Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01653/USCOURTS-ca3-16-01653-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Amin A. Rashid
Appellant
Warden Philadelphia FDC
Not Party

Document Text:

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute 

binding precedent. 

ALD-365 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

____________

No. 16-1653

____________

AMIN A. RASHID,

Appellant

v.

WARDEN PHILADELPHIA FDC

__________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 2-15-cv-00274)

District Judge: Cynthia M Rufe

__________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) or

Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

July 28, 2016

Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: August 3, 2016)

____________

OPINION*

____________

PER CURIAM

Appellant Amin A. Rashid appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing 

his petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, for lack of jurisdiction. For the 

reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/03/2016
2

Rashid was charged by Indictment on August 21, 2008 with two counts of mail 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and one count of aggravated identity theft, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (c)(5). On May 28, 2009, a Superseding 

Indictment charged him with ten counts of mail fraud, eight counts of aggravated identity 

theft, and one count of forging or counterfeiting postal money orders, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 500. A jury found Rashid guilty of nine counts of mail fraud and all eight 

counts of aggravated identity theft, and not guilty of one count of mail fraud and of 

forging or counterfeiting postal money orders. In a Judgment entered on July 24, 2013, 

the District Court sentenced Rashid to a total term of imprisonment of 240 months.1 We 

affirmed on November 25, 2014, see United States v. Rashid, 593 F. App'x 132 (3d Cir. 

2014). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 18, 2015.

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2015, Rashid filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 

28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania, the district where he is confined, claiming that he is actually innocent of a 

1980 District of Oregon conviction for interstate transportation of stolen property, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. 2314, that was used to enhance his 2013 Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania sentence. He argued that, because he was acquitted of a charge of mail 

fraud in the 1980 trial, it was inconsistent and improper to find him guilty of interstate 

 

1 The United States Probation Office determined that Rashid had a criminal history 

category of III, making his advisory Guidelines imprisonment range 108 to 135 months

before application of the mandatory consecutive sentences for his identity theft 

convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. For Rashid’s eight convictions under § 1028A, 

the Government argued that 24 months should be added to the low end of the range and 

that eight 24-month terms should be added to the high end of the range, producing a final 

advisory Guidelines range of 132 to 327 months.

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/03/2016
3

transportation of money taken by fraud, and thus improper for the District Court to have 

enhanced his 2013 sentence based on this prior conviction. Rashid sought to have both 

the enhancement and the allegedly wrongful 1980 conviction vacated. Shortly after filing 

his petition, Rashid filed a motion to disqualify the District Court for personal bias 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The Court denied the motion on the ground that Rashid 

had cited no evidence of an extrajudicial source of bias or of any action by the Court 

demonstrating personal bias. The Government then responded in opposition to the § 

2241 petition, arguing that jurisdiction was lacking.

In an order entered on January 22, 2016, the District Court dismissed the § 2241 

petition for lack of jurisdiction. The Court held that, because Rashid had already served 

the District of Oregon sentence, he was no longer “in custody” and thus the Court was 

without jurisdiction to vacate the 1980 sentence and conviction. The Court further held 

that Rashid could not resort to a § 2241 petition to challenge the enhancement to his 2013 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania sentence because he still had the opportunity to file a 

timely motion to vacate sentence, 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to challenge that sentence; he 

therefore failed to demonstrate that the remedy available to him under § 2255 is 

inadequate or ineffective. 

Rashid filed a timely motion for reconsideration and then a timely notice of 

appeal, resulting in the instant appeal. The appeal was stayed, Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)(A), pending disposition of the reconsideration motion. On April 4, 2016, and

thus more than 28 days after the entry of judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), Rashid filed 

a motion to reopen seeking the District Court’s disqualification. The Government 

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/03/2016
4

responded in opposition to the motion to reopen and asked the District Court to enjoin 

Rashid from future filings in both the instant action and his criminal case, D.C. Crim. No. 

08-cr-00493, arguing that he was engaging in abusive and vexatious litigation. On May 

25, 2016, Rashid filed his § 2255 motion in his criminal case; it was signed and dated 

May 16, 2016.

In an order entered on June 21, 2016, the District Court denied Rashid’s motion 

for reconsideration as meritless, denied his motion to reopen seeking disqualification as 

meritless, and denied the Government’s motion to enjoin Rashid from filing anything 

further in his § 2241 case as moot.2 Rashid did not file an amended notice of appeal 

seeking review of this order nor did he appeal the denial of his motion to reopen seeking 

disqualification. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to review the District Court’s order 

dismissing Rashid’s § 2241 petition and interlocutory order denying his motion for 

disqualification.3 Our Clerk granted Rashid leave to appeal in forma pauperis and 

 

2 The District Court granted the Government’s motion with respect to Rashid’s criminal 

case. The Court found that he had engaged in vexatious and abusive litigation, including 

filing numerous motions seeking to relitigate issues that had already been decided, 

multiple non-meritorious motions to recuse, thirty post-trial motions, and fourteen nonmeritorious challenges to the indictment, among other findings. The Court thus enjoined 

him from filing any further challenges, except for items related to his recently filed § 

2255 motion, without prior approval from the Court. The propriety of this injunction, 

imposed in Rashid’s criminal case, is not before us.

3 Although the District Court’s order denying the motion for reconsideration is the final 

order, we lack jurisdiction to review it because Rashid did not appeal it and the order did 

not decide new issues not covered by the District Court’s January 22, 2016 Order. Fed. 

R. App. Pro. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii); Carrascosa v. McGuire, 520 F.3d 249, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2008). 

We lack jurisdiction to review Rashid’s post-judgment motion to reopen seeking 

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/03/2016
5

advised him that the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) or summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. He 

has submitted written argument in support of the appeal, citing our decision in United 

States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2013), which we have considered. 

We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 

question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. The 

District Court properly dismissed Rashid’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. A 

motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive means for a federal 

prisoner to challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence, see Okereke v. United 

States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002), after he has completed his direct appeal. When 

Rashid filed this § 2241 petition, he had not yet filed a § 2255 motion challenging his 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania conviction and sentence. In certain limited 

circumstances, a petitioner may seek relief under § 2241 if the remedy provided by § 

2255 is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention, see In re: Dorsainvil, 

119 F.3d 245, 249-51 (3d Cir. 1997), but § 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective where 

the petitioner still has the opportunity to file a timely § 2255 motion that is neither second 

nor successive. Following the District Court’s decision, Rashid filed his § 2255 motion, 

which remains pending. He therefore has failed to show that § 2255 is inadequate or 

ineffective to test the legality of his detention pursuant to the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania conviction and sentence. Tyler does not support jurisdiction under the 

 

disqualification, a motion that did not toll the time for taking an appeal, Fed. R. App. P. 

4(a)(4)(A)(vi); Rashid must separately appeal that order and he has not done so.

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/03/2016
6

circumstances presented here. 732 F.3d at, 245 n.2, 246 (§ 2255 petition is inadequate 

when petitioner asserts a claim of actual innocence but is otherwise barred from 

challenging legality of conviction under § 2255). 

The District Court also properly determined that it was without § 2241 jurisdiction 

to vacate Rashid’s 1980 District of Oregon sentence and conviction. A prisoner may 

seek federal habeas corpus relief only if he is in custody in violation of the United States 

Constitution or federal law. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). If a sentence 

has fully expired, the petitioner is no longer “in custody;” the petitioner satisfies the 

custody requirement only by directly attacking a sentence he is serving at the time he 

files his petition. Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 401-02 

(2001). Rashid must rely on 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to attack the sentence he is currently 

serving.

Last, we summarily affirm the District Court’s interlocutory order denying 

Rashid’s motion for recusal; that motion was frivolous.

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 

dismissing Rashid’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction and interlocutory order 

denying his motion for recusal.

Case: 16-1653 Document: 003112371121 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/03/2016