Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02793/USCOURTS-ca3-09-02793-1/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Luke Gatlin
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

 

No. 09-2793

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

LUKE GATLIN,

Appellant

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Delaware

(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-06-cr-00028-001)

District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

 

Argued March 24, 2010

 

Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 15, 2010)

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Robert D. Goldberg, Esquire (Argued)

Biggs & Battaglia

921 Orange Street

P.O. Box 1489

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellant

Seth M. Beausang (Argued)

Ilana H. Eisenstein, Esquire

Office of the United States Attorney

1007 North Orange Street, Suite 700

P.O. Box 2046

Wilmington, DE 19899

Counsel for Appellee

 

OPINION

 

AMBRO, Circuit Judge 

Appellant Luke Gatlin was convicted of one count of

possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1). On appeal, he argues that the

District Court erred in denying his motions that sought (1) to

suppress the evidence of the gun, (2) to compel disclosure of the

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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 1

and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

3

identity of the confidential informant involved in his case, and

(3) a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29(c). We affirm the District Court’s rulings in each

instance.

1

I.

On February 9, 2006, at around 7:00 p.m., Wilmington

Police Detective Joseph Leary received a phone call from a

known and reliable confidential informant telling him that a man

was walking in the area of 30th and Market Streets in

Wilmington with a gun in his front right coat pocket. The

informant described this individual as a “light skinned black

male, approximately five foot eight, wearing a Chicago Cubs

hat, a black hooded jacket and black blue jeans.” Detective

Leary then called police dispatch to have this message relayed

to any officers in that vicinity.

Delaware Probation and Parole Officer Brian Kananen

and Wilmington Police Detective Joshua Burch responded to

this call and went to the corner of 30th and Market Streets.

When they arrived, there were between 15 and 30 people at the

intersection and, though the sun had already set, the area was

well-lit. Among this crowd, the officers spotted a man wearing

a Cubs hat who matched the informant’s description standing at

Case: 09-2793 Document: 003110217998 Page: 3 Date Filed: 07/15/2010
 11 Del. C. § 1442 provides that “[a] person is guilty of 2

carrying a concealed deadly weapon when the person carries

concealed a deadly weapon upon or about the person without a

license to do so as provided by § 1441 of this title.”

4

the passenger window of a red Jeep Grand Cherokee. The

officers got out of their patrol car, Detective Burch drew his gun

and ordered the man down on the ground, and Officer Kananen

handcuffed the man behind his back. The latter then patted the

man down for weapons, and found a handgun in his right front

coat pocket. At that point, Officer Kananen recognized the

individual as Luke Gatlin, based on previous interactions with

him in the Delaware probation system.

Gatlin was arrested and charged as noted above. Before

his trial, Gatlin moved to suppress the evidence of the gun,

arguing that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and

search him based solely on the informant’s tip that he was

carrying a concealed handgun. The District Court denied the

motion because it is a crime in Delaware to carry a concealed

deadly weapon without a license. 11 Del. C. § 1442.2

Gatlin also moved pre-trial to reveal the identity of the

confidential informant based on a justification defense theory.

Gatlin asserted that, shortly before the tip was made, he had

been robbed at gunpoint and managed to wrest the gun away

from his robber. If the informant were the same person as the

robber, he argued, this would buttress his defense theory. The

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5

District Court denied this motion, finding that this theory was

too attenuated to defeat the Government’s privilege to conceal

the informant’s identity.

Gatlin was found guilty after a jury trial. He then moved

for a judgment of acquittal, under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 29(c), arguing that the Government had failed to

prove that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce because

it had not certified one of its witnesses as an expert. The

District Court denied the motion, finding that Gatlin had waived

this argument by not objecting to the witness’s qualifications at

trial. In any event, the Court concluded that, even without this

witness’s testimony, there would still be sufficient evidence to

support the jury’s verdict.

II.

A. Motion to Suppress

Gatlin first argues that the District Court erred in denying

his motion to suppress the handgun. Specifically, he claims that

the tip did not indicate he was engaged in criminal activity

because it contained no information about whether he was

licensed to carry a concealed weapon. He contends further that

the police had no basis to search him for weapons because,

although they had reason to believe he was armed, they had no

reason to believe he was dangerous.

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We review the District Court’s denial of Gatlin’s motion

to suppress “‘for clear error as to the underlying facts, but

exercise plenary review as to its legality in light of the court’s

properly found facts.’” United States v. Lafferty, 503 F.3d 293,

298 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d

452, 458 (3d Cir. 2003)).

A brief, investigatory stop is valid under Terry v. Ohio,

392 U.S. 1 (1968), “when the officer has a reasonable,

articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at

30). In determining whether there was reasonable suspicion, we

consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v.

Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 353 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). When the officer has

“reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and

dangerous individual,” he may then conduct “a reasonable

search for weapons for the protection of the police officer.”

Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. The purpose of a Terry frisk for weapons

“is not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to

pursue his investigation without fear of violence.” Adams v.

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). The stop and the search are

independent actions, and each requires its own justification.

Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784 (2009) (“First, the

investigatory stop must be lawful. . . . Second, to proceed from

a stop to a frisk, the police officer must reasonably suspect that

the person stopped is armed and dangerous.”). If the lawful

bounds marked by Terry are exceeded, any evidence obtained

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from the stop or the weapons search must be suppressed. United

States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 442, 447 (3d Cir. 2010).

1. The Investigatory Stop

Because it is undisputed that the tip here was reliable, the

first question before us is whether the officers had reasonable

suspicion to stop Gatlin based solely on the information that he

was carrying a concealed handgun. This case is different from

most, in that it lacks other factors often present (in addition to a

tip) that suggest the defendant was engaged in criminal activity

(e.g., presence late at night in a high-crime area known for

shootings, or attempting to flee from the police, see Valentine,

232 F.3d at 356–57). Nonetheless, we hold that reasonable

suspicion existed in this case based solely on the reliable tip

from a known informant because carrying a concealed handgun

is presumptively a crime in Delaware. While it is possible to

have a concealed handgun license, “[t]he burden is upon the

defendant to establish that he had a license to carry [the]

concealed . . . weapon.” Lively v. State, 427 A.2d 882, 884 (Del.

1981) (quoting Modesto v. State, 258 A.2d 287, 288 (Del. Super.

Ct. 1969)); see also Upshur v. State, 420 A.2d 165, 169 (Del.

1980) (stating that “the clear import of [Delaware law] . . .

places the burden of proving that he was legally entitled to carry

the deadly weapon (by virtue of a license) on the defendant”).

Thus, under Delaware law, carrying a concealed handgun is a

crime to which possessing a valid license is an affirmative

defense, and an officer can presume a subject’s possession is not

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lawful until proven otherwise. See Lively, 427 A.2d at 884.

This presumption under Delaware law distinguishes

Gatlin’s case from our decision in United States v. Ubiles, 224

F.3d 213, 218 (3d Cir. 2000), in which we held that a stop-andfrisk based solely on a tip that an individual had a firearm

violated Terry. While Ubiles presented similar facts (in that the

only evidence was a tip of firearm possession), the case arose in

the U.S. Virgin Islands, which, unlike Delaware, does not apply

a presumption of illegality. Instead, there it is the Government’s

burden to prove the absence of a license. United States v.

McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 630 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, the tip did not

supply reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot

because it provided evidence of what is presumptively a legal

activity—possession of a handgun. In other words, this tip was

no different than “if [the informant] had told the officers that

Ubiles possessed a wallet, a perfectly legal act in the Virgin

Islands, and the authorities had stopped him for this reason.”

Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 218. 

In contrast, it is presumed in Delaware that concealed

handgun bearers are violating the law. 11 Del. C. § 1442.

When (i) a reliable tip is received that a person is carrying a

concealed firearm, and (ii) that conduct is presumed to be a

crime (as it is in Delaware), an investigatory stop is within the

bounds of Terry. That the suspect might later offer a license as

an affirmative defense does not affect this analysis. 

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 While we are concerned by the manner in which the search 3

was conducted—at gunpoint, ordering Gatlin to the ground, and

then handcuffing him behind his back before even asking him

a single question—this issue is not before us on appeal.

9

Here, the officers had reasonable suspicion that criminal

activity was afoot based on the tip that someone matching

Gatlin’s description was at that very moment committing a

crime—carrying a concealed firearm. Therefore, the

investigatory stop of Gatlin was justified. 

2. The Limited Weapons Search

Stopping Gatlin was a proper police act under Terry.

Moreover, because the officers believed Gatlin to have a

firearm, they were permitted by Terry to conduct a limited

search for weapons. During a lawful stop, if the officer “has 3

reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous

individual,” he may conduct “a reasonable search for weapons

for the protection of the police officer.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.

As noted above, because the “purpose of this limited search is

not to discover evidence of crime, but to allow the officer to

pursue his investigation without fear of violence,” the frisk (so

long as it is conducted pursuant to a lawful stop) may be

permissible “whether or not carrying a concealed weapon

violate[s] any applicable state law.” Adams, 407 U.S. at 146.

* * * * *

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As both the stop and limited search of Gatlin were

constitutionally proper, we conclude that the District Court did

not err in denying his motion to suppress.

B. Confidential Informant’s Identity

Gatlin argues that the identity of Detective Leary’s

informant is central to his defense. He suspects that the

informant might be the same individual, Daquon Anderson, who

allegedly robbed him at gunpoint shortly before his (Gatlin’s)

arrest at 30th and Market Streets. If the police revealed the

informant’s identity and validated this suspicion, Gatlin argues

this would lend credence to his defense theory.

“We review the District Court’s refusal to order

disclosure of [a] confidential informant’s identity for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 149 (3d

Cir. 2002). While the Government has a privilege to withhold

the identity of confidential informants, a “defendant can

overcome this privilege if he demonstrates that disclosure ‘is

relevant and helpful to [his] defense’ or ‘is essential to a fair

determination’ of his guilt.” Id. (quoting Roviaro v. United

States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957)) (alteration in original).

Gatlin did not carry his burden of demonstrating that

disclosure was relevant to his defense; rather, his defense theory

merely indicated a hope that the informant’s identity would be

helpful. See United States v. Brown, 3 F.3d 673, 679 (3d Cir.

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11

1993) (“A defendant who merely hopes (without showing a

likelihood) that disclosure will lead to evidence supporting

suppression has not shown that disclosure will be ‘relevant and

helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination’

of the case.” (quoting Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 60–61)). Even if

Anderson were revealed as the informant, this would not prove

that Anderson had robbed Gatlin and that the latter had obtained

the handgun while defending himself in that robbery.

Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse

its discretion in denying Gatlin’s motion to disclose the

informant’s identity.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Gatlin argues that the Government, by relying on the

testimony of an ATF agent who was not certified as an expert,

failed to establish an element of the crime of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon—namely, that Gatlin’s

handgun had traveled in interstate commerce. “In reviewing a

jury verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, we must consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and

affirm the judgment if there is substantial evidence from which

any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Brown, 3 F.3d at 680 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Here, even without the testimony of the ATF Agent, there

was substantial evidence from which the jury could have found

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12

that the gun had traveled in interstate commerce: the gun was

marked with a “Miami, Florida” engraving and the

manufacturer’s name, the ATF database indicated that the gun

had been purchased in Virginia, and no handguns have been

manufactured in Delaware in nearly 100 years.

* * * * *

For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the District

Court’s rulings.

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