Cal App Unpub LEXIS 1677, at

* 13. The court reasoned that counsel may not have objected in

order to keep the jury focused on the actual testimony of the

eyewitnesses regarding their observation of the gun. Id.

The California Court of Appeal’s rejection of petitioner’s

claim was not contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application

of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. See 28 USC §

2254(d). An objection immediately after the prosecutor’s statement

may have only served to highlight the statement, without any

assurance the jury would have disregarded it had they been

instructed to do so by the judge. Regardless, petitioner’s claim

fails because he has not shown prejudice from counsel’s decision.

In order to show prejudice from failure to object,

petitioner must show that (1) had his counsel objected, it is

reasonable that the trial court would have sustained the objection,

and (2) had the objection been sustained, it is reasonable that

there would have been an outcome more favorable to him. Wilson v

Henry, 185 F3d 986, 990 (9th Cir 1999).

Even if the trial judge could have sustained the

objection, petitioner has not shown that it is reasonable that there

would have been an outcome more favorable to him. Id. In support

of the allegation of personal use of a firearm, the prosecution

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introduced the testimony of Ms Salazar and Ms Villagrana. The

record shows that the jury focused on this testimony in particular

while deciding the firearm enhancement.

During deliberations, the jury requested from the court a

copy of Ms Salazar’s testimony specific to the gun. CT 219. The

jury also submitted a question to the judge, asking if they could

find the enhancement true based solely on the belief of the

witnesses:

We need clarification on the allegation in

count 1. Is it true that we are only to decide

“True” if Jennifer [Salazar] and Vanessa

[Villagrana]’s belief that it was a firearm. Is

the belief that it was a firearm by Jennifer and

Vanessa enough to say it’s true?

Id at 220 (emphasis in original). These were the only two requests

the jury made during deliberations. The court answered as follows:

You must decide whether the allegation as

stated in the Information * * * is true or is

not true beyond a reasonable doubt * * *. Your

decision must be based upon all of the evidence

that you have received in the trial and on the

law as contained in the Instructions * * *

Jennifer and Vanessa’s testimony concerning

their beliefs is evidence that you may use to

reach a decision.

Id at 221.

 The testimony of Ms Salazar and Ms Villagrana was

substantial evidence that petitioner used a real firearm during the

robbery, and the record shows that the jury carefully considered

this testimony. The court is satisfied that confidence in the

outcome of the proceedings is not undermined by counsel’s decision

not to object to the prosecution’s statement during closing. See

Strickland, 46 US at 694.

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Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on his

second basis for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The state

court’s rejection of this claim was not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court

precedent, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the

facts. See 28 USC § 2254(d).

IV

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

habeas corpus is DENIED. 

The clerk shall enter judgment in favor of respondent and

close the file. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

VAUGHN R WALKER

United States District Chief Judge

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