Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01519/USCOURTS-cand-4_19-cv-01519-6/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Addus Healthcare, Inc.
Defendant
Addus HomeCare Corporation
Defendant
Alexandria Encinias
Plaintiff
Mary Moore
Plaintiff

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United States District Court

Northern District of California

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

MARY MOORE, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ADDUS HEALTHCARE, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 19-cv-01519-HSG 

ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF 

ENCINIAS FOR FAILURE TO 

PROSECUTE AND ORDER 

GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' COUNSEL'S 

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS 

ATTORNEY

Re: Dkt. Nos. 51, 52

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney for 

Plaintiff Encinias, Dkt. No. 51, and Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Encinias for failure to 

prosecute, Dkt. No. 52. For the reasons detailed below, the Court GRANTS both motions. 

I. MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS ATTORNEY (DKT. NO. 51)

On July 11, 2017, Plaintiff Mary Moore filed this putative class action in Alameda 

Superior Court. See Dkt. No. 1 Ex. A. On March 21, 2019, an amended complaint was filed, 

which added Alexandria Encinias as a Plaintiff and Addus HomeCare, Inc. as a Defendant.1 See 

Dkt. No. 1-1 Ex. N (“FAC”). 

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Tatiana G. Avakian of Marlin & Saltzman, LLP, first moved to 

withdraw as Plaintiff Encinias’s attorney on September 23, 2019, citing Plaintiff Encinias’s 

“fail[ure] to comply with her duties as a class representative and a break down in the attorneyclient relationship.” Dkt. No. 51 (citing Dkt. No. 48). Plaintiffs’ counsel then withdrew the 

motion after Plaintiff Encinias contacted counsel and assured Plaintiff’s counsel of her ability to 

continue prosecuting the action. Thereafter, however, Plaintiffs’ counsel renewed her motion to 

 

1 Defendants represent that the operative complaint erroneously sues “Addus HomeCare, Inc.” and 

that the correct entity is “Addus HomeCare Corporation.” Dkt. No. 52 at 1. 

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withdraw as Plaintiff Encinias’s attorney on October 29, 2019. Id. Counsel has made numerous 

attempts to contact Plaintiff Encinias over the course of the case. First, in order to address the 

written discovery requests, counsel unsuccessfully attempted to reach Plaintiff Encinias on July 1, 

3, 16, and 19, 2019. Dkt. No. 51-1 at ¶ 3. In order to finalize discovery responses and confirm 

availability for a deposition, counsel again unsuccessfully attempted to reach Plaintiff Encinias on 

July 26, 29, 30, 31, 2019 and August 2, 2019. Id. at ¶ 4. Co-counsel Lawyers for Justice, PC also 

unsuccessfully attempted to reach Plaintiff Encinias on August 14 and 29, 2019. Id. at ¶ 5. 

Counsel even hired an investigator to produce additional contact information, yet the additional 

contacts still proved unsuccessful. Id. at ¶ 6. After a final attempt on September 16, 2019, 

counsel filed the initial motion to withdraw as counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 7–8. Thereafter, counsel again 

tried to contact Plaintiff Encinias on October 7, 8, 10, and 14, 2019. Id. at ¶ 13. Although counsel 

heard from Plaintiff Encinias on October 15, 2019, Plaintiff Encinias did not confirm attendance 

for the October 22 deposition and thereafter again failed to respond to counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 14–15. 

Counsel then renewed her motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff Encinias arguing that 

Plaintiff Encinias’s “failure to communicate . . . has created a conflict between Plaintiff[s’] 

Counsel’s duty to Ms. Encinias and [the] duty to the remaining class representative, Mary Moore, 

as well as putative class members.” Id. at ¶ 17. The Court set a hearing on this motion for 

January 9, 2019, and directed counsel to inform Plaintiff Encinias that she should appear at the 

hearing if she opposed counsel’s motion to withdraw. Dkt. No. 60. Counsel confirmed at the 

hearing that she emailed Ms. Encinias this information. Because Plaintiff Encinias did not appear 

at the hearing, it is unclear to the Court whether she opposes the motion. 

In this district, “[c]ounsel may not withdraw from an action until relieved by order of 

Court after written notice has been given reasonably in advance to the client and to all other 

parties who have appeared in the case.” Civil L.R. 11-5(a). Moreover, “[w]hen withdrawal by an 

attorney from an action is not accompanied by simultaneous appearance of substitute counsel or 

agreement of the party to appear pro se, leave to withdraw may be subject to the condition that 

papers may continue to be served on counsel for forwarding purposes, unless and until the client 

appears by other counsel or pro se.” Civil L.R. 11-5(b).

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Withdrawal is also governed by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. See j2 

Glob. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-4254PJH, 2009 WL 464768, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 

Feb. 24, 2009)). Under these rules, permissive withdrawal may be granted only by leave of the 

Court. CA ST RPC, Rule 3-700(A)(1). The rules provide for permissive withdrawal on various 

grounds. Id. at Rule 3-700(C)(1). But an attorney may not withdraw before he or she “has taken 

reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, including 

giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, complying with 

rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules.” Id., Rule 3-700(A)(2); see also id., 

Rule 3-700(D) (regarding the refund of fees and the release of property and papers).

More broadly, courts assessing a motion to withdraw engage in a balancing of the equities, 

considering such factors as why counsel seeks to withdraw and whether permitting withdrawal 

may prejudice other litigants, harm the administration of justice, or delay the case’s resolution. 

See Robinson v. Delgado, No. CV 02-1538 NJV, 2010 WL 3259384, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 

2010) (citing cases).

The Court finds that Civil Local Rule 11-5(a) is satisfied here. Plaintiff’s counsel filed the

instant motion over two months ago and gave Plaintiff Encinias advance notice of withdrawal 

weeks before by filing the previous withdrawal motion. See Dkt. No. 48. Based upon the 

discussion at the hearing, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff’s counsel filed the motion with a 

good faith belief that there is good cause for withdrawal. See CA ST RPC, Rule 3-700(C)(6). 

Accordingly, the Court finds in the exercise of its discretion that withdrawal is warranted. See

Gong v. City of Alameda, No. C 03-05495-TEH, 2008 WL 160964, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008). 

The Court GRANTS the motion to withdraw as counsel.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE (DKT. NO. 52)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that where a “plaintiff fails to prosecute or 

to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any 

claim against it.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “Despite this authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, 

therefore, it should only be imposed in extreme circumstances.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.3d 

1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that 

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dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as an adjudication on the merits” unless the order says 

otherwise). Courts “must weigh five factors” in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure 

to prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 

disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” See

Ferdik, 963 F.3d at 1260-61. A court need not make “explicit findings in order to show that it has 

considered these factors,” although such findings are preferred. Id. at 1261. Here, the Court 

considers each factor in turn, and finds that they weigh in favor of dismissal.

First, “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 

dismissal.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. 

Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). That is true here. Plaintiff repeatedly failed to 

respond to counsel’s communications over the course of four months, starting in July 2019 and 

continuing through at least January 9, 2020, when the hearing for both this motion and Plaintiffs’ 

counsel’s motion to withdraw took place. See Dkt. No. 51-1 at ¶¶ 3–15. Further, Plaintiff failed 

to appear at the hearing even after the Court’s January 2, 2020 order to appear if she opposed 

Plaintiffs’ counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Dkt. No. 60. The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff’s 

lack of responsiveness contravenes the “public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation.” 

See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal.

Second, it is “incumbent” upon courts “to manage [their] docket[s] without being subject 

to routine noncompliance” of litigants. See id. (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261). Moreover, “[t]he 

trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with 

docket management and the public interest.” Id. Here, Plaintiff failed to attend the hearing on the 

motion to withdraw in person, as ordered by the Court on January 2, 2020, see Dkt. No. 60. 

Counsel represented to the Court that she communicated the Court’s order directing Plaintiff 

Encinias to appear, but she has not received any response or communications from Plaintiff 

Encinias since October 15, 2019. Plaintiff Encinias’s noncompliance and the resulting litigation 

(e.g., the motions to withdraw and motion to dismiss) “ha[ve] consumed some of the court’s time 

that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket.” See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. 

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This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 

Third, in order to prove prejudice, “a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions 

impaired defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 

of the case.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. “Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of 

dismissal is in part judged with reference to the strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.” 

Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Defendant 

argues that Plaintiff Encinias’s inaction has prejudiced its ability to conduct discovery and prepare 

their case. Dkt. No. 52. The Court agrees that Defendant has been prejudiced by an inability to 

properly conduct discovery. See Jones v. Lehigh Sw. Cement Co., No. 1:12-CV-00633-AWI-JL, 

2014 WL 346619, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2014) (“[T]he inability to obtain a plaintiff’s 

deposition significantly impairs the [defendant’s] ability to explore, defend, and challenge the 

claims against it.”) (citation omitted); Rau v. Mission Ranch Primary Care, No. 2:13-CV-00371-

KJM, 2014 WL 1490957, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2014) (finding prejudice where “defendants 

have been unable to move forward or to conduct any discovery in light of plaintiff's counsel's 

absenteeism.”)). Additionally, Plaintiff Encinias has not provided any excuse to date—rather, she 

has been almost entirely absent, and failed to respond counsel’s repeated attempts to respond to 

discovery requests and schedule a deposition. The Court thus finds prejudice to Defendant and 

this factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 

Fourth, “[p]ublic policy favors disposition of cases on the merits.” See Pagtalunan, 291 

F.3d at 643. Plaintiffs’ counsel represents that it anticipates “tak[ing] necessary steps to find a 

replacement class representative for Ms. Encinias (who held the position of direct care worker).” 

Dkt. No. 56 at 4 n.1; see also Dkt. No. 51-1 at ¶ 19. Because the plan is for class members to be 

represented by another direct care worker in this case, there will be no prejudice to the putative 

class members if Plaintiff Encinias is dismissed from the action. This factor then is neutral with 

regard to the putative class since there will still be a resolution on the merits, even if Plaintiff 

Encinias is dismissed. As to Ms. Encinias’s individual claim, this factor weighs against dismissal.

Finally, the Court must consider less drastic measures. Here, Defendant and Plaintiffs’ 

counsel agree that dismissal is the appropriate remedy for Plaintiff Encinias. Given Plaintiff 

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Encinias’s lack of participation at this stage, the Court agrees that dismissal is appropriate. 

Specifically, as noted previously, the Court ordered Plaintiff Encinias to appear at the hearing on 

the motion to withdraw, in order to provide her an opportunity to be heard and, if necessary, 

facilitate a change in the case schedule to accommodate a substitution of counsel. See Dkt. No. 

60. She failed to appear. The Court has no way of verifying whether Plaintiff Encinias intends to 

continue prosecuting this case, as there has been no communication from her either to her counsel 

or the Court in over two months. The question remains whether dismissal with or without 

prejudice is the appropriate remedy. Defendant argues that dismissal with prejudice is appropriate 

here, while Plaintiff’s Counsel argues that dismissal without prejudice is appropriate to allow 

Plaintiff Encinias to remain an absent putative class member should the case be certified. See Dkt. 

No. 52 at 6 with Dkt. No. 56 at 3–6. The Court finds that dismissal without prejudice is the less 

drastic alternative, and the appropriate sanction given the facts of the case. As previously noted, 

Plaintiff Moore remains a class representative in this action, and Plaintiffs’ counsel seeks to 

replace Plaintiff Encinias with another class representative to move this case forward as planned. 

Although the Court recognizes that Plaintiff Encinias’s inaction has caused delay, Defendant’s 

general investment of resources in this litigation will not be rendered futile by dismissal of 

Plaintiff Encinias without prejudice, given the continuation of the litigation. Furthermore, 

allowing Plaintiff Encinias to become an absent class member should the class be certified would 

not be prejudicial to Defendant. 

Because the majority of the factors weigh in favor of dismissal, the Court finds that 

dismissal without prejudice of Plaintiff Encinias for failure to prosecute is appropriate.2 

//

//

//

//

 

2 Because Plaintiff Encinias alone brought the first through ninth causes of action in the Amended 

Complaint, the Court dismisses without prejudice those causes of action. Once Plaintiffs’ counsel 

has found a proper replacement, she may file a motion for leave to amend the pleadings.

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III. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff counsel’s motion to withdraw as attorney. See Dkt. No. 51.

Further, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff Encinias from this action 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b). See Dkt. No. 52. Plaintiff 

Encinias’s former counsel is directed to forward this order to her. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: 1/10/2020

______________________________________

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge

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