Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06132/USCOURTS-ca6-14-06132-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
George R. Booth
Appellant
Robbie Pickett Evans
Appellant
Professional Transportation, Inc.
Appellee

Document Text:

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 15a0422n.06

Case No. 14-6132

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ROBBIE PICKETT EVANS and GEORGE R. 

BOOTH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE EASTERN 

DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

O P I N I O N

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; MERRITT and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

COLE, Chief Judge. Plaintiffs-Appellants Robbie Evans and George Booth appeal the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment on their claim brought under the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). Evans and Booth allege that Professional 

Transportation, Inc. (“PTI”), terminated them in retaliation for joining a lawsuit against the 

company. The district court concluded that Evans and Booth failed to establish a prima facie 

case of retaliation because they were unable to show that the supervisor who terminated them 

had knowledge of their engagement in a protected activity under the FLSA. For the reasons 

discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

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I. BACKGROUND

PTI is in the business of transporting railroad crews. Evans began working as a driver at 

PTI’s Chattanooga branch in 2007. She was promoted to assistant manager in 2008 and became 

the branch manager of the Chattanooga office in 2009. As manager, Evans’s duties included 

general oversight of the branch, including staffing and employee training. 

Booth began working as a driver for PTI in Chattanooga in 2009, and later that year was 

promoted to be the assistant manager of the branch. Booth’s duties included managerial tasks, 

employee training, and some driving.

PTI’s branch offices, including Chattanooga, are staffed by drivers who are scheduled to 

pick up railroad crews in company vans and transport them between locations. If no regular 

drivers were available, branch managers sometimes would drive the vans themselves or hire 

taxicabs. PTI rates the performance of each office based on several factors, including the 

percentage of trips that are on time (“on time performance” or “OTP”), the frequency of taxicab 

use, and the adequacy of staffing. Despite some issues with driver retention and turnover, under 

Evans and Booth’s management, the Chattanooga branch was generally considered one of the 

better performing branches in its division.

In 2009, a group of employees filed a lawsuit against PTI seeking overtime 

compensation. In that case, Miller v. Professional Transportation, Inc., 3:09-cv-111 (S.D. Ind.), 

a settlement agreement was reached in the summer of 2011 and resulted in an overhaul of the 

system by which the company scheduled and tracked overtime hours for its employees. 

Consequently, the Miller litigation was widely known to PTI’s management. Evans and Booth 

testified that, during the course of the litigation, they had conversations with Kenneth Lanzon, a 

PTI regional manager, in which Lanzon suggested that PTI planned to “set up” the Miller

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plaintiffs for termination because PTI’s President, Ronald Romain, “would not allow anybody to 

sue him and receive money and continue to work for his company.” (Evans Dep., R. 24-3, 

PageID 391.) 

In August 2011, a second group of employees filed another lawsuit, Matthews, et al. v. 

Professional Transportation, Inc. & Ronald Romain, 3:11-cv-97 (S.D. Ind.), seeking overtime 

compensation against PTI and its President. Evans and Booth opted into the Matthews litigation 

on March 1, 2012. They did not inform their supervisors that they had opted in, nor did they 

know whether their supervisors were aware of the Matthews litigation.

In February 2012, Evans attended a day-long workshop with several other branch 

managers. At that time, several branches, including the Chattanooga office, were still using taxis 

to transport crew members despite the fact that PTI’s management had informed Evans by email 

in October 2011 that taxicabs were no longer to be used in her branch, or in several others. 

While Evans was not aware of any performance deficiencies in her office, several days after the 

February meeting she was told to develop a plan to improve her branch’s OTP and eliminate cab 

usage.

In March 2012, Evans began experiencing difficulties maintaining the Chattanooga 

branch’s performance. In addition to the heightened emphasis on eliminating taxicab usage, 

Evans and Booth were prohibited from driving vans and told to “focus 100% of their efforts on 

recruiting, hiring and training . . . to get the schedule 100% full.” (Email from Michael Morin, 

March 14, 2012, R. 24-21, PageID 686.) Also, maintenance on the Chattanooga branch’s vans 

was subject to increased delays.

Evans had also been encountering significant and ongoing disciplinary problems with 

two employees, Marc McKibben and Jayanna Dotson. At the February 2012 meeting, PTI’s 

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Human Resources Director, Steven Greulich, and Senior Director of Operations, Danny Barr,

instructed Evans not to take any disciplinary action against either McKibben or Dotson, but 

instead to direct such matters to Greulich. McKibben’s deficiencies continued, culminating in a 

verbal confrontation with Evans in March 2012 after Evans purportedly made several 

unsuccessful attempts to contact Greulich about McKibben. McKibben reported the incident to 

Greulich. Evans then emailed Romain and Steven McClellan, PTI’s Vice President of 

Operations, informing them that she intended to discipline McKibben further, despite Greulich 

and Barr’s instructions that such discipline was Greulich’s responsibility, not Evans’s. Evans 

also verbally disciplined Dotson in March 2012. Later that month, Michael Morin, PTI’s 

Director of Operations, visited the Chattanooga branch and Evans told him about Dotson’s 

discipline and the confrontation with McKibben. 

Meanwhile, Morin had begun hiring management-level employees from outside the 

company in late 2011 and covertly sending them to branch offices to interview and train as 

drivers. In February 2012, Morin hired Robert McElroy as an “undercover manager” and 

assigned him to apply for a driver position at the Chattanooga branch. McElroy began training 

on March 20, 2012, reporting by email that Evans had done a “good job” on his first day. 

Booth trained McElroy to drive routes in company vans. McElroy testified that, during 

the training, Booth drove aggressively, used offensive language, and instructed McElroy and 

another trainee how to falsify trip vouchers and circumvent PTI’s policy against speeding. 

Booth also advised McElroy and the other trainee that smoking while on duty was against 

company policy but that if they did smoke, they should do so away from crews and with the van 

windows down.

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Morin sent an email to McClellan, Barr and Greulich on Friday, March 30, 2012, 

recommending that Evans and Booth be terminated. His email mentioned the outstanding 

staffing and OTP issues at the Chattanooga branch, but focused primarily on Evans’s actions 

against McKibben and Dotson and Booth’s conduct as reported by McElroy. Morin wrote that 

he had decided to terminate Evans for her “willful failure to follow specific, easy to understand 

instructions” and Booth “for performance, effective today, 3/30/12.” (Email from Michael 

Morin, March 30, 2012, R. 24-30, PageID 707–08.) McClellan replied on the same day that he 

would “forward to Ron [Romain] with additional comments related to all of your, [Greulich], 

and [Barr’s] proactive activities to address this issue.” (Id. at 707.) Evans and Booth were 

terminated the following Monday, on April 2, 2012. 

Evans and Booth filed this lawsuit in June 2012 in the United States District Court for the 

Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that PTI violated the FLSA by retaliating against them for 

engaging in protected activity. Specifically, they contend that they were terminated because they 

joined the Matthews litigation. PTI moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs

could not make out a prima facie case of retaliation because Morin, the individual who decided 

to terminate their employment, did not know of the Matthews lawsuit. PTI further argued that 

even if the plaintiffs could make a prima facie case, PTI had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason 

for firing both plaintiffs. The district court granted summary judgment to PTI, finding that the

plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of retaliation because Morin, the person who 

terminated them, did not have knowledge of Evans or Booth’s involvement in the Matthews

litigation. Accordingly, the district court did not reach the issue of whether PTI’s reasons for 

terminating the plaintiffs were pretextual. They now appeal.

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II. ANALYSIS

“We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Guyan Int’l, Inc. v. 

Prof’l Benefits Adm’rs, Inc., 689 F.3d 793, 797 (6th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is proper if 

there are no genuine disputes of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether PTI was entitled to summary 

judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties and draw 

all reasonable inferences in their favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 

(1986).

The anti-retaliation provision of the FLSA makes it unlawful for an employer “to 

discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has 

filed any compliant or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or related to” the 

FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3). A plaintiff may prove unlawful retaliation either with direct 

evidence of such retaliation or with circumstantial evidence establishing a prima facie case under 

the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See 

Taylor v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs offer no direct evidence of 

retaliation, so they must establish a prima facie case in reliance on circumstantial evidence. “To 

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must prove that (1) he or she engaged in a 

protected activity under the FLSA; (2) his or her exercise of this right was known by the 

employer; (3) thereafter, the employer took an employment action adverse to her; and (4) there 

was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” 

Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 452 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 2006). If the plaintiffs succeed in 

making out the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden of production shifts to 

PTI to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the terminations. Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 

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F.3d 324, 333 (6th Cir. 2007). If PTI satisfies its burden of production, the burden shifts back to 

the plaintiffs to show that the reason was a pretext for retaliation. Id. “Although the burden of 

production shifts between the parties, the plaintiff[s] bear[] the burden of persuasion throughout 

the process.” Id.

On appeal, the only contested issue is whether the plaintiffs satisfied the second element 

of the prima facie case, that PTI knew of their protected activity. Circumstantial evidence can 

support a reasonable inference of the decisionmaker’s knowledge if the evidence is comprised of 

“specific facts” and not merely “conspiratorial theories,” “flights of fancy, speculations, hunches, 

intuitions, or rumors.” Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 543, 552 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Visser v. 

Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1991)). We have inferred knowledge of 

protected activity in situations where the decisionmaker “took an action with respect to the 

plaintiff, other than the challenged adverse action, from which it could be inferred that the 

[decisionmaker] was aware of the plaintiff’s” protected activity. Id. at 552–53. 

The district court concluded that the plaintiffs did not meet this burden, and we agree.

Contrary to their contention, plaintiffs cannot establish the second element of the prima facie 

case of retaliation merely by showing that PTI had “general corporate knowledge” of their 

participation in Matthews. They must show that Morin, the decisionmaker, knew of their 

involvement in the Matthews litigation. See Frazier v. USF Holland, Inc., 250 F. App’x 142, 

148 (6th Cir. 2007) (“The decisionmaker’s knowledge of the protected activity is an essential 

element of the prima facie case of unlawful retaliation.”) (citing Mulhall, 287 F.3d at 551). 

The plaintiffs assert that Morin must have known about their participation in Matthews

because he only involved himself in employee discipline when an employee had taken legal 

action against PTI. This argument fails for two reasons. First, Morin initiated undercover 

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manager investigations into several other branches in 2011, each of which resulted in 

terminations of employees, none of whom were involved in overtime or pay-related lawsuits 

against PTI. Second, Morin had already begun investigating the Chattanooga branch in February 

2012, when he assigned McElroy to be an undercover manager, well before the plaintiffs joined 

the Matthews litigation on March 1, 2012. Thus, Morin’s decision to send McElroy to the 

Chattanooga branch could not be related to the plaintiffs’ subsequent decision to join a lawsuit 

against PTI. The plaintiffs also suggest that Morin’s use of an undercover manager investigation 

was itself suspicious because he told McElroy to make his reports by phone, rather than in 

writing. But this suggestion is belied by the fact that the previous undercover managers had also 

reported to Morin by phone. There is no evidence that Morin’s involvement in the plaintiffs’ 

terminations or his use of McElroy as an undercover manager suggest that he knew of their 

participation in Matthews.

The plaintiffs also contend that Morin must have known about their participation in

Matthews because he banned them, but no other managers from any other branch, from driving 

vans. Because driving vans had caused the plaintiffs to accrue significant overtime in the past, 

and Matthews was a lawsuit for overtime compensation, they infer that Morin banned them from 

driving in response to their complaints in Matthews. In other cases, we have found 

circumstantial evidence sufficient to infer employer knowledge where such knowledge was the 

only explanation for an employer’s action. See Allen v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 

413 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Mulhall, 287 F.3d at 552–53. But here, the prohibition on driving 

was a response to scheduling concerns at the Chattanooga branch originating before the 

plaintiffs’ protected activity. PTI’s management emphasized that Evans needed to hire more 

personnel for the Chattanooga branch at least as early as February 2012. That problem persisted 

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into March, when the plaintiffs were told to stop driving vans so that they could “focus 100% of 

their efforts on recruiting, hiring and training . . . in order to get the schedule 100% full.” (Email 

from Michael Morin, March 14, 2012, R. 24-21, PageID 686.) Therefore, Morin’s ban on the 

plaintiffs’ driving does not suggest that he knew they had joined Matthews because the ban arose 

from concerns that pre-dated their protected activity. 

The plaintiffs next suggest that they can establish the employer’s knowledge prong of 

their prima facie case by showing that there was a scheme by “Morin and other high-level 

managers” to set them up for termination. As evidence of this alleged plot, the plaintiffs first 

point to an allegedly hostile attitude in PTI’s management towards those who joined suits against 

the company, but any purported attitudes are irrelevant to whether the managers actually had 

knowledge of protected activity. The plaintiffs also point to the difficulties they encountered in 

March 2012 that negatively impacted the Chattanooga branch’s performance, suggesting that 

these difficulties were intentional acts of sabotage. At the outset, the allegation that PTI’s 

management would undermine its own branch’s performance and profitability as part of a 

scheme to fire the plaintiffs is precisely the sort of conspiracy theory that rarely supports an 

inference of knowledge of protected activity. See Mulhall, 287 F.3d at 552. The specific 

examples that the plaintiffs characterize as sabotage are the ban on driving vans themselves, the 

prohibition on the use of taxis in the Chattanooga branch, and maintenance delays. While each 

of these examples may have had some negative impact on the Chattanooga branch’s OTP, none 

of them suggest the existence of a plot to set the plaintiffs up for termination. As we have noted, 

Morin’s van-driving prohibition arose from performance concerns that originated before the 

plaintiffs joined Matthews. Likewise, PTI’s management instructed Evans to stop using taxicabs 

in her branch at least as early as October 2011, months before she joined Matthews. Finally, as 

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to the maintenance delays in March 2012, there is no evidence that anyone involved in the 

decision to terminate the plaintiffs had any control over maintenance problems, let alone caused 

these delays. Thus, there is no evidence to support the inference that there was a scheme to set 

up the plaintiffs for termination, much less that such a scheme might have been predicated on 

Morin’s knowledge that they had joined Matthews.

The plaintiffs also contend that they can establish the second prong of their prima facie 

case of retaliation by showing that Greulich knew about their protected activity. Even though 

Morin made the ultimate decision to terminate them, the plaintiffs assert that Greulich regularly 

interacted with Morin regarding employee discipline in March 2012, and so it is reasonable to 

infer that he would have told Morin about the plaintiffs’ participation in Matthews. See Mulhall, 

287 F.3d at 553. But the plaintiffs have failed to provide any evidence that Greulich actually 

knew about their protected activity, so they cannot make out a prima facie case by relying on the 

theory that he might have told Morin about it. They first assert that Greulich likely knew of their 

participation in the Matthews litigation because human resources directors are generally aware of 

lawsuits against their companies. Such a general assertion is insufficient to support the specific 

inference that Greulich knew of the particular protected activity here. See Scott v. Eastman 

Chem. Co., 275 F. App’x 466, 482 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a plaintiff must make a specific 

showing that the particular individuals responsible for the adverse employment decision “likely 

had knowledge of [the] protected activity”). Second, the plaintiffs suggest that Greulich 

intentionally refused to respond to Evans’s calls related to McKibben’s insubordination in an 

effort to force Evans herself to discipline McKibben, which would provide a basis for Evans’s 

termination. Again, without evidence to suggest that Greulich deliberately delayed his responses 

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to Evans about McKibben, such an unsupported conspiracy theory cannot create an inference 

that Greulich knew of the plaintiffs’ participation in the Matthews litigation. 

The plaintiffs next allege that Romain must have known about their participation in 

Matthews because he was a named defendant in that suit. But even if Romain did know that they 

were involved in Matthews, this would not establish the plaintiffs’ prima facie case because the 

record reveals that Romain did not make the decision to terminate them. The plaintiffs point to 

McClellan’s March 30, 2012 email in which he said that he would forward the termination 

recommendation to Romain. To be sure, “knowledge of a plaintiff’s protected activity can be 

inferred from evidence of the prior interaction of individuals with such knowledge and those 

taking the adverse employment action.” Mulhall, 287 F.3d at 553 (emphasis added). But the 

March 30 email chain merely shows that McClellan informed Romain about the termination 

decision that Morin had already made. Therefore there is no evidence that Romain was involved 

in the decision to fire the plaintiffs; accordingly, they cannot establish the second element of 

their prima facie case even if Romain knew that they participated in Matthews. 

Finally, the plaintiffs point out that they were terminated a mere thirty-two days after 

they joined the Matthews litigation. “Temporal proximity, when coupled with other facts, may 

be sufficient in certain cases to establish the causal-connection prong” of a prima facie case of 

retaliation, but we have generally declined to consider temporal proximity to establish the

employer’s-knowledge prong. Id. at 551. The plaintiffs, however, urge us to consider temporal 

proximity here, arguing that it can support both the employer’s-knowledge and causalconnection prongs of the prima facie case. But the plaintiffs have produced no other evidence 

that Morin had knowledge of their participation in Matthews, so even if temporal proximity can 

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sometimes serve as circumstantial evidence of an employer’s knowledge, here the temporal 

proximity is not sufficient to establish this prong of the prima facie case.

Because the plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of retaliation, we need not 

determine whether PTI has proffered a non-retaliatory reason for the plaintiffs’ terminations, nor 

whether any such reason is pretextual. See Grubb v. YSK Corp., 401 F. App’x 104, 112 (6th Cir.

2010) (holding that it is generally inappropriate to consider an employer’s proffered reasons for 

terminating an employee before the employee has made out a prima facie case).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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