Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03932/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-03932-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Ruben Cortez
Petitioner
Gail Lewis
Respondent

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

RUBEN CORTEZ,

Petitioner,

 vs.

GAIL LEWIS, Warden,

Respondent. 

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No C 03- 3932 JSW (PR)

ORDER DENYING PETITION

FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS

INTRODUCTION

Ruben Cortez, a prisoner of the State of California, has filed a pro se

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Per order filed

on October 15, 2003, this Court found that the petition, liberally construed, stated

cognizable claims under § 2254 and ordered Respondent to show cause. 

Respondent filed its answer on January 22, 2004. Petitioner filed his traverse on

August 11, 2005. This order denies the petition for writ of habeas corpus on the

merits.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 19, 2000, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of lewd and

lascivious acts on a child of 14 or 15 years-old by a person more than ten years older

than the child, in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 288(c)(1). Petitioner also admitted that

he had sustained three prior convictions that qualified as “strikes” under Cal. Penal

Code § 667(b)-(I), and that he served a prior prison term within the meaning of Cal.

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Penal Code § 667.5(b). The prosecution dismissed a count of exhibiting pornography to

a minor upon Petitioner’s plea. Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) 1. 

On or about April 18, 2001, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of incarceration

of twenty-five years to life. On July 26, 2002, the conviction was affirmed on direct

appeal by the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District. The Supreme Court

of California denied review on October 16, 2002. Petitioner filed this instant petition

on August 27, 2003. 

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The facts underlying the charged offenses as found by the California Court of

Appeal, Sixth District, are summarized below.

On July 1, 2000, defendant took 15-year-old Jane Doe, his former

girlfriend’s daughter, out to dinner. He then offered her alcohol and took

her to a motel. Defendant suggested that she view a pornographic

magazine, but she refused. When defendant touched her breasts, she

tried to leave. Defendant told her to wait, and she did so because she

was afraid of him. Defendant then reached under her shorts and began

rubbing her thighs. Defendant eventually drove Jane Doe home. 

People v. Cortez, No.CC083273, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2002).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “in behalf

of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the

ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of

the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A district court may grant a petition

challenging a state conviction or sentence on the basis of a claim that was

“adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the state court’s adjudication of

the claim: “(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based

on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented

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in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

Under the ‘contrary to’ clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if

a state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme

Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the

Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v.

Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application’

clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if a state court identifies the

correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but

unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams,

529 U.S. at 413. As summarized by the Ninth Circuit: “A state court’s decision

can involve an ‘unreasonable application’ of federal law if it either 1) correctly

identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that

is objectively unreasonable, or 2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established

legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable.” Van

Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1150 (9th Cir. 2000) overruled on other

grounds; Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-73 (2003) (citing Williams, 529

U.S. at 405-07). 

“[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court

concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision

applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that

application must also be unreasonable.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 411; accord

Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436 (2004) (per curiam) (challenge to state

court’s application of governing federal law must not only be erroneous, but

objectively unreasonable); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 25 (2002) (per

curiam) (“unreasonable” application of law is not equivalent to “incorrect”

application of law). In deciding whether a state court’s decision is contrary to, or

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an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, a federal court

looks to the decision of the highest state court to address the merits of the

petitioner’s claim in a reasoned decision. LaJoie v. Thompson, 217 F.3d 663, 669

n.7 (9th Cir. 2000). 

The only definitive source of clearly established federal law under 

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) is in the holdings of the Supreme Court as of the time of the

state court decision. Williams 529 U.S. at 412; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062,

1069 (9th Cir. 2003). While the circuit law may be “persuasive authority” for the

purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an unreasonable

application of Supreme Court precedent, only the Supreme Court’s holdings are

binding on the state courts and only those holdings need be “reasonably” applied. 

Id.

In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Petitioner asserts that his sentence

of 25 years to life amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

Eighth Amendment.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

A criminal sentence that is significantly disproportionate to the crime for

which a defendant was convicted violates the Eighth Amendment. See Solem v.

Helm, 436 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (sentence of life imprisonment without the

possibility of parole for seventh non-violent felony violates the Eighth

Amendment). However, “outside the context of capital punishment, successful

challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences will be exceedingly

rare.” Solem, 436 U.S. at 289-90 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The

Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and

sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly

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disproportionate’ to the crime.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003)

(quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring)). 

A challenge to the proportionality of a sentence should be analyzed using

objective criteria, which include: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness

of the penalty; (2) a comparison of sentences imposed on other criminals in the

same jurisdiction; and (3) a comparison of sentences imposed for the same crime

in other jurisdictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-92. Under this proportionality

principle, the threshold determination for the court is whether Petitioner’s

sentence is one of the rare cases in which a comparison of the crime committed

and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. 

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30-31 (applying Harmelin

standard). Only if such an inference arises does the court proceed and compare

petitioner’s sentence with sentences in the same and other jurisdictions. See

Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005; Cf. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23 (noting that Solem does

not mandate comparative analysis within and between jurisdictions). The

threshold for an “inference of gross disproportionality” is quite high. See id. at

30 (sentence of twenty-five years to life for conviction of grand theft, for

shoplifting three golf clubs, with prior convictions was not grossly

disproportionate). 

In determining whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate under a

state’s recidivist sentencing statute, the court looks to whether such an “extreme

sentence is justified by the gravity of [an individual’s] most recent offense and

criminal history.” Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 744, 768 (9th Cir. 2004). In

judging the appropriateness of a sentence under a recidivist statute, a court may

take into account the government’s interest not only in punishing the offense of

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the conviction, but also its interest “in dealing in a harsher manner with those

who [are] repeat[] criminal[s].” United States v. Bland, 961 F.2d 123, 129 (9th

Cir.) (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 276 (1980)), cert. denied, 506

U.S. 858 (1992). The Eighth Amendment does not preclude a state from making

a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who

have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime, as may occur

in a sentencing scheme that imposes longer terms on recidivists. See Ewing, 538

U.S. at 25.

B. Analysis

Petitioner was sentenced to a term of twenty-five years to life after

pleading guilty to one count of lewd and lascivious acts on a child of 14 or 15

years-old by a person more than ten years older than the child, in violation of Cal.

Penal Code § 288(c)(1) and admitting three prior convictions that qualified as

“strikes” under California law. Although Petitioner’s sentence is undoubtedly a

harsh sentence for conviction of an offense that constitutes a “wobbler” (which

can be charged as either a felony or a misdemeanor under California law), it does

not amount to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth

Amendment.

Petitioner challenged his sentence on direct appeal to the California Court

of Appeal, Sixth District, claiming that his sentence violated the Eighth

Amendment because it was grossly disproportionate to his culpability. The Court

of Appeal denied Petitioner’s claim in a reasoned opinion. The court analyzed

the claim under federal and California law to determine whether Petitioner’s

sentence was unconstitutional, using three techniques identified by the Supreme

Court of California: (1) an examination of the “nature of the offense and/or the

offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society”;

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(2) a comparison of the challenged penalty with those imposed on the same

jurisdiction for more serious crimes; and (3) a comparison of the challenged

penalty with those imposed for the same offense in different jurisdictions. In re

Reed, 33 Cal. 3d 914, 923 (1983) (quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 425-29

(1972)). The Court of Appeal noted that California courts have followed the

reasoning of Rummel v. Estelle in upholding life sentences for third strike

offenders. Cortez, slip op. at 6 (citations omitted). 

The Court of Appeal noted that Petitioner was not just punished for his

lewd conduct on a child, but that his sentence also reflects his recidivism. The

court listed Petitioner’s criminal history, calling it “significant” and “extensive.”

In 1979, [defendant] was convicted of grand theft. In 1984, he was

arrested for possession of a controlled substance. In 1984, he was

also convicted of three forcible rapes, and sentenced to 11 years in

prison. In December 1989, defendant was released from prison. 

When his parole term ended in 1992, he began using drugs again. 

In 1996, defendant was convicted of failing to register as a sex

offender, and was sentenced to 32 months in prison. When he

released in 1998, he began to using drugs again. Defendant had

three other misdemeanor convictions, which included drunk in

public, driving with a suspended license, and driving under the

influence of alcohol. He also had two other felony convictions for

possession of controlled substances.

Id. at 3. The court determined that after considering the “nature of the offense

and the offender,” the imposition of the twenty-five year to life sentence was not

so grossly disproportionate as to “shock the conscience.” Id. at 6 (quoting In re

Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d at 424). 

The Court of Appeal also analyzed Petitioner’s case under the second

inquiry, comparing Petitioner’s sentence to those sentences imposed in California

for more serious crimes. The court noted that the California Three Strikes Law

treats all offenders with three strike convictions the same way, and deferred to the

judgment of the California Legislature who “is in the best position to evaluate the

gravity of different crimes.” Id. at 7. 

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Lastly, the Court of Appeal looked at the third inquiry, comparing

Petitioner’s sentence to sentences imposed for the same offense in other

jurisdictions. The court noted that although California’s Three Strikes scheme is

among the harshest in the nation, that itself does not prove cruel and unusual

punishment. After applying the final inquiry, the court concluded that the

punishment imposed in Petitioner’s case does not violate the constitutional

proscription against cruel and unusual punishment under the California or United

States Constitution. 

The decision of the California Court of Appeal is not contrary to, or an

unreasonable application of federal law as established by the Supreme Court of

the United States. The three inquiries used by the Court of Appeal is

substantially similar to the three-part analysis established by Solem, 436 U.S. at

290-92. However, Solem does not mandate a comparative analysis of sentences

within and between jurisdictions. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23. Only if the court

determines that Petitioner presents one of the rare cases where the comparison of

the crime committed and the sentence leads to an inference of gross

disproportionality should the court engage in a comparative analysis with other

defendants and other jurisdictions. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-04; See

United States v. Harris, 154 F.3d 1082, 1084 (9th Cir. 1998). Examining

Supreme Court precedent, its is clear that the threshold for an “inference of gross

disproportionality” is quite high. See, e.g., Ewing (sentence of twenty-five years

to life for conviction of grand theft with prior convictions was not grossly

disproportionate); Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (mandatory sentence of life

without possibility of parole for first offense of possession of 672 grams of

cocaine did not raise an inference of gross disproportionality). Thus, the Court of

Appeal’s analysis and determination of the first inquiry, that Petitioner’s sentence

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was not grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense committed and the

offender was consistent with controlling federal law.

Petitioner received a harsh sentence because he was a recidivist. His

recidivism must be considered in evaluating the constitutionality of his sentence. 

See Ramirez v. Castro, 365 F.3d 755, 768 (9th Cir. 2004) (because defendant

“was sentenced as a recidivist under the Three Strikes law, ‘in weighing the

gravity’ of his offense in our proportionality analysis, ‘we must place on the

scales not only his current felony,’ but also his criminal history”) (quoting Ewing,

538 U.S. at 29). Once one considers Petitioner’s criminal history – six prior

felony convictions (including three forcible rapes), five misdemeanor

convictions, and two separate prison terms– it is clear that the severity of his

sentence does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.

 Petitioner’s criminal history is more extensive and serious than the

criminal history of several defendants whose harsh convictions were challenged

as in violation of the Eighth Amendment and upheld by the Supreme Court. See

Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (upholding sentence of two consecutive prison terms of

twenty-five years to life for petty theft where defendant’s prior crimes included

residential burglary and stealing video tapes valued at less than $200); Ewing,

538 U.S. 11 (sentence of twenty-five years to life upheld for felony grand theft

where defendant had prior convictions for robbery and three residential

burglaries); Rummel, 445 U.S. 263 (sentence of life in prison upheld for

defendant sentenced under recidivist statute after third conviction where offenses

included credit card fraud, forgery, and theft). 

Considering Petitioner’s instant conviction and his past criminal history,

his sentence of twenty-five years to life is not so grossly disproportionate to

amount to a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. The California Court of

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Appeal correctly completed an analysis of whether the sentence was grossly

disproportionate consistent with that of the Supreme Court in Solem and its

determination that Petitioner’s sentence was not cruel and unusual punishment is

consistent with controlling federal law. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for the writ of habeas corpus is

DENIED. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Respondent and close

the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATE: August 17, 2006

 _____________________

 JEFFREY S. WHITE

 United States District Judge 

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