Document ID: s3://data.kl3m.ai/documents/govinfo/USCOURTS/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01951/USCOURTS-caed-1_15-cv-01951-3/pdf.json

Parties Involved:
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant
Edward Garcia
Plaintiff

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Edward Garcia asserts he is entitled to a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and 

supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff argues the 

administrative law judge erred in evaluating the record and seeks judicial review of the decision to 

deny his applications for benefits. For the reasons set forth below, the decision is AFFIRMED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his applications for benefits on September 26, 2012, alleging disability beginning 

on October 5, 2011. (Doc. 10-3 at 15) The Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff’s 

applications at both the initial level and upon reconsideration. (See generally Doc. 10-4) After 

requesting a hearing, Plaintiff testified before an ALJ on January 21, 2014. (Doc. 10-3 at 15, 30) The 

 

1 Nancy A. Berryhill is now the Acting Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to Rule 25(d) of the Federal 

Rules of Civil Procedure, Nancy A. Berryhill is substituted for her predecessor, Carolyn W. Colvin, as the defendant.

EDWARD GARCIA, 

 Plaintiff,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL1,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

 Defendant.

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Case No.: 1:15-cv-01951 - JLT

ORDER DIRECTING ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF DEFENDANT, NANCY 

BERRYHILL, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, AND AGAINST 

PLAINTIFF EDWARD GARCIA

Case 1:15-cv-01951-JLT Document 19 Filed 03/09/17 Page 1 of 8
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ALJ determined Plaintiff was not disabled and issued an order denying benefits on August 7, 2014. 

(Id. at 15-22) When the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the decision on 

October 27, 2015 (id. at 2-4), the ALJ’s findings became the final decision of the Commissioner of 

Social Security (“Commissioner”).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

District courts have a limited scope of judicial review for disability claims after a decision by 

the Commissioner to deny benefits under the Social Security Act. When reviewing findings of fact, 

such as whether a claimant was disabled, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner’s 

decision is supported by substantial evidence or is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The ALJ’s 

determination that the claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the Court if the proper legal standards 

were applied and the findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Sanchez v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Serv., 812 F.2d 509, 510 (9th Cir. 1987).

Substantial evidence is “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a 

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 

389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938)). The record as a whole 

must be considered, because “[t]he court must consider both evidence that supports and evidence that 

detracts from the ALJ’s conclusion.” Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985).

DISABILITY BENEFITS

To qualify for benefits under the Social Security Act, Plaintiff must establish he is unable to 

engage in substantial gainful activity due to a medically determinable physical or mental impairment 

that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). An individual shall be considered to have a disability only if:

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not 

only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and 

work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in 

the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area 

in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he 

would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). The burden of proof is on a claimant to establish disability. Terry v. 

Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1990). If a claimant establishes a prima facie case of disability, 

Case 1:15-cv-01951-JLT Document 19 Filed 03/09/17 Page 2 of 8
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the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove the claimant is able to engage in other substantial 

gainful employment. Maounois v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 1032, 1034 (9th Cir. 1984).

ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION

To achieve uniform decisions, the Commissioner established a sequential five-step process for 

evaluating a claimant’s alleged disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920(a)-(f). The process requires 

the ALJ to determine whether Plaintiff (1) engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 

alleged disability, (2) had medically determinable severe impairments (3) that met or equaled one of the 

listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether Plaintiff (4) had 

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform to past relevant work or (5) the ability to perform 

other work existing in significant numbers at the state and national level. Id. The ALJ must consider 

testimonial and objective medical evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927.

Pursuant to the five-step process, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not engage in substantial 

gainful activity after the alleged onset date of October 5, 2011. (Doc. 10-3 at 17) At step two, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s “left lower extremity fracture of the tibia and fibula” was a severe impairment. 

(Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment, or combination of 

impairments, that met or medically equaled a Listing, including Listings 1.02 and 1.06. (Id. at 18) 

Next, the ALJ determined:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a), except he must use a single-point cane 

for ambulation. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, can never climb 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds, occasionally balance and stoop, and never kneel, crouch, 

and crawl. He has no manipulative limitations. The claimant must avoid concentrated 

exposure to extreme cold and moderate exposure to hazards, such as unprotected 

heights and dangerous machinery.

(Id. at 18) Based upon this RFC, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was “unable to perform any past 

relevant work.” (Id. at 21) However, the ALJ determined Plaintiff was able to perform other “jobs 

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy,” such as bench hand assembler, DOT 

715.684-026; table worker, DOT 739.687-182; and surveillance system monitor, DOT 379.367-010.

(Id. at 21-22) Consequently, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social 

Security Act. (Id. at 22)

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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff’s sole argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred at step-five of the sequential evaluation 

in finding that he is able to perform work as a bench hand assembler, table worker, and surveillance 

system monitor. (Doc. 15 at 9-10) According to Plaintiff, the ALJ failed to address conflicts between 

the testimony of the vocational expert—who concluded Plaintiff could work with the residual 

functional capacity identified by the ALJ— and the physical requirements of these jobs as defined by 

the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Doc. 15 at 9-10)

A. Step Five of the Sequential Evaluation

At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that Plaintiff can perform other 

substantial gainful activity and a “significant number of jobs exist in the national economy” which 

Plaintiff can perform. Kail v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1496, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984); see also Osenbrock v. 

Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the burden shift at step five). To make this 

determination, the ALJ may rely upon job descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which 

classifies jobs by their exertional and skill requirements, and is published by the United States 

Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration. Terry v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1273, 1276 

(9th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1566(d)(1). In the alternative, the ALJ may call a vocational expert 

“to testify as to (1) what jobs the claimant, given his or her functional capacity, would be able to do; 

and (2) the availability of such jobs in the national economy.” Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1101 

(9th Cir. 1999); see also Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *2 (“In making 

disability determinations, we rely primarily on the DOT . . . for information about the requirements of 

work in the national economy.”) 

The ALJ called Victoria Rei, a vocational expert (“VE”), “[t]o determine the extent to which 

[Plaintiff’s] limitations erode the unskilled sedentary occupational base.” (Doc. 10-3 at 22) 

Specifically, the ALJ asked the VE to consider “a hypothetical individual with the same age, education 

level, and work experience as [Plaintiff].” (Id. at 44) The ALJ indicated the person used “a single cane 

assistive device for ambulation;” and was limited to “occasional” climbing of ramps and stairs, 

balancing, and stooping; and “never” kneeling, crouching, crawling, or climbing ladders, ropes, and 

scaffolds. (Id.) The ALJ stated the hypothetical individual also needed “to avoid concentrated 

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exposure to extreme cold and avoid moderate exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and 

dangerous machinery.” (Id. at 45) Finally, the ALJ stated the person was limited to sedentary work, 

and could stand and walk “two out of eight” hours. (Id. at 45-56) With these limitations, the VE 

opined Plaintiff could perform unskilled sedentary work. (Id. at 46) As examples, the VE identified 

jobs as bench hand assembler, DOT 715.684-026; table worker, DOT 739.687-182; and surveillance 

monitory, DOT 379.367-010. (Id.) The VE did not report whether this conflicted with the Dictionary 

of Occupational Titles, and Plaintiff’s counsel did not question the VE regarding any conflicts between 

her testimony and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles at the hearing. (See Doc. 10-3 at 46-48)

B. Conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles

Pursuant to SSR 00-4p2, occupational evidence provided by a vocational expert “generally 

should be consistent with the occupational information supplied by the DOT.” Id., 2000 WL 1898704 

at *2. When there is a conflict between the testimony of the vocational expert and the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles, “the adjudicator must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before 

relying on the [vocational expert testimony] to support a determination or decision about whether the

claimant is disabled.” Id. Further, SSR 00-4p provides:

At the hearings level, as part of the adjudicator’s duty to fully develop the record, the 

adjudicator will inquire, on the record, as to whether or not there is such consistency. 

Neither the DOT nor the [vocational expert] evidence automatically “trumps” when there 

is a conflict. The adjudicator must resolve the conflict by determining if the explanation 

given by the [vocational expert] is reasonable and provides a basis for relying on the 

[vocational expert] testimony rather than on the DOT information.

Id. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has determined an ALJ must inquire “whether the testimony 

conflicts with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles,” and may only rely upon conflicting expert 

testimony when “the record contains persuasive evidence to support the deviation.” Massachi v. 

Astrue, 486 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2007); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1995). 

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Social Security Rulings are “final opinions and orders and statements of policy and interpretations” issued by the 

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1). While SSRs do not have the force of law, the Ninth Circuit gives the rulings 

deference “unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the Act or regulations.” Han v. Bowen, 882 F.2d 1453, 

1457 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Avenetti v. Barnhart, 456 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006) (“SSRs reflect the official 

interpretation of the [SSA] and are entitled to 'some deference' as long as they are consistent with the Social Security Act 

and regulations”).

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1. Waiver

As an initial matter, Defendant appears to argue Plaintiff has waived the right to appeal the stepfive conclusion because Plaintiff’s counsel “took the opportunity to cross-examine the VE, yet asked no 

questions about a perceived conflict with the DOT.” (Doc. 18 at 5-6) Defendant argues, “If counsel 

had raised the issue of a potential conflict at the hearing, it could have been dealt with administratively 

—rather than waiting until the matter is before this Court.” (Id. at 6, citing Solorzano v. Astrue, 2012 

WL 84527, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012))

However, this Court determined that “the fact that Plaintiff’s representative did not challenge 

the VE’s testimony as inconsistent with the DOT at the time of the hearing is not conclusive as to 

whether an apparent conflict exists, nor does it constitute a waiver of the argument.” Gonzalez v. 

Astrue, 2012 WL 2064947 at *4 (E.D. Cal. June 7, 2012). The Court explained that “while it was 

unfortunate that the claimant’s representative did not challenge [an] apparent conflict between the VE’s 

testimony and the DOT at the hearing so that it could have been addressed by the ALJ, the Supreme 

Court has nonetheless held ‘that a plaintiff challenging a denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 

need not preserve issues in the proceedings before the Commissioner or her delegates.’” Id., quoting

Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir.2005) (citing Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000)). 

Thus, the Court concludes that failure to question the VE regarding conflicts at the administrative 

hearing does not result in a waiver of the issue.

2. Whether conflicts exist

Plaintiff contends the jobs identified by the vocational expert and the ALJ “have requirements 

that exceed [Plaintiff’s] functional limitations.” (Doc. 15 at 10) On the other hand, Defendant 

contends there were no conflicts between the testimony of the vocational expert and the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles. (Doc. 18 at 5-8)

a. Bench hand assembler and table worker positions 

Plaintiff asserts, “according to the DOT’s explanation of the requirements of the positions of 

Bench Hand Assembler and Table Worker, both of these jobs actually require standing 55% of a usual 

work period.” (Doc. 15 at 10, citing DOT 715.684-026, 739.687-182) Notably, Plaintiff does not cite

any language in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles that supports this contention. To the contrary, 

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both the positions of bench hand assembler and table worker identify the work as “sedentary,” 

explaining it “involves sitting most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods 

of time.” DOT 715.684-026, 1991 WL 679344 (bench hand assembler); DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 

680217 (table worker). Thus, the vocational expert’s testimony that a person limited to sedentary work 

could perform these positions was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles.

Moreover, the vocational expert’s testimony regarding Plaintiff’s postural limitations and 

environmental restrictions was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Both the bench 

hand assembler and table worker job descriptions indicate that the worker is not required to do any 

climbing, balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching, or crawling. See DOT 715.684-026, 1991 WL 

679344 (bench hand assembler); DOT 739.687-182, 1991 WL 680217 (table worker). Further, these

positions to do not involve any exposure to extreme cold or hazardous working conditions. Id. Thus, 

the VE’s opinion that an individual required “to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and avoid 

moderate exposure to hazards such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery” could perform the 

job duties of a bench hand assembler and table worker does not conflict with the Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles.

b. Surveillance monitor position

Plaintiff also contends the ALJ erred in finding he is able to work as surveillance system 

monitor because he “is limited to using a cane to ambulate, and can only occasionally balance or climb 

stairs.” (Doc. 15 at 10) According to Plaintiff, his “limited physical ability is in apparent conflict with 

the DOT’s description of the job’s requirements.” (Id.)

The Dictionary of Occupational Titles defines the position of surveillance system monitor as 

including the following duties:

Monitors premises of public transportation terminals to detect crimes or disturbances, 

using closed circuit television monitors, and notifies authorities by telephone of need 

for corrective action: Observes television screens that transmit in sequence views of 

transportation facility sites. Pushes hold button to maintain surveillance of location 

where incident is developing, and telephones police or other designated agency to 

notify authorities of location of disruptive activity. Adjusts monitor controls when 

required to improve reception, and notifies repair service of equipment malfunctions.

DOT 379.397-010, 1991 WL 673244. Thus, as the Ninth Circuit summarized, “a surveillance system 

monitor is a security employee responsible for monitoring security cameras in public transportation 

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terminals.” Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 848 (9th Cir. 2015).

Importantly, the Dictionary of Occupational Titles indicates balancing and climbing are 

activities and conditions that “do[] not exist” with the physical demands of a surveillance system 

monitor. DOT 379.397-010, 1991 WL 673244. The job description does not suggest that surveillance 

monitors would be required to go to sites where a crime or disturbance was underway. Rather, the 

individuals were to notify others of necessary action and simply push “[a] Pushes hold button to 

maintain surveillance of location where [an] incident is developing.” See id. Consequently, Plaintiff 

fails to identify any conflict between the surveillance system monitor job description and the vocational 

expert’s testimony that he could perform the duties of the position.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds the vocational expert’s testimony did not 

conflict with the job descriptions in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles, and the ALJ did not err in 

relying on her testimony at step five of the sequential evaluation. Because the ALJ applied the proper 

legal standards and the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record, the conclusion that 

Plaintiff is not disabled must be upheld by the Court. See Sanchez, 812 F.2d at 510. 

Accordingly, the Court ORDERS:

1. The decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is AFFIRMED; 

2. The Clerk of Court IS DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Nancy A. 

Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Edward Garcia.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 9, 2017 /s/ Jennifer L. Thurston 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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