Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03743/USCOURTS-ca8-03-03743-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Jo Anne B. Barnhart
Appellee
Kristin A. Marrotte
Appellant

Document Text:

1

The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 03-3743

___________

Kristin A. Marrotte, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner, * [UNPUBLISHED]

Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

___________

Submitted: August 6, 2004

Filed: August 13, 2004

___________

Before WOLLMAN, McMILLIAN, and RILEY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

Kristin A. Marrotte appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of

supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. Having reviewed the

record, see Fredrickson v. Barnhart, 359 F.3d 972, 976 (8th Cir. 2004) (standard of

review), we affirm. 

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In her June 2000 applications and related documents, Marrotte alleged

disability since November 1993 from fibromyalgia, chronic migraines, neck pain,

Bell’s palsy, depression, and anxiety. She later revised her alleged onset date to midJune 2000. After a hearing at which a psychological expert (PE) and vocational

expert (VE) testified, an administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that Marrotte’s

impairments--including fibromyalgia, headaches, and depression with anxiety--were

severe but not of listing-level severity, and that her residual functional capacity (RFC)

did not preclude her past relevant work (PRW) in jewelry making.

Marrotte raises numerous challenges to the ALJ’s credibility findings.

Although some of Marrotte’s contentions have force, we find that the ALJ’s

credibility findings are nonetheless entitled to deference. See Gregg v. Barnhart, 354

F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) (if ALJ explicitly discredits claimant and gives good

reasons for doing so, court will normally defer to credibility determination). Among

other things, we disagree with Marrotte’s assertion that the ALJ was required to

discuss her prior work record and her illness-related job losses, see Tucker v.

Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) (ALJ need not discuss each factor listed

in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), so long as analytical

framework is recognized and considered); and in any event, Marrotte’s earnings

record for the nine years preceding 2000 does not help her, see Fredrickson, 359 F.3d

at 976-77 (claimant properly discredited in part due to sporadic work record,

reflecting relatively low earnings and multiple years with no reported earnings,

pointing to potential lack of motivation to work). While there is a statement from her

last employer indicating that Marrotte lost that job due to frequent absences, nothing

in the record establishes that Marrotte lost other jobs due to illness. Further, the

ALJ’s finding that the record suggested that Marrotte was seeking care only to

establish evidence supporting a disability claim is supported by substantial evidence:

for example, Marrotte testified that her Medicaid coverage ended in January 2001 and

did not begin again until shortly before the April 2002 hearing, but the medical

records indicate that once Physician’s Assistant (PA) Debra Brandt completed a

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disability form for Marrotte in July 2000, Marrotte saw Brandt only once more in

August 2000; and Marrotte’s rationale (lack of transportation) for choosing not to

participate in a July 2000 pain-management program is suspect, given pain-center

notes indicating that family members brought her to the center, and her testimony that

she had a car and sometimes drove. See id. at 976 (substantial evidence is less than

preponderance but enough that reasonable person would find it adequate to support

decision). And as to the ALJ’s reliance on references to narcotic-seeking behavior,

while PA Brandt found Marrotte’s symptoms real and not due to drug-seeking

behavior, an emergency room physician noted his concern over Marrotte’s use of

narcotics, Marrotte twice specifically requested stronger narcotics from Brandt, she

was getting narcotics from both Brandt and emergency room physicians during the

same period, and in November 2001 she requested a narcotic analgesic from another

doctor for fibromyalgia and a slight headache. 

We also reject Marrotte’s challenge to the ALJ’s RFC findings. The ALJ

properly discounted the May 2001 RFC opinion of PA Brandt about disabling

migraines, fibromyalgia, and depression, as there is no evidence that she treated

Marrotte after August 2000, and thus her opinion is not supported by treatment

records; the medications she prescribed earlier for depression reportedly helped; and

Marrotte never sought counseling. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a), (d); 416.913(a),

(d) (2004) (PAs are not acceptable medical sources but may provide evidence

showing severity of impairments and how they affect ability to work); cf. Bentley v.

Shalala, 52 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 1995) (ALJ may reject any medical expert’s

conclusions if they are inconsistent with record as whole). As to Dr. Craig Mills’s

November 2000 RFC opinion, it was rendered after a one-time evaluation, and Dr.

Mills did not specify Marrotte’s restrictions, stating only that she would have

problems with repetitive activities. See Singh v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 448, 452 (8th Cir.

2000) (opinion of consulting physician who examines claimant once or not at all

generally does not constitute substantial evidence); cf. Holmstrom v. Massanari, 270

F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2001) (treating physician’s vague and conclusory opinion is

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not entitled to deference). And the “DBQ” finding Marrotte references--indicating

she is capable of no more than sedentary work--is not inconsistent with the ALJ’s

determination that Marrotte could perform her PRW in jewelry making, which was

categorized by the VE as a sedentary job. Finally, the ALJ’s RFC findings are

consistent--except for the purported need to nap frequently, and the 3-4 bad days a

week--with Marrotte’s testimony concerning her RFC; and they are supported by the

RFC findings of Social Security Administration reviewing physicians and of the PE.

See Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir. 2004) (RFC determination is

based on medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and

claimant’s own description of her limitations). As to Marrotte’s argument about the

VE’s response to a hypothetical posed by the ALJ, VE testimony was not required

here. See Banks v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 820, 827 (8th Cir. 2001) (VE testimony is

not required at step four where claimant retains burden of showing she cannot

perform her past relevant work).

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. 

______________________________

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