Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-ca9-13-70385/USCOURTS-ca9-13-70385-0/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
City of Edmonds, Washington
Petitioner
City of Mukilteo, Washington
Petitioner
Victor M. Coupez
Petitioner
Federal Aviation Administration
Respondent
Michael P. Huerta
Respondent
Ray LaHood
Respondent
Michael Moore
Petitioner
Save Our Communities
Petitioner
U.S. Department of Transportation
Respondent
Kathryn Vernon
Respondent

Document Text:

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CITY OF MUKILTEO, WASHINGTON, a

non-charter code city; CITY OF

EDMONDS, WASHINGTON, a noncharter code city; SAVE OUR

COMMUNITIES, a tax exempt

organization; MICHAEL MOORE, an

individual; VICTOR M. COUPEZ, an

individual,

Petitioners,

v.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION; ANTHONY FOXX,

Secretary of Transportation;*

FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION; MICHAEL P.

HUERTA, Acting Administrator,

FAA; DAVID SUOMI, Regional

Administrator, FAA Northwest

Mountain Region,**

Respondents.

No. 13-70385

OPINION

* Anthony Foxx is substituted for Ray LaHood as Secretary of

Transportation. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** David Suomi is substituted for Kathryn Vernon as Acting Regional

Administrator, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. See Fed. R. App. P.

43(c)(2).

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2 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

U.S. Department of Transportation

Federal Aviation Administration

Argued June 18, 2014

Submitted October 9, 2015

Seattle, Washington

Filed March 4, 2016

Before: Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain, Marsha S. Berzon,

and Richard C. Tallman, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Tallman 

SUMMARY***

Federal Aviation Administration / Environmental Law

The panel denied a petition for review challenging the

Federal Aviation Administration’s (“FAA”) decision that no

EnvironmentalImpactStatement was necessaryto commence

operating commercial passenger service at Paine Field near

Everett, Washington.

Under the National Environmental PolicyAct (“NEPA”),

and its implementing regulations, the FAA was required to

analyze all “reasonably foreseeable” environmental impacts

 

*** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 3

of its decision to open Paine Field to commercial passenger

traffic.

The panel held that the scope of the FAA’s review was

not arbitrary and capricious. The panel further held that the

FAA’s demand-based flight operation projections for Paine

Field were neither arbitrary nor capricious. The panel also

rejected the petitioners’ contention that the FAA violated 40

C.F.R. § 1508.25, which requires agencies to consider

“connected actions” in NEPA documents, and held that it was

not arbitrary for the FAA to have included no connected

actions in the final Environmental Assessment. The panel

rejected petitioners’ bias-based arguments, and held that: the

FAA’s Finding of No Significant Impact was not

predetermined by the creation of an optimistic schedule for

completing the environmental review or statements favoring

commercial service at Paine Field; and the FAA performed its

NEPA obligations in good faith and did not prematurely

commit resources to opening the terminal.

COUNSEL

Barbara E. Lichman (argued), Buchalter Nemer, Irvine,

California, for Petitioners.

Lane N. McFadden (argued), Attorney, Environment &

Natural Resources Division; Robert G. Dreher, Acting

Assistant Attorney General, United States Department of

Justice, Washington, D.C.; Patricia A. Deem, Office of

Regional Counsel, NW Mountain Region, Federal Aviation

Administration, Seattle, Washington, for Respondents.

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4 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

OPINION

TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:

Paine Field, located in Snohomish County, Washington,

near the city of Everett, was originally constructed in 1936

when it was envisioned to become a major airport serving the

communities located north of Seattle. Over the years, it has

been used for military purposes (both during and after World

War II), and for commercial and general aviation aircraft. 

Today, the Boeing Company operates its 747 aircraft

production factory at Paine Field. There are a host of related

commercial businesses which repair and service large

airplanes, providing jobs to more than 30,000 people. For

that reason, the three existing runways are as long as 9,010

feet.

Paine Field has not, however, become the hub of

commercial passenger traffic originally envisioned when it

was first built. In 2012, authorization was given to

commence service by commercial passenger carriers, starting

with permission to build a small two-gate terminal. This case

brings to our attention a longstanding public debate over the

future of the airfield.

Petitioners challenge the Federal Aviation

Administration’s (FAA) decision that no Environmental

Impact Statement (EIS) is necessary to commence operating

commercial passenger service at Paine Field. The FAA made

that decision after preparing a draft Environmental

Assessment (EA), a less robust form of environmental

review. See Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 697 F.3d

1010, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2012). Two and a half years and

over 4,000 public comments later, the FAA published a final

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 5

EA in September 2012. It found no significant environmental

impacts as a result of the FAA’s approval. Petitioners claim

that the FAA unreasonably restricted the scope of the EA,

failed to include connected actions as required, and

predetermined an outcome before conducting its review.

We heard argument on this appeal in June of 2014. 

Shortly thereafter, the parties requested that we stay this

action because, for lack of funding, it appeared unlikely that

development would proceed. Construction of the passenger

terminal was indefinitely delayed after Snohomish County,

which owns and operates Paine Field, decided it would not

fund the three million dollars needed to construct a building

that could handle passengers and their baggage. At the time,

no one else was willing to step forward with the money, even

though Alaska Airlines, through its subsidiary Horizon Air,

and Allegiant Airlines had expressed an interest in providing

service in and out of Paine Field if adequate facilities were

made available.1

After argument, we stayed the proceeding and requested

interim status reports every six months. Based on the

Respondents’ September 2015 undisputed assurances that

construction is now imminent, we reinstated this case and

now reach the merits of the petition.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 49 U.S.C.

§ 46110(a). We have reviewed the record compiled by the

1

It appears Horizon Air and Allegiant Airlines may no longer be

interested in providing service at Paine Field. The government has

represented, however, that there is no reason to believe that the new

commercial service proposed at Paine Field would involve a different

number of flight operations than provided for in the original proposal.

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6 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

agency in support of its decision. We hold that the scope of

the FAA’s analysis was not arbitrary and capricious; we

recognize that under the enabling act that created it, the FAA

is allowed to express a preference for a certain outcome; and

we deny the petition for review and uphold the FAA’s

decision to permit commercial passenger operations to begin

at Paine Field once the terminal is built.

I

Petitioners make several arguments about the scope of the

FAA’s review, essentially claiming that the FAA wrongly

failed to analyze what would happen if more airlines followed

the first two proposed airlines into Paine Field. Under the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.

§§ 4321-4370h, and its implementing regulations, the FAA

was required to analyze all “reasonably foreseeable”

environmental impacts of its decision to open Paine Field to

commercial passenger traffic. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9

(requiring EAs to analyze environmental impacts of the

proposed action); Id. at § 1508.8(b) (equating “impact” with

“effect” and defining “indirect effects” as those that are

“reasonably foreseeable”); Id. at § 1508.7 (defining

“cumulative impacts” as those which result from the addition

of impacts from current and past actions to those of

“reasonablyforeseeable” future actions). Similarly, the Clean

Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671, and related federal

regulations also require the FAA to analyze “reasonably

foreseeable” emissions resulting from its action. See 40

C.F.R. § 93.153(b) (requiring agencies to analyze indirect and

direct emissions); Id. at § 93.152 (defining “indirect

emissions” as those that are, among other things, “reasonably

foreseeable”).

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 7

The Supreme Court has emphasized that NEPA only

“guarantees a particular procedure, not a particular result”

and “a person with standing who is injured by a failure to

comply with the NEPA procedure may complain of that

failure at the time the failure takes place, for the claim can

never get riper.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club,

523 U.S. 726, 737 (1998). Accordingly, when reviewing

agency decisions under NEPA, the starting point is the

administrative record. Animal Def. Council v. Hodel,

840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988), amended, 867 F.2d

1244 (9th Cir. 1989). Our task is to determine whether the

agency made an arbitrary and capricious decision based on

that record. Id.

Here, the FAA based its flight operation projections on

demand and determined that the only additional, and

reasonably foreseeable, flights were those initially proposed

by two airlines, amounting to approximately twenty-two

operations2per day. Those airlines proposed to employ

smaller aircraft with a capacity of up to 150 passengers. In

contrast, the projections touted by petitioners were based

solely on the airport’s maximum capacity and do not take into

account actual historical demand. While it is true that we do

not have the most current projections before us, that data is

not necessary to determine whether the FAA based its 2012

decision on reasonable grounds. Further, the ongoing validity

of that 2012 decision is unchallenged. The FAA claims that

2 An “[a]ir carrier operation” is defined as a single takeoff or landing. 

See 14 C.F.R. § 139.5. Historical data shows that Paine Field peaked in

air carrier operations around the year 2000. That year, Paine saw a total

of 213,291 “operations.” More recently, operations declined to 117,104

operations per year in 2011. Thus, adding by 2018 approximately 8,340

operations per year from commercial passenger operators will leave the

overall airport operations within the level of historic variation.

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8 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

the 2012 finding of no significant impact (FONSI) is still

valid because Propeller Air, Inc., the new outside investor,

now plans to build “a terminal facility consistent with that

evaluated in the Final EA,” and that the number of operations

will be similar. Petitioners submitted nothing to challenge

that statement.

The final EA evaluated four proposed FAA actions.3 The

FAA must still take at least one of those original four

actions—amending Paine Field’s Part 139 Certificate—to

allow commercial passenger operations. Given that the major

action4analyzed in the original EA is now likely to occur, and

the FAA maintains that it will occur “consistent” with the

original plan, we evaluate the 2012 FONSI based on the

existing administrative record.

Petitioners do not contest the FAA’s claim that the

projections regarding the number of air carrier operations in

the FONSI are still consistent with the current terminal

construction efforts, despite being given the opportunity to do

3 The four actions were: (1) amending Paine Field’s Part 139 Certificate

to allow it to host commercial passenger service; (2) amending the Part

119 Specifications for Horizon to allow flights in and out of Paine;

(3) amending the Part 119 Specifications for Allegiant to allow flights in

and out of Paine; and (4) determining whether Snohomish County was

eligible to receive a federal grant to defray the cost of expanding and

updating the existing terminal. Only action (1) is challenged here.

4 According to Petitioners, this, and the construction of a new terminal,

are the FAA actions that they really seek to challenge. In a letter

submitted to us on May 20, 2014, the Petitioners said the “cause of the

harm that Petitioners allege and from which they require relief” is the

FAA’s “plans to turn Paine Field into a commercial airport, and expand

its facilities to accommodate commercial service,” rather than the change

in Horizon’s and Allegiant’s Part 119 Specifications.

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 9

so. Given that we are to defer to the FAA “especially in areas

of agency expertise such as aviation forecasting,” the FAA’s

demand-based projections of approximately 8,340 operations

per year in 2018, were not arbitrary and capricious.5 Nat’l

Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

222 F.3d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 2000). We decline to apply the

less deferential standard advanced by Petitioners because this

is a factual determination dependent on agency expertise

rather than a legal determination. See San Luis Obispo

Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 449 F.3d

1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006).

We also reject Petitioners’ argument that amending Paine

Field’s Part 139 Certificate to allow commercial passenger

operations means that Paine Field “must allow access by all

aircraft so requesting” in the future. Petitioners have

provided no support for this come one, come all theory and

instead rely on statutory provisions that limit the ability to

take away airport access once access has been granted to a

particular airline. See 49 U.S.C. § 47524(c)(1) (providing

limits on new airport access restrictions); 49 U.S.C.

§ 41713(b)(1) (preempting state restrictions on access). The

statutes cited by the Petitioners only go into effect after

access has been authorized—meaning that the airport is open

to commercial operations generally (via the airport’s Part 139

Certificate) and the airline specifically has authority to

conduct operations at that airport (via the airline’s Part 119

Specifications). Thus, our decision today does not open the

floodgates because any future airline must still get an

amendment to its Part 119 Specifications in order to operate

5 These demand-based projections were actually quite close to the

maximum terminal capacity projections advanced by Petitioners, which

predicted 8,760 operations per year by 2018.

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10 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

out of Paine Field. The FAA, therefore, reasonably based the

EA on the number of operations Horizon and Allegiant

intended to carry out, not on the speculative number of

operations that could someday be carried out at Paine Field if

other airlines also seek an amendment to their Part 119

Specifications.

Given the existing administrative record, we hold that the

FAA’s demand-based projections were neither arbitrary nor

capricious.

II

Petitioners next argue that the FAA violated 40 C.F.R.

§ 1508.25, which requires agencies to consider “connected

actions” in NEPA documents. Connected actions are those

that are interdependent or automatically triggered by the

proposed action. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25. The FAA

determined that there were no connected actions for this

project, and Petitioners have failed to provide anything more

than mere speculation that the FAA’s actions now will lead

to more aircraft activity at Paine Field in the future than

covered in the EA. Thus, it was not arbitrary for the FAA to

have included no connected actions in the final EA.

III

Petitioners also argue that the FAA decided what the

result would be before performing the EA for two reasons:

(1) the FAA made statements favoring passenger service at

Paine Field; and (2) the FAA gave a schedule to the

consulting firm that prepared the EA which included the date

on which a FONSI could issue. Petitioners argue this

schedule and the FAA’s statements show that the FAA

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 11

decided to issue a FONSI before even starting the

environmental review process. We reject both of these biasbased arguments.

Petitioners’ first argument, that the FAA favored

commercial service, is easilyrejected because NEPA does not

prohibit agencies from having or expressing a favored

outcome. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir.

2000). Agencies are required only to conduct the required

environmental review “objectively and in good faith,” rather

than as “subterfuge to rationalize a decision already made.” 

Id. at 1142. Indeed, the enabling legislation that created the

FAA includes an express congressional directive that the

agency shall promote and encourage the development of

commercial aviation throughout the United States. See

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §§ 102-

103, 72 Stat. 731, 740 (later recodified and repealed)

(explaining that the FAA is charged with “[t]he promotion,

encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics”). The

FAA acted well within the bounds of NEPA by advocating

for commercial service at Paine Field.

Petitioners’ second argument, based on the FAA giving

the EA contractor a schedule which included the date a

FONSI could issue, is also without merit. As the FAA points

out, approving a schedule which included the date a FONSI

could issue did not obligate the FAA to reach a Finding of No

Significant Impact. The FAA simply identified its preferred

outcome and laid out an optimistic timetable for achieving

that outcome. This is consistent with regulations that actually

encourage the FAA to identify a preferred alternative and

encourage the FAA to set time limits during the

environmental review process. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.8

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12 CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT

(encouraging time limits); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e)

(encouraging listing a preferred alternative). 

As the FONSI at issue in this case states, the FAA did a

“careful and thorough” review of the final EA before issuing

its finding. Because the FAA reserved the “absolute right” to

determine whether a FONSI would issue or not, creating this

tentative schedule did not violate NEPA. See Friends of

Southeast’s Future v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 1059, 1063–65 (9th

Cir. 1998) (holding that tentative timber cutting schedule

released before EIS did not violate NEPA). 

In short, the FAA’s Finding of No Significant Impact was

not predetermined by the creation of an optimistic schedule

for completing the environmental review or statements

favoring commercial service at Paine Field. The FAA

performed its NEPA obligations in good faith and did not

prematurely commit resources to opening the terminal. The

Petitioners’ bias arguments fail.

IV

We emphasize that we base our decision today on the

current administrative record. So far as that record shows, the

only changes in the status quo since the FAA issued its 2012

decision is that a private entity, Propeller Air, Inc., has now 

stepped forward to pay for building the small passenger

terminal which the FAA has previously approved, and that

the airlines likely to use the terminal may change. These

changes are not enough to warrant a supplemental EA, as

neither of these changes, in themselves, will necessarily alter

the environmental impact. See Great Old Broads for

Wilderness v. Kimbell, 709 F.3d 836, 854 (9th Cir. 2013)

(holding that supplementation is not required when the final

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CITY OF MUKILTEO V. USDOT 13

project is a “minor variation” of one of the alternatives

discussed in the NEPA document); see also FAA Order

1050.1E (Change One) ¶ 402b(1) (requiring the FAA to

supplement an EA only if “significant changes” have been

made to the project).

Practical concerns also weigh against requiring the FAA

to reevaluate or supplement the EA at this time. As

previously discussed, any airline wishing to fly out of Paine

Field, besides Horizon or Allegiant, needs to request access

from the FAA and an amendment to their Part 119

Specifications, potentially triggering another round of

environmental assessment subject to scrutiny under NEPA. 

We do not prejudice Petitioners by deciding this case on the

current record because if they want post-2012 facts reviewed,

the Petitioners can simply challenge the FAA’s future actions

when further expansion is sought. But on this record we

cannot say the FAA’s decision to permit limited commercial

passenger operations to begin at Paine Field without a full

environmental impact statement was arbitraryand capricious.

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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