Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03103/USCOURTS-caDC-91-03103-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Vielka Dudley
Appellant
United States of America
Appellee

Document Text:

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 19, 1993 Decided October 18, 1994

No. 90-3041

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARCOS LOINAS ANDERSON, A/K/A

MARCOS LOYNAS ANDERSON, A/K/A

T. TORRERO, A/K/A SAMUEL PEREZ,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3044

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MARIA BERDECIA, A/K/A

MARIA C. DEPALACIO, A/K/A CONSUELA,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3045

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

NORBERTO GARCES, A/K/A

VICTORIO TORRES, PIRO,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3046

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

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APPELLEE

v.

GABRIEL RUPERTO DAVIS-MUNOZ,

A/K/A GABRIEL DAVIS, GABELIN,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3047

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ALFREDO BRATHWAITE, A/K/A

SEALY, ALFREDO WEST, FREDDIE,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3048

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

BEVERLY ELAINE NELSON, A/K/A

BEVERLY M. NELSON,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3030

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ROBERT LUIS CASTILLO, A/K/A

ROBERT LUIS CASTILLO-GARRIDO,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3075

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTONIO SCOTT, A/K/A

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TONY ANDERSON, TONY,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3077

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

LEONARD LANCELOT SHAND,

A/K/A STEVE,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3103

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

VIELKA DUDLEY, A/K/A

VIELKA DUDLEY-MAYNARD,

VIELKA DAVIS, BENKY,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3200

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

ANTONIO SCOTT, A/K/A

TONY ANDERSON, TONY,

APPELLANT

No. 90-3131

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

MICHAEL JONATHAN BOOZE,

APPELLANT

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No. 90-3154

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

THOMAS TIMOTHY BOOZE,

A/K/A TIMMY,

APPELLANT

No. 91-3003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

APPELLEE

v.

GREGORY ORLANDER BOOZE,

APPELLANT

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(Criminal No. 89-0160)

William S. Rhyne (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Maria Berdecia.

Achim Kriegsheim (appointed by the Court) argued the cause for

appellant Michael Jonathan Booze. On the joint brief were Diane S.

Lepley for appellant Gregory Orlander Booze and Lois R. Goodman for

appellant Thomas Timothy Booze.

David C. Niblack (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Robert Luis Castillo.

Dennis M. Hart (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and filed

the brief for appellant Marcos Loinas Anderson.

Lois R. Goodman (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and filed

the brief for appellant Thomas Timothy Booze.

Robert W. Mance (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and filed

the brief for appellant Gabriel Ruperto Davis-Munoz.

G. Godwin Oyewole (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Leonard Lancelot Shand.

David Carey Woll (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

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1The "distribution centers" were five rented apartments, two

in Washington and one each in Annapolis, Maryland; Landover,

Maryland; and Alexandria, Virginia. 

filed the brief for appellant Alfredo Brathwaite.

Thomas Abbenante (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Vielka Dudley.

Richard S. Stern (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Antonio Scott.

W. Gary Kohlman argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant

Beverly Elaine Nelson.

Michael J. McCarthy (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and

filed the brief for appellant Norberto Garces.

Diane Lepley (appointed by the Court) argued the cause and filed

the brief for appellant Gregory Orlander Booze.

Stephen J. Pfleger and James C. Bohling, Assistant United States

Attorneys, argued the cause for the appellee. On the brief were J.

Ramsey Johnson, United States Attorney at the time the brief was

filed, and John R. Fisher and Margaret R. Batten, Assistant United

States Attorneys. Elizabeth Trosman, Assistant United States

Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: SILBERMAN, GINSBURG, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges.

Opinion filed PER CURIAM.

Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.

PER CURIAM: The appellants were convicted of and sentenced on

various drug offenses, all related to an extensive cocaine

distribution network organized and managed by appellant Anderson,

a Washington, D.C. area resident. For a period of years, Anderson

purchased cocaine from several suppliers in Washington, New York

and California and resold it to both wholesale distributors and

street level dealers, primarily through five "distribution centers"

located in Washington, Maryland and Virginia.1 According to the

government, appellants Berdecia, Garces, Dudley, Davis and

Brathwaite were among the various individuals who supplied, or

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2The government also contends Michael acted as a sort of

"enforcer" and general factotum to Anderson. 

3Appellants Anderson, Nelson, Berdecia, Garces, Davis and

Brathwaite were in the first group and were convicted in a trial

conducted October 10, 1989 to December 8, 1989. Appellants

Gregory Booze, Michael Booze and Thomas Booze were in the second

group and were convicted in a trial conducted January 22, 1990 to

March 2, 1990. Appellants Castillo, Dudley, Scott and Shand were

in the third group and were convicted in a trial conducted

September 12, 1990 to November 19, 1990. 

attempted to supply, Anderson with cocaine at one time or another;

appellants Thomas Booze, Gregory Booze, Michael Booze2 and

Brathwaite purchased cocaine from Anderson for further

distribution; and appellants Castillo, Shand and Scott worked in

Anderson's distribution centers. Appellant Nelson, Anderson's

girlfriend, relayed messages between other conspirators and

Anderson.

The thirteen appellants, along with 18 alleged

co-conspirators, were indicted in a 126-count superseding

indictment filed June 23, 1989. The trial judge divided the

defendants into three groups for three separate trials (hereafter

referred to collectively as "Group I," "Group II" and "Group III"

defendants).3 Each of the appellants was convicted of one count of

conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and of one or more counts

of using a telephone to facilitate a drug transaction in violation

of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). In addition, appellants Anderson, Thomas

Booze, Brathwaite, Davis and Dudley were convicted of possessing on

at least one occasion some quantity of cocaine with intent to

distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and appellants

Anderson and Thomas Booze were convicted of traveling interstate in

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4We have accorded all arguments full consideration but

address in this opinion only those that warrant discussion. 

aid of racketeering activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a).

Appellant Anderson was also convicted of distributing cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), carrying and using a firearm in

relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c) and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848. The appellants were sentenced to

prison terms ranging from 121 months (Gregory Booze) to 645 months

(Anderson), and fines were imposed on appellants Anderson

($1,000,000), Berdecia ($25,000), Thomas Booze ($17,500) and Davis

($1,000,000).

The appellants have marshaled a host of challenges to both

their convictions and their sentences. For the reasons set out

below, we vacate Anderson's CCE and conspiracy convictions,

remanding for entry of judgment on only one of those two counts,

and his $1,000,000 fine, remanding for findings regarding his

ability to pay it. We affirm all the other defendants' convictions

but vacate their sentences and remand for findings regarding the

quantity of drugs for which each appellant can be held

accountable.4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. PRETRIAL ISSUES

A. The Wiretap Issue .................. 12

B. The Criminal Justice Act .............. 20

C. Peremptory Challenges ................ 22

D. Brathwaite's Suppression Motion ........... 25

II. TRIAL ISSUES

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence ............. 30

B. The Jencks Act ................... 32

C. Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege ........ 34

D. Unanimity Instructions ............... 35

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III. SENTENCING ISSUES

A. Base Offense Level ................. 37

B. Section 924(c)(1) .................. 41

C. Cumulative Punishment ................ 49

D. The $1 Million Fine ................. 50

I. PRETRIAL ISSUES

A. The Wiretap Issue

The drug conspiracy for which the appellants here were

convicted was uncovered in large part through the use of wiretaps

on various conventional and cellular phones. All the appellants

seek reversal of their convictions on the grounds that the evidence

derived from these wiretaps should have been suppressed because of

alleged violations by the government of the wiretap statute.

The wiretap statute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control

and Safe Streets Act of 1968) provides that:

The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate

Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any

acting Assistant Attorney General or any Deputy Assistant

Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially

designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an

application to a Federal judge ... for ... an order

authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral

communications....

18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1988) (emphasis added). Once an authorized

application for a wiretap has been granted, the statute requires

that

[e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a

provision that the authorization to intercept ... shall

be conducted in such a way as to minimize the

interception of communications not otherwise subject to

interception under this chapter.... In the event the

intercepted communication is in a code or foreign

language, and an expert in that foreign language or code

is not reasonably available during the interception

period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as

practicable after such interception.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1988). Finally, section 2518(10)(a) provides

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5In conjunction with the provisions of section 2518(5), this

last requirement would apply the suppression remedy, where

appropriate, to inadequately "minimized" interceptions. 

for the suppression of all evidence, either contained in, or

derived from, a wiretap, if "the communication was unlawfully

intercepted," or "the order of authorization or approval under

which it was intercepted was insufficient on its face," or "the

interception was not made in conformity with the order of

authorization or approval." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1988).5

On December 12, 1986, then-Attorney General Meese signed an

order authorizing three Deputy Assistant Attorneys General (John C.

Keeney, Stephen A. Saltzburg, and Mark M. Richard, referred to as

DAAGs) to authorize applications for wiretaps. On August 12, 1988,

Attorney General Meese resigned and Thornburgh took his place.

Between September 20, 1988 and March 15, 1989, that is between one

and seven months after Meese left office, nine wiretaps were issued

pursuant to requests authorized by the three DAAGs. The

authorization memoranda in question here were each addressed to

Franklin Hess, Head of Enforcement, Criminal Division, and each

purported to be from Edward Dennis, Acting Assistant Attorney

General for the Criminal Division. The memoranda bore a line for

Dennis' signature, over which a signature of one of the three DAAGs

was found. On May 24, 1989, Attorney General Thornburgh

redesignated these same DAAGs as authorized to approve wiretap

applications.

Three violations of the wiretap statute are alleged to have

occurred here. First, the appellants contend that the

authorization memoranda prepared by the Justice Department were not

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6The wiretap statute in effect at the time Giordano was

decided provided that even assistant attorneys general could not

authorize applications unless they had been specially designated

to do so by the Attorney General and did not provide for

authorizations by deputy assistants. Because the only persons

permitted to authorize wiretap applications under the old act

were political appointees requiring the confirmation of the

Senate it made sense for the Supreme Court, as well as for this

court in United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C. Cir.

1983), to state that the purpose of the Wiretap Act was to limit

authorizations to politically accountable officials. See infra

Part I(A)(2). With the amendment of the statute to permit

certain nonpolitically accountable deputy assistants in the

criminal division to authorize applications, that purpose can no

longer be ascribed to Congress. It would perhaps be more

accurate, then, to attribute to Congress the purpose of limiting

such authority to identifiable officials in positions of trust. 

in fact signed by their author. Second, the appellants contend

that the authorizations designating certain officials to authorize

wiretaps expired when they were not re-approved by the Attorney

General who had replaced the designating Attorney General. Third,

the appellants argue that the minimization requirement of the

wiretap statute was violated. We reject each of these challenges.

1.

The appellants first argue that the purposes of the wiretap

statuteto assure that an accountable and identifiable person

actually review wiretap requests, see United States v. Giorda no,

416 U.S. 505, 515-16 (1974) (statute requires "mature judgment of

a particular, responsible Department of Justice official")were

thwarted because the person who signed the memoranda did not

actually write them (i.e. the memos purported to be from Dennis but

were signed by other people), and because there was no clear

evidence as to who actually authorized the applications.6 This

argument is insubstantial. Assuming that the relevant DAAGs were

properly authorized to approve applications, the fact that the

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memos they signed purported to be "from" Dennis is irrelevant to

the purposes of the statute because those individuals who did sign

the applications were identifiable. See United States v. Chavez,

416 U.S. 562, 575 (1974) ("the misidentification of the officer

authorizing the wiretap application did not affect the fulfillment

of any of the reviewing or approval functions required by

Congress"). We have refused to suppress evidence in similar

circumstances. United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C.

Cir.) (agreeing with the district court that it was "immaterial"

that a memorandum was initialed by Assistant Attorney General

Wilson when the decision was in fact made by Attorney General

Mitchell), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020 (1974). And the First

Circuit approved of wiretaps under precisely the facts of this

case. United States v. Citro, 938 F.2d 1431, 1435 (1st Cir. 1991)

(memo from Dennis signed for by Keeney), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.

902 (1992).

2.

The appellants next argue that the three DAAGs in question

were not authorized to approve wiretap applications when those

applications were made up to seven months after the designating

Attorney General had left office. In other words, the appellants

assert that the designations expired automatically upon a change of

Attorneys General, or at least soon thereafter. This identical

argument has been rejected by every circuit to have considered the

issue, with the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh

Circuits holding that under principles of administrative continuity

a designation of officials by one Attorney General continues in

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effect through a change in Attorneys General so long as the people

designated continue to hold their offices. A typical case is

United States v. Kerr, 711 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1983). There, the

Tenth Circuit upheld a wiretap where the application was authorized

by an official almost two and one half years after the designating

Attorney General had left office. The court reasoned:

The wiretaps are obviously different in some

respects from the other functions and the continuing

activities of the Attorney General's staff through

changes in administration. Nevertheless, in our opinion,

when the authority to authorize applications for wiretaps

has been validly delegated to a person in a particular

position, as we are concerned with here, it continues so

long as that person remains qualified. There was no

limitation in the delegation of authority, and the

statute contains no express limitations nor language from

which one could be implied.

Id. at 150-51. To similar effect are United States v. Lawson, 780

F.2d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 1985) (following Kerr ); United States v.

Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 311 (2d Cir.) ("Administrative continuity

requires that the designation by an outgoing Attorney General of

Assistants to authorize electronic surveillance remain valid at

least for a reasonable time after the Attorney General leaves

office, even without an express redesignation by his successor."),

cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Messersmith,

692 F.2d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Wyder, infra );

United States v. Wyder, 674 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.) ("We can see

no basis for holding that § 2516(1) represents a deviation from the

usual rule that administrative orders ordinarily remain in effect

beyond the tenure of the individual who issued them."), cert.

denied, 457 U.S. 1125 (1982). The First Circuit has gone even

further and held that an Attorney General's designation of an

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individual by job title is all that is required. Under that

approach, a designation by one Attorney General of the "chief

deputy assistant in the criminal division" would continue in force

indefinitely through a change in both Attorneys General and deputy

assistants, unless revoked. See United States v. O'Malley, 764

F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Bynum, 763 F.2d 474,

475 (1st Cir. 1985). Under either approach, the designations here

suffice.

This issue, however, is somewhat complicated by our prior

decision in United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C. Cir.

1983). Robinson involved a challenge to the adequacy of

authorization memoranda approved by an Assistant Attorney General

who had been designated by a former Attorney General but not (until

eight days after approval of the wiretap application) by the new

Attorney General. In the course of concluding that "the

authorization by Assistant Attorney General Litvack adequately

satisfies the purposes of the statutory provision" because "Litvack

had been specially designated by [the former Attorney General]

within the literal meaning of Section 2516(1)," 698 F.2d at 452, we

rejected the administrative continuity approach. Our reasoning in

so doing, however, is no longer applicable. We stated:

[A]rguments about the need for administrative continuity

miss the mark in this case. The power to authorize

electronic surveillance applications is uniquely

circumscribed by statute. Congress has identified a very

limited category of officials who may legally wield this

power. Section 2516's restrictions thereby ensure that

decisionmaking is "centralize[d] in a publicly

responsible official subject to the political process."

S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968).

698 F.2d at 452 (emphasis added). In other words, our rejection of

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administrative continuity was premised on the notion that Congress

intended only politically accountable officials (presidentially

appointed and confirmed by the Senate) to authorize wiretap

applications. On that premise, it was feasible to read the statute

to require that upon a change in political administrations the

newly appointed officials re-evaluate all outstanding designations

to ensure full political accountability. That rationale was

rejected by Congress, however, when it amended the statute to

permit Deputy Assistant Attorneys Generalnonpolitical appointees

who are not "publicly responsible ... to the political process"to

authorize wiretap applications. The administrative continuity

approach followed by our sister circuits is surely now more

appropriate. Nothing in the statute as amended suggests that,

unlike other governmental authorizations, officials must be

redesignated every time an Attorney General is replaced by a new

official.

The appellants fix upon the following language in Robinson:

"[S]ince the delay in revalidation was relatively brief and since

the purposes of the statutory requirements were adequately served,

we will not overturn the District Court's denial of appellant's

motion to suppress." 698 F.2d at 452. Because the delay

hereapproximately seven monthswas considerably greater than the

one month delay in Robinson, the appellants would have us conclude

that the delay here was unreasonable and reverse. But, having

concluded that "the purposes of the statutory requirements were

adequately served," and that the designation fell within "the

literal meaning of Section 2516(1)," our statements about the

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7It is worthwhile pointing out that even were we to conclude

that the strictures of the wiretap statute were not fully

complied with, suppression may not be the appropriate remedy. 

The Supreme Court has cautioned on a number of occasions that

"suppression is required only for a "failure to satisfy any of

those statutory requirements that directly and substantially

implement the congressional intention to limit the use of

intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the

employment of this extraordinary investigative device.' " United

States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 434-45 (1977) (emphasis added)

(quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)). 

In this case, it is difficult to fathom how the alleged defect to

which defendants point seriously undermined the purposes of the

Act where the officials authorizing the memoranda had at one time

been designated by the Attorney General. Moreover, a decision

not to suppress the evidence would not leave defendants without a

remedy for an alleged violation, because the statute creates a

brevity of the delay in redesignating Litvack were only dicta.

And, of course, our concern about delays in redesignation must be

understood in light of the statute that we were interpreting at the

time. Because our rejection of the administrative continuity

approach was premised on Congress' then-expressed intention to

limit designations to politically accountable persons, and because

that rejection was the basis of our concern about the delay in

redesignation, Robinson's statements about the length of any such

delayeven if they had been the holding of the casewould not be

binding on us after Congress' amendment of the statute.

We choose to join the majority of our sister circuits in

holding that a designation continues in force through a change in

attorneys general, so long as the designated Deputy Assistant

remains in office. We leave for another day the question of

whether the First Circuit's position, allowing designations by

office rather than person, represents an acceptable application of

the statutory command that Deputy Assistants be "specially

designated."7

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private right of action for damages for individuals injured by an

illegal wiretap. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (1988). 

3.

The appellants next argue that the government violated another

requirement of the statute by failing to reasonably "minimize" the

number of intercepted calls that were not otherwise subject to

interception. The appellants' argument below was apparently based

on a statistical examination of certain logs which allegedly showed

that only ten percent of the calls were "minimized" (i.e. were not

monitored to the end of the conversation). The appellants never

submitted, however, a formal "statistical analysis" which could

have been entered into evidence. The government responds by

pointing out that many of the conversations were too short in

duration to minimize (i.e. to hang up in time) and that many others

were in code or a foreign language (Spanish). The district court

reviewed the evidence and concluded that it "amply" demonstrated

the government's compliance, especially in these circumstances.

The Supreme Court has indicated that the minimization

requirement is not an absolute prohibition on the interception of

nonrelevant conversations, and has approved of government conduct

where only 407 of the intercepted calls were conspiracy-related.

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135, 140 (1978). We have

held that the standard is one of "reasonableness." United States

v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Even if the

minimization requirement was violated, moreover, we have indicated

that "suppression" might not be an "appropriate remedy," United

States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff'd by

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Scott, 436 U.S. at 140, and have suggested, although in dicta, that

the only remedy might be the suppression of the nonrelevant calls,

leaving the aggrieved individuals with a civil suit for damages

under the statute. See Scott, 516 F.2d at 760 n.19.

As the government emphasizes, the appellants make no effort to

point to specific conversations that should not have been

intercepted, or even to a pattern of such conversations. That only

ten percent of calls were not monitored until the end proves

nothingeven if truebecause it may well have been that the

remaining calls all related to the conspiracy or could not have

reasonably been minimized. In light of the Supreme Court's

decision in Scott, and without more concrete indications that the

government failed to meet its obligations to minimize intercepted

communications, there was no error below.

Thus, the district court's refusal to suppress evidence

derived from the wiretaps was proper, and we affirm its disposition

of this issue.

B. The Criminal Justice Act 

Trial of the Group I defendants began on October 2, 1989, and

ended on December 8. The Group II defendants were to go to trial

on January 22, 1990. On January 3rd, counsel for one of the

indigent defendants filed a voucher under the Criminal Justice Act,

18 U.S.C. § 3006(A), on behalf of all of the indigent defendants

requesting transcripts of the earlier trial. Judge Johnson

rejected this request as untimely. At a bench conference on

January 23rd she explained that she had been out of town until

Friday, January 12th, and had been unable to consider the request

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until Tuesday, January 16th, by which time it was too late to

provide the requested transcripts.

On appeal two of the Group II defendants, Michael and Gregory

Booze, argue that the district court's refusal to provide them with

a transcript of the testimony from the trial of the Group I

defendants denied them equal protection and due process of law, as

well as their rights under the CJA, which provides:

Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain

investigative, expert, or other services necessary to an

adequate defense may request them in an ex parte

application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in

an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary

and that the person is financially unable to obtain them,

the court ... shall authorize counsel to obtain the

services.

18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). Counsel maintained in district court that

the transcripts, which fall into the category of "other services"

that in some cases may be "necessary to an adequate defense,"

United States v. Brown, 443 F.2d 659, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1970), should

have been provided pursuant to the CJA because the government's FBI

witness had testified differently at the first trial, and the

defendants would be prejudiced without a transcript.

The government argues that the Booze brothers raise their

equal protection and due process arguments for the first time on

appeal. The record suggests otherwise, however. Although most of

the argument in the district court regarding the requested

transcripts revolved around the Jencks Act issue, counsel for one

of the indigent defendants specifically argued on behalf of all of

them that they were entitled to the transcripts under Griffin v.

Illinois. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, where state

law provides a right to appeal a criminal conviction, due process

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and equal protection require that an indigent defendant be

furnished with a transcript if that is necessary in order to insure

him "adequate and effective appellate review." 351 U.S. 12, 20

(1956). Griffin is the first in a long line of Supreme Court cases

defining the scope of indigents' rights to "the basic tools of an

adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for a

price to other prisoners." Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,

227 (1971). Although it does not directly control in this

situation, we think the appellants' reliance upon Griffin was

enough to preserve their constitutional argument for appeal. We

proceed, therefore, to the merits of the appellants' arguments,

both statutory and constitutional.

As noted above, we have previously held that a defendant has

both an equal protection and a statutory (CJA) right to a trial

transcript where "such a transcript is "necessary to an adequate

defense.' " Brown, 443 F.2d at 660. Necessity is made out where

"the defense attorney makes a timely request in circumstances in

which a reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client

having the independent financial means to pay for them." United

States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1980); accord United

States v. Durant, 545 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1976); Brinkley v.

United States, 498 F.2d 505, 509-10 (8th Cir. 1974); cf. United

States v. Sheppard, 559 F.Supp. 571, 573 (E.D. Va. 1983) (quoting

Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 543 (4th Cir. 1977)

(appropriate inquiry is whether, if defendant were not indigent,

defense counsel would have to obtain transcript in order to "keep

his representation within the "range of competence demanded of

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attorneys in criminal cases' ")).

Here counsel stated at the appellants' trial that he believed

that the FBI agent's testimony at the earlier trial was different

from his testimony in the present case. The government argues that

even if that be so, a transcript of the earlier testimony was not

"necessary to an adequate defense": neither the government nor the

non-indigent defendants had the transcript and, moreover, we are

told, "most skillful cross-examiners would scorn the notion that

they need transcripts in order to be effective."

As it turns out, however, we need not decide whether the

transcripts were "necessary" in this case. The appellants do not

dispute that in preparing their appeal they did have a copy of the

transcript, yet they make no attempt to demonstrate that they were

prejudiced at trial for want of the transcript, whether by virtue

of any inconsistencies in the FBI agent's earlier testimony or

otherwise. Therefore, if it was an error at all for the district

court not to require the government to provide the transcripts upon

request, the error was apparently harmless. United States v. Bari,

750 F.2d 1169, 1182 (2d Cir. 1984).

C. Peremptory Challenges

The Group III appellants seek reversal of their convictions on

the ground that the district court's method of allocating

peremptory challenges among the parties greatly disadvantaged the

appellants and violated their rights under Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 24 to a greater number of strikes than the government.

Although we are troubled by the district court's actions, we

conclude that reversal is not mandated in this case.

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8Rule 24 states: "If there is more than one defendant, the

court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges

and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." FED. R.

CRIM. P. 24(b). A court apparently lacks authority to grant the

government additional peremptory challenges in multi-defendant

cases, and at least one court has held that a district court

lacks authority to add to the government's six allotted

peremptories unless defendants consent. See United States v.

Bruno, 873 F.2d 555, 560-61 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840

(1989). Defendants here do not challenge the lower court's

allocation to the government of seven peremptory challenges. 

1.

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b) provides that in all

felony cases not punishable by death the defendant shall be

entitled to ten peremptory challenges and the government six. The

district court in the trial of the Group III appellants employed a

variant of the "jury box" system of allocating peremptory

challenges. Under that system

twelve members of the array are selected by lot to enter

the jury box; counsel for each side then exercise

challenges for cause and their allotted number of

peremptory challenges, in some prescribed pattern of

alternation, against those seated in the jury box and

against those drawn to replace any of the first twelve

who have been challenged. When both sides have either

used or waived their allotted challenges, the twelve

members of the venire then in the jury box become the

petit jury.

United States v. Blouin, 666 F.2d 796, 796 (2d Cir. 1981). It is

not uncommon under such a system after the first "round" of

challenges to "permit[ ] subsequent challenges to be made only

against those who have replaced jurors previously challenged."

Blouin, 666 F.2d at 797 n.1.

In this case the district court granted the appellants 12

peremptory challenges and the government seven.8 If each side were

to have exercised one challenge in each "round" (that is, prior to

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9A more common method of avoiding that problem is to require

the defense to exercise a greater number of peremptories per

round than the government. Thus, where the defense has ten

strikes and the government six, it is common to hold six rounds

and allot the defendant two challenges in each of the first four

rounds and one in each of the remaining two. See Blouin, 666

F.2d at 797 n.1. 

the seating of the next array of members), the defense would have

been left with the last five challenges. Perhaps to avoid such a

scenario, the district court permitted the government to elect not

to exercise a strike in any particular round.9 Neither side was

permitted to strike a juror who had been seated in a prior round in

which that party participated. Because the government could choose

to wait a number of rounds before using its strikes, the system

employed gave the government a certain informational advantage over

the appellants. The government could "wait and see" whether to

strike a particular juror until determining the characteristics of

the juror chosen to replace the member struck by the defense, while

the defense had no such advantage.

2.

We have repeatedly recognized that a district court enjoys a

great deal of discretion in the manner by which it impanels a jury.

"It suffices that the method chosen allows the defendant to make

his peremptory challenges without embarrassment and does not

intimidate him from exercising them." United States v. Broxton,

926 F.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C. Cir.) (citing Pointer v. United States,

151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894), and United States v. Smith, 891 F.2d 935,

938 (D.C. Cir. 1989)), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 911 (1991). Here,

the appellants do not argue that the district court improperly

prevented them from exercising their full array of challenges.

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Indeed, after conferring with his co-defendants, appellant Scott

declined to exercise the defendants' final challenge. Instead, the

appellants argue that the trial court improperly granted the

government a tactical advantage: the right to "pass" in one round

and yet strike in the next a juror who had been seated in that

prior round. The appellants contend that the trial court thus

discriminated against the defendants in an impermissible effort to

equalize the two parties' strikes.

Although the trial court's empanelment procedure might

ordinarily be objectionable, reversal is not called for in this

case. To be sure, Rule 24 mandates that the defense enjoy a

greater number of peremptory challenges than the government and in

so doing purposefully envisions that the defense would have a

greater impact on the jury through use of peremptory challenges

than the government. And having allocated seven peremptories to

the government and twelve to the defense, the trial court could

easily have subjected both parties to the same rules without

permitting the defendants to have the only peremptories in the

final rounds by holding seven rounds of peremptory challenges and

requiring the defense to exercise two challenges in each of the

first five.

Nevertheless, the appellants do not assert that the jury that

was actually empaneled was in any way biased. Cf. United States v.

Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 80 n.115 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431

U.S. 933 (1977). Nor do the appellants point to any particular

juror whom they would have wished to strike but could not in a

situation where, had they been playing by the government's rules,

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a peremptory challenge would have been possible. As such, their

allegations remain entirely theoretical. Finally, it is noteworthy

that much, if not all, of the comparative advantage the lower court

granted the government was offset, at least in part, because on one

occasion the court did actually permit one of the appellants to

strike a juror who had been seated in a prior round. We,

therefore, conclude that the district court's jury selection method

was not, in this case, reversible error.

D. Brathwaite's Suppression Motion

Appellant Brathwaite argues that the district court

erroneously decided not to suppress certain evidence recovered when

Brathwaite was arrested because of an alleged violation of the

"knock and announce" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988). We

disagree.

1.

The "knock and announce" statute provides that an officer "may

break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any

part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant,

if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused

admittance...." 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988). The facts here are

largely agreed upon. It is undisputed that on May 16, 1989, Agent

Kerr, accompanied by a number of fellow agents, approached the door

to Brathwaite's apartment, knocked and stated, "[O]pen the door.

FBI." The district court credited the agent's testimony that he

heard noises in the apartment (described at trial as "shuffling")

both before and immediately after knocking. The agent also

testified that he waited between 15-20 seconds, during which time

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10On its face, section 3109 applies only to the execution of

search, as opposed to arrest, warrants. Below, the government

argued that the statute did not apply to arrests at all. On

appeal it has apparently abandoned that argument. Although we

have not squarely ruled on this question, other circuits have

concluded that the section applies equally both to arrest and to

search warrants, see, e.g., United States v. De Parias, 805 F.2d

1447, 1457 n.3 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916

(1987); United States v. Little, 753 F.2d 1420, 1435 (9th Cir.

1984); United States v. Nolan, 718 F.2d 589, 591 (3d Cir. 1983); 

cf. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 587 (1968) (section

3109 applies to entries to effect a warrantless arrest), and we

will assume as much for purposes of this opinion. 

he did not hear any noise from within, nor did Brathwaite make any

apparent effort to open the door. Kerr then began hitting the door

with a sledgehammer and within roughly a minute was inside. The

FBI recovered a wallet containing credit and identification cards

from inside a closet, and a scale and a bag with cocaine inside

were recovered at the bottom of an air shaft four floors below

Brathwaite's bathroom window. (Brathwaite claims, and we will

assume, that those items would not have been visible to the agents

from outside the apartment.)

2.

The issue before us is fairly narrow, but significant. Both

sides agree that the FBI agent knocked and announced his authority

by stating "FBI." Both sides also agree that the agent did not

state his purpose as section 3109 requires.10 The government

contends, and the lower court held, that the noises heard by the

agent both before and immediately after knocking, combined with the

failure to open the door, created "exigent circumstances" which

excused the failure to announce a purpose because the agents could

reasonably have feared that the occupant was destroying evidence.

Appellant Brathwaite emphasizes that the agents waited between

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11As we stated:

[A]ssuming a valid consensual entry, the issues of §

3109 compliance, probable cause to arrest, and plain

view search are easily dispatched; once inside

appellant's apartment the police conduct was manifestly

proper. If, however, there was neither consent to

entry nor § 3109 compliance, the latter two issues

become irrelevant and the conviction must be

overturned.

473 F.2d at 142. 

15-20 seconds, by Kerr's estimate, before beginning to break down

the door, during which time the agents could easily have announced

their purpose without in any way aggravating the dangers to

themselves or to the evidence. Although the district court

concluded (in an aspect of its opinion from which Brathwaite does

not appeal) that the warrantless search conducted by the officers

once inside the apartment was consensual, the legality of the

search itself is insufficient, as a matter of law, to overcome an

illegal entry under section 3109. See United States v. Sheard, 473

F.2d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 943 (1973).11

If the officers' entry into the apartment violated that statute,

then the products of the subsequent search would have to be

suppressed, regardless of the reasonableness of the search. We

examine, then, the permissibility of the agents' actions in

entering the apartment.

The governing case in our circuit is United States v. James,

764 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1985). There we stated:

In the ordinary case an officer is required to state both

his authority and his purpose. In this case, however,

the police, after knocking and announcing their authority

repeatedly, but without eliciting a response, heard

someone running down the back stairs. A reasonable

interpretation of such sounds is that the inhabitants are

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well aware of the purpose of the police visit and are

moving to destroy evidence. This is especially true

where, as here, the police knew they had reliable

information that cocaine was being sold at that location.

Faced with the probable imminent destruction of evidence,

the police acted properly by entering the premises at

once. To require the police in these circumstances to

announce that they are there to execute a search warrant

would be to require a futile act. Compliance with

section 3109 is unnecessary in such circumstances.

Id. at 888 (citations omitted). The holding in James, then, was

based on two related strands of analysis. The probable imminent

destruction of evidence gave rise to exigent circumstances

sufficient to excuse full compliance with section 3109's

requirements; and the sounds from inside the apartment, suggesting

that evidence was being destroyed, made the need to announce the

reasons for the police presence futile. In James the officers

knocked repeatedly before eventually breaking in, a fact that

suggests that the officers could well have announced their purpose

while so doing. Nevertheless, we concluded that the facts gave

rise to a sufficient danger that evidence would be destroyed such

that noncompliance with the "purpose" requirement would be excused.

The facts in this case, which are virtually identical to those

in James except for the fact that the officers here heard

"shuffling" rather than evidence of flight, make it

indistinguishable from James in all respects but one: the officers

in James were present to execute a search warrant, whereas the

officers in the case before us were seeking to effect an arrest.

But that seems to us to be a distinction without a difference. To

be sure, the prospect of destroyed evidence might have been thought

to be a greater threat when police officers have come to search for

evidence than when officers seek to arrest an individual. The

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former stands as a greater immediate impediment to the

accomplishment of the officers' mission. The Supreme Court,

however, has recently clarified that under the Fourth Amendment,

exigent circumstances sufficient to excuse the warrantless entry

into a house for purposes of effecting an arrest include the

imminent destruction of evidence. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S.

91, 100 (1990) (concluding that the Minnesota Supreme Court had

applied the "proper legal standard" when it observed that "a

warrantless intrusion [to make an arrest] may be justified by ...

imminent destruction of evidence"). In this respect the Supreme

Court's Fourth Amendment cases do not distinguish between arrests

and searches: fear of the immediate destruction of evidence

excuses the absence of a warrant to do either. Neither do our own.

We have at least twice in recent years recognized that a reasonable

fear that evidence would imminently be destroyed created those

exigent circumstances that would excuse the failure to obtain a

warrant prior to entering a home to effect an arrest. See United

States v. Dawkins, 17 F.3d 399, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United

States v. Socey, 846 F.2d 1439, 1444-45 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 858 (1988).

If the imminent destruction of evidence is sufficient to

excuse noncompliance with a constitutional mandate such as the

Fourth Amendment, we do not see why a different, more stringent,

standard should apply to the confessed noncompliance with section

3109's statutory dictates. At least one circuit has held that the

imminent destruction of evidence provides sufficient exigency to

excuse noncompliance with section 3109, even where the officers in

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question were there to arrest rather than search. See United

States v. Wysong, 528 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1976). This is all the

more true where, as here, such noncompliance was only partial. As

we have held, the degree of exigency necessary to excuse a partial

violation of the knock and announce statute is considerably less

than that required to excuse a total disregard of that statute,

much less the absence of a warrant altogether:

The exigency required to justify a warrantless search

differs from that required to excuse noncompliance with

section 3109's announcement provision. That degree of

exigency is, in turn, greater than that needed to excuse

noncompliance with only the refusal portion of section

3109.

United States v. Bonner, 874 F.2d 822, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1989). This

is especially true where the admitted failurethe lack of any

announcement regarding the agents' purposedid not materially

affect any of appellant's interests. As we reasoned in James,

where the defendant is heard hiding or destroying evidence, or

fleeing, to require the police to announce their purpose in seeking

entry would indeed be to require a futile and pointless act. See

James, 764 F.2d at 888. It is of no avail, then, for appellant to

argue in these circumstances that the police had sufficient time

during the approximately 15 seconds that they awaited a response to

announce their purpose. The district court found that the police

heard noises consistent with the destruction of evidence emanating

from within the apartment, and that the persons inside made no

effort to respond to the officers' knock. Those findings are not

clearly erroneous. In these circumstances, it would, therefore,

have been presumably futile for the police to announce their

purpose. Accordingly, the district court's judgment, denying

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12 See also infra Part III(A) (vacating sentences and

directing district judge to make individual determinations

regarding each defendant's conspiratorial participation of the

sort the Townsend court made in its multiple conspiracy

analysis). 

Brathwaite's motion to suppress, must be affirmed.

II. TRIAL ISSUES

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

The appellants next challenge the sufficiency of the evidence

on various grounds but we find it necessary to address only the

argument that the trial evidence varied materially from the

indictment's allegations. Specifically, the appellants argue that

the trial evidence at most established multiple conspiracies rather

than the single conspiracy charged in the indictment. Because none

of the appellants raised the variance argument below, we review

only for plain error, see Jackson v. United States, 359 F.2d 260

(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 877 (1966), and finding none

decline to reverse the convictions on this ground.

Initially, we find it likely that the government's proof in

fact varied from the indictment's conspiracy count, manifesting, as

the appellants assert, multiple conspiracies rather than a single

overarching one. See United States v. Townsend, 924 F.2d 1385,

1395-1402 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding three separate conspiracies

between three different suppliers and a common purchaser).12 Such

variance, however, is not by itself a sufficient ground for

reversing the appellants' convictions. To secure reversal, each

appellant must establish not only the fact of variance but also

that the variance caused him substantial prejudice. United States

v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1391 (D.C. Cir.) (citing United States

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v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1986), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 840 (1987)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988).

When variance is asserted in the number of conspiracies, the most

commonly claimed prejudice, and one claimed here, is that the

multiplicity of defendants and conspiracies created a substantial

likelihood that the jury transferred evidence from one conspiracy

to a defendant in another. We do not believe the appellants were

so prejudiced.

We first note that the trial court severed the defendants into

three small groups which it tried separately, thereby minimizing

the likelihood of "spillover." See United States v. Alessi, 638

F.2d 466, 475 (2d Cir. 1980) ("While a prejudicial variance may

become more likely as the number of improperly joined defendants

increases, compare Berger v. United States, [295 U.S. 78 (1935)] (4

defendants), with Kotteakos v. United States, [328 U.S. 750, 766

(1946)] (32 defendants), ... the number of persons tried together

here (10 defendants) was sufficiently small to enable the jury to

give individual consideration to each."). Further, the evidence

against the appellants consisted primarily of discrete telephone

conversations to which the individual appellants were parties and

which the jurors could readily "compartmentalize." See United

States v. Toliver, 541 F.2d 958, 963 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding no

prejudice from variance where "the evidence uniquely lent itself to

such a compartmentalized consideration"); United States v.

Townsend, 924 F.2d at 1411 ("danger of "spillover prejudice' " is

"minimal ... when the government presents tape recordings of each

and every defendant discussing the distribution of illegal drugs"

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13The appellants also claim prejudice in the length of the

sentences they received, a matter properly addressed under the

sentencing guidelines. See infra Part III(A). 

and "the jury had no need to look beyond each defendant's own words

in order to convict"). Finally, the appellants cannot claim

prejudice from the admission of co-conspirators' statements since

in each case the bulk of the incriminating evidence consisted of

statements by the individual appellant himself or by someone with

whom he in fact conspired (most notably Anderson). Cf. id. at 1411

(no prejudice when court admitted statements made by one with whom

defendant "clearly conspired" or even by non-co-conspirators where,

as here, "there was little need, if any, for the jurors to look to

the words of others when each defendant supplied enough to ensure

his own undoing") (citation omitted). In sum, we find no

substantial likelihood that the appellants' convictions resulted

from any spillover effect and accordingly find no prejudice

warranting their reversal.13

B. The Jencks Act

After the government finished direct examination of its first

witnessthe FBI agent who was the lead investigator in this

matterthe Group II defendants requested all Jencks Act material

from the government, including the transcripts of the FBI agent's

testimony in the trial of the Group I defendants. The prosecution

gave the defendants a copy of all of the transcripts in its

possession. In response to the defendant's objection that these

did not include a transcript of the agent's direct testimony in the

earlier trial, the district court held that the Jencks Act, 18

U.S.C. § 3500, does not require the government to produce a trial

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transcript it does not have. Whether a trial transcript is Jencks

Act material is a question of law, which we review de novo.

The Jencks Act requires the United States to produce

"statement[s] of ... witness[es] in possession of the United States

which relate[ ] to the subject matter as to which the witness has

testified." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). The statute is "designed to

further the fair and just administration of criminal justice, a

goal of which the judiciary is the special guardian." Campbell v.

United States, 365 U.S. 85, 92 (1961). To this end, the Act "

"reaffirms' " the Supreme Court's holding in Jencks v. United

States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), "that the defendant on trial in a

federal criminal prosecution is entitled, for impeachment purposes,

to relevant and competent statements of a government witness in

possession of the government touching the events or activities as

to which the witness has testified at trial." Id. The Act defines

a "statement" (at § 3500(e)) to include:

(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed

or otherwise adopted or approved by him;

(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other

recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a

substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made

by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the

making of such oral statement; or

(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a

transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a

grand jury.

The appellants argue that "prior trial testimony of a

government witness meets the requirements for a "statement' which

must be disclosed to the defense." The government counters that a

trial transcript is not within the coverage of the Jencks Act at

all, and some courts have so held. Those courts proceed from the

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premise that the purpose of the Act is to "protect government files

against unwarranted intrusions prompted by the excessively

expansive reading by some lower federal courts of the United States

Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States," and thus to

"protect government witnesses from threats, bribery, and perjury."

United States v. Isgro, 974 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 1992).

Because trial transcripts are matters of public record, they have

reasoned, the limitations of the Jencks Act cannot be used to

shield them, and thus the Congress must not have intended to cover

them in the first place. Id.; accord United States v. Harris, 542

F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Munroe, 421 F.2d

644, 645 (5th Cir. 1970). We need not decide in this case,

however, whether trial transcripts fall within the scope of the

Jencks Act, because the trial testimony at issue in this case

clearly was not in the possession of the government.

The government cannot "possess" a statement as defined in the

Jencks Act apart from the writing or recording in which it is

memorialized. Further, to be producible under the Jencks Act, a

"statement" (i.e. the transcript or recording thereof) must be "in

the possession of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). If the

government has not requested and received a transcript from a court

reporter, then obviously the transcript or statement is not "in the

possession of the United States." See United States v. Moeckly,

769 F.2d 453, 464 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Cagnina, 697

F.2d 915, 922 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Hutcher, 622 F.2d

1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Baker, 358 F.2d 18, 20

(7th Cir. 1966) ("The government has no obligation to transcribe

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stenographic notes of testimony in a criminal trial just in case

some of the witnesses might be later called upon to testify in a

related trial"); see also United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733,

738 (6th Cir. 1991) (untranscribed testimony at detention hearing

not "in possession" of government); United States v. Trevino, 556

F.2d 1265, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (presentence report under control

of probation officer is not "in possession of the United States"

for purposes of the Act). As the Second Circuit has stated,

"clearly the government cannot be required to produce that which it

does not control and never possessed or inspected." United States

v. Canniff, 521 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1975); cf. United States v.

Merlino, 595 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1979) ("the government can't

refuse" to provide a transcript of relevant grand jury testimony

"merely because the [witness'] statement is in shorthand and has

not been transposed [sic] in a manner to be read by others").

C. Adverse Spousal Testimonial Privilege

Before testifying for the government at trial, Wilhelmina

Perry Garces claimed that she was married to defendant Norberto

Garces and that she wished to invoke the adverse spousal privilege

not to testify against her husband. Judge Johnson appointed

counsel for Ms. Garces and held a hearing on the applicability of

the privilege. The district court determined that the Garces'

marriage was not intact, that "the purpose of protecting vital

marriages from the harmful impact of compelled testimony would not

be served in this case," and therefore that Ms. Garces would have

to testify.

Norberto Garces argues that the district court erred in

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failing to apply the standard set forth in D.C. Code § 14-306(a),

which, Garces claims, gives his spouse an unqualified privilege not

to testify against her husband. The government responds that the

district court properly consulted the federal common law as

directed by Federal Rule of Evidence 501, rather than the D.C.

Code, and correctly determined that the Garces' marriage was not

intact before denying the privilege.

We need not determine whether the district court erred in this

instance, however, because under both the federal and D.C. law the

spousal privilege is that of the witness-spouse alone, not that of

the nontestifying spouse. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.

40, 53 (1980); Bowler v. United States, 480 A.2d 678, 685 (D.C.

App. 1984). Thus, Garces is without standing to contest the

district court's decision to compel Wilhelmina Perry Garces to

testify. See United States v. Lofton, 957 F.2d 476, 477 n.1 (7th

Cir. 1992); Grand Jury Subpoena of Ford v. United States, 756 F.2d

249, 255 (2d Cir. 1985).

D. Unanimity Instructions

Next appellant Anderson and appellants Gregory Booze and

Thomas Booze challenge the judge's failure to instruct the jurors

that they were required to make unanimous findings regarding

certain elements of the offenses, respectively, of engaging in a

continuing criminal enterprise and of conspiracy. Because none of

the three appellants objected to the challenged omissions below, we

again review only for plain error, United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d

55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and again we find none.

First, appellant Anderson objects to the judge's failure to

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14 See United States v. Markowski, 772 F.2d 358, 364 (7th

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1018 (1986); United States v.

Moorman, 944 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct. 1766 (1992); United States v. English, 925

F.2d 154, 159 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2812 (1991); 

United States v. Linn, 889 F.2d 1369, 1374 (5th Cir. 1989), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 809 (1990); United States v. Jackson, 879 F.2d

85, 88 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1701 (1992); 

United States v. Tarvers, 833 F.2d 1068, 1074 (1st Cir. 1987). 

instruct the jurors that, in order to convict him of managing a

continuing criminal enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848,

they were required to agree unanimously on the particular predicate

acts committed and the identities of the five individuals managed.

We disagree. In United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 362, 364 (1992), we rejected the

appellant's Sixth Amendment and due process challenges to the lack

of a CCE unanimity instruction, holding, as six other circuits

already had,14 that a jury is not required to unanimously agree on

the identities of the individuals managed. We found no Sixth

Amendment problem because "the statute makes relevant only the

number, but not the identities, of the defendant's

co-conspirators," id. at 255, and therefore the "jury was unanimous

in deciding that the government here proved what it had to

provethat Palmer had acted in concert with "five or more persons,'

" id. at 256 (citing Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991)

(majority and plurality opinions)). We further concluded that "the

Due Process Clause permits different people to serve as

"alternative means' of satisfying the CCE five-person requirement"

because to do so did not violate "any historical or contemporary

notions of fundamental fairness" and because it is "beyond dispute

that acting in concert with one group of five persons is the moral

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and practical equivalent of acting in concert with another group of

five." Id. at 256-57. We see no reason to treat a finding of

predicate acts differently. That one juror may find one group of

predicate offenses, while another may find a different, if

overlapping, group seems of little moment. As Harris teaches,

unanimity is required in the finding that each essential element of

the CCE offense is satisfied, not in the subsidiary findings

regarding the particulars of each element. Accordingly, we find no

merit in appellant Anderson's unanimity charge challenge.

For similar reasons we reject the argument advanced by Gregory

Booze and Thomas Booze that the trial judge erred in failing to

instruct the jurors they were required to unanimously identify the

precise object of the conspiracy of which the two appellants were

convicted. These appellants contend that the omission of a

unanimity charge permitted the jurors to convict them of conspiracy

without reaching agreement on whether they conspired to distribute

cocaine or to possess with intent to distribute cocaine,

particularly in light of the judge's initial reference, in setting

out the elements of conspiracy, to the two alternative objectives

in the "disjunctive." See Trial II Tr. (2/27/90) at 29-37. As we

observed in Harris, however, "the law of CCE tracks the law of

conspiracy, which generally has not required jurors to identify the

defendant's co-conspirators." 959 F.2d at 256. We see no reason

to set a more exacting standard for identifying the conspiratorial

objective, particularly where, as here, the alternative objectives

(distributing cocaine and possessing cocaine with intent to

distribute) are so similar. It is enough that jurors unanimously

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15Some of the appellants challenged their sentences on

sufficiency of the evidence grounds, but, as we observed supra

note 13, this issue is properly resolved under the sentencing

guidelines. 

find that a defendant entered into an unlawful conspiracy, thereby

satisfying the statutory elements of conspiracy; they need not

also agree on the precise object of that conspiracy. As the Second

Circuit has observed: "The essence of the crime of conspiracy is

an agreement to put into effect an illegal project. Even if the

agreement contemplates more than one nefarious end, there is still

but a single agreement." United States v. Murray, 618 F.2d 892,

898-99 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding no unanimity problem when appellants

were convicted on charge of importing and distributing both cocaine

and marijuana).

III. SENTENCING ISSUES

A. Base Offense Level

Next, we address the appellants' arguments that their

sentences were impermissibly enhanced based on drugs unrelated to

their participation in the conspiracy.15 Under the sentencing

guidelines, a defendant's base offense level is determined by his

"relevant conduct." When a defendant is sentenced on a drug

trafficking offense, the base offense level is determined by the

amount of drugs involved in the "relevant conduct"the greater the

quantity, the higher the base level. See U.S.S.G. pt. D. In

sentencing the appellants, the district court held each accountable

for the full amount of drugs involved in Anderson's entire

conspiracy, 28.9 kilograms. For the reasons set out below, we

conclude that all of the appellants' sentences, except for

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Anderson's, must be vacated and remanded to the district court for

particularized factual findings regarding the amount of cocaine

attributable to each appellant's participation in the Anderson

organization.

The guidelines define "relevant conduct" generally to include

"all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the

defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise

accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of

conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of

attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense,

or that otherwise were in furtherance of that offense." U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(1). The Application Notes in effect at the time of

sentencing explained the subsection's application to conspiracies

as follows:

In the case of criminal activity undertaken in concert

with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy, the

conduct for which the defendant "would be otherwise

accountable" also includes conduct of others in

furtherance of the execution of the jointly-undertaken

criminal activity that was reasonably foreseeable by the

defendant. Because a count may be broadly worded and

include the conduct of many participants over a

substantial period of time, the scope of the jointly

undertaken criminal activity, and hence relevant conduct,

is not necessarily the same for every participant. Where

it is established that the conduct was neither within the

scope of the defendant's agreement, nor was reasonably

foreseeable in connection with the criminal activity the

defendant agreed to jointly undertake, such conduct is

not included in establishing the defendant's offense

level under this guideline.

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 n.1 (1990); see also id. § 2D1.4 n.1 ("If the

defendant is convicted of conspiracy, see Application Note 1 to §

1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).").

This court recently applied these provisions to the sentencing

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16By "third category" the quoted language means "acts and

omissions ... for which the defendant would be otherwise

accountable." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1). 

of defendants convicted, like the appellants here, of participating

in "a large but loose-knit" drug distribution conspiracy and laid

down the basic principles a sentencing judge must follow in

determining the amount of drugs attributable to a particular

defendant. In United States v. Saro, 24 F.3d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1994),

the court stated:

The extent of a defendant's vicarious liability under

conspiracy law is always determined by the scope of his

agreement with his co-conspirators. Mere foreseeability

is not enough: someone who belongs to a drug conspiracy

may well be able to foresee that his co-venturers, in

addition to acting in furtherance of his agreement with

them, will be conducting drug transactions of their own

on the side, but he is not automatically accountable for

all of those side deals. See, e.g., United States v.

Jenkins, 4 F.3d 1338, 1346-47 (6th Cir. 1993); United

States v. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d 70, 73-74 (5th Cir.

1993).... "[A] general verdict does not establish with

whom a defendant conspired or the quantity of drugs

encompassed by the conspiracy." United States v.

Edwards, 945 F.2d 1387, 1391 (7th Cir. 1991). To

calculate the amount of drugs attributable to defendants

under the third category of "relevant conduct",16 the

sentencing court must "determine the scope of the

conspiratorial agreement each joined". United States v.

Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1344 (7th Cir. 1991); accord

United States v. Goines, 988 F.2d 750, 775 (7th Cir.

1993).

Id. at 288. Applying these principles, the court remanded for

redetermination of one appellant's base offense level because the

judge had simply adopted, without analysis, the presentence

report's apparent conclusion that the defendant "was automatically

responsible for the "[s]pecific drug sales and drug related

activity conducted by members of the conspiracy', ... at least if

he knew about and could foresee that activity." Id. at 288-89

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17As the Saro court observed, however, even competing

suppliers may be charged with drug quantities supplied by each

other if "their relation with the network might have been such as

to make them responsible for its entire distribution activity." 

24 F.3d at 289 (citing Edwards, 945 F.2d at 1393, and Blumenthal

v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 559 (1947)). 

(record citations omitted; emphasis in original). Such automatic,

unexplained attribution was, the court found, plain error requiring

resentencing because the legal standard applied "seems to conflict

with the well-established principles of conspiracy law" and because

it was "reasonably likely ... that a factfinder applying the proper

legal standard" would not have charged the defendant with the

entire amount. Id. at 290. We reach a similar conclusion here.

It appears from the sentencing transcripts that the district

court here, as in Saro, simply adopted the presentence reports'

apparent conclusions that each defendant should automatically be

accountable for the amount of cocaine involved in all the charged

transactions, which the reports found to be 28.9 kilograms. Based

on this quantity the judge assigned each conspirator a base offense

level of 34 for trafficking in 15-50 kilograms of cocaine. See

U.S.S.G. § 2D(c) (Drug Quantity Table). A fair view of the

evidence, however, shows it is at least "reasonably likely" that a

factfinder applying the legal standard set out in Saro would hold

the appellants other than Anderson accountable for less than the

entire quantity and, more significantly, for less than the

threshold 15 kilogram amount. The five suppliers, for example,

appear to have been operating in isolation and to have "agreed"

only to participate in the distribution of the small amounts they

supplied.17 Similarly, some of Anderson's purchasers seem to have

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had but limited "agreements" to purchase discrete drug quantities

at specific times. Finally, it is possible that some or all of the

distribution center workers were responsible for distributing fewer

than 15 kilograms. In the absence of individualized, factual

findings regarding reasonable foreseeability as it relates to each

appellant's conspiratorial participation, we are unable to resolve

these matters or uphold the appellants' sentences. Accordingly, we

conclude that all of the appellants' sentences except Anderson's

must be vacated and remanded for resentencing based on specific,

individualized findings regarding the quantity of drugs each

appellant might have reasonably foreseen his or her agreed-upon

participation would involve. See Saro, supra (remanding for

further findings to support attribution of certain quantities of

drugs to appellant); United States v. Perkins, 963 F.2d 1523, 1528

(D.C. Cir. 1992) (remanding to sentencing court to "decide whether

a preponderance of the evidence supports the inference that [drugs

found in co-conspirator's house] were reasonably foreseeable to

[defendant]" where "district court did not at any point make a

specific finding about foreseeability"); United States v. Lam

Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 307 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (remanding to

sentencing judge "for resentencing and for clarification of the

factual findings concerning what [the defendant] knew or reasonably

could have foreseen concerning the quantity of drugs involved in

the transaction" and observing that "[t]he judge, who heard all of

the evidence and may perhaps draw inferences that we would have

difficulty discerning from the paper record, should be given the

opportunity to make new findings as appropriate"), cert. denied,

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113 S. Ct. 287 (1992).

B. Section 924(c)(1)

In the indictment Anderson was charged with, among other

offenses, four counts of using and carrying a firearm in relation

to a drug trafficking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c)(1). Count 83 of the indictment charges that Anderson used

a .9mm pistol that FBI agents seized when they arrested two

juveniles in Dallas, Texas in February 1989; at Anderson's

direction, the juveniles were taking the gun to Los Angeles, where

Anderson planned to rob a drug source. Count 93 charges that

Anderson used one of two pistols that were seized in L.A. from

defendant Emmanuel Harris in March 1989; Anderson had sent Harris

with the guns and ammunition after his first robbery plan was

foiled. Count 117 charges that Anderson used a Browning .380 semiautomatic pistol that was seized, along with crack cocaine,

cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and $1,000 in $1 bills, in the Park

Towers distribution center when Anderson was arrested there in May

1989. Finally, Count 118 charges that Anderson used a .9mm

semi-automatic pistol that was seized, along with ammunition, drug

paraphernalia, and documents linking Anderson to the location, from

the Woodner distribution center on the day that Anderson was

arrested at the Park Towers.

The jury convicted Anderson on each of the four counts, and

the district court sentenced him to five years for each offense,

the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, Anderson does not

dispute that he "used" each of the guns, nor could he succeed under

our recent decision in United States v. Bailey, No. 90-3119 (D.C.

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Cir. Oct. 4, 1994) (in banc). Rather, he argues that he cannot be

convicted and sentenced, consistent with the Double Jeopardy clause

of the Constitution, for multiple violations of section 924(c)(1)

that are all linked to the same conspiracy charge.

The government argues that Anderson waived this argument

because he failed to object before trial that the indictment was

multiplicitous. "An indictment is multiplicious, and thereby

defective, if a single offense is alleged in a number of counts,

unfairly increasing a defendant's exposure to criminal sanctions."

United States v. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In

this circuit, as in many others, objections to multiplicity in an

indictment that are not raised before trial are indeed waived,

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2) and (f),

absent a showing of good cause. Id. (collecting cases from five

circuits); see also United States v. Wilson, 983 F.2d 221, 225

(11th Cir. 1993); United States v. Marroquin, 885 F.2d 1240, 1245

(5th Cir. 1989); Mitchell v. United States, 434 F.2d 230, 231 (9th

Cir. 1970).

Anderson's objection here is not to multiplicity in the

indictment, however. Rather, he contends that his sentence on

multiplicitous counts is illegal. As Professor Wright explains,

the "principal danger in multiplicity is that a defendant will be

given multiple sentences for the same offense." 1 Charles A.

Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 145, at 525-26 (2d ed.

1982). Such an error may be corrected at any time pursuant to

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35. As one court explained,

Rule 12 applies only to objections with regard to error

in the indictment itself; the effect of Rule 12 is that

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dismissal of a multiplicious indictment is not required;

however, if sentences are imposed on each count of a

multiplicious indictment the defendant is not forced to

serve the erroneous sentence because of any waiver.

United States v. Rosenbarger, 536 F.2d 715, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1976);

accord Wright, supra, § 193, at 702 n.31, § 145, at 525-26 & n.14

and 1994 Supp. § 145 n.14 (collecting cases). See also United

States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The

principal danger in multiplicitythat the defendant will be given

multiple sentences for the same offensecan be remedied at any

time").

Anderson also failed to object in the district court to the

entry of multiple convictions and sentences under section

924(c)(1). Therefore, our review is for plain error only. United

States v. Brown, 16 F.3d 423, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

Section 924(c)(1) provides:

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence

or drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be

prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or

carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment

provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking

crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years....

In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under

this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to

imprisonment for twenty years....

Quoting United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63 (5th

Cir. 1991), Anderson argues that in order to "avoid violating

double jeopardy principles ... "each firearms offense must be

sufficiently linked to a separate drug trafficking offense to

prevent two convictions under Sec. 924(c) on the same drug

offense.' " Notwithstanding the reference to "double jeopardy

principles," this argument is essentially a matter of statutory

construction. As the Supreme Court explained in Missouri v.

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18Although our dissenting colleague, Judge Silberman,

acknowledges that a violation of section 924(c) is a separate

crime, he interprets the statute as though it were an enhancement

provision: it "asks a binary questionwhether [the defendant]

has or has not used a gun during and in relation to the crime. 

The answer to that question is either "yes" or "no," but it

cannot be "yes, yes, yes, and yes." (Dissent, post, at 1-2). 

Under that interpretation each use of a gun after the first is a

freebie, as long as it is committed in connection with the same

predicate offense. Judge Silberman offers no support for this

peculiar interpretation of a criminal statuteother than his

opinion that under the more natural interpretation the penalty is

too steep. That, however, is a matter for the Congress to

determine. See also Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1993

(1993) (approving a 105-year sentence for six violations of §

924(c)). 

Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983), "[w]ith respect to cumulative

sentences imposed in a single trial, the Double Jeopardy Clause

does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing

greater punishment than the legislature intended."

We begin, therefore, with the text of the statute, which is

quite clear: it proscribes the use or carrying of a firearm during

and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. Anderson used a

firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense on at least four

separate occasions, to further four distinct purposes. No amount

of sophisticated analysis can avoid the conclusion that he thereby

violated section 924(c)(1) four times, and therefore can be

convicted and sentenced four times.

Bear in mind that section 924(c)(1) is not a sentence

enhancement provision; rather, it is a compound offense of which

the predicate offense is one element.18 See United States v. Laing,

889 F.2d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1989). A violation of section

924(c)(1) is a crime separate from the predicate drug trafficking

offense or crime of violence. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S.

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6, 10 (1978). Indeed, the defendant need not be convicted of, or

even charged with, a drug trafficking offense for the section

924(c)(1) conviction to be upheld as long as the government proves

all of the elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See

United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(upholding § 924(c)(1) conviction although defendant acquitted on

predicate offense); accord United States v. Hill, 971 F.2d 1461,

1463-64 (10th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Ospina, 18

F.3d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1994) (defendant pled guilty to §

924(c)(1) violation only, and not to predicate drug trafficking

offense); accord Myers v. United States, 993 F.2d 171, 172 (8th

Cir. 1993); Hunter, 887 F.2d at 1003; United States v. MunozFabela, 896 F.2d 908, 910-11 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant pled guilty

to § 924(c)(1) violation predicated on drug trafficking offense

that was charged in separate indictment and then dropped in

exchange for guilty plea to misprision of felony); United States

v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1989) (one-count

indictment charged only violation of § 924(c)(1)). If a defendant

can be convicted for one violation of section 924(c)(1) without

being convicted of a predicate crime, then we see no reason why he

cannot be convicted of four violations of section 924(c)(1) without

being convicted of four, or any other number, of predicate

offenses, so long as each section 924(c)(1) violation has the

requisite relationship to such an offense.

The purpose of section 924(c)(1), to "combat ... the use of

dangerous weaponsmost particularly firearmsto commit federal

felonies," Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 10 (1978),

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requires this straightforward reading. Simply put, the statute was

intended to deal with the danger posed by guns, and that danger is

posed anew each time a gun is used. If a drug trafficking

conspirator could be convicted for only one section 924(c)(1)

violation, however, there would be no marginal penalty for, and

hence no deterrence of, any gun use after the first one. Making

subsequent gun uses "free," as it were, would be an incentive, not

a deterrent, to multiple uses. There is no reason to believe that

the Congress intended so perverse a result.

Some other circuits have nonetheless held that no more than

one section 924(c)(1) conviction may be linked to a single drug

trafficking offense, even if the defendant used different guns on

separate occasions during the course of a drug trafficking

conspiracy. See United States v. Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1346

(11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Smith, 924 F.2d 889, 894 (9th

Cir. 1991); United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 943 (6th Cir.

1989). In their analysis, the unit of prosecution is the drug

trafficking crime (here conspiracy) rather than the use of a gun in

relation to the drug trafficking crime. See, e.g., United States

v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The statute ...

emphasizes the relationship between the firearms and the underlying

drug-trafficking crime, rather than the individual firearms

themselves, thus providing some indication that Congress did not

intend a separate violation for each firearm"). Predicate

offense(s) may be an appropriate unit of account where the

prosecution seeks convictions on two or more section 924(c)(1)

counts for the use of a single gun on a single occasion by linking

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19Our dissenting colleague is concerned that if "each "use'

of a gun during and in relation to a drug crime is a separate

violation of § 924(c)," then "when the crime is an ongoing one

like possession with intent to distribute, or an ongoing

conspiracy, the same gun might be thought to be used hundreds of

times...." (Dissent, post at 3). While stated hyperbolically,

his underlying point is unremarkable. If a drug offender is

shown to have used his gun on two or ten or indeed hundreds of

occasions, then he has violated the statute that many times.

Where the use of a gun in relation to a drug trafficking

crime is itself of a continuing nature, of course, only a single

§ 924(c) charge is warranted. As the Supreme Court explained in

United States v. Midstate Co., 306 U.S. 161, 166 (1939):

A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or

series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and

operated by an unintermittent force, however long a

time it may occupy.

In some section 924(c) cases the use of a gun may be a continuing

offenseas where the defendant once puts it in a chest or drawer

or closet and leaves it there to protect a drug stash; there is

the section 924(c)(1) charges to nominally separate offenses that

are not in fact separable for double jeopardy purposes, see, e.g.,

United States v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1317 (10th Cir. 1987)

(multiple § 924(c)(1) convictions and sentences for murder of

storekeeper during robbery cannot be predicated upon offenses of

felony murder and robbery, which are not themselves distinct

offenses for double jeopardy purposes); or, although we express no

opinion on the matter, where more than one gun is used to protect

a stash of drugs in a single location. See United States v.

Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 654 (2d Cir. 1989); but see United States

v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383, 388-90 (8th Cir. 1991). We think it

is untenable, however, in a case such as this, where the defendant

used a gun on four separate and distinct occasions, for four

separate and distinct purposes over the course of a long-lived drug

trafficking conspiracy.19

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a single impulse with respect to the gun, namely to protect the

drugs, and thus a single section 924(c) violation. There are

separate § 924(c) violations, separately indictable, however,

where "successive impulses are separately given.... The test is

whether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of

action which they constitute." Blockburger v. United States, 284

U.S. 299, 302 (1932). In Blockburger the Court held that

separate drug sales on successive days constituted two violations

of the Harrison Narcotic Act, 26 U.S.C. § 696, because "the first

transaction, resulting in a sale, had come to an end. The next

sale was not the result of the original impulse, but of a fresh

onethat is to say, of a new bargain." Id. at 303. The Court

pointed out that the "Narcotic Act does not create the offense of

engaging in the business of selling the forbidden drugs, but

penalizes any sale made in the absence of either of the

qualifying requirements set forth." Id. at 302. Similarly,

section 924(c) creates an offense not of "engaging in the use of

weapons" but of using a weapon in relation to a drug trafficking

crime. Each use that is prompted by a separate impulse is

therefore a separate violation.

We agree with the Eighth Circuit that "each separate use of

a firearm ... is punishable under section 924(c) regardless of

whether other section 924(c) charges are related to the same

predicate offense." United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1223

(8th Cir. 1993). In Lucas the court approved two § 924(c)

convictions and sentences for the defendant's use of guns for two

different purposes: the pistol was used in the defendant's home

to protect drug money and cocaine held for personal use, while

the machine gun was used to protect a crack lab and the large

inventory of drugs kept there. Similarly, in this case, each of

the four section 924(c) counts involves a use of a gun for a

distinct purpose: two were used to protect separate stashes, and

two were sent to Los Angeles with different couriers on different

occasions for the purpose of robbing a drug source. Separate

impulses drove each use; no two were implicated in a single

continuing section 924(c) offense. 

We are also aware that some courts have invoked the rule of

lenity (as would our dissenting colleague) to determine that

section 924(c)(1) "is ambiguous as to the appropriate unit of

prosecution." United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 675 (2d Cir.

1993). As the Second Circuit explains it:

When viewed as a whole, this firearms statute ... is

ambiguous as to the appropriate unit of prosecution.

Section 924(c)(1) concerns the relationship between

firearms and violent crimes or drug-trafficking offenses.

It is not clear that Congress sought to punish a

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defendant separately for every firearm used during a

single drug-trafficking offense, rather than punish the

defendant for the general act of using firearms in

relation to the underlying drug offense.

Id.; see also, e.g., Chalan, 812 F.2d at 1317.

We think they misapply the rule of lenity. That the Congress

did not expressly address a particular issue does not necessarily

mean that the appropriate interpretation of the statute is unclear.

See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1981) ("Lenity

... serves only as an aid for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to

be used to beget one"). It is only if, "after "seizing every thing

from which aid can be derived' the Court is "left with an ambiguous

statute,' " that the rule of lenity dictates that the matter be

resolved in favor of the accused. Smith v. United States, 113 S.

Ct. 2050, 2059 (1993) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,

347 (1971) (quoting United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358,

386 (1805))). We find no such ambiguity in section 924(c)(1).

Indeed, Anderson has pointed to nothing in the statute (or its

legislative history) that raises any doubt about its meaning.

With this understanding of section 924(c)(1) in mind, we can

readily dispatch Anderson's double jeopardy argument. Because the

statute clearly makes a separate offense out of each use of a gun

in relation to a drug trafficking offense, the double jeopardy

prohibition is no bar to consecutive sentences for multiple

violations of that provision. The district court committed no

error in this regard.

C. Cumulative Punishment

Anderson was convicted of participating in a narcotics

conspiracy, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and of engaging in a continuing

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criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 848, for which he was given

concurrent sentences of 405 months (33 years, nine months) on each

count. Anderson argues that because conspiracy is an element of

the CCE offense, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution

bars his being convicted and sentenced on both counts.

The double jeopardy clause prohibits punishing a defendant for

a section 846 conspiracy and a CCE involving the same conduct.

Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 155 (1977). Because

punishment for both offenses would be cumulative, judgment may be

entered for only one of them; even concurrent sentences, that is,

can not be squared with the intent of the Congress not to inflict

cumulative punishments. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 864

(1985) ("The second conviction, whose concomitant sentence is

served concurrently, does not evaporate simply because of the

concurrence of the sentence"). Therefore, one of Anderson's

convictions must be vacated. See United States v. Cloutier, 966

F.2d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bafia, 949 F.2d

1465, 1474 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Duke, 940 F.2d 1113,

1120 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253,

1268-69 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 908

(11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Stallings, 810 F.2d 973, 975-76

(10th Cir. 1987).

The government makes no objection to Anderson's request to

have his conviction and sentence for conspiracy vacated, although

the resulting sentence will be shorter than if the CCE conviction

were vacated. The district court imposed sentence at the offense

level applicable to conspiracy, 34, adjusted upward to 38 for

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Anderson's leadership role in the offense. The base offense level

for the CCE is 36. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.5 (October 15, 1988).

Therefore, in this case the conspiracy conviction, although the

"lesser" of the two offenses, actually carries a higher adjusted

base offense level than does the CCE conviction.

At oral argument the government suggested that the adjusted

base offense level for the other crimes of which Anderson was

convictedpossession with intent to distribute and

distributionwould mirror that of the conspiracy offense, 38.

Presumably, then, sentence could be imposed at the adjusted offense

level for one of those offenses rather than at the base level for

the CCE. That is a matter for the district court to determine,

however. Therefore, we remand Anderson's case to the district

court with directions to vacate his conviction and sentence for

conspiracy, and to recalculate the appropriate sentence under the

remaining counts.

D. The $1 Million Fine

The district court fined Anderson $1,000,000. Anderson argues

that the court's determination that the fine was appropriate is

contrary to the evidence and in contravention of § 5E1.2(d)(2) of

the Sentencing Guidelines, which requires that the district court

relate any fine to the defendant's ability to pay. As Anderson

concedes, the Sentencing Guidelines do not require, and we have

specifically declined to require, that the trial judge make

findings of fact regarding a defendant's ability to pay the fine

imposed. "So long as the sentencing judge in fact considers

ability to pay, he is in compliance with the guideline's mandates."

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United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

We "review the finding of ability necessarily implied by such

consideration" looking only for clear error. Id. at 906-07.

The government argues that the district court "in fact

consider[ed Anderson's] ability to pay," that the fine imposed was

well within the statutory and guideline ranges, and therefore that

we must affirm it. Here is what the district court had to say

about Anderson's ability to pay:

Now, the probation department has recommended that I not

impose a fine in this case because they seem to believe

that Mr. Anderson doesn't have any money. I'm not

certain of that. I know that there are going to be a lot

of asset forfeitures of property here in the United

States, but Panama may be opening up, and I don't know

whether Mr. Anderson has a lot of money in Panama or not.

I have reason to believe that money was coming from

Panama for some purpose after his arrest. So I don't

know whether he has any money in Panama or not. If he

does have money in Panama, I am going to fine him one

million dollars on counts 1 and 2.

Counsel for Anderson then objected that Anderson "doesn't have a

million dollars," to which the district court replied, "He may

not."

While it is clear that the district judge did consider

Anderson's ability to pay a $1,000,000 fine, her implicit

determination that he had the ability to pay it is at war with her

explicit acknowledgment that he may not, and is therefore clearly

erroneous. We recognize, of course, that a fine is meant to be

punitive; that it causes hardship does not mean that it is

erroneously imposed, Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907, but quite the

opposite. Nothing in the present record, however, even remotely

suggests that Anderson could ever pay a $1,000,000 fine.

Anderson's presentence report indicates that at sentencing he

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had a net worth of $96,000 (most of it the equity in his home) and

that the government had instituted civil forfeiture proceedings

against his property. Anderson was sentenced to 645 months (53

years, nine months) in prison; once he is released from prison he

will not only be rather old to work off so large a fine; he will

also be subject to deportation, and presumably will be deported,

because he is an illegal alien. Thus, all the evidence suggests

that Anderson will not be able to "obtain employment and pay the

fines over time." Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907.

The government argues that the district court's cognizance of

the significant wealth Anderson enjoyed as a drug dealerhis

extravagant spending habits, his ownership of a home and several

apartments and of expensive cars and jewelrysupports the court's

conclusion that the amount of the fine was appropriate "to reflect

the seriousness of the offense (including the gain to the

defendant), to promote respect for the law, to provide just

punishment and to afford adequate deterrence." Perhaps so, but the

government's rationale does not override the district court's duty

under the Guidelines to consider the defendant's ability to pay.

Unable to point to any evidence suggesting that Anderson in

fact has assets in Panama, the government argues that it is

Anderson's burden to prove that he has no such assets and thus

cannot pay the fine. Nothing in the Guidelines, the case law, or

indeed common sense, supports that position. The government cites

two cases. In one of them the court held that where the government

alleges that a defendant owns a specific asset that could be used

or liquidated to pay a fine, the defendant seeking to avoid the

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fine must prove that the asset is not his or that it would not

cover the fine assessed. United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81,

89-90 (3d Cir. 1990). In the other case the court found that the

defendant had actively hindered the government's efforts to

determine his ability to pay by "refus[ing] to provide any

information regarding his financial status." Moreover, $80,000 had

been withdrawn from the defendant's bank account shortly before his

arrest. United States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 232 (9th Cir.

1990).

While it makes good sense to burden a defendant who has

apparently concealed assets, here the government has made no such

showing; nor has the government offered anything to substantiate

its suspicion that Anderson has assets in Panama. In such a case

the burden does not shift to Anderson to prove that he does not

have assets in Panama. Upon remand, therefore, the district court

should also reconsider the fine to be imposed upon Anderson in

light of the record evidence regarding his ability to pay.

* * *

For the preceding reasons, we affirm all of the appellants'

convictions except Anderson's conspiracy and CCE convictions which

we vacate and remand with direction to reinstate only one of them.

We further remand Anderson's $1,000,000 fine for reconsideration of

his ability to pay it and remand all of the other appellants'

prison sentences for reconsideration of the scope of each

individual's participation in the Anderson drug distribution

network.

So ordered.

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SILBERMAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: Appellant

Anderson raises one further argumenta pure question of statutory

interpretationwith which I agree. He contends that his multiple

convictions under four separate counts of violations of section

924(c)(1) are based on a misreading of the statute. Since the

government asserts that he committed only one drug trafficking

crimea section 846 conspiracyhe cannot be guilty of more than one

violation of section 924(c)(1) in connection with that conspiracy.

As does the majority opinion, I include the precise language of

section 924(c)(1).

Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence

or drug trafficking crime ... for which he may be

prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or

carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment

provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking

crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years....

In the case of his second or subsequent conviction under

this subsection, such person shall be sentenced to

imprisonment for twenty years....

It seems that there are three possible meanings that can be derived

from this language. The first, argued by appellant, is that the

unit of prosecution is the drug trafficking crime, i.e., it does

not matter how many times a single gun is "used" during the

commission of a drug trafficking crime nor how many guns are used

during that period; the statute contemplates only one section

924(c)(1) conviction for each event or series of events that

constitutes one crime. (That, of course, does not mean that the

defendant must be charged with the underlying drug crime; only

that the elements of that crime, as a predicate to the section

924(c)(1) violation, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See

United States v. Laing, 889 F.2d 281, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert.

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denied, 494 U.S. 1069 (1990)). In other words, once the jury

determines that a defendant has committed the underlying crime, it

asks a binary questionwhether he has or has not used a gun during

and in relation to the crime. The answer to that question is

either "yes" or "no," but it cannot be "yes, yes, yes, and yes."

All seven circuits that have encountered this issue, with the

single exception (prior to this case) of the Eighth Circuit, have

read section 924(c)(1) in this manner. See United States v.

Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 674-76 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.

Ct. 103 (1993); United States v. Sims, 975 F.2d 1225, 1233 (6th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1315 (1993); United States v.

Moore, 958 F.2d 310, 312-14 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v.

Hamilton, 953 F.2d 1344, 1345-46 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.

Ct. 240 (1992); United States v. Privette, 947 F.2d 1259, 1262-63

(5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1279 (1992); United

States v. Fontanilla, 849 F.2d 1257, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1988).

The second reading of the statute was developed by the Eighth

Circuit. It puts the emphasis not on each separate "use," but on

separate "guns." That is to say, whenever the defendant uses more

than one gun during the commission of a drug crime he violates

section 924(c)(1) as many times as he uses an additional gun.

United States v. Freisinger, 937 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1991). The

Eighth Circuit arrived at this interpretation because the statute

refers to "a" gun; therefore, according to that court, the

language unambiguously contemplates that each separate gun used

during and in relation to the drug crime gives rise to a new

violation of section 924(c)(1). I find the Eighth Circuit's

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exegesis quite unpersuasive; it does not seem to me to have

semantic plausibility.

Not surprisingly, the Eighth Circuit, once adopting the "each

gun is a separate violation" reading, flinched from the sentencing

implications of its decision, and instead determined that "because

[the defendant] was carrying more than one firearm during a single

drug trafficking offense, the convictions after the first one are

not "second or subsequent' convictions within the meaning of the

statute." Freisinger, 937 F.2d at 391. Accordingly, the court

concluded "that the sentence imposed on multiple section 924(c)(1)

convictions based on a single underlying offense cannot exceed five

years." 937 F.2d at 392. Ironically, then, the only court to

interpret section 924(c)(1) as permitting multiple convictions for

the use of separate guns during a single crime did not apply that

holding to require, as the statute does, multiple punishments for

those uses. If that holding were actually applied in this case it

would leave Anderson convicted of four section 924(c)(1) violations

but would require his sentence to be reduced from 20 to five years.

The Eighth Circuit expanded somewhat on Freisinger in United

States v. Edwards, 994 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 701 (1994). There it held that where "two firearm counts

were based upon two separate seizures of weapons" the evidence

suggested "the use of different weapons at different times [which]

... constitutes two separate 924(c) offenses for which consecutive

sentences may be imposed." 994 F.2d at 424. See also United

States v. Mabry, 3 F.3d 244 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.

Ct. 1403 (1994) (same); United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210 (8th

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Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 399 (1991) (same). Under the

Eighth Circuit's current view, then, a defendant who uses multiple

firearms during one underlying crime can be convicted separately

for each use, unless the firearms were all used at the same time

(which apparently would include continuing uses during an extended

conspiracy), in which case only one five-year sentence may be

entered; whereas, if the uses occurred separately 20-year

consecutive sentences may be imposed for each subsequent offense

after the first.

The third reading, which the majority pioneers (although it

does not disavow the Eighth Circuit's "separate gun" analysis), is

that each separate deployment of a gun during and in relation to a

drug crime is a new violation of section 924(c)(1). That

interpretation is linguistically plausible, but I do not believe it

is what Congress intended. One can easily conceive of a defendant

holding, brandishing, or referring to a gun a number of times in

the course of committing a drug trafficking offense such as a sale.

As I understand the majority, each time he would be indulging a

separate "impulse" and then committing a separate section 924(c)(1)

violation. Maj. Op. at 47 n.19. And when the offense, as in this

case, is a conspiracy lasting over months, the same gun might be so

employed scores or even hundreds of times. Presumably, under the

majority's reasoning, if a defendant were charged with possession

of drugs with intent to distribute and kept a gun in a chest, each

time he indulged the impulse to fondle the gun so as to embolden

his criminal determination, see United States v. Bailey, No. 90-

3119 et al., slip op. at 14, 18 (citations omitted) (D.C. Cir. Oct.

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4, 1994) (en banc ), he would have committed a fresh section

924(c)(1) violation.

Although section 924(c)(1) is not just a sentencing

enhancement provisionit is, as the majority emphasizes, a separate

crimenevertheless, the first section 924(c)(1) violation calls for

five years imprisonment, and the second and all others for an

additional 20 years each. If each separate "use" of a gun, so

defined, during a commission of a drug crime was a separate

violation it would not be unusual for the government to obtain, as

a practical matter, a life sentence whenever a gun accompanies a

drug crime. Indeed, in this case, had Anderson been sentenced

after the Supreme Court decided Deal v. United States, 113 S. Ct.

1993 (1993) (affirming 105-year sentence for six convictions under

section 924(c)(1)), he would have received not just 20 years

because of the four separate section 924(c)(1) convictions, but 65

years. I think if Congress had intended such a severe sentence to

be imposed on a defendant who displays a gun more than once in

relation to the same drug trafficking conviction, it would have

said so more directly.

The majority contends that the dominant reading of section

924(c)(1) provides insufficient deterrence of multiple "uses" of a

gun in relation to a single crime. But the majority's reasoning

suggests that Congress actually contemplated that a defendant,

having brandished a gun once in connection with a drug trafficking

crimelet's suppose at 9:00 p.m. when, as a seller, he was

introduced to a prospective drug purchaserconceivably would be

deterred from brandishing a gun the second time at 9:30 p.m. when

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1In that connection, it is ironic that for purposes of this

case the majority, see Maj. Op. at 47 n.16, seems to embrace a

definition of "use"at least with respect to the additional

alleged section 924(c)(1) violationswhich is close, if not

identical, to the definition for which we dissenters argued in

United States v. Bailey, No. 90-3119 et al., slip op. at 8, 12

(D.C. Cir. Oct. 4, 1994) (en banc )an active employment, or

"impulse" to use a gun, rather than a passive possession. The

result of the majority's position here is that defendants get the

worst of both analytical worlds. 

the sale was consummated. I think that is a rather farfetched

supposition of congressional purpose. Congress was concerned about

heightened disincentives. After all, the second and succeeding

convictions for section 924(c)(1) violations carry a 20-year

sentence. But, if Congress had contemplated the majority's

exquisite concept of disincentives to deter a criminal's repeated

brandishing of a gun while committing a drug trafficking offense,

surely Congress would have been a good deal more precise as to its

definition of "use."1

I believe the more plausible and logical interpretation of

section 924(c)(1) to be the one seven circuits have endorsed. And,

in any event, given the ambiguity of the statutory language, the

rule of lenity dictates that we accept appellants' argument.

Lindsay, supra, 985 F.2d at 676 (citation omitted); United States

v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1317 (10th Cir. 1987) (citations

omitted).

I respectfully dissent.

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