Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04646/USCOURTS-cand-3_03-cv-04646-12/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
John Smith III
Plaintiff
United Parcel Service
Defendant

Document Text:

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States District C

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For the Northern District of California

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

JOHN SMITH III,

Plaintiff,

 v.

UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,

Defendant.

 /

No. C 03-04646 CRB

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This is an employment discrimination action based on race in which defendant has

filed a motion for summary judgment as to all four claims in the Complaint, including claims

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California Government Code section

12940 (FEHA) for race discrimination and associational discrimination, wrongful

termination as a violation of public policy, and California Labor Code section 1101. After

carefully considering the parties’ briefs, including multiple rounds of supplemental briefing,

and with the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS defendant’s motion. 

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

Defendant hired plaintiff on August 3, 1988, as a package car driver in its Eastshore

package center in Richmond, California. Plaintiff drove a brown package truck and

delivered and picked up packages along a particular route, which routinely ran through the

campus of the University of California at Berkeley. In March 2002, defendant introduced an

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auditing system which scanned packages every time they exchanged hands, including prior to

being placed in a package car early in the morning. If a driver did not scan a package at

delivery, or obtain some other proof of delivery, the scanning system produced a “scan

exception” report for that driver noting the absence of some proof of delivery. 

On July 11, 2002, defendant received a report showing that three packages were

missing which were purportedly on plaintiff’s route. The packages contained computer

monitors. Plaintiff and his supervisor, Rebecca Cooper, met that day along with a union shop

steward to discuss the scan exception. At that meeting, Cooper showed plaintiff the report

with the scan exceptions. It is undisputed that plaintiff agreed to get proof of delivery for the

missing packages. After plaintiff failed to get a proof of delivery before going on vacation

two days later, defendant commenced an investigation. When plaintiff returned to work,

Cooper and defendant’s investigator visited the destination of the packages to ask if they had

been received. Plaintiff joined them there. It is undisputed that three people from the

destination office said the packages were never delivered. 

On July 23, 2002, defendant terminated plaintiff for theft pursuant to the collective

bargaining agreement. The International Brotherhood of Teamsters represented defendant’s

package drivers, and the terms and conditions of the drivers’ employment were governed by

a collective bargaining agreement between the union and defendant. Pursuant to the

collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff appealed the decision to a neutral, third-party

arbitrator selected from a list mutually agreed upon by the union and defendant. On

November 14, 2004, the arbitrator upheld defendant’s termination for theft based on a good

cause standard. Plaintiff did not raise any race-based claims in front of the arbitrator; rather,

he challenged his termination based on the argument that he did not steal the packages.

On October 15, 2003, prior to the arbitrator’s ruling, plaintiff filed this action and

amended his Complaint on June 18, 2004. On September 2, 2005, defendant filed this

motion for summary judgment. On October 26, 2005, the Court granted plaintiff leave to

notice and take the depositions of two more witnesses. The Court heard oral argument on

December 16, 2005, after which time plaintiff was granted leave to file a motion to compel

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with a magistrate judge. Plaintiff did not file a supplemental brief based on the additional

discovery received as a result of the motion to compel.

II. Remaining Claims

Plaintiff has withdrawn his fourth claim under the California Labor Code, and the

Court accordingly DISMISSES that claim with prejudice. In addition, plaintiff has not

opposed the motion for summary judgment as to his associational discrimination claims. As

a result, defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to those claims is GRANTED. 

Plaintiff’s remaining three claims are analyzed under the same McDonnell-Douglas analysis.

DISCUSSION

I. Summary Judgment Legal Standard

 Summary judgment is proper when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is “genuine” only if there is a sufficient

evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party, and a

dispute is “material” only if it could affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). A principal purpose of the

summary judgment procedure “is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims.” 

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). “Where the record taken as a whole

could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine

issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 

II. Analysis

Under the familiar McDonnell-Douglas test, the plaintiff must first establish a prima

facie case by showing: (1) he belongs to a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the

position, (3) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) some other circumstance

indicates a discriminatory motive, such as similarly qualified individuals being treated more

favorably. See Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). Once

plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden shifts to defendant to

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articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the termination. Id. If defendant meets

this burden of production, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to establish that defendant’s

proffered reason was a pretext for discrimination. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509

U.S. 502 (1993). If plaintiff demonstrates pretext, then the burden-shifting framework

disappears, and the only remaining issue is “discrimination vel non.” See Aragon v.

Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 659 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). 

Although the burden of production shifts, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of

fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times

with the plaintiff.” Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

A. Prima Facie Case

Defendant contends that plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case because he

cannot identify a similarly situated employee of another race who was treated differently. In

addition, it is unclear whether he was even qualified for his job since he was allegedly

terminated for stealing merchandise, which is an offense that leads to immediate termination

for cause under the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff primarily relies on evidence

showing that comparators were treated differently. For the purposes of this motion, however,

the Court will assume arguendo that plaintiff has met the low burden of proving a prima

facie case. Because plaintiff’s arguments concerning comparators are crucial to his argument

that defendant’s termination was pretextual, the Court addresses that argument below. 

B. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason

In order to satisfy its burden of production of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason

for the termination, “the defendant must clearly set forth, through the production of

admissible evidence, reasons for its actions which, if believed by the trier of fact, would

support a finding that unlawful discrimination was not the cause of the employment action.” 

Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003)

(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). To this end, defendant asserts it had a reasonable,

good-faith belief, based on an investigation conducted pursuant to its own bargained-for

procedures, that plaintiff stole the three packages that went missing on July 10. 

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Defendant asserts that it followed proper procedures in investigating the missing

packages in question. Plaintiff does not dispute defendant’s version of events regarding the

missing packages, conversations between plaintiff and UPS personnel surrounding those

packages, and the fact that plaintiff said he would get proof of delivery but never did. 

Defendant asserts, also unopposed by plaintiff, that he was present when Cooper and Julie

Rose, an investigator for UPS, visited the delivery address and were told by three employees

there that the packages never arrived. In sum, defendant has submitted sufficient undisputed

evidence supporting its decision to terminate plaintiff to satisfy its burden of production of a

legitimate non-discriminatory reason.

In addition, defendant also asserts that the arbitration decision favoring defendant

shows that there was no discrimination because defendant had good cause to terminate

plaintiff at the time of its decision. Plaintiff objects to relying on the arbitration decision

because it cannot be used for collateral estoppel or res judicata purposes. While plaintiff is

correct that the arbitration cannot be used for collateral estoppel or res judicata purposes to

defeat a prima facie case of race discrimination, it can be used to support defendant’s

assertion of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing plaintiff and to defeat

plaintiff’s claim of pretext. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 n.21

(1974) (noting that courts have discretion to decide how much weight to give an arbitration

decision). In effect, the arbitration is one of several indices showing that defendant

reasonably believed that plaintiff stole the packages, which, under the collective bargaining

agreement, is grounds for automatic termination. 

Plaintiff does not dispute that the arbitration process was properly conducted

according to the collective bargaining agreement, nor does he dispute that the arbitrator was

not neutral, independent or unbiased. Plaintiff, however, asserts that he decided not to

pursue his claims of race discrimination in the arbitration, as is his right to do, and therefore

the arbitration decision has little relevance to this action. Yet plaintiff did allege in his

arbitration that he did not steal the packages. Based on substantial evidence, including

evidentiary hearings and admission of a number of exhibits, the arbitrator determined that

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Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Collins on the ground that, unlike here, the arbitration

in Collins included the plaintiff’s race discrimination claims. Based on a thorough reading of

Collins, the Court disagrees. See Collins, 305 F.3d 113, 118 (“Appellant challenged the Transit

Authority’s decision to fire him and was finally discharged only after the arbitration board made

an independent inquiry ... and authorized termination because it found that appellant had

assaulted Badr.”). 

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defendant had “good cause” to believe that plaintiff did steal the monitors and upheld the

termination. Where, as here, a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator determines that a termination

is proper, the decision “is highly probative of the absence of discriminatory intent in that

termination.” Collins v. New York City Transit Authority, 305 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2002)

(holding that where an arbitrator’s decision upholding a termination is based on substantial

evidence, a Title VII plaintiff must present strong evidence that the decision was wrong as a

matter of fact in order to survive a motion for summary judgment).1 Even though the

arbitration has no direct influence on plaintiff’s race discrimination claim, it is relevant to

support defendant’s explanation for the termination as a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason. As a result, the arbitrator’s decision raises the bar plaintiff must hurdle to show that

the termination was a pretext for race discrimination.

C. Pretext

After defendant satisfies its burden of production of a legitimate non-discriminatory

reason, the presumption of discrimination diminishes and plaintiff has a burden of persuasion

that defendant’s proffered reason is merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252. Generally, a plaintiff need only produce “very little evidence of

discriminatory motive to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” Goodwin v. Hunt Wesson,

150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998). However, “purely conclusory allegations of alleged

discrimination, with no concrete, relevant particulars, will not bar summary judgment.” 

Forsberg v. Pac. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 840 F.2d 1409, 1419 (9th Cir. 1988). A plaintiff

must show that defendant’s explanation is a pretext by “either directly persuading the court

that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that

the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Aragon v. Republic Silver

State Disposal, Inc., 292 F.3d 654, 658-659 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s

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evidence must be both “specific and substantial” to overcome defendant’s explanation. Id. at

659.

Plaintiff’s pretext argument centers around two overlapping arguments supported by

indirect evidence. First, plaintiff offers several reasons why defendant’s explanation for his

termination is unworthy of credence because he did not steal the packages. Under this

theory, however, plaintiff must show more than that defendant’s proffered justification is

false. “Rather, courts only require that an employer honestly believe[] its reason for its

actions, even if its reason is ‘foolish or trivial or even baseless.’” Villarimo v. Aloha Island

Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th Cir. 2002). Therefore, plaintiff must show that defendant

did not honestly believe he stole the packages in order to satisfy his burden under this theory,

and that the true reason for his termination was his race. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,

509 U.S. 502, 507-508 (1993). 

First, plaintiff denies that he stole the packages. As outlined above, however, that is

not sufficient to show pretext. Even assuming that plaintiff is correct that he did not steal the

packages, he still must show that defendant’s conclusion that he stole the packages was

unreasonable or false at the time the decision was made. As a result, plaintiff’s contentions

that he was driving a different truck than the one at issue; that he gave the packages to

someone else to deliver; that the packages could have been stolen by someone else before he

began his route; and that someone else was arrested for theft where plaintiff worked a year

after the incident all fail to show that defendant’s conclusion, supported by a neutral

arbitrator, was unreasonable under the circumstances. Defendant was not aware of plaintiff’s

assertions that he drove a different truck or that he gave some packages to a different driver. 

Even if both assertions were true, the fact that defendant’s records showed otherwise and that

plaintiff never brought either explanation to the attention of his supervisor supports a

determination that defendant’s conclusion was reasonable. Naturally, defendant cannot be

held responsible for knowing that someone would be arrested for theft one year after this

incident, nor can defendant be required to account for every hypothetical explanation as to

how the packages went missing. As the arbitrator confirmed, defendant had a good faith

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belief that plaintiff stole the packages. Plaintiff has failed to show with admissible

supporting evidence that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding defendant’s

reasons for terminating him. 

Second, plaintiff’s allegations regarding defendant’s discriminatory intent fall short of

a sufficient showing to dissuade the Court of its conclusion that defendant reasonably

believed that plaintiff stole the packages and therefore terminated him. From the outset,

plaintiff faces two significant yet not dispositive obstacles to prove this theory. First,

plaintiff’s supervisor, Cooper, who oversaw the investigation and termination of plaintiff is

also black. Second, 48 percent of defendant’s drivers are black. See Decl. of Roddrick Lee ¶

4. While the Court need not determine whether either fact defeats plaintiff’s claims, they no

doubt increase plaintiff’s burden to show pretext.

Plaintiff argues that defendant treated similarly situated drivers outside of his

protected class more favorably. See Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 641

(9th Cir. 2003) (“A showing that the County treated similarly situated employees outside

Vasquez’s protect class more favorably would be probative of pretext.”). Plaintiff attempts

to make this showing by identifying other drivers who also appeared on audit scans because

packages were missing but did not have proofs of delivery. Plaintiff contends that there is no

indication that the non-black drivers who appeared on these lists provided proof of delivery,

were investigated, or were terminated.

To identify a proper comparator, plaintiff must “point to individuals who have dealt

with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards, and engage in the same

conduct without any mitigating or distinguishing circumstances.” Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d

915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000). In this particular situation, it appears that a proper comparator

would be: (1) a non-African-American driver, (2) who appeared on an audit scan list because

packages were not documented as delivered, (3) was told that proof of delivery was

necessary, (4) agreed to do so but (5) never provided proof, and where (6) the packages were

never discovered and (7) the driver was not terminated. If all of these requirements are not

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2The Court agrees with defendant’ s assertion that individuals who appeared on a

“claims paid” list, which identifies claims that defendant paid on missing packages, are not

proper comparators because plaintiff was not terminated because of claims paid by defendant.

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satisfied, the Court cannot determine with confidence that impermissible race discrimination

is the proper inference to be drawn from the different treatment. 

The only two individuals plaintiff has identified as proper comparators are nonAfrican American drivers who failed to scan packages, could not show proof of delivery, and

were not terminated.2 One was suspended for one day and the other was given a warning. 

See Decl. of Aaron Gorfein, Ex. T. Plaintiff does not provide evidence that the packages

were never discovered or that proof of delivery was never delivered for either or both of the

putative comparators. Even assuming they are true comparators, defendant presents evidence

that, in both cases, the packages were either discovered or were never missing. See Supp.

Decl. of Rebecca Cooper at ¶¶ 6, 7. Therefore, the Court finds that plaintiff has not shown

that similarly situated individuals of another race were treated more favorably than plaintiff.

Plaintiff also argues that proof of discrimination against other members of the same

protected class can create an inference of discrimination in this situation. To this end,

plaintiff contends that the only other driver to be terminated by Rebecca Cooper, who is

black, was another African-American man. Plaintiff also contends that Cooper fired another

African-American man after she alleged that he made threats to her and had to be physically

restrained. Yet the admissible evidence plaintiff submits in support of this argument does not

reveal any discrimination by Cooper based on race. In the first instance, Cooper apparently

fired the individual for theft. The evidence does not indicate that race was even an issue in

the termination, and the Court finds no reason to believe the termination was inappropriate. 

In the second instance, no evidence submitted by plaintiff indicates race played a role in the

altercation. As a result, the Court finds plaintiff has not proved that Cooper discriminated

against other members of plaintiff’s protected class. Accordingly, no reasonable trier of fact

could draw an inference of discrimination here.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff has not satisfied his burden of persuasion that his

termination was a pretext for race discrimination. As a result, the Court finds that no

reasonable jury could find that plaintiff was terminated because of race discrimination. Thus,

defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the three claims of race discrimination is

GRANTED. Defendant’s unopposed motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s

associational discrimination claim is also GRANTED, and plaintiff’s withdrawn claim under

the California Labor Code is DISMISSED with prejudice. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 22, 2006

 

CHARLES R. BREYER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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